

International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas

Politics, Economy, Society -
Transdisciplinary Perspectives

Marcin Grabowski /
Tomasz Pugacewicz (eds.)

Application of International Relations Theories in Asia and Africa



6



PETER LANG

This book discusses the applicability of Western International Relations (IR) theories to Asia and Africa and the rise of non-Western IR theories (especially in Asia), with case studies focused on the Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Sub-Saharan African regions. Theoretically grounded studies of Asia and Africa are still in high demand, as International Relations scholarship on and in those regions seems underdeveloped in this regard. This is the case both in the application of Western theories in research on Asia and Africa, but especially IR theory-building by scholars in both regions. The book is driven by the question, whether we need specific Asia and Africa-oriented IR theories to describe, explain and predict developments in regional international relations or can we apply or adapt the so-called Western IR theories.

Marcin Grabowski is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. His research interests focus on the Asia-Pacific Rim, American and Chinese foreign policies, theories of IR and the International Economics.

Tomasz Pugaczewicz is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. His research interests focus on Foreign Policy Analysis, U.S. and Polish foreign policy decision making as well as history of International Relations in the U.S. and Poland.

Application of International Relations Theories in Asia and Africa

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN ASIA,
AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS

Edited by Andrzej Mania & Marcin Grabowski

VOL. 6



PETER LANG

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

**Application of
International Relations Theories
in Asia and Africa**



PETER LANG

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress

This publication was financially supported by the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

Cover image: © Shutterstock.com/iweta0077

Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck

ISSN 2511-588X
ISBN 978-3-631-67881-7 (Print)
E-ISBN 978-3-653-07021-7 (E-PDF)
E-ISBN 978-3-631-70913-9 (EPUB)
E-ISBN 978-3-631-70914-6 (MOBI)
DOI 10.3726/b15671



Open Access: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 unported license. To view a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

© Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz, 2019

Peter Lang – Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · New York ·
Oxford · Warszawa · Wien

This publication has been peer reviewed.

www.peterlang.com

Contents

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

1. Can We Apply Western IR Theories in Asia and Africa? 11

Theoretical Developments

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

2. Western IR Theories: Analytical Patterns 25

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

3. Ways of Application of Western IR Theories in Asia and Africa 61

Marcin Grabowski

4. International Relations Theory Development in Asia 95

Asia-Pacific Problems

Péter Bobák

5. Japanese Security Policy in Transition – In a Perspective of the
“Normalization” Debate 123

Matthias Haget

6. People’s Republic of China Naval Military Buildup: Constructivist
and Neorealist Explanations 151

Anna Wróbel

7. China’s Trade Policy: Realist and Liberal Approaches 173

Conflicts and Collaboration in the Middle East

Wojciech Grabowski

8. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: A Study of
Arab Regionalism and Integration 205

Paulina Napierała

9. The Influence of Religion on American Policy toward Israel: Is FPA
a Useful Tool for Analysis? 219

Liliana Guevara Opinska

10. Analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Using Realist and Constructivist International Relations Theories: “Operation Protective Edge” Case 249

Julian Laufs

11. A New Perspective on the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Marxist IR, Dependency Theory and the Myth of a “Humanitarian Intervention” 267

African Challenges

Krzysztof Tlalka

12. Why They Participate? Theories of International Relations and the Contribution of Sub-Saharan African States to Peace Operations 285

Mara Stirner

13. The Long Road to (In)dependence: Decolonization of Francophone Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Analyzed through the Lens of Dependency and Neorealist Theory 309

Notes about the Authors 327

Index 331

Preface

Theories of international relations are mostly a concept connected with the modern scholarly discipline International Relations (IR) symbolically created with the establishment of the first Chair of International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth in 1919, and developed especially at American universities, as well as European and to some extent Australian ones. Hence contemporary mainstream IR theories were created in the so-called Western world. As the role of non-Western international relations (especially in Asia and Africa) has been rising, the issue of the applicability of those theories appeared. It was accompanied by a surge in the creation of non-Western IR theories. Both problems – the applicability of the Western IR theories to non-Western regions and the rise of non-Western IR theories – are taken into account in this volume, but the case studies presented are focused on the applicability of Western IR theories to Asian and African settings.

This volume is mostly the result of our collaboration with young researchers (young Ph.D. holders, Ph.D. candidates, independent researchers and graduate students), we worked with between 2013 and 2016. As we have been focusing our research to a large extent on non-European settings, many of our collaborators were asking, if it were possible to apply the Western IR theories we were acquainted with to those regions. In this volume, we try to answer this question by applying different Western international relations theories to studies of Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

As editors, we are obligated to clarify some basic concepts applied in this volume. Firstly, we distinguish between ‘International Relations’ (capital letters, abbreviated as “IR”) as a scholarly discipline and ‘international relations’ (small letters) as social processes occurring at international level (e.g. “Asian international relations”).

Secondly, when we write about International Relations research on Asia without regard to the country (or region) of origin, we are just going to write about “IR”. When we write only about scholars from Asia working on international relations research (“International Relations”), we are going to stress this (e.g. “International Relations (IR) studies in Asia” etc.). By the “Asian International Relations” (“Asian IR”) we understand International Relations research on Asia (developed both in Asia and the West) and, similarly, by “African International Relations” we understand studies on African international relations developed around the world. However, we do realize that the term ‘Asian International

Relations, quite commonly used to describe research on international relations associated with Asia, is relatively often misleading. As Amitav Acharya wrote “The definition of who or what is ‘Asian’ IR is problematic.”¹ Even this prominent researcher was unable to propose and use one definition of ‘Asian IR’ coherently. On the one hand, Acharya wrote that he “would call for including any scholar anywhere working on Asian international issues as part of the Asian IR community” suggesting that he meant by ‘Asian IR’ scientific research (‘International Relations’) on Asia developed in and outside this region.² On the other hand, phrases such as “writings on Asian IR”, “theorizing about Asian IR” and “work on Asian IR” repeat regularly in Acharya’s paper, implying that he mostly understands “Asian IR” as international developments (“international relations”) in Asia.³ There also scholars such as Muthiah Alagappa or Robert Kelly who, by “Asian IR” understand scholars working only in Asia in the field of international relations studies (i.e. ‘International Relations’).⁴ Additionally, L. H. M. Ling and

-
- 1 Acharya, Amitav: “‘Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence?’ Some Reflections.” *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, p. 817. Cf. “We coin the term Asian IR even though it is far from coherent or widely recognized as such”. Ling, L.H.M./Chen, Boyu: “International Relations and the Rise of Asia: A New ‘Moral Imagination’ for World Politics?” In: Gofas, Andreas/Hamati-Ataya, Inanna/Onuf, Nicholas (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*. SAGE: Los Angeles 2018, pp. 134–135.
 - 2 Acharya, Amitav: “‘Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence?’ Some Reflections.” *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, p. 818. Similarly: Acharya, Amitav: “Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR.” In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014, pp. 59–83.
 - 3 Acharya, Amitav: “‘Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence?’ Some Reflections.” *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, pp. 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 824, 825. Similarly: Choi, Jong Kun: “Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea.” *Asian Perspective* 32 (1), 2008, pp. 193–216; Kim, Min Hyung: “East Asia International Relations and International Relations Theory: Where Does a Poor Fit Exist, and What to Do about It.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. 2018. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909618777269>.
 - 4 Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11 (2), 2011, pp. 193–230; Kelly, Robert: “The International Relations Discipline and the Rise of Asia.” *Duck of Minerva*, 2012. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <http://duckofminerva.com/2012/11/the-international-relations-discipline-and-the-rise-of-asia.html>. Similarly on “indigenous Asian IR”: Tan, See Seng: “Southeast Asia: Theory and Praxis in International Relations,” In: Tickner, Arlene B./Waeber, Ole (eds.): *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon and New York, 2009, p. 123.

Boyu Chen point out, that the term “Asian” could be applied not only to research on Asia or developed in Asia but also emerging from Asia.⁵

Additionally, as our research is focused on international relations, we avoided the use of the term ‘Asian studies’ as inaccurate because it refers not only to scholarship on international processes but also on domestic political, economic, societal and cultural issues.

Finally, even when we observe the birth of IR theories developed in the non-Western world, we still refer to the theoretical concepts created in the so-called West as mainstream because they still dominate the worldwide research on international relations.

The publication of this volume would not be possible without the support of many people involved in the project. First and foremost, we would like to express our gratitude to all the authors as they showed enormous patience while adding reviewers’ and editors’ comments and suggestions. Secondly, we are grateful for the organizational and financial support from the Peter Lang editors, especially Magdalena Kalita, and the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the JU, especially Vice-Dean Andrzej Porębski and Malgorzata Jasek. We would also like to express our gratitude to Agnieszka Batko, Iga Kleszczynska and Jakub Stefanowski for supporting us in the editorial process, as well as the to the proof-reader of the text, Michael Doherty. Finally, we are thankful to our wives for their support and consideration as the project consumed much more private time than we envisaged at the beginning.

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugaczewicz

References

- Acharya, Amitav: “Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence?’ Some Reflections.” *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, pp. 816–828.
- Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11 (2), 2011, pp. 193–230.
- Jong, Kun: “Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea.” *Asian Perspective* 32 (1), 2008, pp. 193–216.

5 Ling, L.H.M./Chen, Boyu: “International Relations and the Rise of Asia: A New ‘Moral Imagination’ for World Politics?” In: Gofas, Andreas/Hamati-Ataya, Inanna/Onuf, Nicholas (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*. SAGE: Los Angeles 2018, p. 134.

- Kelly, Robert: "The International Relations Discipline and the Rise of Asia". *Duck of Minerva*, 2012. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <http://duckofminerva.com/2012/11/the-international-relations-discipline-and-the-rise-of-asia.html>.
- Kim, Min Hyung: "East Asia International Relations and International Relations Theory: Where Does a Poor Fit Exist, and What to Do about It." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. 2018. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909618777269>.
- Ling, L.H.M./Chen, Boyu: "International Relations and the Rise of Asia: A New 'Moral Imagination' for World Politics?" In: Gofas, Andreas/Hamati-Ataya, Inanna/Onuf, Nicholas (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*. SAGE: Los Angeles 2018.

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

1. Can We Apply Western IR Theories in Asia and Africa?

Despite the growing body of literature analyzing international relations outside Europe, or even outside the 'Western World', theoretically grounded studies of Asia and Africa are still in high demand, as International Relations (IR) scholarship on and in those regions seems underdeveloped. This is the case both in application of Western theories in research on Asia and Africa, but especially IR theory-building in both regions. This book aims to at least partially fill the gap in the existing literature by applying existing mainstream IR theories to selected case studies of the Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Sub-Saharan African regions.

Asia and Africa cases have been selected for a number of reasons. Asia is currently the most substantial region in terms of its economic potential, population, military buildup or simply becoming the center of gravity in the world. African countries, in turn, are gaining more attention due to growing populations, economies, but also numerous conflicts, especially non-state ones. Africa has also been developing links with Asian states (and applying Asian development models), and the great power competition, especially visible between China and the US, has become an important driving force in African politics and development. These dynamics naturally generate the need to consider linking the sets of events to accurate theoretical approaches.

International Relations theory is a kind of matrix or a tool used for better understanding phenomena in international relations. Therefore, as the Asia-Pacific region, followed by Africa, has become more important in global international relations, a number of questions arise. Whether we need specific Asia and Africa-oriented IR theories to describe, explain and predict developments in regional international relations or we can apply or adapt the so-called Western IR theories is probably the crucial one.

The main research question, driving this publication was, whether we can apply 'Western' IR theories in Asia and Africa, following the assumptions of Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan in the book *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Despite growing theoretical awareness, especially in East Asia (as IR scholarship in Asia has been developing rather well, especially in the 21st century), and to a lesser extent in Africa (as this

continent definitely lags behind), Western theoretical perspectives still seem to have highest explanatory power, hence can be applied in those regions as well.

If Western IR theories are suitable for understanding international relations in Asia and Africa, then the next question arises, whether we should apply one theoretical paradigm or analytical eclecticism would be a better approach. Therefore, the basic goal of this set of essays is an attempt to view different international relations processes via the prism of one or two of the so-called Western theories. In most case study essays from our book, authors applied two theoretical paradigms at the same time, as following normally contradictory assumptions provides a broader analytical perspective.

IR Theory in Africa and Asia

In 1998 the book *International Relations Theory and the Third World* edited by Stephanie Neuman was published. The basic assumption of the book was the irrelevance of IR theories which had been dominant in the 1990s (realist, neorealist and neoliberal) to the so-called Third World due to the Cold War logic of IR scholarship. Therefore, a set of ill-fitting concepts were exemplified, like anarchy not fitting to less developed countries (they are still in a hierarchical system), the idea of the international system itself (as those countries have a kind of alternative system, different from the one mostly theorized about since beginning of the Cold War), rational choice theory (actually not fully relevant in the Western world either), different concepts of the state and sovereignty (with numerous interventions by great powers) and finally, a different concept of alliances (usually weak or somehow enforced by external actors).¹ Even though the described approach seemed correct almost twenty years ago, many developing countries, especially in Asia (to a lesser extent in Africa), have changed and the concepts described above as ill-fitting can be applied to these regions as well.

Challenges to IR theory development in Asia and Africa were then addressed in numerous publications in the early 21st century. One should focus on *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* edited by Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw. This collection of essays addresses various issues concurrently with the book edited by S. Neuman. A crucial difference, one may observe, is an attempt to overcome a kind of exclusion of African IR from global IR thinking, especially IR theorizing. Meanwhile, K. Dunn shows the inadequacy of existing dominant

1 Neuman, Stephanie: "International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?" In: Neuman, Stephanie (ed.): *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. St. Martin's Press: New York 1998, pp. 2–12.

IR theories, of neo-realism (referring to K. Waltz's statement of basing IR theory on great powers), classical realism (referring to H. Morgenthau's idea of Africa as an empty space before World War II) and neoliberalism (focusing mostly on replicating the Western model of economic and political development). Moreover, structuralist theories, usually associated with development in Africa, like Marxism, dependency theory or world-systems theory, are also rooted in the Westphalian state system and analyzing African reality through the Western prism of 'periphery'.²

Additionally, authors in the above-mentioned volume aimed at adjusting basic concepts of IR, like sovereignty, power, states and nations, to the specificity of African international relations and politics, showing that Africa is meaningful for global policy and IR theorizing should also take it into account.³ Despite the abovementioned, realism or neo-realism has still been the dominant paradigm in analyzing African international relations but to some extent approaches, like theories of new wars, are more appropriate to be applied. Even if we refer to regional integration, the neorealist approach may have high explanatory power.⁴

An expectancy to adjust IR theories to Africa has been visible especially since the beginning of the 21st century, as Africa has become an ever more important element of global policy, including Chinese expansion and Sino-American competition on the continent. Many IR researchers around the globe propose wider inclusion of African experiences or scholars, as it may support creation of new IR theories, being better analytical matrixes for international relations in Africa.⁵ Others, however, postulate modifications or exclusion of given theories,

2 Dunn, Kevin: "Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory". In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave: New York 2001, pp. 2–4.

3 Malquias, Assis: "Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges," pp. 11–28; Grovogui, Siba: "Sovereignty in Africa: Quasi-Statehood and Other Myths in International Theory," pp. 29–45; Dunn, Kevin: "MadLib #32: The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in International Relations Theory," pp. 46–63. All in: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): op. cit., pp. 11–63.

4 See Henderson, Errol: *African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015, pp. 19–44, 233–270.

5 Nkiwane, Tandeka: "Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse". *International Political Science Review*, 22 (3), 2001, pp. 279–290; Odoom, Isaac/Andrews, Nathan: "What/Who is Still Missing in International Relations Scholarship? Situating Africa as an Agent in IR Theorizing". *Third World Quarterly*, 38 (1), 2016, pp. 42–60; Smith, Karen: "Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African

not necessarily explaining African international relations, like neo-realism, and arguing that most IR theories actually fit to African international relations.⁶

Authors of this volume definitely support the thesis of applicability and adaptability of the Western IR theories to Africa, even though understanding the need for broader inclusion of African experiences and scholars into the process of modifications of those theories. Economic development in Africa, followed by or preceded by political development in many African countries, makes those theories even more useful.⁷

Nevertheless, IR theory development in Africa has been almost non-existent, and some scholars blame the West for deliberate marginalization of IR researchers from Africa on the basis of colonialism or racism, especially in the past, referring to five categories:

- exclusion as punishment – in a reference to the knowledge-as-power approach,
- representation and positionality – peripheral views play no role in knowledge formation,
- standardization – Africans view politics differently than the mainstream hence do not necessarily fit the standard,
- imperialism and colonialism – resulting in deprecating the African corpus of knowledge, hence making it impossible to encompass them in Western IR theories and finally,
- silencing – removing shameful practices of the past by an abstract approach).

These hamper the development of theoretical reflection on international relations in Africa.⁸ This has definitely been only one of the reasons for the

Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations”. *The Round Table*, 98 (402), 2016, pp. 269–284.

- 6 Brown, William: “Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and Statehood”. *Review of International Studies*, 32 (1), 2006, pp. 119–143.
- 7 One can’t forget about fragile/dysfunctional states, however, as especially realist/neo-realist theories cannot be applied in those cases. More about this issue in Kłosowicz, Robert/Mania, Andrzej: *Problem upadku państw w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2012; Kłosowicz, Robert: *Konteksty dysfunkcyjności państw Afryki Subsaharyjskiej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2017; Jones, Branwen: “Africa and the Poverty of International Relations”. *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (6), 2005, pp. 987–1003.
- 8 See: Fredua-Mensah, Keshia: “Intellectual Gatekeeping – The Metatheoretical Challenges of Incorporating Africa into International Relations Theory”. In: Peters, Ingo/Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.), *Globalizing International Relations: Scholarship amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2016, pp. 81–106.

underdevelopment of African IR theory, but we should have those issues in mind as well.

Broader analysis of non-Western IR theory was published in the book *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (2010) edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan.⁹ It begins with a famous essay, *Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?* authored by A. Acharya and B. Buzan. The authors refer to the problem of the lack of IR theory in Asia, but also issues connected with the incompatibility of the Western, especially the American, positivist approach to IR theory with Asian approaches, and challenges with applying Western theories to non-Westphalian systems (e.g. Chinese tributary system, Sinocentric world order and Confucian culture). Therefore the most important Asian players do not fit into realist or liberal categories in IR theory, as China is trying not to be perceived as a threat to the global system, and Japan as a 'normal' great power. Acharya and Buzan classifies South Korea and Japan as fitting better into the realist paradigm, with Southeast Asia being difficult to be analyzed, no matter what paradigm is applied.¹⁰

The situation described above has been changing recently with growing IR scholarship in Asia, and an attempt to find proper approaches to applying Western IR theories, but also previewing Asian attempts at IR theorizing will be made in this volume. This dual approach is legitimized especially in the case of Asia, as states in Asia become more Western-like in their political and economic development; hence application of existing Western IR theories is justified analytically. At the same time, development of IR theorizing in Asia allows us to expect new tools, better adapted to local conditions. In the case of Africa, we may expect similar developments with a certain delay, compared with Asia.

Theoretical Development

The first part of this book is focused on the theoretical background of the analysis in reference to case studies evaluated later. Marcin Grabowski and Tomasz Pugacewicz provide a brief overview of selected mainstream theoretical

9 Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.

10 Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?: An Introduction". In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 2–4 (about sources of Western domination in IR theory, see pp. 16–22).

paradigms applied by other authors in this volume. They focus on the historical development, the main assumptions and selected theories within those paradigms, as well as their applicability in studies on non-Western international relations. We can find discussion of realism (including classical realism, structural realism, neoclassical realism, strategic realism and brief references to theories like hegemonic stability theory or power transition theory), social constructivism, liberalism (with sociological liberalism, republican liberalism, institutional liberalism and interdependence), rationalism (or the English School) and finally critical theories (or neo-Marxist ones). Brief reference is also made to analytic eclecticism and foreign policy analysis (FPA).

Chapter 3 in this volume, authored by Marcin Grabowski and Tomasz Pugacewicz, refers to IR theory and attempts to show how those Western IR theories were adapted in scholarship on Asia and Africa. Again, the usefulness of realism, the most widespread paradigm in Asia, and to a limited extent in Africa (due to the fact that nation-states are less powerful in Africa than in other continents) is analyzed. Constructivism has been quite promising in both Asian IR (with growing importance in the 21st century, especially in China), but also quite valuable in African IR, as construction of African identity, to a large extent in a reference to ethnicity and nationalism is sometimes described as a core for Pan-African IR theory building. In terms of liberalism, institutional liberalism connected with regionalism and regional integration seems most useful in the case of both Asia and Africa, even though regional institutions are rather weak in comparison with their Western counterparts. The English School is used as an analytical paradigm in the region, but mostly in East Asia, even though a set of obstacles may be observed. Finally, critical or Marxist theories were used extensively in the past in peripheral (as non-mainstream) theorizing, but we may still find many examples when those theories are used to explain underdevelopment, especially in Africa.¹¹

11 This chapter is based especially on analysis of different theoretical paradigms adaptation in Asia and Africa from: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014; Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010; Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001; Henderson, Errol: *African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015.

This chapter is followed by Marcin Grabowski's analysis of International Relations scholarship development in the Asia-Pacific, including its Asian ancient philosophical roots, and historical development, as well as a reference to developments of theories in different Asian subregions. Deep analysis of Chinese IR scholarship portrays it as the most developed and theoretical one, also due to the fact that theory reception and development has been visible in China, especially after the end of the Cold War due to human and financial resources. Generally Northeast Asia has more achievements in this regard, as not only in China, but also in Japan and South Korea, we can observe development of theoretically grounded research, a growing number of study programs, scholarly journals focused on theoretical issues and finally attempts (not necessarily successful) at creation of homegrown theories. Both Southeast Asia and South Asia definitely lag behind, and despite some political leaders that influenced IR theory development in those regions, the quality of theory driven research is relatively poor, with almost no influential indigenous theorizing (even though we have attempts like the Singapore School based on the concept of Asian Values). As African IR theorizing still lags behind, we have decided to present the development of IR theorizing only in Asia.

Asia-Pacific Problems

Three subsequent sections of this book are devoted to different parts of the world (Asia-Pacific – chapters 5–7, Middle East – chapters 8–11, and Africa – chapters 12–13 respectively) and feature case studies authored usually by young scholars from different countries. The first section is focused mostly on current Asia-Pacific security and development problems.

The Japanese foreign and security policy transition from a traditionally defensive position toward a more autonomous one is analyzed by Peter Bobak in chapter 5¹². The author focuses on the second Abe Cabinet, and states that Japan has been in transition to become a 'normal country' in the security sphere.

12 Last years, especially in the second term of prime minister Shinzo Abe, we may observe rising Japanese effort to become the so-called a normal nation. Cf.: Abe, Shinzo/Tepperman, Jonathan: "Japan is Back: A Conversation With Shinzo Abe". *Foreign Affairs*, 92 (4), 2013, pp. 2–8; Lift, Adam: "Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary". *The Washington Quarterly*, 38 (2), 2015, pp. 79–99; Hughes, Christopher: *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism or New Dead End?* Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015; Dobson, Hugo: "Is Japan Really Back? The 'Abe Doctrine' and Global Governance". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47 (2), 2017, pp. 199–224.

Both internal and external forces are analyzed in the paper, including the United States' pressure and an insecure regional order as crucial external factors, and a growing positive attitude for restoration Japan as a 'normal' military power, while opposing traditionally pacifist groups. This chapter references to a wide variety of theoretical paradigms, including realism, liberalism, constructivism, but using mostly so-called analytic eclecticism, as defined by Peter Katzenstein.¹³

In the following chapter 6, Matthias Haget considers whether China may become a superpower, analyzing its naval build-up through the prism of constructivist and neorealist paradigms. Maritime military capabilities have been selected, as they are perceived as a crucial factor of the shift in the distribution of relative military strength between the West and Asia, and especially China. In order to do so, China had set strategic guidelines for the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy and has followed them in its objective of building blue water naval capabilities in the following decades. The analysis is based on neorealist assumptions with a focus on future security threats in the international system, dominated by an actual naval power, the United States, the growing naval power of India and the constructivist approach of Chinese self-image as a peaceful, responsible and confident emerging regional and eventually global power.¹⁴

Finally, Anna Wróbel in chapter 7 employed realist and liberal paradigms for an analysis of Chinese trade policy. She traces the factors that have so far shaped and are still shaping the competitive position of China and influence contemporary international economic relations. It is important also in the context of classifying China as a triad country (in the understanding of Kenichi Ohmae that has changed since 1990, when Asian countries, other than Japan joined),¹⁵ and the broader concept of changing distribution of competitive forces in the global economy. Changing distribution of those competitive forces and the increasing role of China has resulted to a large extent from Chinese trade policy. Out of three theories usually applied to such studies, i.e. realism, liberalism and Marxism, the first two were selected. Even though those theories are contradictory in their nature, the study shows that we cannot interpret this case without applying both of them, hence to some extent justifying the need for analytic eclecticism.

13 Cf.: Sil, Rudra/Katzenstein, Peter: *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010, pp. 9–48.

14 Cf.: Tayloe, Shane: "Crossover Point: How China's Naval Modernization Could Reverse the United States' Strategic Advantage". *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 4 (1), 2017, pp. 1–25; Ji, You: "The Chinese Navy, Its Regional Power and Global Reach". *Strategic Analysis*, 36 (3), 2012, pp. 477–488.

15 Ohmae, Kenichi: *Triad Power*. Free Press-Collier Macmillan, New York-London 1985.

Middle East – Cooperation and Conflict

Middle Eastern problems analyzed in the volume are quite broad, with issues of cooperation and integration, causes of external powers' engagement and finally regional conflicts.

Chapter 8, authored by Wojciech Grabowski, focuses on cooperative efforts within the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (created in 1981), as it is a rather exceptional case in the Middle East due to a conflicting environment (caused by internal and external factors). Basing on the classical integration theories of Ernst Haas (neofunctionalism) and Karl Deutsch (transactionalism) and comparison with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) charter, the author finds a vital gap between theory of integration and GCC Charter objectives, causing a downturn of the integration process.¹⁶

A different level of theorizing, focusing on domestic causes of certain foreign policy activities, is applied by Paulina Napierała in her chapter 9 on religious influence on American policy toward Israel. Rooted in a foreign policy analysis with constructivist inclinations, she has analyzed the role of Christian Zionism represented, especially recently, by the American Religious Right as an important lobbying force shaping US foreign policy. The text was driven by a hypothesis that the influence of Christian Zionism on American policy toward Palestine/Israel (throughout the 20th and 21st century) can be analyzed through certain models of FPA – especially those that consider the impact of pressure groups on the foreign policy decision-making process.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a special focus on the 'Operation Protective Edge' of 2014 is the subject of Liliana Guevara-Opinska's text. She has raised the almost unrealistic issue of finding a solution to a conflict which has lasted more than 70 years, since Israel's inception. She refers to two prominent theoretical paradigms, namely realism and constructivism, hoping to create a framework for analysis of complex problems by simplifying them without disregarding crucial elements and important nuances in the process. Not necessarily seeing a solution to the long-lasting conflict, she has concluded that constructivism has provided richer, although more complex, analytical framework and depth.

16 Cf.: Hass, Ernst: *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964; Deutsch, Karl: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1957.

Another conflict, namely the Iraq War of 2003 was analyzed in chapter 11 by Julian Laufs, questioning the concept of humanitarian intervention in the analyzed case, and basing on Marxist theory. This controversial and highly criticized American intervention, following a long history of bloodshed and hostilities in the Gulf region was portrayed as a 'humanitarian intervention' by those engaged, and a type of 'resource war' by others. Based on the Marxist theory of international relations, Laufs puts forward an argument that the term 'humanitarian intervention' is not only inappropriate, but absolutely wrong in this case, with a multilevel analysis revealing an economic profit-oriented agenda as a main driver of the conflict. Such an agenda made a peaceful solution of the conflict virtually impossible.

Africa – Shall We Blame It or Ourselves?

Africa has long been forgotten both as a subject in international relations, and especially as a source of knowledge, let alone IR theorizing. It has often been perceived as a battlefield of global powers and regional wars of a new type, based on ethnic and nationalistic resentments, caused to a large extent by European colonial powers.

Krzysztof Tłałka's extensive study in chapter 12 looks at the important problem of peacekeeping in Africa, analyzing the causes of African states' contributions of troops to the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations despite domestic security and socio-economic challenges. The analysis was conducted on the basis of realist and liberal theories with reference to a set of case studies (a regional power – Ethiopia; a mid-range power – Ghana; and a small state – Burundi). Both paradigms, neorealist and liberal, proved their usefulness in the theoretical explanation of this phenomenon, with the higher explanatory power of realism.

The final study on Africa, authored by Mara Stirner, analyzes Francophone Africa in the light of critical theories, focusing on dependency theory, but contradicting it with a neorealist approach. Despite withdrawal from eighteen former colonies, France has actually not fully decolonized the region, changing its interference strategy to neo-dependence by influencing the political and economic situation of those countries as security guarantor, development worker, banker or terrorist fighter.

References

- Abe, Shinzo/Tepperman, Jonathan: "Japan is Back: A Conversation with Shinzo Abe". *Foreign Affairs*, 92 (4), 2013, pp. 2–8.
- Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.

- Brown, William: "Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and Statehood". *Review of International Studies*, 32 (1), 2006, pp. 119–143.
- Deutsch, Karl: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1957.
- Dobson, Hugo: "Is Japan Really Back? The 'Abe Doctrine' and Global Governance". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47 (2), 2017, pp 199–224.
- Dunn, Kevin: "Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory". In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave: New York 2001.
- Fredua-Mensah, Keshia: "Intellectual Gatekeeping – The Metatheoretical Challenges of Incorporating Africa into International Relations Theory". In: Peters, Ingo/Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.), *Globalizing International Relations: Scholarship amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2016.
- Hass, Ernst: *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Henderson, Errol: *African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015.
- Hughes, Christopher: *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism or New Dead End?* Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015.
- Ji, You: "The Chinese Navy, Its Regional Power and Global Reach". *Strategic Analysis*, 36 (3), 2012, p. 477–488.
- Jones, Branwen: "Africa and the Poverty of International Relations". *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (6), 2005, pp. 987–1003.
- Kłosowicz, Robert: *Konteksty dysfunkcyjności państw Afryki Subsaharyjskiej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2017.
- Kłosowicz, Robert/Mania, Andrzej: *Problem upadku państw w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2012.
- Lift, Adam: "Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary". *The Washington Quarterly*, 38 (2), 2015, pp. 79–99.
- Neuman, Stephanie: "International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?". In: Neuman, Sephanie (ed.): *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. St. Martin's Press: New York 1998.
- Nkiwane, Tandeka: "Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse". *International Political Science Review*, 22 (3), 2001, pp. 279–290.

- Odoom, Isaac/Andrews, Nathan: "What/Who is Still Missing in International Relations Scholarship? Situating Africa as an Agent in IR Theorizing". *Third World Quarterly*, 38(1), 2016, pp. 42–60.
- Ohmae, Kenichi: *Triad Power*. Free Press-Collier Macmillan: New York-London 1985.
- Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- Sil, Rudra/Katzenstein, Peter: *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010.
- Smith, Karen: "Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations". *The Round Table*, 98 (402), 2016, pp. 269–284.
- Tayloe, Shane: "Crossover Point: How China's Naval Modernization Could Reverse the United States' Strategic Advantage". *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 4 (1), 2017, pp. 1–25.

Theoretical Developments

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

2. Western IR Theories: Analytical Patterns

Abstract: *This chapter aims at a brief description of main theoretical paradigms in Western International Relations scholarship. Five dominant theories were selected, namely realism, constructivism, liberalism, the English School (international society theory) and critical theory (Marxism), with short introduction to foreign policy analysis (FPA). In each case, the main assumptions, historical developments and selected particular theories within a given paradigm are discussed in this text. All these paradigms were used as analytical patterns in case studies presented in this volume, and focusing on Asian and African problems of international relations in the 21st century.*

Keywords: realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, English School

Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to describe the main Western International Relations theoretical paradigms that have been applied as analytical patterns in the case studies published in this book. We have focused on five of them in the order in which they appear in the case studies published in this volume, including realism, constructivism, liberalism, the English School (international society theory) and critical theory (Marxism). The realist approach is the most widespread among the texts published and has been applied by Peter Bobak, Matthias Haget (in its neo-realist form), Liliana Guevara-Opinska, Mara Stirner, Anna Wróbel and Krzysztof Tłałka (as neo-realism). Liberal theories have been applied by Peter Bobak, Anna Wróbel (in its economic dimension), Krzysztof Tłałka and to some extent by Wojciech Grabowski (referring to regionalism). The critical or Marxist school has been applied by Julian Laufs and Mara Stirner. The constructivist approach is visible in articles by Peter Bobak, Matthias Haget and Liliana Guevara-Opinska. We can find limited reference to international society tradition (English School) in Julian Laufs' text, actually contradicting the concept of humanitarian intervention from the Marxist point of view. We have also foreign policy analysis (FPA) applied by Paulina Napierała. In most cases two theoretical paradigms are juxtaposed in order to contrast them with each other. In some cases, we have utilized more paradigms, ending at analytic eclecticism (Peter Bobak).

This chapter is organized in the following way: the main assumptions of theoretical paradigms, their historical development and particular theories are presented, depending on the applicability of such an approach.

Realism in International Relations

Main Assumptions

Realism is perceived as the most influential theoretical paradigm in world-wide IR. To a large extent this is due to the fact that IR is a distinctly US-based discipline. American IR academia seems to be the most influential in the world, both in terms of practical application (many prominent politicians have been IR theorists, especially realists¹) and influence on the discipline. Realism theorists define states as the principal actors in international relations, hence in an anarchical world (stemming from the absolute sovereignty of states), having no decision making center or global government. The international system is a system of unitary and homogenous units, with meaningless domestic policies (government policy may be identified as state policy). Realists focus on description and analysis of the world 'as it is' (not the ideal, 'as it should be'), with a pessimistic vision, not only of human nature, but also of states and the international system. States generally conduct a rational policy, having in mind security dilemmas, and attempt to achieve goals by choosing the best solutions possible by applying available resources.²

Simplifying the issue, we may say that a basic dilemma for realism is the problem of power, as security and survival in a dangerous world depends on power, as well as on the position of the state in the system, dividing states into powers (superpowers) and less important states, solving irresolvable conflicts by waging wars. The central issue of the realist paradigm is the security dilemma.³

-
- 1 Like George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Aaron Friedberg.
 - 2 Description of realism as an IR paradigm is to a large extent based on the book: Grabowski, Marcin: *Wiek Pacyfiku – polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec region Azji i Pacyfiku po roku 1989*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2012, pp. 23–25. Its structure is based on Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg: *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2016, pp. 61–95.
 - 3 The security dilemma concept may be rooted in Thomas Hobbes' thinking, seeing the state as an escape from the state of nature (limiting their evil dispositions). Such a limitation is impossible in the anarchical international system; therefore states aim at increasing their relative power, causing similar reactions by their counterparts. Even if other states increase their defensive power, other states need to counteract, as it

Having in mind such an international system, each state aims at increasing its relative power, interpreted as control over resources, other actors and events and their results. Interdependence in realism is not necessarily understood as a positive aspect in international relations, but rather an additional risk, as it increases vulnerability.⁴

Historical Development

Realism is deeply rooted in classical political thought, both in the Western and Eastern traditions, including scholars such as Thucydides (5th c. BC) and his *History of the Peloponnesian War*; Niccolo Machiavelli (14th–15th c.) and *The Prince*; Thomas Hobbes (16th–17th c.) and *Leviathan*; Carl von Clausewitz (18th–19th c.) and his *On War*; and Sun Tzu (6th–5th c. BC) and his *Art of War* in China, as well as Kautilya (4th–3rd c. BC) and his *Arthashastra* in India. They definitely influenced modern political or IR thought, but will not be deeper analyzed in this chapter.⁵

limits their position in the system, hence arm themselves, also due to the unknown intentions of their counterparts. One should also take into consideration the fact that security dilemma should be understood differently for offensive and defensive realists. See more about security dilemma and ways of limiting it: Montgomery, Evan: “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty”. *International Security*, 36 (2), 2006, pp. 151–185; Tang, Shiping: “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis”. *Security Studies*, 18 (3), 2009, pp. 587–623; Schweller, Randall: “Neorealism’s Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” *Security Studies*, 5 (3), 1996, pp. 90–121. Comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon: Both, Ken/Wheeler, Nicholas: *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2008.

- 4 Cf.: Donnelly, Jack: “Realism”. In: Burchill, Scott/Devetak, Richard/Linklater, Andrew/Patterson, Matthew/Seus-Smit, Christian/True, Jacqui: *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2005, pp. 25–64; Dougherty, James/Pfaltzgraff, Robert: *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 1990, pp. 81–135; Jorgensen, Knud: *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2018, pp. 88–112; Lebow, Richard: “Classical Realism”. In: Dunne, Tim/Kurki, Milja/Smith, Steve: *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013, pp. 34–50. Comprehensive survey of realist paradigm: Guzzini, Stefano: *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. Routledge: London-New York 1998.
- 5 See more about classical realism at: Viotti, Paul/Kauppi, Mark: *International Relations Theory*. Pearson: New York 2010, pp. 45–51; Monoson, Sara/Loriaux, Michael: “Pericles, Realism, and the Normative Conditions of Deliberate Action,” pp. 27–51, Williams,

The 20th century development of realism should be associated especially with two thinkers, namely E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, even though we may find other influential theoreticians of this paradigm, like John Herz.⁶ Carr is mostly associated with his prominent book *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, published initially in 1939, with a better-known second edition of 1946, slightly modified due to the tragedy of World War II. He introduces especially the dichotomy between 'utopians' ('idealists') and 'realists', demonstrating realism's focus on the 'real world', but also trying to show the limits of realism, and define the concept of power based on economic power, military power and power over opinion.⁷ Without doubt, the most prominent thinker of modern realism was Morgenthau. In his book *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* he defined six principles of political realism:⁸

- 1) Politics and society are ruled by objective laws, having roots in human nature, being constant throughout centuries; political realism theory requires

Michael: "The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: Three Traditions," pp. 253–276, Reid, Julian: "Re-appropriating Clausewitz: The Neglected Dimensions of Counter-Strategic Thought," pp. 277–295. All three in: Jahn, Beate (ed.), *Classical Theory in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006; Jackson, Robert: *Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2005, pp. 17–37. As for Asian thought, see the collection of essays: Liebig, Michael/Mishra, Saurabh (eds.): *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun-Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*. Pentagon Press: New Delhi 2017.

- 6) Important concepts of modern realism, including 'security dilemma' were also introduced by John Herz, who was not necessarily an orthodox realist, but defined himself in the 'realist liberalism' paradigm, and tried to address some constraints of traditional realism. Herz, John: "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma". *World Politics*, 2 (2), 1950, pp. 157–180. His most prominent book was: Herz, John: *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1951.
- 7) The author explains slight modifications between editions published in 1939 and 1946 by the fact that the book would have to be totally rewritten otherwise. Carr, E.H.: *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Macmillan Press: London 1946, pp. ix-x, 11–21, 89–94, 102–145.
- 8) One should remember, however, it was not the part of the original book published in 1948, but was added in subsequent editions. Cf.: Morgenthau, Hans: *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf: New York 1948. Many ideas, constituting a modern, systematic approach to realism were presented in his earlier book: Morgenthau, Hans: *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*. Latimer House Limited: London 1947 (first edition published in 1946).

- approaching political reality and its meaning, by seeking the goals of certain activities from the point of view of a statesman;
- 2) Political realism finds its way in international politics on the basis of the concept of interest defined in terms of power; the political sphere should be defined independently from economics, ethics, aesthetics or religion;
 - 3) The concept of interest (power) is an objective, universally valid category; realism assumes that the current system of states may be changed (by e.g. creation of supranational units), if such a change would limit the security dilemma;
 - 4) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to states' actions, as they have to be analyzed in the context of given circumstances, time and place, as the state cannot sacrifice the security of its citizens to those moral principles;
 - 5) Realists refuse the imposition of the moral principles of one nation as universal upon others, as such actions may lead to the destruction of nations or civilizations;
 - 6) Real and profound differences between realism and other schools of political thought exist.⁹

Additionally, Morgenthau developed an important set of IR concepts, including problems of peace, imperialism and the balance of power, but especially the multidimensional concept of power itself. This concept was broadly used thereafter, but not so often referred to Morgenthau himself. This prominent scholar focused not only on geography, natural resources, industrial capacity and military preparedness, but also on national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy and quality of government, taking into account domestic issues (providing also analysis of power evaluation and its errors, including the fallacy of singular factors – geopolitics, nationalism or militarism, still faced today). On the other hand, he focused on the international limitations of national power, including international morality and international law.¹⁰

-
- 9 In order to illustrate those differences and legal-moralist approaches to IR, Hans Morgenthau analyzed historical cases, like the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939, communist government in China or the engagement of the UK in the war with Germany in 1914. Morgenthau, Hans/Thompson, Kenneth: *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf: New York 1985, pp. 4–17 (double authorship results from the fact that the book was revisited by Kenneth Thompson).
 - 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 115–326. More about Hans Morgenthau's theory: Jervis, Robert: "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics". *Social Research*, 61 (4), 1994, pp. 853–876; Tucker, Robert: "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism.'" *American Political Science Review*, 46 (1), 1952, pp. 214–224; Gellman, Peter: "Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism". *Review of International*

Types of Realist IR Theories

One of many realist theories is strategic realism, introduced in the 1960s by Thomas Schelling¹¹ (principally an economist) which brings us closer to the problem of decision-making in foreign policy, focusing on the efficiency of such a policy. Diplomacy was portrayed as a rational-instrumental activity, based on strategy. International politics is a process of bargaining among states, using their power resources wisely. A wise use of power means achieving goals with the least costs. In order to make the bargaining process feasible and reasonable, a minimal level of shared interest is required. Finally, threat of the use of force is generally more efficient than the actual use of force.¹² A strategic realist approach can be juxtaposed with Sun Tzu's ancient Chinese theory of conflict.

Neo-realism or structural realism, created by Kenneth Waltz, was a response to growing criticism of realism, still based on the concept of anarchy and competing with the liberal paradigm. This school of realism was comprehensively introduced by Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979.¹³ He adopted crucial classical realist assumptions, including the existence of sovereign states as the principal actors in the international system, as well as the anarchy of the international system, but diverted from its normative principles, proposing a scientific theory of international politics.

A crucial concept, introduced by Waltz was the idea of the international system and the problems in its structure, interaction of system units and states being functionally similar, but different in capabilities. The issue of change and continuity in the system was discussed as well. The international system is, according to Waltz, led by powers, but the structure of the system defines the behavior of powers, including global powers, and whose political leaders are hostages of the system. Change in the system may stem from war, but is less likely in a bipolar system (existing at the time of the publication of the book) than in a multipolar

Studies, 14 (4), 1988, pp. 247–266. Comprehensive analysis of his approach: Neascu, Mihaela: *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2009.

- 11 Cf.: especially Schelling, Thomas: *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1960.
- 12 Cf.: Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 72–74.
- 13 Waltz, Kenneth: *Theory of International Politics*. Adison-Wesley Publishing Company: Reading-Menlo Park-London, Amsterdam, Don Mills-Sydney 1979. Important background of neorealist approach was published in Waltz, Kenneth: *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press: New York-London 1959.

system, as global powers aim at maintaining their leadership positions in the system.¹⁴ The neorealist approach has been widely analyzed and interpreted, and still remains one of the crucial theories of IR,¹⁵ popular especially in regions with underdeveloped IR scholarship, like Asia and Africa.

Further development of realism has led to some controversies, as many sub-theories appeared, being perceived differently by different scholars, and generally located within neo-realism or the neoclassical realist paradigm. John Mearsheimer locates offensive realism (represented by himself) and defensive realism (represented by Kenneth Waltz or Charles Glaser) within neo-realism (structural realism).¹⁶ Defensive realism, rooted in Waltz's systemic approach and developed by Charles Glaser focuses on the state's survival, hence avoiding conflict.¹⁷ Offensive realism focuses on maximizing power, as its own survival is easiest for the hegemonic power.¹⁸ As for neoclassical realism – attributed to Gideon Rose, who summarized works of different scholars in an article published in 1998,¹⁹ and collectively labeled them neoclassical realism – a fourth school of realism appears, not seeking a general theory of IR, but applying existing theories to circumstances, as it is impossible to have a grand theory of international relations.²⁰

-
- 14 Cf.: Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 75–77. Problems of war, and transformation from the cold to the hot war, cf.: Waltz, Kenneth: “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory”. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18 (4), 1988, pp. 615–628.
 - 15 Cf.: Weaver, Ole: “Waltz’s Theory of Theory: The Pictorial Challenge to Mainstream IR,” pp. 67–88; Onuf, Nicholas: “Structure? What Structure?” pp. 89–106; Sorensen, Georg: “‘Big and Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood, pp. 107–123; Mearsheimer, John: “Reckless States and Realism,” pp. 124–140. All four in: Booth, Ken (ed.): *Realism and World Politics*. Routledge: New York 2011.
 - 16 Mearsheimer, John: “Structural Realism”. In: Dunne, Tim/Kurki, Milja/Smith, Steve: op. cit., pp. 51–67.
 - 17 Cf.: Glaser, Charles: *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*. Princeton University Press: Princeton-Oxford 2010, pp. 51–92.
 - 18 Cf.: Mearsheimer, John: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton: London-New York 2014, pp. 29–54.
 - 19 In his text, Gideon Rose reviewed books of Michael Brown, Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria that are perceived neoclassical realist scholars. See: Rose, Gideon: “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” *World Politics*, 51 (1), pp. 144–172.
 - 20 Schweller, Randall: “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism”. In: Elman, Colin/Elman, Miriam (eds.): *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. MIT Press: Cambridge-London 2003, pp. 311–348.

The problem of cooperation in the realist paradigm was usually neglected, due to the anarchical and conflicting nature of the international system, but reasons for regime or alliance formation exist also in the 'realist world'. Military alliances are the most important form of cooperation, as they increase the relative power of engaged units. Powerful units (including superpowers) lead the alliance (increasing their power), and weaker states use the 'security umbrella' usually by bandwagoning to a stronger state. Cooperation in collective security institutions limits the security dilemma; in the economic dimension, cooperation contributes to the increase of economic power of the units engaged. International institutions are secondary to states and reflect power distribution in the international system. Great powers/superpowers create institutions (regimes and organizations) in order to increase their position in the system.²¹

We can still define a set of theories within the realist paradigm, including balance-of-threat theory, balance-of-power theory, hegemonic stability theory, security-dilemma theory and power transition theory, which can be and are applied in non-Western IR analysis.²² Realism has been weakened today, both by its critics and realists themselves due to adjustments made in order to respond to those critics (shrinking the realist theory of international relations to general assumptions of a rational state operating in an anarchical system), therefore the problem of distinguishing it from institutionalism exist. Therefore, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik propose the following set of assumptions in order to maintain its distinction: unitary, rational units, operating in conditions of anarchy, having conflicting preferences and conflicts solved on the basis of relative control of material capabilities.²³

21 Cf.: Walt, Stephen: *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1987, pp. 1–49; Krasner, Stephen: "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables". In: Krasner, Stephen (ed.): *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1983, pp. 355–368; Jervis, Robert: "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate". In: Elman, Colin/Elman Miriam (eds.): op. cit., pp. 277–310. Naturally, cooperation in realist paradigm is less likely than in liberal paradigm. Cf.: Grieco, Joseph: "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism". *International Organization*, 42 (3), 1988, pp. 485–507.

22 Short analysis of those theories: Wohlforth, William: "Realism". In: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008, pp. 141–143.

23 Legro, Jeffrey/Moravcsik, Andrew: "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, 24 (2), 1999, pp. 5–55.

(Social) Constructivism in International Relations

Different Understandings about Constructivism

Many misapprehensions emerge due to different understandings of constructivism in social sciences. A good way of clarifying the various conceptions is the typology proposed by Knud Erik Jørgensen. From this perspective we can distinguish four different notions of constructivism.²⁴ Firstly, we can identify it as a general social theory. For example, in 1995 John R. Searle in his *The Construction of Social Reality* creates a general social theory (theory of society), where social reality is based on ideas on which people agree.²⁵

Secondly, we can perceive constructivism as a kind of philosophy of science (metatheory), with assumption associated with ontology, epistemology, agent-structure dilemma and the level of analysis question.²⁶ In the area of ontology, it assumes that social reality if not only, then in the first instance, is constructed by people's intersubjective ideas. If there is place for material factors, they are only supplementary to ideational ones.²⁷ From the epistemological perspective constructivism is divided along two lines.²⁸ On one side, proponents – Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Christian Reus-Smit, John Ruggie, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, Ted Hopf and Martha Finnemore – from the so-called conventional constructivism adopt a neopositivist perspective, yet they believe that validation is only partially possible. On the other side representatives of the so-called critical or radical constructivism – David Campbell, Jim George, James Der Derian, R. B. J. Walker, Andrew Linklater and Ann Tickner – follow up postpositivist epistemology and doubt that we can separate issues of power and truth, so we should focus on how power shapes knowledge. In the case of the agent-structure problem, constructivism does not support one-directional

24 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 160; Adler, Emanuel: "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates". In: Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth A. (eds.): *Handbook of International Relations*. SAGE, London 2012, p. 114.

25 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 160; Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 164–165; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 114.

26 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 161; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 114.

27 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 161. More on debates inside constructivism about material factors cf.: Ibid., p. 163.

28 Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., p. 167; Hurd, Ian: "Constructivism". In: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: op. cit., pp. 306–308; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit. p. 121. More about epistemological debates inside constructivism: Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 130–133.

answers only. Instead, it assumes feedback between agent and structure following up the concept brought to IR studies by Wendt in 1987.²⁹ At the same time constructivist assumptions refer to all three levels of analysis (domestic, international and global).³⁰

Thirdly, constructivism brings together different particular IR theories (see more below).³¹

Finally, strictly at the level of methods, constructivism, based on different epistemological assumptions, supports various positions and even tries to build its own ones.³²

Historical Development

Social constructivism in International Relations is heir to different sociological and philosophical approaches developed over the last two centuries.³³ The leading example of such an inspiration and, simultaneously, the etymology of the name for the whole approach is a book written by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann *Social Construction of Reality* (1966), which in the field of the sociology of knowledge pointed out the importance of social constructions.³⁴ Although the first works in International Relations referring to constructivist assumptions emerged at the beginning of the 1980s, Nicholas Onuf, and his book *World of Our Making* (1989), is commonly perceived as a founding father of this approach.³⁵

Many different factors contributed to the popularity of constructivism in the 1990s, but two of them are frequently quoted. Firstly, the Cold War had not ended with neorealist confrontation, but one of the main proponents of this rivalry

29 Barnett, Michael. "Social Constructivism". In: Baylis, John/Smith, Steve (eds.): *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd ed. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 254–255; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 161. More about debate inside constructivism about agent-structure dilemma: Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 128–130.

30 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 164; Hurd, Ian: op. cit., p. 306.

31 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 161–162; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 114.

32 Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 122–123; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 163.

33 Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 115–116.

34 Hay, Colin: "Social Constructivism". In: Bevir, Mark/Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds.): *Routledge Handbook of Interpretive Political Science*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 100; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 115.

35 Barnett, Michael.: op. cit., pp. 254–255; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 118. More on founding fathers of constructivism in IR cf.: Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 118–121.

changed his way of thinking. At the same time, the post-Cold War era brought many conflicts based not on balance of power, but on social identity.³⁶ Secondly, the main approaches taking part in the so-called third (interparadigmatic) debate in the 1980s – neo-realism, neoliberalism and Marxism – were concentrated on material issues and were not able to capture ideational factors contributing to the end of the Cold War and shape of the post-Cold War order.³⁷ Some scholars point out that although in recent years constructivism has been gradually losing its popularity, acceptance of some of its main assumptions has been acknowledged by other IR approaches (e.g. that identity is an important factor).³⁸

Types of Constructivist IR Theories

Although Wendt is perceived as the leading figure in this approach, particular constructivist IR theories diverged.³⁹ According to Jørgensen, these follow three separated paths. Firstly, constructivism enriches existing IR theories. For example, Henry Nau in 2002 supplemented realism with constructivist assumptions, claiming that power theory and identity theory complement each other. Secondly, we can modify established theories of international relations according to constructivist metatheoretical assumptions. For example, the materialistic theory of international system build by Waltz (1979) was reformulated by Wendt in 1999 into the ideational theory of the international system. Lastly, international phenomena (e.g. diplomacy) can become a subject of research for theories that are characteristically constructivist. For example, we can use theory of speech acts.⁴⁰

In the context of constructivist IR theories, we observe many debates, yet one of them requires special attention.⁴¹ Although constructivists agree on identity as a causal factor, they disagree what shapes these ideas. On the one side, the

36 Barnett, Michael: op. cit., pp. 254–255; Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 162–163; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 118.

37 Hurd, Ian: op. cit., pp. 300–301; Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 118.

38 Leheny, David: “Constructivism and International Relations in Asia”. In: Pekkanen, Saadia M./Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia.*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 75.

39 Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., p. 118, more on that issue: pp. 118–121.

40 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 162. Cf. Nau, Henry: *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy.* Cornell University Press: Ithaca 2002; Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics.* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999.

41 Adler, Emanuel: op. cit., pp. 116 and 133–134.

systemic approach places emphasis on factors emerging outside the state – that is at the international system level. Wendt and Finnemore are usually identified as proponents of this approach. On the other hand, supporters of variables at the domestic level – e.g. Risse and Katzenstein – point out that states with a similar international profile develop different identities.⁴²

Liberalism in International Relations

Liberalism has definitely been a less important paradigm in IR scholarship in both Asia and Africa, but at the same time cannot be neglected, especially in the post-Cold War period. The liberal tradition, contrary to realism (focusing on the state), concentrates on human beings and groups of people (including states, but also corporations, organizations, associations, societies or nations). The liberal concept of human nature, also contrary to the realist approach, is different, as human beings are generally good, therefore they do not need to be externally constrained.⁴³

Main Assumptions

If we try to briefly characterize the main assumptions of liberalism, we could focus on the harmony of interests of different groups, basing their activities on reason and benefiting from progress. Therefore international relations, similarly to intrastate relations, may be based on cooperation, not conflict, as reason triumphs over fear. Societies appreciate the value of cooperation, hence they cooperate more eagerly than states. Therefore we should distinguish between the interests of governments and the interests of societies or nations. Increased economic links should also be stressed, being the basis of the development of harmonious cooperation between nations, and being at the same time a way of providing well-being and freedom to their own citizens. Liberals recognize international anarchy, but do not perceive it as a source of interstate conflict. If conflict exists, it stems from government policies, not controlled by societies.⁴⁴

42 Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 169–171.

43 Description of Liberalism as an IR paradigm is to a large extent a translation from the book: Grabowski, Marcin: *Wiek Pacyfiku – polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec region Azji i Pacyfiku po roku 1989*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2012, pp. 26–32. Its structure is based on Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 96–128.

44 The problem of liberalism, including problems of peace, democracy, free trade and globalization is discussed in: Burchill, Scott: “Liberalism”. In: Burchill, Scott/Devetak, Richard/Linklater, Andrew/Patterson, Matthew/Reus-Smit, Christian/True, Jacqui: op.

Andrew Moravcsik puts forward three main assumptions defining liberalism:

- 1) Individuals and private groups are dominant actors in international politics, who can be characterized by middle rationality, are keen to avoid risk and organize exchange and collective actions in order to promote diversified interests, in material scarcity, conflicting values and various social influences;
- 2) States and other political institutions represent certain societal subgroups whose interests determine the way state officials determine state interests and conduct foreign policy based on them – state behavior is the result of a game between the preferences of different actors on the domestic political stage, using political institutions as a transmission belt for the creation of foreign policy (the influence of different interest groups is not the same, however);
- 3) State behavior in the international system does not fully resemble its foreign policy assumptions, to a large degree because of the shape of the international system, and interdependencies with other states, as well as adjusting to the preferences of other states.⁴⁵

Historical Development

Liberalism may be historically associated with Immanuel Kant (complex republican liberalism), John Locke (institutional liberalism), Adam Smith (economic liberalism) or Thomas Woodrow Wilson (interwar idealism known also as liberal internationalism).⁴⁶ Modern liberalism is sometimes connected with

cit., pp. 55–83. Very good analysis of different dimensions of liberalism and neoliberalism, including the role of integration and institutions, cf.: Russett, Bruce: “Liberalism”, and Sterling-Folker, Jennifer: “Neoliberalism”. Both in: Dunne, Tim/Kurki, Milja/Smith, Steve: op. cit., pp. 68–106. Similarly, analysis of the history of liberalism (stoicism, via classical liberalism, Immanuel Kant, Richard Cobden, Joseph Schumpeter, to interest groups liberalism), integration, transnationalism, interdependence, international regimes, neoliberal institutionalism, global governance, economic interdependence, democratic peace etc., cf.: Viotti, Paul/Kauppi, Mark: op. cit., pp. 118–184.

45 Por. Moravcsik, Andrew: “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”. *International Organization*, 51 (4), 1997, pp. 513–553. The aforementioned article focused definitely at the states’ preferences system, as the dominant factor shaping international politics, contrary to realists’ system of capabilities and institutionalists’ focus on system of information and institutions. The latter, according to Moravcsik should rather not be called ‘neoliberal institutionalism’, but ‘modified structural realism’ or ‘institutionalism’.

46 Broader analysis of historical roots of liberalism, cf.: Czaputowicz, Jacek: *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych: Krytyka i systematyzacja*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe

Norman Angell, who in 1912, just two years before World War I broke out, published a book *The Great Illusion: A Study of Relations of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage*, arguing that economic interdependence between major industrial states become so great that control over territory become obsolete. Naturally, he faced a lot of criticism and the Great War, perceived as a failure of his theory, together with World War II, brought IR scholarship back to realism.⁴⁷

Types of Liberal IR Theories

Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen divide liberalism into four main strands of thinking: sociological, republican, institutional and interdependence,⁴⁸ and this approach will be applied here. Other scholars name more sub-schools within the liberal school or tradition. Knud Jorgensen analyzes interdependence liberalism, republican liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism (for some scholars treated as a current connecting liberalism and realism⁴⁹), but also democratic peace theory, transnationalist theory, constructivist liberal theory of cooperation or liberal intergovernmentalism.⁵⁰ Elizabeth Matthews and Rhonda Callaway would distinguish three liberal schools, each with a set of sub-schools: namely liberal internationalism (with just war theory and democratic peace theory); neoliberal institutionalism (with complex interdependence, regime theory and, dubious, game theory); finally, also dubious, economic liberalism (with laissez-faire economics, comparative advantage, Keynesianism and neoliberalism).⁵¹

Sociological liberalism presumes that transnational relations are an important aspect of the international system, as not only governments, but also individuals, groups or associations interact. Generally, relations between societies are more

PWN: Warszawa 2007, pp. 105–115; Doyle, Michael/Recchia, Stefano: “Liberalism in International Relations.” In: Badie, Bertrand/Schlosser, Dirk-Berg/Morlino, Leonardo (eds.): *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Sage: Los Angeles 2011, pp. 1434–1437.

47 Cf.: Griffiths, Martin: *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. Routledge: London-New York 1999, pp. 53–57.

48 The following classification is based on Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 96–128.

49 Cf.: Stein, Arthur: “Neoliberal Institutionalism.” In: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: op. cit., pp. 201–221.

50 Jørgensen, Kund: op. cit., pp. 71–79.

51 Matthews, Elizabeth/Callaway, Rhonda: *International Relations Theory: A Primer*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2017, p. 80.

peaceful than between governments. Moreover, governments' ability to control societies has been decreasing, and individuals' links to the state has been reduced.⁵² The world, according to this concept, is not based on billiard balls (states, interacting just superficially), but a spider's web of dependencies, existing among different groups (business, religious, employment, family, organizations) in different states.⁵³ The security dilemma, basic for realists, was to a certain extent solved by the creation of security communities of states and people, understanding that conflicts may be resolved without the use of force.⁵⁴

Theoreticians of institutional liberalism stress that institutions, namely formal organizations, regimes and conventions may facilitate cooperation among states, hence contribute to more peaceful international relations. They can also play an independent role in international relations, limiting international anarchy. Robert Keohane emphasized the fact that states, rational egoists, engage in the creation of international institutions, as they facilitate maximizing benefits from cooperation. Additionally, "by reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international institutions help states achieve collective gains."⁵⁵ International regimes may be explained by rational-choice theories or functional theories, but also base on so-called hegemonic cooperation, with a dominant player in the regime.⁵⁶

-
- 52 It refers to the 19th-century thought of Richard Cobden, focusing on connections not among governments, but among nations (understood as societies). Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 99–100. Cf.: also Rosenau, James: *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays of the Transnationalization of World Affairs*. Nichols Publishing Company: New York 1980, pp. 1–34; Rosenau, James: "Citizenship in a Changing Global Order". In: Rosenau, James/Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1992, pp. 272–294.
- 53 Such a model of the world was analyzed in: Burton, John: *World Society*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1972, pp. 23–163.
- 54 Karl Deutsch based his analysis on the example of North Atlantic. Cf.: Deutsch, Karl: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1957, pp. 22–116.
- 55 Keohane, Robert: "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?". *Foreign Policy*, 110, 1998, pp. 82–96. Keohane stresses also the fact that hardly ever international institutions are controlled in a democratic way.
- 56 Cf.: Ruggie, John: "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order". In: Krasner, Stephen (ed.): *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1983, pp. 195–232. Comprehensive analysis of different forms of regimes, including functional and hegemonic regimes,

According to Keohane, international institutions may be perceived twofold by engaged states. On the one hand, it is a matter of choice by the given state, deciding to engage in the process of institutionalization of international relations, in certain cases being able to play a dominant role in the given institution, and maximizing the power of this institution. On the other hand, by joining an international organization or regime, the state allows its sovereignty to be limited, ceding it partially to organs of the international institution. Therefore states not only create, but also come under the sway of the institution they have created.⁵⁷ International organizations and, to a lesser degree, other institutions (regimes, conventions) may also socialize their member-states, gradually converging their goals and interests.⁵⁸

In Keohane's view, institutionalization positively impacts the security dimension of the international system as well. On the one hand alliances (security regimes) limit interstate conflicts, also because they share information about military capabilities.⁵⁹ On the other hand international organizations, especially if membership of democratic states prevails, assist in peaceful conflict resolution and socialization toward undertaking credible commitments and international peace.⁶⁰

cf.: Keohane, Robert: *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton-Oxford 2005, pp. 49–181.

- 57 In this context Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons analyze the problem of a degree of domestic institutions' substitution by international ones, regarding the following issues: (1) under what conditions can international institutions substitute domestic ones; (2) are there any domestic actors benefiting from their ability to delegate their powers to international ones; (3) to what degree those decisions and rules can be implemented by domestic institutions. Martin, Lisa/Simmons, Beth: "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions". *International Organization*, 52 (4), 1998, pp. 729–757.
- 58 It refers especially highly structured organizations or those of relatively equal potential (in case of lack of strong structures of organizations or high level of capabilities' diversification among members level of socialization decreases). Authors refer to the constructivist approach to international institutional socialization. Bearace, David/Bondanella, Stacy: "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence". *International Organization*, 61 (4), 2007, pp. 703–733.
- 59 Information policy is crucial in groups of units of similar military capabilities (in cases where the result of possible military conflict is unknown), if disproportions in capabilities are large, mutual information is not so important. Bearce, David/Flanagan, Kristen/Floros, Katharine: "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States". *International Organization*, 60 (3), 2006, pp. 595–625.
- 60 Pevenhouse, Jon/Russett, Bruce: "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace". *International Organization*, 60 (4), 2006, pp. 969–1000.

Strong criticism of international institutions and the theory of the crucial role of those institutions in providing peace in the world (often promoted by politicians and scholars) has been presented by John Mearsheimer, theoretician of offensive realism. He accentuates logical and methodological deficiencies in institutional theories, but primarily focuses on the very limited role played by international institutions on states' behavior, especially in a crisis situation.⁶¹

Republican liberalism's main assumption, often associated with Michael Doyle, is that democracies do not wage wars with each other. As the number of democracies has been gradually increasing, they presumed, the world would become more peaceful. Such an approach is based on the following premises:

- 1) Governments in democracies are under social control, therefore, as societies (people) have more to lose in case of war, they tend to avoid wars, hence social control restrains the waging of wars;
- 2) There are non-violent mechanisms of domestic dispute resolution in democratic systems that can be applied to international relations as well;
- 3) Democracies generally have certain common values, and shared moral values restrain international conflict;
- 4) There has been increasing economic links among states, and increasing economic interdependence results in increased risk of economic losses for both sides of a conflict irrespective of the winner.⁶²

The republican liberalism approach, with its focus on enlarging the area of democracy in the world (based on the spread of democracy, especially at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s), especially in East Europe and East Asia (including

61 Mearsheimer, John: "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 19 (3), 1994–1995, pp. 5–49. In response Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, focusing on the theory of relative gains and empirical experience, but also providing some hints to institutionalists, on how to react on Mearsheimer's criticism. Keohane, Robert/Martin, Lisa: "Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 20 (1), 1995, pp. 39–51.

62 These assumptions, cf.: Jackson, Robert/Sørensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 111–112. Republican liberalism is often associated with the thinking of Immanuel Kant, cf.: Doyle, Michael: "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs". *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12 (3), 1983, pp. 205–235; Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and World Politics". *American Political Science Review*, 80 (4), 1986, pp. 1151–1169.

South Korea, Taiwan), was popularized by Francis Fukuyama,⁶³ but strongly contested thereafter.

Interdependence liberalism bases on the assumption that links among states, but also transnational links of groups or individuals have been increasing, including a rising level of the international division of labor in the global economy. It determines a new approach to international politics, being to a larger extent based on cooperation of states.⁶⁴ Richard Rosecrance accentuated the fact that the factors defining power had changed, as territorial and natural resources used to be power determinants in the past, but a skilled labor force, access to information and knowledge, as well as capital, has been crucial more recently. Therefore, the methods used to acquire power has changed, as currently development of the economy and international trade is more beneficial than use of force in international relations.⁶⁵ In the case of full independence, state A can use any means to influence state B; in the case of interdependence it is easier to use reward and punishment that become more influential in the case of state B, if it is interdependent with state A.⁶⁶

The theory of complex interdependence was introduced in the 1970s by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. They stressed not only the rising number of transnational actors, but also the increasing scope of issues somehow bypassing official state structures (dealt with transnationally), especially by leaders of states, and solved without the use of military force. Even in case of interstate relations, a lot of issues are dealt with by government agencies in one country and their counterparts in another, without centralization (without employing

63 His main arguments were published in Fukuyama, Francis: "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, pp. 3–18. It was developed in a book: Fukuyama, Francis: *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press: New York 1992.

64 An analysis of the interdependence itself, operationalization of the ideas and its influence on power politics in given states, as well as the international system, cf. Baldwin, David: "Interdependence and Power: Conceptual Analysis". *International Organization*, 34 (4), 1980, pp. 471–506. Generally, interdependence may constrain the war (if there are positive expectations in the area of trade), as peace can bring benefits or make war a national strategic choice (if negative trade expectations could materialize in the form of cutting off the country from crucial resources). Cf.: Copeland, Dale: "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations". *International Security*, 20 (4), 1996, pp. 5–41.

65 Cf.: more in: Rosecrance, Richard: *The Rise of Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. Basic Books, New York 1986.

66 Cf.: Rosecrance, Richard: "Reward, Punishment, and Interdependence". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25 (1), 1981, pp. 31–46.

ministries of foreign affairs, but between ministries of economics or agriculture). Simultaneously, the number of non-state actors conducting independent policy, sometimes in contrast to the states, has also been on the rise (such as transnational corporations or non-governmental organizations).⁶⁷

International Society Approach (English School) in International Relations

Main Assumptions

The international society approach was developed as a middle ground between realism and liberalism, so it cannot be understood without proper reference to those two traditions. That is the way the assumptions of the English School are usually presented using the concept of the three traditions (also called the three Rs: Realist, Revolutionist and Rationalist).⁶⁸

The first tradition, referring to realism (also called Hobbesian or Machiavellian), assumes that states, as fundamental actors of international relations, interact with one another without referring to any commonly recognized international law or universal morality. States operate in an anarchical environment and even during times of peace are preparing for war. Even when international agreements are signed, they are in force only as long as their signatories perceived them as beneficial from the national interest point of view. From this perspective states form state system (*de facto* interstate system).⁶⁹

The second tradition, the revolutionist – also called universalist or Kantian – postulates that the basic actors are people who are united by common moral principles and form one world society (society of all mankind). This society is

67 The authors focused on three aspects of this problem: (1) multiplicity of channels connecting societies, including informal links between ruling elites, formal intergovernmental links, informal links between elites not connected to governments, transnational organizations, like transnational corporations; (2) lack of hierarchy among issues being subject to those links (there is no domination of military issues), distinctions between domestic and international politics have become blurred and (3) military force is not used toward other governments in the region, and those outside the region are connected by complex interdependence. Nye, Joseph/Keohane, Robert: *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown and Company: Boston 1977, pp. 23–37.

68 Dunne, Tim: “The English School”. In: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: op. cit., pp. 269–270, 268; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 102, 104 and 106.

69 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 105–107; Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, p. 276.

more important than particular states, which are perceived only as a contemporary form for organizing mankind. For this reason, states ought to follow moral rules. In the radical version this tradition assumes that states should be disbanded and one global government guarding people's rights formed. From this perspective world society forms a structure based on common rules, but without a state system. An indicator of changes in that direction is the development of international humanitarian law and transnational NGOs supporting human rights.⁷⁰

Finally, the rationalist (Grotian) approach tries to posit itself in the middle ground between the two above-mentioned approaches. It assumes, as realism, that states are the primary actors operating in an anarchical environment, so one global government cannot be established. Yet at the same time it says, as the universalist approach, that states not only follow their national interest. Rational states develop some common rules, which bind all states and reduce the scope for conflict. The minimum threshold is the idea of sovereignty and non-intervention principle, but it also could include the idea of war, balance of power, diplomacy and international law. From this point of view, an interstate system is completed by common rules and forms international society (society of states).⁷¹

Historical Development

As many other theories, the English School (or nowadays more commonly international society approach) traces its antecedents from before the 20th century. So it is not surprising that it usually points to Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), perceived as a proponent of modern international law, as its 'ancient' founding father. Yet the English School only began to be perceived as a coherent tradition at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.⁷²

We can distinguish two phases of its development. The first one – the so-called classic – begins in the 1950s and ends in the 1980s. At this stage, the fundamental ideas of this approach were developed and its most representative works were published. Two organizations could be identified as focal points in this process. The first one is the Chair of International Relations at the London School of

70 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 104–105, 106; Dunne, Tim: "The English School", pp. 278–279.

71 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 106–107; Dunne, Tim: "The English School", pp. 272–273; Buzan, Barry: "The International Society Approach and Asia". In: Pekkanen, Saadia M./Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *op. cit.*, p. 100.

72 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 102–103.

Economics. Its longtime head, Charles Manning (1894–1978) is recognized as the founding father of the whole approach as he developed in the 1950s a curriculum, where the idea of international society played a prominent role. Since the end of the 1940s Martin Wight (1913–1972) was also a lecturer at the IR Department and developed an approach which drew on the “three traditions”. Also, Hedley Bull (1932–1985) joined the IR Department in 1955 and followed the concept of “three traditions”. Bull returned to Australia and in 1977 published his best-known work *The Anarchical Society*⁷³ there. The second organization, the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1959–1984), was established by historian Herbert Butterfield. Butterfield was the first chairman of the committee and his successors in this post were also prominent representatives of the English School: Martin Wight (until 1972), Adam Watson (until 1978) and finally Hedley Bull (until 1984).

Only in the second phase of its development – the so-called post-classical – the English School was established as one of the recognized approaches in IR studies. The beginning of this stage is usually traced to the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. It resulted in putting in order the assumptions of this approach and setting the research agenda for further research (cf.: e.g. a paper published in 2001 by Barry Buzan).⁷⁴ Tim Dunne, one of the leading English School proponents, identifies following “the most prominent writers” of this phase: “[already mentioned] Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell, Robert Jackson, Edward Keene, Andrew Linklater, Richard Little, James Mayall, Hidemi Suganami, and Nicholas J. Wheeler.”⁷⁵

73 Dunne, Tim: “The English School”. In: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: op. cit., pp. 269–270; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 104–105; Northedge, F. S.: “In Memoriam: Charles Manning 1894–1978”. *British Journal of International Studies*, 5 (1), 1979, pp. 1–5.

74 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 103–104; Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, pp. 268 and 270. Cf.: e.g. Dunne, Tim: *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, London: Macmillan, St Antony’s Series, 1998; Buzan, Barry: “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR”. *Review of International Studies*, 27 (3), 2001, pp. 471–488. Cf.: also bibliography about the English School developed by Barry Buzan: <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school/> Tim Dunne indicates that the popularity of the English School was accelerated in the 90s while cultural and normative issues in international relations became more influential. Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, pp. 268 and 270.

75 Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, p. 267.

Types of English School IR Theories

During the development of the second phase of the English School we can observe the debate between pluralist and solidarist interpretations of international society.⁷⁶

The pluralist conception assumes that the fundamental value constituting international society is to build order through countering anarchy. Only when this aim is accomplished can we also consider international justice. This means that we focus on sovereignty and non-intervention principles as without them it is difficult to create order. Other important concepts are great powers, status quo and limited war. As a result, justice – e.g. preserving human rights among the population – is in the hands of particular states and every state has its own path to achieve it. Other countries can intervene into domestic affairs only when all great powers agree to do so. Without such an agreement every intervention in the name of international justice risks transformation in full scale war with powers opposing such interference. The main proponents of the pluralist approach are Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson.⁷⁷

According to the solidarist idea of the international society the process of building order should be accompanied by preservation of human rights in all states. When international law or human rights are violated, other states should show solidarity and support those who are fighting for order and justice. States have the right to intervene and break the sovereignty principle in the name of international law and human rights, especially when a serious breach of the rules mentioned occurs and approval by the UN is mandated. Thus a just war is an instrument of this kind of international society. Although people are seen as members of an international society, the solidarist idea assumes that states still dominate international relations and cannot be disbanded. Neither can global government, as proposed by the universalist tradition, come into being. At the beginning, only John Vincent was a proponent of this approach. Nowadays Nicholas Wheeler, Tonny Brems Knudsen, Timothy Dunne and Thomas G. Weiss also support this position.⁷⁸

76 *Ibid.*, p. 275; Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 104 and 108.

77 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 104 and 108–110; Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, pp. 274–275.

78 Barry Buzan perceives the European Union as the most solidarist international society. Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 110–114 and 124; Dunne, Tim: “The English School”, p. 275.

As we can see above, the English School is focused mostly on normative theory. The fact that today the English School is strongly grounded in political philosophy should not be surprising given that one of its founding fathers – M. Wight – was already calling for political theory to be applied to international issues in 1969.⁷⁹ As a result most scholars from this approach focus on normative analysis and the concept of understanding why, in particular situations, states did not behave according to proposed ideal models.⁸⁰ At the same time, in the English School there is strong opposition to the explanatory theory and some scholars even oppose at all the concept of theory. Also, this approach shows limited interest in epistemology and metatheory.⁸¹

Yet Timothy Dunne points out that besides normative and interpretative theory there are also more analytical concepts based on the research agenda proposed by Buzan in 2001.⁸² Jørgensen also states that the English School could be used to construct explanatory theories and illustrates three examples of this. Firstly, he reconstructs Bull's international society theory which is based on five assumptions: (1) the international system is built by states and common rules, (2) states are the primary actors, (3) international society is based on common institutions (e.g. diplomacy, international law and war), (4) international society changes with the flow of time and (5) the shape of international society depends on states.⁸³ The second example of the English School theory is the concept of just humanitarian intervention proposed by Nicholas Wheeler, which shows conditions for that kind of state activity.⁸⁴ Another example of this kind of IR theory is the idea of hegemony proposed by Ian Clark, where he presents the conditions necessary to become a hegemon and emphasizes that besides material power, ideological legitimization is also important.⁸⁵

79 Buzan, Barry: "The International Society Approach and Asia", p. 100.

80 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115, 116; Dunne, Tim: "The English School", pp. 267, 271, 273, 280; Schmidt, Brian C. "On the History and Historiography of International Relations". In: Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth A., *op. cit.*, p. 19.

81 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115, 116; Dunne, Tim: "The English School", pp. 267, 271, 273 and 280; Schmidt, Brian, "On the History and Historiography of International Relations", p. 19.

82 Dunne, Tim: "The English School", pp. 276 and 280.

83 Jørgensen, Knud: *op. cit.*, pp. 116–117.

84 *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 118.

Marxist Theories

Different classifications distinguish various Marxist theories and their assumptions. For example, Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones proposed four categories: the Marxist (classical) imperialism theory and world-system theory, Gramscianism, critical theory and New Marxism.⁸⁶ Jørgensen divides Marxist International Political Economy (IPE) into three schools: the Amsterdam School and the Toronto School (both based on the so-called neo-Gramscian perspective on IPE), and world system theory, at the same time regarding critical theory (and Gramscianism) as an example of a postpositivist approach.⁸⁷ Mark Rupert in his article about Marxist theories discussed the classical theory of imperialism, critical theory related to the Frankfurt school and the Gramscian approach.⁸⁸ Due to this variety, assumptions of particular Marxist theories are discussed separately.

Historical Development

Marxist approaches in IR are more or less based on the general theory of political economy developed by Karl Marx (1818–1883). Society from the classical Marxist perspective (or so-called historical materialism) is perceived as a class struggle, where the owners of financial capital (the capitalists) deprive the working class (the proletariat) of their profits by paying less than that which working men produced. At the same time those abovementioned economic relations (the so-called base), i.e. the dominance of capitalists over the working class, shape all other social relations (the so-called superstructure), i.e. the political and legal system, as well as culture, are focused on preserving economic conditions.⁸⁹

As Hobden and Wyn Jones wrote: “(...) despite the fact that Marx himself wrote copiously about international affairs, most of this writing was journalistic in character. He did not incorporate the international dimension into his theoretical mapping of the contours of capitalism.”⁹⁰ As a consequence, IR is doomed

86 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: “Marxist Theories of International Relations”. In: Baylis, John/Smith, Steve (eds.): op. cit., pp. 145-152.

87 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 138-139.

88 Rupert, Mark: “Marxism and Critical Theory”. In: Dunne, Tim/Kurki, Milja/Smith, Steve: op. cit., pp. 155-158.

89 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., pp. 143–145; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 138. More: Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 149–154.

90 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 143. Cf.: also: Rupert, Mark: op. cit., p. 155.

to rely on different interpretations of Marx's ideas in the international sphere, which is additionally complicated by the fact that his thoughts changed over time and contemporary events bring various readings of his works.⁹¹ Yet, despite Marxist state ideology developed in communist countries around the world after World Wars I and II, "It took the student protests and general social commotion of the 1960s to reinstall Marxism as a major grand theory."⁹²

Types of Marxist IR Theories

Marxist theory was firstly applied to international relations at the beginning of the 20th century, when a growing number of scholars (and at the same time political activists) were critically assessing imperialism, with "the best known and most influential work" written by Vladimir Lenin in 1917 (*Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*).⁹³ Lenin noticed a new, previously unobserved phase of capitalism, which he assumed was the highest stage and the last one. In this stage capitalism was dominated by few monopolist companies searching for new places to expand. Also, in this phase the more developed states (the core) were focused on exploitation of weak and conquered territories (the periphery). As a result, the capitalist class in dominating states could pay more to their own proletariat and at the same time significantly abuse the working people in colonies. The common interest of the global working class was broken. In the end colonialism was explained as a result of capitalism and the colonial powers, left without new territories for expansion, were heading for war.⁹⁴

After World War II many former European colonies and relatively new Latin American republics celebrated sovereignty, but this was not followed by economic development. In explaining this phenomenon, an important role was played by UN Economic Commission for Latin America, created at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. It gathered a group of scholars focused on this problem. One of the first hypotheses in this area was provided by the head of this committee, Raul Prebisch in his study *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (1950). According to this work, industrialized countries (the center) produced and exported goods with higher and growing

91 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 143.

92 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 138.

93 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 145; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 143–144; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., p. 155.

94 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 145; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 143–144; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 155–156.

prices, when non-industrialized states (the periphery) relied on exporting non-manufactured products like agriculture produce or natural resources. Faced with a decline in the terms of trade, the periphery was not benefiting from free trade as much as the center. Even when the colonial era ended, former colonies were still dependent on their former metropolises.⁹⁵

Based on abovementioned reflections by Prebisch, dependency (or from Spanish *dependencia*) theory was further developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and “promoted within the political climate of the 1970s, which also advanced the political vision of a new international economic order (NIEO)”. Prominent scholars associated with this theory include e.g. Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Samir Amin and Johan Galtung.⁹⁶

The world-system theory was in many ways shaped by Marxist theories and dependency theory. It was firstly developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, who until that time was focused mostly on African studies. In his first volume on this topic (*The Modern World System*, 1974) he described how different the so-called world systems, i.e. the most sophisticated forms of social organization, emerged during the history of mankind. He argued that the contemporary world system had arisen in the form of the so-called world economy with decentralized decision making on redistribution of wealth based on market rules. This type of social organization was first developed in Europe in the 16th century and spread all around the world. In the world economy, as in Marxist and dependency theories, developed states (the core) exploit undeveloped countries (the periphery), but there also exists a new category: the semi-periphery. States of that type have their own industry, yet are not only devoured by the core, but also used as a tool to suppress the working class in the core by bolstering competition with lower wages. The world-system is a historical phenomenon and with its inevitable crisis Wallerstein predicts that a new world-system will emerge.⁹⁷

Critical theory was developed at the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University (the so-called Frankfurt School) in the 1920s and early 1930s as an alternative interpretation of Marxism to the state-developed Marxism-Leninism in Soviet Russia. In the mid-1930s they, as Jews, were forced to leave Germany and became associated with the Columbia University in New York, but after World War II most of them returned to Frankfurt. The most prominent representatives

95 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 145; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 144.

96 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 145; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 145.

97 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 145–146; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., pp. 145–146.

of this first wave of scholars included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse.⁹⁸

Critical theory diverges in many ways from classical Marxism. Firstly, it is not focused on material (economic) factors (the base), but on the ideational factors (the superstructure) with research on e.g. culture, bureaucracies, the source and nature of authoritarianism and so on. Secondly, it is anti-positivist, because it doubts objective theory and assumes that knowledge is embodied in norms. As a result, it develops research on the issue of the rationality and theory of knowledge.⁹⁹

Until the 1980s Frankfurt School ideas were not transferred to International Relations. As an example of application of critical theory to international relations one can present Andrew Linklater's normative studies, based on Jurgen Habermas' theory of communication. Linklater shows how to emancipate the whole of mankind by creating a political community reaching beyond nation-state borders and argues that the European Union is an example of that kind of process which goes beyond the sovereignty of particular states.¹⁰⁰

Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who was imprisoned in the second half of the 1920s under the Fascist government. Sitting in jail he developed one of the most popular Marxist approaches nowadays called (Neo-) Gramscianism or just the Italian School. In his *Prison Notebooks* he especially focused on the superstructure, because from his perspective the capitalist class dominates the working class not only by using power based on coercion (e.g. economic resources, the base), but in particular power based on consent. This type of power is called by Gramsci hegemony and refers to the assimilation by the working class of values imposed by the capitalist class. These kinds of norms are cultivated and transmitted autonomously from the state institutions to civil society: NGOs, religious groups, the educational system and the media. To overthrow capitalism it is not sufficient to alter the economic relations, but in the first place to abolish the hegemony by transforming values developed by civil society institutions.¹⁰¹

One of the most prominent scholars representing the above-mentioned tradition is Canadian researcher Robert Cox. Firstly, using Gramsci's concepts, he

98 Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 167; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 156–157.

99 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., pp. 150–151; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 156–157.

100 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., pp. 150–151; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., p. 158; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 168.

101 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., pp. 147–148; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 157–158.

challenged the objectivity of the knowledge and separation between values and science. In his famous article “Social Forces, States, and World Orders, Beyond International Relations” (1981) he describes two type of theories: the problem-solving theory, which accepts the contemporary order (e.g. the domination of rich countries over poor ones) and legitimatizes it by focusing on problems important for the beneficiary of that order (e.g. the realist theory of great power politics); and the critical theory questions existing inequalities by concentrating on the processes catalyzing change understood as the emancipation of the poor (e.g. the Marxist tradition focusing on undeveloped states). Secondly, Cox applies the concept of hegemony, developed by Gramsci in reference to domestic issues, to international relations. From this perspective Western countries dominate not only using coercion, but also by hegemony, i.e. common acceptance of ideas and values which sustain Western superiority (e.g. the free market as a common source of prosperity which in fact brings greater profits to developed economies).¹⁰²

The critical theory approach and to some extent Gramscianism influenced new critical interpretations of many previously developed theories. As a result, we can observe the development of e.g. critical security studies (focused not on states, but on people – the so-called human security dimension) or critical geopolitics (perceiving geopolitical theories not as objective laws of international life, but as ideas legitimizing conquests and great power struggles).¹⁰³

Foreign Policy Analysis and Analytic Eclecticism

Finally, we should also take into account other approaches in Western IR, two of which were applied by authors of our case studies, hence foreign policy analysis and the analytic eclecticism. In both cases, their role has been growing in recent years.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a multidimensional and multitheoretical approach that concentrates on different types of foreign policy theories, including e.g. individual decision makers and their cognitive processes (with an important role for political psychology), small group dynamics (in reference to social psychology), inside and outside large scale governmental organizations activity (e.g. standard operation procedures and bureaucratic rivalry) and non-governmental actors (public opinion, media, interest groups and think tanks) or even identity

102 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., pp. 148–149; Rupert, Mark: op. cit., pp. 158–159; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 168.

103 Hobden, Stephen/Jones, Richard Wyn: op. cit., p. 150; Jørgensen, Knud: op. cit., p. 168.

of whole society.¹⁰⁴ Narrowly understood, FPA is only focused on how domestic processes shape foreign policy, but broadly perceived FPA encompasses any IR theory explaining foreign activity, including realism, liberalism, constructivism or critical theories referring to different levels of analysis (not only individual or domestic, but also systemic).¹⁰⁵ This approach has been advanced not only in Western IR scholarship, but also in Asia and to a lesser extent in other continents.¹⁰⁶

Analytic eclecticism was introduced by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, and is defined as a model of selective integration of analytic elements, like concepts, logics, mechanisms and interpretations from separate paradigms, hence generally engaging theories (or elements of theories) from different theoretical paradigms, either complementary or simply contradicting. It is characterized by pragmatism (in academic debates and policymaking or practice), is applied to problems that are wider in scope (open-ended problems, complex problems with multiple mechanisms) and draws from different paradigms electively, extracting, translating or recombining analytical components.¹⁰⁷

References

Baldwin, David: "Interdependence and Power: Conceptual Analysis". *International Organization*, 34 (4), 1980 pp. 471–506.

104 Cf.: Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg: op. cit., pp. 252–256.

105 Cf.: Hudson, Valerie: "The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis;" Wohlforth, William: "Realism and Foreign Policy;" Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and Foreign Policy;" Flockhart, Trine: "Constructivism and Foreign Policy;" Hansen, Lene: "Discourse Analysis, Post-structuralism, and Foreign Policy." All five in: Smith, Steve/Hadfield, Amelia/Dunne, Tim (eds.): *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, pp. 13–109.

106 There are numerous publications referring to this paradigm, like: Hudson, Valerie: *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Debates*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014; Deach, Derek: *Analyzing Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2012. In Poland, this problem (with a focus on American foreign policy making) was analyzed by Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2017. Very good set of essays about FPA in China, Japan, India, Arab World or African States, cf.: Brummer, Klaus/Hudson, Valerie (eds.): *Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder-London 2015.

107 Cf.: Sil, Rudra/Katzenstein, Peter: *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010, pp. 9–48.

- Barnett, Michael. "Social Constructivism". In: Baylis, John/Smith, Steve (eds.): *The Globalization of World Politics: An Interdiction to International Relations*, 3rd ed. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Bearce, David/Bondanella, Stacy: "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence". *International Organization*, 61 (4), 2007, pp. 703–733.
- Bearce, David/Flanagan, Kristen/Floros, Katharine: "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States". *International Organization*, 60 (3), 2006, pp. 595–625.
- Both, Ken/Wheeler, Nicholas: *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2008.
- Burton, John: *World Society*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1972.
- Buzan, Barry: "The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR". *Review of International Studies*, 27 (3), 2001, pp. 471–488.
- Brummer, Klaus/Hudson, Valerie (eds.): *Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder-London 2015.
- Carr, Edward: *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Macmillan Press: London 1946.
- Copeland, Dale: "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations". *International Security*, 20 (4), 1996, pp. 5–41.
- Czaputowicz, Jacek: *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych: Krytyka i systematyzacja*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa 2007.
- Deach, Derek: *Analyzing Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2012.
- Deutsch, Karl: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1957.
- Donnelly, Jack: "Realism". In: Burchill, Scott/Devetak, Richard/Linklater, Andrew/Patterson, Matthew/Seus-Smit, Christian/True, Jacqui: *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2005.
- Dougherty, James/Pfaltzgraff, Robert: *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 1990.
- Doyle, Michael: "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs". *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12 (3), 1983, pp. 205–235.
- Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and Foreign Policy." In: Smith, Steve/Hadfield, Amelia/Dunne, Tim (eds.): *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, pp. 54–77.
- Doyle, Michael: "Liberalism and World Politics". *American Political Science Review*, 80 (4), 1986, pp. 1151–1169.

- Doyle, Michael/Recchia, Stefano: "Liberalism in International Relations." In: Badie, Bertrand/Schlosser, Dirk-Berg/Morlino, Leonardo (eds.): *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Sage: Los Angeles 2011.
- Dunne, Tim: *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, London: Macmillan, St Antony's Series, 1998. Fukuyama, Francis: "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, pp. 3–18.
- Fukuyama, Francis: *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press: New York 1992.
- Gellman, Peter: "Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism". *Review of International Studies*, 14 (4), 1988, pp. 247–266.
- Glaser, Charles: *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*. Princeton University Press: Princeton-Oxford 2010.
- Grabowski, Marcin: *Wiek Pacyfiku – polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec region Azji i Pacyfiku po roku 1989*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2012.
- Grieco, Joseph: "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism". *International Organization*, 42 (3), 1988, pp. 485–507.
- Griffiths, Martin: *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. Routledge: London-New York 1999.
- Guzzini, Stefano: *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. Routledge: London-New York 1998.
- Hansen, Lene: "Discourse Analysis, Post-structuralism, and Foreign Policy." In: Smith, Steve/Hadfield, Amelia/Dunne, Tim (eds.): *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, pp. 94–109.
- Hay, Colin: "Social Constructivism". In: Bevir, Mark/Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds.): *Routledge Handbook of Interpretive Political Science*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Herz, John: "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma". *World Politics*, 2 (2), 1950, pp. 157–180.
- Herz, John: *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1951.
- Hudson, Valerie: "The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis". In: Smith, Steve/Hadfield, Amelia/Dunne, Tim (eds.): *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, pp. 13–34.
- Hudson, Valerie: *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Debates*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014. Jackson, Robert: *Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2005.

- Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg: *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2016.
- Jervis, Robert: "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics". *Social Research*, 61 (4), 1994, pp. 853–876.
- Jorgensen, Knud: *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2018.
- Keohane, Robert: *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton-Oxford 2005.
- Keohane, Robert: "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work". *Foreign Policy*, 110, 1998, pp. 82–96.
- Keohane, Robert/Martin, Lisa: "Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 20 (1), 1995, pp. 39–51.
- Krasner, Stephen: "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables". In: Krasner, Stephen (ed.): *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1983.
- Lebow, Richard: "Classical Realism". In: Dunne, Tim/Kurki, Milja/Smith, Steve: *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013.
- Leheny, David: "Constructivism and International Relations in Asia". In: Pekkanen, Saadia M./Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Legro, Jeffrey/Moravcsik, Andrew: "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, 24 (2), 1999, pp. 5–55.
- Liebig, Michael/Mishra, Saurabh (eds.): *The Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun-Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*. Pentagon Press: New Delhi 2017.
- Martin, Lisa/Simmons, Beth: "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions". *International Organization*, 52 (4), 1998, pp. 729–757.
- Matthews, Elizabeth/Callway, Rhonda: *International Relations Theory: A Primer*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2017.
- Mearsheimer, John: "Reckless States and Realism." In: Booth, Ken (ed.): *Realism and World Politics*. Routledge: New York 2011, pp. 124–140.
- Mearsheimer, John: "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 19 (3), 1994–1995, pp. 5–49.
- Mearsheimer, John: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton: London-New York 2014.
- Monoson, Sara/Loriaux, Michael: "Pericles, Realism, and the Normative Conditions of Deliberate Action." In: Jahn, Beate (ed.), *Classical Theory*

- in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006, pp. 27–51.
- Montgomery, Evan: “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty”. *International Security*, 36 (2), 2006, pp. 151–185.
- Moravcsik, Andrew: “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”. *International Organization*, 51 (4), 1997, pp. 513–553.
- Morgenthau, Hans: *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf: New York 1948.
- Morgenthau, Hans: *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*. Latimer House Limited: London 1947 (first edition was published in 1946).
- Morgenthau, Hans/Thompson, Kenneth: *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Alfred A. Knopf: New York 1985.
- Nau, Henry: *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca 2002.
- Neascu, Mihaela: *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2009.
- Nye, Joseph/Keohane, Robert: *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown and Company: Boston 1977.
- Onuf, Nicholas: “Structure? What Structure?” In: Booth, Ken (ed.): *Realism and World Politics*. Routledge: New York 2011, pp. 89–106.
- Pevenhouse, Jon/Russett, Bruce: “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace”. *International Organization*, 60 (4), 2006, pp. 969–1000.
- Pugaczewicz, Tomasz: *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2017.
- Reid, Julian: “Re-appropriating Clausewitz: The Neglected Dimensions of Counter-Strategic Thought.” In: Jahn, Beate (ed.), *Classical Theory in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006, pp. 277–295.
- Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008.
- Rose, Gideon: “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” *World Politics*, 51 (1), 1998, pp. 144–172.
- Rosenau, James: “Citizenship in a Changing Global Order”. In: Rosenau, James/Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1992.

- Rosenau, James: *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays of the Transnationalization of World Affairs*. Nichols Publishing Company: New York 1980.
- Rosencrance, Richard: "Reward, Punishment, and Interdependence". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25 (1), 1981, pp. 31–46. Rosencrance, Richard: *The Rise of Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. Basic Books, New York 1986.
- Ruggie, John: "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order". In: Krasner, Stephen (ed.): *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1983.
- Schelling, Thomas: *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1960.
- Schweller, Randall: "Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, 5 (3), 1996, pp. 90–121.
- Schweller, Randall: "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism". In: Elman, Colin/Elman, Miriam (eds.): *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. MIT Press: Cambridge-London 2003.
- Sil, Rudra/Katzenstein, Peter: *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010.
- Sorensen, Georg: "Big and Important Things' in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood." In: Booth, Ken (ed.): *Realism and World Politics*. Routledge: New York 2011, pp. 107–123.
- Tang, Shipping: "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis". *Security Studies*, 18 (3), 2009, pp. 587–623.
- Tucker, Robert: "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism'". *American Political Science Review*, 46 (1), 1952, pp. 214–224.
- Viotti, Paul/Kauppi, Mark: *International Relations Theory*. Pearson: New York 2010.
- Weaver, Ole: "Waltz's Theory of Theory: The Pictorial Challenge to Mainstream IR." In: Booth, Ken (ed.): *Realism and World Politics*. Routledge: New York 2011, pp. 67–88.
- Walt, Stephen: *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1987.
- Walter/Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth A. (eds.): *Handbook of International Relations*. SAGE, London 2012.
- Waltz, Kenneth: *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press: New York-London 1959.

- Waltz, Kenneth: *Theory of International Politics*. Adison-Wesley Publishing Company: Reading-Menlo Park-London, Amsterdam, Don Mills-Sydney 1979.
- Waltz, Kenneth: "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory". *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18 (4), 1988, pp. 615–628.
- Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999.
- Williams, Michael: "The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: Three Traditions." In: Jahn, Beate (ed.), *Classical Theory in International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006, pp. 253–276.
- Wohlforth, William: "Realism and Foreign Policy." In: Smith, Steve/Hadfield, Amelia/Dunne, Tim (eds.): *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012, pp. 35–53.

Marcin Grabowski, Tomasz Pugacewicz

3. Ways of Application of Western IR Theories in Asia and Africa

Abstract: *The main goal of this chapter is an analysis of the application of selected Western International Relations theories in Asia and Africa. Five theoretical paradigms were selected as being most popular in the field, namely realism, constructivism, liberalism, the English School and Marxism. In case of Asia we may definitely notice a further stage of IR theory development, especially in Northeast Asia. It is visible both in the reception and the transformation of given paradigms. In the case of Africa, only an early stage of the reception of Western IR theories has hitherto been observed. As for paradigms, realism is definitely dominant, followed by constructivism, especially in the 21st century. Other paradigms, despite domination in certain periods (like Marxism in the Cold War era or the growing role of liberalism due to rising interactions and regional integration), are rather less important in Asia and Africa.*

Keywords: Asia, Africa, IR theory application, realism, liberalism, constructivism, English School, Marxism

Introduction

This chapter attempts to answer the question how Western IR theories, described in the previous part, were adapted in scholarship on Asia and Africa to the present day. We propose the hypothesis that in both analyzed regions, Western IR theories are predominantly adapted to explain international relations, but this process is at a different stage in research on Asia (not only reception, but also transformation) and Africa (mostly only reception). We apply a comparative case studies research strategy as chosen IR theories adopted on Asia and Africa are presented collaterally. As a result, the chapter is divided into five parts focused on five different theories (realism, constructivism, liberalism, the English School and Marxism) and their applications in both parts of the world mentioned. The paper is based on an extensive literature review, unfortunately published only in English.

All five theoretical paradigms introduced in chapter 2 have been extensively applied in Asian IR scholarship,¹ but if we look at intensity, realism in its different

1 As explained earlier when we write about International Relations research on Asia without regard to the country (or region) of origin, we are just going to write about "IR". When we write only about scholars from Asia working on international relations

emanations is an absolute leader in this respect. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially due to integration processes in Asia, there has been a growing role for liberalism, especially institutional liberalism and interdependence liberalism in the region. Then, in the early 21st century, the role of constructivism has become more important, both in Northeast Asia (especially in China), but also in Southeast Asia. The English School has been less important among the scholars in the region, and Marxist theories, being rather popular during the Cold War, especially in countries leaning toward communism, have lost their prominence in the region. Africa is more difficult to theorize, especially from a Western-based perspective, as despite the important role played by realism, due to the limited role of nation-states (being relatively weak), we need to find other paradigms explaining regional international relations development. Some scholars would look at liberal theories (in terms of regional integration), many of them from constructivism (due to the important role of nationalism and ethnic issues in most of the countries of this region). Traditionally, Western scholars used many Marxist/critical theories, especially connected with post-colonialism and dependence, but this approach limits African agency (see e.g. international relations theories applied to Asian IR by Amitav Acharya shown in Tab. 1).

Realism in Asian and African IR

Realism has definitely been a dominant paradigm of International relations in Asian and African IR scholarship. It has been especially visible among IR researchers in Asia, as realism has been deeply rooted in Asian philosophical thought, and applied by scholars and politicians educated especially in the United States. Such an approach explained post-World War II international relations in the Asia-Pacific in a proper way, as sovereignty, interstate conflict, great power rivalry and cooperation (mostly security alliances) were based on the need to improve relative position in the regional system. Therefore, a realist theoretical explanation was definitely the most appropriate regional IR theory. A realist paradigm application was especially visible in Chinese scholarship on international relations.²

research (“International Relations”), we are going to stress this (e.g. “International Relations (IR) studies in Asia” etc.). By the “Asian International Relations” (“Asian IR”) we understand International Relations research on Asia (developed both in Asia and the West) and, similarly, by “African International Relations” we understand studies on African international relations developed around the world.

2 More about Chinese IR scholarship – see chapter 3.

Tab. 1: Theoretical Perspectives on Asia's International Relations. Source: Acharya, Amitav: "Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR." In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014, p. 63.

	Classical Realism (Defensive Realism)	Neorealism (Offensive Realism)	Liberalism and Neoliberalism Institutionalism	Constructivism (English School)
<i>What kept order in Asia during the Cold War</i>	<i>US military presence</i>	<i>Bipolarity</i>	<i>Interdependence induced by rapid economic growth</i>	<i>Norms diffused through ASEAN</i>
<i>Likely impact of the end of the Cold War and the rise of China</i>	<i>Multipolar rivalry</i>	<i>Regional hegemony (mainly China)</i>	<i>Multipolar stability due to expansion of capitalism and commerce</i>	<i>Multipolar stability through socialization of Cold War rivals; II. benign hierarchy</i>
<i>The role and impact of regional institutions</i>	<i>Adjuncts to balance of power (effective only if there is a prior balance of power)</i>	<i>Instruments of Chinese sphere of influence</i>	<i>Building economic and security regimes to promote free trade and manage disputes arising from growing interdependence</i>	<i>ASEAN's security community as the building block for a wider Asian regional consociation *</i>
<i>Asia's future will resemble:</i>	<i>Europe's past (late 19th and early 20th centuries)</i>	<i>America's past (19th century – Mearsheimer); Asia's past (pre-colonial sinocentrism as the basis of a clash of civilizations)</i>	<i>ASEAN's past (formative years) **</i>	<i>Asian's past (pre-colonial benign hierarchy) ***</i>

The prominence of realism in Chinese IR scholarship was a result of the fact that Chinese scholars primarily chose American universities (dominated by realism) and realist IR theoretical books were the first to be translated into Chinese (followed by liberal and constructivist works). Nevertheless, traditional Chinese thought included elements of realism – e.g. Sun Zi's strategic thinking, close to strategic realism – this Western theory had to be adjusted to Chinese philosophy, with Confucianism – contrary to realism – accentuating the role of harmony in social and international relations.

According to Polish scholar Edward Haliżak, the most influential Chinese realist scholar is Yan Xuetong. He published an impressive monograph *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* in 2011, situating him in a realist paradigm, with a primary focus on power and hegemony of unified China in the system. He created the concept of moral leadership, rooted in ancient Chinese philosophy. Alongside of Yan Xuetong we have observed a growing number of Chinese scholars, adapting and reinterpreting the realist paradigm, and stressing the concept of China as a responsible great power.³

Undoubtedly, the Cold War period was dominated by realist analyses of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. The problem of power, security dilemma or hegemonic stability dominated not only scholarly thinking, but also political debates in the region, following the realist approach. It was visible both in Northeast Asia, and in Southeast Asia. For the Singaporean leader and long-time prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, the US was the chief regional balancer providing stability, hence conditions for economic development. A similar approach was expressed by Seni Pramoj from Thailand's Democratic Party.

The end of the Cold War resulted in new developments in IR research on Asia. Firstly, the rising position of the neorealist school. Two main areas were analyzed in this period. Firstly concerns of a 'power vacuum' after Soviet withdrawal,⁴ and secondly the power transition between the United States and China, generally becoming more and more common as China gained capabilities at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries.⁵ As for international institutions (ASEAN,

3 Development of Chinese realist scholarship, as well as main features of Chinese realist thinking, briefly described in this paragraph, see: Haliżak, Edward: "Realizm w chińskiej nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych." In: Haliżak, Edward/Czaputowicz, Jacek: *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych: Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*. Rambler: Warszawa 2014, pp. 167–194.

4 Such an approach was analyzed in Roy, Denny: "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'power vacuum.'" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 37 (3), 1995, pp. 45–60.

5 Power-transition theory has been applied in many texts, like Kim, Woosang/Gates, Scott: "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China." *International Area Studies Review*, 18 (3), 2015, pp. 219–226; Zhu, Zhiqun: "Power Transition and US-China Relations: Is War Inevitable?" *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 12 (1), 2005, pp. 1–24. In Poland such an approach was used in Mania, Andrzej/Grabowski, Marcin: "Rola Departamentu Stanu w polityce USA wobec Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w okresie pierwszej kadencji prezydenckiej Baracka Obamy (2009–2013)." In: Pietraś, Marek/Dumała, Hanna/Ziętek, Agata (eds.): *Teoria i praktyka stosunków*

SAARC, ARF), realists tended to downplay their role in regional stability and security, especially during the Cold War, but also after the end of the Cold War they predicted Asia would experience more a period of rivalry than cooperation. This attitude was challenged by institutionalists, stressing the role of new regional arrangements since the 1990s, and the realist approach in general has also been competing with the constructivist one, especially since the beginning of the 21st century.⁶

Strategic realism has to some extent been perceived as a crucial paradigm in certain analyses of Asian politics, including conflict zones, like the Korean conflict, as Thomas Schelling's deterrence theory may be utilized in this context (looking deeper at this problem, we may also see Sun Zi's approach from the *Art of War*).⁷ Similarly, the security dilemma concept has often been applied as an analytical tool, due to the high level of uncertainty in relations between North and South Korea,⁸ or, on the other hand, justification of the North Korean nuclear program.⁹ An interesting version of Robert Gilpin's realist approach to Japanese security policy (with a focus on security dilemma) was introduced by Tsuyoshi Kawasaki challenging mostly constructivist approaches to Japanese security policy in the 20th century.¹⁰

Application of realism in research on the Asia-Pacific region should be correlated with the traditional approach to international relations in the region, as the international system, especially in broadly understood East Asia, should be analyzed as a more hierarchical than anarchical system. Acceptance of international hierarchy, with a dominant power as a leader of the regional system is deeply

międzynarodowych: dziedzictwo intelektualne profesora Ziemowita Jacka Pietrasia. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej: Lublin 2014, pp. 389–404.

- 6 This brief analysis is based on: Acharya, Amitav: "Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR." In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014, pp. 62–68.
- 7 Analysis of Korean Conflict in the context of deterrence theory, cf.: Kang, David: "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (3), 2003, pp. 301–324.
- 8 Cf.: Lee, Goo: "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma: Evolving Inter-Korean Relations in the Early 1990s." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 17 (3), 2005, pp. 27–61.
- 9 Sometimes it was juxtaposed with other paradigms, like constructivism. Cf.: Akhtar, Shaheen/Khan, Zulfiqar: "Understanding the Nuclear Aspiration and Behaviour of North Korea and Iran." *Strategic Analysis*, 38 (5), 2014, pp. 617–633.
- 10 Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi: "Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy." *The Pacific Review*, 14 (2), 2001, pp. 221–240.

embedded in East Asia; therefore the system tends toward more stable hierarchy (most likely with a dominant and central role played by China).¹¹

We can definitely apply different realist theories to Asia-Pacific international relations, especially great power rivalry, namely rivalry between the People's Republic of China and the United States. Looking at the approach of defensive realists (like Stephen Walt), we can expect harmonious and peaceful coexistence between the US and China, even if they would balance China.¹² On the other hand, John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist would focus on the dangers caused by the rising Chinese power, leading to its aggressiveness and the American need to maintain a strategic advantage over China, either unilaterally or (recommended) multilaterally, in the form of an anti-Chinese coalition.¹³ Neoclassical realist Randall Schweller provides three alternatives for Sino-American relations: a Chinese fight against US hegemony, cooperation or Chinese politics of gaining as much as possible within a US-led system, before it is able to shape the system unilaterally.¹⁴ A realistic power balancing concept can be perceived in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of relations between crucial regional players, like China and Japan¹⁵ or China and India.¹⁶ Searching for an agenda of realist IR theory in the Asia-Pacific region, we may also refer to Michael Mastanduno's approach, providing five propositions that could be useful for an analysis of international relations in the region. Firstly, he focuses on the need for the political foundation of the Asian regional order after the Cold

11 Kang, David: "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations." *American Asian Review*, 19 (2), 2001, pp. 121–160.

12 Cf.: Walt, Stephen: "Where Do We Draw the Line on Balancing China?" *Foreign Policy*, 2015. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/27/where-do-we-draw-the-line-on-balancing-china/>.

13 Cf.: Mearsheimer, John: "Can China Rise Peacefully?" *National Interest*, 2014. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204> (published as a concluding chapter of updated edition of Mearsheimer, John: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton: New York-London 2014, pp. 360–411).

14 Chen, Rong: "A Critical Analysis of the U.S. 'Pivot' toward the Asia-Pacific: How Realistic is Neo-Realism." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 12 (3), 2013, pp. 39–62.

15 Hughes, Christopher: "Japan's 'Resentful Realism' and Balancing China's Rise." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9 (2), 2016, 109–150.

16 Cf.: Garver, John: *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. University of Washington Press: Seattle-London 2001, pp. 387–388; Scott, David: "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century." *Asian Security*, 4 (3), 2008, pp. 244–270.

War, as a stabilizing mechanism necessary for security and development in the region, which would be difficult without an American presence there. Secondly, he portrays China's rise as creating a potentially dangerous power transition, leading to a conflict between the US and China. Thirdly, he expects balancing of Asian states, using a combination of power and threat, especially balancing against China. Fourthly, he blames nationalist sentiment and enduring historical rivalry for heightening the potential for conflict in Asia. Fifthly and finally, he finds economic cooperation difficult in the aforementioned uncertain security environment.¹⁷

African IR scholarship has been generally less developed than Asian, but many concepts from mainstream IR theories have been adapted there as well, where realism still seems to be the dominant theory, as problems of conflict (both international and intrastate conflicts) have dominated IR analyses connected with this continent. Also, the problem of hegemony, including the hegemony of colonial powers have been important, both in the context of the colonial past, and the current post-colonial environment with new players, like China or the United States.

Realism has been challenged in African IR for various reasons, even though during the Cold War, it was a relatively useful analytical tool for analysis of great power rivalries in Africa.¹⁸ After the Cold War, realism lost its explanatory power, as this paradigm focuses on states (relatively weak in Africa where regime/leader survival is often more important than state survival) and especially powers (great powers/regional powers), generally absent in Africa (at the periphery of international relations). Other IR theory paradigms, especially constructivist or critical, popular among scholars focusing on Africa (and other unfavored areas in the world), also lack explanatory power in this case. Therefore, certain modifications in both realist and other IR theories are needed to enable their enhanced applicability in African IR.¹⁹

17 Mastanduno, Michael: "Realism in Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014, pp. 27–39.

18 The realist approach (contrary to the liberal one) to Sino-American rivalry in Africa may be found in: Grabowski, Marcin: "China and the U.S. in Africa: Conflict or Collaboration?" *Ad Americam: Journal of American Studies*, 12, 2011, pp. 63–86.

19 Cf. Clark, John: "Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era." In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001, pp. 85–102.

Even though realism has been an important component of African IR scholarship, as it has set the stage for international relations in the continent (colonial domination somehow imposed a certain system of states and system structure), there are many factors, usually neglected in theoretical analysis of Africa (called “empirical neglect” by Errol Henderson in his book *African Realism?*). These challenges are connected with the improper application of levels of analysis in African IR, as well as the fact that interstate conflicts are less important than domestic conflicts, closer to the so-called new wars.²⁰ Therefore, even if realism is to be applied in the analysis of regional problem, domestic factors should be accentuated.²¹ Understanding of theory in Africa should be different: even if we adopt a rational, utilitarian approach, we should also use the intervening variable of sociological factors.²² Moreover – despite the domination of realism, hence a value-free theory of IR, in African IR – we should definitely reconsider this approach, as the constructivist approach has demonstrated the limited usefulness of realism to African international relations analysis and the need to create a pan-African school of IR theory.²³ Moreover, the state is relatively often a contested concept in IR theory, if referring to Africa, as the state is to some extent seen as an artificial, imposed concept on the African continent. Therefore, the adaptation of realism to study Africa may be further questioned, and most likely should be reinterpreted or reconceptualized.²⁴

-
- 20 In a reference to Kaldor, Mary: *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Polity Press: Cambridge-Malden 2012 (first edition was published in 1999), pp. 71–93. This problem is also analyzed in Caldor, Mary: *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press: Cambridge-Medford 2018, pp. 75–98.
- 21 Henderson, Errol: *African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015, pp. 19–80.
- 22 Cf.: Tiekou, Thomas Kwasi: “Theoretical Approaches to Africa's International Relations.” In: Murithi, Tim (ed.): *Handbook of Africa's International Relations*. Routledge: New York 2014, pp. 11–20.
- 23 Murithi, Tim: “Bridging the Gap: The Pan-African School and International Relations Theory.” In: Bischoff, Paul-Henri/Aning, Kwesi/Acharya, Amitav (eds.): *Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice*. Routledge: New York 2016, pp. 164–174.
- 24 Smith, Karen: “Africa as an Agent of International Relations Knowledge.” In: Cornelissen, Scarlett/Cheru, Fantu/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2012, pp. 21–34.

Constructivism in Asian and African IR

Even though realism has been the dominant IR theory, both in and on Asia and Africa, other schools have gradually joined as an analytical framework in those regions. In recent years we can observe growing interest in how we can employ constructivism in studies on non-Western areas, including especially Asia. Mostly this is associated with the fact that many conflicts in Asia are based not on material, but identity factors.²⁵

According to David Leheny, in the first phase of the constructivist incursion in Asia studies – from the second half of the 1990s to the second half of the 2000s – we could observe many examples of how this approach enriched understanding about processes in this region.²⁶ The constructivist approach toward Japanese security was already promoted in a paper written by Peter Katzenstein and Nobuko Okawara in 1993.²⁷ Two years later Alastair Iain Johnston pointed out that the Chinese realist approach to international relations had been influenced by Chinese cultural heritage (i.e. classic strategic thought).²⁸ In the second half of the 1990s Katzenstein and Thomas U. Berger indicated that Japanese security policy was not based on rational calculations of regional military balance, but had its roots in legislative consensus norms and pacifistic heritage.²⁹ Finally, in the next phase, first studies on Southeast Asian norms shaping the subregional system were published, resulting in a prominent book, written by Acharya describing ASEAN as a security community.³⁰

25 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 64.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

27 Katzenstein, Peter/Okawara, Nobuko: “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies.” *International Security*, 17 (4), 1993, pp. 84–118. This issue was developed further by Peter Katzenstein in his book, analyzing role of cultural norms to national security, but referring also to other schools of IR theory (institutionalism, realism, liberalism). Cf.: Katzenstein, Peter: *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1996, pp. 17–58.

28 Johnston, Alastair Iain: *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1995.

29 Cf. Berger, Thomas U.: *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 1998; Katzenstein, Peter J.: *Cultural Norms and National Security*.

30 Acharya, Amitav: “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way.’” *The Pacific Review*, 10 (3), 1997: pp. 319–346; Busse, Nikolas: “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security.” *The Pacific Review*, 12 (1), 1999, pp. 39–60; Acharya, Amitav: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Routledge: London & New York 2001.

In the contemporary phase of application of constructivism in Asia studies, during the last 10–15 years, special emphasis was placed on Japan for number of reasons. Firstly, probably because, as seen above, early constructivist studies on security in Asia were developed in the context of this state.³¹ Secondly, the problem of identity was important not only in Japanese domestic policy, but to a large extent in its foreign relations, including relations with neighboring countries, like South Korea.³² Nowadays constructivist studies on Asia follow the division described in the chapter 2 and refer to two types of identity: domestic and systemic (yet some of these try to combine both levels).³³ For example, some research focuses only on how domestic norms shape Japanese foreign policy.³⁴ On the other side, there is research showing how international NGOs, with the collaboration of certain domestic actors, campaign for legislative changes in the area, e.g. regarding minority rights which meet resistance from conservative anti-Western groups.³⁵

Also, studies on China from a constructivist perspective have been ongoing over the last decade.³⁶ Part of this research is concentrated on how international norms shape Chinese identity: e.g. Johnston attempted to answer the question if international institutions socialize China while William A. Callahan analyzed the influence of transnational ideologies on China.³⁷ On the other hand, Allen Carlson focused on building the Chinese idea of sovereignty.³⁸ We can also

31 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 72.

32 Cf.: Tamaki, Taku: “Taking the ‘Taken-for-Grantedness’ Seriously: Problematizing Japan’s Perception of Japan-South Korea Relations.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 4 (1), 2004, pp. 147–169.

33 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 72.

34 Oros, Andrew L.: *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2009; Suzuki, Shogo: “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?” *The Pacific Review*, 28 (1), 2015, pp. 95–116.

35 Hirata, Keiko/Sato, Yoichiro (eds.): *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2008.

36 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 72–73.

37 Johnston, Alastair Iain: *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 2008; Callahan, William A: *Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2004.

38 Carlson, Allen: *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*. Stanford University Press: Stanford 2005.

identify research on reconstructing Korean post-war identity.³⁹ Finally, there is also research based on the English School and the constructivist approach, and focused on constructing a regional order in post-Cold War East Asia (including the United States and the ASEAN countries).⁴⁰

At this stage of applying constructivist theories in Asia, studies on South Asia also emerged.⁴¹ For example, Shibashis Chatterjee conducted research on domestic ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and Karthika Sasikumar focused on how management methods have shaped Indian nuclear strategy.⁴²

However, the most profound studies on Asia in the second phase of applying constructivism were focused on southeast part of this continent.⁴³ Some of them follow the abovementioned Japanese case studies pattern and try to figure out how global norms are in conflict with local politics in this subregion's states. But most of the research is focused on the conception about ASEAN as a different security system than that proposed by realists. As a result, the Southeast Asia region seems to be most popular in terms of constructivist theorizing, especially thanks to Acharya and his book *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (2014), focusing on the role of ASEAN in building a regional security community and identity (including theoretical and historical analysis), basing on a set of norms and values (connected to the so-called ASEAN Way), including non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes, regional autonomy in problem solving, non-interference doctrine or lack of military pacts.⁴⁴ Other

39 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 73. Cf. Suh, Jae-Jung: *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2007.

40 Goh, Evelyn: *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK 2013.

41 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 73.

42 Chatterjee, Shibashis: "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: A Constructivist Reading." *South Asian Survey* 12, 2005, pp. 75–88; Sasikumar, Karthika: "India's Emergence as a 'Responsible' Nuclear Power." *International Journal* 62 (4), 2007, pp. 825–44.

43 Leheny, *Constructivism and International Relations in Asia*, p. 72–73.

44 Acharya, Amitav: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Routledge: Oxon-New York 2014, pp. 43–78. See also: Johnston, Alastair Iain: "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory." In: Mastanduno, Michael/Ikenberry, G. John (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, Columbia University Press, New York 2003, pp. 107–162.

scholars also support this line of thinking showing the influence of ASEAN on norm regulating regional cooperation.⁴⁵

As above, the research described is concentrated around the idea of building regional identity. It should be mentioned that at the same time there is a growing literature critically approaching the idea of regional community.⁴⁶ For example, Emmerson suggests that contemporary developments in Southeast Asia contradict the idea of regional identity, while David Martin Jones and Michael L. Smith point out the growing evidence of ASEAN failures in the area of regional security.⁴⁷

Additional studies stress the fact that the role of constructivist studies in raising awareness of identity concerns in Southeast Asian security analysis may be problematic, partly due to bias toward state-centrism, resulting in the loss of its social constructivist edge.⁴⁸ At the same time, some scholars in Asian IR criticize the constructivist approach as it underestimates structural inheritance, shaping regional international relations, especially in the area of security. Those critics suggest using critical realism assumption on agent-structure relations in security studies and applying a constructivist approach in analysis of the persistence of realism in regional international relations.⁴⁹ A similarly ambivalent approach is used in analysis of ASEAN, and its role in the region, but in this case, the neorealist approach seem to underestimate the institution and its power, while constructivism focuses on the role of the organization in long-term identity building.⁵⁰ There are also studies combining constructivism and foreign

45 Cf. Ba, Alice D.: "Regional Security in East Asia: ASEAN's Value Added and Limitations." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 29 (3), 2010, pp. 115–130.

46 Leheny, Constructivism and International Relations in Asia, p. 73.

47 Emmerson, Donald K.: "What Do the Blind-Sided See? Reapproaching Regionalism in Southeast Asia." *The Pacific Review*, 18 (1), 2005, pp. 1–21; Jones, David Martin/Smith, Michael L. R.: "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order." *International Security* 32 (1), 2007, pp. 148–184.

48 Tan, See Seng: "Rescuing Constructivism from the Constructivists: A Critical Reading of Constructivist Interventions in Southeast Asian Security." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 239–260.

49 Beeson, Mark: "Alternative Realities: Explaining Security in the Asia-Pacific." In: *Review of International Studies*, 43 (3), 2017, pp. 516–533. An approach between institutionalism and constructivism may be found in: Caballero-Anthony, Mely: *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005, pp. 14–48.

50 Cf.: Eaton, Sarah/Stubbs, Richard: "Is ASEAN Powerful?: Neo-realist versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 135–155. See also Nau, Henry R.: "Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia."

policy analysis theories (e.g. operation code concept) in studies on Chinese foreign policy elites.⁵¹

We generally have a limited number of studies applying solely constructivist theories in African studies.⁵² William Brown writes that the state-centric assumption of constructivism is limiting in its application to Africa, but at the same time he argues that this approach is more qualified to study African international relations than e.g. neorealism, as in constructivism society is the main unit of analysis.⁵³ Following this pattern of thinking, Olukayode A. Fale states: “Constructivists have been preoccupied with the social construction of International Relations with a special focus on trans-border sociocultural relations. This seems to hold promise for the understanding of the African informal transnational undercurrent.”⁵⁴

There is some evidence pointing toward South Africa as a center of gravity for constructivist scholars working on African affairs as a “surprisingly large number of South African scholars indicate a preference for constructivism” probably because “constructivism rose to prominence internationally in the late 1990s, when South African scholars were reintegrating into the global community of scholars.”⁵⁵ For example, Van Wyk (2004) tried to assess South African foreign policy using a constructivist approach as a useful tool to explain change ignited by ideas.⁵⁶

In: Mastanduno, Michael/Ikenberry, G. John (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, Columbia University Press, New York 2003, pp. 213–241.

- 51 He, Kai/Feng, Huiyun: “Transcending Rationalism and Constructivism: Chinese Leaders’ Operational Codes, Socialization Processes, and Multilateralism after the Cold War.” *European Political Science Review*, 7 (3), 2015, pp. 401–426.
- 52 For example, constructivism was not taken into consideration in: Dunn, Kevin C./Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.): *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave: Houndmills, and New York, 2001.
- 53 Brown, William: “Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and Statehood.” *Review of International Studies*, 32 (1), 2006, p. 132.
- 54 Faleye, Olukayode A.: “Africa and International Relations Theory: Acquiescence and Responses.” *Globalistics and Globalization Studies* 2014, p. 160.
- 55 Smith, Karen: “International Relations in South Africa: A Case of ‘Add Africa and Stir?’” *Politikon*, 40 (3), 2013, p. 537.
- 56 Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie: “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Analysis”. *Politeia*, 23 (3), 2004, pp. 103–136.

We can also find research on Africa, being multitheoretical, referring to realism, liberalism, critical theories and constructivism itself.⁵⁷ Scholars, both from Africa and the West, have also taken an effort to build African IR theory which is to a large extent constructed on the specificity of African international system, with a strong role for ethnicity (actually nations) and African non-nation-states.⁵⁸ Additionally, there are steps taken to bring theoretical innovation to Western IR theory based on African experience.⁵⁹ In terms of African integration (like the African Union), there are both liberal/institutional explanations, but also constructivist ones.

Liberalism in Asia-Pacific and African IR

Different schools of liberalism have become popular in Asia and studies on Asia, especially following the Cold War, being rooted in all schools mentioned in chapter 2. As Acharya points out, the most popular one was connected with interdependence, especially economic interdependence, bringing peace to the region and stabilizing the strategic situation between regional powers. It was naturally challenged by many realist, especially neorealist, scholars, stressing the fact that highly interdependent states, like China and Japan, have engaged in serious conflicts. As for democratic peace theory, we could observe a lack of interest and lack of application of this theory in Asia and research on Asia, to some extent due to the fact that we still had a limited number of liberal democracies in the region. On the other hand, Asia may be characterized as a region of a stable illiberal peace (non-democracies generally do not fight with each other), and democratic transition brings a risk of instability and conflict. Liberal institutionalism seems to be more useful in the regional analysis, but in reality, despite

57 Cf.: Olivier, Laetitia/Vrey, Francois: “Theoretical Approaches in International Relations: The South African Military as a Foreign Policy Instrument.” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 43, (2), 2015, pp. 39–64.

58 Cf.: Atkinson, Ronald: “The Re(Construction) of Ethnicity in Africa: Extending the Chronology, Conceptualization and Discourse.” Eriksen, Thomas: “A Non-ethnic State for Africa? A Life-world Approach to the Imagining of Communities.” Both in: Yeros, Paris (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 1999, pp. 15–64.

59 Smith, Karen: “Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations,” *The Round Table*, 98 (402), 2009, pp. 269–284; Smith, Karen: “Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa”. *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*, 2017, pp. 1–12.

a large number of regional institutions, the liberal approach hardly overlaps with the constructivist one. Therefore, the liberal school has not been an important element in regional international relations theorizing. As for the causes, Acharya mentions: lack of interest of growing regional powers (China and India) in the creation of a liberal order; regional powers do not necessarily share the norms of liberal internationalism (challenging state sovereignty). Finally, those states expect reforms of global liberal institutions, created after World War II.⁶⁰

A detailed analysis of challenges to the liberal approach to IR in the Asia-Pacific was introduced by Stephan Haggard, focusing on a modern understanding of liberalism based on the preferences of different actors. In this respect he underlines the heterogeneity of the region, including regional institutions (like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN, the East Asia Summit – EAS and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC). Member-states of those institutions are diversified in all aspects, in economic, political, religious or social ones, hence creation of efficient institutions is really difficult (as in the case of converging preferences, domestic policy does not require a lot of structural adjustments). Despite the large number of institutions, they face a set of difficulties, making them ‘shallow’ or ‘thin’: they operate on the basis of consensus decision-making procedures (forcing them to seek the lowest common denominator when taking a decision); commitments states make are generally non-binding, voluntary and imprecise (therefore they are not credible and are difficult to enforce); there are limited international bodies (like secretariats or bureaucracies); therefore this institutional environment is rather informal, cannot constrain actors and does not provide a rule-governed regional order.⁶¹

Regional integration has been perceived as the main testing ground for liberal theories in the Asia-Pacific, and despite doubts about the position of regional organizations, institutional theories, as well as regional integration theories have become important in various studies about Asian international relations, referring to theories of integration, like the functionalism of David

60 Cf.: Acharya, Amitav: “Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR.” In: Shambaugh, David/ Yahuda, Michael (eds.): op. cit., pp. 68–73.

61 Cf.: Haggard, Stephan: “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia.” In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014, pp. 47–56. At the same time, even this shallow, institutionalist approach is useful in regional institutions’ creation. Cf.: Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi: “Neither Skepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game.” *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 219–237.

Mirany, the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas, the security community of Karl Deutsch, classical theories of regionalism of Louis Cantori and Stephen Spiegel or the new regionalism of Fredrik Soderbaum or Bjorn Hettne. There are also attempts to apply economic regionalism theories or theories of stages of economic integration.⁶² Despite these extensive studies, deeper regional integration has still been a problem, leading to what is called 'frustrated regionalism,' due to structural constraints and agents of regionalism, namely regional elites.⁶³ We also observe a set of publications based on a set of complementing or contradictory theories, trying to present alternative futures for Asia and the Pacific, including balance of power, which foresees a gloomy future, while liberal institutionalism

62 There are many forms of application of those theories. Cf.: Dent, Christopher: *East Asian Regionalism*. Routledge: London-New York, pp. 1–38, 271–294; Caballero-Anthony, Mely: *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005, pp. 14–48 (this book refers to regionalism, but also, to large extent, to constructivism); Solingen, Eten: "Multilateralism, Regionalism, and Bilateralism: Conceptual Overview from International Relations Theory." In: Ganesan, N./Amer, Ramses (eds.): *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010, pp. 3–36. Such an approach was also used extensively by Polish researchers. Cf.: Haliżak, Edward: *Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar: Warszawa 1999, pp. 17–40; Haliżak, Edward: *Wspólnota Pacyfiku a Wspólnota Wschodnioazjatycka*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar: Warszawa 2006, pp. 10–24; Fijałkowski, Łukasz: *Regionalny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w Azji Południowo-Wschodniej: Normy – instytucje – ład regionalny*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego: Wrocław 2010, pp. 17–72, 111–136 (in this case both liberal and constructivist perspectives are applied); Skulska, Bogusława: *Regionalizm ekonomiczn Azji Wschodniej: Jedno spojrzenie – różne wymiary*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu: Wrocław 2012, pp. 21–45; Klecha-Tylec, Karolina: *Regionalizm w teorii i praktyce państw Azji Wschodniej*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa 2013, pp. 13–59; Michalski, Bartosz: *Międzyregionalne porozumienia handlowe: Transpacyficzny regionalizm jako alternatywa dla „wolnego” handlu?* Difin: Warszawa 2014, pp. 73–106; Grabowski, Marcin: *Rywalizacja czy integracja? Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*. Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015, pp. 52–70.

63 Nair, Deepak: "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?" In: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 31 (1), 2008, pp. 110–142. Multitheroetical analysis of regional integration within ASEAN (including neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches), cf.: Narine, Shaun: "Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia." *World Affairs*, 161 (1), 1998, pp. 33–47.

predicts cooperation and is thus more optimistic.⁶⁴ Similar attempts are visible in the application of economic interdependence theory and balance of power, but juxtaposed by way of joint application, bringing international relations in Southeast Asia into soft, institutional balancing.⁶⁵

If we look at the liberal approach to Africa two issues are mentioned, firstly that Africa is not taken seriously by researchers within the liberal paradigm (as they perceive Africa as having not much to offer in terms of liberal democracy or market economy). At the same time, researchers focused on Africa may contribute in certain areas, such as human rights in post-colonial states, different approaches to democracy or democratic peace theory, actually challenged by African states, as democracy and liberal institutions have not led to peace on this continent.⁶⁶ On the other hand, regionalism in Africa has been growing, and we can observe both pan-continental integration (like the African Union), and impressive regional trade areas (like ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, IGAD, ECCAS and CEMAC), exemplifying the growing usefulness of liberal institutionalism.⁶⁷ Development of regional trade areas (RTAs) is appreciated, as, among others, membership of RTAs reduces the likelihood of international conflict; trade among members of RTAs is more pacifying than trade in general; the impact of membership of an RTA on international conflict depends on its institutional design.⁶⁸

64 Cf.: Goswami, Namrata: "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism." *Perceptions*, 18 (1), 2013, pp. 3–31.

65 Cf.: He, Kai: "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia." *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 (3), 2008, pp. 489–518.

66 Cf.: Nkiwane, Tandeka: "The End of History? African Challenges to Liberalism in International Relations." In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001, pp. 103–111.

67 More about African regionalism, cf.: *African Integration Facing up to Emerging Challenges*. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Geneva 2016, retrieved on 20.08.2018 from: https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/deepening_african_integration-final.pdf; Melo, Jaime de/Tsikata, Yvonne: "Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects." In: Monga, Celestin/Lin, Justin Yifu (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume II: Policies and Practices*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, pp. 222–246.

68 Henderson, Errol: *African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015, pp. 234–239.

The English School Application in Asian and African IR

According to Barry Buzan, a leading scholar of the English School, this approach is one of the most established in studies on Asia.⁶⁹ He points out that this kind of research is especially developed by experts from China, and to some extent from South Korea, Japan and India.⁷⁰ As Takeshi Uemura wrote “The English School proves to be particularly encouraging for Chinese scholars”⁷¹ for which there are several reasons. Firstly, “because it represents a challenge against the dominant American scientism.”⁷² Secondly, according to Muthiah Alagappa, “because of its historical perspective.”⁷³ Finally, because China’s scholars in the search for the legitimization of their own concepts are asking “if there could be an English school, why not a Chinese school?”⁷⁴ As a result, the international society approach is used as an example in the process of building the so-called Chinese School of IR or more broadly the so-called Asian School.⁷⁵ Acharya and Buzan

-
- 69 Buzan, *The International Society Approach and Asia*, p. 100. On the other side, Acharya in his short chapter on theoretical approaches in Asia studies skips the English School and focuses only on realism, liberalism and constructivism. Acharya, Amitav: “Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR.” In: Shambaugh, David L./Yahuda, Michael B. (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. 2nd ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: New York 2014, p. 61.
- 70 Buzan, *The International Society Approach and Asia*, p. 100; Zhang, Xiaoming: “China in the Conception of International Society: The English School’s Engagements with China.” *Review of International Studies*, 37, 2011, pp. 763–786.
- 71 Uemura, Takeshi: “Constructivism and Chinese Studies.” *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, 30, 2018, pp. 58–59.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 58–59; Ikeda, Josuke: “The Post-Western Turn in International Theory and the English School.” *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, 9 (29), 2010, pp. 29–44.
- 73 Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, p. 211. See e.g.: Zhang, Yongjin: “The ‘English School’ in China: A Travelogue of Ideas and their Diffusion.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (1), 2003, pp. 87–114.
- 74 Ren, Xiao: “Toward a Chinese School of International Relations.” In: Wang, Gungwu/Zheng, Yongnina (eds.): *China and the New International Order*, Routledge: London, 2008, p. 297.
- 75 Buzan, *The International Society Approach and Asia*, p. 100; Acharya, Amitav: Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR, p. 81; Qin, Yaqing: “Core Problematic of International Relations Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School”. *Social Sciences in China*, 3, 2005, pp. 165–176. See also: Cunningham-Cross, Linsay: “(Re)Negotiating China’s Place in the House of IR: The Search for a ‘Chinese School’ of International Relations Theory.” Conference paper at the annual conference of the International Studies

noted that, “when the Chinese became increasingly aware and convinced of their emerging and ‘unstoppable’ status as a world power that they started looking to the possibility of a Chinese International Relations Theory (IRT), or at least at IRT with ‘Chinese characteristics.’”⁷⁶

Yet most of the works on Asia associated with the English School are focused only on East Asia while at the same time ignoring Central and South Asia. We can observe this trend not only in studies on contemporary Asia, but also in those focused on the pre-colonial and colonial periods.⁷⁷ Buzan points out that the studies on the colonial history of Western incursions in East Asia from the 15th century to the 19th century show how the previously formed specific international society was destroyed and supplanted by an international society based on Western norms which dominated the region. On one side is China, whose Sinocentric order was destroyed when it tried to modernize (but without westernization); on the other is Japan which used modernization to break free from the Sinocentric order and to pursue a Western-style imperial conquest of Asia.⁷⁸

An analysis of China’s rise within the assumptions of the English School paradigm was recently published by Buzan, who stresses the fact that the English School provides a useful analytical tool to address the Chinese approach toward international relations by assessing if China favors the status quo or is a revisionist power, highlighting the Chinese hierarchical approach toward international relations structure contradicted with principles of absolute sovereignty or non-intervention, and identifying ‘face’ as an important factor in relations within the region and globally. On the other hand, weaknesses of this paradigm include overstating Chinese alienation from Global International Society (true

Association conference, San Diego, 2 April 2012, pp. 19–22: Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:221785&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF>. See sceptic accounts on this kind of endeavors: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on?” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (3), 2017, pp. 359–361.

76 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Conclusion: On the Possibility of a Non-Western International Relations Theory,” in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*, ed. by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 223.

77 Buzan, *The International Society Approach and Asia*, pp. 102–112.

78 For example, Shogo Suzuki in his book described how Chinese and Japanese elites were socialized to the Western international society in the late 19th century. Suzuki, Shogo: *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society*. Routledge: Oxon and New York, 2009.

in Mao's time, but not anymore), lack of a hierarchical global societies analytical tool that could be useful for assessing the growing Chinese position in the world (GIS) and a lack of analytical tools assessing why societies are cohesive.⁷⁹

Buzan assumes that research on East Asia from the English Schools suggests that we can identify a specific regional international society which is based on a different level of engagement to Western society. It accepts certain Western values (sovereignty and non-intervention) while at the same time opposing others (e.g. human rights and democracy) and also establishes region-specific ones (e.g. regime security and the developmental state). Yet this regional East Asian international society is not homogenous, as some states are more eager to accept Western values (e.g. Japan), while other countries are strongly opposed to them (e.g. China). For Buzan, the development of East Asian regional international society symbolizes the gradual decline of Western countries which tried to force their own international society on the region and the growing importance of non-Western countries creating their own concept of regional international society.⁸⁰

The English School also provides tools to understand great power rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, but contrary to, for example, the assumptions of offensive realism, it claims that due to great power cooperation it is possible to "avoid war, control crises, and maintain the balance of power."⁸¹ In pursuing this line of interpretation, the English School can be supported by constructivism as was shown in the book *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* by Evelyn Goh.⁸²

Surprisingly, the English School is also used as an analytical tool, allowing us to understand both the creation, but especially the durability of ASEAN (contrary to popular constructivist studies), as East Asia, including Southeast Asia, is still based on the concepts of the dominant role of state, territoriality, nationalism

79 Buzan, Barry: "China's Rise in English School Perspective." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 449–476.

80 Buzan, *The International Society Approach and Asia*, pp. 102, 113–115.

81 Khong, Yuen Foong: "East Asia and the Strategic "Deep Rules" of International/Regional Society." In: Buzan, Buzan/Zhang, Yongjin (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2014, p. 148. See also: Cui, Shunji/Buzan, Buzan: "Great Power Management in International Society." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9 (2), 2016, pp. 181–210; Foot, Rosemary: "Power Transitions and Great Power Management: Three Decades of China–Japan–US Relations." *Pacific Review*, 30 (6), 2017, p. 830.

82 Goh, *The Struggle for Order..*

and, in particular, sovereignty. Therefore, the English School stresses the importance of state sovereignty and illustrates relations between nation-states and ASEAN while also referring to international law in its analysis of ASEAN.⁸³

The application of the English School in African studies is quite limited. Published in 2001, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* omits this approach. Also, the recently published *Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice* notices a lack of African studies from this perspective.⁸⁴ Yet in recent years we can observe a slowly growing interest in application of the English School approach in African International Relations. These works mostly focus on how African states and society have interacted with Western-based international society from both historical and contemporary perspectives.⁸⁵

Application of Marxism in Asian and African IR

At the outset it is instructive to notice, that "(...) in much of Asia, Africa, the Middle East (...) development economics, or more radical Marxist and dependency theories of development, provided an important body of ideas and policies that were used by nationalist political and economic elites seeking a state-guided late-industrializing path to national development between the 1940s and the 1970s."⁸⁶ Yet, as Mark T. Berger, a researcher on developmental concepts in Asia, continued: "against the backdrop of the relative developmental success of East Asia by the 1970s and 1980s, dependency theory and world-system theory gained

83 Narine, Shaun: "The English School and ASEAN." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 199–218.

84 Murithi, Tim: "Bridging the Gap: The Pan-African School and International Relations Theory." In: Bischoff, Paul-Henri/Aning, Kwesi/Acharya, Amitav (eds.): *Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice*, Routledge, Abingdon and New York: 2016, p. 164.

85 Pella, John Anthony: *Africa and the Expansion of International Society: Surrendering the Savannah*, Routledge, London and New York, 2014; Pella, John Anthony: "World Society, International Society and the Colonization of Africa." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28 (2), 2015, pp. 210–228; Spies, Yolanda K.: "Africa and the Idea of International Society." *Journal for Contemporary History*, 41(1), 2016, pp. 38–56. Cf.: also Ph.D. thesis written in 2013 by Elaine Tan Shek Yan about *Understanding African International Society: An English School Approach* at the Aberystwyth University: <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2160/13785>.

86 Berger, Mark T.: *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*. RoutledgeCurzon: New York 2004, p. 159.

far more purchase in Latin American studies and African studies than they did in Asian studies.”⁸⁷ For example, “In China – according to Acharya – Realism was the one Western theory of IR that broke the monopoly of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought”, as during the Cold War “Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* enjoyed a huge popularity in classrooms, matching or exceeding the appeal of Marx or Mao.”⁸⁸ Even in the case of Japan case, where Marxism “was very strong from the 1920s, ... it is safe to say that Japanese academics were de facto demarxized by the 1970s.”⁸⁹ This trend went unchanged following the Cold War, as according to the most recent survey of IR studies on Asia: “(...) the Marxist or postmodern traditions (...) have had relatively little purchase among scholars working on the IR of Asia.”⁹⁰ It is not surprising that even though the editors of *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia* prepared separate

-
- 87 Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*, p. 215. Yet, there were minor exceptions as “Some critical theories such as dependency theory and Neo-Marxism from the 1980s affected the theoretical thinking of the new generation of Korean scholars”. Chun, Chaesung: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and from Korea.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London and New York, p. 74.
- 88 Acharya, Amitav: “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia.” In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2008, pp. 64–65. See also: Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 209–210, 218.
- 89 Inoguchi, Takashi: “Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*. Routledge, London and New York, 2010, pp. 51, 53, 56, 61–62. See also: Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 211–212, 218.
- 90 Pekkanen, Saadia M./Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary: “The International Relations of Asia”. In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, p. 18 [footnote no. 1]. Also Amitav Acharya skips Marxist theories in his review of IR theories in Asia. Acharya, Amitav: “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia.” In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2008, p. 77 [footnote 8]; Abbott, Jason P.: “Economic Development in the East Asian (Semi)Periphery.” In: Worth, Owen/Moore, Phoebe (eds.): *Globalization and the ‘New’ Semi-Peripheries*. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills and New York, 2009, p. 88; Acharya, Amitav: “Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence? Some Reflections.” *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, p. 817.

chapters on Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, FPA and the International Society Approach, they skipped the issues of Marxist theories.

This lack of Marxist studies on Asia is not only associated with the field of International Political Economy (IPE) field, but also with Security Studies. The most important attempt to change this situation was the volume edited by two prominent Western scholars working in the field of Critical Security Studies (CSS) and published in 2007 as *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*.⁹¹ Nevertheless, as one of the co-editors wrote recently in the *Critical Studies on Security* issue devoted to the CSS on Asia “the critical security project [on Asia] has been a failure ... When assessed in terms of the take up of the term ‘critical security’ in scholarship, or the prospects of a normatively driven engagement with security in practice, the past decade [2007–2017] has not appeared promising. As noted, the term has not found a significant foothold in scholarship in or about Asian security.”⁹²

The lack of prominence of Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches in IR studies on Asia is surprising as Acharya wrote that “the insights of critical perspectives are especially crucial in understanding and analyzing the impact of globalization on Asian IR [Asian international relations – MG/TP], the limitations and abuses of the sovereign state-system and the national security paradigm, and Asia’s uneven and unjust development trajectory.”⁹³ Marxist theories, when applied to the Asian region, bring mixed results. On the one side, works in the 1980s showed, contrary to the assumptions of dependency theory, surprising freedom in economic development resulting in homegrown industrial development.⁹⁴ It meant that development in Asian states could be differentiated from

91 Burke, Anthony/McDonald, Matt (eds.): *Critical Security in the Asia Pacific*. Manchester University Press: Manchester 2007.

92 McDonald, Matt: “Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific: An Introduction.” *Critical Studies on Security*, 5 (3), 2017, pp. 244, 248 (especially see the literature review on pp. 243–256). See exceptions like: Barthwal-Datta, Monika/Basu, Soumita: “Reconceptualizing Regional Security in South Asia: A Critical Security Approach.” *Security Dialogue* 48 (5), 2017, pp. 393–409.

93 Acharya, Amitav: “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia.” In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2008, p. 77 [footnote 8].

94 Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*, 9–11; Rozman, Gilbert: “The 1990s: Asia’s Transformation and IR Theory.” In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): *Misunderstanding Asia International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2015, p. 110; Abbott: “Economic Development in the East Asian (Semi)Periphery.” p. 82, 87.

e.g. Latin American ones. On the other hand, the so-called Asian Tigers could be easily classified as examples of the semi-periphery from the perspective of World-System theory.⁹⁵

Contemporary Asian studies using Marxist theories also bring interesting confirmations and, simultaneously, modifications. For example, Jason P. Abbott in his article *Economic Development in the East Asian (Semi)Periphery* concluded that even though states in Southeast Asia developed modern industry, they are still “dependent on foreign capital, foreign technology [in specific sectors] and foreign skills” (what he calls neo-dependency).⁹⁶ Gerard Downes, in his article *China and India – The New Powerhouses of the Semi-Periphery?*, using world-system theory describes the growing economic power of those states, noticing at the same time that China and India “merely consolidate their role as being dependent upon Western investments and companies and both China and India remain severely underdeveloped in terms of their internal institutional development and in terms of living standards and marked inequality.”⁹⁷ Also Phoebe Moore in her *Globalisation and Labour Struggle in Asia* used Robert Cox’s Neo-Gramscian concept of ideational hegemony in the international sphere to assess the spread of neoliberalism in Korea. As she concluded, even though there is strong evidence showing a global network of actors imposing hegemony of neoliberal concepts among Korean elites, the working class in these states has questioned the dominance of this way of thinking.⁹⁸

In the African case, some trends in Marxist theories are the same as those in Asian studies, while others are different. Firstly, as in Asia, these concepts were used by local elites as a means to industrialization. Secondly, since the 1960s and 1970s, when dependency theories were developed, such ideas were used to refer to Africa more often than Asia. In effect they shed light on Africa’s place in the international economic system as peripheral.⁹⁹ Thirdly, similarly to the case

95 Moore, Phoebe: *Globalisation and Labour Struggle in Asia: A Neo-Gramscian Critique of South Korea’s Political Economy*. I.B. Tauris: London, 2007, p. 34.

96 Abbott: “Economic Development in the East Asian (Semi) Periphery.” pp. 82–100.

97 Downes, Gerard: “China and India – The New Powerhouses of the Semi-Periphery?” In: *Globalization and the ‘New’ Semi-Peripheries*, pp. 102–118.

98 Moore: *Globalisation and Labour Struggle in Asia*, p. 181.

99 Murphy, Craig N.: “Foreword.” In: *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*, p. ix; Dunn, Kevin C.: “Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory.” In: *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*, pp. 2–3; Mahmud, Sakah: “Controlling African States’ Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions against Libya and Nigeria.” in *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*, p. 132.

of Asia, critics raise the agency-structure problem of Marxist theories in reference to Africa. These concepts place greater emphasis on structure, leaving little or no place for African states to behave as independent agents. Which is why, as one of the editors of the volume *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* wrote, “[Marxist] theories often replicate Western biases by viewing the continent solely as part of the global ‘periphery’; an agency-less victim of Great Power/core manipulations. Africa exists only to the extent that it is acted upon.”¹⁰⁰

In conclusion it is worth mentioning, even though Marxist and critical theory are mainly Western ideas, they were to some extent catalysts of the development of non-Western IR theory.¹⁰¹

Summing up, we may observe some changes in both Asian and African studies in terms of adaptation of Western IR theories. We can conclude that such theories have served predominantly as explanatory and predictive tools in the IR scholarship of those regions. Important differences may be visible in terms of

100 Dunn, “Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory,” pp. 2–3. Cf. also: Murphy, “Foreword,” ix; Janis van der Westhuizen, “Marketing the ‘Rainbow Nation’: The Power of the South African Music, Film and Sport Industry,” in Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, p. 67; Mahmud, Sakah: “Controlling African States’ Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions against Libya and Nigeria.” In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, pp. 132–133; Kendie, Daniel: “How Useful is Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony and Domination to the Study of African States?” *African Social Science Review*, 3 (5), 2006, pp. 89–104; Grovogui, Siba N./Leonard, Lori: “Uncivil Society: Interrogations at the Margins of Neo-Gramscian Theory.” In: Ayers, Alison J. (ed.): *Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008, pp. 169–188 and Taylor, Ian: *Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*, Praeger Publishers: Westport, 2001.

101 Acharya, Amitav: “International Relations Theory and the ‘Rise of Asia.’” In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York, 2014, p. 135 (footnote no. 7). Cf.: “For most Chinese scholars writing on the concept of ‘Chinese characteristics’, IR theory should always take Marxism as a guide”. Cunningham-Cross, Linsay: “(Re)Negotiating China’s Place in the House of IR: The Search for a ‘Chinese School’ of International Relations Theory.” Conference paper at the annual conference of the International Studies Association conference, San Diego, 2 April 2012, p. 9: Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:221785&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF>. -.

theoretical sophistication. In the case of research on Asia, especially Northeast Asia, we could observe reception of IR theory even during the Cold War, but especially after. This reception began with the easiest absorbed theory of realism, followed by other paradigms, like liberalism or constructivism (with a politically grounded bias toward Marxist theories in some countries). In the case of Africa, we can still observe a nascent period of reception of theory, the stage of whose selection and transformation of is still to come.

References

- Abbott, Jason P: "Economic Development in the East Asian (Semi)Periphery." In: Worth, Owen/Moore, Phoebe (eds.): *Globalization and the 'New' Semi-Peripheries*. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills and New York, 2009.
- Acharya, Amitav: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Routledge: London and New York 2001.
- Acharya, Amitav: *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Routledge: Oxon and New York 2014.
- Acharya, Amitav: "Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way.'" *The Pacific Review*, 10 (3), 1997, pp. 319–346.
- Acharya, Amitav: "International Relations Theory and the "Rise of Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York, 2014.
- Acharya, Amitav: "Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia." In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2008.
- Acharya, Amitav: "'Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence?' Some Reflections." *Pacific Review* 30 (6), 2017, pp. 816–828.
- Acharya, Amitav: "Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR." In: Shambaugh, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2014.
- Amitav Acharya/Barry Buzan, "Conclusion: On the Possibility of a Non-Western International Relations Theory." In: Amitav Acharya / Barry Buzan (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*. Routledge: London and New York 2010.
- Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (3), 2017, pp. 341–370.

- African Integration Facing up to Emerging Challenges*. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: Geneva 2016, retrieved on 20.08.2018 from: https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/deepening_african_integration-final.pdf.
- Akhtar, Shaheen/Khan, Zulfiqar: "Understanding the Nuclear Aspiration and Behaviour of North Korea and Iran." *Strategic Analysis*, 38 (5), 2014, pp. 617–633.
- Alagappa, Muthiah: "International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 193–230.
- Anthony, Mely: *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005.
- Atkinson, Ronald: "The Re(Construction) of Ethnicity in Africa: Extending the Chronology, Conceptualization and Discourse." In: Yeros, Paris (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 1999.
- Ba, Alice D.: "Regional Security in East Asia: ASEAN's Value Added and Limitations." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 29 (3), 2010, pp. 115–130.
- Barthwal-Datta, Monika/Basu, Soumita: "Reconceptualizing Regional Security in South Asia: A Critical Security Approach." *Security Dialogue* 48 (5), 2017, pp. 393–409.
- Beeson, Mark: "Alternative Realities: Explaining Security in the Asia-Pacific." *Review of International Studies*, 43 (3), 2017, pp. 516–533.
- Berger, Mark T.: *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*. RoutledgeCurzon: New York 2004. Berger, Thomas U.: *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 1998.
- Brown, William: "Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy and Statehood." *Review of International Studies*, 32 (1), 2006, pp. 119–143.
- Burke, Anthony/McDonald, Matt (eds.): *Critical Security in the Asia Pacific*. Manchester University Press: Manchester 2007.
- Busse, Nikolas: "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security." *The Pacific Review*, 12 (1), 1999, pp. 39–60.
- Buzan, Barry: "The International Society Approach and Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia /Ravenhill, John /Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: New York 2014. Buzan, Barry: "China's Rise in English School Perspective." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 449–476.

- Caballero-Anthony, Mely: *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005.
- Caldor, Mary: *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press: Cambridge and Medford 2018.
- Callahan, William A: *Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis 2004.
- Carlson, Allen: *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*. Stanford University Press: Stanford 2005.
- Chatterjee, Shibashis: "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: A Constructivist Reading." *South Asian Survey* 12, 2005, pp. 75–89.
- Chen, Rong: "A Critical Analysis of the U.S. 'Pivot' toward the Asia-Pacific: How Realistic is Neo-Realism." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 12 (3), 2013, pp. 39–62.
- Chun, Chaesung: "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and from Korea." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London and New York 2010.
- Clark, John: "Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era." In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001.
- Cui, Shunji/Buzan, Buzan: "Great Power Management in International Society." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9 (2), 2016, pp. 181–210.
- Cunningham-Cross, Linsay: "(Re)Negotiating China's Place in the House of IR: The Search for a 'Chinese School' of International Relations Theory." Conference paper at the annual conference of the International Studies Association conference, San Diego, 2 April 2012. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:221785&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF>.
- Czaputowicz, Jacek: *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych: Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*. Rambler: Warszawa 2014.
- Dent, Christopher: *East Asian Regionalism*. Routledge: London and New York 2008.
- Dunn, Kevin C.: "Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory." In: *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001. Dunn, Kevin C./Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave: Houndmills and New York 2001.
- Eaton, Sarah/Stubbs, Richard: "Is ASEAN Powerful?: Neo-realist versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 135–155.

- Emmerson, Donald K.: "What Do the Blind-Sided See? Reapproaching Regionalism in Southeast Asia." *The Pacific Review*, 18 (1), 2005, pp. 1–21.
- Eriksen, Thomas: "A Non-ethnic State for Africa? A Life-world Approach to the Imagining of Communities." In: Yeros, Paris (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 1999.
- Faley, Olukayode A.: "Africa and International Relations Theory: Acquiescence and Responses." *Globalistics and Globalization Studies*, 2014, pp. 81–90.
- Fijałkowski, Łukasz: *Regionalny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w Azji Południowo-Wschodniej: Normy – instytucje – ład regionalny*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego: Wrocław 2010.
- Foot, Rosemary: "Power Transitions and Great Power Management: Three Decades of China–Japan–US Relations." *Pacific Review*, 30 (6), 2017, pp. 829–842.
- Garver, John: *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. University of Washington Press: Seattle and London 2001.
- Goh, Evelyn: *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in post-Cold War East Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013.
- Goswami, Namrata: "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism." *Perceptions*, 18 (1), 2013, pp. 3–31.
- Grabowski, Marcin: "China and the U.S. in Africa - Conflict or Collaboration?" *Ad Americam: Journal of American Studies*, 12, 2011, pp. 63–86.
- Grabowski, Marcin: *Rywalizacja czy integracja? Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*. Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015.
- Grovogui, Siba N./Leonard, Lori: "Uncivil Society: Interrogations at the Margins of Neo-Gramscian Theory." In: Ayers, Alison J. (ed.): *Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2008.
- Haggard, Stephan: "The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- Halizak, Edward: "Realizm w chińskiej nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych." In: Halizak, Edward/Czaputowicz, Jacek: *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych: Założenia i zastosowania badawcze*. Rambler: Warszawa 2014.
- Halizak, Edward: *Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar: Warszawa 1999.
- Halizak, Edward: *Wspólnota Pacyfiku a Wspólnota Wschodnioazjatycka*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar: Warszawa 2006.

- He, Kai: "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia." *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 (3), 2008, pp. 489–518.
- He, Kai/Feng, Huiyun: "Transcending Rationalism and Constructivism: Chinese Leaders' Operational Codes, Socialization Processes, and Multilateralism after the Cold War." *European Political Science Review*, 7 (3), 2015, pp. 401–426.
- Henderson, Errol: *Africa Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham 2015.
- Hirata, Keiko/Sato, Yoichiro (eds.): *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2008.
- Hughes, Christopher: "Japan's 'Resentful Realism' and Balancing China's Rise." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9 (2), 2016, pp. 109–150.
- Ikeda, Josuke: "The Post-Western Turn in International Theory and the English School." *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, 9 (29), 2010, pp. 29–44.
- Inoguchi, Takashi: "Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*. Routledge: London and New York 2010.
- Janis van der Westhuizen: "Marketing the 'Rainbow Nation': The Power of the South African Music, Film and Sport Industry." In Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave: Houndmills and New York 2001.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain: *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1995.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain: *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*. Princeton University Press: Princeton 2008.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain: "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory." In: Mastanduno, Michael/Ikenberry, G. John (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press: New York 2003.
- Jones, David Martin/Smith, Michael L. R.: "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order." *International Security* 32 (1), 2007, pp. 148–184.
- Kaldor, Mary: *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Polity Press: Cambridge-Malden 2012.
- Kang, David: "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations." *American Asian Review*, 19 (2), 2001, pp. 121–160.

- Kang, David: "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (3), 2003, pp. 301–324.
- Katzenstein, Peter: *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-London 1996.
- Katzenstein, Peter/Okawara, Nobuko: "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies." *International Security*, 17 (4), 1993, pp. 84–118.
- Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi: "Neither Skepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 219–237.
- Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi: "Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy." *The Pacific Review*, 14 (2), 2001, pp. 221–240.
- Kendie, Daniel: "How Useful is Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony and Domination to the Study of African States?" *African Social Science Review*, 3 (5), 2006, pp. 89–104.
- Khong, Yuen Foong: "East Asia and the Strategic "Deep Rules" of International/Regional Society." In: Buzan, Buzan/Zhang, Yongjin (eds.), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2014.
- Kim, Woosang/Gates, Scott: "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China." *International Area Studies Review*, 18 (3), 2015, pp. 219–226.
- Klecha-Tylec, Karolina: *Regionalizm w teorii i praktyce państw Azji Wschodniej*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa 2013.
- Lee, Goo: "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma: Evolving Inter-Korean Relations in the Early 1990s." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 17 (3), 2005, pp. 27–61.
- Leheny, David: Constructivism and International Relations in Asia. In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- Mahmud, Sakah: "Controlling African States' Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions against Libya and Nigeria." In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001.
- Mania, Andrzej/Grabowski, Marcin: "Rola Departamentu Stanu w polityce USA wobec Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w okresie pierwszej kadencji prezydenckiej Baracka Obamy (2009–2013)." In: Pietraś, Marek/Dumała, Hanna/Ziętek, Agata (eds.): *Teoria i praktyka stosunków międzynarodowych: dziedzictwo intelektualne profesora Ziemowita Jacka Pietrasia*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej: Lublin 2014.

- Mastanduno, Michael: "Realism in Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- McDonald, Matt: "Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific: An Introduction." *Critical Studies on Security*, 5 (3), 2017, pp. 237–252.
- Mearsheimer, John: "Can China Rise Peacefully?" *National Interest*, 2014. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204> (published as a concluding chapter of updated edition of Mearsheimer, John: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton: New York-London 2014).
- Melo, Jaime de/Tsikata, Yvonne: "Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects." In: Monga, Celestin/Lin, Justin Yifu (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume II: Policies and Practices*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015.
- Michalski, Bartosz: *Międzyregionalne porozumienia handlowe: Transpacyficzny regionalizm jako alternatywa dla „wolnego” handlu?* Difin: Warszawa 2014.
- Moore, Phoebe: *Globalisation and Labour Struggle in Asia: A Neo-Gramscian Critique of South Korea's Political Economy*. I.B. Tauris: London 2007.
- Murithi, Tim: "Bridging the Gap: The Pan-African School and International Relations Theory." In: Bischoff, Paul-Henri/Aning, Kwesi/Acharya, Amitav (eds.): *Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice*. Routledge: Abingdon and New York 2016.
- Nair, Deepak: "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 31 (1), 2008, pp. 110–142.
- Nau, Henry R.: "Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia." In: Mastanduno, Michael/Ikenberry, G. John (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press: New York 2003.
- Narine, Shaun: "Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia." *World Affairs*, 161 (1), 1998, pp. 33–47.
- Narine, Shaun: "The English School and ASEAN." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 199–218.
- Nkiwane, Tandeka: "The End of History? African Challenges to Liberalism in International Relations." In: Dunn, Kevin/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2001.
- Olivier, Laetitia/Vrey, Francois: "Theoretical Approaches in International Relations: The South African Military as a Foreign Policy Instrument." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 43, (2), 2015, pp. 39–64.
- Oros, Andrew L.: *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford University Press: Stanford 2009.

- Pekkanen, Saadia M./Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary: "The International Relations of Asia." In: Pekkanen, Saadia/Ravenhill, John/Foot, Rosemary (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- Pella, John Anthony: *Africa and the Expansion of International Society: Surrendering the Savannah*. Routledge: London and New York 2014.
- Pella, John Anthony: "World Society, International Society and the Colonization of Africa." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28 (2), 2015, pp. 210–228.
- Qin, Yaqing: "Core Problematic of International Relations Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School." *Social Sciences in China*, 3, 2005, pp. 165–176.
- Ren, Xiao: "Toward a Chinese School of International Relations." In: Wang, Gungwu/Zheng, Yongnina (eds.): *China and the New International Order*. Routledge: London 2008.
- Roy, Denny: "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'power vacuum'." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 37 (3), 1995, pp. 45–60.
- Rozman, Gilbert: "The 1990s: Asia's Transformation and IR Theory." In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): *Misunderstanding Asia International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015.
- Sasikumar, Karthika: "India's Emergence as a 'Responsible,' Nuclear Power." *International Journal*, 62 (4), 2007, pp. 825–844.
- Scott, David: "Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century." *Asian Security*, 4 (3), 2008, pp. 244–270.
- Seng, Tang: "Rescuing Constructivism from the Constructivists: A Critical Reading of Constructivist Interventions in Southeast Asian Security." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 239–260.
- Skulska, Bogusława: *Regionalizm ekonomiczny Azji Wschodniej: Jedno spojrzenie – różne wymiary*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu: Wrocław 2012.
- Smith, Karen: "Africa as an Agent of International Relations Knowledge." In: Cornelissen, Scarlett/Cheru, Fantu/Shaw, Timothy (eds.): *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2012.
- Smith, Karen: "Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations." *The Round Table*, 98 (402), 2009, pp. 269–284.
- Smith, Karen: "International Relations in South Africa: A Case of 'Add Africa and Stir'?" *Politikon*, 40 (3), 2013, pp. 533–544.
- Smith, Karen: "Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa." *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*, 7 (2), 2017, pp. 81–92.

- Solingen, Eten: "Multilateralism, Regionalism, and Bilateralism: Conceptual Overview from International Relations Theory." In: Ganesan, N./Amer, Ramses (eds.): *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010.
- Spies, Yolanda K.: "Africa and the Idea of International Society." *Journal for Contemporary History*, 41 (1), 2016, pp. 38–56.
- Suh, Jae-Jung: *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2007.
- Suzuki, Shogo: *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*. Routledge: Oxon and New York 2009.
- Suzuki, Shogo: "The Rise of the Chinese 'Other' in Japan's Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?" *The Pacific Review*, 28 (1), 2015, pp. 95–116.
- Tamaki, Taku: "Taking the 'Taken-for-Grantedness' Seriously: Problematizing Japan's Perception of Japan-South Korea Relations." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 4 (1), 2004, pp. 147–169.
- Tan Shek Yan, Elaine *Understanding African International Society: An English School Approach* at the Aberystwyth University: <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2160/13785>.
- Taylor, Ian: *Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations*. Praeger Publishers: Westport 2001.
- Tieku, Thomas Kwasi: "Theoretical Approaches to Africa's International Relations." In: Murithi, Tim (ed.): *Handbook of Africa's International Relations*. Routledge: New York 2014.
- Uemura, Takeshi: "Constructivism and Chinese Studies." *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies*, 30, 2018, pp. 49–63.
- Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie: "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Analysis." *Politeia*, 23 (3), 2004, pp. 103–136.
- Walt, Stephen: "Where Do We Draw the Line on Balancing China?" *Foreign Policy*, 2015. Retrieved on 15.07.2018, from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/27/where-do-we-draw-the-line-on-balancing-china/>.
- Zhang, Xiaoming: "China in the Conception of International Society: The English School's Engagements with China." *Review of International Studies*, 37, 2011, pp. 763–786.
- Zhang, Yongjin: "The 'English School' in China: A Travelogue of Ideas and their Diffusion." *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (1), 2003, pp. 87–114.
- Zhu, Zhiqun: "Power Transition and U.S.-China Relations: Is War Inevitable?" *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 12 (1), 2005, pp. 1–24.

Marcin Grabowski

4. International Relations Theory Development in Asia

Abstract: This chapter aims at a brief description of the development on International Relations scholarship in Asia, with a special focus on Northeast Asia (China, Japan and Korea). Due to the growing role of Asia in international relations, a need to adapt and build a theoretical background for the international activities of states located there; hence IR theory in Asia has been developing especially intensely in the 21st century. In case of independent theorizing, it was built upon former developments, including (to a large extent) ancient philosophical roots. The state was an important driving force in the case not only of theory adaptation, but also development. Generally, International Relations scholarship is most developed in China, followed by Japan and South Korea. Southeast Asia, despite its traditions in certain areas, as well as South Asia, despite ancient philosophical traditions, definitely lags behind.

Keywords: IR theory, Asia, China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, India

Introduction

The main goal of this chapter is a brief description of the development of IR scholarship in Asia, with a special focus on theory development. It mainly follows the analysis used in the book edited by Gilbert Rozman: *Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century* (2015) and the renowned *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (2010) edited by Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya. While searching for a crucial contribution to understanding of IR theory in the Asia-Pacific region at the beginning of the 21st century, one should also consult the volume edited jointly by John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. This set of essays, written by prominent scholars, applies Western IR theories to understand and explain Asia-Pacific issues, focusing on regional stability and the role of the great powers.¹

Three subregions were selected for analysis, namely Northeast, Southeast and South Asia, with a special focus on the development of IR scholarship in Northeast Asia, as reception of Western IR theory as well as attempts at

1 Ikenberry, John/Mastanduno, Michael (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press: New York 2003.

independent theorizing currently seem most advanced there. Such a development is especially visible in China, where there are solid philosophical roots, but also strong state support for development of IR research development. To a lesser extent, a similar situation may be observed in Japan and South Korea. IR scholarship is definitely less developed in Southeast Asia and South Asia, despite some exceptions (like the Singapore school, based on Asian values, prominent leaders developing independent IR thinking in Southeast Asian countries or philosophical background in India).

This text is based on comparative case studies of “sub-regional” or “national” IR schools in reference to existing publications (both in reference to preview publications, and original papers). Different IR schools are analyzed in the search for institutional development, adoption of Western IR theories or ways of creating their own theories, by adapting their own philosophical traditions or creatively transforming Western approaches.

Due to the rising importance of Asia as well as more developed IR scholarship, IR theory in the Asian region has developed substantially in the 21st century. It includes both application of Western theory and attempts to create indigenous theories.²

Introduction: Historical and Contemporary Context of IR Development in Asia

International Relations theories in Asia evolved to a large extent in response to the development of international relations in the region, but it would be difficult to understand them without a short introduction to the ancient historical and philosophical roots, as well as the modern history of crucial states in Asia. Firstly, International Relations theory in Asia can be traced to classical thinkers, especially those associated with realism, like the Chinese thinker, Sun Zi, who

2 It doesn't refer to Australia naturally, as its IR scholarship, including theoretical contribution, is substantial, especially in the paradigm called rationalism, international society school or English school, but also constructivism. One should mention Christian Reus-Smit, Hedley Bull, Martin Griffiths or Ian Clark, but also prominent role of the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. On the other hand, we can find voices distinguishing unreflective location of Australia IR theory in the West from concepts referring to indigenusness and post-colonialism, encompassing problems of Aboriginal Peoples' and Torres Strait Islanders. Cf.: Dudziak, Julita: “Concept of Indigenusness and Postcolonialism in Australian International Relations (IR).” In: Peters, Ingo / Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.): *Globalizing International Relations Scholarship Amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2016, pp. 187–210.

lived at the turn of 6th and 5th centuries BC (we could compare his approach to that developed by Western strategic realism) or the Indian thinker, Kautilya, who lived at the turn of 4th and 3rd centuries BC.³

Searching for newer inspirations, Acharya and Buzan refer to crucial Asian politicians, often responsible for the creation of ideas shaping statehood of newly created post-war sovereign states, but also shaping the international system. Some of these were educated in the Western tradition (either in the West or based on Western sources, hence intellectual traditions), others locally (like Sukarno, president and one of the founding fathers of Indonesia). In this context, it is noteworthy to mention the novelty of the concept of non-alignment and the idea of non-exclusionary regionalism (at that time contrary to the Western concept of military political-military blocs) developed by Jawaharlal Nehru, first prime minister of India. Aung San, the founding father of independent Burma (assassinated in 1947 right before the country gained its independence) focused on interdependence and multilateralism in international relations (similar to liberal internationalism), rejecting regional discriminatory blocks (either military or economic). Sukarno – the first President of Indonesia – introduced concepts shaping international order, namely OLDEFOS (old established forces) vs. NEFOS (new emerging forces), used to increase Indonesia's and his own role in the global system. One may also look at Mao Zedong, the leader of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976), designing the three worlds theory.⁴

Hence, if one looks back a bit, one may already notice the development of IR theory in East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, when new problems emerged (like the Sino-Soviet split, Japanese development and the flying geese expansion of the Japanese economic growth model, initially to Korea, as well as the Chinese cultural revolution). It brought a need to redefine balance of power theory (bringing

3 Cf.: Desinghar, Giri: "Strategic Thinking of Kautilya and Sun Zi." *China Report* 32 (1), 1996, pp. 1–13; Ramachandran, K.N.: "Sun Zi and Kautilya: Towards a Comparative Analysis." *Strategic Analysis* 34 (3), 2014, pp. 390–408. Interesting analysis of western approach of classical Chinese IR thinking, cf.: Shih, Chih-yu/Hwang, Yih-Jye: "Re-worlding the 'West' in Post-Western IR: The Reception of Sun Zi's the Art of War in the Anglosphere." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 421–448.

4 Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry. *op. cit.*, pp. 11–12. Authors identify also other scholars, applying Western theory of IR in India (A.P. Rana and Kanti Bajpai in India, Chung-In moon in Korea, Muthiah Alagappa, Malaysian scholar working in the US, Takashi Inoguchi in Japan, Yongjin Zhang, Chinese scholar working in New Zealand), as well as certain concepts used to analyze Asian IR taken from different disciplines (Edmund Leach, Benedict Anderson etc.). *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

trilateral systems onto the stage) or claims to focus development in China or Japan on different values (later known as Asian values) or creatively applying modernization and convergence theory (as comprehensive convergence or duplicitous convergence).⁵ In the 1980s, the strategic triangle (US, China and the Soviet Union) was still an important case for IR theory in Asia, although the Sino-Japanese-American triangle was also analyzed at this time. Competition between realism (Reagan's hard line was a reason for the fall of communism) and liberalism (the capitalist economic model prevailed) was also visible in Asia-Pacific IR.⁶

The turbulent decade of the 1990s brought many challenges for IR theorists (including the collapse of the Soviet Union, assertive North Korea or China in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–1998). A greater role was achieved in Chinese IR scholarship, with the Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, Wang Jisi, calling for an increased role for Chinese culture and history in IR theorizing and warning Chinese scholars against lazy application of Western IR theories, being a tool for maximizing political influence. Regional integration issues, with closer cooperation within ASEAN and with Plus Three countries becoming more important. In great power relations, strategic triangle rhetoric was again present, with a falling Russia and a rising China, and finally, the 'Asian Values' school was emerging. Nevertheless, the liberal school of IR was prevalent in analyzing IR in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s.⁷

The first decade of the 21st century directed IR theory toward Sino-American rivalry, stemming from the continued rise of China, as well as addressing threats of global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The realist approach began to prevail over liberalism, but realism was mixed with constructivism, becoming a more important theoretical paradigm in the Asia-Pacific region (introducing analytical eclecticism as an important paradigm to interpret Asia-Pacific IR).⁸

-
- 5 Rozman, Gilbert: "The 1970s: Asia's Emergence in IR Theory". In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): *Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015, pp. 25–45.
 - 6 Rozman, Gilbert: "The 1980s: Asia's Upheavals and IR Theory". In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): op. cit., pp. 69–83.
 - 7 Rozman, Gilbert, "The 1990s: Asia's Transformation and IR Theory." In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): op. cit., pp. 107–124.
 - 8 For analytical eclecticism focusing on constructivist realism cf.: Barkin, Samuel: *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Cambridge University Press: New York 2010, pp. 1–12, 154–173.

Apart from the usual issues, like the strategic triangle (with a special focus on Vladimir Putin, implementing his ‘pivot to the Pacific’ strategy), ASEAN’s desire to centralize its role in regional integration, Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ and ‘harmonious society’ heralded a new, East Asian paradigm in IR.⁹

The decade of the 2010s brought fears about possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region stemming from a growing and more assertive China and its rivalry with the United States (visible both in bilateral and multilateral arrangements like Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) vs. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)). Two approaches – one representing a realist, more conflicting approach and another, a liberal economic-priorities oriented one – were competing to explain and predict the future of the Asia-Pacific. Apart from the Sino-Russo-American triangle, other trilateral relations (like China-US-Japan, China-US-South Korea, China-US-India, China-US-ASEAN) also attracted the attention of theorists.¹⁰

Having in mind the role of external factors on the development of Asian IR theories, and examining subregional differences, we could refer to the approach of Muthiah Alagappa. He raised four propositions, explaining the different development of IR theory in Asia, focusing on the case of China, Japan and India. Firstly, he focuses on the distinctive trajectories of problems faced in the West (building an IR community, norms, preventing the next Great War, especially after World War I, but also World War II) and Asia (building new nations, sovereign survival), hence a differently focus in IR research and creation of theory. Secondly, there was an evolution, both in the national and international context, of objectives, priorities and state domination of public spheres at the same time. Thus the field of IR developed distinctively in China, India and Japan. Thirdly, IR scholarship in Asia has been mostly policy-oriented, bringing understanding of the external world and supporting proper policy responses, hence production of knowledge has not been a priority. Finally, and to some extent contrary to the above, the rise of Asian powers may energize interests in IR scholarship in Asia, by enriching existing concepts, paradigms and providing new perspectives.¹¹

As it was already mentioned in the chapter 1, a famous essay by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Why is there no Non-Western International Relations*

9 Rozman, Gilbert, “The 2000s: China’s Rise, Responses to it, and IR Theory.” In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): op. cit., pp. 143–161.

10 Rozman, Gilbert, “The 2010s: Asia’s Slide toward Conflict and IR Theory.” In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): op. cit., pp. 191–212.

11 Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 193–230.

Theory?, refers to the problem of the lack of IR theory in Asia. At the same time, it approaches issues connected with the incompatibility of the Western, especially American, positivist perspective to IR theory with Asian schools. The essay also addresses the fact that most important Asian players do not fit into realist or liberal categories in IR theory, as China is trying not to be perceived as a threat to the global system, and Japan as a “normal” great power.¹² According to Acharya and Buzan, South Korea and Japan fit better into the realist paradigm and Southeast Asia is difficult to be analyzed, no matter which paradigm is applied.¹³

Ten years after the article *Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?*,¹⁴ Acharya and Buzan published a long follow-up article *Why is there*

- 12 Such an approach may be disputable with recent policy changes introduced by Xi Jinping in China and Shinzo Abe in Japan. Cf.: Saich, Tony, “What Does General Secretary Xi Jinping Dream About?” *Ash Center Occasional Papers*, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2017; Ang, Yuen Yuen: “Autocracy with Chinese Characteristics Beijing’s Behind-the-Scenes Reforms.” *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2018, pp. 39–46; Weissmann, Mikael: “Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer <<Striving For Achievement>>.” *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3(1), 2015, pp. 151–166; Esteban, Mario: “The Foreign Policy of Xi Jinping after the 19th Congress: China Strives for a Central Role on the World Stage.” *ARI 87/2017*, Asia-Pacific Real Instituto Elcano, retrieved on: 10.07.2018 from: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/cf3c30c6-a9c5-4524-b099-57fa42e2bc7a/ARI87-2017-Esteban-Foreign-policy-Xi-Jinping-19th-Congress-China-central-role-world-stage.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=cf3c30c6-a9c5-4524-b099-57fa42e2bc7a>; Ryu, Yongwook, “Departing from the Postwar Regime: The Revision of the ‘Peace Constitution’ and Japan’s National Identity.” In: McCarthy, Mary (ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy*. Routledge: Oxon-New York 2018, pp. 41–54; Sakaki, Alexandra: “Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift in Direction under Abe?” *SWP Research Paper*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin 2015.
- 13 Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations theory?: An Introduction.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 2–4. About sources of Western domination in IR theory, cf.: *ibid.*, pp. 16–22.
- 14 The text was initially published in 2007 as a preface to the special issue of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* and based on ideas presented during the workshop organized in 2005 by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Introduction: Why is there no Non-Western IR theory: reflection on and from Asia.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7 (1), 2007, pp. 285–312.

no Non-Western International Relations Theory?: Ten Years on,¹⁵ focusing on the development of IR, especially in Asia in the formerly analyzed areas. Development has definitely been visible, including a large number of published books, and a rise in regional IR journals (the growing importance of Japan anchored *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, launched in 2001 and *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, published since 2006). The authors identify intensified application of IR theories in Asian IR in general, especially the rise of constructivism in Asian IR research (indicated as a dominant theory by 22.4 % in TRIP research in 2014) and the growing prominence of Asian scholars in global IR scholarship. Nevertheless, Western IR theory still dominates the scholarship in Asia with European views becoming more popular (as published by *European Journal of International Relations*). On the other hand, the Eurocentric English School (school of international society), has evolved by bringing the pre-colonial societies of Asia and Africa into the paradigm. At the same time, authors accentuate challenges to Western IR theories in Asia, including the neorealist approach (predicting the collapse of the regional order after the end of the Cold War), neoclassical economic governance (challenged by state-led economic development in East Asia) or theories of regional integration (challenged by Asian consensual regionalism). Efforts to build theories in Asia aim at middle-range theories, rather than grand theories, with no success in the creation of regional Asian IR theory and limited achievements in vocal attempts to build 'national' theories (like Chinese, Japanese, Korean or Taiwanese IR theory), as they are still rather pluralistic within those 'national' schools. Finally, authors presume the highest development potential in the hierarchical theory of IR based on Confucian thought.¹⁶

International Relations in the People's Republic of China

Chinese IR scholarship seems the most developed in the field, developing rapidly in recent years. We should take into account that it is based on the solid foundations of ancient Chinese strategic thought (like the aforementioned Sun Zi) on the one hand, and the philosophy of Confucius and other philosophical traditions, including Daoism, Legalism or Mohism to a lesser extent.¹⁷ Looking

15 Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: "Why is there no Non-Western IR Theory? Ten Years on". *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (3), 2017, pp. 341–370.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 341–370.

17 Cf.: more about Chinese philosophical schools: Lai, Karyn: *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2008, pp. 19–197.

at the three traditions, namely Confucianism, Legalism and Mohism (land and heaven school), one may find a set of similarities like a focus on peace and security, serving the dominance of the ruler and attaching importance to agricultural production. As for the differences, Confucianism focused more on the goodness of human nature, Legalism stressed the fact that the human nature was evil and power predominant, and Mohism addresses the interests and role of the economy.¹⁸

Different, sometimes overlapping, periodizations of Chinese IR scholarship were proposed by Chinese scholars. Based on three typologies, proposed by two scholars, namely Yaqing Qin and Hung-Jen Wang, one could divide the development of Chinese IR theory into three stages. These stages would be: (1) policy-oriented pre-theorizing (pre-1990, additionally divided into three sub-stages), when China was organizing an institutional setting for IR theory development and adaptation, (2) the scholarly oriented period up until 2010, when Chinese scholars were focused on adaptation and modification of Western IR theories to fit Chinese needs and (3) current developments (since 2010) aiming at the creation of a Chinese IR theory.

After World War II and the founding of the PRC, Chinese IR theory has gone through three sub-stages of institutional development. The first one (between 1953 and 1964) was focused more on developing expertise in the field in order to utilize it for national security purposes, and was connected with the foundation of different institutions, like the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, the Institute of International Relations in Beijing and the Institute of International Politics in Beijing. In the second sub-stage (after 1964) three departments, concentrating on different aspects of IR in general and IR theory were created: liberation movements in the Third World were studied at Peking University, communist movements at Renmin University and IR in the Western World at Fudan University, although Marxist and Maoist philosophy, as well as Chinese 'communist' theories, like the three world theory or the strategic triangle theory still dominated. In the third sub-stage, initiated in 1979, numerous IR institutions and programs were created due to China's opening up to the world in the Deng Xiaoping era. Finally, in 1999 the China National Association for International Studies was created, including since 2004 all important Chinese IR institutions. In terms of the introduction of Western IR theories to China, much was achieved

18 Geeraerts, Gustaaf/Jing, Men: "International Relations Theory in China." *Global Society*, 15 (3), 2001, p. 263.

thanks to four series of translations of classical Western theory texts, but primarily realist ones.¹⁹

The abovementioned author, Yaqing Qin, proposed three phases of theory-oriented research, including understanding of theory as a policy tool in the first phase (until 1990), then awareness of theory as a knowledge-oriented construct and application of Western IR theory in China (until 2010) and finally, the third and ongoing phase, the creation of IR theory in China, which still faces difficulties, as Chinese IR theory did not yet exist in 2010.²⁰ These difficulties were properly identified by Song Xinning, who focused on the close relations of IR scholars with government policymaking circles, lack of qualified scholars, having no proper background in Political Science or International Relations and even a lack of proper Chinese textbooks, problems with ideological shackles or disciplinary divisions in China.²¹ Additional sources of the underdevelopment of Chinese IR theory may include: the lack of a concept of international issues (as World was traditionally perceived as a Sinocentric, tributary, enlarged domestic system), the dominance of Western IR theory, reinforced by the learning by

-
- 19 Cf.: Qin, Yaqing: "Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory?." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 28–32. Deeper analysis of the state of the field, including historical, institutional development was conducted by David Shambaugh. Cf.: Shambaugh, David: "International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects." *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (3), 2011, pp. 339–372.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 32–35. Hung-Jen Wang presents a slightly different approach to Chinese IR theory development, focusing on the need for international recognition of Chinese politics and IR theory. Wang, Hung-Jen: "Being Uniquely Universal: Building Chinese International Relations Theory." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22 (81), 2013, pp. 518–534. Yaqing Qin also uses a comparison with three debates: the first one between orthodox (war and revolution) and reformist (peace and development) scholars, initiated in 1979, ending with the reformist conclusion of prevailing peace and development, but realist view of China having its legitimate national interest, the second one, initiated in 1990s, between realists (national power) and liberals (international institutions) and the third one, since the beginning of the 21st century focused on the issue of China's peaceful rise, with realists opposing this approach, while constructivists and liberals support the option of a peacefully rising China. Qin, Yaqing: "Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress through Debates." *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 231–257.
- 21 Xinning, Song: "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10 (26), 2001, pp. 61–74.

translation process and finally, the lack of theoretical hard core, namely the big idea driving the creation of theory.²²

Four stages of Chinese identity making in IR scholarship were debated by Hung-Jen Wang, including reviewing the history of Chinese IR theory studies and responding to the idea of “Chinese Characteristics” (between 1979 and 1990), serving China’s national interests (in the 1990s), strategic use of the Chinese IR school in the early 21st century and designing the core problematic in the first/second decade of this century. This approach was based on the presumption that there is a distinct Chinese school of IR built upon traditional cultural values and world-view, which can follow the success of the English School in the field dominated by Americans, and the source of inspiration for this school is Chinese peaceful integration into international society.²³

The ‘Chinese school of IR’ movement has been growing since the beginning of the 21st century, including prominent scholars, like Qin Yaqing, Ren Xiao and Wang Yiwei, and referring to selected concepts from Chinese history and philosophy, as mentioned below.²⁴ These ideas include the ancient concepts of *Tianxia* (all under heaven) – Chinese centrality in the international system, to some extent justifying hierarchical world order, the concept of *Datong* (great harmony), fitting well with concepts of globalization, the Confucian concept of order (to large extent based on *Lizhi* – ruled by ethical codes or morality).²⁵ We can also search for sources of Chinese IR theory in other traditional concepts of Chinese society, like concepts of relations (*Guanxi*). Such an approach has been applied in the relatively novel works of Emilian Kavalski²⁶ and Yaqing Qin.²⁷

22 Qin, Yaqing: op. cit., pp. 36–40.

23 Wang, Hung-Jen: *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship*. Lexington Books, Plymouth 2013, pp. 35–52.

24 Do, Thuy: “China’s Rise and the ‘Chinese Dream’ in International Relations Theory.” *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 27 (1), 2015, pp. 21–38. Thuy Do stresses the issue of harmonious mentality (*hexie linian*) stronger.

25 Ibid., pp. 41–43. As for the concept of Tianxia, it’s widely analyzed at Hueckel/Bettina: “Theory of International Relations with Chinese Characteristics: The Tian-Xia System from a Metatheoretical Perspective.” *Diskurs*, 8 (2), 2012 pp. 34–65.

26 Kavalski, Emilian: *The Guanxi of Relational International Theory*. Routledge: Oxon-New York 2018. Cf.: Kavalski, Emilian: “Guanxi or What is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 397–420.

27 Qin, Yaqing: *A Relational Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2018.

As for the application of the aforementioned concepts, extensive efforts were undertaken by Hung-Jen Wang, mostly focusing on adaptation of the China's Rise concept in various Chinese relations (with the United States, with Japan, with Southeast Asia, as well as with Taiwan).²⁸ On the other hand, crucial issues connected with the rising position of the PRC in the system, as well as challenges connected with possible conflicts or power transition, are still being investigated on the basis of Western IR theories.²⁹ It is also worth mentioning that despite the growing role of constructivism or rationalism (English school) in Chinese IR theory, realism or neo-realism has been at the core of Chinese theoretical thinking on IR and the future of the international system, and China's position in it.³⁰

The realist approach dominates in East Asia in general (especially in Northeast Asia), as security concerns have been central there. Stephen Haggard presents five arguments, justifying the application of realism to analysis of Northeast Asia, including: (1) the rise of China, and the presumption that rising powers are revisionists (generating conflicts); (2) the Northeast Asia multipolar system (power distribution) as prone to instability; (3) the US, due to domestic political concerns, willingness to appease or bandwagon China rather than contain it; (4) Japan, possibly tempted to increase its military capabilities and role, causing regional destabilization, if the US would not provide a security umbrella to the region and (5) the lack of a common security framework in the region.³¹

International Relations in Japan

Japan seems to have all the means needed to allow it to develop International Relations, including IR theory, due to financial and scholarly capabilities. Nevertheless, the language barrier, and a sort of dependence on the US was a limitation on independent theorizing in Japan. But there is a chance to popularize the Japanese school of IR theorizing, as one could imagine a vision of a

28 Wang, Hung-Jen: *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship*. Lexington Books, Plymouth 2013, pp. 53–122.

29 Fravel, Taylor: "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion." *International Studies Review*, 12 (4), 2010, pp. 505–532.

30 Lynch, Daniel: "Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?." *The China Quarterly*, 197, 2009, pp. 87–107.

31 Haggard, Stephen: The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy: International Relations Theory in Northeast Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4 (1), 2004, pp. 3–4.

Japan-led system in Northeast Asia, based on economic issues, stemming from the idea of *endaka*³², hence forcing Japan to become a leader of regional economic cooperation, as it would be a tool for overcoming economic difficulties and sustaining regional power status.

Such an approach, stressing the Japanese economic role, was already presented by Haggard, who justified Japanese domination in regional processes, especially in the 1980s, focusing on several issues, including: (1) the role of a strong yen, perceived as a tool for the centrality of Japanese leadership by Japan and the US; (2) the role of Japan as the main provider of capital, technology and FDIs; (3) support for the 'open regionalism' of APEC and ODA policy; (4) the movement of East Asia toward an informal 'yen bloc' and finally, (5) US-Japan regional rivalry, especially in industrial terms (growing networks created by Japanese firms in Northeast and Southeast Asia, exclusive to American capital). This approach changed in the 1990s due to Japanese stagnation, the Asian Financial Crisis and especially the rise of China.³³

Although the rise of China both in economic terms, but also in Chinese international ambitions, led to the rapid development of Chinese IR scholarship, described above, Japanese scholarship has still been rather important in shaping the Asian IR theoretical environment. Japanese IR theory has been shaped by its past experiences, especially by the pre-war period and World War II. Therefore, two main areas of the research, including theory-driven research, have been historical issues (connected with responsibility for World War II) and broadly understood pacifism and its derivatives (including defense strategy, world political economy, global issues and problems of maintaining peace). The main institutional development was the establishment of the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) in 1956. A second Japanese debate was connected with the Cold War and Japanese allegiance to the United States, contradicted by the proposed politics of neutrality, and sometimes portrayed as a debate between idealism and realism, being especially fierce in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the edge of Japanese IR scholarship focused on International Political Economy (IPE) issues, due to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and oil crises. It also brought the concept of comprehensive security to the table (those issues were promoted in the journal *Kokusai Seiji/International Politics*, published by JAIR).

32 *Endaka* meant raising value of Japanese yen, hence limiting Japanese export competitiveness (especially since Plaza Agreement of 1985 and Japanese recession in 1992), and to some extent was a driving force behind Japanese engagement in regional multilateralization efforts, like APEC process.

33 Haggard, Stephen: *op. cit.*, pp. 18–22.

At the same time, new methodologies, especially behavioral ones, were imported from the US and also popularized within Japanese IR scholarship. The 1980s and 1990s faced dynamic development of interest in world system theories and hegemonic stability theory in Japan. Finally, the 21st century brought much deeper interest in globalization issues, as well as the role of non-state actors' in IR, but also focused on theories to a greater extent. It comprised the increasing role of methodology, including mathematical and statistical modeling, growing interest in new paradigms, especially the English School, and finally establishment of the *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (IRAP) journal in 2001, encouraging theory-driven articles.³⁴

It was the IRAP that published an indispensable article by Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon in the very first issue in 2001. Their text analyzed the development of Japanese IR scholarship, and compared American and Japanese academies in this respect (including juxtaposition of four great Western debates with four traditions of IR theorizing in Japan 1868–2000). As for Japanese theoretical traditions, they focus firstly on the *Staatslehre* tradition, influencing the discipline in particular before World War II, and focused on detailed description of events and of the historical-institutional background in order to analyze changes in the international order prospectively affecting Japan. The second tradition was Marxism, popular between the 1920s and the 1960s in opposition to the aforementioned *Staatslehre* tradition, and the one-party dominated government of Japan. It had gradually lost its position by the 1990s, when some scholars turned to postmodernist, feminist or radical traditions. The third approach was the historicist tradition, focusing more on presenting and describing facts, without much interpretation. Finally, the fourth tradition is the American Political Science approach, which has been consolidating its role since the 1970s (and described partially above).³⁵

Looking at the development of IR theory, or the broader IR discipline, in Japan, we should focus on three questions driving developments since 1945 raised by Takashi Inoguchi. All three focus on mistakes in Japan's foreign policy. The first question refers to Japanese engagement in World War II and its defeat.

34 Yamamoto, Kazuya: "International Relations Studies and Theories in Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacific, and Globalization." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 259–278.

35 Inoguchi, Takashi/Bacon, Paul: "The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a more International Discipline." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 1 (1), 2001, pp. 1–20.

The second focuses on the form of international agreements, securing peace, especially in the context of the San Francisco system, and balancing between an alliance with the United States and other great powers in the system (Soviet Union, People's Republic of China). The last question is based on the desired tracks of Japanese diplomacy, especially since the end of the Cold War and with practical implications. These questions were important in the reception of Western theories, partially described above, and promoting first idealism (in the form of pacifism) in the period between 1945 and the end of the Vietnam War, realism (in the form of a strong alliance with the US) after the Vietnam War ended and other paradigms like constructivism, institutionalism or feminism in the 1990s.³⁶

Takashi Inoguchi proposes three Japanese middle-range theories exemplified by three theoreticians, namely (1) Kitaro Nishida (1870–1945), representing innate constructivism, trying to position Japan between the East and the West (the Flying Geese Model of Kaname Akamatsu is also presented as a proto-constructivist theory); (2) Shigejiro Tabata (1911–2001), focusing not only on international law, state sovereignty and democracy, but also on freedom of individuals, hence we could associate him with the liberal paradigm and finally (3) Yoshitaro Hirano (1897–1970), a leftist scholar, focusing on international integration, diminishing the role of state sovereignty, but following the Japanese government's concept of the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. His ideas influenced Saburo Okita, who was an important promoter of Trans-Pacific integration together with John Crawford from the Australian National University.³⁷

The creation of IR theory in Japan as distinct from the West has been facing many challenges. Generally, it is been to large extent dominated by the English School. As the English School to some extent excludes non-European societies (like Asian or African), therefore including Asian values, hence enriching the English School may be perceived as a goal of Japanese IR scholarship.³⁸

36 Inoguchi, Takashi: "Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 55–58.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 59–61.

38 Chen, Ching-Chang: "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations." *Asian Perspective*, 36 (3), 2012, pp. 463–492.

International Relations in South Korea

The third Northeast Asia country, with a relatively developed IR scholarship, is South Korea. Looking briefly at the development of IR theory in this state, we can also realize it is demonstrating its ambition of creating an independent IR theory. At the same time South Korea has had an underdeveloped IR theory, as it was for a long time not an independent actor but subject to international politics, being part of the Chinese tributary system, the Japanese colonial system or part of the US-dominated regional system. In its post-World War II history South Korea imported most of its IR theoretical ideas from the United States. The Korean goal of independent theorizing has been challenging, having in mind henceforth development of IR research and theory, especially with a cross-cutting edge.³⁹

As for the institutional development of IR scholarship in Korea, two organizations should be mentioned, namely the Korean Political Science Association (established in 1953) and Korean Association of International Studies (established in 1956). South Korean IR scholarship was generally dominated by American realism and many realist texts were translated (E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, H. Kissinger and G. Kennan), but studies on the UN were also carried out due to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Attempts to create a Korean school of IR were visible with the *Topos Theory*, identifying broader analytical units of IR, like “sphere of civilization” or “geographical sphere” introduced by Lee Yong-Hee in 1962 (in his book *A General Theory of International Politics in Relation with its Historical Aspects*, published in Korean).⁴⁰ IR scholarship in Korea in the following decades resembled the global development in the field, especially in the US, hence the following concepts were implemented: (1) behavioral revolution, (2) IPE in the 1970s or (3) problems of Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in the 1980s, also (4) structuralism and critical perspectives, coming from academic circles opposed to authoritarian rule and (5) local problems, like strategic issues. Changes after the Cold War resulted in reduced American influence in Korean IR academia, raising claims for the creation of Korean IR theory and an increasing number of associations and journals focusing on IR.⁴¹

39 Korean IR refer to scholarship developed in South Korea (excluding North Korea).

40 Lee, Yong-Hee: *A General Theory of International Politics in Relation with its Historical Aspects*. Bak Young Sa: Seoul 1962. Quoted from Chun, Chaesung: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?: Reflections on and from Korea.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, p. 72.

41 Chun, Chaesung: op. cit., pp. 70–74.

Despite the quest for independent, self-reliant Korean IR theory, such efforts have not proved to be successful, as there are certain limitations, especially the colonial mentality, perceiving Korea as a test case for mainstream IR theories, especially realist or neorealist ones, or mimicking and reaffirming hegemonic Western IR theories. Moreover, there is a dispute, whether there is a need for a Korean IR theory, and rather unlikely that it would not be accepted by the dominant player in the field, namely American academia. Even if such a theory is created, its proponents focus on features distinct to Korean history, traditions, practices or ideologies; therefore the creation of Korea-centrist theory with limited universal applicability.⁴²

Reasons for the underdevelopment of IR scholarship in Korea were also provided by Chesung Chun, including: (1) a premodern approach to international politics, e.g. normative concerns on regional issues, based on a neo-Confucian worldview; (2) import of Western, coherent theories, limiting the need for creation of domestic theory; (3) marginalization of history of the so-called Third World by those Western IR theories; (4) the complexity of Asian IR, creating the need for rather complex IR theories, difficult at the nascent stage of theoretical development; (5) global forces driving modern Korean history, making it easier to adapt external IR theories; (6) easy, direct applicability of certain Western IR theories to Korean IR (theory of alliances, balance of power, hegemonic stability); (7) division between History and IR in Korean academia; as well as (8) a lack of dialogue between disciplines and scholars.⁴³

Lesser challenges exist, if we focus on the creation of IR theory for East Asia. They include: (1) the problem of defining the scope of East Asia itself in the field of Korean IR, (2) followed by identification of particularities of this region and subjects, and questions arising from them (like difficulties in the applicability of an anarchical approach to East Asia) and finally, (3) problem of testing and generalizing main findings by the Korean IR community, in the case of relatively rare collective efforts undertaken outside of the Western theoretical approach.⁴⁴

Summing up, we may notice important institutional growth in Korean IR scholarship and its quest for independence, visible especially since the 1990s. We may also see a lot of challenges making potential creation of Korean theory

42 Cho, Chul Young: "Colonialism and Imperialism in the Quest for a Universalist Korean-style International Relations Theory". *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28 (4), 2015, pp. 680–700.

43 Chun, Chaesung; op. cit., pp. 83–85.

44 Choi, Ajin: "Constructing Theories of East Asian International Relations in Korea: Challenges and Tasks." *Korea Observer*, 39 (2), 2008, pp. 307–328.

relatively difficult and unlikely, especially as a globally accepted theory. This is especially problematic, as it would probably be based on non-Korean philosophical foundations (Chinese or Japanese due to Korean history), hence would not distinguish itself from other Northeast Asian schools.⁴⁵

International Relations in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has definitely been on the lower level of IR theorizing in comparison to its Northeast Asian counterpart. Certain efforts have also been undertaken there, but if we look at theoretically driven studies concerning Southeast Asia, we may mostly find studies applying different Western theories to problems of this region. Looking back at history, we should definitely credit realist and neorealist approaches as the main explanatory tools for Southeast Asia, as conflicts and security were predominately analyzed there. Since the 1990s, however, we may notice the growing importance of social constructivism, used in order to explain regional developments and attempting to capture ideational determinants in the region (including norms and identities). At the same time, other paradigms became important due to integration efforts observable in the region, including liberalism, especially neoliberal institutionalism, different regional integration theories, the English school and critical approaches.⁴⁶

As mentioned above, political leaders in Southeast Asia were to a large extent the driving force and source of IR thought in the region, focusing on liberalization from colonial rule, nationalism, but also modernization, especially in the economic sphere. We should consider the following political leaders, listed by Alan Chong as idea-providers in the region: Sukarno (Indonesia), Aung San and his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi (Burma/Myanmar), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Jose Rizal (Philippines), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia) and General Pibulsongkhram (Thailand).⁴⁷ An important role in regional development of theory has been played by different issues connected with integration

45 There are also rare attempts of theorizing North Korean behavior in IR, mostly based on Western IR theories. Cf.: Woo, Seongji: "Pyongyang and the World: North Korean Perspectives on International Relations under Kim Jong-il." *Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies*, 26 (2), 2011, pp. 188–205.

46 Acharya, Amitav/Stubbbs, Richard: "Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction." *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 125–134.

47 Cf.: Chong, Alan: "Southeast Asia: Theory between Modernization and Tradition." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 137–147.

and regionalization, especially in the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (created in 1967), and in terms of IR expertise connected with a network of Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, located in all ten ASEAN member-states⁴⁸.

IR scholarship in Southeast Asian was to a large extent based on certain Western theories. At the time of state-building in the region, the Marxist perspective played an important role in ideologies of national liberation movements and leaders. Due to increasing problems of regional conflicts, and engagement of extraterritorial actors (US-Soviet conflict), realism and neorealism began to play a more important role in the region, creating a subordinated system of South and Southeast Asia (it was a texture for the structure in the neorealist approach). This bias toward security issues was also due to the fact that many scholars in the region were educated in the US and realism was supported by educational programs, especially of the Ford Foundation. In the search for indigenous sources of Southeast Asian theorizing, we may look at studies on local autonomy (pre-theorizing), or look at hybrid scholarship of testing and enhancing Western theories at the local level by enriching it with 'local' philosophies (e.g. of Buddha, Confucius or Mohammed), and creating an Asian Way or ASEAN Way scholarship of avoiding conflicts, soft power, accommodation and diplomacy etc.⁴⁹

48 The Secretariat of ASEAN-ISIS is located at CSIS in Jakarta, and the network encompasses: Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS); Cambodian Institute for Cooperation & Peace (CICP); Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Indonesia); Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) Lao People's Democratic Republic; Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia; Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS); The Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS Philippines); Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA Singapore); The Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand) and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The quality of their expertise differs and they are policy oriented rather than theory oriented, but at the same time, many of them contribute to theoretically grounded studies over the Southeast Asian region. See more about them *ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS)*. Retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://www.isis.org.my/2018/09/23/asean-isis/>.

49 Broader analysis of this issue, abbreviated here due to space constraints, is to be found: Chong, Alan: "Southeast Asia: Theory between Modernization and Tradition." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 117–147.

There are various explanations for the underdevelopment of Southeast Asian IR scholarship, and especially Southeast Asian IR theory, including metatheoretical gatekeeping of difficulties in translating ontology, epistemology or methods between Western and non-Western settings, but also structural gatekeeping of the discipline's institutional organization. The latter issue creates what is called a vicious circle, as the educational system, IR departments, curricula and lecturers, as well as their theoretical research backgrounds mirror Western ones in order to be acknowledged in Western academia, though such an approach precludes Southeast Asian theorizing attempts from the mainstream of academia.⁵⁰

Definitely, Southeast Asian IR scholarship has been developing much faster since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the 21st century, also due to the fact that Southeast Asian countries, or at least many of them, have become richer and devoted more resources to academia. At the same time, it is still difficult to create a distinctive IR theory becoming even a middle-range theory that is globally accepted and applied.

International Relations in India

Despite its size, the British colonial heritage in the educational system and numerous universities, India is still at an early stage in terms of development of IR scholarship, and especially in terms of IR theorizing. There are different reasons for this, including: (1) the lack of a proper theory-driven approach in the scholarly community (contrary to Political Science in India, rooted in political theory), (2) the lack of IR theory pedagogy (it is rather based on various historical and diplomatic case studies) and finally (3) the policy-oriented approach of Indian IR, especially at the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, relying on his own knowledge and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being the center of expertise for Indian IR and expecting no academic input. Two dominant IR traditions in India can be identified as 'we do not theorize' or 'we do theorize, but in the way that is not recognized in dominant Western IR theorizing'.

Searching deeper, we could find set of 'subsystemic' or 'exceptionalist' theories in Indian IR scholarship, including Nehru's theory of non-exclusionary regionalism, the concept of *panchsheel* (five principles of peaceful coexistence)

50 Rueland, Anchalee: "Constraining Structures: Why Local International Relations Theory in Southeast Asia is having a Hard Time." In: Peters, Ingo/Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.): *Globalizing International Relations Scholarship Amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan : London 2016, pp. 107–129.

or Kautilya's theory of mandala (with the concept of a set of concentric circles, having the given king in the center of one of those concentric circles of kingdoms/mandalas representing his enemies or allies). These theories received virtually no recognition in Western IR scholarship. Therefore an option for Indian IR scholarship should be the creation of post-Western IR theories, dismantling the hierarchies between Western and non-Western IR theories, and thus limiting Western hegemony in IR scholarship.⁵¹

Such a development is relatively challenging, as the abovementioned lack of theoretical background in the state of the art in Indian and South Asian IR is deeply rooted in its institutional development. Problems and obstacles hampering development of IR scholarship include its location in the fields of Political Science, History and sometimes International Economics. Without a distinct identity, it generally lacks proper teaching materials, as well as sound institutions developing the discipline, and the underfunding of said institutions. There is a limited number of professional associations and limited collaboration between university departments, while most of the essential publications are published by research institutes or think tanks (and still not accessible in other parts of the country). Due to all the aforementioned issues, the development of IR scholarship, especially independent theorizing in South Asia is still at a very nascent level.⁵²

Such an endeavor seems relatively challenging, as looking at the current project dealing with Indian or more broadly South Asian IR theories, we may realize it has consisted mostly of adaptation of different Western IR theories to the regional setting. Despite titles indicating theoretical background, it has hardly ever been Indian or South Asian IR theory. Whether it be deterrence theory explaining the India-Pakistan conflict,⁵³ neorealism, neoliberalism (neoliberal institutionalism), regional integration theories and to some extent identity theories, serving rather as a justification for the essential works nominally based on theories,⁵⁴ a similar approach may be found in a chapter devoted to theoretical

51 Behera, Navnita Chadha: "Re-imagining IR in India." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010, pp. 92–116.

52 Behera, Navnita Chadha: "International Relations in South Asia: State of the Art." In: Behera, Navnita Chadha: *International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm*. Sage: New Delhi, 2008, pp. 1–50.

53 Sridharan, E.: "International Relations Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict." *India Review*, 4 (2), 2005, pp. 103–124.

54 Sridharan, E., "International Relations Theory in South Asia: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities, and Images." In: Sridharan, E. (ed.),

reflections over India's foreign policy in the *Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Relations*,⁵⁵ even though the author refers to Indian traditions, focusing on issues like cosmopolitanism, order, justice or non-alignment being a starting point for further theorizing. A similar (Western IR theory-based) approach has also been undertaken by the research project conducted at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India,⁵⁶ as well as the editors and authors of this publication.

Conclusion

Summing up, we can observe a dramatic change in IR scholarship in the Asia-Pacific region, visible especially after the Cold War ended, with an acceleration in the early 21st century. This development has not been distributed equally, as China especially has made tremendous progress in this respect. Having received Western theories, initially focusing on realism, it has begun to rebuild some of them, and introduce Chinese characteristics. This latter change has also been marked by the growing role of constructivism in Chinese IR in the early 21st century. Similarly, Japan and South Korea have introduced IR programs quite widely, established their own IR journals, focusing strongly on theory and theory driven research, and finally tried to establish their own IR theories (without much success, however). Southeast Asia has developed its theory to a large extent on the basis of the political ideologies of crucial politicians ruling in those countries. Even the most famous and promising concept of the Singapore School (based on Asian values) was advanced by Lee Kwan Yew, a prime minister of Singapore and Mahathir bin Mohammad, a prime minister of Malaysia. A similar situation may be observed in South Asia, where India has the most developed IR scholarship. Despite its philosophical roots (Kautilya), English heritage and ideas introduced by Nehru, its IR theorizing definitely lags behind.

International Relations Theory in South Asia, volume I: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities, and Images. Oxford University Press: New Delhi 2011.

- 55 Mallavarpu, Siddharth: "Theorizing India's Foreign Relations." In: Malone, David/Mohan, C. Raja/Raghavan, Srinath (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy.* Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015, retrieved on 25.06.2018 from: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198743538-e-3>.
- 56 Project: *International Relations Theory and South Asia: Toward Regional Conflict Resolution and Cooperation-Building*, retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/upiasi/programs/internationalrelations>.

Future developments of International Relations theory in Asia are difficult to predict. On the one hand, the most powerful states in the region will try to create their own theories of IR, especially as some of them have proper philosophical roots. This refers especially to China, being a growing power, and trying to possess all the attributes of a great power, including soft power. In this respect, proper investment in internationalized IR scholarship, with a theoretical background, would be an asset. Having resources of various types, China may be the only country able to create a grand theory of IR. Whether it will be accepted as a mainstream theory by the IR scholarly community is still doubtful, as long as this community is Western dominated. As for other countries – we can imagine the creation of middle-range theories, either focused on the region (e.g. based on Asian Values) or being a sectoral IR theory. Regardless, Asia is going to be an interesting case in the development of IR theory.

References

- Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Introduction: Why is there no Non-Western IR Theory: Reflection on and from Asia.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7 (1), 2007, pp. 287–312.
- Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?: An Introduction.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.
- Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry: “Why is there no Non-Western IR Theory? Ten Years on”. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (3), 2017, pp. 341–370.
- Acharya, Amitav/Stubbs, Richard: “Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction.” *The Pacific Review*, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 125–134.
- Alagappa, Muthiah: “International Relations Studies in Asia: Distinctive Trajectories.” *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 193–230.
- Ang, Yuen Yuen: “Autocracy with Chinese Characteristics Beijing’s Behind-the-Scenes Reforms.” *Foreign Affairs*, 97 (3), 2018, pp. 39–46.
- Barkin, Samuel: *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Cambridge University Press: New York 2010.
- Behera, Navnita Chadha: “International Relations in South Asia: State of the Art.” In: Behera, Navnita Chadha (ed.): *International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm*. Sage: New Delhi 2008.
- Behera, Navnita Chadha: “Re-imagining IR in India.” In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.

- Chen, Ching-Chang: "The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations." *Asian Perspective*, 36 (3), 2012, pp. 463–492.
- Cho, Chul Young: "Colonialism and Imperialism in the Quest for a Universalist Korean-style International Relations Theory." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 28 (4), 2015, pp. 680–700.
- Choi, Ajin: "Constructing Theories of East Asian International Relations in Korea: Challenges and Tasks." *Korea Observer*, 39 (2), 2008, pp. 307–328.
- Chong, Alan: "Southeast Asia: Theory between Modernization and Tradition." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.
- Chun, Chaesung: "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations theory?: Reflections on and from Korea." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.
- Desinghar, Giri: "Strategic Thinking of Kautilya and Sun Zi." *China Report*, 32 (1), 1996, pp. 1–13
- Do, Thuy: "China's Rise and the 'Chinese Dream' in International Relations Theory." *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 27 (1), 2015, pp. 21–38.
- Dudziak, Julita: "Concept of Indigenousness and Postcolonialism in Australian International Relations (IR)." In: Peters, Ingo /Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.): *Globalizing International Relations Scholarship Amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2016.
- Esteban, Mario: "The Foreign Policy of Xi Jinping after the 19th Congress: China Strives for a Central Role on the World Stage." *ARI 87/2017*, Asia-Pacific Real Instituto Elcano, retrieved on: 10.07.2018 from: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/cf3c30c6-a9c5-4524-b099-57fa42e2bc7a/ARI87-2017-Esteban-Foreign-policy-Xi-Jinping-19th-Congress-China-central-role-world-stage.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=cf3c30c6-a9c5-4524-b099-57fa42e2bc7a>.
- Fravel, Taylor: "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion." *International Studies Review*, 12 (4), 2010, pp. 505–532.
- Geeraerts, Gustaaf/Jing, Men: "International Relations Theory in China." *Global Society*, 15 (3), 2001, pp. 251–276.
- Haggard, Stephen: "The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy: International Relations Theory in Northeast Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4 (1), 2004, pp. 1–38.
- Hueckel/Bettina: "Theory of International Relations with Chinese Characteristics: The Tian-Xia System from a Metatheoretical Perspective." *Diskurs*, 8 (2), 2012, pp. 34–64.

- Ikenberry, John/Mastanduno, Michael (eds.): *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia University Press: New York 2003.
- Inoguchi, Takashi/Bacon, Paul: "The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a more International Discipline." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 1 (1), 2001, pp. 1–20.
- Inoguchi, Takashi: "Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan." In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.
- Kavalski, Emilian: "Guanxi or What is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 397–420.
- Kavalski, Emilian: *The Guanxi of Relational International Theory*. Routledge: Oxon-New York 2018.
- Lai, Karyn: *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2008.
- Lynch, Daniel: "Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?" *The China Quarterly*, 197, 2009, pp. 87–107.
- Mallavarpu, Siddharth: "Theorizing India's Foreign Relations." In: Malone, David/Mohan, C. Raja/Raghavan, Srinath (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015, retrieved on 25.06.2018 from: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198743538-e-3>.
- Qin, Yaqing: "Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress through Debates." *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 231–257.
- Qin, Yaqing: "Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory?" In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: London-New York 2010.
- Qin, Yaqing: *A Relational Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2018.
- Ramachandran, K.N.: "Sun Zi and Kautilya: Towards a Comparative Analysis." *Strategic Analysis* 34 (3), 2014, pp. 390–408.
- Rozman, Gilbert: "The 1970s: Asia's Emergence in IR Theory". In: Rozman, Gilbert (ed.): *Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015.
- Rueland, Anchalee: "Constraining Structures: Why Local International Relations Theory in Southeast Asia is having a Hard Time." In: Peters, Ingo/Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Wiebke (eds.): *Globalizing International Relations*

- Scholarship Amidst Divides and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2016.
- Ryu, Yongwook, "Departing from the Postwar Regime: The Revision of the 'Peace Constitution' and Japan's National Identity." In: McCarthy, Mary (ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy*. Routledge: Oxon-New York 2018.
- Saich, Tony, "What Does General Secretary Xi Jinping Dream About?." Ash Center Occasional Papers, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2017, retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/what_does_xi_jinping_dream_about.pdf.
- Sakaki, Alexandra: "Japan's Security Policy: A Shift in Direction under Abe?." *SWP Research Paper*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs: Berlin 2015, retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP02_skk.pdf.
- Shambaugh, David: "International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects." *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (3), 2011, pp. 339–372.
- Shih, Chih-yu/Hwang, Yih-Jye: "Re-worlding the 'West' in Post-Western IR: The Reception of Sun Zi's the Art of War in the Anglosphere." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 2018, pp. 421–448.
- Sridharan, E.: "International Relations Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict." *India Review*, 4 (2), 2005, pp. 103–124.
- Sridharan, E., "International Relations Theory in South Asia: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities, and Images." In: Sridharan, E. (ed.), *International Relations Theory in South Asia, volume I: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities, and Images*. Oxford University Press: New Delhi 2011.
- University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study on India: *International Relations Theory and South Asia: Toward Regional Conflict Resolution and Cooperation-Building*, retrieved on 15.07.2018 from: <https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/upiasi/programs/internationalrelations>.
- Wang, Hung-Jen: "Being Uniquely Universal: Building Chinese International Relations Theory." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22 (81), 2013, pp. 518–534.
- Wang, Hung-Jen: *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship*. Lexington Books: Plymouth 2013.
- Weissmann, Mikael: "Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer <<Striving For Achievement>>." *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3 (1), 2015, pp. 151–166.
- Woo, Seongji: "Pyongyang and the World: North Korean Perspectives on International Relations under Kim Jong-il." *Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies*, 26 (2), 2011, pp. 188–205.

- Xinning, Song: "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10 (26), 2001, pp. 61–74.
- Yamamoto, Kazuya: "International Relations Studies and Theories in Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacific, and Globalization." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2), 2011, pp. 259–278.

Asia-Pacific Problems

Péter Bobák

5. Japanese Security Policy in Transition – In a Perspective of the “Normalization” Debate

Abstract: *Transition is a tendency to describe shifting Japanese security policy. Japan is shifting from a traditionally defensive position toward a more pro-active and autonomous one. However, Japan has ‘legitimacy’- and ‘capacity deficits’ for full autonomy in the management of its own security affairs. This chapter focuses on the security legislation of the second Abe Cabinet and states that the transition of Japanese security policy follows the path of ‘normalization’ process. By testing major IR theories, the paper argues that the process can be described more comprehensively by using analytical eclecticism. On ‘normalization’, there are internal and external pushing powers. The most important external pushing powers are the United States and the increasingly severe East Asian security environment. Internally, the increasingly positive attitude among the Japanese elite for restoring Japan’s “normal” military status is another pushing power. In particular, the second Abe Cabinet explicitly eased ‘pacifist’ institutional constraints in favor of enhancing Japan’s role in international security affairs. The changing security environment, new security co-operation and transforming the security identity definitely contribute to Japan’s military ‘normalization’ process.*

Keywords: Abe Cabinet, analytical eclecticism, ‘normalization’, “normal” military, transition

Introduction¹

The chapter is concerned with explicating some of the main tendencies of current Japanese security policy. At the same time security policy is a complex topic² but this paper emphasizes the military dimension of Japanese security policy. On the one hand, due to World War II, Japan’s military role is a very sensitive issue in East Asia. On the other hand, in Japan, it has appeared in the center of security related political debates in recent years. This chapter begins with the aim of answering the question whether the currently dominant tendency in Japanese security policy converges with the ‘normalization’ process.

1 This chapter is adapted from Master thesis: Bobák, Péter: *Japanese Security Policy in Transition – In a Perspective of ‘Normalization’ Debate*. (Master thesis). Department of International Studies, Pázmány Péter Catholic University: Budapest 2015.

2 It includes military security, political security, economic security, social security, environmental security, human security, information security etc.

Understanding the tendencies require comprehensive analysis. A key purpose of the present study is to place the developments of shifting Japanese security policies in a conceptual context, namely the ‘normalization theory.’ For understanding the “normal” nation status in the Japanese context, this chapter uses Inoguchi Takashi’s³ definition for “normal” nation.⁴ For analysis, the author adapts Peter J. Katzenstein’s analytical eclectic approach by applying the three main theories of international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

The main focus is the first three-year period of the second Abe Shinzo Cabinet (December 2012 – September 2015). This period was chosen because in recent years, the Abe cabinet has had the most explicit and active security policy agenda. However, current tendencies are difficult to interpret without reviewing the broader historical narrative.

The paper states:

- Japanese security policy is in transition.
- Japanese security policy is on the path of a ‘normalization’ process.
- Current measures of the second Abe Shinzo Cabinet’s security policy largely fit to the ‘normalization’ hypothesis.

Japanese Security Policy after the Cold War

Japanese security policy as a field of study was chosen because of Japan’s geopolitical role as a major factor in shaping the East Asian security complex. However, Japan has had limited opportunities to react to geopolitical changes. At the same time, the end of the Cold War’s bipolar world gave rise to a new security environment and produced new threats and challenges for Japan. In the interest of an effective response, Tokyo began to restructure its own traditional foreign and security policy doctrine, the so-called *Yoshida doctrine*.

In the Cold War, under the *security-umbrella* of the United States, Japan focused on her economic development and prosperity. Later, when Japan became the world’s second largest economy, Tokyo started to use its advanced economic position in its foreign and security policy. However, the successful economic-oriented foreign and security policy through aid and support proved to be less effective after the Cold War.

3 In this chapter Japanese names are written in accordance with the traditional order; first is surname, second is first name.

4 Inoguchi, Takashi: *Japan’s Ambition for Normal Statehood*, retrieved 14.07.2015, from http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/200302_inoguchi_japan/0302inoguchi.pdf.

The collapse of the Soviet Union restructured international relations and changed the global security environment. Subsequently, the United States enjoyed a dominant superpower position, especially in Europe and East Asia. Unlike in Europe, the end of the Soviet Union did not create stability in East Asia. Moreover, problems in the region's main security hotspots remained unresolved. For example, the Korean Peninsula is still divided; Taiwan-strait relations are still sensitive from a security perspective; and most of the countries in the region still have territorial and other disputes with each other.

During the Cold War, Japanese security thinking was focused on the Soviet nuclear and conventional military threat. In the post-Cold War era, Japanese strategic thinkers have perceived North Korea and China as potential threats. The new security situation generated changes in Japanese 'pacifist' identity. Tokyo has eased legal constraints on Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in terms of use of force in overseas operations and developed defense capabilities. Furthermore, Japan and the United States have extended the geographical scope of the Japan-US Alliance. In addition, Japan has diversified its security co-operation in the region especially with ASEAN countries, Australia and India in the recent years. These tendencies in Japanese security policy require a substantial approach.

Japanese Security Policy in Transition

To paint a comprehensive picture, we should define the major tendencies of Japanese security policy. By definition, a tendency is a natural or prevailing disposition to move toward some end or result. Tendency is a transition. More precisely, the paper addresses the transition of Japanese security policy from its traditionally defensive nature toward a pro-active and more autonomous one, a process begun after the end of the Cold War.⁵

During the Cold War, the external 'pushing power' from the United States (*gaiatsu*) determined much of Japanese security policy. As Peter J. Katzenstein

5 The thesis uses the 'Cold War' phrase for the US-Soviet strategic rivalry. In this context the post-Cold War era means the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014, it could be interpreted that Moscow had to suffer a withdrawal rather than a defeat. The increased strategic rivalry between the US and Russia and the hostile military exercises of NATO and Russia might be the signs that the Cold War is not over.

has stated, since the 1970s the US government “had persistently pressed”⁶ Japan to play a more active regional role in Asia and spend more on defense in line with Japan’s growing GDP indicators. However, Japan made only marginal efforts to fulfill Washington’s requirements.

The fact that security affairs have been becoming more important for the Japanese is confirmed by Kenneth B. Pyle. He concluded that the post-Cold War era “appears as a time of transition”⁷ where “Japan is moving from a period of single-minded pursuit of economic power to a more orthodox international role in which it will be deeply engaged in political-military affairs”⁸. Regarding the relative frequency of new security bills and strategic documents in the 2000s, the appearance of a more engaged Japan in regional and global political-military affairs is generally acknowledged.

Indeed, Ralph A. Cossa and Michael J. Green already mentioned in 2008 that Japan “is becoming more geopolitically active (and proactive)”⁹. Green suggested that “Japan’s role in Asia will remain on its current trajectory, but much will depend on two variables: the United States and China”¹⁰. Green argued that the institutional reforms in Japan, for example the “increasing jointness of the defense forces and intelligence agencies (...) have all enhanced the ability of the Japanese government to be more proactive on security and diplomatic affairs”¹¹. In other words, Japan is ‘normalizing’ its foreign and security policy because of her desire to have a bigger say in international security affairs, although this policy is influenced by the US and China. However, Green also agreed that Japanese foreign and security policies have been in a “transitional period” with an “emergent strategic view”, though the transitional tendency is slow and constrained. He called it “reluctant realism”, which means that the Japanese political elite are not willing totally to break with the *Yoshida-doctrine*.¹²

6 Katzenstein, Peter J.: *Rethinking Japanese Security – Internal and External Dimensions*. Routledge: New York 2008, p. 1.

7 Pyle, Kenneth B.: *Japan Rising – The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. The Century Foundation: New York 2007, p. 363.

8 *Ibidem*, p. 2.

9 Cossa, Ralph A.: “Security Dynamics in East Asia – Geopolitics vs. Regional Institutions”. In: Shambough, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Maryland, p. 322.

10 Green, Michael J.: “Japan in Asia”. In: Shambough, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *op. cit.*, p. 188.

11 *Ibidem*, p. 185.

12 *Ibidem*, p. 6.

With regard to the rise of China, in 2008 Richard J. Samuels argued that Japan would pursue a “flexible”¹³ policy in the future; while arranging the contested alliance relations with the United States, Japan would deepen its economic relationship with China. He called it “Goldilocks consensus” which means that Japan would not be too rigid or too accommodating in its foreign and security policy. At the same time, regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute and seeing China as a security threat, deepening economic relations have not had a decisive influence on Japanese perceptions. In this context, “flexible” foreign and security policy seems to be an increasingly difficult option in the future, partly due to increasing Chinese military assertiveness, coupled with Japan’s commitment toward the Japan-US Alliance.

We can assume that Japanese security policy is undoubtedly in transition. It has been altering from its passive Cold War stance into a more pro-active one. At the same time, the new security policy tendency can be interpreted within ‘normalization’ theory.

“Normalization” in Japanese Security Policy

‘Normalization’ theories tend to point out that there is a trend in Japan, which started at the end of the American occupation and could reach ‘normal’ status in the future. Logically, to reach “normal” status implies that to some extent Japan is still in an ‘abnormal’ status.

If we want to get to grips with the concept of ‘normalization’ itself, we should take a look at Japan’s relations to its own traditions, due to the simple fact that there is an increasingly positive sentiment among the Japanese toward their own traditions, history and culture.¹⁴ In this perspective, ‘normalization’ means a return to an intact, uninterrupted or “normal” continuity of Japanese history.¹⁵ Consequently it has an impact on Japan’s foreign and security policy.¹⁶ Indeed, the traditional ambition that Japan must “be equal partner with the world

13 Samuels, Richard J.: *Securing Japan – Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press: New York 2007, p. ix.

14 Eisenstadt, Schmucl: *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1996, p. 94.

15 Eisenstadt, Schmucl: *op. cit.*, p. 298.

16 The broader context of ‘normalization’ theory includes the unique aspects of the Japanese political, economic system and her East Asian diplomatic relations as well.

powers”¹⁷ has consistently remained an important goal for the Japanese elite in the post-war period. For example, in 1992, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the UN Security Council Summit expressed Japan’s ambition for a permanent seat on the Security Council.¹⁸

In Japan, the “normal” nation debate emerged in the 1990s. Two dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, Ozawa Ichiro and Takemura Masayoshi visualized theories about the future security of Japan. After all the international criticism of the Japanese contribution to the Gulf War,¹⁹ Ozawa emphasized, that Japan should not suffer humiliation anymore because of its pacifist legal constraints and should become a “normal” country. Ozawa defined “normal” nation status (*futsū no kuni*) in regard to what Japan should restore or recover, for example, by the revision of Article 9 regarding the exercise of the right of collective self-defense or gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.²⁰

Unlike Ozawa, Takemura was a pacifist and preferred a low international profile for Japan. He thought that Japan should enjoy its economic advances instead of any changes in the Constitution. He urged Japan to maintain a passive stance in international relations, rather than active and risky participation in international conflicts. Later the debate became far more complex. As Japan could play a more important role in international peace-keeping operations, the issue of legitimacy of the use of force emerged. As a ‘peace-loving nation’ Japan

17 Tsujita, Mariko: “A Fragile Balance between ‘Normalization’ and the Revival of Nationalistic Sentiments”. In: Podoler, Guy (ed.): *War and Militarism in Modern Japan – Issues of History and Identity*. Global Oriental Ltd.: Folkestone 2009, p. 189.

18 However, the ‘normalization’ process has been facing bottlenecks. The increasingly positive sentiment toward traditions is entangled with Japan’s ‘abnormal’ historical legacy of war-time militarism. For instance, the controversial content of the Japanese history books about war-time aggression, the so-called comfort-women issue and the frequency of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by politicians divide society and weaken Japan’s relations with her neighboring countries in Asia. Instead of facing and resolving the historical issues, which could help to normalize diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, most of the Japanese want to bypass this legacy.

19 Japan contributed 13 billion USD to Gulf War operations (out of a total 60 billion USD) but could not send SDF troops to the Persian-Gulf in time because of a lack of legal permission. The international media stigmatized Japan through the slogan of “cheque-book diplomacy” which was felt by the Japanese as a humiliation.

20 Hagström, Linus: “The ‘Abnormal’ State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan”. *European Journals of International Relations* 1(24), 2014, p. 12, from DOI: 10.1177/1354066113518356.

outlined strict rules for Self-Defense Forces for the use of weapons, and only non-combatant operations were permitted. However, the debate of overseas operations became a debate over the Constitution and the defense capabilities of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

How to Define “Normality”?

The paper focuses on the ‘normalization’ theory in a security context, suggesting that Japanese security policy is on a trajectory of ‘normalization’. This approach, however, raises the issue how to define ‘normality’ in the given context. In recent years, “normal nation” has often been defined as one that is “constitutionally able and prepared to deploy military force for national and international security ends”²¹

In 1993, Kenneth Waltz defined a “normal nation” as a sovereign nation that possesses strategic nuclear weapons.²² In this view, there are only few “normal” nations around the world. In addition, Japan traditionally maintains her three non-nuclear principles. Andrew Oros defines “normal nation” as an “independent fully armed great power”,²³ but the “fully armed” term is difficult to use for states. In addition, the “independent” term is also difficult to use for Japan, in the Japan-US security alliance context. In 2007 Richard J. Samuels argued that “normal” nation simply means “a nation that can go to war”.²⁴ We need, however, a more sophisticated definition to gain a comprehensive picture about the ‘normalization’ process.

In contrast to the above-mentioned definitions, the paper uses Inoguchi Takashi’s definition of ‘normal’ nation. In the Japanese context the “normal” nation status means that Japan can exercise full autonomy in the management of its own security affairs. Inoguchi pointed out that the defeat in World War II and the loss of sovereignty over its own security affairs due to the American occupation, caused two major deficits in Japanese security policy:²⁵

- 1) ‘legitimacy deficit’ and
- 2) ‘capacity deficit’.

21 *Ibidem*.

22 Inoguchi, Takashi: *op. cit.*, p. 1.

23 Hagström, Linus: *op. cit.*, p. 12.

24 Samuels, Richard J.: *op. cit.*, p. 111.

25 Inoguchi, Takashi: *Japán Politika. Századvég Kiadó*, retrieved 14.07.2015, from <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00013/pdf/k-takasi.pdf>.

First, there is the deficit concerning the legitimate use of armed forces. Based on Article 9 of the Constitution, the use of force to resolve international disputes is excluded as an option since Japan renounced the right of belligerency forever. Moreover, pacifist principles have been strongly supported by Japanese society in general. Pacifist principles render the ‘normalization’ process more difficult.

The second is the deficit in deterrence capacity of defense and in its use for diplomatic reasons. Originally, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was created only for defensive purposes, since the LDP interpreted Article 9, as providing the ground only for the self-defense of Japan. The primary task was internal security, the secondary task was humanitarian assistance in natural disasters; ‘the national defense’ in its classical sense has been taken as a residual task of the SDF. The constitutional restrictions and other constraints have been aggravated to gain the required defense capacity for Japan (e.g.: intelligence functions, preventive capacity, ballistic missile defense etc.)

In the first part of the paper, different perspectives on Japanese security policy are described, and it is argued that it is in transition. Secondly, it is suggested that the transition is a ‘normalization’ process. The next part describes the different theoretical perspectives on ‘normalization’ of Japanese security policy.

Japanese Security Policy and Application of International Relations Theories

Security policy studies are a subdivision within IR; therefore it would be straightforward to apply the approaches of major IR schools in the present study.²⁶

26 Unfortunately, we could not use unified ‘Non-Western’ IR theories because they do not exist. In 2010, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan stated in their work (*Non-Western International Relations Theory*) that only Asian cultures are useful to analyze original ‘Non-Western’ IR theories because of their long-term state traditions. However, they produced writings for regional or domestic relations and not theories but codes of conduct. In addition, most of the current Asian IR academic writers have a ‘Western’ IR education. Takashi Inoguchi, a leading Japanese academic in IR, tried to find a Japanese IR theory in Acharya and Buzan’s book. He argued that Japanese-originated IR theory exists and has had an evolutionary development. However, these are only middle-range theories for regional hegemony, such as the ‘flying geese pattern’ or state behavior theories, as the Japanese style constructivist theory and these are not unified IR theories. See: Inoguchi, Takashi: “Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan”. In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: New York 2010.

Arguing that the transition of Japanese security policy is on the path of ‘normalization’ raises an issue that how IR theories are applicable. In this part, the paper applies the three major IR theories (realist, liberal and constructivist) to understand the ‘normalization’ process of Japanese security policy by testing three different perspectives of “normal” Japan.

“Normal” Japan from a Realist Perspective

In the realist perspective, full sovereignty over security affairs is a crucial element for state survival in the anarchical international system. In the realist context, the Japanese security policy transition is a natural tendency toward autonomous “normal” military power status. Changing the East Asian security environment, for example the potential Chinese and North Korean military threats which place external pressure on Japan, required degradation of pacifist legal constraints. In the neorealist perspective, the security position of Japan is defined by the alliance with the United States within the international system. In this sense, Japan, by ‘normalizing’ her military, intends to be an equal partner with the United States. Realist theories, however, cannot explain why the Japanese political elite are reluctant to restructure security legislation comprehensively. The realist state-oriented approach neglects the importance of the strong pacifist identity of Japanese society.

“Normal” Japan from a Liberal Perspective

Liberalism argues that states co-operate with each other to achieve peace and prosperity, for example through security alliances or partnerships. In this sense, Japanese participation in numerous UN peace-keeping operations (non-combatant missions) can be interpreted as Japan’s ‘international contribution to peace’. Based on the liberal argument, full sovereignty over security affairs is unnecessary for a state because international security co-operation inspires task sharing and contributes to national security.

From the liberal perspective, pacifist institutions (e.g. ‘Peace-Constitution’, 1 % GDP limit on the defense budget, non-nuclear principles etc.) are integral parts of Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) as annual economic aid intended to develop Asian economies, substantially contributed to normalization of Japan’s diplomatic relationships with Asia. For Japan the pacifist institutions and economic-oriented security policy are “normal” in liberal interpretation of security policy. Liberal schools, however,

cannot explain why Japan perceives China as a ‘threat’ despite good Japan–China economic relations.²⁷

“Normal” Japan from a Constructivist Perspective

Constructivism offers us a more sophisticated approach than the realist or liberal schools. The constructivist IR school says politics are based on social constructivism and argues that national interests are changing together with political identity and threat perception. On tendencies, constructivist analyses are useful because they are “able to come to terms with periods of structural changes enabled by strategic actors”.²⁸ These periods are transitions.

In the “normal” Japan context, Katzenstein states that “no polity remains frozen in time, and none returns to its “natural,” historical origin”.²⁹ It can be suggested that ‘Pacifist’ and ‘Nationalistic’³⁰ Japan’ can also be ‘normal’ and it solely depends on the perceptions and ideas of Japanese society.

At the same time, constructivism is also imperfect. Identity can give us only a limited explanation about the tendencies of security policy, because the deterrent capacity of national defense and international security co-operation are also an integral part of ‘normalization’ process.

Difficulties arise when an attempt is made to implement only one paradigm³¹ because unfortunately IR theories are “incomplete in themselves”.³² If an analysis focuses only on power (realism), international co-operation (liberalism)

27 Japanese exports to China rose from 6.1 billion USD to 127.1 billion USD between 1990 and 2014 and imports increased from 12.1 billion USD to 182 billion USD; Xing, Yuqing: “Japan’s Unique Economic Relations with China: Economic Integration under Political Uncertainty”. *East Asian Policy* 1(1), 2009, p. 52.

28 McDonald, Matt: “Constructivism”. In: Williams, Paul (ed.): *Introduction to Security Studies*. Routledge: New York 2008, p. 60.

29 Katzenstein, Peter J./Okawara, Nobuo: “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism”. *International Security* 26(3), 2001, p. 158.

30 Matthews, Eugene: “Japan’s New Nationalism”. *Foreign Affairs* 82(6), 2003, p. 75.

31 Moreover, the academic debates between the different paradigms would not be helpful either. Katzenstein pointed out that academic IR debates in the United States have been affected by “long-standing programmatic debates that divide “paradigms” or “research traditions” from one another” and in general the debates have encouraged conflict rather than co-operation. Katzenstein, Peter, J.: *Rethinking Japanese Security...*, pp. 251–252.

32 Daisuke, Akimoto: “A Theoretical Analysis of Japan’s Changing Security Identity”. *Soka University Peace Research Institute*, 13(1), 2013, retrieved 09.03.2014, from <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcs/vol13/iss1/akimoto.html>.

or norms and identity (constructivism), in turn, we cannot understand our problems comprehensively. In this regard, we must find a flexible approach to understand the 'normalization' tendency of Japanese security policy.

Japanese Security Policy and Analytical Eclecticism

Analytical eclecticism has been chosen with the aim of having a more comprehensive view of Japanese security policy than the realist, liberal or the constructivist IR schools could offer with their own worldviews and limited explanations. This method was promoted by Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil in 2004. The authors emphasized that this is not a probe to create a unified theory. It is only an attempt to find links and synergy between the research traditions. Moreover, analytical eclecticism uses the existing research traditions by borrowing selectively from constructivism, realism and liberalism to create a comprehensive explanation. Thus, the eclectic approach gives flexibility to the research. However, it must be considered how the three main IR schools would be adequately applied to analyze the current Japanese security policy agenda.

The application of analytical eclecticism requires a clear selection from the characteristics of IR theories. In this regard, the present paper uses Daniel Clausen's Ph.D. work³³, which defined selected points from the utilized paradigms: power (realist), efficiency (liberal) and identity (constructivist). On the basis of Clausen's work, this work has focused on three selected subject areas of research:

- **Power:** Japan's power, political, military and economic capabilities in the East Asian international system.³⁴
- **Efficiency:** Japan's efficiency in the US alliance and in regional security co-operation.
- **Identity:** Japanese institutional norms, strategic thinking and identity.

The paper uses analytical eclecticism as an approach and focuses on the three main subject areas of research mentioned above. First, power (realism) is essential for understanding Japan's post-Cold War security related measures as reactions to an increasingly uncertain East Asian security environment. Second,

33 Clausen, Daniel: *Coping with Bounds in the Debate over Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method: An Extended Literature Review and Methodological Review. (Working draft)*, retrieved 25.01.2014, from <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/clausenLAMPmethods.pdf>.

34 This chapter perceives East Asia as a sub-system of international system.

efficiency (liberalism) is also relevant because Japanese security measures should be interpreted within the alliance and also the regional security co-operation context. Finally, identity (constructivism) is important for interpreting structural changes in Japanese security policy to describe tendencies by norms and culture. The three main subject areas are equally important in our research because the interplay of power, efficiency and identity describes Japanese security policy more sophisticatedly.

Analysis of Japan’s “Normalization” Process by Analytical Eclecticism

Based on the theory of Inoguchi, this part will examine the two ‘deficits’ of Japan’s security policies. Japan’s ‘legitimacy deficit’ and ‘capacity deficit’ are the major setbacks to gaining full autonomy in the management of its own security affairs. Each ‘deficit’ will be examined by analytical eclecticism, to understand the ‘normalization’ process of Japanese security policy.

“Legitimacy Deficit”

Power: The East Asian International System and the Japanese State

Changes in the East Asian security environment have acted as external driving forces in Japan’s ‘normalization’ process. From a Japanese perspective the East Asian region has transformed from “equilibrium”³⁵ to a severe security environment.³⁶ Japan has to go beyond its Cold War-style passively defensive security policy toward a more “pro-active” one.

Indeed, in the 1990s, North Korean ballistic missile provocations posed the first direct military threat to Japan. Pyongyang launched two ballistic missiles³⁷ in 1993 and 1998 over Japan and has conducted nuclear tests since 2006. Further on, in December 2012, four days before the LDP victory, North Korea successfully launched a long-range ballistic missile to demonstrate its capability. The range of the missile was calibrated to be 10,000 kilometers. It was shocking, not only for Tokyo but for Washington as well. The launch was a signal that North

35 National Defense Council: *National Defense Program Outline 1976*. Tokyo 1976, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>.

36 *National Security Strategy*, Cabinet Secretariat: Tokyo 2013, retrieved 20.04.2014, from <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryu/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

37 Nodong and Taepodong missiles.

Korea already had missile technology capable of reaching the US mainland. These tests were repeated in 2013 and forced Japan and the US to take further steps to improve Japan's ballistic missile defense capabilities.

In 1996, the Taiwan Strait Crisis convinced Tokyo that Beijing would utilize use of force to promote its national interests. The Chinese annual nuclear tests from 1992 to 1996, with increasing defense budgets and large-scale military modernization reminded Japan of additional security risks. Later, in 2004 China became the second major threat but by 2010 it became the most immediate threat for Japan because of an intensified territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Beyond the Japan-China tensions, the security situation in the South China Sea has also deteriorated in recent years. China has taken a hard line toward the Philippines and Vietnam and is trying to promote its territorial claims by the use of force in the South China Sea. In addition, South and East Asia have been witnessing an increased "arms race" since 2000. Apart from the Chinese military modernization, the other main actors have been increasing their defense budgets³⁸ and modernizing their military. This might be the result of the "increasing uncertainty about the future of the distribution of power"³⁹ in the region, as it is the main cause of the US-China rivalry.

In fact, East Asia has witnessed a rivalry between the United States and China. The US still has strategic supremacy in the region but its supremacy is challenged by China's rising power. Therefore, in November 2011, Barack Obama officially announced the US "rebalance to Asia-Pacific" strategy. The rebalance strategy means that the United States calibrates its strategic focus on East Asia.

In the context of the first 'deficit' for a 'normal' nation, successive Japanese governments have interpreted power in terms of Article 9 of the Constitution. Using this power, the governments gained the possibility of exercising the right of self-defense and dispatch of JSDF troops in overseas operations. Instead of

38 Defense budgets of regional actors (USD): Australia: 7.2 billion (2000) – 25.4 (2014); Indonesia: 1.1 billion (2000) – 7 billion (2014); Malaysia: 1.5 billion (2000) – 4.9 billion (2014); Singapore: 4.3 billion (2000) – 9.8 billion (2014); Taiwan: 8.8 billion (2000) – 10.2 billion (2014); The Philippines: 1.3 billion (2000) – 3.3 billion (2014); Vietnam: 0.8 billion (2003) – 4.2 billion (2014). See: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): *Military Expenditure Database (Data from all countries from 1988–2014)*, retrieved 02.09.2015, from http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database.

39 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2013". *The Military Balance*, 113(1), 2013, p. 245.

changing the Constitution, the governments enacted laws ‘case by case’ in security issues. Moreover, the post-Cold War era initiated an ‘accelerated’ period in the ‘normalization’ process.

After 9/11, the United States promoted the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia as well. In addition, the ‘Six-Party Talks’ did not bring any breakthrough for Japan, regarding North Korea. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro realized that Japan could rely only on the United States to deal with the North Korean threat. Afterwards, the government began to “bolster the alliance”⁴⁰ and initiated new security bills to support United States overseas operations, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan. Preparing for a possible North Korean attack, the Diet enacted seven other security related laws in 2004. For instance, the Armed Attack Situation Response Law determined the fundamental principles, policies and responsibilities in case of armed attack against the Japanese islands, to protect of the civilian population.

In the ‘normalization’ context, the first Abe cabinet had a specific agenda in regard to the Constitution. In 2006 the Cabinet created a legal framework to hold a national referendum about a constitutional revision but only after a two-thirds majority agreed in both houses. Furthermore, the cabinet established an advisory panel, aiming to research issues for Japan regarding the East Asian security environment, regarding the right of collective self-defense (CSD). The panel pointed out the deficiencies in the Japanese security structure and recommended a constitutional reinterpretation, regarding Article 9.

In 2009, after more than 50 years in power, the LDP was forced out of government, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a general election. The DPJ wanted to change the concept of Japanese foreign and security policy by its willingness to reach a more equal status within the alliance. At the same time, the party emphasized the Asian identity of Japan and urged closer relations within the region, including with China. However, the North Korean ballistic missile threat reached a critical level and the increased provocative Chinese behavior in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands caused difficulties for the DPJ’s China-oriented policy and helped the conservative forces to return to power.

In particular, the second Abe cabinet had a very explicit security policy and made major changes in the constitutional structure. These changes intended to create the possibility for Japan to exercise the right of CSD. In 2015, the Abe cabinet pushed its decision about the reinterpreted Article 9 through the Diet in

40 Pyle, Kenneth B.: *op. cit.*, p. 297.

the form of security bills, which were approved by both houses of the Diet. These measures moved Japanese security policy onto the ‘normalization’ path, as now Japan is also able to defend its allies in case of armed attack, even if Japan is not directly under attack.

Efficiency: Japan’s ‘Normalization’ within the Alliance

Another external driving force in Japan’s military ‘normalization’ process is the United States. Actually US pressure (*gaiatsu*) has been helpful for Japanese security policy, and has definitely supported the military ‘normalization’ process. Based on the first security treaty, Japan could only assist US forces, but later became a strategic partner of the United States in 1960. In addition, the alliance has been carrying out a phased integration of global aspects since 1978. In 2015, the new Japan-US defense-guidelines put the Alliance into global context. Actually, the Japan-US alliance has been transformed from bilateral security co-operation to regional and to global security co-operation.

In domestic politics the LDP represented engagement, while the DPJ tried to bolster autonomy. In the Koizumi-era Japan enhanced its role within the alliance and upgraded its emergency legislation and gained more autonomy in case of external armed attack. The role of the US pressure (*gaiatsu*), as a helping factor, cannot be ruled out in these steps, which did move Japanese security policy definitely further toward ‘normalization.’ Later, the three-year DPJ government triggered debates between Washington and Tokyo but although according to critics the alliance was in crisis under the DPJ administration, the “essential” course was followed up between the two countries. Indeed, Christopher W. Hughes stated in 2011: “Japan had not fundamentally changed its strategy of hedging its military commitments both inside and outside the alliance.”⁴¹

On international co-operation, Japanese governments improved the JSDF peace-keeping capabilities to fit the new requirements. When the Gulf War broke out in 1991, Washington requested a logistical contribution to the US-led UN Coalition Forces from Japan,⁴² but Tokyo refused. After long debates about the constraints and opportunities of Article 9, the Diet approved the International Peace Cooperation Law (the UNPKO law) in 1992. The UNPKO law created

41 Serizawa, Sarah: China’s Military Modernization and Implications for Northeast Asia. An Interview with Christopher W. Hughes”. *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 2012, retrieved 07.08.2015, from <https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-military-modernization-and-implications-for-northeast-asia/>.

42 The contribution would have been minesweeping and battleship refueling activities.

a legal precedent that Japan was able to send SDF personnel on several peace-keeping missions. Since 1991, the Diet has approved sending SDF units to various countries, such as Cambodia in 1992 (UNTAC), Angola (UNAVEUM II) or Mozambique in 1993 (ONUMOZ), Golan Heights in 1996 (UNDOF), East-Timor in 1999, of course within strict rules to avoid combat missions and the use of force.

In the 2000s Japan strengthened its security partnerships with regional countries, particularly with Australia, South-Korea, India and some ASEAN countries for their “mutual interests” with special attention to the sea lanes of communication. Indeed, in 2008 Japan and India strengthened security and defense co-operation through the Joint Declaration. Australia, as an “important regional partner”⁴³ for Japan, also declared its engagement in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region and concerning Chinese maritime activities. In 2014 Abe Shinzo and Tony Abbott agreed to strengthen their relationship in political, cultural and security fields in the “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century”⁴⁴ joint statement. Furthermore, the ASEAN countries are also strategically important to Japan. In May 2014, Abe Shinzo said, in his speech at the Shingra-La Dialogue, that “Japan will offer its utmost support for the efforts of the countries of ASEAN as they work to ensure the security of the seas and the skies”⁴⁵.

Identity: ‘Normalization’ vs. Pacifism

This paper argues that Japan’s traditional ‘pacifist’ security role has been modified. Japan’s Cold War security policy: strict interpretation of Article 9, the ‘minimal extent necessary’ limit, the non-nuclear and anti-arms export principles reflected the ‘pacifist’ role. The post-Cold War Japanese security-related legislation began a gradual transition.

As we stated above, Japan modified its peace-keeping policy and sent troops to UN missions, but strictly non-combat operations. Later, Japan could participate in the US-led ‘war on terror’ in the Indian Ocean as well. By 2005, the two big political parties mutually agreed that the Constitution should be revised,

43 *National Security Strategy*, p. 24.

44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century*. Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe Joint Statement, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044543.pdf>.

45 Abe, Shinzo: *Peace and Prosperity in Asia, Forevermore Japan for the Rule of Law Asia for the Rule of Law and the Rule of Law for All of Us*, retrieved 29.07.2014, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html.

although they preferred different solutions.⁴⁶ Presumably in order to pave the way for constitutional revision, in 2000 the House of Representatives established a commission “to study” the Constitution. Surprisingly, in April 2005, the commission released a comprehensive final report, which found the Constitution “excellent”⁴⁷ for Japan because it assures the nation’s inability to become a military power.

From the perspective of identity, the second Abe cabinet promoted the “Pro-active Contribution for Peace” which emphasized that Japan is a ‘peace-loving nation’ but will be pro-active in international security affairs. In the context of the first ‘deficit’, the cabinet’s constitutional reinterpretation policy toward the CSD has definitely contributed to military ‘normalization’, but at the cost of risking constitutional legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the Japanese public. In August 2013, an *Asahi Shimbun* poll revealed that only 27 % of respondents support the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and 59 % were against it.⁴⁸ In 2014, on the day following the cabinet’s decision, on May 16, *Kyodo News* conducted an opinion poll with the result that 54.4 % of the respondents opposed the reinterpretation and only 34.6 % supported it.⁴⁹

In addition, the opposition parties and the general public did not support the cabinet’s security-related measures and pacifist principles were articulated as anti-LDP values. On September 19, 2015, despite intense public opposition and demonstrations,⁵⁰ the House of Councillors approved the security bills by the LDP-New Komeito majority. The opposition parties (DPJ, Japan Innovation Party, Japanese Communist Party, Social-Democratic Party) held an empty chair

46 Inoguchi, Takashi, *Japán Politika...*, p. 315.

47 Research Commission on the Constitution House of Representatives: *Final Report*. 2005, p. 264, retrieved 30.01.2014, from [http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/report.pdf/\\$File/report.pdf](http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/report.pdf/$File/report.pdf).

48 Przystup, James J.: “Japan-China Relations: Can We Talk?”. *Comparative Connections. A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 15(3), 2014, retrieved 26.01.2014, from http://csis.org/files/publication/1303qjapan_china.pdf.

49 Fatton, Lionel P.: *Japan’s New Defense Posture - What are the Implications of Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation on Regional Security Dynamics?*, retrieved 16.07.2014, from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/japans-new-defense-posture/>.

50 There was a huge demonstration numbering 60,000–100,000 demonstrators outside the Diet building despite the more than 100 hours of debate in the Diet. See: Soble, Jonathan: “Japan Moves to Allow Military Combat for First Time in 70 Years”. *New York Times*, 164 (56930), 17.07.2015, p. A1, A7.

protest and said that the security bills were against the people's will.⁵¹ Indeed, the *Asahi Shimbun* opinion poll showed that 56 % of the respondents opposed the bills and only 26 % supported them. The demonstrations and opinion polls showed that the majority of the Japanese public are still committed to pacifist principles.

“Capacity Deficit”

Power: Deterrence Power of the JSDF

Since 1954, the defense capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces improved in a substantial way (e.g.: intelligence, surveillance, BMD capabilities). In parallel, their legal constraints have been eased by the governments and legislation (UNPKO law, Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, Armed Attack Situation Response Law etc.)

Furthermore, the second Abe cabinet outlined the adequate defense equipment of air and maritime capabilities in the 2014 NDPG, preparing for an eventual invasion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and ballistic missile attack. The new concept requires a more flexible and effective defense force, with joint operability, rapid readiness, especially in the south-western region of Japan. In the case of military equipment, the “Cold-War style”⁵² anti-aircraft and anti-submarine warfare capabilities will be radically reduced, and the maritime and air warfare capabilities will be improved in the future. This transition from land warfare to air and maritime warfare concept clearly resonates with the current “pro-active contribution to peace” approach of Japanese security policy.

In spite of the quantitative disadvantages of the JSDF compared with China's PLA⁵³, the alliance with the United States has a qualitative advantage, due to the US power of deterrence. For instance, there is an increasing contrast between the Chinese and the Japanese defense budget. China is spending almost five times more on defense than Japan.⁵⁴ However, China should modernize its old

51 Soble, Jonathan: “Japan Approves Law to Allow Broader Role for Military”. *New York Times*, 164 (56994), Sept. 19, 2015, p. A10.

52 The National Institute for Defense Studies: *East Asian Strategic Review 2014*. The Japan Times, Ltd.: Tokyo 2014, p. 10.

53 In 2014, the Chinese active military personnel was 2.3 million, while Japan had only 247,173. See: Global Fire Power: *Military Power Comparison of Japan-China*, retrieved 08.09.2015, from <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=Japan&country2=China&Submit=COMPARE>.

54 In 2000, the Chinese defense budget was at 22.2 billion USD. By 2014, the budget had increased to 216.3 billion USD. Contrarily, the Japanese defense budget shrank in

Soviet-era equipment, while Japan has modern, high-tech military equipment. Furthermore, the United States, as the strongest military power in the world with its 612 billion USD annual defense budget, 19 aircraft-carriers⁵⁵ and with the most nuclear warheads on a global scale, guarantees territorial and nuclear protection of Japan.⁵⁶

For developing deterrence capacity, the cabinet removed the embargo on Japanese arms exports in April 2014. It means that now Japan is able to transfer military equipment and technology to partners and to jointly develop weapon systems with different partners, not only with the United States. According to early experiences of European companies, the new rules on arms export have not diversified Japan's defense co-operations but established a comprehensive Japan-US co-operation on transfers and joint developments of advanced defense equipment. Moreover, in spite of the economic stagnation the Japanese defense budget was increased from 23.5 trillion yen to 24 trillion yen in 2013. It can be suggested that Japan's military 'normalization' moved forward regarding deterrence capabilities.

Efficiency: Japan's Military 'Normalization' toward the Alliance

The paper has argued that the Japan-US alliance and US pressure (*gaiatsu*) have been critical for Japanese defense capabilities in the military 'normalization' process. In 2011, the United States decided to calibrate its strategic focus on East Asia. The new strategy emphasized the importance of building security partnerships with regional powers, but intended to reduce the defense budget. At the same time, it expressed for Japan that 'rebalance' is 'top priority' for the Alliance. In the light of the US 'rebalance' strategy and Japanese security measures in the name of the 'Proactive Contribution to Peace' concept, logically the defense guidelines of the Japan-US Alliance was also revised in 2015.

The document emphasizes synergic measures between the two governments in their national security policies, regional security co-operations and the "global nature of the Japan-US Alliance."⁵⁷ In addition, according to the new guidelines,

recent years. In 2000, Japan spent 45.9 billion USD for defense but only 45.7 billion USD in 2014. See: SIPRI: *Military Expenditure*....

55 Rest of the world has 12 aircraft-carriers together. See: Bender, Jeremy: "The 11 Most Powerful Militaries in the World". *Business Insider*, 2014, retrieved 16.09.2015, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/11-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2014-4>.

56 The US Forces has 9 military bases in the Japanese mainland and 12 bases in Okinawa.

57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>.

when an armed attack against Japan occurs, the United States will take actions to “shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan”.⁵⁸ The United States defined its responsibilities as an East Asian hegemonic power, which made Japanese security more guaranteed.

Moreover, the alliance’s defense policy would apply the ‘third country’ principle in the future. The document says that, based on consultations, the alliance can take actions “involving use of force” to “respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and if Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks”.⁵⁹ The deterrence power of the alliance stepped up over its geographical borders.

In the regional context, Japan has also enhanced its defense co-operations. In September 2012 during the fourth Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting, foreign ministers Gemba Koichiro and Bob Carr and defense ministers Morimoto Satoshi and Stephen Smith announced the “Common Vision and Objectives”. The Objectives included enhanced co-operation in respect of “ensuring mutual support”⁶⁰ with the United States and strengthening co-operation with the ASEAN countries and working together on long-term stability in East Asia. However, beyond Japan’s security policy, another transition in the defense concepts is observable as well.

Identity: ‘Normalized’ Defense Concepts

In the context of ‘legitimacy deficit’ the paper points out that the interpretation of the total strength of the JSDF largely depends on the “geostrategic nature of threats.” In fact, the Constitution prohibits “war potential” (*senryoku*) for Japan. As the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that:

*...the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.*⁶¹

58 *Ibidem*.

59 *Ibidem*.

60 Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *4th Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations. Australia and Japan – Cooperating for Peace and Stability*, retrieved 14.09.2015, from http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2012/bc_mr_120914a.html.

61 The Cabinet of Japan: *The Constitution of Japan 1947*. retrieved 07.08.2013, from http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

However, the potential to wage “war” as a means of “settling international disputes” has, on the basis of international treaties, been interpreted by the Japanese government to be the potential mechanism to engage in aggressive warfare to invade other nations. Based on the thoughts of Corey Wallace, traditionally the Japanese government interprets “war potential” as referring to the total strength of the JSDF or any given capability, and not necessarily whether a given capability is mostly offensive, or mostly defensive. On the other hand, “war potential” is not an unchanging absolute level of military capabilities. In this sense what type of defense capabilities are required for the JSDF depends on the actual interpretation of geostrategic threats by the Japanese government.⁶²

Japan’s first National Security Strategy was created in 2013. Previously Japan had not had a ‘normal’ grand strategy for its own national security. Since the beginning of the post-war period, Japan’s national defense has been guaranteed by US Forces. Throughout Japan’s post-war history the relevant Japanese strategic documents and the defense documents of the Japan-US alliance reflected a long-term transition in Japanese security policy toward ‘normalization.’

First of all, a number of documents illustrate the transition and ‘normalization’ process. In the Cold War there was only one Japanese strategic document.⁶³ The formulation of the first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was necessary because Japanese defense capabilities spectacularly improved in the first decades of the Cold War. The document stated: “Japan has steadily improved its defense capability through the drafting and implementation of a series of four defense buildup plans”.⁶⁴ Indeed, in the 1980s Japan had the third largest defense budget in the world, while Article 9 remained unchanged.⁶⁵ In spite of the improved defense capabilities, the document also outlined the ‘minimal defense’ posture for Japan in peacetime.

However, in the post-Cold War era four strategic documents on defense were produced (NDPO 1996 and NDPG: 2004, 2010, 2014). The 1996 NDPO already reflected changes in the East Asian security environment and emphasized two main external security threats for Japan. On the one hand, nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and on the other hand, the military modernization of

62 Wallace, Corey.: *SDF Capabilities and War Potential*. retrieved 08.11.2015, from <http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10981>.

63 *National Defense Program Outline 1976*. p. 1.

64 *Ibidem*.

65 Auer, James E.: “Article Nine: Renunciation of War”. In: Luney Percy R./Kozuyuki, Takahashi (eds.): *Japanese Constitutional Law*. University of Tokyo Press: Tokyo 1993, p. 77.

China caused concerns in Japanese strategic thinking. In terms of the Japan-US alliance, the guidelines extended the geographical scope of responsibilities to the “surrounding regions of Japan.”⁶⁶

In the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (2004 NDPG), North Korea and China remained the main external security concerns. Referring to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2004 document emphasized the threat of non-state actors. After eight years, China was already qualified as a ‘threat’ in the new document. Richard J. Samuels observed that and it was argued that the Japanese concerns about Chinese military power had geostrategic justifications. Japan is easily reached from the south and “if China seizes control of Taiwan”⁶⁷ they could easily control the sea lanes of the South China Sea, which could cause problems for imports of Japanese energy.

As explained earlier, the DPJ government wanted to review Japan’s security and defense policy but the Hatoyama government decided to postpone this to gain time for revision of LDP-initiated guidelines.⁶⁸ However, the 2010 NDPG showed continuity with the previous one. The 2010 NDPG emphasized a more active and more assertive security policy.

Indeed, the first objective of Japan’s security policy was not only to “prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan” but to “eliminate external threats” as well.⁶⁹ Besides the North Korean threat, the 2010 document focused more on Japanese territorial waters than the previous one. Japan’s maritime territory disputes became a crucial element in its security concerns. The intensified Chinese maritime activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea caused deep concern in Japan.

From a ‘normalization’ perspective, the first National Security Strategy (2013) is a big step in the history of Japanese strategic documents. The strategy set out essential policies for Japan’s national security, diplomatic policy and defense policy in one comprehensive strategy. It also introduced the idea that the first priority of defense policy is to “strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities.”⁷⁰

66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *National Defense Program Outline 1996*, retrieved 30.01.2015, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

67 Samuels, Richard J.: *op. cit.*, p. 69.

68 The 2010 NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Plan were approved at the same time by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010.

69 Ministry of Defense: *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond*, p. 1, retrieved 21.04.2014, from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.

70 *National Security Strategy*, p. 14.

Territorial integrity is at the center of the document. The “comprehensive defense architecture”⁷¹ phrase referred to enhanced coordination between the law enforcement agencies and the important ministries (MOD, MOFA, MEXT), in favor of territorial protection. These measures are necessary because Japan will “proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders.”⁷² The ‘China-threat’ fundamentally determined Japanese defense planning. The strategy says that the defense of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands will be the primary mission of JSDF.

The defense concept of Japan also went through a major transition. In the 2010 NDPG the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept replaced the Cold War-style “Basic Defense”, which means transition to a more pro-active defense concept by relocation of forces in favor of defending the remote islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu and Okinawa. In addition, it outlined enhancing the “immediate and seamless response”⁷³ capabilities for the GSDF by amphibious equipment. The 2014 NDPG introduced the latest concept, the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force”. The new concept requires a more flexible and effective defense force, with joint operability, rapid readiness, especially in the south-western region of Japan. In case of military equipment, the “Cold War-style”⁷⁴ anti-aircraft and anti-submarine warfare capabilities will be radically reduced, and the maritime and air warfare capabilities will be improved in the future. This transition from the concept of land warfare into air and maritime warfare clearly resonates with the current “pro-active contribution of peace” approach in Japanese security policy.

The defense concept and security identity of Japan went through a major transition. The security identity of Japan remained that of a ‘peace-loving nation’, but its role changed to a “proactive contributor to peace”. Combined with the global nature of the alliance, the JSDF entered a new stage.

Conclusion

The paper was initiated with the aim of answering the question, whether the currently dominant tendency in Japanese security policy converges with the ‘normalization’ process. The paper focused on Japan’s security policy during the second Abe Shinzo cabinet’s first three years. However, analyzing the Cold War and post-Cold War periods of Japan’s security policy was also essential to understand

71 *Ibidem*, p. 16.

72 *Ibidem*.

73 *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond*, p. 6.

74 The National Institute for Defense Studies: *op. cit.*, p. 10.

current trends and prospects. The paper used analytical eclecticism as an approach and focused on three main subject areas of research: power (realism), efficiency (liberalism) and identity (constructivism). Returning to the hypotheses, posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that Japan's security policy transition can be interpreted in a framework of 'normalization' theory.

The paper stated:

- Japanese security policy is in transition.
- Japanese security policy is on the path of a 'normalization' process.
- Current measures of the second Abe Shinzo Cabinet security policy largely fit in the 'normalization' hypothesis.

The paper has shown that the hypotheses can be supported because Japanese security policy has been on the path of 'normalization' since the Cold War. Moreover, the process 'accelerated' in the post-Cold War era. Comparing the two "deficits," it can be seen that the 'normalization' process has continued under the second Abe Cabinet, but not equally in every sense. Japanese society is still pacifist in security affairs.

A key purpose of the present study was to put the developments of shifting Japanese security policies in a conceptual context, namely in that of 'normalization theory.' Simultaneously, the paper has proved the utility of analytical eclecticism as compared with other research approaches. Unavoidable limitations and related issues not directly covered by the present paper warrant further, more systematic research on Japan's evolving security agenda.

Forecast and Questions

The paper makes an attempt at forecast for the plausible course of Japanese security policy. Regarding the trends of the Abe Cabinet's security policy in recent years, it is likely that the 'normalization' path will be continued. However, it raises several issues. For example, how will a more 'normal' Japan affect Japan's security affairs with North Korea and China in the future. Regarding identity, how long will the majority of Japanese public remain pacifist?

In the context of increasing US-China rivalry, it can be suggested that Japan's military 'normalization' will have support from Washington. It raises several issues for Washington as well. How far can be the military 'normalization' of Japan pushed without turning Japan into an 'autonomous great power'? If Japan will not be autonomous where is the ultimate line of 'normalization'?

Moreover, a further issue is raised, in view of Kenneth Waltz's "normal" nation definition. In 2002 Ozawa Ichiro stated that "if Japan desires, it can possess

thousands of nuclear warheads. Japan has enough plutonium to use at its nuclear power plants for three to four thousand...⁷⁵ However, Japan's Three Non-Nuclear principles, which state that Japan will not possess, nor produce and not permit the stationing of nuclear weapons, are still maintained and the pacifist principles are still an integral part of Japanese identity, thus it is unlikely this could happen in a nuclear Japan but the question is still there: does a 'normal' Japan mean a Japan with nuclear weapons?

Summing up, in view of the Abe cabinet's constitutional reinterpretation in favor of collective self-defense, the new defense guidelines of strategic documents and the evolution of the Japan-US alliance, as it transferred from regional alliance to a global alliance, Japan has entered a new stage in its 'normalization' process. The author agrees with Kenneth B. Pyle's observation from 2007, "the transformation of Japan's policies and institutions may be swift, or it may take time as Japan makes incremental adjustments. Presently, it is taking place through a slow evolution, but there can be no question that Japan is on the threshold of a new era."⁷⁶

References

- Abe, Shinzo: *Peace and Prosperity in Asia, Forevermore Japan for the Rule of Law Asia for the Rule of Law and the Rule of Law for All of Us*, retrieved 29.07.2014, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html.
- Auer, James E.: "Article Nine: Renunciation of War". In: Luney Percy R./Kozuyuki, Takahashi (eds.): *Japanese Constitutional Law*. University of Tokyo Press: Tokyo 1993.
- Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *4th Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations. Australia and Japan – Cooperating for Peace and Stability*, retrieved 14.09.2015, from http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2012/bc_mr_120914a.html.
- Bender, Jeremy: "The 11 Most Powerful Militaries in the World". *Business Insider*, 2014, retrieved 16.09.2015, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/11-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2014-4?IR=T>.
- Clausen, Daniel: *Coping with Bounds in the Debate over Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method: An Extended Literature Review and Methodological Review. (Working draft)*, retrieved 25.01.2014, from <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/clausenLAMPmethods.pdf>.

75 Pyle, Kenneth B.: *op. cit.* p. 367.

76 Pyle, Kenneth B.: *op. cit.* p. 374.

- Cossa, Ralph A.: "Security Dynamics in East Asia – Geopolitics vs. Regional Institutions". In: Shambough, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Maryland 2008.
- Daisuke, Akimoto: "A Theoretical Analysis of Japan's Changing Security Identity". *Soka University Peace Research Institute*, 13(1), 2013, retrieved 09.03.2014, from <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcs/vol13/iss1/akimoto.html>.
- Eisenstadt, Schmucl: *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1996.
- Fatton, Lionel Pierre: *Japan's New Defense Posture - What are the Implications of Japan's Constitutional Reinterpretation on Regional Security Dynamics?*, retrieved 16.07.2014, from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/japans-new-defense-posture/>.
- Global Fire Power: *Military Power Comparison of Japan-China*, retrieved 08.09.2015, from <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=Japan&country2=China&Submit=COMPARE>.
- Green, Michael J.: "Japan in Asia". In: Shambough, David/Yahuda, Michael (eds.): *International Relations of Asia*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Maryland 2008.
- Hagström, Linus: "The 'Abnormal' State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan". *European Journals of International Relations* 1(24), 2014, from DOI: 10.1177/1354066113518356.
- Inoguchi, Takashi: "Why are there no Non-Western Theories of International Relations? The Case of Japan". In: Acharya, Amitav/Buzan, Barry (eds.): *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. Routledge: New York 2010.
- Inoguchi, Takashi: *Japán Politika. Századvég Kiadó*, retrieved 14.07.2015, from <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00039/00013/pdf/k-takasi.pdf>.
- Inoguchi, Takashi: *Japan's Ambition for Normal Statehood*, retrieved 14.07.2015, from http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/200302_inoguchi_japan/0302inoguchi.pdf.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2013". *The Military Balance*, 113(1), 2013.
- Katzenstein, Peter J./Okawara, Nobuo: "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism". *International Security* 26(3), 2001, pp. 153–185.
- Katzenstein, Peter J.: *Rethinking Japanese Security – Internal and External Dimensions*. Routledge: New York 2008.
- Matthews, Eugene: "Japan's New Nationalism". *Foreign Affairs* 82(6), 2003, pp. 74–90.

- McDonald, Matt: "Constructivism". In: Williams, Paul (ed.): *Introduction to Security Studies*. Routledge: New York 2008.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *National Defense Program Outline 1996*, retrieved 30.01.2015, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century. Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe Joint Statement*, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044543.pdf>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: *The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>.
- National Defense Council: *National Defense Program Outline 1976*. Tokyo 1976, retrieved 01.06.2016, from <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>.
- National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond*, retrieved 21.04.2014, from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.
- National Security Strategy*, Cabinet Secretariat: Tokyo 2013, retrieved 20.04.2014, from <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryous/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.
- Przystup, James J.: "Japan-China Relations: Can We Talk?". *Comparative Connections. A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 15(3), 2014, retrieved 26.01.2014, from http://csis.org/files/publication/1303qjapan_china.pdf.
- Pyle, Kenneth B.: *Japan Rising – The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. The Century Foundation: New York 2007.
- Research Commission on the Constitution House of Representatives: *Final Report*. 2005, retrieved 30.01.2014, from [http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/report.pdf/\\$File/report.pdf](http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/report.pdf/$File/report.pdf).
- Samuels, Richard J.: *Securing Japan – Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press: New York 2007.
- Serizawa, Sarah: "China's Military Modernization and Implications for Northeast Asia. An Interview with Christopher W. Hughes". *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, retrieved 07.08.2015, from <https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-military-modernization-and-implications-for-northeast-asia/>.
- Soble, Jonathan: "Japan Moves to Allow Military Combat for First Time in 70 Years". *New York Times*, 164 (56930), July 17, 2015, p. A1, A7.
- Soble, Jonathan: "Japan Approves Law to Allow Broader Role for Military". *New York Times*, 164 (56994), Sept. 19, 2015, p. A10.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): *Military Expenditure Database (Data from all countries from 1988–2014)*, retrieved 02.09.2015,

from http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database.

The Cabinet of Japan: *The Constitution of Japan 1947*, retrieved 07.08.2013, from http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

The National Institute for Defense Studies: *East Asian Strategic Review 2014*. The Japan Times, Ltd.: Tokyo 2014.

Tsujita, Mariko: "A Fragile Balance between 'Normalization' and the Revival of Nationalistic Sentiments". In: Podoler, Guy (ed.): *War and Militarism in Modern Japan – Issues of History and Identity*. Global Oriental Ltd.: Folkestone 2009.

Wallace, Correy: *SDF Capabilities and War Potential*, retrieved 08.11.2013, from <http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10981>

Xing, Yuqing: "Japan's Unique Economic Relations with China: Economic Integration under Political Uncertainty". *East Asian Policy* 1(1), 2009, pp. 50–59.

Matthias Haget

6. People's Republic of China Naval Military Buildup: Constructivist and Neorealist Explanations

Abstract: *Chinese maritime expansion and military armament in the naval sphere is a crucial factor in a lasting shift in the distribution of relative military strength away from the West toward Asia. Embedded in the anarchic order of the international System, the Chinese government follows as its main objective of the Strategic guidelines of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, to build up a formidable blue water navy in the decades to come. From a neorealist point of view, the People's Republic of China is aware of current and future security threats by established or rising maritime powers, like the United States or India, and aims to strengthen its power position in the international system by military means. On the other hand, maritime acquisitions by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) follow a stringent Chinese self-image of being seen as a responsible, confident and peaceful emerging power in the international order and thus can be categorized within the constructivist paradigm.*

Keywords: maritime security; Asia-Pacific; United States; People's Republic of China; military build-up, People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN); social constructivism; neorealism

Introduction

“Each year, statistics in *The Military Balance* highlight a significant and continuing shift in the distribution of relative military strength away from the West and towards Asia. While economic problems are undermining defense spending in the US and European countries, Asia is becoming increasingly militarized”.¹ The commissioning of the first Chinese aircraft-carrier in 2012 indicates the growing importance of the maritime sphere. The rapid economic development in the Asia-Pacific region and the increasing dependency of important trade routes by emerging powers not only require investments for the protection of these most important sea routes, the so-called *Sea Lines of Communication* (SLOC), but lead to an increasing geopolitical power shift in favor of the Asia-Pacific region. The relative economic and political weakness of the European continent, as well as the planned rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific by the United States

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies: “The Military Balance 2012”. *The Military Balance* 112(1), 2012, p. 206.

emphasizes this trend. The growing claims of emerging regional powers such as the People's Republic of China, to counter the current regional hegemonic power and security guarantor, the United States, are reflected in ambitious maritime armament projects and attempts at modernization of regional naval forces. With currently about thirty large-scale maritime acquisition programs,² which include the commissioning of major weapons systems such as aircraft-carriers, destroyers, frigates and nuclear and conventional propelled tactical and strategic submarines, as well as increased research and development in the fields of reconnaissance and advanced sensor technology, the states of the Asia-Pacific region, and especially the People's Republic of China, are trying to improve their military naval capacities.

Which factors are the main forces behind this military build-up? Are structural reasons for growing insecurity within the international system the driving force behind these military modernizations or is the reason to be found in other areas like the growing confidence and self-esteem of the emerging powers in the Asia-Pacific region?

With emphasis on the Chinese build up in maritime military capabilities, this elaboration follows the hypothesis that the modernization process in military terms heavily relies on the self-perception of each state.

In the first two parts, this elaboration deals with the nature of the international system from the point of view of the paradigms of structural realism and social constructivism and tries to explain why states accumulate military capacities, followed by an analysis of the reasons for increased Chinese investment in its military naval forces. Finally, the conclusion takes the previously formulated hypothesis and evaluates it.

The Structure of the International System, the Neorealist Paradigm

The basic assumptions of the neorealist paradigm, as a structural theorem, are one of the most influential theoretical approaches in International Relations Theory. This analysis follows the approach of offensive realism, with John J. Mearsheimer as its most well-known theorist, which forms a set of presuppositions about the nature of the international system in this elaboration.

2 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014". *The Military Balance* 114(1), 2014, p. 291.

The basic fundamental hypothesis of this approach, regarding the composition of the international system, is that the international order is characterized by an anarchical *structure* in which states interact as *units*.³

One core premise of the neorealist concept is that all international politics is anarchic.⁴ This lack of a superior *Leviathan* that enforces certain rules in the international system, punishes disobedience or violation and finally protects the units within the structure against any aggressor and leads to the consequence that states need to acquire offensive capabilities to survive in the international anarchic order, because “states cannot depend on others for their security”.⁵ This build-up of material capabilities leads to a system of uncertainty. In an environment that lacks trust and knowledge about the intentions of other *units* within the *structure*, this leads to a system of self-preservation in which the actors act rationally, in order to survive.⁶ In contrast to defensive neorealism, this is mainly represented and elucidated by Kenneth N. Waltz, in which every unit or state only accumulates a certain amount of power to survive and to avoid possible coalitions against them. Offensive realism rejects these restrained assumptions which are strictly bound up with rational cost-benefit calculations.

Instead, offensive realism seeks to relatively maximize the power of one state compared to its competitors, because “the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger”.⁷ Therefore,

-
- 3 See: Waltz, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill: 1979, p. 79; Waltz, Kenneth N.: “Political Structures”. In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press: New York 1986, p. 72; Keohane, Robert O.: “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics”. In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press: New York 1986, p. 7.
 - 4 See: Gu, Xuewu: *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen*. Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag: München 2010, p. 69; Masala, Carlo W.: “Neorealismus”. In: Masala, Carlo W. et al. (eds.): *Handbuch der Internationales*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden 2010, p. 54.
 - 5 Mearsheimer, John J.: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company: New York 2001, p. 33. Gu, Xuewu, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Masala, Carlo W.: *op. cit.*, p. 54.
 - 6 Mearsheimer, John J.: *op. cit.* p. 30–31.
 - 7 See: Mearsheimer, John J.: “Structural Realism,” In: Dunne, Tim et al. (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013, p. 72; Mearsheimer, John J.: *Why China's Rise Will not be Peaceful*, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf>; Mearsheimer, John J.: *The Tragedy...*, p. 29; Toft, Peter: “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power”. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8(4), 2005, p. 2.

according to Mearsheimer, states are forced to display offensive, revisionist and sometimes even aggressive behavior on the international stage in order not to fall behind in the competition for power resources.⁸ Hence the maximization of power is the most appropriate means to survive in a hostile international system, by achieving a position of regional hegemony that ensures immunity to possible risks in the anarchical environment.⁹

According to Mearsheimer, offensive realism distinguishes between potential and actual power.¹⁰ The potential or latent power of a unit reflects the potential power resources of a state measured by socio-economic, as well as demographic and geographic capabilities.¹¹ This potential serves as the foundation for actual power.

In keeping with the theorem of offensive realism, actual power is mostly seen in material factors. The crucial aspect of these material factors is the potential and capabilities of the armed forces of a state. As stated by the logic of relative power maximization within an anarchical self-help system, the most appropriate means for security and safeguard lies in military (hard) power capabilities, because, in accordance with the structural realist approach “a state’s actual power is embedded mainly in its army and the air and naval forces”.¹² Despite the focus on material power capabilities the neorealist proposition recognizes a close relationship between the potential economic, financial, demographic and geographic strength of a nation.

As part of the potential power, as a basis for the actual power, these factors show that the military power capabilities indubitably are the main indicator of the strength of a state, but that this factor cannot be seen without the recognition of other crucial elements. Rather it is a symbiotic relationship between the two aspects of power, even if the potential power has not yet been translated into effective or actual power.¹³

8 *Ibidem.*

9 *Ibidem.*

10 Mearsheimer, John J.: *The Tragedy...*, p. 43.

11 Mearsheimer, John J.: “Structural...”, p. 72; Mearsheimer, John J.: *Why China’s Rise...*, p. 1; Mearsheimer, John J.: *The Tragedy...*, p. 29; Toft, Peter: *op. cit.*, p. 2.

12 *Ibidem.*

13 Gu, Xuewu: *op. cit.*, p. 81; Masala, Carlo W.: *op. cit.*, p. 60.

The Structure of the International System, the Constructivist Paradigm

Social constructivism on the other hand, a diverging major theory of International Relations, with its most famous representative Alexander Wendt, rejects the exogenously given state of anarchy in the structure of international relations.¹⁴ Following the paradigm of social constructivism, the actors in the international system are no longer prisoners of its anarchic structure. Acting units are able to shape their own social environment through interaction, as well as through the emergence of identities and state interests. Therefore, the international system, and changes within this order, are not solely based on material capabilities but on the basis of shared or divergent values, norms, ideas and perception of the international order, hence “neorealist and constructivist structural-isms [...] differ [...] in their assumptions about what structure is made of. Neorealists think it is made only of a distribution of material capabilities, where constructivists think it is also made of social relationships.”¹⁵ The reality is thus created through the social interactions of the actors and hence “to analyze the social construction of international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures.”¹⁶

Therefore, anarchy is an endogenously created structure, rather than an exogenously given one that enables units to create diverging or common interests, identities or ideas and permits them to communicate these intentions within social interactions.¹⁷

In comparison to the neorealist paradigm, the development of the international structure depends on three components: the first component consists of certain shared understandings, expectations or knowledge of each other and determines the way how the states see one another in the international system. Compared to the assumptions of the structural realism approach, the constructivist paradigm does not emphasize the importance of material components such as military capabilities.¹⁸ These (hard) power resources cannot be seen

14 Gu, Xuewu: *op. cit.*, p. 234.

15 Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999, p. 73.

16 *Ibidem*, p. 81.

17 Wendt, Alexander: “Constructing International Politics”. *International Security* 20(1), 1995, p. 72.; Wendt, Alexander: “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. *International Organization* 46(2), 1992, p. 405.; Gu, Xuewu: *op. cit.* p. 235.

18 *Ibidem*.

individually but have to be embedded within the social context and process. Therefore, every accumulation of material capacity has to be seen as just one piece in a wider puzzle.

The Chinese Military Armament

The following section aims to take a closer look at the military armament and modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The main focus however lies on the modernization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This focus on the naval build-up is due to the dual use of military maritime capabilities. These abilities can be used both in a neorealist way, as a tool of military might and power projection (gunboat diplomacy), as well as an instrument of the constructivist approach in International Relations Theory, by representing the state and its interests abroad.

After decades of focusing on continental security issues and a predominant position of the People's Liberation Army Ground Forces (PLAGF) under the leadership of Mao Zedong and his so-called *people's war doctrine*, his successor Deng Xiaoping emphasized a stronger focus on the strengthening of China's military naval forces.¹⁹ Based on China's long tradition of being a sea-power up to the 17th/18th century²⁰ and as a result of the country's humiliating experience of being dominated by maritime European colonial powers as well as the United States and the Japanese Empire until the end of World War II, it was the desire of the People's Republic of China to prevent a renewed oppression by dominant maritime (extraterritorial) powers.²¹

Although the Chinese government hesitated to follow its new ambitious quest for sea-power during the 1970s and 1980s, a shift toward this challenging task was observed during the 1990s.²² After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity in the international system and therefore the abolition of China's biggest security threat hitherto, an invasion of the Chinese mainland by

19 Schambaugh, David: *China goes Global. The Partial Power*. Oxford University Press: New York 2013, p. 279.

20 Kaplan, Robert D.: "While U.S. is Distracted, China Develops Sea Power". *The Washington Post*, 26.09.2010, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html>.

21 Shambaugh, David: *op. cit.*, p. 279.

22 Holslag, Jonathan: *Trapped Giant. China's Military Rise*. Routledge: London 2010, p. 19; Luttwak, Edward N.: *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge 2012, p. 72.

troops of the Soviet Union, as well as a steady growth of economic and political power, led to a lasting growth in national pride and changed the strategic goals of the People's Republic of China.²³ New strategic goals, especially security issues regarding the security of the main *Sea Lines of Communication* in the Asia-Pacific as well as the restoration of China's once historically dominant position within this area, are now the main objectives of the Chinese political and military leaders. This signifies that the People's Liberation Army Navy is now, after decades of neglect, one of the centers of the Chinese military modernization efforts.²⁴

Strategic Guidelines for the People's Liberation Army Navy

Strategically this new accentuation on the maritime armed forces is embedded into a so-called *fifty year plan*. This plan creates the strategic framework of how to modernize the forces of the People's Liberation Army Navy which are embedded into a timetable of different stages for the long-term development of China's naval forces.

Divided into four phases, the *fifty year plan* points out both the objectives as well as the ways to achieve the ultimate goal of the People's Liberation Army Navy, which is the formation of a powerful and globally operational *blue-water navy*.²⁵ The first phase, consisting of the control of Chinese territorial waters and its contiguous zone²⁶ can, according to the Chinese government as well as independent experts, be seen as fulfilled.²⁷ Based on this control, the People's

23 Holslag, Jonathan, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

24 Michael, Paul: "Die Flottenrüstung der Volksrepublik China. Maritime Aspekte der sion-amerikanischen Rivalität". *SWP-Studie* 15, 2013, p. 14.

25 You, Ji; "China's Naval Strategy and Transformation," In: Prabhakar, Lawrence W. *et al.* (eds.): *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific. Maritime Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons at Sea*. Singapore 2006, p. 71.

26 Territorial waters and *contiguous zone* are defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as an exclusive area, spanned up to twenty-four nautical miles (about forty-four kilometers) from the mainland of the adjoining nation. (see: Kraska, James: *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea. Expeditionary Operations in World Politics*. Oxford University Press: New York 2011, p. 95).

27 O'Rourke, Ronald *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service: Washington 2013, p. 3; McDevitt, Michael/Velluci Jr, Frederic: "The Evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy: The Twin Missions of Area-denial and Peacetime Operations". In: Till, Geoffrey *et al.* (eds.): *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific. The Triumph of Neptune?*. Routledge: New York 2012, p. 75.

Liberation Army Navy is pursuing a two-pronged strategy in its military modernization.²⁸

The first pillar of this approach focuses on the consolidation and expansion of the Chinese maritime capabilities within its territorial waters, as well as its so-called *exclusive economic zone* that are set to expand up to 200 nautical miles (approximate 370 kilometers) from 2020 to 2050²⁹ and includes large areas of the Yellow Sea as well as the East China and South China Sea, which extends into *territorial waters* and *exclusive economic zones* of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. Strategic goals of the People's Liberation Army Navy are to secure this area as a direct sphere of influence and to make this region inaccessible for other military powers by strengthening its *Anti Access/Area Denial* (A2/AD) capacities.³⁰

To achieve this goal, China is pursuing a maritime modernization strategy, which is based in particular on defensive, long range weapon systems, such as conventional attack submarines (SSK), land-based ballistic anti-ship missiles (ASBM) as well as land-based anti-aircraft missiles (SAM), cruise missiles and naval aviation.³¹ Though the Chinese efforts are mainly based on consolidating and acquiring defense oriented skills, a shift to the second pillar of the fifty year plan, the ability to project sea control in the Asia-Pacific, followed soon after.³²

The Implementation of the Strategic Guidelines

Since China announced their new orientation and the objectives of its maritime forces at the beginning of the 1990s, modernization efforts, the purchase and development of new weapon systems, as well as investments in research and development are strictly connected to the strategic guidelines set by the Chinese government.³³

28 McDevitt, Michael/Velluci Jr, Frederic: *op. cit.*, p. 77.

29 *Ibidem*.

30 Paul, Michael, *op. cit.*, p 15; McDevitt, Michael/Velluci Jr, Frederic: *op. cit.*, p. 77; Yoshihara, Toshi/Holmes, James R.: "Can China Defend a 'Core Interest' in the South China Sea?". *The Washington Quarterly* 35(2), 2011, p. 46.

31 *Ibidem*.

32 Fischer, Richard D.: *China's Military Modernization. Building for Regional and Global Reach*. Praeger Security International: Westport CT 2008, p. 107; Shambaugh, David; *op. cit.*, p. 288; Schuster, Carl Otis: "China: Its Maritime Traditions and Navy Today". In: Till, Geoffrey *et al.* (eds.): *op. cit.*, p. 58.

33 Fischer, Richard D.: *op. cit.*, p. 148.

Currently the People's Liberation Army Navy can be situated in the so-called *catch-up phase*, in which closing the qualitative gap to modern western maritime forces and strengthening its capabilities to perform maritime operations within the waters of Southeast Asia, are defined as the main target of Chinese military modernization.³⁴ Therefore the current structure of the Chinese naval forces is characterized by a heterogeneous mix of various weapon systems and capabilities.³⁵ Due to this fact, China's sphere of influence and its ability to project power is currently limited within its own territorial waters and heavily relies on defensive land-based weapon systems,³⁶ for example the ballistic anti-ship missile *Donfeng 21D*.³⁷ But in combination with sufficient under water capabilities provided by the People's Liberation Army Navy through conventional attack submarines, this represents a serious risk for most of the regional navies operating in these areas and therefore fulfill the aspired strategic capabilities of the Chinese *fifty year plan*.³⁸

Parallel to, in the strategic sense, not expanding the aligned capacity of China's submarine fleet and land-based missile systems, Chinese naval forces are also pursuing capabilities for future sea control and power projection competences of their weapon systems.³⁹ The core of these ambitions shall consist of two fully operational aircraft-carrier battlegroups.⁴⁰

Whereas other (emerging) regional powers are able to acquire modern western military equipment, China relies heavily on its own research and development programs. During the last two decades the Chinese maritime defense industry has passed through a testing phase in which new types of naval combat vessels were produced in limited quantities to test improvements and provide the Chinese defense industry with extensive knowledge and opportunities for technological improvement. This so-called *leapfrog-method* led to the development of the modern *Luyang II* destroyers and *Jiangkei II* frigates that are almost comparable to modern western naval vessels.⁴¹

34 *Ibidem*.

35 *Ibidem*.

36 Lei, David: "China's New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy". *Orbis* 52(1), 2008, p. 153.

37 O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 2.

38 Fischer, Richard D.: *op. cit.*, p. 148; International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014". *The Military Balance*, 114(1), 2014, p. 233.

39 Paul, Michael, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

40 Schuster, Carl Otis: *op. cit.*, p. 69.

41 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 233; O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 26.

These acquisitions mean a qualitative leap in the nature of China's blue sea fleet, as the Chinese Navy should now be able to replace its outdated naval vessels with an adequate number of combat vessels that are able to compete with western military equipment. A similar approach is followed in terms of tactical and strategic nuclear submarines to accomplish the goals set out in the *fifty year plan*.⁴²

Furthermore, with the commissioning of China's first aircraft-carrier, the *Liaoning*, in 2012 and the placing in service of the three *Yuzhao* amphibious landing ships, the PLAN is following its prudent and successful strategy of gradual testing of new weapons systems before units in larger numbers are ordered.⁴³ In addition to naval units, the maritime capabilities are complemented by naval aviation. The future core of the Chinese naval aviation shall consist of the highly advanced stealth fighter jets *J-20* and *J-31*, which are seen as Chinese counterparts to the US' fifth generation combat aircrafts *F-22* and *F-35*. In the meantime, advanced fourth generation fighter jets of the type *J-15*, the Chinese version of the Russian *Su-33*, are serving as an interim solution.⁴⁴ However with a share of only about 25 % of modern combat aircraft Chinese naval aviation has not yet reached the aims of the *fifty year plan*.⁴⁵

In addition to the quantity and quality of the military equipment, China is investing in better education and training of its soldiers, as well as infrastructure and most importantly, increasing networking within the People's Liberation Army Navy and the other services as well as the strengthening of its *Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)* capabilities. It is believed that with the development and introduction of the so-called *Dragon-Eye radar*, the Chinese maritime forces have achieved an enormous leap in their sensor technology and are further expanding their networked warfare capabilities.⁴⁶

The current capabilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy comply with the guidelines and demands of the strategic doctrine of the Chinese government. Due to the focus on the Chinese territorial waters and its *Exclusive Economic Zone* within 200 nautical miles around the Chinese coastline, the maritime forces enjoy theoretically unrestricted operational freedom within this area.⁴⁷ Supported by land-based aviation units and missile forces and the

42 Fischer, Richard D.: *op. cit.*, p. 149.

43 O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 19.

44 Shambaugh, David: *op. cit.*, p. 286.

45 *Ibidem*.

46 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 207.

47 McDevitt, Michael/Velluci Jr, Frederic: *op. cit.*, p. 79.

relative proximity to important military facilities, to ensure the functioning of essential supply lines, these supply chains can be secured and maintained even during times of crisis and military conflict.⁴⁸ However, beyond its territorial waters, the People's Liberation Army Navy is only able to participate in *military operations other than war* (MOOTW) and cannot be seen as a *blue-water navy*.⁴⁹

Causes for the Military Upgrading of the People's Liberation Army Navy

The rise and military build-up of the Chinese naval forces can be seen in different ways. The following part tries to analyze the military modernization via two approaches.

The first two sections focus on external material security threats to the Chinese state. As an example, as an ongoing military threat in the Asia-Pacific region, the maritime ambitions of two different actors, the United States and India, are going to be analyzed. The United States is selected because of its predominant power position within the Asia-Pacific, whereas the choice of India results from a lasting rivalry between these two nation-states as well as a similar initial situation in terms of their economic and demographic development.⁵⁰

A focus on the structural and material components the Chinese self-perception and identity are the main points of view in trying to explain the military modernization and upgrading of the People's Liberation Army Navy.

48 *Ibidem*.

49 O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 3.

50 Japan, as a main antagonist of Chinese expansion power politics within the region and as a major maritime power in the Asia-Pacific, whose military maritime capabilities are only outplayed by the US Navy within this region (see: International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 250.) is excluded in this analysis because Japan is missing two important aspects within the struggle for power. First of all, Japanese Self-Defense Forces are missing tactical and strategic nuclear components to counter the nuclear threat from its competitors. Furthermore, and most importantly, Japan's restrictions on the use of force set by their constitution as well as their close alliance with the United States within the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan*, may assume that Japanese policies against a rising China are well coordinated and mostly congruent to the politics and actions of its security guarantor, the United States.

The Presence of the United States Navy

The United States established itself as a regional hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region from the end of World War II and after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the only remaining military superpower with global power-projections and operational capabilities, has to adapt its strategy to the changed circumstances of the 21st century.⁵¹

The main objectives of the United States Navy in the Asia-Pacific region are to maintain its regional hegemonic position and relative power to meet and repel new symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, such as the establishment of no-go areas for the United States Navy through advanced *Anti-Area/Access Denial* capabilities by (aggressive) emerging powers.⁵²

The strategic ambitions of the naval forces of the United States are, in simple terms, the maintaining of the existing *status quo* inside the maritime sphere of the Asia-Pacific as well as the continuity of its operational freedom within these waters, maintaining its technological advantage compared to emerging powers and to strengthen its bi- and multilateral ties with important allies to meet future threats within this region. In order to achieve these targets, the United States is looking to strengthen its maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific. By 2020 about 60 % of the US deep sea fleet will be located in this crucial region and will be integrated in the seventh fleet of the United States Navy.⁵³

Furthermore, the US is strengthening its ties with formal allies and partnering nations as well as its military front presence on bases such as Guam, Okinawa, Singapore, Australia and Diego Garcia, by relocating its most modern maritime equipment, such as *Aegis* destroyers and cruisers or *Littoral Combat Ships*, to these bases.⁵⁴

This relocation of troops and military equipment represents a crucial part in the strategic considerations by the United States to strengthen and consolidate its position through the so-called *AirSea Battle* concept.⁵⁵ The vision of the *AirSea Battle* concept shall counter the growing *Anti-Access/Area Denial* capabilities in

51 Department of Defense: *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, retrieved 02.12.2015, from https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/Maritime_Strategy.pdf.

52 *Ibidem*.

53 Bruns, Sebastian: "Weltseemacht und maritime Sicherheit: Ausgewählte Strategien, Kapazitäten und Herausforderungen der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika". In: Bruns, Sebastian *et al.* (eds.): *Maritime Sicherheit*. Springer Verlag: Wiesbaden 2013, p. 172.

54 *Ibidem*.

55 Peifer, Douglas C.: "China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept". *Orbis* 55(1), 2011, p. 116.

Asia-Pacific to secure the US Navy's freedom of navigation, avoid no-go areas, as well as guarantee its operational freedom during times of intensive conflict.⁵⁶

This shall be achieved through the extensive use of electronic warfare, as well as the combined operation of the different services of the United States military to link the different domains of warfare (air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace) into a fully integrated combined joint whole to avoid or eliminate any danger for the operating units.⁵⁷

To achieve this kind of integrated operational level that relies on modern stealth technology, an expensive upgrading and modification of the military equipment of the US Navy, with modern stealth technology fighter aircrafts and warships, as well as the modification of its electronic infrastructure, to make it resistant against any attacks, is needed.⁵⁸ Furthermore, for the United States, a functioning network of allies is indispensable, which are not only able to interoperate with the maritime forces of the US Navy but also willing to follow the United States and its objectives.⁵⁹

This necessity leads to a second strategic approach, which flanks the military modernization of the US Navy. The strategic plans of the United States are to fully integrate the maritime and air force capabilities of its allies into its own forces. Displays of trust through the integration of foreign naval vessels into its aircraft-carrier battlegroups, as well as insight into crucial capabilities and a deepening of bi- and multilateral cooperation, shall on the one hand strengthen the abilities of these maritime forces and on the other hand relieve the United States from its burden to be the sole security guarantor in the region.⁶⁰

These burden-sharing and trust building measures are needed, because the upcoming cost savings of approximately 500 billion US Dollars within the next years⁶¹ will not be unconnected to the fighting power of the United States Navy.

Cancellations and delays of planned commissioning of new units, such as the planned *Zumwalt* class destroyers⁶², or the halving of the planned *Littoral Combat ships*, as well as the premature decommissioning of at least seven *Ticonderoga*

56 O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 92.

57 *Ibidem*.

58 Bratton, Patrick C.: "The United States as a Pacific Power". In: Till, Geoffrey *et al.* (eds.): *op. cit.*, p. 27.

59 *Ibidem*.

60 *Ibidem*, p. 33.

61 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 34.

62 Only three out of up to forty planned units will be delivered to the maritime forces of the United States.

class cruisers and expected delays in future procurements, modernization, repair and maintenance, will weaken the blue-water capabilities of the United States Navy in the decades to come.⁶³

Despite all these savings and budget cuts, the main source of maritime power projection capabilities of the United States Navy, its aircraft-carriers, amphibious landing craft as well as the destroyers of the *Arleigh-Burke* class, will remain stable or will be even expanded.

The American power projection capabilities in Asia-Pacific through its formidable aircraft-carrier fleet will be totally upgraded from its current *Nimitz* class to the superior *Ford* class by 2050. Alongside this step, the United States plans to upgrade its entire force of naval aviation from the current fourth generation fighter jet *F 18/F Super Hornet* to the fifth generation fighter aircraft *F 35C Lightning II* to match the *AirSea Battle* criteria and to expand its offensive power capabilities.⁶⁴ Furthermore the number of American *Arleigh Burke* class destroyers, the backbone of United States maritime power capabilities, which are equipped with the globally unchallenged *Aegis* combat system, remains with sixty to seventy active units stable in the near future.⁶⁵

Moreover, it is a declared goal of the United States Department of Defense to steadily improve and expand its qualitative submarine capabilities to counter *Anti Access/Area Denial* measures. Further investments in improved sensors as well as unmanned systems will strengthen the offensive capabilities of the United States Navy in all relevant dimensions of modern warfare and it will maintain the capability of the US American maritime forces to project power and to be operational in every part of the world.⁶⁶

The Emergence of Old Rivals, the Rise of the Indian Navy

With rising growth rates in the domestic economy and the growing dependency on the important *Sea Lines of Communication* in the Indian Ocean as well as the Asia-Pacific, the Indian state is refocusing its military modernization efforts to the maritime sphere. As a state heavily influenced by national pride and prestige, it is India's objective to become one, if not the most dominant maritime power

63 *Ibidem*, p. 31.

64 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 57; O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 50.

65 *Ibidem*.

66 O'Rourke, Ronald: *op. cit.*, p. 50.

in the Asia-Pacific region.⁶⁷ To some extent driven by Chinese military modernization and its maritime expansion, as well as the desolate status of the Indian military in general and in particular its maritime forces after the 1999 Indian-Pakistani *Kargil* conflict, the Indian government decided to orient its strategic alignment toward the maritime sphere to counter the maritime ambitions of its two biggest security threats and regional rivals, China and Pakistan.⁶⁸

For this purpose, the Indian government published the so-called *Roadmap to Transformation*, which defines the goals of the Indian Navy by 2025. By that year it is India's determined objective to maintain at least two fully operational aircraft-carrier battle groups, consisting of three aircraft-carriers, sixty major warships as well as adequate submarine and air defense capabilities, to defend India's sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean and crucial *Sea Lines of Communication* as well as the ability to deter its competitors and project power into the Asia-Pacific.⁶⁹

To fulfill this vision the Indian Navy focuses its acquisition of new modern maritime weapon systems on large multipurpose platforms that consist mostly of affordable Western technology that fits India's needs and have the ability to compete with the major warships of the People's Liberation Army Navy.⁷⁰ But similar to the Chinese maritime forces, the Indian maritime forces heavily rely on land-based capacities, so that the Indian power projection is currently based on one aircraft-carrier, one amphibious landing ship, eleven destroyers, thirteen frigates and fourteen conventional tactical submarines.⁷¹

With the launch of its first independently produced Indian aircraft-carrier, the *INS Vikrant*, in 2013 and the operational readiness of its aircraft-carrier *INS Vikramaditya*⁷² which is expected in the near future, as well as the forthcoming commissioning of the first independently designed and produced tactical

67 Holmes, James R. *et al.*: *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century*. Routledge: New York 2009, p. 23.

68 Deloitte: *Prospects for Global Defence Export Industry in Indian Defence Market*, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiqués/DeloitteIndianDefence.pdf>.

69 Cohen, Stephen P./Dasgupta, Sunil: *Arming without Aiming. India's Military Modernization*. Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC 2010, p. 92.

70 *Ibidem*, p. 145.

71 International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014", *op. cit.*, p. 243, 292.

72 Kronstadt, Alan K./Pinto, Sonia: *U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues*. Congressional Research Service: Washington 2013, p. 19.

nuclear propelled submarine, the power projection abilities of the Indian state will be strengthened and will support the expansive direction of further maritime acquisitions.⁷³

Nevertheless, despite the lack of sufficient *Anti Access/Area Denial* capabilities of the Indian Navy and the absence of rational and realistic strategic approaches, the Indian Navy has expended a substantial amount of resources to expand their ability to project power although missing a coherent infrastructural base, which leads to the fact that the strategic importance of the Indian Blue Water Navy is mainly limited to *Military Operations other than War* (MOOTW) rather than actual power projection.⁷⁴

China's Self-perception and Its Construction of Reality

In contrast to structural approaches, such as offensive realism, constructivist approaches underline the role of China's self-perception and identity, as well as the social interaction within the international community which together shapes Chinese strategic behavior.⁷⁵ One of the main arguments of this concept is that steady social interaction, and therefore an ongoing socialization, relying on non-material and ideational factors, as well as peaceful economic expansion, creates a pacifist Chinese identity within the international community.⁷⁶

Another important approach is the importance of understanding of how the Chinese leadership perceive themselves and especially how they see themselves and their relations within the international system.⁷⁷ First of all:

"China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. China opposes any form of hegemony or power politics, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion. China advocates a new security concept

73 *Ibidem*.

74 Cohen, Stephen P./Dasgupta, Sunil: *op. cit.*, p. 95.

75 Noguchi, Kazuhiko: "Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China's Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific". *Asia-Pacific Review* 18(2), 2011, p. 61.

76 *Ibidem*.

77 Wang, Zheng: *The Perception Gap between China and Its Neighbors*, retrieved 30.11.2015, from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-perception-gap-between-china-and-its-neighbors/>.

featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security".⁷⁸

This self-perception of the Chinese government seems to justify the military modernization within the use of a constructivist approach. By following the constructivist paradigm, ideals like mutual trust and equality are the cornerstones of international relations, not material capacities. But military capabilities are only needed to be built to match Chinese international responsibilities to secure its environment and guarantee freedom, especially the freedom of vital *Sea Lines of Communications*.⁷⁹

However, the modernization of the Chinese maritime forces can not only be seen from the point of view of a peaceful China, which only contributes to the security of the international community. Furthermore "China is reasserting its role as a major regional power after more than a century of outside interference and exploitation as well as internal conflict. As a world economic power, China's sphere of interests spans the globe",⁸⁰ which allows the military uprising of the People's Liberation Army Navy appear to be driven by the Chinese economic interest of keeping crucial trade routes open for China as well as a certain self-image, that is, one of a strong major regional power.

Still the Chinese identity not only relies on its self-perception, but on the view of other actors within the international system toward China. If a major player in the Asia-Pacific like the United State of America, Japan or India perceive the People's Republic of China as an opponent, rival or even enemy, a certain way of understanding the international system and China's role within it is going to be developed.⁸¹

If this role, as in the Chinese case, is a negative one, a military build-up in terms of self-defense is needed and justifies the development of defensive and offensive military capabilities.

78 Coedesman, Anthony H.: *Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives*. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington DC 2014, p. 50.

79 *Ibidem*.

80 *Ibidem*, p. 57.

81 Patridge, Bryan: *Constructivism: Is the United States Making China an Enemy?*. United States Army War College: Carlisle, PA, p. 1.

Conclusion

Why is the People's Republic of China modernizing its military forces in general and its maritime capabilities in particular? The hypothesis that the self-perception of the Chinese government, that sees China as one leading major regional power, which needs a certain amount of power projection capacities to emphasize its position in the international system, is the main factor behind this build-up, can only be confirmed in some parts.

The emergence of China as a global economic power has shown a shift in interests and identity within the Chinese ruling elite toward the securing of vital trade routes and the flow of resources, and one could argue that military build-up and diplomatic tracks follow more the characteristics of a *status quo* power than a revisionist power.⁸²

However the dynamic modernization of its maritime forces indicates that "China's strategic behavior [...] [is mainly based on] structural and material factors such as anarchy and the distribution of relative power".⁸³ The rebalancing of the United States toward the Asia-Pacific and planned military and technological modernization within its naval forces as well as the military emergence of regional powers like India, support a Chinese foreign policy that has its origin in the neorealist paradigm, because "as China modernizes its economy and enters international institutions [...] it behaves in a way that realists understand well: developing its military slowly but surely as its economic power grows, and avoiding a confrontation with superior US forces".⁸⁴

Nevertheless, this elaboration can conclude that no single paradigm of the theories of International Relations can explain the complex processes in the international arena. To receive a more multifaceted insight into the reasons for military modernizations processes, future analyses are essential.

References

- Bratton, Patrick C.: "The United States as a Pacific Power". In: Till, Geoffrey *et al.* (eds.): *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific. The Triumph of Neptune?*. Routledge: New York 2012, pp. 19–45.
- Bruns, Sebastian: "Weltseemacht und maritime Sicherheit: Ausgewählte Strategien, Kapazitäten und Herausforderungen der Vereinigten Staaten von

82 Noguchi, Kazuhiko: *op. cit.*, p. 62.

83 *Ibidem*, p. 60.

84 *Ibidem*, p. 77.

- Amerika". In: Bruns, Sebastian *et al.* (eds.): *Maritime Sicherheit*. Springer Verlag: Wiesbaden 2013, pp. 165–182.
- Coedesman, Anthony H.: *Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives*. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington DC 2014.
- Cohen, Stephen P./Dasgupta, Sunil: *Arming without Aiming. India's Military Modernization*. Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC 2010.
- Deloitte: *Prospects for Global Defence Export Industry in Indian Defence Market*, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/DeloitteIndianDefence.pdf>.
- Department of Defense: *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Washington DC 2007, retrieved 02.12.2015, from https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/Maritime_Strategy.pdf.
- Fischer, Richard D.: *China's Military Modernization. Building for Regional and Global Reach*. Praeger Security International: Westport CT 2008.
- Gu, Xuewu: *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen*. Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag: München 2010.
- Holmes, James R. *et al.*: *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century*. Routledge: New York 2009.
- Holslag, Jonathan: *Trapped Giant. China's Military Rise*. Routledge: London 2010.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2012". *The Military Balance*, 112(1), 2012.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 2014". *The Military Balance*, 114(1), 2014.
- Kaplan, Robert D.: "While U.S. is Distracted, China Develops Sea Power". *The Washington Post*, 26.09.2010, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html>.
- Keohane, Robert O.: "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics". In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and its Critics*. Columbia University Press: New York 1986.
- Kraska, James: *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea. Expeditionary Operations in World Politics*. Oxford University Press: New York 2011.
- Kronstadt, Alan K./Pinto, Sonia: *U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues*. Congressional Research Service: Washington 2013.
- Lei, David: "China's New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy". *Orbis*, 52(1), 2008, pp. 139–157.

- Luttwak, Edward N.: *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge 2012.
- Masala, Carlo W.: "Neorealismus". In: Masala, Carlo W. et al. (eds.): *Handbuch der Internationalen*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden 2010.
- McDevitt, Michael/Velluci Jr, Frederic: "The Evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy: The Twin Missions of Area-denial and Peacetime Operations". In: Till, Geoffrey et al. (eds.): *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific. The Triumph of Neptune?*. Routledge: New York 2012.
- Mearsheimer, John J.: "Structural Realism," In: Dunne, Tim et al. (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013.
- Mearsheimer, John J.: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton & Company: New York 2001.
- Mearsheimer, John J.: *Why China's Rise Will not be Peaceful*, retrieved 02.12.2015, from <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf>.
- Noguchi, Kazuhiko: "Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China's Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific". *Asia-Pacific Review*, 18(2), 2011, pp. 60–85.
- O'Rourke, Ronald: *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service: Washington 2013.
- Patridge, Bryan: *Constructivism: Is the United States Making China an Enemy?*. United States Army War College: Carlisle, PA 2012.
- Paul, Michael: "Die Flottenrüstung der Volksrepublik China. Maritime Aspekte der sion-amerikanischen Rivalität". *SWP-Studie*, 15, 2013.
- Peifer, Douglas C.: "China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept". *Orbis*, 55(1), 2011, pp. 114–131.
- Schambaugh, David: *China goes Global. The Partial Power*. Oxford University Press: New York 2013.
- Schuster, Carl Otis: "China: Its Maritime Traditions and Navy Today". In: Till, Geoffrey et al. (eds.): *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific. The Triumph of Neptune?*. Routledge: New York 2012.
- Toft, Peter: "John J. Mearsheimer: "An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power". *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 8(4), 2005, pp. 381–408.
- Waltz, Kenneth N.: "Political Structures". In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and its Critics*. Columbia University Press: New York 1986.
- Waltz, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill: Boston 1979.

- Wang, Zheng: *The Perception Gap between China and Its Neighbors*, retrieved 30.11.2015, from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-perception-gap-between-china-and-its-neighbors/>.
- Wendt, Alexander: "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization*, 46(2), 1992, pp. 391–425.
- Wendt, Alexander: "Constructing International Politics." *International Security*, 20(1), 1995, pp. 71–81.
- Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999.
- Yoshihara, Toshi/Holmes, James R.: "Can China Defend a 'Core Interest' in the South China Sea?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 35(2), 2011, pp. 45–59.
- You, Ji: "China's Naval Strategy and Transformation," In: Prabhakar, Lawrence W. et al. (eds.): *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific. Maritime Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons at Sea*. World Scientific Publishing: Singapore 2006.

Anna Wróbel

7. China's Trade Policy: Realist and Liberal Approaches

Abstract: *The aim of this paper is to analyse the measures taken by China in order to liberalize trade in the context of dysfunctionality in the multilateral trade system. The article is divided into three essential parts. The first part discusses the significance of the WTO for China as a platform for pursuing its trade interests, while the second one identifies the reasons why the PRC establishes free trade areas and describes the evolution of the Chinese strategy toward preferential trade agreements. The third part aims to analyse China's trade policy from the point of view of two research perspectives: liberalism and realism.*

Keywords: China's trade policy, trade liberalization, WTO, GATT, global trade exchange, TPP, TTIP

Introduction

The science of international relations features different theoretical approaches to the problem of the impact of commercial exchange on the internal and international relations of partners. The differences arise from the adopted level of analysis which is a derivative of recognising different entities as principal actors in international relations.¹ Liberalism centres on entities and the state; for realists the state is the leading actor in international relations. The application of these two different theoretical approaches based on various levels of analysis enables a comprehensive analysis of international trade and its impact on relations between states. In addition, the application of different theoretical perspectives and different levels of analysis for the purpose of clarification of the development of trade is worthwhile as the effects of the exchange are different for different entities; they are different for entities, states, classes or from the point of view of the global perspective. Examination at different levels of analysis enables one to understand the mutual correlations between these entities which arise in parallel with the commercial exchange.

The analysis of trade policies of states from the point of view of theories of international relations should not be limited to one school of thought about

1 More about levels of analysis of international relations: Halizak, Edward/Pietraś, Marek (eds.): *Poziomy analizy stosunków międzynarodowych*. Rambler: Warszawa 2013.

international relations. Just like in the case of other dimensions of international cooperation in the context of their historical evolution and qualitative changes, the explanatory power of particular theories about international relations changes depending on the conditions defined by the international environment.²

The paper aims to analyse China's trade policy from the point of view of two research perspectives: liberalism and realism. It includes an analysis of the explanatory power of the paradigms in the midst of dynamic changes that have taken place in the global trade system, associated with the progressive marginalisation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as a forum for efficient trade negotiation, and the associated increase in the significance of discriminatory liberalization of trade. The article is divided into three sections. The first section looks at China's involvement in multilateral trade system: GATT³/WTO. The second section identifies the reasons for creating free trade areas by the People's Republic of China (PRC). This section also contains an analysis of agreements signed by China and a description of the process of evolution of China's strategy in respect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The third section centres on verification of the fundamental assumptions of liberalism and realism in the context of the previously analysed trade policy of China.

China's Trade Policy: The Global Dimension

The history of China's involvement in the GATT/WTO multilateral system is closely tied to the internal political situation. While China participated in the work on the establishment of the World Trade Organization and was one of the 23 initial parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), after the civil war of 1946–1949 and Mao Zedong's takeover, the country withdrew from further work under the GATT system. This was largely due to changes in economic policy, choosing the self-sufficiency model and isolation from the markets of capitalist countries as a result of the actions of the United States.⁴

2 Cf. Pietraś, Marek: "Eksplanacyjna użyteczność liberalizmu w badaniu systemu międzynarodowego". In: Haliżak, Edward/Ożarowski, Rafał/Wróbel, Anna (eds.): *Liberalizm i neoliberalizm w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych: teoretyczny pluralizm*. Rambler: Warszawa 2016, pp. 89–114.

3 GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

4 Niemiec, Wioletta/Niemiec, Mariusz: "Konsekwencje przystąpienia Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej do WTO – analiza wymiany towarowej". In: Rymarczyk, Jan/Wróblewski, Marek (eds.): *10 lat Światowej Organizacji Handlu*. Arboretum: Wrocław 2005, p. 242.

The change in the United States' policy toward China that took place in the early 1970s as well as reforms launched within the framework of the Four Modernisations programme led China to reorient its position toward the GATT system. In October 1984, the Chinese authorities applied for observer status and for permission to have their representatives participate in the workings of the GATT Council and its subordinate bodies. Following that, in 1986, China expressed a willingness to resume negotiations with the GATT contracting parties. In a document filed in July of that year it applied for resumption of its status as a GATT contracting party. In February 1987, China presented a memorandum on its economic system and economic foreign policy, the Memorandum on China's Foreign Trade Regime, which discussed, among other things, the tariff system, the rules of goods control, export and import licensing and the system of shaping prices in Chinese exports and imports. Furthermore, it characterised the rules of the functioning of the Chinese special economic zones and open coastal cities. The GATT Council decision of March 4, 1987 established the Working Party on China's Status as a GATT 1947 Contracting Party. Its main tasks were to examine the trade rules presented by the PRC in the Memorandum, to prepare a draft protocol specifying China's rights and obligations, and to prepare negotiations on a Chinese list of liberalization-related commitments.

Despite the efforts of the Chinese leaders, the procedure of granting China GATT contracting party status was not concluded before the end of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), which meant that China was unable to obtain the status of an original member of the newly established World Trade Organization. Negotiations with China were continued after the establishment of the WTO but with some adjustments that were necessary because of the institutional changes that took place in the transition from GATT to WTO. In June 1995, China applied for WTO observer status and for permission to participate in the workings of the WTO General Council and its auxiliary bodies. The application for accession was presented on December 7, 1995. As a result, the Working Party on China's Status as a GATT Contracting Party was transformed into the WTO Accession Working Party. Between March 1996 and September 2001, the Working Party met 21 times, and 63 WTO members participated in its workings, including the European Union and its member states as well as Hong Kong and Macau. Its work resulted in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China adopted in October 2001. Two of the document's most important elements were the Draft Decision and the Draft Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO. In November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference decided to allow China to join the Agreement

Establishing the World Trade Organization (the Marrakech Agreement) under conditions set forth in the Protocol.

China's becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001 was undeniably an important event in the history of the multilateral trade system. It had been stressed already at the stage of accession negotiations that leaving an economy of such significance for world trade outside the multilateral trade system undermined the very purpose of the WTO's existence as a global forum for setting trade rules. On the other hand, however, there were many concerns regarding the accession, which proved at least partially justified as it can be assumed that after 2001 China had a largely destabilizing influence on global trade exchange. China took full advantage of membership of the WTO to strengthen its economic position. The analysis of China's post-2001 trade expansion has led us to the conclusion that it was actually a mistake for highly developed countries to allow the PRC to join the WTO with no conditions concerning exchange rates. Because of China's accession, the other members of the grouping reduced tariffs on Chinese products, which created favourable conditions for the dynamic growth of Chinese exports. Applying aggressive monetary protectionism by excessively lowering the exchange rate of its own currency, China won a considerable advantage in the international market. Due to this exchange rate policy China's economic partners did not achieve comparable benefits from the liberalization of trade resulting from China's membership in the WTO.⁵

One of the major ways of protecting oneself against such practice is to refuse to recognise China as a market economy, which makes it easier to apply protective measures in imports from this country. As a result, China is not treated the same way as the other WTO members. The differences are especially visible in the context of anti-dumping and countervailing procedures. Under the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, for 15 years, that is until the end of 2016, the members of the WTO could treat China as a non-market economy in their anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures.⁶ This approach ensured a high degree of discretion in the treatment of trade partners under anti-dumping procedures, as in this case normal value is not established on the

5 Brunet, Antoine/Guichard, Jean-Poul: *La visée hégémonique de la Chine. L'impérialisme économique*. L'Harmattan: Paris 2011, p. 54.

6 World Trade Organization: *Accession of the People's Republic of China. Decision of 10 November 2001*, WT/L432 Geneva 2001.

basis of actual selling prices or production costs but on the basis of the prices set and costs incurred by producers in a given third country.⁷

Because of this the country most often accused of dumping by the EU is China. While China agreed to the aforementioned conditions of WTO accession, only two years after becoming a member it started making diplomatic efforts to obtain market economy status. This issue is constantly on the agenda in China's relations with the United States and with the European Union. For example, in September 2003 China asked the European Commission to grant it market economy status. Since then, the situation of the Chinese economy has been the subject of a biannual review – just as is the case with the other non-market economies. So far, however, Chinese diplomacy has not managed to persuade the EU to change its position, and recently, although the nature of the issue is purely economic, it has gained a political and strategic dimension.

The conditions of trading with China were not the only factors affected by China's accession to the WTO. Due to the role played by the Chinese economy in global trade it also had a considerable impact on the functioning of the organisation itself. The essential change that has been observed in the functioning of the WTO in recent years is that developing countries have gained prominence, which is a natural consequence of the growing role this group of economies plays in global trade.⁸ Since such states as China, India, Brazil and more recently Russia, became members of the WTO, the organisation has had to face entirely new challenges – not only those related to the negotiations under the Doha Round or the global financial crisis. Presently, the WTO is also struggling with the problem of evolution of the internal balance of power and a leadership crisis.

Reaching an agreement in the present round of negotiations is a much more difficult task than it was in the earlier GATT rounds. The reason for this is in fact not the increase in the number of members in the global trade system or

7 In the case of anti-dumping proceedings against China, the referring countries were, for example: Singapore, the United States, India, Mexico, Canada, Turkey, Poland. Messerlin, Patrick A.: "China in the WTO: Antidumping and Safeguards". In: Bhattachal, Deepak/Li, Shantong/Martin, Will (eds.): *China and the WTO, Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies*. World Bank and Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004, pp. 29–48; Luo, Yan: *Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU and China. The Rise of Legalization in the Trade Regime and its Consequences*. Kluwer Law International, 2010.

8 The changes in the structure of world trade in terms of its participants result from the dynamic development of emerging markets and the pro-export strategy these economies have been successfully implementing, which translates into systematic growth of exports from this group of countries.

the expanded scope of the trade negotiations but rather the more consolidated positions of developing countries, which are displeased with the functioning of the existing multilateral GATT/WTO trade system. Throughout the period of the functioning of GATT 1947, the process of trade liberalization was dependent on the interests of highly developed countries. Liberalization was applied to those sectors in which the countries of the 'North' had a comparative advantage, primarily to trade in industrial goods. As regards those sectors in which wealthy countries were not highly competitive, the expanded market protection systems were maintained. For example, until the Uruguay Round, agriculture and the highly labour-intensive textile and clothing production essentially remained outside the mainstream trade liberalization.

The situation was to be changed by the said 8th round of trade negotiations, which in accordance with the *Punta del Este Declaration* was to focus on the needs of developing countries more than in the previous rounds. However, the fairly mediocre achievements in the field of liberalization of trade in agricultural goods as well as a number of regimes adopted at that time (especially the TRIPS Agreement) that were burdensome to developing countries did not change the situation of developing countries in the world trade system. Therefore, in the current round of negotiations developing countries more effectively strive to secure their own interests. To achieve this, developing countries – referring to themselves as advanced – consolidate their positions in the form of the G20⁹ which is becoming a noteworthy power able to oppose the highly developed countries in the negotiations. The fiasco of the Ministerial Conference in Cancún is a good example of how effective the group is. According to the initial plans, the Development Round started in Qatar's capital was to end in relevant commitments at the summit in Cancún, Mexico. By rejecting the liberal proposals put forward by wealthy countries, developing countries, which have joined their forces for good, managed to prevent a successful conclusion of the conference. At that time the G20 countries refused to open their markets until farmers from industrialised countries were no longer supported by their states.¹⁰

9 Presently, the group has 23 members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. The group was established before the summit in Cancún and aims to restrict all forms of agricultural support, especially support that interferes with international trade (*Amber Box*, *Blue Box* categories) and support for individual products.

10 Costantini, Valeria/Crescezi, Riccardo/Filippis, Fabrizio De/Salvatici, Luca: "Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations". *The World Economy* 30(5), 2007, pp. 863–891.

These countries firmly demanded that the wealthy countries change their policy regarding agricultural production and trade in agricultural raw materials. They demanded considerable reduction of agricultural subsidies, a reform of the customs policy as well as reducing the import limits for this group of commodities. According to the G20 countries, the abolition of agricultural subsidies would allow them to integrate much quicker with the world trade system.

At this point, we should discuss the role of China in the consolidation of the positions of developing countries in the WTO. Although China joined the negotiations of the Doha Round, its initial activity was not as significant as that of Brazil or India. What is important, however, is that China supports the demands put forward by the other developing countries and participates in groups that represent the interests of the countries of the South. At the Cancún Conference, the PRC backed Brazil and India, thus contributing to blocking the proposal made by the United States and the European Union.¹¹ At subsequent WTO ministerial Conferences, China and India – both having considerable agricultural sectors – jointly opposed the fairly conservative proposals of the EU and the US. This cooperation also bore fruit at the WTO summit in Bali, held in December 2003. At that time, India was defending the right to conduct its own policy in terms of ensuring food security, and backed by China it managed to negotiate a temporary exemption from the WTO's general policy rules in this regard.¹²

In the WTO, China works together with other countries establishing blocs and coalitions. One of the youngest but also most powerful blocks in the WTO of which China is a member is the aforementioned G20. Apart from that, China is a member of the G33, which focuses on the problem of special products and protective measures.¹³ The said groups have real influence over the course of

11 See: Thorstensen, Vera/Oliveira, Machado/Tiago, Ivan (eds.): *BRICS in the World Trade Organization: Comparative Trade Policies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa*. CCGI (FGV) and SAIIA: Ipea 2014.

12 Skrzypczyńska, Joanna: "Chiny w WTO", A paper prepared for the 32nd International Scientific Conference "Jabłko niezgody. Współczesne problemy gospodarki światowej" (The Apple of Discord. Contemporary Problems of Global Economy), which took place on May 18, 2015 at the Economic University in Wrocław.

13 The G33 is composed of 46 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, the Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, South Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

agricultural negotiations. Next to the United States and the European Union, they are the key actors in these negotiations. The lack of agreement between the US, the EU and the G20 leads to protracted negotiations not only in this specific sector but also in the entire round. The reason for this is that according to the 'single undertaking' format that was adopted, nothing is settled until everything is agreed upon.¹⁴ Apart from the G20 and the G33, China is also a member of the RAMs (Recent New Members), a coalition of countries that joined the WTO after 1995 and demand fewer obligations in the trade negotiations due to the liberalization commitments they undertook under accession protocols.¹⁵

When analysing China's activity in the Doha Round negotiations, we need to emphasize that so far China has failed to fulfil the hopes and expectations that the other developing countries had had in relation to its accession to the WTO. Despite the fact that China has supported India's and Brazil's initiatives on many occasions, it cannot really be called an advocate of the interests of developing countries which uses its potential in the world economy and promotes WTO reforms that are beneficial to this group of states.¹⁶ It remains an open question whether China is ready to accept this role. So far it has rather focused on protecting its own interests in the WTO and has not aspired to becoming a leader in the negotiations. It needs to be stressed, however, that China's support for the establishment of the G20 and participation in its workings alongside Brazil and India contributed to a change in the balance of power in the World Trade Organization. With this, the WTO is becoming an organisation where the distribution of power reflects the economic potential of its members much better than in other international organisations.¹⁷ The Quad group (the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada) was replaced as the leader by the so-called new G5, that is the US, the EU, Brazil, India and China. The new distribution of power in the WTO is directly reflected in the election of the Brazilian Roberto Azavedo to Director-General of the World Trade Organization.¹⁸

14 World Trade Organization: *Accession of the People's Republic of China. Decision of 10 November 2001*, WT/L432, Geneva 2001.

15 *Groups in the WTO*, July 28, 2010, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf (20.08 2016).

16 Guijun, Lin/Tang, Bi: "China's Role in the WTO: Opening Up as a Way to Push Forward Reforms and Combat Trade Protectionism". In: Luolin Wang (ed.): *China's WTO Accession Reassessed*. Routledge: New York 2015.

17 Sun, Zhenyu: "China's Experience of 10 Years in the WTO". In: Meléndez-Ortiz, Ricardo/Bellmann, Christophe/Cheng, Shuaihua (eds.): *A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China and Global Trade Governance*, ICTSD: Geneva 2011, pp. 11–16.

18 Skrzypczyńska, Joanna: *op. cit.*

Regionalism in China's Trade Policy

Next to the WTO, a multilateral quasi-global institution, the architecture of the contemporary trade system also includes Regional Trade Agreements established under Article XXIV GATT. The relation between multilateralism (globalism) and regionalism evolves on the basis of internal and external factors shaping the trade policy of states. Essentially, regionalism can be treated as a solution that is either complementary to or competitive *vis-à-vis* the GATT/WTO global trade system. In the first case, regionalism is treated as an endogenous element of the global system, complementing the commitments taken within the WTO. In the second case, regionalism is perceived as a competitive alternative to the non-discriminatory global system.

When analysing the trade policy of major economies since the establishment of the GATT system, we should state, however, that for many years multilateral negotiations were the most important forum for pursuing trade interests, and preferential agreements complemented the GATT-based strategy. A gradual change in this approach could be observed from the start of the Uruguay Round, when an impasse in this forum led to the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). The conclusion of NAFTA at that time can be considered a competitive solution *vis-à-vis* the protracting negotiations in GATT, giving the United States access to important sales markets.¹⁹ At the same time, NAFTA and APEC became important instruments for pressuring the other participants of GATT negotiations, showing that the United States had an alternative forum for realising its interests besides the multilateral system, which in fact helped break the impasse in the GATT negotiations.²⁰

Presently, due to the lack of progress in the Doha Round negotiations, the number of preferential trade agreements negotiated by WTO members is growing. The analyses describing this phenomenon even speak of a proliferation

19 Krugman, Paul: "The Move toward Free Trade Zones". In: Summers, Lawrence H. (ed.): *Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones*. Federal Reserve Bank: Kansas City 1991, pp. 7–42.

20 Skulska, Bogusława: *Regionalizm ekonomiczny w Azji Wschodniej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu: Wrocław 2012; Lee, Yong-Shik: "Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation". *Journal of World Trade* 45(3), 2011, pp. 629–651; Brown, Andrew G./Stern, Robert M.: "Free Trade Agreements and Governance of the Global Trading System". *The World Economy* 34, 2011, pp. 331–354.

of preferential trade agreements.²¹ This time, however, PTAs have not become a stimulating factor in multilateral negotiation; on the contrary, the growing number of agreements of this kind escalates the crisis in the WTO negotiations. The reason for this is that PTAs are starting to become an alternative to the WTO as the forum for negotiating and establishing the rules of international trade.²² These trends are confirmed by attempts to establish new trade regimes in sectors already regulated in the WTO, as exemplified by the plurilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). This policy may lead to fragmentation of the multilateral trade system, causing it to break apart into individual trade blocs.²³

What is an especially significant threat to the further functioning of the WTO is the agreements with the key global exporters, especially the United States and the European Union, both those already concluded and those currently being negotiated. Taking into account the extent of negotiations and the possibility of new rules of trade being developed under these treaties, the process we are observing could lead to the establishment of a trade regime alternative to the WTO. What may prove to be a particularly dangerous threat to the multilateral liberalization of trade is the return to the notion of establishing a free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. The reason for this is that due to geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is treated as an instrument of integrating the 'West' in the face of the growing significance of the emerging markets alternative to the WTO, because TTIP negotiations can be treated as a means to maintain Western economic dominance. With the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific

21 This expression can be justified through a comparison of the number of preferential trade agreements concluded in the entire period of functioning of GATT with the number of agreements negotiated after the establishment of the WTO. Between 1948 and 1994, the GATT contracting parties notified 124 various preferential trade agreements; between 1995 and 2006, 130 notifications concerning agreements liberalizing the trade exchange between their parties were filed with the World Trade Organization; in 2009 another 20 preferential agreements were notified to the WTO; in 2010, 13 such agreements were notified; and in the following years, a dozen or so agreements of this type.

22 Abbott, Frederick M.: "A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?" *Journal of International Economic Law* 10(3), 2007, pp. 571–583.

23 Bhagwati Jagdish, Panagariya Arvind: "Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?" In Bhagwati, Jagdish/Panagariya, Arvind (eds.): *The Economics of Preferential Trading*. AEI Press: Washington, D.C., 1996, pp. 62–64.

Partnership (TPP), the TTIP negotiations are a way to exclude China from trade negotiations toward the liberalization of trade exchange and an attempt to correct the earlier mistake of allowing China into the WTO without imposing requirements concerning trade exchange policy, which became an effective instrument for China to build its economic power. In this context, we should ask how China is reacting to the ongoing processes, to what extent China participates in the process of establishing free trade areas and what is special about these agreements.

Reasons behind China's Establishment of Free Trade Agreements

The formal Chinese strategy concerning free trade areas was made by the authorities in 2007. At that time, agreements of this kind were an element of the country's economic development strategy.²⁴ By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, free trade agreements create favourable conditions for the development of exports, which in turn – in accordance with the multiplier mechanism – may contribute to economic growth. In addition, increased competition in the market due to the inflow of foreign goods forces economic reforms aimed at making domestic enterprises more competitive.

Free trade agreements can be treated as an instrument of ensuring energy security or, more broadly, raw material security. Taking into account China's need for fuels and other raw materials used in production, the country's authorities make efforts to secure their supplies. Establishing free trade agreements is one of the elements of this strategy. Guided by the need to ensure stable supplies of oil, China made efforts to establish a free trade area with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).²⁵ A good example of an agreement currently in force that serves to ensure supplies of raw materials for the Chinese industry

24 Xinhua: *Hu Jintao's Report on the Party Congress*, retrieved 12.10.2018, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/24/content_6204564.htm; Wang, Guiguo: "China's FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implication". *The American Journal of International Law* 105 (3), 2011, pp. 493–516.

25 In July 2004, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced that they were launching negotiations leading to the conclusion of a free trade agreement. So far, five negotiation rounds have been held, during which the parties reached agreement in most issues related to trade in goods. Furthermore, negotiations are being held on liberalization of the mutual trade in services.

is the agreement with Chile, which secures the supply of Chilean copper to the Chinese market, among others.²⁶

Another reason for the intensification of the PRC's activity leading to conclusion of bilateral trade agreements was the global economic crisis of 2008 – by stimulating trade, new free trade agreements may help mitigate the effects of recession in the global economy.

Furthermore, FTAs are also intended to mitigate the consequences of the trade diversion effect resulting from agreements concluded by China's main economic competitors – especially the implications of agreements concluded with countries of the Asia-Pacific region by the United States. The negative impact of the trade diversion effect resulting from free trade areas established by the United States were especially felt by the Asian countries that had traditionally treated the US as the major market for their goods. In order to reduce the losses, Asian countries started working more actively toward the economic integration of the region. As a direct consequence of this process, the value of intraregional trade has increased. In 2008, the share of intraregional trade in total trade in East Asia was 50 %, while in 2013, intraregional trade constituted 53.3 % of total exports and 56.7 % of total imports of goods in Asia.²⁷

Presently, the trade strategy of China should take into consideration the consequences of negotiations that are to lead to the establishment of two large trade blocs: the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Another factor that could influence China's trade policy is the plurilateral negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) conducted by 23 economies (including the EU). These agreements could not only have a negative impact on the Chinese economy by generating trade diversion but could also become the source of new rules in international trade – rules on which China will have no influence. Fearing marginalization in the process of developing new regulations in international trade, China expressed the desire to join the TISA negotiations and has been intensifying its efforts toward the development of free trade areas. What is more, at the APEC Summit in Beijing held in November 2014, China proposed launching talks on the establishment of the Free Trade

26 China prefers preferential trade agreements with exporters of raw materials and agricultural products as well as significant recipients of products manufactured in the Chinese market, including importers of clothing, other textiles and electronics.

27 World Trade Organization: *International Trade Statistics 2014*, WTO, Geneva 2014, p. 26.

Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).²⁸ This way, China transitioned from being a country that had to submit to rules established by others without its participation (e.g., the GATT/WTO system) to one able to create them. Moreover, it proposes solutions alternative to the initiatives that preclude them: the FTAAP that the country promotes is its answer to the US-backed idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in which China does not take part.

At this point, it needs to be pointed out that China not only takes actions aimed at mitigating the effects of the integration agreements concluded by its key competitors in global trade (the EU and the US) but also treats free trade agreements as an instrument for building its sphere of influence in East Asia and in other regions. Additionally, FTAs can be perceived as a tool for competing with Japan, the main Asian competitor to the Chinese economy.

The motivation behind the negotiation of free trade agreements is not limited to solely economic issues – such as keeping or obtaining access to a market, intensifying mutual trade exchange, strengthening cooperation in sectors important to the parties or not sufficiently addressed by the world trade system. Another possibly important determinant of FTAs are political or even strategic considerations including activity toward strengthening the existing political cooperation or showing appreciation to selected partners.²⁹ Thus free trade agreements are not only an element of the strategy for developing the Chinese economy; they can also be perceived as an instrument for consolidating China's position in the international arena, an element of building the country's super-power status.

Apart from that, FTAs can also be used to express gratitude for conducting a China-friendly foreign policy; for example, for severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan (as was the case with the agreement between the PRC and Costa Rica). Furthermore, analysts treat agreements concluded between China and the countries of East Asia or Southeast Asia as an attempt to alleviate the concerns of the countries of the region related to China's rising power.

With the consolidated position of the Chinese economy, there appeared opinions that the balance of power could change not only in East Asia: China could threaten the position of the current global powers and bring about changes in the international order on a global scale. An example of coexisting political

28 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: *The Beijing Roadmap for APEC's Contribution to the Realization of the FTAA*, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx.

29 Menon, John: "Bilateral Trade Agreements and the World Trade System". *ADB Discussion Paper 57*, 2006, pp. 6–12.

and economic determinants in negotiations concerning economic cooperation is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),³⁰ signed by China and Taiwan in June 2010. Although the ECFA focuses on commitments leading to the intensification of mutual economic exchange through a reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, more freedom to provide services as well as protection and promotion of investments, it is also perceived as an instrument for creating the right conditions for future reunification of the two states.

Evolution of Bilateralism in China's Trade Policy

The first free trade agreement was concluded by China in 2003 with Hong Kong and Macau (the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, CEPA).³¹ While Hong Kong and Macau are in fact Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China, they are also members of the World Trade Organization. The agreement is a good example of implementation of the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle. On this basis, free trade areas were established with Hong Kong and Macau as separate customs zones.

Subsequently, China launched negotiations with Pakistan, with which it had maintained good political relations from 1950, as Pakistan had been one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. The decades of cooperation between the two states led to a number of agreements addressing political, economic, military and cultural cooperation as well as technical assistance. The negotiations on the establishment of a free trade area with Pakistan started in April 2005 during a visit paid to this country by Premier Wen Jiabao. The agreement was signed in November 2006 and entered into force in July 2007. Initially, the parties only committed to reducing tariffs on goods and to facilitating the flow of investments. After several rounds of negotiations, their commitments became more comprehensive, and in February 2009 they finally signed an agreement liberalising mutual trade in services.³² On this basis,

30 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, June 29, 2010, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf>.

31 Supplements I, II, III, IV, V and VI attached to the agreements were signed in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.

32 *Agreement on Trade in Services between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, February 21, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/xiedingwenben_en.pdf (20.08.2016). The agreement is in force since October 10, 2009.

Pakistan freed 102 subcategories in 12 service sectors.³³ China, in turn, liberalized 28 subcategories of services in 6 service sectors.³⁴

In the following years, the PRC concluded ten preferential trade agreements (with ASEAN,³⁵ New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia and Georgia). Negotiations were also completed with South Korea and the Maldives. Further agreements of this type are being negotiated: with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Sri Lanka, Republic of Moldova, Israel, Norway, Mauritius, Panama as well as a trilateral agreement with Japan and South Korea.³⁶ In addition, China participates in negotiations on the establishment of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and is considering the possibility of launching talks on free trade areas with Columbia, Fiji, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Canada, Bengal, Mongolia and Palestine.³⁷

The liberalization under preferential trade agreements concluded by the PRC differs in scope and scale. China has not developed a single model of such agreements but has instead chosen a flexible approach in adjusting to the given circumstances, like the level of economic development of its trade partners. First of all, according to the definition of this form of integration, the free trade areas developed by China focus on reducing barriers in the trade in goods. Thus, the agreements regulate the following issues: national treatment and market access for goods, rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitations, protective measures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers.

However, the commitments often go beyond the traditional scope of free trade areas, including also some elements of trade in services, flow of investments or protection of intellectual property. Some agreements address the issue of environmental protection (agreements with New Zealand, Chile and Pakistan). Agreements concluded after 2005 also cover the problem of free movement of workers (agreements with Costa Rica, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore). The

33 *Pakistan's Schedule of Specific Commitments*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/pakchengruo_en.pdf.

34 *China's Schedule of Specific Commitments*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/chinachengruo_en.pdf.

35 Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

36 From 2008, negotiations were also conducted with Norway. The FTA negotiations with this country were, however, suspended after the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010.

37 *China FTA Network*, retrieved 12.10.2018, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinarh.shtml>.

regulations in this area concern, among others, business trips, personnel transfers within transnational corporations, movement of independent specialists, contract workers and people performing installation and service works.³⁸

The common element of all the FTAs concluded by China is that the parties recognize the Chinese economy as a market economy. This is directly related to the aforementioned conditions of China's accession to the World Trade Organisation and the different treatment of the Chinese economy in the global trade system because of it not being recognised as a market economy. These differences are especially visible in anti-dumping and countervailing procedures.

Two stages can be distinguished in the process of building free trade areas by China. The first one is characterized by a gradual, selective approach to liberalization of trade. In contrast to the European Union and the United States, at this point China did not engage in comprehensive negotiations addressing a broad scope of commitments; the agreements between the EU and South Korea as well as the US and South Korea concerned not only trade in goods and services but also investments, government purchases, protection of intellectual property and sustainable development, among others. In the individual negotiation rounds, China attempted to work out sectoral agreements and started new negotiations only after the agreement addressing the given issue had been signed. As a result, free trade areas were established on the basis of a number of separate agreements signed one after the other. Usually, the first thing to be regulated was the movement of goods, followed by the movement of services and investments. For example, trade relations with ASEAN are based on a number of individual agreements. In November 2002, the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation³⁹ was signed at the sixth China–ASEAN summit and entered into force in July 2005. A separate agreement establishing free trade in goods had been signed in November 2004.⁴⁰ Following that, in January 2007

38 See: *Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand*, April 7, 2008, Chapter 10, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/gjs/accessory/200804/1208158780064.pdf>.

39 *Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China*, Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002, retrieved 20.08.2016, from https://asean.org/?static_post=framework-agreement-on-comprehensive-economic-co-operation-between-asean-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-phnom-penh-4-november-2002-4.

40 *Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2004, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf>.

both parties signed an agreement on trade in services,⁴¹ which entered into force in July 2007, and an agreement on investments was signed in August 2009.⁴² The situation was similar in the treaty relations with Chile. First, China and Chile signed an agreement on the liberalization of the trade in goods (November 2005).⁴³ Then, in a different agreement signed on April 13, 2008,⁴⁴ the parties regulated the trade in services. Currently, the two parties are negotiating an agreement concerning investments.

China's strategy toward negotiating free trade agreements changed in 2008, with the conclusion of the agreement with New Zealand,⁴⁵ which was the first comprehensive trade agreement signed by China, a single document regulating trade in goods and services, investments and protection of intellectual property. Furthermore, the agreement includes separated rules concerning the movement of workers.⁴⁶ The agreements concluded by China in the following years (e.g., with Costa Rica, Peru, Switzerland, Iceland and Singapore) have a similar structure.

The said FTAs differ not only in scope but also in the scale of liberalization. Analysing the bilateral agreements concluded by China, we should emphasize

41 *Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2007, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml>.

42 *Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/200908/20090817113007764.pdf>.

43 The agreement entered into force in October 2006. According to this agreement, there would be a considerable reduction in tariffs in the mutual trade relations within 10 years, and after this period the abolition of tariffs should concern 97 % of trade in goods subject to the agreement. Apart from activity toward intensification of the mutual trade exchange, the parties also committed to increasing cooperation in such areas as culture, education, science and technology, and environmental protection. The Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile, 2005, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf>.

44 *Supplementary Agreement on Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement between China and Chile*, 13.04.2008, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/xieyizhengwen_en.pdf (20.08.2016).

45 The signing ceremony of the free trade agreement between the PRC and New Zealand, attended by Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Helen Clark, was held in Beijing on 07.04.2008. The agreement entered into force on 01.10.2018.

46 *The Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand*, *op. cit.*

that they are selective and contain a number of exceptions. For example, while the agreement establishing a free trade area with ASEAN and the agreement with New Zealand concern trade in goods and services and investment-related issues, they do not introduce liberalization in many sensitive industry or service sectors. This, of course, reduces the significance of these documents. However, we should expect that with the conclusion of new trade agreements by the United States, the European Union and the markets of the Asia-Pacific that compete with China in the Asian market, China will in fact be forced to intensify the process of liberalization of trade, both under the agreements that it has already concluded and the ones that are being negotiated.

Liberalism and Realism in Analysis of China's Trade Policy

The theoretical assumptions for an analysis of international trade are provided by economic science, and in particular by the theory of international exchange and foreign economic policy, which is a component of the science of international economic relations.⁴⁷ In the context of international trade, specific theoretical approaches aim to answer several questions which include: What are the advantages of international trade and what is the impact it has on the welfare of involved partners, third countries, and, in consequence, the whole world?; What factors determine the size and generic and geographical structure of exchange of goods? and What determines the exchange-based relationship between exported and imported products?⁴⁸ The theory of foreign economic policy explains why representatives of competent authorities in particular states take specific decisions on economic relations within the international environment (positive theory) and explains the consequences of such actions for, e.g. welfare and economic status (normative theory). In the science of international relations, the reflections on trade policy appear as a part of analyses of measures/instruments that act in the national interest and the impact of economic factors on the foreign policy of states. Furthermore, the analysis covers the connection between trade and peace or trade and conflicts between states. The reflections, depending on the adopted research perspective, often lead to conflicting conclusions regarding similar connections. It results from the differences that exist between particular

47 Misala, Józef: *Współczesne teorie wymiany międzynarodowej i zagranicznej polityki ekonomicznej*. Szkoła Główna Handlowa: Warszawa 2001, p. 9.

48 Misala, Józef, *Teorie międzynarodowej wymiany gospodarczej*. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe: Warszawa 1990, pp. 24–25.

theories about international relations in respect of the level of analysis and a different perception of the national interest.⁴⁹

Liberalism emerged as an approach identified with human beings and their freedom in the political and economic spheres. In this instance, commercial exchange has been seen from the beginning as an expression of economic freedom, a factor that contributes to cooperation and interdependence.⁵⁰ According to liberalism, the stronger the economic interdependence between the states, the smaller the likelihood of a war between them. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that various forms of economic ties, including trade, can be seen as instruments that help to maintain peace. Reflections of this sort refer to the classical trade theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.⁵¹ Classical economics, which emerged from the criticism of mercantilism, regards trade as a means of building welfare. The theory holds that the source of wealth is an unobstructed commercial exchange which ensures access to a larger number of goods through specialization and efficient use of factors of production.⁵² While there is no guarantee of equal benefits for all the parties involved, the effect will always be positive. This is acknowledged through voluntary participation in trade. According to Smith, if two states engage in commercial exchange without being forced to, it means that they derive benefits. This is precisely why countries should care about cultivating harmonious relations.⁵³

According to the liberal school of thought, international organizations play a major role in fostering harmonious relations, being an important forum for cooperation that ensures the necessary organizational structures which serve the development of cordial international relations through, e.g. action for the benefit of the market economy, commercial exchange or democratic political systems.⁵⁴ In this context, analysis of China's involvement in multilateral GATT/WTO trade system requires a reference to liberalism. China's accession to the

49 Wróbel, Anna: "Polityka handlowa w świetle założeń realizmu". In: Haliżak, Edward/Czputowicz, Jacek (eds.): *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Rambler: Warszawa 2014, pp. 141–142.

50 Pietraś, Marek: *op. cit.*

51 Cf. Smith, Adam: *Badania nad naturą i przyczynami bogactwa narodów*. Vol. I, PWN: Warszawa 1954; Ricardo, David: *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. London. J. M. Dent & Sons: New York 1949.

52 Koch, Eckart: *Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*. Vahlen: München 2006, pp. 78–92.

53 Wróbel, Anna: *op. cit.*

54 Cf. Pietraś, Marek: *op. cit.*

WTO meant that it joined the global trade governance system based on non-discriminatory rules, whose aim it is to provide its participants with (not always equal) advantages.

In the trade policies of contemporary states, the characteristic of a liberal attachment to the idea of free trade manifests itself in actions aimed at eliminating barriers to trade, which are undertaken on a quasi-global scale under the above-mentioned World Trade Organization, and on a local scale, in the form of integration agreements and bilateral agreements on free trade which have become fairly popular in recent years.

The foundations of the policy of trade liberalization, irrespective of the form or scale of action, are laid down by the free market and trade theory, which says that market powers automatically ensure full exploitation of the factors of production and an economic balance. The process applies to national and global economies alike. Unobstructed commercial exchange and specialization of production enable the most rational possible use of factors of production.⁵⁵ Classical international trade theories hold that free trade is the best way to increase national wealth. Barriers that obstruct international trade reduce GDP, which is equivalent to a reduction in economic welfare. Trade restrictions give rise to differences between domestic and foreign price levels generating a reduction in economic surplus. The loss is not fully compensated for with benefits arising out of protectionism, derived by domestic producers and the national budget. The net effects of restrictions on welfare levels are negative. Free trade, in turn, brings advantages in the form of consumers' profits and increases in specialization.⁵⁶

Keeping in mind the above reasoning, in the face of the mounting crisis in negotiations over the Doha Development Round, China, like other countries, decided to take action aimed at gaining access to foreign outlets based on agreements on free trade zones concluded with specific business partners. An essential element of China's trade policy is the above-mentioned actions aimed at integration within the Asia-Pacific region. One can assume that the economic reforms introduced in China after 1978 substantially influenced the direction and shape of the country's trade policy. The gradual departure from the earlier policy of self-sufficiency and strict control over foreign trade and movement of capital in favour of the increased openness of the Chinese economy and its integration with the global economy is fairly consistent with the assumptions of

55 Bożyk, Paweł: *Zagraniczna i międzynarodowa polityka ekonomiczna*. Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2004, p. 20.

56 Kuźnar, Andżelika: "Proces liberalizacji międzynarodowego handlu usługami w ramach WTO oraz jego skutki". *Zeszyty Naukowe KGS-SGH* 15, 2004, pp. 144–145.

liberalism. The culmination of the process was China's accession to the World Trade Organization, which has had a significant impact on China's contemporary position in international trade and the trade policy of the country.

At this point, it should be pointed out that in China's trade policy there is, on the one hand, room for action aimed at improvement of international cooperation based on existing organizations and international standards, characteristic of the liberal approach to international relations. On the other hand, there are many examples which evidence that China employs trade policy instruments for the purpose of competition handled according to the realistic paradigm in the spirit of mercantilism.

The fundamental principles of mercantilism formulated in the 16th and 17th century have a lot in common with realism. The doctrine advocates that business should be subject to the principal aim, which is the creation of a powerful state. In this context, the global economy is more like a space for conflicts between opposing interests than a forum for cooperation and mutual profits.⁵⁷ International trade is a zero-sum game. The profits of one state are equivalent to losses of the other.⁵⁸ A trade policy based on the principles of realism is a protectionist policy oriented toward maximisation of one's own profits. The logic of one's own profits stands in opposition to collective goods such as free trade. One important truth is that particular states can multiply their wealth by following protectionist policies provided that other states will not follow in their footsteps. The escalation of protectionism on an international scale could lead to substantial limitation, or in extreme cases, discontinuation of commercial exchange, resulting in global recession and reduced economic welfare for all states.

There are two principal forms of economic competition characteristic of mercantilism. Firstly, there is the so-called defensive mercantilism. In this instance, states guard their own economic interests seeing them as guarantors of their security. The policy does not have to entail negative effects for other states. Secondly, there is aggressive mercantilism which manifests itself in pursuit of exploitation of the global economy through expansionism.⁵⁹

57 More: Jędrzejowska, Karina: "Merkantylizm i nacjonalizm ekonomiczny w polityce gospodarczej wschodnioazjatyckich rynków wschodzących". In: Wydymus, Stanisław/Maciejewski, Marek (eds.): *Liberalizacja i protekcjonizm we współczesnym handlu międzynarodowym*. CeDeWu: Warszawa 2015, pp. 133–146.

58 Kuźnar, Andżelika: *op. cit.*

59 Gilpin, Robert: *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 1987, p. 98.

A trade policy that is consistent with the assumptions of realism is based on the state's primacy in the economy, the pursuit of an increase in power seen in economic categories and identified with its military dimension.⁶⁰ Mercantilism, save for the state's primacy in the economy, the subjection of economy to politics, is based on the pursuit of the greatest possible surplus in the balance of trade, and industrial policy.⁶¹ In the present day and age, the doctrine is quoted when analysing the economic success of rapidly developing Asian economies, e.g. China and the Republic of Korea. In both cases, the intense development of the economy was an outcome of significant involvement on the part of the state and the introduction of an industrial policy. The countries also employed mercantilist trade policy to impact the size and structure of import and export. It is true that in 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization, which should have resulted in greater openness of the economy and fulfilment of trade policy in the spirit of liberalism based on free trade and unobstructed commercial exchange. China, however, is still closer to realism and the associated mercantilism than the free-trade policy followed in the spirit of liberalism. Evidence for this statement is offered by the analysis of effects of China's trade expansion after 2001.

As a result of China's accession to the WTO, its members had to reduce customs duties on Chinese products, giving the country an opportunity for rapid development of exports. Further, as a consequence of the application of aggressive monetary protectionism that consists in keeping the value of its currency low, China gained a substantial advantage on the international market. Taking into consideration the exchange-rate policy pursued by China, the country's business partners did not derive comparable benefits from the liberalization of trade arising from its membership of the WTO. The following example neatly illustrates the situation: if China keeps the value of the renminbi twice as low

60 One should note that the same instruments of trade policy may be used, as the case may be, for fulfilment of economic or political objectives or both of them in parallel. For instance, customs duties may protect the so-called infant industries from foreign competitors so as to let them grow and prosper in the future. In other cases, excessively high customs duties may serve as retorsion in connection with negative political actions taken by business partners. Efficient export-oriented policy may improve the economic power of a state and have a positive effect on its position in international political or military relations.

61 A mercantilist trade policy is an export-oriented and import-restricting policy. The states that follow the doctrine apply systems in support of export and limit import. A sign of mercantilism is also an industrial policy pursued under the so-called educational protectionism.

as it should be, it is as if it grants export subsidies equal to 50 % of the value of exported goods and imposes a customs duty equal to 100 % of their value on imported products.⁶²

A sign of mercantilism in China's trade policy is not only the export-oriented exchange-rate policy, but also the restricted access of foreign products and services to the Chinese market. Although at the time of China's accession to the WTO a series of agreements restricted the use of particular instruments of trade policy and reduced customs duties, the concessions are still levelled by non-tariff barriers. European entrepreneurs who supply their products to China complain about the customs clearance procedures, requirements for import licences, certificates and product labelling standards, vague regulations, limited access to public auctions, specific quality standards (China Compulsory Certification, CCC) and the licensing system.

To recapitulate the above reflections, one can conclude that the wealth of theories about international trade which hold that all states would be more prosperous if there were an unobstructed flow of goods and services, are not transposed into the actual policies of particular states. Although substantial progress has been made in the process of liberalization of international trade since World War II, on the international and regional arena alike, and in numerous bilateral trade agreements signed in recent years, national governments still guard their national interest and resort to instruments of protectionism. One example of the above is China, which follows, just like the majority of contemporary states, a hybrid (mixed) trade policy characterized by the co-existence of actions aimed at trade liberalization and protectionism. Depending on internal and external conditions, China chooses to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers in some places merely to apply instruments of trade policy which restrict foreign suppliers. Today, it is extremely difficult to judge which of the two directions prevails in China's trade policy: liberalism or realism? Is it more consistent with the assumptions of liberalism or realism?

Although China is a member of a quasi-global organization whose purpose is the liberalization of global trade, it has not done much to help reach an agreement under the Doha Development Round. This might be due to China's relatively short membership of the WTO. It has not been long since China adopted far-reaching liberalization obligations included in the protocol of accession to the WTO, as a new member, which is why it has not been as involved

62 Brunet, Antoine/Guichard, Jean-Paul: *Chiny światowym hegemonem. Imperializm ekonomiczny państwa środka*. Wydawnictwo Studio Emka: Warszawa 2011, p. 316.

in the negotiations as the other members. One should note that in spite of the actions aimed at eliminating trade barriers undertaken under the protocol of accession to the WTO and the visible involvement in trade liberalization based on preferential trade agreements, China's trade policy is still more consistent with the assumptions of realism.

China takes advantage of trade liberalization to build economic power, as an element of export-oriented policy implemented in the spirit of mercantilism to maintain the surplus in the balance of trade thanks to the access to foreign markets. Further, by taking actions aimed at implementing specific liberalization projects associated with new preferential trade agreements, China goes into competition with the main competitors on the global market for outlets as well as an integration model proposed to their business partners. One example is the competition that currently takes places for domination in the Asia-Pacific region and alternative projects aimed at integration of TPP and RCEP.⁶³ China's action in this regard and the actions of other economic powers aimed at creating new PTAs could lead to the disintegration of the global trade system, as they perpetuate the developing network system of global trade management as a result of the existence of an element of a new structure of the trade system in the form of close preferential ties between the most powerful economies.⁶⁴

From the point of view of actions characteristic of liberalism aimed at improving welfare, trade liberalization based on PTAs is the second-best solution. Naturally, discriminatory liberalization brings economic advantages to the parties involved in the trade agreement (trade creation effect) and losses to other countries that are not involved in the agreement, in the form of trade diversion. From the point of view of improving welfare on a wider scale, not restricted to the selected parties, a much more effective solution is multilateral liberalization implemented via the WTO. Unfortunately, nowadays the divergence of interests of the participants has become a cause of dysfunction within the organization as a negotiation forum and its role has become limited to settlement of trade disputes and supervision of fulfilment of previously accepted obligations.

63 See: Grabowski, Marcin: *Rywalizacja czy integracja? Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015, pp. 185–187.

64 Michalski, Bartosz: *Międzyregionalne porozumienia handlowe Transpacyficzny regionalizm jako alternatywa dla „wolnego” handlu?*. Difin: Warszawa 2014, p. 216.

Conclusion

The current state of China's trade policy stems from the reforms initiated in 1978, which fundamentally transformed the country. The PRC abandoned its earlier policy of self-sufficiency and tight control of foreign trade and capital flows in favour of opening up of the economy and integrating it with the global economy. The crowning achievement of this process was China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has contributed considerably to the country's current position in global trade. With the escalating crisis of the Doha Round negotiations, China has made the same decision as other countries in taking actions toward obtaining access to foreign markets through free trade agreements with selected economic partners.

To sum up, we should point out that China's trade policy is two-dimensional, which means that it takes advantage of both the multilateral WTO trade system and regionalism in order to pursue its economic interests, just as the other major global exporters, such as the US or the EU. China, however, uses the global trade system and regionalism to achieve different goals. The negotiations in the WTO are primarily to serve China's global economic interests. Membership of this organization allowed China to participate in the setting of global norms. Bilateral negotiations, in turn, and the free trade agreements that followed them, allow China to achieve specific pragmatic and strategic objectives. For example, China started negotiations with ASEAN to alleviate the concerns of the countries of this grouping about the PRC's accession to the WTO. Through negotiations with Asian countries and the resulting stronger relations with the countries of the region, China also strives to consolidate its position in the international arena and wants to be perceived as the representative of the region's interests. Moreover, bilateral relations are an alternative to norms developed under the multilateral trade system. Apart from ensuring that Chinese products can expand to foreign markets and from different trade partners, the more pragmatic free trade agreements also allow China to secure supplies of raw materials necessary for the development of Chinese industry. Furthermore, during bilateral negotiations China attempts to change its status in the multilateral trade system by making the commencement of negotiations conditional on being recognised as a market economy by its trade partners.

China's strategy toward FTAs has evolved over time. Initially, the PRC stuck to intraregional agreements with its neighbours. Then, it decided to launch negotiations with the small and larger developed countries of the Asia-Pacific region (Singapore, New Zealand, Korea and Australia). In the recent years, it has also concluded interregional agreements with highly developed countries

(Iceland and Switzerland). Apart from that, China has undertaken actions toward regional integration under broader projects, to confirm the country's status in the region and balance out the effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has been negotiated without China's participation.

Taking into account the role of foreign trade and foreign direct investments in the country's economic development, we should expect that given the crisis of the multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round, FTAs will constitute an important instrument in China's foreign economic policy serving, as it has so far, to ensure supplies of essential resources and to provide greater export opportunities for Chinese goods and services.

In spite of China's actions aimed at trade liberalization and its accession to the WTO, the reflection on the choice of a paradigm for the analysis of China's trade policy makes one note that the country's policy in this regard cannot be reviewed solely with the use of liberal concepts in international relations. Since the country employs mercantilist instruments of trade policy, the analysis of its foreign economic policy requires reference to the principles of realism.

References

- Abbott, Frederick M.: "A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?" *Journal of International Economic Law* 10(3), 2007, pp. 571–583.
- Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/200908/20090817113007764.pdf>.
- Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2004, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf>.
- Agreement on Trade in Services between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, February 21, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/xiedingwenben_en.pdf.
- Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN*, 2007, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml>.
- Bhagwati Jagdish, Panagariya Arvind: "Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?" In Bhagwati, Jagdish/Panagariya, Arvind (eds.): *The Economics of Preferential Trading*. AEI Press: Washington, D.C., 1996.
- Bożyk, Paweł: *Zagraniczna i międzynarodowa polityka ekonomiczna*. Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne: Warszawa 2004.

- Brown, Andrew G./Stern, Robert M.: "Free Trade Agreements and Governance of the Global Trading System". *The World Economy* 34, 2011, pp. 331–354.
- Brunet, Antoine/Guichard, Jean-Paul: *Chiny światowym hegemonem. Imperializm ekonomiczny państwa środka*. Wydawnictwo Studio Emka: Warszawa 2011.
- Brunet, Antoine/Guichard, Jean-Poul: *La visée hégémonique de la Chine. L'impérialisme économique*. L'Harmattan: Paris 2011.
- China FTA Network*, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinarh.shtml>.
- China's Schedule of Specific Commitments*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/chinachengruo_en.pdf.
- Costantini, Valeria/Crescezi, Riccardo/Filippis, Fabrizio De/Salvatici, Luca: "Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations". *The World Economy* 30(5), 2007, pp. 863–891.
- Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement*, June 29, 2010, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf>.
- Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China*, Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002, retrieved 20.08.2016, from https://asean.org/?static_post=framework-agreement-on-comprehensive-economic-co-operation-between-asean-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-phnom-penh-4-november-2002-4.
- Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of New Zealand*, April 7, 2008, Chapter 10, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/gjs/accessory/200804/1208158780064.pdf>.
- Gilpin, Robert: *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 1987.
- Grabowski, Marcin: *Rywalizacja czy integracja? Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015.
- Groups in the WTO*, July 28, 2010, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf.
- Guijun, Lin/Tang, Bi: "China's Role in the WTO: Opening Up as a Way to Push Forward Reforms and Combat Trade Protectionism". In: Luolin Wang (ed.): *China's WTO Accession Reassessed*. Routledge: New York 2015.
- Halizak, Edward/Pietraś, Marek (eds.): *Poziomy analizy stosunków międzynarodowych*. Rambler: Warszawa 2013.
- Jędrzejowska, Karina: "Merkantylizm i nacjonalizm ekonomiczny w polityce gospodarczej wschodnioazjatyckich rynków wschodzących". In: Wydymus, Stanisław/Maciejewski, Marek (eds.): *Liberalizacja i protekcjonizm we*

- współczesnym handlu międzynarodowym. CeDeWu: Warszawa 2015, pp. 133–146.
- Koch, Eckart: *Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*. Vahlen: München 2006.
- Krugman, Paul: “The Move toward Free Trade Zones”. In: Summers, Lawrence H. (ed.): *Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones*. Federal Reserve Bank: Kansas City 1991, pp. 7–42.
- Kuźnar, Andżelika: “Proces liberalizacji międzynarodowego handlu usługami w ramach WTO oraz jego skutki”. *Zeszyty Naukowe KGS-SGH* 15, 2004, pp. 134–159.
- Lee, Yong-Shik: “Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation”. *Journal of World Trade* 45(3), 2011, pp. 629–651.
- Luo, Yan: *Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU and China. The Rise of Legalization in the Trade Regime and its Consequences*. Kluwer Law International: Austin 2010.
- Menon, John: “Bilateral Trade Agreements and the World Trade System”. *ADB Discussion Paper* 57, 2006, pp. 6–12.
- Messerlin, Patrick A.: “China in the WTO: Antidumping and Safeguards”. In: Bhattasali, Deepak/Li, Shantong/Martin, Will (eds.): *China and the WTO, Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies*. World Bank and Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004, pp. 29–48.
- Michalski, Bartosz: *Międzyregionalne porozumienia handlowe Transpacyficzny regionalizm jako alternatywa dla „wolnego” handlu?*. Difin: Warszawa 2014.
- Misala, Józef: *Teorie międzynarodowej wymiany gospodarczej*. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe: Warszawa 1990.
- Misala, Józef: *Współczesne teorie wymiany międzynarodowej i zagranicznej polityki ekonomicznej*. Szkoła Główna Handlowa: Warszawa 2001.
- Niemiec, Wioletta/Niemiec, Mariusz: “Konsekwencje przystąpienia Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej do WTO – analiza wymiany towarowej”. In: Rymarczyk, Jan/Wróblewski, Marek (eds.): *10 lat Światowej Organizacji Handlu*. Arboretum: Wrocław 2005.
- Pakistan’s Schedule of Specific Commitments*, 2009, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistan/xieyi/pakchengruo_en.pdf.
- Pietraś, Marek: “Eksplanacyjna użyteczność liberalizmu w badaniu systemu międzynarodowego”. In: Haliżak, Edward/Ożarowski, Rafał/Wróbel, Anna (eds.): *Liberalizm i neoliberalizm w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych: teoretyczny pluralizm*. Rambler: Warszawa 2016.
- Ricardo, David: *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* London. J. M. Dent & Sons: New York 1949.

- Skrzypczyńska, Joanna: "Chiny w WTO", A paper prepared for the 32nd International Scientific Conference "Jabłko niezgody. Współczesne problemy gospodarki światowej" (The Apple of Discord. Contemporary Problems of Global Economy), which took place on May 18, 2015 at the Economic University in Wrocław.
- Skulska, Bogusława: *Regionalizm ekonomiczny w Azji Wschodniej*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu: Wrocław 2012.
- Smith, Adam: *Badania nad naturą i przyczynami bogactwa narodów*. Vol. I, PWN: Warszawa 1954.
- Sun, Zhenyu: "China's Experience of 10 Years in the WTO". In: Meléndez-Ortiz, Ricardo/Bellmann, Christophe/Cheng, Shuaihua (eds.): *A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China and Global Trade Governance*, ICTSD: Geneva 2011.
- Supplementary Agreement on Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement between China and Chile*, April 13, 2008, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/xieyizhengwen_en.pdf.
- The Beijing Roadmap for APEC's Contribution to the Realization of the FTAA*, 2015, November, retrieved 20.08.2016, from http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexa.aspx.
- The Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Chile*, 2005, retrieved 20.08.2016, from <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf>.
- Thorstensen, Vera/Oliveira, Machado/Tiago, Ivan (eds.): *BRICS in the World Trade Organization: Comparative Trade Policies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa*. CCGI (FGV) and SAIIA: Ipea 2014.
- Wang Guiguo: "China's FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implication". *The American Journal of International Law* 105 (3), 2011, pp. 493–516.
- Wróbel, Anna: "Polityka handlowa w świetle założeń realizmu". In: Haliżak, Edward/Czputowicz, Jacek (eds.): *Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Rambler: Warszawa 2014.
- World Trade Organization: *Accession of the People's Republic of China. Decision of 10 November 2001*, WT/L432, Geneva 2001.
- World Trade Organization: *International Trade Statistics 2014*, WTO, Geneva 2014.
- Xinhua: *Hu Jintao's Report on the Party Congress*, retrieved 12.10.2018, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/24/content_6204564.htm.

Conflicts and Collaboration in the Middle East

Wojciech Grabowski

8. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: A Study of Arab Regionalism and Integration

Abstract: *The Middle East is perceived by most IR researchers and analysts as a region where processes of integration have stalled. The project of integration between six Arab Gulf states resulted in the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. This could have provided a strong foundation for integrationist processes in this region. However, the process of strengthening the Gulf system has been weakened by internal and external threats that challenge this project such as conflicts, civil wars and political tensions. The aim of the article is to analyze the status of Gulf states' integration based on classic integration concepts and relate it to the GCC Charter. This leads to the conclusion that there is a vital gap between the theory of integration and GCC Charter objectives.*

Keywords: Persian Gulf, Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, regionalism, integration

Introduction

Regionalism projects first appeared in the Middle East before the process of European integration had begun. The first regional organization in the Middle East – the League of Arab States (*Jāmi'at ad-Duwal al-'Arabīyah*, LAS) was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 while the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was established in Paris on April 18, 1951. However, the LAS and other regional organizations in the Middle East¹ have faced difficulties in finding a way to reach the basic goal of regionalism – integration. One of the basic obstacles in uniting Arab states was and remains the particular national interests as well as permanent rivalry and conflict in the region of the Middle East. As a consequence of the inability to integrate states in

1 Transregional organizations: Islamic Cooperation Organization, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact) European Neighborhood Policy; Regional Organizations: Arab Maghreb Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, Council of Arab Economic Unity; Regional successful projects: United Arab Emirates, Unification of Yemen; Regional, unsuccessful projects: United Arab Republic, Federation of Arab Republics, Arab Cooperation Council, Damascus Declaration 1991.

the region, chronic economic underdevelopment is observed; one of the major weakness and challenge in the Middle East.

There was hope, however, that this impasse could be broken. On May 25, 1981, six Arab Persian Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) agreed to institutionalize cooperation and establish a regional organization – the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (*Majlis al-Taawun li-Duwal al-Khalij al-Arabiyyah*), commonly known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). They had a strong foundation because they established this integration project along similar political, social and economic lines. In the “Arab Human Development Report Creating Opportunities for Future Generations” issued under the United Nations program its authors wrote: “Perhaps no other group of states in the world has been endowed with the same potential for cooperation, even integration, as have the Arab countries”².

Apart from establishing a regional defense mechanism (Peninsula Shield Force), economic integration (Free Trade Area, Custom Union and Common Market) was initiated. The Gulf system built by the six Arab states also had to deal with external and internal challenges such as border conflicts, common security accords and approving a common currency. This was a natural consequence of the permanent turmoil, conflicts, civil wars and political tensions in the Middle East region³. These states wanted to break the impasse of ineffective and unsuccessful integration in the Middle East.

The growth of the processes of regionalism had its roots in a conviction that cooperation in a unitary, integrative and coordinated manner is more effective than doing so individually or at the global level. Many regional issues like desertification or water scarcity could be resolved more effectively if undertaken at a regional level. Especially when resolving these issues lay in the common interest of states that compose the regional order.

The aim of the article is to answer two questions: 1) Has the GCC broken the impasse of ineffective and unsuccessful integration? and 2) What circumstances need to appear to break this impasse?

2 *The Arab Human Development Report Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*. (United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States). Oxford University Press 2002, p. 121.

3 Aarts, Paul: “The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?”. *Third World Quarterly* 20 (5), 1999, pp. 911–925.

Between Theory and Practice of Regional Integration

Over the last few decades we can observe the increasing prominence of regional agreements, with more than 445 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force (according to data from the World Trade Organization, WTO) and 659 in total, including those inactive. Most of these (80–90 %) constitute free trade agreements⁴. The proliferation of RTAs is also attributable to the GCC. It can be said that the GCC conforms to a growing trend toward regionalism. We can observe it in GCC states membership in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area agreement (GAFTA), which constitutes a pan-Arab free trade zone that came into existence in 1997 and brought together 18 states. Bahrain and Oman established free trade agreements with the US in 2006 and 2009 respectively. The GCC has concluded cooperation agreements with the European Union (1998) and Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (2013), and negotiations with China and Malaysia on a Free Trade Area are ongoing⁵. However, being a part of this trend is not enough to achieve success. To measure the level of success we need to look closer at the definition and requirements of successful integration.

There are many definitions of integration. All of them however have one common feature: integration is a process that enhances the intensity of interactions between its members. This condition regarding the GCC is fulfilled. Representatives of member states – from the highest level (the heads of the member states) through Foreign Ministers of all member states, to members of institutions of the GCC⁶ meet more or less frequently. According to international relations theories every regional organization is a platform that intensifies relations between the states involved, which is also the case with the GCC.

How other features of integration look like in regard to this organization are listed as follows:

1. Ernst Haas (1924–2003), the founder of neofunctionalism, defined integration as a process that drives state actors to transfer their loyalty, expectations and political activity to a supranational level and, as a result, establish

4 Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, retrieved 15.01.2018, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm.

5 Dadush, Uri: "Regionalism and the Gulf Countries". In: Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirātijīyah (eds.): *Human Resources and Development in the Arabian Gulf*. The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research: Abu Dhabi 2010, pp. 265–303.

6 Some of them include: Patent Office, GCC Standardization Organization, Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, Peninsula Shield (military exercises) etc.

a new community⁷. Considering the above definition with regard to the GCC we can assert that between its members there is no integration. Despite the fact that the GCC has well-developed institutions, such as the Supreme Council, Ministerial Council, Secretary General and *Shura* Council, they are ineffective like the Peninsula Shield, or without the right to make decisions (monarchs keep the widest prerogatives) such as the Commission for Settlement of Disputes. Many institutions have led to increased trust between GCC members although they have failed to remove egoistic behavior such as the Saudi-Qatari rivalry over power in the region that led to the Gulf crises of 2014 and 2017;

2. Karl Deutsch (1912–1992), the political scientist, defined integration as a process of identity building and creating institutions and customs that will assure peaceful transformation inside the grouping⁸. This definition better suits the GCC as the sense of identity inside the organization is quite strong. We could observe this particularly in the 1980s when a common sense of identity played a counterbalancing role against the Iranian/Persian threat (identity constituted a line of demarcation between them) but also for globalization and Western culture⁹. In this sense identity increases mutual interactions (trust) as well as development of organization and institutions. The policy of identity is manifested through building museums that praise the cultural heritage of GCC member states. There have also been no revolutions (apart from in Bahrain in 2013), and internal reforms undertaken by the Saudi authorities (the plan to lift the ban on women driving cars and giving them electoral rights at the municipal level) were made by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud without any violence. Matteo Legrenzi from Ca' Foscari University of Venice has emphasized that regional identity helped to constitute boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and that the six Arab Gulf states were headed toward a separate Gulf identity from the rest of the Arab world. To describe this attitude of six Arab Persian Gulf states toward the regional environment Legrenzi used the term “identity diplomacy”¹⁰.

7 Haas Ernst: “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”. *International Organization* 15(3), 1961, pp. 366–367.

8 Deutsch, Karl W: “The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory”. In: Said Abdul (ed.): *Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs 1968, p. 75.

9 Adler, Emanuel/Barnett, Michael: “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities”. *Ethics and International Affairs* 10(1), 1996, pp. 75–92.

10 Legrenzi, Mateo: “Did the GCC Make a Difference. Institutional Realities and (Un)intended Consequences”. In: Harders Cilja/Legrenzi Mateo (eds.): *Beyond*

There is a consensus among researchers that no one school or theory has such a *primum mobile* to fully explain political processes and the above situation confirms that statement. Neither of the above theories can deliver a complex answer on the question of integration in the Persian Gulf although each of them explains some part of the process.

If we compare definitions of integration commonly used and the definition contained in the Charter of the GCC we observe a vital similarity. The general definition of integration is built on the basis that cooperation in a unitary, integrative and coordinated manner is more effective than doing so individually or at the global level. Similarly, the Charter of the GCC says almost the same: “[...] Desiring to effect coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all fields; and, having the conviction that coordination, cooperation, and integration between them serve the sublime objectives of the Arab Nation [...]”¹¹. However, to verify the question of integration in the Gulf we should analyze the relations between the theory of integration and the GCC Charter objectives at the level of implementation.

In this area there is a vital gap between the high ambition of Arab Gulf states to achieve regional goals and their capacity to realize them. To put it another way, the gap between rhetoric and reality seems typical for autocratic regimes. The ambitions that the Council evidence match those of the most integrated regional communities – such as the European Union – but the governance and administrative capacity is more in line with those of developing states. This means that many agreements signed by GCC member states exist only on paper while their implementation is weak or absent. We can observe it in many cases, for example the Peninsula Shield, an armed force of the organization, remains ununified and whose military potential would not deter a potential enemy; a monetary union was planned to be established in 2010 but it transpired that this date was unrealistic and currently the exact timetable for its foundation remains undefined. These and other goals were not adjusted to the tools available, or were simply too ambitious. The roadmap to regionalism/integration should include internal reforms, especially in regards to economic cooperation. Intra-GCC trade remains at a very modest level – around 8 % of the total¹² and gains from the

Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East, Ashgate: Aldershot/Burlington 2008, p. 108.

11 *Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*, retrieved 10.01.2018, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125347/1426_GCC.pdf.

12 al-Mawali, Nasser: “Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia Effect”. *Journal of Economic Integration* 30(3), 2015, p. 538.

integration of markets in goods are limited because of the state's reliance on oil. These gains can be broadened after service sector improvement, liberalization of foreign investment, freeing private sector etc. Still, the greatest opportunity lies in Gulf integration with global markets. Considering the functionalist approach, which views economic integration as an inevitable process within states, the GCC again does not fulfill the requirements of a regional organization.

These tensions between theory and practice or rhetoric or reality in regards to the GCC are also observed in the clash between the realist and liberal way of thinking. The Middle East is perceived by observers as a region of realist thinking where states tend to regional dominance or hegemony. The GCC in some way neither eludes rigid frames of realism, nor adheres to realist foundations in absolute terms. Emile Nakhleh, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, points out that the GCC was established on four neoliberal assumptions: historically grounded cooperation; similar interests that if realized collectively would be more successfully fulfilled; security which could be better ensured collaboratively; regional security is dependent on resolution of the Palestinian conflict¹³. Linking these two attitudes – realist *modus operandi* and liberal objectives lead to conflict inside and outside the organization.

In the Persian Gulf we can illustrate significant reasons why the GCC should become a mature security and regional community. There are common societal identities (language, culture and religion); a long history of cooperation between the six Arab states (especially in the pre-GCC era); similar political and economic structure; and common threat perception (to some degree). These states are more homogenous than in other cases of regional integration (even in Europe) and despite this it is difficult to say that these states are integrated. The study of Persian Gulf regionalism is complicated because some processes of integration have appeared while concrete indicators of this process remain at a very low level. Alexander Bellamy from the University of Queensland in Australia calls it a “stalled integration” or “fortress model of regional integration”. He claims that the process of integration has stalled despite rapid advances in its early years and it cannot be said that the GCC evolved into a security community. One of the reasons for this trend was the fact that along with the passing of time, ever more differences began to appear between member states¹⁴.

13 Nakhleh, Emile: *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Praeger: New York 1986, p. 1.

14 Bellamy, Alexander: “Stalled Integration and Perpetual War: The Gulf Cooperation Council”, In: Bellamy Alexander (ed.): *Security Communities and their Neighbors. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?*, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2004, p. 126.

Selected Factors that Influence Regional Integration

There are many factors that influence regional integration in the Persian Gulf, but because of the limitations of this article, I will present only some of them. I would like to focus on the unstable international environment, neighborhood policy/regional policy, internal reforms, leader/catalyst-state and economic openness.

The unstable international environment and constant war within and around the GCC's borders on the one hand help to preserve monarchical regimes but on the other provides political regimes (traditional monarchies) with legitimacy. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988, civil war in Yemen in the 1980s, the Persian Gulf War of 1990, the US-led coalition's invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring 2010/11, war in Yemen 2015 to now, and of course internal conflict over Qatari policy in 2014 and 2017 are all conflicts which were linked to different ideologies that were perceived by some or all GCC states as a security or national threat. On this basis these states tried to build a regional security system that would confront pan-Arabism, Baathist socialism, Western liberalism and Islamic radicalism. This was not something unrealistic as Islamists in the region of the Middle East had called for the overthrow the Gulf monarchies, secular Arab nationalism was one of the reasons why Iraq was excluded from the GCC, socialism in the Middle East was supported by the Soviets both in Yemen and Oman and was perceived as a threat in the context of war in Afghanistan in 1979, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser called the legitimacy of existing regimes into question as well as attempting to establish an Arab republic throughout the region. In addition to wanting to cut any links between the Gulf and Great Britain, Egypt also deployed 70,000 troops to assist the rebellion against the Yemeni monarchy. The last ideological challenge was posed by liberal-minded anti-monarchism represented by the merchant and middle classes in the Gulf states¹⁵. Gregory Gause III from Texas A&M University emphasized that the cause of confrontation between ideologies in the region was the situation where “[...] the sovereign norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states was flouted with stunning and unapologetic regularity [...]”¹⁶. In some way this ideological threat consolidated the six Arab states according to the proverb that a common enemy unites even the oldest foes. But in recent years different threat perceptions (especially Iran's proxy wars and Saudi sectarianism as well as the ideological threat

15 Bellamy, Alexander, loc. cit., pp. 121–123.

16 Gause III, Gregory: “Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East”. *Journal of International Affairs* 45(2), 1992, p. 448.

posed by the Muslim Brotherhood) and Middle East visions appeared to lead to disunity and tensions between GCC members. These differences led to the diplomatic Gulf crises of 2014 and 2017 linked to the Saudi-Qatari conflict over small emirate foreign policy, ideological support for the Muslim Brotherhood and close relations with Iran. Unofficially this conflict is driven by the race for power between two states.

This factor is closely related to the next one – the neighborhood policy or regional policy of the GCC and its members. We can posit the idea that improvement in GCC relations with Iran, Iraq and Yemen could be helpful in healing some divisions and divergences between Arab Gulf states and in resolving some regional conflicts like the conflict over Abu Musa and the Greater/Lesser Tunb islands between UAE and Iran or more importantly the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy wars in the region. More friendly and open relations between the GCC and Yemen could help their authorities deal with the problem of internal division. However, the inaction of the GCC in recent decades toward Yemen resulted in the current civil war and focus on military action instead of political and economic integration¹⁷, though the most important seems to be a lost opportunity to build a regional security complex (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever) with all states balancing each other¹⁸. This would mean that the security of each Persian Gulf state would interact with the security of the other actors (security interdependence within the subregion). Currently there is a rivalry and power race between Saudi Arabia and Iran where Qatar opposes Saudi domination which is producing serious tensions and crises in the process of integration within the GCC.

Yemen, bordering upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman, plays a pivotal role in GCC neighborhood policy. Yemen in recent decades has shown willingness to join the GCC although it is perceived by its members as a weak link and potential source of instability for the whole Arabian Peninsula. However, its geopolitical meaning for the subregional system – Yemen is the second largest state in the Peninsula with strategic access to the vital Bab al-Mandab strait – provides the GCC with an important argument for strengthening relations with this state. Leaving Yemen isolated in the current civil war with international engagement increases the threat to the Gulf subregion¹⁹.

17 Burke, Edward: *One Blood and One Destiny Yemen's Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council*. London School of Economics and Political Science: London 2012, pp. 2–3.

18 Buzan, Barry/Waever, Ole: *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2003, p. 188.

19 Salisbury, Peter: *Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War'*. (Middle East and North Africa Program). Chatham House: London 2015, pp. 3–9.

Another neighbor, Iran, has no less vital a role in shaping the processes of integration in the subregion. Qatar and Oman maintain good relations (or opt for “soft policy”) with Iran and, together with the UAE, prefer to shape them at the state level, rather than through GCC institutions. This leads to natural divisions inside the Council and weakens it. If we understand that the GCC was established as a reaction to the Iranian threat in the 1980s and that this was an integrating factor for the six Arab Gulf states, perceiving Iran as a neutral or friendly state can lead to serious turbulence in the organization. In both GCC crises in 2014 and 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain accused Qatar of maintaining good relations with Iran²⁰.

Last but not least are GCC relations with Iraq. The point is that that GCC states have differing attitudes toward Iraq as the UAE and Qatar (and Oman on a minor scale) will do business with the Iraqi state while Saudis and Bahrainis relations with Iraq will be determined by the Iranian threat in both Iraq and Bahrain. Therefore they will treat Iraq as a field for the proxy war with Iran. The most attractive scenario for the rapprochement of the Council with Iraq would be the contribution of its members to the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. Fighting against religious violence and extremism in Iraq could provide a strong basis for cooperation between Iraq and the GCC.

Conditions that could boost the process of integration in the Persian Gulf are internal reforms, particularly reform of the political system. Its effectiveness can be measured through the level of public participation in the process of decision-making. There is an assumption that coexistence between democratic states is more productive than between undemocratic states. This means that internal reforms inside the Gulf states can boost further integration. These changes could include: involvement of political opposition and civil society (which should be built) in the decision making process, transparent politics, fair and democratic elections, which could give authorities more political legitimacy and strengthen their position, mutual control by judicial, legislative and executive authorities etc. States and their leaders are aware that the theory of democratic peace is not universal as there have been wars between democracies in the past, but it can still play a breakthrough role in creating peaceful coexistence. If all the above steps could be undertaken it could enhance the ability of governments to take a lead in foreign policy and engage in external projects and initiatives. Governments with strong political legitimacy have a better position in relation to external forces.

20 Grabowski, Wojciech. “Stosunki Iranu z państwami arabskimi Zatoki Perskiej”. *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* 3(XI), 2014, pp. 165–182.

Democratically elected governments are hesitant to resolve conflicts with their neighbors by military means as autocratic and totalitarian regimes do, and last but not least, Gulf societies have taken an active part in education in the last three decades. It has led to the establishment of a broad middle class base. This class is ready to participate in the transformation process as well as lead it. As long as civil society is controlled and limited by state authorities, this process will be disrupted²¹.

Another factor influencing the process of integration is the leader, i.e. a catalyst-state that will take the greatest responsibility for the success or failure of this process. Analysts and policymakers look to Saudi Arabia, but its role and position in this process seems more destructive than constructive. This is due to the dominant role that Saudi Arabia wants to play and concerns other GCC states regarding their sovereignty. This could be seen in 2011 when Saudi King Abdullah Abdul Aziz (1924–2015) proposed deeper integration with Bahrain in the context of the Arab Spring and began the process of transforming the Council into a Union, but the Bahraini Al-Khalifa ruling dynasty refused. However, deeper division appeared in December 2017 in the context of the second diplomatic Gulf crisis linked with Qatar. The UAE announced the formation of a new political and military alliance with Saudi Arabia and at the same time undermined the future of the GCC. Some have suggested that the new alliance is an alternative or even a substitute to the malfunctioning GCC. While Bahrain is considering its membership in this new alliance, Oman and Kuwait want to maintain good relations with all Persian Gulf states, including Iraq and Iran. However, on balance this may prove unfavorable for the 36-year old organization and all its members²².

Economic openness comprises another condition of successful integration. Economic openness in regards to Arab Gulf states means that the role of private sector in state development will increase while role of the state diminishes. This strategy should contain diversification of economies to boost mutual interdependence. Economic cooperation brings mutual benefits and often is easier to attain than political cooperation. Most of the regional organizations (e.g. European Union) have begun from economic cooperation which could later transform

21 Assiri, Abdul Ridha: "The Role of the GCC in Promoting Policies of Regional Coexistence". In: *The Gulf: Challenges of the Future*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research: Dubai 2005, p. 359.

22 *UAE and Saudis Form New Partnership Separate from GCC*, retrieved 04.01.2018, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/uae-saudi-arabia-form-political-partnership-171205075923016.html>.

into political and security regionalism. Many observers and researchers emphasize that without economic and financial linkages, efforts at regional integration are ineffective and even wasteful. Some of them are convinced that because of economic incompatibility, economic integration is unlikely and more efforts should be directed at resolving sociopolitical differences that limit progress toward further integration²³. Despite some steps undertaken by GCC states, the dominant opinion among researchers remains that integration, particularly economic integration, among GCC states is still far from ideal.

Conclusion

There are still many challenges facing the GCC and many projects currently ongoing. Beyond diversification of Arab Gulf economies and creating more space for the private sector, which presents great potential for further integration, there are still multiple fields of cooperation between these states with future plans like the railway project linking ports on the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea; economic projects that promote and facilitate integration (water connection project, project to connect member states power grids, project to create common air transport etc.); and implementation of a value added tax (VAT) in the GCC states. All of these projects have an economic character and all of them are beneficial for these states. On the other side there are political interests that are often contradictory and limit opportunities for economic cooperation. Thus we have to deal with the duality of relations between members of the GCC. In this sense political and national interests pose threats to the GCC while economic cooperation (especially the diversification of national economies) can be considered as an opportunity for the organization. The potential harmony is clear but the choices made by particular states are not always rational.

References

- Aarts, Paul: "The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?". *Third World Quarterly* 20(5), 1999, pp. 911–925.
- Adler, Emanuel/Barnett, Michael: "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities". *Ethics and International Affairs* 10(1), 1996, pp. 63–98.

23 Darrat, Ali/Shamsi, Fatima: "On the Part of Integration in the Gulf Region". *Applied Economics* 37(9), 2007, p. 1061.

- Assiri, Abdul Ridha: "The Role of the GCC in Promoting Policies of Regional Coexistence". In: *The Gulf: Challenges of the Future*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research: Dubai 2005.
- Bellamy, Alexander: "Stalled Integration and Perpetual War: The Gulf Cooperation Council". In: Bellamy Alexander (ed.): *Security Communities and their Neighbors. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2004.
- Burke, Edward: *One Blood and One Destiny Yemen's Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council*. London School of Economics and Political Science: London 2012.
- Buzan, Barry/Waever, Ole: *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2003.
- Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*, retrieved 10.01.2018, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125347/1426_GCC.pdf.
- Dadush, Uri: "Regionalism and the Gulf Countries". In: Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirātijyah (eds.): *Human Resources and Development in the Arabian Gulf*. The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research: Abu Dhabi 2010.
- Darrat, Ali/Shamsi, Fatima: "On the Part of Integration in the Gulf Region". *Applied Economics* 37(9), 2007, pp. 1055–1062.
- Deutsch, Karl W: "The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory". In: Said Abdul (ed.): *Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs 1968.
- Gause III, Gregory: "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East". *Journal of International Affairs* 45(2), 1992, pp. 441–469.
- Grabowski, Wojciech: "Stosunki Iranu z państwami arabskimi Zatoki Perskiej". *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* 3(XI), 2014, pp. 165–181.
- Haas Ernst: "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process". *International Organization* 15(3), 1961, pp. 366–392.
- Legrenzi, Mateo: "Did the GCC Make a Difference. Institutional Realities and (Un)intended Consequences". In: Harders Cilja/Legrenzi Mateo (eds.): *Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*. Ashgate: Aldershot/Burlington 2008.
- Nakhleh, Emile: *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Praeger: New York 1986.
- Mawali al-, Nasser: "Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia Effect". *Journal of Economic Integration* 30(3), 2015, pp. 532–552.
- Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, retrieved 15.01.2018, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm.

Salisbury, Peter: *Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War'*. (Middle East and North Africa Program). Chatham House: London 2015.

UAE and Saudis Form New Partnership Separate from GCC, retrieved 04.01.2018, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/uae-saudi-arabia-form-political-partnership-171205075923016.html>.

Paulina Napierała

9. The Influence of Religion on American Policy toward Israel: Is FPA a Useful Tool for Analysis?

Abstract: *The article presents an analysis of the influence of religion on American policy toward Israel, concentrating on a specific set of beliefs known as Christian Zionism. Although it is commonly thought that Christian Zionism is a new phenomenon, strictly connected with the views represented by the American Christian Right, the author of this article agrees with scholars who stress that in fact it was theologically influential long before the creation of the movement. Additionally, the examples presented in the article demonstrate that Christian Zionism influenced not only American theological thought but also (to a certain degree) American policy – first toward the territory of Palestine, and later toward the state of Israel. Christian Zionists (representing both, premillennial and postmillennial approaches) created various effective lobbying organizations in order to pressure the US government. Therefore, the hypothesis of the text concerns the possibility of using FPA for the analysis of their influence on the US foreign policy decision-making process. It seems that the impact of (this specific form of) religion on American policy toward Palestine/Israel – at least since the early 20th century – can be analyzed through such FPA models that take into consideration pressure groups' influence on the foreign policy decision-making process.*

Keywords: religion, Christian Zionism, FPA, Christian Right, Israel, Promised Land

Introduction

The article discusses the influence of religion on American policy toward Israel, focusing on a specific set of beliefs known as Christian Zionism. Most generally, Christian Zionism is a belief that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, is in accordance with biblical prophecy. Therefore, Israel should be granted unconditional support so that it can survive and thrive.¹ However, finding a precise definition of the term is not so simple. Some historians (e.g. Shalom Goldman) claim that the term was already coined by Theodor Herzl himself – in order to describe Jean-Henri Dunant, the Red Cross founder who attended the first Zionist Conference in

1 Rogers, Paul: *Christian Zionists and Neocons: A Heavenly Marriage*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_2329.jsp.

1897 and supported the creation of a Jewish state. Dunant (raised Calvinist) used mostly humanitarian and moral arguments, rather than religious ones, but Herzl called him a Christian Zionist meaning that he was a non-Jew sympathetic to Zionism.² Some Zionist intellectuals also used the term in a similar manner (e.g. Nahum Sokolow).³ According to Stephan Spector however, such definitions pay insufficient attention to religious concerns, treating “Christian” as a synonym for “Gentile”. As he stresses, many non-Jews have supported Israel for a variety of reasons but they have not all been Christian Zionists⁴. Samuel Goldman agrees with Spector while he also rejects more restrictive definitions which associate Christian Zionists closely with specific commitments, especially a literal interpretation of the Bible.⁵

Usually scholars distinguish two common approaches by which Christian Zionists justify their unconditional support for Israel. One of them is the belief based on the words found in the Book of Genesis 12:3, “I will bless those who bless you, whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you”. The second approach is based on dispensationalist theology, which presents a literal and predictive approach to the Bible and teaches that we are living in the end-times.⁶ The restrictive definitions which tie Christian Zionism to literal readings of the Bible and to dispensationalist ideas are not precise because, as Goldman stresses, throughout history Christians have endorsed Zionist projects on the basis of very different understandings of God’s word and will.⁷

Therefore, he accepts Spector’s definition, which describes “Christian Zionists” as “supporters of a Jewish state in some portion of the biblical Promised Land who draw their main inspiration from Christian beliefs, doctrines, or texts”⁸. Goldman adds that rather than a “unitary movement”, “Christian Zionism is best

2 Goldman, Samuel: *God’s Country. Christian Zionism in America*. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia 2018, p. 3.

3 More about the history of the term: *ibidem*, pp. 3–4.

4 Spector, Stephan: *Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism*. Oxford University Press. New York 2009 referred to [in:] *ibidem*, p. 3.

5 *Ibidem*, p. 3–4.

6 Haija, Rammy M.: “The Armagedon Lobby: Dispensationalist Christian Zionism and the Shaping of US Policy Towards Israel-Palestine”. *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 5(1), 2006, pp. 75–95. Also available at: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/199773/pdf>. Premillennial dispensationalism will be discussed in more detail further in the text.

7 Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 4.

8 *Ibidem*.

understood as a kind of elective affinity among theological, historical, and political themes”. The themes include: covenant (although Christian Zionist views on whether Jews must convert to Christianity before receiving the promised blessing vary, they insist that God maintains an ongoing relationship with the people and the land of Israel); the prophecy of the Promised Land that extends covenant into the future; and cultural affinity, based on shared values and similar institutions.⁹ As such, as he argues, Christian Zionism has been present in American theological thought at least since Puritan times.

However, the term was introduced into the public debate quite recently – around 1980 – after the founding of International Christian Embassy, whose members, calling themselves Christian Zionists, protested Western governments’ refusal to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.¹⁰ Therefore it is often considered a relatively new phenomenon. Additionally, it was soon (almost exclusively) linked with the activity of the American Christian Right – due to the fact that most of the movements’ representatives accepted Christian Zionist ideas¹¹.

Agreeing with Goldman¹² that in fact it was theologically influential long before the creation of the Christian Right, and not only among the dispensational premillennialists but also among postmillennialists and liberal Christians, I present a short history of Christian Zionism, understood according to Spector and Goldman’s definitions, in America. Additionally, noticing that Christian Zionism began to influence American policy toward the Palestine territory at least since the beginning of the 20th century, I am interested in the best method to analyze this influence. While Goldman who points out that “[i]deas linked to Christian Zionism also played an important role in the development of American political thought”, but (due to his expertise in political theology) concentrates on the history of ideas not on politics, I try to go a step further. From the perspective of international relations and foreign policy analysis it is important to consider how Christian Zionist ideas influenced the actual formulation of American foreign policy and to what extent they were effective. Since American Christian Zionists (both from the premillennial and postmillennial backgrounds) often operated

9 *Ibidem*, p. 9.

10 *Ibidem*, p. 167.

11 More in: Haija, Rammy M., *op. cit.*

12 As well as with Caitlin Carenen, Robert O. Smith and Gerald R. McDermott on their research in: Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*; Carenen, Caitlin: *The Fervent Embrace*. New York University Press. New York 2012.

through a number of pressure groups,¹³ I formulate a hypothesis that the influence of Christian Zionism on American policy toward Palestine/Israel (in the 20th and 21st century) can be analyzed by applying certain models of foreign policy analysis (FPA), specifically those that consider the involvement of interest groups in the foreign policy decision-making process. I also try to answer the question whether the alliance with the Christian Right (another strong pressure group) influenced the character of American Christian Zionism and its political activity.

Theoretical Framework

Although scholars nowadays usually agree that religion is one of the many factors influencing international relations,¹⁴ it is important to remember that it stayed on the backburner in the study of international relations (IR) for a long time.¹⁵ This has been especially evident in theoretical approaches.¹⁶ Although, after the end of the Cold War, the role of religion in international affairs started to be

-
- 13 I use a definition of an interest group (a pressure group) that describes it as a group of people who share some interest or set of interests and pursue them through the political system. It is usually formally organized and can be comprised not only of individuals but also of smaller organizations. As such it attempts to influence government policy in its favor by using various methods, including lobbying. Religious groups can also act in this manner. For more about interest groups and religious interest groups: Corbett, Michael/Corbett Julia M.: *Politics and Religion in the United States*. Garland Publishing. New York 1999, pp. 335–378 and *Lobbying for the Faithful: Religious Advocacy Groups in Washington*. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Retrieved 15.04.2018 from: <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/11/21/lobbying-for-the-faithful-exec>.
- 14 More in: Cziomer, Erhard (ed.): *Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*. Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. Kraków 2014, p. 49. More in: Solarz, Anna M./Schreiber, Hanna (eds.): *Religia w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Warszawa 2012; Zenderowski, Radosław: “Religia w teorii stosunków międzynarodowych”. In: Burgoński, Piotr/Gierycz, Michał (eds.): *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*. Elipsa. Warszawa 2014, p. 562.
- 15 Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: “Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding”. *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (1), 2010, p. 3. More in: Fox, Jonathan: “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations”. *The International Studies Review* 3 (3), 2001, pp. 53–73.
- 16 Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*, pp. 548–551; Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: *op. cit.*, p. 4.

noticed,¹⁷ the actual moment when religious actors attracted academia's and the public's attention was when they violently came back to global politics with the events of 9/11, and yet, the theory of IR still has not much to say about it.¹⁸ As many scholars stress, the main schools of thought in international relations have not developed coherent models integrating the religious factor into the theory¹⁹ and many questions regarding how and why religion influences international affairs remain unanswered.²⁰ Therefore, discussing the role of religion and religious groups in contemporary IR, as well as in foreign policy, through which it influences IR, is a very difficult task, especially if one wants to place it in a theoretical frame.

Nevertheless, there has been some reflection on the place of religion in IR theoretical models after 9/11. One group of academics have suggested that religion's return poses a fundamental challenge to IR theory and therefore new and alternative paradigms should be developed,²¹ another group instead have argued that the study of religion in IR does not require a revolution, but rather an evolution in the theoretical frameworks currently at our disposal.²² Additionally, some scholars worked on new approaches incorporating religion not only to IR theory

17 For example, by Samuel Huntington, who has concentrated on religion so much that scholars accused him of overlooking other factors that influence international politics (including economic or social ones). His clash of civilization thesis met with a wide critique. More about Huntington's critique in: Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*, pp. 559–562; Fox, Jonathan/Sandler, Shmuel: *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, London 2004, pp. 115–135.

18 Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*, p. 562.

19 More in: Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*, pp. 562–569; Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: *op. cit.*

20 It does not mean that religion was totally omitted, however, it was almost never analyzed as individual factor, but rather as a part of broader categories, such as culture, civilization or terrorism. More in: Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*, p. 549.

21 Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito, Fabio: "The Return from Exile: An Introduction." In: Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito, Fabio (eds.): *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke; New York 2003, p. 3; Kubalkova, Vidulka: "Toward an International Political Theology." In: Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito, Fabio (eds.): *op. cit.* pp. 79–105; Thomas, Scott: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York; Basingstoke 2005, pp. 72–77.

22 Nexon, Daniel: "Religion and International Relations: No Leap of Faith." In: Snyder, Jack (ed.): *Religion and International Relations Theory*. Columbia University Press: New York: 2011; Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: *op. cit.*

but also to foreign policy analysis, sometimes even trying to connect these two areas.²³

Patrick James and Nukhet Sandal, the representatives of the second group, offered an interesting attempt at incorporating religion into existing IR schools of thought. While declaring that the English School did not use its potential to include religion in its reflections,²⁴ they refuse to analyze constructivism as a separate paradigm or school of thought, “because of an implicit assumption that constructivism is a methodological approach rather than a school of thought by itself. Thus, it can be employed even in the midst of realist and neoliberal paradigms toward their improvement”.²⁵ Therefore they analyze three schools of thought carefully: classical realism, neorealism and neoliberalism, claiming that these have the potential to incorporate religion into their theoretical schemes (sometimes also through what might seem to be a constructivist approach). They stress that religion is not an omnipotent variable, but should rather be investigated as an independent, intervening or dependent variable.²⁶ In classical realism and in neorealism, rational states (that seek power) are the key units of action for policy-making and for policy analysis but, therefore, many scholars have expressed their pessimism about the integration of culture and identity into this school of thought. But as the authors claim, both frameworks allow for the introduction of some independent variables. According to them, “classical realism is most suitable for sub-state accounts of religion. The focus on human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power (...) allows for studies of belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence”.²⁷ Religion as a tool of legitimacy can also be studied under this framework, given the definition of power with a focus on influence. Structural realism is a much more challenging framework.²⁸ And yet, in the authors’ opinion, some ethnic

23 For example, Bettiza, Gregorio: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Desecularization of American Foreign Policy, 1990–2012*, 2012, retrieved 10.02.2018, from http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/728/1/Bettiza_Global_resurgence_religion_2012.pdf; Warner, Carolyn M./Walker, Stephen G.: “Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis”. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, 2011, pp. 113–135.

24 Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: *op. cit.*, p. 4. Zenderowski is of the same opinion.

25 *Ibidem*, p. 7. Other authors stress that although there is room for such factors as norms, values, convictions or identity in constructivism, Alexander Wendt never expressed interest in analyzing religion. More in: Zenderowski, Radosław: *op. cit.*

26 Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: *op. cit.*, p. 6.

27 *Ibidem*, p. 18.

28 *Ibidem*.

conflicts, with their strong religious overtones, could be considered examples of the 'security dilemma' and therefore their explanation could borrow from structural realist terminology.²⁹ In the case of neoliberalism, they suggest that if one wants to look at religious organizations/institutions and related transnational phenomena, it looks like the most suitable framework.³⁰

It seems that for the purpose of this essay, the classical realist framework could be helpful to some degree – if we assume that belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence, may impact the proclivities of some political leaders.³¹ Perhaps, it could also help analyze whether the religious views of Christian Zionists participate in legitimizing some of the state's actions in the Middle East.³² However, it is very complicated and vague to examine the proclivities of all politicians responsible for US policy toward Israel, and although the topic of policy legitimization through the use of religious rhetoric is very interesting and important, it is not the main interest of this essay.

What seems to be true in the case of American Christian Zionists is what Shireen Hunter observes. While admitting that "religion affects the character of international relations (...) by influencing the behavior of states and increasingly non-state actors", she adds that in the case of state actors in democratic systems it often happens through the "activities of religious groups aimed at influencing state behavior".³³ Since many of these organizations, including Christian Zionist ones, have been operating (not only recently but also historically) as quite effective interest groups, we need to use a framework that allows us to examine the role of interests groups in the foreign policy decision-making process.

The so-called foreign policy analysis (FPA), considered by a certain number of scholars as a subfield of IR theory,³⁴ assumes that there are many intrastate actors

29 *Ibidem*, p. 19.

30 *Ibidem*.

31 More in: Hunter, Shireen: *Religion and International Affairs: From Neglect to Over-Emphasis*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/07/religion-and-international-affairs-from-neglect-to-over-emphasis>.

32 Two other approaches on the other hand might be helpful in analyzing other activities of Christian Zionists. It is important to note that they also create organizations that are focused on influencing certain aspects of international relations directly – without the mediation of the state. Their activity in these cases can be considered a transnational phenomenon.

33 Hunter, Shireen: *op. cit.*

34 Hudson, Valerie M.: "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, 2005, p. 1. There is an ongoing debate on this subject.

influencing foreign policy decisions.³⁵ Therefore, it opens the way to include foreign policy pressure groups into the analysis. However, the relationships between FPA and IR theories are complicated. Through adapting a behaviorist approach, FPA departs from classical realism in the sense that a state, although remaining the main actor in international relations, is not considered a homogeneous entity. However, some FPA models (which concentrate only on various state institutions) could be accepted within this framework. Liberalism (which accepts the complex character of the state) is much closer to FPA as well as constructivism (which considers the role of a society and its preferences and assumes that many aspects of IR are socially constructed).³⁶ Valerie M. Hudson stresses that after analyzing the history and trends in the study of FPA, “it is clear that this subfield provides what may be the best conceptual connection to the empirical ground upon which all international relations (IR) theory is based”³⁷ And although not all authors are eager to connect IR theory with FPA, there have been certain attempts to do so.³⁸

While certain FPA models provide the possibility of including pressure groups into the analysis, the question concerning religious interest groups remains open. It is worth mentioning that although originally FPA did not discuss the role of religion specifically,³⁹ with time some scholars decided that religion – as part of culture – can be taken into consideration within FPA. In fact, Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker have shown in their analysis that religion can be included into FPA in many different ways, also at an institutional level.⁴⁰ There are also other recently developed frameworks for the analysis of religion

35 Including domestic pressure groups and public at large. More in: *Ibidem* and in: Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej*. WUJ. Krakow: 2017.

36 More in: Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *op. cit.*; Klotz, Audie/Lynch Cecelia: *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. M.E. Sharpe. London 2007.

37 Hunter, Shireen: *op. cit.*, p. 1. Other scholars however have argued that IR theory and FPA theory may not even be commensurable, e.g. K. Waltz. More in: Waltz, Kenneth N.: “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics.” In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press. New York 1986, pp. 322–346.

38 More in: Bettiza, Gregorio: *op. cit.*

39 Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *op. cit.*, p. 141.

40 Warner, Carolyn M./Walker, Stephen G.: *op. cit.*

in foreign policy that also fall squarely within FPA's theoretical mainstream.⁴¹ However, although religious pressure groups are a specific kind of interest group,⁴² I argue that various Christian Zionist organizations on the American political scene have been operating very much like regular foreign policy interest groups. They have been using similar methods (including lobbying) in order to influence politicians responsible for the formulation of foreign policy toward Israel. Therefore, while adding some constructivist perspectives,⁴³ it seems that their impact on American foreign policy can be analyzed within all FPA models that pay attention to interest groups.⁴⁴ Thus, apart from presenting a short history of Christian Zionism in America, I concentrate on examples of Christian Zionists organizations acting as regular foreign policy interest groups. Then I try to decide which FPA models can be applied.

History of Christian Zionism in the US and the Activity of the First Christian Zionist Pressure Groups

Many scholars derive Christian Zionism from the theological movement known as premillennial dispensationalism,⁴⁵ popularized in the 1970s novel *The Late Great Planet Earth* and the *Left Behind* series co-authored by Christian Right activists. The basic idea of premillennial dispensationalism is that history is divided into several stages that culminate in the return of Jesus who will establish the millennial kingdom. As a theological system it emerged during the early 19th century. It was developed by a Scottish clergyman Edward Irving and an Irish theologian John Nelson Darby who came to America from Plymouth, England. In the early 20th century it gained popularity among American Protestant fundamentalists through the notes of the Scofield Reference Bible.⁴⁶

41 Bettiza gives an example of Haynes' framework. Bettiza, Gregorio: *op. cit.*, p. 68. More in: Haynes, Jeffrey: "Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the U.S., India and Iran: Towards a Research Agenda". *Third World Quarterly* 29 (1), 2008, pp. 143–165.

42 More about it in: Corbett, Michael/Corbett Julia M.: *op. cit.*

43 Especially as understood by James and Sandel.

44 Keeping in mind that not all of them do.

45 Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 4.

46 More in: Marsden, George M.: *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*. W.B. Eerdmans. Grand Rapids, Mich., 1991; Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.* More about the premillennial and dispensationalist approach of the New Christian Right: Lienesch, Michael: *Redeeming America. Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right*. The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 1993, pp. 223–260.

The base of this system is premillennialism which is the belief that Christ will literally reign on the earth for 1,000 years after his Second Coming. His return, the defeat of the Antichrist and establishment of the millennial kingdom is expected soon due to the weak nature of man. While premillennialism is already distinct from the other forms of Christian eschatology such as amillennialism or postmillennialism,⁴⁷ Darby additionally tied some unique features to it.⁴⁸ Most importantly, he emphasized such teachings as “the rapture”,⁴⁹ focused on the rise of the Antichrist, the Battle of Armageddon and the central role that a revived nation-state of Israel would play during the latter days. He divided biblical history into a number of successive economies or administrations, called dispensations,⁵⁰ claiming that the history of the world had reached the last one. The dispensationist timeline included the return of Jews to their land – as a fulfilment of God’s unconditional promises to Israel. As many dispensationalists believe, during the Great Tribulation,⁵¹ 144,000 Jews will convert to Christianity,⁵² meet the Antichrist for the final battle known as Armageddon and help defeat him. After this battle Jesus will return to defeat Satan and establish His Kingdom.⁵³

For many dispensationalists, including evangelicals, the logical outcome of these beliefs is a very protective attitude toward the State of Israel. However, premillennial dispensationalism is a complicated movement with several variants⁵⁴ and in fact “the close association between premillennial dispensationalism and activism on behalf of Israel is a fairly recent development”.⁵⁵ Although Darby

47 The first one views the millennial rule as figurative and non-temporal, the second as occurring prior to the Second Coming of Christ. Lienesh, Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–225.

48 Wagner, Donald: *Christian Zionists, Israel and the ‘Second Coming’*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4930.htm>.

49 In conservative Protestant eschatology, rapture is the name given to the event in which Jesus will descend from Heaven and take the true Christians (together with their bodies) up to Heaven. More in: *ibidem*.

50 A dispensation, according to Darby’s teachings, is a period in which human beings are tested in their obedience to God. More in: Tołwiński, Jan: *Kształtowanie się poglądów amerykańskiego fundamentalizmu protestanckiego od I wojny światowej*. Fundacja Chrześcijańskiej Kultury i Oświaty, Warszawa 2000.

51 A period mentioned by Jesus in the Olivet discourse as a sign that would occur in the end times, marked with a worldwide hardships, disasters and suffering.

52 The rest of them will be condemned and lost.

53 More in: Haija, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*

54 In some versions, the majority of the world’s Jews perish before Christ returns Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 5.

55 *Ibidem*, p. 6.

awaited the fulfilment of the prophecies, he denied politics as a means of hastening or replacing divine intervention. As did most dispensationalists before 1967: they expressed abstract support for the Jewish State, but did not advocate any practical measures on its behalf.⁵⁶ Therefore, Goldman thinks that although “dispensationalist ideas play a crucial role in encouraging favorable attitudes toward Israel among America’s conservative Protestants,”⁵⁷ it is important not to exaggerate their role in the development of the idea.

Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that the story of Christian Zionism is much more complicated⁵⁸. According to some authors, “[i]ts sources stretch back to the English Reformation—and, in some ways, to the early church.”⁵⁹ In America the story of Christian Zionism started with Increase Mather and the Puritans.⁶⁰ And although John Winthrop’s “City Upon a Hill”, which included an analogy between Puritan collective purpose and biblical Israel, was popularly interpreted as implying that the Puritans of New England regarded themselves as the new Israel, for the most prominent Puritan preachers it was not that simple. Such an interpretation is connected with supersessionism or (pejoratively) replacement theology which suggests that “as the lord elected Israel to serve Him in biblical times, so He selected America to do His work in the modern age.”⁶¹ However a closer look at Winthrop’s and other Puritan theologians’ writings proves that they called their brethren to be *like* Israel,⁶² while stressing that God’s relationship with the original chosen people remained in effect. Goldman traces the origins of Puritan thinking to chiliasm, rejected by Catholicism (which chose a figurative approach to ‘millennium’, considering the church as the successor to biblical Israel) but revived during the Reformation (although not accepted by Calvin), and although in a specific sense Puritan America was considered a new Zion, the Puritan leaders kept in mind an idea popularized by rabbi Menasseh

56 *Ibidem.*

57 *Ibidem.*

58 Samuel Goldman analyzed the history of Christian Zionism and its various strands most comprehensively, therefore I extensively refer to his research.

59 According to Robert O. Smith and Gerald R. McDermott. More about these opinions: in Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 7; 167.

60 I also presented this topic in the review: Napierala, Paulina: “God’s Country. Christian Zionism in America”, *Political Theology* 2018, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1462317X.2018.1505380>.

61 Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 8.

62 *Ibidem*, p. 8; 18.

Ben Israel, that those who help the Jews before their return to the Promised Land, would be blessed by God.⁶³

The Puritan assumptions about the restoration of Israel remained widespread among American Protestants and intact in the theological thought of the famous First Awakening preacher Jonathan Edwards. What is interesting about the idea usually ascribed to Darby is that the Jews are destined to return to the Promised Land and play a leading role in the millennium (albeit in a converted state) had already been present in Edwards' writings. Although he was technically a postmillennialist who expected Christ's return *after* the millennium, he foresaw that a Jerusalem inhabited by Jews would be the capital of the kingdom of God.⁶⁴ While he did not advocate any political action but rather spiritual help for the Jews in the inevitable restoration of Israel, there were numerous other theologians, especially during and after the revolutionary period, who discussed the role of the American Republic in Jewish restoration, including David Austin, Elias Boudinot, John McDonald, Ethan Smith or even Joseph Smith.

Although, as Goldman stresses, it was not until the 19th century that there was a definite transition from restorationism to Zionism, this change can be at least partly attributed to the ideas of the Second Great Awakening⁶⁵. In particular, the development and popularization of postmillennial thinking brought important changes in the perception of the role of human activity in fulfilling the divine plan.⁶⁶ Postmillennial theologians began to believe that it was their duty to take part in bringing Jews to their promised Holy Land. Most of them thought that Jews would have to convert to Christianity beforehand.⁶⁷ Therefore, the practical Christian contribution toward the Jewish restoration was initially considered as evangelization. However, an active attitude was also encouraged by prophecy interpretations developing in Britain and by the growth of Jewish communities

63 Although they believed that the salvation of Israel will occur in a miraculous fashion. More in: *ibidem*, p. 72.

64 *Ibidem*, p. 7; More about Edwards: p. 45–46; 49; 51; Edward's writings in: Choiński, Michał/Kwiatkowski, Piotr/Sierotnik Zuzanna (eds./transl.), *Jonatha Edwards. Wybór pism*. Wrocław 2014.

65 More about the Second Great Awakening: Siemieniewski, Andrzej: *Ewangelikalna duchowość nowego narodzenia a tradycja katolicka*. Papieski Fakultet Teologiczny. Wrocław 1997.

66 Charles Finney stressed "human work": intentional action of pious men and women.

67 Although some started to read prophesies as allowing for the return to Palestine even before their awaited conversion to Christianity. More in: Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 73–74.

in the US. By the 1820s there were several organizations developed to help Jews, including: The Female Society of Boston, Vicinity for Promoting Christianity among the Jews and American Society for Meliorating the Condition of the Jews (ASMCI). Although they concentrated on evangelization, Boudinot, the first president of ASMCI, stressed that its goal was also to help people of Israel return physically to God's country.⁶⁸

In the wake of the Civil War a new theological approach started to gain influence in the US – the aforementioned premillennialism – and despite Darby's insistence on the distance between Israel and the church, as well as politics and religion, some “more flexible premillennialists suggested that these categories were not absolutely separate”⁶⁹. A fusion of dispensationalism as an interpretative strategy rather than doctrine with an active attitude and positive conceptions of American destiny was represented by William Eugene Blackstone.⁷⁰ He is most known for *The Blackstone Memorial* but he also organized a number of events, including a Conference of Israelites and Christians Regarding Their Mutual Relations and Welfare. In 1891 he prepared a petition to the President of the US. Although the *Memorial* was largely consistent with premillennialism, there were no explicitly dispensationalist arguments⁷¹. It rather appealed to humanitarian considerations and to the idea that the US was an instrument in fulfilling God's plan. As such it received endorsement from a number of American clergy and was presented to President Harrison.⁷² Blackstone is also known for justifying political Zionism with the verses of a minor prophet, Zephaniah.⁷³ In 1916 he composed a second version of his memorial for submission to President Wilson, who reportedly was excited by the prospect of active help in Jewish restoration.⁷⁴ Among the memorial's signatories were theological and political liberals, which proves that Christian Zionism was not exclusively associated with apocalyptic eschatology.

For premillennialists and dispensationalists, the restoration of the Jews was bound to the idea of the Second Coming. For liberal Protestants (linked to

68 *Ibidem*, p. 73.

69 *Ibidem*, p. 92.

70 *Ibidem*.

71 *The Blackstone Memorial, 1891*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20061006235327/http://www.amfi.org/blackmem.htm>.

72 *Goldman, Samuel: op. cit.*, p. 94. It was six years before Herzl's first Zionist conference.

73 *Ibidem*, p. 95. It can be considered a symbolic moment for transition from restorationism to Zionism.

74 *Ibidem*, p. 98.

postmillennialism, open to a dialog with modern science and denying the personal return of Christ), as Goldman stresses, it was part of establishing a righteous world order.⁷⁵ However, liberals were divided on the question of the right of the Arab population to national self-determination. Some of them were ready to accept a 'limited' or 'moderate' form of Zionism and opted for a binational vision of Palestine's future. Others thought that Jewish domination, despite the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, was inevitable.⁷⁶ With the events in the Third Reich more liberals were in favor of Jewish statehood regardless of the situation of the Arab population. Reinhold Niebuhr, who soon became the most vocal liberal Protestant supporter of the state of Israel, was one of them. He tried to explain it by stating that Arabs have a weaker bond to the land and a weaker sense of nationhood⁷⁷.

A complicated international situation led to the creation of new organizations. In 1932 the American Palestine Committee (APC) and the Pro-Palestine Federation of America (PPFA) were established. The APC was designed to appeal to political figures and included several US senators, while the PPFA (more religiously focused) organized lectures and published pamphlets. They were active for a short time but soon – after the British White Paper of 1939 (restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine) – a new one was formed: The Christian Leaders, Clergymen and Laymen, on Behalf of Jewish Immigration into the Palestine Federation. It included Niebuhr and other prominent liberal Christians as members. Additionally, after the war broke out, the international Zionist movement organized the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs (ECZA) in the US, sponsoring non-Jewish affiliates as part of its lobbying strategy. In 1941 the APC was revived and in 1942 the Christian Committee on Palestine (CCP) was created (with Niebuhr as its charter member). The APC intensified efforts to appeal to politicians, including then Senator Harry Truman.⁷⁸

While the Federal Council of Churches (a liberal umbrella group) was concerned with Arab rights, the APC and CCP intensified efforts to create a Jewish state regardless of this problem. They combined religious, political and

75 *Ibidem*, p. 100.

76 Emerson Fosdick and John Haynes Holmes presented moderate views. More in: *ibidem*, pp. 103–107.

77 Niebuhr admitted that Zionist demands entailed injustice to the Arab population but claimed that denying a state to Jews would entail more injustice. He perceived Palestinian Arabs as "generic Arabs rather than a distinct people attached to a particular place". *Ibidem*, p. 117.

78 *Ibidem*, pp. 112–114.

humanitarian arguments with intensified lobbying.⁷⁹ In 1946 the APC and CCP merged into American Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC) and continued their efforts. All these activities in connection with the political situation in the aftermath of the Holocaust, influenced the decision concerning the creation of the state of Israel. Although it has been debated which factors mostly contributed to President Truman's swift recognition of Israel's statehood in 1948, he told the audience of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York: "I am Cyrus".⁸⁰

This short historical review shows that for a long time the most visible American Christian supporters of the Zionist movement and later, the State of Israel were theological liberals who rejected dispensationalism, not evangelicals and fundamentalists.⁸¹ However, soon after the creation of the state of Israel, liberal Protestants became critical of its militant policy. The tension occurred after a short period of fascination, mutual promotion and cooperation. The former supporters (now concerned with Israel's militarization and strong nationalism) intertwined theological, moral and political arguments to express their disappointment. There was also the change in rhetoric justifying the US relations with Israel. When the Cold War overshadowed all other concerns, the "common Judeo-Christian civilization" argument proved to be useful and convincing. But after "David became Goliath"⁸², as liberal Protestants put it, there was a final shift in their attitude toward Israel. The conflicts in the Middle East coincided with the Vietnam War and caused the mainstream intellectuals and clergy to drift away from Israel after 1967.⁸³

The withdrawal of liberal Christian's support for Israel's military actions, however, left room for a different group's alliance with Israel, and although a new organization called Christians Concerned for Israel (CCI) was created in order to promote a more outspoken and consistent Christian Zionism among adherents of all denominations, it was soon joined by many evangelicals.⁸⁴ It was established shortly after the Six-Day War in June of 1967 by Franklin Littell, out of concern that the France's alliance with Israel in the 1950s and 1960s was

79 *Ibidem*, p. 116.

80 *Ibidem*, p. 120. More in: "I am Cyrus", retrieved 03.03.2018, from: <https://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-99/i-am-cyrus.html>.

81 Goldman, Samuel., op. cit., p. 7. More in: Carenen, Caitlin: *op. cit.*

82 Goldman, Samuel., *op. cit.*, p. 141.

83 More in: *Ibidem*, pp. 141–146. .

84 More about CCI: *Ibidem*, p. 146; American Jewish Archives Collection: *Dr. Franklin Littell on Israel and Christian-Jewish Dialogue*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <http://collections.americanjewisharchives.org/ms/ms0603/cd1077.pdf>.

maintained only out of the strategic interest of retaining control over the Suez Canal. Its establishment initiated a new generation of Christian Zionist organizations, and although CCI preceded the creation of the American Christian Right, they soon joined forces.

Christian Zionism and American Religious Right: Connecting Pressure Groups; Combining Efforts

The newest and best-known history of Christian Zionist activity in the US is connected with the activity of the American Christian Right. The rise of the movement was often called a “political awakening of evangelicals”. In fact, the movement was constructed by Protestant neofundamentalists who managed to politically mobilize a great number of conservative evangelical Christians. However, currently, the terms ‘evangelical’ and ‘fundamentalist’ are often used interchangeably.⁸⁵ The first central organization of the movement was the Moral Majority, created in 1979 by Jerry Falwell and several members of the New Right wing within the Republican Party. With time there were numerous organizations created within the movement. Most of them have been involved either in direct lobbying or placing pressure on politicians through other means, including mobilizing voters, media campaigns or employing grassroots efforts.

Despite the fact that the main focus of the movement was domestic policy, a lot of its members accepted premillennial dispensationalism and believed that Israel is at the center of God’s plan while the Armagedon is near. Therefore, many of them welcomed the initiatives of the new Christian Zionist organizations. Goldman stresses, however, that Christian fundamentalists had to modify Darby’s ideas in order to adapt them to modern times and to political activity. Interestingly, it was the Christian fiction (*The Late Great Planet Earth* and *Left Behind* series) that turned out to be helpful in this respect. As a result, Jerry Falwell soon incorporated Christian Zionist ideas.

In 1978 he said: “I believe that if we fail to protect Israel we will cease to be important to God... we can and must be involved in guiding America towards a biblical position regarding her stand on Israel”.⁸⁶ Lienesch argues, however, that before “millennial mentalities” started shaping the Christian Right’s attitude to

85 Despite the fact that fundamentalists significantly changed the character of American Evangelicalism.

86 As quoted in: Urban, Hugh B.: *America, Left Behind. Bush, the Neoconservatives, and Evangelical Christian Fiction*, retrieved 10.09.2007, from <http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2006/2006-2.html>.

foreign policy issues, the movement's early support for Israel was rather a result of its strong anti-communism in the Middle East.⁸⁷

With time many members of the Christian Right became involved in the activity of the existing Christian Zionist organizations (especially CCI) and soon also established new ones. Among the most active and vocal activists, were Hal Lindsey, John Hagee, Tim LaHaye, Jerry Jenkins, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, and more recently David Brog (to name a few). Among the new Christian Zionist organizations there were: Bridges for Peace (1976), the National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI) (1978), the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ) (1980), the International Christian Zionist Center (and ICZC USA) (1981), the "Exobus Project" (1990), the Christian Friends of Israel (and CFI-USA) (1990s) and more recently, Christians United for Israel (CUFI) (2006). They were designed to promote Israel, generate material help during Israel's military conflicts, provide financial help to the Israeli settlers or even transport new settlers from the former Soviet Union. Many of them also focused strongly on pressuring the US government to support Israel in all possible ways.⁸⁸ As it turned out the CUFI, with its strongest ties to the Christian Right, has been most active in this respect. It was initiated by John Hagee, the influential Texas minister, and is currently considered the most important and effective grassroots movement focused on support for Israel in the US.⁸⁹ The strategy of CUFI is very precisely designed. The organization is supposed to encourage its members to personally speak with their elected officials, inform them on every congressional representative and senator's votes concerning Israel, and organize rapid response alerts in order to mobilize CUFI members at critical junctures to generate millions of phone calls and emails requesting support for Israel from the administration and Congress.⁹⁰ Since its creation CUFI has invited important politicians to speak at such events as the Values Voters' Summit, CUFI's Washington Summit and the Night to Honor Israel and awarding those politicians who help the Christian Zionist cause.

87 Lienesch, Michael: *op. cit.*, pp. 224–225.

88 In this text, I will discuss the activities of these Christian Zionist organizations that have concentrated directly on lobbying the US government.

89 More about its mission in: CUFI: *Mission and Vision*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org/impact/about-us/mission-and-vision/>.

90 More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*. Zed Books: New York 2008.

Attempts of the New Generation of Christian Zionist Organizations to Influence American Foreign Policy Decisions

According to Professor Paul Rogers, it was the Six-Day War in 1967 that gave impetus to the Christian Zionists' renewed political engagement.⁹¹ While criticizing France's policy toward the Middle East, CCI advocated that the US alliance with Israel should be unconditional and based not on political motivations but on religious foundations.⁹² Christian Zionists became active again in March 1977, after President Carter's statement that Palestinians deserve a right to their homeland⁹³. Immediately, the pro-Israel lobby responded and this mobilized a number of evangelicals. They used ads in major US newspapers to stress their belief that Israel is for the Jewish people.⁹⁴ Soon after that, Littell and CCI engaged themselves in a campaign opposing the sale of F-15s and other reconnaissance equipment to the US' Middle East ally, Saudi Arabia. What is interesting, even though Israel and the Israeli lobby in the US also applied heavy pressure on Congress and President Carter to withdraw from the sale, their action remained unsuccessful. The situation changed only after the CCI and a considerable number of the future members of the RR (Religious Right) stepped in. Franklin Littell helped organize a considerable number of evangelical Christians to head to Washington DC and successfully called on the Carter administration to block the sale.⁹⁵

The next attempt by Christian Zionists to influence US foreign policy came about during the mobilization in Washington against the sale of AWACS to the Saudis in the 1980s.⁹⁶ However, this time the movement was not so successful, despite the fact that Ronald Reagan expressed his belief in a final Battle of

91 Rogers, Paul, *op. cit.*

92 Hajja, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 78.

93 I have also discussed some of the following facts in my article: "Christian Zionism and its Influence on American Foreign Policy". In: Mania, Andrzej/Laidler, Paweł/Wordliczek, Łukasz (eds.): *U.S. Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanisms and Practice*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2007, pp. 539–548. The information below however has been extended, completed and updated for the purpose of this essay.

94 Wagner, Donald: *Bible and Sword: US Christian Zionists Discover Israel*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4950.htm>.

95 Hajja, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 79. Some of the cases mentioned in this text were also analyzed in my previous article: "Christian Zionism and its Influence on American Foreign Policy" (2007).

96 Hajja, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 79.

Armageddon on several public occasions and presented himself as an ally of the newly created Moral Majority. The fact that this time Christian Zionists did not manage to block the sale, led them to a very important decision. Franklin Littell chose to unite American Christian Zionists under the National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI), which was joined by Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority.

Not long after its creation, the NCLCI took part in the campaign postulating repeal of UN Resolution 3379. The Resolution which was introduced at the Conference on Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries in Lima, Peru, in August 1975, and adopted by UN General Assembly, stated that “Zionism is a form of racism and discrimination”.⁹⁷ Interestingly, the efforts of Israeli lobby groups requesting the US to exert pressure on the UN remained ineffective. As previously, it was only when the Christian Right lobby joined the campaign that officials in Washington began responding to pressure. In the end, the efforts proved fruitful and the resolution condemning Zionism was overturned in 1991 (during the George H.W. Bush administration). However, George H.W. Bush was never on good terms with the Christian Right and apart from the actions initiated much earlier, Christian Zionists did not manage to achieve much during his administration. This was also the case during the Clinton administration.

The situation radically changed after the election of President George W. Bush. Researchers agree that Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell and Hal Lindsay played a crucial role in encouraging Islamophobia in the US and abroad after the events of 9/11, through their sermons, broadcasts, writings and briefings. The result of their rhetorical exercises was that the “war on terror” became synonymous with the “war on Islam”.⁹⁸ Scholars also agree that Bush’s administration proved to be the most supportive toward Israel of all post-war administrations. However, some of them, including Lee Marsden, are not entirely sure “to what extent this was due to Christian Right influence as opposed to Bush’s own objectives or neo-conservative influence”.⁹⁹ Hugh Urban stresses that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the influence of neoconservatives from the influence of Christian Zionists¹⁰⁰. He explains that there is much similarity between the evangelical story of the imminent return of Christ in the Holy Land beginning a New Millennium and the neoconservative vision of a “New American Century”. In his opinion, this “subtle but powerful fit,” in the end helped them to reinforce each

97 *Ibidem.*

98 More in: Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, *op. cit.*

99 *Ibidem.*

100 He focuses especially on the authors of the *Left Behind* series.

other in very effective ways.¹⁰¹ Therefore, it is useful to analyze at least some of the decisions that Christian Zionists were attempting to influence.

In April 2002, following a Palestinian suicide attack in Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded several West Bank cities. International opinion opposed the action arguing that such destruction would not solve anything. G.W. Bush initially avoided any comments, though, following international pressure, he finally made several appeals to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to cease the Israeli actions. The response from American Christian Zionists was immediate. According to Professor Wagner: “The Pro-Israel lobby, in coordination with the Christian Right, mobilized over 100,000 e-mail messages, calls and visits urging the President to avoid restraining Israel. The tactic worked. The president uttered not another word of criticism or caution, and Sharon continued the offensive.”¹⁰²

Christian Zionists pressured the US government again after the attempted assassination of militant Palestinian Islamist Abdel Aziz Rantisi. In June 2003 in a helicopter raid, the Israeli Air Force killed six people, but Rantisi escaped with non-life threatening injuries. President Bush initially condemned the action.¹⁰³ However, after Christian Zionists mobilized evangelicals to send thousands of e-mails to the White House protesting the criticism, there was a notable change in tone by the President. Stephen Zunes emphasizes that a key element of these e-mails was the threat that if the pressure on Israel continued, religious conservatives would stay home on Election Day.¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, when Rantisi actually fell victim to a successful Israeli assassination in April 2004, the administration largely defended the Israeli action.¹⁰⁵

The next example relates to the US’ endorsement of the “Roadmap” plan. In the spring of 2003, President Bush stated his commitment to establishing progress toward peace in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. He also pledged to establish

101 Urban, Hugh B.: *op. cit.* Oldfield also stresses, the neoconservative idea of unilateralism was reinforced by Christian Zionists although roots of this conviction are different for both groups. Oldfield, Duane: *The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism: The Christian Right’s Influence and How to Counter it*, retrieved 03.03.2018, from: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5889.htm>.

102 Wagner, Donald: “Marching to Zion: The Evangelical-Jewish Alliance”. *Christian Century*, June 28, 2003, pp. 20–24, quoted in: Haija, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 90.

103 Haija, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 92.

104 Zunes, Stephen: “The Influence of the Christian Right on U.S. Middle East Policy”. *Middle East Policy* 12(2), 2005, p. 73 (6).

105 Haija, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 92. Bush administration also defended the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004.

a democratic Palestinian state. In June 2003 the US acted as a third-party mediator at a meeting between Ariel Sharon and the newly appointed first Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas in Aquaba in Jordan. When, shortly after this event, Bush affirmed his commitment to the 'Roadmap', a Christian Zionist organization, known as the Apostolic Congress, mobilized its constituents to send over 50,000 postcards to the White House, opposing any plan that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The same organization also placed billboards in 23 cities with a quotation from Genesis, which mentioned God's Covenant with Israel.¹⁰⁶ After receiving this message from potential electoral supporters, President Bush and his administration decided not to apply any further pressure to the peace process until after the 2004 presidential elections.

Then the newly created CUFI proved to be effective in July 2006, as the conflict in northern Israel and Lebanon heated up. It managed to mobilize around 3,500 conservative evangelicals from all 50 states to come to Washington DC and show their support for Israel. Members of CUFI urged lawmakers to let Israel do what is necessary to defend itself in its current conflict.¹⁰⁷ The group also came together for a "Christians for Israel" dinner that featured Senator Rick Santorum and other powerful political officials, including Ken Mehlman, director of the Republican National Committee.¹⁰⁸ And although the White House spokesman, Tony Snow, claimed that President Bush does not look at the Middle East conflict from a theological perspective, to many researchers, it was clear that, the White House and Republicans in Congress take the views of evangelical Christians on the matter of Israel and a number of other matters very seriously.¹⁰⁹

Most scholars agree that Christian Zionists were effective in pressuring G.W. Bush to abandon his previous condemnation of Israeli incursions into Hebron and targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders in 2002 and 2003. They also recognize CUFI's success in efforts to persuade the President to allow Israel more time to weaken Hezbollah and Hamas not only during Israel's attacks on Southern Lebanon in 2006 but also on Gaza in 2008/9. However, for some of them, the fact that Bush eventually pledged the US to a two-state solution in 'Roadmap' and 'Annapolis' meant that he had disregarded the opinions of Christian Zionists.

106 More in: Rick Perlstein: *In Line for the Rapture*, retrieved 25.05.2004, from <http://www.alternet.org/story/18780>, referred to in: Haija, Rammy M.: *op. cit.*, p. 92.

107 Tapper, Jake/Morris Dan: *Save Israel, for Jesus?*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://abcnews.go.com/nightline/story?id=2258864&page1>.

108 *Ibidem.*

109 *Ibidem.*

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that after their protests, G.W. Bush in fact stopped advocating the 'Roadmap' until after the end of the election 2004 campaign, and in practice until 2007, when Annapolis negotiations started.¹¹⁰ The fear of losing an important segment of the Republican Party electorate was too great. What is also important, during the Annapolis Conference, Christian Zionists were again active. They protested certain solutions, for example, Prime Minister Olmert's indication that he would be willing to give up parts of East Jerusalem, and although this time it was not only due to Christian Zionists' efforts that the peace process ended without success, their activity added to such a result.

Although during the Obama administration, the influence of the Christian Right on certain aspects of American policy remained in place (e.g. through previous faith-based initiatives offices nominations),¹¹¹ the President seemed to be immune to Christian Zionist pressures. Therefore, he was criticized by CUFI many times during both his terms in the office, and called anti-Semitic¹¹². In fact Obama's policy toward Israel was ambiguous, generally due to his disappointment with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After he publicly criticized the US President for signing the Iran Nuclear Deal and implied that he would prevent any Palestinian state from ever coming into existence,¹¹³ on December 23, 2016 the United States abstained from (previously vetoed) United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 that called for a Palestinian state,

110 It is also important to note that in 2004 G.W. Bush stated: "In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949 ... It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities". In: *The Mideast Turmoil*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/world/the-mideast-turmoil-for-bush-and-sharon-confidence-and-realities-are-crucial.html>.

111 More in: Bettiza, Gregorio: *op. cit.*

112 Cohen, Ariel: *Christians United for Israel Chairman John Hagee Tells Jewish Audience that Obama is Anti-Semitic*, retrieved 13.03.2018, from <http://www.jpost.com/Christian-News/Christians-United-for-Israel-Chairmans-John-Hagee-tells-Jewish-audience-that-Obama-is-Anti-Semitic-382675>.

113 Bresnahan, John/Dovere, Edward-Iaac: *Exclusive: Obama Brushed off Reid's Plea on Palestinian State*, retrieved 10.02.2018, from <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/reid-obama-israel-palestinians-netanyahu-united-nations-214011>.

effectively allowing it to pass.¹¹⁴ This decision met with strong criticism from CUFI. Christian Zionist groups organized multiple actions against it.¹¹⁵ In effect on January 5, 2017, the House of Representatives voted to condemn the UN Resolution.

Also, Donald Trump did not seem to be the perfect presidential candidate for the Christian Right. However, “during his campaign, Trump offered conservative evangelicals a deal: help him take the White House and he would make them more politically powerful than ever before.”¹¹⁶ They decided to take the deal, overlooked his character flaws and helped him win office.¹¹⁷ Interestingly, although Donald Trump is rather known for failing to honor his debts, in this case, he is fully repaying his evangelical supporters. Since he was elected, he had appointed a number of them to office, including Mike Pence, Jeff Sessions, Neil Gorsuch, Ben Carson, Betsy DeVos, Mike Pompeo, Scott Pruitt and Rick Perry. He used their religious rhetoric on many occasions, including the introduction of the President’s Executive Order 13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”, and often referred to as the ‘Muslim ban’ or the ‘travel ban’.¹¹⁸ His speeches included such statements as stating terrorism is “a battle between good and evil,” Islam “hates us”.¹¹⁹ And, most importantly for Christian Zionists, he announced that the US would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel already on December 6, 2017. Later he also decided that the US would move its embassy from Tel Aviv to the Holy City.

114 More in: Avishaifeb, Bernard: *A Plan for Peace that Still Could be*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/magazine/13Israel-t.html>; Bresnahan, John/Dovere, Edward-Iaac: *op. cit.*

115 CUFI: *Christians United for Israel News*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org.uk/news/pastor-john-hagee-not-president-obama-the-un-the-eu-nor-iran-hezbollah-or-hamas-can-remove-gods-blessing-from-israel/>; CUFI: *Our Response to the Obama Administration’s Betrayal of Israel*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from http://support.cufi.org/site/MessageViewer?current=true&em_id=75968.0.

116 Montgomery, Peter: *The Religious Right Moves to Cement Political Power under President Trump*, retrieved 10.11.2017, from <http://prospect.org/article/religious-right-moves-cement-political-power-under-president-trump>.

117 *Ibidem.*

118 It was in effect from January 27, 2017, until March 16, 2017, when it was superseded by Executive Order 13780.

119 More in: Green, Emma: *How Religion Made a Global Comeback in 2017*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/religion-trump/548780/>.

CUFI, praising the decision, also stressed that it was largely the effect of their intensive campaign. As they wrote:

CUFI has made moving the embassy to Jerusalem a central focus of its 2017 agenda. The group's founder and Chairman, Pastor John Hagee, has used White House audiences with Pres. Trump and Vice Pres. Mike Pence to urge them to move the embassy. Days before Pres. Trump's inauguration, the CUFI Action Fund held a Washington fly-in during which more than 260 leaders representing 49 states urged that the embassy be moved. And CUFI members have sent more than 137,000 emails to the White House in support of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.¹²⁰

Apart from the decision concerning Jerusalem, CUFI reported other victories in 2017 and announced them on its website:

Over 1,000,000 emails to Congress in support of the Taylor Force Act. In December, the House of Representatives passed the Taylor Force Act and sent it to the Senate. (...). Over 43,000 emails to Congress in support of Hezbollah sanctions. In October, less than a month after CUFI began flooding Capitol Hill inboxes, the House and Senate passed legislation designed to cripple Hezbollah's international financing. Nearly 30,000 emails to the Senate in support of David Friedman's nomination. CUFI members helped secure the confirmation of Friedman as US Ambassador to Israel.¹²¹

The website also informs that already in April 2017 "CUFI's top leadership was invited to the White House and met privately with Vice President Mike Pence and President Donald Trump to discuss the importance of America's support for Israel".¹²² This suggests that certain promises were made to the Christian Zionist movement as soon as there was a change in the White House.

What is interesting however is that Donald Trump never used the term "undivided" when talking about Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.¹²³ Additionally, while Christian Zionists celebrated White House support for their cause, his

120 CUFI: *CUFI Welcomes Pres. Trump's Jerusalem Policy*, retrieved 10.04.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org/cufi-welcomes-pres-trumps-jerusalem-policy/>.

121 CUFI: *We Grew Our IMPACT*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from http://support.cufi.org/2017/CUFIin2017.html?_ga=2.59172141.1284017311.1525208423-177597460.1525208423.

122 *Ibidem*.

123 Some commentators suggest that by avoiding the term "undivided capital of Israel", he left the door open for Israelis and Palestinians to divide the city during any final status negotiations between the two sides. More in: Williams, Jennifer/Wildman Sarah: *Trump's Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's Capital, Explained*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/6/16741528/trump-jerusalem-speech-israel-tel-aviv>.

administration was busy making a deal with an Islamic state. According to The New York Times, around the time of CUFU-Trump negotiations on Jerusalem, Jared Kushner, a senior advisor to the President, was involved in negotiating the sale of arms (worth over a billion dollars) to Saudi Arabia¹²⁴. Therefore, it is very likely that the use of Christian Zionist rhetoric, as well as moving the embassy to Jerusalem might only be symbolic gestures which prove that the current administration uses religious arguments instrumentally – in order to achieve bigger geopolitical goals. However, even if Donald Trump's initial intention was to use the RR rhetoric only instrumentally, the actual decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem caused serious consequences, influencing an already tense situation in the Middle East leading to riots, destabilization and bloodshed.

Conclusions

The analysis presented above proves that Christian Zionism is not a new phenomenon in the US. What is more, at least since the 20th century, Christian Zionists have been trying to influence American foreign policy concerning Israel operating through various organizations. Many of these organizations acted as regular interest groups, using pressurizing methods, including lobbying. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the influence of Christian Zionism on US foreign policy through FPA. The most useful FPA models in this case seem to include the political process model, the governmental bargaining model or, as postulated by Pugacewicz, the neopluralist theory of decision making¹²⁵. These schemes allow for the incorporation of interest groups into foreign policy analysis, and prove to be helpful in tracing overlapping or conflicting interests and in deciding which groups were most effective.

Referring to the question whether the alliance with the Christian Right influenced the character of American Christian Zionism and its political activity, I must say it did. Although Goldman seems to be suggesting that the concern and the wave of attention given to Christian Zionism as adapted by the Christian Right is exaggerated, it actually seems that this new version is in fact more aggressive than previous ones. Goldman admits that after the Six-Day War, tracking the signs of times became an obsession among fundamentalists and evangelicals, but he also stresses that attributing the beliefs of all Christian Zionists “to unsettling eschatological visions” and

124 *\$110 Billion Weapons Sale to Saudis has Jared Kushner's Personal Touch*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/middleeast/jared-kushner-saudi-arabia-arms-deal-lockheed.html>.

125 Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *op. cit.*, pp. 235–249.

depicting them “as a radical and potentially subversive influence on the United States, Israel, the Middle East, and the world” is not fully accurate (and often serves political reasons)¹²⁶. However, it is a fact that most of the currently existing Christian Zionist organizations and especially those associated with the Christian Right actually draw from the modification (and politicization) of Darby’s ideas. Additionally, their programs became firmly combined with a strong sense of Islamophobia and with the promotion of the ‘war on terror’ presented simply as the ‘war on Islam’. What is more, unconditional support for the State of Israel, presented by most prominent American Christian Zionists, does not necessarily entail sympathy for the Jews as a nation or for Judaism as a religion. Hal Lindsay and Pat Robertson are known for their anti-Semitic remarks. Being associated with the movement that has become a very important voting bloc in the US has great significance – although Goldman argues that the Christian Right is just one of many interest groups in the US (and not the strongest one). The example of President Trump’s decision to move the American embassy to Jerusalem, most likely initially intended only as a symbolic gesture satisfying the expectations of the Religious Right voting bloc, shows that the international consequences of such decisions might be very serious. Therefore, the influence on American foreign policy of such a form of religion as contemporary Christian Zionism cannot be ignored.

References

- Avishaifeb, Bernard: *A Plan for Peace that Still Could be*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/magazine/13Israel-t.html>.
- Bettiza, Gregorio: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Desecularization of American Foreign Policy, 1990–2012*, 2012, retrieved 10.02.2018, from http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/728/1/Bettiza_Global_resurgence_religion_2012.pdf.
- Bresnahan, John/Dovere, Edward-Iaac: *Exclusive: Obama Brushed off Reid’s Plea on Palestinian State*, retrieved 10.02.2018, from <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/reid-obama-israel-palestinians-netanyahu-united-nations-214011>.
- Carenen, Caitlin: *The Fervent Embrace*. New York University Press: New York 2012.
- Choiński, Michał/Kwiatkowski, Piotr/Sierotnik Zuzanna (eds./transl.), Jonatha Edwards. *Wybór pism*. Wydawnictwo Credo: Wrocław 2014.
- Cohen, Ariel: *Christians United for Israel Chairman John Hagee Tells Jewish Audience that Obama is Anti-Semitic*, retrieved 13.03.2018, from <http://www>.

126 Goldman, Samuel: *op. cit.*, p. 6.

- jpost.com/Christian-News/Christians-United-for-Israel-Chairmans-John-Hagee-tells-Jewish-audience-that-Obama-is-Anti-Semitic-382675.
- Corbett, Michael/Corbett Julia M.: *Politics and Religion in the United States*. Garland Publishing: New York 1999.
- CUFI: *Christians United for Israel News*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org.uk/news/pastor-john-hagee-not-president-obama-the-un-the-eu-nor-iran-hezbollah-or-hamas-can-remove-gods-blessing-from-israel/>.
- CUFI: *CUFI in Action*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org/impact/about-us/cufi-in-action/>.
- CUFI: *CUFI Welcomes Pres. Trump's Jerusalem Policy*, retrieved 10.04.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org/cufi-welcomes-pres-trumps-jerusalem-policy/>.
- CUFI: *Mission and Vision*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.cufi.org/impact/about-us/mission-and-vision/>.
- CUFI: *Our Response to the Obama Administration's Betrayal of Israel*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from http://support.cufi.org/site/MessageViewer?current=true&em_id=75968.0.
- CUFI: *We Grew Our IMPACT*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from http://support.cufi.org/2017/CUFIin2017.html?_ga=2.59172141.1284017311.1525208423-177597460.1525208423.
- Cziomer, Erhard (ed.): *Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*. Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego: Kraków 2014.
- Dr. Franklin Little on Israel and Christian-Jewish Dialogue*, retrieved: 10.03.2018, from <http://collections.americanjewisharchives.org/ms/ms0603/cd1077.pdf>.
- Fox, Jonathan: "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations". *The International Studies Review* 3 (3), 2001, pp. 53–73.
- Fox, Jonathan/Sandler Shmuel: *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: London 2004.
- George, Marsden: *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*. W.B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, Mich., 1991.
- Goldman, Samuel: *God's Country. Christian Zionism in America*. University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia 2018.
- Green, Emma: *How Religion Made a Global Comeback in 2017*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/religion-trump/548780/>.
- Hajja, Rammy M.: "The Armagedon Lobby: Dispensationalist Christian Zionism and the Shaping of US Policy Towards Israel-Palestine". *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 5 (1), 2006, pp. 75–95.
- Hudson, Valerie M.: "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, 2005, pp. 1–30.

- Hunter, Shireen: *Religion and International Affairs: From Neglect to Over-Emphasis*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/07/religion-and-international-affairs-from-neglect-to-over-emphasis>.
- Huntington, Samuel: "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3), 1993, pp. 22–49.
- Kulbakova, Vendulka: *The "Turn to Religion" in International Relations Theory*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/03/the-turn-to-religion-in-international-relations-theory/>.
- Kubalkova, Vidulka: "Toward an International Political Theology." In: Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito (eds.): *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke; New York: 2003, pp. 79–105.
- Lienesch, Michael: *Redeeming America. Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right*. The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 1993.
- Lobbying for the Faithful: Religious Advocacy Groups in Washington. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Retrieved 15.04.2018 from: <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/11/21/lobbying-for-the-faithful-exec>.
- Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*. Zed Books: New York 2008.
- Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy Today*, retrieved 20.02.2018, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/14/the-christian-right-and-us-foreign-policy-today/>.
- Montgomery, Peter: *The Religious Right Moves to Cement Political Power under President Trump*, retrieved 10.11.2017, from <http://prospect.org/article/religious-right-moves-cement-political-power-under-president-trump>.
- Napierała, Paulina: "Christian Zionism and its Influence on American Foreign Policy". In: Mania, Andrzej/Laidler, Paweł/Wordliczek, Łukasz (eds.): *U.S. Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanisms and Practice*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Kraków 2007, pp. 539–548.
- Oldfield, Duane: *The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism: The Christian Right's Influence and How to Counter it*, retrieved 03.03.2018, from: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5889.htm>.
- Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej*. WUJ: Krakow 2017.
- Rogers, Paul: *Christian Zionists and Neocons: A Heavenly Marriage*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_2329.jsp.
- Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick: "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding". *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (1), 2010, pp. 3–25.

- Siemieniewski, Andrzej: *Ewangelikalna duchowość nowego narodzenia a tradycja katolicka*. Papieski Fakultet Teologiczny. Wrocław 1997.
- Solarz, Anna M./Schreiber, Hanna (eds.): *Religia w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego: Warszawa 2012.
- Tapper, Jake/Morris Dan: *Save Israel, for Jesus?*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://abcnews.go.com/nightline/story?id=2258864&page1>.
- The Blackstone Memorial*, 1891, retrieved 10.03.2018, from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20061006235327/http://www.amfi.org/blackmem.htm>.
- The Mideast Turmoil*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/world/the-mideast-turmoil-for-bush-and-sharon-confidence-and-realities-are-crucial.html>.
- Thomas, Scott: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York; Basingstoke 2005.
- Tołwiński, Jan: *Kształtowanie się poglądów amerykańskiego fundamentalizmu protestanckiego od I wojny światowej*. Fundacja Chrześcijańskiej Kultury i Oświaty: Warszawa 2000.
- Urban, Hugh B.: *America, Left Behind. Bush, the Neoconservatives, and Evangelical Christian Fiction*, retrieved 10.09.2007, from <http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2006/2006-2.html>.
- Wagner, Donald: *Bible and Sword: US Christian Zionists Discover Israel*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4950.htm>.
- Wagner, Donald: *Christian Zionists, Israel and the 'Second Coming'*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4930.htm>.
- Warner, Carolyn M./Walker, Stephen G.: "Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, 2011, pp. 113–135.
- Williams, Jennifer/Wildman Sarah: *Trump's Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's Capital, Explained*, retrieved 10.03.2018, from <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/6/16741528/trump-jerusalem-speech-israel-tel-aviv>.
- Zenderowski, Radosław: "Religia w teorii stosunków międzynarodowych". In: Burgoński, Piotr/Gierycz, Michał (eds.): *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*. Elipsa: Warszawa 2014, pp. 546–574.
- Zunes, Stephen: "The Influence of the Christian Right on U.S. Middle East Policy". *Middle East Policy* 12 (2), 2005, pp. 73–78.
- \$110 Billion Weapons Sale to Saudis has Jared Kushner's Personal Touch*, retrieved 10.01.2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/middleeast/jared-kushner-saudi-arabia-arms-deal-lockheed.html>.

Liliana Guevara Opinska

10. Analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Using Realist and Constructivist International Relations Theories: “Operation Protective Edge” Case

Abstract: *The aim of this work is to use two leading international relation theories, realism and constructivism, to describe and analyze the event known as “Operation Protective Edge” (OPE). OPE refers to the military operation launched by Israel against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip on July 8, 2014. By analyzing this event using two contrasting theories, the paper hopes to examine the explanatory power of each of these theories, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.*

Keywords: Hamas, Operation Protective Edge, Palestinian Authority, Israeli Defense Forces, realism, constructivism

Introduction and Background

Realism as well as constructivism (along with liberalism), are considered to be among the most important theories in International Relations (IR).¹ The two theories differ significantly in their underlying assumptions and their approach to describing and understanding the world and its international affairs. As such, applying these theories to describe a specific problem in international affairs might further illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of each of the two theories.

Realist theory takes states to be the main actors in the international political arena and the most important unit of analysis. In realist theory international organizations and other international actors are not seen as independent actors but rather as entities that represent the interests of their member states. Realist theory is based on four underlying assumptions: international anarchy, political groupism, egoism and power politics.² Neo-realism refers to a modified version of realism, first described by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics*. This theory is also known as structural realism because it emphasizes

1 Viotti, Paul R./Kauppi Mark V.: *International Relations Theory, 5th edition*. Pearson: Boston 2012.

2 Goodin, Robert: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010, p. 133.

the importance of the international structure in determining the state's behavior with respect to other states.

Since, in realist theory, the main subject of analysis is the state it is important to briefly consider the question of Palestinian statehood. Lacking a defined territory and sovereignty Palestine is not considered a state in the strict sense of the definition. However, following the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has given the Palestinians at least partial autonomy. More importantly the PA is considered as Israel's diplomatic partner. According to Peter Dyllick-Brenzinger and Christof Mauersberger "this diplomatic practice seems to be the most important argument for taking Palestine as a state".³ Thus, for the purposes of our analysis we can consider Palestine both as an *ad hoc* and *de facto* state. As part of the reflection on statehood it is important to add that Israel's statehood is currently not recognized by as many as 32 United Nations (UN) member states, including, Cuba, Afghanistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Syria. However, for practical purposes we shall omit this problem and analyze Israel from the point of view of countries that do recognize its statehood.

Constructivist theory is based on an interpretative understanding of the phenomena around us. As the name suggests, it views the world as a social construct and emphasizes the importance of norms, rules and identities in understanding the world.⁴ Constructivism sees the objects of our knowledge as being interconnected to our subjective interpretation. Constructivists believe that in addition to material objectives, ideational factors such as norms, rules and laws play a crucial role in determining state and non-state behavior in international affairs. For these reasons, constructivism is particularly well suited for analyzing situations in which the decisions taken contradict conventional rationality.⁵

In contrast to realists who view the world as essentially static, constructivists see the world as being in perpetual state of change, development and construction. In addition, unlike realism, constructivism does not view the state as a unit but rather considers the associations and interactions of many actors among each

3 Segbers, Klaus *et al*: *Global Politics: How to Use and Apply Theories of International Relations*. (Working Papers. The Eastern Institute. The Free University of Berlin, 56/2006) Berlin 2006.

4 Viotti, Paul R./Kauppi Mark V.: *op. cit*.

5 Javadikouchaksaraei, Mehrzad *et al*.: "Reinterpreting the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Constructivism Theory of Understanding a Cross-Ethnic Phenomena". *Asian Social Science* 11(16), 2015, pp. 107–113.

other and together with the institutions present in each state. Since constructivism does not accept the individualistic approach, the theory does not run into the same problems as realism when it comes to Palestinian statehood.⁶ Perhaps the most important distinction, for the purpose of this essay, between realism and constructivism is that realists view conflicts as intrinsic and determined by historical and objective factors rather than as being constructed. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mehrzad Javadikouchaksaraei *et al.* argue that the importance of constructivism is to emphasize that “without an insight of the subjective reality informed by the Israeli and Palestinian people themselves, the analytical framework would be merely a superimposed reality as perceived by researchers, which may or may not reflect the reality agreed or accepted by the social actors themselves.”⁷

Operation Protective Edge (OPE) was a military operation launched by Israel against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip on July 8, 2014. It represented the third round of fighting between Israel and Hamas since 2008 and was part of an ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. The operation lasted 50 days and resulted in approximately 2,200 casualties on the Palestinian side and 74 on the Israeli side.

OPE was chosen as a focal point of analysis because it represents an instance of a much longer and difficult conflict between Israel and Palestine. This conflict represents an important challenge to the international community at large and to the field of international relations in particular; a conflict that is still awaiting a solution. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be considered one of the major and most relevant conflicts of our time. Analyzing one of the most recent incidents in this conflict through the lens of two major theories might shed light on the different narratives in the conflict and point out key elements worth further consideration.

Analysis

Identity and Normative Structure

Identity is one of the key underlying concepts in constructivist theory. In contrast to realists, who view identity as universally and unchangingly that of a self-interested state, constructivists see it as a guideline providing actors with ways

6 *Ibidem.*

7 *Ibidem.*

to both predict the behavior of others and guide their own actions.⁸ Moreover, constructivists would argue that actors' interests are constituted by their identities.⁹ Another key element in constructivism is the concept of normative structure and "its role in interest formation, instrumentality or means selection, and resulting behavior".¹⁰ Thus, the following discussion on identity as well as normative structure is pertinent and of utmost importance.

Michael Barnett isolates four main elements, which he sees as crucial in understanding the Israeli national identity, these are: the Holocaust, religion (Jewishness), nationalism (Zionism) and liberalism.¹¹ Israeli identity has developed through the ongoing domestic reinterpretation of the historical narrative.¹² In this historical narrative the Holocaust plays an unparalleled role. As Joanna Tidy writes "[t]he Holocaust forms a twentieth century link with an established narrative of two millennia of Jewish history; a past which is remembered as being marked by expulsions, pogroms, persecution and other constant existential struggles".¹³ Furthermore, she writes, "[t]his phenomenon may be distilled into a fundamental sense of vulnerability and insecurity in a hostile world in which threats are to the very existence of the Israeli nation".¹⁴

Based on the above analysis it is not surprising that Jo Jakobsen describes Israel as "the poster child of realism".¹⁵ He writes, "survival and security constitute the be-all and end-all of Jerusalem's domestic and foreign policies alike".¹⁶ Israel's international affairs with its Middle Eastern neighbors are based on the presumption of a constant security threat. Israel is highly skeptical and distrustful of its Arab neighbors and more specifically of the Palestinians. This explains why

8 Hopf, Ted: "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory". *International Security* 23(1), 1998, pp. 171–200.

9 Weldes, Jutta: "Constructing National Interest". *European Journal of International Relations* 2(3), 1996, pp. 275–318.

10 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *HAMAS through a Constructivist Lens*. School of Advanced Military Studies: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2008, p. 5.

11 Barnett, Michael: "The Israeli Identity and Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable". In: Telhami, Shibley/Barnett, Michael (eds.): *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Cornell University Press: New York 2002, p. 63.

12 Tidy, Joanna: *The Social Construction of Identity: Israeli Foreign Policy and the 2006 War in Lebanon*. (Master thesis) Bristol 2007.

13 *Ibidem*, p. 24.

14 *Ibidem*, pp. 24–25.

15 Jakobsen, Jo: *Israel the Poster Child of Realism*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/11/19/israel-the-poster-child-of-realism/>.

16 *Ibidem*.

Israel invests so much in military capabilities. According to the Global Firepower ranking, Israel has the 11th most powerful army in the world and based on statistics from the World Bank, Israel spent 5.2 % of its GDP on military expenditure in 2014. To quote Jakobsen one more time, the Israelis “have interpreted the world using ‘realist’ glasses, which means that they focus on four things: security, security, security, and military strength”¹⁷ OPE is no exception to the rule.

In order to understand Hamas’ identity and normative discourse, it is important to take a look at its ideology established in *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement*, published by Hamas in 1988. Hamas defines itself as an Islamic movement whose objective is to free all oppressed Muslims through a pan-Islamic *jihad*.¹⁸ More specifically Hamas seeks to establish an Islamic state in Palestine.¹⁹ A key distinction between Hamas and groups such as al-Qaeda, is their approach. Al-Qaeda’s vision consists in the creation of an Islamic state first, in order to then allow for the formation of the Islamic man. This approach can be seen as “top down”. In contrast, Hamas, influenced by its Muslim Brotherhood roots, believes that it is first necessary to create the Islamic man and that only after the creation of such Islamic man can the Muslim state be realized.²⁰

Constructivism emphasizes the importance of outside actors in influencing normative structure.²¹ Because Israel serves as the object of Hamas’ resistance, it plays a major role in influencing the movement’s identity and normative structure.²² After achieving a parliamentary majority in the 2006 elections, Hamas’ normative structure was ready to change from that of a resistance movement to one of a governing body. However, as Nikolai Andresky argues, Israel and the West missed the opportunity to shape Hamas’ normative structure by refusing to engage the Unity Government. He writes, “[w]ith more patience and a better understanding of Hamas and the politics involved the West may have been better able to slowly push Hamas towards moderation”.²³ Furthermore, Andresky argues that, “Israel’s refusal to work with a PA that includes Hamas, their economic isolation of Gaza, and their third party negotiations may tend to reinforce

17 *Ibidem*.

18 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *op. cit.*

19 *Ibidem*.

20 *Ibidem*.

21 Berger, Thomas U.: “Norms Identity and National Security”. In: Katzenstein Peter J. (ed.): *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press: New York 1996, pp. 317–356.

22 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *op. cit.*

23 *Ibidem*, p. 35.

the identity of a resistance movement rather than that of a governing party²⁴. This point is also emphasized by Martin Beck who regards Israel's treatment of Hamas as a terrorist group, no matter what, leads to Hamas having little incentive not to act as one.²⁵

Motivations

In order to analyze each side's motivations for engaging in a military confrontation it is necessary to look at the events preceding OPE and understand the context in which the conflict took place. The following paragraph presents a brief overview of these events.

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped at the Israeli settlement of Alon Shvut in Gush Etzion, in the occupied West Bank. On June 30, their bodies were found. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, accused Hamas of the crime (a couple of months later, a Hamas official acknowledged the responsibility of Hamas' military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in the kidnapping). Following the kidnapping the Israel Defense Force (IDF) launched Operation Brother's Keeper. During this operation the IDF killed 5 Palestinians and arrested 350. In addition, it closed large areas around Hebron and indiscriminately arrested many of the Hamas members living in the West Bank. On July 2, a Palestinian youth was abducted from Shuafat, East Jerusalem, and his charred body found a few hours later. The murder of the Palestinian youth was acknowledged to be a revenge killing. In the aftermath of these events and as a response to Israel's "collective punishment" of the Palestinian population, Hamas intensified rocket fire into Israel. On July 8th, Israel initiated OPE citing the increase in rocket fire as one of the main reasons for initiating this military operation. On July 17, a day after four Palestinian boys were killed by Israeli shelling while playing on the beach in Gaza, Israel initiated a ground offensive in Gaza. The ground offensive had the objective of weakening Hamas' infrastructure and destroying the extensive network of tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.²⁶

According to the IDF, Israel's explicit objectives going into OPE were: a) to restore security to Israeli civilians by preventing Hamas from launching rocket

24 *Ibidem*.

25 Beck, Martin: *Hamas, Israel and the July Gaza War 2014: War as the Result of a Policy of Consecutive Provocations*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from www.sdu.dk/-/media/.../2014/july/280714_gazawar2014.pdf.

26 Shamir, Eitan: *Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, the 2014 Gaza War*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.meforum.org/5084/rethinking-operation-protective-edge>.

fire into Israel, b) to dismantle Hamas' tunnel network used to infiltrate Israel.²⁷ Both of these aims can be easily ascribed to realism as they are both based on grounds of a security threat and display/competition of power. However, constructivism offers an additional layer of depth to the analysis as it examines the reasons for the perceived (real or not) security threat posed to Israel by Hamas.

On the other hand, Hamas' main objectives during OPE were: a) to increase pressure in order to lift Israel's blockade of Gaza, b) to implement the 2012 cease-fire agreement and c) to release Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. Thus, Hamas' immediate objectives were much more politically and economically driven than the Israeli ones. Realists could argue that these objectives can be viewed from the perspective of power politics. In contrast, constructivists would likely object to such claims on the grounds that they are over simplistic and do not address the root causes of the conflict.

More relevant than the events directly preceding OPE are the underlying, indirect motivations for engaging in this conflict. In order to understand these motives, both from the realist and the constructivist point of view, it is necessary to look further into the past.

Since Hamas' victory over Fatah in the 2006 elections and the beginning of its control over Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel has adopted the concept of "distinction" between Gaza and the West Bank.²⁸ According to Shlomo Brom this idea of distinction or separation between Gaza Strip and the West Bank has its roots in both security and politics.²⁹

In order to better understand Israel's policies toward Hamas it is first necessary to look into its perception of this organization. The security distinction is based on the fact that Hamas' political ideology is more extreme and violent than that of the PA residing in the West Bank. As such, Israel has an interest in severing the connection between Gaza and the West Bank to minimize the transfer of arms, operational instructions and other capabilities, which Israel considers as terrorist.³⁰ In terms of political interest, the argument is that Israel should embrace

27 *Israeli Defense Forces, Special Report Operation Protective Edge*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160306052922/https://www.idfblog.com/operationgaza2014/#Home>.

28 Brom, Shlomo: "Operation Protective Edge: Leverage for Returning the PA to the Gaza Strip". In: Kurz, Anat/Brom, Shlomo (eds.): *The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge*. The Institute for National Security Studies: Tel Aviv 2014, pp. 95–100, retrieved 01.05.2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/ZukEtanENG_final.pdf.

29 *Ibidem*.

30 *Ibidem*.

a policy of conflict management as opposed to conflict resolution.³¹ This argument presupposes that a two-state solution is contrary to Israel's interests. Based on the political argument, separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank facilitates conflict management by weakening the Palestinian political arena in terms of its cohesiveness and perceived credibility from the outside.³² Based on such arguments, another question that has been publicly debated by the Israeli community is whether or not President Mahmoud Abbas, as the head of the PA, should be considered Israel's partner. Currently, following the logic of a "conflict management" policy, Abbas is not considered to be Israel's partner.³³ Embracing this concept of "distinction", Israel has opposed the formation of a Palestinian National Unity government and the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Israel's position was apparent during the 2014 reconciliation agreement between the two Palestinian parties. Israel opposed this reconciliation and the formation of a National Unity government and prevented the transfer of funds meant to pay the salaries to government employees in Gaza. It also threatened punitive measures against the PA.

Although in the introduction of this text it is argued that Palestine can be considered *de facto* a state, the concept of "distinction" applied by Israel represents a major challenge for realism. One of the key realist assumptions, "that states are sufficiently unified to identify and act on their perceived self-interest"³⁴ is clearly not applicable in the Palestinian case. The interests of Hamas and those of Fatah are not only dissimilar but can be seen as opposing. A further challenge to the realist theory is that Israel itself does not view Hamas as a representative authority of the Palestinian people but rather as a terrorist group. OPE is predominantly seen and described as a conflict between Israel and Hamas as opposed to a conflict between Israel and Palestine. This description of OPE presents a major pragmatic problem in using realism as a descriptive theory in the analysis of international conflicts between states and non-state actors such as Hamas. The concept of 'state unity' in realism is not only problematic for the analysis of such "special cases" as Palestine. The Israeli government and society are also far from homogenous and "unified". Since the 1970s, fragile coalition governments have ruled Israel.³⁵ In addition, Israeli society is highly fragmented

31 *Ibidem*.

32 *Ibidem*.

33 *Ibidem*.

34 Telman, Jeremy: "Non-state Actors in the Middle East: A Challenge for Rationalist Legal Theory". *Cornell International Law Journal* 46(1), 2013, p. 57.

35 *Ibidem*, pp. 65–66.

because of the diverse backgrounds of its citizens.³⁶ Thus, in order to be able to continue our analysis of OPE using realism we must agree to voluntarily detach a key assumption and overlook the premise of a unified, homogenous “state” as a legitimate actor in international affairs.

Each one of the two components of Israel’s “distinction” approach can be best understood through the lens of one of the two international relations theories here analyzed. The security argument for the distinction between the Hamas-ruled Gaza, and the Fatah-led PA in the West Bank is best understood in terms of realism. Israel has a clear security interest in preventing the spread of both reactionary ideas and military equipment into the West Bank.

The political aspect of the problem can be described and understood through the lens of constructivist theory. It is clear that at the heart of this problem lies Israel’s, often incorrect, *perception* of Hamas. David Makovsky has highlighted five major Israeli concerns with respect to Hamas as a legitimate government of the people in Gaza. These concerns are: a) the preoccupation that the Hamas government will further radicalize Palestinian society b) the possibility that Hamas’ political success will influence other Arab countries in Israel’s proximity c) the possible radicalization of Israel’s own Muslim minority d) the possible influence of Hamas at the international level in delegitimizing Israel and e) a concern over how to use Israel’s economic leverage to weaken Hamas.³⁷ In his excellent monograph titled “HAMAS through a Constructivist Lens”, Major Nikolai Andresky³⁸ deconstructs these concerns and shows that they are often not valid. He points out that Hamas was victorious in the elections of 2006 not because of its radical agenda against Israel but primarily due to its promise of improving social services and the perception that the party was not corrupt, especially in comparison with Fatah.³⁹ As for the concerns that Hamas’ success might inspire other Arab nations to imitate it, we can now see, from the perspective of time, that Hamas’ main ideological partner and supporter, the Muslim Brotherhood, was crushed and repressed in the Egyptian 2013 *coup d’état*. With regards to the radicalization of the Muslim minority in Israel, research has shown that the views of this group are more influenced by their treatment by Israel than by religion or a sense

36 Segbers, Klaus *et al.*: *op. cit.*, p. 29.

37 Makovsky, David: *Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas’s Victory*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PF53-Makovsky.pdf>.

38 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *op. cit.*

39 *Ibidem*.

of solidarity with the Palestinians.⁴⁰ In terms of the international perception of Israel and the possibility of reaching an agreement with respect to a two-state solution, such negotiations are all but impossible without the support of the people of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Moreover, in terms of economic leverage, the Gaza blockade has resulted in international condemnation of Israel and has brought the undesired effect of politically strengthening Hamas in the eyes of the population living in the Gaza Strip.⁴¹ It is clear that one of the underlying reasons for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, to a large extent, the erroneous *perception* that the Israeli society and government have of Hamas.

As mentioned previously, Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by Israel as well as by other countries such as the United States, Canada, Jordan, Egypt and Japan.⁴² Alan Baker, the former Israeli ambassador to Canada, writes that: “The professed ideological foundation of Hamas, as set out in its national Charter, aligns it integrally with the Muslim Brotherhood and clearly identifies it as a terrorist entity. According to Hamas’ ideology, Israel has no place in the world and Hamas’ goal is the destruction of the Jewish state”⁴³ Furthermore, Hamas is considered as an organization that promotes anti-Semitism and advocates the killing of Jews.⁴⁴ The perception of Hamas as a terrorist group, especially by the international community, is often used as part of the Israeli political strategy. Before launching OPE, Israel was under international pressure due to yet another failed attempt at peace negotiation with the Fatah-led PLO. An example of such international frustration with Israel was that countries such as the United States and members of the European Union, failed to follow Israel’s demands to boycott the National Unity government. As Martin Beck writes “in the 21st century it is a real discursive challenge for a member of the ‘Civilized’ world to legitimize an occupation regime that will soon celebrate its fiftieth anniversary”⁴⁵ Israel was able to use Hamas’ label to justify the failure of the peace

40 Zaidise, Eran *et al.*: “Politics of God or Politics of Man? The Role of Religion and Deprivation in Predicting Support for Political Violence in Israel”. *Political Studies* 55(3), 2007, pp. 499–521.

41 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *op. cit.*

42 Baker, Alan: “The Legal War: Hamas’ Crimes against Humanity and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense”. In: Goodman, Hirsh/Gold, Dore (eds.): *The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel did not Want and the Disaster it Averted*. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Jerusalem 2015, pp. 61–76.

43 *Ibidem*, p. 62.

44 *Ibidem*.

45 Beck, Martin: *op. cit.*

talks based on Abbas' agreement to form a Unity Government with a "terrorist organization".⁴⁶ Beck also accuses Israel of using the "terrorist label" to "legitimize its occupational regime towards Palestine in general and a blockade regime towards the Gaza Strip without a peace perspective".⁴⁷

The main problem in this case is Israel's *perception* of the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah as a threat to their national interest and security. Additionally, Israel's *idea* that a two-state solution is not desirable can be considered one of the fundamental and underlying causes of the conflict. Jakobsen argues that "Israel in fact is quite satisfied with the status quo, which, for one, has left the state of Israel vastly bigger than originally envisaged by the UN and the major powers back in 1947".⁴⁸ He points out that if Palestine was to become truly an internationally recognized state it would also gain rights in the eyes of international law and any violation of these would be more likely to result in sanctions and concrete actions from the international community.⁴⁹

Brom argues that the current Israeli *perspective* with regards to Hamas is in fact, erroneous and detrimental to Israel's interests. He speculates that if Israel had adopted another political approach and had considered the reconciliation between the two Palestinian factions as an opportunity to restore the PA's rule in Gaza, OPE might have been avoided.⁵⁰ An opposing view to Brom's by Martin Beck states that OPE was a result of Israel provoking Hamas to incite a military conflict by launching rockets into Israeli territory.⁵¹ This point of view proposes that: "it appears plausible that the decisions of both parties to go to war were shaped by the calculus of having an opportunity to increase their respective powers, mainly in terms of enhancing legitimacy".⁵² This last point of view is more aligned with the realist perspective, in which security and power issues are prioritized over other values or concerns.

From Hamas' perspective, Israel's opposition to the reconciliation agreement was, to a large extent, responsible for its failure. The Israeli opposition angered Hamas for whom the agreement represented a desperate measure to escape its political and economic isolation, which was exacerbated by the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2013. The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood was a

46 *Ibidem*.

47 *Ibidem*.

48 Jakobsen, Jo: *op. cit.*

49 *Ibidem*.

50 Brom, Shlomo: *op. cit.*, pp. 95–100.

51 Beck, Martin: *op. cit.*

52 *Ibidem*.

harsh blow for Hamas. The new Egyptian government closed hundreds of tunnels between Egypt and Gaza preventing Hamas from collecting taxes levied on the goods which were used to pay the salaries of more than 40,000 civil servants.⁵³ Hamas' former allies, Iran and Syria had also turned their backs on the organization and Turkey and Qatar were too preoccupied with their own affairs. Hamas' economic and political situation deteriorated. Its rapprochement with the PA in Ramallah was a last-resort political move to remedy the worsening economic situation in the Gaza Strip. It signaled a change in the normative structure of the organization, which during its formation period had declared that *jihad* was the only means acceptable for attaining Palestinian liberation.⁵⁴ Hamas was even willing to back a government which "officially accepted three major demands of the West: recognition of Israel, respect for past agreements, and renunciation of violence".⁵⁵ Israel's actions directed toward deterring this rapprochement and the later violence that ensued after the kidnapping of the Israeli youths left Hamas with limited options but provocation by firing rockets. In the words of Nathan Thrall: "for Hamas, the choice wasn't so much between peace and war as between slow strangulation and a war that had a chance, however slim, of loosening the squeeze".⁵⁶ From Hamas' point of view, OPE was a battle for survival. Hamas' hope was that a military confrontation would eventually lead to the restoration and implementation of the November 2012 ceasefire agreement, which, among other things, called for an end to the blockade of Gaza.

Although material motivation might have been Hamas' main preoccupation, in addition to improving the material *status quo* in Gaza, Hamas foresaw additional political benefits to a military conflict with Israel. Such advantages included strengthening the organization's reputation with respect to both Israel and the PA. Moreover, the conflict would also have the effect of unifying the organization and preventing further internal conflict between the Gaza-based political leadership, the Qassam Brigades and the Hamas leaders abroad, led by Khaled Mashal.⁵⁷

53 Thrall, Nathan: "Hamas's Chances". *London Review of Books* 36(16), 2014, pp. 10–12, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n16/nathan-thrall/hamass-chances>.

54 Andresky, Nikolai L.: *op. cit.*

55 Beck, Martin: *op. cit.*

56 *Ibidem.*

57 Beri, Benedetta: *Organizational Change within Hamas: What Lies Ahead?*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Organizational%20Change%20within%20Hamas_%20What%20Lies%20Ahead_.pdf.

Hamas' economic motivation, as described above, for engaging in a military confrontation can be better explained using realist theory. These motivations are very much material in nature, linked to an asphyxiating and unsustainable economy which left Hamas with few options. However, an analysis of Hamas' political context at the time also clearly points to ideological and political motivations. Realism tends to minimize the importance of internal conflict within a state or government and as such would probably overlook the importance of involvement in a military confrontation as a means to unify a political faction, as was the case for Hamas. In contrast, constructivism places more weight on the diversity of ideas and conflicting points of view within a state or organization, in order to explain external (i.e. international) motivations.

Considerations Related to an Asymmetric Conflict

Lastly, as part of the present discussion, it is important to mention the aspect of asymmetric conflict as pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian relation in general, and to OPE specifically. This type of conflict can be viewed in terms of the realist concept of *balance of power*. An asymmetric conflict is one in which the rivals that confront each other engage in a conflict having very different capabilities. Giorgio Gallo and Arturo Marzano, propose three different categories of conflict asymmetry: power asymmetry, strategic asymmetry and structural asymmetry.⁵⁸ In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and OPE specifically, all three of these categories are applicable. Israel's military capability has already been discussed in a previous paragraph. Israel's military strength is without question, significantly more powerful than that of Hamas. Not only does Israel possess an impressive supply of offensive technology, it is also in possession of important defensive systems such as the Iron Dome system, capable of intercepting and destroying short-range rockets and artillery shells. Although a comparison of the military capabilities between the two sides is sufficient to illustrate the incredible disproportions between the two rivals it is not the complete picture. One must also consider the non-military conditions and availability of war supportive resources such as hospital equipment and trained medical personal to treat the wounded. Due to the blockade of Gaza by Israel, people living there do not have access to life-saving medical equipment. In addition to the material imbalance between the two sides, it is also important to note that the people living in the Gaza Strip do not have the same rights as people living on

58 Gallo, Giorgio/Marzano, Arturo: "The Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case". *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 29, 2009.

Israeli land. Because of the Israeli blockade of Gaza, citizens of Gaza are unable to escape the conflict if they choose to. The right to seek refuge from danger, a fundamental human right, has been denied to the citizens of Gaza.

Strategic asymmetry, according to Gallo and Marzano, refers to a difference in tactical and/or strategic approach to the conflict. The choice of approach to the conflict is often related to power asymmetry. Examples of such strategies are guerrilla wars and terrorism.⁵⁹

A strong imbalance in status between the actors engaged in conflict will bring about structural asymmetry.⁶⁰ In this type of asymmetry, the underlying problem is often related to the structure and relationship between the adversaries. As Gallo and Marzano explain, “in a conflict characterized by structural asymmetry the real object of the fight is to change the structure of relations between the opponents. Usually one of the parties seeks to alter it, while the other struggles to avoid any change.”⁶¹ This type of asymmetry is characterized by a domination relationship where one of the actors is dominant and the other is dominated.⁶² Gallo and Marzano believe that it is this last type of asymmetry that is at the root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that the other two types of asymmetry originate from the structural asymmetry. A sub-category of structural asymmetry is legal asymmetry. The following sentences illustrate the causes of this asymmetry: “From 1948 onwards, Israel has been a state with its own territory, internationally recognized borders, a clear political agenda, a defined foreign policy and a powerful and well-organized army. In contrast, the Palestinians had to fight to move from the status of “non-existence” - if not as “refugees” - to recognition as a nation, with their own right to a national state.”⁶³

The fact that there exists such a large asymmetric gap between the two actors explains based on the realist concept of *balance of power*, why military confrontations arise between these two subjects. Palestine is simply not powerful enough to deter Israel from abusing and attacking it; “today, the threat from the Palestinians is containable and manageable for Israel.”⁶⁴

59 *Ibidem*.

60 *Ibidem*.

61 *Ibidem*.

62 *Ibidem*.

63 *Ibidem*.

64 Jakobsen, Jo: *op. cit.*

Conclusions

In summary, this paper was intended to demonstrate the main differences in the realist and constructivist approaches focusing on OPE to highlight these differences. The main content of this paper was divided in three sections: identity and normative structure, motivations and considerations related to an asymmetric conflict. The first of these three sections focused on addressing some of the key elements pertinent to the constructivist theory. Neither identity nor normative structures are relevant in the description of international relations from the realist point of view. As such realism fails to incorporate and use the important information described in the first section, thus is a major shortcoming of this theory since at least in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict these elements clearly shape the behavior of the actors.

Another major shortcoming of the realist theory is, in Jeremy Telman's words, that, "as the actors on which rationalist theory focuses come increasingly to share the spotlight with actors it ignores, realism loses its appeal as a descriptive and predictive model for international law and IR theory".⁶⁵ As was discussed in this paper, in order to be able to apply the realist theory to the analysis of OPE, it was necessary to distort it in order to reconcile this theory with 'non-state' actors such as Hamas.

In the context of OPE, realism seems to be a theory whose explanatory power is much more superficial than constructivism. Realism tends to simplify the underlying causes of conflict and to reduce them to their most basic, obvious propositions. Realism seems to be the more pragmatic of the two theories: it reduces the variables to the most elementary level, and as such it is often easier to apply it as compared to constructivism. Surprisingly, in spite of frequent omissions of important factors, realism seems to be often accurate both in terms of its descriptive and predictive potential.

Constructivism seems to be ahead of realism in terms of the depth of analysis. For example, Israel, as Jo Jakobsen suggests, may be the poster child for realism, it may behave according to all the realist rules, yet in order to explain why Israel behaves like this, it is necessary to look at Israeli identity and normative structure, such as prescribed in constructivism.⁶⁶

Based on the findings from this essay, it can be concluded that realism and constructivism differ significantly in their approach to analyzing events in international relations. Both of these theories have their strengths and weaknesses,

65 Telman, Jeremy: *op. cit.*, p. 70.

66 Jakobsen, Jo: *op. cit.*

as demonstrated throughout this work. A wise idea for future analysis, of different events in international relations, is to undertake comparative studies such as this one in order to benefit from the insights that both theories have to offer.

References

- Andresky, Nikolai L.: *HAMAS through a Constructivist Lens*. School of Advanced Military Studies: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2008.
- Baker, Alan: “The Legal War: Hamas’ Crimes against Humanity and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense”. In: Goodman, Hirsh/Gold, Dore (eds.): *The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel did not Want and the Disaster it Averted*. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Jerusalem 2015.
- Barnett, Michael: “The Israeli Identity and Peace Process: Re/creating the Unthinkable”. In: Telhami, Shibley/Barnett, Michael (eds.): *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Cornell University Press: New York 2002.
- Beck, Martin: *Hamas, Israel and the July Gaza War 2014: War as the Result of a Policy of Consecutive Provocations*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from www.sdu.dk/-/media/.../2014/july/280714_gazawar2014.pdf.
- Berger, Thomas U.: “Norms Identity and National Security”. In: Katzenstein Peter J. (ed.): *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press: New York 1996.
- Beri, Benedetta: *Organizational Change within Hamas: What Lies Ahead?*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Organizational%20Change%20within%20Hamas_%20What%20Lies%20Ahead_.pdf.
- Brom, Shlomo: “Operation Protective Edge: Leverage for Returning the PA to the Gaza Strip”. In: Kurz, Anat/Brom, Shlomo (eds.): *The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge*, The Institute for National Security Studies: Tel Aviv 2014, retrieved 01.05.2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/ZukEtanENG_final.pdf.
- Gallo, Giorgio/Marzano, Arturo: “The Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case”. *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, 29, 2009, pp. 33–39.
- Goodin, Robert: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010.
- Hopf, Ted: “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”. *International Security*, 23(1), 1998, pp. 171–200.
- Israeli Defense Forces, Special Report Operation Protective Edge*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160306052922/https://www.idfblog.com/operationgaza2014/#Home>.

- Jakobsen, Jo: *Israel the Poster Child of Realism*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/11/19/israel-the-poster-child-of-realism/>.
- Javadikouchaksaraei, Mehrzad *et al.*: "Reinterpreting the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Constructivism Theory of Understanding a Cross-Ethnic Phenomena". *Asian Social Science* 11(16), 2015, pp. 107–113.
- Makovsky, David: *Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas's Victory*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PF53-Makovsky.pdf>.
- Segbers, Klaus *et al.*: *Global Politics: How to Use and Apply Theories of International Relations*. The Eastern Institute. The Free University of Berlin: Berlin 2006.
- Shamir, Eitan: *Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, the 2014 Gaza War*, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.meforum.org/5084/rethinking-operation-protective-edge>.
- Telman, Jeremy: "Non-state Actors in the Middle East: A Challenge for Rationalist Legal Theory". *Cornell International Law Journal* 46(1), 2013, pp. 51–73.
- Thrall, Nathan: "Hamas's Chances". *London Review of Books* 36(16), 2014, retrieved 01.05.2016, from <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n16/nathan-thrall/hamass-chances>.
- Tidy, Joanna: *The Social Construction of Identity: Israeli Foreign Policy and the 2006 War in Lebanon*. (Master thesis). The University of Bristol: Bristol 2007.
- Viotti, Paul R./Kauppi Mark V. (eds.): *International Relations Theory, 5th edition*. Pearson: Boston 2012.
- Waltz, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press Inc.: Long Grove, IL 2010.
- Weldes, Jutta: "Constructing National Interest". *European Journal of International Relations* 2(3), 1996, pp. 275–318.
- Zaidise, Eran *et al.*: "Politics of God or Politics of Man? The Role of Religion and Deprivation in Predicting Support for Political Violence in Israel". *Political Studies* 55(3), 2007, pp. 499–521.

Julian Laufs

11. A New Perspective on the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Marxist IR, Dependency Theory and the Myth of a “Humanitarian Intervention”

Abstract: *The Iraq War began on March 20, 2003, when the United States and “the coalition of the willing” invaded the country. The war that was started on that day would turn into one of the most controversial conflicts in modern history, lasting until 2011, when US troops at last began to leave. This chapter seeks to investigate to what extent ulterior motives were relevant to the invasion of Iraq by applying the Marxist Theory of international relations to the case. Furthermore, it will attempt to show that the term “humanitarian intervention” is not only inappropriate, but downright wrong and does not apply to the case.*

Keywords: Iraq War 2003, Humanitarian Intervention, United States, Oil Wars, dependency theory, Marxist theory

Introduction

The Iraq War began on March 20, 2003, when the United States and “the coalition of the willing” invaded the country. The war that was started on that day would turn into one of the most controversial conflicts in modern history, lasting until 2011, when US troops at last began to leave. The initial reason for the invasion was the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who was believed to have connections to the terror network Al-Qaeda. However, many people, regionally and internationally, perceived the invasion as a new form of anti-Arab or anti-Islam imperialism and a retaliation for the 9/11 attacks. Large demonstrations in the US and around the world followed as a big anti-war movement grew under the slogan “no blood for oil”. After no substantial evidence for WMDs or a connection between Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda could be found¹, the rationale shifted, and the US administration claimed the invasion had been a ‘humanitarian intervention’.

Today, studies show that almost a quarter million people were killed due to the invasion and the following occupation of the country.² Despite the fact that

1 Pillar, Paul R.: “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”. *Foreign Affairs* 85(2), 2006, pp. 15–27.

2 *Iraq Body Count*, retrieved on 05.12.2015, from <https://www.iraqbodycount.org>.

most US troops have left, the country is far from peace. There are new attacks daily and the Iraqi army is in a brutal war with ISIL to regain territory.

Scholars of Marxist IR were from the very beginning critical of the Iraq War, especially the motives of the United States and the way in which the occupation and subsequent insurgency would affect the lives of ordinary Iraqis. As such this particular theoretical lens is well suited to explore possible ulterior motives for the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. This chapter argues that the invasion was not a “humanitarian” one and that the arguments made for it are invalid or irrelevant in the light of a Marxist narrative. To do so, the main question this chapter poses is: *What factors motivated the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was the invasion in fact a “humanitarian intervention”?*

In order to find an answer, this chapter employs a Marxist narrative, using elements of classical Marxist and Dependency Theory, which will both be elaborated in the following section. Though some of the authors mentioned in this case study may not explicitly identify themselves as Marxist, their arguments are distinctive in comparison to liberalism, realism and constructivism and well suited to underscore the overall premise of this chapter.

Theoretical Framework

The relevance of the Marxist theory of international relations to the case at hand may not be obvious at first. However, the theoretical lens of Marxist IR provides a unique opportunity to explore other strands of argumentation that are often neglected in the general discourse of other IR theories. While realism and liberalism focus to a large extent on the political and military dimension of the conflict, Marxist theory emphasizes the importance of (economic) power structures that shape today’s reality and the relations between states. This means that Marxist IR divides the world based on the economic status of countries and peoples.³ This is most famously illustrated in Dependency Theory, which divides the world into core, semi-periphery and periphery.⁴ In the following, the same terminology will be applied to classify countries that are relevant to the case. In addition, since Marxist IR does not only consider the clash between classes of states but also people, it allows this chapter to take the victims as well as key

3 Gupta, Sobhanal Datta: “Marxism in the 21st Century: Towards a New Understanding?”. *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 63(4), 2002, pp. 281–300.; Sathyamurthy, T. V.: “Marxism and Imperialism”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(49), 1997.

4 Baylis, John *et al.* (eds.): *The Globalization of World Politics*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.

individual drivers of the invasion into consideration. Another important aspect of this particular theoretical perspective is that it is inherently critical of great powers and their motives, since these are core countries that founded their dominance on the exploitation of the poor periphery.⁵ Understanding these foundational principles of Marxist IR and its perspective on global power structures is a key aim of the following analysis.

As a more critical stand toward the motives for the invasion is ingrained in the theoretical framework, it allows us to shift our focus away from surface arguments of interstate conflict and toward the influence of more systemic underlying power structures such as capitalism and the global distribution of power. This expansion beyond state or system level explanations can be summarized in this multilevel approach:

- 1) *System-Level*: Systemically, Marxist IR especially focuses on capitalism and (economic) power structures. Power and money as superordinate rationales are viewed critically.
- 2) *Unit-Level*: Most notably, as Marxist IR does not take the interstate system for granted, the unit level is not only limited to countries but may also include peoples (see: dependency theory).
- 3) *Individual-Level*: Even though this level is often disregarded, it is especially important in the case at hand and for Marxist IR. While its inclusion primarily serves to further broaden the analytical scope of this analysis, it also allows specific examples to be given to further illustrate the argument of this contribution. This is especially important, as a discussion of systemic influences and rather abstract units such as countries or “core” and “periphery” may fail to illustrate the personal dimension of decision and policy making.

Nevertheless, using a Marxist approach to explain the invasion of Iraq in 2003 also has its downsides, as it limits the analysis in different ways. The economic-centric view of the theory limits the scope of this chapter and ignores other important factors, as “the dependence of Middle Eastern countries on a group of advanced Western countries is not only limited to the economic sphere”, as stated by Ateş *et al.*⁶ This chapter attempts to counter this imbalance by providing some

5 Rupert, Mark: “Marxism and Critical Theory”. In: Dunne, Tim *et al.* (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2007, pp. 148–165.; Baylis, John *et al.* (eds.): *op. cit.*

6 Ateş, Hamza *et al.*: *Dependency Theory: Still an Appropriate Tool for Understanding the Political Economy of the Middle East?*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://e-dergi.atauni.edu.tr/atauniiibd/article/view/1025003654>.

historical background information and other additional material in order to broaden the foundation of the following analysis. Another factor not fully elaborated in the following is the role of the American public both as a facilitating power for the invasion itself, as well as a reason for the shift in rationale, as it bears smaller significance in light of the theoretical lens applied. As this contribution attempts to give an insight into the applicability of Marxist IR theory as an analytical tool to understand the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it does not claim to include all factors on all levels and is rather limited to the most crucial points that underscore the Marxist understanding of the case.

Terminology

As this chapter deals with a highly complex and controversial topic, it is crucial to define the ambiguous terms that will be used in the analysis. The first important step is to specify what this chapter understands by ‘humanitarian intervention’ and to set some basic criteria for the use of the term. To do so, it follows the definition by Bhikhu Parekh, who synthesizes different approaches. He states that “(...) [a humanitarian intervention is the] external interference with the internal affairs of a country with a view to ending or at least reducing the suffering caused by such events as civil war, genocide and starvation. It is not designed to annex the state or permanently redraw its territorial boundaries”.⁷ The definition uses similar criteria as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which uses genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This chapter, however, chooses to use Parekh’s definition, as there was no UN resolution in the case of Iraq that would qualify it for the R2P, which ultimately would also have made much of this analysis redundant.

Analysis

The following analysis will be structured in two parts. First, this chapter will look at possible alternate motives for the invasion and will attempt to determine to what extent they are valid for our case. Secondly, it will utilize the findings to show why the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 cannot be described as a ‘humanitarian intervention’. To apply Marxist IR theory to the invasion of Iraq, one has to clarify, to which class the US and its allies as well as Iraq belong in terms

7 Parekh, Bhikhu: “The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention: Introduction”. *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique* 18(1), 1997, pp. 5–7.

of Dependency Theory. From the classical understanding, the United States would – as well as most European countries – qualify as a core country. However, pre-war Iraq, because of its vast natural resources, the presence of semi-skilled labor and the totalitarian regime, classifies as a semi-periphery country.⁸ These classifications constitute the foundation of the subsequent analysis and will be referred to throughout.

The Political-Economic Motives for the Invasion

Today, most Marxist scholars would agree that the US has established itself not only as the ‘world’s policeman’ but also as a guardian of global capitalism.⁹ Due to its overwhelming economic and military strength, Marxist IR sees it as not only legitimate but as necessary to question the US’ motives in Iraq. Since a substantial focus of the theory lies in the political economy and the current economic power structures determined by the global distribution of wealth, this chapter questions the extent to which economic motives or rather an underlying capitalist ideology were at play.¹⁰ One of the most important factors in answering that question is that Marxism does not take the interstate system for granted but rather sees conflict in the international arena as a result of a constant clash between classes. Consequently, it sees the roots of the invasion of Iraq not in political disagreement or humanitarian good will but suggests that capitalist (exploitative) motives were major influencing factors.¹¹

While it is practically difficult to find hard evidence of such drivers, they are reflected in the claim that with the invasion of Iraq, the United States sought to secure their position in the global oil trade. McCutcheon even goes so far as to say that “oil and the desire to control oil [was] the primary driving force behind the war against Iraq”.¹² Even though McCutcheon’s point is not universally agreed upon, there is an abundance of evidence to support it.

8 Baylis, John *et al.* (eds.): *op. cit.*

9 *Ibidem.*

10 Friedmann, Harriet/Wayne, Jack: “Dependency Theory: A Critique”. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie* 2(4), 1977, pp. 399–416.; Smith, Tony: “The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited”. *International Organization* 35(4), 1981.; Velasco, Anders: “Dependency Theory”. *Foreign Policy* 133, 2002.

11 Mueller, John: “The Iraq Syndrome”. *Foreign Affairs* 84(6), 2005, pp. 44–54; Ollman, Bertell: *Why War with Iraq? Why Now? Phantom Reasons and Real Ones*, retrieved 16.11.2015, from https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/why_war_iraq.php.

12 McCutcheon, Richard: “Rethinking the War against Iraq”. *Anthropologica* 48(1), 2006, pp. 11–28.

While the invasion of Iraq alienated many states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the invasion provided the opportunity to gain direct economic and military influence.¹³ Furthermore, it allowed the United States to gain access to the vast natural oil reservoirs in Iraq which could secure their dominant position and the US Dollar as the primary currency in the oil trade.¹⁴ This is especially noteworthy as oil has grown to become somewhat a symbol of modern capitalism and Marxists see it as a primary driver behind the current distribution of power in the international system. However, portraying oil as the only factor would not do justice to the complexity of the issue and drive this discussion too much toward a monocausal explanation. Thus, it merely suggests that personal and political oil interests should be taken into consideration.

In its long history of intervention in the Middle East, the US government never hid the fact that one of their prime interests in the region was oil. On February 28, 1990, more than a decade before the invasion, David Mack, the US assistant-secretary of state for Near-Eastern affairs at the time, stated: “We remain committed to deter threats in the Gulf and to maintain freedom of navigation to ensure unimpeded access to the region’s oil resources and the stability and security of friendly countries in the area.”¹⁵ Despite the unambiguous clarity of such statements, the American leadership vehemently denied the role of oil as a decisive factor in the decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein. Even shortly before the war, in November 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, then US Secretary of Defence, rejected such allegations saying “[...] there are certain things like that, myths that are floating around... it [the war] has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil”. Similar statements could be heard from Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary as well as other important political figures from both Washington and their allies in London.¹⁶ However, this seems hardly believable in light of a statistic, published by the US Department of Energy just a year before the invasion which predicted that by 2025 more than

13 Martin, Brian: “Iraq Attack Backfire”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(16), 2004, pp. 1577–1583.

14 Ollman, Bertell: *op. cit.*; Rudolf, Peter: “Der 11. September, die Neuorientierung amerikanischer Außenpolitik und der Krieg gegen den Irak”. *Zeitschrift für Politik* 50(3), 2003, pp. 257–280.

15 al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan: “The Gulf Subregion in the Twenty-First Century: US Involvement & Sources of Instability”. *American Studies International* 38(1), 2000, pp. 73.

16 Stokes, Doug: “Blood for Oil? Global Capital, Counter-Insurgency and the Dual Logic of American Energy Security”. *Review of International Studies* 33(2), 2007, pp. 245–264.

70 % of the US' domestic demand for oil would need to be covered by imports from the Middle East.¹⁷

As a result, Marxist IR points toward the capitalist motives that can be found in many aspects of the political decision making prior to and during the invasion. Not only did the United States as a state gain direct access to oil and political influence; huge profits also went also to politicians and the US economy in general, especially at the hands of large oil companies. Good examples for this personal level of analysis are many leading politicians. The most famous example of this is Dick Cheney, who was involved with big oil companies and their subcontractors such as Halliburton, which ultimately made millions from the war in Iraq.¹⁸ Even though personal gains for individual policy and decision makers were an arguably small factor compared to the bigger picture, their importance should not be underestimated.¹⁹ While the explanatory strength of such claims may not be overwhelming, they still suggest a strong bias for the invasion among the upper political echelons.²⁰ After the initial invasion, big oil companies gained access to the occupied oil fields in Iraq and were directly extracting resources, with the profits going back to the United States.²¹ Another case of a profiting industry was private military contractors (PMCs) that delivered services to US troops and protected facilities and assets.²² These companies profited directly off the conflict situation, leading to an overall strengthening of the US arms and oil industry and the military-industrial complex.²³

Marxist IR places a special emphasis on this personal involvement and there are few cases where the individual level of analysis plays such an important role as in the case of the Iraq War in 2003. The magnitude of this personal bias for an invasion becomes even clearer when examining the official justifications which, after the invasion, were subject to intense scrutiny. Most notably, this includes intelligence that had been presented in the media and at the UN Security Council but which ultimately turned out to be inaccurate in

17 Fisk, Robert: "This Looming War isn't about Chemical Warheads or Human Rights: It's About Oil". *Peace Research* 35(1), 2007, pp. 21–24.

18 Stokes, Doug: *op. cit.*

19 Seifert, Thomas/Werner, Klaus: *Schwarzbuch Öl*. Deuticke Verlag: Wien 2005.

20 Pillar, Paul R: *op. cit.*

21 Le Billon, Philippe: "Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq". *Third World Quarterly* 26(4/5), 2005, pp. 685–703.

22 Rudolf, Peter: *op. cit.*

23 Said, Edward: *Orientalism, 25 Years Later: Worldly Humanism v. the Empire-Builders*, retrieved 15.11.2015, from <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/05/orientalism/>.

most parts. These unprecedented intelligence failures were driven by high level individuals who pushed the security services to politicize uncorroborated intelligence.²⁴ Paul R. Pillar, the national intelligence officer responsible for the Middle East from 2000 to 2005, even goes so far as to describe the relationship between policymaking and intelligence as “broken”.²⁵ During the pre-war period, intelligence was not only relied on to inform decision making but was misused to justify decisions already taken. On many occasions the Bush administration’s arguments directly contradicted judgments made by the intelligence community, a concern that was met by Dick Cheney with the phrase: “intelligence is an uncertain business” in a speech in August 2002, adding that “many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon”.²⁶

This not only shows the importance of individual level factors in the invasion of Iraq, but exemplifies what Marxist IR calls capitalist motives that prompt core countries, namely the United States and its Western allies, to deliberately exploit Iraq’s natural resources. On a theoretical level, this in turn reflects the exploitative nature of global capitalism as described by Marxist IR, whereas on a practical level it indicates that the reasons for the invasion of Iraq were everything but ‘humanitarian’.

The Hypocrisy of the US and the Myth of the “Humanitarian Intervention”

The exploitation described above, if necessary executed by military means, is in itself nothing new in history. However, it is important to note that in this case it was disguised as an intervention to stop a dictator and protect the world from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). After no WMDs could be found in Iraq and the links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda had been disproved, the focus shifted to the human rights issue, which served to justify the invasion. The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was introduced without questioning whether appropriate arguments for such a thing existed as, even in the best case scenario, it would cost [...] several thousand lives”.²⁷ Because the term itself is rather new and lacks a clear definition, there is, or was (at least at the time), room

24 Pillar, Paul R.: *op. cit.*

25 *Ibidem.*

26 *Ibidem.*; Pfiffner, James P./Phythian, Mark (eds.): *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives*. Texas A&M University Press: Texas 2008.

27 *Mueller, John: op. cit.*

for abuse. Regardless of what specific definition one chooses to apply, the shift to the humanitarian argument can be described as nothing less of 'hypocritical' for two major reasons as discussed in the following.

Historical Rationale

Both the UK and the US had a long-standing regime of economic sanctions against Iraq for many years (1990–2003). However, the official reason, that sanctions were a reaction to human rights abuses by the Iraqi regime seems hypocritical, as they follow a long history of non-involvement or even support of the regime. Both Western powers had tried over previous decades to broaden their influence in the region by plotting and supporting different factions which not only had a devastating effect on civilians and the humanitarian situation in Iraq but also the security of the surrounding areas.²⁸ This Western interventionism in the region to strengthen the local representation of their own interests is well exemplified in the behavior of the international community and first and foremost of the United States during the Iran-Iraq War which began in 1980 and lasted over eight years. Despite the harsh consequences of the war for the populations of both countries and the human suffering, the international community was quiet and passive, as many countries sought favor with the victor of the conflict.²⁹ While reactions in the international community were mixed, scholars such as Urquhart classify the Iraqi aggression as a “clear and massive violation of the sovereignty of another state which should, if only as a matter of principle, have immediately been denounced as such [by the international community]”.³⁰

This strategy of deliberate non-involvement despite breaches of international law, the *de facto* 'genocide' against the Iraqi Kurds and various human rights violations by the Iraqi leadership against their political opposition during the 1980s, was the American response to the Iranian revolution.³¹ The US feared that a military victory of Ayatollah Khomeini would fuel the fundamentalist

28 Bellamy, Alex J.: “Ethics and Intervention: The ‘Humanitarian Exception’ and the Problem of Abuse in the Case of Iraq”. *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2), 2004, pp. 131–147.; Bruha, Thomas. “Irak-Krieg und Vereinte Nationen.” *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 41, no. 3 (2003): 295–313.

29 Heintze, Hans-Joachim: “Die vorherige Nichtbefolgung des Völkerrechts als förderndes Moment für die irakische Aggression gegen Kuwait am 2. August 1990”. *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 29(4), 1991, pp. 436–451.

30 Urquhart, Brian: *A Life in Peace and War*. W. W Norton & Company: New York 1987.

31 Heintze, Hans-Joachim: *op. cit.*

Islamic fire further in the Middle East. In order to prevent this, Saddam, who was considered to be the 'lesser evil', was backed and sought to be installed as a 'bulwark' against post-revolution Iran.³² Saddam and his aggressive policies were accepted, even encouraged, as long as they served American interests well and even though a great part of the arming of Iraq took place during the Iran-Iraq War, it shows that parts of Saddam's military strength can be attributed to encouragement by the US³³.

Another example of the American disregard for the human rights situation in Iraq can be dated to 1983. In the very year that Saddam Hussein began to use poison gas against opposition forces, Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, visited the dictator (the moment being captured in one of the most iconic pictures of the century). The meeting, however, was not to discuss the atrocities that the Ba'athist regime was committing against its own people, but to finalize an agreement on billions of dollars of loan guarantees and other credits to Baghdad.³⁴ This is, however, not an exception but rather one of many cases that show that the US could have intervened earlier if the humanitarian principles had been so important. Even though the reign of Saddam continued, the crimes and human rights violations had reached a factual low by 2003. As such, the claim of a humanitarian intervention seems even more hypocritical, considering that far worse atrocities had been backed or at least tolerated by Western powers.³⁵ Even though this should not be an argument ("not helping in one situation because other situations are neglected"³⁶), the non-intervention in previous humanitarian crises raises questions about the real motives of the invasion.

In summary, due to their ruthless record of involvement in the region and the support of different rival factions, the United States have massively contributed to the destabilization of Iraq as well as the entire region. Though it is not directly an argument against a humanitarian intervention that Western (core) countries

32 Waas, Murray: "What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas". In: Sifry, Micah L./ Cerf, Christopher (eds.): *The Gulf War Reader. History, Documents, Opinions*. Simon and Schuster, Inc.: New York 2003.

33 Lock, Peter: "Waffen für den Irak - Krieg als Geschäft oder Die Doppelmoral der Politik?". In: Nirumand, Bahman (ed.): *Sturm am Golf*. Rowohlt: Hamburg 1990, pp. 69–87.

34 Fisk, Robert: *op. cit.*

35 Chomsky, Noam: "Invasion as Marketing Problem: The Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy". *Mississippi Review* 32(3), 2004, pp. 88–93.

36 Miller, Richard T.: *op. cit.*

have not acted on previous occasions, it leads to various questions about why an intervention was necessary then, at a time when the crimes of the Saddam regime were at a factual low.

The Military Action and the Question of International Legitimation

The second argument pertains to the massive civilian casualties and vast destruction of valuable infrastructure by elaborate American bombing campaigns in Iraq as part of the invasion in 2003. They are highlighted here as they stand in direct contrast to the claim of a ‘humanitarian intervention’. As Parekh puts it “(...) how can the duty to help others (...) justify killing some of them or how can humanitarian acts warrant bloodshed?”³⁷

While there is an international track record of ‘humanitarian interventions’ where the military response was disproportional, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 once again stands out. As opposed to humanitarian interventions in some African countries, where all parties were in agreement, and the governments even asked for help from foreign forces, there was neither consent from the local government for the intervention, nor approval by the UN Security Council which could, for example, have been given through a UN resolution under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).³⁸

Some authors not only question the lack of approval from the UN but more broadly their role as a mediator in the conflict. Naidu for example finds that “the UN is committed to avoidance of arbitrary use of military force in any crisis until it deals with the crisis or sanctions the use of force by UN members”.³⁹ Thus, the attack, especially without the previously mentioned approval by appropriate multilateral bodies, also damaged the international legal order and weakened the position of the United Nations which itself plays an important role in protecting human rights, the latter being a core principle in Marxist IR.

Nevertheless, evaluating the role of the United Nations in the case at hand is much more complex and should be seen in relation to their track record of involvement in the region. In some instances, the UN was quite active and responded quickly and swiftly to crises. These interventions, however, were

37 Parekh, Bhikhu: *op. cit.*

38 Walling, Carrie Booth: *All Necessary Measures. The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention*. University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA 2013, pp. 1–32.; Finnemore, Martha: *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY 2003.

39 Naidu, M. V.: “Crises in Post-Saddam Iraq”. *Peace Research* 35(1), 2003, pp. 1–15.

often led by the United States. Most notable here is their involvement and swift resolution-making after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Throughout the conflict and in subsequent years UN contributions became less and less significant and defiance by Iraq had rarely any consequences. A prominent example includes the lack of repercussions after the Iraqi regime ceased cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, which had no direct negative consequences. This ineffectiveness of the international community is exemplified in the remarks of George W. Bush, who called the UN an “ineffective debate society”.⁴⁰

However, while the institutional setup of the United Nations as an institution may not be perfect, it still has unparalleled significance from a Marxist IR perspective. Though many UN operations depend on funding from core states, they nevertheless offer a platform for peripheral countries to have a say in the international arena. The lack of resolutions and repercussions in the case of Iraq throughout the 1990s might be seen as a failure of international diplomacy. However, from a Marxist perspective the disregard for the institution by the US is in this case more significant.⁴¹

While some critics argue that there were no other options left to deal with a defiant Iraq, it is important to ask, why not at least one other method of retorsion such as criminal prosecution against Saddam Hussein was employed before resorting to the most extreme step – military invasion. Even though senior US intelligence officials were convinced that the economic sanctions and deterrence of Saddam were working and that he was being kept “in his box”, the decision for military action was taken.⁴² Though more frequent and diligent inspections and tougher sanctions would undoubtedly also have taken a human toll, most critics suggest that it would have been far less deadly and destructive.

To summarize the analysis, this chapter returns to the question how the Iraq War in 2003 can be qualified using Parekh’s definition of a ‘humanitarian intervention’. This paper finds that the invasion of Iraq was indeed an external interference with the internal affairs of a country and it was at least claimed, that it was aimed at ending the suffering of the Iraqi population. However, Parekh clearly illustrates the legitimate reasons for an intervention, “civil war, genocide

40 Bush, George W.: *Remarks by the President at Lamar Alexander for Senate Luncheon*, retrieved 19.02.2016, from <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020917-5.html>; Kellner, Douglas: “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the “War on Terror”. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37(4), 2007, pp. 622–645, from DOI 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02617.x.

41 Bruha, Thomas: *op. cit.*

42 Pillar, Paul R.: *op. cit.*

or starvation".⁴³ None of these reasons apply to the case and the analysis has shown that there is an overwhelming majority of arguments against the case of a 'humanitarian intervention'. Thus, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 may at best be described as a military intervention on alleged humanitarian grounds without the Iraqi government's consent. However, this paper also presented evidence that shows that capitalist motivations were a major driving factor both for individuals and the invading states as nations. As a result, it is questionable to what extent the invasion could (or should) be considered humanitarian.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States was driven by economic and power political motives. It has laid out specific rationales, such as the cheap access to oil, and elaborated through a multilevel approach, how they affected the decision making in relation to the invasion. The analysis furthermore discussed how the current power distribution in the international system drives different groups of actors to strive toward personal gain, regardless of the collateral damage, showing that the reasons for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were everything but 'humanitarian'. The analysis then argued that due to the ulterior motives for the invasion, the history of Western countries interfering in the region as well as the nature of the invasion, including large bombing campaigns that caused enormous civilian casualties, the claim of a 'humanitarian intervention' in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq is wrong.

Overall, the Marxist theory of international relations has proven to be a valuable tool in this analysis, as it provides several important insights into issues otherwise disregarded in the debate. Employing the mostly economic perspective of Marxist IR allows this chapter to highlight a different set of reasons for the invasion, elaborating them on three different levels of analysis. In detail, this means that Marxist IR theory offers explanations for the motives of individuals (politicians) and units (companies and the US government), as well a systemic basis for the analysis and their relation to one another. This sets it apart from other theoretical perspectives which often take a monodimensional or monocausal approach. However, these same advantages to using Marxist IR theory also narrow the scope of the analysis in some respects, e.g. with a highly economy-centric view of the situation.

43 Parekh, Bhikhu: *op. cit.*

From a Marxist IR perspective, the case of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example of core states taking civilian casualties as collateral in their exploitation of periphery states and in their search for profit. After the invasion a new goal was proclaimed to restructure Iraq to a (liberal) democracy. This was to free the Iraqi people of oppression. Nevertheless, the discussion continues, as many still claim it was a measure to ensure US influence and economic dominance on the new government and in the region. Nevertheless, the discussion is still split with others maintaining that the ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime left Iraq better off than before. The issue of the causes and the blame for the invasion of Iraq becomes today an even more pressing topic, as radical Islamic State (ISIL) militants raid the country and enslave and murder men, women and children. The involvement of the US in the region has no foreseeable end and yet, more weapons are being poured into the region.⁴⁴ The future of Iraq and the Gulf region is an uncertain one and it seems generations of children will grow up in violence and war before peace becomes a remote possibility.

References

- al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan: "The Gulf Subregion in the Twenty-First Century: US Involvement & Sources of Instability". *American Studies International* 38(1), 2000, pp. 72–94.
- Ateş, Hamza *et al.*: *Dependency Theory: Still an Appropriate Tool for Understanding the Political Economy of the Middle East?*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://e-dergi.atauni.edu.tr/atauniiibd/article/view/1025003654>.
- Baylis, John *et al.* (eds.): *The Globalization of World Politics*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014.
- Bellamy, Alex J.: "Ethics and Intervention: The 'Humanitarian Exception' and the Problem of Abuse in the Case of Iraq". *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2), 2004, pp. 131–147.
- Bruha, Thomas: "Irak-Krieg und Vereinte Nationen". *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 41(3), 2003, pp. 295–313.
- Bush, George W.: *Remarks by the President at Lamar Alexander for Senate Luncheon*, retrieved 19.02.2016, from <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020917-5.html>.
- Chomsky, Noam: "Invasion as Marketing Problem: The Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy". *Mississippi Review* 32(3), 2004, pp. 88–93.

44 Schofield, Julian/Zenko, Micah: "Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription". *Third World Quarterly* 25(4), 2004, pp. 677–687.

- Finnemore, Martha: *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY 2003.
- Fisk, Robert: "This Looming War isn't about Chemical Warheads or Human Rights: It's About Oil". *Peace Research* 35(1), 2007, pp. 21–24.
- Friedmann, Harriet/Wayne, Jack: "Dependency Theory: A Critique". *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie* 2(4), 1977, pp. 399–416.
- Gupta, Sobhanal Datta: "Marxism in the 21st Century: Towards a New Understanding?" *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 63(4), 2002, pp. 281–300.
- Heintze, Hans-Joachim: "Die vorherige Nichtbefolgung des Völkerrechts als förderndes Moment für die irakische Aggression gegen Kuwait am 2. August 1990". *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 29(4), 1991, pp. 436–451.
- Iraq Body Count*, retrieved 05.12, 2015, from <https://www.iraqbodycount.org>.
- Kellner, Douglas: "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the "War on Terror". *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37(4), 2007, from DOI 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2007.02617.x.
- Le Billon, Philippe: "Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq". *Third World Quarterly* 26(4/5), 2005, pp. 685–703.
- Lock, Peter: "Waffen für den Irak - Krieg als Geschäft oder Die Doppelmoral der Politik". In: Nirumand, Bahman (ed.): *Sturm am Golf*. Rowohlt: Hamburg 1990.
- Martin, Brian: "Iraq Attack Backfire". *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(16), 2004, pp. 1577–1583.
- McCutcheon, Richard: "Rethinking the War against Iraq". *Anthropologica* 48(1), 2006, pp. 11–28.
- Miller, Richard T.: "Goals of Humanitarian Intervention". *Defense of the Alien* 16, 1993, pp. 159–161.
- Mueller, John: "The Iraq Syndrome". *Foreign Affairs* 84(6), 2005, pp. 44–54.
- Naidu, M. V.: "Crises in Post-Saddam Iraq". *Peace Research* 35(1), 2003, pp. 1–15.
- Ollman, Bertell: *Why War with Iraq? Why Now? Phantom Reasons and Real Ones*, retrieved 16.11.2015, from https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/why_war_iraq.php.
- Parekh, Bhikhu: "The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention: Introduction". *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique* 18(1), 1997, pp. 5–7.
- Pfiffner, James P./Phythian, Mark (eds.): *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives*. Texas A&M University Press: Texas 2008.

- Pillar, Paul R.: "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* 85(2), 2006, pp. 15–27.
- Roth, Ken: *War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention*. Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, retrieved 15.11.2015, from www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm.
- Rudolf, Peter: "Der 11. September, die Neuorientierung amerikanischer Außenpolitik und der Krieg gegen den Irak". *Zeitschrift für Politik* 50(3), 2003, pp. 257–280.
- Rupert, Mark: "Marxism and Critical Theory". In: Dunne, Tim *et al.* (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2007, pp. 148–165.
- Said, Edward: *Orientalism, 25 Years Later: Worldly Humanism v. the Empire-Builders*, retrieved 15.11.2015, from <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/05/orientalism/>.
- Sathyamurthy, T. V.: "Marxism and Imperialism". *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(49), 1997, pp. 3119–3123.
- Schofield, Julian/Zenko, Micah: "Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription". *Third World Quarterly* 25(4), 2004, pp. 677–687.
- Seifert, Thomas/Werner, Klaus: *Schwarzbuch Öl*. Deuticke Verlag: Wien 2005.
- Smith, Tony: "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited". *International Organization* 35(4), 1981, pp. 755–761.
- Stokes, Doug: "Blood for Oil? Global Capital, Counter-Insurgency and the Dual Logic of American Energy Security". *Review of International Studies* 33(2), 2007, pp. 245–264.
- Urquhart, Brian: *A Life in Peace and War*. W. W Norton & Company: New York 1987.
- Velasco, Anders: "Dependency Theory". *Foreign Policy* 133, 2002, pp. 44–45.
- Waas, Murray: "What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas". In: Sifry, Micah L./Cerf, Christopher (eds.): *The Gulf War Reader. History, Documents, Opinions*. Simon and Schuster, Inc.: New York 2003.
- Walling, Carrie Booth: *All Necessary Measures. The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention*. University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA 2013.

African Challenges

Krzysztof Tlalka

12. Why They Participate? Theories of International Relations and the Contribution of Sub-Saharan African States to Peace Operations

Abstract: *The aim of the paper is to investigate the reasons why many Sub-Saharan African states make significant troop and police contributions to the peace operations of the United Nations and African Union while they themselves experiencing numerous internal security issues and socio-economic challenges. The problem is dealt with from the perspectives of realism and liberalism. By invoking the most prominent terms and concepts from both theories, the author attempts to explain the rationalities behind participation in peace operations of countries that belong to three categories: a regional power (Ethiopia), a mid-range power (Ghana) and a small state (Burundi). The main conclusion of the paper is that regardless of the position of a country in a system, both realism and liberalism provide a significant and valuable insight into the reasons behind the peacekeeping contribution of a state. However, the realist explanation seems more convincing when confronted with the decisions of the African governments on sending troops to peace operations.*

Keywords: peacekeeping, peace operations, conflict management, United Nations, African Union, realism, liberalism

What is Peacekeeping and Who Contributes?

Peacekeeping is a broad term that encompasses a complex set of political and military actions that the international community takes to limit and put an end to a conflict. General as it is, this definition corresponds with the growing intricacy of peacekeeping. What started in the late 1940s as observer missions in the hotspots of the nascent post-World War II order, in the subsequent decades has changed significantly.¹ The United Nations – an organization that initiated and has been the most active in the field – defines peacekeeping as only one of five “peace and security activities”. According to the 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines*, peacekeeping is “a technique designated to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted,

1 For more details on peacekeeping history see: Jett, Dennis: *Why Peacekeeping Fails?* Palgrave: New York 2001, pp. 21–34.

and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers”² The other activities are: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding, but the document mentions also “robust peacekeeping” defined as peacekeeping with elements of peace enforcement.³ Today, what is referred to as a peacekeeping operation is in fact a combination of all the abovementioned activities (in different proportions in any given case) and not an undertaking during which the ‘pure’ peacekeeping (understood as defined by the UN) is performed.

During the seven decades of its history, peacekeeping has undergone fundamental changes. The first operations were driven by three main rules: consent of the parties (usually states in dispute) on the deployment of international personnel, impartiality of the international community in a given conflict and limited use of force by the Blue Helmets. After the Cold War, these principles have been applied in an unorthodox way. Since the majority of conflicts has been interstate, the consent on the deployment has been limited to a government of a country in question; other parties (such as rebels, separatists etc.) have not always been asked to give permission for the UN or other peacekeepers to step in. The notion of impartiality has also evolved – the previously blurred lines between it and neutrality have been defined. The third principle – limited use of force – has proven unwieldy and obsolete in the face of ‘new wars’ and widespread violence against civilians. Thus, the concept of “robust peacekeeping” has been introduced and implemented.⁴

Moreover, the growing number of internal conflicts in the countries of the Global South after the collapse of the Soviet Union was addressed by initiating more peacekeeping operations. The UN has been supported in these efforts by regional organizations. The most active in the field of peace and security have been the international bodies from the Western World (NATO and the European Union) and Africa (most significantly the Economic Community of Western African States and the African Union).⁵ These trends – growing complexity, numerous conflicts and new actors willing and able to perform the tasks – have resulted in greater involvement of states in terms of the size of the missions.

2 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines*, p. 18.

3 *Ibidem*, pp. 17–20.

4 *Ibidem*, pp. 31–35.

5 Yamashita, Hikaru: “Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations”. *Review of International Studies* 38, 2012, pp. 165–186.

More troops, police and civilian personnel have been sent to UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations.⁶

Sub-Saharan African states had been relatively active in terms of troop contribution to UN and non-UN peacekeeping during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, their participation grew further – African and Asian countries have become the leaders in the field.⁷ As of March 2016, 27 countries contributed more than 1,000 military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Fifteen – or 55 % – of them were Sub-Saharan African states: Ethiopia (first in the global ranking with 8,311 troops and police officers), Rwanda (6,096), Senegal (3,717), Burkina Faso (2,904), Ghana (2,883), Nigeria (2,810), Tanzania (2,328), South Africa (2,071), Niger (2,062), Togo (1,815), Benin (1,551), Chad (1,488), Kenya (1,229), Burundi (1,205) and Cameroon (1,163).⁸ Moreover, some of these states contribute troops to non-UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, Burundi takes an active part in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with more than 5,000 troops, while Ethiopia has sent more than 4,000 soldiers to this operation.⁹

Here, two fundamental questions arise. The first one is general – why do states contribute troops to peacekeeping? The second is more specific – why do Sub-Saharan African states send so many military, police and civilian personnel to UN and non-UN operations? The following sections of the paper investigate these issues in details by applying two dominant theories of international relations – realism and liberalism.

Why States Contribute to Peacekeeping – Theories of International Relations Applied

In 2000 Roland Paris noted that: “the academic literature on peace operations [...] does not lack theory. What is missing from this literature, rather, is a serious

6 United Nations: *Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160413203858/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Yearly.pdf>.

7 Perry, Chris/Smith, Adam C.: “Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN. Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 1991–2012”. *Providing for Peacekeeping* no. 3, December 2012, p. 3.

8 United Nations: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Fact Sheet. 31 March 2016*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160520001112/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0316.pdf>.

9 *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, PSC/PR/2. (CDLXII)*, October 16, 2014, 4.

effort to engage the central theoretical debates on IR [...] The relationship between peace operations and the structure of the international system remains largely unexplored".¹⁰ Several years subsequent to this observation, the problem-solving theory remains dominant as the majority of scholars focus on the practical aspects of the functioning of a single operation while not paying enough attention to the broader impact of such activities on international relations in a given region or to the concept of peacekeeping itself.¹¹

Therefore, while there are many possible ways of answering the questions posed above, this paper uses some of the most prominent theories of international relations in order to find satisfactory explanations. As the 20th century witnessed tremendous growth in theories of international relations (a fact that both strengthens and weakens their explanatory power), the author does not invoke any specific theory, rather, the bases of the analysis are two most prominent theories: realism and liberalism.

Realism

Realists claim that the main actor in international relations is a state that aims at maximizing its power. This aspiration derives from the anarchic structure of the international system. Since becoming a hegemon is virtually impossible even for the most powerful actors (not to mention a majority of countries), the states act according to the logic of balance of power. One of the methods of maximizing power or keeping the balance of power – albeit highly risky and costly – is armed conflict. Another important term in the realist theories is the security dilemma. States maximize their power as they fear that by acting otherwise, another state could develop its potential and pose a threat to them in the future. The more a state builds up its military and become wealthier, the more other actors in the

10 Paris, Roland: "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations". *International Studies Review* no. 3, 2000, pp. 29, 33.

11 Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: "Thinking Anew about Peace Operations". *International Peacekeeping* 11, 2004, p. 6. As Robert Cox puts it, problem-solving theory "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble": Cox, Robert: "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". *Millenium: Journal of international Studies* Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, pp. 128–129.

system feel insecure. As a result, every state maximizes its own power and the overall security level for all actors decreases.¹²

Peacekeeping operation from the perspective of realism is an instrument of influence and a tool used in order to pursue national interests. This observation applies mainly to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) but other states also use peacekeeping to achieve their goals. Their national interests should be understood broadly – both as an interest of a great power and indirectly as an interest of its allies. It is important to keep in mind that an operation can be authorized only if none of the permanent members of the Council use their veto. Consequently, peacekeeping does not constitute an instrument of maximizing power. Rather, it is defensive by its very nature, as it prevents any significant shift in the balance of power in favor of any of the permanent members of the UNSC.

According to realist logic, an operation is established when escalation of a conflict poses a threat to the interests of great powers and to the balance of power in a strategic square on the geopolitical chessboard. For instance, as Dennis Jett claims, the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II, 1973–1979) in the Middle East could be seen as a mean to increase the security of Israel (strategic aim of the United States) and to decrease the scale and consequences of defeat in the Yom Kippur War for Arab States (supported by the Soviet Union).¹³ UNEF II allowed the balance of power to be kept intact and to preserve the influence of the great powers in one of the most strategically important regions in the Cold War era. Thus, peacekeeping operations are not neutral and do not stem from great powers' attachment to international peace and security as a moral value. Rather, they should be seen as a tool of influence in the hands of great powers that still – according to the fifth Morgenthau principle – use them to portray their engagement as purely altruistic.

In the view of realists, the United Nations enjoys a low level of autonomy – its actions (among them peacekeeping) are the results of great power rivalry. Other organizations conduct peacekeeping operations in pursuit of the interests of their dominant members. For instance, the European Union peacekeeping missions in Africa (such as in Chad/Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo – far removed from the borders of the EU member states) have been the consequences of the strong position of France in the EU. Acting through the

12 For more details on realism as a theory of international relations see: Donnelly, Jack: "Realism". In: Burchill, Scott *et al.* (eds.): *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave: New York 2001, pp. 29–54.

13 Jett, Dennis: *op. cit.*, 26.

EU, Paris has pursued its strategic goal (the one of keeping its influence in francophone Africa) while decreasing the political and military costs of these hazardous enterprises. In most cases, an intervention conducted by an international organization enjoys a higher level of support and legitimacy than similar actions taken by a single state.

Another aspect of peacekeeping that could be convincingly explained by the realists is the issue of countries contributing personnel. In this context, participation in peace operations can be seen as an instrument that provides a state with material benefits and facilitates the development of its armed forces. The reason is that engagement in peacekeeping brings with it money from the UN stipend system for any single soldier serving in an operation. Moreover, very often soldiers undergo professional training provided by experts from donor states. Thus, what is depicted as altruistic behavior could convincingly be explained as a selfish strategy.¹⁴

Liberalism

According to Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, liberal peace theory is “without doubt the most influential theory in relation to peace operations”.¹⁵ This observation could be applied to liberal theories of international relations in general, as many of their central notions are used by politicians and practitioners working in peace operations on the daily basis. On the basic level, this set of theories assumes that an individual is good and aims at personal development (and not at confrontation with other people). The motives and behaviors at the interpersonal level could be attributed also to the states. As the democratic peace theory states, democratic countries are not willing to start and take part in a conflict as any confrontation is risky and costly. Instead, in order to acquire resources and accumulate wealth, they prefer peaceful means (such as trade and industrial production). The disputes (which are inevitable) are resolved by negotiations; the tensions are mitigated by economic interdependence and the development of transnational contacts between citizens. Trade, political relations (institutionalized in the form of international organizations) and an independent network of

14 Boutton, Andrew/D’Orazio, Vito: *Buying Blue Helmets: Western Aid Allocation & UN Peacekeeping Troop Contributors*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://vitodorazio.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/13026085/bbh6.pdf>; Neack, Laura: “UN. Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?”. *Journal of Peace Research* 32, 1995, pp. 181–196.

15 Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity: Cambridge 2010, p. 23.

personal contacts between people from different sides of a border – are the main factors that favor peace over conflict.¹⁶

According to liberal theories, the best way to build a peaceful global order is a system of collective security in which all states guarantee that should any country (a member of the system itself) start a conflict, they would collectively fight and defeat the aggressor. Thus, contrary to realists, the liberals claim that a state is not forced to maximize its own power in order to ensure its security. Moreover, it is discouraged from developing its military potential as this could be perceived by other members of the system as preparation for future aggression. It is important to note that this does not equal an elimination of the use of force on the international stage. A military operation is justified (and even desirable) when conducted in order to prevent a massive human rights violation. Here, the term *humanitarian intervention* is introduced by liberal zealots. The importance of human rights in liberal theories is visible also in the pursuance of the notion of *human security*. Both concepts have been challenged by proponents of Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of states, including by some Sub-Saharan African countries.¹⁷

Peacekeeping constitutes a sign of international community involvement in global peace and security. States, acting in the framework of international organizations, try to reduce the number and intensity of conflicts. International bodies, such as the United Nations, enjoy some level of autonomy and – as a consequence – are partially independent in establishing and conducting peacekeeping operations. They are not a platform for disputes and pursuance of national interests (as realists claim) but rather an emanation of the ‘common will’ of the international community. The reduction in the number and scope of conflicts serves the national interests of states as well, understood as the development of international cooperation, deepening of interdependence, multiplying the volume of international trade etc. Peacekeeping operations contribute also to the protection and promotion of human rights. Meaningfully, these features are present in virtually every single resolution on peacekeeping missions – a fact that shows the prominence of liberal theories among politicians and practitioners dealing with such issues.

It is worth noting that a peacekeeping operation equals neither intervention against an aggressor in the collective security system, nor humanitarian

16 Burchill, Scott: “Liberalism”. In: Burchill, Scott *et al.* (eds.): *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave: New York 2001, pp. 55–83.

17 Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: *Understanding Peacekeeping* pp. 36–39.

intervention. Peacekeeping missions are conducted only on condition of the consent of the parties (or at least a government of a country); humanitarian intervention – on the other hand – is taken against the will of actors violating human rights. At the same time, a hidden assumption of the liberals is that an intervention against an aggressor and humanitarian intervention serve the long-term interests of the citizens of the state in question. A fight against an ‘aggressive’ government that – according to democratic peace theory – does not maintain international standards in human rights, at the end of the day increases the security and prosperity of its citizens. As humanitarian intervention constitutes a chance for a society to join human rights beneficiaries, a peacekeeping operation is an instrument that supports a society and government in strengthening human rights in a post-conflict country.

Liberal theories convincingly explain some post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. In particular, it is worth applying in cases when UN involvement was not entirely justified by the national interests of great powers. One of the most interesting cases is the UN mission in Somalia (tu dodaj proszę w nawiasie UNOSOM II) in the first half of 1990s. The events in the East African country did not undermine international peace and security; nor did they pose a threat to the strategic interests of United States, Russia or European states. Despite this, the US sent more than twenty thousand troops to Somalia. It seems that the declared motive – the one of helping the Somalis facing starvation – was the dominant one. Another significant rationality behind the need to apply liberal theories is that they are very popular in the United Nations. They have been present in the most important documents on peace and security from the early 1990s, such as the fundamental *Agenda for Peace* from 1992 which states: “There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order”.¹⁸

Case Studies from Africa

The above section discusses general linkages between two groups of theories of international relations and peacekeeping. Now, to answer the main question of the paper – the one on African contribution to peacekeeping – the case study method

18 United Nations: *Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*, A/47/277 – S/24111, June 17, 1992, retrieved 25.05.2016, from http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.

will be applied. Some scholars investigate this issue using quantitative methods which is both justified and fruitful. However, in this paper, the author applies qualitative method for three main reasons. First, the number of cases is relatively small – there are no more than 50 states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, in such a small group, even a tiny amount of exceptional behaviors could seriously influence the conclusions. Moreover, in quantitative studies, there is always a problem with the timeframe of the analysis. In the discussed research, this issue is of the utmost importance. As mentioned above, African states made minor contributions to peacekeeping during the Cold War while following the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have participated heavily in such operations. Finally, the explanatory power of qualitative methods in investigating highly complex decisions on whether to contribute troops to peacekeeping is greater than in the case of quantitative studies that have limited ability to capture nuances of the foreign and security policy of a state.

In the following part, by applying the discussed theories of international relations, the author investigates the rationalities behind the peacekeeping contributions of three Sub-Saharan African states: a regional power – Ethiopia; a mid-range power – Ghana; and a small state – Burundi.

Regional Power – Ethiopia

Ethiopia aspires to the status of continental power on the basis of its strategic location (in the very centre of the Horn of Africa), its area (more than 1.1 million km²), population (approaching 100 million people – the second largest in Africa and 13th in the world) and economic potential.¹⁹ Except for the period of communist rule (from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s), the country has remained very active on the global and regional stage. The current international position of Ethiopia is based on its unique past (an African country with roots in ancient times that was never colonized), the ambitious and efficient foreign policy of its last emperor – Haile Selassie I, as well as its importance to the integration processes on the continent. The Ethiopian capital – Addis Ababa – serves as the headquarters of the African Union and in the years of 1963–2002 hosted the Organization of African Unity.

One of the forms of the international engagement of Ethiopia has been participation in peacekeeping operations. The country has been a reliable contributor to UN peacekeeping since the 1960s, i.e. taking part in the United Nations

19 CIA World Factbook: *Ethiopia*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html>.

Operation in the Congo (ONUC).²⁰ In recent years Addis Ababa has provided significant contingents to the United Nations Interim Security Forces in Abyei (or UNISFA, around 4,000 personnel) and the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID, more than 2,500 troops).²¹ Moreover, Ethiopia plays an important role in the AU peace and security policy, contributing more than 4,000 troops to AMISOM.²² Additionally, the country takes part in the process of the establishment of the East African Standby Force – a subregional peacekeeping capability.²³

There are several rationalities behind the Ethiopian contribution to peacekeeping operations. First of all, as an aspiring regional power, the country participates in missions to demonstrate leadership and strength. Given the discussion concerning possible reform of the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular, Ethiopian soldiers in Blue Helmets provide Addis Ababa with leverage in the talks concerning a possible permanent seat in the reformed world body. At the regional level, the contributions to the UN and African Union peacekeeping operations serve a similar purpose. Importantly, there are no permanent members in the AU Peace and Security Council (an African equivalent to the UNSC). However, the continent's most important states enjoy *de facto* permanent membership in the Council. In order to preserve its status, Ethiopia has to prove continuously its devotion to global and regional peace and security, i.e. in the form of participation in peacekeeping.²⁴

Prestige and diplomatic leverage are not the sole rationalities behind the Ethiopian contribution to peacekeeping. National security also matters. If minor deployments (such as 9 experts and 4 troops in Liberia or 2 experts in

20 Dersso, Solomon A.: Contributor Profile: Ethiopia, Providing for Peacekeeping, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://ipi-pdf-document-store.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ppp-profiles/africa/ipi-pub-ppp-Ethiopia.pdf>.

21 United Nations: *Troop and Police Contributors*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

22 International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 2015*. London 2015, pp. 446–447.

23 Tlalka, Krzysztof: *East African Standby Force. Shortcomings and Prospects for the Future*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/handle/10071/7542?mode=simple>.

24 More on the complexity of the Peace and Security Council: Sturman, Kathryn/Hayatou, Aissatou: “The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: From Design to Reality”. In: Porto, Joao G/Engel, Ulf (eds.) *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions*. Routledge: Farnham 2010, pp. 57–76.

Ivory Coast) are not taken into account, it becomes obvious that the country engages in missions almost exclusively in its immediate neighborhood. The three biggest contingents of Ethiopians are deployed in Sudan, Somalia and Abyei (the contested region on the border between Sudan and South Sudan).²⁵ Having a stake in both Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia has engaged in the internal politics of its neighbors since the early days of their independence. Due to a significant Somali minority in the eastern part of the country, Addis Ababa has always been willing to influence the situation in Somalia. Both countries even engaged in a border war in 1977–1978. Thus, support for the African Union Mission in Somalia is driven by national security interests. Meaningfully, the Ethiopia-AMISOM relations are complex – there are accusations that Ethiopian troops do not always coordinate their actions with partners as they pursue their own agenda.²⁶ Therefore, the engagement seems far from benevolent and selfless.

A similar logic presumably applies to the Ethiopian contribution to two other peacekeeping operations – UNAMID and UNISFA. Abyei remains one of many unresolved issues resulting from the division of Sudan into two states in 2011 and is claimed by both Khartoum and Juba.²⁷ In order to provide security to the area and its inhabitants, the UN authorized the UNISFA mission. What makes UNISFA special is the fact that – although it is a UN operation – its personnel consists almost exclusively of Ethiopians. In fact, UNISFA has always been an Ethiopian force authorized by the UN to maintain order and secure the borders of Abyei from intrusions by warring parties.²⁸ Addis Ababa has also been heavily engaged in the UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur. Although the engagement is not so great (both in absolute numbers as well as in relation to other contingents in the mission) as in the case of Abyei, Ethiopia still provides more than 2,500 troops to UNAMID.²⁹

25 Dersso, Solomon A.: op. cit.

26 In 2015, “the African Union mission in Somalia AMISOM’s Sector 4 Contingent, Col. Abdirahman Abdi Dhimbil has accused Ethiopian troops of taking orders from Addis Ababa but not AMISOM”. All Africa: *Somalia: Ethiopian Troops Accused of Taking No Order from AMISOM*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201508180520.html>.

27 Johnson, Douglas H.: “Why Abyei Matters. The Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement?”. *African Affairs* 426, 2008, pp. 2–7.

28 See for instance: *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei*, January 27, 2012, S/2012/68, 11.

29 Dersso, Solomon A.: op. cit.

The deployments in Sudan and Abyei could be explained – as in the case of Somalia – in terms of the pursuance of Ethiopian security interests. Before the division, Sudan was the biggest state in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of territory, with close cultural ties with both the Arab world and Africa. As such, it was perceived by the Ethiopian elites as a potential competitor for regional hegemony that is additionally closely associated with Egypt willing to oversee the flow of the Nile.³⁰ The government in Addis Ababa (regardless whether controlled by a monarch, a communist dictator or an autocrat) has seen the weakening of the Sudanese state as desirable to its national security. Therefore, Ethiopia has been keen to support any peacekeeping operation in Sudan as a tool of influence on the internal situation of its western neighbor. Here of particular importance is the UNISFA mission, as it directly impacts the state of play between Sudan and South Sudan. As such, it positions Addis Ababa as an indispensable actor in any future settlement of that issue.

Ethiopia deploys troops to UN and non-UN peacekeeping also due to economic factors. The country receives military support from donor states partly because of its international engagement – a fact that “contributes to Ethiopia’s modernization endeavours”.³¹ Moreover, the system of UN stipends for participation in peacekeeping allows Ethiopia to earn a significant amount of money. In the wider perspective, the deployments in Sudan, Abyei and Somalia can be perceived as a tool for guarding economic interests in its neighborhood – Ethiopia is a subregional economic powerhouse with growing trade links with most of the states in the Horn of Africa, i.e. with Sudan.³²

The above explanation of Ethiopian contribution to UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations supports the realist point of view on why the states participate in such actions. However, the logic behind the engagement of Addis Ababa is not purely realist for at least two reasons. First, Ethiopia takes part in the UNAMID mission that has been to some extent motivated by humanitarian rationalities. The argument that the operation serves the Ethiopians as a tool of influence on the situation in Sudan does hold but it is strengthened by a logic that is characteristic of liberal theories. As one of the factors contributing to the conflict in Darfur is ethnic division of the region, the conflict has been

30 Woodward, Peter: *The Horn of Africa: State, Politics and International Relations*. I.B. Tauris: London/New York 2002.

31 Dersso, Solomon A.: op. cit.

32 Tesfa-Alem, Tekle: *Sudan: Ethiopia Imports \$U.S.1 Billion in Fuel from Sudan via Djibouti*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304011187.html>.

sometimes portrayed – however simplistic it is – as Arabs vs. Africans.³³ Here, Ethiopia as a country willing to assume a leadership position in the continent on prestigious and humanitarian grounds – notions that link the deployment to liberal rationalities.

The second argument that supports the liberal view on the Ethiopian contribution to UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations is more general and refers to recent trends on the continent. Starting from the mid-2000s, the African Union has been in the process of building a system of peace and security institutions. Acting in the framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU members would be able to initiate humanitarian intervention (with just 2/3 majority of votes in the Assembly of the Union), as well as *traditional* peacekeeping operations. To that end, the multinational capacity – the African Standby Force (ASF) – is being created.³⁴ Ethiopia has supported the APSA since its inception and takes an active part in the establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF) – a subregional component of the wider ASF system.³⁵ This fact – the agreement on the creation of the system of security institution that are partially independent from their member states – seems to go in line with liberal theories of international relations.

Mid-Range Country – Ghana

Ghana is located in West Africa, sharing borders with the Ivory Coast, Togo and Burkina Faso. With an area of 238,535km², a population of 27 million people, a relatively strong economy and vast natural resources (i.e. gold, diamonds and newly discovered oil reserves), the country ranks among mid-range powers on the continent.³⁶ Political factors also contribute to this position – Ghana was the first African state that declared independence from the United Kingdom. Its founding father – Kwame Nkrumah – was one of the leaders of early post-colonial Africa. The first president of the republic supported the ideology of Pan-Africanism – the unity of all peoples of the continent – which to some extent has defined the foreign policy of the country ever since.³⁷ Accordingly, Ghana

33 Flint, Julie: *The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur*. Small Arms Survey: Geneva 2010, p. 9.

34 Vines, Alex: “A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture”. *International Affairs* 89, 2013, pp. 89–109.

35 Tlalka, Krzysztof: *op. cit.*

36 CIA World Factbook: *Ghana*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html>.

37 van Walraven, Klaas: “Heritage and Transformation: From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union”. In: Porto, Joao G./Engel, Ulf (eds.): *Africa's New*

has deployed peacekeepers to UN operations since the 1960s. As mentioned above, in 2015 the country ranked among top contributors of personnel, providing more than 3,200 troops, police officers and civilian experts to several UN missions, including United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 871), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 862), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, 511), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO, 489), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, 221, including a specialized Military Aviation Unit), UNAMID (126) and United Nations Operation in the Ivory Coast (UNOCI, 113). Additionally, Ghana provided smaller numbers of peacekeepers to other UN missions, as well as to AU and ECOWAS operations. In sum, “Ghana contributes about 20% of its total army to UN missions”.³⁸

Contrary to the case of Ethiopia (in which realist notions dominate the analysis), Ghana’s engagement in peacekeeping could probably be investigated more accurately by a combination of liberal and realist theories of international relations. Accra contributes personnel to several missions that can be divided into two groups: the operations in the Ghanaian neighborhood (UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, UNMIL in Liberia and MINUSMA in Mali) and missions outside West Africa (UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNMISS in South Sudan, MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and UNAMID in Sudan). The deployments in the subregion are motivated primarily by security concerns. In the 1990s, West Africa witnessed a number of intertwined civil wars, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, for the political elites of the subregion, the spill-over effect of the conflict is a well-known, direct threat and not merely an academic concept. Aubyn and Aning explain Accra’s engagement in peacekeeping in West Africa as the efforts to: “(a) control and suppress the spread of such wars; (b) prevent them from jeopardizing its security and development agenda; (c) sometimes to extricate Ghanaian expatriates who may be caught up in the conflicts; (d) to stop wars sparking a wider conflagration which might undermine the region’s security, prosperity and stability; and (e) to stem humanitarian crises (...)”.³⁹ Four out of five rationalities support the realist point of view on why states contribute to international peacekeeping. The last one – humanitarian concerns – partially

Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions. Routledge: Farnham 2010, pp. 32–36.

38 Aubyn, Festus/Aning, Kwesi: *Contributor Profile: Ghana*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ghana_aning-aubyn-130227.pdf.

39 *Ibidem*, p. 5.

stems from *hard* security concerns too, as humanitarian crises often go hand in hand with refugee flows that could pose a threat to national security. However, the values of human rights and international solidarity that are underlined by liberal theories are also at stake here.

The abovementioned principles and values that are important for liberals are much more prominent when Ghanaian peacekeeping deployments outside West Africa are investigated. Meaningfully, the 1992 Constitution obligates the government to “promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means” and to adhere “to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the African Union, the Commonwealth, the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (...)”.⁴⁰ Therefore, in its fundamental legal act, Ghana declares the readiness to participate in peacekeeping that is perceived as a tool of pursuance of internationally recognized values. As a result, the country sends troops to missions with a significant humanitarian background, such as UNAMID, UNMISS and MONUSCO. Moreover, Ghana has supported UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon with more than 800 troops annually since the 1970s. All four deployments could hardly be explained by any security rationalities; they are rather purely normative, humanitarian and prestigious in nature.⁴¹

To complete the set of factors influencing the Ghanaian contribution to peacekeeping, the economic rationalities should also be discussed. Participation in the missions yields significant profits to the military as a whole, as well as to individual soldiers, police officers and civilian experts. At the level of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, peacekeeping facilitates international cooperation with donor states. For several years, Ghana has benefited from capacity-building and training programs, such as the American-founded African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), French Reinforcement of African Capabilities to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) and Canadian Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP).⁴² Moreover, the participation in peacekeeping constitutes a source of supplementary income for the state budget. As noted by Prouza and Horak, in 2010 Ghana obtained more than 74 million USD

40 *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*, 1992, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://www.politicsresources.net/docs/ghanaconst.pdf>.

41 Prouza, Jan/Horak, Jakub: “Small but Substantial. What Drives Ghana’s Contributions to UN. Peacekeeping Missions”. *Central European Journal of International Security Studies* 9, 2015, p. 215.

42 Aubyn, Festus/Aning, Kwesi: op. cit.

from the UN while spending 42 million USD on deployments.⁴³ Thus, peacekeeping brought a net profit of 32 million USD, which does not include non-material outputs, such as military experience and training gained in demanding conditions from Mali to the Democratic Republic of Congo to Lebanon. At the individual soldier level, peacekeeping is perceived as a desirable and profitable professional opportunity. Aubyn and Aning claim that it also “forms part of the military’s internal rewards system (in terms of personnel promotion)”⁴⁴

Ghana’s contribution to peacekeeping stems from a combination of security, economic and normative factors. The country yields significant profits from its participation in UN missions. Politically, it strengthens the international position of Ghana and improves the image of the country as a peaceful, stable and reliable partner. As a result, the country was rewarded with the most important UN Position, the position of Secretary General, held in the years 1997–2006 by Kofi Annan. Economically, the international deployments bring millions of dollars to the military budget. In terms of national security, participation in peacekeeping operations in the immediate neighborhood contributes to the stability of West Africa – an important precondition for the prosperity of the country.

Small Country – Burundi

Burundi is a landlocked country located in Central Africa. With 10 million inhabitants, a territory of 27,000km² and very low levels of both economic and human development, Burundi can be considered as a small state when compared to others on the continent.⁴⁵ Since its independence in 1962, the country has witnessed several periods of political turmoil with a devastating civil war from 1993–2005. As a result, between 2003 and 2015, the AU and UN deployed peacekeeping and political missions to monitor the implementation of peace agreements.⁴⁶ The internal instability limited the international engagement of

43 Prouza, Jan/Horak, Jakub: op. cit. p. 214.

44 Aubyn, Festus/Aning, Kwesi: op. cit.

45 CIA World Factbook: *Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html>.

46 These included: The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB, 2003–2004), United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB, 2004–2006), United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB, 2007–2010), United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB, 2011–2014) and United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB, 2015). See: Svensson, Emma: *The African Union Mission in Burundi. Lessons Learned from the African Union’s First Peace Operation*. Swedish Defence Research Agency: Stockholm 2008; United Nations: *United Nations Operation in Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onub/>; United Nations: *United Nations*

Bujumbura and “left Burundi a relative newcomer to providing peacekeeping”.⁴⁷ However, in the last decade, Burundi has deployed several thousand troops to AMISOM and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Additionally, Burundian soldiers (in smaller numbers) take part in other UN missions, such as UNAMID and UNOCI.⁴⁸

The biggest Burundian contribution to peacekeeping up to date – AMISOM – constitutes an interesting case study for analysis for several reasons. In particular the security rationalities, so predominantly present in Ethiopia’s decisions concerning the deployments of troops in the framework of this mission, could hardly be seen here. Somalia is located thousands of miles away from Bujumbura and events in this troubled coastal state have not had any significant impact on the situation in Burundi. Moreover, AMISOM has been one of the most demanding post-Cold War peacekeeping operations due to a full-scale conflict taking place in the area of deployment. It should also be noted that the military of the country is only 20,000 strong which means that a quarter of them are actually deployed in Somalia.⁴⁹ At the same time, AMISOM does not increase the security of Burundi.

However, the participation in AMISOM strengthens the international position of the country. As mentioned above, Burundi has hosted several peacekeeping and political missions in the recent past. By contributing troops to UN and AU operations, the government in Bujumbura has underlined “its new role as a peacekeeper abroad in order to push for the withdrawal of UN agencies at home”.⁵⁰ Here, this move proved insufficient – the UN was willing to engage in Burundi despite the progress claimed by Burundian elites. The last mission – UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) – was terminated due to the unfriendly posture of the government and not because of UN satisfaction with the country’s record.⁵¹ The second reason for *peacekeeping diplomacy* has been the ambition

Office in Burundi retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2963&language=en-US>; United Nations: *United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://menub.unmissions.org/en>.

47 Wilen, Nina/Birantamije, Gerard: *Contributor Profile: Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/ipi-pdf-document-store/ppp-profiles/africa/ipi-pub-ppp-Burundi.pdf>.

48 *Ibidem*.

49 International Institute for Strategic Studies: op. cit., pp. 434–435.

50 Wilen, Nina/Birantamije, Gerard: op. cit.

51 Kelley, Kevin: *Burundi Wants UN Peace Mission to Leave, Ban Says it Should Stay till Elections*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/>

to assume an important position in international organizations. In this case, the punching-above-your-weight strategy certainly contributed to some considerable achievements. Most notably, Burundi was elected a member of the Peace and Security Council in 2008, 2010, 2014 and 2016.⁵² As such, the tiny country enjoys *de facto* permanent member status. Moreover, during the 2015–2016 political crisis, when the AU discussed the possibility of humanitarian intervention in Burundi, one of the reasons the mission did not materialize was leverage in the form of heavy engagement in AMISOM – an operation that largely defines current, and to some extent also, future AU security policy.⁵³

Another important rationality behind the Burundian contribution concerns internal security and regime survival. Some scholars argue that a possible explanation of why the state sends troops to peacekeeping missions is that it keeps the armed forces occupied outside the country. In such a situation, the military is not able to influence internal affairs while also gaining training and experience, and earning money from the stipend system. At the same time, the military has traditionally meddled in Burundian politics – the most recent example being the 2015 attempted coup of General Niyombare. Thus, it is highly probable that such a logic influences the decision-makers in Bujumbura when they consider possible peacekeeping deployments.⁵⁴

However important, the security rationalities outlined above does not constitute the entire portfolio of factors that impacts the Burundian contribution to peacekeeping. For the government in Bujumbura, economic rationalities also play a role. As noted by Wilen and Birantamije, in the 2014 budget estimations, a sixth of the combined budget of army and police came from AMISOM-related income.⁵⁵ In sum, “the fees that the Burundian government is paid for peacekeeping and the salaries of its troops in Somalia, are probably the most

Burundi-wants-UN-peace-mission-to-leave/2558-2169300-view-printVersion-xdwiodz/index.html.

- 52 African Union: *Composition of the PSC, African Union Peace and Security*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/88-composition-of-the-psc>.
- 53 More on 2015–2016 political crisis in Burundi and the AU response: Williams, Paul D.: *Special Report: The African Union's Coercive Diplomacy in Burundi*, IPI Global Observatory, December 18, 2015; Williams, Paul D.: *Special Report, Part 2: The AU's Less Coercive Diplomacy on Burundi*, IPI Global Observatory, February 16, 2016.
- 54 Victor, Jonah: “African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State Legitimacy”. *Journal of Peace Research* 47, 2010, pp. 217–229; Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: “Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries”. *Providing for Peacekeeping* no 1, 2012.
- 55 Wilen, Nina/Birantamije, Gerard: op. cit.

important source of foreign exchange for the country today”.⁵⁶ Additionally, peacekeeping contributions allow Burundi to participate in various international training initiatives, such as the US-led ACOTA or the French RECAMP.⁵⁷ Moreover, at the level of an individual soldier, and the military seen as a professional group, the deployment in Somalia “is the most prized job in the poverty-stricken country”.⁵⁸ Therefore, economic rationalities play a crucial role in the AMISOM deployment. A similar logic applies to the 1000+ troop contribution to MINUSCA.

The above arguments support the realists’ point of view on peacekeeping contributions. There is little evidence of liberal-related rationalities behind Burundian deployments abroad. The fact that the government in Bujumbura fiercely rejected any significant AU engagement during the 2015–2016 political crisis shows that the decision-makers barely support values promoted by peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the government perceived the relatively unobtrusive UN political missions as an undesirable interference in the internal affairs of the country. Therefore, Burundian engagement in peacekeeping should be seen as driven by internal politics, economic factors and prestige-related rationalities.

Conclusion

The paper analyzes the peacekeeping contributions of three Sub-Saharan African states by applying the central notions of realist and liberal theories of international relations. The motives of engagement in the international peace and security initiatives of a regional power – Ethiopia; a mid-range power – Ghana; and a small state – Burundi, are investigated. In the Sub-Saharan African context, realist theories are particularly convincing for four main reasons. First of all, there are many conflicts on the continent – a fact that supports some basic realist assumptions on the character of international relations. At the same time, this feature forces states to implement any possible tool to strengthen national security. As resources (such as the military budget and troop numbers) remain scarce, it can be assumed that any significant application of them is driven by

56 M&G Africa Writer, “Burund Leader Says will Resist AU Troops, but That’s Hot Air and African Union Can Still Out him on the Run,” *Mail&Guardian Africa*, December 30, 2015, accessed May 25, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160307201228/http://mgafrika.com/article/2015-12-30-burundi-leader-says-will-resist-au-troops-but-its-hot-air-and-african-union-can-still-put-him-on-the-run>.

57 Wilen, Nina/Birantamije, Gerard: op. cit.

58 M&G Africa Writer, “Burundi Leaders Says will Resist AU Troops.

security concerns. Second, in some cases the peacekeeping operations are used by the states to pursue their national interest without even hiding the rationalities behind such a contribution (see: the semi-autonomous status of Ethiopian contingent within AMISOM – an operation directly linked to the core security interests of Addis Ababa). Third, peacekeeping personnel are so scarce (globally, but especially in Africa due to the complexity and high level of risk of many missions) that many Sub-Saharan states use it openly as leverage to pursue their goals. In 2010 Rwanda threatened to withdraw its peacekeepers from Darfur should the UN publish a report that accused it of massacring civilians in the DRC⁵⁹. A similar manoeuvre was repeated two years later by Uganda⁶⁰. Fourth, virtually all Sub-Saharan African contributors engage in international peacekeeping for economic benefits resulting from the elaborate system of stipends and military assistance programs. However, realism finds its limitations when confronted with the need to explain some distant deployments, when the national security of a given country is not at stake (see: the Ghanaian contingent in Lebanon). Additionally, there is a lack of empirical evidence that humanitarian concerns do not play a role in some contributions, such as the Ghanaian one to UNAMID.

The explanatory deficiencies of realism could be complemented by liberalism. First, the liberal notions of international solidarity and the importance of the moral obligations of states contribute to the interpretation of an engagement in global and regional peace and security activities by states that themselves struggle with significant internal challenges. This is particularly convincing in the cases of some peacekeeping operations, such as the African Union Mission in Sudan (in fact – Darfur) in the 2000s. Here, the international actors (African countries), driven by the concept of *African solutions to African problems*, stepped in to alleviate human suffering. The case of AMIS demonstrates a second advantage of liberalism – the prominence it gives to soft power factors. In Darfur, in addition to humanitarian concerns, the AU aimed at displaying the leadership and capacity of the African states to manage complex conflicts on the continent with their own resources. This fact partially supports another liberal claim – the one on the importance and autonomy of international organizations. As mentioned above, African states declared a willingness to build an African Peace and Security Architecture. In this framework, humanitarian intervention (one of the crucial

59 Gettleman, Jeffrey/Kron, Josh: “Rwanda Threatens to Leave Sudan Mission”. *New York Times*, 159 (55150), Aug. 31, 2010, p. A7.

60 “Uganda threatens peacekeeper pullout from Somalia”. *Deutsche Welle*, Nov. 3, 2012 retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://p.dw.com/p/16cB2>.

concepts of liberal theories) would be possible to implement even against the will of a significant minority (1/3) of states. Regardless of numerous obstacles, the case in which the states collectively agreed to restrict their sovereignty proves that actors on the international stage could be inclined to build a liberal world order.

Given the above considerations, the main conclusion of the paper is that both groups of theories provide a significant and valuable insight into the issue of peacekeeping contributions. Regardless of the position of a country in a system (regional power, mid-range power or a small state), both realism and liberalism strengthen the understanding of rationalities behind the participation in peacekeeping. However, especially when the cases of Ethiopia and Burundi are considered, realist explanations seem more convincing when confronted with the evidence. Importantly, this does not imply that liberalism should be pushed to the margins when investigating peacekeeping contributions. As shown by the case of Ghana, some international deployments could hardly be explained solely by realist notions. The concepts of solidarity of states and promotion of values also influence the decisions of some governments to send troops, police and civilian experts to UN and non-UN missions⁶¹.

References

- All Africa: *Somalia: Ethiopian Troops Accused of Taking No Order from AMISOM*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201508180520.html>.
- African Union: *Composition of the PSC, African Union Peace and Security*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/88-composition-of-the-psc>.
- Aubyn, Festus/Aning, Kwesi: *Contributor Profile: Ghana*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ghana_aning-aubyn-130227.pdf.
- Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: "Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries". *Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 1, 2012, pp. 1–16.
- Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: "Thinking Anew about Peace Operations". *International Peacekeeping* 11, 2004, pp. 1–15.
- Bellamy, Alex/Williams, Paul D.: *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity: Cambridge 2010.

61 Cutt-off date of the text - 3 June 2016.

- Boutton, Andrew/D'Orazio, Vito: *Buying Blue Helmets: Western Aid Allocation & UN. Peacekeeping Troop Contributors*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://vitorozario.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/13026085/bbh6.pdf>.
- Burchill, Scott: "Liberalism". In: Burchill, Scott *et al.* (eds.): *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave: New York 2001.
- CIA World Factbook: *Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html>.
- CIA World Factbook: *Ethiopia*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html>.
- CIA World Factbook: *Ghana*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html>.
- Cox, Robert: "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". *Millennium: Journal of international Studies* 10(2), 1981, pp. 126–155..
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines*.
- Dersso, Solomon A.: Contributor Profile: Ethiopia, Providing for Peacekeeping, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://ipi-pdf-document-store.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ppp-profiles/africa/ipi-pub-ppp-Ethiopia.pdf>.
- Donnelly, Jack: "Realism". In: Burchill, Scott *et al.* (eds.): *Theories of International Relations*. Palgrave: New York 2001.
- Flint, Julie: *The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur*. Small Arms Survey: Geneva 2010.
- Gettleman, Jeffrey/Kron, Josh: "Rwanda Threatens to Leave Sudan Mission". *New York Times*, 159 (55150), Aug. 31, 2010, p. A7.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 2015*. International Institute for Strategic Studies: London 2015.
- Jett, Dennis: *Why Peacekeeping Fails?:* Palgrave: New York 2001.
- Johnson, Douglas H.: "Why Abyei Matters. The Breaking Point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?". *African Affairs* 426, 2008, pp. 1–19.
- Kelley, Kevin: *Burundi Wants UN Peace Mission to Leave, Ban Says it Should Stay till Elections*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://www.theeastafrikan.co.ke/news/Burundi-wants-UN-peace-mission-to-leave/2558-2169300-view-printVersion-xdwiodz/index.html>.
- M&G Africa Writer, "Burundi Leader Says will Resist AU Troops, but That's Hot Air and African Union Can Still Out him on the Run," *Mail&Guardian Africa*, December 30, 2015, accessed May 25, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160307201228/http://mgafrika.com/>

- article/2015-12-30-burundi-leader-says-will-resist-au-troops-but-its-hot-air-and-african-union-can-still-put-him-on-the-run.
- Neack, Laura: "UN. Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?". *Journal of Peace Research* 32, 1995, pp. 181–196.
- Paris, Roland: "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations". *International Studies Review* No. 3, 2000, pp. 27–44.
- Perry, Chris/Smith, Adam C.: "Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN. Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 1991–2012". *Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 3, December 2012.
- Prouza, Jan/Horak, Jakub: "Small but Substantial. What Drives Ghana's Contributions to UN. Peacekeeping Missions". *Central European Journal of International Security Studies* 9 (2), 2015, pp. 204–226.
- Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII)*, October 16, 2014.
- Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei*, January 27, 2012, S/2012/68.
- Sturman, Kathryn/Hayatou, Aissatou: "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: From Design to Reality". In: Porto, Joao G/Engel, Ulf (eds.) *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions*. Routledge: Farnham 2010.
- Svensson, Emma: *The African Union Mission in Burundi. Lessons Learned from the African Union's First Peace Operation*. Swedish Defence Research Agency: Stockholm 2008.
- Tesfa-Alem, Tekle: *Sudan: Ethiopia Imports \$U.S.1 Billion in Fuel from Sudan via Djibouti*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304011187.html>.
- The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*, 1992, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://www.politicsresources.net/docs/ghanaconst.pdf>.
- Tlalka, Krzysztof: *East African Standby Force. Shortcomings and Prospects for the Future*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/handle/10071/7542?mode=simple>.
- "Uganda threatens peacekeeper pullout from Somalia". *Deutsche Welle*, Nov. 3, 2012 retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://p.dw.com/p/16cB2>.
- United Nations: *Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 – S/24111*, June 17, 1992, retrieved 25.05.2016, from http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.

- United Nations: *Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160413203858/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Yearly.pdf>.
- United Nations: *Troop and Police Contributors*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.
- United Nations: United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://menub.unmissions.org/en>.
- United Nations: *United Nations Office in Burundi* retrieved 25.05.2016, from <http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2963&language=en-US>.
- United Nations: *United Nations Operation in Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onub/>.
- United Nations: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Fact Sheet. 31 March 2016*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20160520001112/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0316.pdf>.
- van Walraven, Klaas: "Heritage and Transformation: From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union". In: Porto, Joao G./Engel, Ulf (eds.): *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions*. Routledge: Farnham 2010.
- Victor, Jonah: "African Peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State Legitimacy". *Journal of Peace Research* 47, 2010, pp. 217–229.
- Vines, Alex: "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture". *International Affairs* 89, 2013, pp. 89–109.
- Wilen, Nina/Birantamije, Gerard: *Contributor Profile: Burundi*, retrieved 25.05.2016, from <https://s3.amazonaws.com/ipi-pdf-document-store/ppp-profiles/africa/ipi-pub-ppp-Burundi.pdf>.
- Williams, Paul D.: Special Report, Part 2: The AU's Less Coercive Diplomacy on Burundi, IPI Global Observatory.
- Williams, Paul D.: *Special Report: The African Union's Coercive Diplomacy in Burundi*, IPI Global Observatory, December 18, 2015. February 16, 2016.
- Woodward, Peter: *The Horn of Africa: State, Politics and International Relations*. I.B. Tauris: London/New York 2002.
- Yamashita, Hikaru: "Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations". *Review of International Studies* 38, 2012, pp. 165–186.

Mara Stirner

13. The Long Road to (In)dependence: Decolonization of Francophone Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Analyzed through the Lens of Dependency and Neorealist Theory

Abstract: The paper analyzes the period of French decolonization in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, applying in the first part dependency theory and in the second part the thought of neo-realism. By the year 1900, France had become the second largest colonial ruler worldwide. On the African continent alone, it controlled eighteen countries. But by the early 1960s France had lost most of its francophone colonies. Unlike other former imperial powers, the Gallic country did not withdraw from the Sub-Saharan region. Even though the former protectorates all reached official independence and the right for self-determination, France would, as Francois Mitterrand famously quoted “leave, in order to stay on more easily”.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan, Africa, France, Decolonization, Dependence, Neo-realism, Dependency Theory

Introduction

French colonialism dates back to the 17th century and the period of its first colonial expansion, lasted for about two hundred years. The second colonial empire in 1830 initiated the so-called *scramble for Africa*, i.e. the occupation and colonization of African countries. In 1830 France conquered Algeria and by 1939 had enlarged its African empire to a territory that reached 13 million square kilometres and governed a total population of over 110 million people. The African countries under French occupation were: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Republic of the Congo and Madagascar.

In 1900 the Gallic country was, after the United Kingdom, the second greatest colonial ruler worldwide. But soon after 1945, movements for independence seriously started to challenge their colonial authority and by the early 1960s France had lost most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, France did not withdraw from independent Africa. Even though the former French colonies have all

gained independence from the colonial ruler, there still exists strong interference from France up to the present day. France has maintained strong ties with Francophone African countries. It has intervened in the affairs of many sovereign African nations and changed its interference-strategy according to the existing political and economic situation. It has moved between an official military presence and interference, to the application of development and aid programs and multilateral approaches. From colonial dependence, the Francophone African countries shifted to an economic dependence on European governments. France has tried to continue a form of domination behind different masks of security guarantor, terrorist fighter and development worker.

This paper seeks to investigate French decolonization and tries to reveal France's steady influence in the African sphere, even more than 50 years after colonial independence. It tries to disentangle parts of the complex interrelation of Europe and Africa, on a political, economic, military and cultural level. The text analyzes historical narratives, applying dependency theory in the first part and the thought of neo-realism in the second part. The article has been elaborated through documentary analysis. The sources used are predominantly news articles, texts from academic journals and chapters from academic books. Due to the size of the paper it was decided to focus on the role of France and to limit the outlining of African narratives. This might lead to the perception of former French colonies as 'passive' victims lacking self-determination, which is not the reality. African anti-colonial movements have existed from the first occupation and are very strong up to the present day.

Historical Background

French Decolonization in Africa

In the aftermath of World War II, France looked with mounting suspicion on the close relationship between Great Britain and the United States and sought reassurance regarding its role as a world power. During the last ten years of France's colonial rule in Africa, Paris devoted more financial resources to the African continent than the grand total of its previous investments in its Sub-Saharan colonies. In 1954 uprisings in *Algérie* emerged and France used all legal and illegal means at its disposal to maintain control over its colony.¹

1 Chafer, Tony: "French African Policy in Historical Perspective". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(2), 2001, pp. 165–182.

Charles de Gaulle created a new constitution that established the 5th Republic, whose political system was shaped in order to do its utmost to preserve the sinking empire. But with the referendum in 1958 his ultimate ‘rescue’ effort failed. Guinea was the first country to separate from French rule and not to join the newly established ‘French Community’. In less than two years, eighteen countries gained sovereignty. Not later than in 1962 the French empire was crushed.

That did not imply that Paris’ influence in Sub-Saharan Africa had been diminished. According to François Mitterrand’s motto “*Partir pour mieux rester*”, his country would literally “*leave, in order to stay on more easily*”.²

After ‘Independence’

The difficult process of independence left behind unstable countries, without an efficient infrastructure on which to build a stable social order and economy. The French government would support the newly independent countries with military and technical support, where the ex-colonies had to reinforce its international policies. France would collaborate closely with African elites and strongly influence the newly formed governments in Francophone Africa. These new leaders were often educated in Western countries and shared many visions with the neoliberal value-system.

A crucial element for French influence in Francophone *Afrique* is the use of a common language. It implements strong ties with important African rulers and maintains a solid relation with local people.³

French activities and influences in the Sub-Saharan region were built on three pillars:

- i. Monetary pillar: they founded the so-called franc zone, with 14 countries as members sharing the same currency the “*franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)*”. Member states were Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
- ii. Network of French experts: A large number of experts were in place in educational, financial and institutional sectors in the former French colonies.
- iii. Military Pillar: France had several permanent military bases and French soldiers throughout its former colonies.

2 Aldrich, Robert: *When did Decolonization End? France and the Ending of Empire*. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, Wisconsin, 2012.

3 Chafer, Tony: *op. cit.*

The most important person responsible for African affairs after the formal decolonization process was Jacques Foccart. He masterminded clandestine military coups in French-speaking Africa. Also called “Monsieur Afrique”, he was a personal adviser to President Charles de Gaulle and for sixteen years the director of the *cellule africaine*. This institution was the presidential cabinet deciding on African issues.

French Interventionism

There were mainly two types of accords that France would base its intervention on:

- i. Technical military agreements: these would assure that French military advisers were stationed in African armies, and that France would provide the soldiers with equipment and training.
- ii. The so-called Defense accords: allowing France to intervene in sovereign questions of the independent countries.⁴

As a *gendarme* for Africa, France would prove its global power and please its economic interests. With François Mitterrand as president (1981–1995) interventions in different African states increased. The main battlefield during that period was Chad. The country was involved in a conflict with Gaddafi’s Libya over the Aouzou strip in Northern Chad, which Libya claimed to be part of their country, based on a colonial treaty between Italy and France from 1935. Gaddafi was backed by the Soviet Union; Chad received military aid from the French army, which intervened several times trying to ‘save’ the Chadian government from a Libyan incursion.⁵

In the environment of the Cold War, the United States recognized France as an important containment partner to intervene in Africa and to help keep countries inside the Western bloc. The unstable new governments on the African continent were, according to the US, likely to ‘fall for communism’ and collaborate with the Soviet bloc (some eventually did, for example Angola, PRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia).

But after the East-West conflict French policy had to adapt to the new circumstances of the era. Mitterrand therefore changed his strategy. In June 1990, he announced at the 16th French-African summit that from now on,

4 Victor-Manuel, Vallin: “France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014”. *Political Science Quarterly* 130(1), 2015, pp. 79–101.

5 BBC: *Chad Profile – Timeline*, retrieved 05.12.2015, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13164690>.

France would support its African associates with financial aid, under the condition that they carry out “democratic changes” within their territory. This way, France’s military presence and influence could endure inside the Sub-Saharan zone behind the mask of development aid. But this constant interference had some devastating effects, for example in Rwanda.⁶

Rwanda was first colonized by Germany, after World War I it was controlled by Belgium and in 1970 it was included into the sphere of French influence. In the 1990s in Rwanda the Hutu regime under Habyarimana gained support from France against the groups of the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). France strongly underestimated the situation at that time and the dimension of ‘ethnic’ animosity, which had been artificially created by the former colonial rulers. The constant economic competition over Africa between America and France during the Cold Peace era of the 90s also played a big role in the events in Rwanda. At that time the RPF was backed by Uganda, which had been supported by the US policy-making establishment. This threat of a potential invasion by the Diaspora Tutsi living in Uganda and with it an English-speaking supremacy in Central Africa reinforced French support for the Hutu rebels. When France finally withdrew its troops from Rwandan ground, it basically left the country open to genocide. Its self-proclaimed ‘Safe Humanitarian zone’, which has been constructed as a sanctuary for Rwandan refugees, permitted genocide culprits to escape the country.⁷

Under the rule of President Jacques Chirac (1995–2002) rearrangements were made. His professionalization reform from 1996 originally arranged for a reduction of French armed forces on African territory. But to maintain a solid presence, France moved from unilateralism and its hegemony in African affairs to a more multilateral approach. The socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin changed the philosophy of French interventionism and claimed that France needed the support of other countries to ensure the ‘security’ of its African partners. France would start to resort to actions through the United Nations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, France acted as a principal guarantor for African security issues. From 1997 to 2001 France conducted about 42 interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Out of those, only eight were of a multilateral nature.⁸

6 Dominic, Thomas: *Nation-building, Propaganda, and Literature in Francophone Africa*. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2012.

7 Schraeder Peter: “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S. -French Competition in Francophone Africa”. *Political Science Quarterly* 115(3), 2000, p. 395.

8 Victor-Manuel, Vallin: *op. cit.*

Adapting to the Circumstances

When in 2002, armed rebel troops in Cote d'Ivoire attempted to subdue President Gbagbo in an unsuccessful *coup d'état*, the country was torn in two. Rebel groups controlled the northern half and loyal forces, the pro-Gbagbo southern. After an attack on a French peacekeeping position by pro-government forces, President Chirac called for the destruction of the Ivorian Air Force. The 2004 Hotel Ivoire events, when the French army fired upon anti-French civilian protesters, who were calling for a 'war of second independence' from imperial powers, marked a turning point in France's interventionism in Africa.⁹

With new political elites coming into power in Sub-Saharan countries, ties between France and their former colonies were reduced. Furthermore, other actors appeared on the scene. The US and China enlarged their influence in the Francophone sphere and signed military accords with both more than 15 countries. In 2008 President Sarkozy published the *livre blanc* (white paper), which stated that France should limit interference and reduce military bases in Africa. France reduced its interest in Sub-Saharan Africa but it still remains a key interest. This was satisfied through cooperation and multilateral operations. France urged the European Union to enter the scene as an effective actor in Africa. Nevertheless, it is mainly French lobbying that has shaped EU African policy.

As Al Qaeda emerged, France found a new mission to be fulfilled: the war on terror. Together with the struggle against piracy in Somalia, this provided re-legitimization for French military intervention. In 2013 François Hollande's soldiers fought against jihadist troops in Northern Mali. "Operation Serval" and "Operation Sangaris" in the Central African Republic reinforced the French military presence in Francophone Africa.¹⁰

From Past to Present

So now, more than 50 years after the independence of colonial countries, one could expect Paris' influence in Africa to be marginal and that its military presence would be reduced dramatically. But this is just partly true. In 2015, France still had 3,000 troops stationed in at least five Francophone countries: Mali,

9 Piccolino, Giulia: "David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's War against Global Governance". *African Affairs* 111(442), 2011, pp. 1–23.

10 Victor-Manuel, Vallin: *op. cit.*

Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. This military presence is part of the anti-terrorist Operation Barkhane that was initiated in 2014.¹¹

Dependency Theory

Theoretical Background

Dependency theory is subdivided into three streams of thought: The liberal reformers under Raúl Prebisch, the Neo-Marxist thinkers with André Gunder Frank as their main exponent and Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theorists.¹²

The *dependencia* theory has its roots in Latin America. The Argentinian Economist Raúl Prebisch founded the theory in the late 1950s and with it challenged the mainstream approach of neoclassical theory. The *laissez faire consensus* argues that an economic surge is profitable for every country, even if there exists an unbalanced allocation of economic benefits. The dependency theorists on the other hand locate the cause for the poverty of the commonly named Third World countries in the development of the capitalist First World. The distinction between so-called rich *core/metropolitan* countries and the poor *periphery/satellite* countries is a fundamental idea of the dependency theory.¹³ The periphery nations are mainly exporters of primary commodities (raw materials) such as agricultural products or mineral resources to the core powers. This causes a strong dependence of the satellite countries (also dependent nations) from the metropolitan (dominant) states. The core industrialized countries add the manufacture value, by producing finished goods out of the raw materials imported from the periphery partners, and sell those value-added products for a much higher price back to the satellite states. This trading system leads to a vicious circle, in which the dependent countries never earn enough from their exports to actually remit their imports. The industrialized advanced nations are those in the OECD, where the satellite nations are most countries of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and big parts of Asia. The Western countries utilize the 'underdeveloped' nations to represent their economic interest abroad.

11 Bender, Jeremy: *France's Military is All over Africa*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1>.

12 Ferraro, Vincent: "Dependency Theory: An Introduction". In: Secondi, Giorgio (ed.): *The Development Economics Reader*. Routledge: New York 2008.

13 Tai Wei Lim: "Multilateralism and Dependency Theory". *African & Asian Studies* 13(1/2), 2014, pp. 80–99.

For *dependencia* theoreticians the internationalization of capitalism is the principal cause for the unequal relationship among nations. In the industrialized countries, political and economic power is accumulated, while poor countries are excluded from global decision-making. Even though there exists a movement of goods and services into the satellite countries, it is still mostly the dominant powers who decide how to allocate these resources.¹⁴

Decolonization Viewed through Dependency Theory

Francophone decolonization could be seen as a new capitalistic form of dependence. The former colonial power France as a core nation, tries to keep its satellite African partners as dependent as possible, even after they reached formal independence. During colonial times, there was a perception of French culture as something universal, which came along with a supposed 'duty' to spread French language and 'civilization'. After decolonization this so-called *Francophonie* bound former colonies to the metropolis. France spends still a lot of money on African cultural institutes, schools and festivals. The continuing dependence of the former colonial powers, according to Prebisch and his colleagues, blocks Francophone countries from building an efficient economy and industry. According to Prebisch and his followers, the only way satellite countries could escape this weak position, is through *import-substitution* and *industrialization*. If African states industrialized, they could themselves produce value added goods and would be less dependent on imports from the metropolitan industries.

Dependency theory strongly opposes the modernization assumption, that all countries follow the same path to a modern form of industrial economy. According to modernization theorists, the successful Western countries should be used as a model that 'underdeveloped' nations aspire to.¹⁵ Prebisch, Wallerstein and Gunder Frank agree on the fact that many African countries are not poor because of inherent cultural and economic characteristics. They are poor, because countries like France keep them dependent, by integrating them into a European economic system, only as producers of commodity products.¹⁶ France holds very strong relations with local leaders – as it did with Senegalese president Léopold Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of Ivory Coast – by incorporating them into a structure, that the capitalist economy and mainly core countries profit from.

14 Ferraro, Vincent: *op. cit.*

15 Aldrich, Robert: *op. cit.*

16 Tai Wei Lim: *op. cit.*

The term *Francafrique* refers to that strong French interference in African affairs. and as dependency theorists argue, even if political independence that most African countries gained by 1960 was a first step to autonomy, they are still blocked from self-sufficiency and from the final steps to full independence. There is a metaphor of different layers of colonial influence in which every layer supports every other layer and even if one is removed, it is replaced by another.¹⁷

Economic Interests

As Prebisch outlines in his most famous *Havana Manifesto*, the metropolitan countries use continuing dependence to represent their economic interests abroad. This is also why de Gaulle established the *cellule africaine*, the special office for African affairs with Jacques Foccart as president. Behind the mask of cooperation and development aid, France obtains in return access to all kinds of natural resources.

André Gunder Frank revealed that the peripheral countries are sources for “cheap mineral and cheap labour, and also serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies and manufactured goods”.¹⁸ The *dependencia* theorists suggest that these resources should be approached in a different way. For example, large amounts of agricultural products are exported by many dependent states, instead of being consumed by the domestic market. Many countries of the so-called Global South suffer from high quotas of malnutrition, even though there are large quantities of foodstuffs being produced. These fundamental contradictions within the world economy are one of the main focuses of dependency thinkers.¹⁹

Wallerstein emphasizes that in the 1950s there were at least five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Columbia), which had the best prospects for economic success. But all of them ended up in a so-called *desarrollo dependiente* (dependent development) and remained trapped in low living standards and depressed welfare. In 1983 about 70 % of the global industrial labor force was still to be found within the satellite countries, which would only produce about 9 % of the world’s industrial output.²⁰

17 Aldrich, Robert: *op. cit.*

18 Kay, Cristóbal: “André Gunder Frank: From the ‘Development of Underdevelopment’ to the ‘World System’”. *Development & Change* 36(6), 2005, pp. 1177–1183.

19 Ferraro, Vincent: *op. cit.*

20 *Latin America World Systems Theory - The Age of Decolonization and the Failings of Modernization Theory, Precursors to World Systems Theory, Wallerstein and World*

Goals of Interest

France has followed three different goals of interest in Sub-Saharan Africa: they were first and foremost seeking an economic benefit. This interest was predominantly fulfilled through the export of commodity products that France has privileged access to and a cheap labor force for their companies. In 2006, one quarter of the exports of the CFA franc zone went to France.

The second goal for French interference in its former colonies is a strategic advantage from close relations with these countries, which at the same time is tightly connected to the economic issue.²¹ French industry profits from the trade with Francophone Africa. In 2003 French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici said: “We have to speak the language of truth: African growth pulls us along; its dynamism supports us and its vitality is stimulating for us. We need Africa”.²²

The ex-colonial power purchases raw materials, mostly agricultural or mineral products, from the dependent states and in exchange sells its finished goods back to them. This causes a strong dependence on imports for African countries. In Togo, for example, the money gained from the phosphate recovery was predominantly invested into the construction of factories, oil refineries and hotels. But the companies who were executing these tasks were mostly French. So, the income from the phosphate industry found its way back into French hands. The Yaoundé convention in 1963 between the European Community and 18 African countries, offered the former colonies privileged access to the European Economic Community. But none of the promises to the African continent were really fulfilled, as they did not lead to any enlargement of trade, nor protect African exported goods from the caprices of the market. The decisive power in economic relations remained in the hands of the six European countries, not of the eighteen African ones.

Nkrumah described African dependence from European powers as follows:

The neo-colonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state may be secured by payment towards the cost of running

Systems Theory, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://science.jrank.org/pages/11669/World-Systems-Theory-Latin-America-Precursors-World-Systems-Theory.html>.

- 21 Profant, Tomáš: “French Geopolitics in Africa: From Neocolonialism to Identity”. *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs* 18(1), 2010, pp. 41–60.
- 22 France24: *France ‘Must Double’ Trade with Africa, Hollande Says*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.france24.com/en/20131204-france-must-double-trade-ties-africa-hollande-economy>.

the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.²³

The third goal that France follows in Africa is the identity 'advantage'. The French language used in the Francophone countries is an arbitrary feature of French interference.²⁴ Wallerstein was convinced that the success of the industrial countries should not serve as an example to be imitated by peripheral economies. He stated that the Western prosperity was just a particular episode in the economic history of the world, which was built on exploitative relationships with its colonies. This specific type of modernization only created profits for the privileged metropolitan countries, and not for the satellite states.²⁵

There are different methods for France to maintain its control over the newly independent countries: Through the education and training of military officials and the army, together with the supply of weaponry, they secure surveillance in the military sphere. France overproduces arms, whose spill over is then sold to the so-called developing countries. In the 1970s such a transaction was conducted with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The central African country bought different ordinances, but had to apply for a French loan. This borrowing led to an explosion of Congo's debts and to a near collapse of its government through the Shaba uprisings and to another intervention by the French *gendarme*. In politics, the French nation protects its concerns through international institutions that represent the interest of Western powers. Through the construction of local schools, missions and collaboration with local media, the Western nation maintains involvement in the cultural field. They achieve technical supremacy by making Africa dependent on their technological know-how. There is a strong financial dependence between African countries and France, caused by loans that they take from their former colonial power and the colonial tax many countries are still forced to pay back.²⁶

23 Profant, Tomáš: *op. cit.*

24 Profant, Tomáš: *op. cit.*

25 *Latin America World Systems Theory - The Age of Decolonization and the Failings of Modernization Theory, Precursors to World Systems Theory, Wallerstein and World Systems Theory*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://science.jrank.org/pages/8165/World-Systems-Theory-Latin-America.html>.

26 Victor-Manuel, Vallin: *op. cit.*

Neo-Dependence?

The dependency theorists have shown how the stagnation of the economies of the Global South and the capitalist wealth of the Western world are strongly intertwined. The unbalanced division of labor that France still profits from, prevents the peripheral states from developing a self-sustaining economy and maintains, according to Wallerstein, Western hegemony in the world system. The satellite nations, according to Prebisch, have to escape this vicious circle. First of all, the unbalanced division of labor has to be stopped. Industrialization has to be accelerated, by substituting a large part of the imports by domestic production. But most of all, Prebisch calls upon the satellite states' governments to be active participants in the industrialization process and upon the Global South civilizations to take control of their joint destiny. Only a strong Africa can change the course of its history toward a self-reliant, autonomous region, independent from European powers and its former colonists.²⁷

Neo-realism

Theory and Background

Neo-realism aims to illustrate the way states behave and interact with each other. This political theory mostly concentrates on powerful countries and their behavior. The most acknowledged neorealist is Kenneth Waltz. His book *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, is recognized as a principal reference for this IR theory.²⁸ Neo-realism also bears the name 'structural realism'. This is due to its main focus on the structure of the international system and its effects on outcomes.

Neo-realism explains the international structures as defined by two principles. The first concept focuses on the ordering tenet of the system, which is 'anarchy'. This is also one of the principal causes of conflicts according to Waltz, because there is no superior power to prevent them. Waltz's so-called self-help system can be observed when looking at African countries. Countries as Cote d'Ivoire or Mali are weak actors in the international economic and political system. By

27 Prebisch, Raúl - *Latin America's Keynes*, *The Economist* 5.3.2009, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.economist.com/node/13226316>.

28 Korab-Karpowicz, Julian W.: "Political Realism in International Relations". In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.): *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition)*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.

virtue of neo-realism, they are not capable of internal balancing and therefore have to rely on stronger powers, like France, and external balancing.²⁹

The second principle of structural realism is the distribution of *capabilities*. Waltz states that all countries are the same, in being autonomous political entities. They might all be shaped by an identical organizing principle, but still behave in various ways. The only differences between the states in the international system are the capabilities and the way they are distributed across the units. Waltz looks for the rationale of actions in the structure a unit is embedded in, and not in the behaving unit. This is where Waltz and Prebisch do agree. Former French colonies are not struggling on the international stage because of their individual characteristics, but because of the structure of that international system in which they are ingrained. But were Prebisch and his dependency theorists strive for a “world that is politically democratic and socially and economically egalitarian”³⁰, neorealist thinkers perceive the predominance of powerful states as something that balances international politics. Waltz describes the behavior of the dominant countries as generic, by abusing their power and exploiting the weaker nations. France, as a global power, is just ‘accommodating’ to its given position in the global system, determined by the capabilities it possesses. According to Waltz, a dominant country cannot be expected to behave with moderation.

This behavior is not just important for self-interest, but also for the whole system to remain unchanged. “In any kind of balancing system”, argues Waltz, “the major players have to continue to exist as major players”.³¹ This is explainable due to the balancing system being embedded within a structure and therefore depending on it. If the structure alters, so does the way of balancing.

Security Dilemma

A recent example of French interventionism was the country of Mali. In 2013 Islamic militants with connections to *Al Qaeda*, were threatening to extend their ‘of influence to the south of the country. France decided to stop the rebels with their operation *Serval*, which led to the incursion of 4,000 French troops into

29 Waltz, Kenneth: “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”. *Journal of International Affairs* 44(1), 1990, p. 21.

30 *Latin America World Systems Theory - The Age of Decolonization and the Failings of Modernization Theory, Precursors to World Systems Theory, Wallerstein and World Systems Theory, op. cit.*

31 Kenneth Neal Waltz – *The Physiocrat of International Politics*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html>.

Mali. For Waltz, the main objective for every country in the international system is survival. What every country is mostly striving for is security within an ‘anarchic’ world order, where no higher authority can protect it from aggressions from other states. According to neo-realism, states in general do not want to fight wars. In this big security dilemma, Waltz is convinced, weaker states should hold on to the ‘world powers’, as a form of protection. The best way in the neorealist view to survive in the international system is power, which is what Francophone African countries lack. When Mali was in danger of being turned into a caliphate, France could play its ‘heroic protection card’ and ‘save’ the country from the jihadist terror groups. The Western media reported the intervention as a big success. The fact, that the *Serval* mission was only a short-term solution was not always reported. Critics argue that this new form of ‘neo-interventionism’ under the flag of fighting terrorism is just an illusion for France to maintain its interests in the country. What Mali is actually suffering from is a domestic political problem. Still there exists an intense conflict between the Tuareg rebels trying to establish their own country in the north, and the government of Mali. The terrorist problem was only carried over to the neighboring regions and has reinforced groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, or Boko Haram in Nigeria and with the arrival of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the West-African country, the situation has deteriorated.

Economic Interest

According to critics, the *Serval* intervention in Mali was more about a conflict of interest. For Waltz the two fundamental sources of war are the two basic principles of the structure of international politics: ‘anarchy’ and distribution of capabilities. France saw its capabilities, backed by cheap resources and the consumer market in Mali, to be in great danger and therefore risked sending its own troops into an armed conflict. This is for Waltz a typical source of conflict in the global system. The principle of ‘anarchy’ could be also applied to the *Serval* intervention. On a mission to fight global terrorism, France has the ultimate legitimization to interfere in African countries. There is no higher committee or institution that would monitor the operation.³²

If for neo-realism the international structure is ‘anarchy’, for economists the structure is the market. The different units, or states, act and move within

32 Tawodzera, Obert: “France in Africa: Fight against Global Terrorism or Neo-colonialism?”. *Nouse* 26.11.2015, retrieved 01.12.2015 from <http://www.nouse.co.uk/2015/11/26/france-in-africa-fight-against-global-terrorism-or-neo-colonialism/>.

the market and produce outcomes. But these outcomes for neorealists, do not depend on the characteristics of the countries, but on the market. As the market forges the behavior and the behavior shapes the outcomes, the outcomes are formed by the structure of the market. So, if Francophone African states produce commodity products, it is not due to their behavior, but due to the market they are embedded in and the capabilities they have. Waltz rejects the definition of the world as interdependent. He explains that there are highly independent countries, strong economic and military powers, and there are weak states that are highly dependent on the strong countries. France's former colonies are still highly dependent, whereas France can in this view be considered an independent country, with strong economic power and many resources.³³

Francophone Africa. Independence or Neo-dependence?

Looking back at the second half of the 20th century, core countries like France highly defined Africa's position in the global market as well as its national institutions. They shaped the Francophone countries culturally, politically, economically and militarily. As the 'African expert', France together with the European Union and the assistance of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the African Development Bank and many NGOs, were well able to retain means of control over former colonies. The dependency web Africa is trapped in was solidified more in recent decades than it might have been during colonization. Despite high investments, especially from China and positive trends in commodity prices, Africa still sees more capital going out than earnings flowing into the region. As the dependency theorists have already revealed, peripheral regions like Sub-Saharan Africa are still highly dependent on their export of raw materials to core countries.

Just as colonial independence in Africa was celebrated in the 1960s, in the 1990s the world was looking to South Africa and revelled in the final abolition of the apartheid system. Nelson Mandela was celebrated as the face of African self-determination and as a symbol for freedom. But as soon as the initial excitement passed, the cameras of the global news channels turned away again and what was left was a country, still trapped with high unemployment rates, persistent low living standards for black people and a growing gap between the rich and the poor.³⁴ The division of labor that Prebisch was criticizing still persists

33 Kenneth Neal Waltz – *The Physiocrat of International Politics*, *op. cit.*

34 Kofas, Jon: *Africa in the 21st Century: Legacy of Imperialism and Development Prospects*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.countercurrents.org/kofas081115.htm>.

and blocks the satellite states from becoming actual equivalent competitors on the international market. In 2013 Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world exports was still only around 3.5 %; in 1998 it was around 1.3 %. Despite the increase in this period it dipped again to 1.5 % in 2015. Even if in recent decades, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced economic growth, this did not give rise to a greater share in global trade.³⁵

The international system, in which poor countries are highly dependent on the rich countries, as described by Prebisch, has not changed very much. Even though Wallerstein introduced an in-between category of peripheral and core states, the semi-peripheral states, he did not predict an actual shift in the balance of global economic power. Even if the influence of Western countries is diminishing and other core actors appear on the scene, the exploitation system remains and only the geographical line alters.³⁶

Neo-realism's differentiation between powerful states and weak countries persists up to the present day. The dependency theory's core countries still command authority on global scale. This is also visible in current European politics on migration.

Still up to the present day, France, as other industrialized nations, strongly influences the African continent to please its own needs. Western consumer behaviour and the economic system of capitalism are only sustainable due to the persistent exploitation of the Global South.

References

- Aldrich, Robert: *When did Decolonization End? France and the Ending of Empire*. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, Wisconsin, 2012.
- Bender, Jeremy: *France's Military is All over Africa*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1>.
- BBC: *Chad Profile – Timeline*, retrieved 05.12.2015, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13164690>.
- Chafer, Tony: "French African Policy in Historical Perspective". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(2), 2001, pp. 165–182.

35 *Trade and Investment*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.one.org/international/issues/trade-and-investment/>.

36 *Latin America World Systems Theory - The Age of Decolonization and the Failings of Modernization Theory, Precursors to World Systems Theory, Wallerstein and World Systems Theory, op. cit.*

- Dominic, Thomas: *Nation-building, Propaganda, and Literature in Francophone Africa*. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2012.
- Ferraro, Vincent: "Dependency Theory: An Introduction". In: Secondi, Giorgio (ed.): *The Development Economics Reader*. Routledge: New York 2008.
- France24: *France 'Must Double' Trade with Africa, Hollande Says*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.france24.com/en/20131204-france-must-double-trade-ties-africa-hollande-economy>.
- Kay, Cristóbal: "André Gunder Frank: From the 'Development of Underdevelopment' to the 'World System'". *Development & Change* 36(6), 2005, pp. 1177–1183.
- Kenneth Neal Waltz – *The Physiocrat of International Politics*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html>.
- Kofas, Jon: *Africa in the 21st Century: Legacy of Imperialism and Development Prospects*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.countercurrents.org/kofas081115.htm>
- Korab-Karpowicz, Julian W.: "Political Realism in International Relations". In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), retrieved 01.12.2015, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.
- Latin America World Systems Theory - The Age Of Decolonization and the Failings Of Modernization Theory, Precursors To World Systems Theory, Wallerstein and World Systems Theory*, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://science.jrank.org/pages/8165/World-Systems-Theory-Latin-America.html>.
- Piccolino, Giulia: "David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's War against Global Governance". *African Affairs* 111(442), 2011, pp. 1–23.
- Prebish, Raúl - *Latin America's Keynes*, *The Economist* 5.3.2009, retrieved 01.12.2015, from <http://www.economist.com/node/13226316>.
- Schraeder Peter: "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S. -French Competition in Francophone Africa". *Political Science Quarterly* 115(3), 2000, pp. 395–419.
- Tawodzera, Obert: "France in Africa: Fight against Global Terrorism or Neo-colonialism?". *Nouse* 26.11.2015, retrieved 01.12.2015, <http://www.nouse.co.uk/2015/11/26/france-in-africa-fight-against-global-terrorism-or-neo-colonialism/>.
- Tai Wei Lim: "Multilateralism and Dependency Theory". *African & Asian Studies* 13(1/2), 2014, pp. 80–99.
- Vallin, Victor-Manuel: "France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014". *Political Science Quarterly* 130(1), 2015, pp. 79–101.
- Waltz, Kenneth "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory". *Journal of International Affairs* 44(1), 1990, pp. 21–37.

Notes about the Authors

Péter Bobák is an independent researcher. He graduated from Pázmány Péter Catholic University from the international studies master program. His research areas are: Japanese politics, Japanese foreign, security and defense policy, Japan-China relations, Japan-Korean relations, East Asian security and international relations. He was an Erasmus-student at Jagiellonian University in Krakow and he did research at University of Vienna with CEEPUS scholarship. He spent half a year at Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies in Budapest to study research methods on security politics where he published his paper about Japanese defense policy. He has been doing Japanese ju-jutsu for many years.

Marcin Grabowski, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University of Krakow and the Director of International Security and Development Program at the JU. His research interests focus on the Asia-Pacific Rim, especially institutional arrangements in the region (APEC, ASEM, ASEAN, EAS, ARF and SAARC), American and Chinese foreign policy, theories of IR and International Economics. He has authored two monographs: *Rywalizacja czy integracja: Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2015 [M. Grabowski, *Cooperation or Competition: Integration Processes and Organizations in the Asia-Pacific at the Turn of 20th and 21st Centuries*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Krakow 2015] and *Wiek Pacyfiku: Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec regionu Azji i Pacyfiku po 1989 r.*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012 [M. Grabowski, *The Pacific Century: U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region since 1989*, Jagiellonian University Press, Krakow 2012]. He has edited five other books and authored numerous scholarly articles. He has also co-edited (together with Professor Andrzej Mania) a series: *International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas: Politics, Economy, Society - Transdisciplinary Perspectives* at Peter Lang Verlag.

Wojciech Grabowski holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and is affiliated to the University of Gdansk, Poland. He wrote a monograph “Muslim Fundamentalism in the Middle East” and published numerous articles and book chapters on the Arab monarchies and international relations in the Persian Gulf. He has also edited three books on terrorism and the Arab world in International Relations. He was a visiting researcher at the Qatar University, Allameh Tabatabai University

(Tehran), Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and King Faisal Foundation (Riyadh). He was also a contributor to the NATO project on targeted killing in terrorism as well as the Polish Foreign Ministry project on “Poland’s Model of Transformation: Implications for the New Foreign Policy of Poland”.

Liliana Guevara Opinska works as a consultant in public policy (focusing on energy and environmental policies) for international clients such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. She holds a Master’s degree in Chemistry from the University of Toronto and a Master’s degree (*summa cum laude*) in International Relations from the Jagiellonian University (in partnership with Masaryk University, University of Pecs and Matej Bel University).

Matthias Haget is a Research Fellow at the Center for International Security and Governance, Bonn University. He obtained his Master’s degree in Political Science and European Studies at the University of Osnabrueck/Germany. His main research focus lies on international security and military studies, with a main emphasis on the European Union, Transatlantic Relations as well as emerging military powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

Julian Laufs is a Ph.D. student at University College London’s Department of Security and Crime Science where he focuses on the prevention of future crime and terrorism. Julian holds a B.A. in International Relations from Malmö University in Sweden and an MSc in Countering Organized Crime and Terrorism from UCL. Between his studies, Julian worked in the German Embassy in Washington DC as well as the Delegation of the European Union to Uganda. His research interests include both topics of International Relations and Criminal Science. He places a great focus on border management and risk assessment and has conducted studies on the implementation dynamics of EU border control policies as well as radicalization trajectories in different ideological groups. Julian’s other research interests include US and EU foreign and security policy, the history of the Middle East and new approaches to crime- and terrorism-prevention.

Paulina Napierala holds a Ph.D. in political science from Jagiellonian University. Her dissertation, defended in 2011, focused on G.W. Bush’s faith-based initiatives policy. Her research explores a variety of issues concerning the role of religion in American public life. She graduated from Jagiellonian University receiving two M.A. degrees: in International Relations and in Ethnic and Migration Studies. Additionally, she holds a B.A. in English Philology. She received several scholarships and grants, including: Kosciuszko Foundation Grant, Fulbright Junior Fellowship (research at Boston College and Harvard University), Józef

Tischner Scholarship (Institute for Human Sciences, 'IWM', Vienna) and J.F. Kennedy Library Grant (Freie Universität Berlin). Thanks to financial support from her home institution (Society-Environment-Technology Scholarship) she also participated in the ICPSR summer program the University of Michigan. She gave visiting lectures and presentations at Boston College, Canisius College, Buffalo; University of Ljubljana and University of Catania. She is the author of two monographs concerning religion in American public life and in politics, and of two co-edited volumes on American society, as well as Managing Editor of "Ad Americam. Journal of American Studies".

Tomasz Pugacewicz is an Assistant Professor at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The theoretical aspects of his Ph.D. dissertation were published in the monograph *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej [Theories of Foreign Policy. American FPA Perspective]* (Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków 2017). The Polish International Studies Association acknowledged this book as the best original International Relations monograph published in 2017. The book also won a distinction in the national Czesław Mosiejewicz Competition organized by the Polish Political Science Association for the best book on political science published in 2017. During his internships abroad, he was a visiting researcher at the Johns Hopkins University, the State University of New York and the Heidelberg University. In 2018, he received a grant from the Polish National Science Centre for the project titled "Between Center and Periphery: A Comparison of Ludwik Ehrlich's Theoretical Concepts with American-British International Relations in the First Half of the Twenty Century". In 2015, he participated in the Ideas Lab – the Young Professionals Programme at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland.

Mara Stirner is a civil society activist and a graduate student of Political Science at the Free University of Berlin. Her main research interests include Post-colonial studies, Feminist theory and anarchist thoughts. She currently works with the association Berlin Postkolonial for an anti-racist and critical perspective on colonialism and its continuities to the present day.

Krzysztof Tlałka holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. His Ph.D. thesis investigates the issue of effectiveness of peacekeeping in the context of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. He is interested in international security issues (particularly conflict management and international military cooperation) as well as the relations between the media and global politics.

Anna Wróbel is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations (Section of IR Political Economy), University of Warsaw. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science in 2007. Her doctoral dissertation is on the policy of liberalization of international trade in services. She did her postgraduate studies in Foreign Trade at the Warsaw School of Economics (2004). She is a graduate of the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw (2003). She is also a founder member of the Polish Association of International Studies (Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Międzynarodowych, PTSM). Her research interests include: global trade governance; international trade liberalization, in particular liberalization of international trade in services; international trade in agri-food commodities; regional economic integration and EU trade policy. She authored five books – *Geografia ekonomiczna. Międzynarodowe struktury produkcji i wymiany* [Economic Geography. International Production and Trade Structures], Warsaw 2017, *Wspólna polityka handlowa Unii Europejskiej* [Common Commercial Policy of European Union], Warsaw 2014; *The Dragon and the Evening Stars: Essays on the Determinants of EU-China relations* (co-authors P.J. Borkowski and Ł. Zamecki), Bishkek-Warsaw 2013; *Międzynarodowa wymiana usług* [International Trade in Services], Warsaw: Scholar, 2009.; *Wewnętrzne uwarunkowania aktywności międzynarodowej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej i jej relacji z Unią Europejską* (coauthors P.J. Borkowski and Ł. Zamecki), Warsaw 2013 – and over 50 articles published in research journals and edited books.

Index

A

Abe Shinzo 17, 20, 21, 100, 119, 123, 124, 136, 138–140, 145–148, 149
Acharya Amitav 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 20, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81–83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 92, 95, 97, 99–101, 103, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116–118, 130, 148
Adler Emanuel 33–35, 208, 215
Africa 7, 11–17, 19–22, 61–65, 67–69, 71, 73–75, 77, 79, 81, 83–85, 87–94, 101, 212, 217, 286, 289, 290, 292–294, 297, 304, 309–315, 317–321, 323–325, 327, 331
African Union 20, 74, 77, 285–287, 293–295, 297, 299, 300, 302–308
Akamatsu Kaname 108
Alagappa Muthiah 8, 9, 78, 82, 87, 99, 116
Al-Qaeda 253, 267, 274
AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) 287, 294, 295, 301
Amsterdam school 48
analytical eclecticism 12, 16, 18, 52, 53, 98, 123, 133, 134, 146
anarchical system 26, 32, 65, 131, 151, 153, 154, 288
anarchy 12, 30, 32, 36, 39, 46, 155, 168, 249, 320, 322
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 75, 106, 181, 184, 185, 201, 327
Arab Spring 211, 214
Arab States 19, 205–207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217, 289
armed conflicts 322
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 63, 64, 69, 71, 72,

75, 76, 80, 81, 86–88, 90–92, 98, 99, 112, 125, 138, 142, 187–190, 197–199, 327

Asia 7–13, 15–17, 19, 21, 31, 35, 36, 41, 44, 47, 53, 56, 61–63, 65–67, 69–87, 89, 91–93, 95, 101, 103, 105–107, 109–119, 126, 133, 135, 136, 138, 147, 148, 151, 184, 185

Asian financial crisis 137

Asian values 98, 115

Asia-Pacific 8, 9, 17, 62, 64–66, 69, 74, 75, 78, 80, 86, 91, 93–95, 98, 100, 107, 121, 135, 151, 152, 161–168, 170, 181, 184, 185, 190, 192, 196, 197, 327, 328

Azavedo Roberto 180

B

balance of power 97, 177, 180, 185, 288, 289

balancing 66, 67, 108, 212, 312

Barnett Michael 34, 35, 54, 208, 215, 252, 264

Baylis John 34, 48, 54, 268, 269, 271, 280

Bellamy Alex(ander) 210, 211, 216, 275, 280, 288, 290, 291, 302, 305

Bhagwati Jagdish 182, 198

bilateralism 99, 137, 184, 189, 192, 195, 197

Boko Haram 322

Branwen Jones 14, 21

Bretton Woods 106

Brzezinski Zbigniew 26

Burma 97, 111

Burundi 20, 285, 287, 293, 300–303, 305–308

- Bush George W. 234, 237–240, 278, 280, 281, 328
- Buzan Barry 11, 15, 16, 20, 44–47, 54, 78–80, 82, 86–88, 90, 91, 95, 97, 99–101, 103, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116–118, 130, 148, 212, 216
- C**
- Cambodia 111, 112, 138
- capitalism 48, 49, 51, 63, 269, 271, 272, 274, 316, 324
- Carr Edward 28, 54, 109
- Chen Boyu 8–10
- China 11, 15–18, 22, 27, 29, 53, 62–64, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 78–80, 82, 84, 85, 87–106, 108, 115–120, 125–127, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, 144–146, 148–163, 165–171, 173–181, 183–201, 207, 314, 323, 327, 330–332
- China's Trade Policy 173–175, 177, 179, 181, 185–187, 189–191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201
- Chinese tributary system 15, 109
- Christian Zionism 19, 219–222, 225, 227–229, 231, 233–247
- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 293, 297, 300, 306
- civil war 174, 205, 206, 211, 212, 270, 278, 298, 300
- civilization 29, 63, 109, 223, 233, 316, 320
- classical realism 13, 16, 27, 31, 224, 226
- Clausewitz 27, 28, 57
- Cold War 12, 17, 34–36, 61–65, 67, 71, 73, 74, 80, 82, 86, 88–90, 101, 106, 108, 109, 113, 115, 124–127, 133, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145, 146, 212, 217, 222, 233, 286, 287, 289, 292, 293, 301, 312, 313, 325
- colonialism 14, 49, 309, 329
- communism 62, 98, 235, 312
- comparative advantage 178
- complex interdependence 38, 42, 43
- conflict management 256, 285, 329
- Confucianism 63, 102
- constructivism 16, 18, 19, 25, 33–35, 53–56, 61–63, 69–74, 76, 78, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 105, 108, 111, 115, 116, 124, 132–134, 146, 149, 151, 152, 155, 167, 170, 224, 226, 249–253, 261, 263–265, 268
- Cox Robert 51, 52, 84, 288, 306
- critical security studies 52, 83, 87, 92
- critical theory 25, 48, 50, 52–54, 85, 269, 282
- Custom Union 206
- D**
- Daoism 101
- decision-making process 19, 75, 219, 222, 225
- decolonization 81–83, 87, 309–311, 313, 315–317, 319, 321, 323–325
- democracy 36, 41, 77, 80, 105, 108, 117, 219, 246, 276, 280
- democratic peace theory 38, 74, 77, 290, 292
- Deng Xiaoping 102, 156
- dependency theory 13, 20, 50, 81–84, 267–269, 271, 280–282, 309, 310, 315–317, 320, 321, 323–325
- dependent nations 315
- Deutsch Karl 19, 21, 39, 54, 76, 208, 216
- development 8, 11–17, 19, 22, 23, 25–28, 31, 34, 36, 37, 42, 44–46, 48, 49, 52, 61, 62, 64, 67, 72, 77, 80–87, 93, 95–99, 101–103,

105–107, 109–119, 124, 130, 131, 141, 145, 146, 151–153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 161, 167, 169, 170, 173, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 206–208, 214, 216, 221, 228–230, 250, 290, 298, 300, 310, 313, 315, 317, 323, 235, 327

diplomacy 29, 30, 35, 44, 47, 108, 112, 128, 156, 177, 208, 278, 292, 301, 302,, 307, 308

Doha Development Round 192, 195

DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) 136, 137, 139, 144

Dunn Kevin 12, 13, 16, 21, 67, 73, 77, 84, 85, 88, 90–92

Dunne Tim 27, 31, 37, 43–48, 53–56, 59, 153, 170, 269, 282

E

East Asia 10, 11, 16, 41, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75–77, 79, 80, 82–84, 86–92, 97, 99, 101, 105, 106, 110, 117, 123–127, 131–136, 139–143, 148–150, 184, 185, 327

East Asian Regionalism 88, 90

East China Sea 136, 144

ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) 186, 199

economic development 14, 64, 83, 101, 124, 151, 187, 198

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 77, 286, 298

Egypt 178, 211, 254, 258–260, 296

English School 16, 25, 43–47, 54, 55, 61–63, 71, 78–81, 87, 92, 94, 101, 104, 107, 108, 224

epistemology 33, 47, 113

Ethiopia 20, 285, 287, 293–298, 301, 303–307, 312

Europe 41, 50, 63, 125, 210, 310

Evangelicalism 234, 245

F

Fatah 255–259

FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) 106, 198

financial crisis 106, 177

financial resources 17, 310

Finnemore Martha 33, 36, 277, 281

Flying Geese Model 97, 108, 130

foreign policy 19, 30, 35, 37, 53–57, 59, 70, 73, 74, 90, 92–94, 100, 107, 115, 118, 119, 166, 168, 175, 185, 212, 213, 219, 221–227, 235, 236, 243–247, 252, 262, 265, 271, 282, 293, 297, 327–329

FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis) 16, 19, 25, 52–55, 83, 219, 221, 222, 224–227, 243, 245, 247, 329

Franc Zone 311, 318

France 20, 233, 236, 289, 309–325

Francophone Africa 310, 311, 313, 314, 318, 322, 325

free trade 36, 50, 63, 173, 174, 181–190, 192–194, 197, 199–201, 206, 207

FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific) 185

Fukuyama Francis 42, 55

fundamentalism 227, 245, 327

G

game theory 38

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 173–175, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185, 191

Gaza Strip 249, 251, 254–256, 258–261, 264

GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 19, 183, 187, 205–217

genocide 270, 275, 278, 313

geopolitics 29, 126, 148, 153, 170, 318

Ghana 20, 285, 287, 293, 297–300, 303–307
 Gilpin Robert 65, 193, 199
 Glaser Charles 31, 55
 global economy 179, 184, 192, 193, 201
 global power 18, 20, 30, 31, 162, 185, 269, 312, 321
 globalization 34, 36, 54, 73, 81–84, 86, 87, 89, 104, 105, 107, 117, 120, 208, 268, 280
 Graham Franklin 237
 grand strategy 69, 90, 127, 143, 149
 grand theory 31, 49, 116
 great powers 12, 13, 32, 46, 95, 108, 289, 292
 Grotius Hugo 44
 Gu Xuewu 153–155, 169
 Guanxi 104, 118
 Guijun Lin 180, 199

H

Haas Ernest 19, 76, 207, 208, 216
 Hagee John 235, 240–242, 244, 245
 Halizak Edward 60, 76, 89, 173, 174, 191, 199–201
 Halliburton 273
 Hamas 238, 239, 241, 245, 249, 251–261, 263–265
 hegemonic stability theory 16, 32, 64
 Hezbollah 239, 241, 242, 245
 Hobbes Thomas 26–28, 43, 59
 Holocaust 233, 252
 Hudson Valerie 53–55, 225, 226, 245
 human rights 44, 46, 77, 80, 273–277, 282, 291, 292, 299
 humanitarian intervention 20, 25, 47, 267, 268, 270, 274, 276–279, 281, 282, 291, 292, 297, 302, 304

I

Ichiro Ozawa 128, 146
 idealism 28, 37, 55, 106, 108
 imperialism 14, 29, 48, 49, 110, 117, 267, 268, 282, 323, 325
 India 18, 27, 53, 66, 71, 75, 78, 84, 89, 93, 95–97, 99, 113–116, 118, 125, 138, 151, 161, 164–169, 177–180, 201, 227
 industrialization 84, 316, 320
 Inoguchi Takashi 82, 90, 97, 107, 108, 118, 124, 129, 130, 134, 139, 148
 institutional liberalism 16, 37, 39, 62
 interdependence 16, 27, 37–39, 41–43, 53, 54, 57, 58, 62, 63, 74, 77, 90, 97, 191, 290, 291
 international economic relations 18
 IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 135, 148, 151, 152, 159, 160, 164, 165, 169, 294, 301, 306
 international law 29, 43, 44, 46, 47, 81, 108, 201, 256, 259, 263, 265, 299
 international order 78, 93, 97, 107, 151, 153, 185
 international organization 19, 37, 39, 40, 42, 53, 55–57, 155, 171, 191, 208, 216, 271, 290, 302, 304
 International Political Economy 27, 48, 83, 106
 international politics 29–31, 37, 42, 43, 45, 55–57, 59, 66, 80, 88, 90, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 118, 153, 155, 170, 171, 226, 265, 320–323, 325
 international regime 32, 39, 56, 58
 international society approach 43, 44, 47, 78–80, 87
 international system 12, 18, 26, 27, 30, 32, 35–38, 40, 47, 65, 97, 104,

105, 131, 133, 134, 151–156,
166–168, 272, 288, 320–322, 324
Iran 65, 87, 208, 211–214, 216, 217,
227, 240, 260, 275, 276
Iraq 20, 136, 211–214, 267–282, 322
Islamic radicalism 211
ISIS (Islamic State) 112, 280, 322
Israel 19, 187, 219–223, 225,
227–245, 247, 249–265, 289

J

Jackson Robert 26, 28, 30, 31, 33,
35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 53,
55, 56
James Patrick 222–224, 227, 246
Japan 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 53, 65, 66,
69, 70, 74, 78–80, 82, 87, 89–92,
94–101, 105–109, 113, 115, 117–
120, 123–150, 156, 158, 161, 167,
180, 185, 187, 158, 327
Japan Association of International
Relations 106
Japanese Official Development
Assistance (ODA) 106, 131
Japanese security 65, 69, 123–125,
127, 129–131, 133, 134, 136–138,
140–143, 145, 146
Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF) 125, 129, 130, 135, 137,
140, 142, 143, 145, 161
Jews 50, 219–221, 228, 230–232,
244, 258
Jihad 253, 260, 314, 322
Jørgensen Knud Erik 33–35,
38, 43–52

K

Kant Immanuel 37, 41, 43, 54
Katzenstein Peter 18, 22, 33, 36, 53,
58, 69, 91, 124–126, 132, 133, 148,
153, 264
Kennan George 26, 109

Keohane Robert 39–43, 56, 57, 153,
169, 170, 226
Keynesianism 38
Kissinger Henry 26, 109
Korea 8, 9, 15, 17, 42, 65, 70, 71,
78, 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94–101,
109–111, 115, 117, 119, 125, 131,
134–136, 138, 143, 144, 146, 179,
187, 188, 194, 197, 327

L

laissez-faire 38
Latin America 49, 82, 84, 315, 317,
319–321, 324, 325
League of Arab States 205
legalism 101, 102
Legrenzi Matteo 208, 216
Legro Jeffrey 32, 56, 159, 163
Lenin Vladimir 49, 50, 82
liberal intergovernmentalism 38
liberalism 16, 18, 25, 28, 32, 35–39,
41–43, 53–55, 58, 61–63, 69, 74,
75, 77, 78, 83, 86, 92, 98, 111,
124, 131–134, 146, 173, 174, 190,
191, 193–196, 211, 226, 249,
252, 268, 285, 287, 288, 290, 291,
304–306
Lindsey Hal 235

M

Mao Zedong 80, 82, 97, 102,
156, 174
maritime 18, 138, 140, 144, 145,
151, 152, 156–165, 167–171
market economy 77, 176, 177,
188, 191
Marx Karol 48, 49, 82
Marxism 13, 18, 25, 35, 48–51, 61,
81, 82, 85, 107, 268, 269, 271,
281, 282
McDonald Matt 83, 87, 82, 132,
149, 230

- Mearsheimer John 30, 40, 56, 63, 66, 92, 152–154, 170
- MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 212, 217, 272
- mercantilism 191, 193–196
- metatheory 33, 47
- Middle East 7, 11, 17, 19, 81, 203, 205, 206, 210–212, 215–217, 225, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 243, 244, 247, 252, 256, 264, 265, 269, 272, 273, 276, 280, 289, 327, 328
- militarism 29, 69, 87, 128, 150
- military alliances 71, 94
- military balance 69, 134, 148, 151, 152, 159–161, 163–165, 169, 295, 306
- military build up 151, 152
- military power 18, 28, 38, 131, 139–141, 144, 148, 154, 158, 323, 328
- millennialism 228, 231–233
- minority rights 70
- Mohism 101, 102
- Moore Phoebe 82, 84, 86, 92
- Moravcsik Andrew 32, 37, 56, 57
- Morgenthau Hans 13, 28–30, 55–58, 82, 109, 289
- multilateral trade system 173, 174, 176, 182, 197
- multilateralism 73, 76, 90, 94, 97, 181, 182, 198, 315, 325
- multipolar system 105
- Muslim 212, 241, 253, 257–259, 327
- N**
- nationalism 16, 28, 29, 37, 38, 55, 62, 70, 74, 75, 80, 87, 89, 94, 97, 111, 132, 148, 211, 233, 252
- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 125, 286, 328
- natural resources 29, 50, 271, 274, 297, 317
- naval forces 152, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 168
- naval power 18
- Nehru Jawaharlal 97, 113, 115, 328
- neo-dependence 20, 320, 323
- neofunctionalism 19, 76, 207
- neoliberal institutionalism 37, 38, 111
- neoliberalism 13, 32, 35, 37, 38, 63, 84, 114, 224, 225
- neo-Marxism 82
- neo-realism 13, 14, 25, 30, 31, 35, 66, 67, 88, 105, 249, 309, 310, 320–322, 324
- Netanyahu Benjamin 240, 244, 254
- Neuman Stephanie 12, 21
- New Millennium 237
- NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) 43, 44, 51, 70, 323
- Nkiwane Tandeke 13, 21, 77, 92
- non-mainstream 16
- non-state actors 43, 107, 225, 256, 265
- non-tariff barriers 186, 195
- normalization 123, 124, 127–134, 136–139, 141, 143, 144, 146, 150
- normative theory 190
- nuclear weapons 129, 147, 157, 171, 274
- O**
- Obama Barack 135, 240, 241, 244, 245
- ODA (Official Development Assistance/Aid) 106, 131
- Ohmae Kenichi 18, 22
- oil crises 106
- oil wars 267
- Oman 206, 207, 211–214
- ontology 33, 113
- Onuf Nicholas 8–10, 31, 34, 57
- Operation Protective Edge 19, 249, 251, 254, 255, 264, 265

P

Palestine 19, 187, 219–222, 230, 232, 233, 245, 250, 251, 253, 256, 259, 262

Pan-African 16, 68, 81, 92

Parekh Bhikhu 270, 277–279, 281

Patridge Bryan 167, 170

peace operations 285, 287–291, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 305, 307

Pence Mike 241, 242

People's Republic of China 66, 101, 108, 151–153, 155–157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167–169, 171, 175, 176, 180, 186, 188, 189, 199, 201

periphery 49, 50, 67, 82–86, 268, 269, 271, 280, 315, 329

Persian Gulf 205, 206, 208–214, 327

Philippines 111, 112, 135, 158, 178, 179

policy transition 17, 131, 146

political community 19, 21, 39, 51, 54

political development 13, 14

political institutions 37

Pompeo Mike 241

positivist theory 15, 33, 48, 100

Postmillennialism 228, 232

power structures 269, 271

power transition theory 16, 32, 64, 91

Prebisch Raul 49, 50, 315–317, 320, 321, 323, 324

preferential trade agreements 173, 174, 181, 182, 184, 187, 196

premillennial
 dispensationalism 220, 227, 228, 234

pressure groups 222, 226, 227, 234

protectionism 176, 180, 192–195, 199

Puritans 229

Putin Vladimir 99

Pyle Kenneth 126, 136, 147, 149

Q

Qatar 178, 206, 208, 211–214, 260, 327

Quin Yaqing 104, 118

R

racism 14, 237

Rantisi Abdel Aziz 238

rational choice theory 12

rationalism 16, 73, 90, 96, 105, 118

RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) 99, 187, 196

Reagan Ronald 98, 236, 276

regime theory 38

regional communities 72, 210

regional integration 13, 16, 61, 62, 75, 76, 92, 98, 99, 101, 111, 114, 198, 207, 210, 211, 215

regional security 72, 76, 83, 87, 88, 133, 134, 139, 141, 148, 210–212

regionalism 16, 25, 72, 76, 77, 88, 89, 92, 94, 97, 106, 113, 181, 197, 205–207, 209, 210, 215, 216

republican liberalism 16, 38, 41

resource war 20

Responsibility to Protect 270, 277

Ricardo David 180, 191, 200, 201

Rose Gideon 31, 57

Rosecrance Richard 42, 58

Rozman Gilbert 83, 93, 95, 98, 99, 118

RTA (Regional Trade Agreement) 77, 181, 200, 207, 216

Russia 50, 98, 125, 160, 177, 179, 201, 292

Rwanda 287, 304, 306, 313

S

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 65, 327

Salisbury Peter 212, 217

San Aung 97, 111

- Sandal Nukhet 222–224, 246
 Saudi Arabia 206, 209, 212–214, 216, 236, 243, 250
 Schelling Thomas 30, 58, 65
 Schweller Randall 27, 31, 58, 66
 security community 69, 71, 76, 86
 security dilemma 26–29, 32, 39, 54, 55, 57, 64, 65, 91, 225, 288, 321, 322
 security policy 17, 21, 65, 91, 100, 119, 123–127, 129–147, 149, 293, 294, 302, 328
 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 135, 136, 140
 Serizawa Sarah 137, 149
 Singapore School 17, 96, 115
 Sinocentric world 15
 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 135, 141, 149, 150
 Smith Adam 13, 22, 27, 31, 34, 37, 48, 53, 54–56, 59, 68, 72–74, 90, 93, 142, 191, 201, 221, 229, 230, 271, 287, 307
 social constructivism 34, 54, 55, 111, 151, 152, 155
 Song Xinning 103, 120
 Sørensen Georg 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41
 South Korea 15, 17, 42, 65, 70, 78, 84, 92, 94–96, 99, 100, 109, 115, 179, 187, 188
 Southeast Asia 8, 15, 17, 62, 64, 69, 71, 72, 75–77, 80, 84, 86–90, 92–96, 100, 105, 106, 111–113, 115–118, 159, 185, 187
 sovereignty 12, 13, 26, 40, 44, 46, 49, 51, 62, 70, 75, 79–81, 88, 108, 129, 131, 211, 214, 216, 250, 275, 291, 305, 311
 strategic realism 16, 30, 63, 65, 97
 structural realism 16, 30, 32, 37, 38, 58, 152, 153, 155, 170, 224, 249, 320, 321
 structuralist theories 13
 Sub-Saharan región 309, 311
 Sukarno 97, 111
 Sun Zi 27, 28, 30, 56, 63, 65, 96, 97, 101, 117–119, 165, 169, 180, 181, 200, 201
 superpower 18, 26, 32, 125, 162
- T**
 Taiwan 42, 98, 101, 105, 125, 135, 144, 158, 185, 186
 terms of trade 50
 Thailand 64, 111, 112, 178
 theoretical paradigm 16, 18, 19, 25, 26, 61, 98
 Thucydides 27
 Tianxia 104
 Toronto school 48
 TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) 99, 173, 182, 183, 184, 196, 198
 trade agreement 173, 174, 181–190, 195–197, 199–201, 207, 216
 trade liberalization 173, 178, 192, 195, 196, 198
 trade policy 18, 173–175, 177, 179, 181, 183–187, 189–199, 201, 330, 331
 transactionalism 19
 Trump Donald 241–247
 TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) 173, 182–184
- U**
 UAE (United Arab Emirates) 205–207, 212–214, 216, 217
 United Nations 20, 157, 206, 250, 277, 278, 282, 285–287, 289,

- 291–294, 298–302, 305, 307,
308, 323
- United States 18, 22, 62, 64, 66, 71,
99, 105, 106, 108, 109, 123–127,
131, 132, 135–137, 140–142,
151, 152, 161–164, 167, 168, 170,
174, 175, 177, 179–182, 184, 188,
190, 222, 240, 241, 245, 258, 267,
268, 271–276, 278, 278, 289, 292,
310, 312
- Uruguay Round 175, 178, 181
- W**
- Wallerstein Immanuel 50, 315
- Walt Stephen 66, 94
- Waltz Kenneth 13, 30–33, 47, 58,
59, 129, 146, 153, 170, 226, 249,
265, 320–323, 325
- war on terror 136, 138, 237, 244,
278, 281
- weapons of mass
destruction 267, 274
- Weaver Ole 31, 58
- Wendt Alexander 33–36, 59, 155,
171, 224
- West Bank 238, 254–257
- Western IR theories 7, 13–16, 19,
21, 25, 27, 29, 31–33, 35, 37, 39,
41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51–53, 55, 57,
59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73–75,
77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93,
95–98, 100–103, 105, 110, 111,
113–116, 119
- Westphalian state system 13, 15, 291
- Williams Paul 27, 59, 132, 149, 242,
247, 288, 290, 291, 302, 305, 308
- World Bank 177, 200, 253, 323
- world order 15, 52, 104, 232, 288,
305, 306, 322
- world system theory 48
- WTO (World Trade Organization)
173–185, 191–201, 207, 216
- X**
- Xing Yuqing 132, 150
- Y**
- Yemen 205, 211, 212, 216, 217
- Yoshida doctrine 124, 126
- Z**
- Zakaria Fareed 31

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS

Edited by Andrzej Mania & Marcin Grabowski

- Band 1 Olga Barbasiewicz (ed.): Postwar Reconciliation in Central Europe and East Asia. 2018
- Band 2 Adam Nobis: A Short Guide to the New Silk Road. 2018
- Band 3 Radka Havlová (ed.): Untangling the Mayhem: Crises and Prospects of the Middle East. 2018
- Band 4 Marcin Grabowski / Paweł Laidler (eds.): Global Development Policy in the 21st Century. New Challenges. 2018
- Band 5 Andrzej Mania / Marcin Grabowski / Tomasz Pugacewicz (eds.): Global Politics in the 21st Century. Between Regional Cooperation and Conflict. 2019
- Band 6 Marcin Grabowski / Tomasz Pugacewicz (eds.): Application of International Relations Theories in Asia and Africa. 2019

www.peterlang.com

