# Relational
peace practices

**Edited by
Anna Jarstad,
Johanna Söderström,
and Malin Åkebo**

Relational peace practices

Manchester University Press

New Approaches to Conflict Analysis

Until recently, the study of conflict and conflict resolution remained comparatively immune to broad developments in social and political theory. When the changing nature and locus of large-scale conflict in the post-Cold War era is also taken into account, the case for a reconsideration of the fundamentals of conflict analysis and conflict resolution becomes all the more stark.

New Approaches to Conflict Analysis promotes the development of new theoretical insights and their application to concrete cases of large-scale conflict, broadly defined. The series intends not to ignore established approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution, but to contribute to the reconstruction of the field through a dialogue between orthodoxy and its contemporary critics. Equally, the series reflects the contemporary porosity of intellectual borderlines rather than simply perpetuating rigid boundaries around the study of conflict and peace. *New Approaches to Conflict Analysis* seeks to uphold the normative commitment of the field's founders yet also recognises that the moral impulse to research is properly part of its subject matter. To these ends, the series is comprised of the highest quality work of scholars drawn from throughout the international academic community, and from a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences.

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Contents

Figures

Tables

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Preface

Despite a growing concern about peace, there is no consensus on what peace is or should mean. This was the starting point for this collaborative work, which also forms part of the project "Varieties of Peace: A Relational Approach." The idea for the book grew as we were working on the conceptualization of relational peace in the article "Friends, fellows, and foes: a new framework for studying relational peace" published in *International Studies Review* (2021), and we were eager to see how our framework would work when applied to empirical studies of different types of cases. The original framework was developed equally by Johanna Söderström and Malin Åkebo and first presented at the Peace Research in Sweden (PRIS) biannual conference in Lund in 2018. The revision process of the manuscript included all three authors, but was driven by Johanna Söderström and Anna Jarstad. All three authors made substantial contributions to the development of the framework. The editors shared the work for this edited volume equally, and their names are thus listed alphabetically (according to the Swedish alphabet). We arranged an open call to a first workshop in Uppsala, Sweden, in 2019, to invite other scholars to use our framework when conducting empirical studies, and to criticize our conceptualization. In a follow-up workshop in 2020, a selected group of authors were invited to further develop their texts into chapters for this book. We are immensely grateful to the chapter authors of this book, and have also benefitted from comments from other colleagues within our network, the Varieties of Peace Research Network (varietiesofpeace.net).

We are also very grateful for comments we have received on various drafts while working on the relational peace framework. In particular, we want to acknowledge the importance of input we received from Emma Elfversson, Sebastian van Baalen, Alexandre Raffoul, Simon-Pierre Boulanger Martel, Elin Bjarnegård, Johan Brosché, Peter Wallensteen, Paul Diehl, and Lisa Strömbom. Throughout the book project it was a great pleasure to

Introduction: conceptualizing and studying relational peace practices

Anna Jarstad, Johanna Söderström, and Malin Åkebo

A quick glance at some recent newspaper headlines will show that peace in South Africa, for instance, is very different from peace in Cyprus, while the peace that emerged immediately after the war in Cambodia is very different from the peace one finds there now. Even just in these three contexts, there is a huge variety in what peace means for all actors involved and the resulting political developments beyond the simple absence of war. However, research thus far has not managed to fully understand what truly constitutes peace, nor to explain the different varieties of peace that evolve after war. So how can we grasp peace beyond the absence of war? This question has gained increasing attention in peace and conflict studies (see for example Richmond 2008; Richmond 2014; Wallensteen 2015; Diehl 2016; Campbell et al. 2017; Guarrieri et al. 2017; Joshi and Wallensteen 2018; McLeod and O'Reilly 2019; Goertz 2020; Olivius et al. 2022), but thus far few have developed precise and theory-driven methods to provide a comprehensive answer. This book contributes to this conversation about how to research peace beyond the absence of war, in terms of both what it is and how it can be studied.

The study of peace was for a long time hampered by insufficient theorizing about what peace actually entails beyond the absence of war. The common distinction is between negative peace (absence of violence) and positive peace (absence of structural or indirect violence and presence of social justice and reconciliation), but this fails to capture the empirical realities in many post-war societies, since peace conceptualizations are "either so narrow that they miss the point, or so expansive that they become utopian" (Klem 2018: 235; see also Stephenson 2017 for a problematization of positive peace). Indeed, in many cultures and languages, the everyday experiences of lived peace are not captured by either negative or positive peace (for more on everyday peace, see among others Richmond 2012; Mac Ginty 2014, 2021; Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017; Firchow 2018; Blomqvist et al. 2021). For instance, in Slavic languages such as Russian and Serbian,

the term *mir* refers to ceasefire, while peace beyond the absence of war is often described as *normal*, just the normal way of things (see e.g. Barash and Webel 2009: 3–12; Jarstad and Segall 2019: 245–247). The latter refers neither to the harmony associated with positive peace nor to merely the absence of warfare, but rather to a recognition that social conflicts do exist but are addressed by non-violent means. But in order to develop a peace concept that is useful for empirical work and comparisons across cases, we need a more specific definition beyond the absence of war. And this definition needs to be accompanied by clear empirical strategies for how to then study this phenomenon.

In this book we employ a relational approach to peace (on peace as relational, see among others Kriesberg 2007; Oelsner 2007; Mac Ginty 2008: 24; Themnér and Ohlson 2014; Maddison 2015; Goertz et al. 2016; Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017: 7; Purdeková 2017; Brigg 2018; Davenport et al. 2018). We use our new conceptual framework (first developed in Söderström et al. 2021) to define peace and apply it to a number of diverse case studies. When developing our framework further it is important to stress that we see conflicts as an inevitable part of social life and that transformation of conflict is necessary to bring about constructive change. This has also been a central point of departure for different strands of research aiming to conceptualize and theorize peace, such as feminist peace research,[1] and agonistic peace research.[2] Like many others, then, we recognize peace as a process of conflict transformation. However, unlike Klem, who conceptualizes peace as an aspiration (Klem 2018), or others who see peace as a structural condition in a specific location (see e.g. the Global Peace Index, Oxford Global Research Initiative (OGRI) 2022), we employ a relational approach to the study of peace as the key feature of our approach. By developing the relational peace framework and in particular how it can be used for empirical studies of peace, this book helps move the field of studying peace forward beyond the absence of war.

We argue that taking a relational approach to peace seriously requires us to conceptualize and define the specific components of such peace in order to conduct fine-grained empirical analysis. We specify identifiable traits that separate the phenomenon from other possible suspects such as democracy, development, and other phenomena often associated with a "good" society. The starting point for this edited volume is the idea that peace research has thus far often focused on conflict, or the mere absence of violent conflict, but has failed to describe the nuances and different varieties of peace that exist beyond the absence of war. But how do we capture and describe these nuances? The role of agency and specific actors, and their relations in turn, are often not seen as key in the literature which describes what peace is, or else they are seen as only a small part of what constitutes peace. Yet

we argue that they are essential to understanding peace, and this book places them front and center. In each case study in this edited volume the issue of identifying actors and dyads is important, and in some cases the analysis covers a web of dyadic relationships and how they affect each other. We also discuss and suggest several methods of studying relational peace empirically. The book primarily takes on relational peace from a descriptive analytical perspective, and the various chapters show how relational peace varies, not only across dyads, but also over time. The aim of this edited volume is to contribute to research on peace beyond the absence of war – what it is and how it can be studied – by developing the relational peace framework and in particular how it can be used for empirical studies of peace.

The book shows that a relational approach to peace has many merits. For instance, if we regard peace as a relationship between actors at different levels of society, peace and war become a web of multiple interactions where some actors are peaceful whereas others are hostile, and it becomes clear how peaceful and conflictual relations can coexist, rather than be two mutually exclusive categories. Clearly delimiting peace in relational terms also makes it possible to conduct case studies which are more comparable, thus advancing discussions on methods, as well as theorization around peace. Thus this book makes an important contribution toward making peace beyond the absence of war more researchable.

The conceptual framework which forms the basis of the book builds on three main components of relational peace: behavioral interaction, subjective attitudes toward the other, and idea of the relationship. In this introduction, we further develop this framework and in particular elaborate on the minimal requirements for relational peace, and also discuss elements that we do *not* consider to be expressions of relational peace, but rather expressions of antagonism and enmity. Indeed, it is not as simple as war being the opposite of relational peace; rather we would define the opposite of relational peace as antagonistic relations, given the stress on dyads. We suggest that relational peace can be identified at different levels of analysis, from relationships between states to relationships between individuals or groups in divided societies. Arguably, the framework's ability to move from the micro-level to the macro-level is one of its strengths. Beyond this definition of relational peace, we also suggest that real-world cases are likely to cluster around two types: peace between fellows and peace between friends.

This edited volume presents a number of case studies of relational peace that illustrate how the framework can be applied at different levels of analysis (from interstate to intrastate and from elite to micro-level), in a variety of geographical contexts and using different temporal perspectives. The conflict contexts focused on in the volume all share the features of

being protracted violent conflicts, predominantly civil wars, and in many of these contexts there have been peace attempts from the 1990s onward. However, we encourage others to use the framework in multiple contexts, and also beyond those found in this volume. In this book, each chapter contributes new and detailed empirical knowledge and understanding of peace in various geographical settings, written mostly by researchers with many years' in-depth experience of working with each case. Each case study is focused on describing the character and extent of relational peace pertaining to the specific actors involved. Thus, each chapter explains why these actors are relevant in order to understand peace, and, as we will see, there is a breadth of actors who ultimately contribute to shaping peace in these societies. This ranges from state actors to political elites, political parties, communal groups, civil society, and local residents and citizens. In some chapters the dyad consists of actors of the same type (e.g. relations between political elites, between political parties, or between communal groups). Other chapters focus on a diverse set of actors and their relationships, such as military–civilian relationships, or explore relational peace from the perspective of a range of local actors vis-à-vis the state. While some chapters engage in macro-level analysis, others explore micro-level interpersonal interactions at the elite or societal level. Some of the case studies focus more on describing relational peace over time, thus approaching it from a long-term perspective and showing how relational peace plays out as a process, whereas other case studies are more focused on problematizing certain relational peace outcomes. The chapters also demonstrate how the relational peace framework enables contributions to other debates in adjacent research fields. The shared relational peace framework enables us to see synergies between the case studies and to draw conclusions based on comparative insights. Taken together, these case studies demonstrate the breadth of varieties in relational peace.

While the various case studies address peace at different levels of analysis, they also engage in discussions of how peace at one level relates to peace at another level of society. Together, the case studies demonstrate the need for a peace framework that can move from the hyperlocal to the macro-level, as well as how this can be done empirically (opting for different methodologies and types of sources). Through separating these levels, it also becomes possible to delineate how peace at one level influences or clashes with expressions of peace at another. We as researchers may understand certain dyads as more central or detrimental to peaceful relations in certain societal contexts and/or based on the researcher's theoretical perspective and research question; in addition, different actors have different relationships that they consider key to peace. For these reasons, there are often several types of relations central to peace coexisting in time and space which we need to study: for instance, minorities and defeated groups often describe the peace

differently from majority groups or winners of wars, and in particular their relationship with the other. During the 1990s, conflicts largely ended in peace agreements rather than military victories (Kreutz 2010), and this is indeed also the case for most of the settings in this volume. Even when a war ends with a negotiated compromise peace agreement, as our case studies show, in many cases peace is dictated by a few. When peace is negotiated by elites who consequently can also ensure themselves a share of the peace dividend, other actors may find peace less attractive or may not even agree that peace has been reached. Highlighting such conflicting perspectives and experiences of peace, depending on which actors are involved, is an important component of the book and demonstrates the great importance of local communities for peace to develop.

While the framework makes no assumptions about the temporal extension of the relationship, applying the framework to data across time is an important feature of this book. Not only is this important for understanding the stability of peace, but interactions over time are also part of how relationships are transformed from that of foes to one between friends. Relationships are formed though interactions, exchanges and practices, and the actors' experiences of these interactions. This makes patterns of engagement over time important for assessing relational traits and how relationships evolve. When we note the *practices* of relational peace, we do so to emphasize "an everyday practice that is implemented by actual people" (Pingeot 2018: 365), and because studying relational peace means paying attention to what becomes habitual in a relationship. Capturing such practices thus requires us to pay attention to dyadic interactions over time. Hence, describing relational peace in each case inevitably involves taking temporal questions seriously. The book as a whole thus also reflects when and why shifts in relations occur. Therefore, in the concluding chapter, we also discuss how the next step is to explain why different types of relational peace occur and what might also explain shifts in relationships.

The case studies also allow us to address how peace can be fruitfully studied. The case studies include a number of different methods for studying peace beyond the absence of violence, ranging from various innovative interview techniques, archival research, and text-analysis to observational methods. The authors discuss and problematize their own method choices in detail, and this methodological diversity therefore also shows the way forward in how to make peace more researchable, giving the reader inspiration for future work. Given the need to study relational peace over time, one challenge our authors face is how they should find data that are comparable over time. Recently, we have seen an increased interest in discussing methodological questions concerning how we should study peace (Mac Ginty 2022; Mac Ginty et al. 2020; Söderström and Olivius 2022), even if this question has

not been addressed adequately. This book contributes to this debate, as all case studies are explicit about their choices of method and make a concerted effort to bring out both methodological challenges and solutions.

The case studies cover a range of actors and demonstrate the breadth of relational peace outcomes in these actor dyads. In each chapter the authors take a critical stance toward the problem of studying relational peace: How and to what extent can the relational peace framework help address their specific research questions? What methodological choices should they follow as they adapt the framework to their study? The actor-oriented relational approach for studying peace also raises new questions and paves the way for new research avenues, as the contributions show their cases in a new light, as well as highlighting new empirical and theoretical lessons, and ultimately pointing to the consequences of varying practices of relational peace. Most importantly, the book demonstrates the centrality of viewing peace in relational terms, and provides avenues for how to tackle this field of research.

In sum, this book brings together work at the forefront of peace research and generates new and important knowledge about how peace can be understood. Our empirical studies show how peace plays out differently in different parts of a country and among different types of actors. Our advancement of theory on peace is not only important for academia, but is also important for improving UN peace operations and grassroots-level peace work (see Goertz 2020). Thus, insights from the book as a whole can be useful beyond academic communities.

Defining relational peace and its practices

Our conceptual framework was first developed in the article "Friends, fellows and foes: a new framework for studying relational peace" (Söderström et al. 2021) and provides a basis for the book. In this section we develop the framework further in order to provide analytical tools for empirical investigations and cross-case comparisons. We both extend the observable implications of the framework by outlining what is not relational peace, and also further expand on the empirical manifestations of relational peace practices. As noted above, the mere absence of war alone is not sufficient for any meaningful definition of relational peace. One reason for this is that a situation of no war may just indicate that the actors in that context do not have any relationship at all (Kriesberg 2007: 43; Oelsner 2007: 263). Instead, both conflict and peace are better understood as relationships, where violent conflict can be transformed into non-violent conflict and peace (Curle 1971). Peace as a relation, thus, first requires us to define what a relationship is. Building

on previous research primarily within sociology, we postulated that a "relationship is only manifest when the actors involved have *some influence on each other*; if the two actors are totally independent and unaffected by the other, they have no relationship" (Söderström et al. 2021: 488). A relationship further consists of behavioral interaction, subjective experiences of each other expressed for instance in attitudes, belief and opinions, and the actors' understanding of the relationship as a whole (Huston and Robins 1982; Peplau and Cochran 1990: 322; Saunders 2005: 60). These are the three components that together constitute a relationship – behavioral interaction, attitudes to the other, and ideas of the relationship – and they also influence and strengthen each other through iterative processes of engaging with the other and responding to the other components.

Behavioral interaction: deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation

So what type of actions are then expressions of peaceful behavioral interactions? We suggest that three types of behavior amount to peaceful behavioral interaction: *deliberation*, *non-domination*, and *cooperation* (Söderström et al. 2021: 489). *Deliberation* entails a form of non-violent political engagement in which actors exchange views and also give reasons for their positions (see for example Dryzek 2005; Barnett 2006; Holdo 2015). Deliberation can, for instance, mean local articulations of peace that challenge dominant peace discourses in divided societies (Björkdahl 2012: 288; Autesserre 2021: 128–146). While such deliberation often takes place at the community level, it can also characterize behavior at other levels including interactions between states, as well as between individuals.

Deliberation does not imply a demand for consensus, but rather an acknowledgment of disagreement through dialogue, and the presence of a venue for transforming relationships (Björkdahl 2012; Maddison 2015). Deliberation can thus allow actors to redefine conflict issues and introduce new political discourses, which in turn can contribute to ways of managing or accepting conflicts. An empirical investigation of this element of behavioral interaction can include the analysis of what issues are being deliberated, whether there is an expansion of the scope of issues discussed, and how the discourse potentially is altered through dialogue (Miall 2007: 7). Violence and threats are in direct opposition to deliberation, but this does not preclude there being deliberation in one arena, such as parliamentary debates, and at the same time political violence in the streets related to the same issue. In this example, it is important to identify whether it is the same dyad of actors who are engaging in these contradictory forms of behavior or whether in fact there are several relevant dyads which constitute a web of relations.

Clearly, therefore, specifying which type of behavior the actors engage in with relation to deliberation, violence, and threats is an important aspect of analyzing relational peace.

The second element of the component behavioral interaction is termed *non-domination* (Young 2005; see also Barnett 2006: 94; Forst 2013). It is a republican ideal, and means freedom from being dominated by another, in particular being free from arbitrary power (Pettit 1996; see also Pettit 1997, 2015). In other words, non-domination means that the room for action of the weaker actor in a dyad is not determined by the other. The reversal of this element, namely domination, can include various forms of coercion, ranging from violence or threats to manipulations, which ultimately shape the other's room for action and formation of beliefs and interests (Pettit 1996: 578–579). Domination thus exists if the dominated actor exhibits a pattern of limiting or censoring their behavior due to the potential influence of the more powerful actor. Pettit describes the potential actors as ranging from individuals to groups of people (1996: 578); thus domination and non-domination can occur at all dyadic scales.

Institutional or legal solutions may be needed to ensure non-domination. These can take the form of a federal constitution which guarantees that both actors in a situation are entitled to equal status (Young 2005), or consociationalism, which ensures the protection of vital minority interests (Lijphart 1968, 1993; see also Jarstad 2001: 28 for an overview of empirical examples). Other power-sharing arrangements (territorial and military) may provide such protection from domination (for a discussion of this, see also Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Sriram 2017: 60–61). Thus, the element of non-domination can be detected empirically by analyzing the implementation of, and practices surrounding, institutional arrangements designed to prevent domination. Prohibition of hate speech is one such arrangement suggested by Paris as a vital legal arrangement to ease the transition from war to democracy. This method was used for instance in Kosovo, where codes of conduct for print and broadcast media were enforced by international peacebuilders, in combination with a licensing system in order to prevent material inciting violence or hatred (Paris 2004: 198). As we shall see in the empirical chapters, domination is exerted in many ways, and indeed the existence of domination is easier than its absence (non-domination) to ascertain empirically. This is why identifying legal or institutional mechanisms designed to ensure non-domination, and how they shape behavioral interactions within the dyad, is one way to study its existence.

The third element of behavioral interaction is *cooperation*. This entails the actors working and acting together on shared issues, requiring the active "development and fulfilment of complementary goals" (Miall 2007: 66). At a basic level of cooperation, actors with separate goals make moves that

benefit the other (either because they expect the same gesture in return or because they value the benefit for the other). At the second level, actors adopt common goals or align their goals to one another, and at the third level the actors may identify common interests, thereby also starting to redefine themselves (Miall 2007: 69). Observable expressions of cooperation include both verbal cooperation (e.g. they approve, promise, agree, request, or propose) and cooperative action (e.g. they yield, grant, or reward) (Goldstein 1992: 371). Again, this can occur at all levels, between individuals, between other actors, and so on, all the way up to states. Active obstruction and hindrance of the other achieving their goals would therefore be examples of behavior that is the opposite of cooperative behavior.

Subjective attitudes: mutual recognition and trust

We will now turn to the subjective attitudes in the dyad in a peaceful relationship, such as emotions, beliefs, and attitudes about the other. Two elements are key here: *mutual recognition* and *trust*. We subscribe to Lindemann's definition of *recognition*, and posit that recognition is "constructed through rapport between an actor's asserted image and the image returned by others" (Lindemann 2011: 70). Recognition fundamentally implies at least an acceptance of the other's existence. The other's self-image is acknowledged through symbolic or material concessions to demonstrate peaceful intentions and attitudes held toward the other. Recognition is associated with values such as dignity, honor, status, and prestige, and the lack of recognition often plays a key role in helping us understand why violent conflicts become protracted; as the conflict lingers on, even more people become devoted to the cause since they have already invested a lot and suffered heavy losses.

Recognition can take many forms, and a distinction is sometimes made between thin and thick recognition. Thin recognition refers to a legal- and rights-based form of recognition and the idea of "being acknowledged as an independent subject within a community of law." Thick recognition concerns "self-esteem" and is related to appreciation and respect "for the features that make a subject unique" (Strömbom 2010: 59–61). Thus, thin recognition is more general while thick recognition refers to the particularities associated with an actor's identity.

The opposite of recognition is non-recognition, and this can take the form of not acknowledging publicly that a group exists; for example, according to official policy, for a long time Kurds did not exist in Turkey, and members of this group were instead referred to as mountain Turks (Harff and Gurr 2018: 46). Similarly, when belonging and citizenship are explicitly denied to specific groups while other groups in society are recognized, this can sustain antagonistic relations. Recognition is also important at the state

level in the international system, where, for instance, Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo as an independent state but instead stipulates in its constitution that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. In a similar vein, the country name Macedonia was disputed by Greece, which stipulated that the name should be used exclusively for a part of Greece. This issue was eventually settled in 2019 when the ex-Yugoslav republic instead took the name Republic of North Macedonia, and in return Greece accepted that its northern neighbor could join NATO. Empirically observing recognition thus looks quite different according to the level of analysis, as recognition between states, groups or communities, or even individuals manifests itself in different ways.

The second element of the subjective attitudes toward each other is *trust*. According to Rousseau et al., "[t]rust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another" (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). This definition is suitable for our purposes and can be applied at various actor scales. Empirically observing trust, like recognition, requires more insight into how each actor feels, thinks, and positions themselves vis-à-vis the other. While the opposite of trust is perhaps best framed as distrust, empirically observing fear or expressions of deep suspicion or prejudice is one way to know that trust is not in place (for example, Höglund and Orjuela 2011 show how domination undermines trust in Sri Lanka). In a study of civil war peace settlement efforts, Walter argues that peace requires an arrangement which provides for the actors to engage in costly signals that "communicate their honorable intentions in order to build an atmosphere of trust" (Walter 2002: 22). For instance, the government can begin to demobilize without requiring the rebels to do so first, and the rebels can allow the government to block important retreat routes to other countries (Walter 2002: 24). Studying these types of arrangements and measures and how they shape the actors' attitudes toward each other can thus be a way to empirically study trust. Walter suggests that when mutual trust is not there, the actors can place their trust in a credible third party who guarantees the upholding of a peace agreement. If the combatants trust the third party (e.g. a UN force) to enforce or verify compliance with the peace agreement, then the chances of behavioral change increase in ways that can lead to more trust also between the conflicting parties. Overall, studying trust means paying attention to the degree to which the two actors allow themselves to be vulnerable to the actions of the other without safeguards.

The actors' understanding of the relationship: fellows or friends

The final component of relational peace is the actor's idea or beliefs about the relationship. Relational peace requires that the constituent actors'

understanding of each other is classified in friendly terms as legitimate others, peers, fellows, allies, partners, or even friends with shared visions, rather than in hostile terms such as foes or enemies (Masters 1967; Wendt 1999; Diehl 2016: 2; Nordin and Smith 2018; van Hoef and Oelsner 2018). Thus, for a relationship to be deemed peaceful, the actors have to express that they have shared something and that there is a sense of reciprocity in their relationship. *Fellowship* means that each actor regards their counterpart as a legitimate other; their relationship is characterized by legitimate coexistence (see also Themnér and Ohlson 2014 for a discussion of vertical and horizontal relations). Fellows do not need to have a close relationship, but just need to accept each other as legitimate and find it possible to engage with each other directly, for instance through collaboration or competition in business or politics. The second concept, *friendship*, in contrast, not only refers to private relationships, but can also define relations between states, organizations, or communities. Friendship does not, however, imply that relationships are harmonious or void of conflict. They can also involve negativity and self-interest and in that way be contradictory. But friendship does suggest a more intimate relationship, which entails that the actors know each other well and cherish one another (Sugden 2002: 68–81; Nordin and Smith 2018; van Hoef and Oelsner 2018: 115–117; see also Miall 2011). While the actors themselves may use emic labels other than friendship and fellowship, paying attention to how the actors name and describe the relationship as a whole is important. In contrast, should they describe the relationship as one of enmity or hostility, it would not qualify in terms of this element of relational peace. We argue that it is important to study both lived practices of a relationship and the stories the actors tell about the dyad in order to fully capture the phenomenon under study (see also Pingeot 2018). Such stories shape expectations (and thus trust) as well as filter how the behavior of the other should be understood, and thus such stories or ideas of the relationship are a key component of the dyadic relationship as a whole. In Table 0.1, we summarize the relational peace framework in terms of which elements belong to what component, and also what kind of observations do not amount to relational peace.

Studying relational peace practices

The ideal type definition of relational peace "entails behavioral interaction that can be characterized as deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation between the actors in the dyad; the actors involved recognize and trust each other and believe that the relationship is either one between legitimate fellows or between friends" (Söderström et al. 2021: 496). The definition of relational peace is an ideal type definition, and consequently we can

Table 0.1 The relational peace framework and examples of contrary elements

Components	Elements	Examples of contrary elements
Behavioral interaction	Non-domination	Domination
	Deliberation	Silence
	Cooperation	Violent dissent
		Obstruction
		Destructive behavior
Subjective attitudes	Recognition	Non-recognition
	Trust	Distrust
		Hate
		Fear
Ideas of the relationship	Fellows	Adversaries
	Friends	Enemies
		Hostiles

expect few or no empirical cases to contain each and every element of each component fully. The elements that constitute the definition of relational peace are not easily separated, but rather affect and mold one another. For instance, the idea of the relationship influences behavior, and a repeated behavior of deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation builds mutual trust. With respect to each component of the relational peace framework, there is a range of different elements that are relevant when we empirically study relational peace practices. For instance, when empirically exploring subjective attitudes, do we see expressions of distrust and hate, as well as indications of trust and recognition, and does the balance change over time? What other kinds of behavioral interaction do we see in the dyad; is there violence, is there destructive behavior? Are the actors obstructing each other's goals? What depictions of the relationship as a whole do the actors express, and of what kind are they if they cannot be categorized as friendship or fellowship ideas? This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but it should give some indications of how one can approach the task of mapping within each component, and it also demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the range of possible content within each component, beyond those elements which can be classified as relational peace. If we are to locate relational peace practices, this entails searching for practices that are habitual or that have some degree of regularity over time (for an example of this perspective, see Autesserre 2014: 29–31; see also Adler and Pouliot

2011; Pouliot 2008; Costa 2006; Lau 2004 for a discussion of the concept of practice). What is the dominant pattern of interaction between the actors in the dyad that we can observe empirically? As a whole, our framework highlights not only how actors talk about their relationship, the discourse around it if you will, but also the behavioral interaction between the dyads, the practice if you will (see also Pingeot 2018). Preferably, this means that we need to scrutinize both texts about and produced by the actors, and observe the actors in order to study all the components in the framework.

While at least some degree of each of the elements must be present in order for a case to be classified as relational peace, the framework can also be used to identify which elements are missing. Importantly, we suggest that the most fruitful analysis can be conducted when the framework is being used as an analytical tool for assessing how relationships evolve and comparing shifts over time or across dyads or cases. This is studying relational peace practices. Thus, our conceptual framework is suitable for assessing to what degree different elements of relational peace practices are present in a relationship in order to grasp the complexity of the processes at different moments in time, but also to understand how the different elements influence and shape each other.

Each of the elements of relational peace can be present to different degrees within a relationship at a specific moment in time. Also, within each component, the elements can be thought of as existing along a wider scale of behavioral interactions, subjective attitudes, and ideas of the relationship – including antagonistic ones. It can be important to consider these too in order to understand how the relationship functions, how it changes, and possible contradictions. Along the scale of behavioral interactions there may be different behavioral acts, such as distancing, segregation, and exiting from political arenas as in the boycotting of elections, sanctions, and civil disobedience. To some degree this kind of behavior signals a retreat from the relationship, and a failure of one actor to recognize the other as one with which it is legitimate to interact. The opposite of cooperation is ultimately the active obstruction of the abilities of the other to operate and live their life by acts of direct violence or domination.

Post-war societies are often characterized by distrust – the antithesis of trust – and during a peace process it is of the utmost importance to transform the relationships by building mutual trust. Through mediation and processes of intercommunal dialogue, misunderstandings can be resolved and prejudices can be countered to facilitate the development of trust, or at least reduce distrust. However, the mere absence of threats is often insufficient for trust to develop, whereas over time, mutual trust can start to take root through continual and iterative peaceful interactions. While distrust is the

opposite of trust, hate is an even more extreme version of distrust of the other. We recognize that recognition and trust do not always appear in the same order: sometimes recognition requires a certain degree of trust, and in other instances recognition of an actor's status, for instance, can lead to increased reciprocal trust.

When exploring recognition, we may also discover that recognition is not extended to all aspects of the other, and this is sometimes called agonistic recognition, which is based on "non-finalism, pluralist multilogue and disaggregated recognition" (Rumelili and Strömbom 2022: 1361). This form of recognition does not require an apology for past actions or future equality arrangements. Instead, agonistic recognition is an open-ended and ongoing dialogue and a reconstruction of relationships between multiple actors (Rumelili and Strömbom 2022: 1365–1367). Paying attention to what kind of recognition is extended to the other is therefore useful when we are trying to study and understand what type of relational peace practices we are empirically observing.

Overall, the different constitutive elements of relational peace can also, to some degree, be related to the idea of agonistic peace. While agonistic peace is not necessarily structured in the same way as our framework, there is some overlap that we suggest at least allows agonistic peace to be related to the relational peace framework. In both relational and agonistic peace there is no requirement to reach a consensus or a shared peace narrative. Instead, multiple and contesting narratives can provide for both agonistic peace (Rumelili and Çelik 2017) and relational peace. However, agonistic peace offers more room for domination and resistance to domination than what we would expect to see in a peace between fellows, and similarly recognition is often less of a given in an agonistic relationship, but rather is something that is fought for (Shinko 2008). Furthermore, agonistic peace builds on agonistic democratic theories (Aggestam et al. 2015: 1738), whereas relational peace is not linked to specific democratic norms.

Some elements of relational peace fit more than one real-world type, while other elements fall more neatly into just one type. For instance, trust and cooperation fit better with the idea of friends. In Table 0.2, we demonstrate how various elements of the relational peace framework can be categorized as belonging to specific real-world types of relational peace practices, and also how other configurations of observations with respect to the components of the framework may result in other kinds of dyadic relations. *Antagonistic relations* clearly fall outside of the scope of what can be considered relational peace, but we would argue that *peace between agonists* also does not fully qualify as relational peace. Whether in some instances we are satisfied with achieving peace between agonists, rather than peace between fellows, is another question.

Table 0.2 Different types of relations

Components of the framework	Antagonistic relations	Peace between agonists	Relational peace	
			Peace between fellows	Peace between friends
Behavioral interaction	Violence and other forms of domination No deliberation Obstruction	Domination Some deliberation No or some cooperation	Some non-domination Deliberation Some cooperation	Non-domination Deliberation Cooperation
Subjective attitudes	Distrust Non-recognition Hate	Distrust No or thin recognition	Some trust Recognition	Trust Recognition
Ideas of relationship	Enemies	Adversaries	Fellows	Friends

Conflict can both be violent and non-violent, and only non-violent conflict is commensurate with relational peace as an ideal type. However, as with all elements in real-world cases of peace practices, there may be some violence in a society generally characterized by relational peace. In addition, we posit that violent conflict may occur alongside relational peace in other dyads. In this sense, it means that relational peace and war can coexist, since it is possible that interaction and cooperation in some dyads continue even in a context of violent conflict. Thus, nation states may be involved in military attacks on each other's territories, while at the same time conducting trade with one another or while being members of the same multilateral organizations. It is also possible that some dyadic interactions are violent while other dyads are peaceful within the same territorial entity. Thus, the relational approach moves the focus from each separate entity to the relationship between dyads. This does not mean that we regard territory as unimportant for understanding war and peace – territorial claims and disagreements regarding belonging and citizenship within a territory, and conflicts over attachment to land, are indeed common facets of war and peace. But the relational peace perspective means shifting the lens away from territories and toward what actually happens between actors, thus gaining the ability to see that different dyads within the same territory have different degrees of peace.

The actor-centric character of the relational approach allows for analysis of relationship at multiple levels: at micro- and macro-levels of the intrastate and interstate as well as transnational levels.[3] Relational peace practices can also take place at several analytical levels, and also across levels, for instance in the case of relationships within and across different communities (as discussed in Klocek's and Jarstad's chapters) or a relationship between the national military and a civil society (as in Nilsson's chapter). As a relationship may be more or less volatile, relationship properties may shift over time (as demonstrated in Söderström's chapter), and so may the actors. Since actors often are fluid and not homogeneous entities (an issue which is especially discussed in the chapter by Olivius and Hedström), it is important to clearly delineate which actors are included in the analysis as well as the time period studied. In some contexts, it makes sense to analyze several dyads or even a web of relationships, but the necessity to define each dyad clearly remains. Any relational approach will have to confront this problem of boundary specification around actors, and also resolve the question of whether or not something is cohesive enough to warrant the label of "actor" (Emirbayer 1997: 303–304). Nonetheless, by engaging in this process of defining actors and actor boundaries, the framework also allows scholars to recognize actor complexities and nuances (as addressed in the chapters by Klocek and by Olivius and Hedström as well as the chapter by Eklund,

Wimelius, and Elfving). Similarly, the same actor may relate to others in different ways, depending on the arena in which the relationship is acted out (for instance private versus public), as is discussed in the chapters by Söderström and Premaratna.

The types of actors that are most relevant for understanding peace in post-war societies are often those that have previously been involved in political violence against each other. However, an analysis of relationships between non-violent actors is often key to understanding everyday expressions of peace. Thus, there is an enormous number of potential cases suitable for empirical investigation, and this book showcases only a small sample of possible empirical studies. Many of the chapters take a very close look at specific events and dyads, while others provide a more overarching analysis of a peace process. Each chapter has taken on an approach that fits its overall purpose, and helps it contribute to its respective field. In particular, they all try to add nuance to peace in each context, by paying attention to both context and the specifics of the framework. As such, they have been innovative with their use of data and tried to combine various sources in order to add a deepened understanding of each dyad. Each chapter discusses how the authors have dealt with such tradeoffs, and what it means for their ability to capture relational peace practices in each case. Each element in the framework, however, has been formulated in such a way as to enable analysis of relational peace processes involving very different types of actors, at different analytical levels. Our hope is that the book as a whole will help and inspire new ways to empirically study peace, by providing specific methodological solutions as well as pinpointing specific methodological challenges as relational peace practices are studied.

Overview of the book

The chapters in this book apply the relational peace framework to a variety of cases dealing with different research questions. The chapters range from more macro-level relationships to interaction between individuals at the micro-level, and from elite actors to citizens involved in everyday interactions, and the order of the chapters largely follows this structure. In addition, the chapters use very different kinds of material for their studies, demonstrating how the framework can and should be adapted to the needs of each specific study. The case study chapters also vary in terms of their ontological and epistemological points of departure. As this suggests, we advocate a pragmatic approach to using the framework based on what is most useful given the aim of the particular research and theoretical perspective.

In Chapter 1, Eklund, Wimelius, and Elfving use the relational peace framework to analyze Russian ideas of peace, particularly focusing on Russia's actions vis-à-vis Georgia (Abkhazia) and Moldova (Transnistria). During the last decade, scholars have been preoccupied with studying Russia's military capabilities and its ideas of war, yet the question of how Russia understands peace and peacekeeping operations has been neglected. Are there particular Russian perceptions and ideas with regard to peace? If we are to truly understand Russian foreign policy, we need to understand not just how conflict is understood, but also how peace is discursively constructed among the Russian elite. Applying the relational peace framework, this chapter shows how such ideas are expressed and conceptualized. Using a range of texts (academic, governmental publications, and open media debates) the chapter shows how the framework can be adjusted to an ideational analysis. It finds that Russian ideas of peace are relational, yet not exclusively so. Different relational traits are also more prominent in the Russian conception when it interacts with the international system, macro-regional geopolitical complexes, and the conflicts in Abkhazia and Transnistria.

In Chapter 2, Söderström similarly departs from written sources and conducts a content analysis of newspaper articles that mention the signatories of the Cambodian peace agreement, in order to study how elite relations across a previously antagonistic divide have developed. Given the continuity of elites after war and their central role in shaping both macro-politics and public opinion, understanding how such elite relations have developed over time provides a more specific depiction than in previous work of the internal dynamics of the Cambodian peace, a case often described as a hybrid peace case. Söderström provides depth to the hybrid depiction by providing a detailed analysis of the shifts and changes in several elite relations which have gradually deteriorated. She shows that behavioral shifts are both more common and faster than changes in the subjective attitudes and the ideas of the relationship. Overall, the main relationship is characterized by domination, distrust, and ideas of dependency. The chapter also demonstrates how one can depart from the framework and identify additional specific behaviors and attitudes which fall within or outside relational peace.

In Chapter 3, Jarstad analyzes how contemporary political parties in South Africa envision intergroup relations decades after the end of apartheid. The idea of the Rainbow Nation was central to South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, as it recognized diversity and reflected a sense of colorblindness. This chapter contributes to the literature on peace and post-war nation-building by investigating how contemporary political parties in South Africa – as key actors in the public debate – discuss and envision future intergroup relations. Using the relational peace framework, the analysis of 2019 election manifestos show a variety of competing visions of intergroup

relations that speak to particular conceptions of nation-building. Jarstad argues that the disagreements among political parties on who belongs to the South African nation and how to create a common identity risk undermining the legitimacy of the state and threaten peace. The chapter points to the importance of studying horizontal intergroup relations, and in particular how actors themselves describe and envision such relations, for understanding the connection between peace and nation-building.

In Chapter 4, Klocek studies relational peace in Cyprus, on the basis of historical records, public opinion surveys, policy reports, and English-language news sources. He suggests that ethno-nationalism and foreign powers as the two main conventional explanations as to why the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved rest on a negative peace framework which favors status quo and also depicts the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as unitary and static actors. By contrast, the application of the relational peace framework allows Klocek to question these ideas and analyze the shifts and changes both between the leaders in the Greek Cypriot community and between Greek and Turkish Cypriot officials. In this way, Klocek shows that there has been deliberation between Greek and Turkish leaders through formal peace processes, but that there has been considerably less room to exchange competing views within the Greek Cypriot community. This underscores how difficult it is to advance intercommunal relations while within-group competition remains high. Overall, Klocek shows how the relational peace framework can add to previous explanations of the status quo in Cyprus, in part by problematizing and breaking up actors that have been seen as unitary in previous work, but also by highlighting behavioral interactions beyond the framework that also inform the relationship.

In Chapter 5, Olivius and Hedström demonstrate the importance of understanding diverging experiences of peace and conflict in the context of Myanmar, and how the relational peace framework can aid in this endeavor. Between 2011 and 2021, political reforms and renewed peace efforts significantly reduced violence in many of Myanmar's conflict-affected regions. Despite this, people living in these areas do not agree that they now enjoy peace. Using focus group discussions, interviews, and participant observation with local civilians, civil society activists, and members of non-state armed groups in two regions, Kayah State and Mon State, the chapter demonstrates how the logic of key conflict relationships between the Myanmar state and ethnic-minority groups and communities has not been transformed by the peace process but merely manifests itself in new ways, with armed violence being replaced by other forms of domination, underpinned by inequality, non-recognition, and distrust. The chapter demonstrates the importance of a relational perspective for pinpointing challenges to a sustainable and legitimate everyday peace. Instead of stressing material and security concerns,

their chapter shows that equality, recognition, and trust are key to understanding everyday peace in a more nuanced fashion.

In Chapter 6, Nilsson takes on the relationship between the military and local communities in Colombia. Rebuilding the social fabric in societies broken by prolonged social conflict is an important part of peacebuilding. This process is particularly challenging where levels of violence are still high and state security actors continue to occupy a powerful position even after a peace accord is signed. Nilsson investigates how representatives of the military and of different civilian state and non-state actors in post-accord Colombia perceive their relationship with each other today, as well as how they envision the role of the military in future Colombia and what they identify as challenges to relational peace across these actors. Based on interview data, the chapter shows significant differences in how the actors evaluate interactions between themselves, how they think of each other, and how they evaluate their future relationship. These differences result in a low level of mutual respect, trust, and cooperation and provide important obstacles to achieving a higher level of relational peace in the near future.

In Chapter 7, Bramsen analyzes the micro-dynamics of the peace talks between the Philippine government and the communist party (the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, NDFP), and discusses this in relation to the larger web of relations shaping the peace talks. Based on participatory observations of the third round of peace talks conducted in January 2017 as well as interviews with participants in the talks, the chapter shows that the interaction between the negotiating parties was cordial and even resembled friendship-like relations. Still, the talks fell apart after the third round. In the chapter, Bramsen discusses this development in the light of three other sets of relationships which affected the talks: intra-party relations; relations between the leaders of the respective parties; and the relations to and within civil society. In this way, Bramsen highlights the need to analyze the broader web of relations within which peace talks take place in order to understand how relational peace develops.

In Chapter 8, Premaratna explores the peacebuilding practice of the multiethnic, bilingual Sri Lankan theater group Jana Karaliya. Specifically, this chapter looks at how the group's interpersonal engagement has moved through the phases of foes, fellows, and friends/family over the course of their work, and the changing phases of the Sri Lankan conflict. The chapter draws from participant observation, focus group interviews with full-time members of the group, and individual interviews with selected members. The chapter conducts a longitudinal analysis and detailed investigation of how relationships in this participatory arts-based peacebuilding initiative transformed over time through sustained everyday interactions in and outside of work. The chapter demonstrates that the shared vision of "performing

peace" enabled Jana Karaliya to develop a lived peace that rests on coexistence amid multiple, changing, and at times disparate behaviors, attitudes, and ideas about each other. Importantly, Premaratna shows how transformation of relationships and changes in relational peace over time can be traced through a close analysis of long-term interpersonal interactions.

Finally, in the concluding chapter we discuss the insights and implications of the relational approach, both for future avenues of research and for policy implications. We also highlight similarities and findings across the various chapters and how they speak to one another. The chapters show that relational aspects are key for understanding how peace is manifested and experienced by different actors, and also for detecting areas that prevent peace from emerging. By using the framework, the chapters contribute with alternative and nuanced understandings of peace in particular settings, and taken together they demonstrate the multifaceted nature of peaceful relations, what we term relational peace practices. While the book is primarily analytically descriptive, in the conclusion we also take on discussions around explaining shifts in and across dyads over time. Ultimately, we see this edited volume as a starting point for taking the relational and process perspective on peace seriously, but we point to continued ways of furthering these debates and how it should be studied.

Notes

The editors shared the work for this chapter equally, and their names are thus listed alphabetically (according to the Swedish alphabet).

1 Feminist peace research has provided important insights in this regard, exploring the everydayness and lived experiences of peace and possibilities of transforming conflicts through transformation of relationships (see e.g. Confortini 2010; McLeod and O'Reilly 2019; Wibben et al. 2019; Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2021; Cárdenas 2022; Olivius et al. 2022).

2 The conflict transformation perspective is also central to scholarship on agonistic peace. In this paradigm, conflicts are accepted as healthy signs of all societies, while post-war power constellations may be contested by non-violent means, and there is space for conflict to transform from antagonism and enmity to agonism and adversity (see e.g. Shinko 2008; Aggestam et al. 2015; Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2016; Rumelili and Çelik 2017; Klem 2018; Strömbom 2020; Çelik 2021; Rumelili and Strömbom 2022; Strömbom et al. 2022).

3 Here, other peace concepts operate differently, where everyday peace is mainly seen as hyperlocalized, even if it can scale out (Mac Ginty 2021: 14, 25–50), whereas Millar has developed a framework for trans-scalar peace for analyzing peace across analytical levels, but its threshold for being classified as peace is higher than that of the relational framework (Millar 2021). However, in contrast to

relational peace, which regards peaceful coexistence as a legitimate and achievable goal, the trans-scalar peace system builds on the aspiration of positive peace, that is, a normative vision and ideal type that is not expected to be fully achieved.

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1

Russian ideas of peace and peacekeeping

Niklas Eklund, Malin Eklund Wimelius, and Jörgen Elfving

Emerging as a nuclear superpower after the Second World War, the Soviet Union was a contender for ideological world dominance almost until its breakup in the early 1990s. Generations of Soviet leaders interpreted their ideology as essentially conflictual, engaging with revolutionary and armed struggles across the world. In 1973, the Soviet Union participated in its very first peacekeeping mission, working under UNEF II in Egypt; however, no other missions of significant scope ever followed this instance. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia sent significant numbers of armed forces to participate in international peacekeeping in the Balkans, but Russia then left the Balkan missions in anger after the NATO forces had gone ahead with Operation Allied Force and bombed parts of Yugoslavia outside the UN mandate (Wimelius, Eklund, and Elfving 2018). Russia has participated in several other UN missions, including those in Chad, Haiti, and East Timor (Bratersky and Lukin 2017: 139). When violence erupted in the republics of Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova in the 1990s, Russia became the lead nation and the backbone of forces from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in response.[1] In four cases, Russia initiated and led peacekeeping without the UN: Transnistria (1992–present), Abkhazia (1994–2008), South Ossetia (1989–2009), and Tadjikistan (1992–2000). According to some commentators, ostensibly leaving its ideological past behind, Russia's peacekeeping was successful in "bringing a relatively durable stability to conflicts in the former Soviet Union" (Heathershaw 2004: 188). Others have argued differently, noting that Russian peace operations were used to freeze conflicts and protect strategic interests (Allison 2013).

After the 1990s Russian peacekeeping evolved outside the UN framework and was met with international suspicion. In contrast to traditional ideas on peacekeeping (which frequently involve consent, impartiality, and a minimum use of force), Russian forces suppressed fighting, separated warring factions, and imposed peace in the post-Soviet sphere (Sagramoso 2003: 13). Russian peacekeeping operations, in vernacular Russian discussed as

mirotvorchestvo or *mirostroitelstvo*, were based on broad mandates, unclear rules of engagement, and – in comparison to UN operations – a less constrained legal framework. This approach allowed negative peace to be enforced in the regions mentioned above and then kept by Russia (Mackinlay and Cross 2003). As described by Bratersky and Lukin: "the fact remains that the majority of Russia's operations have been effective insofar as, following the cessation of hostilities, they did not cause further instability – in marked contrast to the operations led by NATO member countries, for example, in Iraq and Libya" (Bratersky and Lukin 2017: 147).

According to Bratersky and Lukin, however, Russian peacekeeping should be understood against the backdrop of Russian elite perspectives on UN peacekeeping. The introduction of humanitarian interventions (or the responsibility to protect, termed 'R2P') is seen as an erosion of principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention, and state sovereignty (Bratersky and Lukin 2017: 132–133). The world order, as established after the Second World War, on the other hand "grants Russia the right to preserve its own position" (Bratersky and Lukin 2017: 134). In Bratersky and Lukin's analysis, the current Russian leadership embraces a worldview based on competition between national interests, in which the UN is necessary as an arena for seeking compromise and providing world politics with some measure of stability and predictability. Sakwa, in his argument for the concept of cold peace, further contextualizes such ideas by saying that the institutions and rules set in place to manage the realities of a bipolar world are becoming increasingly dysfunctional in the post–Cold War era. As it has struggled to find its place without subscribing to American superpower and hegemony, Russia has contributed to a substitution of cold war for cold peace, which represents "an unstable geopolitical truce" where defeat of "the one side is not accepted as legitimate" and victory "of the other side cannot be consolidated" (Sakwa 2013: 206).

In the field of post-Soviet studies, much thought and research has been inspired by Russian exceptionalism among Russian elites (Tsygankov 2013, 2016; Humphries 2016). Swedish historian Jangfeldt has suggested that Russian elites vacillate between two extremes: on the one hand, a sense of isolation and belonging, felt through most of their modern history (Jangfeldt 2017: 5) and often carried over as an explanatory factor in current analyses of Russia's path from experimentation with nascent liberal heterarchy in the 1990s, and, on the other hand, a stricter political hierarchy under the aegis of President Vladimir Putin (Grigas 2016; Sakwa 2017; Giles 2019). Whether or not they were motivated by exceptionalism, cyclic elite behavior, or illiberal political vision, little is known about Russian ideas of peace beyond the absence of war, and with Russia's global influence on the rise,

more knowledge about how Russia understands peace and peacekeeping has been called for (Davies 2015). Are there ideas of peace that go beyond the absence of war and, if so, to what extent can they be interpreted as relational? In this chapter, we engage with contemporary sources in the Russian language in an endeavor to identify, analyze, and interpret ideas of peace. Our analysis is based on the elements of relational peace, and we have looked for expressions of these in our sources in order to explore Russian ideas of peace beyond the absence of war. Is peace described in terms of relationships that involve non-domination, deliberation, or cooperation? Are ideas of attitudes to counterparts those of recognition or trust? Are ideas of relationships based on notions of legitimate coexistence or friendship?

Our interest in Russian ideas of peace in Transnistria and Abkhazia is motivated first and foremost by the predominance and lingering influence of Russian troops on these territories, establishing de facto Russian political dominance. When Moldova declared sovereignty in 1990, Transnistria responded by declaring independence from Moldova. War followed, and the intervention of the 14th Soviet army stationed in Moldova was instrumental in contributing to the country's partition. Large-scale violence has not recurred since a peace agreement was signed on July 21, 1992. A security zone was created, and 6,000 troops from six Russian, three Moldovan, and three Transnistrian battalions were deployed under a Joint Control Commission (Dias 2013). Deadlines for the withdrawal of Russian troops have never been met, however, and in recent years Moldova has repeatedly expressed fears that Russia is about to annex Transnistria (BBC 2017b).

When the Georgian parliament declared secession from the Soviet Union in 1991, the then Georgian region of Abkhazia responded with fierce military resistance. Outright war in 1992–1993 ended in Georgia losing control and led to the separation of ethnic groups. Under the auspices of the UN, a ceasefire was signed in 1994. The UN also set up an observer mission, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), while the CIS deployed troops dominated by Russian units to uphold a buffer zone between Abkhazia and Georgia. After the defeat of Georgian guerilla fighters in the region of Gali, a peace agreement was reached in the city of Gagra on May 25, 1998. In 2008, however, Russia and Georgia once again clashed, this time over South Ossetia. Russian troops not only moved through Abkhazia but decided to keep a large military force there and, in 2009, they vetoed an extension of the UNOMIG. Having claimed its independence since 1999, Abkhazia is often considered a de facto state by the international community but remains unrecognized by a vast majority of countries (Johnson 2015; BBC 2017a). Because of the strength of Russian dominance, both Transnistria and Abkhazia have become increasingly isolated, but as Russia continues its *mirotvorchestvo*

and *mirostroitelstvo* in what it terms peacekeeping missions there, what do we know about relevant Russian definitions of and ideas of peace?

Descriptive ideational analysis and the relational approach

Ideational scholars hold that ideas – often defined as products of cognition or causal beliefs – are guides for action and that we must identify, interpret, and understand the ideas that shape the world around us in order to make sense of it (Béland and Cox 2010; Gofas and Hay 2010; Vedung 2018). In other words, ideas about what peace is, what it should be, and how it can be built inform decision-making, affect negotiations and agreements, shape policy, help build institutions, and underpin peacebuilding efforts. From this perspective, it is crucial to identify sources that contain ideas which have an impact. Our sources here consist of Russian governmental publications as well as academic and popular reference texts. The texts, which were mostly published after 2010, encompass developments from the early 1990s onward. The sources used in this chapter are valid as a cross-section of Russian publications during and after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea. Events and any ensuing ideational change after 2020 are not covered by these sources, however. We leave the ideational underpinnings of more recent Russian military operations, namely in Nagorno-Karabach and in Kazakhstan, as topics for future research. Russian actions in Donetsk and Luhansk in the wake of Russia's 2022 war on Ukraine also raise questions concerning Russian views on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but we refrain from observations about them as well since all-out war still rages in Ukraine at the time of this writing, and again our sources do not speak to this time period. Of course, our findings here may still inform our understanding of current events. Thus, we do not claim or argue that there is only one set of ideas of peace in Russia, but our interest here is to identify those ideas which not only shape current elite thinking but are also publicly conveyed as underpinning state policy.

Governmental sources are readily available on the internet, and some but not all of them are available in English. The homepages of the Russian government and its ministries, particularly the Ministry of Defense, provide institutional and doctrinal information with regard to current Russian policy and related usages concerning the concepts of peace and peacekeeping. These we refer to as the declarative sources. Another type of source analyzed in this chapter is expounding sources, by which we mean such running or explanatory commentary as can be found in the Russian media, particularly in state-controlled outlets such as TASS and Ria-Novosti, by prominent political figures and analysts. These are descriptive of ideas that matter

because they reflect thinking in wider elite circles and explain intentions of government doctrine to the Russian public. Expounding sources also include books whose authors are either founding fathers of government doctrine (such as the minister of defense Gerasimov) or official interpreters and conveyors of doctrine (such as General Vladimirov). Expounding sources in the form of media outlets are freely accessible online for Russian speakers.

By including academic and popular reference texts, we want to explore the intersection of research-based Russian ideas of peace, declarative governmental positions, and popularized ideas that influence public debates. Can elements and depictions of relational peace be extracted from the four categories of sources? Reference books were sought out in major bookstores in Moscow and Riga, which indicates that these sources are widespread and available to Russian speakers both inside and outside Russia. This, however, also means that the book search was limited by commercial availability and in no way intended as exhaustive. Looking across all four categories, it also means that we are analyzing a cross-section of widely accepted contemporary Russian ideas, as opposed to looking at their roots and evolution through history. Table 1.1 lists our sources according to category; each cell contains works in chronological order of publication.

Table 1.1 Sources according to type

Type of source	Specific sources
Governmental/ declarative	*Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* 2007; Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2014; Russian Federation National Security Strategy 2015; Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2016; Russian Defense Terminology 2018; Ministry of Emergencies 2019.
Expounding	Azyavin 2009; Gerasimov 2013; Vladimirov 2013; Popov and Chamzatov 2016; Kovalev 2017; Moskovskij Komsomolets 2018; Ria Novosti 2019; Averin 2019; Gazeta.ru 2019; TASS 2019.
Academic	Antsupov and Shipilov 2000; Zhirokov 2012; Burdyog 2012; Trushin 2012; Lebedeva and Khakevich 2013; Tsygankov 2013; Guseynov 2014; Gromyko and Feyodorov 2014; Blishenko and Solntseva 2014; Lasutin 2015; Kovalchuk 2015; Igritsky et al. 2015; Starodubovskaya and Sokolov 2015; Smirnov 2017.
Popular reference	Kvasha 2011; Kozlov and Chernobrivy 2015; Starikov 2015; Primakov 2016; Delyagin 2016; Zhirokov 2016; Satanovsky and Kedmi 2017.

Ideas of course do not exist in a vacuum, but are part of a historical, political, economic, and social context, and that context is often helpful for interpreting them (Bergström and Boréus 2000). Although our aim here is to identify, describe, and analyze ideas related to peace in the Russian-language context as such, we also approach and interpret them against the backdrop of the post-Soviet context and draw not only on the first and third authors' extensive knowledge about Russian affairs but particularly on their linguistic proficiency. Our interpretation of Russian ideas is also inspired by practical hermeneutics according to which interpretation starts with a direction and a set of questions, uses specific analytical tools, and is a continuous process of going back and forth between parts of the texts or sources and the texts or sources as a whole (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994: 156). The texts we analyze are all in the Russian language, and all quotations below have been translated into English by the first author. Overall, the approach has been to search across the governmental, expounding, academic, and popular reference source categories and look for unifying Russian ideas of the relational components of peace.

Before sharing the results of our analysis, we should mention that even a cursory reading of Russian sources reveals ideas of peace that are heavily conditioned by structures in the form of states, governments, international organizations, institutions, norms, rules, and geopolitical contexts together with ideas about how relationships flow to and from them (see for example Antsupov and Shipilov 2000; Blishenko and Solntseva 2014; Kovalchuk 2015; Kozlov and Chernobrivy 2015; Starodubrovskaya and Sokolov 2015; Zhirokov 2016). Particular relationships take precedence over others. Exterritorial relations are a case in point: the Russian government defines one of its key tasks as that of protecting Russian minorities in other countries as if they were citizens of the Russian State (Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2014). The Russian government also reserves the right to take unilateral peacekeeping action without a UN mandate (Russian Defense Terminology 2018). In the sources we have studied, there is no critical discussion of these topics or, for example, of the Russian practice of expanding its populations in geopolitically desirable areas by handing out passports to motivate intervention, as for example in Crimea in 2014 (Averin 2019; Gazeta.ru 2019). Our sources can all be subdivided into three broad themes: the first concerns the international system, the second macro-regional geopolitical complexes in *Bolshoy Kavkaz* or Greater Caucasia, and the third conflicts and resolutions in Transnistria and Abkhazia. The first of the three themes tries to pinpoint the workings of global and international systems in the post-Soviet era and pays particular attention to the significance of Russia's emergent role as a (mere) great power in world politics. The second focuses on macro-regional geopolitical complexes. It seems to clarify

the political thoughts and reasons behind Russian views of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Particularly interesting and relevant for our study is the concept of *Bolshoy Kavkaz* (Guseynov 2014), which translates as Greater Caucasia. The third theme deals directly with conflicts and resolutions in Transnistria and Abkhazia.

In what follows, we describe our findings first with regard to carrier ideas, i.e., ideas that recurred in all of our sources and which somehow provide an ideational platform which forms a baseline on which the other ideas are situated. We then proceed to explore ideas of peace relating to the international system; this section is followed by an exploration and analysis of ideas of peace with regard to the *Bolshoy Kavkaz* and with regard to Transnistria and Abkhazia. Table 1.2, in the conclusion of this chapter, summarizes our findings from the ideational analysis.

Carrier ideas

Looking across all sources analyzed here, we find some first-order ideas on the basis of which other ideational expressions are situated. Here, these are referred to as *carrier ideas*, and they are important in setting the stage for our descriptive analysis of ideas concerning the particular elements of relational peace (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). In our analysis, carrier ideas thus refer to an ideational baseline or a set of assumptions about the world and the people who live in it. Peace, in other words, may be discussed by sources in relational terms, but how and to what extent will be guided by certain carrier ideas. The first carrier idea in the sources we have studied here concerns the Russian perspective on history. Conflict is seen as an intrinsic part of the human condition. In the sources we analyzed, war and peace are seen not only as two sides of the same coin, but as intrinsically linked (Antsupov and Shipilov 2000; Vladimirov 2013). It is seen as pointless to argue that peaceful conditions devoid of elements of war can be achieved. Rather, more or less peaceful conditions are viewed as cyclic with warlike conditions all the way through human history. Humanity's perpetuation of violence and the threat of violence lie at the core of social life. Cultures, if left alone, can establish reasonable levels of mutual social understanding and thereby achieve equally reasonable levels of violence in social life. This means that a modicum of peace or a more peaceful condition is achievable. But peace is contingent. In Russian eyes, history teaches us that cultures are rarely left alone. Global relationships are imposed or enforced. Cultures compete, and in the modern world states must act as cultural agents, assumptions which form a carrier idea about cultural agency and state-centrism.

Table 1.2 The components of the relational approach in relation to Russian ideas of peace

Carrier ideas	1. War and peace are intertwined, interlocked, and cyclic throughout history.
	2. Cultural agency and competition lead to repetitive cycles of violence, war, and peace.
	3. The breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the *Semena Raspada,* a scattering of cultural seeds evocative of a broken family of nations.

Themes in the sources	International system	Macro-regional geopolitical complexes in *Bolshoy Kavkaz* or Greater Caucasia	Conflicts and resolutions in Transnistria and Abkhazia
Behavioral elements of relational peace	Peace between states must rest upon state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. A global forum for peaceful cooperation and deliberation is needed; the UN is failing in both regards.	Structures that promote the behavioral components of relational peace are largely lacking. Macro-regional partnerships are needed to address this and step in where the UN fails to do so.	Transnistria and Abkhazia are unique cultural communities. Historically they have enjoyed relative autonomy and should continue to do so, either as states (Abkhazia) or as protected communities within states (Transnistria in Moldova).
Subjective elements of relational peace	The UN is increasingly being by-passed by other actors, for instance NATO, that cannot be trusted.	A current general lack of mutual respect and trust partly due to cultural competition and external actors' interventions.	Mutual recognition and trust are linked both to positions in the state system (Abkhazia) and to respect for cultural communities (Transnistria).
Ideational elements of relational peace	States need not be friends for there to be peace but they must approach each other as legitimate entities and adhere to principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention.	The family is broken; ideas about peace based on legitimate coexistence and friendship are important but not realistic at this point.	Abkhazia and Transnistria should be recognized as unique cultural entities and allowed to coexist on a legitimate basis, Abkhazia as a state and Transnistria as a protected community.

Another carrier idea which is particularly recurrent in the Russian literature on conflict resolution in post-Soviet countries (see Blishenko and Solntseva 2014; Kovalchuk 2015) concerns the post-Soviet geopolitical sphere. According to this, the Soviet Union was a peaceful geopolitical entity. With the disintegration of the union, however, came outright conflict and war. This idea is nowhere more apparent than in historian Mikhail Zhirokov's book *Semena raspada* (2012). The title translates as "Scattered Seeds," evocative of a broken family of nations. A recurrent argument is that armed post-Soviet conflicts generally (and even specifically, for example in Abkhazia and Transnistria) have been wrongly labeled interethnic (Zhirokov 2012: 670–671). Rather, Zhirokov says, the collapse of the union simply liberated violent forces and interests, some of which may prove impossible to manage without macro-regional organization, such as the CIS. The author points out that he is not simply rehashing earlier Soviet literature (see Kim et al. 1976) in which peoples and nationalities of the Soviet Union were labeled as siblings. Zhirokov is in effect critical of Soviet imperialism, but nevertheless argues that all post-Soviet peoples are bound together in a special cultural relationship which is also driven by a common interest in security.

The carrier idea of cultural seeds unable to grow together, indeed another metaphor for a broken family of nations bound together by historic experience and geopolitical reality, also precludes the idea that post-Soviet states are truly independent. Rather, their interrelationship is characterized by extended family ties. Most of the surveyed literature seems to echo the title of Zhirokhov's book, even if some ideas might differ concerning particular aspects of what we might term post-Soviet family relations.

Ideas of peace in the international system

We interpret Russian ideas of peace in the international system as strongly linked to the behavioral components of relational peace. In our sources, non-domination translates as state sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity, and the UN is portrayed as a (failing) arena for deliberation and cooperation. However, Russian governmental sources, such as the Ministry of Defense, rarely if ever define the concept of peace. This absence is not unique to Russia if it is compared for example with NATO (NATO 2019). Yet despite this lack of explicit definitions, much can still be garnered from such sources about (military) peacekeeping operations. A formal two-part Russian definition of peace can nevertheless be found in the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*. According to this definition, peace is first of all about "relations between peoples, states and social groups within a country characterized by the absence of war" which also "presupposes not only the

absence of war but also a broad multifaceted cooperation between states in international politics built on partnership between them in economy, politics, culture, and other areas." Secondly, peace can refer to an "agreement between warring parties to end the war and reestablish peaceful conditions" (*Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* 2007: 560).

Looking for examples of how relational elements of peace are used in the Russian sources, we find them joined with either global or macro-regional terms. It is not so much a question of political or social relationships inside Russia, or in areas of ongoing peacekeeping operations, as it is about geopolitics and international relations:

> The sovereignty of one government is interwoven with that of another, and it follows that it must be coordinated in line with international law. […] The principle of territoriality is intimately connected with other fundamental principles of international law, in the first case such as the non-use of force or threats to use force, the permanence of borders, the equality and right to self-governance of nations. (Lasutin 2015: 124–126, our translation)

Regardless of what one thinks about this interpretation of international law, this kernel of thought as it pertains to statehood, national boundaries, and rights is recurrent in the Russian literature. However, Trushin suggests that, whereas there is basically nothing wrong with the idea of the UN as a global forum for peaceful cooperation, the ability of that organization to perform its broad peacekeeping mission has been curtailed by the inability of some major powers to hold back and wait for negotiations before starting a unilateral or multilateral military intervention. Writing in 2012, Trushin points his finger at NATO, exemplifying his argument with failed UN negotiations over the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan only to conclude that over the past thirty years, NATO seems to have become a more functional and important international organization than the UN in resolving conflict and enforcing negative peace (Trushin 2012: 16–41).

In the literature in question, a recurrent idea is that neither the UN nor any other global organization can politically safeguard for states a level playing field that is based on principles of non-domination, deliberation, and cooperation. Listing examples from her study of the UN, Burdyog concludes that in the 2000s different countries and regions in the world are moving further apart politically, economically, and socially and that the typical *mirotvorchestvo* of the UN must be complemented by macro-regional partnerships. In her analysis, she enumerates several shortcomings of the UN system that point in this direction. Some of these shortcomings are: increasing tendencies toward multilateral interference in the internal affairs of states, regional military involvement, relinquishing the UN mandate to specialized forces or governments, expanding the gray area between keeping

peace and enforcing peace, and a lack of political solutions beyond the military phase of interventions. Non-domination, deliberation, and cooperation must therefore be sought in other political arenas, signified by more closely aligned political interests between governments and, above all, some obvious geopolitical affinities. Burdyog believes that the CIS provides one such organizational alternative with a particular view to safeguarding peaceful relations in cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Burdyog 2012: 88–90). Lasutin (2015: 122–139) goes even further, stipulating how less institutionalized bilateral and multilateral agreements on cooperation and reassurance in Asia might provide deliberative mechanisms for such cooperation.

Consequently, we argue here that elements of relational peace are indeed present in the selected sources but subsumed thematically by ideas of relationships between states. In fact, what shines through is the Russian support for the principles of non-intervention, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity. International peace is understood as relational in the sense that ideally, no state should be allowed to dominate others, to use force, coercion, manipulation, or arbitrary power in its pursuit of national interests. The key term here is of course "allowed," which ties back to what earlier research has demonstrated about the Russian wish to preserve Cold War principles, institutions, and interpretations of international law. From a Russian perspective, the UN would be the arena that states would need for deliberation and cooperation if it continued operating as it used to. However, structures and methods that uphold non-domination and provide for deliberation and cooperation are crumbling, and other states and organizations make up new rules as they go. This prompts countries to establish new, regionally based arenas for safeguarding peaceful relations, a move that is potentially very complicated against the backdrop of the *semena raspada* or, as it were, the broken family of national cultures unable to grow together.

Ideas of peace in the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*

The ideas that we have identified express that structures promoting non-domination, deliberation, and cooperation are largely lacking and regional partnerships are seen as more viable arenas for cooperation than the UN. As far as the subjective and ideational elements of relational peace are concerned (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction), we find that they are closely linked with the behavioral elements in our ideational material. Mutual recognition and trust between states hinge upon respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. These very principles, however, are undermined by the UN itself and by other actors. In the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*

there is a general lack of mutual respect and trust; it is seen, by and large, as a broken family. For example, an academic reader published in Moscow (Guseynov 2014) deals with Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Dagestan and how the situations there relate to developments in Georgia. Its overarching research question is how we can understand the recurrent patterns of conflict between nations, subregions, and social groups in the more than twenty years which have passed since the breakup of the Soviet Union. While paying attention to the longer history of imperial and Soviet military activity in the region, including the forced resettlements of some ethnic groups, Guseynov makes the initial observation that the essentially conflictual nature of relationships in the region spills over into the present:

> The Caucasus region was also a theater of Cold War military activity from the 1940s through the 1980s. The enormous conflict potential consequently exploded both in the south (the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh) and in the north (the so-called Chechen wars on the territory of the Russian Federation, also war on Georgian territory leading to the separation from that state of South Ossetia and Abkhazia), and it continues to threaten the inhabitants of the region with its extension through the first decade of the twenty-first century. (Guseynov 2014: 8–9, our translation)

A multitude of analyses and perspectives are supplied by several Russian academics surveyed for this study, ranging from political strategies, collective traumas, and Islamist and other religious movements to migration and diaspora in the region. The authors are bound together in their search for indicators of collective identities in the region, which may or may not provide the conflict-ridden Greater Caucasia with commonalities. The rather bleak common message, however, is that the only truly macro-regional commonality seems to be the experience and political consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union (Guseynov 2014: 17–19).

This conflictual image of the peoples and countries of the Caucasus region is mirrored in how governmental sources define the relational roots of peace. According to the Russian Ministry of Emergencies (2019), peace can be the result of either of the following contexts, or of a combination of both. On the one hand, one of the warring parties in a conflict may emerge victorious because of the other party's exhaustion or the introduction of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. On the other hand, peace may be enforced by outside military actors. According to the ministry, the art of making peace, or *mirotvorcheskyi deyatelnost*, is focused upon the collective actions of states and international organizations which aim to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict by peaceful means (Ministry of Emergencies 2019). As already observed, however, Russian governmental sources are unclear about

the territorial extension of their unilateral choices. The negative definition of peace as resulting from enforcement provides no answers either. The Chief of the General Staff Gennady Gerasimov reported to the Russian Academy of War Sciences on the blurring of boundaries between peaceful and belligerent relations in what, rightly or wrongly, has since been dubbed the "Gerasimov Doctrine" (Gerasimov 2013). This idea is a cornerstone of current Russian thought about the need to preserve peace through non-peaceful means. This blurring of boundaries between peace and war has been expounded upon by Russian observers as creating a demand for new instruments of peacekeeping, not least in the light of terrorism, hybrid warfare, and cyber warfare (Popov and Chamzatov 2016).

In the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*, the interference of the US, NATO, and the European Union (EU) is complicating matters. Although the US and NATO are the primary targets of Russian critique, the EU also figures as a major source of political imbalances and uncertainties. Macro-regions consequently evolve as geopolitical spheres within the confines of larger similar spheres. In other words, geopolitics from the outside spills over to the inside of post-Soviet macro-regions:

> Moscow moves forward on the basis of agreed positions in international affairs within the framework of international organizations. The EU tries to extend the usage of norms it has worked out for itself to Russia, which means that it plays double roles: on the one hand as a continental power and global player, and on the other hand as a source of regional regulation, competing with the regimes established by international organizations. (Kovalchuk 2015: 103, our translation)

According to Kovalchuk, the first decade following the breakup of the Soviet Union taught Russian decision-makers to be wary of different understandings of (international) integration. The Russian view is that integration is "an objective process, which cannot be wholly controlled or steered," which is why:

> Russian leadership applies to different institutional pathways: within the broad framework of the CIS, in some tighter organizations (the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Cooperation) […], it supports official participation in the frozen Union of Belarus and Russia, intermittently contributes with reinforcement to softening the bilateral relations with Moldova and Ukraine, enticing them with the "good neighbors" project. (Kovalchuk 2015: 109, our translation)

With regard to macro-regional relations, nevertheless, Kovalchuk reinforces her argument that there is a lack of unifying ideas among actors within and across Russian boundaries, and argues that what can be seen as "objective" differs widely between regional settings. In some cases (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine), the relative levels of economic development

and dependence upon Russia are key. In others (Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan), it is a question of relative independence. Regardless, Kovalchuk suggests that both present and potential relationships in the *Bolshoy Kavkaz* evolve around multiple and complex patterns of external interests and internal conflicts (Kovalchuk 2015: 108–110).

To conclude, the challenges in establishing structures conducive to the components of relational peace (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction) are spelled out in the sources we analyzed. The usage, however, is clearly guided by carrier ideas and carry-overs from ideas of peace in the international system, as described in the foregoing. External actors keep intervening, according to our sources, and there is an overarching lack of mutual respect and trust in the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*, this particular part of the broken family of post-Soviet states. Macro-regional partnerships, in the form of state-based international organizations, are depicted as one way out of this political conundrum. Another seems to be for Russia to keep advocating complete international recognition of Transnistria and Abkhazia.

Ideas of peace in Transnistria and Abkhazia

To the extent that they deal directly with Transnistria and Abkhazia, our Russian sources regard them as true cultural communities. Ideas of the prerequisites for peace express that the UN has become irrelevant and resolutions have been made more difficult by the interventions of other external actors. There is, as we interpret the Russian view, no behavioral elements of relational peace present since Abkhazia is not recognized as an independent state and Transnistria not acknowledged as a cultural community that needs protection within Moldova. Whereas there can be no doubt of an ideational Russian determination to safeguard the independence of these territories, however, a baseline idea under this theme is also full dependence upon Russia for support. In their academic report on crises and conflicts in the post-Soviet sphere, for example, Blishenko and Solntseva conclude: "Obviously, the optimal position for Russia concerning Transnistria must be that of neutral arbiter, returning to multilateral cooperation with the EU, to the Istanbul declarations of 1999. It appears that this would correspond with Russian interests as well as wider European interests on the whole" (Blishenko and Solntseva 2014: 286, our translation). When it comes to Abkhazia, the analysts believe that the basis for relationships can be expressed in even more straightforward terms:

> In the press release on the results from Russo-Abkhaz high-level talks on October 6, 2011, President D. Medvedev said that the declarative moment of independence and establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and

Abkhazia [...] forms the two-sided international basis for the relationship between Russia and Abkhazia [and] strengthens the authority of Abkhazia as an independent state. (Blishenko and Solntseva 2014: 177, our translation)

The nub of the problem, as well as the reason for Russia's special relationships with Transnistria and Abkhazia, is partly to do with a re-reading of modern history and partly related to the idea that both international and macro-regional relationships are by nature dyadic. Perestroika in the Soviet Union is held up as a precursor to armed conflict in Abkhazia in the 1990s, and the authors refer to how the messy breakup of the Soviet Union and unpreparedness for nationhood in countries like Georgia and Moldova initially led to multilateral political interest, in the case of Abkhazia even leading to military intervention under UN sanction. Over time, up to the present and according to their reading of official UN documents, international negotiations, and governmental declarations, Russia is the only discussion partner that has remained valid in the long term (Blishenko and Solntseva 2014: 142–178, 271–286). In the case of Transnistria, the authors point specifically to uncertainties and unfinished legal affairs in the Soviet system as the root causes of Russian long-term involvement but, by extension, also argue that international interest in solving problems of independence and freedom in Transnistria and Abkhazia has waxed and waned. On the contrary, in Russian thinking about southeast Europe and Greater Caucasia, the idea remains a longstanding pillar (see also Gromyko and Feyodorov 2014: 579–598, 619–637; Igritsky et al. 2015). In the words of another Russian observer:

Through the inception of regionalized thinking about security a new way of definition was rooted, one in which conflicts in the ex-USSR became defined as interethnic. On closer inspection it becomes clear that this is not altogether true. When it comes to regions like Karabakh, South and North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, where the opposing forces were mainly monoethnic, then the idea is more or less applicable. But if one looks at multinational contexts, such as Abkhazia and Transnistria, it doesn't work, and even much less so in the case of Tadzhikistan. (Zhirokov 2012: 671, our translation)

The Russian idea is that both Abkhazia and Transnistria represent historically unique and culturally delimited political entities. The source of territorial uniqueness, then, is defined as thick and successfully managed multiethnic relations in the region which have evolved through modern history. In the Russian literature, the territories are depicted as having withstood even Soviet and earlier Tsarist dominance, in effect preserving internal cultures that are not signified by dyads but by ethnic pluralism. In the case of Transnistria, for example, dyadic relations were never inherent to the

region but were the result of mistakes made as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate:

> The region of Transnistria was the most developed part of the Moldovan SSR and populated by approximately equal proportions of Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans. [...] Particular to Moldova is the real existence of two languages, Russian and Moldovan. Bilingualism emerged in these parts already toward the end of the seventeenth century [...] Many Moldovans also considered Russian to be their native language. (Blishenko and Solntseva 2014: 271, our translation).

Nationalism inspired by the wish of some social groups in the Moldovan SSR to integrate with Romania was, according to this literature, what brought negative dyadic thinking and eventually war to an essentially multiethnic territory. Russia's self-proclaimed role as a neutral arbiter in Transnistria, as described in the preceding section of this chapter, is thus based on the idea that Russia continually protects culturally thick, historically evolving multiethnic relations in that region:

> The Abkhaz coastline along the Black Sea was known in practically all of the Soviet Union as a region for recreation, "the golden beach." Therefore, it is no surprise that the Georgia–Abkhazia war of 1992–1993 became one of the most gruesome (and at the same time most forgotten) of all the conflicts in the post-Soviet sphere. (Zhirokhov 2016: 3, our translation)

Very similar to the above reasoning on Transnistria, the Russian idea is that Abkhazia used to be a region which enjoyed peaceful multiethnic relations. Similarly, dyadic nationalist sentiments erupting in conjunction with the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union were picked up on and fueled by the interests of an external power. In the case of Abkhazia, however, the Russian literature pins the blame on the burgeoning Georgian nation and its geopolitical interests as different from the case of Transnistria in relation to Romania. The long history of cohabitation between the Abkhaz people proper and other nationalities in the region is nevertheless an important aspect of Russian ideas in this case (Zhirokhov 2016: 20–23).

Nevertheless, Russian ideas about the prerequisites for a peaceful restoration of Abkhazia have changed over time. The change is due less to how actors and relationships within Abkhazia have evolved since the 1990s and more to how the relative interest in peaceful relations between Georgia and Abkhazia can be gauged (Blishenko and Solntseva 2014: 142–178; Zhirokhov 2016: 163–194). Despite the perhaps idealized Russian historical imagery that depicted Abkhazia as a naturalized multiethnic context, the Abkhaz struggle for independence from Georgia was heavily criticized by Russia during the 1990s and well into the first decade of the 2000s. This is partly explained in the Russian literature by Georgia's political vacillation between

security-political structures in the post-Soviet sphere, such as the CIS, and Western structures such as NATO that still remained in the 1990s. Another factor is the recalcitrance toward Russian influence of the early presidents of the young Georgian republic, while the Russian leadership still had faith in the informal (former Soviet) leadership networks centered on Moscow. Originally, Russia was an outspoken opponent to Abkhaz separatism and a proponent both of international intervention in the conflict and of finding a political solution for Georgia along federalist political lines. Gradually, as the relationship between Georgia and Russia soured in the early 2000s, and particularly after Georgia applied for NATO membership, the Russian idea about Abkhazia manifestly changed:

> But it is interesting to note that as the Abkhaz–Georgian conflict started to grow, the United States showed little interest in how it could be regulated, regardless of the many initiatives to form a closer relationship with Washington on the part of Eduard Shevarnadze. From the viewpoint of Abkhazia's geo-strategic interest for Russia, there is a huge interest: the republic is located directly on the Black Sea, it has good agricultural lands and coal reserves, and many popular holiday resorts are located on its territory. (Zhirokov 2016: 181, our translation)

Despite the similarities between Russian ideas about Transnistria and Abkhazia as culturally unique and, in relational terms, thick entities, there is a more blatant ideational turn toward strategic thinking in the latter case.

To the extent that peacekeeping operations can be defined as attempts to establish relational peace, Russian governmental and expounding sources are relevant here. The Russian Federation National Security Strategy (2015) and the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2016) both stipulate that Russian peacekeeping should be initiated and supported first and foremost under UN or other multilateral umbrellas. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine (2014), however, stipulates that peacekeeping is a matter for the armed forces, whether in peacetime or wartime. The military doctrine also skews its ideas to be concerned above all with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries and territories related to the former Soviet Union. Peacetime military units are earmarked and budgeted for activities such as the simple matter of peacetime military planning, not least as part of the CSTO Rapid Deployment Forces, which may act to restore peace, eliminate threat, or suppress aggression on the basis of either a UN or other mandate. There are no signs of geopolitical change in governmental or expounding sources with regard to Russia's self-image as a guarantor of peace in the post-Soviet or CSTO spheres. At the CSTO summit meeting in Bishkek in November 2019, Russian president Vladimir Putin rather stressed the need for all participating countries to increase capabilities with regard to peacekeeping (RIA Novosti 2019).

In the relational approach (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction), the question of legitimate coexistence (and friendship) has to do with the acceptance of and association with counterparts. On the one hand, it could be argued that Russian ideas of peace and peacekeeping in Abkhazia and Transnistria involve many potential counterparts – Georgia, Moldova, the EU, and the US for instance – and that the relationship to each of these (or those between Abkhazia and Georgia and Transnistria and Moldova as seen from a Russian vantage point) could be assessed. On the other hand, it could also be argued that from the Russian perspective, the carrier idea of a broken family subsumes the potential of relational peace, particularly when supported by observations of the armed conflicts that erupted in tandem with the fall of the Soviet Union. Under this theme, the idea becomes that historically unique cultural communities which enjoyed relative autonomy within the union ideally should continue to do so within the boundaries of newly established states. When this does not happen, the idea of the communities' legitimate right to coexist, either as separate states (Abkhazia) or as protected communities within states (Transnistria), becomes the ideational path for Russia and one that (conveniently enough) fits Russian geopolitical interests.

Conclusion

Applying ideational analysis to a variety of open Russian sources, the relational approach has enabled us to describe an intricate web of thought on peace in the post-Soviet sphere. Such an ideational analysis is important, not only for us to understand Russia's positioning on the world stage in relation to the cases discussed here, but also perhaps in relation to recent events in Ukraine or Nagorno-Karabach, for instance. Relationships and their qualities are important ingredients in Russian ideas of peace as expressed in our sources; these ingredients are used but not explicitly discussed as elements of a relational peace per se. In our ideational analysis, we throw the analytical net across a wide variety of public Russian sources, looking for correspondence with the relational peace framework. We find, for example, that war and peace are seen as cyclically relational. There is no end state, no linear view of history; the human condition is rather one of perpetual competition and repetition. War and violence tend to be the outcome of competition between states, and therefore there must be rules that everyone abides by. The rules are pivotal when it comes to the terms on which states engage with each other. From the Russian standpoint, when rules are not adhered to, peace is at risk and Russia will not stand idly by and allow others to break the rules as they see fit. However, as our analysis has demonstrated (see Table

1.2), the thresholds for when rules are to be considered broken are deeply subjective and framed by original notions of structures, institutions, and agreements. The dialectic nature of Russian interpretations, however, turned out in our analysis not to be a typically Western notion of Russian thought. Rather, it comes across as what we refer to in this chapter as a *carrier idea*, one that pervades the Russian sources analyzed here. We can consider this alongside the idea that relational components of peace, at least in Russian sources referred to, should be understood as being embedded in institutional structures (institutions and agreements) that prescribe and enforce certain behaviors, attitudes, and ideas. Such an understanding produces a highly flexible political platform for the achievement of subjective peace. We can but refer to how one of our Russian sources spells this out: "The element of conservative values, clearly declared as principles for foreign policy by the Russian president at the beginning of his new term, has a chance to fill the ideational vacuum pertaining to the project of integration in Central Asia" (Kovalchuk 2015: 105, our translation).

With regard to carrier ideas, we interpret these as flowing from a relational view of war and peace. We also interpret ideas of peace in the international system as strongly linked to the behavioral components of relational peace. Non-domination translates as state sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity. Our sources express the idea that the world today is largely lacking in structures promoting non-domination, deliberation, and cooperation. For this reason, regional partnerships are seen as more viable arenas for cooperation than the UN, particularly given those Russian carrier ideas which have been analyzed and described in this chapter.

As regards behavioral elements – non-domination, cooperation, and deliberation – we find that they figure prominently in our sources. From a Russian perspective, however, non-domination translates as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. Again, the idea is that states are key actors on the international scene; they act as cultural agents and protect the interests of their peoples. From a Russian point of view, it seems that traditional forms of UN peacekeeping are being replaced by more far-reaching and complicated missions, some of which have taken place without Security Council authorization. The introduction of new international norms, such as the *responsibility to protect*, means that the UN must increasingly be replaced by macro-regional arrangements. Thus, the behavioral components or relational peace are better served by the CIS and similar, macro-regional organizations. With regard to the conflicts in Transnistria and Abkhazia and their resolutions on the ground, we find an ideational caveat. Although both territories are discussed in our sources as original cultural entities, historically approximating the right blend of what would be the behavioral, subjective, and ideational elements of relational peace, these are subsumed

by at least one carrier idea. The idea of post-Soviet territories as parts of a broken family of nations takes precedence in our sources, and the ideational effect is regret concerning how Abkhazia is not internationally recognized as an independent state on the one hand, and how Transnistria needs protection within Moldova on the other.

As for the subjective elements of relational peace, mutual recognition, and trust, we interpret some of the ideas that concern macro-regional geopolitical complexes, involving the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*, in those terms. Again, the carrier idea of the broken family serves as a general frame of reference. Peace, understood as relationships between family members, was effectively destroyed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ties were severed to the extent that some sources are pessimistic about the prospects for family reunification, or even re-establishment of some, if not all, ties.

As far as the subjective and ideational components of relational peace are concerned, we find prominent ideational linkage with the behavioral ones. Mutual recognition and trust between states hinge upon respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. These very principles, however, according to our sources, are undermined by the UN itself and by other international actors. To illustrate, on the theme of the *Bolshoy Kavkaz*, we find our sources talking not only about a general lack of mutual respect and trust on the ground but also about a significant linkage with international interference and how the region is tied to the broken post-Soviet family of nations. Therefore, as mentioned above, peace, relational or otherwise, hinges upon, for example, Abkhazia being recognized as a unique cultural entity and allowed to coexist on a legitimate basis with other countries.

As regards the ideational components of relational peace, these might seem unnecessary given the overall methodology of this chapter. We have, nevertheless, searched for ideas expressing legitimate coexistence and friendship. In effect, these come out as prominent ideational elements of relational peace in the Russian sources studied here. In relation to Abkhazia and Transnistria, we find that our Russian sources make the idea of legitimate coexistence a prerequisite for durable peace. Abkhazia and Transnistria should, from a Russian standpoint, be recognized as unique cultural communities, either through statehood or through protection by special international status. There is, however, no clear roadmap or signposting in our sources with regard to how these elements of relational peace might be achieved.

Having engaged with openly available Russian-language sources from a methodological standpoint of ideational analysis, we cannot claim knowledge about the ideas of peace among ordinary Russians. Rather, our approach paints a picture of the ideas those citizens are confronted with as they

consume Russian governmental documents, topical books, academic reports, or popular renderings in their own language. There is an intricate web of ideas flowing from what we have referred to in this chapter as carrier ideas in the Russian context. In post-Soviet studies this is one important piece of the puzzle, and we have especially looked for ideas pertaining to cases where peacekeeping and peacebuilding are prominent in the post-Soviet sphere. Another significant piece of the puzzle is what people make of these ideas on the ground, but this falls outside our approach here. Coming full circle in this chapter, we are reminded of another Russian expression related to peace, one which does not figure in such public sources as analyzed here but which might still inspire study of Russian sources closer to the ground: *pokoy*. It is commonly used in the Russian vernacular and is interpreted by the authors of this chapter as an even stronger connotation of negative peace, which is simply to be left well alone.

Note

1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional intergovernmental organization in Eastern Europe and Asia, formed following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today it has nine member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

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2

Relational peace among elites in Cambodia? Domination, distrust, and dependency

Johanna Söderström

After a war, elites usually continue to be active, and do not disappear. Historically, attempts to remove the war elites in different contexts have often failed despite concerted efforts and large-scale societal transformation (see e.g. Herz 1948; Edinger 1960; Mayzel 1979; Remy 2002). Scholars have noted a similar recycling of elites in current-day peacebuilding contexts, and have also pointed to the difficulties of disentangling military elites from political elites (Käihkö 2012: 191; Utas 2013; Themnér 2017). The continuation of war elites often results in a serious tradeoff between the promotion of peace and democracy (Söderström 2015; see also Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Overall, continuity of elites tends to be the defining trait despite the upheaval of war and peace agreements. The question, then, is how the legacy of these elites has played out over the years. Among cases where the armed conflict, and particularly a civil war, ended many years ago, Cambodia is a case where the degree of elite continuity is extreme. There, following the first elections, some of the peace signatories formed a coalition government. One of these peace signatories, Hun Sen, is still in government and thus has served as prime minister since 1985.[1]

Cambodia's labeling as a hybrid peace case (Richmond and Franks 2007; Öjendal and Ou 2013; Öjendal and Ou 2015) also requires more work in order for us to attempt to decipher what kind and degree of peace is actually in question. While hybridity and hybrid peace are much discussed concepts, they more often focus on the process behind peace, in terms of the interventions and peacebuilding attempts and resulting frictions (see e.g. Mac Ginty 2010; Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo 2018), and thus the concept is limited in terms of how far it helps us disentangle the resultant peace itself. More recent work has categorized Cambodia as a *negative* hybrid peace, in particular with respect to its governance and judicial institutions (Simangan 2018). While Simangan's work is an important step forward, hybrid peace discussions remain focused on the friction and interaction between the interveners and local actors. This chapter suggests that research needs to focus more on the

actors involved in the main conflict, and, in addition, to use tools that help us understand the peace in more detail, something which the relational peace framework can help with. The current categorization of Cambodia as a hybrid peace thus leaves the analysis lacking in details as to the state of affairs in Cambodia, and the long-term presence of one of the peace signatories in government makes the case particularly relevant from a relational peace perspective.

Cambodia is undoubtedly a case with significant gray areas related to the peace that has developed. Cambodia was under Khmer Rouge rule between 1975 and 1979, and around 1.5 to 3 million people died in this period as a result. Cambodia was plagued by both intrastate and interstate war. In 1979 a new communist government was installed following Vietnamese invasion and support, and Pol Pot (of the Khmer Rouge) was ousted. This was followed by a civil war, with Cold War involvement, where the communist regime was challenged by the newly formed Funcinpec (alliance between the Khmer Rouge, King Norodom Sihanouk, and other opposition groups). From 1979 to 1991 the country was ruled by the People's Republic of Kampuchea, with the support of Vietnam among others, although the Khmer Rouge controlled much of the country. On October 23, 1991, a peace agreement was signed following negotiations which involved the five permanent members of the Security Council, and once external support for the peace was present this pushed all internal parties toward peace. Brown notes that the peace agreement:

> was an accord brokered by outside powers and accepted only with deep reservations by the Cambodian parties themselves. Its success depended upon the willingness of the parties to put aside their antagonisms and cooperate across the board in a manner totally foreign to the Cambodian experience. Sihanouk and Hun Sen were the linchpins; were either to be removed, the agreement would at once be in peril. (Brown 1992: 95)

The peace accord was expected to be a fragile one, and heavily dependent on the abilities and desire of the individual signatories to keep the peace. A two-year UN mission followed the agreement, and then elections were held in 1993. The first government was a coalition between the royal Funcinpec party (with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the son of Sihanouk, as the party leader) and the Cambodian People's Party (with Hun Sen as party leader). At the same time Sihanouk was reinstated as king of Cambodia in 1993. The coalition (known as the Royal Cambodian Government) did not last, however, as Hun Sen overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in 1997 in a coup. Moreover, the war did not even end with the peace agreement, as the Khmer Rouge and Funcinpec continued their rebellion until

1999. In 1998, Hun Sen won the elections, and he has been in power ever since. While political violence has decreased since the 1990s, Hun Sen has strengthened his power and continually weakened the opposition over the years (Brown 1992; Barma 2012: 281; Peou 2012; Poluda et al. 2012: 92; for more on power-sharing and political developments in Cambodia, see Leifer 1992; Roberts 2002; Than 2004). Despite the heavy intervention, the merely superficial transformation in Cambodia is sometimes depicted as involving strategic security combined with unaccountability, patronage, corruption, and limited democratization (Richmond and Franks 2007: 45–46).

The role of the elite in Cambodia cannot be overestimated, and Peou notes that "the political elites have since the early 1990s shown little interest in building effective institutions" and that "members of the political and military elites have often pursued their interests by relying on illegal, secretive or even coercive means" (Peou 2012: 200). Barma takes the argument further, claiming that the power-sharing envisaged in the peace agreement failed to produce "true reconciliation among the factions" and that in fact the elites have expanded their patronage and abuse of the state apparatus (Barma 2012: 282; see also Roberts 2002). Thus, paying attention to how these elite actors relate to one another is key to understanding this halted peace process. Cambodia is often talked about in hybrid terms, and Öjendal and Ou note that elites on the two sides (both the dominant party with Hun Sen and the opposition) have resisted the liberal peace project, while also showing an interest in "find[ing] ways for more indigenous power-induced, negotiation-based, consensus politics to emerge" and limiting the amount of violence used (2013: 374). Given this resistance to liberal peace and the centrality of the elite, this chapter delves deeper into the internal elite relations in Cambodia.

Yet while the recent wave of civil wars and ensuing peace have also faced the challenge of an old elite surviving from the war, this group has attracted little attention from peace scholars. The role of post-war elites in protecting or undercutting the peace after the end of a war is central, as these actors hold a disproportionate amount of power. Signatories to peace agreements can take on many different roles in the peace and the ensuing political landscape. The question looms large of what impact the inclusion of these actors has on the development of peace; how do signatories continue to envision peace as guardians of the peace agreement? Having signed the peace agreement, how do they relate to their fellow peace signatories?

Typically, those who sign peace agreements represent the top of the elite at the moment of the peace agreement. Regardless of whether it was military or political to begin with, what role this post-war elite takes on during

peace may matter a great deal. There are many reasons to expect post-war elites from the 1990s – the peace signatories – to continue to be active in society in the post-war phase; the question is in what capacity, and how they serve or undermine peace. It matters how the elites position themselves, not least in terms of how they shape public opinion, and because they may act to promote certain political developments. Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez in particular demonstrate the importance of elites as shapers of public opinion on peace (2017: 156, 164; see also Paffenholz et al. 2017: 53–57). I would argue that this is perhaps even more true in relation to peace signatories, as the weight of those who have signed a peace will be particularly salient in how that peace is reinterpreted or sustained. This chapter focuses on the signatories of the agreements and how they persist in describing their relationships with their counterparts in the peace agreements. Paying attention to how peace is conceived and how this particular group talks about the relationship with the former enemy should deepen our understanding of the kind of peace that has developed over extended periods of time, while studying these elite relations should enable us to pinpoint their long-term involvement in politics (i.e., making conflict or making peace).

The next section of the chapter discusses which specific actors were scrutinized and why, how newspaper article searches were carried out, how the relational peace framework has been operationalized in this case study, and the limitations of these decisions. The elite's relationship with its former enemy of course can be expressed in many different forums; however, the impression made in the mass media is particularly important given the interest in how elite expressions shape larger societal ideas of peace, but also because this may shape deliberation and future behavior (Crawford 2004: 23). The discussion of media is followed by a section that analyzes the relations between the former enemies in Cambodia, paying particular attention to how behavioral interaction, subjective attitudes, and ideas of these relationships have developed over time in order to depict the practices of relational peace in the case of Cambodia.

This chapter seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of how peace develops in the long run; in particular the text demonstrates some key turning points and describes whether and how the elite relations conform to relational peace. This chapter examines a range of central actors involved in the peace process and their subsequent political life journeys over twenty-six years in Cambodia. Overall, this approach to examining the post-war relations of elite actors shows how the relationship is colored by ways of interacting, and ways of thinking about the other and the relationship, which do not conform to relational peace, but which rather underscore domination, distrust, and ideas of dependency. Many years after the signing of the peace agreement, there are still reasons for concern. The analysis also demonstrates shifts in

these elite relations over time, and highlights points in time where there were possibilities for larger transformations.

Peace signatories and newspaper articles

The Paris Peace Accords were settled on October 23, 1991, by four factions. The first was the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK, also called the State of Cambodia or SOC), which evolved into the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in the early 1990s; Hun Sen signed the peace agreement as its representative. Second was the Khmer Rouge, where Khieu Samphan was the leader after Pol Pot from 1985 to 1998, and starting in 2007 was tried for genocide and crimes against humanity. Third and fourth, there were two other armed resistance groups: the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Funcinpec), founded by Norodom Sihanouk and his son Norodom Ranariddh, who also became president of the group; and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), founded by Son Sann. The three resistance groups Khmer Rouge, Funcinpec, and KPNLF together formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which had acted as a government in exile.

For the current chapter, all the relevant peace agreements signed during the 1990s in Cambodia were scrutinized for names of the signatories, and local and international representatives were identified. For each of the local signatories, short political biographies were collected, and on the basis of these, the individuals who took up any kind of political career after the last peace agreement were included in the newspaper search. The following individuals were identified as peace signatories for Cambodia: Norodom Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, Hun Sen, Son Sann,[2] and Norodom Ranariddh. These were the non-international representatives who signed the six documents making up the peace agreement (the first was signed in August 1990, and the final accord was signed on November 20, 1991). The initial search drew on all sources available in the Factiva database (this database covers local and international daily newspapers, magazines, newswires, and TV and radio podcasts among other sources from 200 countries) starting from the date of the final peace agreement (November 20, 1991), and located any English-language articles that mentioned the name of any one of these individuals and the term "peace." This first search resulted in over 13,000 hits, and so a narrower approach had to be taken. As there was one local newspaper published in English (*Phnom Penh Post*), the search was focused on this, as it also is a better reflection of the kind of representations which the Cambodian population as a whole was exposed to even if language

biases cannot be ruled out.[3] In May 2018, the paper was purchased by individuals who were thought to have government leanings, and some of the newspaper's journalists quit as a result, so for this reason the search was limited to the end of April 2018, with a start date of July 1992 when the newspaper first began circulation.

The number of hits per se is not the issue here, but rather the overall progression of the representation of the relationship between the peace signatories. Even so, the number of hits was very extensive, and thus it was also possible to introduce an additional limitation, namely, that at least two of the peace signatories should be mentioned by name in each article. Given the interest in dyads, this made sense. Hun Sen represented the government of Cambodia, whereas the other five were all in clear opposition to the government and also, to varying degrees, to each other; thus Hun Sen would have to be named in each article together with any of the other names. Hence, this search focused on the main cleavage. Also, since Hun Sen has been in government since before the peace agreement, it also makes sense to analyze how he in particular relates to the other peace signatories. Ultimately, the most prominent actors in the media are also those who are active in politics, unless certain ones are explicitly censored. Using the criteria regarding peace signatories mentioned, the search produced 592 newspaper articles, which were then coded in Atlas.TI using the relational framework. These articles do not portray the true attitudes and feelings of the actors involved, but rather the ways in which their attitudes and positions are represented in the media and hence to the public.

The coding of the newspaper articles took as its starting point the relational peace definition set out by Söderström et al:

> A peaceful relation entails behavioral interaction that can be characterized as deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation between the actors in the dyad; the actors involved recognize and trust each other and believe that the relationship is either one between legitimate fellows or between friends. (Söderström et al. 2021: 496; see also Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction)

In particular, this framework stresses the importance of paying attention to behavioral interaction, subjective attitudes toward the other, and the idea of the relationship as it is expressed by the parties involved. Together these three components make up a relationship, and if we are to understand a relationship we need to study all three components over time. In addition, Söderström et al. suggest that certain types of behavior, attitudes, and ideas signal that the relationship is one of peace. In the next section I will therefore comment on each in turn, and clarify how each component is both theoretically defined and dealt with in this particular study.

In analyzing the newspaper articles, particular attention was paid to expressions that signal action toward or with the other, verbs where the signatory is the actor, as a way to identify *behavioral interaction*, either as expressed directly by the signatory or as described by the reporter. The relational peace framework highlights three types of behavioral interaction that denote peace, namely deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation. As a result, I paid attention to the degree to which there is an open exchange of views between the actors (with no expectation of consensus), how power is exerted in the relationship, and the degree of cooperation (working or acting together rather than hostile interaction). Similarly, when coding the newspaper articles, attention was paid to the signatory's attitudes toward the other (again expressed directly or described by the reporter). Here two specific types of attitude toward the other are deemed particularly relevant for relational peace, namely recognition and trust (Söderström et al. 2021: 489–494).

Finally, in reading the newspaper articles, depictions of the relationship as a whole were also coded in order to capture the signatories' own *idea of the relationship*. Here, however, it was more important to limit the search to direct attributions by the signatories themselves, rather than descriptions by the reporter. How do the signatories term the relationship, and how do they name the role of the other – a political partner, opponent, enemy, etc.? The relational peace framework suggests that two ways of formulating the idea of the relationship are particularly consistent with relational peace, namely where the relationship is thought of as a friendship, and where it is seen as a relationship where the actors involved have a legitimate coexistence, each seeing the other as a fellow (Söderström et al. 2021: 494–496; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction).

In going through the material, many different indications of behavioral interaction, subjective attitudes, and ideas of the relationship were recorded and analyzed, not just those that are identified with relational peace, in order to get a sense of how the relationship with the other as a whole has developed over time. These additional elements will be addressed where appropriate below.

Elite relations in Cambodia

In this section, the elite relations between the Cambodian peace signatories are scrutinized with respect to the relational peace framework, taking each component in turn. Starting with behavioral interaction, the text below maps out how the elites depict their interactions with each other over time. First, however, a brief note on the general development of politics in Cambodia

over this time period is necessary. The first election in Cambodia was held in 1993, with Funcinpec receiving 45 percent and the CPP 38 percent, resulting in Hun Sen and Ranariddh becoming second and first prime ministers respectively. Hun Sen and the CPP managed to coerce Ranariddh into this power-sharing arrangement via claims of electoral fraud (Roberts 2002: 104; see also Ponniah 2018). In 1997 Hun Sen seized power in a coup, forcing Ranariddh to step down. In 2003, the CPP's support had increased, but a new deal was made with Funcinpec in 2004. Ranariddh was not the leader of Funcinpec in the 2008 and 2013 elections, but returned as leader of the party for the election in 2018; however, the party only received 6 percent of the votes. While the data collected for this chapter stop in April 2018, the CPP and Hun Sen received all seats in the parliament in July, in an election generally considered as flawed (BBC News 2018b). Indeed, it is the relationship between Hun Sen and Ranariddh which dominates the bulk of the data over this time period.

Behavioral interaction

Behavioral interaction between the different dyads was the most frequently encountered of the three types of components in the data, as behavior is more easily reported in the media than expressions of attitudes and ideas of the relationship by the actors. In this section, the behavioral interaction is discussed chronologically. Broadly speaking, the dyad of Hun Sen and Ranariddh is most prevalent in the data.

During 1993, accusations, critiques, and statements of no cooperation were not uncommon in the *Phnom Penh Post*. In relation to the Khmer Rouge the antagonistic behavior was even more pronounced, for instance with Hun Sen encouraging indictment: "State of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen called for nominal Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan to be tried for genocide" (April 9, 1993).[4] In addition the Khmer Rouge is accused of not complying with the peace agreement. The lack of deliberation between the actors was also followed by hints that the parties were preparing for violence. Toward the end of 1993, there are some indications of attempts at reconciliation and at least having talks with the Khmer Rouge, and potentially ceasing to fight each other. The more positive examples of behavioral interaction during 1993 were particularly tied to Ranariddh and Hun Sen, and were largely seen in statements of cooperation, sharing power, and sometimes even consensus-creation. This was, of course, tied to their coalition government:

> The Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC) has begun functioning with two co-presidents, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, who were once bitter enemies. They have now, at least for the present time,

worked out their differences and agreed to bury the hatchet and sit at the
same table. (July 16, 1993.a)

Sihanouk and Hun Sen also show evidence of constructive behavioral
interaction, but more in the sense of meeting each other and giving expressions
of support.

During 1994 there are statements indicative of failed attempts at delibera-
tion, and even indications that Hun Sen was losing interest in negotiating
with the Khmer Rouge. The behavioral interaction between Ranariddh and
Hun Sen largely consists of meeting, agreeing, doing things, and saying
things together. Together they also express critique against the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge on the other hand refers to continued use of violence in
order to convince its opponents: "So unfortunately we are obliged to push
more on the battlefield to convince them they will not get anything more
by military means" (May 20, 1994.a). Sihanouk's behavioral interaction
with Hun Sen, on the other hand, is more concerned with expressing a
desire for Hun Sen's support, although it also hints at domination, as Sihanouk
does not seem to be free to act without the other:

> I will accept to return to power, but I need also Hun Sen's support. If he does
> not support me it is useless for me to go back to Cambodia because I do not
> want to shed blood to fight a secession led by Hun Sen [...] I need Hun Sen.
> I need his support. I need the approval of his party. I cannot return to power
> to go back to Cambodia unless I have the assurance that Hun Sen and his
> party will join me in my government. (June 17, 1994.a)

Toward the end of the year Sihanouk expresses the fact that he is dominated
by Hun Sen, and also that he will not interfere or dominate in turn: "I will
no longer intervene in their affairs" (December 30, 1994.b).

During 1995 the indications of behavioral interaction within the dyads
are largely positive and constructive, with Hun Sen and Ranariddh cooperating
together, working together, and often speaking together. Sihanouk is open
to cooperation with all others, including the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk and
Hun Sen's behavioral interaction is more concerned with degrees of domina-
tion. For instance, toward the end of 1995, the following suggests that
Sihanouk's freedom to act is limited by Hun Sen's power:

> The King of Cambodia, His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk Varman, bowed to
> this reality, gave Caesar what is Caesar's, and, in order to save his half-brother
> from the prison life or death, asked Hun Sen to allow Sirivudh to go into
> exile in France. Hun Sen agreed and Sirivudh departed on 21 December.
> (December 29, 1995.b)

During 1996, the behavioral interaction depicted begins in constructive
and cooperative terms. Hun Sen's and Ranariddh's interaction is mainly

portrayed by references to cooperation, joint statements, deliberation, and negotiations. Yet these statements come as a result of some disagreement, particularly because it seems as if Ranariddh is unhappy with the degree of power-sharing between himself and Hun Sen: "The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) is threatening to refuse any more power-sharing bids by Funcinpec, after Prince Norodom Ranariddh demanded greater equality between the government partners" (April 5, 1996). Hun Sen in turn asks for apologies from Ranariddh. Hun Sen even "publicly threatened to use force against 'unconstitutional' enemies and privately claimed Funcinpec was plotting against him" (May 3, 1996.b). The tension in their behavioral interaction becomes quite clear this year (see also Roberts 2002: 110). Ranariddh in turn answers by threatening to stop their cooperation and deliberation, and expressing a desire for more non-domination from Hun Sen. Hun Sen and Ranariddh, however, end up cooperating and working together to deal with the Khmer Rouge for the purpose of national unity. They openly recognize that, while they disagree on many things, they have some shared goals and thus enter into negotiations. Hence at this time the two seem to be trying to discuss and solve problems together. This cooperation seems to be largely motivated by their attempt to deal with the Khmer Rouge, and indeed speaking out against the Khmer. Ranariddh describes this cooperation as follows: "since I met with Samdech Hun Sen to deal with this question, we [are] working with each other quite well" (September 20, 1996.b). Yet Ranariddh seems to continue to be frustrated with their relationship, and with what could possibly be termed domination on the side of Hun Sen, and so he demands greater equality in their relationship: "Ranariddh hits out at Funcinpec's lack of equal power with the CPP. The demands are not well-received by the CPP and Hun Sen" (December 27, 1996.b). Hun Sen seems to want to continue working together to deal with the Ieng Sary rebels (part of the Khmer Rouge), recognizing that Ranariddh has been unhappy with their interaction. Hun Sen's expressions of behavior toward Ieng Sary include willingness to use force, refusal to negotiate, and refusal to interact: "Hun Sen said the government did not want further negotiations with the breakaway group […]. The government was not concerned with what Sary wanted, but would concentrate on accepting rank-and-file soldiers who wanted to defect, Hun Sen said" (October 4, 1996.c). Sihanouk and Hun Sen's interaction is more limited; often Sihanouk expresses a willingness to cooperate and sign requests from Hun Sen, and notes that he will not act against Hun Sen: "We are not forming and we will never form a group of anti-Hun Sen or anti-CPP 'plotters'" (December 27, 1996.a). Hun Sen in turn seems to be more threatening in his behavior toward Sihanouk.

In 1997, relations deteriorate further. During July the tension leads to violent confrontations (resulting in casualties) between the CPP and Funcinpec,

and Ranariddh is forced to flee the country and leave power (for more on the developments leading up to this, see Roberts 2002). The July coup is in part facilitated by concerns about access to positions of influence for lower echelons within government, and fragmentation within Funcinpec. This is visible in the behavioral interaction between Hun Sen and Ranariddh as well. There are still some expressions of cooperation, and examples of occasions where they work together, particularly when recounting the interactions over past years. But as seen here, the moment of more positive interaction is just that, a mere moment: "After months of threats and anger, the co-Prime Ministers last week embraced each other for the cameras in a reconciliation which lasted less than 24 hours" (May 16, 1997.d). This public embrace and show of affection was quickly followed by accusations and blame between the two. There followed threats and encouragement of the public to not vote for the other (particularly by Ranariddh), as well as expressions of domination (particularly by Hun Sen). Both actors refuse to negotiate and deliberate, and Ranariddh even expressed threats of violence against Hun Sen: "My priority is diplomatic and political struggle, but I have clearly warned the US if you do not help me put pressure on Hun Sen you will have civil war, a bloody civil war, and you cannot avoid having the participation of the Khmer Rouge" (August 15, 1997.h). Hun Sen in turn accuses Ranariddh of treason and wants him to be prosecuted, while Ranariddh at the end of 1997 seems to be open for new negotiations:

> But the Prince did not completely shut the door opened by Hun Sen. […]
> Ranariddh said he was ready to renounce all claims to the premiership, if the
> Hun Sen government would drop the charges against him and allow him to
> run in the 1998 elections. "I would be willing, even against the will of the
> people, and against legality [and] legitimacy, to compromise," he said. "I'm
> not going to claim my place as First Prime Minister, but the bottom line should
> be the dropping of the charges." (November 21, 1997.c)

During that year the interaction between Sihanouk and Hun Sen continues to be focused on meetings, negotiations, and domination of Sihanouk by Hun Sen. In contrast, Hun Sen and Khieu Samphan's interaction is characterized by warnings, threats, and expressions of blame. For instance, it was reported that the "Second Prime Minister Hun Sen […] warned Khieu Samphan that he would be 'hacked' with knives if he came back to Phnom Penh," even if Hun Sen was more open to issuing pardons later on (June 13, 1997.a).

During 1998 the interaction between Hun Sen and Ranariddh continues to be depicted in rather antagonistic terms, deteriorating further, with both actors accusing the other of inappropriate behavior and of interfering with the other. Hun Sen justifies his use of coercive means as a way to stop a

coup d'état by Ranariddh. Ranariddh in turn claims that he is willing to stop the violence if Hun Sen does the same, and Ranariddh expresses a refusal to be dominated by Hun Sen and a greater openness toward CPP in contrast with Hun Sen:

> If we don't get two-thirds, we will cooperate with the CPP, not with Hun Sen. If the CPP takes two-thirds of the seats, we will be the opposition. A fourth option is a coalition government. I will never serve under Hun Sen but my party members will be free to do so. The fifth option, if we are not allowed to be the opposition, is resistance. (February 27, 1998.a)

Other statements by Ranariddh display a similar position where Ranariddh believes cooperation is impossible and refuses to be dominated by Hun Sen, such as "Ranariddh, for his part, has told that Post [the newspaper] that he 'will never serve under Hun Sen' in the future" (February 27, 1998.b) and "Prince Ranariddh told me that 'If I am alive, it must mean Hun Sen is dead. If Hun Sen is alive, then Ranariddh is dead'" (March 27, 1998). These statements clearly demonstrate how the two are in opposition to each other and show the antagonism embedded in the relationship, yet by March, Ranariddh had returned to the country. After the July elections, where the CPP won over Funcinpec, Ranariddh has changed his position, and instead of calling for Hun Sen's resignation, he calls for more negotiations and talks: "We have to talk. We still have a long, long, long way to go. We have to talk step by step. Please contribute to facilitate the solution and not create any difficulties" (September 18, 1998.b). During 1998, Ranariddh and Khieu Samphan continue to negotiate and cooperate, whereas these interactions are condemned by Hun Sen, who calls these negotiations illegal January 2, 1998.a). Similarly, the relationship between Sihanouk and Hun Sen continues to be characterized by domination by Hun Sen and submission by Sihanouk (Sihanouk abdicated as king and head of state in 2004, and died in 2012).

From 1999 onward, the number of indications of behavioral interaction reported in the media clearly decreases, and from 2000 onward, this decrease reflects the change in political circumstances in the country at this point in time. Funcinpec's role had decreased, and Ranariddh made a political comeback only in 2015. CPP won the elections of 2003, but it did not get a two-thirds majority, which meant that it was unable to form a government on its own. As a result, forming a government became particularly difficult, with heightened tensions. It was only in 2004 that the impasse was resolved and Hun Sen could form a government with the support of Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party (for more on this, see Than 2004).[5] The indications in the newspaper during this time largely reflect an acquiescent Ranariddh, with the dyad between him and Hun Sen mostly described as one that is working together and talking to avoid conflict (both within the dyad itself

and with the Khmer Rouge). In 2005, Hun Sen is quoted as describing the interaction between the two:

> continued cooperation between CPP and Funcinpec is considered to be Cambodia's prime opportunity to preserve peace and stability and would heal the scars left behind by the decades-long war. "Concession and stability are invaluable, but it is not easy to obtain and safeguard them. Peace is key to ensuring co-existence and cooperation to prevent internal disintegration and hostility," said Hun Sen. (December 2, 2005)

During 2010, Ranariddh again opens the door to cooperation with Hun Sen (and particularly with the CPP), but also expresses disappointment concerning their past cooperation, as he felt used by Hun Sen. For instance, Ranariddh noted the following:

> I do think we have a middle path. I don't like the word "collaboration" – collaboration sounds like during the Second World War when Petain of [Vichy] France collaborated with the Nazis. I rather like to talk about cooperation. I share some concerns with the opposition parties; only the approaches are different. I believe that if we cooperate with the ruling party in the same system, maybe it will be more efficient. (December 20, 2010)

> I made him [Hun Sen] prime minister three times, in '93, '98 and 2003. He didn't say anything at that time – he took advantage of this. (December 20, 2010)

While the behavioral interaction between Ranariddh and Hun Sen is largely described in cooperative terms, statements by Ranariddh also hint at the presence of domination in the interaction.

Between 2011 and 2016 very little is reported on any of the dyads. Son Sann was already dead, and Sihanouk died in 2012. Khieu Samphan was facing a war crimes tribunal and was sentenced in 2014. Ranariddh had been ousted from Funcinpec, and he made various attempts to work with other political parties before returning to Funcinpec in 2015. Ranariddh's political comeback is described in BBC reports as being due to his reconciliation with Hun Sen (BBC News 2018a).

During 2017, however, Ranariddh explicitly expresses a refusal to be dominated by Hun Sen. This was perhaps particularly visible in reports such as "Funcinpec's Prince Norodom Ranariddh vowed his party [...] would not become 'slaves' to Hun Sen" (October 19, 2017). The slave metaphor is quite a strong rejection of the domination that seems to be present in the relationship. In connection with this rejection of a slave–master relationship, Ranariddh also expresses why he is willing to cooperate or comply with Hun Sen: "For points that we need to agree with for the sake of peace for the nation, we will comply with; we will oppose the points that we should oppose. The most terrible is the one that always opposes [or] always complies" (October 19, 2017). Peace is thus still seen as an

issue on the national agenda. When cooperation is talked about, it tends to refer to past interaction. In 2018, an election was held and Hun Sen won overwhelmingly, but the victory was compromised as the main opposition had been outlawed and was unable to participate in the election.

Overall, while there are instances of behavioral interaction that suggest cooperation and deliberation, there are also ample indications of behavior which would not fall in the category of relational peace, such as threats, domination, and the use of force, but tend toward more antagonistic relations. At the end of the war Ranariddh had a much stronger electoral position, but over time Hun Sen became more powerful, and this is certainly reflected in the way the interaction between the two developed over time, where Ranariddh's attempts at appeasement only seem to encourage more domination by Hun Sen. Ultimately, domination appears to be the one element limiting transformation of the relationship.

Subjective attitudes toward the other

These behavioral interaction patterns are, in turn, also combined with expressions of subjective attitudes toward the other. Such descriptions are rarer than behavioral descriptions. However, the point of the analysis of the newspaper material from the *Phnom Penh Post* is not to quantify the description, but to pinpoint the overall relationship that comes through in these newspaper reports. Overall, the attitudes toward the other actors are reported as negative throughout 1993–2017 (of course, a bias in favor of more negative news is possible given the type of data). The types of attitudes that are apparent focus on critique, accusations, blame, distrust, and a lack of recognition. Some examples of such statements are the following:

> Hun Sen: "we must have the courage to blame the Khmer Rouge for the recent acts of violence and genocide." (May 7, 1993)

> Hun Sen: "I am very disappointed that I let myself be cheated by the disreputable acts of Prince Ranariddh." (May 21, 1993)

> "Ranariddh also blamed Hun Sen for creating the rift within Funcinpec, accused Hun Sen of being a puppet of the Vietnamese." (May 16, 1997)

> Ranariddh: "I have told Hun Sen that I am always willing to talk, but he is not sincere. He says I have hidden Khmer Rouge forces in the city, but it is a lie, just a pretext. They have been preparing a coup for a long time. They were very well prepared. Hun Sen says we are betraying the Constitution by talking to the Khmer Rouge, but it is a pretext to launch a coup. […] He wants to set up a so-called coalition government without me. It is not acceptable. A lot of my soldiers will never accept it. It is clearly a coup and must be condemned by the world community." (June 12, 1997)

The instances of subjective attitudes in these dyads also contain expressions of fear, more accusations, and a lack of trust. For instance, Ranariddh notes: "Hun Sen said I am not courageous, that I have to return to Phnom Penh and face a trial, but I am not crazy! Who trusts Hun Sen's tribunal? […] Hun Sen is a murderous Prime Minister" (July 25, 1997). Hun Sen in turn is reported as lacking trust in, and recognition of, Ranariddh, for instance in 1998: "In response to Ranariddh's request [to the UN to launch an investigation], Hun Sen says on April 10 'The essence of power is that when you talk you are listened to and respected,' adding that Ranariddh should resign if he doesn't trust a government ministry" (January 2, 1998).

Depictions of Ranariddh's attitudes toward Hun Sen after this largely point to a lack of trust, even distrust, and seeing the other as not legitimate, but also include suggestions that hateful language toward Hun Sen should be avoided. This dyad's subjective attitudes are dominated by instances of describing the other as the problem and of dislike and lack of approval, and Ranariddh suggests that he feels as though he has been taken advantage of. Roberts argues that: "The continued struggle between Ranariddh and Hun Sen over access to power denied the possibility of trust emerging. That trust was also dangerously challenged by Ranariddh's confrontational attitude and activities, and by Hun Sen's dislike of the prince" (Roberts 2002: 116). The generally negative descriptions of attitudes could be suspected of being the result of journalistic bias. However, in the contexts of these relations, had former enemies expressed more positive attitudes toward each other that would certainly have been newsworthy.

The examples of more positive attitudes are largely related to the dyad between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, and here there are examples of descriptions of trust and recognition. Sihanouk expressed belief in his counterpart's capability, appreciation for his support, perceiving the other as legitimate, as well as recognizing Hun Sen's skills as a politician. There are some expressions of disappointment, but also a declaration that he will not act in an "anti-Hun Sen or anti-CPP" manner (December 27, 1996). Hun Sen offers some expressions of recognition of Sihanouk, and even depicts Sihanouk as the father of the nation: "We want you to stay as our father. You are the cement to our nation" (August 29, 1997).

Ideas of the relationship

Expressions concerning how the actors envision the relationship are far less common in the articles from the *Phnom Penh Post*. Here only some dyads are explicitly talked about, particularly the relationship between Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh. The first comment does not suggest a particularly close relationship but merely an acknowledgment of an equal standing

between the two as they entered a coalition government together: "'I respect his age because he is older than I am,' Hun Sen said, adding that work procedures pursued by the two co-premiers would be equal" (September 24, 1993). As we move into 1996 the relationship is more often described as having cracks, mixed with assertions that the relationship is firm. These assertions seem to be made to suppress rumors to the contrary. Ranariddh makes statements suggesting he is unhappy with the degree of equality in the relationship: "Prince Norodom Ranariddh demanded greater equality between the government partners" (April 5, 1996) and states that "the coalition government was a 'slogan', [...] or an 'empty bucket'" (April 5, 1996). This was succeeded by Hun Sen calling Funcinpec "unconstitutional enemies" (May 3, 1996). This was ostensibly followed by more positive depictions of the relationship in September of the same year, when Ranariddh expressed having a common vision with Hun Sen, and Hun Sen in turn talked about their interactions as a "family gathering" (September 6, 1996). During 1998, comments about the relationship mainly come from Ranariddh, who suggests that he and Hun Sen are not of equal standing and that there is no legitimate coexistence between the two: "There is no comparison between Hun Sen and me" (February 27, 1998); "Prince Ranariddh [...] has repeatedly said he can never again work with Hun Sen" (February 27, 1998); and "If I am alive, it must mean Hun Sen is dead. If Hun Sen is alive, then Ranariddh is dead" (March 27, 1998). It is clear that there is very little positive valence attached to the relationship, and only during brief periods do we see some degree of fellowship between the two.

A very telling example of how the relationship between Hun Sen and Ranariddh is regarded is visible in the newspaper in 2002, when Ranariddh describes the dependency in the relationship between the CPP and Funcinpec: he states that they both need each other, adding, "It doesn't matter whether we love each other or not. It is the same as in a marriage – we cannot choose a good or a bad wife" (September 13, 2002.b). Invoking images of marriage, but also a relationship where love is not necessarily part of the equation, says a lot about the kind of relationship these actors envisage. The sense of dependency in the relationship continues in the depictions during the 2000s, but also reflects the fact that the relationship is not perfect. In Hun Sen's statements to the public, he also tends to stress how important their relationship is for the welfare of the country, while also in fact hinting at the possible chaos that may affect the country if they are not able to work together: "The CPP and Funcinpec are like an aircraft. If the wing on one side is broken, the plane will crash" (December 20, 2002) and "Whenever our two parties are strong and reconciling in their leadership of the state and national construction, the country and its people will certainly be enjoying peace, stability, social order and harmonized progress" (December

2, 2005). Ranariddh also seems to recognize this dependency and the lack of options embedded in their partnership. The partnership appears unwanted but also unavoidable. It is a partnership, or fellowship, of necessity, where interaction is necessary for the sake of the country.

Depictions of the relationship between Sihanouk and Hun Sen contain references not only to family metaphors, but also to disparate power positions over the time period, for example, when Sihanouk calls Hun Sen his "godson" (January 10, 1997). Descriptions of the relationship between Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge are consistently referred to as one between enemies. But it is clear from the material that these dyads are less central than that between Hun Sen and Ranariddh to political developments in Cambodia during the period. The relationship overall between Sihanouk and Hun Sen is summarized in Figure 2.1.

In contrast, Figure 2.2 presents a summary of the main dyad (Hun Sen–Ranariddh) over the entire time period. There emerges a picture of the overall relationship between the two as an unholy alliance, where the required trust and equality in the relationship never prospered enough to transform it. Hun Sen continued to use his position of power to weaken the other

Idea of the relationship

Figure 2.1 Relational interaction between party leader and Prime Minister Hun Sen and King Sihanouk, 1993–2012

Limited cooperation and deliberation, over time more domination and threats. In the 2000s Ranariddh expresses more desire for cooperation from a position of weakness.

Negative attitudes: distrust, lack of recognition, dislike and fear throughout the time period.

Fellowship ideas early on, but over time complaints about degree of equality, lack of fellowship, dependency, slave metaphor, loveless marriage, unavoidable partnership.

Behavioral interaction

Subjective attitudes toward the other

Idea of the relationship

Figure 2.2 Relational interaction between party leader and Prime Minister Hun
        Sen and Funcinpec party leader Ranariddh, 1993–2017

actors, often invoking peace as the reason for his opponents to acquiesce
and compromise.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the elite relations among the peace signatories in Cambodia
have been scrutinized with an eye to the relational peace framework. The
behavioral interaction, subjective attitudes, and ideas of the relationship
within each dyad largely seem to move together, and hence dyads with more
positive interactions are also dyads with more positive attitudes and ideas
of the relationship. Notably in the case of Cambodia, the various dyads
seem to be on quite different terms with each other. The dyad between Hun
Sen and Ranariddh, who were political party leaders during most of the
period studied, is the most intense and frequently described in the media.
This relationship was also more peaceful and constructive in its character
at the beginning of the period, and was partially formalized through their

coalition government. This dyad, however, also contained antagonistic behavior, distrust, lack of recognition, and tendencies toward domination, elements that also held the dyad back from further transformation, placing it far from the ideal relational peace. When positive openings from one actor are not reciprocated by the other, the potential for larger transformations of the relationship is moot. Overall, the main relationship is best characterized by domination, distrust, and ideas of dependency. At best this relationship can be described as a peace of domination, or a peace between master and servant, as the expressions and practices of this relationship resemble antagonistic relations or a peace between agonists. In contrast, the dyad between Hun Sen and King Sihanouk minimally meets the criteria of relational peace, but it is also a relationship which is less central to political developments in Cambodia. The relational framework employed here has allowed for a close analysis of how elite relations developed in Cambodia after the peace agreement was signed, and has added depth to the hybrid peace label often applied to Cambodia, by taking the internal elite relations seriously and thereby revealing deep-seated challenges for the overall peace in Cambodia. What we see is Hun Sen consolidating his position, whereas the other counterparts largely disappear from politics or have lost their own power bases, which forces them to appease Hun Sen instead of questioning his rule, ultimately accepting a relationship, and a peace, on his terms.

This chapter has made clear that imbalances occur between the Cambodian actors in the dyads, in terms of power as well as in terms of relational peace elements. Some actors talk more about some actors than others in the media, and are more inclined to depict certain relationships. Some behaviors or frustrations also seem to be more regularly voiced by one side than by both, especially perhaps if the behaviors or attitudes are seen as negative. In the data for Cambodia, several dyads were tracked, and this made coding individual newspaper articles difficult. However, some of the contrasts across these dyads are interesting, revealing how the material as a whole is richest in relation to the Hun Sen–Ranariddh dyad. It was also evident that behavior was more readily reported than attitudes in the media, as one would expect. While some aspects come up more than others in these media reports, I do not see this as a problem with the framework; it simply reflects the fact that when actors talk about their relationships and when the media report on them, descriptions of behavior are more common and attitudes less so, and ideas of the relationship are even rarer (at least in this case). However, it does mean that it is easier to analyze and find nuances, and shifts over time, in the behavioral interactions than in the subjective attitudes and the ideas of the relationship.

This study also suggests that behavioral shifts are more frequent, whereas shifts in attitudes and ideas of the relationship appear to be more slow-moving

(even if the overall trend is the same). If we are to talk of the patterns of interaction, however, these smaller shifts, which sometimes appear over days or weeks, perhaps do not really qualify as shifts in the pattern itself. What qualifies as the practices of a relationship need to show some degree of regularity over time. This instability in the relationship, especially the Hun Sen–Ranariddh dyad, is perhaps part of the pattern itself, reflecting that it is a relationship where the two actors involved are in the midst of potentially reformulating the relationship. However, domination by Hun Sen seems to have been the main detrimental element in the relationship. In fact, this case suggests that non-domination is a crucial element of relational peace, and when it is lacking it seems to create serious obstacles for transforming the dyad.

This chapter also contributes to current attempts to make peace more researchable; by approaching peace as relational, method choices can be more succinctly discussed and evaluated. The newspaper articles seem particularly suitable for application to the framework. The fact that the dyads were so clearly delimited (without fuzzy boundaries) made searching for articles and ensuing coding easier. A central limitation of this study is the use of only one newspaper. It certainly introduces a bias in the material, but this newspaper is at least likely to catch the larger trends in the relationship and how they are communicated in the media. And these are the trends that are likely to shape public opinion anyway. At present, there are no indications that the particular newspaper has any particular leanings during the time period in question that would make it likely to distort specific dyads or actors.

A reasonable extension of this project, if we want to study peace in Cambodia, would be to try to capture all expressions relevant to the entire armed group (beyond specific individuals) involved in the peace agreements using a similar approach, but this would have required more work and been more complicated. In many cases, new individuals within the same group move to the frontlines and often continue to pursue the same goals as the previous leader. Contrasting the relations between new and old leaders across the same dyad would be an important next step, and another way to further contribute to the literature on elite continuity in post-war contexts. The description of relational practices in this chapter is a starting point for exploring how elite behavior and responses link up with other events. If we are to understand and explain variations in peace, the role of these actors cannot be ignored, as the case of Cambodia clearly demonstrates. Whether these elite patterns are repeated in other cases, however, is yet to be explored. How other sections of society responded to these shifts, both other elites and society at large, is not unimportant, but it would require a different kind of data. This larger web of relations constitutes the peace as

a whole in Cambodia, but given the central role of elites in Cambodia in shaping outcomes and public opinion, the continual tension among previous enemies is a real cause for concern and a central facet of the manifestation of peace in Cambodia.

Notes

1 This makes him one of the longest-serving heads of government in the world at the time of writing.
2 Son Sann rarely appears in the newspaper articles, and after serving as a minority member of the coalition government formed in 1993, he left Cambodia in 1997 and then died in 2000.
3 I have informally surveyed other scholars working on Cambodia to ask their impressions of this particular newspaper and its bias, and the informal conclusion so far is that it probably does not skew what is generally reported in the local media in any significant sense, although it is impossible to completely rule out any bias. As it is a local English-language newspaper, one could possibly assume that the *Phnom Penh Post* is likely to cater mainly to upper- and middle-class readers, but unfortunately, I have not been able to find any other literature which explicitly compares different newspapers in Cambodia to claim this in any authoritative way (Songsukrujiroad et al. 2015: 97).
4 Each quotation from *Phnom Penh Post* will be referenced using its date of publication in this manner, and if there was more than one article in each issue, they are indexed with a subsequent letter a, b, or c, etc.
5 The Sam Rainsy Party is today the main opposition party in Cambodia.

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3

At the end of the rainbow: intergroup relations in South Africa

Anna Jarstad

The transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa is often labeled a successful case of nation-building. The process was eased by the idea of a Rainbow Nation, encapsulating a recognition of diversity alongside a sense of colorblindness by envisioning the transformation of racial antagonism into harmonious and peaceful coexistence beyond race. This vision was first coined by Desmond Tutu, who spoke about South Africans as "the Rainbow Nation of God." His position as archbishop and chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee gave the Rainbow Nation, the imaginary new South Africa in the post-apartheid era, an overtone of religion and reconciliation. The rainbow had several positive connotations for South Africans, symbolizing God's forgiveness in the Old Testament, and signifying hope and a bright future in Xhosa traditional culture. The rainbow colors also avoid direct reference to color in the sense of race, while at the same time recognizing diversity and therefore serving as a strong metaphor for nation-building (Baines 1998).

Nation-building is often seen as necessary for peace in countries divided by conflict. There are largely two competing approaches to nation-building advocated by scholars and practitioners alike for creating a common identity: civic and multicultural nation-building. Scholars within the first camp emphasize the mythical aspect of a nation. Modern nations are "imagined communities" in the sense that their members do not know each other personally (Anderson 1994). According to this civil or liberal approach, fluid and multiple identities are possible. This version of nation-building entails a social construction, an invention or even fabrication by which cultural and linguistic groups should be dissolved and replaced by a common culture. The end state of civic nationalism is meant to be achieved through processes of assimilation or integration (Gellner 1990; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1991). It was probably this approach to nation-building which inspired the idea of a Rainbow Nation, but as we shall see the contemporary political

parties have various understandings and experiences of the Rainbow Nation. The second approach, sometimes referred to as multiculturalism, ascribes ethnic meaning to the term "nation" and suggests that states consist of multiple ethnic nations which are characterized by their unique identities, while their members can at the same time feel loyalty and patriotism toward the state, albeit not supranational identification (Kymlicka 1995). According to this perspective, cultural diversity is favorable to society and a safeguard against tyranny. The goal of nation-building should therefore not be unity, but rather respect for diversity. This scholarly debate also outlines constitutional models for divided societies, including South Africa (Lijphart 1985; Horowitz 1991; Smith 1992; Connor 1994).

In this chapter, I depart from this research and interpret the nation-building approaches that seem to underpin the visions of different political parties in South Africa. In addition to the two approaches mentioned above, it is clear that some political parties have a more nationalistic approach where one ethnic group is favored. Although nationalism is seldom advocated as a strategy for nation-building, I find that some political parties aim to create a South Africa where one group's identity is dominant. In theory, multiculturalism and nationalism share similarities in the sense that they both are based on ethnicity, whereas civic nationalism is based on non-ethnic identities. However, in practice civic nationalism can also involve ethnic nationalism, as the process toward a civic identity often involves assimilation into a hegemonic culture.

Nation-building is thus about creating a bond and common identity. McCandless suggests that social cohesion, binding society together horizontally across groups, is necessary for resilient social contracts between the people and the state and for sustaining peace. However, McCandless shows what stagnates peace, rather than what sustains it (2020). In a case study on South Africa based on McCandless's work, Ndinga-Kanga et al. show that failures to adequately address equitable access to service delivery, high unemployment, and lack of livelihood strategies have contributed to the politicization of identity, decreased legitimacy of the reconciliation agenda, and deteriorated intergroup relations (2020). While this research is important for our understanding of threats to peace from the perspective of state–society relationships, it is also important to delve deeper into the horizontal relationships and elaborate on how political parties as important agenda-setting actors envision *how* different groups should interact and view each other beyond the notion of citizens, in order to sustain peace. The relational peace framework (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction) can help us to better describe and analyze different types of nation-building and visions of intergroup peace to address the question: How do contemporary political parties envisage intergroup relations in South Africa?

At the time, the transition from apartheid to democracy was described as a miracle (Sparks 2003), but racial relations remain a painful and contested issue in South Africa. Although apartheid was formally abolished, its legacy remains, and the great economic inequalities as well as the segregated character of residential areas largely reflect the racialized categories established during apartheid. While different human races do not exist in biological terms, in South Africa many people still refer to themselves and others in racialized terms such as "black," "colored," and "white," as is also the convention in the literature and in official documents from the country.[1] It should, however, be remembered that the anti-apartheid struggle – a period marked by a high level of political violence – was not only a conflict between white and black, since many white, colored, and Indian people fought together with blacks against the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid regime. The white population in South Africa is also divided into English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups, and these subgroups are also not homogeneous. Especially among the Afrikaner community, some do not want to define themselves as such, while others claim that Afrikaners are defined by a distinct culture (Netshitenzhe 2018). Despite these complexities, in the 2019 elections a number of political parties mobilized along racial lines. Two parties saw a dramatic increase in votes: the Marxist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who claim to represent the oppressed black majority, became the third largest party, while the right-wing Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) gained about half of the Afrikaner vote. To cover the breadth of the political spectrum, I include these two parties in the analysis to capture the contemporary debate on intergroup relations in South Africa and how they can be understood using the relational peace framework. The analysis also includes the two largest parties: the ruling social democratic party the African National Congress (ANC) and the liberal Democratic Alliance (DA).

Methods: investigating visions of intergroup relations

Political parties are important for both mirroring and shaping people's ideas and visions about intergroup peace. In the 2019 parliamentary election, the voter turnout was 66.1 percent, which places South Africa in the middle range globally (IDEA 2019). The political party spectrum in South Africa represents a range of political beliefs and ideologies, as it includes parties at the far left, liberal parties, and parties at the far right. In order to analyze the political parties' views on intergroup relations, I use material showing how parties themselves approach this subject and how they present their visions to potential voters. I therefore turned to the parties' websites as their public "face" to a broader audience. Because it is just as interesting

to see what is omitted as to see what is included, I wanted to base my analysis on general documents stating the party policy, and not on documents specifically focusing on intergroup relations. To facilitate comparisons, I identified a type of document featured on all parties' websites and selected the 2019 election manifestos as my primary documents. Each such party program reflects the policy adopted collectively by the party and is therefore its most complete presentation (Sindre 2019). One drawback of this material is that it does not reveal the unspoken aspects of the ideology (Pirro 2014). However, by applying all elements of the relational peace framework and comparing several parties' manifestos, my analysis also points to what is absent in the manifestos. Analyzing manifestos also means that the envisioned behavior rather than the actual behavior is in focus, but to contextualize the manifestos I do include secondary sources, news articles, and a few interviews, which show some behavior of the actors and also expands on some of the other elements in the relational peace framework. However, the chapter is first and foremost a depiction of how the various political parties portray and envision societal, horizontal relationships in South Africa.

I analyze the manifestos in their entirety, both the texts and the photos. With regard to behavioral interaction, I identify all types of activity in relation to other groups and discuss them in relation to the elements in the framework (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). The silencing impact of the rainbow idea is seen by some parties as a form of self-censorship and can therefore be interpreted as a sign of domination and a denial of a multicultural characterization of society. When trying to identify whether the criterion of non-domination is fulfilled, I search for proposals on how to prevent arbitrary use of power, for instance laws against discrimination. To identify the cooperation element, I analyze how the parties discuss how different groups should work together on shared issues, for instance in joint ownership of farms, and whether the cooperation is tied to ethnic or civil aspects. The issue of deliberation is operationalized to denote who should have the right to participate in debates and what issues (ethnic or civil) related to intergroup relations should be the focus of debates. Proposals regarding hate speech, strikes, and protests are also used as indicators of this element.

To analyze the parties' attitudes toward each other, the framework specifies two elements: mutual recognition and trust (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). To identify the first element, I analyze how the parties talk about acceptance of other groups, whether or not they use racialized terms, how they view ethnic diversity, and whether they propose measures to protect and enhance cultural markers such as languages and cultural lands. Trust signals positive expectations between the actors, and these include the expectation of a relationship free from threats and violence. Therefore

it is important to analyze issues related to safety and security, and measures proposed to increase intergroup trust. To study the question of how the idea of relationship between groups is expressed, I identify which dyads are mentioned, and how the relationships between the groups were described. In this way, the elements of the relational peace framework are used as tools to determine whether the overall vision of intergroup relations for each party in 2019 is based on ethnicity (an inclusive multiculturalism or an exclusive ethno-nationalism) or a civil identity (civic nationalism).

In order to determine whether a political party's visions of intergroup relations is based on civic nationalism, ethno-nationalism, or multiculturalism, I use the elements of the relational peace framework. The most important aspects are which groups, if any, are acknowledged, how these are described, and how the relationships with other groups are envisioned. If a party writes about a group as a relatively homogeneous entity, which should be favored, I classify it as a case of ethno-nationalism. This is most explicit in the manifestos of the ANC and FF Plus, as we shall see below. Multiculturalism entails recognition of multiple ethnic groups, as in the case of the EFF, although as it exclusively includes different black groups it is therefore classified as a case of black multiculturalism. The DA is the only party analyzed in this chapter which has a clear vision of a non-ethnic South Africa with another type of identity, and it is therefore classified as a case of civic nationalism.

The ANC's vision: black ethno-nationalism with multicultural traits

Before analyzing the ANC's 2019 manifesto, I here give a short description of the roots of the political party in terms of nation-building approaches. According to Ramsamy, before the end of apartheid in 1994 the ANC's approach to nation-building shifted from narrow black nationalism to multiculturalism, to non-racialism, and back to multiculturalism (Ramsamy 2007: 468–472). As we will see, the approach has shifted further since then. The ANC has its roots in the South African Native National Congress founded in 1912, which changed its name to African National Congress in 1923. Membership did not open up to other racialized groups until 1969, and only since 1985 have non-black members been able to become members of the executive body. At its inception the party was a black nationalist, anti-colonial, anti-communist, and elitist organization without many activities. In the 1950s it turned into a black mass movement, and in 1955 the Freedom Charter was adopted by the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats, and the Coloured People's Congress. The Freedom Charter demanded democracy and envisaged a multicultural

South Africa where all national groups had equal rights and status. It was not until the mid-1980s that the ANC adopted non-racialism and began to regard racial identities as private matters which it envisioned becoming obsolete. Ethnic consciousness came to be seen as a remnant of the apartheid divide-and-rule policy. As the ANC transformed from a liberation movement into a political party it became difficult to attract support from either Zulus (the largest black group) or Indians and colored people, as these groups did not feel that their lived experiences as minorities were included in the non-racial ideology. The Rainbow Nation was launched, an idea which could accommodate diverse and even antagonistic identities (Ramsamy 2007; Ajam et al. 2019), marking a return to the multicultural approach to nation-building, as described in the Freedom Charter, which is now posted on the ANC webpage together with the party's constitution in the "about" section (Freedom Charter 1955). The ANC's nation-building methods have shifted between forming alliances and incorporating other organizations. Initially, the anti-apartheid strategies were non-violent, but when the ANC was banned in 1960 and went into exile, Communist and ANC members formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) as an autonomous military organization under the leadership of the former president of the ANC's Transvaal branch, Nelson Mandela (Ellis 1991).

Behavioral aspects of relations

We now turn to the analysis of the ANC 2019 manifesto. In the 2019 general election, the ANC gained the lowest share of votes it has ever received: 57.5 percent compared with 62.7 percent in the first democratic election in 1994. It is noteworthy that the governing party has the shortest manifesto of those analyzed here: The ANC 2019 manifesto contains comparatively little text, presented in bullet point format. There is only one photo, and it shows the ANC leader Ramaphosa lifting his hand and looking into the distance with a serious face. In addition, there are many illustrations, such as two people holding their arms around each other to symbolize "a nation united in diversity." The slogan of the ANC is "a better life for all," while the 2019 election manifesto is entitled "Let's grow South Africa together (ANC 2019a). The latter phrase encapsulates the vision of cooperation – an element of the framework – without specifying who the actors are. However, later on the manifesto uses the term "race," and it is clear that the ANC favors a situation of racially mixing and intermingling, as it explains that there has been "progress towards ending race-based spatial separation" (ANC 2019a: 7). The issue of race also appears in other sections in the manifesto, for instance, in relation to strengthening governance; one of many tasks outlined in the manifesto is to reshape "towns and cities to

correct economic and racial divides" (ANC 2019a: 39, emphasis in original removed). The ANC also describes a racialized dimension of the financial sector, proclaiming a wish to facilitate credit and loans for black industrialists (ANC 2019a: 24).

The element of deliberation is not present in the manifesto as there is no text on debates or public discussions, who should have the right to participate in such debates, or which issues related to intergroup relations should be the focus of debates. To achieve the element of non-domination, institutional arrangement may be necessary for relational peace (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). In the ANC manifesto, the growth of the black middle class is provided as an example of how the lives of the majority of South Africans have improved. It is clear that the ANC means that it is necessary to counter previous domination of the black population with special institutional arrangements, for it suggests that the growth of the black middle class is "due to affirmative action, black industrialization and broad-based black economic empowerment" (ANC 2019a: 9). The BEE (black economic empowerment) program was adopted by the government in 2001 and requires the largest companies to fill quotas for black ownership and employment. Following an outcry that BEE did not benefit ordinary people, the program was changed into BBEE (broad-based black economic empowerment) in 2003. It has been suggested that this policy is part of a shift away from rainbowism and toward more exclusive black nationalism (Ramsamy 2007: 479). This approach still prevails in the 2019 manifesto, although, as becomes apparent in the subsequent part of the analysis, some parts of the text also recognize other groups, suggesting some traits of multiculturalism.

Attitudinal aspects of relations

It is difficult to find any direct empirical referents of the element of trust in the manifesto, but by analyzing how the issues of safety and security are discussed it is possible to identify where there are perceived vulnerabilities and against whom. The manifesto includes two sections entitled "Security" and "Safety" respectively, but in these sections there is neither any mention of issues explicitly related to intergroup relations, nor a calling-out of any racialized group for carrying out threats or violence. Instead, the manifesto presents general ideas for promoting social security by improving the health system and the education system, transforming human settlements, and ensuring safe public transport (ANC 2019a: 26–32). The section on safety deals with the police, gang violence, and domestic violence (ANC 2019a: 33–35). One section is entitled "Build national unity and embrace diversity," and here the framework's trust element is addressed indirectly. For instance,

the ANC proclaims that it will enact legislation to prevent hate crimes, a measure which could reduce the level of intergroup distrust in society. Furthermore, it asserts it will "[p]romote the values of non-racialism and non-sexism through sports, culture and the arts" (ANC 2019a: 41, emphasis in original removed), which could also contribute to mutual trust among racialized groups.

Mutual recognition is another important element of relational peace. The aforementioned section of the manifesto recognizes the country's diversity in different ways. The party proclaims that it carries out indigenous language programs in schools and also promotes history studies, trains teachers to deal with discrimination, and wishes to "[c]elebrate all cultures during national holidays" (ANC 2019a: 41, emphasis in original removed). However, the ANC asserts its wish to speed up land reform, including by submitting the revised expropriation bill to parliament and transferring title deeds to "rightful owners" (ANC 2019a: 20–21). Although it does not explicitly name them, it is clear from this statement that the ANC regards some of the present owners as unlawful and thus does not extend recognition of them as equal "sons of the soil" as the FF Plus refers to the Afrikaner group (FF Plus 2019: 20). Ahead of the 2019 general elections, one of the most hotly debated topics was the issue of land. For a long time there had been a policy of trying to find "willing sellers, willing buyers" to remedy the unfair distribution of land in South Africa. The vast majority of land is still owned by whites, while a majority of black South Africans remain landless and often poor. Landlessness has contributed to a high influx of people to big cities, and the slum areas grow, leading to a large group of squatters who set up basic shelters on occupied soil (Jarstad 2021). Afrikaners are often singled out as the group guilty of this injustice, because apartheid was introduced by the Afrikaner-dominated National Party.

Idea of relations

The ANC manifesto at first gives an impression of embracing the vision of the Rainbow Nation, as it states that one priority area is "Uniting South Africans and embracing our diversity," without specifying any groups (ANC 2019a: 3). However, unlike the original colorblindness of the Rainbow Nation, the manifesto continues: "Ours is a plan about you, South Africans, black and white, young and old, rural and urban" (ANC 2019a: 3). Here and in several other places, the ANC uses the racialized dyad of black and white, and stresses its wish to uplift black people, for instance via BBEE. At the same time, it states that the party refuses "to accept racism as the norm" (ANC 2019a: 6). One interpretation is that racism here refers only

to discrimination against black people, and that race-based affirmative action to favor black people should not be seen as discrimination. The shorter summary also states: "We will WORK to unite all South Africans and build a country in which ALL BELONG and feel at home" (ANC 2019b: 9, capitalization in original, bold in orginal removed). This evokes the notion of the country as a home where everyone feels welcomed and included. However, the short and disjointed texts in the manifesto shows no clear vision of how intergroup relations should be improved. The main impression is that nation-building is envisaged as a form of black ethno-nationalism with multicultural traits.

The DA's vision: civic nationalism

The Democratic Alliance, DA, is the second largest party in South Africa and the only party which attracts a significant number of votes from all population groups (Joubert 2019: 27). The critique of racial politics has always been important to the party, and this is in line with civic nationalism, where ethnicity is expected to become de-politicized and unimportant in creating a common identity. As we will see in the analysis below, the elements of the relational framework help us to identify which aspects of intergroup relations the DA sees as important for a civic identity rather than ethnic identities to develop.

   First, however, I provide a brief background of the party. The DA has its roots in the Progressive Party, which was formed in 1959 to resist apartheid. In 1989, three small parties merged to form the Democratic Party. It was a very small party until the 1999 elections, when it became the largest opposition party. One reason was that in 1998 the party produced the pamphlet *The Death of the Rainbow Nation*, where it accused Mandela of reintroducing racial politics with a law that required employers to write plans for how they intended to advance blacks in their workforce, and this message attracted many Afrikaner votes. In 2000, the Democratic Party and the New National Party merged and established the DA. In the 2019 election many white Afrikaans-speakers turned away from the party and instead voted for the FF Plus, while the DA gained 20.8 percent of the vote overall (Sparks 2003: 12; du Plessis and Plaut 2019: 66–69; Joubert 2019: 27–28).

Behavioral aspects of relations

The DA manifesto is entitled *The Manifesto for Change* and bears the slogan "One South Africa for All." It begins with the following address:

Fellow South Africans,

In 1994, we had a dream. A dream of One South Africa where whatever our race, background or religion, we would be able to stand together as one, living free, happy and dignified lives. A dream where we would reduce the economic inequality in our country. A dream where we would realise the potential of our great nation, working together to make South Africa a beacon of hope and leader in the developing world […] we call that dream *One South Africa for All*. A South Africa where we come together because we are better together. A South Africa of the shared values of freedom, fairness, opportunity and diversity. (DA 2019: 3)

It is clear that the DA wants to convey the message of working together across races, and that diversity is desirable and beneficial to society. The copious eighty-two-page manifesto contains a lot of text in a small font and thirty-four photos. Most of the photos of people portray racially mixed groups interacting peacefully with each other. There are several photos of the smiling black DA leader Maimane in the front, with people of different skin colors in the background. In one photo, five black people and one white person are holding hands. In another photo, a large group of people – black, colored, and white – are singing and holding the South African flag. Other photos show a racial mix of people laughing, cuddling, welding, or hiking. This clearly signals close social interaction between members of different population groups and also some cooperation, one of the elements of the relational peace framework. The DA also envisions greater cooperation between farmers and farmworkers. In relation to the need for broader ownership of land, the DA suggests that farmworkers can own shares in the farms they work on (Democratic Alliance 2019: 21).

A few photos portray serious faces: for instance, in relation to a text on corruption, there is a photo of a white man taking part in a debate in parliament, indicating how deliberation should be performed, a second element of behavioral interaction. Non-domination, a third element of relational peace, is discussed in relation to diversity and each individual's uniqueness. The DA declares: "We celebrate diversity and recognize the right of each individual to be free from domination by others" (DA 2019: 5). Here, the emphasis is on the individual level, and the manifesto does not explicitly discuss intergroup non-domination. Instead, non-domination is to be achieved by providing equal opportunities to everyone: "All South Africans deserve a level playing field where opportunities are not concentrated in the hands of the few" (DA 2019: 5).

The DA also wants to ensure predictability, thereby fulfilling the requirement of non-arbitrary power stipulated in the framework in relation to non-domination (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction), for instance by guaranteeing private property rights for everyone (DA 2019: 10). The issue

of property rights has been evoked by the land reform debate, and by the government's proposal of a law of expropriation without compensation, which many people fear will lead to arbitrary expropriation of property. The DA rejects the ANC's and EFF's plan, which it suggests makes the government the "owner of all property and land" while "citizens would have to rent their homes and land from government for life" (DA 2019: 21). It suggests that the law would lead to the agricultural sector collapsing and hundreds of thousands losing their jobs. Instead, the DA wants to release government-owned land which is not in use and to give title deeds to urban housing beneficiaries so that their children can inherit their houses.

The DA asserts its wish to reform the broad-based black economic empowerment approach, which, according to it, serves only to enrich the elite through state capture and corruption. Instead, the DA proclaims that "real economic empowerment for black South Africans" will be achieved through its program "economic justice for all" (DA 2019: 18). It includes measures to create black entrepreneurs and expand the middle class through education and training. The manifesto also outlines a detailed program for support to the poor, including a housing scheme, an extensive social assistance system, and support for university students from low-income families.

Attitudinal aspects of relations

The manifesto acknowledges the need for a change in attitudes and demonstrates concern about the divided nature of South Africa: "Our country has not faced a period of more racially divisive rhetoric and tension since the dawn of our democracy" (DA 2019: 17). The reason for mobilizing people based on race is, according to the DA, that a majority of South Africans "remain on the periphery of society, where apartheid forced them or their parents" (DA 2019: 17). The DA suggests that a program for race-based redress is an essential part of the reconciliation project, specifically stating that such moves should seek to empower black South Africans. It further states that "once the wrong has been remedied, the need for said redress will by definition fall away" (DA 2019: 17). The DA therefore suggests a sunset clause for the program of redress, "to ensure that we move to a non-racial position as soon as a successful redress programme has been implemented" (DA 2019: 17). Thus, the DA seems to accept that uplifting blacks at the expense of other groups is a temporary necessity for improved intergroup relations, but that the overall vision should be that belonging to the South African nation is based on civil, not ethnic, criteria.

Trust is an important element of relational peace, but is difficult to identify empirically. In the manifesto trust is not discussed in relation to intergroup relations. Instead, trust in the state is discussed, for instance "South Africans deserve a government they can trust and will responsibly spend every cent to create opportunity for all" (DA 2019: 5). The manifesto does, however, discuss security in a way that touches upon some of the elements in the relational peace framework. For instance, it claims that poverty is the main reason for insecurity and details the sufferings associated with poverty, including malnutrition and lack of dignity, further stating: "This toxic mix is keeping our unequal and extremely violent society firmly intact" (DA 2019: 50). Therefore measures to stimulate economic growth have to be complemented with social assistance, including increased child grants (DA 2019: 51). The discussions on security, poverty, and resulting crime describe conditions where it is difficult for mutual trust to develop. As the manifesto also suggests, poverty can lead to a lack of dignity and a sense of not being recognized as an equal. This can be interpreted as a form of domination, and the measures to address poverty as tools to achieve non-domination. Indirectly this could also create more conducive conditions for mutual trust between population groups.

Among many voters there is great distrust because fear of violence and crime, and the manifesto indirectly discusses measures which could be important for trust to develop, including creating safe living spaces, a safe transport system, food security, and rural safety (DA 2019: 33–35, 44). It asserts that the safety of farming communities is a priority of the DA and that both farm owners and farmworkers have a right to be protected from violent attacks (DA 2019: 36). It is noteworthy that the manifesto avoids describing the dyad in terms of black and white here, whereas in the media such murders are often described as blacks killing whites. I would argue that these measures speak to the elements of both non-domination and trust, as they are proposals for how to create an environment where fear is reduced and confidence is built.

In terms of the element recognition, the manifesto asserts that diversity is one of South Africa's key assets and subscribes to the preamble of the South African constitution, which recognizes that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in diversity" (DA 2019: 5). However, it does not mention any group-based rights, nor does it mention how this diversity should be enhanced other than by improving diversity in the party's own ranks. Given that the manifesto is very comprehensive, it is striking that there is no mention of different languages as mediums of instruction in schools, perhaps indicating that the DA regards the increased use of English as a positive trend. Likewise, there is nothing about how other forms of

cultural or ethnic expressions should be celebrated or protected. This suggests a civic approach to nation-building, where an identity based on shared citizenship is nurtured and other identities remain a personal matter.

Idea of relations

The manifesto begins with an address to "Fellow South Africans" which indicates a peaceful relation between individuals rather than groups. The DA proposes that the envisaged future relationships should rest on the principle of equality:

> In effect there are still two South Africas, 25 years into democracy. One where there are the skills and resources to access economic and other opportunities, and another South Africa where the majority of citizens find themselves excluded with no hope of accessing life-changing opportunities […] there is an urgent need to remedy this manifestly unfair reality to ensure that all South Africans – regardless of their race, gender or geographical context – are able to reach their full potential and in so doing, truly build *One South Africa for All.* (DA 2019: 9, italics in original)

The quotation demonstrates an awareness of the inequalities without clearly pointing out a relevant dyad for an envisioned intergroup peace. The relative absence of racialized terms in this very long manifesto is striking. The terms "race" and "black" are used thirteen times each, while no other racialized category is mentioned. It is clear that DA's vision is that "no South African – regardless of their race, gender, sexual orientation or any other marker – should have their life chances determined by the circumstance of their birth" (DA 2019: 6) By describing race as a marker, i.e., as something ascribed, the text signals that race should not be understood as an essentialist term, but instead in parity to other markers such as sex or age which are not based on achievement or merit, but rather are a result of conditions beyond an individual's control. Race should therefore not define status or influence one's employment chances.

In relation to the need for reconciliation and race-based redress, the term "black" is used, without specifying any other racialized categories. Furthermore, the manifesto states that economic redress "does not mean taking from one group or individual to give to another" (DA 2019: 17). This is to be achieved by a dramatic change of financial policy to expand the economic pie and enable the growth of the job market. By setting targets for socioeconomic justice, such as broader ownership, and abolishing such measures once the targets are reached, in combination with social support to all disadvantaged South Africans, regardless of exposure to past

injustices, the DA strives to reach a state where race is no longer politically significant. This nation-building vision thus encapsulates the notion of civic nationalism.

The EFF's vision: black multiculturalism

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was founded in 2013, and arose out of resentment with the dominant politics and with the ANC's vision of racial harmony. My interpretation is that the party envisages a South Africa solely for black groups. Thus, I argue that the party envisages *black* multiculturalism and champions the promotion of ethnic diversity among black groups. This can be viewed in contrast to the ANC's black ethno-nationalism, which presents blacks as a relatively homogeneous group. The EFF is a far-left, Pan-African party formed by Julius Malema, who had been expelled from the ANC Youth League, of which he was the president. One of the reasons for his removal was his outspoken support of Zimbabwe's land policy. In 2014, the EFF gained 6.4 percent of the votes, and in 2019 it became the third largest party with forty-four members in parliament and 11 percent of the votes (Joubert 2019: 108–114).

Behavioral aspects of relations

The EFF manifesto is 170 pages long and contains thirty-one photos. The first one depicts a smiling Malema, presented as the president and commander in chief, in his emblematic red beret. Most photos featuring people show large crowds of black people, often dressed in the party's color, red. The only photo of white people illustrates corruption: faceless white men in suits shaking hands over the table, while exchanging money under the table (EFF 2019b: 38). Without explicitly mentioning the Rainbow Nation, the EFF clearly states that it sees the term as detrimental to deliberations on intergroup relations:

> We are not part of the 1994 elite pact. We are a completely new generation, with new demands. And our demands, unlike those of the 1994 generation, will not be postponed. We refuse to be silenced with so-called reconciliation. We want justice now. We want our land now. We want jobs now. We demand the economy NOW! (EFF 2019b: 6)

The EFF gives voice to the opinion that the pact between the elites to end apartheid is used to silence demands and debates for the sake of reconciliation, and suggests that the colorblindness of the Rainbow Nation prompts

self-censorship on issues related to race and prevents deliberation on intergroup relations. Thus the Rainbow Nation is seen as a means of domination through the hegemonic elite. EFF, however, does not feel bound by the "CODESA compromise" and suggests that the "political change-over in 1994 […] was a bluff which continues to subject black people to economic and social apartheid" (EFF 2019b: 6). CODESA means Convention for a Democratic South Africa and refers to the multiparty constitutional talks held in 1991–1992, which were followed by Constitutional Assembly deliberation in 1995–1996 before the new constitution was adopted (Barnes and de Klerk 2002). By referring to CODESA as a compromise, the EFF signals that it believes it was unacceptable that economic power was given away during the negotiations in return for political power. Instead of reconciliation, the EFF wants "justice on the entire continent" (EFF 2019b: 9).

The EFF suggests that the economic empowerment model is "ostensibly designed to benefit [a] small number of individuals without ever changing the structural exclusion of the majority" (EFF 2019b: 7). Instead the EFF promises to create "millions of decent jobs […] through state-led industrialization" (EFF 2019b: 31). Furthermore, the EFF demands expropriation of land without compensation, and redistribution to "all landless people for residential, industrial, cultural, religious and recreational purposes" (EFF 2019b: 11). It envisions a society where all land will be under the custodianship of the state, and will be redistributed for free usage (not ownership or rental) "in a manner that is demographically representative" so that the majority of the land is controlled by black people (EFF 2019b: 28).

In its constitution, the EFF clearly states that the aim is to "capture political and state power through whatever revolutionary means possible" (EFF 2019a: 9). It also describe itself as a militant movement on its website. When I asked in an interview what this means, the EFF provincial chairperson of Free State, Mandisa Makesini, said, "We are fighting for the rights of the oppressed people," and when asked what the EFF would do if the white farmers do not accept their land being expropriated without compensation: "If the white farmers do not cooperate, we are ready to go to war." When I then asked if there is any future for whites in South Africa, Makesini explained: "There is a future for whites in South Africa if they let go of the greed. There is a future for them if they cooperate."[2] Makesini thus voices a very clear expectation of the behavior of the whites in South Africa: They have to cooperate, and there is no longer room for compromises and accommodation to needs of minorities if that does not benefit the black majority. This is also in line with the message of Malema: "We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now …" (SA People News 2016; see also Copeland 2021). This radical approach and the threat of war are in stark contrast to a vision of peaceful relations. Instead of

deliberation, cooperation, and non-domination, the EFF might impose its societal order by force.

Attitudinal aspects of relations

It is clear that white South Africans are not recognized as equal members of society by the EFF. It is stated that "[t]he economy in South Africa continues to be under the ownership and control of white minority settlers" (EFF 2019b: 7). The choice of the term "settlers" indicates that whites are foreign and not seen as rooted in South Africa. It suggests that whites are not seen as true South Africans and brings their legitimacy into question, as does the photo of corruption described above.

Trust signals positive expectations of the other in the relationship, but after violent conflict, distrust is often nurtured by misunderstandings and prejudice. A change of behavior is often necessary to build trust (Söderström et al. 2021). Trust is often associated with a feeling of security. While safety and security are brought up several times in the EFF manifesto, there is little mention of intergroup relations. The EFF promises to "ensure equality before the law, regardless of class, gender or race" (EFF 2019b: 121). This is the second time the term "race" is used in the 170-page long manifesto. The first time it is used is in the context of oppression of women, where the manifesto states: "The vicious circle of triple oppression, based on race, class and gender, has not been broken for black women in particular" (EFF 2019b: 41). The term "racialized" is used only once, in the foreword, where the situation is described as a "crises of racialised poverty, inequality, underdevelopment, landlessness and joblessness" (EFF 2019b: 6). The more frequent use of labels "black" and "white" indicate that race is seen as a fruitful concept for understanding oppression and injustices while also forming the basis for directed actions to prioritize black South Africans. It is noteworthy that the manifesto does not include any measures for trust-building between different groups. This is logical, since the EFF demands economic liberation and revolution, and thus a complete change of the system which will alter relationships between racialized groups. It does not want to build trust between groups, but rather to instill fear in everyone who resists its struggle.

National symbols can be used to signify unity or acknowledge diverse ethnic groups, thereby encompassing mutual recognition and respect, which is another element of the framework. The EFF wishes to change all names of assets with links to the colonial period and replace "apartheid statues" with statues memorializing African and anti-colonial heroes, while the "apartheid national anthem" is to be replaced with 'Nkosi sikelela i Afrika' (EFF 2019b: 24, 144–145). This song, meaning "Lord bless Africa," was written

by a Xhosa clergyman in 1897 and became a pan-African liberation song. Versions of it have been adopted as national anthems in Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The present South African anthem is a hybrid song combining new English lyrics with extracts from "Nkosi sikelela i Afrika," sung in isiXhosa, isiZulu, and Sesotho, together with "Die stem van Sud-Afrika" ("The call of South Africa") sung in Afrikaans. The latter song was the national anthem during apartheid, while the new merged national anthem was adopted in 1997 (South African Government 2020). The EFF now wants only the original text of "Nkosi sikelela i Afrika" to be used, thus removing the Afrikaner part of the national anthem. This is in direct contradiction to the idea of the Rainbow Nation, where all people should blend together to form a united whole. The EFF also states it will "commission the writing of a proper history of South Africa" (EFF 2019b: 144), suggesting that the present narrative presents an overly harmonious picture.

Eleven languages are recognized as official languages of South Africa, including English and Afrikaans. In relation to the education system, the EFF writes that it will "introduce vernacular languages as the foundation of the education system in all provinces" (EFF 2019b: 59). For higher education institutions, the EFF requires that by 2024, 50 percent of all courses be taught in a South African language other than English or Afrikaans (EFF 2019b: 63). Here it is clear that the EFF does not regard Afrikaans as a South African language, even though this language evolved from a Dutch dialect and adopted words from Khoisan (a group of African languages) and German used by European settlers in South Africa during the seventeenth century. It is noteworthy, however, that in this manifesto there is no demand to abolish Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, an issue which was brought up during the student protest in 2015 in relation to demands for decolonized and free education, which the manifesto also promises to introduce (EFF 2019b: 60).

Idea of relations

The idea of the relationship is strongly linked to which dyad is seen as relevant for intergroup relations, and in the case of the EFF the identification of its own side is clear, while "the other" refers to several actors. The manifesto addresses "[f]ellow South Africans, Commissars, Fighters, and all Ground Forces" (EFF 2019b: 12) and thereby evokes a sense of revolutionary comradeship and solidarity within the party and antagonistic relations to the enemy. Another relevant dyad for the EFF is the elite vs. the masses, whereby it sees itself as representing the masses – the broad population

– against the elite and political establishment. This is related to the numerical relationship between the "black majority, and Africans in particular" and the "white minority settlers" (EFF 2019b: 7). The EFF objects to the fact that African blacks, who are the numerical majority, continue to be the economic minority. The foreword also points to another relevant dyad, namely that between young and old, or between those who have experienced apartheid and the "born-frees" as the generations born after 1994 are called. This generational divide is important for understanding how intergroup relations are perceived. Those who participated in the anti-apartheid struggle have personal experiences of how hard the conditions were under apartheid. They remember the violence during apartheid and the fears of a large-scale civil war just before democracy was introduced and therefore better appreciate how far South Africa has come in terms of intergroup relations since the apartheid period, whereas the EFF appeals to the younger generation, which is frustrated with the lack of economic progress.

With regard to which dyad is most central to the EFF, it clearly presents a racialized class antagonism between poor blacks and the white and wealthy. In the manifesto it says: "our people live in absolute poverty" (EFF 2019b: 6). Further, the manifesto describes "black people" as "landless," "on the margins of economic production and outside of life-enhancing economic participation," and as "suppliers of cheap and disposable labour" (EFF 2019b: 5–6). Here, black people are mainly described in economic terms, as employees or unemployed, poor and landless, and the relationship is thus about economic relations. This is a radical approach to nation-building where ethnic diversity is promoted for all black groups, but where it is difficult to see that the Afrikaners have any place as a cultural South African population group. It is a version of multiculturalism exclusively for black groups.

The FF Plus's vision: Afrikaner nationalism and extreme multiculturalism

The FF Plus has become the party which receives most white Afrikaner votes, with its share of the total vote rising from 0.9 percent in 2014 to 2.3 percent in the 2019 elections (Joubert 2019: 41). Ahead of the first democratic election in 1994 there were well-grounded fears of a counter-revolution when right-wing Afrikaner extremists formed militia movements and threatened to link up with the defense and police forces to take over the government in a coup. Mandela met with the putative leader of the coup, former chief of the defense force General Constand Viljoen, to persuade

him to campaign for separatism by democratic means instead. Viljoen then formed the political party Freedom Front (FF) and won seven seats in parliament (Sparks 2003: 4). The FF prides itself on playing a key role in the writing of sections in the constitution which deal with collective rights for language and cultural communities and a commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious, and language communities, as well as self-determination (FF Plus 2020). In 1999, however, the party won less than 1 percent of the vote, and it was suggested that the Afrikaner nationalism and separatist movement was dead (Sparks 2003: 4–5). FF changed its name to FF Plus in 2004 when a number of smaller national parties merged with it.

Behavioral aspects of relations

The title of the FF Plus's 2019 manifesto is *Fight Back* and its slogan is "There is hope" (FF Plus 2019). It is noteworthy that this is the only manifesto which contains references to substantiate claims, for instance from the official agencies for statistics and the police. There is only one photo in the manifesto, and it shows hands of different colors placed on top of each other, as if they will be lifted up with a shout, as is often done by players before a sports game. White hands are placed on black hands, signaling unity. The notion of unity and cooperation is also reflected in the last sentence of the manifesto: "Let us build a future together" (FF Plus 2019: 30).

However, the manifesto begins by stating that the level of violent crime is as high as in war zones. The party suggests that the high level of farm murders makes it is necessary to have "private security to ensure our own safety" (FF Plus 2019: 1). For this reason, the FF Plus also asserts the right to own and use weapons for self-defense (FF Plus 2019: 22).

With regard to non-domination, the FF Plus rejects affirmative action for black empowerment, saying that race-based appointments and "transformation targets" are unjust, for black as well as white people. It suggests that the system puts "immense pressure" on people who are not equipped to do their job, while competent black people get a "cloud of distrust hanging over their heads" as they ask, "was this possibly an Affirmative Action appointment?" (FF Plus 2019: 5). The manifesto states that skin color "cannot be used as a generalized indication of being previously disadvantaged" and therefore not as a "condition for empowerment" either (FF Plus 2019: 12). This statement is at odds with the fact that under apartheid it was precisely skin color which gave blacks the lowest status in society. The FF Plus suggests that a "new generation of embittered individuals is forming among Afrikaners, coloured and other nonblack people" and that it was "a similar bitterness that provided the impetus for the ANC's

power struggle" (FF Plus 2019: 3). Here it places the sufferings during apartheid on par with discrimination against non-black people during the current system. The FF Plus also writes that it wants to prevent history from repeating itself and instead favors a system of "equal opportunities for all South Africans" (FF Plus 2019: 5). To this end, it proposes moving away from "transformation and redistribution" and toward economic growth to create jobs, with less dependence on social grants (FF Plus 2019: 12). Instead of racial quotas, it suggests that socioeconomic conditions be used as criteria for empowerment measures.

According to the FF Plus, more power should be devolved to the local level and to cultural communities. The party favors a smaller but more effective government which merely acts "as a commonwealth of communities" (FF Plus 2019: 7) and greater power at the local level. For instance, energy systems could be owned and managed by the community. It also wants to "establish autonomy for a cultural community across the entire country concerning matters like education, elderly care, sport, heritage conservation and the like" (FF Plus 2019: 9). For this purpose, the manifesto proposes the establishment of community councils, such as Afrikaner Councils, for communities across the country. These would control education, heritage conservation, and social care. In this way there would be two parallel systems where each institution could decide if it wants to be under the jurisdiction of the community council or the government (FF Plus 2019: 9). The FF Plus states that this system is not racial segregation, perhaps suggesting that others think differently about this proposal, as a colored school might want to be under the jurisdiction of the Afrikaner Council while an Afrikaner school might choose to be under the authority of the government. However, in the early 1990s, a small Afrikaner *volkstaat* (a self-governed homeland) had already been established in Orania in the Northern Cape. Its founder, Carel Boshoff, bought the land, and after screening to ensure they indeed agreed to preserve the culture, Afrikaners were able to buy shares and settle in the little town (Cavanagh 2013). Orania is thus an all-white town where all labor is carried out by the residents, and it also uses its own currency. In this way it is separated from the rest of South Africa, even though black people still come to its grocery store.

With respect to deliberation, it is noteworthy that the FF Plus wants to limit some forms of public expressions which it sees as a threat to security by prohibiting "all forms of marches and protest actions near schools" (FF Plus 2019: 18). The FF Plus also proposes that "[s]trikes and particularly illegal strikes that lead to the loss of hundreds of thousands of job opportunities must be prohibited. Trade unions' power must be restricted" (FF Plus 2019: 15). In South Africa protests are very common, to the point that the country is referred to as the "protest nation" (Duncan 2016). During the struggle

against apartheid, protest was used to make the country ungovernable, and this method is also used today, with the same stated objective, to influence politics.

Attitudinal aspects of relations

FF Plus promises to build "true unity in diversity," based on "mutual respect, without discrimination and racism, with equal opportunities and recognition for that which is our own and that which is shared" (FF Plus 2019: 9). Recognition of cultural communities is central to the FF Plus, for instance in the suggestion that everyone must have access to mother-tongue education (FF Plus 2019: 17):

> The FF Plus views every language as indefinitely more than just a medium of communication. A language is like a home. If one is deprived of your mother tongue, you are essentially left homeless, your human dignity is affected and you are left disoriented. (FF Plus 2019: 18)

The quotation evokes strong emotions by referring to the language as a "home" and a source of "dignity" which is under threat. The manifesto even claims that "Afrikaans as [a] medium of instruction is under severe attack" (FF Plus 2019: 18). The party further suggests that it is unconstitutional for official languages not to be used in public and that this is "detrimental to race relations" (FF Plus 2019: 18). In particular, the dominance of English is sensitive for the party. The animosities between British settlers and Afrikaners date back to the early days of colonial wars, and worsened during the South African War of 1899–1902,[3] when many Afrikaners died in concentration camps, most of their livestock were killed, and the entire Afrikaner economy was crushed by the British (Giliomee 2019: 86). The FF Plus "condemns the creeping language imperialism of Anglophiles who want to subdue indigenous languages to English in the name of global trade and traffic particularly in the field of education, but also in public institutions and state departments" (FF Plus 2019: 19). Consequently, the party favors recognition and "development of all South African's indigenous languages" (FF Plus 2019: 18). To this end, the manifesto suggests that more of the official languages be used in schools, rather than introducing English as the sole medium of instruction, so that the constitutional right to receive instruction in the official language of one's choice can be fulfilled. This idea was further explained in my interview with Wynand Boshoff, the FF Plus provincial leader of Northern Cape (Noord-Kaap) and spokesperson for education:

> There will be much more lasting peace if all cultural groups assert their cultural position and then together make what we together can make better. For instance, on the issue of Afrikaans as language of instruction in schools and at universities,

I think that Afrikaners would have taken it in a more sportsmanlike fashion if our language was removed to make room for isiTswane or isiZulu or isiXhosa, but now it has to make way for English, in the name of de-colonialisation. It is silly and ironic![4]

FF Plus claims to promote nation-building by recognizing cultural community rights, which also entails land ownership, or as the FF Plus puts it:

The cultural value that various cultural groups (including the Afrikaners) ascribe to land, forests and fisheries must be recognized. [...] The FF Plus understands the emotional impact that landownership has on all South Africans. Thus, land must not be viewed through a commercial lens. Afrikaners want the assurance that a part of African soil belongs to them too. (FF Plus 2019: 19–20)

Thus, the FF Plus demands that Afrikaners be recognized as an African community, with indigenous rights. This is a central opinion of the party, and in line with the Afrikaner saying *Die grondvraag is die grondvraag*, which Boshoff translates as the "land issue is the fundamental issue."[5] It is telling that the words for "land" and "fundamental" are one and the same.

The manifesto suggests that the ANC and EFF are behind the deteriorating intergroup relations and that the expropriation law portrays white people as thieves: "Expropriation without compensation threatens every South African's right to owning property and it reduces white South Africans, particularly farmers, to thieves who stole the land or property currently in their possession" (FF Plus 2019: 3). Furthermore, the party indicates that the ANC is using white people as the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in South Africa (FF Plus 2019: 4). This statement is also related to the demand for actions against hate speech, which it suggests must be stopped, regardless of the perpetrator's race or community (FF Plus 2019: 29). The FF Plus is not against land reform, but wants to make certain adjustments. For example, it strongly opposes the fact that beneficiaries today can opt for financial compensation rather than ownership of the land. Instead the party suggests that the redistribution must result in the transfer of title deeds, and expropriation should mean compensation at market value.

Ideas about the relations

The leader of the FF Plus, Pieter Groenewald, has stated that the Rainbow Nation is dead (Joubert 2019: 42). The FF Plus writes that it envisions a South Africa which benefits all its people, and "aspires to a political system based on Christian values that is characterized by the principles of justice, truth, love of one's neighbor, respect for life, loyalty and peaceful co-existence" (FF Plus 2019: 4). In this quotation, fellow South Africans are referred to

as neighbors whom one should love. Overall the idea portrayed in the manifesto is that such peaceful coexistence does not require mixing, but that separation of groups should be allowed. This notion of peace thus speaks to the peace between fellows, rather than friends (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). The FF Plus version of nation-building is an extreme version of multiculturalism based on Afrikaner nationalism, where the ethic community is the primary organizational level and the state should have limited political power.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the visions of nation-building among contemporary South African political parties, as they are key actors in the public debate. This choice of material limits the analysis to nationalist visions and imaginations of intergroup peace, and cannot tell us about how interactions between groups play out in real life, but it is plausible that these visions either reflect or shape many people's ideas of the relationships between different population groups, and thereby also influence relational practices in South Africa. The relational peace framework has enabled the identification of which dyads are talked about in the manifestos and who are regarded as legitimate counterparts. All the manifestos implicitly define who are to be included and who are excluded from nation-building. The only relationship that is recognized in all the manifestos is the one between blacks and whites. It is striking that none of the manifestos mention Indians/Asians at all, and that the apartheid categorization of colored people is only mentioned by one party, the FF Plus. However, if South Africa belongs to "all who live in it, united in diversity," as the preamble to the constitution states, all groups must feel included, including Indians/Asians and coloreds.

The relational peace framework also aided the analysis of contemporary visions of nation-building by bringing out the nuances and variations with regard to behavioral, attitudinal, and ideational components of intergroup relations, both in the manifesto texts and in photos and illustrations. The photos did convey strong signals of intergroup mixing, unity, or separation, and of the illegitimacy of some groups, for instance the EFF photo of white hands signaling corruption. Thus, this chapter shows how photos can be used for the analysis of relational peace. Some of the elements could more clearly capture different types of nation-building. Where the manifestos described issues relating to *cooperation* it became clear whether it was ethnic or civil dyads that were expected to work together or live intermingled, etc. These

assessments helped the sorting of the manifestos into the different types on nation-building. Some manifestos also clearly discussed *deliberative* issues related to prohibiting divisive rhetoric, fostering a common identity, and reducing distrust between population groups, which can all be deemed relevant for nation-building, but here it was less clear which type of nation-building underpinned each manifesto. The element of *non-domination* was more useful in this regard as it was important for identifying any perceived group-based vulnerabilities, and whether the manifesto advocated for any special group-based status or measures. In the analysis, the element of *trust* did not clearly help in the assessment of type of nation-building, but *recognition* proved more fruitful, as in some cases specific groups were acknowledged. In the cases where the population was described as consisting of multiple ethnic entities, in contrast to one whole, unitary entity, this was interpreted as an indicator of multiculturalism. Finally, the *idea of the relationship* proved to be very useful in the classification of civic nationalism, ethno-nationalism, and multiculturalism, as it directly speaks to who is included and how the relationship should be characterized.

The analysis identified that one political party, the EFF, does not exclude violence in intergroup interactions. All the other parties favored fellowship or friendship. An additional behavioral element of intergroup relations was identified in the material, namely *socializing*: being close, even intimate, and happy together – cuddling, laughing, and singing – as portrayed by several photos in the DA manifesto. This element is associated with the idea of the relationship as friendship. The perception of the *other* and the idea of the relationship varies a great deal between the political parties. While the DA refers to other South Africans as fellows and individuals, the EFF stresses racialized class solidarity and comradeship. For the ANC, nation-building aims to build a home where everyone feels included, while the FF Plus writes that it strives for good neighborly relations between different cultural communities. This shows that political parties have very different views on how they should live together. In this way, the relational peace framework proves to be a useful tool for understanding different visions of nation-building by demonstrating how intergroup relations are imagined in different forms of nation-building.

Both multiculturalism and ethno-nationalism are based on the recognition of ethnic groups as important entities in a state, while civic nationalism rejects the importance of ethnicity and instead envisions a civil basis of the state. Among the parties whose manifestos are analyzed in this chapter, the DA is the only party with a vision which is close to pure civic nationalism. All the other parties write about the need to recognize (and for the foreseeable future base several political measures on) racialized categories. These visions

can however be classified as different types of ethno-nationalism, where one group is given a special status, as in the case of the Afrikaner nationalism of the FF Plus, or as in the case of EFF, which features a nationalism that includes several black groups but excludes all others, and is thus classified as black multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is also based on ethnic groups rather than civicness; my interpretation is that the vision of the ANC can be classified as black ethno-nationalism because it wants blacks to be targeted in affirmative action, but we also see some traits of multiculturalism in the vision of the ANC, as several other groups are also pointed out as having separate identities. The FF Plus combines the Afrikaner nationalism with an extreme version of multiculturalism where it envisions that more power is devolved from the state level to all ethnic groups in South Africa. This also speaks to the social contract literature mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, which addresses the vertical relations between society and state. The FF Plus's idea of a society where each ethnic group is autonomous from other ethnic groups and to a large part also from the state is a model based on separation rather than on cohesion. This is also in line with the consociational model that Lijphart proposed for South Africa (1985), which aimed to provide peace. Together, the analyses show that there are several competing visions of nation-building among the political parties. These contradictions contribute to our understanding of relational peace in South Africa, as the disagreements around who belongs to the South African nation and how a common identity can be created risk undermining the legitimacy of the state and threatening peace.

Notes

1 As is often the case with race, there is no neutral terminology. For other countries, the term "people of color" might be preferred, but this does not capture the racial hierarchy of white, colored, Indian, and black during apartheid. "Ethnic minorities" is also a problematic term in this context as South Africa consists of several ethnic groups, and the black ethnic groups often do not want to refer to themselves as ethnic groups, but rather as cultural groups, stressing that blacks are the majority in the country. Moreover, there is no consensus on the issue of capitalization – or not – of the first letter in "apartheid," "black," "white." etc. (Poppiejunkie 2014). I follow the convention in official documents, for instance those of Statistics South Africa, where the labels are written with lower-case first letters. The same source states that the black African population is 80.1 per cent of the total population, colored 8.8 per cent, Indian/Asian 2.6 percent, and white 7.8 percent (Maluleke 2020: 7).
2 Interview by telephone, December 2, 2020.
3 Historically, this war was known as the Anglo-Boer War.

4 Interview, November 24, 2019, in Orania. Boshoff is the son of the founder of Orania and the grandson of a former prime minister of South Africa, Hendrik Verwoerd (National Party), who is often labeled the "architect of apartheid" (Sparks 2003: 4).

5 Interview, November 24, 2019, in Orania.

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4

The shifting sands of relational peace in Cyprus

Jason Klocek

On March 31, 2004, Kofi Annan made an impassioned plea for local Cypriot leaders to support impending referenda to end three decades of division on the island. He framed the importance of these plebiscites in no uncertain terms: "Let me be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In reality, at this stage, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement" (Annan 2004). The Secretary-General's words proved to be hauntingly accurate. While a majority of the Turkish Cypriot population voted in favor of a federation of two states, more than three-quarters of Greek Cypriots cast their ballots in opposition. And in the decade and a half since the failed 2004 reunification plan, no fewer than four additional rounds of peace talks have been attempted and abandoned.[1] Today, the divided island remains the site of Europe's longest unresolved political dispute and an archetype of intractable conflict (Heraclides 2011).[2] The half-century of political stalemate in Cyprus raises challenging questions for peace scholars and practitioners alike.[3] Why has it been so difficult to reunify the island? Why have top-down negotiations such as the Annan Plan, as well as more recent bottom-up approaches, proved equally ineffective? What might a permanent settlement even look like at this point?

There is, of course, no shortage of answers to such questions. Politicians, policy analysts, peacemakers, and conflict scholars have all weighed in over the years. This diverse set of actors has advanced varied and inventive plans of action, but most share a common perspective. Taking a negative peace framework as their starting point, they stress that the island has been free of extended periods of armed conflict since the 1974 ceasefire that divided Cyprus and express a strong desire not to undermine the current status quo. Policy suggestions, in turn, involve some variation of security guarantees and a plan for shared governance between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The primary concern of these plans is to avoid a return to intercommunal violence. They overwhelmingly frame the Greek and Turkish

Cypriot communities as unitary and static actors and focus more on political than societal tensions between the two groups. They often overlook cooperative initiatives that have emerged between the two communities in recent years, and they rarely consider variation within either society.

This chapter applies a relational view of peace as an alternative way of understanding the Cyprus problem (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). It traces variation in each of the framework's components (i.e., behavioral interactions, subjective attitudes, and ideas of the relationship) since 1960. A key value added by this perspective is that it shifts our attention to a more complex set of interactions than is captured by past analyses. Rather than viewing Greek and Turkish Cypriots as homogeneous and fixed groups, this framework draws attention to a varied set of cooperative and competitive relationships within and between the two communities.

This chapter pays particular attention to two sets of dyads at the elite level: those between leaders in the Greek Cypriot community and those between Greek and Turkish Cypriot officials. Understanding the behavior, attitudes, and ideas of Greek Cypriot elites is especially important for securing a lasting peace on the island given the Greek Cypriot community has been the primary veto player in recent years. The opening anecdote of this chapter underscores how support for the 2004 Annan Plan was weakest within that community. A more recent public opinion poll suggests that attitudes toward a federation have not shifted in over a decade (Psaltis et al. 2017: 72–75). Moreover, as the majority population with de jure sovereignty over the island, Greek Cypriots have fewer incentives than their counterparts to reach a resolution in the short term.

The analysis draws on historical accounts, public opinion data, policy reports, English-language news material, and informal conversations with residents of Nicosia during two months of fieldwork in 2015. These data are complemented by secondary sources where appropriate. My analysis is also informed by eight months of research at The National Archives of the United Kingdom and the Cyprus State Archives.[4] This approach of combining multiple data collection methods – known as between-method triangulation – provides several advantages (Denzin 2012, 1970; see also Tarrow 2010: 108–110). It increases the reliability of findings by cross-referencing the accuracy of different data-generating processes. Additionally, triangulation is an important method for mitigating researcher bias because it forces an analyst to consider multiple perspectives and can reveal prejudices underlying a single data source (Fusch et al. 2018). It is also a method especially well suited for the relational peace framework since no single method is likely to capture all of the framework's components. Of course, triangulation is not without its limits. Although the aim is to draw on the best of each

method, it does not eliminate the methods' flaws. I have, therefore, drawn on a diverse set of sources that complement one another rather than those that reproduce biases. In this way, between-method triangulation increases confidence in my claims in this chapter because the different types of evidence I use strengthen the validity of both descriptive and causal inferences (Brady and Collier 2010: 310).

What I ultimately find is not only that peace and conflict coexist within and between political elites in Cyprus, but also that these relationships have evolved in varied and often clashing ways. For instance, while deliberation between Greek and Turkish leaders through formal peace processes is a hallmark of the Cyprus problem, there has been considerably less room to exchange competing views within the Greek Cypriot community. At various points in time, this lack of deliberation has served as a critical barrier to reaching a political solution, as well as to developing cooperation across communities. This chapter further illustrates how the components of the relational peace framework can be mutually reinforcing. The failure to reform the school curricula in the Republic of Cyprus has, for example, also bolstered cultural forms of dominance on the island.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in five parts. In the following section, I discuss existing research on the Cyprus dispute and emphasize why a negative peace framework remains insufficient. I then examine the three components of the relational peace framework. Each section of the chapter includes an operationalization of the component and additional detail on the dyads of political elites examined. My analysis of behavioral interactions is the most extensive section because it offers a direct comparison to what a negative peace framework attempts to capture. Demonstrating how the relational peace framework reveals additional complexity in this component, as well as shedding light on other dimensions of peace, offers a compelling case for the value of adopting this alternative. Finally, I consider the broader implications of my analysis for the relational peace framework and contemporary efforts to bring a lasting peace to Cyprus and similar intractable conflicts in the concluding section.

Current approaches to the Cyprus problem

A substantial literature exists on Cyprus and its politics, most of which is centered on how to resolve the protracted conflict on the island.[5] A majority of scholars acknowledge that the situation is complex, multi-causal, and nuanced. At the same time, peace and conflict scholars typically highlight two distinct factors as the driving obstacles to a permanent settlement: ethno-nationalism and foreign powers. Each factor takes a negative peace framework as a primary point of reference.

Ethno-nationalism

One commonly used approach to understanding the Cyprus problem stresses the role of ethno-nationalism. This strand of research defines the Cyprus problem as an identity-based conflict in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities interpret their struggle for political autonomy, its causes, and potential solutions along a real or perceived ethno-national divide (Wolff 2011; Vogel 2016). Existential fears, mistrust, demonization of the other, unaddressed historical grievances, and socioeconomic inequalities fuel and exacerbate these divisions (Azar 1985; Rouhana and Bar-Tal 1998).

The ethno-national approach pays particular attention to how competing claims for sovereignty evolved and have become reified over time, especially in relation to periods of intercommunal violence (Vogel 2016). The two ethnic communities were widely dispersed across the island and functioned more or less separately during the four centuries prior to independence (Ioannides 2014). This changed, however, with the guerrilla campaign against the British that erupted in 1955 (French 2015). The conflict, waged by the insurgent group EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), was the culmination of longstanding and increasingly assertive calls by the Greek Cypriot community for *enosis*, a political union with Greece. British forces remained the focus of EOKA attacks, but intercommunal violence was not uncommon. In response, Turkish Cypriots formed the TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) and asserted their own ethno-national demands, which called for partition of the island into separate ethnic communities (*taksim*).

The end of the guerrilla war in 1959 saw the British withdrawal from the Island, but intercommunal tensions and competing ethno-nationalist claims persisted despite attempts to address them through the 1960 constitution (Salem 1992). That document set up a complex power-sharing arrangement that included a national legislature and two communal chambers (Jarstad 2001). In addition, it established separate municipal administrations for the two groups in the five largest cities on the island. Archbishop Makarios III, head of the Church of Cyprus, was named the first president of the new republic, while Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, the main leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, served as vice-president.

Leaders of each community quickly sought to exploit the new system (Salem 1992; Jarstad 2001). This culminated in a 1963 proposal by Archbishop Makarios III to amend the constitution in such a way as to undermine most of the privileges enjoyed by the Turkish Cypriot community (James 2001). In protest, Turkish Cypriot leaders withdrew from the government, and a new round of intercommunal violence broke out in December of the same year. Hostilities became so intense over the next few months that Makarios requested that the UN deploy a peacekeeping force, which it did in March 1964. Still, violence and segregation between the two communities

continued through the subsequent decade until Turkish military involvement and de facto partition of the island in 1974.

Foreign powers

A second approach to understanding the Cyprus problem shifts the analytic lens toward colonial politics and the regional interests of foreign powers. On the first point, numerous studies demonstrate how the British "divide and rule" policy exacerbated communal tensions on the island (Pollis 1973; Argyriou 2018). The advisory British Legislative Council established in 1882 provides one striking illustration. This representative body, meant to advise British officials, initially consisted of nine Greek and three Turkish Cypriots, elected by their respective communities. The process, however, superimposed political identities on religiously and ethnically defined communities that previously did not view themselves as such (see Faustmann 1998). It also created controversy over representation. In 1924, when the island became a Crown Colony, Greek Cypriot membership on the council was expanded while Turkish participation remained unchanged. Thus, even as the British tried to establish representative political institutions, they also strengthened identification within each community, sharpened the cleavages between them, and drew the communities into political relationships to which they did not previously subscribe (Holland 1998; Rappas 2014).

   Of equal, if not greater, consequence has been the role of Greece and Turkey since the 1950s. Both countries were directly involved in British attempts to reach a peaceful resolution to the EOKA insurgency. Indeed, it was the two countries' foreign ministers that were largely responsible for the Zurich Agreement that finally brought an end to the conflict and independence for Cyprus (Holland 1998: 302–305; French 2015: 288–290). A key component, along with the 1960 constitution that followed, was power-sharing arrangements for each ethnic community (Souter 1984). The imposition of a peace treaty and a rigid constitution that reinforced religious and ethnic divisions, of course, did not achieve their intended effect. Within three years, intense intercommunal violence reignited. This was followed by increased interference in Greek Cypriot politics by the military junta in Greece, which sought to replace Makarios with a leader who would more aggressively advance the cause of *enosis*. In 1974, Turkish military forces moved onto the island, ostensibly to protect Turkish Cypriots in the north.

The limits of current approaches

Current approaches to understanding the Cyprus problem focus almost exclusively on intercommunal divisions. Some disagreement persists as to

the primary driver of these tensions, especially regarding the degree to which they predate British colonial rule. However, two important assumptions are shared. The first is that the two communities are relatively homogeneous. Even when acknowledging the social construction of Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities, extant studies tend to conceptualize and report a shared set of anxieties and preferences for each group. This is particularly evident in studies that draw on public opinion data, which routinely report the majority view of each society (Hadjipavlou 2007; Stevens 2016). Far less attention, if any at all, is paid to variation within these groups. A second key assumption concerns the unit of analysis. The majority of studies either focus on the whole of the island or treat one side as a homogeneous population. Consequently, they focus on areas where conflict does or does not persist, rather than investigating who within those areas may be cooperating or competing.

Both assumptions have important policy implications. Because the Cyprus problem is understood as being driven by intercommunal divisions, peace processes focus on improving dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens and/or ensuring group rights. This, however, can also reinforce social divisions – much like the above-mentioned British Legislative Council. Additionally, most peace processes concentrate on the idea of territorial unification and political representation based on ethnicity. This obscures other tensions and peaceful interactions, along with alternative ways in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots organize politically. These complexities are precisely what a relational view of peace seeks to capture.

Behavioral interactions in Cyprus

The first component of a relational peace framework involves behavioral interaction (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). This includes three main elements: deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation. The initial two elements have evolved in different and sometimes contradictory ways within and across Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. There is significantly less variation when it comes to cooperation within and between these groups.

Deliberation in Cyprus

Deliberation refers to "the exchange of views combined with actors involved giving reasons for their positions" (Söderström et al. 2021: 489). The establishment of, and participation in, political processes whereby key conflict issues can be addressed without turning to violence is a key indicator of

this component. Parliament, the education sector, the media, and formal peace talks stand out as four of the most important arenas for political discussion in Cyprus. Yet, perhaps counterintuitively, there has been more room for deliberation between the two communities than within each of them. One reason for this is that the conflict in Cyprus has been as much a struggle over the territory of the island as it has been a battle for hegemony within each community (Loizos 1998; Lacher and Kaymak 2005).

Deliberation within the Greek Cypriot community

The first parliamentary elections in Cyprus were held on July 31, 1960. Rather than the parliament becoming a site for deliberation, however, infighting among Greek Cypriot leaders quickly undermined the efficacy of this legislative body. Many Greek Cypriot politicians worried, for instance, that the 1960 constitution was a symbol of defeat for their community. Consequently, they urged Archbishop Makarios to advance constitutional modifications that favored Greek over Turkish Cypriots (Souter 1984; Richmond 2002).

The secret right-wing nationalist group known as EOK, or the Akritas organization, was particularly active in advancing this cause. It was formed by Greek Cypriot community leaders and a number of cabinet members. In 1963, EOK authored a plan that formally called for the weakening of the Turkish Cypriot wing of the government and pursuit once more of *enosis*, or the political union of Cyprus with Greece (Necatigil 1993). The influence of EOK, along with the refusal of Turkish Cypriot legislatures to approve fiscal legislation, eventually led Makarios to introduce constitutional amendments that sparked a constitutional crisis and intercommunal violence in 1963–1964.

The archbishop acted in part to appease right-wing nationalists within his community. However, he did not go far enough for them. Even as intercommunal fighting abated in 1967, dissent from public officials within the Greek Cypriot community intensified. Yet Makarios's attention remained on reestablishing political stability on the island rather than union with Greece after his reelection in 1968 (Mayes 1981; Assos 2018). This policy increasingly frustrated a number of religious and nationalist leaders. The former included three of the highest-ranking bishops on the island (i.e., the Metropolitans of Paphos, Kition, and Kyrenia), who called for Makarios's resignation as president in 1973. As discussed further below, this not only undercut political discussion on the island, but also contributed to forms of domination that put a check on public dissent.

The media in Cyprus reflected similar tensions to those in parliament during the 1960s and 1970s. Even though there were both right-wing and

left-wing TV stations and radio channels, the right dominated in terms of number and resources. As a result, right-wing views were broadcast much more widely and leftist positions were regularly dismissed as propaganda. Close ties between specific print media outlets and political parties persist today (Avraamidou and Psaltis 2019). However, the disparity has been reduced. Since at least the 1980s, the majority of dailies, regardless of political position, have been churning out papers seven days a week (Vassiliadou 2007).

A similar proliferation has occurred with broadcast media. The Cyprus Broadcasting Service enjoyed a monopoly and operated as a semi-governmental organization until 1990. Since then, Cypriots have increasingly turned to private channels. These are predominately owned by Greek or Turkish multimedia conglomerates. Thus, even as state policies ensure freedom of expression and press, a cultural connection to Greece or Turkey and a shared national view are still reinforced via the broadcast media.

The education sector provides a more contemporary example of stifled attempts to promote deliberation within the Greek Cypriot community. Ethnic nationalism remains a central theme in school curricula on the island. Until quite recently, Greek Cypriots were taught the history only of Greece. And even with the introduction of a history of Cyprus to textbooks and classrooms, considerably less space and time is allotted to the island's past compared with Greek history (Koullapis 2002). A 2004 report from the Ministry of Education and Culture in the Republic of Cyprus went so far as to conclude, "the ideological-political framework of contemporary Cypriot [sic] education remains Greek-Cypriot centered, narrowly ethnocentric and culturally monolithic" (as cited in Papadakis 2008: 134–135).

Efforts by some Greek Cypriot politicians to reform the curricula remain unsuccessful. In 2008, a newly elected leftist government established a committee to produce a revised framework for teaching the island's history. The committee charged with reforming the history curriculum consisted of five academics who consulted with a number of teacher-led working groups. The final proposal that emerged focused on substantive knowledge and a single narrative approach (Perikleous 2010). However, a center-right government which took power in 2013 froze the process before the curriculum could be implemented.

Nevertheless, deliberation around the 2004 Annan Plan offers some hope that discourse among Greek Cypriot leaders might be broadening and, at the same time, the efficacy of ethnic outbidding waning. Ethnic outbidding refers to a "process where ethnically-based political parties take increasingly extreme ideological positions as a means of distancing themselves from rival parties' (Stewart and McGauvran 2020: 405). The Democratic Party (DIKO) and the Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK), in particular, engaged in

this process in the period leading up to the public referendum on the Annan Plan by appealing to Greek Cypriot concerns around property rights, security, and collective identity (Avraamidou 2018; Amaral 2019). And these appeals did achieve their short-term goal: the majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the peace agreement, as discussed at the start of this chapter. However, ethnic outbidding did not lead to subsequent electoral gains for either party nor did it escalate to violence. Rather, the Democratic Rally (DISY) party peacefully maintained its dominance in elections despite supporting the referendum when the majority of its members and the public did not (Vural and Peristianis 2008).

One key reason why ethnic outbidding may have worked for the referendum but not for subsequent voting lies in the difference in frames employed by the two sides (Moore et al. 2014). Despite advice from the opposition parties' own communication advisors to avoid "brutal patriotic propaganda" and "soften their language towards moderation," DIKO, EDEK, and other groups adopted more ideologically extreme positions than DISY during and after the referendum (as cited in Moore et al. 2014: 172–173). In contrast, DISY employed an adaptable and prognostic framing strategy. It emphasized, for instance, pragmatic gains to increase the influence of Cyprus within European institutions (Katsourides 2014). At the same time, DISY selectively drew on identity issues during election periods, which included slogans stating that "Cyprus is Greek" (Moore et al. 2014: 174, see also Sandal and Loizides 2013). Thus, deliberations over the 2004 Annan Plan suggest that while ethnic outbidding has not entirely disappeared from the Cypriot landscape, political elites that also give explicit, strategic reasons for their actions have fared better in the long term. Moreover, the non-violent, public disagreement that occurred during the 2004 referendum stands in stark contrast to the belligerent interactions between groups with competing viewpoints in the 1960s.

Deliberation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities

While deliberation within the Greek Cypriot community remains muted, the exchange of competing views between the two communities has been a central feature of peace talks since even before partition. Many analyses capture this. However, they also often point to intercommunal, rather than intracommunal, differences as the reason why talks break down.

Following the reelection of Archbishop Makarios in 1968, for example, UN-sponsored talks began to develop a system of local government which would have given Turkish Cypriots a degree of local autonomy (Polyviou 1980). The main representatives at these meetings were the presidents of

the communal chambers, Glafkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriot side and Rauf Raif Denktaş on the Turkish Cypriot side. These formal discussions offered the space to present both competing views and the reasons behind them. However, no consensus was reached by 1970, at which time Secretary-General U Thant called off the talks, blaming both sides' leaders for their inability to compromise (Mirbagheri 2014). As discussed above, one major constraint on the Greek Cypriot leadership was intracommunal pressure from religious and political elites to hold out for full union with Greece. Indeed, the more Makarios tried to focus on political stability rather than *enosis*, the more opposition he faced from within his community.

Talks in 1977 made substantially more progress. This time President Makarios and Vice-President Denktaş met directly. After five rounds of UN-managed talks, the two leaders signed a four-point agreement confirming that any future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation. Other details were to be worked out at a later time, but the death of Makarios in August 1977 prevented such an outcome. Instead, Spyros Achilleos Kyprianou, the archbishop's successor and leader of the Democratic Party, rejected the plan in 1979 (Souter 1984).

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail all of the peace talks that have taken place over the past five decades. Collectively they demonstrate that deliberation between the two communities has not been absent. They also indicate that there is more room for political dissent within the Greek Cypriot community than there is between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Take the most recent round of stalled UN-sponsored peace talks, which began in 2017. After initial optimism, the special advisor appointed to lead the effort, Jane Holl Lute, reported after an April 2019 meeting that the two sides seemed more divided than ever and subsequently recommended the negotiations be suspended indefinitely (Congressional Research Service 2019). This episode also raises questions about other factors that can influence the space for dialogue. Non-domination is one important permissive condition.

Non-domination in Cyprus

Non-domination refers to a freedom from the arbitrary influence of a more powerful actor. In line with the Introduction of this volume, I operationalize non-domination as the extent to which elites and others adapt or moderate their behavior in the shadow of more powerful actors (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). This is an especially apt allusion for Cyprus. The two communities literally live under the shadow of each other's communal symbols, with flags and other nationalist images prolific on the island.

Accordingly, I look at both explicit and implicit forms of coercion in this section.

Domination within the Greek Cypriot community

Violence or the threat of violence characterized many relations between Greek Cypriot elites and community members before partition. During the insurgency war of the 1950s, for instance, EOKA killed far more civilians than British security forces did. This was because they targeted defectors from the group and local leaders that cooperated with British authorities. Moreover, they often conducted the assassination of defectors publicly with the explicit aim of deterring similar behavior in the future (see French 2015: 111–114).

Following Makarios's reelection in 1968 and his refusal to further advance the cause of unification with Greece, General Georgios Grivas formed EOKA-B as a successor organization to the insurgent group he had led a decade earlier. It was supported by a number of pro-*enosis* members in parliament, as well as clergy in the Church of Cyprus. For several years, the organization engaged in a campaign of sabotage and civilian attacks that culminated in a short-lived coup against Archbishop Makarios in July 1974 (Assos 2018). Makarios weathered that attempt, in part thanks to the Efedriko, a special police force he created with support from the leaders of EDEK.

Over the years, this type of violence has given way to less explicit – but no less influential – forms of coercion, and indeed domination. The most notable is an ethos that Loizos characterizes as "obsessive ethnic nationalism" (Loizos 1998: 40). This perspective not only limits room for debate but actively demonizes those who express opposition and demands they be silenced. Its persistence is particularly striking not just in the school curricula discussed above, but also in how teachers in Cyprus structure their classrooms and lessons. A number of studies, for example, find that teachers are hesitant to discuss controversial periods in the past, especially those that challenge one-sided victimization narratives (see Zembylas 2015). Thus, even when the threat of violence is removed, institutionalized norms continue to shape the behavior of educators on the island.

Self-censorship among elites and within the broader Greek Cypriot community is another marker of this persistent ethos. For instance, during fieldwork I conducted in Nicosia in the winter of 2015, most of my interlocutors regulated what they did and did not share about the past. Discussion of intercommunal violence or tension no longer appears to be an entirely taboo subject. However, when I would bring up specific events or actors, my conversation partners, especially those older than fifty, would quickly steer the conversation back to general terms. Part of the reason for this may

have been that I was an outsider. However, Cypriot-born scholar Papadakis (2006) observed similar behavior during his fieldwork in the 1990s. One particularly telling example comes from his time in coffee shops, which were rigidly split along ideological lines. Certain cafes hosted right-wing nationalist party leaders and members, such as the Progressive Front and the Democratic National Party, and others were for leftist party leaders and members, the most notable being the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL). Both of our experiences suggest that even in the absence of societal violence, Greek Cypriots remain guarded in their political discussions and behavior.

Domination between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities

Forms of symbolic domination persist even more between the two communities than within Greek Cypriot society. In the north, an image of the flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is displayed on the side of Beşparmaklar mountain. Next to the image is the quotation "How happy is the one who says 'I am a Turk.'" Both are impossible to miss when approaching Nicosia. Furthermore, in 2009, a Greek Cypriot Member of the European Parliament submitted an official complaint about the symbols, describing them as an "unprecedented daily provocation" and a "hostile action" (Papadopoulou 2009).

Such symbolism is, of course, not absent south of the partition line. In 1987, a ten-meter-high bronze statue of Makarios III was erected outside the archbishop's palace in the capital. It stood as a towering landmark until 2008, when it was moved to the archbishop's mausoleum in the Troodos mountains. Speculation remains as to whether its position facing toward the northern end of the island is intentional (Assos 2018).

The symbols that dominate the skyline also overshadow the streets of Cyprus. The Greek flag is an example par excellence. One can hardly travel around the Republic of Cyprus without spotting the "sky blue and white" on homes, stores, stadiums, ships, and even beach resorts. On Greek national holidays, the numbers increase exponentially. And the impact of this practice is unambiguous. Turkish Cypriots routinely state that they see the Greek flag as a symbol of "domination, degradation, siege, and violence" that embodies all of their negative experiences prior to 1960 (Anastasiou 2002: 587). The seriousness of this issue led the UN to go so far during the 1990s as to regulate when Greek or Turkish flags could be flown in villages that bordered the Green Line (Papadakis 1997). Despite this effort, however, the number of flags has swelled in recent years.

The symbolic domination within and across communities has reinforced social divisions and produced contestation around the physical development

of the island (Björkdahl and Kappler 2017: 13–31). And while several peace movements have tried to reshape the politics of these physical places, elites and local media outlets continue to exploit them for their political ends. For example, in a 2004 speech opposing the Annan Peace Plan, President Papadopoulos addressed the public as "Greek Cypriot people" – a term that had not been used in decades and before then used exclusively by Archbishop Makarios (Cyprus News Agency 2004). Papadopoulos's speech resulted in a spontaneous mass gathering in front of the presidential palace with hundreds waving Cypriot flags and, ultimately, the failure of that peace plan (Loizides 2007).

Cooperation in Cyprus

If deliberation and non-domination concern the external and internal space to express dissent, cooperation shifts attention to activities that bring communities together. This involves taking steps that benefit both sides, as well as adopting common goals and identities (Söderström et al. 2021: 492). Despite various attempts to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities together, including a bi-communal citizen-based peace movement that has grown since the 1990s, cooperation within and between the two communities remains elusive.[6]

Formal peace talks stand out as the most illustrative examples of a failure to identify common goals at the elite level. Since 2004, Greek and Turkish leaders have increasingly talked in terms of "convergences" related to EU affairs, governance, economics, citizenship, and disputed individual property. This term is notable, as it embodies the overriding frame for more recent negotiations – that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed (Congressional Research Service 2019). Leaders no longer seem willing or able to enter into agreements like the 1997 Makarios–Denktaş accords, which settled the federation question but left other issues on the table. If anything, the interests and goals that might unite the two sides have only become opaquer.

A 2015 public opinion survey suggests that consensus within and between communities remains just as elusive at the local level (Psaltis et al. 2017: 72–75). In particular, efforts to engender a shared identity for inhabitants of the island remain hampered by what that might entail in practice. Two thirds of the survey respondents from the Republic of Cyprus, for instance, favored the development of a common "Cypriot identity." Sixteen percent, however, expressed that such a project would also be detrimental to national interests. Moreover, when they were asked what factors were key for a "Cypriot identity," sharp divisions within and between the two communities emerged. For instance, one third of Greek Cypriot respondents said a love

of the homeland should form the basis of a common identity, whereas a mere 2 percent of Turkish Cypriot respondents shared the same view. Instead, Turkish Cypriots were much more likely to point to a shared past, culture, and temperament. There was also disagreement about the best timing for cultivating a common Cypriot identity. Turkish Cypriots were three times as likely as Greek Cypriots to say that a common identity was a prerequisite for any permanent solution. Greek Cypriots were again divided, with nearly a quarter stating that the development of a common identity should never happen. Other research, including a 2013 interview study conducted with youth in Nicosia, corroborates these patterns (Leonard 2013). This, undoubtedly, also has effects on the subjective attitudes of each group and their idea of relationship with one another.

Subjective attitudes in Cyprus

Peaceful relations involve more than just behaviors; they also encompass how groups perceive one another. These subjective attitudes include patterns of mutual recognition and trust. I assess mutual recognition by identifying explicit and symbolic acts of acceptance of the other's existence. Trust, in turn, involves a psychological state whereby actors have a positive expectation of the intentions or behavior of another and can express vulnerability (Söderström et al. 2021: 494). Like behavioral interactions, attitudes have moved in contrasting directions within and between the communities in Cyprus.

Recognition and trust within the Greek Cypriot community

Following independence, the infighting among elites was marked by a refusal to accept those with competing visions for the future of Cyprus. Consider again the coup attempt against Makarios in July 1974. In many ways, the archbishop became a victim of the ideology he spearheaded in the 1950s. During the insurgency war, the motto of Greek Cypriot religious leaders and EOKA fighters was "*enosis* and only *enosis*" (French 2015: 25). Yet when the archbishop tried to consolidate his authority after British withdrawal through a loose coalition known as the Patriotic Front, some were unwilling to abandon that call. And, as discussed above, a small, but influential opposition movement consisting of right-wing religious and political officials eventually tried to forcibly remove Makarios from office. This example also highlights the relational aspect of recognition; it is an interaction between an actor's asserted image and the image perceived by others (Lindemann 2011).

Since at least the 1974 partition, Greek Cypriot politics have settled into a more routine set of activities with four major parties: DIKO, DISY, EDEK, and AKEL. Moreover, the Republic's proportional representation system has necessitated compromise and coalition-building since no single party enjoys the support of a majority of voters. For instance, the left-wing party EDEK formed an alliance with the centrist party DIKO during the early 2000s. Together they promoted a closer cultural, though not political, connection with Greece (Peristianis 2006).

This is not to say that a thick form of recognition has emerged. Elections remain deeply contested, especially between candidates on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum (i.e., those of DIKO and AKEL). Still, a thin form of recognition has developed whereby elites accept that competing parties have the equal right to participate in politics. For example, while communist parties were banned from 1931 to 1941 and during the insurgency war, the current communist party, AKEL, has participated in every election since 1960 (Dunphy and Bale 2007).

Mutual recognition developed among political elites by the 1970s, but social spaces continued to reflect ideological differences for several decades more. As discussed above, coffee shops in cities and villages were rigidly split as late as the 1990s, with some establishments being reserved for right-wing nationalist parties and others hosting leftist organizations. Not only did political officials and members regulate which cafes they frequented, but Greek Cypriots also self-policed the reading materials they brought with them (Papadakis 2006). This latter point is a striking example of the lack of mutual trust that persisted more broadly within the Greek Cypriot community for several decades as party affiliation created and reinforced negative expectations about the other.

What conclusions can we draw about levels of mutual trust today? It is difficult to infer attitudes from behavior, but the relatively peaceful relations within the Greek Cypriot community suggest that stereotyping and prejudices along ideological lines are minimal. Public opinion surveys would be an even more effective way to measure popular trust, but these can be difficult to implement and interpret in Cyprus. One reason for this is that surveys typically take the ethnic community as their unit of analysis and report only aggregate responses. This provides insight into how average levels of trust have changed between the two communities over time, but we still know far less about change in subjective attitudes within the Greek Cypriot community (or Turkish Cypriot society, for that matter). To my knowledge, no surveys have been designed to intentionally compare differences in the attitudes of citizens in major cities of the Republic of Cyprus. Additionally, there is the self-censorship discussed above, raising questions about how openly Greek Cypriots would share their views if asked. The polls cited in

this chapter do provide the demographic backgrounds of respondents, but this is not always the case. Of course, it is not always possible to avoid all bias in a sample. Yet several surveys seem to actually introduce it by restricting their sample owing to the preferences of funding organizations, rather than methodological grounds. For example, Webster (2005) relied on data from an omnibus survey conducted by a market research firm. That organization excluded respondents aged over sixty-five because that demographic was of limited interest to the commercial organization. The study, despite this sampling bias, still claimed that the data were a generally representative sample of the government-controlled areas of Cyprus (Webster 2005: 82).

While there may be reasons to suspect that public trust has increased within the Greek Cypriot community, the same cannot be said of political trust. Most notably, the 2012–2013 economic crisis appears to have engendered suspicion of political elites as a whole and contributed to voter disillusionment (Triga 2017). According to the 2013 Eurobarometer survey, for instance, 91 percent of Cypriots responded that they did not trust their political parties (Eurobarometer 2013). This ranked Cyprus as the second highest on this measure in Europe that year. Moreover, confidence in political parties has yet to rebound, with some 88 percent of Cypriots still expressing no trust in political parties nearly five years later (Eurobarometer 2017). Thus, even as political parties in Cyprus have gradually come to recognize one another, the divide between political parties and the Cypriot populace has grown.

Recognition and trust between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities

While intracommunal divisions and non-recognition characterized party politics in the years leading up to and immediately after independence, connections *between* workers' parties in Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities stand out as a remarkable example of intercommunal recognition and trust. During the 1930s and 1940s, for example, Greek and Turkish Cypriots frequently interacted through left-wing workers' institutions (Papadakis 2006). Later too, a clear sense of mutual recognition persisted throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. One telling indicator of this is the practice of official and unofficial AKEL publications reporting attacks by Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots (Papadakis 2006: 72).

Other, especially more contemporary, examples of mutual recognition are few and far between. One is the outcome of the Aziz vs. Republic of Cyprus case in the European Court of Human Rights, which restored some individual civil rights to Turkish Cypriots residing in the Republic of Cyprus (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2008). It has not, however, restored any of

the communal rights laid out in the 1960 constitution. Another example of a thin form of mutual recognition is Article Six of the current constitution of Cyprus, which explicitly prohibits discrimination of either Greek or Turkish Cypriots based on race.

Far more common, however, are instances of non-recognition or active attempts to erase the history of the other community. Here the most conspicuous example is the desecration of cemeteries and worship spaces on both sides of the island (Björkdahl and Kappler 2017: 36). North of the Green Line, crosses have been broken off tombstones and icons destroyed. In the Republic of Cyprus, the burial grounds of Turkish Cypriots have been abandoned and vandalized. All of this is compounded by the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have limited interaction because of the formal partition of the island. Nearly three-quarters of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots report they do not maintain any relations and/or contact with members of the other community (Psaltis et al. 2017: 72–75). This isolation has created conditions that make it difficult to advance mutual recognition or trust between elites or citizens. It also has implications for the third component of relational peace.

Ideas of the relationship in Cyprus

Relational peace involves not just behavioral interactions and subjective attitudes, but also actors' ideas of how they relate to one another. As discussed in the Introduction to this volume, the idea of relationship lies along a continuum from foe to fellow to friend. What demarcates these categories is the extent to which they hold a shared vision about society. Here I evaluate these on the basis of words and deeds of political elites. Like the other components, relations within the Greek Cypriot community have taken a form that differs from those between them and their Turkish Cypriot counterparts.

The contemporary Greek Cypriot community, especially at the elite level, is best characterized as a fellowship. One indicator of this is the evolution of the House of Representatives. Despite its shaky beginnings, the Cypriot parliament has emerged as a deliberative body where parties compete in non-violent ways to advance their vision for the future of Cyprus (Charalambous 2009). As discussed above, political leaders now recognize each other as peers and even form coalitions in order to govern. But this does not mean there are warm feelings between them or that they share a single vision of what the future of Cyprus entails.

Similar ideas characterize the broader Greek Cypriot community. Roughly half of respondents to public opinion polls conducted in 2006 and 2007,

for instance, selected "Cypriot" in response to a question that asked how they personally identified (Faustmann 2009). Another third of respondents chose the category of equally Greek and Cypriot. The smallest percentage of respondents identified as more Greek than Cypriot. A more recent poll, conducted in 2015, shows similar results (Psaltis et al. 2017: 72–75). These surveys demonstrate that while debate persists, disagreements are construed as legitimate.

Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have evolved differently. Prior to independence, one could make an argument that a fellowship also existed at this level. The two communities acted more or less separately prior to the mid-twentieth century (Ioannides 2014). However, each group accepted the right of the other group to exist and cooperated through a number of political institutions as outlined above. The division of the island has once again isolated the two communities, but now the overarching idea of relationship may be more that of foes than that of fellows, especially at the elite level.

This was neither an inevitable outcome nor did it occur uniformly within the two societies. In 1963, Turkish Cypriot officials withdrew from government following Makarios's proposed amendments favoring Greek Cypriots. Yet even after those formal ties were severed, left-wing parties on the two sides continued to express strong feelings of mutual solidarity until 1974. Their leaders expressed both a common ideological emphasis on being "Cypriot first" and a shared sense of victimization from nationalist parties within their communities (Papadakis 2006). Moreover, as discussed above, they publicly reported attacks by members of their own societies.

Interactions among Greek and Turkish elites are now reduced to formal peace talks. It may be tempting to see this as a form of fellowship, as both sides recognize the authority of the other and are engaging in a common exercise to advance a more lasting peace. However, a deeper look at negotiations offers a more cautionary note. For instance, a round of negotiations between President Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu in 2010 raises questions about whether the two sides really see one another as worthy of respect or simply engage in talks because external forces pressure them into doing so. The meeting was held under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General's special advisor in Cyprus, Alexander Downer. After just four months, Eroglu expressed his frustration with the process in an interview with Greek Cypriot press and accused the Greek Cypriots of treating Turkish Cypriot positions with contempt (*Cyprus Mail* 2010). Moreover, in the most recent round of talks (2017–2019) doubt has even been expressed about terms that were thought to be settled more than a decade ago, such as the formation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (Andreou 2020).

Conclusion

A relational view of peace underscores the complexity of associations that exist both within and across communities in Cyprus. Most importantly, this chapter highlights considerable variation within Greek Cypriot society, an issue overlooked by a negative peace framework. Attention to within-group competition and cooperation demonstrates that the Cyprus conflict is less static than past analyses suggest. It further brings to light a problematic asymmetry between intercommunal and intracommunal relations. Efforts to advance the former are often undermined and exacerbated by within-group differences. A relational peace framework also shifts the analytic lens away from ethno-nationalism and foreign interests to the strategic priorities of and actions within each community. This underscores how intercommunal relations are difficult to advance while within-group competition is high. Finally, a relational view of peace raises important questions about civil-society peacebuilding efforts that aim to improve dialogue across communities. This is a worthy goal. But so too should be efforts to increase the diversity of viewpoints within Greek Cypriot society.

Cyprus is not alone in facing such challenges. This chapter and the relational peace framework more broadly can speak to other longstanding interethnic conflicts, especially those where domestic identities overlap with regional powers. These include active conflicts such as those in Kashmir and Myanmar and places where peace deals have been signed but tensions persist, such as Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and South Sudan. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict also stands out for its striking similarities to Cyprus. An armed struggle against British rule led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Intercommunal violence preceded and continued long after British withdrawal. And an endless series of peace processes have taken the division between the two communities as their starting point. As in Cyprus, internal politics within Israeli and Palestinian societies have played a pivotal role in undermining attempts at a lasting peace. The most notable example is the role of factional politics within the Palestine Liberation Organization, which limited Arafat's bargaining position during the Camp David Accords. It is telling that foreign policy and conflict scholars have not explored that factor until very recently (see Anziska 2018).

This chapter is, of course, not without its limitations. The most notable of these concerns what is not analyzed. I do not examine variation within the Turkish Cypriot communities, nor do I look at Greek- or Turkish-language sources. A more systematic study of the Turkish Cypriot community and primary sources would add nuance to the investigation. Whether it would contradict the findings is unclear. If anything, a deeper dive into the deliberations of each community might reveal more, not less, internal dissent.

Moreover, the examined sources are public and, for the most part, represent a consensus view of the political parties. These were most likely preceded by internal debate, which would only further demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the communities. Nevertheless, attention to the Turkish Cypriot community and the analysis of primary documents in a future study would be a welcome way to provide additional insight into communities and a peace that are often assumed to be uniform and static.

This chapter also has not systematically explored the interplay between the components of the relational peace framework. Rather, it has pointed out several ways in which the components can be mutually reinforcing. Questions remain as to whether certain components are more influential or should be prioritized by peacebuilders at particular times or during particular activities, such as formal negotiations, or in a certain order. Additional study could shed light on these issues and identify specific mechanisms that might build on advances in one area to promote change in another.

To conclude, analysts all too quickly apply a negative peace framework to interethnic conflicts such as Cyprus. They construe conflict parties as homogeneous communities and frame failed efforts to promote a more lasting peace as a consequence of relations between, not within, these societies. The relational peace framework and the case of Cyprus challenge this conventional approach. They draw attention to opportunities for cooperation, while also providing a cautionary note that some relations can remain competitive and resistant to change over time. Interactions may also not necessarily move in a linear direction, as for example with efforts to identify common goals during elite negotiations. Shared understandings that characterized peace talks in the late 1990s, for instance, no longer seem to be held in common. It is, therefore, never just a simple question of settlement or no settlement between two communities.

Notes

1 These include the 2008–2010 Christofias–Talat negotiations, the 2010–2012 Christofias–Eroglu negotiations, the 2014 Anastasiades–Eroglu negotiations, and the 2015–2017 Anastasiades–Akinci peace talks.
2 Cyprus also boasts one of the longest-standing peacekeeping missions, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which began in 1964.
3 In line with the extant scholarship on Cyprus, I refer to the Cyprus problem, conflict, dispute, stalemate, and issue interchangeably. For consistency, I use the first nomenclature most often.
4 The archival research focused primarily on the Emergency Period (1955–1959) and the years immediately following independence. I reviewed records from the War, Foreign, and Colonial Offices, along with the Foreign and Commonwealth

Offices' migrated archives. The latter has been available to the public only since 2013.

5 For a general history of politics on the island, see Souter 1984; Holland 1998; Papadakis et al. 2006; Dodd 2010; Ker-Lindsay 2011; Bryant and Papadakis 2012.

6 For a summary of the peace movement, see Anastasiou 2002.

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5

"They treat us like visitors in our own house": relational peace and local experiences of the state in Myanmar

Elisabeth Olivius and Jenny Hedström

In 2011, the inauguration of a semi-civilian government led by General Thein Sein marked the start of an ambitious reform agenda that gave rise to widespread hopes that Myanmar's long civil war was finally coming to an end.[1] Subsequently, economic and political liberalization and a renewed peace process fundamentally reshaped both the political landscape in Myanmar and its international relations. Further fueling optimism, the 2015 general election was won by the National League for Democracy, the party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the new government took office without interference from the previous government or the Myanmar Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw (Thawnghmung 2017). Yet, in 2021, the military took back power in a coup d'état, ending the decade of reforms (Jordt et al. 2021; Thawnghmung and Noah 2021; Pedersen 2022; Ye Myo Hein 2022).

While Myanmar's transition from a full-fledged military junta to a quasi-democratic government faced numerous challenges (Aung-Thwin 2014), many conflict-affected areas nevertheless saw a drastic reduction in violence during this reform period. This was the case in the two regions that we focus on in this chapter: Kayah State and Mon State. In both of these areas, ceasefires between the main armed insurgent groups and the government held from 2012 until the 2021 military coup, and the number of battle-related deaths was close to zero (UCDP 2018). According to conventional definitions, these regions, during this decade of reforms, were no longer scenes of war.

However, this narrative of successful peacebuilding is troubled when read alongside local narratives that capture how the post-war order was experienced by people living in conflict-affected areas. For local ethnic-minority communities, the end of war and the beginning of reforms in 2011 did not necessarily mean there was peace. In many of our interviews, the ceasefire period was described as a continuation of the war's many injustices, marked by discrimination, marginalization, and fear. Thus, while the armed conflict ended and a bird's eye view rendered an image of an improving security situation, people in the two areas emphasized how wartime dynamics

continued to shape their lives, and did not agree that they, or the areas in which they lived, were at peace. Based on a study of local experiences and understandings of peace conducted in 2019, this chapter explores how these discrepancies between seemingly contradictory narratives of war and peace can be understood.

In our analysis, we argue that a relational analysis of peace helps us make sense of this gap. By applying a relational perspective in our analysis of peace in Kayah State and Mon State, we illustrate how the fundamental logics of key conflict relationships between the Myanmar state and ethnic-minority groups and communities were not transformed by the peace process but merely manifested themselves in new ways: armed violence was replaced by other forms of domination, underpinned by inequality, non-recognition, and distrust. However, these relational dynamics are rendered invisible by an assessment of peace focusing on indicators such as levels of violence and the status of peace agreements. Instead, uncovering them requires a grounded analysis that places people's everyday experiences and perceptions of peace and war at its center. The relational peace framework (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction), with its focus on relationships and the attitudes and ideas that underpin them, is a useful analytical tool for capturing how peace, or the absence of it, is experienced in a particular empirical context.

In the analysis of our cases, we focus on the relationships that have been at the heart of decades of war in these areas, namely those between the Myanmar state, often embodied by its military, the Tatmadaw, and local actors such as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), civil society organizations, and civilian communities. Although these local actors are by no means homogeneous, our data show that their experiences of interactions with the state, and their ideas of what peace is and should be, have significant commonalities. Thus, in this chapter, we explore how local actors (broadly defined) experience their relationship with the state; and how this has changed over time, in particular during the transitional period which began in 2011 and ended with the coup d'état in 2021. Our analysis draws on focus group discussions, interviews, and participant observation with local civilians, civil society activists, and members of EAOs. This means that the chapter primarily builds on data capturing the behavior, subjective attitudes, and ideas of the relationship of various local actors in ethnic-minority areas. However, secondary sources are used to verify local accounts of state behavior in relation to actors in the regions at hand. Our focus on the perspectives of civilians, local activists, and members and representatives of non-state groups allows us to place local experiences, aspirations, and perspectives at the center of efforts to theorize and analyze relational peace.

The predominant picture that emerges from our interview data is that local actors in Mon and Kayah States perceived their relationship to the Myanmar state as being characterized by top-down domination, the imposition of ethnic Bamar superiority, and suppression and non-recognition of ethnic-minority identities, histories, and political aspirations. Relationships during the period of political transition were marked by significant continuities of war, even though armed violence decreased significantly. State domination of minorities was during this period often carried out through other – and legal – means, such as arbitrary land confiscation facilitated by new land reforms, and repression of political protesters justified under different parliamentary acts. At the same time, and as compared with periods of active armed conflict before 2011, we find more examples of deliberation between state agents and local actors, suggesting that the state gave at least a thin form of recognition of ethnic-minority groups as counterparts in negotiations. Local actors were also increasingly making use of state channels such as government departments and commissions to make claims on the state and protest against state policies and actions they disagreed with, signaling a degree of recognition vis-à-vis the central state and its authority.

Our application of the relational peace framework to cases which are somewhat removed from an ideal definition of relational peace demonstrates the framework's value as an analytical tool for capturing specific features of a particular conflict context. It helps us to pinpoint areas and issues that prevent the emergence of a sustainable and legitimate peace, and to detect possible pathways of transformation. The analysis provides insights of wider relevance into why post-war orders frequently remain unequal, insecure, and fragile for years, or even decades, after the end of war, and helps explain the gap that exists between a bird's eye view of progress and relative security and on-the-ground experiences of insecurity and coercion. A relational analysis of peace also contributes to recent scholarship in critical and feminist peace studies that challenges the notion of a neat dichotomy between war and peace, and explores how war and peace coexist and overlap (Klem 2018; Gusic 2020; Porter 2016). Moreover, our analysis adds to the growing literature on everyday peace, locating and exploring how peace is manifested and experienced in people's everyday practices and interactions (Mac Ginty 2014; Blomqvist et al. 2021; Lee 2021; Ware and Ware 2021). More specifically, our findings add to previous work on everyday peace indicators (see for example Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017). Our analysis shows that in addition to peace indicators relating to security and basic needs, which are often highlighted in this literature, relational dimensions of peace such as recognition, trust, and political equality are also highly significant for local people in conflict-affected contexts. As our cases exemplify, these aspects

of peace are not necessarily perceived as less important or less immediate in contexts where human insecurity is persistent and widespread. A relational analysis of local experiences and perceptions of peace thereby contributes to a fuller, more nuanced understanding of peace.

Contexts, material, and methods

Most of independent Myanmar's history has been marked by military dictatorship, war and oppression (Callahan 2003; Agatha Ma and Kusakabe 2015; Nhkum Bu Lu 2016), with ethnic-minority areas often experiencing the brunt of violence. In 2011, an ambitious reform agenda was initiated by General Thein Sein, resulting in widespread political and economic reforms, including the commencement of elections, a nationwide peace process, and the opening up of the country to investments and foreign aid (Thawnghmung 2017). While these were promising developments, violence and discrimination in ethnic-minority areas did not necessarily cease, and in some cases even intensified (Kachin Women's Association Thailand 2016; Sadan 2016; UNHCR 2019; International Court of Justice 2019). In February 2021, the military took power in a coup d'état, effectively ending the decade of reforms, and the country once again descended into chaos, war, and violence.

However, even before the 2021 coup d'état, in many areas of the country populated by ethnic-minority communities, changes resulting from the reforms initiated from 2011 onward were experienced alongside continuities and legacies of war (Olivius and Hedström 2021). This was clear in the two areas addressed in this chapter, Kayah State and Mon State. These areas are both located along Myanmar's southeastern border with Thailand, and have been scenes of armed conflict for decades.

In Kayah State, the smallest of Myanmar's ethnic-minority states, the main ethnic insurgent group is the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), formed in 1957. Over time, splits and breakaway factions led to the establishment of numerous smaller armed groups, creating a complex conflict landscape. Although the KNPP did agree to a ceasefire with the government in 1995, the deal broke down after a mere three months. The breakdown of the ceasefire agreement was followed by an intense period of violence, in which civilians across the state suffered large-scale human rights abuses and forced displacement (Kramer et al. 2018). This included the forced relocation of around 30,000 civilians to army-led displacement camps (Amnesty International 1999). After the start of the transitional period, armed violence decreased, with the KNPP agreeing to a bilateral ceasefire in 2012. Although it was a participant in the national peace talks, it never signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. During the transitional decade,

the area remained mired in widespread poverty, and tensions around state-led reforms and development initiatives in the area were prominent (Hedström and Olivius 2020). Since the coup in 2021, Kayah State has been the focus for brutal counterinsurgency campaigns waged by the state against both resistance fighters and civilians (Irrawaddy 2022; Quinley 2022; Strangio 2022).

Further south, in Mon State, the main insurgent group, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), was established a year after the KNPP, although the armed struggle began already in 1948 (NMSP 1985). Fighting for an independent Monland, the NMSP soon found itself having a complicated relationship with the neigbouring ethnic Karen rebels of the Karen National Union, with whom they sometimes allied and at other times fought for control over land and resources.[2] As in Kayah State, the regime's infamous counterinsurgency campaigns led to widespread human rights abuses across the state, including sexual violence, arbitrary executions, forced labor, land confiscation, and the destruction of villages (South 2003; Human Rights Watch 2005; Lwin Lwin Mon 2018). In June 1995, the NMSP agreed to a ceasefire with the military regime, and in 2012 the party signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the new semi-democratic regime. In 2018 it signed the National Ceasefire Agreement, yet the situation on the ground continued to be tense, with flareups in fighting as recently as November 2019.

The analysis in this chapter draws on qualitative data collected in Kayah State and in Mon State in 2019 by one of the authors (Hedström) and a research assistant (Zin Mar Phyo).[3] Employing an interactive methodology aimed at gauging experiences and perceptions of peace and conflict, we undertook focus group interviews and semi-structured individual interviews with a total of forty-six women and men living in, or from, Kayah State and southern Shan State, and with a total of fifty-five women and men in Mon State. Our interviews focused on three categories of respondent: civilians, including people from a variety of rural and urban locations across Kayah and Mon States; civil society activists, including representatives of peace monitoring groups, women's organizations, youth organizations, farmer's unions, trade unions, refugee organizations, environmental organizations, and more; and representatives from political organizations including non-state armed groups and political parties. While we successfully interviewed the KNPP as well as smaller non-state armed groups in Kayah State, including several pro-government militias, the research in Mon State was impacted by the fighting in November 2019, when a Karen splinter group, together with local Tatmadaw commanders, attacked a NMSP outpost. Following this, planned interviews with splinter and military groups were canceled, leaving us with interviews with the NMSP only. Taken together, our interviews capture the perspectives of a diversity of local actors in the studied regions,

allowing us to trace patterns in how peace is experienced and envisioned, and how relationships and interactions with the Myanmar state relate to these conceptions of peace. As noted above, we do not assume these diverse local actors to be a homogeneous group, but argue that tracing patterns in how relationships to the state are experienced provides important insights into how key conflict dynamics in Myanmar have evolved since the end of armed violence.

Access to the interviewees was arranged through contacts gained through previous research visits to Myanmar, and with the invaluable help of our research assistant, Zin Mar Phyo, who has worked with one of the authors (Hedström) in Myanmar for close to sixteen years. Together, we developed a research protocol informed by feminist ethics, designed to ensure that the ethical standards we strived for were applicable locally and would minimize possible negative consequences for the research participants (Ackerly and True 2010; Brooten and Metro 2014; Hedström 2019). We asked for informed consent ahead of, during, and after each interview, emphasizing to our respondents that they were ultimately in control of the interview, meaning that they could choose to terminate the interview altogether at any moment in time, and should answer questions only if they felt comfortable doing so. We purposefully did not ask for information about traumatic events but kept the questions broad. If and when respondents showed signs of trauma (such as crying) we explained that while we are here to listen to anything they want to tell us, we can take a break at any moment of their choosing, or come back to the interview at another time. Zin Mar Phyo helped facilitate these interviews and, when necessary, provided translation from local languages into English.

Our interviews aimed to identify different local understandings and experiences of peace over time, in relation to ceasefire agreements and other shifts in the dynamics of armed conflict. Using life history diagrams (Söderström 2020; see also Skidmore 2004 for the use of life histories in Myanmar in particular) as a visual methodological tool to identify significant events or circumstances helped to stimulate discussion about the interviewees' own experience and perception of peace and conflict in Myanmar. Life history diagrams were structured by a horizontal timeline (from 1988 to 2019). In interviews, participants were asked to draw a line depicting the level of peace in their lives over time. In focus groups, we also used an exercise where participants were asked to discuss and rank a number of terms (such as "security," "trust," "democracy") in the order of their importance for peace. In some of the interviews we also asked participants to draw maps depicting the most important actors or groups and their relationships to each other. These interactive exercises, which can broadly be described as visual methodologies (Prosser 2012; Söderström 2020), helped to facilitate

discussion about the meaning of peace; the level, presence, or absence of peace; and the nature of key relationships. When ranking peace-related terms, participants in focus groups were asked to discuss the words and arrive at a joint ranking, thus seeking consensus. However, the discussions provided them with space to articulate divergent views and express different perspectives on what peace means to them. When they drew life history diagrams and relationship maps there was no need to agree, but individual drawings provided a good basis for detailed discussions.

Our data primarily capture the perspectives of local actors on their relationship to the central Myanmar state. While our data do include some local government representatives, we prioritized one side of the relational dyads we explore, for reasons that are practical as well as normative: reaching out to state military officials was deemed potentially unsafe and would also not give us the insights into local perspectives this project was seeking. Official state narratives are furthermore easily available in online and print media. While this gives rise to some limitations, for example in our ability to trace asymmetries in subjective conditions or ideas of the relationship within dyads, our data provide detailed, nuanced insights into how peace – or a lack thereof – is experienced and perceived by local populations whose voices are rarely heard. Thus our analysis can provide a fine-grained understanding of the effects, achievements, and shortcomings of recent ceasefires and political transitions in Myanmar as they are experienced by people living in conflict-affected, and therefore hard-to-reach, regions. We argue that the relational peace framework provides useful analytical tools for pinpointing specific characteristics of the post-war order in these areas, and specific issues and gaps where change is needed in order for a sustainable and legitimate peace to emerge.

Our interview data are complemented with secondary sources, including reports and news material. This material is used to verify events described in interviews, and to explore behavioral interactions in particular. Drawing on these sources allows us to examine the behavior of state actors as well as local actors, and to an extent provides insights into the subjective perspectives and motivations of state actors.

Relational peace and local experiences of the state

In the following analysis, we draw on our interview data combined with secondary sources to analyze how behavioral interactions with the state were experienced by local actors in Kayah State and Mon State; how local actors perceived the level of recognition and trust between themselves and the state; and how they articulated ideas about what type of relationship

they had to the state. We draw on the framework developed by Söderström, Åkebo, and Jarstad (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction) and use the components of this framework as tools to guide the analysis of our cases. Thus, in the first section of the analysis, we examine the degrees of non-domination, deliberation, and cooperation between local actors and the state. In the second section, we explore whether and how subjective conditions of relational peace, mutual recognition, and mutual trust are expressed by our respondents in relation to the state. In the third section, we focus on how local actors perceive and describe their relationship to the state; is it a relationship of legitimate coexistence, a relationship of friendship, or something else?

Behavioral interactions: state domination in new forms

As noted, the wars in both Mon and Kayah States were characterized by grave human rights violations, forced displacement, food insecurity, widespread poverty, and political oppression. Local minority populations therefore associate the state with the oppressive and coercive power of the Tatmadaw. Though the reforms initiated in 2011 resulted in a significant reduction in violence as well as changes in political arrangements and relationships, the military was widely perceived as the embodiment of the state, and, despite the democratic election of the National League for Democracy government in 2015, the government and the military were often perceived to be indivisible. When asked to describe the difference between the government and the military, one focus group participant in Mon State succinctly captured this view: "if you cut a lime, one side is the government and the other is the Tatmadaw."[4] As a result, while we do not assume the Myanmar state to be a unitary actor, our analytical point of departure is local experiences of the state, which very often meant experiences of interactions with the Tatmadaw as the most visible and present face of the state.

   While ceasefire agreements signed between the regime and different types of non-state armed organizations reduced violent interactions, they did not address the underlying cause of the war, including political and economic inequality and discrimination. This came across clearly in our interview material. For example, in a focus group discussion in Kayah State, a now middle-aged man recounts decades of traumatic experiences of repeatedly fleeing from the war, missing education, being separated from family members, and being subjected to the campaigns of government counterinsurgency policies. Telling his story, this man explains that "after 2012, after the peace process [was initiated], we could eat a little bit better, our livelihoods are a little bit improved … but the rest of the issues have not improved yet, so we are still in a bad situation."[5] The unresolved issues he mentions refer

to the longstanding discrimination and oppression of ethnic-minority populations. A representative of a Mon armed group expresses similar sentiments, arguing that "after 1995, the fighting reduced, and our freedom of movement and people's livelihood improved. But the things that we are calling for, equality for ethnic people, we have not gotten that."[6] In the lives of local people we learned from, remaining patterns of domination by the state after 2011 were manifested through top-down state practices of ceasefire negotiations, land governance, and political surveillance and repression, rather than armed violence.

One area in which the state was seen as deploying forms of domination and coercion in new forms was negotiations with EAOs. When signing ceasefires, the state sought to pacify armed opponents through granting business concessions. This enriched some leaders of armed insurgent groups, but also led to popular dissatisfaction and predatory economic orders captured by (predominately male) elites (Woods 2011; Brenner 2017; Hedström and Olivius 2020). In our interviews, these strategies were widely rejected as means for peace precisely because they did not change unequal relationships where ethnic-minority actors were subordinate to the state and its army. As noted by a civil society activist in Kayah State, these strategies were premised on the assumption that resources and business opportunities belong to the state and are theirs to give away: this is precisely what ethnic-minority insurgents and broader movements for self-determination have struggled against, and continue to oppose:

> So, when we talk about peace, the Tatmadaw is the key player … it all depends on the Tatmadaw. What the Tatmadaw is doing, it is like they own everything. For example, when they negotiate with the armed groups they say okay we will give this permit, we will give this permit to work a business or to extract these natural resources or something like that. Like they own everything. They are acting like they are the owner, the boss or something like that. So, as long as their mindset is that "only if we allow it, then they can do it" … As long as they have those kinds of concepts, we cannot be at peace among us. Because ideally, the natural resources and everything is owned by the people, not the Tatmadaw. Or any other groups. So, it is not up to them to provide, offering opportunities … it should not be done like that. There should be equality in talking, political dialogue … there should be equality.[7]

Here, peace is conceived of as being possible only in a relationship between equals who deliberate and cooperate, and not in a relationship where one actor dominates the other. While the granting of business concessions to EAOs and associated companies as part of ceasefire deals represents a significant change in behavioral interactions as compared with periods of fighting, these interactions were still characterized by forms of dominance and coercion rather than deliberation and cooperation. Moreover, for civilians

in these areas, "ceasefire capitalism" (Woods 2011), as well as the intensification of state efforts to develop ceasefire areas through investments in energy and infrastructure (Hedström and Olivius 2020), created new forms of insecurity. As expressed by a woman working for an educational civil society organization in Mon State, "we do not have peace because we have to worry about business and development projects, including coal, cement and rock mining which destroy our mountains and causes landslides and deaths."[8]

Issues of land use and ownership, central to ceasefire politics and state strategies for post-war development, stand out in our interview data as an area where local populations experienced state domination and new forms of insecurity. In both Mon and Kayah States, post-war land confiscation for military purposes and to make space for development projects such as dams and industries led to forced displacement, destroyed livelihoods, and continued, and widespread, human insecurity (Hedström and Olivius 2020; MACDO and Barbesgaard 2019). This process was facilitated by new land laws which, in effect, legitimized the move to bring agrarian areas under customary use under the control of the government (Ferguson 2014; Woods 2014; Scurrah, Hirsch, and Woods 2015; Faxon 2017). The majority of the population in rural areas makes a living from subsistence farming, practicing shifting cultivation (*taungya*). However, as land is used customarily, many people do not have any legal documents identifying them as the owners of their land. This positions rural populations, especially in conflict-affected, minority-dominated areas such as Mon and Kayah, as highly vulnerable to land grabbing. Local groups in Kayah State report that more than 50,000 acres of land have been confiscated by state military forces, government agencies, and individual businessmen since the beginning of the country's transition in 2011 (Htoe Myar 2016; Karenni Social Development Center 2016).

In one case, the military confiscated a large area of farmland in Kayah State. When farmers challenged the taking of their land by continuing to plant seeds, seeking to protect their livelihoods, the army brought charges against forty farmers for trespassing, and imprisoned a number of them without trial (Burma News Online 2019). Thus, while army repression used the law rather than violence as its vehicle, signifying a change in behavior post-war, the arbitrary exercise of power and coercion still characterized the army's treatment of minority populations. However, illustrating the complexity of post-war relationships, when state counselor Aung San Suu Kyi visited Kayah State in January 2020, representatives of the affected farmers were granted a meeting with her; she vowed to review the military's land confiscation and lawsuit. While these farmers had their land and livelihoods arbitrarily taken from them without compensation, and their protests met with arrests, there were also at least a veneer of recognition of their grievances by state

representatives, and the occasional example of deliberation. This shows how post-war behavioral interactions between the state and minority actors are characterized by both change and continuity.

Another example, this time from Mon State, demonstrates a similar mix of deliberation and dominance in state–minority relationships. In 2015, large public protests erupted against plans to construct a coal power plant, Inn Din power station, in Mon State. Residents of the area protested against the destructive effects the project would have on local livelihoods, its environmental impact, and the fact that the electricity would not benefit local communities but be exported to Thailand. As such, this project is typical of large-scale energy projects implemented in a top-down manner in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar since 2011 (HURFOM 2015; Bello 2018; Woods 2019). Conflict around this issue played out through deliberation as well as repression. Like the protesting farmers in Kayah State, people who protested against the Inn Din power station were jailed on several occasions. However, both state authorities and the Thai company that was granted permission to build the plant also made efforts to consult with local communities. Further, protesters not only took to the streets, but made appeals through channels such as local government bodies and the Myanmar human rights commission. This shows that the ways in which conflictual relationships between the state and minority population were expressed indeed changed significantly over the past decade, with more instances of deliberation and a higher degree of local recognition and use of state channels to make political claims. In this case, protests eventually led to the suspension of the project in 2017, indicating that public protest was not simply struck down but did affect the decision-making of the state (Environmental Justice Atlas 2018; Global Energy Monitor 2019).

The recent land confiscation case in Kayah State and the Inn Din power station case in Mon State exemplify how post-war expansion of state power into ethnic-minority areas has been accompanied by new forms of coercion, dominance, and arbitrary exercise of power, leading to the loss of livelihoods, displacement, and insecurity. At the same time, they also show how these continuities of wartime relationships are combined with new patterns of deliberation, and a shift toward the use of administrative mechanisms and the law as venues for communication and conflict on the part of the Myanmar state as well as local actors in Mon and Kayah States.

Subjective conditions: non-recognition at the heart of local grievances

As the examples above indicate, local actors in conflict-affected ethnic-minority-populated areas of Myanmar experience their relationships to the

state as being marked by significant continuities of wartime patterns of domination and coercion. In contrast, our data show that notions of respect, equality, and recognition are central to local conceptions of what peace means. For example, in one focus group, a participant forcefully stated that in Myanmar generally and Kayah State specifically, there is "no recognition for the indigenous people … that's why there is no peace."[9] Discussing the meaning of peace, another focus group participant argued that "the most important thing is respect. Respect each other, respect each other's rights."[10] This conception of peace is fundamentally relational; indeed, the emphasis placed on relational aspects of peace in our data speaks to the analytical usefulness of a relational approach.

Against this backdrop, the actions of the central state, often embodied by the Tatmadaw, are often interpreted as communicating the opposite of respect and recognition. For example, during the transitional period (2011–2021), insurgent structures of governance and service provision that had functioned and enjoyed significant popular legitimacy for decades were weakened by efforts to strengthen government capacity and control in minority areas (South 2018). These state incursions into previously rebel-held territories were often perceived as threatening by local populations, who previously encountered the state only through the violence and coercion of the Tatmadaw. In addition, these developments were also interpreted as signaling disdain and non-recognition of local governance structures where non-state actors played key roles:

> So KNPP they have different causes … like for education, for other things, so many things. But the military they don't want to listen to that, which is one of the challenges to peace in the area. They don't have respect. The ethnic people, we … we are calling for equality, equal civil rights, right, but the military, the government, they are not listening to us and they don't give respect. However, they [EAOs] will fight for equality, as long as there is no respect. Ignoring and not giving respect is one of the challenges to have equal rights and peace.[11]

In this quotation, the Tatmadaw is described as refusing to recognize KNPP structures for education and other services that are already in place, and this refusal is read as a lack of respect and a denial of equal rights, and thereby as a hindrance to peace.

A recent example where non-recognition of ethnic-minority histories, perspectives, and voices has generated an upsurge of public protests is the state's efforts to name landmarks after General Aung San. General Aung San is commonly known as the country's independence hero, and as a key driver of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which outlined a roadmap

toward federalism and gave ethnic minorities the option to secede from the union. That these promises remain unfulfilled is understood among many ethnic-minority communities as symptomatic of subsequent regime attempts to suppress diversity in the country.

In 2017, the lower house of the union parliament voted to name a new bridge across the Salween river in Mon State after General Aung San, despite previous local protests that had already caused the opening ceremony to be canceled once (Irrawaddy 2017a). Prior to the opening, a petition with over 90,000 names was submitted to the president's office (Irrawaddy 2017b). At the inauguration of the bridge, the speaker of parliament defended the choice of name in his speech, claiming that it would contribute to national unity:

> To strengthen union spirit more than ever, and to honour and remind us of Bogyoke Aung San, architect of Independence and national leader, the bridge was named after him. It is reasonable to do so. As known by all, in other countries of the world as well, national heroes and leaders who sacrificed themselves for their countries and people are honoured by recording in such a way. […] Just by hearing or seeing Bogyoke Aung San's name, it will arouse union spirit, beget unity, cause patriotism, encourage people to imitate his honesty and straightforwardness and to emulate his sacrifices. (Global New Light of Myanmar 2017)

However, to ethnic-minority populations, this vision of unity under one national identity closely resembles the policies and processes of "Bamaniza-tion," the forced imposition of ethnic majority Bamar culture and identity, of past decades (Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2019). As expressed by one focus group participant in Mon State, "the Bamar recognizes a national hero that has killed so many ethnic people. This gives us no respect. We have many heroes in our ethnic community. But none of them are recognized."[12] The trope of national unity has a long history of legitimating violence in Myanmar. From the perspective of the military, counterinsurgency operations have been seen as necessary measures against chaos and state disintegration. Thus, a vision of peace as stability and order within a unitary Myanmar state has historically been central for the legitimation of armed violence against ethnic armed groups as well as civilian communities (Callahan 2003; Fink 2008). In this context, naming the bridge in Mon State after General Aung San is widely seen as a symbol of central state expansion, Bamar domination, and non-recognition of ethnic histories and identities. As a result, as expressed by a Buddhist abbot in Mon State, "the bridge saves us [Mon people] physical discomfort, but not mental disturbance. Whenever we cross the bridge, we feel upset in our hearts and minds" (Irrawaddy 2017b).

In Kayah State, the 2019 erection of a statue of General Aung San in a park in the state capital Loikaw similarly led to large-scale public protests (Olivius and Hedström 2021). When news spread about the plans to erect a statue of General Aung San in 2018, protests erupted, first in the form of a letter campaign demanding Aung San's promise of autonomy and federalism instead of the statue, and later in the form of public demonstrations. The government response has consisted of attempts to file lawsuits for defamation and arrest protesters, as well as violent crackdowns and arrests during demonstrations. While the statue was erected on January 28, 2019, it has continued to be a focal point for protests (Transnational Institute 2019). In our interviews, especially those with civil society activists living in Loikaw but also those with representatives from armed groups, resentment over the statue case was noticeable. The issue was represented as symptomatic of the state's failure to recognize and listen to local people. Thus, the state's actions were seen as detrimental to peace, demonstrating that a relationship of respect and mutual recognition does not exist between the state and local communities in Kayah. In a co-authored commentary for the Transnational Institute (2019), local activists locate the statue case as the continuation of a policy of Bamanization, or forced assimilation of minority cultures under a national, Bamar-majority identity: "the local peoples consider this a misuse of public funds and an attempt to erase their own history, continuing a practice of downplaying ethnic minority cultures by a policy known as Bamanisation" (Transnational Institute 2019). From the perspective of our respondents, Bamanization must be replaced by mutual recognition, equality, and respect for difference if peace is to be achieved:

> When we try to build trust and peace in our region, in our country, then Bamanization is one of the most important things that we have to get rid of. In the Tatmadaw and in the government, most of the people have the idea of Bamanization, only they don't show on the paper but they have Bamanization as a hidden agenda. So, to have a genuine peace and a democratic country then they must respect the equality, justice, and equality for ethnic rights, they must give equality to the ethnic people. As long as they have Bamanization as a hidden agenda, it is really far away to get peace.[13]

In the cases of the Aung San Bridge in Mon State and statue in Kayah State, public outrage was met by a combination of repression and attempts at deliberation. However, in the end local protests and claims did not achieve success; instead the state unilaterally imposed its decisions.

In addition to the lack of recognition by the state, our respondents in Mon and Kayah distrusted the state. This attitude was most frequently seen in stories about military expansion and arbitrary use of power, despite the existence of ceasefire agreements that should at the time have regulated the

behavior of the Tatmadaw. While official statements and interviews with state representatives situate the post-1995 period as a period of increasing stability in both Kayah and Mon States, the majority of our respondents did not agree with this interpretation. In Kayah State, the level of peace decreased sharply after 1995, with most communities arguing that the local conflict landscape, and their everyday lives, did not see improvements until the early to mid-2000s. In Mon State, most communities we interviewed suggested that widespread militarization after the ceasefire of 1995 resulted in, if not an increase in war, then at least a continuation of it by other means until around early 2000. The discrepancy between the state narrative and local perceptions of the ceasefire is starkly illustrated in an interview with two women in Mon State, who recounted experiencing torture, forced labor, and military-imposed curfews after 1995.[14] Similarly, a middle-aged farmer living in a Karen village in Mon State recalled periods, sometimes lasting up to a month, of forced labor and portering for military troops, and of arbitrary arrest and torture, between 1995 and 2002.[15]

In Kayah State, a young man we interviewed described how a military camp suddenly appeared near his village, with Tatmadaw troops test-shooting weapons across farmland belonging to the villagers.[16] In this respondent's view, the troops' behavior related to a lack of respect for the current ceasefire agreement in place between the KNPP and the Tatmadaw. The lack of respect was a common theme in many of our interviews, and meant that many of the civilians we spoke to felt they had no trust in the government, and therefore worried about the future:

> So, when there is an agreement, ceasefire agreement or peace agreement, then there is no security for the local people. For example, there are military … it comes to them, even though there is agreement, right … so in the current situation, the local people feel that there is no security for freedom of movement and other things. Even though in the agreement, it is included about security, not to extend the military camps and also to provide or care for refugees coming back, but even though they include it in the agreement, they are not practicing.[17]

The perceived failure of the government and Tatmadaw to abide by prior agreements, and the ongoing militarization of Kayah and Mon States, made people feel that the current situation could not be trusted. Fear about a looming return to war was expressed repeatedly in our interviews. Although armed conflict was not ongoing, the ever-present possibility of violence cast a long shadow over people's lives:

> The peace process is something like in between … it is difficult to say whether it is … how to call … between like hot and cold. So, people are really afraid of whether the fighting will start or not, or something like that. And also, for

the military, they didn't step forward or backward, they are in a "ready" position. […]. For example, in December, last December, the military announced that they would suspend the fighting for four months. However, during that time they extended building military camps.[18]

Because the Tatmadaw was not seen as treating its counterparts in ethnic-minority states as equals or with respect, continuing to breach existing agreements, the civilians we met felt unable to plan for the future or trust that their lives and livelihoods were safe. As expressed by one respondent, because of the lack of trust "we are not sure if there is genuine peace or not, that's why I am afraid that the past time will happen again and I have to worry again."[19] The lack of recognition and trust in the relationship with the state led directly to material insecurities and suffering. Previous experiences and traumas of war further compounded the fear and insecurity that this gave rise to, negatively affecting local actors' understanding of the relationship.

Ideas of the relationship: "owners" and "visitors"

Alongside behavioral interactions and subjective attitudes, a third component of a relationship is how the constituent actors understand and define their relationship (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). For a relationship to be assessed as peaceful, a minimum requirement is that the actors in the dyad no longer think of each other as enemies to be eliminated, but as legitimate adversaries with whom they can coexist and associate.

The empirical examples and interview data presented above suggest that the ceasefire agreements between EAOs and the government in Mon and Kayah States, alongside the initiation of a semi-democratic political transition, did change the way the state interacted with ethnic-minority populations. Ceasefire agreements and peace negotiations brought not only ethnic-minority armed groups, but also political parties and civil society organizations into relationships with the state and its representatives where they were not framed solely as enemies, but as counterparts with whom to negotiate or consult. Further, as exemplified above, ordinary people such as farmers, as well as civil society activists, considered state institutions to be possible channels through which they could protest and make claims on the state. This in itself shows that significant changes took place after 2011, and that a perception of the other as a legitimate party who at least has the right to exist was a facet of the relationship between the state and various local actors in ethnic-minority areas.

Nevertheless, from our interviews it is clear that the most prominent perception of the relationship of various local ethnic-minority actors to

the Myanmar state was one of fundamental and persistent inequality. This is succinctly expressed by a civilian in a focus group in Mon State: "the government and the Tatmadaw behave as if they are the owners of the house. They treat us as visitors."[20] A representative of the Mon armed group similarly described the state as "act[ing] like they have ownership over [political and ethnic] rights, and can pick and choose what they will give us."[21] In a context where struggles over ethnic self-determination and equality have been ongoing for decades, when the state acts as "the owner of the house" in ethnic-minority areas, this was taken as proof that while violence had been reduced, the power dynamics between the state and ethnic-minority populations had not really changed.

While the state was at the time of our interviews not attacking ethnic minorities in Mon and Kayah States, it nevertheless refused to recognize and respect the specificity of ethnic-minority identities, cultures, and histories. Thus, this is a "thin" form of recognition, not a "thick" form where the other is "respected for the features that make a subject unique" (Strömbom 2010: 61). This was illustrated by state actions that locals perceive as the continuation of historic Bamanization policies, aiming to create unity through the suppression and forced assimilation of diversity. Further, while elite representatives of ethnic-minority communities, and occasionally other groups, were recognized as counterparts in negotiation or dialogue, in their everyday lives people often felt that their voices were not heard or recognized as relevant. This was expressed in widespread experiences of land confiscation which lacked any opportunities for compensation or redress, and in experiences of arbitrary arrest when people spoke out against government policies or military actions.

For our respondents, political equality lies at the heart of peaceful relationships, and the persistent expressions of inequality that characterize their relationship with the state were perceived as a key obstacle to peace. In almost all of our interviews, people expressed demands for a federal political system in Myanmar. This was difficult to reconcile with the 2008 constitution, which also reserves significant political power for the military. Constitutional moves toward a political order and political institutions that build on, and which can safeguard, ethnic equality, including recognition of minority languages and practices, were seen as the key to addressing the core grievances of the conflict, and thus as the necessary foundation for peace: "This is one of the main reasons why the ethnic people have to stand for their rights. There is no equality among the ethnic groups and no federal democracy. That is the only ... without that there will be no peace."[22] As noted by Jarstad, Söderström, and Åkebo in the Introduction to this volume, federal systems can offer one institutional or legal solution to ensure non-domination in societies emerging from war. For our respondents, a federal political

order that would guarantee a degree of ethnic self-determination was seen as the institutional framework that could transform current unequal relationships to the state into peaceful ones, by recognizing people in Kayah and Mon States as owners of their own houses, not visitors in them.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have explored how local actors, including civilians, civil society activists, and EAO representatives, experienced their relationships to the Myanmar state, and how these relationships have changed over time, in particular during the decade of political reforms (2011–2021). Our findings demonstrate that local actors in Mon and Kayah States perceive their relationship to the Myanmar state as a relationship of fundamental and persistent inequality, characterized by top-down domination, the imposition of ethnic Bamar superiority, and suppression and non-recognition of ethnic-minority identities, histories, and political aspirations. Post-war relationships were marked by significant continuities of war, even though the level of armed violence decreased significantly. State domination was instead carried out through other means such as arbitrary land confiscation and repression of political protesters. At the same time, and as compared with periods of active armed conflict, examples of deliberation between state agents and local actors increased between 2011 and 2021, suggesting that the state was giving at least a thin form of recognition of ethnic-minority groups as counterparts in negotiations. Local actors were also increasingly making use of state channels such as government departments and commissions to make claims on the state and protest against state policies and actions they disagreed with, signaling a degree of recognition vis-à-vis the central state and its authority.

   Our application of the relational peace framework to cases that are rather far from an ideal definition of relational peace demonstrates its value as an analytical tool for capturing specific features of a particular conflict context, and for pinpointing areas and issues that are preventing the emergence of a sustainable and legitimate peace. Further, our analysis demonstrates the complexity of post-war relationships and their incremental evolution over time, and points to the importance of drawing on local, grounded experiences and perspectives in analyses of peace and conflict. Our analysis adds to the growing interest in locating and exploring peace in everyday experiences and interactions. However, while previous work seeking to capture how local conflict-affected people define and understand peace has primarily emphasized everyday security and material needs, our analysis demonstrates that people

living in conditions of human insecurity nevertheless highly value relational features such as equality, recognition, and trust as key dimensions of peace. These findings show that a relational analysis of peace can generate new insights into how peace is understood, envisioned, and experienced, and thus contribute to a more nuanced analysis of everyday peace.

Notes

1 In this chapter, Myanmar, which in 1989 replaced Burma as the official name of the state, is used to refer to the country, although both names are frequently employed.

2 Since the outbreak of conflict in the late 1940s, tensions between the Karen National Union (KNU), other small Karen breakaway factions, and the NMSP have to a large extent centered on contested areas, lying between an envisoned Monland and Kawthoolei, an independent Karen state. Planned interviews with several armed groups' representatives were canceled because of this in November 2019.

3 Zin Mar Phyo, who also works as a journalist for the women's run website Honest Information (https://hiburma.net), has productively used these trips to gather information and inspiration for news stories and photo essays, which she has later returned to work on. For instance, she has published four photo essays and a longer investigative report on, respectively, the social and gendered impact of the Maw Chi Mines; the effect of water shortages on women's health in villages in Demoso; women's experiences of hydropower projects in Kayah; and Kayan female farmers' access to educational opportunities.

4 Focus group interview, Mon State, civilians, November 28, 2019.

5 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, and civil society organizations, March 26, 2019.

6 Interview, Mon State, representative for NMSP, December 6, 2019.

7 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civil society activists, March 28, 2019.

8 Life history interview, Mon State, civil society organization, December 4, 2019.

9 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, March 26, 2019.

10 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civil society activists, March 28, 2019.

11 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, March 26, 2019.

12 Focus group interview, Mon State, civilians and civil society organizations, November 28, 2019.

13 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civil society activists, March 28, 2019.

14 Interview with two women, civilians, Mon State, November 28, 2019.

15 Life history interview Mon State, civilian, December 6, 2019.

16 Life history interview Kayah State, civilian, March 26, 2019.

17 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, March 26, 2019.

18 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, March 26, 2019.

19 Focus group interview, Kayah State, civilians, March 26, 2019.

20 Focus group interview, civilians, Mon State, November 28, 2019.
21 Interview with New Mon State Party representative, Mon State, December 6, 2019.
22 Focus group interview, civilians, Kayah State, March 26, 2019.

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Colombian civilian and military actors' perceptions of their relationship in the era following the 2016 peace accord

Manuela Nilsson

When countries transition from war to peace, military and civilian actors often struggle with the task of redefining their relationships with each other. In most cases it is not the relationship between the military and the political elites that needs to be redefined, but rather the military's relationship with the civilian population. During protracted social conflicts, military actors often become conflict actors, and the confidence and trust between them and the civilian population deteriorate. (Re)-establishing relational peace between state security actors and civilians is therefore an important part of post-accord reconciliation and may ultimately prove to be more important for peace to be sustainable than repairing the relationship with the opposing conflict actor. When a peace negotiation process is followed by a period of continued violence caused by other armed actors not included in the initial agreement, which is often the case in today's social conflicts, ever-closer cooperation between military and civilian actors is often deemed necessary. However, a dialogue between military actors and representatives of civilian communities and society, in which they discuss the present state and future vision of their relationship with each other, is almost never a part of peace processes and has found very little echo in the literature on civil–military relations.

The concept of civil–military relations refers to the interaction between the armed forces of a state, the state's population, and its civilian political institutions. Just what form this relationship between a society and the security actors tasked to protect it should take has been the subject of a long debate. Until the 1990s, this debate mostly used consolidated democracies as case studies and focused predominantly on the intra-state power distribution between civilian and military actors, the strict social coding separating military and civilian areas of expertise and engagement, the ever-apparent fear of democracy being toppled by legally armed actors, and the resulting need to achieve civilian control over the military (Rosén 2009). A core aspect of this debate has been to find a way in which the allegedly distinct

worldviews, cultures, and functions – liberal civilian on the one hand, and conservative military on the other hand – can peacefully coexist without endangering democracy or compromising security. Theories range from strict separation and regulation to gradual convergence of the two spheres (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Finer 1988; Feaver 2005). Latin American countries have featured prominently in this debate, as the subcontinent has been characterized by cycles of alternations in civilian and military governments and has experienced several attempted and executed military coups even in recent years. Latin American militaries have played a decisive role in the shaping of the nation states after independence and frequently intervene in internal affairs, on the basis of a widespread understanding, among both the military and some civilian political elites, that their predominant task is to preserve internal, rather than external, order and guarantee their countries' social and economic development (Kruijit and Koonings 2002; Mares and Martínez 2014; Skaar and Gianella Malca 2014; Pion-Berlin 2016; Bruneau and Goetze 2019; Pastrana Buelvas and Gehring 2019).

With the expansion during the 1990s of international peacebuilding activities in countries emerging from armed conflict, civil–military relations also became part of the discussion on peacebuilding. The international consensus strongly favors both the establishment of civilian authority over military actors and a rapid transfer of public order security tasks from the military back to the police as well as to local civilian authorities, particularly in societies that feature a security sector that has been greatly enlarged during a prolonged period of armed conflict. Included in the international demands for security sector reform is the reduction and vetting of the security apparatus and training in human rights as an integral part of all peacebuilding operations (United States Institute of Peace 2009; Hanlon and Shultz 2016). At the same time, the idea of enhancing cooperation between military and civilian actors added another dimension to the international debate around the civil–military relationship. Cooperation between international military units and civilian actors, particularly in theaters of operation and violent environments where the military engaged in development work to secure the "hearts and minds" of the civilian population, changed the coding of what is considered military activities and made the military's identity increasingly "fuzzier" (NATO 2003; Rosén 2009: 598).

Except for these attempts by international military units to use development work to enlist the cooperation of civilian populations in host countries, however, it is rather striking that, overall, the debate on civil–military relations has focused predominantly on the relationship between the military and civilian political and economic elites (Rosén 2009; Houngnikpo 2016; Herspring and Volgyes 2018; Mares 2018). We know very little about the process of, and obstacles to, achieving relational peace between the military

and civilian actors below the elite level after peace agreements have been signed, even though this process constitutes a cornerstone of sustainable peace. This gap becomes particularly worrisome when we are dealing with environments where there are still high levels of violence and where cooperation between sectors of the population and the military might become essential to raising security levels, particularly in rural areas. Listening to the actors themselves in the formulation of the challenges their relationship faces is therefore an important first step to filling this gap and embarking on the path toward relational peace between civilians and the military in every society emerging from protracted violent conflict. The objective of this research is therefore to give those actor groups a voice, to provide them with an opportunity to compare their respective perceptions of the other and their relationship and how they envision its future in a period of transition from armed conflict to peace.

Colombia represents a prime example of a country struggling with continued violence in the post-accord period. Originally sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with unequal distribution of power, wealth, and land dating back to colonial times, the internal armed conflict in Colombia erupted into a prolonged period of violence in the 1960s. In later decades, it has been fueled by a rising production of, and traffic with, illegal drugs (National Center for Historic Memory 2013), which entangled a myriad of armed actors, including several guerrilla groups, paramilitary organizations, and state security actors as well as the Colombian government, in a web of violence and corruption (Angelo 2017). After several failed attempts at negotiation between the Colombian government and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), a peace agreement was finally ratified in the fall of 2016. However, violence persists. The disarmament and demobilization process of the FARC has created growing dissident units who joined several armed groups which in part emerged as a result of previous and somewhat unsuccessful disarmament processes of paramilitary forces active between the 1980s and early 2000s (FIP 2018a). The number of assassinations of social leaders fighting for human and indigenous rights is rising constantly, making Colombia the world's most dangerous country for human rights activists and social leaders (UN Security Council 2018; Asmann and O'Reilly 2019). Land restitution as part of victims' reparation has created new conflicts over land and fueled the emergence of anti-restitution armies (Nilsson and Taylor 2017). The retraction of the FARC guerrilla has spurred illegal economic activity, such as illegal mining and logging, and Colombia's coca production is rising in areas that have increasingly become a battleground for FARC dissidents, former paramilitary groups, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) and Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL, Popular Liberation Army) guerrilla, and new criminal gangs (FIP

2018a). The current government's reluctance to implement the peace agreement has already imperiled the peace and incentivized recidivism, which again predominantly affects the more rural parts of the country. This precarious situation represents a defining factor for the relationship between the country's population and the second largest military in the region and makes Colombia a prime case with which to study this relationship in a post-accord violent environment.

Applying the relational peace framework to military–civilian relations in Colombia

In order to investigate the level of relational peace between military and civilian actors in Colombia, this chapter is structured around the three main components of the framework, contrasting and comparing the civilian and military actors' perspectives in each part (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). To operationalize the framework, some adjustments were made to accommodate the particular dyad under investigation (see "Methodology" for further information on the dyad selection). In a first part about *behavioral interaction* below, actors were asked to describe previous and current points of contact with each other as a basis for evaluating levels of deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation.

In the framework's second component dealing with *subjective conditions* of the relationship, each side of the dyad was asked to describe how they felt about the other to determine levels of mutual recognition and trust. As discussed in the Introduction, recognition involves the respect for the other's particular identity elements as put forward in an actor's self-image. In this particular dyad it is predominantly the military actor who has an explicit corporate identity and who is furthermore in the process of adjusting that identity to the post-accord scenario. Therefore, focus has been placed particularly, though not exclusively, on the military's presentation of its self-image and the reception of that image among civilian actors.

Finally, the framework's last component attempts to define the *idea of the relationship* to determine perceptions of antagonism, agonism, fellowship, or friendship. During the interviews, it soon became clear that the military actors, currently intensely engaged in a process of redefinition, were more eager to discuss their future role and relationship with civilian actors than their current relationship, which has been negatively impacted by the protracted armed conflict. This factor caused an adjustment in the use of the theoretical framework's third component. Both actor groups were asked not only to characterize the relationship that exists between them today but also to discuss how they envision the future of that relationship. That

peaceful relationships benefit from envisioning a shared future has been well established in the literature (Lederach 1998), and as a basic principle this is often incorporated into strategies of alternative conflict transformation (Dugan 2001). However, post-war transitions often create divergent aspirations for the future (Klem 2018), and anticipation of future relations is a good indicator of the status of current relations (Schubotz 2017). This chapter therefore argues that hopes and fears attached to future visions are intrinsically conditioned by the current status of the dyad's relationship, as well as its past, and are therefore a good indicator when current levels of relational peace for this dyad are evaluated.

Methodology

This chapter is predominantly based on thirty-seven in-depth interviews conducted during 2017 and 2018 with military and civilian actors in the capital of Colombia, Bogotá, as well as in rural communities in three regions. For more information on the interviewees, see Table 6.1 at the end of the chapter. Since the peace agreement was ratified only in the fall of 2016, the study captures a very early stage in the process toward normalizing the relationship between civilian actors (interviewee names marked with a C) and military (interviewee names marked with an M) actors, and levels of relational peace are therefore expected to be rather low at this stage.

For the military side of the dyad, two groups were selected: first, high-ranking military officers working in and from Bogotá and involved in the planning of the future role of the military either by working at COTEF, the Colombian military Command for the Transformation of the Army of the Future (Comando de la Transformación del Ejército del Futuro), or in military education and training, to capture the military elite's understanding of its role and relationship to the civilian state and non-state actors (M1–7); and, second, military officials of lower rank stationed in the rural areas (M8–11), to see to what extent the plans in the capital had trickled down into the rural areas and to get a more *in situ* understanding of the military's view of their relationship with the surrounding local communities. Colombia's police force has been excluded from this study. Even though both the police and the military in Colombia are part of the Ministry of Defense, share the same budget, fought side by side during the conflict, and continue to have somewhat overlapping tasks, the future role of the military, which is one of the foci of this study, does not include the police force, and it is to be expected that police and military tasks will be increasingly distinct in this post-accord period. Furthermore, the level of relational peace to be achieved with the police may, and maybe even should, differ from that

achieved between civilians and the military, as regular and closer contact between police and civilians is part of daily life, while the same does not apply to the military and civilians, at least not in consolidated democracies.

It has been difficult to select which actors should be interviewed for the civilian side of the dyad, as those might range from ex-combatants and political elites to urban sectors, rural communities, and civil society actors. After careful deliberation, several groups have been intentionally left out. As since the early 2000s Colombia's larger cities have mostly been excluded from the conflict-related violence that continues in the rural areas, the urban population's relationship with the military in these areas has been much less conflictive than in the rural areas, and it has therefore not been selected as the focus for this study. Members of the government's inner circle and the political and economic elites have also been excluded, as they are suspected to have specific ties with military leaders that are not characteristic of the population at large (see below). And finally, ex-combatants were not taken into consideration, as their relationship with the military in the past has been characterized by particularities that differ considerably from those of civilians who have never engaged in armed conflict. Instead, four groups were selected as those civilians who might have the lowest level of trust in the military and therefore encounter the most obstacles to establishing relational peace.

In Bogotá, interviews were conducted with representatives of civil society organizations (C1–5), to provide a more analytical perspective of the relationship between civilians and the military, alongside representatives of different governmental institutions that cooperate closely with military actors in their daily work, such as the Agency for Territorial Reconstruction (ART) (C6 and C7), the School of National Intelligence (C8), and the Ministry of Defense (C9). In the rural areas, the interviews were conducted with the aim of capturing as wide a civilian perspective as possible concerning the military, thereby including local government representatives (C10–17), local indigenous authorities (C18–21), and four group interviews with members of the local communities. Two of the group interviews consisted of local peasants in rather remote and isolated rural areas (C22, Puerto Chispas, Meta, and C23, La Granja, Córdoba), while the other two group interviews were conducted with social leaders (C24, Montería, Córdoba) and indigenous leaders (C25, Jambaló, Cauca). The number of participants, particularly in the two peasant group interviews varied greatly (from eight to sixty-five), as people passing by the selected spaces often spontaneously joined the discussions. While individual interviews allowed for more focused questioning, the group interviews, where some participants came and went during the interview, were conducted in a more unstructured way that enabled discussions among participants and provided more general impressions of the group dynamics,

allowing possible underlying consensus and divergence within the groups to emerge. The logistics of arranging the group interviews in the rural areas were greatly facilitated by the author's local network of contacts in the three selected regions. To avoid any harm to the participants, all interviews were anonymized. Including all these different civilian groups within one side of the dyad has been difficult, as they do not display a corporate identity like that of the military. To show the civilian–military dichotomy, the findings section of this chapter is therefore organized according to this civilian–military divide. However, within the sections on civilian actors, I try to differentiate between the different civilian actors participating in the study.

Finally, the main selection criteria for the rural areas were the degree of control by a myriad of illegally armed actors during the protracted conflict, the decades-long absence of state presence, and the return of the state security actors in the early 2000s that turned those areas even more into battlefields. These conditions all increased the level of hostility and mistrust between rural communities and military actors that also characterizes the post-accord period, and provides a good opportunity to study the level of relational peace between civilian and security actors. However, the three rural areas selected also present several variations, first and foremost the engagement with different conflict actors that shaped their relationship with the military. The communities selected in the Meta region in the center of Colombia, Vista Hermosa and Puerto Rico, as well as two smaller settlements (Palestina and Puerto Chispas), have historically been controlled by the FARC, the main enemy of the military, and are located within the area that became part of the demilitarized zone in the failed peace negotiations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the Cauca region that borders the Pacific Ocean, the Nasa community of Jambaló was selected as an example of a rather isolated and well-organized indigenous community that has lived with the presence of armed actors since the mid-1980s and developed a tense relationship with the military. The Córdoba region in the north of the country, with a border along the Caribbean Sea, constitutes yet another case. The regional capital Montería and the surrounding communities of Tierralta, Puerto Libertador. and even more remote rural areas beyond Puerto Frasquillo were the birthplaces of the paramilitary groups which have constituted a serious threat to the country's security since the 1980s, but who were allied with the military during most of the conflict period. Because of the limited sample size, this study does not aspire to make conclusions which can be generalized for the entire territory of Colombia. However, the maximum variation sought out in the selection of these three rural settings should allow the findings to speak to the relationship between civilians and the military in the rural parts of Colombia affected by the protracted conflict.

How do military and civilian actors interact with each other?

Civilian perspectives

Most members of the rural communities interviewed for this study underlined the fact that they avoid interaction with military actors stationed in or around their villages. Levels of cooperation are kept low, predominantly because of experiences of an antagonistic nature in the past, and the communities therefore do not seek after spaces for deliberation (C1–3, C10, C11, C18, C19, C21–24). At times, both actor groups have even engaged in open confrontations, which are clearly perceived by the communities as acts of domination by the military, for example when the military engages in forced eradication of coca bushes (C3, C7, C11, C12, and C23; M8). One official from the Agencia de Reconstrucción Territorial (ART) described eradication by the military as the most important obstacle to a normalized relationship between the villagers and the military today, as it counteracts civilian state efforts to provide long-term developmental alternatives to coca production as a rural livelihood (C6). The continued use of the military as a tool against social protest is a further detriment to peaceful relations, putting the two actor groups in opposition to each other (C4). "In Colombia, social protest is seen as a problem of public order and not as an exercise of human rights," one member of a civil society organization explained (C1). Communities in rural areas that are still controlled by paramilitary groups, such as the aforementioned areas in the Córdoba region, even accused the military of accommodating those armed actors rather than providing protection from them (C24), as confirmed by one member of a mobile military unit close to Puerto Frasquillo, who described the military's strategy concerning the paramilitary groups in the region as "we don't mix with them and they don't mix with us" (M9). The military has also been accused of being involved in the many infamous killings of social leaders that continue to make headlines in Colombia (Nodal 2020; TeleSurtv 2020).

Rather than cooperation, an element of competition was stressed when the relationship to the military was described, particularly by civilian state actors and civil society representatives in Bogotá, who strongly object to the Colombian security actors' engagement in development work. According to members of COTEF, Colombia's military has practiced the strategy of "winning hearts and minds" through development activities in the rural communities since the 1950s to avoid the possibility that local communities might develop ties with insurgent groups (M1 and M2). Both civilian state actors and civil society representatives argue that the military should not be a development actor and that its activities, perceived as being designed to merely improve the image of the military and being executed somewhat

independently, compete with civilian state initiatives for development by offering cheaper labor than civilian companies can provide. This was particularly significant for representatives of state agencies, who during the many decades of armed conflict had been affected by strong military supervision and constant demands to coordinate all activities with the military and subordinate them to security demands. These state representatives were eager to establish their newly won independence from the military and argued for a shift from security to development and a distinct separation between the two areas (C3, C10, C18, C19, and C23). This tends to indicate a desire to cut down on the need for cooperation and deliberation that had so far been characterized by a clear focus on military needs and priorities. However, in some of the more remote rural areas, civilian state actors welcomed the military's development projects and appreciated all the help they could get in reconstructing their societies with a very limited budget. Since Colombia's military has been attempting to "win hearts and minds" since the beginning of the conflict, the sight of military actors doing development work is quite a common sight for many Colombians (C10, C11, C15, and C16).

Military perspectives

In contrast to the civilian perceptions, the military actors in the study stress high levels of cooperation and deliberation and deny that any forms of domination characterize their relationship with their civilian counterparts. For the Colombian military, development activities are the key to both creating a good relationship with the communities who continue to be affected by high levels of violence and securing the environment against illegally armed actor control, as it believes that abandonment by the state made those areas prone to violence in the first place. To strengthen its case, the reasons the military give are predominantly practical: that it is the only state actor with the capacity to reach the more isolated rural communities; that it has battalions of military engineers standing by for construction work, ready to provide both security and development; that private companies do not dare to engage in areas where levels of violence are still rather high; and that the military simply offers better financial deals than any other actor, which benefits communities struggling with meager reconstruction budgets, as one COTEF general summed up the military's arguments (M3). The examples it uses to illustrate this reasoning – such as the case of a community in Makarena where five civilian construction companies supposedly tried and failed to reconstruct a road of thirty-seven kilometers, until the military finally came to the rescue (M4) – seem to echo the idea of competition with the civilian development actors mentioned by the civilian actors

themselves. However, for the military it is only logical to use the tools used and skills perfected against the enemy during war to improve development levels in peacetime, as several COTEF members underlined (M3, M4). Several programs created during the conflict survived into the post-accord period (Fé en Colombia,[1] COPAI, Acción Integral[2]), and through these, the military aims to decrease popular mistrust, re-establishing trust in the state and creating a new image for itself in the rural areas. It helps to build schools, roads, and housing, cleans up public spaces, and engages in a wide range of educational activities. On many occasions, these activities are coordinated with local civilian state authorities who welcome the extra budget and personnel provided by the military, as their own reconstruction budget is limited.

The collaboration of the local communities is actively sought. Through conversations with the peasants, the military commanders make a diagnosis and advise on what should be done and then serve as intermediaries with state agencies or private business partners. They even educate local communities on how to plan and present their projects and become local businesspeople, and they arrange for entrepreneurial fairs to establish connections between the communities and potential business partners (M1, M5, and M10). "Our work is of a social nature," argues one general (M5). What is important here is the image of the military as a bridge between the population and the civilian state institutions, officials of mobile military brigades in Meta underlined (M8 and M10). This mediator role can even be extended to dealing with other countries as potential buyers of agricultural products produced in remote rural areas of Colombia, as one COTEF official argued (M1). According to military accounts, success stories abound. Military engineers have brought technology to isolated coastal areas to convert salt water into drinking water. Air force helicopters continue to fly cacao beans from a remote area to cacao-processing companies in the nearest urban center and then transport the final product to sellers in Bogotá. In so doing, according to the interviewees, the military is helping to further support a forty-year-old business agreement, and they also claim that almost all coca plantations in the area now are replaced by cacao bushes. They thus also prove that the military's proactive, hands-on approach is more successful than the government's drug substitution program with its long-term, slow development prospective – again underlining the competitive element. The interviewees further claim that the air force brings food, gasoline, and other essentials to remote villages that do not have any access to markets, constructs roads, provides medical services, and brings hard currency to communities that previously used grams of coca as currency (M1 and M2). The state institutions, one COTEF general underlined, come to these remote areas only during electoral campaigns: "The only ones who come here

are the military […] the only money circulating here is the money of the soldiers […] The state is weak, has no capacities, is not there … people are abandoned by the state […]" (M3). However, as the military itself does not have a sufficiently large budget to finance all these development activities, it keeps "knocking at the doors of state institutions" to procure funding. In fact, state institutions ask the military for help with development projects, as one official of a mobile military brigade in Vista Hermosa pointed out (M8). Nevertheless, the military's image of being a bridge between the communities and the government underlines the its desire to increase cooperation and establish common goals with as many civilian actors as possible, not only those selected for this study but also the state government itself, despite the at times derogatory comments concerning state capacity and effort, particularly in comparison with the military as previously pointed out.

How do military and civilian actors feel about each other?

Civilian perspectives

Colombian opinion polls have traditionally reported a rather positive attitude of Colombia's population toward the military, particularly in urban areas that were no longer affected by the conflict after the early 2000s (DANE 2019: 1; 13).[3] However, in the three focus areas a much more negative picture emerges which is closely connected to the history of conflict. Although members of the rural communities all agreed that their relationship to the military has normalized since the peace accord was signed, memories of human rights violations committed against them and state security actors' tacit support of the human rights violations of paramilitary groups still constitute a trust barrier. "The armed forces entered with the paramilitaries," one peasant recalled (C22). These memories pose a dilemma, as they compete with the communities' increasing dependency on those actors for protection in the violent post-accord environment (C1, C10, C21–24). Furthermore, during long periods of the conflict, military actors simply withdrew and left the population at the mercy of the illegally armed groups (C2). Members of Jambaló's indigenous council (*Negwesx*) recall that when the military finally returned in the early 2000s within the framework of President Alvaro Uribe's counterinsurgency offensives against illegally armed actors, its presence brought armed conflict directly to the villages and thus became a detriment, rather than an advantage, to the village population (C18 and C19).

Mistrust therefore prevails and negatively affects local recognition of the military. This is particularly apparent in indigenous communities who

follow their own development and security plans and accept only their own indigenous guards as security actors in their territories. They regard all armed actors as intruders, obstacles to their security, threats to their independence, and, in the particular case of state security actors, tools of the state to control indigenous populations (C13, C18, C19, C25). "The armed forces hide behind the armed conflict and no longer respect and consult the indigenous communities […] The government's excuse is the armed conflict and that national security has to be maintained," one member of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) complained (C21). With levels of violence still high and many armed actors around, state security actors are often regarded as more of a risk than a protection for the local communities, a local government official in Puerto Libertador confirmed (C16).

Furthermore, interviewees in all civilian groups expressed a perception of the military as corrupt and disrespectful of civilians, even in post-accord times (C10, C11, C13, C17, C19, C20, C21, and C25). Civil society actors, civilian state actors, and international experts alike are suspicious of the military's growth as an influential economic actor, following a long tradition of militaries in Latin America. They fear that it undermines fundamental elements of modern democracy, including civilian control over the military, since it allows the military to secure significant sources of revenue independent of government allocation, gain advantageous access to state resources, and maintain a tradition of non-defense roles that make it a go-to provider on development issues where civilians should predominate (Mani 2016; C2, C8, and C19).

Military perspectives

This level of mistrust is reciprocated by the military in its attitude toward different groups of civilians, as exemplified by the clash over collective memory and human rights violations committed during the long conflict, which has caused much national debate in Colombia. The military claims it is misrepresented in the presentations of collective memory published by civil society organizations which blame the military and paramilitary groups for more human rights violations than the guerrilla. One such publication is *Basta ya!*, published by the National Center for Historic Memory in 2013. The Colombian army has therefore taken it upon itself to write its own narrative of what happened during the war, albeit with the help of supportive academics. This could be interpreted as an act of deliberation and a first step toward a constructive dialogue. However, the military also used its power with the government to occupy seats at the board of the National Center for Historic Memory. Fearing the influence of the center's

publication on the truth commission set up by the process of transitional justice already initiated in the country, it demanded that a new report be written (M1 and M2; C2). This constitutes an act of domination and certainly underlines a power disparity between the two dyad actors.

Mistrust of rural communities is often displayed when the military engages in suppressing social protest or eradicating coca bushes. However, the predominant attitude in the interviews with military actors was a sense of benevolent paternalism, a form of thin recognition, which became particularly visible when military interviewees described their development work in the rural communities. "The end goal," one COTEF general underlined:

> is to transform the community from a disorganized village controlled by armed actors and illicit dealings to a community that is organized and free of illegal business and armed actors, that has local businesses generating jobs contributing to the state, and that does not need the military, since they are able to control their own security. (M3)

The self-image emerging from interviews with members of the military is rather positive, to say the least. They describe themselves as loyal, dependable, flexible, peaceful, democratic, God-fearing, honorable, reform-oriented, and heroic, creating a particularly strong contrast to the descriptions of the rural communities (above) and the state (below). Several COTEF generals underlined the fact that the military even shows forgiveness toward ex-members of the FARC who have now joined the communities they are to protect (M3 and M4), and one went so far as to argue that during the past fifteen years, and even today, more guerrilla have turned to the military for demilitarization processes than to the relevant state agencies because the armed forces enjoy an image of honesty and fairness (M1). The military sees itself as the good face of the state. Where the state is negligent, the military emerges as the only actor complying with its promises to solve the problems for remote communities and stand steadfastly by their side as protectors and benefactors, bridging the distance between state and citizens, as COTEF members confirm (M1 and M2). A recurring image is the abandonment of people by the state as the main cause for the decades-long conflict, compared with the omnipresence of the military in every corner of the country today. One commander of a mobile military brigade in Montería emphasized that "in the most remote *vereda* [area/village] you will find a soldier [...] no area in Colombia is forbidden for the army" (M11). Where the government is corrupt and undemocratic, soldiers are transparent and honorable, pillars of democracy rather than threats to it. One COTEF official quoted an indigenous leader stating that "the government does not comply with its promises, but the military does" (M1). Where the government is dysfunctional and slow, it steps in. Another general interviewed boasted,

"while the military runs like a rabbit, the state moves like a turtle" (M3). While politicians represent the political and economic elites of the country, the military represents the lower classes. Where the state is weakened by political discord, the military remains democratic and apolitical (M1).

Views of the relationship

Civilian perspectives

While civilian and military attitudes toward their relationship often seem to be rather contradictory, there is one issue that most civilian and military actors agree on: the apolitical nature of the military, which is a major factor determining the future of the relationship between civilians and the military in Colombia. There is a surprisingly widespread belief among civil society representatives and civilian state actors alike that the military is unlikely to step in as a political actor to overthrow an elected government, which simply rejects the core fear expressed in the debate on civil–military relations (C2, C4, C5, C8, and C9), and this view is also shared by the military informants (M1, M4–6). The argument most used by the interviewees to underline this apolitical nature of the Colombian military focuses on the existence of a pact of coexistence between the military and Colombia's political elite dating back to 1958, which closely resembles Huntington's (1957) civil–military bargain that established clear divisions between civilian state elites and military actors. This pact determines a division of labor whereby state security actors enjoy relative independence and take care of public order, security, and national defense without civilian interference, but in return stay out of politics. In the eyes of many civilians interviewed, this arrangement guarantees a stability that is beneficial to both sides and is also likely to characterize a future relationship.

However, the same interviewees also recognize that this agreement has a downside, as it turns the military into a tool for the political and governmental sector, lowers the quality of democracy, maintains corruption, and blocks any reform efforts, particularly in the countryside. As it is associated with the conservative political forces, the military is accused of servicing particular interests of politicians at the local level, such as protecting landowners and the business sector at the expense of the local peasantry and blocking land reforms. In fact, the military is accused of doing the "dirty work for politicians," one civil society organization member in Bogotá underlined (C5). The accusation of corruption also surfaces in many interviews, embedding the military in a web of relationships with paramilitary, criminal, and drug-trafficking groups. Despite all this criticism, however, civil society and

civilian state actors seem to have resigned themselves to the fact that the military will always play a strong role in Colombia (C1, C4, C5, C8, and C9).

Military perspectives

Just how strong the military envisions its role to be in the future, and how it sees its relationship to all civilian counterparts, was a topic readily discussed in many military interviews. The basis for the military conception of that role is the argument that the military has its roots in, and derives its legitimacy from, the people. Many interviewees underlined common soldiers' shared identity with the working class and argued that even their superiors did not come from the political elites, in contrast to the leaders of many other Latin American militaries. COTEF officials upheld that they understand the population and can identify their needs better than the political elites and are therefore the natural bridge between the poorer constituencies in Colombia and their government (M1 and M5). One general even went so far as to proclaim that "the peasant is our reason to exist" (M4). The fact that (mostly urban) opinion polls prove that the subjects of their protection feel the same way is underlined in virtually every interview. Propaganda signposts everywhere in Colombia point out that soldiers are prepared to give their lives for civilians. A recent film clip that was widely discussed across Colombia featured soldiers passing through rural villages and people expressing their thanks. A little boy salutes a lieutenant and says, "Lieutenant, the country sends me to thank you," and then the lieutenant goes and tells his colonel "my colonel, Colombia sends you thanks," as was told to the author by an official of the School of National Intelligence in Bogotá (C8). Where communities reject state security actors, as in the three areas that are the focus of this study, the military maintained that the image of the soldier was not destroyed by the latter's alleged human rights violations but by illegally armed actors purposefully tainting it (M1, M6, M8, and M10).

The military's proclaimed roots in the poorest parts of society constitute an important building block in the process of preparing Colombia's military for the new post-accord, post-FARC future. This heritage also legitimizes a future role that enhances, rather than diminishes, the presence of the military in peacetimes and where the institution's resources, leadership, knowledge, and skills are used to confront a threat that was rather fuzzily described as "hybrid, volatile, ambiguous, uncertain, and complex" (M4). "Imagine a country that understands the capacities of the armed forces," one COTEF general daydreamed (M4). To grow into this larger, even more important future role, COTEF has started an ambitious transformation process that is designed to prepare the army of the future for its multiple mission (M3 and M4). The military of the future no longer only protects

but assists and develops. "The army is construction, the army is education, the army is health," one COTEF general announced (M3). In the military's "Plan Victoria Plus," human security goals such as reducing corruption and poverty and improving development are now added to its more traditional tasks, all to be achieved in close cooperation with civilian actors (M2, M4, M7, and M11). The military's rather grandiose perception concerning its post-accord role is not too surprising, given its increase in power and independence during the country's protracted social conflict as well as its previously mentioned agreement with the political elites, and similar developments have been observed as well in other post-accord countries (Herath 2012). Furthermore, Latin American militaries have traditionally pursued a larger array of activities that reach beyond the actual duties assigned to militaries in other parts of the world (Mani 2016; Montenegro 2018).

This process of moving toward a future omnipresence of the military and a closer civil–military cooperation started in 2018 with the implementation of the "Plan Horos," supposedly at the request of rural communities that had suffered from state neglect for decades. Replacing the insufficient numbers of mobile army units, "Plan Horos" aims to establish a permanent army presence in a number of former conflict areas in thirteen departments, including those which today are relatively secure, in order to avoid the recurrence of violence and serve as bridges between the communities and the state (M4). "In Colombia, the people want to see their soldiers, they demand the presence of their army in the streets, in the territory," one COTEF general underlined (M3).

Conclusions

Applied to the Colombian case, the relational peace framework provides an important and valuable tool for comparison and categorization, particularly by offering specific components that help to identify the stark differences displayed by the dyad actors under consideration in this study in terms of their perceptions of each other and their relationship. By helping to identify these differences, which pose significant obstacles and challenges to the ability of the relationship to achieve a higher level of relational peace in the future, the framework therefore also provides a point of departure from which to look into the future of relational peace and devise strategies to overcome those obstacles.

After listening to the voices of military and civilian actor groups expressing their understanding of their relationship to each other and its future, this study concludes that, at this early stage of Colombia's post-accord history, relational peace between the dyad actors has been achieved on the lowest level, that of peace between agonists, only. At this point in time, that

relationship is essentially dominated by the understanding prevalent on both sides that the military is there to stay and that its traditionally strong role in the country and agreement with the political and economic elites make major changes in the relationship between the dyad actors impossible. The continued existence of illegally armed actors and the high level of insecurity in the countryside certainly help to cement that understanding. Thus, dyad actors have recognized interdependence and the need to associate, when necessary, while at the same time displaying low levels of trust and cooperation. The possibility of an escalation into a more violent relationship seems somewhat remote – as remote as an improvement of the relationship toward trust, cooperation, empathy, and shared goals.

The latter has much to do with power asymmetry. As one of the dyad actors possesses coercive power, the power disparity between the two actor groups is strong. This enables the military to display a mix of behavior that is dominating (suppression of social protest, fumigation and forced eradication of coca plantations as a strategy to combat the country's cocaine trade) and cooperating (development activities, security provision). While development activities are rejected by some civilian actors and welcomed by others, most civilians interviewed for this study try to avoid interacting with the military. However, the relationship is not characterized by any regular signs of manipulation or coercion, even though occasional clashes, as for example over military actions such as forced eradication of coca bushes, the suppression of social protest, or the conflict over collective memory, persist. Still, efforts to increase cooperation and deliberation are definitely stronger on the military side, while most civilian actors included in this study remain guarded. Overall, the military seems open to dialogue, but also pushes its objectives through where needed. Disagreements are acknowledged in both actor groups. A low level of behavioral interaction certainly exists, but cooperation in terms of shared goals and interests seems still largely unattained. In fact, the element of competition, particularly over developmental work that entered the relationship in the post-accord phase, may well constitute a growing obstacle to cooperation in the future, particularly regarding the power asymmetry between the dyad actors. Much less congruence seems to exist in terms of the actors' subjective experiences of the other, and this constitutes a major obstacle to increased cooperation. Mutual recognition is mostly thin, and the behavior of the other is observed with much reserve and suspicion. The military's self-image clashes decisively with the image of the military prevailing in the groups of civilian actors that voiced their opinions in this study, and levels of trust, empathy, appreciation, and respect between the two sides are generally low.

That leaves the question of whether – and how – the dyad will be able to advance from the current level of peace between agonists toward a higher

level of relational peace in the future. This study shows how strongly the history of a relationship plays into current conceptualizations and even impacts future relationship expectations. Still haunted by memories of human rights violations committed by the military against civilians and state security actors' tacit support of the brutalities of paramilitary groups during the decades of armed conflict, the civilian side of the dyad interviewed for this study is stuck in an agonistic relationship with the military and shies away from a stronger relationship. The Colombian military, on the other hand, is determined to leave the past behind as quickly as possible and considers closer cooperation with civilians and increased interdependence to be an important basis for its extended future role. To increase mutual respect, trust, and cooperation, the cornerstones of higher levels of relational peace, the military as the stronger, more powerful, and more dominant actor in this particular dyad will have to take the first steps and cooperate with the government in implementing deeper structural changes. These might include a change in strategy – such as abstaining from contradictory and adverse actions in rural communities as outlined above and refraining from competing with civilian state and non-state actors concerning its expanding role in development – or they might demand structural changes such as a clear separation from the police in terms of areas of involvement, tasks, and budget, a commitment to transitional justice and the fight against impunity for military personnel, and a more clearly delimited role for the future. Such structural steps would prevent the military from becoming even more independent and powerful.

However, far from its taking a step in that direction, there are indicators that the military's pact with the political elites will strengthen its role and independence even further and contribute to future mistrust and lack of cooperation between the dyad actors. Fumigation of coca plantations, abandoned temporarily during the peace negotiations, is in full swing again (FIP 2018b; Nilsson and González 2021). In May 2019, after accusations that the military violated civilians' human rights in rural areas, then Colombian President Ivan Duque, a stark representative of the conservative political-economic elite, established the Presidential Commission of Military Excellence. The body was tasked with scrutinizing military doctrines for their compliance with human rights and international humanitarian rights law. However, the commission, which was accused of consisting only of friends of the conservative elites, could not find any fault in the military's doctrines and regulations (Duque 2020). In January 2019, the government released a rather bellicose security plan that provided for the creation of citizen security networks (*redes de participación cívica*) to provide information to the military in zones under the control of criminal groups (Ministry of Defense 2019). This government security plan imitated the infamous *convivir* groups of the

1990s,[4] reviving the possibility of new paramilitary formations in Colombia and provoking the question of whether the country is going backward rather than forward toward relational peace.

Colombia is but one of many examples, in Latin America and elsewhere, where post-accord militaries in strong positions and with numbers inflated by protracted social conflict carve out a new role for themselves, including their relationship with civilian actor groups. Future case study research needs to look at those extended roles of military actors that are, at least in part, legitimized by the high levels of violence often persisting after peace accords and consider how far they are acceptable to civilian actors. How do they affect relational peace and in what way do they impact sustainable democracy? This discussion links back to the core debate over what form civil–military relations should take in democracies. However, the relational peace framework does not suggest that all dyads necessarily must achieve higher orders of relational peace for peace to be sustainable. Friendship as the ultimate goal for a relationship might be desirable for other actor dyads, such as, for example, communities that have engaged in conflict with each other or their relations with ex-combatants from illegally armed actor groups who have gone through a disarmament and reintegration process. However, the question is how much further the relationship between a civilian population and its country's military needs to be developed in the first place. While respect, trust, and cooperation do need to reach a certain level, some degree of critical distance might be healthier for a democratic state than excessively close and regular cooperation. A stable level of peace between fellows – not friends – should perhaps be the final goal.

A final note is in order concerning the difficulty of looking at "civil"–military relations once research is expanded to include civilian actors other than political and economic elites: the "fuzziness" of the civilian actor side. The study's findings are based, among others, on interviews with predominantly rural communities, as it is those rural communities who continue to live in environments with high levels of violence. Here, relational peace between civilian and military actors is of most importance, and efforts need to be directed to those relationships. However, the military's relationship might not be agonistic with all civilian actor groups. When this research was conducted, civilians in larger urban centers in Colombia who had lived removed from the conflict scene for years responded much more positively to the military as an actor than did their rural counterparts, as has been pointed out above (see DANE 2019). However, recent opinion polls show that even civilians in urban areas are beginning to distance themselves from the military as an actor after a number of scandals revealed blatant human rights violations committed by the military even recently against civilians in rural areas (*El Espectador* 2020). The myriad of actors that characterize

the "civil" side in that relationship, in Colombia as well as other countries, will always allow for relationships to develop in both directions, toward as well as away from each other. In the end, however, friendship might be neither attainable nor desirable as the ultimate form of relational peace for civil–military relations.

Notes

1 Fe en Colombia (Faith in Colombia) is an inter-institutional program created in 2015 and designed to strengthen cooperation between state agencies, international organizations, and private business to increase security and strengthen governability.
2 Acción Integral (Integral Action) is a military institution and the main coordinating unit of all military development counterinsurgency efforts in Bogotá. It was created in 1964 in connection to the "Plan Laso," the beginning of counterinsurgency development measures, to plan, finance, and coordinate those activities in remote areas, and predominantly draws on resources from the budget of the Ministry of Defense (M11).
3 However, an experimental survey in the more remote rural areas with more guerrilla and coca plantation presence showed that, because of security risks, people in those areas do not *reveal* their true preferences and are much less in favour of the military (only 6.3 percent) (Matanok and Garcia-Sanchez 2018).
4 The Special Vigilance and Private Security Services, commonly called *convivir,* were a national program of neighborhood watch groups created in 1994 by the Colombian Ministry of Defense to deal with growing guerrilla activities, mainly in the countryside. The *convivir* gained a bad reputation because of their association with paramilitary groups and because they resembled similar organizations created by the Colombian government during the 1960s where civilians were trained for internal security purposes and which constituted the beginning of paramilitary organizations in Colombia.

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Table 6.1 List of interviews

Interviewee abbreviation	Rank/position	Date of interview	Location of interview
M1	Retired coronel, member of COTEF	April 17, 2017	Bogotá
M2	Coronel, COTEF	April 21, 2017	Bogotá
M3	General, COTEF	April 19, 2018	Bogotá
M4	General, COTEF	April 23 ,2018	Bogotá
M5	Teniente Coronel, Acción Integral	April 23, 2018	Bogotá
M6	Coronel, Escuela Superior de Guerra	April 24, 2018	Bogotá
M7	General	April 24, 2018	Bogotá
M8	Official, mobile army brigade	September 12, 2017	Vista Hermosa, Meta
M9	Military official guarding the river	September 24, 2017	Puerto Frasquillo, Córdoba
M10	Commander, mobile army brigade	September 13, 2017	Puerto Rico, Meta
M11	Commander, mobile army brigade	September 28, 2017	Montería, Córdoba
C1	Member, CINEP	March 11, 2018	Bogotá
C2	University expert	May 16, 2017	Bogotá
C3	University expert	September 23, 2017	Montería, Córdoba
C4	Member, Fundación Paz y Reconciliación	April 17, 2018	Bogotá
C5	CIPE official	April 13, 2018	Bogotá
C6	ART official	May 13, 2017	Bogotá
C7	ART official	May 12, 2017	Bogotá
C8	School of intelligence official	April 4, 2018	School of National Intelligence, Bogotá
C9	Ministry of Defense official	April 23, 2018	Ministry of Defence, Bogotá
C10	Local government official	September 13, 2017	Puerto Rico, Meta

Table 6.1 List of interviews (Continued)

Interviewee abbreviation	Rank/position	Date of interview	Location of interview
C11	*Personero* (human rights ombudsman, city council)	September 12, 2017	Vista Hermosa, Meta
C12	*Personero* (human rights ombudsman, city council)	September 13, 2017	Puerto Rico, Meta
C13	Government secretary	September 19, 2017	Jambaló, Cauca
C14	Municipal council member	September 13, 2017	Vista Hermosa, Meta
C15	Local government official	September 11, 2017	Vista Hermosa, Meta
C16	Local government official	September 26, 2017	Puerto Libertador, Córdoba
C17	Municipal council member	September 27, 2017	Puerto Libertador, Córdoba
C18	*Negwesx* member	September 20, 2017	Jambaló, Cauca
C19	*Negwesx* member	September 20, 2017	Jambaló, Cauca
C20	Indigenous leader, governor of indigenous protection zone	September 27, 2017	Montería, Córdoba
C21	Indigenous leader, member of ONIC	September 25, 2017	Bogotá
C22	Assembly of local villagers (65)	September 13, 2017	Puerto Chispas, Meta
C23	La Granga agricultural project participants (8)	September 24, 2017	La Granga, Córdoba
C24	Group of social leaders (9–11)	September 23, 2017	Montería, Córdoba
C25	Group of indigenous leaders (8–10)	September 18, 2017	Jambaló, Cauca

7

The web of relations shaping the Philippine peace talks

Isabel Bramsen

How critical for reaching an agreement is relational peace between negotiating parties? And how are peace talks shaped by multiple relations? This chapter investigates elements of relational peace between the negotiating parties of the Philippine peace talks (2016–2020) between the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Philippine government. It shows how the talks broke down despite elements of relational peace between the parties at the table and discusses how this relates to the larger set of relations shaping the peace talks.

The chapter builds on participatory observations from the third round of talks in the Philippine peace talks in 2017, where I was allowed to observe the negotiations from the back of the room over the course of a week of talks. Likewise, the chapter draws upon video material from the first, second, and fourth rounds of talks as well as interviews with negotiators taking part in the talks and peacebuilders working in the Philippines. The chapter shows how the relationship between the parties present at the talks can be characterized as *relational peace* between friends, or at least between fellows, in the form of: (1) deliberation, non-domination, and elements of cooperation; (2) respectful attitudes toward each other as well as elements of trust; and (3) fellowship and in some cases even friendship as the idea of the relationship. This relational peace was built up over several years, with the same negotiators having participated in several attempts at negotiating peace since 1986. Yet despite constructive interaction at the negotiation table, positive attitudes toward the opponents, and friendship-like relations in 2017, the talks fell apart after the third round because of transgressions of the ceasefire on the ground and supposedly also conflicting interests within each party.

Based on observations of the talks, analysis of the overall situation, and insights from relational peace theory and peacebuilding literature, the chapter discusses three further sets of relations besides the relations between the

negotiators that shaped the peace talks: (1) interparty relations between the different political and military components of each party; (2) relations between the leaders of the respective parties, Rodrigo Duterte and Jose Maria Sison; and (3) civil society relations. Finally, the chapter discusses the lessons for relational peace and suggests that political reforms are needed in the Philippines to promote peace.

Apart from a few exceptions (Kingsbury 2006; Ahtisaari 2008), research on peace talks generally builds on secondary material and rarely analyzes the actual behavior and attitudes expressed around the negotiation table. This chapter contributes to the study of diplomacy and peace talks with fine-grained observations and analysis based on in-person fieldwork. Moreover, the study contributes to the body of literature on various cases of peace talks (Michael 2007; Ahtisaari 2008; Cohen-Almagor 2019), adding the importance of cohesion, civil society, and presence of the leaders, and discusses the potential of an agonistic peace.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses how the relational peace framework can be operationalized in a micro-sociological setting. Second, the chapter analyzes the behavioral interaction at the negotiation table, respective attitudes toward the other party, and the idea of the relationship between the parties. Third, it describes the breakdown of the peace talks and discusses the web of relations shaping the talks including interparty relations, leadership relations, and civil society relations. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the takeaways of the study for the relational peace framework, and the prospects of peace in the Philippines as well as future research avenues.

Peace talks

Peace talks imply negotiation and dialogue that are intended to improve the relationship between conflicting parties and, ideally, to find sufficient common ground to sign a peace agreement that can put an end to hostilities (Bramsen and Hagemann 2021). Peace talks are often facilitated by a third party specialized in peace diplomacy, for example a country like Norway or Qatar, an NGO, or, alternatively, international organizations like the UN or the the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Wallensteen 2011; Lehti 2014). The mediator (often assigned as Special Envoy) is usually assisted by a mediation team and/or a mediation support unit, i.e., an NGO specialized in supporting mediation processes. Mediation is a voluntary process that requires the consent of the conflicting parties to initiate talks, and throughout the peace process, each party may at any point withdraw from the talks or the agreement. Apart from the

micro-dynamics at the table, which is the focus of this chapter, various contextual, structural, and geopolitical factors greatly shape the outcome and dynamics of mediation and in many cases may determine the likelihood of success (Kissinger 1994).

In literature on mediation efforts, the success or failure of peace talks has been ascribed to the bias of the mediator, the ripeness of the conflict, the level of conflict intensity, and the nature of the issue(s) in question (Kleiboer 1996; Svensson 2014; Wallensteen and Svensson 2014; Svensson 2020). Moreover, recent studies of mediation have focused on inclusion (Paffenholz and Zartman 2019), the role of women (Aggestam and Svensson 2018), and mediator responsibility (Jensehaugen et al. 2022), as well as a mediator's ability to build "relational empathy" between the conflicting parties (Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017: 107). However, research on mediation and peace talks has rarely gone into the specific practicalities and dynamics of the talks. One reason for this is that researchers are rarely granted access to directly observe peace talks because of the confidential and sensitive nature of such efforts (Bramsen 2022), and hence our knowledge of peace talks has previously stemmed from biographies or writings by diplomats, negotiators, and heads of state. Drawing on direct observations for one of the first times in the study of peace talks, this chapter aims to contribute to the mediation literature with insights about relational peace and inter-actional dynamics in practice. Moreover, the direct observations allow us to go beyond the focus on ripeness outside the negotiation room and allow for a more detailed, micro-sociological analysis of peace talks, that is, how parties engage with each other in and around peace talks. However, because the talks eventually broke down, the chapter argues that friendship at the negotiation table is insufficient for reaching peace and that other relations between the leaders, within-party relations, and the relations to civil society are critical for reaching a peace agreement, as well as for achieving peace in itself.

In addition, the chapter aims to contribute to the literature accumulating "lessons" from various peace talks as well as from the Philippine peace talks specifically. While previous studies have emphasized lessons from peace processes such as the Aceh peace talks (Ahtisaari 2008), the Cyprus peace talks (Michael 2007), the Afghan peace talks (Shinn and Dobbins 2011), and the Israeli–Egyptian peace talks (Cohen-Almagor 2019), the chapter aims to add lessons from the Philippine peace talks to that pool of research, exploring the importance of cohesion, civil society, and the role of the leaders. With a few exceptions, there have been almost no academic studies conducted on the Philippine peace talks with the CPP, and thus the chapter also addresses a gap in the accumulated knowledge of peace talks in general as well as the specific case of the Philippine government–CPP talks.

Relational peace

Theorizing and defining peace has, for good reasons, been at the core of peace research since the beginning of the research tradition. In a recent interview, one of the fathers of peace research, Johan Galtung, provided a very simple definition of peace that is quite different than the negative-positive vision of peace with which he is often associated: "Peace is: I do good to you, you do good to me."[1] Though very blunt, this is a very precise description of peace that reflects the idea that peace is reciprocal and relational but also dynamic in the sense that it suggests that peace may change, depending on the actions of either party. In a similar manner, Söderström, Åkebo, and Jarstad make a very convincing argument that peace should be defined relationally (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). Specifically, they define a peaceful relation as behavioral interaction characterized by non-domination, deliberation, and/or cooperation between actors in a dyad where the actors "recognize and trust each other and believe that the relationship is either one between legitimate fellows or between friends" (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). By defining peace as a particular quality of a relationship, Söderström et al. avoid the pitfalls of defining peace too narrowly (negative peace) or too broadly (positive peace), and make peace relatively tangible.

While I welcome the attempt by Söderström et al. to theorize peaceful relations, I want to question the importance of the third component in the definition of a peaceful relation: the idea of the relationship itself. While peaceful relations certainly often correlate with an actor's idea of a relationship as friendly (or peaceful), I would argue that *the idea of the relationship* does not characterize the relationship per se, but rather it is an effect of the fact that the relationship is peaceful. In other words, it is not the (cognitive) ideas about the relationship that constitute the relationship, but rather *relational* aspects such as interactions and social bonds between the parties. One can even imagine a situation where one party considers a relationship to be a friendship while the other does not. For relational peace to be truly relational it needs to focus on the purely relational aspects rather than individual perceptions. Moreover, one can distinguish between a momentary peaceful relation and the overall definition or idea of a relationship. For example, a married couple may characterize their relationship as friendship and marriage yet still have non-peaceful relations on occasions. I would therefore argue that for relational peace to be more dynamic, it should be tied more closely to the nature of the interactions in question and less to the overall idea of the relationship. Söderström et al. argue that "the idea of the relationship" is necessary in the definition of peaceful relations in order to describe, for example, the non-peaceful relation between the US

and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Söderström et al. 2021: 495), but I would argue that an assessment of the levels of trust, recognition, and collaboration is sufficient to make such a distinction. However, while not necessarily constituting the relationship per se, "the idea of the relationship" or perception of the other as friend or enemy is still a valid measurement of the status of the relationship, because it says something about how the parties consider the relationship. Hence, an assessment of the parties' ideas of the relationship is also included in this chapter.

In terms of behavioral interaction, this chapter contributes with a micro-sociological take, arguing that interaction shapes social bonds between participants, and energizes and de-energizes them, depending on the nature of the interaction. Engaged, rhythmic interaction where participants respond to each other's utterings in an appreciative manner, for example by laughing, smiling, nodding, or adding to the conversation, energizes participants and generates a social bond between them (Collins 2004; Bramsen and Poder 2018; Holmes and Wheeler 2019). This could be considered collaboration as defined in the relational peace framework, but could equally entail, for example, friendly mocking of each other. I therefore refer to this form of interaction as friendly interaction. In particular, when analyzing interaction at a negotiation table it is important to have this rather subtle nuance; parties at the table of course do not exactly collaborate, for otherwise they would reach an agreement right away. Rather, friendly interaction refers to an engaged, responsive, and open mode of interaction that may or may not involve collaboration. Disengaged interaction, on the other hand, de-energizes participants. In such interaction there is no clear focus, a lack of rhythm in the exchange of words for example with long pauses, lack of eye contact, etc. Collaboration may in principle take this disengaged form, and so could deliberation, violence, and many other ways of interacting (Bramsen and Poder 2018: 9). The reason for integrating this extra element along with the relational peace framework here is to go beyond the description of behavioral interaction and capture how interaction energizes and de-energizes participants, using the micro-sociological approach, and how it potentially can generate social bonds and thus relational peace.

Methodology

This chapter builds on direct observations from the Philippine talks as well as interviews with participants in the talks. It applies a micro-sociological methodology (Collins 2004) focusing on micro-interactions between the communist party and the Philippine government. I was allowed to observe

the Philippine peace talks in January 2017, a possibility that was made possible by my contact with the then Special Envoy to the Philippines, Elisabeth Slåttum, whom I met at a Nordic Women Mediators annual meeting in 2016. Slåttum kindly agreed to ask the parties to the Philippine peace talks whether I could come and attend the third round of talks in January 2017, and they agreed on the condition that I would sign a nondisclosure agreement promising not to reveal anything from the talks before eighteen months after the ending of the meeting, and that I would let the parties look at my descriptions of my observations first. From January 19 to 25, 2017, I was therefore allowed into the engine room of diplomacy, where very few researchers have been allowed over the years. I stayed at the hotel where the negotiations took place, and participated in the Norwegian team's planning meetings and in the meals at the hotel as well as in the official talks, where I was sitting behind the negotiation table with other observers from civil society organizations, lawyers, and representatives from the military. The talks took place in Rome, Italy. They were facilitated by Norway, with diplomats from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attending, as well as senior advisors from the Norwegian mediation support unit at the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF).

I also stayed close to the back-channel negotiations in 2020, which took place in Utrecht in the Netherlands. Here I was not allowed to observe the direct talks, but I took part in a dinner with participants from the two delegations as well as several activities with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) including an internal planning meeting for the negotiations, where I also conducted interviews with representatives from the two delegations. Besides this I conducted online interviews with civil society representatives from the Philippines. To supplement the participatory observations and the interviews I draw upon thirty pictures from the talks that I collected in order to be able to analyze the interactions in greater detail, as well as video material from the first, second, and fourth rounds of talks which are available online on YouTube. The video material enables me to not only focus on the third round of talks that I observed, but also draw on data from the other three rounds and thus have a broader basis on which I can draw conclusions about the interaction. Moreover, the video material allows me to analyze micro-details of interaction such as laughing, and to capture the exact phrases in the opening speeches that set the stage for the rest of the talks. Hence, the micro-sociological approach enables me to analyze relational peace in very concrete terms in the form of direct interaction and engagement between conflict parties. Finally, the chapter also draws upon news articles particularly texts from Philippine news sources such as Rappler, Philstar, and CNN Philippines.

The Philippine peace process

The conflict between the communist rebellion of the Philippines and the Philippine government dates back to 1968, when the communist movement was established by Jose Maria Sison. The communist insurgency consists of the New People's Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) as well as the CPP. The communist insurgency is therefore referred to as CPP/NPA/NDF or CNN for short (an abbreviation of the abbreviations). Whereas the CPP is considered the "brain" behind the movement, the NPA is the armed front and the NDFP is the political branch mainly responsible for the peace talks as well as other diplomatic efforts. Sison was an English teacher at the University of the Philippines, and he has written numerous books on the prospects of a communist revolution in the Philippines. The aim of the CNN is to promote constitutional reforms, social and economic reform, and land reform.

The talks between the Philippine government and the NDFP have been ongoing intermittently since 1986 with shifting presidents but with many of the same negotiators on both sides. The peace talks have led to several interim agreements throughout the years, including the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in 1998 (CHARHRIHL 1998).

When Duterte took office in the Philippines in August 2016, he reconvened the peace talks. During his presidential campaign he had promised peace with the communist party, and he considers himself a leftist (Gita-Carlos 2019) and agrees with many of the same ideas put forward by the communist party. During his campaign Duterte even had a friendly and cordial conversation with Sison, which was recorded and put on YouTube (Kilab Multimedia 2016). It was hence an even bigger disappointment that the talks did not bear any fruit right away. Duterte wished for a quick peace deal and pledged that it could be reached within the first year of his presidency; however, as the unilateral ceasefire was breached in January 2017, the hopes for a quick peace deal fell apart (*The Guardian* 2017).

The parties first met in Oslo in August 2016 and then again at a second round of talks in October 2016, a third round of talks in January 2017, and a fourth round in April 2017. Between the third and fourth rounds, the talks broke down, but thanks to back-channel negotiations the parties resumed the talks again in April. However, the talks broke down again, and since then only back-channel talks have been conducted. In July 2020, Duterte signed an anti-terrorism act labeling the CNN as a terrorist organization and thus a party that cannot be negotiated with, and this naturally has been devastating for the peace process. On May 9, 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was elected as the new president of the Philippines. Marcos Jr. is the son

of the dictator Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin, who was ousted by a popular uprising in 1986. The new presidency does not offer much hope for the peace talks with the CPP (Engelbrecht 2022), and the leadership of the CPP is very critical of the new presidency (Raymundo 2022). Hence, the prospects for resuming peace talks in the near future are weak. Nevertheless, important insights about the dynamics of relational peace can be gained from studying the 2016–2017 peace talks and the larger web of relations surrounding and shaping the talks.

The following section will analyze the relationship between the two delegations representing the Philippine government and the CPP (2016–2017), drawing upon the three central dimensions of relational peace: *behavioral interaction*, *subjective attitudes toward the other*, and *idea of the relationship*.

Behavioral interactions

As I will show in the following discussions, the behavioral interaction taking place at the negotiation table and in the breaks corresponds with several of the elements of relational peace in terms of deliberation, non-domination, and even cooperation.

Deliberation

Peace talks are in and of themselves a symbol and practice of deliberation between conflicting parties. As argued by Söderström et al., deliberation "does not imply a demand for consensus, but rather an acknowledgment of disagreement through dialogue, and the presence of a venue for transforming relationships" (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction), and peace talks can be considered exactly such a platform. The interactions at the peace table in the Philippine peace talks were characterized either by being friendly, with jokes being made and smiles being exchanged, or by being disengaged, with a lack of mutual focus and a slow rhythm of interaction (Bramsen 2022). Both forms of deliberation are friendly and polite, but the first form is much more engaged. While engaged, friendly interaction can provide conducive conditions for reaching an agreement, it does not in and of itself lead to an agreement. The low-intensity, disengaged interactions were especially prevalent when the negotiations were concerned with technical issues, issues of law, and discussions of specific formulations. When the talks reached a point where no solution could be found, the Norwegian facilitators often called for a break, and when the parties returned to the negotiation table, the issue that had divided the parties prior to the break was often solved. Such breaks could take up to two hours, and during them the heads of the

negotiating parties would meet outside to have more one-on-one discussions about the issue over a cigarette or similar. When I interviewed the head of the communist delegation I asked about the dynamic in these breaks, and he described how issues that would cause tension in the official talks were solved more easily in informal talks as the parties could talk more freely and, importantly, they spoke in a different more direct and dialogical manner, which increased the understanding between the parties. Hence, the particular space of interaction also shapes the potential for and character of deliberation, with breaks and other informal spaces being particularly conducive to cultivating friendly and engaged interaction.

Non-domination

While power is always present and thus one cannot imagine power-free peace talks (Bramsen et al. 2016), domination entails that one party sets the rhythm of the interaction, talks down to the opponent, and interrupts the other or in other ways establishes a "top-dog" position through interaction. Given that the conflict between the Philippine government and the NDFP is asymmetric on the battleground, the talks were characterized by remarkably little domination and hence "the room for action of the weaker actor in a dyad" was not determined by the stronger party (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction). Despite the clear power asymmetry, which can often be a challenging condition for peace negotiations (Aggestam 2010), the parties seemed to consider each other equals, and this was reflected in their manner of engaging. The parties took turns to express their concerns and goals at the negotiation table, neither party dominated the room with their body postures, tone of voice, or expressions, and none of the delegations seemed restricted by the other when it came to room for maneuver.

Cooperation

Although the parties met to solve a broader conflict in the Philippines, they cannot be said to have had the same goals apart from the overall and more abstract goal of peace in the Philippines. However, in spite of the absence of goals that they can cooperate to achieve, they can still "make moves that benefit the other" as argued by Jarstad et al. (this volume, Introduction). The initiation of the peace talks was characterized by exactly such "goodwill measures," as the Philippine government released twenty-one political prisoners from the CPP, and both parties declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, the parties did not agree as to whether these actions were cooperative enough: the CPP wanted more prisoners to be released and the Philippine government wanted a bilateral ceasefire. At the table too, the interaction

cannot be said to have been cooperative in the sense of working together toward a common goal, but nevertheless it was cooperative in the sense of engaging with each other's concerns and proposals in a cooperative manner. Moreover, representatives of the NDFP offered gifts to all delegates and other people present at the talks (including myself). Suh a gift-giving ritual can be considered a cooperative act cultivating a friendly atmosphere and relationship.

A video from the fourth round of talks shows the opening speech of the special advisor to the peace process, Jesus Dureza, stating that "we are no longer in the concept of negotiating but already sharing common values and common aspirations for a better Philippines" (Kodao Productions 2017). This is particularly remarkable because the fourth round of talks followed an initial breakdown of talks after the third round, as will be described later. Since I took part in only the third round of talks, however, I do not know whether this attitude also characterized the confidential parts of the fourth round of talks, but given the tense situation it is likely that this tension was also felt at the talks. Likewise, there is of course an element of performativity in the statement, and thus it is unclear how much it actually reflects reality at the time.

Subjective attitudes toward the other

Besides the interactions at the table, in the breaks, and in front of the media, an actor's attitudes and perceptions of the opposite party also define the peacefulness of their relationship. In this case, the attitude of the parties toward one another was very much one of recognition, symbolized, for example, by their putting their hands together to display teamwork and cooperation, as seen in Figure 7.1.

Whether or not the parties actually trusted each other is more challenging to assess. My sense, also from the interviews, was that there was a relatively high degree of trust between the individuals representing the two parties, but that there was not necessarily trust in the overall machinery of the government, for example. Of course, even the trust in particular individuals would vary depending on the relationship and prior interaction. Besides relative levels of trust and friendly affection among the parties, several government representatives, most notably the Philippine minister of foreign affairs, Perfecto Yasay Jr., even expressed their admiration for the communist chief political advisor, Sison. In his speech Yasay stated the following:

> I must also confess that my trip has brought about the fulfillment of two of my top bucket list, one is to be able to meet Joma Sison and that is more than

Figure 7.1 Negotiating parties: Norwegian and Philippine ministers of foreign affairs putting their hands together to display teamwork

enough for me, to justify my trip to be here and that also justifies why I am dumbfounded and speechless, Joma thank you for this occasion of meeting with you. I had look(ed) up to him and continue to look up to him even when I was still a young college student at the Central Philippine University in Iloilo City and we have a lot of mutual friends. I know Joma to be a very dedicated leader and Filipino who works greatly and singly for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people. I know him and it is one of the reasons why I admire him most is because when he wants to get things done for the good of the country, he will be relentless and he will not end until that is done. (Dureza 2017)

While agreeing to hold talks can be seen as a form of thin recognition in and of itself (Strömbom 2014), the expressions of admiration and respect reflect a certain level of thick recognition as well. Importantly, however, the trust and recognition between the representatives at the negotiation table were not reflected among all of members of the government: as mentioned by one informant from the government, there was a high level of mistrust in general, even within the government, because of the violent dimension of the conflict:

If this was just an ordinary, political fight settled through political processes – no problem. But the mere fact that there is an armed component to it, the reaction is also extreme on both sides. These are the things you need to balance in the negotiations, because the soldiers fighting them also were paid to do it or are committed to do it. And here we are as negotiators trying to broker a peace agreement, also in their names, the direct combatants, the families and

the victims of the insurgency on both sides so you can just imagine what is running into our heads in the negotiations, and how we are perceived by the outside world in the negotiations so, the level of mistrust is high, imagine fifty years of fighting.[2]

Hence, the trust and subjective attitudes toward the other visible at the table were not reflected in all fractions of the government, an issue which I will come back to as one of the challenges for the peace talks.

Ideas of the relationship

The idea of the relationship between the two groups of delegations representing the Philippine government and the CPP respectively ranged between "fellowship" and "friendship." In a video from the second round of talks in October 2016, the special advisor to the peace process, Jesus Dureza, mentions "our friends on the other side of the table" in his opening statement, referring to the NDFP representatives (Capiastrano 2016). Following Dureza's opening speech, on the other hand, Sison expresses his gratitude to "my compatriots on both sides of the table" (Kodao Productions 2016). While some of this rhetoric may be performative given the negotiation situation, this attitude is also reflected in the private conversations as well as interviews that I had: "some of us are really friends."[3]

Because negotiations between the two delegations have been going on sporadically since 1986, many representatives of the delegations have known each other for many years. Silvestre Bello, for example, the leader of the government delegation, also took part in the talks in 2001–2004. Some delegations have even had family-like bonds; for example, the head of the CPP delegation was the godfather of Hernani Braganza, who was with the government delegation. Moreover, Secretary Bello and Braganza were previously affiliated with the revolutionary movement and thus have ideological ties to the CPP, though this was before they entered into party politics. These connections also seem to create a greater level of understanding by the government representatives of the aims of the CPP and the kinds of causes for which it is fighting. When asked about the friendship-like idea of the relationship, a representative from the government delegation responded that the relationship was characterized by "not only friendship but respect" and described how he respected the communists' decade-long fight for redistribution of wealth, land, and rights. He added that if he did not have this level of respect and friendship with the CPP, "that kind of dinner would never happen," referring to the dinner that I participated in the night before with representatives from both parties.

The idea of the relationship as one of friendship also seemed to be echoed at the level of the leaders, as reflected, for example, in the hand gestures

Figure 7.2 President Duterte with members of the government of the Philippines and NDFP peace panels after a meeting in Malacañang's State Dining Room on September 26, 2016. President Duterte is in the middle of the photo in a white shirt with his wrist in the air, whereas the other government representatives display Duterte's sign of the clenched fist in front

that the parties applied. The representatives of the government of the Philippines and the CPP used different hand gestures: pushing a clenched fist forward (the government) symbolizing force, and holding an arm up in the air (the communists), and very often they assumed these poses when having their picture taken. However, interestingly in Figure 7.2, a photo of a meeting between President Duterte with members of the government of the Philippines and NDFP peace panels on September 26, 2016, Duterte is making the same hand gesture as the CPP instead of his "own" gesture. This perhaps signals recognition and indicates the apparently close ties that existed between the government and the CPP, at least symbolically, when Duterte first became president.

Breakdown of talks

Despite visible elements of relational peace and the very friendly atmosphere at the table in the third round of peace talks in January 2017, discussions

broke down right after the third round ended. On January 23, in the middle of the third round of peace talks in Rome, there was an incident of violence in Makilala, Cotabato, where both parties accused each other of being responsible for initiating the violence. The violence did not seem to have a significant influence on the relationship between the parties at the table or the outcome of the talks. The panel chairperson of the government, Secretary Bello, in an interview with the media, stated that the violence was a clear sign of the need for a bilateral ceasefire, which was the main goal of the government at the time. Likewise, in a press release and also in an interview, the panel chairperson of the NDFP, Fidel V. Agcaoili, blamed the government's forces for the attack. In the joint statement on the successful third round of formal talks, it was stated that "the parties note that their unilateral indefinite ceasefires remain in place. They note however that there are issues and concerns related thereto" (Manlupig 2017). However, just one week after the peace talks, on February 1, the NPA, the armed wing of the communist party, declared the end of the ceasefire and launched attacks, killing two government soldiers and kidnapping two others (*The Guardian* 2017). While the talks were at first called off, diplomatic efforts in back-channel talks managed to get the two parties together again for a fourth round of talks in April 2017 in the Netherlands. However, the talks soon broke down again and have remained closed or limited to back-channel talks since then.

How could the talks break down despite good relations between the negotiating parties and, perhaps even more puzzling, given the relatively aligned perceptions of ideal political solutions in the Philippines? Critically, this illustrates the importance of not only intra-party relations at the table but the multiple, interrelated relationship-shaping peace talks, which will be discussed in the following section.

The web of relations

Söderström et al. rightly state that "peace and war can co-exist in webs of multiple interactions" (2021: 488), and one can argue that the challenge in peacebuilding is to promote relational peace across this web of multiple interactions. Peace talks cultivate peacefulness in a certain set of relations, namely between the respective representatives present at the table. However, these relations are by no means the only relations that matter for the materialization of peace, or even for successfully reaching a peace agreement. Equally critical are relations among the actors constituting each party and between the leaders not necessarily present at the table, as well as between the parties and civil society (and among civil society actors). This section

will therefore discuss the importance of (1) interparty relations, (2) relations between the parties' leaders, and (3) relations to civil society for the cultivation of peace.

Intraparty relations

It is often forgotten that relations within each party matter at least as much as the relations between parties when it comes to peace talks. In an interview about the 2012–2016 peace process in Colombia, the negotiator who represented the government in talks with the FARC, Sergio Emillio Caro, stated, "you are negotiating with your own side all the time […] and that was really hard, you know sometimes harder than negotiating with the FARC."[4] This is also reflected within the Philippine government during the (official and unofficial) peace talks from 2016 to 2020, where there seemed to be a lack of coherence regarding position in the talks. According to one informant there was a division within the government between "those who are against the talks, those who are for the talks, there is a wide gap of 'why should we talk to them?' […] within the government there are many differences, there are those who are advocating not to talk to them."[5]

Moreover, there are certain indications that the peaceful interactions that occurred at the negotiation table in 2017 were not translated to the armed forces on both sides. While both sides accuse each other of instigating the violence and it is unclear what exactly happened on the ground, the fact that violence occurred in the Philippines as the peace talks were going on in Rome, and that the ceasefire was terminated despite successful talks, is an indication that the talks occurred far – probably too far – away from the ground and that the peaceful relations at the table were not reflected in the military relations on the ground. The NPA's official reason for withdrawing from the ceasefire was that the government did not release political prisoners and did not respect the unilateral ceasefire. However, all things being equal, the fact that the NPA declared the end of the ceasefire immediately after the political leadership had reconfirmed the ceasefire indicates limited coordination or agreement between the political and armed wings of the communists. Currently Sison is in exile in the Netherlands and therefore is geographically removed from everyday life in the Philippines. While the communist party naturally denies that it lacks control over the armed wing, not only the violence during the talks but also the corresponding cancelation of unilateral ceasefire by the NPA indicate a limited cohesion between the different fractions of the communists. This lack of coherence has also been pointed out by other researchers. For example, Walch (2016) pointed toward the lack of cohesion within the communist party as one of the core elements of the failed peace talks in the Philippines prior to 2016.

The limited connection within different fractions of the communists, as well as the lack of cohesion within the Philippine government, corresponds with what Lederach has termed the interdependence gap. According to Lederach (2005), most peacebuilding efforts are done horizontally, in order to create peace in the relationship *between* the conflicting parties. Thereby, Lederach argues, the necessity of creating a link between different layers of society is missed (Lederach 1999: 1). Lederach therefore calls for a focus on the vertical relations, to strengthen the interdependence across the different levels of the participants within the society. Similarly, Ramsbotham (2010, 2016) calls for strategizing and confidence-building meetings *within* the respective conflicting parties in intractable conflicts so as to support the cohesion prior to diplomatic engagement with the opponent. Such efforts at generating *relational peace* within each party may also strengthen the peace process between the communist coalition and the Philippine government.

Relations between the leaders of the parties

Like the relationship between the parties at the table, the relationship between the leaders of the conflicting parties, President Duterte and Sison, also has friendship-like elements, at least when it comes to the idea of the relationship. Duterte has expressed on several occasions that he was "friends" with the communists, even after the talks fell apart (Colina 2018; Gita-Carlos 2019). However, as fighting broke out and the talks fell apart, the proclamations of friendship were mixed with accusations and negative labels (Mendez 2018; Corrales 2019), and in 2020, Duterte declared the CPP to be a terrorist group (Gotinga 2020). According to some analysts, Duterte considered the CPP's decision to withdraw its unilateral ceasefire as "a 'betrayal' of his own friends" (Fonbuena 2017: 1) and thus reacted in a more extreme way (by canceling the talks altogether) than he would have done if he had not considered the communists his friends. Another explanation for the simultaneous expressions of friendship and harsh accusations is put forward by Duterte's statement that "you know, only the closest of friends can talk harshly to each other and still continue to talk" (Clapano 2018: 1). Maintaining a friendship while engaging in unfriendly behavioral interaction is not unlike a marriage where the partners continue to perceive the relationship as one of friendship, while spending most of the time fighting. This supports my theoretical objection to the "idea of the relationship" component of the relational peace framework, namely that one might have conflict with fierce exchange and even violence, and still have the idea of the relationship as one of friendship. In fact, you might be even more furious about attacks by someone you consider a friend. In that way, the idea of the relationship does not necessarily reflect the changing levels of enmity and peacefulness

between a dyad, since the idea of the relationship may be more stable than fluctuations in peacefulness.

Recently, scholars have begun recognizing the importance of face-to-face interaction in diplomacy and exploring how trust and social bonds are generated through direct interaction (Wheeler 2018; Holmes and Wheeler 2019). The implicit argument is not that interaction in and of itself necessarily fosters peaceful relations, but that certain circumstances can promote friendly interaction and social bonds. Yet the implicit logic in this argument is that trust is more likely to emerge in face-to-face interaction than in non-face-to-face interaction, and this should increase the chance of success for peace talks (Holmes and Wheeler 2019). However, mediation and diplomacy often take place between representatives of groups or countries rather than the leaders. Hence, the interaction that can potentially give rise to trust and social bonds occurs between people with limited leverage to change the status of affairs, and often much depends on leadership. In the case of the Philippine peace talks I would argue that this is part of the problem (Bramsen 2022). The analysis of the talks shows perfectly how good relations between the negotiators were built through friendly interaction over time. However, President Duterte did not take part in the negotiations, and while Sison was present at the venue, he did not take part in the actual negotiations. In December 2019, it was proposed that Duterte and Sison should meet alone, for example in Hanoi. If such a meeting ends up taking place, it is very likely to lead to progress. As argued by one interviewee, "Their media persona is very different from their actual persona, the way they are portrayed in the media is very different from their actual standpoint" and therefore "face-to-face interaction should not be underestimated at this point in time."[6]

Relations to civil society

Apart from the difficulty of translating the potential good relationships between representatives of the conflicting parties to their respective leaders, a major challenge in peace diplomacy is to translate and transfer the emerging connection generated at the negotiation table to the wider society. If peace emerges in interaction and "corporeal encounters" (Väyrynen 2019), everyone from one side of the conflict should ideally meet everyone from the other side of the conflict. This is of course not possible, but it points toward a crucial difficulty in transposing the relations built behind closed doors in peace talks onto relations in the broader society.

This is also highly relevant in the Philippine context. In a TV program called "*Pros and Cons*, produced by the Philippine News Agency, the agency showed a poll that it had conducted on Facebook where viewers were asked whether or not the government should go through with the peace talks

Figure 7.3 Poll on support for the peace talks from the TV program *Pros and Cons*, January 27, 2020

(Philippine News Agency 2020). It reported that 95 per cent voted against going through with them (see Figure 7.3). While the Philippine News Agency is a newswire service of the Philippine government and thus is not impartial in matters of the peace process, this gives an indication that at least some segments of the Philippine society are skeptical about the peace talks (Philippine News Agency 2020).

Lessons may be drawn here from the Mindanao peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), where civil society was increasingly involved and importantly played a key role in ceasefire monitoring (Ross 2017). In an interview, a program manager at Nonviolent Peaceforce Philippines mentioned that thanks to the successful involvement of civil society in the MILF peace process, he has tried to also involve civil society in the peace process between the CPP and the GRP but that he did not succeed in raising funding.

In April 2019, Duterte formed a new negotiating panel, substituting the long-running negotiators with mainly military personnel and tasking them to facilitate "local peace talks," presumably inspired by the Colombian peace process. However, the NDFP is very critical of the talks. It does not consider them genuine attempts to include locals in negotiations but rather a political bluster to satisfy voters or enforcement of government-interest in rebel-lead areas. According to Sison, local NPA commanders have not been willing to participate in local peace talks, and "all commands of the New People's Army at all levels have rejected since a long time ago the offer of localized peace talks as an inutile tactic of deception to divide and defeat the armed revolutionary movement" (Sison 2019). Given the skepticism toward the government's attempts at local peace efforts, it might be relevant to involve an impartial third party in the local peace engagements to ensure legitimacy and funding of local organizations. Perhaps a third party such as the Norwegian government or NOREF could be further involved in including and funding civil society in the peace process.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the relationship between the negotiating panels of the Philippine government and the CPP could be characterized as relational peace "between fellows" during the third round of peace talks in 2017. The interactions were generally either friendly or disengaged, while the parties' attitudes toward each other demonstrated respect, recognition, and even admiration. The idea of the relationship between the parties at the table was very often one of friendship.

The chapter has shown how the framework of relational peace is very relevant in the context of peace negotiations, in particular because it focuses on the development of the relationship between the particular parties taking part. However, the chapter also showed how difficult it is to translate peaceful relations that are generated and cultivated at the peace table to the wider public as well as to the decision-makers who are not necessarily present at the table. Moreover, it explored the critical importance of intra-party relations for improving the prospects of peace. Hence, relational peace needs to be cultivated not only at the peace table but in the wider web of interactions within which the talks take place. Similarly, studies of relational peace should ideally focus not only on a single dyad, but rather on the comprehensive web or relations shaping a particular intergroup relationship. However, it is nearly impossible to account for all dyads shaping the situation in, for example, the Philippines. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown that it is possible to map out some of the central strands shaping a peace process such as the Philippine peace talks.

In relation to this, the chapter has also illustrated the difficulties of studying actors who are meant to represent a larger dyad, given that dyads may have several representatives with diverging opinions and perceptions that hence constitute a network of dyads rather than a node within a dyad per se. Importantly, the chapter challenges the importance of friendship in peace talks, showing that on its own, friendship between negotiating parties is not sufficient to generate peace. In accordance with the saying "If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies" (Dayan 1977: 1), it is not sufficient to bring together the most moderate representatives from two sides of a country: the hawks also need to be present.

Inspired by the relational peace framework and theorizations of agonistic peace (Shinko 2008; Strömbom 2019; Strömbom et al. 2022), one could argue that what is needed in the Philippines is a reform of the political system that would allow insurgent groups to continue their fight with political means, so that violence does not become their only means of influence (Santos 2022). However, such reforms are currently not within sight, particularly not with the new president in place (as of May 2022).

Future research could compare the case of the Philippine talks with other talks that did lead to a peace agreement, for example the Colombian peace talks, which were also facilitated by Norway (and Cuba) and which also involved a conflict between a communist insurgency and a government. Moreover, future research could investigate the potential of the new president to revisit the peace talks and the prospects for peace with the new president in office.

Notes

1 Virtual interview conducted by the author and Anine Hageman, September 7, 2018.
2 Interview conducted by the author, February 17, 2020.
3 Virtual interview conducted by the author, May 13, 2019.
4 Virtual interview conducted by the author, April 21, 2022.
5 Interview conducted by the author, February 17, 2020.
6 Virtual interview conducted by the author, March 23, 2020.

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8

Foes to fellows to friends: performing relational peace through theater in Sri Lanka

Nilanjana Premaratna

The Sri Lanka I grew up in had very few Tamils. The Tamils who were there appeared mostly in the stories of my parents, in books, and in the media. However, my parents, both Sinhala, grew up in a very different country. My mother, who studied in Bandarawela, had Tamil schoolmates, and can understand Tamil. My father, who worked mostly with Tamil colleagues during the first stage of his career, is fluent in Tamil. They both worked in a multiethnic area when I was born. Apparently as a toddler, I had a habit of sneaking off to our Tamil neighbors whenever I could. Yet, despite this story from my early childhood, I did not inherit this multiethnic Sri Lanka that my parents had. Instead, I grew up in a country with clear conflict lines that ran along ethnicity and language. This is partly because my parents relocated to a place that is closer to Colombo before I turned three. But it is primarily because Sri Lanka became increasingly divided by the conflict. Protracted conflict gave way to increasing ethno-nationalistic sentiments. Ethnic stereotyping and polarization became rampant, as the following quotation from a former (Sinhala) dean at the University of Ruhuna illustrates: "I am not in favor of any close association or forming ties with Tamils […] I think the differences we see among the races are natural. I think that forming kinship ties with people of another culture is something dishonorable […] I can neither speak nor write the Tamil language, because I never associated with Tamil people" (Kariyakarawana 2004: 99). My first post-toddler interaction with a Tamil person that I remember took place only as a university student. Conflict divides along lines of ethnicity, language, geographical boundaries, and, at times, religion characterized the Sri Lanka where I grew up.

This is the context in which Theatre of the People – called Jana Karaliya in Sinhala and Makkal Kalari in Tamil[1] – strived to develop interethnic relations. Jana Karaliya started in 2002 as a bilingual mobile theater group that brought together Sinhala and Tamil youth from different areas in Sri

Lanka to perform in Sinhala- and Tamil-language plays. The plays brought together elements from Sinhala and Tamil drama traditions, specifically in designing costumes, music, and dance styles. Jana Karaliya's peacebuilding therefore aimed to model interethnic peace and harmony, instead of talking about or directly advocating peace. By the very example of its sustained coexistence, the group challenges ethno-linguistic polarization and binary construction of ethnic narratives in Sri Lanka (see de Mel 2021). Peacebuilding at the ground level requires tackling conflict identities (Cohen 2003). Jana Karaliya puts this approach into practice by bringing together strangers and seeming adversaries, who transform into a group of close friends who continue to work across changing conflict phases. In a country that has been deeply marked by ethnocentric identities, subsequent polarizations, an internationally mediated ceasefire agreement followed by a war, and a victor's peace, Jana Karaliya offers a symbol of ethnic harmony with its multiethnic, bilingual team who live, work, and travel together (Premaratna and Bleiker 2010; Premaratna 2018).

How did interethnic relations between Jana Karaliya's Sinhala and Tamil members evolve over time, and what characterizes this particular manifestation of relational peace? In order to answer this puzzle, I apply the relational peace framework of Söderström, Åkebo, and Jarstad (Söderström et al. 2021; Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction) to Jana Karaliya's within-group relations. While the arts have gained increasing attention for offering an approach to peacebuilding that can bring together members from conflict groups, we know relatively little about how this approach works when groups come together in practice. The area needs further empirical study and conceptual frameworks that can explain the process through which arts-based peacebuilding works (Beller 2009; Väyrynen 2019). The existing literature shows that personal interactions and relationships that have developed across conflict groups form a key element in peacebuilding through participatory art forms such as theater. Thus, a relational view of peace provides a fitting lens through which to explore how Jana Karaliya has survived as a multiethnic, bilingual theater group amid changing conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. The framework's focus on the particular attitudes, behaviors, and ideas that characterize relations allows a fine-grained analysis of how relationships between the Sinhala and Tamil members have evolved over time. The chapter contributes to furthering discussions in arts and peacebuilding in three ways. Firstly, it demonstrates a way to map transitions in participatory arts-based peacebuilding. Secondly, it emphasizes the value of doing longitudinal studies by showing how the character of relational peace changes over time. Thirdly, it identifies sustained interaction in work and personal spaces over time as key to the development of relational peace in participatory arts-based peacebuilding.

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I locate my inquiry within a discussion of arts-based peacebuilding. Secondly, I present the methods and materials used in the chapter. Thirdly, I apply the relational peace framework in order to understand how interethnic relationships within Jana Karaliya have evolved over time. The analysis is organized according to the three main components of the relational peace framework: attitudes toward each other, behavioral interaction among the group, and group members' ideas of the relationship. These components are interconnected. Each illustrates how Jana Karaliya members from Sinhala and Tamil ethnicities start from seeing each other as adversaries and move toward closer relationship classifications such as friends and family over time. Finally, I discuss how relations within Jana Karaliya were affected by the overarching conflict tensions in the country.[2] Applying the relational peace framework demonstrates how relations within Jana Karaliya have transformed over time because its members have sustained interaction and shared a vision of performing peace. The primary analytical contribution of the chapter, then, is to illustrate how the relational peace framework can be used to map relational transitions in participatory arts-based peacebuilding initiatives. The chapter extends the framework's relevance by demonstrating how the specific components within the framework can offer a fine-grained analysis, and therefore a useful means for peacebuilding organizations to chart relational transitions in participatory peacebuilding.

I draw attention to two factors that determine the analytical boundaries of this chapter. Firstly, while there are plural relations to which the framework could be applied – such as relations between Jana Karaliya's members and their families or audiences, or the relations between the cultural elements the group draws from – the chapter specifically focuses on exploring Sinhala–Tamil relations among Jana Karaliya members. I purposely limit myself in this way because Jana Karaliya's peacebuilding potential, relevance for the Sri Lankan conflict, and broader relevance for participatory arts-based peacebuilding largely depend on the manifestation of interethnic relations within the group itself. Secondly, in discussing how within-group relations evolve over time, I am taking something that is essentially heuristic and messy, and somewhat simplifying it to present it in a linear form for analytical clarity.

Peacebuilding, the arts, and relational peace

Peacebuilding through the arts is increasingly becoming relevant in peace and conflict studies. State-centric binary understandings of peace and conflict have been under critique for their inability to satisfactorily consider the

range of actors involved in peace produced at the ground level or its complexity. Building peace through the arts allows us to engage with nuanced understandings of peace where culture, bodies, and webs of relationships that constitute the ground level can come to the fore. Bahun argues that art has an "inherently relational nature" as it "emerges only in relation to and is defined by the relationships it establishes between human beings," which in turn lead to a space where "new identities and new relationships" can be created and shaped (Bahun 2020: 73). Arts-based peacebuilding often draws attention to these lives and relationships that characterize peace and conflict at the ground level.

There are repeated calls for in-depth empirical studies and theoretical frameworks that can further our understanding of how arts-based initiatives bridge conflict divides. Beller (2009: 5) notes, "theoretical frameworks and evidence-based research on arts-based peacebuilding are in their infancy." More recently, Väyrynen (2019) and Stephenson and Zanotti (2017) have highlighted the same gap by reiterating the need for empirical studies on how to use the arts for peacebuilding. The *Acting Together* anthologies (see Cohen et al. 2011a, 2011b) and the arts-based theory of change that Bang (2016) proposes respond to this call. The former showcase empirical examples of theater and propose a conceptualization of the relationship between the art product and society. The latter, primarily drawing from existing literature and personal reflection, identifies cooperation as a key element in the process of peacebuilding through music. Both works make important contributions but neither offers a closer analysis of those who take part in arts-based peacebuilding processes. Examining how relations transform over time in arts-based peacebuilding addresses this gap, and contributes to the area's theoretical and methodological advancement.

Applying the relational peace framework to Jana Karaliya's peacebuilding practice addresses this call. Participatory arts such as theater, music, or film are often used to facilitate relational engagement between adversaries at an everyday level (see Premaratna and Bleiker 2010; Howell et al. 2019; Opiyo 2020; Mkwananzi and Cin 2022; Dirnstorfer and Saud 2020;). Peacebuilding in such cases requires bringing people together to transform their antagonistic attitudes about and images of each other. Jana Karaliya's peacebuilding is especially apt for scrutiny because it models this process: instead of talking about or advocating peace, the group performs coexistence as a microcosm of a multiethnic Sri Lanka. Jana Karaliya's relevance to peacebuilding within the larger conflict context in Sri Lanka therefore relies heavily on its within-group interethnic relations. The relational peace framework has the capacity to shed light on the character of peace that is manifested in these interactions and how these relations evolve over time. This chapter thus offers a way to map transitions in arts-based peacebuilding initiatives, with particular

relevance to participatory arts. In doing so, it contributes to further discussions on peacebuilding through the arts.

Method and materials

Jana Karaliya works in Sri Lanka, a multiethnic context marked by a protracted conflict. While polarizations in the country manifest along diverse social, political, and economic vectors (Kadirgamar 2020), the primary conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) revolves around the two parties' respective Sinhala and Tamil ethno-nationalistic sentiments. Geographical separation of ethnicities due to war and communication challenges due to the use of different languages have helped aggravate conflict polarities by limiting interaction between Sinhala and Tamil communities. Populist majoritarian politics in the post-war period has done little to address these divisions.[3]

Jana Karaliya's peacebuilding is ingrained in the interethnic relations developed within its multiethnic cast, and is modeled through these sustained within-group relations. This format allows the group to stand out from other theater groups and peacebuilding initiatives in the country. Theater initiatives in Sri Lanka that engage with the conflict tend to speak to their own communities in Tamil, Sinhala, or English,[4] and often do this through the content of a play. Plays such as *Ravanesan* (Tamil) and *Trojan Women* (Sinhala) are significant for their anti-war message. These are produced only in one language, and are performed as separate, one-off events. Their engagement with the conflict therefore revolves primarily around the message conveyed through the content of the play. The work of multiethnic organizations such as Inter Act Art and Theatre of Friendship follows a similar pattern. Jana Karaliya's relevance for peacebuilding, in contrast, is embedded in its multiethnic, bilingual, residential format, and in the members' relationships to each other on and off stage. Their ability to model interethnic peace therefore depends on successfully developing and performing relational peace among themselves.

A relational view of peace was built into the group from the beginning. Two Sinhala artists, Parakrama Niriella and (the late) H. A. Perera, founded the group in 2002 as a mobile theater group to produce plays in both Sinhala and Tamil languages. The founders publicly advertised the group's formation, and invited applications from interested artists. They recruited Sinhala and Tamil youth from different geographical areas as needed to establish and maintain the group's diverse character.[5] In its mobile theater format, the group's engagement with the community went beyond performances: Jana Karaliya stayed in one location for a period of several weeks

or months as needed, and interacted with the community within and outside the theater space during that time.

The group has had to adapt to external conditions along the conflict trajectory and has had to reinvent itself accordingly. But its work continues. During the ceasefire period (2002–2008), the group traveled to locations within the LTTE-controlled area in the north as well as to remote areas in the majority-Sinhala south and the plantation sector in the hill country. In interviews, members of the group recount experiences of being equally welcomed by the armed forces of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army. The group also engaged with the community through activities such as theater workshops at schools and forum theater programs in villages. At present, even though Jana Karaliya works in remote areas periodically, it no longer tours with the mobile theater, because of practical issues and personal situations of its longstanding members. Instead, the group has a center in Anuradhapura in the North Central Province of the country, where it holds workshops, training sessions, and rehearsals for members and regional theater groups. It also has a base in Homagama, a suburb of Colombo.

This chapter primarily draws on qualitative data I collected from Jana Karaliya in Sri Lanka in 2020, but examines relations within the group from its inception. I have researched Jana Karaliya since 2007, and the analysis benefits from data collected over a decade of engagement with the theater group, its members, and previous interviews with the founder. These include ethnographic data, performances, and participant observation at rehearsals and trainings. The study is thus longitudinal. The relationships I developed with the group over the years played a key role in enabling me to broach the topic and conduct insightful, rich interviews with the theater group members. I also draw on secondary sources such as newspaper articles and reports.

The chapter aims to study relations across the dyad of Tamil and Sinhala members of Jana Karaliya over time, with a particular focus on the group's longstanding members.[6] These members joined the group in its initial stages and played an influential role in developing Jana Karaliya's multiethnic, bilingual image and the character of the interethnic peace within the group. Thus, this specific category of members is the best suited for a longitudinal study on within-group interethnic relations. With them I conducted one focus group interview (two women and three men, of whom two were Sinhala and three were Tamil) and seven semi-structured individual interviews (three women and four men, of whom four were Sinhala and three were Tamil) to explore the character of peace in their interethnic relationships with each other. Candidates for individual interviews were selected according to their availability and information that came up during the focus group discussion. The longest-standing member I interviewed joined the group in 2002, and

the newest in 2007. They had all taken on various roles of responsibility in the group's day-to-day management. The average participant was between thirty-five and forty-five years old. Informed consent was obtained prior to the focus group interview and the individual interviews. The focus group interview examined relationship dynamics and how interethnic relationships within the group evolved over time. Questions also focused on eliciting group processes and practices that facilitated relational peace. Through individual interviews, I explored participants' personal experiences of being a Sinhala or a Tamil in Jana Karaliya, and the members' process of personal transformation if applicable. Exploring relationships within the group is a delicate topic that could have negative consequences unless explored with care and respect; therefore, the interviewees were assured of confidentiality and anonymization for any information they would consider sensitive. Moreover, interviewees were offered the opportunity to withdraw their participation or segments of it by contacting me, whenever possible.

Jana Karaliya: performing relational peace through theater

In this section, I use the relational peace framework to examine interethnic relations within Jana Karaliya and analyze the character of peace within the group. The analysis is structured along the three main components of the relational peace framework: subjective attitudes about each other, behavioral interaction among the group, and participants' understandings of the relationships in the group. I take a chronological approach in order to analyze each component and examine the evolution of interethnic relationships that were initiated at the point of joining Jana Karaliya. The components are interlinked, and this particular ordering of the components is best suited to analyze the peace formation process within the group. The order enables the analysis to start by looking at the predominant ethnocentric attitudes and assumptions the group members had when they joined the group, and then examine how these were recalibrated through sustained behavioral interaction within the group, and finally to look at how individual ideas of the relationship shifted from foes to fellows to friends.

Attitudes toward each other

This section on subjective attitudes toward each other within Jana Karaliya charts the trajectory of relational peace within the group. When they joined Jana Karaliya, members saw each other as strangers at best and adversaries at worst. Their subjective attitudes toward each other at the beginning exemplify how members mirrored conflict narratives and biases seen in the wider society. As discussed below, initial relations within the group were

characterized by antagonistic attitudes and feelings such as mistrust and fear, before these were gradually transformed through sustained interaction.

Jana Karaliya members had no prior experience of peacebuilding when they joined, and carried the differences and conflict divisions of wider society into the group with them. The founding members started the group with the explicit intention of bringing together members from different ethnicities, but this aspiration was not required for someone to join the group as a member. As the focus group discussion and conversations with members revealed, the members joined the group out of a desire to train in and practice theater, and they had little prior interaction with people of another ethnicity. In the early stages, they did not see the multiethnic character of the group as an advantage. Instead, the group's ethnic diversity caused families to worry about the safety of their relatives. Some members' families – both Sinhala and Tamil – even attempted to prevent them from joining.[7] Most members were monolingual at the point of joining except for some Tamil-speaking members who could understand Sinhala to a limited extent. As several members commented, this led to difficulties in communication.[8] Members came from different geographical areas, including the Eastern Province, the Southern Province, the Western Province, the tea-plantation-sector Tamil areas in the hill country, and the North Central Province. Several noted how "there were many issues and no understanding at all, and lots of 'fights'"[9] even among those from the same ethnicity. The following two statements, respectively from Tamil and Sinhala members, make the differences clear: "There were two groups within the Tamil-speaking members, as Trinco Tamils and Upcountry Tamils";[10] "I am from Kandy, there were others from Tangalle [indicating that both were Sinhala] and we had different views. There were different views coming from different areas."[11] Thus, the group was diverse in terms of ethnicity, language, geography, and religion. It represented a microcosm of Sri Lanka in terms of its diversity and its tensions.

Because of these differences that ran along and sustained the conflict divisions and biases, the initial relations between members were often characterized by mistrust, hostility, and fear. A Sinhala member observed how "initially some Tamils wouldn't sleep and stay up all night because they were scared."[12] A Tamil member recalled how shocked and scared she was when asked to share a room with a female Sinhala member immediately after joining the group.[13] Many others recounted stories of not being quite ready to recognize the others for who they said they were, and of assuming they had secret identities such as being undercover agents for the government or the LTTE: a Tamil member said, "I looked at those around me with great suspicion and mistrust. I was actually quite convinced that one of the guys [Sinhala] was a member of the CID [Criminal Investigation Division]."[14] The Sinhala members were also suspicious of the nightly meetings the Tamils

had in the early days: "they all got together and whispered in Tamil, and we couldn't understand anything. We also felt suspicious and some even complained to the Sirs [founders]." [15] While talking about their early days at the group during a break in rehearsals, a Sinhala member laughingly pointed at a Tamil member and said, "I was sure he was a Tiger; he wouldn't talk much, kept to himself, and I was so sure that he was a spy." [16] The comment made all those around him – both Tamil and Sinhala – laugh.

While some of these conflict biases dissipated after a time, developing trust within the group took longer. The following quotation from a female Tamil member illustrates how at these early stages the members reverted to ethnicity to explain away what was felt as negative:

> In the early days of joining the group, we would sing late into the night – [names two other male Tamil members] and I. One practiced the *Serpina*, and the other played the *Dolky*[17] and I sang. Amitha Akka[18] would scold us, asking us not to sing in Tamil after 6 p.m. She did not have a problem with us, she wanted to protect us. But we didn't feel it that way. We felt that she's telling us to stop because she's Sinhala.[19]

It was therefore easy to fall back into ethnic binaries in the early days of Jana Karaliya. The members' subjective attitudes toward each other were influenced by the larger conflict narratives in the society.

The lack of trust at the initial stage became further evident in the members' conflict resolution strategies at the time: a member reminisced that "even for a minor issue" that emerged in everyday interactions, they "ran to the Sirs."[20] Focus group participants agreed: the founders generally calmed down the agitated members, reassured them that nothing major was going on, and asked them to allow some time and see whether the situation improved.[21] Members relied heavily on the founders, as they did not trust each other.

These initial attitudes became more inclusive with time and sustained interaction, and the members gradually started recognizing and accepting each other for their better intentions. The interviewee who is quoted above about singing at night explained how she gradually came to trust the very same person who had scolded her:

> We realized that the army was waiting outside the lodge at night, and that that's why she had asked us to stop. She did say that to us [that the Army was outside] but we thought she was lying. We didn't know. Later on, it was Amitha Akka who was closest to me. Especially when I had all the issues with the Tamil-speaking people [in late-night meetings in Tamil organized by some former members] they [Sinhala members] were supportive and we got closer.[22]

Members also commented on how trust developed through sustained interaction. A Sinhala member noted that the person he trusted the most within

the group was a Tamil female: "I tend to trust her more than a Sinhala; I got to do characters with her, so I spent more time with her. How we personally feel about people also plays a big role here."[23] Thus, once the members get to know each other, trust has more to do with the personality of each individual than with their respective ethnic identities.

The inclusive attitudes that members develop because of being within Jana Karaliya apply to a broader spectrum than ethnicity. A Sinhala member commented on how the experience of Jana Karaliya's theater expanded his boundaries: "Before I joined Jana Karaliya I used to judge people by looking at them but after I joined, I've learned to respect them, their culture, and their ideas."[24] The exposure through the theater group has helped him develop more recognition and trust for people in general, not just for the Tamil members in the group or in the wider society. Thus, while ethnicity was a key factor that shaped their perceptions and feelings about the other at the beginning, sustained interaction in the theater space over time has gradually allowed the members to recognize each other for who they are as unique individuals, and subjective attitudes toward each other has undergone a change from mistrust to trust.

Behavioral interaction: deliberation, non-domination, and cooperation

Behavioral patterns among Jana Karaliya members illustrate how relational peace developed within the group through sustained interaction. Joining the group marked the beginning of a relationship between Jana Karaliya's Sinhala and Tamil members: they shifted from being "totally independent and unaffected by the other" and therefore having "no relationship," to a situation where they had "some influence on each other" (Söderström et al. 2021: 488). Producing theater as a residential group required the members to live, work, and travel together. The process required interethnic relations on work and personal levels to continuously evolve. Thus, becoming Jana Karaliya required the individual Sinhalese and Tamils who joined as strangers or adversaries to develop a fellowship with each other.

This expectation that they would integrate while being unable to understand each other's languages and cultures led to friction within the group. Members were expected to step beyond their comfort zone. A Tamil member who joined in 2006 talked about how being in the group clashed with her sense of safety at the beginning:

> We were three Tamil women who joined the group at the same time, and we were told not to stay together [in the same room] and instead share rooms with the Sinhala women. It was a big shock for us. We couldn't even speak Sinhala, how could we share a room? We talked to an older Tamil sister and

asked for permission to share a room at least for some time until we got to know the group a bit. We were so scared but it helped to stay together at the beginning.[25]

As the example demonstrates, when faced with challenging situations, individual members discussed and negotiated to find solutions that worked for them. Surviving in the group required learning to adapt: "We have to listen and figure out how to fit in, initially. It takes time."[26] The process was therefore gradual and exploratory.

The way in which the group developed its bilingual capacities was also intuitive, and presented extra challenges to those who were unable to communicate in Sinhala. All the longstanding Sinhala and Tamil members can communicate in both languages today. Some Tamil members like Logananthan have acquired a level of fluency that has enabled them to translate Sinhala plays into Tamil and vice versa. The initial behavioral interactions, however, presented a different story: the mostly monolingual members were expected to learn to communicate in both Sinhala and Tamil, and act together in plays that would be performed in each language. They had to help each other learn the languages and memorize lines with correct pronunciations for performances. The resulting behavioral interaction enhanced interdependence within the group. However, trainings and group meetings were generally held in Sinhala because this was the most comfortable language for the founders. In order to actively participate in these, the Tamil-speaking members had to speak and understand Sinhala. Consequently, until the members could gain the required Sinhala language skills, the few Tamil members who could understand Sinhala summarized the discussions for the others in nightly meetings.

Practicing theater together requires discussion and collaboration, and Jana Karaliya's particular format further intensified personal interaction. The members' personal interest in theater brought the team together and played a key role in keeping them together.[27] Drawing from other scholars as well as her own experience as a practitioner, Bang observes that actors learn "how to cooperate" or improve "their capacity to do" through taking part in artistic activities, irrespective of whether they were "intrinsically motivated to cooperate" at the point of joining (Bang 2016: 358). Rehearsals, performances, and traveling with the mobile theater are all collaborative activities that required active participation of everyone involved in Jana Karaliya. In the focus group interview, members recognized how engaging in theater brought them together even after a dispute:

How could we do drama if we stay angry at each other and do not talk? How could we look them in the face and say a dialogue?

We cannot do without anyone. So [we] have to talk somehow.[28]

The residential element of Jana Karaliya also encouraged relational peace practices in the members' behavior. Living together as a group extended interethnic relationships beyond work to ensure interdependence at a personal level. The group members had to look after each other and cooperate in making decisions pertaining to everyday life, including cooking, shopping, cleaning, and sharing spaces. The following conversation between Sinhala and Tamil members captured how living together enabled them to develop a practice of negotiation:

> We couldn't even talk with each other then [at the point of joining], but we somehow had to figure out how to get on.

> Yes, we couldn't really speak but we had to sort out who gets to use the bathroom at what time and who's to sweep the floor.[29]

The group had a schedule for each activity, and the members rotated the responsibilities among themselves. Drawing up, negotiating, and abiding by this schedule also called for deliberation and cooperation.

Emergencies and vulnerable situations called for the development and demonstration of deeper levels of relational peace. A Tamil member recalls how he would often "fall sick at the beginning and it was Sumudu [a Sinhala member] who would take me to hospital."[30] When two team members – one Tamil and one Sinhala – had dengue fever in 2014, a group of Sinhala members took turns to stay in the hospital with them every night. During the last phase of war, Sinhala members would accompany the Tamil members whenever they had to go out of the group's residence. This was imposed as a group policy at the time in order to ensure the group's safety. A Tamil member commented on the palpable sense of protection he felt from some of the Sinhala members while traveling through checkpoints: "They wouldn't say anything as such, but they would pat me on the head at times, and would make sure to sit at the windows either side [of me] while traveling because the guards would usually approach from the windows [during the war times]. They won't let us [Tamils] sit in a single row alone, and would come and sit between us."[31] Even though external conditions of war affected the Tamil members by limiting their freedom, behavioral interaction among the Sinhala and Tamil members in Jana Karaliya generally illustrated a caring friendship.

The ability of the group members to disagree with each other without resorting to violence also indicated relational peace. Members noted that they have a lot of work-related disagreements that lead to heated arguments, but "no matter how much we fight we end up reaching some sort of consensus in the end, in relation to a production."[32] For post-war societies, deliberation is of particular relevance as it provides a non-violent means to express difference and to have these differences recognized and affirmed in turn.

Scholars also comment on how disagreements at micro-level that do not result in violence are common in pluralist societies (Jarstad and Segall 2019). A Tamil member astutely commented that the ability to have open and direct disagreements and arguments might be a key element that enabled the team to continue to work together.[33] Another member noted how their capacity to engage in debate developed over time: "We've gotten accustomed to thinking that whatever we discuss is merely an argument, and that it shouldn't be personalized. The fact that we come from different places and backgrounds also plays a role."[34] The ability to take a broader perspective toward an issue is a learned skill that results from getting to know each other and each other's patterns over a long period. With sustained interaction and closer relations, the character of tensions also changed: "After some time we realized that there was nothing to be scared of and that we all have similar thoughts and issues. Then the fights we have had after that turned out to be the kind of fights that anyone would have – not doing your work, falling in love with someone and such like."[35] Considered from an agonistic point of view, such behavioral interaction indicates that the actors have come to recognize each other as legitimate counterparts to engage with (Strömbom 2020). Jana Karaliya therefore offered a platform where such contestation among actors can safely take place without members resorting to violence (see Mouffe 2013).

Over time, the members who joined to "do drama" out of personal interest developed shared goals that go beyond acting. An example is *Payanihal*, a Tamil play by Jana Karaliya that represented Sri Lanka at an international forum in 2012. Two longstanding female members of *Jana Karaliya*, Ronika Chamalee (Sinhala) and Selvaraj Leelawathi (Tamil), co-directed the play. Rasaiah Logananthan (Tamil), another longstanding member, translated the original Sinhala script into Tamil. The team collaborated, discussed, and negotiated to reach the shared goal of producing the play as an interethnic endeavor. The members recognized that this shared goal of presenting themselves as an interethnic group enabled them to continue working together over a long time: the opportunity to "present ourselves to the society as a team that is engaged in a task, that's why we've been able to be together for this long, because of this work."[36] Thus, the members' behavioral interaction in the space of theater has led them to develop shared goals.

As the group and the founders also acknowledged, Jana Karaliya's relevance to the larger conflict context is embedded in the way the members relate to each other; in how they model coexistence. The interethnic bonds, collaboration, and cohabitation created within the group set it apart from conflict-prone behavior and attitudes seen in the society: "What we did as Jana Karaliya was accepted. The subculture created here can be applied

anywhere."[37] Another member comments on how they are aware of this public image of the group and the need to adhere to it through their behavioral interaction, especially in public: "When I get up on stage or get a mic in my hand, I am well aware of being a part of the group, and I say what I think we *should* say, what I ought to say. It may be different from my personal opinion but at that moment, I am part of the group and this is the side I show. This is what we all do."[38] In saying "[t]his is what we all do" the interviewee also expresses their trust in the other members, noting that they all work together to sustain the image of coexistence that is projected through the group. Thus, behavioral interaction within Jana Karaliya demonstrates how members from different ethno-linguistic backgrounds negotiate their positions, and how peace develops within the group over time through sustained relational interactions performed in work and personal spaces.

Ideas of the relationship: foes to fellows to friends

How members conceptualized their relationship with those from the other ethnicity in Jana Karaliya has also changed over time. The transition illustrates how relational peace has developed within the group. The initial role that ethnicity played in determining members' ideas of the other changed through sustained interaction in work and personal spaces. Thus, interethnic relational engagements between Jana Karaliya's longstanding members started from a position as adversaries but gradually came to be framed by ideas of being acquaintances, colleagues, friends, or at times even family.

Jana Karaliya's particular format, which requires the members to work together and perform peace, played a key role in bringing about this shift. When the members entered Jana Karaliya, they reflected a type of relational peace defined by Söderström et al. (2021: 495) where fellowship is merely "an acceptance of the existence of the other" with "no onus to collaborate or cooperate." They saw each other through conflict biases and doubted each other's credibility at first. As discussed in the previous section, they suspected each other to have hidden agendas, such as being spies for armed groups. To stay with Jana Karaliya, however, the members had to coexist in their everyday life and perform peace in the space of theater. To do so, they had to move beyond the lowest threshold of accepting the other's legitimacy, and actively engage with the other more directly (Jarstad et al., this volume, Introduction) through theater. Thus, despite their reservations and misgivings about the other ethnicity, the members had to perform a fellowship that was cooperative and collaborative as needed, even if it was "largely determined by self-interest" (Söderström et al. 2021: 495). This format, over time, encouraged the idea of the relationship to move beyond

the lowest threshold of relational peace toward a more collaborative fellowship.

After over a decade of working together, the members tend to regard each other as friends and family. Most of the longstanding members agreed that they had become close friends because of sustained interaction and going through ups and downs together as a team. Some recounted stories of asking each other for help when they faced personal issues. The notion of a "family" emerged in the focus group interview and in several individual interviews with both Sinhala and Tamil members. One person saw the others as siblings: "we are like sisters and brothers."[39] For another, the bond was even closer: "closer than a family, they are more a family to me than my own family."[40] Participants reiterated the fact in the focus group interview: "even when we go home it's difficult; we have to at least hear each other's voices. We have a bond like a family."[41] Here, they identified the ability to trust and connect with each other with ease and mutual acceptance as indicators of this familial relationship:

> We don't have to hide anything from each other, we feel each other well.

> We know everything about each other, money, family, there is nothing hidden. So our bond is stronger.

> Even our families wouldn't listen to our opinions, but here, when we share something the others add to it.

> The team discusses things. At home, we don't get together and talk that much but here it's different. We talk a lot.

How the members relate to the group and each other affects their lives in general, and can at times raise tensions. Two Tamil members who recently got married to each other laughingly commented that these close relations among Jana Karaliya can become somewhat "challenging as well," because the couple cannot even leave the others behind and "go for a film" on their own.[42] The closeness of the relationship posed ethical questions for some longstanding members in relation to working elsewhere or leaving the group:

> Even if I would be offered another opportunity, I don't feel like taking them up. I don't feel like leaving and disrupting things here.

> It is always like a team, we haven't had thoughts about doing something for ourselves as individuals.

> When we do get outside work, we'll try to somehow get another one of us there too.

Thus, while relating to each other as a family or even more closely holds the group together, it also brings its own tensions and restrictions at the same time, as being a part of any family does.

Variations in how the members perceived their relationships to one another call in to question the feasibility of reading relations through a predetermined dyad. Even though the analysis focused only on one dyad – namely, Sinhala–Tamil relations – as the relational peace framework recommends, the actors involved operated within a web of relations. Ethnicity, in this web, was just one factor that contributed to members' ideas of the other. For example, a Tamil member saw one Sinhala member as "family" and referred to another as "a friend."[43] Thus, ideas of relationship toward the other can vary depending on factors other than ethnicity. Two members articulated their relationships with the group in more work-related terms, seeing the others as "friends within arts, mostly from a professional, workplace perspective"[44] and "not exactly friends, friends are different like the ones I had at school."[45] All the members acknowledged that they were recognized as legitimate partners when it came to the theater work. Thus, while some members may not see each other as "real friends," they do simultaneously recognize an underlying willingness to coexist and collaborate. Factors such as gender, personal behavior, or membership of professional networks can impact how the members perceive the other. Relationships among Jana Karaliya's multiethnic longstanding members traverse a spectrum, and veer toward a character that surpasses the threshold of relational peace toward friendship or beyond. Once relations evolve to a point of friendship where ethnicity ceases to play a predominant role, relations become more nuanced, and the analysis through the chosen dyad can be limiting. Thus, the relational peace framework is more useful when it comes to analyzing relations at their early stages of transformation, where conflict identities play a prominent role.

Implications of the conflict

While I focus on relations between Sinhala and Tamil members within Jana Karaliya as the dyad to which I apply the framework, these interactions cannot be divorced from the larger conflict situation and the webs of relationships within which the members live. Just as Jana Karaliya intends to contribute to the larger society by modeling interethnic peace and harmony through its relations, the larger conflict context had implications for relations within the group. I have discussed how instances such as encounters at check-points while traveling often demonstrated cooperation and care between the Sinhala and Tamil members. However, the broader conflict situation also affected the group in ways that triggered tension and imposed constraints upon its members.

A Tamil member illustrated the conditions under which they had to operate during the last phase of war: "at the peak of war there were lots of issues. The Tamil members were accompanied everywhere by [names of

two Sinhala senior team members]. Whether it is for Jana Karaliya work, for a workshop, to go to the shops, we had to always have a Sinhala-speaking person with us."[46] Another Tamil member commented on how these external circumstances invaded their everyday life: "even to get a bar of soap or toothpaste, we had to ask someone."[47] While the practice was introduced as a safety measure for the group members, it also imposed limitations on the movement and behavior of the Tamil members within the group, leading to a sense of dependency that reinforced power dynamics and hierarchies. One interviewee described how a female senior member who was accompanying her once asked her to "take off my *pottu*"[48] upon seeing a police officer at a corner and how uncomfortable that made her feel; but at the same time, the interviewee acknowledged that this tension stemmed from external dynamics that permeated the group's relations by saying that this was "not a problem between us, but a problem in the country."[49] Another Tamil member drew attention to how these external conditions highlighted power hierarchies between the ethnicities and inhibited the Tamil members' freedom and development in concrete ways:

> I felt the Sinhalese have more power than us during the incidents [bomb blasts in and around Colombo during the last phase of the war]. I cannot say that it was used to suppress us, but that power enabled them to do whatever they wanted in this country. We [Tamil members] cannot walk around at night, cannot go freely. Sometimes I felt that it's a pity that I was born a Tamil. They haven't used that power to suppress us within the team. They'd get dressed and leave to watch dramas in the evening. We [Tamil members] can't do that. That makes us feel a bit sad.[50]

The power he refers to derives from conflict hierarchies and widespread militarization during the last phase of the war. While the team member acknowledged that this was not something specifically connected to or directed toward him by his Sinhala colleagues, the felt effects of this social domination were real. The larger conflict context had clear effects upon Jana Karaliya members. Thus, while the group on its own strives to perform ethnic harmony, its boundaries inevitably remain porous to conflict dynamics. The actors, despite being studied as a dyad here, were intricately connected to and in turn affected by external situations.

Conclusion

This chapter has applied the relational peace framework to explore relations between Sinhala and Tamil ethnicities in Sri Lanka, in the context of the multiethnic bilingual Sri Lankan theater group Jana Karaliya. Jana Karaliya

has contributed to building peace in Sri Lanka by modeling how different ethnicities can live and work together in harmony. Their process has allowed relational peace to develop among the Sinhala and Tamil members of the group. As a microcosm of ethnic and linguistic harmony, the group has challenged divisive conflict identities and strived to create alternative narratives of ethnic unity in Sri Lanka. In a protracted conflict where conflict divisions run deep, the value of modeled coexistence is both symbolic and tangible: at a symbolic level, Jana Karaliya has enabled communities to envision and witness a shared future. For Sri Lankans who grew up within conflict narratives and have not had any personal interactions with those from the other ethnicity, Jana Karaliya's bilingual, multiethnic team offers a memorable, transformative encounter. At a tangible level, Jana Karaliya members have undergone personal transformations after joining the group.

Applying the relational peace framework to Jana Karaliya in this chapter has enabled me to illustrate how relational peace developed within the group and the factors that triggered these developments. The chapter also highlights the need for longitudinal research, especially when a relational view of peace is adopted. Relationships take time to evolve, and therefore research that focuses on a relatively short period may not be able to capture shifts in relations. Sinhala and Tamil relations within Jana Karaliya have developed over the course of several years. Shifts in these relations came about largely through sustained interaction in work *and* everyday spaces during this period, and the shared vision of performing peace as a group. Over time, those who were regarded with mistrust became trusted confidantes; those who triggered fear at the beginning became protectors; and those who were adversaries became friends and family. Interaction in work roles required collaboration and helped produce a sense of fellowship at the beginning; and the interaction in everyday personal spaces brought the group closer. The shared vision of performing peace underlined the group's relations in both work and personal spaces. It became a constant reminder to the members of their responsibility to present a united front to the outside society as the multiethnic theater group Jana Karaliya. Constraining behavior entered the group primarily as a result of interactions with the larger conflict context. Thus, even in a unique situation such as Jana Karaliya, where the chosen dyads lived together and strived to model ethnic harmony to inspire others, elements from the outside society affected the relationship.

The primary analytical contribution of the relational peace framework to participatory arts-based peacebuilding, therefore, is in how it can be used to capture apparent relationship dynamics and shifts among participants over time. As the chapter has demonstrated, the framework is particularly useful at the early stages of peacebuilding. The focus on the particular attitudes, ideas, and behaviors that characterize relations is well suited to

capturing a dyad's transition from antagonistic to more agonistic forms of expression, and how the relations become more deliberative and cooperative with time. The separate lines of inquiry along the components have enabled a clear analysis of the shifts that have occurred in this particular arts-based peacebuilding initiative from various perspectives over time, and made visible how sustaining relational transformation required regular personal interaction that extended beyond workspaces. Furthermore, these specific components of attitudes, behavioral interaction, and ideas of each other offer key directions along which we could develop and track participatory arts-based peacebuilding initiatives. For example, peacebuilding activities or programs can be designed with the explicit intention of nurturing relational peace along one or more components of the framework. Corresponding indicators that have developed along each component in the form of questions, exercises, or activities can be used to understand and possibly assess the specific character of relational peace or map how participants undergo shifts over time. Doing so would lead to the implementation of context-specific participatory arts-based peacebuilding initiatives with responsive evaluation strategies. The components of the framework therefore serve as a metric for designing and assessing longitudinal impact of arts-based peacebuilding. The chapter has demonstrated how the relational peace framework offers a possible way to map transitions in participatory arts-based peacebuilding. As a future step, the framework can be extended to map how Jana Karaliya's external relations develop with audience members, and the complexities that come in to play when former members function outside the group.

Notes

1 In the present chapter I use the name Jana Karaliya because this is the form most commonly used by the group.
2 Overarching conflict tensions in Sri Lanka have primarily come to be defined along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines, and the conflict underwent a range of phases from a ceasefire-agreement in 2002 followed by an increasingly violent post-accord phase that led to the last phase of war, and a post-war period from 2009 onward. See de Mel et al. (2012) for an overview of conflict tensions, and Spencer et al. (2015) for a close analysis of the associated religious tensions. Höglund (2005) and Åkebo (2016) analyze tensions that characterised the peace process, and Höglund and Orjuela (2012) discuss political tensions that characterise the post-war period.
3 The discussion of the Sri Lankan conflict presented in this chapter is in no way comprehensive. It merely highlights the conflict dynamics relevant to the analysis, and is therefore limited in scope. For a more detailed and a nuanced

discussion of Sri Lankan conflict, its trajectory, and current politics, see Hoole et al. 1990, de Mel et al. 2012; and Kadirgamar 2020.

4 For a further discussion on Sinhala and Tamil theaters and their engagement with contemporary politics and conflict, see Obeyesekere 2001; and Dharmasiri 2014.

5 New members were recruited as needed through periodic intakes.

6 The study considered nine longstanding members who Jana Karaliya identified as co-partners and management team at the time of interviewing (January 2020). Four of them engaged on an as-needed basis because of changes in family circumstances and personal reasons. All five members who worked full time with the group at the time took part in the focus group interview. Jana Karaliya underwent restructuring soon after the interviews were held, resulting in changes to these membership types and individuals. This chapter, however, is based on data collected prior to this re-organization.

7 Individual interview 2, January 6, 2020; individual interview 4, January 9, 2020; focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

8 Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020; focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

9 Focus group interview, January 9, 2020; individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.

10 Upcountry Tamils are historically seen as Indian Tamils who were brought to Sri Lanka from India for plantation sector work during the British colonial period. Tamils from Trincomalee are seen as those who have a longer history as Sri Lankan Tamils.

11 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

12 Individual interview 8, January 6, 2020.

13 Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.

14 "FLICT Super Stars," report prepared for Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation (FLICT) in 2006 by Marissa Fernando.

15 Individual interview 2, January 6, 2020.

16 Field notes, 2012.

17 Musical instruments.

18 Pseudonym used.

19 Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.

20 Individual interview 2, January 6, 2020.

21 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

22 Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.

23 Individual interview 7, January 9, 2020.

24 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

25 Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.

26 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

27 Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020; focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

28 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

29 Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.

30 Individual interview 4, January 9. 2020.

31 Individual interview 4, January 9. 2020.

32　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
33　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.
34　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
35　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
36　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
37　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
38　Individual interview 7, January 9, 2020.
39　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.
40　Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.
41　Focus group interview, January 6, 2020.
42　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.
43　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.
44　Individual interview 7, January 9, 2020.
45　Individual interview 1, January 9, 2020.
46　Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.
47　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.
48　A *pottu* (called *bindi* in Hindi) is a coloured dot associated with a Hindu-Tamil cultural identity that women wear on their forehead, between or slightly above the eyebrows.
49　Individual interview 3, January 6, 2020.
50　Individual interview 4, January 9, 2020.

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9

Relational peace practices moving forward

Anna Jarstad, Johanna Söderström, and Malin Åkebo

This book started with the recognition that research thus far has not managed to fully understand what constitutes peace nor to explain the different varieties of peace that evolve after war. With the aim of contributing to research on peace beyond the absence of war, this edited volume has addressed this lacuna by specifying and developing the concept of relational peace and applying it to several cases at various levels of analysis. Thus, relational peace has been analyzed in several sites, including Cyprus, Cambodia, South Africa, Abkhazia, Transnistria/Russia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Myanmar. The various conflict settings included in the chapters of the book are predominantly protracted civil wars, many of which have been the subjects of major peace attempts or even peace settlements in the past decades. The various chapters use different kinds of material, and identify dyads at different levels of analysis. Each chapter makes its own unique contribution to specific literatures related to its field, including civil–military relations, peacetime and post-war nation-building, arts-based peacebuilding initiatives, negotiation and mediation literature, frozen peacebuilding, post-war elite studies, ideational analysis, post-Soviet studies and everyday peace. Applying the relational peace framework is thus useful in advancing each individual field. Moreover, taken together, the chapters also point the way forward, both theoretically with respect to the framework itself and also with regard to methodological approaches to studying relational peace, as well as indicating what new questions should be asked within this field of peace research, and what the implications for policy are.

Our conceptualization of relational peace, and how it can be used for empirical analysis, is an important contribution of this edited volume. One aspect that clearly distinguishes our conceptualization from others is that it is not bound to a specific territory and instead is actor-centered. This has several advantages. Firstly, it means that the relationship within a dyad is in focus regardless of whether it exists within a state or across borders. Secondly, it allows for peace and war to coexist within specific territories,

as relational peace can exist among some actors while violent conflict is occurring between other actors at the same time. We think that this allows for a more adequate description of relationships in a given territory. However, it also comes with some disadvantages, and some scholars might reject our readiness to identify peace in the midst of violence, as it could be interpreted as downplaying the severity of war. However, we believe that it is important to recognize peaceful relationships in the midst of war, as this can open up new possibilities for building peaceful relationships among other actors and in other parts of a territory (see also Mac Ginty 2021 for a discussion of how such acts can scale out).

The relational peace framework can be used for post-war cases, but it is certainly not limited to them. Indeed, the scope of the theory should not be seen as restricted to civil war or even post-war cases. Another advantage of the framework, which has been clearly demonstrated by the various chapters, is that it can be applied at different levels of analysis. Relational peace can exist at the individual level, between ethnic groups and between states, and in many other relationships as well. Importantly, the framework allows us to trace how relationships unfold over time and to analyze and compare relational shifts over time within and across actors and dyads.

Methodologically, the range of methods and materials used in the chapters of this book may inspire different types of empirical studies of relational peace in various other fields, not limited to the choices made in these chapters. As we have seen, the ontological starting points vary a great deal across the chapters. In each chapter there are sections on material and a discussion of how the elements of relational peace can be investigated empirically. The authors show how they have studied the relational peace framework using a wide range of different sources, and what particular challenges they have faced while doing so. It is clear that the framework can be approached in a multitude of ways, and that these choices ultimately depend on what actors (and what dyads) are studied. In essence, we advocate a pragmatic approach to using the framework on the basis of its practical usefulness. Below, we discuss relational peace practices and the comparative and theoretical conclusions that the chapters lead us to, as well as the methodological consequences and tradeoffs, before turning to the implications for policy and future research.

Relational peace practices

We first turn to comparative conclusions in relation to the framework's components and elements across the respective empirical chapters. We discuss more thoroughly the advantages and challenges of studying peace as relational,

and the implications of this approach for theory and practice. In essence we highlight how the relational approach contributes to a more nuanced understanding of peace beyond the absence of war by recognizing peace as a web of multiple interactions across time, space, and levels. We also problematize questions related to studying process-oriented practices of relational peace. This discussion includes questions about actor boundaries and how we approach the study of webs of relations, given that the framework is built around dyads, and other methodological implications and practical issues that researchers face when applying the framework.

Comparative conclusions across the case studies

What are the overall joint observations and comparative conclusions from the various case studies? Firstly, *deliberation* – or the lack thereof – is emphasized in many chapters as important for relational peace. This points to the need for a platform and enough room for non-violent expressions of dissent and contestation. In the Sri Lankan case study, Premaratna shows how the ability to have open disagreements and arguments enabled theater group members coming from different communities to work together, and ultimately transformed their relationships. In Myanmar, Olivius and Hedström identify key examples of deliberation which point to a change in the patterns of interactions between state agents and local actors. However, in the Myanmar case, despite instances of deliberation, the overall pattern of relational interactions is marked by continuities of war and state domination. In this respect, we see again how domination can limit the room for dialogue, but also that deliberation does not automatically lead to a change of attitudes. While there are many instances where the different elements reinforce and affect one another, this is not always the case. In the micro-sociological setting of peace talks in the Philippines, Bramsen shows that positive interactions and deliberation among the negotiating teams do not extend to peaceful deliberations between the main leaders in the conflict; this stresses the importance of also considering how actors and dyads are situated in a larger web of relations.

Next, we turn to the issue of *cooperation*. As Klocek suggests in his case study of Cyprus, deliberation is about expressing dissent, while cooperation brings communities together. A number of the case studies demonstrate instances of cooperation between actors who have been involved in a conflict for a long period of time, even if there is great variation as to how extensive and deep this cooperation is. At least in some cases, cooperation seems to have contributed to transforming relationships, as we see in the analysis of the arts-based peacebuilding initiative in Sri Lanka, where Premaratna demonstrates how performing cooperation in their professional roles

contributed to the actors' transformed relationships both on and off stage, including at the personal level. Over time the members developed shared goals based on personal interests rather than merely work-related interests for the sake of producing a play. However, in some dyads, cooperation may not be desired by all the actors involved: for instance, as Nilsson points out in the Colombian case study, after decades of dependency some of the civilian actors expressed a wish to reduce their degree of cooperation with the military. This underscores that the elements of the framework are not necessarily equally important for all types of actors and dyads. Also, what ideal should be aimed for and whether that ideal is attainable may well vary to some degree between dyads, and may depend on the level of analysis at which they are situated. Our expectations for deliberation in parliament, for instance, should not be the same as for actors who do not routinely meet or are not obliged to meet, such as military personnel and local farmers.

However, taken together, the case studies underscore how the depth and frequency of deliberation and cooperation need to be spelled out in the assessment of relational peace. Deliberation and cooperation are often sporadic, and may occur in parallel with acts of domination (and sometimes even hostile behavior) rather than being the paramount mode of interactions, as we see for example in Söderström's chapter on Cambodia, as well as in Olivius and Hedström's chapter on Myanmar. Thus, many cases show a mixture of cooperative and dominant behavior existing in parallel, sometimes in what appear to be contradictory ways. To us, this indicates dyadic relations undergoing change, or indeed struggling to live up to full relational peace. Importantly, the framework allows us to capture these nuances and challenges.

The question of *domination versus non-domination* is an important element of behavioral interaction in several of the case studies. By pinpointing non-domination as a central element of relational peace, it has been possible to discover that legal and non-violent forms of domination are still taking place in some of the dyads studied, and that these forms of domination are quite consequential. For instance, in their chapter on Myanmar, Olivius and Hedström show how other means of domination, such as land confiscation, form part of the dyad actors' interaction, while Nilsson points to suppression of social protest as well as fumigation in Colombia. Eklund, Wimelius, and Elfving show how from a Russian perspective non-domination is interpreted as non-intervention. Bramsen's chapter on the Philippine peace talks also provides insights into the issue of non-domination and symmetry and suggests that an asymmetric relationship on the battleground is not necessarily reflected in the peace talks. Söderström observes how elements of domination have been particularly detrimental to the overall relationship between the elites in Cambodia. At the same time, this kind of domination is often interspersed

with more positive forms of behavioral interaction. It is clear that domination comes in many forms, and the empirical study of relational peace thus requires us to be aware of and open to capturing these varied practices. Indeed, this is one of the main contributions of the book, namely that we move beyond the relational peace as an ideal, and scrutinize what this looks like in real dyadic relations; the chapters thus provide us with insights into how *relational peace practices* manifest themselves.

Several chapters point to the importance of also studying symbolic forms of domination, as these also shape the potential for dialogue. Klocek demonstrates how in Cyprus different forms of symbolic domination persist between the two communities and are enacted and reinforced through, for example, the raising of the flag at particular locations, nationalistic messages, and the erection of landmark statues. The symbolic domination both within and across communities has reinforced conflict lines and produced additional contestation, something we also see in Olivius and Hedström's chapter, for instance in relation to the naming of a bridge after a general and the erection of a statue of the same general.

It should be noted that while the three elements of behavioral interactions proposed in the framework seem important for analyzing and understanding relational peace practices across all cases, the chapters also point to other forms of behavioral interactions that are not captured by the framework, but that can still help us understand the relationship. Thus, by focusing our attention on behavior, we can also note the instances of domination or other behavioral practices which fall outside relational peace. Similarly, the framework, by highlighting the importance of considering attitudes and ideas in dyads, can help us discover a range of attitudes (such as distrust) and ideas of the relationship (such as enemy depictions) which do not fall into the category of relational peace, but which still shed light on the relationship.

In terms of the attitudes toward the other, the chapters point to the importance of mutual *recognition*. In several of the case studies, this has been put forward as key to understanding the very nature of peace. In the case study on South Africa, Jarstad writes that two of the opposition parties, the EFF and FF Plus, have at times expressed that they do not recognize the other as a legitimate party, and the question of who is recognized as a full citizen is still debated by South African political parties. In this case, the issue of who is to be recognized as a fellow citizen is central to how community relations are envisioned in South Africa, ultimately shaping the degree of relational peace. In the Myanmar case study, Olivius and Hedström suggest that equality and recognition are key to local conceptions of what peace means and that non-recognition is at the core of local grievances. Likewise, in their ideational analysis of Russian ideas of peace, Eklund, Wimelius, and Elfving identify how, from a Russian perspective, non-recognition of

Transnistria and Abkhazia is key to understanding the absence of peace in the Bolshoi Kavkaz region and the idea of the "broken family."

While recognition and non-recognition are emphasized in many chapters, *trust* is stressed less in the case studies. Trust seems to prevail particularly at the individual level and in personal relations, as demonstrated in Premaratna's analysis of micro-level relationships in the Sri Lankan context. The theoretical literature often emphasizes that establishing trust is a long-term process, which might also help explain why trust is observed particularly in this context of long-term and sustained interactions within a small group. In several cases recognition rather than trust seems to be the dominant attitude, and non-recognition, rather than distrust, tends to be put forward as being at the core of conflict. This supports the proposition that trust is a more difficult attitude to achieve. It also suggests that in some cases trust might not necessarily be strived for. It should be noted, though, that in some of the chapters, including Söderström's and Klocek's, the authors emphasize that the actors' subjective attitudes are rarer, or harder to capture, in the data than their behavioral interactions. Again, this is likely to vary, depending on the dyad under scrutiny and the time frame being investigated. If interviews can be conducted, trust and recognition can be more easily explored, whereas behavioral interactions are more likely to be documented in written sources. Thus, when we are interested in historical processes and dyads, we are always limited to the kinds of sources and material that have been recorded for other reasons, and we are likely to suffer from the bias that behavior and negative attitudes and ideas are more likely to be recorded than attitudes such as trust and recognition.

The idea of the relationship seems to be important for the overall understanding of relational peace in each case, even if it is also often hard to find data on. While behavior and attitudes tend to fluctuate over time and sometimes work in what might appear to be contradictory ways, the idea of the relationship is seemingly pivotal for the overall characterization and assessment of relational peace. Also, the case studies demonstrate nuances in terms of the fellowship and friendship categories proposed in the framework. For example, in the Myanmar case Olivius and Hedström stress that inequality is key to the idea of the relationship, while in the Sri Lankan case Premaratna shows how over time, relationships came to resemble family relationships. Söderström's analysis of Cambodia also points to important nuances in the idea of fellowship, which is described as a partnership of necessity and as based on high levels of dependency. This contrasts with the form of coexistence described by Klocek with regard to pre-independence relationships in Cyprus, which were based on acceptance of the other group's right to exist and institutional cooperation but at a chosen distance. In Jarstad's chapter, the issue is not only how the actors studied formulate the

relationship which is scrutinized, but also what dyads are identified as making up that relationship to begin with. Here it is clear that different political parties formulate the community along different lines, and that they identify different actors making up relevant dyads in that community. Ultimately, trying to understand how the relationship is formulated by the actors involved in the dyad is key to understanding the relationship overall, and these nuances in how the relationship is imagined can reveal not only key aspects that might need to change for a deeper peace to develop, but also to what degree the relationship diverges from relational peace.

Nilsson's chapter on Colombia also demonstrates the importance of recognizing that the ideal is not the same for all dyad relationships. Overall, the empirical chapters demonstrate the importance of the actor's own understanding of the kind of relationship that is in place, and what they want it to be in the future, for the development of the dyad's relationship as a whole. In many of the cases these formulations of the future relationship have been a way to describe where they see problems in contrast with their ideal. Such characterizations are important, especially when there are contrasting formulations between the actors in the dyad, as these may pose impenetrable barriers to transforming a relationship.

Studying process-oriented practices and webs of relationships

Practices of relational peace cannot be captured solely through focusing on one moment in time; rather we need to study the dyadic relationship as a process. Continued interaction between the actors in the dyad, where certain exchanges start to become habitual or exhibit some degree of regularity, are key to identifying what the practice of the dyadic relationship is. The next step is to consider whether the practice exhibited in the dyad amounts to relational peace. Hence, we have to take temporal questions seriously in order to describe relational peace in each case. One of the advantages of focusing on relational peace *practices* is that it allows us to provide a more nuanced characterization, for example as Söderström highlights in the chapter on peace in Cambodia, where back-and-forth changes in relational traits and instability (rather than pronounced shifts) are described as a pattern of the peace. Behavioral changes seem to occur faster and more frequently, while attitudes and ideas of relationships change more slowly. As noted above, several of the case studies reveal a mixture of cooperative and dominant behavior, and in addition, many instances of more positive behavioral interactions are described as somewhat limited in time. Because relations change after war, this is not unexpected. But this is also why it is vital to study relations over time, not only in order to capture such fluctuations in general, but also to establish whether the overall balance between constructive

and destructive behavioral interaction changes over time. This helps avert the risk of overly positive assessments based on sporadic glimpses of change in the interactions, but it also allows us to be cognizant of the presence of instances of peace.

These variations over time also point to the need for explaining such shifts. While the chapters in this book are focused on describing relational peace practices, we do think the next step is to consider how such shifts can be explained. We suggest that a useful approach to this, besides investigating how the various components and elements in themselves influence one another, is to search for radical shifts, or moments in time when the relationship has clearly taken a new path, and explore explanations for such critical junctures. We also suggest that it is important to remember that what explains relational peace at one level may not necessarily translate to explaining relational peace at another; for instance, micro-sociological explanations are likely to be fruitful in some instances but less so for macro-political developments. We now turn to additional insights related to how we can think about explaining relational peace in light of the case studies in the book.

The history of the dyad, as well as its future, are relevant in several of the case studies. The memory of past behavioral interaction, for instance, can clearly influence current attitudes toward the other, particularly the ability to trust the other party. In the case of Colombia, human rights abuses weigh heavily on the filter through which the civilian actors' relationship with the military as a whole is evaluated. The case studies all make clear how the three components feed into each other, again stressing the importance of considering all three in future studies too. If we are to understand the development of the behavioral interaction in a specific dyad, we also need to study the other elements of subjective attitudes and ideas around the relationship within the dyad. Some chapters also stress the importance of studying imaginings of the future relationship; if the actors' visions are incompatible, this is likely to pose a challenge further down the road.

The symmetry of the actors may also affect the relational peace. One aspect of such symmetry relates to the conceptual framework, and to whether or not the various elements are equally present in relation to both actors in the dyad. An unbalanced relationship, where the elements are present for the actors to different degrees, faces serious challenges. Either one actor will have to demonstrate patience and perseverance, and wait for the other actor to slowly update and revise their behavior and attitudes – and finding the motivation for this can be a real challenge – or the relationship is likely to be unstable. In the latter case, one actor may initially have been open to revising the overall relationship, but if attempts at cooperation and trust are continually met with domination and lack of recognition, the relationship is likely to deteriorate.

An important observation in several of the case studies is the inherent privilege and inability of the dominant, stronger party of the dyad to see the perspective of the weaker party. Recognizing the needs and wants of the other, or the way in which the interaction is understood by the weaker party, is simply not a priority for the stronger of the two. Thus, in several of the dyads scrutinized in this book, there is a clear blindness and unwillingness on the part of the more powerful actor. Relational peace symmetry can thus be conditioned by tangible factors such as size, popular support, and military power, but also by less visible elements related to attitudes and beliefs, such as prestige and status.

One difficulty in the study of relational peace is the question of actor boundaries, in addition to selecting which actors to focus on (see also Emirbayer 1997: 303–304). When do we see an actor that reaches "entityness," and which is stable enough over time for us to meaningfully analyze it as a solid "actor"? Several of the authors describe dyads where the actors' boundaries are less easily defined than in other dyads. Their analyses, nevertheless, demonstrate the importance of studying the perspectives of larger entities such as rural communities, the military, ethnic groups, and political parties. The chapter authors handle these challenges differently, but they all endeavor to strategically interview these communities and actors or collect data from within them, recognizing that there are limits to the data at hand. Paying attention to dyads and actor boundaries also helps us highlight another aspect, namely how the relations within one dyad may be impacted by those within another dyad. Both Bramsen and Klocek discuss whether and how intra-actor dynamics affect inter-actor peace. Bramsen discusses a web of relationships consisting of peace talk negotiators, the media, civil society, and the main political leaders in the Philippines. She shows that despite the progression of peace talks among the negotiating teams, the relationship between the main political leaders did not shift enough for a peace deal to be signed. Klocek's chapter shows that the intracommunal relations in the Greek Cypriot community caused obstacles for improving intercommunal relations. Klocek's analysis is a call for researchers to pay more attention to how relations between actors other than the original conflict actors may influence how the peace develops in other cases too. Indeed, it can also be a good exercise in its own right to analytically identify the dyads and the actor boundaries, as this in itself can help us nuance our understanding of the peace and what divides are present in each society, not least because such divides shift over time.

In the chapter on Russian ideas of peace, we see how the authors had to deal not with one dyad, but instead with how Russia position itself vis-à-vis multiple other actors. This is done from the perspective of only one actor, but it does begin to speak to the larger web of relationships and

how they influence one another. Klocek, by contrast, chose to study relational peace within one community and across two communities, including elite and societal levels; because of various limitations, he did not study relational peace within the Turkish community. The choices of which actors to study also have implications for which sources are available, and in the case of Klocek's chapter, the resulting data are not entirely symmetrical. Olivius and Hedström also struggled to get data on all actors in the dyads they wanted to study, in part because of ongoing violence in some of the locations where they were collecting data. The more pressing, and less resolvable, issue in their chapter is perhaps that of who should be deemed an appropriate representative to speak on behalf of the state in interviews. While they do not assume the state to be a homogeneous actor, they do try to conceptualize it as one of the actors in the dyad, as this is the reference point for many of the civilian respondents. Similarly, Nilsson attempts to study the military and how this actor is understood by civilian counterparts.

Premaratna, on the other hand, focuses only on the internal Sinhala–Tamil relations among the members of the theater group she explored, rather than also including other actors such as the audiences and surrounding communities. Given her focus on participant observation and close engagement over a very long time period, it is reasonable that she limits her study to these internal relations in order to justice to the nuances and the richness of her data. Söderström struggled with limiting the newspaper material in a manageable way, and decided to focus on how each of the peace signatories positioned themselves vis-à-vis the prime minister, Hun Sen, rather than investigating all peace signatories' relations with all other peace signatories, thus focusing on the main conflict division as a way to delimit which actor dyads are the most fruitful and practical to study. All of these studies feature difficult tradeoffs, and anyone who wants to study a dyad using the relational peace framework will be affected by similar factors, namely the problems not only of defining actor boundaries and their inherent fuzziness, but also of determining which dyads we should focus on to begin with. The chapter authors make different arguments for why they have chosen to focus on specific actors and dyads, either in terms of political or conflict centrality or because of a theoretical interest and a wish to contribute to a specific field of research. We see this as the best and most useful way forward, as the relational framework in itself does not give guidance in terms of which dyads should be studied; it only determines how such dyads should be studied once selected.

An associated challenge that the chapters deal with is the issue of how to aggregate their findings across time, levels, and scale. As always, comparative research designs make these questions somewhat easier; it will be easier to determine what systematic tendencies are more or less present in one

dyad if we compare it with another. This is perhaps most elegantly shown in Klocek's chapter. However, when we study only one dyad, the question of aggregation looms large. We argue that it is important to consider patterns of engagement over time, as relationships are formed though repeated interactions, exchanges, and practices, and the actors' experiences of these interactions. When studying such patterns, we then have to ask ourselves what the dominant pattern of this interaction is; are there continuous shifts in how the behavioral interaction plays out, is one actor continually doing one thing and the other actor attempting to do something else, or do we see coherent and systematic shifts in this pattern over time? Do these shifts coincide with shifts in other dyads? None of these questions are easy, but they are key if we are to think about how the changes in one dyad contributes to the larger web of relations. They are also useful when we want to understand how actors of more limited scope (even individuals) within a larger community contribute to the larger actor and associated dyad, such as relations between ethnic groups, and when we study specific interethnic relations in a theater group; how a party leader relates to their political party as a whole; or how a representative, for instance in peace negotiations, speaks to the larger conflict actor. Zooming in on specific dyadic relationships also necessitates carefulness as to what conclusions can be drawn from comparisons across dyads and conflict settings. For example, assessing relational peace in one specific actor dyad in the context of a war victory does not automatically allow us to draw comparative conclusions related to the particular type of war-ending (such as victory vs. negotiated settlement, UN involvement or not, etc.), unless we have created a comparative design that speaks to this. We would encourage comparisons of the same dyad across contexts to address such questions.

The various authors describe different methodological considerations and choices in detail, which is useful for others who want to use the framework for empirical analysis. For instance, the availability of data is very context-dependent, as our chapters show; in many cases it is difficult to find data on all components in the framework at one particular point in time. Studying true attitudes is, of course, always a challenge. It is difficult to define the limits of each actor in a dyad, which in turn has consequences for what should be seen as the appropriate sources to give access to each actor's internal reasoning and imaginings. Söderström solves this conundrum by placing more emphasis on what is communicated to an external audience via mass media, as she argues that such elite expressions are what shape larger societal ideas of peace. But it is also important to consider what audience the data were created for, as Jarstad's chapter highlights; party manifestos give insight into how these parties attempt to communicate not only with their voters but also with their own campaign workers, and as

such the data do not give insight into how these parties act in parliament or how their voters behave toward the other communities. Klocek's chapter, on the other hand, is clearly more focused on triangulating across different kinds of material (historical accounts, public opinion data, news reports, conversations with residents, secondary sources, archival research, etc.), and aptly demonstrates that the relational peace framework does require data of very different types for the different components. Again, we see a bias toward the behavioral component being better recorded further back in time, as is shown in Söderström's chapter.

Eklund, Wimelius, and Elfving's chapter takes a very different approach and applies the framework in the context of an ideational analysis of various text documents. The authors take a range of contemporary sources in the original language, including academic, governmental, expounding sources, and popular reference texts, and use the framework as a starting point to analyze and interpret Russian ideas of peace and peacekeeping. This approach allows them to triangulate how these ideas are formulated from an elite perspective and how they underpin state policy, ultimately helping us to understand how Russia acts on the world stage. Rather than pinpointing a particular dyad where each component is analyzed and described, the chapter identifies themes where peace is discussed and where the components figure prominently. Similarly, Jarstad's chapter, while on the one hand identifying political parties as the main actors to be analyzed in the chapter, also scrutinizes how these actors themselves identify which dyads are seen as key in the web of relations that make up South Africa today. Jarstad's use of party manifestos, including images therein, is an important reminder that it is not only text but also the visual that can be used to study relational peace. Premaratna's close-up study of a small microcosm of interactions in the case of the theater group Jana Karaliya, as well as Bramsen's study of micro-sociological dynamics within the Philippine peace talks, also shows how the framework can be applied to study the interactions in quite small groups of individuals, using participant observation and ethnographic work. Thus the framework can be scaled both up and down. The availability of data is very context-dependent, as our chapters show; in many cases it is difficult to find data on all components in the framework at one particular point in time, but the chapters show innovative solutions to this problem.

Policy implications

In this section we discuss the insights and implications of the relational approach to studying peace, especially in terms of policy implications. The framework itself should be useful for building and assessing peace in general,

at a specific point in time or over a longer time period. Here our book is helpful as it crosses empirical boundaries and works with various types of data. The need to assess peace is often important for peacebuilders in order for them to establish what is needed to move the process forward. Policy-makers can make use of our theoretical framework and also of the methods used by the different authors both to provide a baseline for future work and also evaluate whether a measure is successful in building peace. In this way we encourage peacebuilders to look beyond any existing peace agreement and its implementation and use our framework as an external and more neutral scheme for assessing how a peace process unfolds. One reason for this is that peace agreements vary a great deal in content, detail, and length, but more importantly not all peace agreements contain measures that are necessarily good for peace. On the contrary, peace agreements are results of compromises necessary for bringing warring parties to the table and ending an armed conflict, and they can include measures that actually work against long-lasting and consolidated peace. The relational peace framework, on the other hand, gives us a different standard for evaluation, offering an alternative to the peace agreements and numbers of deaths. Thus it can even be used to analyze peace after a military victory where no peace agreement has been reached.

In this volume we have put an emphasis on the actors involved in central relationships, and the dyads that they form. One interesting question that is raised in several chapters, albeit indirectly, is: With whom do we have relations, and which relationships do we invest in? Creating the willingness to invest and the safety to engage with the other are central issues in building peace. The case studies show different ways in which formerly warring parties engage with each other and how peaceful relations can be created and transformed over a longer time period, and also whether and how improved relations within one dyad impact other dyads.

As regards the different elements of our framework, our case studies show that *deliberation* can exist in many forms. In order to promote peaceful relations, we suggest that institutional solutions should allow for deliberations. For instance, it is of utmost importance to open up different arenas for public deliberations, which should be monitored so that hate speech is prevented. Political deliberations are also very important, not least because elite behavior and attitudes may trickle down to the general public. Political elites can serve as role models in creating relational peace in deliberations that are made public. Institutions that enable deliberation do not need to be formal or official ones. The case studies show examples of innovative bottom-up initiatives that have worked as a platform for deliberation and created room for contestation, as within Jana Karaliya in Sri Lanka. A relational approach to peace calls for efforts to increase the room for dialogue

between actors in a dyad; however, by recognizing that peace involves a web of relationships, the chapters of this book also underscore the importance of supporting a plurality of viewpoints. Several chapters stress the diversity *within* actors and the importance of relationships within and across different segments of various actors. Thus, the process of enabling dialogue and deliberation needs to recognize the diversity of actors and the need for many different deliberation platforms, including within actors.

Our case studies also show that institutions are important for *non-domination*. To avert relationships characterized by domination and inequalities, in many conflict settings there is a need for state reforms and structural changes to protect the interests of minorities and of marginalized groups, as Nilsson, and Olivius and Hedström stress. For institutions to contribute to non-domination certain prerequisites are necessary. One is the legitimacy of the institution, which in itself can rest on the legitimacy of the specific state, regime, or country. If there is no consensus about territorial borders, about which groups' members should have the right to become citizens, or about how the government should be elected, institutions will not be enough to prevent arbitrary use of power, as this can boil down to a catch-22 situation. Nevertheless, it is important to regulate behavior which risks producing domination, as this otherwise prevents relational peace from developing and being consolidated. Symbolic domination is also relevant here, and this may be an area where concessions may be easier to achieve via mediation, and which in the long run may open the door for a larger transformation of the relationship. Again, it is important to consider how non-domination can be achieved at various levels of society; it is not simply a macro-level question.

Our case studies also contribute to the longstanding debate on whether and how *cooperation* can promote better relations. There is, for instance, a large literature on how trade influences peaceful relations, and vice versa (see e.g. Deutsch 1957; Singer 2008; Barbieri 2002). A different strand of research focuses on the type of cooperation which is most fruitful for improving relationships. While some scholars suggest measures to encourage cooperation across conflict lines on practical matters of concern for the affected communities (for instance housing, sewage systems, and clean water), others suggest specifically designed workshops on conflict transformation where groups work together in a cooperative manner in an effort to increase the understanding and empathy of the other side, and also try to rebuild future and more positive relationships rather than ruminating over past atrocities and a feeling of victimhood (see e.g. Kelman 1997; Connolly 2000; Kadushin and Livert 2002; Malhotra and Liyanage 2005; Maoz 2011). Our case studies show that cooperation varies in importance across dyads, and is not always desirable. However, some of the chapters

show that under certain conditions, such as those in the case study of the theater group Jana Karaliya in Sri Lanka, where the members live and work closely together and develop a sense of caring and friendship over a long period of time, cooperation can indeed improve the relationships and deepen relational peace. Our framework points to the importance of placing instances of cooperation in a larger relational setting, where other elements of behavioral interaction influence it, and to how attitudes toward the other and ideas of the relationship in turn also shape how cooperation plays out. Continuous iterations of positive behavioral interactions are key for cooperation to blossom.

Next, we turn to actors' subjective attitudes toward each other within their dyad. Several of the case studies in this book show that it is difficult to identify signs of *trust* in the relationships studied. Recognition and equality are important for trust to develop according to civilian actors in Myanmar, while predictability and legitimate institutions are seen as more important for political parties in the case of South Africa. Often, misunderstandings and prejudice need to be overcome through dialogue and repeated interactions over long periods of time in order to sustain and maintain a peaceful relationship. In Sri Lanka, the multiethnic theater group studied by Premaratna created such a space for continuous everyday interactions in which the participants got to know each other, which over time prompted them to overcome biases and develop an understanding of the other. Previous research has shown several ways in which trust can be built in a relationship (see for example Powers 2010 on interreligious deliberation; Zahar and McCandless 2020 on inclusion in the relationship). Some theoretical propositions suggest that trust is built by tit-for-tat strategies (see e.g. Fisher and Ury 2012), where over a long a period of time actors respond by the same measure as their opponent, and such trust-inducing activities can in some cases be created, supported, or overseen by peacebuilders. For instance, the case study on Cambodia shows that there is often a desire for more trust in relationships after civil war, and this is where the role of facilitators and mediators can be important. It is vital to stress that trust is contingent on the behaviors of *both* actors in the dyad and requires that substantial changes come about at the core of a conflictual relationship, particularly in order to remove the sense that one party is at the mercy of the other, ultimately preventing domination of one by the other. In this regard, a third party can act as a facilitator or ensure that a peaceful behavior is maintained, which in turn can promote the development of trust within the dyad.

Recognition is also an important element of relational peace. Recognition can take the form of official recognition of a person as the president of a country rather than just being referred to as "Sir" or "Madam," or it can be at the country level, in relation to whether a territory is officially

recognized as an independent state. As Bramsen suggests in her case study, the labeling of the counterpart in the dyad as a terrorist organization has been devastating for the peace process in the Philippines, and removing such a label would be one way to recognize it as a legitimate negotiation partner. Recognition can take legal, practical, and symbolic forms, as we also see in the case studies on South Africa and Myanmar. The process of gaining recognition can also take place in grassroots settings. Premaratna's chapter shows the importance for members of different ethnic groups of being exposed to the other group via work and profession; the workplace can become a neutral space where the different actors can rediscover each other and find new ways of relating. It thus highlights the importance of and opportunity associated with arenas such as the workplace, public space, and school as locations where sustained interaction can take place that may influence the way various dyads are formed and transformed. For peacebuilding practitioners, it is therefore of utmost importance to create arenas at different levels of society where the transformation of relationships can take place, and to pay attention to symbolic forms of recognition, which, as shown in several chapters, can be key in transforming the interactions in a relationship.

The idea of the relationship is also a key determinant of a peaceful relationship. Our case studies provide different examples of how a peaceful relationship can be labeled. The different emic descriptions used include e.g. notions of family, being in one's own house, feeling like a visitor, or being professional fellows. The question of whether or not the emic label used was one that each actor was comfortable with, or wanted to change, was central to understanding the dynamic in the relationship. In the Introduction we have used the terms "friendship" and "fellowship" for the two analytical categories that we see as plausible for empirical studies and which are likely to encapsulate the two main types. Several of the actors analyzed in the case studies did also use terms such as "friends" and "fellows." For instance, in the peace talks in the Philippines, the actors often referred to the other party in the negotiations as friends. This is also the case in the Sri Lankan chapter, where members of the theater group from different ethnicities described their relationship as having developed into friendship, and even into a family relationship. The chapter on South Africa shows that several political parties preferred to refer to citizens as fellows, but other terms were also used, such as "neighbors." In the Cambodia case study, the relationship in the main dyad was described in terms of an unhappy marriage, or as an airplane where each actor is one of the wings; this suggests a clear dependency on one another, as a broken wing would have a devastating effect on both actors.

   This book thus highlights the work of engaging in discussions, society-wide, and actively trying to formulate visions of what kind of relationships different groups want to have with each other in the future as an important part of peacebuilding work. The study of the role of the military in Colombia is a case in point. In this chapter we see how the actors envisage a future relationship. Facilitating workshops on such forward-looking visions is thus an important task for peacebuilding practitioners. Arts-based initiatives are also promising in this regard, such as the theater group Jana Karaliya, which challenges conflict divides and strives to create an alternative narrative of relationships across ethnicities in Sri Lanka.

   For policy-makers and practitioners, our new framework for relational peace can also help bridge the false dichotomy of the international versus the local in peacebuilding by emphasizing that peace practices take place in a web of relationships between actors at multiple and different analytical levels. Neither should one assume that interactions and positions within one community or actor are homogeneous, as Klocek's study shows. How these levels and different elements of interactions influence each other is important for us to fully understand peace. Our focus on dyads can help determine which are the most relevant actors to focus on when assisting in a peace process, and how such assistance affects actors differently in the dyad with regard to the elements specified in the framework.

Future research

Finally, we turn to suggestions for future avenues of research. The various case studies show a great deal of variation in the ways the dyads they analyze have evolved over time. A next step could be more focused on explaining turning points, considering the question: What are the reasons for shifts toward more peaceful relations? Our case studies place a strong emphasis on the actors, and if individuals assume new roles or die this may lead to a change in the actors' behavior, attitudes, and ideas. The internal legitimacy of specific actors may also change over time with respect to communities they have led in the past. In this book, we particularly emphasize the role of an iterative process whereby actors' interactions over time may transform relations into a more peaceful relationship. Future work should thus pay attention to the degree to which there are changes over time, and to whether such changes are more rapid in behavioral interactions or in attitudes and ideas. On the basis of the case studies in this book, we posit that behavioral interactions may change more rapidly, but ultimately this should be studied further in other settings. This would also help to indicate

how much repeated positive behavioral interaction is required for one actor to update their attitudes toward the other. However, the chapters also show the importance of structures and institutions for enabling relational peace and preventing antagonism. An important future research task is therefore to explore what causes relational peace and what causes a shift toward more peaceful relations. Such an exploration should be careful to separate micro-level and macro-level explanations as we move across different analytical levels. Thus, when and why do shifts in relationships occur? While these questions can be partly addressed with longitudinal and in-depth case studies, there is also an opportunity to collect data on a larger number of cases to conduct large N longitudinal quantitative studies related to these questions. Such explanatory studies may also show that certain shifts are largely the product of shifts in specific relational peace elements, and thus what could be termed intra-framework explanations, whereas other kinds of shifts are more often explained by external factors. The case studies in this book certainly hint at both kinds of processes.

Questions related to the interactions within and across actors, arenas, and levels could also be approached using network analysis, and we would encourage such an expansion of the use of the relational peace framework. Paying attention to networks and differences across actors would also reveal, for instance, how much difference ideas of the relationship, as portrayed by elite actors, make to the reimagining of and shift in behavioral interaction within local communities. How do actors in different parts of the network make sense of conflicting signals from state officials at lower levels as opposed to elite politicians? Ultimately, how do relations within one community or group impact relations across other dyads? How far do specific ideas of a relationship extend within a certain actor group, and how deeply embedded are ideas of the relationship in the actors involved?

While this book focuses on cases with relatively recent experiences of a civil war, it would be interesting to apply the relational peace framework to cases such as Canada and New Zealand, which have not been at war since the Second World War, but where there is tension between the indigenous population (the Inuits, First Nations, and Métis in Canada, and the Maori in New Zealand) and the state, for instance on issues related to mines, rivers, and hunting rights, and where there have been historical experiences of atrocities. Furthermore, it would be interesting to apply the relational peace framework to race relations in the US, or to the relations between different socioeconomic groups, for instance between poor populations, such as unemployed, blue-collar workers, or those living in mobile home areas and white-collar workers in urban areas. Even in old conflict cases, future studies should perhaps focus on new dyads, for instance when new generations have to come to terms with old conflict divides. We further

encourage focusing on different arenas, for instance the private, professional, religious, legal, and public arenas, and how they influence each other, and studying whether the same actor engages differently across such arenas. We also suggest that not all future work needs to employ the framework in full; a scholar could choose to focus on specific elements in order to enable in-depth and longitudinal studies of these elements, depending on the field to which they wish to contribute.

Other cases where the relational peace framework could be applied in the future are at the transnational and supranational levels. For instance, how can we characterize relationships between diaspora groups and groups that have remained in their original home country? The relationship between elites with different war and post-war experiences could also be analyzed using the relational peace framework, and also that between returnees (former refugees or internally displaced people) and the communities in which they have settled. It can also be fruitful to analyze the relationship between states in the European Union (EU) with the help of the relational peace approach. It is clear that the various war histories of the member states and the power relations between them affect their relationships, internal EU politics, and also the foreign policy of the EU. For instance, how has the relational peace among the members of the EU affected the development of the new migration policies, or trade relations with other regions?

This brings us to an additional sphere and fruitful avenue for future research, namely the consequences of the various types of relational peace practices: Does relational peace, for example, contribute to democracy, development, and stability? There is a need to analyze whether various types of relational peace have different effects, and if so, what these are. Does a certain type of relational peace practice have a greater potential than others to spread or trickle down to other dyads? Also, does relational peace evolve differently after different war endings? Do the elements of the framework interact in different ways under varying conditions of external involvement, or at different levels of analysis? These are some of the future applications of the relational peace framework that we foresee, but we do not want to put any limits to its application. Rather, the relational peace framework should be useful to anyone interested in understanding and analyzing peace practices, at different analytical levels, with different types of actors, and in different contexts.

Note

The editors shared the work for this chapter equally, and their names are thus listed alphabetically (according to the Swedish alphabet).

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Index