The proceedings volume of the Fifth International Dharmakirti Conference (Heidelberg, August 2014) is concerned with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, a long-lasting tradition that pursued the analysis of knowledge, inference and proof within a Buddhist soteriological framework based on the works of the Indian epistemologist and logician Dharmakirti (6th–7th c. CE). Having been shaped in the environment of medieval India, with its multiple mutually interacting and partly competing religio-philosophical schools, the methods and approaches of Buddhist logic and epistemology had lasting impact on the intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism and were also received in China and Japan. The 30 papers in this volume offer a snapshot of an international research landscape with centers in Vienna and Japan. They address historical and philological problems raised by important recent manuscript discoveries, pursue specific research questions in the history of philosophy, and undertake philosophical reconstructions and critical examinations relating to individual theories and arguments. By focusing on currents in Asia that developed and applied rigorous philosophical methods, the volume aims to contribute to the formation of a better-founded global historical awareness in the field of philosophy.

Birgit Kellner is the director of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Patrick McAllister is a research fellow and Horst Lasic is a senior scholar at the same institute. Sara McClintock is Associate Professor of Religion at Emory University, Atlanta, USA.
Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy

Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg
August 26 to 30, 2014
Participants of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Heidelberg 2014
## Contents

Preface xi  
Opening Speech xvii
  *Shōryū Katsura* xxiii

Account of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference xxi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jitārī’s <em>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</em></td>
<td>Junjie Chu</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Consciousness and Causality: Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism</td>
<td>Christian Coseru</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (2):</td>
<td>Hugo David</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>On the Determination of Causation by Dharmakīrti</td>
<td>Eli Franco</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reinterpretation of the Compound <em>svabhāva-pratibandha</em> in Dharmakīrti’s Logical Theory</td>
<td>Yoichi Fukuda</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jain Conceptions of Non-Cognition: A Dialogue with Dharmakīrti on Inferential Evidence</td>
<td>Marie-Hélène Gorisse</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Universals, Demons’ Pots, and Demons’ Permanent Pots: Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Unestablished Subjects in Arguments by Consequence</td>
<td>Pascale Hugon</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: <em>sāmānyā śaktīḥ</em> and <em>pratiniyatā śaktīḥ</em></td>
<td>Masahiro Inami</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><em>Jñānaśrīmitra</em> on <em>viparyayabādhakapramāṇa</em></td>
<td>Kyo Kano</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga</td>
<td>Kei Kataoka</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness:</td>
<td>Hiroko Matsuoka</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition</td>
<td>Patrick McAllister</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Balancing the Scales: Dharmakirti Inside and Out</td>
<td>Lawrence McCrea</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Concept of vyava√sthā in Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s</td>
<td>Mai Miyo</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explanation of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dharmakirti’s Apoha Theory: Perceptual Judgment and the Lack of</td>
<td>Miyuki Nakasuka</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superimposition (samāropaviveka)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dharmakirti’s Notion of Permanence and Its Impact on the Tibetan</td>
<td>Hiroshi Nemoto</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buddhist Doctrine of Buddhahood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation</td>
<td>Hideyo Ogawa</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Communication between a Speaker and a Listener as the Seeing of a</td>
<td>Kensho Okada</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Double Moon — In Light of the Apoha Theory of Śāntarakṣita and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamalaśīla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>On pramāṇabhūta — The Change of Its Meaning from Dignāga to</td>
<td>Motoi Ono</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prajñākaragupta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Dharmakirti on the Role of Salvific Initiation and the Reception of</td>
<td>Cristina Pecchia</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>His Critique in the Later Śaiva Tradition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in</td>
<td>Masamichi Sakai</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dharmakirti’s sattvānumāna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22 Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate in Indian Logic
   Ryo Sasaki

23 The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference
   Kiyokuni Shiga

24 Closing a Gap in the Interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s Logic
   Ernst Steinkellner

25 Philosophical Reflections on the sahopalambhaniyama Argument
   John Taber

26 The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths
   Masaki Tamura

27 The Concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist Logic
   Mingjun Tang

28 A Causeless Liberation? Kṣemarāja’s Response to Dharmakīrti’s Critique of Initiation
   Somadeva Vasudeva

29 Dharmakīrti and His Successors on āśrayāsiddha and prasaṅgaviparyaya
   Toshikazu Watanabe

30 Another Look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works
   Kiyotaka Yoshimizu

Index
Preface

This volume contains papers presented at the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, held at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014. Professor Katsura, one of the leading senior scholars in the field, recalled the history of the Dharmakīrti conferences in his opening speech, which is also published in this volume.

The Heidelberg Conference was organized jointly by three projects which Birgit Kellner directed at the University of Heidelberg: Project MC 13.2 “Reasoning in Buddhism between South Asia and Tibet” and Project MC 3.3 “Buddhism between South Asia and Tibet – Negotiating Religious Boundaries in Doctrine and Practice,” both financially supported by the Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe in a Global Context”; and the project “Systems of Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy,” supported by the German Research Foundation DFG. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the sponsors of these projects that made the conference possible, as well as the efficient and kind organizational support by the Cluster’s administrative staff.

Like the previous volumes of Dharmakīrti Conference proceedings, this collection testifies to a growing and dynamic field, driven by significant discoveries of new sources, a growing body of historical knowledge, and a continually refined awareness of the sophisticated nature of the Indian, Tibetan and East Asian intellectual traditions that jointly constitute the historical reference point for Dharmakīrtian Studies. The editing of the proceedings took longer than expected, and for various reasons not all of the papers presented at the conference could be included. Contrarily, the papers by Hiroko Matsuoka and Patrick McAllister could not be presented at the conference, but were included here due to their topical relevance.

Editorial work was conducted chiefly at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, where two of the Heidelberg conference organizers, Kellner and McAllister, had in the meantime relocated (and where Horst Lasic had been working all along; our fourth editor, Sara McClintock, also spent time here in 2016). Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek of the Academy institute corrected the English of a number of the papers, and we thank her for her painstaking efforts. We also gratefully acknowledge editorial assistance by Liudmila Olalde (Heidelberg) whose sharp eyes let no missing bibliographical reference escape. Together with McAllister, Olalde also handled technical aspects in the production of the camera-ready copy.

The shorthand “Dharmakīrtian Studies” refers to the study of philosophical currents in India, China and Tibet which take the theoretical efforts of Dharmakīrti (between mid-6th and mid-7th centuries CE) and his predecessor Dignāga (ca. 480-540) in the fields of epistemology and logic as their inspiration – theoretical efforts that revolve around the explication, justification and defense of a system of “instruments of trustworthy awareness” (pramāṇa), and, driven by these concerns, also extend into other areas of vital
interest to Buddhist intellectuals in the context of their respective times. Such areas include problems in the philosophy of mind pertaining to the analysis of consciousness, subjects in the philosophy of language, here intertwined with the analysis of concepts and concept formation. Theoretical aspects of Buddhism as a soteriology, as a set of teachings geared towards the attainment of liberation from suffering in *samsāra*, also play a central role in Buddhist logico-epistemological discourse. Buddhist *pramāṇa* theories were adopted, adapted and criticized by non-Buddhists primarily in their Indian context. Dharmakīrtian Studies therefore, as a matter of course, also attend to explorations of this larger intellectual environment between the late fifth and thirteenth centuries CE, an environment shaped by mutual influence and cross-fertilization, as well as intense polemics between competing religio-philosophical currents encompassing Brahmanical traditions as well as Jains and others.

In the past decades, the history of Dharmakīrtian Studies has been significantly shaped, if not revolutionized, by the discovery of new sources and improved access to them. Within the larger area of Indian Buddhist literature, Sanskrit *pramāṇa* literature has been particularly profoundly affected by improved access to Sanskrit manuscripts which have been preserved in the territory of today’s Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) within the People’s Republic of China. Until the beginning of the 21st century, key works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves were unknown in the language of their composition, Sanskrit. An agreement between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) in Beijing, concluded in 2004 and renewed several times since, laid the foundation for collaborative research based on photocopies of manuscript photographs kept in the CTRC’s library. Copies of manuscripts of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Hetubindu* and *Santānāntarasiddhi* became accessible, as well as of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, a commentary on Dignāga’s main logico-epistemological work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and -vṛtti. Research on these new sources had already begun when the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference was held in Vienna (August 23-27, 2005). Ernst Steinkellner’s opening speech “News from the manuscript department” lays out the specifics of the cooperation and its (now) early history, and summarizes ongoing work and first results; the edition of the first chapter of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* arrived at the Vienna conference just fresh from the press. Steinkellner also outlined the challenges that lie ahead. Besides the enormous task of scholarly work involved in the analysis, edition and translation of these new materials, there remains the task of a full descriptive catalogue of all Sanskrit manuscripts in the TAR. The actual

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1 This is also borne out by the significant *pramāṇa* content in the by now three panels on Sanskrit manuscripts in China that have been held at the Beijing Seminar of Tibetan Studies, published in the three volumes *Sanskrit Manuscripts in China* I (edited by Ernst Steinkellner in cooperation with Duan Qing and Helmut Krasser, Beijing 2009), II (edited by Horst Lasic and Xuezhu Li, Beijing 2016), and III (edited by Birgit Kellner, Jowita Kramer and Xuezhu Li, Beijing, forthcoming). Volume II is available for download at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/digitales/Lasic_Li_2016.pdf (last accessed 15 September 2019).

manuscripts are still out of bound for Chinese as well as foreign scholars. The same holds good for a reported 61-volume set of color reproductions of all these manuscripts, of which five copies are reported to have been printed. It also has not been possible, since Steinkellner’s report, to access a bundle of paper manuscripts in the Potala palace in Lhasa, which among others includes a manuscript of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha and manuscripts of Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣākārikā, Santānāntarasiddhiprakaraṇa and Pramāṇavi-

niścayakārikā.3 Steinkellner’s introduction to the volume Sanskrit Manuscripts in China III (Beijing, forthcoming) summarizes the current situation and formulates a proposal for further improvement. In the three years since the keynote lecture on which that introduction is based was held in Beijing, nothing of substance has happened.

While progress in further improving access of scholars to Sanskrit manuscripts in China has been slow, editorial activities have yielded significant further results. In 2010, the monograph series Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, founded as a joint venture of the China Tibetology Publishing House and the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, counted eight volumes. In 2019, volumes 21 and 22 are being submitted: the diplomatic edition of the third chapter of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviścayatīkā by Pascale Hugon (Vienna) in collaboration with Takashi Iwata (Tokyo) and Toshikazu Watanabe (Vienna, now Tokyo), as well as the critical edition of the first five chapters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya by Horst Lasic, Xuezhu Li (Beijing) and Anne MacDonald (Vienna), based on preparatory work by Helmut Krasser. The sixth chapter is being edited by Anne MacDonald, while the remaining chapters are being edited by Katsura and Li.

As Katsura also recalled in his opening speech, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviścaya and Hetubindu are now available in critical editions by, respectively, Steinkellner (chapters 1 and 2 of the Pramāṇaviścaya; Hetubindu), as well as Hugon and Toru Tomabechi (Tokyo) (chapter 3 of the Pramāṇaviścaya).4 The second chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayaatīkā has been critically edited by Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser and Horst Lasic. Further chapters are currently being edited by Katsura, Motoi Ono (Tsukuba), Yasutaka Muroya (Vienna), and Toshikazu Watanabe, with additional support by a group of younger Japanese scholars. Sections of the second chapter of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviścayatīkā, preserved only in fragmentary manuscripts, have been edited in two Vienna dissertations by Hisataka Ishida and Masamichi Sakai, supervised by Helmut Krasser.5

Meanwhile, other institutions have been able to conclude cooperation agreements with the CTRC similar to the Viennese model, for individual manuscripts and texts. In the area of pramāṇa literature, mention should here be made of efforts at the University of Leipzig, where Eli Franco, Junjie Chu, Xuezhu Li and Hiroko Matsuoka are editing Yamārī’s (c. 1000-1060) important commentary on Prajñākaragupta’s (c. 750-810) Pramāṇavārttikā-laṅkārabhāṣya, as well as rare works by Jitāri (940-1000).6 It is a promising sign that Chinese scholars are increasingly involved in these editorial activities, as attested by Li’s

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3 For a full list of the contents see Steinkellner, “News from the manuscript department”, p. xxi.
4 For bibliographical references cf. Katsura’s “opening speech” below on page xvii.
5 Sakai’s 2010 dissertation (PDF download at http://othes.univie.ac.at/9623/) concerns the proof of momentariness, while Ishida’s 2011 dissertation (PDF at http://othes.univie.ac.at/13375/) deals with the subject of the logical nexus.
participation in several projects; Luo Hong (formerly CTRC, now at Sichuan University in Chengdu) is working on an edition of Ratnākāraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. In the long run research on these manuscripts will only be able to flourish if a new generation of Sanskritists in China carries it forward.

More recent discoveries that may serve as the basis of future projects belong to the final period of pramāṇa activities in India. There is a third manuscript of Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, in addition to the two manuscripts described by Franco and Chu. There is also a copy of a valuable manuscript of a lengthy work on the sahopalambhanyama-inference entitled Sahopalambhanyamasamarthana, also ascribed to Jitāri. Based on selected sample passages, this text can be assumed to be the same work referred to as Sahopalambhaprakarana in the colophon of a manuscript that both Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and Giuseppe Tucci photographed in Ngor monastery. However, approximately one third of the Ngor manuscript is missing in Tucci’s photographs; the remainder is often out of focus. In Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s photographs, the text is almost completely illegible. A hitherto unknown manuscript of Jñānaśrīmitra’s Advaitabinduprakarana was also recently discovered; it complements the codex photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in 1938 that formed the basis of Anantalal Thakur’s edition first published in 1959 (reprinted in 1987) and allows to substantially improve the text. These are only a few of the many cases where new manuscripts from the TAR lend invaluable support to editorial work together with other materials; Śāntarakṣita’s Vādanyāyatīkā and Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya are another particularly prominent case in point. Lastly, there also remains the extensive manuscript of 123 folios of an otherwise unknown commentary on Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā, in the colophon ascribed to a certain Jayabhadra or Bhavabhadra.

Tibetan developments inspired by Indian pramāṇa have similarly benefited from greater accessibility of sources, as demonstrated by Pascale Hugon’s extensive work on Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) and other authors from the early period of Tibetan Buddhist Scholasticism in the 11th to 13th centuries; her paper in this volume offers an entry point into this newly opened field of enquiry. A considerable amount of pertinent manuscripts testifying to hitherto largely unknown works have surfaced recently, especially as part of the private library of the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617–1682) in Drepung monastery. They have been published in facsimile in the “Collected Works of the Bka’ gdams pas” (Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum), released in several installments which by now number altogether 120 volumes. Hugon and Kazuo Kano (Tokyo) have set out to

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8 In the Göttingen collection, they are preserved as COD MS SANSCR RAH Xc14/10b (Jitāri, Sahopalambhasidhidhi); cf. Bandurski, Frank: “Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen Literatur” = Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 5, Göttingen 1994; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 42.

9 A diplomatic edition of the Kundeling manuscript of the Vādanyāyatīkā is currently being prepared by Yasutaka Muroya at the Academy institute in Vienna, in the framework of the research project “Debate and rational argumentation in South Asian Buddhism” (P30827) supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF.

10 Cf. Steinkellner, “News from the manuscript department”, p. xx.
produce a descriptive catalogue of this vast collection, while at the same time studies of individual texts and their contents are being undertaken.11

Last but not least mention should be made of similarly growing research in Chinese adaptations of Indian pramāṇa. Efforts in this field are undertaken by a younger generation of scholars in China (cf. the paper by Tang Mingjun in this volume), as well as by a team of Japanese scholars comprising chiefly Shigeki Moro (Kyoto), Shinya Moriyama (Matsumoto), Yasutaka Muroya and Motoi Ono – a development facilitated by improved access to rare manuscripts of commentaries in Japanese temple libraries.12

The contributions to this volume demonstrate that the process of exploring new sources, of utilizing them in research endeavors and reflecting on how they motivate revisions of received knowledge, is in full swing. These new discoveries have contributed to a stronger focus on manuscript research – including problems of paleography and codicology –, and they have also given precedence to philologically oriented studies. As new texts are to be edited, new translations are to be produced, and a variety of textual and fundamental historical problems need to be solved. Yet, Dharmakīrtian Studies have at the same time preserved, even strengthened, their disciplinary openness and methodological pluralism. Philological and historical studies chiefly concerned with placing texts and thinkers, theories and arguments in the context of intellectual histories that in many respects still remain to be written, dominate especially in continental Europe and Japan where such methodologies have a longer academic tradition within Asian Studies at large. But a philosophical engagement with pramāṇa ideas, an analysis and critical examination of these ideas in terms of their philosophical significance and substance – more at home in the Angloamerican sphere –, has also had a place at Dharmakīrti conferences in the past and can by now be considered an integral part of the world of Dharmakīrtian Studies.13

To take philosophical texts seriously requires reading them as works of philosophy, just as serious studies of ancient legal literature must take this literature seriously in its legal dimensions. Many have also argued, convincingly, that a proper history of philosophy cannot be merely a descriptive account of which philosopher lived when and where and did what (as notoriously difficult such accounts may be for a field like Indian philosophy where precise external data is hard to come by). In order to be illuminating, it is to be written as a history of philosophical thought, with close attention to ideas and content, and by making plausible why it is that philosophers argue the way they do – in due consideration

11 The current state of their work is accessible at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/a-gateway-to-early-tibetan-scholasticism/.

12 Results of these research endeavours were among others presented at the panel “Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan”, held at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, August 18-23, 2014, published in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 56-57 (2015-2018). The papers presented at the panel “Transmission and Transformation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology in East Asia” (XVIIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, University of Toronto, August 20–25, 2017) will be published in a volume bearing the panel title and edited by Shinya Moriyama (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistsche Studien, Universität Wien, forthcoming).

13 John Taber insightfully discusses these different, sometimes divergent, sometimes complementary approaches to Indian philosophy and their background in disciplinary histories in his paper “On Engaging Philosophically with Indian Philosophical Texts”, Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 67/1 (2013) 125-163.
of other forces that drive intellectual history. Philologically oriented historical approaches
and philosophical approaches – each of which may again come in different forms – may
produce tensions, of course, and they often do. The philosopher may find the philologist’s
reticence at wanting to know whether Dharmakīrti is right frustrating (“how could you not
want to know this?”), while the philologist will in turn find the philosopher’s conviction
that they have understood where Dharmakīrti is wrong hyperbolic (“shouldn’t you first
examine his words more carefully before you jump to conclusions?”). The International
Dharmakīrti Conferences have seen a number of discussions along these lines, as the
individual proceedings volumes demonstrate. The field of Dharmakīrtian Studies is best
served by keeping both parties in dialogue, by focusing on what they stand to learn from
each other, and by striving to turn whatever tensions may arise into constructive critical
discourse. It is only then that the seeds which the wealth of our new sources represent will
be able to mature and develop.

September 2019

Birgit Kellner, Vienna
Horst Lasic, Vienna
Sara McClintock, Atlanta
Patrick McAllister, Vienna
Opening Speech

by

Shōryū Katsura

First of all, I would like to thank all of you for coming to participate in the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference and thereby demonstrating the continued vigor and interest in the study of Dharmakīrti’s works and thought, as well as those of his predecessors and successors. Special thanks are due to the organizer of this conference, Prof. Birgit Kellner of the University of Heidelberg, and her assistant, Ms. Ina Chebbi [Buchholz], for their painstaking efforts. I would also like to thank Dr. Patrick McAllister for his technical support of all sorts.

I am delighted to see again the faces of many I have met at earlier Dharmakīrti Conferences. But I see many new faces as well, and so this may be a good occasion for me to give a brief history of the International Dharmakīrti Conferences. It was the late Prof. Yūichi Kajiyama (1925–2004) who hit upon the idea of holding such a conference. In 1982 Prof. Kajiyama invited Prof. Ernst Steinkellner to Kyōto University as a visiting professor for one semester to have him read the Vādanyāya with students in Kyōto. Just before Prof. Steinkellner returned to Vienna, Prof. Kajiyama decided to hold a one-day workshop on Buddhist logic and epistemology. He invited several Japanese scholars and students, including Prof. Hiromasa Tosaki, to present papers. Prof. Steinkellner gave a lecture on the development of the idea of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam in Dharmakīrti’s works. Prof. Kajiyama called the event “International Dharmakīrti Conference,” despite the fact that apart from Prof. Steinkellner there was perhaps no other participant from abroad.

In 1989 Prof. Steinkellner then held the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference in Vienna. This one was truly “international” in terms of the participants. He called it “the second conference” as a mark of respect for the first one organized by Prof. Kajiyama. It was amazing to see that both Prof. Tilmann Vetter (1937–2012) from Leiden and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen from Hamburg attended the conference. Together with Prof. Steinkellner, they had both been students of Prof. Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974) at the same time as Prof. Kajiyama spent a few months in Vienna in the early 1960s. One afternoon in the middle of the conference we took a Frauwallner Memorial Walk into the Vienna Woods. I then organized the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference in Hiroshima in 1997; the fourth one was held again in Vienna in 2005. The proceedings of these three conferences were published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.14

In this connection I would like to emphasize the significance of guru-śiṣya relationships in our field. I happened to be a student of Prof. Kajiyama in the mid-1960s, just after he came back from his stays in London and Vienna. When I was preparing my MA thesis on Dharmakīrti’s theory of svasamvedana, he read the entire svasamvedana portion of the Pramāṇavārttika Chapter 3 (vv. 320-539) together with Manorathanandin’s commentary with me almost every Saturday afternoon of 1966–67. And the convener of the present conference, Prof. Kellner, studied in Vienna and Hiroshima in the 1990s, when both Prof. Steinkellner and I were teaching at our respective institutes in those cities’ universities. Today I am glad to see that such guru-śiṣya relationships have developed further and further in various parts of the world. Here I must remind you that there is neither a formal association of Dharmakīrti studies, nor any rules that govern us. These conferences have been held spontaneously and irregularly. Therefore, we do not know when and where the next Dharmakīrti conference will take place. But that does not bother me at all. As long as guru-śiṣya relationships continue, I believe that there will be a next one.

It is very sad that I do not see the face of our dear friend Dr. Helmut Krasser (1956–2014) among you. As you all know, Dr. Krasser passed away last March. We all miss him greatly. His untimely death is a great loss, not only for those who were immediately associated with him at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the University of Vienna, but also for everyone who is engaged in the field of Buddhist logic and epistemology. He did such a great service to the development of our field, not only through his own academic contributions but also by organizing various academic projects, such as the deciphering and editing of the Sanskrit manuscripts of Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti as well as other works. He will be remembered by the younger generation in our field as a most sympathetic teacher and guide, a person willing to help them with bodhisattva-like efforts.

Dr. Krasser published an edition and translation of Dharmottara’s Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (his PhD thesis) and Śaṅkaranandana’s Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa (his Habilitation thesis). He also edited a number of proceedings of academic conferences, including those of the Second and the Fourth International Dharmakīrti conferences, as well as the two-volume Festschrift for Prof. Steinkellner entitled Pramāṇakīrti.15 From the very beginning of Prof. Steinkellner’s endeavor to open the door to the treasures of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts found in Buddhist monasteries of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Dr. Krasser helped him, later succeeding him as the Viennese representative for the cooperation with the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing. In that connection, together with Prof. Steinkellner and Dr. Horst Lasic, he published diplomatic and critical editions of the first two chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.

Dr. Krasser also published many academic papers on Buddhist epistemology and logic and related areas. I cannot summarize all that he did in the short period of time of his active years. Instead I would like to refer to two fundamental hypotheses he left for us: the

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dates of Dharmakīrti and the real nature of the Buddhist philosophical treatises attributed to individual authors.

Regarding the dates of Dharmakīrti, Prof. Frauwallner’s proposal of 600–660 C.E. had been widely accepted by modern scholars of Dharmakīrti.\textsuperscript{16} However, Dr. Krasser was courageous enough to challenge the authority of Prof. Frauwallner, proposing a much earlier date for Dharmakīrti, chiefly on the grounds that Bhāviveka’s proof of non-eternity by \textit{sattvānumāna} was influenced by Dharmakīrti. Dr. Vincent Eltschinger has summarized the state of affairs in his most recent book as follows:

Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti have long been considered, ever since Frauwallner’s influential “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic” (1961), roughly contemporary philosophers belonging to the first half of the seventh century CE. … According to Krasser, however, Bhāviveka, who can be assigned with a fair amount of certainty to 500–570, presupposes both Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. As a working hypothesis, Krasser proposes “the time of activity of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti to be the middle of the sixth century.” Hypothetical (and unpopular) as it may be, Krasser’s chronology relies in my opinion on much stronger arguments than Frauwallner’s \textit{argumentum a silentio}.\textsuperscript{17}

Last week I attended the XVII\textsuperscript{th} conference of International Association of Buddhist Studies in Vienna, where I had an opportunity to hear a paper given by Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe titled “Buddhist Critiques of the Sāṅkhya Theory of Causality, Dharmakīrti and his Predecessors.” In that paper, referring to Dharmapāla’s commentary on the tenth chapter of Āryadeva’s \textit{Catuḥśataka}, he demonstrated that Dharmapāla influenced Dharmakīrti with regard to the critique of the Sāṅkhya theory of causality. He also demonstrated that Bhāviveka’s critique of the Sāṅkhya’s logical reason moves along the same lines as Dharmapāla’s. In his concluding remarks, Dr. Watanabe argued that Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka must have lived during almost the same period, i.e., the sixth century, and stated that although he does not accept Dr. Krasser’s proposal that Bhāviveka was influenced by Dharmakīrti, he sees a close relationship between these two Buddhist philosophers. He thus concluded that he is inclined to accept Dr. Krasser’s working hypothesis that Dharmakīrti’s dates could be pushed back into the middle of the sixth century, proposing the dates of 560/570–650.

Also last week in Vienna, Prof. Shinya Moriyama read a paper called “On dharmisvarū-paviparītasūdhana,” in which he pointed out the resemblance between Dharmapāla’s idea of three types of reasons and Dharmakīrti’s idea of three types of śabdārtha in \textit{Pramāṇavārttika}.\textsuperscript{18} This gives supporting evidence for Dr. Watanabe’s argument that Dharmapāla


\textsuperscript{17} Vincent Eltschinger, \textit{Buddhist Epistemology as Apologetics: Studies on the History, Self-Understanding and Dogmatic Foundations of Late Indian Buddhist Philosophy}. Vienna 2014, 116, n. 80.

influenced Dharmakīrti. Of course, there are other possibilities, such as Dharmakīrti having influenced Dharmapāla or both having gotten a similar idea from a common source. But in any case, it is safe to say that Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti lived at approximately the same time, as Dr. Watanabe concluded.

Again during last week’s conference, Prof. Eli Franco re-examined and rejected the earlier date of Dharmakīrti proposed by Dr. Krasser. One of his arguments is based on the silence of Xuanzang, who was in India from 625 to 645, and that of other Indian and Buddhist philosophers with regard to Dharmakīrti. Against such an argument of silence, Prof. Steinkellner rightly pointed out that there are other ways to explain this silence, referring to the well-known legend of Dharmakīrti’s unpopularity with his contemporaries.

As a student of logic, I do not endorse much power to reasoning based on silence. Silence does not prove anything; it only raises doubts. In this connection I would like to refer to my own article “On trairūpya formulae.” In that article I demonstrated the gradual development of the trairūpya formulae in Buddhist logical texts and suggested that Xuanzang was certainly acquainted with the restriction by the particle eva in the formulation of the first condition of the valid logical reason (pakṣadharmatā), which was missing in Dignāga’s formulation of trairūpya but appears in Dharmakīrti’s. It is well known that the sixth-century Naiyāyika, Uddyotakara, criticized Dignāga’s understanding of the first condition and Dharmakīrti tried to respond to his criticism by adding the eva-restriction to the first condition. It is possible that such an eva-restriction was proposed by some unknown Buddhist logician before Dharmakīrti. But considering Dharmakīrti’s position in the development of Buddhist logic, I am inclined to believe that it was Dharmakīrti who initiated this revision in the trairūpya formulae. Therefore, although Xuanzang does not mention the name of Dharmakīrti, he may well have been acquainted with one of the important revisions made by Dharmakīrti in Dignāga’s logic. And if this is the case, I believe that it is possible to refute Prof. Frauwallner’s and Prof. Franco’s argument regarding Xuanzang’s silence about Dharmakīrti.

Of course, while it is impossible to prove Krasser’s hypothesis of the earlier dates of Dharmakīrti, it cannot be easily dismissed either. As Eltschinger and Watanabe have both conjectured, it is quite possible that Dharmakīrti was active in the latter half of the sixth century, and indeed, perhaps he enjoyed little popularity among his colleagues.

Regarding the second topic left for us by Dr. Krasser, I would like to point out that in Vasudhararakṣita’s Tibetan translation of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti on Pramāṇasamuccaya 3.21, there are instructions on how to draw a chart of a hetucakra, which clearly indicates that at least this portion of PSV is a note recorded by a student during a class given by, if not Dignāga, some teacher of Buddhist logic lecturing on the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Moreover, I have recently been reading Avalokitavrata’s Ṭīkā on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpāraṇātīpa, and from time to time I have noticed that Avalokitavrata meticulously points out what

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20 For more about the debate on the dates of Dharmakīrti, please see Dr. Elisa Freschi’s blog: Thinking about through Sanskrit (and) philosophy, http://elisafreschi.com/2014/08/26/third-day-at-the-iabs-franco-on-the-datation-of-dharmakirti-and-some-further-thoughts-on-dharmakirti-dignaga-kumarila/.

is the pakṣa, what is the sādhyadharma and what is the hetu of the relevant prayoga. This also seems in part to support Krasser’s characterization of Buddhist philosophical texts as being students’ notes taken during monastic lessons. There must be many parallel cases like this. I would also like to add that among Japanese Buddhists, a tradition existed of compiling and publishing writings known as kōroku (講録), which are students’ notes of their teachers’ lectures on certain Buddhist texts or doctrines. From this perspective, too, I believe that Krasser’s conjecture must be taken more seriously and that we should continue working on this idea.

As a Japanese Buddhist of the Jōdo-shinshū tradition, I believe that Dr. Krasser, though invisible, is somewhere among us, having ascended to the Sukhāvatī, Land of the Buddha Amitābha, and returned from there as a Bodhisattva to watch over and help us. Having heard what I just said, he would probably say, “Don’t take me too seriously. There are other nice things to do in the world, like drinking and smoking.”

Before I close my opening speech, I should refer to some of the important achievements that have been made since the last Dharmakīrti conference. In the opening speech of the last conference, Prof. Steinkellner presented “News from the manuscript department.” I would like to report now on some of the further developments in this regard, as far as I know of them. As I mentioned above, the first two chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā have been published. I am responsible for editing the third and the fourth chapter of the same text; I am happy to report that I have finished working on the third chapter and am now in the middle of the fourth. Regarding the fifth chapter, as we all know, Mr. Ole Pind finally submitted his work on that apoha chapter to the University of Vienna as his dissertation and it is now available on line to benefit of us all;22 since Dr. Krasser is gone, Dr. Lasic and Dr. McAllister have taken over the task of editing the fifth chapter. Finally, regarding the sixth chapter, Prof. Motoi Ono and his colleagues have more or less worked out the whole chapter. Meanwhile, Prof. Steinkellner has published the critical edition of the first two chapters of the Pramāṇaviniścaya and Dr. Pascale Hugon has published that of the third chapter. Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe and Dr. Krasser’s students Drs. Masamichi Sakai and Hisataka Ishida have critically edited several portions of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā. And Prof. Steinkellner is now polishing up the critical edition of the Hetubindu that was prepared by Dr. Krasser.23

Originally I intended to mention some important recent contributions to our field; many of them come from you. But I decided not to do so because after all, my information is limited and my impressions of those publications may be biased. So this is the end of my opening speech. I hope you will all enjoy the forthcoming papers and presentations, and at the end, I hope we shall have a little better understanding of this marvelous Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti from many different angles. Thank you for your patience.

Heidelberg, 26 August 2014

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22 In the meantime published in revised form as Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language. Vienna 2016.
23 In the meantime published as Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu. Beijing/Vienna 2016.
Account of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference in Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014

Honorary Chairs

• Shōryū Katsura (Ryūkoku University)
• Ernst Steinkellner (Austrian Academy of Sciences)

Planning Committee

• Kei Kataoka (Kyūshū University)
• Birgit Kellner (University of Heidelberg)
• Sara McClintock (Emory University)
• Hideyo Ogawa (Hiroshima University)

Organizing Team

• Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, Ina Chebbi (now Buchholz)
Program

Monday, 25 August: Arrival Day

18:00-20:00 Registration

Tuesday, 26 August

9:00-10:00 Registration
10:00-10:30 Opening Address: Shōryū Katsura
10:30-11:00 Break

Session I chaired by Shōryū Katsura

11:00-11:30 Ernst Steinkellner: Closing a gap in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s logic
11:30-12:00 Eli Franco: The determination of causation and the similarity between cause and effect
12:00-12:30 Horst Lasic: What is the effect of what and how can one determine it?
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Session II chaired by Kei Kataoka

14:30-15:00 Hideyo Ogawa: Dignāga on the view of a generic term as denoting a relation
15:00-15:30 Akane Saitō: Maṇḍanamīśra’s arguments against Dharmakīrti’s ideas on language – different definitions of the convention
15:30-16:00 Break

Session III chaired by Hideyo Ogawa

16:00-16:30 Mai Miyo: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇāphalā
ger
16:30-17:00 Hiroshi Nemoto: Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of buddhahood
17:00-17:30 Artur Przybyslawski: The notion of valid cognition (tshad ma) in the karma bka’ brgyud tradition of Tibetan buddhism
17:30 Birgit Kellner: Buddhist philosophy at the University of Heidelberg – a short history
18:00 Get-together party

Wednesday, 27 August

Session IV chaired by Sara McClintock

09:00-09:30 Patrick McAllister: Form and content in Ratnakīrti’s writings
09:30-10:00  Sara Uckelman: The legitimacy of inference. Argumentation strategy in Ratnakīrti’s Īśvarasādhanadūṣanam

10:00-10:30  Ryō Sasaki: The significance of the Vādanyāya in the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept

10:30-11:00  Break

Session V chaired by Pascale Hugon

11:00-11:30  Kyeongjin Choi: The indeterminate role of bādhakapramāṇa in the Pramāṇaviniścaya
11:30-12:00  Kyō Kanō: On viparyayabādhakapramāṇa
12:00-12:30  Masamichi Sakai: Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trayārya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāṇa
12:30-14:30  Lunch Break

Session VI chaired by Zhihua Yao

14:30-15:00  Christian Coseru: Consciousness and causal explanation. Śāntarakṣita against physicalism
15:00-15:30  Zhihua Yao: Non-activity (nirvyāpāra) in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
15:30-16:00  Break

Session VII chaired by Piotr Balcerowicz

16:00-16:30  Masaki Tamura: The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference. Bhāvikaveka’s theory of two truths
16:30-17:00  Motoi Ono: On pramāṇabhūta – the change of its meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta
17:00-17:30  Hisataka Ishida: The exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda)
17:30  Presentations and discussion of databases and digital resources

Thursday, 28 August

Session VIII chaired by Leonard van der Kuip

09:00-09:30  Masahiro Inami: Two kinds of causal capacity, sāmānyā  śaktīḥ and pratiniyatā śaktīḥ
09:30-10:00  Hisayasu Kobayashi: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on svalakṣaṇa
10:00-10:30  Yōhei Kawajiri: The Pratyabhijñā school’s criticism of the Buddhist concept of svalakṣaṇa
10:30-11:00  Break
Session IX chaired by Kei Kataoka

11:00-11:30  Toshikazu Watanabe: Dharmakīrti and his successors on āśrayāsiddha and prasaṅgaviparyayavaya
11:30-12:00  Pascale Hugon: Revisiting the prasaṅga-passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya
12:00-12:30  Lawrence McCrea: Balancing the scales. Dharmakīrti inside and out
12:30-14:30  Lunch Break

Excursion / free afternoon, followed by joint dinner

Friday, 29 August

Session X chaired by Ernst Steinkellner

09:00-09:30  John Taber: The structure of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument
09:30-10:00  Serena Saccone: Šubhagupta’s theory of reality in the *Bāhyārthasiddhi-kārikā
10:00-10:30  Marie-Hélène Gorisse: Jain conceptions of non-apprehension. A criticism of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference
10:30-11:00  Break

Session XI chaired by Eli Franco

11:00-11:30  Yoichi Fukuda: Reinterpretation of the compound “svabhāva-prati-bandha” in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory
11:30-12:00  Kiyotaka Yoshimizu: Another look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s exegetic works
12:00-12:30  Kiyokuni Shiga: On the meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jineンドrabuddhi’s theories of inference
12:30-14:30  Lunch Break

Session XII chaired by Horst Lasic

14:30-15:00  Laura Guerrero: Pramāṇa as conventional truth in the work of Dharmakīrti
15:00-15:30  Kei Kataoka: How does one cognize a cow? A dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga
15:30-16:00  Break

Session XIII chaired by Birgit Kellner

16:00-16:30  Vincent Eltschinger: Buddhist epistemology as apologetics
16:30-17:00  Cristina Pecchia: Dharmakīrti on the role of rituals
17:00-17:30  Som Dev Vasudeva: Bhoktṛtva and causation in Kṣemarāja’s response to Dharmakīrti’s critique of liberation through initiation
17:30       Presentations and discussion of databases and digital resources
Saturday, 30 August

Session XIV chaired by John Taber

09:00-09:30 Junjie Chu: Jitārī’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi
09:30-10:00 Hugo David: Maṇḍana Miśra on omniscience (sarvajñatva) and the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa), on the early appropriation of a few Buddhist concepts in the Mīmāṁsā tradition
10:00-10:30 Brendan Gillon: Ṣaṭkoṭivāda in the Upāyahṛdaya
10:30-11:00 Break

Session XV chaired by Brendan Gillon

11:00-11:30 Huanhuan He / Leonard van der Kuijp: Turning the Wheels: Yet another look at the *Hetucakra[-ḍamaru]
11:30-12:00 Mingjun Tang: The concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist logic
12:00-12:30 Kensho Okada: A way of communication between a speaker and a listener similar to the way in which two persons with eye disease equally see double moon — in the light of the apoha theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Session XVI chaired by Lawrence McCrea

14:30-15:00 Miyuki Nakasuka: Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, perceptual judgement, and lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka)
15:00-15:30 Piotr Balcerowicz: Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra
15:30-16:00 Break
Participants of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference

1. Balcerowicz, Piotr (University of Warsaw)
2. Choi, Kyeongjin (University of Tokyo)
3. Chu, Junjie (Leipzig University)
4. Coseru, Christian (College of Charleston)
5. David, Hugo (University of Cambridge)
6. Eltschinger, Vincent (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
7. Franco, Eli (Leipzig University)
8. Fukuda, Yoichi (Otani University)
9. Gillon, Brendan (McGill University)
10. Gorisse, Marie-Hélène (Ghent University)
11. Guerrero, Laura (Utah Valley University)
12. Hayashi, Itsuki (Ryukoku University)
13. He, Huanhuan (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
14. Hugon, Pascale (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
15. Inami, Masahiro (Tokyo Gakugei University)
16. Ishida, Hisataka (Tokyo University)
17. Kano, Kyo (Kobe Women’s University)
18. Kataoka, Kei (Kyushu University)
19. Katsura, Shoryu (Ryukoku University)
20. Kawajiri, Yohei (Chikushi Jogakuen University)
21. Kellner, Birgit (Heidelberg University)
22. Kobayashi, Hisayasu (Chikushi Jogakuen University)
23. Kwon, Soonbeom (Dongguk University)
24. Lasic, Horst (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
25. Li, Shenghai (Harvard University)
26. Lo, King Chung (University Leipzig)
27. Luo, Hong (Peking University)
28. McAllister, Patrick (Heidelberg University)
29. McClintock, Sara (Emory University)
30. McCrea, Lawrence (Cornell University)
31. McNamara, Daniel (Emory University)
32. Miyo, Mai (Waseda University)
33. Nakasuka, Miyuki (Hiroshima University)
34. Nemoto, Hiroshi (Hiroshima University)
35. Ogawa, Hideyo (Hiroshima University)
36. Okada, Kensho (University of Tsukuba)
37. O’Leary, Joseph (Sophia University, Tokyo)
38. Ono, Motoi (University of Tsukuba)
39. Pecchia, Cristina (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
40. Prueitt, Catherine (Emory University)
41. Przbylsawski, Artur (Jagiellonian University)
42. Saccone, Margherita Serena (University of Naples)
43. Saito, Akane (Kyoto University)
44. Sakai, Masamichi (Kansai University)
45. Sasaki, Ryo (Waseda University)
46. Shiga, Kiyokuni (Kyoto Sangyo University)
47. Siderits, Mark (Illinois State University)
48. Steinkellner, Ernst (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
49. Stoltz, Jonathan (University of St. Thomas)
50. Sung, Chungwhan (Dongguk University)
51. Taber, John (University of New Mexico)
52. Tamura, Masaki (Hiroshima University)
53. Tang, Mingjun (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)
54. Uckelman, Sara (Heidelberg University)
55. van der Kuijp, Leonard (Harvard University)
56. Vasudeva, Somadeva (Kyoto University)
57. Watanabe, Toshikazu (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
58. Woo, Jeson (Dongguk University)
59. Yao, Zhihua (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
60. Yoshimizu, Kiyotaka (Tohoku University)
Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhī

by

Junjie Chu

Introduction

As we have reported elsewhere, the newly available manuscripts of Jitāri’s (fl. 940–980) contain a number of hitherto unknown works, one of them is the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhī. This is a short philosophical treatise that become accessible through two manuscripts of the Sanskrit text. In this treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra doctrine of the cognitive manifestation of the objects and refutes the “externalism” (bahirarthavāda) around this central topic. The basic ideas he presents can be found in Dharmakīrti’s works and commentaries on them, for instance, PV 3.320–337 and the commentaries ad loc.

At the beginning of the treatise, Jitāri divides the externalists into two groups, according to their opinions on whether awareness possesses the image of object or not, i.e., the sākārajñānavādins and the nirākārajñānavādins, with a short outline of the position held by each group. Jitāri’s refutation, however, focuses mainly on the nirākārajñānavādin-branch. The discussion is initiated with a formal reasoning (prayoga) aiming to prove his main thesis that all things that become manifest (prakāś) – i.e., that appear in consciousness – are cognition, which has the nature of self-manifestation. This is followed by the refutation of various objections that claim the reason in Jitāri’s prayoga is invalid in one of the three usually recognized ways, that is, by being unestablished (asiddha), inconclusive (anaikāntika) or contradictory (viruddha).

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1 I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner for his effort to make it possible for me to read the manuscripts in Beijing, and to Prof. Eli Franco for his establishing a research project on Jitāri’s works in the University of Leipzig supported by the German Research Foundation. I am also indebted to Prof. Franco for many valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. My special thanks go to Prof. Birgit Kellner who carefully read this paper and made numerous suggestions which allow for great improvements in both content and language. I am also very grateful to the German Research Council (DFG) for a substantial grant for the abovementioned research project.


4 In manuscript A the VMS ranges from folios 14b4 to 20ab, in manuscript B from 49a1 to 55b2. A critical edition of the text based on the two manuscripts is being prepared by the present author and will be published separately. All quotations of VMS in this paper are based on this forthcoming critical edition. In the following, two sets of folio-numbers and the line-number separated by forward slash (for instance, “14b5–6/49a1–2”) refer to manuscript A and manuscript B respectively; however, editorial notes from the critical apparatus, including the reports of the variant readings in one of the two manuscripts, are omitted here. I will not describe the physical condition and the philological character of these manuscripts here, which will be made in the critical edition. For the detailed information of the two manuscripts of the works attributed to Jitāri, as a whole, cf. Chu and Franco 2012.

5 I prefer to use the terms “externalism/externalist” (bahirarthavāda/bahirarthavādin) instead of “realism/realist” to refer to the system/person which/who asserts that object of cognition exists outside of or independent of cognition, because these terms can easily remind us of its Sanskrit equivalent.
In the context of countering the attack that the reason is “inconclusive,” Jitāri embarks on an excursion and refutes the opponent’s thesis that the manifestation of the external object in cognition is caused by cognition. He does so by negating all four logically possible propositions with regard to the relationship between manifestation and the object. Jitāri concludes that the manifestation of the object is merely the cognition’s self-manifestation.

After establishing that the reason is not inconclusive, in the final section, Jitāri replies to further objections against the thesis of cognition’s self-manifestation raised from the perspective of non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist systems.

In the following, I will present an analysis of Jitāri’s discussions with the aim of summarizing the main points.

1. The bahirarthavāda position with regard to the image of the object

After dividing the bahirarthavādins into sākārajñānavādins and nirākārajñānavādins at the beginning of the VMS, Jitāri describes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor sākārajñānavāda with regard to the image of the object as follows:

All this is only the cognition which appears with the image of [object-things of the five senses respectively, such as] white color, singing voice, fragrant smell, sweet taste and [tangible] roughness; however, the external (bāhyaḥ) object-thing having a [physical] body established as entirely different from [its] product, the cognition, does not appear in its own form.\(^6\)

The position described here is similar to that of the Sautrāntika. As it is well-known, the Sautrāntika is a strong proponent of sākārajñānavāda.\(^7\) Jitāri then summarizes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor nirākārajñānavāda as follows:

Our cognition is devoid of image [of object]; the external object possesses the image, and is perceptible, for this object is apprehended by perception as connected to the external world (bahirdeśa).\(^8\)

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\(^6\) VMS 14b5–6/49a1–2: jñānam evedaṃ sitagītasurabhimadhurakarkaśākāram bhāsate, bāhyaḥ* punar artho jñānakāryavatirekamātravyavasthāpitaśarīro na svena rūpeṇa ca kāsti. *Both manuscripts clearly read bāhyam. However, since bāhyaḥ appears in related passages quoted below in n. 7 and n. 9, the text should be emended to bāhyaḥ.


\(^8\) VMS 14b6–15a1/49a2–3: nirākārā no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ, pratyaḵṣaṣa ca, sa hi bahirdeśasambuddhaḥ pratyaḵṣenopalabhyate. In the TSP, we can find a similar outline of the nirākāravāda: “Cognition is devoid of the image; however, the external thing has the image, and it is perceived distinctly as connected to the external world. In this manner, the image of cognition is rejected by us.” (TSP 313,4–6 ad TS 980: nirākārā buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ, sa ca bahirdeśasambuddhaḥ vīspaṭam upalabhyata ity evam asmābhir jñānakāro niṣiddhaḥ.)
This refers evidently to the Mīmāṃsā system, which is the major advocate of the nirākāravāda among the non-Buddhist systems, and probably the main opponent functioning as interlocutor in this treatise. On the other hand, among Buddhist systems, the Vaibhāṣika is usually regarded as nirākāravādin, with Śubhagupta as the main representative in the sources available to us. As we will see below, Śubhagupta is quoted and refuted by Jitārī. The Yogācāra system, as it is attested in many sources, is divided into two sub-systems, the sākāravijñānapītimātratāvādin and nirākāravijñānapītimātratāvādin. Ratnākaraśānti is a spokesman of the latter. But, needless to say, as a nirākāravijñānapītimātratāvādin, Ratnākaraśānti could not have been the target of Jitārī’s refutation, since he is not a bāhyārthavādin.

2. Formal reasoning proving cognition’s self-manifestation

In the VMS, Jitārī indeed does not pay much attention to the sākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda, saying that the sākārajñānavādin are not in conformity with the whole set of the generally established convention and they do not provide anything except some pieces of false determination. So, he concentrates himself on the refutation of the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda. He starts his refutation by setting forth a formal reasoning:

What becomes manifest [in cognition] is cognition [itself], just as the conceptual construction of a blue thing; and [a sensory object] like visible matter becomes manifest [in cognition, therefore, it is cognition with the image of object]. This is a reason of essential property.

The main body of the treatise is actually a proof that the reason used in this reasoning is valid. As Jitārī does in many other works, the proof takes on the form of replies to various objections that claim the reason to be fallacious according to the Dharmakīrtian threefold typology of the “pseudo-reason” (hetvābhāsa): (1) unestablished (asiddha); (2) contradictory (viruddha), and (3) inconclusive (anaikāntika).

At first, Jitārī declares that, in the formal reasoning, the proving factor (sādhana), i.e., “becoming manifest,” is not unestablished, because it is proved by perception as existent in

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9 Cf. MSBh 28,17–18: nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo ‘rthaḥ, sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyaśaṃ upalabhya. Cf. also TSP 101,14–15 ad TS 252: kim ca bhavato mīmāṃsakasya mate yo bhāsamānah sa ākāra na buddheḥ. kim tv asau bāhyārthasvabhāvo varṣyaite, ākāravān bāhyo ‘rtho nirākārā buddhir iti vacanāt. “Further, in your Mīmāṃsaka system, it is explained that it is not the image of cognition that appears; rather, it is the nature of the external object, since it is said: ‘the external object possesses the image, the cognition is devoid of the image.’”


11 Cf. VMS 15a1/49a3: parīsamāptitasakalavahāyogāyogābhāvān mithyābhāvaviveśesād ēte naṁśeśarata iti.

12 VMS 15a2–3/49a4–5: yat prakāśate tat jñānaṁ yathā nilavikalpaḥ, prakāśate cedaṁ rūpādīkām iti svabhāvavaheteḥ.

13 Dharmakīrti does not directly offer a separate definition of the pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa). Rather, in PV 1.1 he defines the threefold valid reason and then adds at the end of the verse that reasons other than this are “pseudo-reasons” (pakṣadharmas tadāmśena vyāpto hetus tridhāva saḥ / avinābhāvavānyamād dhetvābhāsās tato pare itī). The verse is translated in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 6; Hayes and Gillon 1991: 2f.; and Steinkellner 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 4; for further discussion see Frauwallner 1954: 145; Steinkellner 1967: 82ff., 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 16; and PVin 3.91–131,5 (kārikā 67–68).
respect to the property-bearer (dharmin), i.e., a “[sensory object] like visible matter.” That means, for the reason he uses, the condition of pakṣadharmaṇā is satisfied. In reply to the objection that the property-bearer is unestablished either for the internalist who regards it as internal, or for the externalist who regards it as external, Jitāri argues that the property-bearer, visible matter, is nothing but the exclusion of non-visible-matter. Its properties of being internal or external that are the subject of disagreement, are characterized with two further different exclusions (i.e., the exclusion of being internal and the exclusion of being external, respectively). However, this disagreement does lead to the non-establishment of the property-bearer, because this property-bearer is established by perception; and in no inference is the property-bearer regarded as particularized to the certain property that is subject to controversy, so that it would incur the criticism of non-establishment.

Then, Jitāri points out further that the reason, “becoming manifest,” is not contradictory, because it is found among the similar cases. He explains: A proving factor becomes contradictory when what is opposed to the factor to be proved (sādhyā), and a pervaded factor (vyāpya) should never come forth without pervading factor (vyāpaka), otherwise it would not be pervaded (tadabhāvaprasāṅgā). So, the reason, insofar as it is contradictory, does not occur in the similar cases.

But the opponent does not agree with this, arguing that the proving factor “becoming manifest” cannot be found in the similar instance, because cognition is not perceptible; for, when an object is cognized, the cognition is known through inference. Here Jitāri obviously refers to the position of Śabara of the Mīmāṃsā system; in fact, he makes use of the Śābarabhāṣya verbatim, incorporating literally the passage in question. Dharmakīrti refutes this opinion in PV 3.460ff. From his externalist’s point of view, Jitāri’s opponent says that, in a cognitive event, we perceive merely the object alone that is the externally existent thing like something blue, which becomes manifest in cognition as blue when we perceive it. Apart from this no other object can be perceived, for the grasping subject cannot be perceived in the way “I experience the internal cognition” (āntaram jñānam.

14 Cf. VMS 15a3/49a5: atra prayoge na sādhanāsiddhir adhyakṣasiddhatvād dharmīni prakāśamānatāyāḥ.
15 Cf. VMS 15a5–6/49b2–4: ayam evārūpādivyāvṛttiviśiṣṭo dharmī, bāhyatvābāhyatve tasya vivādāpade vyāyṛtyantare, na ca tayor asiddhim dharmino ākarṣati, tasyādhyakṣasiddhatvenāsakāryapahnavatvāt, na ca kvacic anumāne vimatadhikaraṇadharmaviśiṣṭo deṣito dharmī yenaivam asidhdhodanālāmbi syāt.
16 A similar definition of the contradictory reason can be found in RNĀ 33,21–22: tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva varātate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpyāteh sādhyaviruddham sādhaṇaṃ sādhyahārviruddhaṃ ‘bhūdhīyate.
17 Cf. VMS 15b1–2/49b5–4: nāpi viruddhatvam sapakṣe bhāvāt. sādhyaviparyayavyāpyātan hi sādhanam viruddham bhavati, na ca vyāpya vyāpakam antarena syāt tadabhāvaprasāṅgād iti sati viruddhatve na sapakṣe varātate.
18 Cf. VMS 15b2/49b5–50a1: nanu ca prakāśanam nāma nāsti eva sapakṣe jñānasya sarvasya parokṣatvāt. na hi kaścid ajñāte ‘ṛthe buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati.
20 Cf. PV 3.460ab: api cādhyākṣasthitahāve dhīyāḥ syāl lingato gatiḥ / “Further, cognition should be known through an inferential sign, insofar as it is not perceptible.” Cf. PV 3.447: etenānātmavitpakṣe sarvārthādarsanena ye / apratyaṃkām dhīyam prāhus te ‘pi nirvarṇitottarāḥ // “Through [the unwanted consequence explained above] that there is no perception of any kind of object in the thesis of non-self-awareness the reply is given to those who say that cognition is non-perceptible.” The opponent who advocates this theory is at PVV 251,17 labelled as Jaiminīya: ye jaiminīyā apratyaṃkāṃ dhīyam arthāpattigamīṃ āhuḥ te ‘pi nirvarṇitottarā dattottarā boddhavyāḥ.
anubhavāmīti). That is to say, the opponent does not accept the Buddhist theory that cognition of an object can be perceived through self-awareness, like the awareness of sensations such as pleasure; as it is explained by Dignāga.\textsuperscript{21} Jitāri’s refutation of this objection is in fact a proof of the existence of the experience of cognition of an object-referent. He argues that even if you do not have an ascertaining awareness (pratipatti) in the form “I experienced the cognition,” you cannot prove that the experience of the cognition does not exist. To support this, he quotes a verse from the Tattvasaṅgraha: The name is not equal to the characteristics (rūpa) of things, so it is not the case that the things whose characteristics have been completely apprehended (parijñāta) [through perception] remain unknown so long their name is unknown.\textsuperscript{22}

Jitāri argues further: If the experience of the cognition of an object-referent would not exist at all, then the pure conceptual awareness of an object like a pot, perceived as arising and disappearing, cannot be included in (antar√bhū) or assigned to anything, i.e., it has no objective substratum at all to be based on; for it can be based neither on the object nor on the cognition – because the object cannot arise and disappear according to a person’s desire (īhāvaśena) and it does not have the nature of the subjective conceptualization. Moreover, the cognition might occur, being imperceptible according to the opponent, but it could not become manifest, even if it occurs as conceptual awareness; the object is manifest, but it does not occur like the subjective cognition. To conclude, Jitāri says, if the cognition were imperceptible, there would be no conceptual awareness consisting in the experience of a cognition in concordance with the verbal designation of the object at all, but in reality it is not so.\textsuperscript{23}

Now, Jitāri turns to treat the problem of the reason’s inconclusiveness (anaikāntikatā), which he defines as the occurrence of reason in the dissimilar cases (vipakṣavṛttikatā). He argues that this occurrence is impossible in this case, because the proving factor, being established by valid means of cognition, leaves no room for deviation; he emphasizes also that this occurrence can never be suspected so long as there is a necessary concomitance.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. PS(V) 1.6ab: mānasam cārtharāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā / mānasam api rūpādivaśīlayālambanam avikalpakaṃ anubhavākārapravṛttarṇ, rāgādīṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasam pratipakṣam. “And the mental [perception], [i.e.,] awareness of an object-referent and self-awareness of desire, etc., is free from conceptual construction. Mental [awareness], too, taking the object-field like a visible matter, etc., as its object-support, [and] occurring with image of direct experience [of that visible matter], is non-conceptual [and thus can be regarded as perception], and self-awareness in respect to the desire, etc., is [also a kind of] mental perception, because it is independent of sense faculties.” And PS(V) 1.9ab: svasaṃvittih phalaṃ vātra dvābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāsaṃ asya yat svasaṃvedanam tat phalam. “Or with regard to this [perception mentioned above as a type of perception] (cf. PST 1 69,6–7: atri pūrvokte pratyakṣe) the self-awareness is the result. (9a) Cognition arises actually with two appearances, self-appearance and object-appearance. The self-awareness of this [cognition] possessing both appearances is the result.”

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. TS 1555: na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnām yat tasyāograhahe satī / pariṇātamatattvānām api avijñātataḥ bhavet //

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. VMS 15b4–16a1/50a3–6: yadi hi jñānānubhavo nāma nāṣī eva, tadā yo ’yaṃ ghatādvikalpaḥ samviditā upayamān upayamān ca kvāntarthāyāvatām, arthe buddhau vā na tāvad arthe, tasyehāvāsena-dvāyāvatāyogat, asa śānenaṃrāpaṇatvā. buddhihi atra vivarteta, sā cāpratyakṣā vivṛttāpi satī vah na prakāśeta, na ca prakāśo ’rthātathāvṛttit ity abhāva evārthābhāvāparokṣaṇaṃ ‘anubhavāvāmano vikalpasya jñānaparokṣapakṣe prasajyeta. na caivaṃ. This is in fact an adaptation of the argument presented in Dharmakīrti’s PVin 1 14,14–15,7. Cf. the German translation of the Tibetan version in Vetter 1966: 53.
between the nature of self-manifestation and the things that become manifest, which he expresses with a formal reasoning:

Everything that does not possess the nature of self-manifestation does not become manifest, just like something that never appears. And [a sensory object] like a blue thing does not have the nature of self-manifestation, if it is not cognition. This is [the reason of] non-perception of a pervading factor.  

Here, it is worth noting that this is just a repetition in the negative form of the first formal reasoning given at the beginning of the work when Jitāri starts his refutation. The only difference is that the word “cognition” (jñāna) is here replaced with “possessing the nature of self-manifestation” (svaprakāśasvabhāva), which Jitāri treats as synonym. This demonstrates clearly that Jitāri sets forth the discussion from the Yogācāra point of view, regarding the nature of self-manifestation as a *conditio sine qua non* for the arising of the object’s manifestation in the cognition as the cognitive content.

The opponent does not accept the theory of self-manifestation, holding that a thing, although not attaining (anu√bhū) the nature of self-manifestation, can still become manifest, for instance, a blue thing, etc., not having the nature of manifestation of itself, when placed (adhīna) near a lamp, etc., can still be manifest, and thus, the nature of self-manifestation is not a necessary condition for the state of being manifest. Jitāri’s reason consequently still remains inconclusive. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that manifestation never takes place in any other form than self-manifestation, so his reason cannot be inconclusive.

In the next section, to refute the objection against the Yogācāra’s position of self-manifestation, he examines the relationship between the cognitive manifestation and the

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24 Cf. VMS 16a1–3/50a6–b2: *anaikāntikatāpy asya na sambhavinī. sā hi bhavanti drṣṭyamānāvipaśaṃvydtitakatyā vā sambhavet sambhāvyamānāvipaśaṃvydtitakatyā vā. tatra na tāvad agrimo grāhyah paksah, pramāṇāsiddhasya vyabhicārarogacarasya kasyacid abhāvāt, nāpi paścimo vipaścātm pratoṣaśiva, yadi viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam na bhavat, asya syād vipaśaṃpracārāśaṅkā, yāvath tad aṣṭi — yad yat svaprakāśasvabhāvam na bhavati tat tan na prakāśate, yathā kiṃcit kadācit apratibhāsamānaṃ. na bhavati ca svaprakāśasvabhāvam asati jñāntve nilādikam iti viyopakānapalabdhīḥ.*

25 Cf. the quotation above in n. 12.

26 As pointed out by Funayama (2007: 194, n. 35), the subject of the verb anu-√bhū can also be a thing, and then it does not mean “to experience …” as when it is used with a human being as its subject; he translates the phrase *sattām anubhavati* in a passage quoted from TSP 1123,6–8 as “directly manifests itself” (but, I think, in that case, the phrase could be simply translated as something like “is connected to/attains its existence”). He gives some other examples of the same expression found in TSP. Actually, examples for this use of the verb in other contexts can also be found in TSP and other texts, for instance, cf. TSP 604,12–14: *sa vāyur niṣkramaṃs tālvādeḥ saṃyogavibhāgāv anubhavati. gacchaṃś ca na sa yāvad ākāśam abhigacchati. kim tarhi. yāvad vegan … “It, i.e., wind, when blowing out, attains connection or disjunction with the palate, etc., and it does not continue to move as long as there is space, but as long as the impetus (vega) [continues].” (Notably, here, the word anurudhyate in TS 2177 is paraphrased as anubhavati).*

27 Cf. VMS 16a4–6/50b3–4: *svaprakāśasvabhāvatām ananubhavann api nilādīḥ prakāśata iti na kiṃcit anupapannam nāma. ko hy atra niyamo yat svaprakāśasvabhāvāhenaivā kevalam prakāśitavyam iti, paraprakāśyavate ’pi prakāśopapatteḥ, svayam aprakāśātmanām api nilādinām dipādisannidhāḥnāhā-prakāśarūpaṃpalabdhīḥ.*

28 Cf. VMS 16a6–16b1/50b5: *bhaved ayam anaikāntiko hetuḥ, yady anyathāpi prakāśo ghaṭate, kim tu svaprakāśatām antareṇa prakārāntareṇa prakāśo nopapadyate.*
object that becomes manifest in cognition, with the conclusion that his own initially presented reason is not inconclusive.

3. Examining the relationship between the “making manifest” (prakāśana) and the object

From the Yogācāra’s point of view, a cognitive event of “manifestation” refers, of course, to the fact that the cognition is manifest, so the question is raised why it is said that an object is made manifest by cognition. According to the externalist opponent, however, that statement means simply the fact that the “making manifest” (prakāśana) of an external object is performed by its cognition. To refute this idea, Jitāri embarks on a rather lengthy discussion to examine the relationship between the making manifest, which the opponent alleges to be created by cognition, and the external object (artha). He uses an argument in the form of “four alternative proposition” (catuskoti), a Buddhist favorite dialectical apparatus: He lists at first exhaustively all conceivable relations between the making manifest and the object, and then negates them all one by one: the manifestation is a different thing than the object-referent (1), it is a non-different thing than the object-referent (2), it is both different and non-different (3), it is neither different nor non-different (4).

Jitāri argues at first that the so-called “making manifest,” which is made by cognition, cannot be a different entity (padārtha) than the object-referent, because in that case it cannot be said that it is the object-referent that is made manifest by cognition. He explains: The object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, since this is contradictory to the thesis of other-manifestation, i.e., becomes manifest as a different thing. Moreover, the “other” cannot operate to add a different nature to the object to make it manifest, since in that case the “other” becomes identical with the object, i.e., one ends up with the second option. Further, in that case, since the object-referent does not undergo any change while the manifestation arises as a different entity, it would not become manifest; and a future thing, inasmuch as it is not appearing in the manifestation, cannot be distinguished from the thing itself (svārūpa) and thus cannot become manifest. To avoid this difficulty, the opponent may argue that the object-referent, without change, becomes manifest with the same manifestation. However, according to Jitāri, the manifestation is a temporal process, i.e., the object undergoes the changes from the state of not being manifest to being manifest; so Jitāri points out, this opponent’s argument does not hold, because in that case also this unchanging manifestation is useless when the object has already its effecting means (karaṇa) of a different manifestation, i.e., the effecting means of making a change; also

29 Cf. VMS 16b1–3/15a1–2: nanu jñānaprakāśate ’pi prakāśo yuyjata eva, idam eva kim uktam bhavati jñānenārthat prakāśyata iti. kim atra prāṣṭavyam, jñānena tasya prakāsanaṃ kriyata ity ayam artho ’nenaḥbhidhiyata iti.
30 Cf. VMS 16b3–5/51a2–5: tatra yadi jñānena prakāśānākhyam kim api padārthāntaraṃ kṛtam, katham tenārthat prakāśito nāma. na hy asa suvayam eva prakāśate, tathāve paraprajāśatvāyogāt. tad api param asya svarūpaviśeṣābhāne na vyāpiyate, dvitīyavikalpa-prasangāt, tasya ca vicārasyayamānāt.
31 Cf. VMS 16b4–5/51a4–5: tathā ca yathābhūto ’sau prakāśānudaye, tathābhūta eva prakāśadrayasamaye ‘pi katham prakāśeta. aprakāśadṛśā bhāvināh svarūpān na viśiṣyate prakāśeta ceti suvyāktam.
32 In the grammatical sense, karaṇa refers to “the most efficient causal factor.” Cf. Pāṇ 1.4.42: sādhaka-tamaṃ karaṇam. and KV Part I: 557,4–5: kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣtopakāraṇaṃ vivakṣitaṃ
because in that case an infinite regress would result, i.e., an endless arising of manifestation, when this manifestation can never be (anupapatti) in the state of being currently manifest because of its not being distinct from its previous form, i.e., the unmanifest form, and undergoes (upagama) nevertheless the action of producing a manifestation other than that manifestation. That means, in that case, the manifestation would not be a momentary phenomenon, rather a never-stopping process.

Jitāri then turns to refute the second option, i.e., that the making manifest is non-different from the object, i.e., identical with object. He argues that the identity between them cannot be possible, for in that case, when, through cognition, the object-referent has the effecting means of making manifest (prakāśanakaraṇa) that is identical to itself, it itself becomes the effecting means of making manifest, and thus the action (kriyā) of making manifest becomes impossible, because it is already accomplished before by the object-referent itself. If the action of making manifest takes a form that is different from what is accomplished by another cause (kāraṇa), then only this different form is created, since it has not been accomplished, but this form cannot be identical with the object-referent (tadātmabhūta). And thus, if the object-referent ceased to exist in its previous form and arises in another form, its appeared form (vyaktarūpa) must arise from cognition, and these two must be momentary, because by accepting a different form, it follows necessarily that it exists with each action (pratikṛti) [of making manifest]. According to Jitāri, this is the idea stated in Dharmakīrti’s PV 3.464–465ab, which he quoted.

Cf. VMS 16b5–17a1/51a5–51b2: tenaiva prakāśena prakāśyata iti cet. vārttam etat, tasyāpi prakāśa-ntarakarane bhāve ’nupayoṣgat, tasya ca pūrvarūpavīśeṣat prakāśaṁānātiṣṇuṣṣapattau tasyāpi tada- raprakāśaṃkriyopagame pavyavasāṁśaśaḥparyapraṣaṇādakasya puvravasthitapadāṛthapraṇā-śaṇātāpaparipāntino ‘navasthānasya prasangāt.

Cf. VMS 17a1–2/51b3: jñānenārtha ṣaśaḥ prakāśanakaraṇa karaṇasaṃjñaṃ bhavati. tat khalv arthasyāṁmabhūtaḥ prakāśaṁkaraṇe tasyāiva karaṇam āpadyeta. yat ca kriyate na cārtha iti riktā vāco yuktiḥ, na cāśya kriyā sambhaviṇī, prāg eva nispaṇnātva.

Cf. VMS 17a2–4/51b3–5: yena rūpeṇa sa nispanṇa na tena kriyā, rūpāntareṇa karaṇād iti cet. tad eva tarhi rūpāntaraṃ anispaṇṇātva kriyata iti priṇātaṃ, tac ca tannispaṇṭāvān anispaṇṇāṃ karaṇāntaraṃ paścād upajāyāmaṇāṃ kathām tadātmabhūtam nāma.

Cf. VMS 17a4–5/51b5–52a1: tasmād yady arthasya pūrvānāntarayaś ca bhavet, bhaved asya vyaktarūpaṃtaraṃ jñānād upatītah, tau cāṣāṇikavate na sthā, tadāmaṇaḥ pratikṛtī bhangu- ratvaprasaṅgaḥ. The phrase pratikṛti (cf. pratijñānam in PV 3.465a quoted below in n. 37) reads in the manuscript B as prakṛtibhaṅguratva°, “perishable in their nature,” however, in this case the phrase loses the connection with PV.

Indeed, Dharmakīrti’s statement aims at the refutation of various opponents’ opinions against the Yogācāra thesis that cognition is cognized by itself (svavedana, cf. PV 3.425ff.). One of them says that cognition is apprehended by inference, i.e., through inferential sign (liṅga). Dharmakīrti refutes this by arguing that, the causal forces for arising of a cognition, like sense faculty, object-referent, mental factor, etc., cannot be established as the inferential sign, because either they could deviate from the causal connection with cognition or they themselves are the cognition that are to be inferred; also the appearance (vyakti) of object-referent, being the cognition, cannot be the inferential sign, because the object-referent, when not being experienced, cannot be ascertained as appearing (cf. PV 3,461’d–463cd: tatra nendriyam vyabhiçāratat // tathārtho dhīmanaskāravajñānam taur ca na sidhyataḥ / nāprasiddhayaśāśaḥ śaśaṃkriyam vyaktir arthasya cen maṭaḥ // saiva nanu jñānam vyakto ‘rtho ‘nena varnitaḥ / vyakta śanubhūtāyaṁ tadyavaktatvaviniścayat /). Dharmakīrti refutes further the objection against this argument in the next one and a half verses which are quoted by Jitāri: “Now, [the opponent] accepts that the appearance is...
Jitāri points out further that a momentary instance of an object-referent (arthakṣaṇa) cannot be made manifest by the cognition, for in that case the cognition needs to be either simultaneously existent or pre-existent, but both cases are impossible: When the cognition is simultaneous with the object, no causality is possible, just like between the left and right horns of a cow; again, a verse from Dharmakīrti’s PV is quoted, which argues that all causes must exist before their results.38 On the other hand, when cognition exists before, the object-referent arising from cognition with its independent nature of manifestation (prakāśasvabhāva) would become manifest to all people, since it is common to all. Moreover, the idea is also incorrect (asaṅgata) that the object-referent has the independent nature of manifestation only for the person through whose cognition such manifest form (tādṛśa) is produced, but not for the others; because the object-referents do not have a different nature (ātmabheda) for each different person (pratipuruṣa), since otherwise it would follow that they do not possess their own nature (nairātmya) on account of the absence of a fixed nature (ātmasthiti).39

an [additional] special property (viśeṣa)8 of the very object-referent. [But] the object-referent, since it does neither arise nor pass away [according to the externalist opponent], cannot have a special property of any kind. Or, when this [special property] is accepted, it would follow that it decays with each cognition.” (PV 3.464–465ab: athārthasyaiva kaścit sa viśeṣo vyaktā iyate / nāmutpādavyavavato viśeṣo 'rthaḥ kaśca na // tadiṣṭau vā pratijñānaṁ kṣaṇabhāṅgah prasajyate / *In PV 256.4 viśeṣa is paraphrased as svabhāvaviśeṣa, so it refers to a form that is different from the object-referent in its own nature.) It is interesting to observe that, in Jitāri’s text, the expression “with each action [of making manifest]” (pratikṛti) is actually a referential use of Dharmakīrti’s expression “with each cognition” (pratijñānam). The point here, in Jitāri’s context, is that the process of making manifest is a cognitive product, and therefore it arises and disappears with each cognition, consequently it is not independent of the cognition.

38 PV 3.246: asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc ca na prayogataḥ / prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetunāṁ nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha // “Because [in the case that the object-referent as the cause and cognition as the effect exist simultaneously, the object-referent], being non-existent before [the arising of the cognition as result], is not efficient [in producing the result], and after [the arising of result] it is useless [since the result has been already produced], all causes exist before [their results]; consequently, an object cannot be simultaneous with its cognition.” The context of this quotation is however not exactly the same as Jitāri’s argument. In the section of PV 3.245–247, Dharmakīrti discusses the problem of the temporal relationship between mental awareness and its object, refuting an objection against the theory that object-referent is an auxiliary factor (sahakārin) for sense faculty in producing mental cognition. The opponent maintains that the object-referent, being active simultaneously with its cognition and thus in a different time than sense faculty, cannot serve the function of auxiliary cause (sahakārin). Cf. PV 3.245: tadatulyakriyākālah kathāṁ svajñānakālikāḥ / sahakāri bhaved artha iti ced akṣacetasaḥ // PV 3.246 is the reply to this objection. Jitāri’s aim of quoting this verse seems to be merely to rule out the possibility of the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. The point here is that, if the object-referent is external, it cannot be simultaneous with cognition. The Sautrāntika, accepting the externally existent object-referent, refutes the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the co-existent causes (sahabhūhetu). However, as an internalist (antarjñeyavādin), the Yogācāra supports the theory that the object-referent, as a cognitive aspect of cognition, and therefore existent internally, can be co-existent with cognition. Cf. Kato 1989: 309ff., Dhammadoti 2009: 154ff.

39 Cf. VMS 17b2–3/52a4–5: samasamayaasambhavinā vā jñānenaarthakṣanah prakāśikriyeta prāgbhāvinā vā. tatra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ. jñānärthakṣanah sarvahetunām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha // tatra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ. jñānena sarvahetunām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha // *quotation of PV 3.246* dvitiye tu vikalpe. jñānena sarvahetunām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha // prakāśasvabhāvo 'rthaḥ sādāhāṅvatāt sarvān pratī prakāśaṁ. jñānena sarvān āpaṁ pratī prakāśaṁ. na hi pratipuruṣaṁ arthānām ātmabhedaḥ,
For the third and fourth alternatives, i.e., that the manifestation is both different and non-different, as well as neither different nor non-different from the object-referent, Jitāri says merely that they have already been refuted through the refutation of the first two alternatives, so it is useless to exert the labor (piṣṭapeṣaṇa) of a separate refutation. He quotes two verses from the 29th chapter of Arcaṭa’s *Hetubinduṭīkā*, “Refutation of Non-absolutism” (dravyaparyāyānekkāntavādakhāndanam), and concludes that, of things with mutually contradictory nature, negating the one implies (nāntarīyaka) affirming the other, and one cannot affirm and negate the same nature in respect to the same thing. The opponents therefore cannot defend themselves by taking this position.

After negating all possible alternative interpretations of the relationship between the cognition’s making manifest and the object, Jitāri says that, since it is not the case that one thing can be made manifest by the other thing, the conclusion must be as follows: “What becomes manifest is [cognition] itself, what is not [cognition] itself [i.e., anything other than cognition], does not have its manifestation at all.” If we compare this conclusion with his first formal reasoning, it becomes clear that here he just repeats the idea of the pervasion (vyāpti) stated in that reasoning. In the remaining part of the text, Jitāri replies to several objections against this conclusion.

4. Replies to the objections against the thesis of self-manifestation

The first objection is directly directed against the above-mentioned pervasion, arguing that a blue thing, etc., can be both not cognition (i.e., external) and self-manifestation in its nature; so Jitāri’s reason is not established. Jitāri replies to this simply by indicating the self-contradiction of this argument. He explains: For a cognition, the nature of being cognition is nothing but the nature of being self-manifestation; so, by admitting the fact...

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40 In that chapter the Jaina’s non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) is systematically refuted, which holds that “substance” (dravya) and “mode” (paryāya) are not contradictory or mutually exclusive; rather, they are in coherence. (For a brief description of this theory, cf. Dasgupta 1975: I 175ff.) Arcaṭa examines the relationship between the “substance” and its “mode,” also using the analytic method of the “four alternatives.” After negating the alternatives that the substance and the mode are “different” and “non-different” individually, he says in the two verses that are quoted by Jitāri that mutually contradictory properties, such as difference and non-difference between substance and mode, cannot occur in one and the same thing, but when they are accepted, the faults mentioned for each case remain, i.e., either “it cannot be a single thing,” or “it cannot have the double form,” still exist, or the faults that are attached to each single case come forth also in the case when these two are together. These faults (or “side-effects,” such as phlegm produced by sugar and bile by ginger in the examples given in HBṬĀ) that come forth in each single case of difference or non-difference between substance and modes cannot cease to exist insofar the quality exists. Cf. HBṬ 29,25 (p. 106,11–12); bhedābhedoktadośā ca tayor iṣṭau kathan na vā / prayeyakam ye prasajyante dvayor bhāve kathāṃ na te // and 29,30 (p. 106,21–22): ye bhedābhedoktimātre hi dosāḥ sambhavināḥ kathāṃ / tatsambhave pi te na syor iti brāyād vicakṣāṇāḥ // Cf. also HBṬĀ 349,8–15, 350,29, 351,3 (ad loc.).

41 Cf. VMS 18a1/52b4: anonyapratisedhāprāṇāt caikapatrisedhayayaparavidhināntariyakatvād ekasya caikatra vidhipratisedhayor ayoīgat, na tatkalpanānusaraṇam śaraṇam paresām.

42 Cf. VMS 18a2/52b5: tasmād anasyānaya prakāśayavānapatiteḥ, yat prakāśate tāt svayam eva, yat tu na svayam tasya nāsyai prakāśa iti ekāntaḥ.

43 Cf. above n. 12.
that the blue, etc., are self-manifestation, one admits also that they are cognition. The opponent is not satisfied with this reply, asserting that being cognition does not equal being reflexive manifestation (ātmaprakāśatva), rather it means simply being an agent of the action of making manifest (prakāśayitṛ). This is refuted by pointing out the fact that cognition’s being the agent of making manifest is dependent upon the object it makes manifest (prakāśya), and since that object-referent outside of cognition cannot be proved as the object to be made manifest by cognition, also cognition cannot be the agent of making manifest.\footnote{Cf. VMS 18a3–4/53a1–2: ajñānaṃ svapra-kāśātmakaṃ ca niilādikam iti kim atrīnupapannam. tad ayam asidhho hetur iti. tad asat, parasparavirudhatvāt. svapra-kāśatvam eva hi jñānasya jñānatvatvam nāyaḥ kīcchit. tataḥ svapra-kāśatvam niilādāh bhīyupannayā jñānatvatvam niilādār api upeti.}

The opponent now introduces the grammatical notion of an “object of action” (karman) to prove that the object of action is separated from the agent. According to the opponent, \textit{Jitāri’s} above argument might be applicable to cases where the object of action is the “object to be created” (kārya) or the “object to be modified” (vikārya). In the grammatical tradition, the object of action is divided into three types: The object to be produced, the object to be modified and the object to be attained.\footnote{Cf. VMS 18a5–6/53a2–4: nātmaprakāśatvam jñānatvatvam, api tu prakāśayitṛtvam iti cet. prakāśyāpe-kṣaṣāḥ hi prakāśayitṛtvam. prakāśyatā cārthasyānupapaṭtyaṁ jñānasya-āpi prakāśayitṛtvam no-papadya-te.} The opponent argues that the object made manifest by cognition could be “the object to be attained” (prāpya), which is neither the object to be produced or effected (kārya) nor the object to be modified (vikārya), like “village” in the sentence “he goes to the village” (grāmaṅ gacchatīti); so it is not contradictory to say that what is attained is made manifest, and is neither produced nor changed.\footnote{Cf. KV Part II 540,3: (ad Pāṇ 3.2.1: karman any: trividhāṁ karmā, nirvartyaṁ, vikāyaṁ prāpyaṁ cetī. Cf. also the more detailed explanation in KVP Part II 540,30–541,25: tatra nirvartyaṁ yad asad evopapapadyate*: yathā kumbhaṁ karoti nagaraṁ karotīti, kumbhādiṁham hi avyādhamānāṃ evotpadyate iti nirvartyaṁ karma. vikāyaṁ yasya sata eva kaścid vikāro vidhiyate, tad yathā kāṇḍaṁ lunaṁti, sata eva kāṇḍārā laveṇa vikārō vidhiyata iti vikāyaṁ karmā. prāpyaṁ nāsata evotpādanāṁ kriyate nāpi sata eva vikāridhiham, kevalaṁ kriyāsambandhamāraṁ pratīyate, tad yathā vedam adhitē cārma pārāyatīti. atra hy adhyāyanañānaṁ vedādeḥ sambandhamāraṁ pratīyate, na tv asata evotpādanāṁ, nāpi sata evānyathālakṣaṇo vikāra iti prāpyam etat karma. *-upapadyate em.: utapapadyate KVP} This is refuted by \textit{Jitāri} based on the following reasons: (1) Other than being cognition no attaining (prāpya), which is possible, and without acquiring no object-referent can be attained; (2) the cognition cannot be characterized as attaining, since [in the opponent’s system] the action (kriyā) and its causal factor (kāraka) cannot be the same thing.\footnote{Cf. KV Part II 540,3 (ad Pāṇ 3.2.1: karmā any: trividhāṁ karmā, nirvartyaṁ, vikāyaṁ prāpyaṁ cetī. Cf. also the more detailed explanation in KVP Part II 540,30–541,25: tatra nirvartyaṁ yad asad evopapapadyate*: yathā kumbhaṁ karoti nagaraṁ karotīti, kumbhādiṁham hi avyādhamānāṃ evotpadyate iti nirvartyaṁ karma. vikāyaṁ yasya sata eva kaścid vikāro vidhiyate, tad yathā kāṇḍaṁ lunaṁti, sata eva kāṇḍārā laveṇa vikārō vidhiyata iti vikāyaṁ karmā. prāpyaṁ nāsata evotpādanāṁ kriyate nāpi sata eva vikāridhiham, kevalaṁ kriyāsambandhamāraṁ pratīyate, tad yathā vedam adhitē cārma pārāyatīti. atra hy adhyāyanañānaṁ vedādeḥ sambandhamāraṁ pratīyate, na tv asata evotpādanāṁ, nāpi sata evānyathālakṣaṇo vikāra iti prāpyam etat karma. *-upapadyate em.: utapapadyate KVP} (3) In the case that the cognition is an agent of action and acts with respect to itself (ātmakarṭṛkakriyārūpa), since the cognition

\textit{\textit{The}} theon (karman) of an action (kāraka) or more precisely, the means of accomplishing the action (karana), and the action (kriyā) as the result is the fundamental principle of the Yogācāra since Dignāga, which is not accepted by the opponents like the Naïyāyika who adheres to the grammatical notion of differentiating the action and its various causal factors. There is evidently a long-lasting debate between Yogācāra and the Naïyāyika on this topic. Cf. PV 3.318–319: kriyākarṣaṇayor aikāvivirodha iti ced asat i dharmabhedābhiyupamād vasty abhinam itiṣyate // evam prakāśā sarvava a kriyākārakaśamsthitāḥ i bhāvasya* bhīmnābhīmaneṣaḥ api āroṣena vṛtiḥ// (*Following PVA and various Tibetan translations, Tosaki reads bhāveṣu. However, the
Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi
does not operate (upayoga) on the [external] object-thing, the latter cannot become the
doctrine of action of that cognition. (4) If the object-thing becomes the object of action (karmatve) merely due to its presence at the time when the action arises, it would follow that everything at that moment (tadātana) would be the object. If it becomes the object of action due to being a cause, then the visual sense, etc., would also come to be the object of action.\footnote{Cf. VMS 18b2–4/53b1–3: nāvīrudddham, jñānasattātirekiṇyāḥ prāpter abhāvāt, prāptim antareṇa cārthasya prāpyamāṇatvāyogāt, jñānasya ca prāpytirupatāyāḥ kriyākārakayogāt bhūmayaṅgat, ātmakartṛkakriyārūpatve ‘pi jñānasyārthe ‘nupayogāt tasya tatkarmatānupapatteḥ, tajjanmakālasaṃtāmātreṇa karmatve sarvasya tadātanasya karmatvaprasaṅgāt, hetutvena tathābhāve cakṣurāder api tathābhāvāpatteḥ.}

The opponent argues further for the separation between the agent of making manifest and the object to be made manifest, saying that a thing that becomes manifest can be an object of action of making manifest when the agent of making manifest occurs, i.e., when there is a causal relationship between them. Jitāri replies that an external object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, nor can it have a different nature, i.e., manifestation produced by cognition. Thus, it is just nonsense to apply the formula of causality which in this case could be expressed as: “When that occurs, this becomes manifest.”\footnote{Cf. VMS 18b4–5/53b3–4: tasmin sati prakāśamāṇasya karmatvād āyam adosa iti cet. sa tāvad artho na svayam eva prakāśate, jñānenāpi nāmāntaram apādyate. tasminś ca sati prakāśata iti ka etad anumatto brāyāt.}

After negating that the relationship between object and cognition is one between object of action and agent of action, Jitāri adds that, through this negation, also Kumārila’s statement in ŚVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55, is refuted. There Kumārila explains the word “birth” in the definition of “perception” in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4: “Perception is the birth of cognition when a person’s sense faculties are connected with an existent object,”\footnote{MS 1.1.4: satsamprayogena puruṣasyendrīyānāṃ buddhijanna tat pratyakṣam. Cf. Hattori 1968: 161, n. 6.1. For Dignāga’s refutation of this definition, cf. Hattori 1968: 63ff.; Frauwallner 1968: 62ff.; for a comprehensive discussion of Kumārila’s interpretation of this definition, cf. Taber 2005: 44f.} saying that the operation of causes is known as additional (atireka) to their birth. The word “birth” used there is intended to mean that it should not be so also in the case of valid means of cognition, and the latter cannot last even for a moment, nor is it to be produced as invalid cognition (apramā), so that the causes should operate later in apprehending of the...
object-thing like sense faculty, etc. Jitāri explains that this is refuted because with respect to an external thing, a cognition that does nothing upon that thing cannot be valid, and that thing cannot be the object of valid cognition; also because, if cognition is valid only upon its birth, an over-excessive consequence would result (atiprasaṅga). This probably means that if a cognition were a valid cognition merely by arising, then all cognitions, or perhaps all things, would be valid cognitions merely by arising.

In the final section of the treatise, Jitāri also refutes some opponents from within the Buddhist tradition. The first opponent is probably the Sautrāntika, whose general opinion on the topic under discussion is that a cognition cognizes its object without taking any action upon the object, just by assuming the image of the object that caused it. The objection claims that a cognition can be that which makes its object-referent manifest (prakāśaka), even without doing anything; and the object-referent can be made manifest (prakāśya) even without any change made by cognition. That is to say, there can be a relationship between a manifest-maker and an object even without any action. The idea of “action-less-ness” of a cognitive event is shared by the Yogācāra, so Jitāri agrees with this completely. However, he points out that, if two things are determined as having such relationship due to an action taken by the one upon the other, then this relationship would be broken in the absence of such action; on the other hand, for a thing that is not causally connected nothing can be made in the case of the non-existence of this action. This means of course that the theory of non-activity cannot be applied in the case of an external object. According to Jitāri, in that case, in the absence of any action, the relationship between cognition and object-referent as the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest cannot exist; and further, the external object is not connected with cognition, so without action nothing can be made. That is to say, the cognition can make the object manifest only in the case that the object is internal to or inside of cognition – that is, cognition can make only itself manifest. The opponent argues against this, saying that, if cognition would make itself manifest, two things would become the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest.
without separate auxiliary means (*upakāra*), and everything would be the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest with respect to everything else. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that the object-subject relationship is restrained through their causal relationship, so the over-excessive consequence mentioned by the opponent would not occur.\(^{56}\)

The topic of discussion then turns to the causal relationship. An opponent from the Vaibhāṣika system argues that both cognition and object-thing, which arise from their respective collection (*kalāpa*) of causes in the preceding moment, will have the form of the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest respectively. This is actually the opinion of Śubhagupta (720–780).\(^{57}\) A verse is quoted from his BSK, which says: “The causal complex in immediately preceding moment should produce the momentary instance of object-field together with cognition (*sajñāna*), just like a visible matter together with its light; for that reason, they should be perceived together.”\(^{58}\) The conclusion of this objection is that, since the manifestation of the object-thing occurs even in the absence of the nature of self-manifestation, so long as the invalidation of this occurrence is not conclusive, the reason used by Jitāri is not conclusive.\(^{59}\) Jitāri replies: If the object-referent produced by the collection of its own causes as something with the form to be made manifest (*prakāśyarūpa*), then for this object only what is to be made manifest is attained (*āpanna*), but not the coexistent cognition; but (*ca*) it is to be propounded by the opponent that the object is made manifest by the cognition. Thus, Jitāri says, whoever claims that the object is produced exclusively from its own cause as being made manifest contradicts the thesis

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58. Cf. VMS 19a6/54b1: *piṇḍvakaiva tu samāgrī sajñānam visayakaṇam / sālokārupeṇaṃ kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam // Quotation from BSK 192b2. The verse is also quoted in JNĀ 23,23–24, 351,17–18; TSP 569,15–17; and VMS(R) 308a2. In the TSP, this verse is quoted together with the verse preceding this one. The preceding verse runs: *nānyo 'sti grāhako jñānāc cākṣuṣair viṣayair vinā / atāś ca sahasamāvitār nāhahāṃ nilataddhiho // “The grasping subject cannot be other than cognition, nor is it without visual object; for this reason a blue thing and its cognition are apprehended together, not because their being non-different [as the Yogācāra holds].” Here, in these two verses, as an externalist (Dreyfuss 1997: 363 describes him as Vaibhāṣika) and a Nirākāravādin, Śubhagupta does not accept the Yogācāra’s theory of non-separation between cognition and its object. In the first verse, he explains *sahavedana* from the viewpoint of the subjective aspect; and then in the second verse quoted in our text he explains it again from the viewpoint of the objective aspect. So, in the second verse the central word must be *visaya*, not *jñāna*; consequently, *sajñānam visayakaṇam* must be the correct form. However, remarkably, in the Tibetan translation of the BSK, *pāda b* appears to be *shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste* (in the quotation of VMS(R) 308a2 it has the form: *shes dang yul bcas skad cig ma*), somewhat like *saviṣayaṃ jñānakṣaṇam*. This seems to me not correct. *yul bcas or yul dang bcas pa* is usually used as the translation of *saviṣaya*. Probably the Tibetan translator (or the scribe of the Sanskrit manuscript which the Tibetan translator used) misread *saviṣayaṃ jñānam* (cf. the phrase used in in Dignāga’s PSV ad PS 1.9b, cf. Chu 2006 [2008]: 239). In the Tibetan translation of the TSP, the phrase is correctly translated as *shes bcas yul gyi skad cig*. Thus, both forms *prajñānam* and *tajjñānam* in the editions TSP and TSP (S), respectively, should be corrected to *sajñānam*, since it is not only supported by the Tibetan translation of the TSP, but also by the two quotations in JNĀ, and now, additionally by our text.

59. Cf. VMS 19a6–19b1/54b2: *tusmāt svapraκāśasvabhāvābhāve ’pi prakāśopapatter bādhakasyānaikāntikatāyāṃ maulyāyāpi hetor anaikāntikateti.*
he proposed. Here, “produced from its own cause” refers of course to the external object that is independent of the cognition.

Now, the opponent argues that the object-referent is produced by its own cause as having the additional quality (atiśaya) of something whose nature is born from cognition, so that it could of course be made manifest by the cognition. The main points of Jitāri’s refutation consists in an examination of the relation between the object and the cognition from the temporal point of view. The opponent’s position that the object possesses an extra characteristic, i.e., the manifestation, given by cognition, while it arises from its own cause, implies necessarily the simultaneity between the object and cognition. This simultaneity is actually completely acceptable for the Yogācāra in the theoretical framework of self-awareness. But for the opponent who is an externalist, as Jitāri points out, the simultaneity is problematic. Jitāri says that, for two things that arise simultaneously, a relationship as supporting and supported factor is impossible; if they are not related in this manner, but merely simultaneous, it would follow that also other things born at the same time were made manifest.

The opponent has now resource to causality: being connected to the same causal complex distinguishes the object-reference from other things. But, Jitāri replies, the cognition, too, being dependent on its object, must belong to the same causal complex (tadbhāva). The opponent still tries to defend himself, saying that the object has to be made manifest by something else, i.e., the cognition, since it itself is not the manifestmaker. Jitāri then replies, as a coup de grâce, that the cognition, doing nothing, cannot be the manifest-maker; and if cognition, being simultaneous with and sharing the same causal complex with the object-referent, could the manifest-maker of the object-referent, the object-referent would also be manifest-maker of the cognition. Jitāri quotes also statements of Dharmakīrti (PV 3.417b–418a and 3.479’cd) to support his arguments.

The conclusion is that the fundamental reason (maula), i.e., “becoming manifest,” cannot be inconclusive, since the manifestation never occurs in any other way; and the

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60 Cf. VMS 19b3/54b3–4: yady asāv arthaḥ svakāraṇakalāpena prakāśyaratpo janitaḥ, tasyaiva tārhi prakāsya 'yam āpanne, na punah sahabhuvu jñānasya. tatprakāsyaśā cāsya pareṇa pratipādyā. tad ayaṃ prastutavastuvirodhīni svahetor evāriṣṭasya prakāśyatopapatti varṇayann...

61 Cf. VMS 19b5/55a1: atha jñānajanyasvabhāvā evāsau svahetunā janitaḥ, tenāsya tatprakāsyaśā syād eva.

62 Cf. VMS 19b5–20a1/55a2–3: …upakāryopakārikayoh sahotpannayos tadbhāvāyogāt.

63 Cf. VMS 20a1/55a3: na, samānakālabhāvinām anyesam apy aviśeṣena prakāśyatvaprasaṅgāt.

64 Cf. VMS 20a1/55a4: ekasāmagrīpratibandho niyāmakālābhinām anyat paripraveṣena pustakāvāyogāt.

65 Cf. VMS 20a2f./55a4f.: arthasyaprakāśakasvabhāvavatvān naśa dosa iti cet, jñānasyapī akāncitkarasya kim idam prakāśakatvatvam nāma. tasmād yatathātthena samānakālam samānasāmahābhāvanām, tad jñānaṃ tadbhāvāt, tathārtho ‘pi teneti so ‘py asya prakāśakaḥ prasajyeta eva.

66 Cf. PV 3.417b–418a: an sayānupakārīṇaḥ / svyaktvā vyajyeta sarvo ‘rthāḥ taddhetor niyamo yadi // naiśāpi kalpanā jñāne. “When some other thing that does not offer support [in producing cognition] has appearance [in cognition], [then] all things could be caused to appear. If a restriction [is assumed] on account of their [simultaneity with cognition], this assumption, too, is not possible with respect to cognition.” PV 3.479’cd: anyathā tulyadharmā viṣaya ‘pi dhiyā saha // “Otherwise, the object-field sharing the same property with the cognition [would also make the cognition manifest].”
thesis that is ascertained through the reason free from the three fallacies like the “non-establishment [of the locus]” should be accepted.

5. Conclusion

In this short treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra thesis that merely the cognitive representation exists by means of the reasoning proving the thesis that anything that becomes manifest is exclusively cognition itself. In doing so, he refutes various objections against this reasoning and its conclusion. Through these objections, opponents try to demonstrate that the reasoning is invalid and thereby defend their thesis that cognition and object are separate things, as, respectively, what makes manifest and what is to be made manifest. Like many other of Jitāri’s works, the VMS has clear polemical traits. He categorizes his opponents mainly as belonging to the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bāhyārthavāda, which includes representatives of non-Buddhist systems as well as Buddhists.

Through the presentation in previous sections, I hope that I was able to outline the most important points of Jitāri’s arguments in this treatise. Although it seems to me that Jitāri does not offer many innovative ideas, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi should still occupy an important place in the history of Yogācāra philosophical literature, as it summarizes the most important points of the Yogācāra position with regard to the topic of the cognitive image of the object, and reports various opponents’ ideas. It thus enriches our knowledge about later development of the Yogācāra system and its interaction with various Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

References and abbreviations


Cf. VMS 20a5–6/55b1–2: tasmād anyathā prakāśāyogād bādhakasyānaikāntikatāvirahān maudasya kuto ’naikāntikā. tad aanāsiddhyādidoṣatrayaviyoginā hetunā yan niścitaṃ vipaścitā tu upādeyam iti.
Derge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka: sDe dge Tibetan tripiṭaka, bstan ’gyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 1981.


HBṬĀ  Durvekamīśra, Hetubinduṭīkāloka. See HBṬ.


KVP Jīnendrabuddhi, Kāśikāvävarṇaṇapanāpikā. See KV.


MSBh Śabarasvāmī, Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣyam ad Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1,1.1–5. See Frauwallner 1968: 10–61.


PVA Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāra of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikam), ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana. Patna 1953.


ŠVK Kumārila, Ślokavārttika. See NR.


TSP Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā. See TS.


Consciousness and Causality: Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism

by

Christian Coseru

It is well known that Buddhist conceptions of personal identity entail a version of the so-called ‘bundle theory of self:’ the human individual comprises five types of aggregates that serve as the basis for what we ordinarily designate as persons. What is less known (or least explored) is the extent to which this conception of personal identity informs the Buddhist epistemological account of cognition. Specifically, the assumption is that with Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their successors, the bundle theory of personal identity is either glossed over in favor of more robust accounts of consciousness and cognition such as that provided by Yogācāra or challenged for its strict reductionism. I will argue that – rather than glossing over or challenging it – the Buddhist epistemologists uncover a structural asymmetry within the bundle theory between the mental and physical domains, and offer an alternative (if problematic) solution to account for the ineliminable aspects of phenomenal consciousness.

The following analysis focuses on Dharmakīrti’s arguments against Cārvāka physicalism in the so-called proof of rebirth in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika, with a focus on classical Indian philosophical attempts to address the mind-body problem. The key issue concerns the relation between cognition and the body, and the role this relation plays in causal-explanatory accounts of consciousness and cognition. Here a number of questions arise. Does the central principle of Buddhist Abhidharma reductionism apply to consciousness? Is there a causal criterion for the presence of consciousness? If there is, can this causal criterion account for the specific features of consciousness, e.g., its intentionality, phenomenality, and reflexive character (svasamvedana)? Can a causal account of phenomena be reconciled with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? The Buddhist answer to the challenge of Cārvāka physicalism displays many of the common features of classical Indian metaphysical debates on personal identity. My aim is not to trace its exegetical contour and restate its historical significance, but to propose a philosophical reconstruction that builds on two important features presented by the Buddhist account: an expanded conception of causality and a robust account of phenomenal content that, taken together, can help us come to terms with the legacy of mind-body dualism.

1. Buddhist reductionism

In replacing the subject with a play of momentary cognitive events, the Buddhist account of personal identity emphasizes what we may call – using the language of contemporary

I am grateful to Sara McClintock for her helpful advice and comments, and for suggesting many conceptual and stylistic improvements.
philosophy of mind – the dynamic, embodied, and embedded functioning of the five aggregates. However, in the schematic analysis of the five aggregates, only “body” or “form” (rūpa) is a physical aggregate stricto sensu. Sensations, apperception, and volitions can acquire an objectual aspect, but are not empirical objects proper. Nor are they things in the generic sense of the Sanskrit term vastu, that is, abstract entities with well-defined properties and functional characteristics. Thus, a sensation of pain is not reducible to the physical substrate, say a finger, in which it is instantiated (nor presumably to a mere physiological response). Rather, as object-oriented cognitive aspects (viṣayākāra), sensations and volitions are included in the broader Abhidharma category of mental factors (caitasika). Feelings may define the quality of the impressions that result from contact with an object, with the implication that they perhaps stand in a causal relation with these objects. But as internal mental states, they are also conditioned by habitual tendencies (vāsanā), which, in turn, they condition: one’s physical condition after strenuous exertion may feel pleasant or unpleasant depending on one’s level of fitness and degree of exercise frequency. Likewise, apperception (saṃjñā), the capacity to make intelligible or cause to be understood, although dependent on a multiplicity of psychological factors, captures the datum of experience only as fused into a single percept. Volitions too fit the same profile, with one important difference: rather than attending to the object at hand or providing a sort of transcendent unity of apperception, they bring forth future states of existence. As dispositions to act in certain ways, they cleave the mental domain into two classes of conditioned phenomena: those that are internal to consciousness (samprayukta-saṃskāra), such as, for instance, obsessive dispositions (paryavasthāna) like greed and delusion, and those that are dissociated from it (viprayukta-saṃskāra), usually taken to refer to latent dispositions (anuśaya) typically comprising various biological and physical traits.

This aggregate model of personal identity is not incompatible with the notion that there are phenomenal primitives (or, in epistemological terms, cognitive universals) – irreducible features of experience. The experience of vividness (spaṣṭa), for instance, marks perception apart from mental imagery, thus making it possible to identify visual qualia as irreducibly perceptual. Likewise, the experience of being dragged across the floor as opposed to

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3 Insofar as the aggregates of sensation, volition, etc. fall under the general Abhidharma category of dharma, they can be treated, at least under some scholastic interpretations (such as, for instance, of the Śhāvīravāda) as substances (dravya). As Ronkin (2005: 15) has convincingly argued – taking her lead from Gombrich 1996 and Hamilton 1996 – the reductive analysis of human beings in terms of their constitutive aggregates is meant to capture not what human beings are made of, but rather what human experience is constituted as: specifically, as series of experiential events.

4 Detailed accounts of this twofold analysis of phenomena are found in Vasumitra’s Pañcavastukavibhāṣāstra [Wu shih p’i-p’o-sha Zun], T 28 (1555), p. 989b2, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, II, 23–34, and Yasomitra’s Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośāvākyā, Cox (1995, ch. 4) offers the most detailed account to date of the citta-viprayuktasamskāra. For a broader discussion of the process by which mental factors that arise in conjunction with a given intentional object come to be associated with the qualities of the respective object, see Waldron 2003: 57ff.

5 One may extend visual tropes to the domain of imagery, rational deliberation, and introspective awareness, but these are metaphorical rather than literal uses. Dignāga’s conception of mānasa-pratyakṣa
moving freely serves to contrast action from agency, and support the view that even
unreflective and habitual practices, if consciously undertaken, are constitutively agentic. As
the classical example of watching a dance performance while entertaining various thoughts
demostrates, one may be solicited to respond in ways that are wholly unreflective. Being
consciously present to the situation at hand, however, means that these solicitations elicit
not merely a reflex but rather a subjective response. A brilliant dance performance does
not simply induce applauding; rather, the performance solicits appreciation, which serves
as an appropriate and deliberate response in such circumstances. Applause is not merely
a participant reactive attitude, but a learned subjective response to excellence (except,
perhaps, in instances where it reflects norms of audience participation).

It has been argued, most forcefully by Mark Siderits (2003, 2011), that Abhidharma
reductionism entails physicalism, the view that everything is or supervenes on the phys-
ical (where “physical” stands for the world as described by our best physics). Although
Dharmakīrti shares the empirical stance of Abhidharma, the naturalism that informs his
epistemological project is patently anti-physicalist. According to the Sautrāntika Abhi-
dharma account of materiality that Dharmakīrti favors, entities reduce to their phenome-
nal primitives: the particular (svalaṅkaṇa) is a token of a type, not blue in general, but this
unique intensity of cerulean. Furthermore, the formal properties of material objects are
analyzed either in terms of how they are impacted by contact or as factors that oppose
resistance. These properties, however, do not extend to the atoms themselves, which ac-
cording to the Abhidharma form the building blocks of materiality. As monadic units the
atoms are seen as devoid of any formal properties (rūpaṇa). It is only as atomic compounds
(samghātastha, samcita) that atoms are subject to the same properties of resistance and
destruction as composite material entities.

The reductionist model of Abhidharma, like all philosophical attempts to carve reality
at its joints, works against the common conception that empirical awareness provides
access to an external, stable, and self-sustaining world: a world as is (captured by the
notion of svabhāva) rather than as it appears to an observer. But the human mind is not
(like) a clear mirror reflecting back the external world, as naïve realism would have it;
rather, its image is as projected by a mind not entirely free of its own propensities and
confabulations. What Abhidharma offers, then, is a metaphysics of experience, where the
irreducible elements of existence and/or experience (dharma) are not fixed substances but
activities, properties, or dynamic patterns of connectedness that are constitutive of the
world as perceived (lokasamjñā). As the Nikāyas clearly state (e.g., SN IV, 96), our sensory
organs (vision, hearing, etc.) operate in a world whose contours are disclosed in a dynamic
and mutually constituted setting of objects and meaning. In practical terms, that means

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6 This example is meant to support an argument for minimal agency as an ineliminable feature of cognitive
awareness. The finer point is that ‘unreflective’ does not mean ‘unconscious’ or purely ‘behavioral.’
Skillful means, much like skillful coping, are treated here as modes of unreflective, but minimally
conscious and implicitly subjective, agency.

7 See, for example, AK I 13 and AKBh ad cit. (Pradhan 1975: 9): paramāṇurūpaṃ tarhi rūpaṃ na
prāpnoty arūpaṇāt / na vai paramāṇurūpaṃ ekaṃ prthag bhūtam asti / samghātasthaṃ tu tad rūpyata
eva.
experience marks the boundary of what there is: the nexus of causes and conditions that set the boundaries of lived experience are determined by the operations of our cognitive architecture. Color, for instance, only exists for an organism that is sensitive to light.

How does this dynamic picture of what there is take on the characteristics of self and other? And how do these emergent phenomena in turn create the conditions for grasping and attachment? For the Buddhist, the answer does not lie primarily in the patterns of conditioning that explain the aggregation of phenomena, but in certain defining characteristics that belong to the structure of experience itself. Not only are the senses conceived as receptacles of experience (adhisthāna), they also serve as ground or support, joining the external domain of sensory activity (bāhirāyatana) with the internal domain of perception (ādhyātmikāyatana). We can make sense of Dignāga’s stance (at PS, I, 1 and PSV ad cit.) that perception gives us the particular as such, without any conceptual mediation, only insofar as the domain of sensory activity is reducible to its most basic physiological function.

Now, does the central principle of Abhidharma reductionism apply to consciousness? The principle states that things reduce to their component parts, which are ultimately real only if they are further irreducible. If something can be reduced either by breaking it down to more basic constituents or through conceptual analysis, then it is not ultimately real. Pots are not ultimately real, nor are persons real in this ultimate sense. Consciousness too is but a stream of momentary conscious events of different types (visual, auditory, introspective, etc.). But reductionism about consciousness is problematic. Why? Because it cannot explain its most basic features: its intentional, phenomenal, and self-reflexive character (svaṃvedana). The recognition that conscious awareness has these ineliminable structural features creates a series of doctrinal problems for Buddhism in its post-Abhidharma stage of development. For Mādhyamika thinkers like Nāgārjuna, notions such as ‘intrinsic’ and ‘ineliminable’ run counter to the cardinal Buddhist view that all phenomena are momentary, impermanent, and interdependently arisen. Conceived largely as a response to Madhyamaka dialectics, Yogācāra sets out to account for the nature of consciousness and cognition itself, bracketing metaphysical assumptions about the kind of things that there are.

The relation between mind and world continues to be a subject of ongoing debate between Buddhists and their opponents, and among rival Buddhist schools up to the present day. The debates in Buddhist metaphysics of mind are not primarily exegetical (the presence of a vast commentarial literature notwithstanding); rather, they often reflect deep philosophical differences. When these differences are grounded in merely exegetical claims, the text-critical method offers the best way to find solutions. However, if these differences are also grounded in empirical and/or experiential claims, the analytic tools of contemporary philosophy and advances in our empirical investigation of cognition ought

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8 One important exception here are the Pudgalavādins, for whom persons, who are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates (although neither identical nor different from them), are nonetheless real. In Vasubandhu’s summary of this position, for the Pudgalavādin “if a consciousness is aware of a person in dependence upon a visible form known to exist by means of the eye, it is said that a person in known to exist by means of the eye” (AKBh IX in Pradhan 1975: 463). Translation per Duerlinger 2003: 77. Persons are ultimately real (for the Pudgalavādin) because, as Amber Carpenter has convincingly argued, “perception-dharmas and consciousness-dharmas … are related to one another in a … person-constituting way” (2015: 27).
to in principle help move this debate forward in more profitable directions. The mind-body problem may be as intractable now as it was for Dharmakīrti in the seventh century, but our conception of what counts as legitimate, reliable evidence, is less arbitrary, at least with regard to the sort of things that can be said to exist both in a concrete and abstract sense. Few philosophers today who are sympathetic to and influenced by Buddhist ideas find traditional Buddhist beliefs about rebirth and cosmic bodhisattvas to be live options.

2. Physicalism and its discontents

The Pramāṇasiddhi section of the Pramāṇavārttika contains Dharmakīrti’s famous proof of rebirth, better known for its ingenious attempt to answer, using mainly a priori arguments, the Čārvāka’s challenge that consciousness originates, or otherwise has its causal basis, in the body. The key verses (PV II vv. 34–72) and the extensive commentarial literature thereon (from Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, and Manorathanandin, to the Tibetan translations by Sa skya paṇḍita and Śākyaśrībhadra) have been explored at length in Eli Franco’s superb monograph, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth (1997). Its key arguments have likewise been discussed in a series of recent, mainly philosophical, engagements with this topic. The proof is occasioned by the claim, first advanced by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, that the Buddha does not merely avail himself of the right sources of knowledge (pramāṇa), but rather he in some fashion embodies them. Dharmakīrti, as is well known, takes this claim one step further when he argues at PV II vv. 34–131 that the proof of the Buddha being a pramāṇabhūta lies in compassion cultivated by practice over many lifetimes, and in the veracity of his teachings (upadeśa).

Of course, the Buddhist epistemologist’s appeal to the Buddha as an enlightened knower to justify the claim that perception and inference are trustworthy sources of knowledge – because the Buddha declares them to be so – is unmistakably circular. Ernst Steinkellner clearly explains this circularity:


10 There are two basic ways to make the case for the Buddha being a pramāṇabhūta: (i) demonstrate the possibility of infinite compassion, and thus of previous lifetimes dedicated to perfecting such a goal, and (ii) argue for the veracity and viability of the Four Noble Truths as proof that only someone motivated by such compassionate aims could have gained this sort of knowledge. The second demonstration has Dharmakīrti employ the so-called “no alternative” (agatyā) strategy; “Given this [teaching of the Four Noble Truths], which leads to achieving human ends, which is reliable and worth practicing, [we] accept that [this teaching] must be equally so with regard to the other domain [e.g., of scriptural or imperceptible truths]. [Such teaching could] not [have been offered] with the intent of deceiving [others], because it is not an obstacle [but rather an aid to knowledge]; and also because there is no reason for the speaker to engage in aimless deception. Both instances, thus, demonstrate the validity of reasoning on the basis of scriptural sources on account of there being no [other] way” (PV I v. 217 and PVSV ad cit.: tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino ’bhīyogāḥhasyāvisanvādād viṣayāntare ’pi tathātapatgamah, na vipralambhāya, anuparodhā; nispravyojanavithāhādvāhānavipralambhāyac ca vaktuh. tad etad agatyobhayāhāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam). Tillemans (1993: 16ff.) thinks this causal relationship between compassionate undertaking and the effectiveness of embodied epistemic warrants only works for things that are empirically tractable (such as the Four Noble Truths). See also Kataoka 2005: 256–59 for an illuminating discussion of Dharmakīrti’s second argument, and the problematic issue of proving matters that fall outside the domain of empirical ascertainment.
(1) Our ordinary valid cognitions (pramāṇa) establish the authority of the Buddha’s teaching (buddha-vacana); (2) the validity of our cognitions (prāmāṇya) is understood as their reliability (avisamvāditva); (3) reliability depends on successful activity (puruṣārtha-siddhi); (4) all human goals are determined by the “ultimate goal” (nirvāṇa); the “ultimate goal” is indicated in the Buddha’s teaching (buddha-vacana) (Steinkellner 2003: 328).

So: perception and inference are taken to be instrumentally capable of demonstrating that the Buddha is a trustworthy teacher. Because of his trustworthiness, his teachings are valid and provide further proof that only perception and inference qualify as sources of knowledge (again, to come full circle, because the Buddha has established that to be the case). Why claim that valid cognition establishes the authority of the Buddha’s teachings in the first place? Why not simply be content with establishing knowledge on the best possible foundation, whether or not the Buddha’s teachings are in agreement with it? If Buddhist epistemology can lay claim to methodological universalism on account of its reliance on perception and reason alone, reverence for the Buddha as a perfect embodiment of epistemic excellence can seem redundant (except perhaps on political or religious grounds).

Does appeal to the authority of the Buddha as a true embodiment of the sources of knowledge, then, undermine the Buddhist epistemological stance? Not necessarily. Indeed, as Franco notes, “Dharmakīrti argues here … that the Buddha used perception and inference, not that they are valid because of him” (Franco 1999: 65). Precisely what it means to ‘embody’ the sources of reliable cognition remains an open question, regardless of whether Dharmakīrti’s argument is found to be circular or not. It is not enough to say that the Buddha is a true embodiment of reliable cognition: one must also show in what ways. Dharmakīrti’s own answer to this question invokes three distinct elements: the Buddha embodies the sources of knowledge by means of (i) his compassion, (ii) his knowledge, and (iii) the actions that bear testimony to this compassion and knowledge. But neither listing the Buddha’s attributes nor the fact that he reasons and acts on the basis of compassion and knowledge justify the veracity of our cognitions (and the sources thereof).

Whatever Dharmakīrti’s motives might have been in seeking to ground epistemic norms in a proof of rebirth, the arguments against the Cārvāka claim that consciousness begins and ends with the body offer interesting new ways to conceptualize the mind-body problem. I will not dwell on the preamble to the proof, which takes compassion to act as a cause in an effort to achieve the kind of knowledge Buddhas require for accomplishing their mission. As John Taber (2003) has convincingly demonstrated, there is nothing particularly original in articulating a conception of epistemic authority grounded on reliable testimony (as provided by an āpta, a trustworthy person or, as in the case of Kumārila’s stance, of the Vedas). One gets to limit the range of reliable sources of knowledge to perception and

11 Various formulations of this argument, first proposed by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964), are also found in Franco 1997, 1999, and Dunne 2004.

12 The rhetorical implications of this sort of appeal to the Buddha’s embodiment of epistemic excellence are well known. They concern the various models and proofs of omniscience, notwithstanding intramural debates about what exactly constitutes the content of such omniscient (hence epistemically warranted) states: the nature of things, their reality, or the knowledge of all things whatsoever. See McClintock 2010: chapters 4 & 5 for a detailed study of these proofs and their epistemic and rhetorical implications.
inference (accepted by most Indian schools of thought) and at the same time hold on to tradition by granting the foundational figure (or text) privileged epistemic status.

Instead, I want to focus on the metaphysical considerations that ground the causal account Dharmakīrti puts forward, and the specific conception of consciousness that thus emerges. As noted above, the Buddhist holds that consciousness is but a stream of conscious episodes of different types (visual, auditory, etc.). If conscious awareness is taken to be made out of these discrete units, a dilemma arises: what accounts for the sense of continuity of awareness and, more importantly, what could serve as the basis for the arising of each instance of cognitive awareness from one moment to the next? The bundle theory stipulates that every phenomenon is part of a complex causal web. Indeed, the Sanskrit notion of skandha (lit., “heap”) captures rather well the aggregated nature of phenomena – something fashioned by the collective combination of multiple causes and conditions (as Vasubandhu glosses it in AKBh ad I, 7). The constitutive factors themselves exist only as part of a causal continuum of interdependently arising phenomena. Of course, not all the constitutive factors that ground causation contribute in equal measure: some are basic or necessary and some are merely contingent. The Cārvāka claims that the body alone is the source of cognition. But on the aggregate model of personal identity, the body is just one among the five constitutive factors of agency. The principle that establishes effects as markedly different from their cause or as not pre-exiting in the cause (asatkāryavāda), which Śāṁkhya philosophers likewise confront, runs counter to empirical evidence. We observe that like causes like: cows give birth to calves, and fermented milk yields yoghurt. Atypical cases, such as the caterpillar’s metamorphosis into a butterfly, are just the exceptions that prove the rule. Central to this model of causation is the so-called principle of “similar kind(s)” (sajāti), which demands that phenomena arise not in an arbitrary manner, but thorough homogeneous causal chains.

On this principle, then, cognitive awareness cannot arise from something non-conscious, such as the physical body. As Dharmakīrti notes (PV II vv. 35–36a), there could be “unwarranted consequences” (atiprasaṅga) for presupposing otherwise, even as he does not spell out what those consequences might be. One possible interpretation is that Dharmakīrti is committed to a strict ontological difference between “cause” (kāraṇa) and “condition” or “conditioning factor” (pratyaya): the former can only give rise to a specific type of effect, while the latter can serve as a basis for the arising of multiple effects. The acorn can only grow into an oak tree, but the same soil and climactic conditions may provide support for various tree species.

On the reductionist Abhidharma model, all aggregate entities reduce to two kinds of basic constituents: elemental atoms (dravya-paramāṇu) comprising the four primary elements (mahābhūta), and the atomic totality (saṅghāta-paramāṇu), which includes the secondary elements associated with each of the four sense spheres (with the exception of sound). Although the position of the Sārvāstivāda – Vaibhāṣika differs somewhat from that of the Sautrāntika (on which Dharmakīrti relies) in terms of how the lines are drawn between primary and secondary existents, the sense spheres, as a domain of phenomenal
primitives, do belong in the Ābhidharmika’s ultimate ontology.\textsuperscript{13} It is worth noting that this elemental domain is ascertained on the basis of different types of cognitive awareness rather than as a mind-independent reality. For the Vaibhāṣika, sensible phenomena – say, the experience of a pot’s color, weight and shape – are real, despite their reducibility to more basic monadic elements of experience (e.g., phenomenal primitives). However, there is an obvious tension between treating something both as a construct and as ultimately real. In articulating the Sautrāntika position, Vasubandhu is keen to point out that shapes and colors are ultimately real only insofar as they display a certain causal or pragmatic efficacy, that is, only to the extent that they generate the appropriate cognitive event: in the case of shape and color, a corresponding visual experience.\textsuperscript{14} In perceiving a pot, it is not the pot itself that serves as the basis for the arising of the cognitive event but rather the causal efficacy of material elements and phenomenal primitives.

Here too conditioning factors play an important role. Under certain conditions something solid may become liquid, like heat causing the melting of a block of ice into water. Given the speculative nature of Abhidharma metaphysics, there should be no surprise in finding disagreements about the specific ways in which properties attach to each aggregated entity. For instance, while for the Vaibhāṣikas entities borrow their physical properties from the elements themselves, Sautrāntikas take them to be present only as mere potentialities. In a block of ice, the fire element is only potentially present, for without it, ice cannot melt into water. Dharmakīrti works out this account of causal efficacy in terms of the strict regularities that must obtain between elements in a causal series. These regularities act as a kind of “restriction in causal potential” (śaktiniyama)\textsuperscript{15} – a notion that Dharmakīrti uses to argue for the limited or restricted efficacy of causal elements. For instance, a lotus seed cannot produce a cow and oil cannot be extracted from sand. The so-called essential nature (or ‘nature-svabhāva’) of the causally efficient element in a causal chain suggests that entities are not simply the product of a given causal chain or causal complex (hetusāmagrī). Rather, they are the product of specifically active elements within that chain and of the conditions that make it possible for those active elements to manifest their potentiality.\textsuperscript{16}

However, regardless of whether ice melts because an internal principle of preponderance governs the transformation of physical substances, or because conditioning factors bolster a particular causal chain of events, it simply cannot be the case that yoghurt could just as easily come from clay as from milk and a gilt could give birth to a calf just as naturally as to

\textsuperscript{13} Atomism – the notion that matter reduces to some elemental constituents – finds expression for the first time in Dharmaśrī’s Abhidharmahṛdaya (2\textsuperscript{nd} c. C.E.), before receiving extensive treatment in the Mahāvibhāṣā.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, AK k. 10–13 and AKBh \textit{ad cit.}, and discussion in Hattori 1988: 39–41 and Ronkin 2005: 56–59.

\textsuperscript{15} This notion appears in several places on the Pramāṇavārttika and its autocommentary (see, e.g., PV I.43, I.195, and I.255 and PVSV \textit{ad cit.}). As John Dunne notes, summarizing Dharmakīrti’s position, the point of the restriction is to tie the causally efficient element to its specific causal antecedent: “it is impossible for an apple seed to produce certain types of effects because it is impossible for it to arise from certain kinds of causes” (2004: 162).

\textsuperscript{16} On the distinction between ‘nature-svabhāva’ of an entity and its location in a causal totality, see Steinkellner 1971: 185f, and Dunne 2004: 163f. Dunne’s translation of the relevant passage from PV I.7 and PVSV \textit{ad cit.}, slightly altered, reads: “The arising of an effect that is inferred by way of a causal complex is characterized as a svabhāva of that causal complex, because the [the capacity for] the effect’s production does not depend on anything else.”
a piglet. Given the widespread belief in pre-modern India that sentience can have multiple origins (e.g., egg-born, sprout-born, womb-born, and moisture-born), Dharmakīrti does in principle concede that the material elements could serve as a basis for the arising of cognition. But empirical observation also yields restrictions: the principle of preponderance may well apply to all kinds, but a cow is not just a collection of elements with a certain predominant property like solidity, heat, or capacity to produce milk. Nor is it a conceptually constructed entity like a forest, or a cart, that is analytically reducible to its constitutive parts. There must be more than just the configuration of matter that accounts for the arising of cognitive awareness (PV II vv. 37–38). The structural asymmetries within this aggregate conception of personal identity are becoming obvious.

3. Causation and emergence

The canonical literature presents us with a standard formula for the dependently arising phenomenon of consciousness:

Dependent on the eye and forms, visual-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perception and notions resulting from mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the eye.\(^{17}\)

On this standard account, a specific type of consciousness accompanies each of the sense modalities. In this specific case, what is occasioned is an instance of visual awareness. No one constitutive factor in this nexus of interactions has causal priority: instead, the association between perception and thinking results from the habitual tendency of the mind towards conceptual proliferation. Note that while sense, object, and conscious apprehension come together as a consequence of past habituations and other conditioning factors, the ensuing cognitive awareness is both sustained by and sustains these factors. As stated, the principle of dependent arising would place consciousness alongside other factors in the causal web in an interrelated, symmetric, and mutually supportive system of relations. The sense would be as necessary for the arising of cognitive awareness as this awareness would for the optimum functioning of the organism. But, as Dharmakīrti points out, the class of internal mental states that comprise thoughts, memories, and affects does not appear to depend on the senses. Introspective awareness (\textit{manovijñāna}), which Dharmakīrti (following Dignāga) categorizes as a distinct type of perception, specifically “mental perception” (\textit{mānasa-pratyakṣa}), does not depend on the sensory systems. Rather, following the Yogācāra analysis of the afflicted mind (\textit{kliṣṭa-manas}), Dharmakīrti takes introspective awareness to be mired in the same confusion and ignorance that can also cloud understanding and render sense perception ineffective. A deluded mind is incapable of providing reliable testimony about matters of fact: the believer in ghosts is more likely

\(^{17}\) MN I, 111–112 in Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi 2001: 203.
to perceive the rustle in the bushes as a shadowy figure stalking them, rather than a gust of wind.

The relational asymmetry between cognitive awareness and the other contributing factors becomes obvious: for Dharmakīrti, introspective awareness cannot thus arise from “the body together with all the senses” because its occurrence is observed even when one or more of the senses are impaired (PV II v. 47). Dharmakīrti would welcome the wealth of empirical evidence from clinical neuroscience about such phenomena as the “locked-in syndrome” or the persistence of “minimal consciousness” in patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state.\(^\text{18}\) This sort of evidence, it seems, lends support to his thesis that sentience, as a minimally conscious state, enjoys a certain degree of causal autonomy from more specific higher-order modes of cognitive awareness.\(^\text{19}\) It also suggests that, given the difficulty of diagnosing whether a patient is in a minimally conscious state rather than a permanent vegetative state, the distinction between unconscious mental states and states of consciousness with minimal cognitive and behavioral function is less clear than it may seem. Rather than being unconscious, a cognitively and behaviorally non-responsive individual could simply be minimally conscious. Most importantly, in the absence of a better understanding of the tight correlation between mental and physical (e.g., brain) states, such evidence sets the stage for developing a wider conception of causality than physicalism allows.

Recall that Dharmakīrti does not reject the idea that the body can serve as a support for cognition. Indeed, he acknowledges that in some circumstances the occurrence of a sensation, say of pain, can simply be the result of a wound in the body. The pain has both qualitative features or qualia (sharp, stingy) and intentional content, insofar as it discloses the body as the locus of tissue damage. Furthermore, the co-occurrence of bodily processes and specific mental states at best suggests that the body is a contributing factor in the arising of cognition, not that it actually causes it. Presupposing otherwise would entail that there is a closer causal connection between cognition and the body than even the physicalist is willing to admit, one that ensures, for instance, that cognition could persist in the body after death (PV II v. 51).

As Taber (2003: 492) notes in pursuing a similar line of inquiry, what we see here is a clear example of Occam’s Razor: Dharmakīrti argues against taking cognitive awareness to be a product of bodily functions because he thinks the mental domain is the natural place

\(^{18}\) For a descriptive account of the varieties of locked-in syndrome, see Bauer/Gerstenbrand/Rumpl 1979 and Laureys et al. 2005. A detailed review of the literature on minimal states of consciousness experienced by coma patients, which also puts forward a model of consciousness that takes it to be an emergent property of the collective functioning of widespread frontoparietal brain networks, is found in Laureys/Schiff 2012.

\(^{19}\) Working out the implications of empirical research on borderline states of consciousness for a theory of consciousness, Bayne, Hohwy and Owen (2016) point out the inadequacy of models that equate global states of consciousness (e.g., alert wakefulness, dreaming, and such comatose conditions as vegetative and minimally conscious states) with levels of consciousness. Unlike local states of consciousness, typically associated with the contents of consciousness (e.g., perceptual states, thoughts, and desires), global states are supposed to indicate that consciousness comes in degrees. But, as Bayne et al. conclude, being conscious, much like being married or being a bachelor, does not come in degrees. Rather, being conscious, at a minimum, is not merely a matter of occupying the first-personal stance, but of having various cognitive capacities available for perceptual and behavioral tasks.
for cognitive awareness. The mental domain is sufficiently complex to support its own operations. No need, therefore, to bring in an incongruous factor such as the body, which obeys a different set of laws, to explain the arising and specific operations of cognitive activity (PV II vv. 33–44). Nothing is closer to each instance of cognitive awareness than a cognition immediately preceding it. Why not postulate that each state of cognitive awareness serves as the antecedent cause for cognition? Hence Dharmakīrti’s dictum: “let only what is observed as the cause always be considered the cause” (PV II v. 44cd). And what is observed is the constant stream of mental states.

Furthermore, as the literature on meditative absorption testifies, while this stream of cognitive awareness can be altered, it cannot be halted. In the Bhāvanākrama I, 212, for instance, Kamalaśīla argues against those who think meditative cultivation essentially amounts to casting aside all mental activity and achieving a state of unconscious concentration (asamjñīsamāpatti). What is achieved is a state of non-conceptual awareness, rather than the cessation of all mental activity (manasikāra). Consciousness, it seems, persists so long as the body is alive (even as the relation between life and mind remains somewhat unclear). Indeed, concepts such as bhavaṅga-citta or “life-continuum mind” hint at an intimate correlation between mind and life, despite the largely speculative nature of the Abhidharma account in which it occurs.20

Dharmakīrti’s attempt to carve out a space for the autonomy of cognition from material causation, while retaining the efficient-causal model, showcases not only his logical ingenuity but also his keen phenomenological sense. We may wonder, then, why he allows his observations to be constrained by doctrinal considerations, rather than deferring to the empirical evidence alone. The Čārvāka physicalist too is a keen observer, but – not saddled with the sort of doctrinal commitments that press the Buddhist into a defense of rebirth – paints a starker picture of the human condition. Just like fermented grain yields a liquid with the capacity to intoxicate, so also consciousness must be regarded as nothing more than a product of the type of material organization that is constitutive of biological organisms. The Čārvāka’s response to the principle of similar kinds (sajāti) is a new conception of causality: emergentism.21 Mental properties are ontologically novel emergent properties that supervene on the physical.

20 The Pāli Abhidhamma typically glosses bhavaṅga as a mode or function of consciousness that captures its receptive or transitional state, as when attention shifts from one object to another. The principal sources (Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga and Athhasālinī, Buddhadatta’s Abhidhammadāvatāra, and Anuruddha Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha) are quite explicit that, like all other aspects of consciousness, bhavaṅga too is intentionally constituted, that is, it is consciousness of something. However, because it stands for consciousness in its liminal state, its intentional content is not available for reflection. It is the kind of consciousness that persists in the interval between more alert states of mind; hence, its association with the continuum of life. Cf. Gethin 2005.

21 On the appropriation of ‘emergentism’ as a category for describing the Čārvāka account of consciousness and cognition, see Ganeri 2011 and Coseru 2017.
4. The challenge of physicalism

As we noted above, Dharmakīrti’s statement about the relation between consciousness and causal explanation points to the autonomy of cognition. His view is most clearly stated in the following verse:

[Nor are the senses, or the body together with the senses, the cause of cognition, for] even when every single one of the senses is impaired, the [corresponding] cognitive awareness is not impaired. But when [the cognitive awareness] is impaired, their (i.e., the senses’) impairment is observed.\(^{22}\)

But cognitive awareness is obviously in some kind of dependency relation to the body, as demanded by the causal principle of dependent arising. For instance, visual awareness can only emerge in organisms that are sensitive to light. The Cārvāka does grant that cognitive awareness can have novel properties not observed in the material substratum (the body) that serves as its basis. But unlike the dualist picture the Buddhist paints, the Cārvāka contends that as an awareness of a certain type (visual, auditory, etc.) consciousness must be related to the body’s specific functionality in the respective cognitive domain. Given that consciousness takes the form of an apprehension of objects (that is, given its inherently intentional structure), and given that apprehension only occurs in specific modes of cognizing such as perceiving, imagining, or remembering, consciousness can be present neither when the sensory systems are not yet developed (e.g., in the embryonic stage) nor when they are not responsive (e.g., in a state of coma). Is there a causal criterion for the presence of consciousness? And, more importantly, can the Buddhist answer the challenge of physicalism without appealing to the kind of evidence (e.g., “the remembrance of past lives”) the Cārvāka would simply not accept?

I have discussed the Cārvāka’s objection to the autonomy of consciousness in detail elsewhere (see Coseru 2017), specifically with reference to Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha, and Kamalaśīla’s commentary thereon. Here I will simply attempt to restate the arguments in a formal description.\(^{23}\) The physicalist’s objection to any presumed continuity of awareness is framed by some easily recognizable arguments, all of which have key Buddhist tenets as their premise, but draw different conclusions. The first argument may be summarized as follows:

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P_1: \text{An individual is nothing but a bundle of aggregates.}
\]

\[
P_2: \text{Aggregates, including consciousness, are reducible to their material substrata (viz., atoms).}
\]

\[
C: \therefore \text{Conscious awareness must be an emergent property of a certain type of material aggregation (typical for biological organisms).}
\]

\(^{22}\) PV II. v. 39: pratyekam upaghāte ’pi nendriyānāṃ manomateḥ / upaghāto ’sti bhaṅge ’syās teṣāṃ bhaṅgaś ca drśyate.

\(^{23}\) Śāntarakṣita’s summary of the Cārvāka position on consciousness and causation is found in TS vv. 1857–1870. For a detailed study of the relevant Cārvāka fragments that survive, see Bhattacharya 2009: 33–43 and Franco 1997: 253–256.
The Cārvāka is comfortable with the aggregate conception of personal identity, and welcomes its epistemic consequences (only irreducible elements are ultimately real). Since consciousness is an aggregate phenomenon, essentially reducible to a stream of momentary conscious events, it too must be the product of a specific kind of material organization, perhaps the sort typical of organisms endowed with a nervous system. The Buddhist faces two important problems: first, that of explanatory sufficiency: why shouldn’t material organization with its emergent properties and functionality suffice as an explanatory account for the arising of consciousness? Second, that of causal relevance: what evidence is there that consciousness, as the Buddhist claims, generates cognitive activity in ways that cannot be accounted for by material causes and conditions? Empirical observation, it seems, yields an altogether different picture, one where conscious states are tightly correlated with bodily processes.

The second argument extends this critique, taking into account the intentional structure of awareness, and pointing to its conditioning factors, specifically that cognition appears to be tied to the development and maturation of the body.

P1: Consciousness is always consciousness of (i.e., it is intentional).

P2: Conscious apprehension occurs only in specific modes (perceiving, remembering, etc.).

C: : . Consciousness cannot be present if the cognitive systems are undeveloped (embryonic stage) or unresponsive (comatose state).

Here the Cārvāka admonishes against taking adult experience to be normative for consciousness at all stages of biological development. For in utero, when the cognitive systems are not yet formed, there is neither vision nor visual object. What sense would it make then to talk about visual awareness without a visual system? Of course, the physicalist is in no better position than the Buddhist to explain the arising of consciousness. But at least, from the physicalist’s standpoint, recognizing that material causation must play a key role in whatever properties or characteristics consciousness exhibits, is a step in the right direction.

Finally, the third argument invokes the principle of positive and negative co-variance (anvaya-vyatireka) to make the case that consciousness can only become manifest in one cognitive chain:

P1: Different types of bodies (of human and non-human animals), and different tokens of the same body, manifest different types of consciousness.

P2: Granted the principle of positive and negative co-variance.

C: : . Consciousness cannot apprehend that which is contrary to its mode of realization (consciousness can only be associated with the one cognitive chain of either human or non-human animals, that can serve as its basis).

If the arising of consciousness is grounded in the body, then it is specific to each body both within and across species. That is, for the Cārvāka every concrete mental state arises from a corresponding bodily process or function. The persistence of conscious awareness within
a given mental stream is only invariably concomitant with that stream as a specifically embodied individual. At least in Śāntarakṣita’s reconstruction, the Cārvāka appears to hold a version of the token identity theory of mental states: every concrete mental particular (e.g., a given sharp pain) can be identified with some concurrent physical (or neurophysiological) state. This view is supported by two key principles that inform the Cārvāka’s philosophy of mind: (i) the human being is just an aggregate of the four elements, the combination thereof instantiating its mental properties; and (ii) mental properties thus instantiated result from the specific ways in which the elements combine. But as Kamalaśīla notes in his commentary, there is disagreement among the Cārvākas on how to interpret earlier statements (attributed to Bṛhaspati) about the precise ways in which these instantiated mental properties relate to the elements, either taken in isolation or combined.

Given these considerations, the Buddhist faces a dilemma: the aggregated conception of personal identity seems to support the physicalist position that consciousness is an emergent property of certain types of material organization. Consciousness cannot be both part of this causal web and just an instance in a beginningless stream of conscious events. Can the Buddhist answer the physicalist challenge while retaining a causal-explanatory framework in accounting for the relation between cognition and the body? In a detailed analysis of the explanatory role of causal generation, Kamalaśīla identifies an important difference between the operations of causality in the physical domain and the limits models of material causation face when extended to consciousness and cognition.

Whenever an effect is dependent on a collection of causes and conditions it does not arise when even one of these conditions is absent, for it would not be dependent upon them, if it did. It could be said, “All the atoms insofar as they occur in [its] proximity are the cause of cognition.” In that case a difference should be observable between the effect produced by a non-deficient cause and that produced by a deficient cause, as the two are different. Otherwise, a distinction in the [capacity of the] cause [to bring about different effects depending on its fitness] would be futile. In effect, when a cause that has been perfect in all its aspects becomes defective in some respect, it does not occasion a difference in the mind and that which is mental (mano-mati), on account of the fact that preceding auditory and other kinds of impression continue intact [in the mental stream].

We see here a clear acknowledgement that cognitive awareness depends upon the efficacy of all underlying causal factors (perceptual, volitional, dispositional, etc.), and the recognition that, in turn, these factors reduce to their causal totality (kāranasāmagrī). On a strict

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24 See Bhattacharyya 2002, and discussion in Ganeri 2011: 5.
account of causal generation, cognitive error would track closely deficient causation. But that does not always happen. One might perceive a sparkling lake where there are only naturally occurring conditions for an optical illusion. This perceptual illusion is not simply a case of misapprehension, for the illusion persists even after it has been disambiguated (that is, after one has come to apprehend the appearance of the lake as a mirage). What the error argument targets is strict causal generation: the notion that each mental state is instantiated by a suitably relevant combination of physical elements and processes. The persistence of perceptual illusion even after disambiguation, and the possibilities of effective action such disambiguation opens up (not chasing after a mirage), work against the strict causal model of the Cārvāka physicalist, which reduces human agency to changes in the microphysical structure of each individual.

When Dharmakīrti claims that a trustworthy cognition (āvisaṃvāda) must also be causally effective, he advances a different naturalistic account of cognition than the one put forth by the Cārvāka, one that takes into account the intentional structure of awareness and its phenomenal character: perception is not simply the apprehension of a unique particular as such; rather it is the apprehension of a particular as perceived, which also discloses the perceiver’s intentional stance. In the case of perceptual illusions such as mirages, it is not only the object or content of the experience that gets disclosed, but also the perceiver’s vantage point, who can ensure successful action through a shift in perspective.

5. Causality and the co-constitutive manifest

Has the Buddhist satisfactorily answered the challenge of physicalism? Before we attempt an answer to this question, let us revisit once more Dharmakīrti’s contention that the senses are rendered ineffective by an impaired consciousness. Regardless of whether we take him to be arguing from a Sautrāntika or Yogācāra position, is it clear that even when he appears to reject the notion that the intentional object is causally related to the experience of a unique particular (as he does in PV III v. 320), Dharmakīrti is in fact pressing an important phenomenological point: specifically, that considerations about the structure of awareness must play a role in settling epistemological disputes. This point is necessary to support his account of the efficacy of cognition. If one does not factor in the dual-aspect theory of mental states in mapping out the relation between consciousness and causality, then one cannot understand why causal explanation retains an element of ontological subjectivity. The justification for taking reflexivity (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti) as a condition for the possibility of warranted cognition may indeed stem from Dharmakīrti’s commitment to

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27 The assumption behind strict models of causal generation is that a suitably efficacious causal chain generates each epistemically salient cognitive state: the state of quench is generated by water ingestion or water metabolism. Cognitive error, as in the case of water mirages and such, results from a defective cause: that is, the water in the mirage has the formal properties of real water (etc., reflectance) but lacks the latter’s efficacy: illusory water does not quench thirst.

28 As Franco (1997: 87) notes, whether we attribute it to Dharmakīrti’s genius or the versatility of the Sanskrit language, it is possible to read him as endorsing both the Yogācāra view of the luminosity of the mind (prabhāsvaram cittam) – which, consequently, means that one may have to take reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) as the only warranted type of cognition – and the Sautrāntika notion that the appearance of objects in cognition corresponds to eternal particulars.
the self-luminosity theory of consciousness. But what is important about this theory is that it rules out the possibility of reducing cognition to subpersonal levels of explanation. Walking is a complex motor skill, which, once learned, may appear involuntary. The same can be said about language and basic perceptual function. But what ensures their epistemic and pragmatic efficacy is the ongoing active presence of an implicit awareness that attends to the object at hand.

The mind’s attentive capacity (manaskāra), then, makes a certain dimension of human cognition not merely the effect of causal chains in the physical domain but a causal factor in its own right in the domain of cognition. This self-reflexive aspect of cognition can remain constant with respect to a given object of experience (say, a column of smoke), despite it being prompted by a deficient cause (in this case, a dust column). On account of this apparent variance, consciousness is neither entirely grounded in, nor explainable in terms of, physical elements and processes. The Buddhist does not deny that cognitive states are made manifest (abhivyajyate) when the body is present, only that their manifestation is to be understood in strictly physical causal terms.

4. Conclusion or how to avoid the fallacy of ambiguity

Let me conclude by revisiting a question that was asked at the beginning of this paper: are causal accounts of generation for material phenomena reconcilable with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? By reducing the analysis of consciousness and cognition to transactions in the physical domain, the Čārvāka, much like contemporary physicalists, is committing a category mistake: consciousness is a subjective phenomenon and thus its manifestation cannot be accounted for in the impersonal language of causality for material objects. Is it possible, then, that even Dharmakīrti, insofar as he seeks a causal explanation for the epistemic reliability of certain cognitions, is guilty of the very charge he levels against the physicalist? As I argued elsewhere (Coseru 2017), ontological reductionism is not the same as epistemological reductionism. Indeed, there is a systematic ambiguity between the ontological and the epistemic sense in using the word ‘empirical’ and its cognates to capture causal relations. Sometimes ‘empirical’ stands for contingent states of affairs, and sometimes for a method that can be used to establish something as factual. Facts about one’s subjective experience, for instance, are not empirically accessible in the way that facts about external objects (or their atomic constituents) are. The basis for the epistemic subjective-objective distinction is an ontological distinction in modes of existence.

In short, ontological subjectivity is no bar to epistemic objectivity. Consciousness, unlike its contents, is implicitly manifest. Conscious awareness does not become manifest by being reflected upon, as do its specific contents (which are only available when attended to in perception or brought under a specific concept). That is to say: consciousness has an observer-independent status. I do not become conscious by observing the occurrence of my mental states. Rather, I become aware of the contents of my experience by virtue of being conscious. Causality, on the other hand, is an observer-relative phenomenon: the very notion of ‘event’ presupposes an observer. Events thus stand in a particular kind of

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29 This distinction is examined at length by Searle (2015: 74ff.).
relation to their antecedents only to the extent that there is a conception of causality in place. That causality should be an observer-relative phenomenon does not mean, however, that it is arbitrary. Rather, its observer-relative status simply suggests that it contains an element of ontological subjectivity.

Dharmakīrti (and his successors) may well admit that aggregated entities reduce to their ontological primitives, which alone are real. But causally describable series of events are not incompatible with treating such basic events as irreducibly mental. Buddhist conceptual reductionism about consciousness, therefore, does not necessarily entail physicalism.

References and abbreviations

Primary sources

AK Abhidharmakośa: See AK Bh.


PSV Pramāṇasamuccayanāti: See PS.


TSP Tattvasamgrahapañjalī: See TS.

Secondary sources


Pradhan 1975  See AKBh.


Shastri 1968  See TS.


1. Introduction

1.1 The proof of the Buddha’s omniscience occupies, as is well-known, a prominent place in Indian Buddhist philosophy, and also constitutes an essential part of Mahāyāna Buddhism’s dogmatic construction, both as an essential component of its soteriological ideal and as a foundation for the transmission of Buddhist teachings through Scripture. Yet, surprisingly, we do not find a systematic consideration of this topic in the ‘pramāṇa’-school until a comparatively late date. Although both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti deal in some detail with the perception of yogins, their consideration of the ‘fourth’ type of perceptual cognition is done independently of the question whether a yogin could become omniscient by this means. One must wait until the 8th century and the works of Śāntarakṣita (725–788),

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2 On the early history of the concept of omniscience in Buddhism, see in particular Pandey 1972, Griffiths 1990 and Kawasaki 1992. For an overview in English, see McClintock 2010: 23–35. As she notes, Buddhist attitudes toward omniscience might have been far more ambivalent than is the case in Jainism, especially in the early period. On this point, see also Jackson 1991: 230–232.

3 For a synthesis on the question, see Eltschinger (2009), who discusses relevant passages of PS (1.6cd), PVin 1 (27.7–28.8) and PV (3.281–286). Further references in Eltschinger 2009: 191 (n. 94).

4 By this I do not mean to say that Dharmakīrti, in particular, did not believe in the Buddha’s omniscience, which is obviously not the case. His conception of yogipratyakṣa as a “vision of the [four] Nobles’ Truths” (āryasatyadarśana – see below § 3.5) also implies a form of ‘focused’ omniscience like the one defined in PV 2.29–33. Nevertheless, omniscience did not constitute a major philosophical or religious issue for him as it would for later Buddhist authors. As pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 17), “the concept of omniscience does not occupy a special place in Dharmakīrti’s argument for establishing the Buddha as pramāṇabhūta,” a point that sharply contrasts with later understandings of this attribute of the Buddha. See also Franco 2011: 89 and Eltschinger (2005: 429–434), who explains this state of affairs in terms of a conscious apologetic strategy: “Dharmakīrti aura élaboré une structure doctrinale assez ouverte pour que les docteurs bouddhistes y lisent l’adhésion du maître à l’omniscience, mais assez implicite pour que les pourfendeurs de ce dogme ne puissent lui en faire le reproche” (p. 434). Equally significant is Dharmakīrti’s lack of interest for God’s omniscience in the section of the PV refuting the existence of īśvara (PV 2.8–28). Specialists of Dharmakīrti still disagree as to what his final position regarding total omniscience might have been, in particular in the case of the Buddha. See Jackson 1991: 232–234, Eltschinger 2005: 434 and McClintock 2010: 135–138. The main passage under discussion (PVin 2.55) is however unrelated to the definition of yogic perception formulated in PVin 1 (see preceding note).
Kamalaśīla (740–795) and Prajñākaragupta (750–810?)\(^5\) to find an articulate defence of omniscience in the school claiming Dharmakīrti’s heritage, further developed by thinkers like Śaṅkaranandana (800–980?), Jñānaśrīmitra (980–1040?) and Ratnakīrti (990–1050?).\(^6\)

1.2 It is now generally admitted that the development of this new field of investigation within the ‘epistemological’ school of Buddhism owes a lot to the critique propounded in the 6\(^{th}–8\(^{th}\) centuries by Brahmanical thinkers, especially those belonging to the ritualistic school of Mīmāṃsā. From an early date, these thinkers regarded the possibility for a person to grasp the totality of being perceptually as a serious threat to their conception of the Veda as the unique means to know dharma, the ritual and ethical system defining what we call ‘Brahmanism.’ As far as we know, the first Brahmanical thinker to present a systematic attack against the belief in an omniscient being is Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600–650?),\(^7\) both in the codanā-section (ad MiSū 1.1.2) of the Ślokavārttika (ŚIV) (vv. 110c–155) and in the corresponding fragments of the Brhaṭṭīkā (BṬ) quoted in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṃgraha (TS) (vv. 3127–3245).\(^8\) There, it is principally the idea of the Buddha as the omniscient founder of a religion which is attacked, a fact that might explain the importance accorded to Kumārila’s ideas in later Buddhist thought.\(^9\) Kumārila, however, was not the only Mīmāṃsaka to have offered a critique of the Buddha’s omniscience by the beginning of the 8\(^{th}\) century. An important examination of this concept was also carried out by Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?) in the first, aporetical part – generally (though somewhat improperly) known as ‘the pūrvapakṣa’ – of his treatise on action and injunction, the Vidhiviveka (ViV), commented upon in the 10\(^{th}\) century by Vācaspati Miśra in the Nyāyakaṇīka (NyK).\(^10\) In

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\(^5\) On Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s discussions of omniscience, see McClintock 2010. On Prajñākaragupta, see Moriyama 2014 and below § 4. Another early and potentially important document is the (mostly unstudied) Sarvajñasiddhi of Śubhagupta (720–78), preserved only in Tibetan (see Bühnemann 1980: viii and Watanabe 1987).

\(^6\) For a preliminary edition and analysis of Śaṅkaranandana’s Sarvajñasiddhi (kārikās only), see Eltschinger 2008. See also Eltschinger (2015: 323), who mentions, besides the Sarvajñasiddhi, a shorter work called Sarvajñasiddhisamkṣepa, still unpublished. A study of fragments of Jñānaśrīmitra’s otherwise lost Sarvajñasiddhi is found in Steinkellner 1977. For an in-depth study of Ratnakīrti’s treatise of the same name, see Bühnemann 1980 and Goodman 1989. On the possible contribution of Jitāri (9\(^{th}–10\(^{th}\) c.?) to this debate, see Bühnemann 1980: viii and Eltschinger 2008: 142.

\(^7\) Kumārila’s date is established in relation to that of Dharmakīrti, of whom he might have been an elder contemporary. The date 600–650 proposed by Kataoka (2011: 112) on the basis of Frauwallner’s dating of Dharmakīrti (600–660) may have to be revised in case the great Buddhist logician should be placed a few decades earlier, as proposed by Krasser (2012).

\(^8\) The numbering of verses in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṃgraha is that of Swami Dwarikadas Shastri’s edition (Benares, 1968) (= TS), which slightly differs from that of Embar Krishnamacharya’s earlier edition (Baroda, 1926, reprinted in 1988). For a detailed study of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience, see Kataoka 2003a and Kataoka 2011. Equally central to this debate are vv. 26–33 of the pratyaśa-section of the ŚIV (ad Sūbarabhāṣya 1.1.4), dealing with the perception of yogins (translation in Taber 2005: 54–56). Omniscience is again alluded to in ŚIV (sambandhākṣepaparipāra) 44ab and 114ab, but these are simple reminiscences of the codanā-section, adding no new arguments.

\(^9\) Only on one occasion does Kumārila allude to omniscience as conceived by the Jains (ŚIV [codanā"] 141–142). No such allusion is found in the BT. The question of God’s omniscience is not touched upon by Kumārila, and seems to have been introduced into Mīmāṃsā by Maṇḍana Miśra (see below § 1.3).

\(^10\) Other Mīmāṃsakas of the period might have been interested in the question of the Buddha’s omniscience, but we do not have much evidence for this. The question whether Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka, in the ninth
this work, the existence of an omniscient being is made the subject of a lengthy refutation occupying more than a third of the whole pūrvapakṣa (ViV 15–25), which has not received much attention so far though it constitutes one of our main sources for the history of this debate in Mīmāṃsā before the time of Śāntarakṣita. My purpose in this essay is to give the reader a first glimpse into this important text, concentrating on its treatment of the Buddhist idea of omniscience.

1.3 Considering the ViV was written perhaps no more than a century after Kumārila’s death, one is struck by how little Maṇḍana apparently owes to the old Master, whose works he simply never quotes in that section. Kumārila’s almost exclusive preoccupation with Buddhism is also not discernible in Maṇḍana’s work. For sure, the Brahmasiddhi (BS) (presumably Maṇḍana’s last work) still mentions “the Buddha, wrongly believed to be omniscient” (sarvajñābhimatabuddha) as the prototype of the false teacher of dharma. Vācaspati is also probably right in considering that the brief description of the Omniscient in the prose introduction to ViV^K 15 refers in priority to the Buddha: “an instructor of chapter of his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās (9.15–16), refers to Kumārila’s views or to those of an earlier Mīmāṃsaka has been raised by Krasser (2012: 559–568), following a remark by Lindtner (2001: 3). I fully agree with Krasser that “one can easily read Bhāviveka as refuting Kumārila” (p. 565), but the passage in question is too brief to say much more. Krasser’s assumption (p. 567) that Bhavya targets an early Mīmāṃsaka different from Kumārila while evoking his opponent’s belief in Jaimini’s omniscience (Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 9.163 and Tarkajvālā thereon; unavailable in Sanskrit, text and translation: Krasser 2012: 566) requires additional cavets, for it holds only assuming Bhavya is perfectly accurate in his critiques or always relies on a Mīmāṃsaka source, which is far from certain. A further unsolved case is that of the two Mīmāṃsakas Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa (see McClintock 2010: 155–156, 225, 356–59). These two enigmatic figures are known exclusively through their mention by Kamalaśīla, who ascribes to them a series of opinions reported by Sāntarakṣita in TS 3246–60 (Japanese translation: Watanabe 1988). See TSP 1020.16–17: sāṃpratam sāmatayajñatayor matena punar api sarvajñatidūṣanam āha; “Now, he exposes yet another refutation of an omniscient [being], following the view of Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa.” Some scholars suspected that these could be forged names, made up in reference to the Sāma-and Yajurveda (Kawasaki 1992: 255), but the fact remains that the opinions associated with them cannot easily be traced to any known mīmāṃsaka text.

11 For a brief synopsis of the section, see Stern 1988: 28–45. The recent summary of the ViV by Potter (2014: 289–295) unfortunately ignores that important section of the work, as did the small monograph by Natarajan (1995) on which it is based. The only study of that part of the ViV-‘corpus’ so far is the German translation of a fragment of Vācaspati Miśra’s NyK (ad ViV 15) dealing with yogic perception by M. Pemwieser (1991). On this fragment, see also Steinkellner 1978. M. Biardeau’s unpublished French translation of the whole pūrvapakṣa of the ViV and NyK, now kept at the archives of the Collège de France in Paris, naturally includes a translation of ViV 15–25 and the corresponding NyK.

12 See David 2013: 281, n. 31.

13 BS 2.27cd–28 (84.9–10).

14 Although Vācaspati does not mention the Buddha by name, his characterisation of the Omniscient in the NyK (445.5–446.6) has a definite Buddhist ring to it: for Vācaspati, the Omniscient is the “Blessed Doctor” (bhagavān bhīṣaj – 445.5), “the Blessed One, whose all-pervasive compassion has become his intimate goal, who has achieved the ultimate degree of detachment, untouched in the least by [main] defilements such as desire or by minor defilements such as excitement or pride” (svārthībhū-taviśvavyāpikāruṇyo bhagavān vairāgyātiśayasaṃpanno mātrayāpi rāgādibhiḥ kleśair upakleśaiś ca madamānādibhir aparāmṛṣṭaḥ [445.10–446.2]). As Stern (1988: 997) rightly points out, the description of the NyK has an almost exact parallel in Vācaspati’s Nyāyāvatārtikātātparyayikā ad Nyāyasūtra 2.1.68 (384.14–19, especially 384.16–19, which corresponds almost word for word to NyK 446.2–6), dealing with the Naiyāyika definition of the āpta (see following note). There, we see the very same characteristics
creatures (*niyokta bhūtānām*), deserving to be obeyed, directly perceiving the means for realizing the Supreme Good as prescribed [in the Scriptures] (*sākṣātkrtānuśravikaśreyasādhana*), who loves [to do] what is useful [to others] (*hitakāma* and is omniscient (*sarvajña*).15 But in fact, only ViV 15 is directly concerned with Buddhism,16 while the rest of the section discusses arguments from other schools17 and even contains the earliest critique of divine omniscience in a Mīmāṃsā text, if not in Indian philosophy overall (ViV 20–24).18 The tone of harsh religious polemics transpiring from Kumārila’s writings

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15 ViV 15 (introduction): *anuvīdayeyo niyokta bhūtānām sākṣātkrtānuśravikaśreyasādhanoḥ hitakāman* sarvajñaḥ (S 445.1–448.1 [= M 110.2–4/G 78.3–4]). *“anuśravika” S G: “anubhavika” M. This description, in itself, has nothing specifically Buddhist. Of the four main characteristics of the omniscient outlined in this passage (*niyoktaḥ*, *sākṣātkṛtaḥ* [*sādhanaḥ*], *hitakāma*, *sarvajñaḥ*), the first directly follows from the context of the ViV (see below § 2.1). The second and third may, of course, refer to the first two epithets of the Buddha in the famous opening verse of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS 1.1a): *pramāṇabhūtaḥ* (“authoritative”) and *jagaddhitaiśin* (“seeking the benefit of the world”). But Maṇḍana’s formulation of the second attribute — *sākṣātkṛtānuśravikaśreyasādhana* (“having directly perceived the means for realizing the Supreme Good as prescribed in the Scriptures”) — also recalls the expression *sākṣātkṛtadharmaḥ* (“having directly perceived the dharma”) used to qualify Vedic *ṛṣis* in the *Nirukta* (1.20), in Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya* (1.5 – SV 24.2) and in Bhavabhūti’s *Uttararāmacarita* (see Ruegg 1994: 307–308). As is well-known, the quality of being *sākṣātkṛtadharmaḥ* (and *paramakāruṇikā*) is also part of Vātsyāyana/Pakṣilasvāmin’s definition of an *āpta* (“reliable speaker”) in the *Bhāṣya* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 and 2.1.68 (14.4 and 96.16). Pakṣilasvāmin’s commentary in *sūtra* 2.1.68 also mentions two additional qualities of the *āpta* — *bhūtadayā* (“compassion for beings”) and *yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayīḥ* (“desire to communicate about a real object”) (96.17) —, the first of which could very well be hinted at by Maṇḍana while speaking of the Omniscient’s compassion toward others. Thus, although several external clues plead for an identification of Maṇḍana’s omniscient being with the Buddha, one must keep in mind that his description remains quite unspecific and corresponds to what most philosophical traditions of his time would have expected of a reliable teacher, human or divine.

16 As Stern (1988: 28) rightly remarks, the section referred to by Vācaspati as *bauddhasarvajñaparīkṣā* (“examination of the Omniscient [as conceived] by the Buddhists”) on two occasions in the *NyK* (612.7–8 and 634.7, ad ViV 17) is certainly ViV 15.

17 Several of them are mentioned in Vācaspati’s commentary: “someone with a whiff of Prabhākara[- doctrine]” (*kaṣcit prabhākarakaragandhī* — *NyK* 570.10, ad ViV 16), Naiyāyikas (*NyK* 606.7–8, ad ViV 17; 679.9, ad ViV 21), “upholders of [the doctrine] of Svayambh [i.e. Patañjali’s Yoga]” (*svāyambhuhvah* — *NyK* 627.14, ad ViV 21). These identifications however testify to Vācaspati’s attempt to read in the ViV a refutation of various ‘doctrines,’ while Maṇḍana’s progression is dialectic much more than doxographic, so they should be taken with much caution.

18 See Moriyama (2014: 37), who also notes Maṇḍana’s influence on immediately later Buddhist thinkers on that topic, in particular on Prajñākaragupta.
(especially the later ones)\(^{19}\) is also hardly discernible in Maṇḍana’s text. Thus we do not find in the ViV anything comparable to Kumārila’s critical examination of non-Vedic Scriptures (āgama) in the ‘appendix’ to Tantravārttika 1.3.4,\(^{20}\) a critique that also occupies a substantial part of his discourse on omniscience in the ŚIV (codanā – 118–136) and BT (= TS 3186–3213). In other words, it seems omniscience has become, in the hands of Maṇḍana, less a matter for religious preachers and apologists than for philosophers, the latter more likely to find in his work tools to convince fellow dialecticians than the former powerful incentives to attract faithful crowds and benevolent patrons.

1.4 The purpose of this study is to show that, in spite of all this, Maṇḍana plays a key role in the early debate on the Buddha’s omniscience, and entertains an intense dialogue with his two main predecessors in the field: Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. I will show, first, how the beginning of ViV 15 can be read as a systematic rejection of Kumārila’s argumentative strategy against omniscience, based on Dharmakīrti’s newly popularised logic (§ 2); second, I will examine how Maṇḍana uses Kumārila’s main argument in terms of a relation between perception and time to introduce a new type of epistemological consideration on the nature and cause of the Omniscient’s cognition (§ 3). Finally, I will consider the possibility that this evolution of the mīmāṃsaka discourse on omniscience influenced later stages of the debate in Buddhism as well, by tracking possible echoes of Maṇḍana’s ideas in a slightly later Buddhist work, Prajñākaragupta’s Vārttikālaṃkāra on Pramāṇavārttika 2.29 (§ 4).

2. Maṇḍana Miśra on non-apprehension and the Buddha’s speech: a ‘Dharmakīrtian’ response to Kumārila?

2.1 Every discussion of omniscience in Brahmanism must start from its prototype in Kumārila’s ŚIV and BT. In these works, the great Mīmāṃsaka makes it clear that his intention is not so much to prove that a human being cannot become omniscient (a possibility he actually leaves open) but rather to maintain an absolute distinction between entities that are accessible to the senses (aindrīyaka) and others essentially beyond their reach (nendriyagocaraḥ), like the relation between the elements of a Vedic sacrifice (dharma) – actions, qualities and substances – and their expected result.\(^{21}\) What is most disturbing, then, to Kumārila is that someone who would “see all things in a [single act of] perception” (sarvapratyakṣadarśin), as he defines the Omniscient in the BT (= TS 3138c), would also know dharma(s) perceptually: being a “knower of all things” (sarvajña), he would also be a “knower of dharma” (dharmajña), and this would contradict the exclusivity of

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\(^{19}\) See Kataoka (2011: 11 and n. 8), who reports the view of Harikai (1985: 63) on a possible evolution in Kumārila’s attitude towards Buddhism (less ‘logical,’ more ‘emotional’) between the ŚIV and the TV. On this topic, see also Eltschinger 2014a: 66.


\(^{21}\) See ŚIV (codanā°) 110cd–111, BT (= TS 3127), Kataoka 2003a: 42–43 and Kataoka 2011: 320–324. On Kumārila’s understanding of dharma, see ŚIV (codanā°) 13–14, translated in Kataoka 2011: 206–209. As explained in these verses, actions, substances and qualities are not considered to be dharma(s) in themselves, but only in so far as they are conducive to an expected result.
the Veda on ethico-ritual matters. Maṇḍana shares the same preoccupation: for him, the point is not the existence of an omniscient being in general, but of an “instructor of creatures” promulgating a teaching on matters inaccessible to ordinary perception in the form of injunctions (vidhilecodanā). The search for such a being is occasioned by Maṇḍana’s reflection on Prabhākara’s concept of “commandment” (niyoga) which, in his view, cannot be operative without supposing such an instructor:

A commandment is [in itself] a mere instigation (pravartanāmātra), and [only] that is the object of an injunctive suffix (linādi). What is grasped, then, through [that] speech[-unit] is [only] that “I am prompted [to do this]” (pravartito 'ham); but the awareness that “I have to do [this]” (kartavyatāvagama) comes from the fact that someone who deserves to be obeyed (anuvidheya) is the author of the commandment. [Only] when a commandment is given by such a [person] do I understand that “I have to do this;” otherwise, I feel a mere instigation, as it has been said [by Prabhākara]: “the commandment has the obligation (kartavyatā) as its content, it does not affirm (āha) the obligation.”

2.2 Given this essential agreement on the main point at stake, one would expect to find at least an echo of Kumārila’s arguments in Maṇḍana’s text. Instead of that, the prose development on ViV^K15 starts with the following statement, which seems at first entirely foreign to Kumārila’s main argumentative strategy:

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22 Modern readers of Dharmakīrti’s statements on omniscience in PV 2.32–33 have rarely noticed how close he actually stands to Kumārila on this point. Thus I would not necessarily interpret these verses of the PV as a ‘response’ from Dharmakīrti to Kumārila (as suggested by Kataoka [2011: 321]), but rather as an essential agreement of both thinkers on the main point at stake: what matters is not the possibility for a human being to know everything, but his capacity to access ethically/soteriologically relevant matters by means of perception. As pointed out by Kataoka (2011: 321), the distinction between sarvajña and dharmajña is introduced by Kumārila only in the BṬ. Its use by Maṇḍana in the prose introduction to ViV^K25 (S 733.4) might therefore point to his familiarity with Kumārila’s lost work.

23 ViV 15 (introduction) – S 445.1 (translated above § 1.3).

24 See ViV 12–14, David 2017 and David (forthcoming).

25 ViV 14: pravartanāmātraṃ niyogaḥ, sa ca līnādya rthāḥ iti pravartito 'ham; iti pratipattiḥ śabdāti. karta-
vyatāvagamas tu niyoktur anuvidheyatvāt, anuvidheyaniyoye mamed kartavyam ity adhyavasaiyāt, ītaatra tu pravartanāmātrapratīteḥ. uktam ca: kartavyatāvīṣyayo hi niyogash, na niyogah kartavyatām āha (S 441.5–442.3 [≈ M 108.5–109.4/G 77.3–6]). a pravartito 'ham S; pravartito 'ham atra M G; b hi S: Ø M G.

26 A more literal translation would be “the awareness of an obligation.” As Vācaspati makes clear (NyK 442.9–10), the difference between a mere instigation (pravartanāmātra) and a proper obligation (kartavyatā) is that only the second can be the cause of an activity (pravṛttihetu) for a rational agent.

27 Brharti 1.1.2 (38.8–9).

28 ViV 15: yady apy ātmapratyakṣanirvṛttir vipraṇaśvaṭaṁ abhāvam vyabhicarati, sarvapratyakṣanirvṛttir asiddhāśvavadṛṣṭaḥ; sakalapramāṇanirvṛtya ca nārtthābhāvasiddhiḥ, avyāpakānirvṛttvā eva avyāpavanirvṛttār aniyamāt, avyāpaktavam ca, ahetuttvā, tamātra pratibandhābhāvāc b ca, anyathā sarvasya sarvarṣadśir-
vyāprasaṅgah, avīśeṣāḥ; vacanādaya ca yady apy avirodhād anivartakāḥ, tathāpi kāraṇanirvṛtyā kāryanirvṛttapratīteḥ pramāṇānupapattyā tatkāryāyāh sarvārthāsaṁviṣad ightvām anumānīmahe (S 459.1–461.2 [≈ M 115.1–116.2/G 81.4–82.6]). a nivṛttau S: “nivṛttyā M G: “nivṛttyā ca Mss (S); b “pratibandha” S; “anubandha” M G; c avīśeṣāḥ S: avīśeṣā ca M G.
Even though (1') the absence (nivṛtti)\(^{29}\) of one’s own perception does not prove the non-existence (abhāva) of [objects] that are at a distance (viprakṛṣṭa),\(^{30}\) and [although] (1") the absence of a perception for all [beings] is impossible to establish unless one sees everything;\(^{31}\) (2) [even though] the absence of all means of knowledge [regarding a certain object] does not prove that [this] object does not exist – for (2A) the absence of a non-pervasive [property] (avyāpaka) does not necessarily imply (ni-ŷam) the absence of the [corresponding] non-pervaded [property] (avyāpya),\(^{32}\) and (2AI) [the existence of a means of knowledge – pramāṇa] is [indeed] non-pervasive [with respect to the existence of an object to be known – prameya], for it is not the cause (hetu) [of the existence of the object to be known],\(^{33}\) and because there is [also] no essen-

\(^{29}\) Literally: the “cessation” or “non-activity,” as opposed to pravṛtti (“activity”). The term is used by Dharmakīrti in a similar context in expressions like pramāṇatrayaniyāvṛtti (“the absence of the three means of knowledge” – PVSV 102.1), also found in Maṇḍana’s text. See Yaita (1985: 215): “the cessation of the three means of knowledge;” Steinkellner (2013: 81) “das Aufliegen der drei Erkenntnismittel;” Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber (2012: 9, n. 9): “the silence of the three means of valid cognition.” This last translation is preferable, in my opinion, as the English term “cessation” implies previous activity, which is not always the case of Dharmakīrti and Maṇḍana’s use of the word nivṛtti. See for instance Maṇḍana’s (or rather, his opponent’s) definition of pleasure (sukha) as “the absence of pain” (duḥkhaniyāvṛtti) in the Brahmāsiddhi (BS 1.1 [1.17]), which does not imply the previous existence of pain. I opt for a plainer translation (“absence”) only to avoid confusion between a proper use of the word “silence” (in the case of Scripture) and a metaphorical one (in the case of perception and inference).

\(^{30}\) According to Vācaspati (NyK 459.6–7), “distance” (viprakṛṣṭa) is threefold: in space (deśa), time (kāla) and nature (svabhāva). The same tripartition is found in chapter 2 of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 64.9–10) and in the Nyāyabindu (NB 2.27); the Pramāṇavārttika (PVSV 102.6–7, ad PV 1.199) only mentions deśa and kāla.

\(^{31}\) Both published editions of the ViV suggest that asarvadṛśaḥ should be read with what follows, not with what precedes, a solution also adopted by M. Biardeau in her unpublished translation: “[…] [quoiquel l’absence de perception de tous ne soit pas établie, que l’on ne puisse établir la non-existence d’un objet par l’absence de tous les moyens de perception chez quelqu’un qui n’est pas omniscient (…)” (Ms. f. 123r). Although neither Stern’s edition nor Vācaspati’s commentary plead for either solution, I find it easier to link the genitive with what precedes, since the position of ca would otherwise be odd. The following argument (2) is directly borrowed from Dharmakīrti, as we shall see (§ 2.3), and stands perfectly well on its own. On the other hand, it makes sense to argue that only an omniscient would be able to establish a universal absence of perception concerning a given object.

\(^{32}\) In other words: the inference of the absence of a pervaded (vyāpya) property from the absence of the pervading (vyāpaka) property is valid, as when we conclude to the absence of smoke (= vyāpya) on the hill from the absence of fire (= vyāpaka): vyāpakābhāva → vyāpyābhāva (“a → b” = “valid inference from a to b”). But this inference would not be valid if both properties were not in a relation of pervasion (vyāpāta), or if the pervasion was the other way round. Thus the inference of the absence of fire (= vyāpaka) on the hill from the absence of smoke (= vyāpya) is not valid, for there are exceptions to this conclusion. In the present case, the question raised is whether one can correctly conclude to the absence in the world of an omniscient being – the object to be known (prameya) – from the absence of a means to know (pramāṇa) such a being (pramāṇābhāva → prameyābhāva?). It follows from what precedes that the inference is valid only if pramāṇa and prameya stand in a relation of pervasion (vyāpāt), in other words if we could correctly conclude to the existence of a means of knowledge from the existence of the object of knowledge (prameya → pramāṇa?). Maṇḍana will now show that this is not the case, by excluding the two only possible grounds for pervasion or invariable concomitance in Dharmakīrti’s system: causality (tadatpattī) and identity (tādātmya) (argument 2AI).

\(^{33}\) See NyK 459.11–460.1: ahetūvād akāraṇatvāt.
tial connection (\textit{tanmātrapratibandha}) [between these two properties],\textsuperscript{34} for otherwise\textsuperscript{35} everybody would see everything as there would be no difference [between us and an omniscient being]; and (3) even though speech, etc. do not rule out [the existence of an omniscient] as there is no contradiction [in his making use of speech, etc.]; even so, (4) since we understand the absence of an effect (\textit{kāryanivṛtti}) from the absence of [its] cause (\textit{kāraṇanivṛtti}), from the impossibility (\textit{anupapatti}) of a means of knowledge [embracing the whole realm of being] we infer the absence of its effect, namely an awareness of all things (\textit{sarvārtheṣu saṃvid}).

This dense passage is for the most part a discussion of inferential matters, and is indeed a remarkable example of how logical considerations can successfully be applied to the solution of a philosophical issue. Maṇḍana discusses here the use of the negative inferential reason (\textit{hetu}), “non-apprehension” (\textit{anupalabdhi}), and its capacity to establish the non-existence (\textit{abhāva}) of a given object – in our case, an “awareness of all things” –, which is the property to be proved (\textit{sādhyā}). His theoretical background is clearly Dharmakīrti’s logical system, as the mention besides \textit{anupalabdhi} of two possible grounds for ‘positive’ inference (causality and identity) suffices to prove. In substance, Maṇḍana proposes to replace a series of illegitimate uses of \textit{anupalabdhi} (conclusion to the non-existence of an entity by mere lack of perception of it, etc.) (1–3) by another, legitimate one, known to Buddhist logicians as \textit{kāraṇānupalabdhi} (“non-apprehension of the cause”) (4).\textsuperscript{37} His argument can be reconstituted as follows (the sign “←” indicates a logical relation: “justified by”):

1. Absence of perception of an entity cannot establish its non-existence.

1’. Case of one’s own perception.

1”. Case of everyone’s perception.

\textsuperscript{34} The compound \textit{tanmātrapratibandha} is equivalent to the expression \textit{tanmārānubandha}sambandha used by Dharmakīrti on several occasions to speak of the relation underlying the use of an “essential [inferential] reason” (\textit{svabhāvahetu}). See for instance PVSV 6.26, 17.20, 18.1 and 18.21 (“\textit{anubandha}”), PVSV 16.28 (“\textit{sambandha}”). See also NyK 460.3–5: \textit{hetudharmanārānubandhī hi sādhyādharmas tasya vyāpakah, yathā vṛkṣatvaṃ śiṃśapātvarya}; “For when the property to be proved (a) merely depends on the property which is the [inferential] reason (b), it (= a) pervades the other (= b); for instance, the quality of being a tree [pervades in this manner] the quality of being a \textit{śiṃśapā}.” The reading \textit{\textsuperscript{°}anubandha\textsuperscript{°}} (instead of \textit{\textsuperscript{°}pratibandha\textsuperscript{°}}), found in all Mss of the ViV and in some Mss of the NyK (see Stern 1988: 1023–1024), is therefore equally plausible.

\textsuperscript{35} That is: if there was an essential connection between the existence of the object to be known (\textit{prameya}) and that of a means for knowing it (\textit{pramāṇa}).

\textsuperscript{36} For a possible paraphrase of this difficult argument by Prajñākaragupta, see below § 4.5.

\textsuperscript{37} On \textit{kāraṇānupalabdhi}, see NB 2.39: \textit{kāraṇānupalabdhīḥ yathā nātra dhūmaḥ, vahnyabḥāvād iti}; “[Es-

\textit{tablishment of the non-existence of the effect through} non-apprehension of [its] cause is for instance: ‘Here, there is no smoke, for there is no fire’” (p. 135). In his commentary, Dharmottara remarks that this particular use of \textit{anupalabdhi} is restricted to cases where “the effect, even if it existed, would not be perceived” (\textit{kāryam sad adhyāyaṃ bhavati – Nyāyabinduṭīkā} 136.1), which is obviously the case of an omniscient being. Although neither Maṇḍana nor Vācaspati uses exactly the term \textit{kāraṇānupalabdhi}, its equivalent \textit{kāraṇānupalambha} is found in a \textit{pūrvapāka} of Ratnakīrti’s \textit{Sarvajñasiddhi} (SSīg 7.18), which presents a reasoning identical in substance to Maṇḍana’s. The parallel between these two passages would certainly require further exploration.
2. Absence of valid knowledge of an entity cannot establish its non-existence.

   ← 2A. A property \( p \)’s non-existence cannot justify positing another property \( q \)’s non-existence unless \( p \) pervades (\( vyāp \) \( q \).

2AI. Valid knowledge (\( pramāṇa \)) does not pervade its object (\( prameya \)).

   ← 2A1a. No relation of causality.

   ← 2A1b. No relation of identity.

3. Speech, etc. do not rule out omniscience in their possessor.

4. Omniscience can be negated, as an effect can be negated through the negation of its cause.

Now this reasoning is clearly not Maṇḍana’s invention; in fact, the very structure of the argument recalls Dharmakīrti’s ‘second’ consideration of \( anupalabdhi \) in the \( Pramāṇavārttika \) (PV) 1.198–204, especially PV 1.198–202 and the corresponding Svavṛtti (PVS).38 What is comparatively new, however, is the application of these reflections to the particular case of omniscience, which is not mentioned in this section of PVS although Dharmakīrti suggests other possible consequences of his theory for religious philosophy.39 The only text I could find where Dharmakīrti applies a similar reasoning to omniscience (\( sarvajñatva \)) is the \( Nyāyabindu \) (NB).40 I suspect this original and quite massive reinvestment of Dharmakīrti’s ideas must be interpreted in a polemical way. For the first victim of this exercise in

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38 This passage has been translated twice, into English by Yaita (1985) and, more recently, into German by Steinkellner (2013; 1 and 2013; 2). I am much indebted to the latter’s translation and rich annotation of this text. Strictly speaking, Dharmakīrti’s discussion of \( anupalabdhi \) is much longer, finding its conclusion only with PV 1.339 (thus practically with the end of the first chapter), including also his lengthy digression on the authority of Scripture (\( āgama \)). See Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 9, n. 9. I am essentially concerned here with the initial part of this section.

39 Dharmakīrti remains quite vague in PV(SV) 1.198–204 about objects whose existence cannot be disqualified by mere silence of Scripture, like “particular things (…) which are far away in time and space” (\( deśakālavyavahitāḥ […] dravyavīśeṣāḥ – PVSV 102.6–7). He is more precise about objects whose non-existence cannot be proved by the mere fact that we cannot infer them: “a mind free of passion” (\( viraktaṃ cetas – PVSV 103.4), “a particular deity” (\( devatāviśeṣa – \text{ibid.}), “the capacity of intentions [relative to] gifts and refraining from violent action to cause happiness” (\( dānahiṃsāviraticetanānām abhyudayaḥetutāḥ – PVSV 103.5; my translation of the compound in the genitive relies entirely on its interpretation by Yaita [1985: 213] and Steinkellner [2013; 84]). The closest approximation we find in the \( Pramāṇavārttika \) to Maṇḍana’s reasoning is found in PV(SV) 1.311 (I thank V. Eltschinger for drawing my attention to this important passage). In that portion of the SV, which forms a sort of ‘coda’ to his discussion on mantras, Dharmakīrti discusses possible objections against the assumption of an “extraordinary person” (\( puruṣātiśaya \)) who could be the author of mantras on the basis of his “humanity” (\( pumstva \), a property which must itself be inferred from his possessing an intellect (\( buddhi \)), senses (\( indriya \)) and speech (\( vacana \)) (see PVSV 164.15). His main response is clearly similar to Maṇḍana’s principal argument: \( na hy atindriyesv ataddarśinaḥ pratikṣepaḥ saṃbhavati, satām āpy esam ajñātānāt; “Those who do not see supersensible [objects] cannot refute (\( pratīksipt) them, for even if they exist, they will not know them” (PVSV 164.17–18 [I do not translate \( hi\]).

40 NB 3.69–71: \( yathāśarvajñatāḥ kaś cid vivakṣitāḥ puruṣo rāgādīmān veti sādhya vakṛtvādāno dharmah samidgadhipaksvāvārātīkāḥ, sarvajño vaktā nopalabhyyata ity evamprakārasyānuvalambhayādvātāṃvīṣayatvān samdehaḥhetutvāt. tato ‘sarvajñāviparyāyād vakṛtvādāno vyāvṛtībhīṣamādi-gādāḥ. vakṛtvāsarvajñatvavāyār vīrohdhābhāvī ca yaḥ sarvajñatā sa vaktā na bhavatī adārdāvāv ‘pi na sidhyati, samdehāt; “If what must be proved is, for instance, that a certain intended person is non-omnicient (\( asarvajña \)), or is passionate, etc. (\( rāgādīmān \), one can doubt that a property like being a speaker (\( vakṛtvā \), etc. [establishing that conclusion] is absent from the negative instance [i.e. an omniscient
Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience

‘applied logic’ is, no doubt, Kumārila, whose arguments against omniscience are – with one exception to which I shall return later on (§ 3) – easily associated with one or the other ‘defective’ use of anupalabdhi. Thus, far from rejecting Dharmakīrti’s elaborations on adṛśyānupalabdhi as ‘Buddhist,’ Maṇḍana appropriates them and adapts them in order to free the classical Mīmāṃsaka argumentation against omniscience of some of its most flagrant weaknesses.41 Let us now consider in more detail a few aspects of this strategy.

2.3 Kumārila’s refutation of omniscience, in the ŚIV and BṬ similarly, takes place in three successive stages: after having established that omniscience is intrinsically impossible (ŚIV 112–115/TS 3157–3183), he shows that no evidence supports the assumption (kalpanā) of an omniscient being in the past (ŚIV 117–136/TS 3184–3236) and finally argues that, even if there had been such a being, he would have been unable to teach (ŚIV 137–140/TS 3237–3239).43 The second part of his demonstration, which is by far the longest, starts with a very simple argument showing how our main means of knowledge (pramāṇa) have no grip on an omniscient being:44

First, people like us do not see an omniscient being now; nor is it possible to postulate that there was [such a being], as [one can] deny [it]. Nor [can one postulate] an omniscient being on the basis of Scripture, for his [Scripture would have the undesirable consequence of having] mutual reliance [with his being an omniscient being]. If [Scripture] is composed by others, how is it understood to be a means of valid cognition?

In a suggestive note of his recent study of PVSV (Steinkellner 2013: 45–48, n. 49), E. Steinkellner proposes to link the development of the theory of anupalabdhi in Dharmakīrti’s *Hetuprakaraṇa to the debate on omniscience as known to us in particular through the works of Kumārila. See Steinkellner 2013: “(…) ein wichtiger Anstoß für die kräftige Entwicklung der Lehre von der negativen Erkenntnis durch Kumārila und stärker noch durch Dharmakīrti [ist] in der bei Kumārila sichtbar werdenden Polemik der Mīmāṃsā gegen die Ansicht von der Existenz eines Allwissenden (sarvajña) zu identifizieren” (p. 46). The ViV provides, in a way, a powerful confirmation of this insight, as do the passage of the Nyāyabindu translated above (n. 40) and the statement from Kamalaśīla’s Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta quoted by Steinkellner (p. 47). I also fully agree that most of Kumārila’s arguments against omniscience do not hold against Dharmakīrti’s elucidation of anupalabdhi (see below § 2.3–4). But one may also wonder how far the question of omniscience was present to Dharmakīrti’s mind from the very beginning and, if it was, why he never mentions it in the Pramāṇavārttika. It is not impossible that Maṇḍana’s text reflects and elaborates on developments which are characteristic of Dharmakīrti’s later work.

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42 All kārikā-numbers refer to the codanā-section (ad MīSū 1.1.2).


Despite its simplicity and extreme popularity in later philosophical literature, the argument is not even mentioned in the ViV. A plausible explanation for this could lie in Dharmakīrti’s newly introduced distinction of two kinds of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi): non-apprehension in general (anupalabdhiṃātra [PVSV 101.23]; anupalambhamātra [PVSV 103.3]) and non-apprehension of what, under normal circumstances, would be fit for (perceptual) apprehension (upalabdhiyoga [PVSV 101.18]). As Dharmakīrti explains it, the first type of non-apprehension can only produce doubt (samāsaya) as to the existence of the object, but cannot prove its non-existence (asattā), from our point of view, an object we do not perceive (say, ghosts, or a particular deity) may as well exist or not. The second type of non-apprehension, on the other hand, positively establishes its non-existence, like when we do not see a pot in front of our eyes even in the clear light of day. Following this important distinction, echoed in the passage of the ViV translated above (§ 2.2), the fact that an omniscient being “is not seen” (na drṣyate) has no value whatsoever to prove that there is no such being, this regardless of whether we speak of the perception of a single person (svapratyakṣa) or of everyone’s perception (sarvapratyakṣa). But the point is not only about perception. Dharmakīrti further claims that even complete lack of evidence about an object cannot persuade us of its non-existence (unless, of course, it fits all conditions for present perceptual apprehension): “one cannot ascertain that [objects that are at a distance] do not exist, even in the absence of [all] three means of knowledge.

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45 See the quite impressive list of quotations of these verses in Kataoka 2011: 29–30. The fact that an omniscient being “is not seen now” (na […] idānīṃ drṣyate) is also, as we remember, the basic argument of Bhavya’s purvaṅga in the Mīmāṃsā-section of his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (15ab) (on Bhavya’s relation with Kumārila, see above n. 10).

46 One could read an echo of Kumārila’s argument in ViV 19, where Maṇḍana underlines that an omniscient being can neither be perceived, as he is “not within the reach of the senses” (Indriyāṇāṃ na gocaraḥ [ViV K 19b]), nor inferred, for the very same reason (ata eva [ViV K 19c]). Yet we should also pay attention to the fact that Maṇḍana thereby only wants to prove our ignorance (ajñāna [Ś 686.2]) of an omniscient being, while its non-existence or intrinsic impossibility (anupapatti) is considered sufficiently proved by the preceding section (ViV 15–18). Kumārila, on the other hand, evaluates which supposition (kalpanā) – that of the Veda’s authorlessness or that of an omniscient being – is more dispendious (see ŚIV [codana°] 116). His reasoning is therefore against the probability for the Omniscient’s existence, while Maṇḍana’s claim is only, on an epistemic level, about our knowledge of that person.

47 On these two types of anupalabdhi, see Steinkellner (1967: 157–158), who proposes to distinguish between non-apprehension in general ("Nicht-Beobachtung im Allgemeinen") and non-apprehension in particular ("Nicht-Beobachtung im Besonderen") in the Pramāṇavārttika. Additional remarks on this distinction are found in Steinkellner 2013: 44.

48 See PVSV 101.19–20: na (…) asatūsamānaḥ (read "sādhani instead of "sādhāni"); PVSV 103.10: atat eva samsāyo 'stu.

49 See PVSV 101.11: anupalabhayamāna na san nāsan, satīm api svabhavādīviprakarṣāt kadā cid anupalambhāt; PV 1.202a: sadasannīṣayaphalā (anupalabdhiḥ); PVSV 103.1–2: yayavyāsya cit svabhavo nopalabhaye deśāvaprapakṣāt, na sa tadanupalambhātmanāyān nāma. See PVSV 101.17–18: asatāsāmyā (…) pramāṇam.

50 Although Dharmakīrti does not mention these two cases in the PVSV, the distinction is found in some of his later works, as pointed out by Stern (1988: 1023). See for instance NB 2.27 ([…] deśākālaṁsvarthaṁviprakṛṣṭeṣu artheṣu ānāpapratyakṣanivṛttir abhāvanīṣayabhāvāt) and Viśdanyāya 10.12–14 (na hy anumāṇādviprakṛṣṭeṣu abhāvām gamayati, vyabhicārāt, na sarvapratyakṣanivṛttī, asiddheḥ, nāmapratyakṣāvishesaniṣvṛttir api viprakṛṣṭeṣu).
Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience

[i.e.: perception, inference, and teaching through Scripture] (pramāṇatrayanivṛttāv api).”

Maṇḍana’s adoption of this argument without any change in the ViV can therefore be read as a rejection of Kumārila’s whole strategy for denying the existence of an omniscient being by mere lack of a pramāṇa capable of establishing it. To put it differently, Kumārila’s proof against the probability of the existence of an omniscient being – quite sufficient for the apologetic purpose of ‘weighing’ kalpanās – is systematically put aside by Maṇḍana, whose only concern is now with the intrinsic impossibility of omniscience.

2.4 The topic of non-apprehension is not the only one where Maṇḍana chooses to distance himself from Kumārila by siding with Dharmakīrti. In v. 137 of the codanā-section of the ŚīV, Kumārila famously points to a contradiction in the assumption of the Buddha’s omniscience:

had the Buddha really been omniscient, he would have been unable to teach; teaching is a form of operation (vyāpāra) that naturally implies some kind of intention to speak, thus a form of desire/passion (rāga), incompatible with the supposedly dispassionate (rāgarahita) state characterizing the Omniscient.

As is well-known, Dharmakīrti is familiar with Kumārila’s argument (or a similar one) and considers it a fundamentally flawed use of the inference from the effect (kāryānumāna). Surely, some teachings are

52 PVSV 102.10: na ca te pramāṇatrayanivṛttāv api na santīti śakyante vyavasātum. The three means of knowledge (pramāṇatraya) are enumerated in PV 1.199. This point, which is developed in the whole SV on this verse, is reiterated at the very end of the first chapter of the PV. See PV 1.339cd and PVSV 176.11–12: tenāsanniścayaphalānupalabdhir na sidhyati // tasmān na pramāṇatrayanivṛttāv api viprakṛṣṭeyv abhāvaniścayayāh; “[PV:] Therefore, it is not established that non-apprehension results in the ascertainment [of something] as non-existent. [SV:] Therefore, the non-existence of [things] beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] cannot be ascertained even if all three means of valid cognition [should] fail to operate” (read asanniścaya° instead of asaṃniścaya°; translation: Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 76–77; I modify “non-perception” into “non-apprehension”).

The same kind of refutation also forms the basis of immediately later Buddhist defences of omniscience, like that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. See McClintock 2010: 165–187. Śāntarakṣita’s use of Dharmakīrti’s analysis of anupalabdhimātra as producive of a mere doubt (saṃśaya) is also clear. See TS 3300–3301, translated in McClintock 2010: 186. I find it quite remarkable that Kumārila who, according to the now (almost) consensual hypothesis of Frauwallner (1962), wrote the BT partly as a response to Dharmakīrti’s *Hetuprakaraṇa, does not modify at all his strategy in what could be his last great work. On the contrary, far from renouncing his proof of the Omniscient’s non-existence by mere lack of evidence, Kumārila brings it to its perfection in the BT by adding to the examination of perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and speech (śabda) carried out in the ŚI a consideration of comparison (upamāna) and presumption (arthāpatti) as well. See BT (= TS 3214–3228).

As we have seen (§ 2.3), this constitutes the third part of Kumārila’s argument in that section.

SIV (codanā°) 137: rāgādirahite cāsmin nirvyāpāre vyavasthite i desānāyapratāyāvaiya syād rte pratyaveksanāt //; “And when he is established as having no action because he lacks desire and so on, [his] teaching could only have been composed by others without having [directly] observed [anything].” Translation: Kataoka 2011: 366–369.

54 See Kataoka 2003a: 55–63, Kataoka 2011: 366–369 (nn. 425–426). Doubts about this identification have been expressed by J. Taber (see Eltschinger/Taber/Krasser 2012: 119–120, n. 3) since Kumārila, unlike Dharmakīrti, does not mention the Buddha’s speech (vacana) but only his operation (vyāpāra). Though I agree that only a quote could settle the matter, I find the objection hardly convincing for, as already pointed out by Steinkellner (2013: 85), one fails to see to which ‘operation’ Kumārila could possibly allude if not to the Buddha’s teaching (desanā), which would otherwise have to be promulgated by others (anyapraṇāta). Further arguments in favour of Kataoka’s identification on the basis of the structure of PVSV have been voiced by Steinkellner (2013: 84–87), who carefully concludes that
made out of desire for a benefit, as we observe among worldly teachers, but this need not be the case for all teachings and does not rule out other reasons for teaching, less incompatible with the state of omniscience, such as compassion (karunā): “Just as a passionate [person] (rakta) speaks, so does the impassionate (virakta) one, too. Therefore it is not apprehended from speech as such [whether one is passionate or dispassionate].”57 That this is precisely the argument alluded to by Maṇḍana when he says in the ViV that “speech, etc. do not rule out [the existence of an omniscient being], as there is no contradiction [in his making use of speech, etc.]” (argument no. 3 in the above-quoted text) is proved, besides the explicit mention of “speech, etc.” (vacanādi),58 by a further allusion to the SV on PV 1.12 in the first book of the BS. In that passage, Maṇḍana distinguishes between two concepts of desire – icchā (desire in general) and rāga (passion, which is an obstacle to liberation from saṃsāra) –, and it is again Dharmakīrti’s definition of rāga in PVSV 9.5–6 that he calls for support.59

Passion (rāga) is not mere desire (icchāmātra); they call “passion” that attachment to unreal qualities [of the object] brought about by nescience (avidyākṣiptam abhūtagunābhinniveśa).60 But the mind’s inclination (prasāda) towards reality – i.e. its delight (abhiruci) [in reality] or desire (abhīcchā) [for it] –, following [its] purification through the vision of reality, does not fall into the category of “passion” (rāga), just as aversion produced by one’s vision of that reality which is the worthlessness of transmigration does not fall into the category of “hatred” (dveṣa).

Dharmakīrti must be attacking, if not Kumārila himself, at least some Mīmāṃsaka position concordant with that of Kumārila.

58 Although Vācaspati tells us nothing of the value of °ādi, the expression vacanādi may correspond to the compound spandavacanādi (“movement, speech, etc.”) found at the beginning of the SV on PV 1.12 (PVSV 9.3), or else to the three properties of humanity enumerated in PV(SV) 3.111 (senses, mind and speech). See above n. 39. The parallel passage in NB 3.71 only mentions vaktṛtva (see our translation of this passage above, n. 40). Another possibility is that Maṇḍana alludes here to the contradiction between contemplation (dhyāna) and teaching (upadeśana) underlined by Kumārila in the BṬ (= TS 3237–3239). It is unclear, in that case, how he intended to solve this apparent contradiction.
59 BS 1.1: na hi cchāmātra rāgah. avidyākṣiptam abhūtagunābhinniveśam rāgam ācāṣate. tattvadarśanānavimalyāt tu cetasaḥ prasāda ’bhururic abhīcchā ca rāgapakṣe vyavasthāpyate, yathā saṃsārāsāratātvadārśanānispanno dveṣagatamatosvāpyate(3.17–20). I slightly modify the translation of this passage by Taber (2011: 443), who rightly points out the importance of this parallel for a correct interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s concept of rāga in PV 1.12 and the corresponding SV.
60 Dharmakīrti’s definition of rāga in PVSV 9.5–6 is exactly similar if we except the mention, instead of “nescience” (avidyā), of a list of objects of defilement typical of Buddhist thought, corresponding to the four “aspects” of the first āryasatya (antiyātā, dakkha, anāmattā, śānyatā – see Eltschinger 2014b): nityasukhātmātmīyadarśanākṣiptam sāsravadharmaviṣayaṃ cetaso ’bhīsvaṅgam rāgam āhuh; “They call ‘passion’ the attachment of the mind, which has the defiled elements of existence as an object, which is caused by seeing [erroneously, what is impermanent, suffering, not the self, and does not belong to the self as] permanent, pleasant, the self and what belongs to the self.” Translation: Franco 2012: 231 (I modify “desire” into “passion,” to suit the convention followed here).
2.5 As we can already see from our analysis of its initial portion, the discussion of omniscience in ViV 15 reveals Maṇḍana’s deep familiarity with the works of Dharmakīrti – especially PV 1 and the Śvaṃvṛtti, but also the Nyāyabindu and, as we shall see later on (§ 3.5), the Pramāṇavinīścaya –, far deeper in any case than that of any Mīmāṃsaka before (and perhaps even after) him. But it also testifies to the complexity of his engagement with the famous Buddhist logician, which contrasts with Kumārila’s strategy of frontal confrontation with Buddhism in general. It is noteworthy in this respect that the debate is never on matters of pure logic, an impression that can only be confirmed by the remaining part of ViV 15. The two kinds of non-apprehension, the negation of the effect through the negation of its cause (see below, § 3), even Dharmakīrti’s conclusions about fallacious uses of the inference from the effect: everything is accepted in block by Maṇḍana and never questioned again in his work. His way to consider anew the topic of the Buddha’s omniscience in the ViV is therefore to play, so to say, Dharmakīrti’s part, and to reconstruct what could have been a ‘Dharmakīrtian’ answer to Kumārila from elements scattered throughout Dharmakīrti’s works. But this is just a prelude to Maṇḍana’s real encounter with Dharmakīrti, carried out once again with his own weapons. The field of this encounter, however, would not be pure logic any more, but the epistemology of perception.

3. Time, perception and Scripture: on a mīmāṃsaka use of kāraṇānu-palabdhi

3.1 If the bulk of Kumārila’s arguments against the Buddha’s omniscience, as we have seen, finds no favour in the eyes of his most immediate successor in Mīmāṃsā, a small section of the ŚśīV (codanā – 112–115) and BṬ (= TS 3157–3183) remains to be investigated, in which Kumārila argues for the incompatibility between omniscience and the very nature of perception. That preoccupation, at least, is well in line with Maṇḍana’s philosophical agenda and the problem is in fact at the heart of his enquiry in ViV 15. Once again, the occasion for this reflection is given to him by a logical remark by Dharmakīrti. As we have seen before (§ 2.3), Dharmakīrti insists in the PV that mere absence of perception (or even of knowledge in general) of an object that is not fit for perceptual apprehension produces no certitude (niścaya) of its non-existence, but only doubt (saṃśaya) regarding its existence. However, there are other ways to produce such a proof of the non-existence of an object, one of them being to find evidence for the absence of a cause (kāraṇa) of the object, as explained in the following passage of the PV and SV:61

[PV:] But the fact that we do not know the efficient [cause] (kāraṇa) of [a given] effect proves that [such an effect] does not exist. [SV:] In case the [property] to be proved is the non-existence (abhāva) of a [given] nature (svabhāva), [we just] said62 that the [mere] absence of apprehension of that [na-

61 PV 1.201cd and PVSV 103.16–18: kārye tu kāraṇānām abhāvasyaiva śādhakaṃ // svabhāvabhāva sādhya tadanupalambha evaḥpramāṇam ucyate. kāraṇānopalambhas tu pramāṇam eva. na hy asti samāhavo yad asati kārane kāryaṃ syāt.

62 See PVSV 103.1–2: yasya kasya cit svabhāvo nopalambhate desādviprakārṣan na sa tadanupalambha-mātreṇaśaḥ nāma, yathoktam prāk. On the identification of the passage alluded to by Dharmakīrti (PVSV 101.11 or 102.11–12?), see Steinkellner 2013: 273 (n. 543).
tare] does not constitute a [valid] means of knowledge (apramāṇam). But the non-apprehension of [its] efficient [cause] (kārakānupalambha)⁶³ is a [valid] means of knowledge (pramāṇam eva), for it is impossible (nāsti sambhavaḥ) that an effect should take place without a cause.

Dharmakīrti’s reasoning is clearly alluded to in the passage quoted above (§ 2.2) by Maṇḍana, who does not speak, however, of “non-apprehension of a cause” (kāraṇānupalambhatanupalabdhī), but simply of the “absence of a cause” (kāraṇanivṛtti). And indeed, a major issue of Dharmakīrti’s reasoning – which is not entirely clear from this passage of the SV – is that “non-apprehension of the efficient [cause]” (kāraṇānupalambha) cannot be mere non-apprehension (anupalabdhimātra), but has to be non-apprehension of the second kind, where the object is fit for (perceptual) apprehension, lest the inference becomes equally inconclusive.⁶⁴ This, of course, is not the case of most objects placed at a distance (viprakṛṣṭa) or supersensible (atīndriya) objects like particular deities, etc., whose cause is very likely to be also beyond the reach of the senses. The case of omniscience is somewhat peculiar, though, due to the presupposition – apparently shared by all participants in this debate – that (valid) knowledge of all things must be, to begin with, valid knowledge over all. Just as “persons of exception” (puruśātisaya) remain persons all the same, “exceptional visions” (darśanātisaya) differ in degree (of precision, intensity, clarity, etc.) from ordinary perceptions, but they obey the same principles as any other perceptual cognition.⁶⁵ Maṇḍana’s task is, then, to prove that the cause of perception is such that it can never produce a knowledge of all things, and thereby to undermine the very possibility (sambhava) of omniscience.⁶⁶

3.2 Kumārila, who already had some thoughts on that topic, mostly insists on the mutual delimitation of our senses, which disqualifies a cognition of all things at once: acute as it

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⁶³ The expression kārakānupalambha used in the PVSV is of course equivalent to the compound kāraṇānupalabdhī found in Dharmakīrti’s later works (see above n. 37).

⁶⁴ This point is well made by Yāita (1985: 202, n. 65).

⁶⁵ On puruṣātisaya / sātisayo naraḥ, see BT (= TS 3161/3159) and PV(SV) 1.311. The expression darsānātisaya is used, for instance, in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (NM 1: 268.3) to define the cognition of yogins. A similar use of atiśaya applied to cognition is found in the ŚlV (codanī – 114) and BṬ (= TS 3386).

⁶⁶ Interestingly, this seems to be precisely the point where the problem of omniscience is taken up by Śaṅkaranandana in his Sarvājñāsiddhi, possibly written in the 9th century. See SSiR 2: jhājakāraṇasadbhāva sambhaviny anyakāryavat / sarvārthavīśayā samvīt, sa hi sambhava ucyate; “A consciousness encompassing all objects, like [any] other effect, is possible (sambhavin) [only] if the actual existence of its cause (kāraṇasadbhāva) is known; for this is what [we] call ‘possibility’ (sambhava).” The corresponding prose portion, a preliminary edition of which is established by Eltschinger (2008: 140–141), is still too obscure (to me, at least) to provide any reliable information about the intellectual background of this stanza. The proximity between Maṇḍana and Śaṅkaranandana’s way of speaking of omniscience (sarvārtheṣu samvīd [Maṇḍana]/sarvārthavīśayā samvīd [Śaṅkaranandana]) need not be significant, but is nevertheless striking. The same kind of consideration is also found in Ratnakīrti’s Sarvājñāsiddhi: nana kāraṇānupalambhād eva sarvājñātāpratisedhah siddhyat; “[Objection:] but, the negation of omniscience is established by the non-apprehension of its cause (kāraṇānupalambha)” (SSiR 7.19–20). See also Moriyama 2014: 64 (n. 29).
may be, the eye – be it a Divine Eye – will never perceive sounds or smells; yet sounds or smells are, no doubt, part of the totality of being. In order to grasp everything at once, the senses of the Omniscient would therefore have to function simultaneously in an eminent way, a possibility which contradicts the widely admitted principle that two cognitions (say, the smell of a strawberry and the vision of its red colour) never take place exactly at the same time. As before, but for reasons that are far less clear, this popular reasoning did not find its way into the ViV. Maṇḍana prefers to concentrate on another aspect of the mīmāṃsaka theory of perception, going back to Jaimini’s treatment of pratyakṣa in MiŚū 1.1.4, namely its relation to the present time (vidyamāna). Perception, so the sūtra goes, cannot be a cause (nimitta) for our knowledge of dharma “because it grasps [something] present” (vidyamānopalambhanatvāt). Applying this conclusion to the debate

67 As noted by Moriyama (2014: 60–61), the quotation of scriptural passages mentioning the Buddha’s “Divine Eye” (divyacakṣus) by commentators on ŚIV (codanā”) 112–115 and by Kamalaśīla while commenting on a verse of the BT (ad TS 3159–3160) in TSP 999.12–13 is certainly not done by chance. It is indeed likely that Kumārila had this or a similar notion in mind while discussing this topic.

68 ŚIV (codanā”) 112–114: ekena tu pramāṇena sarvajñato yena kalpyate / nāmam sa cakṣusā sarvān rasādīna pratipadyate // (…) yatṛūpy atiśayo dṛṣṭah sa svārthānatilāghañā / divānasīkṣmādyātṛtstsyān na rūpe srotāvṛtyāt //; “However, if [you] postulate that he knows everything through a single means of valid cognition, he surely grasps all tastes, etc. with the eye! Even when superiority of a particular [pramāṇa] is seen, in so far as [a sense] does not go beyond [its] own object, that [superiority] can [happen] in perceiving things that are remote, subtle, etc., [but] it is not the case that the ear should grasp color.” Translation: Kataoka 2011: 324–328 (modified). Cf. BT (TS 3157–3158), translated in Kataoka 2011: 328–329 (n. 368).

69 Although this last part of the argument is not voiced by Kumārila, it seems nevertheless a natural consequence of his statements about the senses and their limited domain. It is found explicitly in Kamalaśīla’s commentary on TS 3157. See TSP 998.7–9: na caitac chakyate vaktum mā bhūd ekena jñānena yugapad aśeṣārthasya grahanam, anekena bhaviṣyatīti, yato yugapad anekavijñānānasmabhavāt; “And you cannot say [the following:] ‘Maybe it is impossible to grasp all objects at the same time (yugapad) in a single cognition (ekena jñānena), but this can happen in several [cognitions] (anekena),’ for it is impossible that several cognitions [should take place] at the same time.”

70 To the already long list of quotes of ŚIV (codanā”) 112–114 enumerated by Kataoka (2011: 27–29), I can only add the (somewhat unexpected) quotation of v. 112ab in Helārāja’s Prakīrṇaprakāśa (vol. 1, p. 54.1–5) – ad Vākyapadiya 3.1.46; I thank Vincenzo Vergiani for drawing my attention to this passage. Helārāja’s response to Kumārila is quite unique in that the 10th-century Kashmiri grammarian directly contests the Mīmāṃsaka’s claim that the domains of the senses are mutually impenetrable, and does so on the basis of some hitherto unidentified Scripture (āgama): ta ca teṣāṃ svaśāya grahaṇam, anekena bhaviṣyatīti, yato yugapad anekavijñānānasmabhavāt; “And this knowledge of the Learned Ones (śiṣṭā) is [produced] by all of the senses (sarvendriyā), for omniscient [beings] accomplish the operation of a sense even by means of another, as it is said in the [following] Scripture: ‘Now they do not see only by the senses. [In that state,] one hears sounds by [the organ of] smell, sees forms [even] in [one’s] back. More than that! One grasps all sensory objects even with the tip of a finger!’” (Prakīrṇaprakāśa 54.1–5). The boldness of Helārāja’s statement appears by comparing it, for instance, to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s much milder response to Kumārila: rasādīrāhmayi api yoginām indriyāni caṇḍuravat atiśayavanty eveti na rasādiṣu caṇḍuravārthān paśyanti; “The senses by which yogins grasp smells, etc. are also eminent, just like [their] eyes, so there is no need to assume an operation of the eye towards smells, etc.” (NM 270.1–2). It is impossible to decide if Mandana positively rejected Kumārila’s claim (and in that case, on which basis), or simply considered it irrelevant to the present debate. I find it unlikely, in any case, that he ignored it.
on omniscience, Maṇḍana makes it into a general statement as to the nature of sensory perception:  

Perception, when brought about by the eye, etc. [does not apply] to all objects, for the [eye, etc.] have a restricted domain: their domain is exclusively some particular [object], which is present (vartamāna) and related (sambaddha) [to the senses], and not all objects are like that. Now it is true that, since it is possible to be aware of all sorts of knowable objects, a restriction (niyama) [of the domain of perception] in terms of form (rūpa) is hardly defendable, and so is also [its restriction] in terms of acuity, feebleness, etc. (paṭumandatādi). [Moreover,] since we cognize (pari-√chid) objects at all sorts of distance and in [all sorts of] measures, a restriction of relation in terms of distance (deśa) [or] measure (parimāna) [is also not possible]. But [a restriction] in terms of time (kāla) is defendable (nirūpyate), for in [the view that the eye, etc.] operate by reaching [their object] (prāpyakāritve), they cannot reach it if [the object] is not present; the same [is true] in [the view that the eye, etc.] operate without reaching [their object] (aprāpyakāritve), since [in that case] one needs a [special] capacity (sāmarthya) of the object [to be known], [and objects] that have not come into being or have ceased to exist have no [such] capacity, for they are inexpressible (anupākhyeya) [in terms of being and non-being]. And therefore the eye, etc., should they have a special excellence (ati-√śī), may only make their own domain known in an eminent way (adhikam) in terms of distance, measure [and] number, but not what is beyond their domain, [namely] what has not come to existence, [and] what has ceased to exist. Therefore it is said [in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4]: “because it grasps something present” (vidyamānopalambhanatvāt).

Both characteristics of the object of perception highlighted in this passage (sambandhal vartamānatava) have their source in MiŚū 1.1.4, where “contact with the senses of a person” (samprayog[ah] puruṣasyendriyāṇām) is mentioned besides “being grasped at the present time” (vidyamānopalambhanatvāt). Yet it is obviously the second characteristic that, above all, captivates Maṇḍana’s attention. His four-fold suspension of restriction (niyama) in

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71 ViV 15: na pratyakṣam caṣkarādhiṣṭaṃ tāvāṃ sarvārtheṣu, teṣāṃ viṣayaniyamāt, kim cid eva hi vartamāṇam sambaddhaṃ ca tadvisayah, na ca sarve ‘rthās tathā, yady api cāneka viṣayaprameyasamvedanād rūpato niyamo durṇirūpāh, paṭumandatādibhedataś ca, nānādeśaparimāṇārthaparicchedād deśa-tahb sambandhanyamād, parimāṇato niyamaṃ ca, kālatas tu nirūpyate, prāpyakāritve ‘vartamānasya prāpyahāvāt, aprāpyakāritve ‘py arthasāmarthyasavyapekṣatvāt, jīnāntaptāv ajātaniṣṭthas ānupākhyeyatvād āsāmarthyaat. tada cātiśayānā api caṣkuraṇāh svavisaṃ eva deśa tathā parimāṇataḥ samkhya-tād vādhiṃ bodhayeyuh, nāviṣayam ajātam ativrītām. tad uktam vidyamānopalambhanatvād iti (S 461.2–468.1 [= M 116.2–119.1/G 82.6–84.3]). a tathā S: Ø M G; b deśa-tah S: na deśa-tah M G; c deśa-tah S: tathā M G; d atiśayānāḥ S: atiśayānām M G. The text is trunked in M (118.4).

72 On this well-known divergence, see Chatterjee 1978: 138–141 and Bhatt 1989: 174–177. It opposes thinkers (including Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Sāṃkhya-philosophers) who think that the senses must “reach” (pra-√āpy) their object in order to produce sensation and others (notably Buddhists) who estimate that sensation can happen even while senses and object are at a distance.

73 Maṇḍana’s conception of past and future as “inexpressible [in terms of being and non-being]” (anupākhyeya) might be borrowed from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya. See David (forthcoming).
terms of form, acuity, measure and distance (to which number can be added) also makes the very idea of a relation with the senses practically useless. For what kind of ‘relation’ would there be between the senses and objects placed at an extreme distance, for instance, if not their mere coexistence in one and the same moment? And what would be the point of restricting the object of perception to what is ‘related’ to the senses if virtually everything can be related to them? Thus it is possible to read in this text a form of thought experiment, allowing us to discriminate between factual limitations of perception (in terms of form, size, etc.) which, in principle, can be suspended, and a natural limitation of perception, i.e. its relation to the present time, which no artificial extension of our faculties can allow us to surpass. This insistence on the temporal dimension of perception might be a natural consequence of Mandana’s main thesis in the field of ontology, voiced in ViV 12, identifying existence (sattā) with being present (vartamānatā): if only present things are perceptible, it is perhaps because they only ‘exist’ in the true sense of the term. But this might also be his one true link to Kumārila, whose core argument against the possibility of foresight (obviously an essential component of omniscience) in ŚlV (codanā°) 115 is precisely the natural limitation of sensory perception to the present moment.

3.3  Maṇḍana’s strategy against omniscience thus appears, at this point, essentially as a reduction of Kumārila’s arguments to a single one: perception, relying on the operation of the senses, can only grasp things in the present. His use of this argument in ViV 15, however, marks a radically different approach to Buddhist theories of perception. As we have seen, all arguments of the ŚlV (codanā°) 112–114 and the corresponding verses of the BT are based on the capacity of the senses to grasp all things in a single moment of perception, and this may safely be extended to his remark in v. 115 as well. This presupposes that perception can occur only through the senses, an assumption justified, in Kumārila’s perspective, by his rejection of all kinds of supersensory perception in the chapter of the ŚlV dealing with pratyakṣa (ad MiSū 1.1.4). Quite the opposite, Maṇḍana chooses to confront Buddhist epistemologists on their own ground in order to show that even supersensory perception as they conceive it is incompatible with omniscience. This ‘dialectical’ attitude, so characteristic of Maṇḍana’s philosophical style, allows him to open an entirely new field of philosophical enquiry into the nature of the Omniscient’s cognition, which was to acquire some prominence in later stages of this debate.

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74 Maṇḍana’s equation between being and being present forms the topic of the third study in this series. See David (forthcoming).

75 ŚIV (codanā°) 115ac: bhaviṣyati na dṛṣṭām ca pratyakṣasya manāg api / sāmarthyam; “It is never seen that perception has even a bit (manāg api) of capacity with regard to a thing in the future.” Translation: Kataoka 2011: 329. Unsurprisingly, Kumārila reads in MiSū 1.1.4, especially in the reason vidyamānopalambhanatvāt, an implicit attack against the possibility of yogic perception. See ŚIV (pratyakṣa°) 26–27ab (translated in Taber 2005: 54).

76 The earliest echo of this shift in the Mīmāṃsakas’ attitude towards omniscience in a Buddhist text might be found in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā on TS 3156–3157 (= BT), where the learned Buddhist scholar takes into consideration two hypotheses about the nature of the “complete knowledge of all things” (sakalavastupalījñāna): sensory cognition (indriyajñāna) and mental cognition (manovijñāna). See TSP 997.20–998.21. It is possible that Kamalaśīla’s comments on these stanzas should be read as an effort to integrate Maṇḍana’s arguments into Sāntarakṣita’s mainly Kumārilan framework. His examination of mental cognition (TSP 998.18–21), in particular, with his insistence on the mind’s
3.4 Three types of perceptual awareness are considered in ViV 15, corresponding to Dharmakīrti’s four types with the exception of self-awareness (svasamvedana): perception “born from the eye, etc.” (cakṣurādijanman), “mental” (mānasa) perception and perception “born from meditation” (bhāvanāmaya), which is also how Dharmakīrti defines the cognition of yogins (yogināṃ jñānam). Among them, the greatest attention is not devoted to the last kind of perception, as we would probably expect, but to mental cognition. For sure, external senses are riveted to the present time, but the mind need not be; in fact we observe that dreams, fantasies and other creations of the mind have no evident link to the world of sensation, and also deal with past and future events. Could omniscience be a cognition of that kind? We cannot be sure whether Maṇḍana had a particular Buddhist thinker or school in mind while refuting that possibility, but I find it unlikely that his opponent should be Dharmakīrti, whose conception of mental cognition (manovijñāna [NB 1.9]) explicitly excludes independence of the mind from the senses. In fact it seems Maṇḍana chooses once again not to refute Dharmakīrti’s ideas – at least, not at first –, but skilfully to take them out of their original context to fit his own purpose. As is well-known, mental perception for Dharmakīrti does not only cover internal mental phenomena such as awareness of pleasure and pain, but also the (non-conceptual) moment of attention immediately following a sensation, that of a patch of blue for instance, in which we become aware that there is ‘something’ in front of us without yet knowing that it is ‘blue.’ His main preoccupation in PV 3.239–248 is precisely to show that the content (viṣaya) of that moment of perception is different (anāya) from what has been previously experienced (pūrvānubhūta) – so that it can be considered valid knowledge (pramāṇa) –, but is also not entirely “unseen” (adṛṣṭa), so that awareness of sound, for instance, cannot follow from a sensation of blue, or awareness

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77 On these four types, see for instance NB 1.7–11.


79 This is, at least, the assumption made by Umbeka Bhaṭṭa (8th c.?), the oldest commentator on the ŚlV, who begins his commentary on ŚlV (codanā°) 115 with the following objection: nanu heyopādeya-grāhakasya vijñānasyāsty ekaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhāvanā, kim ucyate kāraṇānupalabdhyā kāryābhāva iti? bhāvanājanyāpratyaṅkāṃ dharmādharmagrāhakatvena tair īṣṭam!; “[Objection:] but, there is [indeed] a cause for the cognition that grasps what is to be abandoned and what is to be appropriated, [namely] meditation (bhāvanā)! Why do [you] say that ‘the effect does not exist since one does not grasp [its] cause’? They [= Buddhists] maintain that perception born from meditation (bhāvanājanyāṃ pratyākṣam) is what grasps merit and demerit!” (Tātparyaṭīkā 74.7–8; translation: Moriyama 2014: 64 [modified]). The phrase kāraṇānupalabdhyā kāryābhāvaḥ recalls Maṇḍana’s formulation in ViV 15 (kāraṇānivṛttyā kāryābhāvaḥ [S 460.2–461.1]), and it is possible that Umbeka, who is also the author of a commentary on Maṇḍana’s Bhāvanāviveka, makes here an approximative quote of the ViV.

80 The possibility that dreams (svapna) manifest the mind’s capacity to grasp external objects independently of the senses – a hypothesis Maṇḍana eventually rules out – is the topic of a separate investigation in ViV 16 (S 583.2–590.3). This enquiry, carried out essentially with non-Buddhist arguments and only loosely related to the question of omniscience, need not concern us here.

of blue from no sensation at all, as in the case a blind man.\textsuperscript{82} Taking the best party of these remarks, Maṇḍana insists, in his turn, on the dependence (\textit{pāratantrya}) of the mind (\textit{manas}) on the senses when it comes to external objects (\textit{bahir});\textsuperscript{83}

Even mental perception (\textit{mānasam pratyakṣam}) [cannot produce omniscience],\textsuperscript{84} for the mind (\textit{manas}) has no autonomy (\textit{asvatantratvāt}) [with regard to what is] outside (\textit{bahir}).\textsuperscript{85} If it had [such an] autonomy (\textit{svātatantra}), the undesired consequence would be that nobody would be blind, deaf, etc. To explain: regarding perceptive awareness (\textit{pratyakṣa[m]} \textit{vedana[m]}) of forms/colours, etc. (\textit{rūpādi}), the [mind] is dependent (\textit{paratantra}) on [senses] like the eye, [and] it is limited by their very limitation (\textit{niyama});\textsuperscript{86} otherwise, as [we have just] said, the undesired consequence would be that nobody would be blind, etc. If [you object] that [this undesired consequence, namely] that nobody would be blind, etc. does not occur, for [mental perception] depends on the [objective] correlate of [its] homogeneous and immediate cause [i.e. a cognition] born from the [senses] (\textit{tajjasamanantarapratyayahakāryapekṣaṇād}),\textsuperscript{87} [our answer is that,] in all cases, the dependence [on the operation of

\textsuperscript{82} See PV 3.239–244: \textit{pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā / adṛṣṭagrahaṇe \textit{indhāder api syād arthadarśanam // (…)} tasmād indriyāvatānantarapratyayodbhavah / mana \textit{niyam eva grhṇāti viṣayaṃ nāndhādṛtataḥ // svārthānvaśānāpeksaśva hatet indriyājā matiḥ / tato \textit{niyagrahaṇe \textit{py asya nityatāgrāhyatā matā //}; “If mental [perception] grasps [an object] that has been experienced before (\textit{pūrvānubhūta}), then it is not a means of valid knowledge (\textit{apramāṇatā}); if it grasps something [entirely] unseen (\textit{adṛṣṭa}), then a vision of the object would occur also to a blind man, etc. (…) Therefore, the mind [= mental cognition (\textit{manas}), born from the immediate cause (\textit{anantarapratyaya}) that is a sensory cognition (\textit{indriyavijñāna}), grasps an entirely different object (\textit{anyam eva viṣayam}) [with respect to that sensation], so that [the undesired consequence that is] the vision [of the object by a blind man does not] [occur]. [Still,] the sensory cognition (\textit{indriyajā matiḥ}) that is [its] cause (\textit{hetu}) is entirely dependent (\textit{apekṣa}) on an object (\textit{artha}) related to its own object [as its immediate cause] (\textit{svārthānva}); so, even though it grasps something different, [we] consider that it grasps [only] a delimited object (\textit{niyatagrahyatā}).” See also Vetter 1964: 40 and PVin 1.19 (19.1–7). A thorough account of Dharmakīrti’s theory of mental cognition is given by Vācaspati in the NyK (471.2–473.8); the passage has been translated into English by Stcherbatsky (1930: 318–320).

\textsuperscript{83} ViV 15: \textit{mānasam api pratyakṣam, bahir manaso \textit{svatantratvāt, svātantuṣy \textit{ndhabhāḍhirādyābhāvaprasangat, tathā hi: pratyakṣe rūpādivedanē tac caṣuṣārādi-paratantrān tantrīṣyamād eva niyatam, anyathāndhāyābhāvaprasangād ity uktam, tajjasamanantarapratyayahakāryapekṣaśvaṇād yadi nāndhāyābhāvah sarvathā na \textit{pāratantrāṃ} \textit{nivartate}, tadviṣaya-viṣayasvayatvāb, anyathāndhāyāntara-jasahakārināṃ\textsuperscript{a} \textit{pi pravṛtteḥ sa evānādhiyābhāvah (S 468.1–474.2 [= M 119.1/G 84.3–85.5]).} \textsuperscript{a} na \textit{pāratantrāṃ S; pāratantrāṃ na M G;\textsuperscript{b} tadviṣaya-viṣayasvayatvāt S; tadviṣaya-viṣayasvayatvāt M G;\textsuperscript{c} indriyāntarajātā M G: indriyāntarajātā\textsuperscript{S}} The order of the sentences differs widely between S and both printed editions (M/G); I do not reproduce these variants here.

\textsuperscript{84} See NyK: \textit{mānasam api pratyakṣam na sarvāṃ bodhayaṭi (468.13)}.

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. ViV\textsuperscript{K} 15d: \textit{paratantraṃ bahir manah; “Regarding external [objects], the mind is dependent (\textit{paratantra}) on [the senses]” (S 458.3 [= M 114.3/G 81.3]).}

\textsuperscript{86} As we have seen before, the essential limitation of the senses, in Maṇḍana’s view, is their incapacity to grasp objects in the past or future.

\textsuperscript{87} Cf. PV 3.243ab (translated above, n. 82), PVin 1.19 (19.5–7) and NB 1.9. The latter’s definition reads as follows: \textit{suvāsīyāntara-aravasahakāra-viṣayājñēnena samanantarapratyayena jānuṣītan \textit{tan manovijñānām; “M}ental perception is the product of a sense perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i.e. the second moment] of its proper object.” Translation: Kajiyama 1998: 45.
the senses] does not disappear, for the content [of mental perception] is born of the content of a [particular sense].\footnote{That is: the objective moment (kṣaṇa) which forms the content (viṣaya) of mental awareness of a patch of blue (K2), for instance, is not identical with the preceding objective moment (K1), the content of sensation. Yet both moments are not unrelated, since K1 is also the “homogeneous and immediate cause” (samanantarapratyaya) of K2. In order for mental cognition to take place, then, we need two things: a (sensory) cognition which is its samanantarapratyaya – or, in Vācaspati’s more oecumenic terms, its “material cause” (upādāna – NyK 472.2) – and an objective correlate (sahakārin) which is the immediate product of the objective moment (K1) grasped by that sensation. Thus, although sensation and mental awareness have different contents, they are nevertheless indissolubly intertwined.}

Were it not, since [mental perception] would take place because of a [moment] that would cooperate with [the cognition] born from another sense (indriyāntarajasahakāriṇo ‘pi),\footnote{I exceptionally disagree with Stern’s choice to read “indriyāntarasahakāriṇo, and prefer the reading “indriyāntarajasahakāriṇo transmitted in his Ms. B, in his own version of the NyK (474.5) and also chosen by both published editions of the ViV (M 120.5/G 85.4). Vācaspati’s interpretation of the compound indriyāntaraja as referring to the cognition (indriyāntarajavijñāna) which is the material cause (or samanantarapratyaya) of mental awareness clearly supports that interpretation.} there would indeed be no blind, etc.!

Despite the presentation of the arguments in a polemical form, there is probably little here that Dharmakīrti would actually disagree with. I find it in general unlikely that a philosopher arguing for the mind’s autonomy (svātantrya) in grasping external objects would really draw any benefit from Dharmakīrti’s theory of mental awareness, and from his distinction of two objective ‘moments’ corresponding to sensory and mental perception. Maṇḍana’s detailed discussion of that theory in the ViV (S 474.2–542.1), leading him to reaffirm the orthodox mīmāṃsaka view that “the mind never operates directly (sākṣāt) and independently (svatantram) on [an object] that is not internal (āntara),”\footnote{ViV 15: na kva cid\textsuperscript{a} anāntare manaḥ sākṣāt svatantram pravartate (S 541.3–4 [= M 140.6–141.1/G 100.3]). \textsuperscript{a} na kva cid S: na kva cid api M G. Cf. SIV (pratyakṣa)\textsuperscript{b} 160cd: pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādau kevalasyaiva drṣyate; “(…) a functioning of the mind by itself is observed in respect to pleasure, pain, etc.” (text and translation: Taber 2005: 158 and 114).} thus conscientiously fulfills the epistemologist’s task, but has little bearing on the topic of omniscience proper.

3.5 A more profound divergence between the two philosophers comes out of Maṇḍana’s brief discussion of perception “born from meditation” (bhāvanāmaya) at the end of ViV 15 (S 542.1–555.2). While Kumārila spoke in very general terms of “the perception of past or future objects, or of one that is very small or obstructed, believed by some to belong to yogins and liberated souls (muktātman),”\footnote{ŚlV (pratyakṣa)\textsuperscript{c} 26ac: attiśāṅgata ‘py arthe sūkṣme vyavahite ‘pi ca / pratyakṣam yoginām iṣṭam kaiś cint muktātmanām api \textit{it} (text: Taber 2005: 152; translation: Taber 2005: 54 [adapted]).} Maṇḍana specifically addresses the Buddhist epistemologists’ conception of yogic perception, especially their belief that it results from “repeated practice” (abhyāśa) or habituation to cognitive contents reached by some other means.\footnote{On abhyāśa and its interpretation in Buddhist texts, see Eltschinger 2009: 184 (n. 57).} As is well-known, Dharmakīrti thinks that the main cause of a yogin’s perception is mental cultivation or “meditation” (bhāvanā), half way between ‘rumination’ of an idea in view of its perfect assimilation and ‘imagination’ understood as the vivid representation of something formerly conceived. In more Buddhist terms, meditation consists of the repeated...
presentation to the mind of the practitioner of the four Nobles’ Truths, culminating in their direct apprehension (sākṣātkāra) or “vision” (darśana). To that activity Dharmakīrti ascribes the power – well-attested in persons subject to hallucinations born from desire, fear, madness, etc. – to produce an awareness with all external traits of perception: clarity (sphuṭābhatā [PV 3.8b]/spaṣṭa [PV 3.281d]/spaṣṭābha [PV 3.284c], etc.), non-conceptuality (kalpanāpo [PVin K 1.4a]/akalpaka [PV 3.123]/akalpa [PV 3.285d], etc.). The difference between mere hallucination and the cognition of a Buddhist Saint only lies, then, in the latter’s being “veridical” (saṃvādin [PV 3.286a]) or “non-erroneous” (abhrānta [PVin K 1.4b]), applying as it does to an object whose reality (bhūta [PV 3.285]) has been ascertained through Scripture (āgama) and reasoning (yukti). This last characteristic, which makes the cognition of yogins into valid knowledge (pramāṇa) or perception (pratyakṣa) in the true sense of the term, is also the main topic of Maṇḍana’s critique. For to claim, as Dharmakīrti does, that yogic perception is non-erroneous as it follows on hearing Buddhist Scriptures and pondering over their content amounts to saying that meditation is essentially non-productive. As Maṇḍana puts in the Brahmasiddhi: “[An injunction] concerning a cognition of the second type [= mental cultivation] does not concern the comprehension of reality (tattvāvabodha), but only the repeated practice (abhyāsa) [of that comprehension].” This ‘borrowed’ character of the content of meditation, a warrant for its validity in Dharmakīrti’s view, is precisely what leads Maṇḍana to disqualify it as mere second-hand knowledge.

Even [perception] born from meditation (bhāvanāmaya) is about an object [previously] heard about [in the Scripture] and/or known by inference (śrutānumitaviṣaya), for it is impossible to meditate at random; since it conforms to a former cognition’s having a real object (bhūtārthatva) or the contrary (viparyaya), it is dependent (paratantra) on Scripture and inference, and relies upon [another means of knowledge to ensure its validity] (sāpekṣatvāt). Therefore it is not a means of valid knowledge (apramāṇam).

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93 On the “vision of the [four] Nobles’ Truths” (āryasatyadarśana) as the specific goal of yogic perception for Dharmakīrti, see PVin 1.28 (27.11) and Eltschinger 2014b: 250–251. As convincingly shown by Eltschinger (2009: 199–200), that vision corresponds, in Dharmakīrti’s view, to the cognition of the Buddhist practitioner after the “revolution of the basis” (āśrayaparivṛtti) has taken place.


96 Maṇḍana alludes here to his own tripartition of Brahmān-knowledge in the beginning of the Niyogakāṇḍa: “knowledge born from speech” (śabdāt pratipattiḥ), knowledge “consisting of its continuous fixation” (tatsaṃtānavatī pratipattiḥ) and knowledge “consisting of a direct apprehension” (sākṣātkārarūpā pratipattiḥ). See BS 74.10–13. Meditation (bhāvanā) as understood by Dharmakīrti, corresponds, of course, to the second of these three stages.

97 BS 2.101–105ab (introduction): dvitiyapratisāpavayo hi na tattvāvabodhavisayah, kim tu tadabhāṣāvisayah (115.2–3 – I do not translate hi). Saṅkhāpāṇi’s commentary (Brahmasiddhiyākhyā 239.10–11) makes the precision that the difference between both types of knowledge (pratipatti) is equivalent to that between valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and memory (smṛti).

98 ViV 15: bhāvanāmayaḥ apiśrutānumitaviśayam akasmād bhāvanāyogād āgamānumānaparatantraṃ pūrvajñānabhūtārthatvapratipavaryāṇvudhānāt sāpekṣatvād apramāṇām (S 542.1–555.2 [= M 147.1–3/G 104.1–3]). *bhāvanāmayaḥ api S: bhāvanāmayaḥ api vijñānām MG.
In these lines, which I propose to read as a direct response to Dharmakīrti’s opposite statement in PVin 1.28, Maṇḍana inaugurates what would be the invariable position of the Advaita tradition on the nature of meditation or “contemplation” (nididhyāsana) for centuries to come. Meditation being only the repeated and progressively intensified thought of an object, it cannot produce by itself any knowledge of that object. So, in order to be mentally cultivated, the object must be reached by some other means, scriptural or inferential. If meditation, then, has its use as a means of assimilation or ‘realisation’ of what has been grasped, it does not bring anything new and because of that it is “not a means of valid knowledge” (apramāṇa). While Dharmakīrti interprets the transition from conceptual knowledge originated from Scripture and reasoning to the immediacy and non-conceptuality of the yogin’s insight as a passage from illusion to truth, Maṇḍana rather insists on the identity of content of all three cognitions: no matter how we take it, it is always the same reality that is “heard, thought and meditated upon,” as the Upaniṣad has it, and neither perception nor reasoning can grasp it without the help of Scripture. Beyond the limited controversy about the yogins’s cognition and its capacity to account for omniscience, we sense a deeper disagreement concerning the very function of Scripture and its place in the path to liberation: from a mere preliminary (and to a certain point superfluous) stage leading the adept to a more authentic and direct apprehension of reality in Dharmakīrti’s view, the audition of Scripture has become for Maṇḍana the very centre of his Vedāntic soteriology, the means of knowledge par excellence that other pramāṇas may of course supplement, but never entirely replace.

99 See PVin 1.28: yogināṃ api śrutamayena jñānenaṁ rthān ghṛtvā yukticintāmayayena vyavasthāpya bhāva-
vatāṃ tamināppattau yat sparśāvabhāṣī bhayādāv ēvā tad avikalpakam avitathavīśayaṁ pramāṇam
pratyakṣam; “Having first grasped objects through a cognition born from listening [to the treatises] and
[then] ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting [upon them] by means of rational
enquiry, yogins cultivate [those objects]. The [cognition] which, at the completion of this [cultivation],
appears as vividly as in such cases as fear, etc. and [at the same time] is non-conceptual [and] has a true
object, is also a means of valid knowledge, [namely] perception” (27.9–11 – translation: Eltschinger
2009: 198 [modified]). The hypothesis of a direct response to Dharmakīrti is indirectly supported by
the paraphrase of PVin 1.28 in the corresponding portion of the NyK. Interestingly, Vācaspati does
not speak in general of the cognition of yogins but specifically of that of the Buddha (tathāgata), and
also relates Dharmakīrti’s remarks to the question of omniscience: śrutamayena vijñānena samasta-
vāstavīśayaṁ nairātmyādi ghṛtvā yukticintāmayayena ca bhūtataṁ asya vyavasthāpyaṣakrcetośiv-esanarā-
pabhāvanāprakāraṁspryatāntajamnām pratyakṣam vijñānāṃ anavayavanātmādīrpañvāsivālbamanaṁ
karatālāravindaviśayaṁ ivātivisadatḥ bhāvayiṣyati tathāgatāḥ; “Having first grasped the absence
of a Self, etc., which concerns all beings, by means of a cognition born from listening [to the treatises]
and [then] established their reality by means of [a cognition] born from reasoning, the Tathāgata was
able to effectuate (bhāvayiṣyati) a perceptual cognition born of [His] intense meditation, consisting
of a repeated presentation to [His] mind [of the objects he reflected upon]. [That vision] had for its
objective correlate everything without exception possessing the property of being selfless, etc. and was
as entirely clear as [the vision] of a lotus on the palm of one’s hand” (S 544.6–545.4).

100 Recall that novelty or “manifestation of an unknown object” (ajñātārthaprakāśa) is one of the definitions
given by Dharmakīrti himself of “valid knowledge” in PV 2.5a. See above n. 81.

101 Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 2.4.5: ātmā vā are draṣṭavyāḥ śrotavyaṁ mantavyaṁ nididhyāśityaḥ; “Truly, it is
the Self that must be seen, heard, thought, mediated upon.” As is well-known, this passage is taken by
the later Vedāntic tradition to enunciate the three stages of the knowledge of Brahmaṇa, starting with its
“audition” (śravana) in the Scripture, developing through “reflection” (manana) and “contemplation”
(nididhyāśana), and eventually leading to “direct perception” (sākṣātkāra).

102 See Steinkellner 1978: 127.
3.6 With this last point it seems we have exhausted most of what Maṇḍana had to say on the topic of the Buddha’s omniscience. It is now time to enquire whether his arguments aroused any response from the Buddhist side in the following centuries, as was the case for Kumārila. Our main field of investigation will be the work of an immediately later Buddhist philosopher, Prajñākaragupta, on whom Maṇḍana’s influence – so is at least my contention – is most easily discernible.

4. An early Buddhist paraphrase of ViV 15: Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (PVA) ad PV 2.29 (vv. 2.358–370)

4.1 Although Maṇḍana’s influence on later Buddhist thought is yet to be properly valued, it is nevertheless certain that the ViV was read and extensively used by some at least among later Buddhist logicians. Of the several texts one could invoke in support of this claim, none is perhaps as revealing as Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV 2.29 (PVA 2.358–370). Prajñākaragupta is probably the first commentator on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika to regard the Buddha’s omniscience (sarvajñatva) as a central topic of the Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter (= PV 2). His commentary on PV 2.29–33 is therefore, along with chapter 26 of Sāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha, among the oldest available testimonies of that debate stemming from the Buddhist pramāṇa-tradition. Prajñākaragupta’s long discussion of PV 2.29, where Dharmakīrti objects to the possibility of a knowledge of objects beyond the senses (parokṣārthrathajñāna) in the absence of a means (sādhana) to accomplish it, forms the pūrvapakṣa of that section, and is for the most part a web of mīmāṃsaka arguments set against the possibility of omniscience. This section of the Vārttikālaṃkāra is thus of high significance for the early history of this debate in Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā alike.

103 Apart from the PVA, possible echoes of Maṇḍana’s arguments have been identified so far in the works of Kamalaśīla (see above n. 76), Śaṅkaranandana (see n. 66) and Ratnakīrti (see nn. 37 and 66).

104 I am quoting here the recent edition of the passage by Moriyama (2014: 168–179) (= PVA), which corresponds to PVA 50.17–52.25. The numbering of kārikās is identical in both editions.

105 According to R. Jackson (1991: 235–236), Prajñākaragupta’s “conflating omniscience and authoritativeness” constitutes a decisive innovation of the Vārttikālaṃkāra with respect to earlier commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s work. See also Franco (2011: 90, n. 44) and Moriyama (2014: 19–26), who reach the same conclusion, the latter by an in-depth study of PVA ad PV 2.1–7. Interestingly, omniscience will be regarded by some later Tibetan commentators as the fundamental topic, not only of those kārikās, but of the whole second chapter. See Jackson (1991: 232 and 236), who mentions in particular the case of rGyal tshab (15th c.). The latter’s indebtedness to Prajñākaragupta (which of course need not be direct) is evident from the passage of his commentary on PV 2 translated in Jackson 1991: 241, which is little more than a paraphrase of PVA ad PV 2.29.

106 Apart from a small portion of the text (PVA 168.9–10 and PVA 2.367–369), a rather bold adaptation of an argument originally found in PV 1.335, all arguments of Prajñākaragupta’s pūrvapakṣin can be traced back to earlier Mīmāṃsā works (see table below, § 4.6). Yamārī’s tentative identification of Prajñākaragupta’s opponent as a materialist (tshu rol mdzes pa pa, Skt. *cārvāka?), on which Moriyama (2014: 244, n. 5) already expressed serious doubts, can therefore be entirely discarded.

107 As he convincingly shows (pp. 58–59), the objection given in PVA 2.359 that an omniscient would also experience the taste of impure things (aśuci), which is not found in the ŚIV, is certainly borrowed from the BT (= TS 3144). Even if some parallels he draws between the PVA and the ŚIV might be
but also notes (pp. 59–60) that this cannot account for the pūrvapakṣin’s argumentation as a whole, which has no clear equivalent in the works of the great Mīmāṃsaka. Adding to Moriyama’s remarks, I shall argue that Prajñākaragupta’s model in building his pūrvapakṣa is not only Kumārila, but also Maṇḍana, and that the first half of the text (PVA 2.358–363) in particular can be read as a paraphrase of ViV 15. Incidentally, this identification of one of Prajñākaragupta’s main opponents will help us, it is hoped, to solve certain difficulties in the interpretation of that delicate passage, and also to highlight certain minor divergences between the Buddhist scholar and his Brahmanical source.

4.2 Prajñākaragupta’s fundamental distinction, to begin with, between two possible interpretations of the word sādhanā (“means”) in PV 2.29bc (tatsādhanasya ca / abhāvāt) – namely, as the (efficient) cause (hetu/kāraṇa) of the Buddha’s omniscience and as the (informing) cause of our certitude (niścaye hetuh) of an omniscient being’s existence – has generally been interpreted in reference to the ŚIV or BṬ. Yet nowhere does Kumārila formulate such an opposition, which on the other hand closely corresponds to Maṇḍana’s distinction, already found on the threshold of ViV 15, between the (efficient) cause (hetu/kāraṇa) that should account (upā-vīpadān) for omniscience and the cause of our knowledge (jīnāna) of an omniscient being. It is thus simpler to assume that

108 The possibility of Maṇḍana’s influence on Prajñākaragupta in this pūrvapakṣa is briefly considered by Moriyama (2014: 63–65), who does not however engage in a systematic comparison of both texts.

109 The whole text of PV 2.29 runs as follows: prāmānyaṃ ca parokṣārthajñānaṃ tatsādhanasya ca (em.; tat sādhanasya Ed) / abhāvān nāsty anuṣṭhānam iti ke cit pracakṣate //; “And the reliability [of any religious authority] consists in [His/its] knowledge of objects beyond the senses, but because there is no [possible] means to complete it, there is no [successful] practice in conformity with [its teaching]. Thus claim certain [Mīmāṃsakas].” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 244.

110 See PVA ad PV 2.29: yas tāvad asarvajña eva sarvaśājñāno bhavati, tasya parokṣārthajñāne ko hetuḥ? na khalv īḍrśam kim api kāraṇam upalakṣītaṃ, yato nāṣṭhānāt sarvavedanam bhavati (…) nāpi tanniścaye hetur asti; “First of all, if someone who is not omniscient becomes omniscient, what is the cause (hetu) of his knowledge of objects that are beyond the senses? For sure, [you] cannot point out any such cause (kāraṇa) from which, through practice, the knowledge of all [things] would arise (…) nor is there any cause of [our] certitude (niścaye hetuh) that such a [being exists]” (168.5–9). Translation: Moriyama 2014: 244 (modified).


112 See ViV K 15ab: hetvabhāve phalābhāvāt pramāne ‘sati na pramā l; “No effect [takes place] without a cause, [so] no valid knowledge [of all things takes place] without a [corresponding] means of valid knowledge” (S 458.2 [= M 114.2/G 81.2]); ViV 15: (…) kāraṇanivṛttyā kāryanivṛttipratīteḥ (S 460.2–461.1 – translated above, § 2.2).

113 See ViV 15: (…) na, tasyānapatpattā ajñānāc ca; “No, for [an omniscient being] cannot be accounted for, and because we would have no way to know [Him]” (S 445.1–458.1 [= M 114.1/G 81.1]); ViV 19: evam tāvad anupapattih, ajñānām api; “Thus [it has been shown], first of all, that [an omniscient being] cannot be accounted for; now [we will see that] there is also no knowledge [of such a being]” (S 686.1–2 [= M 204.5/G 145.2]). a ajñānam S: jñānam M G.
Maṇḍana’s distinction is the source of Prajñākaragupta’s twofold interpretation of the word sādhana in Dharmakīrti’s verse.

4.3 The assumption of a debt to Maṇḍana further allows us to better understand the structure of Prajñākaragupta’s pūrvapakṣa, which already caused some difficulty to its Indian commentators. Thus Yamāri (11th c.) tentatively identifies four parts in PVA 2.358–363, corresponding to four possible causes (rgyu) of the Buddha’s omniscience: sensory cognition (dbang po’i shes pa; Skt. *indriyajñāna?), the senses and the object (?) (dbang po dang don, Skt. indriyārtha?), mental cognition assisted by repeated practice (goms pa dang bcas pa’i yid kyi shes pa, Skt. *abhyaśavanmanojñāna?) and inference (rjes su dpag pa; Skt. *anumāna?). To this rather unlikely organisation of the pūrvapakṣin’s proof, Moriyama (2014: 57–62) opposes his own twofold division, which sounds much more promising: (1) refutation of omniscience as a form of sensory perception (v. 358–359), (2) refutation of omniscience as a form of mental perception (v. 360–362). The problem is that Kumārila, whom he considers to be Prajñākaragupta’s main model, never seems to consider that omniscience could be something other than sensory perception, such as for instance mental perception. So, either one considers that Prajñākaragupta himself introduces that possibility or one has to admit that he draws from some other source, which is then very likely to be Maṇḍana’s set of three (not two) hypotheses: omniscience as a form of sensory, mental or yogic cognition (see § 3.4). The following table presents the various hypotheses in presence regarding the nature of the Omniscient’s cognition:

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<tr>
<td>[indriya-pratyakṣa]</td>
<td>cakṣurādijanma pratya-ksan (S 461.2–468.1)</td>
<td>indriyajñāna (1.358–359 + 50.24)</td>
<td>indriyajñāna (1.358–359 + 50.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mānasam pratya-ksam (S 468.1–542.1)</td>
<td>manovijñāna (1.360)</td>
<td>manovijñāna (1.360–362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bhāvanāmayaṃ pratya-ksam (S 542.1–555.2)</td>
<td>abhyāsāt [vijñānam]/bhāvanā (1.361–363)</td>
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4.4 Arguments set against omniscience as a form of sensory or mental perception are clearly similar in the ViV and PVA: the limitation of the domain (viṣaya) of sensory percep-

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114 Tibetan text quoted in Moriyama (2014: 59, n. 12). Since the original Sanskrit of Yamāri’s Supariśuddhi (on which see Steinkellner/Much 1995: xx) is still unpublished, it is not possible to check whether oddities of this classification are due to Yamāri or to his Tibetan translator. In any case, Maṇḍana’s name is not included in the list of authorities identified by M. Ono (2000: xxiv) in Yamāri’s commentary, so it is quite possible that Prajñākaragupta’s commentator did not know the ViV. My very limited knowledge of Tibetan did not allow me to consult Jayanta’s slightly earlier commentary.

115 This seems to be, in substance, the option chosen by Moriyama (2014: 59–62), who solves the difficulty by reading Prajñākaragupta’s argument as a reaction to Dharmakīrti’s newly elaborated theory of yogic perception. I am not quite convinced by this explanation since Dharmakīrti, like Dignāga before him, clearly distinguishes between mental and yogic perception, so there would be no point for Prajñākaragupta to discuss mental perception specifically if that were really the point at stake.
tion to what is related/proximate (saṃbaddha [ViV]/saṃnihita [PVA]) to the senses,\(^{116}\) the mind’s lack of autonomy (svatantra[iva]) from the senses in knowing external objects.\(^{117}\) A more delicate issue is whether there is any allusion to the perception of yogins in this passage of the Vārttikālaṃkāra, as is my contention. The three kārikās at stake (PVA 2.361–363) read as follows:\(^{118}\)

\[\text{(361) The clarity (spaṣṭatā) of that [cognition acquired] through repeated practice (abhyāsa) cannot encompass all [objects]. If it (tasya) relies on Scripture, [its] erroneousness (bhrāntatā) also (api) follows; (362) on the other hand (tu), one does not reach all things (sarvam vastu) as they are established by an inference (anumānaprasiddha), so there is no meditation (bhāvanā) that can encompass everything; how [then would one become] omniscient? (363) Through repeated practice of the [sacred] treatises, etc. (śāstrādi) one can only understand what is taught by them (śāstraprabhṛti); how [then] will anyone (tasya) attain knowledge of the totality [of being] (sākalya)?}\]

Although these verses still pose considerable problems in the detail of their interpretation, one can clearly recognize in them an elaboration on Maṇḍana’s main thesis regarding meditation (see above, § 3.5): omniscience cannot result from meditation (bhāvanā – 362cd), for it only consists in the repeated practice (abhyāsa – 361a/363a) of what has already been obtained by some other means (i.e. Scripture or inference). It is also possible that v. 363ab should be read in reference to Maṇḍana’s idea of meditation as an essentially non-productive activity, although this is far from certain.\(^{120}\) It seems in any case that Prajñākaragupta substantially changes the nature of Maṇḍana’s argumentation by insisting, above all, on the incapacity of the two ‘root-pramāṇas’ to apprehend all things,\(^{121}\) while

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\(^{116}\) See PVA 168.11–12: (...) indriyajñānasya saṃnihitavisayasya darśanāt; “because one observes that a sensory cognition has its object in [its] proximity.” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 245.


\(^{119}\) My translation of the passage differs only punctually from that of Moriyama (2014: 246–247).

\(^{120}\) Even though this interpretation is clearly very tentative, such a solution would avoid the disturbing redundancy of v. 363ab with respect to vv. 361–362. The hypothesis of an implicit reference to Kumārila’s BT (= TS 3163), upheld by Moriyama (2014: 77), would be another way out of this difficulty, but I must say I cannot easily read in Prajñākaragupta’s half-verse Kumārila’s objection that excellence or superiority (atiśaya) in the knowledge of a treatise (śāstra) does not entail excellence in the knowledge of another treatise (śāstrāntara): evam śāstravicāreṣu drṣyate ‘tiśayo mahān / na tu śāstrāntarajñānam tamārāṇenaiva labhyate // “Thus we notice [in some people] a great superiority in the knowledge of treatises, but this is not sufficient [to establish their] knowledge of other treatises.”

\(^{121}\) The pārvapaksin’s ground for refusing access to the totality of being to inference and Scripture is in itself far from clear. It is almost certain, as rightly pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 59–60, n. 14), that he discards inference in v. 362ab on the basis of Kumārila’s remark in ŚIV (codanā”) 115cd that inference and similar pramāṇas cannot grasp objects in the future (bhaviṣyant). His argument against Scripture in v. 361cd is in turn quite obscure, and I am not at all convinced by Yamāri’s recourse to the (typically
Maṇḍana rather insisted on the “heteronomy” (pāratantrya) of meditation, preventing it from becoming a pramāṇa in the full sense of the term. So, if the general structure of this pūrvapakṣa seems to follow that of ViV 15, the detail of the argument is a blend of Kumārila’s, Maṇḍana’s and – one may think – Prajñākaragupta’s own reflections.

4.5 Assuming, as I did, that most arguments in the first part of this pūrvapakṣa are drawn from the ViV will also, it is hoped, allow us to solve problems in the detail of the interpretation of that passage of the Vārttikālaṃkāra. Two verses are particularly problematic, namely vv. 2.358 and 2.359cd. The first verse is interpreted by Moriyama (2014: 57–58 and 245, n. 12) as an allusion to ŚIV (codanā°) 112–114 which is, as we remember, a crucial group of stanzas dealing with the mutual limitation of the senses, barring them the access to the totality of being. One has some difficulty, however, to read this argument in Moriyama’s translation of PV 2.358.¹²²

If an omniscient being arises despite the non-distinction regarding sense faculties and objects [between omniscient beings and ordinary people], everyone would become omniscient because of the non-distinction regarding sense faculties and objects. (Moriyama 2014: 245)

Although Moriyama does not provide much explanation for this, the logic behind his translation seems to be the following: since the senses of the (putative) Omniscient – the historical Buddha for instance – are not different from ours, they share the same limitations (358ab); if we suspend this limitation (admitting, for instance, that the eye could grasp sounds or smells), then there is no reason why everybody should not become omniscient (358cd). The interpretation of the compound indriyārthāviśeṣa as the “non-distinction of the senses and the object [in us and in an omniscient being]” looks quite forced though, which makes me suspect that this translation somehow misses the point. The argument becomes clearer, I think, if we relate Prajñākaragupta’s remark to Maṇḍana’s reasoning on the relation of identity (tanmātraprabandha°anubandha) possibly underlying a relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and the object to be known (prameya) (see above, § 2.2 [argument 2AIb] and nn. 31–32):¹²³ should an object be identical with the means to know it (e.g., the senses), there would be no

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¹²² Buddhist) argument of an “absence of connection [of speech] with external objects” (phyi rol gyi don dang ‘brel med pa – Tibetan text quoted by Moriyama [2014: 246, n. 18]), which I find very unlikely to come from the mouth of a mīmāṃsaka opponent. Though many interpretations of this half-verse are possible, I think it would make more sense for the pūrvapakṣin to underline, while speaking of the “erroneousness” (bhrāntatā) of verbal cognition, its conceptual character. The opponent would then reject Dharmakīrti’s claim that a conceptual (i.e. erroneous) cognition arising from the audition of Buddhist Scriptures could lead by its mere repetition to a non-conceptual (i.e. non-erroneous) cognition. The Sanskrit text of PVA 2.358 reads as follows: indriyārthāviśeṣe ‘pi yadi sarvavidudbhavaḥ sarvajña eva sarvah syād indriyārthāviśesataḥ // (p. 170).

¹²³ Recall that such a relation would allow us, in the hypothesis considered by Maṇḍana, to infer the absence of the object to be known (prameyaḥbhāva) – i.e., an omniscient being – from the absence of a pramāṇa establishing its existence, as when we infer for instance the absence of smoke (≡ vyāpyu) from the absence of fire (= vyāpaka).
difference between existing and being known, and everyone would become omniscient. On that basis, we can hopefully render Prajñākaragupta’s argument in a more faithful way:

Even if an omniscient being arose out of the absence of difference between a sense and [its] object (indriyārthāviśeṣa), everybody would become omniscient because of this absence of difference between a sense and [its] object!

This is not at all a central point in Maṇḍana’s argumentation, and I am struck by the amount of knowledge of Mīmāṃsā Prajñākaragupta expects from his reader (unless, of course, Maṇḍana himself is borrowing the argument from a Buddhist source). The same impression results from another possible hint at ViV 15 in PVA 2.359cd. As we have seen above (n. 107), the first half of this verse (aśucyādirasāsvādasamgamaś cānivāritah ā) is almost certainly a paraphrase of a verse of the BṬ (= TS 3144) arguing that an omniscient being, who would experience all things, would also experience the taste of impure things, etc. (aśucyādirasa). The second half of the verse (prāpyakārīndriyatve ca sarvavit katham utcyate ā) is read by Moriyama (2014: 245) as a continuation of this argument, and translated as follows:

And [thus,] if [an omniscient being’s] sense faculties function after having had a direct connection [with an object], how can he be [honorably] called an omniscient being?

This translation is in itself impeccable, and it also makes perfect sense to say that the perception of impure things is especially problematic if the senses operate while reaching (prāpyakārīn) their object. The presence of ca in pāda ā is disturbing though, and suggests another argument may be alluded to. As we saw (§ 3.2), the difference between prāpyakārīn and aprāpyakārīn is also mobilised by Maṇḍana while dealing with sensory perception to establish that neither explanation of perception (i.e. with and without a contact between the senses and the object) can account for a knowledge of past and future objects (S 465.1–466.2). I find it plausible that Prajñākaragupta reminds us of this argument, a possibility that would also match our main hypothesis that he is following the chronological order of ViV 15. If this proved correct, the allusion would be even more elliptic than in the preceding case, and would presuppose a reader fully conversant with the detail of Maṇḍana’s argumentation.

124 ViV 15: (...) tanmātrapratibandhābhāvāc ca, anyathā sarvasva sarvadarśitvaprasaṅgaḥ, aviśeṣāt (S 459.4–460.1 – translated above, § 2.2). Supposing Prajñākaragupta is indeed alluding to that argument, it is possible that he interprets aviśeṣa in ViV 15 as well as the absence of difference between the senses and the object (indriyārthāviśeṣa). This interpretation would differ from Vācaspati’s understanding of that term as referring to the absence of difference between us and the Omniscient. See NyK 460.7–8: aviśeṣād asmadādīnāṃ bhavadabhimatena saha sarvavidā. My translation of the passage (above, § 2.2) follows this last interpretation.

125 PVA 2.359ab: aśucyādirasāsvādasamgamaś cānivāritah ā; “And [for an omniscient being who perceives everything through the sense faculties], the connection with the experience of tasting an impure [thing], etc. is unavoidable.” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 245.

126 As rightly pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 246).
4.6 All this suggests that the ViV was not only known to Buddhist scholars, but that its contents were also fairly widespread in learned Buddhist circles by the end of the 8th century. The following table, which also integrates evidence found in previous scholarship, summarizes my hypotheses concerning the sources of this pūrvapakṣa:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ŚīV/BṬ/PV/ViV</th>
<th>PVA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 445.1–458.1)</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt; 15a/ViV 15 (S 461.2–462.1)</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 459.4–460.1)</td>
<td>2.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT (= TS 3144)</td>
<td>2.359ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idem/ViV 15 (S 465.1–466.2)</td>
<td>2.359cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt; 15d/ViV 15 (S 468.1–470.1)</td>
<td>2.360</td>
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<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 542.1–555.2)</td>
<td>2.361–363</td>
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<tr>
<td>ŚīV (&lt;i&gt;cod°&lt;/i&gt;) 115cd/BṬ (= TS 3173cd)</td>
<td>2.362ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚīV (&lt;i&gt;cod°&lt;/i&gt;) 134/BṬ (= TS 3191)</td>
<td>2.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚīV (&lt;i&gt;cod°&lt;/i&gt;) 137/BṬ (= TS 3238–3240)</td>
<td>2.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈ TS 3249/ViV 18 (S 675.1–676.1)</td>
<td>2.366</td>
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<tr>
<td>PV(SV) 1.335</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ViV 18 (S 676.1–3)</td>
<td>2.370/PVAs 114.26</td>
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5. Conclusion

Having reached the term of this enquiry, Maṇḍana Miśra appears to us, without contest, as the other great voice of Mīmāṃsā in the early debate on the Buddha’s omniscience. Less massive, less uncompromising, less influential also than Kumārila’s, his critique is nevertheless more complex, and philosophically more ambitious. It may also have served a slightly different purpose. For sure, Maṇḍana’s final view essentially coincides with that of his predecessor: no Omniscient can legitimately claim to instruct people about their religious duties, their origin or destiny, or about the path leading them to beatitude. Yet this reaffirmation of the basic Mīmāṃsā position on religious authority does not imply, in the case of Maṇḍana, a complete hostility to the ideal of omniscience, as shown by the following passage of the <i>Brahmasiddhi</i>:<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> BS 2.106cd–107: <i>nanu prapaṇcaśānyasyādvaitasya brahmarūpasya jīvēbhāvād iśītavyābhāvāc ca vijīnānām aśvārayām cānupapannām, tatra sarvajñāh, sarvesvāra iti api śruti samādheya eva. – naitat sāram, yato neśītavyakram īśvaratvam, iśītavyakram vā jñātṛtvam, kim tu siddhena jñānariṇēṇa siddhaḥ eṣasānaśaktayā jīyam avāpnoti, iśītavyam ca vinīyukte prāśasti ca, prakāśadāhavat. siddhena hi prakāśarūpena prakāśyam prakāśayati vivasvān, na tu prakāśyādīhaṃ tasya prakāśarūpaṃ, dāhīādīhā vāgner dāhāṣaktih, tathā ca taccaitaneyena kṛṣṇasya prapaṇcaśānyavabhāsanāt tasya bhāsa sarvam idāṃ vībhāti, nānāḥ to ‘sti draṣṭetyādiśruteḥ sarvajñatvam (127.5–13).</i>
[Objection:] but, for that non-dual [entity] having the nature of Brahman, for whom there is no proliferating [universe], there is nothing to be known (jñeya) and nothing to be ruled over (īśitavya), so knowledge (vijñāna) and sovereignty (aiśvarya) are unaccountable [in its case]. If it is so, scriptural passages [mentioning Brahman as] “omniscient” (sarvajña) and “lord of all” (sarveśvara) must be trusted blindly! – This is not true, because sovereignty is not brought about by those who are ruled over, nor is it the known [object] that makes one into a knower (jñātṛ). Quite the contrary! [Only] when the form of knowledge is established, or the ability to reign, may one attain a knowable [object] or assign tasks and govern those to be ruled over. [It all happens] as in the case of light (prakāśa) and burning (dāha): [only] when the sun’s luminosity is established may it shed light on [objects] to be illuminated; its luminosity is not due to [there being] something to illumine, no more than a fire’s capacity to burn is due to [there being] something to burn. Thus, since the whole proliferating [universe] manifests itself only thanks to His consciousness, as stated in scriptural passages like “All this shines only through His splendour,”128 “There is no other seer than Him [= the ātman],”129 [Brahman] is [said to be] omniscient (sarvajña).

In this text, quite unique in Maṇḍana’s work, we see the lineaments of an alternative concept of omniscience, virtually escaping the objections raised in the ViV. Omniscience for Maṇḍana is not a matter of apprehending past and future, or perceiving the extremely large or extremely small; indeed it is not at all about knowing objects. Omniscience is understood here, in a negative way, as the absence of obstruction of the natural property of awareness (jñāna) pertaining to Brahman, inversely proportional to the presence of a multitude of knowable objects (jñeya).130 As such it would be vain to ask for its cause, and the means to ascertain it is, of course, none but the eternal Veda. To put it differently, we can read in ViV 15–25 an attempt to release omniscience from its ties with the problem of dharma, which are as tight in the case of the Buddha as they are in the case of Īśvara for those who uphold Him. In that sense, his critique certainly contributes to Kumārila’s apologetic enterprise of (re)affirming the Veda as the one source of all religious authority. But at the same time it also paves the way for a reevaluation of omniscience as part of a Vedāntic soteriology, and thereby for its integration into the conceptual architecture of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

References and abbreviations


128 Kathopanisad 5.15.
129 Brhadāraṇyakopanisad 3.7.23.
130 See also Ānandapūrṇa’s comment: jāḍapārabhūvopalaksitām rūpaṁ jñānādī, na tu saviṣayam; “Knowledge and [sovereignty] are natures marked by the absence of insensibility and dependence, they do not imply [the existence of] an object” (Bhāvaśuddhi 446.11).
Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience


Brahmasiddhyākhyā  See BS.


BT  Brhaṭṭiṅkā (Kumārila). See TS.


MiSū Mīmāṃsāsūtra. See Frauwallner 1968.


NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti). In: Dharmottarapradīpa (being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu), ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Patna 1971.


Nyāyabinduṭīkā See NB.


NyK Nyāyakanikā. See ViV/ViV^K (S).


PV 2–4 See Miyasaka 1972.

PVA See Moriyama 2014.

PVAs Pramāṇavārtikabha[ṣ]yam or Vārtikālankāraḥ of Prajñākaraṇagupta (being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam), ed. R. Sāṅkrityāyana. Patna 1953.


ŚIV (codanā°) See Kataoka 2011.


SV svavṛtti


TSP See TS.

Vādayāya See Much 1991.


Watanabe 1987 Sh. Watanabe, Subhagupta’s Sarvajñasiddhikārikā. Journal of the Nara


Yaita 1985 H. Yaita, On anupalabdhi, annotated translation of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavār
On the Determination of Causation by Dharmakīrti

by

Eli Franco

One of the benefits of reading new translations is not only to learn new things, but also to find out that things one took for granted and thought to be generally accepted were not at all so. I had such an experience last year when reading the awe-inspiring translation of the logical portions of the PVSV by Ernst Steinkellner.1 To my surprise, his interpretation of the relationship between cause and effect, and especially their putative resemblance in the famous discussion in PVSV on v. 34, were not quite what I took to be the case when I wrote on the same passage some twenty five years ago. I am, therefore, very grateful to Steinkellner to have inspired me to take a fresh look at an old problem. My (not insubstantial) disagreement with Steinkellner on the topic of this paper detracts neither from my admiration for the great scholar who has been a singular force in our discipline for the past half a century nor from my gratitude for his friendship and support ever since I took his seminar on Vādanyāya at the University of Vienna in 1981.

On the alleged similarity between cause and effect

The passage in Steinkellner’s book that took me by surprise concerns the determination of the relationship between cause and effect, where Steinkellner argues at some length that cause and effect must be of the same kind rather than similar. I do not know to what extent this opinion is prevalent. He refers specifically to John Taber and Toshikazu Watanabe,2 who propose different notion of similarity. However in Watanabe’s case, I fail to see that he assumes the similarity or identity to be between causes and effects. Taber informs me in personal communication that his suggestion of similarity was only tentative. It is based on the fact that in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter Dharmakīrti argues that cognition can only arise from cognition, senses only from senses, breath only from breath and so on. This is certainly true, but the question that I want to raise here is whether such similarity is essential or accidental to causal relationship.

Summarising his interpretation that cause and effect must belong to the same kind, Steinkellner concludes (2013 II: 213):


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1 Steinkellner 2013.

Put differently, “smoke” is a species of the genus “fire.” That is to say, it is something “fiery.” It is thus not “similar” or “equal” to [its] cause; rather, because it owes its special properties to its cause, it can be judged to be as a species of the genus of the cause.

My first contention does not only concern the understanding of the similarity – whether it means appertaining to the same kind, the same species or the same genus – but is more radical: Cause and effect are not, or do not have to be, of the same species or the same kind. They don’t even have to be similar. Furthermore, I claim that this question is not at all addressed in the passage in question (PVSV on v. 34). Rather, what Dharmakīrti maintains in this passage is that causes of the same kind produce effects of the same kind. In other words, the similarity, or the appertainment to same kind, is between causes among themselves and effects among themselves, not between causes and effects.\(^3\) To substantiate this claim I suggest to take a close look at the passage in question (PVSV 22.10–19 on 34cd):

> anyahetukatvān nāhetukatvam iti cet / na / tatrāpi tulyatvāt / tadbhāve ’py a-
> gnau bhavatīti / katham vā tato ’nyato vātajjananasvabhāvāvāvat / svayam
> atatsvabhāvasvajjananāt / tasyāhetutā syāt / na vai sa eva bhavati tādṛśāsa
> bhāvā / anyādṛśād bhavan katham tādṛśāh syāt / tādṛśād dhi bhavan tādṛśāh
> syāt / anyādṛśād api tādṛśo bhāve taccakāniyamābhāvāvān na hetubheda bhe-
> daka ity akāśanām viśvasya vaiśvarūpyām syāt / sarvām vā sarvasmāj jāyet
> (read: jāyeta) / tasmāt kāraṇabhedābhāvābhāvābhāvān / tātādṛśād dhūma ’rthād dṛṣṭākāravijātīyād bhavaty ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt

Steinkellner’s translation\(^4\) (2013 I: 55):

>(Einwand:) “Weil er eine andere Ursache haben (kann), ist er [auch dann, wenn er ohne Feuer vorhanden ist] nicht ohne Ursache.” (Antwort:) (Das ist) nicht (der Fall), denn auch im Falle dieser (anderen Ursache) [wäre die Ursachelosigkeit] die gleiche, denn, auch wenn diese (andere Ursache) fehlt, ist (der Rauch) beim (Vorhandensein von) Feuer (dennoch) vorhanden. Oder weshalb könnte er aus diesem oder einem anderen entstehen, wenn (beide) nicht das Wesen\(^N\) haben ihn hervorzubringen? Weil das, was selbst nicht dieses Wesen\(^N\) (ihn hervorzubringen) hat, ihn nicht hervorbringt, wäre dieser (Rauch) nichts als) ursachelos.

(Einwand:) (Aus der anderen Ursache) entsteht ja nicht gerade dieser (gewöhnlich vom Feuer hervorgebrachte Rauch), denn es entsteht ein derartiger (tā-
> dṛśā). (Antwort:) **Wieso ist er ein derartiger (tādṛśa), wenn er aus einem
> nicht Derartigen entsteht? Weil er aus Derartigem entsteht, wäre dieser

\(^3\) Though the formulation is a bit ambiguous, I believe that this is what Mookerjee and Nagasaki also mean in their translation (Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 84): “There is no exception to the rule that similars produce similars and dissimilars produce dissimilars.” Dunne (2004: 335–336) also does not seem to share Steinkellner’s interpretation. Gillon’s translation (2009: 202) leaves the possibility open.

\(^4\) The emphasis indicates where our interpretations differ.

My tentative translation:\(^5\)

[Objection:] Because [smoke] has [also] another cause [than fire],\(^6\) it is not without a cause [when it arises without fire].

[Reply:] No, because it’s the same in this case too.\(^7\) [In this case, one would consider that smoke] arises when fire is present, even when that [other cause] is absent.

Or [given different causes of smoke, which have different natures, if the one, e.g., fire, has the nature of producing smoke, the other, having a different nature, would not have the nature of producing smoke. Thus] how could [smoke] arise either from that [fire that has the nature of producing smoke] or from something else, which does not have the nature of producing it? What itself does not have this nature [of producing smoke] does not produce [it]. Consequently [since that the other thing does not produce smoke, if smoke would arise without fire] it would have no cause.

[Objection:] It is not the case that exactly that [smoke] arises [from the other thing] because something of the same kind [as smoke] arises.

\(^5\) I thank Karin Preisendanz for making this translation more precise.

\(^6\) For instance, a termite mound or an anthill.

\(^7\) The argument is not entirely clear to me. How does it differ from the second argument which begins with katham ví? Perhaps one can understand the first argument epistemologically: If smoke arises also from other cause than fire, then just as one would not be able to infer smoke from fire, one would equally not be able to infer smoke from the other cause, for one knows that even when the other cause is absent, smoke could arise from fire. Thus, what Dharma-kīrtti would be claiming in the first argument (up to katham ví) is not that smoke would actually be without a cause, but that its cause would not be inferable. The second argument is clearer. Dharma-kīrtti defines (or in fact reduces) fire to that whose nature is to produce smoke. If smoke arises from non-fire, it would arise from something whose nature is not to produce smoke and thus without a cause. One may mention here that Dharma-kīrtti recognizes that the determination of causation is not always possible. In a case of a so-called general effect, or effect common to more than one causal complex (kāryasāmānya), the determination of the cause may not be possible, for instance in PVS\textsuperscript{v} on v. 12, the fact that one speaks may be based on desire or on compassion (see also Franco 2012). Similarly, activity after rest, a special configuration (saṃsthānaviśeṣa) and so on (see PV II 10f.) may prove a conscious agent, but not that this agent is an eternal God and not a human being. How are such statements compatible with what is stated here?
[Reply:] Inasmuch as it arises from something of a different kind [than fire], how could it be of the same kind [as smoke]? Indeed, inasmuch as it arises from something of the same kind [as fire], it is/must be\(^8\) of the same kind (i.e., not the same kind as the cause, but of the same kind as the other effects of fire, namely, smoke; viz., effects of the same kind must arise from causes of the same kind). If [an effect] of the same kind [as smoke] would also arise from [a cause] of a different kind [than fire], a difference in cause would not distinguish [effects] because there would be no restriction to the capacity of its [cause to produce all kinds of effects]. Thus, the diversity of the world would be without a cause, or everything would arise from everything. Therefore, the difference and identity of effects are due to difference and identity of causes. Therefore, smoke does not arise from something which is of a different kind than that thing whose form has been observed [before whenever smoke arose] because [in this case smoke] would be without a cause.

The upshot of Dharmakīrti’s argument in this passage is that if causes of different kinds can produce the same effect, we will not be able to infer the cause from the effect. To make such inference, the question whether the effect is similar to the cause is quite irrelevant. The effect does not have to be similar or of the same kind as the cause in order to enable such an inference. The fact that Dharmakīrti does not assume that the effect is similar to the cause in all cases is more than clear in the example of the lotus and the cow dung, which appears a bit later in this context. Dharmakīrti refers to an apparently wide-spread belief that some lotuses do not arise from a lotus seed but from cow dung. It will be difficult to maintain that a lotus and the cow dung are similar or of the same kind, all the more so when Dharmakīrti himself expressly says that they belong do different kinds (vijātīya).\(^9\) If one were to maintain that even cow dung and lotus belong to the same kind, the notion of appertaining to same kind would become arbitrary, tautological, and circular when used for the determination of causation. For if appertaining to same kind means, as Steinkellner argues, the fact that the properties of the effect are due to the cause, then to be of the same kind as something simply means to be produced by that thing. In other words, if we then argue that a cause must be of the same kind as the effect, we would actually argue that the cause must be a cause.

**Modes of causation**

My second and perhaps more important contention is that what Dharmakīrti states at the beginning of PV I (and in the parallel passages in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, Hetubindu and Vādanyāya) is not meant as complete doctrine of determination of causality. I do not wish

\(^8\) See the emendations suggested by Steinkellner (2013 I: 55, nn. 30–31).

\(^9\) See PVSV 22: 22–23: \(yad api kimecid vijātīyād bhavad dṛṣṭam gomayādeḥ śalūkādi.\) Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 106: 13–14) adds the example of śara grass (?) arising from a cow horn and a scorpion arising from cow dung: \(ādiśabdād gauśṛṅgāc charo gomayād vrśčikah.\) Note that the discussion here concerns everyday practice. In Abhidharma causality one could indeed maintain similarity between cause and effect and Dharmakīrti certainly accepts the notion of samanantarapratyaya. This is however not relevant to the present context, which deals with inferences in everyday practice.
to deny the importance of these passages, or even their paradigmatic role, but they do not tell us the whole story. Curiously, studies of Dharmakīrti’s notion of causation\(^{10}\) have not raised the question as to how Dharmakīrti puts his own theory into practice. I suggest, therefore, to broaden the scope of the discussion and open up some new perspectives. It is important to note that Dharmakīrti’s practice in determining causation is considerably more complex and varied than his statement in PVSV on v. 34 and in the parallel passages in his later works would suggest.

\textit{Determining permanent causes}

According to the usual interpretation, Dharmakīrti’s suggestion for the determination of causation (as based on PVSV on v. 34) consists in identifying a cause in a given situation by isolating it from the environment. Given that all other conditions remain the same, and upon the introduction of a certain new element the effect arises, while when this element is removed, the effect does not arise, one can determine that the one is the cause of the other.\(^{11}\)

Thus, according to this statement, one would not be able to determine causal relation, if an entity is permanent or constantly present, for one would be unable to observe whether the effect is absent when the cause is absent. Yet Dharmakīrti admits that the earth, of course along with other factors, is a cause of the sprout. For all practical purposes, the earth is eternal and always present. How could it be determined as a cause of sprouts? Dharmakīrti’s reply indicates that presence and absence are indeed not necessary to determine causation in all cases. In the case of earth, it suffices to observe a transformation that brings about changes in the result. For instance, by perfecting the earth with manure, ploughing it and so forth, one observes changes in the quality of the sprout (PV II 25). These changes allow one to determine that the earth is part of the causal complex of the sprout. (So when it comes to God, the reason why he – at least for Dharmakīrti and his opponents it’s a he – cannot be determined as a cause is, in the final analysis, not because he is eternal and all-pervasive, but because he is changeless.)

\textit{Determining a “permanent” material cause}

Similarly, one would hardly expect the process of introducing and removing the cause in the case of a material cause (\textit{upādāna}). In this case, just like the case of the earth and the sprout, it’s the transformation in the material cause which allows its identification. This is stated several times and in various forms, for instance in PV II 60–61: Without transformation in the material cause (\textit{upādāna}), there is no transformation in the effect, just as a plate does not change without transformation in the clay. One would not seriously expect the enquirer to remove the clay in order to observe whether the plate continues to exist.

\(^{10}\) The most important studies are mentioned in Steinkellner 2013 II: 185–186.
\(^{11}\) PVSV 22.3–5: \textit{yeṣāṃ upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyaḥ, tatraikābhāve ’pi nopalabhyaḥ, tat tasya kāryam.} See the translation below.
Determining a “permanent” non-material cause

Dharmakīrti’s notion of causation is often apparent when he denies causal connection in specific cases and we must pay attention to such cases as well. For instance, cognition and body are always present together, at least throughout one’s life. How can one deny that the body is the cause of cognition or that they are causes of each other? In this case too Dharmakīrti relies on the same principle: a transformation of a cause must bring about a transformation in the effect. Thus, if we observe a transformation of the one without a transformation in the other, we can exclude the possibility that the two are causally related. Therefore, when one observes a change in the cognition without a change in the body, one can conclude that the cognition does not produce the body and vice versa. This does not mean that the body is not at all a cause of cognition, but that it is not its so-called material cause.

Temporality

Cause and effect are also connected by a temporal aspect: The effect must last as long as its cause. For instance, if the body were the cause of cognition, the cognition would last as long as the body, and thus there would be no dead body (PV II 51). Further, temporality allows one to distinguish between material/main cause and auxiliary cause (upakāraka). Fire may change the color of a pot, but the pot and its new color, unlike smoke, continues to exist when the fire ceases (PV II 50). The auxiliary cause is responsible for some specific aspect of the result, not for the result as such.

The influence of the body on cognition is explained by Dharmakīrti in this way, that is, as an auxiliary cause. For instance, the transformation of the body due to poison causes a mental transformation in the form of pain. Dharmakīrti claims that in this case the body is only the object of cognition and the pain results from perceiving the body, not directly from the body (PV II 48). He does not explain though why perceiving someone else’s body does not cause pain in the same manner; one may assume that he would anchor the distinction in the false apprehension of the body as belonging to oneself.

Gradation

Another important aspect to which cause and effect have to conform is the gradual arising. If the cause does not change, the effect cannot arise gradually (or after a time). Thus, lack in gradation allows one to exclude causal relation between breath and body: “How can breath be gradual without its cause be gradual?” (PV II 107) Similarly, if the body is constant throughout one’s life, cognitions cannot arise from it one after the other. They would have to arise all at once. The gradual arising cannot be due to co-producers unless they bring about changes in the cause (e.g., the body, PV II 43). I am not sure how Dharmakīrti would justify this statement in some cases. For instance, light, senses and object, which are co-producers of a cognition, do not bring about changes in the previous cognition.
Locating or locative cause (special case of auxiliary cause)

Dharmakīrti’s causal theory uses not only upakāraka, but also ādhāralāśraya, which may be translated as locating cause. Dharmakīrti considers this cause from two aspects. If things are momentary, the ādhāra causes them to be located in the same place. For instance, the plate causes the berries, which would tend to fall on the floor and disperse in all directions, to be produced in the same place. Similarly, the jug keeps the water from spilling (PV I 144, see also PV II 67–68, 74). If things are not momentary, the ādhāra is the cause that prevents their movement. In this manner, Dharmakīrti explains the role of the body in mental phenomena such as amnesia (smṛtibhramśa, PV II 76).

Reversibility of process

Reversibility of process also allows one to determine causation. For instance, the Čārvākas argue that changes in the humours can account for the changing capacity of the body to produce cognitions, i.e., when the humours are in strong disequilibrium which causes death, the body is no longer capable of producing cognitions, just like a wick becomes incapable to produce a flame, but Dharmakīrti retorts that when the humours of a dead body regain their equilibrium, just as they do when fever is cured, life would arise again (PV II 54–55). If the Čārvāka argues that the process is not reversible, like the transformation of wood into charcoal, this is not correct because one applies medicine to reverse the transformation of humours.

Increase and decrease

An important aspect for the determination of something as a cause is whether its increase and decrease brings about the corresponding increase and decrease in the result. For instance, lamp and light. However, one observes increase in the properties of cognition such as wisdom, compassion, etc., without increase or decrease in the body. Therefore, the body cannot be the support/cause of cognition (PV II 73). It is impossible that the effect would be destroyed when the cause increases, e.g., when pitta increases, fever does not go away (PV II 151). (The anomaly of water and homeopathic medicine would have presented a challenge in this case.)

The Čārvāka claims that when the humours are balanced, the production of sperm increases, which causes the increase of desire. This would be a valid argument, but Dharmakīrti retorts that a sick person may have strong desires and a healthy person none. Further, one may have strong desires even without sperm. Increase in desire arises from increase in pleasure, even when there is no increase in the humours (PV II 151). Further, one observes sick persons with unbalanced humours and strong desires, and also that one ejaculates blood when sperm is exhausted (PV II 153). (I’m afraid I cannot vouch for this observation.)

Another case where increase and decrease are used to reject causal relation is this: Even if the material elements were the cause of consciousness, they cannot be the cause of desire. The causal mode of the elements is not characterized by increase and decrease because one cannot say that one living being is more alive or less alive than another, but some living being have strong desires and some weak. Therefore the cause of desire must be characterized by increase and decrease (PV II 167–169).
Generality and specificity

This is an argument that I have only seen once. The modal correspondence between cause and effect presupposed by Dharmakīrti is so strong that if the cause is general, the effect cannot be specific. Sperm does not explain the nature of desire which is directed towards a specific woman. If the Cārvāka claims that the beauty of the woman also plays a role, this is not correct because one desires also ugly women. The argument looks like an aside, but if we take it seriously, Dharmakīrti claims that if desire is specific towards a single woman, so should also be the sperm (PV II 154).

The numerical aspect

If the cause, or causal complex, is one, the effect is one, if the causes are many, the effects are also many: If each atom is capable of producing a cognition, there would be as many cognitions as there are atoms in the body. Similarly, if breath is a product of the atoms of the body singly, there would be as many breaths as atoms (PV II 103–104).

Restricting, hindering and regulating aspects of causality

It is theoretically possible that although each atom of the body is capable of producing a cognition, and thus there would be as many cognitions as atoms, the breath in the body restricts the capacity of atoms to produce only one cognition at the time (PV II 103–104). Dharmakīrti is not explicit about how this could work, but one can assume perhaps that breath, being a part of the causal complex with one atom, cannot be a part of a causal complex with another atom. The possibility is of course rejected by Dharmakīrti. There is no restriction that one breath produces one cognition because one observes that several cognitions arise during one long breath.

Mental properties such as compassion grow out of their own seed (svabīja); consequently since saṃsāra has no beginning, everyone should have become a Buddha by now. This would indeed be the case if the same did not apply to the opposite negative properties as well. Just as compassion arises from its own seed, so do hatred or aversion (dveṣa), and so on. Thus, compassion and aversion obstruct each other’s development. It is for this reason that great effort is needed to suppress aversion, etc., with their antidotes (pratipakṣa) so that compassion can flow unhindered and reach its utmost degree, as in the case of the Buddha (PV II 131).

Limited and unlimited causal processes

Interesting is Dharmakīrti’s distinction between limited and unlimited causal process. The distinction depends on whether or not the causal process has a stable or an unstable result. Certain results continue by themselves, by their own essence (svarasena pravartate), e.g., the change of color in burned wood or the increase in mental properties such as compassion. Certain are limited because their causes are limited like jumping and its causes force and effort. Others like boiling water have unstable support. Some are reversible, like heating gold (PV II 124–126).
Presence and absence

Finally, we should not forget our starting point. As long as the cause remains, the result does not cease to exist (PV III 133cd). This is indeed the principle discussed in PVSV 34 and applied to smoke and fire.

Intermediary conclusion

To conclude this section, we see all kinds of correspondences between cause and effect. For lack of a better word, I would like to call them modal correspondences. Existence and inexistence or presence and absence are just one of them; others are transformation, gradation, increase and decrease, reversibility and non-reversibility, generality and specificity, temporal aspects, numerical aspects and so on. I do not pretend to be exhaustive here. However, what we do not see is similarity or appertaining to the same kind as an argument or a consideration in the determination of causal relationship or in its denial. If we would like to generalise the underlying principle behind the different modalities, we could say that a change in the cause must bring about a change in the effect. PV II 111 puts it explicitly: if A is the cause of B, B changes when A changes. Or more literally: “What does not change because of the change of something else is not the result of that thing” (na hi tat tasya kāryaṃ yad yasya bhedān na bhidyate).

The problem of induction

I come now to my third contention, which concerns the problem of induction. Steinkellner suggested two new interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s words, which he sees as complementary rather than contradictory (2013 II: 210). The core of the discussion is Dharmakīrti’s famous and enigmatic statement in PVSV 22.3–5 (German transl. in Steinkellner 2013 I: 54): yeśām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyaṃ, tatraikābhāve ’pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryaṃ “When a perceptible thing unperceived [before] is perceived when several [other things] are perceived, and is not perceived when even one among these [things] is absent, it is the effect of that [one of these things]/of these [several things].”

No matter whether one understands tat to refer to tatra or to eka, the straightforward reading of this statement does not single out one thing such as fire as the cause of smoke, and this in contradistinction to the verse on which this statement comments: kāryaṃ dhūmo hutabhujah. “Smoke is the result of fire” (as well as to later formulations where the plural is changed to singular). Rather, it is clear that Dharmakīrti focuses here on a causal complex. Perhaps for this reason, Steinkellner suggests that fire in the verse should be taken for the

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12 Again, this is not to deny Dharmakīrti’s acceptance of samanantrapratyaya and Abhidharma causality. The discussion above deals with inference on the level of everyday practice.

13 Steinkellner’s translation opts for the first alternative, as do Mookerjee and Nagasaki (1964: 82); Gillon (2009: 201) opts for the second: “their effect.” Grammatically eka is subordinate and should not be referred to by tat, but we know that Dharmakīrti does not respect this rule (e.g., Nyāyabindu 1.1). For the time being, I would like to leave this issue open.
entire causal complex, namely, fire (i.e., “heat atoms”), wood, air and so on (2013 II: 189, 199). He further argues that each of the causes referred to by yeṣām, tatra, etc., is not a single thing, but a causal complex. In other words, Dharmakīrti’s statement means that several causal complexes are perceived and then any one of them may be absent and not be perceived. I am not sure what we would gain by this hypothesis; I am also not sure that we don’t have a terminological problem here. Usually according to Dharmakīrti one causal complex, being complete and unhindered, is alone capable to produce an effect (see also “the numerical aspect” above). If several complexes cooperate in producing something, this means, according to Dharmakīrti, that they form one larger and encompassing causal complex. Be that as it may, Steinkellner’s interpretation goes clearly against the straightforward understanding of the verse and is contradicted by the commentaries. Nevertheless, it could be accepted if it would have some advantage, for instance, in making Dharmakīrti’s statements clearer or more persuasive. However, the contrary is the case. If accepted, it would make the determination of the causal relation practically impossible. How could one ascertain that even one of the causal complexes is absent? Steinkellner himself says (2013 II: 189) that every causal complex is “in principle quantitatively infinite” (“grundsätzlich quantitativ unendlich”). Thus, one would be able to ascertain at most that a causal complex is incomplete; not that it is absent.\footnote{Consequently under this interpretation absence (abhāva) of causal complex and its incompleteness (vaikalya) become, at least in practice, conflated.} It is of course true that in the final analysis causes for Dharmakīrti are not individual things, but complexes, but going down to this atomic level of analysis when considering inferences of everyday practice such as from smoke to fire is counter-productive, for it would mean that for practical purposes in everyday practice causation could never be determined.

Whatever the case may be, Steinkellner considers this to be the first step of a proof, which has an inductive character (2013 II: 201). The second step, which consists in a prasaṅga (34cd+Vṛtti), is supposed to bestow the necessity and general validity (2013 II: 201: “Notwendigkeit und allgemeiner Gültigkeit verleihen” with references to Dunne 2004: 174f. and Lasic 2003: 186–191) upon the cognition gained from the first step. This may be true, but one should note the price, and a very high price it is. Basically the prasaṅga argument makes non-fire into fire. For fire is now not what looks like fire, heats like fire and burns like fire, but whatever produces smoke. If it is an anthill, then an anthill is fire,\footnote{See PV I, v. 36. Dharmakīrti probably refers to a popular belief that anthills or termite mounds contain fire and emit smoke. As termite mounds are humid, one can imagine that vapors, that look like smoke, rise out of them when they are heated by the sun. Dharmakīrti may also be alluding to the fire ritual, where an anthill or termite mound symbolizes the head of the sacrifice. On the role of anthills or termite mounds in the “establishing of fire” (agnyādheya), see Krick 1982: 139ff., esp. 141–142 and König 1984: 170ff.; the belief that fire, as well as the god of fire (Agni), and the sun reside in termite mounds appears already in Vedic literature, cf. König 1984: 171. The Majjhimanikāya 23 (Valmīkisutta) mentions an anthill that “smokes by night and blazes up by day” (Horner 2004 I: 183, repeated with explanation p. 185; I owe this reference to Antonio Rigopoulos): ayaṃ vammiko rattiṃ dhūpāyati divā pajjalati. However, this may refer to an unusual appearance and normally it would be the other way round.} if it arises from rubbing together two pieces of wood (PVin II 85.9) then the invisible heat atoms are fire, and if it is water then water is fire. Thus, the understanding and definition of fire becomes arbitrary, and Dharmakīrti more or less admits it. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti...
admits that certain effects may arise from different causes; would he admit that the lotus seed and the cow dung have the same nature inasmuch as they produce lotuses? His suggestion that the nature of lotuses produced by seeds is different from the nature of lotuses produced by cow dung (PVS 23.23–24) sounds like an axiomatic assumption rather than one based on observation. And would scorpions and lotuses have the same nature inasmuch as they are both produced by cow dungs or would one have to distinguish between different types of cow dung? Put differently, Dharmakīrti’s prasāṅga makes the inference from smoke to fire certain, but arbitrary and tautological. If we call fire whatever smoke arises from, then the inference of fire from smoke is only an inference that smoke has a cause. We are not actually inferring fire from smoke, but only that smoke has a cause, which we call fire.

Steinkellner considers Dharmakīrti’s proof to be a stroke of genius (2013 II: 204: “… nichts weniger als für genial”) and that Dharmakīrti may have solved or ‘avoided’ the problem of induction “at least for his own purposes.” It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti did neither avoid nor solve the problem of induction. It would be naïve to expect him to solve what is clearly an insoluble problem. Moreover, the basis of Dharmakīrti’s proof is not particularly original. What he actually does is to revive an old Abhidharma idea which appears in the AKBh. Furthermore, the way Vasubandhu mentions the determination of causation as a matter of course indicates that he too is not its original author, but relies on a well-known Abhidharma definition:

AKBh 461:8–9: tatredam anumānam sati kāraṇe kāraṇāntrasyābhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvas, tadyathāṅkurasya.

There is an inference in relation to these [senses]: When cause(s are) present and another cause is absent, the effect is observed not to arise, and on the other hand when [that other cause] is present, [the effect] arises, for instance [the seed] for the sprout.

However, this does not mean that Dharmakīrti is simply repeating Vasubandhu. Certainly the philosophical problems he faced in the seventh century were different from those of Vasubandhu in the fourth. Rather, we have to appreciate Dharmakīrti’s advance upon the doctrine of his predecessors (especially Kumārila and Īśvarasena), who, like many philosophers in the Western tradition up to the 21st century, seem to have regarded the inductive process as merely or basically cumulative. While sporadic accumulation of facts is certainly used in everyday practice to form general judgements, Dharmakīrti’s (and in that respect also Vasubandhu’s) method depicts not only what we actually often do in everyday practice, but resembles the one used (of course with much more elaboration and refinement) in scientific determination of causality, for instance, by pharmaceutical companies to determine the causes of pathologies, the effect(s) of particular substances,

16 See also AKV 1190.22–24 thereon: sati kāraṇe kṣetrodakādi ke, kāraṇāntrasyābhāve kāryasyāṅkurasyābhāvo dṛṣṭah. bhāve ca iasya bijasya punarbhavo (read punar bhāvo; it does not make sense to say that the sprout arises again) aṅkurasya dṛṣṭah. “When causes such as the field, water and so on are present [and] another cause such as the seed is absent, the absence of the effect, namely the sprout, is observed, and on the other hand when this seed is present the presence of the sprout is observed.”
Dharmakīrti’s advance over the older Abhidharmic formulation can be seen not only in his reformulation in PVSV on v. 34 and the repeated insistence that mere non-observation is an unreliable basis for inference, but also in the supplements of this procedure by multiple other aspects such as increase and decrease, gradation, and so on, as indicated above. Although rudimentary and unsystematic in its formulation, the various aspects of causation that Dharmakīrti uses in practice contain in a nutshell the procedure we still employ today: experiment, strength of association, consistency, specificity, temporality, gradation and coherency. Interestingly, we should also note what it does not contain: plausibility and probability. To repeat, Dharmakīrti neither circumvented the problem of induction, nor did he solve it. Yet, in his perception that inductive knowledge is not merely an accumulation of observations, he comes as close to dealing with the problem of induction as we are today.

What is it all about?

Finally, my fourth and last contention: What is it all about? In the second part of his study, Steinkellner suggests that Dharmakīrti’s statements (in PVSV 22.2–4) can be understood as having an entirely different purpose (Zielrichtung, 2013 II: 205). They are not at all aiming at explaining how to determine a causal connection, but what should be understood under the words “cause” and “effect.” In other words, what Dharmakīrti is talking about are the conditions for the usage of the words. Steinkellner calls this “the linguistic turn” (2013 II: 210 “linguistische Wende”) and justifies this move by the statement the objects one investigates are not real entities, but only conceptual constructions of something as “cause” and as “effect.” Under certain conditions one can conceptualize something as a “cause” or as an “effect.”

To be sure, the term “linguistic turn” has more meanings than one. The article about Relativism in the SEP (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) considers the linguistic turn to be characterized by “questions about properties and concepts being replaced by questions about words and linguistic usage.” For example, some philosophers spoke of the role of language or, more generally, “systems of symbols in structuring our experience, thought, or even reality itself.” In a lengthy introduction to a volume entitled The Linguistic Turn (1967), Rorty characterized the linguistic turn as the opinion that “a ‘philosophical problem’ was a product of the unconscious adoption of a set of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem was stated – assumptions which were to be questioned before the problem itself was taken seriously.” (SEP s.v. Richard Rorty, see Ramberg 2009).

In this sense, Dharmakīrti should not be considered to introduce a linguistic turn into the

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17 The example of pathologies was suggested to me by John Taber in a personal conversation and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to him for many stimulating conversations. However, Taber has his own opinion on the problem of induction (or indeed the lack thereof) in Indian philosophy and is not to be held responsible for anything suggested here. For the determination of causation in medical sciences see for instance the often quoted Hill 1965. Among the criteria specified, Hill mentions the strength of the association, its consistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient (which corresponds to “gradation” in Dharmakīrti’s terminology), plausibility (as far as I can see, not used, at least not explicitly, by Dharmakīrti or anyone else in the Indian tradition), coherence, experiment and analogy.
problem of causation. At least I cannot see him distinguishing concepts from words and linguistic usage or that the assumption built into a vocabulary would have to be articulated and questioned before the problem could be solved. I also fail to see that Dharmakīrti would fit into the linguistic turn of the Vienna Circle, which considers representation as the proper subject matter of philosophy (Vienna Circle, SEP).

The key to our question lies in Dharmakīrti’s purpose. What does he aim to achieve with his new theory of reason in PVSV? As far as I can see, he neither aims at “saving the phenomena,” nor was he concerned with establishing any scientific theory (in sense of natural sciences), nor was he a pure logician concerned with the logical problems per se, nor did he aim at establishing the validity of everyday practice, which involves inferences from smokes to fires. I think that what really troubled him were inferences on doctrinal matters. Such inferences appear in the beginning of the PVSV, and in this sense we cannot say that he keeps his cards close to the chest. Already in v. 11 he addresses the Mīmāṃsā inference: The Buddha had desires because he had a body, like a common man. And immediately after that (v. 12) we have an extensive discussion of a somewhat similar inference: The Buddha was not free from desires (vītarāga) because he spoke, like a common man. Another inference, perhaps put forward by a Naiyāyika, appears in v. 18: The living body is not without a soul because otherwise it would not have breath and so forth. Such inferences were unacceptable to the Buddhists, and yet they were valid in the sense of complying with the trairūpya theory. I suggest that it is probably in response to such inferences that Dharmakīrti developed his theory of three kinds of reasons, and the primary aim of his theory was to show why these and similar inferences were not valid.

Dharmakīrti’s dealing of the vyavahāra inference from smoke to fire may be seen therefore just a by-product for his doctrinal concerns. For in classical India, no theory of inference would get off the ground without dealing with this paradigmatic inference. However, it is clear that his interest lies elsewhere. As Lasic (2003: 190) has already noticed, “[h]e [Dharmakīrti] does not seem to have aimed [in PVSV 22.2–4, etc.] at a detailed discussion of the procedure of establishing the causal dependence in an individual case.” On the other hand, he was very much interested in the pragmatic situation of what should count as a valid proof in the inter-religious debate. His interest in causation was thus not directed at causation in natural phenomena, but in causal connection between body and consciousness, between desires, compassion and speech, between body and soul. And in dealing with these topics, he was as much interested in the possibility of denying a causal relation (notably between body and cognition) as in establishing one.

References and abbreviations


Reinterpretation of the Compound *svabhāva-pratibandha* in Dharmakīrti’s Logical Theory

by

Yoichi Fukuda

**Introduction**

Many scholars agree that *svabhāva-pratibandha* forms the actual basis of Dharmakīrti’s logical theory. However, there are different opinions about what *svabhāva-pratibandha* means.\(^1\)

In his article “Svabhāvapratibandha Again,” Steinkellner wrote that “since the word *pratibandha* has only a formal meaning, the word *svabhāva* is responsible for connecting the reality needed” (1984: 458). He does not distinguish the meaning of *sambandha* from that of *pratibandha*, understanding both as having only the formal meaning of “connection.”

Before examining the usage of the word *svabhāva-pratibandha* in Dharmakīrti’s texts, I would like to consult how *pratibandha*/*pratibaddha* is presented in the *Mahāvyutpatti* and *Abhidharmakośa*, two authoritative texts on Buddhist terminology. As the Tibetan equivalents for *pratibandha*, the *Mahāvyutpatti* lists phyir 'jil ba'am bgegs byed pa'am bar chad byed pa, which mean hindrance or obstruction (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 6483). The same is the case in the *Abhidharmakośa*, where *pratibandha* is translated into Tibetan as gegs byed pa/*bgegs su gyur pa* and into Chinese as 障, 障礙, 障 (Index to the *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 248).

On the other hand, in *Mahāvyutpatti* 6481, rag lus pa'am 'brel ba'am bgegs su gyur pa are given as the Tibetan equivalents of *pratibandha*, while in the *Abhidharmakośa* (Index, p. 248) in four cases “X-pratibaddha” is translated into Tibetan as “X la rag lusllas pa,” and in one case as “X dang 'brel ba.” In five cases, it is translated into Chinese as 障, 障礙, 障. These translations in the *Abhidharmakośa* all mean “dependence upon.” Thus, in these traditional texts, *pratibandha* is never used to mean connection, but is rather chiefly used to mean dependence.

In one-third of the cases where *pratibandha* is used in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* (hereinafter referred to as PVSV), the word means “obstruction,” translated into Tibetan as gegs/gags byed (pa). However, in two-thirds of the cases *pratibandha* is translated as 'brel ba or rag lasllus pa. I have collected fifty-one passages that use the latter meaning for *pratibandhalpratibaddha* (List C). There is no distinction between *pratibandha* and *pratibaddha* in these Tibetan translations. The only difference between them is the syntactic

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\(^1\) Most articles on *svabhāva-pratibandha* have been published in Japanese. A historical survey of these discussions was written by Kei Kataoka (2012). The idea I present here dates back thirty years. At that time I wrote two short papers on this theme in Japanese (“An Inquiry into the Structure of Dharmakīrti’s Logic,” 1987; “On the Meaning of *svabhāvapratibandha* in Dharmakīrti’s Logic,” 1989). In 2012, I wrote two additional longer papers (“On the Interpretation of the Compound *svabhāvapratibandha*,” 2012a; “On the Meaning of *pratibandha* in *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*,” 2012b), in which I rearranged the former presentations and supplemented them with more citations to demonstrate my idea.
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

In twenty-seven of these passages, pratibandhal/pratibaddha is explicitly related to expressions of the logical nexus, for example, gamya, gamaka, gamayate, gamyate, avyabhiñcāra, avisamvāda, vyāpti, anvaya, vyatireka, ekanirṛtyānyāntirṛti, and so on. Another eighteen passages mention pratibandhal/pratibaddha without svabhāva. From these usages I could conclude that pratibandha has a more important role than svabhāva as the basis of the logical nexus.

Of these fifty-one examples of pratibandhal/pratibaddha in the PVSV, I believe that none conflicts with the meaning of dependence, which is the traditional meaning of pratibaddha as seen above. Later I would like to return to this point and add another piece of indirect evidence.

Analysis of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha

To understand the meaning of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha, I will discuss the assumptions regarding the syntactical value of svabhāva in this compound. Until now, there have been three interpretations of this compound, namely as instrumental tatpurūsa, genitive tatpurūsa, and locative tatpurūsa. The first interpretation is the most common and the one used by Dharmottara in paraphrasing the compound in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā: svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ svabhāvapratibandhaḥ (NBT 110,1). However, I could not find any textual evidence in Dharmakīrti confirming that pratibandha is used with words in the instrumental case. Dharmakīrti mentions pratibandha with one word in the genitive case and another in the locative case; the former indicates a possessor of pratibandha and the latter indicates an object upon which the possessor of pratibandha is dependent. A similar situation can be seen in the example of pratibaddha, which is used with a word in the locative case indicating the object of dependence and a notional subject in the appositional case. In order to explain the usage of related words used with pratibandha, I would like to consult the Nyāyabindu (NB) instead of the PVSV for reasons of simplicity.

NB 2.19: svabhāvaprātibandhe hi satyo artho(X) arthaṃ(Y) gamayet l
NB 2.20: tad(Y)-aprātibaddhasya(X) tad(Y)-avyabhiñcārainyāṃbhāvāt l
NB 2.21: sa ca pratibandḥaḥ sādhya arthe(Y) liṅgasya(X) /
NB 2.22: [liṅgasya(X)] vastutas tād(Y)-āīmyāt tad(Y)-utpatteś ca /
NB 2.23: a-tad(Y)-svabhāvasya(X) a-tad(Y)-utpatteś(X) ca tatra(Y) aprati-baddha-svabhāvatvāt /

In these statements, X (= hetu or liṅga) is the object that infers another thing, and Y (= sādhya) is the object to be inferred.

According to NB 2.21, X (liṅga) in the genitive case is a notional subject of pratibandha, which is the repetition of svabhāva-pratibandha in NB 2.19. In other words, X (liṅga)
Yoichi Fukuda

93

is a possessor of pratibandha. sādhye arthe (= Y) of the locative case in NB 2.21 and its substitute pronoun tatra in NB 2.23 represent the object, which is connected to or dependent upon X (liṅga). In other words, Y (sādhyā) is an object upon which X (liṅga) is dependent. According to NB 2.23, X (liṅga), which is implicitly assumed to be in the same case (genitive) as tatzvabhāvasya or tadutpatteś, is a notional subject of the bahuvrīhi compound pratibaddha-svabhāva. The same usage of pratibaddha-svabhāva is found in PVSV: apratibaddha-svabhāvasyāvinābhāvanīyāmabhāvāt (8,12f), or na ca tadaratibaddhasvabhāvo bhāvo anyam gamayati (107,25). In both cases, X (liṅga or hetu) is supplemented in the appositional case.

One could naturally interpret this compound as meaning that something (X = liṅga) has its svabhāva, which is dependent upon another thing (Y = sādhyā); in other words, this would mean that the svabhāva of X (liṅga) is dependent upon Y (sādhyā). From these usages of pratibaddha-svabhāva, one could conclude that the first component of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha is the svabhāva of X (liṅga) and that the compound is a genitive tatpurussa.

However, and inconveniently, one exceptional passage exists that possibly suggests that svabhāva expresses the dependent object. In this case svabhāva-pratibandha must be interpreted as a locative tatpurusa. These examples show that Dharmakīrti was not particularly rigorous in his interpretation of the compound, but that he generally considered svabhāva to be a liṅga and the compound thus a genitive tatpurussa.

The meaning of pratibandha

Next, I would like to return to the investigation into the meaning of the dependence of X (liṅga) upon Y (sādhyā). Because Dharmakīrti does not explain the meaning of pratibandha explicitly, we must try to understand it from its context. The word is very closely related to ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti (PVSV 10,23; PV I.24), which is an improved version of avinābhāva, itself a traditional expression for a logical nexus. While avinābhāva means the inevitable absence of one thing (X = hetu) in the sphere of the absence of another thing (Y = sādhyā), ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti means that the disappearance of one thing (X) is caused by the disappearance of another thing (Y). This causality of disappearance is expressed by the instrumental case or the causative verb, while the inclusive relation of the absence of two things is expressed by the locative case. Dharmakīrti introduces this causality of disappearance as a condition of an inevitable logical nexus, and insists that the causality of disappearance necessarily requires the pratibandha relation, meaning the dependence of the existence of one thing (X = hetu) upon another thing (Y = sādhyā). If X is dependent in this way upon Y, the disappearance of Y will inevitably cause the disappearance of X.

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6 PVSV 17,1–3: svam ca svabhāvam parityajya katham bhāvo bhavet / svabhāvasyaiva bhāvatvād iti tasya (= liṅgasya) svabhāvat pratibandhād avyabhicārāḥ / In this case, svabhāva is consistently the object to be conferred and bhāva is the object conferring it. Śākyabuddhi commented on the second sentence: tasyāmabhāvatasyā sāhāsayā śāṁśapadeḥ svabhāvat pratibandhad eva svabhāve sādhyābhimate vrksādau ... pratibandhād evyavabhicārāḥ / (KG 75,3ff = PVṬ 39b7f).

7 The Tibetan equivalent of avinābhāva is med na mi ‘byung ba, while on the other hand the equivalent of ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti is gcig log pas gzhan ldog pa. As will be shown below, in Tibetan logic the expression corresponding to the latter is de ldog pa’i stobs khyis khyod ldog pa.
Such dependence is, in itself, a connection between real objects and therefore to express this meaning Dharmakīrti does not need to mention svabhāva.

\[ tasmād ekānivṛttyā 'nyanivṛttim icchatā tayoh kaścit svabhāvaprātibandho 'py eṣṭavyaḥ / anyathā 'gamako hetuḥ syāt / (PVSV 10.23–25) \]

This passage shows that the logical reason (= hetu) is based on the relation of ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti and, in turn, this relation is based on svabhāva-pratibandha. Conversely, if svabhāva-pratibandha exists between two objects, the disappearance of one object causes the disappearance of the other and thus one can infer the existence of the former object from the existence of the latter. One can find this used in a similar way several times in the PVSV, as detailed below.

PVSV 16,28f: tanmātrasambandhāḥ svabhāvo (= sādhya) bhāvam (= liṅga) eva nivartayet (k.23a–c) /.

PVSV 17,5: kāraṇaḥ nivartamānāṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati /.

PVSV 17,7f: ubhāyathā (= tādāmyena tadhutpattā vā) svabhāvaprātibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ / anyathā ekanivṛttyānyavinvṛttiḥ katham bhavet (k.24ab) /.

PVSV 19,25: tāv (= kāraṇa and vyāpaka) eva hi nivartamānau svavratibandddham (= kārya and vyāpya) nivartayata iti /.

PVSV 20,1f: apratibandhe hi katham ekasya nivṛttir anyasya nivṛttiḥ sādhaya /.

This nivartaka power does not represent a kind of logical nexus, but rather the power to affect another object existentially. Based on these expressions, I would like to suggest that pratibandha, or existential dependence, is confirmed by means of the realization of the causality between the disappearances of two objects. If svabhāva-pratibandha does not exist, then it is not possible to confirm the causality between the two disappearances. Conversely, if one can find causality between the two disappearances, then svabhāva-pratibandha must exist.

This is the very idea evoked by Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) when he said

\[ byas pa mi rtag pa la 'brel ba'i don ldog gi phyogs gcig de gnyis tha dad mgon sum gyis grub cing / mi rtag pa log pa'i stobs kyis byas pa ldog pa'i tshul ni mi rtag pa log pa'i gzhis la byas pa 'gog pa'i gnod pa can gyi rtags la brten nas bsgrub pa yin ... \]

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8 According to Śākyabuddhi, KG 75,23.

9 The translation “existential dependence” coincides with the translation by F. Th. Stcherbatsky (1930). He translated the first occurrence of svabhāva-pratibandha in NB II.19 (p. 69) as “Because one thing can convey the (existence of) another one when it is existentially dependent (on the latter)” (my emphasis, Y. F.).

10 rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen, tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa, Zhol ed., cha, 22b4–5. That the defining character of 'brel pa is closely related to the causality of two disappearances was first pointed out in the presentation “rGyal tshab’s Understanding of Svabhāvaprātibandha” by Choi Kyeon-jin at the Conference of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, 2013, Ulaanbaatar.
don ldog is an equivalent of mtshan nyid, that is, the “defining character.” Therefore in this passage Dar ma rin chen is postulating that there are two conditions that define the character of the dependence of the produced object upon an impermanent object: (1) the two objects must be different, and (2) the disappearance of the former object is caused by force of the disappearance of the latter object.

It is obvious that the second condition is based on ekanivṛtyānyanivṛtī. don ldog literally means the distinguishing character in the object, and therefore this ekanivṛtyānyanivṛtī is a distinguishing character of pratibandha. This is indirect evidence of the close relationship between pratibandha and ekanivṛtyānyanivṛtī.

Problems in the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and the commentaries on Dharmakīrti

As shown above, there is little that remains speculative about the meaning of pratibandha in the texts of Dharmakīrti. Now I would like to point out some interesting matters that can be drawn from the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and its commentary.

I have already mentioned that in the Abhidharmakośa and Mahāvyutpatti, pratibaddha is in most cases translated as rag las pa. In passages no. 1 to no. 25 of fifty-one citations in List C, below with the exception of no. 5, pratibandha/pratibaddha is translated as ’brel ba/’brel ba and in the rest of the passages, with the exception of nos. 27 and 34, it is translated as rag las/’brel ba. The same situation is found in the Tibetan translation of the commentary on the PVSV by Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ). In half of the cases translated into rag las/’brel ba, pratibandha/pratibaddha is used in the context of the basis for the logical nexus. For example, svabhāva-pratibandha in passages nos. 44 and 46 is translated as rang bzhin la/’brel ba, not as rang bzhin (dang) ’brel ba, which is the translation in the first half of the cases of svabhāva-pratibandha/pratibaddha-svabhāva. In passage no. 40, tadapratibaddhasvabhāva is properly translated as de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhin can gyi, with the meaning of the bahuvrīhi compound. As mentioned above, there is no distinction made between svabhāva-pratibandha and pratibaddha-svabhāva in the Tibetan translation. This transition of the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and PVṬ might mean that the translator(s) of these two texts realized Dharmakīrti’s intentions behind this term in the process of their translation work, and changed their translation of pratibandha/pratibaddha halfway through.

But other Tibetan scholars who did not consult the Sanskrit texts must not have noticed that rag las/’brel ba was the translation of pratibandha. Amazingly, they properly recorded the defining character of ’brel ba as I have mentioned above, even in such a restricted or incomplete situation. I cannot but concede that they had a very profound ability to understand Dharmakīrti’s intentions.

This change in the Tibetan translation of pratibandha/pratibaddha may have been influenced by an annotation of Śākyabuddhi, which paraphrases pratibaddha as āyatta and

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11 The colophon of the PVSV does not mention a translator, but that of the PVṬ mentions lo ts’a ba rma dge ba’i blo gros. Perhaps he also translated the PVSV during the same period.
pratibandha as āyattatva on several occasions (passages nos. 1, 5, 24, 32, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46).

In the midst of paraphrasing pratibandha in NB II.21: sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye 'rthe liṅgasya, Dharmottara comments that liṅgam parāyattatvāt pratibaddham / sādhyas tv artho 'parāyattatvāt pratibandhaviṣayo na tu pratibaddha ity arthaḥ / (NBṬ 112,1f); “liṅga is pratibaddha because it is dependent upon another [object], while on the other hand sādhyya artha – because it is not dependent upon the other [namely the liṅga] – is an object of pratibandha, [but] it is not pratibaddha.” Dharmottara clearly interprets pratibaddha as āyatta and pratibandha as āyattatva. He also puts liṅga and pratibaddha in the appositional case and explains that sādhyya is pratibandhaviṣaya. Moreover, Durvekamiśra annotates pratibandha three times with pratibandhaḥ pratibaddhatvam āyattatvam (NBṬ 96,21; 110,20; 115,15f). These explanations correspond with what I have explicated above in this paper.

Conclusion

To summarize my arguments in this paper:

1. pratibandha is more significant than svabhāva in the compound svabhāva-pratibandha.
2. Generally svabhāva-pratibandha is interpreted as pratibaddha-svabhāvatva, which is an abstract noun of a bahuvrīhi compound. Therefore, svabhāva stands for the liṅga’s svabhāva and svabhāva-pratibandha should be understood as a genitive tatpurusa compound.
3. pratibandha/pratibaddha is closely related to the causality of the dual disappearance of two objects (ekanivṛttyany īnivṛtti).
4. Therefore, pratibandha/pratibaddha express the existential dependence of one object upon another, of which the former is liṅga or hetu and the latter is sādhyya.

References and abbreviations


AKBhT Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: chos mngon pa’i mzdod kyi bshad pa. Derge ed. Tohoku No. 4090. mNgon pa’i bstan bcos, gu 27b6–ngu 109a8.


Dar ma rin chen rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen, tshad ma rnam ’grele gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa. Zhol ed.

12 At this first mention of svabhāva-pratibandha, Śākyabuddhi annotates that rang bzhin bsgrub par bya ba’i dang po dang ’brel pa ni de la rag las pa nyid de yod na’o. But Karnakagomin comments differently, that svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ sādhanaṃ kṛtaī samāsa / svabhāvena pratibandhatvam / pratibaddhavasvabhāvatvam iti yāvat / (KG 13,18f), which is the almost same paraphrase as that in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabindufikā (NBṬ 110,1f).
Yoichi Fukuda 97


NB Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu. See NBṬ.


PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikā. See PVSV.


List A: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

1. AKBh
   icchāmātrapratibaddha hi teṣām sarvagunāsampatsaṃmukhībhāvah / (Ch.2, 70.23)
   AKBhT
de dag gi yon tan 'byor ba mngon sum du 'gyur ba thams cad ni bzhed pa tsam
   la rag lus pa yin pas … (Ku, 76a7)
   一切圓德，隨樂而起故。

2. AKBh
   yasya yatpratibaddha upādāḥ sa tasyāṇantaram upadhyate / (Ch.2, 99.13)
   AKBhT
gang zhig gang la rag las te skye ba de ni de'i 'jug thogs su skye ste /
   (Ku 100a5)
   若此法生，繫屬彼法，要彼無間，此乃得生。如芽等生，要藉種等。

3. AKBh
   tatra pañcavidhamanaskārānantaram āryamārgasammukhībhāvo ’nyatropapa-
   tipratilambhitbhāvyah / prayogapratiyuvavat / (Ch.2, 109.1f)
   AKBhT
de la skyes nas thob pa dag ma gtogs pa yid la byed pa rnam pa lnga'i mjug
   thogs su 'phags pa'i lam mngon du 'gyur te / sbyor ba la rag lus pa'i phyir
   ro // (Ku 107b5f)
   此中五種，作意無間，聖道現前。除生所得聖道。繫屬加行心故。

4. AKBh
   yadā cāsyāśrayo viparītantaṃ ārabhate tadāvaśyam asya tadāśrayapratiyuvavat
   cittaṃ sammukhībhūya pāścāt pracyayet nānyathā / (Ch.3, 156.6f)
   AKBhT
gang gi tshe de'i lus yongs su 'jug par rtsom pa de'i tshe yang de las gdon mi za
   bar de'i lus dang 'brel pa'i sens mngon du gyur nas phyis 'chi 'pho bar 'gyur
   gzhon du ni ma yin no // (Ku, 143a1f)
   若所依身將欲變壞。必定還起屬所依心。然後命終。更無餘理。

5. AKBh
   icchāmātrapratibaddhah sarvagunāsampatsaṃmukhībhāvah / (Ch.7, 421.3)
   AKBhT
de dag gi yon tan 'byor ba thams cad mngon du 'gyur ba ni bzhed pa tsam
   la rag lus so // (Khu, 122b5)
   諸佛功德・・・隨欲能引現前。

List B: Mahāvyutpatti

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6483  pratibandhaḥ / phyir 'jil ba’am bgegs byed pa’am bar chad byed pa /
6481  pratibaddhah / rag lus pa’am ’brel ba’am bgegs su gyur pa /
List C: PVSV, commentaries of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin

1. PVSV svabhāvapratibandha hi satyartho 'ṛthaṁ na vyabhicarati / (2,19)
   SVTib rang bzhin dang 'brel pa yod pa don gyis don 'khrul pa med de / (262a6f)
   KG svabhāvena pratibandhāḥ sādhanam kṛteti samāsaḥ / svabhāvena pratibaddhatvam / pratibaddha-svabhāvatvam iti yāvat / (23,16f)
   PVṬ (=) rang bzhin bsgrub par bya ba'i dangos po dang 'brel pa ni de la rag las pa nyid de de yod na'o // (10a7)

2. PVSV kāryasyāpi svabhāvapratibandhāḥ / (3,3f)
   SVTib 'bras bu yang rang bzhin dang 'brel pa yin te / (262b2)
   KG – (24,25); PVṬ: – (11a2)

3. PVSV tatrānubhayasya pratibandhāt tadabhāve anyena na bhavitavyam iti kuta etat / (5,19f)
   SVTib de la gnyis ka ma yin pa ni 'brel pa med pa'i phyir te / de med na gzhan med par 'gyur ro // zhes bya ba der lta ga la 'gyur // (263b7)
   KG ambhāhayasyākāryākāraṇātmakasya niśedhyena saha pratibandhāḥbhāvāt tada-bhāve 'pratibandhābhāve / (38,17f)
   PVṬ gnyi ga ma yin pa ste rgyu yang ma yin la 'bras bu yang ma yin pa'i bdag nyid ni dgag par bya ba dang lhan cig 'brel pa med pa'i phyir de med na ste 'brel pa med pa med na ... (16b2)

4. PVSV apratibaddhasvabhāvasvabhāvasvabhāvasvabhavisnābhāvaniyamābhāvat / (8,12f)
   SVTib rang bzhin ma 'brel pa ni med na mi 'byung bar nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // (265a6)
   KG tādāmyatadutpattibhyāṃ lāṅgīny apratibandhasvabhāvasvabhāvasvabhāvasvabhāvaniyamābhāvat / (49,12)
   PVṬ de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba dag gi rtags can dang / rang bzhin ma 'brel pa ni med na ma 'byung bar nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // (22b2f)

5. PVSV nāntarīyakam eva kāryaṃ kāraṇam anumāpayati / taprātanubhayasya taprātanubhayasya taprātanubhayasya taprātanubhayasya / (10,5f)
   SVTib med na mi 'byung ba'i 'bras bu kho nas rgyu rjes su dpog par byed do // de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro // (266a6)
   KG taprātanubhayasya / tatra kāraṇe āyattattvāt / (55,4f)
   PVṬ med na mi 'byung ba'i 'bras bu kho nas zhes bya ni rgyu med na mi 'byung ba kho nas so // de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir zhes bya na ri rgyu de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro // (26b2f)

6. PVSV ekaniṃrttyā 'nyaniṃrttim ichchatā tayoḥ kaścīt svabhāvapratibandho 'py eṣṭavyah / anyathā 'gamako hetuh syāt / (10,23f)
   SVTib gcig log pas gzhan ldog par 'dod pas ni de gnyis rang bzhin 'brel pa 'ga' zhi kyang 'dod par bya ba dgos so // de lta ma yin na gtan tshigs go bar byed pa ma yin par 'gyur ro // (266b6)
   KG tayoḥ sādhyasādhanayāvaśa kaścīt svabhāvena pratibandhas tādāmyatadutpati-lakṣaṇo [']py eṣṭavyah / (57,7f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound \textit{svabhāva-pratibandhā}

7. PVṬ\textsuperscript{\textit{}} \(=\) \textit{bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa de gnyis de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba'i mtshan nyid khyis 'brel pa' ga' zhih kyang 'dod par bya dgos te / (28a2f)

7. PVSV \textit{na hy asati pratibandhe} 'nvayavyatirekaniścayo 'sti / (10,28)

SVTib \textit{'brel pa med par ni rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa nges pa med de / (266b7)

KG \textit{–} (59,27); PVṬ: \textit{–} (28a6)

8. PVSV \textit{anyathā hy asati pratibandhe} 'daršanamātreṇa vyatireke / (11,5)

SVTib \textit{de lta ma yin te / 'brel pa med par ma mthong ba tsam gyis ldog na / (267a2)

KG \textit{–} (58,23); PVṬ: \textit{–} (28b6)

9. PVSV \textit{anupalambhāt tu kvacit abhāvasiddhāv apy apratibaddhya tadabhāve sarvabrāhavāsiddhe / (12,23f)

SVTib \textit{mi dmigs pa'i sgo nas ni 'ga' zhih la med pa grub tu zin kyang 'brel pa med pa ni de med kyang thams cad la med pa mi grub pas / (267b4f)

KG \textit{apratisiddhyasa hetoh sadhye / tadabhāve sadhyābhamāve sarvatva vipakṣe 'bhāvāvāsiddhe… (62,9f)

PVṬ \textit{gtan tshigs bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel pa med pa ni sgrub par byed pa de med kyang mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur ba'i dngos po thams cad la med pa mi 'grub pa'i gta tshigs khyis na the tshom za ba yin no / (31a5)

10. PVSV \textit{tannivṛttāu kvacit nivṛttāv api prāṇādīnām apratibaddhā / sarvatva nivṛttya-}

SVTib \textit{agamakatvam / (13,10f)

KG \textit{nivṛttāv api prāṇādīna apratibaddhād ātmanā saha sambandhābhāvāt / (63,23f)

PVṬ \textit{gal te ji zhig ltar mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ma mthong ba tsam gyis 'brel pa med pa yang de 'khrul pa med de zhe na / (269a1)

KG \textit{yadi vipakṣe hetor adarśanamātreṇa apratibaddhya svasādhye tadavyabhicāraḥ sādhyābhamāvāt / (69,2f)

PVṬ \textit{gal te mi mthun pa'i phyogs la gta tshigs ma mthun ba tsam gyis bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel pa med pa'i yang bsgrub par bya ba der 'khrul pa med par 'dod na ni / (35a6f)

11. PVSV \textit{yadi kathamcid vipakṣe 'darśanamātreṇa apratisiddhyāpi tadavyabhicāraḥ / (15,11)

SVTib \textit{gal te ji zhig ltar mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ma mthong ba tsam gyis 'brel pa med pa yang de 'khrul pa med do zhe na / (269a1)

KG \textit{yadi vipakṣe hetor adarśanamātreṇa apratisiddhyā svasādhye tadavyabhicāraḥ sādhyābhamāvāt / (69,2f)

PVṬ \textit{gal te mi mthun pa'i phyogs la gta tshigs ma mthun ba tsam gyis bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel pa med pa'i yang bsgrub par bya ba der 'khrul pa med par 'dod na ni / (35a6f)

12. PVSV \textit{svam ca svabhāvaṃ parityajya katham bhāvo bhavet / svabhāvasyaiva bhāvavād iti tasya svabhāva-pratibandhā avyabhicāraḥ / (17,1f)

SVTib \textit{rang gi ngo bo yongs su bor nas kyang ji ltar yod par 'gyur te / rang gi ngo bo kha na ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro / de'i phyir de ni rang bzhin 'brel pa'i phyir 'khrul pa med do / (270a3)

KG \textit{tasyātmabhūtasya sādhanasya īśīṃśapadeḥ svabhāvapratisiddhyā eva svabhāvāt sādhyābhāvāte vrksādau yathoktena prakāreṇa pratibandhā evāvyabhicāraḥ / (75,3f)
PVṬ  sgrub pa shing sha pa la sogs pa bdag nyid du gyur pa de ni rang bzhin 'brel pa kha na'i phyir te / rang bzhin bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa shing la sogs pa dang ji skad bshad pa'i rnam pas 'brel pa kho nas 'khrul pa med do // (39b7f)

13. PVSV  ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ / (17,7)
SVTib  gnyis ga rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas ldog go // (270a4f)
KG  ubhayatheti tādāmyena tadutpatyā vā yah svabhāvapratibandhas tasmād eva / sādhyāntyllāhāyetahetatvā nivṛttiḥ / anyathetih yadi pratibandho nesyate / ekasyāpratibandhakasya sādhyasya nivṛttyānivyuktirāh / apratibandhāsya sādhanadhar- 

PVṬ  (=) gnyi gar zhes bya ba ni de'i bdag nyid dang / de las byung ba'i mtshan nyid kyis rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas bsgrub par bya ba bo log pas gan tshigs ldog go // de lla mā ni gcig log pas zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ma 'brel pa log pas / ji ltar gzhan mi ldog par 'gyur sgrub pa'i chos ma 'brel pa ldog par 'gyur mi 'gyur ba kho na ste // (40a3f)

14. PVSV  svabhāvapratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyāgamayati / sa ca tadbhāvalakṣaṇas tadutpatillakaṇā vā / (17,12f)
SVTib  rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas tshigs kyis bsgrub par bya ba go bar byed de // de'i nga bo'i mtshan nyid dam // de las byung ba'i mtshan nyid yin no // (270a6)
KG  svabhāvapratibandhād eva sādhyābhimate vastunī pratibandhatvād eva hetuḥ svāsādhyāgamayati / (76,1f)

PVṬ  rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa'i dngos po dang 'brel pa kho nas gan tshigs kyis bsgrub par bya ba go bar byed do // (40a6)

15. PVSV  yada punar drṣṭāntena nāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ pradarśyate / tadā yatra dhūmas tratrāgnir ity eva na syāt / pratibandhābhāvāt / (19,16f)
SVTib  gang gi tshe dpes me dang du ba dag rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po mi ston pa de'i tshe ni 'brel pa med pa'i phyir / gang na du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes bya ba nyid du yang mi 'gyur na / (271a7)
KG  – (85,5f); PVṬ: – (44a2f)

16. PVSV  drṣṭāntenāyam eva yathokta svabhāvapratibandhaḥ pradarśyate / (19,21f)
SVTib  dpes ji skad bshad pa'i rang bzhin 'brel pa 'di kho na rab tu ston pa / (271b1f)
KG  – (85,8f); PVṬ: – (44a4)

17. PVSV  tāv eva hi nivartamānaṁ svaprati(baddhaṁ) nivartayata iti / (19,25)
SVTib  de dag kho na ldog pa na rang gi 'brel pa zlog par byed pas … (271b2)
KG  tāv eva hi kāraṇavyāpakau nivarttamānaṁ svaprati(baddhaṁ) kāryaṁ vyāpyaṁ ca svabhāvaṁ nivartayata … (85,14f)

PVṬ  rgyu dang khyab par byed pa de dag kho na ldog pa na rang dang 'brel pa 'bras bu dang rang bzhin khyab par bya ba zlog par byed pas / (44a5f)

18. PVSV  aprati(bandhe) hi kathām ekasya nivṛttiḥ anyasya nivṛttiṁ sādhyayet / (20,1f)
SVTib  ma 'brel na ni ji ltar gcig log pas gzhan ldog pa sgrub par byed / (271b3)
KG  – (85,18f); PVṬ: – (44a7)

19. PVSV  yadi nāmaite śabdāḥ puruṣaiḥ kvacit prāṇiniṣṭā api na śakyante prāṇetum vastuaprati(bandhād) dhūmādivat / (35,20f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

SVTib  
gal te sgra 'di dag skyes bu rnams kyis 'ga' zhi la bya bar 'dod du zin kyang du ba la sogs pa bzhiin du dngos po *dang* 'brel pa'i phyir bya bar mi nus na …

(280b4f)

KG  
vastuprātibandhāt / vastvāyattavāt / dhūmādvat / na hy agni prātibaddho dhūmo vahnipratyāyanasamanartha tadvaiparītyena jalapratyāyane niyoktuṃ pāryate / tadā vastuprātibandhātvā śabdānām ayaṁ upālambhaḥ syād asati vyaṭireke katham śaṣṭhiyādaya iti // (157,14f)

PVṬ  
(=) dngos po *dang* 'brel pa'i phyir dngos po tha dad pa la rag las pa'i phyir bya bar mi nus na / sgra rnams dngos po *dang* 'brel pa de'i tšhe / tha dad pa med na ji ltar drug pa la sogs par 'gyur zhes bya ba'i klan ka 'di 'gyur ba zhih na / (80a1f)

20. PVSV  
sarvaś cāyam svalakṣaṇānām eva darśanāhitavāsanākṛto viplava iti tatpratibhāda jananānām vikalpānām atatpratibhāsīte 'pi vastuny avisaṃvādo …

(43,2f)

SVTib  
'di thams cad rang gi mtshan nyid dag kho na mthong bas gzhag pa'i bag chags kyis byas pa'i bslad pa yin pa las de *dang* 'brel pa las skye ba'i rnam par rtog pa rnams ni de snang ba nyid ma yin yang dngos po la mi hslug ste l (285a2f)

KG  
sarvaś cāyam ityādi / sarvo viplava iti sambandhaḥ / viplavo bhrāntiḥ / ayaṁ iti sāmānyādārāpiḥ / svalakṣaṇānām eva yad darśanam tenāhitā yā vāsanā tātkṛtāḥ / paramparāyā sarvavicālpānām vastudarśanadvāryāvatāt / tathā hi nityādīvicalpā api vastudarśanenaivotpannāh sadṛśparāparotpattidarśanāvātāt / tatra tulye sarvavicālpānām vastudarśanadvāryāvatāte / tatpratibhāddha jananānām anityādīvicalpānām atatpratibhāsīte [']pi svalakṣaṇānāpratibhāsīte [']pi vastuny avisaṃvādaḥ l(183,4f)

PVṬ  
'di thams cad ces bya ba la sogs pa smos te / 'di zhes bya ba ni rtag pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa'o // thams cad bslad pa yin no zhes bya ba sbyar te / bslad pa'i bslad pa yin pa te / rnam par rtog pa thams cad ni dngos po mthong ba'i sgo nas brgyud de 'ongs pa'i phyir ro ll 'di ltar rtag pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa yang dngos po mthong ba kho na las byung ba yin te / 'dra ba gzhag 'byang ba la sogs pas 'khrul ba 'ba' zhih tu zad do / de la rnam par rtog pa thams cad dngos po mthong ba'i sgo nas 'ongs pa niy du 'dra ba las de *dang* 'brel pa las skye ba mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa rnams ni de snang ba nyid ma yin yang / rang gi mtshan nyid snang ba nyid ma yin dang mi rtag pa niy la sogs pa'i ngo bo de dngos po la yod pa'i phyir dngos po la mi slu ste l / (95b4f)

21. PVSV  
vastusamvādās ta vaśūtpatītvaḥ tatpratibandhe satī bhavati l (49,2)

SVTib  
dngos po *thob* pa ni dngos po las skye bas de *dang* 'brel pa yin na 'gyur gyi … (288b6f)

KG  
tasmin sādhya pratibandhe satī (/) pratibandhe eva kutāh / vastūtpatītvaḥ sādhyatvaḥ vastūtpatītvaḥ hetubbhāyataḥ anyathety asati pratibandhe / (204,8f)

PVṬ  
(=) brgyud de dngos po las skye ba'i rgyur gyur pas dngos po dngos po de *dang* 'brel te l / de lia yin na dngos po *thob* par 'gyur gyi zhes bya bar sbyar ro l (110a1)
22. PVSV vikalpānām arthaḥpratibandhaṇīyamābhāvāt / na hi vikalpā yathārthham eva jāyante / (51,8f)
SVTib rnam par rtog pa rnam ms don dang 'brel par nges pa med pa'i phyir te / rnam par rtog pa ni don ji lta ba bzhin skye ba med pa nyid do // (290a4f)
KG arthaḥpratibandho 'rthākārānavidhānenaotpattiḥ / (212,10)
PVT don dang 'brel pa ni don gyi rnam pa'i rjes su byed par skye ba'o // (116a2)

23. PVSV upakārē 'pi tatraiva tatraivaṇāḥ iti kim anyas tatkaraṇāt tadupakārī / (53,24f)
SVTib phan 'dogs na yang de kho na la de 'brel pas de byed pa'i phyir de la phan par byed pa gzhan ci dgos / (291b1)
KG upakārē vā sāmānyaakte upakārasyābhāvyapagamyamāne / tatraiva sāmānye tasyopakārasya pratibandha iti kim anyo vyaktibhedas tasyopakārasya karanāt tasya sāmānyasyopakārī ... (218,15f)
PVT phan 'dogs na yang zhes bya ba ni spyis byas pa'i phan pa khas len na spyi de kho na la phan pa de 'brel pas de byed pa'i phyir spyi de la phan par byed pa gsal ba'i khyad par gzhan ci dgos te ... (120a1f)

24. PVSV tadupattidharmā bhāvāḥ svabhāvapratibandhāḥ apeekṣate nāma / (53,26f)
SVTib de las skye ba'i cho's can ni rang bzhin 'brel pa'i phyir lītos pa zhes bya'o // (291b2)
KG tasmād apeekṣāniyād utpattīḥ sā dharmāḥ svabhāvo yasya sa tadupattidharmma-bhāvāḥ / svabhāvasya pratibandhāḥ āyattattvād apeekṣate nāma upakārīnaṃ ... (218,20f)
PVT gang la cho's de'i ngo bo nyid yod pa de ni de las skyes ba'i cho's can gyi dngos po'o // rang bzhin 'brel cing rag las pa'i phyir phan par byed pa la lītos pa zhes bya ste / (120a3f)

25. PVSV yaḥ kaścīt kasyacīt kvacīt pratibandhāḥ sa sarvao janyatāyāṃ evāntarrūpyattatvāt / (54,1f)
SVTib gang cung zad 'gā' zhig la lar 'brel pa de thams cad ni bskyed par bya ba'i khongs so gtogs so // (291b3)
KG yaḥ kaścīt bhāvāḥ pratibandhāḥ kasyacīd vastunāḥ kvacīd aśraye sa sarvajanyatāyāṃ kāryatāyāṃ evāntarbhavati / (219,3f)
PVT gang cung zad dngos po 'gā' zhig rten la lar 'brel pa dngos po las gyur pa de thams cad ni bskyed par bya ba ste / 'bras bu kho na'i khongs so gtogs so // (120a6f)

26. PVSV katham anyonyasya sāmyam / tatra tathābhāvāḥ iti cet / na / apratibandhāṣya sambandhayogāt / (55,18f)
SVTib ji litar gzhon dang gzhon du mtshungs pa yin / gal te de dag dang 'brel pa'i phyir ro // zhe na ma yin te / rag ma las pa la 'brel par mi rung ba'i phyir dang / (292b1f)
KG apratibandhāṣya vyaktāv anāyattasya tābhīr anupakārasyet arthaḥ / (224,21f)
PVT rag ma las pa la gsal ba la rag ma las pa la ste / de dag gis phan ma btags pa la zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // (125a1f)
27. PVSV  
\[\text{Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha}\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{SVTib} & \quad \text{tha snayad 'di ni yang dag pa'i don de bzhin du mthong ba'i sgo nas chos du ma dang l gcig dang l tha dad pa dang l tha dad pa ma yin par snang ba 'khrul pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i phyir l de dang der 'brel par 'gyur ba la de (DN: las du) ma 'khrul pa yin no l} \quad (297a5f) \\
\text{KG} & \quad \text{tasya vyavahārasya tapratibandhe tasmims tathābhūte svalakṣaṇe pārampa-ryenotpattipratibandhe sati tadavyabhicāraḥ l vastavyabhicāraḥ l} \quad (260,12f) \\
\end{align*}\]

28. PVSV  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{SVTib} & \quad \text{phrod pa 'du ba dang ldan pa dang l don gcig la 'du ba zhes bya ba la sogs pa dngos po'i 'brel pa dag kyang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po las tha dad pa ma yin no l gcig la gcig gm ghan dag gis phan 'dogs pa med pa ni rag lus pa med pa'i phyir dang l rag lus pa med pa yang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro l} \quad (300a6f) \\
\text{KG} & \quad \text{parasparam anyonyam upakāriṇām anyato và śrayābhimatād anupakāriṇām apratibandhād anāyattatvāt l apratibandhānaśya (=apratibandhāsya) cāsa-bandhāt kāraṇāt} \quad \ldots \quad (278,1f) \\
\text{PVṬ} & \quad \text{gcig la gcig te l phan tshun nam rten du mṣon par 'dod pa ghan gis phan btags pa med pa'o l phan btags pa med pa ni rag lus pa med pa'i phyir te l ltos pa med pa'i rgyu'i phyir} \quad \ldots \quad (167a5) \\
\end{align*}\]

29. PVSV  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{SVTib} & \quad \text{de la yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por byas pa kho na rag lus pa yin no l} \quad (300b1) \\
\text{KG} & \quad \text{tatrāpy ekārthasamavāyini kāryakāraṇabhāvakṛta evaśrayeṇa saha yah kārya-kāraṇabhāvhas tatkṛta eva yaddvāreṇāropita eva sambandhāḥ l} \quad (278,15f) \\
\text{PVṬ} & \quad \text{(=) don gcig dang 'phrod pa' du ba de la yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por byas pa kho na ste l rten dang bcas pa'i rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po yin no l} \quad (167b4f) \\
\end{align*}\]

30. PVSV  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{SVTib} & \quad \text{de nyid de'i rten byed pa yin la l de yang spyi la rag ma lus pa'i phyir l spyi'i rten gis ci zhig byed l} \quad (301b2) \\
\text{KG} & \quad \text{sety arthāntarabhūtā sthitiḥ l na hi tasyāḥ sāmānye pratibandhākāraṇam kimcid asti} \quad \ldots \quad (285,18) \\
\text{PVṬ} & \quad \text{de zhes bya ba ni gnas pa don gzhon du 'gyur po'o l de la spyi la rag lus pa'i rgyu cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin no l} \quad (172a1f) \\
\end{align*}\]

31. PVSV  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{SVTib} & \quad \text{rag las pa kho na la rag las pa zhes ji ltar brjod por bya l} \quad (301b2) \\
\text{KG} & \quad \text{abhuyapagamyata eva sthiteḥ sāmānye pratibandha iti ced āha l} \quad (285,10) \\
\end{align*}\]
32. PVṬ
apekṣeti hi taṇḍaṇānāśrayāyuktaś ca sāmānyasyāyukta iti / (72,7f)

33. PVṬ
dngos po 'di la 'di ltos pa zhes bya ba la ltos pa gang yin pa de ni ltos par bya
ba 'di dang 'brel cing de la rag lus pa nyid de // (172b3)

34. PVṬ
kvacid avisaṃvādāḥ 'syā vastuni kāryakāraṇabhāva pratibandhāḥ // (76,20f)

35. PVṬ
tad dhi kīmciḍc upalīyeta na vā yasya yatra kīmciḍc pratibandhāḥ pratibandhāḥ
vā // (99,27f)

36. PVṬ
seyam sattā apratibandhiniḥ cet / niyamatī na syāt // (99,28f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

PVṬ 

37. PVSV yathāsvam vyāpini sādhye tayor eva pratibandhāt liṅgayor lingini / (101,1f)

SVTib bdag nyid ji lta ba bzhiṅ du khyab (D: khyad) par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba’i rtags can la rtags de dag rag las pa’i phyir ... (318a1f)

KG kāryasya kāraṇam vyāpakam sādhyam (f) svabhāvasyāpi svabhāvo vyāpakah sādhyas tasmin sādhye lingini tayor eva kāryasvabhāvayor liṅgayaḥ pratibandhāt / (370,5f)

PVṬ ’bras bu’i rgyu khyab par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba yin la / rang bzhiṅ gyi yang rang bzhiṅ khyab par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba yin te / bsgrub par bya ba rtags can de la ’bras bu dang / rang bzhiṅ gyi rtags de dag de nyid rag las pa’i phyir ro // (228a2f)

38. PVSV sadasatpakṣabhedenā śabdārthānapavādibhiḥ // vastv eva cintyate hy atra prati- baddhaḥ phalaodayaḥ // (106,27f)

SVTib sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dpayd bya ste // ’di la ’bras ’byung rag las phyir // (321b1f)

KG yasmād atra vastuni pratibandhaḥ phalodayaḥ / (387,11)

PVṬ ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu rag las phyir sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

39. PVSV tad ayaṃ pravartamānāḥ sarvād sadasaccintāyām avadhīritavikalpa-prati- bhāso vastv evādhiṣṭhānīkaroti // yatra vastuni prati- baddho ... (107,3f)

SVTib de bas na ’di ’jug pa na thams cad du yod pa dang med pa dpyod pa na rnam par rtog pa’i snang ba la lhos pa med par gang la skyes bu’i don ’di rag las pa’i dngos po nyid la dmigs par byed de ... (321b3f)

KG vastv evādhiṣṭhānīkaroti viṣayīkaroti yatra vastuny ayaṃ puruṣārthaḥ prati- baddhaḥ / (388,4f)

PVṬ dngos po gang la skyes bu’i don ’di rag las pa’i dngos po nyid la dmigs par byed cing yul du byed de / (241a5)

40. PVSV na ca tad apratibandhahasvabhāvo bhāvo ’nyam gamayati // (107,25)

SVTib de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhiṅ can gyi dngos po ni gzhan go bar byed pa ma yin no // (322a3)

KG tasmin vastuny apratibandhaḥ svabhāvo yasya śabdalakṣaṇasya / anyaṃ ya- trāsau na pratibandhāḥ / (390,7f)

PVṬ (=) dngos po de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhiṅ gyi sgra’i bdag nyid can gyi dngos po gang la yod pa zhes bya bar iṣṭhig rnam par sbyar ro // gang la rag las pa med pa ni gzhan de’i go bar byed pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro // (242b2f)

41. PVSV paryavasthānajanmanapratibandhāduḥkavivekāt // (111,5)

SVTib kun nas dkris pa dang skye ba la rag las pa’i sdrug bsgnas dang bral ba’i phyir dang // (324a3)

KG tayor yat pratibandhan duḥkhān tasya vivekāt / rāgādyutpattikāle yad duḥkham kāyacittaparidāhalaḥkṣaṇan tat paryavasthānapratibandhāṃ jātijāvyādhyād- duḥkhān tu janmapratibandhāṃ / (400,18f)
42. PVSV
tataḥ katham idānīṃ tapratinīyamānasādhiyam tadanvayam sādhayeyah / na hy apratibuddhas tatsādhana iti / (114,28f)

SVTib
de bas na de la so sor nges par bsgrub par bya ba de i rjes su 'gro ba ji ltar sgrub par byed par 'gyur te / rag las pa med pa de i (D adds ni) sgrub par byed pa ma yin no // (326b3f)

KG
bāhye 'rthe 'pratibandhena niyamābhāvāt l (417,5)

PVṬ
don gang la rag las pa med pa de ni sgrub par byed pa'i rigs pa ma yin no // (260b2)

43. PVSV
paraśrayo hi sambandho 'pratibandhe tayoh sambandhitā 'yogāt l (115,14)

SVTib
gzhán la (D adds i) rten pa can 'brel pa yin na ni rag las pa med pa la de dag gi 'brel pa nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // (326b4)

KG
paraśraya iti parasambandhitā āśrayo [']seti kṛtvā / sambandhini sambandhitāyā 'yogāt na hy apratibuddhena kenacit kaścit tadvān bhavati gaur ivāvena / (418,15f)

PVṬ
don 'ga zhig de dang ldan par mi 'gyur ro // (261b3f)

44. PVSV
svabhāvapratabandho 'nyattvam iti cet l (147,3f)

SVTib
gal te rang bzhin la rag las pa med pa ni gzhán nyid yin no zhe na l (346b5f)

KG
nānyavatvam iti cet / sa ca pratiṃbandhā pudgalasya skandheṣv asti tato tatsvabhāvate [']pi nānyavatvam skandhebhyāḥ pudgalasyeti l / (527,16f)

PVṬ
gal te rang bzhin la rag las pa med pa ni gzhán nyid yin na gang zag gi rag las pa de yang phung po dag la yod pa de bas na de'i rang bzhin ma yin kyang phung po dag las gang zag gzhán nyid ma yin no zhe na l / (326a6f)

45. PVSV
ko 'yam pratiṃbandho nāma yena sa ca na syāt l nānyasvabhāvaś ca l (147,4f)

SVTib
rag las pa zhes bya ba 'di gang yin l gang gis der yang mi 'gyur ba dang l rang bzhin gzhán du'ang mi 'gyur l (346b6)

KG
ko [']yam pratiṃbandho nāma pudgalasya skandheṣu yena pratiṃbandhena sa ca na syād iti skandha-svabhāvaś ca pudgalo na syāt l nānyasvabhāvaś ca skandhebhyāḥ l / (527,19f)

PVṬ
phung po dag la gang zag gi rag las pa zhes bya ba 'di'i gang yin l rag las pa'i rgyu gang gis der yang mi 'gyur ba zhes bya ba gang zag phung po'i rang bzhin du mi 'gyur ba dang gzhán gyi rang bzhin can du mi 'gyur ba ste l / (326a7f)

46. PVSV
na ca tajjamalaṅkaṇāti svabhāvapratiṃbandhād anyāḥ pratiṃbandho nāma l anā-yattasya vyabhicārā-virodhāt l (147,10f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

SVTib  
\[
de' i \text{ skye ba'i mtshan nyid kyi rang bzhin gyi rag las pa las rag las pa gzhan yang yod pa ma yin te / rag las pa med pa'i 'khrul pa la 'gal ba med pa'i phyir ro // (347a1f)}
\]

KG  
\[
a na cānyaḥ pratibandhāḥ pudgalasya skandhesu / yasnān na hi janmalakṣaṇāj janmasvabhāvāt svabhāvapratinirdeśaḥ anyāḥ pratibandho nāma / kim kāra-\text{ṇam} (/) anāyattasya tadutpayyā tatrāpratibandhāṣaḥ / tena saha yo vyabhicāras tasyāvirodhāt // (528,8f)
\]

PVṬ  
\[
(=) gal te skye ba'i mtshan nyid can gyi rag las pas phung po dag las gang zag gzhan nyid du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi 'on kyang rag las pa gzhan nyid du yod do zhe na / de'i zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / skye ba'i mtshan nyid can te / skye ba'i dbang po can gyi rang bzhin gyi rag las pa las rag las pa zhes bya ba gzhan yod pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir zhe na / de las byung ba'i rag las pa med pa de ni de la rag las pa med pa de dang lhan cig 'khrul pa gang yin pa de la 'gal ba med pa'i phyir ro // gang zhog gang la rag las pa med pa de ni der 'khrul pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go go // (326b5f)
\]

47. PVSV  
\[
jiṇānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / syād etat / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānaṃ janmānāma svabhāvapratibandhānāḥ / anyāḥ pratibandho / nāma / kiṃ kārṇam (/) anāyattasya tadutpayyā tatrāpratibandhāṣaḥ / tena saha yo vyabhicāras tasyāvirodhāt // (147,12f)
\]

SVTib  
\[
gal te shes pas byas pa'i rag las pa yin no zhe na / de ltar ni 'gyur na gang rtogs pa med na mi 'byung ba'i shes pa gang yin na des rtogs pa la nges par de snang ba'i phyir de de'i ngo bo ma yin du zin kyang / brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na // (347a2f)
\]

KG  
\[
pudgalasya skandhesu jiṇānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / … / yasya rūpādeḥ prati-\text{pattir yatpratipattis tāyā nānātāriyakam avinābhāvi yajjñānaṃ yasya pudgalasya jiṇānaṃ / taddaṭṭāv iti rūpādigatau nīyamena tasya pudgalasya pratibandhānāḥ / jiṇānakṛtaḥ pratibandhaḥ / tena jiṇānakṛtaḥ pratibandhāḥ // (528,13f)
\]

PVṬ  
\[
(=) phung po dag las gang zag gi shes pas byas pa'i rag las pa yin no zhe na // (327a4)
\]

48. PVSV  
\[
nanu saivāsatī pratibandhe na yuktety ucyate // (147,26)
\]

SVTib  
\[
de nyid rag las pa (DN inserts med pa) med par rīgs pa ma yin no zhes brjod pa ma yin nam // (347a6)
\]

KG  
\[
nanu saiva pratītes tannāntāriyakatā / rūpādiṣu pudgalasyāsatī pratibandhe na yuktety ucyate // (530,4f)
\]

PVṬ  
\[
de med na mi 'byung ba'i shes pa de nyid ni gzugs la sogs pa gang zag rag las pa med par rīgs pa ma yin no zhes brjod pa ma yin nam // (328a4)
\]

49. PVSV  
\[
nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kaścit pratibandha iti coktam // (148,1)
\]

SVTib  
\[
rgyu dang 'bras bu ma yin pa dag la ni rag las pa cung zad kyang ma yin no zhes bya ba ying bshad zin to // (347a6f)
\]

KG  
\[
akāryakāraṇayor na kaścid vāstavāḥ pratibandha ity asakṛd uktaṃ … // (530,7)
\]

PVṬ  
\[
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa ma yin pa dag la ni dngos su 'brel pa cung zad kyang yod pa ma yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to // (328a5)
\]

50. PVSV  
\[
vivākṣayā sabdo 'rthe niyamaye / na svabhāvataḥ / tasya kvacid apratibandhena sarvatra tulyatvāt / yatrapī pratibandhas tadabhidhānaniyamābhāvāt // (172,19f)
\]
SVTib  brjod par 'dod pas sgra ni don dag la nges par bya ba yin gyi ngo bo nyid kyis ni ma yin te / de ni 'ga' zhig la yang rag las pa med par thams cad la mtshungs pa nyid kyi phyir ro // gang la rag las pa yin na yang de rjob par byed pa'i nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // (363a4f)

KG  tasya śabdasya kvacid vastuny apratibandhena sambandharahitavena kāraṇena sarvatrārthatulyatvā / yatṛāpi śabdasya pratibandhaḥ sthānakaraneṣu tataḥ śabdānāṃ utpatter abhyavakṣe vā / (606,3f)

PVT  de ni dngos po 'ga' zhig la rag las pa med pa ste / 'brel pa med par don thams cad la mtshungs pa nyid kyi phyir ro // gang la sgra'i rag las pa gnas dang byed pa dag gi yin te / de las (DN: la) sgra rnams skye ba'i phyir ram rtag par smra ba'i gzhung gis mngon par gsal ba'i phyir ro // (nye 61a4f)

51. PVS  uktam atrāpratibandhād aniyam iti // (172,27)

SVTib  'dir rag las pa med pa'i phyir / nges pa yod pa ma yin no zhes bshad zin to // (363a6f)

KG  uktam atrottaram / kvacid vastuny apratibandhād aniyata iti / (606,17)

PVT  dir lan ni dngos po 'ga' zhig la yang rag las pa med pa'i phyir nges pa yod pa ma yin no zhes bshad zin to // (nye 61b3)
Jain Conceptions of Non-Cognition: A Dialogue with Dharmakīrti on Inferential Evidence

by
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1. Introduction

1.1. Philosophical background

This paper aims at presenting and comparing the way non-cognition can serve as the basis of inference according to Buddhist and Jain philosophers, as well as to indicate the philosophical relevance of the main divergences between the two conceptions. I will focus on the view of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti, as it is found in his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti and Nyāyabindu, as well as on the view of the Jains Akalaṅka in his Laghiyastraya and Māṇikyanandi in his Parikṣāmukham.

First of all, the teachings of Akalaṅka (720–780) represent an important step in the development of Jain philosophy, especially in the constitution of a paradigm clearly distinct from the Buddhist one. More precisely, Akalaṅka has founded a systematic Jain theory of knowledge in answer to Dharmakīrti’s attacks against the Jain theory of non-one-sidedness. Following the style of his Buddhist opponent, Akalaṅka expresses his theses in a very concise way. For example, in his Laghiyastraya (henceforth LT), the Three Short Treatises, instead of presenting all the types of inference he grants, he presents only the discrepancies between the ones Dharmakīrti accepts and the one he himself accepts. This concise style explains our recourse to his commentators. Firstly, the Jain Māṇikyanandi (9th c.) has organized Akalaṅka’s mature philosophy in the Parikṣāmukham (PM), the Introduction to Philosophical Investigation. What is more, this work has itself been commented on by the Jain Prabhācandra (980–1065) in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa (PKM), the Sun that Grows the Lotus of Knowable, as well as by Vādi Devasūri (12th c.) in his Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra (PNT), the Commentary on the Explanation of the Nature of Knowledge and Viewpoints. These three works constitute a lineage of commentaries and share the same conception of inference. I will refer to them as “the tradition of Akalaṅka.” Since PM is the first work in this tradition, I will mainly refer to this text, and will quote from PKM and PNT respectively only when considering matters which are absent from earlier works.

Dharmakīrti’s texts are implicitly referred to in the sections on inference in LT and in PM, and explicitly in PKM and PNT. There, the most frequently quoted work of Dharmakīrti is the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVsV), the Auto-commentary on the Essay on Knowledge. In this paper, following Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, I will mainly refer to the PVsV. But I will also make use of Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu (NB), the Drop of Logic, because one finds there the most extensive list of correct types of inference he grants.

To begin with, it is useful to sketch the aforementioned framework of theories of inference, so as to agree on concepts as well as on the means to express them. First of all, inference is the cognitive process by which an epistemic agent acquires new knowledge...
using reasoning. It is specifically used in situations in which cognitive processes like perception fail. Entities being dealt with in metaphysical inquiries are typical examples of such situations. Inferential reasoning consists more precisely of the transmission of certainty from the established knowledge of the fact that a property, referred to as “the evidence-property” (hetu), is ascribed to a given object, to the new knowledge of the fact that another property, referred to as “the target-property” (sādhyā), is ascribed to the same object.¹ For example, from the previous knowledge that there is smoke on the hill, a person can know that there is fire on the hill.² As Shah (1967: 248) noticed, the Sanskrit expression for inference, anumāna, refers to this transmission, since it means “the knowledge that follows [another knowledge].” And this transmission of certainty is based on the vyāpti between the target-property and the evidence-property. Vyāpti means “pervasion” and is traditionally translated by the technical expression “invariable concomitance” in order to refer to the situation in which whenever the evidence-property is present, the target-property is present too. Because such a situation is usually granted by the fact that the target-property is pervading the evidence-property, as we find, for example, between the property of being a tree and the property of being a Sissoo tree.

What is more, stating such an inferential reasoning is the core mechanism of philosophical debates, in which the aim is to convince the interlocutor that a given piece of knowledge, even if not directly agreed on, is a valid one. In consequence, since every participant in such a debate is to seek convincing inclusions, the determination of the extension of the domains of predicates is one of the core issues in those debates.

1.2. Types of inferential evidence in Buddhism and in Jainism

In this conceptual framework, philosophers were aiming towards a theory of the proper relationship between the target-property and the evidence-property. That is to say that they considered it insufficient that the target-property is always present when the evidence-property is present, and they wanted to be able to distinguish between arbitrary and necessary universal relationships. An important step towards such an achievement was Dignāga’s introduction of the particle eva, which functions similarly to the operator of focus “only.”³ One of Dharmakīrti’s subsequent breakthroughs in this dynamic was to seek the precise reasons why a target-property is always present when its evidence-property is present, and as a consequence to accept as good evidence only the properties that are ‘essentially’ connected to the target-property. The requirement that inferential reasoning relies only on

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¹ In the following, I will abbreviate sentences as “the property of ‘being endowed with fire’ is ascribed to the subject ‘here’” by saying simply “there is fire here.”

² In my presentation of inferential reasoning, I make explicit the epistemic conditions by writing “the knowledge that there is smoke on the hill,” and not “there is smoke on the hill.” But I defend the position that although these epistemic conditions are present, it is important to keep them implicit in a formal representation. I do so because in contemporary logic, expressing these epistemic conditions within the object language is usually a technique used in order to have a level of description in which it is possible to deal only with the pure relation between propositions. But this is important to keep in mind that logic in India is concerned with the relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition.

³ Dignāga introduced this particle in his attempt to combine the theory of the triple characteristic of the evidence-property (trairūpya) with the theory of the necessity of the absence of the target-property when the evidence-property is absent (avinābhāva).
necessary relationships led Dharmakīrti to consider only two types of essential connections as ensuring correct inferences: the connection between an effect and it cause, and the connection between two natural properties. In doing so, Dharmakīrti provides “the ontic foundation for valid reasoning” (Katsura 1992: 224). More concretely, only three types of inferential evidence are granted: (i) natural properties (svabhāva); (ii) effects (kārya); and (iii) non-cognitions (anupalabdhi). Indeed, with such a conception, it is not accidental that whenever there is a Sissoo tree, there is also a tree. This is due to the very nature of the Sissoo, for which being a tree is a natural property. And this is also not accidental that whenever there is smoke, there is also fire. This is due to the very nature of smoke, which is the effect of fire. What is more, cases of non-cognition are consequences of this state of affairs also, since it is not accidental that whenever there is no tree, there is also no Sissoo and that whenever there is no fire, there is no smoke.

Two remarks are important for what follows. First of all, we should keep in mind the difference between the first two types of evidence, which are used to infer a presence; and the last one, which is used to infer an absence. The second remark is that when Dharmakīrti speaks about “natural property” he first intends the relation between, e.g., the property of being a cow and the property of being an animal. In other words, he intends a relation between two predicates that do not have the same extension. If we consider that these predicates denote natural kinds, then “pervaded properties” are species, and “pervasive properties” are genera. What is more, only pervaded properties are good evidence to infer the presence of their respective pervasive properties, and not the other way around, since knowing that there is a Sissoo is sufficient to know that there is a tree, but knowing that there is a tree is not sufficient to know that there is a Sissoo, for there might be an oak. Contrary to this, only pervasive properties are good evidence to infer the absence of their respective pervaded properties, and not the other way around, since knowing that there is not a tree is sufficient to know that there is no Sissoo, but knowing that there is no Sissoo is not sufficient to know that there is no tree, for there might be an oak. What is more, when Dharmakīrti speaks about “natural property” he also intends to speak about the relation between, e.g., the property of being perishable (anityatva) and the property of being a product (kṛtakatva). In this case, we have a relation in which the two predicates are co-extensive. Here, no restriction needs to be done in order to draw correct inferences. Both conceptions are in the same category “natural property,” because in both cases it concerns the description of the nature of a thing, and because in both cases there is a numerical identity between what is characterized by the pervaded property and what is characterised by the pervasive property.

Jain philosophers of Akalāṅka’s lineage have a different conception of evidence. More precisely, they consider that there are especially six situations in which the presence of an invariable concomitance is unquestionable, namely when the evidence-property is (i) a property pervaded (vāpya) by the target-property; (ii) an effect (kārya) of it; (iii) a cause (kāraṇa) of it; (iv) a predecessor (pūrvacara) of it; (v) a successor (uttaracara) of it; or (vi) a co-existent (sahacara) with it. My paper deals with the causes and consequences

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4 We are used to conceiving the species ‘cow’ as the set of all cows. But in Vaiśeṣika, the universal ‘cowness’ is a characteristic possessed by all cows. This is how genus and species should be considered here also.
of one discrepancy between Akalaṅka’s tradition and that of Dharmakīrti, namely the fact that ‘non-cognition’ is not part of this list. In fact, instead of being considered as good inferential evidence, as it is by Dharmakīrti, ‘non-cognition’ is considered by Jain philosophers as part of the general form an inference might have.

1.3. Non-cognition as a cognitive or as a linguistic process

In order to understand why ‘non-cognition’ is not listed by Jain philosophers as good evidence, but as part of the general form an inference might have, let us consider the motivations of its introduction for both Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka. First, when introducing non-cognition as a type of evidence, Dharmakīrti’s program is quite specific: he intends to prove the possibility of knowing absences from inference. Such a possibility is essential for Buddhist soteriology, which relies on the awareness of the absence of a persistent soul. This, in turn, enables him not to commit himself to the existence of a third kind of means of knowledge in addition to perception and inference, since everything – absences included – can be known from one of these two means. Therefore, he is only interested in non-cognition as good evidence to infer an absence. Contrary to this, Jain philosophers additionally investigate the situations in which it is possible, from non-cognition, to infer a presence. Such considerations on the possibility to infer presences from absences are not new. They can already be found in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.1.9 and, approximately at the same period, in Jain canonical literature in the Ṭhāṇaṃgasutta (Śthānāṅgasūtra, Possibilities) 4.3.336. Besides, Dharmakīrti criticizes these conceptions in his PVsV in the chapter on inference for oneself, svārthānumānapariccheda 20ff. If we compare Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, we can see an evolution of their focus.

First, Akalaṅka in his LT is clearly responding to Dharmakīrti. He does refer to non-cognition also as a means to know absences and diverges from his Buddhist opponent mainly on the following:

LT.15. People [think they] know the non-existence of the mind of others because of its invisibility. [But this is incorrect,] because the modifications of the forms of this [mind] would be impossible otherwise [than with the postulation of the existence of their minds].

The relevance of this quote is intelligible only if we recall that Dharmakīrti claimed that it is only the non-cognition of something that is usually perceptible and that meets the conditions for cognition that can be used as the basis of an inference. In LT 15, Akalaṅka is criticizing this on the ground that it is wrong to think that non-cognition can be used to infer the absence only of perceptible entities, since it can be used to infer the absence of imperceptible entities as well. For example, from the absence of the recognised characteristics of human cognitive abilities at the moment of death, it is possible to infer the absence of the mind

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5 For a more thorough survey of Jain theories of inference in Akalaṅka’s tradition, see Gorisse 2017.
6 For more on this topic, see Katsura 1992: 228.
8 For more on this topic, see Kellner 2003.
that causes them (see Shah 1967: 276). We won’t go further in this discussion, as it is sufficient for our purpose to understand that for both authors, the concern is primarily an epistemological one.

Contrary to this, non-cognition is by the time of Māṇikyanandin primarily conceived as a negative premise in the stated form of an inference. We have mentioned the fact that inference is not only a cognitive process by which one can acquire knowledge, it is also the rational means used in debates in order to be assured that from a true input, the output is always true as well. In this context of convincing, the inferential process has to be stated, and when this is done so it is commonly followed by a regulated argumentation aiming to defend or refute it. The stated form of an inference is what Indian philosophers call “inference for others” (parārthānumāna), in opposition to “inference for oneself” (svārthānumāna). And whereas Dharmakīrti has introduced non-cognition already in the section presenting the inference for oneself, Māṇikyanandi and after him Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri introduce non-cognition only in the section presenting the inference for others, that is to say, in the section that deals with inference firstly as a linguistic device to transfer values with certainty. And this switch from an epistemological to a formal concern becomes fully explicit with Vādi Devasūri, who introduces cognition and non-cognition in terms of basis for, respectively, affirmation and negation:

PNT.3.55. Cognition and non-cognition are the basis for the establishment of affirmation and negation.\(^9\)

This focus on the linguistic form of inference is what explains why in this precise section of the treatises of Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, nothing is said concerning epistemological problems related to the knowledge of absences. In other words, the Jain focus is on non-cognition as a negation, that is to say as a linguistic device usable to reverse the truth value of a sentence. This work on the relationship between negative (respectively affirmative) premises and negative (respectively affirmative) conclusions led them to single out four forms an inference might have, namely:

(i) Cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property] in the case of affirmation [of the thesis] (aviruddha-upalabdhir vidhau);

(ii) Cognition of [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property] in the case of negation [of the thesis] (viruddha-upalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe);

(iii) Non-cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property] in the case of negation [of the thesis] (aviruddha-anupalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe);


Since the goal of this paper is to compare what can be inferred from non-cognition within this classification of forms of inference with what can be inferred from non-cognition in Dharmakīrti’s classification of types of evidence, it is important to have his classification in mind before we explain the Jain one.

1.4. Types of non-cognition in Dharmakīrti

First of all, according to Dharmakīrti, there are several means to infer that a property does not pertain to a given object. On one hand, this can be achieved from the previous knowledge that another property does not pertain to this object as well. For example, if there is no tree in a given place, then there is also no Sissoo in this place. This first type of non-cognition is “non-cognition” (anupalabdhi) properly speaking. Here, knowledge of absence is gained by means of absence of knowledge. On the other hand, to infer that a property does not pertain to a given object can also be achieved from the previous knowledge that a property incompatible with the one that one seeks to know pertains to the object under discussion. For example, it is sufficient to know that there is a fire in the room, in order to know that the room is not cold. This is so because there cannot be heat and cold at the same place at the same time. For this second type of non-cognition, even though the process does involve a cognition (of the fire) properly speaking, Dharmakīrti speaks also about “non-cognition,” because the cognition of the presence of a property incompatible with another one is equivalent to the knowledge of the impossibility for at least one of the conditions of existence of this other property to be the case. And this, in turn, amounts to the non-cognition of this precise condition.

Now, next to this distinction between non-cognition properly speaking and cognition of a property incompatible with the one that one seeks to know, Dharmakīrti also grants that it is possible to know absence of different types of thing. For example, one may know the absence of something, the absence of its effect, or the absence of its cause. From these distinctions, eleven types of non-cognition are recognised in NB. For the sake of the coming comparison, I will not follow the order of Dharmakīrti’s presentation in NB, but I will present the eleven types of non-cognition following the Jain thematic classification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type 1 (viruddha-x-upalabdhi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ix) Cognition of a [property] pervaded by a [property] incompatible [with the target-property] (viruddha-vyāpta-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) Cognition of the effect of [something] incompatible [with the target-property] (viruddha-kārṇa-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition of an [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 (x-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Cognition of a [property] incompatible with the effect [of the target-property] (kārṇa-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) Cognition of a [property] incompatible with the cause [of the target-property] (kārṇa-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Again, I have chosen the presentation of types of non-cognition as it is in NB, because it is the most comprehensive list, so it furnishes more material to work with in the line of a comparison. But other presentations are found in the different texts of Dharmakīrti. Especially, three types of evidence involving non-cognition are granted in HB; and four types in PVsV.
Non-cognition [of an evidence for the target-property] \((anupalabdhi)\)
(i) Non-cognition of [the target-property] itself \((svabhāva-anupalabdhi)\)
(ii) Non-cognition of a [property] pervading [the target-property] \((vyāpaka-anupalabdhi)\)
(iii) Non-cognition of the effect [of the target-property] \((kārya-anupalabdhi)\)
(iv) Non-cognition of the cause [of the target-property] \((kāraṇa-anupalabdhi)\)

Complex cognition of an [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property]
(x) Cognition of the effect of a [property] incompatible with the cause [of the target-property] \((kāraṇa-viruddha-kārya-upalabdhi)\)

We will examine these types of negative evidence one by one in the course of the presentation of the classification offered by Māṇikyanandi.

2. The four forms of inference according to Māṇikyanandi

In what follows, I will focus on Māṇikyanandi, because Akalaṅka does not offer such an extensive list of the forms of inference and of the different types of evidence valid in each form. In addition, the conceptions of Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri on this topic are substantively the same as those of Māṇikyanandi.


The first pattern is the plain affirmative one. This is the form I have been using by default until now. It is used to express inferences of the presence of a property due to knowledge of appropriate evidence for it. As we have seen, Jain philosophers grant six types of evidence as being appropriate in this context. In Māṇikyanandi’s words:

PM.3.59. In the case of affirmation [of the thesis], there are six kinds of cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property], namely [the evidence can be a property] pervaded \((vyāpya)\) [by it], an effect [of it], a cause [of it], a predecessor [of it], a successor [of it] or [a property] co-existent [with it].

Māṇikyanandi gives the example “sound is subject to change, because it is a product.” In the Indian paradigm of philosophy, this is an example with co-extensive predicates. But it is important to recall that with predicates of different extensions, only the one which is pervaded constitutes correct evidence in this first form. To compare with Dharmakīrti’s theory, this is in this plain affirmative form that he acknowledges evidence-properties that are natural properties \((svabhāva)\) or effects of the target-property. In PVs.V.1.1.6, as in NB.16–17, the examples are, respectively, “this is a tree, because this is a Sissoo” and “there

12 pariṇāmi śabdaḥ kṛtaḥ kātyāvat / Ghoshal (1940: 127).
is fire there, because there is smoke."  

In conclusion, cognition of evidence compatible with the target-property in the case of affirmation of the thesis is twofold in Dharmakīrti’s theory and sixfold in the Jain one.

I will not discuss predecessor, successor or co-existent in this paper, which focuses on the divergences between the two frameworks only when non-cognition is involved, because Dharmakīrti never accepts predecessor, successor or co-existent as correct evidence, no matter whether a non-cognition is involved or not or whether the conclusion of the inference is being stated in a positive or in a negative form. Contrary to this, there are interesting divergences to reflect upon when cause is being considered, because the efficiency of causal evidence is not the same for affirmative and negative forms. Therefore, we will have a special focus on it. First of all, in the affirmative form, Dharmakīrti and Māṇikyanandi agree on the fact that the presence of something can be inferred from the knowledge of the presence of its effect, as in “there is intelligence in this living being, because [it shows activities] like speech.” And the divergence appears when the Jain tradition considers as well that the presence of something can be inferred from the knowledge of the presence of its cause, like in “there is shade here, because there is an umbrella.” In consequence, the causal relationship is a symmetric one as far as the Jain conception is concerned, whereas for Dharmakīrti, only the effect, and not the cause, can serve as evidence in a correct inference. The fact that, e.g., the presence of a seed is not sufficient evidence for the future presence of a plant, is due to the fact that it is impossible to be sure that no impediment is blocking the potency of the given cause to produce its effect. If combinatory considerations alone are being developed, the same divergence, namely the fact that the Jain tradition under consideration accepts both cause and effect, and that Dharmakīrti accepts only the effect, as correct evidence, should be seen in the second form of inference as well. Let us have a look at this second form to see if this is what happens.


The second form is used to express inference of the absence of a property from knowledge of evidence incompatible with it.

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13 ta ete kārya-svabhāva-anupalabdhi-lakṣanās trayo hetavaḥ / yathā ’gnir atra dhūmāt / vrkṣo ’yam śiṃśapātvāt / Gno (1960: 2); svabhāvaḥ […] yathā vrkṣo ’yam śiṃśapātvād iti / kāryam yathā vahnir atra dhūmād iti / Desai (1991: 52).

14 This has been done in Gorisse 2015.

15 asty atra dehini buddhir vyāhāra-ādeḥ / Translated by Ghoshal (1940: 128).

16 asty atra chāyā chatrāt / Ibid.

17 This discussion exceeds the aim of this paper. Let me just indicate that Māṇikyanandi, as well as Naiyāyika philosophers, will counter-attack Dharmakīrti by offering a more finely grained definition of a ‘cause’ as being what already consists of the totality of conditions needed for the emergence of the effect. In other words, as what already ensures that the pre-requisite that nothing is blocking its potency is fulfilled. Since this conception implies that the effect is already present when the cause is being investigated, both conceptions actually agree.
2.2.1. What is an incompatible (viruddha) evidence?

In all Dharmakīrti’s examples, something is incompatible with the target-property if it is its precise contrary. For example, “constant” (dhruva) is incompatible with “inconstant” (adhruva), or “cold” (śīta-sparśa) with “fire/heat” (agni). As far as pervasion and causality are concerned, Māṇikyanandi also uses contraries to illustrate incompatibility. But when it comes to succession, a property recognised as being incompatible with the target-property is not necessarily its contrary. For example, the present rising of the star Revatī is recognised as being incompatible with the rising of the star Rohiṇī in a muhūrta,18 because Revatī is the group of stars in the constellation of Pisces which is the last group of stars to rise in the sky. And in this way, it is impossible for Rohiṇī to rise after it:

PM.3.75. Rohiṇī won’t rise in a muhūrta, because Revatī has just risen.19

As a consequence, at least for Māṇikyanandi and his commentators, what is incompatible with the target-property is “anything whose presence prevents the presence of the target-property.” This being understood, the types of incompatible evidence which ensure inferential knowledge are exactly the same types of evidence as in the previous form. In Māṇikyanandi’s words:

PM.3.71. In the case of negation [of the thesis], the types of cognition of evidence incompatible [with the target-property] are the same [as the types of cognition of evidence compatible with the target-property in the case of affirmation of the thesis].20

To state it in an explicit way, a property pervaded by something incompatible with the target-property, an effect, a cause, a predecessor or a successor of something incompatible with the target-property, as well as a property co-existent with something incompatible with the target-property, all these are correct evidence of the absence of the target-property. In PM.3.72, the example “there is no feeling of cold here, because there is warmth”21 is found. In this example, warmth is a species of heat, which is incompatible with cold.

This form of inference with negative conclusions is a means to know absences. As such, it should interest Dharmakīrti. And indeed, he recognizes as correct evidence two types which belong to this form, namely the cognition of a property pervaded by something incompatible with the target-property and the cognition of an effect of something incompatible with the target-property.22 The example presented in NB.2.36 is not the same as that found in PM.3.72: the disappearance of a being – even of one that has come into

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18 A muhūrta is a unit of measurement in classical Indian astrology, representing approximately 48 minutes.
19 na-udeṣyati muhūrta-ante śakatam revatya-udayat / Ghoshal (1940: 130). Śakatam (the Chariot) is another name for Rohiṇī (the Rising one). Its Arabic name is Aldebaran (the Follower), because its rise follows the one of the famous Pleiades. Concerning Revatī, it means “the Prosperous.”
21 na asty atra śīta-sparśa ausṣyāt / Ghoshal (1940: 129).
22 See paragraph 1.4 of this paper.
being – is not inevitable, because it requires a further cause.\textsuperscript{23} In this example, “requiring a further cause” is pervaded by “being evitable;” and the properties of “being evitable” and of “being inevitable” are incompatible ones. As for the cognition of an effect of something incompatible with the target-property, the example in NB.2.35 is the same as that found in PM.3.73, namely “there is no feeling of cold, because there is smoke here.”\textsuperscript{24} Here, “being endowed with smoke” is an effect of “being endowed with fire/heat;” and the properties of “being endowed with heat” and of “being endowed with cold” are incompatible ones.

To sum up, Māṇikyanandi accepts the same six types of evidence for the first and for the second form of an inference. In the same way, my presentation of Dharmakīrti’s theory indicates that he accepts pervaded (\textit{vyāpta})\textsuperscript{25} properties and effects of a given target-property as sufficient evidence to infer its absence, as he did in the affirmative form. This means that here again, the Buddhist and the Jain tradition disagree on the status of the cause, since Māṇikyanandi recognizes the cause as correct evidence, as in PM.3.74 “there is no happiness in this creature, because it has grief,”\textsuperscript{26} whereas for Dharmakīrti, only the effect, and not the cause, can serve as incompatible evidence to infer an absence:

\begin{quote}
PV.1.5. The cognition of the causal conditions of what is incompatible with that [property which is to be established] is erratic when used when there is no incompatibility between the causal conditions [of the property to be disestablished and the property that is incompatible with it].

PVS.V.1.5.1. For example, [a bad inference based on this kind of erratic sign is]: because there is firewood here, there is no feeling of cold.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

In other words, it is not sufficient to know the presence of the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property in order infer the absence of the latter, because something might block the potency of the cause. On the contrary, knowing the presence of what is incompatible with the cause of a given target-property is sufficient in order to infer the absence of the latter, since it cannot be present without its cause.\textsuperscript{28} First, Māṇikyanandi is avoiding this problem, since in PM.3.74 he provides with an example of the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property, which turns out to be also what is incompatible with the cause of this target-property. Second, the discrepancies between the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property and what is incompatible with the cause of this target-property calls for another type of non-cognition evidence, as we will see in the next paragraph.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] \textit{viruddha-vyāpta-upalabdhir yathā na dhruva-bhāvī bhūtasya api bhāvasya vināśo hetv-antara-apekṣanād iti} / Desai (1991: 71).
\item[25] The difference between natural property (\textit{svabhāva}) and pervaded (\textit{vyāpta}) will be considered in the section on non-cognition.
\item[26] \textit{na asmin śarīrinī sukham asti hṛdaya-śalyāt} / Ghoshal (1940: 130).
\item[28] In the next paragraph, examples of these types of inference will be considered and schemata will be provided.
\end{footnotes}
By the way, these complex inferential forms are not needed in this framework, since they can be dealt with thanks to transitivity. Indeed, when we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of the effect, and that we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of a property incompatible with the target-property, then we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of what is incompatible with the effect of this target-property. And Māṇikyanandi explicitly accepts transitivity when he writes:

PM.3.90. The pieces of evidence which arise one after the other should be included here (in this list).\(^{29}\)

### 2.2.2. Dharmakīrti’s extra type of incompatibility

If we go through the eleven types of non-cognition listed by Dharmakīrti in his NB, then we notice that he deals with a second type of incompatibility, in which what is at stake is not the effect, etc. of what is incompatible with the target-property, but rather what is incompatible with the effect, etc. of it. Strangely enough, Jain philosophers do not even mention this second type of incompatibility. In this type of form of inference, not two, but four sub-types depending on the type of evidence are granted by Dharmakīrti, namely what is incompatible with the target-property itself, what is incompatible with a pervader of it, what is incompatible with an effect of it and what is incompatible with a cause of it. Let us only consider the third situation of this list, namely what is incompatible with an effect of the target-property. This situation is interesting, because in NB.2.37, Dharmakīrti uses the example “there are no causes of cold whose potency is unimpeded here, because there is fire,”\(^{30}\) and this example is easily comparable to the one “there is no feeling of cold, because there is smoke here” he used in NB.2.35 for the effect of what is incompatible with the target-property. More precisely, let us draw a schemata representing the cause and effect of heat in the first line, and the cause and effect of cold in the second line. The elements in bold in this schemata are the ones being considered in NB.2.35:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Causes of fire} & \rightarrow \text{heat/fire} \rightarrow \text{smoke} \\
\text{Causes of cold} & \rightarrow \text{cold} \rightarrow \text{goose flesh}
\end{align*}
\]

Whereas NB.2.37 is concerned with the following elements:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Causes of fire} & \rightarrow \text{heat/fire} \rightarrow \text{smoke} \\
\text{Causes of cold} & \rightarrow \text{cold} \rightarrow \text{goose flesh}
\end{align*}
\]

By the way, it is interesting to notice that in the second example, there is the restriction “whose potency is unimpeded.” This means that in a normal case, the presence of a fire in a room is a sufficient sign for the absence of cold in this room. Another example using this restriction, is found in NB.2.32 on the occasion of a situation displaying non-cognition as evidence, namely: “there is no fire (lit., ‘causes of smoke’) whose potency has not been

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\(^{29}\) *paraṃ-parāyā sambhavat sādhanam atra eva antarbhāvanīyam* / Ghoshal (1940: 135).

\(^{30}\) *na iha apratibuddha saṃmarthyāni śīta-kāraṇāni santi vahner iti* / Desai (1991: 74).
obstructed, because there is no smoke.”
This example illustrates the fact that in a normal case, that is to say in a case in which no external parameter is blocking the spreading of the smoke, its absence is a sufficient sign for the absence of the fire.

As we explained, Dharmakīrti accepts four sub-types of such incompatible evidence. The extra two are due, first to the fact that he distinguishes between natural property (svabhāva) and pervaded property (vyāpta); and second, to the fact that he here accepts not only the effect, but also the cause, as correct evidence. These two differences are important ones. Since they are also present in the non-cognition type of evidence; and since Jain philosophers do not develop the second type of incompatibility, but develop the non-cognition one, we will investigate their importance when considering non-cognition.


The third form advocated by Māṇikyanandi is the one used to express inferences of the absence of a property from the non-cognition of appropriate pieces of evidence. This is non-cognition properly speaking. According to Māṇikyanandi, there are six types of evidence that ensure inferential knowledge in this form:

PM.3.78. In the case of negation [of the thesis], there are seven kinds of non-cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property], namely [the evidence can be the target-property] itself, a [property] pervading (vyāpaka) [it], an effect [of it], a cause [of it], a predecessor [of it], a successor [of it] or a [property] co-existent [with is].

Two main differences with the precedent forms are to be noticed. First, only a property pervading the target-property can function as correct evidence, whereas only a pervaded property could in the previous forms. The reason for this has been fully developed in 1.2.

The second difference from the previous forms is that “the target-property itself” is added to the list of correct evidence. Indeed, in reasonings aiming at inferring an absence from a non-cognition, knowledge is gained through the inference from “I do not know the presence of the target-property” to “I know that the target-property is absent.” But in the affirmative, nothing would have been gained through the inference from “I know the target-property” to “I know the target-property.” As for incompatibility, the situation is more complex and we need to come back to Dharmakīrti in order to understand what happens. In Dharmakīrti’s presentation, whereas he is speaking of natural property (svabhāva) in general for the first type of evidence, he distinguishes between svabhāva and vyāpaka in the situations involving non-cognition and cognition of incompatible properties. I have therefore translated svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhi by “cognition of [a property] incompatible with [the target-property] itself,” and vyāpaka-viruddha-upalabdhi by “cognition of [a property] incompatible with [a property] pervading [the target-property].” Now, we have seen that the two inferential forms involving incompatibility which are granted by Dharmakīrti are,
on one hand, cognition of a [property] pervaded by, etc. a [property] incompatible [with the target-property] and, on the other hand, cognition of a [property] incompatible with a [property] pervading, etc. [the target-property]. And when it comes to “[with the target-property] itself,” the difference between the two types of incompatibilities vanishes. This is probably the reason why Dharmakīrti, in NB.2.34 “there is no feeling of cold, because there is fire/heat,” has treated this type of evidence only one time, as an incompatible of the own nature of the target-property (and not as the own nature of something incompatible with it). This, in turn, might be what explains that “incompatible with the target-property itself” is not being considered as correct evidence in the second form by Jain philosophers either, since they do not consider at all the second type of incompatibility presented by Dharmakīrti.

Now that we have seen the two differences between this third form and the two previous ones in the Jain framework, let us consider Dharmakīrti’s conception on the matter. When it comes to the knowledge of absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of sufficient evidence for it, Dharmakīrti grants more types of properties that can function as sufficient inferential evidence than in the two previous forms. Indeed, non-cognition of the target-property itself, non-cognition of a property pervading it, non-cognition of an effect of it and non-cognition of a cause of it are all correct evidence to infer its absence. First, we have already said one word on the non-cognition of a property pervading the target-property (vyāpaka-anupalabdhi), for which NB.2.33 gives the same example as PM.3.80, namely “there is no Sissoo here, because there is no tree.” Second, we have also presented non-cognition of the target-property itself. In NB.2.31 the following example is found “[It is known that] there is no smoke here, because there is non-cognition of that which meets the conditions for cognition,” which is equivalent to the example in PM.3.79 “there is no pot here, because it is not known.” Third, concerning causality, something unexpected happens. More precisely, we are used to reading Dharmakīrti’s writings on the fact that an effect can be used as good evidence for the presence of its cause. We are less used to seeing him write that a cause may also be one. And yet, in NB.2.39 and PM.3.82, the inference of the absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of its cause (kāraṇa-anupalabdhi) is presented with the following correct example “there is no smoke, because there is no fire.” Second, the inference of the absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of its effect (kārya-anupalabdhi) is presented in NB.2.32 and PM.3.81 with the following correct example “there are no causes of smoke whose potentials are unimpeded here, because there is no smoke.” If we conceive negations as inverting the values, how then are we to give an account of the fact that Dharmakīrti accepts the non-

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33 svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhi yathā na atra śīta-sparśo vahner iti / In Desai 1991: 70.
36 na asty atra bhūtale ghato 'nupalabdheḥ / In Ghoshal 1940: 132.
37 na atra vahny agny-abhāvāt iti / In Desai 1991: 75. na asty atra dhūmo 'n-agneḥ / In Ghoshal 1940: 132.
cognition of the effect of a target-property as good evidence for its absence? Indeed, if only combinatorial purposes are intended, then:

\[ A \rightarrow B \text{ is equivalent to } \neg B \rightarrow \neg A^{39} \]

Therefore:

\[ K (\text{cause } x) \rightarrow K x^{40} \text{ is equivalent to } \neg K x \rightarrow \neg K (\text{cause } x) \]

Which, by definition of a cause and of an effect, is equivalent to:

\[ \neg K (\text{effect } x) \rightarrow \neg K x \]

It seems therefore suspicious to accept that the non-cognition of the effect of a target-property entails the knowledge of its absence, without accepting that the knowledge of the presence of the cause of a target-property entails the knowledge of its presence, as we have seen in 2.1. But if we have a closer look at Dharmakīrti’s refusal of the fact that cause constitutes correct evidence in the affirmative form, we see that the point of disagreement is elsewhere. Indeed, in his PVsV, Dharmakīrti accepts the following:

PVsV.1.7.1. For in that case, it is only the possibility of the effect’s arising from the complete cause that is inferred, because there is an inference of the aptitude of the collected [causes] to produce an effect. And the aptitude is dependent on nothing more than the totality [of causes], so it is only a virtual natural property (svabhāva-bhūta) that is inferred.\(^{41}\)

In other words, Dharmakīrti accepts that one is legitimised to infer the potentiality of the effect from the presence of its cause. Because when we deal with future events, we deal with potential phenomena, not actual ones, since “the beautifully coloured apple that showed promise of tasting sweet may turn out to have a bitter taste.”\(^{42}\) Therefore, Dharmakīrti rescued cause as good piece of evidence given appropriate restrictions. What he is saving in doing so is our ability to make predictions. Indeed, if cause could never be used as an evidence in order to infer its future effects, no prediction could be made by means of inference. And since inference and perception are the only two ways to acquire knowledge according to Buddhist philosophers, and since perception can be of no use in relation with future events, it would not have been possible for us to make predictions at all. And this, in turn, would have had bad consequences, especially for Buddhist soteriology. In conclusion, what Dharmakīrti does not accept is not that the causality relation is not symmetric, but that it is possible to speak about a future event as if it was an actual one. And since in the form exemplified by “there is no smoke, because there is no fire,” no knowledge of a

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\(^{39}\) “\(\neg B \rightarrow \neg A\)” is to be read “non B entails non A.”

\(^{40}\) “\(K \text{ cause } x\)” is to be read “knowledge of the presence of the cause of } x.”


\(^{42}\) Gillon and Hayes 1991: 69.
future event is concerned, there is no reason why it should not be accepted as a correct form of inference. In conclusion, also epistemological considerations and not only formal ones are here guiding Dharmakīrti’s choices. By the way, a possible explanation for the fact that Jain philosophers do not mention the second form involving incompatibility is that they are more concerned with formal considerations and that this is a form which, as far as the transmission of truth values is concerned, is redundant with the one involving non-cognition.


And finally, the last form advocated by Māṇikyanandi is the one used to infer the presence of a target-property from the non-cognition of evidence incompatible with it. In such a challenging form, inference can rely on only three types of evidence, namely the target-property itself, its cause and its effect. In Māṇikyanandi’s words:

PM.3.86. In the case of affirmation [of the thesis], there are three kinds of non-cognition of [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property], namely the non-cognition of [evidence] incompatible with [the target-property] itself, an effect [of it], or a cause [of it].

This last form involves both non-cognition and incompatibility. It is considered that such a combination of two negations entails an affirmation. In this form, one cannot draw as many types of correct inferences as in the other forms, because there exist situations in which “non-non-A” does not equal “A.” This is especially a problem for Jain philosophers, who considered the present rising of the star Revatī as being incompatible with the present rising of the star Rohinī. Let us take an intuitive example to see the problem: if Tuesday can be considered as non-Monday, then non-non-Monday may admittedly be Monday, but it might also be Wednesday, or any day of the week provided it is not Tuesday. Actually, the only way for “non-non-A” to be the equivalent of “A” is if “non-A” refers to the whole list of things that are non-A, and not only to one item of this list. To escape this problem, Māṇikyanandi deals only with predicates that divide the domain into two parts when he investigate this last form. More precisely, the example presented in PM.3.89 to illustrate the inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of something incompatible with it is the following one “all things possess several aspects, because something having only one aspect is never found.”

Second, the example presented in PM.3.87 to illustrate the inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of the effect of something incompatible with it is the following one “as for example, some disease exists in this animal, because the actions of a healthy body are not found.” And third, the example presented in PM.3.88 to illustrate the

43 viruddha-anupalabdhiḥ vidhau tredhā viruddha-kārya-kāraṇa-svabhāva-anupalabdhi-bhedāt / Ghoshal (1940: 133).
45 yathā asmin prāṇini vyādhi-viśeṣa asti nirāmaya-caeṣṭa-anupalabdheḥ / Ibid.
inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of the cause of something incompatible with it is the following one “there is pain in this individual, because he has no connection with his dear ones.”\footnote{asti atra dehini duḥkham iṣṭa-saṃyoga-abhāvāt / Ibid.} In these three examples, the incompatible properties are, respectively, unique/non-unique (ekāntasvarūpa/anekāntasvarūpa), healthy/non-healthy (āmaya/nirāmaya) and happiness/unhappiness (sukham/duḥkham). That is to say, couples of contraries whose contrary nature is reflected already in the grammatical formation of the words. In this way, there is no third option. Someone is either happy or unhappy. In consequence, in this framework not-unhappy is happy, and nothing else.

As for Dharmakīrti, we have seen that his aim in PVsV is to give an account on the means to know absences by means of inference. From this, it is only natural that this form leading to an affirmative conclusion did not receive his attention in this passage.

3. Conclusion

After having compared the way non-cognition is involved in the inferential process in the Buddhist and in the Jain traditions, I would like to summarize their main points of divergence, as well as to address the consequences of these divergences.

First, Dharmakīrti considers non-cognition as a type of evidence employable to infer the absence of a normally perceptible entity, and Akālanaṇa extends this conception to non-perceptible entities as well. In distinction to this, Māṇikyanandi and his commentators consider non-cognition mainly as a negative premise in the stated form of an inference, without being specifically concerned with the possibility to know that something is absent thanks to inference. In this new dynamic, non-cognition is introduced only in the section on inference for others, whereas Dharmakīrti introduced it already in the section on inference for oneself. In other words, the concern on non-cognition in Jainism lies more in the fact that its linguistic counterpart is a negation, that is to say as a linguistic device usable to reverse the truth value of a sentence.

The second line of divergence concerns the forms of inference involving non-cognition on which each tradition focuses. Only Dharmakīrti distinguishes between the cognition of a property incompatible with the effect of the target-property and the cognition of the effect of a property incompatible with the target-property. It is interesting to notice that the first type of incompatibility is strictly equivalent to non-cognition as far as the transmission of truth values is concerned, which might be one explanation of the Jain disinterest for it. Conversely, only Māṇikyanandi is interested in the possibility of inferring the presence of the target-property from the non-cognition of a property incompatible with it since, again, Dharmakīrti here focuses on the possibility of inferring an absence.

The third important line of divergence between the two frameworks concerns the types of evidence that are active in inferences involving non-cognition. Whereas 11 forms of inference involving non-cognition are admitted in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu, 16 forms are admitted in Māṇikyanandi’s Parīksāmukham. First, this is due to the fact that Dharmakīrti rejects succession and coexistence as inferential evidence, therefore he also rejects non-cognition of succession and non-cognition of coexistence. Second, when it comes to the cognition of evidence incompatible with the target-property, which is considered by both
traditions as a type of non-cognition, Māṇikyanandi accepts to infer the absence of a given target-property, both from an effect incompatible with it and from a cause incompatible with it. As expected, Dharmakīrti accepts to infer the absence of a given target-property only from an effect incompatible with it. What is less expected is that he considers both the non-cognition of the cause and the non-cognition of the effect of a target-property as correct evidence for its absence. My hypothesis is that this is due to the fact that when the absence of a target-property is known thanks to the non-cognition of its effect or of its cause, no discourse on future event is involved; and that this was Dharmakīrti’s main objection concerning cause as correct inferential evidence. By the way, this is also probably one good explanation for the fact that the material implication used by contemporary logicians is not a good candidate to express in a formal way the relationship between the evidence-property and the target-property. Indeed, material implication has several properties, amongst which is symmetry, and this epistemological concern that no discourse should be made on future events prevents such a symmetry. Actually, in an attempt towards a formal representation of these theories, as many logical connectors as there are types of evidence would be needed.

I would like to stress the fact that these considerations are really at the junction between logic (recognition of certain patterns, and rules describing them, such as transitivity, types and functions of negations), epistemology (what a person can know) and argumentation (how to convince a given interlocutor).

In conclusion, this presentation is conceived as a first step for a more thorough analysis of the divergences between Jain and Buddhist conceptions of inference after Dharmakīrti. What would be especially useful, in relation to the conceptions of non-cognition in this line of analysis, would be to see if later Buddhist philosophers adopt a classification into different forms of inference; whether they drop the second type of incompatibility (viruddha-upalabdhi); whether they gain an interest in the non-cognition of properties incompatible with one another; or whether they state a rule of transitivity.

References and abbreviations


Bhattacharya 1967 See PNT.

Desai 1991 See NB.

Ghoshal 1940 See PM.


Gnoli 1960 See PV and PVsV.


Jain 1939  See LT.


PM  Māṇikyanandin’s *Parīkṣāmukham*, ed. and tr. S.C. Ghoshal. Lucknow 1940.


PV and PVsV  Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Chapter 1, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.


Shastri 1912  See PKM.
Universals, Demons’ Pots, and Demons’ Permanent Pots: Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Unestablished Subjects in Arguments by Consequence
by
Pascale Hugon

Introduction

According to Dharmakīrti, prasaṅga arguments – i.e., arguments that rely on a logical reason that is merely accepted by the opponent to draw an unacceptable conclusion – are legitimate means of proof provided that they are indicative of a correct, i.e., triply characterized, logical reason on which the reverse form of the prasaṅga (the prasaṅgaviparyaya) is based. The relevant passage of the Pramāṇavinīścaya (hereafter: PVin) has been subject to conflicting interpretations by Indian commentators who notably disagree about the nature of the example that Dharmakīrti gives in this context – namely, whether it is meant to illustrate a prasaṅga argument or its reverse form – and about the status to ascribe to the subject in this example – i.e., whether the subject “universal” is a real universal (as upheld by the intended addressee of the argument) or a non-entity (as accepted by the Buddhist proponent). The second point is crucial for the acceptance of the prasaṅga as a probative argument insofar as the validity of the reverse form would be threatened by the non-existence of the subject. Indeed, the non-existence of the subject would prevent the fulfillment of a required characteristic of the logical reason, being a property of the subject (pakṣadharma) – a fallacy known as that of the “unestablished basis” (āśrayāsiddha).

Whereas this fallacy allows the Buddhists to discard proofs by opponents upholding, for instance, the reality of space (ākāśa), primordial nature (pradhāna) or universals (sāmānya), it also threatens their own arguments aimed at the refutation of such pseudo-entities. The logical reason in the Buddhist proof would indeed also fail to satisfy the requirement of pakṣadharma. The status of the subject poses a similar problem in the...
Madhyamaka proof establishing the emptiness of all things,⁴ and also impacts arguments for the establishment of the negative entailment of logical reasons, typically in the proof of momentariness. Various answers to the problem of the unestablished basis have been developed in the Buddhist tradition.⁵ The question of the subject in the context of prasaṅga arguments was taken up in particular by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta.⁶

The present paper deals with the views on this topic of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169).⁷ Phya pa, as can be expected, was influenced by the discussions of Indian thinkers but he nevertheless came up with his own creative method to deal with this issue. The examination of his views also sheds light on later Tibetan developments that obviously heavily borrowed from his works. In what follows I examine Phya pa’s commentary on the prasaṅga passage of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (’Od zer 149a5–150b3) to establish his take on the question of the nature of Dharmakīrti’s example and on the status of the subject. I then situate his interpretation within the framework of his overall theory of arguments by consequence (thal ’gyur) – of which we find two parallel versions in his commentary on the PVin (’Od zer 145a2–149a5) (preceding his commentary on the prasaṅga passage) and in his epistemological summa (Mun sel 83a1–95b5) – and relate this issue to discussions relevant to the problem of the “unestablished basis” (āśrayāsiddha) in the broader context of inference.

Before turning to Phya pa’s view, it will be useful to provide some references to the solutions developed by Indian thinkers to the problem of the unestablished basis.

**Some methods developed by Indian thinkers to solve problems caused by unestablished subjects**

I refer the reader to Watanabe’s paper in this volume for a detailed discussion of the solutions developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their link to the context of prasaṅga, as well as for further references to primary and secondary literature. I list below (adopting Watanabe’s terminology) some solutions that will be mentioned in my discussion of Phya pa’s position:

**The ‘Method of Conceptual Subject’:** the actual or intended subject is the conceptual representation of the entity in question. This method is adopted by Dharmakīrti in the passage of PVin 3 dealing with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya’s primordial nature (to

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⁵ For a panorama see Iwata 1999 and Watanabe in this volume. For the views of specific authors see also Tillemans 1999, chap. 8, Tillemans and Lopez 1998, and the articles mentioned in n. 4.

⁶ In addition to Iwata 1993 and 1997a, see Watanabe’s paper in this volume, which discusses the various solutions to the problem of āśrayāsiddha developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their connection with prasaṅga arguments. I summarize some of them below.

⁷ Since the surfacing of eighteen of his works, the views of this thinker have been the subject of an increasing number of publications, so that a formal introduction may no longer be needed. For a recapitulation of the information available on his life and works the reader may refer to my “Compiled information on the life and works of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and bibliographical ressources,” which is available online at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/materials-for-the-study-of-phya-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ge-1109-1169/.
which I will refer as the “pradhāna passage”). The core idea can be traced to Dignāga’s discussion on the refutation of pradhāna in the Nyāyamukha, where he describes the subject as “imagined” (kalpita). Dharmakīrti makes clear in what way one can prove the non-existence of pradhāna without negating the subject in a way that would make the proof liable to a fallacy: what is being proven is not that the subject qua concept is inexistent, but that this concept does not have a real substratum. The concept itself is well established for both debaters and not liable to refutation. It is not actually the concept that is targeted by the discussion but the substratum (the entity) which, unlike the concept, is apt to fulfill some human goal.

The ‘Method of Paraphrase:’ the reasoning is reformulated in such a way that the actual subject is acceptable to the proponent. This idea, found in PV 4.136–148 in the commentary on the word svadharmin in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis in PS 3.2, is linked to the distinction between nominal subject (kevaladharmin) and actual subject (svadharmin) when discussing the fallacy of the non-established basis as a fallacy of the thesis. I will refer to this context as the “svadharmin passage.”

The ‘Method of Simple Negation:’ the attribution of negative properties does not require the subject to exist, so no fault occurs as long as the properties attributed to the non-existent subject are simple negations (prasajyapratiṣedha). This method was adopted by Dharmottara in the context of prasaṅga and by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi when discussing the svadharmin passage. Prajñākaragupta criticized this position, arguing that it does not resolve the fallacy of the unestablished subject because an inexistent subject cannot be qualified by any property whatsoever.

Iwata (1999) discerns two other methods found in the Madhyamaka works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla along with the Method of the Conceptual Subject and the Method of Simple Negation; they consist in taking the subject to be existent (i) as a convention (vyavahāra) and (ii) as an appearance. In Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṅkāra/vṛtti and in Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā one finds the idea that the verbal designations of the elements of the inference are based on a subject that appears in the cognition of both disputants – for instance for the subject “sound,” the appearance in the auditive cognition upon hearing a sound. In these texts the authors restrict the notion of “appearance” to the context of perception and do not deal with non-existent subjects such as pradhāna. The issue is mainly to avoid that the subject becomes unestablished when it is proven to be essenceless.

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8 PVin 3 67,4–70,6; Tib. P306a6, D208b3. This passage is parallel to PVSV 105,15–107,14. In both texts it is part of the anupalabdhi section. Verses PVin 3.53–54 = PV 1.205–206 are, however, frequently cited in discussions pertaining to the apoha theory.
9 Cf. PVin 3.54 = PV 1.206 and the auto-commentary. The property to be ascertained is thus not bhāva or abhāva but bhāvopādānatvalbhāvānupādānatva (cf. PVin 3 68,6–7: kim ayam pradhānāsabdapratibhāsy artho bhāvopādāno na veti).
10 Cf. PVin 3 68,7–8: tasya bhāvānupādānatvam sa dharmātva ca pratīyāmavedatvād apratikṣepārtho ’rtho dharmāḥ and 69,5: na tu purātratvam eva śabdvikalpapratiṣedhāḥ artho ’polnīyate.
12 See Iwata 1999: 165.
Kamalaśīla addresses the issue of the inexistent subject in his Madhyamakāloka. In this work he mainly invokes the Method of Simple Negation to deal with such subjects. But he also draws a parallel between the previous idea of positing as the subject a commonly shared appearance and the refutation of pradhāna in which one posits as a subject “something existing in the mind” (blo la yod pa nyid). Actually, the idea that the subject can be a mental appearance is well represented in the pradhāna passage of the PVin. Notably, in his prose commentary to PVin 3.53–54 Dharmakīrti reformulates the notion of the concept qua “object of words” (śabdārtha) in terms of “the object that appears to conceptual thought,” an appearance that emerges upon hearing a given word. This method is thus akin to the Method of Conceptual Subject but emphasizes the mental appearance of the concept rather than the nature of conceptual construction. I will refer to it in terms of ‘Method of Conceptual Appearance.’ As mentioned above, Dharmakīrti clearly indicated that the subject in this form is established for both disputants and not liable to refutation. Among Madhyamaka authors, Jñānagarbha similarly points out that appearances are not negated insofar as they are established to be experienced.

1. Phya pa on the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya

1.1. Phya pa’s interpretation of the example in the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya

In the prasaṅga passage of the PVin, Dharmakīrti introduces with the words “for example” (yathā) an argument against Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika opponents who accept the reality of universals. This argument is complex enough that one cannot avoid, for its very translation, relying on a commentarial interpretation. My tentative translation follows here the understanding of the role of various portions of the Sanskrit sentence by Dharmottara, an interpretation which is also adopted by Phya pa.

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14 The latter view is presented in the form of an objection by an Alīkākāravādin, but is accepted by Kamalaśīla. See the translation and notes in Keira 2004: 142–145 (objection) and 146–148 (reply).
15 See PVin 3.67,12–68,1 (ad.3.53): anādikālavāsanāprabhavavikalpabhairabhāsinam artham (Tib. rtog pa la snang ba’i don); PVin 3.69,5: sabdavikalpabhairabhāsy artho (Tib. sgra’i rnam par rtog pa la snang ba’i don); PVin 3.68,6–7: pradhānaśabdabhairabhāsy artho (Tib. gtso bo’i sgra las snang ba’i don).
16 See, for instance, the passage of the Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā and Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti translated in Keira 2004: 35–37.
17 A degree of interpretation is already present in the Tibetan translation by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and Parahitabhadra, which was the reference for Tibetan interpreters who relied on the Tibetan version of the PVin. In this regard one can note that the Tibetan version known to Phya pa, which one can partially reconstruct from his direct quotes of the text, occasionally differs from the version preserved in the canonical collections. The absence of corresponding direct quotes by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab leaves open the question of the original translation and whether it was Phya pa or the editors of the canon (or maybe both) who adopted a slightly modified version of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s translation.
18 Translations of the prasaṅga passage of the PVin can be found in Tani 1987 (in English) and Iwata 1997b (in German). See also Watanabe’s translation and his discussion in this volume. For the details of Dharmottara’s interpretation see Iwata 1993: 50 and Iwata 1997a: 429–430. I will present the details of Phya pa’s interpretation in a forthcoming paper.
A single thing that occurs in many because it is devoid of another essential property which is not characterized [as] mixed (or: which is not separate, due to being mixed) with a single instance determined in location, time and status, cannot be connected with something else that differs in location, etc.

(PVin 3 4.4–7: deśakālāvasthāviśeṣaniyataikadravyasaṃsargāvyavacchinnasvabhāvāntaravirahād anekavṛtter ekasya na deśādiśeṣavatānyena yogah)

Phya pa notably follows the broad lines of Dharmottara’s interpretation on the following points:

1. This example is taken to illustrate the reverse form of a prasaṅga (i.e., a prasaṅgaviparyaya);  
2. The portion marked as “…” represents the subject, that marked as “…” represents the logical reason of the prasaṅgaviparyaya, and that marked as “…” the property to be proven of the prasaṅgaviparyaya;  
3. The type of the logical reason of the prasaṅgaviparyaya consists in the non-apprehension of the pervader (vyāpakānupalabdhi);  
4. The type of the logical reason of the prasaṅga is an essential property (svabhāva).

When commenting on this passage of the PVin, Dharmottara and Phya pa also similarly reformulate the subject, logical reason and property to be proven (respectively, the derived conclusion), as indicated in the schematic representation provided below.  

A universal does not occur in many, because it is not multiple.

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19 Iwata (1993: 50) notes that this interpretation is shared by Jñānaśrībhadra, Bu ston and Gyalshab Dar ma rin chen. This interpretation qualifies as counter-intuitive insofar as the topic of discussion in this passage of the PVin is prasaṅga. One would thus expect the example introduced by the expression “for example” to illustrate a prasaṅga, not a prasaṅgaviparyaya. The option that Dharmakīrti exemplifies a prasaṅga is considered by Prajñākaragupta and, reportedly, by Vinītadeva and Sāntabhadra. The ascription to these two authors of alternative interpretations (which are discussed by Dharmottara) of Dharmakīrti’s example as a prasaṅga is made by Bu ston (Iwata 1993: 51) and found also in an anonymous interlinear note in the manuscript of Zhang Thang sag pa’s dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka (Yoshimizu and Nemoto 2013: 58). Phya pa ascribes the first alternative interpretation to Vinītadeva, the second to Prajñākaragupta.

20 Dharmottara’s reformulation of the prasaṅgaviparyaya is as schematized in Iwata 1993: 42. The reformulation of its logical reason as na cānekam is found in PVInṬ-Skt 7a5. In PVInṬ-Skt 6b3 Dharmottara speaks of the logical reason and the property to be proven in terms of “the absence of the pervader ‘multiplicity’” (vyāpakānātavabhāva) and the “absence of the pervaded property ‘occurrence in many’” (vyāpasyānekavṛttitvasyābhāva). For Dharmottara’s formulation of the prasaṅga, see PVInṬ-Skt 6a1: sāmānyāder anekavṛttitva iste nekatvam aniṣṭam āsaṃjyate and PVInṬ-Skt 7a5: yad anekadesādiyṛt tad anekam tathā ca sāmānyam ity anekam syān. For Phya pa’s reformulation see ’Od zer 149a6–7: spyi geig gsal ba du ma dang ’brel par kun brtags pas du mar thal zhes bsgrub pa thal bar bsgrub pa’o ’i dets rang rgyud gang ’phun ’che na / du mas stong pas du ma dang ’brel pas stong zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa ’phun te /
which is induced by the prasaṅga (not stated by Dharmakīrti):

Because (according to you) a universal occurs in many, it follows that it is multiple.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>prasaṅga</th>
<th>Dharmottara</th>
<th>Phya pa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>universal</td>
<td>sāmānyādi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>occurrence in many</td>
<td>anekavṛttitva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derived property</td>
<td>multiplicity</td>
<td>anekatva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dharmakīrti’s example (= prasaṅgaviparyaya)

| Subject                   | universal   | sāmānya     | spyi cig |
| Reason                    | non-multiplicity | na...aneka = anekatvābhāvanātrā, nānātvābhāva | du mas stong pa |
| Property to be proven in many | *na anekavṛttitva, anekavṛttitvasyābhāva | du ma dang 'brel pas stong, gsal ba du ma dang ma 'brel ba |

1.2 Phya pa on the subject “universal” in Dharmakīrti’s example

A key issue in Dharmakīrti’s example is the nature of the subject “universal.” Indeed, the Buddhist proponent does not accept the reality of universals and the non-existence of the subject would threaten the validity of the logical reason in the reverse form: the fault of “non-establishment of the basis” (āśrayāsiddha) could be invoked. The case under consideration is typical of the drawbacks of the fallacy of the unestablished basis, which Buddhist scholars have attempted to palliate through various methods.

In the prasaṅga passage of the PV in the question of the subject arises indirectly in an objection pointing out that the logical reason of the prasaṅga is unestablished (asiddha), i.e., it does not satisfy the first characteristic of a correct reason – being a property of the subject (pakṣadharmanā). This, is, according to Dharmottara, because the Buddhist proponent does not accept that “a universal occurs in many” insofar as he does not accept that universals exist in the first place. Although here the non-establishment of the logical reason is a consequence of the non-existence of the subject, the argument appears to be hinting at a more general issue: in any proper prasaṅga, whether the subject is accepted to be existent by both debaters or not, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason is only accepted by the opponent and corresponds to the opposite of what the proponent wishes to establish. Accordingly, in my understanding, Dharmakīrti’s answer does not touch on the

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21 See PV in 3.5,1–6,1: nanu tathāpy asiddhir hetoh... and PV inṬ-Skt 8a6: bauddho hi sāmānyābhāvavāde sthitāḥ prasaṅgasādhanam āha / taddārayāsiddhaṁ asaṅgam anekavṛttitvam nāma hetuh /

22 For instance, in the proof of the presence of fire on a hill where smoke is perceived via the prasaṅga “if there were (as you claim) no fire on the hill, there would be no smoke,” the status of the ‘hill’ is not
way to deal with an inexistent subject, but first of all invokes the indeterminacy that should prevail in an inquiry pertaining to a given subject. In the given argument, the “universal” should not be taken either as “the Buddhists’ universal” or “the Naiyāyika/Vaiśeṣika’s universal.” Further, Dharmakīrti points to the hypothetical nature of the pakṣadharmaṭva in the prasaṅga – it is not something that is required to be established by a valid cognition as it is in a direct proof.

The discussion in this context revolves solely around the prasaṅga. The question of the subject in the reverse form is not addressed by Dharmakīrti, thus leaving the interpreters free to opt for their preferred scenario on this point. Dharmottara applied the Method of Simple Negation in this context (Iwata 1997a: 430). While Phya pa follows the major lines of Dharmottara’s interpretation of the prasaṅga passage and, like Dharmottara, identifies the logical reason and the property to be proven in the prasaṅgaviparyaya as simple negations (using the formulation “void of...”), he does not invoke this as a solution to the potential problem of the unestablished subject. His solution is not influenced by Prajñākaragupta either.

Phya pa’s solution, when commenting on the prasaṅga passage, is to appeal conjointly to the Method of Conceptual Subject and the Method of Conceptual Appearance, both of which find support in the pradhāna passage of the PVin.

The Method of Conceptual Appearance stands out notably in his commentary on the passage of the PVin referred to above discussing a potential non-establishment of the logical reason:

> When one investigates the nature of things, at the time of an initial examination of philosophical tenets, one has not [yet] accepted the Buddhist philosophical tenets and one does not accept the non-Buddhist tenets. Therefore one does not posit as a basis a universal that is either an entity or a non-entity. The mental appearance is the basis. Therefore, even though [the universal] is not controversial, but the “absence of fire on the hill” is not established for the proponent, who precisely aims at establishing the opposite.

23 Obviously it was a concern to ascribe legitimacy to an argument that had the same form as an inference-for-otherwise but whose logical reason did not satisfy the requirements of the former.

24 While it is doubtful that Phya pa would have been well acquainted with Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on the PV on a first hand basis, he might have known about his position via rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s commentarial work on the Pramāṇavārttika cum Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra or rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s discussion of prasaṅga in his larger PVin commentary (both works are currently not available to us). rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s explanation of the difficult points of the PVin (dKa’ gnas) does not offer a word commentary on the prasaṅga passage, but it explicitly enjoins the reader to follow Dharmottara’s interpretation and reject all others (dKa’ gnas 393). It is thus certain that rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s position did not match that of Prajñākaragupta. In his 1997a paper (433–435) Iwata evokes the possibility that Prajñākaragupta influenced the Tibetan classification of arguments by way of a consequence, in which a distinction is made between arguments in which the subject is non-established – i.e., those that are “non-probative” – and arguments in which it is established, i.e., that qualify as probative. This suggestion, however, must be rejected. The classification in question, whether that made by gTsang nag pa (considered in Iwata’s paper) or Phya pa (see below § 2.1), does not distinguish between two ways of dealing with the subject in a single given argument in the way Prajñākaragupta does, but rather distinguishes those arguments in which the subject is established by a valid cognition (for instance the subject “hill” when refuting the absence of fire) from those in which it is not (gTsang nag pa does not give an example – see § 2.3 for Phya pa’s example).
established as an entity for the Buddhist and is not established as a non-entity
for the non-Buddhist, this mere mental appearance is established for both.\textsuperscript{25}

As for the Method of Conceptual Subject, it is visible in Phya pa’s reference to the subject as
the “object of a word” (sgra don, Skt. śabdārtha), i.e., the concept,\textsuperscript{26} on the basis of which
the characteristic of the logical reason being a property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) is
established:

Our [i.e., the Buddhist’s] position is correct: That the pakṣadharmatva of
the logical reason ‘void of multiplicity’ for the object of the word [as it is]
accepted is established by reflexive awareness [is explained by Dharmakīrti]
in the passage “But the singular thing…” (PVin 6.6–7: ekasya tu…).\textsuperscript{27}

Phya pa’s commentary also refers the subject “the singular thing” as an object of the
word for which the property of “appearing as singular” can be established by reflexive
awareness.\textsuperscript{28}

Using this joint method Phya pa is able to guarantee the legitimacy of Dharmakīrti’s
example in spite of the problematic status of the subject “universal:” whether universals
exist in reality or not, debaters who use the term sāmānyya have a conceptual representation,
the appearance of which can be established by reflexive awareness and cannot be refuted.

The Method of Conceptual Appearance and/or Conceptual Subject is successful when
dealing with cases where the author wants to avoid the fallacy of the unestablished basis. But
such a method appears to have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, if all verbal expressions
generate conceptual representations and just any conceptual representation may qualify as
being “established” insofar as its appearance can be established by reflexive awareness, there
should be no unestablished bases, and hence no occasion for the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha to
arise.\textsuperscript{29} However, as I discuss in what follows, Phya pa preserves this fallacy in the context
of inference-for-oneself, and the requirement that the subject must be established also
plays a role in the identification of probative consequences (i.e., instances of arguments by
consequence whose features correspond to Dharmakīrti’s understanding of a legitimate
prasaṅga).

\textsuperscript{25} ’Od zer 150b2–3: shes bya’i gnas lugs dpyad nas (read: na) grub mtha’ gzod tshol ba’i dus su sangs
rgyas pa’i grub mha’ khas blangs pa myed la / mu ste gs pa’i grub mha’ khas myi len pas spyi dngos po
dang dngos med gzhir ma bkod de blo snang gzhis yin pas dngos por sangs rgyas pa la ma grub la
dngos myed du mu ste gs pa la ma grub kyang blo snang tsam de gnyi’ ga la grub po zhes pa’o lī

\textsuperscript{26} One may note that Phya pa does not use the term “concept” (don spyi) in this context. Cf. n. 65.

\textsuperscript{27} ’Od zer 150a9: rang gi lugs la ’thad pa ni khas blangs pa’i sgra don la du mas stong pa’i phyogs chos
rang rig pa’i shugs la grub pa […] gcig la ni zhes pa […].

\textsuperscript{28} ’Od zer 149a7: chos can ni du ma la yod pa’i gcig po ste gcig du snang pa’i chos sgra don la yod
par rang rig pa’i shugs la grub pa’o / The establishment of the properties of “unicity” and “void of
multiplicity” by reflexive awareness evoked in these passages stands out in a more detailed way in the
portion of Phya pa’s excursus on arguments by consequence dealt with in § 3.

\textsuperscript{29} This is not to say that other fallacies would not arise, allowing the Buddhist to criticize his opponent’s
proof.
2. Unestablished subjects in Phya pa’s theory of argumentation by consequence

2.1 Phya pa’s classification of arguments by consequence

Phya pa’s theory of arguments by consequence includes a much broader range of arguments than the type of prasaṅga taken into account by Dharmakīrti as a legitimate argument. According to Phya pa, arguments by consequence include any argument of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q.” A distinction is then made between genuine (rnal ma) arguments by consequence and fallacious ones (ltar snang). Fallacious consequences are to be understood as “non-pertinent.” They are arguments to which the opponent is able to retort that he does not accept the premises – he does not accept that S is P and/or that everything that is P is Q, in which case he is not bound to accept the conclusion “therefore S is Q” – or is able to retort that he accepts the conclusion (S is Q), which the proponent intended to be ‘absurd’ or at least unacceptable for the opponent. If the opponent is unable to retort, the consequence is qualified as “genuine.” Genuine consequences are then divided into probative and non-probative consequences. Only the first type, in which Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga is to be included, amounts to an inference-for-others that proves something. The logical reason of its reverse form satisfies the triple characteristic (traitrūpya) – put shortly, the qualification of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) and the pervasion (vyāpti) are ascertained by a valid cognition.

2.2 The definition of a probative consequence

Phya pa gives as a definition of a probative consequence:

The indication of a logical reason pertaining to a subject in the context such that the pervasion is determined by a valid cognition and the explicit conclusion is eliminated by a valid cognition.

This definition brings two requirements to the fore. For a consequence of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” to be probative,

(a) the pervasion of the consequence (P is pervaded by Q) must be established by a valid cognition;
(b) the derived conclusion (S is Q) must be eliminated by a valid cognition.

30 For an overview of Phya pa’s theory of argumentation by consequence see Hugon 2013. As I make clear in this paper (675–676), the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” is a reference to a consequence statement, which should not be confused with the actual consequence statement, that typically should have the form “all that is P is Q, S is P.”
31 This classification of consequences and the various issues linked with it are analyzed in details in Hugon 2016.
32 Mun sel 90a9–b1, ‘Od zer 146b6: skabs su bab pa’i chos can la dngos kyi dam bca’ (Mun sel sgrub bya, to be emended to dam bca′) la tshad ma salsal pa dang l khyah pa tshad mas nges pa’i rtags ston pa’o il
33 Note that this definition does not include any explicit requirement pertaining to the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the consequence (i.e., to the premise “S is P”). Phya pa disagrees in this regard with some of his predecessors. See below n. 44. But according to Phya pa’s gloss of the terms of
These requirements guarantee that the reverse form of the consequence, which has the form “Since S is not Q, it is not P,” is a correct proof: (a) guarantees that its pervasion (not Q is pervaded by not P) is established, (b) guarantees that its logical reason qualifies the subject (S is not Q).

There is no explicit requirement pertaining to the establishment of the subject in this definition nor is there any mention of this issue in Phya pa’s gloss of the individual terms. Only in a later section of the Mun sel does one finds the mention that the expression used in this definition for the subject, i.e., “property-possessor” (chos can), implies that the basis is established by a valid cognition.34 This requirement is otherwise highlighted in Phya pa’s classification of arguments by consequence.35

Why is the establishment of the subject required? From the point of view of the reverse form, it is required in order to avoid the fallacy of the “unestablished subject,” which would affect the characteristic of pakṣadharmatva of the “root logical reason.” From the point of view of the consequence, the non-establishment of the subject does not affect its qualification by the logical reason, because the premise “S is P” merely needs to be accepted by the opponent.36 But it can affect the negation of the conclusion of the consequence, so that the requirement (b) present in the definition of a probative consequence will not be fulfilled.

2.3 Example of a consequence failing to be probative due to an unestablished subject

In his classification of consequences Phya pa adduces the following example to illustrate the category of arguments by consequence that fail to be probative because of the non-establishment of the subject:

(1) “Because an ultimate entity is produced, it follows that it is impermanent.”

The reverse form of this consequence would be:

(1’) “Since an ultimate entity is not impermanent, it is not produced”

According to Phya pa, the pakṣadharmatva of (1’) fails to be established. Indeed, one cannot establish that “an ultimate entity is not impermanent” due to the non-establishment of the subject “ultimate entity.” This is in line with his take on unestablished subjects when discussing inference-for-oneself. There Phya pa lists seven cases where the qualification

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34 Mun sel 91a7–8: chos can zhes pas gzhi la lta bu tshad mas grub par bstn “With the word ‘property-possessor’ one indicates that a basis such as ‘a mountain pass’ is established by a valid cognition.”
35 For the details see Hugon 2016.
36 Phya pa seldom uses the term phyogs chos (the Tibetan rendering of pakṣadharmatva) for this feature in the argument by consequence. He just speaks of “the nature of the reason being established” or “the reason being established.” See Hugon 2013: 679.
of the subject” (phyogs chos) is not fulfilled for the logical reason.\(^{37}\) The first three are due to the subject (or basis):

i. Unfounded basis (gzhī gtan med pa), for instance, ‘ultimate sound’ or a ‘self consisting in a pudgala’;\(^{38}\)

ii. Basis not ascertained by valid cognition (gzhī tshad mas ma nges pa), for instance, ‘a demon’s pot’ or ‘a nymph’s song;’

iii. Basis with regard to which there is no desire to know (gzhī la shes ’dod med pa), for instance, ‘sound’ when proving audibility.

The first two are relevant to the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha (even though Phya pa does not use the corresponding term gzhi ma grub here). Phya pa does not explain in detail the distinction between (i) and (ii), but a passage in the discussion pertaining to demons’ pots in the context of arguments by consequence suggests that instances of the second category are things that may exist, but whose existence cannot be known to (human)\(^{39}\) cognizers.\(^{40}\)

The subject of the consequence (1) under consideration (“ultimate entity”) would fit into the first category: “unfounded basis” by analogy with the example ‘ultimate sound.’ In the section on inference, the subject is posited as something that the proponent wants to prove to be impermanent via the logical reason ‘produced.’\(^{41}\) In the reverse form of the consequence (1’), however, both the property to be proven and the logical reason are simple negations. This does not prevent the non-establishment of pakṣadharmanavac: Phya pa rejects the possibility that an unestablished subject may be qualified by any property whatsoever, even a simple negation. We can note here a major difference to Dharmottara and other proponents of the Method of Simple Negation.

If the non-establishment of the subject “ultimate entity” affects the establishment of pakṣadharma, it does not prevent the elimination of the conclusion of the consequence by a valid cognition. According to Phya pa, it is possible to refute that “ultimate entity is impermanent.” This is achieved by way of negating the conjunction of ultimate entity and impermanent (mi rtag pa don dam pa’i dngos po dang tshogs pa khegs). To do so, one considers the fact that what is produced is pervaded by impermanence, which is itself pervaded by emptiness. There can thus be no connection between impermanence and something outside the range of what is empty, such as an ultimate entity; hence

\(^{37}\) See Mun sel 46a3–5, ‘Od zer 84b6–7.

\(^{38}\) In Mun sel 28.1a6, the “unfounded definitional basis” (mtshan gzhi gtan med pa) is similarly responsible for the fault of “impossible definiens” (mi srid pa’i mtshan nyid). It is exemplified by the definitional basis “permanent pot” to which someone applies the definiens “causally active” to define it as real.

\(^{39}\) Possibly demons can see their own pots and nymphs can hear their own songs.

\(^{40}\) Cf. ‘Od zer 147a4: rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa dang spyi gcig po’i dngos po chos can du byed na gzhi de dag myed pa dang yod kyang shin du lkog du gyur pas de la ’jug pa’i tshad mas dam bca’ la bsal pa myed pa bden pa zhig na /

\(^{41}\) This is the case for the other examples of (i) and (ii) also. The formal applications mentioned here are (i) “Ultimate sound is impermanent because it is produced” (don dam pa’i sgra byas pa’i phyir mi rtag), or “A self consisting in a pudgala is impermanent because it is produced” (gang zag gi bdag gzhir byas te byas pas myi rtag pa bsgrub pa lta bu’o); (ii) “A demon’s pot is impermanent because it is produced” (sha za’i bum pa byas pa’i phyir mi rtag), or “A nymph’s song is impermanent because it is produced” (dri za’i dbyangs chos can du byas te byas pas myi rtag pa bsgrub pa lta bu’o).
one can negate the association of these two. But this does not amount to establishing *pakṣadharmaṭva*. Phya pa holds (contra to some of his predecessors) that *pakṣadharmaṭva* must consist in the attribution of a property (here consisting in a simple negation) to a basis. In dealing with this example, he thus acknowledges a difference between *pakṣadharmaṭva* and the elimination of the conclusion. The distinction amounts to the one we may draw in terms of “internal negation” and “external negation” when considering the form of the elimination of the conclusion and that of the *pakṣadharmaṭva*:

| Consequence: Because S is P, it follows that it is Q | Elimination of the conclusion = it is not the case that S is Q |
| Reverse form: Since S is not Q, it is not P | *Pakṣadharmaṭva* = S is not Q |

The distinction mostly goes unnoticed in the formulation of the examples in Tibetan: apart from the context where Phya pa speaks of “negation of the conjunction,” the formulation of the elimination of the conclusion in examples is not usually distinguished from that of the *pakṣadharmaṭva*. And the distinction is not actually crucial since apart from cases involving a non-existent subject, the two features are either both ascertained or both not ascertained by a valid cognition. For instance, a hill is either a thing-with-smoke or a thing-without-smoke. By eliminating, for instance by a perception, the conclusion “there is no smoke on the hill” that derives from the acceptance that there is no fire, one also warrants the establishment that “there is smoke on the hill.”

### 2.4 Comparison of four examples of consequences with potentially unestablished subjects

It would obviously be problematic if Dharmakīrti’s example were to fall into the same category as case (1) due to the nature of the subject “universal.” We have already seen in § 1.2 that the Method of Conceptual Appearance would enable Phya pa to ‘save’ this case. In what follows, I will consider two further examples of consequences with problematic subjects in an attempt to establish whether there is a criterion that directs the application or non-application of this method.

Altogether, there are four examples of consequences in Phya pa’s excursus that are relevant to the question of the subject. The first is case (1) considered above; the fourth corresponds to Dharmakīrti’s example. I list below their constitutive elements and those of their putative reverse form. Note that all four examples are genuine consequences –

42 Mun sel 85b4–5: *dang po ni don dam pa’i dngos po byas pa yin no zhes smra ba la don dam pa’i dngos po byas pa’i phyir mi rtag par thal lo zhes brjod pa na byas pa la mi rtag pas khyab pa tshad mas nges la mi rtag pa la stong pa nyid khyab pa nges pas mi rtag pa stong pa nyid kho na la yod par nges pas don dam pa’i dngos po dang tshogs pa khogs pas dam bca’ la tshad mas bsal yang gzhi don dam pa’i dngos po nyid med pas de la mi rtag pas stong pas byas pas stong zhes pa ‘phen mi nus pa yin no //

43 Curiously, the question of the subject is not pointed out in Mun sel in the discussion on “correspondence” (*gnad cig*) preceding the classification of arguments by consequence, where Phya pa establishes that the negation of the conclusion of the consequence and the *pakṣadharmaṭva* of the reverse form are either both established or both not established. In ’Od zer it appears in an interlinear note that, to my opinion, represents a later addition to the text. See Hugon 2016 for the details.
arguments to which the opponent is unable to retort. It must therefore be granted that the opponent accepts the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the consequence and does not agree with the derived property that comes to be ascribed to the subject. In all four cases the pervasion must be taken to be established by a valid cognition for both debaters.

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>ultimate entity</td>
<td>demon’s pot</td>
<td>demon’s permanent</td>
<td>singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>produced</td>
<td>existent</td>
<td>existent</td>
<td>linked with multiple instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Derived property</strong></td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reverse form</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>ultimate entity</td>
<td>demon’s pot</td>
<td>demon’s permanent</td>
<td>singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>void of impermanence</td>
<td>void of impermanence</td>
<td>void of imperman-</td>
<td>void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Property to be proven</strong></td>
<td>void of being produced</td>
<td>void of existence</td>
<td>void of existence</td>
<td>void of link with multiple instances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first sight these four cases look very similar:

1. They are all consequences that a Buddhist could put forward to refute an opponent and/or negate in a proactive way the attribution of a property.
2. In all four cases the subject appears to be non-established. In particular, in Phya pa’s discussion of pakṣadharmatva in the inference-for-oneself, ‘demon’s pot,’ the subject of (2), is mentioned as an instance of a basis that is not established by a valid cognition, and ‘ultimate entity,’ the subject of (1), is akin to the example illustrating an unfounded basis. Note that the distinction between these two types of unestablished basis does not play a role in the section on arguments by consequence: Phya pa does not differentiate in this context between bases that are termed “not determined by valid cognition” (tshad mas nges pa med pa), “unfounded” (gtan myed pa), or simply “not established” (gzhi ma grub).
3. The logical reason and the derived property of the consequence are positive properties, whereas the logical reason and the property to be proven of the reverse form have the form of a simple negation. As we have seen in the analysis of case (1), this is not a feature that justifies the application of the property to an unestablished subject.
4. Hence in all four cases one can expect that pakṣadharmatva is not established, so that the reverse form is not correct.

But Phya pa treats these four cases very differently: (3) and (4) are held to be probative consequences, while (1) and (2) are held to be non-probative due to a failure to establish
paṇḍadharma in the reverse form. Further, (1) and (2) differ as to the possibility of eliminating the conclusion of the consequence.

The difference between the four cases in terms of elimination of the conclusion and establishment of the paṇḍadharma of the reverse form can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elimination of the conclusion</th>
<th>Establishment of the paṇḍadharma of the reverse form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Rejection of the conjunction of impermanence and ultimate entity</td>
<td>✓ Establishment that an ultimate entity is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Refutation that the demon’s pot is impermanent</td>
<td>✗ Establishment that a demon’s pot is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Refutation that the demon’s permanent pot is impermanent</td>
<td>✓ Establishment that a demon’s permanent pot is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Refutation that the singular universal is multiple</td>
<td>✓ Establishment that a singular universal is void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is understandable that Phya pa would want (4) to be probative since it is the case discussed in the prasaṅga passage of the PVin. But what distinguishes it from (1) and (2)? Can the method adopted for (4) in the commentary on the prasaṅga passage not also be applied to (1) and (2)? And further, what distinguishes (2) from (3)?

(2) “Because the demon’s pot is (according to you) existent, it follows that it is impermanent.”

The second example (2) appears in two contexts in the Mun sel (there is no parallel for the second context in the ‘Od zer). In the first Phya pa uses this example to refute the definition of probative consequence given by other scholars in terms of “qualification of the subject merely accepted by the opponent and pervasion established by a valid cognition,” 44 in the second he argues that his own definition of probative consequence (which he inherits from rNgog Blo ldan shes rab) does not allow for the inclusion of this case. 45

The main argument in both discussions revolves around the fact that the conclusion of the consequence “the demon’s pot is impermanent” cannot be eliminated by a valid cognition. 46 As we have seen in case (1), the non-establishment of the subject does not necessarily prevent the elimination of the conclusion – there may be a way to negate the conjunction of the subject and the derived property. But no similar solution is offered here.

The failure to satisfy the feature of elimination of the conclusion disqualifies this example from being probative according to Phya pa’s definition, which includes it as a

44 Mun sel 90a7–9; ‘Od zer 146b4–6. Their definition, he argues, would lead them to include this case among “probative consequences,” whereas it cannot be so. The discussion has a precedent in rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s dKa’ gnas 385.
45 Mun sel 91b3.
46 The formulation in Mun sel is sha za’i bum pa mi rtag pa la tshad ma’i gnod pa med pa; in ’Od zer on the other hand, the formulation matches rather that of the paṇḍadharma of the reverse form: myi rtag pas stong par tshad mas ma nges pa.
necessary criterion. For other scholars who do not include it in the definition, this failure may threaten the consequence to become fallacious. Indeed, unless the opponent is convinced of the permanence of demons’ pots, he is likely to retort that he accepts the derived conclusion that the demon’s pot is impermanent. The consequence would hence not even be genuine.

As a final blow, Phya pa points out that the logical reason of the reverse form would be unestablished (rtags ma grub). Although it is not specified explicitly what makes the reason unestablished, the fallacy of the non-established basis is a likely candidate as it was in (1).

(3) “Because the demon’s permanent pot is existent, it follows that it is impermanent.”

(4) “Because a singular universal is linked with multiple instances, it follows that it is multiple.”

Demons’ permanent pots were probably not a significant topic of debate in philosophical circles but universals certainly were. Nevertheless, case (3) is the key to understanding the difference between cases where the nature of the subject is problematic from those where it is not. On the one hand, its form and constitutive elements are considered by Phya pa to be perfectly parallel to the fourth application – the results obtained from the analysis of this example thus apply to the example from Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga passage. On the other hand, it only differs from (2) in one aspect, namely the subject is “demon’s permanent pot” rather than “demon’s pot” – a detail that turns out to be of major importance.

The argument by consequence about the demon’s permanent pot is introduced as a potential counter-example to Phya pa’s definition of a probative consequence. Phya pa’s definition, as we have seen, includes the requirement of “elimination of the conclusion by a valid cognition,” which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the establishment of the pakṣadharmatva in the reverse form. Phya pa invoked this criterion to exclude case (2) from the range of probative consequences. A (hypothetical) opponent now argues that cases (3) and (4) should be excluded for the same reason: the subject being unestablished, there can be no elimination of the conclusion by a valid cognition. Phya pa thus sets out to show how the conclusion can nevertheless be eliminated in case (3), and hence in (4).

The specification pertaining to what the opponent accepts is only found in ’Od zer.

In the list of consequences that induce a reverse form in which the logical reason is of a different type than the logical reason of the consequence, case (3) illustrates a consequence based on a logical reason qua essential property, the reverse form of which is based on the non-apprehension of the pervader, like (4) (see § 1.1). Cf. Mun sel 86a6: rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa yod pa’i phyir mi rtag par thal zhes pa rang bzhin gyi rtags kyi thal ’gyur gyis mi rtag pas stong pas na yod pas stong zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa’i rang rgyud ’phen ste gnyis so //

’Od zer 147a3–4: gzhi rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa dang spyi gcig po nyid ma grub pas gzhi de la ’jug pa’i tshad ma’i bsal pa myed pa bsgrub pa’i thal ba mtshan nyid myed pas de la ma khyab po zhe na. The objection in Mun sel is more precise. For (3) it states that there is no elimination by valid cognition because the basis is completely inaccessible (Mun sel 91b4: gzhi shin du ikog du gyur pas dam bca’ la tshad ma’i bsal pa med pas grub (em: sgrub) pa’i thal ba de la ma khyab). For (4), it examines two options: the conclusion is eliminated by the opponent’s belief, or it is eliminated by establishing by valid cognition that there is no such thing as a universal. In the former case the corresponding member of the reverse form, pakṣadharmatva, will not be established by valid cognition; in the latter case the intended
The problem had been acknowledged by earlier scholars – in particular rNgog Blo ldan shes rab – who came up with a solution and answered various objections. But Phya pa does not agree with this solution and also claims that these scholars did not satisfactorily answer the objections addressed to them. The presentation of his own solution to the problem is thus to be understood against the background of this earlier debate: in addition to presenting his own account of a valid cognition able to eliminate the conclusion, Phya pa must show that his solution is not liable to the objections addressed to the view of his predecessors.

Leaving the details aside, let me attempt here to provide a summary of this long and complex discussion (Mun sel 91b3–95b5, 'Od zer 147a3–148a4):

According to Phya pa’s predecessors, to eliminate a conclusion – “S is Q” – a valid cognition must grasp the contradiction between the derived property (Q) ascribed to the subject and a property that is part of the subject (S), either by definition or through the formulation of the subject (for instance “singular” in the case of the subject “singular universal” or “permanent” in the case of the subject “demon’s permanent pot”). When the subject is not established, the contradiction must simply be ascertained on the basis of another instance, and can then be applied to the problematic subject. For instance, the contradiction between “permanent” and “impermanent” can be established on the basis of a pot, and then applied to the case of the demon’s permanent pot.

Phya pa’s solution is to appeal to appearances. The subject of (3) is “just what appears as a demon’s permanent pot,” that of (4) is “just what appears as a singular universal.” This appearance is established by reflexive awareness. Thus, technically speaking, the subject is no longer unestablished. The appeal to another basis to ascertain the contradiction (which was the solution advocated by Phya pa’s predecessors) is not needed. The ascertainment of contradiction can be made on the basis of the appearance: The reflexive awareness that establishes an appearance as X also establishes “aspects” or “features” (rnam pa) of this appearance in such a way that the establishment of a feature induces the rejection of the direct or indirect contrary feature (see § 3 for more details).

Thus in the case of the demon’s permanent pot (3), the formulation of the subject in terms of “demon’s permanent pot” generates a conceptual cognition which reflexive awareness can establish to be an “appearance as a demon’s permanent pot” involving,

thesis of the proponent would be likewise established, hence making the argument under consideration useless. This is because negating the universal itself allows one to eliminate the connection between the universal and multiplicity (i.e., to eliminate the conclusion), but also to eliminate the connection between the universal and the link with multiple instances (i.e., which is the intended thesis of the proponent). This long version of the objection runs parallel to the objection in dKa’ gnas 386.

A large portion of the dKa’ gnas (386–393) is devoted to demonstrating that cases (3) and (4) qualify as probative and in particular that their conclusion is invalidated by valid cognition (tshad mas gnod pa). rNgog Blo ldan shes rab presents his version of a valid cognition that enables the elimination of the conclusion in spite of the subject’s lack of establishment and defends it against various objections. There is little doubt that Phya pa is referring to rNgog Blo ldan shes rab in the Mun sel when he reports the view of “previous scholars” (sngon gyi mkhas pa dag), objections to this view, and the answers of these scholars, referred to as “the greatest of the greatest” (che ba’i che ba rnams). Phya pa’s presentation of these previous views, of the objections and answers, are recognizably those found in the dKa’ gnas even though the form and wording differ. If not to rNgog Blo ldan shes rab himself, Phya pa must be referring to a faithful epigone of the latter. But note that in the Tshad ma bsdus pa (354), it is rNgog Blo ldan shes rab who is associated with this view and not a later author.
among other things, the feature of “permanence.” The establishment of the feature of “permanence” in this appearance allows one to reject the feature of “impermanence.” Thereby the conclusion of the consequence, “the demon’s permanent pot is impermanent” is eliminated, and the qualification of the demon’s permanent pot as “void of impermanence” is established. Hence both the elimination of the conclusion of the consequence and the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form are established by the same valid cognition: reflexive awareness. The same method can be applied in case (3): the mental appearance of the subject “singular universal” allows for the establishment of the feature of “singularity,” which rejects “multiplicity” and establishes the “void of multiplicity.”

3. Method of conceptual appearance and ascertainment of features

In dealing with cases (3) and (4), Phya pa thus relies on his version of the Method of Conceptual Subject which highlights the mental appearance. This Method of Conceptual Appearance allows him to remove the potential failure of non-establishment of the subject in the reverse form. Further, it allows the establishment of the pakṣadharmatva and the elimination of the conclusion thanks to an extension brought to the function of reflexive awareness: not only does it establish that there is a mental appearance (by which the subject is no longer unestablished), it also establishes features (rnam pa) that are an integral part of this mental appearance.

The notion of “feature” (rnam pa) that comes into play here appears to be related to a distinction between appearances of properties “with a form” (rnam ldan) and “without a form” (rnam med) (as I translated it in a previous article) invoked by Phya pa in his discussion on perception to explain why opposite superimpositions can be eliminated by perception itself for some properties of a perceived object but not for others. For instance, in the case of the perception of an impermanent blue object, the superimposition as “non-blue” can be eliminated but not the superimposition “non-impermanent.” This, according to Phya pa, because the property “blue” is “endowed with a form” (rnam ldan) whereas the property “impermanence” cannot be ascertained as such because it is “without a form” (rnam med). One could, as in the present discussion, speak of properties being “featured” or “not featured” in the mental appearance. Phya pa also applies this distinction in ’Od zer when commenting on the passage of PVin 1 related to reflexive awareness, including the cognition of “pleasure, etc.” It is in this context also that the terms are already found to be used by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab. The question of a possible Indian source for this terminology remains unanswered so far.

The description of the exact process for eliminating the conclusion of the consequence and establishing the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form based on these features involves first the establishment of a given cognition (1 in the table below). Based on the reciprocal link between mind (blo) and the object of mind (yul), the establishment of the cognition enables the establishment of its apprehended object as being endowed with the features

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51 See Hugon 2011. I avoided the translation “aspect” for rnam pa in view of Phya pa non-aspectualist standpoint on cognition.
52 ’Od zer 59a2 ad PVin 1.19d etc.
that were represented in the cognition (2). Then, the ascertainment of features of what appears enables the negation of opposite features (3a). Phya pa adds that it also enables what I have translated in the table below as “the negation of the [object being] true with regard to the opposite property.” (3b) Expressions such as *mi rtag par bden pa* (“true with regard to impermanence”) and *du mar bden pa* (“true with regard to multiplicity”) must be understood in the framework of Phya pa’s characterization of objects and cognitions as it is found in the section of Mun sel on apprehended objects (see in particular Mun sel 1b7–1b9): objects (*yul*) are characterized as “true” (*bden pa*) or “false” (*brdzun pa*), and the cognitions that apprehend them (*blo*) as, respectively, “non-erroneous” (*ma ‘khrul ba*) and “erroneous” (*’khrul ba*). In subsequent discussions, Phya pa builds on this initial correspondence between the characterization of objects and cognitions, notably by adding specifications to the characterization as “true:” an object is “true” in a specific way (or with regard to a given property) when the cognition to which it appears as such is non-erroneous, and *vice versa*. Its being “true” in this specific way prevents its being true in the opposite way. For instance, when debating whether two things X and Y are distinct or identical, Phya pa considers whether the cognition to which they appear as distinct is erroneous or non-erroneous. In the latter case, the object (i.e., X and Y) is qualified as “true with regard to being distinct” (*tha dad du bden pa*), and its being “true with regard to being one” is negated (*gcig du bden pa‘ang khegs pa*). The “negation of the feature x” (x+loc. *bden pa‘ang khegs pa*) (3a) and the “negation of the object being true with regard to x” (x+loc. *bden pa‘ang khegs pa*) (3b) are also mentioned together by Phya pa in other contexts as following from the establishment of the feature opposite to x.

Although Phya pa is not explicit on the issue in the context under consideration, it would appear that step (3b) supports step (4a) – the elimination of the acceptance that the object has the property whose feature was negated – in view of the relation between the characterization of the object as true and of the mind that cognizes it as non-erroneous: by negating that the object is true with regard to property x, one also negates that the mind that apprehends this object as having the property x is non-erroneous.

Step (4b) – the establishment of the *pakṣadharmatva* of the reverse form – is to be understood as deriving from 3a/3b as well insofar as the logical reason is expressed in the form “void of property x” (e.g., void of impermanence, void of multiplicity). An explicit negation which echoes the “negation of the feature x” (3a) and the “negation of the object being true with regard to x” (3b) rather than the establishment of the object appearing as being positively qualified by the opposite property (e.g., permanence, unicity) (2).

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54 “True” and “false” correspond in this context to the characterization of the objects as, respectively, “real” (*dngos po*) and “unreal” (*dngos med*). For instance, hallucinated objects are “false” and the non-conceptual cognitions in which they appear are “erroneous.” But in other contexts, such as the definition of valid cognition in terms of “the understanding of a true object” (*bden pa‘ang rtags pa*), “true” takes up the meaning of “non-opposed” (*gnod pa med pa*), and “true object” is not paired with “non-erroneous cognition,” but with “valid cognition.” See Hugon 2011.

55 See for instance Mun sel 3a6, where Phya pa discusses the case of the appearance of “white” and “visual consciousness” in parallel with the case of the appearance of “pleasure” and “suffering.”

56 See for instance Mun sel 62b8 and the passage cited in n. 66 for the feature of “momentariness” (*skad cig gis stong pa‘i rnam pa yongs gcod la grub pas / skad cig ma‘i rnam pa‘ang khegs pas skad cig mar bden pa‘ang khegs pa yin no fi*), 63b8 for the feature of “multiplicity” (*du mar bden pa*), 65b9 for the features of “momentariness” and “reality” (*skad cig dang dngos por bden pa*).
Thus in the case of the demon’s permanent pot and, respectively, of the singular universal, we find the following steps:\footnote{57}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experience, by reflexive awareness, that conceptual cognition (i.e., the mind) is something that apprehends a demon’s permanent pot</th>
<th>Experience, by reflexive awareness, that conceptual cognition is something that apprehends a singular universal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The object is established to be the appearance as a (demon’s) permanent pot (i.e., it has the feature of a permanent pot)</td>
<td>The object is established to have the feature of a singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Negation of the feature of impermanence</td>
<td>Negation of the feature of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Negation of [the object being] true with regard to impermanence</td>
<td>Negation of [the object being] true with regard to multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Elimination of the acceptance of the derived consequence that [the demon’s permanent pot] would be impermanent</td>
<td>Elimination of the acceptance of the derived consequence that [the singular universal] is multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Establishment of the \textit{pakṣadharmatva} of [the reason] void of impermanence</td>
<td>Establishment of the \textit{pakṣadharmatva} of [the reason] void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Other applications of the method of conceptual appearance in Phya pa’s works

The method adopted by Phya pa in his commentary on the \textit{prasaṅga} passage and in his own theory of arguments by consequence is also applied in his works in other contexts.

One of those is linked with Dharmakīrti’s discussion in the \textit{svadharmin} passage, which, as pointed out in the introduction, is one of the two main contexts in which Dharmakīrti deals with cases where he wants to rescue arguments from the fallacy of the unestablished basis.\footnote{58}

In the \textit{svadharmin} passage, Dharmakīrti discusses the Buddhist refutation of the Vaiśeṣika’s permanent space and the Vaiśeṣika’s objection that the Buddhist’s argument would be faulty because by refuting the existence of the subject the Buddhist would invalidate his own thesis.\footnote{59} This passage has no direct equivalent in the PVin. But Dharmakīrti

\footnote{57} Mun sel 95a3–4: \textit{rang rig pas} \textit{rtog pa} \textit{rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa} \textit{’dzin pa dang spyi gcig du} \textit{’dzin pa tsam myong pa na yul yang rtag pa’i bum par snang par grub pas mi rtag pa’i rnam pa khegs te mi rtag par bden pa’ang khegs pas mi rtag par thal ba’} \textit{’dod pa la des sel te mi rtag pas stong pa’i phyogs chos kyang rang rig pa’i shugs la grub la} \textit{/ yul spyi gcig gi rnam par grub pa na’ang du ma’i rnam pa khegs te du mar bden pa’ang khegs pas du mar thal ba’} \textit{’dod pa’ang rang rig pa’i shugs la bsal la du mas stong pa’i phyogs chos kyang rang rig pa’i shugs la grub pa yin no //}

\footnote{58} The second context is the \textit{pradhāna} passage, discussed both in the PV and the PVin, which was Phya pa’s main source. But Phya pa does not supplement his commentary on the \textit{pradhāna} passage with an excursus, and the refutation of \textit{pradhāna} does not come forth in his Mun sel.

\footnote{59} PV 4.141–143 (see Tillemans 2000: 202–205).
hints to this issue at the end of the discussion on the word *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis (PVin 3 18,9–19,1). It is when commenting on this part of the PVin that Phya pa introduces in his commentary an excursus on logical reasons “refuting the nature of the subject” (*chos can gyi ngo bo ‘gog pa, Skt. dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*) (’Od zer 157b6–159b7). This excursus has an equivalent in the Mun sel within Phya pa’s discussion of the four categories of contradictory reasons.  

Note that in Phya pa’s discussion, the argument under consideration is not the Buddhist’s refutation of the Vaiśeṣika’s permanent space, but the Vaiśeṣika’s proof of the permanence of space by the logical reason “void of being produced.” Phya pa’s intention is to establish that this proof *is* subject to the fault of “refuting the nature of the subject” all the while arguing that the fallacy of the unestablished basis does not apply. Phya pa invokes in this discussion the Method of Conceptual Appearance: the subject is “the (mere) appearance as space” (*nam mkhar snang pa’i nam mkhar snang pa*), that is established by reflexive awareness and for which the property “void of being produced” can be established. Hence *pākṣadharmaṭva* holds. But if the logical reason is thus not faulty by reason of non-establishment, it is, however, faulty in that it is contradictory. This is because, according to Phya pa, the Vaiśeṣika proponent of the proof additionally applies to the mental appearance as space an intentional determination as “real space” via an erroneous cognition. Due to the incompatibility of the property to be proven, “void of impermanence,” with a subject assumed to have such a real nature, the proof ends up refuting the nature of the subject.

A further passage worth considering occurs in the context of the establishment of pervasion in the proof of momentariness by the logical reason “produced” or “existent.” This involves a secondary inference proving that what is permanent (or not momentary) is not produced or not existent via the reason “void of instantaneous or gradual causal efficacy.” Phya pa identifies the subject in this secondary inference as “the simple negation ‘void of momentariness’” (*skad cig gis stong pa’i med dgag*). This simple negation is to be

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60 The four categories listed in Mun sel 54a8 are: *chos kyi ngo bo ‘gog pa; chos kyi khyad par ‘gog pa; chos can gyi khyad par ‘gog pa; chos can gyi ngo bo ‘gog pa.* This distinction can be traced to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (3.27 = Nyāyamukha 9), and the terminology to Nyāyapraveśa 3.2.3, where one finds the terms: *dharmisvarūpa*, *dharmasvarūpa*, *dharmaviśeṣa*, *dharmaviśeṣaviparītaśādhanā* (see Tachikawa 1971: 125–126). Note that Dharmakīrti does not identify the fallacy occurring in the refutation of the permanence of space in terms of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītaśādhanā*. On Dharmakīrti’s silence on this fallacy see Moriyama 2019.

61 The proof of the permanence of space is given as an example of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītāśādhanā* by Dharmottara (PVinṬ-Skt 24a5, PVinṬ-Tib D26a1). As Moriyama 2019 reveals, the Vaiśeṣika proof is also given as an example of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītāśādhanā* by Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmapāla – both argue that the fault of the unestablished subject does not apply in this case. Before presenting his own view Phya pa makes an extensive presentation and refutation of another view ascribed to Kamalaśīla etc. In Kamalaśīla’s works (notably *Madhyamakāloka* and *Madhyamakālāṅkāraṇātikā*) one finds a discussion which may have been the source of Phya pa’s presentation of Kamalaśīla’s position. Yet Kamalaśīla does not discuss the faulty Vaiśeṣika proof, but the Buddhist refutation of a permanent space, which is the case discussed by Dharmakīrti in the *svadharmin* passage, a case that escapes the fault of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītāśādhanā* as well as the fault of *aśrayāsiddha*. Kamalaśīla appeals in this regard to the Method of Simple Negation (see Iwata 1999: 167).

62 Mun sel 55a4, ’Od zer 158a9.

63 By invoking the “intentional determination” (*zhen pa*) Phya pa identifies a subject that corresponds to Dharmakīrti’s *svadharmin*.

64 Starting at Mun sel 62b5.
established for a verbal object (sgra don) or, as Phya pa rephrases, a concept (don spyi). More precisely, Phya pa invokes the appearance of a concept that has the feature of void of momentariness (Mun sel 63a9: skad cig mas stong pa’i rnam pa can gyi don spyi). Only in such a case can the void of momentariness be ascertained by mere experience (myong pa) – this amounts to reflexive awareness.

The description of the process is the same as in the case of the demon’s permanent pot and the singular universal: experience establishes what the apprehending mind is like – in this case, it apprehends something that is not momentary – and thereby what the object of the apprehending mind is like – the object has the feature of being non-momentary. This in turns leads to the negation of the aspect of momentariness and the negation of the object as being “true with regard to momentariness,” and to the establishment of the simple negation “void of momentariness.”

Phya pa specifies that the experience by which one establishes the property “void of momentariness” does not simultaneously establish or eliminate the property to be proven, i.e., the property “void of existence.” This is because to establish that the object (yul) is existent or non-existent, one must be able to establish that the mind (blo) is erroneous or non-erroneous (see above and n. 54) – but this property is not something that is featured (rnam med) in the appearance and hence cannot be established by reflexive awareness. In other words, introspection does not allow one to ascertain whether the mental appearance as “something void of momentariness” is erroneous or non-erroneous with regard to the properties of existence or void of existence, and therefore whether the object of such a cognition is unreal or real.

Conclusion: When does the fault of the unestablished subject actually apply?

As mentioned at the end of § 2, the adoption of the Method of Conceptual Subject or Method of Conceptual Appearance seems to leave no room for unestablished bases –

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65 This rephrasing is worth noting since, as indicated in n. 26, Phya pa does not use the term “concept” (don spyi) when applying the Method of Conceptual Appearance in his commentary on the prasangā passage. He does not use the term either when commenting on the pradīhāna passage in spite of a visible influence of the pradīhāna passage of the PVin 3 pertaining to Phya pa’s characterization of the don spyi, something I intend to come back to on another occasion. On the other hand, in his commentary on the Madhyamakāloka Phya pa glosses Kamalaśīla’s identification of the subject in the refutation of pradīhāna as “something imagined that exists in the mind” (nye bar brtags pa blo la yod pa) in terms of “the feature of pradīhāna that is present in the appearance of the concept to conceptual thought” (dBu ma snang bshad 38b4: rtog pa la don spyi snang pa la yod pa’i gtso’ bo’i rnam par tsam chos can yin no zhes bya pa’o).

66 Mun sel 63a9–63b1: skad cig mas stong pa’i rnam pa can gyi don spyi la skad cig mas dben par nges pa yin te l blo skad cig ma ma yin pa’i dzin par myong pa na yul skad cig ma ma yin pa’i rnam par grub la skad cig gi rnam pa khegs pa na skad cig du bden pa ’ang myong pa’i shugs la khegs pas skad cig gis stong pa’i med dtag grub pas gzhi’i ldog pa grub la /

67 The inability to ascertain the erroneous or non-erroneous character of mind by reflexive awareness – and thereby whether the corresponding object is false or true – is discussed by Phya pa in Mun sel 36a7–8, with the conclusion that the establishment that an object is true and that the corresponding mind has a true object, is achieved by the cognition of an object (don rig) other than mind itself.
anything can be established as a mental appearance since there is no restriction as to what can be said and thought about. And if there are no unestablished bases, the fault of āśrayāsiddha would never take place. Logical reasons would never lack pakṣadharmatva because of the lack of establishment of the basis. Still, unestablished bases (unfounded or not ascertained by valid cognition) are listed by Phya pa among the reasons for the absence of pakṣadharmatva in inference and come into play in rejecting the fulfillment of the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form of some arguments by consequence (such as case (1) and case (2) considered above). Failure of pakṣadharmatva is not exclusively linked with the attribution of a positive property to a non-existent subject. Indeed, the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form of consequences (1) and (2) is faulty although the logical reason is a simple negation. One could suggest that this fault is restricted to proofs formulated by opponents of the Buddhist, while Buddhist proofs can be ‘saved’ by the application of the Method of Conceptual Appearance. However, we have seen in § 4 that Phya pa also applies this method to argue that the Vaiśeṣika’s proof of the permanence of space is not subject to the fault of āśrayāsiddha.

Is there another criterion that distinguishes cases where the Method of Conceptual Appearance applies and those where the fault of āśrayāsiddha is brought forward? Or should one, as uncharitable as it may seem, conclude that the fault of the unestablished basis is advocated whenever it is convenient for the author to do so, whereas in other cases the Method of Conceptual Appearance is called to the rescue? Before jumping to such a conclusion, let us consider what could be achieved by the application of this method in the cases where Phya pa invokes this fallacy.

Consequence (2) is relevant in this regard because its formulation only differs from consequence (3) by a small detail regarding the subject, but while the argument by consequence about the “demon’s permanent pot” (3) is probative, that about the “demon’s pot” (2) is not: it is possible, according to Phya pa, to establish that “the demon’s permanent pot is void of impermanence” but not to establish that “the demon’s pot is void of impermanence.” What happens if the Method of Conceptual Appearance is applied to consequence (2)? It would indeed remove the potential fallacy of āśrayāsiddha in the pakṣadharmatva, i.e., the establishment that “the demon’s pot is void of impermanence.” However, consequence (2) would remain non-probative (and even possibly not genuine) because this would still not enable one to establish that the property “void of impermanence” qualifies the demon’s pot or to eliminate the connection between the demon’s pot and impermanence. Indeed, the establishment of these two features in consequence (3) is enabled by the fact that reflexive awareness could establish the aspect of “permanence” on the basis of the mental appearance as a “demon’s permanent pot.” Consequence (2) is different in this regard: the feature of “permanence” cannot be established by reflexive awareness because it is not an integral part of the mental appearance of a demon’s pot. This is because it was not explicited in the verbal formulation “demon’s pot” and is also not a feature associated by definition with demons’ pots.

Asking a similar question about Dharmakīrti, Tillemans (2000: 197) concluded that the fault of āśrayāsiddha can be invoked unproblematically unless it would involve self-refutation for the Buddhist proponent. Only in the latter case is the method distinguishing svadharmin and keveladharmin worth applying. This conclusion, however, concerns the fault of āśrayāsiddha as a fault of the thesis and leaves open the question of āśrayāsiddha as a fault of the logical reason.
The appearance as a demon’s pot can also not be ascertained to have the feature of impermanence. One must not be fooled here by the potential impact of the word “pot:” it only allows for the ascertainment of the feature of “being a pot” (one could thus refute the claim that “the demon’s pot is not a pot”), but not of the features of “impermanence,” “existence,” or “causal efficacy” that one typically associates with pots – an association that is erroneous because it fails to take into account that the category of “pots” is not restricted to real pots (it also includes dream pots, etc., that are not real).

It seems that the same analysis could be applied to the other cases where the fault of āśrayāsiddha is invoked, that is, the pakṣadhartmatva of the reverse form of consequence (1) – “ultimate entity is void of impermanence” – and the examples adduced in the chapter on inference – “ultimate sound is produced” or “demon’s pot is produced.” In all these cases the Method of Conceptual Appearance would certainly remove the fault of āśrayāsiddha but would still not enable the establishment of the pakṣadhartmatva because the mental appearance would not have the explicit features that would be relevant in this regard.

One could in conclusion propose that the problem of āśrayāsiddha has been transformed into a failure of the establishment of the pakṣadhartmatva that has nothing to do with the ontological status of the subject, but is a matter of the features of the mental appearance that can or cannot be ascertained by reflexive awareness. However, such an interpretation of the examples where āśrayāsiddha is invoked is not suggested by Phya pa. One could deplore the lack of a unifying theory on this point or, more charitably, envisage that Phya pa is applying a principle of economy in the identification of fallacies.

References and abbreviations


dBu ma snang bshad Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, dBu ma snang ba'i 'grel pa rgya cher bshad pa. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 6, 266–428.


Hugon 2016 P. Hugon, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ’gyur) (2): The analysis of the correspondence between a consequence and its reverse form and the thirteenfold typology of consequences. Journal of the
Universals, Demons' Pots, and Demons' Permanent Pots


Mun sel Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma yid kyi mun pa sel pa. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 8, 434–626.

N Narthang (snar thang) edition of the Buddhist canon in Tib.


‘Od zer Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad yi ye dang rigs pa’i gnad la ’jug pa’i shes rab kyi ’od zer. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 8, 35–427.


PS Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Tibetan translation in D4203, P5700.

PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika.


PVin Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇaviniścaya.


PVin-Tib Tib. translation of the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. D4211 ce 187a6–230a7; P5710 ce 285a7–329b1; N3701 ce 299a6–347a7.

PVin-T-Skt Dharmottara, Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, copy of the manuscript (see the introduction to PVin 1 & 2 and PVin 3 for the details).

PVin-T-Tib Dharmottara, Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Tibetan translation in D4227, P5727.
Pascale Hugon

PVSV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. See PV 1.


Tshad ma bs dus pa Anonymous (attributed to Klong chen Rab ’byams pa), Tshad ma’i de kho na nyid bs dus pa, ed. Padma tshul khrims. Chengdu 2000.

Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

by

Masahiro Inami

1. Introduction

Dharmakīrti and his followers define real things as those that have some causal capacity (arthakriyāśakti), and consider those that cannot produce any effect, such as the universal (sāmānya) and the whole (avayavin), as merely conceptual constructions. In connection with this capacity, as is well known, they refer to the two kinds of causal capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ.

According to the examination of these two kinds of causal capacity by modern scholars, Dharmakīrti and his followers consider external objects, such as jars (ghaṭa, water jar), to have two different causal powers: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. The sāmānyā śaktiḥ is the causal power common to other objects of the same kind, and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is the causal power not common to any other object. For example, a jar has the causal power or capacity of containing water, which is common to other jars, but at the same time it has the unique power of producing its own particular perception as well. Of these, the sāmānyā śaktiḥ is regarded as the useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes, and is therefore not “causal capacity” in a strict sense. In contrast, the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is regarded as the causal efficiency that real things have.

1 The present paper is a revised English version of a Japanese publication entitled “Nishu no ingakōryoku –sāmānyā śakti to pratiniyatā śakti–” [Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śakti and pratiniyatā śakti] (=Inami 2012). Almost all of the passages from Indian texts being treated here were translated into Japanese in another paper entitled “Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13)” (=Inami 2014). I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans for correcting the English of the present paper.

2 Esho Mikogami was the first scholar to pay attention to the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal capacity. He examined PV II 100–102 and Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and concluded that the sāmānyaśakti is the useful function possessed by things in our daily life and that it is related to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; the pratiniyataśakti is the causal efficiency that gives rise to the perception of color, etc., and it is related to the svalakṣaṇa. Mikogami understood that these two correspond with the two meanings of arthakriyā as pointed out by Nagatomi 1967/68 (Mikogami 1978, 1979). After Mikogami’s study, Shoryu Katsura considered these two kinds of causal capacity several times. According to his first examination of this theory (Katsura 1983: 97–100), the pratiniyataśakti is the unique capacity that momentary existence has, and should be regarded as the primary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In contrast, the sāmānyaśakti is, for example, a pot’s capacity for containing water, something common to other pots, thus meaning “a useful function for the fulfillment of a human purpose.” It is related to the conceptual cognition of the universal or of the continuum. It is not causal capacity in a strict sense, and therefore should be regarded as the secondary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In this paper, Katsura concluded that the pratiniyataśakti is the causal capacity to produce a direct perception and the sāmānyaśakti is the causal capacity to produce an indirect or judgmental cognition. This understanding also appears in a later study published in English (Katsura 1984: 218–219).
In addition to this, scholars have presented various other interpretations concerning these two notions. Some scholars understand the sāmānyā śaktiḥ to be related to common characteristics or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ to be related to unique characteristics or particulars (svalakṣaṇa). Some scholars explain that the sāmānyā śaktiḥ belongs to the jar as a continuum (santāna) and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ belongs to the jar as a momentary thing (kṣaṇa). Other scholars remark that the sāmānyā śaktiḥ belongs only to conventional existence (samvṛtisat), but that pratiniyatā śaktiḥ belongs to both conventional existence and ultimate existence (paramārthasat). And some attribute this theory to Prajñākaragupta, a commentator on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV), and not to Dharmakīrti.

However the following questions arise: How can a jar have a causal capacity if it is regarded as a conceptual construction such as a universal or a continuum? How can conventional existence, such as the whole, have a causal capacity? Does the sāmānyā śaktiḥ represent a useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes? Did Dharmakīrti not advocate these two kinds of causal capacity? Previous studies have not yielded sufficient results concerning these matters or, rather, they seem to contain some misunderstandings. The aim of this paper is to clarify the Buddhist theory of the two kinds of causal capacity by rigorously reexamining various materials.

2. Pramāṇavārttika II 100–102 and commentaries

First of all, we shall examine Dharmakīrti’s PV II 100–102, where the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is presented. In order to prove the transmigration (saṃsāra) of living beings against materialists, Dharmakīrti explains that the mind is not crucially dependent on the body. Then, he examines whether the body, which is regarded as the direct cause of the mind by materialists, is a single entity, i.e. the whole (avayavin), or an aggregate of many parts. He denies the first alternative by pointing out that the whole never exists distinctly from parts, and concludes that the body is nothing but an aggregate of many parts. Next, he argues that, even if the body is an aggregate of many parts, it cannot be the direct cause of the mind.

In the context of his negation of the existence of the whole, Dharmakīrti refers to the causal capacity of atoms. According to him, a jar is nothing but an aggregate of many atoms, including color atoms. It can never be regarded as a whole. To this, the following

5 Katsura 2012: 22–23 explains that Dharmakīrti classifies two kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity to produce one’s own cognition, which belongs both to ultimate existence and to conventional existence, and the other is the capacity to fulfill human purpose, which belongs only to conventional existence.
6 Katsura 2002 points out that because it was problematic whether a pot, which Dharmakīrti had explained as possessing the two kinds of causal capacity, could be regarded as an ultimate existence, Prajñākaragupta later explained that both of these capacities belong to atoms. According to Bae 2011: 92–93, Dharmakīrti thinks that the svalakṣaṇa has a causal capacity and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa has the ability to fulfill human purposes. Of these, Prajñākaragupta divides causal capacity into two kinds: common capacity and specific capacity.
7 For an outline of PV II, see Inami and Tillemans 1986. On the details of the arguments in PV II 1–102, see my serial studies on PV II.
objection is raised: “A jar as a whole exists distinctly from its parts, such as color atoms, because people appropriately use genitive expressions such as ‘the color and so on of a jar’ (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ), which indicates that there are different referents.”

Responding to this objection, Dharmakīrti explains that the atoms constituting a jar have two different kinds of causal capacity.

[1] Without implying the individual causal powers (śaktibheda) of the color and other [atoms that constitute a jar], the word “jar” (ghaṭa) [simply] serves to express the exclusion of those things that are not the cause of their common effects [such as containing water] (tatsamānaphala). Therefore, [despite the fact that a jar is not distinct from its parts, including color atoms,] coreferential expressions such as “a color that is a jar” (rūpam ghatah) cannot be used.

According to Dharmakīrti, when referring to aggregated atoms we use the word “jar” to mean that they can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water. It

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8 See PVA 98,3–5: yadi tarhi nāvayavī rasādaya eva tadā na ghaṭasya rūpādaya iti bhavet / na hi bhavatī rūpādīnām rūpam / nāpi ghaṭasya vā ghaṭa iti paryālocanam parasyaśaṅkāyaḥ / …; PVV(R) D34ib5–6, P195b1: gal te gzugs la sogs pa las tha dad pa‘i yan lag can med na l de‘i tse bum pa dang gzugs la‘i don gcig pa nyid du‘gyur ba ma yin nam zhe na l‘dir smras pa l… Cf. PVṬ D160b5, P187a4: gal te bum pa‘i gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa ldog pa ji litar rung zhe na l…; PVSVṬ 271,15–16: yadi rūpādaya eva kevalā ghaṭo na tu tadvyatiriktaṃ dravyam, kathan tarhi ghaṭasya rūpādaya iti vyatireka iti ced āha l… In connection with the theory that the genitive expression indicates the difference of referents, Dharmakīrti and his followers refer to the grammatical rule vyatirekaṣaṣṭhī. PVSV 36,5–6: na hi vyatireke ṣaṣṭhī bāhulye jasādaya ity etad api purasābhāprāyaninirapeksam vastussamīdhāmārena svayam pravṛttam / …; PVP D43b5–43b6, P49a7–b2: gal te ldan pa la sogs pa don gshan ma yin pa de‘i tse l tha dad par rjod (rjod D; brjod P) par byed pa‘i drug pas* tha snyad du byed par mi‘gyur te l dper na‘i gcig nyid ces bya ba la sogs pa ldag pa bya ba yin na yang ‘gyur ba de‘i phyir don gshan yin no l sbor ba ni gan zhih gan gans las tha dad par hstan pa de ni de las don gshan yin ye l dper na lha sbyin (lha sbyin D; las byin P) gyi spyi blugs lta bu‘o l‘Idan pa la sogs pa yang bum pa la sogs pa (sogs pa; P; sogs D) las tha dad par (par D; pas P) bstan pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gtsan shigs yin par sams so l (*Vibh p. 46, n. 5: vyatirekaṣaṣṭhī /); PVṬ D80b3–4, P94b8–95a1: brda sprod pa pa la sogs pa sgra de lta bya brams brjod par bya ba‘i don dag la l‘jug pa sams pa la dad pa ni drug pa‘o l zhes bya ba la sogs pa yang yin pa dang /…; PVSVṬ 158,23–24: … evam bhūtaṇām śabdaṇām vācyeṣv artheṣv yeyam pravṛtticitā vyatireke śaṣṭhādaya itādikā /…, etc. It can be interpreted that the word ghaṭasya refers to dravya and rūpādaya to gunas. Dharmakīrti already criticized the Vaiśeṣika system of ontology in PV II 89–96. According to him, dravya, guna, karman and so on are nothing but conceptual constructions; they do not exist distinctly from each other in the outer world.

9 PV II 100–101a: rūpādiśaktibhēdeṇām anākṣepeṇa vartate / tattsamānaphahetuvāvavacchēde ghaṭa-śrāthā / atop na rūpam ghaṭa ity ekādbhākarāṃ śrāthā /

should be noted that the word *tatsāmānaphala* (PV II 100c) is said to mean the effect common to all the constituents of the same jar, but not the effect common to all jars. Dharmakīrti seems to apply the theory of causal complex (*hetusāmagrī*) to this case.

Each constituent atom has an individual causal power or capacity (*saktibheda*) as well. The word “color” is used to define the unique power of the color atoms. Thus, each constituent atom of the same jar has two different kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity common to all constituent atoms, and the other is the capacity not common to other kinds of atoms.

The word “jar” is used to mean the capacity common to all constituents of the same jar, without implying each individual capacity meant by a word such as “color.” Therefore, we use genitive expressions such as “the color of a jar” (*ghaṭasya rūpam*) and not coreferential expressions such as “*a color that is a jar*” (*rūpam ghātaḥ*).\(^{11}\) In this way, Dharmakīrti insists that a genitive expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (*ghaṭasya rūpādayah*) is not used because two different entities exist, viz. the whole and its parts, but because the parts have two different causal powers. This expression means that the atoms that can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water also have individual powers, such as the power to produce a visual perception.\(^{12}\) By the word *tatsāmānya* (PV II 102b), Dharmakīrti does not mean universals such as “jarness” (*ghaṭatva*), but rather the

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\(^{11}\) The word *ghaṭa* in the expression *ghaṭasya rūpādayah* is regarded as a “term for an aggregate” (*samudāyaśabda*). It is also considered a “generic term” (*jatiśabda*) depending on context. Dharmakīrti explains the difference between *jatiśabda* and *samudāyaśabda* in PV II 101cd: *bhedaś cāyaṃ mēto jātisamudāyābhidhānayoḥ* // [I tentatively adopt this reading of the Sanskrit text of PV II 101cd. See PVmsH 17v1; Ms. B of PVA 40b8.] “This difference [in implication] is found between ‘generic terms’ (*jātyabhidhāna*) and ‘terms for aggregate’ (*samudāyabhidhāna*), as well.” In PV II 98–99, Dharmakīrti has already explained the difference in implication between “words for property” (dharmaśabda) and “words for property-possessor” (dharmsāabda). According to him, the non-coreferential expression *āṅgulyā yogah* (connection of a finger) is made because the property word *yogah* (connection) is conventionally used to mean one property without implying other properties of the finger and its property-possessor, i.e. the finger. On the other hand, the coreferential expression *yuktā ‘ṅgulī* (a connected finger) is made because the property-possessor word *yuktā* (connected) is conventionally used to mean the property-possessor with the implied property of the finger. The same is said of *samudāyaśabda* and *jātisābda*. The word *ghaṭa* will be a *samudāyaśabda* in relation to the word that is used to refer to its constituents, such as colors. In this case, it is used to mean the common capacity of the constituents without implying their specific capacities. That is why non-coreferential expressions such as *ghaṭasya rūpādayah* are used. On the other hand, it will be a *jatiśabda* in relation to the word that is used to refer to a particular jar and in contradistinction to words that are used to refer to other kinds of aggregates, such as trees. In this case, since it implies particulars or other aggregates that have the same capacity, a coreferential expression such as *ghaṭah savarnah* (a golden jar) can be made appropriately. Then the word *ghaṭa* can also be understood to indicate the capacity of containing water, which is common to all jars. However, it is clear that Dharmakīrti, in the context of refuting the existence of the whole, mentions the capacity of the constituent atoms of the same aggregate. See PVP D44b6–45a5, P50b3–51a3; PVA 98, 25–28; PVV(R) D342a4–5, P195b8–196a2; VNTV 32,7–12.

\(^{12}\) Dharmakīrti remarks that this explanation is also applicable to other cases. PV II 102d: *vācyo ‘nyo ‘pi diśā ‘nayāḥ* // “Other [expressions such as ‘fragrance of sandalwood’ (*candanasva candanaṃ*)] should be explained in this manner.” Cf. PVP D45b3–4, P51b1–2; *phyogs ‘dis gzhlan la’ang brjod par bya* // *de pha chen po lha dkar chen bya ba / ’di la yang / lha yang bya ba / ri dzas cung zad kyang dri la so’g pa las thad pa ma yin pa lta zu bu’o / ’o na ci yin zhe na / dri du ma’i bdag nyid can las tsandan gyi rang bzhin gyi dri gang yin pa des de ltar ston par ‘gyur ro /* (Parallel sentences are found in Haribhadra’s Anekāntajayapātākā. See AJP II 40,9–11: etena “candanasva candanaṃ na ma candanaṃ nāma candhavyatiriktaṃ kiṃcid dravyam asti / kiṃ tarhi? anekāmakāsa candhasya candhasva candhasvabhāvo yo
commonness between the constituents with regard to cooperatively producing the same single effect. He means the aggregate (samudāya) of the atoms.  

The commentators call these two kinds of causal capacity sāmānyā śaktih and pratini-yatā śaktih for example. Devendrabuddhi explains PV II 100 in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP) as follows:

[3] The color and other [atoms] have two kinds of causal capacity [viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity]. [Among these, the first one, i.e.] the common [capacity of the atoms] is, for instance, the capacity to [cooperatively] produce a [common] effect, such as containing water, which the color and other atoms forming a jar have. [The second one, i.e.] the specific [capacity] is, for instance, the capacity to [separately] produce a specific effect, such as a visual cognition. … There are many substances [in this world]. [However, when one says the word ghaṭa] it serves to exclude those things which are not the cause of a single effect, such as containing water, e.g. a tree (vrkṣa), among them. Why [is the word ghaṭa used in this manner]? It is because the word ghaṭa is conventionally agreed to mean those atoms which have the causal power to cooperatively produce a single effect [such as containing water]. Intending to say that multiple things [i.e. color and other atoms] have the single [common] capacity [to produce a single effect, such as containing water], one uses the singular word ghaṭaḥ in accordance with conventional agreement. Therefore, the singular word can be used to refer even to multiple things without inconsistency.

It seems to me that Manorathanandin’s explanation is of doubtful accuracy. PVV(M) 48,4–5 (=Ms 10a7–b1): tatsāmānyopasarjanā ghatatvasāmānyaviśeṣitās teṣāṃ rūpādīnāṃ sākṣibhedā raṇjanāda-yaḥ khyāpyante / Cf. PVP D45a7–b3, P51a6–b1: bum pa yi ni gzugs sogs shes // tha snya byed pa na i de’i spyi nye bar byas pa can yin / bum pa i spyi nye bar byas pa i byeg brag de’i nus pa’i khyad par gang la yod pa zhes bya bar tshig rnam par shyar ro // de’i nus pa’i khyad par te i gzugs la sogs pa de dag gi so sor nges pa’i nus pa’i khyad par ci ’dra ba de ’dra ba ston par byed do // bum la pa the sogs pa sgal ba’i khyad par la yod pa can gzugs la sogs pa mi ri rnam par shes pa la sogs pa ’bras bu so sor nges pa can gyi bdag nyid bum pa i khyad par gyi sgras rnas par gcod par byed de i chu’i gan pa la sogs pa’i khyad par can gyi rung bzhin ston par byed ces bya ba’i don to //, PVP(R) D342a7–b1, P196a4–6: bum pa’i gzugs la sogs pa zhes brdar btags pa ’dis ni bun pa i spyi de khyad par du dmigs kyis ‘ger ba gang yin pa’i gzugs la sogs pa de rnam kyi nus pa so sor nges pa’i byeg brag mi ri rnam par shes pa skyed par byed par ston te i gzugs la sogs pa chu len pa la sogs pa’i dgos pa can zhes bya ba’i tha snyig go //
Devendrabuddhi distinguishes between the two kinds of causal capacity with the respective terms “the common capacity” (sāmānyā śaktih) and “the specific capacity” (pratiniyatā śaktih). According to him, both of them belong to the color and so on (rūpādi) that constitute a jar, and not to a jar that can be regarded as the whole or as conventional existence. Namely the color atoms that constitute a jar together with other atoms have both the causal capacity common to other constituent atoms and the causal capacity not common to other kinds of constituent atoms. The common capacity is for producing a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other atoms, and therefore it is common to other constituent atoms such as “smell” atoms. On the other hand, the specific capacity is for producing a specific effect, such as visual cognition, and therefore it is not common to other kinds of constituent atoms such as smell atoms.

It is also significant that a singular expression is applicable to a plural referent. The assumption that a word in singular form must reflect its referent’s singularity is denied here. According to Devendrabuddhi, the singular expression ghaṭaḥ can be used to refer to the multiple atoms that can cooperatively produce a single effect. In this respect, the singular form corresponds to the single capacity or to the capacity of producing a single effect, not to a single referent.

Although a number of modern scholars have attributed the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to Prajñākaragupta, it is clear that before Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi had already explained Dharmakīrti’s theory using the terms sāmānyā śaktih and pratiniyatā śaktih.

Next, we turn to Prajñākaragupta’s explanation in his Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (PVA).

[4] Without implying the individual powers that are separately fixed (pratiniyatā-taśaktihbhedā) for [each component of a jar], like color [atoms], the word “jar” (ghaṭa) is used to mean their causal power of [cooperatively] producing one and the same [effect], such as containing water (samānodakadhāraṇśakti).

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The word pratiniyatā śaktih literally means “the causal capacity separately fixed for each [type of cause].”

Haribhadra Sūri, in his auto-commentary on AJP, explains the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal-
Therefore, a coreferential expression such as “the color and so forth are a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭaḥ) cannot be used. Thus, intending to define some causal power of the aggregate (samudāyaśakti), we use such an aggregate-word (samudāyaśabda) [like the word “jar”]. … [Then, the following question may be raised:] How is the [non-coreferential] expression “the color and so on of a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭasya) used? [We answer this as follows: It is used to] mean that each of those things that can cooperatively produce a common effect, i.e. containing water, can separately produce its own specific effect, such as visual cognition.

We should notice that Prajñākaragupta paraphrases the common capacity as “the causal power of the aggregate” (samudāyaśakti) here. This makes it clear that the common capacity is a causal capacity of the aggregated atoms.

As for the pratiniyātā śaktiḥ, Śākyabuddhi gives a more detailed explanation in his Pramāṇavārttiṭika (PVṬ):

[5] The sentence “The specific [capacity] is, for instance, …” [in PVP] can be explained as follows: Color [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, visual cognition, and smell [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, olfactory cognition. In the same way, for the other [types of atoms, such as taste atoms, their specific capacity] should be mentioned in accordance with their own cognition.

The pratiniyātā śaktiḥ has been understood by scholars to mean a unique power belonging to a certain object, such as a jar, to produce its own particular perception. However, this passage clearly shows that, in the case of a jar, the pratiniyātā śaktiḥ is the causal capacity that is separately fixed for each type of cause; this belongs to each constituent atom. For example, the color atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing a visual sensation, which is separately fixed for the color atoms, and the smell atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing an olfactory sensation, which is separately fixed for the smell atoms.

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17 As pointed out by Katsura 2002: 270, Prajñākaragupta additionally remarks that expressions such as rūpādayaḥ ghaṭaḥ and rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭaḥ are accepted by people who have learned the Buddhist system of knowledge and have arrived at correct understandings, but not by ordinary people who blindly follow other systems of knowledge. According to Prajñākaragupta, someone who has learned the Buddhist theory will be convinced that a jar is nothing but the color and other atoms that have the causal capacity of producing their common effect, such as containing water, or that a jar is the color atoms and so on, which are arranged in a specific shape to produce such an effect. See PVA 98,17–21.


19 PVṬ D110b6–7, P135a7–8: so sor nges pa ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa la / gzugs ni 'bras bu mig gi rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin la / dri ni sna 'i rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin no // de bzhin du gzhan dag gi (gi Corr.; gis DP) yang rang gi rnam par shes pa la ltos (ltos D; blos P) nas brjod par bya'o //
Accordingly, the term *pratiniyatā śaktiḥ* is used from the viewpoint that these different roles are performed by different constituents of the same aggregate.20

The above examination of the commentaries makes it clear that in PV II 100–102, Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to account for non-coreferential expressions such as *ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ* (the color and so on of a jar) without admitting the existence of a whole. Dharmakīrti believes that these two words are used to refer to the two different types of causal capacity, of which both belong to the aggregated atoms. Namely, the word *ghaṭa* (jar) is used to mean their common capacity, and the word *rūpādi* (color and such) is used to mean their specific capacities. The non-coreferential expression can be made because the word *ghaṭa* simply means the common capacity without implying any specific capacity. And besides, the singular word *ghaṭasya* can be used to refer to the multiple aggregated atoms because they commonly have a single effect.

### 3. Dharmakīrti’s other works

Next, we will examine whether this concept of two kinds of causal capacity is found in Dharmakīrti’s other works. I would like to show here that there are several passages related to this concept.

When discussing the relationship between words and the causal capacity of objects in PV I and in his auto-commentary (PVSV), Dharmakīrti explicates the causal capacities of the respective causes and their complex.21 He explains that the reason why a single word is applied to a plural referent is because manifold things share the capacity of producing a single effect. According to him, someone who wants to simplify one’s practical action can collectively designate such manifold things by using a single word in conformity with verbal conventions.22 Dharmakīrti classifies such manifold things as one of three types: 1) aggregate (*samūha*), 2) continuum (*santāna*), and 3) a particular state (*avasthāviśeṣa*).23 Of these, he illustrates the case of an aggregate using the example of a jar as follows:

> [6] In the case where an entire set of causes produces some single effect [e.g. containing water], a worldly person, who thinks that there is no use to express

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20 The specific capacity of a color atom is often explained by commentators to be the causal capacity to produce visual sensation. However, in explaining the specific capacity of a color atom, a few commentators refer to the causal capacity for coloring things such as clothes. Cf. PVV(M) 47.12: *ghaṭavyapadeśabhājāṃ rūpādinām avāntararañjanādiṣaktibhedānāṃ anākṣepaṇa ...*; PVV(M) 48.5–6: * ... teṣāṃ rūpādinām saktibhedā rañjanādiṣaṃ ākṣepaṇa / ghaṭavyapadeśa vīṣayasamudāyāntargataṃ rañjanaṃ / samudāyāntargataṃ niṣkṛṣyacyeta ity arthaḥ /*; TSP ad TS 323: *vividhāḥ nānāprakārāḥ arthakriyāḥ / ... rūpādināṃ paryāyānām samānāṃ sāmaṇeṣaḥ / ... rañjanaṃ vāṣṭarāgalocanādiṣāntargataṃ / ...*; HBṬ 98.22–23: *ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kriyate, rūpādibhiḥ punar vastrāraṇa / * (Corr.: *vasturāga* S) / ...*; *kāryabhedaḥ /* It has been explained by modern scholars that specific capacity means the causal capacity to produce sense perception. However, this is not strictly true. The capacity to produce sense perception must be understood as a typical example of the specific capacity.


22 See PV I 137–138; 141–142.

23 As is well known, these three were argued as being non-existent by Dignāga in his *Qu yin jia she lun* (取因假設論 *Upādānopādāyaprajñāaptīsāstra*). See Ui 1958.
the differences among them because all of them have no difference in this respect, uses a single word, e.g. “jar” (ghaṭa), to refer to all of them at once. Though they are all [ultimately] distinct from their respective homologues and heterologues, [we conventionally consider] there to be no difference among them for the reason that, in terms of their causing that single effect, they are equally differentiated from others [that do not contribute to the production of that effect]. Therefore, all of them are understood by the single word “jar” without distinguishing one from another.24

[7] [Question: If you insist that a jar is nothing but an aggregate of color and other atoms and reject that a jar as the whole (avayavin) exists distinctly from its parts, how do you explain a non-coreferential expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ)? Answer:] In that case, even if the genitive expression “the color and so on of a jar” is used, [it does not indicate that a jar exists distinctly from color and so on]. It simply means that the color and other [atoms together] have the nature of a jar. In other words, this means that [the color and other atoms] can [cooperatively] produce a [single] effect such as “a specific way of containing water” (udakadhāraṇaviśeṣa).25 Those [atoms] are known to have the nature to produce an effect [e.g. visual sensation] common (sāmānyakārya) to other atoms of the same kind, and are established by the words “the color and so on” (rūpādi) as well. Such things are meant by the words “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ). However, in the case [of the word ghaṭa], distinctly [from the color and other atoms], there does not exist any substance [such as a whole] having characteristics just as you described them, because such a substance cannot be perceived at all. Moreover, the reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used [for a plurality of things] is because it refers to their capability of cooperatively producing a single effect [such as containing water], or, rather, just because it depends on the verbal convention (saṃketa).26
A jar should be regarded as a complex of multiple atoms, and not as a single whole. Each of the constituent atoms of the jar is differentiated from its respective homologues and heterologues. However, the atoms are all equally differentiated from atoms that are not constituents of the jar, in respect to their contributions to the production of the same single effect. Therefore, the constituent atoms are conventionally regarded as non-different, and are referred to by the single word “jar.”

Moreover, the term pūrṇepadāyaḥ (the color and so on) refers to those atoms that have different causal powers to produce their specific effects, such as visual perception. These causal powers are common to other atoms that are not constituents of the jar. But in the expression ghaṭasya pūrṇepadāyaḥ, the atoms are identified by the specification indicating that they can produce another effect, e.g. containing water, and the atoms that are meant are those which are the constituent atoms of a jar.

It should be noted that Dharmakīrti mentions here another reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used. He adds that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. This solution seems preferable to him. In this respect, it is not absolute that words correspond to the causal capacity of objects. This point will be examined again below.

The theory of the two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in these passages of PVSV. There, unlike what we find in PV II, an effect such as visual cognition is regarded as a common effect (sāmānyakārya) in that it is common to atoms of the same kind that do not constitute the jar, and an effect such as “containing water” is regarded as a specific effect (viśiṣṭakārya) in that it is not common to other atoms that do not constitute the jar. However, what he intends to explain here is the same as in PV II.

In the Hetubindu (HB), Dharmakīrti illustrates the two different aspects of causal capacity using the example of the production of a jar. It should be noted that here he argues about the causes of the production of a jar, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., and not about the constituents of a jar, such as the color atoms.

[8] [Objection:] If a single effect [i.e. a visual sensation] is produced by the cooperative causes, viz. a visual organ and so on, each of which is differentiated from others in its essence, then effects would not differ in accordance with the difference of the cause. [Answer:] There is no such fault, because the specific features effectuated by the contribution of causes cannot be mixed together since the causes differ amongst themselves according to their respective essences and separately contribute to different features of the [effect].
For example, a jar, made by some cooperative causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., has [the following different features given by them]: [Firstly, the jar has] the essential feature [of being made of clay], by which it is differentiated from non-clay things such as trees. This feature is given by its material cause, i.e. a lump of clay. [Secondly,] the jar, a product of clay, has another essential feature, a certain characteristic form, by which it is differentiated from other [products of clay]. This second feature is given by its maker, i.e. the potter. [Thirdly,] the jar, which is a product of clay and has a characteristic form, has still another essential feature by which it is differentiated from other clay things having a characteristic form, such as a jar made with a potter’s wheel. This third feature is given by its instrumental cause, i.e. the strings. In this way, [there is no confusion of effects]. The essential feature of being made of clay is [given by the clay], not by the potter. The essential feature of a characteristic form is [given by the potter], not by the clay. Moreover, although the scope or range of the specific efficiencies of these two, i.e. clay and a potter, are different from each other, a certain individual thing affected by them, i.e. a certain jar, is [identical, but] not different in its essence. For if it were not identical, a specific form and clay [of the same jar] would not appear together because they would be essentially different from each other.28

A jar is produced by the contribution of causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc. Each of them contributes to the production of the same jar in one way or another. In this respect, they all have the same single effect. However, each causal factor has its own scope or range as well. For example, a lump of clay contributes to the jar’s feature of being made of clay. The potter contributes to the jar’s feature of a specific form. In this respect, every causal factor has its own specific effect as well. Thus, in the case of a causal complex, every cause has two aspects: one is that it produces the same single effect cooperatively with others, and another is that it produces its own specific effect. These two aspects are also illustrated using the example of a visual perception.29

Here Dharmakīrti explains that, in the case of a causal complex, each cause has two kinds of capacity. This is close to the explanation that each constituent atom of a jar has two kinds of causal capacity, or rather his explanation of atoms’ two kinds of causal capacity is based on his theory of causal complexes. It is clear that he regards aggregated atoms as a kind of causal complex.

The common capacity of aggregated atoms is explained in the Vādanyāya (VN) as follows:

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28 HB 9, 13–10, 4: bhinnasvabhāvebhyo caksurādibhyo sahakāribhyo ekakāryottattau na kāraṇabhedā kāryabhedaḥ syād iti cet, na yathāsvaṃ svabhāvabhenedena tadviśeṣopayogatass tadupayogakāryasvabhāvā-viśeṣāṃkārāt, yathā mṛtpiṇḍakalālasūtrādibhyor bhavati ghaṭasya mṛtpiṇḍād amṛtsvabhāvebhyo vṛkṣādibhyo bhinnah svabhāvah kulālā tasya eva mṛdāmanah sataḥ samsthānaviśeṣāṃkārā tadanvebhyo bhinnah sūtrīt tasya eva mṛtsamsthānaviśeṣāṃkārā cakrādērā vībhatah svabhāvo bhavati; tad evāṃ na kulālā mṛtspbhavatā, na mṛdāḥ samsthānaviśeṣā; na ca tayoḥ śaktiviveśavidhah bhavati ‘pi tajjanta-viśeṣabhedeśa kāryasya svabhāvah bhāveḥ, mṛtsamsamsthānavaprarāparatātā mahāsāṃsthānamdrūpābhyām tayor apratībhāsanaprasaṅgāt / This passage is examined and translated in Katsura 1983: 104–105.

Moreover, only the multiple [atoms], including color [atoms], that cooperatively produce a single effect [e.g. containing water] should be referred to by the single word *ghaṭaḥ*. There is no need to assume an object other [than the atoms as being a referent of the word *ghaṭa*]. This is because even multiple things can produce a single effect, as is seen in the case of visual organs and so on. … In that case, if we, referring to multiple things that contribute toward the same purpose collaboratively or separately, use one word in order to express that they are such things, what kind of problem would occur? Because an aggregate word (*samudāyaśabda*) is used to mean their causal capacity [to produce a single effect], there is no inconsistency in the singular form. The one and the same (*eka*) causal power belongs to the things that accompany each other, but not to the things that are separate from each other. Therefore, when an aggregate word is used to refer to one aggregate, the singular word *ghaṭaḥ* is [used for the referent].

The constituents of the same jar operate simultaneously and produce a single effect, such as containing water. All of them contribute to the single effect in one way or another. This type of causal capacity of the constituents is considered similar to the capacity of a causal complex to produce a visual perception. To express that they are such things, one uses the single word *ghaṭa* in the singular form. It is considered an aggregate word (*samudāyaśabda*). Here again, it is clear that Dharmakīrti refers to a common capacity in order to explain the singular expression of the aggregate, which he regards as one kind of causal capacity of a causal complex.

30 The words *saha prthag vā* are understood in various ways by the commentators. In Vinītadeva’s understanding, these words mean the two different kinds of causal capacity, viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity (see VNT D164b3–6, P59b1–4). However, in this understanding, the words *prthag vā* seem incompatible with the word *ekaprayojanāḥ*. In contrast, in Śāntarakṣita’s understanding, Dharmakīrti has added the words *prthag vā* due to his intention of saying that “every” component of a complex contributes to producing a single effect. (See VNTV 31,8–30. Here Śāntarakṣita mentions two different understandings and refutes both.) In this understanding, the words seem compatible with the word *ekaprayojanāḥ*, but Śāntarakṣita dares to ignore the contrasting meanings of the two words, viz. *saha* and *prthag*. My tentative understanding is that Dharmakīrti intends to say here that multiple things can collaboratively produce a single effect and can separately contribute to the different features of that single effect.


32 The word *ghaṭa* is a *jātiśabda* (generic term) under certain circumstances. See n. 11. In the Vādanyāya, Dharmakīrti explains that *jātiśabda* is related to causal capacity as well. The plural word *vṛkṣāḥ* (trees) is used for plural trees to mean the different causal powers of trees for producing different effects, whereas the singular word *vṛkṣaḥ* (a tree) is used for the same trees to mean the causal power of trees for cooperatively producing a single effect. See VN 7,5–7. Śāntarakṣita refers to *ekapratyavamarśa* as the singular effect produced by the plural trees. See VNTV 32,17–18.

33 In the Vādanyāya, while explaining that conceptual cognition and verbal expression cannot establish any real existence of the objects corresponding to them, Dharmakīrti points out that some words are
As we have seen, the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in Dharmakīrti’s works. He consistently argues that each cause of a causal complex has two different kinds of capacity.\(^\text{34}\)

We are now at the stage of evaluating earlier studies. The following points should be made: First, in the case of a jar, the common capacity is the causal capacity of the constituent atoms to produce a single effect cooperatively with each other, but not the causal capacity of the jar, which is common to all jars.\(^\text{35}\) On the other hand, the specific capacity is the causal capacity of each constituent atom to produce its own specific effect, such as visual perception, but not the causal capacity of the jar to produce its own perception, which is not common to other jars. Second, these two kinds of causal capacity both belong to the same element of a complex, for example, in the case of a jar, to the same constituent atoms, such as the color atoms. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that these two belong to the respective things. Third, when discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti introduces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the usage of such expressions without admitting a whole. Therefore, he can never say that a common capacity belongs to a conventional existent (samvyptisat), such as a whole. Fourth, it has been reported that whereas a specific capacity belongs to real things,
Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

viz. particulars (svalakṣaṇa), momentary things (kṣaṇa) and so on, a common capacity belongs to conceptually constructed things, viz. common characteristics or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the continuum (santāna) and so on. However, it is clear that these both belong to real things. Conceptual construction does not have any causal capacity.³⁶ Fifth, the “fulfillment of a human’s purpose,” which is reported to be the meaning of the word arthakriyā, is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s explanation of common capacity. Common capacity and specific capacity are both causal capacities to produce an effect.

4. Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti) I 4cd

As is shown above, the specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ) is, for instance, the causal power of the color atoms of a jar to produce a visual perception, or the causal power of the smell atoms of the same jar to produce an olfactory perception. However, the single atom or the atoms separately situated can never produce a sense perception. Only when gathered together can homologous atoms produce sensations, which is their single effect. Hence, in this respect, an atom’s capacity for producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity (sāmānyā śaktiḥ).

As is well known, such commonness or similarity of the aggregated atoms is referred to by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and in his auto-commentary (PS(V)). He defines perception as cognition that is free from conceptualization and insists that its object is the particular (svalakṣaṇa). This leads to the following two questions: (1) Why is sense perception, which grasps aggregated atoms as one, free from conceptualization? (2) Why is it stated in the Abhidharma treatise that sense perceptions do not have particulars

³⁶ A continuum does not have any capacity to produce an effect because it is nothing but a conceptual construction. Of momentary elements arising in a series, the element immediately before its effect, affected by the preceding elements, is regarded as producing the effect. Or, rather, all momentary elements arising in a series are thought to contribute to producing a single effect. In the latter case, the multiple momentary elements arising in a series share the ability of producing a single effect. This leads us to understand that these momentary elements also can be regarded as a kind of causal complex. They are, so to speak, a complex of the multiple causes situated in different times. Such different momentary elements share a commonality in that they collaboratively produce a single effect, not that the effects of momentary elements resemble each other. The resemblance of different things is due to a conceptual judgement. It should be added that the momentary elements arising in a series have a commonality in that all of them are dependent on the same single seed, and therefore they are mentioned in a single word śāli (a rice plant) in accordance with the verbal convention. Thus, many different things can have a commonality, either in their having a single common effect (ekakāryatā) or in their having the same single complex of causes (ekasāmāgryadhīnatva). This is also true for the commonality of spatially different things. But, care must be taken not to conclude that Buddhists regard united things as a single entity. They do not mean that multiple things can be regarded as a single entity, but simply that such multiple things have a single effect or a single cause. Cf. PVSV 68, 18–21: tathā ye hetuphalavisēsabhūtā kimcid ekam sādhayanti sādhayante vā te ’pi sakrt pratayārtham vihyādīśabdaiḥ kṛtasamkētāḥ kathyanta iti pūrvavad vācyam /; PVA 188,7: ekasāmāgryadhīnatvāt saṃudāyapakalpane / ekākāryatvayogena yatra tatreti kalpanā //
as their object with respect to the particular characteristics of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)?

[10] [Objection:] If you insist that aggregated atoms are not conceptually accepted as one by perception, then why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that five groups of sensation have aggregated [atoms] as their objects? And besides, why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that these [groups of sensation] have particulars as their object with respect to the particular characteristics of the sense spheres (āyatanasvalakṣaṇa), but not to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)? [Answer:]

In the [above Abhidharma passages], [perception that is directed] toward its particular object [in respect to the particular characteristic of the sense sphere] is stated to have a sāmānya as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms]. (4cd)

[Perception that occurs] in its own sense sphere is stated to have a sāmānya as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms], but not because the different [atoms] are conceptually accepted as non-different from each other.38

Answering the two questions, Dignāga explains that sense perception is produced by multiple atoms. According to him, sense perception is said to have aggregated atoms as its object not because it conceptually grasps aggregated atoms as one, but because it is produced by the aggregated atoms. Therefore, it is free from conceptualization. Moreover,

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37 Cf. AKBh¹ 7.20–21 = AKBh² 7.22–24 ad AK I 10d: nanu caivam samastālambanatvāt sāmānyaviṣayāḥ pañca viññānakāyāḥ prāpnuvanti na svalakṣaṇaviṣayāḥ / āyatanasvalakṣaṇam prayat ete svalakṣaṇaviṣayāḥ iśyante na dravyasvalakṣaṇam ity adosah /; Vibhāṣā 655a26–b7: विद्वानो द्वितीय सृजनाय प्रत्येक पाय सो भवनति / भ्रातवत्सलाकारस्ताः प्रत्येक अथवाय / अयतनस्वलक्षणेतर्यथा। अयतनस्वलक्षणिः प्रत्येक अथवाय / अयतनस्वलक्षणेतर्यथा।

38 PS(V) I 4cd: kathaṃ tarhi sañcitaṁ samastālambanati pañca viññānakāyāḥ, yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti / yac cāyatanasvalakṣaṇam prayat ete svalakṣaṇaviṣayā na dravyasvalakṣaṇam iti / tatrānekārthajanyatvāt svārthe sāmānyagocaram // 4 // anekadravyotpādyatvāt tat svāyatane sāmānyaviṣayam uktam, na tu bhinnesv abhedakalpanāt / Dharmakīrti explains this passage of PS(V) as follows: “Owing to the connection with other things, [i.e., other atoms], atoms that are different [from their own previous moments] arise. They are said to be ‘aggregated’ (sañcita). They are causes of the production of [sensual] cognition [unlike previous ones]. Such a special characteristic of the atoms does not occur without other atoms [connected with them]. Therefore, since the object is not limited to a single [atom], but rather to aggregated atoms, the perceptual cognition is said to have a universal [in the sense of aggregated atoms] as its object.” (PV III 194–196.) Cf. PST 44,12–45,5; PST 45,11–1. See Hattori 1968: 26–27, 88–91; Tosaki 1979: 294–298; Dunne 2004: 98–113; Chu 2008: 212–215; Yoshida 2010: 152–156, etc.
its object is said to be sāmānya in respect to dravyasvalakṣaṇa, not because it has a conceptualized object, but because it is produced by aggregated atoms rather than by a single atom.

The idea that multiple things cooperatively produce a single effect is basically the same as the idea of sāmānyā śaktih. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the atom’s efficiency in producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity.

It should be noted that the aggregated atoms that produce a single sense perception are called sāmānya here. The word means neither universals nor commonness in this context. It is being used in a similar fashion as is the word sāmānya in the compound tatsāmānya (PV II 102b. See [2]). The aggregated atoms themselves that commonly have the sāmānya śaktih can also be called sāmānya.39

Moreover, it is significant that Dignāga refers here to two kinds of particular (sva-lakṣaṇa): particulars concerning the sense spheres (āyatanasvalakṣaṇa) and particulars concerning substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa). The aggregated atoms are regarded as svalakṣaṇa with respect to the former, and as sāmānya, which as mentioned above means “aggregate,” with respect to the latter. The aggregated atoms have two different aspects. In the first aspect, for example, the color atoms are differentiated from other types of atoms such as smell atoms. The color atoms never produce olfactory sensations. The ability of the aggregated atoms is limited and separately defined in each type. This ability is nothing but the specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktih) mentioned by later Buddhists. On the other hand, in the second aspect, the aggregated atoms are differentiated from a single atom that cannot produce any sense perception by itself.40 This aggregate’s ability of cooperatively producing a single effect can be regarded as a kind of common capacity, as mentioned above. In this way, Dignāga’s idea that the aggregate becomes the object of sense perception can be interpreted in relation to the theory of two kinds of causal capacity. However, he does not directly mention the two different kinds of causal capacity of atoms. We can safely say that the groundwork for the theory of the two kinds of causal capacity was prepared by Dignāga.41

In fact, Dharmakīrti’s argument concerning the two kinds of causal capacity in PV II arises in the context of the explanation that aggregated atoms have special features for producing their own cognition, unlike a single atom or atoms that are situated separately.42

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39 In Tibetan logic, the word spyi is considered to have three different meanings: 1) tshogs spyi, 2) rigs spyi, and 3) don spyi. Of these, 1) tshogs spyi seems to be related to the aggregate called sāmānya by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. See Dreyfus 1997: 107–109.

40 Jinendrabuddhi (and perhaps Dignāga as well) regards a single atom as dravyasvalakṣaṇa, unlike Yaśomitra, who explains that the dravyasvalakṣaṇa means, for example, specific colors, such as blue. See PST 45,14–46,3; AKV 28,10–16.

41 Before Dignāga, it was debated in the Abhidharma tradition whether multiple things can be perceived at once through a single cognition. See Vibhāṣā 63c22–25; 64a11–25. Dignāga insists in this respect that aggregated atoms are grasped at once through a single perception. Following Dignāga’s insistence, Dharmakīrti holds that even different aggregates of atoms are grasped through a single cognition. Not only color atoms of the same kind (e.g. blue atoms) are grasped through a single cognition, but also color atoms of different kinds (e.g. blue, yellow and red atoms). This is how Dharmakīrti develops his argument of citrādvaita in PV III.

The theory of causal complex, according to which multiple things can cooperatively produce a single effect, seems to be one of the most important foundations for his epistemology and ontology.

5. Is causal capacity absolute?

As we have seen above, Dharmakīrti additionally remarks in PVSV (17) that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. Judging from this, it is not absolute that words must correspond to the causal capacity of objects. There are similar comments in his other works. For example, in the Vādanyāya, after explaining the correspondence between words and causal powers, Dharmakīrti states the following:

[11] However, we [Buddhists] never stick to [our explanation of the relationship between words and causal powers] because [words simply] operate to denote or connote their objects fixed by a verbal convention as the verbal convention governs.43

This passage clearly shows that Dharmakīrti does not overly stress his theory of two kinds of causal capacity. It is not absolute for him. He ultimately thinks that words are dependent only on verbal conventions.44

In PV I and PVSV Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the relationship between words and objects is not intrinsic but extrinsic because it is based only on the verbal conventions established by humans. According to him, the different forms of words do not have any relation to external objects. For example, the words dārāḥ (pl., wife), ṣaṇṇagarī (sg., six cities) and so on do not correspond to their referents in number.45 Dharmakīrti also makes a sarcastic comment about the false view that words are strongly connected to external objects as follows:

[12] Words, which can produce no appearance of external things and which can merely be causes of conceptual cognition in accordance with preceding repeated experiences, operate to denote or connote objects, depending only on human intentions. Nevertheless, [some linguists and philosophers seriously] consider the application of words to objects, and determine real things separately in accordance with words. They just display their own ignorance.46

43 VN 7, 8–9: asoci tu sāṃketikēsy artheṣu sāṃketavāsād vṛttir ity anabhiniveśa eva eva /
44 See VNTV 32,25–26: sāṃketavaśāc chabdānam bahuvacanāntānāṃ dārāḥ sikatāḥ pādā gurava ityādinā 'saty api bhavanteṣv vṛttir ṭathā saty api anekatve śanagare śatipūl vanam ityādinaitvacanāntānāṃ vṛttir ity anabhiniveśa eva / ko hi nāma sacetanaḥ purusābhīpṛyānātrādīnāvṛttiṣu śaṅbheṣv abhiniveśaṃ kartum uṣahata iti bhāvāḥ / Cf. PV IV 116a–c: samketasamśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa ca icchāmātrasamśrayaḥ / nāsiddhiḥ śabdasiddhānām…
45 VN I 67: dārāḥ śanagarityādau bhedābhedayavasthitāḥ / kasya svabhāvaḥ khatvāṃ cety atra vā kim nibhandhanam //
46 PVSV 36, 9–12: vāceṣu purusāyatavṛttiṇām śabdānāṃ avastusamdarśinām yathābhīyāsāṃ vikalpa-prabodhatānāṃ pravṛtticintā tadvāsād vastuyavasthāpanāṃ ca kevalaṃ śadhakahyāpanam /
In the ultimate sense, words themselves do not have any direct relation to external objects. Words can be used to denote or connote objects and are dependent only on the speaker’s will. Words can also produce no appearance of external things. Nevertheless, many thinkers attempt to find the applications of words in external objects, and to determine external objects in accordance with words. According to Dharmakīrti, they should feel deep regret for their follies.

Interestingly, in this context, he presents the objection that a singular word can be used to refer to multiple things because it signifies their causal capacity to produce one and the same effect. He refutes this objection by pointing out that capacity never exists apart from real being.

We should notice that what is refuted by Dharmakīrti here is exactly the same as his own theory of sāmānyā śaktiḥ. Here he has turned around and is criticizing the causal capacity. According to this passage, causal capacity never exists in reality, it can only be a conceptual construction. Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of causal capacity.

The theory of two kinds of causal capacity cannot ultimately contribute to satisfactorily explaining the application of words to referents. It is only used as a conventional theory for the philosophical argument. Dharmakīrti presents his argument only by tentatively

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47 A similar argument is found in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasamgraha. TS 570:  saṣṭhīvacanabhedādi viva-kśāmātrasambhavī / tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tatsvarūpavyavasthītiḥ // See Inami 2014: Appendix II.

48 Prajñākaragupta also argues that there is no exact correspondence between words and external objects, pointing out that every language has inconsistencies in grammatical rules. Furthermore, he severely criticizes those who insist that Sanskrit is the only perfect language. Cf. PV A 99,3–12. See Inami 2014: note 22.

49 PVSV 37, 9–14: tathābhūtañāṃ kvacid arthe ’bhinnā śaktir asti śa nimittaṃ iti cet / na / śakter vasturūpavyātirekā / vyātireke vānupakāryasya pāratantryāyogā / upakāre vā šaktupakārinyā api śakter vyātireka ity anavasthitier apratipatitiḥ / tadavyātreke vā ādyāyām api prasaṅgā iti yat kimcid etat /

50 As is well known, Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of the relation in the same manner in Sambandhapañkṣa. See SP vv. 4–5.

accepting that words have some relation to the external world. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, he holds that how words are used depends merely on verbal conventions established by humans and never reflects reality. Furthermore, he rejects the realistic view of causal capacity. Several concepts are introduced to explain worldly affairs and these concepts have some consistency. However, they are just conceptual constructions and are not absolute. We should not adhere to them.  

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to state the following five points:

1. In the example of a jar, two kinds of causal capacity belong to the constituent atoms of the jar, such as the color atoms, but neither to the jar as a whole (avayavin) nor to the jar as a continuum (santāna).
2. In the case of the color atoms of the jar, common capacity (sāmānyā śaktih) is their causal capacity to produce a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other kinds of atoms of the same jar; specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktih) is their causal capacity to produce their own specific effect, such as visual perception.
3. The capacity of the color atoms to produce a visual perception is regarded as the specific capacity in comparison to other kinds of atoms, such as smell atoms. However, it can be regarded as the common capacity in the sense that only aggregated atoms can have this capacity.
4. The theory of two kinds of causal capacity is advocated by Dharmakīrti throughout his works. The groundwork for this theory was prepared by Dignāga.
5. When discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti introduces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the expression without admitting a whole. However, he does not stick exclusively to this theory. He finally abandons the theoretical explanation of the relationship between words and objects and adopts the view that words are just dependent on the verbal conventions established by humans. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, causal capacity is also merely a conceptual construction.

References and abbreviations


52 Cf. PV III 209: idam vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ / yathā yathā ṛṭhās cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā // 209 //
Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ


Inami 2013  Masahiro Inami, Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (12) [A Study of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika (12)]. *Bulletin of Tokyo Gakugei University, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences II* 64 (2013) 89–114.

Inami 2014  Masahiro Inami, Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13) [A Study of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika (13)]. *Bulletin of Tokyo Gakugei University, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences II* 65 (2014) 71–94.


Mikogami 1978  Esho Mikogami, Mono ni sonawaru fuhenteki-kinō to tokushuteki-kinō [Sāmānyā śakti and Pratiniyatā śakti: Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākara-


PVT Pramāṇavārttīkāṭīkā (Sākyabuddhi), Tibetan translation. D No. 4220. P No. 5718.


PV(V) Pramāṇavārttīkavṛtti (Ravigupta) ad PV II, Tibetan translation. D No. 4224; P No. 5726.

Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ


Vibhūticandra’s Note to Manorathanandin’s PVV. Sanskrit text edited in the footnotes of the Appendix to the Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition of PVV(M).

Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāstra, Chinese translation (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論). Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (大正新修大蔵経), vol. 27, No. 1545.


Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Viniṃdeva), Tibetan translation. D No. 4240; P No. 5737.


Introduction

It was really a new attempt when Dharmakīrti introduced sādhyaviparyaye [hetoh] bādha-
kapramāṇa (hereafter VBP) as a methodological device with reference to svabhāvahetu,
especially with respect to the proof of momentariness of all existence, in his logico-
epistemological system. Dharmakīrti’s followers discussed the role and logical content of
VBP in the pramāṇa system mainly in the context of the proof of kṣanabhaṅga.

With reference to the theory, several studies have brought into focus its impact on the
whole logico-epistemological theory of later Buddhist logicians. Above all Tani, in his
great work, focuses on the relation between VBP and prasaṅgal/prasaṅgaviparyaya and
their roles, and discusses how Dharmakīrti’s followers evaluate them in their proof of
momentariness. This theory, in fact, raised new complications with respect to the structure
of the means of valid cognition and its logical and epistemic base.

One of these complications is the relation between VBP and establishing anvaya(-vyāpti)
as well as vyatireka(-vyāpti). It seems unclear in both traditional and contemporary inter-
pretations whether VBP is valid for establishing either affirmative concomitance (anvaya)
or negative concomitance (vyatireka), or whether it is valid for both at the same time. It is of
course not easy to find a direct answer to this question by an Indian logician. But in an effort
to do so, this paper will begin by focusing on Jñānaśrīmitra’s descriptions of VBP, especially
in the vyatireka section of the Kṣanabhaṅga chapter of the Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali
(JNA). At the beginning of this chapter, an opponent called viparyayabādhakapramāṇāvā-
din appears, whose claims are criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra. By analyzing the relevant texts,
we may be able to discern where Jñānaśrīmitra stands on the issue.

As a preliminary observation, it may help us to keep in mind that anvaya-vyāpti and
vyatireka-vyāpti are accepted as logically equivalent, at least by the thinkers after Dharmakīrti.
In the epistemic process, however, we cannot simply presume their equivalence, since

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3. Tani’s understanding of the VBP’s interpretations by Dharmakīrti’s followers, such as Dharmottara and
   Prajñākaragupta, are scattered throughout his work (1999), but are found in chapter 3 in particular.
4. For instance: First, VBP is sometimes identified with or regarded as being based on vyāpaka[dharma]-
anupalabdhi, at least by Dharmakīrti and some logicians after him. Is VBP an inference based on
   vyāpakānupalabdhi or it cannot necessarily be identified with such an inference? Second, how is VBP
   related to prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya? If VBP is different from these, what is the difference
   between prasaṅgal/prasaṅgaviparyaya and VBP formally, logically, and content-wise? Or is the latter
   the same as the former, especially prasaṅgaviparyaya, since both of them have the same style of proof
   formulation. The late Prof. Kajiyama assessed the matter as follows: “I think that Kamalaśīla was quite
   right when he identified viparyaye bādhaṇkapramāṇam with a prasaṅga. … With Kamalaśīla, I also
   regard bādhaṇkapramāṇa as prasaṅga in essence” (Kajiyama 1999: 37). He did not, however, mention
   the passage upon which his estimation depends.
it depends on what kind of independent \textit{pramāṇa} or other subsidiary means of cognition the determination of \textit{anvaya} or \textit{vyatireka} is related to or based upon, as will be discussed in the following. We can suppose this is one of the reasons Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti treat them separately in their discussion on the proof of momentariness.

Jñānaśrīmitra's \textit{Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya} consists of three \textit{pāda}s. In the first \textit{pāda}, \textit{pakṣadharmādhikāra}, the theme is that in the formula “\textit{yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā jaladharaḥ, santas tu bhāvā ime}” (Whatever is existent is momentary, for instance a rain cloud. And these things are existent. [Therefore, these things are momentary.]), the reason \textit{sat/sattva} is not “unestablished” (\textit{asiddha}). In the second \textit{pāda}, \textit{anvayādhikāra}, it is not incompatible (\textit{viruddha}). And in the third \textit{pāda}, \textit{vyatirekādhikāra}, which I take up in the following, it is not inconclusive (\textit{anaikāntika}).

1. The relation between two kinds of pervasion, \textit{anvaya} and \textit{vyatireka}

The critique of the \textit{viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin} in Jñānaśrīmitra's \textit{vyatirekādhikāra} begins with the following argument:

(A) There is also no suspicion that [the reason “being existent” might be] inconclusive, because the proof is given based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (\textit{sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ}).

\textit{Opponent, i.e., viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin} The pervasion is established by virtue of “the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]” (\textit{viparyayabādhakapramāṇa}). Therefore, we do not find any additional information (\textit{vārtā}) by introducing it (i.e. the pervasion that comprises all individual instances). Then, why do you say that the pervasion is [already] established?

\textit{Opponent} In this way, there must only be an affirmative concomitance (\textit{anvayamātram}). Then, how can we obtain the conclusive exclusion [of the reason] from the dissimilar domain?

\textit{Jñānaśrīmitra} It is because the pervasion is exactly established.

\textit{Opponent} How is the pervasion of the negative exclusion itself established?\footnote{JNA p. 60, 3–10: \textit{nāpy anaikāntikaśaṅkā, sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ prasādhanaḥ, nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇavasād vyāptisiddhiḥ, tasya ca nopanyāsavārtā, tat katham vyāptih prasādhitety ucyate? …nanv evam anvayamātram astu, vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyatireka iti katham labhyam iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva vyatireke vyāptisiddhī eva katham iti cet. (Ci' RNA p. 70, 9–11 and 15–16: \textit{na cāyam anaikāntikāḥ, atrāva sādharmyavatī drṣṭānte sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ prasādhanaḥ, nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇabālād vyāptisiddhiḥ, tasya copanyāsavārāpi nāsti. tat katham vyāptih prasādhitieti cet. …nanv evam anvayamātram astu, vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyāyṛttir iti kuto labhyata iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva. vyatirekāsandehe vyāptisiddhī eva katham iti cet.) [Different readings are in bold font.]}
From the description above, we first notice that Jñānaśrīmitra evaluates sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti in the anvya-vyatireka context of their symmetrical roles, while the opponent, viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin, does not. This is one of the crucial points dividing Jñānaśrīmitra’s position from that of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin. I will come back to this point again in a later section. Jñānaśrīmitra then formally differentiates and defines the two pervasions, anvaya-rūpā and vyatirekarūpā.

(B) 〈Jñānaśrīmitra〉 No, the pervasion is in fact of two kinds. One is that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayarūpā) and is a property of the subjective element (kartṛdharma). It is the inevitable presence of that which is to be proven in the property-possessor that has the proving [property]. And the other is that which has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic (vyatirekarūpā) and is a property of the objective element (karmadharma). It is the inevitable absence of the proving [property] when that which is to be proven is absent. This is because the following is a sound logic: The pervasion is such that the pervader presents there (i.e., in the pervaded) without fail, or else the pervaded presents only there (i.e., in the pervader).

We do not find any original element in Jñānaśrīmitra’s definition of anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti except the introduction of the expressions kartṛdharma and karmadharma. As to these terms, taking the sādhana-sādhya relation into consideration, I tentatively interpret kartṛ and karman as corresponding to sādhana and sādhya, respectively. If my understanding is correct, then it follows that Jñānaśrīmitra regards a proof as a kriyā, of which sādhana and sādhya are constituent elements. Then, he refers to the relation between anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti as follows:

(C) And the establishment of one of these two inevitably (niyamena) hints at the understanding of the second (i.e., the other). This is because otherwise even one of them cannot be established. The practical activity of the valid means of cognition is carried out only directly (sākṣāt) with reference to one [of them], and one can gain an understanding of the other as logically immediate (nāntarīyakatayā). The expression “one [of the two]” is employed just as far as they are related to each other in this way. And in such a case, even if suspicion about one of these two arises before a valid means of cognition of the other functions, the suspicion will be expelled by it afterwards. Just as for those who advocate

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6 The relation between VBP and sarvopasamabhāra has been studied recently by Sakai (2014).

7 JNA p. 60, 10–13: “na, dvividhā hi vyāptih, anvayarūpā ca kartṛdharmanā sādhanavāti dharmini sādhyasāvāsyamabhāvo yah, vyatirekarūpā ca karmadharmanā sādhyaśābhāve sādhanasyāvasyamabhāvo yah,” vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāva iti nyāyāt. (a: Ci’ RNA p. 70, 17–20: na. dvividhā hi vyāptisiddhiḥ. anvayarūpā ca kartṛdharmanā sādhanadharmavāti dharmini sādhyadharmasyāvasyamabhāvo yah, vyatirekarūpā ca karmadharmanā sādhyābhāve sādhanasyāvasyamabhāvo*) yan. [Different readings are in bold font.] (*Emendation. RNA p. 70, 19: sādhanasyāvāsyamabhāvo.)

8 Another interpretation is as follows: Taking the context of the vyāpaka-vyāpya relation into consideration, kartṛ and karman can correspond to vyāpaka (i.e., sādhyasyāvāsyamabhāvo) and vyāpya (i.e., sādhana), respectively.
“the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] (viparyayabādhakapramāṇāvādin),” affirmative concomitance, even though it is suspected, since the suspicion is expelled by virtue of the conclusive exclusion [of the property] from the dissimilar domain (vipaksād ekāntena vyāvṛttibalāt), concludes that the “being existent,” which never happens at all in [the things] that are not momentary, is really restricted by [the property of] momentary perishing.

Accordingly, there is no difference in content (na kaścid arthato bhedaḥ) between them; viz., the conclusive exclusion of the proving [property] in the absence of [the property] to be proven, and the inevitable concomitance of [the property] to be proven when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis].

Here Jñānaśrīmitra stresses the incorporation of the understanding of anvaya and vyatireka into the epistemic process. In the last part of the passage cited above, he says that there is no difference in content between them. Here, we must draw attention to the underlined portion. According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s description, the VBP-vādin claims that the suspicion of anvaya can be expelled by the exclusion [of the property] from dissimilar domain. That is, VBP-vādin prioritizes vyatireka over anvaya.

Jñānaśrīmitra then adds:

(D) As to the function (vyāpāra) of the means of valid cognition, however, its practical activity (vyavahāra) is of two kinds, principally (mukhyato) and implicatively (arthataḥ).

On the level of daily performance, however, we find two kinds of practical activities of the valid means of cognition, principally (mukhyato), or directly (sākṣāt), and implicatively (arthataḥ), which follows direct cognition as [logically] immediate (nāntarīyakataya). For Jñānaśrīmitra, the difference between anvaya and vyatireka lies only in the level of practical activity (vyavahāra). In Dignāga’s system as well as Dharmakīrti’s, the relation between anvaya and vyatireka is sometimes expressed as arthāpattiyā. If one is proven, the other is automatically understood by arthāpatti. That is, either of these two is logically implied in the other. Jñānaśrīmitra’s expression arthataḥ accords with this idea.

9 JNA p. 60, 13–18 and 61, 2–3: **enayoś caikasiddhir niyamena dvitiyaprātītim ākṣipati. anyathā ekasyāpy asiddheḥ.** “kevalam sākṣād ekatra pramāṇavāpyāro ‘nyatra nāntariyakatayā praśūtir iti tāvataivaikavyapadeśah. tathā ca saty ekatra pramāṇapravṛtyteḥ pūrvam anyatra saṃśayasam pravartamāno’pi paścāt [anyā?] tā tayā nirasyate. yathā viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādīnān anvayaḥ sandihyamāno ’pi vipaksād ekāntena vyāvṛttibalāt nirastasamśayasam rigavyasvaty ākṣamanī pravartamāno vistāt kaśmabhaṅgataṁivaśiṣṭya, ...tasmat sādhyāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāvāhīvāv

10 JNA p. 61, 3–4: pramāṇavāpyāras tu mukhyato ‘rthataś ceti dvidhā vyavahārāḥ.

11 NMu 3a1–3 (Katsura 1981: 71–72): 有於此一分已成、隨説一分亦成能立、若如其聲両義同許、俱不須説、或由義准一能顕二。 PSṬ (Ms) 178b6 ad PS 4.5: arthāpattiyā vetyādi. ...; PVSV p. 18, 17 (=PVin2, p. 53, 10): arthāpattiyā vānyatāreṇobhayapradarśanāt iti.
2. sādhakapramāṇa and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa

Then Jñānaśrīmitra presents an argument of sādhaka- and viparyayabādhaka-pramāṇa.

(E) Precisely therefore, in every reasoning, if one seeks “the means of valid cognition that annuls the reverse of that which is to be proven” [and if there is such a means of valid cognition], there is an affirmative concomitance [of the reason] with that which is to be proven, in the case where the proving [property] (i.e., the reason) is present [in the subject of the thesis]. One should know that seeking “the means of valid cognition that establishes [that which is to be proven] (sādhakapramāṇa),” is implied (upalakṣita) by that (i.e., seeking VBP). Furthermore, [when one introduces VBP,] both [of these two pramāṇas, namely, sādhakapramāṇa and bādhakapramāṇa,] are really integrated (ubhayasaṃgraha eva) by the term “annulling the reverse” (viparyayabādhaka).12

If we try to prove the pervasion by VBP, we should know that sādhakapramāṇa is implied in VBP, and accordingly, we should know that both pramāṇas are integrated in the concept bādhakapramāṇa. The ubhaya of ubhayasaṃgraha can also be interpreted as anvaya and vyatireka, but it seems more likely that Jñānaśrīmitra regards sādhakapramāṇa as corresponding to anvaya and bādhakapramāṇa to vyatireka. The above-quoted passage, however, throws into question any simple opposition between adopting sādhakapramāṇa and adopting bādhakapramāṇa. Though the two positions are ostensibly opposed, his argument makes little distinction between them. Rather, he seems to take an integrative or synthetic stance toward sādhakapramāṇa(vādin) and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa(vādin), even if he thinks one of them is prior to the other in a particular case. Then, the question arises what kind of pramāṇa is intended by the term sādhakapramāṇa? We can surmise that Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer is given in the subsequent discussion, so let us examine what follows.

3. Two kinds of viparyayabādhakapramāṇa13

Jñānaśrīmitra continues by explaining the latter position:

(F) In fact, with reference to the pervasion that has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, [there is a means of valid cognition which] annuls the proving [property] in the reverse of that which is to be proven. (In the proof of momentariness, it annuls “being existent” in those that are not momentary.) With reference to [the pervasion] that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic, on the other hand, it annuls “the reverse of that which is

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12 JNA p. 61, 4–6: ata eva yatra yatra sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramānaparyesānā, tatra sādhune sati sādhyānvayaḥ, sādhakapramānaparyesānapī tayopalakṣitā veditavyāḥ. viparyayabādhakasabdena punar ubhayasaṃgraha eva.

13 At the last Dharmakīrti conference in 2005, Shiraishi drew attention to this passage. Regretfully, his paper, titled “Jñānaśrīmitra’s two interpretations of bādhakapramāṇa” was not included in the proceedings of the conference, Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis, 2011.
According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, VBP proves not only vyatireka but anvaya as well, that is, it can be introduced in two ways. Furthermore, for anvaya, VBP annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property]. This is a new interpretation of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa.

As is well known, in his Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti first refers to ‘sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa’ as follows:

\[ \text{anvayaniścayo 'pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmasya vastutas tadbhāvataya sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ. sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇaṃ} \]

\[ \text{anvayarūpāyāṃ tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakaṃ sādhanasya satīti} \]

\[ \text{tadubhayābhāve sādhanasya sādhyapratibandhapattir ity ayam arthaḥ.} \]


From the description, it is ambiguous whether or not Dharmakīrti was conscious of the relation between ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa’ and the proof of anvaya-vyāpti or vyatireka-vyāpti. It seems that Dharmakīrti introduced ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa’ as a subsidiary method for supporting the establishment of the inevitable connection of anvaya, stated as anvayaniścayo ‘pi, but remained strongly conscious of the logical equality of anvaya and vyatireka, an equality that is presupposed by the relation of the contradiction (virodha) between sādhya and sādhyayiparyayaye. Logically, it is clear that ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetor (i.e., sādhanasya) bādhakapramāṇa’ can be understood as expressing vyatireka, since it proves that where sādhyaviparyayaye is present, that is, where sādhya is absent, hetu is absent.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, however, VBP also annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property] (sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa). This is a new interpretation of VBP, based on the interpretation
of the compound (\textit{viparyayabādhakapramāṇa}) as a genitive \textit{tatpuruṣa} (hereafter VBP\textsubscript{2}), which is in contrast to the original interpretation of the compound as a locative \textit{tatpuruṣa} (hereafter VBP\textsubscript{1}). According to Jñānaśrīmitra, at least, VBP\textsubscript{1} annuls the reason “being existent” (i.e., \textit{hetos}) in “those that are not momentary” (i.e., \textit{sādhyaviparyaye}). That is, VBP\textsubscript{1} \textit{principally or directly} proves that if something is not momentary, it is non-existent, namely, \textit{vyatireka}. It also proves that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary; that is, it proves \textit{anvaya indirectly}, because being momentary and not being momentary are contradictory (\textit{virodha}). In the second new interpretation, however, VBP\textsubscript{2} annuls “being not momentary” (i.e., “the reverse of that which is to be proven”) in that which “is existent” (i.e., the proving property). It proves \textit{principally or directly} that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary, that is, \textit{anvaya}. Therefore, according to his understanding, not only \textit{vyatireka} but also \textit{anvaya} can and should be proven by VBP (VBP\textsubscript{1}/VBP\textsubscript{2}). In the descriptions above, however, we do not concretely find both of these \textit{bādhakapramāṇas}, such as \textit{vyāpakānupalabdhi} introduced by Dharmakīrti and other logicians.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, in the above passage, Jñānaśrīmitra emphasizes not only the logical equivalence of \textit{anvaya} and \textit{vyatireka}, but the methodological equivalence of \textit{sādhakapramāṇa} and \textit{bādhakapramāṇa} as well. By \textit{ubhayābhāve} does he indicate that both of these VBPs are necessary? In the next paragraph, he states, “Those who present a proof should seek for both of these (i.e., \textit{anvaya} and \textit{vyatireka}) alternatively (\textit{vikalpena}).” In other words, if one wants to prove a pervasion by VBP, one should introduce not only VBP\textsubscript{1} but also VBP\textsubscript{2}, which principally establishes the \textit{anvaya} relation. It is likely that what he really wants to emphasize is the latter, VBP\textsubscript{2}.

He continues:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(G)] Otherwise, even though one cannot directly (\textit{sākṣāt}) obtain the means of valid cognition that determines negative concomitance, if one shows a means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (\textit{anvayaniyama}) of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven, then what is its (=the proving property’s) inevitable connection with reference to the establishment of that which is to be proven? It is because [the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance] hints at the ability of negative concomitance as well (that is, there is no inevitable connection of affirmative concomitance that is independent from the ability of negative concomitance.)\textsuperscript{18}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Steinkellner 1982: 2; 1991: 318. After Dharmakirti, for instance: HBT p. 44, 24: \textit{etac ca bādhakaṁ pramāṇaṁ vyāpakānupalabdhirūpam uttaratrāvasaarprāptam svayam eva vaksyati}, VNT p. 10, 27–28: idam uktam bhavati, \textit{vyāpakānupalabdhir eva sahabhāvam bādhate hetoḥ sādhyābhāvena}. RNA p. 83, 8: na ca viruddhānaiṅkāntike, \textit{vyāpakānupalambhātmanā viparyaye bādhakaprāmāṇena vyāpteḥ prasādhanāt}. TBh(M) (Kajiyama 1966: 115, n. 309) … \textit{zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa'i mthshan nyid can bzog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas} (… \textit{iti vyāpakānupalabhilalakṣāna( rūpa)viparyayabādhakapramāṇena}…)\textsuperscript{19} [This part is dropped in the Sanskrit text to which we have access. The Sanskrit above has been reconstructed by Kajiyama.]

\textsuperscript{18} JNA p. 61, 8–10: \textit{anyathā vyatirekanaiṅkāntikāprāmāṇasaya sāksād alābhe ’pi yadi sādhanasya sādhye-nvayaniyamaprasādhaḥkam pramāṇam upadarsaṁ, kuśa saśa sādhyavīdhum pratibandho vyatirekasyāpi* sāmarthāyakeṣṭi}. \textsuperscript{*Corrected with Ms.; JNA: vyatirekasyānvyayasyāpi.} Concerning the last part, various readings are possible. The difference in the interpretation of the sentence lies in the
Otherwise [that is, if the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance is only able to establish affirmative concomitance, irrespective of the inevitability of negative concomitance], it would ensue that the proof formulation of similarity should not really be presented, since the proof does not directly express [the inevitability of] negative concomitance.

Accordingly, even though [an inevitable connection], the ability of which one can understand, does not have negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, exactly insofar as “wherever the proving [property is present], that which is to be proven [is also present]” [is the essence of pervasion], if there is the proving [property in the subject of the thesis], a wise person who is provided with the expectation of that which is to be proven [being established] achieves his purpose.

This is because, in fact, when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis], even if [a property that is to be proven] is absent when it (i.e., the proving property) is absent, if the [property] that is to be proven is inevitably present when it (i.e., the proving property) is present, then it is fruitful to accept the proof. Hence, a proponent who presents a proof should seek even for both of these (i.e., anvaya and vyatireka) alternatively (vikalpena), and even in either of these styles [a proof] which is established by a means of valid cognition must be shown by a proponent. In the proofs of the opponent, however, even an affirmative concomitance as having inevitability, is really difficult to be obtained, as a negative concomitance is. We should know in this way.\textsuperscript{19}

From the above description, the position of the opponent, the viparyayabādha-pramāṇa-vādin, seems to be that VBP should be introduced for the proof of vyatireka and it is the only way to prove the pervasion, while Jñānaśrīmitra equates VBP of vyatireka with that of anvaya, which is the substance of his new interpretation. Here, Jñānaśrīmitra claims that it is needless to state both of the means of valid cognition that prove anvaya and vyatireka; that the statement of either one is enough because they are logically connected to each other. Therefore, if the pervasion of anvaya is proven, it is unnecessary to state the proof of vyatireka.

The final statement above is particularly noteworthy. Jñānaśrīmitra points out a disadvantage in the opponent’s view: according to the opponent’s proof by VBP, the relation between anvaya and vyatireka is not clear. The point of his criticism lies not in VBP itself but in the opponent’s understanding of “tasya sādhyasiddhau” [tasya: (a) sādhanaśya; (b) pramāṇasya; sādhyasiddhau: (a) when … is proven, (b) with reference to sādhyasiddha].

\textsuperscript{19} JNA p. 61, 11–17: anyathā sādharmanyaprayogo ‘nupādeya eva syāt, sākṣād vyatirekānupadarśanāt. tad yadi sāmarthyagamyo ’pi na vyatirekātmā, tadā ’pi yatra yatra sādhanaḥ tatra tatra sādhyaṃ ityvatava sādhane sati sādhyapratayāśrayuktah kṛti kṛtaḥ. tadabhāve ’bhāviny api hi sādhane sati yadi tadbhāve ’vaśyambhāvī sādhyaṃ tadā phalitah sādhanavikārāḥ. tasmiḥ sādhanavādātā dvayam api paryevaṃśyam viṣkalpena, vādām caikā ’pi prakārāḥ pramāṇasiddha upadarśayitavyaḥ. parasādhaneṣu ca vyatirekavad anvayo ’pi niyamaṃvāṃ durlabha eveti veditavyam.
as a methodical device, but in the opponent’s position whereby the proof of vyatireka by VBP\textsubscript{1} is the one and only way to prove a pervasion.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, the difference between his position and that of the VBP-vādin is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anvaya</td>
<td>sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP\textsubscript{2}) or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyatireka</td>
<td>sādhyaviparyaye hetoh bādhakapramāṇa (VBP\textsubscript{1})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can say that the position of the opponent, viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin, is a propounder who claims VBP\textsubscript{1} has the exclusive ability to establish pervasion only through proving the vyatireka-vyāpti by VBP\textsubscript{1}. Meanwhile, Jñānaśrīmitra regards VBP (VBP\textsubscript{1}/VBP\textsubscript{2}) as having the synthetic ability to prove pervasion.

### 3. Priority of praśaṅga and praśaṅgaviparyaya

Jñānaśrīmitra continues:

(H) However, for us, with reference to the discussed proof, affirmative concomitance with inevitability (niyamavān anvayaḥ) is really shown by praśaṅga and praśaṅgaviparyaya prior [to other means of valid cognition] (paurastyābhāyām). And even if both are applied to the cloud presented as a similar example, if one thing (A\textsubscript{1}) has the essential property of creating another (B\textsubscript{1}), the former (A\textsubscript{1}) inevitably produces the latter (B\textsubscript{1}), and one thing (A\textsubscript{2}) does not produce another (B\textsubscript{2}), then the former (A\textsubscript{2}) does not have the essential property of creating the latter (B\textsubscript{2}). Thus, [anvaya and vyatireka], which are functioning in this way, show that all [entities], indeed, that are endowed with the ability of activity (kriyāśaktiyuktaṃ) are restricted to being momentary.

Therefore, comprising all cases (sarvopasaṃhāro) is the ground for hinting at negative pervasion (vyatirekākṣepabījaṃ),\textsuperscript{20} such as smoke and the like.\textsuperscript{21}

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\textsuperscript{20} As to the usage of ākṣepa in the context of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, see RNA 67.4: ākṣiptavyatirekā yā vyāptī anvayarūpī / sādharmyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocyate // [The pervasion that has anvaya as its essential characteristic and by which [its] vyatireka is hinted at …]; 83.4: vyatirekāṃ kāmā vyāptī ākṣiptānvyatirekārūpī / vaidharmyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocyate // [The pervasion that has vyatireka as its essence and has the essential characteristic that [its] anvaya is hinted at …] It seems that these two verses, which appear at the beginning of each chapter of Ratnakīrti’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, in the anvaya and vyatireka chapters, respectively, and have symmetrical construction, were composed by the author (Ratnakīrti or someone else) (see Woo 1999: 141), being strongly conscious of the discussion of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, which Jñānaśrīmitra makes here.

\textsuperscript{21} JNA p. 61, 18–22: asmābhīs tu prakṛtrasādhane niyamavān anvayaḥ praśaṅgaviparyavyābhāyāṃ paurastyābhāyāṃ darśita eva, tāu ca yady api sapakṣikre jalabhṛti pravartita, tathāpi yo yatkaranāsasvabhāvaḥ
Against the VBP-vādin, Jñānaśrīmitra argues for the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (anvayaniyama) first and foremost through prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. In the above statement, the first point to note is the expression paurastyābhyāṃ; the second is that the statement is not concerned with pervasion in general, including vyatireka(-niyama), but only with anvayaniyama. As to the first point, the term paurastya means “prior to,” “first,” or “preceding,” which suggests that he does not necessarily exclude the logic of VBP, but insists only that prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya should be introduced before introducing VBP. That is, for Jñānaśrīmitra, prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya are enough for establishing affirmative concomitance with reference to the proof of momentariness, whereas the VBP-vādin considers VBP to be the sole means for establishing the pervasion. Moreover, the “comprising [of] all [individual instances] (sarvopasaṃhāra)” as a concept having a connecting function between anvaya and vyatireka is highly esteemed by Jñānaśrīmitra. According to him, “if anvaya is established by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya,” sarvopasaṃhāra is regarded as “the grounds for hinting at negative pervasion (vyatirekā-kṣepabijām),” whereas the VBP-vādin does not make much of this. The VBP-vādin’s low evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāra suggests that, according to his/their view, vyatireka can be proven independently (concerning each subject of the thesis) as having inevitability and is sufficient for establishing a pervasion.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the basic difference between Jñānaśrīmitra and the VBP-vādin is the evaluation of efficacy of the proof based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti). The opponent, the VBP-vādin, apparently takes a negative stance toward sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti. On this point it is likely that the opponent, the VBP-vādin, is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significant role of the sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti for the proof of momentariness and his antavyāpti-theory. He says, for instance, “as this pervasion comprises all [individual instances], it depends upon the universal,”22 and, “for pervasion comprising all [individual instances] is in fact an indispensable constituent (aṅga) of the establishment of that which is to be proven.”23

4. Priority of anvaya over vyatireka

Furthermore Jñānaśrīmitra argues:

(I) Then, in this way, [the essence of] the pervasion [is that] “the pervading [property] is inevitably present in those which have the [property of being] pervaded.” And the establishment of momentary perishing cannot be repudiated on account of the efficacy itself of the reason “being existent” brought about by such a pervasion as that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayārūpā) and which is a property of the subjective element. Thus, it is considered “what is the use of introducing the means of

sa taj janayaty eva, yo yan na janayati na sa tatkaranaṃvabhāvah, ity evam pravartamānau sarvam eva
kriyāsaktiye kṣamakatve niyatam darśayata iti sarvopasaṃhāro vyatirekākṣepabijām dhūmādivat.

22 AVS p. 64, 4: sā ca sarvopasaṃhārāt sāmānyam avalambate /
23 AVS p. 66, 3: sarvopasaṃhāravatī hi vyāptiḥ saḥhyasiddher aṅgam.
valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] in this case? (kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāsenetit?) Precisely for this reason, even the impossibility of introducing this (=the means of valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]) does not hurt [the inference].

This is because that which is to be proven is established by [the means of valid cognition] that annuls nothing but [the existence of] the reverse [of that which is to be proven in the proving property] (viparyayasyaiva bādhakena). Even in the texts of our tenets, …, the pervasion that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayarūpā) is established in detail, appearing as excluding the inconclusiveness [of the proving property], as with seeds and the like...24

Here we see Jñānaśrīmitra’s efforts to defend the affirmative relation, namely, anvaya.

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<th>Jñānaśrīmitra’s position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anvaya</td>
<td>sādhanē sādhavyiparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP2) or</td>
<td>prasaṅga and prasāṅgavi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>paryaya (=?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyaṭireka</td>
<td>sādhavyiparyayeye hetoh bādhakapramāṇa (VBP1)</td>
<td>sādhanyayiparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Concluding remarks

A cursory glance at the passages cited above seems to suggest that Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes the VBP maintained by the VBP-vādin. A detailed examination of the passage as a whole, however, leads us to the conclusion that the difference between his position and that of the VBP-vādin lies, in fact, above all in their evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti rather than of VBP itself. Both of these issues are, of course, closely related to each other, at least in Jñānaśrīmitra’s theory. The VBP-vādin’s low evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti suggests that the VBP-vādin is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significance of the sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti. Secondly, with reference to VBP itself, Jñānaśrīmitra claims the priority of prasāṅga and prasāṅgaviparyaya over VBP, whereas for the VBP-vādin VBP1 is the only way to establish pervasion. Here Jñānaśrīmitra tries to

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24 JNA p. 63, 10–14: tad evaṃ vyāptir vyāpakasya vyāpyavati bhāva eveti kartṛdharmānvayarūpavyāptisampāditasāmarthityādh eva sattvahetoḥ ksanaḥpangasiddhir apratihateti kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāsenetih samarthatītram? ata eva tadupanyāsāṣāvataiḥ na piḍayati, viparyayasyaiva bādhakena sādhinyasya siddhatāḥ, sāstre’pi pratha[man?]?i yame ca vyāptir anvayarūpaḥ bijādivad anekāntapariḥārvavyājena vistarataḥ prasaḍāḥ. …
interpret VBP as a more synthetic and interrelated theory by expanding his interpretation of VBP (such that VBP is not only used for the proof of vyatireka but for that of anvaya as well). So it would seem that in all of his argumentation on VBP examined above, Jñānaśrīmitra seeks to establish the superiority of anvaya over vyatireka.

By this interpretation, we can easily understand and accept his positive statement concerning VBP in other contexts. For instance, in his Vyāpticarcā, after criticizing the bhūyodarśana of the Naiyāyikas, he says:

However, nothing but the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa, an inference, should be inducted (unneyam). If it (i.e., viparyayabādhakapramāṇa) is absent, it would be impossible to negate the occurrence (vṛtti) [of reason] in the dissimilar domain (vipaṣṭa).\(^\text{25}\)

In the above statement, where the determination of causal relations is discussed, Jñānaśrīmitra really evaluates VBP. In the Īśvara discussion as well, he states:

The means of valid cognition that establishes a pervasion is of only two kinds: perception and non-cognition or viparyayabādhaka, because both of these have perception and inference as their essential characteristics.\(^\text{26}\)

In these passages Jñānaśrīmitra accepts the role of VBP, even if he regards it as having a limited secondary function.

As to the relation between VBP and prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya, Jñānaśrīmitra gives priority to the latter over the former in the proof of the affirmative concomitance of momentariness. Is VBP\(^2\), as a genitive tatpurusa, different from prasaṅga or prasaṅgaviparyaya? If so, in which aspects is it different? And if the VBP-vādin is not Ratnākaraśānti, who might he be? These issues require further investigation.

### References and abbreviations

#### Primary literature

**AVS** Antarvyāptisamarthana (Ratnākaraśānti): See Kajiyama 1999.


**HBṬ** Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.


**NMu** Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論). Taisho 1628.

**PSṬ** Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā.

**PVin2** Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya: Chapters 1 and 2, critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

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\(^{25}\) VC p. 33*, 7–9: viparyayabādhakam eva tu pramāṇam anumānāṃ unneyam, tadabhāve vipaṣṭavṛttini-ṣedhayasyāṣayatvā,....

\(^{26}\) JNA p. 293, 1: tāc ca pramāṇam vyāptiśādhakam dvividham eva. pratyakṣānupalambham vā, viparyayabādhakaḥ vā, anayoḥ pratyakṣānumānasvabhāvāvatvā,.....
PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes, ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1960.

Secondary literature

Steinkellner 1967  See HB.
How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga

by

Kei Kataoka

1. An unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika

In PS 5.39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of *apoha* in reply to a Sāṃkhya theorist. PS ad 5.39 begins with the words *yas tv āha*; the commentator Jinendrabuddhi identifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “the destroyer.” As Pind (2015: II Appendix 13) comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist Mādhava, who is elsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, because his unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets.¹ As Pind observes, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of *apoha* by quoting from a lost work of Dignāga, probably either the *Sāṃkhyaṭaparīkṣā* or the *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa*. The main scenario of PS 5.39 can be depicted as follows:

1. Dignāga has criticized Sāṃkhya views in an earlier work.
2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of *apoha*.
3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

PS 5.41ab refers to a certain view, namely, that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, and so on (*sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ*). Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary *tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam.*² Further, he ascribes the view presented in PS 5.41d (*bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ*) to Mādhava.³ In the following the present author reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PST, and shows that the first view should not be ascribed to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava, and the second view not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pind</th>
<th>Kataoka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS 5.41ab: <em>sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ</em></td>
<td>Jain Vaibhāgika</td>
<td>Mādhava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS 5.41d: <em>bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ</em></td>
<td>Mādhava</td>
<td>Dignāga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ For Mādhava, see Pind 2015: Appendix 13; and Kataoka 2011: 497–498, n. 707.
³ Pind 2015: II 154, n. 518.
2. Vaibhāgika and Vaināśika

It seems that the sole evidence on which Pind ascribes the first view to a Jain Vaibhāgika is Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. The edited text in Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) reads as follows:

PSṬ Ms. B 233a7–233b2: *tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam.* yasya darṣanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsnādidarṣanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhaṇvadarṣanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhaṇvā evātmāntarāṇīti.4

Here the passage *vaibhāgikenoktam* indicates that the subsequent paragraph quoted with *iti* in the end is a quote from a Vaibhāgika. But the corresponding Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading was not *vaibhāgika* but *vaināśika.*5

Hattori 1982: 210, 11–12: *de la ’jig pa smar ba pa yis brjod pa*

The Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading is *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam.* This *vaināśika* is also mentioned previously in PSṬ ad 5.39, where the Sanskrit text reads as follows (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13):

PSṬ Ms. 232a2: *anvayavītoktisamanantarāṃ vaināśikenoktaḥ*6

The same opponent is also called Sāṃkhya in the following explanation of PSṬ (Pind 2015: II 150, n. 508, B232a6). Regarding the paragraph of PSV ad 5.39 beginning with *yas tv āha,* Pind observes as follows:

This paragraph introduces a lengthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sāṃkhya vaināśika Mādhava, who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga’s criticism of his proof of the existence of pradhāna, in connection with his own rebuttal of the *apoha* theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga’s objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13).

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4 The translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516): “For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: ‘In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things.’”

5 The Tibetan translation *’jig pa,* as also shown in the next example, means perishing (*vināśa*) and not dividing (*vibhāga*). If one wanted to support Pind’s reading *vaibhāgika,* one would have to explain how *’jig pa* can mean *vibhāga,* which is usually translated as *dbye ba.*

6 *vaināśikenoktaḥ* at PSṬ Ms. B 232a2 is translated as *’jig pa nid du brjod de* (Hattori 1982: 208, 10–11).
Kei Kataoka

As Pind remarks here, Jinendrabuddhi’s expression *anvayavītoktisamanantaram* indicates the location of the text quoted by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.39. It is a quote from Mādhava’s work, in which the precise location is “immediately after the statement of *anvayavīta*.” This suggests that *tatra* in *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam* in PST ad 5.41 also indicates the same context in the same text: “For in the same context it is stated by Mādhava.”

Thus, we can conclude that the quotation Pind ascribes to an unknown Jain Vaibhāgika should be ascribed to Mādhava by correcting the reading *vaibhāgikenoktam* to *vaināśikenoktam* on the basis of the Tibetan translation.7 The main scenario of PS(V) 5.41 is the same as that of PS(V) 5.39. The argument is between Dignāga and Mādhava in both cases.

3. The cognition of a cow due to the observation of a dewlap, etc.

It is now clear that the quote in PST following *vaināśikenoktam* is a quote from Mādhava’s text. In order to clarify its content, let me quote the entire PST ad 5.41ab, which reads as follows:8

A. *tatra hi *vaināśikenoktam.

B. *yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratayayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratayayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmāntarābhavadarśanāc cātmāntare pratayayaḥ. tasmā ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarānti.

C. etena yaddarśanād yatpratayaya bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratayayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmāntarābhavadarśanāc cātmāntare pratayayo bhavatiī kāryam āha.

D. *atra sāmkhyena pratividhānam uktam.

E. yadi sāsnādidarśanād gopratayayo bhavati(1), evaṃ sati yad uktam ātmāntarābhavadarśanād ātmāntare pratayayo bhavatiī(2), tad ayuktam iti.

F. ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayaḥyupagine kathāṃ sāsnādinimittam goporprayayasyeti yāvat.

G. ātmanābhumpyetahānir uktā, drṣṭānte svapakṣatāyāgāt.

*vaināśikenoktam| Corr.; vaibhāgikenoktam Pind; vaibhāśikenokta Ms. *khalv api [ Corr.; omitted by Pind; khasavāi Ms.

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7 According to information provided by Horst Lasic, the relevant passage of the manuscript can be read as *vaibhāśikeno* and surely not *vaibhāgikeno*. The reading *vaibhāgiken* is probably a mistake arisen in two steps: *vaināśiken* → *vaibhāśiken* → *vaibhāgiken*. First the original *nā* was probably mistaken by an Indian scribe as *bhā*. Then the modern transcriber who prepared the transcript that Pind uses mistakenly copied *śi* as *gi*. We can conclude that the reading *vaibhāgiken* is a modern invention. Furthermore, the immediately following passage which Pind reads as *yasya darśanād* has something in between in the manuscript. Probably the entire passage can be read as *yasya khalv api darśanād*, although the manuscript seems to read *kha sva vi* instead of *kha lva pi*.

8 This citation is based on Pind’s edited text with slight modifications of *sandhi* and punctuation, etc. See Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
Paragraph A (vaināśikenoktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph B is a quote from Mādhava’s text. Paragraph B constitutes a syllogism: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + dṛṣṭānta), upanaya, nigamana. Paragraph C, in which the nigamana part is missing, is almost identical to B. By adding the words etena … iti kāryam āha Jinendrabuddhi seems to classify the reason (hetu) in the syllogism B as kāryaḥhetu. Paragraph D (atra sāṃkhyaena pratīvidhānam uktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph E is the Sāṃkhya’s rebuttal (pratividhāna) to the view given in B. This Sāṃkhya theorist seems to be Mādhava, because there is no other candidate in this context. Paragraph F restates the main point of E with the expression iti yāvat. In order to clarify Mādhava’s intention in these paragraphs, let me start by examining the easier paragraph F.

F. ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhhyupagame kathāṃ sāsnādinimittalvam gopratyayasyeti yāvat.

It means: If it is accepted that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of non-X, how then could the cognition of a cow be caused by a dewlap, etc.? Here Jinendrabuddhi explains Mādhava’s intention. Mādhava is criticizing someone as being inconsistent because he has stated something that goes against his own view. The main view that this someone accepts is that all cognitions of X (sarvapratyaya) are caused by the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva). This is exactly what Dignāga insists on as his theory of apoha. A cow is cognized by means of the exclusion of the non-cow. This view is formulated in E2 as follows:

E2: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati

The cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.11

9 Cf. PST 1 10, 6–10: yo ‘nanyasattvaneyasyābhhiratipūrvaṃ hīnāsthānāparigrahah, sa ātmasnehavato duḥkhasukhayāgpti vābhāvīdāpūrvaṃ, tad yathā māskīkām abhiratipūrvaṃ ‘sucīsthanāparigrahah, ananyasattvaneyasyābhhiratipūrvaṃ ca garbhadhīnāsthānāparigrahah prāṇīna iti kāryam; PST 1 11, 9–11: yo yadiparitassvabhāvah, sa tasya pratipakṣaḥ, tad yathā vīyuviparitassvabhāvam tālīṃ vāyoh, ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati ca nairātmyadarśanam iti svabhāvah; PST 1 11, 12–13: yo yamnādānāvṛddhah, sa tasya bādhakah, yathā vātikasya vyaśades tāvamānāvṛddhah tālīṃ. Ātmānte-hādīnaḥātmadānāvṛddhahm ca nairātmyadarśanam iti svabhāvah; PST 1 57, 8–9: kalpanājñānaṃ apraśīhīṃ api nāmeti, asyāyam arthah – yat svasamvedayam, tat svādhigānam prati pratīyakṣah, rāgādīnāvṛddhah. Tathā ca kalpanājñānam iti svabhāvah; PST 1 84, 3–4: asyāyam arthah, yatra smṛthih, tatrānubhavah, rāpādvāvat. asti ca smṛtī iti kāryam; PST 1 130, 12–131, 1: kuta état – samūdāyāvāsyaṃ tu na pūnār vastasagadhaśāṃdravyavāsyaṃ ity aňa – rāpādvārge tadbuddhavābhāvat iti. yo yadhage saty u-palabadhīlahakaṃ sādvyadhyate, na sa tato vaitirikto śi. tad yathā kāṣṭhādībhīḥ śaŋgaṇārī prāmādhamāla vā. rāpādvāraṃ nopalabdhīyante copalabadbhakṣaṇapraṇāte ghaṭādīāṃ dravyam iti svabhāvam iti kāryam; PST 2 41, 6–7: siddhātvaḥ iti. yat siddham na tat śādhyam, uṣṇo ‘gnir iti yathā, siddhau ca kevalau dhārmadharmanāv iti svabhāvaḥvyaviruddham iti; PST 2 78, 15–16: samyoṣayina ceyādi. yaḥ samyoṣinjaḥsyaṃ sa dūtīye pratīvyogini prati śūnāt, tad yathā dūṃhā, tad yathā cāgnir iti svabhāvam prasāgāṃ aňa; PST 2 111, 1–4: na hīyādi, anena yat pūrvābhāvam tath evēdham iti pratyayamrāt, tat smṛtyātmakam. yathā sa evāyam dhūma iti jñānam, yathoktadṛṣṭam iti svabhāvam dhūma iti; B 119a5: ekdāśatvādi iti. tad yathā Avaṃyadēṣaṃ sa tadvaya-padvēṣaṃ arhati. tad yathā pāte deshaḥ pratyayapadēṣam. pakṣa-kadeśaṃ ca dhārmāṇi svabhāvam aňa. (I thank Horst Lasic for these references. Orthographical modifications are given by the present author.)


This view is incompatible with the view that the cognition of a cow is caused by observing the dewlap, etc. This view is formulated in E1 as follows:

E1: sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.

The cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, and so on.\(^{12}\)

In paragraph E (yad uktam … tad ayuktam), as restated by Jinendrabuddhi in F (katham), Mādhava criticizes Dignāga for stating the incompatible views E1 and E2. Mādhava’s intention is summed up by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph G as follows:

G. ātmanābhuyetahān uktā, dṛṣṭānte svapakṣatāgāt.

You yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have accepted, because you give up your own thesis in the example.\(^{13}\)

Dignāga’s own view (svapakṣa) is E2, i.e. the view that the cognition of X is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X. This is what he has accepted (abhuyetata). But Dignāga, according to Mādhava, abandons this when he states E1 as an example.

svapakṣalabhuyetata (E2): ātmāntaraḥvāvadārśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.

dṛṣṭānta (E1): sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.

These analyses confirm the main scenario. Dignāga first refers to E1 as an example adduced in another work of his that is now lost. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga as being inconsistent, because this E1 is incompatible with Dignāga’s theory of apoha, which can be summarized as E2. But where does Dignāga state E1? A candidate is easily found in paragraph C.

C. etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhavāvadārśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti(3) kāryam āha.

With this [paragraph B] he speaks of an effect [as a reason]: If the cognition of X arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X arises due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.\(^{14}\)

The passage in C “yaddarśanād … bhavati,” i.e. C1, C2 and C3, seems to be a reformulation of B’s syllogism by Jinendrabuddhi in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + dṛṣṭānta) and upanaya (i.e. hetu, which shows pakṣadharmatā). Here the syllogism can be analyzed into three parts as follows:

C1 (vyāpti): yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.

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\(^{13}\) My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

\(^{14}\) My translation. This passage is quoted but not translated in Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
C2 (drṣṭānta): tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ.
C3 (upanaya): ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.

C1 states an invariable concomitance (vyāpti): If X is cognized by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. C2 gives an example (drṣṭānta): One cognizes a cow by observing the dewlap, etc. Therefore, a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. In other words, a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc.15 C3 presents the application (upanaya) of this invariable concomitance to his theory of apoha: One cognizes X by observing the non-existence of non-X. The conclusion, which is not stated in C, is obvious: ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇī (Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X).16 This missing part is explicitly stated in paragraph B, which reads as follows:

B. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ(3). tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇī(4).

In this world, as is also well known, if the cognition “X” arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X. Therefore, Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X.17

B1, B2 and B3 are almost identical with C1, C2 and C3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati</td>
<td>1. yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ</td>
<td>2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ</td>
<td>3. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇī</td>
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The main difference lies in B4, which clarifies the unstated conclusion (nigamana). In paragraph C Jinendrabuddhi reformulates the syllogism of B in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style and classifies the reason as kāryahetu.

15 Cf. PST B 233b5: sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ, quoted by Pind 2015: II 154, n. 520.
16 With the plural form ātmāntarāṇi Dignāga intends, for example, cows in general. See, e.g. his usage in PSV ad 5.36d (Pind 2015: I 45): śabdo ‘ṛthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha; cf. also PST Ms. B 238b5–6 quoted in Pind 2015: II 179, n. 604: yathā vrkṣaśabdaḥ śiṃśapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhida-dhat samānyavači tathā…
17 My translation.
C. etena “C1, C2, C3 (=B1, B2, B3)" iti kāryam āha

With this [paragraph B quoted above] he speaks of an effect [as a reason, for which the entire syllogism is reformulated as] C1, C2, C3.

But who has composed this syllogism in paragraph B? As suggested in paragraphs E, F, G, the syllogism of B must have been originally formulated by Dignāga. Then it is quoted by Mādhava, either literally or not literally, as a pūrvapakṣa, as Jinendrabuddhi’s opening remark tatra hi vaināśikenoktam indicates. Thus, it is surmised that paragraph B (which Jinendrabuddhi explains as C) is Mādhava’s quote from a lost work of Dignāga and that Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view in E (which Jinendrabuddhi explains in F and G).

Recapitulating these analyses, the main scenario can be reconstructed as follows.

1. First a syllogism was stated by Dignāga in a work that is now lost.
2. Mādhava quotes Dignāga’s statement as B, which Jinendrabuddhi reformulates with classification as C.
3. In paragraph E, which follows D (atra sāmkhyena pratividhānam uktam), Mādhava points out Dignāga’s inconsistency with the words yad uktam … tad ayuktam. The issue at stake raised by Mādhava is that the example Dignāga mentions does not fit with the theory of apoha, because the cognition of a cow (gopratyaya), according to the theory of apoha, should be based on the exclusion of the non-cow (agovyavaccheda) and not on the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādi). By referring to, and thereby admitting the example, Dignāga amounts to having abandoned his own tenet that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow).

4. Dignāga’s intention in referring to the example

Although there are uncertainties here and there regarding the reconstruction of PSV ad 5.41, the main argument of the following part is more or less certain.18

PSV ad 5.41: yasya hy [agonivṛttagopratyayāḥ, tasya kathāṃ sāsnādidarśānanimitāḥ].19

PSṬ B 233b5: yasya hīy apohavādinaḥ.

As an apoha theorist (apohavādin), it is inappropriate for Dignāga to state that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc., because according to the theory of apoha and sāmkhyeya, the cognition of a cow should be based on the observation of the non-existence of non-cow (agonivṛttagopratyaya).18

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18 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 10–11): gaṇ la ba laṁ ma yin pa las log pa’i ba laṅ gi blo de ji ltar nog la sogs pa mthon ba’i rgyu mtshan can du smra bar byed l; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 11–12): gaṇ gi ba laṁ ma yin pa las ldog pa’s ba laṅ gi rogs par’gyur ba de’i ji ltar ikog šal la sogs pa mthon ba rgyu mtshan du smra bar byed l; Pind 2015: II 154: “For how could someone, to whom the cognition of a cow (*gopratyaya) as precluded from non-cows (*agonivṛttas), assert that it is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśānanimitāḥ)?”

19 Pind 2015: I 52 presents the reconstruction as “yasya hi […]” not filling in the blank. But the main words are more or less safely reconstructed on the basis of the two Tibetan translations; Pind provides the Sanskrit words in his translation.
apoha} it is based on the exclusion of the non-cow. Here Dignāga seems to accept Mādhava’s claim of inconsistency. The example sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ is indeed incompatible with the theory of apoha. PS 5.41ab amounts to saying, using the word katham: How could an apoha theorist accept the example? But then how can Dignāga defend his reference to the example? The subsequent passage clarifies his strategy.

PSV ad 5.41 (reconstructed by Pind 2015: I 52): abhyupagamyāyam drṣṭāntah svamataviruddhah. šabdabhedād dhī gosānādiṣu bhinnam apohyan.20

PST Ms. B233b5–B234a1: abhyupagamyetyādi. bhavato hi sāsnādisamāh eva gaur iti. atas tad abhyupagamyāyam drṣṭāntah svamataviruddho 'py uktah. etad uktam bhavati. yathā tava sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ tathā maṁpy ātmāntarābhāvavadarśanād ātmāntare pratyaya iti. šabdabhedād dhīyādi. sāsnādisabdasyāsāsnādy apohayam sāsnādīṣu. gośabdasyāpy agar gavi. yata evam bhinnam apohyan. ataḥ sāsnādīṣv asāsnādyapohena sāsnādipratyayaḥ, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyayaḥ. evam cātrāpy ātmāntarābhāvavadarśanād evātmāntare pratyayaḥ.21

It is not easy to reconstruct the original text of PSV, because the two Tibetan translations differ from each other. Nonetheless the main argument can be summarized as follows: the example (drṣṭāntah), although it is incompatible with the Buddhist view (svamataviruddho 'pi), is presented by provisionally accepting (abhyyupagamyat) your view, i.e. the Sāṃkhya’s view.

Sāṃkhya: sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ (→sāsnādaya eva gauḥ)
Dignāga: ātmāntarābhāvavadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ (→ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi)

It is clear from this that the view referred to by Dignāga as an example is a Sāṃkhya view. The Sāṃkhya holds the view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ), and that a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamāh eva gauḥ). Dignāga refers to this view by accepting it only provisionally (abhyyupagamyta). Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Dignāga’s statements, because he does not wholeheartedly accept the Sāṃkhya view. Dignāga consistently keeps his doctrine of apoha, i.e. the view that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow), i.e. ātmāntarābhāvavadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ. Therefore, X is nothing but the non-existence of non-X for Dignāga (ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi). For him the cognition of a cow is caused by the non-existence of the non-cow and not by the dewlap.

20 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 12–13): ba laṅ dañ né nag lo sogs pa sgra tha dad pas tha dad du sel ba can yin yin khyod kyi lugs khas blaṅs nas / ‘gal bzin du yan de ńes par bstan to l; K: khas blaṅs kyan khyod kyi ’dod pas dpe ’di’ gal ba yan yin no l ba laṅ gi lkog šal la sogs pa rnam la sgra’i khyad par gyis tha dad pa sel ba l; Pind 2015: I 154–155: “Having assumed [this], the example is in conflict even with your own theory (svamataviruddhāḥ). For the excluded [object] is different with regard to a cow and the dewlap because of verbal difference (śabdabhedāt).”

etc. The two things, i.e. a cow and a dewlap, etc., have a different scope of exclusion. It is obvious for Dignāga that the words “cow” and “dewlap, etc.” have different objects to be excluded (apohya). The expression “dewlap, etc.” (śāsnādi) communicates the dewlap, etc. (śāsnādisu) by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. (asāsnādi). The word “cow” (gauḥ) communicates a cow (gavi) by excluding the non-cow (agauḥ). This is Dignāga’s own view. The fundamental view of apoha is consistent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>apohya</th>
<th>pratyaya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“śāsnādi”</td>
<td>asāsnādi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“gauḥ”</td>
<td>agauḥ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The view that the two different words have different scopes of exclusion is explicitly expressed in PS 5.41d, which runs as follows.

Pind 2015: I 51: bhinnāpohyās tu te mithah.\(^{22}\)

PST: asmanmatena tu bhinnāpohyās tu te mitho gosāsnādayaḥ, bhinnam apohyam eva iti kṛtvā.

Here Pind’s reconstruction of PS 5.41d is strongly supported by PST. However the reconstruction and interpretation of PS 5.41abc are a bit problematic.\(^{23}\)

PS 5.41abc, Pind 2015: I 51: sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo ’yam udāḥṛtaḥ / so> viruddho bhavanmatyā.

PST: sāsnādidarśanād ityādi … viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt. bhavanmatyeti. bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam.

Considering the meter, it would be better to change the word order of PS 5.41abc to the following:

Kataoka: sāsnādidarśanād yo ’yam gopratyaya udāḥṛtaḥ / sa viruddho bhavanmatyā

It is true that viruddho bhavanmatyā can be interpreted as Pind translates, “is in conflict with your own theory.” K’s translation supports Pind’s interpretation. But this interpretation does not fit the entire context. Here bhava\(t\) clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya, as Jinendrabuddhi clarifies by stating, “For it is your view that a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. (bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam).” As we have already confirmed, this view should be ascribed

\(^{22}\) V (Hattori 1982: 142, 6): phan tshun tha dad dag yod kyaṅ; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 0): tha dad sel la de log pa; Pind 2009: 110: “On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.”

\(^{23}\) V (Hattori 1982: 142, 7–9): nog la sogs pa mthon ba las / de’i blo dper brjod ’gal ba de / khed kyi lugs la rten pa yin i; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 7–9): ikog šal la sogs mthon phyir gaṅ / ba laṅ rogs pa’i dper byas pa i de ni khyod kyi ’dod pas ’gal i; Pind 2015: II 153–154: “The example [you have] adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.”
to the Sāṃkhya and not the Buddhist. Then viruddho bhavanmatyā would mean that the example is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya view. But what we expect here is the opposite: The example is in conflict with the Buddhist view. Taking into consideration V’s translation of bhavanmatyā as khyed kyi lugs la rtin pa yin (resorting to your view), it seems more appropriate to interpret bhavanmatyā as being separate from the preceding word viruddhaḥ. Jinarādabhuddhi’s commentary also supports this interpretation, because he comments on viruddha separately from bhavanmatyā, and states viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāḥ. Considering that the opponent bhavat is the Sāṃkhya in this context, the opposite siddhānta (i.e. svamata) must refer to the Buddhist view (cf. svamataviruddha in PSV ad 5.41). Therefore, the main argument in PS 5.41abc can be reconstructed as follows:

The example (dṛṣṭāntah) that the cognition of a cow (gopratyayaḥ) is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśanāt) is presented (udāḥṛtaḥ) by me in my earlier work. This example is indeed incompatible with the Buddhist view (viruddhaḥ), as you, Mādhava, claim. But it is mentioned by me only by provisionally resorting to your Sāṃkhya view (bhavanmatyā). Therefore, there is no fault of abandoning my thesis.

5. Positive and negative methods of cognizing a cow

The conflict of opinion between Mādhava and Dignāga is clear. Mādhava holds the view that a cow is cognized positively, i.e. by observing the dewlap, etc., whereas Dignāga holds the view that a cow is cognized negatively, i.e. by excluding the non-cow. For Dignāga any X, inasmuch as it is cognized in a general form, is cognized by observing the non-existence of non-X. A dewlap, etc. are no exception. They, too, are cognized by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. This is explicitly stated in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

Pind 2015: I 52: sānāḍīṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthaṭṭarabhāvanirapekṣam na bhavatītī pūrvam evapāpāditam.24

Mādhava holds that X (ātmāntara) is cognized positively, without dependence on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarabhāvadarśana). This view of Mādhava is criticized by Dignāga in PS 5.42ab as follows:25

PS 5.42ab, Pind 2015: I 52: so ’napēkṣa <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam> /

24 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 18–19): nog la sogs pa la spyi’i no bo dañ ldan pa gzn med par mi ltos pa ni mi srid do žes snar bṣad zin to l; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 9–20): lkog sāl la sogs pa tAMS la spyi’i no bo bðag nīd gzn med pa la htps pa med par srid pa ma yin no žes snar bstan pa yin no l; Pind 2015: II 156: “For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (sānāḍīṣu), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (sāmānyarūpam arthaṭṭarabhāvanirapekṣam na bhavaiti.”

25 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 14–15): de mi ltos šes pa’i di ni l rañ gi rnam rtogs spros par zad /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 15–16): de ltos med phyir ’di yan ni l rañ gi rnam par rtogs pas sprul l; Pind 2015: II 155: “The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing (ātmāntara)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-existence of other things], is created out of your own imagination.”
According to Dignāga, Mādhava holds that the cognition of X is independent (so 'napekṣah), i.e. does not depend on the exclusion of the other. A cow is cognized as such in a positive way (vidhirūpeṇaiva). But Mādhava’s idea is a mere fancy, because a general form is never cognized without exclusion of the other, as Dignāga has implied in PSV ad 5.34: vyatirekamukhenaīvānumānam. The individual form (svarūpa), i.e. the particular form (svalakṣaṇa), is beyond the scope of language and therefore inexpressible (anabhilāpya). Thus, the individual form is not the object of everyday communication (vyāvahārika). This is stated by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

PSV ad 5.42 (Pind 2015: I 52): svarūpaṃ tu ten<āvyāvahārikam> anabhilāpyatvāt.26

According to the Sāṃkhya, the individual form is denotable. Therefore, the word “cow” refers to the aggregate of the dewlap, etc., in a positive way. For Dignāga, by contrast, the particular form is not denotable. It is the object of perception and not inference. Words communicate things in a general form only by excluding the other. Our cognition of a cow is not independent but always dependent upon the non-existence of the non-cow.

6. Conclusion

1. The crucial passage in PST vaibhāgikenoktam should be corrected to vaināśikenko-
kram.
2. The argument in PS(V) 5.41 is not between a Jain Vaibhāgika and Mādhava but between Vaināśika Mādhava and Dignāga. The scenario is similar to that of PS(V) 5.39. The Jain ‘distinctionist’ that Pind postulates does not exist.
3. The view that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. should be ascribed to the Sāṃkhya, not a Jain Vaibhāgika.
4. Dignāga refers to the Sāṃkhya view in an example in an earlier work that is now lost. Dignāga’s text quoted by Mādhava is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph B and modified as in C.
5. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view as being inconsistent, because Dignāga abandons his thesis by admitting the Sāṃkhya example. Mādhava first quotes Dignāga’s earlier work (paragraph B) and then criticizes it (paragraph E).
6. Dignāga defends his earlier statement by insisting that his mentioning of the Sāṃkhya example that is incompatible with his thesis is not wholehearted acceptance, but only a provisional acceptance (abhypagamyā). For Dignāga the cognition of a cow is due to the exclusion of the non-cow (agovyavaccheda) and not due to the observation of

26 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 19–20): raṅ gi ṅo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir de’i sgo nas tha siad du bya’o l; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 20–21): raṅ gi ṅo bo ci brjod par bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir de thadu bya’o l; Pind 2015: II 156–157: “The individual form, however, (svarūpaṃ tu) is not denotable (*vyāvahārikam [sic]) in this (tena) [form] because it is inexpressible (anabhilāpyatvāt).”
the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśana). His main thesis of apoha that the cognition of X is based on the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ), is consistent. For him a cow is essentially the non-existence of the non-cow and not the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādaya eva gauḥ; sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ). X is essentially the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi).

References and abbreviations

Corr. Correction by the present author.


K Kanakavarman’s translation of PS(V).


Ms. Manuscript.


V Vasudhararakṣita’s translation of PS(V).
Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness:
sahopalambhāniyama and saṃvedana

by
Hiroko Matsuoka

Introduction

In the last part of the Pratyakṣa chapter of his Pramāṇavinīścaya (PVin I 39,13–43,7), Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660) presents two kinds of arguments to prove self-awareness (svasaṃvedana). Since the theory of self-awareness that a cognition is aware of itself presupposes that an object and the cognition thereof are non-different; and hence the cognition of an object is nothing but the cognition of the cognition itself, the former is established on the basis of the fact that both are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhāniyama); the latter is established on account of its essential nature of being a cognition (saṃvedana). Following Iwata (1991), I am going to call these two arguments the sahopalambhāniyama and saṃvedana arguments, respectively.

What led Dharmakīrti to develop these arguments? Concerning the sahopalambhāniyama argument, Iwata (1991: 20–24) examines how the argument could have been derived directly from the view that is presented by Dignāga (c. 480–540) in Ālambanaparīkṣā v. 6 and the Vṛtti thereon, namely, that an object-support (ālambana) for a cognition is a form within the cognition itself (antarjñeyarūpa). Taber (2010) argues that crucial elements of the argument are found in the Śūnyavāda chapter of Kumārila’s (c. 600–650) Ślokavārttika vv. 31–34. Concerning the saṃvedana argument, on the other hand, no attempts have yet been made to determine the details of its provenance.

The aim of this paper is to explore both of these issues equally, at the same time, namely with the help of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the Tattvasaṅgraha. In this,
Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788), while discussing the sahopolambhaniyama and samvedana arguments, directly references Kumārila’s arguments aimed at proving that a cognition has an external entity for its object. In particular, I hope to provide evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view that Dharmakīrti was responding directly to Kumārila. In order to do this, I will first present Kumārila’s arguments in section 1, and then, in section 2, I will discuss the corresponding details of Śāntarakṣita’s refutation, which follows but also builds upon the arguments of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti. With this foundation in place, section 3 will provide one final piece of evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view, namely, that he sees in the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation an attempt to refute the nirākāravādin’s view rather than to simply improve Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness.

1. Kumārila’s refutation of self-awareness

Kumārila is only one among many concerns for Śāntarakṣita. The Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the latter’s TS is meant to establish the vijñānavāda theory of vijñaptimātratā or “mind-only.” According to Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795), author of the paṇḍita commentary, this chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part, Śāntarakṣita establishes that an external object cannot exist independently of cognition (arthāyoga) (TS2 1964–1997); in the second part, he proves that cognition is devoid of the characteristics of being either grasped or grasper (grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇapāda), that is, that cognition consists in self-awareness (ātmasaṃvedana) (TS2 1998–2083). In this second part, Śāntarakṣita proceeds in three steps: first, he posits his own arguments denying the existence of external objects (bāhyārthaniṣedhaka) (TS2 1998–2049); secondly, he refutes arguments formulated by various realists such as Śubhagupta, Uddyotakara and Kumārila, to establish the existence of such objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS2 2050–2077); and lastly, he presents the fundamental (maula) argument for establishing vijñaptimātratā (TS2 2078–2083).

While refuting the realist arguments, Śāntarakṣita cites verses from the Brhaṭṭīkā of Kumārila, corresponding to ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, which contain seven arguments for proving the existence of external objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS2 2063–2067). In ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, after first presenting them earlier in the same chapter (verses 5–17), Kumārila then refutes vijñānavāda, more precisely, Dignāga’s arguments for self-awareness, by moving through the series of arguments in the same order as before. It is these seven arguments that we will examine in the current section 1. They can be classified into two groups according to the theses (pakṣa) that they support:

1. An object and its cognition are different (bhinna) from each other.
2. A cognition neither cognizes a part of itself (svāṃśa) nor is cognized by a part of itself.

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4 For discussions of quotations from the Brhaṭṭīkā in the TS(P), see Frauwallner 1962, Taber 1986–1992, Krasser 1999: 216 and Kataoka 2011: 25–27. See also the invaluable contribution of Yoshimizu (2007) showing that the Brhaṭṭīkā is earlier than the PV, thus refuting Frauwallner’s influential hypothesis.
5 See section 1.1.2.
These two groups closely relate to Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhāniyama and saṃvedana arguments, respectively, as I will demonstrate below. The first group is discussed in section 1.1, and the second in section 1.2.

1.1 Arguing for the difference between an object and its cognition

The four arguments in this first group can be labeled as follows:

1. The tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti argument;
2. The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument;
3. The itaretarāparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument;
4. The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument.

These arguments will now be discussed individually in the following sections.

1.1.1 The tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti argument

The tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti argument reads as follows:7

The grasper (grāhaka) of color is different from the grasped [color] (grāhya) because the former is not perceived when the latter is perceived (tatsaṃvittāv asamvitteḥ), like the grasper of flavor, etc.

In ŚV Śūnyavāda 79,8 Kumārila explains that the tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti argument is based on the Bhāṣya of Śabara (6th c.), where it is stated that it is only an object connected with the external world (bahirdeśasambaddha) that is perceived by sense-perception (pratyakṣa).9

1.1.2 The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument

The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is as follows:10

The grasped [color] is different from [the cognition] that grasps it because the former is not necessarily recollected by one who recollects the latter, like the grasper of flavor, etc.

7 ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–173ab: tasmād yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asamvitteḥ rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // TS2 2063: aha yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asamvitteḥ rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // (tasmād ŚV : aha TS; grāhakaṃ SVM, SVT, TS : bhāsakaṃ SVV; rūpe TS : rūpaṃ SV.) Here as well as in the following, “ŚV” is in the reporting of variants used as a shorthand for all three editions ŚVV, ŚVT and SVM.

8 ŚV Śūnyavāda 79: sa bahirdeśasambuddha ity (ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4. See n. 9.) anena nirūpyate / grāhyākārasya samvitteṇa grāhyākārasya samvitteṇa (śa) grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakād bhinnaṃ tatparāmrśatā yat / na parāmrśyate // (nirūpyate ŚV : anena TS.)

9 ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4: syād etat – evam yady arthākāra buddhiḥ syāt / nirākāra tā buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo ‘rthāh / sa hi bahirdeśasambuddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate /

10 ŚV Śūnyavāda 173cd–174ab: grāhyam tadgrāhakād bhinnam tatparāmrśatā yat / na parāmrśyate / vaśyam rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā / TS2 2064: grāhyam tadgrāhakād bhinnam tatparāmrśatā yat / na parāmrśyate / vaśyam rasādigrāhakāvantatḥ / (kād bhinnam SVM : -kāc caiva SVT TS : -kāc caiva SVV ; yathā SV : -kādivat TS) As for TS2 2064, the reading -kāc caiva attested in TS1 and TSPa (and also chosen for the editions TS1 and TS2) is here emended to bhinnam following SVM.
According to ŚV Śūnyavāda 82–85,11 the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is also based on Śabara’s Bhāṣya. Śabara argues that there are cases where one remembers a cognition that occurred in the past, without at the same time remembering what one cognized.12

The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is undoubtedly directed against a point made by Dignāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya I v. 11cd and the Vṛtti thereon. There, Dignāga argues that a cognition has both characteristics (dvirūpatā), namely, both the characteristic of being the grasped and that of being the grasping, and that such a cognition is cognized by itself (svasamvedyatā). He claims that these two points are to be accepted on the basis of the empirical fact that both grasper and grasped are remembered afterwards (smṛter uttarakālam PS I 11c).13

1.1.3 The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument

The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument is as follows:14

The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different (bhinna) [because one is not recollected when the other is recollected (itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt)],15 like flavor [and color],16 etc.

Pārthasārathi (10th c.) comments that each of the two is remembered by excluding the other (parasparaparāhārena).17 The point is that the recollection of an object cannot simultaneously be the recollection of its cognition and vice versa. Whatever is an object is not a cognition, and whatever is a cognition is not an object. These two properties is not an object. These two properties are not exclusive each other.

11 ŚV Śūnyavāda 82–85: na pūrvaṃ jñāyate buddhir ity (ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4. See n. 12.) atraītaṁ vāṣ�ate / grāhakasyaiva samvittir laksyate grahaṁ kvacit // na smarāṁ mayā ko ’pi grīhito ’rhas tadeti hi / smanari grāhakotpādaṁ grāhyārāparāmarśānāt // tasmād abhinmātyāyām ca grahīyā ’pi smaraṇaṁ bhave / grāhakasmtirnirbhasāt tatrāpy esāva grahyate // tad atyatavānābhāvān (ŚV T; tadayatānta-ŚVM ŚV); naikākāraṁ hi jāyate // anvayavatikrābhāyāṁ siddhaṁ bhinnatā tayoh // TS 2070–2072 correspond to 83–84 and 85cd: na smarāṁ mayā ko ’pi grīhito ’rhas tadeti ca / smanari grāhakotpādaṁ grāhyārāparāmarśānāt // tasmād abhinmātyāyām ca grahīyā ’pi smaraṇaṁ bhave / grāhakasmtirnirbhasāte taut tv evaśā grahyate // anvayavatikrābhāyāṁ siddhaṁ bhinnatā tayoh / evam ca hetavo ’py ete prasiddhā śādhyadharminī // (83b hi ŠV : ca TS) / pādaṁ grāhyā-ŚVM ŚV ; -pādgrāhyā-ŚV ; -smṛtir bhinnāṣāt-ŚV ; -smṛtisadbhāve ŚV ; smaranti grāhakotpādaṁ // tad atyantāvinabhāvān (ŚV bhavati hi kadācid etad yaj jñāto ’rthaḥ san’aśāvita) //
12 ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4: na tu pūrvaṁ jñāyate / bhavati hi kāda cid etad yaj jñāto ’rthaḥ san’aśāvita ity ucyate /
13 PSV I 5,1 on PS I 11cd (verse parts from PS are printed in bold): smṛter uttarakālaṁ ca (PS I 11c) dvairūpam iti sambandhaḥ / yasmāc cānapbhavottarākālam viṣaya iva jñāne ’pi smṛtr utpadyate tasmād aṣṭi dvairūpata jñānasya svasamvedyatā ca // kiṃ kāraṇaṁ na hy atad vāvībhāvīte // (PS I 11d) na hy anumatītāḥtehavedasmatrītī rūpādīśrīvat / See the most recent studies of PS(V) I 11 by Kellner (2010) and by Kataoka (2012).
14 ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd (quoted in TS2 2065ab): dvayam parasparaśeṣa bhinnām sādhyam rasādi vac //
15 Kā 163,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt... / NR 226,4 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: parasparaparāmarśe parāmarśāt... / TSP 704,22 on TS2 2065: ekataraparāmarśe sutu aparāṣaparāmarśānāt / aparāṣaparāmarśānāt em. following TSP; aparāmarśānāt TSP; TSPp. The edition TSP2 emends to aparāparāmarśānāt, the Tibetan translation T has gzhan mi rhyo pa’i phyir ro. Cf. TT 281,18 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: hetudṛṣṭāntau tāv eva /
16 NR 226,4 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: ṛparasavad iti /
17 For the concept of virodha, see Bandypadhyay 1988, Kyuma 1999 and Watanabe 2002.
1.1.4 The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna (bhedopalambhana) argument

The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is as follows:\(^{18}\)

[The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different] because they are not perceived as identical (aikarūpyenaajñānāt),\(^\text{19}\) like another [mental] continuum (santānāntara) and the cognition thereof.

Importantly, this aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is reformulated by Umbeka (8\(^{th}\) c.) as follows:\(^{20}\)

Blue and the cognition thereof are different (bhedo) from each other because they are perceived separately (bhedopalambhanāt).

Here Umbeka is drawing a contrast between the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument and Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument, the latter of which is formulated as follows:

PVin I 54ab:

sahopalambhaniyamād abheda nilataddhiyoh /

Blue and the cognition thereof are not different (abheda) [from each other] because they are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyamāt).

According to Umbeka,\(^{21}\) Kumārila’s aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is thus a counter-argument to Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument. This represents the opposite of Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation, namely that the latter argument of Dharmakīrti is actually responding to the former by Kumārila. We will return to this point later.

1.2 Arguing against self-awareness

Kumārila goes on to formulate the following arguments of the second group to establish that a relation between the grasped and the grasper never exists within a cognition.\(^{22}\)

1. The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself;
2. The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself;
3. The jñānatva argument.

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\(^{18}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: aikarūpyeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / TS\(^2\) 2065cd: aikarūpyeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / (vājñā- TS : cājñā- ŚV\(_M\) : vijñā- ŚV\(_T\), ŚV\(_V\) : aikarūpyena TS\(_J\), ŚV : ekarūpyena TS\(_P\), also adopted in the editions TS\(_1\) and TS\(_2\).)

\(^{19}\) Cf. Kā 163,15 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: grāhyaṃ grāhakād bhinnaṃ tena sahaikarūpyenaajñānāt / “The grasped is not different from the grasper because the former is not perceived as identical with the latter.”

\(^{20}\) TT 282,9 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: nilabuddhyor iti dharmitvam, parasparenā bheda iti sādhyo dharmah / nilam idam iti bhedopalambhānād iti hetah /

\(^{21}\) TT 282,11 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: abhedasādhakasya sahopalambhasya, paroktasya vā sahopalambhaniyamād ity avyāśīdhatām anenaḥa /

\(^{22}\) TT 282,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–177ab: idānīm ekavijñānasambandhīnār dharmayor grāhyagrāhakabhāvo nāstīti yad uktam, tatra prayogam āha – jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na grhaṇāti /
1.2.1 The two jñāna-utpatti arguments

These two arguments have a same logical reason and are thus treated as a pair. The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself is as follows:\(^{23}\)

A cognition does not grasp a part of itself (svāṃśa) because it is produced from a cognition (jñānotpatteḥ), like a power of [cognition] itself (svaśakti).

The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself is as follows:\(^{24}\)

A cognition is not grasped by a part of itself because it is produced from a cognition, like a power of [cognition] itself.

Within the framework of the vijñānavāda,\(^{26}\) one may say the following: What is meant by the word svaśakti is a latent impression (vāsanā).\(^{27}\) The latent impression is produced from a cognition (jñānātiriktavāsanā) and devoid of both the property of being grasped and that of being grasper.\(^{28}\) Now, a cognition arises from its immediately preceding condition, which

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\(^{23}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd (quoted in TS 2066ab): jñānam svāṃśam na grhnāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat //

\(^{24}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 176ab (quoted in TS 2066cd): grāhyatvapratisedhaḥ ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā / (grāhyatvaprati- TS; grāhyavat prati- ŚV; grāhyatvam prati- ŚV; hi vā- ŚVM TS; dvivā- ŚVTŚV)” [For the same reason,] there is also the negation of [a cognition being grasped [by a part of itself]. For, a latent impression (vāsanā) is devoid of both [the property of being grasped and that of the grasper].” TT 282.13 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176a: jñānam svāṃśam na grhnāti na vā svāṃśena grhyate ... / NR 226.10 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176a: jñānam svāṃśam na grhnāti nāpi svāṃśena grhyate /

\(^{25}\) See TSP 705,11 on TS 2066c: tadyathā – jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyaḥ / jñānād utpannatvāt / tadvat vāsanāvat / “A part of cognition is not grasped by the same cognition because it is produced from a cognition, like that [power of itself], namely, like a latent impression.”

\(^{26}\) According to Sucarita (10th c.), Kumārila formulates the jñāna-utpatti arguments from the standpoint of the “old” Buddhist who regards a latent impression (vāsanā) as distinct from a cognition (jñānātiriktavāsanā). On the other hand, the “modern” Buddhist holds that a latent impression is not distinguished from the immediately preceding cognition (samanantarajñāna) itself. Kā 163,27 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–176ab: etac ca cirantana-buddhā-hāprāyaṇa jñānātiriktavāsanāpākṣe śhītvakṣam iti dṛṣṭavyam / na tāpādānāparānāmānāmō viśiṣṭāt samanantarajñānānām anyam kācid vāsanām avṛcācinā manyante // For Prajñākāragupta (c. 750–810), a latent impression is not the power produced from the preceding cognition (pūrvavijñānajānantā śaktih), but the immediately preceding cognition itself (samanantaravijñānātmabhūtā). PVA 356,6,8: vāsanetī hi pūrvavijñānajānantā śaktim āmananti vāsanāvarūpavidah / PVA 356,23: [na ca] samanantaravijñānātmabhūtā vāsanēsya āt // As Kobayashi (2001: 327) has pointed out, Yamārī (c. 1000–1060) refers to a discrepancy in the views of Dharmottara (c. 740–800) and Prajñākāragupta on whether a latent impression is distinct from the immediately preceding cognition or not. PVATS II (D 259a4; P 347b7): de līta na re zhig slob dpon chos mchog la sogs pas ’dod pa’i bag chags kyi phyogs la yang pha rol pos brjod pas nyes pa bsa’i nas rang gi ’dod pa brjod pa ni de ma thag pa’i zhes bya ba’o // See also PVin I 43.14–44.2 for Dharmaśāri’s theory of the latent impression.

\(^{27}\) TT 282.14 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175d: śloke svaśaktīsabdabha vāsanām ēha /

\(^{28}\) Kā 163,25 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: na ca sādhyavikalo drṣṭāntah / dvayavāsanāvāsanāḥhyupagamāt / bauddhānām hi svāṃśam na grhnāti / na ca tena grhyate / NR 316.17 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: vāsānāvat / sā hi svāṃśam na grhnāti, nāpi svāṃśena grhyate iti / TSP 705.12 on TS 2066cd: katham asmin anantare pratyakṣavade (emendation following TSP 1: pratyakṣavade TSP, TSPv, also adopted in TSPv); cf. gtan tshigs gnis po... la T) ’pi sādhyadharmānvito drṣṭāntātā siddha ity āha – dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti / dvayena grhyāgrahakatvena /
is a cognition (samanantarapratyaya). Whatever arises from a cognition can neither be grasped nor grasper, so that a cognition can neither be grasped or grasper with respect to a part of itself (svāṃśa).

1.2.2 The jñānatva argument

The jñānatva argument is as follows.

The cognition of Caitra does not cognize the grasped part of the cognition occurring in [Caitra] himself because it is a cognition [itself] (jñānatvāt), like [the cognition] occurring in another body [e.g., of Maitra].

It is clear that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend the cognition of Caitra, which also implies that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra. In the same manner, the cognition of Caitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra himself. This is attributed to the fact that the respective cognitions of Caitra and Maitra equally have the property of being cognitions.

In other words, this argument is based on what it means to be a cognition (jñānatva). This will also be of importance for understanding the development of Dharmakīrti’s samvedana argument and will be taken up again below.

2. Śāntarakṣita’s defense of self-awareness

Let us now examine how Śāntarakṣita rebuts all the arguments Kumārila formulated in ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab.

2.1 The sahopalambhāniyama argument

Śāntarakṣita commences his refutation of the first group of arguments as follows:

TS₂ 2068:

apṛthag vedanāt pūrvaṃ tasyaiva pratipāditāt
aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā
Since [the non-difference between an object and its cognition] has already been explained as based on [the logical reason of] not being separately cognized, [all the reasons] up to the reason “not being perceived as identical” have [the fault of] being unestablished.

According to Kamalaśīla, with the expression aprthag vedanāt “because they are not cognized separately,” Śāntarakṣita refers to the reason sahopalambhaniyamāt “because they are necessarily perceived together,” of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument. Since this argument establishes the non-difference between an object and the cognition thereof, all the four reasons in Kumārila’s first group of arguments are to be considered unestablished (asiddha).

It is to be noted, in passing, that Śāntarakṣita reformulates the sahopalambhaniyama argument earlier in the TS as follows:\footnote{36} [\begin{verbatim}
TS2 2029–2030:
yatsaṁvedanam eva syād yasya saṁvedanaṁ dhruvam //
tasmād avyatiriktaṁ tat tato vā na vibhidyate //
yathā nīlādhiyāḥ svātmā dvitiyō vā yathoḍuṇāḥ //
nīlādhiyedanaṁ cedaṁ nīlākārasya vedanaṁ //
\end{verbatim}

If a cognition of X is necessarily a cognition of Y, X is not different from Y, or Y does not differ from X. Just as the cognition’s own essence [is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the cognition’s own essence], or just as the second moon [is not different from the first one, or the first moon does not differ from the second one]. And this cognition of the form of blue (nīlākāra) is [necessarily] a cognition of the cognition of blue (nīladhi). [Therefore, the form of blue is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the form of blue.]

As noted by Umbeka, Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument basically has the reverse factors of the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument. Namely, the property to be proved (sādhyadharma) is “being non-different [from each other]” (abheda) rather than “being different [from each other]” (bhīna), and the logical reason is “being necessarily perceived together” (sahopalambhaniyama) rather than “not being perceived as identical” (aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna) or “being perceived separately” (bhedopalambhana). In Dharmakīrti’s treatment, this is the main argument corresponding to Kumārila’s first group, meaning that, if Dharmakīrti’s treatment is later than Kumārila’s, then the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is being taken to imply or speak for the other three arguments of the first group,
namely, the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti, tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa, and itaretaraporāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa arguments.

2.2 Refutations of the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti and tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa arguments

After collectively refuting Kumārila’s first group of arguments, Śāntarakṣita discusses the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti and tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa arguments individually.

2.2.1 Refutation of the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument

To begin with, the logical reason of this argument is unestablished (asiddha). In order to show this, Śāntarakṣita cites PVin I 54cd with slight modification and further argues.37

TS2 2073:

aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati TS 38 tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte //

For someone whose perception is not established, the cognition of the object is not established. Therefore, there is no cognition of the grasped without an experience of the grasper.

The point is that an object can be established, in Dharmakīrti’s words, as perceived only when the cognition of an object is perceived. It cannot be the case that the cognition is not perceived when its object is perceived.

In the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument, Kumārila has increased the scope of the reason that a cognition is not cognized when its object is cognized on the basis of the statement in Śabara’s Bhāṣya that only an object as connected with the external world (bahirdeśasambaddha) is perceived. In connection with this statement, Śāntarakṣita points out that what is perceived is not always an external object, and thereby argues that Kumārila’s reason is inconclusive (anaikāntika).

TS2 2074:

asmahalocanair dṛṣṭaṃ tathā piñādy avekṣyate /
vispaṣṭam grāhakāṃśāc ca sanvedyāṃ na tathā param //

[Unreal objects like] yellow, etc., that are seen by someone with an eye-disease are vividly (vispaṣṭam) perceived in that way [i.e., connected with the external

37 See Kellner 2011 for a comparison of the two different arguments for self-awareness that are presented in PS(V) I 11d–12 and PVin I 54cd.
38 This is a quotation of PVin I 54cd, with aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ TS : apratyaksopalambhasya nārthavṛṣṭiḥ PVin, which reads “For someone who does not perceive perception, the perception of the object is not established either” (trans. Kellner 2011: 420). For the further discussion with PVin I 54cd as Dharmakīrti’s argument of infinite regress, see Kellner 2011.
39 grāhyasya... // TS, ŚV Śūnyavāda 79cd.
40 vispaṣṭam em. (gsal por T, vispaṣṭam TSP1 : nīskṛṣṭam TSj, TSd (adopted in TSj and TS2).
and they are not perceived [separately (niṣkrṣṭam)] from the grasping part. Likewise for another [i.e. yellow as seen by someone with healthy eyes].

Needless to say, in the case of an erroneous cognition, someone with an eye-disease perceives an object that is not externally existent.

2.2.2 Refutation of the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument

In attacking the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument, Śāntarakṣita begins by saying the following:

TS₂ 2075:

alakṣitaviśeṣā ca grāhyarūpe ca sā smṛṭiḥ //
sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhhyāsādyasambhavāt //

A recollection by which a particular is not observed occurs with respect to an object to be grasped. But it does not occur with respect to an object distinguished from all others since habituation (abhyāsa) and the other [causal factors for ascertainment] are not possible.

According to Kamalaśīla, an individual entity cannot be remembered because recollection (smṛṭi) is not capable of having an individual for its object, unlike perception. A perception of an individual entity can cause the perceiver to determine (adhyavasāya) that the object is an individual if one of several causal factors for ascertainment (niścayatva) is present:

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41 TSP₂ 706,23 on TS₂ 2074: vispaṣṭam ity ita chedaḥ / tatheti yathā satyābhimaṭam pitādī bahird-śasambaddham vispaṣṭam upalabhya tathā kāmalādyupahatanayanopalabdham api samikṣyate ity (vispaṣṭam ity TSP₁ (gsal pa bya ba T): niṣkrṣṭam ity TSP₂; both editions TSP₁ and TSP₂ have niṣkrṣṭam ity.)

42 TSP₂ 706,25 on TS₂ 2074: grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ / grāhakāṃśād ity niṣkrṣṭaṃ ity adhyāhāryam //

43 TSP₂ 707,7 on TS₂ 2074: tathā param iti satyābhimaṭam api pitādī /

44 TS₂ 2075cd: etad ukiṣam bhavati – na tāvad vikalpaśya yathāvasthitavastugraḥana-sāmarthyam / tasyāvastuvisyaśvayāt / kevalam tathābhūtapadārthābhuvanabalād yatravitārthāvādyāya niścayihatvāvah sanītata tadākārārdhyavāsāyī smārtah prayeto nirvigha eva / paramārthatāḥ svaprabhāse ‘narthe ‘ṛthādhyavasāyena pravṛtyer bhrānta eva sarva jyāte / tasya tv adhyavasāyavaśaṇa viṣayavasāṣṭhā na paramārthatā / na ca grāhyādhyavasāyaṃ smṛṭer apidāvate / kevalam tathāvividhābhāṣapāṭam apratīsattātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātाद्य

45 TSP₂ 707,14 on TS₂ 2075cd: etad ukiṣam bhavati – na tāvad vikalpaśya yathāvasthitavastugraḥana-sāmarthyam / tasyāvastuvisyaśvayāt / kevalam tathābhūtapadārthābhuvanabalād yatravitārthāvādyāyo niścayaḥetavah sanītata tadākārārdhyavāsāyī smārtah prayeto nirvigha eva / paramārthatāḥ svaprabhāse ’narthe ’ṛthādhyavasāyena pravṛtyer bhrānta eva sarvo jyāte / tasya tv adhyavasāyavaśaṇa viṣayavavasāṣṭhā na paramārthatā / na ca grāhyādhyavasāyaṃ smṛṭer apidāvate / kevalam tathāvividhābhāṣapāṭam apratīsattātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātātाद्य

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46 See also PVSV 31,16–32,12 on PV I 58 for Dharmakīrti’s explanation of causal factors for ascertainment (niścayapratyaya). I referred to Kellner’s (2004) descriptions of PVSV 32,5–12 for the translations of niścayahetu, tathāvidhābhāṣya, pātava, pratīsattātātātātātātātātātātātाद्य.
a [state of] habituation due to similar situations (tathāvidhābhyaśa), acuity [of cognition] (pāṭava), or the [difference in] degree of proximity (pratyāsattitāratamya). There are no such causal factors for ascertainment in the case of recollection, which means that its objects will always be determined as universals instead of particulars.

Now, if recollection has only a universal character for its object, how could the object be remembered? Śāntarakṣita answers the question by saying the following:

TS₂ 2076:

grhīta iti ko 'py evaṃ nānyathā smaṛaṇaṁ bhavet /
śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśe vidyate⁴⁷ smaṛaṇaṁ na ca //

Otherwise, there could be no recollection as in the form “Something was grasped.” And there is no recollection [of a grasper] like a pure crystal.

There is no recollection of a cognition like a colorless transparent crystal that is not marked with the form of its object. Even if there is a case where, after cognizing a certain object, one cannot remember the object in a specific way, it does not follow that one is remembering a cognition which grasped no object.

Śāntarakṣita concludes that the logical reason presented in PS I 11c is established whereas that of the tatparāmarśa-aperāmarśa argument is not.

2.3 The saṃvedana argument

Śāntarakṣita then continues on to refute the arguments of group 2 as follows:

TS₂ 2077:

kambupīṭādivijñānair hetvoḥ⁴⁹ paścimayor api /
anaiṅkāntikatā vyaktaṃ dig eṣānyatra sādhane //

In view of the cognition of a yellow conch-shell and the like, the latter two logical reasons are clearly inconclusive (anaiṅkāntika). This is the way to deal with the other reasons [to prove the existence of an external object, too].⁵₀

Like in TS₂ 2074, Śāntarakṣita here gives as an example of an erroneous cognition in order to point out that the logical reasons of the two jñāna-utpatti arguments and of the jñānatva argument are all inconclusive.

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⁴⁶ TSP₂ 707,22 on TS₂ 2076: syād etat – katham avasīyate grāhyādhyaśaśayo 'trāsti smṛter ity āha – grhīta ityādi /
⁴⁷ vidyate em. following yod pa T : vedyate TS₁, TSPₑ (adopted in TS₁, TS₂).
⁴⁸ TSP₂ 707,24 on TS₂ 2076: na cāpi kevalo grāhyākārānkitamūrtitayā grāhakah śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśaṃ smaryate /
⁴⁹ hetvoḥ em. with TS₂ (gтан tshigs… gnyis po T) : hetoh TS₁ (adopted in TS₁), hetoh [sic] TSPₑ.
⁵₀ TSP₂ 708,10 on TS₂ 2077d: eṣā dig ity anayatraḥ bahirarhasādhanē paśanyastye eṣā dīśānādik //
⁵¹ See section 2.2.1.
To explain, suppose that there occurs a cognition of yellow with reference to a white conch-shell. The erroneous cognition cognizes the form (ākāra) of yellow, which is a part of the cognition and which has no counterpart in the external world. If a continuum of cognitions is accepted, then the erroneous cognition must be presumed to arise from an immediately preceding cognition. Alternatively, the cognition, which is identical with the form of yellow, is cognized by the grasping part of the erroneous cognition.

It is to be noted that, according to Kamalaśīla, the other (anyat) cognition, that is, the non-erroneous cognition, also deviates from “not cognizing a part of [cognition] itself.” Even the cognition of a white conch-shell or that of someone with healthy eyes also cognizes a part of the cognition, which means that every cognition cognizes itself.

This reminds us of Dharmakīrti’s samvedana argument which was reformulated by Śāntarakṣita as follows:

TS₂ 2032:

\[
\text{ṣaṃvedanam idam sarvam na cărthāntaragocaram /} \\
\text{ṣaṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt svātmasaṃvedanam yathā} //
\]

Every cognition does not have for its object anything other [than the cognition itself] because it has the essential nature of a cognition, like the cognition of one’s own self.

According to Dharmakīrti as well as Śāntarakṣita, no cognition cognizes any object distinct from the cognition itself because its essential nature is that of a cognition.

For both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, the essential nature of a cognition is being that which illuminates (prakāśaka). What is illuminated, however, differs for each: the cognition itself or an external object, respectively. Therefore, the same logical reason “being a cognition itself” or “having a cognition as its essence” will yield opposite implications; for Kumārila, a cognition never cognizes a part of the cognition (svāṃśa), whereas for Dharmakīrti, it never cognizes anything different from the cognition.

Thus, in the same way as was the case with the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna and sahopalambhaniyama arguments (cf. section 2.1), here too, Dharmakīrti seems to have reversed only the properties to be proved of the jñānatva argument and then let this imply the other two jñāna-utpatti arguments of the second group.

---

52 TSP₂ 708.6 on TS₂ 2077: tathā hi – yathā yadi pīṭāśankhūdhijñānāṃ jñānotpannam api sat svāṃśaṃ pīṭādīkārām grāhyā / (tathā hi yathā TSP₂: yathā TSP₂: ’di ltar na T; n.e. TSP₆, TSP₁.)
53 TSP₂ 708.7 on TS₂ 2077: yathā ca jñānam api sat jñānāṃśasya pīṭāder grāhyasya bodhakam bhavati /
54 TSP₂ 708.7 on TS₂ 2077: tathānyad apiśī vyabhicāritā hetvoh /
55 For saṃvedanasvabhāvatvā TSP₁, TSP₆ (adopted in TS₂, cf. also rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi phyir TSP₃, rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi phyir TSP₂), TSP₁ emends to saṃvedanam ca niñāsay.
56 PV III 329: prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakāh / yathā prakāśo abhimutas tathā dhīr ātmavedini //; TS₂ 2081a: vijñānatvam prakāśatvam ... / ŚV Śūnyavāda 187ab quoted in TS₂ 2017ab: prakāśatvam bāhye ’rthe śakyabhāvāt tu nātmani //
3. Against nirākāravāda

Lastly, let us consider how Śāntarakṣita regards the function of the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments.

After reformulating the saṃvedana argument, he states:

TS₂ 2034:

śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśam arthākāraṇaṁ arthaṅkāraiṣṭam tān prati sādhanam

Both⁵⁷ of these arguments are addressed to those who maintain that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object, being like a pure crystal.

That is, according to Śāntarakṣita (as understood by Kamalaśīla, see n. 57) both the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments are meant to prove self-awareness (svasamvid), which, stated from a different perspective, is the same as proving that a cognition is marked with the form of its object (sākāratā).⁵⁸ Those who claim that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object (nirākāratā) are none other than nirākāravādins represented by Kumārila.

Thus, according to Śāntarakṣita, Dharmakīrti’s aim in including both of these arguments is not to prove svasamvid or sākāratā yet again after it had already been proved (siddhasādhana) by the other of the two, as suggested by Śubhagupta;⁵⁹ indeed, it would not be appropriate, given the rules of debate, for Dharmakīrti to offer two arguments for the same thing only for the sake of improving upon the position laid out by Dignāga. Rather, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla helpfully point out, these two arguments must be meant for refuting nirākāravāda; after all, in refuting an opposing position, it is indeed permitted to adopt as many approaches as might be necessary.

4. Concluding remarks

According to Śāntarakṣita, the reason Dharmakīrti developed his arguments is to defend Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness against the attack by Kumārila. In order to counter Dignāga’s arguments for dvirūpatā and svasamvedyatā respectively, Kumārila had argued that an object and its cognition are different from one another on the basis of the fact that they are perceived differently (bhedopalambhana), and, secondly, that a cognition never cognizes a part of itself on the basis of its essential nature of being a cognition (jñānatva).

---

⁵⁷ TSP₂ 696,14 on TS₂ 2034d: idam iti dvividham api sādhanaṁ nirākāravādinaṁ prati yatas tena na siddhasādhyatā /

⁵⁸ The logical reasons sahopalambhaniyama and samvedana are collectively called svasamvitprasādhana or sākārajñānapakṣe by Kamalaśīla. TSP₂ 695,14 on TS₂ 2032: dvitiyam api sākāratāsiddhye sādhanam ñhā – samvedanam idam ityādi / TSP₂ 705,20 on TS₂ 2068: ataḥ svasamvitprasādhanena pratipādītaḥ abhedasya nilataddhiḥyoh prasādhitatvātāv... / See n. 34.

⁵⁹ In BASK 87 Śubhagupta points out that the samvedana argument is not valid because it proves what is already proved (siddhasādhana) by the sahopalambhaniyama argument. BASK 87 is quoted in TSP₂ 696,11 on TS₂ 2034: sākārajñānānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā / tasyābhede ca sāṁsādhye siddhasādhanatā bhavet //
Accordingly, Dharmakīrti formulated the sahopolambhaniyama and samvedana arguments as counter-arguments against these arguments by Kumārila.

Although it is unacceptable to the ŚV-commentators such as Umbeka, Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of the relation among the various arguments given in PS I, ŚV Śūnyavāda and PVin I is reasonable. This is because, although it is clear that Kumārila, in his exhaustive detail, was attempting to refute Dignāga’s arguments from multiple perspectives, it should also be apparent from the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation that he himself was also responding to a challenge. To do so, Dharmakīrti simply reversed the factors of the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna and jñānatva arguments in particular, implying that – from his perspective – these two arguments would also cover the other five arguments which Kumārila employed. If Dharmakīrti thereby successfully boiled down these discussions to their essential issues, this could then represent a rather elegant response to Kumārila’s detailed challenge.

References and abbreviations

Primary sources

PSV Pramāṇaśamuccayavṛtti: See PS I.
PV I Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 1 (Śvārthānumāna): See PVSV.
PV III Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 3 (Pratyakṣa): See PVV.
PVAṬS II Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṇaśāstrikā Supariṣuddhā, ch. 2 (Pratyakṣa): Tibetan translation, D 4226 me 1–328a7; P 5723 me 1–436a8 (Vol. 135, pp. 77–252).
ŚBh Śābarabhāṣya: See Frauwallner 1968.
ŚV Ślokavārttika: ŠV$_V$=ŠV$_T$=ŠV$_M$.
ŚV$_M$ Ślokavārttika: See TṬ.
ŚV$_T$ Ślokavārttika: See Kā.
ŚV$_V$ Ślokavārttika: See NR.
T Tibetan translation of TS(P) (in cases where D and P have identical readings).
TS(P)$_1$ Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Kṛṣṇamācārya. 2 vols. Baroda 1926.
TS$_D$ Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, D 4266 ze 1–133a6.
TS$_P$ Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, P 5764 ’e 1–159a5.
TS$_P_D$ Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, D 4267 ze 133b1–’e 331a7.

Secondary literature


Watanabe 2014  T. Watanabe, Buddhist Critiques of the Sāṅkhya Theory of Causality: Dharmakīrti and His Predecessors. Paper presented at the XIIth Congress of the
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Concordance of passages cited

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Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

by
Patrick McAllister

1 Introduction

The Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition starting with Dignāga (ca. fifth to sixth-century CE) accepts only two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa): perception and inference. Whilst many aspects of pramāṇa theories have been studied carefully by modern scholars, the history of the arguments that are used to prove that only inference and perception are pramāṇas has not been investigated in great detail. The analysis usually offered is that there are, first, two means of valid cognition since there are two objects, but that, second, really only the particular is the object of a valid cognition.

For example, Franco and Notake (2014) characterize PV III 1–63 as follows, Franco and Notake 2014: 4:

[The] argumentative structure is clear: There are two pramāṇas because there are two prameyas, and there are two prameyas because of the four criteria that distinguish between universals and particulars.

In their comments (Franco and Notake 2014: 30, n. 2) on PV III 1, they add that,

[…] in the final analysis, for Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta it cannot be said that the fact that there are two kinds of object is the reason for there being two kinds of means of knowledge, but that two modes of cognition of the same thing are the reason for there being two kinds of objects of knowledge (prameya).

Such a paraphrase of the two arguments for inference and perception is in no way the result of misunderstanding what Dharmakīrti said. He does certainly say this. The question is, rather, how the two arguments cohere.

1 The material in this article was first presented at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2014, in Vienna. The research was conducted in the project (226063163) “Systems of epistemology in classical Indian philosophy: Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810) on the number of instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa)”, sponsored by the DFG, German Research Foundation. I would like to thank Birgit Kellner for her thoughtful and critical appreciation of the arguments I make here, and Markus Viehbeck for helping me with many Tibetan issues.

2 The Buddha’s special role in the context of means of valid cognition is beyond the scope of this article. See Motoi Ono’s contribution to this volume for a discussion of that issue.

3 The pratyakṣa (perception) chapter is here counted as the third of the Pramāṇavārttika’s four chapters, in accordance with how Dharmakīrti can be determined to have arranged them (see Kellner 2004a), and referred to as PV III. Prajñākaragupta comments on the pratyakṣa chapter in the second chapter of his Pramāṇavārttikālankārabhāṣya (PVABh2).
That there is a tension between the two statements can be seen by contrasting PV III 1, the opening verse of the pratyakṣa chapter, and PV III 53:

\[ PV \text{ III 1: } pramāṇaṃ dvividham meyadvaidhyāc chaktyaśakti-\text{-}taḥ \]

\[ arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣatah \]

The means of valid cognition is twofold because that to be cognized [by it] is twofold; for [that to be cognized by it] is [either] capable [or] incapable of fulfilling an aim;\(^4\) [an illusory object like] hair and so on is not an object [that is to be cognized by it], because one does not apply [oneself to it] as an object.\(^5\)

This corresponds exactly to the first part of the view of Franco and Notake (2014) quoted above: there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects of valid cognition. This view is already endorsed by Dignāga.\(^6\)

The verse corresponding to the second statement is this:

\[ PV \text{ III 53d: } \ldots \text{me} \text{y} \text{a} \text{m tv ekam svala} \text{ka} \text{san} \text{am} \]

There is, however, [only] one [thing] to be validly cognized, the particular.

So according to the first argument, there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects of valid cognition. Here, however, Dharmakīrti maintains that there is only one object of valid cognition. Dharmakīrti continues, giving the reason that there is only one object:

\[ PV \text{ III 54: tasmād arthakriyāsiddheḥ sadasattāvicāraṇāt } \]

\[ tasya svapararūpābhīyām gater meyadvayaṃ matam \]

For one examines the existence and non-existence [of the particular], since the fulfilment of an aim is accomplished [only] due to this [particular]. [We] think\(^7\) that there are two [objects] of valid cognition, because this [particular] is cognized through [its] own nature and through another nature.

\(^4\) The term arthakriyā is here translated as referring to the usefulness something can have in conventional, human activity. It is also a technical term in Buddhist pramāṇa theory (cf. Nagatomi 1967–1968, Dunne 2004: 256–260). In the current instance it can be taken in both ways: a thing fulfils a person’s aim, or, in the technical sense, it is able to cause an effect. In this article, I will render it as a technical term (by ‘causal efficacy’, or similar), when I think it is referring to the property of a real thing independently of that thing’s use by another being.

\(^5\) For adhimokṣa, and also abhiniveśa (a term relevant below), see Kobayashi 2010: n. 23.


\(^7\) Franco and Notake (2014: 140) take the subject of matam to be Dignāga, translating “It is held [by Dignāga] …”, referring to PPV 132, 8–9, where an opponent asks whether PV III 54d–55b does not contradict Dignāga’s statement that “there is no [object] to be validly cognized apart from the particular and the universal” (cf. PS I 1, 19 and Hattori 1968: 24). I agree, but think the impersonal matam here carries the additional notion that, at least in a revised way, this is still maintained to be the case. The “we” I have added here is therefore meant to include Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Also Prajñākaragupta relates this to Dignāga, see below.
So the difference of the objects of valid cognition is due to the *same* object being understood in two different ways: either it is understood through the characteristic particular to it, as it is apprehended by direct perception, or it is indirectly understood through another, general aspect, which is how a conceptual cognition comprehends its object. This argument broadly separates the field into two parts: it specifies perception and “something else”; this other is conceptual cognition, of which inference is only a subclass.\(^8\)

Prajñākaragupta lets an opponent use the tension between the two arguments for an attack in the following passage, immediately after the citation of PV III 54ab:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PVABh}_2 \ 213, \ 4–8: \ & \text{yadi svalaśānam eva dvābhīyām api viśayākriyate ekaviṣa-} \\
& \text{yatvād ekam eva mānaṃ prasaktam. athaikaviṣayatve }'\text{pi sāmagrībhedāt prama-} \\
& \text{nabhedaḥ. evaṃ sati prameyadvaśāṣāṇam prameyam iti. sāmagrībhedena ca pramāṇabhede ca-} \\
& \text{kṣurādivijñānānām api bhedaḥ sāmagryā iti tāvanti pramāṇāni bhaveyuh.}
\end{align*}
\]

[Opponent:] If only the particular is made an object by all two, [then], because there is [only] one object, only a single means follows.

[Proponent:] Now, even though there is only one object, there is a difference of the means of valid cognition because of a difference of the causal complex.

[Opponent:] If that is so, then [the statement] “because there are two [objects] to be validly cognized” (PV III 1) is contradicted, as well as what the teacher [Dignāga] said: “[There are two means of valid cognition] because the [object] to be validly cognized has two characteristics, [i.e., one particular to it and one that it has in common with other things].” (PS I 2bc)

But if there were a difference of the means of valid cognition because of the difference of the causal complex [generating a cognition], [then] also [different types of] cognitions such as visual [cognition] and so on would be differentiated [from each other] due to [their] causal complex. So there would be as many means of valid cognition [as there are different causal complexes].

In this passage, the opponent addresses the most important difficulties in maintaining both PV III 1 and PV III 53d–54ab. The core of the criticism can be explicated like this:

1. Given that there is only one object of valid cognition, the particular, and given the argument in PV III 1 that the number of objects is the reason for the number of means, it results that one means of valid cognition, perception, would be sufficient: Dharmakīrti would thus be contradicting the position that there are two means, expressed in PV III 1.

2. If the duality of the means of valid cognition is to be maintained, but for a reason other than the number of objects that are to be validly cognized, then Dharmakīrti

\(^8\) The difference between conceptual cognition in general and inference in particular is a separate argument and is not discussed here.
Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

is contradicting both the reason he himself gave in PV III 1, “because the object of valid cognition is twofold”, as well as Dignāga’s reasoning in PS I 2bc.

3. In addition to this, if the new reason for the duality of the means of valid cognition should be that each valid cognition’s specific set of causes is different, then one will have to assume that there are as many means of valid cognition as there are variations in the causal complexes.

The argument in PV III 53d–54ab is thus problematic in various respects: it contradicts Dharmakīrti’s previous statement, and it contradicts the tradition Dharmakīrti claims to uphold. Furthermore, if the actual reason for the differentiation of means of valid cognition lies in the difference of their causal complexes, then this reason does not prove what it is supposed to prove (according to this opponent, it could prove that there is either only one or that there are very many means of valid cognition).

In the following, I will focus on Prajñākaragupta’s strategy in answering this objection. The most relevant passages in this regard are his commentary on PV III 1–2 and on PV III 53d–58.

2 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 1–2: a conventional criterion of validity

Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of the argument in PV III 1, which is clearly influenced by the later argument found in PV III 53d–54, is as follows:

\[ PVABh_{36}, 25–27: viṣayasya caikasyaiva dvaividhyāṃ pratipattiprakāra-
\[ sya dvaividhyāt | pratipattibhedāś ca pramāṇabhedaḥ | sa eva ca viṣayabheda-
\[ daḥ |]

And the object, which is only one, is twofold, because the manner of [its] cognition is twofold. And the difference of means of valid cognition is [this] difference of cognition. And exactly this [difference of the means of valid cognition] is the difference of the object.

Prajñākaragupta is here interpreting PV III 1 in the light of the later argument: the object of valid cognition is only one, but we think it is twofold because it is apprehended in two different ways.

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9 There is a a slight textual variation in the text as quoted here and PV III 1: (pra)meyadvaividhyāt.
10 The term caṇḍurādvijñāna suggests that a visual and an auditory cognition would have to be taken as different types of means of valid cognition because at least one element in each causal complex, the sense organ involved, is different. This is contrary to the Buddhist classification of both as a single means of valid cognition, perception.
11 Kobayashi 2011 has presented a concise analysis of two elements that are important to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti explored in the following sections: first, Kobayashi 2011: 1257–1259 shows that, against Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta maintains that the object of activity which any means of valid cognition directs a person towards is always a future particular (bhāvivastu), and that this is the single meya that Dharmakīrti is referring to; second, Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 illustrates that, according to Prajñākaragupta, both perception and inference can be said to be erroneous with regard to this future object.
Before examining the later verses in the light of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary, it is necessary to understand a few of the programmatic points of his commentary on PV III 1–2: for it is here, in the opening section of the pratyakṣa chapter, that he describes the purpose and scope that he considers the chapter to have, and therefore these statements help in interpreting his later arguments.

The commentary on these two verses, up to PVABhIn 44, 27, is too long to be discussed here, and I will therefore limit myself to two issues that are central to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s argument: the role that self-awareness and everyday activity have in establishing that there are two means of valid cognition, and Prajñākaragupta’s characterization of the relation between inference and perception.

### 2.1 Self-awareness and everyday activity

Prajñākaragupta’s general answer to why one can say there are two objects of valid cognition is as follows:  

\[
\text{PVABhIn 39, 6–9: atrocyate | viśayadvaīvidhyāṃ pratyakṣata eva siddham | sadrśāsadrśapratītir hi pratītēva dharmāḥ | sa ca svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddhāḥ | na ca pratītīḥ svarūpe bhrāntisaṅgatā | tatra bhrāntiśaṅkāyāṃ avyavahāra eva bhaved anavatārahetur vā vādipratiśvādiśrikavacanasya |}
\]

To this [we] respond: That there are two [kinds of] object [for cognition] is established solely from perception. For the cognition of [something as] similar [to other things or as] dissimilar [to everything else] is a property only of cognition; and this [property] is established by the perception [that is cognition’s] awareness of itself. And cognition cannot be mistaken about [its] own form. If there is a suspicion about [the possibility of] an error with regard to that [form of cognition itself], there would be no everyday activity at all, or there would be no reason for the talk of [either] the proponent, opponent, or questioner to take place.

In other words, the fact that there are two objects of cognition is evident. A cognition of something can occur in two modes: it can be cognized as similar or dissimilar to something else—that is, it can be cognized as something that has something in common with other things, as a universal in the broadest sense of the term; or as being dissimilar from everything else, as a unique thing. These two modes are qualities of cognition, not of the object. As we will repeatedly see below, it is the distinct (spaṣṭa) or indistinct (aspaṣṭa) appearance of the object that differentiates the two types of cognition. This appearance as such is directly

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13 The term “self-awareness”, which renders the Sanskrit svasaṃvedana, here “… refers to the idea that all mental states and the factors like passion or feelings that accompany them are aware of themselves.” (Kellner 2010: 204) I will below also use the phrase “cognition’s awareness of itself” for svasaṃvedana to make it clear that it means that here the object of cognition is cognition itself.

14 Franco and Notake (2014: n. 2, p. 31) point out that Manorathananandin makes a similar argument. Prajñākaragupta’s argument here is also quoted and refuted in NBhūṣ 382, 3–9.

15 Cf. section 4, n. 56, and n. 48.
perceived by the awareness that every cognition has of itself, and doubt about this aspect of cognition would end all conventional activity, as well as make any debate impossible.

In explaining this, Prajñākaragupta emphasizes that the duality of means of valid cognition is only conventional. This becomes especially clear in the following passage, where he addresses the overall aim of the pratyakṣa chapter:

PVAbh\textsubscript{In} II 20–21, and 39, 20–24: pratītibheda evāstu mānabheda-
dah kathām bhavet |
nanu prasiddham mānatvam pūrvaṃ sāmānyalakṣanāt ||

tadbhedavyavahāro 'yam idānīṃ sādhyatāṃ gataḥ |
savikalpam adhyakṣam eṣo 'gnir iti yo vadet ||

[Opponent:] There certainly may be a difference of cognitions. [But] why would there be a difference of means of valid cognition?

Well, the state of being a means of valid cognition was well established earlier, from [its] general characteristic.

[Proponent:] Now, this everyday activity [of ours that treats] the means of valid cognition as different, has come to be what is to be established, as [someone might proclaim a conceptual perception, [like] “This is a fire.”

On the basis of everyday activity, [that is], from the characteristic of engagement or nonengagement [with an object], what it is to be a means of valid cognition has been well established in the first chapter [the `textitpramāṇasiddhi chapter of the PV, but] only according to [its] general characteristic.

Now, [in this chapter, what it is to be a means of valid cognition] has become what is to be established only [insofar as] it is commonly treated as differentiated [into two types]; [the explanation] “this [means of valid cognition] is twofold” [is given by Dharmakīrti] for that [person] who would say about this [means of valid cognition] that there is only a single conceptual perception, for example, “This is a fire, from it the attainment of a desired aim is brought about.”; [this is said to him] because the form of cognition is differentiated.
In these statements Prajñākargupta is contrasting the scope of the first (pramāṇasiddhi) chapter and the current chapter: in the first chapter, validity was established in its general form—as a definition applicable to all kinds of valid cognitions. Moreover, validity was established there conventionally—that is, in relation to the engagement in some activity (or abstention from an activity) that a means of valid cognition facilitates in a way that makes that activity successful. On this background, Prajñākaragupta continues, an opponent might object: conceptual perception is compatible with this criterion of validity, and, in fact, it is the only (ekam eva) means of valid cognition that has to be assumed. It is compatible with this definition of validity because, if conceptual perception is possible, it could contain the ascertainment “This is a fire, it can fulfil my aim.” This is not acceptable to Dharmakīrtians. Therefore, a further argument is necessary to show that there is not only one combined means of valid cognition, a perception containing a conceptual cognition, but rather that there are different means of valid cognition.

In other words, the pramāṇasiddhi chapter does not answer the question of which means of valid cognition there are, but only of what a means of valid cognition is. The pratyakṣa chapter will however deal exactly with this question: what are the different means of valid cognition? In addition, Prajñākaragupta qualifies this with the statement that that which is to be established now is bheda vyavahāramātraka: it consists exclusively in the conventional talk of a division of the means of valid cognition as defined in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter.

The importance of noting this lies in the fact that Prajñākaragupta separates two elements: the capacity for leading to successful activity, the general criterion of any cognition’s validity, and what cognitions are like (in particular, whether they are conceptual or perceptual), which is the basis for distinguishing the types of valid cognitions and is evident in any cognition’s awareness of itself. In a conventional sense, a cognition can be considered ‘valid’ if it allows one to act successfully; it is not important for its validity what type of cognition it is. And vice versa, the general mark of validity is not important for distinguishing the types of these cognitions.

2.2 The relation of inference and perception

Prajñākaragupta then discusses which means of valid cognition can lead to successful activity, or, in other words, conforms to the conventional and general criterion of validity. First, an opponent, apparently a Buddhist, raises this objection:

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16 For Prajñākaragupta’s general analysis of cognition’s validity and its relation to activity, see Ono 2000 and Franco 2004. The explicit equation of “being a means of valid cognition” with enabling or motivating successful activity derives from PV M II 1–5, and was already elucidated by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi (see Dunne 2004: 253–256). We find it fully developed as one of a number of equal definitions of validity in Dharmottara’s work, cf. Krasser 1995: 247–248, Franco 1997: 52.

17 Cf. Yamārī, (PVATS: 103, 37): ‘on te zhes bya ba la sogs pas ni rang gi phyogs pa’i rtso dpal slong ba’o/ Yamārī goes on to describe a position held by these others (explicitly excepting Bhaṭṭārcaṭa), on which a conceptual cognition that has an object that accomplishes some end is different from perception, and therefore not a means of valid cognition. Inami et al. (2002: 26, n. 35) give more details.
Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

Now, perception alone is what causes activity, nothing else. That other cognition, though it exists, is not a means of valid cognition. For, [something] is not a means of valid cognition to the extent that [it] exists together with [a means of valid cognition], because it would result that even the body, the earth, and so on [which might all co-exist with a means of valid cognition] would be means of valid cognition.

Prajñākaragupta answers that perception is not, in and of itself, capable of letting a person act:

[Something] is determined as assisting [something else] or not through the positive and negative concomitance [of that which assists and that which it assists].

But perception by itself is not, when that [which assists it, i.e., conceptual cognition], is absent, what causes activity.

Without the introductory passage explaining that the topic here is the conventional difference of perception and inference, this would of course be in stark contrast to Dharma-kīrti’s well-known position that, in activity following upon perception, only the perception is a means of valid cognition, but not the conceptual cognition that perception needs to be followed by in order to cause a person to act.\(^{19}\)

But, given that the discussion has here been restricted to the question about the difference of means of valid cognition, the verse says that it is not possible that perception alone—only a cognition with an object that is distinct (spaṣṭa)—can cause activity. The statement thus emphasizes that the general and conventional characteristic of a means of valid cognition, that it prompts activity, cannot be upheld if one wishes to also bind it to only one type of cognition—the perceptual one. That would immediately land one in an untenable position. In other words, to take perception alone as a means of valid cognition in this conventional sense is impossible: it will only work if one grants that status also to a conceptual cognition (or at least some conceptual cognitions).

This is then elaborated in the following, where Prajñākaragupta examines the relationship between inference and an activity following upon perception. Even in the case of complete habituation—a state in which a being is able to act upon a perception without intervening conceptual cognition—conceptual cognition is involved: for, so Prajñākaragupta,

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\(^{18}\) PVABh-msB 84a5 reads mano’ntaram, which I think is possible: it could be understood as ‘another cognition’, which corresponds to the Tibetan translation. Inami et al. (2002) correct to mānāntaram based on the Tibetan. Prof. Inami informs me that the tat tu is missing in his edition only due to an unfortunate misprint, and it is represented in his Japanese translation.

\(^{19}\) See Katsura 1993 for a study of this “perceptual judgement” in Dharmakīrti’s writings.
the fact that there is a habituation presupposes an inferential cognition on whose basis the
habit must initially have been formed. To hold otherwise, so PVABh₂ II 24, would be as
clever as thinking, because one contracts a disease the first time one goes somewhere, it is
unsafe to go there the first time, but safe thereafter. In this sense, inference can be said to be
the main element (pradhāna) even in purely habitual activity, which the opponent would
like to see as the main support for the claim that perception can promote activity without
conceptual aid. We can now investigate Prajñākaragupta’s comments on the later verses.

3 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 53d–54: one object known in two ways

In this section of the PVABh₂, Prajñākaragupta is presenting a discussion in which, as we
will see, the following argumentative aims are intertwined:

1. He needs to resolve and explain the possible contradiction between PV III 1 and PV
   III 53d (described above).
2. He has to prepare for the proof that perception and inference are the only means of
   valid cognition.
3. He has to prove that perception and inference are different means of valid cognition.
   (Points 2 and 3 together make it possible to maintain that there are two, and only
   two, means of valid cognition.)
4. He has to uphold cognition’s awareness of itself as the central cognitive faculty, in
   the sense that in reality perception and inference are two forms of this, and can only
   be conventionally separated.

Prajñākaragupta starts his commentary on PV III 53d (see above, section 1) as follows:

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20 See section 5 for how this position is taken up again in showing how inference and perception depend
on each other.
21 See the following passage: PVABh₂ II 28: uktam atra vinābhvyāsān na pratyakṣe pramāṇatā | tato
numānam evātra pradhānam iti gnyatāṁ || (It was explained that without habituation there is no
means of valid cognition in a perception. Therefore it must be understood that inference alone is the
main element here.)
22 McCrea (2011) has analyzed this section. Whilst he makes many valid points, he does not take the
overall argumentative context that is carried over into this section from the beginning of the pratyakṣa
chapter into due account. This results in attributing the following positions to Prajñākaragupta, which
directly contradict Dharmakīrti:

1. that perception is not free from error (McCrea 2011: 327)
2. that it is not perception, but rather the following moment of conceptual awareness that is a
   means of valid cognition (McCrea 2011: 323)

I do not agree with these attributions. Point one, though indeed Prajñākaragupta does make it, cannot
be taken out of its context (see section 6 and n. 54). Point two is a position that the opponent is being
forced into and cannot accept (see section 4).

Another issue that McCrea (2011: 323) discusses is that the conceptual awareness following perception
does not have the fault of gṛhitagrahana, or that this fault is not a reason to not be a means of valid
cognition. The discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article (see the comment in n. 40).
Prajñākaragupta's Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

*PVABh₂* 212, 29–30: *na hi sāmānyaṁ nāma prameyam, yathākalpanam ayo-gāt | svalaṅkaṇaṁ eva paramārthataḥ prameyam | tasyaiva sadasattvenāva-bodhasya prayajanatvāt | kuta etat |

\[\text{tasmād arthakriyāsiddheḥ sadasattāvicāraṇāt} |\]

*arthakriyākārino hi padārthasya sattvāsattvābhyyāṁ arthītā prekṣāvatām | tadavabodhāya ca pramāṇam anvisyate | anyathā pramāṇaparīkṣaṇam aprē-kṣāpūrvakriyaiva bhavet | tasmād arthakriyākāripadārthabhāvābhāvaviśayi-karaṇasamartham arthavat pramāṇam | tasmāt dvābhyyām api pratyakṣānumā-nābhyyāṁ svalaṅkaṇaṁ eva viśayikartavyam | anyathā pramāṇatvāyogāt |*

For the so-called universal is not an object of valid cognition, since it is not possible as it is imagined. In reality, only the particular is [the object] to be validly cognized, because the knowledge of the existence or non-existence of it alone is of use. Why is that?

Because one examines the existence and non-existence [of the particular], since the fulfilment of an aim is accomplished [only] due to it. (PV III 54ab)

For, judicious beings are intent upon [whether] the object that produces the fulfilment of [their desired] aims exists [or] not. And for [the purpose of] knowing that, [i.e., whether that objects exists or not], a means of valid cognition has to be sought for. Otherwise, the investigation by a means of valid cognition would be an entirely injudicious activity. Therefore, a means of valid cognition has an object [insofar as] it is capable of making the existence or non-existence of a thing that produces the fulfilment of an aim [its] object.

Therefore, by all two [means of valid cognition], perception and inference, only the particular is to be made the object, because otherwise it would be incoherent that [they should] be means of valid cognition.

So perception and inference are each a means of valid cognition only insofar as they direct a person to the successful accomplishment of a purpose. In order to do this, they have to reliably let a person attain a particular, since only that is capable of causing the desired effect. From this perspective, the particular alone is the object that is to be validly cognized, the *prameya*. The opponent immediately raises the objection that, if there is only one object of valid cognition, then one means would be enough, too.

Prajñākaragupta just remarks that this is wrong, since it is due to the differences in the respective causal complexes that two types of valid cognition can be assumed—implying that it is not because there are two objects.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) This idea of differences in the causal complex already appears in the analysis of PV III 2, most explicitly in *PVABh₄* II 49, and the accompanying prose, especially this passage: *PVABh₄* 44, 16–18: *na hi sarvadā pramāṇadvitayaṁ prameyadvitayaṁ sādhyate | api tu sāmagrīśambhavād iti vayam brūmaḥ |
It is after this statement that the opponent delivers the main objection, presented above in section 1, and it should now be clearer what the exact direction of that objection is. McCrea (2011: 322 f.) has characterized it well, along with the main defence that Prajñākaragupta uses:

… the opponent attempts to find some way to distinguish perception from inference as a more direct or immediate mode of awareness, so that he can still deny the validity of inference without similarly condemning perception. In each case, Prajñākaragupta demonstrates that the opponent’s purported distinction is spurious, and that perception and inference are similarly indirect, such that one could not accept one as a pramāṇa without accepting the other as well.

In the current context, the problem concerns the causal complex of the means of valid cognition. The opponent distinguishes the object (prameya), which is the main factor in the causal complex, and the other, secondary factors in his criticism:

\[ PVABh2 \text{ II 229: paramārthaprameyatve syād anantaprameyatā} | \text{apekṣākṛtabhedatve paramārtho na lakṣaṇam ||} \]

If the object of valid cognition were real, there would be infinite objects of valid cognition. If [the object] is differentiated in dependence [on some other factor], reality is not a characteristic [of the object so differentiated].

This verse sums up the two sides of the opponent’s attack: if the particulars are the objects of valid cognition, then there would be infinitely many different objects. In other words, if the main factor in the causal complex generating a cognition were the real thing, there would be very many such cognitions, each a proper and separate means of valid cognition. So the Buddhist position expressed in PV III 53d, that there is only one object of valid cognition and that it is real, would be incoherent since this object’s reality implies its multiplicity. Alternatively, the opponent continues, the proponent might claim that the objects of valid cognition are differentiated in dependence on some other factor in the causal complex (as claimed in PV III 54cd); this, however, would mean that the difference maintained for the objects of valid cognition would not belong to the objects themselves, but would be external to them. Again, this consequence would violate what is endorsed in PV III 53d, namely that the object of valid cognition is real. In other words, one cannot

\[ sāmagrīsamabhavam ca paścāt pratipādayisyaṃmah | \text{("For that there are two means of valid cognition is not always established from there being two objects of valid cognition. Rather, we say that [two means are established] because [they each] arise from [a specific] causal complex. And we will later explain [this] arising from a causal complex.")} \]

The context there is an opponent’s argument that, if one takes the two objects of valid cognition and the two means of valid cognition as, respectively, cause and effect, the inference proving the two means of valid cognition would be an inference from cause to effect, and therefore not certain. Prajñākaragupta’s answer is that in this case the inference is possible, because the effect is inferred not from an individual cause, but from the causal complex, one factor of which is the object of valid cognition.
maintain both that the object of valid cognition can be defined as real (paramārtho na lakṣaṇam) and that it is only one (anantaprameyatā), both of which are asserted, however, in PV III 53d: meyam tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam.

The immediately following excursion leads up to PV III 55. For our purposes, a look at its conclusion is sufficient:

PVA Bh2 215, 4–9: katham tarhi meyāntaram | tasyaiva pararūpeṇa praṭītēḥ | tathāpraṭīyāmānāṃ drṣṭāntasādhāraṇena rūpeṇa meyāntaram | pratipatti-bhedena tadrūpāropān na paramārthataḥ | evaṃ tarhy apekṣākṛtvān na paramārthataḥ | satyam avastu sāmānyam iti pratipāditam eva | nesam apūrvam ucyaṭe | vastusamyādavāreṇa vyavahāribhir alakṣitanāṅtvair vastv iti vyavahṛyat | tena tadapekṣayēdum ucyaṭe prameyadvaividhyam ]

How then is there another object of valid cognition? Because of a cognition of exactly that [same object of valid cognition] with another nature. [Insofar as the particular is] being cognized in this way with a form that it has in common with the example [in an inference], there is another object of valid cognition; [in other words, there is another object] because that form [which the particular has in common with the example] is superimposed [on it] due to a difference in cognitions; [but there is] not [another object of valid cognition] in reality.

[Opponent:] In that way, then, because it is made in dependence [on something else, this other object of valid cognition] is not real.

[Answer:] That is true. Indeed it was taught that the universal is not a real thing. But this is not said without precedent. [For], in virtue of [a universal] cohering well with a real thing, [people] engaged in everyday activity commonly act [with regard to a universal] by [considering it] a real thing, [insofar as] they do not take note of the fact that [the particulars they are acting towards] are different. Therefore, it is in dependence on this [real thing that appears in two forms in everyday activity] that the duality of the object of valid cognition is spoken of.

The heart of the passage rephrases a part of PV III 54, namely the cognition of a particular in an indirect way (literally, “with another nature”; tasya svaparārūpābhyan gater meyadvayaṃ matam). Prajñākaragupta is again making the notion of the duality of the object of valid cognition depend on an everyday understanding of the matter: normal people, when inferring something, think about the object of that cognition as “the real thing,” even though what they are actually cognizing—the proper object of the valid cognition—is a future real thing; and it is this which is not directly cognized, but only by means of a feature that it shares with the example. If a fire on the hill is being inferred from smoke, it, the

24 Read paramārthataḥ with PVABh-msB 106b2, PVABh-msE 210b5 against paramārthaḥ PVABh2.
25 The last line, vyavahāri° … prameyadvaividhyam, is repeated in PVABh2. This must be a printing error, it is not found in either PVABh-msB 106b2 or PVABh-msE 210b6.
26 Franco (2012) and Franco and Notake (2014: 4–17) discuss how unreal things can be the objects of valid cognition.
actual fire that could cook our food if we reach the place on the hill soon enough, is being
cognized, not as it is in itself, but as similar to a kitchen fire previously seen. This similarity
cannot be a phenomenal one, of course: the fire on the hill does not appear.

With this, the scene is set for the discussion of how inference can be a means of valid
cognition. The main points to bear in mind in reading this discussion, in addition to those
previously stressed in Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 1, are as follows:

1. That there are two means of valid cognition, as well as two objects of valid cognition,
is only a concession to everyday activity. This is, essentially, the justification for the
tension between PV III 1 and PV III 53d–54.
2. Only the real thing is the object of valid cognition.
3. There are two ways in which the real thing is known: through its own nature, and
through another nature.
4. Perception is dependent on inference because inference initiates what becomes
habitual. Without habituation, and thus without inference, perception does not cause
a person to act.

The main controversy discussed in the following passages of PVABh₂ is about how to
understand item 2. The question is whether the statement in PV III 53d is true conventionally
or in reality. Depending on the answer, the consequences vary. When this statement is taken
to express a convention, the opponent’s claims are very strong: the tension between, on the
one hand, inferring “there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects
of valid cognition, a real thing and an unreal one”, and, on the other hand, maintaining that
“there is only one object of valid cognition, the real thing” can hardly be contained if the
term “real thing” is here taken in the same sense. If the latter statement is, however, taken
as expressing a fact of reality (and the former one not), then the opponent’s attacks lose
most of their power; but this forces us to reconsider in what sense the particular is the only
object of valid cognition.²⁷

4 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 55–58: saving inference

This section asks how inference can be considered a means of valid cognition, even though
it is mistaken because it has an imagined universal, not a real thing, as its object. This
problem is raised in PV III 55cd, and Dharmakīrti’s answer is given in PV III 56–58.²⁸

Prajñākaragupta opens this exchange with the following objection:

PVABh₂ 215, 18–19: kathaṃ tarhi paramārthasya viṣayākaraṇad bhedaḥ |
svarūpasākṣātkaraṇe hi pratyakṣataiva bhavet | tadasamsparśe kathaṃ tadvi-
ṣayatā |

²⁷ We will see in section 4 that no present particular is the object of valid cognition: it is the future
particular, both for perception and inference. In other words, to take PV III 53d as a statement that
accords with reality means that the object of valid cognition mentioned there is neither of the two
objects in PV III 1–3, the present particular or the universal.

²⁸ PV III 56 is: ayathābhinniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir isyate | gatiṣ cet pararūpeṇa na ca bhrānteḥ pra-
mānātā || abhiprāyāvisamvādād api bhrānteḥ pramānātā | gatir api anyathā dṛṣṭā paśuś cāyaṃ
How, then, is there a difference [between perception and inference], since [they both] make a real thing [their] object? For if [a cognition] directly presents the nature [of something], then [it] is just perception. [But] if [a cognition] does not touch that [nature], how is that [nature] the object [of that cognition]?

The opponent is here engaged in a variation on McCrea’s schema quoted above (in section 3). Either one takes it seriously that there is only one object of valid cognition, and concludes that there is no difference between cognitions of that object, or one takes the position that one cognition has that object and the other does not. This latter position implies that the cognition is not correct (that it is an error or bhrānti); this means, in the eyes of the opponent, that it cannot have the status of a valid cognition.

Here, and in the following discussion, the opponent’s general position will be that the difference between validity and invalidity hinges on the contact of cognition with reality: if the cognition is in direct contact with a real thing, it is valid; if not, then it is invalid. In this way, we can read the debate as not only being about what differentiates inference from perception, but also as being about the implicit criterion that constitutes the validity of a cognition. As we will see, Prajñākaragupta maintains quite simply that the contact with the real thing is not what makes a cognition valid: neither perception nor inference are valid for this reason.

Prajñākaragupta first explains (PV ABh 215, 21–23) what it means that a cognition is erroneous in the sense that the opponent is using in his argument: it means that a cognition does not have the actual particular as its object, and can thus not be said to conceive of its object as it is. The opponent immediately counters that then this cognition cannot be considered to have the status of a means of valid cognition, presenting the gist of PV III 55cd, as follows:

\[ PV ABh 215, 26–27: \text{yadi pararūpeṇa gatiḥ kathāṃ tasya gatiḥ | pararūpasayai-} \]
\[ \text{vāsau gatiḥ | tatrānyasya prāptau bhrāntir eva | bhrānteś ca na pramāṇatā} \]

30 If there is a cognition [of something] with another nature, then how is [this] a cognition of that [thing]? This is a cognition only of another nature. When

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29 It would be interesting to know who the opponent is, exactly. It seems that it is someone who—like Prajñākaragupta, and Dharmottara before him—accepts that ‘prompting activity’ (pravartaka) is a central criterion for being a means of valid cognition, but links this capacity to the fact that the cognition has for its object something real as it is. If one, reasonably, assumes that only the Cārvākas would argue against inference as a means of valid cognition, then one could infer that they recognized pravartakatva as an important criterion for being a means of valid cognition.

30 There are two textual difficulties here. First, for pararūpasyaivā: PVABh-msB reads pararūpasyavāsau, but this is not completely clear, and PVABh-msE reads pararūpasyāsau. Both seem possible, and the vā could easily have gotten lost. Since PVABh-msB is really not clearly legible here, I think one should follow Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reading.

The second problem is with prāptau bhrāntir eva: PVABh-msB originally read prāntireva and was then corrected, but the marginal addition is now illegible. PVABh-msE supports prāptau bhrāntir eva. The printed bhrānteś ca na pramāṇatā (PVABh 215, 26–27) must be due to either Sāṅkṛtyāyana misreading the correction here or a misprint. Both prāptir and prāptau seem possible. I prefer the latter, in accordance with PVABh-msE, and probably PVABh-msB post correctionem.
one attains another [thing, there is] simply an error with regard to that [thing which was cognized]. And an error is not a valid means of cognition.

The argument of the opponent can be analyzed as follows:

1. There is a cognition of something (X) in a form other than its own (Y), e.g., the cognition of a particular fire in the form of the general concept ‘fire’.
2. So this “cognition of X” is, in fact, a cognition only of something else, Y.
3. If one acts upon this cognition of Y, one attains X.\(^\text{31}\)
4. But the cognition of Y is an error with regard to X (because X is not cognized as it really is).
5. An error cannot be a means of valid cognition.
6. So the cognition of X in the form of Y cannot be a means of valid cognition.

Dharmakīrti answers this in PV III 56. Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of this verse is indeed, as McCrea (2011: 321) has noted, striking in “… the overall similarity, indeed the virtual identity, of perception and inference” that the verse is said to imply. The first passage runs as follows:

\[
P\text{VABh}_2 \, 215, \, 30–216.2: \text{anyatrápi yathārthābhiniveśah katham avagantavyah } | \text{abhíprāyāvisamvādād eva } | \text{sa cātrāstīti nāyathārthābhiniveśah } | \text{idam tu vāsanābalāj jñānaṃ pratibhāsabhedato bheda iti naivaṃ vyavahārīno vida-nti } | \text{vyākhyātṛpratītir eveyam } |
\]

Even in the other [case, that of perception], how is [this] “determination [of the object] as the object is” to be understood? Only on [the basis that determination] does not belie [a person’s] intentions. And this is the case here [in the case of inference as well]. So there [is, in fact], no determination that is not according to [the] object [in the case of inference either].

But [people] engaged in everyday activity do not know that this cognition [has, in fact, originated] in virtue of the impressions [left by previous experiences, and] that there is a difference [of perceptual and conceptual cognition only] due to the difference in the appearance [of an object to cognition]. This is only the insight of those [people] who explain [things].

Prajñākaragupta is here basing his argument on the expression ayathābhiniveśena of PV III 55a, by which Dharmakīrti means to say that inference does not determine its object correctly (lit., “as [it] is”). It is this element that Dharmakīrti lets the opponent criticize in PV III 55cd: if inference is not correct in that it does not determine its object correctly—Prajñākaragupta’s opponent here taking “correctly” as “how the object really is”—then how can it be a means of valid cognition? Prajñākaragupta turns the question around, and simultaneously gives the more precise interpretation of “determines [its object] as [that] object [really] is” (yathārthābhiniveśena) to Dharmakīrti’s formulation: what, he

\(^{31}\) It could also be that one attains some altogether different element, Z. But the important thing is that Prajñākaragupta has to concede that one does not attain Y.
asks the opponent, is the meaning of the qualifier “determine something as it really is” in the case of perception?

Prajñākaragupta adds an important qualification: normal people do not understand that cognition—which I take here to include both perception and inference—is not due to different causes (it is always generated by mental imprints, not external objects), and that cognitions are different on account of how something appears in them, not, one must understand, essentially. ‘Philosophers’, on the other hand, do know that this is the case.

It is therefore justified to say that Prajñākaragupta, as in the interpretation of PV III 1–2 and 53d (section 2 and section 3), again distinguishes two levels on which one can differentiate perception and inference, in this passage and in the following ones: one respect in which they follow the everyday usage of normal people, who say that they directly perceive some things, and indirectly cognize others (correctly, when by inference); and one respect, corresponding to reality, in which the cognitions are distinguished only on account of how an object appears in them.

Now, there might be a problem: if Prajñākaragupta says that ayathārthābhiniveśa is not the case in inference, then PV III 55ab, ayathābhiniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate, would seem to be contradicted; there, Dharmakīrti obviously accepts that the second kind of cognition, inference, is an error because it does not conceive of its object as it really is.

This alerts us to a further point in Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of PV III 55ab: it stresses the provisional character of that statement. In order to avoid the contradiction to Dharmakīrti, the sentence governed by the verb iṣyate (“it is assumed”) must not be understood as expressing something endorsed by Dharmakīrti, but as a general statement of fact about what people normally take to be the case. Relying on this aspect of Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, one might then want to translate this sentence as “The second [kind of cognition, inference], is [commonly] assumed to be an error since there is no determination [of an object] as it is.”

And the implied agent of the sentence then would be “by people engaged in everyday activity.” In other words, that the criterion ayathārthābhiniveśa, which makes a cognition an error, is applied to inference is something usually done by ‘normal people’. This is an important interpretative move, because now Prajñākaragupta has created enough room to say that it is, in fact, not the case that this assumption is correct. It leaves open three directions in which Dharmakīrti might have continued to argue: First, he could have tried to argue that inference is in fact not an error according to the criterion of ayathābhiniveśa (in its common sense), a path that was not chosen. Second, that inference is, unlike perception, an error, but that this does no harm to its status as a means of valid cognition; this is perhaps the simplest interpretation, upon which the statement “inference is assumed to be an error” is taken as implying that perception is not. Third, that not only is inference an error according to the criterion of ayathābhiniveśa, but also perception; on this reading, the statement “inference is assumed to be an error” entails an insufficiency: inference is assumed to be so by people, but they forget that perception is also like that. We will see that, with some caveats, this is the road that Prajñākaragupta presents Dharmakīrti as having chosen.

To understand iṣyate like this does not preclude that Dharmakīrti himself did indeed take inference to be an erroneous cognition, cf., e.g., PVin 2 1cd: ...bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā || The point is rather that to take inference like this has no bearing on the question of whether it is a pramāṇa or not; likewise, for perception, its not being erroneous is irrelevant for its status as a means of valid cognition.
He then continues to explain the general equality of inference and perception in terms of their being means of valid cognition. Having said that yathārthābhīnivesa, insofar as it results only from abhiprāyā-visamvāda, is not different for them, he analyzes the next acknowledged criterion for being a means of valid cognition, the fact that it leads to (successful) activity:\(^{33}\)

 PVABh\(^2\) 216, 2–7: sa evābhīpṛāyāḥ katham anyadarśānād iti cet \| na vikālpānām vastupratiniyāmābhavāt \| anādivāsanāśmārthyaṃ evavatā \| tataḥ katham aparicchinnatattvāsata pravartata iti na codyām etat \| drṣṭe ca nānapapattisambhavaḥ \| pratyakṣe 'pi katham pravartate \| tatrāpi naiva prāptavāparicchēdāh sannihitamātrāsya paricchēdāt \| pratyakṣam evāpravartakaṁ sannihitamātrasya pariśāpaṭeḥ \| tatrāpi tadekatavādhyaava-sāyād eva vṛttir bhāvini vastunī \| tato 'numāne 'py evam eva vṛttih \| katham asamānatayeśkyate \|

[If one asks:] How can there be exactly this intention from seeing something [completely] different?

[Then we answer:] It is not [because of seeing something that there is this intention], because conceptual cognitions are not restricted to real things. Such is simply the capacity of beginningless impressions. It must not be criticized how, because of this [capacity, someone] who has not discerned reality can act towards it. But if [this activity] is observed, [its] not being the case is impossible.

Also in [the case of] perception [one could ask the same question:] how does one act? Not only is there, in this [perception], no discerning of the nature that is to be attained, because only that which is [immediately] present is discerned, but perception as such [also] does not make [a person] act, because only that which is present is completely attained [by perception].

In that case [of perception] too [a person] acts towards a future real thing only because there is a determination [of it] as identical [with what is perceived]. Therefore activity is exactly the same also in the case of inference. [So] why [are they] regarded as not being the same [by you]?

The explanations here underpin the main point of the previous discussion: the opponent holds that inference cannot enable a person to act because it ‘does not discern reality’, i.e., it does not put the person in direct contact with the real thing that successful activity must be directed at—contrary, so the opponent still assumes, to perception. Prajñākaragupta’s answer to this is double sided: first, activity arising from inference can be observed, and can therefore not be impossible. Prajñākaragupta then turns the question around: how can one act in the case of perception? The opponent’s criticism of inference would be

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\(^{33}\) A part of this passage is also translated and discussed in McCrea 2011: 321–322.

\(^{34}\) I follow McCrea (2011: 322, n. 8) in reading the marginal addition to pratyuta, kiṃ tv arthe, as a gloss rather than as a correction or addition.
applicable there too: perception knows nothing of the object that is capable of fulfilling one’s aims (since what one perceives is a present, momentary object). And as such it can enable activity towards a future real thing only through a determination of the thing it has directly perceived and the future thing as identical; one must think that the thing’s existence is temporally extended. And in this respect, it would be just like inference.  

Again, the situation described by McCrea is found: Prajñākaragupta is applying the opponent’s statement about inference to perception, and the opponent cannot accept the consequences. If the opponent insists that the attainment of something that was not cognized is an error (item 4), then the exact same thing has to be said for perception: it too grasps only the present thing, yet acting upon it a person will attain a future thing; and it does, by itself, not actually make a person act.

A concise summary of this approach is found in PVABh₂ II 234 and the following prose explanation:

\[
PVABh₂ II 234: \text{pravartako vikalpaś ced avastugrahaṇe katham} | \\
\text{tathāpi vartayaty etad anumāne na kim matam} ||
\]

\[
PVABh₂ 216, 21–22: \text{yadi hi vikalpajananadvāreṇa pratyakṣaṃ pravartakam} | \\
\text{āyātam tarhi vikalpasya pravartakatvāt pramāṇatvam} | \text{tathā saty anumānasya prāmāṇyam avyāhatam eva} |
\]

If [you say that in the case of perception] a [following] conceptual cognition prompts [a person] to act, how [does it do that] without grasping a real thing?

If [you say that it] prompts [a person] to act nevertheless, then why is this not assumed in [the case of] inference?

For, if perception prompts activity by means of generating a conceptual cognition [that makes a person act], then one has arrived at [the position] that conceptual cognition, because it prompts activity, [would be] a means of valid cognition. [And] if it is so, it has not been rejected at all that inference is a means of valid cognition.

This passage is exemplary for Prajñākaragupta’s defence of the difference between inference and perception: given that perception itself does not prompt activity, it must be the following conceptual event. But that conceptual cognition, like inference, does not grasp anything real (being conceptual, it has a universal, not a particular, as its object). The alternatives are dire: if the opponent were to insist on his position, not only would the state of being a means of valid cognition be a quality of the conceptual cognition following perception, but also the fact that inference is a means of valid cognition—the point that the current debate is actually about—would not have been fended off. This would be a bad defeat for the opponent.

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36 My interpretation here diverges from the interpretation of the prose part of this passage by McCrea (2011: 323), who takes it as expressing Prajñākaragupta’s own position. I think one has to read the
The implied consequences are unacceptable to the opponent, who wishes to link what it is to be a means of valid cognition to this criterion of knowing a real thing as it is: he has to admit either that neither perception nor inference has a claim to being a means of valid cognition, or that both have.

The following discussion continues in much the same way. We can skip to the end of the discussion, and consider its summary:

This shows in what sense Prajñākaragupta takes perception and inference to be parallel: neither apprehends the future object directly, obviously impossible; but both do apprehend something else directly: what this is, Prajñākaragupta can still leave open at this point in the discussion, content to call it either the form of an (external) real thing (vasturūpa) or the form of cognition itself (svarūpa).

Note that Kobayashi 2011: 1257–1258 identifies Dharmottara as the opponent in the statements that follow the passage just quoted and translated.

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37 That the following passage contains a summary was first suggested by McCrea (2011: 325). Apart from clearly rephrasing PV III 56c, gatir apy anyathā drṣṭā para-rūpeṇaiva [38 na kācit pravṛttiviśayē svarūpe gatiḥ | anyatra tu vasturūpe svarūpe vā gatir ubhayor apīṭī bhāvivastuni ko viśeṣah ]

Therefore, also [that] cognition, [namely, the one] that is considered to be perception, is observed [to be] otherwise, [that is], only [to cognize an object] with another nature. As regards the object of activity, [that] is not cognized at all with its own nature; but concerning another, [be it] the nature of the real thing or the nature of cognition, all two, [perception and inference], cognize [it]. So what difference is there with regard to the future object?39

This shows in what sense Prajñākaragupta takes perception and inference to be parallel: neither apprehends the future object directly, obviously impossible; but both do apprehend something else directly: what this is, Prajñākaragupta can still leave open at this point in the discussion, content to call it either the form of an (external) real thing (vasturūpa) or the form of cognition itself (svarūpa).40

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[38] PVABh 218, 2–8: tasmād gatir api prayakṣābhimatā ’nyathā drṣṭā para-rūpeṇaiva [38 na kācit pravṛttiviśayē svarūpe gatiḥ | anyatra tu vasturūpe svarūpe vā gatir ubhayor apīṭī bhāvivastuni ko viśeṣah ]

[39] This shows in what sense Prajñākaragupta takes perception and inference to be parallel: neither apprehends the future object directly, obviously impossible; but both do apprehend something else directly: what this is, Prajñākaragupta can still leave open at this point in the discussion, content to call it either the form of an (external) real thing (vasturūpa) or the form of cognition itself (svarūpa).40

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[37] That the following passage contains a summary was first suggested by McCrea (2011: 325). Apart from clearly rephrasing PV III 56c, gatir apy anyathā drṣṭā, this is also explicitly stated by Yamārī, PVATS; 103, 279–280: de ltar rnam pa gzhān gyis kyang rtogs pa mthong zhes bya ba’i rgya cher bshad nas mjug sūd pa ni kyi phyir zhes bya ba’a’ol (“Having explained [the verse] gatir … drṣṭā in detail, [Prajñākaragupta] states the summary [of this explanation] with [the word] tasmāt.”)

[38] The bold words are lifted from PV III 56, the text this is a comment on. Read pararūpeṇaiva PVABh-msB 108a3, PVABh 218, 2, against pararūpeṇeva PVABh-msE 213b6. Yamārī explains, PVATS; 103, 280: gzhān gyi rang bzhin du zhes bya ba ni thob par bya ba las gzhān gyi rang bzhin du’o’l (“… with another nature, [meaning] with a nature other than what is to be obtained.”)

[39] See Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 for another translation and short discussion of this passage, alongside two others in which Prajñākaragupta presents alternative interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s phrase gatir apy anyathā drṣṭā. I follow Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 here as far as the future object is concerned. McCrea (2011: 323, n. 13) notes in this context that Prajñākaragupta does not think that a conceptual cognition following perception grasps what is already grasped, and therefore accepts it as a means of valid cognition. In this claim, Prajñākaragupta would be in direct contradiction to Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. (For Dharmakīrti, see the summary in Kellner 2004b: 9–10, referring to these two passages: HBs 2, 18 ff., and a prose passage to PVin 3 k. 48. For Dharmottara, see Krasser 1995: 248–249.)

[40] To understand Prajñākaragupta’s argument here, one has to take into account his discussion of the second pramāṇa definition in PVIV II 5c, ajjñātārthaprakāśo vā, where ajjñātārthaprakāśa excludes gṛhiṭagrahaṇa. Franco (1997: 50) translates an important passage of it (corresponding to Ono 2000: 79,
5 Jewels and keyholes

In the next section of the PVABh, Prajñākaragupta comments on a famous example given by Dharmakīrti. According to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, the example is supposed to show that a cognition, though mistaken, can be a means of valid cognition; this is possible because even a mistaken cognition can lead to the attainment of an intended aim.⁴¹

Dharmakīrti’s illustration of this involves two very similar situations: two people, thinking that they have seen a jewel, proceed to get that jewel. What they have seen is, however, not in fact a jewel, but only the shine of something: one of them has seen the shine of an actual jewel (spilling through a keyhole, according to Prajñākaragupta), the other the shine of a lamp. For Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of this example, the following points are important:

1. The cognition “A jewel!” is the same in both cases.
2. It is also wrong in both cases, since both persons only see the shine of something, never the jewel itself.
3. There is a difference in that one person will attain a jewel, and the other will not.
4. Based on this difference, one does not say that cognitions are mistaken in the same way.

In a first step, Prajñākaragupta explains how this example shows the possibility that inference, though mistaken, can a means of valid cognition;⁴² it is actually not due to it

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⁴¹ Cf. the introduction of the passage by Prajñākaragupta, PVABh 218, 28: avisamvādāt pramāṇatve ‘pi bhṛnantatāṃ darśayati | (“[Dharmakīrti] explains that [a cognition], even though [it] is a means of valid cognition because it does not belie [a person’s intentions], is erroneous.”)

⁴² McCrea (2011: 321) stresses the point that Prajñākaragupta takes the example of a jewel’s and a lamp’s shine as exemplification of both inference and perception. This is true, especially if one reads the later passages, but the initial analysis of these verses by Prajñākaragupta does talk only about inference (and what is not really an inference), PVABh 219, 2: tadvad anumānatadābhāsayor api tata eva pramāṇetaṃ | (“Like that [example of the jewel and the lamp], also inference and what [only] seems to be an [inference] are, just because of that, a means of valid cognition and something else.” The phrase ‘just because of that’ refers to what makes the difference in the case of the jewel and the lamp: the difference in attainment of what is desired.) Prajñākaragupta does, then, at least start off with what can be taken as Dharmakīrti’s intent in these verses. The “abrupt reversal of this emphasis” (McCrea 2011: 321), that is, of this example being only for inference, is actually not very abrupt: Prajñākaragupta analyzes the example of the jewel and the lamp first in terms of inference, then (as we will see shortly) makes the point that inference and perception are interdependent, and only then goes on to defend Dharmakīrti’s position, that inference and pseudo-inference have the same relation as the cognitions of the people in the example, by showing that, if one were not to accept this argument about inference, also perception would be vulnerable to the same problem. Rather than seeing Prajñākaragupta break sharply with the intent of Dharmakīrti’s example, we could thus equally well speak of his careful explication of it, perhaps with a view to opponents that had been trying to use the example against the Buddhist epistemologists.
being a cognition, but rather to factors external to the cognition. Though everything about
the two people’s cognitions is the same, the circumstances in which they have them is not.
And this is what differentiates an erroneous and non-erroneous cognition.

A further explanation of the varying degrees of erroneousness centers on whether an
error can belong to the causes that give rise to a means of valid cognition. It is in the
context of this explanation that Prajñākaragupta again introduces everyday activity as an
important factor in determining what a means of valid cognition is, and which means of
valid cognition there are:

\[ PVABh_2 \ II 244–245: \text{vinānumānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ na pravartakam} \]
\[ \text{āditaḥ |} \]
\[ \text{tathānumānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ vineti pratipāditam |} \]
\[ \text{viśeṣas tv ayam evātra kvacit pūrvaṃ kvacit param |} \]
\[ \text{anumānāt paraṃ nākṣaṃ nākṣāt pūrvānumeṣyate |} \]

Without inference perception does not, at first, prompt [a person] to act; like-
wise inference without perception. This was explained.

[There is], however, certainly this distinction here, [that] in some cases [one
is] earlier, in some cases later. One does not assume a perception following
upon inference, nor an inference prior to perception.

In these two verses, Prajñākaragupta is stating that inference and perception are de-
pendent on each other: perception would never allow a person to act if there were not—
temporally prior to it—an inference that ascertains the connection between what is seen and
what is acted towards. The important thing to note here is the qualifier \text{āditaḥ}, “at first” or
“the first time”, which alludes back to the point that Prajñākaragupta made at the beginning
of the chapter, namely, that habituation, the necessary prerequisite for perception’s directly
leading to activity, cannot happen without inference.\textsuperscript{43} And the same holds for inference: it
does not prompt a person to act without perception, and could hence not be considered a
means of valid cognition without perception.\textsuperscript{44}

In PVABh\textsubscript{2} II 245, Prajñākaragupta admits to a difference between the two different
types of means of valid cognition: sometimes one is earlier, sometimes one is later;\textsuperscript{45} and,
as a kind of loose reason given for this difference, he puts forward what is not commonly
held to be the case: that perception follows upon inference, or, in other words, that inference
precedes perception. Implied, we must understand, is that the usually held view is correct,
but has to be augmented by this other case. The commonly held difference of perception
and inference is made with reference to cases where perception precedes inference (as

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. n. 21, and the paraphrase of \textit{PVABh\textsubscript{2}} II 24 above, section 2.2.

\textsuperscript{44} I am not yet quite sure how exactly to understand this point.

\textsuperscript{45} Jayanta explains concisely, PVAT-\textit{t}: 101, 97: \textit{la lar dang por} zhes bya ba ni mngon sum mam rjes sudpag par yang ngo/ (“\textbf{In some [cases] earlier}, [that is], in [the case of] perception or also in [the case of] inference.”)
in the usual case where a person sees smoke and infers ‘There’s a fire!’), and inference follows perception.\(^{46}\)

6 The final position: self-awareness, perception, and inference

After the opponent states that, whereas inference does depend on perception, perception can occur without inference, Prajñākaragupta further clarifies his position:

\[
PV\text{ABh}\text{2 II 246–248:} \text{pratyakṣam anumānena vinā mānaṃ svave-dane} | \\
\text{vyavahāras tathā nāsti pramāṇatve }'\text{pi kiṃ bhavet} | \\
\text{svasamvedanamātre ca pratyakṣe }'\text{ṛthāprasiddhitāḥ} | \\
\text{bhedasya ca na kiṃcit syād advaitam avaśiṣyate} | \\
\text{tasmād arthasya bhedasya nādhyakṣasādhakaṃ vinā} | \\
\text{anumāṇaṃ tatas tasya pramātvaṃ nānumāṃ vinā} |
\]

Perception without inference is a means of valid cognition concerning the awareness [any cognition has] of itself.\(^{47}\) In that way, [however], there is no everyday activity. So even though it is a means of valid cognition, what should happen?

Furthermore, in a perception [that is] merely self-awareness, an [external] object is not established, nor a difference; so there would be nothing at all; [only] non-duality remains.

Therefore, perception does not establish an object [or] a difference without inference. Therefore, this [perception] is not a means of valid cognition without inference.

These three verses for the first time present the final position that Prajñākaragupta has had in view throughout the whole debate.\(^{48}\) The two main points are:

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\(^{46}\) One of the standard uses of inference is to clear up wrong notions that arise after a perception, cf. Kellner 2004b: 6–9.

\(^{47}\) I have taken the locative \textit{svavedane} here as signifying the object of perception, or what perception applies to. The locative could also state the condition for the main clause, “In [the case of] the [perceptual] awareness [that every cognition has] of itself, perception is a means of valid cognition without inference.” This does not commit Prajñākaragupta to a particularly difficult position. But in the light of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 63 (PV\text{ABh}\text{2 223, 19–20, discussed in n. 48}, I prefer to take the locative as expressing the object of perception.

\(^{48}\) That this is his accepted position can be seen from his commentary on PV III 63, which marks the end of the discussion of how two objects are the reason for two means of valid cognition (see Franco and Notake 2014: 23):

\[
PV\text{ABh}\text{2 223, 19–21: }\text{prameyaṃ pramānena sidhyati }\text{| pramānasvarūpaṃ tu svasamvedanākārasāddheḥ }\text{| jīvānākāra eva ca svasamvedanah svasāmitya-yo-palabhyāmānāḥ pratyakṣanāmnāni-viṣaya ity uktam }\text{| viṣayadvaividhyād ākāradaiva-viṣayaḥ ity arthāḥ }\text{| svākāradya-vyāsāmvedane hi naikam iti yuktam }|
\]
1. Perception is a means of valid cognition in and of itself, but only as far as its own appearance to itself is concerned.

2. However, in order to count as a means of valid cognition in the conventional sense, i.e., as a cognition that allows a person to reliably attain a desired aim in interaction with external objects, it has to be supplemented by inference.

It is this distinction between perception in the sense of direct awareness of consciousness itself and the direct awareness of an external object that has been driving, and sometimes confusing, the discussion.

Prajñākaragupta is not prepared to admit that perception, taken as a cognition that reliably leads to activity, can be given the status of a means of valid cognition without also granting that status to inference. The reason for this is that perception, whilst in and of itself a means of valid cognition, does not let a person act. The only object that it can be considered to be a means of valid cognition for is its own appearance to itself. Any other object, or quality of an object, must be ascertained by another type of cognition. If one still insists, as the opponent does, that perception does reliably cause successful activity, then one must include a cognitive element which is not perception itself, and hence has lost the argument that only perception is a means of valid cognition.

To close, let us look at how this interpretation fits in with the example of the lamp and the jewel. Prajñākaragupta explain the errors that are involved in this situation:

*PVABh₂ 221, 1–3: manipratibhāsas tu maṇau maniprabhāyāṃ ca samāna eva | tatra kvacid desabhṛṅtiḥ | kvacit svarūpabhrāntiḥ | kvacid ubhayam | kvacid anubhayam | maniprabhāyāṃ manijñānasya desabhṛṅtir | maṇāv eva prāpyasvarūpabhrāntiḥ | sāmānyānumānasyabhayabhṛṅtiḥ | svasaṃvedanasya nobhayathāpīti prakāraḥ |

The appearance of a jewel [to cognition], however, is exactly the same in [the case of] a jewel and in [the case of] the shine of a jewel. In this [situation],

The object of valid cognition is established by the means of valid cognition. The own nature of the means of valid cognition, however, [is established] on [the basis of] the establishment of the form of [cognition’s] awareness of itself. And it was stated that [this] awareness [that cognition has] of itself, the very form of cognition [itself], is the object of perception [or] inference, [depending on whether] it is being apprehended as being [only] itself or common [also to other things]. [To say] “because there are two [types of] object” means “because there are two [types of] form [of cognition].” For, given [cognition’s] awareness of two forms of itself, it is incoherent [to say:] “There is one [object of valid cognition].”

This passage is also discussed and partially translated in Franco and Notake 2014: 149–150 (note that they emend अकारसिद्धे to अकारसिद्धम).

I was unable to find an exact quote of the explanation referred to in this passage, but the differentiation made here is closely parallel to that made repeatedly for the distinct and indistinct forms of cognition, see n. 15, PVABh₃ 39, 6–9 (discussed section 2.1), and PVABh₃ 36, 25–27 (discussed section 2). The viṣayadvaividhyāt rephrases the expression “prameyadvitvena” in tasmāt prameyadvitvena pramāṇadvitvam iṣyate (PV III 63cd), which in turn might echo the expression “meyadvaividhyāt” of PV III 1 (cf. Franco and Notake 2014: 23).
there is, in some respect, an error about the place; in some respect, an error about the proper nature; in some respect, both; in some respect, neither.

As regards the shine of a jewel, the cognition of a jewel is wrong about the place; for the actual jewel, there is an error about the nature of the [thing] to be obtained; the inference, [concerned with] a general property, is wrong about both [the place and the nature of the obtained thing]; [cognition’s] awareness of itself is wrong about neither. This is the manner [in which one has to understand this].

There are thus quite a few different respects in which the cognition of a jewel can be mistaken:

1. When one perceives not the jewel itself, but the shine of the jewel, the jewel cognition is wrong about the place of the thing that will be attained on account of this cognition.
2. When one is actually perceiving a jewel, the jewel cognition is still wrong about the essential nature of the object that will be attained (because the present jewel is not identical with the jewel that will be attained).\(^{49}\)
3. An inference is wrong about both the place and the nature of the attained thing.\(^{50}\)
4. The jewel cognition’s awareness of itself is wrong about neither the place nor the nature of what will be attained (though it is of little practical value that the gleam-of-a-jewel-appearance is of the same nature as the gleam-of-a-jewel-appearance that will be attained).

After having presented this analysis, Prajñākaragupta can make the first part of his closing statement:

\(\text{PVABh}_2\ 221, 4–7: \text{tato yad uktam yā gatiḥ sā svarūpeṇaiva yathā pratyakṣā gatiḥ | yat pramāṇaṁ tad abhrantiṁ yathā pratyakṣam tad ayuktam | pratyakṣāpi gatiṁ na svarūpeṇa | na cābhṛantam pratyakṣam asti | svarūpe ca yathā pratyakṣam abhrantiṁ tathā 'numānam apy anye ca bhṛtābhimsatāḥ pratyayā iti na tathā bhṛtātā pratiyādanāṁ kvacī dvayogī |}\)

\(^{49}\) If my interpretation is correct, this error would also apply to the situation described in the previous point. It would further imply that inference has (at least) the same two errors as that perception of the shine of a jewel: it is mistaken about the place of the inferred thing, and also about the nature of what will be obtained. This would actually suit Dharmakīrti’s example (an inference likened to a ‘slightly wrong’ perception). But Prajñākaragupta’s formulation of these different errors is not quite clear on this point: is each error specific to each case (but not the only one that is applicable), or is it the only error in each case? If the latter, it would contradict my understanding.

\(^{50}\) It is wrong about the nature because the thing to be attained is not its object; an inference does not have particulars as its object at all, but only general concepts. It is wrong concerning the place because an inference cannot say exactly where the inferred thing is placed: cf. PVABh\(_2\) II 249, where it is explained that one can infer only the general existence of a fire behind a wall, but not its specific location.
Therefore, what was said:51 “That is a cognition which [cognizes something] according to [the thing’s] own nature, like perceptual cognition. What is a means of valid cognition is not erroneous, like perception.” is incorrect.

Even if it is perceptual, a cognition is not according to [the thing’s] nature. Nor is there a non-erroneous perception.

But as perception is non-erroneous with regard to [its] own nature, so also inference is [non-erroneous], as well as other cognitions which are assumed to be erroneous.52 So an explanation as being erroneous in these ways is of no use in any case.

Prajñākaragupta is here succinctly restating the main points of his commentary on the example of the jewel and the lamp, which in turn exemplifies the points made in the section starting from PV III 53d: the whole section has been aimed at refuting an opponent who claims that ‘being erroneous’ is the criterion by which to differentiate what is a means of valid cognition from what is not.53 And as Prajñākaragupta has made abundantly clear, this is not how means of valid cognition can be identified, at least not if one simultaneously wants to uphold that perception is such a means of valid cognition: one would have to admit that inference, and actually also other types of cognition which are generally held to be erroneous, are ‘erroneous’ and ‘non-erroneous’ in the exact same way as perception. All are wrong concerning the object to be attained (though they might be wrong in different ways),54 and all are correct concerning their direct awareness of themselves. That they are wrong in some respect is a necessary condition for enabling everyday activity; that they are necessarily correct in terms of self-awareness might be a nice philosophical insight, but one that is not useful for normal people at this point.55

51 I was not able to identify a statement that corresponds to this literally, but the same argument was made in the context of Prajñākaragupta’s comment on PV III 55cd, PVABh2 215, 26–27, discussed above, section 4: there too, an opponent makes non-erroneousness a criterion of validity, and maintains that cognizing a thing with a form other than its own cannot be valid.

52 Cf. the quotation in TBh2 19, 7: svarūpe sarvan abhrāntam pararūpe viparyayaḥ. (“Every cognition is non-erroneous regarding its own nature, but wrong concerning another nature.”) Kajiyama (1998: 52, n. 118) notes that the quote is not identified, and refers to PVABh2 331, 13–14 which expresses the same idea. I thank Birgit Kellner for alerting me to this passage.

53 Yamāri points out that the opponent here is “Cārvāka and so on”, PVATS1: 103, 295: ’dis ni tshu rol mdzes pa la sogs pa gsal ba ma yin no zhes mjug sdud pa n/ des na zhes bya ba’o/

54 From the list given above (section 6), it follows that the erroneousness of perception consists in not grasping the nature of what is to be obtained by it (prāpyasvarūpabhrānti, PVABh2 221, 2–3). The observation by McCrea (2011: 327)—that “[…] Prajñākara is […] flatly contradicting one of the most fundamental claims that Dharmakīrti himself made about perception” by saying that “perception is not free from error”—has to be modified: even according to Prajñākaragupta it is non-erroneous with regard to the present thing; but it is erroneous with regard to what is to be obtained by the activity that it could lead to. Taken in this sense, the contradiction to Dharmakīrti vanishes. Prajñākaragupta is only clarifying that pratyakṣa is not a means of valid cognition because it is non-erroneous.

55 In a soteriological context, however, cognition’s awareness of itself is a central issue, especially in Prajñākaragupta’s discussion of PV M II 1–6, edited in Ono 2000. To illustrate this with just one passage, cf. Franco 2004: 168: “Means of knowledge is only self-awareness, the single [type of] perception; there is no other, because the multiplicity (prapañca) of the means of knowledge taught by the Buddha merely] follows [the needs of] the people to be trained.” See also Arnold 2012: 187–88.
In the second part of the closing statement for this section, we can see that the direct awareness a cognition has of itself is essential for the differentiation of two, and only two, means of valid cognition, the other central point that was at issue:

PVABh₂ 221, 7–10: evaṃ tarhi kathāṃ pratyakṣaṅnamānayor lakṣaṇabhedaḥ | uktam atra spaṣṭetarapratibhāsedād iti | sa eva pratibhāsabhedas tathā kuto bhavatī | yasya svatantram grahaṇaṃ tatra spaṣṭapratibhāsatā | yasyānyathā tad spaṣṭapratibhāsam atīndriyaṃ parokṣam |

[Opponent:] If it is so, how [can there be] a different definition for perception and inference?

[Proponent:] To this [question] it was said that [it is] due to a difference in the appearance as distinct [or] not.₅₆

[Opponent:] Exactly this different appearance in such a way, what does it come from?

[Proponent:] In the case of that which is grasped independently [from any form other than its own], there is a distinct appearance. That which is grasped in another way has an indistinct appearance, is beyond the senses, is remote.

With this, Prajñākaragupta has restated the main reason (as he saw it) for the differentiation of two types of valid cognitions: it is wholly ‘intrinsic’ to the content of the cognitions, and has nothing to do with the correctness or erroneousness of the respective cognitions.₅₇

7 Conclusion

I have tried to show that Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 53d–57 is carefully composed and consistently argued in view of his commentary on PV III 1–2: the same central concerns underlie many arguments, and it can sometimes be misleading to focus on one particular segment of the text in isolation from its wider context.

The main points from Prajñākaragupta’s discussion, as I have analyzed it here, can be restated as follows:

1. To be a means of valid cognition is here being considered as making activity according to a cognizer’s expectations possible (pravartaka-tva is the main criterion for validity in these passages).

2. Under that definition, there are two such means of valid cognition, perception and another, based on the two ways in which objects appear in awareness: distinctly and indistinctly.

₅₆ There are various passages this could be referring to. The most likely candidate, in my opinion, is the last statement before the example of the jewel and the lamp is introduced, PVABh₂ 218, 26: tasmāt parokṣaviṣayapravartakatve ’pi spaṣṭaspaṣṭabhedat pramāṇadvitayam eva | See also n. 15.

₅₇ Note also that, whereas this is a sufficient criterion for the distinction of perception and non-perception, it is certainly not a sufficient one for the distinction of inference and conceptual cognition. But Prajñākaragupta is here trying to show only that there must be perception and at least one other type of valid cognition. For this, the argument is sufficient.
3. Both means are erroneous about the object that they enable a cognizer to obtain: that object does not appear in perception (which grasps a present thing), and the other type operates without particulars, one of which will be obtained.

4. Using any notion of “correspondence to an object” other than making successful activity possible, in order to distinguish what is and what is not a means of valid cognition, is doomed to failure, because to be a means of valid cognition implies non-correspondence to the very object to which it facilitates everyday activity; that object is never present to it.

Prajñākaragupta thus resolves the tension between PV III 1 and PV III 53d—that the two means of valid cognition result from two objects of valid cognition, but that there is in fact only one such object—on the basis of a complex argument that works on two levels: if everyday activity is to be possible, the duality of the means of valid cognition must be accepted; perception by itself cannot support this activity. That only the particular is sought for in this activity does not change this: perception and inference cannot be distinguished in their erroneousness about this future thing, and the main argument of PV III 1 has therefore to be understood to mean that there are two means of valid cognition because this particular, the future object of successful activity, is cognized in two ways, distinctly or indistinctly. Alternatively, it is possible to maintain that only perception is a means of valid cognition. Only the perception of cognition by itself exists in reality: this does, however, not support everyday activity, is not the topic of the pratyakṣa chapter, and is not acceptable to the opponent.

Quite a few factors make the interpretation of Prajñākaragupta’s work as difficult as it is interesting: its sheer extent and the unreliability of its edition are two major ones; they are compounded by Prajñākaragupta’s style of writing, nearly colloquial in its flow of arguments, and his skill in letting multiple threads run throughout long exchanges that shift in their main focus: the question of a cognition’s correctness, the general definition of a means of valid cognition, the distinction of the means of valid cognition acceptable to the participants in Prajñākaragupta’s debate, the relation between cognition’s accordance to an object and the definition of a means of valid cognition, and a number of assumptions that in the end turn out to entail unwanted consequences and have to be discarded.

I have here presented one example of such an exchange, taking care to weigh the arguments in respect to their dialectical context, in terms both of their content and of the commitment with which they are made. I believe this is the best way to come to a clearer understanding of the claims that Prajñākaragupta is actually making.

References and abbreviations


PS I  Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya I. Reconstruction in Steinkellner 2005.


Recent years have witnessed much debate about the best way to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s apparent diversity of philosophical positions regarding the status of mind-independent objects: at some times he appears to argue in ways that presuppose the existence of such objects, while at others he argues against them. Several approaches have been proposed to account for this apparent contradiction in Dharmakīrti’s various statements regarding ontology. Most famously John Dunne (2004), building on earlier interpretive strategies suggested by Georges Dreyfus (1997) and Sara McClintock (2003), has suggested that we should see such positions as ranged along a “sliding scale” of hierarchically arranged stances, in which “more accurate descriptions of what we perceive and think supersede less accurate ones.” He finds in the Pramāṇavārttika four such levels of analysis: “The Views of Ordinary Persons,” “the Abhidharma Typology,” “External Realism” and “Epistemic Idealism.” Each of these levels is said to give way to the next through a specific kind of “mereological” transition argument, which shows that certain entities accepted as real on a given ontological level cannot be accounted for either as unitary or as multiform – as “one or many” – forcing one to abandon this ontology and ascend to the next, higher level of analysis.

Dunne’s views have provoked much discussion and several significant critiques. I will mention here specifically only Kellner (2011) Arnold (2008). Kellner challenges the uniformity of the “mereological” model for ascending the levels, among others discussing a specific idealist argument of Dharmakīrti, showing that there is no way to satisfactorily distinguish definitionally between the supposedly external object of a cognition and the immediately preceding cognition (samanantara-pratyaya) that gives rise to it, since both are causes of the awareness, and resemble it in form. Arnold questions whether the third, external realist level is philosophically viable, even as a theoretical alternative to the “epistemic idealist” level, to which he believes it inevitably reduces. But neither of them, or any other critic of the sliding scale so far as I know, questions the hierarchy itself – in particular the idea that the idealist or Yogācāra position set forth at certain points in the Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya is meant to be presented as clearly and unambiguously preferable to the external realist, “Sautrāntika” or bāhyārthavāda level. It is this widespread assumption I wish here to call into question.

On Dunne’s view, the external realist or “Sautrāntika” arguments Dharmakīrti often relies upon are there only as preliminary, conditional positions—as stepping stones which invariably give way through a specific kind of “transition argument” to the more accurate and more soteriologically beneficial idealist or Yogācāra position which represents Dharmakīrti’s real view. Dunne characterizes the interpretive strategy that leads him to this conclusion as one of a “hermeneutics of charity.”¹ As Dunne explains this,

¹ See Dunne 2004: 11, 68–69, 239.
If... a well articulated passage or position clearly contradicts some other, equally well articulated passage or position, then the general principle of hermeneutical charity we have adopted will prompt us to rank these positions along a hierarchical scale; the lower position, while contextually expedient, is superseded by the higher position that, by virtue of passing a rational test that the lower position fails, conforms more closely to Dharmakīrti’s version of ultimate truth (Dunne 2004: 239, n. 24).

But should we take it as a given that there can be no reason why a philosophical author might choose to present multiple, genuinely alternative points of view, or alternative explanations of the phenomena he is attempting to account for, without falling prey to charges of incoherence? It is not in fact difficult to imagine motives that might prompt such an approach. For example, Vincent Eltschinger (2010, 2014) has recently stressed the importance of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as foregrounding for apologetic purposes a “supersectarian” identity “aimed at defending Buddhism as a whole against Brahmanical hostility” (2010: 399; see also Eltschinger 2014: 174ff.). Taking this into account, one can easily see how it might have seemed desirable to formulate a broad-based, “big tent” defense of Buddhism which could accommodate defenders of somewhat different Buddhist positions within a largely common epistemological framework. I will later mention one more way (apart from the “sliding scale”) in which we might make sense of Dharmakīrti’s apparent accommodation of multiple ontological stances.

At this point I would like, instead, to point out one obvious counterexample to Dunne’s line of thinking on this question—one which has not, so far as I know, been discussed in connection with the vexed question of Dharmakīrti’s ontology and his argumentative method and goals. I am thinking of Dharmakīrti’s own primer on Buddhist logic and epistemology, the Nyāyabindu. It has long been a commonplace among commentators and subcommentators on this work (stretching back at least to Vinītadeva in the 8th century) to view the Nyāyabindu as a work designed to conform to both a realist and an idealist ontology (usually labelled as “Sautrāntika” and “Yogācāra,” respectively). Certain commentators observe that, at a few specific points in the text, these two contrary ontological perspectives necessarily diverge, and the question is sometimes raised as to whether some point advanced in the text is incompatible with either the Yogācāra or the Sautrāntika positions. But the idea that the text on the whole is meant to accommodate both ontologies is widely shared, and nowhere, I think, seriously disputed.

What I would like to suggest, simply put, is that both of Dharmakīrti’s major systemic treatises on Buddhist logic and epistemology, the Pramāṇavārttika and the Pramāṇaviniścaya, are, like the Nyāyabindu, designed to accommodate and to accord, as seamlessly as possible, both with an idealist, Yogācāra, “mind-only” ontology and with that specific variety of external realism which later doxographers designate as “Sautrāntika” – what is sometimes known as the anumeya-bāhyārthavāda, the “inferred external object” view. There may well be – indeed there certainly is – reason to believe that, between these two views, Dharmakīrti regarded the Yogācāra position as philosophically (and perhaps

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2 See Vinītadeva ad Nyāyabindu 1.1 and 1.3 (Nyāyabinduṭīkā, pp. 4 and 7): ṭaṃ ca prakaranāraṃbhah sautrāntikayogācārobhayanayānudhāvanārtham. See Dharmottarapradīpa, pp. 42–44 and 61 for additional references.
soteriologically) preferable, but, as we shall see, he nevertheless goes out of his way on multiple occasions to present these two positions as viable alternative philosophical paths.

Once we abandon the presupposition that discerning Dharmakīrti’s own preferred position on the question of objects and discerning what he intends to argue for in his works are necessarily equivalent, it becomes much easier to account for certain aspects of the way he juxtaposes the vijñānavāda and bāhyārthavāda positions at several key points in the Pramāṇavārttika and the Pramāṇaviniścaya. One important reason it is difficult to read Dharmakīrti’s key statements of the vijñānavāda position as an unambiguous ontological step up from the bāhyārthavāda position is that it is often after having developed what seem to be, and have generally been accepted as, his definitive vijñānavādin arguments that Dharmakīrti advances his most fully developed bāhyārthavādin arguments. Indeed, it seems to be Dharmakīrti’s regular, and perhaps even invariable, practice (as I will demonstrate), to follow his fullest and seemingly most conclusive arguments for the vijñānavādin position with a corresponding and parallel argument defending a specific version of the bāhyārthavādin position. It is difficult to see why he would adopt this approach if his ultimate philosophical and soteriological strategy were designed to bring his readers up to the highest, idealist, level and leave them there.

**Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58**

The most striking passage of this kind, and the one that seems to have garnered the most attention from later chroniclers and critics of the Sautrāntika position, is one for which the original Sanskrit text has only recently become fully available, and has not yet, I think, received the attention it deserves – that is, Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 (the final kārikā in the chapter on perception), along with its accompanying vṛtti. The passage occurs just after Dharmakīrti has presented his famous sahopolyambha-niyama (“necessary co-apprehension”) argument – that “there is no distinction between blue and the awareness of blue, because they are necessarily co- apprehended.” Having advanced this claim as part of his defense of the vijñānavāda position, Dharmakīrti now turns to consider its relevance to the bāhyārthavādin position:

**Because of this, even if there is an external object, there is no difference between the appearing object and the awareness of it.** (1.58ab)

Even if an external object does exist, the non-differentiation between the appearing object (“blue,” or the like) and the awareness of it is established by the co-apprehension and co-awareness of the two.

**Therefore, the awareness has a double form.**

Therefore it is established that awareness has a twofold form, since it bears the form of both object and awareness. [Pūrvapakṣin:] If the appearing object is not differentiated from the awareness, then how can one think that it is something different?

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3 PVin 1.54 (p. 39): sahopolyambhāntiḥyamūd abhedo nīlataddhiyōḥ
There can be proof of an external object on the basis of disjunction [vya-tireka]. (1.58cd)

The fact that awareness [sometimes] does not arise when all other causes capable of producing it exist indicates the lack of some other cause; this could be the external object.4

Even if we accept that all that is phenomenally apparent to us in any awareness is the awareness’s own form, we may still be able to infer an external object as a cause of what appears to us. We do not, for example, see “blue” at all times and, in the absence of any evident factor in our immediately prior awareness that determines whether we do or not see blue at any particular moment, we may legitimately infer an additional, extra-mental cause for the occasional appearance of, e.g., blue in our visual awareness. This is clearly presented as a positive argument in favor of the bāhyārthavādin position, and has invariably been interpreted as such by later authors, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist (for whom Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and its attendant vṛtti become, indeed, the classic statement of the Buddhist bāhyārthavādin or Sautrāntika position).5

It is hard to see why, if the defense of bāhyārthavāda (conditional or otherwise) is meant to be a stepping stone on the path to Dharmakīrti’s ultimate stance of vijñānavāda, he should choose, after directly presenting his most fully developed argument in defense of this vijñānavāda, to then deliberately step backwards, or downwards, to the “lower,” supposedly philosophically less tenable and soteriologically less useful level of external realism. Moreover, even if we were able to find some motive for this return to defense of the bāhyārthavādin position after the supposed transition to “epistemic idealism” has already been effected, there is no way what we see in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 can be read as a step backward to a more primitive, more naive, or less fully developed position than the vijñānavādin view that precedes it. On the contrary, it is presented explicitly as a sequel to, and an outgrowth of, the purportedly vijñānavādin analysis that immediately precedes it. It builds on, and entirely presupposes, the dvairūpya of perceptual cognitions that Dharmakīrti has just argued for, and the validity of the sahopalambhaniyama argument that formed its centerpiece. Indeed, in the light of the way Dharmakīrti constructs the bāhyārthavādin argument in 1.58, and the way he connects it with the preceding argument, one must in fact recognize that the sahopalambhaniyama argument, despite the way it has so often been characterized by both premodern and modern expositors of Dharmakīrti’s thought, is in fact not an idealist argument at all. That is to say, it is fully consistent with the final versions of both the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions as Dharmakīrti develops them in both the Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and the parallel passage of the Pramāṇavārttika

4 PVin 1.58 (p. 43): bāhye ‘py arthe tato ‘bbedo bhāsamānārthatadvidō / (1.58ab) saty api bāhye ‘rthe sahopalambhavedanābhāyām bhāsamānāsya nilādes tattsamvīdās cāvivekah siddhaḥ. dvairūpyaṃ tad dhiyāḥ (1.58c) viṣayājñānarūpābhāyām ato dvirūpā buddhiḥ siddhā bhavati. yadi bhāsamāno viṣayākāro buddher abhinām, tato bhinnam astti kutah? bāhyasiddhiḥ syād vyatirekataḥ // (1.58cd) satsu samartheṣu anyeṣu hetuṣu jñānakāryānispattīḥ kāraṇāntaraivaikalyoṃ sūcayati. sa bāhyo ‘rthah syāt.

5 For quotations of the passage, see for example the following: bāhyasiddhiḥ syād vyatirekataḥ: NM, vol. 2, p. 492; İPVV, vol. 2, p. 129; TBh, p. 35 (as “Sautrāntika” view); Jinendrabuddhi (PST, p. 68). satsu samartheṣu... sa bāhyo ‘rthah syāt: Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda 20 (Śāstrī 1927–1943, vol. 2, p. 100), Jinendrabuddhi (PST, p. 68).
discussed below. Rather than an argument for the non-reality of mind independent objects, the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is designed to establish only that the phenomenal content of perception, its grasping and grasped aspects, are artificially abstracted parts of a single cognitive image. Establishing this is a necessary prerequisite for defending a *vijñānavādin* position, but does not require one to adopt such a position, as Dharmakīrti’s own discussion in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58 explicitly shows.6

While the final *kārikā* of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* chapter on perception thus presents us with a viable avenue for the defense of the existence of extra-mental objects, Dharmakīrti does not leave us with a definitive endorsement of this position over the *vijñānavādin* stance developed earlier. This new *sahopalambhaniyama*-consistent argument for extra-mental objects is immediately followed by a further remark that rehabilitates the *vijñānavādin* position but, again, as a viable alternative path, not as a decisive victor over the *bāhyārthavādin* position:

> Unless one can say that this disjunction of effect is produced by the absence of a specific material cause [*upādāna*, i.e. the *samanantara-pratyaya*].7

The idealist might try to account for the occasional appearance of images such as blue in our awareness by positing, instead of an extra-mental object, a specific (but unperceived) factor in the immediately prior awareness (*samanantara-pratyaya* – which is the material cause of any given awareness-moment) that causes us to see blue on some occasions and not others. So, we are left with two possible ways of explaining the occasional appearance of specific images in our perceptual awareness, both of which require us to postulate something not itself phenomenally evident – either a putative extra-mental object, or an unperceived causal factor in our prior awareness – whose presence or absence accounts for our perception containing a given image at some times but not others. But there is, notably, no explicit indication of whether either of these views is to be preferred over the other, nor even the suggestion of an argument or a criterion that would enable one to choose between them. Far from attempting to compel us to move “up” from the external realist to the epistemic idealist level, Dharmakīrti seems almost to be going out of his way to display ambivalence: there “can be proof” of the external object, “unless someone were able to say” that the disjunction in effect is produced by a difference in the *samanantara-pratyaya*. He does not say explicitly whether the object is proven in this way, or whether the *vijñānavādin* is or is not able to explain the occasional appearance of the effect in this way. We are simply left with two ways of accounting causally for the appearance of specific images in our perceptual awareness, with no indication of how (or whether) we should decide between them.

Having set forth this pair of parallel accounts, the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* concludes with one further objection against and response in support of the *vijñānavādin* view:

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6 I am not in fact the first to take note of the fact the *sahopalambha-niyama* argument is consistent with both the *vijñānavādin* and *bāhyārthavādin* positions as Dharmakīrti ultimately develops them. Matsumoto (1980: 26) makes the same point and Alex Watson (2010: 311, n. 46) has recently drawn attention to this point as well.

7 PV in ad 1.58cd (p. 43): *yady atra kaścid upādānaviśeṣābhāvakṛtaṃ kāryavyatirekaṃ na bruyāt.*
[Objection:] But how then could this person [i.e. the viññānavādin], while denying objects for all awarenesses, nevertheless say that a confused awareness is not a pramāṇa while an unconfused one is, since there would be no difference between them? [Reply:] Seeing that, even for someone who is not fully awakened, activity sometimes proves to be untrustworthy, due to the fault of being connected with karmic traces of confusion, one can say that one sort of awareness is not a pramāṇa; seeing that, in other cases, this activity has dependable consequences which persist as long as samsāra does, being based on firmly established karmic traces, one can say that this other sort of awareness is a pramāṇa, in consideration of its non-disparity with [other] worldly activity. What is stated here is the form of conventional pramāṇas. Others are confused even about this, and draw people into disagreements. Those who devote themselves to the wisdom consisting in thought (cintāmayī prajñā), however, turn their attention toward the ultimate pramāṇa, which is faultless through the discrimination of error and free from decay. This too is slightly hinted at.\(^8\)

This explanation of how pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa can be distinguished in an object-free world does redress the opponent’s objection, and rehabilitates viññānavāda, but only as a possibility, not as a position to which we are compelled. It leaves in place the unresolved ambiguity of Dharmakīrti’s prior treatment of the two as alternatives. Furthermore, it rehabilitates the idealist position even as a possible stance only by bracketing both the viññānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions as less than the ultimate truth. Again, at least within the realm of “conventional pramāṇas,” we are left not with a decisive argument that forces us to move from an external realist to an idealist stance (or vice versa); these two basic ontological stances are both left on the table as Dharmakīrti ends his discussion of perception.

**Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 391–398**

The basic features of this ambiguous back and forth between the viññānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions in PVin 1.58 and its accompanying vṛtti are all in fact prefigured in what is clearly the parallel passage in the Perception chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika:

Therefore it is unavoidable that the object, which appears at the same time as the awareness, is not distinguished from the awareness. There could be an inference of a difference in the cause [of one’s awareness],

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\(^8\) PVIn ad 1.58 (pp. 43–44): so 'pi katham sarvajñānānām viśayam vyatirecayann upapalavetaraññoh pramāṇetaratāṃ brūyād, viśesābhāvāt? upapalavavāsānāvisandhidosād aprabuddhasāyapy anāśvāsikam vyavahāram upaśīyant ekam apramāṇam ācaksita, aparām āsaṃsāram aviśiṣṭānubandhaṃ drīḍavāsanaṇvād iha vyavahāravāsāvyavādāpeksayā pramāṇām. sāmyvyavahārīkasya caidat pramāṇasaya rūpam uktam. atrapi pare mūḍhā visamvādayanti lokam iti. cintāmāyīm eva tu praṣādīm anuṣilayanto vi-bhramavivekanirāmam anapāyī pāramārthikapramāṇam abhinnukhikurvanti. tād api leṣataḥ sācitaṃ eveti.
due to the absence of [specific] perceptual awarenesses even when all the other causes are present. Unless one can state a restriction based on the immediately preceding awareness.  

Here too we have, immediately following an argument for the nondifferentiation of the awareness from its object, the claim that one may nevertheless infer an extra-mental object as a cause for the occasional occurrence of specific images in our awareness. And here again we have the possibility of an unrecognized causal factor in our immediately prior awareness suggested as an alternate explanation of these occasional images. The phrasing is extremely close to that of Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, and again we have the same juxtaposed optative construction: “There could be an inference… unless one can say…,” leaving us with a similar ambiguity on the external object question. But there is one significant difference between this passage and the (later) vṛtti on Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58. There Dharmakīrti presented the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin as hypothetical alternative stances without ultimately indicating a preference for one over the other. Here, on the other hand, Dharmakīrti does at least indirectly indicate such a preference (PV, Pratyakṣa 398):  

This [vijñānamātra view] is the doctrine of the wise; but this dual nature of awareness [as grāhya and grāhaka] is [also] established in reliance on an external object, due to the rule of co-awareness.  

Labelling the vijñānavādin view as “the doctrine of the wise” does certainly suggest that Dharmakīrti considers this view to be preferable (whether philosophically or soteriologically). But it is important to note that this offhand indication of preference does not come coupled with any sort of argument that would justify it. Here too, as in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, we are left with two philosophically viable accounts of perceptual images, one which posits the reality of extra-mental objects, and one which denies them, but with no clear argument for preferring one over the other.  

If, then, as it seems, Dharmakīrti does not wish to present any compelling argument that forces his readers to abandon the external realist position in favor of an idealist one, what is he trying to do here? If, as the label “doctrine of the wise” would at least seem to suggest, the vijñānavādin position is Dharmakīrti’s preferred view, why should he present it and the parallel bāhyārthavādin account in such careful equipoise (as he later does, without a similar indication of preference, in the Pramāṇaviniścaya)? Both available Sanskrit commentaries on this passage of the Pramāṇavārttika address the question directly. Prajñākaragupta comments on Pratyakṣa 398 as follows:  

[Pūrvapakṣin:] Why then did the Teacher [Dignāga] explain that [the awareness has] a dual form even if the external object exists? Vijnānavāda alone is the correct position. In response to this, he [Dharmakīrti] says:  

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9 PV, Pratyakṣa 391–392: tasmād arthasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāvabhāsinah / jñānād avyatirekitvām hetubhedānumā bhavet / 391 abhāvād akṣabuddhīnāṃ satsv api anyesu hetuṣu / niyamaṃ yadi na brūyāt pratyayāt samanantarāt // 392  
10 The intervening verses (PV, Pratyakṣa 393–397) parallel the objection against the vijñānavādin account of prāmāṇya and the vijñānavādin response given in the vṛtti on PV in 1.58, but in more detail.  
11 PV, Pratyakṣa 398: asty eṣa viduṣāṃ vādo bāhyam tv āśritya varṇyate / dvairūpyam sahasanvittinamāt tac ca sidhyate // 398
This [vijñānamātra view] is the doctrine of the wise; but this dual nature of awareness [as grāhya and grāhaka] is [also] established in reliance on an external object, due to the role of co-awareness.

The dual form [of awareness] is explained with provisional acceptance of the external object, in consideration of others [who hold opposing views]. But wise people accept vijñānavāda alone.¹²

Manorathanandin, whose comment on the verse closely mirrors that of Prajñākaragupta, explains further:

This is the doctrine “of the wise,” i.e. the Yogācārins who understand reasoning, which explains that there is nothing but consciousness in all conditions. The teacher [Dignāga] has [also] explained the duality of form of awareness relying on the external object accepted by the Sautrāntikas. And this duality of form is established “due to the rule of co-awareness,” i.e. due to the rule of co-apprehension [sahopalambha-niyama] since, even if there is a difference [between the awareness and the object], this [rule of co-apprehension] still exists.¹³

As Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin both rightly point out, Dignāga in his investigation of the objects of perception in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (on which the Pramāṇavārttika is ostensibly a commentary) similarly offers parallel vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin accounts without indicating a preference for one over the other:

If the awareness together with its content is the object, then what one apprehends is an object in the form of one’s own self-awareness, which may be either desirable or not. If, however, the thing to be known is an external object, then

The pramāṇa for this is simply that it has the form of the object.

For then, setting aside the [awareness’ own] form, even though this is what is cognized by the awareness, the pramāṇa for this [awareness] is simply that it has the form of the object, since that object is known through this. ⁹ (emphasis mine) ¹⁴

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¹³ Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti on Pratyākṣa 398 (PVV, p. 142): asty esa sarvvyavasthīsu vijñānaptiṭātraitāpātipādāko viduṣyām nyāyādarsūnām yogācārānām vādah. sautrāntikair īṣṭam bāhyam artham āśrīrya jñānasya dvairūpyam ācāryena varṇyate. tāc ca dvairūpyam sahasamvedaniyamāt sahopalambhaniyamāt sidhyati bhede ’pi sati tadbhāvāt [corr. tadbhāvāt].

¹⁴ Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9cd (PS, p. 4): yadā hi savisayam jñānam arthah, tadā svasamvedanāurūpam artham pratipadyata īṣṭam anīṣṭaṁ vā. yadā tu bāhyah evārthah prameyah, tadā viṣayābhāsataiśāya pramāṇam tadā hi jñānasvasamvedyam api svarūpam anapeksyārthābhāsataiśāya pramāṇam, yasmāt so ’rthaḥ tena miyate // 9 //
The connection these commentators posit between Dharmakīrti’s practice and Dignāga’s thus makes sense, though it simply pushes the basic question back one step further: It is plausible to suggest that Dharmakīrti’s parallel presentation of the vijñānavāda and bāhyārthavāda as viable alternatives is meant to conform to Dignāga’s practice, but this does not explain why Dignāga himself would have adopted this approach in the first place. A basic gesture of inclusiveness towards others in the Buddhist camp is presumably intended by Prajñākaragupta’s “in consideration of others” (parāpekṣayā) and Manorathanandin’s reference to “the external object accepted by the Sautrāntikas.” In any case, both clearly acknowledge that both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, while themselves personally inclined toward the vijñānavādin stance, are seeking in these passages to accommodate (and precisely thereby not to supersede) the bāhyārthavādin/Sautrāntika position.

Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224

I will close by briefly examining one further passage in which Dharmakīrti appears to balance the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions in this way: verses 194–224 of the Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. This passage deals with the problem of citraśā – “multicoloredness,” or more generally “multiplicity” of any kind in a cognitive image. When we perceive a multicolored object, or any object that appears to have multiple properties of any kind (such as a spatially extended object that appears to exist at more than one point), how is it that we have an impression of the “oneness”? Does it exist only in our minds, or is there some way that external, atomic objects can be aggregated into what is in some sense a “single” object? This is an absolutely key passage for both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s analyses, as both see it as marking Dharmakīrti’s crucial transition from the external realist to the idealist level of analysis (i.e. from the third to the fourth level in Dunne’s “sliding scale”). It is with reference to this passage that Dunne says:

Finally, in moving from the third to the fourth level of analysis, the inability to specify whether the image in perception is single or multiple is the primary argument against the existence of extra-mental objects (Dunne 2004: 63).

In response to the intractable problem of the cognitive image’s variegated singularity, Dharmakīrti abandons External Realism in favor of Epistemic Idealism (Dunne 2004: 112).

Dreyfus similarly sees Dharmakīrti’s exploration of the problems posed by the multiformity of perceptual images as setting the stage for a definitive transition from external realism to idealism. As he says:

This denial of the reality of external objects is where Dharmakīrti finds a solution to the dilemma created by an impression of a solid extended object produced by atoms, which do not have any extension by themselves. The

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15 The link between Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the external object question and Dignāga’s is reinforced by Jinendrabuddhi, who, in explaining the version of the bāhyārthavādin view set forth by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, quotes PVin 1.58cd and closely paraphrases the following vṛtti (PS, p. 68).
problem is solved by rooting out its source, the assumption that objects exist external to consciousness as a result of atomic aggregation. The Yogācāra view that objects exist only as reflections of consciousness is Dharmakīrti’s answer to the problem created by extended objects (Dreyfus 1997: 103).

The problem with both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s reading of this passage of the Pramāṇavārttika is that here too, as in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, we find, as a coda to what they take to be Dharmakīrti’s conclusive argument driving the shift from the “external realist” to the “epistemic idealist” stance, a return to the defense of the external realist (or, at any rate, an external realist) position. Dharmakīrti’s response to the problem of citratā (Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 209–224) is too complex to analyze in detail here. He offers in fact there three different ways to account for multiform appearance in awareness, apparently presented as parallel, alternative lines of argument: one which denies that multiformity can really exist either externally or within awareness (209–219), a second that accepts the existence of multiformity in cognitive images (ākāra) but denies that it can exist externally (220–222), and a third that, accepting the stricture that multiformity can exist only in awareness, nevertheless asserts that multiple, real external objects can give rise to a single, multiform awareness (223–224). 

Obviously it is the third position here that is of most interest for my argument, as it represents yet another retrospective rehabilitation of the external realist position. The relevant verses run as follows:

On the other hand, what contradiction is there if many [atoms] which have this special causal capacity [collectively] do not separately cause the awareness, just as is the case with the self, the sense organ, and so on.16

To be “grasped” is nothing other than to be a cause. When the awareness has the same appearance as something [that causes it], one says that this thing is grasped by the awareness.18

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16 The commentator Prajñākaragupta says that these three alternative lines of argument are offered “in accordance with the reasoning of the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras, and the Bāhyārthavādins” (mādhyamikavogācārabāhyārthavādinayena – PVA, p. 288). Steinkellner, with good reason, questions Prajñākaragupta’s use of the label “Mādhyamika” here (1990: 76–78 and p. 86, n. 35). The first position seems closer to what later becomes known as the nirākāravādin position (that cognitions are in reality “without form;” or, in Dreyfus’s terms, the “False Aspectarian” position) – Dreyfus in fact straightforwardly labels it as such, plainly recognizing the divide between the nirākāravādin view argued for in Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 210–219 and the sākāravādin view advanced in 220–222 (but not, as far as I can see, taking heed of the third, bāhyārthavādin, position on offer in 223–224 – see Dreyfus 1997: 103–104 and 490).

17 On the Nyāya view of perception a group of factors – self, sense organ, mind, object, etc. – are said to collectively cause perceptual awareness, while any of these factors individually will not do so. In the same way, there is no contradiction in asserting that multiple “blue” atoms in appropriate spatial proximity can collectively cause an awareness of blue, even though no single atom could cause such an awareness by itself.

18 Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224: ko vā virodho bahavah samjātātāsāyāḥ prthukṣ / bhaveyah kāraṇam buddhar yadi nātmendriyādiśvita // 223 hetubhāvaḥ rite nāryā grāhyatā nāma kācana / tatra buddhir yadāḥḥāśā tasyās tad grāhyam ucyate // 224 Dunne does recognize that these verses form part of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the citratā problem, and translates them (2004: 411), but does not appear to consider their implications for his “sliding scale” analysis.
That Dharmakīrti is here transitioning to an alternative line of argument is clearly marked in the text (“On the other hand”) and, as in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, there is nothing to indicate whether this line of argument or the one that precedes it is to be preferred for any reason. On Dharmakīrti’s own explicit analysis, then, the problem of citratā explored in this passage does not compel us, or even forcefully nudge us, toward an idealist stance. He offers the reader answers to the citratā problem that work just as well whether one accepts external objects or rejects them. It is true that the alternative resolution of the citratā question presented in the final two verses of this passage only opens the door to bāhyārthavāda as a possibility; the claim is that multiple atoms can act as external causes for a single multicolored mental image, not that such external causes must exist. Nevertheless, taken seriously, these verses undo much of the supposed work done by the earlier portion of the passage, on both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s accounts. The external realist position is certainly not definitively abandoned here, and the move from realism to idealism cannot reasonably be described as “Dharmakīrti’s answer” to the citratā problem, but (at best) one of several possible answers.

Conclusion

In the light of the treatment of the bāhyārthavādin position in all of the passages discussed above, it seems difficult to maintain that Dharmakīrti was seeking in his major epistemological works to push readers to ultimately adopt a vijñānavādin stance. Whatever his personal position on the status of extra-mental objects, he seems deliberately to have written in such a way that either vijñānavādin or bāhyārthavādin readers could comfortably adopt his epistemology. He in fact developed what came to be some of the most influential arguments in support of Buddhist bāhyārthavāda. This helps to explain why later doxographers, when seeking to delineate the “Sautrāntika” view, so often turned precisely to Dharmakīrti’s statements, and specifically to PVin 1.58, as the classic textual formulation of this position. The specific variety of “external realism” set forth in PVin 1.58 is not a preexisting philosophical position that Dharmakīrti (or Dignāga) adopted as a heuristic device or a stepping stone to draw readers along to his “real” idealist position; it is, rather, explicitly presented as an outgrowth of his own analysis of the phenomenology of perception. It is not only that one can be a “Sautrāntika” in the sense recognized by the later doxographers and still be a Dharmakīrtian. Rather, one can be a Sautrāntika, in the doxographers’ sense of this term, only if one is a Dharmakīrtian. That is, the externalist argument as set forth in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and, more briefly, in Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224 and 398 grows specifically out of the analysis of the dvirūpatā of all perceptual cognitions – the artificial division what is really a unitary cognitive image into a “grasping” and “grasped” form (grāhaka and grāhya ākāra) – and fully presupposes the validity of the arguments on which this analysis is based. That is, the epistemology and phenomenology of perception elaborated by both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga is entirely shared between the vijñānavādin and the bāhyārthavādin position as they elaborate them.

Arnold is entirely right to stress this in his discussion of Dunne’s “sliding scale.” Whether he is right in suggesting that such a phenomenology (which takes the only “object”
directly accessible to awareness to be its own image) tends by its nature to force one into an idealist rather than a bāhyārtha-vāadin position is less obvious. This is in fact precisely the question at issue between the bāhyārtha-vādin and the vijñāna-vādin as Dharmakīrti finally represents them: given that we have immediate cognitive access only to the ākāras of our own awareness, can we or can we not legitimately infer an extra-mental cause for the occasional appearance of particular ākāras? Obviously if Arnold were right in this claim, and if Dharmakīrti held a similar view of the question, this would tend to support Dunne’s model of the sliding scale, as it would leave us with a Sautrāntika position deliberately designed to collapse into a Yogācāra one. But, as I have already said, this makes Dharmakīrti’s regular return to defense of the bāhyārtha-vādin position after presenting his seemingly ultimate vijñāna-vādin arguments hard to explain.

So, the same general pattern recurs in Dharmakīrti’s works, seemingly whenever he presents his ultimate versions of the vijñāna-vāda and bāhyārtha-vāda positions in explicit contrast to one another. We first find an argument for how the phenomenology and epistemology of perception function on the vijñāna-vāda view (in one case only, PV, Pratyākṣa 398, accompanied by a fairly clear suggestion that this is Dharmakīrti’s preferred view), followed by a defense of the bāhyārtha position, adopting precisely the same phenomenology of perception, but taking it to imply the existence of an extra-mental cause for the images that appear in our awareness.

Is Dharmakīrti, then, contradicting himself? Is there anything problematic in developing a set of views regarding perception that accommodates and accords with two conflicting ontologies? Must we, in charity, seek to forcibly extract from his works one definitive stance on the external object question, even when he himself seems to be trying carefully to avoid doing so? I think Dreyfus himself makes a very important observation, when considering the question of Dharmakīrti’s possible self-contradiction in his seemingly inconsistent position on bāhyārtha-vāda. To quote:

Suffice to say that I take Dharmakīrti’s essential preoccupation to be epistemology not metaphysics. His interest in defining the nature of reality is to ontologically ground his epistemology… The exact nature of real entities (whether, for example, they are ultimately mind independent or not) is a lesser concern (Dreyfus 1997: 105).

I think this quite nicely sums up and makes sense of Dharmakīrti’s method here. The real matter Dharmakīrti wishes to stress, and does stress, is precisely the account of the epistemology and phenomenology of perception that is common to his final versions of both the vijñāna-vādin and the bāhyārtha-vādin positions. This is what he argues for consistently, forcefully, and without ambiguity.

An interesting side-question here is whether, and if so how, Dharmakīrti sees the final bāhyārtha-vādin argument in PV in 1.58 as escaping the earlier samanantara-pratyaya argument already discussed by Kellner. She notes that this argument is directed against what she describes as “the theory that Dharmakīrti first adopts and then abandons: that external objects produce a perception which has their form (ākāra), or which resembles them” (Kellner 2011: 294 – emphasis mine). The samanantara-pratyaya argument basically hinges on the problem of discriminating exactly what part of the causal complex producing
an awareness would count as the “object.” If one defines the object as that which both causes an awareness and bears the same or a similar form, then one will in many cases have to consider the samanantara-pratyaya, the awareness immediately preceding the one in question, to be its object; if one has a continuous awareness of, say, blue, then any later moment of this stream will have as part of its causal complex its samanantara-pratyaya, which also contains a blue image, and hence will meet the test for being an “object.” The consequent inability to define an “object” in a way that distinguishes it from the samanantara-pratyaya is presented as a crippling flaw in this version of the external realist theory. In connection with this, it is interesting to note that the positive arguments for the bāhyārtha position presented in Pramanaviniścaya 1.58 (after the samanantara-pratyaya argument has been presented) and in the parallel passage of the Pramanavārttika make no reference to any resemblance of form between the inferred extra-mental object and the image contained in the cognition it produces. In connection with this, it is interesting to note that the positive arguments for the bāhyārtha position presented in Pramanaviniścaya 1.58 (after the samanantara-pratyaya argument has been presented) and in the parallel passage of the Pramanavārttika make no reference to any resemblance of form between the inferred extra-mental object and the image contained in the cognition it produces. In PV, Pratyakaṣa 224, Dharmakīrti still refers to the awareness having the appearance (ābhāsa) of the aggregated atoms which are “grasped” by it, and it seems that this position should therefore fall prey to the samanantara-pratyaya argument. But the later treatments of the bāhyārtha position say nothing about a shared image or appearance between the atomic external objects and the macroscopic image they produce in our awareness (which, perhaps intentionally, renders the samanantara-pratyaya argument moot). Instead, the external object is postulated purely as an extra-mental cause which explains the appearance of an image such as “blue” at some times but not at others. This is then something like a Kantian Ding an sich, the “thing in itself,” something we can know of as the cause of particular manifestations in our own awareness, but of which we can know nothing more that it causes these manifestations. On this understanding blue atoms would be “blue” only in the sense that they cause in us an awareness containing a blue image. There is no sense in which the atoms can be thought of as “blue” in and of themselves, when not producing an awareness, and consequently there could be no question or resemblance between the atoms and the image they produce in our awareness.

The avoidance of this question of resemblance in the presentation of the Sautrāntika position in Pramanaviniścaya 1.58 and the parallel portion of Pramanavārttika may or may not represent a deliberate departure from the discussion in Perception 223–224 in the Pramanavārttika, but in any case we can still see a basic continuity of approach to the question of external objects in both of Dharmakīrti’s major works, and for that matter in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya as well. In all of these works, as in the Nyāyabhāṣya, it seems that, even though Dignāga clearly held vijñānavādin views, and Dharmakīrti seems to indicate (at least in Pramanavārttika, Pratyakaṣa 398) that this was his preferred position as well, both authors sought to produce an account of Buddhist epistemology that was consistent with either a vijñānavādin or a bāhyārthavādin stance, and hence could be adopted by people of varied ontological persuasions.

There is a larger context to the claim I am making here about Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the Sautrāntika or bāhyārthavādin view in the Pramanavārttika and Pramanaviniścaya. As I have argued elsewhere,20 there is actually quite strong evidence to indicate that some followers of Dharmakīrti were in fact bāhyārthavādins, most notably the highly influential commentator Dharmottara. It was precisely Dharmakīrti’s consistently guarded and careful

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balancing of the vijnānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions that made it possible for his followers to adopt either of these ontological stances while still presenting themselves as loyal adherents of the Dharmakīrtian tradition.

In the light of Dharmakīrti’s own seemingly ambivalent treatment of the status of mind-independent objects in his major epistemological works, a full understanding of the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition as it developed in India in the wake of Dharmakīrti’s work would seem to call for a significant reevaluation of the role and status of the bāhyārthavādin position within it.

References and abbreviations


Kāśikā Sucaritamiśra, Kāśikā. See Śāstrī 1927–1943.


PVA Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Varttikālaṅkāra, ed. Rahula Sankri-tyayana. Patna 1943.


PVV Manorathanandin, Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti. In PV.


Ślokavārttika See Śāstrī 1927–1943.


The Concept of \textit{vyavaśthā} in Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s Explanation of \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{pramāṇaphala}

by

Mai Miyo

Introduction

My paper will examine the concept of \textit{vyavaśthā} (“to differentiate, establish, fix”) in the context of the theory of the non-distinction between \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{pramāṇaphala}. This theory is characteristic of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school and criticized mainly by Brahmanical philosophers. Dharmakīrti expounds the relevant notions in the chapters on perception (\textit{pratyakṣa}) of his \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} (PV III), \textit{Pramāṇaviniścaya} (PVin I) and \textit{Nyāyabindu} (NB I), more specifically, at PV III 301–319, at PVin I 34–37 with prose,\textsuperscript{1} and NB I 18–21. My focus, however, are the divergent interpretations of \textit{vyavaśthā} given by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta. Firstly, by way of an introduction I shall briefly present Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between \textit{pramāṇa} and \textit{pramāṇaphala}, how the concept of \textit{vyavaśthā} is introduced in this context, and how it was interpreted by his followers. Secondly, I will investigate the interpretations of Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, which differ from each other in quite obvious ways; this confirms the conclusions of other scholars that these thinkers are adversaries on many topics.\textsuperscript{2} The central point of their controversy in the present context is whether or not the function of \textit{vyavaśthā} involves ascertainment (\textit{niścaya}) or conceptual construction (\textit{vikalpa}). Dharmottara affirms this, while Prajñākaragupta denies it.

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\textsuperscript{1} For an edition of the Sanskrit text of PV III and a critically annotated Japanese translation, see Tosaki 1979: 394–413. For German and Japanese translations of PVin I based on the Tibetan translations, see Vetter 1966: 79–87 and Tosaki 1991, respectively. An edition of the Sanskrit text of the first two chapters of PVin was made by Ernst Steinkellner (see PVin I, II).

\textsuperscript{2} See, above all, Ono 1995.
1. Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

1.1 The meaning of the terms pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

As is well known, the term pramāṇa has two main meanings in epistemological discourse. The first meaning is “means of valid cognition,” according to the nirvacana-analysis of the term as deriving from the verb prameṣṭi (“to cognize”), and formed with the suffix -ana in the meaning of an instrument (karaṇa). The second meaning is “valid cognition,” that is, not the means of valid cognition, but the cognition itself. In this respect pramāṇa is used synonymously with samyagjñāna. We can detect this second meaning in the so-called first definition of pramāṇa in the first verse of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of PV (PV II), according to which pramāṇa is non-belying cognition (avismitā jñānam). The same meaning is also at work in the definitions of perception and the two kinds of inference (i.e., svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna), which are the subcategories of pramāṇa. Dignāga attempts to resolve the confusion arising from this dual meaning by arguing that the valid cognition is metaphorically designated, by way of upacāra, as the means of valid cognition. Dharmakīrti seems to use the term pramāṇa in a broader sense which encompasses both meanings. Regardless, we can ascertain that in the cases where the two terms pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are used as a pair pramāṇa means “means of valid cognition,” and pramāṇaphala means “valid cognition.”

The word pramāṇaphala is normally analyzed as a genitive tatpurusa, i.e. as pramāṇasya phalam. Given that pramāṇa here refers specifically to a means of valid cognition,
pramāṇaphala literally translates as “the result of a means of valid cognition,” and by consequence refers to the valid cognition itself, as a resulting cognition. Dharmakīrti does not distinguish the action of cognizing (i.e. the action of knowing) from the resulting cognition (i.e., knowledge); rather, he denies the action of cognizing which has active sense and argues that only a resulting momentary cognition arises. This becomes most evident in PV III 307cd–308, the passage that is central for the concept of vyavaśṭhā:

\[
\text{dadhānaṃ tac ca tām ātmany arthādhigamanātmanā } \parallel \\
\text{savyāpāram ivābhāti vyāpāreṇa svakarmanī } \\
\text{tadvāśāt tadvyavasthānād akārakam api svayam } \parallel \\
\]

Moreover, the [cognition] which possesses the [property of having the form of the object] (meyarūpatā) in itself appears as if it performs an activity toward its object through the activity whose nature is the understanding of the object, because the [understanding of the object] is differentiated (vyavasthāna) by the [property of having the form of the object] even if [the cognition] does not act by itself.

In PV III 307–309, Dharmakīrti mainly expounds Dignāga’s point in PS I 8cd and the prose thereon, using the same metaphor, but he also adds the new idea of vyavaśṭhā to characterize the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala.

1.2 Specific referents of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

What are the specific referents of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala? The theory of the means and the result of valid cognition is not only applicable to perception, but also in the case of inferential cognition (anumāna), but we shall limit the discussion to perception here. Moreover, we may also confine ourselves to how Dharmakīrti explains means and result on the assumption of an external object (bāhyārtha). According to Dharmakīrti, we do not perceive external objects directly. Rather, the object projects its own form onto the cognition and we perceive the form or image of the cognition. Dharmakīrti changes his position from this type of representationalism (Sautrāntika) to idealism (Yogācāra) in the latter part of the pratyakṣa chapters of the PV and PVin, according to a “sliding/ascending scale of analysis,” where self-awareness (svasamvedana) plays a key role. The resulting complications are, however, outside the scope of this paper.

9 For example, Katsura 2007: 409 and Moriyama 2010: 263 use this translation.
10 See NB II 4: pramāṇaphalavyavasthārāpi pratyakṣavat // (“The distinction between a means of valid cognition and [its] result is here too [i.e., in the case of inference for oneself] the same as in the case of perception.”) PVin II 46.4: pratyakṣavad asya phalavikalpo vijñeyah (“The differentiation of the result of this [i.e., inference for oneself] should be known just like in the case of perception.”) The latter passage is also translated in Steinkellner 1979: 26.
11 PV III 247: bhinnakālaṃ katham grāhyam iti ced grāhyatāṃ viduḥ / hetutvam eva yuktiṃ jñānā-kārārpanakṣamam / (“[Objection:] How could [an object] which exists at a different time [from its cognition] be grasped [by that cognition]? [Answer:] People who know reasoning understand that to be grasped is to be a cause which is able to project [its own] form onto the cognition.”) Also translated in Tosaki 1979: 346.
12 For this issue, see Dreyfus 1997: 83, Kellner 2011, and others.
ionalist theory, *pramāṇa* refers to the cognition’s property of having the form of the object (*jñānasya meyarūpatā*),\(^{14}\) or its similarity to the object (*arthasārūpya*),\(^{15}\) and *pramāṇaphala* refers to the cognition’s function of understanding the object (*prameyādhigati* or *arthapratīti*).\(^ {17}\)

### 1.3 The relationship between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*

Both *meyarūpatā* and *prameyādhigati* belong to one and the same perceptual cognition. Accordingly, they are distinguished only as properties (*dharma*) or aspects of the cognition, and not as real entities (*vastu*).\(^ {18}\) This is the main point of Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*.

There are many ways in which the relationship between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* is characterized in Dharmakīrti’s works. Most prominently, they are referred to as *sādhanā* and *śādhyā*, what establishes and what is established, and as *karaṇa* and *kriyā*, instrument and function. Moreover, Dharmakīrti does not limit himself to the general understanding of *pramāṇa* given by Dignāga, which does not go beyond the commonly used grammatical derivation.\(^ {19}\) Instead, Dharmakīrti maintains that *pramāṇa* is something which “differentiates” (*√bhidd, √vrībhaj, vyav√sthā*) *pramāṇaphala*. This means that a cognition of an object like blue or yellow is differentiated by the cognition’s own property of having the form of the object, e.g., blue or yellow.

The differentiating function of *pramāṇa* is stressed in various places in PV and PVin: “[only the factor] which is uninterrupted (*antyaṃ*) toward and differentiating (*bhedakam*) for the [function (*kriyā*)] is regarded as the most effective establishing factor (*sādhakatama*), i.e., *pramāṇa*,”\(^ {20}\) “[In a cognition,] there should be its own nature by which [the cognition]*

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14 See PV III 306ab (= PV I 35ab): *tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ sādhanaṃ meyarūpatā* // (“Therefore, what establishes the understanding of the object of valid cognition is [the cognition’s] property of having the form of the object.”)

15 See NB I 20: *arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam* // (“The means of valid cognition is the [cognition’s] similarity to the object.”) PVin I 31,10–11: *na ceyam arthaḥgaṇantārthaśārūpyād anyato jñānasya sambhavati* (“And this connection of the cognition to the object cannot be performed by anything other than its similarity to the object.”) Dharmakīrti demonstrates why *meyarūpatā* is *pramāṇa* more elaborately in this part of the PVin than in the PV. See Miyo 2008.

16 See n. 14.

17 See NB I 18–19: *tad eva ca prayātkāṃ jñānāṃ pramāṇaphalam* // *arthapratītraśabdhā* // (“And this perceptual cognition itself is the result of the means of valid cognition because it has the property of understanding the object.”)

18 See PV III 314: *kriyākaraṇayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat / dharmabhedābhyupagamād vastv abhimnam itīṣyate* // (“[Objection:] It is contradictory that action and instrument are one. [Reply:] [That is] not true because a distinction of properties is admitted. We assent that the real entity is not distinguished.”)

19 See PS(V) I 4,11–12: *... arthābhaśātaśaśāya pramāṇam. yasmāt so ‘rthāḥ tena mīyate* (9d) (“... the means of valid cognition is exactly its [i.e., the cognition’s] having the appearance of the object, for the object is cognized by means of it [i.e., cognition’s having the appearance of the object].”) The same kind of interpretation is found in Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* 91,2–3 on NS 1.1.3: *upalabdhisādhanāni pramānāni samāhyaṁtrvacanasāmarthāv storefront bodhavyam. pramīyate ‘neneti karanārthaśādhyāno hi pramānasabdhah* (“It should be known that, by a nirvacana-explanation of the term, *pramānas* are what establishes cognition, because the word *pramāṇa* expresses the meaning of instrument by means of which [the object] is cognized.”)

20 PV III 311cd: *yad antyaṁ bhedaḥkṣaṃ tasyās tat sādhakatamaḥ mātām* //
is differentiated (vibhajyate) according to the object,” or “the understanding of the object (arthādhigama as pramāṇaphala) is differentiated (vyavasthāna) by the property of having the form of the object (meyarūpatā as pramāṇa).”

1.4 Vyavṣthā in the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

Commentators on Dharmakīrti’s works use words derived from vyavṣthā to interpret his definition of pramāṇa, referring to pramāṇa as differentiator (vyavasthāpaka) and pramāṇaphala as that which is differentiated (vyavasthāpya). The relationship between differentiator and differentiated (vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva) is contrasted with the causal relationship between producer and product (janyajanakabhāva) as which certain opponents analyze the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. For example, the contact between the senses and the object (indriyārthasannikarṣa) and the cognition of the object (arthavijñāna) have such a causal relationship, and Naiyāyikas assume them to be related as pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. Dharmakīrti’s successors attempt to justify the theory of non-distinction by keeping these two relationships clearly separate. If one supposes pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala to be related as producer and product, then the two factors must be distinct from each other, because producer and product are two different entities occupying different moments in time; they are non-contemporaneous. But if it is accepted that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are related as vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya, so that the means differentiates the result and, at the same time, is the result’s own nature, then both belong to one and the same cognition, and they cannot be distinguished as real entities. Of course, they are then also simultaneous.

Dharmottara is thought to be the most authoritative commentator on these two relationships by modern scholars, but their distinction is also found in other commentaries, such as Manorathanandin’s Pramāṇavārttikāvṛtti. Moreover, Dharmottara’s remarks in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā (NBṬ) are actually not as simple as one might expect. As Oki 1993 pointed out, his explanation includes not only the two aspects of perceptual cognition, but also, as a third factor, an ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyaya) that arises immediately after the perceptual cognition. Moreover, as we shall see, Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara’s view in his Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra (PVA). It is to this controversy that we now turn.

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21 PV III 302cd: bhāvyam tenātmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate //
22 PV III 308c: tadvaśāt tadvyavasthānād ... //
23 For example, Tosaki 1979: 397 abstracts this understanding from the Nyāyabinduṭīkā.
24 See PVV 213,15–16 on PV III 315: nāsty atra kāryakāranatātmakāḥ (PVVMS; kāryakāranatāmakāḥ PVV) kriyākaranabhāvaḥ, kim tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvaḥ (“In this case, the relationship between instrument and action does not have the nature of the relationship between producer and product, but is the relationship between differentiator and what is differentiated.”) Devendrabuddhi also refers to the relationship between janaka and janya, but does not use the words vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya. See PV P 216a3–4/P 253a8–253b2 on PV III 301: ‘o na ci yin zhe na / gang las ’bras yin / gang yin pa’i las de bya ba de ni de sgrub byed / de sgrub par byed pa las chod pa med par tha snyad la brten pa’i sog nas rab tu ’grub pa thob par ’gyur gyi / bskyed par bya ba skyed par byed pa’i dngos po (D; pos P) ni ma yin te / de’i bya ba ni de nyid yin no //
2. Dharmottara’s explanation of *vyavarṣṭhā* as involving an ascertaining cognition

2.1 Two kinds of relationships and *vyavasthāpaka* as *vyavasthāpanahetu*

After commenting on the individual words of NB I 21,²⁵ Dharmottara justifies the non-distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* in the way we have outlined above. The text reads as follows:

> na cātra janyajanakabhāvanibandhanaḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ, yenaikasmin vastuni virodhaḥ syāt, api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena,²⁶ tata eka-sya vastunāḥ kишcid rūpaṃ pramāṇam kишcit pramāṇaphalam na virudhyate. vyavasthāpanahetur hi sārūpyam tasya jñānasaya, vyavasthāpyam ca nilasamvedanarūpaṃ.

In the case of [pramāṇā and pramāṇaphala], the relationship between what establishes (i.e., *pramāṇa*) and what is established (i.e., *pramāṇaphala*) is not based on the relationship between producer and product. If it were, [then the relationship would result in a] contradiction in one and the same real entity (i.e., a momentary cognition). Rather, it is [given] in terms of the relationship between differentiator and differentiated. Therefore, it is not contradictory that a certain property of one real entity [i.e., cognition] is the means of valid cognition and a certain other [property of the same cognition] is the result of the means of valid cognition. For, the cause for differentiation (*vyavasthāpanahetu*) is the similarity (*sārūpya*) of cognition [to the blue object], and what is differentiated is the property of the awareness of blue (*nilasamvedanarūpa*).

Dharmottara attempts to counter the objection that there would be a contradiction if *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* belonged to the same cognition. In addition to introducing the contrast between the two kinds of relationships, he characterizes cognition’s similarity to the object (*sārūpya*) as cause for the differentiation of the property of the awareness of the object (*nilasamvedanarūpa*). The point I wish to emphasize is that the word *vyavasthāpaka* is here explained as *vyavasthāpanahetu*. This word *vyavasthāpaka* is problematic, and in fact, Malvania changes this reading, which appears in all the manuscripts, to *vyavasthāpana*, apparently following Durvekamiśra’s suggestion in the Dharmottarapradīpa (DhPr) subcommentary. However, the reading *vyavasthāpaka* that all manuscripts used by Malvania contain should be kept, because Durvekamiśra himself confesses that the reading *vyavasthāpana* contradicts what will be stated, by which he probably refers to *vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva* in NBṬ 83,2. Moreover, it seems more reasonable that Dharmottara would explain *vyavasthāpaka* as *vyavasthāpanahetu*, whereas it appears less plausible that he would apply the same explanation to *vyavasthāpana*. Durvekamiśra’s commentary is nevertheless helpful for understanding the meaning of the word: *vyavasthāpaka*

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²⁵ NB I 21: *tadvaśād arthaprātiṣdehīti iti* // (“For, the understanding of the object is established through the force of that [i.e., cognition’s having the form of the object].”)

²⁶ -vyavasthāpaka- MSS. (reported in NBṬ); -vyavasthāpana- NBṬ. See below.
is the cause for differentiating, with the -aka suffix having the sense of instrument (karaṇa),
and vyavasthāpanahetu is the cause for the function of differentiation.27

2.2 The ascertaining cognition as the third factor

Dharmottara next goes on to explain the relationship between vyavasthāpaka, vyavasthāpanahetu, and vyavasthāpya in more detail.

NBṬ 83,2–84,1: vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvo28 ‘pi katham ekasya jñānasayetī cet. ucyate. sādṛśam29 anubhūya tadviśiṣṭam yato nīlasam grāhakam avasthāpyate niścayapratyayena. tasmāt sārūpyam anubhūtān vyavasthāpanahetūḥ. niścayapratyayena ca tajñānaṃ nīlasamvedanam avasthāpyamānaṃ vyavasthāpyam. ... vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpratayayah pratyaśabalampano draṣṭavyah.

[Question:] How does the relationship between differentiator and differentiated, for its part, exist for one and the same cognition?

[Answer:] We say: having experienced (anubhūya) a likeness [to the external blue object] ([nīla]sādṛśa, i.e., the blue form of the cognition), the [perceptual] cognition is ascertained (avasthāpyate)30 to be grasping blue by the [subsequent] ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyayah) (“I perceive blue”).31

27 DhPr 83,14–17: vyavasthāpyate viśiṣṭenātmanā niyamyate ‘neneti vyavasthānimittam vyavasthāpanam abhipretam. vyavasthāpanabhāvene ayam pātho vaksyamānānvirodhi. yadā tu vyavasthāpakabhāvene pātho drṣyate, tadā karane kartrbhāvavivakṣayā tathā draṣṭavyam. sādṛśiṣṭi chinattitī yathā (“[In NBṬ according to Durvekamīra’s reading: vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpanabhāvena,] vyavasthāpya is intended to be the factor for differentiating, by means of which [the property of the awareness of blue] is differentiated, that is, limited by [its] distinct nature. This reading vyavasthāpanabhāvena contradicts what will be stated [by Dharmottara in NBṬ 83,2]. When on the other hand the reading vyavasthāpakabhāvena is observed, [the word vyavasthāpaka] should be taken in the same way [as the word vyavasthāpya] with the intention to express agency (-aka suffix) in the sense of instrument (-ana suffix); for example, an excellent sword cuts”); DhPr 83,24–25: vyavasthāpanam vyavasthākāraṇam, vyavasthāyāṃ prayojakavāpyāpāt iti yāvat, tasya hetur nīlām (“vyavasthāpana [in the phrase, vyavasthāpanahetu] is the function of differentiating, to be precise, the activity causing differentiation. Its [i.e., vyavasthāpana’s] cause [means] factor.”)

28 Oki 1993: 136, n. 23 suggests to change vyavasthāpaka to vyavasthāpana in accordance with Malvania’s earlier emendation. But now that Malvania’s emendation has been rejected, this change is also unnecessary. It is true that Oki’s modification solves the problem of two meanings in one word in this passage, which seems to be mentioned by Durvekamīra, but it produces the same problem for the word vyavasthāpana in the earlier passage.

29 sādṛśam MSS. (reported in NBṬ); nīlasādṛśam NBṬ. Malvania adds nīla according to DhPr, but this seems to be an addition by Durvekamīra. I have not incorporated it into Dharmottara’s text, in accordance with all the manuscripts reported in NBṬ and the Tibetan translation.

30 avarśthā, in causative, is a function of the ascertaining cognition and explained using the verbs nīḷyam (DhPr 84,15) and nīḷeci (DhPr 84,17), so I translate it as “to ascertain.” Nevertheless, I am not sure about the difference between the meanings of avarśthā and vyavarśthā – both in causative – here. They seem to be almost the same, so the meaning “differentiate” for avarśthayati is also possible.

See DhPr 84,10: niścayapratrayeyeti. niścayāmakajñānānottarakālabhāvinā (“[Answer:] By the ascertaining cognition. [This means] by the cognition whose nature it is to ascertain, and which arises at a subsequent time.”)
Therefore, the similarity which has been experienced is the cause for differentiation, and the [perceptual cognition] is what is differentiated, being ascertained, by the ascertaining cognition, to be the awareness of blue. ... Moreover, it is to be observed that the conceptual cognition (vikalpapratyaya, i.e., the ascertaining cognition), which arises due to the [preceding] perception, is the differentiator (vyavasthāpaka, i.e., the agent of differentiation).\textsuperscript{32}

In this section Dharmottara uses the term vyavasthāpaka in two different senses. In the question, it is used in the same sense as before, i.e. as the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu), and it indicates pramāṇa understood as similarity. On the other hand, in the answer, the term vyavasthāpaka is used in the sense of “agent of differentiation,”\textsuperscript{33} referring to the ascertaining cognition which arises immediately after the perception.

The argument, now, runs as follows. First of all, Dharmottara presupposes that the cognitive process consists of two stages in different moments: In a first moment the perceptual cognition (pratyakṣaṃ jñānam, anubhava) experiences a likeness to the external blue object (nīlasadrśa, i.e., the blue form of the cognition), and in a second moment there arises the ascertaining cognition, “I perceive this very blue” (nīlam evānubhavāmi).\textsuperscript{34} The preceding perceptual cognition’s similarity to the blue object here is the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu, vyavasthāpaka\textsuperscript{1}) because the succeeding ascertaining cognition carries out the function of ascertaining (avasthāpayati) due to the fact that the preceding cognition experiences (anubhūti) the blue form in cognition. The preceding perceptual cognition – the awareness of blue (nīlasaṃvedana) – is what is ascertained (vyavasthāpya) because it is ascertained to be grasping blue by the succeeding cognition. The succeeding ascertaining cognition, for its part, is the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpaka\textsuperscript{2}). This ascertaining cognition is also characterized as a conceptual cognition (vikalpapratyaya) because it accomplishes its function of ascertaining by the exclusion of others (anyavyāvṛtti).\textsuperscript{35}

3. Prajñākaragupta’s refutation of Dharmottara’s interpretation

Prajñākaragupta explicitly denies the intervention by the ascertaining cognition that Dharmottara assumes. A dialogue at the end of the PVA on PV III 311\textsuperscript{36} clearly illustrates

\textsuperscript{32} This vyavasthāpaka does not mean the cause for differentiating, but the agent of differentiation. See below.

\textsuperscript{33} See DhPr 84,25: vyavasthāpayatiḥ vyavasthāpakah ("It differentiates [the perceptual cognition], so [it is] the differentiator.")

\textsuperscript{34} See DhPr 83,29–30: na tu nīlasadrśam anubhavāmīti niścayo 'sti, api tu nilam evānubhavāmīti nilasya grāhakaṃ avasthāpyate.

\textsuperscript{35} See NBṬ 83,5–6: tasmād asārūpyavyāvṛttyā sārūpyam jñānasya vyavasthāpanahetub. anilabodhavyāvṛttyā ca niñlabodhāriṇapitvam vyavasthāpyam ("Therefore, the [perceptual] cognition’s similarity [to the object] is the cause for differentiating by the exclusion of something which is not the similarity, and the [cognition’s] property of awareness of blue is what is ascertained by the exclusion of that which is not the awareness of blue.")

\textsuperscript{36} This numbering of the verse follows Tosaki 1979. Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s numbering in PVA is mistaken.
this point.\(^{37}\) The opponent, whom the subcommentator Yamāri identifies as Dharmottara,\(^{38}\) first says:

PVA 345,9f. on PV III 311: \textit{tadākāratāyām api niścayāh parah pratiniyatavyavasthāyām apekṣyata iti cet}.

[Objection:] Even if [a cognition] has the form (ākāra) of that [object], ascertaining (niścaya),\(^{39}\) which is different [from the cognition’s property of having the form], is required for the differentiation [of the cognition/object] as being limited in each case (pratiniyatavyavasthā).\(^{40}\)

According to the opponent’s view, ascertaining (niścaya) intervenes between the cognition’s property of having the form of the object (i.e., pramāṇa) and cognition’s differentiation according to the object (i.e., pramāṇaphala). We can see how this opponent’s view corresponds to that of Dharmottara as discussed above.

Prajñākaragupta refutes this position as follows:

PVA 345,10–12: na, pratyakṣaprāmāṇyaaprastāvāt. abhyāsasambhave hi pratyakṣam pramāṇam. tadākāramātrād eva ca tadā pravartanaṃ\(^{41}\) niścayam antareṇāpi. yadā tu niścayāpeksā, tadānumānaṃ pramāṇam. tasyāpy ākāra-mātrād eva pravṛtteḥ nāparāpeksā. tasmād ākārān nāparaṃ karaṇam.

No. For, the relevant subject is perception’s being a valid cognition. To explain: perception is the \textit{pramāṇa} when there is habituation (abhyāsa). And then, [perception] prompts [the cognizing person] to act (pravartana), only due to its form (ākāra), even without ascertaining (niścaya). On the other hand, inference (anumāna) is the \textit{pramāṇa} when [the person] depends on ascertaining [in order to act]. [However, he/she] also acts only due to the form of that [inference], so the [inference] does not depend on anything other [than its form for prompting him/her to act]. Accordingly, there is no other instrument (karaṇa, i.e., pramāṇa) apart from the [object’s] form [in direct perception or inference].

Prajñākaragupta introduces a new topic here regarding \textit{pramāṇa} in the broader sense, i.e., valid cognition and human action, thus broadening the scope of the discussion. As Dharmakīrti claims in PV II 3cd, valid cognition is the main cause (pradhāna) for human

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\(^{37}\) See Miyo 2013 for a critical edition of the whole Sanskrit text of PVA on PV III 311, a Japanese translation, and additional information.

\(^{38}\) Y (D 251a3, P 337b1–2): \textit{da ni slob dpon chos mchog gi lugs sun phyung ba’i don du nye bar ’god pa ni i de’i ruam pa yang zhes bya ba’o // (“In order to criticize the teacher Dharmottara’s theory, [Prajñākaragupta] states here that even if [the cognition] has the form of the [object,] and so on.”)}

\(^{39}\) It is also possible to interpret niścaya here as “ascertaining cognition,” as in the NBT.

\(^{40}\) The interpretation of this compound involves some difficulties. We have a synonym for it, pratiniyatārthavyavasthā, cited in n. 46. I tentatively interpret it according to PVA 346,23–24: \textit{yadi sa tathābhūta ākāro na syāt, na kaścit pratiniyatam arthāṃ vyavasthāpayet} (“If such a form did not exist, nothing would differentiate the object as being limited in each case.”)

\(^{41}\) pravarttanaṃ PVA\textsubscript{MS} [’jug pa yin no T (D 15a4, P 18a7)]; pravarttana- PVA.
The Concept of vyāvāśṭā in Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta

action (pravṛtti) toward an object that is to be obtained or avoided. If one interprets this statement strictly speaking, perception as valid cognition, or more precisely, its object-form, should directly prompt the cognizing person to act without ascertaining. But if perception could cause the action only through ascertaining, then the ascertaining cognition would be the pramāṇa. It is important to note that Prajñākaragupta here adopts the concept of “habituation” (abhyāsa) as a powerful device that guarantees perception’s ability to cause action. He clearly separates perception and inference in accordance with the presence or absence of habituation, so the range of perception as a pramāṇa is limited to those particular cases that directly cause human action based on habituation. Consequently, perception causes human action only through its object-form without ascertaining. On the other hand, inference is the pramāṇa if the person acts depending on ascertainment, but inference does not depend on subsequent ascertaining; rather, inference itself is the ascertaining cognition. Therefore, the object-form is the means of valid cognition in both cases, perception and inference, and the ascertaining cognition which is different from them does not have any influence on them.

A detailed discussion of Prajñākaragupta’s views on the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, as well as an examination of his unique terminology for explaining the aspects of cognition that are involved, must be left to another occasion. But for the present context we may note that according to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition’s aspect of understanding (i.e., pramāṇaphala) is completely identical with its aspect of having the object’s form (i.e., pramāṇa), so there is no room for a third factor that might intervene to differentiate the understanding; rather, it must be differentiated by another aspect of the very same perception.

See PV II 3b’–d: dhīpramāṇatā / pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni // (“Cognition is the pramāṇa because it is the main cause for [human] action toward an object that is to be obtained or avoided.”) The verse is also translated in Dunne 2004: 262. As Katsura 1989: 541 points out, it is a distinctive feature of Dharmakīrti’s thought, in contrast to Dharmottara’s, to formulate pramāṇa theory as concerning the whole of the cognitive process including the action toward the object.

However, Dharmakīrti accepts that some other factors intervene between perception and the action that it prompts. Dharmottara justifies this intervention by paraphrasing “what prompts to act” (pravartaka) as “what indicates the object of the action” (pravṛttiviṣayapradarśaka) and Durvekamiśra interprets it introducing the concept of “capable of action” (pravṛttiyogya). Therefore, we can say Prajñākaragupta makes a radical interpretation here. On this subject, see Miyo 2014.

The concept of atyaṁtabhyāṣa is already used by Śākyabuddhi in the same context, as seen, among others, in Inami 1993: 96 and Krasser 2003. This issue may relate to the topic of yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa).

For other instances demonstrating the same idea, see PVAO 55,15–56,1 on PV II 3b’c: na ca cakṣuśād-dikāt pravartate jītānam antareṇa, vikalpam antareṇāpi tv abhyāsāt pravartate. tato heypōdeyavishaye dhīr eva pūrvikā pravartanat pramāṇam, na vikalpādayah. yatra tu nābhāyāsah, tatrānumānam eva pratyabhijñānādayah, dealt with in Ono 1993: 110–111; PVA 218,6–8 on PV III 56: yatra bhāvīgatis tatrānumānam mānam ityate / vartamāne ‘timātreṇa vṛttāv adhyakṣamānātā //240// vratātyantābhāyā-śad avikalpayato ‘pi pravartanam, tatra pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. anyathā vikalpaya pramāṇāntaratā prāptā, yadi yatra vikalpas tatraiva pratyakṣaṃ pravartakaṃ pramāṇaṃ ceti.

Some examples for his unique terminology are: pratiniyatākāratā (PV A 345,31), tadākāraviśeṣa (PVA 345,3), and ākāraniyama (PVA 345,7) for pramāṇa; and arthaparicchedhayavasthā (PVA 345,1), niyatārthavasthā (PVA 345,2), arthavyavasthiti (PVA 345,6), and pratiniyatārthavasthā (PVA 345,4–5) for pramāṇaphala.

PVA 345,6: akāraniyamah saddho yadi sārthhayavasthitāt (em.; -vyavasthitāt PVA) / akāraṇam paraḥ (PVA; śaraḥ PVA) saddhe prāptāt kim iti posyate // (618) (“If the limitation of the form has been
4. Conclusion

As we have shown, for Dharmottara the ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyaya), which arises immediately after a perceptual cognition, plays an important role even in his discussion of perception. This ascertaining cognition works as the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpaka), and the perception’s similarity to the object is merely the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu). Prajñākaragupta, on the other hand, denies this kind of intervention by an ascertaining cognition. He excludes it from the discourse on perception by taking recourse to the idea of habituation (ābhyāsa). According to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition’s aspect of understanding the object (i.e., pramāṇaphala) is completely identical with its aspect of having the object’s form (i.e., pramāṇa), so one aspect of cognition is simply differentiated by another aspect of the very same cognition. This difference in the two commentator’s interpretations also results in a difference in their usage of derivatives of vyavasthā. Dharmottara uses these only in cases where the function of ascertaining, or conceptual construction, is involved. On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta uses them even in cases where conceptual construction is not concerned.

Why do Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta present us with such divergent opinions on the influence of the conceptual construction on perception? While this topic calls for further in-depth studies, I would like to highlight three points that seem to be of special interest. The first is the position of the form or image in a cognition. Prajñākaragupta emphasizes the unity of the form and cognition, which easily leads to a negation of the intervention by conceptual construction, while Dharmottara does not. A second point worthy of note is the kind of cognition they are thinking about when discussing perception as a pramāṇa. Dharmottara thinks mainly about mundane cognition, such as perception by the sense faculties, but Prajñākaragupta seems to think more about supramundane cognition, such as yogic perception up to a Buddha’s cognition. This soteriologically relevant cognition should be free from the influence of conceptual construction. As a last and final point, I would like to highlight that already the earlier commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttika by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi show a faint indication of the same controversy.
Thus, a satisfactory understanding of the dissimilarity of views held by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta will emerge only after comprehensive investigation into its epistemological and historical roots.

References and abbreviations


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human action directly because of its vivid form of the object. PVP D 5a5/P 5b?: ‘on kyang bzung ba’i rnam pa gang yin pa dag la yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de la /’jug par byed pa’i phyir tshad ma nyid du ’dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no // PVT(Ś) D 72a5–7/P 87a5–87b2: mngon sum ni rnam par rtog pa med pa nyid kyi phyir nges pa ma yin mod kyi ’on kyang der snang bar skyes pa tsam yin no // ... mngon sum gyi rten can gyi ’jug pa ni rnam pa gnyis te dang po nyid dang goms pa can no // de la goms pa dang ldan pa gang yin pa de la shin tu goms pa gsal (D; bsal P) ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bzhi dun goms pa’i rnam par ’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan spangs pa can nyid kyi sions su bcad nas skye ba dang // de lta bur gyur pa’i phyis ’byung ba’i nges pa skyed par byed pa’i phyir de la skyes bu ’jug par byed do // This passage is translated in Inami 1993: 95–96.
Mai Miyo 279


NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): see DhPr.

NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara): see DhPr.

NS Nyāyasūtra (Akṣapāda Gautama): see Nbh.


PS I Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter I (Dignāga): see PS(V) I.


PV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti).

PV II Pramāṇavārttika, chapter II (Dharmakīrti): see PVV.


PV Vin Pramāṇaviniścaya (Dharmakīrti).


PVP Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi): D 4217 (che), P 5717(b) (che).

PVT(S) Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā (Śākyabuddhi): D 4220 (nye), P 5718 (nye).


Y Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikāṅkāraṇaṇa Suparīṣuddhi (Yamārī): D 4226 (me), P 5723 (me).

Dharmakīrti’s Apoha Theory: Perceptual Judgment and the Lack of Superimposition (samāropaviveka)

by

Miyuki Nakasuka

Introduction

In the Apoha section in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti starts by characterizing apoha as the difference (bheda) among real entities from an ontological point of view (PV I.40–42), and then as the exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) from an epistemological point of view (PV I.43–58). He defines as a determinate cognition (niścayajñāna) an inference (anumāna) and a perceptual judgment, of which the latter is the conceptual cognition that follows a perceptual cognition (pratyaśyapratyabhāvavikalpa), and argues that both have the exclusion of superimposition as their object. It is important to note that what Dharmakīrti means by the term samāropavyavaccheda “exclusion of superimposition” differs for inference and perceptual judgment. In the case of an inference, the term in question signifies the function of excluding superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) that is carried out by the inference when there is an erroneous cognition with respect to the subject of the inference. In the case of a perceptual judgment, on the other hand, it means “lack of superimposition” (samāropaviveka). This latter point is made by Dharmakīrti in PV I.48.

PV I.48: kvacid drṣṭe ’pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /

asamāropitānyāṃśa tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Katsura (1984, 1989, 1993) and Kellner (2004), when dealing with Dharmakīrti’s concept of perceptual judgment, refer to the exclusion of superimposition. Katsura (1984: 226), relying on PV I.48–49, says: “Apart from provoking a practical activity, another important function is to prevent wrong judgement from arising.” In addition, Kellner (2004: 41) explicitly states that “ascertainment which follows immediately after perception, serves to keep error and doubt away and for this reason also has an ‘exclusion’ as its object.” Their view of perceptual judgment is quite acceptable. But to my knowledge, no studies have ever tried to show how perceptual judgment is linked to the exclusion of superimposition. The aim of this paper is thus to show how Dharmakīrti establishes that a perceptual judgment has “exclusion” as its object.

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1. Arguments in PV I.43–47: samāropavyavaccheda

Before entering into the main task, let us look at the preceding arguments Dharmakīrti brings forward in PV I.43–47. Dharmakīrti introduces PV I.43 by saying the following:

PVSV ad PV I.43 (G25.26–26.1, M17.1–2): *kathaṃ punar etad gamyate – vyavacchedah śabdaliṅgābhyaṃ pratipādyate vidhīnā na vasturūpam eveti pramāṇāntarasya śabdāntarasya ca pravṛtteḥ /

[Objection] But how can this be understood: it is exclusion (*vyavaccheda*) and not a real thing in a positive form that is understood from a word and an inferential mark?

[Answer] [This is reasonable] because another word occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing] and because another valid cognition occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing].

Dharmakīrti here cites Dignāga’s well-known statement: *vyavacchedah śabdaliṅgābhyaṃ pratipādyate vidhīnā na vasturūpam eva*. According to Dharmakīrti, the fact that different words or different valid cognitions can occur with reference to one and the same real thing shows that what is understood from a word or an inferential mark is not the real thing itself but exclusion (*vyavaccheda*). In order to demonstrate this point, Dharmakīrti starts to develop arguments.

In PV I.43–44, to begin with, Dharmakīrti says the following:

PV I.43: ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam / ko ’nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yah pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate //

PV I.44: no ced bhrāntinimittena saṃyojyeta guṇāntaram / śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt //

When the single essential nature of an object is perceived as it is, what part could be left unseen separately from it? To be sure, if a part is left unseen, it is examined through valid cognitions.

[But the condition must be imposed:] “On the condition that a quality foreign to the object is not connected with it by cause of an erroneous cognition (*bhrāntinimitta*), unlike the case where the form of a piece of silver is connected with mother of pearl due to the perception of the similarity in form between them.”

PVSV ad PV I.44 (G26.18–27.2, M17.16–21): *tasmāt paśyan śuktirūpam viśiṣṭam eva paśyati / niścayapratyayaivaikalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyaṃ*

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1 This translation of Dignāga’s statement is based on Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation. According to Karṇakagomin, the statement is interpreted as follows: It is exclusion in a positive form and not a real thing that is understood from a word and an inferential mark. On the different interpretations, see Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3. On this statement of Dignāga’s, see Pind 2015: II 127, n. 431.
Therefore, a person, when seeing the form of mother of pearl, is to see it precisely as what is differentiated [from a piece of silver]. But, due to the deficiency of causes of a determinate cognition, the person, without determining the form, conceives: “I see a property common to them.” Consequently the person superimposes [the image of] silver [on mother of pearl]. Similarly, to a person who does not recognize the difference between moments since there arise similar moments in sequence, there arises the erroneous cognition: “This is [temporally] persistent” because of the superimposition of identity (tadbhāvasamāropā).

If an entity has a certain number of foreign properties, that number of properties is what arises from causes [of erroneous cognitions] according to each case and is superimposed on the entity.

Therefore, valid cognitions which arise to exclude what is superimposed must be fruitful.

But, it is not the case that the [valid cognitions] bringing about the exclusion take place in order to make known the part of a real thing which has not been understood. For the [part for which valid cognitions take place] has been perceived. Indeed, it is not proper to say that something indivisible is partially perceived.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti accepts the following points:

1. On the condition that no erroneous cognition (bhrānti) arises with respect to a real thing, when a real thing is perceived, all its parts are perceived.
2. An erroneous cognition can arise with respect to a real thing.
3. When a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them, and erroneously cognizes “this is permanent.” (The non-recognition of the difference between

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2 According to Dharmakīrti, the causes of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment are: acuity of a cognition (buddhipāṭava), a state of habituation to the imprint of this (tadvāsanā-bhyāsa), situation-context (prakaraṇa), and others. PVSV ad PV I.58 (G32.3–8, M20.29–21.1): yady api amśarahitah sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo 'nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu távatá nīcāya bhavati / kāraṇāntarāpekṣyatvāt / anubhavo hi yathāvikalpāṅkhyāsam nīcāyapratyayān janañayā / yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe ‘pi kanapakāminibhaksyavikalpāḥ / tatra buddhipāṭavam tadvāsanābhāvyāśaḥ prakāram iṣayādya 'nubhāvad bhedaniścayotpattisahakārīnaḥ / On the concept of the causes of a determinate cognition, see Kellner 2004: 19–32.

3 Karnakagomin glosses tadbhāva as sattā “the property of continuing to exist.” PVSVṬ 123.28: tadbhāvasamāropāt sattāsamāropā. But the term tadbhāva, synonymous with tattva, can be taken as meaning “identity,” as opposed to “difference” (nānātva).
moments or the observation of the similarity between moments \([bhrāntinimitta] \rightarrow\) superimposition of identity \([samāropa] \rightarrow\) an erroneous cognition \([bhrānti]\).

4. A valid cognition \((pramāṇa)\), i.e., an inference, is resorted to in order to exclude the superimposition.

5. This superimposition must take place with reference to the part which has been perceived.

Dharmakīrti here explains the basic structure in which a valid cognition brings about the exclusion of superimposition.

In PV I.45,\(^4\) which is a recapitulating verse \((samgrahaśloka)\), he goes on to argue that when a real thing is perceived, all its qualities are perceived; but when an erroneous cognition arises with reference to that real thing, these qualities are not determined. Thus one must resort to an inference in order to determine them.

Moreover, in PV I.46\(^5\) he states that if an inference were to grasp a real thing, then it would follow that once one property of it is determined, all properties are determined; and that if an inference has exclusion \((apoha)\) as its object, the undesirable consequence does not follow. It is in commenting this verse that Dharmakīrti makes an important point: an inference brings about the exclusion of superimposition \((samāropavyavaccheda)\). He states:

\[
\text{PVSV ad PV I.46 (G27.13–15, M18.1–3): yadā punar anumānena samāropavyavacchedah kriyate tadā naikasamāropavyavacchedād anyavyavacchedah krto bhavatīti tadartham anyat pravartate /}
\]

However, when \([it is assumed that] the exclusion of superimposition is brought about by an inference, then \([it can be said that] since the exclusion of a different \([superimposition (non-B)]\) is not brought about just because the superimposition \((non-A)\) is excluded by one \([inference (A)]\), another \([inference (B)]\) takes place in order to \([exclude the different superimposition (non-B)]\).\(^6\)

Here Dharmakīrti assumes that, with reference to sound, two superimpositions arise: \((non-A)\) the superimposition of the property of not being produced \((akṛtakasamāropa)\), and \((non-B)\) that of the property of being permanent \((nityasamāropa)\). Also, two inferences take place: \((A)\) the inference to prove the property of being produced \((kṛtakānumāna)\) and \((B)\) that to prove the property of being impermanent \((anityatvānumāna)\). He supposes that when a real thing is perceived, a property which the real thing does not bear is superimposed on it and that an inference is performed in order to exclude such a superimposition.

\(^4\) PV I.45: \(tasmād drṣṭasya bhāvasya drṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ / bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanaṃ saṃpravartate /
\(^5\) PV I.46: \(vastugrahe 'numānac ca dharmasyakasya niścaye / sarvadharmagraho 'pohe nāyam doṣaḥ prasajyate /
\(^6\) PVSVṬ 125.23–25: tadaikenā kṛtakānumānenaikasya kṛtakasamāropasya vyavacchedād anyasya nityasamāropasya vyavacchedah krto na bhavatīti kṛtvā tadartham anyasaropavyavacchedārtham anyad ity anityatvādyanumānām pravartate /
In PV I.47,\(^7\) which is also a saṃgrahaśloka, he states that it is due to the reason stated in PV I.46 that Dignāga declares an inference to have exclusion as its object; if an inference did not have exclusion as its object, it would follow that when the subject of an inference is known, it would be knowns in its entirety, and therefore there would be no part left to be inferred.

All these points make the following clear: In PV I.43–47 Dharmakīrti develops an argument to establish that an inference has for its object exclusion and not a real thing. It is in this connection that, in PV I.48, Dharmakīrti introduces an argument to establish that a perceptual judgment also has exclusion as its object.

2. PVSV on PV I.48

2.1 Now let us look closely at what Dharmakīrti says in PVSV on PV I.48. He comments on the verse as follows:

A: PVSV G28.8–9, M18.15–16: *yat rūpādirśanānantaram aliṅgaṃ niścayajñānaṃ bhavati, tat katham asati samārope bhavad vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati/*

[Objection] A determinate cognition that arises immediately after the perception of an entity like color is not an inferential cognition (*aliṅga*). Therefore, how is it that such a determinate cognition, arising when superimposition is absent (*asati samārope bhavat*), has exclusion for its object?\(^8\)

B: PVSV G28.10–11, M18.16–17: *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt\(^9\) / yatra hy asya samārope yathā sthirah sāmaka iti vā, na tatra bhede\(^10\) niścayo bhavati/*

[Answer] For the very reason that the [determinate cognition] does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (*samārope*), [it is proper to say that it has for its object the exclusion of superimposition]. Indeed, a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the difference (*bheda*) on which something is superimposed by the cognizer (*asya*), as in the case where [one has an erroneous cognition such as] “[this is] permanent” or “[this has] an Ātman.”\(^11\)

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\(^7\) PV I.47: tasmād apohaviṣayam iti liṅgaṃ prakīrtitam / anyathā dharmaṇaḥ Siddhāv asiddhaṃ kim ataḥ param //

\(^8\) PVSVṬ 129.21–24: *yat ityādinā ślokaṃ vyācaṣṭe / ādiśabdāc chabdādiparigrahaḥ / nāsyā liṅgam astity aliṅgam rūpādikam (aliṅgam rūpādikam Ms; iliṅgarūpādikam S.) etad iti nīscayajñānam / asati samārope bhavati / na hi pratyaksadrṣte rūpādau tadānīm viparītakārasamāropo ’sti / tat katham vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati / iyatā ślokasya pūrvārddho vyākhyātāḥ //

\(^9\) samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt G; samāropaviṣaye ’bhāvāt M. PVSVt and PVṬ: *sgra ma btags pa’i yul la yod pa’i phyir ro* (*asamāropitaviṣaye bhāvāt*). G’s reading is supported by PVSVṬ: *samāropaviṣaye tasya nīscayajñānasyabhāvāt* (see note 11). In PVṬ ad PV I.48 we find a passage parallel to G’s reading: *de ni sgr o ’dogs pa’i yul la med pa’i phyir* (see 2.3.1).

\(^10\) bhede G; bhedo M.

\(^11\) PVSVT 129.25–28: *uttarārddhaṃ vyākhyātum āha // samāropaviṣaye tasya nīscayajñānasvabhāvāt tadvyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavatī prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / etad evāha / yatra bhede ’sya puṃsāḥ samārope na tatra bhede samāropaviṣaye niścayo bhavaty asthiro nirātmaka iti vā //
In A Dharmakīrti makes two points. First, immediately after the perception of color there arises a determinate cognition (niścayajñāna) which is not an inference. Needless to say, this determinate cognition is what we call perceptual judgment. Second, a perceptual judgment arises when there is no superimposition (asati samārope bhavad), and thus, unlike an inference, the perceptual judgment cannot have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. This second point is extremely important because it is a strong indication that a perceptual judgment arises when superimposition is absent. Let us note here that Dharmakīrti holds that if the “exclusion” (vyavaccheda) is that of superimposition as in the case of an inference, then the exclusion certainly does not obtain; but if it is not, then it does obtain.

In B Dharmakīrti argues that perceptual judgment does have the exclusion of superimposition as its object, because a perceptual judgment does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt). To explain. First of all, an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaya) is bheda “difference.” With respect to the bheda on which (yatra) something is superimposed, there is no determinate cognition. The superimposition leads to the erroneous cognition “this is permanent” (sthira). Thus the superimposition in question is that of the property of being permanent. We should, however, have the determinate cognition “this is impermanent.” Accordingly, what is meant by the term bheda here must be the property of being impermanent. We must note that Dharmakīrti holds the property of being permanent to be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. A real thing has differences (bheda) from all other things, such as the property of being impermanent. Suppose that a person superimposes the property of being permanent on the property of being impermanent, resulting in the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” In this case the person has no determinate cognition with respect to the property of being impermanent. In contrast, suppose that a person has a determinate cognition with respect to the latter property. In this case, the person clearly has no superimposition with respect to the property of being impermanent. This is how the determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. According to Dharmakīrti, one is justified in saying that the exclusion of superimposition forms the object of a perceptual judgment only insofar as the perceptual judgment arises only when a superimposition is absent.

2.2 In the latter half of the verse Dharmakīrti says: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram. It is important to note here that what Dharmakīrti means by the word aṃśa “part” in PV I.48 is a difference (bheda) such as the property of being impermanent. Naturally it follows that that which has parts is an object to be perceived, referred to by the phrase kvacid dṛṣṭe in the verse.

If we accept that the phrase asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram can be paraphrased as asamāropitānyāṃśe niścayajñānāṃ, the expression asamāropitānyāṃśa must refer to the difference (bheda) that is the object of a determinate cognition. If the difference is the property of being impermanent, the term anyāṃśa “a different part” must refer to the property of being permanent, which is different (anīya-) from the property of being impermanent. According to Dharmakīrti, the property of being permanent can be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. Therefore, the expression asamāropitānyāṃśa, as a
must refer to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent is not superimposed. When the property of being permanent is superimposed on the property of being impermanent, the latter property is concealed by the former and goes beyond the scope of determination.

2.3 At this point it may be useful to consider how the commentators interpret this compound.

2.3.1 Śākyabuddhi

PVT ad PV I.48cd (D63b6–64a1, P75a4–7): *rnam pa gang la gzh an gyi cha ste ’o / / de la ’jug pa de yang de tsam sel ba’i spyod yul can cha sgro ma btags pa gang yin pa de tsam gyi rnam par gcod pa’i yul can yin no / / ’di skad du mngon sum gyi rjes la ’byung ba’i shes pa rnam par rtog pa can gyis sgro ’dogs pa sngar zhugs pa sel bar mi byed mod kyi l ’on kyang de ni sgro ’dogs pa’i yul la med pa’i phyir de rnam par gcod pa’i yul can kho na yin no zhes bya bar shes so / / gal te yang rnam par rtog pa can gyi shes pa de dngos po la12 bsgrub par ’jug par ’gyur na ni / rnam pa thams cad la nges par ’gyur ro zhes bshad pa yin no / /

(a) The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi*, referring to “an image (*x*) on which a different part, i.e., an image (non-*x*) contradictory to the image (*x*), is not superimposed.”

(b) The [cognition] which arises with respect to the [image (*x*)], too, has for its object the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of the part (non-*x*) which is not superimposed.

(c1) [What Dharmakīrti means to say] is this: It is not the case that a conceptual cognition arising immediately after perception excludes a superimposition which occurred before [this conceptual cognition].

(c2) On the contrary, it is seen that the [conceptual cognition] does have exclusion as its object because it does not arise with respect to the object of superimposition.

(c3) If the conceptual cognition arose as what establishes a real thing, then it would follow that [the conceptual cognition] determines all forms [of the real thing].

This is what was explained by the teacher.

The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi* formed from *asamāropita* and *anyāṃśa*, referring to an image (*rnam pa, *ākāra*) (image *x*). The latter part of the compound, *anyāṃśa*, signifies “a different part,” which refers to “an image contradictory to the image” (*zla bo rnam pa, *pratiyogyākāra*) (image non-*x*). Thus the compound in question means

12 _la_ D; om. _P_.

“an image (x) on which an image (non-x) contradictory to it is not superimposed.” The demonstrative *tad* in *tanmātra* refers to the image which is not superimposed (image non-x).

### 2.3.2 Karnakagomin

**PVSVṬ ad PV I.48cd (128.4–12):** (A) *asamāropitāḥ anyāṃśaḥ* pratiyogyākāro yasmin viṣaye sa tad / tatra pravarttamānaṃ tad api *tanmāṭrāpohagocaram* / tenāyam artho bhavati / samāroparahitam svalakṣaṇam svākārabhedena *grñnad*[^13] vikalpakam jñānaṃ bhrāntatvāt tatsamāroparhitabāhyādhyavasāyakam eva na tu bāhyasvarūpagrāhakam / atas *tanmātram* eva nīyatabāhyāvāsāya evāvityasya samāropasyāpohagocaram vikalpakam jñānam /

(B) yadvā *asamāropitāḥ* cāsāv *anyāṃśaḥ* ca tasmin sati vikalpaṃ jñānam pravarttamānaṃ *tanmāṭrāpohagocaram* / yo 'sāv asamāropito 'nyāṅśas tanmātravyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati /

(A) [First interpretation:]

(a) The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi*, denoting “an object (viṣaya) on which a different part, i.e., an image contradictory to it (pratiyogyākāra), is not superimposed.”

(b) The [cognition], which arises with respect to the [object], too, is spoken of as *tanmāṭrāpohagocara* “the cognition whose part is of that [i.e., an external object] and whose object is exclusion.”

(c1) Therefore, [by the present verse] is meant the following: Since [a conceptual cognition] grasps an individual (svalakṣaṇa) that is devoid of superimposition (samāroparahita) through its own image, it is an erroneous cognition. Therefore, the conceptual cognition is a mere judgment about the external object that is devoid of superimposition and does not grasp the external object in itself.

(c2) Accordingly, [the cognition] is a conceptual cognition in the form of [a cognition] that has a part related to the [external object] (tanmāram eva), i.e., in the form of a judgment about a specific external object (nīyatabāhyāvāsāya eva), whose object is the exclusion of what is other, i.e., superimposition.

(B) [Second interpretation:]

(a) Or, the compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *karmadhāraya*, meaning “that part (non-x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.”

(b) When there is such a part (non-x), a conceptual cognition arises. Accordingly, the conceptual cognition has for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non-x). That is, [the conceptual cognition has] for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non-x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.

[^13]: *grñnad* Ms; *grñnan* S.
Karṇakagomin offers two interpretations for the compound asamāropitānyāṃśa: as a bahuvrīhi and as a karmadhāraya. In the bahuvrīhi interpretation the compound refers to an object (viṣaya) on which an image contradictory to the object is not superimposed. The object is an individual (svalakṣaṇa), which is said to admit of no superimposition. The expression tanmātra refers to adhyavasāya “judgment,” which is said to be that whose part (mātrā), i.e., an image, is related to the object.

In the karmadhāraya interpretation the compound refers to a different part that is not superimposed, i.e., the part (non-x) that is different from the part (x) to be determined and that is not superimposed on the latter part (x). The demonstrative tad refers to this putative part (non-x). When such a different part is present (sati), that is, when a different part is not superimposed on the object with respect to which determination takes place, a perceptual judgment arises as what excludes only the different part. Accordingly, perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion only of the different part as its object.

2.3.3 Manorathanandin

PVV ad PV I.48 (305.11–15): nanu kvacin nīlādāv asamāropito ’nyo viparīṭāṃśo yasmin tasmin pratyakṣena dṛṣṭe yaj jñānam aliṅgajaṃ vikalpakaṃ sāmānyaviṣayam bhavati, tad āropābhāvāt katham anyāpohaviṣayam / āha tanmātrasya niṃtamaṃtrasyāpoha vijātyād vyāvṛttir vyavacchedaḥ sa gocaro yasya tat tathā / nīlavikalpasyāniṃtavyavaccheda eva viṣaya ity arthaḥ //

[Objection] When a certain [entity], say, blue, on which a part foreign to it, i.e., a part contradictory to it, is not superimposed is cognized through perception, there arises a cognition (jñāna) which is not based on an inferential mark, which is conceptual, and which has a universal as its object. How could it be that such a cognition has exclusion as its object, since no superimposition occurs?

[Answer] [Dharmakīrti] answers [this objection by stating]: The cognition is spoken of as “that whose object is the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of non-blue; exclusion means the exclusion (vyāvṛtti = vyavaccheda) of an entity of a dissimilar class.” The conceptual cognition “this is blue” has as its object only the exclusion of non-blue. This is what is meant by the verse.

According to Manorathanandin, the compound asamāropitānyāṃśa refers to a perceived, real blue on which a part foreign to it is not superimposed. The expression tanmātrapohā means the exclusion of non-blue. We must say that his interpretation strays quite far from the earlier interpretations. Manorathanandin fails to grasp the point made by Dharmakīrti that in the context of a perceptual judgment, the exclusion of superimposition forms the lack of superimposition.

3. PV I.49 and PVSV

In PVSV B, Dharmakīrti states that a determinate cognition does not exist with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt). This means, as shown
in 2.1, that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent has been superimposed. In PV I.49ab, the reason for this point is given.

3.1 bādhyabādhaṇaḥ

Dharmakīrti states the following:

\[
\text{C (PV I.49ab):} \niśca\text{yāropamanasor bādhyabādhaṇaḥ} / \\
\text{Because the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking obtains between a determinate cognition and a superimposing cognition.}^{14}
\]

According to Dharmakīrti, the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking obtains between the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” and the erroneous cognition “this is permanent,” which is based on superimposition. Because of this relationship, it is said that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent is superimposed. This point is explained in PVSV as follows:

\[
\text{D: PVSV G28.13–14, M18.19–20: na hi sarvato bhīnno drṣṭo 'pi bhāvas tathāvaḥ pratyaḥbhijñāyate / kvacid bhede vyavadhānasambhavāt / yathā śukteḥ śuktitve} / \\
\text{Indeed, even if an entity has been perceived as something differentiated from all others, it is not recognized as it really is. For there can be an impediment to a certain difference [being cognized], just as there is [an impediment to the cognition of] mother of pearl’s property of being mother of pearl[, if mother of pearl is erroneously cognized].}^{15}
\]

\[
\text{E: PVSV G28.15–16, M18.20–21: yatra tu pratipattur bhrāntinimittam nāsti tātāvīśaya taddarśanāvaśiśe 'pi smārto niścayo bhavati} / \\
\text{With respect only to the [difference] about which a cognizer has no cause to have an erroneous cognition, a determinate cognition[, i.e., a perceptual judgment,] arises for the cognizer based on remembrance even if [all] the [differences] have been equally perceived.}^{16}
\]

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14 PVSVṬ 130.9–10: kiṃ kāraṇam / niśca\text{yāropamanasor bādhyabādhaṇaḥ} (bhāvate Ms; bhāvah S.) / niśca\text{yājñānasāca} tadviparītasamāropajñānasāca ca bādhyabādhaṇaḥ \\
15 PVSVṬ 130.10–15: bādhyabādhaṇaḥ eva sādhayam āha navītī / sarvataḥ sajātīyād vijātīyāc ca bhīnno drṣṭo 'pi bhāvas tathāvaḥ pratyabhijñāyate niścāya ca hiti sambandhā / kiṃ kāraṇam / kvacid bhede kṣanīkāvādike vyavadhānasambhavāt / *bhrāntinimittagataḥ (read; bhrāntinimittasambhavāt) / yathā śukteḥ sarvataḥ vyāvṛttāyā darśane 'pi śuktitāditte rajatasaḍharmyasā ca bhrāntinimittasyā sambhavān na niścayāḥ / *PVT: 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan srid pa'i phyir ro. \\
16 PVSVṬ 130.15–17: yatra tu ākāre bhrāntinimittam nāsti tātāvīśya pratipattur anubhavottarakālābhāvī smārto niścayo bhavati / taddarśanāviśe 'pi sarvasvākāreṣu pratyaḥkaśyāviśe 'pi / smārta iti smṛtirūpaḥ /
D. An entity that is differentiated from all others is a real thing (svalakṣaṇa). A real thing has differences relative to all other things. Such a real thing, even if it has been perceived, is not recognized as it really is through a perceptual judgment. This is because a certain difference of the real thing can be blocked from being cognized.

E. Recall that, according to Dharmakīrti, when a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them and so has the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” That a cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference of a real thing means that the cognizer recognizes the difference as it is. Therefore, when the cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference, there is no chance of superimposition arising with respect to the difference. The point Dharmakīrti makes here is that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to the difference on which nothing is superimposed.

Now we can see the following. A real thing has differences (bheda) from all other things, which can also be conceptually posited as parts (aṃśa) of that real thing. On the condition that no erroneous cognition arises with respect to a real thing, when the real thing is perceived, all its differences are perceived. A determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference that is not erroneously cognized. For instance, the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” arises only with respect to the property of being impermanent, which is not the object of an erroneous cognition. When the property of being permanent is superimposed on the property of being impermanent, the latter property is said to be the object of an erroneous cognition. Thus it is clear why Dharmakīrti says that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt).

3.2 samāropaviveka

3.2.1 In PV I.48d Dharmakīrti speaks of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment as tanmātrāpohagocara. The next step is to consider how this expression should be interpreted.

Consider the following passage:

F1: PVSV G28.16–19, M18.22–24: samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhabhāvāt / niścayasya
samāropaviveke ’sya pravr̥ttir iti ganyate // [49cd]
tadviveka eva cānyāpohah /

Because there obtains the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking between superimposition and a determinate cognition, it is understood that the determinate cognition occurs when there is a lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka). [49cd]

And this very lack of [superimposition] is the exclusion of others (anyāpoha).

17 PVSVṬ 130.20–24: yataś ca pratyakṣāviśeṣe ’pi samāropahita eva viśaye niścayo bhavati tasmāt samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhabhāvo ganyate / tato bādhyabādhabhāvāt kāraṇāt samāropavi-
According to Dharmakīrti, a determinate cognition arises when there is a lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka). The reason for this is that a determinate cognition and superimposition are incompatible with each other.

3.2.2 The term samāropaviveka can be paraphrased as samāropābhāva “absence/negation of superimposition.” It is proper to say that viveka is an equivalent for abhāva “non-existence, absence.” In PV I.56–57a Dharmakīrti, having introduced an opponent’s position that, after a real thing is grasped in its entirety by a conceptual cognition, a valid cognition arises to remove an erroneous cognition which prevents one from determining the real thing as it is, says the following:

PV I.56–57a: yadi bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ gṛhīte ’pi anyad iṣyate /
tad vyavacchedaviṣayam siddham tadvat tato ’param //
asamāropaviṣaye vrteḥ

If it is accepted that even if an entity is grasped in its entirety [by a determinate cognition (C1)], another [valid cognition (C2)] occurs to remove an erroneous cognition [that prevents one from determining the real thing as it is], it is established that the [valid cognition (C2)] has exclusion as its object. Like the [valid cognition (C2)], it is established that the [cognition (C1)] different from the [valid cognition (C2) has exclusion as its object]. For [cognition (C1)] occurs with respect to an object that has no superimposition (asamāropaviṣaya).

In PVSV Dharmakīrti explains:

F₂: PVSV ad PV I.56cd–57a (G31.12–15, M20.14–16): tat tarhi bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ pravṛttam pramāṇam anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam\(^{21}\) iti Siddham anyāpohaviṣayam / tadvat anyad api / asamāropaviṣaye vrteḥ / yatrāṣya samāropo na tatra niścaya iti samāropābhāve\(^{22}\) varṭamāno ’nyāpohaviṣayah Siddham /

(a) In that case, it is established that the valid cognition which occurs to remove an erroneous cognition, which occurs to remove the superimposition

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18 In PVSV Dharmakīrti states that existence is viveka of non-existence, while non-existence is viveka of existence. PVSV ad PV I.291 (G154.10–11): bhāvābhāvayor anyonyavivekarāpāt vāt /

19 PVSVṬ 139.18–19: yadītyādinā parābhīpbriyam āśamakte / ekena niścaya jñānena sarvātmanā gṛhīte ’pi vastuni bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ anyad iti pramāṇānātaram /

20 PVSVṬ 139.23–26: yadī evam ityadānaṃ mittadāvadā / yat tad bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ uttaram pramāṇam iṣyate tad vyavacchedaviṣayam anyāpohaviṣayam Siddham pūrvkāla nyāvēna / tadad uttara-pramānāvat / tata uttarākālabhāvā pramāṇād (read: uttarakālabhāvaprāmāṇād) aparām api pūrvkāla-bhāviniścaya jñānena tād api vyavacchedaviṣayam / kim kāraṇam / asamāropaviṣaye vrteḥ / anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam G; anyavyavacchedaphalam M.

21 samāropābhāve G; samāropābhāve ca M.
of a different [image] (vyavacchedaphala), has as its object the exclusion of others (anyāpoha).

(b) In the same manner, it is established that, like the [valid cognition], another [cognition], [i.e., the preceding determinate cognition,] also [has as its object the exclusion of others]. For it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition.

(c) Since a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object on which something is superimposed by a cognizer, it is established that the determinate cognition, occurring when there is an absence of superimposition (samāropābhāva), has as its object the exclusion of others.  

An opponent makes the following points. First, a conceptual cognition grasps a real thing in its entirety. Second, a valid cognition can arise in order to remove an erroneous cognition that is assumed to occur with respect to the real thing. According to Dharmakīrti, in this case it can be said that the valid cognition has exclusion as its object, since the valid cognition brings about the exclusion of the superimposition of something foreign to the real thing. What is important is that Dharmakīrti points out that, like a valid cognition, a perceptual judgment can also be said to have exclusion as its object. It is imperative to note here that the reason the perceptual judgment is said to have exclusion as its object is held to be that it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition, or that it occurs when there is absence of superimposition with respect to the object. In this connection, let us recall the passage in B: samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvā. There it was said that no determinate cognition arises with respect to an object of superimposition which consists in a difference. In the above-cited passage (F₂b), on the other hand, it is stated that a determinate cognition arises with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition. It is clear that the reason a perceptual judgment is described as having exclusion as its object must be found in the way the object of the perceptual judgment should be: the object is far from being what something is superimposed on. To put it in another way, it is because its object lacks superimposition that the perceptual judgment is defined as having exclusion as its object.

3.3 tanmātra

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti has defined a determinate cognition as tanmātrāpohagocara instead of defining it as anyāpohaviṣaya. A question arises: What is meant by the term tanmātra? The following passage offers a key to solving this problem.

Therefore, the [determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment] also has as its object the exclusion only of that [putative specific difference]. It does not consist in a determinate cognition which determines the real thing in itself. For [the determinate cognition is defined] in that manner because it is seen that, even if a certain difference is determined, another difference is not understood and because, when the real thing in itself is determined, it is improper to say that [another difference is not determined].

It is clear that the term mātra makes a restriction on the differences the real thing has. In B it has been stated that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to a difference on which something is superimposed, and in E that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference which does not fall under the scope of an erroneous cognition. In PV I.48c it is stated that a determinate cognition occurs with respect to the part on which a part different from it is not superimposed.

All this makes the following clear: Suppose that a given real thing has the property of being impermanent as its part or difference. When a determinate cognition occurs with respect to this property, the property is that on which the property of being permanent is not superimposed, that is, what has no superimposition of this latter property. Thus the absence of superimposition must be that of the superimposition only of this property. What is meant by the expression tanmātrāpoha is the absence (viveka, abhāva) of the superimposition only of that part or difference which is different from the part or difference to be determined. There is no doubt that the demonstrative tad in tanmātra- refers to the part which is different from the part to be determined (anyāṃśa).

4. PV I.48: reinterpretation

Now we are in a good position to interpret PV I.48.25

This verse has already been interpreted as follows: Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 108: “Now when in respect of a perceived datum a determinate judgement arises (in its trail) referring to a conceptualized construction without the obtrusion of the opposite misconception, it also serves to eliminate the unperceived misconception (or doubt) of the opposite of that very datum.” Steinkellner 1971: 199, n. 71: “Die vorstellende Erkenntnis, welche ein Allgemeines zum Gegenstand hat, richtet sich, wenn irgendein [Ding] wahrgenommen wurde, ohne daß [auf dieses Ding] ein Teil eines andern [Dinges] übertragen worden ist, bloß dazu, diesen [fremden Teil] fernzuhalten …” Zwilling 1976: 96: “Even in the absence of an opposing misconception the determinate cognition which follows the direct cognition of some real and whose prime object is a [constructed] general nature nevertheless has for its sphere of operation the elimination of just that [absent misconception.]” Okada 2007: 4, 6: [シャーキヤブッディ解釈] 知覚された何らかのものに関しても、およそ（直接知覚の後に生じる）認識は、普遍を対象としており、別を有している。他の部分（＝対立項の形象）が付託されていない（形象）に対して（働くその認識は）、それ（＝付託されていない他の部分）のみを排除
PV I.48: *kvacid drṣṭe 'pi yaj jñānam sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /
asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Even when a certain [real thing] has been perceived, a cognition which has a universal as its object and which is conceptual arises; [this cognition, arising] with respect to the [real thing’s part (x)] on which a part (non-x) different [from it] is not superimposed, [is characterized as] what has as its object the exclusion only of that [part non-x].

Dharmakīrti is saying this: A conceptual cognition arising immediately after the perception of a real thing, that is, a perceptual judgment, has for its object only one part or difference of that real thing, say, the property of being impermanent (x); if this part or difference is determined, then it is one on which a putative part or difference contradictory to it, say, the property of being permanent (non-x), is not superimposed. In this case the perceptual judgment is said to have as its object the exclusion of the superimposition only of the putative part or difference, or, in other words, the exclusion only of the putative part or difference.

Thus the reason that a perceptual judgment is described as that which has exclusion as its object lies in the fact that the object of the perceptual judgment is what is devoid of the superimposition that gives rise to an erroneous cognition with respect to that object. We may say that Dharmakīrti establishes that perceptual judgment has exclusion as its object.
from the point of view of the object of a perceptual judgment. By contrast, he establishes that inference is said to have exclusion as its object from the point of view of how one can remove an erroneous cognition which can occur with reference to a real thing.

5. Conclusion

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti tells us that in the case of a perceptual judgment, the occurrence of determination implies the absence of superimposition. To put it in another way, perceptual judgment and superimposition are incompatible with each other. Unlike in the case of an inference, in the case of a perceptual judgment there is no chance of a prior superimposition.

Dharmakīrti defines a perceptual judgment as having exclusion as its object in the sense that the perceptual judgment arises with respect to the difference which a real thing is supposed to bear and on which no putative contradictory difference has been superimposed. According to Dharmakīrti, a perceptual judgment is described as “what has exclusion as its object” because its object is devoid of superimposition. In Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception, perceptual judgment plays a critical role in sustaining the practical efficacy of a perceptual cognition. By defining perceptual judgment as having as its object the absence of superimposition, he tries to show that perceptual judgment, distinguished from a mere erroneous cognition, is a trustworthy cognition (avīsamvādi-jñāna). The great significance Dharmakīrti attaches to perceptual judgment is clearly seen in his interpreting apoha as “lack of superimposition.”

References and abbreviations


**PV I** Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.


**PVSVr** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Tib.): D 4216, P 5717.


**PVṬ** Pramāṇavārttikatīkā (Tib.): D 4220, P 5718.


Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Permanence and Its Impact on the Tibetan Buddhist Doctrine of Buddhahood

by

Hiroshi Nemoto

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence (*nitya*), as found in his *Pramāṇavārttika* II 204cd, and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Buddhahood. As is well known, Dharmakīrti holds the view that whatever exists is momentary (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva*), which literally means that everything is impermanent. This view is accepted by later Indian commentators, as well as by many of his Tibetan successors like Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251) and Glo bo mkhan chen (1456–1532), who belong to the Sa skya pa. However, Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), the founder of the Dge lugs pa, and his followers have a different opinion. They consider that Dharmakīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent when he says: “Wise men speak of the thing that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent” (*PV* II 204cd: *nityam tam āhur vidvāṃso yah svabhāvo na naśyati*). Moreover, the Dge lugs pa scholars assert that to be permanent (*rtag pa*) does not necessarily mean to be always existing (*dus thams cad pa*), and hence that there are permanent entities that exist only temporarily (*res ‘ga’ ba*). Such an idea of permanence is peculiar to Tsong kha pa and his followers, and it plays an important role especially in their analysis of Buddhahood or the Nature Body (*svābhāvikakāya; ngo bo nyid sku*) of a Buddha.

In what follows, I would like to discuss how Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence has survived in the Dge lugs pa’s exposition of Buddhahood. After a short remark about the Indian concept of permanence, I will give an analysis of the Dge lugs pa’s idea of permanence, together with the interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* II 204cd as found in the *Dbu ma rgyan zin bris*, Tsong kha pa’s memorandum on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. I will then move on to examine the Dge lugs pa’s analysis of the Nature Body, which is given in their commentaries on Chapter VIII of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*.

1 The concept of permanence in India

The concept of permanence (*nitya*) is found in ancient Indian thought. For instance, Patañjali (2nd cent. BCE), in his *Mahābhāṣya*, defines permanence in several ways. Patañjali says that

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1 The Dge lugs pa’s concept of “permanence” (*rtag pa*) is briefly discussed in Nemoto 2009. The aim of this paper, then, is to show how the concept plays an important role in their analysis of Buddhahood.


3 The title of the text is given as: *Dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris rjes rang gis gnang ba*, which means “A memorandum on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* given by the Lord [Tsong kha pa] himself,” so that we may tentatively assume that the text was written by Tsong kha pa himself.

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the term *nitya* is applied to immovable (*kūṭastha*), or invariable things (*avicālin*); and he says that it also means continued repetition (*ābhīkṣṇya*).

Furthermore, he remarks: “That in which its identity is not destroyed is also permanent” (*tad api nityam yasminṃ tattvaṃ na vihanyate*). We notice here that what is expressed by the last definition is almost the same as what Dharmakīrti says in *Pramāṇavārttika* II 204cd. It is highly likely that Dharmakīrti was fully aware of the definition of permanence as found in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

In Buddhism, specifically in the Abhidharma tradition, factors (*dharma*) are classified into two categories, the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), of which unconditioned factors are considered to be permanent.

Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharma-kośa* teaches that there are three unconditioned factors: space (*ākāśa*), extinction through discernment (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), and extinction not through discernment (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*). According to Yaśomitra’s commentary, these three factors are “permanent since they do not pass through the [three] time periods [of future, present, and past]” (*adhyasaṃcārābhāvāt nityāḥ*).

In the Mahāyāna tradition, the concept of permanence plays an important role, especially in the doctrine of Buddhahood and the Buddha Body. The *Uttaratantra* says that Buddhahood (*buddhatva*) is permanent and already present in every sentient being.

Concerning this, the *Vyākhyā* explains that Buddhahood is “permanent because it is free from origination” (*uptādavigamān nityam*). In the same vein, Vasubandhu’s *Sūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya* states that a Buddha’s Nature Body is essentially permanent (*prakṛtyā nityatā svābhāvikasya*). According to Sthiramati’s commentary, this is because the Nature Body

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4 MBh I, 6.17f.: *nityaparyāyavācī siddhaśabdaḥ / katham jñāyate / yat kūṭastheṣv avicāliṣu bhāvesu vartate / (“The word *siddha* is a synonym of *nitya*. How is it understood? It is used to refer to things which are immovable and invariable”); MBh I, 7.3f.: *ayaṃ khalv api nityāśabdo nāvaśyaṃ kūṭastheṣv avicāliṣu bhāvesu vartate / kiṃ tarhi / ābhīkṣṇye ’pi vartate / (“Furthermore, the word *nitya* is not always used to refer to things which are immovable and invariable. Then what does it mean? It is also used to refer to continued repetition”).

5 MBh I, 7.22.

6 AK I 48b: *nityā dharmā asaṃskṛtāḥ / (“Unconditioned factors are permanent”).

7 AKV I, 90.23: *asaṃskṛtā eva nityā ity avadhāraṇam / adhvasaṃcārābhāvāt nityāḥ / (“It is ascertained that only unconditioned [factors] are permanent. [They are] permanent since they do not pass through the [three] time periods [of future, present, and past]”).

8 UT 84.7ff. (II 29): *acintyaṃ nityaṃ ca dhruvam atha śivaṃ śāśvatam atha praśāntaṃ ca vyāpi vyapagatvai kālam gaṇanavat / asaktaṃ sarvatrāpratīghaṇaśapparṇaśaṃsivaṃ na dṛśyaṃ na grāhyaṃ śubham api ca buddhatvam amalam // (“Buddhahood is inconceivable, permanent, stable, quiescent, everlasting, calm, all-pervading, free from conceptualization, and akin to space; it has neither attachment nor hindrance in all respects and is devoid of rough sensation; it cannot be perceived or grasped; furthermore, it is auspicious and immeasurable”).

9 UT 84.20 (II 34).

10 MSAbh 46.12f. (ad MSA IX 66): *teṣu ca triṣu kāyeṣu yathākramam trividhā nityatā viditavyā yena nityakāyās tathāgatā śūnyam ucyate / prakṛtyā nityatā svābhāvikasya svābhāvena nityatvāt / asraṃsanena sāṃbhogikasya dharmasamābhogāvicchedāt / prabhandaḥ nairmāṇikasyāntardhāya* punah punar nirmanadarsanāt / (“It is to be understood with respect to these three bodies, respectively, that there are three types of permanence, on account of which Tathāgatas are said to have permanent Bodies. [1] The Nature Body is essentially permanent because it is permanent by nature. [2] The Enjoyment Body is [permanent] in terms of non-cessation because its enjoyment of good qualities is devoid of interruption. [3] The Manifestation Body is [permanent] in terms of continuity because, after having hidden itself, it displays manifestation repeatedly.”) "ntarvaye; read -ntardhāya in accordance with Lévi’s note."
Thus, apart from the fact that the Buddha teaches the doctrine of impermanence of all conditioned phenomena, these Buddhist thinkers hold that there do exist unconditioned factors, which are permanent.

2 Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on permanence

But turning to the pramāṇa school, we find that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti take a different position on the issue. It is true that Dignāga speaks of permanent things, such as space, when he gives examples of various formulations. This, however, does not mean that Dignāga himself acknowledges the existence of the permanent. For example, let us look at the following formulation given by Dignāga:12

(Proposition:) Sound is impermanent.
(Reason:) Because it is produced by human effort.
(Similar example:) Whatever is produced by human effort is impermanent, just like a pot.
(Dissimilar example:) Whatever is permanent is not produced by human effort, just like space.

One may suspect that the last statement presupposes the existence of permanent entities. But Dignāga clearly says that the sentence showing a dissimilar example should be interpreted as a non-affirming negation (prasaṣṭāpattiṣedha), and not as an implicative negation (paryudāsa), so that the sentence does not imply the existence of permanent entities. Therefore, he says that a dissimilar example is established without needing to accept the existence of permanent entities. It seems that Dharmakīrti takes a similar position on this issue.14 He says:

11 VBh D 138a7f.: de la rang bzhin rtog pa ni chos kyi sku ste / chos kyi sku ni rang bzhin gyis skye ’gag med pa’i rang bzhin yin pa’i phyir ro // (“Among them, what is essentially permanent refers to Nature Body, since Nature Body is an entity that is free from origination and cessation by nature”).
12 See Katsura 2004: 143, n. 16: sādharmaṇyaṇa tāvad anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīkādhyakāvitaḥ / yad dhī prayatnāntarīkākam tad anityam śrṣṭam yathā ghaṭa iti / vaidharmyena nityam aprayatnāntarīkākam śrṣṭam yathākāśam iti //.
14 See Sa paṇ’s comments on this issue. Rigs gter rang ’grel 100.26ff.: chos kyi grags pas skabs ’go’ Zhig tu nam mkha’ rtog par gsungs pa ni l tī ka byed pa kha cig na re rdul phrun dang / nam mkha’ rtog par gsungs pa la sogs pa rang nyid mi bzhed pa de dag phal che ba gzhon gyi bsam pa la dper brjod pa yin no // zhes gsungs la / de lta yang ’gal ba med kyi ’on kyang mi rtog pa log pa tsam la rtog par sgru btags nas gsungs kyi rtog pa nyid ni ma yin te // (“Concerning the fact that Dharmakīrti in some places speaks of the permanence of space, a certain commentator [lit. a certain author of the tīkā] explains as follows: ‘Most of the statements about the permanence of atoms, space, and so forth, which are not acknowledged by himself, are what illustrate [permanence] in accordance with the thoughts of others.’ Although there is no contradiction in such an explanation, [we think that] he speaks of them by reifying permanence upon the mere absence of impermanence, and that he never [speaks of] permanent things themselves”).
Dharmakīrti here refutes the Vātsīputrīya’s notion of the *pudgala*, the personal entity that performs action and that receives pleasure and pain. The Vātsīputrīya school asserts that the *pudgala* is neither permanent nor impermanent. Dharmakīrti then argues that, if the *pudgala* were not impermanent, it would be free from disintegration, which implies that the *pudgala* is permanent since wise men consider that which does not disintegrate to be permanent. Thus, Dharmakīrti applies hypothetical reasoning to refute the Vātsīputrīya’s view. He never questions whether permanent entities really exist or not.

3 Tsong kha pa on permanence

Tsong kha pa, however, regards the passage in question as conveying Dharmakīrti’s own view on permanence. According to Tsong kha pa, Dharmakīrti not only affirms the existence of permanent entities but also gives the clear definition as approved by wise men (*mkhas pa rnams*), which is contrasted with the one accepted by foolish men (*skyé bo blun po*). Let us first examine the foolish men’s view on permanence. Tsong kha pa summarizes their view as follows:

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\begin{align*}
\text{de yang rtag par } & \text{‘dod phyin chad dus snga ma } \{\text{na}\} \ast \text{yod tshad gang yin dus phyi ma na’ang yod par } \text{‘dod pa ni } / \text{mu stegs kyi } \text{‘dod pa’i rtag pa’i don yin la } / \text{skye bo blun po’i rtag par } \text{‘dzin tshul yang de yin te rtag pa’i don } \text{‘di,lhar byed pa ni rang sde la bye brag tu smra ba ma gtogs pa } / \text{mdo sde pa dang } \\
& \text{sems tsam pa dang } / \text{dbu ma pa su yang mi } \text{‘dod do l} / \text{(Dbu ma rgyan zin bris 13b4ff.)} \ast \text{‘ni Zhol}; \text{read na.}
\end{align*}
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16 Cf. *Thar lam gsal byed* 187a4f.: *gnas ma bu pa na re / kho bo cag la nyes pa med de / gang zag de rtag mi rtag gang du yang brjod du med pa’i ‘dod pas so zhe na l (“The Vātsīputrīya says: There is no fault in our opinion, since we assert that the *pudgala* cannot be expressed as either permanent or impermanent”).
17 Cf. *Thar lam gsal byed* 187a5ff.: *gang zag de ni chos can / […] rtag pa yin par thal / beesgs gral gyi gshi gang zhiq ‘jig med yin pa’i phyir / khyab par thal / rang gi rang bzhin ‘jig pa med pa’i chos de la mkhas pa rnams rtag pa zhes brjod pa’i phyir / ‘dis ‘jig pa log pa’i rang bzhin gcig rtag par ’thad pa bstan nas rtag pa yin na dangos pos khyab pa dang / gshi ma grub rtag par ’dod pa legs par bkag go l (“It follows that the subject, the *pudgala*, is permanent because it is the support for bondage and liberation and because it is devoid of disintegration. It follows that there is entailment because wise men speak of the factor that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent. Through this [statement, Dharmakīrti], by saying that it is proper to consider the nature of the absence of disintegration to be permanence, correctly refutes the assertion that if something is permanent, it must necessarily be a functioning thing, and the assertion that what is not existent [lit. ‘what is not established as a basis’] is permanent”).

Furthermore, with respect to whatever is considered to be permanent, [some people] assert that whatever existed formerly exists at a later time, too. But [what is stated here] is the meaning of “permanence” as asserted by non-Buddhist schools. And this is nothing but the way foolish men apprehend [the meaning of] “permanence.” Apart from the Vaibhāṣika, others in our [Buddhist] schools – the Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka schools – never assign such a meaning to “permanence.”

What Tsong kha pa has in mind here is Śāntarakṣita’s argument in the Madhyamakālāṃkāra 2–3, where the unity of permanent entities, as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika and the Vaibhāṣika, is negated. The Vaiśeṣika school asserts īśvara to be a single permanent entity. The Buddhist Vaibhāṣika school asserts that unconditioned factors are permanent and indivisible. Both the Vaiśeṣika and Vaibhāṣika schools consider that to be permanent means to be always existent without losing unity or singularity, as represented by Tsong kha pa’s phrase: “whatever existed formerly exists at a later time.” However, according to Tsong kha pa, this is nothing but the way foolish men understand the meaning of “permanence.” He says that such a view on the permanent is not acceptable to the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka schools.

Then Tsong kha pa moves on to explain the wise men’s view on permanence. He says as follows:

\[
\text{des na rnam } \text{'grel las } \langle / \rangle \text{ gang gi rang bzhiṅ 'jig med pa } \langle / \rangle \text{ de la mkhas rnam}s \text{ rtag ces brjod } \langle / \rangle \text{ ces gsungs pa ltar 'jig pa med pa'i chos ni rtag pa'i don yin gyi sngar ltar mi 'dod do } \langle / \rangle \text{ (Dbu ma rgyan zin bris 13b6f.)}
\]

Therefore, the meaning of “permanence” is identified with the property of not being subject to disintegration, as stated in the Vārttika: “Wise men speak of the thing that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent.” [The meaning of that] stated before is, on the contrary, not accepted [by wise men].

Here Tsong kha pa, citing the passage from the Pramāṇavārttika, gives another definition of permanence, which he says is accepted by the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka schools. In short, Tsong kha pa says that to be permanent means to not be subject to disintegration. To make this point clear, let us consider the example of “emptiness” (stong nyid). By definition, emptiness is immutable and unchangeable. It is not subject


19 MAI vv. 2–3: ‘bras bu rim can nyer shyor bas } rtag rnam}s gcig pu’i bdag nyid min } ‘bras bu re re tha dad na } de dag rtag las nyams par ’gyur } bsgoms las byung ba’i shes pa yis } shes bya’ dus ma byas smra ba’i } lugs la’ang gcig min de dag ni } rim can shes dang ’brel phyir ro } (“Permanent things cannot have a single nature, since they bring about effects in succession. Suppose that their effects existed at different moments respectively, then the [Vaiśeṣika’s] assertion that they are permanent would be inappropriate. Even those objects known by the cognition arisen from meditation, which are [said to be] unconditioned factors according to the [Vaibhāṣika’s] doctrine, cannot be unitary since they are related to a series of cognitions arising in succession”).

Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Permanence

to disintegration, so that it is permanent. To be sure, the emptiness possessed by \( p \) exists only when the property-possessor \( p \) exists; and the emptiness of \( p \) disappears when the property-possessor \( p \) disappears. But, according to Tsong kha pa, it does not follow that the emptiness possessed by \( p \) is impermanent. He remarks:

*rang bzhin rnam dag gi dbang du byas can snga ma’i stong nyid chos de log pa na ldog pas l chos de med pa’i dus na med pas dus res ’ga’ ba yin kyang mi rtag par mi ’gyur te / dgag bya rnam par bcad tsam gyi med dgag yin pa’i phyir dang / khyad gzhi log pa na khyad chos ldog pa’i phyir po ro l* (Dbu ma rgyan zin bris 14a3ff.)

With reference to [the emptiness, which is] innately pure, [we can point out the following things]: The emptiness of a property-possessor \( [p] \) that existed before disappears when the factor \( [p] \) disappears, and it is nonexistent when that factor \( [p] \) is nonexistent; therefore, it exists only temporarily. However, it does not follow that it is impermanent because it is a non-affirming negation that is [recognized] merely by eliminating an object of negation, and because [it is natural to say that] the attribute should disappear when the basis of the attribute disappears.\(^{21}\)

To sum up, Tsong kha pa says that the emptiness possessed by \( p \) is permanent because it is a non-affirming negation (*med dgag*). But what does it mean to be a non-affirming negation? Tsong kha pa uses the term “non-affirming negation” to refer to a thing that is posited as present only by way of eliminating an object of negation (*dgag bya*), without affirming the existence of other factors.\(^{22}\) The emptiness of \( p \) is recognized only by eliminating an object of negation, that is, \( p \)’s intrinsic existence. Nothing else is affirmed to be present through that process of negation. It is for this reason that emptiness is said to be a non-affirming negation.

This brings us to the second point. The emptiness of \( p \) as such cannot be perceived directly, but it is cognized only by means of eliminating another factor, \( p \)’s intrinsic existence; it has a secondary existence imputed by conceptual consciousness. In other words, the emptiness of \( p \) is a conceptual construct devoid of origination and disintegration. It is true that the attribute, emptiness, disappears when the basis of the attribute \( p \) disappears. But it

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\(^{21}\) Cf. Thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan [cha–ka] 81a1f. (Klein 1991: 145); Gcig du bral gyi rnam bzhag 21a3f.

\(^{22}\) ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa defines *dgag pa* and *med dgag*, respectively, as follows. Bs dus gshi gni rnam bzhag 28b5 (cf. Sras bs dus grwa 295.7ff.): *rang dngos su rtogs pa’i blos rang gi dgag bya dngos su bcad nas rtogs pa bya ba’i cho de dgag pa’i mthshan nyid / (“A negative phenomenon \([p]\) is defined as a factor that is recognized only after having directly eliminated its object of negation by the mind that directly knows \( p \)”)*. Bs dus gshi gni rnam bzhag 31b5f. (cf. Sras bs dus grwa 295.14ff.): *rang dngos su rtogs pa’i blos rang gi dgag bya dngos su bcad nas rtogs par bya ba gang zhi g / rang dngos su rtogs pa’i blos rang gi dgag bya bshad shul de cho gshen ma yin dgag dang sgrub pa gang rung mi ’phen pa de med dgag gi mthshan nyid / (“A non-affirming negation \([p]\) is defined as the thing that is recognized only after having directly eliminated its object of negation by the mind that directly knows \( p \), and that does not make known another factor – whether it is an affirming negative or a positive phenomenon – through the process of negating its object of negation by the mind which directly knows \( p \)”)*. See also Klein 1991: 107ff.
is not the case that the emptiness loses its identity over the course of time. Consequently, Tsong kha pa argues, the emptiness of $p$ is permanent irrespective of the fact that it exists only at a particular moment.

4 The Dge lugs pa’s exposition of the Nature Body

Tsong kha pa applies the same reasoning to other unconditional factors such as nirvāṇa (myaṅgan las ’das pa’), extinction through discernment (so sor brags ’gog; Skt. pratisamkhya-nirodha), the truth of cessation (’gog bden; Skt. nirodhasatya), the true nature of things (chos nyid; Skt. dharmatā), and so on, all of which pertain to religious attainments. Tsong kha pa holds that these factors are permanent even if they may occur only at a particular moment. By now it is not surprising that Tsong kha pa’s disciple, Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432), offers a similar analysis with respect to a Buddha’s Nature Body, which is permanent but not always existent. In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Dar ma rin chen says as follows:

\[
\text{Someone might claim: “If [a Buddha’s Nature] Body endowed with twofold purity is not present in the continuum of sentient beings since beginningless time and will occur only at the moment of enlightenment, then it must necessarily be impermanent.” But this is an error due to confusion between [the concept of] permanence accepted by wise men and that accepted by the foolish, and also it is due to confusion between functioning things occurring at a particular moment and unconditioned things occurring at a particular moment.}
\]

Dar ma rin chen interprets the eighth chapter of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra in terms of the fourfold Buddha Bodies, i.e., the Nature Body, the Gnostic Dharma Body, the Enjoyment Body, and the Manifestation Body. He identifies the Nature Body with the twofold purity. The first is the innate purity (rang bzhin rnam dag), which again is identified with a Buddha’s mind and body being empty of intrinsic existence. The second is the purity from adventitious stains (glo bur rnam dag), i.e., the cessation of all obstructions including afflictive obstructions (nyon sgrib) and obstructions to the knowable (shes sgrib). The Nature Body characterized as such is the quintessence of Buddhahood.

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23 Tsong kha pa, as well as other Dge lugs pa scholars including Dar ma rin chen, accepts Haribhadra’s four-kāya interpretation, instead of the three-kāya interpretation by Āryavimuktisena, Ratnākaraśānti, and Abhayākaraṇa. For further details, see Makransky 1997: 289ff.

24 Rnam bshad snying po rgyan 311b5: gzugs kyi sku dang ye shes chos kyi sku ’i glo bur rnam dag gis khyad par du byas pa’i rang bzhin rnam dag gi cha dang / de’i steng gi glo bur rnam dag gi cha ni ’dus ma byas kyi sku dang / ngo bo nyid kyi sku ’zes bya la / (“The following elements are said to be the Unconditioned Body or Nature Body: the element of innate purity that is characterized by the purity from adventitious stains on the Form Body and Gnostic Dharma Body; and that of purity from adventitious stains on them”).
The point to observe is that the Nature Body is embodied only at the moment of supreme enlightenment; for, otherwise, it would absurdly follow that every sentient being is already enlightened without requiring any effort. Therefore, it must be said that a Buddha’s Nature Body is a thing occurring at a particular moment (res ’ga’ ba). But this fact does not invalidate the assumption that the Nature Body is permanent. In this connection, let us look at the argument given by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson’ grus (1648–1721):

He [namely, a certain opponent] says: “It follows that the Nature Body occurs in the continuum of sentient beings simultaneously with enlightenment, because there is the moment in which it occurs in their continuum, and because it is not the case that it exists since beginningless time […] If you accept the root thesis (rtsa ba), then it follows that it occurs at a particular moment because you have accepted that [it occurs simultaneously with enlightenment]. If you accept this, it follows that it is impermanent because you have accepted that [it occurs at a particular moment].”

[We reply:] “There is no entailment.”

[The opponent says:] “It follows that there is entailment because if something occurs at a particular moment, it must necessarily be a thing which has a cause, for the Vārttika says: ‘It is established that this suffering has a cause since it occurs [only] at a particular moment’.”

[We reply:] “There is no entailment because what is meant here is that, if something is an effective thing occurring at a particular moment, it must be something that has a cause.”

We notice that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa tries to modify the meaning of PV II 179, which explicitly says that suffering has a cause since it occurs only at a particular moment (res ’ga’ ba). The exact meaning of the verse, according to ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, is that suffering has a cause and hence is impermanent since it is an effective thing occurring only at a particular moment (res ’ga’ ba’i dngos po). Instead of saying that a thing occurring at a particular moment is impermanent, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa suggests the idea that an effective thing occurring at a particular moment is impermanent, which implies that there exist permanent, non-effective, and causeless things which occur at a particular moment. What he means to say is that the Nature Body of the Buddha is a permanent (non-effective

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and causeless) thing, despite the fact that it is present only at the moment of enlightenment and absent prior to that time. The wise men’s definition of the permanent must be recalled here. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa says:

res 'ga’ mi 'byung la res 'ga’ 'byung ba 'di mi rtag pa'i don ma yin par thal /
[…] mkhas pa rnams res 'ga’ ba yin min tsam la mi byed par chos gang gi
rang bzhin la 'jig pa yod med kyis mi rtag par dang rtag par 'jog pa'i phyir te /
(Mi pham zhal lung [skabs brgyad pa] 40a3ff.)

It does not follow that the meaning of “impermanence” is defined as being present at a certain time and absent at another [...] because wise men posit [a factor] either as impermanent or permanent in accordance with whether or not the factor itself is subject to disintegration, without needing to consider whether or not it is present only at a certain time.

This is a paraphrase of Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd. A thing that itself is not subject to disintegration is permanent irrespective of its presence or absence at a certain time. The Nature Body, then, is just the mere absence of intrinsic existence and obstructions; it is a conceptual construct that never arises from causes, and that never undergoes disintegration. Hence, it is concluded that the Nature Body is permanent. This of course does not imply that the Nature Body is always existent, nor does it mean that it is a positive and independent reality (sgrub pa rang dbang ba'i bden grub), as conceived of by the Jo nang pa school. Rather, that the Nature Body is permanent means that it is something that is ascertained through a simple negation of disintegration.26

5 Concluding remarks

This is how the Dge lugs pa scholars interpret the meaning of “permanence” especially within the context of the theory of Buddhahood. They identify the quintessence of Buddhahood with the Nature Body, which again is characterized as the mere absence of intrinsic existence and obstructions. The Nature Body so identified is a conceptual construct imputed on the mere absence of the object of negation. It is free from origination and disintegration so that it satisfies the condition of being permanent.

The important point to note here is that these Dge lugs pa scholars refer to Dharmakīrti’s hypothetical definition of permanence in order to justify their theory of Buddhahood. They assume that Dharmakīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent and defines it as

26 See Mi pham zhal lung [skabs brgyad pa] 37b1ff.: kun mkhyen jo nang na re / rang bzhin rnam dag gi
char gyar pa'i ngo bo nyid sku de sgrub pa rang dbang ba'i bden grub yin pa rgyud bla ma dang dus
'khor lugs zer na l' o na / rtag pa rnams 'jig pa rnam par bcad tsam la mi 'jog par thal / dam bca'
thad pa'i phyir / 'dod mi nus te / ndo sde pa yan chad kyi lugs la rtag dngos med pa'i phyir te /
(“The omniscient scholar of the Jo nang [i.e., Dol po pa,] says: ‘The Nature Body which is the element of innate purity is a positive independent reality; this is the doctrine of the Uttaratantra and also that of the Kālacakra.’ Then it follows that the mere absence of disintegration is not posited as the permanent, because [according to you] your thesis is true. But you cannot accept this because, according to the higher doctrine of the Sautrāntika [Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools], there does not exist a thing which is both permanent and functioning”).
“the thing that itself does not disintegrate” in its own right. Such a concept of permanence, which goes back to ancient Indian thought as seen in the Mahābhāṣya, functions forcefully to explain why the Nature Body is permanent in spite of the fact that it is not always manifested in an individual being.

It is also interesting to note that the Dge lugs pa carefully avoid the two extreme positions held by other Tibetan thinkers. First, unlike Sa skya panḍita and Glo bo mkhan chen, Tsong kha pa and his successors strongly assert that permanent things do exist, as they think that otherwise the state of emptiness and the attainment of Buddhahood would be inexplicable. Secondly, the Dge lugs pa reject the Jo nang pa position that the innate purity of the Nature Body is a positive and independent reality (sgrub pa rang dbang ba’i bden grub); the Dge lugs pa say instead that the innate purity is a non-affirming negation imputed on the mere absence of disintegration. Thus, we see that Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence survived in the Dge lugs pa’s theory of Buddhahood and enabled them to give the most plausible explanation of the Nature Body without falling into the two extreme positions.

References and abbreviations

Works in Sanskrit and Tibetan

AK Abhidharmakośa (Vasubandhu). See AKBh.
Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhaṅ Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhaṅ rigs lam gser gyi sgo ’byed lung dang rigs pa’i gan mdzod blo gsal yid kyi mun sel skal ldan dad pa’i ’jug ngogs (’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus), Bkra shis ’khyil ed. Ba.
D Derge (sde dge) edition of the Buddhist canon (tripiṭaka) in Tibetan.
MAI Madhyamakālaṃkāra (Śāntarakṣita): Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, ed. M. Ichigo. Kyoto 1985.
Mi pham zhal lung Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mtha’ dpod ’khrul sel gang ga’i chu rgyun mi pham zhal lung (’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus), Bkra shis ’khyil ed. Nya.
MSA Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra ("Maitreya"). See MSABh.
PSV_K  Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), Tibetan Peking ed. *gtan tshigs rig pa* Ce. Otani No. 5702.


Rigs gter rang 'grel  *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rtsa ba dang 'grel pa* (Sa skya pañḍita kun dga’ rgyal mtshan). Beijing 1989.

Rnam bshad snying po rgyan  *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa don gsal ba'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan* (Rgyal tshab rje dar ma rin chen), Zhol ed. Kha. Tohoku No. 5433.

Sras bsdus grwa  *Tshad ma'i dgongs 'grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam 'grel gyi don geig tu driil ba blo rab 'bring tha ma gsun du ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan skal bzang re ba kun skong* (Thugs sras ngag dbang bkra shis). Beijing 1985.

Thar lam gsal byed  *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa* (Rgyal tshab rje dar ma rin chen), Zhol ed. Cha. Tohoku No. 5450.

Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan  *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bzlag pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* (Lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje), Lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje'i gsung 'bum. Cha and Ja. Beijing 1995.


VBh D  Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya (Sthiramati), Tibetan Sde dge ed. *sems tsam* Mi. Tohoku No. 4034.

Works in western languages


Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation

by
Hideyo Ogawa

Introduction

Like grammarians, Dignāga bases his linguistic theory, which is well known as the *apoha* theory, on actual usage of language. His observation of the fact that the word *go* “cow” is not found to be used in actual usage to convey the meaning of the word *aśva* “horse” leads him to build up the *apoha* theory, which is constructed out of three factors: a word’s own meaning (*svārtha*), the meaning to be conveyed by another word (*arthāntara*, *anyāśabdārtha*), and the exclusion of the latter (*apoha*, *nivṛtti*, *vyāvṛtti*, *vyavaccheda*). These three factors are connected with one another in such a way that the word *go* brings about the understanding of its meaning as qualified by the exclusion of the meaning of another word, say, the word *aśva* (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭabhāva*). Dignāga assumes that from the word *go* one understands *nothing else but the cow*, and not simply the cow. When he says that *anyāpoha* “exclusion of others” is the meaning of a word, he wishes to imply that *anyāpoha* is a meaning of a word as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the word’s own meaning, or as the occasioning ground for the use of the word (*pravṛttinimitta*).

In the Apoha chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* Dignāga argues that a generic term (*jātiśabda*) like *sat* “being, existent” cannot denote an individual (*bheda*), a generic property (*jāti*), a relation between the two (*yoga*, *sambandha*), or an individual qualified by a generic property (*tadvat*). In the latter half of the second *kārikā*, he, relying on the observation of utterances such as *sad dravyam* “A substance is existent,” in which the item *sat* is supposed to be co-referential with a co-occurring item for an individual, states his view that the generic term cannot denote a relation.

PS V.2cd: [na jātiśabo] vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ /
Nor does the generic term denote a relation or a generic property, since it refers to the same entity (*aprthakśruti*) as [words] signifying individuals.\(^2\)

The third *kārikā* of the Apoha chapter is devoted to adducing the conclusive reason for the view. The *kārikā* goes as follows:

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\(^1\) I deeply respect Dr. Ole Holten Pind, whose epoch-making achievement is represented by Pind (2009, 2015). The present paper owes much to the work, without which I could not even have stood on the threshold of Dignāga’s *apoha* theory. *Editor’s note*: This contribution contains changes that the author has left to the editor’s discretion.

\(^2\) Pind 2015: II 14 (§ 4): “(vācakaḥ) neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not ‘heard apart’ (*aprthakśruteḥ*) from [words] whose referents (*bhedārthaiḥ*) are particular [general properties].”
Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation

PS V.3: *sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācyata ucyate |
tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yuyjate //

Pind 2015: II 18–19 gives the following translation of the *kārikā*:

And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum (*sambandhidharmeṇa vācyata*). That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action (*bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ*); and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum] (*bhāvaś cānyena yuyjate*).

Pind’s interpretation of the *kārikā* is well grounded. But I have to say that, resting even on Pind’s interpretation, it is almost impossible to fathom what Dignāga intends to say in the *kārikā*.

Dignāga here simply brings out the point Bhartṛhari makes about the denotation of a relation. According to Bhartṛhari, there is no nominal (nāman) that denotes a relation qua relation; a nominal such as *sambandha* “relation” cannot denote a relation in its own property (svadharmeṇa) but simply as a substance (dravya), because an act (bhāva) denoted by an action noun (bhāvasādhana) is treated like a substance (dravyavat).

The aim of this paper is to give a plausible interpretation of the *kārikā* by taking into consideration arguments Bhartṛhari brings forward about the denotation of a relation in his *Vākyapadiya* and thereby to show clearly the reason for Dignāga’s argument that a generic term cannot denote a relation. It will be shown that the same approach to everyday speech (lokavyavahāra) as Dignāga takes for the purpose of establishing *anyāpoha* as a word meaning (padārtha) is found in his arguments about the denotation of a relation.

Before turning to a closer examination of the question at issue, a few remarks should be made concerning Dignāga’s *apoha* theory. It is extremely important to note that Dignāga accepts the abstraction (*apoddhāra*) theory which is known as forming the pivot of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic theory.

Consider PS V.46, where Dignāga introduces the concept of the abstraction of words from a sentence.

[A] PS V.46: *apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ /
vākyārthah pratibhāhko ‘yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate //

When a word is abstracted from a sentence, this [i.e., *anyāpaha*] is conceptually posited (vikalpita) as the meaning of the word. This sentence meaning called *pratibhā* “a flash of knowledge” is brought about by means of [the grasping of] that [word meaning] at the outset [when one has not familiarized oneself with the sentence].

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3 Pind 2015: II 166 (§ 61): “the referent of the syntactical word (*padasya*) is imagined (vikalpita) when abstracted (*apoddhāre*) from the sentence (*vākyāt*). Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition (*pratibhā*) is in the beginning (*ādau*) produced by that [namely the syntactic word].” According to Jinendrabuddhi, the pronominal *ayam “this* in *pāda* refers to *anyāpoha*. PSṬ Ms B 236b1 (Pind
Hideyo Ogawa

315

Dignāga comments on the first half of the kārikā as follows:
[B] PSV on PS V.46 (Pind 2015: I 55–56): (a) padasyāsato 〈’pi〉 vākyād
apoddhṛtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt prakṛtipratyayavat.4 (b) sā cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahaṇī .
tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam,5
(a-1) A word or a syntactic unit (pada) is abstracted from a sentence (vākya).
(a-2) The word is unreal (asat) because it is not used in isolation [in the realm
of actual communication], just like a base (prakṛti) and an affix (pratyaya)
that are abstracted from a word. (a-3) Nonetheless, [a certain entity is] posited
as its meaning through invention (utprekṣā) in accordance with tradition (yathāgamam). (b-1) And the invention based on other traditions is that through
which a [word] meaning that is logically invalid (ayuktārtha) is conceived of.
(b-2) Therefore, this [word] meaning [called anyāpoha], which is different
from entities posited as [word] meanings by other traditions, has been brought
forward here.6
As Pind (2015: II Appendix 14) has pointed out, [B](a) presents a striking parallel to
Bhartṛhari’s Vṛtti.7 Let us take note of (a-3): A word meaning is an invented entity (padasya … utprekṣayā … artho vyavasthāpyate). The invention is conditioned by tradition
(yathāgamam). There are different inventions according to different traditions. As mentioned earlier, regarding the question of what a generic term denotes Dignāga tries to reject
four views: an individual, a generic property, a relation between the two, and an individual

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2015: II 166, n. 554): ayam ity anyāpohaḥ. I shall waste no words on Dignāga’s view that pratibhā is the
sentence meaning. This view, needless to say, is borrowed from Bhartṛhari. The details of Bhartṛhari’s
concept of pratibhā are to be left to Ogawa (forthcoming).
Pind 2015: II 167–168 (§ 61): “Even though the syntactical word is unreal (asat) as abstracted from
the sentence, its referent is determined by invention (utprekṣayā) according to the [grammatical]
tradition, because it is not used in isolation (kevalasyāprayogāt) in the same way as a stem and an affix
(prakṛtipratyayavat) [are not used in isolation].”
Pind 2015: II 169–170 (§ 61): “And this invention apprehends a referent that is not justified (ayuktārthagrahaṇī ) in other traditions. Therefore this different referent (arthāntaram) has been brought forward
(utkṣiptam).”
The phrase arthāntara (lit. “another meaning”) refers to a word meaning that is reasonable and that is
called anyāpoha. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: yuktimad … anyāpohākhyam. See Pind 2015: II 169, n. 566.
Vṛtti on VP 1.24 (65.1–4): tatrāpoddhārapadārtho nāmātyantasaṃsṛṣṭaḥ saṃsargād anumeyena parikalpitena rūpeṇa prakṛtavivekaḥ sann apoddhriyate / pravivaktasya hi tasya vastuno vyavahārātītaṃ
rūpam / tat tu svapratyayānukāreṇa yathāgamaṃ bhāvanābhyāsavaśād utprekṣayā prāyeṇa vyavasthāpyate / In this passage Bhartṛhari makes the following points. Of the eight topics to be dealt with in the
Vākyapadīya (aṣṭaka), what is called apoddhārapadārtha “abstracted word meaning” is absolutely fused
in a single whole meaning (atyantasaṃsṛṣṭa). The word meaning is abstracted from a putative complex
(saṃsarga) on the basis of a form that is to be inferred and that is conceptually assumed, so that it is
distinguished from other abstracted word meanings. Such a partial word meaning which is distinguished
from other partial word meanings has a form that is outside the realm of actual communication. Grammarians posit (vyavasthāpyate) such an assumed form (parikalpita) through invention (utprekṣayā), in
accordance with what they have understood (svapratyayānukāreṇa) following traditions (yathāgamam)
and exposing themselves to them so repeatedly as to have their latent traces (bhāvanābhyāsa). See
Cardona 1999: 96–98 for a full account of the points made by Bhartṛhari here.


Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation

It is important to note [B](b-1) and [B](b-2), which clearly show that anyāpoha is posited as a word meaning through invention in accordance with the Buddhist tradition. According to Dignāga, the assumption that anyāpoha is a word meaning is more reasonable than the others. That is, this assumption is not only based on the Buddhist tradition (āgama) but also is well grounded on logical reasoning (yukti). But in terms of what is the assumption reasonable? Consider the following Vṛtti.

[C] PSV on PS V.37b (Pind 2015: I 46): (a) tasmād asmābhīr api 〈loka-vyavahārā naimittikā vā〉 pāribhāṣikā 〈vā〉 bhūtārthatvena na mṛṣyante, (b) lokavad evānugamyante. (c) siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu.

(a) Therefore, we, too, do not cling (mṛṣyante) to everyday speech (lokavyavahāra), whether it has a basis for application or comes from a scientific field, as related to a real entity (bhūtārtha). (b) Just as the world follows (anugamyante) everyday speech, so do we. (c) And in everyday usage it has been established that the word rūpa “color” denotes only (eva) blue and the like and not taste and others.

Let us take note of [C](b): Dignāga makes the point that he follows everyday speech, just as does the world. Clearly what this implies is that he holds that his apoha theory can most reasonably account for everyday speech. Moreover, when he states [C](c), he intends to imply that the apoha theory is constructed on the basis of the fact found in everyday speech such that the word rūpa denotes only (eva) blue and the like and not taste and others. It may be said without much exaggeration that Dignāga’s theory of apoha is meant for reasonably explaining the fact of speech that a certain linguistic item occurs only in the domain of a certain meaning and not in the domain of another meaning.

In [C](a) it is stated that Dignāga does not suppose that everyday speech must be related to a real entity. Naturally this suggests that he stands far apart from realism according to which language reflects reality.

Interestingly and importantly, Dignāga’s approach to established everyday usage, which is shown in [C](b), is not different from Bhartṛhari’s. Bhartṛhari asserts that he accepts things as they are spoken of, without making an ontological commitment to them. Relevant to this point is Bhartṛhari’s following remark:

8 Jinendrabuddhi says: PST Ms B 237a1–2 (Pind 2015: II 168, n. 561); yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keśāṃ cid bhedā vācyāḥ, pareśāṃ jātir, anyesāṃ sambandhah, keśām cit tad vadh iti padasyārthā ity āgamaḥ. (“That which is the tradition as to a word is the tradition such that this is the meaning of a word: some have a tradition that individuals (bheda) are to be denoted by words; some have a tradition that a generic property is to be denoted by a word; others have a tradition that a relation between a generic property and its bearer is to be denoted by a word; some have a tradition that an individual qualified by a generic property is to be denoted by a word.”)

9 On the meaning of mṛṣyante, see Pind 2015: II 142, n. 468.

10 In the Śādhanaśamuddeśa Bhartṛhari says of the power of functioning as agent (kartṛtva) the following: VP 3.7.38: tattve vā vyātirekāḥ vā vyātiriktiṃ tad ucyate / šabdāparināmako lokah sa śāstrenānugamyate // (“The property of being an agent, whether it be identical with its bearer or different from the latter, we declare that it is different from its bearer. The world holds usage as their standard. The science of
The world (loka) achieves verbal communication by resorting to conceptual word meanings. In the science (of grammar) the word meanings commonly known to the world (laukika) are divided into actions (kriyā), substances (dravya), qualities (guna), and others (pravibhajyate) for the sake of grammatical operations. Thus, if we accept that in constructing his linguistic theory Dignāga takes the same position as Bhartṛhari, namely that the usage common in the world is taken as the standard that is to be followed, we may say the following: Dignāga conceptually posits anyāpoha as the word meaning in order to establish a linguistic theory that holds up in the universe as the world speaks of it and believes it to be real. The universe as such is not spoken of, it is only a conceptual construct.

Now let us consider how Dignāga argues against the assumption that a relation between a generic property and its bearer is denoted by a generic term. Here I will consider the Vṛtti on PS V.3. To begin with, I will give the text of the Vṛtti and its translation by Pind.

For connection means “state of connecting;” it [namely the state of connecting] is connected to the other [relatum] in the same way as the state of colouring (rāgādivat), etc. Therefore, assuming (iti kṛtvā) that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum, doubt (āśaṅkitam) about (prati) the claim...
internal bhāva, signified by an L-affix (as in MBh on A 3.3.19 (II.186):


Here and in the following, bold letters are used to signify the term is derived from the verb bandh preceded by the preverb (upasarga) sam with the kṛt affix ghañ, meaning “connecting, connection, relation.” The term sambandhana is derived from the same string with the kṛt affix lyuñ. Jinendrabuddhi properly notes that the term sambandha is an item that denotes bhāva, or what is called an action noun.

In Pāṇini’s grammar, bhāva as signified by a kṛt affix is to be distinguished from bhāva as signified by an L-affix (as in āṣyate devadattena “Devadatta is sitting:” A 3.4.69 laḥ karmane ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ): the former is an act in the abstract, something that has been brought to accomplishment (siddha), termed bāhyabhāva “external bhāva,” while the latter is an act in process, which is the significand of a verbal base itself (prakṛtyartha) and hence something that is to be brought to accomplishment (śādhyā), termed āhyantarabhāva “internal bhāva.”

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13 SK, sarvasamāsaśeṣapakaranā (II.215): kṛttaddhitasamāṣaśeṣasamāṣyantahirūpāḥ paica vṛttayah / parārthābhādhihaṇam vṛttīḥ / vṛtyarthāvābodhakam vāyam vighrahaḥ / MBh on A 1.3.1 (I.256.20): kah punar bhāvah / bhavateh svapadārtho bhavanam bhāva iti / Pradīpa on MBh to A 1.3.1 (II.186): bhavanam bhāva iti vighrahaḥ kṛtśādhanavinvṛttaḥ /

14 To adduce a typical example of a vigraha for a bhāvasādhana term, I will cite from the Bhāṣya. MBh on A 3.1.22 (II.28.13–14): samabhīhāraḥ iti ko ‘yam śādahā / samabhīpūrvedḥ dharaterv bhāvasādhana ghañ / samabhīhārānam samabhīhāraḥ / The term samabhīhāra, used in A 3.1.22, signifies the act of performing repeatedly, intensively, or repeated, intensive performance.

15 Here and in the following, bold letters are used to signify the anubandhas.

16 sam-bandh-ghañ (A 3.3.18); sam-bandh-lyuñ (A 3.3.115) → sam-bandh-ana (A 7.1.1).

17 PST Ms B 195a5 (Pind 2015: II 20, n. 44): bhāvavatvam asya dārśayati. Grammatical rules we have to take into consideration here are the following: A 3.3.18 bhāve and A 3.3.115 lyuñ ca. A 3.3.18 and A 3.3.115 provide respectively for introducing ghañ and lyuñ after a verb on condition that an act in the abstract (bhāva) is to be signified.

18 MBh on A 3.3.19 (II.145.16–18): nanu coktaṁ vihitāḥ pratyāye svārthe bhāve ghañ itiḥ / anyah sa bhāvo bhāye prakṛtyarthāḥ / annedanāṁ abhyantare bhāve syāt / kah punar etayor bhāvvāyor viśeṣah / ukto bhāvaḥ bhāye // See PWT 297. In the Kriyāsamuddeśa Bhartṛhari states: VP 3.8.47: āhyātaśabde bhāgābhāyam sādhisādhanavartitā / prakalpiṭā yathā śāstre sa ghañādyṣv api kramah // ("In grammar, just as, with reference to a finite verb form, its divisions are fictitiously assumed respectively to denote something to be brought to accomplishment and something to bring it to accomplishment, so, with reference to items ending in affixes like ghañ also, the same analysis is given"); VP 3.8.48: sādhyavatena kriyā tatra dhātuvāpanibhandhanaḥ / sattabhāvasa tu yas tasyāḥ sa ghañādīminibandhanaḥ // ("In those items ending in affixes like ghañ, an action is conveyed as something to be brought to accomplishment on the basis of a verb, while the action’s status of being a substance is..."
2.1.2 The external bhāva is denoted by an item ending in a kṛt affix (kṛdanta), while the internal bhāva is denoted by an item ending in a verbal ending (tiṅanta). Both bhāvas have in common the property of being an action. They have the following distinguishing characteristics:

1. kṛdabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati

2. The external bhāva behaves like a substance (dravya). It functions as what brings an action to accomplishment (sādhana, kāraka).

3. tiṅabhihitenā bhavena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyājyante

4. Time (kāla), person (puruṣa), and aspect (upagraha) are manifested by the internal bhāva.

5. tiṅabhihito bhāvah kartrā samprayujyate

6. The internal bhāva is connected with an agent.

7. ayam api višeṣaḥ syāl lingakṛtaḥ saṅkhyākṛtaḥ cett

8. The external bhāva is capable of being connected with gender and number.

Thus what Dignāga means by the statement in question ([F]) is clear: The sambandha in question is a relation as signified by the action noun sambandha.

2.2 Next let us take up the second sentence.

[G] PSV on PS V.3: (b) "so 'nyena yujyate rāgādivat".

2.2.1 In mentioning the term rāga, Dignāga might have had the following rule in mind.

[H] A 6.4.27 ghaṇi ca bhāvakaraṇayoḥ //

By this rule we have rāga “coloring, dye” as follows: ranj-ghaṇi → raj-a → rāj-a (A 7.2.116) → rāga (A 7.3.52).21 Rule A 3.3.121 halaś ca accounts for raṇga “paint, place of conveyed on the basis of affixes such as ghaṇś); Iyer 1974: 27–28: “Just as Grammar divides a verb into two parts, one expressive of a process (sāḍhya) and the other of a thing (sāḍhāna), the same can be done to a word ending in a primary suffix like ghaṇś;” “The expression of action as a process depends upon the root and its aspect as a thing depends for its expression on suffixes like ghaṇś.”

19 In the Bhāṣya on A 3.1.67 Patañjali states: MBh on A 3.1.67 (II.57.7–17): asti khalv api višeṣaḥ krdabhihitasya bhāvasya tiṅabhihitasya ca / krdabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati / kim idam dravyavad iti / dravyam kriyāyam samāvāyam gacchati / kām samāvāyam / dravyam kriyābhāvinirvṛttam sādhanaṃ vartati / tadvac cāsyā bhāvasya krdabhihitasya bhavati / pāko vartata iti / kriyāvān na bhavati / kim idam kriyāvad iti / kriyā kriyāyam samāvāyam na gacchati / pāko vartata iti / tadvac ca asya kṛtabhihitasya na bhavati / pāko vartata iti / asti khalv api višeṣaḥ krdabhihitasya bhāvasya tiṅabhihitasya ca / / krdabhihitena bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyājyante / krdabhihitenā puranā na vāyajyante / asti khalv api višeṣaḥ krdabhihitasya bhāvasya tiṅabhihitasya ca / / krdabhihitena bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyājyante / krdabhihitena puranā na vāyajyante / asti khalv api višeṣaḥ krdabhihitasya bhāvasya tiṅabhihitasya ca / /

20 This rule provides that the penultimate n of ranj “dye, color” is deleted in a stem followed by ghaṇś introduced on condition that an action in the abstract (bhāva) or an instrument (karaṇa) is to be signified (A 3.3.18–19).

21 See PWT 446.
public amusement,” in which ghañ signifies an instrument (karana) or a locus (adhikarana) and which is used as an appellation (samjña) to denote a particular thing. Thus we may say that the item rāga is an apt example of an action noun.

2.2.2 The expression so ’nyena yujyate must be separated from the phrase rāgādivat, which has to be construed with the previous sentence. The expression corresponds to PS V.3d: bhāvaś cānyena yujyate, which Jinendrabuddhi glosses as bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyate. The act of connecting in the abstract, which is denoted by the nominal sambandha that is an item ending in the kṛt affix ghañ, is to be treated like a substance. Thus what Dignāga means by the expression is that the entity relation denoted by the nominal sambandha is related to the other relatum through another relation, which implies that a relation (sambandha) itself becomes a relatum (sambandhin): to be precise, a relation behaves like a relatum.

2.2.3 In the situation in which a relation behaves like a relatum, the term which denotes such a relation is a sambandhiśabda “relative term.” At this point, it is important to note what a sambandhiśabda is. According to Patañjali, the item called sambandhiśabda implies (ākṣipati) a relatum. One uses the utterance mātari vartitavyam “One should obey a mother” instead of svasyāṃ mātari vartitavyam “One should obey one’s own mother.” The word mātṛ “mother” is a sambandhiśabda. By virtue of a relation, the mother is understood to be the mother of a certain person. Similarly, when the term sambandha is used, a relation signified by this term behaves like a relatum, so that it implies a relatum on the basis of another relation.

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22 PST Ms B 68b7 (Pind 2015: II 18, n. 41): sambandham hi sambandha iti bhāvarūpena sambandhaśabdenābhidhānāt. bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyata iti. sambandhyantarākāṅkṣā jāyate: kasya sambandha iti. tataś ca bhāvata eva sa bhavataḥ na svarūpena sambandho ‘bhidhiyate.

23 MBh on A 3.1.19 (II.27.14–16): sambandhiśabdāś ca punar evamātmakāḥ yaduta sambandhinam ākṣipanti / tady athā / mātari varitavayam pitari śusrūstavayam iti / na cocyate svasyāṃ mātari svasmin vā pitarīti / sambandha caitad gamyate yā yasya mātā yaś ca yasya pitet /

24 Jinendrabuddhi illustrates this point by taking as an example the term samuccaya “connection” which is supposed to convey a meaning of the particle (nipāta, A 1.4.57) ca “and.” PST Ms B 195a1–3 (Pind 2015: II 19, n. 43): iha kaścic chabdārthaḥ kenacic chabdenābhidhīyamāh sambandhyantarākāṅkṣopajanahetuḥ. tathā hi samuccayah samuccayasabdābhidhīyamānaḥ parākāṅkṣopajanahetur bhavati, sa eva cādy upādānāḥ kasyet akāṅkṣām nepaṇjanayati (em: akāṅkṣām upaṇjanayati Pind). bhāvaś ca bhāvasādhanam hi sambandhyantarākāṅkṣopajanahetūṁ niyatat anyāvishayām akāṅkṣām janayati til: (“In this everyday speech, a certain meaning of an item, when being conveyed by a certain other item, becomes the cause of awakening expectations of the other relatum. To explain. Connection (samuccaya), when being conveyed by the term samuccaya, is the cause of awakening expectations of something other than it. But the very same entity connection, when being referred to by a particle such as ca ‘and,’ does not awaken expectations as ‘connection of what?’ The act [of connecting], when being conveyed by an action noun, necessarily awaken expectations regarding something different from it.”) Pind 2015: II 19–20, n. 43: “In this case when a certain word referent is being denoted by a certain word it is the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation of] the other relatum. Like, for instance, an accumulation is the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation] of the correlate when being denoted by a word denoting accumulation. The [word denoting accumulation] comprising [the word] ‘and,’ and so on, with certainty generates expectation [of complementation] at the thought [‘accumulation of what’? And a state that is denoted by a word having a state [of action] as its means of realisation necessarily generates expectation concerning the other relatum.” Suffice it to give the utterances ghaṭaś ca pataś ca...
2.3 The next step is to consider the remaining passage.

[I] PSV on PS V.3: (c) tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāsāṅkitaṃ svadharmena tu nāsti sambandhasyā vācakah śābdah iti idāṃ tat prati nāsti. ato naivasya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate.

2.3.1 Let us note the statements sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyaḥ and svadharmeṇa nāsti sambandhasyā vācakah śābdah. Strangely enough, Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi do not specify what the terms sambandhidharma and svadharma mean, which seems to be self-explanatory for them. In this connection it will be useful to consider what Bhartṛhari says in the Sambandhasamuddeśa.

[J] VP 3.3.4: nābhidhānaṃ svadharmena sambandhasyāsti vācakam / atyantaparatantratvād rūpaṃ nāsyāpadiśyate //

There is no term which denotes a relation qua relation [lit. “a relation as characterized (upalakṣita) by its own property”]. Since a relation is absolutely dependent, its form is not spoken of [by any particular nominal term].

A relation’s own property (svadharma) is that of being absolutely dependent (atyantaparatratra). According to Bhartṛhari, a power (śakti) and a quality (guṇa) are of a dependent nature; a relation is a power that even powers have and a quality that even qualities have.

25 As to the term svadharma, Pind (2015: II 20, n. 48) says: “The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the grammatical operation of introducing the sixth triplet that denotes the relation …” I cannot understand his point here.

26 Helārāja takes the third-triplet ending of svadharmena to denote a characteristic that makes known something as having acquired a certain aspect (A 2.3.21 itthambhūtalakṣaṇe). Prakāśa on VP 3.3.4 (128.10–11): tatra svena asādhāraṇena dharmena svabhăvenupalakṣitasasya vācakaṃ prayāyakam, abhidhānaṃ saṣṭhīvyatiriktaṃ nāsti, idam tayā svarūpaṇavadhāraṇāt /

27 Bhartṛhari states the following kārikā, VP 3.3.5: upakārāt sa yatrāsti dharmas tatrānugamyate / śaṅkitaṃ api sā śakti ĺunānām api asau guṇāḥ // (“Where, by virtue of one thing rendering service (upakāra) to another, there is the relation, there the property of being absolutely dependent is recognized. It [i.e., the relation] is a power even of powers; it is a quality even of qualities”); Iyer 1971: 81: “Where there is service rendered, there an attribute (that is, relation) is understood. It is the power of powers, it is the attribute of attributes”; Houben 1995: 170; 341: “Where this [relation] is, because some service is rendered [from one thing to another, or: from signifier to signified and vice versa], there one arrives at a property (viz. dependence). Even for capacities [dependent on that which has the capacity] it is a capacity, even for qualities [dependent on that which has the quality] it is a quality [so it is extremely dependent].” According to Bhartṛhari, when a certain entity is seen to render service to, i.e., help (upakāra), another, there obtains a relation between them. A power and a quality are what renders service to an entity: a power helps the entity to bring about a certain result and a quality helps the entity to be differentiated from other entities. A power is also to be served by a certain thing in order to be determined both to abide in a locus and to bring about a specific result. Such a thing is a relation that the power has with respect to its locus (āśrayāśrayibhāva) and to its result (kāryakāraṇabhāva), and the relation can consequently be viewed as a power in that it helps the power to abide in a locus and to bring about a specific result. The reason that, with regard to qualities, a relation is called a quality is that it is viewed as meant for a quality (parārtha) because it serves to determine the quality abiding in a specific substance. On these points, see Ogawa 2009.
2.3.2 It is proper to say that an entity cannot at the same time both be a relation (sambandha) and not be a relation, or be a relatum (sambandhin). We must say accordingly that in a certain context a relation has a property which is like that of a relatum. In addition, we have seen that a relation’s own property is that of being absolutely dependent. What is meant by the term sambandhidharma is just opposite to this property. In order to make these points clear, it is useful to consider the Vṛtti on VP 2.439. On the assumption that contact (saṃyoga) and inherence (samavāya), which are relational concepts of the Vaiśeṣika school, are a relation, Bhartṛhari says:

[K] VP 2.439: sambandhidharmā saṃyogaḥ svāsabdenābhidhidhiyate / sambandhaḥ samavāyaś ca sambandhitvena gamyate //

Contact, even if it is a relation, is conveyed as something whose property (dharman) is like that of a relatum by its own word [i.e., the word saṃyoga]. Inherence, even if it is a relation, is also understood as a relatum [from its own word samavāya].

In his Vṛtti Bhartṛhari comments as follows:

[L] Vṛtti on VP 2.439 (312.17–22): (a) aṅgulyoḥ saṃyoga iti sambandho ’pi saṃyogaḥ svayāṁyapadena svatantro ’bhidhiyamāṇaḥ puruṣādīvat sambandhidharmābhidhidhiyate /

The following kārikā is useful in considering what it means to say that an entity has a property which is like that of another entity. VP 3.3.6: taddharmaṇos tu tācchabdyaṃ saṃyogasamavāyayoh / tayor apy upakārārthā niyatās tadupādhayaḥ // (“But, contact (saṃyoga) and inherence (samavāya) are termed sambandha because they have the property which is like the property of that [i.e. the relation]. Even those two have specific factors which delimit that [i.e., the relation] and which serve to render service to the relation”); Iyer 1971: 81: “Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. They have definite conditions the purpose of which is to render service;” Houben 1995: 176; 341: “As regards saṃyoga (connection) and samavāya (inherence), they (are tacchabdāḥ) are called by that word (sc. ‘relation’), because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence). Even these two have restricted functions of rendering service, with this [relation] as limiting factor.” A relation that is delimited by a specific factor, such as the property of residing only in a substance (dravyaikaniyatatva) or its being related to being as a quality (gunaṇatvena satīsambandhah), is termed saṃyoga; a relation that is delimited by a specific factor, such as the property of its relata being inseparable (ayutasiddhi), is termed samavāya. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.7 (130.5–6): tathā ca dravyaikaniyatatvaṃ gunatvena satīsambandhah saṃyogasyopādhir iti tatropakāraḥ sambandhena tasyāvacchidyate /; Prakāśa on VP 3.3.8–11 (131.11): anena cāyutasiddhiḥ samavāyasopādhir uktāḥ / According to Bhartṛhari, contact and inherence, which the Vaiśeṣikas posit as relations, do not fit the definition of a relation given by him. Suppose that the defining feature of a relation is to be dependent; contact and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities, so that the term sambandha is used for them. The point is that contact and inherence are dependent entities but not absolutely dependent entities. They are metaphorically spoken of as relations. An important thing to note is Bhartṛhari’s use of the phrase taddharmanoḥ “those two whose property is like the property of that [i.e., the relation],” which is an uṣtramukha “camel-faced” type of bhavavṛti. MBh on A 1.1.70 (1.180.18–19): uṣtramukham iva mukham asya so ’yam uṣtramukhaḥ / The bhavavṛti uṣtramukha signifies someone who has a face (mukha) like (iva) that of a camel (uṣtra).

Iyer 1977: 187: “The relation called contact is expressed as that which is related (sambandhin) by its own word (namely, saṃyoga); similarly, inherence is also expressed as that which has inherence.”
(b) sambandhisambandas tu ṣaṣṭhyā nimitattviya kalpate /

(c) yadi śāstrāntaradarśanam avaśyam abhyupagantavyam etad āśrīyate saṃyogasamavāyaṣaṃṭhiṣṭiṣṭiṣāya (read: saṃyogasamavāyaḥ ṣaṣṭhiṣṭiṣāya) iti /

(d) saṃvāye 'pi ca saṃyogasamyoginoḥ saṃavāya iti sati vyaapadeśe sambhdhitvena saṃvāye 'bhidhiyāmāne bhavitavyaṃ sambhandhāntareṇa /

(e) yadi tu śāstravyapadeśa evāyaṃ lokavyavahārāṇaṃāṇuṭi tatrā pratipādanārtham upacāreṇa saṃvyavahārāḥ kriyate //

(a) In the utterance aṅgulyoḥ saṃyogaḥ “There is contact related to two fingers,” contact (saṃyoga), even if it is a relation, is conveyed as something independent (svatantra) by a saṃvijñānapada “a conveying word” like saṃyoga.30 just like the servant in the utterance rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ “the king’s servant.” The contact is conveyed here as that which has the property that is like the property of a relatum (sambhandhidharman).

(b) In the same utterance, on the other hand, the relation with the contact as a relatum becomes the cause for the occurrence of a sixth-triplet ending.

(c) If another philosophical doctrine is necessarily to be accepted, this is admitted: [in the utterance in question] inherence-relation with the contact enters the domain of [A 2.3.50 ṣaṣṭhi ṣeṣe that provides for] the occurrence of a sixth-triplet ending.31

(d) And in the case in which the expression saṃyogasamyoginoḥ saṃavāyah “There is inherence related to the contact and its bearer” is used of the inherence, too, there must be another relation since the inherence is conveyed as a relatum.

(e) If, however, this very expression used in a scientific field follows everyday speech, the inherence is metaphorically spoken of as a relatum in order to afford an understanding of it.32

In [L](a) it has been shown that contact, if it is denoted by the term saṃyoga, is conveyed as something independent (svatantra). The property of a relatum (sambhandhidhārma) is that of being independent. In addition, in [L](e) it is stated that in the utterance saṃyogasamyoginoḥ saṃavāyah the inherence denoted by the term saṃavāya is metaphorically (upacāreṇa) spoken of as a relatum.33

30 On the concept of saṃvijñānapada, see Ogawa 2010.
31 On A 2.3.50, see PWT 251.
32 See n. 28. [L](e) suggests that there is a twofold relatum: primary and metaphorical.
33 Puṇyarāja says that in the utterance saṃyogaḥ dravyayoh “There is contact between two substances” contact is understood from the term saṃyoga as something that has been brought to accomplishment (pariniṣṭhasvabhāva), that is, as a substance. Ṭīkā on VP 2.439 (173.5–10): saṃyogasabdāt saṃyogaḥ dravyayor iti yathāvata pariniṣṭhasvarūpaḥ [read: pariniṣṭhasvarūpaḥ] tatra sambhandhisvabhāvaḥ pratiyate, na ca tasya tadrūpam / evam saṃavāyasabdāt saṃavāyah pratiyata iti āha – sambhandhaḥ saṃavāyaḥ ityādī / sambhandhitvena sambhandhasvarūpavrīrāṇaḥ saṃavāyaḥ ity āsmāḥ pratiyate / aṭhmā yadā saṃyogaḥśabdāt cāsau sambhandhaḥ svatantro 'bhidhiyate tadā tatra saṃavāyah sambhandhatvena ganyate iti yadā sambhandhatvena iti pāṭhas tadāvāṃ yojaniyam // Puṇyarāja tells us that there is a variant reading of pāḍa d: sambhandhatvena ganyate. Given this reading, the kārikā is interpreted as arguing that in the utterance saṃyogaḥ dravyayoh the inherence-relation is understood as a relation to be denoted by the sixth-triplet endings.
Now we are in a good position to give an interpretation of statement A: *sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyaḥ* and statement B: *svadharmena nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ*. Recall that the third-triplet ending both in *sambandhidharmena* and in *svadharmena* can be taken as *itthambhūtalakṣaṇa-trītīyā* (A 2.3.21). Thus, A and B respectively mean:

A: “A relation as characterized by the property of a relatum is to be denoted [by a generic term];”
B: “There is no nominal which denotes a relation as characterized by its own property.”

2.3.3 In PSV on PS V.3 (c) ((II)) as it is given by Pind, we find the expression *idam tat prati*, which can be deleted from the text. We must note the following comments by Jinendrabuddhi:

[M] PST Ms B 195a5–195b1 (Pind 2015: I 4, n. 15): [(a)] *[sambandhanaṃ hi sambandha iti ... rāgavat ... tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāśaniktam iti ... svadharmena tv iti. svarūpeṇa nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti.]*

[(b)] *idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśāyogyarūpavatvenāsattvabhūtavāt svarūpāḥbhidhānāṃ prayāśankaiva nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapatyata iti.*

((a) omitted.) (b) A relation is not a substance (*sattva*) since it is incapable of being reflexively grasped as “this” or “that;” therefore, there never arises a suspicion that [a generic term] denotes a relation *per se*.

The terms *dravya*, *sattva*, and *vastu* are synonymous with one another in the context of grammar. According to Helārāja, a substance (*dravya*) has the following properties (*dravyadharma*):

1. the property of being capable of being reflexively grasped as “this” or “that” (*idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśayogatvam*);
2. the property of having been brought to completion (*parinīspannatā*);
3. the property of being independent (*svātantrya*);
4. the property of taking on a fixed gender and number (*liṅgasaṃkhyāyoga*).**

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34 See n. 26.
35 Pind 2015: I 5, n. 15: “(3)KV do not reproduce the expression *idam tad prati* that is to be construed with *āśankitam.*”
36 Paddhati on Vṛtti to VP 1.13 (45.26–46.7): *vastu iti / nāmapadavācyam / tvādādīnām iti sarvanāmo-palakṣaṇam / sattvalakṣaṇānām iti / sattvam dravyam tal lakṣyata ehiḥ iti / vastūpalakṣaṇām yatra sarvanāma iti dravyalakṣaṇam /

37 Prakāśa on VP 3.1.13 (26.14–27.1): *tatra dravyadharmā idam tad iti pratyavamarśayogatvam, parini-spannatā, svātantryaṃ, liṅgasāṃkhyāyogaṃ cetyevamādayaḥ / From the point of view of those who hold that a word denotes a substance (dravyapadārthapakṣa) Bhartṛhari says: VP 3.1.13: *dravyadharmā padārthe tu dravye sarvo ’rtha ucyate / dravyadharmāśrayād dravyam ataḥ sarvo ’rtha iṣyate // (“In the view that a substance is a word meaning, it is stated that any word meaning has the property of...*
The first property is what Bhartṛhari explains in the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa.

[N] VP 3.4.3: vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate / dravyam ity ucyate so ’rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ //

That object, with reference to which a pronominal that refers to an entity (vastu) is used, is called dravya when it is intended to be conveyed as something to be differentiated (bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ).38

The point is that whatever the proniminals idam or tad, grammatically assigned the name sarvanāman,39 can refer to is called a substance (dravya).40

3 Now let us turn to PSV on PS V.3. I will propose the following reading of the text.

[O] PSV on PS V.3: (a) sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhaḥ / ṛgādivat / (b) so ’nyena yujyate / (c) tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyā iti kṛtvāśaṅkitam / (d) svadharmena tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti nāsti / (e) ato naiśāya jātisābdena vācyatvam upapadyate //

(a) Indeed, the word sambandha is a word derived in the sense of an action in the abstract, such as the word rāga “coloring” and the like, meaning “relating, relation.”

(b) The [relation as denoted by the word sambandha, forming one relatum], is connected with the other [relatum].

38 Iyer 1971: 123: “That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.” Bhartṛhari introduces the concept of a speaker’s intention (vivakṣā) here. It depends on the speaker’s intention what dravya is in a given situation. The status of being guṇa and that of being dravya are not ontologically fixed; they depend on how things are spoken of.

39 A 1.1.27 sarvādīni sarvanāmanā // See PWT 53.

40 This concept of a substance (dravya) forms a pair with that of a quality (guṇa), which Bhartṛhari defines as follows: VP 3.5.1: sansargi bhedakam yat yat savyāpāram pratiyate / gunatvam paratantravāt tasya śāstra udāhṛtam // (“Whatever is related [to a certain thing] and differentiates the thing [from others] is regarded as guṇa when it activates the function [of differentiating], because it is something dependent. This is what has been illustrated in grammar”); Iyer 1971: 126: “Whatever rests on something else (sansargī) differentiates it (bhedaka) and is understood in that function (savyāpāra), is, being dependent, called ‘quality’ in the śāstra.” A quality is defined as something dependent (paratantra), from which a substance related to the quality must be something independent.
Therefore, assuming that a relation as characterized by the property of a relatum can be denoted [by the word *sambandha*], the proponent has a suspicion that a generic term denotes a relation.

However, considering there is no nominal which denotes a relation as characterized by its own property, such a suspicion does not arise.

Accordingly, it is absolutely improper to say that the relation is to be denoted by a generic term.

On the basis of this text of the *Vṛtti* and its interpretation, I will also propose the following reading of the third *kārikā*.

\[ P \] PS V.3: *sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate / tathā hi bhāva ity ukto bhāvaś cānyena yuyjate //\n
The question arises: what does the word *atra* “here” in *pāda* a refer to? Consider the immediately preceding passage.

\[ Q \] PSV on PS V.2 (Pind 2015: I 3–4): (a) *tathā hi* 〈*sad dravyam, san guṇah, sat karmaḥ bhedārthair dravyādiśabdaḥ*〉 sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na sāt. tac ca drṣṭam.

(b) *na hi sattā* 〈*tadyogyo vā*〉 dravyam guṇo vā bhavati, kim tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā.

(c) āha ca:

*vibhaktibheda niyamād guṇagunyabhidhāyinoḥ*  
sāmānādhikaraṇasya prasiddhir dravyāśabdayoh.

(a) To explain. [If a generic term denoted a relation or a generic property,] the generic term *sat* could not be co-referential with words like *dravya* “substance” which signify individuals in the utterances *sad dravyam* “A substance is existent,” *san guṇah* “A quality is existent,” and *sat karmat* “An action is existent;” but, in reality, this is observed.

(b) Indeed, the generic property being or the relation to it is not a substance or a quality. [Question] Then what? [Answer] They are something related to a substance or a quality.42

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41 I have emended *bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ* to *bhāva ity ukto*. Jambūvijayajī reconstructs this portion as *bhāvikṛtyocyaṭe*. NC 607: *sambandho ’py atra sambandhidharmavācyo ’bhidhiyaṭe / tathā bhāvikṛtyocyaṭe bhāvo ’py anyena yuyjate //* Pind reports: Ms 195a5: *bhāvaḥ kṛtvoka ṭi (Pind 2015: I 4, n. 14); Ms B 195a5: *bhāva ity abhiprāyaṇoktaḥ* (Pind 2015: II 19, n. 42). It is hard to justify *bhāvaḥ kṛtvokaḥ* grammatically. To be sure, in view of the *pratīkā* given by Jinendrabuddhi, we can assume *bhāvikṛtyoktaḥ* “[the relation is] said to be [a significand of the generic term] after treating it as *bhāva.*” But, in this case, we have a *vipulā* “irregular”*-anuṣṭubh. With *bhāva ity ukto*, on the other hand, we have a *padyā* “regular”*-anuṣṭubh (5th, 6th, 7th syllables of *pāda* c: short, long, long). I gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Dr. Yūto Kawamura on this point.

42 Pind 2015: II 14–16: “That is (*tathā hi*), there would be no co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na sāt*) with words like ‘substance’ (*dravyādiśabdaḥ*) whose referents are particular [general properties]
(c) Thus he [i.e., Bhartṛhari] says:

“The items that denote respectively something principal (guṇin) and something subsidiary (guṇa) take different nominal vibhaktis43 because of a restriction (niyama) [such that a sixth-triplet ending occurs only after an item whose significand serves as something subsidiary].44 Two words, each of which denotes a substance, are established to be co-referential with each other[., so that the principal-subsidiary relation is not known from an utterance consisting of the two words].”45

Note the statement “They are something related to a substance or a quality” (dravyasya guṇasya vā) [Q(b)]. What is meant by this statement is that when the term sat denotes the generic property being or a relation, it becomes a sambandhiśabda because a generic property implies its bearer (jātimat) and because a relation implies its relatums. This is how one has to have the utterance *sad dravyasya which is paraphrased as sattā dravyasya or sambandhaḥ (yogah) dravyasya.

It is important to note that Dignāga quotes VP 3.14.8. In rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ “the king’s servant,” the significand of the nominal base rājan “king” is a qualifier (viśeṣana) with respect to the significand of the nominal base puruṣa: what is a qualifier is subsidiary to what is a qualificand (viśeṣya). In the utterance sambandhaḥ dravyasya “the relation of the substance” the relation behaves like a substance and serves as a qualificand with respect to the substance, just as the quality white does in the utterance paṭasya śuklah “the white of the cloth.”

(*bhedārthaiḥ), like, for instance, ‘existent substance’ (*sad dravyam), ‘existent quality’ (*san guṇah), and ‘existent action’ (*sat karma); but this is observed (tac ca drṣṭam). For existence (sattā) or its inherence relation (tadyogaḥ) is neither a substance (dravyam) nor a quality (guṇah), but is rather (kiṃ tartiḥ) of a substance (dravyasya) or of a quality (guṇasya)."

43 Here the term vibhakti signifies a nominal ending (sup: A 1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca).

Of this restriction Bhartṛhari says the following. VP 3.7.157: dviṣṭho 'py asau parārthatvād guṇeṣu vyatiricyate / tatrābhidhīyamānaḥ san pradhāne 'py *upayujyate // (“Even if the relation resides in two entities (dviṣṭha), it becomes something additional in entities that are subsidiary because of being intended for others. The relation which resides in the subsidiary entity, when it is denoted [by a sixth-triplet ending], is, as something residing in the principal entity also, of use to the latter.”) Iyer: upabhujyate. I have followed Rau’s reading. Iyer 1971: 237: “Even though it (the śeṣa relation) rests on both it brings about a distinction in what are secondary because of their being subordinate to something else. Being expressed there (that is, in what are secondary), it touches what is primary also.”

44 VP 3.14.8. Iyer 1974: 125: “The two words expressive of the secondary and the primary have necessarily different case-endings. Where they have the same case-endings, both express substance;” Pind 2015: II 16–17: “It is, moreover, explained that (ōha ca) [a word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality (guṇagunyabhidhāyinoḥ) have different case affixes (vibhaktibhedah) because of a restrictive rule. However, for two words that denote a substance (dravyaśabdah) co-reference is acknowledged (sāmānādhiḥkaranyasya prasiddhiḥ).” Iyer takes the terms guṇa and guṇin respectively as meaning “the secondary” and “the primary,” which I think is suited to the given context. Prakāśa on VP 3.14.8 (154.1–8): paṭasya śukla iti dravyagnābhīdhāyipadaprayoge śābdo guṇapradhānabhāvah / ... vīraḥ puruṣa ityādau tu sāmānādhiḥkarane visaye dvāv api dravyaśabdabau svanistham svārtham ācaksūte / tathā ca prathamaiva / sāmārthyanibandhanas tu guṇapradhānabhāvah ukto viśeṣayam syād anirjñātām ityādānā / evaṃ ca saty api guṇapradhānabhāve śābdāśabdavakrto viśeṣaḥ sāmānādhi- karanyayadvedhīkaranyayor ... // On the relation of the subsidiary and the principal between word meanings, see Ogawa 2017.
Thus in the given context the word *atra* refers to the utterance *sad dravyasya* that is equivalent to *sambandhaḥ dravyasya*. On this assumption, therefore, we can interpret PS V.3 as follows:

In addition (*ca*), it is said (*ucyate*) that, in this utterance [*sad dravyasya* as paraphrased by *sambandhaḥ* (*yogah* *dravyasya*) (*atra*), a relation as characterized by the property of a relatum (*sambandhidharmena sambandhaḥ*) is to be denoted (*vācyā*) [by the generic term]. That is to say (*tathā hi*), a relation, on the assumption that it is *bhāva* [i.e., what is denoted by an action noun such as *sambandha*],

is said [to be something to be denoted by a generic term] (*bhāva ity uktah*); but (*ca*), [a relation as] *bhāva* [i.e., a relation as denoted by such an action noun, forming one relatum,] is connected (*yuñyate*) with the other [relatum] (*anyena*).

What is crucial for understanding the present *kārikā* is that a generic term, insofar as it is a nominal (*nāman*), cannot denote a relation qua relation and that a relation which is denoted by a nominal cannot claim to be a relation *per se*.

### 4 Conclusion

A relation is posited as a word meaning through invention in accordance with some tradition. For Dignāga, who accepts the *apoddhāra* theory, a relation, which is a conceptual construct, is posited as the meaning of a nominal such as *sambandha* on the one hand and as a meaning of a sixth-triplet ending on the other. As is clear from [O], he accepts that a relation is a meaning of the sixth-triplet ending. In the everyday world one not only uses the sixth-triplet ending to convey a relation but also speaks of a relation by using the nominal. He is aware that one has expressions such as *aṅgulyoḥ samyogah* and *samyogasamyoginoh samavāyah* as well as those such as *rājñah puṇuṣah*. According to Dignāga, however, the same observation of everyday usage reveals that the nominal cannot denote a relation qua relation. Thus a generic term, being a nominal, has no possibility of denoting the relation *per se*. We must pay deep attention to the fact that the basis for his arguments about a relation is everyday speech, just as it is the basis for his arguments for positing *anyāpoha* as the word meaning. It is no accident that he enters into the arguments about relations by grammatically analyzing the term *sambandha*, which is commonly used in everyday speech. Dignāga knows that grammar is grounded on everyday speech.

### References and abbreviations


Ogawa forthcoming H. Ogawa, On a bias for doxographical accounts in later commentaries on the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari: With special reference to pratibhā. (Forthcoming.)

Paddhati Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati: See VP (c).


Pradīpa Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa: See MBh (a).

Prakāśa Helārāja’s Prakāśa: See VP (b) and VP (d).

PS Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya: See Pind 2015.

PSṬ Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: See Pind 2009.

PSV Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavrtti: See Pind 2009.


Ṭīkā  Punyarāja’s Ṭīkā. See VP (e).[References are to pages and lines.]


Vṛtti  Vākyapadiya Vṛtti. See VP (c) and VP (e). [References to kārikās, pages, and lines.]
Communication between a Speaker and a Listener as the Seeing of a Double Moon — In Light of the Apoha Theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

by
Kensho Okada

Introduction

We experience the practical use of words in our everyday activities 1) when a person understands/grasps an object through a word, and 2) when one person tells another something. The latter case is a person-to-person interaction in which a speaker intends to make a listener understand something by speaking word(s), while the listener infers the speaker’s intention by hearing and interpreting them. Communication is said to be established between the speaker and listener only when they are both present. People are, however, quite distinct from one another. Hence, even if the speaker and listener are present in the same time and space, they perceive altogether different things/images respectively. How can they communicate with each other under such circumstances? Also, what is the way in which they engage in conversation with one another?

Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) and Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795) present an explanation of this issue in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of their Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) and its pañjikā (TSP). This paper aims to examine their view to clarify how they answer the question at hand.

As is well known, Śāntarakṣita offers a threefold classification of the theory of the “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha):

1. Nominally bound negation/Implicative negation (paryudāsa)
   a) Exclusion having cognition as its essence (buddhyātmāpoha)
   b) Exclusion having a referent as its essence (arthātmāpoha)

2. Verbally bound negation/Non-affirmative negation (prasajyapraṭiṣedha)\(^1\)

Of these three exclusions, two of the paryudāsa variety and one prasajyapraṭiṣedha, Śāntarakṣita asserts that the exclusion having cognition as its essence (= reflection, pratibimba) is the principal referent denoted by a word, and that the other two are understood by implication. In this way, when reflection is admitted to be the principal referent, the aforementioned question regarding communication arises, for reflections manifest entirely differently in the cognition of individuals. How do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla resolve this issue?

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\(^1\) Cf. TS 1003, 1010, and 1014cd.
1. Impossibility of verbal convention-setting

First, let us examine Śāntarakṣita’s statement, which is the origin of the question we seek to answer. In TS 870, he asserts that the 5 categories of particulars, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus, and the form of cognition are, ultimately, not suitable as the referent denoted by a word. To begin with, arguing over particulars Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla state the following:

\[
tatra svalaṅkṣaṇaṃ tāvan na śabdaiḥ pratipādyate / 
śaṃketa vyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyyogataḥ // TS 871 // 
\]

Of these, first of all, particulars cannot be understood by words. Because [particulars are] devoid of the pervasion of the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, [convention cannot be set with regard to particulars].\(^3\) (871)\(^4\)

TSP 341, 14–17 ad TS 871:

\[
etad uktam bhavati – samayo hi vyavahārārtham kriyate, na vyasanitayā / 
tenā yasyaiva saṃketa vyavahārāptakālavyāptivatvam asti, tatraiva samayo vyavaharitānāṃ yuktā, nānyatra / na ca svalaṅkṣaṇasya saṃketa vyavahārāptakālavyāptivatvam asti / tasmān na svalaṅkṣaṇa samaya iti / 
\]

[By this,] the [following] is said: Indeed, verbal convention is made for [use at the time of] verbal activity,\(^5\) not through [mere] desire for [it]. Therefore, it is suitable to [set] verbal convention only with regard to that which pervades the time pervaded by verbal convention and verbal activity for [people] living daily [with use of language], not on anything else. And particulars do not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity. Therefore, verbal convention [can]not be [set] with regard to them [i.e., particulars].

Here, from the viewpoint of verbal convention (saṃketa) and verbal activity (vyavahāra), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla examine whether particulars are suitable to be the referent denoted by a word and indicate that particulars cannot be the target of verbal convention. In the following verses, Śāntarakṣita asserts that (1) convention-setting with regard to particulars is useless for verbal activity\(^6\) and that (2) it is impossible to make verbal

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\(^2\) Cf. TS 870: \[yataḥ svalaṅkṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogō jātimāṃs tathā / buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭām aṅcati tattvataḥ //; McAllister 2011: 181–182.\n
\(^3\) Cf. TSP 341,13–14 ad TS 871: \[na tatra svalaṅkṣaṇe samaya iti śeṣaḥ / \]

\(^4\) Cf. PV I 92: \[śabdāḥ saṃketa itam prāhuḥ vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ / tadā svalaṅkṣaṇaṃ nāsti saṃketa tena tatra na // “Words express something upon which verbal convention has been agreed and it [i.e., verbal convention] is recalled for the purpose of verbal activity. At the time [of verbal activity] the particular [with regard to which verbal convention is set] no longer exists. Therefore, verbal convention is not set with regard to the particular.”\n
\(^5\) According to Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, Dharmakīrti asserts that the purposes of verbal convention are 1) the understanding of form of cognition and 2) the apprehension of particulars. Cf. PVṬ D127a7–b5/P151a3–b2 ad PV I 110d and PVSV 57,15–19.

\(^6\) Cf. TS 873: \[tasmā samketa dhṛṣṭo ’rtho vyavahāre na drśyate / na cāgṛhitaṃ samketa gamyate ’nya (gamyate ’nya G; (bodhyetā)nya B) iva dhvaneḥ // “Therefore, the thing perceived [at the time of]
convention in regard to particulars.\textsuperscript{7} In both cases, on the grounds that particulars cannot be something on which verbal convention is established, Śāntarakṣita criticizes the view that particulars are the referent denoted by a word. In the same way, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus,\textsuperscript{8} and the form of cognition are not accepted as the word-referent due to the impossibility of convention-setting.\textsuperscript{9}

2. Opponent’s criticism

In the final part of the Śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of TS/TSP, the impossibility of setting verbal convention and the uselessness of it are discussed once again.\textsuperscript{10}

As previously mentioned, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla admit that the principal referent denoted by a word is the reflection manifesting in cognition. Therefore, for them, the very reflection is the referent which sets with regard to verbal convention. Criticizing their view, an opponent indicates that the impossibility of making [verbal convention], [the setting of verbal convention] is impossible, [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘āsakyaṃ’ and so on.”

\textsuperscript{7} Cf. TSP 344,1–3 ad TS 875–876: evam tāvat svalakṣaṇe vyavahārānupapatteḥ samayavaiyarthaprasangān na samayaḥ sambhavatīti pratipādītum / sāmpratam aṣṭakṣrayatvād eva na sambhavatīti pratipādāyann āha – aṣakyaṃ ityādi / “In this way, because verbal action toward particulars is impossible, it would follow that verbal convention is useless, [Therefore, the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars is impossible. This is, firstly, understood. Next, in order to explain that, because it is impossible to make [verbal convention], [the setting of verbal convention] is impossible, [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘aṣakyaṃ’ and so on.”

\textsuperscript{8} Cf. TS 882: jātisambandhayoḥ pūrvaṃ vyāsataḥ pratiṣedhanāt / nānantarāḥ prakalpyante śabdārthās trividhāḥ pare / “Because genus and connection have been already rejected in detail before, the other three [which are enumerated] immediately after [particulars] are not supposed to be the referent of a word.” TSP 348,7–8 ad TS 882: evam tāvat svalakṣaṇe samayāsambhavam pratipādyā jātyādisu trisu samayāsambhavam pratipādāyann āha – jātisambandhayor ityādi / “In this way, to begin with, the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to particulars is explained. After this, in order to explain the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to three things – that is, genus and so on [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘jātisambandhayor’ and so on.”

\textsuperscript{9} Cf. TS 884: buddhyākāro hi tādātmyena buddhāv evāvasthitā iti nāsau tadbhūtvārūpaḥ pratipādyān arthaṃ buddhyantarāṃ vānugacchati / tataś ca samkṣetavyavahārāptakālāvypakatvāt svalakṣaṇavan na tatrāpi samayaḥ sambhavati / “… Therefore, [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to it [i.e., form of cognition] is also impossible, because it does not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, just as particulars.”

\textsuperscript{10} Cf. TS 1206ab: samkṣetāsambhavo hy atra bhedādau sādhitāh purā / “Indeed, the impossibility of [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars and so on has already been proved before.” TSP 446,8–10 ad TS 1206ab: aṣahyāsasamayvatvād ananyabhā́ktyāc ceti pūrvaṃ svalakṣaṇādau samkṣetāsambhavasya samkṣetavyaiphalasya ca prasādhitatvāt / “It is because the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention and the uselessness of it with regard to particulars and so on have already been proved in such ways as ‘because of the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention is impossible’ and ‘because of having no connection with the others’.”
of it are also applied to the reflection that they accept as the object of convention. The opponent says the following:

nanu cāpohapakṣe 'pi katham samketasambhavah /
sāphalyo ca katham tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati // TS 1207 //
vaktṛśrotor na hi jiñānaḥ vedyate tat parasparam /
saṃkete na ca tad drṣṭaḥ vyavahāre samīkyate // TS 1208 //

[Objection:] Even in the apoha theory, (1) how can convention[-setting] be possible? (2) How can it be useful, either? (1) For it [i.e., the apoha as reflection] cannot be established between two [persons, i.e.,] a speaker and listener [in the same way]. It is because [they can] not mutually cognize [one another’s] cognition. (2) And, that [reflection] which was perceived at the time of [setting the] verbal convention is not seen [any longer] at the time of verbal activity.

Here, adopting the same method as Śāntarakṣita, the opponent indicates that it can be neither possible nor useful to set verbal convention with regard to a reflection.

As far as the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to a reflection is concerned, according to the opponent, the speaker never cognizes the reflection manifesting in the listener’s cognition, nor does the listener cognize the reflection manifesting in the speaker’s cognition. Therefore, it cannot be established that their reflections are one and the same. This is the reason for the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to such reflections.

Regarding the uselessness of verbal convention-setting, the opponent asserts that, because the reflection perceived at the time of verbal convention and the one perceived at the time of verbal activity are totally different, it follows that setting verbal convention with regard to a reflection is not useful for ordinary verbal usage.

With regard to the former question, Kamalaśīla explains as follows:

TSP 447,1–7 ad TS 1208’ab:

ekasmād ity āha – na hi jiñānam ityādi / pratyātmasaṃvedanīyam evārvāgda-
rśanānāṁ jiñānam / na hy anyadyajñānam aparo ’paradarśanaḥ samvedaya-
te / jiñānād avyatiriktaś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātmakalakṣanāpohah /

Commenting on the opponent’s view, Kamalaśīla explains the uselessness of the setting convention with regard to reflections as follows: Cf. TSP 447,7–11 ad TS 1208cd: ānarthakyaṃ ca pratipādayann āha – saṃkete na ceyādi / yat samketakāle pratibimbakam anubhūtam śrotā vāt vā, na tad vyavahārākāle ’nubhūyate, tasya kṣaṇaṅkatvam etvāc irvāc nābhyādhyādhyātvād / na cāt va samketakāle drṣṭaḥ, anyasyati tatevā samāstriyate api prasangād iva / “In addition, in order to explain the uselessness [of setting convention with regard to reflection, the opponent] states ‘samkete na ca’ and so on. Some reflection has been experienced by a listener or by a speaker at the time of the verbal convention. [However, ] that [reflection] cannot be experienced at the time of verbal activity. This is because that [reflection], being momentary, has ceased to existence long before [the time of the verbal activity]. Moreover, that which is experienced at the time of the verbal activity cannot be that which has been perceived at the time of verbal convention. This is because a very different [reflection] is experienced at that time (= at the time of verbal activity). And, it is untenable that verbal activity regarding Y is [established] on the basis of verbal convention [set with regard to] X. This is because [otherwise] an absurd consequence would follow.”
Why? [Objection:] “[They cannot cognize one another’s cognition]” and so on. Ordinary persons can only cognize something to be cognized by themselves, for, being an ordinary person, no one knows the cognition [represented in] another’s [mind]. Moreover, the exclusion, having a reflection as its own nature, is ultimately not different from the cognition. Therefore, [the following question arises:] With regard to what [object] can the convention be set [by a speaker]? In what [object] can the convention be comprehended [by a listener]? It is because the same object is not established as the target of verbal convention at all between the two persons—that is, the speaker and listener. Indeed, if nothing real is established, the speaker cannot make any convention; nor can the listener comprehend it. This is because [if such a thing were possible,] an absurd consequence would follow. Namely, the listener would comprehend the reflection of an object manifesting in his own cognition; but the speaker would be unable to cognize it. The listener cannot comprehend what the speaker cognizes. This is because [each] cognizes only his own manifestation.

Here, the argument encounters difficulty when a reflection is regarded as the object with regard to which verbal convention is set. Reflections are different for each individual. An ordinary person can only cognize the reflection manifesting in his own cognition. It is impossible for a reflection to move from one person’s cognition to another’s. Therefore, in reality, one can neither tell the content of his cognition to another, nor perceive that of another’s cognition. As a result, it may follow that there is not any object of verbal convention that a speaker and listener share at the time of verbal convention, and thus, the verbal convention itself cannot be established.

3. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s reply

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla sought to address this issue. How do they explain the manner of establishing verbal convention? Śāntarakṣita says the following:

\[
\text{svasya svasyābhāsasya vedane 'pi sa vartate} \\
\text{bāhyārthādhyavasāyo}^{14} \text{ yo}^{15} \text{ dvayor api samo yataḥ} \text{ // 1209 //} \\
\text{timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayam} \text{ /}
\]

\[12\] īśā, nāpi B; īśāno 'pi G.
\[13\] śrotā em. (cf. nyan pa pos D, P); śrotā G, B.
\[14\] ’ādhyavasāyō em. (cf. zhen pa D, P; bāhyārthādhyavasāyas tulya eva TSP 477,18); ’ādhyavasāye G, B.
\[15\] yo em.; yad G, B; yad om. D, P.
svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā // 1210 //
vyāpakatvaṃ ca tasyedam iṣṭam ādhyavasāyi
tam // 1211 //
mithyāvabhāsino hy ete pratayayaḥ śabdānirmitāḥ // 1211 //

It is because, although a speaker and listener cognize their respective manifestations, they both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be an external object. Just as one [person] whose eyes are affected by eye disease says to [another person] like himself “there is a double moon,” all verbal activities are thought to be the same. That [i.e., reflection] is accepted as being such a pervader, [i.e., being that which pervades the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity,] on the basis of [persons] determining [so]. In actuality, these notions brought about by word(s) are [nothing more than] something manifesting erroneously.

Commenting on TS 1209, Kamalaśīla states the following:

TSP 447,12–448,3 ad TS 1209:

na hi paramārthato jñānakāro 'pi śabdānām vācyatayā 'bhīṣṭaḥ, yena tatra samkētāsambhavaś codyate / yataḥ sarva evāyaṃ śābdā vyavahāraḥ svapra-tibhāsānumrodhena taimirikadvañadvicandradarśanaṇaṇav bhrānta iṣyate / ke-valam arthaśūnyābhijalpavāsanāprabodhāc chaddebyo 'ṛthādhvavāsāyivi-kalpamātrotpadāî tat pratibimbaṃ śabdānām vācyam ity abhidhīyate jananāt, na tv abhidhēyatayā / tatra yady api svasya svasayaivāvabhāsasya vaktrśrotṛbhyyām paramārthataḥ sanvedanam, tathāpi taimirikadvañasyevasa bhrāntibījasa tulyatvādv dvayor api vaktrśrotor bāhyārthādhyavasāyās tulya eva / tathāpi vaktr ayam abhimāno vartate – yam evāham arthām pratipādyeyam evaṃ pratipadyata iti / evaṃ śrotur api yojyam /
ekārthādhyavasāyitvaṃ katham anayor vaktrśrotroḥ parasparam viśitam iti cet, yadi nāma paramārthato na viśitam, tathāpi bhrāntibījasa tulyavād asty eva paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānumrodhena taimirikadvañasad bhṛānta evāyaṃ vyavahārāḥ iti niveditam etat / tenaikārthādhyavasāyavāsāt samkēta-kaṇṇam upapadyata eva /

Indeed, ultimately, the form of cognition is also not admitted to be the referent denoted by words, so that the impossibility of [setting] convention with regard to it [i.e., the form of cognition] would be criticized. It is because all verbal activities are admitted to be something erroneous, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both] seeing double moons in accordance with their respective manifestations. Merely by awakening of the latent disposition which [is deposited] through objectless discourse, only conceptual [cognitions], by which [a manifestation] is determined as being an object, are produced by words. [Hence,] on the grounds that [conceptual cognition is] produced

16 Cf. TSP 448,6–8 ad TS 1211: samkētāvyavahārāptakāśā/ayāpakatvam ca vaktrśrotrbhyyām adhyava-sūttārāparamārthatāna bhimbakasyāvasāvasād evēṣṭaṃ, na paramārthataḥ /
17 "ādhyavasāyi" B; "āvasaśa" G.
by a word], that reflection [of conceptual cognition] is said to be the referent denoted by words; not on the grounds that [the reflection is, in reality, the referent denoted by a word]. That being the case, although a speaker and listener ultimately only cognize their respective manifestations, they still both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be external objects, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both seeing a double moon]. Even so, the speaker thinks, “He [i.e., the listener] also understands the object that I understand.” So does the listener.

Question:] How can the speaker and the listener know that they are determining the same object?

Reply:] Although they ultimately cannot know [it], such a verbal activity, which is nothing but erroneous, [is still established between them] in accordance with their respective manifestations, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as the case of the two persons affected by eye disease. It has already been explained. Therefore, it is quite possible that verbal convention is made by the force of [people] determining [their respective manifestations] to be the same.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla accept that, in reality, a speaker and listener cognize only their own respective manifestations. According to them, however, a speaker and listener determine their own manifestations as external things in the same way. This same determination is the reason for the establishment of verbal convention. That is to say, a convention is established on the basis of the thinking that “we perceive the same thing.” Based on this erroneous determination, two persons can communicate.

Moreover, there would appear to be no difference between the verbal activity of persons affected by eye disease and that of ordinary persons, given that all people cognize only their own respective manifestations. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla therefore assert that all verbal activity is erroneous.

4. Causal relation between word and intention

It is found that Kamalaśīla uses this example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon in the same way” also in the Śābdavicāra section of the Pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā chapter and Śrutiparīkṣā chapter of the TSP. There, Śāntarakṣita denies that there is an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, and suggests that a causal relation is established between a word and speaker’s intention. While commenting on

Kamalaśīla has already stated the same thing in the following portion. Cf. TSP 358,9–12 ad TS 908: etad uktam bhavati – paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānubhave ’pi vaktur evam adhyavaśāyo bhavati – mayā ’smai bāhya evārthāḥ pratipādayate l śrotur apy evam bhavati – mamāyaṃ bāhyam eva pratipādayati / atas taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavad ayaṃ sarvāḥ śābdo vyavahāra iti (cf. sgra las byung ba’i tha snyad ’di thams cad de lta bu yin no D, P) /

Cf. TS 1512 (Śābda): vacasāṃ pratibandho vā ko bāhyesv api vastuṣu / pratipādayatāṃ tāni venaśāṃ syāt pramāṇatā // “How can be there any invariable connection between words and external things? If
such statements by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla gives explanations with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease.”

Here, let us consider the views of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as presented in the Śābdavicāra section of the TS/TSP. There, as mentioned above, rejecting an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, Śāntarakṣita explains the manner in which verbal cognition is meant to be included in the inference.

\[ vacobhīyo nikhilebhīyo 'pi vivaksaiśānumīyate / \]
\[ pratyaksanupalambhābhīyāṃ taddhetuḥ sā hi niścitā // TS 1514 // \]

From all words it follows that [speaker's] intention is inferred. For it [i.e., intention] is ascertained to be the cause of a word through perception and non-perception.

Here, Śāntarakṣita states that an invariable connection having causality as its character is established between a word and an intention, and suggests that a word is a valid cognition with regard to intention. In some cases, however, an intention and an uttered word are known to be different. That is to say, it is just as in the case of some speaker uttering the word “X” erroneously while intending to speak about “X.” In this case, it is assumed that the fallacy lies not in the word but in the erroneous speaker. Furthermore, with respect to a word’s deviation from a particular intention, Kamalaśīla gives explanatory statements as follows:

\[ [invariable connection were to be admitted], words expressing them [i.e., external things,) would be valid cognition.” TS 2618 (Śruti): sākṣāc chabdā na bāhyārthapratibandhavivekataḥ / gamayanitī ca proktam vivaksāśūcakās tv amī // “It has already explained that words do not make [external things] known directly, because there is no invariable connection between external things [and words]. And, these [i.e., words,] are [nothing but] something indicating [the presence of the speaker's] intention.” TSP 854,1–3 ad TS 2618: vivaksām api na vācyatayā pratipādayanti, kim tarhi, liṅgataḥ sācyantl / ata eva sūcakā ity uktam / tathā hi – sābdā ucchāritat arthādhyavasāyāṃ vikalpo jāyate, na vivaksādhyavasāyā / “[Words] do not express [the speaker’s] intention as something denoted [by words]. How then? [Words merely] indicate [the speaker’s intention] as a logical mark. Therefore, [words are] said to be something indicating. That is to say, [when] a word is uttered, there arises a conceptual cognition which judges an [external] thing, not [a conceptual cognition which] judges [the speaker’s intention].” \]

In his TS 2620, Śāntarakṣita asserts that only when a person has already cognized a causal relation, can he know a speaker’s intention through words. Against this, the opponent objects that verbal convention cannot be a means for knowing a particular intention of a speaker. In response, Kamalaśīla criticizes the opponent’s view with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon.” Cf. TSP 854,12–22 ad TS 2620.

20 In his TS 2620, Śāntarakṣita asserts that only when a person has already cognized a causal relation, can he know a speaker’s intention through words. Against this, the opponent objects that verbal convention cannot be a means for knowing a particular intention of a speaker. In response, Kamalaśīla criticizes the opponent’s view with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon.” Cf. TSP 854,12–22 ad TS 2620.

21 Cf. TS 1515–1516: bhrāntasyānyavivaksāśūcāṃ vākyāṃ ced anyad īkṣyate / yathāvivaksāṃ (yathāvivaksāṃ B; tathā vāivakṣaṃ G) apy etat tasām (etat tasām; etatākṣāsamānye tvesaṃ G [sic]) naiva pravartate / bhrāntābhācbhavatvuktiḥ vailakṣāmyam pariśphutam / vidagdhaḥ prakṛtādhiḥ vailakṣāmayāṃ kṣāsāmānye ta?smān / na eva pravartate / bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktāṃ vailakṣāmyam pariśphutam / vidagdhaḥ prakṛtādhiḥ niścinvanti girām alam // vailakṣāmayena hetaunāṃ viśeṣaṃ tāsu ye na tu / avagacchanti doṣo ‘yam teṣām liṅgasya nāsti tu // “[Objection:] It is found that as for an erroneous person, his statement and intention are different. Therefore, it [i.e., his statement] cannot be made in accordance with intention. [Reply:] There is clearly a difference between words used by an erroneous person and those used by a non-erroneous person. [However,] clever men [definitely] discern [this difference] through context and so son. The fallacy lies not in the logical mark, but in the persons who do not notice the difference among them [i.e., these words] due to difference of their causes.”
Furthermore, when all verbal activity is accepted to be erroneous due to dependence on [respective] manifestations of one’s own, just as two persons affected by eye disease see a double moon [in the same way], how can [a word/verbal cognition] be invalid on the basis of pointing out the deviation from a particular intention [of speaker]. For it is not accepted that [a word/verbal cognition has] ultimate validity with regard to a particular intention of speaker. The same thing is stated as follows: A word (/verbal cognition) is said to be an inference just when it is taken into consideration that a word makes manifest [an object] with dependence on verbal convention, not when with dependence on real truth.

Here, from the standpoint that all verbal activity is erroneous, Kamalaśīla implicitly indicates that the validity of words/verbal knowledge is not ultimate but conventional. Thus, as long as the erroneousness of verbal knowledge is considered, it follows that the validity of a word/verbal knowledge depends only on verbal convention, and has nothing to do with real truth.

For example, when one taimirika (person affected by eye disease) says to another taimirika “there is a double moon in the sky” and the latter agrees with the former, it follows that based on this agreement, verbal convention is established between them. In this case, in reality, the so-called “double moon” does not exist, and the word “double moon” would be nonsense. However, to the two taimirika the word “double moon” is thought to be useful.

Conclusion

To conclude, when reflection is admitted to be the referent denoted by a word, a speaker and listener cannot share the same real object, because they only cognize different reflections manifesting in their respective cognitions. They, however, think/believe that they perceive the same thing by the force of determination. Based on this same determination, the setting of convention is established. Therefore, according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, all verbal activity is erroneous, as it is the same as when two persons affected by eye disease both see a double moon.

22 The source for this citation is uncertain.
Supplemental remarks

As discussed above, bearing in mind that a person cognizes only his own representation, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla suggest that all verbal activity is established in the same ways as two persons with eye disease equally see a double moon. Interestingly enough, similar views have been presented by Dharmakīrti in his Santānāntarasiddhi (SS) and by Vinītadeva in his Santānāntarasiddhiḥ (SSṬ). Dharmakīrti and Vinītadeva state the following:

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23 For your information, similar descriptions can also be found in Śubhagupta’s Anyāpohavicārakārtikā (AVK) and Karnakagomin’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtiṣṭikā (PVSVṬ), as far as treatises on apoha theory are concerned. Cf. Mikogami 1993. Cf. AVK D199a1–2: rang gi blo la snang ba ni // rig pa yin yang phyi rol dang // gcig par ’dzin pa’i nga rgyal skye // rab rib can du mthungs blo bzhin // “Although [persons] cognize their own [respective] manifestations, they [erroneously] think ‘We comprehend the same external thing,’ just as the cognitions of persons suffering from same eye disease.” This verse is quoted in Anekāntajayapatākā (AJP 338,6–7 svabuddhipratibhāsasya saṃvittāv api jāyate // bahi-rarthagrahe mānas tulyatimārabuddhivat //), PVSV 60,26–61,1: … pratipattā pratipattim anasytā ete vṛkṣā iti svaparavikalpeṣy evakratibhāsān ādārṣya vyavasthitās tāvad udehetāthān bhedena pratipadyetety uktim ataddhetabyo bhede nityuktie. “… [One who makes the setting of a verbal convention] applies a word to what is excluded from those which are not its causes with the following hope: The cognizer [for whom the verbal convention is made such as ‘tree’] would be able to understand that these are trees [when he hears the word ‘tree’] in accordance with his understanding [of the verbal convention], having referred to [the object] which equally appear in the cognitions of himself and others, although being dependent [solely on his own conceptual cognition], by differentiating the causes of this [cognition from others].” PVSVṬ 241,10–21 ad PVSV 60,27: nanu vyāvṛttasya svalakṣaṇasya vyavahārakāle ’negama nāsti. nāpi vikalpapratibhāsānā sāmānyākārasya svajñānābhīnna tāvād vikalpāntare ’nvayo št. nāpi vakṛṣambandhinā sasya śrotuḥ srotasambandhinā vā vaktuḥ pratitiḥ, anyacetadharmatvenāntindriyatvat. na cāpratipanne samam pratipādyapratipādakābhyām samketāḥ sambhavātīta at āha — svaparetvādi. … etad uktam bhavati — yathāiskas taimiriko dvicandram drystvānyataimirikāyopadānā svadṛṣṣam evopādāti, na padṛṣṣam, apratikāsvatvat āthā ca tasyaiṃ bhavati — ayam eva maṇḍaya parasmaya pratipādita īti / paro ’pi ca svasaṃtānabhāvinam eva dvicandrákāram pratipāyan ya eva pratipādakaṃ māma pratipādītas sa eva maṇḍaya iti manaye / tadav pratipādyapratipādakayor buddhākārasyādhiyavātsita-bāhyariṣṭasya bhede ’py ekatvādhyavasayā samketakaraṇam / vyavahārākāle ca tasyaiṃ pratitiḥ, ekatvādhyavasayāt / "[Objection:] An excluded particular does not continue to exist at the time of verbal activity. Also, since the form of the universal manifestation in one’s conceptual cognition is not different from this one’s own cognition, it does not occur in the other’s conceptual cognition. Neither one who listens to the speaker nor one who speaks to the listener cognizes [the form of the universal manifesting in the others’ conceptual cognition], because it is not cognizable by sense organs. It is because it is the quality belonging to the other’s mind. When [the form of the universal appearing in the others’ conceptual cognition] is not cognized, the speaker (pratipādaka) and listener (pratipādyā) cannot equally make verbal convention. [Reply:] [Dharmakīrti] states ‘svapara’ and so on. … [By this,] the following is said: When some person affected by eye disease sees a double moon and tells this to another person affected by eye disease, he describes only that which is perceived by himself, not that which is perceived by anyone else. This is because [he] cannot perceive [what anyone else perceives]. And he thinks ‘I explain it to him.’ Also, another person, understanding the form of the double moon that belongs to his own mind, thinks ‘I understand what he has explained to me.’ In the same way, although the forms of cognition, which are determined to be an external thing, are different between someone explaining [i.e., speaker] and someone to be explained [i.e., listener], conventions are made [on the forms of cognition] by the force of the determination of [these forms] being the same. And, it [i.e., the form of cognition] is cognized at the time of verbal activity, because [the form of cognition at the time of verbal activity] is determined to be the same [as that at the time of verbal convention].’” (There is no corresponding description in Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikā.)
A representation is called a manifest action (vijñapti). It is because although each person, i.e., a speaker and listener, experiences his own representations, just as two persons with eye-disease perceive a double moon [in the same way], it is determined that the same thing is grasped by a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time.

That is to say, the speaker thinks “the listener will understand what I say.” The listener, in his turn, thinks “I have understood what he said.” ... Although the speaker and the listener both experience their respective representations, cognitions having the form of action and speech appear in both from the same cause, and these [cognitions] determinately grasp the same thing. Therefore, it is called manifest action (vijñapti) metaphorically. Because there exists a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time, the same thing is determinately grasped. "Just as in the case that two persons see a double moon" is the example [demonstrating] this. If a person affected by eye disease (A) indicates another moon and says to another person affected by eye disease (B) “Look!” and he (B) says “I see [it],” then, the speaker thinks “I have indicated it to him,” and the listener thinks “he indicated it to me.” Even so, they both only cognize their respective representations.
References and abbreviations


AVK Anyāpohavicārakārikā (Śubhagupta): D4246, P5744.


PV I Pramāṇavārttika, chapter I (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.


PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi): D4220, P5718.


SSṬ Saṃtānāntarasiddhitīkī (Vinītadeva): See SS.

TS Tattvasamgraha (Śāntarakṣita): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). The verse-numbers follow TSP (B).

TS (D) Tattvasamgraha (Śāntarakṣita). Tibetan: D4266.

TS (P) Tattvasamgraha (Śāntarakṣita). Tibetan: P5764.

TSP Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). Page- and line-numbers are given in accordance with TSP (B).


TSP (G) Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla): Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita: With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Krishnamacharya. Baroda 1926.

TSP (D) Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla). Tibetan: D4267.

TSP (P) Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla). Tibetan: P5765.
On pramāṇabhūta — The Change of Its Meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta

by

Motoi Ono

Introduction

In the maṅgalaśloka of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (=PS), Dignāga (ca. 480–540) describes the Buddha-Bhagavat by five epithets. Among these epithets, the term pramāṇabhūta is remarkable because this compound word includes the word pramāṇa (i.e., means of cognition; valid cognition) in its former part. The term is a key concept to explain the relationship between pramāṇa as knowledge and the Bhagavat as pramāṇa in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school.1

Tilmann Vetter showed that the term in Dignāga should be translated as “who is a pramāṇa,” by indicating that the translation “who has become a pramāṇa” based on the interpretation by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) cannot be justified in Dignāga.2 However, even if pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga means “who is a pramāṇa,” the following question remains open: How can the Buddha as a person be called a pramāṇa, which is supposed to mean valid cognition?3

In response to this question, D. Seyfort Ruegg, by investigating exhaustively the use of the term pramāṇabhūta and the compound words x-bhūta in Sanskrit literature, proposed to translate pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga as “who is like (i.e., similar to) a pramāṇa.”4 His

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1 Cf. pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine praṇamya sāstre sugatāya tāvīne / pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ karityate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ // (PS maṅgalaśloka) Masaaki Hattori’s translation in Hattori 1968: 23 is as follows: “Saluting Him, who is the personification of the means of cognition, who seeks the benefit of [all] living beings, who is the teacher, sugata, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the [Pramāṇa]-samuccaya, uniting here under one head my theories scattered [in many treatises].”

2 Cf. Vetter 1984: 14; note 6. Vetter has previously translated the word in the same way (cf. Vetter 1964: 32,17). Ernst Steinkellner agreed with Vetter’s view as follows: “Tilmann Vetter gives the reason for his translation of the term pramāṇabhūta from the maṅgala of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya as ’who is a means of valid cognition’ (’der Erkenntnismittel ist.’): the interpretation that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition (as if the text read pramāṇibhūta) which does not figure at all in Dignāga’s own explanation of the verse and can, therefore, hardly be based on the term pramāṇabhūta, was added by Dharmakīrti, … Since the compound pramāṇabhūta does really not have a cvi-formation, … Vetter is certainly right in asking for an interpretation of bhūta as the equivalent of the copula serving the simple adjectivization of the first member” (cf. Steinkellner 1989: 180).


view was thereafter criticized by Eli Franco and Helmut Krasser. In my opinion, however, Ruegg’s interpretation is worth reconsidering. This paper aims to provide new materials for supporting Ruegg’s view and, furthermore, to show that his view is meaningful from the historical viewpoint of the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school by elucidating the change of the meaning of the word pramāṇabhūta from Dignāga, through Dharmakīrti, to Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810).

1. The meaning of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga

1.1. Ruegg’s view

Ruegg pointed out that Patañjali (ca. 150 BCE) called “the teacher (ācārya)” pramāṇabhūta in his Mahābhāṣya (=MBh), and considered this the apparently earliest use of the word pramāṇabhūta in Sanskrit literature. Kaiyāta (11th c.), a later commentator on the MBh, analyzed this compound word as prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ. According to Nārāyaṇa, a subcommentator on the MBh, this explanation serves to avert both interpretations of pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like” and as “has become a pramāṇa.” Thus, the established theory by commentators on the MBh seems to be that the word pramāṇabhūta means “being authority.”

On the other hand, grammarians explain in some cases that bhūta in the compound x-bhūta has a meaning of “like (i.e., similar).” According to Ruegg, Yāska (4th c. BCE)

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8 Nāgeśa (17th c.), a subcommentator to the MBh, tries to justify Kaiyāta’s interpretation of the word pramāṇabhūta as meaning prāmāṇyaṃ prāpta as follows: “If (the teacher) were supposed to have become what he was not previously (abhūtatadbhāva) since the verb bhū means ‘become,’ there should be the form pramāṇībhūta with cvi-suffix. On the other hand, …” (cf. MBhPrU 126,7ff.: nanu bhavater janmārthatvenābhūtataubhāvapratītyā cvau sati pramāṇībhūta iti syāt, tadavvāṣāyāṃ tu pramāṇam ācāryah prakārāntarenā bhūta ity arthah syād atā āha – prāmāṇyam iti; Ruegg 1994a: 310f.; note 31). Nārāyaṇa also tries to justify Kaiyāta’s interpretation as follows: “If the word bhūta means similarity (apamāṇārhatve) just as in the case of the word pīṭṛbhūta etc., it would follow that the trustworthiness of the teacher is not stated as primary. (On the other hand) if (the word pramāṇabhūta) means that the teacher has become what he was not previously (abhūtāprādurbhāva), it would follow that there should be the cvi-suffix just like (in the expression) anikīrībhūta etc. …” (cf. MBhPrN 232,26ff.: pīṭṛbhūta ityādīvad bhūtasadbasyapamānārhatve mukhyam prāmāṇyam ācāryasya noktaṃ syāt, anikīrībhūta ityādīvad abhūtāprādurbhāvavacitve tadvad eva cvīprasāṅgah, …, ato vyāçaṣte – prāmāṇyam iti; Ruegg 1994a: 310,23ff.).

9 Cf. Ruegg 1995: 820,27f. Ruegg also pointed out the uses of the word pramāṇabhūta in the Mahāyāna-sūrālāmākārabhāṣya (cf. Ruegg 1994a: 306f.; 1995: 821f.). Also in this case, the word pramāṇabhūta can be understood as “being authority” by interpreting bhūta as the equivalent of the copula. Further, Ruegg pointed out the use of the word in the Lalitavistara. Regarding this use, however, Hakamaya and Silk indicated that the word pramāṇabhūta extant in the Sanskrit text may have been added in a later period, based on a comparison to the Chinese translation (cf. Hakamaya 2000: (14); Silk 2002: 113f.).
gives such an explanation in his Nirukta, and Bhartṛhari (5th c.) explains in his commentary on the MBh that bhūta in the expression sāmānyabhūta has the meaning of “like.” Thus, Ruegg paid attention to the fact that the use of the expression x-bhūta in the meaning “like” was already established before Dignāga.11 He further asserted that “the use of ॐbhūta in the meaning ‘like’ … is found even in some of the post-Dharmakīrti commentaries.”12

By interpreting bhūta in pramāṇabhūta as meaning “like,” Ruegg suggested that the whole compound pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga may be translated as “who is like a pramāṇa.” He summed up the issue as follows: “If understood in this way, there will be no conflict with Dignāga’s own doctrine that only pratyakṣa and anumāna are pramāṇas.”13

1.2. Krasser’s criticism

Krasser criticized this view of Ruegg. At first, he classified scholars’ interpretation of the word pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga into three types: “1) pramāṇa should be understood either 1A) in an extended sense, as authority, or 1B) metaphorically, or 2) bhūta should be understood in the sense of a comparison.”14 Among these, the interpretation 2) is attributed to Ruegg, and Krasser’s own position seems to be identical with 1B).

By examining new Sanskrit material of Jinendrabuddhi’s (8th c.) Pramāṇasamuccayafīkā (=PST), Krasser indicated that the PST, in contrast to Ruegg’s assertion, does not explain that bhūta in pramāṇabhūta means “like,” but rather that the former part, i.e., pramāṇa, implies the meaning of “like.” Namely, Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇam (the Bhagavat is valid cognition [inasmuch as he is] like a valid cognition) shows the interpretation that the mere expression bhagavān pramāṇam implies the meaning bhagavān pramāṇam iva.15 Krasser concluded: According to Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, “the word pramāṇa is applied to the Buddha not in an extended sense but metaphorically and it does not require any qualification in order to be understood as metaphor …, and it is also clear that his explanation does not support the interpretation of ॐbhūta as ‘like’. ”16

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12 Cf. Ruegg 1994a: 311ff.; 1995: 820ff. This argument was thereafter criticized by Krasser. See below.
14 Cf. Krasser 2001: 173,17ff. Here, the subdivisions of the type 1) in Krasser’s paper are called 1A) and 1B) respectively, for convenience of explanation.
16 Cf. Krasser 2001: 179; PVṬ(P) 86b6; (D)71b7: tshad ma’i sgra dpe dng du ’das pa can yin no zhes bya ba’i don to //
17 Cf. Krasser 2001: 176,25–177,5. Further, Krasser pointed out that the Tibetan expression tshad ma dang ’dra bas in the PVP by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690) is the Tibetan equivalent to the Sanskrit pramāṇam iva, and that Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇam is derived from Devendrabuddhi (cf. Krasser 2001: 177,6ff.; PVṬ(P)2a1f.; (D)1b2f. ad PV II 1a: tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba ni tshad mar ’khrungs pa’o // tshad ma dang ’dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan ’das so //).
Thus, Krasser elucidated that Ruegg’s assertion can be substantiated neither in the PST nor the Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (=PVP). Nevertheless, on the basis of this fact, one cannot necessarily conclude that the expression pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga does not mean “pramāṇa-like.” Krasser does not seem to intend to deny entirely Ruegg’s interpretation of the word pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga as meaning “pramāṇa-like.”

1.3. New materials supporting the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like”

In my opinion, it is not so relevant which part of the compound word pramāṇabhūta has the meaning of “like.” What is important for interpreting Dignāga’s thought is, rather, the difference between the view 1A) of Krasser’s classification that the word should be translated as “being authority” by understanding the word pramāṇa as having an extended sense and bhūta as the equivalent of the copula, and the view 1B) or 2) that the compound pramāṇabhūta as a whole means “pramāṇa-like,” independently of which part has the meaning of “like.” Both materials which Ruegg and Krasser showed seem to support the latter view.

1.3.1. The interpretation mentioned by Jayanta and Yamāri

The interpretation of the compound pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like” is indeed attested in the literature of the later Buddhist Pramāṇa-school. Namely, there are at least two such passages in the commentaries by Jayanta (10th c.) and Yamāri (ca. 1000–1060) on Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (=PVA).

First, Yamāri, in his remark on PVA’s first maṅgalaśloka, presents two different interpretations of pramāṇabhūta. The following interpretation is the second one of them:

Yamāri [Phe] (D:190b2f.; (P)228a5f.: yang na tshad ma dang ‘dra bas (D: tshad ma dang ‘dra bas lacking in P) tshad mar gyur pa ste / ci litar mgon sum la sogs pa ma rtogs pa’i don bsal bar byed pa nyid kyis tshad ma yin pa de bzhin du bcom ldan ‘das kyang ’phyags pa’i bden pa bshi la sogs pa ma rtogs pa’i don *gsal bar byed pa’i (D: *gsal ba’i P) phyir tshad ma yin no //; Ms 11b2 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 82)20

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18 Krasser mentioned that a remark of Vibhūticandra’s suggests that there are those who interpret bhūta as “like.” For, Vibhūticandra, after having explained the interpretation of the word bhūta according to Dharmakīrti by paraphrasing Jinendrabuddhi’s statement, states the following: “(Dharmakīrti) will indicate that the (word bhūta) does not have the meaning (‘like’) because the meaning ‘like’ is understood by implication” (cf. Vibhūti 519.3: ivārthas tu sāmarthyagata iti na tadārtham etad iti vaksyate; Krasser 2001: note 16).

19 Whether such interpretation is grammatical or not is another question (cf. Franco 1997: 16f., note 3: “On the other hand, even if -bhūta did not mean ‘similar,’ once authoritative treatises state that it does, it acquires this meaning for the readers who are acquainted with these treatises”).

20 The Sanskrit manuscript of the first chapter of Yamāri’s commentary has been discovered recently, and a series of diplomatic editions of its beginning portion (folios 3a1-20a5) has been published by Xuezhu Li, Junjie Chu and Eli Franco (cf. Li and Chu 2016; Li,Chu and Franco 2017; Li, Chu and Franco 2018) after this paper was written. Since all three portions of Yamāri’s commentary that this paper discusses are included in the mentioned diplomatic editions, I indicate the location in the respective edition after quoting the text of the Tibetan translation. Although my assumptions about the Sanskrit corresponding
[= Or, (the Bhagavat is) **pramāṇabhūta**, inasmuch as he is like **pramāṇa** (*atha vā pramāṇam iva pramāṇabhūtaḥ*).\textsuperscript{21} Just as direct perception is a **pramāṇa** because it reveals an unknown object, also the Bhagavat is a **pramāṇa** because he reveals an unknown object like the four noble truths.]

This is really the interpretation that the compound **pramāṇabhūta** as a whole means “**pramāṇa-like**” without specifying the part of the compound which means “like.”

The next case, that of Jayanta, is more interesting. Jayanta comments on Prajñākaragupta’s view that the Bhagavat as **pramāṇabhūta** is necessary, although every purpose of human beings can be established on the basis of conventional means of cognition (*sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa*),\textsuperscript{22} as follows:

Jayanta[De] (D)39b7ff.; (P)46a5ff.: *der yang mngon sum la sogs pa nyid tshad ma ’i gtso bo yin te l rtogs pa ’i *bdag nyid can (D: *gtso bo dag P) yin pa ’i phyir ro l bcom ldan ’das ni tshad ma dang ’dra bas tshad mar gyur pa yin no zhes bya ba ’i bsam pas dogs pa la l *khyab par byed pa (D: *khyab par byed par byed pa P) rtogs pa ’i bdag nyid yin pa ’i phyir / bcom ldan ’das kho na tshad ma ’i gtso bo yin la / gzhan ni de dang mthun pa nyid kyi gtso bo ma yin no zhes bstan to l

[= Supposing the view: “In that case too, the actual direct perception etc. are primary **pramāṇas**, because they are of the nature of cognition. The Bhagavat is, on the contrary, **pramāṇabhūta**, inasmuch as he is like a **pramāṇa** (*bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇabhūtaḥ*),” (Prajñākaragupta) indicated that the very Bhagavat is a primary (*mukhya*) **pramāṇa**, because (he) is of the nature of pervading cognition; other (**pramāṇas** such as cognition) are (however) similar to the (Bhagavat) and not primary.]

According to Jayanta, Prajñākaragupta indicates here, by stating that “the pervading concomitance cannot be grasped by those who are not omniscient (*na ca saṁbandho vyāpy asarvavidā grahitum śakyah*),” that the Bhagavat is the primary (*mukhya*) **pramāṇa**, and this statement is aimed against the fallacious view that **pramāṇa** as knowledge is primary and the word **pramāṇabhūta** means “**pramāṇa-like**.”

Thus, Jayanta also presupposes the possibility of the interpretation that the compound word **pramāṇabhūta** means “**pramāṇa-like**.” It should be noted that this interpretation is

\textsuperscript{21} In this case too, tshad ma dang ’dra bas is probably the rendering of **pramāṇa iva** (cf. note 17 in this paper).

\textsuperscript{22} For direct perception does not function in terms of transcendent objects, and inference ultimately does not function without the cognition of the pervading concomitance (*sambando vyāpi*) by the omniscient being (cf. PV AO 12,12ff.: *nana pramāṇabhūtena bhagavatā ko ’rthaḥ, sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇād eva sarvaparāsārthaśiddeṣe, naitad asti. […] na tāvat pratyakṣam paralokādau pravartate, tasya svārūpāmātragrahaṇād iti pratipādāyisyate. anusāmaṇ tu saṁbandhagrahaṇam antareṇa nāsti, na ca sambandho vyāpy asarvavidā grahitum śakyah*).
equated by him with the view that the Bhagavat is not a primary pramāṇa. This reminds us of Nārāyaṇa’s above-mentioned interpretation.  

1.3.2. The expression x-bhūta in the introduction of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Ruegg considered that Bhartṛhari’s use of x-bhūta to express likeness could have been familiar to Dignāga, and regarded it as supporting evidence for his interpretation of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga.  

The beginning of the AKBh could have been familiar to Dignāga, because the PS’s maṅgalaśloka and its explanation in the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (=PSV) seem to be influenced by the AKBh. Previous studies have already indicated that three of the Bhagavat’s four epithets besides pramāṇabhūta in the PS’s maṅgalaśloka correspond to the three characteristics describing the trustworthiness of an authoritative person (āpta) in the Nyāyabhāṣya (=NBh).  

However, we must recognize that the PS’s description of the Bhagavat is probably influenced not directly by the NBh, but via the AKBh or, rather, directly by the AKBh. For, the maṅgalaśloka of the AKBh is as follows:

\[
yah sarvathāsarvahatāndhakāraḥ saṃsārapaṅkāj jagad ujjahāra / 
tasmai namaskṛtya yathārthaśāstre śāstraṃ pravakṣyāmy abhidharmakośam ll
\]

[= Saluting Him who has averted the darkness regarding everything by every manner and means, who emancipates living beings from a morass of reincarnation, who teaches reality as it is, I will teach the treatise named Abhidharmakośa.]

Further, it is to be noted that the compound word saṃsārapaṅka in this maṅgalaśloka is explained by Vasubandhu himself as follows:

AKBh 1,17: saṃsāro hi jagadāsaṅgasthānatvāduruttaratvāc ca paṅkabhūtah.

[= Namely, reincarnation is like a morass, because it is the place to which living beings cling, and from which (living beings) hardly escape.]  

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23 Cf. note 8 in this paper.  
24 Cf. Ruegg 1994a: 309,20ff.; 1995: 821. Ruegg seems to consider that the attestation of the word x-bhūta meaning “x-like” in Bhartṛhari is relevant because his writing had great influence on Dignāga.  
25 Cf. Vetter 1984: note 6; Franco 1997: 28ff. Namely, Pakṣilasvāmin (5th c.) enumerated three characteristics establishing the trustworthiness of the āpta, i.e., 1) having direct knowledge of reality (sākṣātkṛtadharmatā), 2) having compassion towards living beings (bhūtadayā), and 3) having the desire to teach reality as it is (yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā) (cf. NBh 565,6ff.). These correspond respectively to the sugata, the āpta, and the āpta. The Bhāṣya explains the phrases sarvathāsarvahatāndhakāraḥ, saṃsārapaṅkāj, and yathārthaśāstre by the words ātmahitapratipattisaṃpad, parahitapratipattisaṃpad, and parahitapratipattyupāya respectively (cf. AKBh 1.8ff.).  
26 Cf. AKBhVy 5,30f.: saṃsāro hi jagadāsaṅgasthānatvāduruttaratvāc ca paṅkabhūtah iti. [= (Vasubandhu said:) “a morass of reincarnation,” because the reincarnation is like a morass, since it is similar to a morass. Therefore, he said: “Reincarnation is like a morass, because it is the place, to which living beings cling to, and from which (living beings) hardly escape.”]
Dignāga who depended on the AKBh in writing the maṅgalaśloka and the introduction of the PSV could have understood the expression paṅkabhūta as meaning “paṅka-like.”

1.4. The meaning of pramāṇabhūta and Dignāga’s purpose of writing the PS

From the above, it is likely that the word pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga means “who is like pramāṇa (as knowledge),” as Ruegg suggested. This interpretation not only serves to avoid the difficulty in considering bhūta as the equivalent of the copula. The crucial point is, rather, that it corresponds well to Dignāga’s thought about the relationship between pramāṇa as knowledge and the Bhagavat.

As is well known, Dignāga, in contrast to Dharmakīrti, did not talk much about the Bhagavat and Buddhist ontology at least in his logical works.28 The explanations in the PS, except for the maṅgalaśloka, are almost entirely restricted to establishing pramāṇa as knowledge. In this sense, pramāṇa as knowledge is primary (mukhya), and the Bhagavat as pramāṇa is secondary in the PS. In the closing section of the PSV, Dignāga says the following:

Thus,29 this (treatise) has been undertaken only for turning around (vyāvartaṇa) those people who cling to the (opponent’s views), not for introducing (them) to the Tathāgata’s teaching, because his teaching is not the object of reasoning. Those who have turned away (from clinging to the fallacious views), however, can easily comprehend the essence of the teaching which is perfectly manifested, after having listened to it, because (our logic and the logic of the opponents) are at different degrees of distance (from the truth).30 (Namely,)

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29 Cf. Krasser 2004: 134f. I give here my tentative translation according to the following reconstruction of this part which is a result of the joint research workshop on the PST chapter VI held by Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe (Kokugakuin University), Dr. Yasutaka Muroya (Austrian Academy of Sciences) and myself under the support of Prof. Franco, Prof. Chizuko Yoshimizu and Dr. Krasser: iti tadāsaktānāṃ vyāvarta-nārtha 'yam ārambhaḥ, na tv ityā tathāgatāśasanānapravēśarthāḥ, taddharmasyātārakagocaratvāt, vyāvṛtās tu paripūritāṃ dharmatāṃ upāsrutāyatnenaiva pratipatsyante, viprakṛṣṭāntaravatvāt. tarkamātrabalās tīrthyāḥ so 'py anirdīṣṭalakṣaṇāḥ / svaprayogaviruddhāḥ ca na cestārthaprasādhakah // 23 // sudūranaṣṭās tu mūnindrāsānāṃ nayanti ye tarkapathena dharmatām / tathāpi tūrthāgatadharmalakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣyantām yady upāyāti vikriyām // 24 // (Italics are used for words retranslated from the Tibetan translations, whereas normal script is used for the words taken from the PST manuscript.)
30 Krasser interpreted the word viprakṛṣṭāntara as Dvandva, i.e., “remote” and “near” (cf. Krasser 2004: 133f.). However, his interpretation is not supported by PSV’s Tibetan translations, and the PST also does not necessarily seem to support it. Regarding the word viprakṛṣṭāntara, Kumārila’s use is worth considering (cf. the Ślokavārttika, Šabdaniyatādikaraṇa, v.168–169a: tadantarādikātām ca bhāti tenāgrataḥ shtāh / viprakṛṣṭāntarāṃ ca stokadeśe ’pi drśyate // siddhabhināgraḍeshānāṃ dārada-sasamānantā // / [Ganganath Jha’s translation in Jha 1983: 437: “Even in the case of an object which is comparatively much nearer to us (than the Sun really is), we find that persons, – residing at places that are at different degrees of distance from that object, and consequently having their fronts decidedly different from one another, – mistake that distant object to be at equal distances from themselves”]; I would like to thank Dr. Ryō Sasaki for his informing me of this passage). In my opinion, the word viprakṛṣṭāntara can be meaningfully understood only by relating it to the following two verses. Jine-nādabuddhi’s interpretation of this word seems to have somewhat deviated from Dignāga’s original intention.
The opponents depend only on (their) logic. But this very (logic) is one in which (correct) characteristics are not indicated, is one that contradicts its own syllogism, and cannot establish the intended object. (k.23) On the other hand, those who lead (the people) to the essence of the teaching by way of logic, have (also) deviated very far from the teaching by the king of saints. Nevertheless, the essence of the Tathāgata’s teaching is to be considered (by logic) if (it) undergoes a change. (k.24)

Needless to say, it does not mean that Dignāga did not give importance to the Bhagavat. I agree with Krasser in that Dignāga as a pramāṇavādin is definitely Buddhistic.31

2. Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of pramāṇabhūta

Dharmakīrti paraphrases the word pramāṇabhūta in his PV II as follows:

PV II 7 abc’: tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān abhūtavinivṛttaye / bhūtoktiḥ

[= The Bhagavat is a pramāṇa like that (pramāṇa as knowledge) (tadvat). The expression bhūta serves to avert those who have not become (abhūta) (a pramāṇa, likeĪvara and the Veda).]

On the basis of this statement, Śākyabuddhi etc. interpret the word pramāṇabhūta as a compound meaning “he is a pramāṇa, and he has become.”32 However, it is not necessarily clear whether such an interpretation matches Dharmakīrti’s own intention. At least it is obvious that Dharmakīrti did not reinterpret the word pramāṇabhūta in order to use it in his own philosophy. For, unlike in the case of Prajñākaragupta, the word was never really used in Dharmakīrti’s treatises.33 Dharmakīrti uses the word pramāṇa instead of pramāṇabhūta to designate “the Bhagavat as pramāṇa.” He seems to intend to only deconstruct this compound.

Now, how did he understand the original meaning of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga, so that he did not use this word? In order to answer this question, we need to reconsider Devendrabuddhi’s expression pramāṇam iva pramāṇam (tshad ma dang ’dra bas na tshad ma ste) which is referred to by Krasser as the evidence for refuting Ruegg’s interpretation of °bhūta as “like.” This expression first appears in Devendrabuddhi’s introductory remark on PV II 1, where he explains Dignāga’s usage of the word pramāṇabhūta:

32 Cf. PVP(D)1b2; (P)2a1: tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba ni tshad mar ’khrungs pa’o; PV(T)71b5f.; (P)86b4f.: tshad mar ’khrungs pa zhes bya bar (D: ba P) gyur pa’i sgra ni ’khrungs pa’i don to / tshad ma yang de yin la gyur pa yang de yin pas na tshad mar gyur pa’o (cf. Vibhūti 521,27: pramāṇajāta [em. in Krasser 2001: 178: pramāṇaṃ jāta] iti bhūtaśabdaḥ prādurbhāvārthaḥ; PST 2.7: pramāṇaṃ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇabhūtaḥ; note 15 in this paper). The Tibetan translation tshad mar gyur pa is also derived from such interpretation (cf. Hakamaya 2000: (10)f.).
33 As a matter of fact, the translation “who has become a pramāṇa” can be applied only to the word pramāṇabhūta found in the treatises of Dharmakīrti’s followers. Furthermore, whether such a translation is appropriate depends on the context. For example, in Dharmottara’s case, where the word appears in his Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā’s maṅgalaśloka, it may be, contrary to Krasser’s view (cf. Krasser 2001: note 44), appropriately translated as “pramāṇa-like” in Dignāga’s sense, because pramāṇa as knowledge is primary in this treatise, just as in the case of the PS. Regarding Prajñākaragupta, see below.
The statement *pramāṇam iva pramāṇam*, which means that the expression *bhagavān pramāṇa* implies the meaning *iva*, is, according to Śākyabuddhi, the reply to the question “The *pramāṇas* are direct perception and inference. Thus, how can the Bhagavat who is not of their nature be said to be *pramāṇa*?”\(^{35}\) Note that this statement appears immediately after the explanation of the compound *pramāṇabhūta* according to PV II 7bc’. This fact seems to show that such a statement became necessary owing to the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of *bhūta*. Namely, it is possible that Devendrabuddhi interpreted *bhūta* as meaning “has become” and, as a consequence, had to transfer the meaning which the compound *pramāṇabhūta* as a whole originally had in Dignāga to the part *pramāṇa*. If this is the case, it means that *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga was understood as meaning “*pramāṇa*-like” by Devendrabuddhi.

I think that his understanding derives from Dharmakīrti. Devendrabuddhi’s remark on PV II 7a shows it:

\[\text{PVP (D)6b5; (P)7b2f.: } \text{de bzhin bcom ldan tshad ma nyid (PV II 7a: tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān)} \]  
\[\text{\(\big|\) \text{tadvat tshad ma dang yang ci zhi} \text{gtshungs na l’gang gis na tshad ma dang} \text{’dra bas tshad ma nyid yin tshad ma’i mtshan nyid rnam pa gnyis nyid dang mtshungs pa yin no} \big|\]  
\[\text{\(\big|\) \text{\[= The Bhagavat is a *pramāṇa* like that (*pramāṇa* as knowledge). In what way is he like a *pramāṇa*? He is like (a *pramāṇa*) in having the twofold defining characteristic of *pramāṇa* so that, he is (said to be) *pramāṇa*, inasmuch as he is like a *pramāṇa*.]\}^{36}\]

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti shows by the expression *tadvat* that the Bhagavat’s likeness to *pramāṇa* as knowledge means that the Bhagavat has the same twofold defining characteristic that *pramāṇa* as knowledge has (but not that the Bhagavat is secondary to *pramāṇa* as knowledge). Further, Dharmakīrti calls the Bhagavat, not *pramāṇabhūta*, but a *pramāṇa* meaning *pramāṇam iva*, because both the Bhagavat and *pramāṇa* as knowledge are said to be *pramāṇa* in having the twofold defining characteristic.


\(^{35}\) Cf. PVṬ(P)86b5f.; (D)71b6f.: mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa ni tshad ma yin pa de bas na l ji ltar na bcom ldan ’das de’i rang bzhin can ma yin pa la de skad da ce na tshad ma dang ’dra bas na tshad ma stes zhes bya ba smos te; Inami 1994: note 2; Krasser 2001: 178f. I follow Krasser’s translation.

\(^{36}\) Cf. Krasser 2001: 182f. I follow Krasser’s translation in terms of Devendrabuddhi’s remark with some modifications. However, I cannot agree with his view that Devendrabuddhi understood –vat in *tadvat* in a possessive sense and the Tibetan translation *de bzhin* to *tadvat* was a misunderstanding (cf. Krasser 2001: 183). In my opinion, *tadvat* must carry the meaning “like that (*pramāṇa* as knowledge)” in this context, because *tadvat* is nothing but the paraphrase of the word *pramāṇabhūta*. Nevertheless, it is possible that *tadvat* was understood as an intentionally ambiguous expression (a kind of *śleṣa* in Sanskrit rhetoric) by Devendrabuddhi.
I think Devendrabuddhi is right. What Dharmakīrti is doing here is interpreting the word *pramāṇabhūta*; and the Bhagavat’s likeness to *pramāṇa* as knowledge is nothing but what is meant by the word *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga. Thus, the word *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga is probably understood as meaning “*pramāṇa*-like” by Dharmakīrti himself.

3. Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of *pramāṇabhūta*

3.1. *pramāṇabhūta* as a purpose of the PVA

Prajñākaragupta calls the Bhagavat *pramāṇabhūta* in the first *maṅgalaśloka* of his PVA, following Dignāga, and adopts this term as a key concept of his philosophy. However, the meaning of this term in Prajñākaragupta is different from that in Dignāga. The opening paragraph of the PVA, immediately after the *maṅgalaślokas*, clearly shows this difference. In this paragraph, Prajñākaragupta follows the opening section of the PSV with some modifications. Among these modifications, the following two are relevant for our issue:

(1) PSV I 1.3f.: *atra bhagavato hetuphalasampattyā pramāṇabhūtāvatena stotrabhidhānaṃ prakaranādau gauravotpādanārtham*. 

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37 I would like to thank Prof. Inami for the following suggestion expressed by E-mail on the 27. Sept. 2013: “It is possible that Dharmakīrti also understands in the meantime bhūta in *pramāṇabhūta* as meaning ‘like’ by stating *tadvat* in PV II 7a. From PV II 7a onwards, Dharmakīrti apparently begins to explain the word *pramāṇabhūta*, even if commentators would not support it.” (English translation is mine.)

38 The first *maṅgalaśloka*, whose first half is identical to that of the PS, states the purpose of writing the PVA (cf. *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣitāni pranamyā śāstre sugatāya tāyitē / kutakasambhrāntajanānuñkampayā pramāṇaśiddhir vidhivad vidhiyate /)

39 Cf. PSV I 1.3–13: *atra bhagavato hetuphalasampattyā pramāṇabhūtāvatena stotrabhidhānaṃ prakaranādau gauravotpādanārtham*.

40 Regarding the importance of the addition *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇāpekṣayā* after the sentence *tatra hetur āśayaprayogasaṃpat* for Prajñākaragupta’s thought, see Iwata 2001: (48)ff.

41 Hattori’s translation: “At the beginning of the treatise, here [in this verse], I express praise in honor of the Worshipful [Buddha] in order to produce in [the hearts of] men faith in Him who, because of His perfection in cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*), is to be regarded as the personification of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*).”
PVA₀ 1,10–12: *atra bhagavato hetuphasamappattyā pramāṇabhūtavatena stotrhaddhānam śastrādau, śastrārthatvāt. bhagavān eva hi pramāṇabhūto ’smin prasādhyate.*

(2) PSV I 1,10–13: *evamgunam sāstāram pranamya pramāṇasiddhyai svaparakānebhyo nyāyamukhādibhyo iha samāhṛtya pramāṇasamuccayaḥ kariyate parapramāṇapratisēdhāya svapramāṇagnodbdhāvaṇāya ca, yasmāt pramāṇā- yattā prameyapratiśtitthīr bhavaḥ cātra vipratipannāḥ.*

PVA₀ 2,4–7: *evambhūtaṃ bhagavantam pranamya pramāṇasiddhir vidhiyate. pramāṇadhiino hi prameyādihigamaḥ, bhagavān eva ca pramāṇam, pramāṇalakṣaṇasadbhāvāt. pramiyate ’neneti pramāṇam.*

In passage (1), Prajñākaragupta replaces the PSV’s sentence “in order to produce in men faith (*gauravotpādanārtham*)” with the sentence “because (the Bhagavat is) the purpose of the treatise. Namely, the very Bhagavat as *pramāṇabhūta* is to be established here” (*śāstrārthatvāt. bhagavān eva hi pramāṇabhūto ’smin prasādhyate*). Prajñākaragupta shows by this replacement that the Bhagavat is praised right at the beginning of the treatise in order to make it clear that the purpose of the treatise is to establish the Bhagavat as *pramāṇabhūta*.

In passage (2), Dignāga shows that the purpose of the PS is to reject opponents’ theories of *pramāṇa* as knowledge and to establish correctly the Buddhist theories of it. Prajñākaragupta, on the other hand, while showing that the purpose of the PVA is to establish the *pramāṇa*, emphasizes that the *pramāṇa* which he will establish in the PVA is nothing but the Bhagavat. Thus, in the PVA, not *pramāṇa* as knowledge, but the Bhagavat as *pramāṇa*, i.e., *pramāṇabhūta*, is regarded as *pramāṇa* in the primary sense, and is the main topic of the treatise.

### 3.2. The identification of the Bhagavat as *pramāṇabhūta* with pāramārthikapramāṇa

Dharmakīrti uses the word *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa*, meaning direct perception and inference, in the closing paragraph of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*’s first chapter. However, the word *pāramārthikapramāṇa* in the same paragraph does not necessarily mean the Bhagavat.*

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42 Hattori’s translation: “Saluting the teacher who is endowed with such merits, the author will compose the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or the Collected Writings on the Means of Cognition by gathering [passages] from the *Nyāyamukha* and other of his treatises in order to establish the means of valid cognition. The purpose [of the work] is to reject the theories concerning the means of cognition maintained by others and to elucidate the virtues in his own theories concerning the means of cognition, since there are divergent opinions with regard to [the nature, number, object, and result of] the means of cognition, on which depends the clear understanding of the object to be cognized.”

43 The phrase *pramāṇalakṣaṇasadbhāvāt* is related to Prajñākaragupta’s theory of the definition of *pramāṇa* that in the ultimate sense only the Bhagavat has the twofold defining characteristic of *pramāṇa* (cf. Ono 2014).

44 Cf. PVin I 44,2ff.: *sāṃvyavahārikasya caitart pramāṇasya rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā visamvāda- yanti lokam iti, cintāmayī eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmanam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhāhurṣvanti. tad api leśataḥ sācito eveti.*
Prajñākaragupta, however, clearly identifies the Bhagavat with pāramārthikam pramāṇam.45 He calls the Bhagavat paraṃ pramāṇam too.46

The word pramāṇabhūta qualifying the Bhagavat in the PVA can be regarded as a synonym of these terms. The term pāramārthikapramāṇa is used by Prajñākaragupta in the sense that the Bhagavat is the ‘ultimate’ pramāṇa insofar as the trustworthiness of his direct perception is ascertained by itself, whereas ordinary direct perception and inference are conventional pramāṇas.47 According to Prajñākaragupta, the Bhagavat as pramāṇabhūta is by nature a direct perception (pratyakṣaśrīrāpa).48 It is clear from this point that Prajñākaragupta interprets pramāṇa in pramāṇabhūta literally.49

3.3. Blo ldan shes rab’s rendering of pramāṇabhūta as tshad ma yang dag (pa)

As is well known, sKal ldan rgyal po and Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) translate the word pramāṇabhūta qualifying the Bhagavat in the PVA as tshad ma yang dag (pa), i.e., “true pramāṇa,”50 while rendering the same word qualifying cognitions etc. in the same text as tshad mar (’)gyur pa.51 Although the translation of bhūta as yang dag (pa) is not impossible in itself,52 it can be regarded as reflecting Prajñākaragupta’s usage of the word.

However, Prajñākaragupta himself does not give any analysis of the compound by which such a translation can be justified.53 His new interpretation that the sentence abhūtaviniṛttyaye bhūtakīthā (PV II 7bc)’ means “the Bhagavat tells the truth in order to

45 Cf. PVA 67,12ff.; Ms26a8: bhagavān eva ca paramārthataḥ kāryakāraṇabhūve pāramārthikam pramāṇam vyāpyanavayantarikagrahyānād iti pratipāditam. (cf. PVAQ 12,12ff.; note 22 in this paper).
46 Cf. PVA 83,15ff.: bhagavatas tarhi kathām pramāṇīyam, pratyakṣaśrīrāmāyaḥ hi viyavahārāmātrenā pramāṇam, na bhagavataḥ. tadbhiḥ paraṃ pramāṇam. atrocyan – tadbhiḥ pramāṇam bhagavān (PV II 7a).
47 Insofar as the trustworthiness of ordinary direct perception can be ascertained only in a conventional sense and inference postulates the omniscience of the Bhagavat in order to be universally right (cf. note 22 in this paper; Ono 1994; 2012; 2014).
48 Cf. PVA 84,1ff.: tathāgato hi bhagavān tadvān iti kṛtvā pratyakṣaśrīrāpa eva bhagavān pramāṇam.
49 It corresponds to the fact that Prajñākaragupta interprets the word tadvāt in PV II 7 in the possessive meaning (cf. Krasser 2001: 181, and note 36 above).
50 Cf. Hakamaya 2000: (11). The rendering tshad ma yang dag (pa) is attested many times also in the Tibetan translation of Yāmāri’s commentary on the PVA by Sumati and Blo ldan shes rab. Many examples of this appear in Yāmāri’s remark on the maṅgalaśloka and the introductory paragraph of the PVA. In the Tibetan translation of Jayanta’s commentary on the PVA by Śrī Dipaṃkararaksita and Byang chub shes rab, the rendering tshad ma yang dag (pa) is attested only once, whereas the rendering tshad mar gyur pa is attested many times.
51 The word pramāṇabhūta qualifying cognitions or treatises etc. is also attested in the PVA (cf. PVA 385,1ff.: pramāṇabhūtapratyayakṣam; PVA 494,9ff.: śāstrād eva pramāṇabhūtā; PVA 568,6ff.: pramāṇabhūtā pratyayapratipādyāḥ). In those cases, bhūta can be understood as the equivalent of the copula without problems and the Tibetan equivalent of it is almost tshad mar (’)gyur pa. In Yāmāri’s commentary as well, the rendering tshad mar gyur pa is attested many times. Most of them qualify Veda, Niyoga, words, cognitions etc. But some of them qualify the Bhagavat. Among them we can find some interesting examples, as we shall see later.
52 Cf. Ruegg 1994a: note 44; Hakamaya 2000: 324ff.; Steinkellner 2003: note 15. Interestingly, Jonathan A. Silk found the Chinese equivalent 真實稱量 for pramāṇabhūta in the Chinese translation of the Śīksāsamuccaya 大乘集菩薩學論 (cf. Silk 2002: note 26); there bhūta is rendered as 真實, i.e., true or real, just like in the case of tshad ma yang dag (pa).
53 As far as I am aware, Yāmāri refers to the word bhūta in pramāṇabhūta as follows: “Further, supposing the question ‘why is only the Bhagavat pramāṇa (in the true sense) and others not?,” (Prajñākaragupta)
avert error”\(^{54}\) appears to justify the translation \textit{tshad ma yang dag (pa)} because the word \textit{bhūta} means the contrary concept of “error” (\textit{bhrānti}), i.e., “truth” or “true” in this context. What Prajñākaragupta really intends here is, however, not to interpret the word \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta}, but to justify his own usage of the word \textit{pramāṇabhūta} by interpreting Dharmakīrti’s word \textit{bhūtokti} as not referring to \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta}.

3.4. Yamāri’s interpretation of the compound \textit{pramāṇabhūta}

Then, how should we interpret the compound \textit{pramāṇabhūta} in Prajñākaragupta? Yamāri’s commentary provides us with an important clue to Prajñākaragupta’s understanding. Among Yamāri’s two different interpretations, the second interpretation explaining \textit{pramāṇabhūta} as “\textit{pramāṇa-like}” has been mentioned above. The first one, which can be regarded as Yamāri’s own interpretation, is as follows:

Yamāri [Phe] (D)188b5f.; (P)226a3f.: ’di rtsom pa yang ci zhi gya nas yin zhe na / bshad pa phyag chal nas te rab tu btud cing lus phul nas so (D: song P) / su la zhe na / tshad ma yang dag gam tshad mar gyur pa la’o\(^{55}\) // tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa ’am tshad mar thob pa’o //; Ms 10b1–2 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80)

[= (Question:) Further, what has been done before beginning to write this (treatise)? (Prajñākaragupta) replies: “saluting,” i.e., bowing his head and throwing his body on the ground. (Question:) To whom? (Prajñākaragupta replies:) To \textit{pramāṇabhūta}. (The compound) \textit{pramāṇabhūta} means “who has reached the means of cognition (\textit{*pramāṇaṃ gataḥ}),” in other words, “who has attained trustworthiness (\textit{*prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ}).”]

By comparing this with Śākyabuddhi’s explanation of the compound \textit{parabhāvabhūta} found in the \textit{Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti}, one can assume that the Sanskrit equivalent of the sentence \textit{tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa}\(^{56}\) is probably \textit{*pramāṇaṃ gataḥ pramāṇabhūtaḥ}, and it is also clear that this sentence shows the interpretation of \textit{bhūta} as the equivalent of the copula.\(^{57}\) Further, \textit{tshad mar thob pa} is most likely the rendering of \textit{prāmāṇyaṃ}

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\(^{55}\) I assume that \textit{gam tshad mar gyur pa} is a kind of gloss. The rendering should be merely \textit{tshad ma yang dag}, insofar as the word \textit{pramāṇabhūta} qualifies the Bhagavat in this case, but the general translation \textit{tshad mar gyur pa} is added here to the semantic translation, probably because the interpretation of the compound itself is talked about (cf. Ms 10b2; Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80).

\(^{56}\) The Tibetan \textit{tshad mar red pa} literally means “being \textit{pramāṇa}.”

\(^{57}\) Commenting on the compound \textit{parabhāvabhūta} in the PVSV, which cannot but be understood as a pleonastic expression, Śākyabuddhi explains it as \textit{gzhan gyi ngo bor red pa}, the Sanskrit equivalent
prāptaḥ,⁵⁸ which is the same as Kaiyaṭa’s explanation of Patañjali’s pramāṇabhūta and therefore means “being pramāṇa” as well. Thus, Yamāri shows here the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “being pramāṇa.”⁵⁹

Further, in commenting on Prajñākaragupta’s above-mentioned statement “because (the Bhagavat is) the purpose of the treatise” (śāstrārthatvāt), Yamāri says as follows:

Yamāri [Phe](D)198b5f.; (P)237a6ff.: gal te ’o na bcom ldan ’das mngon sum gyi khyad par gyi rang bzhin yin mod / gang gi bstan bcos kyi don yin pas bstan bcos blang byar ’gyur ba de tsam gyis (D: gyi P) bdag cag la nye bar mkho ba ni ma yin no / tshad ma yang dag pas zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so / tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa zhes bya ba’i don to / ma byung ba las byung ba ni yin yang brjod par mi ’dod pa’i phyir rtsi ba’i rkyen med do / dper na “au pa las yang man (D: u tpa las yan P) ni rang gi rgyu las so” zhes bya ba ’dir / Pa tan dzi lis bshad pa “de la phan pa ’jig pa ni / sna tshogs pa’i phyir ro ll des na (D: na lacking in P) de la phan pa ma byas so” zhes bya ba de bzhin du ’dir yang lta’o (D: bta P) ll; Ms 16a4–5 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2018: 44)

[= (Objection:) Then, even if the Bhagavat is by nature a special direct perception, it is so far not helpful for us in accepting the treatise because (the Bhagavat) is the purpose of the treatise. (Prajñākaragupta) replies: “(the very Bhagavat) as pramāṇabhūta” etc. (The compound) pramāṇabhūta means “who has reached the means of cognition (*pramāṇam gataḥ).” Namely, the suffix meaning “become” (*cviprayaya) does not exist (in the expression pramāṇabhūta) because, even though (the Bhagavat) has become what he was not previously, it is not intended to mention (it). Also in this case, one should consider (it) according to Patañjali who explains: “The operations of taddhita are manifold and hence the taddhita-suffix is not found (vicitrās taddhita-vṛttayo nātas taddhita utpadyate)” regarding (Pāṇini 1.3.56:) “After the verb yam- preceded by upa-, when used in the sense of ‘espousing,’ (ātmanepada is employed) (upād yamah svakaraṇe).”]

Although this paragraph is not easy to understand, it is at least clear that Yamāri presents here again the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “being pramāṇa” and mentions that the expression pramāṇabhūta does not mean “has become what he was not previously” (*abhūtataddhāva)⁶⁰ since the cvi-suffix does not exist in it. At the end of this paragraph,

of which is parabhāvaṃ gataḥ, as found in Karṇakagomin’s commentary (cf. PVṬ(D)37b3; (P)44b5: gzhan gyi (D: gyis P) ngo bor gyur pa ni gzhan gyi ngo bor red pa ste; PVSVṬ 72,16f.: parabhāvaṃ gataḥ parabhāvabhūtaḥ).

⁵⁸ This assumption can be ascertained by the Sanskrit manuscript (cf. Ms 10b2; Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80). The explanation prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ is referred to also by Vibhūticandra (cf. note 62 in this paper).

⁵⁹ In Yamāri’s case, however, “being pramāṇa” does not mean “being authority,” as in the case of grammarians, but “being valid cognition.” See above, section 1.1 in this paper.

⁶⁰ The Sanskrit equivalent of ma byung ba las byung ba is normally abhūtvā bhāva (Mahāvyutpatti 2182). But, abhūtataddhāva or abhūtaprādurbhāva is also possible (cf. note 8 in this paper). The meaning is not different in any case. Cf. Ms 16a5; Li, Chu and Franco 2018: 44.
Yamāri tries to reinforce his argument by referring to Patañjali’s explanation to Panini-sūtra 1.3.56.\(^{61}\)

Thus, we can find some parallels between Yamāri’s statements including his reference to the interpretation pramāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ and the explanations of pramāṇabhūta by MBh-commentators.\(^{62}\) It is noteworthy that the time of Yamāri’s activity (ca. 1000–1060)\(^{63}\) seems to be close to that of Kaiyāṭa.\(^{64}\) The parallel between the grammarians and the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school which Ruegg suggested may be a result of actual influence of one on the other.\(^{65}\)

In any case, it is clear from the above that Yamāri interprets the compound pramāṇabhūta as meaning “being pramāṇa,” while presupposing the existence of other interpretations like “pramāṇa-like” and “who has become a pramāṇa.” In my view, Yamāri’s interpretation is not contradictory to either Prajñākaragupta’s identification of the word with pāramārthikapramāṇa, or to Blo Idan shes rab’s translation tshad ma yang dag (pa). Rather, among various interpretations of the word, only the interpretation “being pramāṇa” can be in harmony with Prajñākaragupta’s usage of the word. For, the expression “who is A” can carry the meaning “who is the true A” or “who is A in the true sense.”\(^{66}\)

Taking the above into consideration, I would like to propose the translation “who is a pramāṇa in the true sense” for the term pramāṇabhūta when qualifying the Bhagavat in Prajñākaragupta.

### 4. Conclusion

The results of the above consideration are summarized in Table 1.

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\(^{61}\) Commenting on Panini 1.3.56 which prescribes that ātmanepada should be employed after the verb upa-yam- in the sense of “espousing.” Patañjali states the following: “(Question:) How does (the active voice) not appear here, like in the sentence ‘he holds (upayacchati) the end of his cloth’? (Answer:) (the active voice) should appear where one makes one’s own what was not previously one’s own (like in the case that one has illicit intercourse with another’s wife). (However) if so, it follows that the word in the Sūtra should be svikaraṇe (instead of svakaraṇe according to Panini 5.4.50: [abhūtatadbhāve] kṛbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cviḥ). The operations of taddhitu are manifold (i.e., the cvi-suffix does not appear if one does not wish to say that one makes one’s own what was not previously one’s own) and hence the taddhita-suffix is not found (cf. MBh I,284,10–12: iha kasmān na bhavai – svam śājakāntam upayacchatīti. asvam yadā svam karoti, tadā bhavitavyam. yady evaṃ svikaraṇa iti prāpnoti. vicitrās taddhitavṛttayaḥ, nātas taddhita upadyate).” Concerning the identification of Yamāri’s citation, I would like to thank Prof. Vincent Eltschinger, Prof. Hiroshi Nemoto, Dr. Junjie Chu and Dr. Yasutaka Muroya for their valuable suggestions.

\(^{62}\) Cf. notes 7 and 8 in this paper. In addition, we can find the following notable sentences in Vibhūticandra’s remark (cf. Vibhūti 521.29ff.: pramāṇaśabdo jñāne mukhya itaratra tu kena sādharmyenaupamānopa-meyatvam ity āha – avisamvāditi. prāptivāc āttham spāṣṭārtham ity asau na vivṛtaḥ pramāṇyam prāptaḥ pramāṇabhūta iti). Their meaning is unfortunately not entirely clear for me.


\(^{64}\) Cf. Cardona 1976: 347, note 344.


Table 1: The interpretations of *pramāṇabhūta*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dignāga</th>
<th>Dharmakīrti</th>
<th>Prajñākaragupta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the Bhagavat called?</td>
<td><em>pramāṇabhūta</em></td>
<td><em>pramāṇa</em> (=<em>pramāṇam iva</em>)</td>
<td><em>pramāṇabhūta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning of <em>pramāṇabhūta</em></td>
<td>“<em>pramāṇa</em>-like”</td>
<td>“[“who has become a <em>pramāṇa</em>”]&quot;</td>
<td>“<em>pramāṇa</em> in the true sense”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function of <em>bhūta</em></td>
<td>“<em>x</em>-bhūta” means “<em>x</em>-like”</td>
<td><em>abhūtaviniyātaye bhūtoktiḥ</em></td>
<td>copula implying “in true sense”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentator’s explana- nation of the compound <em>pramāṇabhūta</em></td>
<td><em>pramāṇam iva pramāṇabhūtāḥ.</em> (Jayanta, Yamāri)</td>
<td><em>pramāṇam cāsau bhūtasya ceti pramāṇabhūtāḥ.</em> (Śākyabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi)</td>
<td><em>pramāṇam gatah pramāṇabhūtāḥ,</em> <em>prāmāṇyaṃ prāptah pramāṇabhūtāḥ.</em> (Yamāri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between <em>pramāṇa</em> and the Bhagavat</td>
<td><em>pramāṇa</em> &gt; Bhagavat (<em>pramāṇa</em> is mukhya)</td>
<td><em>pramāṇa</em> = Bhagavat (in having the twofold defining characteristic of <em>pramāṇa</em>)</td>
<td><em>pramāṇa</em> &lt; Bhagavat (Bhagavat is mukhya)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†*pramāṇa* means “valid cognition” in all cases
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PS Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga).


PSV Pramāṇasamuccayaṁvṛtti (Dignāga).


PVAo See Ono 2000.

PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
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Dharmakīrti on the Role of Salvific Initiation and the Reception of His Critique in the Later Śaiva Tradition

by
Cristina Pecchia

In memory of Helmut Krasser

Towards the end of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (= PV II) Dharmakīrti examines various non-Buddhist theories about how to attain liberation. In this context, he discusses the function of the ritual of dīkṣā, “initiation,” in attaining the elimination of the soul’s sins or impurities and, thus, the liberation from the cycle of transmigrations.

An original point-by-point refutation of the Buddhist opinion represented in Dharmakīrti’s text is expounded – as Attilia Sironi has indicated – by Kṣemarāja (approximately 1000–1050 CE) in his commentary on Svacchandatantra V.88, where he provides a survey of different views on initiation. In this way, the target of Dharmakīrti’s critique is confirmed as corresponding to the followers of tantric ideas and practices who advocate a Śaiva type of salvific initiation. Indeed, as observed by Alexis Sanderson and Raffaele Torella, PV II.259ab refers to an initiate who is lighter than before the performance of the initiation, very likely alluding to the tulādīkṣā, a ritual characterized by the use of a balance (tulā). More generally, dīkṣā is described in Śaiva sources as the action that removes all the bonds (pāśas) or innate impurity (mala) which causes rebirth and, therefore, is the necessary step to be made in order to attain liberation. The special type of ritual that includes a balance is widely attested in Śaiva sources, from the early Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, from

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2 Attilia Sironi, assisted by Raniero Gnoli, has published an Italian translation of the Uddyota passage here under consideration and the relevant part of the PV (Sironi 1988).


4 As it is not clear when the term tantra became a standard designation for texts of tantric revelation (see Niśvāsa, pp. 30f.), it might be anachronistic to speak of “tantric” ideas and practices in Dharmakīrti’s time.

5 The numbering of the kārikās accords to that established in Vetter 1964: 116f.

6 Sanderson 2001: 10f., n. 7. Raśeore Torella’s identification of the ritual as a Śaiva type of initiation is reported in Franco 2001, n. 24.

7 See, for example, Sanderson 1988: 662, 664ff. and 691; Sanderson 1992: 285; and Acharya 2014: 16f., with nn. 25 and 27.

8 Niśvāsa, Mūlasūtra 7:15ab: tulayā śodhayet pāpam ātmanasya parasya vā; see also Niśvāsa, p. 324, Acharya 2014: 16, and Eltschinger 2014: 123, n. 102.
sometime between 450 and 550 CE, to later works of eminent authors such as Sadyojyotis and Abhinavagupta.

In what follows I will analyse the PV section on initiation and the related response of Kṣemarāja. The skillful use of rhetorical means seems to shape both texts, in the former adding a sarcastic nuance to the refutation of the opponents’ view, in the latter covertly minimizing the long past Buddhist attack. This investigation will contribute to our understanding of Dharmakīrti’s engagement in discussing contemporary soteriological ideologies and, on the other hand, to our understanding of how his thought reverberated in a later and different intellectual environment such as the Śaiva one.

In this study I take Manorathanandin’s Vyrtti (PVV) as the guiding commentary. The indicators typical of commentarial phraseology (e.g., nanu, cet, and syād etal) show that, in his opinion, PV II.257–267 forms a section in which Dharmakīrti addresses the followers of the Scriptures of the Lord (īśvarāgama) with regard to salvific initiation (hereafter “section on initiation”). The two subsequent kārikas, kk. 268–269, present a discussion of the existence of the self that can be regarded as continuing the refutation of the previous soteriological view; however, it does not display any explicit indications with regard to it.

The section on initiation consists of six short thematic units:

a) K. 257, where, against those who claim the salvific effects of an initiation, Dharmakīrti argues that they explain such an effect by resorting to the authority of the Scriptures only – which is not satisfactory.

b) Kk. 258–259, where, showing the undesired consequences of their claim, he argues that a ritual such as initiation is not sufficient to stop rebirth and that bad deeds are not something that can be embodied.

c) Kk. 260–261, where Dharmakīrti presents the Buddhist view of how to attain liberation, especially focusing on the role of karman in the perpetuation of rebirths.

d) Kk. 262–264, which concern the nature of karmic impulses (samskāras). These are related to the unseen force (adṛṣṭa) of merits and demerits for the upholders of salvific initiation, but to cetanā for the Buddhists.

e) Kk. 265–266, which explain the role of the mind and the nature of mental faults with regard to the cognitive faculties’ agency and rebirth.

f) K. 267, where Dharmakīrti explains that the nature of the mind cannot be permanent.

After stating the unacceptability of resorting to Scriptures to argue for salvific initiation, Dharmakīrti points out that, when urged to prove the efficacy of initiation, the followers of

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10 See TAK III, s.v. tulādikṣā.
11 See Torella 1992 for some reflexions on the relationships between Pratyabhijñā thought and the Buddhist logical-epistemological system.
12 PVV 98.17: nanūktam īśvareṇāgame ‘stṛ ātmā mokṣaś cāsya dīkṣāvidhineti, and 100.15f.... syād etad ātmano ’pi garbhagatakaranādijanane vyāpāraḥ sa eva dīkṣāyā niruddha iti na punarjanmety.
13 The Tibetan tradition represented in dGe ‘dun grub pa’s topical outlines (sa bcad) takes the kk. 264–269 as one thematic unit within the section that begins at k. 257 (dbang phyug pa’i grol lam dgyag pa – “Refuting the path to deliverance of the devotees of īśvara;” see Inami & Tillemans 1986: 133f. and 140, items 166–171). Note that the word dbang denotes special rituals such as initiation.
14 For the text and translation, see the Appendix.
the Scriptures of the Lord adduce arguments which lead to \textit{prasāṅgas}. For they compare the efficacy of initiation with the efficacy of rituals applied to physical objects and consider the initiate’s weighing less after the performance of the ritual a proof of the initiate’s elimination of sins and attainment of liberation.

Dharmakīrti explicitly identifies the former alleged proof as implying the undesired consequence that one would then have to believe in the salvific power of other rituals, too, such as oil massage or scorching oneself with fire. A human being would be like a seed: if treated with oil or burnt by fire, it does not generate a sprout (k. 258cd). Further, Dharmakīrti covertly suggests that the opponents’ proof implies a \textit{prasāṅga}; for, saying that even the initiates’ loss of their entire weight would not be a proof of their loss of sins (k. 259c), he alludes to the eventual implication that liberation corresponds to having no weight at all. To this he adds the inference “sin is not heavy because it is not embodied” (k. 259d), which refutes the opponents’ implicit inference that is based on the reason “because sin is embodied” – a reason that may be indicative of another fact such as the loss of sins after initiation only within a physicalist view of sins. Although Dharmakīrti does not expand on this, his audience can go back to the refutation of the materialist view on rebirth explained in a previous part of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, where, showing that the mental does not depend on the corporeal, he argued for the non-physicality of faults that prevent living beings from attaining liberation.

The opening of Dharmakīrti’s critique of salvific initiation seems to be designed to persuade the audience, before any demonstration, of the evident implausibility of a soteriological method based on a ritual ceremony. In fact, the examples of an oil massage and a ritual with a balance easily remind one of magical treatments and freak shows. Mentioning them, Dharmakīrti seems to be adopting a rhetorical strategy that reinforces the \textit{prasāṅgas} with which his refutation begins: he intentionally exposes the simplicity of the opponents’ soteriological proposal and the unsophisticatedness of their proof, also evoking the unreliability and negligibility of the latter.

His refutation continues with a more general assertion, at kk. 260–261, concerning the causes of rebirth from the Buddhist point of view. The content of the text is quite similar to the idea expounded at PV II.81 and 189, where Dharmakīrti states that rebirth is rooted in misjudgement and thirst, and it is thirst rather than karma that ultimately effects the setting in motion of the continuum of the five \textit{skandha}s. Arguing against salvific initiation, he not only reasserts the primacy of cognitive and emotional experience, but also emphasizes the subordinate role of karma in the Buddhist discourse on liberation. Moreover, he elaborates on the nature of ignorance and thirst by saying that they are \textit{cetanā} (“intention,” or “volition”) and are connected with karma (\textit{te cetane svayaṃ karmety} – k. 261c). His formulation refers to a notion that appears in canonical and Abhidharmic sources – famously in AN III.415 and in AK 4.1ab, where it is said that the manifold

15 See, in particular, PV II.34–53. For a study and English translation of the text, see Franco 1997, chapter 4 and pp. 159–258, and Taber 2003.
17 See Heim 2013 for a comprehensive study of \textit{cetanā} as presented in relevant Pāli sources.
18 “It is volition (\textit{cetana}), monks, that I call karma. Having willed (\textit{cetayitvā}), one performs an action (\textit{kammaṃ karoti}) by body, by speech, by mind” (Harvey 2011: 182).
world is caused by karma, which is characterized by intention (karmaḥ lokāvicitryaṃ cetanā tat kṛtaṃ ca tat).

The subsequent text features a more committed Dharmakīrti, who explains why salvific initiation is considered problematic and takes into serious account his opponents’ argument. In a Buddhist soteriological perspective, he states, it is the series of seeds continuously generating mental faults that has to be stopped, but initiation, as a ritual, does not have any impact on mental faults.

Upholders of salvific initiation can argue against this stance focussing on the nature and role of karma. Their main argument is concerned with the nature of saṃskāras, “karmic impulses,” which in their view are linked to adṛṣṭa (“the unseen”), a latent force from which physical and mental actions ultimately derive and which is eliminated through initiation. From a Buddhist point of view, however, the saṃskāras are connected to cetanā,19 which performs its function as long as the sense faculties exist. Therefore, a ritual performance such as initiation, which does not affect the sense faculties’ capacity of being operative, cannot hinder their capacity of generating physical and mental activity (kk. 262–264).

The two positions are based on antithetic doctrinal views. Dharmakīrti takes the opportunity to discuss them as regards their implications in view of rebirth, shifting the focus to the causes of rebirth, i.e., mental faults. He has the upholders of salvific initiation point out that if actions are linked to the mind only, the absence of mind – which is the case at the time of death – would also imply the absence of rebirth. The Buddhist reply to this is that mental impurities are what links the mind to another birth; therefore, one could accept initiation as a means to liberation only if such a special ritual affected this capacity of the impurities. But the Buddhists do not believe that a ritual performance can determine the results of future actions, since it cannot affect the series of mental faults which arise from their own seeds, and whose capacity and perpetuation depends on the presence of what nourishes them, i.e., the view of a self (kk. 265–266).

However, the mention of bījas in the present context seems to be parallel to the example of a bīja in k. 258, where Dharmakīrti refers to the special treatment of a seed that hinders the seed’s capacity of generating a sprout. Thus, the discussion of the effects of initiation seems to be intentionally enclosed between two references to bījas which, given their difference, amplify the polarization of the debate over the causes of rebirth. On the Buddhist side, the metaphor of the seed (bīja) in relation to the series of faults is linked to the traditional view of causation referred to in texts such as the Śālistambasūtra and the AK, where the stock example is the arising of a sprout from a seed and other causes. It should be noted that this metaphor is not predictable in Dharmakīrti’s work. In fact, it piles up especially in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter and occurs in a few places of the Svārthānumāna and Pratyakṣa chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika, suggesting that Dharmakīrti mentioned the example of the seed in order to show how his philosophical discourse linked to the Abhidharmic tradition.

The informed discussion of salvific initiation presented in the PV confirms that materials relating to groups of Śaiva worshippers were available to Dharmakīrti and his audience.

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19 As observed by D. Keown, saṃskāras “designate the transformative effect that moral action has upon the character of the agent” and “Phalas (referred to in Buddhism as karma-vipāka) denote not the end product of a transpersonal causal chain but the effect of saṃskāric change as experienced by the actor” (Keown 1996: 336f.). Dharmakīrti’s text can be taken as evidence for Keown’s statement that “a coherent account of karma can be given purely in terms of saṃskāras” (ibid., p. 337).
as significant parts of their religious and intellectual environment. Further, although the intellectual apparatus of the tantric communities was very likely still quite thin, these groups were probably well aware of the necessity of having their soteriological programme legitimized at various levels. The fact that they provide a physical proof of the validity of their ritual procedure is indeed telling about their programmatic effort of gaining a place in society for their soteriological proposal. When Dharmakīrti specifically refers to the *tulādīkṣā*, he is not only arguing against another way of attaining liberation, but also, or primarily, against the demonstrative value attached to a ritual performance, as if liberation from suffering could be equated to a reduction of bodily weight. The *tulādīkṣā* was a perfect example to this end, namely casting a bad light on the tantric proposal for liberation.

However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to specify the identity of Dharmakīrti’s target, whether he was addressing various groups that shared some basic ideas based on their belief in īśvara, or practitioners whose ideology was represented in a particular tantric work. Some key terms in the section on initiation point to ideas and practices that correspond to those attested in the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā*, testifying to early forms of concepts that will develop and appear in later tantric texts in different forms and sometimes under different names. A case in point is the idea of impurity, which is referred to as *pāpa* (“bad deed” or “sin”) in the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā* and in the PV section on initiation. The term *pāpa* mentioned at k. 259 refers to an imperceptible material substance (*dravya*) and is contrasted with *mala* (k. 265), which Dharmakīrti uses to designate mental impurity within a Buddhist discourse, as can be seen in PV II.208–209 and 212. Thus, the PV section on initiation bears witness to a stage of the development of tantric doctrines earlier than that attested in the *Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* (not later than the middle of the seventh century), where the term *mala*, together with *pāśa* (bonds), denotes three distinct types of impurities that cover the soul. Indeed, D. Acharya has argued that strong criticism from the Buddhists urged the Śaivas to reformulate their claims on the removal of sin through initiation. It is to be noted that the tantric doctrinal development reflected by the use of the term *mala* in extant written sources does not correspond to a change in the role of initiation, which maintains its function of making Śiva intervene in the initiand’s life and allowing the initiand to eventually attain liberation.

The concept of impurities features prominently in section V.88 of Kṣemarāja’s *Uddyota* on *Svačhandatantra* (SvaTU), which concludes the chapter concerning tantric initiation. In the *pūrvapakṣa* he has the Buddhists (saugatāḥ) dispute tantric purification and its four possible objects, which are the self, the mind, actions, and impurities such as the view of a self. Also, at the beginning of his response to the Buddhist criticism he explains the

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20 See Eltschinger 2014: 125ff. for a consideration of the mention of tantric works in the Svārthānumāna chapter of the PV, and Bisschop 2010: 483–486 for some considerations about the presence of the Pāśupata movement around the middle of the first millennium.

21 On these kārikās see Pecchia 2015: 148–153 and the respective sections in Part 3, “Comments upon the Kārikās ...”.

22 See *Niśvāsa*, pp. 40ff., and Acharya 2014: 10ff.


24 SvaTU 73.10–13: *tad utra dīkṣāyām eva pratayahatihante saugatāḥ – iha dīksayā kim ātmanāḥ saṃskāraḥ kriyate buddher vā? kim ātmagrahādīnāṃ malānāṃ, kiṃ vā karmanāṃ?*
Śaiva typology of impurities which cover the self.\textsuperscript{25} In both cases, he seems to be blissfully unaware of earlier articulations of the tantric concept of impurity.

The Buddhists mentioned by Kṣemarāja, as Sironi has shown, can be easily identified with Dharmakīrti and followers of his ideas, since most of the arguments in the pūrvapakṣa consist in a free paraphrase of formulations found in the PV section on initiation. Also, the uttarapakṣa includes citations from the same passage. The following issues from the pūrvapakṣa, in particular, can be linked to the PV:

1. If the mind were not capable of moving the senses after initiation, the senses of an initiate could not be active (SvaTU 75.1f. → PV II.265cd).
2. Mental faults together with their karmic impressions do not disappear in an initiate (SvaTU 75.2f. → PV II.266cd).
3. If the mind were eradicated immediately after initiation, the body would dissolve and there would not be any activity (SvaTU 75.3ff. → PV II.264d–265a).
4. The āgama as a valid means of cognition (SvaTU 75.10f. → PV II.257).
5. If actions could be destroyed only by initiation because they are not embodied, they would not possess any power even in the case of an oil massage or scorching oneself with fire; also, if the initiation with scales (dhaṭadīkṣā)\textsuperscript{26} makes the initiate lighter, sin should be embodied (SvaTU 75.11–76.1 → PV II.258–259).

In his discussion Kṣemarāja avails himself of the devices elaborated in a centuries-long reflection within non-dualist Śaiva thought. However, while arguing from a coherent and mature perspective, he also seems to employ a rhetorical strategy aiming to neutralize the negative nuance covertly generated by Dharmakīrti’s remarks on initiation. As can be seen in Table 1, he in fact reverses the PV sequence of arguments. The segment PV II.258–259, which presents a prasaṅga and Dharmakīrti’s sarcastic remarks against initiation, appears only at the end of Kṣemarāja’s pūrvapakṣa and is split in two parts in the uttarapakṣa, where k. 258 is discussed at the very beginning and k. 259 towards the end, followed by a defense of the validity of the Śaiva Scriptures.

In his response, Kṣemarāja first states that Dharmakīrti’s critique concerning the undesired consequence of ritual initiation in fact reveals the risibility of the Buddhist point of view.\textsuperscript{27} He then adduces the argument of mantras, which, given their inconceivable power, also possess the capacity of eliminating bonds.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} SvaTU 76.4–10: ayam ātmā … āṇavena malena … kārmena … māyākhyena malena ca valitaḥ.
\textsuperscript{26} Sironi’s Italian translation of dhaṭadīkṣā” (SvaTU 75.17) with “iniziazione del vaso” (1988: 93) seems to presuppose the reading ghaṭadīkṣā”, because “vaso” (in English “pot”) is a usual translation of ghaṭa. However, the reading ghaṭa is problematic in the present SvaTU context and might be due to an oversight. An analogous oversight might have caused Sironi’s translations of dhaṭasuddhitvat and dhaṭavat (SvaTU 81.4 and 7) with “come quando si pulisce un vaso” and “così come accade di un vaso,” respectively (Sironi 1988: 97). With regard to the latter passage Sironi explicitly states that she reads ghaṭataḥ, and not dhaṭa”, by saying that she emends the edited text ghaṭataḥ to ghaṭavat (Sironi 1988: 97, n. 37).
\textsuperscript{27} SvaTU 77.7f.: tat teṣām eva upahāsyatām āviṣkaroti.
\textsuperscript{28} SvaTU 77.13f.: acintyaprabhāvatvāt teṣām pāśapraśamane ’pi sāmartyaṃ kiṃ na sahyate.
Table 1: Arrangement of PV II.257–267 (on ritual initiation) in Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on Svachchandatantra V.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PV kārikās grouped in thematic units according to the PVV</th>
<th>PV kārikās in the SvaTU pūrvapakṣa&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>PV kārikās in the SvaTU uttarapakṣa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>265cd (75.1f.)</td>
<td>258 (77.5f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258–259</td>
<td>266cd (75.2f.)</td>
<td>266cd (77.15f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260–261</td>
<td>264d–265a (75.3ff.)</td>
<td>262a–c, 264 (80.14f., 18f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262–264</td>
<td>257 (75.10f.)</td>
<td>259c (81.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265–266</td>
<td>258ac–259 (75.11–76.1)</td>
<td>257 (82.7f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>[256 (82.10f.)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Page and line numbers of the SvaTU edition are given in brackets.

One of his main concerns, however, is the nature of faults and the means for their final elimination. The view expounded in PV II.266, in particular, engages him in a longer analysis aiming to demonstrate, first, that the cleansing of impurities is not distinct from that of the self and, second, that initiation can hinder the arising of faults because it has the capacity of eventually effecting the purification of the self. In this connection, Kṣemarāja argues again for the special powers of mantras. Even if they cannot cancel the karman that supports the present body and its related passions, they are able to hinder any future arising of bonds (pāśas). Their way of operating is exemplified by the case of an ugly man who by means of mantras obtains a very beautiful wife, although his ugliness is not cancelled.<sup>29</sup>

Kṣemarāja’s emphasis on the force of mantras in connection with karman and impurities points out his commitment in holding onto the tradition and providing evidence for its tenability. A similar commitment is shown when he explains the loss of weight after initiation, which he regards as being due to the elimination of the cause of weight, namely tamas. A quite different attitude was possible, though, as is evident from Abhinavagupta’s consideration of the tulādīkṣā as a means to give confidence to deluded people.<sup>30</sup>

It is worth noting that in both the pūrvapakṣa and the uttarapakṣa Kṣemarāja does not refer to contents of the PV section on initiation which focus on the role of karman (PV II.260–261) and in the pūrvapakṣa he also omits to mention Dharmakīrti’s remarks on the nature of karmic impulses (PV II.262–264a). Rather, in his response, Kṣemarāja elaborates on the view of the self according to a non-dualist Śaiva doctrine and the value of its purification through initiation:

But in truth liberation is the viewing of the self in that which has the nature of truth, which is made of consciousness, and is admitted as the ultimate reality

<sup>29</sup> SvaTU 78.1–5: yathā hi virūpasya vai rūpayam anivartyāpi lokottararāmanīvaśīkaraṇam mantrair kriyate, tadvad dehārambhikarmāsādhanaḥ vartamānadehe rāgāyanivṛttav api bhāviprāhapratirodhanaṃ pāśānām kurvatāṃ mantrānāṁ kim añvātām.

of any form of action and cognition because it is the ultimate reality of the I-awareness. From any point of view, … liberation is just the manifestation of being Śiva. And in this regard the performance of initiation is for the sake of realizing that one attains that everything is of the same essence after knowing it.

This forms a stark contrast with the Buddhist approach to the way of attaining liberation, which Kṣemarāja describes in the concluding part of the pūrvapakṣa:

Therefore, liberation is nothing but the insight of selflessness preceded by the meditative practice on momentariness and so forth.\textsuperscript{31}

His statement shows how a late representative of the Indian intellectual tradition perceived Dharmakīrti’s soteriological stance and can be taken as an answer from within the tradition to the question “Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic?,” which Helmut Krasser asked and discussed in an article of 2004. The SvaTU presentation of Dharmakīrti’s critique on initiation as a method to attain liberation suggests that Kṣemarāja regarded such a critique as being part of a soteriological approach in which typically Buddhist concepts such as momentariness are considered instrumental to practices that lead to liberation according to a Buddhist point of view, namely meditative practices that lead to the realization of selflessness.

Appendix

Text and translation of PV II.257–267

The Sanskrit text and footnotes presented in this appendix are not a critical edition of the PV kārikās, but only a provisional presentation of them, as they are transmitted in the available witnesses in Sanskrit, i.e., KH, the manuscript bearing the PV kārikās; ASa, the manuscript bearing Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on the PV, which includes the kārikās; and V, which indicates the kārikās as reflected in Manorathanandin’s commentary on the PV. The text in Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s printed edition of the latter does not deviate from the text in the manuscript. It is to be noted that the PV kārikās in the PVV result from Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reconstruction of the PV.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{align}
\text{(257)} & \quad \text{āgamasya tathābhāvānibandhanam apaśyatām} / \\
& \quad \text{muktim āgamamātreṇa vadan}^{33} \text{ na paritoṣakṛt} / // \\
\end{align}

One who, based on the Scripture alone, proclaims liberation, does not satisfy

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] SvaTU 76.1f.: \textit{tasmāt kṣanikatvādibhāvānāpūrvikā nairātmyadṛṣṭir eva mokṣa iti.}
\item[32] For details about these witnesses, see Pecchia 2015, chapter 9. A critical edition of the PV kārikās here under examination and Manorathanandin’s commentary thereon is under preparation in the framework of the FWF project “Indian Buddhist epistemology and the path to liberation” (see first note). For a German translation of this section of the PV, see Vetter 1990; for some considerations, see Eltschinger 2014: 122ff. My translation of kk. 258–59 and 262–265 only slightly differs from the translation provided in Acharya 2014: 14ff.
\item[33] \textit{vadan} KH V: \textit{bruvan} ASa.
\end{footnotes}
those who do not see the reason why the Scripture is of that kind [i.e., reliable with regard to its content].

(258) nālam bijādisaṃśiddho vidhiḥ punsām ajanmane /
tailābyaṅgāgīṇādāder api muktprasāṅgataḥ //
The rite [of initiation] validated by the example of a seed et cetera is not sufficient for the absence of rebirth of embodied souls, because there would be the undesired consequence of liberation even due to an oil massage, scorching [oneself] with fire, and the like.

(259) prāg guror lāghavāt paścān na pāpaharaṇam kṛtam /
maḥ bhūd gauravam evāya na pāpaṁ gury amūrtitah34 //
That a man who weighed heavier before becomes lighter after [initiation] does not mean that his sin is removed. Let it [even] be the case that he has no weight at all; [but] sin is not heavy because it is not embodied.

(260) mithyajñānatadudbhūtatarṣasaṃcetanāvaśāt /
hīnasthānagatir janma tenā35 tacchin na jāyate //
It is due to intentional mental acts associated with false cognition and the craving arising from it that there is rebirth, which is going to an inferior place [such as a womb]. Therefore, one who cuts them is not reborn.

(261) tayor eva hi sāmarthyaṁ jātau tanmātrabhāvataḥ /
te cetane svayam karmety36 akhandam janmakāraṇam //
Indeed, these two alone are capable of causing rebirth, because the latter occurs only due to them. Those two [types of] intentional mental acts are by themselves karma. Therefore, the cause of rebirth is not fragmentary (i.e., defective, in our description).

(262) gatipratītyoh karanāny37 āśrayas tāny adṛṣṭataḥ /
adṛṣṭanāśād agatis38 tat samskāro na cetanā //
[Ob.:] The sense faculties are the basis of [instances of] cognition and motion; they are due to the unseen force. Because the unseen force is destroyed, there is no motion. This [force] is the karmic impulse, not an intentional mental act.

(263) sāmarthyaṁ karanotpatter bhāvābhāvānvrttitāḥ /
dṛṣṭaṁ buddher na cānyasya santi tāni na yanti kim39 //
[Re.:] The capacity of arising that belongs to [the activity of] the sense faculties is observed in connection with the presence or absence of the mind, and nothing else. When these [faculties] exist, why should they not continue [to be operative]?

34 amūrtitah A3a V: amūrttataḥ KH.
35 tena KH A3a: tatas V.
36 karmety KH V A3a (post correctionem): karmmāty A3a (ante correctionem).
37 The reading karaṇāny is attested in KH A3a V, but the printed edition of Prajinākaragupta’s commentary has kāraṇāny.
38 agatis KH V: na gatis A3a.
39 santi tāni na yanti kim KH V: tāni santi na santi kim A3a.
Concentrating, moving, being agitated or withdrawing are due to intentional mental acts. These actions would not occur if those faculties were not possessed of any capacity immediately after one’s initiation et cetera.

If actions were due to the mind, they would not occur, because then (i.e. after initiation) the mind would not be there. Because of impurities the mind is linked to other births. If impurities were not possessed of any capacity to impel action after initiation, even in the case of an initiated living being they would be unable to produce any effect.

Since they decrease or increase according to the degree of prosperity of what hinders or favours them, mental faults, whose series arise from their own seeds, are unimpeded even in one who is initiated.

The successive arising of something permanent is contradictory because of the independence of the latter—something permanent which is of the same nature in the case of action and non-action of the faculties etc. in both times (e.g., before death and after death).

References and abbreviations

A\textsubscript{Sa} Manuscript copy of the \textit{Alaṅkāra} of Prajñākaragupta as reproduced in: Sanskrit manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam. Facsimile edition by S. Watanabe. Patna/Narita 1998.


\textsuperscript{40} \textit{buddhis} K\textsubscript{H} V (see PVV 101.3): \textit{buddhes} A\textsubscript{Sa} (and Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reconstruction of the \textit{pāda} in his edition of the PVV).

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{kriyayōḥ} K\textsubscript{H} V: \textit{kriyā ca} A\textsubscript{Sa}. 

\begin{align*}
\text{(264)} & \textit{dhāraṇapraṇaṣṭobhāṇirodhāś cetanāvaśāḥ} / \nonumber \\
& \text{na syus teṣām asāmarthye tasya diṅśaṇyanantaram} // \\
& \text{Concentrating, moving, being agitated or withdrawing are due to intentional mental acts. These actions would not occur if those faculties were not possessed of any capacity immediately after one’s initiation et cetera.} \\
\text{(265)} & \textit{atha buddhes tadā 'bhāvān na syuh sandhiyate malaiḥ} / \nonumber \\
& \textit{buddhis}^{40} \text{teṣām asāmarthye jīvato 'pi syur aṅkṣamāḥ} // \\
& \text{[Ob.:] If actions were due to the mind, they would not occur, because then (i.e. after initiation) the mind would not be there. [Re.:] Because of impurities the mind is linked to other births. If impurities were not possessed of any capacity to impel action after initiation, even in the case of an initiated living being they would be unable to produce any effect.} \\
\text{(266)} & \textit{nirhrāṣatiśayāt puṣṭau pratipāṣavapāṣaṇayoh} / \nonumber \\
& \textit{doṣāḥ svabijasantāṇā diṅśīte 'py anivāritāḥ} // \\
& \text{Since they decrease or increase according to the degree of prosperity of what hinders or favours them, mental faults, whose series arise from their own seeds, are unimpeded even in one who is initiated.} \\
\text{(267)} & \textit{nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramotpattir virudhyate} / \nonumber \\
& \textit{kriyāyām aṅkṣamāṁ ca kriyayōḥ}^{41} sadṛśānāṁ // \\
& \text{The successive arising of something permanent is contradictory because of the independence of the latter—something permanent which is] of the same nature in the case of action and non-action of the faculties etc. in both times (e.g., before death and after death).}
\end{align*}


PV  Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, in PVV and ASa.

PV II  Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the PV.


V Pramāṇavārttika kārikās as reflected in the PVV.


Dharmottara on the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* and *trairūpya* in Dharmakīrti’s *sattvānumāṇa*

*by*

Masamichi Sakai

**Introduction**

It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti’s new approach of inferring momentariness (*kṣanikatvānumāṇa*) – i.e., the *sattvānumāṇa*, the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property “existence” (*sattva*) – had a decisive impact on the later development of this kind of Buddhist inference. At the same time, it is also true that the *sattvānumāṇa* generated a number of interpretative tasks for Dharmakīrti’s successors. The problem is that the *sattvānumāṇa* seems to contain many aspects that threaten to shake the foundation of the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga.¹ Prof. Katsumi Mimaki gives a clear synopsis of the problems confronting later Buddhist logicians, basing himself mainly on the works of Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti, and Mokṣākaragupta, who constitute the last phase of Buddhist philosophers.² I agree with Prof. Mimaki’s contention that the problems they dealt with did not arise suddenly at that time, but rather had been developing gradually over the course of history.³ I have shown for example that one of the most crucial problems of the *sattvānumāṇa* – namely that the “example” (henceforth: *dṛṣṭānta*) is of no use, which seemingly forces the Buddhist to discard the second *trairūpya* condition (*sapakṣa eva sattvam*; henceforth T2) – was argued by Arcaṭa with a keen awareness.⁴

Arcaṭa’s pupil, Dharmottara, shares his teacher’s awareness of the problem. In line with Arcaṭa’s argument, he also asks whether or not the *dṛṣṭānta* in the *sattvānumāṇa* is necessary. However, Dharmottara goes even further, contesting the necessity of the inferential reason property “existence” itself, thereby deepening the problem and developing the argument.

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¹ It is interesting that Dharmakīrti himself presents the *sattvānumāṇa* as if there were no conflict between the logic underlying the *sattvānumāṇa* and the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga. For now I cannot make any judgments about whether Dharmakīrti himself thinks that the logic of the *sattvānumāṇa* does not deviate from the traditional Dignāgean logic, but his followers’ activities make me think this is unlikely.


⁴ I read a paper on this topic at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vienna 2014; see Sakai 2015. In Arcaṭa’s argument, we can see a direct link with the *antarvyāpti* theory advocated by Ratnākaraśānti and reported by Mokṣākaragupta in comparison with the *bahirvyāpti* theory (cf. TBh 47,1–6).
The aim of this article is to introduce and clarify Dharmottara’s arguments for solving the problematic nature of the sattvānumāna, by shedding light on what the exact problem is that Dharmottara inherits from his teacher, and how he addresses and develops it. In doing so, I attempt to properly locate Dharmottara’s contribution within the larger interpretative history of the sattvānumāna.

1 Arcaṭa and Dharmottara: sharing the problem of the 

1.1 Arcaṭa’s argument: the dṛṣṭānta is useless and redundant

Arcaṭa’s greatest concern, as well as his pupil’s, is the relation between the threefold characteristic of a good reason property, i.e., trairūpya, and the so-called viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in the sattvānumāna.

In Dharmakīrtian logic, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in the sattvānumāna plays the critical role of demonstrating the essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) or the pervasion (vyāpti) between the inferential reason property (henceforth: hetu) “existence” and the target property (henceforth: sādhyadharma) “momentariness.”

In the Hetubinduṭīkā (HBṬ), Arcaṭa argues that, in the case of kṣaṇikatvānumāna, since its sādhyadharma “momentariness” is imperceptible by nature, it is therefore impossible to find and show a dṛṣṭānta via perception (pratyakṣa). Generally speaking, in Dignāgean inference, in order to say that a hetu satisfies T2, one must exhibit at least one thing that possesses the hetu as well as the sādhyadharma and that is ontologically different from the site of inference (sādhyadharmin; henceforth: pakṣa). However, in the kṣaṇikatvānumāna, it is in fact impossible to find any momentary thing at all via perception. How then can one find a momentary thing to serve as dṛṣṭānta? Concerning this problem, Arcaṭa is of

5 Perceiving the importance of Dharmottara’s arguments, Prof. Tadashi Tani was early in exploring them as they appear both in Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (KBhS) and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, second chapter (PVinṬ 2). See Tani 1997 and Tani 2000. At that time, however, the Sanskrit manuscript of the latter was unavailable. But now, the situation has changed, and I am luckily in a position to consult the codex unicus of the PVinṬ 2 (for the project of editing the codex unicus of the PVinṬ, see https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/buddhismuskunde-sinologie/schwerpunkte/pramanaviniscayatika/), which covers the entirety of the important portion in which Dharmottara discusses the problem of the sattvānumāna most intensively. The Sanskrit original surely enables us to grasp Dharmottara’s arguments with more clarity.

6 Dharmakīrti’s first use of this defeating source of knowledge (bādhakapramāṇa) for the sattvānumāna is in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, second chapter (cf. PVin 2 80,1–8), and also in his later works, the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya (cf. HB 4,9–12, VN 2,1–4, respectively). He puts forward the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa as the method of proving the essential connection for the sattvānumāna. Its basic and simple form can be demonstrated as follows: “Given that there is non-momentariness, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfillment, the being-real which is characterized as that [i.e., purpose fulfillment,] is abandoned” (HB 4,11-12: aksanikatve 'arthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṁ vastutvaṁ hiyata iti.). For a German translation, cf. Steinkellner 1967: 37. “My understanding of the word arthakriyā is based on Dharmottara’s elucidation in his PVinṬ and the Nyāyabinduṭīkā. Cf. PVinṬ 2 Ms 89a2–3 (PVinṬS 17,11): arthaḥ prayojanaṁ, tasya kriyā nispatiḥ; NBṬ 76,3–4: arthasya prayojanasya kriyā nispatiḥ,”

7 This paragraph is a summary of Sakai 2015: 284–289 (sections 3.1.–3.2.).
the opinion that, since the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can prove the essential connection, it can also prove that whatever possesses the hetu has the sādhyadharma. Thus, if one applies the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to something possessing the hetu and ontologically different from the pakṣa, one can show that the hetu satisfies T2. In the final analysis, however, Arcaṭa sees this activity of finding a dṛṣṭānta as nonsensical, given the natural objection in favor of directly applying the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to the pakṣa. That is, the logical method used to find something momentary as a dṛṣṭānta can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary. With this in mind, Arcaṭa views the dṛṣṭānta as being redundant and of no use in the case of the sattvānumāna. He asserts that T2 in the case of the sattvānumāna should be understood to be fictitious (kālpanika).

1.2 Dharmottara’s treatment of the dṛṣṭānta

Dharmottara takes the same position as Arcaṭa, namely that what proves the momentariness of a dṛṣṭānta is the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and not any other source of knowledge, and that the same viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary. Given this position, the dṛṣṭānta seems to be of no use, according to Arcaṭa. However, in the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (PVinṬ), Dharmottara elucidates a positive significance of, and role for, the dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna. The following series of arguments in the PVinṬ is strongly influenced by Arcaṭa’s position, and it seems here that Dharmottara, in an attempt to preserve some kind of raison d’être for the triairūpya, tries to overturn Arcaṭa’s conclusion.

8 In other words, the dṛṣṭānta never contributes in any way to a proof that the pakṣa has the sādhyadharma. This is so in the sense that the dṛṣṭānta cannot play even the Dharmakīrtian role of conveying the essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) to those who do not remember or do not know it, since without the functioning of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, one can never know that the dṛṣṭānta possesses the sādhyadharma “momentariness.” Given that momentariness itself can never be perceived, there is no difference between the dṛṣṭānta and the pakṣa. For the difference between the Dharmakīrtian and the Dignāgean role of dṛṣṭānta, see Steinkellner 2004.

9 In the KBhS, Dharmottara asserts that even if there can be dṛṣṭāntas, namely things whose momentariness is accepted, it cannot thereby be proved that the pakṣa too is of that nature, and this is because a mere similarity with such dṛṣṭāntas cannot conclusively prove that the other thing is also momentary. Thus, Dharmottara requires, in order to prove the momentariness of the pakṣa, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to be applied to the pakṣa. Cf. KBhS 223,15–17, 21–23: ‘di la dpe ni yod kyang chos mthun pa tsam ‘ba’ zhig gis (‘ba’ zhig gis KBhS: ‘ba’ zhig gi KBhS) dngos po gzhan dag de’i rang bzhin du ‘gyur ba rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no / … gal te yang dpe la skad cig mar ’jig pa yod na (’jig pa yod na KBhS: ’jig pa KBhS) / de lua na yang khyab pa rab tu sgrub pa’i (rab tu sgrub pa’i KBhS: rab tu bsgrubs pa’i KBhS) tshad mar rab tu bstan pa ’di las skad cig mar ’jig par grub bo l’ “In this case [i.e., when momentariness is to be proved], even if there are dṛṣṭāntas, it is not tenable that other things are [also] of that nature [i.e., = of the nature of momentariness] due to a mere similarity [with dṛṣṭāntas]. …even if there can be perishing within a moment in dṛṣṭāntas, nevertheless it is only on the basis of showing the source of knowledge which in fact demonstrates pervasion (i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa) that perishing within a moment is proved.” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241.

10 In both the KBhS and the PVinṬ, Dharmottara discusses various logical problems with the sattvānumāna, and although many of these discussions are common to both works, it is only in the PVinṬ that Dharmottara cares about the positive aspect of the dṛṣṭānta.
1.2.1 dṛṣṭānta’s role and significance

In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara states:

If impermanence [i.e., momentariness,] is to be proved, what is a dṛṣṭānta, where the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it] should be demonstrated? And he [i.e., Dharmakīrti] will declare [later, in PVin 3 128,1–131,5] that, “One should not take up a hetu, relying on scriptural doctrine (samaya/gzhung PVinṬ).” And, when an opponent who does not adhere to [any] settled doctrine (siddhānta) objects to momentariness, in that case, he should be forced to provisionally accept the momentariness of a certain thing even by receiving bribes (utkoca). This is because, otherwise, owing to the lack of a dṛṣṭānta, there would be no hetu. Therefore, there is no [dṛṣṭānta] at all whose sādhyadharma has already been well established [for such an opponent].

First, in asking himself what to make of the dṛṣṭānta in the inference of momentariness, Dharmottara refers to Dharmakīrti’s discourse on the antinomic reasons (viruddhāvyabhicārīhetu) in the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. There Dharmakīrti argues that his three kinds of hetu – essential feature (svabhāva), effect (kārya), and non-perception (anupalabdhi) – can never be antinomic. This is because they are all based on real things (vastu). According to him, any hetu based on scriptures (āgama) are antinomic, since they do not issue from the force of seeing real things (avastudarśanabalapravṛttā). With respect to this position of Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara sees a role for a dṛṣṭānta. Namely,

11 PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a3–6: athānityatve sādhye ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ, yatra vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ sidhyeta. “na ca samayam āśritya hetur upādeya” iti vaksyati. anāśritasiddhāntakaś ca paro yadā kṣaṇikatvam (ksanikatvam emended [cf. skad cig ma nyid PVinṬ]; ksanikam Ms) prati prayavishtate, tadasāv utkocidādenāpi kasyacit padārthasya kṣaṇikatvabhyaupagamam (padārthasya kṣaṇikatvā° emended: padārthaksanikatvā° Ms) kārayitavyah. Itarathā hi dṛṣṭāntābhāvād dhetur na syāt. tasmān prasi-dhāsādhyadharmah kaścit. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 167. To my understanding, the bold part is Dharmottara’s short summary of PVin 3 128,1–131,5, where Dharmakīrti details antinomic reasons (viruddhāvyabhicāra). I have not yet been able to find an exact passage in the PVin. For the Tibetan translation corresponding to PVin 3 128,1–131,5, which has been translated into Japanese with a clear analysis, see Ono 2010: 136–139. For this part, the Tibetan version reads as follows: PVinṬ, P305b3;D253a3: de lta ma yin na dpe med do // “Otherwise, because there is no dṛṣṭānta, [a relevant reason property] would not indeed be a reason property. Therefore, with regard to [a reason property] whose sādhyadharma is not well established (*apratisādhyadharmam*), there is no dṛṣṭānta at all (*kaścit dṛṣṭāntaḥ*).” For me, the content of this Tibetan translation is difficult.

12 Cf. PVin 3 128,2–5: na hi sambhavo ’sti kāryasvabhāvayor utkalakṣanayor anupalambhasya va viruddhāvyabhicārītāyaḥ. na cānayo ’vyabhicāri. tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamaśrayaṃ an-numaṇam āśritya tadārthavidyārcāraḥ viruddhāvyabhicārī śādhanadoṣa upadyaḥ, śaṅkrākāraṇam artheṣu bhṛntyā viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhārasambhavat. na hi astī sambhavo yathāvasthitavastusthitīṣv ātmakārṣyopalambhaṃ.    
Dharmottara regards a dṛṣṭānta as a place where it is guaranteed that a relevant hetu is based on a real thing and not on scripture.\textsuperscript{13}

Then, Dharmottara imagines a certain situation in which a dṛṣṭānta is needed: Suppose there is an opponent who is open-minded, i.e., free from any dogmas, but who never accepts momentariness. In that case, an advocate of momentariness must force that opponent into provisionally accepting (abhi-upa-ṅgam) the momentariness of a certain thing – this ‘certain thing’ is a dṛṣṭānta. Otherwise, not only could he not present the sādhyadharma to him, but he could not present even the hetu. That is, for such an opponent a certain thing serving as dṛṣṭānta would be the first place where both the sādhyadharma and the hetu coexist. Therefore, with this dṛṣṭānta the proponent can first establish both for that opponent. So, the proponent must employ the following procedure: first, force the opponent into provisionally accepting the momentariness of a certain thing, and second, make it known to him that the hetu is also there. After that, he can eventually move on to a proof of the momentariness of the pākṣa. However, at this point, the sādhyadharma of that dṛṣṭānta has not yet been proved.

1.2.2 Definition of the dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna

In this line of argumentation, Dharmottara defines the dṛṣṭānta in the inference of momentariness as follows:

Moreover, with regard to this “grasping/holding of a dṛṣṭānta [in a proof],” mentioned here and there, the following is the meaning: It is by depending on the fact that the hetu exists in a thing that is different from the pākṣa that one can make the defeating source of knowledge function, not in a different manner. Therefore, the dṛṣṭānta is an object 1) which is a sphere (viṣaya) where hetu is established and 2) which is a place where the defeating source of knowledge is shown. For an opponent in turn, however, [dṛṣṭānta] is not [yet] proved as being caused to be bound to the sādhyadharma, [i.e., momentariness], [until the defeating source of knowledge is made to function there].\textsuperscript{14}

One aspect of this is that Dharmottara confirms that the hetu should be established on the basis of reality and that it is in the dṛṣṭānta that this takes place. Another aspect is that the dṛṣṭānta is a place where the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa should be shown, since

\textsuperscript{13} In the sattvānumāna, the hetu as “existence” refers to “purpose fulfillment,” and this is of course established on the basis of seeing real things – for example, in the case of a pot as the dṛṣṭānta, its purpose fulfillment, holding water etc., is established by observation.

\textsuperscript{14} PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a6–7: yaḥ punas tatra tatra dṛṣṭāntaparigraha uktah, tatrāyam abhiprayah (abhiprayah emended [cf. dgongs pa PVinṬ]: a{pra}y{ā}yaḥ Ms) – sādhyadharinivatirikte vastuni hetoh sattvam āśritya bādhakam pramāṇam vyāpārayitum śākyam, nāṇyathā, tasmād dhetor vidhivisayo bādhaka-pramāṇapradarśanagocaro (“pradarśana” emended [cf. rab tu ston pa’i PVinṬ]: “darśana”) ’rtho dṛṣṭāntah, na tu pratītvīdīnāḥ sādhyadharmasambandhitah siddhāḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168.
otherwise, the proponent cannot prove the drṣṭānta’s momentariness, which has been only forcibly and provisionally accepted by the opponent.\textsuperscript{15}

\section{2 The crucial problem of the hetu sattva: No need for the trairūpya condition as a whole}

However, the position that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa establishes as proved the provisionally accepted momentariness of a drṣṭānta evokes the very crucial problem, which, to the best of my knowledge, was first propounded by Arcaṭa, and which equally confronted later Buddhist logicians.

Dharmottara introduces the following, seemingly rhetorical pūrvakapāka:\textsuperscript{16}

[Objection 1:] If the defeating source of knowledge does not require [a drṣṭānta] of which the sādhyadharma is already admitted, then, in this manner, when the defeating source of knowledge shows the pervasion of [a property] “being produced” by [a property] “being impermanent” in a property possessor as drṣṭānta, this very same defeating source of knowledge will prove the impermanence in the pakṣa too. Thus, it is in every case the defeating source of knowledge that is capable of proving the sādhya[dharma]. For this reason, there is the undesirable consequence that the hetu, which is of the essential feature type, is not a real hetu (ahetutvaprasaṅga). [Objection 2:] Moreover, even if the following is the case: “Defeating (bādhaka) itself does not occur without depending upon [the hetu] ‘being existent’ and ‘being produced,’ therefore, [the hetu] ‘being existent’ should be needed,” it is nevertheless only on the basis of pakṣadharmatva [i.e., the fact that the hetu is a property of the pakṣa], which is accompanied by the defeating source of knowledge, that the sādhyadharma is proved. Thus, there is the undesirable consequence that there is not a threefold condition [as a whole, namely because only the first condition is needed].\textsuperscript{16}

The points of this objection are:

\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted here that in the KBhS Dharmottara does not mention the role and significance of drṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna that he discusses in the PVinṬ (cf. the text portions of the PVinṬ 2 cited in nn. 11 and 14 above).

\textsuperscript{16} PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a7–99b3: \textit{a}yadi bādhakam pramāṇaṃ na siddhasādhyadharmāpekṣaṃ, evam tarhi yenaiva bādhakena pramāṇena drṣṭāntadharminī kṛtakavasyānityatvena vyāptir upadārṣyate, tenaiva pramāṇena sādhyadharminy apy anityatvam sādhyāvadābādhanasartham, atah svabāhavedopetoputvaprasaṅgaḥ;\textit{a}thāpi sattvam kṛtakavam cānāśritya bādhakam eva na pravartata iti sattvam āśrayaṇīyaṃ, evam api pakṣadharmatvād eva bādhakapramāṇasahāyāḥ sādhyasādhanam iti trairūpyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168–169. \textit{a}–\textit{a} For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhŚ. Cf. KBhŚ 223,23–25: \textit{gal te de ldar na bṣgrub pa'i chos can nyid la khyab pa (khyab pa KBhŚ\textit{a}) sgrub pa'i isha md skad cig ma nyid du sgrub na yod pa zhes bya ba'i gta m tshigs nye bar blaṅs pa don med par 'gyur ro zhe na l}’ “[Objection:] If, in this way [i.e., as it is in the drṣṭānta], the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion proves momentariness just in the pakṣa itself, it should be useless to take/employ the hetu called sattva [in an inference].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241–242.
1. Given that the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* can in fact prove the *dṛṣṭānta*’s momentariness, it can prove the *pakṣa*’s momentariness too. It follows then that the *hetu sattva* in the *sattvānumāna* is not a real *hetu* that can in fact prove *sādhyadharma* – the real *hetu*, i.e., reasoning, is the very *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* instead.

2. It may be the case that defeating does not occur without this *hetu* – since what is defeated by the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* is this *sattva* in the case where non-momentariness is supposed17 – and so, in this sense, the *hetu* seems to be needed.18 Nevertheless, it should actually be the case that only the *pakṣadharmatva* – the fact that the *hetu* is a property of the *pakṣa* – is needed. This is because the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* can function in the *pakṣa* if and only if that *pakṣa* possesses *sattva*, so that its possession of the *sādhyadharma* can be proved by it. In this case, what is needed for a sound inference is only the first *trairūpya* condition (henceforth: T1). Thus, the *trairūpya* condition considered as a whole would be useless.

It is this same second point of this objection on the basis of which Arcaṭa discards the necessity of T2.

### 2.1 Counterexample and the second *trairūpya* condition

To respond to these undesired consequences on behalf of the *trairūpya* theory, Dharmottara appeals to the concept of a ‘counterexample’ in a possible debate with opponents:

[Answer:] [To this objection,] we say (*ucyate*): What has been said, namely that, “[It is sufficient that] there is pervasion only in the *pakṣa*, and so what can be gained by grasping other property possessors [other than the *pakṣa*]?” is not tenable. This is because it is not possible to show the defeating source of knowledge in a single locus [i.e., in the *pakṣa*], after setting aside visible objects that are different from the *pakṣa*. Suppose the defeating source of knowledge should be shown in the following manner: “If there were not the momentariness of a sound, there would not be even [its] existence.” If an opponent were to say, “Just as a visible thing, such as a pot etc., though not momentary, achieves purpose fulfillment, this sound too must be so,” [then] those visible [things], such as pots, should also in the same manner [i.e., like in the case of a sound] be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. And, with regards to those [visible things such as a pot and the like] that have [already] been brought into the scope [of the defeating source of knowledge], he [i.e., the opponent] may respond: “A certain invisible thing, though it achieves purpose [fulfillment], should be (*bhaviṣyati*) non-momentary, and these visible [things, the pot and so on] are like this.” Therefore, [this] invisible thing that has in turn been put forth as a [counter]example by the opponent should be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. Therefore, why is it the

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17 Cf. n. 6 above.
18 In other words, this position refers to the view that the *hetu sattva* and the property “being existent” defeated by the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* are the same.
case that the defeating source of knowledge is shown only in the specific and single pakṣa?\footnote{PVinT 2 Ms 99b3–7: \textit{ucyate} – \textit{yad uktam} – \textit{sādhyaadharmīny eva vyāptih, tat kim dharmyantaraparigarheneti, tad ayuktam, yasmād drṣṭān sādhyaadharmīvatīrktān bhāvān parityajyā naikasmīn dharmīnī bādhakam pramāṇām śaśāṃm darśayitum. yadi kṣanikatvam na syāc chābāsaya, sattvam eva no syād ity evam bādhake pramāṇe darśayitave yadi paro brīyāt – yathā ghaṭādir drṣṭo bhāvo ‘kṣanikatve ‘py arthakriyākāri, tadvad ayam śabdo ‘pi syāt iti, evam te ‘pi drṣṭā ghaṭādayo bādhakapramāṇānavisayikartavyāh, teṣu ca visayikṛteṣu punarbrīyāt (punarbrīyāt emended: punarbrīyāt Ms) – adṛṣṭo bhāvah kaścid arthakāry āpy aksāniho bhāvisyati, tadvac cāmī drṣṭā iti punah parena drṣṭāntikṛto ‘drṣṭo bhāvo bādhakapramāṇānavisayikartavya iti (‘kartavya iti emended [bya dgos pa ’i phyir PVinT]; *karta iti Ms) katham ekamasmin eva sādhyaadharmīnī bādhakapramāṇāvyādhārśani. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 169–170. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS (the exact literal parallel is the part from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 169–170. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS: (223,25–224,17: *chos can nyid la khyab pa sgrub par byed pa ’i (khyab pa sgrub par byed pa ’i KBhS\(^{F}\): khyab par sgrub par byed na ’i KBhS\(^{F}\)) tshaw mar rab tu bstan par ni nus pa ma yin te ’i di liar khyab pa sgrub pa ’i tshaw ma ni ’di liar bstan par bya ste ‘i gal te sgra riag par gyur na rim dang cig car dag gis don bya ba la nye bar sbyor bar mi ’gyur ro zhes so ’l’ ’di la ni pha rol pos kyang ji liar bum pa skad cig ma ma yin yang rim dang cig car dag gis mgon par ’dod pa ’i ’bras bs gra par nus pa de bzhin du sgra yang ’gyur ro zhes brjod par nus so ’l’ ’di la yang lan l bum pa yang ngas gnod par byed pa ’i tshaw ma ’i yul da byas pa nyid do zhes brjod dgos so ’/ des na rnam grangs ’di pha rol gni nye bkod pa mthong ba ’i dngos po mtha’ dag rgo bas (rgol bas KBhS\(^{F}\); gol bas KBhS\(^{F}\)) gnod par byed pa ’i tshaw ma ’i yul da byas pa ba yin no ’l’ gal te pha rol po dgos po ’ga’ zhig skad cig ma ma yin par rim dang cig car gyis (rim dang cig car gyis KBhS\(^{F}\); rim dang cig car gyi KBhS\(^{F}\)) don byed par nus pa de bzhin sgra yang yin no zhes ma mthong ba yang dogs par byed na (dogs par byed na KBhS\(^{F}\); dags par byed na KBhS\(^{F}\)) de la yang gal te ’ga’ zhig der gyur na skad cig ma ma yin pa des kyang rim dang cig car dag gis don byed par m’tus so zhes spiyur brjod par bya’o ’l’ des na srid par byas pa ’i ma mthong ba de yang gnod par byed pa ’i tshaw ma ’i yul nyid du khas blang bar bya ba nyid do l’ de lta yin pa dang mthong ba dang ma mthong ba ’i dngos po mtha’ dag la (dngos po mtha’ dag la KBhS\(^{F}\); dngos po mtha’ dag KBhS\(^{F}\)) khyab pa sgrub pa ’i tshaw ma bstan par rnam par gnas pa na (rnam par gnas pa na KBhS\(^{F}\); rnam par gnas pa dang KBhS\(^{F}\)) / gang dag bs gra par bya’i chos can las (bs gra par bya’i chos can las KBhS\(^{F}\); bs gra par bya’i chos can las KBhS\(^{F}\))inha pa’i phyir bs gra par bya’i chos can las thad pa’i dngos po de dag dpe’i dngos la brten pa’i phyir bs gra par bya’i chos can las thad pa dang dag la (gang dag la KBhS\(^{F}\); gang la KBhS\(^{F}\)) tshigs yod pa de dag ni dpe yin te / bs gra par bya’i dngos po ngas pa ni (ngas pa ni KBhS\(^{F}\); nges pa na KBhS\(^{F}\)) khyab pa sgrub pa ’i tshaw ma la rag las pa’i phyir ro ’l’ "[Answer:] It is not possible to show the source of knowledge proving pervasion only in the pakṣa alone. This is because the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion should be shown in the following manner – ‘If a sound [i.e., the pakṣa] were permanent, it would be employed in fulfilling a purpose neither in a gradual nor in a simultaneous manner.’ [A proponent says] so. Against this, [his] opponent in turn can retort – ‘Just as a pot, though being non-momentary, can bring about an expected effect in a gradual or simultaneous manner, so too must a sound be.’ Against this too, the reply should be stated [as follows] – ‘A pot too is by all means brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by me [i.e., the proponent].’ Thus, every visible thing proposed (*upanayasta) by the opponent through such an enumeration is brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by the disputation [i.e., the proponent]. If the opponent doubts even an invisible [thing], saying that, ‘A certain thing, being non-momentary, can fulfill a purpose in a gradual or simultaneous manner, and a sound is so too,’ [then], against this too, it should be generally stated – ‘If there were to exist a certain [thing, and if it were] not momentary, it also would be incapable of fulfilling a purpose, whether in a gradual or in a simultaneous manner.’ Therefore, this invisible [thing] too, which has been hypothetically assumed [by the opponent], is necessarily provisionally accepted as the object of the defeating source of knowledge. And when in this manner it is established that the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is
opponent might bring other existing things as ‘counterexamples’ which are thought to be non-momentary but capable of purpose fulfillment. Theoretically speaking, for any existent things including even invisible things (adṛśya), it is not until the viparyaye bādhakapramāna functions that their momentariness is proved, since only it is capable of proving momentariness. In this sense, the opponent has the right to present counterexamples to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāna has not yet been applied, so as to invalidate the pakṣa’s momentariness. Dharmottara insists that, in order to rebut such counterexamples, the proponent must show the viparyaye bādhakapramāna in counterexamples. This activity amounts to the fact that the opponent needs to hold T2, in that such counterexamples will be ontologically different things from the pakṣa. In this regard, it is not the case that the trairūpya condition in its totality is useless. Rather, it is an indispensable condition for a sound inference of the pakṣa’s momentariness. In this way, Dharmottara, although basically inheriting Arcaṭa’s view, asserts the significance of T2.

2.1.1 Omni-applicability of the viparyaye bādhakapramāna

In theory, the opponent can pose an infinite number of counterexamples including even invisible things. Therefore, the proponent must apply the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to each and every case according to the situation. In other words, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa must be such a source of knowledge as should and in fact can be applied to all counterexamples brought forth by the opponent. In this regard, Dharmottara calls Dharmakīrti’s viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa “that whose scope is a collection of all things” (sarvapadārthapasamhāravīṣayam).

And for this very reason, for the Teacher [i.e., Dharmakīrti], which demonstrates the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it, i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa,] is intended to have the scope of a collection of all things, as [he] has said [in the PVin 2 76,3–4]: “whatsoever is produced is impermanent.” And he does not accept the pervasion which is subject to distinctions among the pakṣa and the like. Therefore, the logical mark, whose scope is in fact all things, is ascertained to be pervaded by its own target [property], which is proved by the defeating source of knowledge.20

As the reason for the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability, Dharmottara refers to an essential feature of the hetu “existence” (sattva), which is a part of the viparyaye

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20 PVinṬ 2 Ms 99b1–100a1: ata eva ca sarvapadārthapasamhāravīṣayam vyāpyavāpakbhāvasādhakam īstam ācāryasya, yad āha – yat kiṣitṛ krtakam, tat sarvam anityam iti (cf. PVin 2 76,3–4: yat kiṣitṛ krtakam tat sarvam anityam...), paksādipravībhāgāpekteśam ca vyāptim necchati. tasnām sarvapadārthavisayam eva līṅgam bādhakena pramāṇena sādhitasvādhavyāpyātikam avasātavyam. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 172.
3 Problem of the first trairūpya condition

However, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability prompts a further crucial problem for the advocate of trairūpya, namely that T1 (= pakṣadharmatā) is useless. Given that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa proves that all things are momentary, then, since the pakṣa is already included in the sphere of everything, its momentariness is proved solely by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Thus, it is useless to particularly point out, in an inference, the pakṣa’s possession of the hetu “existence.” Arcaṭa does not discuss any problem of this kind in his HBṬ.22

The relevant objection in the PVinṬ reads:

[Objection:] But, given that the pervasion is shown [by the defeating source of knowledge] as encompassing all things, a sound [as the pakṣa] too, which is included in all [things], is proved to be momentary. Thus, there is no benefit to including a property of the pakṣa [in the arguments].23

21 In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara differentiates the logical scope of the inferential reason property “being existent” (sattva) from that of the inferential reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva). For the Buddhists, their ontological scopes are the same, but it might be the case that there are some opponents for whom this is not the case. According to Dharmottara’s explanation, Dharmakīrti is taking such a possibility into account when he introduces this hetu. The scope of the former includes something that has a cause, i.e., is produced, but which is included in the category of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha), i.e., invisible, incognizable. Cf. Sakai 2010: 143–144.

22 Cf. Sakai 2015: 291–292 (section 4.2.). Durvekamiśra elucidates where Arcaṭa sees the significance of T1 in the sattvānumāna. He reports (HBṬĀ 261,23–262,2) that Arcaṭa’s way of recognizing the necessity of T1 is rejected by Dharmottara and the like who have a different view on the same issue. According to Durvekamiśra, Arcaṭa requires T1, so that one can indicate the object to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is applied in a relevant inference. On the other hand, Dharmottara’s reason for needing T1 is so that one can ascertain the pakṣa’s being real (tattva). For this interesting controversy, cf. Sakai 2019.

23 PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a1–2: nanu ca sarvapadārthopasaṃhāraṇavatī vyāptipradarśānāṁ śabdo ’pi sarvānta-rbūtābhāśaḥ kṣaṇīkāḥ tattvātāḥ iti na pakṣadharmopasaṃhāraṇavyāpti phalam. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhS F 224,18–22: gal te dangs po mtha’ dag gi yul la (yul la KBhS:F: yul can la KBhS²) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma srid na l’o na ni des na ji litar dpe dag la bsgrub bya nges pa khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma dang ’brel pa de bzhin du bsgrub bya’i chos can la yang rjes su ’gro ldog rab tu grub pa dag las mngon par ’dod pa grub pas phyogs kyi chos nye bar bstan pas ci bya the na l’ “[Objection:] If the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is applicable to the sphere of all things, then, on the basis of this [fact], with regard to examples, ascertainment of the target [property] is subject to the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion. In the same manner, with regard to the site too, the desired [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved due to the positive and negative concomitances that are in fact established [by the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion]. Thus, what can be gained by pointing out a property of the site?” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242–243.
Dharmottara rebuts this by strictly distinguishing the ascertainment of pervasion from that of whether or not the relevant \textit{pakṣa actually exists}, i.e., in reality. That is, the ascertainment of pervasion by the \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} that everything, including the \textit{pakṣa}, is momentary belongs to a theoretical level; on the other hand, the ascertainment of whether the \textit{pakṣa actually exists} belongs to an actual, epistemological level. He says:

\begin{quote}
[Dharmottara:] Well then, is it the case that a hare’s horn is known to be existent to a person who has already ascertained that “Whatever is existent is momentary?” [Objector:] Since a hare’s horn does not exist, it is not known [to him]. But a sound does exist. [Dharmottara:] Then, this [i.e., the existence of a sound] should be known by means of another source of knowledge, [since], if this is known, it can be understood that a sound is not like a hare’s horn. Therefore, though a sound is generally [i.e., without its individuality,] included in [all things] when pervasion is [demonstrated by the defeating source of knowledge], its [i.e., a sound’s] existence should be individually known by means of another source of knowledge in order to ascertain [its own] momentariness.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

The ascertainment of pervasion and that of the \textit{pakṣa’s} actual existence are totally different and independent issues. Knowledge of the former does not imply the latter. Otherwise, once pervasion is demonstrated, it would be proved that not only a sound, but also a hare’s horn is momentary. But this is not the case, since a hare’s horn does not exist in reality. According to Dharmottara, the \textit{pakṣa’s} actual existence must be ascertained by another source of

\textsuperscript{24} PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a2–4: \textit{tat kim idānīṃ yat sat, tat sarvam kṣanikam iti niścitavato ‘pi pumsah śaśavisānaṃ sad iti jñātām. śaśavisānayāsattvāt ajñātām. śabdasya tu sattvam. tat tathā pramāṇāntarajājñātāvam, yasmāṃ jñātā na śaśavisānāvacaḥ chchabā ity avagamayeta, tasmiṃ sāmānyanāntarbhūtāsyāpi śabdasya vyāptikāle kṣanikatvaṁśayārtham viśeṣena sattvam pramāṇāntarena jñātāvam. For this part too we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhS\textsuperscript{F} 224,22–225,2: \textit{bden mod kyi ‘on kyang drungs po’i tshogs ni mtha’ yas las khyab pa bsgrub pa (khyab pa bsgrub pa K BhS\textsuperscript{F}: khyab pa sgrub pa) yang drungs po mtha’ dag gi yul can yin pa des na sgra med kyang bsgrub bya sgrub byed dag gi (sgrub byed dag gi KBhS\textsuperscript{F}; sgrub byed dag gi KBhS\textsuperscript{F}) khyab pa ni drungs po gzhan nyid las rab tu grub pa kho na’o (rab tu grub pa kho na’o KBhS\textsuperscript{F}; rab tu grub tu grub pa kho na’o KBhS\textsuperscript{F}) // des na ji ltar ri bong gi rwa med par khyab pa grub pa de bzhin du sgra med par rab tu ‘grub pa nyid do // de las khyab pa mi ‘grub pa’i phyir na sgra’i yod pa ni ji ltar yang phan ’dogs par byed pa nyid ma yin no // de lta yin dang khyab pa ‘grub pa la khas ma blangs pa’i byed pa can sgra’i yod pa nyid ni ishad ma gzhan kha no las rigs par bya ba yin no // des na nges pa ishad ma gzhan la rag las pa sgra’i yod pa nyid ni sgra’i mtag par bsgrub par nas pa’i phyir phyogs kyi chos nge bar bsudu bar bya ba (nye bar bsudu bar bya ba K BhS\textsuperscript{F}; nye bar bsu bar bya ba K BhS\textsuperscript{F}) kho na’o // “[Answer:] This is right. But, a collection of things is infinite, and [the source of knowledge] demonstrating pervasion can be applied to all things (*sakalapadārthavisayam). Therefore, even if a sound were not to exist, pervasion between the target property and the reason property would surely be realized on the basis of other things [other than a sound]. Thus, just as pervasion is established without the existence of a hare’s horn, so [pervasion] is surely established without the existence of a sound. Since pervasion is not established on the basis of that [i.e., a sound], the existence of a sound in no way brings benefits [to the establishment of pervasion]. And it is on the basis of another source of knowledge that the existence of a sound, whose functioning is not accepted in this way when pervasion is proved, has to be understood. Thus, since the existence of a sound, whose ascertainment requires another source of knowledge, is in position to prove the impermanence of that sound, a property of the site must by all means be included [in the arguments of a proof].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 243.
knowledge other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Showing T1 in an inference amounts to the fact that the actual existence of the pakṣa is epistemologically ascertained by another source of the knowledge.\(^{25}\) In this way, Dharmottara insists on the indispensability of T1.

### 4 Concluding remarks

In short, while absolutely relying on the logical universality of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, Dharmottara strives not for a formal, but rather for a substantial raison d’être of trairūpya. Furthermore, this reliance is well founded, given that he is basing himself on Dharmakīrti’s position as expressed in his Hetubindu and Vādanyāya.\(^{26}\) For the discussions of the kṣaṇikatvānumāna in these works, Dharmakīrti depends exclusively on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. At the same time, however, his formulation includes T1 and T2.\(^{27}\) It appears that under this logically ambiguous circumstance, Arcaṭa steers his course of interpretation toward stressing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, judging Dharmakīrti’s retention of the trairūpya to be a mere formality, and Dharmottara, in turn, makes efforts toward harmonizing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa with trairūpya.

To the best of my knowledge, in the larger interpretative history of the sattvānumāna, Dharmottara’s argument examined above is the first systematic defense of the significance of trairūpya taken as a whole, which well represents the Buddhist logical standpoint of being neither antarvyāpti nor bahirvyāpti.\(^{28}\) What’s more, this seems to remain the only way for traditional Buddhists to maintain their argumentative identity until the innovation by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti of proving the momentariness of a drśṭānta via the combination of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya,\(^{29}\) itself a strategy that avoids exclusive reliance on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa.\(^{30}\)

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25 Namely, perception (pratyakṣa). In the previous part of the PVinṬ (= PVinṬ 2 Ms 98b1–99a3) Dharmottara already discussed how and by which source of knowledge the inferential reason property “existence” is established (siddha). There is also a parallel argument in the KBhS (= KBhS F 221,7–16 [pūrvapakṣa], 231,7–232,13 [uttarapakṣa]). For a detail of the arguments, see Sakai 2013, where I have translated these texts and analyzed their contents.

26 For now I am uncertain whether Dharmakīrti, in PVin 2, absolutely relies on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa for establishing the pervasion of the reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva) by the target property “being impermanent” (anityatva), though in this work he introduces the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in its complete form. This is because Dharmakīrti also introduces other arguments for establishing pervasion other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇā. Cf. Sakai 2014.

27 Cf. HB 6,9-10: yat sat, tat sarvam kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭādayah, sanś ca sābda iti..., VN 1,13–14: yat sat kṛtakam vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ, san kṛtako vā sābda iti.


30 See, for example, Vācaspatimiśra, one of the most renowned representatives of the Brahmanical side, who probably flourished before the time of Jñānaśrīmitra (for the date of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Acharya 2006: xviii–xxii. Dr. Yasutaka Muroya recently suggested a new chronological relationship between Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra in Muroya 2011). In his Nyāyakanikā and Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā, he summarizes and then introduces as pūrvapakṣa Dharmottara’s argument defending the Buddhist trairūpya theory considered as a whole in the case of the sattvānumāna. Cf. NKaṇ 509,7–511,9 (=NVTṬ 515,3–13): “nākṣaṇikasyārthakriyāvirodhād (nākṣaṇika° conjecture; na ksana° NKaṇ; na ca kṣaṇika° NVTṬ) asaḍhāraṇaḥ hetoh, na ca sādhyadharmini drśyaṃmāṇe sādadhānu vyāptiprasādhanāh (°prasādhanād NKaṇ; °sādhanād NVTṬ) eva sādhyasiddher asādhanāṅgaṃ hetuvacanam. na khalu
References and abbreviations


HBṬĀ Hetubinduṭīkāloka (Durvekamiśra): see HBṬ.

KBhS Kaśanabhaṅgasiddhī (Dharmottara) (Tibetan), ed. E. Frauwallner: In: Frauwallner 1935.

KBhS P Kaśanabhaṅgasiddhī (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5751.

———. ‘sattva’ a bhāvābhaṣyāya bhavat tvam arhati. śakyaṃ hi śaṅkītum parenādṛṣṭya-vyāptir dṛśyamātraviṣayā bhavitum arhati. śaṇkītum shāṅkītum anākāntikam kaśanīkatvasādhanāna iti. tasmād yad dṛśyam adṛśyam vā, tatt sarvāṃ kaśanīkam iti darsaṇīyam vyāptiṃ. b nanv evam api sabādār vivādāśpadhītasya vyāptidarsaṇanābalīd eva siddhā kaśanīketai tadavastham ēvaśādhanāṅgatvam hetuvacanasya. maivaṃ. asaty api śaṇavisūṃdārād ati yat sad dṛśyam adṛśyam vā, tatt sarvāṃ kaśanīkam iti, yathā sabādār vivādāśpadhītā vaśādāt yādhyati (vyāptih yādhyati NKaṇ: vyāptih NVTT). na ca śaṇavisūṃdārād api bhāvantī kaśanīkāh. evam saty api vivādāśpadikrite (“kṛte NKaṇ: “bhūte NVTT”) sabādātād vyāptīsiddhā api na siddhātī kaśanīkatety avasaṃytram darsaṇītvyam eva teṣām (darsaṇītvyam eva teṣām NKaṇ: darsaṇītvyam eteṣām NVTT), kaśanīkatvasādhanānya sattvaṃ iti nāsaṃdhanīgatā hetuvacanasya (”vacanasya NKaṇ: ”vacanasyeti NVTT”). na ca śaṇavisūṃdārād api bhāvantī kaśanīkāh api siddhātī kaśanīkatety avasaṃytram darsaṇītvyam eva teṣām (darsaṇītvyam eva teṣām NKaṇ: darsaṇītvyam eteṣām NVTT), kaśanīkatvasādhanānya sattvaṃ iti nāsaṃdhanīgatā hetuvacanasya (”vacanasya NKaṇ: ”vacanasyeti NVTT”).

It is not the case that, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfillment for a non-momentary [thing], the inferential reason property [of being existent] is unique/specific. Nor is it the case that, since the target [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved solely on the basis of the fact that the pervasion is well established with regard to the pakṣa, i.e., a sound and the like, which is seen, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof. It is indeed impossible for the pervasion that encompasses all [things] to have as its object seen [things] only. This is because the opponent has the right to doubt [this] in the following manner: ‘By you [i.e., the proponent] the property of being existent belonging to unseen [things] is not excluded from a non-momentary [thing].’ Thus, the [inferential reason] property of being existent is indeterminate in the proof of momentariness. Therefore, [in order to rebut such doubt,] the pervasion should be shown in the following way: ‘Whatever a thing is, i.e., whether seen or unseen, it is exclusively momentary.’

If one says: even if this is so, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof, [something that] is the case when a sound and the like about which there is a dispute is proved to be momentary only by virtue of showing the pervasion, [then, we answer:] it should not be like that [for the logical reason saṭṭva]. The pervasion that encompasses all [things] is established in such a way that, even if a hare’s horn and the like does not exist, that which exists, whether seen or unseen, is all/exclusively momentary. And it is not the case that a hare’s horn and the like too are momentary. In this way, even if a sound and the like which becomes the subject of dispute exists, [its] momentariness is not proved, even when the pervasion is established. Therefore, in order to prove their momentariness [i.e., that of a sound and the like], their existence must necessarily be shown in full. Thus, it is not the case that the statement of inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof. But the part a–a, in terms of content, corresponds to Dharmottara’s defense of T2 examined above (cf. section 2.1.), the part b–b to the discussion examined in section 3. The part b–b has a parallel in the Tattvasamīkṣā by the same author. Cf. TSam 36,29–35: na ca sarvopasaṃhāravādyāśpadhītā saṃpratam sarvapadāśpadhītām saṃpratam api kṣaṇikatvasādhenār asādhanāṅgatvam hetuvacanam iti) sāṃpratam. yathāvāhī hi gigananalināndānām asaṭām api kṣaṇikatve avasaṃytram darsāyītvyam eva teṣām (darsāyītvyam eva teṣām NKaṇ: darsāyītvyam eteṣām NVTT) kṣaṇikatvasādhanānya sattvaṃ iti nāsaṃdhanīgatā hetuvacanasya ("vacanasya NKaṇ: "vacanasyeti NVTT").

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Sارد Venezuela
Dharmottara on viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya


PVinṬ 2 Ms Sanskrit Manuscript of the second chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā of Dharmottara: see PVin 2: Introduction xxx–xxxi.


PVinṬt Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5727, Derge No. 4227.


Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate in Indian Logic

by

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1. Introduction

Throughout the history of Indian thought in the classical period, the method of debate has been a subject of investigation side by side with philosophical ideas. A conception of “debate” can already be found at an early stage, notably in the medical treatise Carakasaṃhitā (CaS). After passing through the Fangbianxinlun (*Upāyahṛdaya, UH, 方便心論),1 an early Buddhist debate treatise, the conception of debate was more systematically approached in the Nyāyasūtras (NS), and further expanded and elaborated in Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh) and Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika (NV).

In the Vādanyāya (VN),2 Dharmakīrti redefined a traditional Nyāya concept related to debate, namely the idea of a “condition of defeat” (nigrahasthāna),3 a criterion that determines victory or defeat in a debate. In the Vādanyāya’s redefinition of nigrahasthāna, Dharmakīrti presented a new conception of debate, i.e., the “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). By doing so, he appears to have reacted to traditional ideas found in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya. His ideas in turn influenced the presentation of debate in later Nyāya works, as will be discussed below with a focus on the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū) of Bhāsarvajña and the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTṬ) of Vācaspati Miśra.

Prets 2000, Kang 2003, Preisendanz 2009 and others have analyzed the ancient Indian exposition of debate in the Carakasaṃhitā. Pertinent ideas in the *Upāyahṛdaya were investigated by several Japanese researchers (Ui 1925, Kajiyama 1984, Ishitobi 2006). The more systematic exposition of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya was studied in detail especially by Matilal 1998, Preisendanz 2000, and Nicholson 2010. Steinkellner 1988 pointed out Dharmakīrti’s new conception of debate. Much’s translation and critical

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1 G. Tucci suggests Upāyahṛdaya as the original Sanskrit title of Fangbianxinlun, while E. Frauwallner suggested Prayogasāra. At the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) in 2014, Prof. Shōryū Katsura proposed a third possibility: Prayogahṛdaya.

2 See VN 1.4–5: asādhanāṅgavacanam adoṣodbhāvanaṃ dvayoḥ / nigrahasthānam, anyat tu na yuktam iti nesyate // “Asādhanāṅgavacana and adoṣodbhāvana are the conditions of defeat for the two (debaters, i.e. a proponent and an opponent, respectively). However, other [conditions of defeat that the Nyāya school and the like explain] are not correct, hence [they are] not accepted.” Here Dharmakīrti presents his original idea of dividing “the condition of defeat” into asādhanāṅgavacana (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and adoṣodbhāvana (the condition of defeat for an opponent). This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to asādhanāṅgavacana and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to adoṣodbhāvana, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong. See section 5 for details.

3 As for nigrahasthāna as presented in the Nyāyasūtras, see Vidyabhusana 1921: 84–90. With regard to nigrahasthāna as defined in the Vādanyāya, see Much 1986 and 1991; Chinchore 1988; Gokhale 1993; Sasaki 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, and 2014b.

Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate

392

While several studies have thus been conducted on Indian debate, little attention has been given to how the Vādanyāya marks a historical transition in the conception of debate. This paper therefore aims to place the Vādanyāya in the context of expositions of debate in the above-mentioned texts, and to thereby clarify its significance.

2. Jalpa in the Carakasamhitā

As the first step in our analysis, we will examine the idea of debate in the Carakasamhitā because it is one of the earliest works in which the concept of debate is introduced in detail, even though it was not exactly explained in a systematic manner. In the Carakasamhitā, the parts of the eighth chapter of the Vīmānasthāna dealing with debate can be divided into two sections: the section on colloquy (saṃbhāṣā) in CaS 8.8.15–26 and the section on disputation (vāda) in CaS 8.8.27–66.4 In the latter section, vāda is defined as follows:

CaS 8.8.28: tatra vādo nāma sa yat pareṇa saha śāstrapūrvakaṃ vigṛhya kathayati. sa ca dvividhāḥ samgrahaṇa – jalpaḥ, vitanḍā ca. tatra pakṣāśritayor vacanaṃ jalpaḥ, jalpaviparyayo vitanḍā. yathā – ekasya pakṣah punarbhavo 'stīti, nāstīty aparasya; tau ca svasvapakṣahetuṇīḥ svasvapakṣaṃ sthāpayatāḥ, parapakṣam udbhāvayaṇāḥ, eṣa jalpaḥ. jalpaviparyayo vitanḍā. vitanḍā nāma parapakṣe doṣavacanamātram eva.

Of these [44 technical terms], disputation (vāda) is [debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya), based on scriptures. In brief, this [disputation] is of two kinds: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitanḍā).

Disputation (vāda) is here defined as a “[debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya).” There are two types of vāda: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitanḍā). As discussed below in section 4, this classification differs from the one in the Nyāyasūtras. Let us note that jalpa here involves hostility to the other disputant, and that it consists of individual assertions of a proponent and opponent, and mutual ripostes between them.

While the vāda section of the Carakasamhitā provides a brief account of vāda in which jalpa occurs as a subcategory of vāda, the concept of jalpa, the action of √jalp, as well as

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the idea of a hostile (vighrhya) verbal confrontation are already introduced in the *sambhāṣā* section.\(^5\)

CaS 8.8.15: *saṃbhāṣāvidhim ata ārdhvan vyākhyāsyāmaḥ – bhiṣag bhiṣajā saha saṃbhāṣeta. tadvidyasambhāṣā hi jñānābhiyogasamhāsakarī bhavati, vaiśārdayam api cābhīnirvartayati, vacanaśaktim api cādhatte, yaśas cābhī-
dipayati, … yac cācāryaḥ śīsyāya śuśrūśave prasannāh kramenopadiśaīi guhyābhimatam arthajātaṃ tat paraspärṇa saha jalpan piṇḍena vijigīṣur āha saṃharṣāt, tasmāt tadvidyasambhāṣām abhipraśaṃsanti kuśalāḥ.

CaS 8.8.16: dvividhā tu khalu tadvidyasamabhāṣā bhavati – samdhāyasam-
bhāṣā, vighyasamabhāṣā ca.

Hereafter, we shall describe the method of colloquy. A physician should discuss with a physician. Colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasambhāṣā*) increases the pleasure of the application of knowledge, provides dexterity [in debate], gives skill of speech, illuminates fame (yaśas)…. Besides, the teacher who is pleased with the disciple desirous of hearing [teachings] teaches things intended to be kept secret in an orderly manner. [The same teacher] who disputes with another [disputant] in wrangle (√*jalpa*) excitedly states [the secret] in one breath in order to gain victory (vijigīṣu). Therefore, the wise highly praise colloquy with experts.

One should know (khalu) that colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasambhāṣā*) takes two forms: friendly colloquy and hostile colloquy.

The *sambhāṣā* section describes the method and purpose of colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasambhāṣā*) more concretely and vividly than the brief definitions of *vāda*, or *jalpa* or *vitaṇḍā* in the *vāda* section. Although the relationship between *sambhāṣā* and *jalpa* is problematic, it is likely that *vighyasamabhāṣā* and *jalpa* are the same or at least very similar concepts, considering such expressions as *vighyasamabhāṣāyāṃ jalpet* (CaS 8.8.18).\(^6\)

Here “the person who disputes in wrangle” (*jalpa*) is considered to be desirous of victory (vijigīṣu). Hence, we can say that one purpose of wrangle (*jalpa*) is victory. This purpose deserves careful attention for two reasons: (i) the *Nyāyabhāṣya* adopted the same idea and (ii) the *Vādanyāya* criticizes the purpose of victory. Both points will be examined in more detail later.

Fame is another of the purposes listed in connection with *sambhāṣā*. It must be noted that fame or something akin to fame is not considered to be the purpose worth accomplishing in the context of debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, the *Nyāyasūtras*, several commentaries of the *Nyāyasūtras*, and the *Vādanyāya*. This point will be examined later again.

Regarding the means of debate, acts by a disputant such as ridiculing the opponent are also allowed in a *samabhāṣā*:

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\(^5\) For *jalpa* or *jalp*, cf. CaS 8.8.15, CaS 8.8.18, CaS 8.8.20, CaS 8.8.21. As Preisendanz 2009: 268 pointed out, the word *vāda* is also already introduced in the *samabhāṣā* section.

\(^6\) Matilal 1998: 38–41 also points out that Caraka divides the “hostile debate” (*vighyasamabhāṣā*) into two main types, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Matilal calls the first the “j-type” hostile debate and the second the “v-type” hostile debate.
There are two types of congregations: the intellectual [congregation] and the ignorant congregation. Even though [the congregation] takes two forms, the very same [congregation can be divided into] three kinds through the following classification based on [different] grounds – the friendly congregation, the neutral congregation and the prejudiced congregation. Among these, the prejudiced congregation consists of persons endowed with the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, and of ignorant ones; those who [should] in no way be involved in wrangle (jalpa) with anyone else. However, in the friendly congregation or the neutral [congregation], which consists of ignorant persons, one [should] work on wrangle with [another who is] devoid of the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, does not illumine fame (yaśas) and is hated by great men. Furthermore, while disputing with such a person, one should dispute by means of long sentences mingled with distorted and long holy scriptures and should not give the opportunity to the [opposing] speaker by ridiculing another (i.e., the opposing speaker) in high spirits again and again and making gestures in the presence of the congregation. Furthermore, [one should say,] “while [the opponent] makes a mischievous remark, he does not say what he should say,” or indeed “Your (i.e., the opponent’s) thesis has been abandoned.” Again, when [the opponent] challenges [the disputant], [the disputant] should reply, “You should learn for another year,” “You have not yet honored [your] preceptor,” or “That’s enough of your [talking]!” If [the opponent] is condemned to be defeated even once, [people will] say that he is defeated and, therefore, will lack the ability to concentrate on what he is saying. Besides, some say that one should talk in a hostile manner (vigṛhya) with a superior [opponent] in the same way, but [to begin with] the wise does not recommend the discord with a more excellent [opponent] in this manner.

For căhvāyamānaḥ, CaS prints căhā(hva)yamānaḥ.
Here we should note that a disputant is recommended to use incomprehensible sentences and ridicule an opponent when engaging in wrangle with a friendly but ignorant congregation, a neutral but ignorant congregation, or sometimes a superior congregation. Such a hostile manner of debate is also allowed in wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) defined in the Nyāyasūtras and in the Nyāyabhāṣya; on the other hand, in the Vādanyāya, acts such as embarrassing others (parapamsana), which are regarded as bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), are not considered to be an admissible method of debate.

3. The discussion of the composition of a treatise (造論) in the *Upāyahṛdaya

Having discussed the conception of debate in the Carakasamhitā, we will now consider debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya. There is no Sanskrit text of the *Upāyahṛdaya, but the extant Chinese translations permit to conclude that the *Upāyahṛdaya contains remarkable ideas that can be connected with the Nyāyasūtras.

UH (T1632) 23b14–24: 答曰不然。今造此論不爲勝負利養名聞。但欲顯示善惡諸相故造此論。世若無論迷惑者衆、則爲世間邪智巧辯所共誑惑、起不善業、輪迴惡趣、失眞實利。若達論者則自分別善惡空相、衆魔外道邪見之人、無能惱壞作障礙也。故我爲欲利益衆生造此正論。又欲令正法流布於世。如爲修治蓖婆羅果、而外廣植荊棘之林爲防果故、今我造論亦復如是、欲護正法不求名聞故。汝前説長諍論者是事不然。爲護法故、故應造論。I will answer that [this is] not so. Now, I have not composed this treatise (造此論) for the purpose of victory, profit, or reputation (勝負利養名聞). I compose this treatise because I only wish to reveal diverse good and bad features [of debate]. If the world had no treatise [of debate], there would be many confused people. Then, [the confused] people would be deceived by the world’s perverse ideas, and wily rhetoric would give rise to bad deeds, which would be reborn in an evil world and would lose real benefits. If debate (論) is understood, [its] good, bad, and useless features are distinguished as a matter of course. [Then], evildoers, non-Buddhists, and adherents of perverse views would not be able to harm [people] and obstruct [their nirvāṇa]. Therefore, to benefit people (利益衆生), I compose this correct treatise. Furthermore, I wish to disseminate the true teaching [of Buddha] (正法) to the world. Just as in order to cultivate the fruits of mango trees one plants a thicket of thorns (荊棘之林) widely around them, so now I will compose [this] treatise in the same way because I wish to protect the true teaching [of the Buddha] and I do not seek [to enhance my] reputation. You explained earlier that [I am] good

8 Kajiyama 1984 assumes that the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya is Nāgārjuna.

9 The same basic point is argued by Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra as follows, MA 6.118 (p. 231): bstan bcos las dp Yad rtosod la chags pa'i phyir // na mdzad rnam grol phyir ni de n yid bst an l // gal te de n yid rnam par bshad pa na // gzhan gzhung 'jig par ’gyur na nyes pa med // Cf. Uryuzu and Nakazawa 2012: 214. I am indebted to Dr. Shenghai Li for having provided this useful information.
at debate (諍論), [but] this is not true. In order to protect the teaching [of the Buddha], I must compose [this] treatise.\textsuperscript{10}

Compared with claims made in the Carakasamhitā about jalpa or sambhāśā, the way in which the \textit{Upāyahṛdaya} explains the purposes and methods of composing a treatise can be summed up as follows:

1. The purpose is not “victory;”
2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit” or “reputation;”
3. The purpose is the “benefit of people;”
4. The purpose is “protection of the true teaching [of the Buddha];”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

According to the author’s intention, the \textit{Upāyahṛdaya} was composed in order to protect the true teaching of the Buddha. This means of protection is metaphorically explained as planting a thicket of thorns around mango trees. As will be seen in the following section, a similar expression appears in the Nyāyasūtras.

\section*{4. Jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya}

With these considerations in mind, we will now examine the concept of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya in order to trace conceptual changes in the idea of “debate.” In NS 1.2.1–3, the concept of debate is classified into three categories, namely, vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā, while jalpa and vitaṇḍā are presented as subcategories of vāda in CaS 8.8.28. On the other hand, NS 4.2.47–51 proposes three types of debate: samvāda, jalpa, and vitaṇḍā. Although this discrepancy in terminology and classification is problematic,\textsuperscript{11} we will not discuss this and rather concentrate on jalpa and vitaṇḍā, which are explained with the help of metaphors as follows:

NS 4.2.50: \texttt{tattvādhyavasāyasamrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasamrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakasākhāvaranaṇava}\

Just as thorny branches cover [seeds] for the purpose of protecting seed germination, so wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.\textsuperscript{12}

As pointed out in Preisendanz 2000: 236, Kang 2003: 36–37 and Ishitobi 2003, this sentence parallels the very beginning of the \textit{Upāyahṛdaya} discussed above. It can be assumed that the Nyāyasūtras adopted the metaphor of “thorns” from the \textit{Upāyahṛdaya}, or that both the Nyāyasūtras and \textit{Upāyahṛdaya} drew on another text which is their origin. In the same context of explaining jalpa and vitaṇḍā, Vātsyāyana commented on the sūtra as follows:

\textsuperscript{10} Ishitobi 2006: 42–44 and Eltschinger 2012: 471–472 translate this passage and analyze the motives and aims of treatise or debate presented in the \textit{Upāyahṛdaya}.

\textsuperscript{11} Preisendanz 2000 considered this problem in detail.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. NBh 1099,4: \texttt{anutpannatattvaśyajñānānām apraśnaṇadosānām tadadartham ghaṭamānānām etad iti; NV 1099,8: anutpannatattvaśyajñānenaīsat kartavyam iti sūtrārthaḥ.}
By means of these two, [i.e., the wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā),] hostile (vigrhya) dispute [is undertaken].

“Hostile” (vigrhya) is [equivalent to] “by a desire to win” (vijigīṣayā); [however] is [this] not [equivalent to] “by a desire to know truth.” This [hostile dispute is undertaken] for the purpose of defending expertise (vidyā), [but] is not [undertaken] for the purpose of profit, honor, or reputation.\footnote{Cf. NV 1099,10–2000,4: tābhyāṃ jalpavitaṇḍābhyāṃ vigrhyeti vijigīṣayā, na tattvabubhutsayeti. vidyāpālanārtham caītat, na lāhapājākhyaṭāyartham iti.}

As to the purpose of, respectively, jalpa/vitaṇḍā and the composition of a treatise (造論), both NBh and UH exclude (self-)profit and endorse the protection of their own doctrine. On the other hand, the presentation in the Nyāyabhāṣya is different from that in the *Upāyahṛdaya in terms of whether the desire for victory is approved of as a legitimate purpose.

The main points regarding purpose and method of jalpa and vitaṇḍā according to the Nyāyabhāṣya can be summed up as follows:

1. The purpose is “victory;”
2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation;”
3. The idea of “benefit of people” is not mentioned;
4. The purpose is “defense of expertise;”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

5. The concept of debate in the Vādanyāya

As Ruegg 2000: 137–138, n. 41 acutely pointed out, Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, and probably also Vasubandhu, reject jalpa or vitaṇḍā. Here we limit the discussion to Dharmakīrti’s criticism of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Dharmakīrti does not mention the thorn metaphor used in the Nyāyasūtras. However, Śāntarakṣita quotes NS 4.2.50 in his commentary on the Vādanyāya, the Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipaṇcitārtha (VA):

\textit{VA 70,25–26}: yathoktaṃ tattvādhyavasāyaṃrakṣanārtham jalpavitaṇḍe bijaprarohasamrakṣanārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavad iti.

This quotation occurs in a context where Dharmakīrti criticized the traditional concept of debate – particularly wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) – and instead promoted his own original conception.
5.1 The “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) in the Vādanyāya

First, Dharmakīrti criticizes jalpa and vitandā by considering these two concepts to mean “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ).

VN 22.8–16: chalavyavahāre ’pi vijigīṣūṇāṃ vāda iti cet, na, durjanaviprati-pattyadhikāre satām sāstrāpravṛttee. na hi parānugrahapravertyā mithyāpra-lāpārambhātmotkarsaraparapamsanādīn asadvyavahārān upadiśanti. na ca paravipamsanena lābhasatkāraślokapārjanam satām acāraḥ. nāpi tathāpra-vṛtteebhyaḥ svahatanātena prāṇinām upatāpanam satsammatānām sāstrā-kārasabhāsaddāṃ yuktam. na ca nyāyasāstrāṇi sadbhīr lābhādyupārjanāya prāṇihante. tasmān na yogavihitaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo nāma. 

(Objection:) Even if distortion (chala) is used, the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) [is undertaken]. (Answer:) [This is] not [so] because well-educated people are not engaged in the doctrinal system in consideration of bad people’s evil deeds (vipratiṣṭiti). That is to say, [well-educated] people who are engaged in the benefit of others do not teach bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), such as boasting and embarrassing others through beginning incoherent speech. Besides, winning profit, reverence, or praise by disgracing others is not [suitable] behavior for well-educated people. Furthermore, troubling [other] people by giving a [helping] hand to those who are engaged in this manner [i.e., disgracing others] is not suitable for those who are considered to be well-educated people, i.e., those who are participants in the meeting of learned men (sāstrākārasabhāsad). Additionally, well-educated people don’t compose methodically written works for the purpose of gaining profit and the rest. Because of these [evil deeds, such as distortion (chala)], a so-called “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable (yogavihita) at all.

On the surface, it would seem that Dharmakīrti does not directly explain the characteristics of “debate of people with a desire to win,” but merely states evil deeds that are not appropriate for well-educated people. However, Dharmakīrti here comes to the conclusion that “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable. From this viewpoint, one may say that the “evil deeds” should be considered to be precisely the behavior exhibited in a debate of people with a desire to win.

Dharmakīrti does not use the terms jalpa or vitandā. However, according to the explanation in the Nyāyasūtras, “distortion” (chala) is the hostile method used in jalpa and vitandā. Additionally, with the passage of time, the terms vijigīṣukathā or vijigīṣuvāda

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14 See VA 70,19–21: durjanānām vipratiṣṭitti aśobhano vyavahāraḥ tasmān na yogavihito nyāyāḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo nāma, yac chalādhībhī kriyata ity adhyāhāraḥ. (1) vijigīṣu “em.: vijagīṣu”.
15 McClintock 2010: 70, n. 169 has pointed out that Much uses the inappropriate translation “regellos” for the yogavihita in Much 1991: 51.2.
16 Vītandā is criticized in VN 61,1–2: etenai vītandā pratyuktābhypamābhāve vivādābhāvāt.
17 See NS 1.2.2: yathoktopannā sahajāṭiṅgṛahasthāṇāśādhanopālambo jālpaḥ //
18 Cf. SDS 30: vijigīṣukathā (1) yā tu chalajātyādidaśanā / sa jālpaḥ, să vītandā tu yā pratipakṣavajaritā // (1) vijigīṣu “em.: vijagīṣu.”
came to be considered alternative expressions for jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that Dharmakīrti criticizes the characteristics of jalpa and vitaṇḍā in these phrases.

Let me summarize the purposes and methods of “debate of people with a desire to win” presented in the Vādanyāya as follows:

1. The purpose is “victory;”
2. The purpose is “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise;”
3. The purpose is not “benefit of others;”
4. The idea of “defense of expertise” and the like is not mentioned;
5. The method is “evil deeds,” “distortion,” “embarrassing others” and so forth.

5.2 The “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ) in the Vādanyāya

After criticizing the debate of people with a desire to win, i.e., wrangle and cavil, Dharmakīrti presents his original conception of debate, namely, “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ).

VN 22,16–21: parānugrahapravṛttās tu santo vipratipannaṃ pratipādayanto
nyāyam anusareyuḥ satsādhanābhidhānena bhūtadoṣodbhāvanena va, sākṣi-
pratyakṣam tasyaivānuprabodhāya. tad eva nyāyānusaranam satāṃ vādaḥ,
ukte nyāye tattvārthi cet pratipadyeta, tadapratiippattāv apy anyo na vipratipadyeteti.¹⁹

On the other hand, when [well-educated people] persuade one who has fallacious notions, well-educated people who aim at the benefit of others (pa-rānugraha) would abide by the reasonable rule (nyāya) by stating a correct piece of proof or pointing out a real fault for making him (i.e., the one who has fallacious notions) notice [his fault] in the presence of witnesses. The debate of well-educated people (satāṃ vādaḥ) is precisely that, i.e., abiding by reasonable rules if [an opponent] seeking the truth were to properly understand the logical argument (nyāya) stated [by the proponent, and] even if [he] does not understand it, others [in proximity] were not to misunderstand it.²¹

Elsewhere, Dharmakīrti claims that the proper means for a proponent is “stating a piece of correct proof” (satsādhanābhidhāna), while the means for an opponent is “pointing out a real fault” (bhūtadoṣodbhāvana). The means of “debate of people with a desire to win” are described as “evil deeds” (vipratipattīsadvayavahāra). Dharmakīrti compared the former to the latter in the following passage:

VN 22,22–23,6: tattvarakṣanārtham sadbhupahartavyam eva chalādi vijī-
giśubhir i tī cet, na, nakhaacetaśastra-prahārādīpanādibhir apīti vaktavyam.

¹⁹ vipratipadyeta° em. [D337a6/P377b8: mi rogs pa; VA 70,24: vipratipadyeta° VN.
²⁰ See VA 70,21–22: ukte sati nyāye tattvārthi cet prativādi pratipadyeta tam artham nyāyopetam.
²¹ See VA 70,22–24: atha svapakṣarāgasya balīyastvād ukte ’pi nyāye na pratipadyeta. tadā tena prativi-
vādīna tasya nyāyasvārthasāyvānuprātivādīv ānāyah(1) samipavartyātmajjo janakāyo na vipratipadyetetī kṛtvā nyāyānusāraṇam eva satāṃ vāda iti vartate. (1) anāya° VAms em.: anya° VA.)
It is important to consider the following features of “debate of well-educated people” when comparing it with the definition of “debate of people with a desire to win.”

1. Dharmakīrti does not consider the concept of “victory” in the usual sense of the word to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people, and insteadreinterpretsthis concept. In a debate of well-educated people, a proponent is victorious when

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22 The Tibetan translation of the Vādanyāya gives the lines a different reading. Cf. D337a6–7/P377b8–378a1: gal te de kho na nyid bsrung ba’i don du dam pa rnam kyang rgyal bar ’dod pa sgyu(1) la sogs pa dag gis tshar gcad (D; bcad P) par bya ba yin no zhe na l ma yin te khu tshur dang l thal lcag dang l mtshon chas bsnun (D; bsnan P) pa dang l me la sogs pa dag gis kyang zhes brjod par bya na l (1) sgyu D337a7/P377b8.)

23 The word ādi seems to imply jāti or nigrasthāna. Cf. NS 1.2.2: yathoktopapannā chalajātānigrasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ //

24 See VA 70.27–28: tadbhāva iti sādhanaprapakhyāpanasādhanābhāsadūṣaṇayor abhāve.

25 See VA 70.28: anyathāpitī mithyāpralāpādyabhāve ‘pi.

26 Steinkellner 1988: 1441–1442 pointed out that [satāṃ-]vādaḥ has to serve the investigation of truth (tattvacintā VN 21.22) and the explanation of truth (tattvakhyāpana VN 23.5). In the discussion at the conference, Prof. Steinkellner made the important remark that tattva in the case of tattvacintā should mean “true reality.”

27 As for the difference between Dharmakīrti’s satāṃ vādaḥ and the notions of vāda, jalpa or vitanā as defined in the Nyāyasūtras, see Much 1991: Einleitung 2.2 and Gokhale 1993: Introduction, pp. xv–xvii.
he “explains truth [to others]” and an opponent is victorious when he “removes misapprehension [of others].”

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise.”

3. Dharmakīrti considers the concept of “benefitting others” (parānugraha) to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people. The Nyāyasūtras, Nyāyabhāṣya, and Nyāyavārttika do not propose this concept to be the purpose of jalpa or vitaṇḍā, at least not in the context of debate.

4. The purpose is “protection of truth.”

5. The proponent’s method is “the explanation of proof” or “stating a piece of correct proof” and the opponent’s method is “the refutation of pseudo-proof” or “pointing out a real fault.”

Regarding the first point, we must draw attention to the condition of defeat (nigrahasthāna) and victory as constructed systematically by Dharmakīrti in the Vādanyāya. In Dharmakīrti’s theory, neither a proponent nor an opponent are to be defeated, even if they act solely within the guidelines of the nigrahasthāna. On the basis of Figure 1, which shows the flow chart of the conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādanyāya, the following situation serves as an example: in the beginning, a proponent intends to prove his statement using correct proof, i.e., the proof-action is not the case of nigrahasthāna. An opponent then tries to refute the proof of the proponent, but what the opponent points out is a pseudo-fault, not a real fault. If the proponent does not refute the pseudo-fault, neither proponent nor opponent will win or lose, in spite of the fact that the proponent’s proof is correct. The reason why Dharmakīrti regards the winner and the loser as undecided in this situation is that the victory of the proponent is defined to be the explanation of truth, but the proponent does not achieve this, since he fails to correct the opponent’s mistake. This reinterpreted idea of victory is consistently maintained throughout the entire text of the Vādanyāya.

6. Responses to Dharmakīrti’s ideas in the Nyāya school

It remains to be studied how different Naiyāyikas accepted or refuted the ideas on debate from the Vādanyāya. In this paper, we shall concentrate on Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā (NVTT) and Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū).

6.1 Jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā

Vācaspati Miśra explained wrangle and cavil as follows:

NVTT 1099,15–2000,11 (ad NS 4.2.51): na kevalaṃ tadartham ghaṭamānāṃ jalpavitaṇḍe, api tu vidyānirvedādibhiś ca pareṇāvajñāyamānasya; tābhyaṁ vigṛhyakathanam iti sūtram. yas tu svadarśanavilasitamithyājñānāvānepadurvidaghatayā sadvidyāvairāgyād vā labhupūjakhyātyarthisṭayā khetubhir īśvarāṇāṃ jañādhārānāṃ puratō vedabrāhmaṇaparakarokādīśaṇa-pravṛttāḥ, taṃ prati vādī samicīnādīśaṇam apratibhyāpaśyan jalpavitaṇḍe
Figure 1: The conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādaṇyāya. (This figure has been presented in Sasaki 2013a)
Wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) [take place] not only between those who strive for it (i.e., protecting the ascertainment of truth) but also between those who are derogatorily considered to disregard expertise by others. [According to the Nyāya-]sūtra (i.e., NS 4.2.51), “by means of these two, [i.e., wrangle and cavil,] the hostile dispute [is undertaken].” However, the debater who doesn’t find an appropriate objection against the [following] person introduces (avatārya), namely, divides (vigṛhya) wrangle and cavil and then makes statements about truth through wrangle and cavil for the purpose of defending expertise. The [above-mentioned] person is engaged in objecting to Veda, Brahman, the future world and the rest in the presence of the Gods held firm by people through fallacious logical reasons because of a false conception, haughtiness, or unsophisticatedness that appears in his own view or [because of] a desire for profit, honor, or reputation on account of aversion to the true expertise…. This (i.e., defending expertise) is also the purpose of the wrangling and the cavil. However, profit, reputation and the like are considered to be neither [the purpose of the wrangling nor the cavil] because the extremely compassionate sage who is engaged in the welfare of others (parahita) does not teach obvious methods for deceiving others.

Vācaspati seems to reinterpret the traditional definition of jalpa and vitaṇḍā by introducing a new concept in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā. The main points of his reinterpretation can be summarized as follows:

1. Vācaspati reinterpreted vigṛhya in NS 4.2.51 as avatārya, while Vātsyāyana interpreted vigṛhya as vijigīṣayā. It is assumed that Vācaspati intended to change the traditional idea that debaters seek victory in jalpa and vitaṇḍā. This probably indicates his acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣānm vādaḥ). However, according to Thakur’s edition, this interpretation is problematic because he reads avatārya vijigīṣayā tam vigṛhya. Therefore, I would like to avoid drawing a definitive conclusion here.

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation.”

3. Vācaspati introduced the idea of “welfare of others” (parahita). He does not clearly describe this concept as the purpose or motivation of jalpa or vitaṇḍā. However, it is likely that Vācaspati integrated the Vādanyāya’s idea of “benefit of others” (parānugraha) into his own approach.

28 avatārya vigṛhya NVTT(CSS), NVTT(KSS); avatārya vijigīṣayā tam vigṛhya NVTT(Thakur).
29 See NS 4.2.50: tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe… // “The wrangling (jalpa) and the cavil (vitaṇḍā) [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.” See section 4 for details.
30 See NVTP 558,2–3: vidyānirveda ity asya vivaraṇaḥ sadvidyāvairāgyād iti. ādigrāhaṇavivaraṇaṃ lābhāpūjeyti.
31 See section 4 for details.
4. The purpose is “defense of expertise.”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

Although there remain some uncertainties as to how Vācaspāti Miśra responded to the ideas on debate presented in the Vādanyāya, it seems clear that he adopted some of these ideas to fit his own concept of debate.

6.2 Jalpa and vitanḍā in the Nyāyabhāṣaṇa

In the case of the Nyāyabhāṣaṇa, an influence from the Vādanyāya is more evident than in the case of the Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā.

NBhū 332,11–23: yatra tu vijigīṣunā saha lābhapūjākhyātikāmo jayārtham pravartate, sā vijigīṣukathā. nanu ca mokṣamārgaviruddhatvāl lābhaḍiprāptes tatprayaścitaṃ kathā na yuktet, satyam; neyam mumukṣunā kartavyā, kim tu jñārāvā varjanīyetai nirūpita. yadā tu vītarāgo vijigīṣunākṣiptaḥ kathām pari-hartum parapatrotvān na śaknoti, tadāsau vītarāgas tena vijigīṣunā saha parānugrahārtham jñānānukurakaṇaśāntarthaḥ ca tām eva caturṣaṅgām kathām kuryā .... svātmāni śisyādvyādūrman cilopannas tatprābyāsaṃbhūtān ṣākāryā-yādmgair bhākṣyātāpi yadi jalpavitanḍabhāyām kāntakaśākhābhāyām āvāraṇam na kriyeta. ye cānuntpatattvajñānāḥ śisyādayaḥ, teṣām pratīvādānāṃ cānugrahārthām vītarāgēṇāpi jalpādau pravartitavyam ity uktaṃ. anugrahaḥ ca mokṣāśāstrāśāraḥādyāś śraddhotpatidvārena bhavati.

However, when those who long for profit, honor, or reputation undertake a certain [debate] for the purpose of victory with those [disputants who are] desirous of victory, the [debate] is the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣukathā). (Objection:) Because the acquisition of profit and the rest is contrary to the path to liberation, the dispute that has it (i.e., victory) as its purpose is not appropriate. (Answer:) Yes, [you are correct]. It is determined that those who desire liberation ought not to do this (i.e., the disputation whose purpose is victory), but rather ought to avoid [such a disputation] after becoming aware of [such a disputation]. However, unless a person without passion who is provoked by a person with the desire to win can repel the dispute by troubling others, this passionless person will undertake the very dispute, which consists of four component parts with this person with a

32 Cf. NVTT 1099,13–14 (ad NS 4.2.50): tatprābyāsaṃbhūtān āśāntaḥ jayārtham jalpavitanḍe bijapraro-hasanprāṇaḥ śāntarthaḥ kāntakaśākhāhāvāraṇat iti sūtram. tad vyācaṣte – anupannattvajñānānaṁ iti.

33 Basically, in the Nyāya school vītarāgakathā corresponds to vāda, and vijigīṣukathā corresponds to jalpa or vitanḍā. Bhāsarvajña, however, shows another interpretative possibility — that vītarāgakathā and vijigīṣukathā are divided into four sub-types: (i) apratipakṣā vītarāgakathā, (ii) apratipakṣā vītarāgakathā, (iii) apratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā, and (iv) apratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā. See NBhū 332.7–11: vītarāgakathā pi dvividhā bhavati – apratipakṣā svāpratipakṣā(1) ca .... evam cāvāntarabhedaśāstrāyām ca vāapyāntarabhedaśāstrāyām ca vā vā apratipakṣā em. : vā apratipakṣā. “The dispute of people without passion (vītarāgakathā) also has two types: [the dispute
desire to win for the purpose of benefitting others (parānugrahārtham) and for protecting the sprout of knowledge…. The sprout of the ascertainment of truth that surfaces in [a debater] himself and in his disciples would be eaten by savage animals, such as Buddhists, if [the sprout] were not covered by thorny branches, i.e., the wrangling and the cavil. Furthermore, it is said that even the person without passion has to undertake the wrangling and so on for the purpose of benefitting (anugrahārtham) disciples and the rest who have no knowledge of truth and for [benefitting] an opponent. Additionally, the benefit [of others] occurs through having faith in the masters [who teach] the doctrine of liberation and the like.

As in Vācaspati’s text cited above, Bhāsarvajña also proposes a new interpretation of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. The main points are summarized as follows:

1. Bhāsarvajña considers that a person without passion (vītarāga) has to participate in the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣukathā) when he is provoked by a person with the desire to win (vijigīṣu). Even in that case, vītarāga, as its name suggests, is free from passion, such as the desire to win. Therefore, in the case of vijigīṣukathā carried out by vītarāga, it seems that Bhāsarvajña intends, like Dharmakīrti, to remove the idea of victory as the purpose of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. In other words, both vītarāga in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa and sat in the Vādanyāya have no desire to win (vijigīṣā). It seems quite probable that the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa’s view is influenced by the Vādanyāya.

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor,” or “reputation” for those who desire liberation (mumukṣu).

3. Bhāsarvajña introduced the idea of parānugrahārtham “for the purpose of benefitting others” as the motivation behind vītarāga in the context of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Being engaged in parānugraha “benefitting others” is common among vītarāga in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa and sat in the Vādanyāya. One may say that Bhāsarvajña covertly imported Dharmakīrti’s idea of parānugrahāya.

4. The purpose is the “protection of the sprout of knowledge [of the ascertainment of truth].”

5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

Judging from the above, we can be fairly certain that Bhāsarvajña adopted the viewpoint and concept described in the Vādanyāya to his own notion of debate, presented in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose (Motivation)</th>
<th>Caś’s jaśpa</th>
<th>UN’s composition of the treatise (विषय)</th>
<th>NS’s jaśpa and vītaṇḍa</th>
<th>NBha’s jaśpa and vītaṇḍa</th>
<th>VN’s vaśīgyavāda</th>
<th>VN’s saṃsāra vījaśpa</th>
<th>NYṬ’s jaśpa and vītaṇḍa</th>
<th>NBha’s jaśpa and vītaṇḍa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victory</strong> (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>the explanation of truth (sattvādhyāpāna) and the removal of misapprehension (mithyāpratipattivivarana)</td>
<td>= reinterpreted &quot;victory&quot;</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-profit</strong> (dāhaka)</td>
<td>self-profit (dāhaka)</td>
<td>self-profit (dāhaka)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fame</strong> (yulaśa)</td>
<td>reputation (vakāraśa)</td>
<td>reverence (vatskāraśa), praise (lokaśa)</td>
<td>reverence (vatskāraśa), praise (lokaśa)</td>
<td>honour (pupīṣa), reputation (lokaśa)</td>
<td>honour (pupīṣa), reputation (lokaśa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit of people</strong> (parāmygraśa)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parāmygraśa)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parāmygraśa)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parāmygraśa)</td>
<td>welfare of others (parākhu)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parāmygraśa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection of the true teaching</strong> (adhyātra)</td>
<td>protection of the ascertainment of truth (sattvādhyāpāna)</td>
<td>defense of expertise (vidyāparipāla)</td>
<td>protection of truth (sattvārakaśa)</td>
<td>defense of expertise (vidyāparipāla)</td>
<td>protection of the sprout of knowledge (jñānātākaraśa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ridicule another</strong> (apahānand param)</td>
<td>thorns (kaṇṭhaka)</td>
<td>thorns (kaṇṭhaka)</td>
<td>evil deeds (vījīrayāsa/āśrayāsa), distortion (hakha, embarasses others (parāpanamsa)</td>
<td>the explanation of proof (nāpparāpāhāpāna) and the refutation of pseudo proof (nādhavanādāśaśaśa)</td>
<td>thorns (kaṇṭhaka)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: These purposes and method have interpretative problems. See section 2 for details.

**: A crossed line indicates rejection. For example, the Nyāyaśāstra rejects "victory" as the purpose of debate.

**: The rejection of concept of “victory” in the Nyāyavrāntikatāpatyayākā is problematic. See section 6.1 for details.

**: The “welfare for others (parākhu)” is not clearly described as the purpose of jaśpa or vītaṇḍa in the Nyāyavrāntikatāpatyayākā. See section 6.1 for details.

**: The negation of the purpose of victory and the affirmation of the purpose of “benefit of others” is attributed to the case of vītaṇḍa. See section 6.2 for details.

Figure 2: The comparison of conceptions of debate in Indian Logic
7. Concluding remarks

The comparison of “debate” concepts in the sources examined in this paper is presented in Figure 2. In addition, this comparison yields the following main points:

1. In the Carakasaṃhitā the term jalpa is employed to refer to a type of hostile debate conducted for the purpose of victory.
2. In the *Upāyahrdaya the composition of a treatise (造論) is explained using the metaphor of thorns (荊棘). The same metaphor is used in the Nyāyasūtras. Either it was adapted from the *Upāyahrdaya or from another text upon which both the Nyāyasūtras and the *Upāyahrdaya draw. In the Nyāyasūtras the metaphor is used to explain jalpa and vitaṇḍā, technical terms that are also employed in the Carakasaṃhitā.
3. In the Nyāyabhāṣya both jalpa and vitaṇḍā are interpreted as forms of debate for the purpose of victory. As for jalpa, this interpretation is similar to that found in the Carakasaṃhitā.
4. In the Vādanyāya Dharmakīrti criticized the purpose of victory attributed to jalpa and vitaṇḍā in the Nyāyabhāṣya, presenting instead the idea of parānugraha “benefitting others,” as the purpose of debate. Dharmakīrti’s negation of the purpose of victory and the affirmation of the purpose of “benefit of others” is similar to the position found in the *Upāyahrdaya.
5. From among the later Naiyāyikas, at least Bhāsarvajña, in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, accepted implicitly Dharmakīrti’s construction of the debate concept in the Vādanyāya by adopting the idea of “benefitting others” and rejecting the idea of “victory.” It is possible that the same might be said of Vācaspati’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā as well, although the text is not explicit.

We may reasonably conclude that the Vādanyāya marked a turning point in the historical transition of the concept of debate. Dharmakīrti criticized the earlier concept of debate in the Nyāya school as “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) and created a new one, i.e., “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). His new understanding of the nature of the debate affected the later Nyāya school and led some Naiyāyikas to modify their approach. However, the extent to which the Vādanyāya influenced later works in the Nyāya school remains a matter for further research. An extended examination of the Vādanyāya’s commentaries, such as Śāntarakṣita’s Vipaścítārthā, as well as more comprehensive studies on later Nyāya literature, are needed to more fully understand these relationships.

References and abbreviations

Primary sources

D sDe dge edition of the Tripiṭaka in Tibetan.
NBh Nyāyabhāṣya. See NV.
NS Nyāyasūtras. See NV.
NV Nyāyavārttika. See NVTṬ.
P Peking edition of the Tripiṭaka in Tibetan.
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō. (Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese.)
UH *Upāyahṛdaya. See T [Vol. 32, No. 1632].
VA_MS Vipaścitārthā: Photostat copy of the Sanskrit manuscript in the library of Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. (Color photostat copies of the same manuscript: 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a are contained in 尼瑪旦增編,『羅布林卡珍藏文物輯選』, 中国藏学出版社, 2011.)

Secondary sources


The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference
by
Kiyokuni Shiga

1. Introductory remarks

In an earlier paper, “Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion” (henceforth Shiga 2011b), I proposed the hypothesis that the theory of all-inclusive pervasion (sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti), considered to have been created by Dharmakīrti, in fact originated in Dignāga’s theory of inference. The statement of Dignāga’s in question, which appears in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (henceforth PSV), is the following:

To be more precise, the co-existence [of a logical reason] with such an [object to be proved] is understood by means of two [types of] exemplification based on similarity or dissimilarity, [in] which [the property to be proved] is associated\(^1\) with external thing[s\(^2\)] that respectively have the proving property (bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena).\(^3\)

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\(^1\) As we will see below, Jinendrabuddhi understands the word upasaṃhṛta or upasaṃhāra as forming part of the compound bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta or bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra as upadarśita (PSṬ D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2), upanayana or prakāśana (PST D230a3; P260b5; Skt. PST B185a2). Moreover, he interprets the word upasaṃhāra as “associating/bringing the [property] to be proved with/near all the proving [properties]” elsewhere in the same chapter (PST D227b1; P257b7f.: ney bar bsdu ba ni med na mi ‘byung ba nyid de[ste P] / thams cad du sgrub par byed pa la bsgrub par bya ba nye bar bsdu ba ste / nye bar ’dren pa’o // Skt. B182b6f.: upasamḥāro ‘vinābhāvitvam, sarvatra sādhane sādhyāyopasamhāram upanayah). Therefore, it would be more appropriate in this case to translate upasaṃhṛta as “associated,” “applied” or “brought near” than as “summed up” (Shiga 2011b: 525 with n. 14) or “included,” as in the case of Dharmakīrti’s term sarvopasaṃhāra (HB 5*, 21), which could be translated as “including” or “summing up [the property to be proved in] all the [property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]” (HBṬ 62, 18–20: sarvasmin sādhanadharmavaṃ dharmiṇī, na drṣṭaṃdharṣinī eva, sādhyadharmasopasamhāram upamahāro dhaukanam ...). Meanwhile, it should be noted here that Arcaṭa glosses upasamḥāra as dhaukanā (“bringing [the property to be proved] near [all the property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]”). Taking this interpretation into consideration, it is probable that the word upasaṃhāra, even in the compound sarvopasaṃhāra, could mean “associating” or “applying” rather than “summing up” or “including.”

\(^2\) According to Jinendrabuddhi, bāhyārtha is to be understood not as a single and particular individual (PST D215a4f.; P244b2; Skt. B171a2f.: ... ekatraiva vyaktivīese pradarśanasya prādhanayanirāsapañam drasṭavyam, but as a whole assembly of things (PST D215a3; P244a8f.; Skt. B171b7: sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadṛṣṭanālam upasaṃhṛtena ‘ṛthiṣiṭir drṣṭaṃṭah, na tu ghaṭa eva) or the generalized property-bearer as opposed to the particular property-bearer to be proved (PST D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2: dharmiṇaḥ paksiktaḥ viśeṣād anyatra sāmānye ...).

\(^3\) PSV(K) P138a6ff.: de ’dra ba’i lhan cig rgyu ba nyid ni phyi rol gyi don nye bar sdud par byed pa chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa’i dpe gnyis po dag gis rtogs pa yin te / PSV(V) D51a7–b1;
The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

This statement coincides with Dharmakīrti’s formulation of all-inclusive pervasion in his Hetubindu⁴ (henceforth HB). Considering various factors, I concluded that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shared the idea that pervasion is established or confirmed by taking individual cases⁵ into account.⁶

As I mentioned in Shiga 2011b, the term bāhyārtha also appears several times in the fourth chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (henceforth PS) and the PSV in the expressions bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra, bāhyārthapradarśana, bāhyārthāpekṣā, as well as bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta. These examples of its use need to be examined in a new light to clarify the relationship between bāhyārtha and drṣṭānta. This paper aims to further investigate various issues that were not settled in Shiga 2011b, including the following: (1) What do Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi mean by the term bāhyārtha used in logical contexts, mainly in the PS and PSV 4? (2) Does it literally denote “an external object,” that is, “a thing in the external world as an object of cognition,” or does it denote “something external to the subject or the property-bearer to be proved,” as Jinendrabuddhi understands it? (3) In this case, does Jinendrabuddhi deviate from Dignāga’s original intention by adopting Dharmakīrti’s theories when he interprets Dignāga, or are his comments on the term bāhyārtha in keeping with Dignāga’s intention? (4) What is the relationship between the terms bāhyārtha and bahirvyāpti?

2. Usage examples for the term bāhyārtha in the PS/PSV 4

2.1. Regarding the role of drṣṭānta⁷

First, we will observe an example of Dignāga’s use of the term bāhyārtha in PS/PSV 4, where he defines the role of drṣṭānta.⁸

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⁴ HB 5*, 18–22: tasya dvividhā prayogāḥ; sādhyarthaṃ vaidharmyaṃ ca, yathā yat sat tat sarvam kṣanikam yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, samā ca sābda iti, tathā kṣaṇikatvābhāve sattvābhāvaḥ, samā ca sābda ity anvayavyatirekābhāvāṃ sarvopasaṃbhāraṃ vyāptipradarśanālakṣaṇam sādhyarthaṃ vaidharmyaṃ prayogau.

⁵ While Dignāga states “external case[s]” (bāhyārtha), Dharmakīrti refers to “all cases” (sarva).

⁶ See Shiga 2011b: 532f.

⁷ In Dignāga’s system of logic, the word drṣṭānta has two different meanings: an actual example or a thing (artha, abhidheya) and an exemplification or a statement (vacana, abhidhāna). (See Katsura 2004: 141f.)

⁸ See Shiga 2011b: 527. In PS 4.2 drṣṭānta is defined differently as follows: sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāsitītā / khyāpyate yatra drṣṭāntah sa sādhyarthaṃ dvidhā / (See Jambuvijaya 1966:133. This verse is quoted in Dasāvākālokaśūrahārībhādhyāvṛtti 34b. Cf. NMukh 11.) “The example is a [thing] in which it is conveyed that a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved and that [the logical reason] is absent when what is to be proved is absent. This is in two forms: [the example on the basis of] similarity and the other (= the example on the basis of dissimilarity).” (See also Katsura 2004: 141 with n. 11.)
Reconstructed text\(^9\) of PSV on PS 4.3 (= Appendix [2]):\(^{10}\)

evaṃ tarhi ghaṭo 'nudāharaṇam. \(\text{tatra hi yathā hetuḥ sādhyāṅugataḥ, tathā sādhyam api hetvanagatam iti cet. na, avivakṣitatvāt [yathā]}\)\(^{11}\) kṛtakatvavi-

\(\text{śeṣasya hetutvena, tathā ghaṭe sādhyāṅugamasya. bāhyāṛthapradarśanaṃ hi nidarśye pradhānam.}\)\(^{12}\)

[Question:] If so (= if the example on the basis of similarity is defined as a thing in which a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved),\(^{13}\) a pot would not [constitute a valid] exemplification, because in the [pot], just as a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved, what is to be proved is [also] accompanied by the logical reason.

[Answer:] This is not [right], because just as being produced as a particular property is not intended to be the logical reason, what is to be proved is [not intended to be] accompanied [by the logical reason] in a pot[ which is a particular thing, even though that is the case],\(^{14}\) for the primary [role] of exemplification is to indicate external thing[s].\(^{15}\)

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the term \(bāhyāṛtha\) as follows:

\(9\) Words in roman type are found in the PST or in the fragments, whereas those in \textit{italics} are reconstructed. The Sanskrit reconstructions of the Tibetan translations of PS/PSV 3 and 4 cited in this paper, other than a few passages, are part of the achievements of the PST seminar organized and led by Prof. Shōryū Katsu

\(10\) I would like to specially thank all the participants of this seminar, especially Dr. Yasuhiro Okazaki, who made Sanskrit reconstructions and editions of PS/PSV/PST 4; Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe, who checked and corrected Dr. Okazaki’s draft; Prof. Diwakar Acharya for his valuable comments and suggestions on the Sanskrit reconstructions; and Prof. Katsu for permission to use these results and other relevant materials. Any errors that remain are my own.

\(11\) See also Shiga 2011b: 527 with n. 21–24.

\(12\) No equivalent in PSV(K).

\(13\) PSV(K): P148b4–6: ‘on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste l de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya’i rjes su ‘gro ba de tshin du l bsgrub bya yang gan tshigs kyi rjes su ‘gro ba yin no zhe na l ma yin te l byas pa’i khvad par gan tshigs su brjod par ‘dod pa ma ya yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su ‘gro ba brjod pa ma yin pa’i phiyor ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // PSV(V) D60b1–3; P64a6f.: gal te ‘di ltar bum pa dper brjod pa de lta na ni ji ltar gan tshigs bsgrub bya dang ldan pa de ltar bsgrub bya gan tshigs dang ldan par ‘gyur ro zhe na ma yin te / brjod par mi bya ba’i phiyor te / l bum pa ni gang bsgrub bya’i rjes su ‘gro ba can gyas[gyi P] byas pa nyid kyi khvad par du byas pa brjod par bya ba’i phiyor ro // ngag gi don bstan pa ni nges par bstan pa’i don gtso bo yin no // (See also Katsura 2004: 155 with n.28.)

\(14\) PST D214b5f.: P244a2f.: ‘o na de lta na zhes pa l gal te gang du gan tshigs bsgrub byas rjes su ‘gro ba yin pa de chos mthun pa nyid kyi dpe’o zhes pa mtshan nyid yin na l (Skt. B171b3: \textit{evam}\(\textit{tarhīti}\) \(yadi hetoh śādhyāṅvayo yatra sa śādharṇyadṛṣṭānta iti lakṣanam.)

\(15\) PST D214b7; P244a4f.: \textit{ma yin te brjod par mi ‘dod pa nyid kyi phyir} zhes pa bsgrub bya’i gan tshigs kyi rjes su ‘gro ba yod kyang l brjod par ‘dod pa yod pa ma yin te l (Skt. B171b4: \textit{nāvivakṣitatvād iti. sann api śādhyāṁṣya hetuśūrabhyāṁ na vivakṣyate.})

\(15\) Cf. Katsu 2004: 143: “Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example statement is to indicate an external object (\(bāhyāṛtha\)) as an example. This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality.” Also cf. Katsu 2004: 155: “He (= Dignāga) further states that the main purpose in referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in external reality.”
The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

External thing[s] mean [those things] in general that are [similar] in kind to what is to be proved, which are [external] to a particular [thing, that is, a particular property-bearer] such as a pot. [The expression bāhyārthapradarsanam, i.e.] “to manifest external thing[s]” means to generally manifest the pervasion of a logical reason by what is to be proved in the [external things in the following way:] “Whatever is produced is all necessarily impermanent.”

Here, Jinendrabuddhi interprets bāhyārtha differently from how he commented on the phrase bāhyārtha (-upasamhṛta) in the third chapter, where he interpreted bāhyārtha as “elsewhere than in a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e., the [property-bearer] in general” (dharmināh pakṣikṛtād višeṣād anyatra sāmānye). This gloss shows the contrast between the inside and the outside of the subject (pakṣa), and the contrast between particular and generalized property-bearers.

The above quotation, on the other hand, suggests that the term bāhyārtha does not mean a particular thing such as a pot, which is one of similar examples, but the generality of things that are similar in kind to what is to be proved (sādhyajātīyasāmānya). In this case, particularity (= an internal thing) is contrasted to generality (= external things). Jinendrabuddhi focuses on the division between an example as an individual thing and a generalized example, but not on the division between a thing inside the subject and things outside the subject.

Next, let us look into the compound bāhyārthapradarśana. According to the Pramānasamuccayaṭīkā, the first half bāhyārtha is to be interpreted in the locative sense, i.e. as “in external thing[s],” and the word vyāpti is complemented as an object of the last half -pradarśana. Thus, the compound as a whole means “indicating the pervasion in external thing[s].” Elsewhere in the same chapter, Jinendrabuddhi presents another interpretation with regard to bāhyārtha. He understands drṣṭānta as meaning an assembly of things (artha-rāsi), but not as a particular individual thing (vyaktiviśeṣa). And that particular individual

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16 PST D215a1f.; P244a6f.: bum pa la sogs pa'i khyad par las / bsgrub bya'i rīgs can gyi spyi ni phyi rol gyi don no[to D] / de la spyir gang cung zad byas pa zhes bya bo de[de'i P] thams cad mi rtag pa kha na'o zhes bsgrub byas gian tshig la khyab pa gsal bar byed pa ni phyi rol gyi don gsal bar byed pa'o // (Skt. B171b5f.: ghaṭāder viśeṣāt sādhyajātīyasāmānyaṃ bāhyo 'ṛthāḥ, tatra sāmānya yan nāma kincit kṛtaṃ tath sarvam anityam eveti sādhyena hetor vyāśpīprakāśanam bāhyārthapradarśanam.)

17 PST D185b2–4; P211a7f. (= Appendix [1]): phyī rol gyi don nye bar bsdu pas zhes pa / phyogs su byas pa'i chos can gyi khyad par las gzhan du spyi la nye bar bstan pas zhes pa'i don to // spyi yang khyad par yongs su mi spong pa'i phyī / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos can yang der nang du 'dus pa kha na ste / bsgrub bya'i chos can kha na la med na mi 'byang ba nyid ston pa bsal ba lhun len pa ni phyi rol gyi don smos pa'o // (Skt. B146a1–3: bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena. dharmināh pakṣikṛtād višeṣād anyatra sāmānyaka upadarśātihetur arthāḥ. sāmānyasya ca višeṣāparityāgāt, sādhyadharmy aniprañāsanaṇaṃ tu bāhyārthapradarśanam.) “[The phrase] bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena means ‘by [means of two types of exemplification based on the similarity or dissimilarity, in which the inseparable relation] is indicated elsewhere (anyatra) than in the particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e. in the [property-bearer] in general.’ And because the general does not abandon a particular, the property-bearer to be proved is also included in it (= the property-bearer in general).” See also Shiga 2011b: 525f. with n. 18. It is to be noted that Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases the word bāhyārtha to anyatra here.
thing is described as being included in the assembly of things. For Jinendrabuddhi, the term bāhyārtha means “something external to a single and particular individual thing,” or “an assembly of similar things.”

It is worth mentioning in passing that an opponent paraphrases this role of dṛṣṭānta as: “This exemplification depends on external thing[s]” (*bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanaṃ). Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases this as “pervasion that depends on external thing[s].”

3. Examination of the instances in PS/PSV 1

As Katsura (2004) points out, there is still a possibility that the term bāhyārtha in bāhyārthapradarśana means “an object in the external world” and implies “some positive support in external reality.” The expression bāhyārtha is used at least nine times in PS/PSV 1. An examination of these instances (PSV 1 4, 8; 18, 13; 18, 25; 19, 2; 19, 6; 19, 11; 19, 15; 19, 16; 19, 18) reveals that all of them mean “an external object” or “an object in the external world.” It is easily understood that the counterpart of bāhyārtha is “an internal thing,” such as cognition, knowledge or the mind.

However, if the term bāhyārtha, which is used in logical contexts in PS/PSV 3 and 4, means “an external object,” we encounter certain difficulties. First, Dignāga uses the example buddhi in his formulation of this inference: “Sound is permanent, because it is intangible, like cognition.” It is obvious that this buddhi is not a so-called ‘external object.’

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18 PST D215a3–5; P244a8–3: de’i phyir spyis[spyi yis P] ji skad bshad pa’i dpe’i mtshan nyid can gyi don gyi phung po thams cad dpe st/ bum pa kho na[na ni D] ma yin no ll bu m ni de’i nang du ’dus pas te de[om. P] kho na nye bar mtshan pa’i don du dper rjod[brjod P] pa’o ll / ... phyi rol gyi don ston pa ni nges par bstan par[par om. P] bya la gsto bo’o zhes pa’i tshig ni gsal ba’i khyad par gcig kho na la rab tu ston pa gsto bo nyid yin pa sel ba lhur byed par bta bar bya’o ll (Skt. B171b6–172a2: tasmāt sāmānyena sarvopāraśiṣṭo devonānugamā yathoktadṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇo ’rtharāśir drṣṭanāh, na tu ghaṭa eva. ghaṭas tu tadantargatas tasyaiṣvopakatabhūtaḥ udāhriyate. ... bāhyārthapradarśanaṃ hi nidarśye pradhānām iti vacanam ekatraiva vyaktiśīve pradarśanasya pradhānyanirāsaparaṃ draṣṭavyam.) “Therefore the example is a whole assembly of things in general that have the characteristic of the example as already stated, but not just a pot. A pot, on the other hand, being included within it (= the assembly of things), is given as an [actual] example for the purpose of implying the very [assembly of things]. ... It should be understood that [Dignāga’s] statement: ‘For the primary [role] of exemplification is to indicate external thing[s]’ is [made] for the purpose of negating [the view that] to indicate [pervasion] only [in] a single particular individual is its primary [role].” See also Shiga 2011b: 527, n. 23.

19 PSV on PS 4.4 (K) 149b1–3; (V) D60b5f.; P64b2f.

20 PST D217a6; P246b7f.: dir phyi rol gyi don la llos pas ci zhiig l khyab pa kho nas zhes pa gang du bsgrub byas rjes su ’gro ba zhes pa’i mtshan nyid las so ll (Skt. B173b7–174a1: kim atra bāhyārthāpekṣayā vyāptaiva, sādhyanāyānato vato bhāṣanāt). In this case, bāhyārthopasaṃhāra means “to comprehend/cover objects in the external world.”

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The expression bāhyārthopasaṃhāra is found in PST I 160, 7–9: yadi tāvad viṣaye pravartamānā manabhyāvyavṛttikṛtam anugramā nāpeksate, evam satāndriyānān sarvavāyānaḥ kathayamānāt, mañasaiva bāhyārthopasaṃhārāt puruṣāsyaopahogasiddheḥ. In this case, bāhyārthopasaṃhāra means “to comprehend/cover objects in the external world.”

PSV(K) P125b3f. (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): dper na sgra ni rtag[em. : mi rtag P/Kitagawa] ste l reg bya ma yin pa’i phyir blo bzhin no ll de bzhin du mig gi gzung bar bya ba yin pa’i phyir mi rtag zhes bya ba ’di yang bsgrub byar bstan pa’i phyir dam bca’ ba thob po ll / PSV(V) D41a5f.; P43b8–44a1 (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): dper na sgra rtag ste l reg par bya ba yin pa’i phyir blo bzhin no zhes bya ba dang l de bzhin du mig gzung bya yin pa’i phyir mi rtag ces bya ba ’di yang bsgrub bya bstan
Although the formulation that contains the example buddhi is presented as fallacious, this is not because buddhi is not “an external object,” but because buddhi is a pseudo-example that does not have the property to be proved (nityatva).

Furthermore, if we take a close look at the expression bāhyārtha, the word artha itself can mean “an actual thing” with some factual basis. So it is likely that the word bāhya is used in the sense of “outside” or “external [to the subject]” and artha is used in the sense of “actual example” or a thing that can be verbally expressed or named, i.e., in the sense of padārtha.

4. The expression bāhyārtha-upasaṃhāra or -anupasaṃhāra

4.1. A usage example found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of exemplification (udāharaṇa)

Next, we shall examine cases where the word upasaṃhāra or anupasaṃhāra comes after bāhyārtha.

[Even] if [an opponent states that] the example is qualified by the first half [of the definition of udāharaṇa in NS 1.1.36], the similarity or dissimilarity to the [property-bearer] to be proved does not need to be mentioned [as a part of the definition of example], because:

[If] so, it (= the example) is not seen as what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. (PS 4.19b)

To wit, when [the example] does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property] (bāhyārthānupa-ṣamhāre), the example does not convey the knowledge of the property to be proved. Alternatively, for that reason, [the necessity of mentioning similarity or dissimilarity] is not established, [because similarity and dissimilarity are pa’i phyir dam bca’ bar thal bar ’gyur ro // (Skt. reconstruction: *tad yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ, asparśatvāt, buddhivat, evam anityaḥ śabdaḥ, cākṣuṣatvāc cety etad api sādhanīrdeśāt prattiṇā já prassajàte. Cf. NV 274, 4f.) Cf. NP 8, 9: sādhyādharmaśiddho yathā nityaḥ śabdo ‘mārtatvād buddhivat.

NP 8, 10f.: yad amārtam vastu taṇ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam yathā buddhīt iti. buddhau hi sādhanadharma ‘mārtatvam asti, sādhyādharma nityatvam nāsti, anityatvād buddhā. 24

Also cf. PV 1.26: tasmād vai dharmayadṛṣṭānte neṣto ’vāyam ihāśrayaḥ / tadabhāve ca taṇ neti vacanād api tadgatē // This is Dignāga’s view on the substratum (āśraya) of vai dharmayadṛṣṭānte, which is indirectly quoted by Dharmakīrti. They both think that it is not always necessary for a dissimilar example to have a substratum.

Cf. Hetumukha (?) sarva evāyam anumānānushayaavyavahāro buddhyārūdhena dharmadharmibhedena, [na bahih sadasatvam apekṣate NVTT]. (Quoted in PVS 2, 22–3, 1; NVTT 51, 11f.; 162, 28f.) See also Frauwallner 1959: 164.

25 The entire Naiyāyika definition of udāharaṇa is as follows. NS 1.1.36–37: sādhyāsādhamyāt taddharmabāvyām dharmadharmanā, tadvāpayaśvām vā viparītaṃ. “The exemplification is an [actual] example that [is supposed to] have [another] property (i.e., the property to be proved) of it (= the property-bearer to be proved) due to the [example’s] similarity (i.e., the proving property) to the [property-bearer] to be proved. The counter-example is an [actual example that is not supposed to have another property (i.e., the property to be proved) of the property-bearer to be proved] due to its opposite (= the similarity to what is to be proved) (i.e., the dissimilarity to what is to be proved).”
This is found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the exemplification (udāharaṇa) in the paramata-section of PS/PSV 4. Dignāga asserts that if dṛṣṭānta “does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property],”\(^\text{29}\) such dṛṣṭānta cannot prove what is to be proved. This suggests that bāhyārtho-pasamñhāra is an indispensable condition for dṛṣṭānta to prove what is to be proved. Just before this assertion, he also states that if dṛṣṭānta is treated as separate from the content of the logical reason, a fallacy would occur: a certain thing (e.g. space) could become both a similar and dissimilar example because of its similarity (e.g. being existent) and dissimilarity (e.g. being inaudible) to the property-bearer to be proved (e.g. sound).\(^\text{30}\)

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the use of the words bāhyārthā and upasamñhāra in the above quotation as follows:

[The word] bāhyārthā in [the phrase] na hi bāhyārthānupasamñhāre means another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity. Furthermore, it (= bāhyārthā) [actually] means a pervasion or inseparable relation (avinābhāvitva). The association (upasamñhāra) of it (= bāhyārthā = avinābhāvitva) means applying (upanayana), i.e. manifesting (prakāśana) that [bāhyārthā] is an object to be explained. When it (= upasamñhāra) is not present, the example is not what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. ...\(^\text{31}\)

28 PSV(K) P153b6–8: gal te dpe snga mas khyad par du bya ba yin na bsgrub bya dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa smos par mi bya ste l gang gi phyr, de ltar go byed de ma mthong l (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don rjes su ma bsdas pa la dpes bsgrub bya’i chos rtogs pa ni yod pa ma yin pa’i phyr de’i chos rtogs pa nyid du ma grub pa kho na yin no // PS(V) D64a7–b1; P68a6–8: gzhan yang gal te dpe[de yis P] sngon du khyad par du byed na ni bsgrub par bya’i chos dang mthun pa dang / chos dang mi mthun par ’dzin pa yin[ma yin P] te / go byed du de mthong ma yin // (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don gyi rjes thogs su ma smos pa’i dpes ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos la go bar bya ba yin no zhes chos de rtogs pa ndang yuan mi ’grub po l (Skt. reconstruction: *yadi pūrveṇa dṛṣṭānto viśeṣyate, na sādhyasādharmavāidharmyagrahaṇam kartavyam. yasmāt, naivām sa gamako drṣṭāh (PS 4.19b) na hi bāhyārthānupasamñhāre drṣṭāntasya sādhyadharmamagamak[a]tvam asiti taddharmabhāvitvenaiva vāśiddham.)

29 Or “does not associate [the pervasion or inseparable relation of the proving property with the property to be proved] with external thing[s],” according to Jinendrabuddhi.

30 PSV(K) P153b6f.: ’di la yang gal te gtan tshigs kyi don las dpe tha dad pa yin na dpe gtan tshigs kyi don la ’brel pa nyid du gdon mi za bar brjod par bya bar mi ’gyur ro // de lat na yang byas pa’i phyr mi rtag ste nam mkha’ bzhin zhes bya ba yang dper ’gyur te yod pas yod pa’i phyr dang l mnyan bya ba ma yin pa’i phyr zhes bya ba ’di la bsgrub par bya va dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa yod pa yin no // PS(V) D64a6f.; P68a5f.: de yang[de yang om. P] gal te gtan tshigs kyi don las dpe logz shig pa yin na ni dpe gtan tshigs kyi don darg rjes su ’brel par brjod par mi bya bar ’gyur ro // de bzhin du byas pa’i phyr mi rtag pa ste / nam mkha’ bzhin no zhes bya bar yang dper ’gyur ro // de’i phyr bsgrub par bya ba’i chos dang mi mthun pa dang / chos dang mthun pa ni yod pa dang mnyan bya nyid dag la sogs pa la yang yod pa[yod pa om. P] yin no // (Skt. reconstruction: *aṭṛāpi yadi hetvarthāḥ prthāḥ drṣṭāntah, na drṣṭānto hetvarthāṅgata evāvāsyam vācyaṁ sāyāḥ tathā ca kṛtatvād antiya ākāśavād ity api drṣṭāntah sāyāt. asti hy asya sādhīyena sādharṇyam vaidhārṇyam ca sattvāśrāvānaśrāvānaśrāvānaśrāvāna.)

31 PST D230a2f.; P260b4–6 (= Appendix [4]): phyi rol gyi don nye bar ma bsdu pa zhes pa chos mthun pa nyid dang chos mi mthun pa nyid tsam las gzhan pa’i don ni phyi rol gyi don te / de yang khyab pa ste / med na mi ’byung ba nyid do zhes pa’i tha tshig go // de’i nye bar bsdu pa ni rtogs par bya
Jinendrabuddhi understands *bāhyārtha* as “another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity,” then regards it as “pervasion” or “inseparable relation.” These interpretations are unique, in that he takes *bāhya* in the sense of “different” and then identifies it as pervasion.

In any case, regarding the word *bāhyārtha*, Jinendrabuddhi calls attention to the fact that *drṣṭānta* does not consist of the combination of an actual example (e.g. a pot) and its mere similarity (e.g. being produced) or dissimilarity (e.g. not being produced) to the subject (e.g. sound), but instead the combination of *drṣṭāntadharmin* and the inseparable relation of a logical reason (e.g. being produced) with what is to be proved (e.g. impermanence).

### 4.2. Usage examples regarding the Naiyāyika definition of the application (*upanaya*)

Here we will examine the uses of *bāhyārtha* and *bahiḥ* found in the criticism against the Naiyāyika definition of the application (*upanaya*).

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32 This interpretation seems to reflect Dignāga’s preceding assertion that the part of the Naiyāyika definition of exemplification *sādharmyasādharmyāt* is useless, because an example defined as such does not convey the knowledge of the property to be proved. Cf. PSṬ D232b1f.; P263a7:

33 In other words, Jinendrabuddhi here equates ‘the place’ where the association is made (= *bāhyārtha*) with ‘the object’ of the association (= *vyāpti*). And there is another passage in the PS where *bāhyārtha* is interpreted as pervasion. PSV(K) 154a6f.: *gal te khyod kyis bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed dang ldan pa dpe’i don yin na gnyis gi’i chos dang ldan du zin kyang phyi rol gi yon nye bar ma bs dus na bsgrub bya’i don rtog par nus pa ma yan no zhes bshad zin to // PS(V) D64b6; P68b5f.: *gal te khyod kyis bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed dang pa’i chos dang ldan pa dpe’i das lon yin na ni gnyis ka’i chos dang ldan pas kyang ngag gi don mjuq bs dus pa las bsgrub par bya ba’i don rtogs par mi nus so zhes sngar brjod zin to // (Skt. *sādharmyam ca na yuyata ity avisesanābhīdhānāt.*)

34 For the meaning of *sādharmya*, see NBT 152, 8–10 on NB 3.5: *samāno dharmo ‘sya so ‘yaṃ sadha- rmā. tasya bhāvaṃ sādharmyam ... drṣṭāntadharminā sādhya ṛṭhaḥ šāko bhāvayitaṃ ity uktam.*

35 The outline of Dignāga’s criticism is as follows. According to the Naiyāyika definition of *upanaya*, the property as a logical reason, such as “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*), is applied to the subject, such as “sound.” In that case, it follows that the property *kṛtakatva* could be applied as either a common property or a particularized property. However, fallacies would occur in both cases. It is not possible to apply all kinds of common properties of the example to the subject. (PSV(K) 154a5b, PS(V) D65a4f.; P69a3–5)

36 For the meaning of *sādharmya*, see NBT 152, 8–10 on NB 3.5: *samāno dharmo ‘sya so ‘yaṃ sadha- rmā. tasya bhāvaṃ sādharmyam ... drṣṭāntadharminā sāḍṛṣyaṃ hetukṛtam sādharmyam ucyate."

The application is to associate [the property of the example, i.e., the proving property] with what is to be proved in relation
On the other hand, the application [of the property to be proved and/or the proving property] to [a dissimilar example such as] space [in the inference: “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced”] by depending on external thing[s] is correct, because, unlike space [and so on], there is nothing that is produced [and] permanent outside [the subject, i.e. sound], whereas, like a pot [and so on], there is something [produced] and impermanent [outside the subject, i.e. sound]. Therefore [sound that is produced] is impermanent. Hence, [the application] is [valid only when it is made] with regard to certain external case[s].

As we have already seen, both Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi recognize “associating [the property to be proved or inseparable relation] with external thing[s]” (bāhyārthopasaṃhāra) as an essential factor of drṣṭānta for a valid inference. And here “external thing[s]” (bāhyārtha) are restated as being “outside” (bahiḥ), and space and a pot are given as actual examples. According to Jinendrabuddhi, common absence (vyatireka) is indicated in space, whereas common occurrence (anvaya) is indicated in a pot. And the word bahiḥ is men-

to the examples: [the subject] is like [the similar example] or [the subject] is unlike [the dissimilar example].” It should be noted in passing that Viśvanātha glosses the word upasaṃhāra as “placing near” (upanyāsa) in his Vṛtti 313, 26 on NS 1.1.38. Cf. YD 91, 3: sādhyadṛṣṭāntayor ekakriyopasaṃhāra upanayatā. “The association, i.e., the application is to equate an example with what is to be proved.”

The preceding passage reads as follows: PSV(K) 155b3f.: mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs lus can nyid la sogs pa yang med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid 'gog par yang ma gyur cig snyam nas gang las de med pas rtag par mi 'gyur ba ma byas pa k Dro na rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs ni ma yin no/ PSV(V) D66a1; P69b8–70a1: ma byas pa nyid ni rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs ma yin te/ gang de med pa las rtag par mi 'gyur ro/ mi rtag pa nyid kyi gtan tshigs las can ma yin pa la sogs pa yang med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid 'gogs pa yang ma yin no/ (Skt. reconstruction: *mā bhūd mūrtatvādāpy anityatvapatrāpiṣedhō pi, na hy akṛta eva nityatvahetah, yatah tadabhāvān na nityāḥ svāḥ.) “Also regarding [the logical reason] having a fixed form (mūrtatva) and the like, it is not possible to negate impermanence either, because [mūrtatva] is not a [valid] logical reason for [proving] impermanence, for [the fact of] not being produced [would] never be a [valid] logical reason for [proving] permanence; otherwise (= if the fact of not being produced were a valid logical reason for proving permanence) what is permanent would not be present for the reason that it (= the fact of not being produced) is not present.”

PSṬ D236a3; P267a4f.: de nyid kyi phyir gsungs pa/ rtag pa nyid byas pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no/ zhes pa ste/ mi rtag pa nyid dang bral ba'i byas pa yod pa ma yin no zhes pa'i don to lo/ (Skt. B90a3f.: na hi kincā nityāḥ kṛtakam asītī na kincā anityatvavahitām kṛtakam astī.)

PSṬ D236a4f.; P267a6f.: rjes 'gro dang ldog pa la ltos[bhūs P] nas/ de bsan pa'i ched du nam mkha' bzhin dang bum pa bzhin zhes phyogs gcig dper brjod pa tsam nye bar sbyar ba'o zhes pas kho bo'i lugs kyis nam mkha' sogs nye bar sbyar ba'ī P rigso so (Skt. B90a4f.: anvayavatītekam cāpeksya tatpradāsanārthām ākāśavat ghaṭavac cety ekadesa udāharaṇanātām upaniyata iti yuktō 'smanmatenākāśādyupanayāḥ.)
tioned “for the purpose of negating the dependence on the mere [fact that the property to be proved and/or the proving property] is present only in a pot and absent only in space,” which implies that bāhyārtha does not refer to a single case, but plural cases. Indeed, on the basis of this passage alone, we cannot decide whether bāhyārtha means “an object in the external world” or “external things outside [the subject],” but at least Jinendrabuddhi’s comments consistently support the meaning of “external thing[s] outside [the subject].”

5. bāhyārtha and the term and notion of bahirvyāpti

As I observed in Shiga 2011b, the expression *anyatra*, which means “in another place [than the location of the property-bearer to be proved],” is found in PS 2.11. Dignāga himself comments on this word, presenting a remarkable idea. He introduces the concept of “the generalized substratum” (*ādhārasāmānya*). Jinendrabuddhi glosses the word *anyatra* as “generally (*sāmānyena*) in all cases, e.g. a kitchen.” He also uses the words *anyatra* and *sāmānyena* when he comments on the expression bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta in PST 3. From this fact, we can safely say that Jinendrabuddhi, for one, sees the terms bāhyārtha and *anyatra* as referring to substantially the same thing: that is, property-bearer[s] of the example outside the subject. It is worth noting that he also states that a logical reason (e.g. smoke) is inseparably related not only with the property to be proved (e.g. fire), but also with the generalized substratum (e.g. any place that has fire), because a property-bearer depends on its property, and the property to be proved is particularized by the generalized substratum.
If these observations thus far are valid, it follows that āhya in the term bāhyārtha and bahir- in the term “external pervasion” (bahirvyāpti) have the same logical value. Dignāga is sometimes described as a “typical” bāhyārthopasaṃhāra by modern scholars, presumably because he constructed the system of inference, especially the theory of traśūpya, which requires presenting the similar (sapakṣa) and the dissimilar (vipakṣa) as separate from the subject (pakṣa). Nevertheless, Dignāga does not declare himself a proponent of bahirvyāpti. In Buddhist treatises on logic and epistemology, the term bahirvyāpti first appeared in Arcaṭa’s HBT 62, 9; 62, 23; 62, 27. Sāntaraksita uses both bahirvyāpti and antarvyāpti in his VṬ 5, 30–6, 7. It should be noted here that Arcaṭa and others understand bahirvyāpti as “pervasion that is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved, that is, ‘only’ in a property-bearer of the example,” but this is different from Dignāga’s view. Dignāga does not state that pervasion is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved. Rather, he devised the notion of “the generalized property-bearer” (adharmaśāmānya), which can implicitly include the property-bearer to be proved (sādhyaḥdarmin, pakṣa).

Pātrasvāmin (7–8 cent.), a Jain logician who is considered to have been the first to advocate the theory of the single characteristic (ekalakṣaṇa) of a logical reason, which is virtually identical to the theory of antarvyāpti, states that the inseparable relation (avinābhāvitva) asserted by Buddhists is acknowledged outside sādhyā or in drśṭānta, whereas “being otherwise impossible” (anyathānupapannatva) is only acknowledged in the property-bearer to be proved. Pātrasvāmin’s view was followed by other Jaina

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49 We can describe the relationship between traśūpya and bāhyārthopasaṃhāra as follows: to confirm the three characteristics of a logical reason (hetu), i.e., its being the property of the subject, its being present in sapakṣa (which is similar to the subject in that it has the property to be proved [sādhyadharma]) and its not being present in vipakṣa (which is dissimilar to pakṣa because it does not have sādhyadharma), means to check whether the logical reason is valid, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the logical reason to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of hetu.” bāhyārthopasaṃhāra, on the other hand, means to associate/apply the property to be proved (sādhyadharma) with/to external things (drśṭāntadharmin), having the proving property (sādhana-dharma) in the exemplification (drśṭānta) as a member of proof, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the property to be proved to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of sādhyadharma.”

50 Cf. HBT(V) D117a3f.; P145b2f.: ji ltar gzhan dag gis bsgrub par bya ba′i chox can yongs su spangs nas khyab pa gzhan rab tu ston pa lta bu ni ma yin te l thams cad smos pas[pa P] ni khyab pa gzhan dgag pa′i phyir ro // (For this passage, see also Funayama 2001.)


52 For the detail of Pātrasvāmin, see Shiga 2011a: 423–426.


54 TSP 500, 13f. and PST 2 2, 13f.: vinā sādhyā adṛṣṭasya drśṭānta hetutesyate / paṭair maṃ bhūr dharmiyā asamḥāsno vinīmūnā // PST 2 2, 10f.: avinābhāvitvaḥ hi sādhyā bahir iṣyate, anyathānupapannatvaḥ tu dharmiyā eva sādhyā eveti; 2 3, 4: avinābhāvitvaḥ hi paraḥ sādhyā bahir iṣyata iti, eṣo ‘dhīrontaḥ. Cf. HBT 62, 27–63, 2: na hi sa śyāmaḥ, tatputrāṃ, paridṛśyamānaputravat iti
logicians such as Akalaṅka. They regarded themselves as proponents of antarvyāpti and the Buddhists as proponents of bahirvyāpti. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that Arcaṭa and other successors of Dharmakīrti did not intend to criticize Dignāga’s view directly, but rather to point out that Dignāga was allegedly credited with creating the theory of the so-called bahirvyāpti.

6. Conclusion

We can safely state that, as long as we do not disregard Jinendrabuddhi’s annotations, when Dignāga uses the term bāhyārtha in connection with upasaṃhāra, pradarśana or apekṣā in the context of inference, he does not mean “an external object” or “an object in the external world,” but “external thing[s] outside the subject.” It is possible to suppose that Dignāga was well aware of the division between the inside and outside of the subject or property-bearer to be proved.

More specifically, the term bāhyārtha found in PS/PSV 3 and 4 refers to (1) “[external] things, that is, the generalized [property-bearer], which is other than a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject” (PSṬ B146a2, Appendix [1]); (2) “the generalized [property-bearer] that is similar in kind to what is to be proved, which is external to a particular [property-bearer] such as a pot” (PSṬ B171b5, Appendix [2]); (3) “an [external] thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity,” that is, “pervasion or inseparable relation” (PSṬ B185a2, Appendix [4]); (4) more than simply a single example such as a pot or space (PSṬ B190a3, Appendix [8]). Apart from (3), Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretations do not seem to deviate from Dignāga’s original intention.

Due to his trairūpya-theory, Dignāga is often regarded as the proponent of bahirvyāpti. What he intended to maintain, however, might not be the so-called position of bahirvyāpti that means, according to Arcaṭa, the pervasion that is to be grasped or observed ‘only’ in a property-bearer of the example, that is, outside the subject. Rather, it is probable that Dignāga, like Dharmakīrti, assumed some sort of generality or universality regarding pervasion and its substratum.

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55 See SVin 5.15cd: antarvyāptāv asiddhāyām bahirvyāptir asādhanam // PSaṃ 32cd: avinābhāvasaṃbandhe ‘py antarvyāpyāvatiṣṭhate // PSaṃ 50cd: antarvyāptāv asiddhāyām bahirangam anarthakam //
56 Cf. NA 20: antarvyāpyāvisa sādhyasya siddhārthiḥ / vyāptāv / sādhyād bahiḥ paridṛśyamānaputre vyāptipradarśane ‘pi sādhyasiddhir bhavati.
57 Indeed Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation may have been influenced by Dharmakīrti’s thoughts, but it is also problematic to think that Jinendrabuddhi always comments on the PS/PSV by adopting and following Dharmakīrti’s theories. There may be cases where Jinendrabuddhi’s comments conform to Dignāga’s original intention. (Cf. Steinkellner 2004: 227f. with n. 5.)
58 We cannot find passages that positively support the meaning of “an object in the external world” in Dignāga’s statements on inference either.
As for pervasion, on the other hand, Dignāga asserts the logical predominance of the common absence (vyatireka) over the common occurrence (anvaya),\(^{59}\) and states that vyatireka can be grasped or understood by mere non-observation (adarśanamātra).\(^{60}\) Indeed, the pervasion based on Dignāga’s system appears to be hypothetical, because pervasion would not be valid if even a single counter-example is found, but it is likely that he thought that pervasion should be universal once it was established.\(^{61}\) We can assume that Dignāga thought that this universal pervasion should be applied to external cases outside the subject. In addition, since the subject is supposed to be implicitly included in those external cases, it is possible to apply the pervasion to the subject and infer what is to be proved.

Table 1: Dignāga's usage of *bāhyārtha* in logical contexts, with Jinendrabuddhi’s comments (PS/PSV/PST 3 and 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dignāga</th>
<th>Jinendrabuddhi</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 3.36b: tādṛksāhabhavyam hi sādharṣya vā bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena drṣṭāntadvayena gamyate. (PSV(K) P138a5–7; PSV(V) D51a6–b1; P54b5–7)</td>
<td>PST B146a1–3: darminah pākṣikṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānyā upadarśitenety arthah. sāmānya ca viśeṣāparātyāgāt, sādhyadharmy api tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharmīnī evāvinābhāvitvat-pradarśānīnīvāya pradarśānīrāsapaṇaṃ tu bāhyārtha-grhaṇaṃ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.3: bāhyārthapradarśānaṃ hi nidārsye pradhānām. (PSV(K) P148b6; PSV(V) D60b2f.; P64a7)</td>
<td>PST B171b5–6: bāhyārthapradarśānaṃ hi nidārsye pradhānām. (See also PST B171b6–172a2: tasmāt sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadrṣṭāntalaṃ kṣaṇo 'rtharāśir drṣṭāntah, na tu ghaṭa eva; PST B171b6–172a2: bāhyārthapradarśānaṃ hi nidārsye pradhānām iti vacanam ekatraiva vyakti-viśeṣe pra-darśānasya prādhaṇīnārāsapaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam.)</td>
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\(^{59}\) PST 2 47, 16–18: sarvatrānāṅgau na drṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhaṇīnāṃ vipakṣe sarvatrādarṣānena khyāpayati. anyatrāpi ca drṣṭa iti. apiśabdena kvacin na drṣṭo 'pīti dyotayann anvayasyāpṛadhānīnām. (See also Pind 2015: II 232.)

\(^{60}\) See PS/PSV 5.34 and Pind 2011: 70–73.


\(^{62}\) Words in *italics* are not attested in the PSṬ or other texts.
### Table continued

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.4: <em>bāhyārthāpeksam</em> idam nidarśanam. (PSV(K) P149b3; PSV(V) D60b6; P64b3)</td>
<td>No direct comment. Cf. PST B173b6: <em>na hi sadbhāvamātradarśane bāhyārthāpeksatvam nidarśanasya yuyate</em>; PST B173b6–174a1: <em>tataś ca ghaṭe ‘ni-tyatvam prayatnānantarīyakatvam ca drṣṭam iti kṛte hetoh sapakṣe ganyata eva sadbhāvamātram iti kim atra bāhyārthāpeksayā vyāptyaivyeti ...</em></td>
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<td>[4]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.19: <em>na hi bāhyārthānupasamhāre</em> drṣṭāntena sādhyadharmo gamyate. (PSV(K) P153b7; PSV(V) D64b1; P68a7)</td>
<td>PST B185a1–3: <em>na hi bāhyārthānupasamhāra</em> iti sādhyadharmavaidharmyama-trād anyo ‘rthaḥ bāhyārthaḥ. sa punar vyāptir avinābhāvitvam iti yāvat.*</td>
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<td>[5]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: yadi bhavatāṃ sādhyā-sādhanadharmavatā drṣṭāntenārthaḥ, na tūbhayadharmavatāpi bāhyārthānupasamhāreṇa sādhyo ‘rthaḥ śakyo bhāvayitum ity uktam. (PSV(K) P154a6; PSV(V) D64b6; P68b5f.)</td>
<td>No direct comment. Cf. PST B186a3–4: <em>na tv etāvatā vyāptiprakāśanam anta-reṇa sādhyo ‘rthāḥ śakyo gamayitum ity uktam prāk; PST B186a4–6: na hi vastudharmavatāpi drṣṭāntena vinā bāhyārthopasamhāreṇa sādhyo ‘rthaḥ śakyo bhāvayitum.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: <em>na ca drṣṭānta-sādhyayor ekikaraṇād evaṃ anityatvam siddham, bāhyārthānupasamhārāt.</em> (PSV(K) P154b8; PSV(V) D65a6f.; P69a6)</td>
<td>No direct comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[7]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: <em>bāhyārthāpeksayā tv ākāśasyopanayo yuktaḥ.</em> (PSV(K) P155b4f.; PSV(V) D66a1f.; P70a1f.)</td>
<td>No direct comment. See the example [8].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: <em>yasmād ākāśavad bāhiḥ, na hi kiṃcinv nityaṃ kṛtakam evaṃ anityatvam siddham, bāhyārthānupasamhārāt.</em> (PSV(K) P155b5f.; PSV(V) D66a2; D70a2f.)</td>
<td>PST B190a2–3: <em>kathāṃ bāhyārthāpeksa ity āhā: yasmād ityādī. kevalaghaṭākāśasadasatvamātrāpeksatvanirāsapaṃ bahirgraṇānām. See also PST B190a3–5: anvayayati-rekam cāpeksya tatpradarśanārthaṃ ākāśavad ghaṭavac cety ekadeśa udāharanamātram upaniyate.</em></td>
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**References and abbreviations**

**Primary Sources**


HBṬ(V) Hetubinduṭīkā (Vinītadeva): (Tib.) D4234, P5733.


NAVi Nyāyāvatāraṇavivṛty (Siddharṣi): See NA.

NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): See NBṬ

NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara): Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra’s Dharmottarapradiṣa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu], ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Patna 21971.

NMukh Nyāyamukha (Dignāga): See Katsura 1981.


NV Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara): See NS.

NVTṬ Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (Vācaspati Miṣra): See NS.

PS Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga): See PSV.

PS/PSV 1 Pramāṇasamuccayā/Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), chapter 1: See Stein-kellner 2005.


PSṬ Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā (Jinendrabuddhi): (Tib.) D4268; P5766.


PSV(K) Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga) translated by Kanakavarman: (Tib.) P5702. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.

PSV(V) Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga) translated by Vasudhararakṣita: (Tib.) D4204; P5701. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.

PV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.


The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

Secondary Sources


Shiga 2011a K. Shiga, antarvyāpṭi and bahirvyāpṭi re-examined. In: Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis, Proceedings of the Fourth International Dhar-


Closing a Gap in the Interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s Logic

by

Ernst Steinkellner

Dedicated to Hans Lenk in gratitude.¹

It is the ontic character² of Dharmakīrti’s logic that allows us to consider his method for ascertaining the necessary concomitance (vyāpti) of the concept of an “effect” as logical reason (kāryahetu) with that of a “cause” as its consequent (sādhya) to be a method for ascertaining a causal relation (kāryakāraṇabhāva) as well.

Scholars have long examined the formulation of this method from various perspectives, seeing it as two different topics, one causal, the other logical. I will begin by taking a closer look at the first, the causal. In my opinion, it was separated from the second due to its focus on causality, and moreover, its proper understanding was also impeded by a weighty interpretational mistake. Although the second topic, the logical one, fared better, its systematic purpose in the context of Dharmakīrti’s work has not been clarified sufficiently.

Three papers presented in Vienna at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference in 1989 are my starting point: one by Brendan Gillon, who criticized Dharmakīrti’s proposed method for ascertaining a causal relation or, in other words, for solving the induction problem (Gillon 1991), and the papers by Tadashi Tani (1991) and myself (Steinkellner 1991) The reason for this dedication to the German philosopher Hans Lenk is my assumption that certain basic Buddhist epistemic and ontologic conceptions, such as vikalpa, vāsanā, anāditva, can fruitfully be stimulated by his epistemological thought: Grasping as acting on various levels of interventional interpretations on the basis of schemata that are bio-genetically determined on all levels. For some concise introductions to Lenk’s thought, cf. Lenk 1998 and 2003; the collection of articles Global TechnoScience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to Human Values, Technology, Creativity, and Globalisation, 2007; and chapters III and IV in Lenk and Paul 2014: 71–117.

While, as a strict nominalist, Dharmakīrti is not bothered by a correspondence principle for the relationship between concepts or words and their referents in reality, his theory of concepts and their generation (apohavāda) provides, nevertheless, a link to reality via actual experiences. Actual experience gives some additional precision to the general profile of the concepts which are inherited from a past without beginning and continuously transported as residual impregnations in the continuum of cognition. Experience gradually reduces the innate erroneous misrepresentation of what there is in these impregnations. As for the concepts themselves, Dharmakīrti thinks that they can be more or less closely related to reality. In order to cope with a world of universal dissatisfaction, what is needed is a way to distinguish concepts that are closer to reality from those that are less or not at all related to reality. The former can be considered sound or true because they can be relied on in activities. To determine their truth is the task of logic, a method for deriving the truth of one concept from its necessary concomitance with another concept whose truth is already established or generally accepted. With Dharmakīrti, in this respect going beyond Dignāga’s logical conceptions, the result of distinguishing sound or true concepts from others is possible because their relationship is grounded in relations that are considered real, such as factual identity and causality. It is this idea that makes for nothing less than an ontic character of Dharmakīrti’s logic. Yet, even if Dharmakīrti admits at the same time that factual identity and causality, too, are only conceptual constructs, he considers them as the only reliable constructs that satisfyingly function when applied in worldly affairs and with the ambition to transgress the world of suffering.

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1991), which dealt with Dharmakīrti’s proposal of how to ascertain concomitance (vyāpti) in the case of a svabhāvahetu.

Tadashi Tani, on his part, was able to show that in Dharmakīrti’s first work (that is, the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika with the Vṛtti usually called *Svavyrtti), a prasaṅga assumes this function.4 In my own paper, I examined the meaning of Dharmakīrti’s later formulation of this device, in the Vādanyāya, as viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Dharmakīrti developed this method on the basis of the sattvānumāna, and by means of an experiment I was able to show that it is applicable to all svabhāvahetu inferences, such as the one of the designation “tree” from the designation “Śiṃśapā.” The question left open at the time I wrote my paper was “… whether the different treatments of the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are no indications to be found in Dharmakīrti’s work that he was aiming in this direction” (Steinkellner 1991: 323).

Based on PV 1.23’cd and passages from the Hetubindu, Tani in fact already answered this question affirmatively, summarizing: “The kāryahetu too can be interpreted by the same model …” and “The necessary relation can be determined by SVB-pramāṇa.” Yet, he added: “Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti did not explicitly explain so” (Tani 1991: 337).

In fact, Tani only very closely missed the mark. The passage he refers to (PV 1.23’cd–24ab with PVSV 17,5–7) belongs to a section of the Vṛtti in which Dharmakīrti establishes the essential relation (svabhāvapratibandha) as the fundament of a reason’s non-deviation from the property to be proved (PVSV 10,13–20,13). It is, however, only in the section beginning with PV 1.34ab (from PVSV 21,24 to the end of the work) that Dharmakīrti actually deals with the question of how, in the case of the two types of acceptable reasons, such an essential relation can be ascertained. And it is here, in PV 1.34 with PVSV 22,2–4 and 6f, that Dharmakīrti’s answer is clearly spelled out in regard to the kāryahetu. It is this clarification that links my present paper to both Tani’s explanation and Gillon’s critique.

I will start with Gillon, because only with a more exact view of the object of his critique are we in a position to see that Dharmakīrti did, in fact, already in this first work of his, provide everything needed for designing a comprehensive and consistent logical system, even if he did not use the later and subsequently traditional term viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa.

In his 1991 paper, Gillon demonstrated that “Dharmakīrti’s solution” to the problem in his formulating a method for ascertaining a causal relation “can be seen not to work” (Gillon 1991: 57). As far as I can see, Gillon’s critique seems invalid with regard to Dharmakīrti’s statement as it has been interpreted until now by all who have set their minds to it, including myself.5

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4 Tani 1991: 332–338. Tani refers to prasaṅga as “hypothetical negative reasoning.”
5 Gillon’s observations were later refined in two papers by Horst Lasic, who closely analysed the cog-nitional process implied in the steps of this method (1999) and interpreted it as serving another aim, namely, that of justifying a vyāpti already ascertained (2003: 194). But the existence of an induction problem remained unquestioned; this was finally also affirmed by John Dunne (2004: 191–192) and Tom Tillemans (2004: note 25; cf. below).
I must admit that I could not approve when, in 1989, I heard Dharmakīrti being charged with such a blunder, or with not having seen the pitfalls implied in his proposed method. This irritation lingered on: While on one hand, Dharmakīrti’s fallacy seemed evident, on the other hand, it did not coincide with my appreciation of the acuteness of his thinking and expression. Yet it was only after my retirement that I had the leisure to look at the issue again in the hope of being able to disperse my qualms. So that is what I did. The fault may lie, after all, not in the interpreted object but in the interpreter’s perception. The results of my re-examination have already been published (Steinkellner 2013), and are reflected in three sentences of translation and 25 pages of notes. Alas, all in German!6

I will, therefore, first remind you of Gillon’s critique, which, on the basis of Kajiyama’s translation, is directed against Dharmakīrti’s earliest formulation. Then I will indicate the crux of all earlier translations and summarize the main points of my new understanding.7 Finally, I will draw support for this interpretation from Dharmakīrti’s last work, the Vādanyāya.

The formulation at stake consists of three sentences that belong together. So far, everyone has only dealt with the first sentence (except for John Dunne, who includes the second but misunderstands it, and Gillon and Richard Hayes, who include the third but jump over the second). These sentences are:

1. yeśām upalambhe tallaṃṣaṇam anupalabdhām yad upalabhyyate, tatrai-kābhāve ’pi nopalabhyate, tatasya kāryam.
2. tac ca dhūme ’sti.
3. sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ, akāryatve ’kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt (PVSV 22,2–4 and 6f). 8

The salient point of Gillon’s critique9 has been made quite clear by Tom Tillemans:

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6 The conclusion of these notes (II.209f) also finds support from Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṅgraha 1695–1697, where the causality relation and non-existence are similarly seen: in both cases only the respective verbal usage (vyavahāra) is inferred, not a real entity as such (cf. Steinkellner 2019: 68-69).

7 In this section, I repeat parts of a paper delivered at the Lumbini conference in 2013 (cf. Steinkellner 2015).

8 Kajiyama translates the first: "If a thing (E) which, having perceptible characteristics, was not perceived, is perceived when other things (Cs) have been perceived, and if, when even one thing (C) among these has disappeared E is not perceived, then E is the effect of C …" (Kajiyama 1963: 2f; E = effect, C = cause). Other samples of translations are: “If a previously unperceived thing defined as perceptible is later perceived when other things are perceived, and if that thing is not perceived when one among those other things is absent, then it is the effect of that thing. That kind of definition of an effect applies to smoke” (Dunne 2004: 335). “That which, not having been apprehended, is apprehended, when its conditions have been apprehended, [but] is not apprehended, when even one of them is absent, is [ascertained] to be their effect. … An effect is established because of being observed even once in that way, because, if it were not an effect, it would not arise even once from what is not its cause” (Gillon and Hayes 2008: 353 and 398).

9 In his paper, Gillon only concludes: “… Dharmakīrti seems to believe that a sequence of five simple non-relational observations results in relational knowledge. … The problem is that this sequence cannot discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. … Moreover, further observations will
The root of the problem of determining causality is that people just have no way of knowing definitely when they have correctly isolated the true cause from the myriad of other background things. Using Mill’s method or that of Dharmakīrti, there can always be the doubt that, in spite of something being thought to be the cause, the presence of *that* circumstance was not in fact what was actually responsible for the effect and *its* absence was not what brought about an absence of the effect – some other hidden factor that we didn’t know about, didn’t think about and perhaps didn’t see at all was first present and then absent at the key stages of our tests (Tillemans 2004: note 25).

The following is my present translation. The italicized words indicate deviations from my earlier ones.

1. That (entity) (*tat*) which (*yat*) as unperceived (at first), although (on principle) perceptible, is perceived on the perception of which (*other entities present*) (*yeṣām*), (and again) is not perceived when even a single (entity) among these (*other entities*) (*tatra*) is absent, is the effect of *this* (single other entity that is absent).

2. And *this [fact of being conditionally]*10 known through perceptions and non-perceptions* does occur in the case of smoke.*

3. From being observed in this way even once (something, such as smoke,) is established as *that which is to be effected* (*kāryaḥ*) (by something else, such as fire); for, were it not (that which is) to be effected (by this), it would not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause.

In terms of mere translating, this new version is roughly the same, with the exception of some added phrases, as all those earlier ones that evoked Gillon’s critique. My interpretation of the italicized items, however, differs in the following ways:

1. Hitherto almost everyone11 has assumed the pronoun *yeṣām* to refer to the many different individual entities as causes that, by coming together, constitute a single causal complex (*hetusāmagrī*). I now consider the plural pronoun, in the light of Dharmakīrti’s concept of “cause,” which always means a causal complex, to refer to different causal complexes and not different individual causes that together constitute a single causal complex.12

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10 “Conditionally,” in this context, is short for “in respect to the fact of the presence or absence of something else.”

11 The exception being Horst Lasic who already in 1999: 237 and 238 clearly excluded an interpretation of *yeṣām* as referring to the constituents of a single causal complex when he paraphrases with “a perception of everything present at the place of observation.” In my note (2013: 354) I overlooked this paraphrase. Mind, however, that in my opinion Lasic’s “things” should also be understood as causal complexes.

2. The process of cognition described in the first sentence consists of several perceptions and non-perceptions under certain conditions, namely, the presence and absence of another entity, and it refers to a specific case of two different entities. In order to generalize the cognition derived from a specific case, Dharmakīrti uses a reductio ad absurdum argument, a prasaṅga, when he says, in the third sentence: “Were (something, say smoke,) not to be effected (by another thing, say fire,) it (could) not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause.” This second step indicates an unwanted consequence, should the truth of the cognition gained by observing a specific concrete case not be accepted. It thereby is supposed to provide the qualities of necessity and general validity for this cognition. In other words, the prasaṅga “transforms,” so to speak, the formulation into one of a necessary concomitance (vyāpti), and in this function of justifying a specific common presence and absence as being necessary in general, the prasaṅga is an integral part of the proposed method.

3. Thus, the three cited sentences belong together. Together they make for a veritable proof formula (prayoga): The first sentence states a specific cognition of the common presence and common absence (anvayavyatireka) of the property “being conditionally perceived and non-perceived” as the logical reason (hetu) with the property to be established, the consequent (sādhya), namely, “being the effect of a certain other entity.” This cognition of a mere anvaya and vyatireka is transformed into, i.e. established as, a generally valid vyāpti by the third sentence, the prasaṅga. And the second sentence states the presence of the reason (“being conditionally perceived and non-perceived”) in the locus of smoke (pakṣadharmatā).

In this way, I think, Dharmakīrti tried to overcome the problem of an incomplete induction. I consider his completing the concomitance formulation with a prasaṅga, whose function is to justify that formulation, to be a veritable stroke of genius. Whether he really succeeded or only shifted the problem to yet another level is a question beyond the scope of this article. Dharmakīrti actually modified this early formulation in his later works, the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya. In these, the prasaṅga argument is either not included, as in the Hetubindu’s first passage (HB § 3.32), which is focussed on the formal aspects of inference and proof, or it is present in a more elaborate form, as in the Hetubindu’s second passage (HB § 4.22) and in the Vādanyāya.

13 PVSV 22.6f: akāryatve 'kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt.
14 Dharmakīrti expressly states this to be the function of the prasaṅga in PVin 3. 4.7–9 (cf. Watanabe, this volume: § 2.3).
15 It was repeated with only syntactic adaptions in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 2. 85.6–8).
16 For the differences of these formulations from the earlier ones, cf. Steinkellner 2013: II 193–198; for a synoptic survey of the formulations, see Steinkellner 2013: II 197.
17 Throughout the later tradition, it was particularly the formulation offered in the first passage of the Hetubindu that was adopted as the authoritative Dharmakīrtian statement on the issue. In my study of 2013, much to my shame, I completely forgot the prasaṅga-related passages in his later works and judged this wrongly asserted lack of a prasaṅga argument as a set-back in Dharmakīrti’s theory (Steinkellner 2013: II 204). I now see that Dharmakīrti did not (!) change his conception of ascertaining a causal relation, but rather further elaborated on the original version in his later works with the purpose of strengthening exactly this prasaṅga.
We can thus jump straight to the Vādanyāya, his last work, where Dharmakīrti’s awareness of the induction problem is most clearly revealed. Already in the Vṛtti (PVSV 22,10–23,6 with PV 1.35), Dharmakīrti deals with the issue that an effect, say, smoke, does not deviate from fire as its cause (avyabhicāra) by parrying the idea that it may have “another cause,”¹⁸ such as a termite hill.¹⁹ In his answer there, Dharmakīrti repudiates the opponent’s proposal by clarifying that this deviating item is only something similar to smoke, but not one of “such type” (tādrśa) that it is the product of something that is “such,” namely, being able to produce real smoke.²⁰

In the Vādanyāya, however, where Dharmakīrti demonstrates how “effect” as a means of proof (sādhanāṅga) is justified (samarth-), the notion of “another cause” is given a more stringent meaning. The relevant passage in the Vādanyāya (VN 4,2–10) consists of two parts: One is Dharmakīrti’s last formulation (VN 4,2f) of the content to be ascertained, a causal relation; the other is his answer to an alternative, in a sentence nicely resembling Tilleman’s conclusion cited above: “Another (entity) may be capable in regard to (the production of) this (effect); because of the absence of that (other entity) this (effect) did not come about” (anyat tatra samartham. tadabhāvāt tan na bhūtam, VN 4,6f).

The formulation in the Vādanyāya is as follows: “This (entity) comes to be, when that (other entity) is present, (and) even if the (various) causes of this (entity) which are different from that entity (and) capable (of producing its perception) are present, (this entity) does not come about in the absence of that (entity).”²¹ Here, the problem seen by Gillon in the earlier formulation is still present.

¹⁸ PVSV 22,10: anyahetukatvān nāhetukatvam iti cet.
¹⁹ Cf. PVT, 60a7 = PVSVT 100,12. When summarizing his argument, Dharmakīrti refers to the termite hill (śakramūrdhan) again: “If a termite hill is of fiery nature, it is surely fire. If it is not of fiery nature, how can smoke come about there?” (agnisvabhāvaḥ śakrasya mūrdhā yady agnir eva sah / athānagnisvabhāvo ’sau dhīmas tatra katham bhavet // PV 1.36). To understand this example of the termite hill, I can offer a quite plausible physical explanation that I gratefully received from the entomologist Dominique Zimmermann of the Natural History Museum Vienna: Temperature and humidity in termite structures are kept constant by means of ventilation systems (which maintain the temperature at around 30 degree Celsius). The air that escapes through the central chimney can be up to 15 degrees warmer and also more humid than the surrounding air. Given the appropriate conditions, the escaping air, through effects of condensation, can become visible as vapour. Zimmermann could not find any references to this phenomenon in scientific publications. She sees this as possibly due to the fact that biologically it is irrelevant whether the air escaping from a termite hill is visible as vapour or not. But since a termite hill is used as an example by our philosopher, we can safely assume that this sort of smoke-like vapour from termite hills was commonly known in India.
²⁰ PVSV 22,14f: tādrśād dhi bhavat sa tādrśaḥ syāt. And tādrśa is “something with a certain nature when it comes about through nothing but its own cause,” as he states later in the Hetubindu (yo hi yasya svabhāvaḥ, sa svahetor evotpadyamānas tādrśo bhavatī, HB 11,7f).
²¹ idam asmin sati bhavatī, satav api taddhetuṣa samartheṣu tadadhēvāt na bhavatī (VN 4,2f). In this formulation, a form was chosen the proximity of which to the Venerable’s description of a causal relation in the short formula at the beginning of the pratītyasamutpāda is obvious and seemingly intended. For the ādi-formula of the pratītyasamutpāda: asmin satiddam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate (“If that is present, this comes to be; on account of the arising of that this arises”), cf. La Vallée Poussin 1913: 49–51.
But then, Dharmakīrti considers the option of “another cause,” not of something similar to smoke, but of smoke as such.\textsuperscript{22} And in order to indicate the unwanted consequence should the above justification not be acknowledged, he adds:

Otherwise, (i.e.) if only (the proposition) “(this) is not present in the absence of that” (\textit{tadabhāve na bhavatī}) were communicated, the (causal) capacity of the latter would be in doubt, since also another (entity) is absent there (where the latter is absent). Another (entity, then) may be capable in regard to (the production of) this (effect); because of the absence of that (other entity,) this (effect) did not come about. (In this case) moreover, the absence (of the effect) in the absence of that (cause) would be (nothing but) a fortuitous conformity (\textit{yādṛcchāsamvāda}), just like the absence of a date palm that grows in regions where mother marriage is customary in the absence of mother marriage in other regions.\textsuperscript{23}

By introducing a \textit{prasaṅga} into his proof of a causal relation and by this final elaboration of the \textit{prasaṅga}’s function, Dharmakīrti seems to have solved, for his own specific purposes\textsuperscript{24} and historical context, the problem of induction found in the need to know, with indisputable certainty, the common absence of reason and consequence as a necessary feature of a good reason.

Now, induction in a modern, post-Baconian sense is a method for acquiring knowledge. This was certainly true for Dharmakīrti as well. There is, however, possibly a limitation to this comparison due to the fact that Dharmakīrti deals with it only in connection with the need in Dignāga’s system of logic to ascertain the knowledge of the common absence of two properties (\textit{vyatireka}). This problem was already realized by Dharmakīrti’s teacher Īśvarasena, who felt motivated to increase the number of characteristics of a good logical reason to six, instead of the three as defined by Dignāga.\textsuperscript{25} It is for this reason that I believe the “taste” of the induction problem in the Indian context to be different. The important remaining questions are not only whether indeed different concepts of induction and its problem are at stake, but also whether Dharmakīrti actually succeeded in working out a solution to the induction problem as such, and if not, where exactly he failed under the new interpretation presented. Yet, with much curiosity I will have to leave it to better equipped and interested philosophers to find answers to questions such as these.\textsuperscript{26}

We can now shift to the same statement as a logical topic:

The three sentences we dealt with so far from the perspective of being a method for ascertaining causality must also be seen, in terms of the central purport of Dharmakīrti’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} VN 4,6f: \textit{anyat tatra samartham, tadabhāvāt tan na bhūtam.}
\item \textsuperscript{23} VN 4,5–10: \textit{anyathā kevalam tadabhāve na bhavatī upadāraśane ’nyasyāpi tatrābhāve sandīgdam asya sāṃarthyaṃ. anyat tatra samartham, tadabhāvāt tan na bhūtam. etannivṛttau punar nivṛttir yadṛcchāsamvādaḥ, mātrivivohcitadeśaṇjanmanah piṇḍakhajrārasya deśantaṇeṣu mātrivivohbhāve ’bhāvat.}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Such as to avoid the insufficiencies of Īśvarasena’s \textit{adarśanamātra}-theorem (cf. Steinkellner 1966 and 2013: note 180) or his increasing Dignāga’s three characteristics of a good reason to six (cf. HB § d., Steinkellner 1967: 70–78 with notes, and Steinkellner forthcoming).
\item \textsuperscript{25} On Īśvarasena’s \textit{sādākṣaraṇa hetu,} cf. HB 40,1–47,7 and Steinkellner 1967: 70–78; 1979: note 475; as well as Tillemans 2000: note 335.
\item \textsuperscript{26} See the appendix.
\end{itemize}
work, from the logical perspective. As said above, the three sentences amount to a proof that consists of a vyāpti formulation, the indication of a pakṣadharma and a prasaṅga to establish the vyāpti, because the section of PV 1.34–38 (PVSV 21,24–24,7) is dedicated to the question of how the essential relation that a kāryahetu presupposes can be ascertained.27

The question is then whether we can identify, also in this case, the prasaṅga component applied for establishing the vyāpti of a kāryahetu, as in the case of the svabhāvahetu (Steinkellner 1991: 319ff.), as structurally constituting or being equivalent to a sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. I think we can. Again, however, only by way of an experiment because – as Tani has said – he “did not explicitly explain so.”

According to Dharmakīrti’s later work, the bādhakapramāṇa is the non-perception of a pervading property (vyāpakadharma, VN 8,6) through which the absence of the reason in the contradictory opposite (viparyaya) of the consequent (sādhyya) can be inferred.

In this experiment, the principal uncertainty lies in determining the pervading property (vyāpaka). If Dharmakīrti had a pre-formation of the later term for this structure in mind, as I think he did, this property should not be one that is referred to in the proof itself, but one that should nevertheless be referred to in his prasaṅga. As far as I can see, the only candidate to offer itself is the property of “being observed in this way at least once” (*sakṛttathādṛṣṭatva). Under this hypothesis, we may conclude that the property *sakṛttathādṛṣṭatva, which pervades the reason “being conditionally perceived and non-perceived,”29 is not perceived and thus is negated in the locus of the contradictory opposite of the property to be proven, i.e., the property of “not being the effect of that” (*atakāryatva).

Moreover, I think we can discover this structure in the words Dharmakīrti uses to complete the prasaṅga establishing the vyāpti, namely: “For, were it not (that which is) to be effected (by this), it would not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause,”30 when he continues with the words “If an effect, however, would occur without its cause, it would not have a cause at all,”31 and to this adds, with the pepper of irony, a proof formula in corroboration of this last statement: “That, namely, is not a cause of this, which occurs without that; and smoke occurs without fire; therefore this (smoke) would not have that (fire) as (its) cause.”

To conclude: If my experiment can be considered sound, it means that Dharmakīrti applied the structure of the later (sādhyya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa already in his first work, and at the appropriate place in his work, that is, where the ascertainment of a logical concomitance as based on essential relations is the subject matter. Already in his first work, then, Dharmakīrti seems to have given a comprehensive and consistent account of all the basic constituents of his new logic, even if he did not yet use the terminology he coined later.

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27 This section is followed by PV 1.39 (PVSV 7–15), where the same question is answered for the svabhāvahetu.
28 I derive this hypothetically constructed property from sakrd api tatādaryyanāt (PVSV 22,6).
29 A property derived from bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇābhāvyām (VN 4,1f).
30 akāryatve 'karaṇāt sakrd api abhāvāt (PVSV 22,6f).
31 kāryasya ca svakāraṇam antarena bhāve 'hetumattātva syāt (PVSV 22,7f).
32 na hi yasya yam antarena bhāvaḥ, sa tasya hetur bhavati; bhavati ca dhūmo 'gnim antarena; tan na taddhētuḥ syāt (PVSV 22,8–10).
At this point we also have to pay attention to the wider context of Dharmakīrti’s logical thought and to follow up on some more questions that need answers. For I think there is yet another way to get to grips with Dharmakīrti’s “failure” to solve the induction problem beyond being possibly satisfied with the solution presented above. And this line of interpretation will have to be elaborated, too, although I do not think it will make for a substantial difference in respect to the induction issue. Here I can only indicate the general direction of the way.

Right at the beginning, when he introduces the new theorem of the three kinds of logical reason (trividhā hetu) for the first time, Dharmakīrti cites a statement that is possibly from Dignāga’s lost Hetumukha (cf. Frauwallner 1959: 103f.):

All this dealing with inference and what can be inferred is entirely based on a distinction between properties and a bearer of properties, (a distinction) that is mounted on the mind (buddhyārūḍha).

(sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmabhedena, PVSV 2.22–3.1).

These words express, above all, the trivial acknowledgement that a logician is dealing with concepts and linguistic items, also when cause and effect and their relation are at stake. This means that Dharmakīrti is clear about the fact that inference, as resulting knowledge, belongs to the realm of concepts which are inherited from a beginningless past. As such, it is also erroneous because it does not truly represent reality as it is (yathābhūta). But the application of logical rules and his specific theory of concept formation (apohavāda) allow for a differentiation between concepts that can be considered true, i.e., referring to real (sat) entities, and false, i.e., referring to unreal (asat) entities. Exactly this differentiation, then, is the task of inference when it attributes or excludes properties from entities, and its success is the reason for judging inferential cognition as valid (pramāṇa), meaning reliable when adopted in any kind of activity, be it worldly or aiming beyond.

Moreover, by purging false concepts, inference is essential for weeding out all those misapprehensions that are the cause for being bound to continuous suffering existence (samsāra), the cause of which is for Dharmakīrti, above all, the belief in a permanent self (ātman), tantamount to nescience (avidyā).33

Terms such as “cause,” “effect,” and their “relation” refer to concepts and as such have no referent in reality. This is clearly spelled out in Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā, a short work that I believe was composed in close proximity to his first work on logic. If it is necessary, as I said at the beginning, to identify causes and what effects they have in order to act successfully as a worldling or as someone already on the Buddhist path, one must clarify what a cause and what an effect are. In other words: On what grounds can we attribute the word or concept of “cause” or “effect” to a certain entity? Or: Why can we correctly say that something is the “effect” of something else as its “cause”?

The answer to such questions is Dharmakīrti’s yeṣām upalambhe-formula presented above. It offers no less than a logical model that determines exactly in what sense the concepts or terms of “cause” and “effect” can be correctly applied, for it provides a reason

on account of which something can be conceived and named as being the effect of a specific cause.

Not being a post-Baconian scholar, causality as a natural phenomenon may not have been Dharmakīrti’s concern. Yet what he laboured over was also not a mere “language game.” On the contrary, his examination had the most serious purpose of uprooting the false conceptions that constitute impediments for the mind in its progress towards liberation from suffering.34 In the same manner as his elaborations on the inference from essence as reason (svabhāvahetu), which is based on the common acceptance of linguistic conventions (tathāprasiddhi, PVSV 16,30f), Dharmakīrti’s thought on causality and on the inference from effect as reason is grounded in the very core of the Buddhist world view.35

References and abbreviations

La Vallée Poussin 1913 L. de La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes. Gand 1913.


PV 1 See PVSV.


PVSVṬ Ṭācārya-Dharmakīrtīṣ Pramāṇavārṭṭikā (svārthānumāna-paricchedāḥ) svopajñāvatītyā, Kārṇakagomīviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Ilāhābād 1943.

PVṬ1 Pramāṇavārṭṭikāṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi), Kapitel 1 – P 5718, Je 1b–348a8, Ňe 1b–85b2.


Appendix

Having seen my paper of 2015, Claus Oetke sent me a mail (November 26, 2016) on the subject of induction with its different aspects that I consider valuable sharing in the hope to make the present contribution more interesting to philosophers. Claus Oetke says (in my translation from the German):

There are (at least) four variants of problems related to induction that are reflected by the following questions:

1. How is it possible, a) to distinguish between causal and merely accompanying states of affairs and b) to find out which (preceding) states of affairs are causes of (later) appearing facts and which are not?
2. How is it possible to justify that for a certain (type of) fact only a certain other (type of) fact can be the cause?
3. How is it possible to ascertain that a regularity given within certain framing conditions must also be given within alternative framing conditions?
4. How is it possible to ascertain that in the world of experience there are causal regularities (at all) and that laws referring to causality must be valid?

… Regarding Dharmakīrti, he apparently offers a plausible answer to 1), while it looks as if he was aware of questions 2) and 3) yet did not offer a cogent solution. Against this the problematic question of 4) seems to be altogether beyond his sense of problems, while it is, seen philosophically, the perhaps most significant question.
Philosophical Reflections on the *sahopalambhaniyama* Argument

by

John Taber

Introduction

In 1991 the Japanese scholar T. Iwata published a masterful study of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. In his work he carefully traces the development and interpretation of the argument throughout the entire Buddhist epistemological tradition, from Dignāga to Jñānaśrīmitra, and also surveys responses to the argument from a variety of Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. He is not, however, primarily concerned with evaluating the argument philosophically – though questions of logic inevitably arise when interpreting the argument – and, it would seem, not at all with assessing it as a piece of philosophical reasoning independently of its historical context. That is what I would like to do in this essay. In what follows I shall construct a version of the *sahopalambhaniyama* (henceforth SUN) argument and attempt to judge its strengths and weaknesses as an argument, in particular, its formal validity and the defensibility of what I shall represent as its premises. Although I shall indeed allow myself to be prompted by the statements of Dharmakīrti (as well as other classical authors), and will even at the beginning touch on the question how Dharmakīrti might have used the argument – what it was supposed to prove – I make no claim that the version of the SUN argument I will be considering was Dharmakīrti’s. Aside from the fact that other scholars are much more qualified to ascertain that than I,¹ that is, tell us how the SUN argument as presented by Dharmakīrti should be understood, I wish to be relieved of the burden of historical accuracy in this essay in order better to focus on the logical and philosophical features of my reconstruction of it.

I believe it is worthwhile extracting the SUN argument from its historical and textual context and considering it in isolation just as an argument for at least two reasons. First, I believe that the version of the argument I shall devise is an argument for idealism unknown to Western philosophers. One could call it a ‘new’ argument for idealism if there were any traffic these days in arguments for idealism!² Although it is not the case that idealism is a hotly contested view now and a ‘new’ argument might just push it over the top, so to speak – that is, bring it within the range of plausible or at least defensible philosophical positions – any argument for it that is not obviously fallacious is of inherent interest. For philosophers remain interested in the possibilities of reason. An argument that purports to prove so unexpected a thesis as that nothing can exist outside of consciousness represents, in the first instance, a bold claim about what philosophical reasoning can accomplish.

¹ In addition to Iwata’s study see Arnold 2008, Ratié 2014, and Kellner 2017. Kellner’s study is, to date, the most penetrating.

² I know of only two defenders of idealism among contemporary philosophers: S. Rickless (2013) and J. Foster (2008).
Second, although I would hesitate to say that I consider the argument a viable one, it does not, as far as I can tell, have any obvious flaws. It is valid, and its premises appear to be at least tenable. I believe it is a strong argument – which is not to say, of course, that I think it is conclusive.

I should say at the outset that I believe that the usual prejudice against idealism, the opinion that there could not possibly be any good arguments for it, is wholly unphilosophical. For what is it based on? Merely, as far as I can tell, the unshakeable conviction that we live in a world populated by mind-independent, physical objects. The very thrust of any argument for idealism, however, is to call this very conviction into question on the basis of common observations about the nature of our experience. Typically – we will consider an exception later – those who would see any argument for idealism as a non-starter, as already refuted by perception, are simply begging the question.

Perhaps one final remark is in order to reinforce the value of investigating the SUN philosophically as well as historically. Despite the interest in aspects of Indian philosophical thought that are contiguous with contemporary analytic philosophy, one cannot deny that many of the greatest Indian thinkers – such as Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti, and Śaṅkara – were attempting to demonstrate views about the nature of reality that are radically opposed to those of contemporary philosophers. In particular, they held that the empirical world is an illusion. As some scholars now seem to recognize, in order to give a balanced picture of Indian thought we should take Indian arguments for anti-realism just as seriously as arguments concerning topics in philosophy of logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language.3

The SUN argument as an argument for idealism

Thus far I have referred to the SUN argument as an argument for idealism. But was it really meant to prove that? Here, I would like tentatively to explore this admittedly historical question – though still in a philosophical way – which will set up the examination of the argument itself. Iwata 1991 (henceforth “Iwata”) I, 18–20 suggests that Dharmakīrti, at least, used it to prove only dvirūpatā: the thesis that a cognition includes within itself two aspects, the object-form (arthākāra) and the subject-form (grāhakākāra, i.e., the cognition itself as the “grasper”), hence that the immediate object of experience is the form within cognition. Iwata cites as his main evidence the fact that, when presenting the SUN argument both in his Pramāṇavārttika (PV 3.387–397) and his Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 1.54–58), Dharmakīrti either directly states or implies that the conclusion of the argument – namely, that object or object-form and cognition are not different – holds even if there is an external object.4 Thus, evidently, he believed that the argument would be acceptable even to a Sautrāntika, who postulates something outside of cognition as the cause of the object-form. The SUN argument is thus intended to refute the bāhyārthavādin who is also

3 I have in mind J. Westerhoff in particular. See, e.g., Westerhoff 2009 and 2010.
4 PVin 1 43,4–5: saty api bāhye ‘rthe sahopalambhavedanābhyyām bhāsamānasya nilades tatsamvidas cāvivekah siddhah. In PV 3.387–397 this is implied when Dharmakīrti, after developing the argument in vv. 387–390c, concedes apparently to the Sautrāntika that one could infer an external object as the cause of the arising of a perceptual cognition were it not possible to explain it as the effect of the immediately preceding cognition (390d–391).
a nirākāravādin, that is, in modern terminology, the ‘naive’ or ‘direct’ realist who holds that we directly perceive physical objects. It does not rule out the existence of an external object by itself.

Nevertheless, while some of Dharmakīrti’s successors followed him in viewing the argument as a proof of dvirūpatā, hence in the first instance as a refutation of the nirākārajñānavāda, others, Buddhists and Brahmins alike, saw it as a proof of vijñaptimātratā, mere-cognition: the thesis that there are no uncognized objects or that nothing exists outside of cognition. Iwata notes how the argument might have been seen by Dharmakīrti himself as practically amounting to a proof of mere-cognition. If what we are directly experiencing are only forms in cognition, that is to say, if our experience of a world that seemingly contains physical objects can be accounted for solely in terms of changes taking place within cognition itself, then it becomes superfluous to postulate physical objects at all. As Iwata puts it, “Insofar as the external object, in the sense in which it is postulated in Sautrāntika … is fundamentally imperceptible, that is, it can only be represented by means of inference, there is no longer any reason for it to be presupposed as the object of knowledge” (Iwata I, 6). Thus, the external object becomes “epistemologically completely superfluous” (Iwata I, 6). But perhaps that meant for Dharmakīrti that it does not exist at all? Although Dharmakīrti has moved beyond the direct refutation of the possibility of physical objects that Vasubandhu appears to undertake in his Viṃśikā – when arguing that the Buddha could not have literally meant there are such things when he referred to the āyatana – he might still have been in sympathy with the overall strategy for proving vijñaptimātratā in that text, as Kellner/Taber 2014 have now explained it. Namely, there are no objects outside of cognition because there is no evidence for them. This strategy tacitly appeals to the epistemological principle, employed in Indian philosophy prior to Vasubandhu and still widely used for centuries after him (and after Dharmakīrti), that something exists if there is a pramāṇa for it, and something does not exist if there is not. Kellner (2017: 29–31) is quite right to emphasize (contra Ratié 2014) that the constraints of his logical theory would have prevented Dharmakīrti from devising a formal anumāna based on an anupalabdhihetu demonstrating that objects outside of cognition do not exist. Yet he surely must have known that when asking questions like, “If the cognition has the form of blue, etc., what is the pramāṇa for an external object?” – implying that in light of arguments like the SUN which undermine perception as evidence for external objects and the lack of conclusive inferential evidence, there is no reason to postulate them – he was coming as close as he could to asserting that they do not exist, and that is what most of his readers would probably take away.

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5 See Arnold 2008. Although Manorathanandin, in one passage, recommends that one who demands a proof that there is no external object even after it has been shown that the object is never experienced independently of cognition should consult Vasubandhu’s mereological arguments, I don’t think one can conclude that Dharmakīrti, who nowhere mentions them, endorsed them too. See Ratié 2014: 358–362.

6 Or, something does not exist anupalabdheḥ, “because it is not apprehended.” See Kellner/Taber 2014: 727–734.

7 dhiyo nilādirūpatve bāhyo ’rthaḥ kimpramāṇakaḥ / PV 3.432ab. Or PV 3.333: “[Objection:] If an external object were experienced, what mistake would there be? [Reply:] None at all! Only this [remains to be asked:] Why would it be said that an external object is perceived?” Kellner 2017: 24.

8 Thus, Ratié 2014 shows that Abhinavagupta understood the SUN in this way while adapting it to his own purposes: “…For the Śaivas the epistemic argument is not confined to a demonstration that there is
Iwata generally presupposes that when arguing for the two-fold nature of cognition (dvirūpātā) Dharmakīrti is in dialogue with the Sautrāntika or Buddhist ‘externalist’ (as some prefer). There is good evidence for this. The framework of the initial discussion of dvirūpātā in both PV 3 and PV in 1 is the identification of self-awareness as the result (phala) of the pramāṇa perception, and Dharmakīrti wants to show that his solution is acceptable to both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra. If the immediate result of the SUN argument, however, is the demonstration of dvirūpātā, then the logical opponent against whom it is directed would be, as I’ve already suggested, a bāhyārthavādin who is also a nirākāravādin, rather than a Sautrāntika. Indeed, as is well known, much of the time in his works Dharmakīrti is arguing against a Mīmāṃsaka, an incorrigible direct realist who thinks that perception by itself establishes the existence of external objects. Especially in this case – if the SUN targets a direct realist – it would be tantamount to a proof of vijñaptimātratā. For the direct realist, unlike the representationalist (the Sautrāntika), does not think we can infer the existence of physical objects; we just see them. Once it has been shown to such a person, by proving dvirūpātā, that what he is seeing is really just the form in cognition, then what he thought were external objects are eliminated and he has nothing else, no inferred entities, with which to replace them.

Thus, the SUN argument, even when seen as a proof of dvirūpātā, could also be seen as amounting to a proof of vijñaptimātratā if supplemented by a further step – whether or not this was Dharmakīrti’s actual intention – namely, the claim that if there is no reason to believe in objects outside of cognition, then it is reasonable to assume that there are none. Or else it could be seen as amounting to a proof of vijñaptimātratā if one stipulates that it is meant to be deployed in a specific dialectical situation: for the direct realist, if what we are perceiving are not mind-independent objects, then there are none at all. On neither of these readings would the proof of mere-cognition be a rigorously deductive one. On the former, the conclusion that there are no uncognized objects is, in the final stage of the argument, in effect offered as the best explanation for the lack of any evidence for them. Thus, it is strictly something that could only be presumed, not asserted. On the latter, insofar as the argument is context-bound, it will not be persuasive for all interlocutors (for instance, non-Mīmāṃsaka representationalists).

What I would like to do, then, is develop a third reading of the SUN argument according to which it is rigorously deductive: that objects do not exist outside cognition will follow immediately from the conclusion of the argument, that object and cognition are not different. Some of Dharmakīrti’s opponents apparently perceived the argument in this way, as sufficient by itself for proving cognition-only. Consider, for instance, Śaṅkara’s presentation of it in his Brahmaṇaṭtrabhāṣya:

Moreover, a cognition arises having mere experience as its common nature.

The inclination (paksapāta) it has in regard to a particular object, so that it is

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9 Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla would agree with this assessment, as Iwata I, 25–27 interprets them.
the cognition of a pillar, the cognition of a wall, or the cognition of a pot – that is not possible without some difference that belongs to the cognition [itself], so that necessarily the cognition’s similarity with the object must be assumed. And that being assumed, since the object-form is obtained (avaruddha) just by the cognition, the postulation of an external object is pointless. Moreover, the non-difference of object and cognition results from their invariable co-apprehension; for it is not the case that there is the apprehension of the one when there is no apprehension of the other. And this is not possible if there is a difference of [their] nature, since there is no [other] cause [of their co-apprehension] consisting in a connection. For that [reason] as well, there is no [external] object.\(^4\)

It is clear from this passage that Śaṅkara understands the proof of the fact that cognition bears the form of the object, which is essentially d{\textit{dvirūpatā}}, as distinct from the proof of the non-difference of object and cognition from their invariable co-apprehension. From the cognition’s bearing the object-form within itself it follows only that an external object is ‘pointless’ – that is, there is no reason to postulate one; but from the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition it follows that there is no external object.\(^5\)

Therefore, one may even be historically justified in seeing the SUN argument as proving vîjñâpatimātratā directly, without any additional, non-deductive step or specification of the dialectical environment – hence as rigorously deductive. I shall now attempt to reconstruct the argument explicitly along such lines.

**The strongest formulation of the argument**

We may take as our point of departure Dharmakīrti’s classic statement of the argument at PVin 1.54ab:

> Because they are invariably apprehended\(^12\) together, blue and the cognition of it are not different.

\[
\text{sahopalambhaniyamād abheda ni\-lataladhiyoh.}\]

\(^10\) BSBh 544,1–6: \textit{api cāmubhavamātreṇa sādārūpa\-nāmano jñānasya yo 'yaṃ prativiṣayam pa\-kṣapātah stambhajñānāṃ kudvyājñānāṃ pata\-jñānāṃ tī tāsau jñānagatavishe\-sāṃ antarenopapapadāta ity avasāyan vi\-ṣayāsarūpyam jñānasyāṅgikārthavyam, angikête ca tasmin vi\-ṣayākārasya jñānenaivāvaruddhatvād apārthikā bāhyārthasadbhāva\-vakalpanā. api ca sahopalambhaniya\-mād abheda viṣayavijñānayor āpatati. na hy anayor ekas\-yānupalambhē 'nyayopalambhē 'sti. na ca ita\-t svabhāvaviveke yuktam pratibandha\-kāraṇābhāvāt. tasmād apy arthābhāvāh.}\]

The first sentence of this passage closely follows PV 3.302; the penultimate sentence almost verbatim corresponds to PVin 1 40,2–4. Thanks to B. Kellner for pointing this out.

\(^11\) But the final sentence of the passage, “For that [reason] as well (\textit{api}), there is no external object,” may suggest that Śaṅkara also thought that showing it is ‘pointless’ amounted to proving that it does not exist. Such a proof, however, would involve an additional step. To say that something is pointless is obviously not the same as saying it is nonexistent.

\(^12\) Although \textit{upalabdhi} often means specifically perception, it also has the broader meaning of an apprehension by any \textit{pramāṇa}, which I prefer to follow in my treatment because I think it is more suitable for what I shall reconstruct as the first or major premise of the argument.
I shall not be following Iwata’s method of examining the argument according to the terms of an Indian anumāna: What is the dharmin, the hetu, and the sādhya, and so forth? I shall rather be formulating the argument in the modern way, as a set of statements consisting of premises and a conclusion following from them that could be translated into predicate calculus if one wanted (though I shall not do that); for I believe that putting the argument in this form makes it more accessible to philosophers. Nevertheless, what is normally referred to as the subject of the argument (dharmin), that about which non-difference is being demonstrated, should be clarified at the outset. Normally, blue and the cognition of blue or, more generally, an object and the cognition of the object, are taken as the subject of the argument, and what is being proved about them by the argument is that they are not different. What is important to keep in mind when investigating the argument is that, in order for it to be able to establish vijñaptimātratā, the status of blue, or the object, must be undecided at the outset: it could be either not different from cognition or different from it. That is to say, it must be left undecided whether blue is something occurring inside or outside cognition. If one assumed at the outset that “blue” refers to an aspect of the cognition itself, that is, to the so-called object-form (arthākāra or grāhyākāra), then one would not prove anything very interesting or significant by demonstrating that it is not different from the cognition. In fact, one might even in that case object that, if the subject of the inference is interpreted in that way, and the purpose of the argument is to prove vijñaptimātratā, then the argument would be assuming what it is supposed to prove. If, on the other hand, the status of blue is left open, the argument immediately becomes much more interesting. For it then establishes (if it is successful!) that what one might very well have taken to be something external to cognition – a mind-independent object – turns out in fact to be something that is not different from it. The achievement of the argument would be, in effect, to bring everything that one is naively inclined to suppose exists outside of cognition inside cognition itself, and that would be a rather spectacular result indeed.

Our initial task in evaluating the SUN argument is to formulate it in the best possible way as a series of premises and a conclusion so as to avoid obvious prima facie objections. Now some statements of the argument by Dharmakīrti himself suggest that what in Western logic would be taken as the minor premise of the argument should be formulated as follows:

A. Whenever there is an apprehension of an object, there is an apprehension of cognition and vice versa.

Thus, PV 3.387:

In what way can an object, which is invariably experienced at the same time together with cognition, be shown to be different from that?[^16]

[^13]: He also asks, more specifically of the hetu, sahopalambhaniyamāt, what is the meaning of saha and what is the meaning of niyama.

[^14]: See Iwata I, 41–44.

[^15]: Though Galen Strawson might disagree. See below. Precisely this point is made by Śubhagupta BSKā 87.

[^16]: sakṛt samvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha / visayasya tato ‘nyatvam kenākāraṇaḥ sādhyaḥ // Unlike for Pramāṇaviniścaya 1, we do not have a critical edition of Pramāṇavārttika 3. I’ve used the edition of Tosaki.
Here, Dharmakīrti seems not to be talking about the cognition specifically of blue, as he seems to be in PVin 1.54ab, but of cognition in general. That is, he is saying: whatever object we happen to be aware of, that is not different from cognition.

Consider, however, a specific object, say blue, and the statement:

B. Whenever there is an apprehension of blue, there is an apprehension of cognition and vice versa.

This statement, especially the conjunct implied by the phrase “and vice versa,” is clearly false. We are conscious of many other things besides blue, namely, red, yellow, brown, sweet, bitter, rough, smooth, and so on. Awareness in general is not invariably accompanied by blue.

This point was very clearly stated by G. W. Moore in his famous essay “The Refutation of Idealism:”

We all know that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green. But it is plain that if both are sensations they also have some point in common. What is it that they have in common? And how is this common element related to the points in which they differ? I will call the common element ‘consciousness’ without yet attempting to say what the thing I so call is. We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1) ‘consciousness,’ in respect of what all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the ‘object’ of a sensation: this also without attempting to say what I mean by the word. (Moore 1922: 17)

Precisely because the object in consciousness varies while consciousness remains constant, Moore goes on to say, we believe that consciousness is one thing, the object another.

In fact, we needn’t rely on a modern Western author to appreciate this point. It was already effectively stated by Śaṅkara in his critique of the SUN argument:

Moreover, when there is a cognition of a pot [then] a cognition of a cloth, there is a difference of the two qualifiers pot and cloth but not of the thing qualified, the cognition; just as when there is a white cow [then] a black cow, there is a difference of the whiteness and the blackness, but not of cowness. And a difference of the one from the two is [thereby] established, and of the two from the one. Hence, there is a difference of cognition and object.18

Thus, with B as a counterexample – the statement has now been shown to be false – it seems, on the face of things, that A cannot be true.

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17 That is to say, B is really the conjunction, “Whenever there is an apprehension of blue there is an apprehension of cognition, and whenever there is an apprehension of cognition there is an apprehension of blue.”
18 BSBh 550, 1–3.
On the other hand, it does seem plausible to suggest that blue and the cognition, specifically, of blue are invariably apprehended together, as the wording of PVin 1.54ab implies.

Now, if we take together all (presumably true) statements such as,

Blue is invariably apprehended together with the cognition of blue.
Red is invariably apprehended together with the cognition of red.
Etc.

then one can derive the universal generalization:

C. For every object X and every cognition of the object Cx, one apprehends X if and only if one apprehends Cx,

which could also be stated as,

C. Any object and the awareness of that object are invariably apprehended together.

And C looks very much like A above. Dharmakīrti does not make this clarification himself, but it is not inconsistent with his statements. Indeed, when he says things like, “For even though they have separate appearances, there is no nature of blue that is a different thing from the experience,” in his prose explanation of PVin 1.54ab), he could very well mean by “experience” (anubhava) that particular type of experience, namely, an experience of blue.

Thus, a general formulation of the minor premise of the SUN argument, with the terms “object” and “cognition,” seems appropriate after all, such as PV 3.389:

Neither an object without awareness nor awareness without an object is ever observed being experienced. Therefore, they are not distinct.

Taking C as the minor premise of the argument, then, the following suggests itself as the major premise:

D. Two things that are invariably apprehended together are not different.

Putting together D and C as the major and minor premises, we get the following formulation of the argument.

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19 Chakrabarti 1990: 32–33 comes up with virtually the same solution to this problem.

20 na hi bhīnnavabhāṣīte ’py arthāntaram eva rāpaṃ nīlasānubhavāt... PVin 1 40,1. Cf. Iwata I, 110–111.

21 nārtho ’samvedanaḥ kaścit anartham vāpi vedanam / drṣṭaṃ samvedyamāṇaṃ tat tayor nāsti vivekitā //
**Premise 1 (major premise):** Two things that are invariably apprehended together are not different.

**Premise 2 (minor premise):** Any object and the cognition of that object are invariably apprehended together.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, any object and the cognition of that object are not different.

I maintain that the following statements are obvious corollaries of the argument:

- In general, object and awareness are in some sense the same thing.\(^{22}\)
- There is no object external to/without cognition.
  
  (For an object cannot exist unless there is awareness of it; hence, *esse est percipi*.)

  The world of objects that are experienced is “nothing but cognition.”

Thus, with the SUN argument formulated as suggested above, *vijñaptimātratā* follows from it immediately.

**Examination of premise 1**

The SUN argument as formulated above is a logically valid argument: the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. To evaluate the argument further we must determine whether the premises are true.

Now, one of the classic objections raised against the SUN argument is that what is construed in Indian logic as the “reason” or *hetu*, namely, “because they are invariably apprehended together,” is a “contradictory reason” (*viruddhahetu*); that is to say, it actually proves the opposite of the desired conclusion. For when we say that things are apprehended “together,” we obviously imply that they are different things. Thus,

> I saw the ācārya walking together with his student,

and

> I see the stars together in the sky,

prima facie suggest that one has to do, not with one thing, but with more than one thing.\(^{23}\)

A related objection is that the reason “because they are invariably apprehended together”

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22 For the purposes of my reconstruction of the SUN argument it is not necessary to specify whether “not different” means merely not different or, taken as “non-different,” implies sameness. As far as I can tell, either way the argument would go through and would amount to a proof of idealism. For Buddhist defenders of the argument the debate about the precise meaning of *abheda* was driven by other doctrinal issues, especially the problems of the unity and reality of the object-form. See Iwata I, 110–215.

23 See Iwata I, 93–94, referencing Jaina authors, e.g., Prabhācandra, and others (Iwata II, 84, n. 95). The objection may have been raised first by the Vaibhāṣika (?) Śubhagupta; see BSKā 71, cited by Kamalaśīla TSP 692,2–3. The example of the teacher and his student is from Yāmuna’s *Ātmasiddhi*; see Mesquita 1990: 38. I regret that Saccone 2018 was not yet available for me to take into consideration in this essay; to do so would have required substantial revisions.
is inconclusive (anaikāntika); it does not reliably indicate that the things in question are not different. However, it does not mean that they are different, either. An inconclusive reason is not the same as a contradictory one. Thus, although the stars of a constellation are invariably seen together, they are different.24

In my formulation of the argument these objections constitute challenges to the truth of the first, major premise – which expresses what in Indian logic is the “pervasion” (vyāpti) of the reason by the property-to-be-proved (sādhyā). Thus, the question arises, How should one interpret the first premise so that it is not vulnerable to these sorts of objections? Here, there are at least two strategies one could follow. (1) One could stipulate a specific meaning of the word “together.” (2) One could stipulate a specific meaning of the word “invariably.” I shall discuss these suggestions in order.

Suggestion 1: The first strategy for defeating the sorts of objections raised above is to suggest that one should understand “together” correctly. It does not mean simply juxtaposed or simultaneous, but completely together, that is, inseparable like water and milk. Proposals quite similar to this were in fact made by different Buddhist authors in response to the objection that sahopalambhaniyamāt is a contradictory or inconclusive reason.25

This proposal is not without problems, however.26 For one thing, it would seem to disqualify the example Dharmakīrti himself gives in support of his reason, “like two moons” seen by a person afflicted by an eye disease. For the two moons, presumably, can be clearly distinguished.27 Another problem with interpreting Premise 1 in this way, namely, as saying that two things that are invariably apprehended as inseparable are not different, is that it now sounds an awful lot like: two things that are invariably apprehended as not different are not different. Thus, the non-difference of entities would already be given with their invariable co-apprehension, so that by assuming, with Premise 2, the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition, one is assuming what one is supposed to be proving – their non-difference. The argument becomes a petitio principii.28

More generally, however, it is difficult to come up with examples of two things invariably seen together, as inseparable, that are the same thing. Consider:

the Commander-in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and the President of the United States

24 See Iwata II, 84, n. 98; BSKā 68. The anaikāntikatā objection is generally thought to apply if saha is understood specifically to mean “at the same time.”

25 Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, for instance, interpret saha as eka, so that sahopalambha = ekopalambha or abhedopalambha, an apprehension as united, or an apprehension as not different (Iwata I, 67–71). Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Dharmottara interpret sahopalambha as eka evopalambhaḥ, a single apprehension [of both]. (See Iwata I, 84–88 on Dharmottara and 88–89 on Kamalaśīla. Cf. Matsumoto 1980: 284–283. See n. 33 below.) For a schematic presentation of the different options for construing saha see Iwata I, 66–67, and the entire section, 66–103, for a comprehensive discussion.

26 Bhāsarvajña neatly refutes most of the Buddhist maneuvers to evade these objections, NBhū 132–135.

27 Dharmakīrti himself says, PVin 1 40,1–2, that blue and its experience have separate appearances “like two moons, etc.”: na hi bhīnāvabhāsīte ‘py arthāntaram eva rūpam nilayānubhavāt tayoḥ sahopalambhaniyamād dvicandrādīv. I am not aware of this criticism being raised by a classical author, but the literature is vast.

28 This is essentially the objection, raised by some classical opponents against the interpretation of sahopalambhanah as ekatvenopalambhanah, that in that case the hetu would not be different from the sādhyā, resulting in siddhasādhanatā, “proof of what is already established.” See Iwata I, 94; BSKā 76.
an Indian-Head Nickel and a Buffalo Nickel

a duck-rabbit

It seems that the latter two cases in particular, where it is a question of a thing with different visual aspects, are akin to the cognition of blue and blue. But are they seen together as inseparable? Indeed, both aspects are not seen at the same time – seeing the Indian head, one must turn the nickel over to see the buffalo and vice versa, and one can only shift from seeing the duck to seeing the rabbit and back —, so it is difficult to understand how they could be seen as inseparable or as one.

Thus, it becomes doubtful that Premise 1, even with a stronger construal of “together” as “inseparable,” would have any basis in observation – unlike the major premise of most syllogisms. We are confident in saying, “Where there is smoke, there is fire,” because we have observed many times that something that is smoking is on fire and have never observed that something that is smoking is not on fire, but that would not be the case here.

Suggestion 2: The second strategy for removing obvious challenges to the truth of the first premise is to suggest that one has to understand “invariably,” which translates niyama, correctly. Namely, one should take it modally, as meaning necessarily. Thus, sahopolambhaniyamāt would mean “because they are necessarily apprehended together.” One way of interpreting this would be that one cannot imagine apprehending one and not apprehending the other.

I am not aware of any Buddhist authors making this move in response to the objections of viruddahetutva and anaikāntikahetutva. Dharmakīrti himself does not formulate the relation between the apprehension of an object and the apprehension of a cognition modally. Rather, he typically says things like, “For it is not the case that, when there is not the apprehension of one form, there is apprehension of the other” (PVin I 40,2–3). He does not use modal language like “there could not be apprehension of the other.” We do, however, find something like a modal formulation in the Tattvasaṅgraha:

That (X) whose awareness would necessarily (dhruvam) be the awareness of that (Y), is non-different from that (Y) or does not differ from that.

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29 An American Indian-Head nickel was a five-cent coin minted in the United States from 1913 to 1933, now a collector’s item. By definition, the nickel shows an Indian on the ‘heads’ side and a buffalo on the ‘tails’ side.

30 Iwata translates niyama as “ausschließlich.”

31 Mesquita 1990 for instance translates it as “notwendigerweise,” Matsumoto 1980 as “necessarily.”

32 Iwata’s discussion of niyama is relatively short. It would seem that the interpretation of niyama was not a matter of major concern in the debate over the SUN argument.

33 TS 2029: yatsamvedanam eva svāyād yasya saṃvedanam dhruvam tasmād avyatiriktam tat tato vā na vibhidyate // See Matsuoka, this volume, for a different translation. This verse, however, represents the view that sahopolambha implies that there is just one apprehension of X and Y: eka evopalambhah. See TSP 692,23–24: na hy atraikenaivopalambha ekopalambha ity ayaṃ artho ’bhipretah, kim tarhi? jñānañjñeyavohl paraparam eka evapolambhah, na prthag iti. This is different from what I am suggesting, and I think is attended by the sorts of problems brought out by Bhāsarvajña. See above, nn. 25 and 26.
We also have the statement of Dharmottara:

Apprehension of the knowable [arises] only having the nature of the apprehension of the cognition, not otherwise; and apprehension of the cognition has only the nature of the apprehension of the knowable.\(^{34}\)

Let us, then, replace Premise 1 with

**Premise 1’**: Two things that are necessarily apprehended together are not different.

Premise 1’ seems a priori justified. That is to say, the generalization expressed by Premise 1’ – the vyāpti of the traditional SUN argument – is not based on observation but is a truth of reason, if you will.

In support of this claim I refer to a recent article by Galen Strawson, “What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?” from his collection *Real Materialism*.\(^{35}\) In this essay Strawson argues that for any occurrent experience \(e\), \(e\) cannot exist without a subject of the experience \(s\); the subject of the experience \(s\) cannot exist without an experiential content it is experiencing, \(c\); and the experience \(e\) also cannot exist without an experiential content \(c\) and vice versa.

Thus we get

\[
e \iff s \iff c,
\]

where “\(x \iff y\)” means “if \(x\) then necessarily \(y\), and if \(y\) then necessarily \(x\).”

Strawson does not appeal to invariable co-apprehension to support the equivalences \(e \iff s \iff c\); rather, he notes certain conceptual relationships. For instance, in arguing for \(e \iff s\) he writes, “There cannot be an experience without a subject of experience simply because experience is necessarily experience for – for someone-or-something. Experience involves experiential ‘what-it-is-likeness,’ and experiential what-it-is-likeness is necessarily what-it-is-likeness for someone-or-something.”\(^{36}\) In arguing for the equivalence \(e \iff c\) Strawson offers observations such as, “Evidently there can’t be concretely occurring experiential content without there being an experience of some sort which the content is the content of,”\(^{37}\) and, “For surely this very experience couldn’t have had a different content and still be the experience it is?”\(^{38}\) Thus, Strawson’s method for establishing equivalences for \(e\), \(s\), and \(c\) is different from that of the SUN argument – which of course is only concerned

\(^{34}\) *jñeyopalambho jñānopalambhātmaka eva nānyathā / jñānopalambho ‘pi jñeyopalambhātmaka eva II*, from Dharmottara’s *Pramāṇaviniścayatikā*. See Iwata I, 107–108 and II, 89, n. 15.

\(^{35}\) Strawson 2008. Thanks to Mark Siderits for bringing this article to my attention.

\(^{36}\) Strawson 2008: 153. It should be noted that the type of subject Strawson conceives of as necessary for experience is a ‘thin’ subject, which is not ontologically distinct from the experience but only its subjective pole and which is different from one experience to the next. Thus, it is not incompatible with a Buddhist view of consciousness which involves no self distinct from cognition but includes a subjective factor, namely, the *grāhakākāra* or subject form. See esp. Strawson 2008: 182–183, also 167–168.


\(^{38}\) Strawson 2008: 177.
with the necessary equivalence \( e \iff c \). Moreover, Strawson takes \( c \) to be the content of an experience, an “experiential content;” it is “internal,” “phenomenological.” Thus, it belongs to the experience at the outset. Its status is not initially undetermined, as merely the knowable that might or might not belong to the cognition, as it is on my interpretation of the SUN argument. Nevertheless, Strawson’s reflections become particularly useful for us when he suggests that one can move from

\[
e \iff s \iff c
\]

to

\[
e = s = c
\]

by force of the following principle, which he borrows from Descartes:

There is a real distinction between two phenomena … if and only if they can possibly “exist apart,” and a merely conceptual distinction between them if and only if they are conceptually distinct, like trilaterality and triangularity, but cannot possibly exist apart.\(^{39}\)

Strawson (and Descartes) accept this as an a priori principle. Following them, then, it seems a priori justified – that is, not based on any observational data – that

Two things that are necessarily apprehended together are not different,

which is our Premise 1’. Of course, to say that two things are necessarily apprehended as co-occurring is slightly different from saying that two things necessarily co-occur, but it seems the difference is so slight as to be negligible. The only way to know that things are a certain way is by apprehending them as being so. I shall, however, return to this point below.

Before moving on to consider Premise 2, it may be helpful to clarify how Strawson is not proving the same thing as the SUN argument in the way I am interpreting it. Indeed, it would seem that by arguing for \( e = c \) Strawson is arguing for what the Buddhists referred to as dvīrūpatā, essentially, the non-difference of the object-form from the cognition (cognition, that is, has two aspects: the cognition and the object), which I have distinguished from vijñātmitteratā above. Strawson of course is not interested at all in the thesis of idealism; however, he believes that \( e = s = c \), hence \( e = c \), is “a deep truth.”\(^{40}\) He believes it is particularly significant that \( s \) and \( c \) cannot exist apart, hence that they must be identical in some sense – the content of the experience is the subject. Why? The main reason appears to be that Strawson, as a physicalist or materialist, believes that all of \( e, s, \) and \( c \) are not just correlated with, but are physical entities: portions of “process-stuff” in the nervous system,

\(^{39}\) Strawson 2008: 168. Strawson cites Descartes 1985: I, 213–215 (Principles of Philosophy). See also Strawson 2008: 181: “…Let me now formally endorse the principle that if there is at most a conceptual distinction between two apparently distinct (concrete) particulars, if they cannot possible exist apart, then they are not really two but only one…”

\(^{40}\) Strawson 2008: 180.
which will eventually be pinpointed by neuroscience. The equivalence \( e = s = c \), then, predicts that the neuroscientists will someday discover that the neurological process-stuff that is \( e \) ‘just is’ the neurological process-stuff that is independently identified as \( s \), and that \( s \) ‘just is’ the neurological process-stuff that is independently identified as \( c \).\(^{41}\) Here we have – though Strawson does not exactly say this – a priori philosophy proposing a specific research program in brain science! Be that as it may, in the end Strawson’s essay offers nothing for the Buddhist; for materialism is just as much a non-starter for the Buddhist – at least for Dharmakīrti – as idealism is for the contemporary analytic philosopher.\(^{42}\)

It seems that in light of this examination of Premise 1’ it is safe to say that the first premise of the argument, for now, looks quite solid. Thus, having established that the argument is valid, that is, commits no logical mistake, and that its first premise appears true, it would seem that the best hope for defeating it is to show somehow that the second premise is false.

**Examination of premise 2**

Is it true that object and cognition are necessarily apprehended together? Well, it seems uncontroversial that one cannot possibly apprehend a cognition of blue without apprehending what it is a cognition of – blue. What seems, and was for Indian philosophers, much more controversial is the other half of the equivalence: that one could not apprehend blue without apprehending the cognition of it. Dharmakīrti is clearly attempting to establish this with the second half of PVin 1.54:

\[ \text{The seeing of an object is not established for someone for whom the apprehension is not evident.}^{43} \]

The idea is that a cognition that does not reveal itself cannot reveal an object. Dharmakīrti continues,

\[ \text{For there is not an apprehending of an object due to the presence of the object, but rather due to the presence of the apprehension. And if that [presence] is not known by a pramāṇa it does not attach itself to/conform to [verbal, conceptual, and corporal forms of] behaviour that presuppose existence. If that [apprehension] were not established, there would be no establishing of the object either, so everything would disappear; for if it were not established, even though it exists, it cannot be treated as existing. Therefore, someone who does not apprehend the awareness of something is not aware of anything.}^{44} \]

\(^{41}\) Strawson 2008: 183–185.
\(^{42}\) See Taber 2003.
\(^{43}\) apratyaksopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭih prasidhyati // Iwata I, 106.
Dharmakīrti seems to be saying that apprehending something, but not being aware that one is apprehending it, is as good as not apprehending it at all.

Despite the strong prima facie appeal of this view it was aggressively attacked by opponents of Yogācāra anti-realism. One of the most forceful critiques is by Kumārila, who in the Śūnyavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika is taking on an argument that anticipates the SUN, which was already known to the Vṛttikāra: if the form (ākāra) that appears in a cognition can be shown to belong to the cognition itself, then there is no reason to postulate an object.\footnote{See Taber 2010.} In arguing for the possession of the form by the cognition the pūrvapakṣin offers, among other reasons, that for something to illumine or manifest anything it has to be apprehended itself: “…the object which is to be illumined is not ascertained when the appearance of the cognition is not apprehended, because its illumination is dependent on that, like a pot when there is the light of a lamp.”\footnote{ŚV, Śūnyavāda 22.} The opponent even says that the cognition must reveal itself. We fail to be aware of something only because either a source of illumination is lacking or there is something obstructing it. When a cognition arises, however, neither is the case: nothing obstructs it, and it itself is the source of illumination.\footnote{ŚV Śūnyavāda 23–24.}

Moreover, if a cognition necessarily apprehends itself, it must apprehend itself as having some form. Thus, the ākāra must belong to the cognition.\footnote{Taber 2010: 284–287.}

Kumārila’s refutation of this argument in his siddhānta is extensive and complex. A better understanding of it awaits a new edition and translation of the Śūnyavāda. Nevertheless, it is clear that it involves at least the following three elements. (1) In fact we are not aware of both object and cognition at the same time. Usually we are only aware of the object. “…When one cognizes the object (grāhya), the form blue and so forth, one does not at that time ever observe an awareness having the form of the subject (grāhaka).”\footnote{ŚV Śūnyavāda 74.} And sometimes one is just aware of the subject without the object, for instance when one remembers experiencing something but cannot remember what it was.\footnote{ŚV Śūnyavāda 82cd–83.} (2) It is not necessary for the cognition itself to be apprehended in order for it to cognize an object. The senses provide a counterexample: we apprehend things by means of them without apprehending them themselves.\footnote{ŚV Śūnyavāda 179cd–180ab.} (3) There is no example of something that illumines itself as it illumines other things. Fire and so forth illumine other objects without their own natures being revealed. When they are apprehended, it is the sense that apprehends them.\footnote{ŚV Śūnyavāda 64–66.}

In general, Kumārila seems to subscribe to the principle that something cannot act on itself: an axe cannot cut itself, a finger cannot touch itself, and so on.

Obviously, we cannot adjudicate this dispute here – essentially, the debate about the truth of the second premise of the SUN argument – which continued for centuries after Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. We should note, however, that there is widespread support in modern philosophy, in both the analytic and continental traditions, for the thesis that some
kind of self-awareness or reflexivity is essential to consciousness. Consider the following précis of Sartre’s position by the contemporary phenomenologist Dan Zahavi.

Sartre, probably the best-known defender of a phenomenological theory of self-consciousness, considered consciousness to be essentially characterized by intentionality. He also claimed, however, that each intentional experience is characterized by self-consciousness. Thus, Sartre took self-consciousness to constitute a necessary condition for being conscious of something. To perceive a withering oak, a dance performance, or a red pillow consciously without being aware of it, that is, without having access to or being acquainted with the experience in question was, for Sartre, a manifest absurdity. This line of thought is elaborated in the important introduction to L’être et le néant, where he claimed that an ontological analysis of intentionality leads to self-consciousness since the mode of being of intentional consciousness is to be for-itself (pour soi), that is, self-conscious. An experience does not simply exist; it exists for itself, that is, it is given for itself, and this self-givenness is not simply a quality added to the experience, a mere varnish, but it rather constitutes the very mode of being of the experience. As Sartre wrote: “This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something.”

Thus, it seems obvious that Premise 2, if not actually true, is at least defensible – many philosophers of different traditions have held and defended it. The main point to be made here in favor of the SUN argument is this, that if one accepts Premise 2, as it appears many do, then, given that Premise 1 already looks quite strong, the argument will go through.

Further objections?

With the strategy of refuting the SUN argument decisively by contesting its premises not looking very hopeful, one is challenged to come up with other ways to attack the argument.

(1) Perhaps one can ask, Does the argument really establish vijñaptimātratā as its conclusion? Is the non-difference of object and cognition really tantamount to the idealist thesis that esse est percipi – an object cannot exist unless there is an awareness of it – as I maintained above?

Consider in this connection the one-liner the Vṛttikāra throws out at the end of his refutation of the Buddhist argument that cognition is ‘empty,’ that is, without any objective

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53 Zahavi 2005: 12. Note Zahavi’s claim about the ubiquity of this view: “One should not overestimate the homogeneity of the phenomenological tradition; like any other tradition, it spans many differences. Although phenomenologists might disagree on important questions concerning method and focus, and even about the status and existence of a self, they are in nearly unanimous agreement when it comes to the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Literally all the major figures in phenomenology defend the view that the experiential dimension is characterized by a tacit self-consciousness” (11). Kellner 2017: 21, interestingly enough, also refers to Sartre’s view of consciousness when discussing the so-called samvedana argument and cites Zahavi’s treatment of it, but she warns that the conclusion Dharmakīrti draws, that cognition cannot be of an external object, “is one that phenomenologists shun.” My point is simply that the SUN argument would force them to accept it.
support, because the form (ākāra) we are aware of belongs to the cognition, hence object (artha) and cognition (buddhi) are one:

Moreover, if one likes, if there is sameness of nature [of the object and the cognition], then it is the cognition that doesn’t exist, not the object, which is [after all] perceptible.\(^{54}\)

That is to say, if one proves the non-difference of object and cognition, then what is the true nature of the (one) thing they both are? Is it the object or the cognition? It seems that there is no way to decide this question. Hence, it would be illegitimate to draw the idealist conclusion, that it is only the cognition that is real, and that the object, although it appears to be something distinct from the cognition, is really just the cognition!\(^{55}\)

The Vṛttikāra, in posing this question, seems to be presupposing that the object has some determinate nature that the cognition could also turn out to have; presumably, it is physical in nature. In doing so, however, he ignores the stipulation I made at the beginning of my exposition of the SUN argument – but which should hold for any argument for idealism – that the status of the object must be left undecided at the outset in regard to whether it is an aspect of the cognition or not. For, once again, if one assumes that it is merely the object-form, then the argument proves very little; but equally, one cannot assume that it is, say, a physical object that could exist unperceived – the very opposite of what the argument is supposed to prove. Given that the SUN argument establishes that object and cognition are not different, the independent existence of the object – as, say, something physical – is ruled out by the argument itself and the only remaining possibility is that it belongs to the cognition. In other words, were it shown (by some other argument) that the object does exist independently of the cognition, then one might conduct an investigation into its nature, whether for instance it is something physical. Having proven, on the other hand, that object and cognition are not different, and the nature of the cognition as something internal and phenomenal being beyond doubt, the object acquires that nature as well.

(2) A different approach – one historically attempted by certain Brahmin authors – is to claim that the very thesis (pratijñā) of the argument is contradicted by perception. This objection probably originated with Kumārila but it is very forcefully stated, once again, by Śaṅkara:

\(^{54}\) Frauwallner 1968: 30.10–11: api ca kāmam ekarūpatve buddher evābhāvo, na tv arthasya pratyakṣasya satah.

\(^{55}\) Ernst Steinkellner presented this objection to me after I delivered a preliminary version of this paper at the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, in Heidelberg, in August, 2015. He did not refer to the passage in the Śābarabhāṣya, and I suspect he came up with it on his own. He went on to say, with a mischievous twinkle in his eye, that whenever he tries to think about the philosophical problems the Buddhist epistemologists are concerned with he finds himself faced with similar conundrums – and that is why he prefers not to think about them. The Buddha, perhaps, would have said the same thing. It was in order to avoid a similar problem that some Buddhist interpreters of the argument, e.g., Dharmottara, suggested that “non-difference” (abheda) should be understood to connote just the negation of difference and not also the affirmation of identity, that is, as a prasajyapratisedha rather than a paryudāsa. Otherwise, if cognition and object were the same, then the object-form being unreal (as some believed), the cognition would become unreal. See Matsumoto 1980: 281–278; Iwata I, 173–183.
The non-existence of an external object certainly cannot be ascertained. Why? Because it is apprehended (upalabdheḥ). For, for each cognition an external object is apprehended, as [for instance] a post, a wall, a cloth, [or] a pot. And something that is apprehended cannot not exist. Just as if someone who is eating, experiencing the satisfaction produced by the food for himself, were to say, “I am not eating,” or “I am not satisfied,” so if someone apprehending for himself an external object by means of contact with his sense faculty were to say, “I do not apprehend it, and it does not exist” – how could we take his statements seriously?

In other words, perception itself reveals to us objects outside consciousness. The externality of the object, the fact that it exists independently of being perceived, is given as part of the content of perception itself. As Kumārila puts it, the idea that arises, upon perceiving something, that one’s cognition has an external support, is never overturned – unlike, say, dreaming cognitions. Therefore, by implicit appeal to the principle of intrinsic validity that a cognition is true unless and until it is overturned by another, that idea is correct.

Moreover, the notion that a cognition has an external object is true, for it is a notion devoid of any contradiction, like the cognition [one has upon waking] that contradicts a dream.

This argument is more sophisticated than the mere prejudice against idealism that I dismissed as question-begging at the beginning of this essay, for it is an actual argument that provides us with a reason for believing that our conviction that we are perceiving things outside us is true. Nevertheless – and very briefly – I do not think this is a fatal objection to the SUN argument. Even if our conviction in the externality and independence of the objects we experience is firm and never overturned, there is still no explanation for how such a conviction could be true. We would, somehow, have to be able to step outside our minds – adopt a “God’s-eye view” – and observe that our perceptions are really being caused by physical objects. Needless to say, that is impossible.
(3) Having exhausted two initially promising avenues of attack against the SUN argument we are compelled to return to its premises and scrutinize them one last time. I do think that Premise 2, though not proven, is certainly defensible, and so I shall not attempt to investigate it further. There was, however, a point that came up at the end of my discussion of Premise 1’ that I did not pursue.

It certainly seems indisputable that if one thing can possibly be apprehended without the other, they are different. This is equivalent to the statement

If two things are not different, then they are necessarily apprehended together.

But is the converse, which is Premise 1’, true?

If two things are necessarily apprehended together, then they are not different.

I have offered in support of this principle the examples of the President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and an Indian Head Nickel and a Buffalo Nickel, but ended up doubting that it could be established a posteriori. I proposed that it be accepted as a priori justified instead, and appealed to the principle Galen Strawson (relying on Descartes) articulates in asserting the identity of experience, subject, and content of experience, namely (in one of its formulations):

If two things cannot possibly exist apart, so that there is only a conceptual distinction between them, then they are one.

The wording of this principle, however, is slightly different from Premise 1’ above. Premise 1’ refers to the apprehension of two things, whereas Strawson’s principle refers to the existence (or occurrence) of two things. Now, the question arises: Does this difference in wording constitute an important difference?

It seems that an opponent of the SUN argument could claim that it does. It may be the case that one never apprehends an object without apprehending the cognition that apprehends it, and that it is even inconceivable that one could. But why, exactly? It could indeed be because one can only apprehend an object by means of a cognition, and – as we have seen Sartre argue – all cognitions are self-aware, so that whenever one is aware of an object one is also aware of one’s cognition. Similarly, one can see an object by means of light, and light also illumines itself; when one sees an object one is aware of both the object and the illumination. Yet the object is different from the light that illuminates it.

The word “apprehension” in Premise 1’, then, introduces a condition that guarantees that object and cognition will seem invariably to co-occur. Precisely because it qualifies the co-occurrence of two things as their apprehended co-occurrence, then, Premise 1’ does not rule out categorically that an object could occur without a cognition. Indeed, that is precisely the possibility that the realist thinks she envisions.

experiences. As Abhinavagupta puts it, “…Since the external object is not an object of perception, one cannot establish any causal relation between this [external object] and anything else; as a consequence, the cognition [of this or that object] is not a kāryahetu in regard to this [object] to be inferred” (Ratié 2011: 485, slightly adjusted).
Again, it is Śaṅkara who states the problem about as succinctly as one could: “For this reason also, it is to be assumed that invariable co-apprehension, too, is caused by cognition and object being means and what is assisted (upāyopeyabhāvahetuka), not by their non-difference.” Here he is taking advantage of an opening left by Dharmakīrti himself. In his prose discussion of PVin 54ab Dharmakīrti clarifies that the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition establishes the non-difference of their nature, “because there is no [other] cause [of their co-apprehension] consisting in a connection” (pratibandhakāraṇābhāvāt). In the case of visible form and light, on the other hand, there is a connection consisting of the object’s acquiring the capacity to produce a cognition of visible form, or else the arising of a capacity of the sense to cognize it. It is this connection, and not their non-difference, that accounts for their co-apprehension – the light enables the apprehension of visible form.

What is most interesting is that Dharmakīrti does not think that there is any other factor that determines the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition other than their non-difference. The question is, Why not? Why couldn’t, as Śaṅkara suggests, their co-apprehension be due to the fact that the cognition is what enables us to apprehend the object?

I believe that this is the most serious objection that can be leveled against the SUN argument. Unfortunately, I do not have space to develop an adequate response to it, which would take us deep into difficult philosophical issues (especially in philosophy of mind) – and also, of necessity, back to the texts. For the Buddhists themselves, of course, were aware of this problem, which may have been first formulated by Śubhagupta: the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition may be due, not to their non-difference, but to the fact that the preceding causal complex causes them to arise at the same time as grāhya and grāhaka, respectively. And Dharmakīrti already indicates the line of response later Buddhist epistemologists will take: “The other object, however, which arises simultaneously [with the cognition] does not shape [the cognition], because it does not influence it; how would [the object] be manifest, which the cognition [in turn] does not shape with its own form?” That is to say, simultaneously arising entities cannot stand in a causal relationship to each other, any more than, say, “the right and left horns of a cow.” But more generally, and independently of the historical development of the arguments, the question is: How can there be any causal relation between cognition and physical object at all? That is, How can

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61 The argument that precedes this was that the fact that the cognition is similar in form to the object does not eliminate the object; to the contrary, it presupposes it, moreover the object is perceived externally (bahirupalabdhe ca viṣayasya) (BSBh 549.4–5).
62 atena eva sahopalambhāniyamo ’pi pratyayaviṣayayor upāyopeyabhāvahetuko nābhedaḥ hetuṣu ity abhyupagantavyam, BSBh 549.6–550.1.
63 Iwata I, 221: “denn es gibt keine in einer Verbindung bestehende Ursache [für die Ausschließlichkeit des Zusammenwahnomenmenswerdens].”
64 PVin 1 40.3–7. See Iwata I, 221–226. His presentation is rather dense and I am not sure how he understands the passage.
65 See BSKā 66; Kamalaśīla presents Šubhagupta’s position at TSP 694.9–20 (ad TS 2031), citing BSKā 66 and 81.
67 Cf. TSP 695.4–5: nāpi tadutpatteḥ sahavedanam, sahabhūtayoḥ kāryakāraṇābhyāvāt; Iwata I, 228–233. The analogy is from Nyāyakumudacandra, cited by Iwata I, 232.
consciousness illumine an object? Even if the (questionable) assumption that object and cognition arise simultaneously is abandoned, the realist has a lot of explaining to do! The defender of the SUN argument can defend the first premise simply by shifting the burden of proof: Explain to me how cognition, which is experienced as being non-material and non-spatial, can influence a physical thing to bring about the quality of its being manifest to us, or how could a physical object impose its form upon cognition?68

In summary, the SUN argument appears to be a strong one. It is not invalid; there is evidence in support of its premises; and initial, and even secondary, objections to the premises can be answered. Even though one may not be convinced by it, it is not easy to refute.69

References and abbreviations


BS Brahmasūtra. See BSBh.


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68 This is essentially what Jñānaśrīmitra does in his Advaitabinduparakarana. His line of investigation strikes one as an elaboration of the thought behind what is known as the samvedana argument: awareness is by nature just the “appearing in a certain way,” and like the awareness of awareness, can only be of awareness. See Kellner 2017: 20–22.

69 I believe that Berkeley’s arguments for idealism, for instance, are easier to refute.
Philosophical Reflections on the sahopalambhāniyama Argument


The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths

by
Masaki Tamura

Introduction

The Buddhist truth, which was directly realized by the Buddha, is beyond verbalization in itself. For it is precisely his personal, direct experience of reality. The Buddha, fully aware that the truth is ineffable, taught it to us by resorting to words. No Buddhist can deny the authority of the Buddha’s words. But the critical problem has arisen that they are susceptible to divergent interpretations. The following serves as an example. In the Daśabhūmikasūtra the Buddha states that the three realms are mind-only (cittamātra). According to Bhāviveka, the Yogācāra school interprets the statement to mean that an external object does not exist independently of the mind, while the Mādhyamika school interprets the same statement to mean that the self (ātman) serving as agent of an action and as enjoyer of the fruit of the action does not exist independently of the mind. The question comes up: What is the means for arriving at a real understanding of the Buddha’s statement? According to Bhāviveka, it is scripturally based inference or the inference (amunāna) which follows the Buddhist scriptures (āgamānuvidhāyin). Bhāviveka argues that the truth is beyond the reach of inference and that inference plays the role of removing the misconception about the truth which arises from the Buddha’s statement. The aim of this paper is to show how Bhāviveka considers the determination of the truth to be linked with its self-realization (pratyātmavedya) within the framework of the two truths theory.

It is to be noted that Bhāviveka uses the term anumāna “inference” without making a clear distinction between svārthānumāna “inference for oneself” and parārthānumāna “inference for others,” a distinction established by Dignāga. In this paper, accordingly, I will also render the term anumāna used by Bhāviveka as “inference” without specifying what the term means in a given context.

1 DBhS 98.8–9: cittamātraṃ idam yad idam traidhātukam /
2 ViṃśV 3.2–4: mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātraṃ vyavasthāpayate / cittamātraṃ bho jinaputraḥ yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtraḥ / … / mātram ity artha-pratīṣṭhārtham /
3 MHK V 28cd: sūtreṣu* cittamāroktih kartṛbhokṭinīṣedhataḥ **/ (*sūtreṣu ] L1, L2, Ec; sūtre ca H, S; ś[ā]streva SG; sastreva Ms. **cittamāroktih kartṛbhokṭinīṣedhataḥ ] L2, H, S, SG; cittamāroktikartṛ- bhokṭinīṣedhataḥ L1, Ec, Ms.)
4 It is well known that Dharmakīrti divides inference into two types: inference which functions by the force of reality (vastubalapravṛttānumāna) and inference which is based on scripture (āgamāśritānumāna). While the former is the inference whose object is imperceptible (paroṣkha), the latter is the inference whose object is completely imperceptible (atyantaparoṣkha). What Bhāviveka means by the term āgamaśritānumāna is the inference which functions only within the framework of the Buddhist āgama and which is in perfect accordance with it. On Dharmakīrti’s concept of āgamaśritānumāna, see Tillemans (1986; 1990: 23–35; 1999).
1. When to use inference

1.1 Bhāviveka begins the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā by giving the outline of the Yogācāras’ view of the nectar-like truth as emptiness of the grasped-grasper duality. After expounding the theories of “mind-only” (cittamātra), of asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāya, and of the three natures (trisvabhāva), Bhāviveka states the following kārikā.

MHK V 7: prajñāpāramitānītir iyaṃ sarvajñatāptaye /
na tūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhaparotpako naḥ 5 //

This doctrine propounded by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras [as interpreted by the Yogācāras]6 leads to the attainment of omniscience, while the doctrine as it is taken to intend to deny arising, cessation, and so forth does not.

An important point to note here is: Bhāviveka states that the Yogācāras’ view of emptiness and the Mādhyamikas’ view of emptiness are equally derived from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, which consist in the words of the Buddha. The Yogācāras might argue that only their view of emptiness can lead to the attainment of omniscience and that the Mādhyamikas misunderstand the Buddha’s words.

1.2 To this objection, Bhāviveka answers as follows:

MHK V 8–9: atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvam tāthāgataṃ vacaḥ /
āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate //
nāgamāntarasamidgadviparyastamatih parah /
tasmāt tatpratipattyartham tanmṛgyo yuktimannayah //

We will answer to this objection as follows. Since the teaching of a credible person (āpta) is authoritative, all the words of the Tathāgata[,] who is a credible person[,] are authoritative for us [Buddhists]. Indeed, a good person (bhadra) accepts all the words of the Tathāgata, while our opponent does not. For, the latter, under the influence of other traditions, holds that [what the Tathāgata states is] doubtful and wrong.7 Therefore, the [good person] must seek for a reasonable argument so that the opponent may accept the [Tathāgata’s words].

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5 -pratiṣedhaparo naḥ [H, S, SG, Ms; -pratiṣedhaparāyaṇā L1, L2, Ec.]
6 The Tarkajvālā explains how the Yogācāras’ doctrine is derived from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. TJ ad MHK V 7 [D202b1; P222b4–5]: sems de ni sems ma yin no zhes gsungs pa des ni gzung ba dang ’dzin pa med par bstan to // (“The statement ‘That mind is not the mind’ (*tac cittam acittam) means that there does not exist [the duality of] the grasper and the grasped (*grāhyagrāhakābhāva).’”) APS 3.18: tac cittam acittam /
7 Previous studies render the term āgamāntarasamidgadviparyastamatih as follows. Iida 1966: 83: “[O]ur opponent, whose judgement is confused and perverted by other āgama(s).” Hoornaert 2000: 90: “Others who have doubts and erroneous ideas from other scriptures.” Eckel 2008: 227: “the opponent, whose mind is confused and misled by other traditions.” Krasser 2012: 546: “The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures.”
There are a few points to note here. First, the Tathāgata is characterized as a credible person (āpta) and hence his teaching must be authoritative.

Secondly, there are two types of hearers of the Tathāgata’s words: one is “a good person” (bhadra) and the other is a person who is dubious of what the Tathāgata states and who conceives of it as wrong. The latter is under the influence of āgamas other than the Buddhist. It is important to note in this connection that Bhāviveka uses the term bhadra, which refers to a Bodhisattva who confers a benefit on others. According to the Tarkajvālā, Buddhist disciples are classified into four groups: (1) those who properly understand their own āgamas; (2) those who doubt what they state; (3) those who incorrectly understand what they state; (4) those who have insufficient intelligence to understand what they state. A Bodhisattva called bhadra belongs to the first group. Interestingly, Bhāviveka professes to be a bhadra who is bound to lead the second and third groups to the Great Enlightenment (mahābodhi), treating Yogācāra Buddhists as such groups of disciples.

Thirdly, the bhadra is said to be requested to seek for a reasonable argument (yukti-mannaya) in order to lead the disciples of groups (2) and (3), referred to by the word para “opponent” in the kārikā and characterized as those who are dubious of what the Tathāgata states and who conceive of it as wrong, to a correct understanding of the Tathāgata’s statement. The reasonable argument, according to the Tarkajvālā, consists in a three-membered inference, comprised of a thesis (pakṣa), a reason (hetu), and an example (dṛṣṭānta). The Tarkajvālā says:

\[ \text{TJ ad MHK V 9 [D203a1–2; P223a6–8]: } \text{de'i phyir de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa'i phyir / smra ba po rigs}^{11} \text{ pa dang ldan pa'i tshul phyogs dang / gtan tshigs dang / dpe'i skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa'i gnas su ma gyur pa'i mtha'i rigs pa'i lam btsal bar bya'o //} \]

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8 See, for example, AvŚ I.184.2–4.

9 In MHK IX 155 Bhāviveka makes the same point. MHK IX 155: skyon med rjes su dpag pa yis // rigs sam mi rigs ma dpayod par // blo ni gzhan gyis bskyed pa'i phyir // lung gzhan dag la the tshom za // (Lindtner 1999: 295: “If one does not investigate what is logical and what is not logical by means of an \textit{anumāna} free from faults, then one’s understanding will be formed by other [traditions] and therefore one will be in doubt about other traditions (āgama).”) TJ ad MHK IX 155 [D317a7–b2; P363a5–8]: slob ma ni nram pa gsam yod de / lung gzhan mthong na 'di ltar yin nam / ma yin zhes the tshom za ba'i blo can dang / lung gcig la rab tu thugs shing zhen par gyur nas gzhan la sens kyi (D; kyi P) sdang (D; ldang P) bar gyur cing phyin ci log tu thugs pa'i blo can dang / lung thams cad la the rigs pa yin nam / rigs pa ma yin zhes dpayod par mi nus pa'i riogs pa dang bral ba'i blo can no // de la lung gzhan gyis (D; gyi P) the tshom bskyed pa'am l phyin ci log tu zhen par gyur ba'i blo gang la yod pa de dag ni rjes su dpag pa med par rigs sam / mi rigs zhes dpayod par nus pa ma yin no //

10 Krasser 2012 argues that the word \textit{para} here refers to Dharmakīrti for the reason that the concept of āgama introduced by Bhāviveka (i.e., \textit{āptopadeśaprāmāṇya}, which echoes Dignāga’s definition of āgama: \textit{āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā}) is not shared by Dharmakīrti. I do not agree with him. This is still being debated, though. See also Hoornaert 2000: 90, n.1. There is no question that in the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Bhāviveka focuses on refuting the Yogācāra doctrine propounded only by Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga. Incidentally, Krasser 2012: 546 gives the following translation of the kārikās in question: “To this (pārvapakṣa of the Yogācāra) we reply: All the words of the Tathāgata are authoritative \textit{[pramāṇa]} for us, because the teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. A good one puts (these) into practice. The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures, does not. Therefore the path of reasoning \textit{[yuktimannaya]} should be followed by him in order to put these into practice.”

11 \text{rigs} J; \text{rig} P.
Therefore, for an opponent to accept the Tathāgata’s words completely, a proponent must seek for a reasonable argument, that is, a final logical method which has no faults in the thesis, the reason, and the example, and with which others find no fault.\footnote{See also MHK V 109.}

Needless to say, the argument in question is of the type \textit{parārthānumāna}. The following is an instance of such a reasonable argument:

\textbf{MHK V 36:} \textit{tasyālambanatā ceṣṭā tadābhamatihetutaḥ / rāgavad bādhyate tasmāt pratijñā te `numānataḥ //}

[Thesis:] The [color and form in the form of an aggregation of atoms] are an objective basis;

[Reason:] because they are the cause of a cognition in which they appear;

[Example:] like in the case of desire.

Therefore, your thesis is refuted through this inference.

Bhāviveka here intends to refute the theory of “mind-only” which the Yogācāra school establishes by means of introducing counter-arguments against the atomic theory.\footnote{According to the \textit{Tarkajvālā}, the theory is also contradicted by the Buddhist \textit{āgama}. TJ ad MHK V 36 [D210a1; P232a4]: \textit{rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga’i gnas dang / dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes gsungs pa’i lung dang yang ’gal lo} // (“[Your thesis] contradicts the scripture also which says that the supporting faculties and the objective basis of the five sense consciousnesses are aggregations [of atoms].”)}

In this connection, it is important to note that, according to Dignāga, \textit{parārthānumana} is what makes what one has seen known to others (\textit{svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana}), and what serves to give true information to others.\footnote{PS III 1ab: \textit{parārtham anumānam tu svadrṣṭārthapraκāśanam / -tvāt } L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -tvā SG, Ms.}

\section*{2. Role of inference}

Then what role can inference play in this context? First of all, Bhāviveka specifies that the truth is beyond the sphere of inference.

\textbf{MHK V 104:} \textit{tattvasyātarkaṃgamyaṭvā / nātas tarkeṇa dharmāṇāṃ gamyate dharmateti cet //}

[Objection:] The truth is not realized through logical reasoning (\textit{tarka}). [For] it is said [in the \textit{āgama}] that the real nature (\textit{dharmatā}) of existential factors is not realized through logical reasoning. Accordingly, there does not occur the understanding of the [truth] through inference.
According to Bhāviveka, the truth cannot be understood through inference. Nonetheless, Bhāviveka does not absolutely deny that inference plays a certain role in understanding the truth. Referring to the Buddhas, he states:

\[
\text{MHK V 105–106: } \text{ihānumānān nirdoṣād āgamanuvidhāyinah} / \\
kalpitāśeṣavividhavikalpaughanirākṛteḥ}^{16} // \\
sakalajñeyayātāmyam}^{17} ākāśasamacetasah \\
\text{jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt} //
\]

[Answer:] In our [Mādhyamikas’] view, the Buddhas, after negating a flood of conceptions of what has been conceptually constructed, through inference which has no fault and which accords with the Buddhist āgama, become those who have a mind like space.\(^{18}\) Then they see, by way of non-seeing, the true nature of all objects to be cognized, by means of a non-conceptual cognition. Bhāviveka here shows the process through which the Buddhas come to get an intuitive insight into the real nature of things. According to Bhāviveka, there are two stages. At the first stage the Buddhas resort to inference in order to get rid of a flood of conceptualizations. The inference is with no defects and accords with the Buddhist āgama. At the second stage they, with minds pure as space,\(^{19}\) intuitively, by way of non-seeing, grasp the real nature of things.

An important point to note is that Bhāviveka introduces inference in this way in the context of the realization of the truth. Clearly, for Bhāviveka inference, which consists in being svārthānumāna, has as its object not the truth itself but conceptualizations of what has been conceptually constructed. Hence he says the following:

\[
\text{MHK V 107: } \text{ato 'numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvaṃ pratipadyate} / \\
tattvajñānnapakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //}
\]

For this reason, the truth is not understood to be within the sphere of inference. That which is opposed to the knowledge of the truth is removed through inference.

Bhāviveka here specifies the role of inference. The role of inference is to rule out the opposite of the knowledge of the truth, that is, the conceptualizations of what has been conceptually constructed. Suppose that one makes the assertion “A certain thing is such and such” and another the assertion “The thing is not such and such.” If the two assertions obtain, there arises a doubt about the thing: Which assertion is true? Thus one must resort to inference.

\(^{16}\) -nirākṛte\] L1, L2, H, S, Ec, SG; -nirākṛte Ms; bsal mdzad nas Tib (TJ: bsal bar mdzad nas de’i ‘og tu).
\(^{17}\) sakala-\] L1, L2, H, S, SG. Ms; akala- Ec.
\(^{18}\) The mind which is free from conceptual construction is likened to space in pureness. See Tamura 2013.
\(^{19}\) See the footnote above.
The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths

MHK V 109: pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā\textsuperscript{20} pratipakṣanirākriyā / anniśiddhe vipakṣe ca nirvikalpā matiḥ kutaḥ //

How can one admit that what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is negated by mere assertion? In addition, if what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is not negated, how can there arise a non-conceptual cognition [of the truth]?

The structure envisaged by Bhāviveka is such that, when different understandings of the truth arise from the Buddha’s words, its real understanding is arrived at by means of removing its unreasonable understanding through inference; what is assumed to be a real understanding of the truth is simply its conceptual understanding, so that it must be denied to get an intuitive insight into the truth.

The following kārikā is interesting in that Bhāviveka explains why Buddhists, who follow the Buddha’s teaching, can have different views concerning the truth.

MHK V 108: āgamāntarabhedena bhedāyatāsu buddhiṣu / abhede ‘py āgamasyānyaḥ\textsuperscript{21} kaḥ parikṣākṣamo\textsuperscript{22} vidhiḥ //

Even if there is no difference in āgama among Buddhists, they have different understandings by the influence of a variety of āgamas other than their own. In this case, what else than inference could be the means to investigate the truth?

Buddhists follow the Buddhist āgama. But, if they are influenced by āgamas other than their own, they may have different views. In order to deny an opposite assertion, one must resort to inference; otherwise, a doubt about the truth could not be banished. The inference in question is one that is effective among those who accept the same āgama, that is, it is the inference that is scripturally based.

3. The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference

3.1 Two truths

In this way, an assertion different from one’s own is refuted by means of resorting to inference, and thus one’s own assertion turns out to be justified. Even then, the assertion obtains only in the sphere of conceptualization. For the assertion reflects only a conceptual understanding of the truth. Therefore Bhāviveka continues to bring in the viewpoint of the two truths theory.

MHK V 110: satyadvayam ataś coktaṃ muninā tattvadarśinā / vyavahāramaṃ samāsritya tattvārthādhigamo yataḥ //

\textsuperscript{20} pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā ] em.; pratijñāmātrakā neṣṭā L1, L2, H, S, Ec, SG, Ms; dam bcas tsam gyis ji ltar ’dod (*pratijñāmātrakā neṣṭā kutaḥ) Tib.

\textsuperscript{21} -ānyaḥ ] L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -ādyaḥ SG, Ms.

\textsuperscript{22} -kṣamo ] L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -kṣayo SG, Ms.
And, since the truth is realized in reliance on verbalization (vyavahāra), the Muni, who sees the truth, taught two truths.

The given context clearly reveals that the term vyavahāra refers to the Buddha’s verbalization of the truth, that is, the Buddha’s words about the truth, or the Buddha’s statement of the truth. The Buddha taught two truths. This must mean that there is one truth beyond and one within language.

Bhāviveka goes on to state that the understanding gotten from the statement of the truth is false since it has the truth for its objective basis.

MHK V 111: sālambanatvād vitathā tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ
tvād tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ
svapnādidhīvat tadgrāhyaṃ nātas tattvaṃ ca yuyate

[Thesis:] A cognition that has thus-ness as its objective basis (ālambana) is erroneous;
[Reason:] because it has an objective basis (sālambanatvāt);
[Example:] like a dream-cognition and so forth.
Thus, it is not tenable that the truth is what is grasped by such [a cognition].

In Bhāviveka’s view, a cognition which has an objective basis is a conceptual cognition, and is thus based on the dichotomy between a cognition and its object, and consists in judging.

The following kārikā is important in that Bhāviveka points out that the Buddha himself denies the truth within language.

MHK V 112: agrāhyo ’nabhilāpyaś ca dhīpracāravivarjitaḥ
dharma ukto munīndreṇa sa caivaṃ sati bādhyaṭe

The truth (dharma), which is beyond the sphere of cognitive activities, cannot be [conceptually] grasped or expressed in words. But the great sage speaks of the truth. This being the case, it is denied [by himself].

The reason that the Buddha denies the truth as it is spoken of is that the cognition stemming from the verbalization of the truth is merely conceptual, so that it grasps the truth only partially and not in its entirety. In reality the truth is beyond conceptualization and language.

3.2 The Buddha’s words and the Mādhyamikas’ understanding of the truth

The main intention of the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā is to oppose the Yogācāras’ understanding of the Buddha’s words about the truth. Bhāviveka ends the fifth chapter as follows:

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23 Hoornaert 2003: 168 and Eckel 2008: 296 render the term vyavahāra here as “conventional [truth]” and “conventional usage,” respectively. I do not think that they catch the point.
24 tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ ] L1, H, S, Ec, SG, Ms; tathatālambanādi api L2.
The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths

MHK V 113: 
\[ \text{ato yuktyāgamopetaṃ tattvaṃ yat prāgudāḥṛtam} \]
\[ \text{pariśyaṃaṇaṃ yuktyaivaṃ tad evāvyaḥataṃ sthitam} \]

For this reason, the truth which has been described before\(^{26}\) and which is well founded on logical reasoning and āgama remains undenied even if it is investigated through logical reasoning in this way.

Let us note that there are two different domains where we are involved in the understanding of the truth. In one domain logical reasoning based on āgama works and in the other the truth is beyond conceptualization and language and independently realized by way of non-seeing. Bhāviveka states here that in the former domain the truth as conceived of by the Mādhyamikas cannot be invalidated.

It is important to note in this connection that the Tarkajvālā cites MHK III 266 in commenting on the present kārikā.

MHK III 266: 
\[ \text{jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ} \]
\[ \text{notpadyate tad atulyaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavido viduḥ} \]

Those who know the truth call “the unequalled truth” the truth with reference to which there does not arise even a non-conceptual cognition since an entity to be cognized is absolutely not established.

The Buddha verbalized the truth into which he had achieved intuitive insight. From the Buddha’s statement referring to the truth the Mādhyamikas, though at a conceptual level, correctly understand the truth, which is well founded on logical reasoning and āgama. To the extent that the truth as the Mādhyamikas understand it accords with the truth as the Buddha speaks of it, the Mādhyamikas’ view of the truth cannot be disputed by the Yogācāras. Needless to say, the truth which the Buddha saw directly consists in svabhāvaśūnyatā, namely that all existential factors are empty of an intrinsic essential nature.\(^{27}\)

4. Conclusion

Buddhism originated in the Buddha’s verbalization of the truth that he directly experienced. This is why for Buddhism the two truths theory, that there is one truth beyond and one within language is a logical necessity.

In common to all Buddhists is the acceptance of the Buddha’s words. But it is not always the case that the same statement brings about the same understanding of its meaning. According to Bhāviveka, a Buddhist, even if following the Buddhist āgama, is subject to the influence of āgamas other than the Buddhist. Thus Buddhists have different understandings of what the Buddha stated. The Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools hold different views of the truth, emptiness, even though both base themselves on the Buddhist āgama. Bhāviveka explicitly states that he feels it is necessary to give the Yogācāras a clear understanding

\(^{26}\) According to the Tarkajvālā, Bhāviveka describes the Mādhyamika truth in the third chapter of MHK. See TJ ad MHK V 113 [D227a5–6; P253b4–6].

\(^{27}\) MHK III 115: svabhāvaśūnyatābodhān ... /
of what the Buddha states (pratipattyartham), and that there is no other means than inference for achieving this purpose. In his view, the function of inference is just to rule out misunderstandings of the Buddha’s statements and not to give an intuitive insight into the truth. Bhāviveka never says that inference is a means to know directly the Buddhist truth of emptiness. If the Yogācāras’ understanding of the Buddha’s statement is refuted, the Mādhyamikas’ understanding of it alone will remain as the only one true to the Buddhist āgama. Furthermore, it is said that in Bhāviveka’s time a sectarian consciousness began to develop among Buddhists. It is in this context that Bhāviveka brings in the concept of āgamaṇvidhāyyanumāna, the inference which works within the framework of the Buddhist āgama.

References and abbreviations


Iida 1966 Sh. Iida, Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka. In: Kanakura Hakushi Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū (1966) 79–96.


MHK  Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā.
MHK (Ec)  M.D. Eckel, ed. See Eckel 2008.
MHK (L1)  Chr. Lindtner, ed. See Lindtner 1995.
MHK (L2)  Chr. Lindtner, ed. See Lindtner 2001.
MHK (Ms)  Manuscript of MHK. See Jiang 1991.
MHK (S)  A. Saito, ed. See Saito 2007.
MHK (SG)  V.V. Gokhale’s Copy of MHK (Ms). See Bahulkar 1994.
The Concept of *sādhana* in Chinese Buddhist Logic  
by  
Mingjun Tang

1. Introduction

In his article “More on *parārthānumāna*, theses and syllogisms” ([1991] 1999), Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans gave us a brief account of the interpretation of *sādhana* (means of proof) in Dharmakīrti’s works as well as in the tradition following him. In this article, he showed us, on one hand, the development concerning this concept in Dignāga’s thought from the NMu to the PS, and on the other hand, insightfully explained the theoretical significance of this development through a comparison with the Aristotelian syllogism. In short, in Vasubandhu’s logical works as well as in Dignāga’s NMu, the *sādhana* was identified with the linguistic expression of the three members, i.e., the thesis (*pakṣa*), the reason (*hetu*) and the example (*drṣṭānta*). In Dignāga’s PS as well as in Dharmakīrti’s tradition, it was identified only with the reason and the example. This exclusion of the thesis-statement from *sādhana* highlights a particular Buddhist conception of what is decisive for the acceptability of an argument, one which contrasts with the principles governing the Aristotelian syllogism. The decisive or probative factor in an argument, according to this new conception of *sādhana*, is the truth of the premises, and not merely the logical form of an inference.

The present paper, as an extended observation based on Tillemans’ abovementioned article as well as on an earlier seminal article of Prof. Masahiro Inami,¹ will show that in the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic, the concept of *sādhana* (*neng li* 能立) was consistently interpreted as the reason-statement together with the statements of the positive and negative example, or directly as the *trairūpya*, the triple characterization of a correct reason. This interpretation of *sādhana* was explicitly ascribed to Dignāga himself as one significant innovation over earlier masters. Although the Chinese tradition appears to have proclaimed its theoretical exploration as exclusively based on the NP and the NMu, its novel interpretation of *sādhana* in fact only finds support in the PS. Like the tradition following Dharmakīrti, Chinese interpreters following Dignāga also took to various hermeneutic strategies in order to harmonize their new interpretation with the old one from the NP and the NMu, which is also found in various pre-Dignāgan Buddhist texts on logic.

In Chinese sources one also comes across the view that Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga held the new interpretation instead of the old one. Moreover, these logicians were reported in Chinese sources to have interpreted the “incompleteness” (*nyūnatā*) of

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an argument as referring to the incompleteness of the three characteristics, and not as indicating the incompleteness of the three statements that constitute a proof. This new interpretation of nyūnatā together with the above new interpretation of sādhana was inherited by Chinese logicians. In light of this new interpretation of nyūnatā, the present paper tries to demonstrate once more, “from a slightly different angle” than Tillemans, that it does not just reveal a terminological difference, but that it points to more fundamental issues at stake and indicates “how logic works” for Buddhist thinkers.

2. The twofold meaning of sādhana in the NP and the NMu

The literal meaning of sādhana is “means of proof.” As we know, sādhana is one of the eight topics in the basic framework of the NP. The eight topics are: (1) demonstration (sādhana), (2) refutation (dūṣaṇa), (3) pseudo-demonstration (sādhanaḥbhāsa, si neng li 似能立), (4) pseudo-refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa, si neng po 似能破), (5) perception (pratyakṣa, xian liang 现量), (6) inference (anumāna, bi liang 比量), (7) pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa, si xian liang 似现量) and (8) pseudo-inference (anumānābhāsa, si bi liang 似比量):

NP 1: sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇam caiva sābhāsaṃ parasaṃvide / pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātmasaṃvide //
NPCh 11a28–29: 能立與能破 及似唯悟他，現量與比量 及似唯自悟。

Demonstration (sādhana), refutation (dūṣaṇa) and their pseudo-forms (ābhāsa) are for the understanding of others. Perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and their pseudo-forms are for the understanding of oneself.3

The sādhana is the foremost among the eight topics. The sections on sādhana and sādhanaḥbhāsa are the most extensive ones in the whole text of the NP. In this context, the term sādhana refers to a three-membered argument and stands in contrast with dūṣaṇa (lit. “means of refutation”). While the former is aimed at proving a view, the latter serves the purpose of refutation. Therefore, we could translate the term sādhana when used in this sense as “demonstration” or rather “argument,” i.e., the linguistic expression of a proof.4

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3 Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 120.
4 The anumānasādhana distinction in the NP (cf. above NP 1) comes approximately to the inference/argument distinction in today’s logic. I discussed this in Tang 2020: 414–416. In short, by inference we mean nowadays “a process of linking propositions by affirming one proposition on the basis of one or more other propositions.” By argument we mean “a structured group of propositions, reflecting an inference” (Copi and Cohen 2005: 7). The working of an inference does not necessitate the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An inference is only a process of pure thinking, regardless of whether or not it is expressed linguistically. However, the working of an argument necessitates the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An argument should spell out an inference in certain linguistic forms which are suitable to be understood by others. Hence, I suggest “argument” as an alternative translation of sādhana in addition to the traditional translation “demonstration.” A three-membered sādhana is called a three-membered argument throughout this paper.
The three members or statements making up a sādhana are the thesis (pakṣa, zong 宗), the reason (hetu, yin 因) and the example (dṛṣṭānta, yu 喻). The last one normally consists of two parts, the positive example (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, lit. “example by similarity,” tong fa yu 同法喻) and the negative example (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta, lit. “example by dissimilarity,” yi fa yu 異法喻):

A three-membered sādhana can consequently be written in its full form as follows:

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5 Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 120.
6 Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 121–122. The phrase in the last square brackets is added in the Chinese translation.
The Concept of śādhana in Chinese Buddhist Logic

Proof (1)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thesis:</td>
<td>Sound is impermanent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason:</td>
<td>for sound is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Whatever is produced is observed to be imper-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manent, like a pot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Whatever is permanent is observed to be not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>produced, like ether (ākāśa).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the NMu, the three-membered śādhana together with its various pseudo-forms is also the foremost topic. The same idea of śādhana as in the NP is found in the exposition of the basic theoretical framework in NMu 1, together with the autocommentary:

NMu k. 1a: pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam
宗等多言能立。

The śādhana is the [three] statements consisting of the thesis and the other [two factors, i.e., the reason and the example].

NMu 1.1: 由宗、因、喻多言，辯說他未了義故，此多言於《論式》等說名能立。又以一言說能立者，為顯總成一能立性 (sādhanam iti caikavacananirdeśāḥ samastasādhanatvakhyaśpanārthaḥ),7由此應知隨有所聞名能立過。

Since the object [yet] unknown to someone else is made evident [to that person] by these [three] statements consisting of the thesis, the reason and the example, these [three] statements are said to be the śādhana in the Vādavidhāna and other [logical works of Vasubandhu]. Now, the expression “śādhanam” [here in k. 1a] is in singular form so as to show that the śādhana is a united [whole, even though it is comprised of three statements]. Thus it should be understood that the lack [of any of these statements] is called a fault of the śādhana.8

In all the passages cited above, the grammatical phenomenon that the word vacana (statement, yan 言) appears in plural form (vacanāni/vacanair, duo yan 多言) betrays the view of the NP and the NMu that a śādhana has more than two members, that is, specifically three.

In both the NP and the NMu, the term śādhana is also used in a more limited sense for the reason(-property), i.e., the predicate of the reason-statement, in the above proof “producedness” or “being produced” (kṛtakatva). Now, the śādhana is in contrast with sādhya (suō li 所立), the property to be proved or the inferable property, i.e., “impermanent” in the above proof. The former property possesses the force of proving and the latter property is to be proved by it to be present in the subject, i.e., “sound.” In this sense, the term śādhana, when used as a substantive, can be translated as “means of proof;” when used as an adjective, it can be rendered as “proving.” The translation of śādhana as probans and sādhya as

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7 Inami 1991: 76, n. 33; cf. NPT 19,5–6.
The meaning of *sādhana* can be found in the NP’s classification of four types of contradictory reason (*viruddha*, *xiang wei* 相違), and as well as in that of ten types of pseudo-example (*drštántabhāśa*, *si yu* 似喻):

NP 3.2.3: *viruddhaḥ catuhprakāraḥ tadyathā / (1) dharmasvarūpa-viparīta-sādhanaḥ / (2) dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhanaḥ / (3) dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhanaḥ / (4) dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhanaṁ ceti //

NP Ch 12a15–16: 相違有四，謂法自相相違因，法差別相違因，有法自相相違因，有法差別相違因等。

The contradictory [reasons] are of four kinds, as follows: (1) the [reason] proving the opposite of the own form of the [inferable] property, (2) the [reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the [inferable] property, (3) the [reason] proving the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor, and (4) the [reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor.9

NP 3.3–3.3.2: *drštántabhāśo dvividhaḥ / sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca // tatra sādharmyeṇa ātvaḍ drštántabhāṣah paścaprakāraḥ / tadyathā / (1) sādhanadharma-siddhāḥ / (2) sādhyadharmasiddhāḥ / (3) ubhayadharmasiddhāḥ / (4) ananvayāḥ / (5) viparītānvayaṁ ceti // ... vaidharmyeṇāpi drštántabhāsah paścaprakāraḥ / tadyathā / (1) sādhyāvyāvṛttah / (2) sādhanāvyāvṛttah / (3) ubhayāvyāvṛttah / (4) avyatirekāḥ / (5) viparītavyatirekāḥ ceti //

NP Ch 12b1–4: 似同法喻有其五種: 一、能立法不成, 二、所立法不成, 三、俱不成, 四、無合, 五、倒合。似異法喻亦有五種: 一、所立不遣, 二、能立不遣, 三、俱不遣, 四、不離, 五、倒離。

The pseudo-example is of two kinds, by similarity or by dissimilarity. Of these, first, the pseudo-example by similarity is of five kinds, as follows: (1) [an example where] the proving property (*sādhanadharma*) is not established, (2) [an example where] the inferable property (*sādhyadharma*) is not established, (3) [an example where] both [properties] are not established, (4) [an example] without [the statement of] positive concomitance and (5) [an example where] the positive concomitance is reversed. ... Second, the pseudo-example by dissimilarity is of five kinds, as follows: (1) [an example where] the inferable property is not excluded, (2) [an example where] the proving property is not excluded, (3) [an example where] both [properties] are not excluded, (4) [an example] without [the statement of] negative concomitance and (5) [an example where] the negative concomitance is reversed.10

In the Chinese translation of the name for each contradictory reason, the word *sādhana* is consistently rendered as “reason” (*yin* 因). The Indian commentator Haribhadra also follows the same technique in glossing this word as *hetu* (reason). When commenting on the first kind of contradictory reason, i.e., the *dharmasvarūpa-viparīta-sādhana*, he says:

NPT 39,4–5: *atra dharmasvarūpaṃ nityatvam / ayaṃ ca hetus tadviparītam nityatvam sādhayati tenaivāvinābhūtatvāt /*

Here the own form of the [inferable] property is permanence. Now, this reason (*hetuḥ*) proves (sādhayati) the opposite (viparīta) of that [own form of the inferable property (dharmasvarūpa)], i.e., impermanence, because [it] is invariably concomitant only with that [opposite property].

When commenting on the word *sādhanadharmāsiddha* as the name leading the NP list of pseudo-examples, Haribhadra says:

NPT 44,5–11: *sādhanadharmo hetur asiddho nāstīti bhanyate / tataś ca sādhanadharmo ’siddho ’smin so ’yaṃ sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ / … evaṃ sādhyobhayadhmāsiddhayor api bhāvanīyam /*

That is to say, the proving property, the reason, is not established, i.e., does not exist. Hence, this *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is that in which the proving property is not established. … With regard to the *sādhyadhmāsiddha* and *ubhayadharmāsiddha*, it should also be thought in this manner.

Haribhadra analyzes the term *sādhanadharmāsiddha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, and identifies the *sādhanadharma* (proving property) with *hetu* (reason). On the term *sādhanadharma*, the NPVP explains further that: “This is both *sādha* and property. Thus *sādhanadharma*. What does it mean? The reason.” Here, the *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is analyzed as a *karmadhāraya* compound. It refers to the property which is resorted to as the means of proof (sādha) in an argument and therefore possesses the force of proving. When commenting on NP 3.3.1.(4) on *ananvaya*, Haribhadra directly glosses *sādha* as *hetu*:

NPT 46,7–9: *vinānvayena vinā vyāptidarśanena sādhyasādhanayoḥ sādhyahetvor ity arthah sahabhāva ekatrayavittimātram / pradarśyate kathyate akhyāyate / na vīpsayā sādhyānugato hetur iti /

The meaning is: without [the statement of] positive concomitance, i.e., without the presentation of the pervasion, merely the occurrence in one place, of the inferable and the *sādha*, i.e., of the inferable and the reason (*hetu*), is indicated, i.e., is stated or announced, but not the reason as followed by the inferable in accordance with the requirement of pervading.

In the NMu classification of the pseudo-example, the name *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is replaced by *sādhanāsiddha*, hence *sādhanadharma* by *sādha*. Here, the *sādha* is also used in the sense of reason(-property):

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11 See also NPT 47,9; 47,18: *sādhanadharmo hetuḥ /
12 NPVP 109,21–22: *sādhanam̐ ca sa sa ḍharmasvarūpa / ka ity āha – hetur iti /
NMu 5.3: 「餘此相似」 (k. 11d) 是似喻義。何謂此餘? 謂於是處所立、能立及不同品，雖有合、離而顛倒說。或於是處不作合、離，唯現所立、能立俱有，異品俱無。如是二法或有隨一不成、不遣，或有二俱不成、不遣。

That “all other [kinds of example] different from them are pseudo-[examples]” means the pseudo-example. Which are those other [kinds] different from them? They are [examples] where there is [the statement of] the positive concomitance or [of] the negative concomitance with regard to sāḍhya, sādhana or asapākṣa (i.e., an individual used as negative example), nevertheless, it is stated in reversed manner; or [examples] where only the co-occurrence of sāḍhya and sādhana or [only] the co-absence [of sāḍhya and sādhana] from vipakṣa is indicated, [but] without the statement of the positive concomitance or of the negative concomitance. [Pseudo-examples also include such cases where] with regard to these two properties [i.e., the sāḍhya and the sādhana], either (anyatara) [of them] is not established (asiddha) or not excluded (avvāyṛtta), or both (ubhaya) are not established or not excluded.

The word sādhana (sgrub pālsgrub par byed pālsgrub byed) does not occur in the corresponding PS IV kk. 13–14, nor in the PSV on these verses:

The pseudo-form of that [i.e., example] is [an example where] the reason (gtan tshigs), the sāḍhya or both are not established in or not excluded from the asapākṣa (mi mthun phyogs), or [where] the concomitance is reversed in two ways [i.e., in either positive or negative fashion], or [where] the concomitance is absent. (k. 13)

[An example where] the [inferential] sign (rtags) is not found and so on, or [where] the positive concomitance or the other [i.e., the negative concomitance] is reversed, is not a [correct] example. The [mere] aggregation [of two properties in one place] is not a [logical] connection, because the [logical] connection is [yet] not explicated. (k. 14)

The term sādhana has here been completely replaced by the words gtan tshigs (hetu) and rtags (liṅga = hetu); the above cited passage NPṬ 46,7–9 also demonstrates that these terms are synonymous. Therefore, we can see that the terms sādhana and hetu are interchangeable as referring to the reason-property.

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16 See Kitagawa 1965: 527,12–529.9; 277–281.
17 K 152a5–6, 152b4–5: gtan tshigs bsgrub bya gnis ldan min // rjes 'gro llog pa gnis dag ste // de'i mi mthun phyogs bsal dan // rjes 'gro med pa der snañ ba'o // (k. 13) rtags med sogs dahn rjes 'gro sogs // phyin ci log pa dpe ma yin // né bar bsdu ba ma 'brel ba // 'brel pa rab tu ma bstan phyir // (k. 14); V 63a3–4, 63a7–b1: gtan tshigs bsgrub bya gnis ka med // mi mthun phyogs las med ma byas // rjes 'gro phyin log rnam pa gnis // ltar snañ rjes 'gro med pa'añ yin // (k. 13) rtags med sogs dahn dpe med dan // rjes 'gro phyin ci log la sogs // 'brel par ma bstan pa yi phyir // ñer 'jal 'brel pa can ma yin // (k. 14) (Kitagawa 1965: 527,12–15; 529,5–8)
In the NMu, the term *sādhanahetu (neng li yin 能立因) must be considered as another relevant term relating to sādhana:

NMu 8: 「餘所說因生」(k. 15b)¹⁸者，謂智是前智餘。從如所說能立因生，是緣彼義。

The sentence “[the inference (anumāna) which is different [from perception] is derived from the reason as presented [above in the discussion of sādhana]” means that the [inferential] cognition is different from the above [perceptual] cognition. It is derived from the *sādhanahetu as presented above. That is to say, it is based on that [*sādhanahetu].¹⁹

Although I have found no Sanskrit material to confirm a karmadhāraya interpretation of this term, it is highly probable that if it were in Sanskrit, must be construed in the same way as the term sādhanadharma: the former refers to a reason which possesses the force of proving, while the latter refers to a property which possesses the same force. Both terms refer to the reason(-property). The PS has a corresponding definition of inference for oneself (svārthānumāna):

PS II k. 1a–b: svārthāṃ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk /²⁰

[Inference] for oneself consists in observing an object through a triply characterized sign.²¹

Here, the term *sādhanahetu has been replaced by liṅga,²² and liṅga is just another name of hetu. Now, we have a series of synonyms: sādhana, sādhanadharma, *sādhanahetu, hetu and liṅga. All of them refer to the reason(-property) in this connection.

With this survey, we have exhausted almost all the occurrences of sādhana in the NP and the NMu. In both texts, the term sādhana sometimes refers to a “demonstration,” i.e., a three-membered argument, and at other times the reason(-property). There is no third option.

3. The new interpretation following the Pramāṇasamuccaya

Therefore, it seems surprising or even strange to some critical thinkers²³ that Chinese classical commentators consistently proclaim the sādhana to be the reason-statement

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¹⁹ Cf. Tucci 1930: 52; Katsura [5]: 91.
²⁰ Katsura [5]: 92.
²² See also NP 4: anumāṇam liṅgād arthadārasanam / liṅgam punas trirūpam uktam / NP_ch 12b29–c2: 说比量者，謂藉眾相而觀於義。相有三種，如前已說。“Inference is the observation of an object through an [inferential] sign. The sign has been said [above] to have three characteristics.” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 128. The word *sādhanahetu is also recurrent in NMu 10.14 on prāptyaprāptisama and ahetusama. In the corresponding PSV passage, it has been replaced completely by gian tshigs (hetu). Cf. Katsura [7]: 46, nn. 3–4.
together with the positive and negative example-statements, or directly to be the trairūpya
(yin san xiang 因三相), the triple characterization of a correct reason. Since the statements
are three, and the characteristics of a correct reason are also three, the nature of sādhana
as being three-membered is still perfectly preserved in this interpretation. Moreover, this
interpretation of sādhana is ascribed to Dignāga himself as one significant innovation over
earlier masters. Kuiji 窺基 (632–682 CE) says:

YMDS 37–38 / 93a29–b2: 陳那能立，唯取因、喻，古兼宗等。…宗由
言顯，故名能立。

The sādhana of Dignāga only includes the reason and the example, while in
early times the thesis and others are also included. … The thesis is elucidated
through the statements [of the reason and two examples]. Therefore, [the
reason-statement and two example-statements] are named sādhana.

YMDS 50 / 93c28–94a3: 古師又有說四能立，謂宗及因、同喻、異喻。
世親菩薩《論軌》等說能立有三：一宗、二因、三喻。以能立者，必
是多言。多言顯彼所立便足，故但說三。

The early masters also talk about four [members of] sādhana. They are the
thesis, the reason, the positive example and the negative example. The Bodhi-
sattva Vasubandhu in the Vādavidhi and other treatises says that there are
three [members of] sādhana, i.e., (1) the thesis, (2) the reason and (3) the
example. This is because the sādhana is necessarily comprised of more than
two statements, and [sādhana of] more than two statements is already adequate
for elucidating that which is to be proved (sādhya).24 Therefore, only three
[members] are asserted [by him].25

YMDS 52 / 94a14–17: 今者陳那因、喻為能立，宗為所立。自性、差別
二並極成，但是宗依，未成所諍。合以成宗，不相離性，方為所諍，
何成能立？故能立中，定除其宗。

Now, Dignāga [asserts that] the reason and the example are means of proof
(sādhana), and the thesis is what is to be proved (sādhya). Both the subject
(*svabhāva, zì xìng 自性) and the property (viśeṣa, cha bie 差別) [i.e., the
qualificand and the qualifier in the thesis-statement,] have been well established
(prasiddha, ji cheng 極成) [i.e., accepted by both the proponent and the
opponent]. They are merely two substrata of the thesis-statement (*paksāśraya,

24 Note, Vasubandhu’s concept of sādhya is different from that of Dignāga in that only the inferable
property but not the whole thesis-statement is said to be what is to be proved. Moreover, Vasubandhu’s
concept of paksā is also slightly different from that of Dignāga in that only the subject is said to be
pratijñālaṅkaṇanam, me dañ sa bon dañ mi rtog pa ŋid mnam rjes su dpag par bya ba ŋid du dper brjod
pa’i phyir chos tams rjes su dpag par bya ba ŋid du mñon par ’dod do ’dus rtogs par bya'o. “The paksā
is the object one wishes to investigate. The definition of proposition (pratijñā) is that the proposition is
the expression of what is to be proved (sādhya). Examples for the definition of what is to be inferred
(anumeya = sādhya) is said to be fire, seed and impermanence. Hence, it shall be understood that only
the property (dharma) is intended [here] as the definition of anumeya.” Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 16.

The Concept of *sādhana* in Chinese Buddhist Logic

*zong yi* (宗依), but not [by themselves] the point under disputation. Only when [they are] combined together so as to produce a thesis-statement, the invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*, *bu xiang li xing* 不相離性) [of the subject with the property as expressed in the whole thesis-statement] then constitutes the point under disputation. So, how can these [two substrata] be the *sādhana*? Therefore, the thesis shall certainly be excluded from the *sādhana*.

Here, the reason-statement together with the example-statement is identified as *sādhana*. This time, the *sādhana* is in contrast with *sādhya*, the thesis-statement, in that the reason and the example are means of proof and the thesis is merely what is to be proved. Although the *sādhana* here is also in contrast with *sādhya*, the *sādhana* and the *sādhya* here are different from the interpretation of the NP and the NMu where they are taken only as the reason-property and the inferable predicate. The *hetu* in Indian logic can mean either the whole reason-statement or only the reason-predicate in that statement. Hence, the exegetical movement from the reason-predicate to the whole reason-statement is not prima facie breaking news. Nevertheless, the implied significance of this movement is very important. It concerns not a mere terminological shift, but a shift of perspective in the basic consideration of what makes a good argument good. When used in this new sense, the term *sādhana* may be translated as “probative factor.”

In order to harmonize this new interpretation with the NP and NMu passages where the *sādhana* is clearly said to have more than two statements – i.e., three members [26] – the example is carefully counted as two members, i.e., the positive example and the negative example. The reason together with these two example-statements can then easily be interpreted as the three members of the *sādhana*. Kuiji continues:

YMDS 53 / 94a17–21: 問：然依聲明，一言云「婆達喃」，二言云「婆達泥」，多言云「婆達」。27 今此能立，「婆達」聲音。既並多言，
云何但說因、喻二法以為能立？答：陳那釋云：因有三相，一因、二喻，豈非多言？非要三體。由是定說宗是所立。

Question: However, according to Sanskrit grammar (*śabdavidyā*, *sheng ming* 聲明), a single statement is called *vacanam*, a pair of statements is called *vacane*, [and] more than two statements are called *vacanāni*. Here, the *sādhana* is mentioned in the form *vacanāni*. Since it is of more than two statements, why do you only assert the reason-statement and the example-statement, these two, as *sādhana*? Reply: Dignāga explains that the reason has three characteristics, i.e., the reason and the two examples. Aren’t they three statements [in all]? It is not required that there shall be three separate substrata (*san ti* 三體). Hence, the thesis shall be definitely asserted to be [merely] what is to be proved (*sādhya*).

Furthermore, when commenting on the last sentence in the NP 2.4 passage cited above (唯此三分, 說名能立), Kuiji says:

26 See the above cited passages NP 2, NMu k. 1a and NMu 1.1.
27 The transcription of *vacanāni* given by Zenju 善珠 (723–797 CE) is *po da na ni* 婆達那膩 (IRMS 237a28) instead of the *po da* 婆達 given in this passage. *po da* 婆達 must be a corruption of *po da na ni* 婆達那膩. The IRMS is a running commentary on Kuiji’s YMDS.
YMDS 304; 113b25–29:《理門論》云: 「又比量中, 唯見此理: 若所比處, 此相審定(遍是宗法性也); 於餘同類, 念此定有(同品定有性也); 於彼無處, 念此遍無(異品遍無性也)。是故由此生決定解。」 (NMu 5.5) 即是此中唯舉三能立。

The NMu says: “and in an inference, only the following rule is to be observed: when the [inferential] sign (liṅga, xiang 相 = hetu) is ascertained in the subject of inference (anumeya, suo bi 所比), that is, the reason is pervasively a property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva, bian shi zong fa xing 遍是宗法性), and in cases other than [the subject], we remember its being [certainly] present in cases similar to that [subject in possessing the inferable property], that is, the reason is certainly present in similar instances (sapakṣe sattvam, tong pin ding you xing 同品定有性), and its being [pervasively] absent where that [inferable property] is absent, that is, the reason is pervasively absent from dissimilar instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam, yi pin bian wu xing 異品遍無性), then knowledge of this [subject] is generated.” This means the same as [when it] is [claimed] here that only three [members of] a sādhana are presented.

Here, the three members of sādhana are further identified with the three characteristics of a correct reason, the alleged basic criteria for a good argument in Buddhist logic. The presupposition made here is that the reason-statement and especially the positive and negative example-statements are nothing but the expression of the three characteristics, in the sense that these three statements are true if and only if the three characteristics are fulfilled.

This kind of interpretation of sādhana, though without being supported in the NP and the NMu, can indeed be supported from the PS, Dignāga's magnum opus and his final work. Recent studies by Tom J. F. Tillemans have already showed that although in the NMu, Dignāga did consider the thesis-statement to be a member of sādhana, “in PS Dignāga did not consider the thesis-statement as being a sādhana, but nevertheless he most likely allowed its presence in a parārthānumāna.” As pointed out by Tillemans, one passage from PS fits quite well with the intention to exclude the thesis-statement from sādhana while nonetheless letting it remain in the arrangement of a proof:

PSV ad PS III k. 1cd: tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ // (k. 1cd)

yan lag rnams la rjes su dpag par bya ba bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de ni kho bo cag gi sgrub byed ņid du bstan pa ni ma yin te de ņid las the tson skye ba’i phyir

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29 Cf. Tucci 1930: 44; Katsura [4]: 74. The adverbs “certainly” (ding 定) and “pervasively” (bian 遍) qualifying “being present” (astițva, you 有) and “being absent” (nāstițva, wu 無) respectively are probably added in the Chinese translation. Cf. the parallel passage in PSV IV (K 150b5–7): rjes su dpag pa la yin tshul ’di yin par mthoṅ ste / gal te rtags ’di rjes su dpag par bya ba la rjes par bzuṅ na la / gzan du de dan rigs mthun pa la yod pa ņid daṅ l med pa la med pa ņid dran par byed pa de’i phyir ’di’i šes pa bskyed par yin no // (Kitagawa 1965: 521,8–13)

The Concept of śādhanā in Chinese Buddhist Logic

The presentation of what is to be inferred (anumeya) is held to concern the goal of the reason. (k. 1cd)

Among the members, the presentation of what is to be inferred is not presented by us to be the śādhanā, because doubt will arise from it. However, because it concerns the goal of the reason, it [i.e., the thesis,] is to be established by that [i.e., the reason].

Besides the exclusion of the thesis-statement from śādhanā, the equivalence of the śādhanā with the expression of three characteristics can also be found in the PS:

PSV ad PS III k. 1: trirūpalingākhyānāṃ parārthānumānam.

Inference for others (parārthānumāna) is the communication of a triply characterized sign (liṅga).

The idea of assigning the reason together with the positive and negative examples to express the three characteristics can be found in the NMu as well as in the PS:

NMu 5.6: 若爾喻言應非異分，顯因義故。事雖實爾，然此因言唯為顯了是宗法性，非為顯了同品、異品有性、無性，故須別說同、異喻言。

[Objection:] If so, then the example-statement must not be a separate member [from that of the reason], because it is [designed] to express the implication of the reason. [Reply:] Although the fact is actually so, yet the statement of the reason is only meant to express [the reason’s] being a property of the subject, but not to express [the reason’s] being present in similar instances and being absent from dissimilar instances. Therefore, it is necessary to express the positive and negative examples separately [from the reason-statement].

PSV ad PS IV k. 7: ’on te de lta na dpe’i tshig kyi don bstan pa’i phyir ro // … gan tshigs ni mtshan ŋūd gsum pa can yin la / bsgrub bya’i chos ŋūd ni gan tshigs kyi tshig gis bstan pa yin no // de las gan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba’i don du dpe brjod pa ni don dain bcas pa yin no // (K 151a2–4, Kitagawa 1965: 522,7–523,2)

[Objection:] However, if so, even the example-statement will not be separated [from the reason], because it is [designed] to express the implication of the reason. [Reply:] … Since the reason possesses three characteristics, [only the reason’s] being a property of the subject (śādhyā = pakṣa) is expressed by the

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32 Kitagawa 1965: 126, n. 154. The parārthānumāna is a verbalized inference and corresponds to the śādhanā in the terminology of the NP and the NMu.
statement of the reason. In order to express the remaining [characteristics of the] reason other than that [first characteristic], it is meaningful to express the example.

Combining this idea with the PS’s claim that the sādhana is nothing but the expression of the triple characterization of a correct reason, it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that only the reason and example are sādhana, and not the thesis. To preserve the nature of the sādhana as being three-membered, counting the example as two members may suggest itself. The separation of positive and negative examples naturally results from the idea that the second and third characteristics of a correct reason are to be expressed by them respectively. At the same time, the statement of thesis is always preserved in an inference, even though it is no longer recognized as a member of sādhana. This is also Dignāga’s attitude as mentioned above.34

Therefore, the Chinese conception of sādhana as the reason together with two examples or being exactly the triple characterization of a correct reason can be regarded as a natural movement from Dignāga’s late thought, and may to some extent reflects Indian views following Dignāga when Xuanzang was taught there. Although the Chinese tradition is alleged to have only the NP and the NMu as its root texts, the ideas presented in the Chinese commentarial literature on these two short treatises need not be limited to Dignāga’s early views. On certain occasions, and to a certain extent, ideas in Chinese literature are even more probably based on his later views, as well as on Indian interpretations that were produced shortly after Dignāga and were not yet influenced by the revolutionary contributions from Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 CE). However, clues for gaining certainty on this hereto unknown historical relation might always remain ambiguous, since no special reference to the subtle differences between earlier and later stages in Dignāga’s thought could so far be found in the Chinese tradition. In this regard, recent studies on Dharmakīrti and his successors as well as on Dignāga himself will surely prove to be relevant to an improvement in our understanding of Chinese hetuvidyā.35

34 Cf. n. 30.
35 Unlike Dharmakīrti (Tillemans [1991] 1999: 72–73), Chinese tradition consistently retains the thesis-statement. The idea that the thesis-statement can be known by “implication” (arthā, yi 義) or by “presumption” (arthāpatti, yi zhün 義准) is absent from Chinese sources. Nevertheless, like the tradition following Dharmakīrti, the Chinese tradition also pays a lot effort and takes a roundabout hermeneutic strategy so as to explain away the word pakṣa which always takes place at the beginning of the definition of sādhana in the NP and the NMu (cf. n. 26). The gist of such a strategy is to say that this word is so placed as to indicate exactly the aim or the object of sādhana. For details, see YMD (54–56 / 94a21–b13) ad NP 1; YMD (86–94 / 96c11–97b7) ad NP 2; For Wengui 文軌 (early 7th century)’s similar discussion, see ZYS (1.4b–5b) ad NP 2 and ZYS (2.2a–3a) ad NP 2.4; For Kuījī’s ambiguous comment on NMu k. 13cd = PS IV. k. 6cd, see YMD (305 / 113c6–10) ad NP 2.4. Shentai 神泰 (early 7th century), the author of the only extant commentary on the NMu, says nothing on relevant passages in the NMu. On one hand, he makes reference to his commentary on the NP, which however has been lost, and on the other hand, he misleadingly ascribes this new interpretation even to Vasubandhu, see YZMS (1.3b) ad NMu 1.1. Nevertheless, he has said something on nyūnatā (incompleteness), see below, n. 38. Furthermore, the author of the NP, Śaṅkarasvāmin, who was said to be a disciple of Dignāga, did know the PS. There are certain elements in the NP which can be found only in PS, e.g. NP 3.1(9): eṣāṃ vacanāni dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇamukhena NP Ch 11c7–8: 如是多言，是遣諸法自相門故 = PSV ad PS III k. 2 (K 125a5–6): ‘di yaṅ chos kyi raṅ gi ņo bo daṅ ’gal bas sel ba’i sgo tsam žig bstan
4. The “completeness” of an argument and the identification of the probative factors

As brought into light in Tillemans’ 1991 article, the above reinterpretations are not merely terminological issues, but reach deeper into the nature of “how logic works.” The theoretical implication of these new interpretations can be clarified if we look at the matter from a different angle, and take into account the reinterpretation of the fault called “incompleteness” (nyūnatā, que jian guo xing 缺減過性), which results from the new interpretation of sādhana. In NMu 1.1 Dignāga defined sādhana to be a three-membered argument, comprised of the thesis, the reason and the example. The lack of any one of these members results in the fault called “incompleteness.” However, in the PS Dignāga says:

PSV ad PS III k. 1ab: 'dir yaṅ tshul gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba cig ma smras na yaṅ ma tshaṅ ba brjod par 'gyur ro // (V 40b2, Kitagawa 1965: 470,7–8)

Here [in saying that inference for others is the communication of a triply characterized reason], it shall also be called incomplete when any characteristic [of the three characteristics] is unstated.39

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37 For this development, see Tillemans [1991] 1999: 75.
38 Cf. Tillemans [1991] 1999: 85, n. 14. When commenting on this passage, Shentai (YZMS 1.4a–b) gives three different explanations of “incompleteness,” among which the first two correspond respectively to that of Vasubandhu and that of scholars after Vasubandhu (but before Dignāga), and the last one to that of Dignāga and his followers. However, he attributes the first two explanations both ambiguously to a “certain master,” cf. Tucci 1930: 6, n. 5. The definition of “incompleteness” in the NP is basically the same as that in the NMū, see NP 6: sādhanadoṣo nyūnataṃ / pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam / hetudoṣo 'siddhiṇaikaṁkāntikaviruddhatvam / drṣṭāntadoṣaḥ sādhanadharmādyasiddhatvam / tasyodbhāvanam prāṇiṣkapratyāyanam dūṣanāṃ // NPṬ (54,12–13) on this passage: sādhanadoṣo nyūnataṃ sāmānyena ti / nyūnataṃ pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam / yathoktalakṣaṇaṁ pramāṇabādhitatvam iti / yāvat / ayam arthah – sādhanavākye 'vyavāpeksaya nyūnatayā atiriktatāyāś ca sabhāsādaḥ purāto 'bhidhānaḥ yat tat sāmānyena dūṣanām / viśeṣatas tu pakṣadoṣodbhāvanam asiddhiṇaikaṁkāntikadoṣodbhāvanam ḍrṣṭāntadoṣodbhāvanam vā dūṣanām iti / “The fault of the sādhana in general (sāmānyena) is incompleteness.” That is to say, incompleteness is the fact that the members including the thesis and others lack [one or more of] the above mentioned definitions, or is contradicted by [other] means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). This means: refutation is any expression in general of the incompleteness or redundancy (atiriktatā) with regard to any member in the statement of a sādhana in front of a witness (sabhbhāsa); in particular (viśeṣatas), however, refutation is either to point out the fault of thesis, or to point out the fault of unestablished, contradictory or inconclusive [reason], or to point out the fault of example.”
This understanding changes not only how the fault called “incompleteness” as handed down from the early phase of Indian logic is understood, but also the conception of what kind of factor contributes to the “completeness” of an argument, in the absence of which the argument becomes “incomplete” or unsound. We are now inclined to call them the “probative factors.” Indeed, a number of elements can be regarded as being capable of contributing to the “completeness” of an argument. At first, there should be certain linguistic expression with certain ideas the proponent would like to communicate to the opponent. This expression should be capable of explicating ideas in accordance with certain semantic conventions. Even the intelligence of the opponent could be presupposed as part of the necessary prerequisites for an argument to be practically adequate, since he should be intelligent enough to pick out the meaning as being the one the proponent intended to convey. In addition, one might also include the overall situation of the debate as being one where arguments from each side are to be evaluated only according to principles for thinking rationally. But not all factors which are necessary for a rational exchange to occur contribute to the soundness of an argument in the same way. Therefore, by “probative factors,” we do not mean all the necessary conditions for an argument to be “complete” in a general sense, which are nearly infinite, but only those factors which were actually selected by thinkers in the history of logic to be in the focus of their theorization of argument. The notion of a “probative factor” is therefore just a meta-logical concept, not a logical one in the usual sense. This is a concept only used to represent or recapture the main concern of a logician in his theory of argument. In fact, we are bound to select only a limited number of elements for reflecting on the soundness of a sound argument in a theoretical manner. This does not prevent us from recognizing the fact that there must be other elements remaining untheorized in our present framework, or even yet unobserved.

The mere illustration of probative factors contributes to a theory of argument just as little as a good intuition of what a sound argument may look like; it is not yet a theory of logic. The key feature of a theory is that the probative factors identified in it are at the same time considered to be the criteria for discriminating in a general way a sound argument from an unsound one. Theories of argument can be based on different approaches to the identification of different kinds of probative factor, and as a result yield different systems of criteria for sound argument. In short, different identifications of probative factors betray different conceptions of argument, which may lead to different theories of argument, or even different logical theories.

Now, let us return to the historical account as given in the Chinese literature, which is in line with PS’s new interpretation of “incompleteness.”

YMDS 57 / 94b17–21: 世親菩薩，缺減過性，宗、因、喻中，闕一有三，闕二有三，闕三有一。世親已後，皆除第七。以宗、因、喻三為能立，總闕便非。既本無體，何成能立？有何所闕而得似名？

[According to] the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, [there are seven cases of] incompleteness (nyūnatā). [Of them,] three are the lack of [only] one [statement] among the thesis, the reason and the example, three are the lack of two [statements among them], and one is the lack of all the three [statements]. [Scholars] after Vasubandhu all exclude the seventh case. Since the thesis, the reason and the example, as three [members], form a sādhana, it is impossible for
The Concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist Logic

all of them to be lacking [and there is still an argument]. Since then, there would be no substratum (wu ti 無體) at all, what could be an argument (sādhana) and what [kind of argument] could be called faulty on account of being incomplete?

According to this view, logicians before Dignāga identified the probative factors with the statements of the thesis, the reason and the example. When one of these factors is lacking, the whole argument has the fault of incompleteness. A point that remains unclarified here is that the linguistic expression itself could contribute to the “completeness” or soundness of an argument in two ways. On one hand, the linguistic expression could be probative in representing a certain form of valid reasoning. On the other hand, it could be probative in that the reason-statement together with the example-statement is or is accepted to be true. According to contemporary logical theory, an argument is sound if and only if all its premises are true and the whole argument represents a certain form of valid reasoning. Therefore, if the identification of probative factors with the linguistic expression itself does not merely represent a good intuition of what a sound argument looks like, but is actually taken as resting upon a solid theory, it could possibly provide the Buddhist logicians with two different options in theorizing the “completeness” of an argument.

We name the first option the “formalist approach” in that the logical form itself is identified as the probative factor, forms the focus of theorization, and becomes the criterion for discriminating sound arguments from unsound ones. For the second option that takes the truth of premises to be the foremost criterion for finding sound arguments, we will speak of an “epistemic approach” or “dialectic approach,” depending on the interpretation of “truth” that is chosen. If we interpret a true statement as being approved by ascertained evidences (*niścayaprasiddha), we have an “epistemic approach.” If interpreting a statement’s being true as merely being accepted to be true, i.e., being equally accepted by both sides in debate (*abhyupagamaprasiddha, gong xu ji cheng 共許極成), we have a “dialectic approach.”

Our text continues:

YMDS 57–58 / 94b21–26: 陳那菩薩，因一喻二，說有六過，則因三相

[According to] the Bodhisattva Dignāga, six cases of the fault [of incompleteness] are mentioned concerning the reason, the first, with the examples, the last two (yin yi yu er 因一喻二). They are the six faults concerning the three characteristics of a correct reason. [Of them,] three are the lack of [only] one

40 Cf. RINM 30c29–31a2: 且「能立」者，即有二義：一一因二喻，二因一喻二。一因二喻，約因三相也；因一喻二，約因二喻也。"Here, the sādhana has two meanings: (1) one reason with two examples (yī yin er yu 一因二喻); and (2) the reason, the first, with the examples, the last two (yin yi yu er 因一喻二). The ‘one reason with two examples’ concerns the three characteristics of a correct reason. The ‘reason, the first, with the examples, the last two’ concerns the reason together with two examples.” Gomyō 護命 (750–834 CE)’s division between 一因二喻 and 因一喻二 in this passage is quite obscure. However, I have kept the room for such a subtle division in translating these two expressions differently, though Kuiji in the above passage equated the three characteristics with 因一喻二 but not 一因二喻.
As is reported in the above passage, Buddhist logicians following Dignāga identified the factors contributing to the “completeness” of an argument directly with the three characteristics of a correct reason, the alleged basic criteria for a good argument in Buddhist logic. As a detailed account of the trairūpya formulae according to the Chinese tradition is not in place here, we can make no decision as to whether the “epistemic approach” or the “dialectic approach” was actually adopted by those Chinese logicians following Dignāga. Still, the evidence from our text clarifies that the “formalist approach” was not chosen. Towards this end, we just point out that the “incomplete” or unsound arguments which are to be ruled out by the three characteristics represent the same logical form with that of the above proof (1), which is typically a sound argument in Buddhist logic, regardless of its variety. Indeed, it is not difficult for us to abstract the following form from the above proof (1):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Thesis:} & Sp \\
\text{Reason:} & Hp \\
\text{Positive example:} & (x) (Hx \rightarrow Sx) \\
\text{Negative example:} & (x) (\neg Sx \rightarrow \neg Hx) \\
\end{array}
\]

\(p = \text{pakṣa the subject, “sound;”}
S = \text{sādhyadharma the inferable property, “being impermanent;”}
H = \text{hetu the reason-property, “being produced.” Note that, the formalization here is just a provisional one adjusted to the present purpose and ignores aspects that are irrelevant.}

41 In fact, Kuiji is also unwilling to exclude the seventh possibility. Just a few lines after this passage, he says: 又雖有言，三相並闕。如聲論師，對佛法者，立「聲為常，德所依故，猶如擇滅。諸非常者，皆非德依，如四大種」。(YMDS 58–59 / 94b28–c3) “Again, there is also the case where the statement is complete but all the three characteristics are lacking. For example, an upholder of the permanence of sound (śābdika, sheng lun shi 聲論師), against a Buddhist, claims that ‘sound is permanent, because of being a substratum of qualities (guṇāśraya, de suo yi 德所依, cf. NP 3.2.1(4)), like cessation through analytical meditation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha, ze mie 擇滅). Whatever is impermanent is not a substratum of qualities, like the four great elements (caturmahābhūta, si da zhong 四大種).’ Although there is an argument from the reason ‘being a substratum of qualities,’ it lacks all the three characteristics. How can it not be faulty? Hence, the seventh case should also be counted as incomplete.” That is to say, there could be some linguistic expressions in which all the three characteristics are lacking, although expressions of this kind have no probative force at all. Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714 CE) gives a much clearer example for the seventh possibility: 如立「聲常，眼所見故」，虛空為同，盆等為異，三相俱闕。(YMDS 753 / 141c21–22) “For example, ‘sound is permanent, because of being visible.’ [Here,] ether is the similar instance. A dish, etc., are dissimilar instances. [The argument] lacks all the three characteristics.”
Moreover, if we regard the negative example as merely the contraposition of its positive counterpart, we could just skip it. Then, the whole process of reasoning can be considered as beginning from the statement of the positive example and ending with the thesis-statement. If the formalization is correct, the above process clearly represents a valid reasoning.

When commenting on the NP passage on refutation (dūṣaṇa, NP 6), Huizhao has provided each one of these seven possibilities with an example. Here, we just concern the first three where only one characteristic is lacking respectively:

YMDS 752 / 141c12–16: 闕一有三者：如數論師，對聲論立：「聲是無常，眼所見故」，聲無常宗，瓶、盆等為同品，虛空等為異品，此但闕初而有後二；聲論對薩婆多立：「聲為常宗，所聞性故」，虛空為共同品，瓶、盆等為異品，闕第二相；「所量性」因，闕第三相。

The three [kinds of incomplete argument where only one [characteristic] is lacking [respectively] are for example: (1) When a Śāṅkhya, against a Śābdika, claims that “sound is impermanent, because of being visible (cākṣsuṣatva, yan suo jian 眼所見).” The thesis (pakṣa) that sound is impermanent has a pot and a dish, etc., as similar instances (sapakṣa, tong pin 同品), and has ether, etc. as dissimilar instances (vipakṣa, yi pin 異品). The [argument] lacks only the first [characteristic] but has the last two [characteristics]. (2) When a Śābdika, against a Sarvāstivādin (sa po duo 薩婆多), claims that “sound is permanent – thesis, because of being audible (śrāvaṇatva, suo wen xing 所聞性).” [Here,] ether is the similar instance equally [accepted by both sides] (gong tong pin 共同品). A pot and a dish, etc., are dissimilar instances. [The argument] lacks [only] the second characteristic. (3) The reason “being cognizable (prameyatva, suo liang xing 所量性)” [for the thesis “sound is permanent”] lacks [only] the third characteristic.

If we present all the three arguments in a “syllogistic” manner with subject-predicate statements, skip the negative example and all the individual cases cited and refer to the “positive example” just as “example” for the sake of convenience, we end up with the following three proofs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proof (2)</th>
<th>Proof (3)</th>
<th>Proof (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thesis: Sound is impermanent,</td>
<td>Sound is permanent,</td>
<td>Sound is permanent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason: for sound is visible.</td>
<td>for sound is audible.</td>
<td>for sound is cognizable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Whatever is visible</td>
<td>Whatever is audible is</td>
<td>Whatever is cognizable is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is impermanent.</td>
<td>permanent.</td>
<td>permanent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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42 See n. 38.
43 The YMDS from the commentary on NP 3.3.1(1) to the end is actually written by Huizhao after the death of his teacher Kuiji, see Zheng 2010: 605.
44 See YMDS 752–753 / 141c11–22.
It is not a surprise to find out that all the unsound arguments illustrated here and the above proof (1) as a sound argument share the same logical form. The differences are only as follows:

In proof (2), the reason-statement “sound is visible” is not true, in that sound is clearly not visible. Here, the proposition $Hp$ is false. In this case, only the first characteristic pakṣadharmaṇa, i.e., the reason’s being (pervasively) a property of the subject ($bian shi zong fa xing$ 遍是宗法性), does not obtain or is not fulfilled.\[45\]

In proof (3), the example-statement “whatever is audible is permanent” is not true. It cannot be instantiated in existent individuals apart from the subject “sound,” since only sound is audible. Here, the positive example should be interpreted as a statement with existential import, like $(x) ((x \neq p & Hx) \rightarrow Sx)$ & $(\exists x) (x \neq p & (Hx & Sx))$.\[46\] The whole conjunction is false just because the last conjunct is false. In this case, only the second characteristic sapakṣa sattva, i.e., the reason’s being (certainly) present in similar instances (tong pin ding you xing 同品定有性) is not fulfilled, since no similar instance or nothing permanent apart from sound itself instantiates the reason-property “being audible.”\[47\]

In proof (4), the example-statement that “whatever cognizable is permanent” is also not true. There certainly are impermanent things which are not only cognizable but also different from sound, say a pot. Here, the first conjunct in the above conjunction is false. Hence, the whole conjunction is false. In this case, only the third characteristic vipakṣa sattva, i.e., the reason’s being (pervasively) absent from dissimilar instances (yi pin bian wu xing 異品遍無性), is not fulfilled, since the dissimilar instances, things not “being permanent” apart from sound itself, also have the reason-property “being cognizable,” like a pot.\[48\]

In all the three cases, a valid form of reasoning does not perform a role in discriminating sound arguments from unsound ones. Arguments are considered as unsound only on account of the lacking of this or that characteristic. The “probative factor” is in this theory not

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45 Cf. NP 3.2.1(1): śabdānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ // NPCh 11c12–13: 如成立聲為無常等，若言是眼所見性故，俱不成立。 “When one is to prove that sound is impermanent, [the reason] ‘because of being visible’ is not established for both (ubhayāsiddha).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 123.


47 Cf. NP 3.2.2(2): asādāraṇaḥ śrāvanatvān nitya iti / tad dhī nityānityapakṣābhivyām vyāvṛttatvān nityānityavinnusmrtya cānyayāsāmbhavāt samāstātāya śrāvanatvam iti // NPCh 11c22–24: 言不共者，如說聲常，所聞性故，常、無常品皆離此因，常、無常外非有故是猶豫因，此所聞性其猶何等? “An uncommon (asādāraṇa) [reason] is: ‘Sound is permanent, because of being audible.’ For, since this [reason] is [certainly] excluded from both the permanent and impermanent kinds (pakṣa, pin 俱) [apart from the subject ‘sound’], and since anything else which is different from permanent and impermanent is impossible, this [reason] is a cause for doubt. [The question remains:] ‘What kind of [thing] has audibility?’” For translation and discussion, see Tachikawa 1971: 124; Oetke 1994: 33–35.

48 Cf. NP 3.2.2(1): sādāraṇaḥ śabdah prameyatvān nitya iti / tad dhī nityānityapakṣāyoḥ sādāraṇatvād anaikāntikam / kim ghaṭatav prameyatvād anityaḥ śābda āhosvid ākāśavat prameyatvān nitya iti // NPCh 11c19–22: 共者，如言聲常，所量性故，常、無常品皆離此因，是故不定。為如瓶等，所量性故，聲是無常；為如空等，所量性故，聲音是常? “A common (sādāraṇa) [reason] is: ‘Sound is permanent, because of being cognizable.’ For, since this [reason] is common to both the permanent and impermanent kinds [apart from the subject ‘sound’], it is inconclusive (anaikāntika). [The question remains:] ‘Is sound impermanent because of being cognizable, like a pot, or permanent because of being cognizable, like ether?”’ Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 124.
the logical form, but the set of the three characteristics, just as the three characteristics are proclaimed by logicians following Dignāga as sādhana, means of proof. Therefore, in identifying the three characteristics as the probative factor, the “formalist approach” is not the approach actually stepped on by Buddhist logicians.

Moreover, each case above where one characteristic is lacking or is not fulfilled can be reduced to the scenario where one premise in the argument, either the reason-statement or the example-statement, is not true. In this sense, the three characteristics concern nothing formal. They are only the definition of the truths of the reason-statement and the example-statement, i.e., the definition of the truths of the premises in an argument, in the sense that all the premises are true if and only if all the three characteristics are fulfilled. Therefore, in identifying the three characteristics as probative factor, the implied intention is that the essential factors or criteria for discriminating a sound argument from unsound one should be the truths of the premises. The theory of trairūpya is only a theorization of this implied intention. It is only in this sense that the reason together with the positive and negative examples is also proclaimed to be a “probative factor,” the sādhana. Whether the emphasis is put on the three characteristics or on the reason and the examples is only a matter of the level on which this implied intention is to be presented, the level of the meta-language or that of the object-language.

However, one might argue in favor of a formalist interpretation of Buddhist logic that: Since at least the statement of the reason and that of the example are recognized as sādhana in this new interpretation following PS, there is certainly an awareness of the logical form of an argument coming to the core in Buddhist theorization of argument. In this sense, the “formalist approach” has not been totally neglected by Buddhist logicians following this new interpretation of sādhana. As a matter of fact, what is actually at stake in this new interpretation is not the form of these two members, but their truth. As we have said above, on the one hand, a good intuition of what a sound argument looks like does not by itself amount to a theory of argument, let alone to a “formalist” theory. The Buddhist view of the three-membered argument is just a representation of this good intuition. Moreover, there is only one form which is actually elaborated in this form of Buddhist theory of three-membered argument. It is nothing but a linguistic standard for all the arguments to follow. At any rate, a formal logic does not come about when there is only one form of reasoning, which is neither compared with other equally valid forms of reasoning, nor with other invalid ones. On the other hand, to adopt an approach other than a “formalist” one and to take some factors other than the logical form itself as the theoretically most significant does not necessarily imply that the other equally necessary factors, esp. the logical form, are rejected or considered to be irrelevant to the “completeness” of an argument. To adopt

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49 This is partly demonstrated by the constant practice of transforming a negative statement into its affirmative counterpart, cf. NP 2.3: vaidharmyeṇāpi / ... tadyathā / yan nityam tad akṛtakam drṣṭam yathākāśam iti / nityasabdenātṛṇityatvasābhāva ucyate / akṛtakasabdenāpi kṛtakavasyābhāvah / yathā bhāvabhāvo 'bhāva iti / NPCh 11b15–18: 异法者, ...，謂若是常, 見非所作, 如虛空等。此中常言表非無常, 非所作言表無所作, 如有非有說名非有。"[The example] by dissimilarity [i.e., the negative example] is ... for instance, ‘whatever is permanent is observed to be non-produced, like ether.’ Here, the negation (abhāva) of being impermanent is said by the word ‘permanent,’ and the negation of being produced is said by the word ‘non-produced,’ like non-being (abhāva) is the negation (abhāva) of being (bhāva).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 121.
one particular approach just concerns the focus of theorization and relegates other possible candidates for a “probative factor” to a position at the edge of the horizon of a given framework, not outside of it.\footnote{Indeed, there are other minor faults beyond the scope of trairūpya which concern the logical form of a statement, cf. NP 3.3.1(5): viparītānvayo yathā / yat kṛtakam tad anityam drṣṭam iti vaktavye yad anityam tat kṛtakam drṣṭam iti bravīti // NP\textsubscript{Ch} 12b14–15: 倒合者，謂應說言，諸所作者，皆是無常，而倒說言，諸無常者，皆是所作。” [An example where] the positive concomitance is reversed is that: One states ‘whatever is impermanent is observed to be produced,’ when he should say ‘whatever is produced is observed to be impermanent’;” NP 3.3.2(5): viparītvavatireko yathā / yad anityam tan mūrtam drṣṭam iti vaktavye yan mūrtam tad anityam drṣṭam iti bravīti // NP\textsubscript{Ch} 12b25: 倒離者，謂如說言，諸質礙者，皆是無常。” [An example where] the negative concomitance is reversed is that: one states ‘whatever is corporeal (mūrtā, zhì ài 質礙) is observed to be impermanent,’ when he should say ‘whatever is impermanent is observed to be corporeal’.” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 127, 128.}

Therefore, to interpret the Buddhist three-membered argument merely on its face value as some Indian equivalence to the Aristotelian syllogism might well be an over-interpretation.\footnote{This is exactly the conclusion of Tillemans’ 1991 article (Tillemans [1991] 1999: 78–81), where he clearly shows that the thesis or conclusion constitutes “an integral part of the syllogism,” but not of the Buddhist sādhana, and that this fact foreshadows the “fundamental incommensurability” between syllogism and sādhana. To certain extent, my treatment of the concept of sādhana in Chinese literature could be regarded as presenting the matter “from a slightly different angle.”} For such an interpretation, the thesis or conclusion has to be taken into account so that a form representing the complete process of reasoning can be available for further considerations concerning its being valid or not. However, this is obviously not the intention of logicians following Dignāga, in that the thesis is explicitly excluded by them from “probative factors” and from their fundamental considerations concerning an argument’s being tenable or not.

5. Conclusion

In the development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga and the latter’s Indian and Chinese followers, and in the new interpretation of sādhana as the triple characterization of a correct reason (trairūpya) instead of the linguistic expression of a three-membered argument, what comes to the fore is a gradually clearer conception of what is essentially decisive for an argument to be good or sound. In identifying the decisive factor as the trairūpya or the truth of premises, Dignāga and his followers lead the Buddhist theory of argument to an approach that sharply different from that of the formal logic of their European colleagues.

A crucial problem that remains undecided, however, is whether the “epistemic approach” or the “dialectic approach” was adopted in further historical development after Dignāga in India and China. As we have said, we leave the answer open at the present stage. I believe that a solution will come about with a comparative study of the interpretation of trairūpya by Chinese logicians and that by Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga, e.g. Dharmakīrti.\footnote{I have made some preliminary attempts in this direction, esp. on the concept of sapakṣa and vipakṣa in Chinese Buddhist logic, and on a logical reading of the second characteristic under the Chinese interpretation, see Tang 2015: 289–307, 323–336. For the most extensive and profound analysis of the “epistemic operator” in Indian logic and of the trairūpya, see Oetke 1994.}
References and abbreviations

Primary sources

IRMS  Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 (Zenju 善珠): T68, no. 2270.
NMu  Dignāga, Nyāyamukha. See Katsura [1]–[7].
NP  Śaṅkarasvāmin, Nyāyapraveśa. See Tachikawa 1971: 140–144; Chinese translation, T32, no. 1630.
NPch  Chinese translation of NP: Yin ming ru zheng li lun 因明入正理論, T32, no. 1630.
PS(V)  Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti), Tibetan translation. See Kitagawa 1965.
YMDS  Kuiji窺基, Yin ming da shu 因明大疏. See Zheng 2010; also T44, no. 1840.

Secondary sources


I Who are Dharmakīrti’s Śaivas?

Kṣemarāja (active around 1000–1050 CE), a Kashmirian exegete of the non-dualist Śaiva Mantramārga, has supplied, as an appendix to his commentary on the Svachchandatantra, a short Prakaraṇa style tract defending the theory that Śaiva ritual initiation, or dīkṣā, is capable of bestowing final liberation. Kṣemarāja begins with a Buddhist pūrvapakṣa built on ten and a half verses of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, namely the Pramāṇasiddhi 257cd–267. Before proceeding to analyze Kṣemarāja’s work, it is helpful to establish the identity of Dharmakīrti’s original opponent. What kind of Śaiva views is Dharmakīrti attacking, and how do these views compare to what Kṣemarāja is defending?

As Acharya (2014) has shown, Dharmakīrti addresses the doctrines of the early dualist Śaivasiddhānta, that is, groups who accepted the authority of revealed scriptures such as the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, the Kiraṇatantra, and the Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha. The Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, the earliest work of this school that has come down to us, is tentatively dated to around 450–550 CE. It is in this work that we see the first defense of the new doctrine that was to become the hallmark of the Śaiva Mantramārga: The claim that dīkṣā, or initiation, is sufficient cause for the end of rebirth. We are asked to believe that this is possible because Śaiva mantras have an unimaginable power (acintyavibhava) capable of excising the substantial defilements that lead to incarnation. The early Śaivasiddhānta makes the claim that this excision can be empirically verified in a ritual of weighing, the tulādīkṣā, or dhaṭadīkṣā, “Initiation with the scales.” Dharmakīrti responds to this kind of a claim in the Pramāṇasiddhi section of the Pramāṇavārttika:

PV Pramāṇasiddhi 258cd–260ab:

nālam bijādisaṃsiddho vidhiḥ puṃsām ajanmane //258//
tailābhyāṅgāgniṃdāhāder api muktiprasangataḥ /

1 PV Pramāṇasiddhi, 257cd–267 (Edmi).
2 For the Śaivas mantras are souls appointed by the cause deity Śiva to enable various effects. Mataṅga-pārameśvaravṛtti of Rāmakaṇṭha to Vidyāpaḍa 7.40cd–42ab: ...śabdātiriktā ātmaviśeṣā eva mantrāṃ syuh...,”Mantras are specific souls, different from sounds.” Similarly, Mataṅgapārameśvara Vidyāpaḍa 7.42cd–43: vācyavācakabhedo ‘yaṃ suprasiddho mahāmune / moksārtham suniyuktānāṃ vācyānāṃ kāraṇecchayā / nyuktā vācakatvena varṇāḥ śāstre śivodaye, “O great sage, this dichotomy of denoted and denoter is well-known. In Śaiva scripture, [certain] phonemes have, by the will of the cause-deity (Śiva = kāraṇa-), been prescribed as denoters of commissioned mantra[-souls], for the purpose of liberation.” Scil., both the mantra souls that are the vācyas, and the phonemes used that are the vācakas (sometimes also: śabdas), are considered to be mantras.
A ritual admitted as effective for seeds and so on is not sufficient to end rebirth for persons, because of the undesirable consequence that liberation could also [be brought about] by rubbing with sesame oil, or by burning with fire, and so on.

A removal of sin is not established by [the initiand’s] prior heavier weight and subsequent lighter weight. Let him become even weightless [after initiation]!

It proves nothing:] Sin has no weight because it is formless.

Dharmakīrti objects here to the Saiddhāntika claim that mantras possess the power to liberate. The intended inference is probably something like the following: “An initiatory mantra-procedure is sufficient cause for the end of rebirth. Because sin-seeds are burnt. Just as in the case of other burnt seeds.”

Here the reason is a type of *viruddahetu* called *dharmaviśeṣaviruddha*. That is to say, it establishes an undesired additional property (*dharmaviśeṣa*) for the probandum, namely that an end of rebirth can also be achieved by other things that stop seeds from sprouting, such as heating or rubbing with oil. Both parties actually accept that mantras can bring about other effects, such as destroying the capacity of seeds to sprout and neutralizing snake-poison (perhaps the most common practical application of mantras). For Dharmakīrti, as Eltschinger (2001: 86) explains: “…les mantra possèdent, en vertu de leur propre nature (*svabhāva*, *svarūpa*), une efficacité naturelle (*bhāvaśakti*) dont le mode d’opération demeure inexplicable.” For the Śaivas, the efficacy of mantras – understood as souls* appointed to this high office by Śiva* derives from the “virility of mantras” (*mantravīrya*). These minor supernatural effects supposedly prove that mantras can indeed perform also their primary function of effecting liberation through initiation. Dharmakīrti’s *prasaṅga* then asserts that if mantras can block rebirth, then other methods used to prevent seeds from sprouting should also be capable of blocking rebirth.

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3 Prajñākaraṇagupta: *atha taillābhyaṃgasya tavamātrāṃ eva satamātrāṃ eva satī dīkṣāyām api samānaṃ tathā / Manorathananandin: dīkṣāyāḥ prāg guror lāghavād dīkṣayā na pāpaharaṇam asya dīkṣita-sya kim tu gauravam evāsya kṛtam sat mahūd iti kasmāna na kalpṣate lāghavaṃ hi gauravaviruddhi dṛṣṭānam kastamudhāvam eva gamayen na pāpabhāvaṃ / pāpam eva gurv iti cen na pāpam gurv amūrtito mūrtābhāvāt /

4 For this translation see Acharya 2014.

5 Subject: [dīkṣā-/mantra-]vidhiḥ, property to be proven: *alam ajanmane*, reason: *dagdhapāpa[bīja]tvā*, example: *dagdhabījavat*.

6 Mataṅgapārameśvaravṛtti of Rāmakaṇṭha to Vidyāpāda 7.40cd–42ab: *śabdātiriktā ātmaviśeṣā eva mantrāḥ syuḥ*, “Mantras are specific souls, different from sounds.”

7 For an authoritative, early, Saiddhāntika exposition of *mantravīrya* see Mataṅgapārameśvara Caryāpāda 5.13cd–16 with Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary. The history of the concept of *mantravīrya* has not yet been written. Kṣemarāja and his non-dualist co-religionists have settled on defining *mantravīrya* as *pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśa* an awareness of the plenary self. See Śivasūtravārttika 1.20: *mantravīryam iti prakṛtaṃ pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśanam, also Tantrāloka 137: mantrayati svābhāvam tam eva prākṛtah. For pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśana, see Utpaladeva’s Aṣṭāsātrasāradhā 22: yā svamvidhā svātmātārāvirāhāṃtāsvabhāvo ’hambhāvo ’rthavyavasthāpako gīyate. On pūrṇāhaṃtā see Kṣemarāja’s Netrodhyota 7.16 avataranikā: aham bhūtvā dehādipramātṛtā-praśamanam pūrṇāhaṃtām āviṣyety atryaḥ.\"
Since other methods used to sterilize seeds are not capable of blocking rebirth, there is no reason to believe that mantras are capable of doing so. The notion that mantras have the power to nullify the ability of karmic seeds to sprout is also a topos of the early, dualist Śaivasiddhānta Kīrṣṭanātra.  

The action of many existences has its seeds burnt, so to speak (iva), by mantras [in initiation]. Future [action] too is blocked; [but] that by which this [body is sustained can be destroyed only] by experience. (trans. Goodall).

DHARMAKĪRTI then refutes the Śaiva claim that weighing the initiate before and after initiation, and seeing that he weighs less afterwards, demonstrates that mantras have removed his sins. Beyond the scriptural sources, the two earliest exegetes of this tradition to whose ideas we still have access are Brhaspati (ca. 650–750, of whose work, however, only a few fragments survive) and Sadyojyotis (ca. 675–725). Of these two, Sadyojyotis is explicit on the probative value of the initiation with the scales (tulādikṣā, dhātadikṣā):

[By initiation] on the scales, [the initiate] is purified of great sins such as brahminicide. One may know that his bonds have been destroyed through direct evidence, just as the destruction of poison [by Gāruḍa-mantras is proved by visible evidence].

Very similarly, Sadyojyotis speaks of the ritual destruction of sin being “perceived” (dṛṣṭa) in his Nareśvaraparākṣā 3.83. Other scriptures, such as the Sārdhatriṣatiśatikālottara, classified the ‘evidence’ of the ritual of the scales as the fourth of a list of eight pratyayās, which it understood as faith-inspiring miracles, a position the Śaiva non-dualists were subsequently to develop further.

The example of poison is possibly also what DHARMAKĪRTI intended by the force of his -ādi. Poison was a stock example for the Saiddhāntikas. In the Sarvajñānottāra we read:

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8 Dharmākirti criticises the Saiddhāntika’s extension of the observable blocking of the power to sprout in ordinary seeds, to invisible, karmic ‘seeds’ as unwarranted. If the two cases were really completely congruent, then actions such as burning etc. should also have congruent effects. Pakṣa: [Diṣṭā-/mantra-/yuddhi, sādhya: pāpaharaṇakṛt, hetu: prāg guror lāghavāt paścāt. Here, the idea that sin or karma has weight is anyatarāsiddha; it is only accepted by the Saiddhāntika.

9 For the compound dagdhabījam see Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha 3.15a and Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha 4.51c.

10 Kīrantantra 6.19: anekabhavikam karma dagdhabījāṃ ivānabhiḥ l bhaviṣyad api samruddhaṃ yenaṃ tad dhi bhogataḥ //

11 For the dates of these authors see Sanderson 2006.

12 Tattvasaṃgraha of Sadyojyotis 38: śuddhiṃ vrajati tūlāyāṃ diṣṭāto brahmahatyato mukhyāt / pratyayato jānīyād bandhavanigāmaṃ viśaksayavat //

13 Nareśvaraparākṣā 3.83: subhāyā kriśyāyā vede kṣayah pāpasya coiditaḥ / diṣṭaḥ ca tatksayah śaive kriśyayāvā tūlādīnā. Rāmakṛṣṭha, ad loc., is perhaps also more cautious, as he calls this claim a “supporting argument” (yukti) and not a “proof.” ihāpi diṣṭādikṣāyām evamvidhiḥ yuktir asty eveti na niryuktikah kriśyāyā karmāsamksayo gadita iti.

14 According to Sārdhatriṣatiśatikālottara 21 these are: [1.] burning without fire, [2.] killing and reviving trees, [3.] stunning, [4.] removing the major sins, proven by weighing on a scale, [5.] neutralizing poison, [6.] rendering infertile, [7.] removing possession, [8.] quelling a fever.

15 See the entry to pratyayā 2 in TĀK III.
Just as the toxicologist, through the power of visualizations and seed-mantras, effects the removal of poison, so the ācārya effects a disjunction with the bonds through Śaiva [initiation] rituals. Just as a suppression of poison [takes place] by the power of mantras and herbs, so there takes place a suppression of all bonds through initiation.

It is uncertain whether Dharmakīrti knew scriptures such as the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā or the Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha or, whether he was merely attacking a popular idea. It is possible that he personally consulted these earliest Śaiva scriptures, though in view of their archaic language it seems unlikely that he would have rated them as credible opponents. A more plausible candidate, however, is the post-Diṅnāga Mataṅgapārameśvara, which aspires to a more śāstraic presentation and diction, and which engages in polemics. In its yoga section, in the context of the rite of weighing, the Mataṅgapārameśvara does indeed claim that ḍīkṣā removes pāpa, exactly the claim that Dharmakīrti attacks:

[The fire concentration (āgneyī dhāraṇā)],

intense with a raging conflagration of flames, deployed [through visualization] in the ritual of mounting the scales, can render a person free from defilement, [because he is now] possessed of a body from which sin (pāpa-) has been burnt away.

Commenting on this, the tenth century Kashmirian Saiddhāntika commentator Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha defends the idea that sin (pāpa) has mass and that the “body really becomes heavier, because sin is a function of tamas, and so has mass.” He corroborates this by citing Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā 13c, where it is said that, “the factor tamas is heavy and it conceals.” The Yuktidīpikā (ca. 680–720 CE) explains this heaviness as a dullness of the

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16 This is how Aghoraśiva interprets the verse (...yathā viṣavaidyo mantrasāmarthyena dhyānādinā ca karmanā viṣahāraṇaṃ karoti...). It would also be quite natural to take the ācārya as the subject. While Aghoraśiva might not approve of the idea that an ācārya should engage in low status activities such as curing snake-bite, it is plausible that this is the intention of the Sarvajñānottara. ayam abhiprāyaḥ / prayāścittakarmanā dukṣṭreyeho mokṣāsaṅgānāna anaikāntikam etat / tataḥ ca yathā viṣavaidyo mantrasāmarthah dhyānādīnā ca karmanā viṣahāraṇam karoti tathācāryo ’pi śivaśaktyupabṛṃhitena dīkṣāh sāhyeha karmanā matādipāsaviśeṣam karotito avirodhah.

17 Sarvajñānottara Vidyāpāda 8: viṣāpahāram kurute dhyānabījabalair yathā / kurute pāśaviśleṣam tathācāryaḥ śivaśaktyaiḥ //

18 Sarvajñānottara Vidyāpāda 9: mantrasadhabalair yadvat sannirodho viṣāya tu / tathā hi sarvapāśānāṃ sannirodhah tu ḍīkṣāyā //

19 Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā Mūlasūtra 7.15ab: tulayā śodhayet pāpam ātmanasya parasya vā / Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha 8: 3: yathā sūryodayam prāpya tamah kṣipram viśayaḥ / evam dīkṣām samāśaya dharmadharmaṁ vimucyate // “As darkness gets instantly destroyed after having reached the time of sunrise, in the same way one is freed from merits and demerits as soon as he receives initiation.” (Trans. Acharya 2014: 16.)

20 The final dhāraṇā is one of the four (or five) dhāraṇās common in Saiddhāntika śaṅgayoga, see Vasudeva 2004: 297–299.

21 Read as a hetutarbivaśeṣaṇa.

22 Mataṅgapārameśvara Yogapāda 2.48–9ab: tulārohavidhāne ca prayogāyte bhātakatā / vegavadhiḥ karalāśair mayūkhaiḥ samprayojitāḥ / karoti vigatakleśaṃ dagdhaḥpataṇām naram /

23 Sāṃkhyakārikā 13c: guru varanakam tamah. Yuktidīpikā ad loc.: tatra gurutvaṃ kāryasyādhogamaheturaḥ dharmah, karaṇasya vṛttaṃ vanditaḥ / varanam api kāryagyatam ca pravānāratirodhānām / karaṇagatā cāsuddhitā prakāśapratidvandvī bhūtā /
internal instrument that causes downward motion of the effect (kārya). This shifts the focus away from sin to the Śāmkhya guṇa of tamas, a material constituent of primal matter; but for Dharmakīrti this claim still would remain anyatarāsiddha.

A significant problem in assuming that Dharmakīrti knew the Mataṅgapārameśvara as we now know it, is that the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Vidyāpāda also teaches a more developed theory of mala as opposed to the simpler idea of pāpa found in the Yogapāda. There is, however, no evidence that Dharmakīrti knew the theory of a material mala. As Goodall (2013: s.v. pāśa) notes, it may be a later development:

In a number of the earliest surviving Siddhāntatantras, “impurity” (mala) is noticeable by its absence: we find no mention of it in the Ni, in the non-eclectic recensions of the Kālottara, such as the SārK, in what survives of the RauSS or even in the SJU(G) (in which, pace Aghoraśiva, the word mala is used to refer to karman). The first surviving Siddhānta in which “impurity” figures may be the SvāSS.

It is conceivable, therefore, that Dharmakīrti knew only the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda, or, since this reference to sin (pāpa) in the Yogapāda is an archaic throwback, it is also possible that Dharmakīrti had access to the archetype. It is relevant, in this context, that the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda also elsewhere evidences Śaivas engaging with the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition. Mataṅgapārameśvara Yogapāda 4.15cd–16a paraphrases Diṅnāga’s definition of pratyakṣa: anirdeśyam asaṃdigdhaṃ kalpanāpoḍhagocaram / pratyakṣam, “Sense-knowledge is unobjectifiable, free of doubt, and free of imagination.” If the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda section itself appears to be in dialogue with the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition, it becomes more likely that a Buddhist response can be expected. Until a more reliable critical edition of the Mataṅgapārameśvara has been published, any chronological layering of the text remains speculative. We may conclude that it is possible that Dharmakīrti is responding to a text as late as the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda.

2 After Dharmakīrti

Dharmakīrti’s critique of initiation may have had a noticeable impact on the Saiddhāntikas. Acharya (2014: 14–16) notes that Dharmakīrti’s Śaivas speak of initiation removing sin (pāpa) or unseen, yet still weighty, demerit (adṛṣṭa), an idea that he traces back to the Śaivasiddhānta’s foundational scripture, the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā. This he contrasts with the post-Dharmakīrti Śaiva doctrine that initiation removes a defilement (mala), an imperceptible substance (dravya) that acts on the soul from outside. Acharya has posited that this development was motivated by Buddhist criticism of the early Śaiva Mantramārga, and that Dharmakīrti provides us with a concrete example of what this criticism looked like.
3 The causes of liberation

If it is initiation that removes the defilements that cause bondage, then why does not everyone seek Śaiva initiation? Is there some other factor that prompts individual to seek Śaiva initiation. Both the dualists and non-dualists held that a salvific divine contact called the descent of grace (śaktipāta) had to occur before a bound soul developed an interest in seeking initiation. In a sense this was the most significant event in the spiritual career of a Śaiva. But what, we may ask, caused the descent of grace?

Within the dualist fold two rival schools of thought emerged. One of the earliest ideas was that the descent of grace was caused by a karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya) caused by two simultaneously maturing karmas of equal strength. In the ensuing logjam, God needs intervene to maintain the regular working of karmic retribution, but any divine contact inevitably changes the individual in a profound way. A later idea, promoted by Sadyojyotis, was the theory of the maturation of defilement (malaparipāka), a kind of ripening of mala that renders it fit for removal.

The non-dualists rejected both of these narratives and held that God was completely free in his bestowal of grace (nirapekṣa).

The history of these developments is somewhat difficult to trace in our available sources. After Sadyojyotis and Bṛhaspati there follows a long gap of more than two hundred years in our record of the Saiddhāntika theorists until their tradition was revived by later Kashmirians such as Nārāyaṇaṇaṇa and Rāmakaṇṭha, authors who have been described as scriptural fundamentalists who wished to return to the original positions of Sadyojyotis. In this apparent interregnum, it appears that rival theories of the causes and processes that lead up to liberation gained currency. We have evidence that there existed other early Saiddhāntika exegetes who rejected Sadyojyotis’ interpretation of the processes that lead to initiation and thence to liberation, objecting specifically to the idea that Śiva needs to take karmas into account, and espousing instead a radical karmanirapekṣavāda, as did the later non-dualist Śaivas. Abhinavagupta, for example, reports, approvingly, that a certain Aniruddha, apparently an early commentator of the Mataṅgapārameśvara, held that the descent of liberating grace was in no way dependent on karma.

28 Evidently, Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, keen to reestablish Sadyojyotis’ interpretation of the processes that lead to initiation and thence to liberation, objecting specifically to the idea that Śiva needs to take karmas into account, and espousing instead a radical karmanirapekṣavāda, as did the later non-dualist Śaivas. Abhinavagupta, for example, reports, approvingly, that a certain Aniruddha, apparently an early commentator of the Mataṅgapārameśvara, held that the descent of liberating grace was in no way dependent on karma. Evidently, Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, keen to reestablish Sadyojyotis’ theory of the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) as the decisive factor, would not have approved of this position. Above all, he wished to limit the

resorted to those Vedic texts from which their Pāśupata predecessors had adapted and adopted the rite of initiation and related ideas. In these texts sin was depicted as innate impurity.” (Acharya 2014: 23)

28 “Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha presents his exegesis in a fundamentalist spirit as a return to the original position set out in an earlier time by the founding fathers of his tradition with the purpose of rescuing it from the contamination it had suffered from attempts to assimilate its scriptures to alien perspectives, at one extreme to that of orthodox Brahmanism and at the other to that of the Śākta Śaivas.” (Sanderson 2007: 427-428)

29 Tantrāloka 13.293cd–295ab: śrīmatāpy Aniruddhena śaktim unmīlinīṃ vibhoḥ // vyācakṣāṇena mātange varnitā nirapeksatā / sīhāvārantē ’pi devasya svarāppomūlaṃātmikā // sākthih patanti sāpeksā na kvāpi sudistarā. “The venerable Aniruddha too has taught that [Śiva’s liberating power] is autonomous when commenting on the Lord’s ‘power that awakens’ in the Tantra of Mātanga [the Mataṅgapārameśvara, Vidyāpāda 4.44], explaining at great length that when the power of the Lord descends it is beholden to nothing, being an unfolding of the nature of the self that can take place even in the extreme case of immobile life-forms.” (Trans. Sanderson 2006: 81-82 n. 54)
operation of Śiva’s descent of grace (śaktipāta) to what he considered meritorious human beings.\(^{30}\)

For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, the cause of rebirth is fully explained by the influence of two kinds of conscious intention (saṃcetanā), one being false knowledge (mithyājñāna-) and the other being the craving that arises from it (tadudbhūttatarṣa-).\(^{31}\)

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PV Pramāṇasiddhi 2.260cd–262ab:

mithyājñānatadudbhūttatarṣasamcetanāvaśāt //
hinasthānagatir janma tena\(^{32}\) tachchin\(^{33}\) na jāyate /
tayor eva hi sāmarthyam jātav tanmārabhayavataḥ //
te cetane svayam karmety\(^{34}\) akhaṇḍam janmakāraṇam /

Birth is to enter an inferior mode of existence,\(^{35}\) under the influence of [two kinds of] conscious intention, [one instigated by]\(^{36}\) false knowledge and [the other instigated by] the craving that arises from it. Therefore, one who severs these two is not born [again], for they alone, by their mere presence, are sufficient [causes] for [re]birth. These two kinds of intention are of themselves motivated action, and so constitute the complete cause of [re]birth.\(^{37}\)

\(^{30}\) Kiranavṛtti on Vidyāpāda 6.11cd–12.

\(^{31}\) For a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s proof of rebirth see Franco 1997.

\(^{32}\) tena] Edₘ₁ Edₜₚₐ, tatas Edₘₗₚₐ.

\(^{33}\) tachchin] Edₘ₉ Edₜₚₐ, tac chin Edₘ₁ (understand as: te (du.) chinattītī tacchid).

\(^{34}\) karmety] Edₘ₁ Edₘ₉, karmāry Edₜₚₐ.

\(^{35}\) A gati is a rebirth destination, see Franco 1997: 69.

\(^{36}\) Manorathananndin: tadudbhūtas tārṣo mithyājñānataphrābhavāḥ ० त्र्यष / tābhhyām samprayuktē cetane tadvaṣād vā hinasthānagatīs taj jāmety uktam.

\(^{37}\) See also the discussion of this passage in Bodhicaryāvatārapāndikā 9: nānā ca satyadarśanād avidyādi prahiyate, tatprahānāt saṃskārādiprahaṇakramaṇaḥ ० त्र्यषā prahiyate / ० त्र्यषेविपर्यासमाती ca
After Dharmakīrti, or, in different Śaiva traditions not known to him, the Śaivas had developed the idea that initiation removed not pāpa, but the three substantial impurities (mala): āṇava, māyīya, kārma.\(^{38}\) The non-dualists inherited this theory, but, on the authority of the Mālinīvijayottara, they re-interpreted the defilements as three forms of ignorance.\(^{39}\) A standardized set of expansions for the three defilements becomes commonplace (see e.g. Netratantrodhyota 16.56): [1.] āṇava = apūrṇaṃmanyatā, erroneous belief that one is incomplete, [2.] kārma = śubhāśubhādisaṃskāra, positive and negative karmic latencies, [3.] māyīya = bhinnavedyaprathā, manifestation of differentiated objects of cognition.

It is not impossible, here (see table 1), to see a parallel between Dharmakīrti’s false knowledge and the non-dualist’s erroneous belief that one is incomplete, and between Dharmakīrti’s craving that arises from false knowledge and the non-dualists positive and negative karmic tendencies. The third mala, that accounts for the differentiation of the objects of cognition, is something Dharmakīrti might have included also under mithyājñāna. It may be this closeness that leads Kṣemarāja to adopt at times a conciliatory tone, pointing out that the only difference of opinion is that the Buddhists refuse to accept that mantras have enough power to liberate.

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<th>Early Śaivasiddhānta</th>
<th>Dharmakīrti</th>
<th>Later Dualist Śaivasiddhānta</th>
<th>Śaiva Non-dualists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innate pāpa or a-dṛṣṭa</td>
<td>Two kinds of conscious intention: 1. mithyājñānasamcetanā 2. trṣṇāsamcetanā arising from mithyājñāna</td>
<td>Three substantial defilements (mala): 1. āṇava, 2. māyīya, 3. kārma</td>
<td>Three forms of ignorance (mala): 1. āṇava = apūrṇaṃmanyatā, 2. kārma = śubhāśubhādisaṃskāra, 3. māyīya = bhinnavedyaprathā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4 The process of liberation

What happens to the initiand after the binding defilements are nullified with Śaiva mantras? An overview of the possible processes and outcomes described in the Mālinīvijayottara is given in figure 1. At time T+0 the bound soul is affected by a descent of grace (śaktisaṃbandha). This occurs at a certain time of self-reflection (kālavīṣeṣa) and is dependent

punarbhavotpattinimitte / tataś ca tayor abhāvā tuṣārahitasya bijasyeva karnaṇaḥ saddbhāve 'pi na kimcid vihanyate iti / taduṅkanti – mithyājñānataduddhistasamcetanāvāsitaḥ / hīnasthānagatir janma tyaṅvā caitan na jāyate // iti / The reading of 261b is quite different: “Having given up this (most naturally etad here refers to janma, though logically we would expect a reference to ajñāna and trṣṇā) one is not born again.”

\(^{38}\) See Vasudeva 2004: 164–166, and the respective entries in the Tāntrikābhidhānakośa for definitions of these.

\(^{39}\) See Mālinīvijayottara 1.24ab.
Figure 2: The default case: liberation after death

$\text{death} \quad - \quad \oplus \quad \ominus \quad \oplus$

\begin{align*}
\text{dikṣā} & \quad - \\
\text{birth} & \quad - \\
\text{P} & = \text{pauruṣa}m \; jñānam \; (= \text{svaśvarūpa}) \\
\text{P}_A & = \text{pauruṣa}m \; ajñānam \; (= \text{puruṣa}niśthapātaka) \\
\text{B}_A & = \text{buddha}m \; ajñānam \; (= \text{bheda}buddhi) \\
\text{Mu} & = \text{mukti}
\end{align*}

on the fitness of the candidate. If the descent of grace is of the rare, extremely intense variety (tīvraṇa), souls are liberated immediately (mu1). For others, at T+1, ignorance (ajñāna) is loosened and there arises a desire to go to a Śaiva guru (yīyāsā). At T+2 the guru performs the ritual intervention of initiation using efficacious Śaiva mantras. Liberation can take place either immediately afterward, or after death (mu2, mu3).

This account, however, glosses over an important additional event that takes place during initiation. It is not merely a ritual of eradication (ksapaṇa), but also a ritual of conferring (dāna). The binding defilements (pasuvaśanāḥ) are destroyed and an essential self-knowledge (jñānasadbhāvah) is bestowed. It is after elaborating on this dual power of mantras that Kṣemarāja cites Pramāṇavārttika 2.258cd–259ab and charges Dharmākīrti with failing to take this aspect into account:

Svacchandoddyota 5.88, S1 149v: yat tu

nālaṃ bijādisamsiddho\textsuperscript{42} vidhiḥ puṃsāṃ ajjanmane /
tailābhyaṃgaṇidhādāv\textsuperscript{43} api muktiprasaṅgataḥ //

\textsuperscript{40} Abhinavagupta interprets this passage slightly differently in his Tantrāloka.
\textsuperscript{41} Kṣemarāja in Svachchandoddyota 5.88, p. 76: dīyaṭe jñānasadbhiyā h kṣiyante pasuvaśanāḥ l dānaśa-panasaṃyuktā dīksā teneaḥ kīrtita.
\textsuperscript{42} samsiddho Ed\textsubscript{mu} Ed\textsubscript{ma}, samsiddhau K\textsubscript{ed} S1.
\textsuperscript{43} tailābhyaṃgaṇidhādāv] K\textsubscript{ed}, tailābhyaṃgaṇidhādāv S1, tailābhyaṃgaṇidhādāder Ed\textsubscript{mu} Ed\textsubscript{ma}. 
A ritual admitted as effective for seeds and so on is not sufficient to end rebirth for persons, because of the undesirable consequence of liberation also [being brought about] by rubbing with sesame oil, or by burning with fire, and so on, only makes them objects of derision. For, in the case of a poison of either immobile, mobile, or artificial type, mantras quell its power to bring about its natural effect just as in the case of the seed, and this objection [of rubbing with oil] can [therefore] also be raised in that case. However (atha), anointing with oil etc. can only obstruct a capacity of the seed, but it is not able to add anything distinct, but it is said that mantras can do so. Therefore, because they have an inconceivable power, why can you not accept that they are also capable of neutralizing the bonds.

What kind of knowledge is this special kind of gnosis that is conferred by initiation? To determine this, Abhinavagupta proceeds with an heuristic evaluation in the opening section of his *Tantrasāra*. Knowledge, he says, is the cause of liberation, because it is the opposite of ignorance, which is the cause of bondage. Ignorance can be of two kinds, one present in the intellect (buddhigata) and the other implicit in individuality itself (pauruṣa). The former (buddhigata) is non-ascertainment (doubt) or wrong ascertainment (error). The latter (pauruṣa) is individualized differential cognition (vikalpaśvabhāva) which causes *samsāra*. This *pauruṣa* form of ignorance is removed by initiation. But initiation cannot take place while intellectual ignorance persists. Intellectual ignorance is removed by cultivating the discernment (*adhyavasāya*) of what must be cultivated and what must be rejected. Figure 2 shows these forms of knowledge and ignorance in relation to initiation and death. To this can be added the idea of the *jīvanmukta* who develops gnosis before death, a theory not discussed here.

44 *viṣasya* Kṣem, *viṣayasya* Sūt. 
45 *svakāryakaraṇa* Kṣem, *svakāryakāraṇa* Sūt. 
46 *viṣeṣakṛttvaṃ* Kṣem, *viṣeṣa* Sūt. 
47 *ta* Kṣem, *na tu* Sūt. 
48 The three sources of poison are toxic plants, venomous animals, and artificial or processed derivatives of these such as camphor. See *Manoramāṭīkā* to *Tantrarāja* 3.37. 
49 The proposed inference is: [1. *pakṣa*:] A mantra-procedure [2. *sādhya*:] is sufficient to quell poison, [3. *hetu*:] because it suppresses the innate power to produce the normal effect. [4. *dṛṣṭānta*:] just as in notes case of a seed.” ([1] *mantravidhiḥ* [2] *visapraśamanakṛt*, [3] *svakāryakaraṇaśaktinirōdakṛttvāt*, [4] *bījavat*). Here the reason should be again dharmaviśeṣaviruddha, yet Dharmakīrti does not disavow the medical use of mantras. As we see Kṣemāraja adds a different *hetu*: *acintyaprabhāvatvāt*, “because they have inconceivable power.” This alludes to a famous list (*manimaṇtrausadha*) of non-ordinary substances that can cancel the innate capacities of things. For example there exists a non-ordinary gem (*maṇi* = asbestos?) that can cancel fire’s capacity to burn, etc.
2 Kṣemarāja and the Saiddhāntikas

Kṣemarāja’s own teacher Abhinavagupta had placed little value on such supernatural displays as he does not subscribe to the probative view of initiation with the scales. He went as far as claiming that such pratyaya-miracles occurring during initiation with the scales are meant to give comfort to the simple-minded (mūḍhajana). While both the dualists and the non-dualists accepted that a descent of grace was a prerequisite for liberation, they differed fundamentally on its underlying cause. The non-dualists refused to admit any causal factors at all, for to do so would have compromised their doctrine of divine autonomy (svātantryavāda). Kṣemarāja therefore refutes the rival Saiddhāntika theories of a karmic equilibrium and a maturation of defilement at great length. The Saiddhāntikas, in turn, charged the non-dualists with a similarly specific catalogue of false doctrines:

1. Īśvara would act without deliberation when he punishes and rewards souls without cause or motivation.
2. Īśvara would have to create all realities at once.
3. Īśvara would have to bestow all karmic rewards to all at once.
4. Souls would lose their true form during liberation and would be reborn.
5. The scriptural statement that defilement is substantial would make no sense.

To get an overview of the structure of Kṣemarāja’s central argument we can look to his own brief summary of it that he included in his commentary to Stavacintāmaṇi of Bhāṭṭanārāyaṇa (late 9th to early 10th cent. CE). This pair of hymns reposed the question of grace as a dilemma: does the individual need to pacify the mind before liberating grace can enter, or is a calm mind the result of liberating grace?

Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118:

I waver –
O Lord, do you enter awareness when it is pellucid, or does it become pellucid because you have entered?

Kṣemarāja glosses this as “preside over with your power:” niviśase – svaśaktyadhiṣṭhānaṃ karosi.

Kṣemarāja expands this to subsume the two theories of the Saiddhāntikas, the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) and karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya); prasanne – paripakvamale samjātakarmasāmye vā sati (sati) Ed, manasi sati J1[08] R1[08].
But this is how the question can be resolved:

Your controlling presence is itself the pellucidity of awareness.

It is perfection, it is the highest level.\(^{57}\)

Neither option spelled out in the first stanza is acceptable to the non-dualists, for in either case Śiva remains beholden (sāpekṣa-) to some extrinsic factors or conditions necessary to trigger the descent of grace. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa’s second stanza presents the non-dualists solution: He identifies the active entrance (praveśa-) by Śiva’s liberating power of grace as Śiva’s controlling presence (tvadadhiṣṭhāna-), which is then reified as nothing other than the pellucid awareness that is the essence of the liberated state. Kṣemarāja explains the cpd. as follows: “Your controlling presence is nothing other than the unveiling of your autonomous powers by suspending immersion into the concealment of your true form.”\(^{58}\)

Kṣemarāja’s commentary then rehearses his main attacks against the Saiddhāntikas. If they argue that the descent of liberating grace is caused by either the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) or by a karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya) then we need to ask: What causes either of these two phenomena?\(^{59}\) If the answer is that they are controlled by Śiva’s superintending power, then they are redundant, and we should just admit that power as the autonomous agency responsible for liberating grace. If the answer is that there is no cause, then we need to ask why the descent does not take place for everyone all at once.\(^{60}\) If it is said that it takes place after a specific amount of time for each person, then how is it not the same as establishing a fixed time, since bondage\(^{61}\) is for everyone beginningless?\(^{62}\) If the answer is that for any given soul it eventually takes place somehow, at some unspecified time, then, unless we adduce some other dissimilar and sentient cause, we have the incoherence of impurity – unequivocally insentient because its intrinsic power is that of obstruction – producing a heterogeneous, sentient, effect in the form of maturation.\(^{63}\) If it is claimed that the time we are talking about acts as an auxiliary cause, then, when asked what this time might be, no answer is forthcoming.\(^{64}\) If it is argued that impurity gradually transforms into a different, mature form, then, unless we adduce another dissimilar cause such as heat\(^{65}\) in the case of milk transforming into yoghurt, we have the incoherence of an impossible

\(^{57}\) Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: prasanne manasi svāmin kiṃ tvam nivāsase kim u / tvatpraveśāt prasīdet tad iti dolāyate janaḥ // niścayah punar eṣo ’tra tvadadhiṣṭhānam eva hi / prasādo manasaḥ svāmin sā Siddhis tat param padum //


\(^{59}\) Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: tathā hi yadi malaparipākaḥ śaktipātaśaḥ karmasāmyādī kim cit.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.: ahetukam iti cet sarvasya yugapat kim na bhaviṣyatī.


\(^{62}\) Ibid.: kasmiṃ cit kāle bhavaṭīti cet sarvesāṃ bandhakoṭeh anādītīvat kālanīyamaḥ kim na kṛṭah.

\(^{63}\) Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: tat kādat iti kasya cit kathaṃ cit bhavaṭīti cet malasya svāsaktā nirodhakātaṇvāsthitasya jadasya vijātyakāraṇānupraveśam vinā paripākalakṣanavilakṣanākāryaṇanānupāpattiḥ /

\(^{64}\) Ibid.: kaś cid eva kālo ’tra sahakkārārami iti cet, ko ’sau iti praśne nattaram labhyate /

\(^{65}\) Milk needs to be maintained for several hours at a temperature of 110–120 degrees F to produce dadhi. See Vedamuthu (2006: 298ff.).
transformation into something heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{66} Kṣemarāja then makes the Saiddhāntika approximate the non-dualist position:

If you [dualist Saiddhāntikas] say: “This [transformation] will happen just in the same way as it does in the theory of [you] proponents of autonomous descent grace, for whom the variety of experiences due to karma, and also liberation, occur at a particular time, and for whom the relation of cause and effect relates māyā, time etc. in the universe which has god as the only agent,”\textsuperscript{67} then an instance of the principle of tenuous connection is at hand.\textsuperscript{68}

For Kṣemarāja the attempted rapprochement is unworkable, for the Saiddhāntikas do not accept the identity of Śiva (the liberator) and the bound soul (the one to liberated):

Because in the non-dualist’s theory, the lord himself, freely assuming the appearance of contraction, just as he appears as the various principles, so he also appears as [their] relation of cause and effect, that is to say as their fixed order, and also as the diversity of the respective experiences determined by karma which thus appear to be temporally sequentialized, but in all of this there is no individually [independent] reality for any of these temporal moments or karmas etc. Since [Śiva] projects in this way both the diversity of experience, as also, out of his autonomy, the diversity of [liberating] grace, there is no other here who is being punished or favored, and so this theory is faultless.\textsuperscript{69}

Kṣemarāja subverts the charge of divine bias by explaining that in a non-dualist system there exists no ‘other’ who is more or less favored or punished.\textsuperscript{70} A significant factor in


\textsuperscript{67} For the maxim of tenuous linkage see Kataoka 2010: 72–76 on Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s expression: \textit{na cāsaṁ paṅcāśad bhavitum arhati}. He explains: 1. \textit{cāsa} and \textit{paṅcāśad} both share the same sound \textit{cāṣa} (\textit{cāśa}). 2. \textit{paṅcāśad} means fifty in number 3. Therefore \textit{cāsa}s, i.e. a flock of the blue-jay (\textit{cāṣāṇāṁ samūhaḥ}), are fifty in number. We could consider emending our passage to \textit{cāṣaṁpaṅcāśanyāya}, but the expression \textit{cāṣaṁpaṅcāśanyāya} with the palatal sibilant is well attested in Kashmirian works, so we may also rather consider \textit{cāśa} an orthographical variant for \textit{cāṣa}.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti} 117–118: \textit{yatas tatpakṣe bhagavān eva svātantryād grhītasamkocābhāso yathā tatattattvātmānaḥ bhāti, tathā tadgataniyatapaurvāyātmakakāryakāraṇabhāvabhāshāsāntmanāpi niyata-karmatathalavacitryātmānanāpi kramabhāsāsamayena, na tv atra kālākarmādeḥ kasyāpi nījan tattvam asti tathā tāt̄aḥ bhagavaceitryam abhāṣayati, tathā svāsvarāitṛyaḥ anugrahavacitryam apītī nātra nigrahānugrahabhāh kaś cid anyo ‘stīti niravyaya evāyaṁ paksah /}

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}: \textit{idam atra tattvam, yac cītīśaktir eva bhagavati svāsvarāitṛyaḥ grhītasamkocā cirapārāpābhāhā parābhavābhāsāsanāpi kramabhāsāsanayena, na tv atra kālākarmādeḥ kasyāpi niyam tattvam asti tathā tāt̄at hābhavacitryam abhāṣayati, tathā svāsvarāitṛyaḥ anugrahacitryam apītī nātra nīgrahānugrahabhāh kaś cid anyo ‘stīti niravyaya evāyaṁ paksah /}

\textsuperscript{70} “This is the truth here: when the blessed power of consciousness out of her own autonomy accepts contraction and diffuses into the level of \textit{citta} and makes herself appear to possess many offshoots, and then again out of her own autonomy loosens the contraction in some region and flashes forth as full, that is the highest state.”
this perspective, is that causation in the world of transmigration is itself nothing but an apparent phenomenon manifested by Śiva out of his free will. Abhinavagupta therefore distinguishes the causal relationship into two types: an absolute, or non-artificial causal relation (pāramārthikaḥ), and an artificial causal relation (kalpitaḥ). In the absolute causal relation Śiva is the only existing cause and agent. This is so because true agency (kartṛtva) can only be grounded in autonomy (svātantrya). The artificial causal relation of everyday experience is merely an appearance, amounting to no more than a belief in personal agency, as discussed in Vasudeva (2012–2014: 213–215). Even in the standard example of a potter who makes pots, Abhinavagupta claims that Śiva is the actual, underlying agent. In the sense that all artificial causation is merely apparent anyway, liberation is not really caused by any of the factors adduced by the Saiddhāntikas. Or rather, it is caused by the same absolute cause as everything else, Śiva’s will.

References and abbreviations

K ed See Svacchandoddyota.
Kiranavṛtti See Kiranatantra.
Manoramāṭīkā See Tantrarāja.
Mataṅgapārameśvaravṛtti See Mataṅgapāreśvara.
Nareśvaraparīkṣā

Nareśvaraparīkṣā: Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Sadyojyotis with the commentary (prakāśikā) of Bhāṭṭa Rāmakanṭha, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī. Srinagar 1926.

Netratantra
dyota

Netratantradoyo: The Netra Tantram, with Commentary by Kshema-

Netrod 
yota

See Netratantradoyo.

Nīśvāsatattv 
asamhitā

Nīśvāsatattvasamhitā: The Nīśvāsatattvasamhitā. The Earliest Surv-

PV Ed 
ma

Pramāṇavārttika: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Mano-

PV Ed 
mī


PV Ed 
pra

Pramāṇavārttika: Pramāṇavārttikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñāka-
aragupta: Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛ-
tyāyana. Patna 1953.

Rauravātrasamgraha


S1

Svacchandatratra
dyota, Šrīnagar acc. no. 1054-II. Šāradā. 411 folios.

Sāṃkhya 
karikā

See Yuktidīpikā.

Sanderson 1992


Sanderson 2006


Sanderson 2007


Sārdhatriśatikālott 
ara


Sarvajā 
no 
ntara


Śivasū 
travār 
̐ 
rti 
ka

Śivasūtravārttika: Śivasūtravārttika of Varadarāja, also called Kṛṣṇa-

Stavacint 
̐ 
 am 
na

Stavacintāmaṇi: Stavacintāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with the commentary (vivṛti) of Kṣemarāja, ed. Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī. Srinagar 1918.

Stavacint 
̐ 
 am 
na 
J1

Stavacintāmaṇi, Jammu ORL1329. Šāradā on paper. Contains marginal glosses drawn from Kṣemarāja’s commentary.
Stavacintāmaṇi R₁ Stavacintāmaṇi, Raghunath Temple MS. 9632. Śāradā on paper. Contains marginal glosses drawn from Kṣemarāja’s commentary.

Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti: See Stavacintāmaṇi.


TĀK III Tāntrikābhidhānakośa: See Goodall 2013.


Tantrālokaviveka See Tantrāloka.


Introduction

For Buddhist philosophers the logical fallacy called āśrayāsiddha (a pseudo-logical reason whose basis is not established) is an intractable problem when dealing with something whose existence is not accepted by Buddhists as the subject of a thesis of their own, such as the Sāṅkhya’s pradhāna (primordial matter) or the Vaiśeṣika’s eternal ākāśa (space) and so on. Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, presented different approaches to this issue in his two works, the Nyāyamukha and the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In his earlier work, the Nyāyamukha, when proving the non-existence of the Sāṅkhya’s pradhāna through the logical reason “not being perceived,” he permitted pradhāna to be placed as the subject of the thesis by seeing pradhāna as a conceptually constructed object (kalpita), in order to allow the logical reason to be a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadhharma). However, in the Pramāṇasamuccaya he does not use this method, but addresses the problem in a different way. According to his new method, the Buddhist proponent can put forth the Sāṅkhya’s pradhāna as the subject of the thesis when he formulates a reductio ad absurdum kind of argument (prasaṅga) to refute (dūṣaṇa/parihāna) the adversary’s tenets. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to this technique for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha as the “method of hypothetical assumption.”

As Tom Tillemans has pointed out, Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 or 550–650?) also provides two ways to deal with this issue: The first is based on Dignāga’s solution found in the Nyāyamukha. In his Svavṛtti on Pramāṇavārttika 1.205–206 Dharmakīrti explains the word kalpita mentioned in the NMu as referring to an image that appears in the cognition and that it thus can exist as the subject of the thesis. This first method is designated by Tillemans as the “principle of conceptual subjects.” The second method is mentioned in PV 4.136–148, where Dharmakīrti comments on the word svadharmini in Dignāga’s definition of a thesis (pakṣa) given in Pramāṇasamuccaya 3.2. According to this second method, when the Buddhist proponent places ākāśa, for example, as the subject of a thesis, what is intended by the word ākāśa is not the eternal entity postulated by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, but any other entity called ākāśa whose existence is recognized not only by the Buddhist proponent, but also by ordinary people. Tillemans calls this “the method of paraphrase.”

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In the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Dharmakīrti also adopts Dignāga’s second method as presented in the PS, i.e., the “method of hypothetical assumption.” As a result, a total of three methods – two from Dignāga and one developed by Dharmakīrti – coexist within Dharmakīrti’s system of logic in order to prevent the problem of āśrayāsiddha. How then does he harmonize these three, especially the two methods adopted from Dignāga? If the “principle of conceptual subjects” is applied, the “method of hypothetical assumption” seems to be no longer necessary. Moreover, it is reported by Takashi Iwata that Dharmakīrti’s commentators, such as Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, have views on prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya that are different from how they are discussed by Dharmakīrti in PVin 3. The difference of their opinions depends on which of Dharmakīrti’s methods they ascribe more importance to.

The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine Dharmakīrti’s explanation of how to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha and to clarify its historical development from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti and on to his successors.

1. Dignāga

1.1 The *Nyāyamukha*: the principle of conceptual subjects

In the NMu, Dignāga explains the general rule that in an inference – be it an inference-for-oneself (svārthānumāna) or an inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) – one property of the subject (i.e., sādhya-dharma/property to be proved) is known through another property of the same subject (i.e., sādhana-dharma/proving property). In this explanation, Dignāga refers to an opponent (probably a Sāṅkhya) who insists that this rule cannot cover every instance because in some cases the subject (dharmin) itself is proved to be existent or non-existent. As an example this opponent gives the following reasoning, which uses pradhāna as the subject of the thesis:

\[\text{[Thesis:]} \text{pradhāna does not exist;}\]

\[\text{[Reason:]} \text{because in various individuals homology (anvaya) concerning the three constituents, i.e., pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), and confusion (moha) is observed (bhedānām anvayadarśanāt). (NMu [Katsura 1978: 110] T. 1628 1b29: 有成立最勝爲有。現見別物有總類故)}\]

His answer to this is: The thesis should be formulated as “The various individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e. pradhāna].” [If so,] the [existence of] pradhāna is not established [directly]; hence, there is no error [of the violation of the above-mentioned general rule]. (NMu [Katsura 1978: 110] T. 1628 1c1-2: 此中但立別物定有一因

3) Dignāga criticizes this *prayoga* by pointing out that its thesis is not formulated properly. The subject of the thesis should be “various individuals,” since otherwise the logical reason “homology” cannot be a pakṣadharmartha. Although earlier studies (Tillemans 1999: 175 and Yao 2009: 386–387) regard this explanation by Dignāga as similar to the method of paraphrase applied by Dharmakīrti in PV 4.136–148, there is a fundamental difference. While Dharmakīrti’s method, as will be explained below, § 2.2, just rephrases the subject of the thesis pradhāna into “pleasure, etc.,” the existence of which is accepted by the Buddhists, Dignāga’s method mentioned above changes the subject from pradhāna to “various individuals” in order to give pakṣadharmatva to the logical reason “homology.” Thus Dignāga’s critique is not aimed at avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha.
To this, Dignāga gives the following answer:

When the non-existence [of pradhāna] is proved [on account of its not being perceived], “non-perception” is a property of a conceptually constructed object (i.e., pradhāna) (假安立不可得法/*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmaḥ); hence, there is also no error of [proving] the subject of the thesis [with the logical reason].

Here, in order to ensure the pakṣadharmatva for the logical reason “non-perception,” Dignāga gives a certain status of existence to pradhāna by seeing it as a conceptual construction (kalpita). In this way, any pseudo-entity can be accepted as a substratum of the logical reason, and the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha can be thereby avoided. This strategy, following Tillemans, is called the “principle of conceptual subjects.” At the time of the NMu this was the only means for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha. In this connection, it should be noted that Dignāga shows here that using this principle enables Buddhists to put pradhāna as a subject of the thesis in a proper proof (sādhana), i.e., a proof that is put forth by Buddhist proponents themselves, even though they do not accept such pseudo-entities in reality.

1.2 The Pramāṇasamuccaya: the method of hypothetical assumption

In the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, while Dignāga deals with a reasoning that has the same thesis as the (Prayoga 1), i.e., nāsti pradhāna, he discusses it in a different context, i.e., a discussion about the reductio ad absurdum kind of argument (prasaṅga).

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4 See NMu (Katsura 1978: 110) T. 1628 1e1: 或立為無。不可得故。
5 See NMu (Katsura 1978: 110) T. 1628 1e2–4: 若立為無、亦假安立不可得法、是故亦無有有法過。
Dignāga refutes the Sāṅkhya’s proof of the existence of pradhāna, bhoktrbhogyayor guṇāgunaṭvaprasaṅgā ... iti. sa katham āvīta iti cet. na hy āgam āvītaḥ. yasmāt

prasāṅgo ’pakṣadhartmatvād anyo hetupratijñayoh //16//
dośoktyā dūṣanam jāṭatam pūrvatropagame sati //

[Objection:] Like [the Sāṅkhyas], some [Buddhists] also speak of another reductio ad absurdum reasoning (prasāṅga) [as follows:]

⟨Prayoga 2⟩ It is not the case that pradhāna exists, because [if the pervasion (vyāpti) you presuppose in your proof of the existence of pradhāna were to be accepted,]7 it would follow that both the enjoyer (i.e., puruṣa) and that which

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6 Words in roman typeface are attested in Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary (PSṬ) or in fragments, whereas those in italics have been reconstructed. The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS and PSV used in this paper is a result of the PSṬ seminar organized and led by Prof. Shōryū Katsura at Ryukoku University. Through his kindness, I have been able to use their reconstruction. As for the number of kārikās in PS 3, it is to be noted that recently the editorial team of the PSṬ 3 has adopted a different way of counting them than was hitherto widely adopted by scholars, e.g., Kitagawa 1965 and Katsura 2009, etc. While the earlier counting regards k.7 as consisting of only a half verse (i.e., 7ab), the new counting includes the following half verse into k.7. That is, in the new counting k.7 consists of 7ab and 8ab of the earlier counting. Therefore, the new number of the kārikās in PS 3 shifts back by half from k.7. In this paper I use the new way of counting. The reading of k. 16cd–17ab I have adopted here is a modified version of that presented in Katsura 2009: 158; there it reads as follows: prasāṅgo ’pakṣadhartmatvāt pūrvatropagame sati / hetupratijñayos tesām (or tatra) dośoktyā dusanam gatam // Cf. K (P129b3–6): de itar na ’ga’zhig gtsos bo ni yod pa ma yin te / longs spyd pa po dang longs spyod par bya ba dag yon tan dang yon tan med pa’i (yon tan med pa’i em) [see P129b8–130a1]: yon tan can gyi P) rang bzhin du thal ba’i phyir … zhes thal bar ’gyur ba gzhan brjod par byed pa de ci itar bsal te ’ongs pa ma yin zhe na / ’di ni bsal te ’ongs pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir / thal ’gyur phyogs chos can min phyir / sngon du khas blangs yod na ni // rtags dang dam bca’ gzhan dag la // skyon brjod sun ’byin shes par bya //; V (D44b1–3, P47a8–47b2); yang ’dir thal ba gzhan brjod pa gtsos bor yod pa ma yin te / longs spyd pa po dang longs spyod par bya ba dag yon tan dang yon tan can nyid du thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro zhes pa … zhes bya ba de ji itar bsal te ’ongs pa ma yin ’di ni bsal te ’ongs pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir / thal ’gyur phyogs chos can min phyir / khas blangs sngon du song ba las // de gzhan (de gzhan P vimi: de bzhin D vimi: D Kāñka) rtags dang dam bca’ yi / yi D vimi: P vimi: yiś D Kāñka) // skyon brjod sun ’byin du shes bya //

7 Dignāga refutes the Sāṅkhyas’ proof of the existence of pradhāna through the following process: First the Sāṅkhyas puts forth ⟨Prayoga A⟩ for proving the existence of pradhāna. ⟨Prayoga A⟩ Pradhāna exists because in various individual things homology (anvaya) [concerning three constituents, i.e., sukha, duḥkha and moha] is observed. (asti pradhānam, bhedānām anvayadarśanāt.) (2) In order to ensure the pakṣadhartmatvā of the logical reason “homology,” this ⟨Prayoga A⟩ is rewritten as ⟨Prayoga A’⟩. Various individual things possess one and the same cause because homology is observed. (bhedānām ekākāraṇatvam, anvayadarśanāt.) (3) The Sāṅkhyas adds the following reasoning in order to prove ⟨Prayoga A’⟩, because otherwise the opponent, such as Buddhists, does not accept that pleasure etc. are commonly shared by various individual things. ⟨Prayoga B⟩ In various individual things homology is observed because they have common effects such as joy (prīti). (4) Dignāga’s refutation: if ⟨Prayoga B⟩ is held to be true, the following vyāpti relation must be accepted. [Vyāpti:] Whatever brings about common effects, such as joy, etc., has a homology concerning three constituents. (vasya prītiyādī kāryam drṣṭam, tasya guṇānayam.) (5) However, because even a soul (puruṣa), which cannot be accepted in the Sāṅkhyas system as consisting of three constituents, can bring about an effect such as joy if it is used as an object of meditation by adherents of the Sāṅkhyas, the logical reason “having common effects” in ⟨Prayoga B⟩ would be inconclusive (anaikāntika). (6) Suppose that, on the contrary, the Sāṅkhyas does
is to be enjoyed (i.e., vyakti) consist of [three] constituents (guna), or do not consist of [three] constituents.

… Why is this an ávīta reasoning? [Of course it is not.]

[Answer:] Actually, this is not an ávīta reasoning because, since [its logical reason is] not the property of the subject of the thesis, the reductio ad absurdum reasoning is different [from the ávīta reasoning]. [Instead, this reductio ad absurdum reasoning is] understood as a refutation (dūṣana) because [it] points out the failure of the [adversary’s] logical reason or of his thesis after accepting [them].

Just before this passage, Dignāga rejects the Sāṅkhyya view that in the ávīta reasoning—a type of prasaṅga argument—the logical reason can prove the Sāṅkhyya’s proposition without its being a property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), and he explained that if the pakṣadharmatva of the logical reason in the viṭa reasoning for proving the existence of pradhāna is accepted (at least) by the Sāṅkhyya proponent, then the logical reason in the ávīta reasoning can also be regarded as possessing pakṣadharmatva because it can be reduced to the logical reason in the viṭa reasoning. 8

The Sāṅkhyya raises an objection against this explanation: In spite of the fact that for the Buddhists the (Prayoga 2) must consist in sound reasoning, the logical reason cannot possess pakṣadharmatva because the existence of the subject of the thesis in (Prayoga 2), i.e., pradhāna, is not accepted by Buddhists. As a result, it cannot be held that every sound logical reason must be a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharma).

In his reply, Dignāga, unlike in the case of the NMu, does not try to ensure the pakṣadharmatva of the logical reason in the (Prayoga 2). He rather agrees that the logical reason does not possess pakṣadharmatva. This does not mean, however, that he relinquishes the soundness of the (Prayoga 2). He is able to do this by distinguishing the logical reason in a proper proof (sādhana) from the logical reason in a refutation (dūṣana). While the former should possess pakṣadharmatva (and a vyāpti relation with the property to be proved), the latter does not. According to Dignāga, a refutation is simply a means of denying the soundness of the adversary’s reasoning by pointing out the undesired consequences which occur when the adversary’s thesis or logical reason (which necessarily includes a vyāpti relation) is accepted. 9 And since in the refutation what is to be investigated is the logical consequence derived from the adversary’s thesis or reasoning, the existence or non-existence of the subject of the thesis does not become a topic of discussion. Therefore, the problem of āśrayāsiddha does not occur in the refutation. Since the prasaṅga argument is formulated

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8 See Watanabe 2013.

9 See PS 3.13cd–14ab: hetupratijnādvāreṇa yatāniṣṭiḥ prasajyate // taddvāreṇa prayogāt* sa parihāra ।। ।।

(*sbyor phyir V: thul ba’i phyir K. Following K, Yoshimizu 2013: 433 adopts prasaṅgāt.)
after hypothetically assuming the opponent’s system of philosophy, this method can be called the “method of hypothetical assumption.”

2. Dharmakīrti

2.1 Dharmakīrti’s version of the principle of conceptual subject – PV 1 and PVin 3

In PV 1.205–212 and his own commentary on these verses, Dharmakīrti explains Dignāga’s previously mentioned Prayoga 1 (“pradhāna does not exist because it is not perceived”) presented in the NMu, developing Dignāga’s principle of conceptual subjects from the point of view of the theory of apoha. In the following verses, he explains why in the Prayoga 1 the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha does not occur.

PV 1.205–206 = PVin 3.53–54:
\[
\begin{align*}
anādivāsanodbhitavikalpaparinisthitah & \\
śabdārthas trividho dharma bhāvābhāvobhabhayāśrayah & //205//
tasmin bhāvānupādāne sādhye ‘syānupalambhanam & \\
tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogatah & //206//
\end{align*}
\]

The verbal object (śabdārtha), which is completely derived from conceptualisation proceeding from beginningless karmic tendencies, is a dharma of three kinds: based on something existent, something non-existent or both. When this [verbal object, such as pradhāna, etc.], which is without any existent substratum, is being proven, then the non-perception of this as being in such a way [i.e. as existing externally] is the logical reason. The non-existence of this very [śabdārtha] itself is not, for we do use words [like ‘pradhāna,’ etc.].

(Tillemans 1999: 176)

Following Dignāga’s description in the NMu, Dharmakīrti here explains that the subject of the thesis pradhāna is a conceptual construction and that this pradhāna does not have any external basis. But why can this conceptual construction be accepted as a proper subject of the thesis? This is explained as follows:

PVSV 105,26–27 = PVin 3 68,1–3: vaktuḥ śrotuś ca tadvikalpabhājāḥ, yathā-pratibhāsivastupratipādanasamīhāprayogāt, tadākārvikalpajananāc ca.

And both speaker and listener share such a conceptual cognition (i.e., a conceptual cognition coming from a beginningless imprint) because [the former]

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10 This method corresponds to “the principle of propositional attitude,” as it has been called by Zhihua Yao. In his article (Yao 2009: 393–396) he states that this principle was developed by Chinese Buddhist logicians, such as Kuiji, and is merely implied by Dignāga and the Indian Buddhists. However, as we have seen, this principle can clearly be traced back to Dignāga’s description in PS 3.

11 As Shinya Moriyama has pointed out in his presentation at the 17th IABS conference (21 Aug. 2014), Dharmapāla (T. 1571 188b12–14) also applies the same triple typology. The difference between Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti is that the former applies it to the classification of the logical reason, but the latter to the conceptual construction in general.
uses [words] according to the intention to convey a thing as it appears [to his conceptual cognition] and because [the latter, by hearing the speaker’s words,] brings about the conceptual cognition which has the same form [as that of the speaker].

Although the conceptually constructed pradhāna does not have an external basis, it exists as an image appearing to the cognition, that is, it has an internal basis. Moreover, since this internal image is considered to be common to the speaker and listener, i.e., the proponent and opponent, it can be a proper subject of the thesis.

In this way, Dharmakīrti develops Dignāga’s “principle of conceptual subjects” further by providing an ontological basis. He first advocated this view in his PVSSV, and in his later work it is included in PVIn 3 without any changes.

2.2 Method of paraphrase – PV 4

Dharmakīrti’s second method for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha is, in the words of Tillemans, the “method of paraphrase.” This method is employed by Dharmakīrti in his PV 4.136–148, where he comments on the word svadharmīṇi that appears in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis in PS 3.2. An example dealt with in the relevant passage of PV 4 is a Buddhist proof of the impermanence of space and so forth (khādi or vyomādi) through the logical reason “not producing sound, etc., all at once” (sakṛc chabdādyahetutva).

The Vaiśeṣika opponent raises the objection that if this reasoning is held to be true and is aimed at negating the Vaiśeṣika understanding of space as an eternal entity, it then follows that, because this reasoning negates the nature of space as understood by the Vaiśeṣika and hence the existence of that space cannot be accepted, the logical reason is categorized as dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana. Dharmakīrti replies to this objection by introducing the distinction between svadharmin (the subject intended by the proponent) and kevaladharmin (a thing that is not related to the subject intended by the proponent). In the case of the reasoning of impermanence of space, the subject put forth by the Buddhist proponent is not eternal space as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, but a certain entity called “space” whose existence is widely accepted by ordinary people. Therefore, even though the existence of eternal space is negated by the reasoning, no invalidation of the Buddhist proponent’s thesis can occur.

Although Dharmakīrti himself does not mention here the problem of āśrayāsiddha directly, this method is applicable to our relevant problem. Hence

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12 According to Dharmakīrti, although in reality the internal image held by the speaker must differ from the internal image held by the listener, these two are regarded as the same. For this fundamental problem of Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha, see Kataoka 2010: 267–269.

13 See PV 4.141abcd: yathā parair anutpādyāpyānvarvarāpam na khādikam / sakṛc chabdādyahetvād ity ukte. “For example, when [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once …” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)

14 See PV 4.141d’–142ab: prāha dūṣakaḥ / tadvad vastusvabhāvo ‘san dharmī vyomādir ity api / “… then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in a similar way the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity.” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)

15 See PV 4.142cd: naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana vidyate // “In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated], there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (sādhyas) at all.” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)
the logical reason “not producing sound, etc., all at once” is accepted to be a property of the subject of the thesis because the svadharmin of this reasoning is a certain entity called “space.”

2.3 Dharmakīrti’s version of the method of hypothetical assumption – PVin 3

In PVin 3, Dharmakīrti speaks about prasaṅga arguments formulated by relying on what is accepted only by the opponent. There, in order to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha, he also adopts the method of hypothetical assumption presented by Dignāga in PS 3. Dharmakīrti begins his discussion as follows:

\[
\text{PVin 3 4,4–9: } \text{yas tu paraparikalpitaiḥ prasaṅgaḥ, yathā deśakālāvāstāviśe-
\text{saniyataikadravyasamsargāvyavacchinnasvabhāvāṅtaravirahād anekavyrtter}
\text{ ekasya na deśādiviśeṣavatānyena yogah, tathābhūtasvabhāvāsyā virodhād}
\text{ bhinnadesādiyogena, sa ekadhamopagame } \text{paradharmopagamasandarśa-
\text{nārthaḥ, tadanabhupagame cobhayanivṛttiḥ, vivekasya kartum aṣākyatvāt,}
\text{ tasyānyatra vastutāḥ pratibandhāt.}
\]

On the other hand, a reductio ad absurdum kind of argument (prasaṅga) [is formulated] by means of [things] postulated by the opponent, as for instance:

\( \langle \text{Prayoga 3} \rangle \)

[Thesis:] A single entity (eka), [although] it is [regarded by the opponent as] occurring in several things, is not united with others which have differences in terms of place, etc.

[Reason:] because it is devoid of another essential property which is not obstructed (avyavacchinnā) by the unification (samsarga) with a single substance restricted by a particular place, time and state.

For it is incompatible that a thing that has such a nature (i.e., singularity) is united with those which are different in place, etc.

The purpose of such [an argument] (saḥ) is to show that when one property X is accepted, the other property Y is [also] accepted. To the contrary, when Y is not accepted, both are negated because [Y] cannot be distinguished [from X]. This is because Y is in reality bound to the other (i.e., X).

I will discuss the entire structure of this \( \langle \text{Prayoga 3} \rangle \) below. What I would like to focus on here is the passage beginning with the relative pronoun saḥ. In this part Dharmakīrti explains the purpose of the prasaṅga argument. According to him, the prasaṅga argument is set forth in order to show that a vyāpti relation between the logical reason and the property to be proved is established.

To this explanation, however, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent raises an objection by regarding this \( \langle \text{Prayoga 3} \rangle \) as a proper proof (sādhana). If \( \langle \text{Prayoga 3} \rangle \) proves the non-existence of a single entity, i.e., a universal (sāmānya) which is taken by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent as occurring in several things, then the logical reason of \( \langle \text{Prayoga 3} \rangle \) cannot escape the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, because for the Buddhist proponent the existence of the subject,
i.e., the universal, cannot be accepted as real existence. Or if, relying on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the Buddhist proponent accepts the existence of the universal as the subject of the thesis, then, because the consequence of this (Prayoga 3) is incompatible with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets, the invalidation of the thesis would occur. To this objection, Dharmakīrti replies as follows:

P Vin 3 5,1–2: nanu tathāpy asiddhir hetoḥ pratijñāyāś cābhhyupetādibādhā, svayam abhyupagamāntarāvasthānāt. na, parīkṣākāle kasyacid abhyupaga-māt.

[Objection:] Even then, the logical reason is unestablished and the thesis is invalidated by that which is accepted [by the proponent], etc., because [the proponent] bases himself on a different acceptance.

[Dharmakīrti:] This is not the case. For, at the time of the critical examination (parīkṣā) [of dogmatic ideas], any particular [dogmatic views] are not accepted [as its basis].

According to Dharmakīrti, a prasaṅga argument is used for the critical examination of a dogmatically accepted notion and any critical examination should be done without relying on particular tenets. In other words, a critical examination only concerns the logical consequence that is necessarily derived from certain characteristics postulated by the opponent as belonging to the subject of the thesis. Therefore, in a prasaṅga argument, the ontological status of the subject of the thesis is left out of consideration. As a result, the purpose of a prasaṅga argument is merely to show the vyāpti relation.

P Vin 3 5,7–8: nāpy asidhyādayah, yady evam idam api syān na vobhayam iti dharmayoḥ sambandhopadarśanat. ekāntaparigrahe syād eṣa dosah.

Moreover, there is no [fault of] the unestablished etc. because [in the prasaṅga argument] the relationship between two properties is shown as follows: if X were the case, then Y would also follow; or [otherwise, if the latter is not accepted], then both [X and Y] could not exist. [But if] the firm conclusion (ekānta) is grasped [through the prasaṅga argument], such a fault would occur.

As far as the purpose of the prasaṅga argument is restricted to show the vyāpti relation, there is no fault of āśrayāsiddha because in this case the first characteristics of a proper logical reason, i.e., pakṣadharmatva, is not needed. But if the prasaṅga argument is set forth for proving a property with regard to the subject of the thesis, then since the existence of the subject of the thesis is not accepted by the proponent himself, the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha cannot be avoided.

In this way, although he basically follows Dignāga’s method of hypothetical assumption, Dharmakīrti, by restricting the purpose of the prasaṅga argument to present the vyāpti relation, can successfully explain the reason why the problem of pakṣadharmatva is eliminated in the case of the prasaṅga argument.
2.4 Dharmakīrti’s theory of *prasaṅga* and the relationship between his three methods for avoiding āśrayāsiddha

Just after the passage in PVin 3 cited above, Dharmakīrti seems to link the principle of the conceptual subject or the method of paraphrase to the *prasaṅga* argument.

PVin 3 5.8–6.1: *na vā sati hetau, yuktiprāptasyāvaśyam parigrahārhatvāt,... asati tu hetau maulasya hetor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasādhanaparakāra eṣaḥ, na viparyayasādhanam, hetor apramāṇatvāt.*

Or no [fault would occur] when the proper logical reason exists [in the *prasaṅga* argument] because what is obtained by rational reasoning is necessarily grasped [through such a logical reason]. ... On the contrary, when the proper logical reason does not exist [in the *prasaṅga* argument], this (i.e., the *prasaṅga* argument) is a type of [reasoning] which proves, for the original logical reason (i.e., the reason in the *Prayoga* 3), the relationship between what is pervaded and what pervades. [But it is] not a proof of the opposite [of the opponent’s view] because [its] logical reason is not [established by] valid cognition.

In the first sentence of this passage, Dharmakīrti suggests that there is a possibility of the transformation from the *prasaṅga* argument to a proper proof (*sādhana*).

When the *vyāpti* relation between the logical reason and the property to be proved is acknowledged, one can turn the reasoning into a proper proof (*sādhana*), if both the proponent and the opponent accept the following two things:

1. the existence of the subject of the thesis,
2. the logical reason’s being a property of the subject.

If one of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the reasoning remains a *prasaṅga* argument that does not prove anything with regard to the subject, but simply demonstrates the *vyāpti* relation. But if these two conditions are fulfilled, the reasoning becomes a proper proof (*sādhana*) and hence no fault of asiddha occurs.

To fulfil the first of these two characteristics, the principle of conceptual subject or the method of paraphrase must be used. When we take (*Prayoga* 3) as an example, the method of paraphrase has probably been applied. That is, when the subject of the thesis “a single entity” (*eka*) is not taken to mean the universal (*sāmānya*) which occurs in several things, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent insists, but just a single entity like a form (*rūpa*), then the existence of the subject of the thesis is acceptable for both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Therefore, it can be said that in Dharmakīrti’s system of logic, the principle of conceptual subject and the method of paraphrase play an important role also for the conversion from the *prasaṅga* argument to a proper proof.

In this connection, the relationship between the principle of conceptual subject and the method of paraphrase must be considered. If we compare these two, it is obvious that the former has a wider range of application. To wit, when the proponent proclaims the non-existence of the subject (i.e., “X does not exist”), the latter cannot be applied to the subject because in the case of the method of paraphrase the subject “X” is paraphrased...
by a thing that is accepted by everybody as existing externally. Since the principle of
categorical subject alone seems enough to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha, why then
does Dharmakīrti add the method of paraphrase? Although Dharmakīrti does not address
this problem, it is likely that he restricts the application of the principle of conceptual
subject to negating the existence of metaphysical things such as pradhāna, etc. in the form of
“pradhāna does not exist,” using the method of paraphrase as widely as possible. Otherwise
the inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) might lose touch with external objects.

3. Dharmakīrti and his successors on prasaṅgaviparyaya and another
way to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha

As I have mentioned above, a prasaṅga argument is formulated by the proponent on the
basis of the opponent’s assumption with regard to some subject. Therefore, even after the
existence of the subject of the thesis is accepted, the second condition for avoiding the
problem of asiddha, i.e., the logical reason’s being a property of the subject, should not be
fulfilled. However, in the case of (Prayoga 3) the logical reason “being devoid of another
essential property which is not obstructed (āvyavacchima) by the unification (saṃsarga)
with a single substance restricted by a particular place, time and state,” i.e., “being devoid of
multiplicity” (*anekatvaviraha) is accepted as a property of the subject of the thesis, i.e., a
single entity, by both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Therefore,
it is understood that this (Prayoga 3) is more than just a normal prasaṅga argument. That
is, this prasaṅga argument has already undergone some alterations. This is the process, I
believe, that one can understand as Dharmakīrti’s formulation of prasaṅgaviparyaya.

Let’s present the vyāpti relation of property “A” by the property “B” as “A → B,” and
describe the establishment of the vyāpti with regard to a subject “S” as “S: A → B.” Although
Dharmakīrti himself did not explain the structure of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya, we
can describe it, following his commentators, as follows (here the sign “¬” means negation):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{prasaṅga} & \quad S : A \rightarrow B \\
\text{prasaṅgaviparyaya} & \quad S : \neg B \rightarrow \neg A
\end{align*}
\]

If this description is applied to the (Prayoga 3), the main structure of the (Prasaṅga 3)
would be expressed as follows:

\[\text{Prayoga 3–1} \quad \text{eka} : \text{*anekatvaviraha} \rightarrow \text{nānyena yoga}\]

This structure of (Prayoga 3) corresponds perfectly to the prasaṅgaviparyaya described
by Dharmottara, if the expressions anyena yoga (i.e., no negation of nānyena yoga) and
anekavṛtti are regarded as having the same meaning: \(^{16}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dharmottara’s prasaṅga} & \quad sāmānya: \text{anekavṛtti} \rightarrow \text{anekatva} \\
\text{Dharmottara’s prasaṅgaviparyaya} & \quad sāmānya: \text{anekatvaviraha} \rightarrow \text{nānekavṛtti}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{16}\) See Iwata 1993: 50.
Moreover, Prajñākaragupta also gives a similar interpretation of \(\text{Prayoga 3}\) as his second interpretation:\(^{17}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle \text{Prajñākaragupta's prasaṅga} \rangle & \text{ sāmānyā (= rūpādi) : vyāpitva → naikavyaktiniṣṭha-tayopalambha} \\
\langle \text{Prajñākaragupta's prasaṅgaviparyaya} \rangle & \text{ sāmānyā (= rūpādi) : ekavyaktiniṣṭhatayo-palambha → avyāpitva}
\end{align*}
\]

Although these two commentators differ in how they express the logical reason in the prasaṅgaviparyaya, i.e., Dharmottara uses a negative expression and Prajñākaragupta uses an affirmative expression, the contents conveyed by both are roughly the same. Therefore, it can be said that both commentators understand Dharmakīrti’s \(\text{Prayoga 3–1}\) as an example of prasaṅgaviparyaya. When we take their interpretations into consideration, it can be seen that Dharmakīrti’s \(\text{Prayoga 3}\) consists of the following prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya:

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle \text{Dharmakīrti's prasaṅga} \rangle & \text{ eka : anekavṛtti → [*anekatva]} \\
\langle \text{Dharmakīrti's prasaṅgaviparyaya} \rangle & \text{ eka : *anekatvaviraha → nānyena yoga (= } \langle \text{Prayoga 3–1} \rangle )
\end{align*}
\]

That is, \(\text{Prayoga 3}\) describes the following process of reasoning:

**Step 1 (prasaṅga):** Following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the property anekavṛtti is assumed with reference to the subject eka, and from it anekatva is logically derived although it is not stated in \(\text{Prayoga 3}\).

**Step 2 (prasaṅgaviparyaya):** But it is not the case that this anekatva is accepted by both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent, and it should be negated because it contradicts the subject eka. Therefore, anekatvaviraha is assumed to be a property of the subject, as is accepted by both. From this nānyena yoga, which for the opponent is an undesired consequence, is proved.

Despite the fact that the main structure of the \(\text{Prayoga 3}\) is a prasaṅgaviparyaya, which is in fact a proper proof (sādhana), Dharmakīrti presents this \(\text{Prayoga 3}\) as an example of a prasaṅga argument. Perhaps the reason for this is that he thinks prasaṅgaviparyaya can also be called prasaṅga in that both bring undesired consequences for the opponent.

Be that as it may, forming a prasaṅgaviparyaya is a method for ensuring that the logical reason is a property of the subject of the thesis, enabling Dharmakīrti, sometimes in connection with the principle of conceptual subject or the method of paraphrase, to transform a prasaṅga argument into a proper proof.

Now I would like to mention briefly how Dharmakīrti’s successors try to solve the problem of āśrayāsiddha. In commenting on \(\text{Prayoga 3}\), Dharmottara presents another way of avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha. According to him, if the logical reason consists of non-existence (abhāva), it is established in the subject of the thesis, as for

\(^{17}\) See Iwata 1993: 72.
example the universal, whose existence is not accepted by the Buddhist proponent.\textsuperscript{18} This fourth way of avoiding the problem can be described as the “method of simple negation.”\textsuperscript{19} As earlier research has shown, this method is also adopted by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi in their commentaries on PV 4.136–148.\textsuperscript{20} Dharmottara presents this view on the basis of the following statement of Dharmakīrti:

\begin{quote}
PV 1.26ab (= PVin 2 100,8): \textit{tasmād vaidharmyadrṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihā-śrayah /}

Therefore, a (factual) basis (āśraya) [i.e., a real locus] in the case of the dissimilar example is not assumed to be necessary here [in the tradition that follows Dignāga]. (Steinkellner 2004: 236)
\end{quote}

Since Dharmakīrti’s statement is based on Dignāga’s explanation of \textit{vaidharmyadrṣṭānta} in PS(V) 4.3bcd,\textsuperscript{21} the “method of simple negation” can be traced back to Dignāga. However, since neither Dignāga nor Dharmakīrti mention this method in the context in question, it might be said that in some way this method was invented by the commentators to solve the problem of \textit{āśrayāsiddha}. In contrast to Dharmottara, etc., Prajñākaragupta, when explaining \textit{(Prayoga 3)} in his commentary on PV 4.12, does not adopt this method; instead, he adopts the method of paraphrase, that is, he paraphrases the subject of the thesis “universal” (sāmānya) as “form, etc.” (rūpādi).\textsuperscript{22} In his commentary on PV 4.136–148, he uses the principle of conceptual subjects and then, as a second interpretation, again employs the method of paraphrase.\textsuperscript{23} It is thus likely that he chooses the method of paraphrase as his final view. Therefore, as far as the problem of \textit{āśrayāsiddha} is concerned, Prajñākaragupta’s view, when compared to that of the other commentators, is more similar to Dharmakīrti’s.

\section*{4. Concluding remarks}

As seen above, whereas in the NMu Dignāga avoided the problem of \textit{āśrayāsiddha} by applying the principle of conceptual subject, in the PS he avoids the same problem by employing the method of hypothetical assumption. This raises the question: Why doesn’t Dignāga use the strategy employed in the NMu, i.e., the principle of conceptual subjects, in the PS as well? It is likely that the difference in his two works of how the thesis is defined has played a role in his shift of position. The two definitions run as follows:

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{19} Tillemans 1999 does not distinguish this method from the “principle of conceptual subjects.” However, as Yao (2009: 391) has pointed out, these are two different things.


\textsuperscript{21} PS(V) 4.3bcd: \textit{sādhye 'sati tv asat /} (4.3b) \textit{vaidharmyeṇa tv avaśyam sādhyābhāve tasyaiva hetor abhāvo dārsaśtayavaḥ. paryuḍāso nisedhaḥ ca tathā satī vilakṣaṇe /} (4.3b) \textit{tathā ca satī pūrvatara paryuḍāsah, aparatra tu prasajyapratīrṣedha ity uktaṃ. evaṃ ca nityānabhyupagame 'pi vaidharmyadrṣṭāntah siddhah. Cf. NMu §5.1 (Katsura 1981: 63): 由是雖對不立實有太虚空等、而得顯示無有宗処無因義成。}

\textsuperscript{22} See Iwata 1993: 69–73.

Comparing these two, one of the most significant differences is the word svadharmin in PS 3.2d. This word seems to stipulate that, in the proponent’s own thesis, not only the property to be proved, but also the subject of the thesis (svadharmin) should not be opposed. Therefore, once a thesis is defined in this way, a Buddhist proponent cannot place pseudo-entities, such as pradhāna, into the position of the subject of his own thesis, even if he intends to prove the non-existence of such a thing.

But this does not answer the question of why Dignāga does not repeat the principle of conceptual subjects in the PS, for he could have also defined the thesis without using the term svadharmin. Unfortunately, no decisive clue can be found to solve this question. However, some possible reasons can be raised.

(i) Weakness of the NMu’s argument against the Sāṅkhya’s proof

In the NMu, even though the pakṣadharmatva of the logical reason in (Prayoga 1) is ensured by employing the principle of the conceptual subject, the Sāṅkhya does not accept the logical reason as necessarily negating the existence of pradhāna since for the Sāṅkhya, pradhāna is, by definition, not perceived, but is to be inferred. For this reason, Dignāga may have thought that to negate pradhāna, it is easier to refute the Sāṅkhya’s proof than to explain (Prayoga 1) more convincingly to the Sāṅkhya.

(ii) Avoiding unnecessary expansion of his ontological framework

In the NMu, Dignāga posits a kind of existential status on pradhāna by using the principle of conceptual subjects. But in the PS, he provisionally accepts the Sāṅkhya’s tenet of the existence of pradhāna (along with the vyāpti relation). Basing himself on this provisionally accepted tenet, he points out the defectiveness of the Sāṅkhya’s proofs. He may have thought this strategy to be more preferable because, unlike the case of the principle of conceptual subjects, it does not need any expansion of his own ontological framework. It is likely that one or both of these reasons made Dignāga shift his position.

Unlike in the case of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti is able to overcome these two weak points by his new anupalabdhi theory and apoha theory. Therefore, the principle of conceptual subjects again becomes available as a way to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha. He not only inherits two methods from Dignāga, but also adds a third, i.e., the method of

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1. **NMu** (Katsura 1977: 109) T. 1628 1a8–9: 是中、唯隨自意樂為所成立説名宗。非彼相違義能遣。
   “Of them (viz. thesis, reason and example), a valid thesis (pakṣa) is [precisely] one which is intended (īpsita) by [the proponent] himself as something to be proved (sādhya) and which is not opposed (anirākṛta) by incompatible states of affairs.” (Tr. Katsura 2004: 119.)

2. **PS 3.2** (Katsura 1977: 109) T. 1628 1a8–9: svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ‘nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumā-nāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi
   “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (iṣṭā) by [the proponent] himself (svayam) as something to be stated (nirdeṣya) in its proper form alone (svarūpeṇaiva) [i.e., as something to be proved (sādhya)]. With regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (svadharmiṇi), it is not opposed (anirākṛta) by perceptible objects (pratyakṣārthā), by inference (anumāna), by authorities (āpta) or by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha).” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 4–5.)
paraphrase. Then he tries to connect these three methods in the discussion of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. When the prasaṅga argument is used for refuting the opponent’s view, thanks to the method of hypothetical assumption, the problem of āśrayāsiddha does not occur. But when the proponent wants to formulate a proper proof, i.e., prasaṅgaviparyaya, from the prasaṅga argument, the method of paraphrase or the principle of conceptual subject is employed in order to avoid the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha in the case of the proponent not accepting the existence of the subject of the thesis. After that, the contrapositive (viparyaya) of the vyāpti relation in the prasaṅga argument is made in order to avoid the logical reason being an asiddha. As I have shown elsewhere, Dignāga has already indicated the possibility of reformulating a prasaṅga argument into prasaṅgaviparyaya.26 It is, however, Dharmakīrti who establishes this theory by using the methods for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha.

Note

After having finished my paper, I received Yoshimizu Chizuko’s article “Dharmakīrti’s Statement of Consequence (prasaṅga) in the Third Chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya” (Yoshimizu 2016). She takes, contrary to my understanding, the Ḥ Pravoga 3 to be a prasaṅga argument. The difference between our interpretations comes from how we understand the role of anekavṛtti in the Ḥ Pravoga 3. While Prof. Yoshimizu takes both eka and anekavṛtti as being properties of the subject of the thesis (Yoshimizu 2016: 1248), I understand eka as the subject of the Ḥ Pravoga 3 and regard anekavṛtti as just a subsidiary element of eka that has been added to explain the opponent’s assumption. In the passage discussed above, anekavṛtti is presented in apposition to eka. However, as Prof. Yoshimizu has also pointed out (Yoshimizu 2016: 1253, note 5), Dharmakīrti refers to almost the same argument with Ḥ Pravoga 3 in the subsequent part without referring anekavṛtti and gives only eka as its subject. See PVin 3 6,6–7: ekasya tu yathoktasvabhāvāntaravirahopagamād eva bhinnadeśādibhir yogābhāvah.

References and abbreviations

D Derge edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.


K PS(V) translated by Kaṇakavarman and Dad pa’i shes rab.


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26 See Watanabe 2013.


P  Peking edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.

PS(V)  Pramāṇasamuccaya(वृत्ति). See n. 6.

PSṬ  Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. See n. 6.


PV in T  Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā.

PVS V  See PV 1.


V  PS(V) translated by Vasudararakṣita and Seng rgyal.


Another Look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works
by
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu

Introduction

In one of my recent papers (K. Yoshimizu 2007a) I argued that in a fragment quoted by Karnakagomin from the Brḥaṭṭīkā (BṬ), which I call the ‘avinābhāva fragment,’ Kumārila (ca. 560–620) states that avinābhāva, the inseparability of the reason (hetu) from the thing to be inferred (sādhya), is not sufficient for a valid inference because it would even justify an inference by asādhāraṇahetu, which has no positive examples. In another fragment from the Brḥaṭṭīkā, which I call the ‘niyama fragment,’ Kumārila designates niyama, natural restriction, as the foundation of inference, illustrating this by means of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāvā).

In the avinābhāva fragment, however, Kumārila does not deny the necessity of avinābhāva for a valid inference. In the niyama fragment, avinābhāva is considered to have a sound footing in reality by means of niyama, which means that in the real world the existence of one thing is spatiotemporally determined by another thing, and therefore the existence of the latter is invariably inferred from the confirmation of the former’s existence. Inasmuch as the inseparability of one thing from another is considered to require substantiation in reality, it follows that this inseparability is reflected in the consciousness


2 Franco (2019) convincingly demonstrates that Dharmakīrti’s dates, which were assumed by Frauwallner as ca. 600–660, cannot be moved back to the sixth century. I surmise that Kumārila passed away about 620 CE (K. Yoshimizu 2015a: n. 1), before coming to know about young Dharmakīrti, whereas Dharmakīrti wrote his first work, the first chapter of the PV refuting the Mīmāṃsā view of the intrinsic relation between a word and its meaning, by thoroughly remodeling the idea of Kumārila advocated in the BT that niyama is the foundation of avinābhāva. Because Dharmakīrti made use of this idea in order to attack the Mīmāṃsā theory of word and meaning, we may rightly assume as follows: If Kumārila, a hard-core Mīmāṃsaka, had first come to be informed of this idea through Dharmakīrti, he would have held it too provocative to be adopted into his own philosophical system, contrary to the assumption of Frauwallner (1962). See the appendix of the present article. Moreover, showing that PV 1.335cd is a quotation from the BT, Franco (2019: 132–137) corroborates young Dharmakīrti’s acquaintance with the BT. Following Frauwallner’s unacceptable assumption of the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, Kataoka (2011: 47–60) errs in assuming Kumārila’s date as ca. 600–650.

of human beings. Therefore, the *avinābhāva* in the BṬ might rightly be called 'epistemic inseparability' in distinction from physical inseparability. In the present paper, I would like to elucidate how, before composing the BṬ, Kumārila attempted to substantiate *avinābhāva* through *niyama* by collecting from the *Tantravārttika* (TV) as many cases as possible in which he presents the invariable transition from one concept to another on the basis of the relation between two things in reality. In other words, I would like to reinforce the conclusion of another paper of mine (K. Yoshimizu 2011), that Kumārila was not indebted to Dharmakīrti for this idea, as assumed by Frauwallner (1962).

I. The conceptual transition modeled upon causality

1.1 Authorization of customs by assuming the existence of Vedic injunctions

In Mīmāṃsā, it is required that all provisions of man-made (*pauruṣeya*) scripture (*smṛti*) as well as traditional customs (*sadācāra*), if they pertain to religious duties (*dharma*), be based on the Veda. If the Vedic corpus one has inherited has no injunction that can be deemed as testifying these *smṛti* or customs, then it is, unlike in modern philology, allowed to assume the existence of corresponding Vedic injunctions in one way or another,\(^4\) as they are sanctioned by learned people (*śiṣṭa*), namely, by those who have received the cultural inheritance of the Vedic tradition.\(^5\) The popular festivals celebrated by the common peoples of different regions belong to those Mīmāṃsā topics where authority was discussed. The opponent in Śabarasvāmin’s *Bhāṣya* (*ŚBh*) lists the names of three popular festivals held in east, south, and north India\(^7\) and states that the authority of the Vedic injunctions assumed to prescribe these festivals is limited to the respective regions, in the same way

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\(^4\) For the chronological order of Kumārila’s works, see K. Yoshimizu 2007b: 213–219. We can outline the change of Kumārila’s attitude towards Dignāga’s theory of logic as follows: In his early years, Kumārila adopted it as a theory more excellent than those advocated in Brahmin schools. He proudly demonstrated his proficiency in this innovative logic in the *Anumānapariccheda* of the *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*), which holds formal logic to be neutral and separate from the religious conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism. In his middle years, however, having become active as a leading Mīmāṃsaka and defending orthodox Brahmanism, in the Smṛtipāda of the TV he criticized Buddhism as a heresy (cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015a). In his later years, Kumārila finally directed his attack to Dignāga’s theory of logic, and in the BṬ even attempted to find fault with “the three characteristics for a valid reason” (*hetutairūpya*), the basis of this logic, as I argue in K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1084–1096.

\(^5\) In early Mīmāṃsā, this problem was solved by assuming that the Vedic text containing the needed injunctions had disappeared. Kumārila, however, rejected this view in order to prevent heretics from making use of this excuse to claim orthodoxy. Instead, he proposed assuming that a corroborating injunction was preserved somewhere in other branches of the Veda. Cf. K. Yoshimizu 2012a: 650–654.

\(^6\) Cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015a, section III.

\(^7\) *ŚBh* 243,5–244,2: *anumānāt smṛter ācārāṇāṃ ca prāmāṇyam iṣyate. yenaiva hetunā te pramāṇam, tenaiva vyavasthitāḥ prāmāṇyam arhanti. tasmād holākād[ya]ḥ prācyair eva kartavyāḥ, āhnīnai-bukādayor dākṣiṇātyair eva, udvṛṣabhayajñādaya udīcyair eva.* “Man-made scripture and traditional customs are regarded as authoritative on the basis of the assumption of corroborating injunctions of the Veda. On account of this very reason to make them authoritative, they (i.e., traditional customs) have authority only in respective (regions). Therefore, Holākā, etc., are to be performed only by easterners, Āhnīnai-bukā, etc., only by southerners, and Udvrṣabhayajñā, etc., only by northerners.”
as the authority of the Vedic injunctions assumed to prescribe the number of topknots arranged on one’s head is limited to one’s own kinship group.  

1.2 Difference in authorization between regional festivals and the customs of kinship group

Despite its conservative position, the Mīmāṃsā school never considers the Veda as forcing human beings to comply with its injunctions unconditionally. Vedic injunction urges only those who satisfy appropriate conditions (nimitta) of entitlement to perform duties. With regard to these conditions, however, one’s living place does not matter at all if one lives in the so-called “homeland of Aryans” (āryāvarta). No matter where someone was born among the four geographical quarters, they are not endowed with a generic property (jāti) distinguishing them from people who live in other quarters. The generic properties recognized as real, at least by Mīmāṃsakas, such as humanness (manusyatva) and Brahmin-ness (brāhmaṇatva) never change regardless of where one lives, even if one moves to another country. Therefore, even if Vedic injunctions existed that were deemed as testifying popular festivals, their authority could not be limited to a particular quarter because one’s living place has no effect on one’s social affiliation.

In contrast, regarding the traditional customs of kinship groups, Kumārila adduces some examples of ritual details prescribed in the Śrāutasūtras specifically for people of particular kinship groups, adding that it is actually observed that such rituals are performed by these groups.

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8 ŚBh 244.2–3: yathā śikhākalpo vyavatiṣṭhate, kecī triśikhāḥ, kecī pañcaśikhā iti. “Just as [the number of] topknots one arranges [on one’s head] is regulated in respective [families], for example, some [families] keep three, some five.” For the śikhā to be arranged at the cūḍākaraṇa for the children of a twice-born (dvija) family, see Pandey 2006: 94–101.

9 TV 246.10–11: na tāvat praṇayatvadākṣinātvatvādijātāh praṇīcyodayāvidhvāvādijātāh sarva Praṇāyāvidhvāvādijātāh amūgataḥ kācārd upapādyate, yadvacanam upapadaṁ holākādyadhikāraṁ viśiṣyāt. “First, easterners or southerners do not have any generic properties which would be separate from every westerner or every northerner and inhere in every easterner [or in every southerner], and which would be denoted by an accompanying word, if any, that qualifies the entitlement to Holākā, etc.”

10 TV 246.12–13: yās tu manusyasatyavrāmaṇatvādijātayaḥ teṣu vidyante tāḥ sarvadeśavāsivyākhyāty avisiṣṭā iti nācārānurūravisēṣaṣaṣamathatha vena jhāyante. “On the other hand, the generic properties found in them, such as humanness, Brahmin-ness, and so on, are equally inherent in all individuals who live in any region. Therefore, no [generic properties] are recognized as able to qualify [the assumed Vedic injunction] to correspond to the [localized] customs.”

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9 TV 246.10–11: na tāvat praṇayatvadākṣinātvatvādijātāh praṇīcyodayāvidhvāvādijātāh sarva Praṇāyāvidhvāvādijātāh amūgataḥ kācārd upapādyate, yadvacanam upapadaṁ holākādyadhikāraṁ viśiṣyāt. “First, easterners or southerners do not have any generic properties which would be separate from every westerner or every northerner and inhere in every easterner [or in every southerner], and which would be denoted by an accompanying word, if any, that qualifies the entitlement to Holākā, etc.”

10 TV 246.12–13: yās tu manusyasatyavrāmaṇatvādijātayaḥ teṣu vidyante tāḥ sarvadeśavāsivyākhyāty avisiṣṭā iti nācārānurūravisēṣaṣaṣamathatha vena jhāyante. “On the other hand, the generic properties found in them, such as humanness, Brahmin-ness, and so on, are equally inherent in all individuals who live in any region. Therefore, no [generic properties] are recognized as able to qualify [the assumed Vedic injunction] to correspond to the [localized] customs.”

11 TV 248.23–25: yathāiva pañcāvattavam tu bhrūgīnāṁ, vasiṣṭha-śunaka-atri-vadhṛyaśa-vānva-samkṛti-rājanyānāṁ “nārāśaṁso dvitiyaṁ prayājasya tanūnapād anyeṣāṁ” ity anvayato vyāstiketāś cōpalakṣaṇasamabhāvād vyavasthitavidhavyasaṇān. “For example, the pañcāvattva is prescribed for the members of the Bhrūgu family. For the members of the families of Vasiṣṭha, Śunaka, Atri, Vadhṛyaśa, Kāṇva, Samkṛti, and royal families, the second prayāja [verse that begins with] nārāśaṁsa is prescribed whereas that [which begins with] tanūnapād is prescribed for the others. As we observe [these details performed] in this way through association (anvaya) [of practice with prescription] and dissociation (vyāstirīka) [of practice with the absence of prescription], we conclude that there are [Vedic] injunctions differentiated [by these kinship groups].” Among the offerings in the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the ājyabhāga (ghee-portion) scooped four times should be offered for Agni and Soma, respectively. But in the case of the sacrifices of the Jamadagni family, the portion scooped five times (pañcāvattva) should be offered. Cf. ĀpŚS 2.18.1; BhārŚS 2.17.7; HirŚS 2.2: 190; MānŚS 1.3.2.5. Jamadagni is compared to Bhrūgu in Jaiminiyabrāhmaṇa (JB) 1.152. Cf. Bodewitz 1990: 85 and 256, n. 22; Atharvavedasamhitā
Another Look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works

concludes that with regard to traditional customs, if one observes a life-style restricted (niyata) to a caste or Brahmin lineage (pratijātigotra), then one can infer the existence of Vedic injunctions restricting each life-style to the corresponding kinship group.\textsuperscript{12}

This argument reveals Mīmāṃsaka’s conservative view that one’s birth into a particular kinship group is just as deeply engraved in one’s identity as the generic properties of a natural species. This crystallization of one’s inborn social affiliation leads to the assumption that the life-style of Aryan kinship groups is regulated by the Veda, which has no regional difference in validity, just as the characteristics and the behaviors of natural species are regulated by their nature and not by where they live. Considering that this argument is modeled upon the laws of nature, Kumārila refers to a sort of rationale (nyāya)\textsuperscript{13} found in causality, namely that effect is compliant to its cause (kāraṇānuvidhāyikāryanyāya), and uses this rationale to infer that when observing an effect it must have a conformable (anurūpa) cause (avaśyam upalabhyamānakāryanurūpakāraṇānunāmānair bhavitavyam).\textsuperscript{14}

In this statement, the laws of nature regulating the behavior of individual entities through their generic properties are said to have universal validity because generic properties are not affected by the place where these entities are located or when they exist. Moreover, the effect (kārya) is said to occur passively as regulated by the cause (kāraṇa); the effect becomes the logical reason that actively leads to the existence of the cause.\textsuperscript{15} This reversal

\textsuperscript{12} TV 248,25–26: tathāiva pratijātigotrayatvaruṣṭatriṣṭikāryakāraṇakāryadvityaṣūnyavasthitavidhivisvaśāntiṃaṃpañapattir asūtī. “In the same way, from the fact that whether one arranges three topknots or one topknot is restricted (niyata) to each caste and each Brahmin lineage (pratijātigotra), it is appropriate to infer the existence of a particular injunction differentiated [by the respective kinship group].”

\textsuperscript{13} The first of the proponent sūtra (Mīmāṃsāsūtra [MmS] 1.3.16: api vā sarvadharmaḥ syāt, tannyāyatvād) asserts that a Vedic injunction, if it exists, must be a norm issued to all people (sarvadharma) irrespective of where they live. To assert this, however, this sūtra merely adds the tautological reason that it is reasonable (tannyāyatva) to consider that Vedic injunction works (vidhāna) in this way. Kumārila mentions the Kāṇva and the Samkṛti families. RV 10.110 is a hymn of Jamadagni, and RV 7 is the collection of Vasiṣṭha’s hymns. See Th. Aufrecht’s “Verzeichnis der angeblichen Hymnendichter gemäß der Anukramaṇikā” appended to his edition of the RV.

\textsuperscript{14} TV 245,14–15: iha smṛtir acāramāṃ copalabhya mūlaśrutiṃ anumānyamāṇāṣu kāraṇānuvidhāyikāryanyāyenaśāṣyam upalabhyamānakāryanurūpakāraṇānunāmānair bhavitavyam. “When one, having observed some man-made scriptures and customs in this world, attempts to assume the corroborating injunctions [of the Veda], one should invariably infer the cause that is conformable to the effect one has observed, following the rationale that the effect is compliant to its cause.”

\textsuperscript{15} On another occasion, Kumārila remarks that unlike effect, cause does not work as an indicator (gamaka) because in many cases it is inconclusive (vyabhicārabhutva), namely, when auxiliary conditions are not fulfilled, it fails to indicate the occurrence of its effect. TV 544,20–21: kāryakāranaṃ gamakaṃ vyabhicārabhutvā yathā kāryam. This remark is made immediately after the argument that the inference from kṛtakatva to anityaṃya is not based upon causality. Cf. n. 41.
of direction from cause to effect in reality and from effect to cause in cognition anticipates the formulation given by Kumārila in the niyama fragment from the BT\textsuperscript{16} and reminds us that Dharmakīrti assigns only the effect, not the cause, as the logical reason based on the causality between a cause and its effect (PVSV 3.11–16 on PV 1.2abc).

II. The conceptual transition from species to genus

2.1 Various relations in reality between two epistemically inseparable things

In the TV we find various cases in which Kumārila assumes epistemic inseparability (aviniśhāva) between two things. Illustrating the relation that makes one thing epistemically inseparable from another, Kumārila adduces the relation between cause and effect (kāryakāraṇa), between owner and owned (svasvāmin), and the accompaniment (sahacarabhāva) of two particular things.\textsuperscript{17} To illustrate the last, Kumārila says that if the constellation kṛttikā appears in the night sky, the rohiṇī will soon appear.\textsuperscript{18} As regards the relation between owner and owned, this might be considered a typical example of the relation between a substrate and its properties, both essential ones and those that are accidental.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} PVSVṬ 87,29–30: niyamasnarataḥ samyag niyamyaikāṅgadarśanāt / niyāmakāṅgavijñānam anumānam tadarśīsu // “If one who correctly remembers the restriction sees one member [of the restriction-relation], (namely) the restricted (member) (niyama), the resultant cognition of the (other) member which is the restricting (niyāma) is an inference in regard to such (entities) that possess these two members [i.e. pakṣas].” (Tr. Steinkellner 1997: 634, n. 28.)

\textsuperscript{17} TV 139,13–14: atha vodāhṛtaviṣayahetulakṣaṇam etat*. avinābhāvo hy aneya-kāryakāraṇa-svavāmin-sahacarabhāvādi-prabhedabhinnaḥ. “Or, this [merely] characterizes the logical reason given in the quoted ‘example sentence of exegesis’ (viṣaya). For, the epistemic inseparability differentiates according to the difference of the relation between cause and effect, that between owner and owned, the accompaniment, and so on.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 933; Harikai 2006: 307, n. 10. In view of the context of the section in question (MmS 1.2.26–30), this portion of the TV is included in the part of the pūrvapakṣa that construes sārpeṇa juhoti, tena hy amnam kriyate as a reason justifying the use of a winnowing basket (śūrpa) for an offering. For the contents of this section, see Harikai 2006. * This etat refers to the kāryakāraṇabhāva in ŚBh 139,1: nanv aprasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāvē na hetūpadēśōḥ. “[Some people] may contend that the presentation of a logical reason is made impossible unless a causal relationship is established [between the reason and the thing to be proved].”

\textsuperscript{18} TV 139,8–9: tat* tv ayuktaṃ. akāryakāraṇabhāvānām api krittikādīnām aśrūyaś vajrītīndram anumāpayati. “The word ‘day,’ which expresses a particular sacrifice [in the text concerned, that is, PB 22.9.1], makes one infer the [sacrifice] qualified [by it] even if [the sacrifice] is not directly expressed. This qualifier cannot occur [in the text] without the sacrifice.” * Cf. PB 22.9.1: catvāri trīrvrty ahāny agnisṭoṃmukhāni viśvajīn mahāvratam jyotistoma tirātraḥ “Four nine-versed days, the first of which is an agniśtoṃ [the three others being uktivas]; a Viśvajīt-day; a mahāvratay day, and a jyotistoma as over-night-rite.” (Tr. Caland 1982: 578.) This is the breakdown of a seven-day-sacrifice called janakasaptarātra (cf. Caland 1982: 578, n. 1). Moreover, Kumārila considers the restriction of parts by the whole (samudāya) as the basis for the conceptual transition from a piece of text to the entire text by which it is restricted (niyama), in
Moreover, Kumārila considers *avinābhāva* to include any kind of necessary condition when he distinguishes *avinābhāva* from the relationship between the subordinate means and the primary purpose (*śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva*), one of the Mīmāṃsā topics that is exegetically determined from ritual texts. For example, the study of the Veda (*adhyayana*), the installation (*ādhāna*) of sacred fires, the cultivation (*kṛṣi*) of crops for oblations, and the earning of money (*dravyārjana*) for rewards to be paid to priests are all necessary for the performance of sacrifices (*kratu*). But although a sacrifice cannot be performed without them (*vinā-asamabhava*), they are not exegetically subordinate (*śeṣa*) to a sacrifice because they are not prescribed in the text of the sacrifice.

As a further instance of a necessary condition, Kumārila applies *avinābhāva* to his theory of human action and Vedic injunction. In the Mīmāṃsā position, the ending of a finite verb (*tiṄ*) denotes the general form of intentional action called “bringing into being” (*bhāvanā*). Fully aware of the Pāṇinian rule that *tiṄ* in the active voice and the middle voice denotes the agent (*kartṛ*), Kumārila maintains that the agent is invariably cognized from *bhāvanā* on account of *avinābhāva* because if there is no agent, no action can be performed.

other words, to which it belongs. See n. 47. In addition, we may also classify the inference from an accidental property (*guna*) to its substrate into this type. Kumārila offers the example that one can infer the existence of a substance (*dravya*) from the cognition of color. Cf. TT 1368.15–18: *yathā suklaśādikunyo dravyena vinā na bhavatīty avinābhāvād dravyaṃ lakṣayati, naivam iha;* Kanazawa 1983: 932.

20 TV 654,10–15: *ayuktam evaṃ śeṣatvam avinābhāvalakṣaṇam / vyabhicārāt tathāhīdam aśeṣeṣv api dṛṣyate // sarvadā hy avinābhūtā rūpasparśādayaḥ kṣitau / na caiśāṃ tulyakalpatvād bhavaty anyonyaśeṣatā / svāmīna ca vinā dāsāḥ na bhavanti kadācana / tathā grhādayas teṣāṃ śeṣah svāmī ca nesyate // “It is not right to say that subordination is defined as epistemic inseparability on account of inconclusiveness, for we find this also in those cases that are not subordinate. As a matter of fact, color, touch and other [qualities of elements] are always inseparable from one another in earth, but among them, there is no [subordination] because they are equally arranged [in earth]. Without a master, moreover, there can never be a slave, a house, and so on, but the master is not deemed to be subordinate to them.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 932–933.

21 TV 654,20–21: *etenādhyayanādānakṛṣidravyārjanādīsuvācyaṃ prasaṅgiśeṣa (IO 2157, 6b6: śeṣa; Ānandāśrama ed.: śeṣī) tvaṃ tair vinā kratvasaṃbhavāt /* “By this (i.e., assuming *avinābhāva* to be the definition of subordination), one would have to say that Vedic study, fire installation, cultivation, earning money, and so on, come to be subordinate because without them the performance of a sacrifice is impossible.” Moreover, Kumārila finds inseparability in the hierarchy of social order, saying that when a king is invited somewhere, all the subordinates who are inseparable from him must follow him. TV 486,23–26: *loke ‘pi ca yat pradhānaṃ rājaśrībrīhīr va ca yat rājahānāma rājaprabhṛti kvacin nīyate tadātmanāvinābhūtāny amātyā-dīny arigāyany apy aśeṣāṇy ākṣipati. yadā tu kaścid bhṛtyānāṃ kvacid gacchati tadā tadāsambandhīni bhṛtyāntarāṇi padam api na calanti.* “Even in this world, a chief person, for example, a king, when invited to some place, mobilizes all the subordinate people who are inseparable from him, for example, ministers, etc. On the other hand, when one of the servants goes somewhere, the others do not take even a single step because they are not connected to that (servant).”

22 For the reason why Mīmāṃsakas insist on denoting *bhāvanā* through verbal endings, in defiance of the Pāṇinian rule, see K. Yoshimizu 2012b: 555–557.

23 A 3.4.67: *kartarı kṛt; 69: laḥ karman ca bhāve cākarmakebhayah.*

24 TV 914,1–2: *yādṛśas ca guṇabhūtāḥ kartārāvagamyate na tādṛśena vinā bhāvanopapadyata ityarthā-pattayānunāmenā vā śaktā gamayitum.* “No matter in whichever manner an agent that is subordinate [to the action] is cognized in this (finite verb), *bhāvanā* is impossible without an agent. In this way, *bhāvanā* is able to make [an agent] known through logical derivation or through inference.”
2.2 The inseparability of species from generic properties, and causality as its ontological background

Whereas an agent is indispensable for any action, action in many cases requires other kārakas in addition to agent. According to Kumārila, bhāvanā can bear relations with kārakas other than an agent without breaking the relation with the agent. To illustrate this, he refers to the following simile: When one sees a tree and notices that it is a śiṃśapā, one can also optionally realize the same object in other ways – as a tree (vrksa), an earthen thing (pārthiva), a substance (dravya), or a being (sat) – without denying that it is a śiṃśapā. This is because the specific property of a śiṃśapā, śiṃśapātvā, exists only in an entity in which generic properties of its genus such as tree-ness and so on invariably exist. Kumārila expresses the inseparability (avinābhāva) of a species from each level of its genus by saying that śiṃśapātvā is not inconclusive (na … anaikāntikatvam) in the sense that it never loses its ability (pratyāyanaśakti) to make the existence of the generic properties known.

Owing to this inseparability, śiṃśapātvā can be compared to bhāvanā in the theory of action. Upon hearing a finite verb, one may comprehend many things, such as bhāvanā, action, agent, time and other ideas. If the verbal root or the tense changes, the action or the time also changes; if the verbal ending remains the same, the comprehension with regard to the agent remains the same. According to Kumārila, however, we do not have to assume the agent to be the meaning of the verbal ending because, once bhāvanā is confirmed, it is invariably known that there is an agent. This can be explained by analogy with deriving the concepts of genus from the names of species; that is, we do not have to assume that the word śiṃśapā denotes any generic properties of a genus, such as tree-ness, because a tree is invariably known to be referred to when an object is called śiṃśapā, if it is accepted that the word śiṃśapā denotes only śiṃśapātvā. According to Kumārila, śiṃśapātvā is

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25 TV 914,7–8: yas tv anyatāpi vartamānah pārśvāgatasya bandhyaparitvājanyai ṣaṃbandhā yathā śiṃśa-pātvam vrksatvāpārthivrattvadravyatvatvasattveṣu. “On the other hand, there is a case in which a thing does not renounce the formerly cognized relation with another thing, even if it has come into the relation with something else. For example, [when an object is cognized as śiṃśapā] the śiṃśapā-ness remains in one’s cognition even if [the object is cognized as having] the generic properties of tree, earthen thing, substance, and being.”

26 TV 914,8: na tasyānaikāntikatvam, sarveṣu pratyāyanaśaktiyavighātāt. “It (i.e., śiṃśapātvā) is not inconclusive in the sense that it never loses its ability to make [the existence of] all of them known.”

27 TV 913,16–18: tad iha pacatātādiśabdoccāraṇād iyanto ‘ṛthā gamyante, bhāvanād ‘ṛthāvarthakkartṛta-tsamkhya-puropagrahakālaviśeṣāḥ. teṣāṃ tu kaḥ śābdaḥ ko ‘ṛthād iti vibhāga na jñāyate. īṣṭam caitāvad yā ‘ṛthāna gamycē sa ṣābārthā iti. “Now, when hearing the word pacati, etc., pronounced, one cognizes so many things, such as bhāvanā, the meaning of the verbal root (i.e., an action), agent, its number, the grammatical person, grammatical voice, and a certain time. Among them, however, it is not yet ascertained which one is known directly from the word and which one is from the meaning [of the word], and the meaning of a word is merely defined as that which cannot be cognized through anything else that is assumed to be the meaning [of that word].” Cf. Ogawa 1993: 1052–1053.

28 TV 940,12–14: śiṃśapāśabdo hi na tāvad vrksatvāpārthivrattvadravyatvatvasattaprameyatvajñeyatvānām abhidhāyakam ‘thā ca tadāvāsena eva śiṃśapātvam(*-pātvam; IO 2158, 39(152) b2 & Ānandāśrama ed.: -pām) abhidhatte. “For the word śiṃśapā does not denote tree-ness, nor earthen-ness, nor substance-ness, nor being-ness, nor the property of being correctly known, nor the property of being known, but it denotes only their particular form, namely, śiṃśapā[-ness].” Cf. TV 982,10–13; TV 1048,15–16.
inseparable from tree-ness because śiṃśapā is restricted by tree-ness (vrksatvaniyata) in its nature.29

Here, Kumārila seems to refer to the hierarchical relationship between two generic properties, taking into account the Apoha chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS)30 as well as Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 2.2.30, upasarjanam pūrvam, lays down that the subordinate item (upasarjana) forms the first part of a compound. Anticipating this rule, A 2.1.57, viśeṣanam viśeṣyena bahulam, lays down that whether a qualifier (viśeṣa) and the item qualified (viśeṣya) do or do not form a tatpurusa compound (2.1.22) including karmadhāraya is determined according to the cases (bahulam). In his commentary on this sūtra, Patañjali comments that the compound kṛṣṇatila (black sesame) has kṛṣṇa before tila because kṛṣṇa is subservient to tila; kṛṣṇa qualifies the object as black sesame by excluding white sesame and sesamoid of other colors.32 In this context, Patañjali additionally remarks that the compound “vrksaśimśapā is impossible because vrksa does not qualify śimśapā as a particular kind, for there is no śimśapā that is not a tree (avrksa).”33

In this argument, Patañjali merely deals with the semantic connotation of tree by śimśapā without going into the ontological background, but we can say that Kumārila implies an ontological relation between śimśapā and vrksatva in the phrase “śimśapā is restricted by tree-ness (vrksatvaniyata),” for in his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) he has already discussed the idea that a species is ontologically restricted by a generic property. In the ŚV, Kumārila affirms that specific entities are endowed with generic properties through their own nature (svābhāvi); to possess them they do not need any cause (na hetumān).34

29 TV 932,16–18: nābhidhātā kartṛkarmano pacatvādīśabdas tadatantavānābhūtārthābhidhāyivāt, yo yatantavānābhūtārthabhidhāyī sa tasya na vācakāh, yathā śimśapāśabdo vrksatvaniyataśimśapāvasya. “The word ‘pacati,’ etc., does not denote agent or object because it denotes a meaning that is completely inseparable from them. If a word denotes something that is completely inseparable from something else, then the word does not denote the latter, just as the word śimśapā [denotes only] śimśapā-ness, which is restricted by tree-ness.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 929.

30 Kumārila may have collected the essential predicates applicable to a śimśapā from PS 5.35: vrksatvā-prthividrayasajñeyāḥ pratilomyatāḥ / catustridvyeka sandehe nimitam niścaye ‘nyathā // “treeness,’ ‘earthen,’ ‘substance,’ ‘existent,’ and ‘knowable’ are [each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order, about four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order they serve the purpose of ascertainment.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: 125.)

31 The case in which a compound is obligatory, such as kṛṣṇasarpa (cobra = “black snake”), is an exception to the governing rule (adhihārasātra), A 2.1.11: “optional” (vibhāsa). Cf. Katre 1989: 121.

32 VMBh I, 399: 3–15: anyatatrasya pradhānābhāvāt tadviśeṣakatvāc cāparasyopasarjanaśāmājñā bhav三亚tya, yadāśya tilāh pradhāhānyaśaṇaḥ bhavantī krṣṇo viśeṣañatvānādā tilāh pradhāhānam krṣno viśeṣaṇam. “(Therefore,) since one of the two is the main (word) and since the other functions as the qualifier of that, the designation upasarjana will apply. When the sesame seeds are intended as the main thing by somebody, and black as the qualifier, then (the word) tilāh becomes the main (word) and (the word) krṣṇo (becomes) the qualifying word.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: 140.)

33 VMBh I, 399: 25–26: katham tarhīmau dvau pradhānāsabdaya ekasmin arthe yugapad avavṛdhetye vrksah śimśapeti. nātyauvāsayaḥ samāveśah na ha avṛksah śimśapāsti. “Then in what way can these two main words vrksah śimśapā ‘the tree śimśapā’ be locked up together to refer to one and the same object? The co-usage of these two words in the order vrksah śimśapā is not necessary, because there is no śimśapā which is not a tree.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: 147–149.)

34 ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, vv. 31cd–32: svābhāviṣeṣa ca sambandho jātyaviahyāt kathā na hetumān // tena saṃsārasya praviśiṣṭhadhyartham nāyata samānya layate / śāktisiddhiḥ evaasticsvabhāvo ‘tra na vāyaṭeyate // “The relation between an individual and its generic property is based on its own natural disposition and has no [extraordinary] cause. Therefore, for the purpose of the accomplishment of this (relation), no more universal is
Kumārila regards generic properties as a kind of intrinsic ability (śakti) of an individual entity.\textsuperscript{35} Generally speaking, entities of a certain kind are, by nature, invariably equipped with their own particular abilities, which can never be shared with entities of other kinds.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, because they are equipped with these abilities by nature, they start up their own activity of their own accord once they have been brought into existence.\textsuperscript{37}

Taking his own remarks into account, Kumārila maintains that there must be some causes for an individual entity to be brought into existence, but in addition to these causes, nothing is required for possessing generic properties. Once an entity is brought into existence as an instance of a certain species (viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu keṣucit), no external condition is required (nānyavāñchana) for its acquisition of the generic property of its genus. What is required for this acquisition is only a cause to that extent (tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇa), a cause that brings about the individual as an instance of some species or other that belongs to the genus.\textsuperscript{38} In other words, an animal has already been equipped with the generic property of a cow when it is caused to be born as an instance of śābaleya, bāhuleya, or any other specific kind of a cow, by a pair of cows, male and female, of the respective species. This view is very close to Aristotle’s idea of “universals in the thing (in re)” (cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015b).

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\textsuperscript{35} ŚV, Ākritivāda, vv. 17–18: bhinnā viśeṣasaktibhyah sarvatrānugatāpi ca / pratyekam samavetā ca tasmaj jātir apiṣyatām // tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhīviṣayo 'sti nah / sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhiṣyatām // “[This generic ability (śakti) of an individual] is different from specific abilities; [it] recurs everywhere [in all individuals] and completely inheres in each individual, and thus should be accepted as a generic property [called cow-ness]. Therefore, in our position, entities are endowed with an essential property that is the object of the cognition of the same kind, and one may call it universal, form, generic property, or ability.”

\textsuperscript{36} ŚV, Ākritivāda, vv. 28–29ab: bhinnatve 'pi hi kāsāñ cic chaktiḥ kāś cid aśaktikāḥ / na ca paryanyayogo 'sti vastuṣakteḥ kadā cana // vahnir dahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām // “Although [all individuals are] different from one another, some of them have a particular ability and others do not, and one should never bring the ability of a real thing into question. Who would be questioned about the fact that fire burns but the ether does not?”

\textsuperscript{37} ŚV, Ākritivāda, v. 33: yad vā naimititakve 'pi tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇaḥ / viśeṣesṣv eva labdheṣu keṣucin nānyavāñchanaṃ // “Even if [assumed to be] dependent on a certain cause, [the relation between an individual and its generic property] merely requires [a cause] to the following extent: once [an instance of] any species has been brought into existence, nothing more is required.”

\textsuperscript{38} In SV, Pratyakṣasūtra, vv. 146–148, Kumārila criticizes this idea as follows: the assumption that two things have already been established (niṣpanna) as inseparable would make inherence useless, whereas the assumption that two things require inherence for their inseparability leads to a regress (avyavasthā) of further intermediary (see Taber 2005: 108–109).
2.3 Kumārila’s reference to the proof of the impermanence by nature

In criticizing the Jaina theory that the soul (jīva), that is, the self (ātman) in transmigration, has the size of one’s body, Kumārila assumes the case that the soul consists of many parts (avayava), and from this assumption, he leads to the absurd consequence that the soul (jīva) would perish like a pot (ghaṭa) at some time because, he says, all forms of conjunction (saṃyoga) are inseparable from disjunction (viyogāvinābhūta). Considering the production and the perishing of a pot added as an example, we can substitute produced-ness (kṛtakatva) for the conjunction of the parts that form a whole, and impermanence (anityatva) or perishing (vināśa) for the disjunction of conglomerated parts from one another.

In another place (MmS 2.2.25), Kumārila briefly discusses the ontological relation that enables the inference of impermanence (anityatva) from produced-ness (kṛtakatva). Here Kumārila holds this type of inference to be different from those based on causality. Presenting this inference, he remarks that even between two things that are not cause and effect (akāryakāraṇabhūta), it is well known that in some cases one thing indicates the other (gamyagamakabhāvaprasidhī).

Moreover, in the ŚV chapter on the permanence of words (Ṣabdanityatādhikaraṇa), Kumārila enumerates three kinds of permanent elements (asamsktra-dharma) in the Buddhist Abhidharma, namely, “cessation [of the occurrence of a dharma] by means of reflection” (pratisamkhyānānirādhi), “cessation [of the occurrence of a dharma] without
reflection” (aprasīṃkhyānānirodha), and the ether (vyoman).\[^{42}\] Thereafter, without distinguishing between Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, Kumārila refers to the Buddhist theory that things are destined to perish (vināśa) through their own nature (svabhāvasiddha) without any external cause (ahetuka).\[^{43}\] Then adding two examples, he compares generation with perishing in terms of whether or not an external cause is needed.\[^{44}\] When something new is immediately generated after the perishing of an old thing, an extraneous cause is necessary. For example, a piece of fuel is changed into ashes when connected to fire, and a pot is changed into fragments when struck by a hammer. However, perishing is not produced (akṛiyamāna) within individual entities afterwards; rather it has been in progress from the beginning in a subtle form (sūkṣma) without being noticed; it manifests (abhivyajyate) in a gross form (sthūla) upon meeting a heterogeneous cause (vilaksanahetu) such as fire or a hammer.\[^{45}\] In short, perishing is the essential nature of an entity (svabhāvika) and is already established insofar as the entity is brought into existence (jātamātrapratiṣṭhita).

\[^{42}\] ŚV, Sabdanityatādikārana, vv. 22–23ab.

\[^{43}\] ŚV, Sabdanityatādikārana, vv. 23cd–24: tau ca dvāv apy anāśitvād īṣṭau ākṛtakā api // āhūt svabhāvavasiddham hi te vināśam ahetukam / hetur yaya vināśo ’pi tasya drṣṭo ’nkurādīvāt / “And both of them (i.e., pratisamkhyānānirodha and apratisamkhyānānirodha) are considered not to be produced because of their imperishability. For they (i.e., Buddhists) say the perishing [of an entity] is established by nature without [extraneous] cause because anything that has a cause is also observed to be perishable, just like sprouts, etc.” I am indebted to Dr. Taisei Shida for telling me about this reference by Kumārila to the Buddhist proof of impermanence without extraneous cause in the Sabdanityatādikārana.

\[^{44}\] ŚV, Sabdanityatādikārana, vv. 25cd–29: bhavati hy agnisambandhāt kāṣṭād arigārasantatiḥ // mudgarādhathūcāpi kapālam jāyate ghatāt / svabhāvikā vinināsās tu jātamātrapratiṣṭhītāḥ // sūkṣmaḥ sadsrāsantarvantyānāṃyānāt / yaddā vilaksanō hetuḥ patet sadsrāsantaḥ // vilaksanāna kārṇyaḥ sthūlo ’bhivyajyate tadā / tenasādārasantarāṇo hetoh sañjāyate yatāḥ / tenaivaśāryāmāno ’pi nāśo ’bhivyajyate sputah / sa mudgarapahāradīpravyatānāntaṇaśāyakah // “The temporal succession of embers proceeds from the fuel if it is connected to fire; and when a pot is struck by a hammer, a fragment is born from that (pot). The perishing [of the fuel and the pot], however, is based on their own natural disposition and established insofar as they are produced. [The inborn perishing] in subtle form is imperceptible on account of their existence in homogenous succession. When a heterogeneous cause happens to the homogeneous succession, then [the inborn perishing] is manifest in gross form by means of heterogeneous efficacy. In this manner, there occurs a heterogeneous succession on account of the (heterogeneous) cause. By means of this (cause), the perishing, despite not being produced, is manifest in explicit form. This [explicit perishing] appears as soon as one makes an effort, for example, to hit a hammer [on a pot].” Kumārila’s explanation of spontaneous perishing seems to be based on Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (Akbh) 193.5–7: samśṛtyāvāśyām “vyāyat” // AKBh 4.2.2d, aksāmikāḥ hit bhāvānāṃ vinināsah [The momentariness of everything is established] because the conditioned entity necessarily ‘perishes.’ For the destruction of things is spontaneous” (tr. von Rospatt 1995: n. 397), because the simile of the contact of the fuel with fire is applied in Akbh 194.1–6: yadi ca kāṣṭhād aṅgārasanām aṃyogōcīyata ko vinināsāḥ syād evaṃ sati pākajānām guṇānām pakavaratāmopattau “hetuḥ syac ca vinīśakah” (AK 4.3b). hetur eva ca vinīśakah syāt. “And if the destruction of firewood etc. was caused by the contact with fire etc., this being so, in the case of the more and more progressed origination of the qualities borne from burning (pākaja) ‘the cause [for these qualities] would be the [factor] destroying [them],’ [that is,] precisely [their generative] cause would be the [factor] destroying [them].” (Tr. von Rospatt 1995: n. 402.)

\[^{45}\] Kumārila insists, however, that the proof of impermanence cannot be applied to words (sābdo) because words are not produced but only made manifest by means of an utterance. Cf. ŚV, Sabdanityatādikārana, v. 39ab: vyāśākābhāvataḥ śābde ’py abodho badhirādīvāt / “As regards words, too, if there is no cause of manifestation, one cannot perceive them just like deaf people;” vv. 40cd–41: sann eva sādhanābhāvāc chado naivopalabhaye // kṣanikam sādhanam cāsya buddhiḥ apya anvartate // meghāhārāsaṃvaraṃ vidyajajantadṛṣṭvā // “In spite of existing, a word is never perceived insofar...
Another Look at *avinābhāva* and *niyama* in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works

The phrase *jātamātrapratiṣṭhita*, which conforms to *tāvanmātrapratikṣaṇa* (ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, v. 33), anticipates Dharmakīrti’s definition of the *svabhāva* to be proved by a *svabhāvahetu*, namely, *bhāvamātrānurodhin* (PV 1.2d & 39b).

### III. Limits of logical formulation in exegetical works

From the abovementioned examples, we may say that in the TV Kumārila has already conceived the gist of the *niyama* fragment from the BT as stating that if one thing is restricted (*niyamya*) in nature, namely, brought into existence under the control of another thing (*niyāmaka*) in reality, then the confirmation of the former becomes the logical indicator (*gamaka*) of the existence of the latter thing (*gamyā*). He also had the idea of the invariable one-way transition in the concept from an effect to its cause, and from the existence of a thing to its generic properties on the basis of causality. He was even aware that the inference of impermanence from produced-ness is an example of the latter type of conceptual transition. However, because every section of the TV deals with exegesis of scriptures, Kumārila refers only sporadically to the invariable transition from one concept to another on the basis of the natural restriction of various types.

Unlike Dharmakīrti, he never attempts to reduce various types of *niyama* to fundamental ones and relate them to each other. Moreover, in another exegetical work by Kumārila, the *Ṭupṭīkā* (*ṬṬ*), we find some cases in which the object to be known from an indicator that is inseparable (*avinābhūta*) from it is called “restricted” (*niyata*), instead of “the agent of restriction” (*niyāmaka*).

When one hears the Vedic injunction “One who wishes for heaven should perform a sacrifice” (*svargakāmo yajeta*), one may first, urged by the verb in the optative, feel obliged to perform a sacrifice. However, one usually performs an action in order to achieve a purpose one has set up in advance. The general form of action called “bringing into being” (*bhāvanā*) is, therefore, said to be inseparable from the motivation to achieve a purpose (*prayojyādibhir avinābhūtā*). Then, paying attention to another word in this injunction that describes the entitled person (*adhikārin*), “one who desires heaven” (*svargakāmaḥ*),

as the means [of its perception, i.e., an utterance] is absent. And the cognition of that (word) conforms to the means that remains only for a moment, just like the sight caused by a flash of lightning during a dark night covered with clouds.” Cf. ŚV, *Śabdanityatādikaraṇa*, vv. 424–425; von Rospatt 1995: n. 369. Kumārila also denies the momentariness of things for everyday use. ŚV, *Śabdanityatādikaraṇa*, v. 426: *ksanabhango ghatudīnāṁ vāryas tair eva sādhanaḥ l tathāiva prayābhiṣijāṇād, yāvad drṣṭaṁ na bādhate // “The momentary perishing of a pot, etc., is, to be rejected for the same reasons [as those given in vv. 416–421 in order to disprove the momentary perishing of words]. Because [a pot] is recognized to be the same [as a few moments before], [the continuation of its identity] is not denied insofar as it remains to be perceived.”

46 Cf. n. 41.

47 Based on a holistic view that the whole pervades (*vyāpakā*) its parts and parts are restricted (*niyamya*) by the whole they form, Kumārila maintains an exegetical principle that a word that directly refers to a Rgveda verse (*ṛc*) indirectly indicates the whole text of the *Rgvedasamhitā*. Cf. TV 807, 17–18: *vedaḥ ca vyāpakatvād ahetulakṣaṇayuktah san na śaknoty eva vāyaṇavam lakṣaṇayitum. rgādayas tu niyamayatvāt samudāyam lakṣayanti. “Because [an entire text of] the Veda pervades [all of its parts], it is not fit for the definition of a logical reason. Therefore, it cannot indirectly denote its part. The verses of *ṛc*, etc., on the other hand, indirectly denote the whole [text of the *Rgvedasamhitā*] on account of being restricted [by the whole].”
one may come to be aware that the purpose to perform the sacrifice is a particular kind of something valuable for a human being (puruṣārtha), namely, heaven (svarga). In this way, focused on the verb in the optative at first, one may simply feel one’s duty to perform a sacrifice (yāgasya kartavyatā), but this sense of unconditional duty is suspended and replaced by the motivation to achieve heaven by performing a sacrifice.

However, accepting that the performance of a sacrifice is motivated by something valuable for human beings, Kumārila calls this goal of conceptual transition “restricted” (niyata-puruṣārtha-prayojyatva), instead of calling it the agent of restriction (niyāmaka) in view of the causa finalis. Nor does he consider the performance of a sacrifice to be the niyāmaka in view of the causa efficiens, for he assumes that the efficacy of a sacrifice is based on nothing other than the Vedic injunction (vidhi).

In the case of Dharmakīrti’s logic, the arising of an effect (kāryotpāda) is inferred from the “complete cause” (kāraṇasāmagrī), in other words, when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled in addition to the existence of the main cause (PVSV 6,22–7,12 on PV 1.7–8).

Although Kumārila analogically compares the performance of a sacrifice to ordinary activities such as farming for a harvest, it is impossible to consider the performance of a sacrifice a “complete cause” (kāraṇasāmagrī) for attaining a result such as heaven.

48 ṬṬ 1352,16–18: ānantaryaśrutyā yāgasya kartavyatā. pratrayaḥ punah svārthe bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayati. sā ca prayojyādibhir avinābhūtā, tena yan niyamitaṃ tad eva puruṣārtham prayojyatvānākāṅkṣati, na yāgam. “No sooner than one has heard the injunction, one recognizes that the sacrifice is to be performed. The ending [of the verb in the injunction], however, prompts one to exert oneself for bhāvanā, its own meaning. And this (bhāvanā [of one’s activity]) is inseparable from its purpose, etc. [that is, purpose (sādhyā), means (sādhanā) and the mode of performance (itikartavyatā)]. For its purpose (prayojya), [the bhāvanā] requires only the things valuable for a human being insofar as they are restricted (niyamita) by that (injunction), not the sacrifice itself.” Kumārila distinguishes two kinds of bhāvanā (cf. TV 378,20–21). The bhāvanā discussed in this context is the “intentional force for activity” (arthātmabhāvanā), the general form of one’s action that requires a purpose to be achieved by the one who performed the action, but not the “verbal force for activity” (abhidhābhāvanā). The bhāvanā, which is the function of the verbal ending of an injunction to urge one to exert one’s bhāvanā.

49 ṬṬ 1352,23–25: tasāṃ naiva kadācid yāge prayayaḥ upanipatati saty evānantarye. aṣṭavaḥ pṛaptaḥ pāramparyena vāvinābhūtā, tasmād yāgasya kartavyatā prāptāḥ, sā bhāvanāśabdasya niyatapuruṣārthaprāpyavatvād bādhyaṭe. “Therefore, the verbal ending never happens to be directed to the sacrifice even though it is immediately cognized. Thus, no matter in what statement a duty is enjoined, something valuable for a human being is inseparably connected [to that duty], whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the sacrifice is to be performed [for its own sake], this assumption is given up because the word that [urges the hearer to exert his] bhāvanā has [the hearer’s] purpose [in performing the sacrifice] restricted [by the injunction] to something valuable for a human being.”

50 In his commentary on the ṬṬ, Pārthasārathiniśā remarks that what Kumārila refers to by the pronoun tena, by which the purpose in performing the sacrifice is restricted to a particular puruṣārtha (ṬṬ 1352,17: tena yan niyamitaṃ tad eva puruṣārtham prayojyatvānākāṅkṣati), is not the action of sacrifice but the injunction (vidhi) that prompts human beings by nature (puruṣapravartanāmaka). Cf. TR 390,10–13.

51 TV 395,3–6: laukikam cāpi yat karma phale kālāntarodgatā / tatāpi śakti evāste na tv āpārvam iheṣyate // yāny api ca laukikāni kṛṣighṛtapānādhyayanaprabhṛtīti karmāṇi kālāntarpārtha eveti teṣām api svarūpāvasthānāsambhavāhī samśāśāvair eva tisthadbhir vyavahārasiddhāh. “Even in worldly activities, there must remain an ability that brings about its result later on, but [such ability] is not recognized as apūrva in this (science of exegesis, mīmāṃsā). Such worldly activities as cultivation, drinking ghee, and study are accepted to have their result later on. Because they do not continue to
because we cannot clarify why or how a sacrifice can bring about a result by empirically investigating its mechanism. This is because in Mīmāṃsā it is firmly presupposed that the Veda alone has authority over religious duties (dharma); there is no need to resort to empirical knowledge.

**Conclusion**

Despite assuming human rationality to be subordinate to Vedic authority as far as religious duties are concerned, Kumārila never advocates an extreme fundamentalism in which human beings are incapable of acquiring any knowledge without Vedic revelation. On the contrary, Kumārila clearly states that there are many fields to be investigated on the basis of empirical observation, giving many examples concerning the man-made scriptures (smṛtis) and the sciences ancillary to the Veda (vedāṅgas).⁵² Accordingly, we may safely conjecture that after having completed the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila continued to study logical reasoning while compiling such exegetical works as the Tantravārttika and the Tuṭṭīkā. Finally, in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, he declared natural restriction (niyama) to be the foundation of epistemic inseparability (avīnābhāva).⁵³

**References and abbreviations**

A Aṣṭādhyāyī.

AK Abhidharmakośa. See AKBh.


exist in their own form [until the time of the appearing of the result], these ordinary activities are accomplished through certain dispositions that continue [until then].”

⁵² Cf. TV 166,27–28: *tatra yāvad dharmamokṣasambandhit tad vedaprabhavam, yat tv arthasukhiṣayam tal lokavyavahārāpūrṇakam iti vivektavyam “Among those (smṛti texts), the portions have their origin in the Veda insofar as they pertain to duties and emancipation, but those concerned with profit and pleasure are to be distinguished because they are based on worldly activities;” 166,29–167,1: *yat tu prthivivihāragakathānam tad dharmādharmasādhanaprabhogapradeśavivekāya kimcid darśanapūrṇakam kimcid vedamūlam, vaṃsānukramanam api brāhmaṇa-kṣatriya-jāgāt-gotiṣṭhāntām darsanamaraṇamūlam “The reports of the various parts of the earth are partly based on observance and partly on the Veda, for the purpose of distinguishing the regions appropriate for receiving the reward for having performed dharma and adharma. In addition, the chronicles of genealogies, which serve to know the caste and lineage of Brahmins and Kṣatriyas, are based on observance and legends;” 167,4: *aṅgavidyānam api kṛtra-dharmaprārthi-pratipādanam lokavedapūrṇakatvena vivektavyam “Also in the ancillary sciences [of the Veda], one should distinguish between the portions based on the Veda for informing what is valuable for the sacrifice, and the portions based on the ordinary world for informing what is valuable for human beings.”

⁵³ See appendix for a reply to Ernst Steinkellner.


MmŚ Mimāṁsāśūtra. See TV.


PS 5 Pramāṇasamuccaya, the fifth chapter. See Pind 2015: Appendix 1.

PV 1 Pramāṇavārttika, the first chapter. See PVSV.


ŚBh Śābarabhāṣya. See TV.


In his PVSV on PV 1.1, after having concisely explained the three kinds of logical reason (PV 1.1b: hetus tridhaiva saḥ), namely, effect (kārya), essential property (svabhāva), and the absence of the perception (anupalabdhi) of a perceptible thing, Dharmakīrti summarizes that the first two are reasons for affirmation (vastusādhanau) and the last one for negation (pratiṣedhahetuḥ) (PVSV 2,19). Then, in order to briefly answer why logical reasons must be one of these three kinds, he introduces svabhāvapratibandha, which takes either one of the two forms: tādātmya (PVSV 2,21: tadātmatva), that is, the relation between an essential property (bhāva) and another essential property (svabhāva) of one and the same thing; or tadutpatti (PVSV 3,4), that is, causality between two different (anyā) things.

Then, after a short interlude, he briefly explains how an inferential cognition can be a pramāṇa on account of its non-deviation (avyabhicāra) from its object, saying “Because, between the [two] things one of which is not dependent on the other, there is no restriction [that would account] for an invariable occurrence [of the latter] with [the former]” (PVSV 3,9: anāyattarūpāṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt). This phrase can be considered the logical inverse (¬P→¬Q) of the general law (P→Q) given in PVSV 2,19–20: “Because, if [one thing] is bound [by the other] by nature, the former does not deviate from the latter” (svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty arthaḥ arthaṃ na vyabhicarati). If P and Q are logically equivalent, the conditional sentence “P→Q” as well as its inverse “¬P→¬Q” holds good (cf. Oetke 1992: 198–199). What is called āyattarūpa is something A whose essence (rūpa, i.e., svabhāva) is dependent on (āyatta), in other words, bound (pratibaddha) by, the other thing B.\(^{54}\) Sahabhāva, that is, the invariable occurrence (bhāva) of B with (saha) A, is logically equivalent to its contraposition, namely, avinābhāva, that is, the never-occurrence (a-bhāva) of A without (vinā) B, which can be paraphrased as artho (A) artham (B) na vyabhicarati. Thus, sahabhāvaniyama is said to be the restriction of A's nature by B for making the conceptual occurrence of B with A invariable; but it is unlikely that in this

\(^{54}\) For the synonymy between āyatta and pratibaddha, see Y. Fukuda’s article in the present volume.
context *sahabhāva* is said to be restricted (*niyata*) to the three modes in accord with the three kinds of logical reason including non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) that leads to non-existence, because what is argued about is the cognition of the two kinds of object to be affirmatively inferred (PVSV 3,5: *etāv dvāv anumeyapratyayau*), namely, *svabhāva* and cause (*kārana*).

In the PVSV on PV 1.2a–c, in which *kāryahetu* is defined, *niyama* is the name of the state of real affairs in which the production of effect is regulated by its cause (3,11–12: *tadutpattiniyama*; 3,16: *tatkāryatvaniyama*). Later, concerning an inference of one thing from another different (*anya*) thing that is neither its effect nor its cause (PVSV 7,12: *akāryakāraṇabhūta*, cf. Steinkellner 2013, vol. I: 19), Dharmakīrti repeats the content of the phrase *anāyattarūpāṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt* in PVSV 8,12–13: *apratiḥaddhāsvabhāvasya* *avinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt*, in which *sahabhāvaniyama* is explicitly replaced with *avinābhāvaniyama*. As regards the immediately preceding sentence, “Hence there is no other logical reason that makes [it] known” (PVSV 8,12: *tena nānyo hetur gamako ‘sti*), Kānkapagomin glosses “no other” (*nānyo*) with “nothing other than a *hetu* of [either one of] the three kinds” (PVSVṬ 49,14: *trividhād dhetor nānyo*; 50,6: *hetutrayavyatirekena nānyo*). But this gloss is off the mark. What is intended here with “no other” is “nothing other than a *kāryahetu*,” because this sentence is Dharmakīrti’s own comment on the last part of PV 1.10, *tat kāryaliṅgajā*, which concludes that the inferential cognition from a particular taste (*rasa*) to a particular color (*rūpa*) arises from the epistemic application of a special type of causality that brings about two effects simultaneously. In the rest of his commentary on PV 1.10 and from PV 1.11 onwards, Dharmakīrti goes on arguing about how to apply causality in inference.

Moreover, in the PVSV on PV 1.2cd, which defines *svabhāvahetu*, it is said that what is not spatiotemporally present (B) in the presence of something (A) is not restricted to its later presence (4,3: *tadbhāve ‘bhūtasya paścād bhāvaniyamābhāvāt*), in other words, will not necessarily appear later on. With this lack of *paścādbhāva-niyama* in case of the absence of something B when another thing A is present (tadbhāve ‘bhūtasya), Dharmakīrti formulates the contraposition (∼Q→∼P) of the general law (P→Q), *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho (A) arthaṃ (B) na vyabhicarati*, in the case of pseudo *tādātya*. On the other hand, as mentioned above, he formulates the inverse (∼P→∼Q) arguing the lack of *avinābhāvaniyama* in the case of pseudo *tadutpatti* in PVSV 8,12–13: *apratiḥaddhāsvabhāvasya* *avinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt*.

In all these cases of PVSV 3,9, 4,3 and 8,12–13, the “restriction” (*niyama*) that enables *sahabhāva*, *tadbhāve-bhāva*, and even *avinābhāva* between two concepts is completed within either one of the two binomial forms of *svabhāvapratibandha*, *tādātya* or *tadutpatti*, respectively. For the spatiotemporal occurrence in reality, the nature of one thing is determined by another thing that is either its own essential property or its cause. Later, Dharmakīrti refers to this ontological restriction with the term *svabhāvaniyama* (cf. Steinkellner 1971: 188f.). In all of these three cases, however, *niyama* does not restrict the total number of the types of epistemic inseparability: It is not discussed how many modes there are of the invariable transition from one concept to another.

Seeking Dharmakīrti’s own paraphrase of *avinābhāvaniyamāt* (PV 1.1c) in his PVSV on PV 1.1, we find only *anāyattarīpaṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt* (PVSV 3,9) as an approximate phrase in the inverse form. If the *avinābhāvaniyama* in PV 1.1c is paraphrased
as sahabhāvaniyama in PVSV 3,9, and this sahabhāvaniyama is replaced with avinābha-
vaniyama in PVSV 8,12–13, then the avinābha vaniyama in PV 1.1c, too, cannot be the
restriction “of” avinābha vā in three modes in accord with the three kinds of logical reason,
because anupalabdhi hetu does not require its own ontological restriction for conceptual
transition. Dharmakīrti does not separately assume a third form of svabhāvapratibandha
for anupalabdhi hetu because this kind of logical reason is based on the tādātmya of the
complete cause (kāranasāmagrī) of the perception of a visible thing (cf. PVSV 105, 1–3;
Steinkellner 1991: 712). The state of real affairs presupposed in applying an anupalabdhi-
hetu is that the complete cause of perception including the existence of a visible thing is
restricted by, or, naturally equipped with, their essence (svabhāva), which is the fitness
(yogyatā) to bring about its perception as their effect. It is only on an epistemic level
that one can, seeing an existing empty purse, infer the non-existence of money from its
non-perception on the grounds of the non-existence of the impediments of its perception,
because the existence of money in a purse without impediments naturally possesses the
fitness to be perceived.

That being the case, we may construe even the avinābha vaniyama in the c-pāda of
PV 1.31, which Dharmakīrti inserts as one of the two “intermediate (or, transitive) verses”
(antaraślokau) after finishing a discussion about anupalabdhi hetu (PVSV 19,23–20,13 on
PV 1.29–30). He does this in order to introduce a new section, referring to the ontological
restriction in either one of the two positive forms, but not the epistemic restriction “of”
avinābha vā to the three modes of conceptual transition. This is because in the ab-pāda of
the same verse Dharmakīrti declares avinābha vaniyama to be brought into existence in
“either” (vā) one of the two positive forms: kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt,
as I argued in K. Y oshimizu 2007a: n. 62.55 Accordingly, as far as PV 1 and the PVSV
are concerned, we may conjecture that Dharmakīrti uses niyama in the compound avinā-
bhāvaniyama “[natural] restriction [that accounts] for [epistemic] inseparability” as an
ontological term allied with svabhāvaniyama and svabhāvapratibandha when he concisely
asserts that the restriction of the nature of things in either one of the two positive forms
brings about epistemic inseparability.

Finally, let me quote the final phrase of K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1100:

Dharmakīrti revises Kumārila’s concept of niyama as advocated in the BṬ
by ontologically confining it to two kinds, tādātmya and tadutpatti, both of
which he later asserts not established between a word and its meaning (PV I v.
336) in order to disprove the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that a word is intrinsically
(autpattika) related to its meaning.

55 See also Ch. Yoshimizu 2011, Appendix 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abhayākaragupta: 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidhammatthaṅkāla: 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidhammāvatāra: 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidharmahṛdaya: 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidharmakośa: 22–24, 28, 91, 95, 169, 302, 365, 366, 539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 27, 28, 87, 169, 348, 349, 539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 22, 87, 170, 302, 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhinavagupta: 364, 369, 443, 502, 505–507, 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhisamayālaṃkāra: 301, 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advaitabinduprakarana: 461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aghoraśiva: 500, 501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajadapramātṛsiddhi: 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akalanka: 111, 113, 114, 117, 126, 422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaka: 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ālambanaparīkṣā: 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ānandapūrṇa: 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anekāntajayapatākā: 160, 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anekāntajayapatākāśvopajñavyākhyā: 160, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṅguttaraniyā: 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aniruddha: 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antarvṛtyāptisamarthana: 182, 186–188, 307, 375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyāpohavicārkārikā (Śubhagupta): 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āpastambaśrautasūtra: 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcaṭa: 10, 375–377, 380, 381, 383, 384, 386, 411, 421, 422, 432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āryavimuktisena: 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asaṅga: 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭādhyāyī: 7, 11, 317–325, 327, 356, 357, 536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṣṭasahasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra: 464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āśvalāyanaśrautasūtra: 532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atharvavedasamāhitā: 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ātmasiddhi: 449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atthasālinī: 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avadānaśataka: 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahirarthaparīkṣā: 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāhyārthasiddhiḥkāri: 215, 446, 449, 450, 460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāhyārthavādin: 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley: 461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāradvājaśrūtaśūtra: 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhārtrihari: 314–318, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 345, 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāsavaṇḍa: 391, 401, 404, 405, 407, 450, 451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāṭṭanārāyaṇa: 507, 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāvanākrama: 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāvaśuddhi: 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāviveka: 42, 43, 203, 397, 463–471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blo ldan shes rab: 354, 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodhicaryāvatārāpaniṇīkā: 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmasiddhi: 43, 47, 53, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmasiddhyākhyā: 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmasūtraśrībhāṣya: 444, 445, 447, 460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad: 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bṛhaspati: 499, 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bṛhaṭṭi: 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bṛhaṭṭikā: 42, 45, 46, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 64, 65, 204, 529, 530, 540, 542, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhag: 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu ston: 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byang chub shes rab: 354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candrakīrti: 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraka: 393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carakasaṃhitā: 391–396, 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cārvāka: 21, 27, 31–33, 83, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cittamātra: 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar ma rin chen: 307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dasabhūmikaśūtra: 463
Daśavaikālikasūtraḥāribhadrīvṛtti: 412
Dbu ma rgyan zin bris: 301, 304–306
Dbu ma snang bshad: 149
Dbu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka: 133
Descartes: 453, 459
Dge lugs pa: 301, 307, 309, 310
Dharmapāla: 148, 167, 518
Dharmaśrī: 28
Dharmottarapradīpa: 252, 272–274
Dīpankarakṣita: 354
Dka gnas: 135, 142, 144
Durvekamīśra: 96, 272, 273, 276, 384
Geig du bral gyi rnam bzhag: 305, 306
Glo bo mch'en chen: 301, 310
Haravijaya: 508
Haribhadrasūri: 160, 167, 307, 477, 478
Helārāja: 56, 317, 321, 324, 325
Hetubindu: 80, 164, 165, 182, 376, 386, 412, 430, 432–435
Hetubinduṭīkā: 10, 167, 183, 376, 384, 411, 418, 421, 432
Hetubinduṭīkāloka: 10, 384
Hetumukha: 416, 437
Hetuprakaraṇa: 52
Hetutattvopadeśa: 486
Hiranyakēśo'rātvasūtra: 531
Huizhao: 489, 490
Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō: 482
Īśvarakṛṣṇa: 500
Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī: 254
Īśvarasena: 87, 435
Jaimini: 4, 43, 56
Jaiminīyabrāhmaṇa: 531
Jain: 42, 111
Jayanta: 55, 56, 65, 346, 347, 354, 358, 509
Jitāri: 1–11, 16, 42, 486
Jñānagarbha: 132
Jñānaśrībhadrā: 133
Jñānaśrīmitra: 42, 177–188, 375, 386, 441, 461
Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali: 177–185, 187, 188
Kaiyaṭa: 344, 356, 357
Karṇakagomin: 80, 96, 284, 285, 291, 340, 356, 529, 546
Kāśikā (Sucaritamiśra): 206–209, 254
Kāśikāvivaranapañcikā: 11
Kāśikāvṛtti: 7, 11
Kiraṇatantra: 497, 499
Kiraṇavrūtī: 503
Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya: 177, 178
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (Dharmottara): 376, 377, 384–386
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (Ratnakīrti): 185
Kṣemarāja: 363, 364, 368–370, 497, 498, 504–509
Kuiji: 481, 482, 485, 488–490
Laghīyastraya: 111, 114
Lalitavistara: 344
Mādhyamaka: 260, 309, 310, 318–320, 322, 344, 345, 357, 356
Mādhyamakālaṃkāra: 131, 132, 305
Mādhyamakālaṃkāramārga: 131, 301, 305
Mādhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā: 131, 148
Mādhyamakāloka: 130, 132, 148, 149
Mādhyamakāvatāra: 395
Mādhyamika: 260, 309, 463, 464, 469–471
Mahābhārata: 532
Mahābhāṣya: 301, 302, 310, 318–320, 322, 344, 345, 357, 536
Mahābhāṣyaapradīpa: 344
Mahābhāṣyaapradīpoḍḍyota: 344
Mahāvīśā: 28
Mahāvīṣṇupattī: 91, 95, 356
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra: 302
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraravīṭī: 302
Mālinīvijayottara: 504
Mānakaviṣayottāra: 531
Māṇikyanandi: 111, 114, 115, 117–120, 125–127
Manorāja: 309
Manorathānandin: 25, 258, 259, 271, 291, 364, 370, 443, 498, 503
Mantramārga: 497, 501
Mataṅgapārameśvara: 497, 498, 500–502
Mataṅgapārameśvaravrūtī: 497, 498
Mi pham zhal lung: 309
Mīmāṃsā: 3, 4, 42, 89, 529–531, 542, 547
Mīmāṃsaka: 42, 43, 54, 56, 57, 444, 529–532
Mīmāṃsāsūtra: 42, 56–58, 532, 544
Mokṣākaragupta: 375
Mun sel: 130, 137–140, 142–144, 146–149
Nāgārjuna: 395, 397, 442
Nāgeśa: 344
Nārāyana: 344, 348
Nārāyanakanṭha: 502
Nārāyanīya: 344
Nareśvaraparīkṣā: 499
Nayacakravālavrūtī: 326
Netratantrodhyota: 504
Netroddyota: 498
Nirukta: 345
Nisvāsa: 363, 367
Nisvāsatattvasaṃhitā: 363, 364, 367, 497, 500, 501
Niyogakāṇḍa: 62
Nyāya: 260, 391, 404, 520–524
Nyāyabhāṣya: 270, 348, 391, 393, 395–397, 401, 407
Nyāyabhāṣṣaṇa: 391, 401, 404, 405, 407, 450
Index

120, 126, 129, 252, 263, 267–270, 272, 418, 486
Nyāyabinduṭīkā: 92, 96, 252, 271–275, 376, 418
Nyāyakaṇikā: 42–44, 46–48, 63, 386
Nyāyakumudacandra: 460
Nyāyamañjarī: 55, 56, 254
Nyāyakumudacandra: 460
Nyāyakumudacandra: 460
Nyāyapraveśaṅkaṭīkā: 476, 478, 479, 486
Nyāyaratnākara: 206, 208
Nyāyavārttika: 391, 397, 401, 416
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaśāstra: 22
Od zer: 130, 133, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142–145, 148
Paddhaṭi: 324
Paśularavāmin: 348
Paścavastukaviḥbāṣāśāstra: 22
Pāṇini: 318
Parahitabhadra: 132
Parīkṣāmukha: 111, 117, 119, 120, 125, 126
Pārthasārathi: 206, 541
Pāṣupata: 367
Prajñāpāramitāśāstra: 464
Prakāśa (Helāraja): 56, 317, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327
Pramāṇanayatattvālokaśāstra: 111, 115
Pramāṇasamgraha: 422
Pramāṇavārttikālokaśāstra: 64–66, 135, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 168, 172,
Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali: 4, 178–180, 183, 185
Rauravasūtrasamgraha: 499, 500
Ravigupta: 25
Ṛgveda: 532, 540
Ṛgyal tshab dar ma rin chen: 94, 95, 133
Rigs gter: 303
Rnam bshad snying po rgyan: 307
Rngog blo ldan shes rab: 132, 135, 142, 144, 145
Ryakken inmyō nisshōri mon: 488
Sa skya pandita: 25, 301, 303, 310
Śābara: 4, 206, 211, 530, 538
Śābarabhāṣya: 4, 205, 206, 211, 530, 531, 538
Śabdārthaṭīkā: 331
Śabdika: 490
Śaddarśanasamuccaya: 398
Sadyojyotis: 364, 499, 502
Śaiddhāntika: 498–502, 507–510
Śaiva: 363, 364, 366, 368, 369, 497–502, 504, 505
Śaivas: 367, 443
Śaivasiddhānta: 497, 499, 501, 504
Śākyabuddhi: 93–96, 131, 276, 277, 284, 289, 332, 340, 350, 351, 355, 358, 450, 525
Śākyasūryabhadra: 25
Śālistambasūtra: 366
Śāmāntryaprakāsa (Dignāga): 191
Śāmaṭa: 43
Śambandhaparīkṣā: 172, 437
Śāmkhyakārikā: 500
Śāmkhyanāśaka: 191
Śāmkhyaparāśā (Dignāga): 191
Śāmkhyas: 516
Śāmkhyavaināśika: 192
Saṃyuttaniyāka: 23
Saṃkara: 442, 444, 445, 447, 460
Saṃkaranaandana: 42, 55
Saṃkarasvāmin: 485
Saṃkhapāṇi: 323
Śāṅkhāyanaśrautasūtra: 532
Śantabhada: 133
Śantānāntarasiddhi: 340, 341
Śantānāntarasiddhitākā: 340, 341
Śārdhatriśālikāllottara: 499
Śarvajñānottara: 499, 500
Śravijñāsiddhi (Jñānasrīmitra): 42
Śravijñāsiddhi (Ratnakirti): 42, 48, 55
Śravijñāsiddhi (Śāṅkaranandana): 42, 55, 297
Śravijñāsiddhi (Śubhagupta): 42
Śravijñāsiddhisāmkṣepa: 42
Śravāstivāda: 27, 539
Śravāstivādin: 490
Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā: 132
Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti: 132
Sautrāntika: 2, 9, 27, 28, 251–254, 258, 259, 261–263, 269, 305, 309, 442–444, 539
Shentai: 485, 486
Siddhāntatana: 501
Siddhiviniścaya: 422
Śīksāsamuccaya: 354
Śivasūtravārttika: 530–532, 535, 536, 538, 540–542
Śāṅkhāyanaśdrautasūtra: 532
Śantabhada: 133
Śantānāntarasiddhi: 340, 341
Śantānāntarasiddhitākā: 340, 341
Śārdhatriśālikāllottara: 499
Śarvajñānottara: 499, 500
Śravijñāsiddhi (Jñānasrīmitra): 42
Śravijñāsiddhi (Ratnakirti): 42, 48, 55
Śravijñāsiddhi (Śāṅkaranandana): 42, 55, 297
Śravijñāsiddhi (Śubhagupta): 42
Śravijñāsiddhisāmkṣepa: 42
Śravāstivāda: 27, 539
Śravāstivādin: 490
Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā: 132
Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti: 132
Sautrāntika: 2, 9, 27, 28, 251–254, 258, 259, 261–263, 269, 305, 309, 442–444, 539
Shentai: 485, 486
Siddhāntatana: 501
Siddhiviniścaya: 422
Śīksāsamuccaya: 354
Śivasūtravārttika: 498
Sras bdus grwa: 306
Stavacintāmaṇi: 507, 508
Stavacintāmaṇivarṇī: 507–509
Sthiramati: 302
Śubhagupta: 3, 42, 204, 215, 340, 446, 449, 460
Sucarita: 208
Sumati: 354
Supariṇāddhā: 66, 208
Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya: 302
Sūtrālaṃkāraratna: 303
Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha: 367, 497, 499
Tantrāloka: 369, 502, 505, 507
Tantrālokaviveka: 498
Tantrarāja: 506
Tantraratna: 541
Tantrapāra: 506
Tantravārttika: 530–532, 535, 536, 538, 540–542
Tarkabhāṣā: 2, 183, 254, 375
Tarkajvāla: 43, 464–466, 470
Tarkarāhasya: 157, 159
Ṭātparyāṭīkā (Umbeka): 59, 206–208
Tattvasaṃgrahapāṇiṭīkā: 2, 3, 6, 43, 56, 58, 167, 206, 208–210, 212–215, 331–339, 421, 451, 460
Tattvasaṃśāra: 387
Thānāṁgasutta: 114
Thar lam gsal byed: 304
Thub bstan lhun poi mdzes rgyan: 305, 306
Ṭīkā (Punyarāja): 323
Tshad ma bs dus pa: 144
Tsong kha pa: 301, 304–307, 310
Ṭupṭikā: 540–542
Udayana: 392
Udayanānirākaraṇa: 157
Uddyotakara: 204, 391
Umbeka: 59, 207, 210, 216
Upāyahṛdaya: 391, 393, 395–397, 407
Utpaladeva: 498
Utarāstuvīmāṁsā: 71
Uttaratantra: 302
Vādanyāyaṭīkā: 166, 183, 421
Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā: 163, 166, 167, 171, 172, 397–400, 407, 432
Vādarahasya: 157
Vādadīnhdāna: 476
Vādadīhi: 481
Vāḍī Devasūri: 111, 114, 115, 117
Vaibhāgika: 191–193, 201
Vaibhāṣīka: 3, 9, 27, 28, 305, 449
Vaṁśā́ṣīka: 191, 192, 201
Vaiśeṣika: 113, 132, 135, 147, 148, 150, 157, 305, 322, 513, 519–524, 537
Vaiśeṣikasūtra: 114
Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī: 318
Vākyapadīya: 56, 157, 315–318, 321–325, 327
Valmīkisutta: 86
Vārttika (Kātyāyana): 344
Vasumitra: 22
Vātsīputrīya: 304
Vātsyāyana: 270, 391, 396, 403
Vibhāṣā: 169, 170
Vibhūticandra: 346, 356, 357
Vibhūticandra (Notes): 157, 159, 160, 346, 350, 357
Vijñānavāda: 257
Vijñaptimātrāsiddhi: 1–11, 16
Viṁśatikāvṛtti: 463
Vinītadeva: 133, 166, 252, 340
Visuddhamagga: 31
Viśvanātha: 419
Vyāpticarcā: 188
Wengui: 485
Xuanzang: 485, 489
Yajñaṭa: 43
Yamāri: 66, 208, 275, 346, 354–358
Yāmuna: 449
Yāska: 344
Yaśomitra: 22, 170, 302
Yin ming da shu: 481–483, 485, 487–490
Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu: 485
Yin ming zheng li men lun shu ji: 485, 486
Yogācāra: 9, 258, 260, 305, 309, 444, 455, 463–466, 469–471
Yuktidīpikā: 419, 500
Zenju: 482
Zhang thang sag pa: 133
The proceedings volume of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference (Heidelberg, August 2014) is concerned with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, a long-lasting tradition that pursued the analysis of knowledge, inference and proof within a Buddhist soteriological framework based on the works of the Indian epistemologist and logician Dharmakīrti (6th–7th c. CE). Having been shaped in the environment of medieval India, with its multiple mutually interacting and partly competing religio-philosophical schools, the methods and approaches of Buddhist logic and epistemology had lasting impact on the intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism and were also received in China and Japan. The 30 papers in this volume offer a snapshot of an international research landscape with centers in Vienna and Japan. They address historical and philological problems raised by important recent manuscript discoveries, pursue specific research questions in the history of philosophy, and undertake philosophical reconstructions and critical examinations relating to individual theories and arguments. By focusing on currents in Asia that developed and applied rigorous philosophical methods, the volume aims to contribute to the formation of a better-founded global historical awareness in the field of philosophy.

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