THE WISH LIST

Reading and Rhetoric in Montaigne and Shakespeare

Peter Mack

BLOOMSBURY

Reading and Rhetoric in Montaigne and Shakespeare

The WISH List
(Warwick Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities)

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For Larry and Kees

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Series Editor's Preface

Warwick Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities – the WISH List – is a new series that takes its impulse from the dialogue between academic disciplines that has been one of the most striking features of early twenty-first century scholarly life. Peter Mack's book is the ideal launch volume for the series because of the exceptionally high standard of interdisciplinary study that it sets. Its treatment of Shakespeare will be of interest to all students of early modern drama, while its reading of Montaigne is a major contribution to French Studies, and its analysis of rhetoric of value to anyone interested in the persuasive arts of language. It is also a major contribution to both the emergent discipline of the History of Reading and the long-established History of the Classical Tradition. There could be no more distinguished or apt author for the first volume in the series than a Professor of English Literature at the University of Warwick who has become Director of the Warburg Institute in London, not least because the Warburg Library has been at the forefront of interdisciplinary work in the humanities for a hundred years.

Michel de Montaigne was never more himself than when sitting alone in his library. William Shakespeare, by contrast, was most at home in the collaborative, improvised world of the theatre: working with actors, revising scripts, ensuring that the show goes on. And yet, like Montaigne, Shakespeare was a great reader. Nearly all his plays were adapted from inherited sources. And certain books, such as the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, remained at his side throughout his career as poet and playwright. In the third chapter of the third book of his *Essais*, Montaigne argued that 'society' or human 'commerce' consists of three kinds of relationship: friendship, sexual company and, more constant and comforting than either of these, the companionship of books. Books are both a weapon and a guide: 'the best munition I have found in this human peregrination'. If, as Sir Francis Bacon said, the key inventions that made the modern world were the compass, gunpowder and printing, then books are the force that unites the three, because they offer instruction in how to travel, how to live through wars and political upheaval, how to think, how to live. Shakespeare knew this just as well as Montaigne did.

> 'At home I betake me somewhat the oftner to my library, whence all at once I command and survey all my household', writes Montaigne, 'it is seated in the chief entry of my house, thence I behold under me my garden, my base court, my yard, and look even into most rooms of my

> house. There without order, without method, and by piecemeals I turn over and ransack, now one book and now another. Sometimes I muse and rave; and walking up and down I endite and enregister these my humours, these my conceits'.
>
> ('Of Three Commerces or Societies', translated by John Florio, 1603)

The scriptorium was a key room in monastic communities of the middle ages, but that a library should become the central room of an individual gentleman's house was something new to the sixteenth century. Montaigne does not order his books according to some librarian's system of classification. He ingests them at random. One effect of the mass production of a huge variety of books was that different fields of discourse were held together in the ideal space of the library. Montaigne's was round, so that he had full sight of all his books and all were implicitly equal in merit, like the knights of Arthur's round table. At the centre of his library, at the centre of his house, was Montaigne's 'seat', his 'throne'. This was a place where he could 'withdraw himself' in order to 'be to himself'. The self is 'endited' not only through social transactions, but also privately through communion with an eclectic array of books.

Montaigne's writing is frequently about his reading and is invariably thoughtfully informed by it. He weaves quotations and proverbs into the body of his prose, intermingling his opinions with his knowledge. When John Florio translated the essays into English, other voices were introduced. Many pages of the English version have at least four authors: Montaigne, Florio, a quoted author (Horace, say, or Ovid or Juvenal) and Matthew Gwynne, who provided Florio with English verse translations of Montaigne's Latin quotations. The idea of writing as the rewriting of earlier texts is an ancient one. In an introduction to a commentary on a collection of sententious sayings, the thirteenth-century Franciscan friar St Bonaventure proposed that there were four ways of making a book: 'Sometimes a man writes others' words, adding nothing and changing nothing; and he is simply called a scribe [*scriptor*]. Sometimes a man writes others' words, putting together passages which are not his own; and he is called a compiler [*compilator*]. Sometimes a man writes both others' words and his own, but with the others' words in prime place and his own added only for purposes of clarification; and he is called not an author but a commentator [*commentator*]. Sometimes a man writes both his own words and others', but with his own in prime place and others' added only for purposes of confirmation; and he should be called an author [*auctor*].' Copying, adapting and inventing are all forms of book-making; even 'original authors', as we would now call them, spend a proportion of their time reproducing the words of others. Montaigne writes something similar in his final essay, 'Of Experience', when he suggests that we go through life inheriting and incrementing knowledge, in the same way that generation upon generation of lawyers add interpretive glosses to a pre-existent body of law. Montaigne and Shakespeare were great originals not because they thought things that had never been thought before, but because they *ordered* thought in new ways.

They constantly engaged in what we would now call *research*, the quest for knowledge by means of the examination of pre-existing knowledge. Of course Shakespeare created his plays from his experience, his memory and above all his imagination. But he also created them from his reading: for each play, he read a variety of particular books. His did his research.

How did Montaigne and Shakespeare read their books? What was their *method* of ingesting knowledge? Peter Mack's comparative study answers this question and in so doing reveals the intimate relationship between how they read and how they wrote. In so doing, he provides us with the richest comparative study we yet have of the affinities between the minds of the two literary personalities with the most original and humane imaginations in early modern Europe.

Jonathan Bate
Series Editor

Preface and Note on Texts

In this book I compare the ways in which Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) and William Shakespeare (1564–1616), the pre-eminent French and English writers of the sixteenth century, used their training in rhetoric and the books they read to compose *essais* and plays. Montaigne knew that he was writing a new kind of book; Shakespeare was among the first to write for the new public theatres on the outskirts of the city of London; but both drew on their reading in ancient history, philosophy, poetry and narrative to present new ways of thinking about the world. They are the two Renaissance writers whom modern readers respond to most warmly and their works always feature in lists of the great books of the western tradition. I argue that Renaissance practices of reading and training in composition contribute to the new and effective ways in which both wrote. Comparing the ways in which they made use of their literary heritage will help us respond better to both writers.

At the outset I need to explain my approach to the text of Montaigne's *Essais*. Montaigne liked to revise his texts for new editions. For the three centuries following Montaigne's death the text was usually read in the posthumous Paris 1595 edition which was seen through the press by Mlle de Gournay. This is the edition which was translated into English by John Florio, Charles Cotton and later translators. After the discovery and publication of the *Exemplaire de Bordeaux* (The Bordeaux copy), a copy of the Paris 1588 edition with numerous alterations and additions in Montaigne's own hand, twentieth-century editions printed the text of the Bordeaux copy with markings to indicate the different levels (or *couches*) of the compilation of the text. In such editions [A] represents text originating in the first Bordeaux 1580 edition; [B] text first added in the Paris 1588 edition; and [C] additions in the Bordeaux copy. Sometimes where the Bordeaux copy was illegible or where words had been cut out when it was rebound, additions were made from the 1595 edition. Some 1582 and 1587 additions were also marked in editions of this type, pre-eminent among them the long-term standard edition by Pierre Villey, revised by V.-L. Saulnier (3rd edn, Paris, 1978). This is the text translated into English by Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) and Michael Screech. It is also the edition referenced in R. Leake's *Concordance des Essais de Montaigne*, 2 vols (Geneva: Droz, 1981) and Philippe Desan's invaluable *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne*, 2nd edn (Paris: Champion, 2007). More recent research suggests that Montaigne made a second manuscript of additions to the 1588 text and that this text was faithfully edited by Mlle de Gournay as the 1595 Paris edition.[1] The 1595 text, without markings of levels, is therefore the basis for the two most recent French editions, a modern-spelling edition by a team led by Jean Céard (Paris, 2001) and the new Pléiade edition by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien and Catherine Magnien-Simonin (Paris, 2007), which reports all the variants more accurately than any previous edition.

My wish to investigate the way in which Montaigne composed his text meant that the different levels of text indicated easily by the Villey-Saulnier edition were helpful to me in analysing Montaigne's work and in presenting my findings. I also wanted to include a modern English translation so that Anglophone readers could more easily follow my analyses and locate the original context for short passages which I had quoted. These considerations suggested that I should give references to the Villey-Saulnier edition (marked in text and notes by V, followed directly by the page number). But at the same time I believe both that the new Pléiade edition will become the standard edition and that it reports the text more faithfully than Villey-Saulnier (who frequently did not mark single word changes, for example). Therefore I have also added references to that edition (marked in text and notes as P). Generally the two texts differ only in spelling and punctuation, but sometimes there are small verbal variants and in those I have generally quoted the text as in P (though V was my working text and I obtained a copy of P only quite late in the process of revision). There are also a few occasions in which my notes point out substantive differences between the texts. I give references to Michael Screech's English translation as S. So Montaigne's famous question about his cat would be represented thus:

> [C] Quand je me joue à ma chatte, qui sçait si elle passe son temps de moy plus que je ne fay d'elle? (V452, P474)
>
> [C] When I play with my cat, how do I know that she is not passing the time with me rather than I with her? (S505)

Or, as a reference only (V452, P474, S505). For anyone wanting to move between different editions from those cited I should paraphrase the advice given by Michael Screech (S, p. li). Once you have located a passage in one edition, and noted the chapter in which it appears, finding a near-by Latin quotation will usually enable you to find the same passage in a different edition.

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1. Introduction: Renaissance Education in Reading and Writing

The aim of this book is to compare Montaigne's and Shakespeare's methods of using the material obtained from their reading in order to develop their own ideas and expressions. The key to understanding how both writers exploited what they read is to be found in Renaissance rhetorical training. Montaigne often expressed his hostility to classical rhetoric, especially in *De la vanité des paroles* (I, 51), but the way in which he used his reading and developed his arguments owes everything to his grammar-school training.[1]

This focus on comparing the approaches of these two great writers is intended also as a way out of a critical impasse. In an article in *Montaigne Studies* I argue that the question of how much and how early Shakespeare used Montaigne's *Essais* (in Florio's English translation) is ultimately undecideable.[2] While some scholars argue (or assume) that Shakespeare made extensive use of Montaigne's work from the late 1590s onwards,[3] others claim that the only proven example is Gonzalo's speech from *The Tempest* (II.1.139–64) and that other parallels depend on shared sources or coincidence.[4] Faced with this apparently irreconcilable conflict I suggest that we focus on the common ground between the two positions: that on many occasions both authors used the same sources in similar ways, while in at least one Shakespeare deliberately copied Montaigne. These two procedures can then be seen to have a certain continuity; Shakespeare may even be closer to Montaigne when he reaches a similar position independently than when he copies, perhaps with parodic intent. Since reaching agreement on the question of the exact quantity and timing of Shakespeare's indebtedness has so far proved impossible and since such a resolution would make no real difference to the way we read, I suggest that we accept that the two writers are similar and that we study the nature and meaning of that similarity, which also involves appreciating the differences between the two writers. This is the task of comparison, which is the aim of this book.

In this first chapter I shall outline the rhetorical features of Renaissance grammar-school and university education, discuss Plutarch's *Moralia*, a crucial source for Montaigne, and consider Montaigne's *De l'inconstance de nos actions* (II, 1) and Claudius's soliloquy from *Hamlet* (III.3.36–72) as examples of the practical use of Renaissance rhetorical education. The second chapter will analyse Montaigne's use of his reading, in composing and revising his *Essais*. The third chapter will be concerned with the way

Montaigne develops his thinking, by applying different techniques of elaboration and invention to the stories and axioms he takes over from his reading and continually adds to his own texts. As a companion to the third chapter's discussion of Montaigne's methods of argument, the fourth chapter begins by exploring Shakespeare's logical transformation of received material and development of speeches from outlines. It then compares the ways in which Shakespeare and Montaigne connect narrative and argument. The fifth chapter compares Montaigne's use of history (and in particular of Plutarch and Tacitus) with Shakespeare's, contrasting their views of Roman liberty, honour and the arbitrariness of the historical record, and noting Shakespeare's special interest in the historical role of women, servants and rogues. The final chapter compares and contrasts views on ethical questions such as revenge, death, repentance, sexual relations, family life and justice, expressed in the works of the two authors.

Humanist grammar schools, like the Collège de Guyenne in Bordeaux and Stratford Grammar School, had three main aims. Pupils were meant to learn to read, write and speak Latin, to study a syllabus of the finest Latin writers and to practice Latin composition in a variety of genres.[5] Conventional pupils began their grammar-school education by learning the Latin accidence by heart. Then they exercised this knowledge by varying simple Latin sentences, by learning dialogues and by reading fables. Even their later Latin reading was to some extent aimed at acquiring vocabulary and phrases for their conversation and composition. This part of the training was rather irksome to Montaigne since he was almost a native speaker of Latin as a result of his father's teaching methods.[6] The later years of the grammar school were devoted to a course in Latin literature: Terence (partly for conversation and phrases), a selection of Cicero's *Epistolae familiares* (for imitation in the pupils' letter-writing), Virgil's *Eclogues* and *Aeneid*, Ovid, Horace, Cicero's philosophical works and some history.[7] Montaigne's early proficiency in Latin meant that he was withdrawn from the drilling associated with the teaching of these texts and instead enticed into reading Ovid, Virgil, Terence, Plautus and the Italian comedies for pleasure.[8] Montaigne clearly also learned some Greek at the Collège de Guyenne, as he occasionally writes in Greek and refers to Greek words, but in later life he preferred to read Greek authors in French or Latin translations.[9]

Pupils' reading was intended to feed into their writing. This could take the form of imitating one of Cicero's letters to his family or writing a letter or a speech on behalf of one of the people in the history they were reading. Often it entailed collecting phrases and stories from all the texts read and reusing them in *progymnasmata* exercises like the *chreia* and the commonplace. Some of these exercises (such as description, comparison, speech by a character, proposal for a law) were the potential building blocks for longer compositions. In exercises like fable, maxim and confirmation, students were taught to connect narratives and arguments. The writerly approach was also evident in the way in which pupils were trained to read texts. Their teachers were expected to point out the uses of the figures of rhetoric, instances of imitation and examples of moral teaching through axiom and narrative.[10]

The most widely used Latin composition text produced in the Renaissance was Erasmus's *De copia rerum et verborum*. The book aims at encouraging fullness and fluency of expression by teaching ways of adapting existing texts or outlines through a sort of rhetorical supercharging. Under *copia* (plenty) of words, pupils were instructed in ways to vary and add to their language by applying the figures of rhetoric. This section of the work culminates in a playful demonstration of hundreds of ways of reformulating simple expressions, such as 'your letters pleased me greatly' and 'as long as I live I shall always remember you'.[11] *De copia* taught that any sentence involved a choice among many differently weighted ways of expressing an idea but also provided a technique for making one's speech more emphatic by combining several different ways of putting the same idea. Under *copia* of things, pupils were instructed in ways of expanding a simple expression through logical means, for example by breaking a single thing into parts and investigating each part in turn, relating what happened before and after, adding the causes or describing the circumstances.[12] This second book of *De copia* gave special instruction in writing descriptions and comparisons, and in ways of using examples.[13] It also included instructions for compiling a commonplace book, a book in which pupils would collect the most impressive phrases and stories from their reading, under thematic headings (such as virtue, justice, mercy, anger, friendship, flattery) so as to be able to reuse the highlights of their reading in their own compositions.[14]

Erasmus's *Adagia* was written partly as a reference book to assist pupils in using the classical heritage of proverbs to add distinction to their compositions but it also serves as an example of the kind of book a humanist could write out of extensive and critical reading of ancient literature. Montaigne is generally believed to have used the work and it may also have served him as a model. The *Adagia* was first published in 1500 as a listing of 818 proverbs with examples and explanations. As Erasmus read and re-read classical literature for the rest of his life he found new examples of proverbs he had already listed and also new proverbs, culminating in the 600 folio pages of the *Adagiorum chiliades* of 1536, containing accounts of 4,151 proverbs.[15] Many people owned more than one edition of the *Adagia* and Montaigne may have known of it as a model for the writing-in-progress of his successive revisions to his own book.[16]

After reviewing earlier opinions and showing their shortcomings Erasmus opts for a definition flexible enough to encompass the range of his subject: 'a proverb is a saying in popular use, remarkable for some shrewd and novel turn'.[17] A knowledge of proverbs is useful because proverbs encapsulate moral teaching, because they can be effective in persuasion, because the addition of proverbs can give distinction and charm to a person's style and because understanding of proverbs can help us in interpreting literature.[18] So proverbs contribute to morality, reading and writing, to invention and style. Erasmus shows with examples that ignorance of proverbs can make classical texts harder to understand and can even lead to corruption of the text.[19] Proverbs confer dignity on one's own writing because of their antiquity.[20] Erasmus embroiders on the benefits of proverbs for a writer's style.

> And so to interweave adages deftly and appropriately is to make the language as a whole glitter with sparkles from antiquity, please us with the colours of the art of rhetoric, gleam with jewel-like words of wisdom, and charm us with titbits of wit and humour. Finally it will wake interest by its novelty, bring delight by its concision, convince by its decisive power.[21]

After advising intending writers not to over-use proverbs, he suggests ways in which a particular proverb can be turned to different uses, through analogy, irony and metaphor. He links the methods of varying proverbs with the instructions for amplifying thoughts and varying verbal expression in *De copia*.[22]

In most of the sections on individual proverbs Erasmus names the proverb, gives some examples from classical literature, explains the meaning of the proverb and gives some advice about its use.

> II, 3, 74 *A Liar should have a Good Memory*: Quintilian in book IV of his *Institutio oratoria* cites as proverbial this aphorism: a liar should have a good memory. Apuleius too in his second *Defence* against a charge of

> witchcraft: ‘I have often heard it said, and much to the point, that a liar should have a good memory’. St Jerome: ‘Forgetting the old proverb, that liars should have a good memory’. The meaning of the adage is clear enough, that it is very difficult for a liar to be always consistent, unless he has a very good memory; for it is much more difficult to remember falsehoods than the truth. And so this is how they are usually caught out: they forget what they have said and produce a discrepant story. This is how Davus in Terence is detected and thus Psyche’s invention in Apuleius is detected by her sisters.[23]

In this case Erasmus is careful to document both the use of the phrase and the fact that it is called a proverb. His final examples take his readers back to their reading, first to Terence’s *Andria*, a standard grammar-school text (in which Donatus’s commentary cites this proverb when Davus’s lies are revealed), and then to the favourite interlude of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius’s *Golden Ass*. The basic pattern of naming, examples, explanation and use responds to the main role of the *Adagia* as a reference work to help in reading and composition. Some of the more ambitious entries develop this form considerably. For example, in the first adage of all, *Amicorum communia sunt omnia*, ‘Between friends all is common’, Erasmus reflects on the importance of the proverb:

> If only it were so fixed in men’s minds as it is frequent on everybody’s lips, most of the evils of our lives would promptly be removed.[24]

Later he says that Plato’s interpretation of this proverb in *The Laws* as calling for community of possessions is the most Christian thing he wrote, though it is opposed by many practising Christians. Erasmus gives examples of the different deductions which Socrates, Aristotle, Plutarch and Martial (among many others) draw from this proverb. This survey of usage has the effect of juxtaposing different philosophical and literary attitudes to life.

Sometimes Erasmus takes the opportunity which a proverb offers to retell a well-known story[25] or in the case of ‘A Dung-beetle hunts an Eagle’ (III, 7, 1) to elaborate an Aesopian fable with a contemporary allegory against war. ‘Man is a bubble’ (II, 3, 48) provides the occasion for a collection of quotations on the shortness and frailty of life and for a lament on the death in 1506 of Philip, Archduke of Austria. Some of the longer *Adagia* entries can be thought of as variants of school rhetorical exercises, the *chreia* and the commonplace. The most powerful of all the *Adagia*, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, 'War is sweet to those who have not experienced it' (IV, 1, 1),[26] can be analysed as an exercise in copious speech. After praising and exemplifying the adage Erasmus supports it from an argument from generality (all things seem sweet to those who have not tasted them). Then he makes a comparison between war and man, the creature who promotes war. Since in comparison with other animals the human body is unarmed and defenceless, gifted chiefly with speech which promotes collaboration, it is unnatural that man should be so addicted to war. He describes in detail the sights, sounds, occurrences and consequences of war, later contrasting this description with a commonplace in praise of peace. He collects quotations from scripture in favour of peace and examples from classical poetry of the monstrous savagery and madness of war. The deeply rhetorical combination of argument, description and figurative language creates an eloquent moral denunciation of war, which must certainly be ranked among Erasmus's finest writings. Its success derives from its exemplification of rhetorical principles, copiously elaborating a moral theme to which Erasmus felt the strongest commitment.

For an instance of a proverb prompting Erasmus to reconsider his position we may turn to a much shorter adage, *Polypae mentem obtine*, 'Adopt the outlook of the polyp' (I, 1, 93). At first Erasmus explains the meaning of the adage, describing this fish's chameleon-like ability to take on the colour of the rocks it swims near and citing examples from Lucian, St Basil, Theognis and Plutarch. He makes a comparison with Homer's praise of Ulysses. Then he draws the lesson from the adage:

> This advises us to suit ourselves to every contingency in life, acting the part of Proteus, and changing ourselves into any form a situation demands.[27]

Erasmus makes a comparison with the need to adapt oneself to the customs of different countries one travels in. But then an anxiety registers.

> Let no man think that by this adage we are taught a disgusting type of flattery, which assents to everything in everybody, or an improper changeability of behaviour,[28]

immediately citing classical and Christian authors on the evils of changeability and the benefits of constancy. Then he recalls the example of

Alcibiades, wondering whether the different ways he behaved in Athens and Sparta should be taken as a vice or a virtue: 'he certainly had a happy and enviable dexterity of mind and character which made him act the polyp'.[29] Later still he suggests that we *could* use this adage to criticize people who are too changeable, though his final example suggests that changeability may offer someone their only chance of survival. In this adage we see Erasmus thinking on his feet, trying to establish a position which balances the prudential benefits of changeability against its moral dangers. Perhaps he is better equipped by his rhetorical training to develop the opposing arguments for and against changeability than to resolve the question or perhaps he intends a demonstration of the very changeability which is the subject of the adage.

Neither Shakespeare nor Montaigne attended university, but many of their readers did, and the higher classes of the Collège de Guyenne studied logic, which was the staple teaching of the university arts course. Both Aphthonius's *progymnasmata* and Erasmus's *De copia* relied on (and presumably began the teaching of) the topics of invention. In the second third of the sixteenth century, the humanist approach of analysing practical argument which used the full resources of language (rather than the restricted subset of language denoted by propositions of the pattern 'All A is B') profoundly altered university teaching of logic in northern Europe. The key text in this development was Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, which asserted that the primary purpose of all interactions in language was to convey information and that dialectic should train pupils to teach, move and please, using the topics of invention.[30] The topics of invention are a list of headings (such as definition, genus, species, parts, subject, adjunct, action, cause, effect, circumstances, comparisons and contraries) through which one can explore a subject and construct arguments about it. Agricola emphasized the importance of understanding the relationships between things in the world implied by the topics. He defined each topic and showed how it could be used to find arguments, but he also analysed examples to explain the difficulties involved in constructing a definition or establishing the relationships between causes and effects. He believed that understanding the nature of the topics would enable people to construct more effective arguments and that the best way to understand the topics was to analyse the way in which great writers like Cicero and Virgil had used arguments.[31]

Agricola divided language into exposition (related to the rhetorical category of narration), in which one sets out information in a straightforward way for an audience which follows willingly, and argumentation, in which one joins reasons together densely in order to force assent from an audience which resists. This led him to re-examine the central rhetorical perception (going back at least to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* but also enshrined in the Latin rhetorical tradition) that narrative and argument must be used together in order to convince an audience. Agricola analyses the ways in which narratives can be made to seem convincing in themselves and can be presented so as to give the strongest support to arguments.[32] He also directed more explicit attention to the importance of emotional persuasion, insisting on the need for speakers to think carefully about the specific audiences, their relationships to the speaker and their views of the issue, and identifying logical relationships and textures of language which could be used to achieve emotional effects on an audience.[33] Next he reinvigorated the traditional rhetorical skill of disposition, showing that many different types of structure could effectively be employed and arguing that the format best suited to a particular writing task would need to be worked out by thinking about the subject, audience and circumstances of the work in question. Together with the grammar-school emphasis on letter-writing and the *progymnasmata*, this helped to open up a range of different possible structures in place of the near-monopoly of the four-part oration within classical rhetoric.[34] Finally he gave instructions for (and a model of) logical commentary on classical texts, setting out the argumentative structures underlying a speech or poem and analysing a writer's use of the topics, alongside the more familiar rhetorical analysis, which focuses on the divisions of the oration and on the use of the tropes and figures. This form of commentary was taken up and adapted by many influential sixteenth-century commentators, among them Latomus, Sturm, Melanchthon and Ramus.[35] It also offers a Renaissance technique for examining classical texts which modern readers can apply to passages from Montaigne and speeches from Shakespeare.

Where school provided a general grounding in classical Latin literature and a training in ways of reading, the books which Montaigne and Shakespeare used most in their writing were their own choices: recent histories, Plutarch and (for Montaigne) Seneca and Lucretius. Although Montaigne knew some Greek, the real impulse to his reading of Plutarch was given by the translations into French by Jacques Amyot of the *Parallel Lives* (1559) and *Moralia* (1572). In Amyot's French translation (which was also the basis for North's translation of Plutarch's *Lives*, one of Shakespeare's favourite books), Plutarch became an important source of material and the favourite author of Montaigne's maturity. He named Plutarch as 'of all authors I know the one who has best blended art with nature and judgement with erudition'.[36] Plutarch is the writer he finds himself relying on the most.

> [B] Mais je me puis plus malaiséement deffaire de Plutarque. Il est si universel et si plain, qu'à toutes occasions, et quelque suject extravagant que vous ayez pris, il s'ingere à vostre besongne et vous tend une main liberale et inespuisable de richesses et d'embellissemens. (III, 5, V875, P918)

> [B] But I cannot free myself from Plutarch so easily. He is so universal and so full of matter that for all occasions and for whatever extraordinary subject you have undertaken, he insinuates himself into your work, offering you riches and embellishments with a liberal and inexhaustible hand. (S989)

We can learn more about what attracted Montaigne to Plutarch by considering some examples from the *Moralia*, today much less well-known than the *Parallel Lives* but important to Montaigne as models and as sources of stories and quotations.[37] I shall concentrate here on two of Plutarch's essays, 29 *On Restraining Anger* and 43 *The Daemon of Socrates*. *On Restraining Anger* is a dialogue which is almost entirely taken up with a long speech by Fundanus on how he has managed to restrain his bad temper. The speech consists partly of practical advice on restraining anger (*e.g.*, that one needs command of one's reason to resist anger, that it must be resisted as soon as it appears, that one should practice restraint of anger in relation to family and slaves), partly of descriptions of the bad effect of anger, intended as a warning (because observing anger in others will make you want to avoid it), and partly of analysis of the causes of anger, to assist the reason in finding remedies. That anger disfigures the face is taken as a sign of its destructive effect. Householders are warned not to be affected by anger when they punish their servants. Anger is usually caused by a sense of being slighted, despised or ignored; this in turn also results from a sense of self-importance and discontent with one's lot. So the risk of anger can be reduced by addressing these problems.[38]

The moral advice is often presented through similes and comparisons and illustrated with anecdotes from historical events and the behaviour of philosophers, some mentioned briefly, others related at length. In a more scholarly vein the views of Aristotle, Hieronymus and Melantius are reviewed and found wanting.[39] There are short digressions to commonplace themes of ancient moral philosophy: whether anger can ever be good and whether it can assist in revenge (both denied).[40] Plutarch sometimes develops ideas by quoting and analysing passages from Homer.[41] Simon Swain argues that Plutarch regarded observation and analysis of other people's behaviour as the best way to learn how to improve one's own.[42]

Montaigne used this essay especially in *De la colère* (II, 31), mentioning Plutarch at the outset and summarizing many of his ideas (the effect of anger on the face; that it is wrong to punish when angry; the usefulness of deferring punishment) in the first two pages.[43] He also took material for this section directly from Seneca's *De ira*, which Plutarch had quarried as a source. But Plutarch's essay is used mainly as a starting point. As the chapter progresses Montaigne finds different arguments and stories (including stories from other works of Plutarch). In the middle he amuses himself by relating a story from Aulus Gellius in which a slave who is being whipped accuses Plutarch of transgressing his own philosophy by becoming angry and Plutarch calmly debates the point with him as the whipping continues.[44]

Plutarch's *The Daemon of Socrates* has a rather complicated plan.[45] It begins with a dialogue in which Caphisias, a young Theban, is asked by his Athenian host to tell the story of the recent rising of the Thebans against their puppet government and the expulsion of the Spartan garrison. In his long speech telling the story Caphisias relates the philosophical discussion which took place on the night of the rebellion and which the conspirators used as a cover. At first a stranger Theanor tries to offer payment to Epaminondas for the kindness he showed to the exiled Pythagorean Lysis before his death.[46] Epaminondas persuades him to agree that the practice of poverty and the refusal of temptation is more important.[47] Various speakers debate the nature of Socrates's guardian spirit.[48] The most comprehensive answer is given by Simmias who follows a physical explanation of the functioning of guardian spirits with a Plato-style myth of the visionary dream of Timarchus, in which voices from a cave explain the workings of the daemones in relation to the movements of the lights he can see.[49] Theanor then gives his own complementary account of the soul and the guardian spirit, illustrated with analysis of Homer.[50] From time to time the debate is interrupted by arrivals and conspiratorial discussions, culminating in an exciting narrative of the killing of the tyrants.

Interwoven with this is a description of the character of Epaminondas, who will become the great hero of Thebes. His refusal to join the conspiracy is first criticized and later understood as he declines to be involved in bloodshed but also explains the role which his independent position will enable him to play in the reconstruction of the state.[51] His contributions to the ethical debate illustrate his education which fits him for practical politics as well as philosophy. *The Daemon of Socrates* provides an example of ways of interweaving narrative and argument. In *De la vanité* Montaigne cites this essay as a model of the delight which can come from mixing together different elements in a way which appears casual and fortuitous.[52]

Plutarch mixes technical philosophical argument with exciting historical narrative and description of a morally exemplary character. He writes speeches and arguments suited to different personalities but he is also willing to provide straightforward practical moral instruction. His notebook provides him with anecdotes and *sententiae* for every occasion, some of them so effective that he uses them several times over.[53] His works mix philosophy, antiquarianism, science, Homeric scholarship and medicine. He enjoys showing off his range of knowledge but he also regards scholarly debate as one of the signs of civilized life, as important as dinner parties or moderate political engagement. Plutarch kept enough distance from his arguments to understand opposing points of view and to reach balanced judgements.

Montaigne appreciated Plutarch's mixing of materials. He liked and borrowed his stories and sayings. He is more questioning, especially self-questioning, but Plutarch's comments often provide a starting point or a position against which he can define himself. Where the arguments in a Plutarch essay are often juxtaposed quite loosely, Montaigne tends to link his points together with reasons for and against each position. These passages of logical reflection on a story or an argument are often the places where Montaigne's toughest and most original thought appears. Plutarch's essays stimulated Montaigne to admiration and enjoyment but also to the ambition to do things differently. But he kept returning to Plutarch and he used him at some of the most important moments of the *Essais*.

Having looked at some of the techniques of reading and expression which they and their audiences were taught, I shall examine one short example each of Montaigne's and Shakespeare's writing, in order to show both the contribution which their training makes to their writing and the way in which similarities of outlook and presentation could occur without direct copying.

De l'inconstance de nos actions (II, 1) begins and ends by confronting the difficulty facing those who wish to judge people by their actions.[54] Because people characteristically act inconsistently it is hard to draw a particular person's actions together as a whole and view them under the same light (*les r'appiesser et mettre à mesme lustre*). At the beginning Montaigne immediately supports his claim that people's actions contradict each other with the historical examples of Marius, Pope Boniface VIII and Nero. These examples are so plain, Montaigne says, and each man can add to them so easily that it is surprising to see men of discernment struggling to arrange the pieces, given that vacillation is the most common and obvious defect of our nature. He supports this conclusion with an ethical axiom from Publilius Syrus which he could have taken from Aulus Gellius (XVII, 14) or from a proverb collection:

> [A] *Malum consilium est quod mutari non potest.* (V332, P351)

> [A] It's a bad decision which can never be changed. (S373)

Montaigne begins the chapter with a general observation which he backs up with historical examples (taken from Plutarch, a chronicle and Seneca). He uses an ethical axiom to back up his conclusion. Then, as if borrowing from a commonplace book, he collects quotations contrasting the ideal of constancy (from Demosthenes, in French) with actual human changeability (from Horace and Homer, both in Latin),[55] before exemplifying the ideal of constancy with a character description of Cato.

> [A] A qui auroit prescript et estably certaines loix et certaine police en sa teste, nous verrions tout par tout en sa vie reluire une equalité de meurs, un ordre et une relation infallible des unes choses aux autres … Le discours en seroit bien aisé à faire, comme il se voit du jeune Caton: qui en a touché une marche, a tout touché; c'est une harmonie de sons très-accordans, qui ne se peut démentir. A nous, au rebours, autant d'actions, autant faut-il de jugemens particuliers. Le plus seur, à mon opinion, seroit de les rapporter aux circonstances voisines, sans entrer en plus longue recherche et sans en conclurre autre consequence. (V333–4, P353)

> [A] If a man were to prescribe settled laws for a settled government established over his own brain, then we would see, shining throughout his whole life, a calm uniformity of conduct and a faultless interrelationship between his principles and his action. It would be easy enough to explain the character of such a man; that can be seen from the younger Cato: strike

> one of his keys and you have struck them all; there is in him a harmony of sounds in perfect concord such as none can deny. In our own cases on the contrary every one of our actions requires to be judged on its own; the surest way in my opinion would be to refer each of them to its context, without looking farther and without drawing any firm inference from it. (S375)

Montaigne collects quotations and stories which present different outlooks on the question. Then he uses them as a starting point for his own reasoning. Part of the richness of the chapter derives from this juxtaposition of different voices. He then illustrates the argument for the inconsistency of human actions with three stories told at greater length: a woman in the wars of religion who almost kills herself to defend her chastity, where her usual behaviour is more flexible, and two soldiers who become less courageous once their bravery has been rewarded by Antigonus and Lucullus respectively. As he tells these stories Montaigne gives possible reasons for the change in behaviour in each case (topic of causes). Then he generalizes the lessons of his stories by imagining a person who is brave one day and cowardly the next. Anger, necessity, company, wine, even the sound of a trumpet can make someone brave, but you should not expect him to remain so when circumstances change. Behaviour is dictated by circumstances, not reason, and therefore it is subject to change.

The chapter presents a great longing for the philosophical ideal of a constant pursuit of virtue, while at the same time Montaigne insists that human nature is too patched and mixed to be capable of constancy. The peroration explains that the changeability of human nature and motivation makes judgement very difficult, but still leaves a small space for the exercise of that judgement, which is, after all, one of the chief preoccupations of Montaigne's book.

> [A] Nous sommes tous de lopins, et d'une contexture si informe et diverse, que chaque piece, chaque moment, faict son jeu. Et se trouve autant de difference de nous à nous mesmes, que de nous à autruy … Puis que l'ambition peut apprendre aux hommes et la vaillance, et la temperance, et la liberalité, voire et la justice; puis que l'avarice peut planter au courage d'un garçon de boutique, nourri à l'ombre et à l'oysiveté, l'asseurance de se jetter si loing du foyer domestique, à la mercy des vagues et de Neptune courroucé dans un fraile bateau, et qu'elle apprend encore la discretion et la prudence; et que Venus mesme fournit de resolution et de hardiesse la jeunesse encore soubs la discipline et la verge, et gendarme le tendre

> coeur des pucelles au giron de leurs meres: ... Ce n'est pas tour de rassis entendement de nous juger simplement par nos actions de dehors; il faut sonder jusqu'au dedans, et voir par quels ressors se donne le bransle. Mais d'autant que c'est une hazardeuse et haute entreprinse, je voudrois que moins de gens s'en meslassent. (V337–8, P357–8)

> [A] We are entirely made up of bits and pieces, woven together so diversely and so shapelessly that each of them pulls its own way at every moment. And there is as much difference between us and ourselves as there is between us and other people. Since ambition can teach men valour, temperance and generosity – and indeed justice; since covetousness can plant in the mind of a shop boy, brought up in obscurity and idleness, enough confidence to cast himself on the mercy of the waves and angry Neptune in a frail boat, far from his hearth and home, and also teach him discernment and prudence; and since Venus herself furnishes resolution and hardiness to young men still subject to correction and the cane and puts a soldier's heart into girls still on their mothers' knees, it is not the act of a settled judgement to judge us simply by our outward deeds: we must probe right down inside and find out what principles make things move; but since this is a deep and chancy undertaking, I would that fewer people would concern themselves with it. (S380)

The sharp pithy conclusions of the first two sentences lead into the copious elaboration of the vices prompting virtuous actions. While these deliberately extended and decorated allegorical stories confirm the preceding statements and support the need for detailed internal investigation, they contrast with the humorously restricted final conclusion. Montaigne's smile tells us that he has no intention of giving up his own project of making judgements but, like the prologue of the whole book, it hints that his readers may be wasting their time in attempting to follow him. The paragraph turns on a complicated exchange between the self and others. Montaigne's conclusions about the changeability of human behaviour are based on reading, observation of others and introspection. He is happy to include his readers and humanity in general as objects of these conclusions ('we are entirely made up of bits and pieces') and as their audience, but his suggested solution to the problem of judgement seems to rely on a depth of interior knowledge that could come about only from introspection. In what other case could we hope to 'probe right down inside and find out what principles make things move'? So part of Montaigne's joke here is to suggest that other people might not be able to perform the delicate task of self-investigation which is the subject of his book.

Later additions do not significantly change the plan or the overall meaning of the chapter, though a few of them introduce new ideas. Most of Montaigne's changes involve adding further quotations and stories to illustrate or amplify ideas already expressed. For example in 1588 he adds a quotation from Lucretius to support the depiction of changeability, a quotation from Tibullus, which may have lain behind the text of the first version, explaining how Venus makes young girls brave and a discussion of Alexander as an example of someone whose battlefield bravery was compromised by his excessive fear of people plotting against him.[56] Some of the 1595 additions, especially towards the end of the chapter, reflect further reading in Roman moral philosophy. Montaigne cites in Latin Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (II.27.65) for the view that nothing can be constant unless it proceeds from a fixed principle, his *De officiis* (I.21.71) on pretences of moral virtue that actually reveal weakness and his *Paradoxa* (V.1.34) for the difficulty of always acting in the same way (V336–7, P356, S378–9). These quotations do not change the direction of Montaigne's thought but they show how his ideas can be supported from different classical authorities.

In the 1588 version, near the beginning, he adds a new section extending his discussion of the problem of judging others to reflect on the practice of historians. Even good authors err in trying to make people too uniform.

> [B] Ils choisissent un air universel, et suyvant cette image, vont rengeant et interpretant toutes les actions d'un personnage, et, s'ils ne les peuvent assez tordre, les renvoyent à la dissimulation. Auguste leur est eschappé: car il se trouve en cest homme une varieté d'actions si apparente, soudaine et continuelle, tout le cours de sa vie, qu'il s'est faict lacher entier et indecis, aux plus hardis juges. Je croy des hommes plus mal aisément la constance que toute autre chose, et rien plus aisément que l'inconstance. Qui en jugeroit en detail [C] et distinctement piece à piece [B] rencontreroit plus souvent à dire vray. (V332, P352)

> [B] They select one universal character, then, following that model, they classify and interpret all the actions of a great man; if they cannot twist them the way they want they accuse the man of insincerity. Augustus did get away from them: for there is in that man throughout his life a diversity of actions so clear, so sudden and so uninterrupted that they had to let him

> go in one piece, with no verdict made on him by even the boldest judges. Of Man I can believe nothing less easily than invariability; nothing more easily than variability. Whoever would judge a man in his detail, [C] piece by piece, separately, [B] would hit on the truth more often. (S374)

Reflecting on the way in which writers construct a character enables Montaigne to express a new idea about historians' accusations of insincerity. If you believe that people are bound to change you are less likely to try to set up standards of behaviour which people will inevitably fail. Also in 1588 he adds an important new section discussing the process and results of introspection.

> [B] Non seulement le vent des accidens me remue selon son inclination, mais en outre je me remue et trouble moy mesme par l'instabilité de ma posture; et qui y regarde primement, ne se trouve guere deux fois en mesme estat. Je donne à mon ame tantost un visage, tantost un autre, selon le costé où je la couche. Si je parle diversement de moy, c'est que je me regarde diversement. Toutes les contrarietez s'y trouvent selon quelque tour et en quelque façon. Honteux, insolent; [C] chaste, luxurieux; [B] bavard, taciturne; laborieux, delicat; ingenieux, hebeté; chagrin, debonnaire; menteur, veritable; [C] sçavant, ignorant, et liberal, et avare, et prodigue, [B] tout cela, je le vois en moy aucunement, selon que je me vire; et quiconque s'estudie bien attentifvement trouve en soy, voire et en son jugement mesme, cette volubilité et discordance. Je n'ay rien à dire de moi, entierement, simplement, et solidement, sans confusion et sans meslange, ny en un mot. *Distinguo* est la plus universel membre de ma Logique. (V335, P355)

> [B] Not only does the wind of chance events shake me about as it lists, but I also shake and disturb myself by the instability of my stance: anyone who turns his prime attention on to himself will hardly ever find himself in the same state twice. I give my soul this face or that depending upon which side I lay it down on. I speak about myself in diverse ways: that is because I look at myself in diverse ways. Every sort of contradiction can be found in me, depending on some twist or attribute: timid, insolent; [C] chaste, lecherous; [B] talkative, taciturn; tough, sickly; clever, dull; brooding, affable; lying, truthful; [C] learned, ignorant; generous, miserly and then prodigal – [B] I can see something of all that in myself, depending on how I gyrate; and anyone who studies himself attentively

> finds in himself and in his very judgement this whirring about and this discordancy. There is nothing I can say about myself as a whole simply and completely or in one word, without intermingling and admixture. The most universal article of my logic is *I differentiate*. (S377)

Montaigne refines his idea of inconstancy by describing in detail how he finds it within himself. Inconstancy is a matter of internal reality as well as of external pressure. But he now sees that it also reflects the act of looking at oneself. One sees different things because one looks in different ways. The grammar-school *copia* techniques of listing qualities and generating contraries here provide him with a way of presenting his experience of self-analysis. Looking at himself he finds contradictory qualities. But because self-description is not his main aim he immediately generalizes the claim: anyone else will find this too. In order to speak of oneself one must reject simple statements and make distinctions. Within the argument of *De l'inconstance de nos actions* this section describes his own experience to support the view that man is inconstant. In its own terms and for the sake of the *Essais* as a whole it provides a new and deeper portrayal of how introspection works. And, to conclude, it encapsulates the point in one of those epigrams which Montaigne's readers will always remember. We find this also in some of 1595's shorter additions.

> [C] Nous flottons entre divers advis: nous ne voulons rien librement, rien absoluement, rien constamment. (V333, P353)

> [C] We float about between different opinions. We desire nothing freely, nothing absolutely, nothing constantly. (S375)

While Montaigne evidently relies very heavily on grammar-school staples like moral axioms, quotations from classical literature and exemplary figures (Cato, Alexander, Augustus, Marius, Nero and Boniface VIII), he also transforms that inheritance. He contrasts assertions of the importance of constancy against poetic statements of change, going on to test these opinions against his understanding of himself in order to discover his own view. He is attracted by the ideal of a virtuous plan of life, rationally chosen and strictly followed, but his own experience of life is more divided. Later he reflects that part of the difference he finds in looking at himself is the consequence of differences in his way of looking. Through the statement of positions and of objections to them, through examination of contraries, Montaigne comes to a greater understanding of his own thinking. He uses inherited maxims as a basis for thought but he also enjoys formulating his own ideas as new epigrams, often marked by an astute employment of figures of thought and repetition. He varies conciseness with *copia*, enjoying the persuasive force of carefully amplified text but also using detailed description and topical exploration as a way of discovering the significance of an idea or a story. Amplification also makes him aware of his own voice. Just as he enjoys his peroration he knows how to deflate it and to leave both sides of the issue hanging with his impossible wish that fewer people would engage in making judgements.

Prior to Act III scene 3 spectators of *Hamlet* have been able to contrast Claudius's unctuous but effective public manner with his private sense of guilt at his unnatural murder. The soliloquy portrays him as a villain with self-knowledge, aware of his entrapment between contrary impulses, but trying to find a way of breaking out of the impasse.[57] After an exclamation which acknowledges the primal depth of his guilt, Claudius first outlines and then elaborates the dilemma he faces

Pray can I not,
Though inclination be as sharp as will,
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent (III.3.38–40)

He first develops the arguments in favour of praying for forgiveness, extolling the power of divine mercy by describing the extremity of the guilt it can absolve, through a comparison ('wash it white as snow') and an investigation of the meaning of mercy and the purpose of prayer (43–50). Understanding the power of mercy and prayer makes him optimistic ('Then I'll look up', 50). But when he starts to ponder the form of words in which he will ask for forgiveness, he is struck by the impossibility of repenting what he has no intention of giving up, his crown and his Queen (51–5). He develops this dilemma by expressing it as a general question which he will explore in both its earthly and heavenly dimensions.

May one be pardon'd and retain th'offence?
In the corrupted currents of this world
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice,
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law. But 'tis not so above:

There is no shuffling, there the action lies
In his true nature, and we ourselves compell'd
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults
To give in evidence. (56–64)

Where earthly power can coerce justice, faced with God we are forced to incriminate ourselves. The contrasting positions he explores (the power of mercy, the subjection of human justice to earthly power and the unescapable force of divine justice) lead him back to the anguish of his entanglement between the desire to repent and the impossibility of doing so.

What then? What rests?
Try what repentance can. What can it not?
Yet what can it, when one cannot repent?
O wretched state! O bosom black as death!
O limed soul, that struggling to be free
Art more engag'd! Help, angels! Make assay.
Bow, stubborn knees; and heart with strings of steel,
Be soft as sinews of the new-born babe.
All may be well. (64–72)

Claudius amplifies his entanglement through paradox, apostrophe, imagined description and exclamation. All he can do to escape his dilemma is test the power of prayer and hope that it can work. The soliloquy depicts thought which moves by statement, response and reflection on that response, just as Montaigne's *Essais* do. Shakespeare portrays in Claudius's soliloquy something of the movement and changeability of the human mind, which Montaigne asserts as a general principle on the basis of collecting different examples and testing their implications against his introspection. Shakespeare is not following Montaigne here; rather both of them elaborate a series of ideas by applying Renaissance rhetorical techniques. Montaigne starts from quotations and examples; Shakespeare starts from Claudius's impulse to seek forgiveness which arises from the inherited story and his own conception of the character of Claudius. The idea of making Claudius consider repentance might have come to Shakespeare through analogy; one might imagine that he wished the audience to compare the expressions of conscience in Hamlet and Claudius. Certainly it is possible for the audience to think about this speech in relation to Claudius's subsequent actions and in relation to

Hamlet's inability to make a serious acknowledgement of his responsibility in the deaths of Polonius, Ophelia, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Thinking with Shakespeare involves comparing the views expressed by different characters at different moments in the play in the light of their actions, moral qualities and fates. Montaigne helps his readers think by questioning axioms and comparing them with different narrative exempla and with his logical reflections on his own experience. In the next two chapters we shall look in more detail at Montaigne's use of his reading and at the way his thinking develops.

2. Montaigne's Use of His Reading

Although Montaigne was one of the great originals of world literature, the founder of a new genre, the discoverer of a new subject, his work is strongly marked by, and acutely conscious of, the role of reading. Reading stimulated him to thought and to writing. Because he studs his text with quotations and because of the survival of several annotated books from his library, we can learn more about his practices and uses of reading than about any other sixteenth-century writer. We learn that his reading prompted him to begin writing certain chapters, that it helped him find more moving expressions and that it stimulated questioning and reformulation of ideas. Montaigne's originality of thought and force of expression arise from his logical and rhetorical response to his reading. In this chapter I shall consider the contributions which Montaigne's reading of other authors made to his *Essais*.

While Montaigne rejects the emphasis on rote-learning in humanist education, arguing that the teacher should ask the pupil what he thinks rather than expecting him to repeat what the authors have said,[1] he nevertheless believes that readers ought to take over from others the arguments they believe to be true.

> [A] Car s'il embrasse les opinions de Xenophon et de Platon par son propre discours, ce ne seront plus les leurs, ce seront les siennes … La verité et la raison sont communes à un chacun, et ne sont non plus à qui les a dites premierement, qu'à qui les dict apres … Les abeilles pillotent deçà delà les fleurs, mais elles en font apres le miel, qui est tout leur; ce n'est plus thin ny marjorlaine: ainsi les pieces empruntées d'autruy, il les transformera et confondera, pour en faire un ouvrage tout sien: à sçavoir son jugement. Son institution, son travail et estude ne vise qu'à le former (I, 26, V151–2, P157).

> [A] If it is by his own reasoning that he adopts the opinions of Xenophon and Plato; they are no longer theirs: they are his … Truth and reason are common to all: they no more belong to the man who first put them into words than to him who last did so … Bees ransack flowers here and flowers there; but then they make their own honey which is entirely theirs and no longer thyme or marjoram. Similarly the boy will transform his borrowings; he will confound their forms so that the end-product is entirely his: namely his judgement, the forming of which is the only aim of his toil, his study and his education (S170–1).

The purpose of reading is to stimulate the mind and the judgement by providing materials for them to work on. Montaigne's comment on the use of reading depends heavily on Plutarch's essay 'How to Listen to Poetry' (2), which itself draws on Horace and Seneca.[2] Some of Montaigne's comments represent his own reading as self-consciously casual. 'I leaf through books; I do not study them'.[3] 'I only look to books to give me pleasure through honest amusement'.[4] 'If I come across difficult passages in my reading I never bite my nails over them, after making a charge or two I let them be ... If one book wearies me I take up another'.[5] '[In my library] I turn the pages of one book at one time, of another at another, without plan or order, in short pieces; sometimes I dream, sometimes while walking I take note and dictate my dreams like this one'.[6] But his detailed comments on his reading and his deep enthusiasm for a number of favourite authors (Plutarch and Seneca primarily, but also Ovid, Virgil, Lucretius, Horace, Catullus, Caesar) suggest that this is largely presentational *sprezzatura*.[7] There is also good evidence in Montaigne's surviving books of the thoroughness and discriminating judgement with which he read.[8] Elsewhere he claims that reading has a special role in stimulating his processes of thought.

> [C] La lecture me sert specialement à esveiller par divers objects mon discours: à embesongner mon jugement, non ma memoyre (III, 3, V819, P860).

> [C] Reading because of its different subjects particularly awakes my linguistic expression; it sets to work my judgement, not my memory (S923).

He insists that a *lecteur suffisant* (competent reader) 'can find many perfections in a text which the author did not put in and gives it richer meanings and perspectives'[9] and he evidently includes himself in this category.

> [C] J'ay leu en Tite Live cent choses que tel n'y a pas leu. Plutarque en y a leu cent, outre ce que j'y ay sceu lire, et, à l'adventure, outre ce que l'autheur y avoit mis (I, 26, V156, P162).

> [C] I have read a hundred things in Livy which others have not found there. Plutarch has read a hundred beyond what I have known enough to read there, and perhaps, beyond what the author put there (S175–6).

He also hopes for this critical and creative reading from his own readers.[10] He fully understands that there is no end to interpretation.

> [A] Ceste opinion me ramentoit l'experience que nous avons, qu'il n'est aucun sens ny visage, ou droict, ou amer, ou doux, ou courbe, que l'esprit humain ne trouve aux escrits qu'il entreprend de fouiller (II, 12, V585, P621).

> [A] This opinion reminded me of an experience which we all have, that there is no slant or meaning, strict or twisted, sweet or bitter, which the human mind cannot find in writings which it undertakes to read (S661).

The reading of books promotes the proliferation of more writing. Reading stimulates him to write but reading the very best authors can also be a little intimidating.

> [B] Quand j'escris, je me passe bien de la compagnie et souvenance des livres, de peur qu'ils n'interrompent ma forme. Aussi qu'à la verité, les bons autheurs m'abattent par trop et rompent le courage (III, 5, p. 874, P917).

> [B] When I am writing I can do without the company and support of books because I am afraid that they will interfere with my form. Also, to tell the truth, because great authors overwhelm me and destroy my confidence (S989).

Nevertheless the amount of quotation and paraphrase indicates that Montaigne must have had books before him as he composed and revised his *Essais*. He gives different reasons for his quotations.[11] While attacking others for indiscriminate borrowing he claims that he uses other authors when they have expressed what he thinks better than he can ('I only speak others' words the better to express myself').[12] For all his criticism of humanist educational methods, it seems that Montaigne's thinking, which he prefers to describe as self-expression, generally forms itself as a response (sometimes appreciative, sometimes critical) to the texts he has been reading.

Montaigne's reading provides him with models for the processes and structures of composition. In the first stages of the early essays Montaigne collected historical and poetic examples illustrating moral lessons on the models of the training offered in the humanist grammar school and of compilations like Pietro Crinito's *De honesta disciplina* (1504) and Pedro

Mexia's *La Silva di varia leccion* (1542) which Montaigne used in the French translation by Claude Gruget (1552).[13] But the decisive model for the initial stages of the more complex essays was Plutarch's *Moralia* in Amyot's French translation.[14] These short prose treatises which discussed a range of moral and scholarly topics from many angles, embracing narrative, philosophy and poetry and permitting dialogue, combine many of the elements found in Montaigne's mature essays. Indeed it is quite possible that the appearance of Amyot's translation in 1572 was one of the factors which persuaded Montaigne to turn the leisure reading of his retirement into the intellectual labour of the *Essais*. Plutarch is the author whom Montaigne uses most, often in direct (but unmarked) quotation of the French translation, sometimes with light alteration. Isabelle Konstantinovic's valuable *Montaigne et Plutarque* lists 751 borrowings from the *Parallel Lives* and the *Moralia* in the *Essais*. Her tables show that these borrowings are spread across ninety-one of Montaigne's 107 chapters. The great majority of these borrowings (601 out of her subdivided total of 763) occur in the first published version of each *essai*.[15] The greatest number of borrowings are from three less well-known 'essays' which are quite well adapted to Montaigne's purposes:[16] *Whether Land or Sea Animals Are More Intelligent* (forty-six borrowings), which provides many of the examples for Montaigne's *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*; *Notable Sayings of the Spartans* (38) and *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (33), collections of the quotations Montaigne likes to use as evidence or as provocations to contradiction and qualification. The Plutarch essays which Montaigne uses most in the 1588 revision and after tend to be ethical treatises (*How to Tell a Friend from a Flatterer* (twenty borrowings in 1588 and after), *Tanquillity of Mind* (10), *Why Divine Justice Delays* (8) and *How to Restrain Anger* (7); but also *How to Listen* (8), *Instructions for Politicians* (8) and *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (25)) used particularly in Montaigne's third book. Among the *Lives* only *Alexander*, *Caesar* and *Lycurgus* are much used after the first edition.[17] These numerical patterns suggest that Montaigne used Plutarch mainly as a starting point.

But on the whole the *Moralia* provides general rather than specific models.[18] When Plutarch and Montaigne write essays on similar topics (*e.g.*, education and friendship) there is usually little resemblance between them, but *De la colere* (II, 31) makes considerable use of *Moralia* 29, *On Restraining Anger*.[19]

Reading provided Montaigne with the starting point for some of his chapters. In *A demain les affaires* (II, 4) Montaigne's prefatory praise of

Amyot and Plutarch leads into a story about Rusticus at dinner declining to open a letter from the emperor from *Moralia* 36, *On Curiosity*, which opens the subject of the chapter. *De la conscience* (II, 5) takes its inspiration and some of its early examples from two pages of *Moralia* 41, *Why Divine Justice Delays*.[20] *De la solitude* (I, 39) begins its exploration of the contemplative life with some close translations from Seneca's *Epistolae morales*, 7 and 28 and draws material from other letters and treatises of Seneca as it continues.[21] *Coustume de l'isle de Cea* (II, 3) takes its first examples of suicide as a form of defiance from Plutarch, *Moralia* 16, *Notable Sayings of the Spartans* before drawing on Stoic sources like Seneca, *Epistolae morales*, 70, 77 and 78, and Cicero, *De finibus*.[22] The essay begins by citing quotations for and against suicide before developing Montaigne's own view through a discussion of narrative examples mostly taken from his reading.

In other cases I believe that Montaigne knew from quite early on in its composition that a chapter would conclude with a quotation or a passage based on quotation. *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (I, 20) ends with a four-page imaginary speech (*ethopoeia*, speech for a character, an exercise from the *progymnasmata*) for Nature, based on Lucretius III, 931–62 (several quotations from here and elsewhere in Lucretius III were added in 1588) and translations from Seneca's *Epistolae morales*, 24, 30, 49, 77, 117, 120.[23] *De la solitude* (I, 39) ends with a letter constructed out of phrases translated from Seneca's *Epistolae morales*, 7, 22 and 68.[24] The second half of *De l'inequalité qui est entre nous* (I, 42) summarizes and elaborates the views of Hieron from Xenophon's dialogue *Hieron*, filling it out with examples from other sources.[25] Most strikingly (and wittily) of all, Montaigne ends his massive argument about the inability of the unaided human intellect to make theological conclusions in the *Apologie* with a long, just about acknowledged quotation from Plutarch's *Moralia* 24, *On the E at Delphi*, in which the pagan Plutarch argues that man should not fear death because man's experience of existence is wholly inadequate in comparison with the full existence of God.[26]

Having established Montaigne's use of his reading as a model and as a starting and finishing point for particular essays, I now want to examine the more controversial suggestion that he undertook systematic research for some of his essays, deliberately reading particular texts which he thought might furnish material for particular chapters. For example Bernard Weinberg has shown that in *Des cannibales* Montaigne supplements the words of his informant with recollections and re-reading of travel narratives.[27] This suggestion runs against the image which Montaigne likes to present of himself as a casual reader who picks up books from time to time, putting them down equally quickly and never reading for long. Montaigne was exceptionally perceptive and retained much of what he read. He liked to portray himself as a gentleman rather than a scholar, writing his works with a certain casual *sprezzatura*, but no one could have assimilated the range of works which Montaigne knew or have thought so profoundly about the implications of many of the stories and ideas he met in them without serious intellectual labour.

The case of Lucretius provides some indications.[28] We now know that Montaigne bought a copy of Lambinus's edition of Lucretius soon after its publication in late 1563 or early 1564.[29] Between the date of this purchase and 16 October 1564 he read the entire work carefully and made many annotations to the text. Simone Fraisse dates Montaigne's quotations of Lucretius in the *Essais* as follows: fifty (1580); two more (1582); ninety-five added (1588) and one more in 1595 (this last is quoted via Lipsius).[30] This suggests that after his reading of Lucretius in 1564, Montaigne must have re-read the work at least twice: at some time between 1572 and 1580 for the first edition and again in the second phase of the composition of the *Essais* in 1585–8. The likelihood is that he read sections of Lucretius even more frequently since he regarded him as one of his four favourite Latin poets, and at times even on a par with Virgil.[31] But the use of Lucretius in the *Essais* is highly concentrated. Of the total of 148 quotations, ninety-eight occur in just three chapters. The seventy-six quotations in *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* (II, 12) form an essential part of the argument of that work. Montaigne takes delight in inverting Lucretius's arguments that unless we believe our senses we have no knowledge, to argue that, because the senses are unreliable, secure knowledge of any kind is unattainable.[32] Montaigne quotes a series of excerpts from book IV of Lucretius to make this point.[33] It seems that Montaigne had certain pages of Lucretius before him at both stages of writing his longest essay.[34] The much shorter *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (I, 20) includes sixteen quotations from Lucretius in its nineteen pages, many of them concentrated in the speech of Nature at the end. The next largest number of quotations (6) occurs in the ten page *De l'inequalité qui est entre nous* (I, 42), where Lucretius and Horace carry much of the argument and Lucretius is used to conclude. Three of the quotations are taken from the prefatory section of book two where Lucretius explains the irrelevance of splendour and glory. There are only four quotations from Lucretius in *Sur des* *vers de Virgile* (III, 5) but one of them is the description of the lovemaking of Venus and Mars in the introduction to book one (I.32–40) which Montaigne compares with the Virgilian verses of the title.[35] Montaigne greatly admired Lucretius as a poet. Along with Horace,[36] he quotes him more than any other Latin poet, and sometimes at considerable length.[37] Many of the quotations bear witness to his admiration of his expression but in other cases he exploits the relevance of his arguments to the topic in hand.

Because of his atheistic outlook Lucretius was a dangerous author to appear to endorse in the sixteenth century. Montaigne sets all this aside, never using him to attack religion but never concealing the extent to which he quoted him or his admiration for Lucretius's powers of thought and expression. His extensive quotation helped establish Lucretius as a great poet who had to be read whatever people might think of his religious opinions. While this seems quite understandable for secular moderns it was a courageous and important attitude to promote in a century torn by religious wars, and in which accusations of atheism were common and sometimes murderous.

Even though Montaigne knew Seneca's *Epistolae morales* and some of the moral treatises (*e.g.*, *De beneficiis*, *De clementia* and *De ira*) well,[38] in this case too his borrowings are strongly concentrated. Only nine chapters of the *Essais* have ten or more borrowings from Seneca's *Epistolae morales*, and of those the leading ones, which have already been mentioned, tend to focus especially on one or two of Seneca's letters: *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (thirty-seven borrowings; especially from letters 26, 77); *De la solitude* (thirty-three, especially from 7, 28); *Coustume de l'isle de Cea* (sixteen, especially from 70); *De l'inequalité qui est entre nous* (fifteen, especially from 76). The relevance of these titles to the philosophical preoccupations of the *Epistolae morales* is clear. Looking at the question from the other direction the seven letters which are borrowed from more than five times are all closely linked with particular chapters.[39] Montaigne used Cornelius Agrippa's *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum* in only two essays but quite heavily in those two.[40]

Furthermore there are particular sections of the *Essais* where one source is used consistently. For example, in the section of the *Apologie* on the rationality of animals a twenty-five page passage depends very heavily on Plutarch, *Moralia* 63, *Whether Land or Sea Animals Are More Intelligent*, and this is the only place where Montaigne uses this work.[41] Some crucial sections of the later chapters in book three rely on the more strictly ethical treatises of the *Moralia*. Near the end of *De l'incommodité de la grandeur*

(III, 7) three stories of sycophantic behaviour are taken from *Moralia* 4, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, an obvious reference for this topic.[42] In *De l'art de conferer* (III, 8) the crucial move towards accusing oneself of one's faults is made with a saying from Plato (which Montaigne reinforces from the source in the C text) taken from *Moralia* 29, *On Restraining Anger*.[43] Konstantinovic points out that the central part of *De la phisionomie* (III, 12), when, moralizing his story of the reaction of the poor to the plague, Montaigne finds that preparation for death is useless, is a reworking of a section from the beginning of Plutarch's *The Love of Parents for Their Children*, *Moralia* 32.[44] A little later in the same essay Montaigne writes a speech for Socrates which is an obvious reworking of Plato's *Apology*.[45] A section on the importance of plain-speaking to rulers from *De l'experience* relies on ideas and phrases from a few pages of *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, which, once more, would be an obvious place to look for suitable material on this topic.[46]

For the later revisions of the book Montaigne appears to have undertaken a systematic programme of reading in histories of the new world and of Asia.[47] His reading of the second edition of Fumée's translation of López de Gómara's *Histoire générалle des Indes occidentalles* provided the material and the stimulus for one of the most moving sections of the whole work. All the examples and stories mentioned in the final section of *Des coches* (III, 6) are taken from Gómara's compilation history (apart from the story of Cuauhtémoc which comes from Gómara's life of Cortés). Montaigne has built arguments around them, shortened some of the stories and amplified the emotional effect of others and in so doing has entirely changed what he has taken over while at the same time introducing a new and strong element to his own thought. Gómara had written his history to celebrate the Spanish conquest and justify Cortés's actions. Montaigne reacts against the atrocities Gómara relates and takes his manner of telling the stories as a guarantee of their essential truth.

> [B] Nous tenons d'eux-mesmes ces narrations, car ils ne les advouent pas seulement, [C] ils s'en ventent et les preschent. (V913, P958)[48]

> [B] These accounts we have from the Spaniards themselves. They do not merely confess to them, they [C] boast of them and proclaim them. (S1034)

Montaigne compares the new world to a young child, a new brother, whose development has been crippled by the corruption of the old world.[49] He uses examples from Gómara's history to argue first that the new world was superior to the old in craftsmanship, piety and bravery and second that the conquerors (whom he usually identifies with as 'we', *i.e.*, fellow representatives of the old world, but sometimes distances himself from as 'the Spaniards') were superior only in the destructive power of their weapons. Then he comments on the motivations and effects of the European conquest.

> [B] Au rebours nous nous sommes servis de leur ignorance et inexperience à les plier plus facilement vers la trahison, luxure, avarice et vers toute sorte d'inhumanité et de cruauté, à l'exemple et patron de nos moeurs. Qui mit jamais à tel prix le service de la mercadence et de la trafique? Tant de villes rasées, tant de nations exterminées, tant de millions de peuples passez au fil de l'espée, et la plus riche et belle partie du monde bouleversée pour la negotiation des perles et du poivre: Mechaniques victoires. (V910, P955)

> [B] We, on the contrary, took advantage of their ignorance and lack of experience to pervert them more easily towards treachery, debauchery and cupidity, toward every kind of cruelty and inhumanity, by the example and model of our own manners. Whoever else has rated trade and commerce at such a price? So many cities razed to the ground, so many nations wiped out, so many millions of individuals put to the sword, and the most beautiful and the richest part of the world shattered, on behalf of the pearls-and-pepper business! Tradesman's victories! (S1031)

By reorganizing Gómara's account of a dialogue between a Spanish captain and the rulers of a local port, he allows the Indians' words to speak for their rationality and restraint in comparison with the rapaciousness of their conquerors.[50] Their calm and reasonable response is then contrasted with two atrocity stories of the murder and torture of the Inca Atahualpa and the Aztec Emperor Cuauhtémoc.[51] Desperate to discover their treasure the Spaniards tortured the king's favourite lord in his presence.

> [B] Ce seigneur, se trouvant forcé de la douleur, environné de braziers ardens, tourna sur la fin piteusement sa veue vers son maistre, comme pour luy demander [C] mercy de ce qu'il n'en pouvoit plus. [B] Le Roy, plantant fierement et rigoureusement les yeux sur luy, pour reproche de sa lascheté et pusillanimité, luy dit seulement ces mots, d'une voix rude et ferme: Et moy, suis je dans un bain, suis je pas plus à mon aise que toy? (V912, P957)[52]

> [B] That lord, overcome with pain, surrounded by blazing braziers, finally turned his gaze piteously towards his sovereign as if to beg [C] forgiveness because he could stand it no longer. [B] That King proudly and severely fixed his eyes on him to reproach him for his cowardice and faint-heartedness and simply said these words in a firm hoarse voice: 'And me, am I having a bath? Am I any more at ease than you are?' (S1033)

Elsewhere Montaigne quarries Gómara for additional examples to support arguments he had already formulated. These 1588 additions include new instances of civilized behaviour on the part of cannibals (I, 31), many new instances to illustrate the extraordinary customs which different people accept as normal (I, 23) and a new section for the *Apologie* on similarities of belief between the old and new worlds.[53] While these additions form part of his wider project to add examples from Asian and American history and culture to existing arguments, *Des coches* shows how a new reading in history prompted Montaigne to develop a new response.

It can be argued that Montaigne deliberately re-read the Latin poets in order to add to the Latin quotations of the 1588 edition. Of the total 739 quotations, 464 (roughly 63 per cent) were added then.[54] On the other hand, a good deal of Montaigne's reading must have stuck with him. When he sets out a Stoic idea, searching for the precise passage in Seneca's letters from which he took it may well be fruitless, even though he may have first come across the idea there. Montaigne's instructions on reading always emphasize the need to ingest the substance of an author's idea rather than remembering the words or the source. By the same token, Montaigne owes his knowledge of Epaminondas primarily to Plutarch's *The Daemon of Socrates*,[55] but we must not expect that he needed to re-read that work every time he mentioned him. The use of Plato's *Apology* in *De la phisionomie* offers a middle case. Montaigne would obviously have remembered the general tenor of Socrates's speech from his earlier readings of the text. That would have prompted him to think it suitable for that particular point in his developing argument. But once he decided to re-work the speech rather than simply referring to it he surely would have opened Ficino's translation and worked from it. Reviewing the text at a later stage he decided to extend his summary of the speech and turned again to his translation of Plato to do so.[56]

Speculation about Montaigne's methods of working is also encouraged by the frequency with which, especially in the 1588 edition, new Latin quotations are added to passages where the French text is not otherwise changed.[57] Of the twenty-one Latin quotations added to *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (I, 20) in 1588, fifteen are added to the existing French text without any other additions. It seems likely that Montaigne combined two related procedures. On one side we may imagine that as he re-read Latin poetry while he was preparing the second edition between 1585 and 1588 he inserted passages into his existing text where it seemed appropriate.[58] On the other side we can imagine that while he was re-reading his own text in order to improve it (he must have done this because he made many additions in his own voice), he found places where short sections of poetry he knew would add to the effect.

Montaigne may well have employed indexes in finding quotations from Latin literature suitable for inclusion in his book. We know that he compiled an index for the copy of Lucretius he bought in 1563[59] as well as marking or commenting on particular passages, several of which later turn up in the *Essais* as he read or re-read the text.[60] There is evidence, too, that he preferred to buy editions with indexes (*e.g.*, of Plutarch, Virgil and Seneca).[61] The opening quotations and stories about Homer in *Des plus excellens hommes* (II, 36) are taken (and slightly rearranged) from the alphabetical index of Amyot's translation of the *Moralia*.[62] In the *Apologie* he expresses the wish that Lipsius would produce a classified list of the opinions of the ancients on metaphysics and ethics.[63] It may well be, as Michel Magnien has suggested,[64] that Montaigne or his secretary kept an index to the *Essais* to assist them in finding appropriate locations for new extracts from his reading. In II, 27 he justifies including a story from Livy that is not entirely suitable to his theme at that point by saying that 'beautiful subjects always justify their place, wherever you put them'.[65] This implies that there were some stories that he liked so much that he decided to include them before finding the place in which to put them.

I know of only one instance in which Montaigne quotes the same lines of poetry twice, using Cicero's translation of two lines from Homer's *Odyssey* to explain the changeability of human moods (II, 1) and the inconsistency of our judgement (II, 12), both originating in the 1580 edition.[66] There are several cases in which he uses a series of adjacent quotations, some within a short passage of the same essay but others quite far apart. For example, consecutive lines of Horace, *Odes*, III, 3 are used in relation to despising death in I, 20 and considering suicide in II, 3. The strong-minded man stands firm against death and fear in both cases.[67] Consecutive lines from Evander's speech lamenting Pallas's impetuosity (*Aeneid* XI, 154–7) were added in 1588 to *De la cruauté*

(II, 11) and *Couardise mere de la cruauté* (II, 27), in the first case showing the thoughtless bravery of inexperienced warriors, in the second, comparing Frenchmen who travel to Italy to learn fencing with overenthusiastic novice soldiers.[68] Both these paired examples may show Montaigne re-reading passages from Horace and Virgil and finding two distinct places in his book for the expression which has impressed him. Mary McKinley suggests that on some occasions the B text additions deliberately revisit texts which were in Montaigne's mind when he first composed a passage but which he did not then quote.[69] Once (in *Du démentir*, II, 18, B addition) in the Bordeaux copy he removes four words from a quotation of Persius which also appeared in the 1588 text of *Des Boyteux* (III, 11).[70] This suggests that in re-reading his text he remembered a repetition which he wished to avoid.[71] But in at least one case he uses the same exemplum to make strongly contrasted points. In *Des plus excellens hommes* (II, 36) Alexander's remorse after the killing of Clytus is a sign of his goodness and generosity but in *De l'inconstance de nos actions* (II, 1) this excessive remorse demonstrates his inconstancy of mind.[72]

All these examples suggest that Montaigne was engaged in an intricate process of re-reading, of his own text and of the philosophy and poetry which inspired it. At each stage he must have questioned the appropriateness of a particular quotation (including whatever associations it brought with it from its context) to the particular section of his own work in which he placed it. In the examples we have considered so far Montaigne's reading provides him with: statements of views which support his own; which offer confirmation, authority or admirable expression; inherited responses to problems against which he can react; evidence and opinion on the subject of the chapter; arguments; preselected collections of relevant maxims and stories; and stories reflecting new experience. Different conclusions about the effect of his reading can be obtained by analysing the impact on particular chapters of reading in different authors.[73]

The thirty-six Latin quotations of *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (I, 20), which has already been mentioned in relation to Lucretius and Seneca, will offer some basis for further analysis. This essay presents a consistent strongly but not exclusively Stoic case for thinking about death frequently in order to live better. People are helped by awareness of death because life is uncertain and because a proper detachment from life and an understanding that death is an essential part of the cycle of life enables a person to live fully and without fear. Montaigne urges people to prepare for death by thinking about it continually. By stripping away its macabre masks people can increase their understanding and diminish their apprehension of death. At the end of the essay Montaigne weaves a tapestry of quotations from Seneca's letters and the soliloquy of Nature in Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, III to produce a speech in which Nature proclaims the rightness of death and answers various objections to it.[74] Sixteen of the poetic quotations, almost all from Lucretius, occur in this section.

In most cases (twenty-one out of thirty-six) the poetic quotations repeat the material which immediately precedes them, sometimes plainly, sometimes with amplification and sometimes only partially.[75] But what is the force of this repetition? The first quotation (Horace, *Odes*, II 3, 25–8, added in B) is used to support the idea that death is inevitable. It functions both as confirmation of the point and as poetic elaboration.[76] It enriches the text. The third, immediately following (Claudian, *In Ruffinum*, II, 137–8, added in B), expands on the idea of death overhanging condemned criminals by picturing the man numbering the days of life remaining. These quotations support the idea that death changes perceptions, but they also make the thought of the chapter more concrete and emotional as well as introducing examples of a more elegant use of language, for Montaigne firmly believed that Latin was more forceful than French.[77] The sixth quotation (Horace, *Epistles*, II 2, 126–8 present in A) heralds a new development in the argument. Montaigne's text states that he would happily find any way to avoid pain. The quotation rephrases this slightly differently (As long as my faults pleased me or at least deceived me, I would prefer to be mad or foolish than to be wise and unhappy), but the restatement makes Montaigne realize that he does not wish to endorse this position. By providing another voice which states the point in a more extreme form, the quotation prompts Montaigne to oppose that view.[78]

Something rather similar to this occurs later in the chapter. Quotation 13 (Lucretius, III.898–9, added in B) amplifies the French text's description of different men complaining of what death has prevented them from doing, with a common voice expressing misery at the rewards which have been lost on a single day. A few lines later B again adds the lines immediately following in which Lucretius counters that once the complainants are dead they will desire nothing of the kind. Here the addition of a quotation which amplifies a previous thought leads on to a new reason for rejecting this approach to death, though this reason is not developed further, as he returns to the text he had already published in 1580.

In between these two quotations from Lucretius a line from Ovid offers a useful *caveat*. Between two statements of the need for people to be active which before C preferred noblemen to die on their feet, Montaigne amplified with a quotation from Ovid (When I die, I would like to be in the middle of my work). In Montaigne's context this Latin phrase repeats the ideas of the French on either side of it. But in Ovid, *Amores*, II 10, 36, the reference was clearly to wishing to die while making love, a sentiment which would contradict Montaigne's argument here. So while Montaigne's Latin quotations often bring with them the flavour of their original context, as many scholars have argued, nevertheless there are occasions when the passage works better without awareness of the context.[79]

Montaigne is quite critical of Cicero's approach to moral philosophy (S464–6) but Cicero's works state some opinions which are also important to Montaigne. Examples of Montaigne-like arguments from the *Tusculan Disputations* would include: the whole life of a wise man is a preparation for death (*Tusc*. I.74, V81, P82–3, S89); if pain is not real there is no place for courage (II.33, V56, P265, S59); intense pain does not last long (II.44, V57, P265–6, S60); be thoughtful in prosperity, not in adversity (III.30, V947, P991, S1072); the natural needs of human beings are small and few (III.56, V471, 1009, P495, 1054–5, S526, 1141–2); sexual pleasure is trivial and humiliating (IV.68, V877, P920, S991–2); Socrates brought philosophy back to the level of ordinary people (V.11, V1037, P1082–3, S1173). In his final revisions to the work Montaigne adds many references to Cicero's philosophical works. For example he inserts five Latin quotations and one exemplum from Cicero's *De officiis*, whose topic is obviously relevant to this chapter, in *De l'utile et de l'honneste* (III, 1).[80] Perhaps Cicero always influenced Montaigne more than he admits or perhaps he came across a particular opinion through another work or without direct reference to Cicero. Adding the Cicero quotations later might have been either a matter of intellectual honesty or a realization that for some of his readers Cicero's authority would add weight to the view.

While acknowledging that the majority of Latin quotations repeat the ideas of Montaigne's French text I should like to consider some cases in which the quotation moves the argument on in an important way, taking examples from *De la vanité* (III, 9). After a tale from Guevara, Montaigne introduces a quotation from Juvenal, *Satires*, XIV, 233–4, which denounces the viciousness of sons. Montaigne's response to the story and the quotation drives the essay in a new direction.

> [B] Je ne sçay quels livres, disoit la courtisanne Lays, quelle sapience, quelle philosophie, mais ces gens-là battent aussi souvant à ma porte que aucuns autres. D’autant que nostre licence nous porte tousjours au delà de ce qui nous est loisible et permis, on a estressy souvant outre la raison universelle les preceptes et loys de nostre vie.
>
> *Nemo satis credit tantum delinquere quantum*
> *Permittas.*
>
> Il seroit à desirer qu’il y eust plus de proportion du commandement à l’obeïssance: Et semble la visée injuste, à laquelle on ne peut atteindre. (V990, P1036)

> [B] ‘I don’t know these books’, said Laïs the courtesan, ‘nor their wisdom and philosophy, but these men knock at my door as often as anyone else’. Just as our licence always takes us beyond what is lawful and permissible, we have often made the precepts and laws for our lives stricter than universal reason requires.
>
> *No one thinks that it is enough to offend as much as you allow.*
>
> It would be preferable if there were more proportion between command and obedience. A target we cannot reach appears unfair. (S1120)

Guevara’s story is about hypocrisy and Juvenal’s line is in a passage concerned with boundless vice, but the construction of Juvenal’s line (By so much he exceeds … by how much you allow) alerts Montaigne to the idea of proportionality between rule and behaviour. Rather than regarding the son’s excess as a matter of vice only he sees (in the sentence he places before the quotation) that reciprocally men set rules that are impossible for them to obey, which leads him to the conclusion that impractically strict rules are part of human vanity. Juvenal would not have imagined such a use for his satire in which parents are urged to a strictness that might nevertheless fail to reform their children, but Montaigne’s reading against the grain (encouraged by the construction) has a strong point.

When Montaigne turns his attention to fortune, a quotation from Horace, *Odes* III 16, 21–3, 42–3 formulates one of the attitudes he might take.

> [B] Je doibs beaucoup à la fortune dequoy jusques à cette heure elle n'a rien fait contre moy d'outrageux [C] au moins au delà de ma portée. [B] Seroit ce pas sa façon de laisser en paix ceux de qui elle n'est point importunée?
>
> *Quanto quisque sibi plura negaverit,*
> *A Diis, plura feret. Nil cupientium*
> *Nudus castra peto …*
> *… Multa petentibus*
> *Desunt multa.*
>
> Si elle continue, elle me r'envoyera tres-content et satisfaict,
> *Nihil supra*
> *Deos lacesso.*
>
> Mais gare le heurt. Il en est mille qui rompent au port. (V998, P1044)
>
> [B] I am deeply indebted to Fortune in that, up to the present, she has done me no outrage, [C] at least, none above what I can bear. [B] Perhaps it is her custom to leave in peace those who do not pester her?
> *The more a man denies himself*
> *The more he receives from the Gods*
> *Although I have nothing I join the camp of those*
> *Who desire nothing …*
> *… Those who ask for much*
> *Lack much.*
>
> If she continues she will dispatch me well satisfied.
> *I harass the Gods*
> *For nothing more.*
>
> But watch out for the snag! Hundreds founder within the harbour. (S1129)

Horace's rather complacent assertion of a link between moderated desires and happiness offers Montaigne a rational explanation for the safety from disaster which he had previously noted. He embraces the idea long enough to hope that it may continue (and to find another supporting quotation from Horace, *Odes* II 18, 11–12). But then his experience intervenes. Many have thought themselves safe from disaster and then foundered. Gratitude to fortune (which carries with it an awareness of future calamity) is here wiser than a rationalizing which might encourage a dangerous sense of security.

Here the quotation states a point of view which Montaigne wants to hear but which he decides to reject.

Uniquely among the earlier chapters *De l'exercitation* (II, 6) is centred on the narrative of an event from Montaigne's own life, the time he was knocked unconscious and gradually recovered his sensations and his memory.[81] The quotations in this chapter (many of them added in the 1588 edition) help him understand and generalize his experience. When he initially doubts the possibility of practising for death, he amplifies his claim that none have returned to tell us about it with a 1580 quotation from Lucretius.[82] Speaking of those in torment he backs up his claim that the gods mercifully assist them to die with a line from Virgil.[83] When he wants to describe the weakness of his sight as he begins to recover, a simile from Tasso helps him do so, in a 1582 addition.[84] In 1588 he uses a line from Ovid's *Tristia*, in which the poet about to be exiled compares himself to a man struck by a thunderbolt, still living but unaware that he is alive, to explain his belief that in spite of their appearance of sighing and groaning the dying experience no sensations.[85] When he narrates his own awakening he underlines the event with a quotation from two lines later in the same passage, in which the poet begins to come to his senses.[86] He connects his own unconscious actions with Virgil's description of dying fingers clutching at their sword.[87] This essay relates his own experience of recovering from unconsciousness in order to justify his belief that acquaintance with death will lessen fear of it. The quotations amplify and generalize his experience but they also seem to help him understand it.

We have come across several examples which depend on the philosophical aspect of Horace's *Odes* or Lucretius and one using the social-historical aspect of Juvenal. So what is the special role of Latin poetry in the *Essais*? Poetry has a special contribution to make in certain types of subject matter.[88] There is a wider range of poetry in *Sur des vers de Virgile* (III, 5), whose subject is love, than in any other chapter. Eleven of the twenty-nine quotations from Catullus occur there.[89] In parts of that essay Montaigne uses Latin poetry to express what he could not say in French. Quotations from epigram and satire sometimes express misogynist commonplaces about women and sex.[90] The amatory subject matter of *Que nostre desir s'accroit par la malaisance* (II, 15) gives poetry (and especially Ovid) an important place in that chapter. Floyd Gray tells us that nature only enters the *Essais* through Montaigne's quotations from his favourite poets.[91]

Poetry can also be important in establishing a mood. The opening of *Sur des vers de Virgile* emphasizes the need for relaxation when stern moral thoughts can become oppressive. In old age Montaigne finds it necessary to think debauched, intemperate thoughts. Wisdom has its excesses as much as folly does. Ovid and Petronius decorate this turn of thought but the mood of joyful looking back is really established by a maxim from Martial, *Epigrams*, X, 23, 7–8.

Hoc est
Vivere bis, vita posse priore frui.[92]

To confirm this atmosphere the C text adds Plato's instruction to old men to watch the gymnastic exercises of the young, so as to enjoy in others what they no longer possess in themselves. When the prose asks him to acquire toys to succour his old age, the concision and liveliness of Horace's phrase (from a poem inviting Virgil to dinner) makes the idea dance:

Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem (*Odes*, IV 12, 27)[93]

The connection between wisdom and jesting is recalled later in the essay, notably in another pithy quotation from Horace.

ridentem dicere verum
quid vetat? (*Satires*, I, 1, 24)[94]

At the beginning of the chapter its force is immediately highlighted by the contrast of quotations from Ovid's exile on the fragility of the mind that needs this help.[95] He preserves this mood by announcing the subject matter of his essay in quotations from Euripides[96] and Lucretius (I, 22–4, slightly adapted).

Those who strive too much to flee from Venus
Fail as much as those who follow her too much.

You, Goddess, you alone govern the nature of things.
Without you nothing rises to the heavenly shores of light,
And nothing becomes joyful, nothing amiable. (V848, P890, S957)

The first quotation establishes the importance of balance, neither seeking Venus too avidly nor avoiding her. The second praises the power of love in creating being, joy and pleasure in the universe. The direct linkage of the two quotations, one warning, the other praising, also conveys the crucial information about the identity of the goddess. The quotations then prepare Montaigne's next point, on which the whole essay turns, about the mutual dependence of poetry and love.[97]

Quoting poetry gives Montaigne the opportunity to write eloquently about the poet's use of language and about the effect of poetry more generally. When he reacts to the quotation from Lucretius describing the love of Venus and Mars (*De rerum natura*, I.33–40), he evokes also the language Virgil had used to describe Venus's seduction of Vulcan (*Aeneid*, VIII.387–92, 404–6).

> [B] Quand je rumine ce, *rejicit*, *pascit*, *inhians*, *molli, fovet*, *medullas*, *labefacta*, *pendet*, *percurrit*, et cette noble, *circunfusa*, mere du gentil, *infusus*, j'ay desdain de ces menues pointes et allusions verballes qui nasquirent depuis. A ces bonnes gens, il ne falloit pas d'aiguë et subtile rencontre; leur langage est tout plein et gros d'une vigueur naturelle et constante; ils sont tout epigramme, non la queue seulement, mais la teste, l'estomach et les pieds. Il n'y a rien d'efforcé, rien de trainant, tout y marche d'une pareille teneur. [C] *Contextus totus virilis est; non sunt circa flosculos occupati* [Seneca, *Moral epistles*, 32, 1]. [B] Ce n'est pas une eloquence molle et seulement sans offence: elle est nerveuse et solide, qui ne plaist pas tant comme elle remplit et ravit, et ravit le plus, les plus forts esprits. Quand je voy ces braves formes de s'expliquer, si vifves, si profondes, je ne dis pas que c'est bien dire, je dis que c'est bien penser. C'est la gaillardise de l'imagination qui esleve et enfle les parolles. [C] *Pectus est quod disertum facit* [Quintilian, X.7.15]. [B] Nos gens appellent jugement, langage; et beaux mots, les pleines conceptions. Cette peinture est conduitte non tant par dexterité de la main comme pour avoir l'object plus vifvement empreint en l'ame. Gallus parle simplement, par ce qu'il conçoit simplement. Horace ne se contente point d'une superficielle expression, elle la trahiroit. Il voit plus clair et plus outre dans la chose; son esprit crochette et furette tout le magasin des mots et des figures pour se representer; et les luy faut outre l'ordinaire, comme sa conception est outre l'ordinaire. (V872–3, P915–16)

> [B] When I chew over those words *rejicit*, *pascit*, *inhians* and then *molli fovet*, *medullas*, *labefacta*, *pendet*, *percurrit*, and Lucretius's noble *circunfusa* mother to Virgil's elegant *infusus*, I feel contempt for those

> little sallies and verbal sports which have been born since then. Those fine poets had no need for smart and cunning wordplay; their style is full, pregnant with a sustained and natural power. With them not only the tail but everything is epigram: head, breast and feet. Nothing is strained. Nothing drags. Everything progresses steadily on its course. [C] *The whole texture of their language is virile. They are not concerned with little flowers*. [B] Here is not merely gentle eloquence where nothing offends: it is solid and has sinews; it does not please you so much as invade and enrapture you. And the stronger the mind the more it enraptures it. When I look upon such powerful means of expression, so dense and full of life, I do not conclude that it is said well but thought well. It is the audacity of the conception which fills the words and makes them soar. [C] *It is the mind which makes for good style*. [B] Nowadays when men say judgement they mean style, and rich concepts are but beautiful words. Descriptions such as these are produced not by skilful hands but by having the subject vividly stamped upon the soul. Gallus writes straightforwardly because his concepts are straightforward. Horace is not satisfied with such superficial vividness; that would betray his sense; he sees further and more clearly into his subject: to describe itself his mind goes fishing and ferreting through the whole treasure-house of words and figures of speech; as his concepts surpass the ordinary it is not ordinary words that he needs. (S986–7)

Montaigne's comments are detailed and forceful. Though he writes less about literature than Plutarch had, his words give us more sense of what he responds to in poetry and of how strong poetry might teach its readers how to express themselves better. For Montaigne poetry is at the centre of education not merely for its subject matter but for the reaction its imagination and expression evoke. In *De la vanité* Montaigne expresses his admiration for poetry, his belief that the best prose can embody the same qualities and his hope that what he has learned from his reading informs his own work.[98]

The poetry competition that concludes *Du jeune Caton* (I, 37) at first relies more on the reader to respond to each text in turn. It is greatly improved by the C addition in which Montaigne both gives reasons for his decision and describes the development of his own taste in poetry from the gay and genial fluidity (*fluidité gaye et ingenieuse*) of Ovid, through the keen and sublime subtlety (*subtilité aiguë et relevée*) exemplified by Lucan, to the ripe and constant power (*force meure et constante*) of Virgil.[99] The passage he chooses from Virgil is notable for the force of its concision but Montaigne distorts the context to amplify what he says about its ambition. For in *Aeneid* VIII, Cato is portrayed on the shield of Aeneas giving laws to the virtuous souls in Hades rather than to the greatest of all the Romans.[100]

Montaigne uses quotations from poetry as the best expression of the deepest emotions at the end of *De l'amitié* (I, 28) where Aeneas's recollection of his father before the funeral games, Horace's lament for the loss of half himself in anticipation of Maecenas's death and Catullus's elegy for the loss of his whole soul and all pleasure at his brother's death are written out to express his own feelings at the death of La Boétie.[101] Montaigne uses Virgil's similes as a source of emotional power in *De la colère* when he illustrates the frenzy of anger with the simile of the cauldron from Turnus's response to Allecto's visitation (*Aeneid* VII, 462–6).[102] In *Des plus excellens hommes* (II, 36) the simile of the forest fires, which illustrated the impact of Turnus and Aeneas on different sides of the battle in *Aeneid* XII, 521–5, is applied to his comparison of Caesar to Alexander, evoking the destruction wrought by both these 'excellent men'.[103] The impact of poetry on Montaigne's use of imagery has been discussed by Friedrich and Metschies.[104]

As important as poetry was to Montaigne, not least for its forceful concision in moral philosophy, the hard thoughts which get the final chapter underway derive from proverbial wisdom read through the scholarly lens of Erasmus's *Adagia*. The questioning of similarity and difference is founded on *Non tam ovum ovo simile* (as alike as two eggs), which provides the story of the man from Delphi who could tell eggs apart.[105] Montaigne's development of the idea that commentary buries meaning in obscurity is founded on the adages *Mus in pice* (a mouse in pitch) and *Davus sum non Oedipus* (I am Davus, not Oedipus).[106] In the last phase the exceptional insights of poetry have to take their place beside the fruit of the centuries' experience expressed in proverbs.

3. Montaigne's Logic of Fragment and Sequence

This chapter will address issues of form, method and interpretation. In portraying a mind in motion, Montaigne recorded successive thoughts, which were always subject to elaboration and revision. In the *Apologie* Montaigne spoke of the strength of feeling with which he believes one opinion at a certain moment, only to change his mind entirely at a later stage.[1] I shall argue that Montaigne's method of additive construction requires that we attend first to the individual fragments of which he constructs the chapters and (even more importantly) relatively short sequences of such fragments. Montaigne generally develops his thought in short sequences (rarely longer than two or three pages). As readers we need to grasp those short sequences alongside attempting to understand a chapter as a whole. Philippe Desan has written of the open form of the essays and of Montaigne's need to juxtapose different points of view and to move freely between contrary positions.[2] André Tournon has shown that the additive techniques evidenced by later revisions of the essays also played a part in the construction of the 1580 version.[3] In his study of the successive versions of *Des prieres* (I, 56) Alain Legros argues that reconstructing the process of thought which brought about the changes is more important than interpreting the 1595 state of the text, since further revision was always possible.[4] Terence Cave writes of Montaigne's method as involving, the collection of commonplaces, improvisation, soundings and testing, but also a hidden logic.[5] I shall argue that many of the building blocks from which the essays are constructed (and some of the primitive structures into which they are placed) are derived from Renaissance rhetorical training. Sixteenth-century rhetoric and dialectic also provide us with categories for studying the ways in which these fragments are combined and the ways in which one thought leads on to another.

I need to begin by looking at the impact of Montaigne's method of constructing his essays through successive additions. The different published and manuscript states of the text (1580, 1582, 1587, 1588 and 1595/Bordeaux copy) show plainly that Montaigne added in new material for each publication. Deletions (apart from the substitutions of individual words) are comparatively rare. For some of the simpler chapters from books one and two one can produce reasonably convincing accounts of the sequence of additions within the different published states of the text. I have some reservations about this approach which I shall explain later but for now

I shall consider how the recovery of the sequence of additions affects our understanding. The 1580 stage of *Des Menteurs* (I, 9) can be analysed as containing eight elements:

1. I have no business talking about memory because mine is so bad.
2. **People with weak memories should not tell lies.**
3. Distinction between to tell an untruth (dire mensonge) and to lie (mentir).
4. Liars either (a) alter parts of the truth or (b) make everything up.
5. Solution to (a): question them repeatedly and they will falter.
6. Solution to (b): usually they will forget some part of it under questioning.
7. **Story of Francis I and Francesco Taverna.**
8. Story of Henry VIII and Papal Ambassador.

It seems likely that the original germ of this essay is contained in the connection between element 2 (a general statement) and element 7 (a story). The precept that you need a good memory to tell lies effectively is illustrated by the story of the way in which Francis I uncovered Francesco Sforza's murder of his secret representative (Merveille) by questioning of the Milanese ambassador (Francesco Taverna) who had been instructed to provide a false explanation. The combination of narrative and moral maxim reflects school training, both because pupils were trained to extract maxims and stories from their reading and because the writing exercise of the fable, the first of the *progymnasmata*, required pupils to place maxims and illustrative stories side by side. In this case the combination of story and maxim also suits the title of the chapter.

It is reasonable to believe that between this initial germ and the published essay, other elements were added as a result of different kinds of reflection on what was already there. Thus, for example, the story about Henry VIII and the papal ambassador is not strictly a story about a lie. After the papal ambassador attempts to persuade Henry to go to war against Francis, his reply to Henry's counter-arguments about the difficulty of such a war reveals to Henry that the ambassador's private sympathies are with the French. When Henry recounts this to the Pope the ambassador is disgraced. Where Francis detected an ambassador's lie told on behalf of his master, Henry found that the ambassador's private political sympathies were opposed to the instructions he had been given. The stories are parallel because both involve a monarch and an ambassador who is treacherous and whose words reveal more than he intends, but the story about Henry VIII has nothing to do with lying or memory. No doubt the parallelism persuaded Montaigne to place the second story (which is interesting and memorable in itself) alongside the first. Similarly the first element (the opening comment on his own memory) seems to be called up logically by the maxim, even though it concerns memory rather than lying. Element three looks like a typical piece of humanist grammatical clarification, noting the difference between two words and signalling which meaning of lying he has in mind. This comment could be taken from Aulus Gellius or from Montaigne's reading of the expanded French edition of Pedro Mexia's *Silvae*.[6] Elements 4, 5 and 6 take the logical form of a dilemma. Montaigne distinguishes between two approaches to lying and explains how each kind may be uncovered through questioning. They belong in the chapter because Montaigne wants to give advice on how to combat lying. This advice in turn is reinforced by the ways in which Francis and Henry uncover truths the ambassadors did not intend to reveal.

In 1588 Montaigne adds after element 1 further comments on his own bad memory and after element 6 more comments on lies in general, giving the following structure:

1. I have no business talking about memory because mine is so bad.
    1.1. This is naturally inconvenient.
    1.2. And even worse because in Gascony memory is equated with intelligence.
    1.3. But this is wrong. Experience shows that people with good memories often have bad judgement.
    1.4. Worse still people think because of my bad memory that I am ungrateful.
    1.5. But this is untrue. I have always rejected ingratitude.
    1.6. But there are advantages of a bad memory.
    1.7. First, I talk less since it is always easier to remember than to think.
    1.8. That this is a vice is confirmed by the boring material which my relatives dredge up from their memories to say. They weigh their stories down with irrelevant details.
    1.9. Secondly, I never remember insults.
    1.10. Places and books always seem fresh to me.
2. People with weak memories should not tell lies.
3. Distinction between to tell an untruth (dire mensonge) and to lie (mentir).
4. Liars either (a) alter parts of the truth or (b) make everything up.
5. Solution to (a): question them repeatedly and they will falter.

6. Solution to (b): usually they will forget some part of it under questioning.
    6.1. Experience supports this. The lies of flatterers are often shown up by the way they have to change their words to fit changed circumstances.
    6.2. No memory could ever be good enough to remember all they devise.
    6.3. Some people are proud of a reputation for this sort of skill; they should instead be ashamed.
    6.4. Lying is a terrible vice.
    6.5. Only words keep us together and keep us human.
    6.6. Lying is the worst of crimes and children should be punished for it in order to discourage it.
    6.7. Because lies go in so many directions and are not merely the opposite of the truth, it is even harder to discern the truth from them.
    6.8. I don't think I could bring myself to lie, even to avoid danger.
    6.9. Quotation from St Augustine: those whom we cannot understand are not fully human for us.
    6.10. Lying is even worse than not being understood.
7. Story of Francis I and Francesco Taverna.
8. Story of Henry VIII and Papal Ambassador.

Montaigne's first set of additions are loosely arranged into advantages and disadvantages of a bad memory. Even within this structure he adds rebuttals of his neighbours' negative views of his bad memory. It is characteristic (or at least very frequent) that once he has set out a view (even as the view of somebody else) he immediately gives a counter-argument. Montaigne's arguments for the apparently paradoxical view that a bad memory may be an advantage are especially rich and interesting. Although there is a strong element of self-justification in this position, the surprise and interest of the arguments make them charming to the reader.

The first three additions to element 6 concern flatterers, seen as a sub-category of liars. Montaigne first explains that the same process of listening to a number of comments and comparing them will find flatterers out. Then he denounces them. His love of paradox is amused by the pride they take in their shame. Then he adds a series of forceful arguments against lying, giving reasons for his dislike of lying (6.5, 6.7, 6.9, 6.10). Since lying undermines human communication and human society he argues (making the connection with his preferred topic of education) that children should be punished much more severely for lying than for other crimes. Again this has the force of paradox because (apart from lying under oath) most societies treat a lie as less serious than a physical crime, perhaps because lying is so widespread.

Although these 1588 additions obscure the structure of the essay, tending (apart from 6.2) to develop separately the two parts of the principal maxim which connects memory and lying, they are much more interesting in their thought and expression than the more structurally significant parts of the essay. These are also the sections where we see Montaigne developing arguments, putting up ideas (some of them attributed to other people) and then responding with counter-arguments. They seem more characteristic of what readers generally value in Montaigne.

The changes of 1595 all add to the first set of 1588 additions, so that the structure of the relevant section now becomes:

1. I have no business talking about memory because mine is so bad.
    1.1. This is naturally inconvenient.
        1.1.1. Because memory is so important that Plato calls it a goddess.
    1.2. And even worse because in Gascony memory is equated with intelligence.
    1.3. But this is wrong. Experience shows that people with good memories often have bad judgement.
    1.4. Worse still people think because of my bad memory that I am ungrateful.
    1.5. But this is untrue. I have always rejected ingratitude.
    1.6. But there are advantages of a bad memory. First
        1.6.1. It corrects the worse vice of ambition.
        1.6.2. A bad memory is an intolerable defect for a politician.
        1.6.3. Nature has strengthened other faculties in response.
        1.6.4. If I had a good memory I would think less for myself. Then
    1.7. I talk less since it is always easier to remember than to think
        1.7.1. If I had a good memory I would deafen my friends with talk.
        1.7.2. Memory would have given me more material to extend my arguments.
    1.8. That this is a vice is confirmed by the boring material which my relatives dredge up from their memories to say. They weigh their stories down with irrelevant details.
        1.8.1. Once you have started talking it is hard to stop.
        1.8.2. The ability to pull up short is important in a horse.

1.8.3. Some men want to stop their gallop of speech but can't.
1.8.4. This is a particular problem in old men.
1.8.5. They remember the story but forget they have told it already.
1.8.6. Old men can make even good stories boring.
1.9. Secondly, I never remember insults.
1.9.1. I would need someone like the servant of Darius who had to remind him at every meal of the injuries done him by the Athenians.
1.10. Places and books always seem fresh to me.

The general tendency of these C additions is to reinforce and develop the additional points made in 1588. The first and last of them confirm and decorate a point already made by displaying knowledge of ancient philosophy and history. From 1.6.1 onwards, more advantages of Montaigne's poor memory are added. He is thereby rendered unfit for the public career which might otherwise have tempted him. He implies that men in public life need the same skills as liars. Because his memory does not recall other people's opinions he is forced to develop his own intellectual resources and think things out for himself.[7] Setting himself the apparently paradoxical task of finding the advantages of a bad memory prompts him to ideas about practical conduct more generally (ambition, political life) and about the workings of his mind. From 1.7.1 and 1.8.1 he elaborates the idea of the bad effect of a good memory on speech, loading our words with additional circumstances, providing ever more material which itself can be developed in new directions.

These passages tend to draw Montaigne and his reader together, laughing at the follies of the old men who ruin their stories because they are unable to stop talking. One could also take Montaigne's comments as an implicit criticism of the whole doctrine of *copia* and even as self-criticism, since he doesn't hesitate elsewhere in C additions to number himself among those whose judgements are weakened by age. One could notice too the repetition between the additions to 1.7 and 1.8, as if he is giving an example of the difficulty of stopping the gallop (*clorre leur pas*) of language.

The way that these arguments are added to his discussion of memory (*e.g.*, by adding to the arguments in favour of a poor memory to the point where the reason which he still states to be his second (1.9) is now actually his fourth) enhances the picture of a mind in movement, following one idea and then another. We would almost be justified in separating this section off as a sort of mini-essay on memory, but even if we treated it in this way it would not be a particularly orderly essay and it would not build to a conclusion.

My aim in giving this temporal analysis of the successive accretions of *Des Menteurs* has been to show how Montaigne develops original argument, reflection on his experience and interaction with his reader in an essay which starts from inherited maxims and stories. That liars need a good memory is one of the maxims from the *Sententiae pueriles*, the first Latin reader of the grammar school.[8] The proverb occurs in Quintilian (IV.2.91) and Erasmus.[9] But this type of temporal analysis of structure also makes me uneasy, first because it can only really be applied in detail to the simpler essays (which we tend to think of as Montaigne's less accomplished works), and second because it tends to privilege the structural elements present in an essay from the beginning without giving due weight to the impact which additions may have on the way we read an essay. For example, the following plan of *Par divers moyens on arrive a pareille fin* (I, 1) enables one to see how the essay evolved.[10]

Key: (A) 1580 edition; (B) additions in 1588; (C) additions in 1595

1. (A) (General observation) Usually we obtain mercy from those about to harm us by appealing for pity but sometimes bravery and defiance leads to pity.
2. Example of Black Prince at Limoges.
3. Example of Scanderbeg.
4. Example of Conrad III.
5. (B) Comment (personal): Both bravery and pity appeal to me; if anything compassion moves me more.
6. (A) Comment (conclusion): My examples show that souls which steadfastly resist one approach (compassion) are moved by the other (bravery).
7. Cause: Perhaps affable natures and women are more apt to pity whereas strong noble minds prefer to respond to valour.
8. Objection: But less magnanimous minds can also respond the same way.
9. Supporting example: Story about Thebans being merciful to a general who defied them.
10. (C) Story: Dionysius captures Phyton, tortures him in spite of his bravery, then has him secretly murdered, because of the effect of his enemy's noble defiance on his own troops.
11. (A) General conclusion: Man is a wavering creature, moved first in one direction, then another. Two examples pointing in opposite directions.
12. (B) Contrary to my other examples: Story of Alexander provoked to extreme cruelty by the valour of Betis in opposing him.

13. Cause: Was this because Alexander was so accustomed to valour that it didn't move him?
14. (C) Further reflection: Or did he think valour belonged only to him? Or did the violence of his anger reject all opposition?
15. Example of slaughter at Thebes to confirm Alexander's violence and his lack of response to the bravery of those who opposed him.

Using this plan as a key we can now give a plan of the 1580 version of the essay:

General observation (1)
Three Supporting examples (2, 3, 4)
Conclusion (6)
Cause (7)
Objection to part of cause (with supporting example) (8, 9)
General conclusion (11)

We may surmise that the essay originally consisted of a general observation which may be useful advice for a soldier. Usually we obtain mercy by appealing for pity but sometimes it is bravery and defiance that succeed. This was followed by one or more examples and a conclusion (that souls which resist one approach may be won over by the other). On further reading Montaigne probably added extra examples and began to think more about the causes and consequences of his general observation. Perhaps the reason for the occasional success of defiance is that noble minds respond to valour. This offered cause is immediately met by a partial objection (that less magnanimous minds can react the same way), again backed up with an example from history. This in turn leads to a more general conclusion (that man is a changeable creature). So the simple initial structure of observation plus examples and conclusion is enlarged by a suggested cause, an objection to that cause and a new conclusion taking account of the objection. This is the shape of the essay when it is first published.

In the second edition of 1588 Montaigne adds two new elements:

Personal reflection complicating the conclusion (5)
Story about Alexander which functions as a counterexample, with a suggested reason (12–13)

Re-reading the 1588 edition prompted Montaigne to make further additions, published in 1595:

Story of Dionysius about attitude to resistance: Complicates question of effect of bravery (10)
Further reflection on causes of Alexander's action and another story showing his lack of mercy (14, 15)

An essay which began as an offer of advice to a soldier has turned into a perplexed acknowledgement of the different motives which may move people (since human reactions are so varied, it is impossible to make constant judgements of people) and an analysis of the character (more especially the cruelty) of Alexander the Great.

The impetus for Montaigne's rethinking in each case comes from reading. Reading the works of others contributes new examples; re-reading his own text in the light of his judgement of logical reasoning leads to reflection, statement of objections, conclusions and causes. Instead of providing advice on practical conduct supported by historical examples, Montaigne now invites his readers to follow him in a process of drawing conclusions and making judgements.

Such an analysis offers a way of understanding the structure and development of the chapter but it underplays the changes brought about by the final additions. Many readers of the essay will find that the two new stories turn it from a Renaissance military man's discussion of the best line of conduct in a difficult circumstance to an Erasmian condemnation of the cruelty of Dionysius and Alexander. The stories are told so vividly and with such telling amplified detail that they change the reader's whole attitude to the chapter and to its subject.

Paola Iemma's analysis of the Bordeaux copy changes to book one identifies four kinds of change. In the first place, as we have seen, Montaigne adds new stories and quotations, drawn from his reading, and new comments reacting to his own text and his quotations. Secondly he makes numerous stylistic changes: changes of spellings, forms and vocabulary; repositioning of phrases, reduction of binomial phrases, shortening and simplification of arguments.[11] In some sections these stylistic changes predominate. For example, in the C text Montaigne makes many changes to the crucial final pages of *De l'experience*, the conclusion of the whole book, but almost all the changes attempt improvements of expression; the thought of these important pages hardly alters from B to C. Thirdly he adds to the sense of oral presentation, of the mind in motion and of the presence of the self.[12] Finally he removes some repetitions. A note to the printer instructs him that if he finds the same thing said twice with the same meaning he should remove whichever seems to him less effective.[13] Although Iemma finds that reductions of repetition account for 20 per cent of Montaigne's changes she also acknowledges that other changes add to repetitions. The repetitions removed are also generally at a local level within a particular essay rather than across the whole book.[14]

Keeping the evolution of *Des Menteurs* and *Par divers moyens* in mind for further discussion, I want to analyse a short section from *De la vanité* (III, 9), one of the late essays in which everyone would agree that Montaigne is writing at his absolute peak. This time I will quote the essay itself, instead of summarizing, using my commentary to discuss the structural progression.

> [B] Il n'en est à l'avanture aucune plus expresse que d'en escrire si vainement. Ce que la divinité nous en a si divinement exprimé debvroit estre soingneusement et continuellement medité par les gens d'entendement. Qui ne voit que j'ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j'iray autant qu'il y aura d'ancre et de papier au monde? Je ne puis tenir registre de ma vie par mes actions: fortune les met trop bas; je le tiens par mes fantasies. Si ay-je veu un Gentilhomme qui ne communiquoit sa vie que par les operations de son ventre: vous voyiez chez luy, en montre, un ordre des bassins de sept ou huict jours; c'estoit son estude, ses discours; tout autre propos luy puoit. Ce sont icy, un peu plus civilement, des excremens d'un vieil esprit, dur tantost, tantost lache et tousjours indigeste. Et quand seray-je à bout de representer une continuelle agitation et mutation de mes pensées, en quelque matiere qu'elles tombent, puisque Diomedes remplit six mille livres du seul subject de la grammaire? Que doit produire le babil, puisque le begaiement et desnouement de la langue estouffa le monde d'une si horrible charge de volumes? Tant de paroles pour les paroles seules! O Pythagoras, que n'esconjuras-tu cette tempeste! (V945–6, P989–90)[15]

> [B] Perhaps there is no more manifest vanity than writing so vainly about it. That which the Godhead has made so godly manifest should be meditated upon by men of intelligence anxiously and continuously. Anyone can see that I have set out upon a road along which I shall travel without toil and without ceasing as long as the world has ink and paper. I cannot give an account of my life by my actions; Fortune has placed them too low for that; so I do so by my thoughts. Thus did a nobleman I once knew reveal his daily life only by the workings of his bowels: at home he paraded before you a series

> of seven or eight days' chamberpots. He thought about them, talked about them: for him any other topic stank. Here (a little more decorously) you have the droppings of an old mind, sometimes hard, sometimes squittery, but always ill-digested. And when shall I ever have done describing some commotion and revolution of my thoughts, no matter what subject they happen on, when Diomedes wrote six thousand books upon the sole subject of philology? What can babble produce when the stammering of an untied tongue smothered the world under such a dreadful weight of volumes? So many words about nothing but words! O Pythagoras! Why couldest thou not conjure away such turbulence! (S1070–1)

Taking his starting point from his title, Montaigne begins with a paradox, expressed as a suggestion: perhaps the most evident vanity is to write so vainly about vanity. He immediately supports this notion by alluding to Ecclesiastes (1: 2, 14). For the rest of this paragraph he takes a different tack. The vanity of his enterprise is illustrated by its excessive size. Everyone can see that he will need all the paper and ink in the world because, owing to the unimportance of his actions, he has to register his thoughts instead. The vanity of *his* obsession leads to an amusing comparison with the gentleman who gives an account of his life through the contents of his bowels. Montaigne turns to the topic of idleness with a story about the Emperor Galba taken from Suetonius.[16]

> On accusoit un Galba du temps passé de ce qu'il vivoit oyseusement; il respondit que chacun devoit rendre raison de ses actions, non pas de son sejour. Il se trompoit: car la justice a cognoissance et animadversion aussi sur ceux qui chaument. Mais il y devroit avoir quelque coerction des loix contre les escrivains ineptes et inutiles, comme il y a contre les vagabons et faineants. On banniroit des mains de nostre peuple et moy et cent autres. Ce n'est pas moquerie. L'escrivaillerie semble estre quelque symptome d'un siecle desbordé. Quand escrivismes nous tant que depuis que nous sommes en trouble? quand les Romains tant que lors de leur ruyne? Outre ce, que l'affinement des esprits ce ne'en est pas l'assagissement en une police, cet embesongnement oisif naist de ce que chacun se prent laschement à l'office de sa vacation, et s'en desbauche. (V946, P990)

> A certain Galba in days gone by was criticized for living in idleness. He replied that everyone should have to account for his actions but not for his free time. He was deceiving himself: for justice also takes note and

> cognizance of those who are not employed. The Law ought to impose restraints on silly useless writers as it does on vagabonds and loafers. Then my own book and a hundred others would be banished from the hands of our people. I am not joking. Scribbling seems to be one of the symptoms of an age of excess. When did we ever write so much as since the beginning of our troubles? And whenever did the Romans do so as just before their collapse? Apart from the fact that to make minds more refined does not mean that a polity is made more wise, such busy idleness arises from someone slacking over the duties of his vocation and being enticed away. (S1071)

Rejecting Galba’s reply to his critic, Montaigne suggests that useless writers should be forbidden, just as vagabonds are. The effect of this would be to save the French from his book and many others. He supports this proposal by suggesting a historical connection between excessive writing and political ruin, both in present-day France and in ancient Rome. Not only does writing fail to make people wiser, idle writing is evidence that people are neglecting their true duties. Both Montaigne’s protest that he intends his suggestion seriously (*Ce n’est pas moquerie*) and the discrepancy between the problem and the proposed solution invite us to read some of this vehemence ironically, opening up the way to a comically amused view of vanity. Then he has to consider the epoch in which he lives more broadly.

> La corruption du siecle se fait par la contribution particuliere de chacun de nous: les uns y conferent la trahison, les autres l’injustice, l’irreligion, la tyrannie, l’avarice, la cruauté, selon qu’ils sont plus puissans; les plus foibles y apportent la sottise, la vanité, l’oisiveté, desquels je suis. Il semble que ce soit la saison des choses vaines quand les dommageables nous pressent. En un temps où le meschamment faire est si commun, de ne faire qu’inutilement il est comme louable. Je me console que je seray des derniers sur qui il faudra mettre la main. Ce pendant qu’on pourvoira aux plus pressans, j’auray loy de m’amender. Car il me semble que ce seroit contre raison de poursuyvre les menus inconvenients, quand les grands nous infestent. Et le medecin Philotimus, à un qui luy presentoit le doigt à penser, auquel il recognoissoit au visage et à l’haleine un ulcere aux poulmons: Mon amy, fit-il, ce n’est pas à cette heure le temps de t’amuser à tes ongles. (V946–7, P990)

> Each individual one of us contributes to the corrupting of our time: some contribute treachery, others (since they are more powerful) injustice, irreligion, tyranny, cupidity, cruelty: the weaker ones like me contribute silliness, vanity and idleness. When harmful things press upon us, then, it seems, is the season for vain ones; in an age when so many behave wickedly it is almost praiseworthy merely to be useless. I console myself with the thought that I shall be one of the last they will have to lay hands on. While they are dealing with the more urgent cases I shall have time to improve, for to me it seems contrary to reason to punish minor offences while we are ravished by great ones. Philotimus, a doctor, recognized the symptoms of an ulcerated lung from the features and breath of a patient who brought him his finger to be dressed. 'My friend,' he said, 'this is no time to be thinking about fingernails!' (S1071)

Everyone contributes in different ways to the corruption of our times. So perhaps those who contribute only vanity should be seen as *less* corrupt than others when there are more serious crimes to be denounced. Where before he lacerated his project with the accusation of vanity, Montaigne now consoles himself. In these bad times *his* crime could be so much worse. Since rulers need to concern themselves with more serious errors first, he may be allowed some time of respite in which to improve. The idea that when great things are in danger, lesser problems can be neglected is confirmed with a story about Philotimus taken from Plutarch's *Moralia*. In comparison with the worst vices of his time his own fault (of vain writing) seems much less serious. Consoling himself with the thought that his writing resembles overlong fingernails strikes a humorous tone. But a parallel example from recent history suggests a different conclusion.

> Je vis pourtant sur ce propos, il y a quelques années, qu'un personnage, de qui j'ay la memoire en recommandation singuliere, au milieu de nos grands maux, qu'il n'y avoit ny loy, ny justice, ny magistrat qui fist son office non plus qu'à cette heure, alla publier je ne sçay quelles chetives reformations sur les habillemens, la cuisine et la chicane. Ce sont amusoires dequoy on paist un peuple mal-mené, pour dire qu'on ne l'a pas du tout mis en oubly. Ces autres font de mesme, qui s'arrestent à deffendre à toute instance des formes de parler, les dances, et les jeux, à un peuple abbandonné à toute sorte de vices execrables. Il n'est pas temps de se laver et decrasser, quand on est atteint d'une bonne fièvre. [C] C'est à faire aux seuls Spartiates de

> se mettre à se peigner et testonner sur le poinct qu'ils se vont precipiter à quelque extreme hazard de leur vie. (V947, P990–1)
>
> While on this subject, a few years ago a great man, whom I recall with particular esteem, in the midst of our ills, when there was no justice, law or magistrate functioning properly any more than today, went and published edicts covering some wretched reform or other of our clothing, eating and legal chicanery. Such things are tidbits on which we feed an ill-governed people to show that we have not entirely forgotten them. Others do the same when they issue detailed prohibitions of swear-words, dances and sports for people sunk in detestable vices of every kind. It is not the time to wash and get the dirt off you once you have caught a good fever. [C] It is right only for Spartans about to rush into some extreme mortal danger to start combing and dressing their hair. (S1071–2)

In a time of national crisis a great man published footling reforms. Because worrying about clothing and food at a time when civility is collapsing would seem to be foolish, Montaigne appears at first to use the story to confirm the relative triviality of vanity, but the historical event described in the anecdote works in the other direction, since it provides an example of a law-maker occupying himself with repressing vanity at a time when he might have been thought to have had better things to do. In the previous passage, Montaigne was trying to reassure himself that in the present state of crisis his vanity in pursuing his writing would be safe from this kind of interference.

This second interpretation seems to be confirmed in the next sentence, which speaks of the reassurance which such laws may have given the populace, though the political value of such prudential actions is again questioned by the tone. A parallel example follows: when you have a fever there is no need to worry about washing. But C adds a counterexample, which it treats as an exception: leave it to the Spartans to put their hair in order before a battle. At this point we may remember that Montaigne often admires the Spartans and that the battle in question was the glorious defeat of Thermopylae. If we are to admire the Spartans then perhaps we *should* concern ourselves with vanities (such as hairdressing or writing *essais*) at moments of crisis. Or perhaps the difference between the Spartans and ourselves makes them an inappropriate model.

Montaigne's main tactic here seems to be to relativize the attitude to vanity. For good people and in good times vanity is to be condemned but in bad times either it may be a lesser evil than the others being committed, or such times may make vain preoccupations seem even more worthless, or to concern yourself with vanities may run so much against the imperatives of the time as to constitute a sort of heroism. By the way he has set up the oppositions and parallels in the section and through his manipulation of tone, Montaigne throws his readers beyond their normal ways of thinking and reduces any sense of certainty they may have. His next move destabilizes his readers' judgements even further by insisting on the difference between his own habits and other people's.

> [B] Quant à moy, j'ay cette autre pire coustume, que si j'ay un escarpin de travers, je laisse encores de travers et ma chemise et ma cappe: je desdaigne de m'amender à demy. Quand je suis en mauvais estat, je m'acharne au mal; je m'abandonne par desespoir et me laisse aller vers la cheute [C] et jette, comme l'on dict, le manche apres la coignée; [B] je m'obstine à l'empirement et ne m'estime plus digne de mon soing: ou tout bien ou tout mal. (V947, P991)

> [B] I have a worse habit myself: if one of my shoes is askew then I let my shirt and my cloak lie askew as well: I am too proud to amend my ways by halves. When my condition is bad I cling violently to my illness: I abandon myself to despair and let myself go towards catastrophe, [C] casting as they say the haft after the axe-head; [B] stubbornly, I want to get worse and think myself no longer worth curing. Either totally well or totally ill. (S1072)

Where the previous paragraph suggested that in times of crisis it may be foolish to make small alterations in behaviour or dress, here Montaigne proclaims that he has an even worse habit. He will not correct small faults at any time. Rather than straighten his shoe he will leave both his cloak and his shirt at odd angles. Once he sees himself getting ill, rather than try to cure his illness by half measures, he will embrace it and expect to get worse. Montaigne invites the reader to condemn this 'pire coustume', which he even calls 'abandoning himself to despair' but the reader can hardly agree to this without having to question the whole process of thought which he or she has been following so far.

The logical connection between these sections is the notion of whole and part. In the previous paragraph the danger to the whole society meant that vanity in an individual could be ignored. By the same token, when the whole body was fevered, it was hardly worthwhile to wash away dirt on the skin. In this paragraph Montaigne says that for him (by contrast) if even one part is wrong he would prefer the whole thing to be bad. ‘Je desdaigne de m’amender à demi … ou tout bien ou tout mal’. The next paragraph extends this play of part and whole by considering the impact of the ruin of his whole society on Montaigne.

> Ce m’est faveur que la desolation de cet estat se rencontre à la desolation de mon aage: je souffre plus volontiers que mes maux en soient rechargez, que si mes biens en eussent esté troublez. Les paroles que j’exprime au mal-heur sont paroles de despit; mon courage se herisse au lieu de s’applatir. Et, au rebours des autres, je me trouve plus devost en la bonne qu’en la mauvaise fortune, suyvant le precepte de Xenophon, sinon suyvant sa raison; et fais plus volontiers les doux yeux au ciel pour le remercier que pour le requerir. J’ay plus de soing d’augmenter la santé quand elle me rit, que je n’ay de la remettre quand je l’ay escartée. Les prosperitez me servent de discipline et d’instruction, comme aux autres les adversitez et les verges. [C] Comme si la bonne fortune estoit incompatible avec la bonne conscience, les hommes ne se rendent gens de bien qu’en la mauvaise. Le bon heur [B] m’est un singulier aiguillon à la moderation et modestie. La priere me gaigne, la menace me rebute; [C] la faveur me ploye, la crainte me roydit. (V947, P991)[17]

> It is fortunate for me that the forlorn state of France should correspond to the forlorn age I have reached. It is easier for me to accept that my ills should be augmented by it than that such good things as I have should be troubled by it. The words I utter when wretched are words of defiance: instead of lying low my mind bristles up. Contrary to others I find I am more prayerful in good fortune than in bad. Following Xenophon’s precept, though not his reasoning, I am more ready to make sheep’s eyes at heaven in thanksgiving than in supplication. I am more anxious to improve my health when it beams upon me than to restore it when I have lost it; prosperous times serve to discipline me and instruct me, as rods and adversities do to others. [C] As though good fortune were incompatible with a good conscience, men never become moral except when times are bad. For me good luck [B] is a unique spur to measure and moderation. Entreaties win me over: menaces I despise; [C] good-will makes me bow: fear makes me unbending. (S1072)

It suits Montaigne that the ruin of his country should coincide with his old age. If both body and state were not in ruin he might regret the impact of either (the pronouns are just about ambiguous) on his well-being. While this sentence draws on the idea of a correspondence between part and whole the rest of the paragraph relies on the contrast between *his* reaction to outside circumstances, good and bad, and that of other people. Where ill-fortune makes others humble and prayerful, it makes him defiant.[18] For him, in contrast to others, it is good fortune that acts as a moral school, making him grateful and urging him to self-improvement. The effect of the C additions here is both to amplify his point by restating it succinctly (good-will makes me bow; fear makes me firm) and to argue that the behaviour of others is not just different from his own but actually absurd (as if good fortune were incompatible with a good conscience; as if men were only made good by bad fortune).

> [B] Parmy les conditions humaines, cette-cy est assez commune: de nous plaire plus des choses estrangeres que des nostres et d'aymer le remuement et le changement.
>
> *Ipsa dies ideo nos grato perluit haustu*
> *Quod permutatis hora recurrit equis.*
>
> J'en tiens ma part. Ceux qui suyvent l'autre extremité, de s'aggreer en eux-mesmes, d'estimer ce qu'ils tiennent au dessus du reste et de ne recognoistre aucune forme plus belle que celle qu'ils voyent, s'ils ne sont plus advisez que nous, ils sont à la verité plus heureux. Je n'envie point leur sagesse, mais ouy leur bonne fortune. (V948, P991–2)
>
> [B] Among human characteristics this one is common enough: to delight more in what belongs to others than to ourselves and to love variation and change:
>
> *Ipsa dies ideo nos grato perluit haustu*
> *Quod permutatis hora recurrit equis.*
>
> (Even the daylight only pleases us because the hours run by on changing steeds)

> I have my share of that. Those who go to the other extreme, who are happy with themselves and who esteem above all else whatever they possess and who recognize no form more beautiful than the one they behold, may not be wise as we are but they are truly happier. I do not envy them their wisdom but I do envy them their good fortune. (S1072–3)

From the vanity of writing with which the essay began and the idleness of Galba, the pettymindedness of the legislator and the hairdressing of the Spartans with which it continued, Montaigne turns to the vanity of preferring other people's possessions and customs to one's own and seeking change (exemplified with a quotation from Petronius fragments, 42, 5–6).[19] This form of vanity Montaigne admits to sharing. He explains and justifies himself by imagining the contrary. Those who are not interested in what others have must be happy with themselves. Montaigne exaggerates their self-satisfaction to the point of caricature. He will envy their good fortune in being so happy but he can hardly admire the wisdom of what he implies is their complacent lack of judgement. Apparently Montaigne is poking fun at Stoic notions of self-reliance. Stoics would certainly not want to be praised for their good fortune at the expense of their wisdom. But he is also making the more serious point that the vanity of curiosity is part of what he takes to be his own nature (and, if we apply the logic of *Du repentir*, human nature more generally).[20] The person who does not want to urge his mind to novelty of experience and thought cannot really be wise.

Most structural accounts of *De la vanité* will treat this section as a prelude to the discussion of travel which begins in the next paragraph and to which Montaigne frequently returns in the course of the essay. One could even subtitle the section 'a defence of vanity'. But neither of these reactions accounts for the dense process of thought we have already been through or for the pleasure which Montaigne's jokes, allusions and extravagances have given us on the way. This is an example of Montaigne's representation of thought in action. It is also a mental gymnasium for the reader.[21] Following the logical connections is hard work and the hard work we are forced to do in order to understand the connections makes us question our assumptions and see beyond our ordinary ways of thinking. The joking tone liberates us to think freshly and lightens the labour but does not detract from the impact of these ideas on our normal ways of thinking.[22] The rapid movement of ideas justifies the claim that the essay presents thought in process.[23] But I would also want to argue that even though Montaigne always keeps moving, still he makes successful points (scores goals, if you like) before continuing with the game.

Writing is a form of vanity. It may be less blameworthy than other sins. The vanity of curiosity probably is a constitutive part of the make-up of Montaigne, his contemporaries and most of his readers. Arguments which rely on the inter-relationship of part and whole raise troubling questions and draw our minds in unexpected directions. Parts can be similar to wholes (and can in that sense represent them) or they can contribute to the whole by differing from it in some respect (in which case the meaning of the whole may be more subject to negotiation and interpretation).[24] Such thoughts may or may not form part of an overall impression of this chapter but they arise in the reading and readers may take them away as conclusions or develop them in new directions of their own. At the same time no one's mind can work as hard over sixty pages as we have over the first two and a half and retain the fruits of that thought. Even though there are pages where the amplification is greater and the movement of thought slower than in these, the combination of extreme density of thought and considerable length makes it almost inevitable that a reader will attend unevenly within a chapter, focusing strongly on some passages, skipping lightly over others. This feature ensures the enduring freshness of the *Essais*. We never fully possess them; there are always places where more thought can bring us the pleasure of new understanding, to set alongside the growing pleasure of the familiarity of other passages. It may also help explain why such very different people can share the experience of finding themselves in reading Montaigne. Helpfully Montaigne says something similar about his own experience of reading.

> [A] Quand je prens des livres, j'auray apperceu en tel passage des graces excellentes et qui auront feru mon ame; qu'un'autre fois j'y retombe, j'ay beau le tourner et virer, j'ay beau le plier et le manier, c'est une masse incognue et informe pour moy. [B] En mes escris mesmes je ne retrouve pas tousjours l'air de ma premiere imagination: je ne sçay ce que j'ay voulu dire, et m'eschaude souvent à corriger et y mettre un nouveau sens, pour avoir perdu le premier, qui valloit mieux. (II, 12, V566, P600)

> [A] I pick up some books: I may have discovered outstanding beauties in a particular passage which really struck home: another time I happen upon the same passage and it remains an unknown, shapeless lump for me, however much I twist it, and pat it and bend it or turn it. [B] Even

> in the case of my own writings I cannot always recover the flavour of my original meaning; I do not know what I wanted to say and burn my fingers making corrections and giving it some new meaning for want of recovering the original one, which was better. (S637–8)

We now need to consider the elements from which Montaigne builds his sequences and the ways in which he relates and develops them. Montaigne takes over two types of material from his reading: stories and quotations (some of which are ethical axioms). I shall call these two types of material 'fragments', because they are typically short sections taken from his reading of longer books.

Montaigne was taught to quarry maxims, stories and quotations from his reading. We find him doing just this in constructing the essays. Since his audience was taught in the same way, it follows that from the Renaissance point of view one entirely legitimate way to read Montaigne is to read him for the sake of fragments (such as quotations, stories, fine phrases) which can be stored up and used elsewhere. There are plenty of examples of Renaissance authors reading contemporary and ancient texts in this way and indeed Montaigne's publishers promoted such a reading by adding a topic index, 'Les Pages du Sieur de Montaigne', to the editions of 1602 and 1604.[25] But if we want to follow Montaigne's own thought or to state that a particular opinion is his, the meaning of each particular fragment will need to be clarified by reading its immediate predecessors and successors. A comment may be made and then immediately contested and contradicted; indeed some statements seem to be introduced for the sake of the responses which can be made to them. In such cases the initial statement might be a stage of Montaigne's thought (or a provocation to his thought) which we can reuse because it is fruitful for our thinking in other ways but which could not reasonably be claimed to be Montaigne's view. When we look at a sequence of fragments, though, the connections between them will usually give us some indications about the role of each particular fragment. In cases where there is a sequence of arguments the meaning of the whole sequence may seem more secure than the meaning of the fragments considered separately. There will be other cases where the sequence of fragments has the effect of questioning all the ideas which are put forward and this questioning (sometimes relativizing, sometimes setting up contradictions) will be Montaigne's point in that passage. So, while the chapter is evidently made up of fragments, the sequence will usually be more capable of definite interpretation as well as richer in meaning. Equally the meaning of fragments and sequences will alter when new material is added in successive stages.

In the earliest forms of the chapters maxim and story are connected directly. The story is offered as a particular exemplification of the general proposition encapsulated in the maxim or the maxim is placed after the story as an abstract (and generalizing) summary of its message. The story provides detail, interest and often emotion, where the maxim proposes meaning. Stories can be compared to other stories; maxims can form the starting points for arguments. The combination of story and maxim offers a range of possibilities for further development. At the same time there can always be questions about the degree to which the moral is applicable to the story or the extent to which this particular story illustrates one maxim rather than another. Sometimes Montaigne will take us into a story expecting one idea and will emerge from it with others as well. The relations between story and maxim, which are linked by the idea of generality and particularity, are confronted in the grammar school *progymnasmata* exercises.

The most common move for Montaigne to make after stating a maxim is to provide some justification for it. The justification may take the form of a quotation from philosophy or poetry. Or Montaigne may give an example or a cause. In the later versions of *Des Menteurs* Montaigne says (as one of the advantages of a bad memory) that he talks less than other people because it is harder to think up things to say than to remember them. Later he makes the converse point that his bad memory causes him to think things out more for himself. When in *Par divers moyens on arrive a pareille fin* he suggests that souls which steadfastly resist pity may be moved by bravery he gives as a cause for this that affable natures and women are more inclined to pity whereas noble minds respond to valour. In *De la vanité* after he states that scribbling may be a symptom of an age of excess, he justifies this statement first by giving historical examples (both ancient Rome and modern France went to ruin at a time of excessive writing) and then by providing two causes (writing does not make people better; excessive writing may in fact be caused by neglect of other duties). Sometimes the justification involves a comparison from the greater to lesser. In *De la vanité* men have to account for their hours of inactivity because the law concerns itself with the unemployed as well as with those who labour. All these forms of justification are set out in the *progymnasmata* exercise of the *sententia*, in which the pupil is trained to confirm the maxim using the topics of cause, similarity, example, testimony of the ancients and contrary.

Parallel to justification (and not easily separable from it) is exploration of the meaning of a maxim. This may involve distinguishing the particular shade of meaning in which one of the words is employed, as happens near the beginning of *Des Menteurs*. Or Montaigne may examine the logical consequence of a statement or look at the effects which arise from some phenomenon. In *Des Menteurs*, the exclamation that lying is a terrible vice is justified by the larger claim that only language keeps people human and keeps society together. The implication is that since lying corrupts the use of language, it also has the effect of damaging people and society. For Montaigne it is a consequence of this view that in the process of education children should be punished for lying in order to dissuade them from acquiring this bad habit. In *De la vanité* he suggests that if in times of disaster vanity is one of the less serious vices, the consequence may be that punishment is delayed with the possible effect of allowing him time to change his ways.

Clarifying the meaning or consequence of a proposition can be linked to amplification, when something is made to seem more significant by going into detail or by repeating the same idea in different words. Near the beginning of *De la vanité* Montaigne dramatizes the verbal excesses implied in his project of recounting himself through his fantasies, by envisaging the paper and ink which he will require and by comparing the 6,000 volumes which Diomedes devoted to the much more limited subject of grammar. Quintilian discusses the use of consequences and causes in amplification (8.4.17–20) in a passage which is also taken up in Erasmus's *De copia*. The use of detailed, concrete images to put across the implications of an idea is considered by Erasmus in his treatment of description as part of the fifth method of acquiring *copia*. Restatements of ideas in different words are described in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (under expolitio, IV.54) and in the first book of Erasmus's *De copia*.

Much of Montaigne's most important thought is driven by the motive of opposition. This can take the form of questioning a proposition by immediately stating its contrary and backing this up with a further maxim or an example. In *Par divers moyens on arrive a pareille fin* Montaigne follows his statement that strong noble minds may respond better to bravery by stating the objection, that less magnanimous minds can be moved in the same way and providing an example to illustrate this. The example of Alexander's cruelty to Betis is introduced in 1588 as a contrary to the earlier examples of defiance provoking mercy. In *Des Menteurs* the second and third disadvantages of a bad memory are immediately refuted by a statement of their contrary. In *De la vanité* the consolation that small vices may be ignored in times of crisis is contradicted by the example of the great man publishing edicts on small matters, but this example is soon contrasted with the maxim that when you have a strong fever it is no time to wash. The structure of statement followed by its contradiction sometimes develops into a sort of dialogue, as when, later in *De la vanité*, a series of reasons not to go travelling are stated and then in turn argued against. In *De l'art de conferer* Montaigne gave his own appreciation of the role of contradiction in clarifying and advancing thought:

> [B] Les contradictions donc des jugemens ne m'offencent ny m'alterent; elles m'esveillent seulement et m'exercent. Nous fuyons la correction; il s'y faudroit presenter et produire … Quand on me contrarie, on esveille mon attention, non pas ma cholere; je m'avance vers celuy qui me contredit, qui m'instruit. La cause de la verité devroit estre la cause commune à l'une et à l'autre. Que respondra-il? (III, 8, V924, P968)

> [B] Contradictory judgements neither offend nor irritate me: they merely wake me up and provide me with exercise. We avoid being corrected; we ought to come forward and accept it … When I am contradicted it arouses my attention, not my wrath. I move towards the man who contradicts me; he is instructing me. The cause of truth ought to be common to us both. What will his answer be? (S1046–7)

In conversation people learn from each other by testing points of contradiction. The method of contraries is equally important to the internal conversation of the essays.[26] The contrary was one of the major topics expected in the earlier *progymnasmata*, such as *chreia* and *sententia* (and also in commonplace). The exercise of *subversio* is devoted to different methods of rejecting a proposition. In later *progymnasmata*, like *thesis* and *legislatio*, the later part of the composition involves the statement of objections and their refutation (*contradictio* and *solutio*), as if in anticipation of the university exercise of disputation. In the *Apologie* Montaigne tells us that when he finds himself arguing a certain position he sometimes puts the arguments for the contrary position as a mental exercise and then finds himself believing those arguments.

> [B] Maintes-fois (comme il m'advient de faire volontiers) ayant pris pour exercice et pour esbat à maintenir une contraire opinion à la mienne, mon esprit, s'applicant et tournant de ce costé là, m'y attache si bien que

> je ne trouve plus la raison de mon premier advis, et m'en despars. (II, 12, V566, P600)
>
> [B] Many's the time I have taken an opinion contrary to my own and (as I am fond of doing) tried defending it for the fun of the exercise: then, once my mind has really applied itself to that other side, I get so firmly attached to it that I forget why I held the first opinion and give it up. (S638)

His aim in this passage is to illustrate the changeability of human reason using himself as an example but it also provides an insight into the way he directs his mind. The topic of contraries is usually treated as one of the most important sources of arguments in dialectic textbooks and handbooks of rhetorical invention. Textbook discussions of declamation emphasize the strength of arguments which can be discovered by imagining the opponent's replies and replying to them. Some of Montaigne's most original and stimulating thoughts arise from setting up contrary positions on an issue and trying to work a positive statement out of his objections to both contradictory positions. We do not know exactly where Montaigne studied logic, but it is hard to imagine that he could have pursued his legal career without it. Disputations (which require some logical training) were an important part of the curriculum at the Collège de Guyenne and logic was studied in the first year of the philosophy course there.[27]

Montaigne's characteristic move from a general statement of an issue to exploring his own experience and opinions is often related to this statement of opposition. Most often his own habits and opinions are contrasted with the generality of other people. In *De la vanité* his habit of being defiant in bad times and prayerful and ready to learn when times are good is contrasted with the general custom, which he mocks. But there are times when his own experience is used to support a position which he has taken in the essay or when he wishes to affirm the community of experience between himself and other men. In *Du repentir* he asserts that every man bears the whole form of the human condition, to imply that his account of his own life has exemplary value for others.[28] In *Des Menteurs*, the first turn to himself in the first sentence of the essay begins as modesty but then offers the opportunity for a disquisition on memory, not without self-justification. Later when he declares (as it will later turn out, misleadingly)[29] that he could never bring himself to tell a lie, the effect is to emphasize further the strong critique of lying. This turning to himself is rightly regarded as one of Montaigne's most important and innovative characteristics, but there are some intimations of it in the rhetoric textbooks, for example in Quintilian's discussion of Cicero's use of his own persona in the conclusion of *Pro Milone* (*Institutio oratoria*, 6.1.24–7, developed by Rudolph Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 199–201) and in discussions of *prosopopeia* and the speaker's use of ethos.

The movement to expressing his own view may be linked to the more general issue of comparison. Montaigne may use comparison at a very local level as a way of illuminating a particular idea or he may juxtapose similar statements or stories with the aim of eliciting difference as well as similarity. In *Des Menteurs* the image of the horse, which is more capable than many other horses because of its capacity to stop, illuminates the feared torrent of words but also suggests that a well-trained animal may be more susceptible to control than people. The later comparison with a quotation from St Augustine, in which those who cannot be understood (even though they are thereby deprived of the advantages of humanity) are said to be better off than those who lie, serves to amplify the vice of lying. In *De la vanité*, the comparison with the nobleman who displays chamber pots is largely comic in effect. The comparison with those who are content with themselves serves to improve the status of vanity with an effective sideswipe at Stoicism. The comparisons with the legislators complicate the reader's understanding of the dangers the vain man runs into, both belittling the significance of vanity by the comparison and threatening people who engage in vain pursuits with the illogicality of those in power. Comparison is one of the later *progymnasmata*, where it is linked with the rhetoric of praise and blame, and one of the major resources for producing amplification and *copia*. We shall see later that the relations between similarity and difference interested Montaigne as a general issue of logical theory as well as a practical device.

Alongside comparison we may notice moves which Montaigne makes to place a particular occurrence in a wider context, perhaps of the historical time in which it takes place, or perhaps of human experience viewed more generally. The effort to try to understand things as in harmony with their time or as having their value changed by differences between national or temporal customs forms one of Montaigne's most important manoeuvres for questioning received opinions or commonsense reactions. In *De la vanité* Montaigne appeals to the connection between part and whole in order to make a whole series of moves to destabilize the reader's sense of the implication of vanity. Rhetorical training envisages the use of attendant circumstances mainly as a device of amplification but humanist commentary, with its newly won sense of the difference between classical and modern times, is sympathetic to the usefulness of context in arriving at judgements.

Sometimes Montaigne makes use of the larger scale structuring device of the list. In *Des Menteurs* he gives a list of advantages and disadvantages of a bad memory. In *De la vanité* there is a sequence of objections to travel. These lists provide him with a series of statements which he responds to using the logical techniques I have been outlining. When he has (temporarily) finished developing his position on a particular statement, he turns from it to the next statement on his list. A slightly similar effect is achieved by his occasional interjecting of a structuring comment, on the lines of, 'but to return to my argument'. Both devices provide for a non-linear logical structure to the essay. Both in some sense run against his various protestations that he is not concerned with Aristotelian or Ciceronian methods of organizing what he has to say, preferring to rely on fortune or to depict the minute-to-minute alterations in his mind.

I have analysed the connections between fragments and the logical moves Montaigne makes in relation to the sections from the three essays analysed above in order to argue that Montaigne's most important interventions typically involve combining several connecting motifs (or logical moves). In the earlier stages of the essays there will be a link (*e.g.*, of justification, clarification or opposition) between a story and a maxim. Later he will build a succession of logical moves from a single proposition. It is this worrying away at the significance, the truth value and the personal applicability of an argument which leads Montaigne to new ideas. By specifying the typical basic components (which I have called the fragments) and the principal methods of combination I have described a way of analysing the sequences, which I take to be the most important part of Montaigne's thinking. Looking for the ways in which Montaigne combines these logical moves will help readers notice the methods and the content of his thought. I have already compared the reading of Montaigne to the appreciation of a game. I have been trying to describe the pieces in play and the elementary moves which can be made with them. Skill in the game and knowledge in the spectator (who as a reader of the essays is led to re-enact the sequences of Montaigne's thought) consist in the art of combination. Students of chess usually devote more attention to unusual or beautiful combinations in particular sections of a master game they are reading than they do to the eventual result. In practical terms these are the new ideas which they may take from the study of that game and perhaps apply in a different situation. In aesthetic terms the delight which comes from understanding the logical implications of the combinations is what makes the games of the masters worth playing over.

I have also tried to show that the basic methods of connecting fragments (and of building on propositions) are closely related to composition exercises practised in the grammar schools. This historical claim has two implications. In the first place this is an instance of something which other scholars have noticed. Although Montaigne is very critical of rhetoric (and of most aspects of grammar school training) he makes extensive and innovative use of rhetorical techniques. It seems to me that the extent to which Montaigne adds questioning, clarification and opposition at every stage suggests that he was highly self-conscious about the possibilities of each move. When you have been taught to notice and label topics of invention or figures of speech, you can learn from the ways others have used them and you can use them more self-consciously and artistically yourself. The second implication concerns the audience. Insofar as Montaigne employed methods corresponding to the teaching of the grammar schools (whether or not school training affected Montaigne himself), his logical moves became readable by his contemporaries. The training provided them with a means of reading which helped them look out for certain logical connections and enabled them to appreciate the ways in which these connections were being combined. And this in turn helped them follow his new ideas.

In the last part of the chapter I want to consider the role of the sequences in relation to the structure of complete chapters. I have already provided analyses of the whole of two early chapters (*Par divers moyens on arrive a pareille fin* and *Des Menteurs*). We found that simple initial structures were developed into complex shapes by the addition of new material, which added to or changed the emphasis of the subject matter and altered the implication of the whole essay. A truly detailed plan of one of the late essays would take up several pages and in so doing would fail to provide an intelligible view of the whole. A smaller scale map of *De la vanité* might look like this:[30]

		V	**P**	**S**
1	Introduction: Vanity, Idleness and Writing, Self, Travel	945–8	989–92	1070–3
2	Household Management (linking passage) travel	948–55 955–6	992–9 999–1000	1073–81 1081–2

		V	P	S
3	Political Change and Civil War	956–62	1000–6	1082–9
	(digression) problems about writing	962–5	1006–10	1089–92
4	Trying to avoid obligations to others	965–70	1010–15	1092–8
	(linking passage) effects of the civil wars	970–2	1015–17	1098–1100
5	Travel: refutes reasons against; his habits in travel	972–87	1017–33	1100–16
	(interspersed with Marriage and Friendship	974–7	1019–22	1102–5
	Death	978–80	1023–5	1106–8
		983–4	1029–30	1112–13
	Writing)	980–1	1025–7	1108–10
		982–3	1028–9	1111–12
6	Vanity, Human Inconsistency, Philosophy	987–91	1033–7	1116–21
7	Problems of Public Service	991–4	1037–40	1121–4
8	Writing	994–6	1040–2	1124–7
9	Rome and Roman Citizenship	996–1000	1042–7	1127–32
10	Coda on Vanity	1000–1	1047	1132–3

Such a plan gives some idea of the succession of major topics in the essay (and will be of some help in locating particular passages) but it cannot show us how Montaigne's thought develops.[31] Rather unusually *De la vanité* has a conclusion but the conclusion concerns only one of the main subjects and by no means implies a rejection of the others. The fact that Montaigne discusses public service after his main sections on travel does not imply that what he has to say about public service answers or is more fundamental than his remarks on travel. Nor is it likely that Montaigne worked with a plan like this in composing the essay. Because of the complexity of a chapter like this we can only guess at the stages of composition. My suspicion is that Montaigne knew at the beginning that the essay would involve vanity, travel (partly seen as an instance of vanity) and the issue of one's duties to others (perhaps seen as a counterweight to his idea that all we do is vanity). As he wrote, these leading issues would have become entangled with the problems of household management (which encouraged him to travel), the trials of the civil war, general observations on the conduct of life and reflections on his processes of writing. The structure of this essay is not impressive in itself. It is effective because it allows a place (and a degree of mutual reflection) to exceptionally searching and eloquent sequences of fragments and thoughts.

The work which sets the reader's mind thinking in new directions is to be found in local sequences of the essay. In what I have called the sixth section Montaigne admits that his love of travel is a symptom of a lack of constancy and security but he insists that this is an essential part of being human.

> [B] Je sçay bien qu'à le prendre à la lettre, ce plaisir de voyager porte tesmoignage d'inquietitude et d'irresolution. Aussi sont ce nos maistresses qualitez, et praedominantes … Il y a de la vanité, dictes vous, en cet amusement? Mais où non? Et ces beaux preceptes sont vanité, et vanité toute la sagesse … Ces exquises subtilitez ne sont propres qu'au presche: ce sont discours qui nous veulent envoyez tous bastez en l'autre monde. La vie est un mouvement materiel et corporel, action imparfaicte de sa propre essence, et desreglée; je m'emploie à la servir selon elle.
>
> *Quisque suos patimur manes*
>
> … A quoy faire ces poinctes eslevées de la philosophie sur lesquelles aucun estre humain ne se peut rasseoir, et ces regles qui excedent nostre usage et nostre force? Je voy souvent qu'on nous propose des images de vie, lesquelles ny le proposant ny les auditeurs n'ont aucune esperance de suyvre ny, qui plus est, envie. De ce mesme papier où il vient d'escrire l'arrest de condemnation contre un adultere, le juge en desrobe un lopin pour en faire un poulet à la femme de son compagnon. [C] Celle à qui vous viendrez de vous frotter illicitement, criera plus asprement tantost, en vostre presence mesme, à l'encontre d'une pareille faute de sa compaigne que ne feroit Porcie. [B] Et tel condamne des hommes à mourir pour des crimes qu'il n'estime point fautes … D'autant que nostre licence nous porte tousjours au delà de ce qui nous est loisible et permis,

on a estressy souvent outre la raison universelle les preceptes et loix de nostre vie … Il n'est si homme de bien, qu'il mette à l'examen des loix toutes ses actions et pensées, qui ne soit pendable dix fois en sa vie … L'humaine sagesse n'arriva jamais aux devoirs qu'elle s'estoit elle mesme prescript et, si elle y estoit arrivée, elle s'en prescriroit d'autres au delà, où elle aspirast tousjours et pretendist, tant nostre estat est ennemy de consistance … La vie commune doibt avoir conference aux autres vies. La vertu de Caton estoit vigoreuse outre la mesure de son siècle; et à un homme qui se mesloit de gouverner les autres, destiné au service commun, il se pourroit dire que c'estoit une justice, sinon injuste, au moins vaine, et hors de saison … La vertu assignée aux affaires du monde est une vertu à plusieurs plis, encoigneures et couddes, pour s'appliquer et joindre à l'humaine foiblesse, meslée et artificielle, non droitte, nette, constante, ny purement innocente. (III, 9, V988–91, P1034–7)[32]

[B] I am well aware that, taken literally, this delight in travelling bears witness to restlessness and inconstancy. But these are indeed our dominant master-qualities … 'There is vanity,' you say, 'in such a pastime.' – Yes. Where is there not? Those fine precepts are all vanity and all wisdom is vanity … Those exquisite subtleties are only good for sermons: they are themes which seek to drive us into the next world like donkeys. But life is material motion in the body, an activity, by its very essence, imperfect and unruly: I work to serve it on its own terms.

> *Quisque suos patimur manes* (each suffers his own torments, *Aeneid*, 6.743)

… What is the use of those high philosophical peaks on which no human being can settle and those rules which exceed our practice and our power? I am well aware that people often expound to us ideas about life which neither the speaker nor the hearers have any hope of following or (what is more) any desire. The judge filches a bit of paper on which he has just written the sentence on an adulterer in order to send a billet-doux to the wife of a colleague. [C] The woman you have just been having an illicit tumble with will soon, in your very presence, be screaming harsher condemnations of a similar fault in a friend of hers than Portia would. [B] Some condemn people to death for crimes which they do not actually believe to be even mistakes … Since our licence

> always takes us beyond what is lawful and reasonable, we have often made the precepts and laws for our lives stricter than universal reason requires … No man is so moral but that, if he submitted his deeds and thoughts to cross-examination by the laws, he would be found worthy of hanging on ten occasions in his lifetime … Human wisdom has never managed to live up to the duties which it has prescribed for itself; and if it had done so, it would have prescribed itself more, further beyond them still, towards which it could continue to strive and aspire, so hostile is our condition to consistency … A life lived in society must bear some relationship to other lives. Cato's virtue was excessively rigorous by the standards of his age; and in a man occupied with governing others and destined to serve the commonwealth, we could say that his justice, if not unjust, was at least vain and unseasonable … The virtue allotted to this world's affairs is a virtue with many angles, crinkles and corners so that it can be applied and joined to our human frailty; it is complex and artificial, not straight, clear-cut, constant, nor purely innocent. (S1117–21)

The passage begins with two arguments generalizing both halves of his starting proposition (the person and the activity). To like travel is a sign of inconstancy, but inconstancy is a dominant feature of human beings. Travel itself is vain but so are all human activities. The next move is from general to specific: if all activity is vain then so are precepts and so is wisdom itself. He then justifies the statement that moral precepts are vain by describing their goal and contrasting this with the reality of human life (seen here in a Lucretian way as bodies in movement). This leads to a further contrast, with the characteristic turn to the self: while others seek to impose rules, I try to respond to the reality of change.

After the quotation from Virgil he elaborates on (with amplification and rhetorical question) and argues for the bad fit between ethical axioms and human life. He gives examples of humans ignoring the rules. These draw their detail and vigour from satirical portrayals of hypocrisy but Montaigne's point is that such behaviour is the norm. Rather than being outraged by such behaviour he finds it amusing and instructive. This leads him to an extraordinary exposé of both sides of the contradiction he has set up. For exactly the same reasons that humans always break the rules they fix, they always set rules which are beyond their capacity to keep. People are equally excessive in their lawmaking and lawbreaking (hence the adulterous judge of adultery). Montaigne then amplifies both sides of this equation. If anyone’s life were examined carefully that person would be judged worthy of hanging ten times. Our reason is incapable of living up to our rules. But if it could keep its rules it would immediately make further rules which would be impossible to keep. This argument is then linked back to the recurring theme of this passage, the perpetual movement and lack of constancy of the human condition.

The next argument appeals to the context of human life and draws in one of Montaigne’s favourite specific examples. Living in the world involves living in relation to other people. But the austere virtue of Cato goes so far beyond what others can manage that in relation to other people it too is vain. So vanity now includes not only the commonality of human behaviour but also (in the different light cast by social context) one of the strongest exemplars of moral virtue. Having exemplified and amplified the corruption of mankind on one side and having established the vanity of moral rules and examples on the other, Montaigne attempts to reconstruct a possible human virtue (*une vertu à plusieurs plis, encoigneres et couddes*), while remaining acutely aware of its limitations in relation to the two contradictory pressures he has observed and deployed around it.

Passages like this represent what is extraordinary in the essays. The chosen subject(s) of a chapter provides the armature within which fragments can be combined in breathtaking sequences of thought. Such sequences are then embedded together and further elaborated in order to produce whole chapters. Rather than the sections being subordinated to the whole, the structure exists for the sake of the perceptive sequences of thought which emerge within it. Even though (untypically) this chapter returns to the topic of vanity for its brilliant concluding page, the conclusion neither repeats nor replaces the arguments we have been tracing here and from the beginning of the essay. Instead it develops the implications of the human involvement with vanity in a different way. As readers we can choose to work from all three sections separately or we can, if we wish, make connections and comparisons between them.

4. Logic and Narrative in Shakespeare and Montaigne

In this chapter I shall first consider the role of logic and argument in the composition of some of Shakespeare's speeches. This will prepare the way for a comparison between Shakespeare's logic and Montaigne's. Then I shall compare the approach of both authors to the crucial rhetorical question of the relationship between argument and narrative. Where the rhetorical tradition established *narratio*, and proof and refutation as the two central sections of the four-part oration, Rudolph Agricola generalized this analysis in presenting exposition and argumentation as the two registers governing all kinds of persuasive discourse.[1]

Shakespeare took the great majority of his plots and many details of fact and expression in the plays from his reading.[2] For each play there are generally one or two sources which provide the main outline and sometimes also structure and phrases for particular scenes:[3] for example Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland*, 2nd edition (London, 1587), for the plays concerned with British history (including *Macbeth* and *Cymbeline* as well as the history plays); Plutarch's *The lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans* (London, 1579) for the Roman plays; prose romances, such as Lodge's *Rosalynde* and Greene's *Pandosto*; and earlier plays. Shakespeare may have used some of these books over a long period; others he may have turned to strictly for a single subject. For many plays he read other books for more information on the subject (*e.g.*, further historical accounts of the same period) or for local flavour (*e.g.*, the treatises on witchcraft and demonic possession which helped him with the language of *Macbeth* and *King Lear*).[4] Beyond this reading undertaken to write a particular play there were other books which Shakespeare frequently returned to for small details and which he probably owned, for example Chaucer, Spenser, Virgil, Ovid and some of Cicero's philosophical works.[5] Shakespeare probably also retained and reused a good deal of material from oral conversation: moral axioms, proverbs, stories, striking expressions, even perhaps images or arguments which we can trace to classical texts but which came to him indirectly rather than through reading.[6]

In some cases Shakespeare worked very closely from his sources. An example of this type from *Coriolanus* V.3 gives us a place to start. First, to demonstrate the closeness with which Shakespeare sometimes dramatized his source, here is the beginning of Volumnia's first speech from North's translation of Plutarch and the corresponding passage from *Coriolanus* (1608), in which italicized phrases represent changes.[7]

> If we held our peace, my son, and determined not to speak, the state of our poor bodies and the present sight of our raiment would easily bewray to thee what life we have led at home, since thy exile and abode abroad. But think now with thyself how much more unfortunately than all the women living we are come hither, considering that the sight which should be most pleasant to all other to behold, spiteful fortune hath made most fearful to us; making myself to see my son, and my daughter here her husband, besieging the walls of his native country; so as that which is the only comfort to all other in their adversity and misery, to pray unto the gods and call them for aid, is the only thing which plungeth us into most deep perplexity.[8]

> Should we be silent and not speak, our raiment
> And state of our bodies would bewray what life
> We have led since thy exile. Think with thyself
> How much more unfortunate than all living women
> Are we come hither; since that thy sight, which should
> *Make our eyes flow with joy, hearts dance with comforts*,
> Constrains them *to weep, and shake with fear and sorrow*,
> Making the mother, wife and child to see
> The son, the husband and the father, *tearing*
> His country's *bowels out*. And to poor we
> Thine enmity's most capital. *Thou barr'st us*
> Our prayers to the gods, which is a comfort
> That all but we enjoy. (V.3.94–106)

In the first sentence Shakespeare slightly rephrases the opening, reverses the order of bodies and raiment and omits some of Plutarch's doubling, but in essence and in most of its words the sentence is taken directly from North. Shakespeare's second sentence amplifies Plutarch's contrast by describing physical embodiments (topic of adjuncts) for his more abstract 'most pleasant/most fearful'. For North's 'besieging the walls', Shakespeare substitutes the more metaphorical and more emotive 'tearing the bowels out'. Shakespeare's final two sentences rephrase and shorten Plutarch's idea, retaining the key words but emphasizing Coriolanus's special enmity to his family and his personal responsibility ('Thou barr'st us': topic of subject) for their missing the comfort of prayer. Shakespeare takes over the main ideas, their sequence and the key words in which they are expressed directly from Plutarch. For the most part he is simply versifying North's prose.

At the climax of the same dialogue, Shakespeare continues to draw arguments and ideas from Plutarch but he makes a series of substitutions and additions. In both these texts I have italicized the phrases Shakespeare takes from his source.

> *My son, why dost thou not answer me?* Dost thou think it good altogether to give place unto thy choler and desire of revenge? And thinkest thou it not *honesty* for thou to grant the mother's *request* in so weighty a cause? *Dost thou take it honourable for a nobleman to remember the wrongs* and injuries done him, and dost not in like case think it a nobleman's part to *be thankful for the goodness that parents do show to their children, acknowledging the duty and reverence* they ought to bear unto them? *No man living is more bound to show himself thankful in all parts and respects than thyself, who so unnaturally showeth all ingratitude.* Moreover, my son, thou hast sorely taken of thy country, exacting grievous payments upon them, in revenge of the injuries offered thee. Besides, *thou hast not hitherto showed thy poor mother any courtesy.* And therefore it is not only *honest, but due unto me*, that without compulsion I should obtain my so *just and reasonable request* of thee. But, since by reason I cannot persuade thee to it, *to what purpose do I defer my last hope*?
> And with these words *herself, his wife and children fell down upon their knees* before him. Martius, seeing that, could refrain no longer, but went straight and lift her up, crying out:
>
> '*Oh, mother, what have you done to me?*'
> *And holding her hard by the right hand,*
> '*Oh, mother,*' said he, '*you have won a happy victory for your country, but mortal and unhappy for your son.* For I see myself vanquished by you alone.'[9]
>
> VOL *Why dost not speak?*
> *Think'st thou it honourable for a noble man*
> *Still to remember wrongs?* Daughter, speak you:
> He cares not for your weeping. Speak thou, boy:

Perhaps thy childishness will move him more
Than can our reasons. *There's no man in the world*
More bound to's mother, yet here he lets me prate
Like one i'th'stocks. *Thou hast never in thy life*
Show'd thy dear mother any courtesy,
When she, poor hen, fond of no second brood,
Has cluck'd thee to the wars, and safely home,
Loaden with honour. Say my *request*'s unjust,
And spurn me back; but if it be not so,
Thou art not *honest*, and the gods will plague thee
That thou restrain'st from me the duty which
To a mother's part belongs. He turns away.
Down, ladies: let us shame him with our knees.
To his surname Coriolanus longs more pride
Than pity to our prayers. *Down! an end:*
This is the last. So, we will home to Rome
And die among our neighbours. Nay, behold's,
This boy that cannot tell what he would have,
But kneels, and holds up hands for fellowship,
Does reason our petition with more strength
Than thou hast to deny't. Come, let us go:
This fellow had a Volscian to his mother;
His wife is in Corioles, and his child
Like him by chance. Yet give us our dispatch:
I am husht until our city be afire,
And then I'll speak a little.
COR (*Holds her by the hand silent*.) *O mother, mother!*
What have you done? Behold the heavens do ope,
The gods look down, and this unnatural scene
They laugh at. *O my mother, mother! O!*
You have won a happy victory to Rome;
But for your son, Believe it, O, Believe it,
Most dangerously you have with him prevail'd,
If not most mortal to him. (V.3.153–89)

Shakespeare composes the first part of Volumnia's speech by simplifying and reducing Plutarch before adding new arguments. Volumnia's first two points are taken directly from Plutarch. Then Shakespeare directs her words to the stage context (topic of circumstances), begging for support from Virgilia and suggesting that if young Martius were to speak, his childish expressions would be more effective than adult reason. Shakespeare reverses the order of the next argument. Where Plutarch's Volumnia had sought to balance Coriolanus's anger and desire for revenge against his duty to honour his parents, Shakespeare begins with Coriolanus's obligation to his mother, contrasted (using North's words but amplifying them with the more descriptive 'prate like one i'th'stocks') with his ill-treatment of her. This is contrasted with her devotion to him, amplified both from its cause ('fond of no second brood') and from its success ('safely home, loaden with honour').

The next new logical move is a dilemma. Either he must state that her request is unjust or if it is not he must accept that the gods will punish him for dishonourably refusing to perform his duty (drawing here on an idea which Plutarch had used a little earlier). Coriolanus's action in turning away then prompts her response of urging her companions to kneel. Where Plutarch had ended Volumnia's speech with the conclusion that since he was refusing her honourable request her only recourse was to give up reason and silently implore compassion by kneeling, Shakespeare adds angry taunts and verbal underlinings of their physical gestures. She pretends to explain the reason for his failure to respond compassionately first out of pride and later by allotting him a Volscian mother, wife and child. These bitter accusations are derived from the topics of causes and opposites. In describing her grandson's actions (in effect making speak the picture the audience sees) she amplifies by describing circumstances and by comparison ('with more strength than thou has't to deny't') and she ends her speech by declaring that she will speak no more words until she sees the city burning.

Where Plutarch described Coriolanus responding immediately, overcome by his mother's gesture of kneeling, Shakespeare not only gives Volumnia further words on her knees but also allows for a period of silence in which Coriolanus's face and body can depict the struggle between contrary impulses before giving way in words which amplify North's mainly through repetition and assurance of sincerity. When Shakespeare adds to Coriolanus's reply the comment on the unnatural scene he places the scene in a broader context (the heavens looking down but also the play audience looking on) and responds to the unnaturalness both of the mother kneeling to the son and of the destruction of the son which is implicit in the mother's demand of compassion. Plutarch provides Shakespeare with the main stages of this dialogue but Shakespeare sometimes compresses

North's expression and adds arguments to intensify the emotional impact of the scene.

Two examples from the second scene of *Hamlet* show Shakespeare using his logical and rhetorical inheritance to elaborate a speech from a relatively simple outline.

> KING Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother's death
> The memory be green, and that it us befitted
> To bear our hearts in grief, and our whole kingdom
> To be contracted in one brow of woe,
> Yet so far hath discretion fought with nature
> That we with wisest sorrow think on him
> Together with remembrance of ourselves.
> Therefore our sometime sister, now our queen,
> Th'imperial jointress to this warlike state,
> Have we, as 'twere with a defeated joy,
> With an auspicious and a dropping eye,
> With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage,
> In equal scale weighing delight and dole,
> Taken to wife. Nor have we herein barr'd
> Your better wisdoms, which have freely gone
> With this affair along. For all, our thanks.

The logical outline for this speech runs something like this: though we mourn Hamlet's recent death, yet we also remember ourselves, therefore, balancing sorrow and joy, we have married his widow. R. W. Dent suggests that two of the basic elements of this outline are adapted from proverbs: He is not wise that will forget himself (W532) and To Cry with one eye and laugh with the other (E248).[10] Shakespeare amplifies the first clause by stressing the closeness of the friendship and the relationship, by a metaphor for the freshness of the loss and by explaining the expected effect of that event first on the court ('our hearts') and then on the whole kingdom. The fourth line plays on 'contracted' to combine the unity of the kingdom contracted in grief with the bodily picture of the contracted brow conventionally signifying unhappiness.

Shakespeare organizes the second clause around a series of contrasts. Claudius remembers himself as well as his brother (remembrance/memory) but he does so combining wisdom and sorrow ('wisest sorrow'). This combination is the outcome of a psychomachia between the personifications discretion and nature (nature here causes sorrow; when Claudius speaks to Hamlet later nature will imply the limitation of sorrow and the continuation of life). Claudius here presents himself as a man divided between wisdom and the natural emotion (or conventional display) of sadness. This represents a logical move from the action to its performer (topic of subject) and its cause.

He amplifies the third part of his argument through copia of words, finding three phrases to describe Gertrude and five to express the manner in which he marries her. Each of these five phrases couples contraries in an attempt to present himself as a man of experience who can give due weight to the conflicting emotions of life, though perhaps there is an element of incongruity in the contrast between the two eyes, one looking upwards in hope, the other down in tears. Later in the scene Hamlet will make a joke out of applying the same ambivalences to the food which physically sustains both these attitudes ('the funeral bak'd meats did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables'). Having described and justified his actions, Claudius turns to the court, recalling that he has consulted them and that they have freely consented to these arrangements and thanking them. He presents himself as their leader but takes care to implicate them in the decisions which will form the basis for the regime he now wishes to defend.

Claudius's ceremonial presentation to the court is contrasted once the court departs with Hamlet's self-presentation to the audience.

HAM O that this too too sullied flesh would melt,
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew,
Or that the Everlasting had not fix'd
His canon 'gainst self-slaughter. O God! God!
How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable
Seem to me all the uses of this world!
Fie on't, ah fie, 'tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely. That it should come to this!
But two months dead – nay, not so much, not two –
So excellent a king, that was to this
Hyperion to a satyr, so loving to my mother
That he might not beteem the winds of heaven
Visit her face too roughly. Heaven and earth,
Must I remember? Why, she would hang on him

As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on; and yet within a month –
Let me not think on't – Frailty, thy name is woman –
A little month, or ere those shoes were old
With which she follow'd my poor father's body,
Like Niobe, all tears – why, she –
O, God, a beast that wants discourse of reason
Would have mourn'd longer – married with my uncle,
My father's brother – but no more like my father
Than I to Hercules. Within a month,
Ere yet the salt of most ungracious tears
Had left the flushing in her galled eyes,
She married – O most wicked speed! To post
With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!
It is not, nor it cannot come to good.

Hamlet's first soliloquy can be thought of as having four main sections: a wish for death and oblivion (129–32), an exclamation against the rottenness of the world (132–7), a narrative of Hamlet's family history (137–57) and a conclusion (158). The narrative can be further subdivided between comments on his father and mother (137–45) and segment by segment amplification (with commentary exclamations) of the sentence, within a month she married my uncle (145–57). The first three sections are placed sequentially without explicit logical connections but the clear implication is that each one explains its predecessor: Hamlet wants to die because the world is rotten and the world seems to him rotten because shortly after the death of his admired father his mother has married his hated uncle.

Shakespeare amplifies the second section through *copia* of words with a masterfully exhausting group of epithets ('weary, stale, flat and unprofitable') for the effect the world has on him. Here 'uses' alludes to the world of profit but also implies the impact of the wear and tear of the practical world on the sensitive young man (almost in the sense of *Macbeth*'s 'hard use'). Then, drawing on the proverb 'Weeds grow on fertile soil if it is untilled' (W241),[11] he imagines the world as an untended garden, formerly ordered but now luxuriating in unchecked growth, reproduction and decay, given over to the elements of nature which are rank and gross. The topics are comparison and effect.

The first part of the family history includes arguments from time (with *correctio* and an implied argument from lesser to greater: if remarrying within two months is bad, then doing the same within one month is worse), from comparison when the difference between the two brothers is likened to that between the classical god of the sun and a half-beast, and from effects, arguing for his father's excellence by describing the protective actions which arise from and demonstrate his love. This returns Hamlet momentarily to the exclamatory tone of the start of the speech, as if even the act of remembering worsens the torment he feels. Then he describes the reciprocation of this love by his mother. Through a sort of cornucopian paradox the more she feeds on him the more her appetite towards him increases, with an implied contrast with the ordinary workings of appetite which is gradually weakened by feeding. The unusualness of this effect acts as a sign of the extraordinary quality of the love he inspires and she feels.

Shakespeare amplifies the outline sentence ('within a month she married my uncle') mainly through descriptive detail (the shoes, the funeral, the tears, the bed) latterly elaborated with loaded descriptive epithet (unrighteous, galled, incestuous), comparison (Niobe, the irrational beast which would have mourned longer, Hercules) and exclaimed comment (Frailty,[12] wicked speed). Hamlet twice exclaims the wish not to remember or not to think of the details of the subject he explores.[13] His intense absorption in the visual and narrative details which explain his disgust is interrupted (and to some extent opposed) by exclamations of the personal discomfort caused by these memories. Not remembering at all would lead back to the wish for death with which he began the speech, but remembering less intensely might assist a return to a more balanced perspective on the world. For Hamlet at this stage any such balance or perspective is to be rejected because it represents Claudius's outlook on the world.

Some of Shakespeare's speeches involve a kind of internal dialogue, in which the character tries out an expression, and which he or she then comments in order to reject or change it. This form of expression clearly resembles Montaigne's portrayals of the mind in motion and of the changeability of human character. Hamlet reacts to and comments on his own thoughts in his second soliloquy ('O what a rogue and peasant slave am I', II.2.544–601). The main plan of this speech is a comparison between the player and himself. First he describes the intense emotion with which the player reacts to imagining the death of Hecuba (545–54); then he imagines what the player would do if he had Hamlet's reasons for grief (554–60) and contrasts this with a disparaging depiction of his own reaction (561–6). Thinking of a reason for this he asks himself if he is a coward and then imagines himself defying someone whose provocative insults he describes in physical detail.

Am I a coward?
Who calls me villain, breaks my pate across,
Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face,
Tweaks me by the nose, gives me the lie I'th' throat
As deep as to the lungs – who does me this?
Ha!
'Swounds, I should take it: for it cannot be
But I am pigeon-liver'd and lack gall
To make oppression bitter, or ere this
I should ha' fatted all the region kites
With this slave's offal. (566–76)

But further reflection prompts him to abandon the implied defiant response to the insult to his honour and instead to depict the faint-heart he must be if he has not already exposed Claudius's dead body to the local birds of prey. The dominant mode here is reasoning by contraries. He proves his cowardice by contrasting the bloody revenge he has failed to carry out. To reject that weakness therefore involves imitating the Senecan defiance which earlier in the speech he considered more appropriate to the situation he finds himself in. But no sooner has he spoken a few well-chosen words of defiance than he turns on himself, decisively rejecting any such display as a sort of prostitution.

Bloody, bawdy villain!
Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain!
Why, what an ass am I! This is most brave,
That I, the son of a dear father murder'd,
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell,
Must like a whore unpack my heart with words
And fall a-cursing like a very drab,
A scullion! Fie upon't! Foh!
About, my brains. (576–84)

This speech is full of turns. He moves from a detailed description of the actor as an exemplary embodiment of a fully adequate emotional response to questioning himself, imagining words he might say and then commenting on those words. More than simply stating positions and then reacting to those statements, the soliloquy tries on different voices and comments on their value and appropriateness. But the speech is also notable for the vehemence of his condemnatory language and the vividness and detail of its descriptions. Each element of the comparison and each imagined voice is skilfully amplified from cause, subject, attendant circumstances, effect and consequence, to name only a few of the topics employed in the speech. The speech is especially rich in detailed descriptions of facial expressions and in persistent naming of parts of the body.

These elaborately crafted speeches suggest some categories for Shakespeare's methods of composition, starting from outlines or from speeches in his source. There is a strong preference for detailed physical description, especially description of the body, used both to develop metaphors and for amplification through description of circumstances. Shakespeare favours techniques of *copia* of words, both for substitutions and to produce moderate-length series of epithets.

In elaborating an idea he makes frequent use of the topics of comparison, causes, effects, consequences, circumstances (used both to describe the manner in which something is done and as evidence of underlying motives or significances) and contraries. He makes special use of the topic of subject, moving from an idea to thinking about the person expressing it, considering the audience to which it is addressed and discussing the broader circumstances in which a speech or action takes place. Sometimes the soliloquy encapsulates the expression of different voices, one commenting on the experience the speaker is describing or one voice responding to another. Shakespeare makes smaller use of topics like time, place, greater and lesser and the figure of personification. He usually avoids (or when working from a source even suppresses) the logical connectives which explain the links between ideas or seek to force the listener's assent to particular conclusions, though we shall see that sometimes in comedy he draws attention to the logical characteristics of some forms of verbal play.

In the speeches I have analysed Shakespeare makes relatively little use of the forms of argumentation. His appreciation of these forms is more apparent in comedy, for example in Feste's catechistic proof that Olivia is a fool to mourn her brother since she knows he is in heaven.[14] In *As You Like It* (*c.*1599) characters often joke about the forms of argumentation. Celia teases Rosalind by pointing out that because her father loved Orlando's father it does not follow that Rosalind must love Orlando and that if it were so Celia would be equally bound to hate him (I.3.24–7), but later in the scene Rosalind makes serious use of a hypothetical syllogism to protest her loyalty to Duke Frederick (I.3.39–46).

ROS I do beseech your grace
Let me the knowledge of my fault bear with me.
If with myself I hold intelligence,
Or have acquaintance with mine own desires,
If that I do not dream, or be not frantic –
As I do trust I am not – then, dear uncle,
Never so much as in a thought unborn
Did I offend your highness.

Rosalind copiously doubles her condition (the if-clause, the first part of the hypothetical syllogism), and then expresses it negatively, confirming that part of the condition before she states the consequence, but the form is set out in full and the inference is clear. Celia uses the same form to argue that she must be as guilty as Rosalind.

CELIA If she be a traitor,
Why so am I. We still have slept together,
Rose at an instant, learned, played, eat together
And wheresoe'er we went, like Juno's swans
Still we went coupled and inseparable. (66–70)

Having stated the argument, Celia provides evidence to support the connection between condition and inference. The force of the hypothetical syllogism depends on the similarity between us. We must be very similar because of all the things we do together. Once she has failed to persuade her father of the negative inference from the hypothetical syllogism (since I am not a traitor, therefore she cannot be) she follows its positive logic by declaring that if Rosalind is banished, then so is she (79–80, 88–94). The dénouement of the play depends on the conditions which Rosalind extorts from the mystified lovers (V.4.6–16).[15] The passage of comedy which depends most heavily on exploitation and parody of logic is the dialogue between Corin and Touchstone in Act III in which Touchstone, in answering

Corin's innocent question about the shepherd's life, imitates the distinctions between the meanings of terms characteristic of a university disputation.

> TOUCH Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in respect it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it very well; but in respect that it is private, it is a vile life. Now in respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth me well, but in respect it is not in the court, it is tedious. (III.2.13–18)

The parody appears to make distinctions where none really exist and exaggerates their number. When Touchstone declares that those who have not been in the court are damned, Corin challenges him for his reason and Touchstone replies with a chain of inferences.

> TOUCH Why, if thou was't never at the court thou never sawest good manners. If thou never sawest good manners, then thy manners must be wicked, and wickedness is sin, and sin is damnation. Thou art in a parlous state, shepherd.
>
> CORIN Not a whit, Touchstone. Those that are good manners at court are as ridiculous in the country as the behaviour of the country is most mockable at court. You told me you salute not at the court but you kiss your hands. That courtesy would be uncleanly if courtiers were shepherds. (III.2.36–44)

Touchstone's sophistic inferences are answered by Corin's argument from context and comparison. Touchstone then asks Corin for a series of instances (45, 50, 57, 60), which he refutes in turn. The parody of logical disputation is the funnier because this is the last in a series of scenes presenting the courtiers' views of the country.

Where Shakespeare sets out forms of argumentation in full, or when he alludes to institutions of logic, his intention is often comic. Nonetheless the expectations of logic and the topics of invention provide his characters with resources for amplification, debate and play.

In the speeches which we have examined Shakespeare undertakes two types of logical operation, sometimes separately, sometimes sequentially, sometimes simultaneously. One type of operation enlarges a brief outline into a fully developed speech; the other takes a statement and reacts to it. In both types Shakespeare uses the topics of invention to generate new arguments and employs techniques for generating *copia* of words and things.

In transforming an outline into an elaborate speech (as in Claudius's and Hamlet's speeches from *Hamlet* I.2), Shakespeare employs *copia* of words (especially additional epithets and rephrasings which express abstract ideas in physical terms), descriptive detail (especially of the circumstances of an event and of parts of the body, sometimes employed as metaphors), investigation of effects, comparisons and examples. He sometimes uses the form of dilemma (in which the consequences of two alternative answers are explored) to organize a speech. In reacting to a statement Shakespeare makes considerable use of exclamation and apostrophe, makes distinctions, states consequences and looks into causes. He often reflects on the motivation of or the impression given by the speaker (topic of subject) and on the reaction to the words of an audience. In both types of operation he makes considerable use of the topics of opposition and contraries. He employs many comparisons and metaphors.

Shakespeare's favourite topics seem to be description, causes, effects, subject, adjuncts, circumstances, contraries and comparisons. He employs forms of argumentation, such as syllogism and hypothetical syllogism and techniques of disputation, such as making distinctions and offering far-fetched comparisons mainly for comic effect, but he takes an interest in arguments which go beyond the normal possibilities of logic: juxtaposing images which the audience must connect, investigating paradoxes, consequences of equality of opposites and problems of limit. He is interested in the contribution of spoken context to the effect of an argument, for example in *The Winter's Tale* when Hermione points out that since Leontes regards her as false, her statements of innocence can immediately be reinterpreted as further examples of her falsehood (III.2.22–8)[16] and Leontes confirms this (III.2.84–6), or when she points out that having accused her in public of such a great wrong he will scarcely be able to make amends to her later by admitting his error (II.1.96–100).

These remarks on Shakespeare's logical techniques are all based on relatively full single speeches; it would be very interesting for someone to investigate the logical procedures Shakespeare employs in other places and at different levels: in writing dialogue, in constructing scenes and in organizing the relationships between scenes both as sequences and in an entire play.

While Montaigne and Shakespeare inherit and make use of broadly the same topics of invention and resources of argument there are some large differences between their practices. Most of Montaigne's lines of argument set out from ethical maxims, which may be justified, explored or opposed. Shakespeare's characters use moral axioms more to explain their conduct or to hide behind than for the purpose of opening questions. Within the words of the characters moral axioms are rarely questioned or exemplified. However, the training in reading provided by the grammar school would encourage members of the audience to compare the axioms presented by different characters and to ask whether the events narrated in the play tended to confirm or question particular axioms. On the other hand, both Montaigne and Shakespeare make use of the idea of different voices, when one person states a point of view and another opposes it, or when an individual comments on what he or she has just said.

Shakespeare's logical originality appears most strongly in his interest in what one might call middle forms, territories in which two contradictory things may temporarily both be true or in which one of a pair of opposites may pass over into the other.[17] Hamlet found that in the case of his mother's love for his father increase of appetite grew from what it fed on, while Richard II argued that the cares which he had given away nevertheless remained with him (IV.1.190–8). In *The Winter's Tale* the statue expresses the contradictions between death and life with such equal intensity that they appear to be equivalents and death can transform into life (V.3.14–42).

Shakespeare makes his arguments mainly from the narrative situation of his characters, while Montaigne's originality mainly results from the way he uses logical methods to interrogate moral axioms. Nevertheless Montaigne makes strong arguments questioning the fundamental assumptions and normal procedures of logic.

> [B] Comme nul evenement et nulle forme ressemble entierement à une autre, aussi ne differe l'une de l'autre entierement. [C] Ingenieux meslange de nature. Si nos faces n'estoient semblables, on ne sçauroit discerner l'homme de la beste; si elles n'estoient dissemblables, on ne sçauroit discerner l'homme de l'homme. [B] Toutes choses se tiennent par quelque similitude, tout exemple cloche, et la relation qui se tire de l'experience est tousjours defaillante et imparfaicte; on joinct toutesfois les comparaisons par quelque bout. Ainsi servent les loix, et s'assortissent ainsin à chacun de nos affaires, par quelque interpretation [C] destournée, [B] contrainte et biaise. (III, 13, V1070, P1116)[18]

> [B] Just as no event and no form completely resembles another, neither does any completely differ. [C] What an ingenious medley is Nature's: if our faces were not alike we could not tell man from beast: if they were not unlike we could not tell man from man. [B] All things are connected by some similarity; yet every example limps and any correspondence which we draw from experience is always feeble and imperfect; we can nevertheless find some corner or other by which to link our comparisons. And that is how laws serve us: they can be adapted to each one of our concerns by means of some [C] twisted, [B] forced or oblique interpretation. (S1213)

At the same time as denying the logical basis for making distinctions and analogies Montaigne insists that our minds will find ways of making connections. Like Shakespeare, Montaigne is especially concerned with problems associated with contradiction and paradox. Often he insists on the importance of both sides or a contradiction, real or apparent. So, in *De l'experience* pleasure is vanity but like vanity it is also an essential part of being human;[19] in *De l'incommodité de la grandeur* (III, 7) high rank is said to be over-rated and so is rejecting it;[20] in *De l'art de conferer* (III, 8) Montaigne presents his generalized judgement of Tacitus only to declare that all generalized judgements are defective;[21] in the same chapter the human addiction to exterior forms is presented as both laughable and important;[22] and in *De la phisionomie* (III, 12), opposed conclusions of Plutarch are acknowledged as equally true.[23]

Montaigne also provides us with ways of moving beyond contradictions. In *De l'art de conferer* he solves the contradiction by placing it within the larger rhetorical perspective in which the writer or speaker is attempting to benefit others, and also himself. The discovery that most judgments are hypocritical because the judge is as guilty as the judged leads him not to reject the habit of passing judgement on others but to insist that one must investigate oneself according to the same criteria.[24] Rather than cautioning himself about motes and beams Montaigne argues that it is a work of charity to try to weed out a defect in another which one cannot eradicate in oneself.[25]

De la coustume (I, 23) explores a double contradiction. Montaigne begins by insisting on the power and treachery of habits. Custom makes us misrecognize nature. It is so powerful that things which seem to us very strange can be accepted by other people as natural. Custom can do anything. Although it distorts our understanding, the power of custom makes it hard for us to break free of it.

> [A] Le principal effect de sa puissance, c'est de nous saisir et empieter de telle sorte, qu'à peine soit-il en nous de nous r'avoir de sa prinse et de r'entrer en nous, pour discourir et raisonner de ses ordonnances. (V115, P119)

> [A] The principal activity of custom is so to seize us and to grip us in her claws that it is hardly in our power to struggle free and to come back into ourselves where we can reason and argue about her ordinances. (S130)

So both nature and reason are envisaged as opposed to custom. Having urged us to set aside custom, while acknowledging the difficulty of doing so, Montaigne sets out the opposite side of the question, the many advantages which follow from observing custom. Having done this he transposes to the sphere of law, which he here treats as a form of practice. He gives many examples to prove that great difficulties attend attempts to change laws, even when they are wrong, but he ends, now reverting to the other side of the contradiction, with instances in which a law had to be changed and was changed successfully. Thinking about the force of laws and the necessity of breaking them sometimes enables Montaigne to allow a space for resisting and overthrowing custom, even as he acknowledges the difficulty of so doing and the opposed convenience of observing custom. The practice of discovering examples supporting both sides of a question can lead him to insist, under certain circumstances, on rejecting even a principle which he normally holds strongly (the obligation to follow the customs and laws of one's country).

Montaigne himself discusses the question of the relationship between argument and narrative in *De la force de l'imagination* (I, 21). He starts from a concern about the reliability of stories taken over from his reading of authors, adding in 1588 and after reflections on the force of exemplary stories.

> [A] Car les Histoires que j'emprunte, je les renvoye sur la conscience de ceux de qui je les prens. [B] Les discours sont à moy, et se tiennent par la preuve de la raison, non de l'expérience: chacun y peut joindre ses exemples: et qui n'en a point, qu'il ne laisse pas de croire qu'il en est assez, veu le nombre et varieté des accidens. [C] Si je ne comme bien, qu'un autre comme pour moy. Aussi en l'estude que je traitte de noz moeurs et mouvements, les tesmoignages fabuleux, pourveu qu'ils soient possibles, y servent comme les vrais. Advenu ou non advenu, à Paris ou à

> Rome, à Jean ou à Pierre, c'est tousjours un tour de l'humaine capacité, duquel je suis utilement advisé par ce recit. (V105, P108)

> [A] When I borrow *exempla* I commit them to the consciences of those I took them from. [B] The discursive reflexions are my own and depend on rational proof not on experience: everyone can add his own examples; if anyone has none of his own he should not stop believing that such *exempla* exist, given the number and variety of human occurrences. [C] If my *exempla* do not fit, supply your own for me. In the study I am making of our manners and motives, fabulous testimonies – provided they remain possible – can do service as well as true ones. Whether it happened or not, to Peter or John, in Rome or in Paris, it still remains within the compass of what human beings are capable of; it tells me something useful about that. (S119)

Montaigne treats his arguments as both more reliable and more fully his own than the exemplary narratives (just after this passage he insists on the reliability of the stories he tells about his own life) but he explains that the latter provide important information about human behaviour. In *De la praesumption* (II, 17) he finds that arguments based on experience (and perhaps especially political and ethical observations) can always be contested because 'the diversity of events offers an infinity of examples of every kind of type'.[26]

In most of the chapters the stories amplify, justify and provide greater human significance to the positions outlined by reason. Thus in *Divers evenemens de mesme conseil* (I, 24) the proposition that the same plan of action may have different results is illustrated by two stories told at length in which first the Duc de Guise and second Augustus showed clemency towards noblemen who had plotted to kill them. After Cinna, no further assassination plots were laid against Augustus, but in contrast the Duc de Guise was murdered the following year.[27] Montaigne attributes this difference in results to the role of fortune in human affairs, which he illustrates with examples from medicine, poetry and warfare. Since the consequences of our choices are in doubt he argues that it is always preferable to choose the more honourable course of action, which he then supports with stories showing the advantages of forgiveness and the disadvantages of suspicion. Two stories from his own experience (told in detail) lead him to make a condition to this proposition: the act of bravery or forgiveness must always be carried out with a great show of confidence. This leads on to further stories in which Caesar and Dionysius overcame plots against them by publicizing their discovery and a corollary story in which a high-ranking Roman became so wearied by the anxiety caused by hiding from his pursuers that he gave himself up.[28] The argument that forgiveness of treachery is better than revenge, illustrated by a series of thorough narrations, leads to a conclusion which reaches a little further.

> [A] D'appeller les mains ennemies, c'est un conseil un peu gaillard; si croy-je qu'encore vaudroit-il mieux le prendre que de demeurer en la fievre continuelle d'un accident qui n'a point de remede. Mais, puis que les provisions qu'on y peut apporter sont pleines d'inquietitude et d'incertitude, il vaut mieux d'une belle asseurance se preparer à tout ce qui en pourra advenir, et tirer quelque consolation de ce qu'on n'est pas asseuré qu'il advienne. (V132, P137)

> [A] Issuing invitations to the hands of an enemy is a rather rash decision, yet I believe it would be better to take it than to remain in a continual sweat over an outcome which cannot be remedied. But since such provisions as we can make are full of uncertainty and anguish, it is better to be ready with fair assurance that anything *can* happen, while drawing some consolation from not being sure that it will. (S149)

Thinking back over all the stories (and particularly the last) Montaigne draws the preliminary conclusion that the dangers of forgiveness and openness are less than the consequences of continual anxiety. But then he reconsiders the uncertainty of all outcomes and finds that this puts in doubt both positive and negative consequences. The uncertainty of human affairs means that any decision taken on the basis of a rational calculation of its consequences and risks may turn out badly (thus in effect negating the value of rational consideration). But, on the other hand, it need not turn out badly and therefore it is preferable to act on the basis of rational consideration.

The longer narratives of *Que le goust des biens …* (I, 14) are firmly linked to the logical structure of the essay but they also contribute something distinct and important to the effect of the chapter and of the whole book. The chapter departs from a saying attributed to Epictetus, 'that men are tormented not by things themselves but by what they think about them'.[29] Montaigne outlines the consequences of this opinion, arguing that if it could be proved to be true it would be a considerable comfort against the wretchedness of the human condition. He asks himself whether a case can be made for the idea that what we call evil depends on our opinions rather than on external reality.[30] He decides to consider the idea in relation to three recognized evils: death, pain and poverty. If he can show that humans take very different views of these three then he will have established his case. His arguments and stories about attitudes to death certainly show a wide range of reactions. He especially focuses on the nonchalant heroism of common people threatened with death.

> [A] Combien voit-on de personnes populaires, conduictes à la mort, et non à une mort simple, mais meslée de honte et quelque fois de griefs tourmens, y apporter une telle asseurance, qui par opiniatreté, qui par simplesse naturelle, qu'on n'y apperçoit rien de changé de leur estat ordinaire: establissans leurs affaires domestiques, se recommandans à leurs amis, chantans, preschans et entretenans le peuple: voire y meslans quelque-fois des mots pour rire, et beuvans à leurs cognoissans, aussi bien que Socrates? (V51–2, P259)

> [A] And how many of the common ordinary people can we see, led forth not merely to die, but to die a death mixed with disgrace and grievous torments, yet showing such assurance (some out of stubbornness, others from a natural simplicity) that we may perceive no change in their normal behaviour: they settle their family affairs and commend themselves to those they love, singing their hymns, preaching and addressing the crowd – indeed even including a few jests and drinking the health of their acquaintances every bit as well as Socrates did. (S53)

Montaigne amplifies this idea with a few jokes taken from Henri Estienne's *Apologie pour Herodote* and Des Périers's *Nouvelles récréations et joyeux devis* (V52–3, P259–60, S53–5). As well as making Montaigne's point about different attitudes to death, these stories show a fierce gaiety and a sardonic defiance which make a lasting impression. Perhaps this behaviour is bolder and freer than one could expect to imitate but whatever degree of shock one registers it is nonetheless admirable and entertaining.

After 1588 Montaigne adds a story shortened and sharpened from Osorio's *On the Deeds of King Emmanuel of Portugal* which shocks and moves his readers in a different way.

> [C] Les Roys de Castille ayants banni de leur terre les Juifs, le Roy Jehan de Portugal leur vendit à huict escus pour teste la retraicte aux siennes pour un certain temps, à condition que iceluy venu, ils auroient à les vuider: et leur promettoit fournir de vaisseaux à les trajecter en Afrique. Le jour arrive, lequel passé il estoit dict que ceux qui n'auroient obeï demeuroient esclaves, les vaisseaux leur furent fournis escharcement et ceux qui s'y embarquerent, rudement et villainement traittez par les passagers, qui, outre plusieurs autres indignitez, les amuserent sur mer, tantost avant, tantost arriere, jusques à ce qu'ils eussent consumé leurs victuailles et contreints d'en acheter d'eux si cherement et si longuement qu on ne les mit à bord, qu'ils ne fussent du tout en chemise. (P261, V53)[31]

> [C] When the Kings of Castile banished the Jews from their lands, King John of Portugal sold them sanctuary in his territories at eight crowns a head, on condition that they would have to leave by a particular day when he would provide transport to Africa. The day duly arrived after which they were to remain as slaves if they had not obeyed: but too few ships were provided; those who did get aboard were treated harshly and villainously by the sailors who, apart from many other indignities, delayed them at sea, sailing this way and that until they had used up all their provisions and were forced to buy others from them at so high a price and over so long a period that they were set ashore with the shirts they stood up in. (S553)

John's successor Emmanuel tried to win the remaining Jews to Christianity at first with kindness and later with the fear of a difficult sea journey and the loss of their homes and possessions.

> [C] Mais, se voyant decheu de son esperance, et eux tous deliberez au passage, il retrancha deux des ports qu'il leur avoit promis, affin que la longueur et incommodité du traject en reduisist aucuns: ou qu'il eust moien de les amonceller tous à un lieu, pour une plus grande commodité de l'execution qu'il avoit destinée. Ce fut qu'il ordonna qu'on arrachast d'entre les mains des peres et des meres tous les enfans au dessous de quatorze ans, pour les transporter hors de leur veue et conversation, en lieu où ils fussent instruits à nostre religion. Il dit que cet effect produisit un horrible spectacle: la naturelle affection d'entre les peres et enfants et

> de plus le zele à leur ancienne creance, combattant à l'encontre de cette violente ordonnance. Il fut veu communement des peres et meres se deffaisants eux mesmes: et, d'un plus rude exemple encore, precipitants par amour et compassion leurs jeunes enfans dans des puits pour fuir à la loy. (P262, V53–4)[32]
>
> [C] But finding his hopes deceived and the Jews determined to make the crossing, he withdrew two of the ports he had promised in order that the length and difficulty of the voyage would make them think again – or perhaps it was to pile them all together in one place so as the more easily to carry out his design, which was to tear all the children under fourteen from their parents and to transport them out of sight and out of contact, where they could be taught our religion. This deed is said to have produced a dreadful spectacle, as the natural love of parents and children together with their zeal for their ancient faith rebelled against this harsh decree: it was common to see fathers and mothers killing themselves or – an even harsher example – throwing their babes down wells out of love and compassion in order to evade that law. (S56)

This narrative works on its readers far beyond its place in the argument of the essay. It forces them to reflect on the appalling consequences of rational schemes based on assumptions of superiority. Admiration for the defiance of the (presumably protestant) martyrs in the first narrative here gives way to appalled despair (amplified by registering more of the details) at the King's treatment of his Jewish subjects.

Later in the same chapter much of Montaigne's reflection on the third of his recognized evils, poverty, takes the form of autobiography, comparing his attitudes to money at different stages of his life. In the second stage, he tells us, he practised economy and always made sure that he had savings. He relates his experience almost as a character description, imagining appropriate circumstances and feelings rather than describing actual ones.

> [B] Allois-je en voyage? il ne me sembloit estre jamais suffisament pourveu. Et plus je m'estois chargé de monnoye, plus aussi je m'estois chargé de crainte: tantost de la seurté des chemins, tantost de la fidelité de ceux qui conduisoyent mon bagage: duquel, comme d'autres que je cognois, je ne m'asseurois jamais assez si je ne l'avois devant mes yeux. Laissoy-je ma boyte chez moy? combien de soubçons et pensements

> espineux, et, qui pis est, incommunicables? J'avois tousjours l'esprit de ce costé. [C] Tout compté, il y a plus de peine à garder l'argent qu'à l'acquerir. [B] Si je n'en faisois du tout tant que j'en dis, au moins il me coustoit à m'empescher de le faire. De commodité, j'en tirois peu ou rien … Au paravant j'engageois mes hardes, et vendois un cheval avec bien moins de contrainte, et moins envys, que lors je ne faisois bresche à cette bource favorie, que je tenois à part. (V64–5, P274)

> [B] Was I setting out on a journey? I never thought I had made adequate provision. The heavier my money the heavier my worries, wondering as I did whether the roads were safe and then about the trustworthiness of the men in charge of my baggage; like others that I know I was only happy about it when I had it before my eyes. When I left my strong-box at home, what thoughts and suspicions I had, sharp thorny ones and, what is worse, ones I could tell nobody about. My mind forever dwelt on it. [C] When you tot it all up, there is more trouble in keeping money than in acquiring it. [B] And even if I did not actually do all I have just said, stopping myself from doing so cost me dear. I got little profit out of my savings … Formerly I would pawn my furniture and sell my horse far less unwillingly and with less regret than I would ever have made a breech in that beloved purse which I kept in reserve. (S68–9)

This story takes the essay in a wholly different direction to the previous one. Here he is amplifying a character which will serve as a negative model, giving the well-off practical and partly unexpected advice about the most advantageous attitude to money. Montaigne's dismaying self-portrait, exaggerated for effect in both aspects of the comparison, arouses his readers' amusement rather than their pity but it provides teaching which is directed to situations they might find themselves in rather than arousing a deeper but more remote compassion for the great wrongs of the world. These narratives contribute to the argumentative aim of the chapter but they make their deeper effects, so different as to be almost incompatible with each other, independently from the chapter to which they belong. It seems to me that an adequate reading of this chapter must be a reading in fragments, separating the emotional responses called up by these very different narratives from the overarching argument of the chapter.

The contribution which narrative techniques make to the realization of Montaigne's argumentative aims can be illustrated from *De mesnager sa* *volonté* (III, 10). At the beginning and end of this extract he describes two pairs of characters (two apparently selfless men, a soldier and an observer of the wars), three of whom he treats as having made mistaken choices. The purpose of the character evaluations is to support his own advocacy of a partly disengaged engagement with public life.

> [B] Comme qui oublieroit de bien et saintement vivre, et penseroit estre quitte de son devoir en y acheminant et dressant les autres, ce seroit un sot; tout de mesme, qui abandonne en son propre le sainement et gayement vivre pour en servir autruy, prent à mon gré un mauvais et desnaturé parti. Je ne veux pas qu'on refuse aux charges qu'on prend l'attention, les pas, les parolles, et la sueur et le sang au besoing:
>
> *non ipse pro charis amicis*
> *Aut patria timidus perire.*[33]
>
> Mais c'est par emprunt et accidentalement, l'esprit se tenant tousjours en repos et en santé, non pas sans action, mais sans vexation, sans passion … On faict pareilles choses avec divers efforts et differente contention de volonté. L'un va bien sans l'autre. Car combien de gens se hazardent tous les jours aux guerres, dequoy il ne leur chault, et se pressent aux dangers des battailles, desquelles la perte ne leur troublera pas le voisin sommeil? Tel en sa maison, hors de ce danger qu'il n'oseroit avoir regardé, est plus passionné de l'yssue de cette guerre et en a l'ame plus travaillée que n'a le soldat, qui y employe son sang et sa vie. J'ay peu me mesler des charges publiques sans me despartir de moy de la largeur d'une ongle, [C] et me donner à autruy sans m'oster à moy. (V1007, P1052–3)
>
> [B] For example, any man who forgot to live a good and holy life himself, but who thought that he had fulfilled his duties by guiding and training others to do so, would be stupid: in exactly the same way, any man who gives up a sane and happy life in order to provide one for others makes (in my opinion) a bad and unnatural decision. I have no wish that anyone should refuse to his tasks, when the need arises, his attention, his deeds, his words, or his sweat and blood:
>
> *non ipse pro charis amicis*
> *Aut patria timidus perire*

> But it will be in the form of an incidental loan, his mind meanwhile remaining quiet and sane – not without activity but without distress, without passion … With different efforts and different straining of our wills we achieve similar things. One thing does not imply the other: for how many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep: meanwhile another man in his own home and far from that danger (which he would never have dared to face) is more passionate about the outcome of the war, and has his soul in greater travail over it, than the soldier who is shedding his life-blood there. I have been able to engage in public duties without going even a nail's breadth from myself, [C] and to give myself to others without taking myself away from me. (S1138–9)

However logically paradoxical his own position at the end may seem, it is explained and justified by the contrast with the brief characterizations of examples to avoid. Living more like the soldier and less like the people who either disregard themselves or over-invest their anxieties in external events advocates an imagined way through the apparent contradiction between selfishness and altruism. *De l'art de conferer* offers some ideas on the effect of negative examples which explain Montaigne's use of stories of horror and torture in other chapters.[34]

> [B] Il en peut estre aucuns de ma complexion, qui m'instruis mieux par contrarieté que par similitude, et par fuite que par suite … L'horreur de la cruauté me rejecte plus avant en la clemence qu'aucun patron de clemence ne me sçauroit attirer. (V922, P966)

> [B] There may be others of my complexion who learn better by counter-example than by example, by eschewing not pursuing … My horror of cruelty drives me deeper into clemency than any example of clemency could ever draw me. (S1044–5)

Montaigne finds himself and others to be more strongly affected by negative examples partly because he believes that the emotions associated with horror and revulsion are stronger and partly because the times in which he lives (presumably he has in mind the wars of religion) provide examples which should be rejected rather than imitated. But in *De la phisionomie* he retells two of his civil war experiences at length in support of principles of prudent conduct and therefore as examples worthy of imitation.

One of his neighbours had planned to seize Montaigne's manor house by asking for refuge from pretended attackers there, gradually admitting more and more of his men. Montaigne began to become suspicious of his neighbour's intentions but he decided to go through with the pretence of welcoming him, since it would have been impossible to resist without destroying everything. When the neighbour has placed enough men inside Montaigne's gates to execute his plan, he decides not to do so, moved, as he later tells Montaigne by his welcoming and honest behaviour (V1060–1, P1107–8, S1202–3).

In the second story, the leader of the band of armed men, who, after tracking his journey for three days, capture him and place him under guard, in response to Montaigne's determined arguing over the ransom to be asked, decides to set him free and restore his possessions. He explained that he had done so because of Montaigne's appearance and because of the honesty and firmness of his speech (V1061–2, P1108–10, S1204–5)

Montaigne suggests that in both cases well-laid plans were spontaneously abandoned because of the plotters' reaction to his honest face and frank manner. In 1595 he draws from the first story the moral that as a general principle we should be more willing to trust the outcome of events to Heaven.[35] But in fact the reader is bound to notice a gap between the calculation of Montaigne's response in the first story and the apparent frankness and warmth of his welcome. Describing events (including his own thoughts) in detail allows the reader to ask how well the moral drawn really sums up the story. At the same time such stories about his own life increase readers' feelings of closeness to a writer whose reading and arguments they have already come to admire. To some extent the possibility that reader and writer might understand a given story differently enhances the feeling of close contact and sincerity. We even know the ways he would like to deceive himself. The popularity of autobiographical readings of the *Essais* confirms that the stories Montaigne tells about himself have a resonance for readers outside the role which each plays in the argumentative context of the individual chapter.

Narratives within a play have different effects from narratives in an essay for two main reasons. In the first place the dramatist has the option of presenting an action on stage or providing a character to narrate an action, where the essayist can only tell stories. Secondly the dramatist must always assign a narrative to one of the actors (who may, however, be a prologue or a chorus figure) and the narrative must usually be told to other characters, with the effect that questions are raised about the perspective from which a narrative is told and the character's motive for telling it to a particular audience. Essayists can raise some of these issues by attributing a narrative to someone else but often they tell a story in the same voice as the rest of the essay.

The narrative practices of Montaigne and Shakespeare may be compared in their approaches to atrocity stories. As we have seen, Montaigne sometimes tells stories involving cruelty or torture in great detail so as to arouse abhorrence in his readers and by a negative example to strengthen his own preference for compassion. Where cruelty forms an important part of the action Shakespeare usually places before the eyes of his audience either the events themselves or the disfigured bodies of their victims. This reflects a difference in the emotional economy of the two genres. In a play what you see is always more powerful than what is narrated, just as in a prose work events narrated in detail tend to be more affecting than examples simply referred to. But once an atrocity has taken place on stage (*e.g.*, the murders of Rutland and York in *Henry VI part three*, the murders of Macduff's family in *Macbeth*) it is often retold on stage by a character, usually with the aim of arousing the desire for revenge or of justifying a cruel act of revenge already committed. In *Titus Andronicus* Shakespeare shows that acts of cruelty can damage the moral judgement of the family member driven to take revenge (and so may induce a general hatred of cruelty in the audience) but in his plays the witnessing of cruelty rarely or never deters characters from inflicting it. This makes a very strong contrast with Montaigne where representations of cruelty are always a warning against man's inhumanity and a persuasion to restraint and compassion rather than revenge.

The connection between narrative and action can also be complicated or reversed. Actions in the play often present themselves as repetitions or variations of previous actions. In *The Tempest*, as Reuben Brower has shown, the plots against Ferdinand and Prospero can be regarded as re-enactments of the play's founding act of usurpation which Prospero narrates at the beginning of the play.[36] Characters in the history plays very often re-tell the events of previous plays in order to position themselves in the play's present or to draw conclusions about the most appropriate form of action. The theatre makes the audience question the understanding and motives of on-stage story-tellers. In the second scene of *The Tempest* Prospero delivers a long, interrupted narration of past events to enable Miranda and the audience to understand the events of the play, but the language in which he tells the story reveals to the audience both his anger and his incomplete and biased comprehension of those past events.

> Prospero ... Thy false uncle –
> Dost thou attend me?
> Miranda Sir, most heedfully.
> Prospero Being once perfected how to grant suits,
> How to deny them, who t'advance and who
> To trash for over-topping, new created
> The creatures that were mine, I say – or changed 'em
> Or else new formed 'em; having both the key
> Of officer and office, set all hearts i'th'state
> To what tune pleased his ear, that now he was
> The ivy which had hid my princely trunk
> And sucked my verdure out on't. Thou attend'st not!
> Miranda O good sir, I do.
> Prospero I pray thee mark me.
> I, thus neglecting worldly ends, all dedicated
> To closeness and to bettering of my mind
> With that which but by being so retired
> O'er-priced all popular rate, in my false brother
> Awaked an evil nature; and my trust,
> Like a good parent, did beget of him
> A falsehood, in its contrary as great
> As my trust was, which had indeed no limit,
> A confidence sans bound. (I.2.77–97)

Prospero's anxiety is betrayed by his reiterations, false starts and self-interruptions. He means to say that his brother's evil nature causes him to take advantage of Prospero's trust but the expression he chooses ('I ... in my false brother, awaked an evil nature') admits the responsibility for the usurpation that he is not yet consciously willing to allow. The facts of the narrative prompt the audience to wonder how Prospero expected to remain Duke if he had passed all the responsibilities of rule to his brother in order to spend his time in study.[37] Theatre audiences are especially open to devices which enable them to believe that they understand what is happening better than the characters on-stage. Usually an on-stage narrator unconsciously reveals to the audience his or her biases by the way he or she tells the story. Tubal's double narrative in *Merchant of Venice* (III.1.67–108) offers an interestingly self-conscious example of a narrative tailored to the reactions of its on-stage audience. Tubal interlaces stories about the disasters befalling Antonio's argosies, to which Shylock reacts with malicious satisfaction, with stories about Jessica's expenditure on her travels, which appal him. The audience soon realizes that Tubal enjoys pulling Shylock's emotions in opposite directions and this helps them temper their dislike of his joy in Antonio's misfortune with an understanding of Shylock as a victim of his own emotions.

In *Twelfth Night* II.4, Viola (as Cesario) tells Orsino two stories which the audience understands better than he does. Her avowal that her love (she allows Orsino to assume that this beloved is a woman) is of about Orsino's age and complexion draws from him first a conventional comment on age and then a more unexpected admission.

> ORSINO Too old, by heaven. Let still the woman take
> An elder than herself. So wears she to him;
> So sways she level in her husband's heart.
> For, boy, however we do praise ourselves
> Our fancies are more giddy and unfirm,
> More longing, wavering, sooner lost and worn
> Than women's are. (II.4.28–34)

After the song, when Viola tries to make him understand Olivia's rejection by imagining his own reaction to the advances of a woman he was unable to love, he rejects any such comparison, proudly (as well as self-contradictingly) insisting that no woman could love as deeply as he does. To his claim that women's love lacks constancy since it is no more than an appetite, Viola responds with another story.

> VIOLA Ay, but I know –
> ORSINO What dost thou know?
> VIOLA Too well what love women to men may owe.
> In faith, they are as true of heart as we.
> My father had a daughter loved a man
> As it might be, perhaps, were I a woman
> I should your lordship.
> ORSINO And what's her history?

> Viola A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
> But let concealment, like a worm i'th'bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek. She pined in thought,
> And with a green and yellow melancholy
> She sat like patience on a monument,
> Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?
> We men may say more, swear more, but indeed
> Our shows are more than will; for still we prove
> Much in our vows but little in our love.
> Orsino But died thy sister of her love, my boy? (302–18)

One effect of narrative in this scene is the comic exposure (to the audience, though not to himself) of Orsino's egotistical self-confidence and lack of true understanding. More seriously Viola's second narrative expresses, as well as her constancy in love, her inability to communicate her feelings (neatly illustrated by Orsino's inability to understand her overwhelming hints) and her anxiety about her future under that restriction. But the mode of narrative offers also a pin-prick of hope. Her enigmatic expression and the power of story-telling prompt Orsino to ask her what happened to her sister. Narratives in Shakespeare's plays force us to reflect on the motives of the teller and the reactions of the characters listening. Our reflections on the narrative scene prompt us to thoughts about the people on stage and about human behaviour more widely which argument could scarcely convey to us.

The relationship between story-telling and persuasion is almost an overt topic of *Othello*. Iago's reinterpretations of events keep Rodrigo conspiring for Desdemona's affection long after his cause is lost; Othello shows the Venetian court how his stories about his life won Desdemona's heart and they find them almost equally persuasive. At the centre of the play Iago uses a detailed narration of Cassio's sleep-talk to convince Othello that Desdemona has been unfaithful.[38] On discovering the depth of his error Othello reinterprets his story for another Venetian court, interrupting his narrative by re-enacting on himself the stab wound he tells them he inflicted on a Turk who maligned the Venetians.[39]

Shakespeare sometimes uses poetic narrative to achieve effects beyond the means of argument or dramatic representation. In the fourth scene of *Richard III* Clarence's dream recounts his unexpected death at the hands of his brother Richard, the pain of dying and the bitterness of the accusations of the spirits in the underworld, the tempest of his soul, more painful than the struggle of bodily death. It is the most striking poetic passage in the whole play and scholars have noted Shakespeare's incorporation of remembered fragments from Seneca's plays in his evocation of drowning and torment.[40] After Richard's jokes and Margaret's curses Shakespeare crucially depicts for us, through the prism of stoic dramatic poetry, what dying might feel like from the inside and what an individual might have to fear from it.

> O Lord! Methought what pain it was to drown,
> What dreadful noise of waters in my ears,
> What sights of ugly death within my eyes.
> Methoughts I saw a thousand fearful wrecks,
> Ten thousand men that fishes gnawed upon,
> Wedges of gold, great ouches,[41] heaps of pearl,
> Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels,
> All scattered in the bottom of the sea.
> Some lay in dead men's skulls, and in those holes
> Where eyes did once inhabit, there were crept –
> As 'twere in scorn of eyes – reflecting gems,
> Which wooed the slimy bottom of the deep
> And mocked the dead bones that lay scattered by.
> … often did I strive
> To yield the ghost but still the envious flood
> Stopped-in my soul and would not let it forth
> To find the empty, vast, and wand'ring air,
> But smothered it within my panting bulk,
> Who almost burst to belch it in the sea. (I.4.21–41)

Here poetry spoken by the imprisoned Clarence, whose death the audience knows to be at hand, presents to their imagination more than action or argument could achieve. The detailed linguistic portrayal of the useless wealth and abandoned skeletons, followed by the mystery of seeking to die but finding it so hard as to be almost impossible, fascinates and moves the hearer so powerfully that the dramatic situation of the speaker can add only a little to the effect. This is an example of Shakespeare using poetry in a way that is similar to Montaigne's strongest poetic quotations but more powerful because more extended and more tightly interwoven with the audience's response to the overarching narrative structure of the work.

In this chapter I have tried to show that both Montaigne and Shakespeare use the resources of rhetoric and dialectic to generate thought and discourse:

to amplify, to investigate, to question and to contradict. Both Montaigne's essays and Shakespeare's scenes (and even some speeches) can be understood as dialogues, often interior dialogues. The quality of the thinking (and the poetry) is a consequence of the skill and insistence with which Shakespeare and Montaigne ask questions, explore consequences, illuminate through comparisons and consider alternatives.

In Shakespeare the overall narrative of the play provides the starting point (and also the narrative end point) for the speeches of the characters, but even though his genre requires him to tell a story Shakespeare seriously engages other interests. He wants to explore the motives and feelings of different individuals. The force of his words is always visibly related to the person speaking and the on-stage listening audience. But the speaker's words are not only a representation of a character. Shakespeare also develops debates about ideas between individual voices with different experiences and intentions. His use of inset narratives allows the audience to think about stories, narrators and audiences. The different ways in which characters tell a story show the audience different responses to and uses of the same narrative. Sometimes the narrator's failure to communicate an implicit message reveals to the off-stage audience the limitations constraining teller and speaker. By comparing the words of different speakers the audience obtains food for reflection about particular characters and about human nature more generally.

For Montaigne narratives are usually subordinated to thought. Sometimes the narratives are examples to illustrate the truth of an already expressed moral axiom or conclusion from history or personal experience. At times the narrative supports the expression of a dissenting view; at times reflection on a narrative provokes new thoughts. But generally Montaigne regards his reflections on the implications of a narrative and the truth to experience of the derived lesson as more significant and more his own than the narrative, which is often drawn from his reading. At some important moments this scheme of values is reversed and the detailed re-telling of a story gives a special force to a chapter and to the whole book. While I tend to think of Montaigne's originality as expressed through his logical questioning and elaboration of expressed positions, the strongest emotional reactions and some of the most important lessons are provoked by narratives. Narratives (*e.g.*, about his attitudes to money) teach more vividly than precepts and sometimes the juxtaposition of narratives (as in his comparisons between different degrees of engagement) establishes and clarifies a position beyond the reach of logic.

5. History in Montaigne and Shakespeare

Ancient and modern historians were major sources for both Shakespeare and Montaigne. Montaigne's *Essais* probably originated in moral and political observations derived from his reading of historians. Throughout his writing life he re-read the historians, adding new examples and retelling stories from history both as evidence to support arguments and to move and please his audience. Shakespeare's reading of English chronicles and of Plutarch's *Lives* provided him with the main plot materials (and many scenes and sentences) for fifteen of his plays. Both Montaigne and Shakespeare thought deeply about the problems of writing and interpreting history. Earlier studies have analysed Montaigne's debts to historians and Shakespeare's contributions to historiography but both writers' use of history has not previously been compared.[1] I shall begin the chapter by looking at the way Montaigne uses two historians who were particularly important to him: Plutarch and Tacitus, with particular reference to *De l'utile et de l'honneste* (III, 1), the first half of which hinges on two examples from Tacitus. Turning to Shakespeare I shall discuss his use of his reading in planning and writing historical plays, his close observation of different kinds of political manoeuvring, his characters' retelling of history for political purposes and his presentation of views from below. Finally I shall compare Montaigne's and Shakespeare's approaches to issues raised by history: the use of exemplary figures, the question of providence, the attitude to war and the value of honour.

Montaigne often tells us that history is his favourite reading matter and the kind he would most recommend for the education of others. Among historians he especially likes Plutarch because Plutarch tells him about the internal motivation of the great men of the ancient world.[2]

> [A] Car j'ay une singuliere curiosité, comme j'ay dit ailleurs, de connoistre l'ame et les naïfs jugemens de mes autheurs. Il faut bien juger leur suffisance, mais non pas leurs moeurs ny eux, par ceste monstre de leurs escris qu'ils étalent au theatre du monde. J'ay mille fois regretté que nous ayons perdu le livre que Brutus avoit escrit de la vertu … Mais d'autant que c'est autre chose le presche que le prescheur, j'ayme bien autant voir Brutus chez Plutarque que chez luy mesme. Je choisiroy plustost de sçavoir au vray les devis qu'il tenoit en sa tente à quelqu'un de ses privez amis, la veille d'une bataille, que les propos qu'il tint le lendemain à son armée. (II, 10, V414–5, P435–6)

> [A] For as I have said elsewhere I am uniquely curious about my author's soul and native judgement. By what their writings display when they are paraded in the theatre of the world we can indeed judge their talents, but we cannot judge them as men nor their morals. I have regretted hundreds of times that we have lost the book which Brutus wrote about virtue … yet seeing that the preacher and the preaching are two different things, I am just as happy to see Brutus in Plutarch as in a book of his own. I would rather have a true account of his chat with his private friends in his tent on the eve of battle than the oration which he delivered next morning to his army. (S465)

Plutarch himself suggests that the focus of his interest is the same in his preface to the parallel lives of Alexander and Julius Caesar. He asks the reader's indulgence for failing to record all their great achievements. Because he is writing about the kind of men they were he may find less interest in their most brilliant exploits, which

> often tell us nothing of the virtues and vices of the men who performed them, while on the other hand a chance remark or a joke may reveal far more of a man's character than the mere feat of winning battles in which thousands fall, or of marshalling great armies, or laying siege to cities … it is my task to dwell upon those actions which illuminate the workings of the soul, and by this means to create a portrait of each man's life. I leave the story of his greatest struggles and achievements to be told by others.[3]

Although Pelling has recently argued that the lives in which the character of the hero is the dominant explanatory feature are untypical of the whole work,[4] it was Plutarch's analysis and judgement of his subjects' characters which most appealed to Montaigne.

Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* are very varied in approach and content. Some of the variations reflect differences in the sources available to Plutarch, others represent his artistic choices about the most effective way to shape his material. The largest component in all the lives is a narrative of the hero's political and military career, often organized to suggest alternation between periods of success and failure. Sometimes his account of the career is organized more to provide evidence for an analysis of character than to represent the chronological sequence in detail.[5] Generally, where Plutarch's sources permit,[6] the *Lives* also contain stories of the hero's childhood and private life, intended to reveal his character in a nutshell. In some cases there is a conscious posing of the inherited nature of the person, as indicated by his family and childhood, against the rational development of virtuous characteristics through education and deliberate habituation.[7] The *Lives* usually include a number of striking or characteristic sayings of the hero, intended to provide a pithy summation of his views (and sometimes of contemporary opinions about him). The best of the *Lives* characteristically include vivid descriptions and developed narratives (often including direct speech) of significant scenes in the hero's life. For example there are dramatic accounts of the murder of Julius Caesar, of Antony's speech at his funeral and of Antony's own death. For some readers these great scenes are the most impressive thing about the whole work. Plutarch must have allowed himself considerable freedom of invention in the dramatization of such scenes. Sometimes, too, he includes received stories whose veracity he doubts on chronological grounds but which he approves because they correspond so closely to the manners and nature of the people described.[8] Almost all the lives also contain shorter sections in which Plutarch gives free rein to his usual intellectual interests, discussing religious or cultural customs,[9] mentioning and analysing references to the hero in comedy or parallels with Homer,[10] analysing phenomena of the physical world or discussing philosophical opinions.[11] Most of the *Lives* also include moral commentary on the hero, using ethical categories to explain the actions of the hero and to judge him. For the most part Plutarch expects the great lives he describes to encourage emulation,[12] but the moral commentary also provides more general reflections which instruct the reader in the nature and consequences of human behaviour. Plutarch offers these comments near the beginning of *Coriolanus*.

> His example shows us that the loss of a father, even though it may impose other disadvantages on a boy, does not prevent him from living a virtuous or distinguished life ... On the other hand this same Gaius Marcius's career bears witness to the truth of the view that a naturally generous and noble disposition, if it lacks discipline, will produce both good and evil fruits at once ... Coriolanus's energy of mind and strength of purpose constantly led him to attempt ambitious exploits, the results of which were momentous for Rome, but those qualities were combined with a violent temper and an uncompromising self-assertion, which made it difficult for him to co-operate with others. People could admire his indifference to hardship,

> to pleasure and to the temptations of money, which they dignified by the names of courage, moderation and probity, but when he displayed the same qualities in his dealings with his fellow-citizens, they were offended and found him harsh, ungracious and overbearing. (*Coriolanus* 1)
>
> It would seem that to win distinction and high honours too early in life is apt to stifle the ambitions of young men in whom the desire to excel does not go very deep, for then their thirst or appetite for fame, never very intense, is quickly satisfied. But for those strong-willed spirits, with whom ambition is already a ruling passion, the honours they receive serve only to spur them to greater efforts … But while other men displayed their courage to win glory for themselves, Marcius's motive was always to please his mother. The delight that she experienced when she saw him crowned, and the tears of joy that she wept as she embraced him, these things were for him the supreme joy and felicity that life could offer. (*Coriolanus* 4)[13]

These comments are all derived from Coriolanus's life but they use him as an exemplification of broadly applicable moral lessons as much as they seek to explain his conduct by reference to general human characteristics. Some of the characteristic components of the *Lives*, as well as the specific content of some of them, have much in common with Plutarch's *Moralia*, but the aim and narrative shape of the *Lives* enable them to preserve a unity over and above the apparent digressions. The *Lives* also give more prominent opportunities for Plutarch to display his talents for description and vivid narration.

Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* provided Montaigne both with important programmatic encouragement and with narratives and sayings which he could re-use. Montaigne particularly praised the comparisons at the end of each pair of lives (' in these comparisons, which are the most admirable part of the work …, the faithfulness and purity of his judgements equals their weight and profundity'),[14] though he makes relatively little direct use of them.[15] Most importantly Plutarch encouraged Montaigne in his task of understanding and judging human behaviour. Some of Montaigne's specific judgements were taken over from Plutarch, for example his repeated denunciations of Caesar's 'pernicious ambition'[16] and this view of Alcibiades.

> [A] J'ay souvent remarqué avec grande admiration la merveilleuse nature d'Alcibiades, de se transformer si aisément à façons si diverses,

> sans interest de sa santé: surpassant tantost la somptuosité et pompe Persienne, tantost l'austerité et frugalité Lacedemonienne; autant reformé en Sparte comme voluptueux en Ionie. (I, 26, V167, P174)[17]
>
> [A] I have often noted with great astonishment the extraordinary character of Alcibiades who, without impairing his health, could so easily adapt to diverse manners: at times he could out-do the Persians in pomp and luxury; at others, Spartans in austerity and frugal living. He was a reformed man in Sparta, yet equally pleasure-seeking in Ionia. (S187)

Here Montaigne sees Alcibiades's adaptability as an indication of self-mastery of the kind he would like a pupil to have. He may also have remembered Erasmus's comments on Alcibiades in his adage on the polyp. It is even possible that Montaigne's own much more frequent reference to his personal opinions may have been encouraged by Plutarch's occasional use of his own voice to underline a view which he held strongly but believed not to be widely shared, as in this comment on the elder Cato.

> For my own part I regard his conduct towards his slaves in treating them like beasts of burden, exploiting them to the limits of their strength, and then, when they were old, driving them off and selling them, as the mark of a thoroughly ungenerous nature, which cannot recognize any bond between man and man but that of necessity ... For my part, I would not sell even my draught ox simply because of his age, far less turn out an old man from the home and the way of life to which he has grown accustomed for the sake of a few paltry coins.[18]

Montaigne often takes sayings of famous men from Plutarch's *Lives*, as when he quotes Cato on the benefits wise men draw from fools,[19] or when Antony said that the greatness of the Roman people was revealed not by what they took but by what they gave away.[20] This is the normal use which Renaissance schoolboys were encouraged to make of their reading. We could say the same of Montaigne's extensive use of exempla from the *Lives* to provide evidence in support of his arguments. At the end of *De la coustume* (I, 23) the argument that in times of great necessity the laws may have to be forced to one's will is supported by a series of examples from the *Lives of Agesilaus*, *Alexander*, *Lysander*, *Pericles* and *Philipoemen*.[21] Sometimes Montaigne retells a story from Plutarch at some length in order to register the nature and meaning of an action as well as its mere fact, as when he uses this story taken from Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* to illustrate a better response to the danger of assassination than suspicion and pre-emptive violence.

> [B] Ce qu'Alexandre representa bien plus vivement par effect, et plus roidement, quand, ayant eu advis par un lettre de Parmenion, que Philippus, son plus cher medecin, estoit corrumpu par l'argent de Darius pour l'empoisonner, en mesme temps qu'il donnoit à lire sa lettre à Philippus, il avala le bruvage qu'il luy avoit presenté. Fut-ce pas exprimer cette resolution, que, si ses amis le vouloient tuer, il consentoit qu'ils le peussent faire? Ce prince est le souverain patron des actes hazardeux; mais je ne sçay s'il y a traict en sa vie, qui ayt plus de fermeté que cestuy-cy, ny un beauté illustre par tant de visages. (I, 24, V129, P133–4)

> [B] Alexander acted this out even more clearly and rigorously. When he received a letter from Parmenion warning him that his beloved doctor Philip had been suborned by money from Darius to poison him, he handed the letter to Philip to read and, at the same time, swallowed down the medicine that he had just handed to him. Was he not showing his resolve to abet his friends if they wished to kill him? This prince is the supreme example of daring deeds, but I doubt whether there is anything in his whole life which showed a firmer resolve than this nor a beauty shimmering with such lustre. (S145)

Plutarch tells the story with far more circumstantial detail and drama (*Alexander*, 19); Montaigne recounts the most significant facts but lays the emphasis on interpreting the significance of Alexander's actions. Montaigne's praise of Alexander's trust here is all the more striking since in *De l'inconstance* (in a passage also added in 1588) he criticizes Alexander for worrying too much over suspicions that his men were plotting against him and for conducting investigations into their plots with an injustice which revealed his fear.[22] Usually Montaigne's retelling of a story is abbreviated in comparison with the version in Plutarch. Conversely the stories which Montaigne retells at length with dramatic embellishment generally come from his own experience, chronicles or recent history rather than from Plutarch. When he mentions the famous climactic scenes from Plutarch he never retells them vividly or at length. Montaigne also uses Plutarch as a source of historical information or in order to explain Roman or Spartan customs.[23] With some of the great figures of antiquity who particularly interested him, such as Caesar, Alexander and Cato the younger, Montaigne read Plutarch alongside other sources. Because of his training Montaigne used Plutarch's *Lives* mainly as a resource of stories, sayings and moral ideas from which he could take fragments appropriate to the argument he was trying to construct. A few of the less developed chapters from 1580 show Montaigne using selections from Plutarch as the basis from which his own thinking would develop.

At the end of *De l'art de conferer* (III, 8) Montaigne writes three discriminating pages of praise and analysis of Tacitus, whose history he has just read through completely, contrary to his normal practice of dipping in and out of books, on the advice of a nobleman famous for his virtue and ability, probably Louis de Foix.[24]

> [B] Je ne sçache point d'autheur qui mesle à un registre public tant de consideration des moeurs et inclinations particulieres … Cette forme d'Histoire est de beaucoup la plus utile. Les mouvemens publics dependent plus de la conduicte de la fortune, les privez de la nostre. C'est plustot un jugement que deduction d'histoire; il y a plus de preceptes que de contes. Ce n'est pas un livre à lire, c'est un livre à estudier et apprendre; il est si plein de sentences qu'il y en a à tort et à droict: c'est une pepiniere de discours ethiques et politiques, pour la provision et ornement de ceux qui tiennent quelque rang au maniement du monde. Il plaide tousjours par raisons solides et vigoureuses, d'une façon poinctue et subtile, suyvant le stile affecté du siecle. (V940–1, P986).

> [B] I know of no author who combines a chronicle of public events with so much reflection on individual morals and biases … This manner of history is by far the most useful. The unrolling of public events depends more on the guiding hand of fortune: that of private ones, on our own. Tacitus's work is more a judgement on historical events than a narration of them. There are more precepts than stories. It is not a book to be read but one to be studied and learnt. It is so full of aphorisms that, apposite or not, they are everywhere. It is a seed-bed of ethical and political arguments to supply and adorn those who hold high rank in the governing of this world. He pleads his case with solid and vigorous reasons, in an epigrammatic and exquisite style following the affected manner of his century. (S1065–6)

Montaigne praises Tacitus's subject matter for its combination of public and private interest as much as his style. He admires Tacitus's judgements, the ethical and political lessons he draws so astutely and expresses so pithily that later governors can easily remember and reuse them. Montaigne also expresses a few reservations about Tacitus's literary choices and about his judgements but he defends him against moderns who have attacked his disparagement of Christianity and he believes (rather in the manner of Bodin) that the fact that his narratives do not entirely fit with his more consciously decisive judgements proves that they are essentially reliable.[25] Some of Montaigne's praise suggests that Tacitus is the kind of writer that he himself would like to be and it is noticeable how easily he shifts from discussing Tacitus's work to describing his own. Montaigne uses material from every surviving book of Tacitus's *Annals* and *Histories*. He draws on them alongside other historians in the lists of examples of suicides (II, 3) and attempts at suicide which required assistance from others (II, 13). Sometimes Montaigne researches Tacitus as a source for the topic of a particular essay, for example on Seneca (II, 32) and his wife Paulina (II, 35) where for two pages he retells the story of their joint deaths from *Annals* XV, 57–64.

The first half of *De l'utile et de l'honneste* (III, 1) is hinged on two examples from Tacitus. In the first which Montaigne retells very briefly, putting the emphasis on the emperor's *sententia* rather than on the story, Tiberius refuses an offer to poison the troublesome German chieftain Ariminius on the grounds that 'the Roman people were in the habit of avenging themselves sword in hand, by overt means not by trickery'.[26] Montaigne uses this example as the basis for an argument from lesser to greater. If even the hypocritical Tiberius prefers the honourable to the expedient, how much more strongly should we do so. This leads Montaigne to a personal rejection of *politique* behaviour. Even though vices like ambition, jealousy and vengeance are part of human nature, even though in all states there are vicious duties which need to be performed, he declines to become involved in this type of action.

> [B] S'ils deviennent excusables, d'autant qu'ils nous font besoing et que la necessité commune efface leur vraye qualité, il faut laisser jouer cette partie aux citoyens plus vigoureux et moins craintifs qui sacrifient leur honneur et leur conscience, comme ces autres anciens sacrifierent leur vie pour le salut de leur pays; nous autres, plus foibles, prenons des rolles et plus aisez et moins hazardeux. Le bien public requiert qu'on trahisse

> et qu'on mente [C] et qu'on massacre; [B] resignons cette commission à gens plus obeissans et plus soupples. (V791, P830)

> [B] If [vicious deeds] were to become excusable insofar as we have need of them, necessity effacing their true qualities we must leave this role to be played by citizens who are more vigorous and less timorous, those prepared to sacrifice their honour and their consciences, as men of yore once sacrificed their lives, for the well-being of their country. Men like me are too weak for that: we accept roles which are easier and less dangerous. The public interest requires men to betray, to tell lies [C] and to massacre; [B] let us assign that commission to such as are more obedient and more pliant. (S892)

His apparently modest refusal of this role (he vacillates between depicting those who will take it on as more self-sacrificingly heroic and more flexibly subservient) is then balanced by an assertion of the plain uprightness of the way he conducts himself in political negotiations (presumably he is referring to his role as an envoy between Henry of Navarre and Henry III). The next story from Tacitus, told at more length but still greatly abbreviated from the original, shows Tiberius using an unusual kind of diplomacy to defuse an awkward moral and political dilemma.

> [B] Mais continuons nostre exemple de la trahison. Deux pretendans au Royaume de Thrace estoyent tombez en debat de leurs droicts. L'Empereur les empescha de venir aux armes; mais l'un d'eux, sous couleur de conduire un accord amiable par leur entreveue, ayant assigné son compagnon pour le festoyer en sa maison, le fit emprisonner et tuer. La justice requeroit que les Romains eussent raison de ce forfaict; la difficulté en empeschoit les voyes ordinaires: ce qu'ils ne peurent legitimement sans guerre et sans hazard, ils entreprindrent de le faire par trahison. Ce qu'ils ne peurent honnestement, ils le firent utilement. A quoy se trouva propre un Pomponius Flaccus; cettuy-ci, soubs feintes parolles et asseurances, ayant attiré cet homme dans ses rets, au lieu de l'honneur et faveur qu'il lui promettoit, l'envoya pieds et poings liez à Romme. Un traistre y trahit l'autre, contre l'usage commun; car ils sont pleins de deffiance, et est mal-aysé de les surprendre par leur art: tesmoing la poisante experience que nous venons d'en sentir. (V796, P836)[27]

> [B] But let us get on with exemplifying treachery. Two pretenders to the throne of Thrace had fallen into a quarrel over their claims. The Emperor stopped their coming to blows; but one of them, under the pretext of a meeting to establish loving harmony between them, arranged for his rival to feast in his house; he then had him imprisoned and killed. Justice required that the Romans should avenge this crime, but difficulties lay in doing so in the normal way: what the Romans could not legally achieve without the hazard of war they therefore undertook to do by treachery. They could not do so 'honourably' but they did so 'usefully'. A certain Pomponius Flaccus was deemed the very man for the job; he ensnared that other pretender with feigned words and assurances and, instead of the honour and favour which he promised him, he dispatched him to Rome bound hand and foot. Here we have one traitor betraying another, which goes against the usual pattern, for traitors are full of mistrust and it is hard to catch them out by cunning like their own – witness the painful experience which we have just had. (S898)

Tacitus had introduced this story as an example of Tiberius's cunning, but he also emphasizes the treachery of Rhescuporis, whom Augustus had installed in one half of Thrace, leaving the rest to Cotys. Rhescuporis's encroachments on Cotys's half are all represented by Tacitus as successes of cunning over credulity. When he is summoned to Rome for imprisoning his nephew, he decides that it would be better to kill him. Tacitus emphasizes Tiberius's cunning in choosing Pomponius Flaccus as an envoy 'chiefly because that veteran campaigner was a friend of the king, and, as such, the better adapted to deceive him', and describes how the military escort which at first looked like a sign of honour became more openly coercive at each stage of the journey to Rome.[28] But in Tacitus's hands the story can still be read as a cunning (and bloodless) solution to an apparently intractable problem. Montaigne's abbreviations of the story, his descriptive vocabulary ('trahison', 'soubs feintes parolles et asseurances ayant attiré … dans ses rets') and his choice of descriptive details (' pieds et poings liez') put almost all the emphasis on the treachery of Pomponius Flaccus. Even though the treachery in this story is successful, Montaigne's reaction is to reiterate his refusal of such tasks. He then argues for the prudence of this position by giving examples of treacherous servants who were punished by the princes who benefited from their treachery.

These examples lead Montaigne to two further reflections: that there are times when it is better to die than save your life by obeying immoral commands and that princes, unlike private persons, may sometimes find themselves in situations where the good of the state obliges them to act immorally.

> [B] Le Prince, quand une urgente circonstance et quelque impetueux et inopiné accident du besoing de son estat luy faict gauchir sa parolle et sa foy, ou autrement le jette hors de son devoir ordinaire, doibt attribuer cette necessité à un coup de la verge divine: vice, n'est-ce pas, car il a quitté sa raison a une plus universelle et puissante raison, mais certes c'est malheur. De maniere qu'à quelqu'un qui me demandoit: Quel remede? – Nul remede, fis-je, s'il fut veritablement gehenné entre ces deux extremes … il le falloit faire; mais s'il le fit sans regret, s'il ne luy greva de le faire, c'est signe que sa conscience est en mauvais termes. (V799, P840)[29]

> [B] As for a prince, whenever some urgent necessity or some violent unforeseeable event affecting the needs of his State obliges him to go back on his pledged word, or otherwise forces him from the ordinate path of duty, he must consider it as a scourging from God; vice it is not, for he has abandoned his own right reason for a more powerful universal one, but it is indeed a calamity. So when I was asked, 'What remedy is there?', I replied, 'None: if the prince was really torn between those two extremes, … then he had to do it; but if he had no regrets about doing it, if it did not weigh upon him, then that is a sign that his conscience has gone astray'. (S902)

The question of the relationship between private good and public necessity is then explored through two further examples from Plutarch: Timoleon (added in C), whose agonized decision to kill his brother because he was a tyrant is eventually vindicated by the justice and prudence of his other decisions, and Epaminondas, who as far as possible refused to do evil, even in battle or when securing the liberty of his people. This leads to quotations from Livy, Ovid and Cicero to the effect that neither civil war nor the national interest overrides individual rights and duties. The chapter concludes with two more examples from Tacitus to illustrate the decline of morality in extended periods of civil war.

> [B] Combien peut le temps et l'exemple! En une rencontre de la guerre Civile contre Cynna, un soldat de Pompeius, ayant tué sans y penser son frere qui estoit au party contraire, se tua sur le champ soy-mesme de honte et de regret, et, quelques années apres, en une autre guerre civile de ce mesme peuple, un soldat, pour avoir tué son frere, demanda recompense à ses capitaines. (V803, P844)[30]

> [B] Think what examples can do over time! In an engagement against Cinna during the Civil War, one of Pompey's soldiers unintentionally killed his brother on the other side; from shame and sorrow he killed himself there and then on the field; yet a few years later in another Civil War between the same nations, a soldier killed his brother and then asked his officers for a reward for doing so. (S906)

Tacitus puts these two examples together and draws very much the same moral. It is just possible that the same passage from Tacitus suggested Shakespeare's episode of the son who kills his father in *Henry VI part three*, II.5. This is one of only two possible cases of Shakespeare using Tacitus, but the play is too early for Shakespeare to have taken the story from Montaigne.[31] While *De l'utile et de l'honneste* includes observations on public morality and fascinating stories about Montaigne's conduct in the Wars of Religion, the major thinking of the essay is provoked by analysis of examples taken from historians.

Whereas historical examples drive the thought and structure of *De l'utile et de l'honneste*, history is not an important motivating force for *De la vanité* (III, 9), but two stories from history support the arguments, making them more memorable and affecting. In a passage of the essay in which, thinking of the wars of religion, he argues that all states ought to retain their established forms of government, he produces an aphorism.

> [B] Rien ne presse un estat que l'innovation: le changement donne seul forme à l'injustice et à la tyrannie. (V958, P1002)

> [B] Nothing crushes a state save novelty; change alone provides the mould for injustice and tyranny. (S1084)

First he develops this idea to suggest that all attempts at cure result in destruction and to attack those who wish to undertake change at such a cost. The 1595 edition adds a comparison with surgery. The surgeon not only cuts out what is rotten but he also helps what is sound to grow back and restore the limb. In political terms this means not merely removing the evil (as Brutus thought he was doing when he killed Caesar) but providing for a cure, which, he suggests, will usually be beyond advocates of political change. These reflections are then illustrated by a story from Livy.

> [C] Toutes grandes mutations esbranlent l'estat et le desordonnent. Qui viseroit droit à la guarison et en consulteroit avant toute oeuvre se refroidiroit volontiers d'y mettre la main. Pacuvius Calavius corrigea le vice de ce proceder par un exemple insigne. Ses concitoyens estoient mutinez contre leurs magistrats. Luy, personnage de grande authorité en la ville de Capoue, trouva un jour moyen d'enfermer le Senat dans le Palais et, convoquant le peuple en la place, leur dict que le jour estoit venu auquel en pleine liberté ils pouvoient prendre vengeance des tyrans qui les avoyent si long temps oppressez, lesquels il tenoit à sa mercy seuls et desarmez. Fut d'avis qu'au sort on les tirast hors, l'un apres l'autre, et de chacun on ordonnast particulierement, faisant sur le champ executer ce qui en seroit decreté, pourveu aussi que tout d'un train ils advisassent d'establir quelque homme de bien en la place du condamné, affin qu'elle ne demeurast vuide d'officier. Ils n'eurent pas plus tost ouy le nom d'un Senateur qu'il s'esleva un cri de mescontentement universel à l'encontre de luy. Je voy bien, dict Pacuvius, il faut demettre cettuy-cy: c'est un meschant; ayons en un bon en change. Ce fut un prompt silence, tout le monde se trouvant empesché au choix; au premier plus effronté qui dit le sien, voylà un consentement de voix encore plus grand à refuser celuy là, cent imperfections et justes causes de le rebuter. Ces humeurs contradictoires s'estans eschauffées, il advint encore pis du second Senateur, et du tiers: autant de discorde à l'election que de convenance à la demission. S'estans inutilement lassez à ce trouble, ils commencent, qui deçà qui delà, à se desrober peu à peu de l'assemblée, rapportant chacun cette resolution en son ame que le plus vieil et mieux cogneu mal est tousjours plus supportable que le mal recent et inexperimenté. (V958–9, P1003)

> [C] All great revolutions convulse the state and cause disorder. Anyone who was aiming straight for a cure, and would reflect about it before anything was done, would soon cool his ardour for setting his hand to it. Pacuvius Calavius corrected that defective procedure, so providing

> a memorable example. His fellow-citizens had revolted against their magistrates. He was an important man with great authority in his city of Capua. One day he found the means of locking the Senate in their palace; calling the citizens together in the market-place he told them that the time had come when they were fully at liberty to take their revenge on the tyrants who had so long oppressed them. He had those tyrants in his power, disarmed and isolated. His advice was that they should summon each of them out one at a time by lots, decide what should be done to each of them and immediately carry out the sentence, provided that they should at the same time decide to put some honourable man in the place of the man they had condemned so that the office should not remain unfilled. No sooner had they heard the name of the first senator than there arose shouts of universal disapproval. 'Yes, I can see', said Pacuvius, 'that we shall have to get rid of that one. He is a wicked man. Let us put a good man in his place'. An immediate silence fell, everyone being embarrassed over whom to choose. When the first man was rash enough to name his choice there was an even greater consensus of voices yelling out a hundred defects and just causes for rejecting him. As those opposing humours became inflamed the second and third senators fared even worse, with as much discord over the elections as agreement over the rejections. Having uselessly exhausted themselves in this quarrel they gradually began to slip this way and that out of the meeting, each going off convinced in his mind that an older better-known evil is more bearable than a new and untried one. (S1085–6)

Montaigne uses the story as a parable against change. The populace could agree on the people it rejected but found that anyone presented in their place was so unacceptable to some of them as to make agreement on a replacement impossible. Montaigne regards the discord greeting each new name as more damaging to them (and to the state as a whole) than the universal disapproval is to the existing senators. The illogicality of his position (that someone universally hated should be preferred to someone hated by a proportion of the people) reveals the strength of his distaste for change (and perhaps for democracy). In retelling the story this way Montaigne has also had to suppress important aspects of Livy's original.[32] Livy made it clear from the start that Pacuvius's proposal was a trick designed to make him unchallengeable within the city. He persuaded the senate to let him lock them in their chamber by saying that he had a stratagem which would save their position if they left everything to him. Livy calls him a bad man (*improbus homo*) and introduces the story by saying that he had 'started on a plan to save the senate and at the same time make it submissive to himself and the common people' (*rationem initiit qua et senatum servaret et obnoxium sibi ac plebi faceret*). At the end of the story he says that Pacuvius has made the senate subservient to him and now rules unchallenged as all give way to him. In many chapters Montaigne would be opposed both to someone who aimed at complete domination of a state and to anyone who used a trick to achieve his purposes, but here the force of the story as a memorable example of a principle he endorsed overrode any impetus to criticize Pacuvius's behaviour.

Shakespeare either invented or contributed to the establishment of the Renaissance genre of the English history play, to which he devoted more than a third of his plays.[33] His principal sources for the sequence of ten English and four Roman histories (and for some of the tragedies) were Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland*, in the second edition of 1587, augmented by Francis Thynne, Abraham Fleming and John Stow,[34] and Plutarch's *Lives* in the translation of Thomas North, based on Amyot's French translation, using either the first edition of 1579 or the second of 1595.[35] In addition to these sources Shakespeare consulted for particular plays other chronicles and ancient historians, earlier plays and poetic treatments of the material.

Shakespeare uses his historical sources to establish a structure for the play, for outlines of individual scenes and characters, and for narrative details and phrases which he incorporates in speeches. At the structural level he adds to the narrative derived from the sources to clarify the shape and to introduce dramatic confrontations. At the local level almost anything from the source may stick in his mind for reuse in the actual writing of the play. For example Samuel Daniel's *First Four Books of the Civil Wars* suggests a soliloquy for Richard II, which Shakespeare writes in a different way, but he uses the ideas expressed in Daniel's soliloquy in writing the dialogue for the meeting between Richard and Isabella in V.1.[36]

Holinshed's *Chronicle*, like other English printed chronicles of the sixteenth century, was a compilation based on the work of earlier writers, drawing especially (for the reigns from Richard II to Henry VIII) on Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia* (Basel, 1534), a manuscript of Sir Thomas More's unfinished *Life of Richard III*,[37] and Edward Hall's *The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancaster and York* (1548), also known as his *Chronicle*. More narrates Richard III's usurpation of the throne in a sequence of brightly depicted scenes and polished speeches. He presents Richard as a ruthless and devious manipulator like the Tiberius of Tacitus's *Annals*.[38] Hall's *Chronicle* combines materials derived from medieval chronicles with the humanist tradition of historiography, including invented speeches for the principal characters, moral exclamations from the author, proverbs, character sketches and rhetorical flourishes but also extracts from documents, comparisons of versions of events and attempts to assign causes. At times Hall presents a providential pattern of English history from the deposition of Richard II to the accession of Edward VI,[39] but he also offers criticism of Richard and non-providential explanations, and records many events which make no contribution to this pattern. For the reign of Richard III Hall copied More's manuscript as far as it lasted (just past the coronation) and chronicle materials thereafter. Holinshed relies very heavily on Hall but he often omits the speeches and usually reduces the exclamations and interpretations. He and his augmenters frequently add further documents, new information and local events from other chronicles. In Holinshed there is much less sense of a governing pattern to the whole history. Holinshed absorbs More and Hall without obliterating their more distinctive voices.[40]

Shakespeare usually supplemented Holinshed with other sources. For example for *Henry VI part two* he must have used Hall and Grafton for incidents not mentioned in Holinshed.[41] Although the sources provide the main events of the play Shakespeare usually alters them to simplify the pattern of rises and falls of different characters and to establish characters early in the play. He may have derived this pattern of rising and falling from the *Mirror for Magistrates* or he may have introduced it because it suited theatrical presentation.[42] Thus, although More provides many details for the scenes which portray the tyrannized society,[43] the real excitement of *Richard III* derives from the scenes Shakespeare invents at the beginning to establish the character of Richard. Where More condemns Richard and jokes at his expense, Shakespeare's Richard confides his own ruthless and hypocritical stratagems to the audience, making his own jokes about his ironic kindnesses to his victims (I.1.119–20, 154–6).

Shakespeare typically builds up the women's roles and invents scenes of family and domestic life, as in his elaboration of Margaret in *Henry VI part two* and of the Yorkist Queens in *Richard III*. Shakespeare makes a major change to the chronicles in placing the fall of Dame Eleanor, wife of Duke Humphrey, after the negotiations for Henry VI's marriage instead of before.[44] This move allows him to introduce a wider social range of characters (the magician, the witch and the devil), to introduce an unhistorical but dramatically rewarding rivalry between Eleanor and Margaret, and to dramatize Humphrey's moderation in the domestic as well as the political sphere. In his adaptation of the outline of *Henry IV part one*, whose political plot derives mainly from Holinshed's narrative as selected by Samuel Daniel,[45] Shakespeare introduces a major comic strand to the play (I.2, II.1–2, II.4, III.3), richly inventing material to illustrate the legendary madcap youth of Henry V. He based some of this material, especially relating to the robbery and tavern life, on the anonymous play *The Famous Victories of Henry V*, which he may have seen in a version different from that first printed in 1598. He elaborated this comedy to the point where celebrating tavern merriment became a major purpose of the play, fuelled by his invention of the character of Falstaff. Shakespeare linked the comic plot to the political narrative by developing the theme of the education of Hal, by making Hal and Falstaff rehearse Hal's meeting with his father, and by bringing Falstaff and Bardolph from Eastcheap to the battle of Shrewsbury. Shakespeare further adds scenes which establish the major characters and groupings early in the play and which provide a domestic life for the rebels, which again serves as a contrast to Hal's private life.

When Shakespeare turns to Plutarch he finds already there much of the personal and domestic material he earlier had to invent. Plutarch provided him with the kind of history he had previously composed for himself. For *Julius Caesar* (1599) Shakespeare read North's translation of Plutarch's lives of Antony, Brutus and Caesar. His reading in Plutarch prompted his decision to base the play around two major scenes which Plutarch describes in detail, the murder of Julius Caesar and the defeat of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi. Plutarch provided Shakespeare with the main outline of the story, with many of the scenes he dramatized and with an extraordinary number of arguments, narratives, names and phrases. It seems that Shakespeare went out of his way to include additional details from Plutarch, even when they might seem to raise a side-issue.[46] Scenes which one would normally think of as typical of the additions Shakespeare makes to history, for example dramatizing Portia's concern to be taken into her husband Brutus's confidence or the lynching by the crowd of the wrong Cinna, turn out to have been taken directly from Plutarch. Shakespeare makes some additions to Plutarch's account of Brutus's domestic life, building up the character of the young servant Lucius, to whose need for sleep Brutus is at times sensitive. He also establishes the tribunes at the beginning of the play so that they can serve as an image of the suppression of republican Rome. At the same time he undercuts any such claims by portraying their bullying imposition of a Pompeyan perspective on the common people of Rome, who may well be more attuned to Caesar and Antony.

As in *Henry VI part two* Shakespeare organized the play around a set of rises and falls: the fall of Caesar, the rise and fall of Brutus and Cassius and the questionable rise of Antony and Octavius. The play is articulated in four large movements: the preparation of the conspiracy; the murder of Julius Caesar; the funeral orations, which reverse the fortunes of the conspirators; and the battle of Philippi, with the deaths of Brutus and Cassius. In each half of the play Shakespeare places a major scene of confrontation between Brutus and Cassius: Cassius's temptation of Brutus (I.2) and their quarrel near Sardis and its resolution (IV.3). Shakespeare develops both scenes on the basis of Plutarch's descriptions.

In selecting and adapting material from Plutarch Shakespeare takes particular care to create characterizations which can be argued for and against, criticized as well as praised. Shakespeare's Brutus has many admirable qualities but he is also shown to impose his will on others (in II.1), to make disastrous political errors (especially in his handling of Antony) and to be guilty of moral inconsistency, most notably in asking Cassius for money at the same time as criticizing him for the way in which the money was raised. The reasons he gives for killing Caesar in his soliloquy at the beginning of II.1 rely on conjectures about how Caesar might behave in the future rather than on tyrannical characteristics he has so far showed.[47] They do credit to Brutus's intellectual scrupulousness but they seem like rather slight reasons for killing a friend. They could be read as retrospective (and tellingly weak) justifications for a decision he has already taken ('It must be by his death', II.1.10). For Shakespeare Brutus is not the straightforwardly exemplary figure he was for Montaigne. Montaigne tells us that he has begun dozens of quarrels in defence of Pompey or Brutus. In contrast to other authors Brutus's very writings declare that he was the man to lose his life in the defence of liberty. Montaigne praises him as a general who loved books and in the final chapter particularly commends the calmness that enabled him to give an hour to reading Polybius at a time when all the world was conspiring against him and the liberty of Rome.[48] Shakespeare picks up this bookishness in the moment when Brutus finds in his pocket the volume he has asked Lucius to find (IV.2.303–5).[49]

Coriolanus (1608) was a much more unusual choice of subject to dramatize than either the death of Caesar or the career of Antony. Although he respects

Coriolanus's valour in war Plutarch ultimately treats him as an example of the faults which follow from pride, obstinacy and anger.[50] Montaigne often discusses Caesar and Antony (and many other Roman generals) but never mentions Coriolanus. Shakespeare follows Plutarch very closely basing some major speeches (we looked at Shakespeare's rewriting of Volumnia's speech in Chapter 4) and three important scenes on his source. We must assume that Plutarch's emphasis on the strong mother–son relationship, the flawed hero and the political conflict within Rome attracted Shakespeare to the subject.[51] Plutarch provided him with the plot outline and the essential basis of the battle sequence near Corioli (I.4–10), the meeting with Aufidius (IV.5), the confrontation with Volumnia (V.3) and the death of Coriolanus (V.6).

From Plutarch's narrative Shakespeare develops a plot in five main movements, encompassing two rises and falls for the hero. He adds some scenes which Plutarch narrates briefly (*e.g.*, Menenius's pacification of the plebeians and the scene in which Coriolanus visits the plebeians to solicit their voices) and scenes designed to establish and develop characters (such as Aufidius and Volumnia) who will be important later in the play but are not needed at the beginning of Plutarch's narrative. Providing Coriolanus with a wife whose expressive silence mildly contests the expectation of his mother enhances our understanding of the hero's domestic circumstances. Shakespeare maintains the tribunes and the common people in the audience's view throughout the play, where Plutarch refers to them mainly during the disputes about debt, the colony, food and the consulship.[52] He follows and develops Plutarch's observations that the keys to understanding Coriolanus's character were his anger and his need for his mother's approval.[53]

In the central movement of the play, as we shall see, Shakespeare rearranges and adds to Plutarch's account of political arguments at Rome. This section of the play is as much concerned with the political expression of the views of the people and with the contrast between moderate and hard-line senators as with the conflict between senators and plebeians. Shakespeare here takes the opportunity to portray the different factions in a complex political struggle within the city and the consequences of that struggle for the well-being of the city. Towards the end of the play, by contrast, he concentrates more on dramatizing his source and focuses the audience's attention on the fate of the hero. Plutarch gives Shakespeare an outline of Coriolanus's meeting with Aufidius, and an important model for the argument and words of Coriolanus's speech.[54] Plutarch's account of Coriolanus's death provides the main outline of the play's final scene,[55] but Shakespeare makes Coriolanus react to Aufidius's goading ('boy of tears') with anger and pride.

> Cut me to pieces, Volsces, men and lads,
> Stain all your edges on me. Boy! False hound!
> If you have writ your annals true, 'tis there,
> That like an eagle in a dove-cote, I
> Flutter'd your Volscians in Corioles.
> Alone I did it. Boy! … (V.6.111–16)

Shakespeare's adaptation here removes the passivity of Martius's death in Plutarch. For Plutarch Martius here is a wronged victim and his murder a political calamity for the Volsces. Shakespeare allows Coriolanus to reassert his character and reinforces the play's depiction of the troubles caused by his lack of restraint. His Coriolanus is unfit for the society of other men in Antium just as much as in Rome. He offers the audience a choice of explanations for the hero's death, not simply Aufidius's desire for revenge but also the understandable fury of the Volsces at his boastful reminders of the violence he has done to them. Coriolanus's boasts are similar in tone and effect to the words spoken by captured American Indians to the tribes about to execute them which Montaigne's account in *Des cannibales* (I, 31), here borrowing from Léry, so much admires.

> [A] Ils le deffient, les injurient, leur reprochent leur lascheté et le nombre des batailles perdues contre les leurs. J'ay une chanson faicte par un prisonnier, où il y a ce traict: qu'ils viennent hardiment trétous et s'assemblent pour disner de luy: car ils mangeront quant et quant leurs peres et leurs ayeulx, qui ont servy d'aliment et de nourriture à son corps. Ces muscles, dit-il, cette cher et ces veines, ce sont les vostres, pauvres fols que vous estes; vous ne recognoissez pas que la substance des membres de vos ancestres s'y tient encore: savourez les bien, vous y trouverez le goust de vostre propre chair. Invention qui ne sent aucunement la barbarie. (V212, P219)[56]

> [A] They defy them, insult them, and reproach them for cowardice, and for all the battles they have lost against their people. I have a song made by one such prisoner which contains the following: Let them all courageously come and gather to feast off him, for they will then be

> eating their own fathers and grandfathers, who have served as food and nourishment for his body. 'These muscles', he says, 'this flesh, and these veins are your own, poor fools that you are! You do not realize that the substance of your ancestors' limbs is still in them. Taste them carefully, and you will find the flavour is that of your own flesh'. The discovery of that topic does not savour of barbarism. (S239)

Coriolanus's defiance is less extreme than this, and in contrast to Montaigne's open admiration, Shakespeare's treatment seems more hostile. He certainly read this chapter of Montaigne carefully (in view of his borrowings in *The Tempest*) and may have done so before writing *Coriolanus*.

Both Shakespeare and Montaigne wanted to understand the human side of great historical figures. This is the basis of their shared admiration for Plutarch. Montaigne always favoured anecdotes about the personal habits of great men while Shakespeare was not only drawn to domestic scenes in historical sources (Brutus with Portia, Coriolanus with his mother) but frequently included additional scenes of this type. Perhaps the needs of the actors who specialized in women's roles and the mixed audience of the playhouse encouraged Shakespeare to build up scenes and roles for women.[57] Where Montaigne expressed the wish to hear Brutus's words and see his behaviour to his friends on the eve of a great battle, Shakespeare gives his audience such scenes. Montaigne might well have disapproved. Although he understood the unreliability of historians and disliked the cult of the old for its own sake, he nevertheless elevated the truthfulness of ancient historians without really considering whether Plutarch, for example, might not have invented words and details for some of the scenes he describes (as it seems he did). The great dramatist will almost inevitably re-imagine his characters from the inside and he may believe that he has more licence to invent plausible domestic details than public events (though Shakespeare was sometimes willing to do that, as with the alteration in the chronology of Eleanor's disgrace and the reorganization of the political struggle in *Coriolanus*).

Responses to the requirements and opportunities offered by the theatre prompt many of the changes Shakespeare makes to historical sources. Especially at the beginning of a play, he adds scenes to establish characters and explain pre-existing rivalries or to maintain in the audience's mind someone who will be important later for the plot. Sometimes he chooses to add scenes which will create correspondences and comparisons within a play (*e.g.*, the two dialogues between Brutus and Cassius, the two large scenes for Queen Margaret and the

Yorkist Queens, the scenes of private life for Hotspur to balance the tavern scenes for Hal). Far from being a dramatic necessity such scenes suggest the kind of intellectual work which Shakespeare wants his audience to do, making comparisons and connections between different parts of the play and different characters. While he is attracted by stories which suggest scenes of conflict he also finds it dramatically rewarding to invent further scenes of this type, such as the confrontation between Hal and Henry IV (III.2), which he then redoubles with its two separate rehearsals in the great tavern scene (II.4) or Richard III's seduction of Anne (I.2), which he then balances with the request for the hand of Elizabeth of York (IV.4.204–361). In a different way the excitement which Richard's outrageous forcefulness creates in the first two scenes of *Richard III* is immediately balanced by two great scenes which focus on the cost of dynastic violence and the fearfulness of death.

Shakespeare's choice of historical subjects and the manner in which he adapted his sources indicate that he was far more interested than Montaigne in exploring the principles of practical politics. In this preoccupation he was also closer to the mainstream of humanist history. Shakespeare's portrayal of nobles jostling for power in the court of the weak king Henry VI depends on Hall but presents a much clearer account of the real fissures among the nobility and the temporary alliances by which Duke Humphrey was removed. By removing the characters in stages at the end of the first scene of *Henry VI part two*, and by allowing characters to comment on the motivations of those who have just left, Shakespeare offers a clear exposition of the rivalries and temporary alliances prevailing in the court. Shakespeare's analysis of the political situation also makes it clear, somewhat against Hall's words, that the instability of Humphrey's position (and by extension, of the kingdom) predated the arrival of Queen Margaret and was a consequence of the individual political agendas pursued by the fractured class of nobles.

Shakespeare's building up of the role of Dame Eleanor enables Duke Humphrey to demonstrate his virtue but produces a more surprising and enlightening contrast in their political analyses. Where Humphrey first advises his wife against ambition and later counsels patience, she offers a more personalized analysis of the political situation which appears more perceptive than his confidence in virtue.

> DUCHESS But be thou mild and blush not at my shame
> Nor stir at nothing till the axe of death
> Hang over thee, as sure it shortly will.

> For Suffolk, he that can do all in all
> With her that hateth thee and hates us all,
> And York, and impious Beaufort, that false priest,
> Have all limed bushes to betray thy wings;
> And fly thou how thou canst, they'll tangle thee.
> But fear not thou until thy foot be snared,
> Nor never seek prevention of thy foes.
> GLOUCESTER Ah, Nell, forbear; thou aimest all awry.
> I must offend before I be attainted,
> And had I twenty times so many foes,
> And each of them had twenty times their power,
> All these could not procure me any scathe
> So long as I am loyal, true, and crimeless. (II.4.49–67)

Eleanor's accurate estimation of the political world Humphrey lives in and of his own character (overconfident in his own virtue, unwilling to see the dangers which surround him) makes the audience reevaluate her. The generally held view that she is foolish and ambitious invites others to manipulate her and prevents Gloucester from listening to her good advice. His confidence in his own just conduct corresponds to the historical sources, but Shakespeare's presentation of this dialogue invites the audience to question the wisdom of Gloucester's attitude long before his death.

Shakespeare's adaptation of Plutarch's *Coriolanus* expands the role of the people of Rome. Whereas in *Henry VI part two* and *Julius Caesar* the on-stage crowd was largely manipulated by members of the political class, in *Coriolanus* the people of Rome are depicted as having political goals and debates of their own. In II.2 the difference of opinion between those who think that Coriolanus's deeds merit the consulship in spite of his flaws and those who regard him as a danger to Rome is resolved by the people's realization of how poorly Coriolanus had treated them. It is entirely understandable that part of the population feels that the city's debt to Coriolanus requires that he be appointed consul and also that when they think over the way he has treated them they should decide to withdraw their consent. Thus, although Shakespeare portrays the tribunes as manipulative, he shows that they allow the people's view (here presented as considered and perceptive) to be expressed.

In III.1, Sicinius and Brutus block Coriolanus's way to the capitol. They explain that now that the people have decided to reject Coriolanus's candidacy, he must not enter the market place because of the risk of civil disturbance

(III.1.26–32). Coriolanus angrily denounces their intervention as an attempt to curb the power of the nobility and the patricians attempt to calm him. The scene exposes the fissures within the senatorial party which the diplomacy of the politicians must attempt to restrain, at the same time as arguing their case against the tribunes. Cominius and Coriolanus resent the way the tribunes use the fear of civil disorder to end Coriolanus's hopes of the consulship, but Menenius understands that the expression of this antagonism to the people will have to be restrained in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the division within the city. In his anger Coriolanus takes the opportunity to express his political theories (III.1.68–73, 80–4). Menenius and the first senator's attempts to restrain Coriolanus and preserve a moderated senatorial authority are attacked both by Coriolanus who wants to express his true opinions freely and by Sicinius who wants to allow Coriolanus to provoke the people's hatred. Coriolanus expresses a coherent political philosophy with considerable force. The sympathy the audience has with Menenius's role as peacemaker is balanced with a resentment of his attempt to restrain the expression of ideas which it wants to hear and see tested.

> Cor ... This double worship,
> Where one part does disdain with cause, the other
> Insult without all reason: where gentry, title, wisdom,
> Cannot conclude but by the yea and no
> Of general ignorance, it must omit
> Real necessities, and give way the while
> To unstable slightness. Purpose so barr'd, it follows
> Nothing is done to purpose. (141–8)

Although we must understand Coriolanus's forceful words as an expression of his anger, nevertheless we want to consider the question he has raised, to determine for ourselves whether popular suffrage means that the state can never see through hard decisions. This speech expresses a point of view which is usually assumed to be true in Renaissance English justifications of monarchy. But by giving this idea to Coriolanus, shortly after a scene which has demonstrated the political rationality of the people, Shakespeare offers the audience the possibility of understanding them as self-serving. Here using a Roman subject permits Shakespeare to discuss issues, about the political expression of popular opinion and about the role of office-holders elected by the people, which would be unaddressable in an English historical context. Conversely the audience's view of Coriolanus's words on the dangers of government with popular approval must also be coloured by their understanding of his personal motivation and the tribunes' comments on the implications of what he says.

The next scene (III.2), devised by Shakespeare and entirely independent of Plutarch, explores the personal cost for Coriolanus of his party's attempt to heal the breach in the city by persuading him to stand trial against the tribunes' accusations. After her entry Volumnia dominates the scene. As Coriolanus had expected she hates the plebeians as much as he does but she manages to control her expression of her feelings. She criticizes him for showing his anger before he had secured power (17–23), reminds him that policy can be reconciled with honour in war (42–51), urges him to utter a conciliatory form of words without believing them (54–64) and explains how he should perform them (72–86). When Coriolanus complains that she is asking him to play 'a part which never I shall discharge to th' life', Volumnia replies by promising him for performing the new part the same praise which he says first made him a soldier. Describing his new role to himself Coriolanus reacts against its denial of his truth.

> Cor Well, I must do't.
> Away my disposition and possess me
> Some harlot's spirit! …
> A beggar's tongue
> Make motion through my lips, and my armed knees,
> Who bowed but in my stirrup, bend like his
> That hath received an alms! I will not do't,
> Lest I surcease to honour mine own truth,
> And by my body teach my mind
> A most inherent baseness.
> Vol At thy choice then.
> To beg of thee it is my more dishonour
> Than thou of them. Come all to ruin …
> Thy valiantness was mine, thou sucked'st it from me,
> But owe thy pride thyself. (III.3.110–12, 117–25, 128–9)

By naming the actions which the parts of his body would need to perform Coriolanus finds that such a degree of pretence would contradict the truth of his own mind. His body's performance would teach his mind dishonour.

The external voice of Volumnia dramatizes his internal struggle. She insists that his obligations to her override any other form of honour. Her claim to have shaped him, by explaining the construction of his inner ‘truth’, denies its fixity and opens the way for her to denounce his proclaimed constancy as pride. Faced with his fashioner his determined sense of his identity and values collapses. Submission to her will under such conditions hardly equips him to dissemble his feelings before the people, but his alternative (‘as if a man were author of himself’, V.3.36) is no more sustaining.

Political analysis in *Henry IV part one* depends on the way in which history is represented. Worcester tells Hotspur of Mortimer’s claim to the throne and Henry IV’s mistreatment of Richard II in order to tempt him into rebellion. When Henry confronts his son, in a scene which Shakespeare invents, partly to explain why Prince Hal is given a position of trust in the battle of Shrewsbury, he retells the story of his winning the throne to set up a pair of comparisons.[58] Henry contrasts Hal’s conduct with his own youthful behaviour, which proved politically effective because it differed so greatly from the frivolity of Richard II. Then he contrasts Hal’s actions with Hotspur’s (as they had been in Henry’s speech in I.1), so that in effect Hal is aligned with Richard, while Hotspur is paired with Henry (not an obvious parallel in all respects) with the implication that Hal runs the risk of losing the throne to Hotspur. The logical structure depends on the topic of opposites and the unreliable corollary assumption that if two things are opposites then what is opposite to the second will be like the first. The force of the speech comes from the descriptive power with which Henry amplifies his four exemplary figures (III.2.39–120). Henry magnifies Hotspur’s glory in order to contrast it with Hal’s disgrace and conclude that Hal is an even more dangerous enemy to him than Hotspur. Henry applies the rhetorical arts of description, amplification and comparison to the historical record of the past twenty years. He collects the history into four paired exemplary figures, the spendthrift Richard and the politic Henry, the disgraceful Hal and the chivalric ideal of Hotspur. As Henry’s eloquence exhausts itself in a caricatured extrapolation of Hal’s degeneracy, Hal responds by vividly describing a fictional future scene.

PRINCE I will redeem all this on Percy’s head,
And in the closing of some glorious day
Be bold to tell you that I am your son,
When I will wear a garment all of blood,

And stain my favours in a bloody mask,
Which, wash'd away, shall scour my shame with it (132–7)

Hal's argument depends on his vivid amplification of an imagined scene rather than on any proof he can offer, but his determination, his zest for glory and his eloquence are so unexpected that they win Henry over and restore Hal to a central place of trust. Where Henry recasts the past into a pattern of comparisons, Hal provides a stirringly imagined fiction to move his father. The audience are less surprised than Henry because they have heard Hal's first soliloquy.[59]

So when this loose behaviour I throw off,
And pay the debt I never promised,
By how much better than my word I am,
By so much shall I falsify men's hopes;
And like bright metal on a sullen ground,
My reformation, glitt'ring o'er my fault,
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off. (I.2.203–10)

Looking back on that speech from the perspective of III.2, the audience appreciates that Hal's Machiavellian scheme to manufacture public astonishment both was an extension of his father's avowed methods and prepared the way for an effective deception of that father. This is where the parallelism between I.3 and III.2 becomes logically telling. Where Worcester's cunning exploitation of Hotspur's charisma led to civil war, Hal's combination of calculation and glamorous eloquence in the same person regained the lost trust of his father and thereby reclaimed his royal inheritance. Hal's fictional exemplary representation of himself out-argued the scheme of contrasts and implications devised by his father.

Some of Shakespeare's most important elaborations of his sources contrast unofficial views of politics and morality with the established ideology of the political élite.[60] In *Richard III* I.4, as Clarence sleeps, after relating his guilty dream, his keeper Brakenbury attempts to generalize and sanitize his fears as moral axioms on the play's developing theme of the troubles which come with the crown (I.4.78–83). These provisional conclusions are interrupted by the arrival of the two murderers with their commission. His own casual mention of the last judgement provokes an emotion of remorse in the second murderer, which is imaged as a liquid washing through his body and ebbing out, with time and at the thought of payment.

> 1 MURD Where's thy conscience now?
> 2 MURD Oh, in the Duke of Gloucester's purse.
> 1 MURD When he opens his purse to give us our reward, thy conscience flies out?
> 2 MURD 'Tis no matter; let it go. There's few, or none, will entertain it.
> 1 MURD What if it come to thee again?
> 2 MURD I'll not meddle with it; it makes a man a coward. A man cannot steal but it accuseth him; a man cannot swear but it checks him; a man cannot lie with his neighbour's wife but it detects him. 'Tis a blushing, shamefaced spirit, that mutinies in a man's bosom. It fills a man full of obstacles; it made me once restore a purse of gold that by chance I found. It beggars any man that keeps it; it is turned out of towns and cities for a dangerous thing; and every man that means to live well endeavours to trust himself and live without it. (I.4.121–39)

In a move which will later become one of his hallmarks Shakespeare invites low-life characters to think through issues which generically normally concern their betters. Their perspective from below reveals a different side of the argument and conducts it in a different vein. The second murderer envisages conscience as a chemical which overcomes his body. The idea of taking conscience as a physical rather than a mental entity is then extended into a series of jokes. The second murderer anatomizes its affect on his pleasures and wealth. But the mental exercise he has to go through in order to expel conscience indicates the paradoxical hold it still has over him. He presents a world and a profession in which conscience has no place, yet it keeps returning to afflict him. What he sees as misleading and debilitating the audience interprets as a sign of hope. When the murderers accidentally wake Clarence they can hardly bear to confront him, but when he argues that they should refrain from murdering him, they readily find strong counter-arguments from his own actions (183–98). Once Clarence states his position so clearly, the murderers promptly reply with the counter-arguments arising from the particular case. As we saw in the last chapter, stating positions readily generates objections and contraries. Here the contraries derive from Clarence's well-known history of betrayals. The murderers finish each other's sentences as if they were now, together, Clarence's conscience, and had the audience's insight into his soul. The excitement of the scene arises from the high level of the intellectual contest and the temporary sense that Clarence's life (and perhaps the destiny of his soul) depends on the outcome of the argument. At the same time Clarence's appeals to God's absolute standards and to notions of providence are continually answered by the murderers' recall of the history of the particular people involved. Clarence's false move is to refer his murderers to the support he anticipates from Richard. The shock with which he learns of Richard's real command (reminding us of the way Richard swept him to his death in his dream) emboldens the murderers to dispatch him. And once the crisis of the argument is past the second murderer's remorse is reawakened, as if he can argue his way out of conscience but cannot avoid the strong physical feelings which tie him to a kind of humanity he thought his profession had excluded.

Shakespeare's history plays include servants, murderers, citizens, rebels, officers and gardeners who pursue their own lives but also comment on and intervene in the preoccupations of the great figures. This extends the idea of placing great events in the context of ordinary life from which they emerge but it also involves expanding the range of experience presented (sorcerers, an armourer and his apprentice, cobblers, tavern keepers, waiters, unfortunately named poets) to depict the diversity of the nation but also to present that nation, made up of so many different interests and viewpoints, as a central figure of history. The continuity of the nation can be posed against the eclipse and death of the individual hero. The later Montaigne shares Shakespeare's interest in the experiences and actions of ordinary people. His comments on the heroism of ordinary people are based on his experience in the religious wars. His appreciation of their courage in much more trying circumstances than his own prompts him to draw lessons from them for his own behaviour and for that of the leisured gentry who are his principal audience. It is telling that when, in the final chapter of the book, Montaigne praises the wisdom of everyday life, the examples he chooses are Epaminondas and Socrates. He praises Socrates for his drinking and enjoyment of children's games as well as for his bravery and resilience. 'We should never tire of comparing the ideal of that great man against all patterns and forms of perfection.'[61] The depiction of Socrates as both the supreme moral exemplum and representative of the ordinary man, courageous in war and public life but entering fully into ordinary forms of enjoyment, drives the conclusion of the whole book.

> [B] C'est une absolue perfection, et comme divine, de sçavoir jouyr loyallement de son estre. Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des nostres, et sortons hors de nous, pour ne sçavoir quel il y faict. [C] Si avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde si ne sommes assis que sus nostre cul. [B] Les plus belles vies sont, à mon gré, celles qui se rangent au modelle commun [C] et humain, avec ordre, mais sans miracle, [B] sans extravagance. (V1115–16, P1166)[62]

> [B] It is an accomplishment, absolute and as it were God-like, to know how to enjoy our being as we ought. We seek other attributes because we do not understand the use of our own, and, having no knowledge of what is within, we sally forth outside ourselves. [C] It is vain to get up on stilts: for even on stilts we must walk on our legs. And upon the highest throne in the world, we are seated, still, upon our arses. [B] The most beautiful of lives to my taste are those which conform to the common measure, [C] human and ordinate, without miracles though and [B] without rapture. (S1268–9)

Montaigne uses the necessity of bodily functions to equate rulers with ordinary people. Probably he would have sympathized with the second murderer's material understanding of conscience. Shakespeare depicts and listens to ordinary, near-anonymous individuals. Perhaps, as in the Mystery Plays, it was the popular audience who encouraged this or perhaps it was the dramatist's instinct to explore the motivations and feelings which drive everyone framed in the historical scene.

The character of Falstaff takes its origin from an implication of the historical tradition rather than from a record in Holinshed. Since Henry V had a riotous youth he must have had companions in riot, who may well have misled him. *The Famous Victories* develops the character of Oldcastle (which was also Falstaff's original name) to fill this need. Stephen Greenblatt calls Falstaff 'gross, drunken, irresponsible, self-dramatizing and astonishingly witty', arguing that although based on Oldcastle, the character is an amalgam of established theatrical types: the braggart soldier, the parasite, with his limitless appetite for food and drink, and the vice.[63] Other critics have made connections with the improvisations of Elizabethan clowns.[64] Nuttall connects Falstaff with King Arthur, pregnancy and babies.[65] There may be a sense in which the character of Falstaff is itself improvised with different aspects coming to the fore in different situations and in response to particular verbal cues. We can describe his effect by registering the impact he makes in different scenes and in individual speeches.

Falstaff makes his first impression by size and grossness, snoring, slowly waking out of a presumably drunken stupor, perhaps belching. The first impression (and one of the longest lasting) is simply of excessive size and consumption. Then one is struck by his linguistic resourcefulness, picking up Hal's exaggerating, ridiculing accusations and overgoing them with quotations and puns. His inventiveness of word and thought feeds off other people's languages, imaginatively developing and reversing their jests and taunts. At other times he builds character and expression through parody of commonly available styles, for example the Biblical and the Euphuistic.[66] From the first he has an eye to the future and what he might gain from the prince's friendship ('When thou art king'). His speech is filled with boasting and lies, with name-calling and altering, twisting and reversing the meanings of words. Readers of Bakhtin's *Rabelais and His World* will not hesitate to identify Falstaff with the carnivalesque, the eruption of billingsgate, popular language and festivity onto the stage.[67] But it needs to be remembered that in particular scenes the accusations and the inventive language often originate with the prince. Falstaff is so adept at adapting himself to the prince's moods that he must also be thought of as the flatterer, the false friend. From the first he is the butt of Hal's jokes. Hal's only reason for participating in the robbery is to hear Falstaff's attempts to lie his way out of Poins's trap. Falstaff plays up to this role and enjoys it, exaggerating his retelling of the robbery past any limit of credibility before evading the trap, 'instinctively'. Falstaff's 'instinct' is for survival and the gusto with which he embraces life remains his most charming characteristic.[68] At Gad's Hill Falstaff acts like a coward but when the watch call at the Boar's Head to arrest him for the capital offence of highway robbery he surprises us with his willingness to face them, even as he appeals successfully for Hal's protection (II.5.452–5). Sometimes defiance is the best way of arousing pity. II.4 immortally celebrates his good-humoured acting and resourcefulness even as it exposes his cunning and his expectation of betraying others in order to survive ('banish Peto, banish Bardolph, banish Poins', 431). He is vanity personified and he lacks any scrap of honour, falsely accusing the landlady who dotes on him in order to extract a little extra cash to add to the mountain of debt he already owes her (III.3.44–94).

If the first half of the play celebrates his largely harmless excess with good humour, when Shakespeare decides to bring him from the tavern to the war we see him in a more sinister and serious light. He misuses his power of pressing, weakening the king's army in order to make money. His attitude to his soldiers is heartless and obscene but it voices and personally acknowledges the truth that people with means will put themselves in positions where they escape the penalties of war, for which the poor will pay with their lives (IV.2.11–62). When he explains that the men he has assembled in place of those who bought their way out of service will 'fill a pit as well as better' he speaks an unacceptable truth. In the civil war of Henry IV immorality and counterfeiting are a great help in surviving (just as Worcester's lies condemn many men to death). Falstaff's great speeches on honour question one of the main principles of the lives of Hal and Hotspur.[69] But, as the cases of Worcester and Northumberland show, it is not necessarily preferable, or even better for survival, to be without honour. Even if honour is no more than empty vanity, vanity itself is a powerful motivation in human affairs.

> FALSTAFF I would 'twere bed-time, Hal, and all well.
> PRINCE HAL Why, thou owest God a death. [*Exit*]
> FALSTAFF 'Tis not due yet. I would be loath to pay him before his day. What need I be so forward with him that calls not on me? Well, 'tis no matter, honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on, how then? Can honour set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in surgery then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died a – Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No Doth he hear it? No. 'Tis insensible, then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon – and so ends my catechism. (V.1.125–41)

Hal's reminder of the inevitability of death sets Falstaff on a path of evasion. He has no reason to pay any debt early and besides honour stimulates him to action rather than to thoughts of death. But Falstaff pauses to question his own words: what if honour were to choose him (punning on 'prick') for death or injury? What good would honour be then? Then he applies the techniques of *copia*, envisaging the particular injuries he might suffer and, through the rhetoric of *interrogatio* and the logic of induction, concluding with absurd literal accuracy, ‘honour hath no skill in surgery’. This conclusion prompts him to the more fundamental question (not posed by anyone else in the play) of the nature of honour. Having established that the word is just air (vanity?) he turns to the topics of subject and effect, asking who has it and what good it does them, before concluding with a dilemma: it is no use to the dead, because they cannot feel it, or to the living, because it will always be questioned by the jealous. Falstaff’s puns and unexpected questions lead him to an idea about the fragility of glory which is like the argument of Montaigne’s *De la gloire* (II, 16), which Shakespeare almost certainly had not then read. Falstaff’s false acquisition of honour at the battle of Shrewsbury could almost be an exemplary story from that chapter.

In his final chapter, *De l’experience*, Montaigne almost turns his back on historical examples. The difficulties of applying reason, of making appropriate comparisons and inductions mean that we are thrown back on our understanding of our own experience (‘When reason fails us we make use of experience’).[70]

> [B] Quel que soit donq le fruict que nous pouvons avoir de l’experience, à peine servira beaucoup à nostre institution celle que nous tirons des exemples estrangers, si nous faisons si mal nostre profit de celle que nous avons de nous mesme, qui nous est plus familiere, et certes suffisante à nous instruire de ce qu’il nous faut. Je m’estudie plus qu’autre subject. C’est ma metaphysique, c’est ma physique … La vie de Caesar n’a poinct plus d’exemple que la nostre pour nous. (V1072–4, P1119–21)

> [B] Whatever we may in fact get from experience, such benefit as we derive from other people’s examples will hardly provide us with an elementary education if we make so poor a use of such experience as we have presumably enjoyed ourselves; that is more familiar to us and certainly enough to instruct us in what we need. I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics; that is my physics … Even the life of Caesar is less exemplary for us than our own. (S1217–18)

Setting aside exemplary figures encourages him to interrogate further his own experience, but the main learning he derives from experience is to distrust his memory and his reason. His disease has taught him to appreciate relief from pain and the simple moments of bodily pleasure.[71]

Without knowing exactly what she will provide he is now confident that Nature will give him the resources needed to complete his life and to die. The aim of living a life in harmony with human nature provides him with a new model, Socrates, whom he praises for his ordinate manner of living and for the delight which he took in simple pleasures. Even as Montaigne's understanding of experience urges him to dispense with all exemplary historical figures, his habits of thinking drive him back to his reading.

Shakespeare has sometimes been accused of taking a Christian providentialist view of history, for example as an exponent of the so called Tudor myth in which the legacy of the deposition of Richard II haunted the reigns of successive kings until Richard III drew into himself all the evil of the realm in preparation for the triumph of Henry VII.[72] While it is true that some characters in the plays (both Richard II and III would do as examples) speak of God's protection of themselves or his punishment of previous acts of inhumanity, the plays tend to reveal these claims as self-interested and false. Shakespeare's careful representations of political behaviour suggest that he took a pragmatic view of history.[73] Montaigne mocks those who see events as the expression of the divine will,[74] and he finds that history is too varied to promote simple political lessons. Although some lines of conduct can be shown to be mistaken, political success, in his view, owes as much to good fortune as to correct calculation.[75]

Both Montaigne and Shakespeare acknowledge connections between war and politics. Both see war as the final test of noble qualities. For Montaigne it is the duty of the nobleman to go to war at the behest of his sovereign.[76] Both Hal and Hotspur regard military glory as the decisive index of worth. Montaigne condemns the expansionist wars of the Spanish in America. At home he regards the religious wars as the causes of a breakdown in social morality. At the same time they offer him examples of the heroic suffering of ordinary people. Henry IV presents foreign war as a way of averting internal political violence.[77] Montaigne can see the force of this political analysis but he regards the conclusion as immoral.

> [A] Il y en a plusieurs en ce temps qui discourent de pareille façon, souhaitans que ceste esmotion chaleureuse qui est parmy nous, se peust deriver à quelque guerre voisine … mais je ne croy pas que Dieu favorisast une si injuste entreprise, d'offencer et quereler autruy pour notre commodité. (V683, P721)

> [A] There are many today who use similar arguments, wishing that the heat of the civil commotions among us could be diverted into some war against our neighbours … but I do not believe that God would look favourably on so wicked an enterprise as our attacking and quarrelling with a neighbour simply for our own convenience. (S776)

Montaigne accepts the primacy of honour among the aristocracy though he can also see it as a type of vanity. But in *De la gloire* (II, 16) he shows the arbitrariness of glory. Of the thousands of men who were killed in battle, only a handful of names have come down to us. The histories of most of the world have vanished (S713, V627). Most of the histories which are written are inaccurate. Fortune allows only a small number of writings about the past to survive. Even people who rightfully earn a reputation often outlive it, suffering the eclipse of their honour and glory.[78] Since public honour is so transient and arbitrary, people should not chase it so shamelessly. For Montaigne the only true honour is an internal sense that one has done one's duty. For him dissembling is always incompatible with honour, where Shakespeare's characters find many stratagems justifiable. Political activity benefits from the prestige of honour, which can also be seen as an incitement to military valour. At the same time Shakespeare can acknowledge the destructiveness of a proud obsession with honour in Hotspur and Coriolanus and in the way Brutus's pride in his family name enables Cassius to seduce him. Like Shakespeare Montaigne thought that the suicides of Cassius and Brutus were premature, but he saw their larger consequence as disastrous for Roman liberty. Montaigne's admiration of Brutus reflects his strong commitment to Roman liberty, represented quite narrowly as the liberty of the senatorial class. Shakespeare is more concerned to present the viewpoints of the underclass than to celebrate a liberty that does not include them.

6. Ethical Issues in Montaigne and Shakespeare

Montaigne's *Essais* and Shakespeare's characters express a wide range of views on ethical questions; in both cases the reader is called upon to compare the statements of several different voices before being able to determine the case. Both writers present their audiences with divergent opinions to think about and with.

Revenge

A section of *Couardise mere de la cruauté* (II, 27) asks why so many present-day quarrels end in death and mounts an impressive argument that revenge-killing is a form of cowardice, something which Montaigne knows his audience would reject.

> [A] Là où nos peres avoient quelque degré de vengeance, nous commençons à cette heure par le dernier, et ne se parle d'arrivée que de tuer? Qu'est-ce, si ce n'est couardise? Chacun sent bien que'il y a plus de braverie et desdain à battre son ennemy qu'à l'achever, et de le faire bouquer que de le faire mourir. D'avantage que l'appetit de vengeance s'en assouvit et contente mieux, car elle ne vise qu'à donner ressentiment de soy … [C] C'est une action plus de crainte que de braverie, de precaution que de courage, de defense que d'entreprinse. [A] Il est apparent que nous quittons par là et la vraye fin de la vengeance, et le soing de nostre reputation; nous craignons, s'il demeure en vie, qu'il nous recharge d'une pareille. [C] Ce n'est pas contre luy, c'est pour toy, que tu t'en deffais. (V694–5, P729–30)

> [A] Whereas our fathers knew degrees of vengeance we now begin at the end and straightway talk of nothing but killing. What causes that if not cowardice? Everyone knows that there is more bravery in beating an enemy than in finishing him off: more contempt in making him bow his head than in making him die; that, moreover, the thirst for vengeance is better slaked and satisfied by doing so, since the only intention is to make it felt … Killing is good for preventing a future offence, but not for avenging one already done. [C] It is a deed more of fear than of bravery; it is an act of caution rather than of courage; of defence rather than of attack. [A] It is clear that by acting thus we give up both the true end of

> vengeance and all care for our reputation: we show we are afraid that if we let the man live he will do it again. (S787–8)

Since the idea of revenge depends on making the person who has wronged us feel our power over him, killing our opponent is against the true nature of revenge. Montaigne's rare amplification of a single viewpoint without subjecting it to questioning indicates that he here expresses a view which is important to him and which he knows his aristocratic audience will find it hard to accept. He condemns revenge-killing in terms which are calculated to make it unattractive to his contemporaries. Some modern critics have wanted Hamlet to condemn the whole idea of revenge rather than to regret that he had been given the obligation to set right the wrong (I.5.196–7).[1] The ghost is quite certain that Hamlet's new knowledge obliges him to seek revenge (I.5.7) and, once he has convinced himself of the ghost's truthfulness, Hamlet seems to agree.

Montaigne's *De la gloire* (II, 16) investigates the conception of honour which underlies revenge-killing and which Martin Dodsworth has presented as the source of unity in the play and a key concern of Hamlet.[2] Montaigne begins with a religious perspective. God cannot be made greater but his praises can. Therefore all glory should belong to God. Humans, on the other hand, are so lacking in beauty, health, wisdom and virtue that they need to be filled with more substantial goods than mere air. Then he draws on the traditional ethical topos of the danger of flattery. He praises the Senecan and Plutarchan injunction to conceal oneself and attacks Epicurus's, Cicero's and Horace's preoccupation with glory. Virtue is vain and frivolous if it inspires us only on account of glory, for reputation depends on fortune.

> [C] C'est le sort qui nous applique la gloire, selon sa temerité. Je l'ay veue fort souvent marcher avant le merite; et souvent outrepasser le merite d'une longue mesure. Celuy qui premier s'advisa de la ressemblance de l'ombre à la gloire fit mieux qu'il ne vouloit. Ce sont choses excellemment vaines. (V621–2, P659)[3]

> [C]Chance it is which bestows glory on us according to her fickle will: I have often seen it marching ahead of merit, and often outstripping merit by a long chalk. The man who first recognized the resemblance between shadow and glory did better than he intended. Both are things exceedingly vain. (S706)

Even the great deeds of Caesar and Alexander depended in great part on good fortune. Often the most dangerous parts of a battle occur in trivial and hidden situations. It is no use acting bravely only when there are witnesses; we need to behave properly when we are alone (V623–4, P660–1, S707–9). Montaigne insists that our own knowledge of our virtuous actions provides the only satisfaction we can take from them, even as he recognizes the limitations of that knowledge (V626, P664, S712). Montaigne agrees with Falstaff on the uselessness of honour to the dead, but he draws a different final inference.

> [C] Toute personne d'honneur choisit de perdre plus tost son honneur, que de perdre sa conscience. (V630, P669)

> [C] Any honourable person prefers to sully his honour than his conscience. (S717)

While some critics have tried to defend Hamlet's delay by arguing that the assumed honourable duty of revenge was barbaric and unsuited to Hamlet's better self, Montaigne actually argues for this position.

Death

Death is a major subject both in Montaigne's *Essais* and in *Hamlet*.[4] Broadly Montaigne maintains three positions in relation to death.[5] In *Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir* (I, 20), which we have already come across as one of the chapters in which Latin poetry plays a very significant part, he accepts that death is the defining moment of a life and that thoughts of death may torment any moment of life. He urges serious-minded people to prepare themselves for death, arguing that the mind can learn not to fear death. He suggests that the gradual decay of our faculties makes death more acceptable to us. The chapter concludes with a long speech by Nature, constructed from excerpts from Nature's speech in Lucretius III.933–62 and from Seneca.[6] Nature prepares us for death by showing that death is part of the world and part of our life. She points out the advantages of death and the disadvantages of a long life. All these views were widely accepted ethical principles shared by the Stoics and the Epicureans. The chapter ends with recollection of the calm deaths of ordinary people, to complement the stories of the defiant attitude to death exhibited by ordinary people, whether protestant martyrs or common criminals, which were related in I, 14.[7]

In *Coustume de l'isle de Cea* (II, 3) Montaigne first collects examples, sayings and arguments in favour of suicide and then matches them with arguments and examples against, including the arguments from God's will and from the greater heroism of enduring suffering. Contempt of life is ridiculous because life is all we have.[8] Then he tells a few stories at greater length, trying to establish the circumstances in which suicide might be acceptable. These stories feature religiously motivated suicides and suicides in order to avoid sin. Some of the stories treat fighting in such a way that one is bound to be killed as equivalent to suicide. The force of the chapter rests on the more fully told stories. On the whole Montaigne leaves the reader to respond to them without adding explicit conclusions but the chapter ends on the judgement that suicides to avoid unbearable pain or a worse death are the most acceptable. The chapter begins with an apparent disclaimer that the question being explored is a matter of philosophy and doubt and that we must be ruled by the word of God. Behind the self-censorship the attitude of this chapter is unusually positive towards suicide.

At the end of the book Montaigne argues against philosophical preparation for death, insisting that living (rather than death) is the aim of life and that nature will provide the resources for dying at the moment they are needed. *De la phisionomie* (III, 12), the crucial discussion of death in the later chapters, focuses on the figure of Socrates. Towards the middle of the chapter Montaigne relates Socrates's speech anticipating death from Plato's *Apology*, calling it 'crisp and sensible, yet naive and lowly, unimaginably sublime, true, frank and incomparably right'.[9] Because it pleases him so much he does not consider doubting its historical accuracy. From the beginning of the chapter Montaigne sought to connect the sublime Socrates with the speech and principles of thought of ordinary people ('thus speaks a peasant, thus speaks a woman').[10]

> [B] Il ne la represente ny eslevée ny riche; il ne la represente que saine, mais certes d'une bien allegre et nette santé. Par ces vulguaires ressorts et naturels, par ces fantasies ordinaires et communes, sans s'esmouvoir et sans se piquer, il dressa non seulement les plus reglées, mais les plus hautes et vigoreuses creances, actions et moeurs qui furent onques. (V1038, P1083–4)

> [B] He portrays [the soul] as neither as high soaring nor abundantly endowed; he portrays it simply as sane, though with a pure and lively

> sanity. From such commonplace natural principles, from such ordinary everyday ideas, without being carried away and without goading himself on, he formed beliefs, actions and morals which were not simply the best regulated but also the most sublime and forceful that have ever been. (S1174, V1038)

The chapter abounds with examples of the steadfastness and heroism of ordinary people victimized by the destructiveness and corruption caused by the wars of religion. Their example convinces him that nature (rather than education or philosophy) will provide the surest guide of how to act in any circumstances. As in I, 20 Nature is seen as the surest guide but this time she provides help from inside at the time it is needed rather than speaking arguments and precepts to learn in advance and hoard up against calamity. Since death is part of life, nature will provide us with the resources to meet it. Looking back to *De la conscience* Montaigne now retells at length two experiences from the civil wars in which his honest and open appearance saved him from death. Thinking about the moral of these stories leads him, with a little comparison, to an explanation of his distaste for revenge.

> [B] Si mon visage ne respondoit pour moy, si on ne lisoit en mes yeux et en ma voix la simplicité de mon intention, je n'eusse pas duré sans querelle et sans offence si long temps, avec cette indiscrette liberté de dire à tort et à droict ce qui me vient en fantasie, et juger temerairement des choses … Aussi ne hay-je personne; et suis si láche à offencer que, pour le service de la raison mesme, je ne le puis faire. Et lors que l'occasion m'a convié aux condemnations criminelles, j'ay plustost manqué à la justice … [C] Les jugements ordinaires s'exasperent à la punition [vengence: EB] par l'horreur du meffaict. Cela mesme refroidit le mien: l'horreur du premier meurtre m'en faict craindre un second, et la haine de la premiere cruauté m'en faict hayr toute imitation. (V1062–3, P1110, 1830)

> [B] If my countenance did not vouch for me, if people did not read in my eyes the innocence of my intentions, I would never have endured so long without feud or offence, given my indiscriminate frankness in saying, rightly or wrongly, whatever comes into my head and in making casual judgements … Besides I do not hate anybody; and am such a coward

> about hurting people that I cannot do it even to serve a rational end: when circumstances have required me to pass sentences on criminals I have preferred not to enforce justice … [C] Judgements normally inflame themselves towards revenge out of horror for the crime. That is precisely what tempers mine: my horror for the first murder makes me frightened of committing a second, and my loathing for the original act of cruelty makes me loathe to imitate it. (S1205)

In his first soliloquy Hamlet strongly desires the oblivion of death; in III.1 his fear of the unknown aspects of death persuades him not to seek it (*e.g.*, by suicide or by open rebellion against Claudius). After killing Polonius he tries to shock the King with his savagely humorous evocation of the worms eating the rotting body. When the flesh of an emperor is seen to pass through a beggar's belly via a worm and a fish, the carbon-cycle has eliminated all human pretensions to glory. In his final soliloquy Hamlet apparently reverses this position, approving the honourable deaths of thousands of men to gain a piece of land not worth tilling (IV.4.53–66; Q2 only). So far Hamlet, prompted by his feelings and his experiences, has explored a range of sometimes opposed positions. But in the final act he seems to reach a conclusion, regretfully accepting the levelling effect of death (V.1.178–209) and finding himself (rather like the later Montaigne) ready to meet it whenever it should come.

> There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all. Since no man, of aught he leaves, knows aught, what is't to leave betimes? (V.2.215–20)

Besides the deliberate reference to Matthew 10:29 ('Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father') the speech seems to recall the ideas of *Que philosopher c'est apprendre mourir*,[11] where Montaigne draws most heavily on the Stoicism of Seneca's *Epistolae morales*. Shakespeare uses the Biblical allusion to indicate that Hamlet's anguished self-questioning is now over, that he has reached the point of accepting God's plans and of abandoning his fear of death.[12] While Hamlet's attitude to death seems to develop over the play, other characters express ideas which enable the audience to compare and reconsider. At the beginning of the play Claudius and Gertrude urge Hamlet to accept his father's death, in a way which allows us to see them as mature and considerate in contrast to Hamlet's peevishness. Later Claudius's confession of guilt and his contradictory encouragement of Laertes's revenge enable us to see his words as self-interested without forcing us to deny their wisdom. Ophelia vividly demonstrates that the death (or estrangement) of a loved one can undo happiness and connected reason. Her sense of the meaninglessness of life makes her reckless of death, if not actually suicidal.[13]

Montaigne is much more learned than Shakespeare and his response to the philosophical and poetic tradition allows him to reach firmly grounded conclusions. Shakespeare can use both poetic narrative and enactment to inspire in his audience pity and shock at Ophelia's death. The contrasted language and viewpoint of the gravedigger place death's ubiquitousness in vivid contrast and prepares for Hamlet's uneasy jokes. Montaigne and Shakespeare agree on emphasizing the experience of ordinary people and a final improvisational acceptance of death but in comparison with the grandeur and eloquence of *De la phisionomie*, Hamlet's acceptance is sketchy and conventional, perhaps intentionally so.

Repentance

In *Du repentir* (III, 2), against orthodox Catholic doctrine, Montaigne justifies the fact that he rarely repents, and explains his difficulty in understanding what true repentance would involve.

> [B] Excusons icy ce que je dy souvent que je me repens rarement, [C] et que ma conscience se contente de soy: non comme de la conscience d'un Ange ou d'un cheval, mais comme de la conscience d'un homme. (V806, P846)

> [B] Let me justify here what I often say: that I rarely repent [C] and that my conscience is happy with itself – not as the conscience of an angel is nor of a horse, but as behoves the conscience of a man. (S909)

He believes that vices are abhorrent and are condemned by all sound judgements (V806, P846, S909).

> [B] Mais ce qu'on dit, que la repentance suit de pres le peché, ne semble pas regarder le peché qui est en son haut appareil, qui loge en nous comme en son propre domicile. On peut desavouer et desdire les vices qui nous surprennent et vers lesquels les passions nous emportent; mais

> ceux qui par longue habitude sont enracinez et ancrez en une volonté forte et vigoreuse, ne sont subjects à contradiction. Le repentir n'est qu'une desdicte de nostre volonté et opposition de nos fantasies, qui nous pourmene à tout sens. (V808, P848)

> [B] Yet the saying that 'repentance follows hard upon sin' does not seem to me to concern sin in its full apparel, when lodged in us as in its own home. We can disown such vices as take us by surprise and towards which we are carried away by our passions; but such vices as are rooted and anchored in a will which is strong and vigorous brook no denial. To repent is but to gainsay our will and to contradict our ideas; it can lead us in any direction. (S911)

Incidental sins can easily be disowned, but there are some characteristics which we know to be wrong and which are ingrained in our character (here he may be thinking of his illicit love affairs) and which we would have to become different people in order to change.

> [B] Quant à moy, je puis desirer en general estre autre; je puis condamner et me desplaire de ma forme universelle, et supplier Dieu pour mon entiere reformation et pour l'excuse de ma foiblesse naturelle. Mais cela, je ne le doits nommer repentir, ce me semble, non plus que le desplaisir de n'estre ny Ange ny Caton. Mes actions sont reglées, et conformes à ce que je suis, et à ma condition. Je ne puis faire mieux. Et le repentir ne touche pas proprement les choses qui ne sont pas en nostre force, ouy bien le regret. J'imagine infinies natures plus hautes et plus reglées que la mienne … Lors que je consulte des deportemens de ma jeunesse avec ma vieillesse, je trouve que je les ay communement conduits avec ordre, selon moy; c'est tout ce que peut ma resistance. Je ne me flatte pas: à circonstances pareilles, je seroy tousjours tel. Ce n'est pas macheure, c'est plustost une teinture universelle qui me tache. Je ne cognoy pas de repentance superficielle, moyenne et de ceremonie. Il faut qu'elle me touche de toutes parts avant que je la nomme ainsin, et qu'elle pinse mes entrailles, et les afflige autant profondement, que Dieu me voit, et autant universellement. (V813, P854)

> [B] As for me I can desire to be entirely different, I can condemn my universal form and grieve at it and beg God to form me again entirely

> and to pardon my natural frailty. But it seems to me that that should not be called repenting any more than grieving at not being an angel or Cato. My actions are regulated and suit what I am and my condition. I cannot do better. And the act of repenting is not really concerned with the things which are not in our power, though they are certainly regretted. I can imagine countless natures more elevated and better regulated than mine … When I compare my behaviour in youth and age, I find that I have usually conducted my affairs in an orderly fashion, according to my own lights; my resistance is capable of no more. I do not flatter myself. In like circumstances I would still be thus. It is not a small discolouring but a universal stain which tarnishes me. I do not know any superficial, moderate or purely formal repentance. Something must touch all parts of me before I will call it repentance. That must pinch my entrails and afflict them as deeply and universally as if God should search me. (S916–17)

As a contrast to his acceptance of his own behaviour (while waiting for God's intervention), he relates the story of a man he met in Armagnac, whom everyone calls *le larron* (the thief). He was born a beggar, and finding that by working he could not earn enough to live, he decided to become a thief. By stealing a little from the fields of many different people at considerable distances from each other he succeeded in avoiding discovery and becoming rich. In his old age in order to come to terms with God he has begun making gifts to the heirs of those he robbed as a sort of compensation. Since he will not be able to complete this task himself (as he cannot afford to give to everyone at once) he has instructed his heirs to continue this process.

> [B] Par cette description, soit vraye ou fauce, cettuy-cy regarde le larrecin comme action des-honneste et le hayt, mais moins que l'indigence; s'en repent bien simplement, mais, en tant qu'elle estoit ainsi contrebalancée et compencée, il ne s'en repent pas. (V812, P853)

> [B] From this description, whether it is true or false, this man regards theft as dishonest and hates it, but hates it less than poverty. He repents of the simple theft but in so far as it has been counterbalanced and compensated for he does not repent it. (S915, V812)

Montaigne agrees that all vice is repulsive and carries its own penalty, yet he acknowledges that there are some vices he cannot truthfully reject.

Nevertheless he believes that within the limits of the human he conducts his life in accordance with reason and with a clear conscience. He does not wish to reject the moral laws of his society or to avoid moral judgements of himself or others but at the same time he acknowledges the likelihood of human failing without being excessively disgusted with humanity. And he is suspicious of forms of repentance which are on the one hand too easy and self-serving and on the other too sweeping a rejection of one's own past and nature. His attempt to reconcile the truths of morality with his own experience opens up the possibility of a morality which is more understanding of the limitations of individuals.

The predicament of being unable to repent is also the subject of Claudius's soliloquy in *Hamlet* (III.3.36–72), discussed at the end of Chapter 1 above.[14] Because of the unquestionably vicious way in which he obtained the throne and because he is unable to contemplate giving up what he has gained, Claudius might be thought of as closer to *le larron*, whom Montaigne criticizes, than to Montaigne himself. Both Montaigne and Claudius ask for a divine resolution of their dilemma, and neither really believes that it will come. In comparison Claudius seems more anguished and more impressed by the power of grace.

> What if this cursed hand
> Were thicker than itself with brother's blood,
> Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens
> To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy
> But to confront the visage of offence? (III.3.43–7)

Shakespeare's interest in the meaning of repentance and the power of forgiveness is also evident in *Measure for Measure*, when Isabella joins Mariana in begging the Duke to spare Angelo's life (V.1.433–57). Within *Hamlet*, Claudius's anguished attempt to repent makes a telling contrast with Hamlet's lack of concern for the deaths of Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and to his inability to conceive of his responsibility for the madness and death of Ophelia. Claudius is inescapably the villain of the play, but comparisons suggest that parts of his moral judgement are more finely tuned than Hamlet's. Montaigne accepted that for the common good princes would sometimes have to carry out immoral acts, but he required them to feel remorse when they did so (V799, P840, S902).

Sex and Marriage

Montaigne is self-consciously frank about sex, especially in the chapter *Sur des vers de Virgile* (III, 5).[15] He defends himself by asserting that he dares to write whatever he dares to do or think and by wishing that others would be more reluctant to do what they are ashamed to speak of (V845, P886–7, S953). He recognizes that women have sexual desires, which he believes to be greater than men's, even though they are hidden where men's are physically overt.

> [B] Les femmes n'ont pas tort du tout, quand elles refusent les reigles de vie, qui sont introduites au monde: d'autant que ce sont les hommes qui les ont faictes sans elles … Après que nous avons cogneu, qu'elles sont sans comparaison plus capables et ardentes aux effects de l'amour que nous … Après avoir creu (dis-je) et presché cela, nous sommes allez leur donner la continence peculierement en partage: et sur peines dernieres et extremes. Il n'est passion plus pressante que cette cy, à laquelle nous voulons qu'elles resistent seules … et nous nous y rendons ce pendant sans coulpe et reproche. (V854–5, P896–7)

> [B] Women are not entirely wrong when they reject the moral rules proclaimed in society, since it is we men alone who have made them … We realize that women have an incomparably greater capacity for the act of love than men do and desire it more ardently … We believe all that and teach all that. And then we go and assign sexual restraint to women as something peculiarly theirs, under pain of punishments of utmost severity. No passion is more urgent than this one, yet our will is that they alone should resist it … Meanwhile we men can give way to it without blame or reproach. (S964–5)

Men's expectations of women's preservation of honour and resistance to sexual temptation should not be so high when they fall so easily themselves. Montaigne's criticism of men's double standards and his condemnation of their injustice to women (V885, P928, S1001) conclude by asserting the similarity between men and women.

> [B] Je dis que les masles et femelles sont jettez en mesme moule, sauf l'institution et l'usage, la difference n'y est pas grande. (V897, P941)

> [B] I say that male and female are cast in the same mould: save for education and custom the difference between them is not great. (S1016)

Montaigne finds that, in the verses which give the chapter its title, Virgil portrays the married Venus as too passionate. He finds an opposition between marriage, which is devoted to social usefulness, and love, which requires passionate desire.

> [B] En ce sage marché les appetits ne se trouvent pas si follastres: ils sont sombres et plus mousses. L'amour hait qu'on se tienne par ailleurs que par luy, et se mesle laschement aux accointances qui sont dressées et entretenues soubs autre titre, comme est le mariage. (V849, P891)

> [B] Within that wise contract our sexual desires are not so madcap; they are darkened and have lost their edge. Cupid hates that couples should be held together except by himself, and only slackly comes into partnerships such as marriage which are drawn up and sustained by different title-deeds. (S958–9)

He finds strong sexual desire both incompatible with marital obligations and demeaning to the status of marriage (V853–4, 850, P895–6, 891–2, S963–4, 959). A good marriage is closer to friendship and fellowship than to love (V851, P893, S961).

> [B] Ce sont deux desseins, qui ont des routes distinguées, et non confondues. Une femme se peut rendre à tel personnage, que nullement elle ne voudroit avoir espousé: je ne dy pas pour les conditions de la fortune, mais pour celles mesmes de la personne. Peu de gens ont espousé des amies qui ne s'en soyent repentis. (V853, P895)

> [B] We are dealing with two projects which each go their own distinct separate ways. A wife may give herself to another man whom – not because of the state of his finances but because of his very personality – she would never wish to marry. Few men have married their mistresses without repenting of it. (S963)

Even outside marriage, in spite of the comments quoted above, he assigns different roles to the two sexes. He relates women's greater capacity for love and their smaller likelihood of failing to satisfy, to their passive sexual role.

> [B] Et si l'inconstance leur est à l'adventure aucunement plus pardonnable qu'à nous. Elles peuvent alleguer comme nous l'inclination qui nous est commune à la varieté et à la nouvelleté; et alleguer secondement sans nous qu'elles achetent chat en sac … Que l'action a plus d'effort que n'a la souffrance; ainsi que de leur part tousjours aumoins il est pourveu à la necessité; de nostre part il peut avenir autrement. (V885–6, P929)

> [B] And fickleness is perhaps somewhat more excusable in them than in us. Like us they can cite in their defence the penchant we both have for variety and novelty; secondly they can cite, what we cannot, that they buy a pig in a poke [illustrated in C by a story of Queen Joanna of Naples murdering a husband whose sexual performance failed to match her expectations]; they can also cite the fact that since the active partner is required to make more effort than the passive one, they at least can always provide for this necessity while we cannot. (S1002)

He criticizes women who try to enhance their sexual enjoyment by moving their thighs instead of remaining still (V470, P494, S525). His separation of love from marriage encourages him to develop a strongly physiological view of love.

> [B] Je trouve après tout que l'amour n'est autre chose que la soif de cette jouyssance [C] en un subject desiré; ny Venus autre chose que le plaisir à descharger ses vases, comme le plaisir que nature nous donne à descharger d'autres parties, qui devient vicieux ou par l'immoderation ou par indiscretion … [B] Et que c'est par moquerie que nature nous a laissé la plus trouble de nos actions, la plus commune, pour nous esgaller par là, et apparier les fols et les sages, et nous et les bestes. (V877, P920)

> [B] I find that love is nothing but the thirst for enjoyment [C] within the object of our desire and that Venus is nothing other than the pleasure of discharging our vessels, a pleasure which becomes vicious through lack of moderation or discretion … [B] and that it was in mockery that nature gave us this most awkward and common of our activities, to make us all equal, the fools and the wise, we humans and the animals. (S991–2)

As a matter of sexual economy Montaigne advises women to dispense their favours gradually, taking time before they yield fully. This would have benefits for men too.

> [B] Cette dispensation reviendroit à nostre commodité; nous y arresterions, et nous y aymerions plus long temps; sans esperance et sans desir nous n'allons plus rien qui vaille. Nostre maistrise et entiere possession leur est infiniement à craindre. Depuis qu'elles sont du tout rendues à la mercy de nostre foy et constance, elles sont un peu bien hasardées; ce sont vertus rares et difficiles. Soudain qu'elles sont à nous, nous ne sommes plus à elles. (V881, P924)

> [B] Such stewardship would turn to our advantage; there we would linger and love longer; without hope and desire we no longer achieve anything worthwhile. Women should infinitely fear our overmastery and entire possession. Their position is pretty perilous once they have totally thrown themselves on the mercy of our faith and constancy; those virtues are rare and exacting; as for the women, as soon as we have them, they no longer have us. (S996)

Thinking about sex persuades Montaigne to reverse his usual view on the importance of speaking the truth. He prefers women to pretend a greater innocence and reluctance than they feel. Lying has an honourable place in love, bringing us to truth by the back door, whereas frankness comes too close to shamelessness (V867, P910, S980). Lying is not just a matter of prudence but also of pleasure. Although Montaigne rejects sexual jealousy, he still seems to be reassured by a fantasy of male forcefulness and female exclusivity.

Montaigne devotes a substantial section of the chapter to the stupidity and self-destructiveness of sexual jealousy (V863–72, P906–15, S975–86). He points out that most of the most famous men of antiquity knew of their wives' infidelity and never made a fuss about it (V864, P906, S975–6). He writes of the irrational ferocity of jealousy (especially female jealousy).

> [C] C'est des maladies d'esprit celle, à qui plus des choses servent d'aliment, et moins de choses de remede. (V865, P907)

> [C] Of all the spiritual illnesses, jealousy is the one which has more things which feed it and fewer things which cure it. (S977)

He tries to make men understand what they are up against in demanding female chastity. The will is too flighty to be restrained. No one can control what they think or dream of (V865–6, P908, S978). Even actions can have different meanings. Unless a man wishes to make women invisible or insensible he can never feel absolutely secure (V868, P910, S981). Intention is the crucial point here and many dubious actions can be carried out with spotless intentions. Since such things are unknowable and since knowledge can only be painful it is better not to inquire too closely.

> [B] La curiosité est vicieuse par tout, mais elle est pernicieuse icy. C'est folie de vouloir s'esclaircir d'un mal, auquel il n'y a point de medecine, qui ne l'empire et le rengrege; duquel la honte s'augmente et se publie principalement par la jalousie; duquel la vengeance blesse plus nos enfants qu'elle ne nous guerit. Vous assechez et mourez à la queste d'une si obscure verification … Si l'advertisseur n'y presente quand et quand le remede et son secours, c'est un advertissement injurieux, et qui merite mieux un coup de poignard, que ne faict un dementir. (V869, P912)

> [B] Curiosity is always a fault; here it is baleful. It is madness to want to find out about an ill for which there is no treatment except one which makes it worse and exacerbates it; one the shame of which is spread abroad and augmented chiefly by our jealousy; one which to avenge means hurting our children rather than curing ourselves. You wither and die while hunting for such hidden truth … If the man who warns you of it does not also at once supply a remedy and his help, his warning is noxious, deserving your dagger more than if he called you a liar. (S982)

Being a cuckold is not simply ridiculous, it is also in a sense just.

> [C] Chacun de vous a fait quelqu'un coqu; or nature est toute en pareilles, en compensation et vicissitude. [B] La frequence de cet accident en doibt mes-huy avoir moderé l'aigreur. (V870, P913)

> [C] Each one of you has cuckolded somebody; and Nature is ever like, alternating and balancing accounts. [B] The frequency of this misfortune ought by now to have limited its bitter taste. (S983, V870)

Montaigne finds that men by placing difficult demands on women may increase the likelihood that they will succumb.

> [B] Regardons aussi que cette grande et violente aspreté d'obligation, que nous leur enjoignons, ne produise deux effects contraires à nostre fin: à sçavoir, qu'elle aiguise les poursuyvants, et face les femmes plus faciles à se rendre. Car quant au premier point, montant le prix de la place, nous montons le prix et le desir de la conqueste. Seroit-ce pas Venus mesme, qui eust ainsi finement haussé le chevet à sa marchandise par le maquerelage des loix, cognoissant combien c'est un sot desduit, qui ne le feroit valoir par fantasie et par cherté? (V871, P914)

> [B] We also need to ensure that the great and intense harshness of the obligations which we lay on women should not produce two results hostile to our ends: namely, that it does not whet the appetites of their suitors nor make the wives more ready to surrender. As for the first point, by raising the value of a redoubt we raise the value of conquering it and the desire to do so. May not Venus herself cunningly have raised the cost of her merchandise by making the laws pimp for her, realizing that it is a silly pleasure for anyone who does not enhance it by imagination and by buying it dear? (S984–5)

At the same time Montaigne appreciates the connection between sexual desire and liveliness of body and mind. As a doctor he would prescribe love to keep men lively (V891–2, P935, S1008–9). Philosophy teaches us to moderate such pleasures, not to avoid them (V892, P936, S1009). For himself, he only has love to keep him going in old age (V893, P937, S1011). But this is tempered with an awareness that love really belongs to the young; that he would not expect to be attracted by women of his own age (V894–5, P938–9, S1012–13) and that young women would have no reason for loving older men (V896, P940, S1015).

Shakespeare resembles Montaigne in his portrayal of the strength of women's sexual desires, which he can treat both comically, as in *Venus and Adonis*, and with admiration, for example in Juliet and Rosalind. These two cases show us that, in line with the conventions of comedy, Shakespeare does not accept Montaigne's strong separation of the pleasures of love from the obligations of marriage. His presentation of Cressida in the second scene combines passionate commitment with an appreciation of the advantages of managing male desire.[16] Troilus's comments on his imagination of the sweetness of love (III.2.16–27), contrasted with the apparent ease of his intended departure the morning after (IV.2.1–18), tend to confirm Montaigne's view and her tactics, but there are also voices in the play which condemn her conduct as whorish rather than prudent. Sonnet 138 agrees with Montaigne about the commerce between lying and love.

Like the sonnets, *Troilus and Cressida* (1601–2) and *Measure for Measure* (1604) present an idea of the powerlessness of individuals to resist the demands of desire, even against the claims of reason and the grain of their own character. Where Montaigne prudentially presents the power of love as something to be lamented, resisted and moderated, Shakespeare understands that the exposure of its destructive effect, even on the unwilling, is more gripping theatrically. That Angelo in seeking to extort Isabella's consent is victim as well as tyrant and hypocrite excitingly twists an audience's responses.

When Iago declares that love is 'merely a lust of the blood and a permission of the will',[17] or when Paris defines it as 'hot blood, hot thoughts and hot deeds',[18] the audience understands this Montaigne-ish, physiological view of love as an expression of one character's views, contested by others and to be judged in the light of the meaning of the whole play. That Desdemona's more self-sacrificing love can be destroyed by Iago may tell the audience more about the world in which the tragedy of *Othello* takes place than about the nature of love. But Desdemona's love, like Juliet's, demands a bodily expression. Thersites's perception of the Trojan War as 'lechery, lechery, still wars and lechery' (V.2.193) must be weighed by the audience in relation to its speaker, in comparison with other views and in the context of the story presented, before they can determine how much truth it conveys.

Montaigne's comments on the destructiveness and folly of jealousy, and on the ease with which it can be fuelled, have an obvious resonance for Shakespeare's two great tragic representations of jealousy, in *Othello* (1604) and *The Winter's Tale* (1611). As with revenge, the way in which Montaigne argues against jealousy without attending to any counter-arguments may suggest that here he knew he was opposing something which many of his readers would have found acceptable. Shakespeare shows us very clearly how jealousy destroys even experienced rulers once they give way to it and how easy it is for someone to find (or to be given) evidence which they find compelling. When the audience is shown that even Othello's battle-tested calmness, even his understanding of jealousy's power to infect the mind

(III.3.18–95) cannot inoculate him against cunningly placed suspicion, the spectacle of his fall is gripping and appalling. When even Desdemona's kind and charitable actions can be turned into motives for suspecting her, the audience is compelled to face up to the fragility of our understanding of the impact of our deeds on the minds of others.

Young or old Shakespeare's romantic leads (*e.g.*, Romeo, Orlando, Orsino, Antony) have a tendency to appear ridiculous, partly in their self-indulgence, but especially in comparison with the superior understanding of the women they court. This fits in well enough with Montaigne's comments on the role of sex in human life. But Shakespeare is not unsympathetic to Montaigne's idea that thoughts of love enhance the liveliness of the old. Doll Tearsheet's tenderness towards Falstaff gives a sentimental gloss to his determination to live, while Justice Shallow's recollections of Jane Nightwork portray the small spark of life remaining as more vivid than his youth as others saw it.

However much or little Montaigne's comments on sex help us in understanding Shakespeare's plays, none of them could be regarded as a source. With Montaigne there is always a suspicion that apparent assertions of the rights of women may have been intended mainly as criticisms of male behaviour (though against this we need to remember that he hoped that *Sur des vers* would win him a special place in women's intimate reading);[19] in characters like Cleopatra and Rosalind there is more sense of an attempt to portray a woman's view, especially a certain playfulness towards men's aspirations. When we turn from Shakespeare to Montaigne we are amazed by the directness with which he describes in his own voice what he has learned about sex. By contrast when Rosalind, for example, declares that 'I will be more jealous of thee than a Barbary cock-pigeon over his hen, more clamorous than a parrot against rain, more new-fangled than an ape, more giddy in my desires than a monkey' (*As You Like It*, IV.1.141–5), we cannot easily tell whether it is Ganymede, Rosalind or Shakespeare who is making these assertions about female sexuality.

Fathers and Children

De l'affection des peres aux enfans (II, 8) discusses the idea of older men giving their wealth to their heirs which is one of the main plot issues of *King Lear* (1605–6).[20] Some of the arguments of the chapter may have provided Shakespeare with material for his characters to develop. Although the love of one's children is a law of nature, Montaigne finds that parents have different ways of treating their children and trying to win their love. He is particularly preoccupied with questions of property and inheritance.

> If we were to feare that since the order of things beareth, that they [*i.e.*, children] cannot indeed, neither be, nor live, but by our being and life, we should not meddle to be fathers. As for mee, I deeme it a kind of cruelty and injustice, not to receive them into the share and society of our goods, and to admit them as Partners in the understanding of our domestical affaires (if they be once capable of it) and not to cut off and shut-up our commodities to provide for theirs, since we have engendred them to that purpose. It is meere injustice to see an old, crazed, sinnow-shronken, and nigh dead father sitting alone in a Chimny-corner, to enjoy so many goods as would suffice for the preferment and entertainment of many children, and in the meane while, for want of meanes, to suffer them to lose their best dayes and yeares, without thrusting them into publike service and knowledge of men.[21]

Montaigne rejects the idea of using financial control to obtain honour and respect from one's children.

> That father may truly be said miserable, that holdeth the affection of his children tied unto him by no other meanes than by the need they have of his helpe, or want of his assistance, if that may be termed affection.[22]

He repeats that it is better to be loved than feared.[23] Perhaps naively he asserts that a man who has behaved honourably and generously will always be respected by his children.[24] Montaigne commends Charles V for his wisdom in resigning his property and kingdom to his son at the point when he felt his own powers had begin to decay.[25]

> This fault, for a man not to be able to know himselfe betimes, and not to feele the impuissance and extreme alteration, that age doth naturally bring, both to the body and the minde (which in my opinion is equall, if the minde have but one halfe) hath lost the reputation of the most part of the greatest men in the world.[26]

Montaigne tells of advising one of his friends who had grown up children.

> I chanced one day to tell him somewhat boldly (as my custome is) that it would better beseeme him to give us place, and resigne his chiefe house to his sonne (for he had no other mannor-house conveniently well furnished) and quietly retire himselfe to some farm of his, where no man might trouble him, or disturbe his rest … who afterward followed my counsell, and found great ease by it. It is not to be said, that they have any thing given them by such a way of obligation, which a man may not recall againe; I, that am ready to play such a part, would give over unto them the full possession of my house, and enjoying of my goods, but with such libertie and limited condition, as if they should give me occasion, I might repent my selfe of my gift and revoke my deed. I would leave the use and fruition of all unto them, the rather because it were no longer fit for me to weald the same. And touching the disposing of all matters in grosse, I would reserve what I pleased unto my selfe.[27]

Against this optimistic narrative and personal recommendation of retirement Montaigne tells at greater length a negative exemplum of a formerly very able man who believed himself to be in full control of his household when in fact his children and servants colluded to manage all his affairs behind his back. Montaigne amplifies the old man's boasts about his control of the household before asking whether perhaps it was not preferable for him to be deceived in this way.[28] In a further counter example he expresses his pity for the former Marshal of France, M. de Monluc, who regrets that, in maintaining the stern demeanour he thought appropriate to a father, he never conveyed to his son the deep affection he felt for him.[29] The untypically one-sided manner in which Montaigne presents the argument for abdication of power may itself indicate how unusual the suggestion was and the degree of opposition he could expect it to encounter.

While there are no precise verbal repetitions it is easy to see how passages from this essay could have suggested the argument which Edmund gives Edgar in his forged letter and which Gloucester rejects so vehemently (I.2.44–78). Edmund even suggests that the argument may have been intended as 'an essay or taste of my virtue' (45). The issues raised in this chapter of the dangers of clinging on to power for too long, the difficult relationship between love and property, the impossibility of trying to force love and even the idea of keeping back a certain portion for oneself are all germane to the plot of *King Lear*. In a way the double plot investigates each of the two alternatives which Montaigne poses. Lear abdicates power while Gloucester holds on to it. But in *King Lear* both alternatives lead to dispossession and suffering. Both old men seek to dominate, yet are outmanoeuvred by, their children.[30] Not only are they unable to extort love, they fail to recognize love when it exists. In comparison with the depths of inter-generational hatred revealed by *King Lear*,[31] Montaigne's confidence in balancing considerations and reservations of rights appears naïve. Montaigne's rather cosy idea of benevolent self-deception is not an option in *King Lear*, where the fathers' destined suffering, consequent on their own use of their power as well as their blindness, offers only a limited insight as a recompense for madness. Reading *De l'affection des peres aux enfans* one is reminded of the premisses of the plot of *King Lear*, but turning back to it after reading the play the atmosphere of the chapter seems quite different. Through the stories he tells, Montaigne faces up to the melancholy and incomprehension of parent–child relationships. He understands that money causes conflicts between parents and children and he proposes the conditional advance gift of the inheritance as a practical solution. This sort of prudential advice seems somehow beside the point in relation to Lear's denunciation of his daughters, Gloucester's unknowing reliance on the wronged Edgar and both men's attempts to win a realistic understanding of the world they had previously misrecognized.

Human Sufficiency and the Animals

In the *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* (II, 12) Montaigne presents many arguments for the wretchedness of human life in the absence of God. A long section argues that mankind's pretended superiority over animals is false by retelling stories from Plutarch about the superior intelligence, loyalty and bravery of animals (V452–86, P474–512, S506–41). Montaigne makes it clear that his aim in telling these stories is to demolish human pretensions of superiority.

> We are neither above nor under the rest [of the animals]: whatever is under the coape of heaven runneth one law, and followeth one fortune … Miserable man with all his wit cannot in effect goe beyond it: he is embraced, and engaged, and as other creatures of his ranke are, he is subjected in like bondes, and without any prerogative or essentiall pre-excellencie, what ever Privilege he assume unto himselfe, he is of very meane condition.[32]

Jonathan Bate argues that the *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* provides the philosophical basis for *King Lear* while Henderson suggests that both works share the project of undermining the pretensions of human pride.[33] When Montaigne reviews the number of things that human beings can desire he concludes that most of them are 'neither necessary nor naturall'.

> They are all superfluous and artificiall. It is wonderfull to see with how little nature will be satisfied, and how little she hath left for us to be desired. The preparations in our kitchins, doe nothing at all concerne her lawes.[34]

It is striking that many aspects of the view of mankind depicted in *King Lear* can be paralleled from the *Apologie*. Montaigne insists on man's emptiness, vanity and self-deception.

> The meanes I use to supresse this frenzy … is to crush, and trample this humane pride and fiercenesse underfoot, to make them feele the emptinesse, vacuitie, and no worth of man … all our wisdome is but folly before God; that of all vanities, man is the greatest.[35]

Montaigne contrasts man's low place in the world with his great presumption.

> Of all creatures man is the most miserable and fraile, and therewithall the proudest and disdainfullest. Who perceiveth and seeth himselfe placed here, amidst the filth and mire of the world, fast tied and nailed to the worst, most senselesse and drooping part of the world, in the vilest corner of the house, and farthest from heavens coape.[36]

When his daughters attempt to reduce the number of his followers to one ('What need one?'), Lear enlarges the question of his needs as a king to the more general issue of the relationship between necessity and human identity.

> O reason not the need! Our basest beggars
> Are in the poorest thing superfluous:
> Allow not nature more than nature needs,
> Man's life is cheap as beast's. Thou art a lady;
> If only to go warm were gorgeous,
> Why, nature needs not what thou gorgeous wear'st
> Which scarcely keeps thee warm. (II.4.261–7)

Montaigne had made a similar point in *De mesnager sa volonté* (III, 10, V1009–10, P1055, S1141–2), arguing that human nature should be thought of as including more than the small amount physically needed for survival. Both Montaigne and Shakespeare may well have taken this idea from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (III.56, V.97). There is no verbal similarity to suggest that Shakespeare took it from Florio's translation (III, 260–1) of Montaigne.

> [B] Si ce que nature exactement et originelement nous demande pour la conservation de nostre estre est trop peu (comme de vray combien ce l'est et combien à bon comte nostre vie se peut maintenir, il ne se doit exprimer mieux que par cette consideration, que c'est si peu qu'il eschappe la prise et le choc de la fortune par sa petitesse), dispensons nous de quelque chose plus outre: appellons encore nature l'usage et condition de chacun de nous; taxons nous, traitons nous à cette mesure, estendons nos appartenances et nos comtes jusques là. (V1009, P1055)

> [B] If what Nature precisely and basically requires for the preservation of our being is too little (and how little it is and how cheaply life can be sustained cannot be better expressed than by the following consideration: that it is so little that it escapes the grasp and blows of Fortune) then let us allow ourselves a little more: let us call 'nature' the habits and endowments of each one of us; let us appraise ourselves and treat ourselves by that measure: let us stretch out our appurtenances and our calculations as far as that. (S1141–2)

A little later, once the storm has begun, Lear modifies this view when he finds that under pressure from the weather things which he would earlier have regarded as vile now seem valuable.

> The art of our necessities is strange,
> And can make vile things precious. Come; your hovel. (III.2.70–1)

Foakes connects this idea with the proverbial need to 'make a virtue of necessity' but it could also be seen as related to Montaigne's argument in *Que le goust des biens …* (I, 14), that the mind can prepare itself to accept poverty, pain and death, without regarding them as evils. Later still, in the storm, with the appearance of Mad Tom, Lear revises his view that superfluity defines the human. Once he has seen Tom he feels compelled to acknowledge that in essence man really is no different from the animals.

> Why, thou wert better in a grave than to answer with thy uncovered body this extremity of the skies. Is man no more than this? Consider him well. Thou ow'st the worm no silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha? Here's three on's us are sophisticated; thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! (III.4.104–7)

Both in this speech and in the previous one some of Lear's anger is fuelled by commonplaces of anti-female satire: the silks and perfumes or the gorgeous clothes cut so as to reveal rather than warm the wearer's body. Curiously this speech has something in common with a passage in which Montaigne makes the opposite point.

> Truly, when I consider man all naked (yea, be it in that sex, which seemeth to have and challenge the greatest share of eye-pleasing beautie) and view his defects, his naturall subjection, and manifold imperfections; I finde we have had much more reason to hide and cover our nakedness, than any creature else. We may be excused for borrowing those which nature had therein favored more than us, with their beauties to adorne us, and under their spoiles of wooll, of haire, of feathers, and of silke to shroud us.[37]

If Shakespeare in fact used this passage (and it is far from certain, since the verbal parallels are rather slight) it might have amused him to twist its purpose. The *Apologie* also contrasts madness and blindness in ways that are relevant to *King Lear*.

> [1582] Quel sault vient de prendre de sa propre agitation et allegresse, l'un des plus judicieux, ingenieux et plus formés à l'air de cette antique et pure poësie, qu'autre poëte Italien n'aye de long temps esté? N'a-il pas dequoy sçavoir gré à cette sienne vivacité meurtriere? à cette clarté qui l'a aveuglé? à cette exacte et tendue apprehension de la raison, qui l'a mis sans raison? … Voulez vous un homme sain, le voulez vous reglé, et en ferme et seure posture? Affublez le de tenebres d'oisiveté et de pesanteur. [C] Il nous faut abestir pour nous assagir; et nous esblouir, pour nous guider. (V492, P518)

> [1582] What a leap has just been taken, because of the restlessness and liveliness of his mind by an Italian poet, fashioned in the atmosphere of the pure poetry of Antiquity, who showed more judgement and genius than any other Italian for many a long year; yet his agile and lively mind has overthrown him; the light has made him blind; his reason's grasp was so precise and so intense that it has left him quite irrational … Do you want a man who is sane, moderate, firmly based and reliable? Then array him in darkness, sluggishness and heaviness. [C] To teach us to be wise, make us stupid like beasts; to guide us you must blind us. (S548)

Towards the end of the chapter, after mockingly describing the attempts of those who are blind from birth to adapt themselves to a world and a language dominated by the sighted Montaigne asks,

> [A] Que sçait-on si le genre humain fait une sottise pareille, à faute de quelque sens, et que par ce defaut la plus part du visage des choses nous soit caché? (V589, P626)

> [A] How do we know that the whole human race is not doing something just as silly? We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us. (S666)

Just as Montaigne reversed Lucretius's arguments intended to assert the primacy of knowledge through the senses to argue against the possibility of knowledge so Shakespeare could have used Montaigne's depiction of the wretchedness of man without God to portray the suffering inherent in the human lot. But he might equally have found his way to these ideas with the same independence as he showed in shaping the central scenes of the play.

Justice

Montaigne's final chapter, *De l'experience* (III, 13), begins with a strong critique of the law. There are too many laws and their interpretation and enforcement are astonishingly capricious (V1065–8, P1112–14, S1208–10). He supports this idea with a story about some peasants who have just found a severely wounded man who was still alive. They were afraid to help him in case they should be accused of having harmed the man.

> [B] Que leur eussé-je dict? Il est certain que cet office d'humanité les eust mis en peine. (V1070, P1117)

> [B] What ought I to have said to them? It is certain that such an act of humanity would have got them into difficulties. (S1214)

Fear of the workings of the law led the peasants to decline a clear moral obligation which they would otherwise have fulfilled. Montaigne partly defends them by describing innocent parties being executed for the sake of judicial procedures, even when the court knew they were innocent (V1070–1, P1117–18, S1214–15).

Thinking about man's vanity in proposing rules which he has no intention of obeying prompts Montaigne to describe an incident in which a judge used part of a sheet of paper on which he has condemned an adulterer to write a love letter to a colleague's wife, and to recall one of his own lovers loudly condemning the adulteries of her female friend (III, 9, V989, P1035, S1118–19). The figure of the adulterous judge also turns up in Lear's denunciation of human justice.

> LEAR What, art mad? A man may see how this world goes with no eyes. Look with thine ears. See how yon justice rails upon yon simple thief. Hark in thine ear: change places and handy-dandy, which is the justice, which is the thief? Thou hast seen a farmer's dog bark at a beggar?
> GLOS Ay, sir.
> LEAR And the creature run from the cur – there thou mightst behold the great image of authority: a dog's obeyed in office.
> Thou, rascal beadle, hold thy bloody hand;
> Why dost thou lash that whore? Strip thine own back,
> Thou hotly lusts to use her in that kind
> For which thou whipp'st her. The usurer hangs the cozener.
> Through tattered clothes great vices do appear:
> Robes and furred gowns hide all. [F]Plate sin with gold,
> And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks;
> Arm it in rags, a pigmy's straw does pierce it.
> None, does offend, none, I say none. I'll able 'em;[F] (IV.6.146–64)[38]

Lear argues that hearing without seeing is actually an advantage in that it enables you to understand from their words that the thief and the judge are the same without being distracted by the difference in their costumes.

Shakespeare may here draw on the proverb Great thieves hang the little ones (T119).[39] Hearing, which Lear still insists on associating with seeing, leads him to the barking of dogs. He explains that authority, far from being an effect of some innate superhuman quality like charisma, is a product of mere force, an attribute of the dog rather than the beggar. After evoking this picture from Gloucester's memory he uses personification to create a scene in which a beadle beats a whore before linking through genus and species to hypocritical judgements over money. This in turn leads him, in a move Montaigne as an aristocrat and judge never makes, to the causal relationship between power, wealth and impunity. He sets up a contrast (topic of contraries) between judgments of those who are poor ('tattered clothes') and the rich, or the judges ('Robes and furred gowns'). Amplifying this point with descriptions of gorgeous clothes and gold-plated armour (with an overtone of the wealthy eating from golden plates) leads him back to the poor, whose poverty justice can punish on the weakest grounds ('a pigmy's straw'). This leads to his most general and devastating conclusion. In such circumstances there can be no justice and his duty as king is to enfranchise prisoners and silence prosecutors. The speed and lack of differentiation with which Lear moves from one topic to the next make his uncontrolled perceptiveness express itself as madness. The conclusion Lear here draws as a counsel of disgust can be compared with Goneril's tyrannical taunt later ('Say if I do, the laws are mine, not thine./ Who can arraign me for't?', V.3.156–7) which Albany strongly deplores. In III.4 Lear articulates a different kind of justice, based on compassion and sufficiency.

> Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are,
> That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
> How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
> Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you
> From seasons such as these? O, I have ta'en
> Too little care of this. Take physic, pomp,
> Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
> That thou mayst shake the superflux to them
> And show the heavens more just. (28–36)

Considering the voices and needs of others prompts a different response to Lear's own situation. The outer storm and the concern for others (first of all Kent and the Fool) which it evokes becomes a means of avoiding self-destructive thoughts. Then he extends his compassion to imagine the experience of all the impoverished people who lack proper shelter and sustenance to protect them from the extremes of the weather. After amplifying his depictions of the storm and the unpreparedness of the poor, he connects this with his own political role, acknowledging his responsibility in not meeting this need. And then he generalizes his recent experience into a wider political lesson. The medicine to cure the ills of the proud and powerful is to share homeless people's conditions of life in order to experience the human feelings which will prompt them to make proper provision for the poor.[40] Instead of using superfluous wealth to procure luxuries, they should provide housing, clothing and food for the needy. In this way human action will create a social justice which avoids the disproportionate effect of the heavens' anger on the poor. So human beings through their emotions will create a world which is more just than the one heaven has provided. Shakespeare's language here makes use of Christian ideas about the conditions on the obligation to charity (you are enjoined to give superfluous wealth, money which goes beyond your local needs, for relief, but not to impoverish yourself)[41] but with the idea that humans can make the world more just than the gods have.

Utopia

In *Des cannibales* (I, 31) Montaigne attacks the European view that the people of the new world are barbaric.

> [A] Or je trouve … qu'il n'y a rien de barbare et de sauvage en cette nation, à ce qu'on m'en a rapporté; sinon que chacun appelle barbarie, ce qui n'est pas de son usage. Comme de vray nous n'avons autre mire de la verité, et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs où nous sommes … Ils sont sauvages de mesmes, que nous appellons sauvages les fruicts, que nature de soy et de son progrez ordinaire a produicts; là où à la verité ce sont ceux que nous avons alterez par nostre artifice, et destournez de l'ordre commun, que nous devrions appeller plustost sauvages. (V205, P211)

> [A] I find (from what has been told me) nothing savage or barbarous about these peoples but that every man calls barbarous anything that he is not accustomed to; it is indeed the case that we have no other criterion of truth or right reason than the example and form of the opinions and customs of our own country … These 'savages' are only wild in the sense that we call fruits wild when they are produced by Nature in her ordinary

> course; whereas it is fruit which we have artificially perverted and misled from the common order which we ought to call savage. (S231)

He points out that the ancient world knew nothing of this part of the world (V203–5, P209–11, S229–31) and wishes that Plato could have known of their simple and pure nature (V206–7, P212–13, S232–3) so far superior to his *Republic*.

> It is a nation, would I answer Plato, that hath no kinde of traffike, no knowledge of letters, no intelligence of numbers, no name of magistrate, nor of politike superiority; no use of service, of riches or of povertie; no contracts, no successions, no partitions, no occupation but idle; no respect of kinred, but common, no apparell but naturall, no manuring of lands, no use of wine, corne, or mettle.[42]

After describing their customs, especially their bravery in war and their polygamy, he relates two comments which the Indians who he met at Rouen made about the French. First they were surprised that the strong soldiers were willing to obey a boy king rather than choosing one of themselves as commander.

> [A] Secondement (ils ont une façon de leur langage telle qu'ils nomment les hommes, moitié les uns des autres) qu'ils avoyent apperceu qu'il y avoit parmy nous des hommes pleins et gorgez de toutes sortes de commoditez, et que leurs moitiez estoient mendians à leurs portes, décharnez de faim et de pauvreté; et trouvoient estrange comme ces moitiez icy necessiteuses pouvoient souffrir une telle injustice, qu'ils ne prinsent les autres à la gorge, ou missent le feu à leurs maisons. (V213–14, P221)

> [A] Secondly – since they have an idiom in their language which calls all men 'halves' of the other – that they had noticed that there were among us men fully bloated with all sorts of comforts while their halves were begging at doors, emaciated with poverty and hunger: they found it odd that those destitute halves should put up with such injustice and did not take the others by the throat or set fire to their houses. (S240–1)

Reading and thinking about the new world prompt some of Montaigne's strongest criticisms of the wrongs of his own society.

When Shakespeare was reading voyages and accounts of the new world in preparation for writing *The Tempest* (1611) he was struck by the passage in which Montaigne listed the characteristics of the new world as a reproach to Plato.[43] He deliberately converted the description from an account of new world customs to Gonzalo's project for founding an ideal colony. Since it is highly probable that the people who wrote the accounts which Montaigne worked from were themselves influenced by More's *Utopia*, Shakespeare's handling of the passage could be considered as returning it to its origins.

> I'th' commonwealth I would by contraries
> Execute all things. For no kind of traffic
> Would I admit, no name of magistrate;
> Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
> And use of service, none; contract, succession,
> Bourn, bound of tilth, vineyard, none;
> No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
> No occupation, all men idle, all;
> And women too – but innocent and pure;
> No sovereignty – (II.1.147–56)

In framing the speech as Gonzalo's legislative proposal Shakespeare introduces the contradiction ('Had I plantation of this isle … and were the king on't' (143–5); 'No sovereignty' (156)) which Sebastian and Antonio mock. By pointing out that the men and women are all idle (Montaigne had not mentioned the women), Shakespeare draws attention to the impracticality of the proposal, underlining it even as Gonzalo tries to anticipate the problem ('but innocent and pure'). As it happens Montaigne took a similar view of the impracticality of ideal commonwealths.

> [B] Et certes toutes ces descriptions de police feintes par art se trouvent ridicules et ineptes à mettre en practique. Ces grandes et longues altercations de la meilleure forme de societé, et des reigles plus commodes à nous attacher, sont altercations propres seulement à l'exercice de nostre esprit … Telle peinture de police seroit de mise en un nouveau monde, mais nous prenons un monde desjà faict et formé à certaines coustumes. (III, 9, V957, P1001)

> [B] Such descriptions of fictional and artificial polities are ridiculous and silly when it comes to putting them into practice. All those solemn long debates about the best form of society and the laws most suitable for bonding us together are appropriate only for exercising our minds … Such political theories might be applied in some new-made world, but we have to take men already fashioned and bound to particular customs. (S1083)

Since Gonzalo's well-meaning conversational diversions are deliberately mocked, it is quite possible that the close repetition of Florio's words here is an intentional signal to the audience that Montaigne is here being joked with. On the other hand Gonzalo is seen as well-meaning and (in the past) strong in defeating tyranny, so the reference (if the audience were able to pick it up) could also be thought of as an affectionate tribute.[44] Shakespeare is as concerned to point out the tyranny of Alonso and Prospero as Montaigne is to show the shortcomings of European views of the Amerindians. Reading Montaigne may well have prompted Shakespeare to develop positive aspects of his portrait of Caliban, but he reacted against the idea of idealizing the new world in order to chastise the old. Reading provided resources for thinking with. In this case Shakespeare's reaction of mocking part of what Montaigne wrote in *Des cannibales* helped him articulate a view of utopian writing which resembled the opinion Montaigne had expressed in *De la vanité*.

Conclusion

A great performance of one of Shakespeare's tragedies provokes a strong emotional involvement. We are forcefully reminded of the fragility of our conventional, comfortable ways of living and of the abysses of hatred and horror which lie beneath. By comparison a careful reading of one of Montaigne's *essais* excites the brain more than the emotions, as we follow the axioms and counterexamples, as Montaigne overlays arguments to the point where we can accept neither side of a contradiction. And yet Montaigne incorporates appalling descriptions of tortures and suicides and when they are read carefully Shakespeare's words prompt new worlds of reflection.

Montaigne's greatest chapters demand to be read slowly in relatively short sequences of fragments. Such a reading enables us to appreciate the force and originality of his logical combinations, to respond to his intarsia of styles. Furthermore it recognizes that each reading of Montaigne will be different, that an analysis which seeks to fix the flux of his responses differentiated with time is bound to fail. Shakespeare's thought operates both in dizzying metaphorical poetry and by enforcing questions and comparisons. Why is this speaker saying this? How are his words different from others'? What does the plot tell us about the consequences of their different views?

One of Montaigne's great achievements is to present us with a character whom everybody wishes to recognize as a friend but who represents changing reactions to events and ideas. He not only depicts passage and process but also persuades and denounces, offers models to others and questions their and his own conclusions. The *Essais* are not simply moral teaching; rather the spirit of reflective self-improvement animates Montaigne's juxtaposing of moral axioms and exemplary stories, and the questions and counterinstances his reflection offers to both. While Shakespeare depicts changeability of response in Hamlet and bewildering moment to moment discontinuities in King Lear, he arouses thought in his audience by counterposing different (and differently valued) viewpoints. The quotations Montaigne culls from his reading provide a similar range of positions to test out.

In the central chapters of this book I have suggested that rhetoric and dialectic offer us Renaissance ways of understanding Montaigne's successive responses to an axiom and Shakespeare's methods of constructing speeches. That procedures for writing should teach you how to read is a corollary of the reciprocity between reading and writing in humanist school practice. Montaigne's thought is driven by his reaction to axioms, usually involving a story (which can stand in different relations to the axiom), support for the idea through various topics or exploration of its meaning, grammatically, through effects and consequences and using amplification. His most characteristic further moves are various expressions of opposition, the turn to the self, in which he reflects on whether the conclusion stated truthfully represents his own experience, and comparison. Some of his most innovative logical moves result from consideration of the relationship between a part or a singular event and the whole context of the time.

Shakespeare constructs many of his characters' speeches by applying the resources of *copia* (including descriptive detail, circumstances, effects and examples) to a simple outline. One character is made to reflect on statements made by another typically by considering consequences, evidence and causes, and especially the motives of the person speaking and the expected response of the on-stage audience. As in Montaigne, many speeches express opposition to a previously expressed idea, including distinctions of senses, contraries and investigations of effects.

There is nothing in Shakespeare's use of his reading to compare with Montaigne's use of quotations to generalize and clarify his own experience (*e.g.*, in *De l'exercitation*, II, 6), to move an argument on (*e.g.*, in *Que philosopher*, I, 20 and *De la vanité*, III, 9) or to formulate a position in such a way that he realizes that he needs to oppose it (*e.g.*, in *De la vanité*). The way in which he quotes Latin poetry to express a heightened emotional state in himself (*e.g.*, in *De l'amitié*, I, 28) might be considered as an equivalent for Shakespeare's imitation of earlier poetry at particularly intense moments (*e.g.*, his use of Seneca in *Richard III*) but more likely it reveals a difference between the two writers. Shakespeare's most intensely emotional moments, at least in the later works, more usually occur when he is writing free of his sources, whereas Montaigne's usually rely on retelling a disturbing story or savouring a resonant passage of Latin poetry. The very occasional comments on the effectiveness of poetry in Shakespeare's plays have nothing like the force of Montaigne's observations on Virgil or his descriptions of the growth of his poetic taste in *Du jeune Caton* (I, 37). Montaigne became a great writer through making himself a great reader.

The method of Montaigne's ethical explorations is unusual for a moral philosopher but normal for a Renaissance reader. He gathers axioms, stories and model figures from his reading and compares them both with each other (since they often contradict each other) and with his own experience. By including different conclusions, and by embracing some of them as his own view at different times, he exemplifies the way practical moral judgement varies according to circumstance. Stories and character descriptions, especially the descriptions of Socrates and Epaminondas, convey his ethical approach more comprehensively and more effectively than axioms. Montaigne denies that he aims at moral teaching but he allows that his aim in writing is to present (one could add, to justify and promote) his *moeurs* (habits and ethical preferences) to an audience.

Montaigne's ethical innovations are founded on a determination to examine what other people ignore, for reasons of custom or social pressure. So he accepts the needs and pleasures of the body. He analyses men's demands on women in the light of his understanding of sexuality. He acknowledges what he owes to his appearance, his social position and plain good luck. He insists on thinking about death, which other people try to ignore, until he realizes that death is only a part of life and that nature will prepare him (and everyone else) for that, just as she prepares them for birth and for eating. While acknowledging and regretting his faults he takes the view that he lives well, in a human way.

Early in the 1570s, not long after taking possession of his house, Montaigne inscribed a set of Latin and Greek moral axioms, largely representing Stoic and Sceptical philosophy, but including some Biblical proverbs, on the beams of his library.[1] For the most part Montaigne uses proverbs as he uses other quotations.[2] In some chapters they are among the more important intellectual stimuli. In I, 9, the proverb that the liar needs a good memory (Erasmus, *Adagia*, II, 3, 74) serves as the hinge connecting two of the main topics of the essay. In III, 2, questioning the meaning of the common saying (*ce qu'on dit*) that repentance follows immediately upon vice helps Montaigne to develop his critical inquiry into the nature of repentance. But proverbs seem especially important, and implicit references to Erasmus's *Adagia* are especially common, in the final chapters. The close of *De la vanité* (III, 9) focuses on Know thyself (*Adagia*, I, 6, 95) and several associated proverbs. The main idea of *Des boyteux* (III, 11) depends on a proverb about lame women and Erasmus's comments on it in *Adagia*, II, 9, 49. *De l'éxperience* (III, 13) begins by examining the proverb 'as like as two eggs' and uses a number of other proverbs as it proceeds. Where Shakespeare uses proverbs to open arguments, to decorate his texts, to generalize and to describe character throughout his career, Montaigne makes much greater use of them in his final chapters in parallel with his movement away from learning and philosophy and towards an appreciation of the wisdom of ordinary people.

The differences in genre and structure between Montaigne and Shakespeare paradoxically serve to highlight similarities in their approach. Montaigne's *Essais* are built around contrasts between maxims and stories and among different maxims. An idea is stated and then measured against narratives, some of them supporting it, others questioning it. Contrasting axioms are subjected to the same type of questioning and testing against Montaigne's sense of his own experience. The local organization of a sequence results from a logical worrying over the connections and contrasts between axioms (and between axioms and narratives), often in turn complicated by new counterexamples, new quotations and new attempts to trace a path among the conflicting ideas. Where Montaigne's narratives serve mainly to provoke, confirm or question lessons phrased as axioms, Shakespeare as a dramatist (rather than the creator of a new learned genre) is obliged to use his narrative sources as the main cohesive and forward-driving structure of his works. But he characteristically adapts his sources so as to introduce parallels and comparisons between the narratives of different characters and he gives them maxims to express, to worry over and to compare with their experiences. The narrative and the histories of the different characters invite the audience to compare the truthfulness and the implications of the axioms spoken by the different characters. Using similar reading, and rethinking about their ideas with similar logical and rhetorical techniques, Montaigne and Shakespeare both offer and develop different perspectives on events with the aim of providing the playgoer and the reader with food to think with.

Sometimes they seem to be working out of the same material but taking it in different directions. In other ethical and political areas comparisons show that their approach and their conclusions are much further apart. Shakespeare's plays demonstrate a fascination with the machinations of practical politics on the basis of a reading of history and of participating in the governance of his company but Montaigne had considerable personal experience of city politics, of the friendship of princes and of negotiations about great affairs of state. In *De l'utile et de l'honneste* (III, 1) he recognizes that princes may sometimes need to break their word or to act deceitfully, because of their responsibility for their states, but insists that he himself would be unwilling to do this, and that he would think badly of any prince who acted in this way without great regret. Personal experience of high politics has reinforced his conviction that honourable behaviour is personally preferable (and almost always politically more effective). In *De mesnager sa* *volonté* (III, 10), in which he gives his most detailed account of his period as Mayor of Bordeaux, he insists on the public man's need of personal time and on the importance of acknowledging duties to oneself alongside duties to others. Shakespeare's close observation of the principles and consequences of political manoeuvring takes account of the need to build alliances (in the fall of Humphrey Duke of Gloucester) and of the benefits of manipulating public opinion (in Henry IV and Prince Hal) but it also depicts the personal costs of political behaviour (*e.g.*, in Clarence in *Richard III* and in the portrayal of the King in *Henry IV part two*). In different ways Hotspur and Falstaff force us to question the basis of aristocratic honour (which Montaigne is relatively comfortable in preferring to utility). Montaigne's position within the state enables him to experience and reject a division of loyalties (and thus resemble Shakespeare's imagination of what political activity feels like for the politician), but perhaps limits his possibility of questioning the bases for his line of conduct. Shakespeare's portrayal of a wider range of points of view extends the possible arguments he can entertain. In the subject of politics it seems that Montaigne can explore deeply the complexity of an individual response, whereas Shakespeare can contrast a wide range of points of view of different political figures. Here each of them takes on the usual advantages of the other.

On other subjects the differences between the two are more striking than the similarities. Shakespeare presents the horror at the heart of human existence and family life in an altogether less reassuring way than Montaigne. Where Montaigne's bitter attacks on human pretension generally have a positive purpose, to instil humility, to reinstate faith and to justify Sebond, *King Lear* presents agony as part of human life from the moment of birth. Where Montaigne hopes that the kindness of a father will encourage a reciprocal love and consideration from his children, Shakespeare depicts the destructive resentments which family closeness and the misapprehensions of love promote. Montaigne's horror stories (largely involving the conquistadores and the history of the Turks) show man's inhumanity, which he depicts as essentially avoidable, as aberrations and reproaches to the hypocritical self-esteem of the European aristocracy. His narratives of the moral decay caused by the French wars of religion are framed as a conservative attack on the folly of attempting religious or political change. Where Montaigne generally contains his horror narratives as part of a moral critique intended to improve the Renaissance man, Shakespeare can present misery as at the heart of all human experience.

Their difference in social position and audience causes a large disparity between their views of the relationship between rulers and people. In his late phase Montaigne expresses his admiration for the behaviour of ordinary people, suggesting that their attitudes to death and misfortune should be regarded as a model for their betters. He wants to learn from the people but he remains quite firmly within the world of the educated landed gentry as his audience and as the people whose attitudes he wishes to change. Shakespeare by contrast almost always adds to his narratives scenes reflecting the reactions and the agency of the non-aristocratic population. The actions of the Old Man and the Servant in *King Lear* provide both models of selfless and caring interventions and reproaches to the responses of the aristocratic families. So far there is a similarity, but Shakespeare also insists on the words and views of the socially marginalized. The gravediggers provide Hamlet with ideas to reflect on and mirror his changed outlook without sharing his disavowal of the consequences of his actions. Falstaff and Eastcheap question the English élite's assumptions about moral behaviour. Caliban, who can acknowledge his faults, nevertheless shows us what the unthinking oppressiveness of European intellectual superiority feels like from beneath. If Montaigne's ethical innovation was to understand the changeability and failings of the individual, that is to say to recognize without despair both human failings and the inextricable human vanity with which they are covered over, then Shakespeare's was to revalue the view from below and insist on the social obligation to compassionate action even in the light of a recognition of the horrors within human existence. The messages we take from Shakespeare and Montaigne reflect our own preoccupations. Using their humanist rhetorical and logical inheritance (derived from Agricola and Erasmus) they refashion elements from their own reading in classical literature to provide their audiences with arguments and narratives to think with, and with models of how thinking might develop.

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Notes

Note on Texts and Acknowledgements

1 Sayce, R., 'L'édition des *Essais* de Montaigne de 1595', *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 36 (1974), 115–41; Maskell, D., 'Quel est le dernier état authentique des *Essais* de Montaigne?', *BHR*, 40 (1978), 85–103; Sayce, R. and Maskell, D., *A Descriptive Bibliography of Montaigne's Essais* (London: Bibliographical Society, 1983), pp. 25–35; Desan, P. (ed.), *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne* (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 297–312, 363–8.

2 Mack, P., *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden: Brill, 1993); *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 'Rhetoric, Ethics and Reading in the Renaissance', *Renaissance Studies*, 19 (2005), 1–21.

Chapter 1

1 Cave, T., *How to Read Montaigne* (London: Granta, 2007), pp. 3, 22–4; Panichi, N., 'Rhétorique', in P. Desan (ed.), *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne* (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 873–6; Lestringant, F. (ed.), *Rhétorique de Montaigne* (Paris: Champion, 1985); O'Brien, J., Quainton, M. and Supple, J. (eds), *Montaigne et la rhétorique* (Paris: Champion, 1995).

2 Mack, P. 'Montaigne and Shakespeare: Source, Parallel or Comparison?', *Montaigne Studies*, 23, to appear.

3 Taylor, G., *Shakespere's Debt to Montaigne* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925); Türck, S., *Shakespeare und Montaigne: ein Beitrag zur Hamlet-frage* (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1930); Ellrodt, R., 'Self-consciousness in Montaigne and Shakespeare', *Shakespeare Survey*, 28 (1975), 37–50; Flygare, W., *Montaigne–Shakespeare Studies* (Kyoto: Apollon Press, 1983); Grady, H., *Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4 Villey, P., 'Montaigne et les poètes dramatiques anglais du temps de Shakespeare', *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, 24 (1917), 357–93; Harmon, A., 'How Great Was Shakespeare's Debt to Montaigne?', *PMLA*, 57 (1942), 988–1008; Parker, F., 'Shakespeare's Argument with Montaigne', *Cambridge Quarterly*, 28 (1999), 1–18; Kapitaniak, P. and Maguin, J.-M. (eds), *Shakespeare et Montaigne: vers un nouvel humanisme* (Montpellier: Société Française Shakespeare, 2004).

5 Mack, P., *Elizabethan Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 12–14. The curriculum of the Collège de Guyenne is described in Vinet, E., *Schola Aquitanica (1583)*, ed. L. Massebieau (Paris: Le Musée pédagogique, 1886).

6 *Essais*, I, 26, V173–4, P180, S195.

7 The syllabus of the Collège de Guyenne is slightly different from the Elizabethan grammar schools but within the general pattern. Philosophy is kept back for

the final two years. There is more work on Cicero's epistles and orations. Textbooks of rhetoric are mentioned, specifically Cicero's *Partitiones oratoriae*. The students read a good deal of Ovid. Persius, Juvenal and Lucan are included.

8 V175, P182, S197.

9 Legros, A., 'Grec', in P. Desan (ed.), *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne* (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 443–5.

10 Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, trans. M. Heath, at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/resources/rhetoric/prog-aph.htm, accessed 30/8/2010; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 14–24, 27–9, 34–43.

11 Erasmus, *De copia*, ed. B. Knott, *Opera omnia*, vol. I-6 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988), pp. 38–90, trans. B. Knott, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 24 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 307–65; Chomarat, J., *Grammaire et rhétoriqu chez Erasme*, 2 vols (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981); Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, pp. 31–2, 42–6.

12 Erasmus*, De copia*, pp. 197–230, trans. pp. 572–605.

13 Erasmus*, De copia*, pp. 202–15, 230–58, trans. pp. 577–89, 605–35.

14 Agricola, R., *De formando studio* in *Lucubrationes* (Cologne, 1539, repr. Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1967), pp. 198–200; Erasmus, *De copia*, pp. 258–63, trans. pp. 635–41; Melanchthon, P., *De locis communibus ratio*, *CR*, vol. XX, cols 695–8; Moss, A., *Printed Commonplace – Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 107–13, 119–26.

15 Mann Philipps, M., *The Adages of Erasmus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Barker, W., *The Adages of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) provides a useful selection based on the translation in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vols 31–6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982–).

16 I owe this suggestion to Kees Meerhoff. Montaigne comments on wanting to give purchasers of subsequent editions something new for their money (V964, P1008, S1091). George Hoffman points out the advantages of this type of publication in obtaining additional sales and retaining copyright privileges, *Montaigne's Career* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 113–18.

17 Paroemia est celebre dictum, scita quapiam novitate insigne. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1993), p. 46; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, p. 5; Mack, P., 'Rhetoric, Ethics and Reading in the Renaissance', *Renaissance Studies*, 19 (2005), 1–21.

18 Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 60; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, pp. 12–13.

19 Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, pp. 64–5; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, p. 17.

20 Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 64; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, p. 16.

21 Proinde si scite et in loco intertexantur adagia, futurum est, ut sermo totus et antiquitatis ceu stellulis quibusdam luceat et figurarum arrideat coloribus et

sententiarum niteat gemmulis et festivitatis cupediis blandiatur, denique novitate excitet, brevitate delectet, autoritate persuadeat. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 64; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, p. 16.

22 Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, pp. 66–8; Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, pp. 19–20; Cave, T., *The Cornucopian Text* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

23 *Mendacem memorem esse oportet*. Quintilianus Institutionum oratoriarum libro quarto sententiam hanc proverbii vice citat: *mendacem memorem esse oportere*. Item Apuleius in Apologia magiae secunda: *Saepe*, inquit, *audivi non de nihilo dici: mendacem memorem esse oportere*. Divus Hieronymus: *oblitus veteris proverbii*, *mendaces memores esse oportere*. Satis liquet adagii sensus, nemper perdifficile est, ut, qui mentitur, semper sibi constet, nisi sit summa memoria. Est autem fictarum rerum memoria non paulo difficilior, quam verarum. Proinde plerunque deprehunduntur hoc pacto mendaciorum architecti, dum obliti, quae prius dixerint, diversa a superioribus loquuntur. Sic deprehenditur apud Terentium Davus, sic Psyches Apuleianae commentum a sororibus sentitur. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-3 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2005), p. 292; *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 33 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 175.

24 Quod quidem si tam esset fixum in hominum animis, quam nulli non est in ore, profecto maxima malorum parte vita nostris levaretur. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 84, trans. W. Barker, p. 29.

25 For example the ring of Gyges, *Adagia*, I, 1, 96.

26 Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-7 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999), pp. 11–44, trans. W. Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, pp. 317–56.

27 Qui nos admonet, uti nos ad omnem vitae rationem accommodemus ac Proteum quendam agentes, prout res postulabit, in quamlibet formam transfiguremus. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 200.

28 Neque quisquam existimet hoc adagio doceri foedam adulationem, qua quidam omnibus omnia assentantur aut vitiosam morum inaequalitatem. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 200.

29 Certe felicissima quaedam et admiranda fuit morum et ingenii dexteritas, qui sic polypum agebat. Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-1, p. 200, trans. W. Barker, *The Adages of Erasmus*, pp. 42–3.

30 Agricola, R., *De inventione dialectica* (Cologne, 1539, repr. Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1967), pp. 1–3; Mack, P., *Renaissance Argument* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), pp. 124–5, 138–9.

31 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 6–177, 355–77; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 130–67, 233–7.

32 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 1–2, 258–93; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 190–202.

33 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 198–201, 378–91; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 203–12.

34 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 197, 413–50; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 218–25.

35 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 354–60, 461–71; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 227–33; van der Poel, M., 'The Scholia in Orationem Pro lege Manilia of Rudolph Agricola', *Lias*, 24 (1997), 1–35; Meerhoff, K., *Entre logique et littérature* (Orléans: Paradigme, 2001), pp. 25–99.

36 [B] De tous les autheurs que je cognoisse celuy qui a mieux meslé l'art à la nature et le jugement à la science. *Essais*, III 6, V899, P942, S1018. Other praises of Plutarch at II, 10, V413, 416, P433, 437, S463, 467.

37 The fundamental reference on Plutarch is Ziegler, K., 'Ploutarchos', in Pauly, A. and Wissowa, F. (eds), *Realenzyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: A. Druckenmüller, 1964), pp. xxi, 636–962. Also Jones, C. P., 'Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works', *Journal of Roman Studies*, 56 (1966), 61–74; Russell, D. A., *Plutarch* (London: Duckworth, 1972); Swain, S., *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 138–96; Duff, T., *Plutarch's* Lives: *Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Pelling, C., *Plutarch and History* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2002). Selected translations of the *Moralia* in English were made by D. A. Russell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) and R. Waterfield (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).

38 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 452F–464D, vol. VI, Loeb Classical Library, trans. W. C. Hembold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 92–159, trans. R. Waterfield, pp. 176–201. I am grateful to Simon Swain for his comments on this essay.

39 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 453E, 454C, 454F.

40 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 456F, 458C–E.

41 *E.g.*, Plutarch, *Moralia*, 455A, D, 460E, 462C.

42 Swain, S., 'Polemon's *Physiognomy*', in S. Swain (ed.), *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's* Physiognomy *from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 125–201, 137–40.

43 V714–15, P750–1, S809–11.

44 V716–17, P752–3, S812; Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, I, 26, 1–10.

45 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 575B–598F, vol. VII, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 372–509, trans. D. Russell, pp. 82–119, trans. R. Waterfield, pp. 308–58.

46 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 582E–583C.

47 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 583C–585D.

48 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 580C–582C, 588B–C.

49 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 588C–592F.

50 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 593A–594A.

51 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 576E–577A, 594B–C.

52 III, 9, V994, P1040–1, S1125.

53 For example the same idea from Plato is used in *Progress in Virtue*, 84F, *On Listening*, 45A and *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,* 56C.

54 Hugo Friedrich's analysis of this chapter emphasizes his discovery of the contradictoriness of human thoughts and behaviour, *Montaigne* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 151–3.

55 Demosthenes, *Funeral Oration*, 17; Horace, *Epistles*, I, 1, 98–9; Homer, *Odyssey*, XVIII, 136–7, quoted in Cicero's Latin translation preserved in Augustine, *City of God*, V, 8. *Essais*, V332–3, P352–3, S374–5.

56 V333–7, P353–8, S375–80, Tibullus, II, 1, 75–6.

57 There are some fine comments on this speech in Kermode, F., *Shakespeare's Language* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), pp. 119–20.

Chapter 2

1 *Essais*, I, 25, V136–8, P141–3, S153–5; I, 26, V150–2, P155–8, S168–71.

2 Horace, *Odes*, IV 2, Seneca, *Epistolae*, 84; Konstantinovic, I., *Montaigne et Plutarque* (Geneva: Droz, 1989), p. 175.

3 [A] Je feuillette les livres, je ne les estudie pas. *Essais*, II, 17, V651, P690, S740. Metschies studies Montaigne's comments on his quotations, *La citation et l'art de citer dans les* Essais *de Montaigne*, trans. J. Brody (Paris: Champion, 1997), pp. 67–78.

4 [A] Je ne cherche aux livres qu'à m'y donner du plaisir par un honneste amusement. *Essais*, II, 10, V409, P429, S459. But he continues: ou, si j'estudie, je n'y cherche que la science qui traicte de moy mesmes, et qui m'instruise à bien mourir et à bien vivre.

5 [A] Les difficultez, si j'en rencontre en lisant, je n'en ronge pas mes ongles; je les laisse là, apres avoir fait un charge ou deux ... Si ce livre me fasche, j'en prens un autre. *Essais*, II, 10, V409, P429–30, S459.

6 [A] Là je feuillette à cette heure un livre, à cette heure un autre, sans ordre et sans dessein, à pieces descousues; tantost je resve, tantost j'enregistre et dicte, en me promenant, mes songes que voicy. *Essais*, III, 3, V828, P869–70, S933.

7 Sayce, R., *The Essays of Montaigne* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 25–8; Supple, J., *Arms versus Letters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 240–2; and especially Cave, T., 'Problems of Reading in the Renaissance', in I. D. McFarlane and Maclean, I. (eds), *Montaigne: Essays in Memory of Richard Sayce* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 133–66; an essay which has been important to me for this whole chapter.

8 *E.g.,* in the notes in his copy of Caesar (P1295–6) or his judgement of Guicciardini (V418–19, P440, S470). Or Montaigne's annotated copy of Lucretius, discussed below, pp. 26–7.

9 [A] Des perfections autres que celles que l'autheur y a mises et apperceües, et y preste des sens et des visages plus riches. *Essais,* I, 24, V127, P132, S144.

10 *Essais*, III, 9, V994–5, P1040–2, S1124–6.

11 Metschies, M., *La citation*; Compagnon, A., *La seconde main* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), esp. pp. 243–352; O'Brien, J., 'Montaigne and antiquity: Fantasies and Grotesques', in U. Langer (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 53–73.

12 [C] Je ne dis les autres, sinon pour d'autant plus me dire. I, 26, V148, P153, S166.

13 Metschies, *La citation*, pp. 92–3. Friedrich points out that because it can be proved that Montaigne sometimes cites texts from compilations we must always keep this possibility in mind, *Montaigne*, p. 34.

14 Aulotte, R., *Amyot et Plutarque: La tradition des Moralia au XVIe siècle* (Geneva: Droz, 1965); Langer*, Cambridge Companion to Montaigne*, p. 2.

15 Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 517, 20–3.

16 Professor Russell tells me that it is not quite certain that Plutarch wrote these works. They might have been collections made by other writers found among his papers.

17 All these observations are based on Konstantinovic's tables, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 26–32.

18 Many of Plutarch's borrowings from the *Moralia* are stories, quotations and anecdotes. Konstantinovic's tables show that the most used sections from the *Moralia* are miscellanies like (using the French titles and the traditional numberings of the Greek text) 15 *Les dicts notables des anciens Roys* (thirty-three borrowings), 16 *Les dicts notables des Lacedemoniens* (thirty-eight) and 63 *Quels Animaux sont les plus advisez* (forty-six). Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque,* pp. 26–7. Somehow 43 *Du Daemon ou esprit familier du Socrate*, which Montaigne undoubtedly used, has been omitted from this table.

19 Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque,* pp. 410–17.

20 Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 271–3.

21 Notes of Céard edition, pp. 366–8; Grilli, A., 'Su Montaigne e Seneca', in *Studi di letteratura e filosofia in onore di Bruno Revel* (Florence: Olschki, 1965), pp. 303–11, concentrates on this chapter.

22 Montaigne, *Les Essais*, eds J. Céard, D. Bjaï, B. Boudou and I. Pantin (Paris: Livre de Poche, 2001), notes pp. 559–62, V350–2, P368–70, S392–4.

23 V92–6, P94–8, S103–7, see notes to Céard edition, pp. 140–5.

24 V247–8, P251–2, S277–8, see notes to Céard edition, pp. 382–4.

25 V264–7, P285–9, S294–8, Xenophon, *Hieron*, I. 11–12, 18, 29, 30, 37, see also notes to Céard edition, pp. 432–7.

26 V601–3, P639–42, S680–3; just about acknowledged by '[A] A cette conclusion si religieuse d'un homme payen' (603) at the end of the quotation (whose beginning Montaigne does not mark). He also edits a few references to Apollo out of Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi*, 392A–393B and introduces a quotation from Lucretius, V, 828–31.

27 Weinberg, B., 'Montaigne's Readings for *Des Cannibales*', in G. B. Daniel (ed.), *Renaissance and Other Studies in Honour of William Leon Wiley* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 261–79.

28 Ménager, D., 'Les citations de Lucrèce chez Montaigne', in P. Ford and G. Jondorf (eds), *Montaigne in Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge French Colloquia, 1989), pp. 25–38; Metschies, *La citation*, pp. 126–9.

29 Screech, M. A., *Montaigne's Annotated Copy of Lucretius* (Geneva: Droz, 1998), pp. 9–10. The notes are now edited by A. Legros in P1188–1250.

30 Fraisse, S., *Une conquête du rationalisme. L'Influence de Lucrèce en France au Seizième Siècle* (Paris: Nizet, 1962), pp. 171–2, cited in Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, p. 25; Villey, *Sources et évolution*, I, p. 188.

31 *Essais*, II, 10, V410–11, P431, S460–1.

32 Compare Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, p. 149.

33 V588–92, P624–9, S664–9; Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, IV, 478–80, 482–3, 486–8, 489–90, 379–80, 499–510, 397, 389–90, 420–4. This series is recalled and concluded in the long quotation (IV, 513–21; V600, P637–8, S678) which leads into the sections from Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch which end the *Apologie*.

34 Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, pp. 460–70 notes a series of seventeen quotations from book three (6A; 11B) in a fourteen page section of the *Apologie*, V542–55, P573–88, S609–25.

35 Montaigne's annotation (Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, pp. 200–1) confirms McKinley's view that Montaigne was aware of Virgil's imitation here, *Words in a Corner: Studies in Montaigne's Latin Quotations* (Lexington French Forum, 1981), pp. 90–1.

36 Coleman, D., 'Quelques citations partielles d'Horace dans les Essais', in F. Moureau *et al.* (eds), *Montaigne et les Essais 1580–1980* (Paris: Champion, 1983), pp. 43–7; 'L'exemplaire d'Horace daté de 1543 que possédait Montaigne', in M. Soulié (ed.), *La littérature de la Renaissance* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1984), pp. 345–55; Holland, A., 'Montaigne et Horace', *Montaigne Studies*, 18 (2006), 67–77.

37 According to the figures in Villey's Table Chronologique, *Les Sources et l' évolution des Essais de Montaigne*, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1933), I, p. 423 both are quoted 148 times or roughly a fifth of the total 739 quotations from Classical Latin poetry.

38 Villey, *Sources et évolution*, I, pp. 237–42; Tarrête, A., 'Sénèque', in P. Desan (ed.), *Dictionnaire de MM* (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 904–8.

39 Seneca, *Epistolae*, 70, on the right time to die is used fifteen times, especially in II, 3; 77, on taking one's own life, nine times, especially in I, 20; 88, on liberal studies, eight times, especially in II, 12; 7, on crowds, seven times, exclusively in I, 39; 20, on practising what you preach, six times, especially in II, 1; 76, on learning wisdom in old age, six times, almost exclusively in I, 42; and 83, on drunkenness, especially in II, 2.

40 II, 12 and II, 37. Villey, *Sources et évolution*, I, pp. 61–2.

41 V455–81, P476–506, S508–35; Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 297–334.

42 V919–20, P963–5, S1042–3; Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 478–9.

43 V929, P974, S1052; Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, p. 480; Konstantinovic shows that the saying is related in two other places in the *Moralia*.

44 V1049–50, P1096, S1188; Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 502–4.

45 V1052–4, P1099–1101, S1192–4.

46 V1077–8, P1125, S1223–4; Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 509–11.

47 In 1595 Montaigne also makes use of histories and ethnographical writings about China, Turkey and Central Asian people, for example in the works of Chalcondylas and Postel. See Villey, P., *Les Livres d'histoire moderne utilisés par Montaigne* (Paris: Hachette, 1908), pp. 113–28 and passim.

48 For the final phrase B gives: ils les preschent et publient, P1769.

49 V909B, P952–3, S1029.

50 V911, P955–6, S1031–2; de Gómara, L., *Histoire générale des Indes*, trans. M. Fumée (Paris: Sonnius, 1578), III, 19, 234v–35r; Villey, *Livres d'histoire moderne*, pp. 81–3.

51 V911–12, P956–7, S1032–4. Gómara, *Histoire*, V, 7, 318v–321r; de Gómara, L., *Historia di Don Fernando Cortes … Tradotto nella Italiana per Agostino di Cravalia* (Venice: Franceschini, 1576), fols Dd3r–v.

52 Gómara, *Historia di Don Fernando Cortes*, fols Dd3r–v.

53 V573–5, P608–10, S646–8, Villey, *Livres*, pp. 77–8, 87–95.

54 250 classical Latin poetic quotations (about one-third of the total) were present in 1580. Figures based on Villey's Table Chronologique, *Sources et évolution*, I, p. 423.

55 Plutarch also writes about Epaminondas in *Tranquillity of Mind* and *Life of Philipoemen*. Quint goes too far in saying that 'Montaigne is largely making up this Epaminondas', Quint, D. *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 40; Hartle, A., *Michel de Montaigne* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 82. Montaigne collects information from his sources and embellishes it in the retelling.

56 V1052–4, P1099–1101, S1192–4.

57 Magnien, M., '"Latiniser en Françoys": citation et imitation dans les *Essais*', in P. Ford (ed.), *Montaigne in Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge French Colloquia, 1989), pp. 7–23.

58 Compagnon, *La seconde main*, pp. 293–4.

59 Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, pp. 22–3.

60 For example Screech, *Montaigne's Lucretius*, pp. 200–1 (noting the passage from Lucretius used in III, 5 as 'imité par Vergile'), 149 (deception of the senses), 318 (not being affected by what happens after our death).

61 V, pp. lvi–vii, lix, lxi. The ownership note in his copy of Virgil makes particular reference to Erythraeus's index. Villey, *Sources et évolution*, I, p. 265.

62 Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 435–7.

63 V578, P613–14, S652.

64 Personal communication.

65 [C] Les belles matieres tiennent tousjours bien leur reng, en quelque place qu'on les seme. V699, P735, S793. Livy, XL. 3.

66 V333, 564, P353, 598, S375, 636. *Odyssey* 18, 136–7, translation preserved in St Augustine, *City of God*, V, 8.

67 V91B, 353A, P93, 371, S101, 396.

68 V427, 697, P448, 733, S477, 790.

69 McKinley, *Words in a Corner*, pp. 54, 63–5. An example of this type is discussed in p. 15 above.

70 Bordeaux copy, fol. Eeee1r, V664, 1027, P702, 1072, S754, 1161. Persius, *Satires*, V, 19–21.

71 This is consistent with his request to the printer to remove repetitions. 'S'il treuve une mesme chose en mesme sens deus fois qu'il en oste l'une ou il verra qu'elle sert le moins', ed. A. Tournon, *Essais* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1998), p. 664.

72 V336C, 754B, P356, 792, S378, 854, *Alexander*, 50–2. Montaigne may also have used Quintus Curtius, *History of Alexander*, VIII.1.21–2.12. The change might reflect Montaigne's stronger antipathy to Alexander after 1588.

73 Floyd Gray provides a classification of seventeen ways in which Montaigne employs quotations, among them that the quotation provides an image, that it improves upon the argument and that it makes the text more concrete, *Montaigne bilingue: le latin des Essais* (Paris: Champion, 1991), pp. 66–70.

74 Lucretius may have been the model for the texture of quotation and assertion here, for in Nature's speech and before it a series of interpolated remarks are commented on by the speaker of the poem. *De rerum natura*, III, 894–963.

75 On a couple of occasions the quotation provides material which anticipates the next point made in the French text.

76 Compagnon insists that Montaigne's quotations are used to back up his points as well as to open links with other texts, *La seconde main*, pp. 282–4.

77 V873–4, P916–17, S987–8. Friedrich points out that the corollary is that French is more fluid and therefore better adapted to portraying fluctuation and change, *Montaigne*, p. 24.

78 Of course Montaigne frequently opposes propositions he has just stated without the need of another voice.

79 McKinley, *Words in a Corner*, pp. 19–23, 69; Metschies, *La citation*, pp. 100–2.

80 V795, 796, 799, 801, 802 (quotations), 800 (example), P835–43.

81 Cave, *How to Read Montaigne*, pp. 10–17.

82 V371, P389, S417, Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, III, 929–30.

83 V375, P393, S421, Virgil, *Aeneid*, IV, 702–3.

84 V374, P392, S419, Tasso, *Gerusalemme Liberata*, VIII, 26, 3–4.

85 V374, P393, S420, Ovid, *Tristia*, I, 3, 12.

86 V377B, P395, S423, Ovid, *Tristia*, I, 3, 14.

87 V375B, P394, S422, Virgil, *Aeneid*, X, 396.

88 Friedrich discusses Montaigne's imaginative and visceral response to poetry, *Montaigne*, pp. 46–51.

89 Haig Gaisser, J., *Catullus and His Renaissance Readers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Wiesmann, M., 'Intertextual Labyrinths', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 53 (2000), 792–820; 'Catulle', *Dictionnaire de MM*, pp. 145–6; Céard, J., 'Montaigne lecteur de Catulle', *Montaigne Studies*, 18 (2006), 109–18.

90 Wiesmann, M., ‘Verses Have Fingers: Montaigne Reads Juvenal’, *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 23 (1993), 43–67. Wiesmann notes that Montaigne quotes Juvenal fifty times, without mentioning his name, *Dictionnaire de MM*, p. 546. Gray shows that Montaigne sometimes quotes in order to say things he does not want to say in French, *Montaigne bilingue*, pp. 77–98.

91 Gray, *Montaigne bilingue*, pp. 70–5.

92 To enjoy your former life again is to live twice. V842, P883, S949.

93 Mix a little folly with your wisdom. V843, P884, S951.

94 What stops you speaking the truth laughingly? V877, P921, S992.

95 V843, P884–5, S951, Ovid, *Ex Ponto*, I, 5, 18; Ovid, *Tristia*, III, 11, 22.

96 Plutarch, ‘Qu’il faut qu’un philosophe converse principalement avec les princes’, *Moralia*, 778B, trans. J. Amyot (Paris: Vascosan, 1572), II, p. 134.

97 V848, P890, S957.

98 V994–5, P1040–1, S1125.

99 V232, P237, S260.

100 V232, P238, S261, *Aeneid*, VIII, 670.

101 V193–4, P200–1, S217–19. The emotional effect of quoting Catullus is discussed in Coleman, D., ‘Catullus in Montaigne’s 1580 Version of “De la tristesse” (1.2)’, *Bibliotheque d’humanisme et renaissance*, 42 (1980), 139–44.

102 *Essais*, II, 31, V718, P754–5, S841.

103 V755, P793, S855. Metschies, *La citation*, p. 121.

104 Friedrich, *Montaigne*, pp. 369–73; Metschies, *La citation*, pp. 120–3.

105 V1065, P1111, S1207 and notes, Erasmus, *Adagia*, I, 5, 10, relating a story reported in Cicero, *Academica*, II, 18, 57–8.

106 V1067–8, P1114, S1210–11 and notes, Erasmus, *Adagia*, II, 3, 68; I, 3, 36. Ruth Calder discusses the role of Erasmus’s *Adagia* in Montaigne’s self-presentation, ‘Montaigne as Satirist’, *Sixteenth Century Studies*, 17 (1986), 225–35.

Chapter 3

1 V563, P596–7, S634.

2 Desan, P., *Montaigne: Les formes du monde et de l’esprit* (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2008), pp. 84, 114, 191.

3 Tournon, A., *Montaigne: la glose et l’essai* (Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1983), pp. 74–104.

4 Montaigne, *Essais I 56 ‘Des prières’*, ed. A. Legros (Geneva: Droz, 2003), pp. 19–22, 83.

5 Cave, *How to Read Montaigne*, pp. 2, 20–6.

6 Gellius, A., *Noctes atticae*, XI.11; Mexia, P., *Les diverses leçons* (Lyon: Cotier, 1563), V.18, sigs Mm2r-3r.

7 Here Montaigne is a little deceptive, perhaps out of modesty. He often does remember (or research) the views of others and it is not his poor memory so much as his questioning of established views which enables him to express his own opinions.

8 'Mendacem memorem esse oportet', *Sententiae pueriles* (London, 1639) sig. A8r.

9 Erasmus, *Adagia*, II.3.74, *Opera omnia*, vol. II-3, p. 292, see Chapter 1, pp. 4–5 above.

10 Friedrich analyses this chapter, *Montaigne*, pp. 145–8.

11 Iemma, P., *Les repentirs de l'Exemplaire de Bordeaux* (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 33, 55, 144–5; Montaigne, *Des prières*, ed. A. Legros, pp. 19–22, 83.

12 Iemma, *Les repentirs*, pp. 25–6, 192, 247; Legros, p. 97.

13 S'il treuve une mesme chose en mesme sens deus fois qu'il en oste l'une où il verra qu'elle sert la moins. Tournon, A. (ed.), *Essais* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1998), p. 664; Iemma, *Les repentirs*, p. 91.

14 Iemma, *Les repentirs*, pp. 92, 103.

15 *Lives of the Philosophers*, VIII.10, also reported in Guazzo, S., *La civil conversazione*, ed. A. Quondam, 2 vols (Modena: Franco Cosimo Panini, 1993), I, p. 84, which appeared as *La civile conversation*, trad. G. Chappuys (Lyon: Beraud, 1580), p. 134.

16 *Galba*, 9.

17 In the C text 'Le bon heur' replaced B's 'La bonne fortune', perhaps to avoid the repetition of the same phrase within two lines.

18 This claim seems to create a contrast with the previous paragraph. Where in clothing and even in health he had claimed that he gave way to despair, here he insists that unhappiness makes him defiant. But perhaps the defiance is a sign of despair, since he goes on to say that he is more likely to reform himself or take steps to improve his health when things are going well.

19 Villey, *Sources et évolution*, I, p. 210 suggests that Montaigne may have read this fragment in Lipsius, *De constantia* (1584) or *Saturnalium sermonum libri duo* (1582).

20 Chaque homme porte la forme entiere de l'humaine condition. V805, P845, S908.

21 Cave, *How to Read Montaigne*, pp. 3, 114–15.

22 I am very sympathetic to Barbara Bowen's insistence on the jokiness of this passage, seen as part of a strategy of destabilizing the reader's normal ethical expectations, *The Age of Bluff* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1972), pp. 104, 118–20, 160.

23 Cave, T., 'Montaigne', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 131 (2005), 183–203 (192, 202–3).

24 I owe this idea to Thomas Docherty.

25 Montaigne, *Les Essais*, eds J. Céard, D. Bjaï, B. Boudou and I. Pantin, pp. 1763–1807.

26 Terence Cave finds that debate is Montaigne's ideal form of interaction, *How to Read Montaigne*, pp. 98–102.

27 Vinet, *Schola Aquitanica*, pp. 24–6, 30–4. For the possibility that Montaigne knew the logic textbooks of his teacher Nicolas de Grouchy see *Dictionnaire de MM*, pp. 447–8, 599–601.

28 V805, P845, S908.

29 Montaigne relates a deception he practised to help a friend in *Essais*, I, 21, V100–1, P102–3, S113–14.

30 Richard Sayce analyses the essay in a different but consistent manner, specifying eleven major topics: (i) vanity, (ii) the state of France and the civil wars, (iii) travel, (iv) household management, (v) society and politics, (vi) Rome, (vii) the composition of the *Essais*, (viii) obligations, (ix) death, (x) the inconsistency of philosophy, (xi) fortune. 'Four of the topics (i–iv) can reasonably be considered the main themes of the essay and these weave in and out of the fabric'. *The Essays of Montaigne*, pp. 269–70. W. Traeger offers a much longer and more complex plan, *Aufbau und Gedankenführung in Montaignes Essays* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1961), pp. 198–206. Barbara Bowen, by contrast, regards this chapter as 'one of the most unified Montaigne ever wrote ... based on the analogy man's life/journey/essays', *The Age of Bluff*, p. 119.

31 Friedrich refers to the elaborate structure of Montaigne's letter to his father on the death of La Boétie to argue that he consciously gave up this method of writing for the *Essais*, *Montaigne*, p. 13.

32 I have compressed this sequence of thought for the sake of brevity, largely but not entirely by leaving out the C additions. I hope I have not misrepresented it; it is better in full, of course.

Chapter 4

1 Agricola, *De inventione dialectica*, pp. 1–2, 258–312; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, pp. 190–202.

2 Muir, K., *The Sources of Shakespeare's Plays* (London: Methuen, 1977); Miola, R. S., *Shakespeare's Reading* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Gillespie, S., *Shakespeare's Books: A Dictionary of Shakespeare's Sources* (London: Athlone, 2001).

3 Sources of this type are reprinted in Bullough, G. (ed.), *Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare*, 8 vols (London: Routledge, 1957–75).

4 Scot, R., *Discovery of Witchcraft* (London: Brome, 1584); Harsnett, S., *Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures* (London: Roberts, 1603); Muir, *The Sources of Shakespeare's Plays*, pp. 202–6, 216–17.

5 Thompson, A., *Shakespeare's Chaucer* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978); Potts, A., *Shakespeare and the Faerie Queene* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958); Baldwin, T. W., *William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, 2 vols (II), (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1944), pp. 417–96, 579–616; Bate, J., *Shakespeare and Ovid* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1993); Gillespie, *Shakespeare's Books*, pp. 87–97, 106–12, 390–403, 469–70, 495–506.

6 Dent, R. W., *Shakespeare's Proverbial Language: An Index* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981).

7 D. A. Russell points out that Plutarch adds Volumnia's speech to his source, 'Plutarch's Life of Coriolanus', *Journal of Roman Studies*, 53 (1963), 21–8 (26).

8 Spencer, T. J. B., *Shakespeare's Plutarch* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 354.

9 Spencer, *Shakespeare's Plutarch*, pp. 356–7.

10 Dent, *Shakespeare's Proverbial Language*, pp. 27, 104, 252. The first proverb is related to He is a fool that will forget himself (F480) which appears in *King Lear* and two other plays.

11 Dent, *Shakespeare's Proverbial Language*, pp. 27, 245. This proverb is also used prominently at the beginning of Montaigne's *De l'oisivité* (I, 8), *Essais*, p. 32, which is often regarded as the original preface of the book.

12 Here the proverb Women are frail (W700.1) is used as a conclusion (or partly to justify and generalize a conclusion) rather than as a starting point, Dent, *Shakespeare's Proverbial Language*, pp. 27, 255–6.

13 Harold Bloom believes that the individuation of Shakespeare's greatest characters depends on their overhearing of themselves, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York, NY: Penguin Putnam, 1998), p. xvii.

14 Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, I.5.50–62.

15 Rosalind sets up most of these agreements at V.3.101–14 and they are repeated at V.4.18–25 and 105–13.

16 Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale*, ed. J. Pafford (London: Methuen, 1963).

17 Rabkin identified the enhancement of two contradictory positions as a feature of Shakespeare's way of seeing, *Shakespeare and the Common Understanding* (New York, NY 1967), pp. 1–12, 27, 30.

18 The first C addition is from Augustine, *City of God*, XXI, viii: Nisi inter se similes essent, non discerneretur species eorum ab animalibus ceteris, et rursum nisi inter se dissimiles essent, non discernerentur singuli ab hominibus ceteris.

19 V1106–7, P1156–7, S1256–7.

20 V916, P960, S1038.

21 V943, P989, S1069.

22 V930–1, P975–6, S1054.

23 V1063, P1110, S1206.

24 V929–30, P973–5, S1052–4.

25 [C] C'est office de charité que qui ne peut oster un vice en soy cherche à l'oster ce neantmoins en autruy, où il peut avoir moins maligne et revesche semence. V930, P975, S1053.

26 [C] La diversité des evenemens humains nous presentant infinis exemples à toute sorte de formes. V655, P694, S744.

27 V124–6, P128–31, S140–3.

28 V127–32, P131–7, S143–9.

29 [A] Les hommes … sont tourmentez par les opinions qu'ils ont des choses, non par les choses mesmes. V50, P258, S52. Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, X. This sentence was inscribed in Greek in Montaigne's library, V, p. lxxi, P1315 (42).

30 V50, P258–9, S52.

31 Osorius, *De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae* (Cologne: Birckmann, 1574), fol. A6r–v. Screech's translation of this passage is based on the Bordeaux copy which has small verbal differences from 1595 (quoted here) in this passage.

32 Osorius, *De rebus Emmanuelis*, fols B4v–6v. Montaigne slightly reorders the narrative and omits some of Osorio's half-hearted justifications of Emmanuel's actions. I follow P's 1595 text here.

33 'not afraid to die for country or dear friends', Horace, *Odes*, IV 9, 51–2. In the Latin quotation the participle can be applied to all singular male persons but the original context supplies the first person.

34 *E.g.*, V699–701, 724, P735–8, 760–1, S793–5, 820.

35 [C] Nous faillons, ce me semble, en ce que nous ne nous fions assez au ciel de nous. V1061, P1108, S1203. Hartle wants to interpret these stories as Montaigne's faith in the role of grace in his preservation, which seems to me too literal, *Michel de Montaigne*, pp. 133–4.

36 Brower, R. A., 'The Mirror of Analogy: *The Tempest*', *The Fields of Light* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 95–122.

37 Robert Maslen suggests that Shakespeare's late plays are particularly concerned with the implications of narrative, thinking particularly of the narratives of the Clown, Autolycus and the Gentlemen in *The Winter's Tale*.

38 Shakespeare, *Othello* III.3.416–33.

39 Shakespeare, *Othello* V.2.337–54.

40 Brooks, H., '*Richard III*: Antecedents of Clarence's Dream', *Shakespeare Survey*, 32 (1979), 145–50.

41 Brooches set with jewels.

Chapter 5

1 Villey, P., *Livres d'histoire moderne*, *Les sources et l'évolution*; Campbell, L. B., *Shakespeare's Histories* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1947); Holderness, G., *Shakespeare's History* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1985); Pagliatti, P., *Shakespeare the Historian* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).

2 V416, P437, S467. Friedrich argues that reading in history is the source of Montaigne's understanding of man, *Montaigne*, pp. 196–206.

3 Plutarch, *Alexander*, 1, trans. Scott-Kilvert, I., *The Age of Alexander* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 252.

4 Pelling, *Plutarch and History*, pp. 102–5.

5 Russell, *Plutarch*, p. 102.

6 Pelling, *Plutarch and History*, p. 302. Pelling shows that Plutarch does not invent stories about his heroes' childhoods.

7 Russell, *Plutarch*, pp. 103, 105–6, 108.

8 Plutarch, *Solon*, 27. I am grateful to Simon Swain for this reference.

9 *E.g.*, *Coriolanus*, 24, 37–8, *Alcibiades*, 18, *Alexander*, 2–3, 14, 17, *Antony*, 75.

10 *E.g.*, *Coriolanus*, 32, *Pericles*, 3, *Alexander*, 17.

11 *E.g.*, *Alexander*, 35, 64, *Pericles*, 4, 12–14, *Brutus*, 2.

12 *Pericles*, 1; Russell, *Plutarch*, pp. 100–1.

13 Translated by Scott-Kilvert, I., *Makers of Rome* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 15–16, 17–18. Pelling shows that Plutarch reverses his source here, *Plutarch and History*, p. 310; Knowles, R., *Shakespeare's Arguments with History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 179.

14 [A] En ces comparaisons (qui est la piece plus admirable de ses oeuvres …), la fidelité et syncerité de ses jugemens esgale leur profondeur et leur poix. II, 32, V726, P762, S822.

15 Konstantinovic, *Montaigne et Plutarque*, pp. 31–2. Montaigne's use of the comparison between Lycurgus and Numa in *De la colere* (II, 31) is an important counterexample, V714, P750, S809.

16 *E.g.*, *Essais*, II 10, V416, P437, S467–8.

17 Montaigne is here working from Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades* or his *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, Konstantinovic, p. 184.

18 *Cato the Elder*, 5, trans. Scott-Kilvert, I., *Makers of Rome*, pp. 125–6.

19 *Cato the Elder*, 9, *Essais*, III 8, V922B, P966, S1045.

20 II 24, V686, P724, S779–80, *Antony* 8.

21 V122–3, P127, S138–9, Konstantinovic, pp. 160–2.

22 II, 1, V336, P356, S378.

23 *E.g.*, I, 20, V84, 89, P85, 91, S93, 99; Konstantinovic, pp. 154–5, 157.

24 V940, 921, P986, S1065.

25 V941, P987, S1066; Bodin, J., *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Paris: PUF, 1951), 295A–6B, 306B–7A.

26 Le peuple Romain avoit accoustumé de se venger de ses ennemis par voye ouverte, les armes en main, non par fraude et en cachette. V790, P829, S892. Tacitus, *Annals*, II.88.

27 What the *poisante experience* was has not been established.

28 Tacitus, *Annals*, II.65–7.

29 The C additions which I have omitted from this quotation add first a maxim from Cicero's *De officiis* in Latin and second the suggestions that a prince might justifiably refuse the offence to his conscience or might decide to commit his people to God's help.

30 Tacitus, *Histories*, III.51.

31 Gillespie, *Shakespeare's Books*, pp. 477–80; Womersley, D., '*3 Henry VI*: Shakespeare, Tacitus and Parricide', *Notes and Queries*, 230 (1985), 468–73.

32 Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, XXIII.2.2–4.1.

33 Wilson, F. P., *Marlowe and the Early Shakespeare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 104–8; Nuttall, A. D., *Shakespeare the Thinker* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 26–7; Hunter, G. K., *English Drama 1586–1642: The Age of Shakespeare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 155–67 prefers to emphasize Shakespeare's contribution to the evolution of the genre.

34 Matthew Black argues that in the case of *Richard II* Shakespeare skimmed Holinshed by reading the marginal annotations and the lower half of the inner columns, 'The Sources of Shakespeare's *Richard II*', in G. Dawson, J. McManaway and E. Willoughby (eds), *Joseph Quincy Adams Memorial Studies* (Washington, DC: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1948), pp. 199–216. I owe this reference to the kindness of Stuart Gillespie.

35 Bullough, *Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare*, vol. II, pp. 13–14; Holinshed, R., *The First and Second Volumes of Chronicles* (London: Harrison, 1587), STC 13569; Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes* (London: Vautroullier, 1579), STC 20065.

36 Shakespeare, *King Richard II*, ed. A. Gurr, updated edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 11, 221–3.

37 For the manuscript tradition of the Latin and English versions of the *History* see Hanham, A., 'The Texts of Thomas More's *Richard III*', *Renaissance Studies*, 21 (2007), 62–84. Goy-Blanquet analyses the incorporation of More in E. Hall and R. Holinshed, *Shakespeare's Earlier History Plays: From Chronicle to Stage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 213–14, 236.

38 More, *Richard III*, ed. R. Sylvester, *Complete Works of St Thomas More*, vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963); *Historia Richardi Tertii*, ed. D. Kinney, *Complete Works of St Thomas More*, vol. XV (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. cxxx–cliv, 314–485; Shakespeare, *King Richard III*, ed. A. Hammond (London: Methuen, 1981), ed. J. Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

39 Hall, E., *Chronicle* (London: J. Johnson, 1809), p. vii.

40 Levy, F. J., *Tudor Historical Thought* (San Marino, 1967, repr. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 170–7, 182–6.

41 Shakespeare, *King Henry VI part two*, ed. R. Knowles (London: Thomson Learning, 1999), pp. 438–43, ed. R. Warren (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 29–31.

42 Levy, *Tudor Historical Thought*, pp. 212–33. Levy says that the dramatists preceded the Elizabethan historians in constructing an organized history.

43 *E.g.*, Richard sending the Bishop of Ely for the strawberries and refusing to dine until Hastings has been beheaded and the scene with the scrivener, based on a paragraph by More. Holinshed, *Chronicles*, III, pp. 379–81, 383; Shakespeare, *Richard III*, III.4.21–79, III.6.1–12.

44 Goy-Blanquet points out that *Mirror for Magistrates* and Foxe's *Actes and Monuments* had made the same move, *Shakespeare's Earlier History Plays*, pp. 64–5.

45 Daniel, *First Four Books of the Civil Wars* (London, 1595) versifies almost the same sections of Holinshed as Shakespeare uses, and reduces Hotspur's age so as to make him a contemporary of Prince Hal. Holinshed, *Chronicles*, III, pp. 20–6 provides names of knights, stories about Glendower and details of the negotiations before the battle of Shrewsbury, which are not in Hall's *Chronicle* and which Shakespeare uses.

46 The connections are described in Green, D., *Julius Caesar and Its Source* (Salzburg: Universität Salzburg, 1979).

47 A. D. Nuttall analyses this speech, *A New Mimesis* (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 106–9; *Shakespeare the Thinker*, pp. 179–84; Honigmann links it with Plutarch's summary of the reasons for the murder of Caesar in the comparison between Brutus and Dion, 'Shakespeare's Plutarch', pp. 26–7.

48 V996, 716, 736, 1108, P1043, 752, 772, 1158, S1128, 811, 833, 1259.

49 I am grateful to Carol Rutter for some of these points about Brutus.

50 Plutarch, *Coriolanus*, 15, 21 and *Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus*, 1–2, 4.

51 Green, D., *Plutarch Revisited* (Salzburg: Universität Salzburg, 1979), p. 210; C. Pelling finds that Shakespeare chooses to develop those parts of Plutarch's *Coriolanus* which were his original elaborations of his main source, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Plutarch and History*, pp. 387–411.

52 Shakespeare omits the controversies about debt and the plan to send some of the plebeians to re-establish the population of Velitrae. Plutarch, *Coriolanus*, 5–7, 12–13.

53 Plutarch, *Coriolanus*, 4; Spencer, *Shakespeare's Plutarch*, p. 300. The passage is quoted in pp. 108–9 above. In North's words: For lack of education, he was so choleric and impatient that he would yield to no living creature; which made him churlish, uncivil and altogether unfit for any man's conversation. *Shakespeare's Plutarch*, p. 297.

54 *Coriolanus*, IV.5, esp. pp. 66–102; Spencer, *Shakespeare's Plutarch*, pp. 336–8; see also Nuttall, *A New Mimesis*, pp. 113–20.

55 Spencer, *Shakespeare's Plutarch*, pp. 360–1.

56 de Léry, J., *Histoire d'un voyage faict en la terre du Bresil* (Geneva: Chuppin, 1578), p. 239; quoted in Weinberg, B., 'Montaigne's Readings for *Des Cannibales*', in G. B. Daniel (ed.), *Renaissance and Other Studies in Honour of William Leon Wiley* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 261–79 (p. 276).

57 Forse, J. H., *Art Imitates Business* (Bowling Green, OH: Popular Press, 1983), pp. 71–99 shows the relative importance of the women's roles throughout the canon, argues that these reflected the needs of the established mature actors who specialized in these roles and suggests that Shakespeare may have himself played Margaret. I am grateful to Carol Rutter for making me give more attention to this.

58 These parallels and comparisons are extended into *Henry IV part two*, IV.3.

59 See Nuttall's superb reading, *A New Mimesis*, pp. 144–7, 159. He compares Hal's approach with Sonnet 94, pp. 153–4.

60 Pagliatti, *Shakespeare the Historian*, pp. 181–245.

61 [B] Ne doibt on jamais se lasser de presenter l'image de ce personnage à tous patrons et formes de perfection. V1109–10, P1159–60, S1260–1.

62 [B] gives the last phrase as: commun, sans merveille, sans extravagance, P1850.

63 Greenblatt, S., *Will in the World* (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 220–1, Goddard, H., *The Meaning of Shakespeare*, 2 vols (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, p. 175.

64 Howard, J. E., *The Norton Shakespeare* (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 1154.

65 Nuttall, *A New Mimesis*, pp. 151–3, 161.

66 *E.g.*, *Henry IV part one*, I.2.74–86, II.5.365–82.

67 Holderness, *Shakespeare's History*, pp. 79–90.

68 Bloom, *Shakespeare*, pp. 275–313.

69 Watson, C. B., *Shakespeare and the Renaissance Concept of Honor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); Council, N., *When Honour's at the Stake: Ideas of Honour in Shakespeare's Plays* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973).

70 [B] Quand la raison nous faut, nous y employons l'experience. V1065, P1111, S1207.

71 V1090–5, P1138–44, S1237–43.

72 H. A. Kelly points out that the role of providence in history was not accepted by all Tudor historians, *Divine Providence in the England of Shakespeare's Histories* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

73 This is the view of Wilders, J., *The Lost Garden* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

74 I, 32, V216, P222–3, S242–3.

75 III, 2, V813–14, P854–5, S917.

76 II, 16, V623, P661, S708.

77 *Henry IV part one*, I.1.1–18.

78 II, 16, V627–8, P665–6, S713–14.

Chapter 6

1 Knights, L. C., *An Approach to Hamlet* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960); Prosser, E., *Hamlet and Revenge* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967).

2 Dodsworth, M., *Hamlet Closely Observed* (London: Athlone, 1985), pp. 46, 53, 90, 248–9, 272–3, 297.

3 In *Tusculan Disputations* I.45.109 Cicero made this comparison with the intention of praising glory.

4 Several of the speeches of *Julius Caesar* embody Roman, rather than Stoic, attitudes to death which are relevant to *Hamlet*. See Monsarratt, G., *Light from the Porch* (Paris: Didier-Erudition, 1984), pp. 136–47, which offers a convincing critique of arguments for Stoic implications in both plays.

5 Friedrich analyses the different stages of Montaigne's response to death, but perhaps overstates Montaigne's rejection of Christian views, *Montaigne*, pp. 258–300.

6 V92–6, P94–7, S103–7.

7 V96, 51–3, P98, 259–60, S107–8, 53–5. See above pp. 92–3.

8 [A] Et l'opinion qui desdaigne nostre vie, elle est ridicule. Car en fin c'est nostre estre, c'est nostre tout. V353, P372, S397.

9 [B] Voylà pas un plaidoyer [C] sec et sain, mais quand et quand naïf et bas, [B] d'une hauteur inimaginable, [C] veritable, franc et juste au delà de tout exemple. V1054, S1194. The text of 1595 is somewhat different here: Voylà pas un playdoyé puerile, d'une hauteur inimaginable, et employé en quelle necessité? P1101. In this instance 1595 resembles B, where the Bordeaux copy seems to give a more revised text. P1826.

10 [B] Ainsi dict un paysan, ainsi dict une femme. V1037, P1082, S1173.

11 Türck, *Shakespeare und Montaigne*, pp. 61–2.

12 Where Harry Levin considers Hamlet a new man in the final act, *The Question of Hamlet* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 94, Martin Dodsworth agrees that he has changed, but not for the better, *Hamlet Closely Observed*, p. 239.

13 Shakespeare leaves the issue finely balanced. She falls into the river when a bough accidentally breaks but floating in the water (and able to sing) she takes no steps to save her own life (IV.7.171–82).

14 See also Granville-Barker's comments on Claudius's inability to repent, *Prefaces to Shakespeare*, 4 vols (London: Batsford, 1963), I, pp. 256–67.

15 I am grateful to Carol Rutter for her contribution to and comments on this section.

16 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, ed. K. Palmer, Arden 2 (London: Methuen, 1982), I.2.286–300.

17 Shakespeare, *Othello*, ed. E. Honigmann, Arden 3 (London: Nelson, 1997), I.3.335.

18 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, III.2.123–30.

19 V847, P889, S956.

20 Salingar, L., '*King Lear*, Montaigne and Harsnett', *Aligarh Journal of English Studies*, 8(2) (1983), 124–66.

21 Montaigne, *Essayes*, trans. J. Florio, 3 vols (London: Everyman, 1910), II, pp. 68–9, V387–8, P406–7, S435. In this section and the next I quote Florio's English translation because there is a possibility that Shakespeare knew these sections.

22 Florio, II, p. 70, V388–9, P408, S436.

23 [A] Quand je pourroy me faire craindre, j'aimeroy encore mieux me faire aymer. V393, P413, S441.

24 V389, P408–9, S436–7.

25 V391, P410, S439.

26 Florio, II, p. 73, V391, P411, S439.

27 Florio, II, p. 74, V391–2, P411, S440. As Carol Rutter points out, there is an element of self-dramatizing here. Montaigne did not actually give his estate to his daughter, nor does he offer to do so here.

28 [C] Ce seroit matière à une question scholastique, s'il est ainsi mieux, ou autrement. V393, P413, S442.

29 V395, P415–6, S444.

30 Carol Rutter shows that the fathers make their children what they are by the way they exercise power within the family, 'Eel Pie and Ugly Sisters in *King Lear*', in J. Ogden and A. Scouten (eds), *Lear from Study to Stage* (Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1997), pp. 172–225 (pp. 175–9).

31 'The only authentic love is between parents and children, yet the prime consequence of such love is only devastation … There is love that can be avoided and there is a deeper love, unavoidable and terrible', Bloom, *Shakespeare*, pp. 483, 487.

32 Florio, II, 12, p. 151, V459, P481, S513–14.

33 Bate, J., 'Shakespeare's Foolosophy', in G. Ioppolo (ed.), *Shakespeare Performed: Essays in Honour of R. A. Foakes* (Cranbury, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2000), pp. 17–32; Henderson, W. B. D., 'Montaigne's *Apologie of Raymond Sebond* and *King Lear*', *Shakespeare Association Bulletin*, 14 (1939), 209–25 and 15 (1940), 40–56.

34 Florio, II, 12, pp. 165–6, V471, P495, S526.

35 Florio, II, pp. 137–8, V448–9, P469–70, S500–2. Montaigne draws on the Bible here.

36 Florio, II, p. 142, V452, P473, S505.

37 Florio, II, p. 181, V484, P509, S539.

38 I have followed Foakes's Arden 3 edition (London: Thomson, 1997) in marking the Folio addition to this speech between superscript capital Fs, because the addition affects the logical progression of the speech. I agree with him that Quarto and Folio represent one play printed in an earlier and revised (Folio) version.

39 Dent, *Shakespeare's Proverbial Language*, p. 227.

40 W. B. D. Henderson points out that Lear's words here echo Vives's *Epistola de Europae statu ac tumultibus*, addressed to Hadrian VI: Utinam principes omnes aliquando in privata vita versati essent, quanto facilius subditorum necessitatibus obsecunderent, et discerent succurrere miseris, non ignari et ipsi malorum, *Opera omnia* (Valencia, 1703), vol. V, p. 168 (I wish that all princes could pass some part of their lives in a private station, that they might know the wants of their subjects, and from suffering themselves, learn to pity those who suffer), 'Montaigne's *Apologie* and *King Lear*', p. 219.

41 The obligation to charity is often linked to the word 'superfluous' in this play and in other Elizabethan literary texts as well as in theology. St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.2.32.5, trans. English Dominican Fathers, vol. II (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 544; Calvin, J., *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. F. L. Battles, 2 vols (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1960), III.7.7; Shuger, D., 'Subversive Fathers and Suffering Subjects: Shakespeare and Christianity', in R. Strier and D. Hamilton (eds), *Albion's Conscience: Religion, Literature and Politics in Post-Reformation England 1540–1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 47–69.

42 Florio, I, p. 220, V206, P212–13, S233.

43 Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, ed. F. Kermode, Arden 2 (London: Methuen, 1958), pp. xxv–xxxviii; Muir, K., *The Sources of Shakespeare's Plays*, pp. 278–83.

44 Lestringant, F., 'La république des cannibales de Montaigne à Shakespeare', in P. Kapitaniak and J.-M. Maguin (eds), *Shakespeare et Montaigne* (Montpellier: Société Française Shakespeare, 2004), pp. 175–93.

Conclusion

1 V, pp. lxvii–lxxii, P1309–16. Legros, A., *Essais sur poutres* (Paris: Klincksieck, 2000).

2 Desan, *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne*, p. 833.

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