

Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies

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Chapter 9

Nation building and Kashmir

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9 Nation building and Kashmir

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9.1 The inception of an ideological state

In August 1947, Pakistan was carved out of the Muslim-majority north-western and north-eastern parts of British India, as a result of the political movement led by the All-India Muslim League (AIML¹) and the propitious geopolitical situation in the aftermath of the II World War. The partition of the Indian subcontinent along communal lines was projected as a guarantee to get appropriate share of power for Indian Muslims, who would otherwise be marginalised in undivided India, according to the proponents of Pakistan. Notwithstanding these assumptions, it was also a quest for power among influential political leaders, who hoped to materialise their political ambitions in a separate state. Islam was politicised and incorporated as an element of national ideology, identified as the basis for nationhood and a fundamental determinant in buttressing the support of some Indian Muslims for the partition.

In Urdu, which was opinionatedly declared by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's 'founding father', as the official and national language of the state,² the name Pakistan stands for the 'land of the pure', epitomising the exclusivist aspect of the Muslim-majority state³ and heralding future challenges related to domestic power discourses: who is 'pure' enough to be the 'the real' Pakistani? It is also an acronym embracing the Muslim-majority regions of India, which were supposed to be incorporated in the newly established state, and, at the same time, indicating its diverse ethno-nationalist makeup (yet, no letter represented East Bengal). The letter 'P' stood for Punjab, 'A' for the Afghan Province known also the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 'K' stood for Kashmir, 'S' for Sindh and the ending -tan for Balochistan.⁴ The letter 'K' in the name symbolises Kashmir which was regarded as an intrinsic part of Pakistan.

Pakistan's Kashmir policy is profoundly related to the ideological rationales which led to the state's inception. The major political concept of the new state was based on the two-nation theory, articulated by a conservative thinker, Sir Muhammad Iqbal (known as '*allāma*'⁵ Iqbal, acknowledged as the national poet of Pakistan), in Allahabad on 29 December 1930, during his

Presidential address at the AIML session.⁶ The theory rejected sociopolitical order based on secularism and called for unity among Muslim communities and adherence to Islamic principles; religion and national(ist) identity were moulded together and projected as key pillar of the statehood.⁷ It held Hindus and Muslims as separate nations and questioned the possibility of their coexisting peacefully within the boundaries of one sovereign, post-partition state. Jinnah, whose ancestors belonged to the Hindu trading caste of Lohanas,⁸ was a leader of the AIML since 1913. This Western-educated (like Iqbal) lawyer, cherished and sanctified in Pakistan as *Quaid-e-Azam*,⁹ or 'Great Leader', developed Iqbal's idea and propounded the theory, which became more pronounced in the late 1930s and officially confirmed on 23 March 1940 at the annual 27th session of the AIML, when the ground-breaking Lahore Resolution, demanding a separate homeland for Muslims, was adopted. In his often quoted statement, Jinnah accentuated that Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense, but different social orders, philosophies, literatures, based on conflicting ideas and conceptions: 'To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent, and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state'.¹⁰ In demands for a separate state, the Muslims, belonging to different Islamic sects with their own interpretations, were artificially projected as a monolithic group, which heralded future tensions within Pakistan, both among Muslims and vis-à-vis the minorities. Irrespective of their place of birth in British India, Muslims were portrayed as a separate nation with their own distinct identity and culture. The rich ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversities of various groups practising Islam were ignored, even though they had for centuries determined the distinct identities of these groups spread over different regions of the subcontinent.

The proponents of Pakistan projected the religious differences between Hindus and Muslims as irreconcilable and this assumption served as the explanation for the purported distinctiveness of Muslim 'nationhood'. For them, the very act of partition along communal lines under the leadership of Jinnah justified the recognition of the two-nation theory.¹¹ These diversities were overridden by unifying idea of one, allegedly homogenous religion that was intended to distinguish them from members of the same ethnic, cultural and religious groups but following Hinduism or other faiths. The AIML leaders propagated firm belief that the unity under the flag of Islam was the major ideological tool which could be adopted to pursue the agenda of creating a new state. This tactic turned out successful, yet the communalist construct clearly stood in sharp contrast with Nehruvian socialist secular nationalism and Gandhian inclusiveness, which viewed India as an indivisible blending of different religions, cultures and ethnicities (this approach was challenged by Hindutva-based nationalism).

Two-nation theory laid ground for Muslim separatism and India's bifurcation, which is a unique state-inception case study, materialised within

remarkably short period of time. Moreover, there is a fundamental contradiction in the perception of a state's identity as a constitutional, Westphalian-type nation-state, being a secular, democratic political entity, and a Muslim state, based on Islamic universalism, Allah's supremacy and Quranic teachings. These two concepts are difficult to reconcile¹²: the latter largely rejects the constitutional democracy, personal liberties and secularism but recognises the paramountcy of Sharia law and exceeds territorial or political boundaries by perceiving the oneness of the Muslim community (*ummah*) as a supranational entity.¹³ This perception was envisaged in the writings of Iqbal, who rather highlighted Islamic identity, the need to unify under the banner of Islam and rejected the Western democracy-based state model: 'Don't compare your nation with the nations of the West, distinctive is the nation of the Prophet of Islam; Their solidarity depends on territorial nationality; your solidarity rests on the strength of your religion. When faith slips away, where is the solidarity of the community? And when the community is no more, neither is the nation'.¹⁴ It can hardly be assumed that Jinnah, an alcohol-drinking Shī'a with the looks and manners of an English gentleman, married to Rattanbai Petit, a woman from wealthy Parsi community from Bombay,¹⁵ truly advocated the idea of Islamic theocracy. He briskly balanced between diverse approaches—on the one hand, guaranteeing that minorities would retain their rights to religious practice and worship¹⁶ as it had 'nothing to do with the business of the state', on the other—nurturing Muslim communalism and jingoism. Yet, as Ishtiaq AHMED (2020) appositely argues, Jinnah's vision of the state did not assume democratic secularism because the interconnection between Islam and the state was inseparable and Islam (and as a consequence Islamic nationalism) was a key pillar of Pakistan's existence. Therefore, it leads to a logic conclusion, that the future scenarios could include either a modern Muslim, or a fundamentalist Islamic state, or balance between the two, as current dynamics in Pakistan proves. Ahmed meticulously assesses the evolution of Jinnah's approach and portrays him as a man obsessed with his vision and political ambition, who felt overshadowed by Gandhi's and Nehru's charisma, which fuelled his gradual transition from an Indian nationalist, advocating Hindu-Muslim unity (at the times of Lucknow Pact, 1916) to a Muslim separatist.

By adjusting his narrative to the particular groups of listeners, without precisely formulating the political objectives of the future state, Jinnah succeeded in mobilising and pulling together some of diverse groups of Muslims and transformed the notion that Muslims and Hindus constitute two separate nations into a substantial political movement. He had the ambition to represent all Muslims of India, unified under the religious umbrella, yet due to divisions and varied interests between Muslims in different parts of India, the political programme 'could not be very precise'.¹⁷ The necessity to establish Pakistan seemed a primary goal; what would come thereafter with regard to the socio-political system and the level of its Islamisation was not clear: there was no long-term, coherent political strategy.

It remains disputable whether Jinnah genuinely believed that partition could lead to governments of India and Pakistan cooperating 'like Canada and the United States and other sovereign States both in North and South America'.¹⁸ However, he kept his Malabar Hill residence in Bombay, perhaps hoping he might travel there freely after partition.

Notably, the two-nation theory had more support in North India's United Provinces, where Muslims constituted a minority and were particularly apprehensive of Hindu domination, than in the Muslim-majority provinces that were later included to Pakistan. That could be the reason why Jinnah was intentionally ambiguous about the political features of Pakistan: he had to deal with 'different constituencies which had diverse priorities and concerns'.¹⁹ The argument that the demand for Pakistan had also a secular facet and was pursued *inter alia* by those Muslims 'who felt threatened, not religiously but economically, by the Hindu majority'²⁰, seems to reflect this diversity. Stephen COHEN (2004: 29–30) contends that Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders managed to garner support but, although they were westernised 'half converted preachers of democracy', they had no practical experience or knowledge of how to govern a democratic state. Consequently, the very lack of Jinnah's experience of how to rule any sovereign political entity, heralded challenges, irrespective of socio-political system to be implemented. Jinnah's purported charisma did not convince Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy who oversaw the partition and first (since 15 August 1947 till 21 June 1948) Governor-General of India. In his weekly Personal Report to the British authorities, he wrote on 17 April 1947: 'I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic case; in fact, until I had met him I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down so powerful position'.²¹

Muhammad Ali Jinnah's rule as Pakistani Governor General (until his death on 11 September 1948), with his dominating position in all political decisions, presiding over the cabinet meetings (and not giving this task to the Prime Minister), uncompromising attitude vis-à-vis all who dared to question the official narrative in the name of imposing 'one nation spirit', illustrated the defiance of democratic norms in Pakistan right from the moment of its inception. In the speech delivered during a rally in Dacca (now Dhaka, the spelling was changed in 1982) on 21 March 1948, confirming Urdu as a national language (although he barely spoke it), in negligence of Bengali and other Pakistani provinces' separate cultural and linguistic identity, Jinnah omnipotently stressed: 'anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan'. Bengali was *lingua franca* of East Bengal; the imposition of Urdu was met with dismay and widely rejected. The fact that Calcutta-based newspapers supported Bengali language cause ignited accusations in West Pakistan of Dacca demands being 'Indian-inspired', already in 1948.²²

The animosities became apparent in other regions of Pakistan, for example the apprehensions of Sindhis of being marginalised by the newcomers (*vide infra*) were also neglected and Karachi was declared the state capital, to be

governed directly by federal authorities. After 1948, huge parts of irrigated land in Sindh were allotted to Punjabi elites, including the armed forces and their families, heralding a pattern of hegemonic taking over the state's valuable resources by the Deep State. Jinnah's short rule anticipated the era of centralised authority, weak civilian governments, disempowered local authorities and political culture based on censorship, with no space for pluralist, democratic debate. Jinnah himself, cherished, sanctified, was simultaneously propagandistically moulded by Pakistan's subsequent regimes, civil and military, to fit into their political agenda. It started right after his death, when a first-hand account 'With the Quaid-i-Azam During His Last Days' written by Jinnah's personal physician, Colonel Ilahi Bakhsh, was banned by the government. The 1978 republished version was subjected to intense censorship. The formative years of Pakistan also laid ground to the common political narrative where opponents/dissidents are labelled as 'traitors' or 'enemies of the state' and 'pro-India'. For example, Liaquat Ali Khan described Bengali politician Hussain Suhrawardy (a pre-partition supporter of Pakistan movement) as 'the mad dog let loose by India' to disrupt Pakistan. Jinnah's sister, Fatima, an activist, distinguished stateswoman, known in Pakistan as the 'Mother of the Nation', was accused of being on the US payroll by general Ayub Khan's regime in 1964, during the presidential campaign,²³ when she challenged his authoritarian state apparatus and undemocratic rule.

Markedly, the purported Islamic credentials were not convincing to some conservatives, who vehemently resisted the idea of Pakistan. The ulema (*ulamā*; learned Islamic scholars) from the Deobandī school of thought organisation, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH, Organization of Indian Scholars²⁴), cooperated with the Indian National Congress (INC), advocated a united India and opposed the Muslim League's quest for an independent, separate Pakistan. Ajmal and Al-Jamayat, the two important periodicals of Jamiat, adhered to Indian nationalism, and strongly denounced the demand for Pakistan.²⁵ The pro-Congress ulema represented by JUH and the Majlis-e-Ahrrar protested against the fact that Muslims with socialist or communist views were among the supporters of the idea of Pakistan. They accused Jinnah and Muslim League of being a secular travesty and denounced him claiming that he was not the *Quaid-e-Azam* (*Qā'id-e-Ā'zam*), or the great leader, but the *Kafir-e-Azam* (*Kāfir-e-Ā'zam*),²⁶ or the major leader of the infidels.²⁷ Markedly, many JUH members remained in India after partition and were actively engaged in political life.²⁸

Among the ulema who turned against Jinnah and rebutted the Lahore Resolution was *mawlānā*²⁹ Abul Muhammad Sajjad, a leading member of the JUH from Bihar. He astutely envisaged the conflicts between India and Pakistan and warned strongly that retributive violence against religious minorities would become a reality. He also repudiated Islamic credentials of the Muslim League leaders and blamed them for deceiving their supporters by using the idea of a separate state to buttress their leadership position and maintain the League's political influences. Sajjad's questioned the League's

claim that Pakistan would be an Islamic state where Islamic laws would regulate the lives of the faithful, arguing it was impossible to establish such state with substantial non-Muslim population. He also firmly denounced as un-Islamic the AIML's 'hostage population theory' with its idea of retributive violence against minorities in Pakistan in case of anti-Muslim attacks in India.³⁰

Apart from some Islamic scholars, there were regional nationalist leaders who expressed their apprehensions (for different reasons) and managed to foresee the grim future of Pakistan under the Islamic leadership. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly known as 'Bacha Khan', 'Badshah Khan' (King of Chiefs) or 'Frontier Gandhi', opposed joining Pakistan. This renowned Pashtun nationalist, freedom fighter, social activist and leader of the *Khudai Khidmatgar*³¹ (KK, Servants of God), non-violent movement, operating in the NWFP, rejected Pakistan on grounds of Pashtun nationalism and his loyalty to the Indian National Congress.³² As one of the admirers and closest associates of Mahatma Gandhi, he allied with Congress in the struggle of national civil disobedience campaign (1930–1931) against the British colonialism. Bacha Khan reportedly felt betrayed by Congress and bitterly complained to Gandhi in June 1946, once the party gave consent to the partition and referendum in the Frontier province (which KK boycotted³³): 'We Pakhtuns stood by you and had undergone great sacrifices for attaining freedom, but you have now deserted us and thrown us to the wolves'.³⁴ In June 1947, the KK called for an independent Pashtunistan. Markedly, Khan also opposed the participation of tribesmen from the NWFP in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) invasion in 1947. His attitude was vehemently at loggerheads with the political ideology of the leaders of Pakistan, who vilified him as an anti-state element, a traitor, Indian and Afghani agent. In late 1948, he was arrested for conspiring against Pakistan³⁵ (it is a sad paradox that he was also regularly incarcerated by the British colonisers during an independence struggle). The turbulent post-partition time paved the way to political careers in Pakistan for some opportunistic politicians, who would sway loyalties whenever needed. One of them was Abdul Qaiyum (sometimes spelled: Qayyum) Khan Kashmiri, a prominent politician and barrister from the NWFP (former name of Khyber Pakhtunkwa, renamed in 2010 under the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan) with Kashmiri origin. In 1945, he published a book titled *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, criticising British colonialism, Jinnah and two-nation theory and praising Ghaffar Khan's movement.³⁶ He later changed the front and banned his own book. He turned against Khan and supported the 1947–1948 tribal invasion in Kashmir when he served as the Chief Minister of NWFP (1947–1953).³⁷ This political adjustment paid him well: he pursued his political career and became a federal Interior Minister of Pakistan (1972–1977).

The accession to Pakistan was rejected by some Baloch leaders, including the Khan of Kalat, who formally declared independence of his coastal state of Kalat (the Khanate of Kalat) on 15 August 1947. This decision was overwhelmingly endorsed by the local assembly. The Khan of Kalat emphasised

the benefits of Kalat's sovereignty: 'Today our country is independent, and I can express my views freely and openly'.³⁸ He tried to negotiate independence with the departing British administration, hoping (in vain) to settle the issue before their withdrawal from the subcontinent, assuming it would be too late once the successor government (of Pakistan) was established. In December 1947, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the prominent Baloch politician and nationalist leader (till today referred to as 'the Father of Balochistan' by Baloch nationalists), delivered a speech against the accession of Kalat to Pakistan: 'We have a distinct civilization. We have a separate culture like that of Iran and Afghanistan. We are Muslims but it is not necessary that by virtue of our being Muslims we should lose our freedom and merge with others. If the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran, both Muslim countries, should also amalgamate with Pakistan... [...] They say we must join Pakistan for economic reasons. Yet we have minerals, we have petroleum, we have ports. The question is, what would Pakistan be without us. [...] Pakistan's unpleasant and loathsome desire that our national homeland, Balochistan, should merge with it, is impossible to concede'.³⁹ Bizenjo rejected the two-nation theory throughout his life. In 1984, he stated: 'At no time Muslims were, are or would be a nation ever. Islam is a multi-national institution. An Indian Muslim is a Muslim. So is Afghan, Arab and Indonesian Muslim a Muslim. But they are not one nation. Islam is not one nation, it is an *ummaḥ*, it is a multi-national institution'.⁴⁰

Another aspect, neglected by those who advocated Islam as a sufficient pre-partition nation-building force, is the fact that the population of the newly established Pakistan was ethnically, culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse. In British India the Muslims were already religiously and socially divided,⁴¹ so it should not come as a surprise that various differences manifested themselves among the inhabitants of the newly established Pakistan. They had various identities, historical, ethnic and cultural backgrounds and sometimes worldviews and they belonged to different sects of Islam or religious minorities. Additionally, the elites-oriented policies, accompanied by negligence of regional discourses, manifested by the imposition of centralised control and paternalistic rule from the Karachi-based, and then Punjab-based bureaucracy, evoked justified accusations that the new establishment restored the colonial manner of exercising power.

Pakistan quickly plunged into political turmoil. Following its inception in 1947, the state operated under the British 1935 Government of India Act, while the Constituent Assembly was formed to prepare a new constitution. It passed the Objectives Resolution (OR, 1949) on 12 March 1949 defining the principles for the future constitution and stipulating that 'the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed'. In his emotional address to the Constituent Assembly, during the discussion over the OR, Pakistan's first foreign minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan, referred to Quran and claimed that Islamic ideals went well with Pakistan's statehood. He tried to appease minority groups

apprehensive of combining the state with Islam, by referring to Prophet Muhammad's life as an example of tolerance; the amendments proposed by minorities were rejected. Paradoxically, Khan belonged to Aḥmadiya community, against which the riots soon erupted, leading to its gradual, state-led persecution (*vide infra*, §9.5). The OR remains a fundamental framework in defining and constructing Pakistan's legal history; it authorised politicised Islam, religious nationalism and majoritarian state with patterns of systemic and systematic disenfranchisement of minorities. Presently, it is an operative part of the Constitution of Pakistan under Article 2A (CIRP 1973).

The unquestionable state-constructing uniqueness of Pakistan is related to the fact that it was established without undergoing the internationally recognised process of acquiring a sovereign state by an already established, identity-conscious nation. In the case of Pakistan, a geopolitical and ideological construct which appeared on South Asian map as a result of short-term, yet successful, political campaign, this historical evolution was remarkably reversed: on 14 August 1947, when it became an independent state, its citizens did not constitute a nation⁴² and even decades after its inception they remained 'a nation in the making'.⁴³ The nationhood claims by the Pakistan movement in the pre-partition era can be described as a unique example of 'the nationalist movement without a clearly defined nation'.⁴⁴ Islam was the only connection between Bengalis and Pakistanis from the West, who had different historical experiences, cultural backgrounds and language. Importantly, at the time of inception, Jinnah was given the powerful position of Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan, his Secretary General, became the first Prime Minister. Even though Bengalis constituted 56% of the then Pakistani population, they were not given the post of Prime Minister (Hussain Suhrawardy, Bengali politician who largely contributed to the Muslim League victory in Bengal and supported Pakistan movement could be an appropriate candidate⁴⁵). Western Pakistan was inhabited by Balochis, Sindhis, Punjabis and Pashtuns, but its ruling elite consisted mostly of Punjabis, Pashtuns and muhajirs (muhājir) (Muslim immigrants from India and their descendants). The significant influx of migrants from India who took bureaucratic positions, sparked conflicts with the long-term inhabitants, particularly in Sindh province and Karachi, and added another element to the identity question: who is a 'real Pakistani'? Notably, Jinnah, in his message to the muhajirs during the riots in January 1948, asked them to show restraint and warned them 'not to abuse the hospitality they have been extended'⁴⁶ in Pakistan, as if they were just guests, not the new residents of the 'homeland for Muslims'. Nonetheless, it was the Urdu-speaking muhajirs and the Punjabi elites (including those related to the armed forces), which secured their dominant position in Pakistan. Whereas the establishment tried to make religion the major source of unity, provincial identity and diverse ethnic affiliations remained a crucial binding force among Pakistanis, even more important than religious ones. Precisely 40 years after the inception of Pakistan, Khan

Abdul Wali Khan, a Pashtun nationalist, and son of the prominent leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan, asked about his identity, replied stylishly: ‘I am 4000-year old Pakhtun, 1400-year old Muslim and a forty-year old Pakistani’.⁴⁷

Political turmoil, exacerbated by the rivalry between the muhajirs and the native inhabitants of the territories constituting Pakistan, and between religious radicals and moderates was one among the major obstacles for establishing a stable government and adopting a constitution. Self-serving political elites, which included feudal landlords (in West Pakistan), were unable to quell the violence and remained in conflict with each other. The overall worsening political situation had a destructive impact on building democratic institutions and governance in Pakistan. The Muslim League did not have a political base strong enough to successfully take the burden of its pre-partition leadership. Hasan Askari RIZVI (2000: 4) argued: ‘the League, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, utterly failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement into a national party which could serve as an effective political machine for aggregating diverse interests and identities into a plural and participatory national framework’.

Geographical construction of Pakistan, divided into two ‘wings’, separated by 1500 km—West Pakistan with the centre of political power, and East Pakistan (East Bengal), became a major test for two-nation theory which failed to perform its role as a sufficient binding force, an ideological paradigm, capable to uphold the state’s territorial integrity. Culturally, historically, linguistically and ethnically diverse regions were stitched into one political entity, which disintegrated in 1971, mainly due to West Pakistan’s exploitative policies vis-à-vis the eastern wing (*vide supra*, §5.1).

9.2 The army has the state

In nascent Pakistan, basic elements of statehood (defined territory, permanent population and government) were unsettled due to unresolved conflicts, migration and the lack of stable institutions. Political and economic instability and gamesmanship prevented the establishment of a legitimate, operative government able to deal with mounting problems. The encroachment of the military on political affairs and its gradual emergence as key economic actor, exercising enhanced control over the state’s resources, substantially undermined the chances for democratic consolidation. Praetorianisation and *kha-hi-mullah* alliance in Pakistan became its intrinsic features leading to creation of a hybrid system which combines competitive, yet fragile, multi-party system (key parties ruled by wealthy and mighty families) and hegemonic role of the unelected apparatus. Global dynamics of the 1950s with Pakistan’s strategic location, enabled its inclusion in the US global security strategy (*vide infra*, §11.5; HAQQANI 2013: 2), with direct links between the military establishments of both states that further facilitated the generals’ dominance in defining foreign policy objectives, including those Kashmir-related. The first martial law was imposed in 1958 by Pakistan’s first President Iskander

Mirza, who had effectively interfered in the constitutional process, dismissed four prime ministers and escalated the political turmoil.⁴⁸ Notably, he was a retired army officer and a classmate of General Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani military dictator, who later dismissed him.

Over the decades, the army, focused on the main goal of neutralising India's power, exacerbated its role in shaping Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy. The army-ISI conglomerate secures two-nation theory as Pakistan's identity, propagandistically acting as self-proclaimed guardian of the nation against the India threat and an advocate of Kashmiri Muslim rights in IaJK. The protracted conflict with a powerful neighbour provides an excuse for the army's dominating position and excessive military spending at the cost of vital socio-economic needs.⁴⁹ It can be assumed that as long as the army plays the first fiddle in Pakistan, the chances for genuine reconciliation with India are largely limited, unless some additional strategic or economic circumstances occur.

Primarily since the 1970s and the fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (executed by the regime of General Zia ul-Haq in April 1979), the generals' political clout has risen substantially. The paucity of democratic culture was bolstered by the fact that the civilian leaders of most important Pakistani political parties were given power with the military support—no major political party in the history of Pakistan was allowed to develop and act independently. Meanwhile, the army used its political power to achieve the 'state within state' position, and regularly mocked politicians' incompetence and corruption. Consequently, it has become Pakistan's persistent phenomenon that leading civilian politicians, holding power or being deprived of it by the military establishment, are unable to renounce the revisionism in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IaJK) or introduce any effective actions against the *jihād*ist and sectarian groups. Stephen COHEN (1985: 105) wrote: 'there are armies that guard their nation's border, there are armies concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are armies which defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan army does all three'. According to Global Firepower, as of early 2021 Pakistani overall military strength is ranked 10th of 140 countries enumerated in the Global Firepower (GFP) annual defense review. Pakistan has 654,000 active personnel (6th in the world), 550,000 reserve forces and 500,000 paramilitary forces. Maintenance of such forces is a serious budgetary burden for Pakistan with its approximate 226 million population.⁵⁰

Moreover, domestic dynamics indicates the army's relentless involvement not only in political engineering, but also its notorious engagement in the state's resource management. Defending the army's vast interests and privileges became core element of what Ayesha SIDDIQA (2017: 7–8, 67) describes in her cutting-edge analysis of the army's position in Pakistan as predatory activity, which she dubbed *milbus* (military and business)—the protracted and unlimited engagement of the military in politics and its presence in all dominant sectors of Pakistan's economy,⁵¹ illustrated for example by such

business conglomerates as the Fauji Foundation (exists since 1954). They provide profits from managing the financial services, power generation, gas exploration, farming, running hotels, airlines, banks or real estate agencies; the military is directly engaged in service and manufacturing industry, and the agriculture. Siddiqi rightfully highlights the correlations between the army's political power and its limitless desire to control resources: 'military's penetration of the national economy, which is directly proportional to the organization's political influence. (...). The power of the defence establishment intensifies with the organization's financial autonomy, and especially its capacity to exploit national resources'.

The milbus, legally and institutionally developed throughout the decades, was structurally bolstered by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI),⁵² which formed the government in coalition with five other parties in 2018. Prime Minister Imran Khan, former captain of the national cricket team, which defeated England in the World Cup final in 1992 and ex-playboy, now posing as pious Muslim,⁵³ often acted as the army's political agent, who won the elections with the establishment's support, rather than an independent civilian authority. In 2019, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa's three-year tenure was extended by army-conducive Khan for another three years, which evoked protests among Pakistani HR activists, civil society, and opposition. The Supreme Court temporarily suspended the extension, risking confrontation with the army, but in January 2020, the National Assembly of Pakistan legalised General Bajwa's extension. The institutional encroachment is another pillar of the army's domestic empire. The key positions, which should be restricted to civilian professionals, are given to the army: the 2019-established China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Authority (CPECA, officially comes under the Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives) was chaired by a retired Lt General Asim Saleem Bajwa. Another retired Lt General, Bilal Akbar, was appointed as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia in January 2021, which confirmed the practice of controlling diplomatic relations with strategically important states by the generals. The COAS is directly engaged in the decision-making process, for example by his membership in the National Development Council. Notably, the defence policy was partially shifted from the ministries to the National Security Division, a relatively new power centre which includes top military leadership. If such army's negligence of the democratic process and overwhelming grip on power at the cost of civilian authorities prevails, Pakistan may slide into authoritarianism.⁵⁴ By projecting its own interests as equivalent to the interests of the state, Pakistan's military aims to suppress even more any public criticism of its activities, providing poor justification that such limitations on freedom of speech should be introduced 'in the name of national security'. Imposition of censorship is tantamount to a substantial violation of the citizens' democratic right to criticise the authorities, yet the PTI government complied with these demands, confirming its dependence on the

Deep State. It proposed the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 2020, aimed to amend the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) by adding Section 500-A. It will make ‘ridiculing’ or ‘defaming’ the army punishable crime (imprisonment up to two years or a high fine).⁵⁵ At the same time, the military establishment is empowered to perpetrate legalised and extralegal use of force with impunity and practically no accountability in restive areas, including Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK) or Balochistan, and against those who are projected as ‘enemies of the state’.⁵⁶

9.3 Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir—Key components

Pakistan’s official narratives, incessantly embedded in the two-nation theory, moulded its position on Kashmir that is anchored in enduring territorial revisionism. The state-promoted stance on Kashmir is unalterably based on key 12 components, which epitomise the India-centric traits of Pakistan’s geostrategic objectives:

- 1 The incorporation of Kashmir to India was forced and illegal *ab initio*, and Maharaja Hari Singh had no authority to sign the Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (IoAJ&K) on 26 October 1947. Therefore, contrary to Indian claims, IaJK is not an integral part of India, and, consequently, the dynamics in the Valley and other pieces of IaJK is not India’s internal matter.
- 2 India and Pakistan share equal position in the conflict and are entitled to the same rights and obligations towards Kashmir (obviously, this includes only Pakistan’s rights vis-à-vis IaJK, not India’s vis-à-vis PaJK).
- 3 Kashmir is the main source of Indo-Pakistani tensions. All other issues may be worked out once the Kashmir conflict is successfully resolved.
- 4 Unlike India, Pakistan identifies Kashmir as a territorial conflict.
- 5 Disputed territories within the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (PSJ&K) are on the Indian side. PaJK’s state and political affiliation is not subjected to discussion.
- 6 The future of the state should be determined by a plebiscite held in both parts of Kashmir. Having refused to reconsider the possibility of holding a plebiscite in J&K, India has showed disregard to the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions.
- 7 There are strong sociocultural and religious ties between Pakistan and Muslim majority in the Valley of Kashmir.
- 8 Pakistan is entitled to provide Kashmiris in IaJK moral support and act internationally as a sole proponent of their right for self-determination. Materialising this right is a precondition of conflict resolution.
- 9 India and its armed forces commit massive, state-authorised human rights violations in IaJK. The legal impunity of perpetrators encourages

further repressions against multi-dimensionally persecuted minority (Muslims). In PaJK, the rights are not restricted, moreover, in Pakistan minorities enjoy more freedom than in India.

- 10 India is solely responsible for thwarting the peace process and for cease-fire violations along the LoC.
- 11 Indian government's unilateral bifurcation of IaJK and annulment of its semi-autonomous status in 2019 was unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal. It resulted in massive human rights violations which call for international attention and condemnation.
- 12 Any secessionist ambitions in PaJK are anti-state and have to be unambiguously countered by the state apparatus; there is no independence option for Kashmir (notably, it is a stance shared by India with regard to Kashmir under its administration).

9.4 Persistent quest for Kashmir

Throughout more than seven decades of Pakistan's existence, the quest for Kashmir remained a central pretext of its key decision makers for pursuing regional strategy: the nation-building process in Pakistan will not be completed as long as Muslim majority Kashmir remains under India's administration. This supposition has strong symbolic connotation and it was adopted as inherent element of Pakistan's officially promoted identity, a significant point of reference in the education system and a benchmark for the level of patriotism of successive generations of Pakistanis. It is unstintingly repeated that for Pakistan, Kashmir is an inalienable part, an 'unfinished business of partition'⁵⁷ and, as Kalim Bahadur puts it, 'not only a territorial dispute, it is a reassertion of its ideology, the justification of its existence and a defence of its identity as against secular India'. The author, a retired professor from the New Delhi-based prominent Jawaharlal Nehru University, by paraphrasing Jean Jacques Voltaire's words on God,⁵⁸ emphasises the Indo-centric orientation and regional goals of Pakistan's foreign policy: 'there is some truth in the claims that Pakistan would have invented Kashmir if it was already not there'.⁵⁹ As Kashmir conflict is already there, this hypothesis can't be verified, but it illustrates how Pakistani policy is viewed by Indian elites.

The intentional politisation of communal differences by Pakistani leadership turned out to be a very effective political means which unprecedentedly aggravated the rivalry and cast a shadow over the whole array of Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly the Kashmir conflict. Most of the contemporary problems of Pakistan—ideologisation of education, proxy regional strategies, the overall growing impact of radical Islamisation on every sphere of political and social life and the stubbornly reorientation-resistant stance on Kashmir—come from the fact that the state was formed as 'the land of the pure' on the basis of majoritarian religious nationalism. Consequently, despite the fact that logic of the two-nation theory was repeatedly devalued, it remains inextricably linked to Pakistan's policy, nurtured by all ruling establishments.⁶⁰

The major argument for merging Kashmir with Pakistan at the time of partition was religious affiliation of the Kashmiris: as per the British Census of India, 1941, the PSJ&K was inhabited by a 77% Muslim majority and a 20% Hindu minority.⁶¹ Pakistan's stance vis-à-vis IaJK is incessantly constructed upon religious affinities and the predicaments of Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley; these territorial claims disguised as genuine care for peoples' rights, may serve as distinctive example of irredentism-oriented agenda, in which Kashmir is strongly embedded in Pakistan's Islamic nationalism. The popular patriotic slogan *Pakistan zindābād* (long live Pakistan) was supplemented by the General Zia ul-Haq's military regime that popularised the ideologically grounded catchphrase: *Pākistān kā matlab kyā? Lā ilāha 'ilāllāh* ('What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but God'). It shows how deeply politicised the Islamic agenda became, and how it influenced Pakistan's national identity.⁶² Pakistan's enduring territorial claims vis-à-vis IaJK and emphasis on the alleged willingness of Kashmiri Muslims to liberate themselves from Indian administration and join Pakistan unremittingly serve as the justification and driving force for core aspects of foreign and internal policy.

The research completed by Christine Fair shows that 58% of Punjabis in Pakistan assume that Kashmiris living under India's rule would prefer to join Pakistan.⁶³ The scholar, known for her critical assessments of Pakistani army's incursions into polity, highlights persistent revisionism as an inseparable part of its ideology. She argues that in all probability even a genuine democratic transition of power in Pakistan may be not insufficient condition to move away from the ideology.⁶⁴ This supposition may be questioned, provided that the transition would be indeed 'genuine', that is, based on competent and competitive civilian leadership, just power-sharing system and inclusiveness. Meanwhile, Pakistan's revisionism has intensely encroached into political narrative: the defence of the ideology of Pakistan regarded as tantamount to the interest of the state, an obligatory duty of every citizen; it requires absolute unity, quashes political pluralism and independent debate on current and future policies of Pakistan. As a result of the state-supported Sunnī majoritarian nationalism, that served as a political tool aimed to construct a unified society, democratic freedoms and the rights of minorities were gradually curbed, and sectarian conflict in Pakistan escalated. At the same time, the demands for larger defence expenditures were raised by the Deep State in order to achieve an unattainable goal: military parity with India.

Rising political appetites of the army⁶⁵ led to the first military takeover by general Ayub Khan in 1958, which was accompanied by strategic alliance with the United States and domestic tensions: permanent political crisis and marginalisation of progressive civilian policymakers. The process of structural dismantling of democratic institutions and the rule of law was inexorably initiated. Pakistan was subjected to a transition from a promised homeland for Indian Muslims, pledging to uphold the minorities' rights, to a 'fortress' of Islam, oriented primarily at protection against predatory India.⁶⁶

While pursuing territorial claims vis-à-vis IaJK, within the framework of the nation-building agenda, the civilian and military leaders assumed that the local ethnic identities within Pakistan and Pakistani nationalism are mutually incompatible. They demanded that the ethnic groups living in independent Pakistan should subordinate all aspects of their identities to the one vision of nationalism rooted in Islam.⁶⁷ The concentration of power in West Pakistan and marginalisation of East Bengal was ingloriously crowned by One Unit Scheme policy (1954–1970), which merged the four western provinces into one political unit. The goal was to counterbalance political (and demographic) domination of East Bengal. Instead of constructing national narratives around political empowerment and respect to regional sociocultural and linguistic diversities, the leadership escalated secessionist inclinations, regional ethnonationalisms, and the resistance of local populations against violations of basic human rights in marginalised regions. Consequently, the ruling elites-oriented, enforced ‘Pakistanisation’ undermined the nation building process. Moreover, the structural disenfranchisement of a significant portion of Pakistani society, did not seem to contradict the establishment’s self-proclaimed image as protector of Kashmiri Muslims’ rights in India. The centralised control accelerated opposition among Bengali population and resulted in the pro-independence movement, followed by brutal suppressive measures taken by the Pakistani army, and finally, the secession and inception of Bangladesh in 1971. Notably, the army’s rough campaign against unarmed civilians was recounted in a breakthrough article, titled *Genocide*, authored by its witness, Karachi-born reporter, Anthony MASCARENHAS (1971), published by *Sunday Times* on 13 June 1971. It largely contributed to unveil the truth and turned international community against Pakistani narrative; the author (who earlier moved to the United Kingdom) was dubbed the enemy of state. The civil war in Bengal remains a fragile issue in Pakistan as it officially denies its armed forces engagement in the atrocities committed against Bengali population. Pakistan’s territorial disintegration and a war against India, which broke out that year, substantially exacerbated Islamabad/Rawalpindi’s anti-India security narratives in the forthcoming decades.

After 1971, a grim scenario of further balkanisation (fragmentation) became a key element of Pakistan’s security dilemma with distinctive impact on its internal and external policies. Yet, instead of learning from the East Bengal experience and introducing a more inclusive, power-sharing and equality-based internal strategy vis-à-vis disenfranchised regions, minorities and local communities, the establishment chose to marginalise religious minorities, struggle against provincial empowerment and persistently accentuated the IaJK as a major element of the ‘Muslim nation’ concept. Pakistan’s policy towards India and Kashmir coalesced around the idea of a revisionist strategy, that was structurally and ideologically bolstered by the subsequent military and civilian governments since the 1970s. The regional security dynamics of that time created favourable conditions for the rise of radicalism in Pakistan.

9.5 Sociopolitical effects of radicalisation

In the aftermath of Bangladesh inception, Pakistani policymakers reinforced their determination to maintain and justify the ideological relevance of the two-nation theory and to combine it with security dilemma vis-à-vis India. The major decision makers of that time, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and then General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq used Islam to consolidate their power: as part of populist ideologies with declared modernist approach (the former) or socio-political promotion of extremist Sunnī Islam (the latter). Paradoxically, it was the civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who opened the gate to considerable radicalisation of some portions of Pakistani society in subsequent decades. In April 1977, shortly before he lost power in Zia ul-Haq military coup, he announced the enforcement of Sharia law ‘in six months’ and declared immediate ban on alcohol and nightclubs.⁶⁸ The 1974, the constitutional amendment legalised state-induced marginalisation of religious minorities and created favourable conditions for escalation of sectarian hostilities by declaring the Aḥmadīya sect to be non-Muslim. In this regard, Bhutto turned out to be an opportunistic and autocratic leader, which unequivocally tarnished his cherished image as a secular and democratic politician.⁶⁹ The amendment met the long-time quests spearheaded by radical Sunnī mullahs in the early 1950s, accusing the Aḥmadīs of being *kuffār* (infidels) who do not respect Prophet Mohammad. Maulana Abul A’la Al-Maududi,⁷⁰ the founder of the most influential Islamic organisation in India, Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), and in the independent Pakistan vociferous proponent of an Islamic state, successfully initiated the anti-Aḥmadī hate campaign and riots, which broke out in February 1953 in various cities in Punjab (a state of emergency was introduced in Lahore between 6 March and 14 May), foreshadowing the horrifying patterns of violence against minorities in Pakistan.⁷¹ He was one of the fundamentalist clerics who had cooperated with the Congress in the pre-partition era and opposed creation of Pakistan, yet, following the state’s inception, initiated ruthless campaigns aimed at ‘purification’ of Islam, imposition of sharia supremacy and other radical views on all Pakistanis. Instead of dealing with religious fanatics who instigated communal hatred, the state authorities embarked upon a strategy of appeasement.⁷² This encouraged the radicals to continue polarising campaigns and hate speech. Over the next decades, Aḥmadīs and other minorities became the victims of such policy. In 1984, during the Zia’s martial law regime,⁷³ the repressive policies were legalised under the PPC. In Chapter XV (‘On Offences Relating to Religion’), Section 298-B and 298-C, it gave the right to persecute Aḥmadīs if they ‘behave like Muslims’⁷⁴ and punish them with imprisonment. According to the Section 298-C: ‘Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Aḥmadis’ or by any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by

visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine'. The effect of these legal provisions added to the PPC was particularly damaging to the religious freedom of Aḥmadīs, which was drastically curtailed.⁷⁵ Violence against them rose exponentially and became more systematic and systemic; the laws paved the way to legalising the culture of impunity for open attacks against this and other religious minorities under suspicion of any 'anti-Islamic' behaviour (dubbed also as 'anti-state').

The foundations for anti-democratic leanings were established at the time of Pakistan's inception and subsequently bolstered, yet it cannot be denied that the harshest campaigns of authoritarianism and Islamisation, fundamentally transforming Pakistan, were introduced by General Zia ul-Haq's military regime (1977–1988).⁷⁶ His policy had critical, and largely irreversible, implications for the whole political, legal, economic and social system in Pakistan, escalating its hard line policy towards India and the Kashmir issue. The self-professed 'soldier of Islam' aimed to implement Sharia legislation and provided the Islamist lobby with unprecedented leverage and influence on domestic political affairs. The structural, state-authorised religious radicalisation had never before encumbered Pakistan to such an extent and it may be assumed that this overwhelmingly violent transformation was incompatible with Jinnah's vision. Sharia courts were set up to decide if any law was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam,⁷⁷ religious taxes were collected by the government, the civil service was Islamised and the media and mosques acted as staunch promoters of Islamisation, chastising all those who opposed the policy of radicalisation. The school curricula and syllabuses were 'purified', and those books deemed un-Islamic were removed from the libraries.⁷⁸ Substantial efforts were focused on the army, where the Islamic teachings became a crucial part of education in the Pakistan Military Academy. According to a senior officer, the term 'ideology of Pakistan' became synonymous with the 'glory of Islam', and some officers sounded more like high priests than soldiers.⁷⁹ They had to read books on the Quranic concept of war and obligatorily attend Friday prayers to prove that they were religious enough to be promoted; their piety, not professionalism and military abilities, decisively affected their career prospects. Under the patronage of the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), religious groups established their own militias led by radical religious leaders. After the Iranian revolution, the Shī'a issue became more politicised with Sunnī Deobandī Sipāh-e-Sahābā Pākistān ('Guardians of the Prophet's Companions', established in 1985) perpetrating violent attacks against Shī'a Muslims.⁸⁰ Pakistani army, once a secular entity that inherited British traditions, became more involved in sectarian tensions and radicalised its India-centred strategy. This directly bolstered the ideological motivations of Pakistan's policies, with strategic goals vis-à-vis India (Kashmir) and in Afghanistan (pursuing the 'strategic depth' doctrine to control Afghanistan's domestic political dynamics in case

of tensions with India and to prevent the escalation of Pashtun separatism across the Durand Line).

During the Zia's era, the education system in Pakistan gained a strong institutional base in *madāris* (plural of *madrasa*), or Islamic seminaries/schools. Stephen COHEN (2004: 184) highlights that at the time of partition there were about 250 religious schools in Pakistan and by 1987, that number rose to around 3000.⁸¹ Ian TALBOT (2012: 131) writes that by 1983–1984 alone, over 12,000 were opened. According to Mohammad A. QADEER (2011: 214), it is not possible to give an accurate number of Islamic seminaries, but for the late 1990s, estimates range from around 4000 to 20,000 and newly built mosques or *madāris* could be seen every 10 or 20 miles while travelling along any major road. Their growth was encouraged to an unprecedented level and most of them were financed from *zakāt* funds (religious tax, a form of alms giving for social needs) centralised under the Ministry of Finance by dictatorial Zia's regime, which introduced the compulsory deduction of *zakāt* from bank-account holders. Those seminaries which were funded by Saudi Arabia propagated an aggressive mixture of Wahhābīsm and Deobandīsm, encouraging extremism in Afghanistan and later in IaJK. Many students of these seminaries came from underprivileged, poor families (including Pashtun, Afghan refugees) and it was the only option for them to get a free education, which illustrates the systemic predicaments of Pakistani education system. 'A class of religious lumpen proletariat'⁸² was created: the graduates who received mostly religious teachings, could pursue their career only within the religious establishment or extremist groups. Later, it paved the way for the formation of the Taliban movement with its transnational *jihādīst* agenda. The official sources available from the Ministry of Education indicate that there are currently more than 12,000 *madāris* (around 5% of all schools in Pakistan),⁸³ but including those unregistered, their number is much higher: approximately 20,000.⁸⁴

In order to boost employment opportunities for graduates of Islamic seminaries, their degrees were equated in the early 1980s to the mainstream institutions without any requirements to comply with the standards of curricular frameworks.⁸⁵ Till now, some of *madāris* still openly preach sectarian hatred, provide military training and produce *jihādīst* fighters. Their curricula are often not controlled by the state. Jamia Dar al-Ulum Haqqania (Jāmi'a Dār al-'Ulūm Haqqāniya), which propagates Deobandī school of Sunnī Islam, situated in Akora Khattak near Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK] province), is one of the seminaries with many of the foremost Afghan Taliban leaders as graduates (including Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Akhtar Mansoor). The school, run by the JUI-S (breakaway faction of JUI, Jamīyat Ulemā-e-Islām) chief Maulana Sami ul-Haq, known as 'The Taliban Godfather', is regarded as the cradle of the Afghan *jihādīst* movement, a 'university of Taliban', which also recruited Pakistani militants to fight in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. Notably, the then Imran Khan's PTI provincial government in KPK allocated significant grants from its budget

for this *madrasa* in the years 2016–2018 under the insubstantial pretext that the money may help bring the seminar into the educational mainstream.⁸⁶ It was a continuation of the policies carried out by the Pakistani leadership, aimed at appeasing the extremists; Khan earned his nickname ‘Taliban Khan’ for his conciliatory approach vis-à-vis radicals. When Sami ul-Haq was assassinated on 2 November 2018 at his residence in Rawalpindi, Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that the country had suffered ‘a great loss’.

The radical Islamist groups and parties benefited substantially in the 1980s, from Zia ul-Haq’s state-led Islamisation policy. It had a strong impact on the significant part of Pakistani society and escalated the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir. In the post-Zia era, the civilian governments were largely unable to curb the powers of the radical Deobandī clergy. Instead, in 1993, Zulfiqar’s daughter, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, further increased political clout of the conservatives. While trying to build a majority coalition, she turned to the radical Deobandi Sunnī party, Jamīyat Ulemā-e-Islām (JUI). Its leader, a pro-Taliban politician Fazal-ur-Rehman, became the Chairman of the National Committee on Foreign Relations. Having close contacts with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf Arab states, he could successfully arrange financial support for the Taliban movement. He enabled contacts between the Taliban and Arab princes, for instance, by organising hunting trips to Kandahar for the latter. The old training camps along the Durand Line (the *de facto* border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a post-colonial legacy unrecognised by Kabul) were used to train a new generation of *jihādists*, some of whom were later sent to Kashmir.⁸⁷ After the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the violent non-state actors under the permanent patronage of the ISI focused their attention to the campaign in Indian Kashmir. ‘The Kashmir wing’ of the ISI was established to monitor their activities and to Islamise the indigenous Kashmiri liberation movement. The policy of supporting the Islamic groups continued until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, under the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, even though Musharraf’s rule facilitated limited liberalisation (of the media, for instance) and partially rolled back Zia’s policies.⁸⁸ Some Sunnī extremist groups were banned in 2002 under post-9/11 American pressure, but their leaders were repeatedly acquitted and managed to continue their sectarian campaigns in Pakistan and Kashmir-oriented *jihādism*, with the backing of the security establishment.

In July 2007, General Musharraf confronted Pakistan’s Islamic fundamentalists by ordering a *Lāl Māsjid* (Red Mosque) and adjacent Jamia Hafsa *madrasa* (in Islamabad) siege, codenamed Operation Silence. Dozens were killed (including female students) and the mosque leader, Islamic fundamentalist Maulana Abdul Aziz, was arrested, while trying to flee, disguised in burqa (he earned an ironic nickname, ‘mullah burqa’). After the siege, in December 2007, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella group of Pakistani Taliban from different (often rival) Pashtun tribes, was founded under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.⁸⁹ Pakistani Taliban regarded the

government in Islamabad as apostate for its post-9/11 cooperation with the United States. Contrary to the ISI-supported terrorists such as notorious Haqqani Network, which did not engage in attacks within Pakistan, TTP aimed to overthrow the government and terrorised the country with attacks against the military establishment and soft targets, such as Şūfī shrines, schools and parks. Aziz was released from custody by Pakistani Supreme Court in 2009, and acquitted in 2013.⁹⁰

The linkages between the military establishment and *jihādīst* groups were pursued despite Pakistan's participation in the so-called American-led 'global war on terror' in Afghanistan. Some outfits were banned in 2002, but their leaders were incessantly shielded by the Deep State. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, a core Pakistani fundamentalist with anti-Indian and anti-American approach, the founder and leader of the notorious Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar-e-Tāyibā, LeT) terror group, known also under the name of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Jamā'at al-Da'wa, JuD), is regarded as a mastermind of the Mumbai coordinated series of terrorist attacks carried out in November 2008, in which 175 people were killed and around 300 wounded. The UN and United States declared him a terrorist; the latter announced a ten-million dollar bounty on him. Defenders of Hafiz Saeed applaud his charitable activities and portray him as a respected hero of the Kashmiri struggle (JuD observed 2017 as the 'year of Kashmir'). In a bid to enter Pakistani political scene, JuD established a political party—the Milli Muslim League (MML).⁹¹ In the September 2017, Pakistani parliamentary constituency of NA120 by-election in September 2017 Lahore, Qari Muhammad Yaqoob Sheikh, the candidate supported by Saeed, won 4th place with 5822 votes.⁹² Kulsoom Nawaz, the ousted Nawaz Sharif's wife, won the by-election. Saeed's arrest and 11-year sentence passed by the anti-terrorism court in Lahore in February 2020, raised doubts that it was only a temporary strategy of the authorities to avoid being blacklisted by the Paris-based FATF (Financial Action Task Force), a terror-financing watchdog, in assessing Pakistan's progress in dealing with the Islamist groups.

Fundamentalist *madāris* are not the only platform for preaching intolerance and promoting hatred against the 'enemies of the Pakistani nation'. In his landmark publication, *The Murder of History*, K.K. AZIZ (1993: 193) pointed out that mainstream school textbooks were set out to foster hatred for India and the Hindus, who were presented as inferior and dirty. A.H. NAYYAR (2013: 7–8) argued that history is still narrated with distortions and omissions and textbooks rationalise the glorification of war and military heroes: 'The curriculum as well as the books laid excessive emphasis on the "ideology of Pakistan" which is a device used by those political forces which were initially inimical to the creation of Pakistan to sanctify their politics'. Even a brief examination of selected textbooks confirms the accuracy of the aforementioned remarks. Schoolchildren from the first years of their education are taught that a 'spirit of sacrifice', Islam and nationalism are inseparable virtues which should characterise every Pakistani citizen.

The 'Islamiyat' textbook, published in 2013 (Grade 6), emphasised the sacrifices of the Prophet Mohammad, 'who would go without food' and whose companions 'were known for their spirit of nationalism and would give away all whenever the need arose in times of wars'. These sacrifices are compared to the sacrifices of Pakistanis and the 'great wisdom and courage of the leaders' during the independence struggle which gave the people 'a country where they can practice faith without fear', and one can read between the lines that in an unpartitioned India it would not be possible. The appeal to the people is simple: the 'real' Pakistanis are grateful to Allah and, in order to preserve freedom, they 'must be completely loyal to the country' and in times of need, such as war, 'sacrifice their interests for the interests of the country'.⁹³ The 'Social Studies' textbook (Grade 5) highlighted the positive role of the army throughout the history of Pakistan and advised children to join paramilitary organisations such as the Boy Scouts or Girl Guides, suggesting that it will make them 'useful citizens'. In the historical chapters, the book suggested that the Hindu Dogra Maharaja decided to join India in 1947 against the will of the Muslim majority of the PSJ&K. Unsurprisingly, the authors completely neglected the plundering Pashtun tribal invasion in Kashmir, supported by Pakistani army. The book also stated that Bangladesh was established with the help of India, because 'East Pakistanis wanted their homeland'. There is no explanation of domestic factors, which led to the initiation of the liberation struggle. The authors emphasise that Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) was given the status of a self-governing region in 2009, suggesting that it is administered in a democratic fashion. The contested status of GB was glossed over, but it was highlighted that the region has a border with the 'disputed' J&K.⁹⁴ 'Pakistan Studies' Grade 9, 'selected as the best textbook for the academic year 2017–2018 in all government schools of Punjab' according to the information on the cover, praises the ideology of Pakistan that lies in Islam, which is projected as 'a complete code of life'. The book portrays Pakistan as a country established against the wishes of Hindus, who never accepted it, presents Hindus and Muslims as two entirely different nations and claims that 'in the Subcontinent every individual who embraced Islam associated himself, socially and politically, to the Muslim society and the State. Thus he would break all the previous relationships and link himself to a new social system'. The 1965 war is depicted as India's open aggression against Pakistan in order to materialise its 'expansionist intentions', but Pakistani armed forces 'filled with spirit of Jihad forced an enemy many times bigger to face a humiliated defeat'.⁹⁵

The children schooled by such system not only do not know their real history, are prone to committing communal violence, but they are also discouraged from independent, critical thinking. The sole purpose of such state-led narratives is to create a citizen who will not question them, and is incapable of analysing the facts on the basis of unbiased sources. This process of doctrinaire conditioning continues throughout their lives. As adults, they are incessantly exposed to this rhetoric disseminated via pro-establishment

mainstream media, including controlled channels of the electronic media, social networks⁹⁶ and all those individuals who openly support the hawkish rhetoric, either cynically liaising with the regime or being genuinely ideologically involved, including some academicians, anchor persons, retired officers, civilian bureaucrats, celebrities, etc. Some of them will one-sidedly perceive India as a treacherous enemy with hostile intentions, responsible for all the problems that plague Pakistan. People are persuaded against opposing this official rhetoric of the establishment—otherwise they might be publicly deemed ‘unpatriotic’, hence pro-Indian, ‘liberal’, which has derogative connotations as it suggests ‘Westernized’ and rejecting traditional values, or—even worse—*kuffar*, i.e. infidels, people who renounce Islam. The anti-Indian stance and confrontational nature of bilateral relations is sturdily upheld by the key decision makers. The regular reports on HR violations perpetrated by Indian armed forces in Kashmir Valley on the one hand strengthen the negative perception of India, and on the other, distract public attention from the abuses committed by Pakistani security apparatus in PaJK and other marginalised regions.

Moulding education into state-controlled strategy, which fosters ideological *coup d'état*, has evolved both in Pakistan, and in India. Majoritarian Hindutva-based nationalism in India nurtures similar patterns based on normalising distorted historical facts and mobilising masses around exclusivist narratives. COHEN (2013: 133) observes: ‘on both sides of the border Indian and Pakistani children are being educated in nationalistic and religiously inspired way which automatically puts them in conflict with each other. Their shared past has been distorted beyond recognition in some of the history textbooks’. The Indian and Pakistani leaders are faced with an immensely challenging task to deradicalise their rhetoric and deideologise the school curricula to provide frameworks for discussing and resolving contentious issues, and bolstering mutually profitable cooperation. It must be accentuated, that radicalisation is not a one-sided process: in both states, the civil society, academia, HR activists, media, artists and other progressive sectors of the society actively confront the officially promoted belligerent policies and repudiate religious extremism. In case of Pakistan, the processes of Islamic radicalisation that lead to religiously motivated violence, pose a deadly threat primarily to its citizens, curtail their basic rights and largely restrict development opportunities. The historically-rooted conflict over different visions of the country’s future (from Shariatisation to secularisation), often portrayed as Pakistan’s persistent being ‘at war with itself’⁹⁷, largely hampers Pakistanis’ enormous political, socio-economic and cultural potential.

Meanwhile, the school curricula, which largely foster radicalisation, remain just one of Pakistan’s education-related problems—the other being a systemic lack of access to any education. An extremely large number of children do not attend schools, particularly girls, rural or impoverished children, and those from less-developed provinces. Despite a slight progress, still, according to UNICEF (2017: 81–82) around 22.6 million children

between the ages of 5 and 16 are out of school in Pakistan (some never attended, some dropped out) at the primary, middle and secondary levels. It accounts for around 44% of the country's children (40% boys versus 49% girls). Lack of education reinforces the vicious cycle of inequity, exclusion and poverty, and disables people from developing skills to defend themselves against radical narratives.

The structural impact of the policy of Islamisation on Pakistani society is overwhelming. The conservative clergy, politically patronised since Zia's regime, and some *madāris*, are used by Islamic parties as a reserve force and a forum for promoting and imposing radicalised attitudes (e.g. denying women's rights and civil liberties). They fostered the cultural and social transformation of Pakistani society in accordance with the Islamisation policy.⁹⁸ Pakistani radical clergy incessantly fuels sectarian tensions, marginalisation and persecution of religious minorities. The hate speech from the mosque loudspeakers or false accusations of insulting Prophet Muhammad, burning the Quran, etc. (which typically reflect local personal rivalries or communal tensions), can turn people into an agitated mob, ready to engage in pogroms, lootings, ransacking and torching houses (for example, Christian Joseph colony in Lahore, attacked in 2013) and killing anyone (Muslims and non-Muslims) falsely accused of blasphemy. These violent acts evoke rage among the majority of Pakistanis who criticise incompetent governments and police for not doing enough to protect the victims. Sometimes mob violence gets an international coverage, for example, when Shama and Shahzad Masih, a Christian couple of bonded kiln labourers, were tortured and burnt alive in Punjab on 4 November 2014 (in 2016, five culprits were sentenced to death) by instigated mob and self-proclaimed defenders of Islam, again, under false blasphemy accusations. Radical mindset is a major threat for freethinking and makes people who question the injustices and want to initiate the debate on how to introduce progressive socio-political changes particularly prone to organised violence and spontaneous brutal attacks. Worryingly, the urge to compromise and introduce self-censorship entered the university campuses. On 13 April 2017, Mashal Khan, a student of Abdul Wali Khan University, was cruelly lynched for the alleged blasphemous content, which he posted online. It later turned out that the (false) accusation was not only used to eliminate Mashal, who was criticising the university mismanagement, but also served as a punishment for a young man who considered himself a knowledge-thirsty, open-minded *Šūfī* and challenged the radical postures of many of his environment.⁹⁹ For many Pakistanis, it was an eye-opener that such brutal attacks are perpetrated not only by radical, uneducated mob, instigated by mullahs, but they may also happen on the premises of the university. The mullah-military nexus and successive civilian governments were equally accountable in this and other such cases for not acting against communalism and sectarianism, or simple, fear-motivated hatred against those who dare to think progressively. Pervez HOODBHOY (2008: 3–4), contended: 'Fearful of taking on powerful

religious forces, every incumbent government has refused to take a position on the curriculum and thus quietly allowed young minds to be moulded by fanatics'. According to a 2013 Pew Research poll, 84% Pakistanis say Sharia should be an official law of the state,¹⁰⁰ 84% claim that religious judges should decide in family and property disputes and 76% say that apostates should be executed. Only 29% of Pakistanis unconditionally accept a democratic government, whereas a 56% majority would prefer a strong leader instead.¹⁰¹

The proponents of radicalisation in Pakistan reduce Islam to violent political campaign which largely questions the country's belonging to a syncretic blend of many cultures and faiths, embracing diverse beliefs and practices, which is a distinctive feature of the Indian subcontinent. Promotion of radicalised mindset is not only restricted to the aggressive strands of radical Deobandī clergy and its military/civilian followers. It has also to a large extent penetrated the so-called *Šūfī* or shrine culture, often projected as open-minded and tolerant symbol of the state. *Šūfī* culture with its devotional rituals is deeply embedded in South Asian tradition and remains one of the sources of collective regional identity, with particular manifestation in Pakistan. *Šūfī* mystics and poets such as Syed Abdullah Shah Qadri, known as Baba Bulleh Shah, Fariduddin Ganjshakar (Baba Farid), or Lal Shahbaz Qalandar,¹⁰² to name just these distinguished ones among others, are cherished along with devotional *qawwali* music, performed also by renowned artists in Pakistan and abroad, which has a strong emotional and spiritual component for many Muslims, Hindus and Christians. People belonging to different creeds or social groups have unique opportunities to intermingle in the shrines: local elites, powerful statesmen, landowners and systemically discriminated groups, like women, transgender, religious minorities, etc.¹⁰³ Rare foreign guests are welcomed with utmost friendliness, as the authors of this book experienced multiple times.

The adherents of *Šūfīsm* are often portraying themselves as more eclectic and spiritual proponents of religious syncretism and highlighting their staunch opposition against militant Islam. They are often young people, such as Mashal Khan. Yet, such one-sided, naïve, mass media-promoted, popular-in-the-West perception of *Šūfīsm*, as only apolitical and pacifistic attitude, ignores the fact that '*Šūfī* culture' has also been challenged by radicalism. *Šūfī* traditions are internally profoundly diverse, rivalry-prone; their politisation and radicalisation date back at least to the pre-partition era.¹⁰⁴ Khadim Hussain Rizvi, posing as an eccentric follower of *Šūfī* masters, proved that *Šūfīsm* may also be entangled into current political process and used for preaching intolerance. Rizvi's organisation, the far-right Lahore-based Islamist Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP, 'I am present Pakistan' movement), was not engaged in terrorist activities, yet it cynically used the positive connotations that *Šūfīsm* evokes among many young people to agitate them and force its own political agenda. Nadeem F. PARACHA (2018) refers to *Šūfīsm* as 'contested space': he contradicts the Taliban extremism as being not intrinsic to Pakistani culture with Barelvi fundamentalism,

prevalent in Pakistani society, represented by Rizvi, who used *Ṣūfīsm* to bolster sentiments sown by Deep-State-promoted supremacist narrative. The TLP organised massive anti-government rallies which led to violent clashes with the police on numerous occasions. For example, they claimed it was against Islam when a Christian woman, Asia Bibi, was acquitted from blasphemy charges after having spent nine years in prison. The TLP tried to influence the verdict by threatening to organise massive sit-ins. In November 2017, Rizvi's supporters paralysed Islamabad and other major cities in a bid to force the Minister for Law and Justice Zahid Hamid to step down over the alleged blasphemy accusations. The army refused to implement the government's order to assist in the dispersal of the religious hardliners, calling them 'their own people'. Instead, the generals chose to act as intermediaries, strengthening the army's positive image among certain pro-military elements of society. The COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa 'advised' the then Premier Shahid Khaqan Abbasi to deal with protesters 'peacefully' and participate in political dialogue. The arrested Islamists were freed and each was supported by the army with 1000 rupees for their journey home. Minister Hamid's forced resignation proved that the hard line religious demands could be easily imposed on civilian politicians. In 2020, during the second wave of COVID-19 pandemic, Rizvi's proponents rallied against what they regarded as anti-Muslim content of a French satirical magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*. Khadim Hussain Rizvi died on 19 November 2020 and his funeral at the Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore, attended by thousands of followers, served as an illustration of how deeply *Barelwī* radicalism disguised in *Ṣūfī* uniform is popular in Pakistan's collective mindset and how effectively it mobilises the masses. His son and successor, Saad Hussain Rizvi, organised disruptive and violent anti-French protests against the presentation of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad (for which the French teacher, Samuel Paty, had been beheaded by an 18-year old Chechen refugee in October 2020, in a suburb of Paris), demanding a boycott of French products and an expulsion of the ambassador. This goal was not achievable (France is a key source of financial assistance to Pakistan¹⁰⁵) but mass agitation, persistent politicising of blasphemy laws and inciting clashes in major cities, illustrated hard-liners' desire to control Pakistan's mainstream policies. Saad Rizvi was arrested in April 2021 (his organisation was also banned) under Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which led to violent protests, proving that the TLP is a force which is likely to be difficult to control in the future.

The reforms that aim to transform Pakistani society into more equality-based, with universal access to education, are slow, *inter alia* because considerable expenditure is allocated on security issues, at the expense of urgent economic and social needs. It is promoted as a form of 'sacrifice' of the entire nation (yet mostly hits the poorest and disenfranchised groups), which is—in accordance with Pakistani ideology—manifested as the 'put the country first' attitude. This evokes the words of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who mobilised nuclear nationalism in Pakistan¹⁰⁶ and endorsed the state's nuclear

programme at any cost. In 1965, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he made his famous declaration: 'If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative'. Today these words sound like a grim prophecy of the nuclearisation of Indo-Pakistani relations (India became officially nuclear in 1974, Pakistan in 1998). Notwithstanding the economic and social challenges Pakistan faces, the significant portion of its society would confirm their pride of being the only Muslim nuclear state, which gives them a sense of 'atomic equilibrium' with India. Nuclear weapons are officially projected as a means to achieve the long-term goal of Pakistani strategic planning: matching India's technological capacity and conventional advantages, and offsetting its regional influence. Nuclear capabilities constitute a core pillar of Pakistan's India-centered security objectives and the incessant, obsessive projection of India as a potential assailant: having the bomb is portrayed as an ultimate guarantor of Pakistan's national survival in case of Indian attack, either nuclear or conventional. Pakistan's nuclear posture is therefore determined by several factors, that include a perceived level of Indian threat and the necessity to maintain minimum deterrent capability, the external pressure deriving from international non-proliferation regime and domestic challenges related to the ability to generate recourses for the nuclear programme.¹⁰⁷

9.6 Mainstream political parties and Kashmir

Major political parties in Pakistan have a fixed political agenda aimed at expressing dedication to the cause of Kashmir, in accordance with Pakistan's ideology and territorial claims, that involve constant reference to the situation of Kashmiri Muslims in IaJK. They highlight the human rights violations there and declare support for the 'aspirations' of Kashmiris, living, according to Pakistan's discourse, in 'illegally occupied' Indian Kashmir. Some parties abstain from bringing up the subject of Kashmir, instead, they refer to commonly used generalities, such as resolving the conflict through dialogue or guaranteeing economic development in PaJK. These narratives illustrate the unprecedented level of multi-layered submissiveness towards the Deep State in Pakistan, where the politicians do not dare to question the establishment's strategy vis-à-vis Kashmir and their parties mainly play the role of 'patronage platforms', without any trace of independent strategy.¹⁰⁸ A brief analysis of political parties' programmes corroborates this sombre assumption.

The resolution of the Kashmir dispute is specified as a core national interest of Imran Khan's party, the presently (2021) ruling PTI. Khan made many populist promises during his election campaign, including improving relations with India. Progressive rapprochement was emphasised as one of the main goals in the long-term foreign policy of Pakistan. While referring to domestic affairs, the party pointed out the necessity for decentralisation, but in its 2013 Manifesto, 'addressing political grievances' was restricted only to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan.¹⁰⁹ In 2018, Imran Khan got his

chance to prove if he is able to deliver *nayā Pākistān*, which he had pledged, gaining popularity among many Pakistanis. The party's manifesto, titled *The Road to Nayā Pākistān*, briefly sketched the external security strategy. The Kashmir resolution 'within the parameters of UNSC resolutions' was enumerated among four core national security interests.¹¹⁰ It signified the relentless political attachment to Pakistan's traditional position on Kashmir, based on the UN resolutions. Consequently, no political shifts were introduced by Khan's administration when it comes to regional strategy. Conversely, the first years of Imran Khan's tenure were marked with escalated tensions with India, especially following the JeM-carried out 14 February 2019 Pulwama attack in IaJK. Following the abrogation of the Article 370 by New Delhi, Khan gave an interview given during the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos on 22 January 2020 to *Foreign Policy*, where he accused India of unilateral annexation of Kashmir by its bifurcation, turning IaJK Kashmir into an 'open prison' and called it a disaster for India. Referring to his own government's two-faced silence on the plight of China's Uighurs, Imran Khan claimed his alleged lack of information on China's brutality: 'One main reason is that the scale of what is going on in China—and frankly, I don't know much about it, I just occasionally read about it—is nothing compared to what is happening in Kashmir'. Apart from the unconvincing argument of the 'scale' of human rights violations, Khan added: 'As far as the Uighurs, look—*China has helped us* (italics—AK). China came to help our government when we were at the rock bottom'.¹¹¹ This statement illustrated Pakistan's generally sycophantic attitude regarding China, upheld by the PTI-led administration, which includes opportunistic negligence of the Uighurs' plight, while raising Kashmiri Muslims' situation on every occasion. Therefore, Pakistan's human rights selective criticism may be assessed rather as part of a two-nation theory-based territorial revisionism with reference to the concept of its ideological and territorial frontiers, embraced by the Pakistani army¹¹² and some compromising politicians, than an actual concern over the violations of Kashmiris' rights and freedoms.

Pakistani civilian leaders seem powerless and repetitive; in their parties' manifestoes, they primarily replicate parallel slogans regarding Kashmir, refer to historically-rooted agenda, without going beyond the military establishment rhetoric. They typically prioritise 'Kashmir conflict resolution' claiming it as high-priority political objective. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which remained in power until 2018, declared that 'special efforts will be made to resolve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN resolutions and the 1999 Lahore Accord and in consonance with the aspirations of the people of the territory for their inherent right of self-determination'.¹¹³ It was not clarified whether the 'territory' includes all pieces of the former PSJ&K, or rather, the Indian-administered part. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which propagated the slogan 'The new hope for a prosperous and progressive Pakistan' on its official website, in its manifesto advocated 'empowerment for all' as its central political commitment. In the 2013 manifesto, it vowed to 'maintain

full solidarity with and continued moral, political and diplomatic support of the Kashmiri people for realizing their legitimate aspirations'.¹¹⁴ Kashmir remained a vital issue in the international political agenda of the PPP. In its 2018 programme, the party pledged to use Pakistan's strategic status to address the political and humanitarian crises in IaJK and Palestine (conveniently omitting the Muslim Uighurs' predicament in China) on the forum of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) to provide 'political and economic support for the self-determination of the Kashmiri people'¹¹⁵

Regarding PaJK, the PPP expressed its 'long commitment to the greater integration of Gilgit-Baltistan into the mainstream, and to the rights and welfare of the people of the region', praised Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's policy vis-à-vis Kashmir (with no precise examples of how it contributed to the economic development of the region) and criticised 'the undemocratic steps taken by the PML-N government' (there was no reference to the Deep State's presence in GB and AJK or to human rights violations). The PPP pledged to facilitate political devolution, to empower Legislative Assembly and to enhance fiscal autonomy by providing the people of GB with 'greater control over revenues generated within the area'.¹¹⁶ The party also declared commitment to the political and economic empowerment of the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and improvement of the governance. It assured 'to increase the development budget' and to put AJK 'on the track of prosperity and development'; the projects included electricity, natural gas, motorways, health, education, water projects, national investment and viable public transport network across the region. AJK's share of net hydel profits was supposed to be evaluated in response to local needs.¹¹⁷

Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), one of Pakistan's mainstream Islamic parties,¹¹⁸ as of 2021 led by Siraj ul-Haq, had its contribution to the Islamisation of Kashmiri movement by supporting Hizb al-Mujāhidīn (Party of Holy Fighters), *jihādīst* group fighting in IaJK. JeI collected funds and recruited militants to fight in Kashmir insurgency after 1989.¹¹⁹ In its 2013 Manifesto the party announced that 'Pakistan is passing through the worse phase of its history' and emphasised the elusiveness of peace ('a fundamental need of the society') in different regions of the country: Karachi, Balochistan, the tribal areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. GB and AJK were not mentioned. It further highlighted the need for a 'sovereign, independent and dignified Pakistan', with a strong reference to IaJK: 'liberation of Kashmir from Indian occupation will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We hold in the highest esteem the seven-decade-long freedom movement in Kashmir. [...] We believe that the only solution to the Kashmir dispute lies in holding plebiscite in the light of the UN resolutions. To achieve this goal, we consider it our foremost duty to extend full cooperation political, moral and diplomatic to the oppressed Muslims of Kashmir'.¹²⁰

PaJK was not mentioned in the political agenda of the Awami National Party (ANP, secular, Pashtun nationalist party), which adhered to the slogan of 'peace, democracy and development'. According to its programme, the

party draws its motivations from the teachings of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. With reference to Indo-Pakistani relations and the Kashmir issue, the document only vaguely declared that ‘the establishment of peaceful, cooperative good neighbourly relations with India will be given high priority. All issues including J&K and other outstanding issues would be solved through peaceful negotiations and open dialogue shall become the hallmark of bilateral relations’,¹²¹

Political declarations of major Pakistani parties are constructed with great circumspection as far as the choice of words is concerned. This applies particularly to the issues projected as ‘fragile’, including the Kashmir conflict, reconciliation with India, or the situation in PaJK. Not much space is devoted to the resolution of conflict with India recognised as key precognition to regional development, no potentially workable solutions are proposed; the problems of the inhabitants of AJK or GB are often non-existent in the parties’ officially published agendas. At the same time, Pakistan’s international strategy and security concerns are incessantly portrayed as overwhelmingly India-centric and their core component is based on a deeply rooted revisionist agenda with reference to IaJK, which is particularly noticeable in the JeI programme. Religious parties, militant groups and the radical section of the establishment reinforce each other in mobilising people around Islamic conservatism in order to bolster their role in shaping a more fundamentalist sociopolitical system in the country.¹²² The India-centric rhetoric, that goes hand in hand in with the strategy aimed at providing support to the Muslims in Indian Kashmir, has always been a beneficial tool for Pakistani policymakers, not only when military regimes directly ruled the country. The projection of Kashmiri Muslims as marginalised, traumatised and multi-dimensionally exploited by the Indian policymakers and ferocious armed forces, easily mobilises public support for the anti-Indian policies and at the same time arouses nationalist sentiments. It also partially enables to divert public opinion from a plethora of internal problems encumbering Pakistan and enhances support for revisionist and jingoistic foreign policies. The unresolved conflict for which the arch enemy is held responsible, and the quest for ‘obtaining justice for Kashmiri Muslims’ have thus remained crucial elements of Pakistani ideologically motivated official narratives and its security policy,¹²³ as shown in the key parties’ programmes referred to above.

The army’s role in perpetrating a soft *coup d’état* with the government that follows the military’s ultimate influence on crucial objectives of Pakistan’s security policy¹²⁴, including the strategy towards India, Afghanistan, relations with China and the United States, was upheld in the aftermath of the 2018 elections. It can be reasonably assessed that without such prevalent Deep State’s political leverage, the genuinely popular civilian authorities, acting in accordance with core principles of democracy (i.e. guaranteeing popular control over decision-making process), backed by an electoral mandate and willing to alter the country’s policies versus India, would redefine and reorient these objectives. Meanwhile, Imran Khan’s administration seems to confirm the assumption that he will not have a decisive

role in handling the Kashmir issue and relations with India. The anti-India speeches of Pakistani top policymakers, reprimanding New Delhi for its policies in Kashmir, resonated mostly in Pakistan and were augmented by a presentation of a ‘new’ map of Pakistan, depicting IaJK (without Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin) as illegally occupied (this cartographic rivalry is not a new phenomenon, though; India also presents its own versions of Kashmir map¹²⁵). Under Imran Khan’s government, the military establishment, having comfortably no desire for direct military rule, which would include accountability for managing the economic crisis, has substantially buttressed its self-serving strategy. With a compliant proxy (Khan) within Pakistani territory, the security establishment seeks what may be termed as ‘internal strategic depth’ in order to uphold its milbus-related privileges and pursue a strategy of regional revisionism while remaining a guardian of the Islamic ideology projected as a crucial element of Pakistan’s *raison d’être*. The intensified Hindu majoritarianism in India, the annulment of the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the institutionalised disenfranchisement of India’s Muslims, including those in Kashmir, exacerbated by the ruling Indian People’s Party (BJP)-led coalition with support of the far-right RSS, enabled Pakistani leadership to bolster the accusatory, Kashmir-centred narrative and provoke domestic ‘patriotic fervour’ among the critics of India’s policies, yet without meaningful international success.

9.7 Selective approach to human rights

Exhortations to respect human rights (HR) are moulded into political slogans in mutual contacts between Indian and Pakistani representatives whenever their respective leaders have the occasion to condemn their opponents. This persistent juggling with HR and treating them instrumentally as political tool in the war of words is perfected by the geostrategic hawks on both sides. Needless to say, it does not improve the situation of the indigenous people in either side of Kashmir, who are marginalised and, to a large extent, voiceless in this mutual Indo-Pakistani tussle. Asma Jahangir, the renowned Pakistani lawyer and HR defender (passed away in February 2018),¹²⁶ argued that state-authorised projection of the neighbours’ negative image, which exacerbates the already existing trust deficit, is strongly embedded in the political agenda on both countries.¹²⁷ Accentuating how parallel the Kashmir policies of both rivals are, in October 2016, Jahangir tweeted: ‘Liberate Srinagar’s Kashmiris from brutality of Indian army and Pakistani Kashmiri leaders in Islamabad from the fear of Pakistani generals’.¹²⁸ She relentlessly contended that Kashmiris are systemically and systematically deprived of their political rights on both sides of the border, not only in India, thus earning the allegations against her, produced and disseminated by Pakistani Deep State of being a ‘darling of India’, ‘Indian agent’, and a ‘RAW spy’.

In Pakistan, HR are instrumentally and selectively used as key slogan in the rallies supporting the Muslim Kashmiris in IaJK (and sometimes

Rohingyas in Burma or Palestinians). Manifesting Pakistan's commitment to human rights protection by organising protests against the violations of Kashmiris' human rights in IaJK has been an inalienable part of Pakistan's strategy, illustrated also by staunch reactions whenever any violent news from Indian part of Kashmir reaches the world. The intentions of such policies are as follows: mainstreaming a catchphrase of suffering Kashmiris to materialise revisionist agenda vis-à-vis IaJK, diverting attention towards India's misconduct and overlooking its own wrongdoings in PaJK, buttressing the 'freedom struggle' of Kashmiri militants in Kashmir Valley and projecting Pakistan's international image as a human rights defender (versus India as HR violator). Rebuking India's abuses serves, therefore, primarily as a convenient domestic and international policy tool. Pakistani civilian and military leaders deliver catchy speeches at international fora and use the lofty slogan of self-determination for the Kashmiris whilst knowing well that this goal is unattainable also due to their own resistance to acknowledge that self-determination right should involve the inhabitants of PaJK. The emphasis on abuses is restricted to the rights of the people living on the Indian side alone. Every instance of HR violations committed by the Indian security apparatus is internationally vociferously criticised by Pakistani policymakers, with a complete silence concerning HR situation in PaJK.

Pakistani reaction to India's bifurcation of IaJK in 2019, may serve as an illustrious example of such selected approach. Imran Khan called and presided over the National Security Council, a controversial federal consultative body, created and supported by the military leaders (for the first time by president-general Yahya Khan in 1969, and later reintroduced by General Pervez Musharraf). The NSC, which includes *inter alia* the Director General ISI and the COAS, and ensures additional platform for the military establishment to directly influence Pakistan's foreign and security policy, sharply rebuked India's policy. Islamabad downgraded relations with New Delhi, suspended trade, pledged to discuss the issue at the UN forum and declared 14 August (Pakistan's independence day) as solidarity day with Kashmiris residing on Indian side of the LoC and 15 August (India's independence day) as a 'black day'. Pakistan turned down India's request to open airspace¹²⁹ to Narendra Modi for his flights to the United States (to attend the UN General Assembly meeting) and Saudi Arabia, referring to HR violations in IaJK. Notably, Imran Khan also warned hundreds AJK pro-independence activists (who do not recognise the LoC) against expressing solidarity with IaJK's Kashmiris who wanted to march towards Srinagar after India revoked Article 370. Cooperation initiatives between divided Kashmiris, which would oppose the official state-authorised narratives, are regarded with apprehension both by Pakistani and Indian leadership.

Human rights and freedoms that in democratic states are anchored in principles endorsed by the domestic and international law, in Pakistan are often selectively interpreted and those who question the state-imposed rhetoric are systematically excluded from protection. It is exceptionally dicey

to take up the problems connected with broadly understood civil liberties, fundamental constitutional freedoms and other issues considered fragile by the leadership (they include *inter alia* independent debates on Kashmir and on Balochi or Pashtun nationalisms). If such debates are held, it is under the strict control of the security establishment and the participants are aware of the necessity of self-censorship, otherwise they might risk persecution, and in some cases, even life. Local activists or progressive thinkers risk torture, illegal arrests, basic rights deprivation and physical elimination. The federal authorities have compromised the freedom of expression with the establishment; they do not encourage civil society initiatives and any meaningful debate on sensitive issues is heavily restricted, banned or rigidly state-controlled by the civil-military bureaucracy. Activists, bloggers, human rights defenders, NGO's, local nationalist leaders and all those who think independently, encourage to discuss or reject mainstream rhetoric, are exposed to threats, enforced disappearances and torture, or simply assassinated. Among others, so was the case of a distinguished HR activist Sabeen Mahmud, shot dead in April 2015 in Karachi after she had organised a discussion *Unsilencing Balochistan* in the community space called The Second Floor or T2F. The T2F is much more than a coffee shop; it was meant to be a platform for an open discussion, intellectual gatherings, workshops, seminars, cultural activity and propagating progressive ideas, founded by Sabeen as a project of a non-profit NGO, Peace Niche.¹³⁰ Her killing was meant to warn the activists in Karachi and elsewhere.

In January 2017, the Rawalpindi-based NGO expressed its concern about the enforced disappearances of at least four independent activists who were 'active on social media groups promoting secular views and criticized military or conservative state'. Waqas Goraya and Asim Saeed disappeared on 4 January, Salman Haider went missing on 6 January and Ahmad Raza Naseer vanished the following day. They were labelled by the state as infidels and traitors, serving the interests of the West. 'It clearly shows [the] zero tolerance policy of the government of Pakistan for human rights activists, journalists and any other outspoken professionals. (...)None of the government official took a single step in direction to resolve the grave issue of enforced disappearance that clearly shows that government is not interested to end this cruel practice, compensating the aggrieved family members or ratifying the international conventions against enforced disappearance'.¹³¹ Upon their release, a few weeks later, they immediately left Pakistan to seek safety. In March 2017, Ahmad Waqas Goraya admitted that he had been tortured by a 'government institution', which had links to the military/ISI. He was unlawfully detained because he had a satirical Facebook page, which criticised the army's political influence in Pakistan, including the military strategy in the restive area of Balochistan.¹³² It was easy to accuse him publicly of 'infidelity', undermine his patriotism and loyalty to 'Pakistanihood' as he is a liberal activist. The harassment and intimidation of the activists who are regarded as enemies of state, reaches far beyond Pakistan. Goraya,

who lives in exile in Rotterdam, was attacked and threatened to be killed on 2 February 2020 in front of his home reportedly by some Urdu speakers. Reporters without Borders immediately called on the Dutch authorities to protect him.¹³³ The UK-based Pakistani researchers, authors and activists who criticise the army, also receive threats: for example a renowned political scientist Ayesha Siddiqā or columnist Gul Bukhari. In April 2020, another dissident, Sajid Hussain Baloch, a missing journalist, who reported HR violations in Balochistan, was found dead close to Uppsala. In December 2020, Karima Baloch, a young dissident, who campaigned for independence of Balochistan, and exposed HR violations there, was found dead in Toronto (she had been granted asylum on Canada in 2016 and enumerated on the BBC's list of 100 inspirational and influential women that year). As both were at loggerheads with Pakistani military establishment, it raised suspicions that they had been kidnapped and assassinated to show that exile does not provide safety if dissidents continue to criticise the Deep State and Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies.

It is important to highlight here that Pakistan is among the countries that have neither signed¹³⁴ nor ratified the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted by the UNGA on 6 February 2007, entered into force on 23 December 2010), despite its commitments to do so since 2008. Consequently, Islamabad does not recognise the competence of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances to consider individual and interstate complaints, pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention. The UN Human Rights Commission Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances visited the country between 10 and 20 September 2012. According to its report, the perpetrators of enforced disappearances act with impunity and the Group was not provided with information about any conviction of State agents in relation to such acts, UNHRC (2013). Another report, published in 2016 following the visit of The Working Group to Pakistan, expressed concern about lack of progress in enhancing the citizens' rights and freedoms. The military courts, which were established after 2014 Peshawar terrorist attack as part of the National Action Plan to prevent terrorism, tried civilians suspected of involvement in terrorism-related offences. It expanded the power of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and was not in conformity with internationally recognised HR standards, according to the UNHRC (2016: 35–41). The 2019 UNHRC (2019a: 19, 27, 42) report highlighted 'a very high number of allegations both under the urgent action and the standard procedures in relation to cases of enforced disappearances' and pointed out the intimidation practices perpetrated by the authorities according to the received testimonies, which indicated the 'pressure on relatives of victims of enforced disappearances to persuade them not to pursue their cases before the Working Group'. There were 1144 cases of disappearances in Pakistan reported by the Working Group between 1980 and May 2019, with the number skyrocketing during the military campaign in the tribal areas in

2015 and 2016 (284 and 300 cases, respectively). The victims were abducted mostly in Sindh (Karachi), Balochistan and KPK (UNHRC 2019b: 15–17). There is not information regarding the abductions in PaJK, which should not be interpreted as proof that there are no enforced disappearances there, rather the access to impartial, credible information is curtailed.

It is worth to look briefly at the Pashtun Protection Movement's (PTM) history as it illustrates systemic inequalities fostered by the Pakistani decision makers and their approach vis-à-vis peaceful political activism in marginalised areas. The PTM was set up (under the name of Mehsud Tahafuz Movement, later renamed PTM) in the aftermath of the 2014 military campaign in the tribal areas and became more active in 2018 when a young Pashtun, Naqeebullah Mehsud (Waziristan-native shop-keeper and popular, aspiring model), was abducted, tortured and then extrajudicially killed in Karachi in a fake encounter staged by the then powerful and known for his brutal methods superintendent of police, Rao Anwar (he was suspended after Mehsud's death). Mehsud was cleared of terrorism charges in January 2019; his case sparked national outrage and reactivated Pashtun civil rights movement. Pakistani artist, Adeela Suleman, shot a documentary titled *The Killing Fields of Karachi*, presenting his story with participation of the father of Mehsud,¹³⁵ and organised art exhibit during Karachi Biennale in October 2019. It consisted of 444 tombstones—each being a symbol of Rao Anwar's victims; the installation was subsequently closed by the intelligence establishment, which was accused of curbing free speech by HR activists. In December 2019, Rao was blacklisted by the United States for HR violations, including fake encounters and Naqeebullah's killing.

The PTM is led by a young, popular leader, Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen, who represents the voices of many Pashtun people, claiming the army's accountability for kidnappings and killings. He also demands clearing of land mines and releasing detained people, who are considered 'missing'. It is a unique sociopolitical movement on the political scene of Pakistan. Pashteen openly criticised the military establishment and accused it of sponsoring terrorist groups, HR violations (extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 'strongly urged the government to refrain from interfering in people's right to peaceful assembly',¹³⁶ but the repressions intensified (with tacit consent of the Imran Khan's government) when the PTM planned to hold public rallies, which usually attract thousands of supporters. Its activists were subjected to a vilification campaign (PTM was accused of receiving funding from India and Afghanistan), labelled as enemies of state, traitors and repeatedly harassed, abducted or arrested. On 27 January 2020, Manzoor Pashteen was detained without due process ahead the planned rally and accused of 'disturbing public order'¹³⁷; same happened to some other leaders of the PTM. His arrests and intimidation continued in 2021. Markedly, the colonial era offence of 'sedition' (section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, PPC) is widely used to

eliminate dissent by charging anyone who ‘excites disaffection towards the Federal or Provincial Government’ or spreads ‘feelings of disloyalty’.

Pakistani establishment exerts control over domestic discourses and practices by designating the issues which have to be regarded as ‘fragile’, and thus, exempted from an independent debate. At the same time, the state endorses victimhood narrative and conspiracy theories, the involvement of a ‘hidden hand’ of ‘enemies’ in escalating Pakistan’s problems and tarnishing its international image. Husain HAQQANI (2018b: 5–6) mentions the ‘if only’ discourse, which occasionally serves as explanative tool to justify Pakistan’s crisis by referring to historical dynamics: ‘If only Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had not died within a year of its creation’ is one of the most popular of such ‘if only’ contentions. Others include ‘If only Pakistan had not become embroiled in the Cold War as America’s partner since the 1950s’; ‘if only Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populist politics had not unsettled the established post-colonial order in the 1970s’ and ‘if only General Zia-ul-Haq had not adopted Islamisation as the justification for his dictatorship during the 1980s’. This wishful thinking does not provide solutions to Pakistan’s problems but rather halts complex, genuine assessment of the interconnections between its persistent dysfunction and the role Islamic nationalism and Kashmir-oriented revisionism have played in its nation-building process and persistently upheld ideological *raison d’être*.

Notes

1. Established in 1906 with the initial aim to promote and protect Muslims’ interests in British India.
2. Urdu was spoken fluently by approximately 7% of the then Pakistani society. The language played an important nation-building role for the ruling establishment of Pakistan, but its imposition was considered a state-led oppression by marginalised provinces, particularly East Bengal. TALBOT (2015: 474–476), NAWAZ (2008: 172–173).
3. On 15 April 1947, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, Indian independence activist, the INC leader, and later, the first Indian Minister of Education, issued a statement: ‘the very term of Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests that some portions of it are pure and others are impure’. He called such divisions un-Islamic. KUMAR (1991: 132).
4. JAFFRELOT (2015: 81–82), CHAPMAN (2003: 141–165). The name was presented in 1933 by Choudhary Rehmat Ali, the University of Cambridge student, in his pamphlet titled *Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever?* He rejected the idea of ‘Muslims being duped into a Hindu-dominated Federation’.
5. Islamic title for a distinguished scholar, an erudite.
6. WOLPERT (1984: 123).
7. Markedly, in his 1930 speech Iqbal supported the creation of a ‘Muslim India within India’, an amalgamation of Muslim-majority provinces into a ‘North-West Indian Muslim State’.
8. AHMED (2020: 47).
9. *Qā'id-e-Ā'zam*.
10. DFP (1983: 5–23).
11. HAQQANI (2003: 34).

12. JALAL (2014: 10–11).
13. KEAY (2014: 106), SHAIKH (2009: 5).
14. Muhammad Iqbal, *Mazhab*, cited in LIEVEN (2011: 124).
15. Ruttie died in 1929. Their only daughter, Dina, married a Parsi-born man, who had converted to Christianity; it severely strained her relations with father, who hypocritically disapproved of a marriage to a non-Muslim. Dina died in 2017, at the age of 98. After M.A. Jinnah's death in 1948, she visited Pakistan only once more, in 2004, for India-Pakistan 'cricket diplomacy' match.
16. In May 1947, while negotiating with the Sikh community to revoke their opposition to Pakistan in Punjab, he reportedly narcissistically argued: 'My word in Pakistan will be like a word of God. No one will go back on it'. More on Jinnah-Sikhs interactions and Punjab partition: AHMED (2014). To appease the Sikhs' apprehensions following the Lahore Resolution, 1940, Jinnah promised them an 'effective and influential role in Punjab', which he saw as autonomous and sovereign unit. SHAHID (1976: 20–21).
17. JALAL (1990: 16).
18. Interview given by Jinnah to W. Muller of the BBC, NAP (2006: 737).
19. FAIR (2014: 44).
20. KHAN (2005: 69).
21. Cited in SHERWANI (1986: 15).
22. TALBOT (2015: 475).
23. PIRBHAI (2017: 234).
24. Jamīyat Ulemā-e-Himḍ.
25. CHAWLA (2011: 36).
26. *Kāfir-e-Ā'zam*.
27. JALAL (2014: 33–34).
28. ULLAH (2014: 77).
29. A learned Islamic scholar's title, used in the Indian subcontinent.
30. DHULIPALA (2015: 283–290).
31. *Khudāi Khidmatgār*.
32. JAFFRELOT (2015: 152–153).
33. As a result, the NFWP was merged with Pakistan with only 51% turnout in the referendum of the 573,000 registered voters. JAFFRELOT (2015: 153).
34. KHAN (2010: 41).
35. PURI (2012: 24–25).
36. QAIYUM (1945: 38, 43–44).
37. About his role in 1947–1948 *jihād* in Kashmir, see: HASSAN (2015: 1–2).
38. BRESEEG (2004: 233).
39. ALI-REHMAN (2001: 62), AXMANN (2009: 230).
40. ZIAULLAH-BAID (1985: 76–77).
41. JAFFRELOT (2015: 13).
42. See more: JAFFRELOT (2002: 7–50).
43. LA PORTE (1999: 45).
44. WILLMER (1996: 574).
45. He became the 5th Pakistani Prime Minister for a short time in 1956–1957.
46. JINNAH (2000: 92).
47. As quoted in TALBOT (1998: 1), PAUL (2014: 127). A.R. SIDDIQI (2008: xviii) gives a similar statement of the Pashtun leader, but declared much earlier, 27 years after the establishment of Pakistan.
48. SHAIKH-ISLAM-JATOI-KHAN (2018: 133).
49. More on army's position: FAIR (2014), HAQQANI (2016, 2018b), CLOUGHLEY (2014), COHEN (1985), KUSZEWSKA (2017).

50. GFP (2021). In comparison, India, inhabited by more than 1.3 billion people, has military strength ranked 4th by the GFP. The forces include: over 1.4 million active personnel (second in the world, after China), 1.1 million reserve personnel, and 2.5 million paramilitary forces.
51. See also: CONSTABLE (2011).
52. In 2013 elections, the PTI was the third largest party in the National Assembly and managed to take power in KPK province.
53. The radical transformation from ‘playboy to prayboy’, from a London night-clubs party-man to newfound piety, was ridiculed by his opponents as hypocritical and politically motivated.
54. DI (2020).
55. BALCEROWICZ–KUSZEWSKA (2022a, Epilogue).
56. BALCEROWICZ–KUSZEWSKA (2022a, §9).
57. RACINE (2002: 120), FAROOQ (2016: 106).
58. ‘Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer’ (‘If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him’), see DOMENECH (1989: 128). Jawaharlal NEHRU (1985: 513) quotes these words in his book.
59. BAHADUR (1998: 263).
60. FAIR (2018b: 42).
61. HOODBHOY (2013: 117).
62. Similar slogans, showing the alleged links of Kashmiri Muslims with Pakistan, are sometimes chanted during protests against the Indian administration in the Kashmir Valley: *Pākistān se rishta kyā? Llā ’ilāhā ’illā llāh* (What is our bond with Pakistan? There is no God but God (Allah); *āzādī ka matlab kyā?–lā ’ilāhā ’illā llāh* What does freedom mean? There is no God but God (Allah). ROY (2011: 65–66).
63. FAIR (2014: 273). Referring to ‘what Kashmiri people want’ has become a permanent component of the tug of war between India and Pakistan, with the establishments on both sides usurping the right to speak on behalf of the Kashmiris, but in fact, often projecting their respective states’ official objectives without providing a reliable source. Verghese KOITHARA (a retired Indian vice-admiral) (2004: 84) cites the surveys carried out in 2002 (he does not give the source of this information), showing that only 1–6% of Kashmiris prefer Pakistan and most want to stay with India, but with a reduction of security forces and greater control over local affairs.
64. FAIR (2014: 265).
65. AHMED (2010: 6–8), KUSZEWSKA (2017: 48–55).
66. COHEN (2004: 61).
67. HASSAN (2014: 42).
68. HAQQANI (2016: 137).
69. ZIRING (2003: 150).
70. JeI was founded in 1941, and its leader was against the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 as according to him it did not promise to establish an Islamic state. Later, as he asserted his position in Pakistan’s politics, Maududi’s approach changed.
71. KUSZEWSKA (2015b: 124).
72. AHMAR (2014: xix).
73. AZIZ (2015: 84).
74. GUALTIERI (2004: 135).
75. KUSZEWSKA (2015b: 121–127).
76. JAN (2019: 17).
77. AZIZ (2009: 57).
78. HUSSAIN (2007: 19).
79. RIZVI (2000: 208–10).

80. The initial purpose was to disempower Shī'a landlords in South Punjab. The organisation was banned by Pervez Musharraf in 2002 but thereafter reemerged. The SSP was accused of supporting *jihādists* from Jaish-e-Mohammad active in J&K and creating its own branch, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a violently anti-Shī'a terrorist group.
81. The data differs: some claim there were 137–147 *madāris*, others mention 245. ESPOSITO (2002: 23), RAHMAN (2016).
82. COHEN (2004: 181).
83. IQBAL–SIDDIQUI (2008: 23).
84. AYAZ (2013: 179).
85. ALI (2009: 3).
86. *Dawn* (2018-02-26).
87. BURGESS (2009: 53).
88. LIEVEN (2011: 69).
89. Killed by the CIA drone strike in 2009. The next TTP's emir, Hakimullah Mehsud, was also killed, in 2013. This fate was shared in 2018 by Fazal Hayat (known as Maulana Fazlullah), a militant formerly active in imposing strict sharia law in Swat Valley in 2007, later engaged in TTP-conducted tragic massacre in the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014, with 156 killed, mostly children. As of 2021, Noor Wali Mehsud (designated in 2019 as global terrorist by the United States) leads the TTP, which managed to reorganise itself and overcome internal rivalries.
90. The appalling process of radicalisation unstopped by the siege on Red Mosque and the heart-wrenching helplessness of progressive forces in Pakistan is portrayed in the documentary *Among the Believers*, directed by Hemal TRIVEDI and Mohammed Ali NAQUI (2015). The seemingly unsolvable crisis with Aziz continued in 2020, when he gathered and incited hundreds of people at the Red Mosque, disobeying a ban imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.
91. Its leadership was designated as terrorist by the US Department of the Treasury and State Department in April 2018. US Department of the Treasury (2018).
92. NA 120.
93. Quotations taken from the textbook by ZAIDI (2013: 43).
94. HORSBURGH (2012: 27–28, 85, 87). More on Pakistani textbooks: BALCEROWICZ–KUSZEWSKA (2022b).
95. CHOUDHARY–AZAM (2017: 4,9,114).
96. Social media serve also as a connectivity platform. In a bit to transgress politically imposed borders and prejudices, the India Pakistan Heritage Club Facebook group engages people from both countries: they can discuss the history in an unbiased way or share photos to enable people across the border to see their ancestral towns, houses, etc., which they left during partition.
97. CONSTABLE (2011).
98. QADEER (2011: 214).
99. A conversation with students in Peshawar, December 2018.
100. Due to potential unwillingness to openly share thoughts with strangers, who conduct a public opinion poll, it may be assumed that some surveyed Pakistanis, who experience the dreadful results of radicalisation, answered what they thought they should reply, not what they really thought. The actual support for strict sharia law in Pakistan may, therefore, be lower.
101. PEW (2013: 42–59).
102. Sayyid 'Abdallāh Shāh Qādrī, Bābā Bulle Shāh, Farīduddin Ganjshakar (Bābā Farīd), Lāl Shāhbāz Qalandar.
103. BOIVIN (2015: 5).

104. Hussain Ahmad KHAN (2014: 34–35) discusses the phenomenon of neo-Şūfīsm by referring to violent inclinations among the 19th-century Şūfīs in Punjab, who considered themselves torchbearers of religious purification and morality, and contributed to shape Indian Muslims' separatist identity against the non-Muslims.
105. In 2019, the French Ambassador declared to increase annual development assistance from €150 to €500 million per year.
106. HILALI (2011: 200).
107. CHAKMA (2006: 121–127).
108. SIDDIQA (2020) appositely argued, 'From minor to major, all political parties in Pakistan were either created with the military's help or are infested with their moles. Those with no links to the Pakistani military cannot grow beyond a point'.
109. PTI MANIFESTO (2013: 7–9).
110. PTI MANIFESTO (2018: 54–55).
111. TEPPERMAN (2020).
112. FAIR (2014: 72–86).
113. PML-N (2013: 82), CIP (2020) as of mid-2020, the official PML-N website (www.pmln.org) was not available.
114. PPPM (2013: 74).
115. PPPM (2018: 58).
116. PPPM (2018: 43).
117. PPPM (2018: 43).
118. The other being Jamīyat Ulemā-e-Islām (JUI).
119. BEHERA (2006: 154).
120. JEI-P (2013: 11).
121. ANP (2018).
122. SIDDIQA (2017: 293).
123. COHEN (2004: 6).
124. HAQQANI (2018a).
125. Unfortunately, some South Asia experts from the West regularly fall prey to this rivalry and in their presentations, which are supposed to be neutral and academic, they present maps with either side of Kashmir depicted as 'occupied' not 'administered' or 'held', without providing clear information that they show India's or Pakistan's narrative.
126. The 29th edition of the HRCP's report, assessing Pakistan's major human rights problems in 2017, was dedicated to the memory of Asma Jahangir, the distinguished lawyer and human rights activist who was the moving spirit behind the formation of the HRCP in 1986. HRCP (2018: 4).
127. The interview with Asma Jahangir, awarded with the Pro Dignitate Humana Award by the Polish Foreign Ministry, Warsaw, 29 January 2014.
128. JAHANGIR (2016).
129. Closed after February 2019 Pulwama attack in IaJK.
130. In a well-researched piece of investigative journalism, published in *Herald*, Pakistan's prominent monthly magazine, the authors convincingly argue that the military establishment stood behind the murder. ALI-ZAMAN (2015). The Karachi-based *Herald*, which once angered Zia ul-Haq, who did not tolerate in-depth, courageous reporting, sadly stopped its publication in 2019, largely due to growing state-imposed censorship.
131. AFAD (2017).
132. More on conflict in Balochistan: SIDDIQI (2015: 64–71).
133. RSF (2020-02-06).
134. India signed the convention but did not ratify it.
135. SULEMAN (2019).
136. HRCP (2018, 2019: 331).
137. CARTER (2020).