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THE LEGACY OF EARLY FRANCISCAN THOUGHT

Edited by Lydia Schumacher

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The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought

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Lydia Schumacher and Simon Maria Kopf
A Guide to Citing the *Summa Halensis*

When citing the Quaracchi edition of the Franciscan Fathers, we suggest and use in this volume the following form as a standardized way of citing the *Summa Halensis*:

Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

The relevant text divisions of the Quaracchi edition include, in the following order:

Vol	Volume (<i>tomus</i>)
P	Part (<i>pars</i>)
In	Inquiry (<i>inquisitio</i>)
Tr	Tract (<i>tractatus</i>)
S	Section (<i>sectio</i>)
Q	Question (<i>quaestio</i>)
Ti	Title (<i>titulus</i>)
D	Distinction (<i>distinctio</i>)
M	Member (<i>membrum</i>)
C	Chapter (<i>caput</i>)
Ar	Article (<i>articulus</i>)
Pr	Problem (<i>problema</i>)
Pa	Particle (<i>particula</i>)
(n[n].)	Paragraph number[s]

A further specification of the thus determined entity (to be cited as given in the edition) might, at this point, include:

[arg.]	Objections
Respondeo/Solutio	Answer
(Sed) Contra	On the Contrary
Ad obiecta	Answers to Objections
p[p].	page number[s].

The second instance of citation should read as follows (including all relevant text divisions):

SH III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

Note that according to our proposal the number after *SH* indicates the volume number (*tomus*) of the Quaracchi edition – and not the book (*liber*) of the *Summa Halensis*. Hence *SH* I refers to Book 1, *SH* II to Book 2.1, *SH* III to Book 2.2, and *SH* IV to

Book 3, respectively. The unedited Book 4, which is not part of the Quaracchi edition, will be cited, with reference to the respective edition, as *SH* Bk IV.

Where it would not lead to confusion, a shorthand could be used for further citations:

SH III (n. 162), p. 179.

Please note that all translations of the *Summa Halensis* and other texts belong to the author, unless otherwise noted.

Abbreviations

AF	<i>Analecta Franciscana</i>
Ar/ar.	article (<i>articulus</i>)
BFr	Bullarium Franciscanum
Bk./bk.	book (<i>liber</i>)
C/c./ch.	chapter (<i>caput</i>)
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (1953–)
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (1866–)
D/d.	distinction (<i>distinctio</i>)
<i>De cons. phil.</i>	Boethius, <i>De consolatione philosophiae</i>
<i>De corrept. et grat.</i>	Augustine, <i>De correptione et gratia</i>
<i>De fid. orth.</i>	John of Damascus, <i>De fide orthodoxa</i>
<i>De grat. et lib. arbit.</i>	Bernard of Clairvaux, <i>De gratia et libero arbitrio</i>
<i>disp.</i>	disputation
DN	<i>De Divinis Nominibus</i> of Pseudo-Dionysius
Glossa	Alexander of Hales, <i>Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi</i>
In/in.	inquiry (<i>inquisitio</i>)
<i>In Sent.</i>	<i>Sentences</i> commentary (Aquinas, Bonaventure, etc.)
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
M/m.	member (<i>membrum</i>)
n[n].	paragraph number[s]
P/pt.	part (<i>pars</i>)
Pa/pa.	particular (<i>particula</i>)
PL	Patrologia Latina
Pr/pr.	problem (<i>problema</i>)
Q/q.	question (<i>quaestio</i>)
QD	Alexander of Hales, <i>Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’</i>
S/s.	section (<i>sectio</i>)
SC	<i>Sources Chrétiennes</i>
<i>Sent.</i>	<i>Sentences</i> of Peter Lombard
SH	<i>Summa Halensis</i>
<i>Soph. Elen.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De Sophisticis Elenchis (On Sophistical Refutations)</i>
ST	<i>Summa Theologiae</i> of Thomas Aquinas
STh	Albert the Great, <i>Summa Theologica</i>
Ti/ti.	title (<i>titulus</i>)
Tr/tr.	tract (<i>tractatus</i>)
trans.	translation
Vol.	volume (<i>tomus</i>)

Lydia Schumacher

Introduction

For those schooled in the historiography of the Franciscan intellectual tradition, a volume on the legacy of early Franciscan thought, that is, the work of the scholars who founded this tradition in the decades between around 1220–50, may seem unusual in its focus. Certainly, the later Franciscan tradition, from John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) onwards, enjoys a significant legacy, which is celebrated by some and loathed by others. On some views, this legacy stretched not only through the later Middle Ages but even into modernity.¹ In laying the foundations for future developments in intellectual history, however, later Franciscans are widely supposed to have broken with their Franciscan predecessors, most famously Bonaventure (1221–74), who codified the findings of his teachers, including Alexander of Hales (c.1185–1245) and John of La Rochelle (1200–45).

Such early 13th-century Franciscans were supposedly preoccupied with preserving the longstanding intellectual tradition of Augustine in the face of the rising popularity of Aristotle's recently-recovered major works.² Despite their best attempts, their formulations eventually proved outdated and even Franciscans, not just Aquinas, turned in a more Aristotelian direction, albeit in their own way which was often at odds with that of Aquinas (1225–74).

In recent years, this narrative has been called into question through research efforts that highlight key continuities between early and later Franciscan thinkers, which transcend their allegiances to sometimes differing authorities. Some of these efforts have turned on illustrating that there is more than meets the eye to

1 Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge: MIT, 1985); Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: Essays in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, repr. 2012); Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).

2 Franz Ehrle, *Grundsätzliches zur Charakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1918) was among the first to label early Franciscans 'neo-Augustinians'. Etienne Gilson followed suit in his voluminous works, including his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), as did other leading medievalists like Bernard Vogt, in 'Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Franziskanerschule,' *Franziskanische Studien* 9 (1922). See also Ignatius Brady, 'The *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (1924–1948),' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977), pp. 437–47; Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II *Summa Fratris Alexandri, Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica* (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1948), p. 88: 'Sed momentum, ni fallimur, Summae Halensianae in hoc consistit, quod omnia elementa, theologica scilicet et philosophica, huius traditionis augustinianae in ea colliguntur, ordinantur atque defenduntur Aristotele licet iam invadente. Quare et merito fundamentum Scholae augustino-franciscanae saec. XIII communiter salutatur.' Idem, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa*,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), pp. 26–41, 274–312.

early not to mention later Franciscan appeals to authorities such as Augustine. In a previous volume for this same series with De Gruyter, *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*,³ numerous specialists in the medieval and Franciscan tradition joined forces to nuance scholarly understanding of how the early Franciscan tradition drew on authoritative sources, in the *Summa* which was in fact the product of the co-operation of the founders of the early Franciscan school, above all, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, but not excluding Odo Rigaldus (1200–75) and potentially Bonaventure. This *Summa*, one of the first and ‘flagship’ systematic theologies of university scholasticism, was also the charter text for the early Franciscan tradition.⁴

The sources of this monumental work include not only Augustine but also the Bible; the 5/6th century author, Pseudo-Dionysius, whose works grew in popularity during the 12th century; and the Greek Father John of Damascus (676–749), whose *De fide orthodoxa*⁵ had been translated in the same century by Burgundio of Pisa and was initially employed in a limited way in Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* (c.1150), which became the standard textbook of theology in the early universities founded around the turn of the 13th century.⁶ As Saccenti has shown, theologians of the early 13th century, not least early Franciscans, started to engage with the whole of the Damascene’s work, in part because of its affinity with the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in terms of the themes covered.⁷

Indeed, the order in which those themes were treated lent itself to the eventual division of the work – probably by Philip the Chancellor (1160–1236) – according to the four-part structure of Lombard’s *Sentences*, which treated God, creation, Incarnation, and Sacraments.⁸ As Saccenti demonstrates, the late 12th-century manuscripts of Burgundio’s translation do not present the work in terms of this four-fold division but according to Damascus’ original organizational schema of one hundred chap-

³ *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020).

⁴ For more on the theology of the *Summa*, see Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

⁵ *Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955).

⁶ On the use of *De fide orthodoxa* by Peter Lombard, see J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIIe siècle. Sa préparation lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard, ses rapports avec les initiatives des canonistes. Études, recherches et documents* (Bruges: Éditions De Temple, 1948), pp. 374–415; E. Bertola, ‘Le citazioni di Giovanni Damasceno nel primo libro delle Sentenze lombardiane,’ in *Pier Lombardo* 1 (1957), pp. 2–17.

⁷ Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225–1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino), p. 55.

⁸ Eligius M. Buytaert attributes the partitioning of the text to Philip the Chancellor. See his ‘Introduction,’ in *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, XXI. The study of Lottin concerning the influence of the psychology of the human action of the Damascene on the theology of the 13th century shows in fact that Philip is the first author to make extensive use of the contents of the *De fide orthodoxa*. See his section on ‘La psychologie de l’acte humain chez Saint Jean Damascene et les théologiens du XIIIe siècle occidental,’ in *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 400–1, 405–10.

ters.⁹ Through these divisions, Damascus was pressed into the service and even the style of early Latin scholasticism and was presented as a new and key resource to facilitate efforts increasingly to systematize theology.

Although the Damascene became a major authority alongside Augustine – though perhaps not equal in weight – during this period, he was not the only source of great significance. The lingering influence of John Scotus Eriugena (815–77), whose work had been condemned for pantheism in 1225, remained in certain ways, although it was channelled through other sources. Moreover, the Halensian authors were among the first to popularize the work of Anselm of Canterbury (1033/34–1109), which had been largely neglected in the century previous.¹⁰ Another key authority for the *Summa* was the 12th-century School of St Victor – not only Hugh (1096–1141) but especially Richard (d. 1173).

As is well-known, the scholastic method of argumentation which was employed in the recently-founded universities as well as pre-dating them, involved marshalling quotations from authorities for and against a particular opinion, seeking to reconcile them and indeed drawing on authorities again to resolve any outstanding tensions or objections between them. For the modern reader, the use of this method can give the impression that early scholastic authors did little but rehearse the arguments of earlier thinkers. This, however, could not be further from the truth. As numerous studies have borne out, scholastic authors often took quotations out of context in order to give them a new meaning which fit the arguments they themselves wanted to develop. This was not a matter of academic malpractice but was standard operating procedure at a time when thinking for oneself or advancing arguments of one's own required doing so in relation to points of contact with prior tradition.¹¹

When we consider scholastic arguments in this light, they are completely reconfigured: we can begin to see how deeply personal arguments, or arguments consistent with the values of the Franciscan order, for instance, were advanced through the guise of authorities who stood for a cause with which scholars wished to associ-

9 Eligius M. Buytaert, 'Introduction,' in *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, XXXV–XXXVI: 'The oldest code that certifies the version of Burgundio, the Vaticanus latinus 313 (late 12th century), does not present the division into four books but only the partition of the text into 100 chapters, according to the original organization given to the work by Damascene.'

10 Scott Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); V. Doucet, *Prolegomena in Librum III* (Quarrachi, 1948), VII. Michael Robson, 'Anselm's Influence on the Soteriology of Alexander of Hales: The *Cur Deus Homo* in the Commentary on the Sentences,' in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale*, eds. Paul Gilbert, Helmut Kohl, Elmar Salmann (Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S Anselmo, 1999), pp. 191–219.

11 On this, see Marcia L. Colish, 'The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century,' in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Grundler* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1997), p. 11; Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 235; Jacques Bougerol, 'The Church Fathers and *Auctoritates*,' in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. 334.

ate themselves. In the case of Augustine, this was the longstanding Christian tradition and indeed Christian orthodoxy. As noted above, the older literature on medieval thought often paints this as having come into tension around the turn of the 13th century with the newly translated major works of Aristotle's philosophy.¹² But the situation is rather more nuanced than this.

As some contributions to the *Sources and Context* volume illustrate, scholars working in the first half of the 13th century approached Aristotle rather timidly, due to perceived problems with the translations, and with a decided bias towards reading him as compatible with Neo-Platonism, which was attributable to the circulation of spurious works like the *Liber de causis*, which was attributed to Aristotle but which Aquinas in 1268 identified as an amalgam of ideas from the Neo-Platonists Plotinus and Porphyry.

This bias inclined early scholastics warmly to receive the major works of the Islamic philosopher, Avicenna (980–1037), whose monumental *Book of the Cure* had been published in Latin by 1168 in an impeccable translation.¹³ Although Avicenna, following many earlier Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle, regarded the Greek philosopher as compatible with Neo-Platonism, his brand of Platonic-Aristotelianism was ultimately unique and highly innovative. This is something early scholastics could not help but find attractive.

Furthermore, the Neo-Platonic leanings of Avicenna rendered him amenable to projection on to the thought of Augustine, to say nothing of Aristotle, both of whom were interpreted as relatively harmonious sources, albeit with different major areas of philosophical interest.¹⁴ In sum, Avicenna proved a perfect resource not only for interpreting the still-dubious Aristotle but also for doing so in a decidedly religious or broadly 'Augustinian' way that nonetheless allowed Latin thinkers to introduce a level of philosophical sophistication into their thinking that exceeded their abilities previously.

In examining the *Summa Halensis* with these and other crucial contextual matters in mind, the *Sources and Context* volume contributed to deconstructing the oversimplified notion of early Franciscans as relatively unoriginal 'systematizers' of Augustine. It highlights all the ways they used authorities creatively, sometimes even manipulatively and highly unfaithfully, to develop an intellectual system all their own, which rose to and indeed epitomized the high scholastic standards of the

12 See for example Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955).

13 Amos Bertolacci, 'A Community of Translators: The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna's Book of the Cure,' in *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe 1100–1500*, eds. Constant J. Mews and John N. Crossley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).

14 Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, eds. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), p. 213; Dag. N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), p. 226.

day. The second volume, *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, took this project further by examining some of the major theological questions that the *Summa* addresses, for example, on how to know and name God or to prove his existence, as well as its treatment of the nature of predestination and providence, the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, sin, grace, law, confession, Eucharist, prayer, and even the sanctification of Mary.¹⁵ In each case, close attention was paid to the actual arguments presented through the mouthpiece of authorities. What emerged as a consequence was a deeper understanding of the respects in which early Franciscan thought paved new theological ground and indeed anticipated some of the famous arguments of later Franciscans who supposedly departed from their predecessors' 'mere' Augustinianism.

The present volume represents a natural progression in this line of inquiry. As the title conveys, the purpose of the volume is not only to explore in more detail some of the innovations of the *Summa Halensis* in philosophy and theology and to highlight continuities, despite differences, between early Franciscans and the successors who received their initial output. That is to say, the goal is to elucidate the reception and legacy of the *Summa Halensis* to later Franciscan and scholastic thought. The first part of the volume, on the philosophy and theology of the *Summa*, kicks off with a study by **Cecilia Trifogli** of what is arguably most fundamental in any metaphysical system, namely, matter. This is one area where early Franciscans were influenced by Avicenna's position according to which a kind of 'prime matter' exists, even though it is not detectable until it becomes subject to form.

This was a very 'positive' way of rendering matter in comparison with Aristotle, for example, and indeed Augustine, who saw matter not so much as the 'stuff' from which things are formed as the sheer potential for formation that exists when there is simply nothing. Trifogli pursues two specific questions the *Summa* considers about the creation of matter, namely, whether it is created or eternally existent – a question which would become a serious subject of debate later in the century – and whether it is initially created unformed or whether it is created together with a form, as indeed it is, as noted above. In an important development of her analysis, Trifogli illustrates precisely the ways and extent to which the *Summa* anticipates the views of Duns Scotus and the ways in which he surpasses his predecessors.

From matter, the volume turns to the question of the specifically human matter, as it were, that subsists in the body-soul union. **Magdalena Bieniak** expands her extensive research on this topic to show how the *Summa Halensis* codified and developed a form of body-soul substance dualism, inspired by Avicenna, that was popular at the time and would become a hallmark of the later Franciscan school. By contrast to some earlier contemporaries, the Summist followed John of La Rochelle, who himself built on an insight from the Dominican Hugh of St Cher (c.1200 – 63), in arguing

15 *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020).

for the essential unitability of the body and soul despite their distinctness as substances.¹⁶

In an example of the aforementioned tendency to read Aristotle in line with Avicenna, Bieniak shows how the Summist attributes its dualism to Aristotle, who in fact held the body and soul to comprise a single substance, where the main role of the soul is to make matter whatever it is. By contrast to this view, the Summist argued for the Avicennian idea according to which the soul is separate from its own matter – and therefore capable of existing immortally beyond it. For this reason, a series of media are required to translate the intents of the soul into the movements of the body, which are not needed by non-human beings in which the form does not exist beyond the life of the body or matter.

Furthering the study of Avicenna's reception, **Anna-Katharina Strohschneider** assesses the way the Islamic philosopher informed readings of Aristotle's newly-translated *Posterior Analytics*, which delineated the conditions for any science and thus raised the question whether and how theology is a science. In this regard, the *Summa* distinguishes between the science of things caused versus the cause of causes, which Avicenna called wisdom; and between a science of causes that perfect the faculty of cognition and those that move the affective part of the soul towards what is good. While metaphysics achieves the former, only theology achieves the latter and is therefore a science of the cause of causes, or wisdom, in the full sense. In treating the subject-matter of the science of theology, the *Summa* further adopts Avicenna's influential distinction between the subject-matter of metaphysics and that which metaphysics seeks. He does not name his source, however, and instead uses the vocabulary of Augustine and Peter Lombard to incorporate an Avicennian position, in a way that was typical of Franciscans and indeed scholastics of this generation, who often used their own indigenous authorities as 'code names' for philosophers like Avicenna.

In her contribution, **Tiziana Suarez-Nani** demonstrates how the *Summa Halensis* epitomizes and sets fully in motion a major transition away from a negative idea of divine infinity, which had dominated in previous generations. According to this, God lacks spatial limitations and an origin or end. By contrast, the positive concept of God's infinity that increasingly replaced it described God as infinite not only in the sense of lacking any limits but also insofar as he positively fills all places and all times. The theological significance of this shift cannot be over-stated in that it altered entirely the way in which scholars thought about God's presence in the world and indeed his knowability through finite creatures. Whereas earlier thinkers saw these as indicators of what God 'is not', or what he surpasses and exceeds, creatures now became a window, albeit a finite one, into the divine nature.

¹⁶ Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris ca. 1200–1250* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).

Next, **Simon Kopf** shows how the *Summa* innovatively reworks earlier accounts of divine providence, most famously that of Lombard who describes providence as a matter of God's knowledge, by incorporating John of Damascus' claim that providence is a matter of God's will and care for creation. The *Summa Halensis* harmonizes the two authorities by invoking the Boethian notion of the *ratio* of providence, terming the resultant *executio* of God's will as 'government'. In this basis, Kopf shows that the distinction between *providentia* and *gubernatio*, so central to Thomas Aquinas' (1225–74) doctrine of providence, is to be found initially in the *Summa Halensis*.

Oleg Bychkov offers a corrective to the view presented by some modern scholars that beauty in the *Summa Halensis* represents a sort of 'super-transcendental' that permeates the other transcendentals of unity, truth, and goodness, which respectively represent the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. While there is no textual evidence for this view of the *Summa*, which in fact describes beauty as a sub-set of the good, Bychkov shows how aesthetic forms of argumentation still play a significant role in the text, which affirms the function that evil and difficulties can perform in bringing about or promoting the good, and which describes things which are 'fitting' or in a sense aesthetically pleasing doctrinally, for instance, concerning the internal order of the Trinitarian persons, or concerning the act of Incarnation, as effectively necessary on that basis.

In anticipation of the contribution by Mary Beth Ingham, **Lydia Schumacher** describes how the *Summa Halensis* draws on the work of Alexander of Hales to introduce a novel idea of free will. According to this, free will is not strictly limited to willing the good, as Augustine, Anselm, and others supposed, on the ground that willing evil things actually enslaves and limits freedom. Rather, free will is indifferent to good and evil and can go either way, where the question which way it chooses is down primarily to the will, rather than the co-operation of will and reason, as Augustine and the longstanding tradition had affirmed. This new and rather voluntaristic view of the matter laid the groundwork for the even more radical presentation of later figures like Scotus and gave a legitimacy or positive role to evil that was designed once again to throw into relief the goodness of the good.

A further contribution from **Nathalie Gorochov** seeks to situate the person of Odo Rigaldus, who likely contributed to the *Summa Halensis*, in the context of his Parisian contemporaries and the other *Summa* authors. She pays particular attention to a historical factor which probably drove many scholars at the time, including Odo, into the arms of the religious orders like the Franciscans, namely, the debate over whether a cleric could hold a plurality of benefices. These were sources of income derived from parishes or clerical associations that some never even fulfilled because they found ways to prolong their courses of study. The religious orders naturally shunned this ecclesial-social-ladder climbing activity and thus became a refuge for the likes of Odo, who succeeded Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle as one of the regent masters of the Franciscan school at Paris.

In a fascinating contribution to this study, **Alexander Fidora** treats the *Summa*'s unique stance on the Jewish Talmud, which had recently come under close scrutiny

and criticism. In 1239, more specifically, the pope ordered all manuscripts of the Talmud to be confiscated and examined on the grounds that they constituted an alternative law to that of the Christian world, which he sought to undermine as a rival. To this end, he oversaw the burning of the Jewish books in 1241/42 in Paris. At a time when many objected to the Talmud as an *alia lex*, the *Summa* upheld the more traditional view, endorsed by Augustine, that Jews were witnesses of Christian truth as contained in the Old Testament. Although the *Summa* also ultimately supports the destruction of the Talmud, it does so for a different reason, namely, because the Talmud blasphemes against Christ and the Virgin Mary. Ultimately, this is still a critical perspective but it nonetheless allows for tolerance of Jews in society.

Following the aforementioned studies of certain philosophical theories in the *Summa Halensis*, the volume proceeds to consider its influence and reception in later generations. In the first chapter of this section, **Jacob Wood** observes that Thomas Aquinas' inquiry concerning and indeed rejection of the view that God's existence is self-evident is normally traced directly to Anselm of Canterbury, whom Aquinas quotes. As Wood shows, however, two major ways of interpreting Anselm had developed amongst Franciscan sympathizers in Paris and Oxford, respectively, most notably by John of La Rochelle and Robert Grosseteste (c.1168–1253), which had become 'coded in' to Anselm's arguments on this score. Wood traces how these theories evolve in the *Summa Halensis* and Odo Rigaldus, in Paris, and Richard Rufus of Cornwall (d. 1260), in Oxford, with a view to demonstrating that these are clearly the theories to which Aquinas responds when he undertakes his famous discussion of God's existence.

For his part, **Theo Kobusch** takes on the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, that is, the distinction between what God is capable in principle of doing and what he actually does, which receives its first systematic articulation in the *Summa Halensis*. This distinction was used by some later Franciscans such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (c.1287–1347) to affirm that God can even break the law of non-contradiction or contravene his own goodness and command evil. Whereas some have seen the *Summa* as a forerunner of this extreme position, Kobusch makes the more nuanced argument that the *Summa* does not genuinely entertain the idea that God could command opposites or evil. Rather, the distinction is meant to highlight what is orderly or disorderly in terms of human and divine willing, the latter being ultimately impossible for God. Thus, he implicitly draws an important distinction between the purpose the *Summa* attributed to its argument and the ends to which later thinkers employed it.

In her contribution, **Mary Beth Ingham** considers the role that the poverty controversy – or the question how Franciscans were to deal with the use versus ownership of property – played in bringing about the transition from the semi-voluntaristic account of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) as outlined in the *Summa Halensis*, to full-blown freedom of the will (*libertas voluntatis*) in later Franciscans like Scotus. As Ingham shows, the latter perspective not only represents the natural development of the *Summa*'s position but also underlines an important aspect of the Franciscan identity,

which regards unimpeded freedom, that is, the ability to do good or evil, as essential to human dignity and indeed to the meritorious nature of human decisions.

Drawing on his past research in medieval Christology, **Richard Cross** tackles the views of the *Summa Halensis* on two key questions in this field, namely, how the human and divine natures of Christ are united and why it is that human nature does not itself count as a subsisting person.¹⁷ On the former matter, the *Summa* offers an initial statement of the substance-accident model of the hypostatic union that would be developed by Scotus, appealing to the analogy of a branch that is grafted onto a tree, which changes the situation of the branch, or Christ's human nature, without altering the status of the divine nature.¹⁸ As regards subsistence, the *Summa* affirms that Christ draws his personhood from his divine nature, as the Son of God, while nonetheless maintaining the fullness of his status as a human individual. From this point, Cross makes the surprising and significant point that Thomas Aquinas, normally a critic of his Franciscan counterparts, actually adopted from the Halensian Summists the idea of an immediate connection between the united natures, even though he did not use the grafting model to describe that connection. By contrast, Bonaventure and Scotus posited a mediated connection, even though they furthered the *Summa's* general model of the union in its own right.

In a further study building on previous publications, **Drew Rosato** considers the *Summa's* analysis of Christ's sorrow and the way that later Franciscan thinkers developed this.¹⁹ Here, the key topic of debate was whether Christ could feel sorrow over his own suffering, not just as a natural or instinctual reaction to pain but as a product of his own free will. The problem raised by the latter view particularly is that it seems to suggest that Christ opposed God's will for himself. Following a trajectory set by the *Summa Halensis*, albeit with a variety of different strategies, later Franciscans Richard of Middleton (1249–1308), Matthew of Aquasparta (1240–1302), and Duns Scotus all find ways to affirm that he willed he would not suffer, nevertheless without implying that he somehow disobeyed or did not accept God's will.

While the contributions so far have focussed on the ways the *Summa* anticipates later Franciscan arguments, even if these are not always identical in their purpose or content, **Volker Leppin** argues in his paper on Ockham that the Franciscan heritage was not the only factor that influenced the development of later Franciscan thought. As Leppin demonstrates, the context in which Ockham worked and dialogued with

¹⁷ See also his previous contribution: Richard Cross, 'John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 71–90.

¹⁸ Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁹ See Andrew V. Rosato, 'Anselm's Influence on the Teaching of the *Summa Halensis* on Redemption,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher, pp. 187–200; Andrew Rosato, 'The Interpretation of Anselm's Teaching on Christ's Satisfaction for Sin in the Franciscan Tradition from Alexander of Hales to Duns Scotus,' *Franciscan Studies* 71 (2013), pp. 411–44.

contemporaries, who entertained their own set of specific concerns, is also necessary to consider when trying to interpret how Ockham came to defend certain positions.

According to the research of **José Meirinhos** on John of La Rochelle and Peter of Spain (d. 1277), ‘the understanding of the nature and functions of the intellect became one of the main problems of the 13th-century Latin reception of Aristotle’s *De anima*,’ which reflected interpretive difficulties that had already been reckoned with by Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle. As Meirinhos shows, those difficulties were exacerbated by the confluence of the new Aristotelian sources with the already prevalent tradition of Augustine, which seemingly placed certain restrictions on the way scholars felt they could describe theological-anthropological matters like the body-soul relationship, the limits of perception, and the work of the agent intellect in terms of illumination. This study shows how John of La Rochelle, and arguably also the *Summa Halensis*, inspired Peter of Spain, whose account of the faculties of the soul in his *Scientia libri de anima* silently appropriates Avicenna’s *Liber de anima* to explain human life, sensation, knowledge, and free will.

In his chapter, **William J. Short**, OFM showcases the work of the 14th-century friar, Bartholomew of Pisa (1338–1401), who disseminates considerable knowledge of Alexander of Hales in his *Book of Conformities*. This work includes chapters on key Franciscan thinkers and Franciscan theology, in which Alexander is much discussed. In particular, Bartholomew invokes the *Summa Halensis* book III in his treatment of the life of Christ. There is also extensive discussion of Alexander in a hagiographical sense, as an example of Christian life, especially as regards his decision to join the friars minor somewhat late in life, after a career in the University of Paris – an event which Bartholomew describes as miraculous. Bartholomew also expresses admiration for the role Alexander played in writing a commentary on the Franciscan Rule, with several other friars.

Further to this discussion, **William Courtenay** explores the use of the *Summa Halensis* in the 15th-century *Canonis misse expositio* of Egeling Becker, which was revised and circulated by Gabriel Biel (1420–95). As Courtenay writes in his abstract: ‘Despite Biel’s reputation as an Ockhamist and a leading proponent of the *via moderna*, the views of Alexander of Hales as reflected in the *Summa Halensis* prove to be the major source on which Biel relies for his Eucharistic theology. In addition, the study notes major differences between the Koberger edition of the *Summa Halensis* (Nürnberg 1481–82 and Lyon 1515–16), which Biel used, and the edition published at Venice in 1575 and Cologne 1622.’

In his contribution, **Riccardo Saccenti** investigates the large number of manuscripts that survive of the four parts of the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa fratris Alexandri*. As Saccenti shows, the study of these manuscripts and their composition and circulation offer insight into the different contexts in which the text was received and used, from the time of its composition in the 1240s to the production of its first printed edition at the end of the 15th century. The study in this regard takes into consideration a variety of factors that influenced the *Summa*’s transmission, including the development of theology as a discipline in the early decades of the 13th century; the

material production of manuscripts within the university milieu, the institutionalization of the so-called *pecia* system, and the multiple ways in which theological texts were used in the university and in the convents of the religious orders. All these elements contribute to reconstructing the circulation and influence of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.

In a concluding article, **Oliver Davies** offers a broader perspective on the influence and legacy of the *Summa Halensis*, reflecting on the ways that Franciscan ideas, which were developed and designed to articulate and facilitate the earliest form of the Franciscan life, resonate with contemporary scientific concepts concerning the ways human beings shape society and operate together. In this regard, Davies explores how the Halensian doctrines of the transcendentals, natural law, free will, and so on, which were philosophical innovations in their own time, continue to hold authority today.

That is one ultimate purpose of this volume, namely, to recover the Franciscan intellectual tradition, particularly from Scotus onwards, from a generations-long tendency either to prefer the Thomist tradition to it as a resource for contemporary thought or even to charge it with causing the alleged ills of modernity that Thomism has been summoned to resolve in modern times.²⁰ For instance, Scotus' doctrine of God's absolute versus ordained power supposedly introduced an arbitrary God who could command humans to do evil just as much as good. By the same token, he implied that human beings themselves are completely unbound by good or evil and only choose the good out of a sheer and even unexplained will to do so (see Kobusch, Schumacher, Ingham).

Such voluntarism is often supposed to have bled into the question of faith in God, which Franciscans allegedly rendered as a sort of unfounded or irrational 'leap', thus creating a clear divide between matters of faith and matters of reason, including rational proofs for the existence of God, which in a highly rationalist manner were considered virtually infallible and above reproach (see Wood). In other philosophical contexts, Franciscans have been accused of denigrating the body by advocating a form of dualism which renders the body and soul or matter and form as separate substances (see Trifogli, Bieniak). They have supposedly offended God's transcendence and rendered him a 'great big being like us', that is, an infinite being that is the sum total of all beings (see Suarez-Nani).²¹ In addition, Franciscan Christology has been charged with being too 'Nestorian', or subjecting Christ to a split personality between his human and divine natures (Cross, Rosato).²²

20 See for example Catherine Pickstock, 'Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,' *Modern Theology* 21 (2005), pp. 543–74; John Milbank, 'The Franciscan Conundrum,' *Communio* 42 (2015), pp. 466–92. A much earlier example of this tendency is Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955).

21 Anne Davenport, *The Measure of a Different Greatness: The Intensive Infinite, 1250–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

22 Aaron Riches, 'Christology and the Scotist Rupture,' *Theological Research* 1 (2013), pp. 31–63.

In this work, the contributors come up against such accusations both indirectly and directly by providing a more nuanced picture of early Franciscan doctrine, represented first and foremost by the *Summa Halensis*, and by highlighting the ways this laid the foundation for later Franciscans and scholastics more generally, whose work has often been regarded as a break from the earlier tradition. The goal has been to read the tradition on its own terms and to understand the way it developed from its earlier to later forms as part of an organic process which, notwithstanding sometimes considerable developments and changes, resulted in a tradition characterized by some basic areas of continuity. Our efforts to interpret Franciscan ideas in their own context and in view of their original purposes – to support particular perspectives on religious life and action – help to dispel the myth that they were designed intentionally or otherwise for the supposedly more sinister intents of modern minds.

That is not to deny that the Franciscan intellectual tradition may have introduced ideas that were elaborated in new ways and in other contexts later on in the history of thought. However, it is to stress that criticizing them for later developments in which they had no involvement is anachronistic and misses the point of what the Franciscans themselves had to argue, which is something that this volume endeavours to make clear in several key areas of early Franciscan thinking, highlighting also for the first time the extent of its reach and influence in some more unexpected areas of late medieval and modern thought (see Bychkov, Gorochoy, Fidora, Meirinhos, Short, Courtenay, Saccenti, Cross, Davies). From a variety of different perspectives, in summary, this volume underscores the legacy of early Franciscan thought – both historically and in terms of its future potential to be invoked as a resource in addressing the philosophical problems of contemporary research.



Part I: **Philosophy and Theology**

Cecilia Trifogli

The Creation of Matter in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The *Summa* contains an extensive discussion of the creation of matter, which addresses two main questions: a general question of whether matter is something created or rather an eternal independent principle of creation, and a more specific question about the mode of creation of matter, that is, whether matter is first created without any forms or whether it is created together with a form so that a composite of matter and form is properly-speaking created. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the two *quaestiones* of the *Summa* devoted to these two issues. The principal aim of the investigation is to explain and assess the views of the Summists on these two issues and the arguments in support of them, and to point out those aspects of their discussions that contain important indications about the ontological status of matter and that allow a comparison with the views of John Duns Scotus.

Introduction

The most extensive discussions about matter in the *Summa Halensis* deal with the topic of its creation. Two main questions are addressed: a general question of whether matter is something created or rather an eternal independent principle of creation, and a more specific question about the mode of creation of matter, that is, whether matter is first created without any forms or whether it is created together with a form so that a composite of matter and form is properly speaking created. In my paper I will examine the two *quaestiones* of the *Summa* devoted to these two issues: ‘Whether corporeal goods have two principles’ (*Utrum boni corporalis sint duo principia*),¹ and ‘Whether corporeal things are said to be created because of matter together with form or because of formless matter’ (*Utrum res corporales dicantur creari ratione materiae cum forma aut ratione materiae informis*).² The principal aim of my investigation is to explain and assess the views of the Summists on these two issues and the arguments in support of them. I will also point out those aspects of their discussions that contain important indications about the ontological status of matter and that allow a comparison with the views of John Duns Scotus.

1 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), pp. 11–13.

2 *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), pp. 306–8.

‘Whether Corporeal Goods Have Two Principles’

The question about the creation of matter is raised in a Platonic framework, as a question about Plato’s view according to which there are two irreducible and eternal principles of corporeal things, namely the maker (*opifex*) and matter. The Platonic framework is made explicit in the expanded formulation of the question added as a clarification of its title:

(T1) The next question is whether corporeal goods have two principles, namely, the maker and matter, each of which does not derive from something else, as Plato seemed to say since he posited that the maker and matter exist from eternity and are two principles.³

The main idea in the view ascribed to Plato is that the maker is the efficient cause and matter is the material that the efficient cause uses to produce corporeal things. In particular, matter is not produced by the maker but it is something presupposed by the action of the maker.⁴

The Summists reject Plato’s view. More precisely, they follow Plato in positing that the maker and matter are both principles of corporeal things, but they deny that these two principles are independent one from the other. The maker is indeed independent from matter and from anything else, but matter is not. For matter is produced by the maker out of nothing. This is how the Summists formulate their reply to the question:

(T2) In reply to the issues just raised we must say that the maker and matter are said to be two principles of corporeal things that come to be from matter but in different ways: the maker as the principle by which (*a quo*), whereas matter as the principle out of which (*de quo*) or from which (*ex quo*). But they are not principles such that each of the two is not produced by the other; for matter is produced by the maker.⁵

3 *SH II*, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 11: ‘Consequenter quaeritur utrum boni corporalis sint duo principia, scilicet opifex et materia, quorum utrumque non sit ab aliquo, sicut videbatur Plato dicere, qui posuit opificem et materiam esse ab aeterno et esse duo principia.’ All translations of passages from the *Summa* and other Latin works are mine, unless otherwise noted.

4 Thomas Aquinas too mentions Plato’s view and classifies it as one of the erroneous positions about the plurality of principles. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 1 (*Utrum sint plura prima principia*), co.: ‘Tertius error fuit eorum qui posuerunt agens et materiam, sed agens non esse principium materiae, quamvis sit unum tantum agens. Et haec est opinio Anaxagorae et Platonis, nisi quod Plato superaddit tertium principium, scilicet ideas separatas a rebus, quas exemplaria dicebat; et nullum esse causam alterius, sed per haec tria causari mundum, et res ex quibus mundus constat.’ All quotations from Aquinas’ works are from the online versions available at www.corpusthomicum.org.

5 *SH II*, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 12: ‘Respondendum est ad iam dicta quod opifex et materia duo dicuntur principia rerum corporalium quae fiunt ex materia, sed differenter: opifex ut a quo, materia vero ut de quo vel ex quo. Sed non sunt duo principia, quorum neutrum sit ab altero: nam ipsa materia est ab opifice.’

This reply contains two main points. The first is a specification of Plato's claim that the maker and matter are principles of material things. They are both principles of material things but of different kinds. The maker is the principle 'by which' (*a quo*), i.e. in the sense of being the efficient cause of corporeal things. Matter is the principle 'out of which' (*de quo*), i.e. something out of which a corporeal thing is made (the subject or a component of such thing) or the principle 'from which' (*ex quo*), i.e. that from which the production of a corporeal thing starts. The second main point is the statement of the Summists' view that matter is produced by the maker, against Plato's claim of the independence of matter.

Despite its role in the formulation of the question, the Platonic framework does not play any significant role in its actual discussion. In fact, this is shaped by general principles of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics about act and potency, matter, change. The dominant philosophical framework is indeed Aristotelian.⁶ A significant indication of the Aristotelian framework is the frequent use of the expression '*prima materia*' (prime matter), which is used interchangeably with the term '*materia*'. Furthermore, the only argument in favor of the Platonic view exclusively appeals to Aristotelian ideas about active and passive powers and principles.⁷

The substantial controversial issue of the question is whether (prime) matter is produced by the maker, i.e. by God, and if it is produced, whether it is produced in time.

The question presents and discusses three different views on this issue: 1. Plato's/Aristotle's view: matter (i) is eternal and (ii) is an independent principle (does not depend on the maker or anything else). 2. Augustine's view: matter is (i) eternal but (not ii) is not an independent principle: it is caused by the maker. (3) Summists' view (standard medieval Christian view): matter is (not i) not eternal and (not ii) not independent: it is created from nothing by the maker, i.e. God, and it starts to exist.

In what follows I will concentrate on major philosophical aspects in the discussions of each of these three views.

Plato's/Aristotle's View

The Summists present only one argument in support of this view.⁸ The argument appeals to standard Aristotelian ideas about agency. Matter and the maker are assumed to be the ultimate passive principle and the ultimate active principle respectively. Then the existence of these two irreducible principles is inferred from the distinction between acting and being acted upon: since there is an essential distinction between

⁶ A clear sign of this is provided by the *apparatus fontium* of the question. Almost all references are to Aristotle's works (*Physics* and *Metaphysics*). In addition to Aristotle and internal references, the only other references are to Augustine (and are very few).

⁷ On this argument, see below, pp. 17–18.

⁸ *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 11.

acting and being acted upon, then also the principles from which acting and being acted upon ultimately derive must both exist and be essentially distinct and independent. The Summists' reply to this argument appeals to the main claim of their view that, although matter is the ultimate passive principle, it is produced by the ultimate active principle (the maker or God) from nothing.⁹

The discussion of Plato's/Aristotle's view, however, is not limited to this standard argument.¹⁰ We shall see that some of the objections against the Summists' view are in fact forceful arguments in support of Plato's/Aristotle's view.¹¹

Augustine's View

The Summists do not present any argument in support of the view that matter is eternal but (eternally) dependent on God. They simply illustrate it with the famous example of *De civitate Dei* of the foot and the footprint:

(T3) Just as the footprint imprinted in the dust is produced by the foot, and if the foot were always placed in the dust, the footprint would always be there, so matter is produced by the maker in such a way that, if the maker always exists, matter too always exists.¹²

The example is supposed to illustrate the difficult idea that something can be eternal (the footprint) and still caused by something else (the foot).

The Summists do not find the combination of being eternal and being dependent incoherent. They mention the trinitarian case of the Son as dependent on the Father as a case in which this combination is found. They deny, however, that this combination holds for matter. They argue that in the case of matter, dependence on the maker entails that matter is not eternal, but it starts to exist. Their argument for this conclusion is the following:

(T4) If matter is produced by the maker, it does not however belong to the substance of the maker; for if this were the case, then the maker would belong to the substance of the things that are from matter. Therefore, if matter is caused by or derives from the maker as from a principle, this happens with a diversity in substance. There is also a distinction between what is prior in causality and what is prior in duration, just as we say that eternity is prior to time. Now, given this distinction, it is necessary that the thing by which another thing is produced with a diversity in substance has both kinds of priority together. For the thing produced by it is either out of the First or out of nothing; but it cannot be out of the First, because it is different

⁹ SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 13.

¹⁰ A version of this argument against the creation of matter is also in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 2, arg. 2.

¹¹ See below, pp. 22–27.

¹² SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 11: 'Sicut vestigium pedis in pulvere est a pede, et si semper esset pes in pulvere, semper esset vestigium, ita materia sit ab opifice, et semper existente opifice semper sit materia.'

in substance; therefore, it is out of nothing. Therefore, it is not eternal, but just as eternity is prior to the instant of time, so the essence of the maker will be prior to matter. Therefore, matter will not be produced by the maker and existing from eternity.¹³

This argument is compressed and obscure. Let us try to make sense of it. An essential ingredient of it is the distinction between two kinds of priority: (i) priority in causality: the priority of a cause qua cause with respect to its effect; and (ii) priority in duration: the priority of something that exists before something else. In the example of the foot and the footprint, there is priority in causality of the foot over the footprint but there is no priority in duration. According to the Summists, however, the case of the maker and matter is not like the case of the foot and the footprint: if the maker (also called ‘the First’ in this argument) is prior in causality to matter, then it is also prior in duration, so that it cannot be the case that matter is caused by the maker and eternal like the maker. Thus, in the case of the maker and matter, priority in causality entails priority in duration. The bulk of the argument then consists in proving that this inference is valid.

The crucial premise in support of this inference appeals to the different natures of matter and the maker: diversity in substance (*diversitas substantiae*) in the text. This premise is formulated at the very beginning of the argument and supported with an appeal to the difference between the transcendence of the maker and the immanence of matter: matter is an essential component of corporeal things whereas the (nature of the) maker is not. The diversity in nature of matter from the maker or the First is expressed by the condensed claim that matter is not out of the First (*de Primo*). The distinction at work here is that between being out of the First and being by the First (*a Primo*), that is, produced by the first. Matter, according to this view, is by the First but not out of the First.

The next crucial step in the argument is the following inference: if matter is not out of the First, then it is out of nothing (*de nihilo*). The inference is based on the assumption that the alternatives ‘out of the First’ and ‘out of nothing’ are exhaustive. Although it is difficult to give a rigorous account of these alternatives, the main idea is the following. It is clear that the claim that matter is out of nothing should not be understood in the sense that ‘nothing’ indicates somehow a component of matter or something from which the production of matter starts. Rather the sense is that ‘nothing’ indicates the lack of a component or of a starting point, so that the claim should be understood in the sense that there is nothing out of which matter is produced. So

13 *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 11: ‘Materia, si est ab opifice, non est de substantia opificis: nam si hoc esset, opifex esset de substantia eorum quae sunt ex materia; ergo si causatur sive principiatur, est in diversitate substantiae. Sed est prius, scilicet in causalitate, et est prius duratione, sicut dicitur aeternitas praecedere tempus. Sed si hoc, necesse est quod haec duo simul sint in eo a quo est alterum in diversitate substantiae secundum iam dicta. Nam aut est de Primo aut de nihilo. De Primo non potest esse, cum diversum sit in substantia; ergo de nihilo. Ergo non est aeternum, sed sicut aeternitas praecedat nunc temporis, ita essentia opificis praecedet materiam. Non ergo erit materia ab opifice et aeternaliter ens.’

the alternatives can be reformulated as: either matter is out of the First or there is nothing out of which matter is. Thus, it is only the First that could be the thing out of which matter is produced. But because of their different natures, this cannot be the case.

The final inference in the argument is that being out of nothing entails not being eternal: since matter is out of nothing, then it is not eternal. This inference is obviously of great importance to establish the conclusion that matter cannot be both produced by the First and eternal, but it is simply taken for granted in this argument.

Some explanation of this final inference is found in the question devoted specifically to the notion of creation as coming to be out of nothing ('The next question asks what is meant by 'nothing' when we say that creation is coming to be from nothing').¹⁴ The Summists' reply is the following:

(T5) To this question it must be replied that coming to be from nothing or out of nothing is said in many ways. For the particle 'out of' or 'from' can express an order and not a cause, and an order such that it is saved in only one of the two extremes. And it is in this way that to be created is said to be coming to be from nothing or out of nothing, that is, because a creature proceeds into being after its absolute non-being (...). If instead it [i. e. 'from' or 'out of'] expresses a cause, in this way it is not the case that to be created is coming to be from nothing.¹⁵

This reply is based on a distinction between a cause and an ordering associated to the particle 'from'. In the expression 'from nothing', the particle 'from' does not express a cause: for what is nothing cannot be a cause, whereas creation does have a cause. The particle rather expresses an order. The extremes between which this relation of order obtains, however, are such that only one of them is something positive; for the order is that between non-being and being, where non-being precedes being or equivalently being is after non-being.

The crucial assumption here is that the order of before and after involved in the notion of creation from nothing is a temporal one, so that what is created from nothing is such that it starts to exist. It is this assumption that, according to the Summists, makes the inference of the main argument from being out of nothing to non-being eternal a valid one. This assumption, however, is controversial. Eminent later theologians, like Aquinas and Scotus, reject it. Aquinas, for example, gives a very clear explanation of what is wrong with this assumption in his discussion of the eternity of the world in his *Sentences* commentary. Aquinas, like the Summists, maintains that the world had a temporal beginning and so it is not eternal, but, un-

¹⁴ SH II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 50), pp. 58–59: 'Consequenter quaeritur de hoc quod creari est fieri ex nihilo, qualiter accipiat hoc ipsum "nihil".'

¹⁵ SH II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 50), pp. 58–59: 'Ad quod dicendum quod fieri ex nihilo sive de nihilo dicitur multipliciter. Nam "de" vel "ex" potest dicere ordinem, non causam, qui tamen ordo non salvatur nisi in altero extremorum. Et secundum hunc modum dicitur "creari" fieri ex nihilo vel de nihilo, quia post omnino non-esse procedit creatura in esse (...). Si vero dicat causam, secundum illum modum non est creari fieri ex nihilo.'

like the Summists, he does not think that the non-eternity of the world can be proved with a rational argument. It can only be accepted by faith.¹⁶ Therefore, according to Aquinas, the arguments against the eternity of the world are not conclusive. One such argument reported by Aquinas is very similar to the argument of the Summists:

(T6) Every created thing is produced from nothing; but everything that is produced from nothing is a being after that it was nothing, since it is not at the same time a being and a non-being. Therefore, it is necessary that the heavens first did not exist and afterward existed, and likewise the whole world.¹⁷

This argument is based on the crucial assumption endorsed by the Summists that being from nothing entails having being after non-being in the temporal order. But this assumption is wrong, according to Aquinas, because it fails to consider an alternative kind of order: an order of nature. It is to the distinction between order of duration and order of nature, ascribed to Avicenna, that Aquinas appeals to in his reply to the argument:

(T7) A reply to the second argument is given by Avicenna in his metaphysics. He maintains that all things are created by God and that creation is from nothing, that is, of what has being after nothing. But this can be understood in two ways: (i) either in the sense that an order of duration is designated, and if understood in this way the claim that things are created from nothing is false, according to Avicenna. (ii) Or in the sense that an order of nature is designated, and if understood in this way the claim is true.¹⁸

Like Aquinas, Scotus too draws the distinction between these two orders in his account of creation from nothing.¹⁹

In Aquinas' explanation, the order of nature involved in the creation from nothing expresses the total dependence of the being of a creature from God. A creature by its nature is a non-being, and the whole of its being comes from God; and what a creature is by its nature is by nature prior to what it is in virtue of something

16 Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, co.: 'Tertia positio est dicentium quod omne quod est praeter Deum incepit esse, sed tamen Deus potuit res ab aeterno produxisse, ita quod mundum incepisse non potuit demonstrari, sed per revelationem divinam esse habitum et creditum. (...) Et huic positioni consentio, quia non credo quod a nobis possit sumi ratio demonstrativa ad hoc.'

17 Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, con. 2: 'Praeterea, omne creatum est ex nihilo factum. Sed omne quod est ex nihilo factum est ens postquam fuit nihil, cum non sit simul ens et non ens. Ergo oportet quod caelum prius non fuerit et postmodum fuerit, et sic totus mundus.'

18 Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad con. 2: 'Ad secundum respondet Avicenna in sua metaphysica: dicit enim omnes res a Deo creatas esse, et quod creatio est ex nihilo, vel ejus quod habet esse post nihil. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod designetur ordo durationis, et sic secundum eum falsum est; aut quod designetur ordo naturae, et sic verum est.'

19 John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, q. 2 (nn. 60–62), in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 18 (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1982), p. 20; *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, q. 2 (nn. 58–59), *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 7 (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973), p. 34.

else.²⁰ Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas believes that creation from nothing involves both an order of nature and an order of duration, but, unlike the Summists, he does not think that the order of duration can be demonstrated.

The Summists' View

The most interesting part of the discussion of this view are the arguments presented against it. The main ones are the following:

1 Argument from the Possibility of Matter

This argument challenges the assumption of the dependence of matter on the first principle:

(T8) (i) Having the possibility to all things is not incompatible with the property of not being from something nor with the property of being per se; therefore, both properties can belong to the same thing; (ii) but they can both belong only to prime matter; (iii) therefore, prime matter can exist and yet not derive from a principle.²¹

The argument intends to show that matter by its nature is the kind of thing that can have independent existence (iii). The crucial premise (i) for this conclusion is that the property of having possibility to all things and the property of not being dependent on something are compatible, so that they can belong to the same thing. Then the other premise (ii) says that matter is the only thing that can have these two properties (possibly because matter is the only thing that can have the property of the possibility to all things). The crucial premise (i) is left without any explanation, let alone proof. It would also be important to understand what the two conditions 'not being from something' and 'being per se' exactly mean. Anyway, the general point made in this argument seems to be that, if something can produce all things, then it can also be not produced by anything.

²⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5., ad con. 2: 'Unicuique enim est prius secundum naturam illud quod est ei ex se, quam id quod est ei ab alio. Quaelibet autem res praeter Deum habet esse ab alio. Ergo oportet quod secundum naturam suam esset non ens, nisi a Deo esse haberet; sicut etiam dicit Gregorius quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret: et ita non esse quod ex se habet naturaliter, est prius quam esse quod ab alio habet, etsi non duratione; et per hunc modum conceduntur a philosophis res a Deo creatae et factae.'

²¹ *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 11: '(i) Possibilitatem habere ad omnia non repugnat ei quod est "non esse ex aliquo" nec ei quod est "esse per se"; ergo possunt simul coincidere; (ii) sed non nisi in prima materia; (iii) ergo prima materia potest esse, non tamen ab aliquo principio.' The subdivisions of this and other passages are mine.

What makes this argument very interesting is the positive account of the possibility of matter, expressed by the crucial premise (i). If the possibility of matter is one compatible with an independent status from an efficient cause, this possibility does indeed express a positive ontological feature of matter. The Summists' reply is the following:

(T9) To the objection that says that matter can be a first principle, in virtue of its having possibility to all things, it must be replied that having the capacity to all things is a distinct property from having the possibility to all things. For having the possibility to all things is restricted to forms that come to be in matter, whereas having the capacity to all things also applies to the coming into being of matter, which is possible to all things. Therefore, having the possibility to all things is incompatible with not being by something, but it is not incompatible with not being out of something.²²

The reply points out that the initial argument is based on a confusion between possibility and capacity (*potestas*). Matter has the possibility to all things but does not have the capacity to all things. The reply then asserts that it is the property of having the capacity to all things that it is not incompatible with the property of not being by something (*ab aliquo*). The property of having the possibility to all things instead is incompatible with the property of not being by something, although it is compatible with the property of not being from something (*ex aliquo*). Roughly, the idea of this reply is that its having a possibility to all things makes matter independent from a subject or something that is the starting point of its production, but does not make matter independent from an efficient cause.

This reply is very obscure, with many assumptions left unexplained. For example, no explanation is given of the incompatibility between the matter as independent subject and its independence from an efficient cause. Why is it the case that matter as ultimate subject cannot be something uncaused? This crucial question is not addressed at all in this argument.²³

What I find very original in the Summists' reply is how the difference between possibility and capacity is explained. Given the standard Aristotelian characterization of matter as passive principle, one would expect an account of this difference in terms of passive and active powers: possibility as property of matter would be a passive power, whereas capacity as property of an efficient cause would be an active power. This is not, however, how the difference between possibility and capacity is

²² *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 13: 'Ad id vero quod obicitur quod materia possit esse primum principium, eo quod habet possibilitatem ad omnia, respondendum est quod aliud est habere potestatem ad omnia et aliud est habere possibilitatem. "Habere enim possibilitatem" coarctatur ad formas quae fiunt in materia; "habere vero potestatem" extendit se etiam ad hoc quod fiat materia, quae est possibilis ad omnia. Et ideo repugnat inter se "habere possibilitatem ad omnia" et "non esse ab aliquo," sed non repugnat "non esse ex aliquo."'

²³ It is, however, addressed in the third argument that we shall examine: the argument from the eternity of matter. See below, pp. 26–27.

explicitly presented in this argument. Their difference is not given by the kinds of power that they represent but by the range of things to which they extend respectively: possibility is restricted to forms, whereas capacity extends to matter too. Thus, the power of matter is simply a more limited power (effective on fewer things) than the power of the First.

This account of the power of matter also appears in a contra-argument of the question, that is, an argument that shows that matter is not a principle:

(T10) Furthermore, matter has a determinate potency. For although it has potency to this or that form, it does not have, however, potency to everything that comes to be; therefore, since the potency of the first active principle is infinite, they [i.e. matter and the first principle] do not have an equal status as principles.²⁴

This argument too presents the difference between the potency of matter and the potency of the First as a difference not in kind but in the range of the objects to which it extends: matter only to forms, the First to everything that comes to be.

If, as these passages suggest, the considered view of the Summists is that the power of matter is somehow active, then this view is in sharp contrast not only with Aquinas' negative account of the ontological status of matter but also with Scotus' view. While Scotus gives matter a positive ontological status, according to which matter is a being in act of its own, that is, independently of any form, he also specifies that the actuality of matter is not that of an active power or an agent.²⁵

2 Infinite Regress Argument

This argument too is against the dependence of matter on the maker:

(T11) Prime matter is a being in potency* in its own genus, just as the maker is in its own genus. Therefore, if prime matter had a principle, someone would give it its being in potency*; there-

24 *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 12: 'Item, materia habet potentiam determinatam. Licet enim habeat potentiam ad hanc formam vel illam, non tamen habet potentiam ad omne esse quod fit; ergo, cum potentia primi principii activi sit infinita, non habent se ex aequo in ratione principii.'

25 See John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 12, q. 1 (n. 38), in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 19 (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1993), p. 82: 'Si autem quaeras an debeat dici actus aut non, dico quod nolo de nomine disputare. Si enim actus dicatur ab "agere", sic non est actus. Sed dico quod materia est aliqua realitas vera, quae cum realitate formae facit unum. Unde si actus et potentia accipiantur prout dividunt ens, sic actus dicitur omne illud quod habet entitatem suam extra causam suam,—et sic materia, cum sit principium et causa rei, dicitur ens in actu; si autem accipiatur potentia ut est principium distinctum contra actum informantem,—sic materia dicitur esse potentia (et sic loquitur Philosophus de actu VII et VIII *Metaphysicae*): sic enim actus distinguitur contra illud quod recipit actum,—et sic materia non est actus, quia est principium receptivum actus; tale autem oportet esse denudatum ab omni actu.'

fore, matter could be in potency** when it would not yet be in potency*; therefore, another potency** would precede that potency*, and this other potency** could only be a material potency, because a potency with respect to an act, which is not yet in act, is as such a material potency; therefore, matter would precede matter. But this is impossible; therefore, the first potency in receiving is always in its act, as the first potency in acting; therefore, there are two principles.²⁶

The idea here is that, if matter comes to be, matter would be in potency before coming into being; but this potency is the potency distinctive of matter; so that matter would exist before matter (given that the distinctive property of matter exists then). This leads to an infinite regress: the prior matter too comes to be and so we need to posit another material potency and so another matter.

I have indicated with potency* and potency** what Scotus would have regarded as two distinct kinds of potency: potency* corresponds to Scotus' subjective potency and potency** corresponds to Scotus' objective potency. Subjective potency is the potency with respect to forms, whereas objective potency is potency with respect to existence.²⁷ A Scotist reply to this argument would consist in pointing out that the argument is based on the confusion/failure to distinguish between these two kinds of potency.

Let us see the reply of the Summists:

(T12) To the next objection, which says that in matter there is a potency which is first in its own genus, just as in the maker there is a potency which is first in its own genus, so that if another potency preceded the potency of matter, there would be another matter before matter, and so on ad infinitum, it must be replied as follows. There is a material potency of matter to the forms that come to be in it; and if another potency of this kind preceded such potency, there would necessarily be an infinite regress. But there is also the potency of the maker in virtue of which matter could exist before it actually existed; and on the side of this potency there is no infinite regress, but one comes to a halt. Therefore, there is only one principle. Nor prime matter always exists in its own act, as the first maker instead always does in its own act.²⁸

26 *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), pp. 11–12: 'Prima materia est ens in potentia* secundum genus suum, sicut opifex secundum genus suum. Si ergo haberet principium, aliquis daret ei esse in potentia*; ergo posset esse in potentia**, cum nondum esset in potentia*; ergo potentiam illam* praecederet alia potentia**, et illa** non esset nisi materialis, quia potentia respectu actus, quae nondum est in actu, quoad hoc materialis est; ergo materiam praecederet materia. Sed hoc est impossibile; ergo prima potentia in recipiendo semper est in aliquo suo actu, sicut prima potentia in agendo; ergo sunt duo principia.' The asterisks are my own addition.

27 On Scotus' distinction between objective and subjective potency, see Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 17–20.

28 *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 13: 'Ad id vero quod obicitur consequenter quod in materia est prima potentia secundum suum genus, sicut in opifex est secundum suum, eo quod si potentiam materiae praecederet alia potentia, ante materiam esset alia materia, et ita in infinitum, dicendum quod est potentia materialis ad esse formae quae fit in ea; et si talem praecederet alia potentia consimilis, in infinitum oporteret abire. Sed est potentia opificis qua materia potuit esse antequam esset; et ex hac non est abire in infinitum, sed est stare. Et ideo unum solum est principium. Nec est prima materia in suo actu, sicut est primus opifex in suo actu, semper.'

The reply points out that the infinite regress is based on the false assumption that there is only one kind of potency involved in the hypothesis of the coming into being of matter. What is true instead is that there are two kinds of potency. One of them is the material potency, i.e. the potency intrinsic to matter; and this is the potency to a form. The other is that associated with the potential being of matter, that is, the possibility of its existence before its actual existence. This is called the ‘potency of the maker’ in the argument, but this expression should not be understood in the sense that the maker is the subject of this potency but in the sense that the maker is somehow responsible for this potency. The distinction between two kinds of potency in the Summists’ reply is indeed very similar to Scotus’ distinction between the objective and subjective potency.

The last sentence in the Summists’ reply that prime matter does not always exist in its own act can be interpreted as an indirect indication of the positive ontological status of matter. For it does not challenge the idea that matter has its own act; it simply adds the qualification that matter does not always have its own act.

3 Argument From the Eternity of Matter

The argument primarily attacks the claim that matter is not eternal. Then from the eternity of matter concludes that matter does not depend on anything.

(T13) (i) The material potency or matter is a principle of every change. For what is subject to change can change from one thing into another; therefore, it is already in potency. And this is why the philosophers maintained that matter is not subject to generation and corruption. If instead matter proceeded from non-being into being, there would be a change before matter, and so there would be an infinite regress. It is necessary therefore to come to a halt, so that prime matter cannot change from non-being into being. But what is in this way unchangeable is eternal. (ii) And since this happens with a diversity in substance [from the first], matter will be without a principle. This last sentence is adduced to address the case of the Son which is produced eternally by the Father but not with a diversity in substance.²⁹

The first part (i) of this argument proves that matter is eternal. It gives the standard Aristotelian argument for this conclusion.³⁰ It is based on the assumption that matter is the principle of any change because it is the subject of change: that item that persists throughout the change and that in which change occurs. The change in the

²⁹ *SH II*, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 12: ‘(i) Potentia materialis sive materia est principium omnis transmutationis. Quod enim transmutatur, de uno in aliud potest transmutari; ergo potentia iam est. Et propter hoc dixerunt philosophi materiam esse ingenerabilem et incorruptibilem. Si autem materia de non-esse in esse procederet, praecederet eam transmutatio, et sic abiretur in infinitum. Necesse est ergo stare, ut materia prima sit intransmutabilis de non-esse in esse. Sed quod sic est immutabile, aeternum est. (ii) Et cum sit in diversitate substantiae, sine principio erit. Hoc enim dicitur propter hoc quod Filius est a Patre aeternaliter, sed non in diversitate substantiae.’

³⁰ See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 2, arg. 1 and ad 1.

sense of coming into being of matter would therefore require matter and so open an infinite regress. The second part (ii) of the argument infers from the eternity of matter that matter does not depend on the maker. This part is more original. It relies on the idea that we have already seen in the argument against Augustine's view, namely, that eternal dependence on the First and identity in nature with the First go together.³¹ In the present argument this idea is used as follows: suppose that matter depends on the maker so that it is caused by the maker. But the maker and matter are different in nature so that matter could not be out of the first (*de Primo*); but given the exhaustion of the alternatives 'out of the first' and 'out of nothing' (*de nihilo*), matter would be out of nothing; but what is out of nothing is not eternal, which is against the conclusion of the first part of the argument.

The reply of the Summists is the following:

(T14) To the next objection, which says that matter is not subject to corruption and generation, and so it is unchangeable, it must be replied that matter is said to be unchangeable with respect to generation and corruption in so far as these are natural processes, that is, generation is a change from non-being to being that requires matter as its subject, and similarly corruption is a change from being to non-being. Matter, however, is changeable in so far as it proceeded into being from nothing, and as to its nature it has the possibility to non-being.³²

The reply attacks part (i) of the argument in (T13) by pointing out that it is based on the wrong assumption that the only coming into being of matter would be through the natural process of generation, which indeed requires matter as a subject. There is, instead, another way of coming into being, that is, out of nothing. The distinction between two different ways of coming into being in the Summists' reply is a standard one. However, the implicit inference contained in the original argument and left unchallenged in this reply, namely, that the coming into being by creation entails that matter is not eternal, is controversial, as we have seen in the discussion of Augustine's view.³³

³¹ See above, pp. 18–19.

³² *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3 (n. 5), p. 13: 'Ad id vero quod obicitur consequenter quod materia est incorruptibilis, ingenerabilis, et ita intransmutabilis, dicendum est quod intransmutabilis dicitur secundum viam generationis et corruptionis, in quantum haec sunt a natura, secundum quod generatio est mutatio de non-esse in esse, subiecta existente materia, et corruptio de esse in non-esse. Nihilominus tamen transmutabilis est eo quod de nihilo processit in esse, et quantum est de se, possibilitatem habet ad non-esse.'

³³ See above, pp. 20–22.

‘Whether Corporeal Things are Said to be Created Because of Matter Together with Form or Because of Formless Matter’

This question has a complicated title but what it actually asks is relatively clear, namely, whether matter is created alone or together with a form, so that the composite of matter and form is created. Remember that creation means to be produced out of nothing in the temporal order. Therefore, if matter is created alone, then any composite of matter and form is not properly speaking created since matter would exist before its coming into being, and so the composite would not be out of nothing. In the language of the title of the question, in this case a corporeal thing would be created because of matter. If instead matter is created together with a form, then the corporeal thing itself, that is, the composite of matter and form, would be properly speaking created, given that nothing belonging to it would exist before its coming into being. In the language of the title of the question, in this case a corporeal thing would be created because of matter together with form.

Another complication is about the notion of matter at stake. What is the matter this question of the *Summa Halensis* refers to? Is it prime matter in the medieval Aristotelian sense of matter without any forms? This Aristotelian expression is never used in this question (whereas it was the one used in the first question). In this question the expression used is *materia informis*: formless matter. This terminology is not Aristotelian, but a common one in medieval theological discussions. A major theological source of it are the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard,³⁴ a possible source of the *Summa* too. The question we are interested in is whether the difference in terminology conceals a substantial difference. Is *materia informis* simply another expression for prime matter? This is not the case, as is clear from the following explicit definition of formless matter, added to the title of the question:

(T15) Whether corporeal things are said to be created with respect to matter together with form or with respect to formless matter – and I understand formless matter in two ways: either because it does not have any forms or because has forms but in a confusion, which is called chaos – And

³⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 12, c. 1, in *Libri IV Sententiarum*, 2 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1916), vol. 1, p. 358: ‘Cum Deus in sapientia sua angelicos condidit spiritus, alia etiam creavit, sicut ostendit supra memorata Scriptura Genesis, quae dicit, in principio creasse Deum *caelum*, id est Angelos, et *terram*, scilicet materiam quattuor elementorum adhuc confusam et informem, quae a Graecis dicta est chaos; et hoc fuit ante omnem diem. Deinde elementa distinxit et species proprias atque distinctas singulis rebus secundum genus suum dedit, quae non simul, ut quibusdam sanctorum Patrum placuit, sed per intervalla temporum ac sex volumina dierum, ut aliis visum est formavit.’

if corporeal things are created with respect to formless matter, the question is in which of the two ways of taking formless matter this happens.³⁵

Thus, formless matter can either be understood as (i) matter without any forms or as (ii) matter with some kind of confusion/indistinction of forms. Formless matter in the first sense (i) is the Aristotelian prime matter (in the standard medieval reading). Formless matter in the second sense (ii) is not an Aristotelian item, but it is one suggested by theological sources. Peter Lombard, for example, seems to understand formless matter in the second sense only, without hinting at the Aristotelian sense.³⁶

The distinction between these two kinds of formless matter is taken into account in the discussion of the question. For example, of the six initial arguments against the alternative that formless matter (rather than the composite of matter and form) is created, three of them are against the creation of formless matter understood as matter without any forms (i.e. prime matter) and three are against the creation of formless matter understood as matter with the confusion of forms.³⁷ Similarly, of the four initial arguments in favor of the alternative that formless matter is created, two are in favor of the creation of formless matter understood as matter without any forms and two in favor the creation of formless matter understood as matter with the confusion of forms.³⁸

The Summists' reply to the question presents two contrasting views among the Saints on this issue, namely, the view that matter is created together with form and the view that formless matter is created, without explicitly taking side with one or other of these two views or without hinting at a possible reconciliation between the two.³⁹

(T16) To this question it must be replied in accordance with the different opinions of the Saints.

- (i) According to the opinion of Augustine, it seems that creation belongs to matter together with the form that gives perfection to matter, so that each single thing would be created in its proper matter and forms.
- (ii) According to the opinion of Gregory and others, it seems instead that matter is created in the substance of matter. Thus Gregory says: 'The things that have their origin from matter are produced simultaneously with matter in substance but not in their species, which is shown in the following days: sun and moon originating from the heavens, saplings and the like from the earth.' Augustine too in his book *On Symbol* seems to say this: 'By a su-

35 *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 305: 'Utrum res corporales dicantur creari ratione materiae cum forma aut ratione materiae informis – dico autem informem duobus modis: vel quia non habet formam vel quia habet in confusione quae dicitur chaos – Si vero ratione materiae informis, quo illorum duorum modorum.'

36 See n. 34 above.

37 *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 306.

38 *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 306.

39 A further task would be to find out whether the extensive discussions about *Genesis* in this section of the *Summa* offer clear evidence in favor of one of the two conflicting views. At a first reading, no such evidence appears.

premely ordered gift of God things have been arranged in such a way that the capacity to forms comes to be first, and afterwards all the things that have a form are formed.’ Furthermore, in *Confessions* XII, Augustine explains the claim ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth’ in one way as follows: ‘In virtue of the Word coeternal with him, God produced the formless matter of a corporeal creature, where there was a confusion of heavens and earth, which we now perceive as already distinct and with a form in the extension of this world.’ This explanation is in agreement with a Gloss on the beginning of Genesis. Furthermore, about the claim from Psalm ‘God himself commanded them and they are created,’ the Gloss says: ‘formless matter out of nothing.’⁴⁰

What I am interested in are the philosophical aspects of this question, those that provide indications of the Summists’ ideas about the ontological status of matter. The view that what is created is formless matter understood as matter without any forms is the most relevant one in this connection. For this view gives matter a very strong ontological status indeed: existence independent from any forms. And it is frustrating that the Summists’ reply to the question in presenting the second view (ii) among the Saints – the view that formless matter is created – does not make explicit which of the theological authorities quoted understand formless matter as matter without any forms and which instead understand formless matter as matter with a confusion of forms.

The Summists’ reply, however, becomes more interesting when it is compared with that of Thomas Aquinas to a parallel question from his *Summa Theologiae*.⁴¹

40 SH II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), pp. 306–7: ‘Ad quod respondendum secundum diversas sententias Sanctorum. (i) Secundum enim sententiam Augustini videtur quod creatio erat materiae cum forma perficienti eam, ita quod singulae res creatae essent in propriis materiis et formis. (ii) Secundum autem sententiam Gregorii et aliorum videtur quod creata sit in substantia materiae. Unde dicit Gregorius: “In substantia simul facta sunt quae de eis habent originem, sed non in specie, quae sequentibus diebus ostensa est: sol et luna de caelo, virgulta et huiusmodi de terra.” Augustinus etiam in libro *De Symbolo*, videtur hoc dicere: “Ordinatissimo Dei munere factum est ut primo capacitas formarum fieret, postea formarentur quaecumque formata sunt.” Item, Augustinus, in XII *Confessionum*, uno modo sic exponit “In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram:” “Deus Verbo sibi caeterno fecit informem materiam creaturae corporalis, ubi confusum erat caelum et terra, quae nunc iam distincta et formata in huius mundi mole sentimus.” Huic expositioni concordant quaedam Glossae super principium Geneseos. Item, super illud Psalmi: “Ipse mandavit et creata sunt,” Glossa dicit: “Informem materiam de nihilo.”

41 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 66, a. 1 (*Utrum informitas materiae creatae praecesserit tempore distinctionem ipsius*), co.: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Augustinus enim vult quod informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius, sed solum origine vel ordine naturae. Alii vero, ut Basilius, Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, volunt quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem. Et quamvis hae opiniones videantur esse contrariae, tamen parum ab invicem differunt, aliter enim accipit informitatem materiae Augustinus quam alii. Augustinus enim accipit informitatem materiae pro carentia omnis formae. Et sic impossibile est dicere quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit vel formationem ipsius, vel distinctionem. Et de formatione quidem manifestum est. Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere

Aquinas too presents two conflicting opinions among the Saints, but he shows that they can be reconciled. And Aquinas' major concern in reconciling them is clearly that of showing that none of the two views endorses the idea that matter can exist without any forms, an idea that Aquinas finds incoherent. No such concern appears in the reply of the Summists. In particular, while in presenting view (ii) that formless matter is created Aquinas immediately specifies that formless matter should not here be understood as matter without any forms but as matter with somehow a confusion of forms (or without the specific forms), the Summists do not care at all to distinguish which of the two senses of matter the second view refers to. This suggests that, unlike Aquinas, the Summists do not find anything fundamentally wrong with the idea that matter exists without any forms.

This positive attitude of the Summists towards the ontological status of prime matter also appears in their discussion of two arguments in favor of the creation of matter understood as matter without any forms:

1 Argument from the Order of Creation

(T17) Creation is a coming out from non-being into being, which is immediately followed by the coming out of the material potency into act; and this is making. But in the works of the six days there is making or founding. For it is said: *Let light be, and light is then made*, and likewise about the other things. Therefore, before making there was nothing else but creation. Therefore, matter was first created in some way from non-being into being, so that the order is the following: first from absolute non-being to potential being, and then from potential being to being in act, which is the kind of being determined by a form.⁴²

In this argument the being of matter is described as a potential being (*posse esse*) and it is contrasted both with non-being and with a being in act due to a form. The potential being of matter is a being, although of a different kind from the being in act due to a form. Indeed, creation is a passage from non-being to being, and what is created is matter and so a being. The further stage, namely, the passage from the potency of matter to the act of the form (i. e. the production of the composite), presupposes the existence of matter and so it is not creation (since it is not from

ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. (...) Alii vero sancti accipiunt informitatem, non secundum quod excludit omnem formam, sed secundum quod excludit istam formositatem et decorum qui nunc apparet in corporea creatura. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod informitas materiae corporalis duratione praecessit formationem eiusdem. Et sic secundum hoc, quantum ad aliquid cum eis Augustinus concordat, et quantum ad aliquid discordat (...).'

⁴² *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 307: 'Creatio est exitus de non-esse in esse, cui immediatus est exitus de potentia materiali in actum; hoc autem est "facere"; sed in operibus sex dierum est factio sive conditio. Dicitur enim: *Fiat lux, et facta est lux*, et ita de aliis. Ergo ante non fuit nisi creatio. Prius ergo creabatur de non-esse in esse aliquo modo materia, ut sit ordo de non-esse omnino in posse-esse, et deinde de posse-esse in esse actu, quod est esse per formam determinatum.'

nothing) but is called ‘factio’ (making) in theological terms, in Aristotelian terms it would be called generation.

The reply that, according to the Summists, someone supporting the opposite view would give is the following:

(T18) If one follows the first opinion, then, the objections must be replied as follows: although the coming out from absolute non-being into potential being – then followed by the coming out from potential being to the being in act in virtue of a form – can be understood, however, these two coming out take place simultaneously, so that form is created simultaneously with matter, and as joined to matter, so that the work of the Creator can be said to be perfect.⁴³

The reply denies that there are these two stages in the production of things. It is not the case that there is first the creation of matter, that is, the passage from non-being to potential being. The point relevant for us is that the reply does not challenge the coherence of the notion of matter existing without any forms. The passage from non-being to the being of matter can be understood, that is, is intelligible, the reply says.

The comparison with Aquinas is again meaningful, since Aquinas denies the coherence of the notion of matter existing without any forms. Thus, a reply to the argument along Aquinas’ lines of thought would be that the passage from non-being to the being of matter is not creation. Creation is a passage from non-being to being; but matter of itself is not a being. No hint to this kind of reply in our text. The idea there seems to be that the passage from non-being to the being of matter is not properly speaking creation, but not because matter is a not being altogether, but because it is not a complete/perfect being, as is suggested by the last sentence in the reply about the perfection of creation. Accordingly, if creation is understood as a passage from non-being to a perfect being, then it is not matter that is created but something with a form (which gives perfect being).

2 Argument from the Potency of Matter

(T19) The potency of the First extends to all things; and since this is proper to it, it cannot share this property with anything else; therefore, that thing among creatures that is most similar to the First as to the universality of potency is matter, which is capable of all forms; therefore, the first coming out effected by the divine potency seems to be the foundation of matter as capable of all forms.⁴⁴

⁴³ *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 307: ‘Si ergo teneatur prima sententia, respondendum est ad obiecta, dicendo quod, licet intelligi posset exitus de non-esse omnino in posse-esse et post de posse-esse in esse actu per formam, tamen simul utrumque factum est, ut simul crearetur forma cum materia, et hoc ut unita, ut opus Creatoris perfectum dicatur.’

⁴⁴ *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 306: ‘Primum habet potentiam quantum ad omne; hoc autem nulli potest communicare, cum sit eius proprium; illud ergo in creatura quod magis assimilatur ei in universalitate potentiae est materia, quae capax est omnium formarum; ergo primus exitus a potentia divina videtur esse conditio materiae ut capacis omnium formarum.’

This argument relies on an idea that we have already found in the argument from the possibility of matter against the Summists' view.⁴⁵ The idea is that the potency of the First and the potency of matter are powers of the same kind; their difference simply consists in the range of things subject to the two potencies. The potency of the First extends to all things (including matter) while the potency of matter extends to all forms only. Matter because of its potency is the creature most similar to the First. From this the argument concludes that matter is created first: what is created first is what is most similar to the First.

The reply of the Summists is the following:

(T20) To the second objection it must be replied that, although matter insofar as it is capable of forms has some similarity, although a very remote one, to the divine potency, it was not necessary, however, that matter was created as formless, but it was more appropriate that it would be capable in act rather than in potency only.⁴⁶

This short reply contains two points that are relevant for us because they indicate the Summists' positive attitude towards the ontological status of matter: (i) some kind of similarity between the potency of God and the potency of matter is admitted; (ii) the creation of matter without any forms is regarded as not necessary (*non oportuit quod sic crearetur informis*), but not as incoherent.

Conclusion

The two *quaestiones* of the *Summa* that I have focussed on in this paper deal with fundamental topics of the medieval speculation about matter. In the first *quaestio* the Summists argue for the central Christian thesis that matter is created by God in time so that it is not eternal but it starts to exist. In doing so, they defend this thesis from objections arising from major authoritative sources, like Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. Both Greek philosophers posited matter as an eternal independent principle of being. And it is Aristotle who provides the strongest argument for this view: the argument based on the assumption that matter is a principle of change or coming into being so that it cannot itself come into being.⁴⁷ The Summists' reply to this argument of the philosophers – as they describe it – is the standard one in the Christian tradition: the assumption of the philosophers about matter is only valid for the coming into being through natural changes, like generation and corruption, but not also

⁴⁵ See above, pp. 22–24.

⁴⁶ *SH* II, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 248), p. 307: 'Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet materia, in quantum est capax formarum, quamdam habeat similitudinem, sed multum remotam, respectu divinae potentiae, non tamen oportuit quod sic crearetur informis, sed magis conveniebat quod esset capax in actu quam tantum in potentia.'

⁴⁷ See above, (T13).

for the coming into being that only God can cause, i. e. creation from nothing.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Summists maintain that matter insofar as created from nothing is non-eternal but it starts to exist, contrary to what Augustine's example of the foot and the footprint suggests.⁴⁹ Their assumption here is that the notion itself of creation from nothing has built into it the notion of a temporal beginning.⁵⁰

This assumption, however, would become controversial in the later tradition. Both Aquinas and Scotus, for example, reject it.⁵¹ More generally, while the Summists are confident that they can prove the temporal beginning of matter and of the created universe with philosophical arguments, many later Christian philosophers are led to admit that temporal beginning is a matter of faith, not of philosophy.

The second *quaestio*, about the creation of formless matter, is of a more specifically theological nature. It presents a debate about the issue of the mode of creation of formless matter among eminent theological authorities (Augustine, Gregory and other 'saints'), a debate that has its origin in the Gloss on *Genesis*.⁵² This debate is also a very important one and would indeed continue to attract attention in the later tradition, as a parallel question from Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* indicates.⁵³ While the Summists' main concern in this *quaestio* is to present the opposite parties,⁵⁴ they also give an original contribution to this debate by pointing out some major philosophical ideas that animate the different views.

One of the principal aims of my analysis of the Summists' discussion about the creation of matter has been that of finding out what it tells us about the Summists' view on the issue of the ontological status of (prime) matter. The two most representative opposite views in the later tradition are those of Aquinas and Scotus, and it is these views that I have taken as a guide of my investigation. Formulated in anachronistic terms, the question that I have asked is whether the Summists side with Aquinas or with Scotus. The Summists' discussion, however, does not provide a definite answer to this question. The main problem here is that the question itself of the ontological status of matter is not explicitly asked by the Summists. There are many remarks relevant to this issue in the Summists' discussion but they are scattered throughout their dealing with other issues.

These remarks are not substantial and systematic enough to allow for reconstructing a reply to the question that can with some degree of certainty and accuracy be ascribed to the Summists. They do contain, however, important indications that the Summists do not share the strong feelings of Aquinas against the independence of the being of matter from form. The second *quaestio* about the creation of formless

⁴⁸ See above, (T14).

⁴⁹ See above, (T3).

⁵⁰ See above, (T4) and (T5).

⁵¹ See above, (T6) and (T7).

⁵² See above, n. 34.

⁵³ See above, n. 41.

⁵⁴ See above, (T16).

matter offers an excellent occasion for expressing such feelings. And Aquinas does not miss this occasion in his discussion of a parallel question from his *Summa Theologiae*.⁵⁵ No such negative reaction on the Summists' side. They present the opinion of those theologians who posited that matter is created on its own, without any forms, as a perfectly acceptable one, just like the opposite opinion according to which matter is created together with forms.⁵⁶ There are also positive indications that the Summists' attitude to the ontological status of matter is similar to that of Scotus. For example, they point out that the potency proper to matter is not a potency to existence but a potency to forms, so that matter is an actual being, although it is in itself in potency to forms.⁵⁷ This distinction corresponds to Scotus' distinction between objective and subjective potency, which is a central theme of his account of matter. The Summists' discussion, however, offers conflicting evidence about their conception of the potency of matter with respect to forms. In some passages this potency is described as a passive power and contrasted with the active power;⁵⁸ this is the standard Aristotelian view endorsed by Scotus too. In other passages instead this potency seems to be understood as an active one, so that matter plays somehow an active role with respect to the forms that come to exist in it,⁵⁹ an idea that is rejected by Scotus but endorsed by many Aristotelians of the middle of the 13th century.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ See above, n. 41.

⁵⁶ See above, (T16). See also the Summists' replies to the arguments in favor of this opinion in the texts (T17) to (T20).

⁵⁷ See above, (T11) and (T12).

⁵⁸ See above, (T2) and n. 9.

⁵⁹ See above, texts (T8) to (T10).

⁶⁰ See my paper Cecilia Trifogli, 'Geoffrey of Aspell on Matter,' in *Materia, Nouvelles perspectives de recherche dans la pensée et la culture médiévales (XIIe–XVIe siècles)*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Florence: SISMEL-Edizioni dell Galluzzo, 2017), pp. 99–122, and the secondary literature quoted there.

Magdalena Bieniak

The Soul-Body Union in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The author of the first part of book II of the *Summa Halensis* – perhaps Alexander of Hales himself – was among the partisans of the plurality of forms. The aim of this paper is to examine the character of Alexander’s hylomorphism, his philosophical strategies, sources, and motivations. It is argued that the *Summa* combines a wide range of philosophical and theological sources in order to build a non-Aristotelian anthropological vision, which is part of a broader metaphysical picture. The Aristotelian conception of the human being from the *De anima*, which makes the soul the first act or the form of the organic body, is rejected on the grounds of three basic assumptions: no form can move its own matter; the forms in the most proper sense are principles of homoeomerous substances, such as fire or gold; the human being is composed according to the principle of continuous proportion (*analogia syneches*), which rules out any direct union of elements that have nothing in common. The matter and the rational soul are such disparate elements, while the form-matter relation is direct.

As soon as the idea of a hylomorphic compound made its way into universities and became the basic conceptual pattern in physics, metaphysics, and even in some areas of theology, the controversy around the plurality of forms emerged.¹ The problem was general and concerned the whole created world, but was discussed mainly with reference to human beings. During the first half of the 13th century, most theologians maintained that the human organism was determined by more than one substantial form. There were many variants of the pluralist position, but all of them were somehow related to the common view that the human soul was a complete, spiritual substance, united to a particular body which had its own autonomy of some kind. The author of the *prima secundae* of the *Summa Halensis* – perhaps Alexander of Hales himself² – was among the partisans of the plurality of forms. Like his predecessors and contemporaries, he benefited from a wide range of philosophical and theological sources and combined them in order to build his vision of

1 For a survey of the debate on the plurality of forms, see for example Daniel A. Callus, ‘Forms, Unicity and Plurality of,’ in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 5, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Thomson/Gale; Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2003), pp. 816–19. An excellent study of the early 13th-century discussion can be found in Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des forms* (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1951), pp. 383–436.

2 On the problem of the authorship of the *Summa Halensis*, see above all Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*,’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), pp. 274–312 (on book II, see pp. 296–310). The main part of book II was composed while Alexander was still alive, i. e. before 1245, under the strong influence of John of La Rochelle.

the human being.³ Unsurprisingly, then, his standpoint has often been considered eclectic from a Thomistic perspective. More disputable is the tendency to accuse the so-called eclectic Aristotelianism of being philosophically unsound and superficial. In this paper, I will try to avoid this prejudice in examining the character of Alexander's hylomorphism, his philosophical strategies, sources, and motivations. My aim is to show that the *Summa Halensis* offers a mature and well-thought-out account of the human composite, and this account is part of a broader metaphysical picture.

The Definition of the Soul

The basic anthropological position of the *Summa Halensis* is revealed by the way in which the Aristotelian theory of the soul is treated in the chapter where various definitions of the soul are discussed. The attitude of the author of that chapter becomes evident in the context of other writings. In the first half of the 13th century, it was not unusual for Latin masters to quote Aristotle's definition of the soul. Roland of Cremona,⁴ Hugh of St Cher,⁵ William of Auvergne,⁶ John of La Rochelle⁷ all included the *Peri psyches* formula in their lists of definitions, among other, more dualistic descriptions. For each of these authors, the soul is both a form and a substance, although the words 'form' and 'first act' are used less frequently than other terms: those who followed the Arabic tradition used the term '*perfectio*';⁸ those who preferred to stick to the Latin translation by Jacob of Venice, spoke of *entelechy*.⁹

There was a growing interest in Aristotle's psychology in the thirties and in the forties, that is to say at the time when the second book of the *Summa Halensis* was written. However, at least in one aspect, the author of this book seems quite resistant

3 On the Arabic and Jewish origins of the theory of the plurality of forms, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), pp. 119–30.

4 Roland of Cremona, *Summa*, MS Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, 795, f. 34va, in Charles R. Hess, 'Roland of Cremona's Place in the Current of Thought,' *Angelicum* 45:4 (1968), pp. 429–77, on p. 440; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), pp. 36–42.

5 Hugh of St Cher, *De anima*, ed. Magdalena Bieniak, in 'Una questione disputata di Ugo di St-Cher sull'anima. Edizione e studio dottrinale,' *Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne* 37 (2004), pp. 127–84, on p. 169.

6 William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. Blaise Le Feron, in *Opera omnia: Supplementum*, eds. F. Hotot and Blaise Le Feron (Orléans-Paris, 1674, repr. Frankfurt a.M., 1963), p. 65.

7 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques-Guy Bougerol (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), p. 53.

8 See Meryem Sebti, *Avicenne: L'âme humaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000), pp. 16–17; Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem*, pp. 13–16.

9 Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.1 (412a 20–21), *translatio vetus*, ed. Manuel Alonso, in Peter of Spain, *Obras filosoficas*, vol. 3 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1952), p. 188. See also Bieniak, 'Una questione disputata,' pp. 155–56, n. 100.

to the Aristotelian fashion. The chapter on the definition of the soul – *Quid sit anima secundum definitionem* – does not include the Aristotelian definition. The author of the *Summa* knew Aristotle's *libri naturales* very well, as can be seen from his numerous references. Moreover, he calls the human soul 'the perfection of the body' many times.¹⁰ Surprisingly, however, in response to the question 'what is the soul?', he chooses not to include the Aristotelian account of the soul in the list of defensible definitions.¹¹ Instead, he quotes numerous sources: a couple of Augustinian texts, the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, the works of Seneca, Cassiodorus, and John of Damascus. On the basis of these *auctoritates*, the author of the *Summa* concludes that the soul is a spiritual substance.¹² This substance is a concrete particular (*hoc aliquid*) and a compound of spiritual matter and form.¹³

But Aristotle has a role to play in this account. In order to show that the soul is an independent substance, the *Summa* compares the soul-body union to the relationship between a sailor and his ship, a metaphor that Aristotle himself found problematic.¹⁴ Moreover, it is vigorously argued that the soul is not a substantial form or act, and the basis for the argumentation is found in Aristotle's *Physics*.

According to the *Summa*, someone who considers the soul as the first act of an organic body has to admit that the soul is *nothing more* than a substantial form. This would mean that the whole act of the soul is exhausted in its matter and that the soul cannot perform any other act than that of being the act of the body.¹⁵ Within the Peripatetic framework, this inference seems strange, because Aristotle makes a distinction between the first act and the second act:¹⁶ the first act of the body – i. e. the soul – is also responsible for all the second acts of life, such as growth, nutrition, or sense perception. Yet for Aristotle, the second acts are movements of the hylomorphic whole, i. e. of the living organism, not of the soul alone. In my opinion, this is the part of the hylomorphic theory that the author of the *Summa Halensis* rejects. According to the *Summa*, the only author and subject of bodily movements is the soul. In order to prove this standpoint, the *Summa* turns to Aristotle's theory of movement. In *Physics*, Aristotle wrote:

Of things to which the motion is essential, some derive their motion from themselves, others from something else: and in some cases their motion is natural, in others violent and unnatural.

10 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, pp. 151b, 152b; *ibid.*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, p. 399a; *ibid.*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, p. 404b; *ibid.*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, pp. 418b-22b and C2, p. 423b; *ibid.*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C1, pp. 579a-80b.

11 In this and many other respects the *Summa Halensis* follows Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*.

12 See *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, pp. 384b-86a.

13 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, p. 399a-b.

14 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, p. 386a; Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.1 (413a 9).

15 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, pp. 385b-86a.

16 Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.1 (413a 8–9).

(...) The animal as a whole moves itself naturally: but the body of the animal may be in motion unnaturally as well as naturally: it depends upon the kind of motion that it may chance to be suffering and the kind of element of which it is composed. And the motion of things that derive their motion from something else is in some cases natural, in others unnatural: e.g. upward motion of earthy things and downward motion of fire are unnatural. Moreover the parts of animals are often in motion in an unnatural way, their positions and the character of the motion being abnormal. The fact that a thing that is in motion derives its motion from something is most evident in things that are in motion unnaturally, because in such cases it is clear that the motion is derived from something other than the thing itself.¹⁷

Drawing on Aristotle, the *Summa* offers the following reasoning: some movements are natural, others are contrary to nature. The natural movements – as Aristotle claims – are: for fire to rise, for earthy things to fall, and similar. The parts of a plant, for example, are weighty, earthy things. Their natural movement would be to go down, but some of them – like leaves or plant sap – move upward. The movement of leaves and sap is, therefore, not a natural movement.¹⁸ Aristotle admits that parts of living organisms may move in an unnatural way, and the unnatural motion is the best proof that an object is moved by something else. The body movements are the best proof that the body is moved by something different than itself. In the absence of an external force applied on the body, the bodily movements demonstrate that the body is moved by its soul. Consequently, the soul and the body are two different substances, even in the plants, and the demonstration of this can be found in Aristotle himself.

The soul has two basic functions related to its body: it is the principle of movement and the principle of life. The two kinds of operation are, of course, strictly related, because a living organism is moved by a kind of motion associated with life, which – as we have seen – has to be distinguished from natural movements, such as the upward movement of fire. The *Summa Halensis* uses the distinction between mov-

17 Aristotle, *Physics*, 8.4 (254b 12–25), ed. Jonathan Barnes, *Complete Works of Aristotle*, trans. Robert P. Hardie and Russell K. Gaye, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 425.

18 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, pp. 386b-87a: ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc discernitur vitam habens a non vivente, quia motus vitalis est in contrarium motui naturae. Videmus enim quod secundum motum naturae grave fertur deorsum et leve sursum, secundum motum vero nutrimenti grave fertur sursum, sicut apparet in plantis, et quod igneum est, ut cholera, fertur deorsum in animalibus, cum nutritur simile simili. (...) Ergo differentia est inter esse vitale et naturale, et ideo <anima> dicitur “propria substantia sui corporis vivificatrix.” [‘A living being can be distinguished from something inanimate by the fact that the motion associated with life is contrary to the motion of nature. For we see that, in the movements of nature, heavy things go down, and light things go up, while in the movements of nutrition heavy things move upwards, as can be seen in plants, and the things that are fire-like, such as the bile, move downwards in animals, since like is nourished by like. (...) Hence there is a difference between a biological being and a natural being, and so the soul is called “a proper substance that vivifies its body.”’]

ing and vivifying mainly in order to explain the difference between the rational soul and the angel: an angel can assume and move a body, but it cannot give life to it.¹⁹

One feature may seem particularly striking in the *Summa's* rebuttal of the *Peri psyches* definition. In order to prove that the soul's essence is not limited to being the act of a body, it focuses on physics and on the movements of living organisms. In the chapter on the definition of the soul, it is not even mentioned that, according to Aristotle, the intellectual activity of the soul may be performed without an organ, even though the presence of such power would prove that the soul is something more than an act of body parts. Apparently, the case of intellect is not essential to the point that is being made. Let us then investigate the philosophical basis of the *Summa's* position.

Nature and Movement

In order to understand why the author of the *Summa* claims that the soul cannot be considered a form, it is useful to determine how he describes the nature of the body. The chapter on the difference between the soul and an angel contains a brief explanation of what is intended by 'natural being'. When something is considered in its natural existence, it is studied with reference to the bodies that are capable of movement.²⁰ The soul is the principle of the life of the organism. Consequently, in order to investigate the natural being of the soul, one has to examine the motion of the human body. However, while the movements of the living body tell us a lot about the soul's nature, paradoxically, they do not tell us much about the body itself. The reason can be found again in Aristotle's *Physics*: 'nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.'²¹ Since any movement associated with life (*motus vitalis*) is caused by something other than the body, namely by the soul, the *Summa* concludes that no movement associated with life is natural for the body.

However, any natural substance has its own natural kind of movement, and the human body is no exception. The organism is composed of flesh, blood, bones, etc. Each of these materials has its natural kind of movement; for example, blood has a natural movement similar to water, and bones have a natural movement similar to earth. This means that each kind of matter making up the body has its own nature or essence, and each of these ingredients has its own formal principle. The form itself never moves the matter of which it is the form (*forma non movet suam materiam lo-*

¹⁹ See *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, p. 385b.

²⁰ *SH* II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, p. 150b: 'Quantum ad esse naturale, in quo fit consideratio corporum mobilium et eorum quae ordinantur ad illa.' ['As for the natural being, we consider moving bodies and the items assigned to them.']

²¹ Aristotle, *Physics*, 2.1 (192b 20–22), p. 329.

caliter). The role of the act is different: it makes the matter what it is, namely, the form is responsible for the actual being of the matter and for nothing more.²² The natural movement of any substance is possible thanks to its particular form, but the form does not move. Indeed, in order to cause a natural movement of something heavy, it is necessary for example to remove an obstacle or to apply some kind of force (*a removente prohibens movetur et perducente ad suum locum*). Even the form of fire does not move its own matter, as Alexander explicitly states (*igneitas enim non movet materiam cuius est actus*). We get the false impression that the form of fire moves its matter because the fire acts on the matter of the air and moves it by actualizing its potency.²³

To summarize, the *Summa Halensis* refuses to define the soul as the first act of a body, because the only function of any act or form is to make matter what it is, namely, to confer a specific nature on matter, and not to move it. Since the soul is the principle of bodily movements, it cannot be the act of the body.

Homoeomerous Substances and Living Bodies

Properly speaking, the soul is not a form. However, in some sense the soul can be considered a kind of form or perfection. In order to explain the difference between a proper form and the soul, Alexander presents a hierarchy, in which the lowest and the most basic position is determined by what we could call the homoeomerous

22 See *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, p. 399a: 'Eodem modo forma non movet suam materiam localiter, quia non est quid actu praeter suam materiam; anima vero movet ipsum corpus quod est perfectum ab ea, et ideo non dicitur tantum forma, sed in se substantia.' ['In the same way, the form does not move its matter with regard to place, because it is something in act only in relation to its matter, whereas the soul moves the same body to which it gives perfection, hence it is not only called a form but also a substance in its own right.']; *ibid.*, p. 399b: 'Ad quantum dicendum quod non est simile de forma et anima: forma enim, praeter hoc quod est materiae forma, non habet aliquam actualitatem; sed anima praeter hoc quod est anima, habet virtutem quamdam secundum quam dicitur habere compositionem propriam, cui respondet agere et pati, etiam cum est separata.' ['There is a difference between the form and the soul: the form does not have any actuality apart from being a form of some matter, while the soul not only is a form of some matter but also has some excellence by virtue of which it is said to be a compound in its own right, acting and being acted upon, even in its separate state.']

23 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, p. 386a: 'Et hoc patet per exemplum: igneitas enim non movet materiam cuius est actus, sed materiam aeris, ut extrahat in actu quod fuit in potentia; eodem modo ponderosum quod movetur, a removente prohibens movetur et perducente ad suum locum. Restat ergo: cum anima per se moveat corpus, erit aliquid praeter hoc quod est forma sive actus corporis; ergo erit substantia simpliciter.' ['The following example makes it clear: the form of fire does not move the matter of which it is an act, but moves the matter of the air, making actual what has been in potency. By the same token, a weighty thing in motion is moved by something that removes an obstacle and by something that leads it to its place. Consequently, given that the soul itself moves the body, the soul is something more than a form or an act of the body, hence it is simply a substance.']

forms. But before taking a closer look at this theory, let me make a short general remark.

A typical scholastic *summa*, commentary, or collection of questions covers many topics and addresses a great number of particular problems. In such vast works, it is quite normal to find slight shifts in opinions from one topic to another. These differences do not necessarily derive from the time lapse between the composition of different questions or chapters, or from a difference in authorship. The adopted line of argumentation often depends on the currently discussed issue. Each question had its own autonomous tradition, in which a standard set of *auctoritates* and some argumentative strategies were transmitted from one master to another. Moreover, each issue required a different approach because of the doctrinal limits imposed on each discussion. It is then no surprise that the anthropological account offered in the second book of *Summa Halensis* assumes a different tone depending on the problem at stake. Hence, when speaking of the definition of the soul, Alexander vividly refuses to call the soul an act, a form or even a *perfectio*. However, when he examines the difference between the soul and the angel or the relationship between the soul and the body, the terms '*perfectio*' and 'form' turn out to be quite useful.²⁴

Another way of saying that the soul is the principle of life is to call it a formal perfection of the body (*perfectio formalis*).²⁵ Yet this label must be qualified. First, neither the essence of the body nor the essence of the soul needs to be perfected or completed. The soul is a spiritual substance, perfect in its own spiritual nature. It is naturally capable of union (*unibilis*), but not incomplete. By the same token, the body is a finished corporeal substance, ready for union. It needs the soul in order to live and in order to maintain its shape and qualities, since without a soul the body cannot endure; however, the nature or the essence of the body is ready before the soul arrives. The soul-body union is a natural union of two substances. The soul is called a *perfectio*, because a living organism is something more noble and higher than a body without a soul, not because without a soul the body is less corporeal or lacks its natural organs.²⁶

Second, the word *perfectio* does not describe the soul's essence but its function in relation to the body: the spirit is considered in itself, the soul in relation to the body (*de spiritu est consideratio absolute, de anima respectiva*).²⁷ The essence or the definition of the soul is to be a spirit. The soul is an act or a perfection, but

²⁴ See above, n. 10.

²⁵ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, p. 420a: 'Ad quod dicendum quod anima rationalis coniungitur suo corpori ut motor mobili et ut perfectio formalis suo perfectibili.' ['The soul is united to its body like a mover to what is moved and like the formal perfection to what is perfected.']

²⁶ See *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, p. 419a.

²⁷ *SH* II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, p. 149a. See also *ibid.*, p. 151b: 'Licet sit considerare substantiam animae in se per modum spiritus, nihilominus tamen in esse naturali est "perfectio corporis organici."' ['Although one should regard the very substance of the soul as a spirit, nevertheless, with regard to its natural being, the soul is "the perfection of an organic body."']

only with reference to the natural world, namely in its relationship to a corporeal substance that is capable of movement. This notion is reminiscent of the famous Avicennian principle, the so-called double consideration of the soul, according to which ‘the soul has two faces.’²⁸ There is, however, an important difference. Avicenna maintains that the soul’s capacity for union with a particular body is an accidental feature of the soul. By contrast, Alexander of Hales, just like many other theologians of his time, claims that this aptitude for unity (*unibilitas*) is an essential feature. Why then does he refuse to accept the Aristotelian definition of the soul? Clearly, Alexander considered this definition reductionist: the soul is *not* the capacity for union but *has* the capacity for union. Moreover, it seems that what is intended by the ‘essential capacity for union’ is that the soul joins the body directly with its essence, and not, for example, through the mediation of some of its potencies. Nevertheless, as will be seen below, the soul needs some media in order to operate.

Finally, the reluctance to call the soul a form or perfection depends on a fundamental principle which is repeatedly stated in book II of the *Summa Halensis*. The position of this rule is significant: it can usually be found at the beginning of the solutions to the discussed problems. Moreover, the principle is not subject to modification depending on the context. The rule is as follows. There are two basic kinds of forms. The first kind – the form properly speaking – is the form closest to matter. It is the principle of the homoeomers. Such substances share all their properties with all their parts: for instance, the properties of fire or gold are the same regardless of whether we choose to consider the bulk of it, or a tiny part of a greater mass. The same rule is also expressed in terms of predicability: ‘any portion of fire can be called fire.’ Thus the ‘material forms’ act in the same way upon the whole substances and upon their parts. By contrast, the forms of the second kind act upon the matter in such a way that none of the parts are called by the same name as the whole. No part of an animal is called ‘an animal’ (even though some parts are sentient).²⁹ This is why the *Summa* claims that the soul is a kind of form that is distant from matter: the soul gives perfection to the whole in a different manner than to its parts.

The distinction between the forms of like-parted substances and the superior forms is certainly not an invention of the *Summa Halensis*. Very similar accounts can be found in Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de bono*³⁰ and in the *Summa de anima* by John of La Rochelle.³¹ The idea might have come from *De generatione et corruptione*, where Aristotle argues that every living body is composed of *anhomoeo-*

²⁸ Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus*, 1.1, ed. Simone van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 1.1, pp. 26–27. On the medieval reception of this theory, see above all Massimiliano Lenzi, *Anima, forma e sostanza: filosofia e teologia nel dibattito antropologico del XIII secolo* (Spoleto: CISAM, 2011).

²⁹ See *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, p. 386a and *ibid.*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C1, p. 579a-b.

³⁰ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, vol. 1, ed. Nicolai Wicki (Berne: Francke, 1985), pp. 288–89.

³¹ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 1.42, pp. 132–33.

merous parts, each of which is composed of homoeomers, such as flesh and bone. Moreover, Aristotle claims that

the difference between the matter and the form is clearer (in the case of anhomoeomers, such as hand or head) than in the case of flesh and the homoeomers. This is why we would be more inclined to think of a dead man's flesh and bone as still existing than his hand and arm.³²

This may seem not far from saying that the forms of like-parted substances are closer to the matter than the forms of complex bodies. Yet the basic distinction between the two kinds of forms does not exhaust the issue of the ontological structure of the living beings. The rational soul differs not only from the material forms, but also from the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul. The formal perfections are ordered in an ontologically founded hierarchy, which again brings us to the theory of multiple substantial forms.

***Analogia Syneches*, or the Principle of Continuous Proportion**

Among all the formal principles, the material forms and the rational soul occupy the extreme positions. Both constitute the human being at some level. In order to think of the human being as one substance, it is necessary to link these extremes by some suitable media. This urge lies at the heart of medieval Neoplatonism and is among the basic metaphysical principles used in the *Summa Halensis*. It is the rule of continuous proportion – *analogia syneches* – made explicit by Calcidius in his Commentary on *Timaeus*.³³ Calcidius explains how the body of the world maintains its unity despite the fact that it is composed of opposite elements, such as fire and earth, which have nothing in common. These elements are linked through media in such a way that the neighbouring elements share at least one common quality, creating a chain of partly similar and partly different components.

The same pattern is present in many 13th-century anthropological accounts, including the *Summa Halensis*.³⁴ Between the material forms and the rational soul there are two formal media. The vegetative perfection belongs to the second class of forms, namely to the forms of uneven bodies, because not all the parts – or perhaps no part – of a plant can be called ‘a plant’. Nevertheless, the vegetative perfection is to some extent similar to the forms of homoeomerous bodies, because it gives

³² Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione*, 1.5 (321b 28–33), trans. Christopher F.J. Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 19.

³³ Calcidius, *Commentarius in Timaeum*, 18, ed. Jan H. Waszink (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), p. 68. See Irene Caiazzo, ‘Harmonie et mathématique dans le cosmos du XII^e siècle,’ *Micrologus* 25 (2017), 121–47, on pp. 134–35.

³⁴ For more on the union *per media*, see Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem*, pp. 119–36.

life to each part of the organism. The vegetative form is closer to the matter than the sensitive form, since the latter is the perfection of the whole animal, but not of each of its parts. In fact, not all the organs of an animal are capable of sense perception. Finally, the rational soul, the furthest from matter, is the perfection of the whole organism, but of none of the parts, because the intellect has no proper organ.³⁵

What Alexander implies in this account is that the hylomorphic union properly speaking is the union between the material form and matter. The union between the rational soul and the human body somewhat resembles the hylomorphic union but also differs from it in some key respects. In the hylomorphic union, the form is nothing but the act of matter; its being is exhausted in this function. The rational soul is a concrete particular (*hoc aliquid*) and has many acts other than conferring nature and shape on the matter. Furthermore, the rational soul is not the form of prime matter, but of an organic body, which is complete and ready for union thanks to its own form, the *forma corporalis* – a well-known Avicennian concept.³⁶

As already mentioned, the soul-body union is supposed to be direct and essential. Nevertheless, the *Summa Halensis* claims, on the one hand, that the body has to be prepared for the union before the soul arrives; on the other hand, it affirms that the soul operates in the body through a number of media on the part of the soul and on the part of the body. On the soul's part, the organs are activated through the vegetative and the sensitive powers. Yet it is difficult to see how it is possible to claim at the same time that the soul operates in the body through its potencies and that the union is direct and essential. Perhaps it could be useful to appeal to the Aristotelian metaphor used in the *Summa Halensis*. The soul is like a sailor on a ship. One can say that the sailor navigates per media of his hands and legs, and still claim that his union with the ship is direct and essential, because the whole sailor is present on board. By the same token, the soul animates the body through the vegetative and sensitive powers but is directly united to the body.

However, using the sailor parallel involves a difficulty. The vegetative and sensitive potencies are not parts of the soul strictly speaking, because only corporeal beings can truly be divided, while the soul is incorporeal. Yet someone who introduces soul-based media between the rational soul and the body suggests that the soul can be divided into parts. The *Summa de bono*, to which the *Summa Halensis* is greatly indebted, supported a similar theory of media and claimed that the human soul was composed of three substances.³⁷ The *Summa Halensis* claims that the soul con-

³⁵ A long and detailed exposition of this theory can be found in *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, p. 422a-b.

³⁶ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, p. 422b. On the form of 'corporeity', see Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, 2.2, ed. Simone van Riet, 3 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 78–79; Sebtī, *Avicenne*, pp. 22–23. The concept can be found also in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, vol. 1, p. 284.

³⁷ See *Summa de bono*, vol. 1, pp. 233–34. A study of Philip's theory can be found in Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla*, pp. 397–98, 407–9, and in Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem*, pp. 119–30.

sists of only one indivisible substance but maintains the theory of operational media at the same time.³⁸

The human soul combines all the forms of a living being *qua* living: is has the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational powers, all embedded in one substance. One human being has only one soul, but it does not mean that it has only one form. The human body is, in fact, a complex substance. Its complexity is ensured by a multitude of material and organic forms, which are held together by the *forma corporalis*. Finally, the existence of the body is preserved by the ultimate perfection, namely the soul.

The numerous capacities and the complexity of the human organism bear witness to the spirituality of the soul. Inspired by Ibn Gabirol's *Fons vitae*, Alexander affirms: 'the more a substance is free from matter, the more actions it is capable of performing.'³⁹ Moreover, in order to bring to fruition all of its capacities, the soul needs an appropriate tool, and the human body is the right one, because it is the most sophisticated among the corporeal creatures.

The multipart, hierarchical structure of the human being reflects the structure of the universe. The same principle of continuity, which governs the body of the world, governs the human organism. But the order of resemblance is from top to bottom, not the other way around. The origin of the analogy of the natural structures is God himself, who created man in his own image (Gen. 1:27). The numerous potencies of the soul reflect the multiplicity of Forms in God's mind, and the complexity of the body reflects the powerfulness of the human soul.⁴⁰ The Neoplatonic metaphysics find their ultimate validation in the book of Genesis.

38 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, p. 404b: 'Ad quod potest responderi quod una est substantia in homine habens has virtutes; unde 'anima rationalis, cum separatur, secum trahit sensum et imaginationem', sicut dicitur in libro De anima et spiritu.' ['In the human being, there is only one substance that has these powers; accordingly, 'when the rational soul is detached, it carries away the sense perception and the imagination,' as the book *On the Soul and the Spirit* says.']

39 *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C1, p. 579a: 'Quanto substantia aliqua magis est immunis a materia, tanto plurium operationum est effectiva.' See Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, ed. Clemens Baeumker (Munich: Aschendorff, 1895), tr. 4 (n. 14), p. 243: 'Et propter hoc accidit quod una substantia est sapientior alia et perfectior, scilicet propter spissitudinem materiae et turbationem, non propter formam in se ipsa, quia scientia et cognitio ex forma est.' ['And for that reason, it happens that some substances are wiser and more perfect than others – because of the density of the matter and due to some perturbation, not by virtue of the form as such, since knowledge and cognition come from the form.'] Alexander uses the *Fons vitae* quite frequently and adopts Ibn Gabirol's view that the soul is composed of form and matter.

40 See *SH* II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, M3, C1, p. 578b.

Conclusion

I believe that there is enough evidence to state that Alexander is not seeking to mitigate the *Peri psyches* definition in order to protect the soul's immortality, but he simply rejects the Aristotelian notion of the soul for its own sake. He does this on the grounds of some well-defined philosophical principles, which include the following:

1. In a hylomorphic composite, the only function of the form is to make the respective matter what it is. In particular, a form which gives perfection to some matter cannot be the mover of that matter.
2. The forms in the first and most proper sense of the word are forms of homoeomerous substances. The soul is not a form properly speaking, because no part of an animal can be called an animal.
3. The human being is a complex, pluriform organism, which is composed according to the principle of continuous proportion. Matter and the rational soul comprise the two extremes of this composite and therefore they require media in order to operate together.

None of these principles is new. What is perhaps unique in the second book of the *Summa Halensis*, is the attempt to find an alternative label for the soul-body combination that would emphasize its distinctiveness. Instead of calling it a 'hylomorphic unity', Alexander retrieves a formula from Bernard of Clairvaux, who called the soul-body relation an 'inborn unity' (*unitas nativa, qua anima et caro unus nascitur homo*).⁴¹ Alexander's attempt was appreciated by Bonaventure, who used the same label in his *Sentences* Commentary in order to show the analogy between the soul-body union and the hypostatic union, both of which result in the birth of one person.⁴² But more importantly, the attempt to find a particular name for the soul-body relation shows how strongminded the author of the *Summa Halensis* was in finding a coherent and comprehensive anthropological account that could compete with the Aristotelian vision.

⁴¹ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, p. 422a: 'Ad quod dicendum quod haec unio, quae est animae et corporis, a B. Bernardo dicitur nativa et se habet ad modum formae cum materia. Sed (...) non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis. Sic ergo habet proprium modum unionis, et ideo vocat B. Bernardus istam unionem proprio nomine unitatem nativam.' ['Blessed Bernard calls the union between the soul and the body "the inborn union," which is similar to the union between the form and the matter. Yet (...) properly speaking, [in that union] the act is not united to matter, but the natural act is united to a complete body in its natural form, and that form is called "the corporeal form." Thus, [the soul] has its own mode of union, and Blessed Bernard calls this union with its proper name: "the inborn union."'] See Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione ad Eugenium* 5, c. 8 (PL 182:799C-D).

⁴² Bonaventure, *Commentaria in III Sententiarum*, d. 6, ar. 2, q. 2 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1887), vol. 3, pp. 160–61.

Anna-Katharina Strohschneider

The *Summa Halensis* on Theology and the Sciences: The Influence of Aristotle and Avicenna

Abstract: This chapter investigates the conception of theology as a science in the *Summa Halensis*, and shows how the author of book I utilizes the theories of Aristotle and Avicenna. The Summist introduces his own innovative system of the sciences, into which theology is integrated. I argue that in justifying the claim that theology is a science and in explaining how both metaphysics and theology are wisdom, the author takes over Aristotle's theory of what constitutes a science and his definition of wisdom and uses Avicenna's terminology for the first cause. In his solution to the problem of the subject-matter of theology, he adopts Avicenna's influential distinction between the proper subject-matter of a science and that which it seeks. Instead of Avicenna's own expressions, however, he uses the vocabulary of Augustine and Peter Lombard. The chapter thus shows how the author reacts to the newly available sources translated from the Arabic and incorporates them into his own framework. Under their influence, the *Summa* suggests a solution to the novel problem of theology as a science by creating a theory of theology which combines the requirements of 'sacred doctrine' with a philosophical, rational concept of science.

Over the course of the 12th century and into the early 13th century, the theory of science in the Latin Christian world changed considerably under the influence of not only new and better translations of Aristotle – especially the *Posterior Analytics* – but also philosophical sources translated from the Arabic such as the works of Avicenna.¹ Consequently, the methodological requirements of a science and the relations between the different sciences, their order and their interdependence, were widely debated. In this climate, the question of the scientific status of Christian theology came into focus. As far as we know, Roland of Cremona was the first to explicitly discuss theology as a science.² But if theology is a science, is it a science according to the criteria put forth by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*? Or is it wisdom in the Augustinian sense? What is its methodology and its inner structure, its relation to

1 Charles Burnett, 'Arabic into Latin,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, eds. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 370–404, esp. pp. 373–74; Charles Burnett, 'The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth Century,' *Science in Context* 14 (2001), pp. 249–88.

2 Charles R. Hess, 'Roland of Cremona's Place in the Current of Thought,' *Angelicum* 45 (1968), pp. 429–77, esp. pp. 453–55.

faith and the human intellect? And what is theology about? These questions were widely debated in the 13th century.³

The *Summa Halensis* is one of the earliest texts to answer these questions. In this article I will claim that it does so by taking over doctrines from Aristotle and Avicenna and incorporating them into its own original theory. Thus, the *Summa* can defend theology as a genuine science while also keeping it distinct from other sciences by devising a system of distinctions between different types of scientific endeavour. Finally, the Summist can solve the problem of what theology is about as a science by adopting Avicenna's theory of the subject-matter of metaphysics.

The *Summa Halensis* was composed shortly after the newly-translated sources had become available, but before an established way of dealing with these new authorities had been developed. It has recently been shown that the authors of the *Summa Halensis* indeed rely heavily in many areas of their philosophy on both Aristotle and Avicenna.⁴ As was common at the time, they seem to have read the two authors side by side, not always clearly distinguishing between them, and interpreting Aristotle through the lens of Avicenna.⁵ There are cases in which a theory which was actually established by Avicenna is ascribed to Aristotle, or in which an Aristotelian theory is cloaked in Augustinian language.⁶ The authors of the *Summa Halensis* refer to both Aristotle and Avicenna frequently,⁷ but they are not always straightforward in reporting their sources. So the influence of Aristotle and Avicenna is not immediately obvious in its full extent.

In the following, I will investigate how the author of the beginning of the first book of the *Summa Halensis* – probably John of La Rochelle⁸ – grappled with

3 Oleg V. Bychkov, 'The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and His Franciscan Predecessors,' *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), pp. 5–62, esp. pp. 13–15; Philotheus Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics in Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5:4 (1945), pp. 366–414, esp. pp. 369–70.

4 Amos Bertolacci, 'Reading Aristotle with Avicenna: On the Reception of the *Philosophia Prima* in the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 135–54; Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 136–38, 142–47; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), pp. 51–54; Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 60–64, 76–89, 108–16; Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 97–98.

5 Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics Before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, eds. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), pp. 197–223, esp. pp. 202–4.

6 Bertolacci, 'Reading Aristotle with Avicenna,' pp. 136, 146–52.

7 Victorin Doucet, *Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summae fratris Alexandri*, in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, Tome A, pp. xcv–cxx.

8 Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. ccclx–ccclxi.

these diverse influences. In three steps I will present different aspects of the theory of theology as a science in the *Summa Halensis*, which represent three different ways of interacting with Aristotle and Avicenna as sources.

First, I will point out that in justifying its claim that theology is a science, the *Summa* conceptualizes theology in a very rationalistic manner. Even though the author quotes Augustine, he deliberately misrepresents his intention. The conception of science is much closer to that of Aristotle than that of Augustine, and theology is indeed a science in the full Aristotelian sense.

Secondly, I will investigate how the *Summa Halensis* situates theology among the other sciences from which the author carefully distinguishes it. The text introduces its own system of the sciences, into which theology is integrated. In this instance, when explaining that both theology and metaphysics fulfil the requirements of being wisdom albeit to different extents, the *Summa Halensis* is again strongly influenced by its pagan and Muslim sources. It takes over the criteria of what constitutes wisdom from Aristotle and adopts the terminology for the first cause from Avicenna, but it forms its own innovative system.

The third case is that of the subject-matter of the science of theology. In his solution to this problem, the *Summa's* author adopts Avicenna's influential distinction between the subject-matter of metaphysics and that which metaphysics seeks. He does not name his source, however, and instead uses the vocabulary of Augustine and Peter Lombard.

These three instances will not only clarify how the novel problem of theology as a science is dealt with in the *Summa Halensis*, but also show how the author reacts to the newly-available sources, in particular Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Posterior Analytics* and Avicenna's *Metaphysics of The Healing*, namely, by utilizing their characterizations of metaphysics to define theology and by creating a theory of theology that combines the requirements of 'sacred doctrine' with a philosophical, rational concept of science. While Aristotle is explicitly quoted in the passages analyzed here, Avicenna is not, but his influence is nevertheless clearly present. In his regard, the *Summa* stands as an example of the trend Amos Bertolacci has identified before 1240 of reading Aristotle under Avicenna's influence.⁹

What Makes Theology a Science?

In the very beginning of book I of the *Summa Halensis*, question 1, chapter 1, the author asks whether theology, which he interchangeably calls *doctrina sacra*, *doctrina*

⁹ Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics,' pp. 202–4; Bertolacci, 'Reading Aristotle with Avicenna.'

theologiae, theologia, or scientia Sacrae Scripturae,¹⁰ is a science (*Utrum doctrina theologiae sit scientia*). His answer is unambiguous: theology is a science according to a set of criteria which, in line with Aristotle, conceptualize science as a rational, universal pursuit.

These criteria are first introduced in the form of arguments against the claim that theology could be a science. Hence, they all indicate a characteristic feature of sciences and then claim that theology does not exhibit it. These criteria are:

1. Sciences deal with intelligible things (*scientia enim est intelligibilium*).¹¹

Quoting Augustine who states that certain things can only be believed but never be subject to intellection,¹² the argument states that sciences are always about intelligible things. Things which cannot be grasped by our intellect cannot be the subject of a science. This criterion is applied to theology. Since, following Augustine, stories and history are such that they can only ever be believed but not known by the intellect, the argument concludes that, since large parts of theology are about stories and history, it cannot be a science.

2. Sciences are about universals (*ars vero universalium*).¹³

Strictly speaking, this criterion follows from the first, since according to Aristotle, particular things can be perceived by the senses or stored in memory and imagination, while abstract, universal knowledge is specific to the intellect.¹⁴ Therefore, sciences are about intelligibles and universals, and scientific knowledge is universal knowledge.

3. Sciences consist of things which can be known (*ex scibilibus scientia*).¹⁵

Faith refers to things which are credible; opinion refers to things which are conjectural, or about which an opinion can be formed. Likewise, the objects of scientific knowledge need to be of a certain nature. They are that of which we can have knowledge. Again, this criterion is implied in the first two, but the text makes a point of stating expressly that science does not deal with things about which we can have opinions, or which we can believe. The objects of science need to possess the property of being knowable.

10 Aaron Gies, 'Biblical Exegesis in the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 11–31, esp. pp. 11–12; James R. Ginther, 'There is a Text in this Classroom: The Bible and Theology in the Medieval University,' in *Essays in Medieval Philosophy and Theology in Memory of Walter H. Principe, CSB*, eds. James R. Ginther and Carl N. Still (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 31–51.

11 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), arg. 1, p. 1.

12 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* I.48: *De credibilibus*, PL 40:31. See John Rist, 'Faith and Reason,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 26–39.

13 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad quod arguet sic 2, p. 1. See Gies, 'Biblical Exegesis in the *Summa Halensis*,' pp. 15–17.

14 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.1, 981a6–17; Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.31, 87b28–88a17.

15 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad quod arguet sic 3, p. 2.

Since theology is mostly concerned with individual stories, it is neither universal nor something which can be known. It is particular, deals with that which can be believed, and is, hence, not a science.

It is easy to see that these points rely heavily on Aristotle, that is, on his conception of intellectual knowledge and his theory of science. The *Summa* even provides a direct quotation from the very beginning of the *Metaphysics* and attributes it correctly:

Experience is [knowledge] of particulars, but science of universals; science develops when from many notions of experience one judgement develops about similar things.¹⁶

The passage as quoted is actually a composition of two different phrases from book A of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in reverse order.¹⁷ Aristotle introduces here his distinction between different forms of cognition: sense perception, memory, experience, and science. This way of quoting shows clearly that the author was familiar with the text, and carefully chose the precise phrases that best expressed what the argument called for, namely, establishing a connection between abstracted universals and scientific knowledge.

The author of this question, however, does indeed defend the position that theology is a science and rejects all objections. But it is noteworthy that in doing so, the criteria for what constitutes a science are upheld. The individual answers to the arguments try to justify why theology actually fulfils the respective criterion, instead of undermining its validity. The *Summa Halensis* argues:

In the history of sacred Scripture, the singular fact is introduced in order to signify the universal, and it is therefore that there is understanding and science of [this fact].¹⁸

Unlike other stories and historical reports which only refer to individual human acts, the stories told in Scripture are universal; they are exemplary for many events and experiences, and they refer to universal acts and the universal conditions of

¹⁶ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad quod arguet sic 2, p. 1: 'Experientia singularium est, ars vero universalium: fit autem ars, cum ex multis experimento intellectis una fit de similibus acceptio.'

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.1, 981a6–8, 981a16–17. In the *translatio media*, which was apparently used here, the passage reads: 'Fit autem ars, cum ex multis experimento intellectis una fit universalis de similibus acceptio. (...) Experientia quidem singularium cognitio est ars vero universalium,' *Aristoteles Latinus XXV.2, Metaphysica: Lib. I-X, XII-XIV: translatio anonyma sive 'media'*, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden: Brill, 1976), pp. 7–8. Other sources for the criteria seem to be Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.31, 87b28–88a17, and Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.33, 88b30–89a3.

¹⁸ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 1, p. 3: 'Introducitur ergo in historia sacrae Scripturae factum singulare ad significandum universale, et inde est quod eius est intellectus et scientia.' See Patrizia Preda, 'L'Epistemologia teologica in Alessandro d'Hales,' *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 74:1 (1982), pp. 47–67, esp. pp. 48–50; Bychkov, 'The Nature of Theology,' pp. 16–17.

human nature. Therefore, theological content is universal and intelligible and can belong to a science.¹⁹

Then the author of the *Summa* pushes back against a clear-cut division between the credible (*credibilis*) and the knowable (*scibilis*).²⁰ There are things which are first believed and then understood (*postea intelliguntur*), credible things which can be united or connected with a science (*coniunguntur scientiae*), and indeed things which are credible, but ordered towards understanding and science (*disponunt ad intellectum et scientiam*). These things, such as the divine, can very well belong to a science.²¹

All counterarguments are careful not to water down the necessity of knowability, intelligibility, and universality in a science. They only make the point that certain credible things can be knowable and that certain individual stories can be universal and intelligible.

The author discusses another possible argument against the idea that theology is a science. The argument quotes a passage from Augustine from the context of an exploration of the differences between wisdom and science. Here Augustine explains, ‘science’ refers to human things, but a science still needs to have a strong connection to faith, it needs to bring about faith, and protect it.²² Interestingly, the argument in the *Summa* twists this thought and makes it into an argument against theology as a science, by claiming that the science of theology can do nothing *but* bring about faith (*non generat nisi fidem*). Therefore, it is not a science in the strict sense (*non est vero nomine scientia*).²³

The author of this section of the *Summa* replies by clarifying that theology does indeed generate faith, but by doing so, it brings about intellectual cognition (*primo*

19 The *Summa Halensis* distinguishes between four different meanings of universal: aside from the customary sense (i.e. *in praedicando*), a singular thing can be universal by being an example for many things (*in exemplando*), by signifying many things (*in significando*), or by being a cause for many things (*in causando*). Scripture contains universal statements according to all four meanings; *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 1 and 2, pp. 2–3. See Preda, ‘L’Epistemologia teologica,’ pp. 55–56; Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales)* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1964), pp. 16–19.

20 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 3, p. 3: ‘Est “credibile” quod nunquam coniungitur scientiae, sicut sunt gesta historica; quaedam vero quae coniunguntur scientiae (...). Non repugnat ergo doctrinam Theologiae esse credibilium et esse scientiam.’ See Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* I.48: *De credibilibus*, PL 40:31.

21 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 3, p. 3. See Preda, ‘L’Epistemologia teologica,’ p. 56; Bychkov, ‘The Nature of Theology,’ pp. 17–18; Gössmann, ‘Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte,’ pp. 19–20. On the resulting necessary multiformity of the science of theology, see *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Solutio, Ad obiecta 1 and 2, p. 8; *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), esp. Quod autem sit multiformis c, f, and Solutio, pp. 10–11; *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar4 (n. 7), I, Solutio, p. 12.

22 Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.1.3 (PL 42:1037); English translation in Augustine, *On the Trinity, Books 8–15*, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, trans. Stephen McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 138.

23 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad quod arguet sic 4, p. 2.

generat fidem, et postea [...] generat intellectum). In the other sciences, intellectual knowledge produces belief, or the assent to certain doctrines, whereas in theology faith produces intellectual knowledge.²⁴ Theological faith inspires to assent to the first true thing, or the first truth itself.²⁵

This argument is quite noteworthy. The expected reaction to such a one-sided interpretation of a quote would be to rectify the intention of the author, and to point out that Augustine certainly did not think that the fact that a science leads to faith somehow disqualified it from being a science. Quite to the contrary, Augustine uses the orientation towards faith as a positive criterion to distinguish true science in a Christian spirit, through which we reach wisdom, from the vanity and curiosity of other types of human knowledge.

Instead, the Summist opts for a different solution. He further explains what it means for theology to generate faith – but it is not this fact that makes theology a science. The *Summa Halensis* emphasizes that theology does lead to intellectual knowledge, to an acceptance of the truth. The implicit criterion is, again, that theology is not only connected to faith, but also to the intellect. It is this property which secures its status as a science.²⁶

Thus, I think, this passage shows clearly how different the approach of the *Summa Halensis* is from Augustine's theory of science, and how Aristotelian the conception is. Even though Augustine's words on faith, belief, and knowledge are repeatedly quoted, the author of this section of the *Summa* works hard not to compromise the essential tie between the term 'science' and the idea of a rational endeavour, dealing with universal intelligibles and leading to certain intellectual knowledge.²⁷ He fiercely defends theology against all claims that due to its particular nature it might not count as a science in the strict sense. The strategy is not to adapt the concept of science to fit theology, but to explain how, why, and in what sense theology fulfils the criteria of a science.

What Type of Science is Theology?

Having defended the scientific status of theology, the author of the *Summa Halensis* needs to account for the special status of theology among the sciences. It seems clear that its methodology, its sources and origin, and its potential achievements set it

²⁴ This is an example of the voluntaristic tendencies present in the *Summa Halensis*; see Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 89–96.

²⁵ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad objecta 4, pp. 3–4; see Preda, 'L'Epistemologia teologica,' p. 56.

²⁶ The quotation is repeated later in a context which better fits Augustine's intention; see *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Solutio, p. 8. There, it supports the fact that the method of acquiring knowledge is different in theology than in the other sciences, and that theology is concerned with the things which lead to salvation.

²⁷ See also *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Solutio and Ad objecta 2, p. 8.

apart from other sciences. The Summist clarifies that theology is not simply like any one among the other sciences (*una scientiarum, connumerabilis inter alias*).²⁸

He explains that, although the peculiarities of theology do not prevent it from being a science in the full sense, theology still proceeds in different ways than the other sciences, and its method (*modus*) is scientific in a different way than that of sciences which proceed according to the understanding of truth by the human intellect (*secundum comprehensionem veritatis per humanam rationem*). As mentioned, theology inspires to assent to truths, but it also leads the affective part of the soul towards piety or shapes our affection according to piety (*informare affectum secundum pietatem*).²⁹

When discussing whether the knowledge which is achieved through the theological science is more or less certain than the knowledge achieved in the other sciences, the author answers: neither. He adduces several arguments which defend the claim that theology provides less certainty, as well as arguments for the opposite claim that theology provides a more certain knowledge than the other sciences, since its type of knowledge (*modus sciendi*) is provided by inspiration and through the testimony of the Holy Spirit.³⁰ But the magisterial response to the question defends a balanced position and seems to reject both the claim that theology is *less* clear, and that theology is *more* clear than the other sciences. Its certainty is simply of a different kind. Theology is more certain when it comes to the certainty of experience (*certitudo experientiae*), the certainty according to the affective soul (*certitudo secundum affectum*), and the certainty concerning the spiritual human soul (*certitudo quoad animum spiritualem*). It is less certain than the other sciences, however, when it comes to the certainty of the intellect (*certitudo secundum intellectum*) and of speculation (*certitudo speculationis*), and regarding the animal part of humans (*certitudo quoad animum animale*).³¹

The author stresses these methodological differences because he wants to avoid any impression that all sciences are theology in some sense, or that there could be a conflation between theology and metaphysics.³² Instead, theology is a distinct science.

In order to clarify the relation between theology and the other sciences and its role among them, the author introduces two different distinctions between different

²⁸ *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Solutio, p. 5.

²⁹ *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Solutio and Ad obiecta 2, p. 8. See also *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5; *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Contra f, p. 5.

³⁰ *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Contra, p. 9; English translation in Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics,' p. 375. See also *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Contra a and b, p. 4.

³¹ *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Respondeo, p. 9; English translation in Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics,' p. 375. See also *SH I*, Tr1, Q2, M3, C5 (n. 24), Respondeo, p. 36; see Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics,' pp. 374–75; Preda, 'L'Epistemologia teologica,' pp. 58–59; Bychkov, 'The Nature of Theology,' pp. 20–21.

³² *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Ad obiecta 1 and 3, pp. 8–9; *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Ad obiecta 3 and 4, pp. 9–10.

types of science, and then ultimately combines both to form a novel system of the sciences.

The first distinction is a bipartition among all sciences. There are 1. sciences of causes (*scientia causae*) and 2. sciences of caused things, or effects (*scientia causati/causatorum*). The first type refers to a science which is concerned with the first uncaused cause or causes. Its object is described as the ‘cause of causes’ (*causa causarum*). The second class treats things which are either themselves the causes of further effects, or effects only, without causing anything.³³

The first type of science exists for its own sake, or is conducted in its own right, with no further aim external to the science itself. This is not true for the second class, however, which is dependent upon a higher cause and refers back (*referuntur*) to it.³⁴

This passage tells us that, according to the *Summa Halensis*, the nature of the things which a science studies has consequences for the nature and status of the science itself. When an object of investigation is ontologically dependent upon something else, this means the knowledge we can have about this object, and the discipline responsible for providing this knowledge, are also dependent upon the science responsible for the object’s cause.

The author of the question then identifies the first type of science as theology. It is the science of the cause of causes, i. e. a science about God. It serves no further or higher purpose than to pursue the knowledge proper to it. All of the other sciences depend upon theology. It transcends (*transcendit*) them, presumably because it deals with the first cause which is the cause of everything the other sciences are concerned with.³⁵ In a further terminological clarification, the text states:

The name of ‘science’ is applied to the science of caused things, but the name of ‘wisdom’ to the science of the cause of causes.³⁶

This science is properly named ‘wisdom’ (*sapientia*), while the name ‘science’ is, in a certain sense, more appropriate for the second class of sciences, i. e. the sciences of caused things.

The text has stated time and again (and in fact, this is the very claim the question itself defends) that theology is indeed a science. So I do not take this passage to mean that theology is *not* a science at all. The text introduces an internal distinction between two different types of sciences, namely science which can be referred to as wisdom (i. e. the science of the cause of causes), and science in a narrower sense,

³³ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2. For this tripartition of the members of a chain of causes see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II.2, 994a11–19.

³⁴ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2.

³⁵ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2.

³⁶ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2: ‘Nomen ergo scientiae appropriatur scientiae causatorum, nomen vero sapientiae scientiae causae causarum.’

which is not wisdom. This is simply a different way of phrasing the aforementioned distinction between science of cause and science of effect.³⁷

‘Wisdom’ (*sophia*) is the term which Aristotle famously uses in his *Metaphysics* to name the science which he introduces and describes there.³⁸ In the Arabic tradition as well, the term ‘wisdom’ (*hikma*) becomes prominent. Avicenna introduces it as one of the synonyms for ‘metaphysics’, in Arabic literally ‘the divine science’ (*al-ilm al-ilāhī*), and uses it extensively.³⁹ Augustine, however, makes a distinction between science and wisdom.⁴⁰ Therefore, in the later Latin tradition, the relation between philosophical and theological wisdom and between wisdom and faith becomes a hotly contested topic.⁴¹

The *Summa Halensis* positions itself towards these questions and provides its own explanation of what wisdom is. In the eyes of the authors of the *Summa*, the science which is wisdom has to meet the following criteria: 1. It is a science concerned not only with causes but with the highest uncaused cause. 2. It contains its own end in itself; it is not conducted for the sake of something external. 3. This means that it is superior to all other sciences which are dependent on this particular science.

The author explicitly adduces these points as explanations for why theology can be described as wisdom, and he makes the source of this set of criteria clear:

Therefore, the Philosopher himself says that first philosophy, which is for its own sake and about the cause of causes, needs to be called wisdom. For a similar reason, theology, which transcends all other sciences, needs to be called wisdom.⁴²

37 In this, I disagree with Chenu who takes science and wisdom to be disjuncts, and claims that since theology is wisdom, it is not a science. See Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Die Theologie als Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert*, trans. Michael Lauble (Ostfildern: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 2008), pp. 75–76, 151–52; Martin Grabmann, *Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift ‘In Boethium de Trinitate’ im Zusammenhang der Scholastik des 13. und beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts* (Fribourg: Paulusverlag, 1948), p. 190.

38 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.1, 981b28; I.2, 982a20.

39 Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.1, Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), p. 3.5–15, § 9–10/ Avicenna, *Grundlagen der Metaphysik: Eine Auswahl aus den Büchern I–V der Metaphysik*, ed. and trans. Jens Ole Schmitt (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), pp. 38–41/ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I–IV*, ed. Simone van Riet (Louvain: Peeters, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 3–4; Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.2, ed. Marmura, pp. 11.17–12.4, § 18/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 66–67/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, p. 16.

40 Augustine, *De Trinitate* 12.14.22 (PL 42:1009–10); English translation in Augustine, *On the Trinity*, trans. McKenna, p. 98.

41 Andreas Speer, ‘*Sapientia nostra: Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts*,’ in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery Jr. et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 248–75; Gregory F. LaNave, ‘God, Creation, and the Possibility of Philosophical Wisdom: The Perspectives of Bonaventure and Aquinas,’ *Theological Studies* 69 (2008), pp. 812–33.

42 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2: ‘Unde et ipse Philosophus dicit quod Philosophia Prima, quae est sui gratia et de causa causarum, debet dici sapientia. Simili ratione doctrina theologica, quae

The source for the *Summa*'s conception of wisdom is named as 'the Philosopher'. While in the later tradition this epithet is used almost exclusively to refer to Aristotle, the *Summa Halensis* uses it more ambiguously. There are cases in which *philosophus* refers to thinkers other than Aristotle. Sometimes theories which cannot be found in Aristotle but instead only in Avicenna are ascribed to this 'Philosopher'.⁴³ The quotation at hand seems to be one of the instances in which it is not clear whether the author thinks of Aristotle or Avicenna, or simply does not distinguish between them.

Aristotle introduces all of the characteristics in his description of the science of metaphysics: it exists and is pursued solely for its own sake,⁴⁴ it is the science which is responsible for studying the first causes, the immaterial and divine substances, and God, and metaphysics, or wisdom, is the first, highest, and divine science.⁴⁵

Aristotle himself, however, does not use the expression 'cause of causes' to refer to what is treated in metaphysics, i. e. the highest cause. Instead, the *Summa Halensis* seems to have adopted this expression from Avicenna who uses it several times in the *Metaphysics* of his *Šifā'*. The most prominent passage, and the most likely source for the author of this section of the *Summa*, occurs in the very beginning of the *Metaphysics*, where Avicenna discusses the subject-matter of metaphysics. In the Latin translation of this work, to which the authors of the *Summa Halensis* had access, it reads:

You have also heard that the divine science is the one in which the first causes of natural and mathematical existence and what relates to them are investigated; and [so also is] the Cause of Causes and Principle of Principles – namely, God, exalted be His greatness.⁴⁶

The context here is the very same in which the Summist uses the expression. The divine science (Avicenna means metaphysics) is about the cause of causes, which is identified with God. In a later passage Avicenna claims that the ultimate final cause can be described as the cause of all other causes,⁴⁷ and states: the science

transcendit omnes alias scientias, debet dici sapientia.' See Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics,' pp. 377–78, Preda, 'L'Epistemologia teologica,' p. 53.

⁴³ Bertolacci, 'Reading Aristotle with Avicenna,' pp. 146–52; Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West*, p. 53; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 141.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.2, 982b24–28.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.2, 982a25–b10, 983a5–11; VI.1, 1026a19–23; XII.6, 1071b3–5.

⁴⁶ Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.1, ed. Marmura, p. 2.15–17, § 7/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 38–39/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, pp. 2–3: 'Iam etiam audisti quod scientia divina est in qua quaerunt de primis causis naturalis esse et doctrinalis esse et de eo quod pendet ex his, et de causa causarum et de principio principiorum, quod est Deus excelsus.' (The English translation is Marmura's from the Arabic, but is also adequate for the Latin which is very literal here.)

⁴⁷ Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI.5, ed. Marmura, p. 229.5–6, § 30 and p. 229.11–13, § 31/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 2, pp. 338–39.

which is concerned with this cause of causes is the most noble of sciences, namely wisdom.⁴⁸

Avicenna is not mentioned as an authority in this context in the *Summa Halensis*, however. Instead of explicitly naming either Aristotle or Avicenna, the author refers to ‘the Philosopher’.

While both Aristotle and Avicenna apply the term ‘wisdom’ to metaphysics, and describe metaphysics as existing for its own sake and being about the highest cause, the *Summa* stresses the shared properties of metaphysics and theology and it adopts the philosophical reasoning for ascribing to both the status of ‘wisdom’. Both of these sciences fulfil the criteria established by Aristotle and Avicenna.

But the text also introduces a second distinction between different types of sciences which it then uses to establish a difference between metaphysics and theology:

It has to be noted that there is a science which perfects cognition according to truth, and there is also a science which moves affection towards goodness. The first is like cognition according to sight, and therefore it needs to be called absolute science; the second [is] like cognition according to taste, and therefore it needs to be called wisdom from the taste of affection.⁴⁹

There is (a) science which perfects the faculty of cognition, i. e., the intellect, according to truth, which probably means, by fulfilling the intellectual striving for truth. And there is (b) science which moves the faculty of affection towards goodness. The first type of science (a) is compared to the sense of sight, the second (b) to the sense of taste.⁵⁰

The reference to the senses might be metaphorical, but I think the passage also works as an analogy: both senses are directed towards the same sensible things and

48 The Latin translation reads: ‘Si autem de unaquaque istarum causarum esset scientia per se, utique nobilior inter eas esset scientia de finali; et ipsa esset sapientia.’ Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI.5, ed. Marmura, p. 235.17, § 54/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 2, p. 348.

49 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2: ‘Notandum quod est scientia perficiens cognitionem secundum veritatem; est etiam scientia movens affectionem ad bonitatem. Prima est ut cognitio secundum visum, et ideo debet dici scientia absoluta; secunda, ut cognitio secundum gustum, et ideo debet dici sapientia a sapore affectionis.’

50 See Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 97–99; Boehner, ‘The System of Metaphysics,’ pp. 371–74, 377–78; Preda, ‘L’Epistemologia teologica,’ pp. 51–52. The idea that wisdom is connected to taste (*sapor* or *gustus*) can also be found in other texts from the period, for instance in William of Auxerre, see Inos Biffi, ‘Teologi dell’università di Parigi nella prima metà del XIII secolo,’ in *La nuova razionalità: XIII secolo*, eds. Inos Biffi and Costante Marabelli, Figure del pensiero medievale, vol. 4 (Rome: Città Nuova; Milan: Jaca Book, 2008), pp. 237–98, esp. p. 294; Boyd Taylor Coolman, *Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), pp. 211–15. Another source could be an anonymous text from the 1220s which states that the intellect, or science, reaches the first truth through the sense of sight, and wisdom through the sense of taste; see Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952), pp. 131–70, esp. pp. 162–63.

both can grasp the same objects. Likewise, truth and goodness are both transcendentals, and the highest goodness and the highest truth are ontologically identical – both are only found in God. So both types of science, as well, are directed towards the same object or goal. But the two senses of sight and taste strive for their object in different respects. Sight is directed towards the property of visibility and senses things insofar as they are visible, while taste senses them insofar as they are ‘tastable’. Similarly, the intellect is directed towards the highest being as the highest truth, while the affectionate parts of the human soul are directed towards God as the highest good; and the same applies to the sciences associated with them.

This is precisely the difference between theology and metaphysics: Theology moves the human soul towards the good through fear and love. Metaphysics is also about the highest cause, but it perfects the human intellect by using the means of scientific argument and syllogistic conclusion (*secundum viam artis et ratiocinationis*).

When discussing the argument that theology and metaphysics could be one and the same science since both are divine,⁵¹ the Summist rejects the idea that both sciences are *about* God in the same sense and thus indistinguishable. Indeed, theology is characterized as *the* divine science. A science is divine when and if it is from God, about God, and leads to God (*a Deo et de Deo et ductiva ad Deum*). And this is only true for theology.⁵² Theology treats God with regard to the Trinity and the sacrament of humans’ reparation (*secundum mysterium Trinitatis vel secundum sacramentum humanae reparationis*). Neither metaphysics (*Prima Philosophia*) nor any other science achieves this, so it is a unique feature of theology. Only theology leads to God ‘through the principle of fear and love through faith in the justice and mercy of God’ (*per principium timoris et amoris ex fide misericordiae et iustitiae Dei*).⁵³

The author rejects a direct comparison between these two sciences and their respective ways of acquiring knowledge. Confronted with the claim that what is known in the manner of taste could be known more certainly than what is known in the manner of sight (*certius est quod scitur per modum gustus quam quod per modum visus*), he responds, as mentioned before: these are simply two different ways of ac-

51 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad quod obiicitur sic 2, p. 4.

52 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5; English translation in Boehner, ‘The System of Metaphysics,’ p. 376. See also *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Ad obiecta 2, p. 9. See Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 96–97; Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis* and St Thomas Aquinas,’ *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 79:3 (2015), pp. 439–66, esp. pp. 440–41; Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘Hugh of St Victor’s Influence on the Halensian Definition of Theology,’ *Franciscan Studies* 70 (2012), pp. 367–84, esp. pp. 377–78; Preda, ‘L’Epistemologia teologica,’ p. 66; Bychkov, ‘The Nature of Theology,’ pp. 18–19.

53 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5; English translation in Boehner, ‘The System of Metaphysics,’ p. 376.

quiring certain knowledge. Theology is more certain in one regard, but less certain in the other.⁵⁴

I think it is important to remember that even though the author of the passage describes the perfection of cognition as something that is proper to metaphysics (and possibly the other theoretical sciences), and uses this criterion to distinguish it (or them) from theology, theology is still an intellectual endeavour. As the author has emphasized again and again, we must think of theology as a habit of the intellect. It is a science and it is about universal intelligibles. Hence, we can assume, the difference between metaphysics and theology lies more in the fact that metaphysics does *not* move the affective soul towards the good, than in the fact that theology does not perfect the intellect. As a science it would have to do so, at least partly.

Finally, the *Summa Halensis* combines the two different systems of distinction it had introduced and presents its final system of the different types of sciences:

Theology is wisdom as wisdom; but first philosophy, which is cognition of the first causes which are goodness, wisdom, and power, is wisdom, but as science; the other sciences, however, which consider the attributes of [their] subject-matter through their causes, are sciences as sciences.⁵⁵

Most sciences (2) treat caused things. They are sciences in the most typical sense, sciences as sciences.⁵⁶ Metaphysics is cognition of the first uncaused causes (1), but it does not move the soul towards the good, but rather perfects the human intellect through cognition of the truth (1a). It is wisdom, but wisdom as a science. Theology, finally, is also concerned with God, the first uncaused cause (1), and – in addition to perfecting the intellect, we have to assume – it moves the affective soul towards the good through love and fear (1b). Therefore, it is wisdom in the highest sense, wisdom as wisdom.⁵⁷

So theology is more deserving of the label of wisdom: Theology is wisdom properly and primarily (*proprie et principaliter*), while metaphysics can only be called wis-

⁵⁴ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Contra and Respondeo, p. 9; English translation in Boehner, ‘The System of Metaphysics,’ p. 375.

⁵⁵ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2: ‘Doctrina Theologiae est sapientia ut sapientia; Philosophia vero Prima, quae est cognitio primarum causarum, quae sunt bonitas, sapientia et potentia, est sapientia, sed ut scientia; ceterae vero scientiae, quae considerant passiones de subiecto per suas causas, sunt scientiae ut scientiae.’

⁵⁶ It is not quite clear how the second distinction between sciences perfecting the intellect (a) and sciences leading the affective soul towards goodness (b) relates to the sciences dealing with caused things (2). The author of the *Summa Halensis* explicitly states that the property of leading to God through love and fear is specific to theology only. He seems to think that some other sciences (such as ethics) also have an effect upon the affective part of the soul. See *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5. Then, a difference could be drawn between (2a) sciences which only perfect the intellect, and (2b) sciences which lead towards the good.

⁵⁷ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2.

dom in a less proper way (*minus proprie*).⁵⁸ The *Summa Halensis* on the one hand adopts the Aristotelian definition of wisdom and applies it to the science of theology. But it also modifies it and denies that metaphysics – the science for which the term in this sense was coined by Aristotle – carries the full and primary meaning of wisdom. Instead, the descriptor in its purest form is claimed for theology because it is not only about the cause of causes but also influences the affective soul.

The Subject-Matter of Theology

Having clarified the status of theology and its place among the other sciences, the author turns to what is commonly referred to as the subject-matter of the science. The Arabic readers of Aristotle, most notably Avicenna and Averroes, explicitly discussed the subject-matter (Arabic: *mawḏūʿ*, in the Latin translation of both of their works rendered as *subiectum*) of metaphysics and the other sciences, and after the Latin translation of their works it became a staple topic in the discussion of sciences in the Latin Middle Ages. The *Summa Halensis* interestingly does not use the term *subiectum*, but instead uses *materia*, or simply asks what the science of theology is *about*, or the science *of what* it is. This terminology is rather unusual and shows that the *Summa* was written before the standard vocabulary for discussing these matters was developed (which, I would say, happened with Albert the Great's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* in the 1260s).⁵⁹

In order to answer the question of the subject-matter of theology, the *Summa Halensis* introduces a distinction which, I will argue, was actually adopted from Avicenna. The Summist states that a science can be *about* something in two different ways. To express this difference, two different Latin phrases (both of which can be translated as 'the subject-matter about which [the science is]') are used: 1. *materia de qua* and 2. *materia circa quam*.

⁵⁸ *SH I*, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2. See Boehner, 'The System of Metaphysics,' p. 376; Preda, 'L'Epistemologia teologica,' pp. 53–54.

⁵⁹ The *Memoriale quaestionum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, sometimes ascribed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall and written in the 1230s, interestingly uses the term *subiectum* in this context, see Richard Rufus of Cornwall, *Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, eds. Rega Wood and Neil Lewis (2013), available at <https://rrp.stanford.edu/MMet.shtml>, preface. See Rega Wood, 'Richard Rufus of Cornwall,' in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, eds. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy N. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 579–87, esp. pp. 581–82; Rega Wood, 'The Earliest Known Surviving Western Medieval Metaphysics Commentary,' *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 7 (1998), pp. 39–49.

The subject-matter is taken in two ways in the sciences: that ‘of (*de*) which’ and that ‘about (*circa*) which’ [a science is]. (...) Therefore, according to this, theology is a science of (*de*) the divine substance which can be known through Christ in the work of reparation.⁶⁰

The author further explains the first of these and applies it to the case of theology: *Materia de qua* can itself be used in three different respects:⁶¹ 1a. according to the criterion of work (*secundum rationem operationis*), and in this sense the works of reparation of the human genus (*opera reparationis humani generis*) are the subject-matter of theology;⁶² 1b. according to the criterion of virtue (*secundum rationem virtutis*), and in this respect the subject-matter is Christ who, according to Scripture,⁶³ is the virtue and wisdom of God; and 1c. according to the criterion of essence (*secundum rationem essentiae*), which here refers to the divine essence, or God.

All three of these are in different respects the *de qua*-subject-matter of theology. The Summist explains their relation: theology is about the divine essence which can be known through Christ in the work of reparation (*scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis*).⁶⁴ God, the cause of all things, becomes known to us through the work of reparation, the virtue of Christ.⁶⁵

The *materia circa quam* of theology, on the other hand, is introduced in the discussion of Peter Lombard’s claim that theology is about things and signs (*res et signa*). These, according to the *Summa Halensis*, are not the *materia de qua* of theology, but rather its *materia circa quam*.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Solutio, p. 6: ‘Materia dupliciter accipitur in scientiis: “de qua” et “circa quam”. (...) Unde secundum hoc Theologia est scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.’ See Boehner, ‘The System of Metaphysics,’ p. 371; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 136; Coolman, ‘Hugh of St Victor’s Influence on the Halensian Definition,’ pp. 381–83; Coolman, ‘On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis*,’ pp. 441–42, 444–47; Preda, ‘L’Epistemologia teologica,’ p. 57.

⁶¹ In this, the *Summa Halensis* follows Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, eds. Günter Heil and Adolf Ritter, 2nd ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), XI.2, pp. 41–42.

⁶² SH I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 1, p. 6. In a discussion of Hugh of St Victor’s claim that theology is about the works of reparation, but using Aristotle’s idea that every science treats one genus of beings and all the species which fall under this genus, the author explains that these works of reparation are also the genus of things which the science of theology investigates. See Hugh of St Victor, *De Sacramentis Christianae fidei*, prologue, c. 2 (PL 176:183–84); *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De Sacramentis)*, ed. and trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007), pp. 3–4; Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I.10, 76b11–76b22; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III.2, 997a18–22; IV.2, 1003b19–36.

⁶³ 1 Cor. 1:24.

⁶⁴ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Solutio, p. 6. Coolman, ‘On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis*,’ pp. 447–49, states that for the *Summa Halensis* the works of reparation are not themselves included in the *de qua*-subject-matter of theology, but are only instrumentally relevant. On the basis of this passage, which makes clear that the divine essence, Christ, and the works of reparation are all in different respects *materia de qua* of theology, I disagree with this reading.

⁶⁵ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 2, p. 6.

⁶⁶ SH I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 3, pp. 6–7.

Confronted with the problem of how one single science can possibly deal with all things and all signs,⁶⁷ the author answers that both signs and things are considered in one respect, and insofar as they are related to one thing (*sit relatio considerationis ad unum*), namely the human conformation to God and the human reformation through Christ.⁶⁸ This is highly reminiscent of Aristotle who argues that the science of metaphysics treats all beings. But since these are connected through their relation to one common principle, it can still be one unified science.⁶⁹ Likewise, the author of the *Summa Halensis* is careful to make sure that the unity of theology as a science can be retained in spite of the science's enormous scope.

But the source of this distinction between two different ways in which a science can be about the things it considers, is not Aristotle but Avicenna. Avicenna famously introduces a distinction between the proper, actual subject-matter of a science (*mawḍū'*/ *subiectum*) and that which is sought in a science (*maṭlūb*/ *quaesitum*). The subject-matter itself has to fulfil certain systematic requirements; it is like a genus whose species and accidents the science investigates. Everything in the science is studied with respect to this. In the case of metaphysics, this means (according to the Latin translation):

Therefore, the first subject-matter of this science is being insofar as it is being, and the [things] which it inquires are those that accompany being insofar as it is being unconditionally.⁷⁰

The thing which is sought, on the other hand, is what the science primarily aims to investigate. The study of this is the perfection of the science and its noblest part, and to learn about it and to prove its existence is indeed the intention of the science:

Knowledge of God is the aim of this science. Many things are named after that which is the noblest in them, or after their noblest part, or after the part which is like the aim in them. Therefore, this science will be like [the science] whose perfection and whose more noble part and whose first intention is knowledge of that which is separate from nature in every way.⁷¹

67 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Contra 4, p. 6.

68 *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), ad 4, p. 7: 'Ad illud vero quod obicitur de unitate scientiae quae non est rerum et signorum: respondendum quod hoc est ubi est separata ratio considerationis rei et signorum. Hic vero non separatur consideratio, cum sit relatio considerationis ad unum, quod est reformatio hominis ad similitudinem Dei seu conformatio hominis ad Deum per opus reparationis a Christo.'

69 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.2, 1003a33-b16.

70 Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.2, ed. Marmura p. 10.2–3, § 12/ ed. Schmitt, p. 60/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, p. 13: 'Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens, in quantum est ens; et ea quae inquirunt sunt consequentia ens, in quantum est ens, sine conditione.' See also Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.2, ed. Marmura, pp. 7.1–12.17, § 1–20/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 52–69/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, pp. 9–17.

71 Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.3, ed. Marmura, p. 18.4–7, § 16/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 86–87/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, p. 26: 'Cognitio enim Dei finis est huius scientiae; multae enim res appellantur ab eo quod est in eis dignius, vel a parte digniore, vel a parte quae est eis quasi finis. Erit igitur haec scientia quasi cuius perfectio et cuius pars aliqua nobilior et cuius prima intentio est cognitio eius quod separatum est a natura omnimodo.' See also Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.1, ed. Marmura, pp. 3.13–4.14,

This distinction regarding the inner structure of a science is parallel to the distinction introduced in the *Summa Halensis*. Like Avicenna's subject-matter, the *materia circa quam* in the *Summa* seems to be everything about which a science makes investigations, everything it treats or considers. The *materia de qua*, on the other hand, is something more specific, just like that which a science seeks according to Avicenna. It is described in the *Summa* as the aim and the intention of the science, and seems to consist of the things that a science is primarily about, the things which only this science properly and uniquely investigates.

That Avicenna's metaphysical considerations are the source for the equivalent distinction in the *Summa Halensis* is supported by the fact that the Summist invokes the case of metaphysics in order to further illuminate his take on the subject-matter of theology. He explains what the respective subject-matters, i.e. the *materia de qua* and the *materia circa quam*, of metaphysics are:

For instance it can be said about first philosophy that its *circa quam*-subject-matter is everything – and therefore it is said that it is about all things, because it is about being according to all of its differences, according to the different divisions of being, namely being in potency, being in act, one being and many, substantial and accidental being, and the like – but the subject-matter about which (*de qua*) [its] intention [is], is being which is one in its act, which is the first substance, on which everything depends.⁷²

In line with his earlier claim that metaphysics is about God, but in a different way than theology, the author states that the *materia de qua* of metaphysics is the first substance which is the cause of everything, or the being which is one through its act. He also adds that it is the intention (*intentio*) of metaphysics to explore this subject-matter.⁷³ This idea that the *materia de qua* represents the intention of the science also applies to theology.⁷⁴

The *materia circa quam* of metaphysics is everything. Metaphysics is about (*circa*) being according to all its specific differences and different distinctions,

§ 10–12/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 40–45/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, pp. 4–5. Also Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.3, ed. Marmura, pp. 14.19–15.2, § 6/ ed. Schmitt, pp. 76–77/ ed. Van Riet, vol. 1, p. 21.

⁷² *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 3, p. 7: 'Quemadmodum est dicere de Philosophia Prima quod materia circa quam est sunt omnia – unde et dicitur esse de omnibus, quia est circa ens secundum omnem sui differentiam, secundum differentes divisiones entis, scilicet ens potentia, ens actu, ens unum et multa, ens substantia et accidens, et huiusmodi – materia vero de qua intentio, est ens actu unum, quod est substantia prima, a qua omnia dependent.' See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 136; Coolman, 'On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis*,' pp. 442–43; Coolman, 'Hugh of St Victor's Influence on the Halensian Definition,' p. 379.

⁷³ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 3, pp. 6–7.

⁷⁴ See *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 7, p. 7, where the *Summa Halensis* states that the end and the subject-matter of a science are not mutually exclusive. For some sciences, their subject-matter is the same as their end or final cause (*idem habet pro materia et fine*). In the case of theology, Christ is indeed both the subject-matter, in the sense explained above, and the end of the science.

such as potential and actual being, one and many, substantial and accidental being, etc.

Coming back to theology, the *Summa* concludes that, since the *materia circa quam* of theology are things and signs, theology in a way treats everything, just like metaphysics. But unlike metaphysics, it does not treat all beings according to all possible different respects and in every way (*secundum omnem modum sive secundum omnium rationem*). The *Summa Halensis* stresses that theology studies all things in one respect, i. e. in the one way that is proper to the science (*secundum unum proprium modum et rationem*). This respect is the human reparation through the incarnation of Christ which ultimately leads to enjoyment of the Trinity.⁷⁵

We can see that, regarding the content of these two concepts (*materia circa quam*/ subject-matter, and *materia de qua*/ that which is sought) when applied to metaphysics, the *Summa Halensis* again follows Avicenna. Aristotle of course mentions that metaphysics is concerned with the divine separate substance and the first being,⁷⁶ and he also explains how metaphysics is the science concerned with investigating being insofar as it is being.⁷⁷ But Aristotle famously does not provide a clear and satisfactory explanation of how these two different descriptions of the science fit together.

Avicenna develops his theory of the distinction between what is sought and what is a subject-matter in the *Metaphysics* of his *Šifā'* precisely as a solution to this problem: metaphysics treats all of these disparate objects but treats them in a different manner. The science is in one sense about the first substance because that is what is sought, and it is in another sense about every being, and the species and differences of being, since these are its proper subject-matter.

The innovation of the *Summa's* approach lies in the application of the Avicennian theory to the science of theology. Similarly to Avicenna who has to explain the disparate character of metaphysics, the *Summa Halensis* is faced with diverging an-

⁷⁵ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 5, p. 7: 'Etsi agat de omnibus, non tamen secundum rationes differentes omnium, sed secundum unam rationem, quae est ut homo reparatus per sacramenta incarnationis (...) perveniat ad fruenda, quae sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, incommutabile bonum.' See Coolman, 'On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa Halensis*,' pp. 446–47, 449. In his interpretation of this passage, Coolman claims that the text makes the following analogy: Metaphysics is primarily about the first cause and studies it and all beings through the ratio of being, while theology is about (*de*) the Trinity and studies or knows it through the works of reparation. I do not think that this interpretation holds, however. It is true that, according to the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, the ratio with respect to which metaphysics studies everything, coincides in a sense with the extension of its *circa quam*-subject-matter (i. e. being is considered insofar as it is being). But that is not the case for theology: The theological analogue to being as the *materia circa quam* of metaphysics are all things and signs, and the analogue to being as the ratio is the human reformation and conformation to God. The things and signs are not considered *as* things and signs, and thus metaphysics and theology differ from each other even though both treat all beings.

⁷⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.2, 982a25–b10, 983a5–11; VI.1, 1026a19–23; XII.6, 1071b3–5.

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.1, 1003a20–26, 1003b12–36.

swers to the question of what theology is about (the essence of God, the Trinity, the sacraments, the works of reparation, all things and signs, etc.). It uses Avicenna's conception of metaphysics in order to explain in what sense theology is concerned with all of these concepts respectively, and thus solves the problem of the subject-matter of theology.

While it is extremely likely that the Summist has adopted this theory from Avicenna, he clearly uses a different terminology. This type of reception seems fairly typical of the *Summa's* approach to sources like Avicenna.⁷⁸ The Summist here takes over a theory or a piece of doctrine from a pagan or Muslim source, but he does not use the original author's own terminology but cloaks it, or rather, assimilates it into his own vocabulary, which is closer to the traditional Christian sources.

In this case, the terminology used in the *Summa Halensis* is taken from Peter Lombard. At the very beginning of book I of his *Sentences*, when Peter Lombard introduces Augustine's distinction between signs and things which can be treated in sciences, he uses the expression '*circa res vel signa*'.⁷⁹ Augustine himself states in his *De doctrina Christiana* that every science is either about signs or about things (*Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum*), but he does not use the preposition *circa*.⁸⁰ The *Summa* names both of these authorities and partially quotes the passage from the *Sentences* twice in the chapter in question.⁸¹ Replying to the argument that the signs and things should be the subject-matter of the science of theology, the author of the *Summa* clarifies that theology is indeed – exactly as claimed in the *Sentences* – about (*circa*) these.

So the *Summa Halensis* adopts the terminology from the *Sentences*, where *circa* is by no means a technical expression, and forges the phrase into one half of a systematic distinction between two different ways in which a science relates to the things it studies – a distinction taken over from Avicenna.

Conclusion

As I showed in the first step of my argument, the author of this section of the *Summa Halensis* defends theology against all claims that due to its particular nature it might not count as a science in the strict sense. Upholding an Aristotelian understanding of

⁷⁸ Bertolacci, 'Reading Aristotle with Avicenna.'

⁷⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), vol. 1, pt. 1, bk. 1, d. 1, c. 1, p. 55. The whole passage reads: 'Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam diligenti indagine etiam atque etiam considerantibus nobis, praevia Dei gratia innotuit sacrae paginae tractatum circa res vel signa praecipue versari.'

⁸⁰ Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, bk. 1, c. 2 (PL 34:19), English translation in Augustine, *City of God and Christian Doctrine*, trans. Philip Schaff (New York: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1890), p. 827.

⁸¹ *SH* I, Tr1, Q1, C3 (n. 3), *Contra* 3, p. 6 and *Ad obiecta* 3, pp. 6–7.

the concept of science as a rational endeavour, dealing with universal intelligibles and leading to certain intellectual knowledge, the author of the *Summa* claims that theology does meet all necessary criteria.

In the second step, I showed how theology is then integrated into a unique and innovative system of sciences: Sciences in general are divided – on the one hand – into sciences of causes, meaning sciences of the first uncaused cause, and these are theology and metaphysics, and sciences of secondary causes and effects, and these are all the particular sciences, sciences *as* sciences. On the other hand, sciences are divided into sciences which perfect the faculty of cognition, i. e. metaphysics and the other theoretical sciences, and sciences which move the affective part of the soul towards goodness, including theology.

The *Summa Halensis* picks up on Avicenna's expression of describing wisdom as the science of the 'cause of causes', and it uses Aristotle's definition of metaphysics as wisdom, and applies this to theology, even claiming that theology is wisdom in a stronger sense than metaphysics. Even though metaphysics is concerned with God, theology is the singular divine science. Theology is still about everything, in a sense, i. e. about all things and signs, but the *Summa Halensis*, using Aristotle again, makes sure to still stress the unity of the science which is guaranteed through the fact that everything is studied in the same respect.

In response to the problem of how the different things that theology is about fit together within the inner structure of the science, the author adopts Avicenna's distinction between the proper subject-matter and that which is sought within a science, but uses his own terminology, taken from Peter Lombard.

The *Summa Halensis* attempts, on the one hand, to harmonize the competing claims of what theology is about by arguing that it is about several different concepts in different ways. By creating a structure of different categories among the things a science treats, the Summist gives this thesis a systematic underpinning. On the other hand, he harmonizes the criteria of science in general, and of the highest science of the first cause in particular, with the Christian requirements of a divine science. The author tries to balance both by carefully putting forth certain properties which theology shares with all sciences (or at least with metaphysics), and others which are unique to theology and set it apart.

As we have seen, this theory of theology as a science in the *Summa Halensis* is interwoven with the theories and arguments of Aristotle and Avicenna. The author takes their doctrines regarding scientific methodology, the properties of wisdom, and the inner structure of a science extremely seriously. However, he also merges them with other sources such as Augustine, and applies them to new systematic problems the original authors were not concerned with, such as the difference between metaphysics and theology.

Through the use of these sources the *Summa Halensis* can thus offer an innovative answer to the newly arisen systematic problem of theology as a science.

Tiziana Suarez-Nani

On Divine Immensity and Infinity in Relation to Space and Time: The Crossroad of the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Medieval philosophers gave particular attention to the notion of infinity, developing a wide-ranging body of thought on its meaning according to its various fields of application. This contribution will examine the concept of divine infinity set out in the *Summa Halensis* (1245), in particular, the signification of divine infinity in relation to space (immensity) and to time (eternity). The intended purpose is to verify two theses: 1. the *Summa Halensis* considers divine infinity as a ‘positive infinite’, i.e. as a perfection intrinsic to the divine essence; 2. the *Summa Halensis* represents both the culmination of the preceding tradition, which was centred on the notion of immensity, and the starting point for the theories on divine infinity developed by Franciscan thinkers of succeeding generations.

Preliminary Remarks

Ever since the maieutics of Socrates and the science of Aristotle, philosophical investigation has focused on realities capable of being defined and circumscribed, leaving to one side what is non-determined and non-definable (i.e. the non-finite). This trajectory serves to explain how certain thinkers came to reject the very idea of the infinite, on the grounds that the existence (notional or real) of an infinite lies beyond the bounds of philosophical knowledge. That was the position adopted by Hume and by empiricism, which Kant openly contested.¹ The reductionist approach which rejects the notion of the infinite is indeed unacceptable since – as Kant states – even if it is not possible to apply the term ‘infinite’ to an object in the world or to the world as a totality, the idea of infinity – like that of every noumenon – is nevertheless an indispensable point of reference in philosophy in order to reach a true understanding of what is conditioned and finite.² Setting aside the question of whether

1 Immanuel Kant, *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen*, in *Kants Werke: Akademie Textausgabe*, Bd. II (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968), p. 168: ‘Der Begriff des unendlich Kleinen (Grössen) wird mit einer angemassen Dreistigkeit so gerade zu als erdichtet verworfen, anstatt dass man eher vermuten sollte, dass man noch nicht genug davon verstünde, um ein Urteil darüber zu fällen.’ See Wolfgang Röd, ‘Le problème de l’infini dans le développement de la pensée critique de Kant,’ in *Infini des mathématiciens, Infini des philosophes*, ed. Françoise Monnoyeur (Paris: Belin, 1992), pp. 159 – 74.

2 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, III, in *Kants Werke: Akademie Textausgabe*, Bd. IV (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968), n. 254 – 55: ‘Ferner ist dieser Begriff (eines Noumenon) notwendig, um die sinn-

an infinite has real existence in the world and whether it is possible to have knowledge of it, infinity is thus thinkable and the idea of it is necessary.

That was the conviction shared by all the thinkers of the Middle Ages, who adopted the concept of the infinite while at the same time expressing doubts as to whether it existed outside of the mind and whether it was possible to have knowledge of it. In fact, medieval thought gave particular attention to the notion of infinity, developing a wide-ranging body of thought which served to clarify its meaning according to its field of application. In metaphysics and in theology, the notion of infinity was examined in relation to divine reality, as an attribute of God and of his power and as an object of his action. In cosmology, the infinite becomes an issue when investigating the question of the eternity of the world (temporal infinity) and of the spatial extent of the universe (the idea of an imagined infinity of space). In physics, the notion of infinity arises in particular in the analysis of the composition of a continuum (matter, space, time) and of its divisibility, in the question of the intensification of forms (or the possibility for qualities to increase to an infinite extent), as well as in the investigation of force and resistance in movement. The issue of infinity is likewise present in certain medieval theories of language, notably in 14th-century terminist logic, which elucidates the meanings of the term 'infinite' according to its referents and its usage in various kinds of proposition (categorematic or syncategorematic usage of the term).³ Finally, in the theory of knowledge, the notion of infinity arises in questions concerning the possibility of having knowledge of the infinite as a complete totality (God) or as a limitless series of numbers.

The scope of the question of infinity in medieval thought is thus extremely vast. In this paper I shall limit myself to presenting the conception of divine infinity set out in the *Summa Halensis*, which will serve to situate our discussion in the realms of metaphysics and theology.

The *Summa Halensis* and Divine Immensity: Some Clarifications

The most recent research has shown that the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa fratris Alexandri* is the result of a collective effort, commissioned by Pope Gregory IX in order to systematize Franciscan thinking in a *corpus* and thus to establish the doctrinal identity of the order founded by Francis of Assisi. This project was entrusted to Alexander of Hales, who gave his name to the work which he supervised until his death in 1245,

liche Anschauung nicht bis über die Dinge an sich selbst auszudehnen, und also um die objektive Gültigkeit der sinnlichen Erkenntnis einzuschränken.'

³ See Joël Biard, 'Logique et physique de l'infini au XIV^e siècle,' in *Infini des mathématiciens, Infini des philosophes*, ed. Françoise Monnoyeur (Paris: Belin, 1992), pp. 17–36.

in collaboration with John of La Rochelle. In fact, the *Summa* represents a compilation and partial reworking of works mainly written by them.⁴

Divine immensity occupies an important place in this *Summa*, in which four questions are devoted to it: the first concerns the immensity of the divine essence in itself (*quantum ad se*); the second deals with immensity relative to the human intellect (*quantum ad intellectum*) and to its capacity to have knowledge of it; the third concerns immensity in relation to space (*quantum ad locum*), and the fourth deals with divine immensity in relation to the duration of time (*quantum ad durationem*), this last question being the one most fully elaborated.

As early as the 1960s, the doctrine of the *Summa Halensis* on divine immensity attracted the attention of Leo Sweeney⁵ and of Meldon Wass,⁶ who set out differing interpretations of it. Lydia Schumacher pursued research on this theme, publishing her conclusions notably in her article ‘The early Franciscan doctrine of divine immensity’ and in a new book, in which she analyses the infinity of divine power and divine will.⁷ In this paper I will devote myself mainly to two less well studied aspects, that is, divine immensity in relation to space and to time.

In this regard I will seek to advance two theses: 1. in the *Summa* infinity is posited as a perfection intrinsic to the divine essence, rather than being ‘extrinsically’ attributed to it;⁸ 2. if that is the case, the *Summa* represents not only the culmination of the preceding tradition, which was centered on the notion of immensity,⁹ but also the starting point and point of reference for the speculations on divine infinity developed by Franciscan thinkers of succeeding generations.

4 See Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination in Augustinian and Franciscan Thought*, unpublished doctoral thesis (University of Edinburgh, 2009), p. 155. Subsequently published as, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

5 Leo Sweeney published several articles on divine infinity, whose conclusions have been brought together in the volume *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought* (New York: Peter Lang, 1992).

6 Meldon C. Wass, *The Infinity of God and the ‘Summa fratris Alexandri’* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964).

7 Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). I am grateful to Lydia Schumacher for making this study available to me before its publication.

8 According to Leo Sweeney, in the *Summa Halensis* divine essence is posited as infinite only in relation to created beings: infinity is thus attributed to God by virtue of a ‘(purely) extrinsic denomination’ and would become an attribute of divine essence only from Richard Fishacre onward; this hypothesis leads Sweeney to criticize the interpretation developed by Meldon Wass; Sweeney, *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought*, p. 425, n. 30. Sweeney’s approach aroused a number of reactions: see Antoine Côté, ‘L’infinité divine dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Age,’ *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* 34:1 (1995), pp. 119–38, as well as the studies by Anne Davenport and Antoine Côté referred to below.

9 See, for example, Antoine Côté, *L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale (1220–1255)* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002), p. 26.

Some Definitions

It is worth at the outset recalling some conceptual clarifications. The *Summa Halensis* specifies that the word *finis* can have three meanings: either 1. it indicates an end or limit relating to quantity – in this sense God is infinite in terms of the quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*) which characterizes him; or 2. it can mean the completion and perfection of something – in this sense matter is infinite for it is not complete in itself; or 3. it can mean finality, i.e. that for which something is ordered as for its end – in this sense, every created reality is finite.

Similarly, the notion of ‘infinite’ can have three accepted meanings:

1. The infinite, in a negative sense, is what has no limit; it thus signifies the negation of all finitude (*infinitum = non-finitum*¹⁰) – in this sense, the divine essence is infinite since it possesses no limit, but bestows on things their own limits (*finiens*).
2. The infinite, in a privative sense, is what can have an end or a limit, but is deprived of it and thus does not really possess it (*quod natum est finire, non tamen finitur*) – in this sense, God is not infinite, for his nature is not such as to possess ends or limits.
3. The infinite by contrariety designates that which has a disposition contrary to all possible limitation (*infinitum contrarie seu disparate: quod habet contrariam dispositionem sive disparatam ad finiendum*). It thus refers to what is infinite in that it is opposed to every form of finitude: in that sense the divine essence is infinite in being contrary to every limitation, whether ontological, spatial or temporal. This type of divine infinity implies (but does not equate to) the universal presence of God in the places of the world as well as his everlasting nature.

These conceptual clarifications invite two observations: 1. The first concerns the consideration given to the notion of the ‘infinite by contrariety’. The origin of this notion is unclear, but its use in discourse about God is an innovation introduced by the *Summa*. While earlier theological tradition, in particular that of the 12th century, had focused on the distinction between negative infinity and privative infinity,¹¹ the *Summa Halensis* adds this third mode and accords great importance to it, such that the two longest questions in fact concern divine immensity ‘by contrariety’ in respect of space and time. It is my hypothesis that this type of infinity is a figure of positive infinity, since it equates to the position of infinity as completion and full-

¹⁰ ‘Finite’ (= ‘finitum’) is here used in the non-Aristotelian sense of what is determined, limited and thus imperfect.

¹¹ This is attested notably in the *Glossa (Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, 4 vols [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–57])* where Alexander of Hales had distinguished only between negative infinity and privative infinity; see Côté, *L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, pp. 27–28.

ness.¹² While it was generally neglected by subsequent thinkers, infinity ‘by contrariety’ will be taken up again by Duns Scotus, who conceives of it as a ‘contrary position’, that is to say, precisely as an affirmation of a positive infinity.¹³

2. Secondly, we can note that the notion of ‘infinity’ arises explicitly in discussion of the divine essence considered in itself – as the first question indicates: *De immensitate Dei quantum ad se, seu de infinitate eius* – whereas the three other questions use the term immensity (*De immensitate Dei quantum ad intellectum, quantum ad locum, quantum ad durationem*). This recourse to the concept of immensity reveals how the *Summa Halensis* links back to earlier theological speculation,¹⁴ which made virtually no use of the concept of infinity, foregrounding instead that of immensity. The reason for that is that the term infinity does not occur in the Bible, whereas divine immensity did feature in authoritative theological writings and was considered as being in keeping with faith.¹⁵ However, as we have suggested, the *Summa* also brings in infinity as an intrinsic attribute of divine essence: we can find there the statement that ‘*proprie ergo est dicendum ipsum [sc. Deum] esse infinitum secundum substantiam.*’¹⁶ In this light, the *Summa* can be viewed as an intermediary stage between earlier theological speculation, centered on divine immensity, and post-1250 speculation, which sees the emergence of the concept of infinity. Indeed, as Antoine Côté has clearly shown in his study on divine infinity, from Thomas Aquinas onward the term infinity will supplant that of immensity in the language of theologians.¹⁷

¹² See nn. 40, 50 below.

¹³ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, q. 6, in *Opera omnia, Editio minor*, vol. I, ed. G. Lauriola (Alberobello: Editrice AGA, 1998), pp. 101–2: ‘Potest enim infinitum accipi tripliciter: negative, privative et contrarie. Privative, quia privat finem in apto nato finire, et hoc sonat vocabulum. Contrarie: quod patet per Boethium *Super Praedicamenta*, cap. *De qualitate* (...) Sic infinitum negat finitatem cum positione contrarii, sicut infinitum extensum sine terminis’ (my emphasis). Etienne Gilson had moreover already pointed out that in Henry of Ghent the positive infinity of God signifies ‘la position contraire à celle de la fin’ [‘the opposite position to that of the end’]; see Etienne Gilson, ‘L’infinité divine chez St Augustin,’ *Augustinus Magister*, vol. I (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), p. 573.

¹⁴ On this point, see the observations of Lydia Schumacher, ‘The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity: Towards a Middle Way Between Classical Theism and Panentheism,’ *Scottish Journal of Theology* 70:3 (2017), pp. 278–94, esp. pp. 280–83.

¹⁵ Gilson, ‘L’infinité divine chez St. Augustin;’ Sweeney, *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought*, pp. 332, 429. See Heinrich Denzinger, *Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen*, 37th edition (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1991), nn. 75, 800.

¹⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), I, In1, Tr2, Q1, C1 (n. 34), Solutio, p. 56.

¹⁷ See Côté, *L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, pp. 30–31.

Divine Immensity in Relation to Space

The *Summa* clarifies the relationship of God to the expanse of space by examining the incircumscribability and the location of God,¹⁸ before going on to define the modality of God's presence in things.¹⁹

I will restrict myself to addressing the first point, which deals with the question as it relates to God envisaged in himself, independently of his action and his presence in the created world. On this issue, the *Summa* rejects the possibility that the divine essence could be circumscribed, since circumscription always implies physical limits: thus, for example, when one pours water into a glass, the water is circumscribed by the sides of the glass; the same is true for all bodies, which are circumscribed by their contours (*dimensiones*). Rather than Peter Lombard – who established the terms of the question for succeeding speculations²⁰ – the *Summa* is here referencing John of Damascus, who defined circumscribability as the fact of being contained or delimited by place, time and knowledge.²¹ On the basis on this reference, it was concluded that God cannot be circumscribed since he is limited neither in his being and his power, nor in relation to place, time or human knowledge.²² Since God alone is beyond any limitation, incircumscribability is an attribute exclusive to the divine being.²³

The Delimitation of Spiritual Substances

Conversely, that which is created is always limited and circumscribed, albeit according to differing modalities. Bodies are thus totally circumscribed by their dimensions. In contrast, spiritual entities – human souls and angels – are at once circumscribed and uncircumscribed: this means that when they are entirely located in one place,

18 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1–2 (nn. 38–44), pp. 62–70.

19 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M1 (nn. 45–49), pp. 70–76.

20 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), vol. I, bk. I, d. 37, c. 1–6, pp. 263–71.

21 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1955), bk. I, c. 13, p. 59.

22 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 38), Respondeo, p. 62: 'Simpliciter dicendum sine distinctione quod divina essentia est incircumscriptibilis, quia non habet terminum nec essentiae nec virtutis; item, nec loco nec tempore nec comprehensione comprehenditur.' The *Summa Halensis* thus distances itself from the rejection of divine infinity motivated by the safeguarding of the beatific vision, a rejection which characterizes earlier theology. On this point see Côté, *L'infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, pp. 33–70.

23 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 39), Ad obiecta 2, p. 63: 'Simpliciter ergo incircumscriptibile est quod nec loco nec tempore sive duratione nec fine circumscribitur: quod soli Deo convenit.'

they can simultaneously be elsewhere, but not everywhere: ‘*Circumscriptum simul et incircumscriptum, quod, cum alicubi sit totum, potest simul esse totum alibi, non tamen ubique.*’²⁴

This is true of the human soul, which is entirely present in every part of the body,²⁵ but cannot be anywhere other than in the body which it animates. It is also true of the angels, who occupy entirely every part of the place where they are, but cannot occupy simultaneously every place in the world. Human souls and angels are thus capable of practicing a form of relative (but not absolute) multilocation.

This particular modality of relationship to space is called ‘delimitation’ (*definitio*), and constitutes an intermediate modality between the circumscription of bodies and divine ubiquity. Thus, unlike bodies, the human soul and the angel are not circumscribed by spatial dimensions; however, unlike God, they cannot simultaneously be everywhere. This ‘delimitation’ or ‘definition’ thus indicates that human souls or angels each occupy one single divisible place at a time. The reason for this limitation in their location lies in the finitude which characterizes their substance and their power as created beings.²⁶

Notwithstanding this limitation, the *Summa* attributes to angels another possibility in location. This means that when an angel is acting upon a body, it can also be localized by its power (*virtus*) and its operation (*operatio*) in respect of the particular body in question. The exercise of a causality of this nature confers on the angel a quite special capability: that of being able to occupy several places simultaneously. Here the *Summa* refers once more to John of Damascus, asserting that the angel ‘*ibi est ubi operatur*’.²⁷ This modality of location is elucidated by anal-

24 SH I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 39), Ad obiecta 1, p. 63.

25 In the 17th century, this theory, which was shared by all the thinkers of the Middle Ages, would be labelled ‘holenmerism’ by Henry More in his critique of Descartes. See Jen-Paul Anfray, ‘Etendue spatiale et temporelle des esprits: Descartes et le holenmérisme,’ *Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger* 139 (2014), pp. 23–46; Tiziana Suarez-Nani, ‘Le lieu de l’esprit: Echos du Moyen Age dans la correspondance de Descartes avec Henry More,’ in *Descartes en dialogue*, eds. Olivier Ribordy and Isabelle Wienand (Fribourg: Schwabe, 2018), pp. 158–87.

26 SH I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 39), p. 63: ‘Licet enim angelus et corpus ultimum non circumscribantur loco nec tempore, fine tamen circumscribuntur, quia habent terminum substantiae et virtutis.’ On the Halesian conception of place and of the location of angels, see Alice Lamy, ‘La théorie du lieu selon Alexandre de Halès,’ in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: physique, métaphysique et cosmologie (XIIe-XVIe siècles)*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine, *Textes et études du moyen âge* 86 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 39–55.

27 SH II, In2, Tr3, Q2, Ti2, C4, Ar3 (n. 179), Respondeo, p. 232: ‘Dicimus quod angelus non est nisi in uno loco partibili secundum quod ipsum ponimus in loco ratione suae essentiae. Nihilominus tamen potest movere quoddam corpus magnum et tamen in unica parte esse, sed eius virtus et operatio extendit se ad quamlibet partem eius, ut cuilibet parti dicatur praesens per effectum suae operationis. Secundum hoc potest intelligi quod dicit Damascenus, quod “ibi est ubi operatur,” non quod oporteat ipsum esse per essentiam in quacumque parte operatur, sed solum per effectum suae operationis, secundum quod sua virtus potest se extendere’ (my emphasis).

ogy with the capacity of certain bodies to move other bodies by the application of their force (*virtus*): an example of this is when steel moves iron. Similarly, the angel has the capacity to move a whole body by means of its power, even if the angel is not present within it.²⁸ Thus, insofar as it acts on several bodies at once, the angel will be located in several places, i.e. ‘multi-located’.

This conception merits close consideration: it suggests that angels are both 1. located by their being (or essence) in a single divisible place, and also 2. capable of occupying several places simultaneously by the power of their agency. These two theses demonstrate clearly that in the *Summa* two positions coexist which will become irreconcilable after the condemnation of 1277: the one in which the location of the angel is founded on its agency (as maintained by Thomas Aquinas and his followers) and the one in which it is founded on its being or its essence (a position upheld by Peter John Olivi and several Franciscans in the post-1277 period).²⁹ In respect to this theme, therefore, as for others, the *Summa Halensis* constitutes both the point at which preceding tradition has arrived (in particular the tradition of the school of St Victor) and the point of departure for the speculations which will be developed by later authors according to divergent, or indeed opposing, doctrinal approaches.³⁰

The Modality of Divine Location: ‘Deus est ubique’

We have seen that location by circumscription (*circumscriptio*) and by delimitation (*definitio*) characterize the relationship of created beings to space and cannot therefore apply to God. What is then the modality of divine location? Is God somewhere (*alicubi*), nowhere (*nusquam*) or everywhere (*ubique*)? The response to this question

28 *SH* II, In2, Tr3, Q2, Ti2, C4, Ar3 (n. 179), Respondeo, p. 232: ‘Quaedam enim corpora possunt movere corpora etiam per essentiam a se distincta, sicut adamas ferrum, et multo magis postest esse hoc in spiritibus angelicis.’

29 See Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et le lieu: Quatre questions sur la localisation des substances séparées* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2017); Tiziana Suarez-Nani ‘Vers le dépassement du lieu: l’ange, l’espace et le point,’ in *Représentations et conceptions de l’espace dans la culture médiévale*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and M. Rohde (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2011), pp. 121–46.

30 A similar observation can be made as regards angelic knowledge: according to the *Summa*, the angel is, and has always been, endowed with intelligible universal forms, but has knowledge of singulars through receptivity; see *SH* II, In2, Tr3, Q1, Ti2, C7, Ar1 (n. 137), pp. 184–85. However, particularly after 1277, these two theses will be set in opposition to each other, and can no longer both be upheld at the same time; see Tiziana Suarez-Nani, ‘L’innato e l’acquisito: Pietro Aureolo e la conoscenza degli angeli,’ in *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo: Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina*, eds. Chiara Crisciani and Luca Bianchi (Florence: SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), pp. 135–94. Lydia Schumacher has made a similar observation as regards analogy and univocity, which coexist in the *Summa* (see Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 134). Côté, for his part, has noted that Alexander of Hales can be seen as a ‘janus bifrons’; see Côté, *L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, p. 26.

investigates the hypothesis that God may be nowhere (*nusquam*).³¹ This investigation requires an elucidation of the meaning of the adverb ‘*nusquam*’ when it is applied to God. What transpires is that, in this one particular case, ‘*nusquam*’ does not signify the simple straightforward negation of every place and thus does not mean that God, *stricto sensu*, might be nowhere. In this instance, it simply means that God is nowhere ‘in a determinate way’, which amounts to saying that he is everywhere. When applied to God therefore, the adverb ‘*nusquam*’ takes on an eminently positive meaning, that of divine ubiquity.

It is the authority of Boethius which lends support to this idea: ‘*Ideo [Deus] nusquam [in loco] esse dicitur, quia ubique est [sed non in loco]*.’³² If God is nowhere, it is only in the sense that he is not contained or limited by any particular place, since he occupies all places simultaneously: applied to God, ‘*nusquam*’ is thus equivalent to ‘*ubique*’. This ‘omni-location’ does not however mean that God is contained in all the places in the world, but only that he is present in every place and that he fills them through his power (*virtualiter*) ‘in the way that wisdom fills the wise.’³³ For this reason, the affirmation that ‘God is everywhere’ implies that every place in the world is present to God to receive the effect of his power, i. e. to be conserved in their being.³⁴ God is thus located everywhere, but only through his causal power, i. e. virtually (*virtute*).

The idea of a virtual presence or location is linked to the Neoplatonic concept of the ‘intelligible place’, handed down in the Middle Ages in particular by John of

31 *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), p. 64: ‘Si dicatur quod esse in loco est dupliciter: vel per definitionem, sicut spiritus sunt in loco, vel per circumscriptionem, sicut corpora: istis modis non est Deus in loco (...); eo modo quo haec est falsa: “Deus est alicubi”, est haec vera “Deus est nusquam”, quae est sua contradictoria.’

32 *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), p. 64. For Boethius, see *De Trinitate*, c. 4, in *The Theological Tractates*, eds. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 20. See Schumacher, ‘The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity,’ p. 287.

33 *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), p. 65: ‘Secundo modo [Deus] est in loco, non tamen ut dicatur replere locum materialiter, sed virtualiter; secundum quod dicit Augustinus, *Ad Dardanum*, quod aliter dicitur sapientia replere sapientem et aqua vas. Eo modo quo sapientia replet sapientes, eo modo divina essentia replet loca: sapientia enim non maior est in maiore nec minor in minore. Sic Deus est in locis virtualiter et consummative, in hoc quod dat locis esse et virtutem qua repleantur.’ See also Augustine, *De praesentia Dei liber seu Epistola 187*, c. 6, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia*, vol. II (Paris: Gaume Fratres, 1836), col. 1025–26. Within this realm of ideas, it is significant that the *Summa* does not use the metaphor of God as an infinite sphere to indicate his extent in space, but simply to emphasize his unknowability.

34 *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C1 (n. 40), pp. 64–65: “Deus est ubique” ita dici videtur non quod sit in omni loco, sed quod omnis locus *ei adsit* ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non capiatur a loco. (...) Ad tertium (...) dicerentur enim loca vacua et imperfecta, nisi replerentur locato: et propter hoc locus dicit imperfectionem respectu locati. Deus autem perficit locum, dando ei virtutem qua continet et salvat (...) et sic [Deus] est in loco (...) et sic replet repletionem virtuali.’ *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C2 (n. 41), p. 66: ‘Sic dicitur Deus ubique, et tunc idem est dicere “Deus est ubique” quod “Deus omni ubi praesens est totus et secundum idem.”’ (My italics.)

Damascus, one of the main sources of the *Summa* in this context.³⁵ By virtue of the superiority of what is intelligible and spiritual over what is tangible and material, John of Damascus had attributed to the ‘intelligible place’ the capacity to contain, i.e. to locate material realities. This thesis was widely shared by medieval thinkers and can even be found in faithful followers of Aristotle: Albert the Great, for instance, maintains – in terms which for him are not at all paradoxical – that what is internal and spiritual contains that which is external and material;³⁶ for his part, Thomas Aquinas sees spiritual beings as being ‘containing (places)’;³⁷ and Meister Eckhart calls God ‘the place of all things’.³⁸ In terms of this way of thinking, when the *Summa* declares that God is everywhere (*ubique*), what is meant is that God is present in every place and that he fills them all with his presence: ‘*Cum dicitur “Deus est ubique”, notatur habitudo replentis ad repletum; unde sensus est: “Deus est ubique”, id est “Deus est praesens omni ubi et replens omne ubi.”*’³⁹

By means of this notion of the ‘intelligible place’, the thesis of divine ubiquity thus leads to a reversal of the Aristotelian conception of location and of the relationship between the place which contains and the body which is located: in the case of divine ubiquity, it is not the place which contains what is located there but, on the contrary, it is God himself who fills, contains and locates all things. From this per-

35 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67: ‘Est etiam locus spiritualis, de quo idem Damascenus [ait]: “Est autem intelligibilis locus, ubi intelligitur et est intellectualis et incorporea natura; et non corporaliter continetur, sed intelligibiliter.”’ (See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 13, pp. 56–57.)

36 Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei*, pt. 1, tr. 18, q. 70, m. 4, in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, 38 vols, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–99), vol. 31, p. 741; see the article by Anna Rodolfi, ‘Présence de Dieu et lieu des anges chez Albert le Grand,’ in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: physique, métaphysique et cosmologie (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles)*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine, Textes et études du moyen âge 86 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 79–92. The position taken by Albert the Great was to be further elaborated by Dietrich of Freiberg; see Tiziana Suarez-Nani, ‘Les êtres et leurs lieux: le fondement de la localisation selon Dietrich de Freiberg,’ in *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg*, eds. Dragos Calma, Joël Biard, and Ruedi Imbach (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), pp. 145–63.

37 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 52, a. 3, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia: iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-), vol. 4, p. 28; see Suarez-Nani, ‘Vers le dépassement du lieu,’ pp. 126–27.

38 Meister Eckhart, *Prologus expositio libri Genesis*, § 49, ed. Karl Weiss, in *Lateinische Werke*, Bd. I (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964), pp. 220–21; see Yossef Schwarz, ‘Divine Space and Space of the Divine: On the Scholastic Rejection of Arab Cosmology,’ in *Représentations et conceptions de l’espace dans la culture médiévale*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and M. Rohde (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2011), pp. 89–119. The current of thinking which sees the intelligible and the spiritual as the site of what is material will persist at least until the 17th century, notably among the Platonists of Cambridge: see Suarez-Nani, ‘Le lieu de l’esprit.’

39 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67. In the *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Alexander of Hales was even more explicit: ‘Videtur quod primus locus intellectualis sit divina essentia,’ *Glossa*, bk. I, d. 37, p. 380, quoted in Côté, *L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, p. 26.

spective, to say that God is ‘in things’ means in reality that ‘things are in God in that he maintains them in their being.’⁴⁰

Having completed this first stage of our investigation, we can conclude that divine immensity in relation to space combines two meanings: the first is the absence of any limit and the negation of any circumscription; the second is the universal extent of the divine presence. According to the first meaning, God is a ‘negative infinity’; according to the second he is an ‘infinity by contrariety’, that is to say a ‘positive infinity’ which contains, fills and delimits every place.⁴¹

That being so, it appears that the infinity attributed to God characterizes him in himself, independently of his relationship to created beings.⁴² The perfection of his being, complete and beyond any limit, implies immensity and infinity, in a manner prior to and independent of, any relationship with earthly things. Infinity is thus an intrinsic property of the divine substance:⁴³ it characterizes it ‘*quantum ad se*’ and is not an extrinsic attribution. While at the level of vocabulary the positive infinity of God is most frequently designated by the term ‘immensity’,⁴⁴ infinity is nevertheless an intrinsic condition of the divine essence.

40 *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67. On the theme of the presence of God in things, see Schumacher, ‘The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity,’ p. 287. On divine ubiquity in the 12th century, see Luisa Valente, ‘*Deus est ubique, ergo alicubi?* Ubiquité et immanence de Dieu dans la théologie du XIIe siècle,’ in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: physique, métaphysique et cosmologie (XIIe-XVIIe siècles)*, eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine, *Textes et études du moyen âge* 86 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 17–38.

41 While the expression is not used as such in the *Summa*, ‘positive infinity’ is clearly signified by the notion of completeness: ‘*Deus est completus in se, quia est finis omnium, [hoc est] omnia finiens.*’ From this perspective, that which is ‘finite’ is what is delimited or terminated by something else: God is thus, ‘by contrariety’, an active and perfectly complete infinity. See *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q1, C1 (n. 34), p. 57.

42 The *Summa* makes a clear distinction between divine immensity/ubiquity and the presence of God in things: ‘*Dicendum ergo quod differt Deum esse in omni loco et ubique et in omni re. Cum ergo dicitur “Deus est ubique” notatur habitudo replentis ad repletum (...). Cum autem dicitur “Deus est in omni re,” notatur habitudo conservantis ad conservatum per hanc prepositionem “in”.*’ *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C3 (n. 42), p. 67.

43 Sweeney’s interpretation (see n. 8 above) is refuted, by the following passages (among others): ‘*Proprie ergo est dicendum ipse esse infinitum secundum substantiam.*’ Also: ‘*Et ideo esse effectum, esse formatum, esse finitum, omnia ista sunt nobilitatis in creatura, quia ordinatur ad efficiens, formam et finem; in Deo tamen, qui est efficiens primum et prima forma omnium exemplaris, erunt ista ignobilitatis, et ideo contraria istorum [sc. esse infinitum] sunt nobilitatis in illo.*’ *SH I*, In1, Tr2, Q1, C1 (n. 34), pp. 56–57. We thus agree with the interpretation of Wass, who is of the view that the *Summa* regards infinity as an intrinsic attribute of God; see Wass, *The Infinity of God*, pp. 3–5 and *passim*.

44 At the level of vocabulary, it is only after 1250 that the term infinity replaces that of immensity (see above, n. 16); however, the latter does not thereby disappear: it is to be found, for example, in Thomas Aquinas (*Compendium theologiae*, bk. I, c. 18, accessed from www.corpusthomicum.org), Henry of Ghent (*Summa quaestionum ordinarium*, II, a. XLIV, q. 2, in *Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia*, vol. 29, ed. Ludwig Hödl [Leuven: University Press, 1998], pp. 87–99), Duns Scotus (see below, n. 63), and in Thomas Bradwardine (*De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum*, c. 5, eds. George Abbot and Henry Savile [London: Apud Ioannem Billium, 1618], pp. 177–79).

Divine Immensity in Relation to Time

Divine immensity in relation to time is eternity,⁴⁵ and eternity is a figure of infinity. The *Summa* starts by presenting some conceptual clarifications (*quid nominis*) before examining the nature (*quid rei*) of eternity and its relationship to other modalities of time.

Conceptual Clarifications

1. The term '*sempiternitas*' equates to the expression '*semper esse*'; it can mean either 1.1. 'existing at every point in time' (*esse omni tempore*), or 1.2. 'never not existing' (*nunquam non esse*), i.e. having neither beginning nor end.⁴⁶

1.1. The first meaning applies to the time of angels, who exist at every point in time, but are not coeternal with God; in this sense, '*sempiternitas*' is to be distinguished from eternity in reality (*re*) just as much as in its meaning (*significatione*). On the other hand, '*sempiternitas*' in the second sense 1.2. coincides with eternity in reality, since what is eternal has never not existed: however it does differ from it in respect of meaning.

In fact, 2. '*aeternitas*' signifies the absence of any beginning, or end, or of any sort of change or mutability: '*aeternum [est] quod caret principio et fine et omni mutabilitate.*'⁴⁷

The terms '*sempiternitas*' and '*aeternitas*' thus partially overlap, and distinguishing between them depends on the use made of them and on the subject to which they are attributed. Specifically, the term 'eternity' lends itself to analogical use; the *Summa*, therefore, considering it in its broadest sense of 'a long period of time that has no end' (*diuturnitas*), distinguishes four modalities within it:

2.1. The eternity of the time of the angels (*diuturnitas angeli*), which has no end (neither in itself nor from anything else) and is not subject to change, but does have a beginning;

2.2. the eternity of the punishment of the damned (*diuturnitas poenae reprobum*), which has no end (neither in itself nor from anything else), but does have a beginning and is subject to change;

2.3. the eternity of time, which has no end in itself, but does have one from something else; it also has a beginning and is subject to change;

⁴⁵ This question is the one examined at greatest length in the *Summa*, where it takes up pages 84 to 111 in the first volume of the edition to which reference is made here.

⁴⁶ *SH* I, InI, Tr2, Q4, M1, C1, Ar1 (n. 56), p. 85.

⁴⁷ *SH* I, InI, Tr2, Q4, M1, C1, Ar1 (n. 56), p. 85. The *Summa* borrows these definitions from Richard of St Victor, who considerably influenced Alexander of Hales; see Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate*, bk. II, c. IV, in *De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, *Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age*, 6 (Paris: Vrin, 1958), p. 111.

2.4. divine eternity, which has neither beginning nor end nor any change.⁴⁸

This typology thus embraces different forms and senses of eternity as endless, i.e. infinite, time. It stems from a qualitative vision of time which associates each type of eternity with a particular mode of being: whether it be angelical existence, punishment in hell, cosmic time or divine eternity, each form of eternity corresponds to the mode of being of its subject and reflects its status. In a manner characteristic of Platonism,⁴⁹ the first three modalities of eternity are imperfect imitations of divine eternity. This latter is the only one to possess paradigmatic value, since it designates the only reality whose time is beyond any origin, or end, or change. Unlike the others, this fourth modality of eternity is not simply the attribute of that which possesses infinite time, but is identical with the divine essence, just as spatial immensity is identical to God himself.⁵⁰

Divine eternity as conceived in this way corresponds to Boethius' famous definition: '*Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.*'⁵¹ This definition applies only to God, as it simultaneously posits three conditions: the absence of limits (*interminabilis*), invariability (*invariabilitas*) and simplicity (*simplicitas*). These conditions make a radical distinction between divine eternity and created infinities of time: timelessness or limitlessness distinguish divine eternity from that of corruptible substances; simultaneity distinguishes it from that of incorruptible, but changeable, heavenly substances; and simplicity distinguishes it from the perpetual time of spiritual substances, those of angels in particular, which are incorruptible and invariable, but composed of essence and being.

In uniting these three conditions, divine eternity is perfect in the proper sense of the word, that is, complete and actual. It is thus qualitatively different from the other three and designates the 'positive' infinity of God. By contrast, infinity as lack of an origin or an end (which characterizes the time of certain created substances) is a quantitative and 'privative' infinity. The positivity of divine infinity/eternity is still further underlined by the explanation given of the adjective '*perfectum*': according to the *Summa*, God is perfect in that he is 'that to which nothing can be added and that of which no part is possible (i.e. potential) in respect of the whole.'⁵²

48 SH I, In1, Tr2, Q4, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 57), pp. 85–86.

49 The Platonic roots of this doctrine can be seen from the reference to Boethius: 'Unde Boethius hac ratione dicit, ultimo *De consolatione*, quod aeternitatem "infinitus temporalium motus imitatur";' SH I, In1, Tr2, Q4, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 57), p. 86.

50 SH I, In1, Tr2, Q4, M1, C2 (n. 58), pp. 86–87: 'Sic cum dicitur "aeternitas" significatur divina essentia ut diuturnitas immensa, quemadmodum cum dicitur "incircumscribilitas" significatur [divina essentia] ut extensio immensa.'

51 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, bk. V, prosa 6, ed. Claudio Moreschini (Leipzig: Teubner, 2000), p. 155.

52 SH I, In1, Tr2, Q4, M1, C3 (n. 59), p. 87: 'Ad cuius differentiam additur "perfecta"; illud enim summe perfectum est, cui non est possibilis aliqua additio et ubi non est aliqua pars possibilis respectu totius: et simplicitate ista solus Deus perfectus est, quia quidquid est in eo ipse est.' The positivity of divine infinity defined in this text is confirmed by the notion of completeness (see above,

This definition of divine perfection excludes all potentiality and all lack so as to designate the infinity/eternity of God as fullness, actuality and totality fulfilled – an infinity that can only be identical with God himself.

This definition is an inverse echo of the Aristotelian conception of the infinite as ‘that to which something can always be added’ or ‘that outside of which there is always something.’⁵³ Aristotle was there articulating a negative and privative conception of infinity, whose nature is to remain for ever incomplete (*imperfectum*) and whose realization is merely potential (through the infinite division of the continuum). Conversely, in the *Summa* divine infinity signified by eternity is a positive representation of the supreme perfection, completeness and fullness of the only essence which is ‘*causa sui*’.

In a similar way to spatial infinity, divine eternity implies the presence of God in every time: God is ‘with’ time, but not ‘in’ time. Conversely, temporal entities are subsumed in divine eternity, which contains all things.⁵⁴

At this point in our analysis, we can note that divine immensity in relation to time is a-temporal, just as his immensity in relation to space is without expanse (or non-spatial).⁵⁵ By the negation of the negation (i.e. of spatial and temporal finitude) which they imply, these two forms of immensity can be seen as figures of the positive and intrinsic infinity of the divine essence:⁵⁶ it is indeed in his essence, and not simply in relation to the created universe, that God is infinite and immense, that is to say incommensurable.⁵⁷

n. 41) which will become a fundamental idea for Henry of Ghent; see Anne Davenport, *Measure of a Different Greatness: The Intensive Infinite, 1250–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 89–154.

53 Aristotle, *Physics* 3.6 (206b 33–207a 1), in *Physica, Translatio Vetus*, ed. Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams, *Aristoteles Latinus* 7/1 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), p. 128, 10–11.

54 *SH* I, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C2 (n. 62), p. 91: ‘In summa vero essentia unum tantum percipitur, scilicet quia [Deus] praesens est, non quia continetur. Unde si usus loquendi admitteret, convenientius videretur esse cum loco et tempore quam in loco et tempore. (...) Et in hoc sensu intelligit Anselmus, in *Proslogion* (c. 19): (...) tu autem non es in loco vel tempore, sed omnia sunt in te; nihil enim continet te, sed tu continens omnia.’

55 On this point the *Summa* is echoing the views of Augustine, *Confessiones* XI.14, and *Epistle* 187, col. 1025: ‘[Deus] ubique, quia nusquam est absens. In seipso autem, quia non continetur ab eis quibus est praesens.’ See above, n. 33.

56 The positivity of divine infinity resulting from this double negation will be explicitly put forward by Henry of Ghent (see Davenport, *Measure of a Different Greatness*, pp. 89–154). That said, as Côté observes (*L’infinité divine dans la théologie médiévale*, pp. 26 and 30–31), it would be wrong to claim that Alexander of Hales did not posit the positive infinity of the divine essence – an idea already present in his *Glossa* (bk. I, d. 19, p. 373) – merely on the basis that he predominantly uses the term ‘immensity’.

57 In the words of Richard of St Victor, a major source for the *Summa Halensis*, ‘Deus, qui magnitudo ipsa est, magnitudinem ad mensuram habere non potest. Supra omnem itaque mensuram, et eo ipso immensum esse deprehenditur quod nulla mensura comprehenditur;’ Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* II, c. 10, p. 117.

What we see emerging, therefore, is a dialectical opposition between divine immensity and any spatial delimitation, and equally between divine eternity and any duration of time, including created eternity.⁵⁸ That is obvious in the comparison between the instants (*nunc*) which characterize the different kinds of time. To the question ‘*Utrum idem sit nunc temporis, aevi et aeternitatis,*’ the *Summa* replies that if one conceives of the instant as what is multiplied in time (*instans quod multiplicatur in tempore*) or as what elapses (*instans fluens*),⁵⁹ such an instant is alien to divine eternity. Divine eternity equates in fact to a single instant, permanent and perfectly identical to itself.⁶⁰ Again, this in no way signifies that God is ‘in’ his eternal instant, but rather that divine eternity is incommensurable and identical to God himself; conversely, created entities are in the eternal instant of God just as they are in their common measure.⁶¹

This dialectical opposition arises again with the rejection of an intermediate time (*mensura media*) between time and created eternity (*aeviternitas*). According to the *Summa*, such a time is superfluous, since all change is measured by time and all that is stable in things is measured by created eternity. This shows that even at the level of created things there is no continuity, but rather an opposition between the time which measures change and that which measures stability.⁶²

The dialectical relationship between divine eternity and the other forms of time shows clearly that the difference between them is not quantitative in nature: a created eternity (such as that of spiritual substances) is not just ‘shorter’ than divine eternity, and a created infinity is not just ‘smaller’ than divine infinity. Rather, their diversity is qualitative: they represent specifically different forms of time, in that they correspond to different modes of being. There is thus no continuity between divine eternity and other forms of time, just as there is no continuity between quantitative dimensions (*quantitates dimensionales*) and the quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*) of God. This discontinuity and this cleavage require that divine immensity and divine eternity be considered in themselves, in their absoluteness: they can then be

58 The *Summa* notes this dialectic, drawing on the *Monologion* of Anselm; see *SH* 1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C2 (n. 62), p. 91.

59 *SH* 1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M3, C4, Ar3 (n. 70), p. 109: ‘Est enim nunc quod multiplicatur in tempore, sicut ipsa successio motus (...). Item est nunc quod est idem in tempore (...), quod fluit et fertur in tempore.’

60 *SH* 1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M3, C4, Ar3 (n. 70), p. 109: ‘Item est nunc quod non fluit, quemadmodum id quod est, in quantum huiusmodi, intelligitur manens.’

61 *SH* 1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M3, C4, Ar3 (n. 70), p. 109: ‘Item, in nunc aeternitatis, sicut in mensura communi excedente est motus [=tempus] et angelus [=aeviternitas].’

62 The rejection of an intermediate modality of time will be a feature of the position of a number of Franciscan thinkers, such as Bonaventure, Peter John Olivi, Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, and William Ockham.

seen as the sign of an infinity (spatial and temporal) which characterizes God in his essence, independently of his relationship to created beings.⁶³

The outcome of the analysis of divine immensity put forward in the *Summa* appears to us to be the following: God is positively and intrinsically infinite and not only immense and incommensurable.

Brief Concluding Observation

In conclusion, I would like to return to the second thesis presented at the outset of our investigation.

If it is true – as is our belief – that the idea of divine infinity is clearly formulated in the *Summa* to refer to the perfection and the fullness of God, then this text marks – at least within the Franciscan milieu – a pivotal intermediate stage between earlier speculations and later theories concerning the infinity of God. By bringing together the notions of immensity and infinity, the *Summa* will in fact enable succeeding thinkers to work with a range of theoretical options, while still remaining true to the authority of this founding text of Franciscan doctrinal identity. Thus it is that in Duns Scotus, who invests the concept of infinity with a quite new level of importance, the term immensity is still to be found, even if marginally.⁶⁴

As it opens up speculative perspectives which will subsequently follow a variety of paths, the *Summa* can rightly be considered as the doctrinal charter of the Franciscan order,⁶⁵ to which its members can give common allegiance while at the same time pursuing different speculative directions. Here we are touching on a specific aspect of the identity of the Franciscan order: this order did not invest the doctrine of a particular master with a normative value and function – as was the case with Tho-

⁶³ See above, n. 39. The dialectical opposition between what is created infinite and divine infinity will be specifically addressed by Henry of Ghent (see Davenport, *Measure of Different Greatness*, pp. 89–154).

⁶⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, bk. I, d. 37, q. 1, in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 6, ed. Carolus Balic (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), pp. 299–302: ‘Utrum Dei omnipotentia necessario inferat eius immensitatem;’ John Duns Scotus, *In IV Sententiarum*, d. 10, q. 2, in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 12 (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2010), p. 96. The term ‘immensity’ does not in fact totally disappear: it can still be found in the 17th century, for instance in Francisco Suarez (see *De angelis*, bk. 4, c. 3–4 and 6, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. II, ed. Michel André (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856), pp. 433a–442a and 450b): for the debate on divine infinity in early modern philosophy, see Igor Agostini, *L’infinità di Dio: Il dibattito da Suarez a Caterus (1597–1641)* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2008). As regards Duns Scotus, it should be noted that he is to be credited not only with having made infinity the principal attribute of God (see *Tractatus de primo principio*), but also with having developed a positive conception of the infinite in nature; see Joël Biard, ‘Duns Scot et l’infini dans la nature,’ in *Duns Scot à Paris 1302–2002*, eds. Olivier Boulnois et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 387–405.

⁶⁵ See Schumacher, ‘The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity,’ p. 292.

mas Aquinas in the Dominican order⁶⁶ – but instead permitted within its ranks the development of doctrines which were often very varied whilst still remaining faithful to the inspiration of its founder.

This is highly significant: even after Duns Scotus, who launched a school of thought whose influence would be felt right up to the 17th century, the thinkers who refer to it will do so in a properly ‘Franciscan’ spirit of freedom. Whether one thinks of William Alnwick, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, William Ockham or Francis of Meyronnes, the ‘*schola minorum*’⁶⁷ is marked by a plurality of opinions which bears witness, on the level of doctrine, to the freedom prized by the ‘*sequaces*’ of Francis of Assisi. The credit for having made this freedom of thought possible is due in large measure to Alexander of Hales and his *Summa*.

⁶⁶ See Maarten Hoenen, ‘Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden: Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters,’ *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 260–85.

⁶⁷ This name was coined by Francis of Meyronnes; see William O. Duba, *The Forge of the Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330–31 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 23–24.

Simon Maria Kopf

Providence in the *Summa Halensis*: Between Authority and Innovation

Abstract: The doctrine of divine providence features prominently in the 13th-century early Franciscan *Summa Halensis*. This chapter argues that the account of providence presented in the *Summa* is an innovative reworking of past authorities and may thus be counted among the examples of early Franciscan innovations. For instance, while John of Damascus claimed that providence is part of God's will and Peter Lombard took providence to be a specific form of divine knowledge, the *Summa Halensis* applies the Boethian notion of the *ratio* of providence to harmonize the two authorities, terming the corresponding *executio* 'government'. Thus the distinction between *providentia* and *gubernatio*, so central to Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of providence, is to be found initially in the *Summa Halensis*.

Introduction

In his historical study of Albert the Great's treatise on providence and fate, which shows the dependence of Albert's treatise in the *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei* on the *Summa Halensis*,¹ Josef Georgen argues that the rise to prominence of the topic of divine providence in the 13th century, in particular, at the University of Paris, is, apart from its intrinsic importance and value for theology generally, largely a function of the theological and philosophical circumstances of the mid-13th century. In particular, Georgen suggests that the Parisian controversy between Christian and Averroistic Aristotelians goes a long way towards explaining the increased interest in the doctrine of providence, not least because it was attacked, in various forms, by Latin Averroists, such as Siger of Brabant, and consequently also dealt with in some of the articles of the condemnations of 1270 and 1277.² Pierre Mandonnet, Antonin Sertillanges, and Martin Grabmann, to name just

1 On the question of the dependence of Albert the Great on the *Summa Halensis*, see also Parthenius Minges, 'Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen Alexander von Hales und Albert dem Grossen,' *Franziskanische Studien* 2 (1915), pp. 208–29; Mathieu-Maxime Gorce, 'Le problème des trois Sommes: Alexandre de Halès, Thomas d'Aquin, Albert le Grand,' *Revue Thomiste* 36 (1931), pp. 293–300; Hubert Neufeld, 'Zum Problem des Verhältnisses der theologischen Summe Alberts des Großen zur Theologischen Summe Alexander von Hales,' *Franziskanische Studien* 27 (1940), pp. 22–56, 65–87.

2 Josef Georgen, *Des hl. Albertus Magnus Lehre von der göttlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vorsehungs- und Schicksalslehre des Ulrich von Straßburg* (Vechta in Oldenburg: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag, 1932), pp. 1–6, 41, 71–74, 95–102. The doctrine of providence is – implicitly and explicitly – subject of both the condemnation of 1270 and 1277. See *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, eds. Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain (Paris: Delalain Frères,

a few examples, have all noted that the Christian vision of providence was under attack at the time.³ These circumstances, Georgen argues, explain why Albert the Great and his students Thomas Aquinas and Ulrich of Strasburg dedicated so much attention to the doctrine of providence.

The early Franciscan Parisian *Summa Halensis* predates these discussions by a generation but nevertheless dedicates a surprising amount of attention to this topic. This chapter sets out to explore the doctrine of providence in the *Summa Halensis* in the historical-theological context of scholastic treatises at the time and seeks to assess the originality of its contribution against this backdrop. The *Summa Halensis*, at times called the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, is a collaborative work of the earliest generation of Franciscan theologians at the University of Paris in the first half of the 13th century, which was composed under the auspices of the Parisian master and Franciscan friar Alexander of Hales (1184–1245).⁴ The thesis I will defend is that the *Summa Halensis*, in drawing on past authorities, such as Augustine, Boethius, John of Damascus, and Peter Lombard, introduced a couple of noteworthy innovations, most notably the view that providence is a matter not just of knowledge but also of will, on the basis of which the *Summa* then distinguishes government from providence, which influenced later renderings of providence, for example, in Aquinas.

To make this argument, I will first outline in section one the scholastic context of the debates about providence, to determine when the topic became of interest; I will then turn to the *Summa Halensis* and discuss, in section two, the definition of providence adopted and adapted by the *Summa*. In section three, I will finally describe the causal role of divine providence in the world.

The *Summa Halensis* in the Scholastic Context: A Quick Theological Detour

The doctrine of providence asserts in some form or another that God is actively involved in the events that take place and unfold in the world beyond its creation

1889), no. 432; Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^{me} siècle*, 2 vols (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de L'Université, 1908–11), vol. 2, pp. 175–91.

³ Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, vol. 1, p. 160; A.-D. Sertillanges, *S. Thomas D'Aquin*, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1922), p. 11; Martin Grabmann, *Neu aufgefundene Werke des Siger von Brabant und Boetius von Dacien* (München: Verlag der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1924), p. 21.

⁴ For an introduction to and extensive assessment of early Franciscan theology, see Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); for questions concerning the authorship and dating of the *Summa Halensis*, see Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), pp. 26–41, and Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa* (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), pp. 274–312.

and conservation. Thus, it is generally taken to be distinct from the doctrine of creation, which concerns the coming into being of the world itself – as well as at times from conservation as the continuation of the act of creation, or the upholding of the created order, for that matter. Although the general notion of providence has a well-known pre-Christian origin, Christianity developed a genuinely Christian form of providence: the Christian doctrine of the providence of God.⁵

Although the Christian doctrine of providence can be traced throughout the history of theology, at various points in history it finds diverse forms of expression of varying intensity and detail. In this section I shall show that providence was not a major subject of the theological discourse in the decades prior to the composition of the *Summa Halensis* (1236–45/56; books I–III were largely completed by 1245).⁶ The key scholars who worked in this earlier generation, before 1245, and who influenced the *Summa Halensis*, are mentioned by Victorin Doucet, then prefect of the Commission for the study of Alexander of Hales and chief editor of the Quaracchi edition of the *Summa Halensis*:

[The *Summa Halensis*] very often borrows from them without mentioning them by name; e.g. Prevostin, William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, William of Auvergne, etc. (...) From more recent studies, two authors especially stand out as sources of the *Summa*, namely, John of Rupella and Alexander (...).⁷

The first scholar Doucet mentions, Praepositinus of Cremona (c.1135–1210), is a good example of the trend of his generation to avoid much discussion of providence.⁸ In part one of his *Summa Theologiae* (1206–10), he treats a number of related topics, such as foreknowledge and predestination, but the notion of providence does not ap-

5 For an overview of the historical origins and the general development of the Christian doctrine of providence, see, for example, David Fergusson, *The Providence of God: A Polyphonic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

6 Book IV is a later addition compiled after the death of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle in 1245. Books I–III also include parts, such as the membrum *De Missione Visibili* (SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti3, M2 [nn. 514–18], pp. 734–51) or the tractates *De Corpore Humano* (SH II, In4, Tr2 [nn. 427–68], pp. 501–630) and *De Coniuncto Humano* (SH II, In4, Tr3 [nn. 469–523], pp. 631–784), which were added later. See Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem (Continued),’ pp. 310–11.

7 Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem (Continued),’ p. 305.

8 For a study of providence in the Middle Ages, see Mikko Posti, *Medieval Theories of Divine Providence 1250–1350* (Leiden: Brill, 2020); for brief discussions of providence in the 12th century and early Disputed Questions and *Sentences*, see Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 268–90, and Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 151–68. Colish comments on treatises on providence in the first half of the 12th century: ‘In examining the approaches taken to these questions by Peter [Lombard], his contemporaries, and his immediate predecessors, one is struck by the one-sidedness of the address of many of them to the recourses provided by both the theological tradition and the school tradition on these matters.’ Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, p. 269.

pear in the index.⁹ Similarly, Philip the Chancellor (1160–1236) seems to have no specific account of providence in his *Summa de bono* (c.1228–36),¹⁰ and the same applies to Roland of Cremona's (d. 1259) *Summa*, which was probably written around 1234.¹¹

William of Auxerre (d. 1231), on the other hand, inserts a short discussion of providence in his *Summa aurea* (first version 1215–26; second version 1226–29) between the tractates on God's knowledge, including the topics of foreknowledge and predestination, and God's power, which is then followed by a discussion of God's will.¹² Thus, the interpolated question seems to mediate between divine knowledge and power. Drawing on John of Damascus and also Augustine, William considers the relationship of providence to good and evil and concludes that God has providence over both good and evil.¹³ He thereby states that divine providence is 'the care (*cura*) and diligence, with which God administers what is necessary for his subjects, where that be good things or, I may say, bad ones, namely, the lashes by which God whips humans to punish them.'¹⁴

As this evidence confirms, two of the most influential *Summae*¹⁵ at the time, the *Summa aurea* and the *Summa de bono*, included little or no specific treatment of providence. On the former, Parthenius Minges comments:

9 Georges Lacombe, *Prepositini Cancellarii Parisiensis (1206–1210) Opera Omnia*, vol. I: *La vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin* (Le Saulchoir, Kain: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 1927), pp. 168–78.

10 Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 2 vols, ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985).

11 Roland of Cremona, *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis*, 4 vols, eds. Luigi Cortesi and Umberto Midali, Cortesiana, 9–12 (Bergamo: Corponove Editrice, 2015–17).

12 On the influence of William's short discussion of providence on the *Summa Halensis*, see also Richard Cross, 'The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 77–79; on the dependent relationship of the *Summa Halensis* on the *Summa aurea* in general, see Parthenius Minges, 'Die theologischen Summen Wilhelms von Auxerre und Alexanders von Hales,' *Theologische Quartalschrift* 97 (1915), pp. 508–29.

13 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–87), I, tr. 10, vol. 1, pp. 198–201.

14 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10, vol. 1, p. 198. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the Latin and German are mine.

15 As Lydia Schumacher points out, 'early *Summae* were based loosely on the *Sentences* [of Peter Lombard] and incorporated its main divisions but did not comment on the text per se;' Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 14, n. 52. Another way to determine the rise of providence would be to look at *Sentences* commentaries. But since the *Summa Halensis* is a *Summa*, it seems preferable to compare it to other *Summae* (of sorts). For the transition between the two genres, see Marcia L. Colish, 'From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the *Summa*: Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130–1215,' in Marcia L. Colish, *Studies in Scholasticism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 1–29.

William [of Auxerre] does not discuss many new topics in comparison to the Lombard; in Alexander [i.e. the *Summa Halensis*], however, we find many and long Questions, of which those offer nothing or relatively little, such as (...) on fate and the book of life, on God's disposition, providence, election, and love to creatures.¹⁶

While the doctrine of providence does not appear to have featured prominently, if at all, in early scholastic Summae in the 13th century, things start to change around the time of William of Auvergne's (d. 1249) *De universo* (c.1236–40).¹⁷ William's *De universo*, which is part of his voluminous *Magisterium divinale et sapientiale*, includes a lengthy, though compared to the *Summa Halensis* less principled, treatment of providence. As a reason for his discussion of providence, William cites 'dangerous errors' about the doctrine, especially as it concerns humans – a subject that was also part of the condemnation of 1270.¹⁸ As a recipient of the new Arabic and Greek knowledge, William addresses two issues in particular, namely, God's providence over individuals and evils.¹⁹ In treating providence, William argues, among other things, that the providence of God is often mediated through creaturely causes,²⁰ and applies the Aristotelian categories of causation to the topic. William states, for example, that

whatever is the cause of an essential cause in the same kind of causality is also the cause of the effect (...). Since, therefore, the diligence and will of human beings to use such animals were caused by the creator efficiently or effectively and since he causes such a use of them in the same manner of causing, such a use is necessarily the work, gift, and benefit of the creator. But whatever is caused or given by him in that way is caused or given by him through his care and providence.²¹

Thus William of Auvergne argues, according to Corey Barnes, that providence is primarily an efficient cause.²² By contrast, the *Summa Halensis* will classify the causality implied by providence differently and hence takes a stance against the view promoted in *De universo*. This shift dovetails well with Mikko Posti's statement about medieval theories of providence in the 13th century, that 'there was no universal

16 Minges, 'Die theologischen Summen,' p. 512.

17 Corey L. Barnes, 'Providence and Causality in the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), p. 91.

18 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I–III, Proem., in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, vol. 1 (Paris: Apud Andreae Pralard, 1674, repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), p. 754; English translation in *The Providence of God Regarding the Universe: Part Three of the First Principal Part of The Universe of Creatures*, trans. Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), p. 29. The condemnation of 1270 includes the following condemned proposition: 'That human acts are not ruled by the providence of God;' *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, eds. Denifle and Châtelain, no. 432.

19 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I–III, Proem. (repr. Minerva, p. 754; trans. Teske, pp. 29–30).

20 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I–III, c. 1 (repr. Minerva, pp. 754–55; trans. Teske, pp. 30–33).

21 William of Auvergne, *De universo* I–III, c. 2 (repr. Minerva, p. 757; trans. Teske, p. 39).

22 Barnes, 'Providence and Causality,' pp. 91–94.

agreement about how providence should have been classified within the Aristotelian causal theory.²³

This brief discussion of the *Summa Halensis*' forebears might already suffice to illustrate that it is among the first scholastic Summae to include an extensive treatise on providence. In fact, an initial innovation concerning its doctrine of providence consists in its comprehensive and principled treatment of the topic by comparison to earlier or contemporary accounts. The relevant section, *De scientia Dei relative spectata*,²⁴ including, in question 1, the topic of divine foreknowledge (9.5 pages), in question 2, divine disposition (5.5 pages), in question 3, divine providence and fate (34 pages), and in question 4, divine predestination, reprobation, election, love, and the book of life (45 pages), is over 90 pages long in the Quaracchi edition, and the discussion of providence amounts to no less than 24 pages, with 8 main questions and a total of 14 sub-questions.

In this context, the *Summa Halensis* apparently feels the need to justify the doctrine of providence, and perhaps also its extensive treatment of the matter, in light of the fact that the creed does not include an article about God's government. The authors point out that, although the government of God was contested, for instance, by the Epicureans, for which reason one would expect the creed to rebuke the denial, an implicit assertion of providence suffices in this instance. The reason is that compared to other heresies negating, for instance, creation, the objection to providence is less principled. Since God's government of the world is, according to the *Summa*, closely linked with creation, the creed's affirmation of creation extends also to the doctrine of providence. God the creator is, as John of Damascus has it, also God the governor.²⁵

What is more, the fact that the *Summa Halensis* holds the sin of accusing God, the source and author of providence, of evil to outweigh the sin of rejecting providence altogether, might be taken to suggest the assumption that what prompts the authors of the *Summa* to deal with providence to such an extent has to do with an attack not so much on providence as such, but on the nature of providence.²⁶

23 Posti, *Medieval Theories*, p. 5.

24 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q1–4 (nn. 181–265), pp. 266–359.

25 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C8, Ar1 (n. 210), p. 303. John of Damascus states that 'God is both Creator and Provider, and [H]is power of creating, sustaining, and providing is His good will;' John of Damascus, 'The Orthodox Faith,' in *Saint John of Damascus: Writings*, trans. Frederic H. Chase, The Fathers of the Church, 37 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1958), p. 260 (*De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 29).

26 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C8, Ar2 (n. 211), p. 304.

The Definition of Providence: A Synthesis of the Damascene and the Lombard

The standard scholastic definitions of providence and related terms at the time were provided by Peter Lombard (c.1095/1100–60) in the *Sentences* (final redaction 1155–57), on which various medieval theologians, including the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, commented and which they integrated differently into their theological systems.²⁷ Hubert Neufeld notes in this connection that the authors of the *Summa* do not often follow the scheme of the Lombard in the way other scholastic authors do, rarely taking ‘a passage from the *Sentences* explicitly as an occasion to treat a theological question.’²⁸ The tractate on providence and divine knowledge more generally appears to be an exception.²⁹ In fact, the approach of the *Summa* will become clear once we have examined the background provided by Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, to which we will now turn.

Peter Lombard and the Terminological Definitions in the *Sentences*

Peter Lombard sets the scene for subsequent medieval debates about providence, by introducing the basic terminology for this purpose in distinction 35 of the first book of the *Sentences*. The *Summa Halensis* will comment extensively on this understanding of providence.³⁰ In his treatise on God as the cause of creation in the first book, the Lombard discusses divine knowledge (dd. 35–41), divine power (dd. 42–44), and the divine will (dd. 45–48) in that order. The context of his discussion of providence is God’s knowledge or wisdom.³¹ Peter effectively presents divine providence and related terms as species of divine knowledge. He states:

God’s wisdom or knowledge (...) is called not only knowledge, but also foreknowledge or foresight, disposition, predestination and providence.

—And foreknowledge (*praescientia*) or foresight (*praeventia*) concerns only future things (*de futuris tantum*), but all of them, namely good and evil ones; disposition (*dispositio*) concerns

²⁷ Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, p. 269. On Peter Lombard’s sources and earlier related discussions, see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, pp. 268–90.

²⁸ Neufeld, ‘Zum Problem des Verhältnisses,’ p. 80.

²⁹ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), pp. 244–47.

³⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), IV and Respondeo IV, pp. 245–47; *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio IV, p. 287; *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M1, C2 (n. 221), I and Solutio I, pp. 316–17.

³¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (*Sent.*), 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), I, dd. 35–41, pp. 254–93.

things that are to be done (*de faciendis*); predestination (*praedestinatio*) concerns all who are to be saved (*de hominibus salvandis*), as well as the good things by which these are freed in this life and will be crowned in the future. (...) Providence (*providentia*) is concerned with governance (*gubernandorum*), and it seems to be taken entirely in the same way as disposition; and yet sometimes providence is taken for foreknowledge.

—Wisdom (*sapientia*) and knowledge (*scientia*), however, concerns all things (*de omnibus*): namely good and evil, and present, past, and future, and not only temporal things, but also eternal ones.³²

According to Peter Lombard, consequently, there are two sets of related terms. On the one hand, ‘foreknowledge’, ‘foresight’, ‘disposition’, ‘predestination’, and ‘providence’ all concern the future, in one way or another. ‘Wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’, on the other hand, relate in the case of God to all temporal and not only future things, as well as to eternal ones.

Within the first set, foreknowledge or foresight must be distinguished from disposition, predestination, and providence. Foreknowledge or foresight concerns all future things, whether good or bad, while the remainder is concerned only with future things that are good in some respect. Disposition has to do with things to be done, or made, as we will see below; predestination concerns the salvation of human beings; and providence pertains to things to be governed (*gubernandorum*). The latter is closely linked to or taken to be identical with disposition. The Lombard also notes an alternative interpretation according to which providence is divine foreknowledge.³³ Despite this ambiguity regarding providence, the favored option suggests that providence implies some goodness and a reference to the future. In Lombard’s view, then, providence is a form of divine knowledge, one that implies a reference to the future and probably to the good. So construed, providence pertains to and is a form of God’s wisdom.

The Lombardian Structure of the Exposition of Providence in the *Summa Halensis*

The *Summa Halensis*’ treatise on providence is situated within its first book, and more specifically the tractate on divine knowledge (*SH I, P1, In1, Tr5*), which is preceded by a discussion of divine power (*SH I, P1, In1, Tr4*) and followed by one of the divine will (*SH I, P1, In1, Tr6*). The structure is accordingly power – knowledge – will. In comparison to the *Sentences*, therefore, the power of God comes to the fore;³⁴ for,

³² Peter Lombard, *The Sentences: Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), p. 194; Peter Lombard, *Sent. I, d. 35, cc. 1–6* (ed. Brady, 1:254–55).

³³ Peter Lombard, *Sent. I, d. 35, cc. 1–6* (ed. Brady, 1:255).

³⁴ On this change in Franciscan theology, see also Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quattuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae,

as pointed out previously, in the *Sentences* the order was knowledge – power – will. In passing, it is worth noting that the *Summa* later on links or ‘appropriates’ power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit, following a long-standing tradition championed in the 12th century by the Victorines.³⁵ Consequently, the *Summa*’s presentation of power, knowledge, and will in God corresponds to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the Trinity.

Following the basic terminological distinctions of the *Sentences*, the *Summa Halensis*’ tractate on divine knowledge is divided into two sections, which respectively treat the knowledge of God in his own right, or ‘absolutely considered’ (*absolute spectata*), and knowledge of God in relation to other beings, or ‘relatively considered’ (*relative spectata*). In the section concerning divine knowledge relatively considered, the *Summa* deals first with divine foreknowledge,³⁶ before moving on to divine disposition,³⁷ divine providence (and fate),³⁸ and finally divine predestination (and reprobation, election, love, and the book of life).³⁹

The *Summa Halensis* follows then not only to a considerable extent the structure of the *Sentences*, but also adopts its approach in terms of divine knowledge and basic definitions.⁴⁰ In the preface to the section on divine knowledge relatively considered, we read as follows:

Having examined divine knowledge in an absolute sense, it behoves to enquire into it in relation [to other things] (*in comparatione*). For in relation to future things (*ad futura*) it is called foreknowledge (*praescientia*); in relation to things to be made (*ad facienda*), disposition (*dispositio*); in relation to things to be ruled (*ad regenda*), providence (*providentia*); in relation to ‘things’ to be saved (*ad salvanda*), predestination (*praedestinatio*).⁴¹

Accordingly, the *Summa Halensis* structures the material as follows:

1. *De scientia Dei relate ad futura*: divine foreknowledge.
2. *De scientia Dei relate ad facienda*: divine disposition.

1951–57), I, d. 35, 2, pp. 348–49, and Bonaventure, *Commentaries on the First Book of Sentences: Opera Omnia: On the One and Triune God* (Mansfield, MA: The Franciscan Archive, 2014), d. 35, doubt II, p. 614.

35 *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr2, S2, Q3 (nn. 450–60), pp. 645–57, on p. 645: ‘Consequently, it is asked about the appropriations (*de appropriatis*), which are power [which is appropriated] to the Father, wisdom [which is appropriated] to the Son, will [which is appropriated] to the Holy Spirit.’ See also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, C3 (n. 138), pp. 213–15. The *Summa* makes extensive use of these Trinitarian appropriations. On the origins of the Trinitarian appropriations, see also Dominique Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons, Monastic Meditations and Victorine Conciliations: The Question of the Unity and Plurality in the Twelfth Century,’ in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, eds. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 168–81.

36 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q1 (nn. 181–87), pp. 266–75.

37 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2 (nn. 188–94), pp. 275–80.

38 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3 (nn. 195–219), pp. 281–314.

39 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4 (nn. 220–65), pp. 315–59.

40 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), IV and Ad objecta IV, pp. 245–47.

41 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q1, pr., p. 266.

3. *De scientia Dei relate ad regenda*: divine providence and fate.⁴²
4. *De scientia Dei relate ad salvanda*: divine predestination, reprobation, election, love, and the book of life.⁴³

Two authorities are cited in support of Lombard's distinctions.⁴⁴ Hugh of St Victor is held to define (the subject matter of) divine knowledge, foreknowledge, disposition, predestination, and providence as follows:

Knowledge [is] of existing things (*scientia existentium*),⁴⁵ foreknowledge of future things (*praescientia futurorum*), disposition of things to be made (*dispositio faciendorum*), predestination of 'things' to be saved (*praedestinatio salvandorum*), providence of subjected things (*providentia subiectorum*).⁴⁶

According to the Quaracchi editors, a second implicit source is Peter of Poitiers, who distinguishes the term 'knowledge', as it refers to the divine essence, from the temporal aspect of the preposition 'fore-'knowledge, as it refers to a temporal relation in creatures.⁴⁷ Accordingly, the *Summa* explains that if we abstract from the temporal aspect, then we refer to divine knowledge by the name 'knowledge' or 'wisdom' – the difference being that the former concerns the effect, known through the cause, whereas the latter concerns the cause itself. But if the temporal dimension of creatures is considered, then it is referred to as 'foreknowledge', 'disposition', 'predestination', and 'providence'. Under the name 'foreknowledge', divine knowledge extends to both good and evil, but under the names 'disposition', 'predestination', and 'providence', it only relates to good things, although in different respects: 'disposition' signifies the good of nature in coming-to-be, or as being made (*in fieri*), whereas 'providence' signifies the good of nature in being, or as having been

⁴² As Josef Georgen has shown, the discussion of fate in the *Summa Halensis* has a great similarity with Alexander of Hales' *De fato*, which in this instance presumably served as the main source for the *Summa*. See Josef Georgen, 'Untersuchungen und Erläuterungen zu den Quästionen de fato, de divinatione, de sortibus des Magister Alexander,' *Franziskanische Studien* 19 (1932), pp. 13–39.

⁴³ The questions concerning the book of life in the *Summa Halensis* have, as the editors of the Quaracchi edition have pointed out (*SH* I, p. 346, n. 1), a great similarity with John of La Rochelle's *De libro vitae* (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 182, fols 4rb-5ra).

⁴⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), Ad objecta IV, pp. 246–47.

⁴⁵ Later on, in *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M3 (n. 168), Ad objecta 1, p. 251, the *Summa* clarifies that this statement does not exclude God's knowledge of non-existing things. Things might not exist in their nature and yet be known by God in their cause.

⁴⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), Ad objecta IV, p. 247; Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* I, pt. 2, c. 9 (PL 176:210B); cf. Pseudo-Hugo, *Summa sententiarum septem tractatibus distincta*, tr. 1, c. 12 (PL 176:61C).

⁴⁷ Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum libri quinque* I, c. 14 (PL 211:845 A): 'For by the simple [i.e. mere] name is signified the divine essence, by the preposition a temporal relation which is in creatures. For the divine essence in respect of creatures is called foreknowledge.'

made (*in facto esse*); ‘predestination’, however, signifies the good of grace.⁴⁸ The former statement is essentially Lombard’s position,⁴⁹ further specified in the latter part by the distinction between *in fieri* and *in facto esse*, in order to distinguish providence from disposition. In this the *Summa Halensis* goes beyond the Lombard.

Adopting John of Damascus’ Definition of Providence

In addition to Peter Lombard, the *Summa Halensis* draws here, as in other cases,⁵⁰ on the *De fide orthodoxa* of John of Damascus (d. c.750), who is known for passing down the Greek theological tradition, and in this instance draws in turn on the account of providence in Nemesius’ *De natura hominis*.⁵¹ John’s work had been translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa (c.1110–93) in the 12th century and was gaining in authority during this period, not least due to the similarities with the Lombard in terms of theological topics covered.⁵²

In the *De fide orthodoxa*, John defines providence as divine care over created things, an act following from and pertaining to the will of God. He writes: ‘Providence, then, is the solicitude (ἐπιμέλεια) which God has for existing things.’⁵³ And he goes on to explain: ‘Providence is that will of God by which all existing things receive suitable guidance through to their end.’ This statement implies that providence pertains to God’s will. In fact, on John’s view, ‘providence is God’s will.’⁵⁴

The Damascene’s definition of providence was subsequently invoked by the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, who interpret providence, and hence divine knowledge concerning things to be governed, that is, the *gubernandorum* of Peter Lombard, as a form of divine care.⁵⁵ Over and again we read, in one form or another, that ‘provi-

48 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), Ad obiecta IV, pp. 246–47.

49 See Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 35, c. 7 (ed. Brady, 1:255–57).

50 For a discussion of various other topics, see Cross, ‘The Reception of John of Damascus,’ pp. 71–90, and Johannes Zachhuber, ‘John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 91–116.

51 On the significance of John of Damascus for scholasticism, see Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, vol. 1, pp. 108–13; for his influence on the *Summa Halensis*, see Parthenius Minges, ‘Zum Gebrauch der Schrift *De fide orthodoxa* des Johannes Damaszenus in der Scholastik,’ *Theologische Quartalschrift* 96 (1914), pp. 225–47.

52 On the *Summa*’s use of this translation, see Minges, ‘Zum Gebrauch der Schrift *De fide orthodoxa*,’ pp. 233–38.

53 John of Damascus, ‘The Orthodox Faith,’ trans. Chase, p. 260 (*De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 29); for the Greek text, see John of Damascus, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskus*, vol. 2, *Expositio fidei*, ed. Bonifatius Kotter (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 1973), p. 100; cf. Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, c. 43 (PG 40:791B).

54 John of Damascus, ‘The Orthodox Faith,’ trans. Chase, p. 260 (*De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 29); cf. Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, c. 43 (PG 40:791B).

55 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), pp. 285–88; SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), pp. 288–89; SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar4 (n. 203), pp. 295–96. On the basic definition I dis-

dence is care (*cura*).⁵⁶ In defining providence as care, the authors of the *Summa* effectively adopt John of Damascus' definition, as rendered into the Latin by the Burgundio translation, as their own: 'Providence is the care which God has for existing things (*providentia est quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura*).'⁵⁷

In explicating the statement *providentia est gubernandorum* as *providentia est cura*, the *Summa Halensis* thus combines two past authorities, namely Peter Lombard and John of Damascus.

Adapting the Adopted Positions

The *Summa Halensis* then starts explicating and adapting the adopted positions. Based on quotations from Boethius, John of Damascus, the Lombard, and Scripture, the *Summa Halensis* discusses five prominent options as to what divine providence is or that to which it pertains: these positions suggest that providence might be identical with disposition or fate, and it might pertain to God's wisdom, will, or power. The same five positions will be discussed by Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) in his *Commentary on the Sentences* (1252–56), where he was among the first to introduce the topic of providence in distinction 39.⁵⁸ What is more, the arguments for each position, quoting four out of five times the same authorities, are initially to be found in the *Summa Halensis*. Like Aquinas, the *Summa* argues that providence is neither identical with disposition nor with fate. Nor does it pertain to power rather than to wisdom or will. Providence is a form of divine knowledge in its own right, conjoined with the will, and distinct from both fate and disposition.⁵⁹

Providence is not (really) divine disposition. The *Summa Halensis* draws a couple of distinctions to differentiate the closely related terms 'wisdom', 'disposition', 'providence', and 'government'. According to the *Summa*, disposition is divine foreknowledge of things to be made with the scope of them being made (*praescientia facien-*

agree with Barnes, 'Providence and Causality,' p. 98, who suggests that 'exemplar reason [as] considered in the divine art (*exemplaris ratio consideratur in arte divina*)' (*SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 [n. 196], p. 288) is the preferred definition of the *Summa*. The definition that reappears in various forms in the subsequent articles, however, is the one of John of Damascus. It seems therefore reasonable to see this definition as a further explication of the fundamental identification of providence with divine care.

⁵⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio I-II, p. 287.

⁵⁷ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), I, p. 285; similarly, *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3 (n. 197), Contra b, p. 287: 'Providence is care for existing things (*providentia est ad existentia cura*).' The Burgundio translation reads: 'Providentia igitur est quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura;' John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955), p. 155.

⁵⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum (In Sent.)* ed. R.P. Mandonnet (Paris: Sump-tibus P. Lethielleux, 1929), I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, vol. 1, pp. 927–29.

⁵⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), pp. 285–88.

dorum ut fiant). The *Summa* thus further specifies Peter Lombard's definition of disposition as foreknowledge of things to be made (*praescientia faciendorum*), by distinguishing wisdom from disposition along the following lines.⁶⁰ First, knowledge of things to be made is twofold: someone might have knowledge that something is worthy of being made (*dignum est fieri*), or knowledge with the scope of it being made (*ut fiat*). Accordingly, wisdom is knowledge of things to be made insofar as they are worthy of being made; disposition is knowledge of things to be made with the scope of making them. Hence, whereas wisdom is a judgement that something would be good to be made, the notion of disposition adds the intention of making it.⁶¹

Second, although both disposition and providence concern the actual being of things, they are not identical in their meaning. For disposition concerns the being of a thing with the scope of making it (*esse rei ut fiat*), or insofar as it is being made, whereas providence concerns the being of a thing after it is made (*esse rei postquam factum est*), or insofar as it has been made, furthering their conservation or perfection.⁶² In other words, the coming of a thing into being (*fieri ad esse*), or bringing it into existence, is subject to divine disposition, but the becoming of a thing in being (*fieri in esse*), the ruling of a thing in existence, is subject to government or providence, depending on whether the ruling of a thing in being concerns the continuation of being (*gubernatio*) or the ordination of being (*providentia*).⁶³ In this specific sense, then, the *Summa Halensis* defines providence as follows: 'Providence is disposition, at least insofar as it is said with respect to *fieri in esse*,' that is, ruling a thing in being.⁶⁴

Providence is not fate. Following Boethius, the *Summa* distinguishes between fate and providence. Fate differs from providence in that the former refers to a reality in created things, whereas the latter refers to the *ratio exemplaris* in God. Providence is the exemplar reason in the divine art, but fate is the created effect of God's action. Just like a disposition in the one disposing is not identical to the disposition of the thing disposed, so, too, providence as the exemplar (*exemplar*) is not identical

60 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C2 (n. 189), pp. 276–77. The *Summa* defends the view that there is a disposition in God for things to be made (*dispositio rerum faciendarum*), although not in the same sense human beings have dispositions. In fact, according to the *Summa*, disposition and council (*concilium*) are one in God, but conceptually different. See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C1 (n. 188), pp. 275–76.

61 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C2 (n. 189), Ad obiecta 1, p. 277.

62 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C2 (n. 189), Ad obiecta 2, p. 277.

63 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C2 (n. 189), Ad obiecta b, p. 277.

64 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), IV, p. 286. In commenting on the *Sentences* and its suggestion that providence is commonly taken to be identical with disposition, the Summists distinguish between two senses of the term 'disposition'. In the strict sense disposition seems to imply some form of coming-to-be (*fieri*), whereas providence is about things in being (*factum esse*). Yet this coming-to-be may refer either to first being or second being which is subject to perfection. Now insofar as 'disposition' has two senses, 'providence' could be taken either in the first sense, complete with regard to first being, or in the second sense, as coming-to-be with regard to second being (*in fieri*). See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio IV, p. 287.

to fate as the instantiation of the exemplar (*exemplatum*). ‘Fate’, however, can denote either the pagan law of the stars or the Boethian inherent disposition in the things moved by divine providence. While the former is rejected as an erroneous belief, the *Summa* defends and expands on the latter view in a separate treatise on fate, which is based on Alexander of Hales’ *De fato*,⁶⁵ added right after the discussion of providence.⁶⁶

Having explained what providence is not, the *Summa* then turns to the controversial question as to which divine attribute providence pertains. As Marcia Colish observes: ‘There is not a clear consensus, across the period, as to which divine attribute this constellation of ideas should be seen as illustrating.’⁶⁷

Providence does not pertain to God’s power, but to his wisdom and will. The *Summa Halensis* maintains that divine providence contains two elements. The Summists argue that *providere* derives from *videre*. To see, however, implies cognition (*videntia sive cognitio*). Cognition is the first and fundamental dimension of providence. But the notion of providence adds a causal aspect to divine knowledge insofar as the *videre* in question is a *pro-videre*. The *Summa* takes the preposition ‘*pro*’ to imply a form of causality (*causalitas*), namely, an ordering or governing one. So the second essential dimension of providence is causality. While the former and fundamental epistemic dimension of providence concerns, according to the *Summa*, God’s intellect, the latter superadded causal dimension pertains to God’s will.⁶⁸ The Summists state:

Providence provides [literally, foresees] (*providet*) and orders or governs (*ordinat sive gubernat*): this seeing (*videre*) pertains to wisdom, but this order and government (*ordo et gubernatio*) is from the highest goodness and will.⁶⁹

On the *Summa*’s account, then, providence is first and foremost knowledge or cognition, as the Lombard argues, and as such, it pertains to, or is reducible to, God’s wisdom; and secondarily, it is causality, and as such pertains to, or is reducible to, God’s will, or his goodness, as the Damascene suggested.⁷⁰ By contrast, the *Summa* rejects the view attributing providence to God’s power, at least insofar as it is distinguished from God’s wisdom and will. On this account, ‘power’ at best denotes God’s ability or capacity to enact his wisdom and will.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Georgen, ‘Untersuchungen und Erläuterungen,’ pp. 13–39.

⁶⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio V, pp. 287–88. The *Summa*’s discussion of fate can be found in *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti2 (nn. 212–19), pp. 304–14.

⁶⁷ Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, p. 269.

⁶⁸ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio I–II, pp. 286–87.

⁶⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio I–II, p. 287.

⁷⁰ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio I–II, p. 287.

⁷¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio III, p. 287.

In summary, the *Summa Halensis* concludes that providence pertains fundamentally to God's wisdom, but in terms of its realization it depends on God's will.⁷² In this manner, the *Summa* seeks to explain and account for John of Damascus' description of providence as care and God's good will.⁷³ Although it may therefore seem successfully to reconcile two seemingly conflicting authorities, namely, the Lombard and Damascene, there is an interesting challenge which arises from this innovative synthesis of Peter Lombard and John of Damascus which calls for further scrutiny.

A Challenge and its Solution

The tension concerns the question of how we are to reconcile the two dimensions of providence which the *Summa Halensis* posits, to wit, the cognitive and the causative, which pertain to God's wisdom and will, respectively, in God.

The *Summa* eases this tension by invoking a remarkable distinction which soon afterwards will become crucial for the further history of the doctrine of providence, which is found in one of the *Summa's* sources. In the *De divinis nominibus*, John of La Rochelle (c.1190/1200 – 45) introduces providence as 'the precognition of that which is to be governed' (*praecognitio eius quod gubernandum est*), which he distinguishes from 'the execution of that which has been provided' (*executio eius quod provisum est*):

Providence is defined in two ways. In one way it refers to the precognition of that which is to be governed and how, and in another way it refers to the execution of that which has been provided.⁷⁴

The context of John's argument is the question of how to reconcile the claims of the Lombard and the Damascene that providence is divine knowledge and the divine will, respectively. The distinction between the two modes of providence supports the conclusion that providence pertains to both, namely, as providence in the first mode to God's knowledge and as providence in the second mode to God's will. The will in a way executes the things which are providentially ordered, and in the way they are ordered, in God's knowledge.⁷⁵

The *Summa Halensis* introduces a similar but slightly modified distinction when differentiating between providence as 'the divine reason by which all (things) are

⁷² In this regard, the reader might find some similarities with the *Summa's* account of free will, as outlined by Lydia Schumacher in this volume, where free will is comprised not only of the considering reason, but more importantly of the choosing will, without one being reducible to the other.

⁷³ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio I–II, p. 287.

⁷⁴ John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus* (Trier, Stadtbibliothek, 162, fol. 138ra).

⁷⁵ John of La Rochelle, *De divinis nominibus* (Trier, Stadtbibliothek, 162, fol. 138ra).

governed' (*divina ratio qua cuncta gubernantur*) and government as 'the execution of providence' (*executio providentiae*):

The providence (*providentia*) of God refers, properly speaking, to the divine reason (*divina ratio*) by which all [things] are governed (*gubernantur*): and in this way the providence of God exists only by itself (*se ipsa solum*); in another way [providence refers to] the execution of providence (*executio providentiae*), namely, the government (*gubernatio*) itself: and this is for the most part through a creature.⁷⁶

The immediate context of the distinction here is the question of whether God's providence is mediated through creatures (*per creaturam*). The *Summa* argues that providence in the strict sense is immediate to God, whereas the execution of providence is often mediated through creatures – where 'through' (*per*) is to be understood as by the power and authority of God (*subauctoritatem*) and not of their own accord (*auctoritatem*).⁷⁷ Providence thereby moves, in the form of the execution which is conceptually distinguished from the divine reason in God, into the creation, partially crossing the creator/creature divide, while remaining, as this divine reason, an attribute of God.

Two things are noteworthy in this connection. First, the *Summa* identifies providence in the strict sense as the *divina ratio*. Second, the *Summa* terms the execution of providence *gubernatio*. Thus the *Summa Halensis* clearly distinguishes between providence as the divine reason in God and government as the execution of providence, which happens for the most part through the mediation of creaturely causes.

Moreover, while providence as the *divina ratio* is a reality in God's wisdom or knowledge, the latter execution through secondary causes elaborates further on the causal aspect resulting from God's will. Concerning the mode of providence, the *Summa Halensis* teaches that providence is not wholly eternal but has in a certain way a temporal aspect. As noted already, on the *Summa's* account, providence implies both cognition and causation. Now insofar as providence is considered under the cognitive dimension, it is said to be eternal. It is also eternal insofar as the causative aspect is concerned in habit (*cura in habitu*), or to the extent to which the providential care refers to God's essence being able to govern creatures, but providence is temporal insofar as this causality is enacted (*cura in actu*).⁷⁸ Thus the *Summa* states that 'the view of providence is from eternity (*ab aeterno*) (...); but [its] causality, insofar as it is called in act (*in actu*), is in time (*ex tempore*).'⁷⁹ From this statement it can be inferred that providence as the *divina ratio* is eternal, whereas government as the execution of providence, at least if executed through secondary causes (although not insofar as the execution of providence is 'habitually' in God's will), is temporal.

⁷⁶ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar2 (n. 205), Respondeo, p. 297.

⁷⁷ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar2 (n. 205), Respondeo, p. 297.

⁷⁸ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), Respondeo, pp. 288–89.

⁷⁹ *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), Respondeo 1, pp. 289.

As is well known, the distinction between providence and government – arguably prefigured in the *Summa Halensis* – is among the main building blocks of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of providence and has since become the hallmark of the subsequent Thomist tradition. In his *Summa Theologiae* (c.1266–73), Aquinas introduces providence as ‘the reason of the order of things provided for to an end’ (*ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem*) and government as ‘the execution of this order’ (*executio huius ordinis*):

Two [things] pertain to providence, namely, the reason of the order of things provided for to an end (*ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem*); and the execution of this order (*executio huius ordinis*), which is called government (*gubernatio*).⁸⁰

As in the *Summa Halensis*, the context is the question of the immediacy of God’s providence. Similar to the *Summa Halensis*, Aquinas teaches that providence is immediate to God, whereas his government is ordinarily mediated through secondary causes executing his providential ordering;⁸¹ that providence is eternal, whereas government is temporal;⁸² and finally that both providence and government are universal, but fate as the providential order existing in the governing secondary causes, implying a mediated execution, is not.⁸³ Moreover, like the *Summa Halensis*, Aquinas calls providence the divine *ratio* and terms its execution *gubernatio*.

While the initial context of John of La Rochelle’s discussion seems inextricably linked to the Franciscan synthesis of John of Damascus and Peter Lombard, and the *Summa Halensis*’ appropriation of the modified distinction in a new context is still encapsulated in the Lombardian structure, Thomas Aquinas will systematically develop, in his mature writing, the explanatory power of the distinction for the explication of the doctrine of providence.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, the similarity between the Do-

80 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (ST), in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882–), I, q. 22, a. 3, vol. 4, p. 267.

81 Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 22, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4:267–68).

82 Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 22, a. 1 ad 2 (Leonine ed., 4:264).

83 Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 116, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 5:555–56); ST I, q. 22, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:264–66); SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti2, C3, Ar1 (n. 215), pp. 309–11.

84 The distinction appears in one way or another in most, if not all, of the relevant writings of Aquinas, until it finds its full systematic expression in the prima pars of the *Summa Theologiae*, where Aquinas effectively reorganizes the doctrinal materials by dividing his discussion of providence in two parts, one discussing it as a divine attribute (q. 22), the other as an effect in creation (qq. 103–119). See Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1 and ad 5 (ed. Mandouret, pp. 928–29); Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882–), q. 5, a. 1, vol. 22/1:2, pp. 137–41; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882–), III, q. 94, vol. 14, pp. 287–90; Thomas Aquinas, *De Substantiis Separatis*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882–),

minican Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscans John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales is striking in this instance, down to the very wording of the distinction of providence and government: *divina ratio qua cuncta gubernantur* and *executio providentiae* in the *Summa Halensis*, and *ratio gubernationis rerum (...) in mente divina* and *executio providentiae* in Thomas Aquinas' *Commentary on the Sentences*.⁸⁵ Although this comment is not meant to imply a textual dependence of Aquinas on the *Summa Halensis*,⁸⁶ the previously discussed evidence of John of La Rochelle and, more importantly, the *Summa Halensis* suggests that the distinction was being employed at the University of Paris, by his Franciscan contemporaries at a time Aquinas wrote his *Commentary on the Sentences* (1252–56). In fact, as already mentioned, Aquinas was among the first to introduce providence as a separate question in his *Sentences Commentary*, where we find the distinction between *providentia* and *gubernatio* for the first time in his writing.⁸⁷

Now one might say that this distinction comes in fact from Boethius (c.480–524), another important source of the *Summa Halensis*, and in one sense that is true, but I will show that in another respect the evidence best supports it being an innovation of the *Summa*. As seen previously, the *Summa* holds fate in the Boethian sense to be distinct from providence. In fact, if providence is the divine reason in God which disposes all things, as the *Summa* notes, then this would seem to speak against the view that God provides for creatures through creatures.⁸⁸ By contrast, the *Summa* takes the Boethian notion of fate to be a correlate to their notion of government. Maintaining

c. 15, vol. 40 (D-E), pp. 67–68; Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium Theologiae*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882–), I, c. 131, vol. 42, p. 131; Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 22, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 4:267–68); *ST I*, q. 103, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 5:458–59).

85 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar2 (n. 205), Respondeo, p. 297; Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 928): 'The execution of providence (*executio providentiae*) is called government (*gubernatio*).' Aquinas then goes on to explain: 'The reason of the government of things (*ratio gubernationis rerum*) in the divine mind (*in mente divina*) is one thing, where it is called providence (*providentia*), and another in secondary causes, through whose service the divine government is completed (*officio gubernatio divina expletur*);' Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 ad 5 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 929). In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas states that 'the reason of the order of things to an end (*ratio ordinis rerum in finem*) preexists in the divine mind (*in mente divina praeexistat*);' Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 22, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 4:263). Similarly, the *Summa Halensis* calls providence 'the exemplar reason (*exemplaris ratio*) [as] considered in the divine art (*in arte divina*),' and an 'order (*ordo*) (...) in the divine mind (*in mente divina*);' *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), Solutio V, p. 288.

86 On the question of a potential dependence of Thomas Aquinas on the *Summa Halensis*, see Parthenius Minges, 'Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen der Summe Alexanders von Hales und dem heiligen Thomas von Aquin,' *Franziskanische Studien* 3 (1916), pp. 58–76, where Minges suggests that 'between the Summa of Alexander and several writings of St Thomas there is some kind of relationship of dependence, be it a direct or indirect one, namely, in such a way that the Summa has a temporal priority;' Minges, 'Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen der Summa,' p. 76.

87 Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1 and ad 5 (ed. Mandonnet, pp. 928–29).

88 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar2 (n. 205), Contra 1, p. 297.

the Boethian distinction between the divine reason and creaturely dispositions, the *Summa* interprets Boethius as saying that if providence is taken as the divine reason, then no creature administers in it, but if it is taken as the disposition inherent in creatures, then it is administered by creatures, which the *Summa* terms an ‘execution’.⁸⁹

While Boethius’ famous distinction of providence and fate is indeed an important and explicit source of the *Summa*’s distinction between providence and government, they are arguably not identical. In the *De consolazione philosophiae* (c.524) we read:

Providence is the divine reason (*divina ratio*) itself, established in the highest ruler of all things, the reason which disposes all things that exist; but fate is a disposition inherent in movable things, through which providence binds all things together, each in its own proper ordering. (...) Now although these are different, yet the one depends on the other; for the order of fate proceeds from the simplicity of providence.⁹⁰

Although we clearly see here the idea of providence as divine reason in God and hence the first element of the distinction, the ‘execution’ terminology is absent in Boethius. On his account, providence is to be distinguished from fate as inherent dispositions in creatures, which are in a sense dependent on the former, but if the statement above about the universality of government in contrast to fate is correct, then fate cannot be the same as government. In the *Summa Halensis* and Aquinas, it seems, the term ‘government’ refers to the universal execution of providence, whereas fate is the particular disposition inherent in secondary causes and hence restricted to God’s government executed through secondary causes.⁹¹ In other words, fate in the Boethian sense appears to become a part of the general notion of government, namely, the one mediated through secondary causes, and hence a specific form of the execution of providence. Moreover, while this new concept of government developed into a crucial element for explaining divine providence, theologians were increasingly reluctant to speak of fate, not least because of its pagan connotations. Thus in contrast to the former, in later providence studies the latter notion of fate was eventually dropped.

Note also that the context of the distinction of providence and fate in Boethius is the simplicity and immutability of God’s providence, in comparison to the complexity and mutability of creaturely causes and fate. The circle analogy illustrates this.

⁸⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar2 (n. 205), Ad obiecta 1, p. 297.

⁹⁰ Boethius, *Theological Tractates; The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester, LCL 74 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), IV, 6, p. 359; Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae; Opuscula Theologiae*, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Munich; Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2005), IV, 6, p. 122.

⁹¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti2, C3, Ar1 (n. 215), pp. 309–11; Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 116, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 5:555–56); *ST* I, 22, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:264–66).

According to Boethius, fate and providence may be compared to a circle and its center.⁹² In a way, fate is like the moving part of a compass whereas providence is likened to the stable needle point at the centre of the circle. On the *Summa Halensis*' reading, the circle analogy can then be taken to mean that, similar to the fact that the centre of the circle remains, in a sense, stable while the pencil lead rotates, providence is immobile while fate is mobile. Moreover, like the complex process of reasoning is derived from the simple intellect, fate comes from and is the result of providence. Providence is the simple disposition of things to be governed in God but fate the complex and derivative dispositions in the things governed.⁹³ Boethius accordingly concludes:

So God by providence disposes what is to be done (*facienda*) in a single and unchanging way, but by fate accomplishes those same things he has disposed in a manifold and temporal way.⁹⁴

But notably Boethius neither speaks of an execution of providence in this connection, nor does John of La Rochelle, who does so, term this execution 'government'; both elements we find innovatively combined in the *Summa Halensis*, newly applied to the question of divine and creaturely causation in the execution of providence.

In light of this, then, it seems reasonable to consider the treatise on providence in the *Summa Halensis* an innovative reworking of past masters. We have here a synthesis of Damascene's and Lombard's definition of providence, further elaborated by an application of the Boethian notion of *ratio* combined with John of La Rochelle's idea of an *executio*, which the *Summa* termed *gubernatio* and employed in a new and causal context. With this much information, we can now proceed to look more closely into the causality of providence.

The Causality of Providence

As Hester Goodenough Gelber has pointed out, 'The recovery of Aristotle's natural philosophy in the Latin West provided a new vocabulary for analysing providence.'⁹⁵ Yet there was, as previously mentioned, no consensus at the time on how to classify

⁹² Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* IV, 6 (ed. Moreschini, p. 124; trans. Stewart, Rand, and Tester, p. 363): 'Therefore as reasoning is to understanding, as that which becomes is to that which is, as time is to eternity, as the circle is to its centre, so is the moving course of fate to the unmoving simplicity of providence.' See also, *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), arg. 3, p. 288. The Summists use a similar analogy to explain the relation of divine ideas to God. See Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 129.

⁹³ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar1 (n. 197), Respondeo 3, p. 289.

⁹⁴ Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* IV, 6 (ed. Moreschini, p. 123; trans. Stewart, Rand, and Tester, pp. 359–61).

⁹⁵ Hester Goodenough Gelber, 'Providence,' in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 762.

providence in the fourfold Aristotelian account of causation. In the *Summa Halensis* the question of the causality of providence appears as a corollary of the question of what providence is, or to which divine attribute it can be reduced. Power is thereby associated with efficient causation, wisdom with (exemplar, that is, extrinsic) formal causation, and will or goodness with final causation.⁹⁶ Since on their account providence implies not only cognition but also causation, the *Summa Halensis* concedes that providence is a cause, that is, an efficient cause, but suggests it is first and foremost an exemplar formal cause: in his knowledge God contains the forms of all things to be made as an exemplar, that is, an extrinsic formal cause.⁹⁷

Here we encounter a slight ambiguity in the *Summa's* reasoning, for if providence pertains primarily to God's wisdom and secondarily to his will or goodness, then one would expect the *Summa* to characterize the causality of providence primarily as (exemplar) formal causation and secondarily as final causation. Instead, the *Summa* replies that providence is not the final cause of things: God orders things but these things do not terminate in him as an end.⁹⁸ In other words, providence is the end moving the efficient cause, insofar as God externally orders creatures, but not in the sense that these creatures internally seek him as an end of their own account. Hence, with respect to the cognitive dimension, the causality of providence is classified as formal causality, and with respect to the causal dimension, it is classified as efficient causation. Material causation, on the other hand, is ruled out as irrelevant because God is not a material being.⁹⁹

This view of providence as the *exemplaris ratio*, as formal and, to a lesser degree, efficient causality linked to the divine wisdom and will, is worth highlighting for at least two reasons. First, if William of Auvergne's efficient causal account of providence turns out to be problematic, as Barnes argues, then the *Summa Halensis's* account relocating providence's causation into the category of formal causation is a noteworthy development.¹⁰⁰ Second, Mandonnet credits Bonaventure for having exposed the errors of Siger of Brabant and other Latin Averroists in their interrelatedness, one of which Bonaventure names as the denial of providence.¹⁰¹ Bonaventure suggests in this connection that a neglect of exemplar causation (*exemplaria rerum*) in God, namely, that the reasons of things (*rationes rerum*) are not in him, is at the

96 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), I, p. 285.

97 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 198), pp. 289–91.

98 Albert the Great will at least partly remedy this ambiguity in his *Summa Theologiae*, by further distinguishing the good of the will and the good of all other goods, thus suggesting that providence falls into three categories, namely, formal, efficient, and final causation. See Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, 38 vols, ed. Étienne César Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1890–99), I, tr. 17, q. 67, m. 4, a. 1, Solutio, vol. 31, p. 687.

99 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 198), Solutio I–II, pp. 290–91.

100 Barnes, 'Providence and Causality,' esp. pp. 91–95. On the contested relation of God and creatures in William's account of efficient causation, see Michael Miller, 'William of Auvergne on Primary and Secondary Qualities,' *The Modern Schoolman* 75 (1998), pp. 265–77.

101 Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, vol. 1, p. 156, n. 2.

root of these errors.¹⁰² In this regard the *Summa* might even be considered to anticipate a later development found in Bonaventure, one of Alexander of Hales' students.

Conclusion

The *Summa Halensis* is among the first scholastic *Summae* in the 13th century to include an extensive, detailed, and principled treatment of the doctrine of divine providence. In drawing on past authorities, such as Boethius, John of Damascus, and Peter Lombard, the authors of the *Summa Halensis* developed their own and distinct account of providence. Noteworthy examples of innovations found in their exposition of providence include not only the fact of its extensive treatment, but also the distinction between providence as the divine reason and government as the execution of providence – a distinction that will later become the hallmark of Thomistic approaches to providence – and the exposition of providence in terms of exemplar causality, which might be considered a precursor of Bonaventure's reply to Siger of Brabant. Thus the *Summa's* treatise on providence seems not only to have had an impact on Albert the Great, but can also claim its distinct place in the history of theology.

¹⁰² Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), Collatio VI, 2–4, vol. 5, pp. 360–61.

Oleg Bychkov

Suspended Beauty? The Mystery of Aesthetic Experience in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The *Summa Halensis* has been one of the first Western European scholastic works to offer a systematic treatment of beauty (*pulchrum*). There have been many controversial claims about exactly what the status of beauty is in the *Summa* and how important it is to its general framework. The present chapter reexamines the main contexts of the discussion of beauty in the *Summa*, examines several modern interpretations of beauty in the *Summa*, specifically that of Hans Urs von Balthasar, debunks several views on the ‘key’ role of beauty in the *Summa*, especially that beauty is a transcendental, and the most important one at that, but reaffirms the importance of ‘aesthetic argumentation’ in this work.

The Background

The subject ‘medieval aesthetics’ was popularized – or, some would claim, invented – by Edgar de Bruyne in the 1940s.¹ Various 20th-century Thomists, culminating in Hans Urs von Balthasar, jumped on the bandwagon.² They presented beauty in scholastic theology, beginning with the *Summa Halensis*, as a transcendental with a special ‘suspended’ status in that it connects all other transcendentals, thus being reminiscent of the circumincession of persons within the Trinity, the one, the true, and the good standing for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, respectively. This ‘circumincession’ of transcendentals within being makes being into a true image of God. Thereby beauty is turned into a Trinitarian trace in the world, and its discussion grows into a full-blown Trinitarian aesthetics supposedly present in the *Summa* and later scholasticism. This view of beauty supposedly present in the *Summa* has been resurrected recently, e.g. by Justin Coyle.³ However, is there really any textual

1 Edgar de Bruyne, *Études d'esthétique médiévale*, 3 vols (Bruges: De Tempel, 1946).

2 See D.H. Pouillon, ‘La beauté, propriété transcendantale chez les Scholastiques (1220 – 1270),’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 15 (1946), pp. 263 – 329; D. Halcour, ‘Tractatus de transcendentalibus entis condicionibus (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Codex 186),’ *Franziskanische Studien* 41 (1959), pp. 41–106; H.U. von Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, in H.U. von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1965), vol. 3.1; the English translation of this work is H.U. von Balthasar, *The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity*, in *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*, vol. 4, ed. J. Riches, trans. B. McNeil et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989).

3 Justin Shaun Coyle, ‘An Essay on Theological Aesthetics in the *Summa halensis*’ (PhD, Boston College, 2018).

support for it? And what is the true status of beauty and the role of aesthetic experience in the *Summa*?

Von Balthasar's View

The most advanced defense of 'transcendental aesthetics' – in the medieval meaning of this term – in the *Summa* and later scholasticism is mounted by von Balthasar. Like most Thomists of his time, such as D.H. Pouillon and D. Halcour, Balthasar assumes that beauty (*pulchrum*) in medieval scholastic thought is a transcendental: a view that has been decisively debunked by J.A. Aertsen.⁴ The only evidence that exists of such a view in the Franciscan milieu is an anonymous Assisi manuscript (edited by Halcour, see n. 2) previously attributed to Bonaventure where beauty does appear to have such a role. The only evidence that I found among Dominicans is one passage in Ulrich of Strassburg's *De summo bono*, which expressly says that 'the beautiful (*pulchrum*), just like the good, is coextensive with being (*convertitur cum ente*) as far as their suppositis are concerned.'⁵ However, Balthasar makes rather much of this scanty evidence and develops the teaching about the transcendental properties of being into a grandiose Trinitarian-aesthetic picture of the structure of being, which assigns a systematic place to the beautiful: 'as the one, true, and good of being point back to the Trinitarian causality of God as the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, it appears that there is no more free place in God for another transcendental.'⁶ The way most traveled here, after the Greeks, is to see the beautiful as a species of the good. However, the 'proximity of the beautiful to the concept of form, and in addition to [something] that rests in itself (...) not ordered to any end allows one to order the beautiful under the true as well.'⁷ The anonymous author of the Assisi manuscript has in mind 'this suspended state (*Schweben*) of the beautiful between the transcendentals as an ultimate, intangible value of being.'⁸ It is precisely this drawing on the 'transcendental status' of the beautiful (as it is a species of other transcendentals) that allows one to speak of the 'universal extension' of the beautiful as an interplay of all the transcendentals that corresponds to the circumincession of the persons of the Trinity, thus making being into a true 'likeness' of God

4 J.A. Aertsen, 'Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?' *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), pp. 68–97; see also his latest book on the subject: J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor to Francisco Suarez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

5 Ulrich von Strassburg, *De summo bono, liber II*, in *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987), vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 57.73–77.

6 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 339 (Riches and McNeil, p. 377).

7 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 339 (Riches and McNeil, p. 377).

8 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 339 (Riches and McNeil, p. 377).

the Trinity.⁹ The term *Schwebe/Schweben* becomes the key characteristic of the elusive nature of beauty as the fourth transcendental.

Balthasar's treatment of scholastic aesthetics, including that of the *Summa*, is dependent on older studies, such as those of M. Grabmann, E. de Bruyne, D.H. Pouillon, D. Halcour, and others, who tend to view beauty as a transcendental. Proceeding from his main assumption that 'theological aesthetics' is an *a posteriori* affirmation of certain theological positions, Balthasar thinks that the 'leap' from *a posteriori* aesthetic experience to the 'proposition that being as such is beautiful' (i.e. that beauty is a transcendental) 'can hardly be attempted from below.'¹⁰ This leap was attempted for the first time by the Franciscans and is evidence of the 'theological *a priori* of scholastic philosophy.' Francis had a certain 'experience of being' that is clarified by subsequent Franciscan theologians such as Bonaventure. It is not clear how 'experience' of being could lead to an *a priori* position, but it is true that Franciscan theology is generally based on phenomenal experience.¹¹ Francis' experience of being is summed up as follows: 'the Franciscan life is therefore pure, glorifying (*verherrlichender*) praise of the glory of God's grace and love that stream through every existent (*Seiende*).'¹² It is closely linked to the experience of highest poverty: 'the one who praises makes himself poor, in order to be able to experience *all* being as God's streaming love (...).'¹³

Out of early Franciscan scholastic thought, Balthasar focuses only on the *Summa*. He sees its aesthetics as part of the theory of transcendentals. The *Summa*, first of all, is seen through the lens of Aquinas, for, according to Balthasar, it is Aquinas, and not the Franciscans themselves, 'who will first definitively clarify this issue and at the same time satisfy the deepest concern of the *Poverello* to find God's glory in the humility-poverty-beauty of all being.'¹⁴ The *Summa* is also seen through the lens of Halcour's analysis of the anonymous Assisi manuscript, which, according to Balthasar, 'adds' (*beifügt*) to his interpretation of the *Summa*, as the lat-

9 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 340 (Riches and McNeil, p. 377).

10 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 340 (Riches and McNeil, p. 378).

11 See also Oleg Bychkov, 'The Status of the Phenomenal Appearance of the Sensory in Fourteenth-Century Franciscan Thought after Duns Scotus (Peter Aureol to Adam of Wodeham),' *Franciscan Studies* 76 (2018), pp. 267–85; idem, "'He Who Sees Does Not Desire to Imagine": The Shifting Role of Art and Aesthetic Observation in Medieval Franciscan Theological Discourse in the Fourteenth Century,' in *Religion and Art: Rethinking Aesthetic and Auratic Experiences in 'Post-Secular' Times*, ed. D. Džalto, *Religions* 10:3 (2019), pp. 15–27. Published online March 18, 2019. DOI: 10.3390/rel10030205; idem, 'The Status of Sensory and Aesthetic Experience in Fourteenth-century Franciscan Theology, from Peter Aureol to Adam Wodeham,' in *Aesthetic Theology in the Franciscan Tradition: The Senses and the Experience of God in Art*, eds. O. Bychkov and X. Seubert (New York; London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 354–68.

12 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 341 (Riches and McNeil, p. 379).

13 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 342 (Riches and McNeil, p. 380), my emphasis.

14 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 344 (Riches and McNeil, p. 382).

ter does not expressly place beauty among the transcendentals.¹⁵ Beauty – following not the *Summa* but the Assisi text – is a ‘moment’ that ‘reveals itself’ in the outpouring of the good, while binding together all the transcendentals. The beautiful describes precisely the extent, to which the ‘form’ in its revelation ‘remains unattainable and unavailable;’ this opens up the way to theological aesthetics, as the form here ‘shows its ontological (*seinshafte*) glory.’¹⁶ ‘Here it becomes finally clear,’ Balthasar concludes, ‘how these thinkers could elevate beauty to a property of being as such, and how they must have done that already based on the interrelation between the one, the true, and the good, with none of which does the beautiful fully and definitively overlap.’ And he calls the beautiful ‘the fourth transcendental’.¹⁷

Sources, Terminology, and Context of the Discussion of Beauty and Aesthetic Experience in the *Summa Halensis*

No discussion about the role and meaning of aesthetic terms in the *Summa* is possible without looking at its sources and the issue of transmission of aesthetic terms from the sources.¹⁸ The text of the *Summa*, as those of other early scholastic works, sometimes consists entirely of selections of quotations from Patristic and early medieval sources, and its position is expressed through the way the sources are selected and matched. This sort of ‘patchwork’ hermeneutics means that the *Summa* inherits terminological problems from its sources, many of which are translated from the Greek with various degrees of accuracy. The main sources for the discussion of aesthetic issues are two: Augustine on the Latin side and pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite on the Greek. Occasionally Boethius and some other late ancient or early medieval authors are quoted as well, but the trend overall is obvious: the material on beauty and aesthetic issues comes from Christian Neoplatonism – which makes perfect sense given the importance of beauty and aesthetics in the Neoplatonic tradition.

The translation of terms from the Greek in this case is important. Even ancient Latin authors such as Cicero and Augustine, who were mined for aesthetic terms

15 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 344 (Riches and McNeil, p. 383).

16 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 345 (Riches and McNeil, p. 383).

17 Balthasar, *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, p. 346 (Riches and McNeil, p. 384).

18 All the information in this section is based on my doctoral dissertation on the topic, Oleg Bychkov, ‘A Propos of Medieval Aesthetics: A Historical Study of Terminology, Sources, and Textual Traditions of Commenting on Beauty in the Thirteenth Century’ (PhD thesis, Toronto, 1999), as well as my monograph, Oleg Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation: Reading Ancient and Medieval Texts after Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), which substantially reworks, amplifies, and develops the material collected for the dissertation.

by the *Summa*, operated with Greek material translated into Latin, e.g. Hellenistic Greek material in Cicero's own translation, which is absorbed into Augustine, or the Latin translation of Plotinus. Pseudo-Dionysius existed in several Latin translations made from the 9th to the 13th centuries with varying degrees of accuracy. The most important factor is that the Greek term for general excellence, either moral or physical, τὸ καλόν, is translated into Latin by Cicero as *honestum*, and τὸ πρέπον, the term for fittingness – again, either moral or physical – as *decorum*. As this fact was widely known, and *decor/decorus* could simply mean 'beauty' in Latin, occurrences of the terms *honestum/honestas* or *decorum/decor* could be interpreted as 'beauty'/'the beautiful' (*pulchritudo/pulchrum*), and, in fact, in some translations of Dionysius are rendered as such. This brings in a host of contexts, both from ethics and from theology, that have little to do with what we would call 'aesthetic' beauty, and, indeed, creates an impression that in some Patristic sources 'beauty' is an all-pervasive notion that certainly must be discussed. In addition, τὸ καλόν in Dionysius, and thus 'beauty' in translations, is one of the divine names, which makes the discussion of beauty even less avoidable in theology. The 'aesthetic' theme is also boosted by the use of 'aesthetic' argumentation in two distinct topics inherited from antiquity and co-opted by Augustine into the Christian scheme. The first is the cosmological argument for the existence of divine power from the beauty and order of the universe, and the second is the 'aesthetic' justification of evil in the universe in the sense that it creates a flattering contrast with the good. Both arguments were used by Stoics, are reported by Cicero, and are included in Plotinus' *Enneads*.

It is also important to trace the authorship of the discussion of beauty and aesthetic issues in the *Summa* and indicate its significance for the subsequent medieval tradition. Curiously, the contexts related to beauty, in particular the 'aesthetic' theory of evil and especially the way the sources of aesthetic material are used, point to Alexander himself as the author. Studies from the 1940s by Doucet and Lottin analyze the dependence of the *Summa* on Alexander's own *Sentences Commentary*.¹⁹ The *Prolegomena* to the edition of Alexander's *Sentences Commentary* identifies it as a major source for the *Summa*. The *Summa* copies from the Commentary 'not only Pro and Contra arguments, but also solutions and sometimes entire chapters verbatim.'²⁰ The dependence of the sections related to beauty in the *Summa* on the authentic works of Alexander also can be demonstrated textually. Thus, parts of book 1 of the *Summa*, which discuss Augustine's argument that the existence of evil in the universe can be justified through the beauty of contrast that it creates,²¹ have textual

¹⁹ See Victorin Doucet, 'A New Source of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*: The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946), pp. 403–17; O. Lottin, 'Le Commentaire d'Alexandre de Hales sur les Sentences,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 14 (1947), pp. 93–96.

²⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951), vol. 1, d. 8, p. 101.

²¹ The text is cited and discussed below.

parallels with Alexander's *Sentences* Commentary. The similarity between the *Summa* and Alexander's *Sentences* Commentary is best expressed through the way they use Augustine's text as a source. The selection of Augustinian passages in the sections with matching contents in the *Summa* and Alexander's *Sentences* Commentary is very similar, even regarding the way the passages are cut. For example, as far as the discussion of the place of evil in the universe is concerned, Alexander's *Sentences* Commentary contains about one half of the material from *De libero arbitrio* 3.9.24–27 used in the section on beauty in the *Summa*, with many passages almost exactly corresponding to the ones used in the *Summa*.

As far as the later tradition is concerned, subsequent scholastic authors, both Franciscan and Dominican, are heavily dependent on the *Summa* for their discussions of beauty. The evidence is clear in Bonaventure,²² but also in Dominican authors, beginning with Albert's *Summa Theologica* and commentary *On the Divine Names*, which have influenced the work of his two disciples: Aquinas' *Sentences* Commentary, *Summa Theologica*, and commentary *On the Divine Names*, and Ulrich of Strassburg's *De bono*. Albert's *Summa Theologica*'s dependence on the *Summa Halensis* has been acknowledged on many occasions. For example, the editors of the *Summa Halensis* notice a 'great affinity' existing between the *Summa Halensis* and Albert's *Summa Theologica*. According to them, 'those Sums frequently agree with each other,' and Albert makes a constant use of the *Summa*, which he 'continuously had at hand.'²³ As far as the discussion of beauty is concerned, the dependence of Albert's *Summa Theologica* on the *Summa Halensis* is also striking. First of all, the structure of Albert's *Summa Theologica* 2, tract 11, question 6²⁴ is almost identical to that of *SH* 2 discussed below.²⁵ Both have sections on the 'evil of punishment',²⁶ on 'monstrosity',²⁷ on the 'changeable good',²⁸ and on miracles.²⁹ This dependence can also be clearly demonstrated through textual similarities. The similarities between the two works as far as their respective treatments of beauty are concerned also extend to the selection of sources. For example, they exhibit similar textual se-

22 Cf. Oleg Bychkov, 'Decor ex praesentia mali: Aesthetic Explanation of Evil in Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought,' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 68:2 (2001), pp. 245–69.

23 Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II *Summa Fratris Alexandri*,' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), pp. ccxxxv-vi; cf. Bychkov, 'A Propos of Medieval Aesthetics,' pp. 27–29, 211–12.

24 Albert the Great, *Summa Theologica, pars II, qu. 1–67*, ed. S. Borgnet, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1895), vol. 32, pp. 596 ff.

25 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), II, In1, Tr2, Q3 (nn. 75 ff.), pp. 99 ff.

26 Albert the Great, *STh* 2, p. 599; *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C3, Ar2 (n. 78), p. 101.

27 Albert the Great, *STh* 2, p. 599; *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C3, Ar3 (n. 79), p. 101.

28 Albert the Great, *STh* 2, p. 600; *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar2 (n. 83), p. 105.

29 Albert the Great, *STh* 2, pp. 600–1; *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar3 (n. 84), pp. 106–7.

lections, up to the exact order of lines, from Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 16.8 and *De libero arbitrio* 3.9.26–27.

After having established some textual and terminological facts about the context of the discussion of beauty and aesthetic experience in the *Summa*, the rest of the analysis will proceed as follows. It is logical to start with the discussion of the beautiful in the context of the *Summa's* teaching on the transcendentals in book 1, as this is the subject that has generated the most debate in modern times. Beauty comes up once again in book 1 in the context of the 'aesthetic' proof of the existence of evil in the universe. The third major context where beauty is discussed is in a similar segment on evil contributing to the beauty of the universe in book 2, except that this time the discussion is much more extensive. The beginning of the section in book 2 contains another general discussion of the nature of the beautiful, and it makes more sense to analyze this passage together with the context of the transcendentals. Finally, I will look at several contexts where the *Summa* uses what we might call 'aesthetic reasoning', or an 'aesthetic' way to construct an argument, in order to determine whether it really presents suitable material for a Balthasar-style theological aesthetics.

Beauty and the Transcendentals in the *Summa*

Beginning with the section on the transcendentals in book 1 of the *Summa*,³⁰ one notices that the beautiful is discussed strictly under the rubric of the good: question 3, 'On the goodness of the divine nature,' division (*membrum*) 1, 'On goodness in general,' chapter 1, 'What is the implied meaning of the "good"?' Article 2 of this chapter deals with the question 'whether the good is identical to the beautiful (*pulchrum*) as far as their meaning is concerned.'³¹ The arguments in favor are based on translations of some excerpts from Dionysius, according to which it appears that he applies the terms *decorum* and *pulchrum* to God indiscriminately together with 'good'. Thus beauty appears to be the final cause just as the good, i.e. identical with the good. Arguments to the contrary suggest that there is some difference between the two. First, the 'term "beautiful" is applied when the meaning of the formal cause is intended; hence, God is called beautiful when he is understood as the exemplary cause.'³² In addition, '*decorum* and *speciosum* in creatures refer to one and the same thing: namely, a thing is called "shapely" or "beautiful" (*speciosa*) based on its shape, which is the form of the thing. However, the term "good" refers to the

³⁰ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3.

³¹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 103), pp. 162–63.

³² The translations from the *Summa Halensis* in this essay are mostly mine, with a couple of exceptions where they are by Lydia Schumacher with my adjustments; most of the translations are taken from Lydia Schumacher and Oleg Bychkov, ed. and trans., *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology: The Summa Halensis* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2021).

final cause.’ In addition, Augustine’s well-known definition of beauty in *De civitate Dei* 22.19.21, which comes from the Stoic background, is that ‘all beauty consists in congruence of parts with some sweetness of color.’ This definition, then, suggests that ‘there will be no beauty in simple and spiritual things. However, there is goodness in them: for the most part in God and therefrom in spiritual things.’ In other words, the *Summa* resurrects the old Plotinian argument as to whether there is beauty in simple things or only in complex patterns.

The *Summa*’s reply is based on Augustine’s distinction between *utile*, or ‘useful’, and *honestum*, or ‘excellent’, in *Quaestiones* 83, question 30. As is well known from ancient Greek thought, excellence is pursued for its own sake, while utility for the sake of something else. Augustine famously equates ‘excellence’ (*honestas*) with ‘intelligible beauty’, which can be properly applied to God. ‘It is clear,’ the *Summa* concludes,

that insofar as the good is referred to as ‘excellent’, it is the same as ‘the beautiful’, while insofar as the good is useful it is not. For these [two aspects of the good] differ: indeed, the term ‘beautiful’ denotes the ability of the good to please our faculty of perception, while the term ‘good’ denotes its ability to delight our affective faculty. This is the difference as far as the consideration of the final cause is concerned.³³

First of all, it is clear from this text that Aertsen’s assessment is correct: the beautiful is an aspect of the good, not a separate transcendental property of being that is convertible with it. Second, it is clear what aspect of the good it is. It is its ability to become manifest or to reveal itself externally to something that is capable of perception. Also, this manifestation is accompanied by pleasure, which has been a mark of aesthetic experience from time immemorial. Aesthetic experience is a particular way of revealing its value – the aesthetic value – that is not based on reasoning but on feeling, and the mark of this value that signals its presence is one’s immediate reaction of aesthetic pleasure. The reply to objection 1 confirms that the beautiful is interchangeable with the good, not with being.³⁴ The *Summa* argues that sometimes the formal cause is viewed as an end, and sometimes we consider the final cause formally, as a set of rules to achieve the end. ‘In a similar way, the beautiful puts on the garbs of the good, and the good the garbs of the beautiful, although the primary meaning of “beautiful” seems to be based more on exemplarity, just as the primary meaning of “good” on finality.’³⁵

33 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 103), Respondeo, p. 162.

34 One can make an argument that by virtue of the good being interchangeable with being, this ‘aesthetic’ aspect of the good will be interchangeable with being as well. However, as is explained below, it appears that not all levels of the good are interchangeable with being, and some of its aesthetic aspects are precisely not, which might explain why the ‘convertibility of the beautiful’ position was never expressly articulated in the *Summa* or other major medieval texts.

35 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 103), Ad obiecta 1, pp. 162–63.

The *Summa's* reply goes on to address another feature that is commonly attributed to beauty and aesthetic experience: that it has to do with a pattern or arrangement, i. e. something complex. If one considers the efficient cause, the difference between the good and the beautiful is that the term “good” denotes the flow [of effects] from a cause without considering [their] distinction, while “beautiful” describes this flow with regard to distinction (...).’ A similar line of reasoning applies if one considers the exemplary or formal cause: the “good” stands for the exemplar upon which something is modeled, insofar as the end is, as it were, a set of regulations – an art – for a craftsman who works toward a final goal (...).’ At the same time, the “beautiful” refers to the exemplar itself, insofar as it is an art that distinguishes and brings into harmony different elements.³⁶

This set of statements points to one common classification in medieval thought that goes at least as far back as Boethius. There are two levels of goodness in created things. The first level is convertible with being: things are good in some way simply by virtue of existing, as beings. However, there is another, second, level of goodness that results from arrangement, order, and pattern, and can only exist in things that can be ordered. Beauty is commonly associated with this second-level goodness that exists in an arrangement and within an order. A reply to objection 2 based on Augustine’s texts solidifies this position: ‘For just as “bodily beauty consists of a fitting arrangement of parts,” in the same way the beauty of souls consists of the harmony and ordering of mental faculties, and beauty in the divine consists of the sacred order of divine persons (...).’³⁷

The *Summa* continues to clarify its conceptualization of the beautiful in book 2. The context of question 3 is the discussion of creatures under the aspect of their quality (*De creatura secundum qualitatem*).³⁸ It is clear that the context here is similar to the discussion of transcendentals in book 1. The previous question 2 (*De creatura secundum quantitatem*) discusses creatures under the aspect of quantity and includes topics such as oneness/multiplicity and being/non-being, i. e. being and at least one other transcendental. Among the ‘creaturely conditions’ to be discussed under the rubric of ‘quality’ the introductory text to question 3 mentions the ‘true’, the ‘good’, and the ‘beautiful’, i. e. two other transcendentals plus the beautiful.³⁹

Chapter 1 of this question is dedicated to the essence of the beautiful (*Quid sit pulchrum*).⁴⁰ Based on pseudo-Dionysius, *Divine Names* 4.7, the *Summa* suggests that the ‘beautiful and the good are identical as far as their substance is concerned’ but are different conceptually. The question is, then, ‘since each of them adds to being, what it is that the beautiful adds to being that is different from what the

³⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 103), Ad obiecta 1, pp. 162–63.

³⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C1, Ar2 (n. 103), Ad obiecta 2, p. 163.

³⁸ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q3, p. 99.

³⁹ SH II, In2, Tr2, Q3, p. 99.

⁴⁰ SH II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C1 (n. 75), p. 99.

good does.’ First of all, once again, it is clear that the *Summa* assumes that the beautiful is convertible with the good, not with being,⁴¹ and that both add to being. The initial arguments, again, revolve around various types of causes. Since the good definitely has to do with the final cause, if the beautiful is conceptually different from it, it can only be associated with the formal cause, i.e. with arrangement, order, and pattern. Engaging this subject further, one could narrow down what exactly the beautiful is associated with in terms of pattern, and it seems to be the *species* (out of the classical triad *modus*, *species*, and *ordo*). Indeed, the adjective *speciosus* (‘shapely’) is synonymous with *pulcher*. Now both *species* and beauty are related to form. However, this creates a problem, because truth is also commonly associated with some sort of a formal pattern. But then how is the beautiful different from the true? In other words, the formal aspect does not make the beautiful distinct.

In its reply the *Summa* basically reiterates what it says in book 1, confirming that this way of thinking about the beautiful is consistent throughout books 1 and 2: ‘Truth is a formal disposition that is related to the inside, while beauty is a formal disposition that is related to the outside: for we habitually call that thing beautiful, which of itself possesses an ability to be perceived visually as something harmonious or becoming (*conveniens*).’⁴² Once again, beauty describes the ability of things to appear and to be perceived in a certain way, i.e. as harmonious and thereby pleasing to the faculty of perception. Beauty is the revelatory aspect of both the good and the true.

The *Summa* also uses the text of Dionysius’ *Divine Names* to determine how exactly the beautiful is related to the final cause. In fact, when the Latin translation of Dionysius reads that ‘all things desire the beautiful (*decorum*) and good,’ *decorum* in this case translates the Greek term for general excellence τὸ καλόν, which makes it into a trite statement common to Greek thought: of course all things desire excellence! However, the *Summa* operates under the assumption that it says that all things desire beauty. It seems from this statement that *decorum*, which the *Summa* freely glosses as *pulchrum*, is related to the final cause. However, if one uses the common meaning of ‘desire’, ‘everything that quenches one’s appetite is called the end (*finis*), for example, we [commonly] say that the intellect desires that which is delightful to it, and so does the faculty of sight. (...) And from this perspective the beautiful falls under the natural appetite of all things.’⁴³

It is clear from the discussion of the nature of the beautiful in the *Summa* up to this point that the Summists present a standard Greek – Platonic or Neoplatonic – teaching about beauty, which would appear non-controversial even to modern aestheticians. So far, there is not much that would make this aesthetics distinctly theological or distinctly Christian.

⁴¹ See n. 36 that addresses the possible argument that if the beautiful is convertible with the good, it is automatically convertible with being.

⁴² *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C1 (n. 75), Respondendum, p. 99.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

The Beauty of Contrast and Arrangement in the *Summa*

Another significant block of topics where beauty and aesthetics feature prominently in the *Summa* is its ‘aesthetic’ interpretation of the order of the created universe, and specifically its ‘aesthetic’ defense of the place of evil, badness, and ugliness in this arrangement. The first occurrence of this topic is in the same question 3 (‘On the goodness of the divine nature’)⁴⁴ as where the discussion of transcendentals occurs. Division (*membrum*) 3 is devoted to the ‘created good’, and the topic of chapter 5 is the ‘good of the universe.’⁴⁵ As an answer to the question ‘whether God permits evil to arise in the universe,’⁴⁶ the *Summa* uses a well-known passage from Augustine’s *Enchiridion* 11:

Therefore, God permitted evil things to exist for the sake of the beauty of good things: for if evil did not exist, the good would only possess absolute beauty, namely of the good itself; however, when evil exists, the relative beauty of the good grows, so that in comparison with its opposite – evil – the good shines forth more beautifully.⁴⁷

The answer to objections is also based on Augustine: ‘It says, then, that if evil did not exist, things in the universe would have lacked some beauty.’ These texts suggest, again, that beauty is an aspect of the good, not of being, and that at least one type of beauty is only present in a complex pattern and thus cannot be a property of being as such. Article 2 asks ‘whether the universe could have been better without evil things.’ The answer is, again, based on Augustine’s passage from *De civitate Dei* 11.18, where he employs the example of the use of antitheses in rhetoric in order to solve the problem of evil. Using antithetical statements increases the beauty of speech; in the same way, the presence of evil, badness, and ugliness increases the beauty of the universe. Once again, both Augustine and the *Summa* here speak of the second-level ‘good of arrangement’ that is not immediately convertible with being.

Answers to objections provide more aesthetic examples from both rhetoric and visual experience to illustrate the same point. Thus ‘just as the beauty of speech is greater when we interject pauses into it than if it flowed continuously without them, in the same way the beauty of the universe is greater when evil things are well placed within it.’⁴⁸ Further, ‘a woman can have a blemish in such a place that it would be fittingly placed and result in greater beauty. Another example is a

⁴⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, p. 160.

⁴⁵ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar1–2 (nn. 120–21), pp. 188–91.

⁴⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar1 (n. 120), pp. 188–89.

⁴⁷ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar1 (n. 120), Respondet, p. 189.

⁴⁸ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar2 (n. 121), Ad obiecta 2, p. 190.

scar on the face of a soldier: if it is in a fitting place, he looks more handsome.⁴⁹ Augustine provides another visual example in *De civitate Dei* 11.23, about using black color in a painting: of itself, black color is not beautiful, but if used appropriately in a chiaroscuro technique, it enhances significantly the total beauty of the painting.

The *Summa* returns to the same line of ‘aesthetic’ argumentation in book 2 in question 3 on creatures ‘as far as their quality is concerned,’⁵⁰ so this section harmonizes well with the discussion in book 1. After laying out the essence of beauty in chapter 1 discussed previously, the *Summa* goes to considerable length in a number of chapters to address the same subject: how evil and ugly things can result in beauty.⁵¹ The answer is basically the same: evil or badness of crime and punishment are only such in a qualified sense, but within the total picture of universal justice they are beautiful. Again, the *Summa* here speaks of relative beauty, or beauty in a qualified sense (*pulchrum secundum quid*), that is, the beauty of order and pattern. A couple of statements from this segment also reinforce the position that beauty is convertible with goodness, not with being. Thus one initial argument for chapter 5 states directly that ‘the beautiful and the good are interconnected’ (literally, ‘one accompanies the other,’ *pulchrum et bonum sese concomitantur*), and if one is defined in a certain way, so is the other.⁵² And a counter-argument from the following chapter 6 states that ‘beauty follows goodness’ (*bonitatem consequitur pulchritudo*).⁵³

Beauty and Theology in the *Summa*

So far, what we have seen in the *Summa* is a summary of the ancient pagan view of beauty that was adapted during the Patristic period to Christian cosmology and theodicy. If we look at this material through a Balthasarian lens, even leaving aside the unsubstantiated claim that beauty is a transcendental, we do see some correspondence to Balthasar’s scheme of theological aesthetics. Thus our experience of reality, even apart from any belief system, contains an element of fascination, wonder, awe, and delight in the face of certain phenomena – especially complex patterns – that we traditionally describe by aesthetic terms, such as beauty, fittingness, and so forth. This is Balthasar’s ‘horizontal dimension’ of theological aesthetics that starts with our universally accessible experience of beauty that suggests that there is something more to reality. But does this experience lead directly to God in the *Summa*, and, which is more important for theological aesthetics, does the *Summa* apply aesthetic principles to the construction of theological arguments?

⁴⁹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar2 (n. 121), Ad obiecta 3, p. 190.

⁵⁰ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, p. 99.

⁵¹ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C3–6 (nn. 77–85), pp. 100–8.

⁵² *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C5 (n. 81), Ad quod sic *a*, p. 103.

⁵³ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), Contra 1, p. 107.

As it happens, the *Summa* also does contain the standard Augustinian line of thought that establishes a direct link between our aesthetic experience and the revelation of the divine behind phenomenal reality. This view that sees beauty as a trace of the divine in created reality becomes pervasive in Bonaventure. For example, the *Summa* in book 2 devotes a whole chapter to the question ‘whether a trace leads us to the cause of which it is a trace.’⁵⁴ The reply engages the notion of beauty:

There are two ways to consider visible and even invisible creatures. For one can consider them under the aspect of beauty or delightfulness (*pulchritudinis sive delectabilitatis*) that they have without relating this [beauty] to God, from whom they have [it]: and this way brings about error. Another way [to consider them is] insofar as they have beauty from the supremely beautiful one and delightfulness from the supremely delightful one: and in this way traces do lead us to him, of whom they are traces. An example from Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 1.5, illustrates this. One can consider a painting in two ways: as a painting or as an image. If [one appreciates it] as a painting, the appreciation does not go beyond the painting itself (...); if [one evaluates it] as an image, under this aspect it leads us to something else, [i.e. to that] of which it is an image.⁵⁵

The reply ends by quoting Augustine’s ‘aesthetic’ comparison from *De vera religione* 22.43, along the same lines: one can appreciate the versification aspect of poetry, such as the delightful movement of the meter in your hearing experience, or one can appreciate the art of the poet who wrote it. In the same way, one could be delighted by created reality without thinking of the divine power that is responsible for it. In other words, an object of art or an aesthetic object can be enjoyed and appreciated for its aesthetic features or the experience it provides, in a secular fashion. Or one’s aesthetic experience of it can trigger a further movement of the mind to the origin of this experience, which, either in Augustine or, subsequently, in German Idealist philosophy, can be styled ‘transcendental’ (in the modern sense of the term). The proper way of handling aesthetic experience, either in medieval thinkers or in Balthasar, of course, is the second one. As the *Summa* sums up this position in another context, ‘the beauty of creatures is a certain sign that opens up a cognitive path toward uncreated beauty.’⁵⁶

Aesthetic Argumentation in the *Summa*

According to Balthasar, practicing theological aesthetics amounts to solving crucial theological problems by aesthetic means or by applying typically aesthetic ways of

⁵⁴ *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, M2, C7 (n. 40), pp. 48–49.

⁵⁵ *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, M2, C7 (n. 40), Solutio, p. 49.

⁵⁶ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3 (*De creatura secundum qualitatem*), C5 (n. 81), Ad quod sic *b*, p. 103: ‘Pulchritudo ergo creaturae est vestigium quoddam perveniendi per cognitionem ad pulchritudinem incretam.’

reasoning. As it happens, the *Summa*, just as subsequent Franciscan thought (for example, Bonaventure and Scotus),⁵⁷ often exhibits such ways of reasoning as opposed to logical deduction. In fact, the Prologue to the *Summa* states clearly that theology is an emotional discipline that proceeds not by way of logical deduction but by way of ‘taste’, playing on the etymology of the word *sapientia* and inadvertently introducing the aesthetic undertone to the modern ear.⁵⁸ In what follows I will examine several cases of using aesthetic reasoning in the *Summa* in addressing key topics of Christian theology: the Trinity, creation, the Incarnation, and the limits of the divine will.

In book 1 the *Summa* discusses the question ‘whether there is generation in God.’⁵⁹ The relevant passage is contained in one of the Pro arguments,⁶⁰ but since the reply upholds the position of the Pro arguments and there is no refutation of this point, one can assume that the *Summa* at least silently supports this reasoning. The aesthetic terms that are used in the argument instead of logical inference are ‘to be fitting’ (*convenire*) and ‘to be congruent’ (*congruere*).

If it is said that it is fitting (*congruit*) for eternal generation to be in God, but it is not necessary, (...) [then] Anselm [says] to the contrary [in *Cur Deus Homo* 1.9]: ‘Whatever is unfitting (*inconveniens*) for God is thereby impossible, and whatever is fitting for God is thereby necessary.’ Therefore, if generation is congruent (*congruit*) with or befits (*convenit*) God, then it is necessarily present in God, especially speaking of the necessity of immutability, because such is present in the divine, and not the necessity that imposes coercion; so eternal generation is necessary.⁶¹

That is, the argument is that if something befits God, therefore it is necessarily present in him, which can only be interpreted as ‘aesthetic necessity’: ‘it is fitting; therefore it is necessary.’

The aesthetic argument *ex convenientia* or *ex congruitate* is used again in this same question in the answer to objection 6. The objection claims that the ‘likening of natural things to the divine involves a comparison of exceedingly remote things, because the distance between creatures and the creator is exceedingly great. For this reason, what is found in created things does not necessarily have to be posited in the divine (...).’⁶² This objection weakens some of the arguments for the existence of generation in God. The reply to this question generally upholds the parallel with the operation of nature, so the refutation of objection 6 is crucial. Interestingly, an

⁵⁷ See Oleg Bychkov, “‘But Everyone Experiences the Opposite’: John Duns Scotus’s Aesthetic Defense of Anselm’s “Proof” of the Existence of God in Light of Present-day Thought,” *Franciscan Studies* 72 (2014), pp. 259–303.

⁵⁸ See Oleg Bychkov, ‘The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan Predecessors,’ *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), pp. 5–62; the appendix contains translations, including relevant excerpts from the *Summa Halensis*, *ibid.*, pp. 63–99.

⁵⁹ *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), pp. 414–18.

⁶⁰ *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), Pro *f*, p. 415.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), p. 416.

aesthetic argumentation from fittingness is used again. No fitting (*conveniens*) parallel can be drawn between God and creatures when creatures are considered ‘in themselves’,

However, when creatures are considered as vestiges of their cause, it is possible to find both necessary and fitting (*convenientes*) parallels between the creature and the Creator; thus from the power of the creature, we necessarily infer the omnipotence of the Creator, and from wisdom, the highest wisdom, and from goodness, the highest good.⁶³

The *Summa* continues to employ the ‘aesthetic necessity’ argument in book 2. One of the important theological questions is about the reasons for creation: ‘Does God become an efficient cause by will or of necessity?’⁶⁴ In its answer to objection 1, the Summists deal with the question about the necessity of God’s goodness, or whether he created out of necessity. The reasoning proceeds as follows:

However, if one were to speak of the necessity of what is congruous or fitting (*necessitas congruitatis sive idoneitatis*), as in one of the authoritative statements [the apparatus cites Dionysius, *Divine Names* 4.19], then one can say that God created things out of the necessity of goodness. However, it does not seem fitting (*congruere*) to say [that he created things] out of the necessity of nature. For although his goodness is identical with his nature, nevertheless if one were to say [that he created things] out of the necessity of nature, one would seem to posit the sort of necessity [in God] that exists in natural things (...).⁶⁵

Aesthetic reasoning is also used in the discussion of the most important Christian theological issue of the Incarnation, where Franciscan thought is generally known to be innovative. The discussion in book 2 comes up at the end of the segment on the beauty of evil and order discussed above.⁶⁶ Chapter 6, article 4 of this segment examines the question ‘whether the Incarnation (...) pertains to the beauty of the universe.’⁶⁷ As the question is about the beauty of the *universe*, the proof should be based on what obtains in the created world. In the Pro argument *a* the Summists observe that there are intermediate beings between minerals and plants, such as sponges, between plants and animals, such as birds, and so forth. Based on the aesthetic

63 SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), p. 418. In a related Trinitarian topic, ‘Is there a procession of the Holy Spirit?’ (SH I, P1, In2, Tr1 Q1, Ti2, C1 [n. 304], pp. 438–40), the Summists use the ‘fittingness’ argument as well; cf. Ad obiecta 5: ‘That however the persons are three in number can be shown in this way: if we posit a fourth person, and there are two modes of production, namely, the mode of nature or the mode of the will, then this fourth person is either produced through the mode of nature or through the mode of the will. If however it is produced through the mode of nature, since this mode is the same as generation, then the person produced will be the Son, and there will be two sons in the Trinity, which is unfitting.’

64 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M4, C2 (n. 18), pp. 27–29.

65 SH II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M4, C2 (n. 18), p. 28.

66 SH II, In1, Tr2, Q3 (*De creatura secundum qualitatem*).

67 SH II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), pp. 107–8.

principles of completeness and harmony, the *Summa* concludes that there should be an intermediate being between humans and God as well:

Therefore, in order to achieve perfect unity and connection (*coniunctio*), a union of the divine and human natures is necessary, to allow the beauty of the universe to shine forth [also] in this manner; but this can only happen through the Incarnation; therefore, the Incarnation contributes to the beauty of the universe.⁶⁸

In other words, there is also an aesthetic reason for the Incarnation: in order to maintain the aesthetic principles of harmony, completeness, and beauty in the universe.

Of course, the perennial point of discussion is whether the restoration of the human kind was possible without the Incarnation, and if yes, why was the Incarnation necessary? The Pro argument *b* engages this point by stating that the ‘restoration of the human kind through the Incarnation was of the most becoming sort (*decentissima*),’ not that it could not be accomplished without it. The *Summa* quotes Augustine’s *De Trinitate* 13.10.13: ‘Another way of restoring us was possible, but none was more fitting (*convenientior*).’ This most fitting type of restoration, therefore, completes the beauty of the universe.⁶⁹ The solution confirms that the Incarnation does contribute to the beauty of the universe in the post-lapsarian state. The difference is that achieving the state of the restoration of the human nature, and thus of the beauty of the universe, ‘can be considered generically or as far as the best and most seemly (*decentissimum*)’ way of achieving it is concerned. Now the ‘Incarnation was not a contributing factor to the beauty of the universe as an absolutely indispensable factor (*sine quo non potuerit*) for the restoration of the fallen human nature, but as an absolutely indispensable factor for accomplishing this in the most seemly way (*sine quo non potuit decentissime*).’⁷⁰ In other words, there could be an alternative, but it would not be an aesthetic one; it could be otherwise, but it would not be as beautiful. One could compare this aesthetic line of reasoning, e.g. to ancient Greek aestheticized discussions of ethics: there can be alternatives to achieving one and the same goal in moral behavior, but some are more noble or beautiful, which are to be preferred. Finally, in the answer to objection 3 the *Summa* wraps up its position: ‘although the beauty of the universe (...) could exist without the Incarnation, nevertheless it would not be possible for it to exist in such a way as to preserve multiple [types of] congruence (*multiplex congruentia*).’ The restoration of the human kind ‘could not happen in a congruent way (*congruenter*) without the satisfaction by the Son of God [become] man.’⁷¹

The *Summa* continues to apply aesthetic argumentation to the question of the Incarnation in book 4, where it discusses directly the topic of the ‘fittingness of

⁶⁸ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), p. 107.

⁶⁹ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), p. 107.

⁷⁰ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), p. 108.

⁷¹ *SH* II, In1, Tr2, Q3, C6, Ar4 (n. 85), p. 108.

the Incarnation.⁷² Specifically, medieval theologians were curious about the ‘fittingness of the Incarnation should nature not have fallen due to sin, namely, whether there would be any reason for the Incarnation or whether it would be fitting.’⁷³ The Pro argument *c* suggests that

three scenarios are logically possible: three persons in a single substance; the opposite of this, i.e. three substances in a single person; and in between these two scenarios, three persons in three substances. Now one of the opposite scenarios – three persons in one substance – does really obtain, namely in the Trinity. So does the intermediate scenario – three persons in three substances – when three human beings or three angels are present (alternatively, if one takes one person of the Trinity, one angel, and one human being). Therefore, so should the third scenario, namely, one person in three substances. But this can only happen through a union of the divine and human natures. Indeed, no other creature, except for the human being, contains two substances, namely spiritual and corporeal, or soul and body. Also, no creature can perfect the human being by uniting with it: indeed, no angel can accomplish this, because the human being is equal to an angel as far as his or her superior part is concerned. Therefore, in order to achieve perfection in the order of things, it is fitting (*convenit*) that the divine nature be united to the human nature in a single person, so that just as there are three persons in one nature and three persons in three natures, there would be three natures – namely, divine nature, body, and soul – in one person.⁷⁴

It is difficult to interpret this argument *ex convenientia* as anything else than aesthetic: there is no reason mentioned here except completing the harmony or balance by realizing all possible combinations of persons and natures!

Finally, the *Summa* uses the language of fittingness navigating the tricky issue of the range of the divine will. Throughout the medieval Franciscan tradition, up to Duns Scotus and his followers, the debate went on as to whether God’s absolute power was limited in any way by his ordained power and to what extent. The issue as to whether one can set limits to God’s power is obviously tricky, especially in a tradition that is often dubbed ‘voluntarist’ where the power of the will holds primacy over intellectual powers. The ‘aesthetic’ solution in terms of what ‘befits’ God, which is not entirely rationally based, appeared to the Summists, as later to Duns Scotus,⁷⁵ very attractive.⁷⁶

72 *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q2, p. 25.

73 *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), pp. 41–42.

74 *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 41.

75 Cf. Oleg Bychkov, “In Harmony with Reason”: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics,’ *Open Theology* 1:1 (2014), pp. 45–55. Published online November 14, 2014. DOI: 10.2478/opth-2014–0005.

76 See some of the argumentation in the question ‘Is divine power limited by God’s goodness and justice?’ at *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 219–21: ‘[Ad obiecta I.] To the second argument it must be said that this verb “to demand” is strictly speaking a verb of requirement, but no verb of requirement befits God. Nevertheless, accepted improperly, it signifies something that is congruent with God. Thus we must draw the following distinction: when we say “God is not able to do anything unless his justice demands it,” if the verb “demand” implies habitual congruence, it is true, as if the sense were, “if he were to do anything, he is not able to do anything except what would be consistent

Granted, the *Summa* does not invent most or any of its aesthetic argumentation, which can be traced back to Anselm, who borrows it from Augustine, who draws on the ancient tradition. However, at the very least it can be seen as a *promoter* of this line of argument for the Franciscan tradition. So ultimately it does present a case for theological aesthetics, if not through the theory of transcendentals.

with his justice.” If it implies congruence that actually exists now, however, it is false to say that “he is not able to do anything except what currently befits his justice.” (...) [Ad objecta II, general] In reply to the objection that deals with “whether he can do by his absolute power what he cannot do by his justice,” it must be distinguished that the justice of God in one sense connotes what befits (*condecet*) the divine goodness. And in this sense, whatever he can do from power, he can do from justice, meaning from what befits his goodness; for it befits the highest goodness to be able to do whatever is possible for its power. In another sense it connotes what is congruent with merit; and in this sense he is not able to do by his justice, which is given to us according to what is consistent with our merit, whatever he is able to do by his power. (...) [Ad objecta II.1] For God, however, what is possible in principle and by right is the same, insofar as what is “right” refers to what befits the divine goodness.’

Lydia Schumacher

Free Will in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Although the doctrine of free will was analyzed in different ways over the middle ages, there was broad agreement on two points, namely, that free will can only choose the good, and that it is a matter of both reason which determines what to do and the will that chooses it. Following the lead of Alexander of Hales, the *Summa Halensis* breaks from this longstanding tradition by describing free will as capable of choosing either good or evil, reinterpreting the words of major authorities like Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard of Clairvaux to support its opinion. According to the *Summa*, the only way to obtain merit or demerit is if both options are available. In a further development, the *Summa* follows Philip the Chancellor in arguing that free will, while entailing both reason and will, is more a matter of the will which chooses what to do, thus laying the foundation for the further development of voluntarism in the Franciscan intellectual tradition.

The concept or doctrine of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) represents an area of intensive early scholastic interest.¹ While Augustine and Anselm's writings by the title *De libero arbitrio* were long known in the Middle Ages, more recent writings by John of Damascus, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Abelard, among others, stimulated new discussion and debate on the topic in this period. This chapter will show that the *Summa Halensis* takes a decisive new stance on the nature of free will, locating it more in the will than in reason, and defining it as capable of both good and evil rather than simply the good.

In these respects, the *Summa's* source of inspiration was Alexander of Hales, whose evident interest in the subject can be noted in his fairly extensive writings on the topic. The voluntarism he endorses, along with his definition of free will, we now know, would become defining features of the Franciscan school, not least in the work of John Duns Scotus. Here, consequently, the Halensian sources of later Franciscan thought are highlighted for the first time. As important as those sources are, I wish to show in this chapter that the *Summa's* account emerges as part of a conversation amongst predecessors and contemporaries, whose theories in some respects lay the groundwork for – though none goes so far as – the *Summa* itself.

The demonstration of this point in the present chapter will take the following form. I will first recount briefly the doctrine of free will advocated by Augustine, for whom free choice was a matter of reason and will's orientation to the good.

¹ I am grateful to Riccardo Saccenti and Marcia Colish for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

This view, we will see, was elaborated further by Anselm. John of Damascus added new terms and arguments to the discussion, which factored into key aspects of 12th-century thought on the subject, which will then be treated briefly. The result will be to place on full display the constellation of sources and concepts that was at Alexander of Hales' disposal and that he was to some extent constrained to reconcile with his own opinions. A recounting of his theory of free choice as well as that of his main collaborator John of La Rochelle and the *Summa* will reveal that the latter depends upon the former, even while taking the 'irrefragible doctor's' position to new heights.

Augustine

There are many different interpretations of Augustine on free will, and there are some who would say he changed his mind on the subject over the course of his career.² By contrast, Eleonore Stump observes that Augustine himself states in his *Retractationes* that his earlier thought in this topic was simply underdeveloped by comparison to his later views and is ultimately consistent with them.³ The views presented in his early work are very clearly outlined in the *De libero arbitrio*, one of the texts that was most well known and most cited by the Summists and their contemporaries.⁴ There, Augustine states that free will is given for the purpose of acting rightly; in other words, its purview does not include sin and evil.⁵ While he does acknowledge in a later work, *De correptione et gratia*, that humans are free to do good or evil after the fall, this claim is heavily qualified.⁶ For choices to sin are in fact 'free of justice but enslaved to sin.'⁷

This enslavement comes from confusing greater goods – ultimately, God – with lesser goods which are perceived as sources of happiness and fulfilment, something Augustine elsewhere describes in terms of concupiscence. The finite and fleeting, or changeable nature of goods other than God entails that pursuing them as matters of supreme importance for our happiness inevitably leads to the frustration of our de-

2 For example, Eugene TeSelle, 'Background: Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy,' in *Grace after Grace*, eds. Alexander Y. Hwang et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), pp. 1–13; John M. Rist, 'Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,' *Journal of Theological Studies* 20:2 (1969), p. 420, in pp. 420–47.

3 Augustine, *Retractions* 1.9; Eleonore Stump, 'Augustine on Free Will,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 167 in pp. 166–86.

4 This work was finished before 395 according to Peter King; see *Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, ed. Peter King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. xvii. It was followed by *On Grace and Free Choice* (426–27), *On Reprimand and Grace* (426–27), and *On the Gift of Perseverance* (428–29), works which were written primarily in relation to Pelagian controversy.

5 Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.1.

6 Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 12.32 (trans. King, p. 213); cf. 2.3 (trans. King, p. 186).

7 Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 14.42 (trans. King, p. 222).

sires.⁸ If we seek those goods as a matter of priority, in other words, we will be slaves to the pursuit of things we cannot always possess and will therefore never be happy.⁹ As Augustine is quick to stress, the objects of our desires themselves are not good or evil – only the use we make of them and the level of significance we attribute to them.¹⁰ That is why it is so important to attribute absolute significance to God alone: not because other goods are insignificant or devalued in Augustine’s thought, but because we can only perceive their significance accurately and avoid enslavement to desires for them when we keep them in proper perspective.¹¹

The success or failure to do just this, that is, to exercise free will, is precisely the realm of our moral responsibility in Augustine’s paradigm. Admittedly, Augustine does say in his later works that we require God’s grace for all the good that we do, in opposition to Pelagius who supposedly affirmed the possibility of achieving perfection without God’s aid.¹² Apart from the ongoing support of grace, Augustine insists, a person would simply revert to evil and sin. Contrary to what is often supposed in certain interpretations of Augustine, however, this does not imply that the human being is ‘totally depraved’ and defunct with regard to any good act. What it suggests, by contrast, is that God is the one who gives the ability to do good in the first place and restores that ability following its loss to sin. On this account, God is not the one performing good deeds on a person’s behalf. Rather, he is the one and indeed the only one who can impart the power to act rightly in the first place.

Anselm

Anselm’s account of free will in the *De libero arbitrio* – the text that was most well-known to the Summists and their contemporaries – broadly follows the early Augustine at least in stating in no uncertain terms that the power of sinning is not a matter of free will.¹³ This is because sin enslaves us to desires for things that are not in our

8 Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.19: sin involves turning to a lesser good.

9 Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.11, 3.1: on slavery to sin.

10 Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.16.

11 Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.13.

12 Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5.12 (trans. King, p. 151).

13 As Mary Beth Ingham shows in her contribution to this volume, later Franciscans preferred some of Anselm’s later works on free will, which Marcia Colish takes as an attack on the later, anti-Pelagian views of Augustine. See Marcia Colish, ‘Free Will and Grace: Method and Model in Anselm’s *De concordia*,’ in *Anselm of Canterbury: Nature, Order and the Divine*, eds. Ian Logan and Giles G. E. Gasper, Anselm Studies and Texts (Leiden: Brill, 2021).

Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 1. See the excellent account of Augustine and Anselm on free will in Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225–1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013), pp. 37–45. See also Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), pp. 12–14: Anselm on free will.

best interests and limits our freedom accordingly.¹⁴ On this basis, Anselm concludes that free will strictly speaking can only will what is good. As Anselm puts it, in language which had been hinted at but not employed to the same extent by Augustine, free will can only will to preserve the rectitude, justice, or righteousness of the will, for its own sake.¹⁵ To do precisely this is what Anselm following Augustine again affirms that human beings fittingly ‘owe’ to God. After all, the purpose for which they were made was to honor him by preserving the justice he instilled in them.¹⁶

That is not to suggest that humans are mere functionaries of the divine will; for doing what God wants us to do is in our own interests. Indeed, there is nothing about being a slave to sin that is consistent with human happiness and flourishing. As Augustine had affirmed, so Anselm posits that willing what God wants us to will, which is to will to treat him as the supreme good and regard all other goods as second to him, helps us put other goods in proper perspective so that desires for mundane things do not become inordinate and enslaving. In summary, the will to preserve the just and proper order of our will, first to God, and then to other things, is what truly liberates the will.

John of Damascus

The more recent authority, John of Damascus, whose *De fide orthodoxa* was translated in the 12th century, played a significant role in early Franciscan accounts of free will. From Damascus, early Franciscans adopt the idea that ‘everything that is generable is changeable.’¹⁷ As the very notion of generation involves a change, the implication is that created beings are changeable (*vertibilis*) by nature. In the case of human beings, that entails that they can will to do or not to do any given thing (*facere et non facere*). In other words, they can voluntarily desire one thing but not another.¹⁸ As we will see, Alexander of Hales stretched the idea that free will entails

¹⁴ Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 3 and 10.

¹⁵ Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 13; cf. Augustine *De Trinitate* 14.15. Robert Pouchet, *La ‘rectitudo’ chez Saint Anselme: Un itinéraire augustinien de l’Âme à Dieu* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1964); K. Trego, *L’essence de la liberté: La refondation de l’éthique dans l’œuvre de s. Anselme de Cantorbéry*, (Paris: Vrin, 2010).

¹⁶ Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 3.15: ‘Since no one overcomes the laws of the Almighty Creator, it is not permitted for the soul not to repay its debt. Now the soul repays it either by using well what it received, or by losing what it was unwilling to use well. Thus if the soul does not repay it by doing justice, it will repay it by suffering unhappiness, since in each case the word “debt” applies. We could put the point like this: “If the soul does not repay its debt by doing what it ought, it will repay its debt by suffering what it ought.”’

¹⁷ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955) c. 41, p. 152: ‘Omne enim generabile et vertibile est.’ See pp. 152–54 more generally on free will.

¹⁸ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* c. 40, p. 150.

wanting ‘this and not that’ so far as to suggest that it allows for willing ‘opposites’, that is, good or evil.¹⁹

This perspective on the will represents a rather extreme take on the position of John of Damascus.²⁰ As Michael Frede writes, ‘looking at John of Damascus’ account shows us that he does not construe choice as inherently a choice between two options, the good and the evil.’²¹ As noted above, the Damascene’s much simpler point, which is the product of his complex reception of Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Greek church fathers, is that the human will is not fixed to one object or another.²² Different people desire different things, presumably in accordance with different abilities, interests and so on. Moreover, their desires and preferences can change. To observe this is a far cry from saying that evil is a legitimate object of free will.

12th-Century Developments

In addition to Augustine, Anselm, and Damascus, the 13th-century canon of authorities on free will expanded to include Bernard of Clairvaux, who wrote his account of ‘grace and free will’ around 1128.²³ There, he argued, among other things, that free will consists in consent which is not subject to any constraint or necessity.²⁴ This consent is ultimately to God and thus to the good which is the source of all freedom. Although free will can do evil since its definition is not to be compelled to one thing or another, sin diminishes freedom which is more ordered or genuine in doing good than evil.²⁵

In this connection, Bernard formulated a distinction between a three-fold freedom, namely, from necessity, from sin, and from misery, which became a fixture of medieval discussions of this topic, not least because it was included in Lombard’s

19 Alexander of Hales, ‘De libero arbitrio,’ in *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), q. XXXIII, p. 566.

20 Denise Ryan, ‘An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind-Body Dichotomy: Jean de La Rochelle on the Soul and its Powers’ (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010), p. 173.

21 Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom,’ in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 63–95.

22 René A. Gauthier, ‘Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’act humain,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), pp. 51–100.

23 Bernard of Clairvaux, *On Grace and Free Choice*, ed. Daniel O’Donovan, intro. Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1997).

24 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 19–20.

25 Bernard of Clairvaux, *The Treatise of St Bernard, Abbat of Clairvaux, Concerning Grace and Free Will*, trans. Watkin Wynn Williams (New York: MacMillan, 1920), c. 4, p. 18.

Sentences.²⁶ The first freedom is a gift of nature, the second of grace, and the third of glory. In his *De sacramentis fidei* (1135–40), Hugh of St Victor also espoused the basic idea of free will as not being subject to any compulsion.²⁷ So construed, freedom could be attributed not only to humans, but also to angels and God; in this period, as Mary Beth Ingham shows in her chapter for this volume, it remained a priority for scholars to find a definition that applied across the board.

Another key moment in the history of free will theory came with Peter Abelard, who introduced the definition of Boethius, or ‘the philosophers’ in his *Introductio ad theologiam* around 1138. This involved the idea of free will as ‘*voluntate iudicium*’, or a ‘free judgment concerning the will’ whereby we decide whether or not we will follow an inclination of the will.²⁸ As Lottin notes, the deliberation in question is free, because it is exempt from any necessity. Thus, Abelard upholds the growing consensus that free will is the power to achieve what reason decides without any force or compulsion. That is not to say that free will entails freedom to sin, for sin diminishes freedom. The kind of freedom Abelard has in mind is of a different sort, and it pertains to the power to choose between different good alternatives.

A further advance which Lottin identifies in the 12th-century history of free will concerns the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*, which has sometimes been attributed to Hugh of St Victor, but which Lottin assigns to Othon of Lucca, and which has more recently been traced to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers.²⁹ This is the text that would formulate the definition of free will as the ability or ‘*facultas*’ of reason and will to choose the good, if the grace of God assists, and to choose evil, if grace ceases.³⁰ Although the author supports this idea with citations from Bernard, Peter Lombard would later associate it with Augustine.³¹

26 Bernard of Clairvaux, *Concerning Grace and Free Will*, c. 3, pp. 14–17: three kinds of grace; pp. 18–24: freedom from necessity, sin, and misery. The distinction that would become famous later on between *posse non peccare* and *non posse peccare* is also found in chapter 7. See also Peter Lombard, *Libri sententiarum. Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, 3rd ed. (Grottaferrata, Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), bk. 2, d. 25, c. 8, p. 160.

27 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 22: Hugh of St Victor.

28 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 22: *Petri Abaelardi Introductio ad theologiam*, in *Petri Abaelardi Opera II*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris: A. Durand, 1859), p. 139; cf. PL 178:1110a. This was also quoted in the *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 25 c. 1, n. 2, p. 153.

29 L. Catalani, *I Porretani. Una scuola di pensiero tra alto e basso Medioevo* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). See also Marcia Colish, ‘Otto of Lucca: Author of the *Summa sententiarum*?’ in *Discovery and Distinction in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John J. Contreni*, eds. Cullen J. Chandler and Steven A. Sofferahn (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2013), pp. 57–70.

30 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 25.

31 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 28. See also Lombard, *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 24, c. 3, p. 142, trans. Giulio Silano, in *The Sentences, Book 2: On Creation* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008), p. 109: ‘Free choice, however, is a faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen with the assistance of grace, or evil without its assistance. And it is called “free” in regard to the will, which may turn itself to either of them; but “choice” in regard to reason, whose faculty or

The Lombard's work thus gave rise inadvertently to the subsequent debate on whether free will consists mainly in reason or in the will or even some other faculty that perhaps contains or exceeds those two.³² While Lombard continued to maintain the idea also found in the *Summa sententiarum* that free will is essentially the power to choose between different alternatives, he and his followers still did not count evil as a legitimate one of those options. This is why God can be said to have free choice in the truest sense of the term.³³ For Lombard, free choice is unequivocally freer when one is not able to sin.³⁴

The situation changed with Gandolph of Bologna, who around 1160–70 argued that free will involves a choice between good and evil, although Lottin notes that it is difficult to identify the sources of inspiration for this rather unconventional view.³⁵ Simon of Tournai, a follower of the school of Gilbert of Poitiers, further elaborated a case for the idea that there are two different kinds of free will, namely, to do good, and to do evil.³⁶ In some respects, he argued, the freedom to do evil is greater than that to do good, because we need grace to avoid evil. Nevertheless, the natural inclination of reason untainted by sin, and its true and proper end, is to choose the good.³⁷

In the school of Peter Lombard, Praepositinus of Cremona pushes much further the idea of free will as consisting primarily in reason rather than the faculty of both reason and will, as Lombard supposed.³⁸ On his account, reason plays the role of discerning between good and evil; it chooses the good and detests evil. The will simply executes the orders of reason regarding our moral or immoral activities. As we move into the early 13th century, John Blund takes the traditional line on the nature of free will.³⁹ He sees free will as entailing both reason and will, where reason knows what is good and the will chooses it, thus 'preserving righteousness' and rejecting its opposite.

power it is, and to which it also belongs to discern between good and evil.' See also *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 24, c. 1 (140), trans. Giulio Silano, quoting Augustine's *De corruptione et gratia* 11.32: 'God gave a good will to man, indeed he made him upright in it; he gave him the help without which he could not remain steadfast in that will, if he so willed, and through which he could, but he left it to man's choice to do this.'

³² Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 29.

³³ *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 25, c. 1, p. 153.

³⁴ *Sentences* bk. 2, d. 24, c. 4, p. 156.

³⁵ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 38.

³⁶ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 41.

³⁷ When this fails to happen, Simon claims, it is not therefore because reason actually is able to command evil acts but rather because it allows them to be performed, inevitably at the impetus of lower impulses. Although reason is indirectly responsible for evil, because it fails to fulfil its duty to curb sin, its only proper object remains, as ever, the good.

³⁸ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 50.

³⁹ John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, eds. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, trans. Michael W. Dunne (London: British Academy, 2012), pp. 213–21.

Although he is not mentioned by name, Anselm is clearly at the background here, as is Augustine, whose spurious definition of free will is quoted, albeit from the *Sentences*, as ‘a faculty of reason and understanding by which, with the help of grace, the good is chosen, and by which, when grace ceases, evil is chosen.’⁴⁰ Augustine’s own wording of this sentiment states that ‘free choice must be acknowledged as the ability we have to do good and to do evil.’⁴¹ Blund’s indebtedness to Augustine becomes evident in his emphatic rejection of the notion that it is possible for free will to sin or pursue what is evil. As he stresses, this would involve slavery to one’s desires, which has nothing to do with the exercise of a free power.⁴²

William of Auxerre’s *Summa aurea* offers one of the first in-depth treatises on free will in the period post-Lombard. However, the author proves resistant to departing from the traditional Augustinian line in his account of free will.⁴³ Like Blund, he states Augustine’s view as represented by Lombard:⁴⁴ ‘free will is the operation of will and reason by which good is chosen with the assistance of grace and evil when grace is lacking.’⁴⁵ In this connection, he expounds on Praepositinus’ argument that free will consists primarily in reason – which he now perhaps under Aristotle’s influence refers to specifically as ‘practical reason’. He makes his case by distinguishing between two levels of judgment, the first of which discriminates between two options and the second of which elects one over the other.⁴⁶ The second is the proper act of free will and the locus of merit.

For William, there is as Augustine said a place for the will proper as well as reason within free will – which can therefore be said to include both – but only insofar as the will is part of reason’s second act.⁴⁷ In addition to this, William insists that free

⁴⁰ John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, p. 223.

⁴¹ Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 1: ‘Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere.’

⁴² John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, p. 217.

⁴³ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 1, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 17, ed. Jean Ribailier (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), pp. 274–309; see also bk. 2, tome 2, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 18 (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), pp. 470–510. See a fuller account of William’s doctrine of free will in Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, pp. 116–21.

⁴⁴ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 1, p. 276. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* bk. 1, d. 24, c. 3, p. 453.

⁴⁵ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 1, p. 276: ‘Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente; malum vero gratia desistente.’ Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 11.31, trans. King, p. 212: ‘Free choice is sufficient for evil, but hardly for good, unless it is assisted by the omnipotent Good One.’

⁴⁶ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 67; William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 1, p. 276.

⁴⁷ See an excellent discussion by Tobias Hoffman which focusses on questions of the relationship between necessity and freedom in Auxerre, the Chancellor, Hugh of St Cher and others, ‘Freedom without Choice: Medieval Theories of the Essence of Freedom,’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 196–97, in pp. 194–216.

will is more related to the good than evil, citing Augustine's *De civitate Dei* 12.7, where he states that 'evil is not an efficient but a deficient cause.'⁴⁸ Later on, he reiterates this view, and its association with Augustine, quoting the latter's *De libero arbitrio* 2.19.53, which states that 'the ability to sin is not an ability' strictly speaking, for precisely the reason Blund already mentioned, namely, that it limits the scope of free will rather than facilitating it.⁴⁹

In summary, for William, free will is the power of choosing to do what *synderesis* dictates.⁵⁰ As has been noted, *synderesis* or right reason, also described by some as natural law, was a term derived from the writings of Jerome and first given an extended treatment by Auxerre, after which it became a standard topic in the schools.⁵¹ The proper motion of free will is to choose to do or not to do one thing over another – but its options must always be consistent with what *synderesis* would require.⁵²

As Saccenti observes, Philip the Chancellor represents a new phase in work on free will. This is not only because his account of free will takes up more space in his section on human nature than all other topics combined: around 75 pages of an approximately 150-page text.⁵³ Nor is it simply because he introduces the *thelesis/boulesis* distinction as well as the distinction between cognitive and motive powers which are found in John of Damascus and would later be more or less adopted in the same way by John of La Rochelle.⁵⁴ Although Philip is indebted to the main sources – Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard⁵⁵ – that also feature in the *Summa Halensis*, he breaks from his predecessors to argue that free will is identical with the will rather than reason. In his opinion, it is the will rather than reason that possesses the power to act or not to act and thus to acquire or lose merit.⁵⁶

48 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 2, p. 275: 'Mali non est causa efficiens sed deficiens.'

49 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 2, p. 489.

50 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 2, p. 283.

51 *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*, 2 vols, ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), pp. 129–30: Philip the Chancellor created the formal tract on the topic and most subsequent thinkers simply answered questions in the order he listed them, including Hales, Odo Rigaldus, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, according to Michael Bertram Crow, 'Fresh Lineaments of the Natural Law,' in *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 111–35.

52 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, bk. 2, tome 2, p. 278.

53 *Summa de bono*, pp. 155–231: as mentioned previously, the discussion of the motive powers and free will take up the greater proportion of his section on human nature, which ends on p. 297.

54 *Summa de bono*, p. 160: provides a summary of John's division between cognitive and motive powers; p. 161: treats the distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis*. On the use of Damascus by the Chancellor in treating these concepts, see Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, pp. 91–101.

55 *Summa de bono*, pp. 165–66, citing the definitions of Augustine, Anselm and Bernard on free will.

56 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 73–74. *Summa de bono*, p. 173: 'Libertas autem principaliter residet apud illam potentiam in quantum est voluntas' ['Liberty principally resides in the power of the will']; pp. 175–76: free will is mainly in doing what one wills rather than what reason dictates, because this is how we acquire merit and demerit; cf. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, p. 124.

That is not to say that for Philip, reason has no role to play in free will. Rather it is a question of which power assumes primacy in this context. According to Philip, free choice is ultimately the power to do what one wills, that is, the power of self-determination. As Lottin explains, however, this power for Philip does not include that of doing evil, which diminishes freedom.⁵⁷ Although Philip in that sense adheres to Anselm's definition of free will, he acknowledges that it is not adequate to explaining how those who do evil can have free will.⁵⁸ To address this problem, he argues that the power of preserving the rectitude of which Anselm speaks remains even in the person who fails to use it.⁵⁹

By contrast to Philip, Hugh of St Cher takes a more 'intellectualist' line on free will. He acknowledges that some see free will as reason, others as will, others as a composite of these two, adding that others, presumably Godfrey of Poitiers, regard it as something over and above reason and will.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, he refuses to accept that there is any faculty in the person that is superior to reason, which has the power to determine how to act, a determination that is executed by free will. In this regard, as Lottin notes, he is visibly influenced firstly by William of Auxerre, whose work, we have learned, he often reiterates while sometimes making additions or changes to William's solutions.⁶¹

Elsewhere, Hugh acknowledges that free will can be defined as flexible to do whatever it wants or as flexible between good and evil. In his view, however, free will is not flexible between good and evil but only to do what it wants within the parameters of the good.⁶² Further details of the accounts given by both Philip and Hugh are superbly outlined by Riccardo Saccenti in his book on the subject.⁶³ Although Roland of Cremona was Hugh's teacher, we know that he was probably more influenced by his student than the other way around, since he only wrote his own *Summa* after Hugh's major *Sentences* Commentary was completed. For his

57 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 79–80. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, p. 135. *Summa de bono*, p. 162: on the flexibility of free will between good and evil.

58 *Summa de bono*, pp. 184–85: 'Similiter dicit esse in libertate arbitrii quod nichil prohibet libertatem arbitrii esse quantum ad hoc quod est potestas conservandi rectitudinem non existente rectitudine, quamdiu ratio est in nobis, qua eam valeamus cognoscere et voluntas qua illam tenere possumus.'

59 Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, pp. 137–38.

60 The *Quaestiones* of Stephen Langton identify free will with the rational faculty, holding that this embraces reason and will.

61 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 96–103.

62 See the edition at Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, pp. 230–31.

63 Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, pp. 142–51: on free will in Hugh of St Cher. See also Magdalena Bieniak, 'Contents of Hugh of St Cher's Commentary on the *Sentences*, Books I–II,' *Przeład Tomistyczny* 19 (2013), p. 76 in pp. 9–90. See also her 'The *Sentences* Commentary of Hugh of St Cher,' in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. Philipp Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 139–40 in pp. 111–47. On p. 135 she notes that Hugh was the first to speak of the absolute/ordained power distinction in a theological context.

part, however, he offers a somewhat unique solution, which seemingly seeks to accommodate in a qualified way the idea that free will can in fact choose evil.

To this end, Roland invokes the famous Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason, which was codified by Lombard, arguing that while lower reason which is linked to the body is capable of choosing good and evil, higher reason is independent of it and always retains its preference for the good.⁶⁴ At this level, consequently, free will only involves the power to choose whatever one wills, that is, not to be determined to any one object but to be able to discriminate and choose amongst various good options.⁶⁵ As this suggests, Roland follows Hugh or at least William of Auxerre in emphasizing that free will – at least higher by contrast to lower free will – is basically reason.⁶⁶

John of La Rochelle

Before moving on to Alexander of Hales, it is worth pausing to reflect on John of La Rochelle's treatment of free will. Although John is influenced by Philip the Chancellor in his account of many matters, this is a case where he does not take Philip's radical line of referring free choice to the will. According to Lottin, he instead identifies free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) with the rational faculty, more specifically, the practical intellect, which is comprised of reason (*ratio*) and will (*voluntas*) and their operation, which is that of *liberum arbitrium* itself. For John, these three represent one and the same faculty that only differs according to its acts.⁶⁷ While reason discerns or refrains from seeking knowledge (*agnoscit*) of what is to be done, the will, previously described as *boulesis*, desires the good to be done, and *liberum arbitrium* chooses the desired good.⁶⁸

As Augustine put it, free choice is one power in its root but three in its branches. This point was consistent with Augustine's broader view, presented in *De Trinitate*,

64 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 103–8: on Roland of Cremona and free will. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, eds. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), p. 144: citing Augustine's *De Trinitate* 12.7.12, Roland distinguishes between higher and lower reason and on p. 233, he states that inferior reason can move between good and evil, though higher reason is ordered towards the good.

65 *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, pp. 237–38: there is flexibility to choose between different objects of desire but not between good and evil (*liberi arbitrii est potestas sed flexibilitas ad id quod vult habens liberum arbitrium*).

66 *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, p. 234: free will is reason for Roland.

67 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 128: Rochelle says free will is the rational faculty, under the influence of Hugh.

68 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae. Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables (Tractatus)*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), p. 98: 'Sicut enim habemus vim intellectiuam ordinatam ad verum, sic habemus vim intellectiuam motiuam ordinatam ad bonum. Notandum ergo quod est vis motiua ut natura et est vis motiua ut ratio.'

that the mind, its knowledge and its will represent an image of the Trinity; to give one primacy over the other would be to imply inequality within the Trinity and thus heresy.⁶⁹ In this connection, John notes that free choice can be understood in two ways, distinctly or indistinctly. In a distinct or specific sense, free choice is the final arbiter of the work of will and reason. In this case, each of the three faculties have their own proper operation: reason discerns, the will desires, and free will chooses. In an indistinct sense, however, Damascus says that free will can be said to apply to any aspect of the process of free willing and thus to the work of reason and will individually, as when we say that one thinks freely, wills freely, and chooses freely.⁷⁰

Although John allows with his contemporaries that free will is the power to act without determination or external pressures, this does not amount for him to a power to choose between good and evil. As John notes, ‘free will is not called *liberum* because it is flexible between good and evil but because it is able to do or not to do something, as it consults and is instigated by *synderesis*, or as it is suggested by sensuality.’⁷¹ This power is what sets human beings apart from animals, which operate under the force of instinct and are in that sense tied to their desires for material objects. Since volitions follow intelligible goals which are free from matter, they are undetermined and can be focussed on any good end or object whatever.

Alexander of Hales

As Lottin has aptly observed, Alexander of Hales has little in common with his Franciscan contemporary John of La Rochelle as regards free will.⁷² This is a topic Alexander covers in both his *Glossa* and his disputed questions, and the level of interest he had in the subject is apparent from the amount of space he devotes to it in both places.⁷³ For instance, questions about the relationship between sin, grace, and free will consume around half of the second volume of his *Gloss*.⁷⁴ The three volumes of disputed questions that date from before Alexander became a friar are highly selective in the topics they cover; the questions overwhelmingly deal with issues in moral and sacramental theology and the Trinity.

⁶⁹ I am grateful to Marcia Colish for making this point to me.

⁷⁰ *De fide orthodoxa* 36.12.

⁷¹ *Tractatus*, p. 121: *libero arbitrio*.

⁷² Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, p. 134: Alexander of Hales has little in common with Rochelle on free will.

⁷³ *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’* (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1960), tome 1, q. 33, m. 3, d. 3, p. 592 in pp. 566–608: Alexander says free will is the same as *prohaeresis* and contrasts it with *synderesis* which innately moves the will to the good.

⁷⁴ *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1952), vol. 2, pp. 181–421; pp. 1–15, reason of creation; pp. 15–116, angels; pp. 116–45, the seven days of creation; pp. 145–81, the creation of Adam and Eve; pp. 181–421, sin, grace, and free will.

Among these is Alexander's lengthy question 33 on free will and several appendix questions, which witness to his preoccupation with the subject matter. Although much of the material from the Gloss is repeated in the disputed questions – most importantly question 33 – the account of the matter in that question is the most coherent and extensive one he left us, partly because the Gloss format constrained Alexander to follow Lombard's line of reasoning, more than his own. The overlaps between Alexander of Hales' question 33 on free will and the account of this topic in the *Summa Halensis* are countless and striking and make evident that his work is the source for the *Summa's* treatment of this topic more than John of La Rochelle's.⁷⁵

Alexander's argument in this context proceeds as follows: every creature that comes into being moves from non-being. Thus, he says, as Damascus writes, everything generable is changeable.⁷⁶ The ability to change can be *simpliciter*, but this is not possible for rational beings because they are immortal; that is to say, they cannot revert back into non-being.⁷⁷ Thus, the ability of humans must involve change between the good in which they were made, on the one hand, and evil, on the other. On this basis, Alexander says that the rational creature must be changeable and therefore flexible between good and evil as regards free will. In sum, the creation of the human being from nothing is the reason for the ability to will opposites, namely, good and evil.⁷⁸

To the objection that this is not possible because God is good, and humans are made in the image of God, Alexander observes that creatures are unlike God, because they are made from nothing and are therefore changeable and able by nature to turn away from the good in which they were made.⁷⁹ In response to Anselm's claim that 'willing evil is a defect of liberty,' Alexander states that this is only the case when we think of graced human nature – and that, Alexander claims, is the state to which Anselm refers.⁸⁰ In the case of the liberty of nature, humans are able to do good as much as what is not good, and the power of doing evil is not called servitude, because it is not simply a matter of being compelled by nature or instinct to do something, as is the case with animal.

Later on in the question, Alexander reinforces this point when he says that Anselm's definition only really applies insofar as free will is common to God, good and

⁷⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 1, pp. 566–608, quoting *De fide orthodoxa* II.27.

⁷⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 1, contra 9, p. 569.

⁷⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 1, contra 10, p. 569.

⁷⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, p. 209b.

⁷⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 1, n. 16, p. 572; see also the *Glossa*, vol. 2, p. 209b, on the idea that humans are changeable between good and evil because they are not like God.

⁸⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 1, n. 20, p. 573.

gels, and graced human beings.⁸¹ This, Alexander believes, is how Lombard understands free will in his *Sentences*, namely, insofar as it is common to God and creatures and thus not related to evil.⁸² When it comes to rational beings in their own right, however, free will pertains to both good and evil.⁸³ In short, it involves consent to either one and entails the power to do effectively whatever one wants, whether good or evil.⁸⁴

On another note, Alexander takes the view, in relation to the contemporary debate on the matter, that free will is a separate faculty which contains both reason and will. This tri-partite dimension is what renders free will an image of the Trinity – where the Son represents knowledge or reason, the Spirit, will, and the Father an ultimate decision or operation – that therefore involves both reason, will, and their cooperation (*facultas*).⁸⁵ After marshalling a series of proof texts from some of the usual suspects – Bernard, Damascus, and Augustine, however – Alexander draws the conclusion that even though a preliminary cognitive act is needed to weigh what one should do, free will is ultimately a matter of willing to do it and thus in essence pertains more to the will than reason.⁸⁶ In fact, Alexander goes so far as to say, following Philip the Chancellor, that it really is just a matter of the will.⁸⁷

To justify this in relation to Augustine, he notes like John that one can speak of free will distinctly or indistinctly. To speak of free will indistinctly is to speak of reason, will, and their operation as Augustine does.⁸⁸ But to speak of it distinctly is only to speak of the will.⁸⁹ For this very reason, Alexander further argues that sin is primarily in the will.⁹⁰ In other words, it is not a matter of knowing what is right or wrong, which is instilled in us by *synderesis* or the natural law, which gives us an innate orientation to the good. Rather, it is a matter of refusing to do what is good. This is quite a contrast to someone like Augustine and later Anselm and Aquinas, who held that sin was both a matter of reason and will. In the account of these thinkers, reason starts to think of its supreme good as consisting in something other

81 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, Respondeo 33, p. 576.

82 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, Respondeo, p. 587, citing Lombard's *Sentences*, bk. 2, d. 25.

83 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, Respondeo, p. 587: 'Secundo modo libera voluntas in bono et in malo.'

84 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, Respondeo 60, p. 587: 'Et sic est libertas quia potest in hoc vel in illud consentire.' See also p. 588, Ad 63: 'Liberum arbitrium potest facere quodlibet;' cf. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, m. 2, n. 24, p. 574.

85 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 2, p. 581.

86 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, n. 50, p. 583.

87 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, n. 51, p. 584.

88 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, n. 54, p. 584.

89 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, p. 212, 8a, 8c: 'Dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est primo ipsius voluntatis et secundum voluntatem est omnium actuum aliorum.' ['It is said that free will is first of the will and all other acts are according to the will.'] See also p. 226.

90 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, d. 39, n. 4, p. 378.

than God – as this or that ‘lesser good’ – and therefore organizes life around obtaining that good, by virtue of a will to do so.⁹¹

The co-operation of reason and will in Augustine’s account of free choice calls into question the legitimacy of the kind of voluntarist reading of his thought that was offered by early Franciscans.⁹² Although many modern scholars have taken that reading at face value, the early Franciscan texts we are examining here themselves provide evidence that Franciscans departed from Augustine’s thinking on this matter in the very act of interpreting him. They illustrate how far someone like Alexander had to stretch Augustine’s words in order to make a case to readers that the Bishop attributes primacy to the will.

By prioritizing goods other than God, Alexander suggests, the will can gradually obscure its knowledge of God and of the natural law, increasingly compromising its ability to will what is good. However, it cannot simply forget what it knows about him, for this would imply a deficiency in God and his ability constantly to make himself knowable to us through his image in us. While a bad will can make us ignorant of the good, consequently, Alexander concludes that the knowledge of it in *synderesis* can never be extinguished. For this reason, Alexander elaborates, merit and demerit consist primarily in the will.⁹³

Since *synderesis* is innate to all and cannot be depleted, in other words, one cannot accumulate merit on the basis of what one knows. Rather, one can only accumulate merit on the basis of what one decides to do with that knowledge, or what one wills.⁹⁴ According to Alexander, the philosophers did not know of free will precisely because they did not know the principle of meriting by consenting to the divine will.⁹⁵ Through the natural grace that all human beings possess (*gratia gratis data*), Alexander claims, human beings are able to resist venial though not mortal sin.⁹⁶ The latter can only be overcome or resisted with so-called sanctifying grace

⁹¹ As Anselm notes, this becomes a matter of slavery precisely because things other than God are finite and fleeting. To pursue them above all is else to put our happiness at the mercy of circumstances that are out of our control.

⁹² This is demonstrated by A. San Cristóbal Sebastián, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270–1300* (Madrid: Editorial y librería co., 1958), p. 111, pp. 118–28. On p. 98, Sebastián also shows that medieval writers discussed *liberum arbitrium* until 1270; after this time, they frequently spoke in terms *voluntas libera* – freedom of the will and more occasionally, *liberum arbitrium*.

⁹³ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, m. 4, pp. 592–93; see also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, Respondeo 7, p. 211.

⁹⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, m. 4, p. 593: ‘Dico ergo quod meritum penes voluntatem attenditur et penes liberum arbitrium, quoniam duo ad hoc exiguntur, scilicet separare appetendum a non appetendo, et hoc est liberi arbitrii; et adhaerere illi, et hoc voluntatis est; unde penes liberum arbitrium initiabitur, penes voluntatem consummabitur.’ See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, d. 25, p. 224.

⁹⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 3, m. 5, n. 77, p. 594.

⁹⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 5, m. 1, Respondeo 104, p. 601.

(*gratia gratum faciente*), which works on those who are open to receiving it by faith, which is a movement of the will to conform to the will of God.

The *Summa Halensis*

The *Summa Halensis* clearly follows the lead of Alexander of Hales on the nature of free will.⁹⁷ This becomes exceptionally clear in a section on ‘whether free will is indifferent to good and evil.’⁹⁸ Here, the *Summa* quotes Damascus saying that ‘the rational creature is changeable so far as choice is concerned.’⁹⁹ As we have seen, this principle was the basis for the Damascene’s argument that free will entails the ability to choose between opposites, which he understands to entail a variety of good options. Thus, he writes that free will is the ability ‘to be moved or not to be moved, to order to do or not to do, to desire or not to desire’ any given thing.¹⁰⁰ Taking a cue from Alexander, however, the *Summa* contends that the changeability of human nature presupposes ‘the power to choose between opposites’¹⁰¹ of good and evil. On the basis of Damascus, consequently, the *Summa* draws a conclusion that Damascus did not, namely, that free will is indifferent to good or evil.¹⁰² That is to say, ‘free will is that by which one is able to sin or do right.’¹⁰³ No author previous to or outside of the Franciscan tradition had dared to make such a claim without extensive qualifications.

In this regard, the *Summa* acknowledges that Anselm and Bernard denied that the power of sinning is part of free choice.¹⁰⁴ The same objection is traced to Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio* 2.1–2 which states that God gives human beings free will that it can be rightly used, not so that it can be used for wrongdoing. Additionally, the

97 This is well demonstrated in the following section: *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M1 (n. 389), pp. 466–67. A translation of this material has been prepared by Oleg Bychkov in *The Summa Halensis: A Reader*, trans. Lydia Schumacher and Oleg Bychkov (New York: Fordham University Press, forthcoming).

98 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Circa primum sic obicitur a, p. 475.

99 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Circa primum sic obicitur a, p. 475: ‘Creatura rationalis vertibilis est secundum electionem,’ quoting *De fide orthodoxa* II.27.

100 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C2 (n. 403), Ad 1, p. 480, citing *De fide orthodoxa* II.26: ‘Liberi arbitrii est moveri vel non moveri, impetum facere et non facere, appetere et non appetere.’

101 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M5, C2 (n. 411), Ad a, p. 487: ‘Liberum enim arbitrium est potestas ad opposita.’

102 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Circa primum sic obicitur a, p. 475: ‘Creatura rationalis vertibilis est secundum electionem, ex hoc enim liberum arbitrium est, quod eligere potest vel recusare. Cum ergo eligere sit indifferenter inter utrumque, et recusare similiter, ergo liberum arbitrium indifferenter dicitur boni et mali.’

103 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C5 (n. 406), Ad 2, p. 483: ‘Liberum arbitrium est quo homo potest peccare et recte agere.’

104 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Contra 1, p. 475, citing Anselm’s *De libero arbitrio* 1, Contra 2, citing Bernard’s *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 9.

Summist quotes *De civitate Dei* 14.11.1, which states that free will is free as it is not enslaved to sin.¹⁰⁵ In the response to the objection, the Summist states that free will can be considered in three ways.¹⁰⁶ In the first way, it is considered insofar as it is not restricted (*non cogitur*), and in this sense, it is indifferent to good or evil; in another mode, free will is considered according to nature, which is assimilated to God and thus ordained to the good, and in this way, as Anselm says, the ability to do evil is not a part of freedom.¹⁰⁷ The third mode considers free will in relation to the defect of nature which it has insofar as it is a creature, and according to the defect of the will which is proper to it, and in this way, it tends more to evil than to the good.

After saying that, however, the *Summa* denies that there is any fundamental difference between free will in the states of nature, grace, or glory. In all cases, it is a matter of having the option to serve either good or evil. The main difference between the pre-lapsarian state and the present one is simply that humans started out in the good, and were indeed designed by God to serve that end, even though they did not use the power they had to remain steadfast in it. The following argument, found in the ‘contra’ section, is indicative of what ends up being the *Summa*’s position: ‘just as humans could change their choice and remained flexible in the first state [of innocence], so [they can] in the states of sin and grace; but sharing the same ability – namely, to change one’s choice – amounts to sharing the same free choice; therefore, all three states share the same kind of free choice.’¹⁰⁸

On this basis, the *Summa* concludes that ‘the servitude of sin is not compatible with the freedom of grace, but it is compatible with natural freedom. For this reason humans do possess free choice that stems from natural freedom in both states, i. e. of grace and sin.’¹⁰⁹ Perhaps conscious that its radical position was not so easy to reconcile with the leading authorities on free will, namely, Anselm, Augustine, and Bernard, the *Summa* proceeds to dedicate an entire section to the exposition of their opinions, which are also found already in Alexander of Hales’ question 33, and to seek essentially to explain away the thrust of their perspectives in order to justify its own.¹¹⁰

105 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Contra 4, p. 475, citing Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* 14.11.1.

106 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Respondeo, p. 476.

107 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1 (n. 397), Respondeo, p. 476, citing *De libero arbitrio* 1 and 3: ‘Posse facere malum non est pars libertatis.’

108 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M3, C4 (n. 405), Respondeo, p. 482, trans. Oleg Bychkov.

109 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M3, C4 (n. 405), Ad objecta 2, p. 482.

110 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C2 (n. 392), p. 471.

Anselm, Augustine, and Bernard on Free Will

The first definition of free will the *Summa* considers is that of Anselm in *De libero arbitrio* 13, which states that ‘free choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake.’¹¹¹ On this account, the power of sinning lessens freedom and is no part of free will. The problem this poses for the *Summa* is that its definition entails that free choice involves options of preserving or deserting rectitude.¹¹² To get around the problem, the *Summa* observes that the power of preserving rectitude can be understood in several ways, namely, on the part of the one who preserves rectitude, on the part of what is preserved, that is, ‘the right thing to do’, and on the part of the means through which it is preserved.

When all three of these factors are taken into account, there is no power of preserving rectitude without rectitude itself. However, when we consider the power to preserve only in terms of the nature of the one who has the power, the power of preserving rectitude can be said to exist even if there is no rectitude. This, the Summist surmises, is the view of Anselm and what he intends to convey with the analogy of vision he presents in his *De libero arbitrio*, which notes that the power of seeing remains in the agent even if there is no object of vision – as in the dark – and no actual vision is taking place.

Naturally, that was not the sense in which Anselm clearly intended his analogy to be interpreted in *De libero arbitrio* 7. His objective was only to suggest that free will is present even when we are not using it, as when we are asleep. Nevertheless, this same justification for effectively rejecting Anselm’s position was given by Alexander of Hales in his question 33, namely, that the power of preserving rectitude remains even when the right thing is not done but evil is done instead.¹¹³ On this basis, the Summist concludes that Anselm believes that the power to preserve rectitude which is the definition of free will does not actually depend on acting rightly. In this way, he paves the way for the view that free will can also serve evil.

The next definition the Summist considers is that of Augustine, or at least Lombard’s rendering of Augustine, as follows: ‘free will is the operation of will and reason by which the good is chosen through the assistance of grace and evil resisted also by grace.’¹¹⁴ As Anselm says, so the *Summa* allows that the power of sinning lessens freedom, and so the one who is able to act rightly and is not able not to do so is more free.¹¹⁵ In the response, he says that there is a three-fold liberty, name-

111 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr1 (n. 393), Ad 1, p. 472: ‘Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se.’

112 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr1 (n. 393), Ad 2, p. 472.

113 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, Respondeo 34, p. 577.

114 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr2 (n. 394), Ad 1, p. 472: ‘Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente et malum eadem desistente.’ See also Augustine, *De corrept. et grat.* 11.32 (PL 44:935); Peter Lombard, *II Sent.*, d. 24, c. 3, p. 421.

115 Citing Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 2.3.

ly, of nature, grace and glory. The liberty of nature is from force or compulsion, the liberty of grace is from sin, and the liberty of glory is from misery.

According to the *Summa*, the idea that free will precludes sin does not pertain to the liberty of nature, for as Bernard says, ‘as in the good, so in the bad, the will equally endures.’¹¹⁶ Rather, it concerns the liberty of guilt and misery. For guilt can be augmented and lessened as can misery, but this is not the case with nature, which is changeable. Thus, the power of choosing evil when grace is lacking is part of liberty, not insofar as it is enjoyed in common with God, but insofar as it pertains to creatures only. As in the case of Anselm above, so this justification for rejecting Augustine is reproduced virtually verbatim from Alexander of Hales’ question 33.¹¹⁷

Finally, the *Summa* addresses the definition of Bernard of Clairvaux in his *De libero arbitrio* 2.4: ‘free choice is consent on the basis of the freedom of the will that cannot be lost and the judgment of reason that cannot be changed.’¹¹⁸ According to Bernard, this consent is a medium between the sense of the mind and the sense of the flesh. While the sense of the mind cannot pertain to evil, the sense of the flesh cannot pertain to anything good. When understood in terms the mind, consequently, Bernard says that ‘no one would try to say that free will is a power or faculty that can alternate between good and evil.’¹¹⁹ As the medium between the mind and the senses, however, consent is indifferent to good and evil. For it is capable of preferring what is good and ultimately God or of declining it.¹²⁰ This again is a position largely repeated from Alexander of Hales.¹²¹

Free Will: Will or Reason?

As noted already, Alexander and the *Summa Halensis* take the position that free will is comprised of both reason and will and cannot be reduced to just one of them. As the *Summa* nicely puts it, free will ‘is *arbitrium* according to reason and *liberum* according to will,’¹²² although the operation of *liberum arbitrium* is seemingly something over and above reason and will which includes them. On this basis, Lottin ob-

116 Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 8.24.

117 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, Respondeo 38, pp. 578–79.

118 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr3 (n. 395), p. 473, citing Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 3.7 (PL 182:1005): ‘Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium.’

119 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr3 (n. 395), Ad 1, p. 473, citing Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 10.35: ‘Nemo putet ideo dictum liberum arbitrium quia inter bonum et malum potestate vel facultate versetur.’

120 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2 (n. 396), Solutio, p. 474.

121 Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, m. 1, Respondeo 39, p. 579; see also disp. 3, m. 1, n. 63, p. 588; n. 77, p. 594.

122 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar4 (n. 401), Respondeo 1, p. 478.

serves that free will for them has two stages, namely, deliberation and choice. In its first stage, free will judges what to do according to the moral law; secondly, it chooses, and in this sense, it can become released from the law to do as it pleases.¹²³

To defend its position, the *Summa* marshals quotations from both Bernard of Clairvaux and Augustine which argue for as well as against the idea that free will primarily concerns the will rather than reason.¹²⁴ On the authority of Augustine, who says that nothing is in our control except the will, the *Summa* eventually concludes that free will is primarily a matter of the will.¹²⁵ This is because the will is the one that ultimately exercises the power of free choice. The *Summa* responds to the objections to its position as follows:

Therefore, to those authoritative statements of the saints that seem to conclude that free choice is the will, one must reply that the saints do not intend to say that free choice is essentially the will, but that freedom mostly has to do with the will, and free choice is called will for this reason alone.¹²⁶

A closely related question to this one is whether merit and demerit are based on the will only or on the work of both reason and will. The *Summa's* solution to this problem clearly states that merit consists in a general sense in all aspects of free will, namely, reason, will, and their operation through the exercise of free choice. The involvement of all three renders free choice an image of the Trinity, where the Son represents reason, the Spirit, will, and the Father the ultimate arbiter of free choice. The fact that free will pertains more to the will than to anything else, however, suggests that merit is accumulated mostly through the will.

The reason the philosophers, and presumably Aristotle, did not know about free choice or discuss it explicitly, the Summist argues, is that they did not concern themselves with the principle of merit and demerit before God. They knew about the power of choosing opposites, though they did not speak of it in terms of *liberum arbitrium*.¹²⁷ However, they did not know about the grace that makes free willing meritoriously possible.

With such words, the Summist introduces what would soon become one of the defining features of the Franciscan school: its voluntarism. As we have seen, all human beings on the early Franciscan view have an innate knowledge of the Highest Good that gives them equal access in principle to the knowledge of what is good to do and ultimately God. What determines whether that access is utilized is however the will to do so. According to the *Summa*, all human beings have in principle the

¹²³ Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, pp. 140–49: the *Summa Halensis* on free will.

¹²⁴ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2 (n. 398), p. 476.

¹²⁵ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2 (n. 398), Ad a, p. 476, citing Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 3.3.7, p. 476.

¹²⁶ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar3 (n. 392), Ad objecta 1–5, p. 470.

¹²⁷ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar4 (n. 401), Ad c, p. 478: 'Liberum arbitrium est potestas faciendi quodlibet aut potestas ad opposita.'

complete freedom to choose without any compulsion between good and evil. It is for this very reason that the choices they make to prefer the good are so rightly credited to them as meritorious.

A Metaphysics of Evil

The early Franciscan view that evil can vacillate between good and evil was not an isolated position. A broader metaphysics of evil runs throughout the *Summa Halensis*, which derives mostly from Alexander of Hales. As Oleg Bychkov has shown, Alexander was the pioneer of a quite remarkable position that evil contributes to the beauty of the universe by throwing the good into greater relief.¹²⁸ He did this in sharp contrast to Peter Lombard before him, who insisted that God did not want evil to exist or to emerge, and to Albert the Great, who strongly opposed his position.¹²⁹

In addition to what Bychkov describes as the ‘aesthetic value’ of evil, early Franciscans regarded evil as essential to free choice, insofar as freedom and merit are only attained when there are two legitimate options to choose from: good and evil. As we have seen, evil only exists because human beings are created from nothing and can alternate for this reason between the good God intended for them, and its opposite, namely, evil.¹³⁰ The reason God is not responsible for evil, on this showing, is that he is only the cause of the good in which he originally created humans, albeit with the power to will the opposite of the good, namely, evil, to their own merit or demerit.¹³¹

For obvious reasons, this position resulted in the attribution of some kind of substantiality to evil, against the grain of the previous Western tradition, which was dominated by the idea that evil is not strictly speaking ‘something’ but an absence of the good. This is certainly a view to which the *Summa* pays lip service, not least through quotations to the major proponents of the theory, including Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Isidore of Seville, and Gregory the Great.¹³² All of these thinkers deny that evil is a substance and treat it as a privation of the good.

In a radical departure from the tradition, however, the *Summa* tries to create a space for a positive conception of evil by distinguishing between three different ways of defining a being, in terms of *esse rationis*, *esse naturae*, and *esse moris*. In

¹²⁸ Oleg Bychkov, ‘*Decor ex praesentia mali: Aesthetic Explanations of Evil in Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought*,’ *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 68:1 (2001), pp. 250–51 in pp. 245–69.

¹²⁹ Oleg Bychkov, ‘Aesthetic Explanations of Evil,’ p. 265.

¹³⁰ *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q3, M1, C3 (n. 5), Respondeo, p. 11; cf. C5 (n. 7), Respondeo, p. 13: ‘Liberum arbitrium est principium omnis mali culpabilis.’ [‘Free will is the beginning of all culpable evil.’]

¹³¹ *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q3, M2 (n. 8), Respondeo 1–2, p. 14.

¹³² *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Ad 1–10, p. 2.

the first sense, something is an entity if there can be a correspondence between the thing and the mind. Here, evil is something because it deforms that in which it exists, namely, the human mind.¹³³ As regards *esse naturae*, moreover, evil is something, by virtue of the fact that it is diffused in the world through evil acts which are in fact ‘something’.¹³⁴

When talking about *esse moris*, the Summist admits that evil is not strictly speaking ‘something’, because *esse* in this sense refers to the order human beings have to God. Since evil persons lack this order, they do not possess *esse moris*. Although the human capacity or nature to serve the good and God remains despite these circumstances, it is reduced until they turn from sinful ways.¹³⁵ What is remarkable about this way of putting things is that it attributes substantiality to evil in the very areas where previous generations of Christian thinkers in the West refused to do so.

For someone like Augustine, evil thoughts (*esse rationis*) and evil actions (*esse naturae*) lacked substance precisely because they lacked the qualities that God intended human thoughts and acts to possess: they exhibited a deficiency in the good that reduced their quality as beings. In the view of the Summist, however, the thoughts and actions in question remain thoughts and actions, the reality of which needs to be recognized if they are to be considered legitimate objects of free choice per the *Summa*’s account of this topic above. The *Summa* allows that those who pursue evil contradict God’s design and so lack being in the sense of *esse moris*. This, however, is a heavily qualified way of describing evil as privation.

While the *Summa* acknowledges that the sinful human person is not living as they should be, it still admits by virtue of the categories of *esse rationis* and *esse naturae* that the evil acts or intents of the sinful person are nonetheless ‘something’. For all practical purposes, evil on this account is not a privation of the good but a positive reality which can be entertained by those who turn away from God. For this very reason, however, evil is something that God can incorporate into accomplishing the good, as Bychkov has shown. In summary, the very substantiality attributed to it by early Franciscans means that it is material that can be employed, whether by God or by good humans, to achieve his ends, at the impetus of the free will to do so.

133 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Respondeo, p. 2: ‘Est enim esse rationis, secundum quem modum quaecumque veritatem habent, id est adaequationem rei et intellectus dicuntur entia: secundum hunc modum malitia est, cum deformat illud in quo est.’

134 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Respondeo, p. 2: ‘Est etiam esse naturae: et secundum hunc modum, ratione eius quod substernitur malitiae, dicitur malum esse aliquid, ut mala actio ratione actionis dicitur esse aliquid.’

135 *SH* III, In1, Tr1, Q1 (n. 1), Respondeo, p. 2: ‘Est iterum esse moris, prout esse est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam.’

Nathalie Gorochov

Odo Rigaldus at the University of Paris (c.1220 – 48)

Abstract: This article is about Odo Rigaldus' stay at the University of Paris. Odo Rigaldus arrived in Paris around 1220 to study the liberal arts and then theology. He was already an advanced student of theology when he took the Franciscan habit like his master, Alexander of Hales, in 1236. Odo remained in Paris as a bachelor then master in theology until 1248. Throughout his years in Paris, he learned from other masters, participated in debates and disputationes, received academic training, studied alongside other students, and trained disciples in his turn. This article presents the training received by Odo Rigaldus, his intellectual activity within the university, as well as the social network which he established during his years in Paris, in order to shed light on the knowledge he acquired and on the clerics and the personalities with whom he was linked during these founding years and whom he met, in some cases, during his episcopate.

Only a few traces or references have come down to us relating to the time spent by Odo Rigaldus at the University of Paris. His name figures, among many others, in the Latin MS 15652 in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, which is a collection of *reportationes* or notes taken by an anonymous student during a course of study on the *Sentences* or on the Bible in Paris around 1240.¹ In 1242, with his master Alexander of Hales and two other bachelor students in theology, he composed the *Expositio regulae quatuor magistrorum super regulam fratrum minorum*.² A number of sermons from this period in Paris can also be identified.³ The Franciscan chronicler Salimbene offers these words in praise of Odo's authoritative status in Paris:

There was a brother [called Odo] Rigaldus of the order of Friars Minor and Archbishop of Rouen, who was one of the greatest clerics in the world. This consecrated master was from Paris and read theology for many years in the house of the friars. He was the greatest disputer and a popular preacher. He wrote a work on the *Sentences*. He was a friend of the King of France [St Louis] and even worked for him when he held the Archbishopric of Rouen. He was admired by many in

¹ M.D. Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers de l'université de Paris vers 1240: Description du manuscrit Paris, Bibl. nat. 15652,' *Etudes d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), pp. 11–39.

² *Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum Super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241–1242)*, ed. L. Oligier (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1950).

³ See below.

the Order of Friars Preachers as in the Order of Friars Minor, of whom he was a member and for whom he became a benefactor.⁴

Odo probably spent at least twenty years at the University of Paris. If one accepts that he was awarded his degree in theology in 1245, then he would have begun studying this subject as a ‘secular’ student around 1230, after some years studying the liberal arts in the 1220s. The theology programme of study was itself seemingly interminable – averaging fifteen years in length. Initially, Odo would have been enrolled in this course just as a student auditor, then, from perhaps 1235–38 – around which time he entered the Franciscan order – he would have been promoted to the level of bachelor, and subsequently, to master in theology.⁵

The present study will focus solely on the period spent by Odo Rigaldus at the University of Paris, placing it in a wider context, namely, that of the university environment in Paris which must have influenced him. Throughout these years, he listened to the masters there, participated in debates and *disputationes*, received academic training, studied alongside other students, and trained disciples in his turn. In considering this period, we need to examine the training Odo received, his intellectual activity within the university, as well as the social network which he established during his years in Paris. This will further our understanding of the knowledge he acquired and of the personalities with whom he forged links during these formative years, some of whom he would, in certain cases, encounter again during his episcopate.

Odo Rigaldus as a Student in Paris in the 1220s

The Intellectual Context

In all probability Odo began by studying the liberal arts, in the years 1220–25. Prior to 1229, teaching in the faculty of arts in Paris was limited essentially to grammar, logic and moral philosophy, as is testified by the writings authored by the masters

4 Salimbene of Parma, *Chronica*, ed. G. Scalia (Bari: G. Laterza, 1966), vol. II, p. 656: ‘Erat autem frater Rigaldus ex ordine fratrum minorum et Rotomagensis archiepiscopus et unus de maioribus clericis de mundo. Magister cathedratus fuit Parisius et multis annis legit theologiam in domo fratrum. Optimus disputator fuit gratosus sermocinator. Opus fecit super Sentencias. Amicus fuit regis Francie sancti Lodoici qui etiam laboravit pro eo ut archiepiscopatum Rotomagensem haberet. Ordinem fratrum predicatorum multum dilexit sicut et ordinem fratrum minorum, de quo erat et fuit eorum benefactor.’

5 P. Andrieu-Guitrancourt, in *L’archevêque Eudes Rigaud et la vie de l’Eglise au XIII^e siècle d’après le Regestrum Visitationum* (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sire, 1938), p. 18, presumes that he entered the Franciscan order in 1236.

of this time.⁶ The earliest known logician is John Pagus. Two of his works on logic survive, which reflect his teaching: the *Appelationes* and the *Rationes super predicamenta Aristotelis*.⁷ The little pedagogical treatise entitled *De disciplina scolarium*, possibly the work of the Englishman Elias of Trickingham, also designates logic as the principal discipline in the 1220s.⁸

As regards the teaching of grammar, the major figure was John of Garland, who composed some early works before 1229. His *Dictionarius*, from the early 1220s, offers a systematic explanation of words in common usage, and his *De triumphis Ecclesiae*, written in about 1230, is a hymn to crusade in which he refers to the strike in the University of Paris. The main body of his work dates from after 1232, when he returned to Paris following three years spent at Toulouse.⁹

Alongside the teaching of logic and grammar, certain masters of the liberal arts concerned themselves with moral philosophy, and with commentaries on the *Ethics*, the teaching of which had been authorized by the statutes of 1215. These writings reveal an indisputable connection between the teaching provided in arts and in theology, and they include allusions to the theological problems which were taught in this period.¹⁰

Teaching on the *libri naturales* of Aristotle remained very marginal in the 1220s, following a censure of his and related works in this area which was issued in 1210 and renewed in 1215.¹¹ Not long after, however, a number of masters turned their attention to the commentaries of Averroes, recently translated into Latin by Michel Scot.¹² Around 1225, by Gauthier's estimate, an anonymous Parisian master of arts

6 N. Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université: Les écoles de Paris d'Innocent III à Thomas d'Aquin (v. 1200 – v. 1245)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2012), pp. 381–93, and, more recently, some contributions to the collected volume, *Les débuts de l'enseignement à Paris (v. 1200 – v. 1245)*, eds. J. Verger and O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014).

7 A. de Libéra, 'Les Appelationes de Jean le Page,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 51 (1984), pp. 193–255; E. Franceschini, 'Giovanni Pigo: Le sue *Rationes super predicamenta Aristotelis* e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII,' *Sophia* 2 (1934), pp. 172–82, 329–50, 476–86.

8 Pseudo-Boèce: *De disciplina scolarium*, ed. O. Weijers (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

9 A. Grondeux, E. Marguin, 'L'œuvre grammaticale de Jean de Garlande (v. 1195–1272), auteur, réviseur, glosateur: Un bilan,' in *Histoire, Epistémologie, Langage* 21:1 (1999), pp. 133–63; E. Marguin-Hamon, *L'ars lectoria Ecclesie de Jean de Garlande: Une grammaire versifiée du XIII^e siècle et ses gloses* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 1–12; A. Grondeux, 'Le trivium à la faculté des arts de Paris avant 1245: Quelques questions méthodologiques,' in *Les débuts de l'enseignement*, eds. Verger and Weijers, pp. 65–76.

10 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 392–93.

11 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 276–88, 314–15; L. Bianchi, *Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'université de Paris* (Paris: Belles lettres, 1999), p. 57.

12 R.-A. Gauthier, 'Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier averroïsme,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 321–74.

composed a little treatise entitled *De anima et de potenciis suis*,¹³ which refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Averroes' commentary *On the Soul*. This proves that Michel Scot's Latin translation of Averroes was available from around this time in Paris. Apart from this brief treatise, the first quotation from Averroes in Paris is to be found in the *Gloss* of William of Auxerre on the *Anticlaudianus* of Alan of Lille (1220–25).¹⁴

All in all, very few Parisian masters were concerned with the study of Aristotle and Averroes before 1229. The censures of 1210 and 1215 – in addition to the absence of commentaries – almost entirely silenced any teaching in Paris of Aristotle's philosophy, with the exception of works long since permitted, and even recommended by the statutes of 1215, such as the books on logic. It is in this intellectual context that Odo Rigaldus would have studied in the faculty of arts in Paris.

Around 1230, he began to frequent the Parisian schools of theology and needed to attach himself to a particular master. On the one hand, there were the more elderly masters who had been active between 1216–29: Geoffrey of Poitiers, William of Auxerre, Boniface Clutinc, Guiard of Laon, Pierre Petit, Philip the Chancellor, Matthew of Scotland, Guido of Orchellis, William of Auvergne, Arnoul of La Pierre, John of Barastre, John Blund, Peter Bar, who, declining to be converted by the first mendicant friars, all remained seculars.¹⁵ On the other hand, there were the younger masters, and their students, who gained the *licencia docendi* between 1226–29 and who, in certain cases, did not hesitate to join the mendicants in the course of the following years: Alexander of Hales, Nicolas of Flavigny, Stephen Bérout, William of Durham, Hugh of St Cher.¹⁶

Among the aforementioned, certain names are particularly noteworthy. The *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre, written before 1223, enjoyed enormous success and conferred unparalleled prestige on its author. He stands as the pioneer of a new theology, considered as a science, which assimilated, albeit timidly, Aristotle's thinking.¹⁷ His colleague Philip the Chancellor is the author of another major theological work of the 1220s, namely, his *Summa de bono*, which he worked on before 1228 and which grew out of his teaching.¹⁸ It is indebted to the *Summa aurea*, but exhibits a more philosophical way of thinking, branching into metaphysics, psychology, and moral philosophy.

13 R.-A. Gauthier, 'Le traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225): Introduction et texte critique,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 3–55.

14 Gauthier, 'Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier averroïsme,' pp. 321–74.

15 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 383–84.

16 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 383–84.

17 M. Grabmann, *I divieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX* (Rome: Gregoriana, 1941), pp. 84–85; F. van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1991), p. 142; J. Longère, 'Guillaume d'Auxerre,' in *Dictionnaire des lettres françaises*, eds. G. Grente, G. Hasenohr, and M. Zink (Paris: Fayard, 1992), p. 608.

18 Philip the Chancellor, *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, 2 vols (Bern: Francke, 1984).

A third major intellectual figure in the faculty of theology in these same years was William of Auvergne, who is sometimes considered to be the first speculative theologian because of his copious use of Aristotle, notably in his *Magisteriale divina*, whose composition he embarked on in 1223–24.¹⁹ To these three French theologians one must add the Englishman Alexander of Hales, a master from 1225 or 1226 onwards, whose Gloss on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard dates from around 1225, between the *Summa* of William of Auxerre and the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor. Alexander of Hales was the first to write a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in the course of his magisterial *lectiones*. In his *Glossa*, theological sources predominate, among them the Bible and St Augustine, but Alexander also makes considerable use of Aristotle's writings on logic as well as his *libri naturales* (*On the Soul*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*).²⁰

Apart from the works of these four recognized masters, theological writings from the 1230s appear broadly oblivious to the movement towards philosophy.²¹ The majority of masters perpetuated the kind of theological teaching which prevailed in the time of Stephen Langton. It is as though, as a body, the Parisian theologians were attentive to the injunctions of the Papacy, both of Honorius III and then of Gregory IX (1227–41) who, promptly after his election, addressed a letter to the Parisian masters in theology to warn them against the improper use of philosophy, *Ancilla theologie*.²² His discourse is in agreement with that of contemporary theologians such as Guiard of Laon, who in a sermon from the 1220s accused theologians and masters of the arts of giving clandestine teaching on 'forbidden books'.²³ When they were not teaching, the Parisian masters of theology also delivered many sermons, following the pattern advocated by Peter the Chanter, to an audience of students who took notes in the form of *reportationes*.²⁴ Along with his fellow students, consequently, Odo Rigaldus was nourished by the preaching of these masters.

The Social Context

As a young secular student, Odo Rigaldus was immersed in an educational environment which he himself also represented, which was composed for the most part of

¹⁹ The most recent bibliography is the one compiled in *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne (†1249)*, ed. F. Morenzoni and J.-Y. Tilliette (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005).

²⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–57).

²¹ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 385–88.

²² Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 382.

²³ P.C. Boeren, *La vie et les œuvres de Guiard de Laon 1170–1248* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), p. 159.

²⁴ These all have an entry in J.B. Schneyer, *Repertorium der Lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350*, 11 vols (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969–80).

younger sons of the minor nobility.²⁵ In fact, Odo was the son of the lord of Courquetaine, who was based about ten kilometers from Brie-Comte-Robert, the site of the fortress of the Comte de Brie.²⁶ Odo's elder brother, Peter, inherited the fiefdom of Courquetaine, as Odo himself reports in his account, in several passages of the *Registrum*, which describes the brief periods he spent at Courquetaine, in the manor house of his brother. Within this minor nobility, which often showed little interest in scholarly culture and university studies, a few families became aware early on that a period of university study could help young clerics, who were of minor noble stock, to climb up the ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It is useful to remind ourselves of the social profile of Odo's fellow students, and particularly those he mixes with in the faculty of theology in the 1230s and 1240s. Of the ninety masters, bachelors, and students in theology surveyed for the period 1231–45, more than a third came from a noble background.²⁷ However, family ambition alone is not always a sufficient explanation for the departure of a younger son to university; such an ambition was often supported, sustained, and encouraged by a neighbouring prelate, who incited the young clerics of his diocese to go off and pursue a course of study.

On the benches of the university, the sons of squires and lords of the manor found themselves alongside clerics born into families of the high or very high nobility. Some were of illegitimate birth, for example Philip the Chancellor, son of an archdeacon of Paris related to the Nemours family, or Peter Charlot, who later became Bishop of Noyon, but who was the illegitimate son of king Philippe Auguste.²⁸ Among them too were clerics such as Guy of Bourbon, younger son of Archaubaud VI, Bourbon seigneur.²⁹ But the highest ranked nobles undoubtedly come from Italy: Fieschi, Visconti, Anagni. From the 12th century, the great Roman families, having become 'baronial' in the 13th century, and the families of counts from Liguria or Tuscany, sent several clerics to these schools from each generation, so as to ensure their rapid entry into the curia and a career adorned with benefices. In the second quarter of the 13th century, these noble families from Italy, particularly from Latium but also from northern and central communities, developed this characteristic tendency of supporting younger sons destined for the priesthood in further studies in Paris or Bologna.³⁰ Around 1230–40, consequently, ten or so nobles from very powerful Italian families attended the schools of theology.³¹

²⁵ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 485–508.

²⁶ As we learn from the *Registrum*: 'Apud Courquetainnes, in domo germane nostri, domini Petri Rigaudi, militis;' see T. Bonnin, *Registrum visitationum Archiepiscopi Rothomagensis* (Rouen: A. Le Brument, 1852), p. 313.

²⁷ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 494.

²⁸ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 496.

²⁹ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 497.

³⁰ P. Classen, 'La curia romana e le scuole di Francia nel secolo XII,' in *Le istituzioni della Societas Christiana dei secoli XI-XII: Papato, cardinalato, e episcopato* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1974),

Finally, there were all those English nobles, of varying levels of affluence, who come together in the schools of theology in Paris: either sons of barons, like Thomas of Cantilupe, son of William, second baron of Cantilupe, or of less powerful nobles, such as Alexander of Hales, whom Roger Bacon describes as very rich (*dives*).³² In England, the belief in ecclesiastical circles since the 12th century was that studies were advantageous in making progress in an ecclesiastical career, and so young nobles destined for the priesthood flocked to Paris and Bologna.³³

The Success of the Mendicant Orders

At the time when Odo was beginning his studies in theology, the students from the nobility were quite numerous and, if one is to believe Robert of Sorbon,³⁴ they appear to have been particularly receptive to the discourse of the mendicant friars, perhaps because they were more affluent, and thus more attracted than others to undergo voluntary poverty. The mendicant orders were indeed spectacularly successful from the beginning of the 1230s. The Order of Preachers was established in Paris by 1218, and Honorius III granted them a fundamental pastoral role in the university before they obtained their first chairs.³⁵

Likewise, he encouraged the installation of the Friars Minor, commending them warmly in a letter addressed to the archbishops of Sens and the Bishop of Paris in 1219. The first friary of the minors was situated at Saint-Denis³⁶ and numbered thirty or so friars in 1224, when the English master Haymo of Faversham,³⁷ his companion

pp. 432–36; P. Montaubin, *Le gouvernement par la grâce: La politique bénéficiaire des papes au XIII^e siècle dans la moitié nord de la France*, 2 vols, unpublished doctoral thesis (Paris: University of Paris, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 342–53.

31 For example, Federico Visconti, Hugues de Pise (Ugo de Fagiano), Ottobono Fieschi, Adénulfe d'Anagni, Jacques Savelli; see Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 497–98.

32 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 498–500.

33 J.W. Baldwin, 'Studium et Regnum: The Penetration of University Personnel into French and English Administration at the Turn of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,' *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 44 (1976), pp. 199–215; J. Barrow, 'Education and the Recruitment of Cathedral Canons in England and Germany (1100–1225),' *Viator* 20 (1989), pp. 117–37.

34 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 376. Robert of Sorbon's sermon is quoted in N. Bériou, *L'avènement des maîtres de la parole: la prédication à Paris au XIII^e siècle*, 2 vols (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 123–24.

35 Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 366–81.

36 F. de Sessevalle, *Histoire générale de l'ordre de Saint-François*, vol. 1 (Paris: Editions de la Revue d'histoire Franciscaine, 1935).

37 He became provincial Minister of England in 1239–40, then Minister General of the Franciscan order in 1240; see R.B. Brooke, *Early Franciscan Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 202ff.

Simon of Sandwich,³⁸ and two other masters of the arts joined the order. In the following months, they undertook to renovate a vast house called Vauvert, which the stricter Franciscans did not hesitate to criticize, but which collapsed just before they were able to move in.³⁹ It is possible that the Friars Minor may have rented a house in Paris, perhaps at the top of the Mount St Geneviève, prior to the completion of the great Convent of the Cordeliers of Paris near St Germain des Prés, where they took up residence in 1230 and remained until the French Revolution.⁴⁰ Their installation there was thanks to the Abbot of St Germain des Prés who gave them a plot of land, as well as to the unfailing support of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (1228–49).⁴¹ From 1230–34 onwards, the Friars Minor occupied a vast monastery, which grew progressively year by year, situated *extra muros*, all along the wall of Philip Augustus. Its vast church as completed about 1260, but it housed the tombs of masters from before 1240: Philip the Chancellor had his burial there in 1236,⁴² and Alexander of Hales in 1245.⁴³

While the conversions of masters to the religious orders remained few in number before the end of the 1220s, the vast majority of those converts are to be found among the youngest students, those in the arts, a point on which Jordan of Saxony congratulates himself in his letters to Diane of Andalo.⁴⁴ Odo Rigaldus, like the majority of masters in the arts, still held out, for some time, against joining a religious order.

Odo Rigaldus, Secular and Student of Theology (c.1230 – 36)

Two phases can be distinguished in the history of the schools of theology between 1230 and 1245: before 1236–38, the group of masters remained more or less identical to what it had been before the great strike, albeit shorn of the English masters. But then, from 1236–38 onward, significant renewals occurred, thanks to conversions. These two phases correspond to the two periods of Odo's theological studies: up

38 He became a reader in theology in the province of Saxony in 1228, according to the *Chronica Fratris Jordani*, ed. H. Boehmer (Paris: Fischbacher, 1908), pp. 52, 54, 58.

39 Thomas of Eccleston, *Tractatus de adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam*, ed. A.G. Little (Paris: Fischbacher, 1909), p. 47.

40 It grew rapidly, as has been shown by L. Beaumont-Maillet, *Le Grand Couvent des Cordeliers de Paris: étude historique et archéologique du XIIIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Champion, 1975).

41 E. Longpré, 'Guillaume d'Auvergne et l'école franciscaine de Paris,' *France Franciscaine* 5 (1922), pp. 426–31.

42 *Chronicum Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, vol. 21, ed. J.-D. Guigniaut and N. de Wailly (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1855), p. 618.

43 *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, eds. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols (Paris: Delalain Frères, 1889), vol. 1, pp. 186–87.

44 Jordan of Saxony, *Jordani de Saxonia epistulae*, ed. A. Walz (Rome: Apud Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1951); see, for example, letters XXXII, XL, XLII.

until 1236, he was a simple student, but thereafter, having become a Franciscan, he is attested as a bachelor.

The Schools of Theology 1231–c.1236: The Masters

In 1231, the theologians of the cathedral chapter of Paris, who had not gone into exile during the strike, continued their teaching in the cloister.⁴⁵ Besides William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris, who probably did no further teaching after his election (1228), the secular masters at the start of the 1230s include Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236),⁴⁶ canons Odo of Chateauroux (cardinal in 1244),⁴⁷ Guiard of Laon (Bishop of Cambrai in 1238),⁴⁸ Pierre Petit (chancellor in 1244),⁴⁹ and the Archdeacon of Paris, Stephen of Provins (d. c. 1250).⁵⁰ Beside the canons of Notre-Dame, the Dean of St Germain l'Auxerrois, Stephen Bérout, seems to have been active in the faculty of theology until his death (1243).⁵¹ Arnoul of La Pierre offered teaching in theology until his election to the bishopric of Amiens in 1236; Stephen of Cudot, who was elevated to the status of master in 1231, taught theology until he entered the Val des Ecoliers in the mid-1230s.⁵²

It is not impossible that William of Durham, a master in theology who had gone back to England in 1229, returned to teach in Paris between 1232 and 1235 after the strike. The other master of theology who left for England during the great strike was Alexander of Hales. He returned to teach in Paris in 1231 or 1232, despite having been endowed with several ecclesiastical benefices in England, including a prebend at St Paul's in London, a prebend at Lichfield and the archdeaconate of Coventry.⁵³ Having been settled in Paris for more than twenty years, this master, already highly reputed and with an excellent knowledge of the Capetian kingdom, was entrusted by King Henry III of England on 25 August 1235 with the mission of serving as his representative to King Louis IX to negotiate a truce. Already in his fifties, Alexander of

45 A.-L. Gabriel, 'Les écoles de la cathédrale de Notre-Dame et le commencement de l'université de Paris,' *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France* 50:147 (1964), pp. 73–98.

46 P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, 2 vols (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), vol. 1, pp. 282–84.

47 A. Charansonnet, 'Du Berry en Curie: la carrière du cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux (1190?–1273),' *Revue d'histoire de l'Eglise de France* 86 (2000), pp. 5–37.

48 Boeren, *La vie et les œuvres de Guiard de Laon*.

49 Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres*, vol. 1, p. 312.

50 Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres*, vol. 1, p. 303.

51 A. Molinier, *Obituaires de la province de Sens* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1902), vol. 1, pp. 446, 502, 794.

52 Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres*, vol. 1, p. 321; C. Guyon, *Les écoliers du Christ: L'ordre canonial du Val des Ecoliers 1201–1539* (Saint-Etienne: CERCOR, 1998), p. 523.

53 On William of Durham and Alexander of Hales, see Gorochof, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 462–64.

Hales seemed then close to the peak of his ecclesiastical career: in 1235, all he lacked was the rank of bishop.

Besides these ten secular schools whose masters, with the exception of Stephen of Cudot, were all in possession of their chairs by 1229, there were also, in the aftermath of the great strike, the two schools acquired by the Dominicans between 1229 and 1231: the school created by the Bishop of Paris for Roland of Cremona (1229), which he left to Hugh of St Cher on his departure to Toulouse, and the school of John of St Giles, which came into the possession of the Preachers when this secular master entered the order in 1230. Promoted to the rank of Prior Provincial in 1233, Hugh of St Cher was called on to travel, and he let his chair, sometimes called the 'chair of the French', to Stephen of Vénizy (1233–35), who is succeeded by Geoffrey of Bléneau (1235–42), while the other chair of the convent of St Jacques passed in 1233 to Gueric of St Quentin (1233–42), a pupil of John of St Giles who departed for Toulouse to replace Roland of Cremona who had returned to Italy.⁵⁴ In all, a dozen masters of theology, or maybe thirteen if, like Palémon Glorieux, one includes Peter of Bar, who preached in Paris between 1229 and 1231, but who is otherwise not attested as a master. In 1229, therefore, a dozen schools of theology, rather than sixteen or seventeen, and these masters of theology, all originated from the kingdom of France, with the exception of two Englishmen, William of Durham and Alexander of Hales, after the departure of John of St Giles.⁵⁵ Most probably, Odo Rigaldus studied under Alexander of Hales, as did John of La Rochelle and other fellow students, at a time when the theology faculty was in the throes of an important debate.

The Argument over Plurality of Benefices (1235–38)

In the course of the year 1235, all these masters of theology, both seculars and regulars, were called together by the Bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne, to debate the plurality of benefices.⁵⁶ This was an argument which caused disturbance in the theological schools between 1235 and 1238. The austere bishop sought to oppose the practice of accumulating benefices, which he condemned in a treatise entitled *De collatione beneficiorum* where he inveighs against those who do so in the most vehe-

⁵⁴ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 464.

⁵⁵ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 464.

⁵⁶ As the Dominican Thomas de Cantimpré testifies in a passage of *Bonum universale de apibus*, ed. Denifle in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. I, pp. 157–58; see also C. de Miramon, 'La place d'Hugues de Saint-Cher dans les débats sur la pluralité des bénéfices (1230–1240),' in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (†1263): Bibliste et théologien*, eds. L.-J. Bataillon, G. Dahan, and P.-M. Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 341–86.

ment terms.⁵⁷ The stance adopted by the Bishop of Paris must be seen in the context of a debate whose origins go back some two or three decades to the development of pluralism itself, and which became one of the main debates troubling the church in the 13th century.

At the time, everyone ended up taking one side or the other in the argument.⁵⁸ In sermons from the year 1230 – 31, for example, several masters criticized the plurality of benefices as well as the clerics who, in the hope of climbing the social ladder, prolonged their studies repeatedly, abandoning their flock to the care of incompetent curates.⁵⁹ Guiard of Laon was one of the first, alongside William of Auvergne, to preach against the accumulation of benefices. John of St Giles, Odo of Châteauroux, and some unnamed Dominicans also preached against this practice in the weeks following. Theirs represented a kind of coordinated attack, launched using the same arsenal of weapons, that is, the same biblical references, from one sermon to the next.

Both in France and in England, in contested episcopal elections, the controversy over accumulation was even invoked as a reason to reject a particular candidate, and no one could afford to ignore this debate, nor the pontifical stance on pluralism.⁶⁰ William of Auvergne thus aroused a long and solemn dispute in which the masters, with the exception of Philip the Chancellor and Arnoul of La Pierre, took a stand against the pluralism of benefices. They ruled that there can be no possible salvation for any holder of two benefices, either one of which yields a revenue of fifteen *livres parisis* or more, and that this verdict must be disseminated by the masters within their schools. In 1238, William of Auvergne once more called together the masters of theology and renewed this verdict, condemning the accumulation of benefices. According to Thomas of Cantimpré, who was apparently present at the debate, the Bishop of Paris had emerged victorious as early as 1235, since the majority of the masters, with the exception of two, had declared themselves opposed to such pluralism.

These university debates on the pluralism of benefices, along with the verdict of the Bishop of Paris promulgated in 1235 and renewed in 1238, had an impact both within the University of Paris and also beyond the limits of the university environment. At the French royal court, for instance, King Louis IX himself began to apply this principle of non-accumulation, according to the chronicler Geoffrey of Beaulieu.⁶¹ In 1237, moreover, the debate crossed the Channel, where it was brought to England by the legate Otton of Tonengo, who, in the Council which he convened in London in November 1237, fully intended to have drafted lengthy reforming statutes,

57 William of Auvergne, *De collatione beneficiorum, Opera Omnia* (Paris-Orléans: Lacaille, 1671), vol. 2, p. 248 – 60; see also N. Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris (1228 – 1249): Sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris: A. Picard, 1880), pp. 28 – 39.

58 Gorochoy, *Naissance de l'université*, pp. 465 – 79.

59 Bériou, *L'avènement des maîtres de la parole*, pp. 122, 159. Eudes de Châteauroux is also an avowed opponent of the accumulation of benefices.

60 C. de Miramon, 'La place d'Hugues de Saint-Cher dans les débats.'

61 Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris*, pp. 28 – 39.

including the prohibition of the accumulation of benefices and the sharing of prebends.⁶²

At the request of several prelates, however, the legate shifted to a more moderate position. The restraint shown by legate Otton was also due to the fact that the English reforming prelates who opposed pluralism had little to say at the Council of London, as was the case with Edmond, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, who was apparently unwell at the time of the Council.⁶³ So it is that, in both the university and the diocese of Paris, and on the other side of the channel, despite divisions of opinion among the clergy, the accumulation of ecclesiastical benefices was increasingly frowned upon. Through sermons, *disputationes*, and councils, opposition to pluralism found insistent expression in both university debates and in ecclesiastical legislation. Could 'pluralist' clerics continue to ignore the criticisms and threats of damnation emerging from Paris, London, Oxford and the Curia? This atmosphere had the effect of spurring the masters and their bachelor students into resigning some of their benefices, or even renouncing them entirely to enter the ranks of the canon regulars. Conversions increased in number between 1236 and 1238. For his part, Odo Rigaldus chose to join the Franciscans.

Odo Rigaldus as Franciscan, Bachelor, and Master of Theology (c.1236 – 48)

The Conversion of Odo and Others after the Debate on the Plurality of Benefices

Among the most renowned cases of conversion, two of the most conspicuous Parisian masters at that time, Alexander of Hales, master of theology, and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, master of arts, chose to join the Friars Minor in Paris, in the period between 1236 and 1238. These dates coincide strikingly with the debate on pluralism. Alexander of Hales took several of his pupils with him following his conversion, notably Odo Rigaldus, who had up to that point remained a secular student, and who himself took the Franciscan habit shortly after his master, in the same year 1236.⁶⁴ A few years later, Bonaventure decided to enter the Franciscan order, reportedly out of admiration for his old master Alexander of Hales, and this was also the case for the theology graduate Raoul of Corbrigge.⁶⁵

⁶² D.M. Williamson, 'Some Aspects of the Legation of Cardinal Otto in England, 1237–1241,' *English Historical Review* 64 (1949), pp. 145–73.

⁶³ Williamson, 'Some Aspects of the Legation of Cardinal Otto in England,' p. 162.

⁶⁴ Andrieu-Guitrancourt, *L'archevêque Eudes Rigaud*, p. 18.

⁶⁵ A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to 1500*, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. 1, p. 484.

Upon joining the order in 1236, Alexander of Hales became the second master of theology in Paris to join the mendicants, following John of St Giles in 1230.⁶⁶ Although Alexander's decision to join the order was partly due to an admiration for Franciscan spirituality, it is impossible to say whether he was also motivated by a desire to leave behind the complex situation as regards benefices, which were frowned upon by the ecclesiastical authorities, or perhaps by an inclination often found in elderly clerics to end their days in a monastic community. Be that as it may, his conversion in 1236 gave the Friars Minor a chair in theology in Paris and marked the inauguration of a 'Franciscan school' for disciples of St Francis wishing to study theology.

Further conversions occurred in schools of theology other than that of Odo Rigaldus, and these too were perhaps linked to the climate of hostility towards the accumulation of benefices. Stephen of Cudot, master of theology from 1230/31, left the schools at the end of the 1230s to join the Val des Ecoliers.⁶⁷ The conversion of Richard Rufus of Cornwall was another that cannot have passed unnoticed in Parisian school circles. By the time he joined the Franciscans in Paris in 1238, less than two years after Alexander of Hales and Odo Rigaldus, Richard Rufus was a renowned master, a pioneer in the teaching of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle in Paris.⁶⁸

In England, at exactly the same time, the conversions of some very highly-placed clerics in the episcopal hierarchy must have had an impact on their contemporaries. The rising opposition to pluralism, accompanied by forceful encouragements to resign benefices for which residence was not a requirement, pressured masters and students, including ambitious and well-supported clerics, to devote themselves fully to pastoral duties in a single benefice, unless they entered the Franciscan order.

⁶⁶ Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford*, vol. 3, p. 2180.

⁶⁷ See Molinier, *Obituaires de la province de Sens*, vol. 1, pp. 446, 502, 794.

⁶⁸ The life and works of Richard Rufus have given rise to an extensive bibliography and debate, both as regards the chronology of his writings and their attribution. P. Raeds, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), adds to knowledge about Richard Rufus, but questions the authenticity of Rufus' commentary on the *Metaphysics*. On this point, he has been criticized by T. Noone, 'Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Authorship of the *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*,' *Franciscan Studies* 49 (1989), pp. 55–91, and also by R. Wood, who demonstrated the ground-breaking nature of Rufus' teaching on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* in Paris before 1238, in particular in *Richard Rufus of Cornwall*, *In Physicam Aristotelis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The British Academy, 2003). The entry which Emden, at an earlier date, devoted to Rufus in *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford*, vol. 3, pp. 1604–5, gives an incorrect date for his conversion.

The Schools of Theology (1236–45)

After 1236–38, following the disturbances provoked by the debate over the plurality of benefices, a change took place amongst the masters of theology in Paris. Alexander of Hales pursued his teaching in the convent of the Friars Minor. When, nine years later, on 15 August 1245, Alexander died in Paris, the passing of this renowned master of theology had a very wide impact.⁶⁹ The masters of theology active in the years 1235–45 included the seculars Aymeric of Veyre, Peter of Lamballe, Gauthier of Château-Thierry, Stephen of Poligny, Jacques of Dinant, and John Pagus, and after 1245, Raoul of Montdidier, William of Cramaut, Peter the Archbishop, and Adam of Pouzoles. To these should perhaps be added the name of Raoul of Corbrigge, assuming that he was already a master when, influenced by Alexander of Hales, he joined the Franciscans between 1240 and 1245.⁷⁰ Teaching at the convent of St Jacques were Geoffrey of Bléneau, Laurent of Fougères and William of Etampes, holders of the first Dominican chair, and Gueric of St Quentin and Albert the Great, holders of the second chair.⁷¹ At the Franciscan convent, Alexander of Hales may have passed his chair on to his disciple John of La Rochelle in 1238, who was succeeded by Odo Rigaldus, who gained the status of master in 1245.⁷²

Almost all these names are to be found in the Latin MS 15652 in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, within the notes taken down by an anonymous student in the course of lessons on the *Sentences* or the Bible, which were delivered in Paris around 1240. This studious author seems to have taken notes for two or three years in succession.⁷³ These *reportationes*, all in the same hand, occupy folios 32–80 and 81–109 of the manuscript, which also contains notebooks in other formats and by other hands. These notes taken down from lessons given by bachelor students of the *Sentences* are followed, in folios 110–221, by notes similarly constructed from the lessons given by masters on the Bible.

In the view of M.-D. Chenu, despite some differences in format, the collection is manifestly homogeneous in nature and offers an account of various commentaries by masters of the Bible.⁷⁴ These notes naturally reflect the forms of teaching current in the theology faculty in the early 1240s, with commentary on the Bible by the masters and commentary on the *Sentences* by the bachelors, a demarcation which was beginning to become established. The manuscript also includes *reportationes* on questions, in particular in folios 11–13 and 107–9. This manuscript and works written in this same period shed light on the conditions in which this literature was born, and allow us to identify the masters, often accompanied by disciples, who drew

⁶⁹ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 479.

⁷⁰ Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 479.

⁷¹ Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie*, vol. 1, pp. 42–82.

⁷² Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers.'

⁷³ Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers.'

⁷⁴ Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers.'

up the major works. The name of Odo Rigaldus appears on folio 32, where the scribe has noted down the ‘introitus’, i.e. his first lesson as a bachelor on the *Sentences*, a text which remains unpublished to this day.

Odo Rigaldus in the School of Alexander of Hales: The ‘Scholastic Workshop’

In the years of 1236–45, Odo Rigaldus was a member of the school, which gathered around the master ‘mourned by the whole university,’⁷⁵ Alexander of Hales, a secular until 1236 and then a Franciscan from 1236 to 1245. Even before the great strike, the bachelor Alexander of Hales had composed commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard,⁷⁶ inaugurating a form of teaching which was to become more common from the 1240s onwards, and which became the preserve of bachelors. The teaching of Alexander of Hales, enshrined in the form of theological questions, is relatively little known, in particular, the questions following his conversion.⁷⁷ Until 1236, the assumption was that this secular master enjoyed a great reputation and that he attracted many pupils.

Within Alexander’s circle of pupils, alongside Odo Rigaldus, was John of La Rochelle, who joined the Friars Minor around 1230. After obtaining his ‘licence’ degree in theology, John of La Rochelle seems to have headed a second Franciscan school from 1238 to 1245, unless in fact he took over the chair of Alexander, who apparently did not undertake regular teaching after 1238; opinions vary on this point.⁷⁸ What is definite, however, is the major role which John played in the composition of the *Summa Halensis*, which was for a long time attributed to Alexander of Hales alone. Many publications have shown that the first and third parts of the *Summa*, begun around 1240, are from the hand of John of La Rochelle rather than exclusively that of Alexander, and that the second part was written by another, unnamed, disci-

⁷⁵ John of Garlande, *De triumphis Ecclesie*, cited in Gorochoff, *Naissance de l’université*, p. 479.

⁷⁶ This text was only discovered in 1945; see F.-M. Henquin, ‘Le commentaire d’Alexandre de Halès sur les *Sentences* enfin retrouvé,’ in *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, vol. 2 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1946), pp. 359–82.

⁷⁷ Only the questions preceding his conversion have been published: Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae “Antequam esset frater”*, 3 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960).

⁷⁸ The existence of a second Franciscan school is the subject of discussion in several articles. For instance, according to H. Felder (‘Les franciscains ont-ils eu deux écoles universitaires à Paris de 1238 à 1253?’ *Etudes Franciscaines* 25 [1911], pp. 598–613), Alexander of Hales obtained a second chair for the benefit of his pupil John of La Rochelle. P. Glorieux (*Répertoire des maîtres en théologie*, vol. 2, p. 25) takes a different view, that John of La Rochelle obtained Alexander of Hales’ chair in about 1238.

ple.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, these two authors make abundant use of the writings of Alexander, sometimes to present his doctrine and at other times to contradict it.⁸⁰

The second author of the *Summa*, a Parisian Franciscan from the 1240s, has not been definitively identified, and a series of names have been proposed as possibilities: Robert of La Bassée, Bertrand of Bayonne, John of Parma, or Odo of Rosny, all of whom were students of theology in the convent of the Friars Minor between 1230 and 1245.⁸¹ Specialists have declined to detect in the opening parts the hand of the Englishman William of Melitona, another of Alexander's pupils, who was however given official responsibility for the completion of the fourth volume of *Summa* on the sacraments in 1256.⁸² According to Salimbene, John of Parma offered a commentary on the *Sentences* when he was a bachelor, dating to around 1240, probably under the authority of Alexander of Hales.⁸³ He then went on to teach at Bologna and Naples, before being promoted to Minister General of the Order in 1247. Shortly before 1245, Bonaventure came to Paris to study theology, and presumably was a pupil of Alexander of Hales; he did not become a bachelor until 1248.

Alain Boureau invented the term 'scholastic workshop' to describe the school of Alexander of Hales, a workshop based on the principle of a division of labor according to the skills each had acquired. In the case of the *Summa*, there is no feature which serves to distinguish the various authors, who have only been identified by specialists patiently scrutinizing the text.⁸⁴ A further collective work prepared in 1242 in the 'scholastic workshop' around Alexander of Hales was the *Expositio regule quattuor magistrorum*, published under Alexander's own name, and the names of those who were no doubt his three closest disciples, John of La Rochelle (master), Odo Rigaldus and Robert of La Bassée (both bachelors).⁸⁵

F.-M. Henquinet emphasized years ago the influence which Odo Rigaldus exercised, not only on Franciscan students such as Bonaventure, Odo de Rosny, and Adam of Pouzzoles, who were studying alongside him, but also on the Friars Preachers, such as Albert the Great, who had occasion to hear him or read his work.⁸⁶ The

79 F.-M. Henquinet, 'Frater Considerans, l'un des auteurs jumeaux de la *Summa Fratris Alexandri* primitive,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 15 (1948), pp. 76–96.

80 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48); see the *Prolegomena* in volume IV.

81 In his article, 'Frater Considerans, l'un des auteurs jumeaux de la *Summa Fratris Alexandri* primitive,' F.-M. Henquinet suggests instead the name of Robert de La Bassée.

82 R. Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), pp. 789–91.

83 Salimbene, *Chronica*, vol. 1, p. 434.

84 A. Boureau, *L'empire du livre: Pour une histoire du savoir scolastique, 1200–1380* (Paris: Belles lettres, 2007), p. 41; also V. Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II *Summae Fratris Alexandri*,' in *Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1948).

85 *Expositio*, ed. Oligier.

86 F.-M. Henquinet, 'Les manuscrits et l'influence des écrits théologiques d'Eudes Rigaud O.F.M.' *Revue de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11 (1939), pp. 324–50.

passage from the *Chronique* of Salimbene similarly lays bare the close relations between the preachers and minor theologians at the time of Odo's tenure of the office of Regent (1245–48).⁸⁷

Theological Teaching and Preaching in the Period 1231–45

From the 1230s onward, there was an upsurge in preaching in the University of Paris, closely linked to the teaching of theology.⁸⁸ In addition to their lectures and 'scholastic workshops', Odo Rigaldus and his fellow students and masters probably devoted a considerable proportion of their time to this activity. Increased opportunities for preaching also came with the introduction of the 'collation' or afternoon sermon, which added further commitments to an already heavy preaching schedule. Between 1230 and 1245, sermons were more or less equally shared between seculars and mendicants, as the masters of theology in Paris continued to be very active preachers in this period.

Whether seculars or mendicants, Parisian theologians practiced as a matter of course the new art of preaching, the *sermo modernus*, which is already attested in the first third of the 13th century and which flourished after 1230–31, as Nicole Bériou has shown in her research.⁸⁹ The many *Artes predicandi* written by the Parisian masters now emphasized the task of composition, based on subdividing and expanding on the theme. On Sundays and feast-days, students could regularly listen to sermons given by masters or bachelors of theology, seculars or mendicants, which they could then take as models to emulate in other contexts.

The chronicler Salimbene powerfully underlines Odo Rigaldus' qualities as a preacher. Sources testify that he preached a hundred sermons, and yet, up until now, only eight extant sermon texts can be attributed to Odo Rigaldus with any certainty.⁹⁰ Of these eight, two might be said to originate from sermons preached in the University of Paris; one, unpublished, was delivered on the occasion of the feast of St Nicholas on 6 December 1242, when Odo was a bachelor student of the *Sentences*,⁹¹ while the other, undated, is a sermon for St Catherine.⁹² In all probability, it was to

⁸⁷ See the passage from Salimbene quoted at the beginning of this study.

⁸⁸ Bériou, *L'avènement des maîtres de la parole*, especially vol. 1, pp. 109–12 and pp. 147–214; L.-J. Bataillon, 'De la *lectio* à la *predicatio*: Commentaires bibliques et sermons au XIII^e siècle,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 70 (1986), pp. 559–74.

⁸⁹ Bériou, *L'avènement des maîtres de la parole*, vol. 1, p. 114.

⁹⁰ On the preaching of Odo Rigaldus in general, see S. Delmas, 'Eudes Rigaud prédicateur,' *Collectanea Franciscana* 83 (2013), pp. 1–12.

⁹¹ This is known from two manuscripts: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16502, fols 157r–158r, and Brussels, KBR, II, 1142, fol. 134, according to J.-B. Schneyer, *Repertorium*, vol. IV, p. 511.

⁹² J.-G. Bougerol, 'Un sermon inédit d'Eudes Rigaud,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 62 (1995), pp. 343–58.

the most talented bachelors and masters, including Odo, that the university entrusted the preaching for these two great feast days of the corporation.

Conclusion

The foregoing study inevitably casts more light on the milieu of the University of Paris in the years 1220–40 than it does on the personal career of Odo Rigaldus, which is very poorly documented. Nevertheless, what emerges is that Odo was a man of his time and that he held very much in common with his contemporaries. There is nothing to suggest that he had a particular interest in the newly available treatises of Aristotle, and he shows similar prudence in the face of the success of the mendicant orders among younger students in the schools. Odo was a secular student, and probably attached himself very early on to a secular master.

From the start of his studies in theology, that master may well have been Alexander of Hales, one of the most prominent masters in Paris around 1230. Later on, in 1236, their almost simultaneous choice to enter the Franciscan order seems like no mere coincidence, following as it does on the bitter debate over the plurality of benefices. This context however in no way precludes the spiritual dimension of their conversion. Many other examples can be found of such simultaneous conversions of masters and disciples.⁹³ After becoming a bachelor, Odo taught in the monastery of the Friars Minor, and participated in the collective works produced in the scholastic workshop, teaching the younger members, and Bonaventure in particular.

After his election as Archbishop of Rouen in 1248, Odo Rigaldus, who was trained at the highest levels in liberal arts and in theology, did not break from his previous life as a master of theology in the monastery of the Friars Minor. He retained a strong memory of his former masters and fellow students whose names appear occasionally in the *Regestrum*. One such name is that of Thomas Hélié of Biville, who studied theology at the same time as Odo Rigaldus, between 1230 and 1240, and to whose tomb Archbishop Odo went to pay his respects in 1266.⁹⁴ Among those closest to him include former Parisian masters who, by chance or by design, obtained a prebend in Rouen.⁹⁵ The history of these networks of relationships forged in the schools of Paris in the 13th century still remains to be written.

⁹³ N. Gorochov, 'Les écoles et les relations entre maîtres et étudiants dans l'université de Paris au XIII^e siècle,' in *L'enseignement supérieur dans les mondes antiques et médiévaux*, ed. H. Hugonard-Roche (Paris: Vrin, 2008), pp. 43–68.

⁹⁴ Bonnin, *Registrum*, p. 555.

⁹⁵ For example, see Gui of Bourbon, fellow student of Odo Rigaldus, who was canon and dean of the cathedral chapter at Rouen when Odo was archbishop, in the early 1260s; see Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université*, p. 497.

Alexander Fidora

The Talmud in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The Christian discovery of the Babylonian Talmud is a significant landmark in the long and complex history of anti-Jewish polemic. In 1239 the pope wrote to kings and bishops across Europe requesting them to confiscate and examine the manuscripts of the Talmud in their territories. He was particularly concerned with the Talmud's status as an *alia lex*, which challenged the traditional account of the Jews as witnesses of the old law. As a result, a trial against the Talmud was staged in Paris in 1240 and Jewish books were put in flames at the Place de la Grève in 1241/42. In this historical and doctrinal context, the *Summa Halensis* is particularly important, for it offers one of the very few, if not the only attempt at a systematic reappraisal of the Augustinian doctrine in the light of the Christian discovery of the Talmud and its purported status as another law.¹

Introduction

While the Talmudic corpus developed in the same period and context as early Christianity, the church fathers referred only occasionally to what they called the *deuterosis* of the Jews, that is, their second teaching.² It was not until the early medieval period that Christians started showing more interest in the Talmud, one of the first Christian figures to address it being the 9th-century Carolingian bishop Agobard of Lyon, who mentioned it in a letter he wrote to Emperor Louis the Pious.³ He was followed, in the 12th century, by Peter Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable, who both criticized various rabbinic teachings as anthropomorphic and irrational.⁴

Full awareness of the Talmud among Christian authors arose in the late 1230s when the Jewish convert Nicholas Donin submitted a Latin anthology of Talmudic fragments to Pope Gregory IX. Donin's translation, also known as the Thirty-Five Articles against the Talmud, was to have an enormous impact on the Christian attitude

1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) / ERC Grant agreement n° 613694 (Consolidator Grant: 'The Latin Talmud').

2 See Carlos del Valle Rodríguez, 'Los primeros contactos de la Iglesia con el Talmud: El significado de la deuterosis,' in *The Words of a Wise Man's Mouth are Gracious* (Qoh 10,12): *Festschrift for Günter Stemberger on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, ed. Mauro Perani (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), pp. 299–308.

3 See, e.g. Agobard's *De iudaicis superstitionibus*, 10, with allusions to Berakhot, Avodah Zarah and others; *Opera omnia*, ed. Lieven van Acker, CCCM 52 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), pp. 205–6.

4 See the useful survey of Talmudic passages in Peter Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable's works by Manfred Kniewasser, 'Die antijüdische Polemik des Petrus Alfonsi (getauft 1106) und des Abtes Petrus Venerabilis von Cluny (d. 1156),' *Kairos* 22 (1980), pp. 34–76.

towards Judaism. In 1239 the pope wrote to kings and bishops across Europe urging them to seize and examine manuscripts of the Talmud in their dominions, as a result of which a process against the Talmud took place in Paris in 1240.⁵ Although the Talmud was condemned and went up in flames at the Place de la Grève in 1241/42, the controversy about the Talmud continued over the following years, since Gregory's successor, Pope Innocent IV, called for a revision of its condemnation. At the center of this revision are the *Extractiones de Talmud*, a Latin translation of 1922 passages from the Babylonian Talmud prepared in 1245 for Odo of Châteauroux, Papal Legate in France, that served as the basis for the final condemnation of the Talmud in May 1248.⁶

The texts surrounding this infamous controversy have survived in several manuscripts, the most complete of which – though not the original – is MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16558. This manuscript offers a comprehensive 'dossier' on the Talmud affair, its first part containing the *Extractiones de Talmud*, and the second part including Nicholas Donin's Thirty-Five Articles against the Talmud along with further materials.⁷ Though scholars have been dealing with this dossier for more than 130 years, critical editions of the documents have been prepared only recently.⁸

5 Daniela Müller has claimed that Alexander of Hales took part in the trial; there is, however, no evidence for this in any of the documents. Daniela Müller, 'Die Pariser Verfahren gegen den Talmud von 1240 und 1248 im Kontext von Papsttum und französischem Königtum,' in *Interaction between Judaism and Christianity in History, Religion, Art and Literature*, ed. Marcel Poorthuis, Joshua Schwartz and Joseph Turner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 181–99, on p. 186.

6 It is worth noting that one of Alexander of Hales' disciples, namely William of Melitona, was among the signatories of this final condemnation. For the document and the list of signatories, see Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain, *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*, 4 vols (Paris: Delalain, 1889–97), 1:209–11. The theologians and masters of law in this list have been identified in Nathalie Gorochov, *Naissance de l'Université: Les écoles de Paris d'Innocent III à Thomas d'Aquin (v. 1200-v. 1245)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2012), pp. 535, 544–45.

7 For a detailed analysis of the contents of this manuscript and its textual layers, see Óscar de la Cruz, 'El estadio textual de las *Extractiones de Talmud* en el BnF ms. lat 16558,' in *Studies on the Latin Talmud*, ed. Ulisse Cecini and Eulàlia Vernet (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2017), pp. 23–44.

8 A critical edition of the *Extractiones* has been published by Ulisse Cecini and Óscar de la Cruz in the CCCM series: *Extractiones de Talmud per ordinem sequentialem* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018). A critical edition of Nicholas Donin's Thirty-Five Articles has been published by Piero Capelli, 'De articulis litterarum Papae: A Critical Edition,' in *The Talmud in Dispute During the High Middle Ages*, eds. Alexander Fidora and Görgé K. Hasselhoff (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2019), pp. 29–57; it replaces the 19th-century edition by Isidore Loeb, which was based on a single manuscript: 'La controverse de 1240 sur le Talmud,' *Revue des études juives* 1 (1880), pp. 247–61; 2 (1881), pp. 248–70; 3 (1881), pp. 39–57, edition in no. 2, pp. 253–70, and no. 3, pp. 39–54.

The Talmud as a New Law

The discovery of the Talmud, which considerably broadened Christian knowledge about Judaism, had a direct influence on perceptions of the Jews. It changed the assessment of their legal status and ultimately led to their becoming qualified as heretics. Already in the 12th century, shifts and changes in canon law can be noticed which degraded the legal position of the Jews, as for instance the reinterpretation in social and legal terms of the theological notion of perpetual serfdom of Jews *vis-à-vis* the Christians (the *servitus Iudaeorum*). Yet, it was not until the 13th century that the Jews were subjected to papal jurisdiction.⁹

From a theological point of view, the reason for this development may be summarized as follows: from the times of Augustine, the Jews were considered to be witnesses of Christian truth as contained in the Old Testament, which Jews and Christians likewise venerate as True Word of God. Although the Jews did not embrace the new Law, they were to be tolerated as long as they would not depart from the old one. In a famous passage from book 18 of *De civitate Dei*, Augustine summarizes his views on the toleration of the Jews as follows:

But the Jews who slew him, and would not believe in him (...), were yet more miserably wasted by the Romans, and utterly rooted out from their kingdom, where aliens had already ruled over them, and were dispersed through the lands (so that indeed there is no place where they are not), and are thus by their own Scriptures a testimony to us that we have not forged the prophecies about Christ. (...) For us, indeed, those suffice which are quoted from the books of our enemies, to whom we make our acknowledgement, on account of this testimony which, in spite of themselves, they contribute by their possession of these books, while they themselves are dispersed among all nations, wherever the Church of Christ is spread abroad. For a prophecy about this thing was sent before in the Psalms, which they also read, where it is written: 'My God, his mercy shall prevent me. My God hath shown me concerning mine enemies, that Thou shalt not slay them, lest they should at last forget Thy law: disperse them in Thy might' (Ps. 58:11–12). (...) Therefore God has shown the Church in her enemies the Jews the grace of His compassion (...); he has not slain them, that is, he has not let the knowledge that they are Jews be lost in them, although they have been conquered by the Romans, lest they should forget the law of God, and their testimony should be of no avail in this matter of which we treat. But it was not enough that he should say: 'Slay them not, lest they should at last forget Thy law,' unless he had also added: 'Disperse them;' because if they had only been in their own land with that testimony of the Scriptures, and not everywhere, certainly the Church which is everywhere could not have had them as witnesses among all nations to the prophecies which were sent before concerning Christ.¹⁰

⁹ See, among others, Christine Magin, *Wie es umb der juden recht stet': Der Status der Juden in spätmittelalterlichen Rechtsbüchern* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1999), pp. 21–26.

¹⁰ Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods, George Wilson and J. J. Smith, 2 vols (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872), 2:277–79. Latin text in Augustine, *De civitate Dei, libri XI–XXII*, ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alfons Kalb, CCSL 48 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), pp. 644–45: 'Iudaei autem, qui eum occiderunt et in eum credere noluerunt (...) vastati infeliciter a Romanis funditusque a suo regno, ubi iam eis alienigenae dominabantur, eradicati dispersique per terras (quando quidem ubique

The Augustinian account, which granted Jews the protection of the Church in their capacity as custodians of the Old Law and witnesses to the new one, was radically called into question when Nicholas Donin approached Pope Gregory in 1238/9 with his Thirty-Five Articles against the Talmud. The tremendous challenge that the Talmud posed to the Christian world is put in a nutshell by Pope Gregory's immediate reaction to these accusations, namely the letter he addressed on 9 June 1239 to the Archbishops of France:

If the things that are asserted about the Jews residing in the Kingdom of France and other provinces are true, there would be no adequate or fitting punishment for them. For not content, as we have heard [from Nicholas Donin], with the Old Law, which the Lord gave in writing through Moses, indeed completely neglecting the same, they maintain that the Lord also proclaimed another law, which is called Talmud, i.e. teaching; and they falsely claim that it was passed on orally to Moses.¹¹

From this letter it is evident that the pope's concern did not refer so much to the specific content of the Talmud, but rather to its alleged status as another law, a law which not only complemented but probably also superseded the old one. This law

non desunt) per scripturas suas testimonio nobis sunt prophetias nos non finxisse de Christo. (...) Nobis quidem illae sufficiunt quae de nostrorum inimicorum codicibus proferuntur, quos agnoscimus propter hoc testimonium, quod nobis inviti perhibent eosdem codices habendo atque servando, per omnes gentes etiam ipsos esse dispersos, quaque verum Christi ecclesia dilatatur. Nam prophetia in psalmis, quos legunt etiam, de cordia eius praeveniet me: "Deus meus demonstravit mihi in inimicis meis, ne occideris eos, ne quando obliviscantur legem tuam; disperge eos in virtute tua." (...) Et ideo non eos occidit, id est non in eis perdidit quod sunt Iudaei, quamvis a Romanis fuerint devicti et oppressi, ne obliti legem Dei ad hoc, de quo agimus, testimonium nihil valerent. Ideo parum fuit, ut diceret: "Ne occideris eos, ne quando obliviscantur legem tuam," nisi adderet etiam: "Disperge eos;" quoniam si cum isto testimonio scripturarum in sua tantummodo terra, non ubique essent, profecto ecclesia, quae ubique est, eos prophetiarum, quae de Christo premissae sunt, testes in omnibus gentibus habere non posset.' For an analysis of Augustine's posture, see Jeremy Cohen, 'Slay Them Not: Augustine and the Jews in Modern Scholarship,' *Medieval Encounters* 4:1 (1998), pp. 78–92, and more detailed Paula Fredriksen, *Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 290–352.

11 Translation in *The Trial of the Talmud: Paris, 1240*, eds. John Friedman, Jean Connell Hoff and Robert Chazan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012), pp. 93–94. Latin text in Solomon Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth Century: Vol. I: A Study of Their Relations During the Years 1198–1254, Based on the Papal Letters and the Conciliar Decrees of the Period* (New York: Hermon Press, 1966), p. 240: 'Si vera sunt, quae de Iudaeis in regno Franciae, et aliis provinciis commorantibus asseruntur, nulla de ipsis esset poena sufficiens, sive digna; ipsi enim sicut accepimus, lege veteri, quam Dominus per Moysen in scriptis edidit, non contenti, immo penitus praetermittentes eadem, affirmant legem aliam, quae Talmud, id est Doctrina, dicitur, Dominum edidisse ac verbo Moysi traditam.' The suspicion which the pope raises in his letter is based on the first accusation that Nicholas Donin levelled in his anthology against the Talmud, i.e. that 'the Jews claim that the Lord gave the Law which is called the Talmud' (Friedman, Connell Hoff and Chazan, *The Trial of the Talmud*, p. 102).

was neither *lex vetus* nor *lex nova*, but, as the text has it, a *lex alia*, revealed by God to Moses.

Gregory's approach represents a completely new take on the Talmud. When the church fathers considered the 'second teachings' of the Jews among which they included the Talmud, they qualified this unwritten extra-biblical tradition as a collection of fables and tales.¹² Later, in the 12th century, Peter Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable did use the term '*lex*' in their polemical discussions of other religions, but they consistently avoided applying this term to the Talmud. While Peter Alfonsi speaks of a '*lex Moysi*', which refers to the Hebrew Bible, a '*lex Christianorum*', namely the New Law of the Gospels, and even a '*lex Sarracenorum*', that is the Quran, the Talmud is never referred to as a law, but always as a doctrine (*doctrina* or *liber doctrinarum*). The same is true for Peter the Venerable, who is the first to mention the Talmud by name in Latin literature, which he describes likewise as a doctrine, which, following Jerome and Augustine, he considers to be full of irrational fables.¹³

Addressing the Talmud as a new law, which undermines the old one and thus severely compromises the Jews' function as witnesses of the Christian truth, was a hard blow for the Augustinian paradigm. For, if the Jews were to forget their law, to use Augustine's words, the Psalms' imperative 'Slay them not, lest my people forget' became pointless and the Jews lost their *raison d'être*. Based on Donin's accusations against the Talmud, Pope Gregory thus made a new and momentous claim when qualifying the Talmud as an *alia lex*, one which was to have far-reaching consequences. To start with, it was this claim, much more than the purported blasphemies of the Talmud, which prompted the pope to order the investigation of the Talmud that led to its condemnation first in 1240 and again in 1248, after the translation of large portions of the Talmud in the monumental *Extractiones de Talmud*.

¹² See the passages from St Jerome and St Augustine analyzed in del Valle Rodríguez, 'Los primeros contactos de la Iglesia con el Talmud,' esp. pp. 300–4.

¹³ This has been discussed in more detail by Matthias M. Tischler, '*Lex Mahometi*: The Authority of a Pattern of Religious Polemics,' *Journal of Transcultural Medieval Studies* 2:1 (2015), pp. 3–62, on pp. 13–19. See also the relevant passages in Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogus*, eds. Carmen Cardelle de Hartmann, Darko Senekovic, and Thomas Ziegler, German trans. Peter Stotz (Florence: SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2018), pp. 16 and 20, and Peter the Venerable, *Adversus Iudaeorum inveteratam duritiam*, ed. Yvonne Friedman, CCCM 58 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 125–26. Causing a certain confusion, Amos Funkenstein has credited Peter the Venerable with qualifying the Talmud as a Jewish equivalent to the New Testament, and hence as a different *nova lex*: Amos Funkenstein, 'Ha-temurot be-vikua'ah ha-dat she-beyn yehudim le-notzrim ba-me'ah ha-12 (Changes in the Patterns of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemic in the Twelfth Century),' *Zion: Quarterly for Research in Jewish History* 33:3–4 (1968), pp. 124–44, on p. 140. See, however, the objection by Jeremy Cohen, 'Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy: The Study and Evaluation of Judaism in European Christendom,' *The American Historical Review* 91:3 (1986), pp. 592–613, on p. 603, n. 30. Along similar lines, see Yvonne Friedman, 'Anti-Talmudic Invective from Peter the Venerable to Nicholas Donin (1144–1244),' in *Le brûlement du Talmud à Paris 1242–1244*, eds. Gilbert Dahan and Élie Nicolas (Paris: Cerf, 1999), pp. 171–89, on p. 174.

The *Summa Halensis*: Revisiting the Augustinian Model

In the historical and doctrinal context which I have presented until now, the *Summa Halensis* is particularly important, for it offers one of the very few, if not the only attempt at a systematic reappraisal of the Augustinian doctrine in the light of the Christian discovery of the Talmud and its purported status as an *alia lex*.

The *Summa Halensis* mentions the Talmud in its very first chapter of the Titulus dedicated to Jews and Pagans, ‘*De Iudaeis et Paganis*,’ which is usually dated around the year 1240, that is, after Donin’s Thirty-Five Articles against the Talmud from 1238/9, but before the Talmud’s burning in 1241 or 1242.¹⁴ The chapter, which asks whether the Jews should be tolerated, starts with three arguments to the negative:¹⁵

1. They blaspheme against Christ and against the Blessed Virgin; they take revenge on the Catholic faith; they do injury to the sacraments of the Church, as is indicated in the *Liber Extra, De Iudaeis, Etsi Iudaeos*. According to the Old Testament, blasphemers are to be punished to death (Lev. 24:16). Therefore Jews are not to be tolerated, but should be consigned to death, especially those who behave in this fashion.

2. Moreover, in their book which is called the Talmud, many statements are contained which relate to blasphemy of Christ and the Blessed Virgin. Since they observe this book as a law, they must be destroyed along with such books.

14 This dating is based on the fact that the *Summa* knows Donin’s Thirty-Five Articles, but refers to the burning of the Talmud as in the future. See Willibrord Lampen, ‘Alexander von Hales und der Antisemitismus,’ *Franziskanische Studien* 16 (1929), pp. 1–14, on p. 5, and idem, ‘Opinio Joannis de Rupella, O.F.M., quoad Iudaeos,’ *Studi Francescani* 28 (1931), pp. 208–11, on p. 208. It has been confirmed through internal evidence in the *Summa* by the Patres Editores; see their Prolegomena to vol. III, p. LIII, n. 16. For the dating of Nicholas Donin’s Thirty-Five Articles, see Alexander Fidora and Ulisse Cecini, ‘Nicholas Donin’s Thirty-Five Articles Against the Talmud: A Case of Collaborative Translation in Jewish-Christian Polemic,’ in ‘*Ex Oriente Lux*’: *Translating Words, Scripts and Styles in Medieval Mediterranean Society: Selected Papers*, eds. Charles Burnett and Pedro Mantas-España (Córdoba; London: Córdoba University Press, 2016), pp. 187–99, esp. pp. 190–91. For the chronology of the burning (or burnings?) of the Talmud, see Paul Lawrence Rose, ‘When Was the Talmud Burnt in Paris? A Critical Examination of the Christian and Jewish Sources and a New Dating. June 1241,’ *Journal of Jewish Studies* 62 (2011), pp. 324–39.

15 The chapter has been translated by Robert Chazan, whose translation I follow here and in what follows. Yet, I include several corrections, some of which change the tenor of the text significantly: Robert Chazan, *Church, State and Jew in the Middle Ages* (New York: Behrman House, 1980), pp. 44–46. See also his very insightful analysis of the chapter, which reconstructs the historical development of its anti-Jewish arguments, in Robert Chazan, *The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom: 1000–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 44–51. In addition, see the classical chapter on Alexander of Hales in Jacob Guttman, *Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und zur jüdischen Literatur* (Breslau: M. & H. Marcus, 1902), pp. 32–46. Less illuminating are the notes on Alexander and the Jews in Luca Parisoli, *La ‘Summa fratris Alexandri’ e la nascita della filosofia politica francescana: Riflessioni dall’ontologia delle norme alla vita sociale* (Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 2008), pp. 65–80.

3. Also, Christians persecute to the death those pagans who hold the Holy Land. However, contempt of the redeemer is a greater injury. Therefore Christians ought to persecute to the death those who perpetrate such contempt. That they exhibit such contempt is revealed through that which is said in *Liber Extra, De Iudaeis, In Nonnullis*.¹⁶

Arguments 1 and 3, which have been discussed in more detail by Robert Chazan,¹⁷ explicitly refer to the *Liber Extra*, that is, Gregory IX's *Decretales*, the authoritative compilation of canon law by Ramon of Penyafort, which the pope had sent to the Masters of the University of Paris only a few years before the Talmud trial, namely in 1234.¹⁸ This is certainly no coincidence, but reflects the increasing concern with the legal status of the Jews that also contributed to the juridification of the Talmud affair during the 1240s.

Argument 2 targets the Talmud. It not only accuses the Talmud of blasphemies against Christ and the Virgin, both of which play a prominent role in Nicholas Domin's Thirty-Five Articles against the Talmud,¹⁹ but interestingly enough it echoes Pope Gregory IX's words when applying the term *lex* to the Talmud. To determine the exact meaning of this reference, it is important to briefly consider the Latin text: *Cum ergo doctrinam illius libri quasi legem observent, simul cum libris huiusmodi sunt disperdendi*.

Robert Chazan translated the sentence this way: 'Since they [i.e. the Jews] must observe the doctrine of this book [i.e. the Talmud] as law, they along with these books should be dispersed.'²⁰ Although Chazan was followed in his rendering by other scholars, such as Jeremy Cohen,²¹ I believe that their reading is misleading, not only because the text has '*disperdendi*' and not '*dispergendi*', that is to say,

16 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, T2, M1, C1 (n. 740), p. 729: '1. Blasphemant enim et contra Christum et contra B. Virginem, persequuntur etiam fidem catholicam, sacramentis etiam ecclesiasticis faciunt iniuriam, sicut habetur *Extra, De Iudaeis, Etsi Iudaeos*. Blasphemi autem secundum Legem etiam Veterem erant morti tradendi; ergo et Iudaei non sunt tolerandi, sed morti exponendi, maxime qui sic se habent. – 2. Praeterea, in libro eorum, qui dicitur Talmud, plura continebantur, quae ad blasphemiam Christi et B. Virginis pertinebant; cum ergo doctrinam illius libri quasi legem observent, simul cum libris huiusmodi sunt disperdendi. – 3. Item, Christiani persequuntur paganos usque ad mortem, qui sunt detentores Terrae Sanctae; sed amplior iniuria est contumelia Redemptoris; ergo perpetrantes huiusmodi contumeliam persequi debent Christiani usque ad mortem; non ergo sunt tolerandi. – Quod autem contumeliam ingerant, patet per hoc quod dicitur *Extra, De Iudaeis, In nonnullis*.'

17 See Chazan, *The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom: 1000–1500*, pp. 44–51.

18 For the texts quoted, i.e. Pope Innocent III's bull *Etsi Iudaeos* (1205) and the Fourth Lateran Council's *In nonnullis* (1215), see *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, eds. Emil Friedberg, 2 vols (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879–81), 2:775–77.

19 On the particular role of blasphemies concerning the Virgin, see William Chester Jordan, 'Marian Devotion and the Talmud Trial of 1240,' in *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, eds. Bernard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992), pp. 61–76.

20 Chazan, *Church, State and Jew in the Middle Ages*, p. 44.

21 See Cohen, 'Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy,' p. 608, n. 43.

they should be destroyed, not dispersed along with the Talmud; but more importantly, because the sentence does not express the idea of the Talmud as a constitutive part of Judaism. The subjunctive in the first clause (*'observent'*) is due to the *cum causale*, it does not express any kind of necessity. Instead, what the text comes to say is: 'Since they [i. e. the Jews] observe the doctrine of this book [i. e. the Talmud] as a law, they must be destroyed along with such books.' The difference may seem minor, but is important: according to Chazan and Cohen's reading, the Talmud is presented as an indispensable part of Judaism, which it certainly is, that *must* be followed. However, the *Summa* makes no such essentialist claim, but limits itself to report facts, namely that the Jews do observe the Talmud as a law. Depending on how much weight one is willing to put on the particle 'quasi' (*quasi legem observent*), one may even translate: that the Jews 'observe the Talmud as if it were a law.'

Such a more descriptive account receives further support from the logic of the *Summa's* argument, which is not about what the Talmud is but about how it is observed. Pope Gregory IX's main concern with the Talmud was that, as a new law, it threatened the Old Law. It is important to note that the *Summa* passes over Gregory's concern that the Talmud as an *alia lex* would eclipse the Old Law. In effect, the *Summa's* argument is much less concerned with the Talmud as such than with blasphemy, wherever it occurs, including the Talmud. In this context, the idea of the Talmud as a *lex* is less of a theological problem regarding the essence of the Talmud than a practical concern: the problem for the *Summa* is that the Talmud is full of blasphemy and must therefore be destroyed. That the Jews follow it as if it was a law is not a different problem, as it was for Gregory, but a simple extension of the former; for in following the Talmud so strictly, as if it was a law, the Jews sustain its blasphemies and hence must be punished, like the Talmud.

That the *Summa* does not target the Talmud as an alternative to the Old Law, which jeopardizes the latter's observance, becomes manifest when considering the *Summa's* three arguments in favor of tolerating the Jews, which come next:

a. [It seems to the contrary] through that which is said in Psalms 'Slay them not' (Ps. 58:12). In regard to this the Gloss says: 'This may be applied particularly to the Jews. The Psalmist beseeches, lest the Jews utterly disappear. Rather they were dispersed so that they might be invited to conversion. This Psalmist also prays on their behalf, saying 'Slay them not,' those who killed me. Rather let the Jewish people remain with the sign of circumcision.' Therefore they are to be tolerated.

b. Also testimony taken from the adversaries is the very best. The Catholic Church takes testimony from the Old Testament, which the Jews observe. To the end that the Catholic Church may have testimony from its enemies, the Jews are to be tolerated. For from the Old Testament, namely from the Law of Moses and the Prophets, testimony is taken concerning Christ which the Jews are unable to negate.

c. Also in Isaiah 10:22, it is indicated that a ‘remnant’ of Israel ‘shall turn again.’ Similarly the Apostle, in Romans 11:5. Now remnants cannot be saved, unless the seed of the Jews remains. Therefore the seed of the Jews must be preserved. Therefore the Jews must be tolerated.²²

Argument b) unambiguously contends that the Jews still observe the Old Law, in spite of the Talmud: *Ecclesia catholica sumit testimonium a Veteri Lege, quam observant Iudaei* [‘The Catholic Church takes testimony from the Old Testament, which the Jews observe’]. On the *Summa*’s view, the Jews have by no means abandoned the Old Law and embraced, instead, a new one, namely the Talmud, as Pope Gregory IX reckoned. Rather, the Jews continue observing the Old Law and therefore continue to qualify as witnesses of the Christian truth. The Talmud indeed poses a problem because of its content, which is said to be blasphemous, and because of its strict observance by the Jews, who consequently appropriate and reproduce its blasphemous content. But the Talmud as such is not conceived of as a serious theological complement or even alternative that could enter into conflict with the Old Testament and therefore represent an obstacle to the Jews’ observance of the Hebrew Bible. This is why the *Summa* can eventually reaffirm the Augustinian position on the toleration of the Jews, which it does basing itself on Peter Lombard’s commentary on the Psalms as the source for the arguments provided under paragraphs a) and b). Through Peter Lombard’s influential commentary, Augustine’s interpretation of Psalm 58:12: ‘Slay them not’ is recovered, in order that the Jews and their foundational texts can once more be martialed in evidence as the living witness of the ultimate Christian truths.²³

The *Summa*’s attempt to reconcile the new charges against the Jews and the Talmud with the traditional Augustinian approach required some refinement and concessions. This becomes manifest in the replies to the initial arguments against the toleration of the Jews:

²² *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, T2, M1, C1 (n. 740), p. 729: ‘a. Per hoc quod dicitur in Psalmo, super illud: “Ne occidas eos,” Glossa: “Hoc de Iudaeis specialiter potest accipi; precatur, ne Iudaei funditus pereant: dispersi quidem sunt, ut ad conversionem provocentur; orat etiam pro eis, dicens: ‘Ne occidas eos,’ qui me occiderunt, sed maneat gens Iudaeorum cum signo circumcisionis.” Ergo tolerandi sunt. – b. Item, fortius est testimonium quod ab adversariis accipitur; sed Ecclesia catholica sumit testimonium a Veteri Lege, quam observant Iudaei; ad hoc ergo quod Ecclesia catholica ab inimicis habeat testimonium, tolerandi sunt Iudaei: a Lege enim Veteri, scilicet a Lege Moysi et Prophetis, accipitur testimonium de Christo, quod negare non possunt. – c. Item, Is. 10:22 habetur quod “reliquiae” Israel “salvae fient;” et similiter dicit Apostolus, Rom. 11:5; reliquiae autem salvari non possent nisi semen Iudaeorum maneret; salvandum est ergo semen Iudaeorum; tolerandi ergo sunt Iudaei.’

²³ See Augustine and Peter Lombard on Psalm 58: Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos LI-C*, eds. Eligius Dekkers and Jean Fraipont, CCSL 39 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), pp. 743–44, and Peter Lombard, *Commentarium in Psalmos*, PL 191 (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1854), cols 545–46. On Peter Lombard’s Augustinian account on the toleration of the Jews and its influence on Alexander of Hales, see also Jack Watt, ‘Parisian Theologians and the Jews: Peter Lombard and Peter Cantor,’ in *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff*, eds. Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), pp. 55–76.

1. To the objection it must be said in rebuttal that, although they perpetrate blasphemy, they believe that they do not sin thereby, since they believe that the messiah has not yet come. In this they err and are consigned to future damnation, unless they recover their senses. As is said in Psalms: 'I shall pay them out' (Ps. 40:11). In regard to this the Gloss says: 'In the present, they shall be dispersed; in the future, they shall be damned.' If, however, they persist in open blasphemy, they must be coerced by the secular rulers, as is indicated in *Liber Extra, De Iudaeis, In Nonnullis Provinciis*, where it is said: 'We most especially forbid anyone to dare to break forth into insults against the Redeemer. Since we cannot shut our eyes to insults heaped upon Him Who washed away our sins, we decree that such presumptuous persons shall be duly restrained by fitting punishment meted out by the secular rulers, so that none dare blaspheme against him who was crucified for our sake.'

2. To the second objection, it must be said that their books, in which blasphemies are contained, are to be burned. If they tenaciously persist in blasphemy and are convicted before a tribunal, they are to be punished with a fitting penalty. It is different, if they blaspheme secretly.

3. To the third objection, it must be said that the issue concerning those pagans holding the Holy Land is different from that concerning the Jews. Christians persecute those pagans as unjust holders of the Holy Land and as violators of a sacred place, to the injury of Christ. Jews, however, are allowed for many reasons to live and dwell among Christians. This is so, since we have received the Old Testament from the Jews, since Christ came from their seed, since the promise of their salvation when 'the Gentiles have been admitted in full strength' (Rom. 11:25) has been made. Therefore, if they transgress openly against Christ, they are to be coerced by the proper punishment. It does not seem that they should be spared punishment in cases of open sins any more than evil Christians.²⁴

The second paragraph replies to the argument concerning the blasphemous content of the Talmud and the need to destroy it as well as to punish those men and women who subscribe to its purportedly blasphemous doctrines. Here, the *Summa* introduces an important distinction which is present throughout the above three para-

24 *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, T2, M1, C1 (n. 740), pp. 729–30: '1. Ad obiectum autem in contrarium dicendum est quod, licet blasphemiam perpetrent, credunt tamen se non in hoc delinquere, eo quod nondum credunt Messiam venisse, et in hoc errant et reservantur ad futuram damnationem nisi resipiscant, sicut dicitur super illud Psalmi: "Retribuam eis," Glossa: "In praesenti, ut dispergantur; in futuro, ut damnentur." Si tamen persistent in blasphemia manifesta, coercendi essent per principes saeculares, sicut habetur in *Extra, De Iudaeis, In nonnullis provinciis*, ubi dicitur: "Districtissime prohibemus ne in contumeliam Creatoris prosilire praesumant; et quoniam illius non debemus dissimulare opprobrium, qui probra nostra delevit, praecipimus praesumptores huiusmodi per principes saeculares dignae animadversionis adiectione compesci, ne Crucifixum pro nobis aliquatenus blasphemare praesumant." – 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod libri eorum, in quibus huiusmodi blasphemiae continentur, comburendi sunt; ipsi vero, si pertinaciter in huiusmodi blasphemia persistent, coram iudice convicti, digna poena sunt puniendi. Secus autem est, si occulte blasphemant. – 3. Ad tertium vero dicendum quod alia est ratio de ipsis paganis detentoribus Terrae Sanctae et de ipsis Iudaeis. Persequuntur enim Christiani ipsos paganos tamquam iniustos detentores et sacri loci violatores in iniuriam Christi; Iudaei vero multiplici ratione permittuntur vivere et inter Christianos commorari, tum propter hoc quod a Iudaeis Legem Veterem accepimus, tum quia de semine illo venit Christus, tum quia facta est promissio salutis eorum, cum "plenitudo gentium intraverit." Unde, si delinquant manifeste in Christum, debita animadversione sunt coercendi; nec videtur eis magis parcendum in delictis manifestis quam Christianis malis.'

graphs, though it has not received sufficient attention: namely that of open or public (*manifeste*) blasphemy on the one hand and secret or private (*occulte*) blasphemy on the other. Thus, the *Summa* concludes that the Talmud must indeed be burned and also shall those persons be condemned and punished who stick to its blasphemies. Yet, the *Summa* adds an important proviso: *Secus autem est, si occulte blasphemant*, which Chazan very unfortunately translated as: ‘The same is the case if they blaspheme secretly,’²⁵ though it means in fact the exact the opposite: ‘It is different, if they blaspheme secretly.’

The same idea is also present in the first of the three replies. Drawing again on Augustinian motives from Peter Lombard’s commentary on the Psalms and Pope Gregory’s *Liber Extra*,²⁶ the *Summa* restricts punishment for anti-Christian blasphemies among the Jews to cases which occur openly, i.e. in the public sphere, not in private. In the same vein, the refutation of the third argument contends that *manifest* transgressions against Christ must be punished likewise among Jews and Christians. With regard to the ensuing penal action, it is worth noting that both the first and the third argument imply that law enforcement belongs to the secular powers.²⁷

On the whole, the *Summa Halensis* arrives at a fragile equilibrium between the Augustinian approach and Pope Gregory’s much more aggressive posture. Key for this equilibrium is the *Summa*’s very conscious choice of its proof texts, namely Peter Lombard’s commentary on Psalms, which must be considered an up-to-date version of the Augustinian model, and Pope Gregory’s *Liber Extra*. Balancing these sources, the *Summa Halensis* clearly tries to avoid or at least to mitigate the serious consequences that the accusation of the Talmud as an *alia lex* would have only a few years later.

Consequences: The Talmud, Heresy and Papal Jurisdiction

While it may sound paradoxical, it was the Christian discovery of an exclusively Jewish law, that is, the Talmud, which eventually legitimized the Jews’ subjection under Christian law and papal jurisdiction, for the reason that their departure from the Old Testament due to their *alia lex* made them heretics. While Pope Gregory IX did not say so expressly, his focus on the Talmud as an *alia lex* was part of a strategy that aimed

²⁵ Chazan, *Church, State and Jew in the Middle Ages*, p. 46.

²⁶ See Peter Lombard, *Commentarium in Psalmos*, col. 413 and *In nonnullis* in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 2:776–77.

²⁷ Cf. the first argument’s ‘praecipimus praesumptores huiusmodi per principes saeculares dignae animadversionis adiectione compesci’ which is echoed by ‘si delinquant manifeste in Christum, debita animadversione sunt coercendi.’ As indicated, this principle goes back to *In nonnullis*.

at further extending his jurisdiction over heretics with the goal of including the Jews in these measures.²⁸

An explicit corroboration of this connection between the discovery of the Talmud and the claim for universal papal jurisdiction over Jews as heretics can be found in Pope Innocent IV's commentary on Gregory's *Liber Extra*. In this text from the 1240s, we read (X.3.34.8) that the pope

can judge the Jews if they act against the law in moral issues, and are not punished by their leaders; and also if they are found guilty of heresy with regard to their own law. And this was the reason why Pope Gregory and Pope Innocent were moved to order the burning of the Talmud in which there are many heresies and to punish those who followed or taught these heresies.²⁹

Innocent not only argues that the Talmud makes the Jews depart from their law, namely the Old Testament, but – based on this claim – he establishes a direct relation between the Talmud and heresy: Jews who follow the doctrines of the Talmud or teach them are to be considered heretics, and it is eventually as such that they can be judged by the Church.

This position is very different to the *Summa*'s. To the question whether the Church can judge the Jews, one of the ensuing chapters of '*De Iudaeis et Paganis*' replies by quoting Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 5:12, according to which the Church cannot judge those who are not part of its community:

The Church is not entitled to 'judge those who stand outside of it' by imposing spiritual chastisement or religious rules on them; it can, however, impose temporal and spiritual chastisement on them in an indirect manner, namely by removing Christians from their company.³⁰

The *Summa* dismisses any form of direct jurisdiction over the Jews. What it concedes is an indirect jurisdiction over the Jews, known as the *iudicium Iudaeorum*. This form of Church jurisdiction consists in forbidding Christians any dealings with Jews, thus marginalizing the latter and aggravating their social and economic condition. While this form of jurisdiction, which was introduced at the end of the 12th century, had

²⁸ For a similar view, see Joel E. Rembaum, 'The Talmud and the Popes: Reflections on the Talmud Trials of the 1240s,' *Viator* 13 (1982), pp. 203–23, on pp. 211–12.

²⁹ Quoted from Benjamin Z. Kedar, 'Canon Law and the Burning of the Talmud,' *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* n.s. 79 (1979), pp. 79–82, who shows that the printed editions are not reliable for this passage. The Latin text from the manuscripts reads as follows (p. 80): 'Item Iudaeos potest iudicare papa si contra legem faciant in moralibus, si eorum praelati eos non puniant et eodem modo si haereses contra suam legem inveniant, et hac ratione motus papa Gregorius et Innocentius mandaverunt comburi libros talmuth in quibus multae continebantur haereses et mandavit puniri illos qui praedictas haereses sequerentur vel docerent.'

³⁰ *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, T2, M2, C1 (n. 745), p. 733: 'Non est Ecclesiae "iudicare" eos "qui foris sunt," ut poenam spiritualem eis infligat vel regulas religionis imponat; potest autem poenas temporales eos infligere vel spiritualem indirecte, removendo Christianos ab eorum communione.'

severe consequences for the Jews, it must be clearly distinguished from the pretension of direct jurisdiction over Jews pursued by Gregory IX and Innocent IV.³¹ Whereas Gregory IX and Innocent IV present the Talmud as another law which makes the Jews become heretics and hence subject to direct Church jurisdiction, for the *Summa* there are no legitimate reasons for extending the legal competences of the Church beyond the limits of the traditional *iudicium Iudaeorum*.

Conclusion

From what has been said, the *Summa's* insistence on the Talmud's blasphemy appears to be anything but accidental. It seems as if the *Summa* tried to concentrate all the charges against the Talmud in particular and the Jews in general on blasphemy precisely in order to attenuate the theological and probably also the legal consequences of the Talmud affair. To phrase the charges against the Talmud and further accusations against the Jews in terms of the rather traditional vocabulary of blasphemous practices and to limit their prosecution to the public sphere was a way to deal with the conflict within the established theoretical and institutional framework. From this more conservative perspective, it was neither required nor desirable to alter the status of the Jews as witnesses of the Christian truth and to stigmatize them as heretics instead – a shift of paradigm which would cause much harm to Christian-Jewish relations.

Notwithstanding the *Summa's* attempt to uphold and refine the Augustinian model of toleration, in the second half of the 13th century Jews were definitely represented as heretics,³² giving way to such radical anti-Jewish attitudes as that of Berthold of Regensburg (d.c.1272), who wrote in one of his very popular German sermons:

They have become heretics (...) making a book which is called Talmud. This is altogether heretical, and it contains so condemnable heresies that it is evil that they exist.³³

³¹ See Magin, 'Wie es umb der juden recht stet': *Der Status der Juden in spätmittelalterlichen Rechtsbüchern*, pp. 23–24.

³² The legitimation of papal jurisdiction over Jews by means of their representation as heretics would play a central role also in the 14th century. See Claudia Heimann, 'Nicolaus Eymerich OP: Der Inquisitor und die Juden im Aragon des 14. Jahrhunderts,' in *Dominikaner und Juden/Dominicans and Jews: Personen, Konflikte und Perspektiven vom 13. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert/Personalities, Conflicts, and Perspectives from the 13th to the 20th Century*, eds. Elias H. Füllenbach OP and Gianfranco Miletto (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), pp. 135–54.

³³ Berthold of Regensburg, *Vollständige Ausgabe seiner deutschen Predigten*, eds. Franz Pfeiffer and Josef Strobl, 2 vols (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1862–86), 1:401: 'Sie sint ze ketzern worden (...) unde habent ein buoch gemachet, daz heizet dalmut. Daz ist allez sament ketzerie, unde dâ stêt sô verfluochtiu ketzerie an, daz daz übel ist daz sie lebent.'

At the end of the 13th century, the Psalms' appeal 'Slay them not,' which is the cornerstone of both Augustine's and the *Summa's* account on toleration of the Jews, had expired: the Talmudic Jew had eventually become a heretic who was to be eradicated.³⁴

³⁴ See also Alexander Patschovsky, 'Der 'Talmudjude': Vom mittelalterlichen Ursprung eines neuzeitlichen Themas,' *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, Beiheft 13 (1992), pp. 14–27.

Part II: The Legacy of the *Summa Halensis*

Jacob W. Wood

It's Not Just about Anselm: Aquinas' *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1 and Early Franciscan Illumination Theory

Abstract: Although Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 2, a. 1, appears to be a straightforward discussion of Anselm's *Proslogion*, ch. 2–3, a study of theologians from the preceding decades suggests that the text is also, and perhaps principally, a deliberate contribution to a conversation that was taking place among Franciscan theologians in the 1240s–50s about how to reconcile theories of divine illumination emerging at Oxford and Paris in the 1220s–30s. On the basis of his own highly particularized understanding of divine illumination, which centers on how concupiscentia causes fallen human persons to lose access to the illumination of the possible intellect, Aquinas criticizes Bonaventure and the *Summa Halensis* for arguing that God's existence is naturally known prior to demonstration, by drawing upon Richard Rufus' earlier criticism of *Proslogion* 2 as well as a modified version of the *Summa Halensis*' argument that God can be naturally known as the object of desire. Read in this context, q. 2, a. 1 can be seen as a deliberate attempt to place the beginning of theology within the broader context of 13th-century divine illumination theory, and to identify the starting point for the fallen intellect in knowing and naming God.

Thomas Aquinas' *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1 ('whether God's existence is *per se notum*') is customarily presented as a straightforward discussion of Anselm's *Proslogion*.¹ There are good grounds for this reading: something akin to Anselm's argument from *Proslogion* 2 is presented in objection 2, and Aquinas cites Anselm himself directly in earlier discussions of the topic.² But the very fact that Aquinas does not cite Anselm by name in this text should give us pause before interpreting the text solely as a discussion of Anselm. No one would wish to deny that the consideration of Anselm is *necessary* for a proper understanding of Aquinas' text. But one might reasonably ask whether the consideration of Anselm is *sufficient*, or whether a more complete under-

1 For the texts of Thomas Aquinas, I will be relying on the Leonine edition, unless otherwise noted: Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII*, 50 vols (Rome; Paris: Commissio Leonina, 1882–). References to the Leonine edition will be abbreviated 'Leon'. For the text of *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1, see Leon., 4:27–28.

2 See *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, ar. 2, obj. 4, in Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, vol. 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), p. 93; *De veritate*, q. 10, ar. 12, co. and ad s.c. 1 (Leon., 22:340, 342); *De Trinitate*, pt. 1, q. 1, ar. 3, ad 6 (Leon., 50:88); and *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.10–11, in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, *Editio Leonina Manualis* (Rome: Apud sedem Commissionis Leoninae, 1934), pp. 8–9.

standing of the text also requires the consideration of the reception history of Anselm in the mid-13th century.

This chapter will outline the conversation about Anselm's *Proslogion* that took place among theologians at Oxford and Paris in the mid-13th century, and suggest how Aquinas' *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1 may be connected to it. In the first part, I will trace the development of two branches of divine illumination theory: that of Robert Grosseteste at Oxford, and that of John of La Rochelle at Paris. In the second and third, I will examine the introduction of language from Anselm's *Proslogion* into the discussion of Paris illumination theory in the *Commentary on the Sentences* of Odo Rigaldus, as well as the critical reception of both Oxford and Paris illumination theories in the *Summa Halensis*, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure. In the fourth and fifth, I will document the ways in which Aquinas accepts elements of both Oxford and Paris illumination theories into his understanding of the Creation, Fall, and Redemption of the human intellect, and show how Aquinas' *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1, can be read as a critical discussion and reception of early Franciscan illumination theory. Aquinas rejects Bonaventure's idea that God's existence is *per se notum* on logical grounds, as well as the common Franciscan idea that God's existence is habitually impressed upon the mind, but Aquinas does not therefore reject the early Franciscan illumination tradition altogether. Rather, Aquinas draws upon the *Summa Halensis* and Rufus to illustrate how the need to demonstrate God's existence is actually part of the structure divine illumination itself.

The Development of Oxford and Paris Illumination Theories: Robert Grosseteste and John of La Rochelle

The 1220s and early 1230s witnessed a radical shift in the scholastic understanding of our knowledge of God. While figures like William of Auxerre were giving the apophaticism of the long 12th century its characteristic shape,³ the period also witnessed what has been called the 'invention' of analogy,⁴ and the development of several different cataphatic approaches to knowing and naming God. One of the key figures in

³ On the apophaticism of equivocity during this period, see Louisa Valente, *Logique et théologie: Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008), pp. 74, 206–32; on the apophaticism of univocity, see Valente, *Logique et théologie*, pp. 234–57. William's *Summa aurea* was written between 1215–25. On its dating, see Walter Principe, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: PIMS, 1963), p. 158, n. 28.

⁴ Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suarez* (Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 8.

the development of mid-13th century cataphaticism was Robert Grosseteste.⁵ The impetus behind Grosseteste's work appears to have been an effort to harmonize the epistemology of divine illumination, which he received from the Augustinian tradition, with the epistemology of abstraction, which he found in Aristotle.⁶ The first place that we find expression of this 'Aristotelian-Augustinianism' is Grosseteste's *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*,⁷ which he wrote as a *magister artium* in the 1220s.⁸

In Grosseteste's work, knowledge and love are inseparably wed. Love has priority, but love does not surpass knowledge so much as it disposes us towards it.⁹ All things being equal, humanity would love God above creatures and that love would dispose us towards a direct illumination of the mind by God. But all things are not equal: sin has caused humanity to love the sensations and phantasms of the human body more than God. Consequently, sin has disposed us to know only those things which can be acquired through abstraction from the sensations and phantasms of the body.¹⁰ Knowledge acquired by abstraction is still dependent on God, but its dependence is indirect; Grosseteste thinks that God is the light in which the created order becomes intelligible to the fallen mind.¹¹

The indirect dependence of the fallen mind on divine light creates an analogical link between fallen knowledge and unfallen knowledge. When fallen knowledge alights on a created truth through abstraction, it ascends by an awakened desire through exemplar causality to know God as basis of that truth. The more this desire is healed by grace, the more the soul gradually ascends once more towards the direct knowledge of God for which it was created.¹² Formal exemplar causality thus opens to the mind a path from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of God. The

5 On Grosseteste's theological formation, see Joseph Goering, 'When and Where did Grosseteste Study Theology?' in *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on his Thought and Scholarship*, ed. James McEvoy (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), pp. 9–51.

6 There are many divergent readings of Grosseteste's *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*. I follow Christina van Dyke, 'An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*,' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17:4 (2009), pp. 685–704. For a summary of the divergent views of Grosseteste on this question, see *ibid.*, p. 686.

7 The text of the *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* can be found in Robert Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros*, ed. Pietro Rossi (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981). For the summary of Grosseteste that follows, I rely on Scott Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 93–95.

8 Pietro Rossi, Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros*, p. 21.

9 Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros* 1.14 (Rossi, pp. 215–16).

10 Van Dyke, 'An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination,' pp. 690–92.

11 Van Dyke, 'An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination,' pp. 700–4.

12 Robert Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros* 1.14 (Rossi, p. 216): '[I]n quantum avertitur amor a corporalibus corruptibilibus in tantum convertitur aspectus ad suum lumen et in tantum reperit ipsum.'

result, which Grosseteste continued to reaffirm in his *De veritate* (c.1235),¹³ is that ‘just as the truth of a [created] thing can only be understood in the light of the highest truth, so likewise everything that supposits for the noun “truth” includes a reference to the highest truth.’¹⁴

Grosseteste’s influence on the subsequent philosophy and theology of the Franciscan Order has been so well documented that it needs no elaboration here.¹⁵ What is less well-known is that there was another, equally influential strand of illumination theory among the Franciscans from approximately 1231 to at least 1250, which developed in parallel to that of Grosseteste: the illumination theory of John of La Rochelle.¹⁶

John’s initial account of our knowledge of God can be found in his treatise *De divinis nominibus*, which is roughly contemporaneous with Grosseteste’s *De veritate*.¹⁷ It is based upon Avicenna’s theory of impressed concepts. According to Avicenna, all cognition begins with ideas or forms impressed upon the mind by the ‘giver of forms’ (*dator formarum*), whom Christian Avicennians identified with God.¹⁸ Avicenna him-

13 On the date of this work, see Goering, ‘When and Where did Grosseteste Study Theology?’ p. 41.

14 Robert Grosseteste, *De veritate* (Baumker, p. 139): ‘Sicut enim veritas rei nec intelligi potest nisi in luce veritatis summae, sic forte nec supponitur per nomen veritatis nisi cum significatione veritatis summae.’ On the relationship of Grosseteste’s *De veritate* to the work of Anselm by the same name, see Timothy Noone, ‘Truth, Creation, and Intelligibility in Anselm, Grosseteste, and Bonaventure,’ in *Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence*, ed. Kurt Pritzl (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), pp. 114–20. On Grosseteste’s analogical knowledge of God, see *ibid.*, pp. 116–17. On the relationship between sin and knowledge, see *ibid.*, p. 117.

15 See the bibliography of sources in Servus Gieben, ‘Robert Grosseteste and the Evolution of the Franciscan Order,’ in *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on his Thought and Scholarship*, ed. McEvoy, p. 216, n. 4.

16 On the life of John of La Rochelle, see Jacques Bougerol, Introduction to John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), pp. 9–13. On his works, see Jacques Bougerol, ‘Jean de la Rochelle: Les oeuvres et les manuscrits,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 87 (1994), pp. 205–15. Upon Alexander’s entrance to the Order, John was assigned Alexander’s *socius*. He may or may not have succeeded him to the magistral chair in 1238. See Sophie Delmas, ‘Alexandre de Halès et le studium franciscain de Paris: Aux origines de la question des chaires franciscaines et de l’exercice quodlibétique,’ in *Les collèges réguliers en Europe au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, eds. A. Sohn and J. Verger (Paris: Winkler de Bochum, 2012), pp. 37–47.

17 For an introduction to the treatise, see Jacob Wood, ‘Forging the Analogy of Being: John of La Rochelle’s *De divinis nominibus* (Trier, Abtei St. Matthias, 162) and the *Summa Halensis* on Knowing and Naming God,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 31–57.

18 For Avicenna’s doctrine of impressed concepts, see Avicenna, *Prima philosophia* 1.5, in Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, ed. Simone van Riet (Leiden: Peeters, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 32–33. For their applicability in a medieval context, see Jan Aertsen, ‘Avicenna’s Doctrine of the Primary Notions and Its Influence on Medieval Philosophy,’ in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation*, in *Honour of Hans Daiber*, eds. Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven (Boston: Brill, 2008), pp. 21–42; Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 70–73; Jacob W. Wood, *To Stir a Restless*

self does not specify a 'first' impressed concept, but John identifies it with 'being' (*ens*). According to this line of reasoning, the concept of being, impressed upon the mind by God, gives the soul a knowledge of its own being without any reference to exterior creatures.¹⁹ Unlike in Grosseteste, where the knowledge of any created truth would include an implicit knowledge of God's existence in virtue of exemplar causality, John thinks that in order to arrive at the knowledge of God, the soul has to undertake a process of analogical reasoning based upon efficient causality.

John's reasoning runs thus: the soul knows that it exists, because the concept of being has been impressed upon it by God; however, the soul is also aware that it has not always existed; its being must therefore have come to it from another; John identifies this other with God.²⁰ The metaphysics of causality thus open for us a pathway to predicate being of creatures and God analogically. Following the Dionysian *triplex via*, John has us deny creaturely limitations on being (the *via negationis*); acknowledge God as the cause of being in creatures (the *via causalitatis*); and apply 'being' (*ens*) supereminently to God (the *via eminentiae*). In this way, John thinks that we can predicate *ens* of God *per prius* and of the soul *per posterius*. A similar process obtains for other names which we use of God, such as 'good' (*bonum*). Once we distinguish the *ratio* of good from the *ratio* of being, we can predicate 'good' of God *per prius* and of creatures *per posterius* by a similar process of analogy.

In a different context, and with a different but related goal in mind, John thus developed an alternate, cataphatic illumination theory to that of Grosseteste. Where Grosseteste relied on the exemplar causality by which God illuminates truth in the mind to establish an analogical knowledge of God, John relied on the efficient causality by which God creates the soul and impresses concepts in the mind. As we shall see in a moment, Franciscan theologians of the 1240s and 1250s recognized these as two distinct ways of approaching the question of divine illumination. In order to facilitate our discussion of their thought, we can label the two theories based upon their respective places of origin. Grosseteste's theory, which is based upon exemplar causality, we will call 'Oxford illumination theory'. John's theory, which is based upon efficient causality, we will call 'Paris illumination theory'. It is important to note that these labels are not intended to suggest anything about the future reception of these theories; the labels have merely been selected as a convenient way of distinguishing the two theories based upon their location of origin. In fact, both theories received significant attention from authors on both sides of the English Channel.

Heart: Nature, Grace, and the Desire for God in Thomas Aquinas in Henri de Lubac (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019), pp. 91–92.

¹⁹ This is the basis of Avicenna's famous 'flying man' argument. See Therese Scarpelli Cory, *Aquinas on Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 24–26.

²⁰ The summary of John's argument is based on Wood, 'Forging the Analogy of Being,' pp. 41–51.

A *Ressourcement* of Anselm: Odo Rigaldus

In 1240–42, Odo Rigaldus became the first Franciscan to write a *Commentary on the Sentences*, lecturing under Alexander of Hales, and possibly also John of La Rochelle.²¹ As Davis and Delmas both note, Odo had two *exempla* to follow: that of Alexander's earlier *Glossa on the Sentences*, which was more in the earlier style of a *glossa continua*, and the more recent and more heavily edited example of a Dominican, Hugh of St Cher.²² What Odo lacked was an example from a member of his own order of the sort of more heavily edited commentary that was expected of him. This meant that he had to make editorial decisions about where to include theological material that had become important to Franciscan theologians since the composition of Alexander's *Glossa*, and which was not of as much interest to a member of a different order, like Hugh. The material on divine illumination was of this sort.

Odo selected two places to insert the material on divine illumination. In book 1, distinction 8, which concerns our knowledge of the divine attributes, he inserted John's account of how the soul arrives at the knowledge of God.²³ In book 1, distinction 2, Odo did something more radical. As Matthews observes: 'The second distinction, as Odo states, is concerned with showing evidence for the Trinity from the Old and New Testaments. Yet, because unbelievers do not accept authorities, we should not hesitate to provide reasons, where we seem able, for those things that the Catholic faith holds most certainly concerning God.'²⁴ In the service of this goal, Odo decided to utilize John's proof for the existence of God as 'unreceived being' outside of the Christian narrative of sin and grace.

Ironically, although Odo's intention was to prove the existence of God to unbelievers, the genre in which he was writing demanded that he ground his arguments in theological authority. Accordingly, Odo engaged in a *ressourcement* of 11th and 12th-century thinkers, whom he understood to have also proved the existence of God to non-believers. He settled on two. First, he chose Richard of St Victor, who in his *De Trinitate* offers a series of arguments for the existence of God as well as the identification and distinction of certain divine attributes. Second, he chose Anselm of Canterbury, who in *Proslogion* 2 argues that God is that greater than which

²¹ Adam Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 14–17; Sophie Delmas, 'Odo Rigaldus, Alexander of Hales, and the *Summa Halensis*,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 267–84.

²² Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat*, p. 16; Delmas, 'Odo Rigaldus, Alexander of Hales, and the *Summa Halensis*.'

²³ See Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, p. 61.

²⁴ Matthews, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, p. 60.

nothing can be thought, and in *Proslogion* 3 argues that God cannot be thought not to be.²⁵

Odo's use of Richard of St Victor makes Richard sound a lot like John of La Rochelle: Odo has Richard assume that creaturely being is caused, argue for the existence of a first cause on that basis, and establish various attributes of the first cause from the fact that a first cause exists (eternity, simplicity, omnipotence, wisdom, immutability, and goodness).²⁶ His use of Anselm is similar. Rather than merely rehearsing what Anselm says, Odo makes creative use of a mixture of the arguments in *Proslogion* 2 and 3. We can best make sense of this mixture if we consider Odo's use of Anselm in light of John's use of Avicennian impressed concepts: Anselm's argument in *Proslogion* 2 concerns the order of being, while his argument in *Proslogion* 3 concerns the order of knowing; since Avicenna's view of human thought effectively merges the order of knowing with the order of being, it would make sense for a scholar utilizing Anselm to support Avicenna's view of human thought to want to merge Anselm's two arguments. We can best appreciate what Odo is trying to achieve if we put to one side the question of what Avicenna or Anselm thought, and take Odo's argument on its own merits.

Odo's argument runs thus: God is a being than which nothing greater can be thought to be; such a being either exists or it does not; if it does, Odo rests his case; if not, then since having being is better than not having being, we would be forced to say that any being whatsoever is better than that being which cannot be thought not to be, which is impossible; therefore God must exist, and must possess all the attributes which befit 'goodness and nobility' (e.g. ultimate simplicity, eternity, omnipotence, etc.).²⁷ Odo does acknowledge that, notwithstanding his reworking of Anselm's argument, people have and do in actual fact deny the existence of God. But recurring to what is in fact John's analogy of being, Odo holds that no one can be ignorant of God's existence simply speaking; although the Fall has caused the

25 For the text of Odo, I rely on Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS 14910. For further study of the manuscripts, see F. M. Henquinet, 'Les Manuscrits et l'Influence des Écrits Théologiques d'Eudes Rigaud O.F.M.,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11 (1940), pp. 324–50; Sophie Delmas, 'Appendix: List of Manuscripts,' in Delmas, 'Odo Rigaldus, Alexander of Hales, and the *Summa Halensis*.' For Richard of St Victor, see Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate*, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age VI* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958). For Anselm's *Proslogion*, see Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 89–122. Chapters 2 and 3 can be found on pp. 101–3. There was a certain logic to Odo's selection of Richard and Anselm, as well as to the ahistorical order in which he placed the texts. As Schumacher (*Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 110) observes, Richard provided subsequent thinkers with something of a paradigm for reading Anselm.

26 Odo Rigaldus, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, ar. 1 (Paris, BnF lat. MS 14910, f. 6vb–7ra).

27 Odo Rigaldus, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, ar. 1 (Paris, BnF lat. MS 14910, f. 7rb–7va).

human intellect to ‘deteriorate’ to a certain extent,²⁸ the knowledge of being remains naturally present in the soul, as does the awareness of the fact that the soul receives being from another. A person can only err concerning the determinations of being by which we arrive at God through the knowledge of creatures. Odo’s example is justice: a person, while knowing that God exists, could have a hard time seeing that God is just; on that basis he could deny that God exists insofar as he is just.²⁹

Assessing Oxford and Paris Illumination Theory: The *Summa Halensis*, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure

After Odo, it became customary for mid-13th-century Franciscans to adapt the text of Anselm’s *Proslogion* to support their own attempts at a critical reception of Grosseteste and John of La Rochelle. In this way, Anselm’s words and phrases became part of a common tradition in search of a contemporary understanding of divine illumination. Since the object of this chapter is ultimately to arrive at an understanding of Thomas Aquinas, we will look briefly in this section at three Franciscan works/figures with which he appears to interact: the *Summa Halensis*, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure.

In its understanding of the knowledge of God, the *Summa Halensis* attempts to merge Oxford and Paris illumination theory. With John and Odo, it argues that human intellection begins with a series of impressed concepts.³⁰ The first of these is being, which we can know without reference to creatures. By comparing being with creatures, we can come to distinguish the first determinations of being: one, true, and good.³¹ Each of these impressed concepts taken individually can also lead us to a cataphatic knowledge of God by an analogy.³²

At this point in the reasoning process, the *Summa Halensis* shifts to something more akin to Grosseteste. The first determinations of being have a logical structure: they are arranged into a *vestigium trinitatis* which links the faculties of the soul (memory, reason, will), by means of the knowledge that God impresses in the soul (one, true, good), with the persons of the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).³³ As Schumacher has shown, it is by means of this analogical *vestigium* that the Sum-

²⁸ See Odo Rigaldus, *In II Sent.*, d. 29, q. 3, ad 2, in Jean Bouvy, ‘La nécessité de la grâce dans le Commentaire des Sentences d’Odon Rigaud,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 28 (1961), p. 94.

²⁹ Odo Rigaldus, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, ar. 1 (Paris, BnF lat. MS 14910, f. 7rb).

³⁰ Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, pp. 92–93.

³¹ Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, p. 92; Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 161.

³² Wood, ‘Forging the Analogy of Being,’ pp. 52–55.

³³ Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 161.

mist situates our knowledge of God within the Christian narrative of sin and grace.³⁴ All things being equal, the soul's analogical ascent to the one God by individual concepts through efficient causality, will open up into an analogical ascent to the triune God by exemplar causality in relation to the *vestigium Trinitatis* discovered in such concepts.³⁵ However, sin prevents this analogical pathway from coming to complete fruition in every person, because concupiscence obscures our awareness of that transcendental pathway.³⁶ In this context, the healing of the will by grace restores our awareness of divine illumination, and our ability to come to the knowledge of God through it.³⁷

Like Odo, the *Summa Halensis* bolsters its discussion of the knowledge of God with reference to Anselm's *Proslogion*. The argument from *Proslogion* 2 it quotes *verbatim*.³⁸ It takes a more creative approach to *Proslogion* 3. According to the Summist, there are really two kinds of knowledge of God: habitual and actual. Our habitual knowledge of God is the latent understanding of God's existence, which exists in the soul and is unaffected by sin: 'The knowledge of God in habit is naturally impressed upon us, since there is naturally in us an impressed habit, namely, a similitude of the first truth in the intellect, whereby it can be known by the rational soul that [God] is and it cannot be not known.'³⁹ If we are speaking of this kind of knowledge, Anselm's argument from *Proslogion* 3 holds true. Our knowledge of God in act is the conscious knowledge, which proceeds from an analogy of efficient causality establishing God's existence to an analogy of exemplar causality which perceives the Trinity in the *vestigium* of the transcendentals. If we are speaking of this kind of knowledge, Anselm's argument from *Proslogion* 3 does not necessarily hold true; its efficacy depends upon the love of God, which may or may not be present in an individual soul, or may only be present to a certain degree.

At one point the Summist merges *Proslogion* 2 and 3. It is in an objection stating that 'if (...) the divine essence most truly is (*verissime est*) and is the most true thing (*verissima*), it cannot not be, nor can it be thought not to be.'⁴⁰ While the proximate source of the objection is not clear, the reply suggests that one purpose of raising it was to utilize the Summist's blend of Paris and Oxford illumination theories to respond to Odo's evangelistic use of Paris illumination theory. We will quote the Summist's reply in full, since it would later form the basis of *ST* Ia, q. 2, ar. 1, ad 1.

34 Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 89–92.

35 Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 161.

36 Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 91.

37 Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 89, 92.

38 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 42.

39 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 26), p. 43: 'Cognitio de Deo in habitu naturaliter nobis impressa est, quia ipsa naturaliter est in nobis habitus impressus, scilicet similitudo primae veritatis in intellectu, quo potest concipere ipsum esse et non potest ignorari ab anima rationali.'

40 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 26), p. 43: 'Si (...) divina essentia verissime est et verissima, ergo non potest non esse, nec cogitari non esse.'

The knowledge of something can happen in two ways: in a general conception (*ratio communis*) and in a specific identity (*ratio propria*). Therefore, something can be known in a general conception and yet remain unknown in its specific identity, like when someone knows honey under a general conception, namely that it is a soft, reddish substance, however he does not know it under its specific identity; and for this reason when he sees that gall is a soft, reddish substance, he mistakenly thinks that it is honey (Aristotle, *Soph. Elen.* 5; 167b18–20). Similarly, the knowledge of happiness and the desire for it is innate in us in its general conception, which ‘is a state made perfect by the amalgamation of all that is good’ (Boethius, *De cons. phil.* 3, pros. 2), yet some people do not know it in its specific identity. That is why different people seek it in different things. (...) Likewise we should say that idolaters are not unaware of God in a general conception, which is being (*ens*), principle (*principium*), almighty (*omnipotens*); yet they do not know God under his specific identity, and that is why they say of the God, who is triune, one, and true, that he is not God, and of an idol, that it is God.⁴¹

This reply is a reworking of a passage in William of Auxerre’s *Summa aurea*.⁴² William had wanted to know whether a pagan, worshipping an idol, identifies that idol with the true God. In response, he had distinguished two kinds of pagans: those who know the true God but identify him with an idol, and those who do not know the true God, but attribute to an idol some attribute of God (William’s example is omnipotence). The Summist implicitly rejects William’s distinction, because it would mean that some pagans were capable of thinking that God does not exist. Instead, he takes a distinction adapted from Avicenna between a general idea of something and a knowledge of its specific identity, a distinction which Avicenna had said that ‘even the mistaken and the simple grant,’⁴³ and uses it to put every pagan into

41 *SH I*, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 26), p. 43: ‘Cognitio alicuius potest esse duobus modis: in ratione communi et in ratione propria. Potest ergo aliquid cognosci in ratione communi et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria: sicut cum aliquid cognoscit mel sub ratione communi, videlicet quia est corpus molle, rubeum, ignorat autem ipsum sub ratione propria; et ideo, cum videt fel esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus credit ipsum esse mel. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est in ratione communi, quae est “status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus;” tamen in ratione propria ab aliquibus ignoratur. Unde diversi in diversis ponunt. (...) Similiter dicendum quod idololatrae in ratione communi Deum non ignorant, quod est ens, principium, omnipotens; Deum tamen sub ratione propria ignorant, et ideo dicunt de Deo, qui est trinus et unus et verus, quia non est Deus, et de idolo quia est Deus.’

42 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 1, tr. 4, c. 5, sol., ed. Jean Ribailleur (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 51–52.

43 The substance of the distinction can be found in Avicenna, *Primus naturalium*, tr. 1, in *Avicenna Latinus, De causis et principis naturae*, ed. Simone van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1992), pp. 9–14; the terminological labels of *ratio communis* and *ratio propria* appear to be adapted from Avicenna, *Prima philosophia*, 1.8 (van Riet, 1:60): ‘Si autem illae multae res convenerint in una intentione, tunc iam significavit ex sua locutione unam intentionem. Si vero non convenerint, tunc nomen est commune, et sine dubio potest unaquaeque illarum designari proprio nomine, et haec omnia concedunt erronei et imbecilles.’ [‘However, if many things come together in one intention, then he has already signified one intention by his speaking. But if they do not come together (under one intention), then the noun is common, and without a doubt each one of them can be designed by its own noun. Even the mistaken and the simple grant these things.’]

William's first category. This appears to be an implicit warning about the efficacy of Odo's use of illumination theory outside the context of sin and grace. As Odo indicates, one can fail to know that the one God exists, at least by habitual knowledge. But knowing that the one God exists does not necessarily mean that a given person will identify the one God with the triune God of Christianity.

After the *Summa Halensis'* attempt to reconcile the double-tradition, both Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Bonaventure made their own attempts at a critical reception of it. Rufus leans in the direction of the Paris illumination tradition, while Bonaventure leans in the direction of the Oxford illumination tradition. Rufus' understanding of divine illumination is consistent in both his *Commentaries on the Sentences*: the first, which he lectured at Oxford c.1250;⁴⁴ and the second, the so-called *Abbreviatio* of Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences*, which he lectured either at Paris from 1253–56, or at Oxford from 1256–59.⁴⁵ For the purposes of understanding Aquinas, we will concern ourselves with the first of these *Commentaries*.

Rufus has a maximalist view of illumination. On the one hand, he agrees with Grosseteste that human knowledge requires a divine illumination of the objects known; on the other, he also agrees with John of La Rochelle that it begins from certain theoretical knowledge impressed upon the soul at creation.⁴⁶ This distinction between two kinds of illumination had an important effect on how Rufus received Grosseteste's understanding of the relationship of the Fall to human knowledge. Rufus agrees with Grosseteste that humanity would have known God immediately prior to the Fall, but according to Gál, Rufus associates that immediate knowledge with the second kind of illumination (i.e. John's), not the first (i.e. Grosseteste's).⁴⁷ Consequently, Rufus does not think that post-lapsarian man retains any implicit analogical knowledge of God's existence the way that Grosseteste did.

Like John, therefore, Rufus identifies the beginning of the fallen mind's knowledge of creatures with the soul's knowledge of itself,⁴⁸ and with certain ideas impressed upon the mind at creation,⁴⁹ arguing that the fallen soul must demonstrate the existence of God from this knowledge of creatures. Rufus gives a variety of such demonstrations, but most follow the general pattern of John's Dionysian *triplex via*:

⁴⁴ On the authenticity and dating of this commentary, see Peter Raedts, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 20–39.

⁴⁵ On the authenticity and dating of this commentary, see Raedts, *Richard Rufus of Cornwall*, pp. 40–63. An edition of book 1, distinction 2 of both commentaries can be found in Gedeon Gál, 'Viae ad existentiam Dei probandam in doctrina Richardi Rufi OFM,' *Franziskanische Studien* 38 (1956), pp. 177–202. References to Rufus' text will be made on the basis of Gál's edition.

⁴⁶ Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 179.

⁴⁷ Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 180.

⁴⁸ On the soul's knowledge of itself, see Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 178.

⁴⁹ Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 179.

removing limitations to creaturely perfections, and seeing their source as that which pre-possesses them without any admixture of imperfection.⁵⁰

Like Odo, Rufus is open to the idea that demonstrating God's existence in this way is in principle open to non-believers, because it is based upon an encounter with Creation. But like Grosseteste, Rufus also thinks that such knowledge needs to be understood within the context of the healing of the will by grace. As the will is healed, the intellect passes through four stages of knowledge, which Gál summarizes: 'bodily sight (...), the imagination (...), intellectual vision, (...) ideal *rationes* in the eternal Word.'⁵¹ At this point, the intellect reaches the limits of its power in this life, even under the influence of grace. Rufus identifies a fifth stage of love beyond knowledge, into which the soul passes as it is perfected by grace in this life.⁵²

Perhaps because of his more severe stance towards fallen knowledge, Rufus critiqued Odo's use of Anselm in a manner that anticipates Aquinas.⁵³ According to Rufus, we need to distinguish carefully between the arguments in *Proslogion* 2 and 3. The argument in *Proslogion* 3 concerns merely the question of what a person is capable of thinking; Rufus sees no fundamental problem with Anselm's reasoning: it is a contradiction in terms to say that a person can think that 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' can be thought not to exist.⁵⁴ But this does not prove the existence of God. The argument stays at the level of intention, and does not touch upon the divine nature itself except *per accidens*.⁵⁵ Rufus is even more sanguine about the argument in *Proslogion* 2. Perhaps in an ironic allusion to Grosseteste's *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, Rufus argues that since the mere thinking of a being-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought does not necessitate that such a being actually exists, it would seem that in order to be an atheist, one merely needs to affirm that what is signified by 'that-greater-than-which-nothing-can-be-thought' has no supposit.⁵⁶

Bonaventure's understanding of divine illumination is expressed throughout the *corpus* of his writings, but for the purpose of understanding of Thomas Aquinas, we may focus on three of them: his *Commentary on the Sentences*, which he lectured from 1250–52 at Paris, his *Quaestiones Disputatae De scientia Dei*, which he disputed at Paris in 1254, and his *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, which he composed at Alverno

50 Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 181. For specific applications of this argument to being, power, goodness, knowledge, essence, truth, and simplicity, see Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, pp. 194–200).

51 Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, p. 181): 'Primus consistit in visione corporali, secundus in visione spirituali, in imaginatione scilicet et imaginabilibus, tertius in visione intellectuali, quartus autem assurgi in rationes ideales in Verbo aeterno.'

52 Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, pp. 181–82).

53 Gál, 'Doctrina Richardi Rufi,' p. 183, notes the anticipation of Aquinas here.

54 Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, p. 193).

55 Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, p. 193).

56 Richard Rufus, *Lectura Oxoniensis* 1.2 (Gál, pp. 191–92).

in 1259.⁵⁷ In the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *De scientia Dei*, Bonaventure distinguishes more clearly than other authors considered so far at least three distinct kinds of illumination: a light which enlightens the objects of knowledge, a light which enlightens the power of the mind itself (i.e. the agent intellect), and the light of eternal reason in God.⁵⁸ While scholars dispute whether Bonaventure thinks that the intellect itself is darkened by the Fall or whether it is merely that our use of the intellect is impeded by a wounded will,⁵⁹ scholars agree that Bonaventure thinks that the Fall prevents us from using our intellectual powers the way that God intended. As Bonaventure expresses clearly in the *Itinerarium*, God gave us an intellect with a supernatural calling to use the objects of this world as sacramental signs pointing us to God; sin turns us towards creatures in such a way as to prevent us from fulfilling that calling.⁶⁰

Notwithstanding the effects of the Fall on human intellection, Bonaventure is clear that any act of human knowledge still requires the coordination of different illuminative lights: the light of divine wisdom needs to shine on the mind, the light of the agent intellect needs to shine on an object, and the light of the object itself needs to shine back at the agent intellect.⁶¹ When these processes concur, the agent intellect indirectly sees the truth of the created object in the eternal *rationes* of the divine intellect in an act called 'contuition' (*contuitio*). As Scarpelli explains succinctly, 'the created essence directs man upwards to the Divine Idea which is its truth, while the Divine Idea illuminates the mind in such a way as to enable it to understand the immutable truth which constitutes the ultimate reality of a created essence.'⁶² The result is that Bonaventure arrives at an understanding of the knowledge of God which is very similar to that of Grosseteste: in any knowledge of a created truth, the soul implicitly knows divine truth as its exemplar. *A fortiori*, the soul also knows the existence of divine being.⁶³

57 On the dating Bonaventure's works, I follow Jacques Bougerol, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1988).

58 Therese Scarpelli, 'Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology: Christ's Human Knowledge as the Epitome of Illumination in *De scientia Christi*,' *Franciscan Studies* 65 (2007), p. 67. For the texts of Bonaventure, I will be relying on the Quaracchi edition: Bonaventure, *Opera Omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902). In at least two texts, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, ar. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (Quaracchi, 1:70), and *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, pt. 1, ar. 1, q. 2, co. (Quaracchi, 4:1004), Bonaventure also discusses a fourth kind of light, that of John of La Rochelle's Avicennian impressed concepts.

59 For the view that the intellect is not darkened by the Fall, see Scarpelli, 'Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology,' p. 75; Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 132, 143–53. For the view that it is, see Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, 'Questioning Bonaventure's Augustinianism? On the Noetic Effects of Sin,' *New Blackfriars*.

60 See Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, pp. 137–41.

61 Scarpelli, 'Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology,' p. 66. See also Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, pp. 129–31.

62 Scarpelli, 'Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology,' pp. 70.

63 Noone, 'Truth, Creation, and Intelligibility in Anselm, Grosseteste, and Bonaventure,' p. 122.

Matthews observes that the association between divine truth and divine being on the basis of exemplar causality is so strong for Bonaventure, that when he was composing book 1 of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he reworked Odo's editorial separation of the material that proves the existence of God (which Odo had placed in distinction 2) and the material that discusses divine illumination (which Odo had placed in distinction 8). The separation would have been superfluous to Bonaventure, because he thought that our knowledge of divine truth is our strongest pathway to the knowledge of divine being. Accordingly, Bonaventure moved the material about the existence of God – including Odo's references to Anselm's *Proslogion* – out of distinction 2 into the discussion of divine truth in distinction 8.⁶⁴

Even the framing of Bonaventure's engagement with Anselm in distinction 8 is indicative of his association between our knowledge of divine truth and our knowledge of divine being. He asks 'whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be?'⁶⁵ In response, Bonaventure signals his indebtedness to Grosseteste by returning to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Bonaventure's engagement with Aristotle is significant; we will see below that Aquinas responds directly to it in question 2, ar. 1. Following *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 (73a34), Bonaventure argues that a proposition is self-evident (*notum in se*) if the cause of its predicate is contained in its subject. Applying this to the proposition 'God exists', Bonaventure argues that, 'God, or the highest truth, is being itself; therefore he cannot not exist, nor be thought not to exist. For the predicate is contained in the subject.'⁶⁶ How, then, can there be atheists? Exchanging the *Summa Halensis*' Avicennian distinction between *ratio communis* and *ratio propria* for the Aristotelian distinction between knowledge *quia* and knowledge *propter quid*, Bonaventure gives us an updated version of Odo's distinction between knowing God's being and knowing his other attributes: since we are not born knowing *what* God is, a person might have trouble perceiving or understanding divine justice, and consequently be led to deny the existence of divine being.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Matthews (*Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, p. 116) helpfully observes the significance of Bonaventure's shifting the Anselmian material to d. 8, but wrongly infers that Bonaventure does not, therefore, consider his own adaptation of Anselm's argument to constitute a proof for the existence of God.

⁶⁵ Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, ar. 1, q. 2 (Quaracchi, 1:153): 'Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum quod non possit cogitare non esse.'

⁶⁶ Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, ar. 1, q. 2, co. (Quaracchi, 1:155): 'Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto.'

⁶⁷ Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, ar. 1, q. 2, co. (Quaracchi, 1:154). It should be noted that although Bonaventure prefers the Oxford tradition, he does not in all respects reject the Paris tradition. He merely thinks that the Oxford tradition provides a stronger account of our knowledge of God. As a sort of post-script to his discussion of Anselm's *Proslogion*, Bonaventure lists a number of other proofs for God's existence that he thinks also work. Here we find John's argument affirmed: that the soul is

Aquinas on Illumination before the Fall

Thomas Aquinas' theory of human intellection is most often presented outside of the Christian narrative of sin and grace. However, Aquinas himself situates his understanding of human intellection within it.⁶⁸ Since this context is key to understanding the relationship between *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1 and the Oxford and Paris theories of divine illumination, we will begin our discussion of Aquinas by outlining his understanding of pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian intellection, and then proceed to examine the structure and text of q. 2, ar. 1 in light of this context.

Aquinas presents two different versions of the relationship between the human intellect and the Fall at different points in his career. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, which he lectured at Paris from 1252–56, and his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, which he disputed as a regent master at Paris from 1256–59, the early Aquinas thought that Adam's intellect knew God in two ways prior to the Fall.⁶⁹ Adam's first kind of knowledge began with grace: he received by grace an illumination of the sort that angels receive by nature, a created intelligible species impressed directly upon the possible intellect by God, from which he could arrive at the knowledge of God by acts of judgment and reasoning under the light of the agent intellect.⁷⁰ The second kind of knowledge that the early Aquinas attributed to Adam began with nature. In addition to the knowledge of God that Adam formed from impressed, intelligible species, Adam could also use his agent intellect to abstract intelligible species directly from sensory perceptions, and then arrive at the knowledge of God by analogical acts of judgment and reasoning based upon them.⁷¹

For the early Aquinas, there was a dependence in Adam of nature's abstractive knowledge upon grace's illuminative knowledge. In the *De veritate*, Aquinas gives the example of a teacher to explain this dependence. A teacher, teaching a problem to a student, already knows the answer; but in order to teach a student how to arrive at the answer, he can imaginatively place himself in the position of a student as though figuring out that problem for the first time. The teacher in this situation is not exactly like a student, since the teacher already knows the answer; but the exer-

naturally aware of being which is received from another, and consequently can recognize that the existence of being which is not.

68 On the general importance of placing Aquinas' account of illumination within a broader theological context, see Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, pp. 154–60. I prescind here from several of the particular questions taken up by Schumacher in terms of the authentic interpretation of Augustine and Anselm, as well as the question of which of the medieval scholastics represents their best interpreter.

69 For the dates of Aquinas' works, I follow Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Cerf, 2017). The relevant texts are *In II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, ar. 1–2, in *Scriptum super Sententias*, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), vol. 2, pp. 571–78; *De veritate*, q. 18, ar. 1–2 (Leon., 22:529–537).

70 *In II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, ar. 1, co. (Mandonnet, 2:573); *De veritate*, q. 18, ar. 1, ad 1 (Leon., 22:533).

71 *In II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, ar. 1, co. (Mandonnet, 2:573); *De veritate*, q. 18, ar. 1, ad 1 (Leon., 22:533).

cise can help the teacher explain the steps by which a student might arrive at the answer which the teacher already knows. In a similar way, Adam arrived at a clear knowledge of God's existence through the intelligible species impressed by grace upon his intellect. This put him in the position of a teacher. But if he so chose, he could also play the part of the student and try to 'figure out' those same things through the intelligible species he abstracted from corporeal creatures.⁷² In this context, the Fall caused something of a shock to Adam's intellect. Adam was deprived of the illumination whereby he had previously known God, and he was also cast into the position of having to depend exclusively upon his abstractive powers for the first time.

During Aquinas' Roman Period (1265–68), during which he composed the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, he changed his view of divine illumination in Adam. The change, which I have documented elsewhere in relation to natural desire, had two parts. The first part concerned the agent intellect, and was based on a mistake in Moerbeke's Latin translation of Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's *De anima* (1267).⁷³ Themistius held that there was a single agent intellect for all persons, but Moerbeke made Themistius out to say that this single agent intellect was complemented by an individual agent intellect in each human person. The text appears to have given Thomas a conceptual framework for seeing God's illumination of the agent intellect as itself a form of divine illumination, a concept which Schumacher has observed throughout *Summa Theologiae*.⁷⁴

The second part of the change in Aquinas' view of divine illumination concerned the possible intellect, and appears to have been based on Thomas's reading of John of La Rochelle's *Tractatus de multiplici divisione potentiarum animae*.⁷⁵ John's text convinced Aquinas that the 'proper' mode of apprehension for a spiritual creature is by the natural infusion of intelligible species from God. In the *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 15, Aquinas applied this view of human intellection to the separated soul.⁷⁶ In the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, he applied it to Adam:

God is seen more eminently through intelligible effects than through sensible and bodily ones. However, in his present state, man is impeded from a complete and clear consideration of intelligible effects through the fact that he is distracted by and busy with sensible things. Yet, as is said in Ecclesiastes 7[.29], *God made man upright*. However, the uprightness of man when he was created by God was such that his inferior [powers] were subject to his superior [powers], and his superior [powers] were not impeded by his inferior [powers]. For this reason, the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and stable contemplation of the intelligible effects, which he saw shining forth in rays from the first truth, whether *by natural knowledge* or gratuitous knowledge. For this reason Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram* 11[.33.43] that *perhaps*

⁷² *De veritate*, q. 18, ar. 2, co. (Leon., 22:536).

⁷³ Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, pp. 269–75.

⁷⁴ Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, pp. 173–78.

⁷⁵ Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, pp. 262–63.

⁷⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 15, co. (Leon., 24.1:136).

(...) *God previously used to speak to the first human beings as he speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds with his unchangeable truth (...).*⁷⁷

Aquinas here produces something close to a mixture of Grosseteste's narrative of sin and grace and Paris illumination theory. Prior to the Fall, Adam was illuminated naturally and supernaturally. Naturally, he received the impression of intelligible species in his possible intellect in a manner similar to that of the angels, as well as an influx of light in his agent intellect; supernaturally, he received the impression of other intelligible species in his possible intellect by grace. Beginning from either set of intelligible species, Adam could engage in acts of judgment and reasoning under the light of his agent intellect. At the Fall, Adam lost access to the direct impression of intelligible species by grace on account of sin, as well as the ability to 'see' naturally impressed intelligible species on account of concupiscence. But Adam did not lose access to the illumination of his agent intellect. The result is that, having been turned towards corporeal creatures, he could – and we can – still abstract intelligible species from them, and engage in acts of judgment and reasoning under the light of the agent intellect.

For the later Aquinas, grace repairs the damage done to divine illumination by the Fall, but does not restore it in exactly the same way that humanity possessed it previously. The reparation of illumination by grace begins with the charism of prophecy, whereby certain people receive a supernatural guidance and strengthening of their intellect for judging supernatural truths revealed by God; this judgment may be accompanied by the supernatural infusion of intelligible species directly into the possible intellect (Aquinas gives the examples of Solomon and the Apostles), but it may leave the species to be abstracted either from imaginative or corporeal visions mediated by the angels,⁷⁸ or from imaginative or corporeal visions given to others.⁷⁹ The reparation of illumination by grace continues with the grace of faith, received in

⁷⁷ *ST Ia*, q. 94, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 5:413–14, emphasis added): 'Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori cognitione quam nos cognoscamus: et sic quodammodo eius cognitio media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur: sicut homo perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccles. VII, *Deus fecit hominem rectum*. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat, sive *naturali cognitione* sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus, in XI *super Gen. ad Litt.*, quod *fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum (...).*'

⁷⁸ *ST Ia*, q. 111, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 5:515); *ST Ia*, q. 111, ar. 5, co. (Leon., 5:520).

⁷⁹ *ST IIa-IIae*, q. 173, ar. 2, co. (Leon., 10:386–387).

baptism, in which Aquinas says the faithful are ‘illuminated’ (*illuminentur*),⁸⁰ and in which an individual mind adheres to God as first truth, granting its assent to what has been proposed for belief by revelation through prophecy.⁸¹ This illumination is complemented by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, specifically understanding (which strengthens our apprehension of supernatural truths);⁸² knowledge (which strengthens our discretion of supernatural truths);⁸³ and wisdom (which strengthens our judgment concerning supernatural truths).⁸⁴ It is completed in glory, when the blessed are strengthened by the light of glory, God himself becomes the intelligible species in their possible intellect,⁸⁵ and, since concupiscence is finally abolished, the natural illumination of the possible intellect is restored.⁸⁶

Aquinas on Illumination after the Fall: *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1

By situating Aquinas’ understanding of human intellection within the Christian narrative of sin and grace, we can better appreciate Aquinas’ engagement with Oxford and Paris illumination theory in *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1. In this final part of the chapter, we will detail that engagement through a step-by-step commentary on the article.

The article follows the classic shape of many articles in Aquinas’ *Summa*: it consists of three objections, a single *sed contra*, a *corpus*, and individual replies to each of its three objections. The beginning of the article asks whether the existence of God is *per se notum*; even the question situates the article against the backdrop of Bonaventure’s *ressourcement* of the *Posterior Analytics* in support of Grosseteste.⁸⁷

Objection 1 summarizes a basic point common to both the Oxford and Parisian illumination traditions and utilizes their most common proof-text. It offers a definition of *per se notum* as those things whose knowledge is naturally within us. On the authority of Damascene, that ‘the knowledge of God has been naturally placed within us,’⁸⁸ it argues that the knowledge of God is of this sort. Aquinas will use this objection as an opportunity to respond to the *Summa Halensis*.

⁸⁰ *ST IIIa*, q. 69, ar. 5, co. (Leon., 12:110).

⁸¹ *ST IIa-IIae*, q. 1, ar. 1–2 (Leon., 8:7–11).

⁸² *ST IIa-IIae*, q. 8, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 8:66).

⁸³ *ST IIa-IIae*, q. 9, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 8:74).

⁸⁴ *ST IIa-IIae*, q. 45, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 8:339).

⁸⁵ *ST Ia*, q. 12, ar. 2 (Leon., 4:116–17).

⁸⁶ *ST Ia*, q. 89, ar. 1, ad 3 (Leon., 5:371).

⁸⁷ Matthews (*Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition*, pp. 146–47) notes the dependence of Thomas on the earlier tradition, without connecting individual objections and replies with specific members of that tradition.

⁸⁸ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.2, in *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1955), p. 12.

Objection 2 offers a different definition of *per se notum*. On the authority of a position that Aristotle mentions in *Posterior Analytics* 1.3 (72b5–7), it describes those things as *per se notum* which are understood when their terms are understood. Based on this definition, the objection argues that the name ‘God’ (*Deus*) means ‘that greater than which nothing can be signified (*significari*),’ and that the greatest thing that can be signified is one which exists ‘both in reality and in the intellect’ (*et in re et in intellectu*). The use of the verb *significari* is important. Anselm had used the verb ‘to be thought of’ (*cogitari*); Rufus’ *significare* had been deliberately chosen to drive a wedge between the order of knowing and the order of being. Aquinas will use this objection as an opportunity to respond to Rufus.

Objection 3 engages Bonaventure’s association of divine truth with divine being. It argues that the existence of truth is *per se notum*, pointing out the paradox inherent in the truth-claim that ‘truth does not exist.’ It goes on to argue that since God is truth, God’s existence is *per se notum*, which was the crux of Bonaventure’s argument for the unthinkability of God’s non-existence. Aquinas will use this objection to respond to Bonaventure.

The *sed contra* grounds Thomas in the broader illuminationist conversation, using the existence of atheists, a thorny problem from Odo onwards, as proof against the idea that God’s existence is *per se notum*.

The *corpus* takes up the Oxford and Paris theories of divine illumination in turn and includes a subtle response to a question about the relationship between divine illumination and the Fall that could be raised in relationship to Paris illumination theory. It begins with a response to the Oxford Tradition, grounded in Bonaventure’s use of the *Posterior Analytics*. Aquinas accepts Bonaventure’s definition of *per se notum*, as well as Bonaventure’s argument that the proposition ‘God exists’ is *per se notum*, because the predicate is included in the subject. But relying on the authority of Boethius, Aquinas differentiates between something being *per se notum* in itself and *per se notum* to us.⁸⁹ Bonaventure was right that God’s existence is *per se notum* in itself because God is his being. But in order for it to be *per se notum* to us, we would have to have *propter quid* knowledge of the subject and the predicate, something which Bonaventure had said we lack. Consequently, the knowledge of God’s existence is not *per se notum* to us.

The distinction between what is *per se notum* in itself and what is *per se notum* to us raises a subtle question that would have occurred to a contemporary of Aquinas, but is likely to be obscured for readers at a distance from that historical context: given that he thinks that Adam received, and the saints in heaven do receive, a natural impression of intelligible species in the possible intellect, when Aquinas says that the knowledge of God is not *per se notum* to us, is he saying that it is *per se*

⁸⁹ Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* 1, in *De consolatione philosophiae; Opuscula Theologica*, ed. C. More-schini (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2005), p. 187. On Aquinas’ identification of Boethius’ common conceptions with Aristotle’s self-evident principles, see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 240–41.

notum to them in virtue of their natural illumination, and that therefore the Parisian tradition is fundamentally correct about the unthinkability of God's non-existence, even if their argument only applies to Adam and the saints? The last sentence of the *corpus* answers this question in the negative. 'But since we do not know what God is, [the proposition "God is"] is not *per se notum* to us; rather, it needs to be demonstrated by those things which are more known to us, namely, *by effects*.'⁹⁰ Notice that Aquinas does not distinguish at the end of this sentence between corporeal and intelligible effects. The fact that Aquinas does not make that distinction here indicates that he intends the phrase '*per se notum* to us' to apply not only to fallen individuals, who must demonstrate God's existence from intelligible species that are abstracted from corporeal creatures, but also to Adam, who had to demonstrate it from intelligible species impressed upon his possible intellect, as well as the saints, who, though they enjoy something close to *per se notum* knowledge of God's existence from the beatific vision, do not enjoy that same benefit from the intelligible species naturally impressed upon their possible intellect.

The reply to objection 1 takes up the distinction between *ratio communis* and *ratio propria* from the *Summa Halensis* and offers a different way of reworking it than the one which Bonaventure had suggested. If man does not have the kind of innate knowledge of God's existence that the *Summa Halensis* supposed, whether habitual or actual, does that mean that there is no natural knowledge of God whatsoever in the soul? Aquinas thinks that there is, but that it is of a more oblique kind. In order to explain this sort of knowledge, Aquinas borrows the *Summa Halensis'* idea that our natural desire for happiness is accompanied by a natural knowledge of happiness. In the *Summa Halensis*, that knowledge arose from an impressed concept of the good, and so had a direct, analogical orientation towards God. For Aquinas, it arises from a desire for happiness in general without an impressed concept of the good; its content is derived from our sense of what it would mean to have our desires fulfilled. The result is an Augustinian awareness of having something within us that objectively can only be fulfilled in God, together with an equally Augustinian appreciation for how widely our fallen desires can miss the mark in attempting to identify and grasp the object of their fulfillment.⁹¹

The reply to objection 2 offers a rather uncritical reception of Rufus. Apart from an initial musing about the possibility of a person who hears the word 'God' and does not know what it means, which critiques Rufus' assessment of *Proslogion* 3, the text repeats Rufus' argument against *Proslogion* 2 almost verbatim, claiming that those who admit that the word 'God' means 'that greater than which nothing

⁹⁰ *ST* Ia, q. 2, ar. 1 (Leon., 4:28, emphasis added): 'Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota: sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet *per effectus*.'

⁹¹ We find an expression here of Aquinas' understanding of the natural desire for God. The key text in the *Prima Pars* in this regard is *ST* Ia, q. 12, ar. 1 (Leon., 4:114–15). I have provided a contextual reading of this article in Wood, *To Stir a Restless Heart*, pp. 291–95.

can be signified' do not therefore admit that such a thing can be found among the things of nature.

The reply to objection 3 offers a critical response to Bonaventure, and through him to the Oxford tradition. It also is based upon the distinction in the *Summa Halensis* between *ratio communis* and *ratio propria*. The intellect's natural orientation is towards 'truth in common' (*veritas in commune*), not towards God as first truth. Just as the will has to break through the veil of desire to find the source of 'happiness in general' in the *Summum bonum*, so does the intellect have to break through the veil of demonstration to find the source of 'truth in common' in the *Prima veritas*. Moreover, just as there are a great many temptations to which the fallen will might succumb along the way, so are there a great many errors into which the fallen intellect might stumble, as it labors to know the existence of God with nothing but its abstract powers.⁹²

Conclusion

While *ST Ia*, q. 2, ar. 1, appears as a straightforward treatment of Anselm when abstracted from its mid-13th-century context, even a short study of theologians from the preceding decades suggests that the text is also, and perhaps principally, a careful and deliberate contribution to a specific conversation about divine illumination which was well-established among Franciscan theologians at the time when Aquinas was writing. In this context, the words and phrases of Anselm had long since been abstracted from their original context and reworked to support critical receptions of Oxford and Paris illumination theory in the *Summa Halensis*, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure. Read in this light, Aquinas' mature work offers his own critical reception of Oxford and Paris illumination theory, in which the possible intellect of Adam received the impression of intelligible species both by nature and by grace, and his agent intellect received an influx of light from God. At the Fall, sin removed our access to the illumination of the possible intellect by grace; concupiscence removed our access to the illumination of the possible intellect by nature; but the illumination of the agent intellect survived to form the basis of our ability to abstract intelligible species from corporeal effects.

Since Aquinas thinks that, in both the pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian state, God's existence has to be demonstrated by acts of judgment and reasoning from intelligible species, q. 2, ar. 1, carefully criticizes the arguments of Bonaventure and the *Summa Halensis* that God's existence is naturally known prior to demonstration, by drawing upon Rufus' criticism of Anselm's argument in *Proslogion 2*, as well as a modified version of the *Summa Halensis*' argument that God can be naturally known as the object of desire. The text of q. 2, ar. 1, thus serves as an important

⁹² *ST Ia*, q. 1, ar. 1, co. (Leon., 4:6).

part of Aquinas' contribution to the common mid-13th-century goal of developing an Aristotelian-Augustinian account of human understanding. In that light, it also functions as a hinge between question 1 (on theology in general) and the articles that follow it in question 2 (on the demonstration of God's existence). It situates the beginning of theology within the broader context of divine illumination and identifies the starting point for the fallen intellect in knowing and naming God.

Theo Kobusch

The Possible and the Impossible: *Potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* Under Close Scrutiny

Abstract: The medieval debates about the ‘absolute’ and ‘ordained’ power of God highlight the different meanings of the concept of possibility. According to the *Summa Halensis*, the *potentia absoluta* involves willing the impossible, namely, that which is not predetermined by any metaphysical or moral order. The *potentia ordinata*, on the other hand, concerns the will for what is possible, whether metaphysically, logically, or morally. John Duns Scotus is famous for dogmatizing the theory of God’s absolute and ordained power. According to his univocal concept of the will, both the divine will and the human will can want something *de potentia absoluta* and *de potentia ordinata*. While ‘ordained power’ refers to actions that are possible within the framework of laws given by God himself, deviation from those laws is possible not only for humans but also for God through the absolute power. Although the *Summa Halensis* is sometimes regarded as a forerunner of Scotus’ approach to absolute and ordained power, this chapter shows that it develops its account only to explain the condition of possibility of human willing. Thus, it does not anticipate Scotus’ idea of an arbitrary God who is capable of deviating from his own laws.

Absolute Power and Moral Power in the *Summa Halensis*

Medieval thinkers no doubt have the modal category of the ‘possible’ in mind when they use the terms ‘power’ (*potentia*) or ‘thinkable’ (*possibile*). There is even direct evidence for this, although in some cases the authors themselves do not seem to be entirely convinced of the convention of speech. William of Auvergne handed down the view of ‘some’ philosophers, according to which the modality of possibility was to be distinguished in the three realms of nature, morality and logic known from the Stoics and also to be given different names. The possible in the realm of nature is the possibility (*potentia*) which is different from reality; the possible in the realm of morality is the power of office (*potestas*); the possible in the realm of logic finally is the conceivable (*possibilitas*).¹ This terminology did not become generally accepted

¹ William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate* 8.33, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976), p. 54; cf. William of Auvergne, *De anima*, in *Opera Omnia* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963) vol. II, pt. 6, p. 92.

in the Middle Ages, but it does show that from the 13th century onwards philosophical sensitivity to what can be called ‘possible’ increases. The *Summa Halensis* also knows the distinction between the logically possible and the possible within the realm of nature.²

This indeed also applies to the concept of divine power and also for human power, as Anselm of Canterbury had already advocated the univocity of moral concepts, and Duns Scotus would shortly thereafter speak of the same structure of human and divine will.³

The Franciscan doctrine of the power of God – i.e. the distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* – has its foundation in the *Summa Halensis*. Here the concept of the power of God, which is called *potentia activa*, nevertheless denotes a possible, which in certain respects resembles the possible of the passive power of matter. Just as prime matter (*materia prima*) is not determined in one form, but is indifferent to all forms (although it is thought of as having a disposition and is therefore already determined), so is the divine active power undetermined in itself, yet determined as a cause, which contains potentially infinite worlds, by a superordinate disposition.⁴

With regard to the impossible, a distinction must be made: the impossible in the arena of human statements or actions always refers to the ‘nature of the matter.’ However, if a possible or impossible is to be indicated in the area of divine foreknowledge or predestination or in the area of the divine at all – i.e. a metaphysical possibility or impossibility – then reference is made to the divine power.⁵ Even if it is

2 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C1 (n. 151), p. 231: ‘Respondeo: Dicendum quod intentio “possibilis” solet dici de dicto et de re subiecta. Secundum quod dicitur de dicto, non pertinet ad praesentem quaestionem, quia dictum “possibile” dicitur respectu veritatis necessariae vel contingentis in dicto, quae quidem fundatur in affirmationibus et negationibus, et secundum omne genus causalitatis.’ Also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C1 (n. 151), p. 232: ‘Dicendum quod possibile secundum naturam dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo, cuius principium est natura sive cuius principium est in natura; alio modo, quod non est a potentia naturae, sed tamen est consuetum ut fiat in natura a causa superiori, secundum quod dicitur “consuetudo est altera natura,” ut creatio et iustificatio et huiusmodi.’

3 Cf. Theo Kobusch, *Selbstwertung und Personalität: Spätantike Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf die Moderne* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), p. 321.

4 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 133), p. 204: ‘Et si obicitur quod in Deo est possibilitas ad infinitos mundos, ergo possibile est infinitos mundos creari: dicendum quod sicut in prima materia est prima potentia passiva, ita in Deo est prima potentia activa; prima autem materia, quantum est de sua prima potentia, non est determinata ad aliquam formam, sed indifferens ad omnes; sed tamen intelligitur materia cum aliqua dispositione: et sic est determinata ad aliquam formam. Similiter dicendum de potentia Dei activa quia est potentia indeterminata, quae se habet ad infinitos mundos et secundum hoc est potentia in causa ad infinitos mundos, et est potentia determinata per dispositionem praeordinatam.’

5 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti1, M4, C3 (n. 233), p. 327: ‘(...) quia in dictis vel factis hominum impossibilitas refertur ad naturam rei, in praescientia et praedestinatione refertur possibilitas vel impossi-

said that before the world came into being, or before the Virgin gave birth, the possibility of these events must have existed previously, in a sense reference is made implicitly to the ‘uncreated power’.⁶ But since the ‘natures’ of things were created by divine omnipotence, they too are dependent on it. That is why everything possible and impossible is determined by divine power. But divine power is either absolute power or ordained power. Thus, the possible and the impossible vary depending on whether they are related to absolute or ordained power.⁷ Yet the divine power is the divine will. For the will is generally a power which is directed towards an aim.⁸ Thus, the power represents the possibility, which the will actively implements.⁹

But what is it, the absolute and the ordered power? The *SH* is characterized by the fact that it approaches this problem very carefully. It clearly distances itself from overly bold theories of omnipotence, according to which God can do anything we could imagine, even in disregard of the law of contradiction. One must – it reads there – while avoiding excessively brisk assertions, answer with all humility and bring to mind that it is the human soul which makes this division of the *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*. If the power of God is understood in the absolute sense, then the human soul ‘could neither determine nor comprehend the infinite sea of His power.’ But if the soul regards the divine power as an ordered power in the sense of power, truth and goodness, then everything is possible to God that does not derogate from its power, truth and goodness: i. e. he could not make himself *de potentia ordinata* greater than he is, because that would confuse the order of power; he could not disregard the law of contradiction, because that would disavow the order of thought; and he could not commit sin, condemn Peter and save Judas, because that would turn the moral order on its head.¹⁰

bilitas ad potentiam Dei, quae eadem semper fuit et erit: praedestinatio enim et potentia in Deo idem sunt.’

6 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–57), vol. 1, d. 43, p. 441: ‘Si vero possibile dicat dispositionem complexi, secundum hoc potest esse verum: “antequam pareret, Virginem parere est possibile;” cointelligitur enim ibi potentia increata, sicut si diceretur: antequam mundus foret, possibile est mundum fore. Ad illud vero quod obicitur: “quod aliquando fuit verum, prius fuit possibile,” dicendum quod verum est secundum quod “possible” dicit dispositionem dicti et connotat potentiam increatam; secundum autem quod notat dispositionem rei subiectae, falsum est.’

7 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M7, C4 (n. 688), p. 1093: ‘Nota ergo quod necessarium opponitur impossibili et diversificatur secundum quod diversificatur impossibile. Impossibile autem et possibile respicit potentiam; potentia autem dicitur vel potentia prima simpliciter vel potentia ordinata.’

8 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 1 (n. 16), p. 15: ‘Nam ex parte eius qui fruitur, accipitur ipsa anima cuius est potentia, et ipsa potentia, et iterum ipsa ut inclinatur in finem et dicitur voluntas.’

9 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 42 (n. 14), p. 432: ‘Sed quia exsecutio potentiae in actum est a voluntate.’

10 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C3 (n. 155), p. 236: ‘[Solutio]: Ad hoc, nihil temere asserendo, cum omni modestia respondendum quod, si potentia Dei concipiatur ab anima absolute, non poterit anima determinare nec capere infinitum pelagus suae potestatis. Sed cum anima speculatur divinam potentiam ut ordinatam secundum conditionem potestatis, veritatis, bonitatis, dico quod possibile Deo est quod

On the other hand, it says that God could *de potentia absoluta* condemn Peter and save Judas.¹¹ How can that go together? How can something be possible *de potentia absoluta* and thus morally permitted, that *de potentia ordinata* is morally prohibited? The thesis, which is advocated in this paper and will be explicated in the following is: in the *SH* we have no dogmatic doctrine of the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* before us. Rather, it is used to be able to explain the possibility of our willing, i.e. the willing of created, rational beings. What is the condition of possibility of our willing? This is the key question of the *SH* in this context. The answer of the *SH* is: for our normal, ‘orderly’ willing we assume the *potentia ordinata*, for our ‘disorderly’ willing the *potentia absoluta*.

In this latter sense the distinction between the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* is also established. The absolute power refers to that which is not predetermined by a divine order; the ordained power, in contrast, refers precisely to this order predetermined by God.¹² At times the *potentia absoluta* is also contraposed with the moral power (*condecencia divinae bonitatis*). The moral in a broad sense includes justice and equality as well as the disposition, i.e. the preordained and compassion.¹³ In relation to this *potentia ordinata* as a moral power, the *potentia absoluta* also appears as a *potentia naturae*. It is called so because it is from this that the will of what is impossible in nature becomes conceivable. Thus, the angel could only want to be everywhere *de potentia naturae*, yet not *de potentia ordinata*, because wanting to be everywhere at the same time would mean wanting to be God, and that is *de potentia ordinata* impossible. It is similarly the case with the possibility of not wanting to die. This possibility is not given for the *potentia ordinata*. This shows that the *potentia absoluta* is the willing of the impossible.¹⁴ Whoever recogniz-

posse potentiae est et non potest quod est impotentiae. Secundum hoc dixerunt, sicut habetur in libro De regulis Theologiae, quod quia contradicit suae potentiae vel veritati vel bonitati, potentiae maiestatis non conveniret ut faceret maiorem se; item, veritati eius contradiceret facere de eodem simul esse et non-esse; item, bonitati eius contradiceret damnare Petrum et salvare Iudam et peccare. Semper ergo cum debet dici aliquid Deo possibile, exigitur quod non detrahat potentiae eius, veritati vel bonitati.’

11 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2 (n. 141), p. 221: ‘De potentia ergo absoluta posset damnare Petrum et salvare Iudam; de potentia vero ordinata secundum praeordinationem et retributionem secundum merita, non posset.’

12 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, M2, C2 (n. 135), p. 207: ‘Distinguitur ergo potentia absoluta [a] potentia ordinata. Potentia absoluta est eorum quorum non est divina praeordinatio; potentia vero ordinata est eorum quorum est divina praeordinatio, hoc est eorum quae a Deo sunt praeordinata sive disposita.’

13 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C3, Ar3 (n. 282), p. 393: ‘Unde distinguendum est, quia in Deo est condecencia potestatis et est in eo condecencia sapientiae et condecencia dispositionis et condecencia aequitatis et condecencia miserationis: haec enim omnia complectitur condecencia divinae bonitatis.’

14 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti2, C5 (n. 44), p. 70: ‘Ad ultimum dicendum quod duplex est potentia: scilicet potentia absoluta, quae dicitur potentia naturae, et potentia ordinata. Sic angelus de potentia naturae posset velle esse in omni “ubi”, sed non de potentia ordinata per gratiam: quia cum nihil posset esse ubique simul nisi Deus, si ipse vellet esse ubique simul, vellet esse Deus; quod non potest velle de potentia ordinata, licet possit de potentia naturae, quia, ut dictum est, ipsa est impossibili-

es a miracle assumes an absolute power superior to nature. For what is impossible in the order of nature – such as that a tree trunk should become a cow – is in a God-revocable order that is above the order of nature, i.e. through the *potentia absoluta*, quite possible.¹⁵

While the eternal punishment of a wrongdoer in hell appears to be possible from the *potentia absoluta* point of view, it is not possible from the standpoint of moral power, because it does not correspond to the overflowing moral goodness of God to punish without mercy.¹⁶ The incarnation of God – i.e. the incarnation as an event in this world – appears to us to be solely possible *de potentia absoluta*, while it is impossible according to the order of the *potentia decens*. As *potentia absoluta*, however, God is only nature or disposition, or only will, i.e. natural will, but not moral will.¹⁷ What the *SH* wants to say is: we cannot integrate the incarnation of God as an event into the order of this world. We can merely explain it as the will of an absolute power. It looks different from the standpoint of faith, which regards everything as necessary in the sense of the non-contingent, that is, as morally necessary. From this point of view the distinction of the two kinds of divine power no longer matters. The incarnation of Christ is a necessity for the believer, even if the ‘cause’ – i.e. the circumstances, time and place, etc. – maintains its contingent character. It is necessary in the sense of the *potentia ordinata*, i.e. the moral power of God, which is the normal exercise of God’s power.¹⁸

um. Loquendo de potentia absoluta, possem ego velle non mori, quia talis voluntas est impossibilium, sed non loquendo de potentia ordinata. Sic angelus de potentia naturae posset velle esse in omni “ubi”, sed non de potentia ordinata per gratiam: quia cum nihil posset esse ubique simul nisi Deus, si ipse vellet esse ubique simul, vellet esse Deus; quod non potest velle de potentia ordinata, licet possit de potentia naturae, quia, ut dictum est, ipsa est impossibilium.’

15 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C4 (n. 156), p. 238: ‘Et causa huius est, quia impossibile per se est de illis impossibilibus quae sunt impossibilia ex ordine naturae, ut truncum fieri vitulum, sunt [autem] possibilia ex ordine revocabili a Deo, qui est supra ordinem naturae.’

16 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, Ar3 (n. 282), p. 396: ‘Ad illud quod quaeritur de punitione aeterna, “an scilicet Deus aliquem possit punire in inferno quantum meruit,” dicendum quod dupliciter contingit loqui de potentia Dei: aut de potentia absoluta aut de potentia secundum condecenciam bonitatis. Loquendo ergo de potentia absoluta, dicendum quod posset; sed non de potentia quae est secundum condecenciam bonitatis, quia non decet suam bonitatem, quae est superabundans, quod ipse puniat absque misericordia.’

17 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol.1, d. 44 (n. 6), p. 448: ‘Licet ergo posset incarnari quoad potentiam absolutam, non tamen quoad potentiam decentem.’ Also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C2, Ar1 (n. 152), p. 234: ‘Alia vero sunt quae non sunt in potentia activa nec passiva, ut ad hoc quod Deus fiat homo, et in iis solus Deus est natura sive dispositio divina sive voluntas.’

18 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M7, C4 (n. 688), p. 1093: ‘Impossibile autem et possibile respicit potentiam; potentia autem dicitur vel potentia prima simpliciter vel potentia ordinata. Quocumque autem modo accipiatur potentia, necessarium est Christum esse incarnandum, secundum quod accipitur pro hoc “ordinatum est quod Christus incarnabitur.” Sed si accipiatur pro hoc “Christus incarnabitur,” distinguendum est, scilicet quod duplicem habet comparationem: unam ad res, et secundum hoc habet contingentiam; alteram ad potentiam ordinatam, et secundum hoc habet necessitatem.’

The possible in the sense of *potentia ordinata* thus encompasses everything that is feasible under the conditions of the majesty law (that is, the law of divine omnipotence¹⁹), the law of contradiction and the law of morality. What is striking is that the law of contradiction represents a limit of the *potentia ordinata*, not the *potentia absoluta*, and this together with other laws. A little later, already with Thomas Aquinas, the law of contradiction was declared the sole limit of the *potentia absoluta*, and in our context that means above all: omitting the moral law.

For the idea and expression of the '*potentia maiestatis*' Alexander refers to the philosophy of the 12th century specially Bernard of Clairvaux but also to Alan of Lille.²⁰ According to this idea is it the 'power of majesty'. So, God can do everything that does not represent an inability or a non-allowance (*non decere*). Impossible for God is therefore that which lacks the determinateness of the true and the good.²¹ Against this background, the *potentia absoluta* appears as a distant condition in order to explain the possibility of uncertain knowledge on the human side. But it finds its limit in the reality of the divine moral will: 'Even if he can do it *de potentia absoluta*, he only does what befits him.'²² Yet it does not befit God to do or prescribe something outside of the order (inordinate). But then he cannot prescribe evil, because it could only be prescribed out of order: 'So he cannot "fornicate, kill, commit theft" because they are *mala de se* (bad in themselves), and so he cannot prescribe anything against the laws of the Decalogue, which are: You shall not fornicate; you shall not commit theft, etc.'²³ Hence there can be no other order for the divine will

19 See *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q1, p. 715: 'Omnipotentia divinae maiestatis'; *SH* III, In3, Tr8, S1, Q3, Ti1, p. 779: 'Omnipotentia divinae maiestatis'. See n. 23 below.

20 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 34, (n. 5), p. 350. See also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C3 (n. 155), p. 236: 'Secundum hoc dixerunt, sicut habetur in libro De regulis Theologiae, quod quia contradiciti suae potentiae vel veritati vel bonitati, potentiae maiestatis non conveniret ut faceret maiorem se.'

21 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 44 (n. 6), p. 448: 'Ad quod dicimus: Ad notitiam eorum quae hic dicuntur, notandum quod omnia potest Deus quae posse non est "non posse" vel "non decere." Licet ergo posset incarnari quoad potentiam absolutam, non tamen quoad potentiam decentem. Item, quaeritur, si Deus omnia possit, utrum simul possit opposita facere, ut simul in eodem scientiam et ignorantiam. Dicendum quod impossibile dicitur Deo, quod caret ratione veri boni quae, et hoc est impossibile secundum genus; tale autem est prima contradictio et omnis oppositio in quantum habet primam oppositionem. Tale autem est hoc impossibile: facere maiorem se.' See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 42 (n. 11), p. 432: 'Colligitur ergo quod "omnia potest quaecumque posse potentia est; nam quaedam sunt quae magis est omnino non posse quam posse, magis infirmitatis indicia quam maiestatis insignia.'"

22 *SH* II, P1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, Ti2, M2, C5, Ar3 (n. 135), p. 183: 'Licet possit de potentia absoluta, non facit nisi quod decet ipsum.'

23 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 276), p. 381: 'Ergo si non decet Deum aliquid inordinate agere, non faciet hoc ex libertate; sed similiter non decet ipsum praecipere inordinate; ergo si non potest facere nisi quod liberum est et decens, constat quod non potest malum praecipere, cum non possit praecipere nisi inordinate; ergo ista "fornicari, occidere, furtum facere," cum sint mala de se, non potest ista praecipere; et sic non potest praecipere contra praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt: Non fornicaberis, non furtum facies etc.'

besides the moral. This unity and identity of the divine will is expressed in the *SH* in a sentence that will later, in Duns Scotus, be reversed into its opposite: ‘In God the ability *de facto* and the ability *de jure* are identical, insofar as the law means that which befits the divine benevolence.’²⁴

Duns Scotus: Arbitrary Power and Ordained Power

The doctrine of divine power in the *SH* was very influential and determined the thought of the Franciscan tradition to a great extent. I do not need to trace in detail the different ways of reception of this teaching in Bonaventure and in his school, in Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, in Spanish scholasticism, in the 16th century with Puritan theologians in the Netherlands or England, in the 17th century not only with philosophers such as Descartes or Francis Bacon, but also with the jurists and especially in natural philosophy, i.e. in early modern science (with Gassendi, Sir Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle): the works of William J. Courtenay and F. Oakley have already accomplished this feat in a perfect form.²⁵

Duns Scotus also belongs to this great Franciscan tradition. Yet he, indeed, changes everything. The basic thought of the *SH*, that in the case of the two kinds of power – *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* – we are dealing with two

²⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), p. 220: ‘In Deo idem est posse de facto et posse de iure, secundum quod ius dicit concedentiam bonitatis divinae.’

²⁵ See William J. Courtenay, ‘Potentia absoluta/ordinata,’ in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 7 (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), pp. 1157–62; idem, *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Berkeley: P. Lubrina, 1990); F. Oakley, *Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1984); idem, ‘The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Theology,’ *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59 (1998), pp. 437–61; idem, ‘Voluntarist Theology and Early-modern Science: The Matter of the Divine Power, Absolute and Ordained,’ *History of Science* 56 (2018), pp. 72–96. One of the great changes in the minds of the interpreters mentioned by Oakley (‘Voluntarist Theology and Early-modern Science,’ p. 76) is his own shift to theological interpretation. While in his early works of the 1960s (especially about Pierre d’Ailly) none of this was perceptible – although H.A. Oberman’s *The Harvest of Medieval Theology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963) had already been published – he later took over the theological interpretation as presented in the 1980s by Courtenay, Hamm, Greschat et al. of the relationship between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*, which is called the ‘covenantal/dialectical theory.’ This interpretation is theological because, from other contexts, it uses the idea of the covenant or the idea of promise or the later concept of God’s self-commitment as a theological measure to make the relationship between the two types of power appear orthodox. The term ‘dialectic’ is also rather misleading, since neither the relationship of the *potentia ordinata* to the *potentia absoluta* nor the inverse relationship is to be thought of as a necessary change of the one into the other, but only subject to the unsearchable divine will.

forms of the possible, he explicitly adopts.²⁶ Yet what the *SH* develops, as it were, as a transcendental groundwork becomes a dogmatic doctrine in Duns Scotus. This becomes clear in distinction 44 of the first book of *Sentences*, indeed in the *Ordinatio* as well as in the *Lectura* and the *Reportatio Parisiensis*.²⁷ What Duns Scotus develops in this distinction is nothing less than the theory of arbitrary will, which is not bound by any law other than the law of contradiction. Yet, compared to the *SH*, this is already a fundamental change: while in the *SH* the *potentia ordinata* has its limit in the already enacted laws (i. e. in the law of majesty [*potential*]), in the law of logic (i. e. the law of contradiction and in moral law), according to Duns Scotus the divine *potentia absoluta* (i. e. the field of the real possibilities) is now only limited by the law of contradiction.

The Scotist distinction 44 of the first book of *Sentences* begins with a philosophical-theological sensation: ‘Not only in God, but in every free agent’ (i. e. particularly in human will) the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* are to be distinguished – and thereby that which the jurists distinguish as *de facto* and *de jure*.²⁸ Here Scotus’ univocal concept of will is clearly recognizable in the background. In several passages he explicitly adverts to the same structure of the divine and human will. Thus the human will is also characterized by that indeterminateness by virtue of which it can determine itself by itself whether to pursue opposite, even contradictory possibilities.²⁹ Furthermore, the human will, just as the divine, can be regarded as the reason for contingency.³⁰ Duns Scotus goes even further in this parallelization. He says that ‘now in each and every future moment as in the very first’ God could establish a new order, just as we can act differently at any moment than we do.³¹ The distinction 44 proceeds from this univocal concept of will. The explanation of the conceptual pair *potentia absoluta/ordinata* following it has remained valid for centuries: the absolute power of God is the possibility given to the divine will, outside of the law given by God and, as the case may be (namely in that of human will) also to act ‘against’ it. This action is nonetheless ‘ordinate’, of course not according to the old order, but according to another moral order which the divine will establishes.³² The moral order is therefore something which has been established by the absolute divine will. One could call this moral positivism. In the case of the deviation from a given law the divine action nevertheless remains lawful, namely ac-

²⁶ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* IV, d. 1, q. 5 (n. 2), in *Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Vivès (Paris: L. Vivès, 1891), 13:559a: ‘Aliquid autem est possibile Deo dupliciter: vel secundum potentiam absolutam, (...) aut secundum potentiam eius ordinatam.’

²⁷ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–2017).

²⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (Vat. 14:363f.).

²⁹ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pt. 2, q. 1 (n. 298) (Vat. 4:324).

³⁰ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I, d. 40, q. 1 (n. 8) (Vivès, 22:475).

³¹ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* III, d. 18, q. 3 (n. 6) (Vivès, 23:393).

³² John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (Vat. 6:366): ‘Non quidem fieret ordinate secundum istum ordinem, sed fieret ordinate secundum alium ordinem, quem ordinem ita posset voluntas divina statuere sicut potest agere.’

according to another law, for God can ‘change the law’ and respectively establish another. And it is precisely this determination through the will alone, which constitutes the ‘rightfulness’ of the law.³³ Hereby Duns Scotus thinks of the absolute divine power as well as the power of the absolute ruler.³⁴

With regard to the definition of the terms *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*, we have the following basic constellation, which has been established by Duns Scotus and which increases in sharpness and clarity in the course of nominalism, so that finally in Pierre d’Ailly, at the peak of this development, the last limit of divine omnipotence, namely the principle of contradiction, no longer applies: the ‘ordained power’ means the possible action within the frame of the laws given by God Himself. The divergence from these laws is possible for the divine as well as the human will through the absolute power. In the case of the human divergence from law, we are dealing with the phenomenon of ‘guilt’. The divine divergence from its own laws, which does not occur according to any particular rule or law known to us, is instead understood as the sovereign establishment of a new order. Both kinds of divergence are an expression of arbitrariness. It is a form of ‘freedom without reason’ or ‘abstract freedom without necessity,’ which reigns here, and exactly these G.W.F. Hegel later names ‘arbitrariness’ (*Willkür*) as opposed to true freedom, which coincides with a particular form of necessity.³⁵ Arbitrariness of that kind owes itself to the unholy alliance of power-ideology and voluntarism.

It is hardly disputed that in the work of Duns Scotus we are dealing with a form of voluntarism. Yet it is controversial whether it is a voluntarism mitigated by a kind of rationalism or an ‘unmitigated voluntarism’. Thomas Williams has chosen one of the most voluntaristic-sounding *Sentences* in Scotus as the point of departure for his verification of the ‘unmitigated voluntarism’: ‘Everything different to God is good, be-

33 John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 44 (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–2017), 17:535: ‘Sed si illa (scilicet lex) subsit voluntati suae, bene potest de potentia absoluta quod non potest de potentia ordinata secundum illam legem; si tamen sic operetur, erit ordinata secundum aliam legem, – sicut, ponatur quod aliquis esset ita liber (sicut rex) quod possit facere legem et eam mutare, tunc praeter illam legem de potentia sua absoluta aliter potest agere, quia potest legem mutare et aliam statuere.’ Idem, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (n. 3) (Vat. 6:364): ‘In omni agente libere – qui potest agere secundum dictamen legis rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra eam – est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam et absolutam.’ Idem, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (Vat. 6:366): ‘Ideo sicut potest aliter agere, ita potest aliam legem rectam statuere, – quae si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus a voluntate divina acceptante est statute.’

34 John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1 (nn. 3–7) (Vat. 6:364 sqq.); idem, *Lectura* I, d. 44, q. 1 (Vat. 17:535 sq.); idem, *Lectura* II, d. 7, q. 1 (nn. 26–28) (Vat. 19:8 sq.).

35 See also Thomas Williams, ‘The Unmitigated Scotus,’ *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 80:2 (1998), p. 10: ‘Obviously, though, the principle once again seems to imply a certain arbitrariness on God’s part.’ For the opposition of arbitrariness and true freedom, see Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, in *Werke in 20 Bänden*, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 65–66; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, in *Werke in 20 Bänden*, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 18 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 45.

cause it is willed by God and not the other way around.' He has convincingly shown the voluntaristic background of transcendental and moral goodness. Great efforts have been made recently to exonerate Duns Scotus from the charge of 'unmitigated voluntarism'.³⁶ Allen Wolter, Mary Beth Ingham, Richard Cross, and in Germany particularly Ludger Honnefelder and his colleagues have tried to 'mitigate' the Scotist voluntarism, which is not contested by anyone.³⁷ In most cases, this is done by referring to the *recta ratio*, which plays a major role in the process of willing. Yet final doubts remain: there are indications that right reason (*rechte Vernunft*) does not have the last word, but instead is subordinated to the divine will,³⁸ so that here we have before us an indication of that sentence by William of Ockham, which from an authoritative source had been designated as the origin of the so-called 'ethics of divine command': 'Solely because the divine will wants this, the right reason orders that one should want it.' Consequently, in this connection the *recta ratio* is regarded as the 'second-order moral principle'.³⁹

36 The accusation that has always been raised has been renewed in an essay by Thomas Williams (see Williams, 'The Unmitigated Scotus') and in other works.

37 Allen B. Wolter, 'The Unshredded Scotus: A Response to Thomas Williams,' *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77:3 (2003), pp. 315–56; Mary Beth Ingham, 'Letting Scotus Speak for Himself,' *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10:2 (2001), pp. 173–216; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 190, n. 50; Ludger Honnefelder, *Woher kommen wir? Ursprünge der Moderne im Denken des Mittelalters* (Berlin University Press: Berlin, 2008), pp. 188–206; Isabelle Mandrella, *Das Isaak-Opfer: Historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Rationalität und Wandelbarkeit des Naturrechts in der mittelalterlichen Lehre vom natürlichen Gesetz*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge, Bd. 62 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002), pp. 132–50. On the other hand, Mandrella, *Das Isaak-Opfer*, as well as in other works has gained the merit, to have drawn attention to the anticipation of the *etsi Deus non daretur* principle – which is usually only associated with the name Hugo Grotius – in Gregory of Rimini and thus in a kind of Platonism at the height of the period of voluntarism. See for example Isabelle Mandrella, 'Die Autarkie des mittelalterlichen Naturrechts als Vernunftrecht: Gregor von Rimini und das etiamsi Deus non daretur-Argument,' in *Herbst des Mittelalters? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Jan Aertsen and Martin Pickavé (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), pp. 265–76. Another mitigating tendency towards voluntarism also can be found in H. Möhle, *Ethik als Scientia practica nach Johannes Duns Scotus: Eine philosophische Grundlegung*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge, Bd. 44 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1995), which for the first time opened up to us the world of Scotist practical philosophy. Strikingly – since they both want to 'mitigate' voluntarism – Möhle, *Ethik*, p. 361, agrees with Wolter, 'daß das Naturgesetz nur insofern verpflichtenden Charakter hat, als es von Gott gewollt wird' ['that the law of nature is only binding in so far as it is willed by God.']

38 See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio 1 A*, d. 44, q. 2, in *Johannes Duns Scotus: Pariser Verlesungen über Wissen und Kontingenzen*, ed. and trans. Joachim R. Söder (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 206: 'Nihil est melius simpliciter recta ratione quin in quantum volitum a Deo. (...) Unde auctoritas nihil vult dicere nisi quod quodcumque Deus fecit, hoc scias eum recta ratione fecisse; omnia enim quaecumque voluit fecit.'

39 William of Ockham, *Ordinatio I*, d. 41, q. 1, in *Guillelmi de Ockham. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum: ordinatio, distinctiones XIX–XLVIII*, eds. Girard I. Etzkorn and Francis E. Kelly (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1979), p. 610. For the later reception of the sentence in vol-

What can furthermore be seen as an indication of an ‘unmitigated voluntarism’ is the fact that in connection with the question of the validity of natural law, in Duns Scotus precisely the intellectual constellation surfaces, which will later determine the discussion at the height of the voluntaristic development with a historical reminiscence of the so-called dilemma of Euthyphro. Already in Scotus the voluntaristic position is contraposed with the opinion according to which the good is a good in and of itself: ‘The good is good indeed not because it is prescribed, or bad because it is forbidden (like the instruction not to eat the apple), but rather conversely, because it is good it is prescribed.’⁴⁰ It is argued against this position in the name of voluntarism: ‘if all instructions of the Decalogue innately had such an intrinsic goodness, then God could not dispense with them because they would not be subject to the divine will (...) yet, if furthermore the opposite act were innately bad in itself, then it would thus follow that the law would not be within the divine power, but instead exist above it (...).’⁴¹ Hence we already have here in Duns Scotus this classical constellation which will characterize the later voluntarism as such: on one side the Platonic being-in-itself (*An-sich-Sein*) of good and evil, on the other side the dependence of the prescriptions of the Decalogue of the divine will.

In the background of this issue lies the question raised by Plato if the good is good because the gods will it, or if they will the good because it is good and valuable in itself. Platonism of all times has always taken the latter position: what good and evil are, cannot be traced back to a will (not even that of the gods) as their reason. The theological voluntarism of the 14th and 15th centuries has performed a complete turn-around on this question. It is immediately noticeable in that the initial Platonic question – if the good is good because the gods will it or if the gods will it because it is good – is now in the times of voluntarism answered in opposition to the spirit of Platonism.⁴² A sentence directed against Plato, which is circulated throughout the entire Nominalist movement, reads in Pierre d’Ailly, so to speak on the pinnacle of voluntarism thus: ‘God prescribes the good not because it is good nor forbids the bad because it is bad, but instead it is good, because it is bidden and bad because it is forbidden.’⁴³ It reads similarly in Gabriel Biel from the perspective of moral positivism: ‘Not because something is righteous or just is it willed by God, but because

untarism see especially J.M. Idziak, Introduction to Andrew of Neufchateau, O.F.M., *Questions on an Ethics of Divine Commands*, ed. and trans. J.M. Idziak (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. xi–xliii, on p. xx.

40 John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* III, d. 37 (Vat. 21:350): ‘Non enim ideo sunt bona quia praecipuntur, vel mala quia prohibentur (sicut praeceptum “de non comedendo pomum”), sed magis e converso “quia bona, ideo praecepta.”’

41 John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* III, d. 37 (Vat. 21:352).

42 See further Theo Kobusch, *Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. 5 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), pp. 481–82, 491.

43 Pierre d’Ailly, *In Sent.* I, q. 14, ar. 1b, in *Questiones super libros sententiarum* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968): ‘Nec ideo precipit (Deus) bona quia bona sint, vel prohibet mala quia mala sint, sed (...) ideo bona sunt quia precipiuntur, et mala quia prohibentur.’

God wills it, it is just and righteous.⁴⁴ The formulation, which as such goes back to an older tradition, in the times of voluntarism presents the alternative in its contrary exclusiveness, while a compatibility was otherwise conceivable.⁴⁵ There is not good or evil in itself which God necessarily loves or hates, but instead all positive moral qualities are what they are because of the love (i. e. the ‘acceptance’) of God. And correspondingly all negative moral qualities are not despicable because of their nature – i. e. in themselves detestable to God – not even the hate of God itself, but instead they are credited to man as eternal punishment ‘solely on the basis of the pure divine will.’⁴⁶

As we have seen already in Duns Scotus, the notions of arbitrariness, of moral positivism and the unpredictability of the divine will connected with them, lie at the center of voluntarism. The criticism of this voluntaristic conception which already begins in the Middle Ages confirms this in an effective manner. As I have expounded upon this in detail elsewhere, I can here limit myself to references.⁴⁷ The famous *etsi Deus non daretur* argument, which stems from Gregory of Rimini, is the first form of the criticism of voluntarism. It lies at the core of a Platonic position: even if there is no divine will, the validity of the moral laws is not questioned.⁴⁸

The severest and most sustained criticism of theological voluntarism comes from large parts of modern philosophy. The Cambridge Platonists, above all R. Cudworth, yet also H. More, G. Rust and others, the English deists (A. Collins, M. Tindal, Th. Morgan), Leibniz, C. Wolff and his school, and not least the whole tradition of classical German philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) submit the voluntaristic doctrine to an unambiguous criticism: the moral good is not good, because God wills it; it is desired by any will, because it is good in itself. Closely connected with this is the tenet of the univocity of the moral, which is clearly formulated by the Cambridge Platonists and adopted by the others. It too is directed against voluntarism.

44 Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium* I, d. 17, q. 1, dub. 4, 44–45, in *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. W. Werbeck (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), p. 423; Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium* II, d. 37, ar. 3, dub. 1, (Werbeck, p. 643).

45 For the history of the formulation, see Jacob Schmutz, ‘Was Duns Scotus a Voluntarist? Juan Carmuel Lobkowitz against the Bratislava Franciscans,’ *Filosofický časopis* (2016), pp. 147–84, esp. p. 152.

46 Pierre d’Ailly, *In Sent.* II, principium D (cf. *In Sent.*, principium E and *In Sent.* II, princ. Q): ‘Nullum est ex se peccatum sed precise quia lege prohibitum.’ *In Sent.* I 9 R: ‘Nullum est bonum vel malum quod Deus de necessitate sive ex natura rei diligit vel odiat. (...) Nec aliqua qualitas est ex natura rei iusticia sed ex mera (...) Acceptatione divina.’ *In Sent.* I 9 P: ‘Nec odium Dei nec alius quicumque actus culpabilis est Deo odibilis ex natura rei sive ex sui natura. Patet: nullus talis actus deceptatur ad vitam aeternam vel imputatur ad penam aeternam nisi ex mera voluntate divina.’

47 Theo Kobusch, ‘Das Moralische: Der absolute Standpunkt: Kants Metaphysik der Sitten und ihre Herausforderung für das moderne Denken,’ in *Freiheit nach Kant: Tradition, Rezeption, Transformation, Aktualität*, eds. S. Josivovic and J. Noller (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 54–92; idem, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität*, pp. 323–33; idem, ‘Wer Großes will, muß sich beschränken können’: *Vom Wesen des Moralischen* (Basel: Schwabe, 2018), pp. 27–31.

48 Cf. Kobusch, *Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters*, pp. 423–25, 490–93.

Finally, another idea directed against voluntarism was born in the 17th and 18th centuries, within the so-called ‘second’ or ‘Spanish scholasticism’, from where it was adopted in the other philosophical systems. This is the idea of the modalities proper to the realm of the moral. The possibility within this realm is what Kant calls the ‘permitted’ (*Erlaubtes*), while the ‘moral necessity’, which also determines the willing of God (Leibniz: *necessitas moralis ad optimum*), is the highest form of freedom. This tenet too is frontally directed against the theological voluntarism.⁴⁹

To summarize: The *etsi Deus non daretur* argument, the principle of univocity of the moral and the principle of moral necessity confirm *ex negativo* that the god of voluntarism is a god of arbitrariness, i.e. a god who deals with reasons which are known only to him and are beyond our research, who always acts orderly, but can change the ‘orders’, including the moral order, whose will is the reason for all contingency, without him being bound to a kind of necessity (as e.g. the moral necessity), with the exception of the law of contradiction. The god of voluntarism is, like the absolute ruler, unpredictable. The origins of such absolute power can be found in the thought of Duns Scotus, more specifically in his doctrine of the *potentia absoluta*, not in the *SH* nor in the early Franciscans – *quod erat demonstrandum*.

⁴⁹ Regarding the idea of moral necessity see Sven K. Knebel, *Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550–1700* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000); idem, ‘Necessitas Moralis ad Optimum (I): Zum historischen Hintergrund der Wahl der besten aller möglichen Welten,’ *Studia Leibnitiana* 23 (1991), pp. 3–24; idem, ‘Necessitas Moralis ad Optimum (II): Die früheste scholastische Absage an den Optimismus: Eine unveröffentlichte Handschrift Jorge Hemelmans S.J. von 1617,’ *Theologie und Philosophie* 67 (1992), pp. 514–35; idem, ‘Necessitas Moralis ad Optimum (III): Naturgesetz und Induktionsproblem in der Jesuitenscholastik während, des zweiten Drittels des 17. Jahrhunderts,’ *Studia Leibnitiana* 24:2 (1992), pp. 182–215.

Richard Cross

The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in the *Summa Halensis* and its Place in the Later History of Christology

Abstract: The aim of this chapter is not to give a complete overview of the *Summa*'s understanding of the metaphysics of Christology. Rather, the goal is to focus on the most distinctive claims to be found in the text, and to try to show what effect they had on the later tradition up to William of Ockham. That said, the two most distinctive claims that the text makes also turn out to be on the two topics most central to an account of the metaphysics of the Incarnation: that is to say, the nature of the union between the natures, and the nature of subsistence – why it is that the human nature does not itself count as a subsisting person. This chapter deals with the two topics in turn, and then shows how the *Summa*'s insights were developed (and sometimes rejected) in its three most important readers: Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Scotus.

The Christology of the *Summa Halensis*

Varieties of Union

Alexander's *Glossa* takes as its metaphysical starting point Alan of Lille's attempt in his *Regulae theologiae* to situate the hypostatic union in a general taxonomy of the kinds of union – one which Alan seems to have based on a reading of Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, chapter 10. The *Summa* follows it closely, using the classification as an account of the ways in which, as the *Summa* puts it, things can be 'substantially one'.¹ Alan distinguishes cases of aggregation (*appositio*) from non-aggregative unions. Aggregative unions are such that the things collected together 'do not make one thing,' and such that 'there is no composition from them.'² Aggregations are divided into four sorts: those in which there is neither shar-

¹ See Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, p. 83a. Much of Alan's text is quoted verbatim in Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954), vol. III, d. 7, n. 6, p. 96; in the second redaction it is ascribed (wrongly) to Gilbert of Poitiers: *Glossa* III, d. 7, n. 19, p. 96 (suggesting that Alexander was not aware of its ultimately Aristotelian origin).

² Alan of Lille, *Regulae theologiae*, c. 100, n. 1, in N.M. Häring (ed.), 'Magister Alanus de Insulis, *Regulae caelestis iuris*,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 48 (1981), pp. 97–226, on p. 205.

ing of properties nor the denomination of one by the other;³ those in which there is sharing of properties;⁴ those in which there is denomination;⁵ and those in which one predominates over the other such that the other is ‘absorbed by it.’⁶ (Alan’s examples of each: two stones next to each other; a hand taking on the scent of an apple that it is grasping; a man wearing a cloak [thus becoming a ‘cloaked man’]; and a drop of wine poured into the Seine – of which only the Seine survives.) I assume that cases in which one of the components gains both property and denomination from the other would count as one of the non-aggregative unions outlined next in the discussion. Such unions, indeed, are in turn divided into three kinds: mixtures, in which the components are destroyed and a third kind of thing produced;⁷ cases in which the union results in a third thing without the components being destroyed;⁸ and cases in which one thing is made to belong to another.⁹ (Alan’s examples: a mixture of water and honey, in which [supposedly] neither the water nor the honey survives; body and soul resulting in a human being; and ‘a shoot united to a tree by grafting [*insitionem*], through the medium of heat and a humor.’) The last of these best models the Incarnation:

The body and soul are united to the Son of God, not such that they are the Son of God, but instead such that they belong to the Son of God; and not such that the Son of God consists of them along with something else; but the two natures are in the one person, the divine [nature] remaining divine and the human remaining human.¹⁰

So here the human nature is united to the Son of God by being made to belong to him in the relevant way. As far as I know, incidentally, this is the first case in which the instance of grafting is used as a model for the Incarnation.

The *Summa* follows this analysis closely, tidying up details as it goes. Cases of substantial unity are divided into two broad kinds, *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*. The latter correspond to Alan’s aggregations, divided into three kinds: cases in which one component gains neither property nor denomination from the other; cases in which the one gains property but not denomination from the other; and cases in which the one gains denomination but not property from the other.¹¹ (Examples of each: two stones in a heap [*acervo*]; ‘an apple or something aromatic in the hand’ – the hand gains a property of the apple without being an apple; and someone

³ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 1 (Häring, p. 205).

⁴ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 2 (Häring, p. 205).

⁵ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 2 (Häring, p. 205).

⁶ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 4 (Häring, p. 205).

⁷ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 5 (Häring, p. 206).

⁸ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 6 (Häring, p. 206).

⁹ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 7 (Häring, p. 206).

¹⁰ Alan of Lille, *Regulae*, c. 100, n. 7 (Häring, p. 206).

¹¹ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, p. 83a.

clothed.¹²) There are four ways in which two things can be one *simpliciter*. Two such ways are incompatible with the survival of both components: either one is destroyed (and the other preserved – a particular case of predominance), or, contrariwise, both are destroyed. The remaining two ways require the preservation of both components' natures: first, cases in which the two components constitute a third thing distinct from themselves; and, secondly, cases in which they fail to do so, such that the one is made to be 'of (*de*) the other' – according to the *Summa*, another kind of predominance.¹³ (Examples of each: a large amount of wine mixed with a small amount of water – of which only the wine survives; a mixture of water and honey; the union body and soul resulting in a human being; and the case in which 'a shoot of pear is united to a tree in which it is grafted, be it an apple or other [tree].')

The taxonomy is neater than Alan's: in particular, the predominance case is far better thought of as a case of union *simpliciter*: one substance results, after all; and, equally, it does not really seem plausible to think of such cases – in which, after all, one of the substances does not survive – as a case of the aggregation or apposition of two substances. Equally, the *Summa* makes clear what Alan's view presupposes but does not make explicit: that the relevant grafting case must involve two distinct species if it is to model the Incarnation. Indeed, the *Summa* goes into much more detail on the crucial cases:

In grafting, the predominant [component] draws (*trahit*) the other to its unity, such that [the latter] is of it, but is not it. So in the union in which [just] one [component] is altered, there is a union in the one which draws the other to its nature. In the union in which both are altered, there is a union in a third – that is, a third nature – which third is effected or conected from them. But in the union in which one is of the other, as in a union by grafting, there is a union in one hypostasis, such that there is one hypostasis of two natures. Hence after they are united by grafting there is, of the pear and the apple grafted onto the same trunk, the same hypostasis – that is to say, the same tree – which has two utterly different natures, and there is one hypostasis, not [one] nature.¹⁴

The idea is that the apple-pear hybrid has two natures while remaining just one tree. I assume that the trunk should be either that of what is predominantly an apple tree or predominantly a pear tree, else there would be no explanation of the way in which the one 'draws the other to its unity': there would, in other words, be no explanation of the way in which the tree itself persists through the change.

The applicability of the model is likewise spelled out with considerable precision (albeit with a rather fanciful bit of scriptural exegesis, added by the authors of the *Summa* to their two sources):

¹² *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, p. 83a-b.

¹³ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, p. 83b.

¹⁴ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, pp. 83a-84b. For the grafting example, see too Odo Rigaldus, *In Sent.* III, d. 7 (MS Bruges, Openbare Bibliotheek, lat. 208, fol. 372ra).

In this way it should be said (...) that the union of the humanity to the deity is that in which one is *of* the other, and not that in which one is the other or in which one thing (namely, a third), is from them. So Blessed James (1:21) says ‘Receive with meekness the engrafted Word,’ that is, the Son of God united to the human nature. And since the divine person is predominant in this union, it draws (*trahit*) the human nature to the unity of its hypostasis. So the human nature is not a part of the divine person, but is of him, since there is one hypostasis of each [nature], and the integrity of each nature is preserved.¹⁵

Elsewhere, the *Summa* speaks of this unity in terms of a relationship of the human nature to the divine *esse*: the human nature ‘is grafted into the Word such that he draws (*trahit*) the human nature to the *esse* of his hypostasis, and that [the nature] is of his hypostasis as a pear is of the hypostasis of the apple [tree], while the nature of a pear is not the nature of an apple.’¹⁶ And, slightly less clearly, ‘the human nature goes (*transit*) from divine *non-esse* to divine *esse* (*de non-esse divino ad esse divinum*) by union with the Word in one person and in the one *esse* of the person.’¹⁷ Unfortunately, the *Summa* does not develop an account of *esse* such that these suggestions could provide any real way of understanding the mechanics of the hypostatic union.

Both of these cases (grafting and incarnation) involve an action – uniting. In the Aristotelianism of the *Summa*, actions have corresponding passions: ‘to assume is like an action, and to be assumed like a passion.’¹⁸ In his discussion of the grafting case, Alan of Lille offers some detail on the relevant process: it is brought about by means of the heat and humors of the tree. The *Summa* does not bother with the natural case. But it asks a rather deeper question about the supernatural case: is it immediate, not (of course) in the sense of having no efficiently causal explanation, but in the sense of lacking any *formal* explanation over and above the things united – which is to say, the divine person and the human nature? The *Summa* distinguishes between a ‘medium of necessity’ and a ‘medium of congruity’. The former ‘ties the extremes’;¹⁹ the latter ‘implies an order in the extremes.’²⁰ It is the first that is of interest here: ‘If we speak of a medium of necessity between the uncreated spiritual substance that is the deity and the corporeal created [substance] in Christ, there was no medium.’²¹ In line with this, the *Summa* maintains that what ties the natures in Christ is simply the divine person (‘the person binds and ties [*vincit et ligat*] the natures’).²² And not only is there no created relation between the two natures; there is no created relation between the human nature and the divine person either:

15 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Solutio, p. 84a.

16 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C7, Ar2 (n. 64), Solutio, pp. 94b-95b.

17 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C7, Ar1 (n. 63), Ad obiecta 3, p. 93b.

18 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C1 (n. 30), Ad obiecta 5, p. 49b.

19 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C3 (n. 34), Respondeo, p. 53a.

20 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C3 (n. 34), Respondeo, p. 53b.

21 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C3 (n. 34), Respondeo, p. 53b.

22 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C6 (n. 62), Ad quod sic c, p. 90a.

When it is said that this tree is united to a shoot, we can consider this tree both as a thing of a nature (*res naturae*) and as an individual (...). And as it is a thing of a nature, it is in this way the extreme of the union; but as it is an individual, in this way it is the medium of the union, because in this way it is that in which the union is made, for this thing, that is, the tree, is united to the shoot in individuality or in hypostasis. Likewise, the Son of God, understood as a thing of nature, is the extreme of this union; but as he is a person, in this way he is the medium of that union, because the Word is united to the human nature in person.²³

What the *Summa* here argues is that there is a tie between the human nature and the divine nature (that is to say, ‘the Son of God understood as a thing of nature’): and that tie is simply the Son of God himself. But there is no further tie – for example, between the Son of God and the human nature.

The position has the odd but natural consequence that the Son of God is both the end term of the relation (to the human nature) and the relation itself – a view that the *Summa* takes from Odo Rigaldus:

To (...) the argument in which it is objected that nothing is terminated on itself, it should be said that this is true [of a thing understood] under the same description (...). But it should be said that the person who is the Son of God, as he is a thing of a nature, is in this way the end term of the union; but as he is a person, in this way is the medium and the end term of the union, and thus he is terminated on himself, but under a different description (*differt secundum rationem*).²⁴

The Son of God, considered as being the same as the divine nature, is the end term of the relation; but considered as that item in which the natures are united, he is himself the relation or tie between the natures.

Elsewhere the *Summa* expresses the immediacy of the union between person and nature by means of a rather striking metaphor: ‘The union of the Word to the flesh does not bring about a change in the Word, but there is a change merely in the humanity, which now receives the “ray” of divinity and previously did not. For this reason, there is no change in the eternal light.’²⁵ The human nature is in immediate contact with the ‘light’ that is the Word. The text talks of the reception of a ‘disposition’ in this context; but, evidently, all that it means is that the nature is changed by its contact with the Word: it is now true that it is immediately united to the *esse* of the Word; prior to the assumption, it was not true.²⁶

The grafting model, as appealed to by the *Summa*, has a crucial limitation. It does, after all, rely on a certain kind of *physical* or *biological* process, and it is questionable whether much sense of it can be made outside that context. As we shall see,

²³ SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Ad obiecta 2, p. 84b.

²⁴ SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Ad obiecta 3, p. 84b; see Odo Rigaldus, *In Sent.* III, d. 6 (MS OBB lat. 208, fol. 368vb).

²⁵ SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C7, Ar1 (n. 63), Solutio, p. 93a.

²⁶ For the view that there is a change in the human nature but not in the Word, see Odo Rigaldus, *In Sent.* III, d. 6 (MS OBB lat. 208, fol. 369va). Rigaldus seems to be a source here for both the *Summa* and for Bonaventure.

the theologian who follows the *Summa* most closely – that is to say, Thomas Aquinas – provides a metaphysical framework that goes some considerable way towards mitigating this worry.

The Nature of Subsistence

Another distinctive feature of the *Summa* that turned out to be highly significant in the later development of Christology is its discussion of the nature of subsistence. It is fair to say that the *Summa* faces in two distinct directions on this topic. The understanding of the nature of subsistence changed radically in the mid-13th century, away from older, juridical, notions, and towards a more metaphysical focus.²⁷ The *Summa* nicely combines both, and was doubtless significant in helping to foster the change – if only, perhaps, as a rather negative example.

The *Summa* paraphrases Richard of St Victor's definition of 'person', but argues that it is, properly speaking, the definition not of 'person' but of 'hypostasis': 'hypostasis is an existence or substance, incommunicable in virtue of certain kinds of distinguishing features (*hypostasis [...] est existentia vel substantia incommunicabilis ex quibuscumque distinguuntibus*).'²⁸ The notion of person adds two further notes: 'A person, both according to the reality and the name of "person" is an incommunicable rational substance, distinct by a property of dignity.'²⁹

A number of things emerge that are worthy of comment. First of all, the authors of the *Summa* evidently hold that properties have a role in individuation: "Individual" is said in two ways: first, individual substance, which is of itself divided from all others; and, secondly, something that has a collection of properties that is never the same in anything else.³⁰ And this latter sense is what explains incommunicability, as we learn from the definition of 'hypostasis' just given. In the same article, we learn that paradigm cases of communicability involve being part of, or united to some further substance (e. g. soul, as joined with a whole human being,³¹ or Christ's human nature as joined to the Word).³² Furthermore, personhood adds two further features to hypostasis: being rational, and having a 'property of dignity'.

Elsewhere, the authors give us an explicit account of these three features (singularity, incommunicability, dignity; for ease of reference I number the *Sentences*):

27 On this, see Theo Kobusch, *Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild* (Freiburg; Basel; Vienna: Herder, 1993).

28 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 52), Solutio, p. 76a.

29 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 52), Solutio, p. 76b.

30 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar3 (n. 52), Solutio, p. 76b.

31 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar4 (n. 53), Ad quod sic 5, p. 77b.

32 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar4 (n. 53), Ad obiecta 5, p. 79a.

1. For the *esse* of a person there is required a three-fold distinction, namely, of singularity, of incommunicability, and of dignity. 2. The distinction of singularity is in a soul while it is in a body: for it is separate (*distans*) from any other soul by a singular property. 3. The distinction of incommunicability is what some singular has, such as this animal, an ass; but a soul existing in a body does not have this, because it and the body communicate in constituting one *esse*. 4. The distinction of dignity is that by which a human being is precisely distinguished from any other [kind]: by individual rationality (*qua purus aliquis homo distinguitur ab alio rationalitate individuali*), which is the property with the greatest dignity (*dignissima proprietas*), because, as Boethius says, ‘the name “person” is suitable for substances of greater dignity.’³³

2. To be singular is, as in the first discussion, to be ‘separate’ from other instances of the same kind. 3. To be incommunicable is not to share with another in the constitution of a kind. 4. And the distinction of dignity is, at least *prima facie*, rationality. But the discussion is a bit misleading, because it turns out that the distinction of dignity is in fact to have whatever in a particular thing is its highest property. And it turns out too that the incommunicability criterion is understood rather precisely, as we shall see, and in such a way as to render the application to Christology *prima facie* rather surprising (again, I number the *Sentences* for ease of reference):

1. For the *esse* of a person is required this three-fold distinction: of singularity, of incommunicability, and of dignity (which is applied according to the property of the greater dignity). 2. We should say therefore that the first distinction – namely, of singularity – is in the soul of Christ, and also in the body. 3. The first and second are in the composite of soul and body, which is denoted when I say ‘this man’, pointing to the composite of soul and body – that is, the singular. 4. The first, second, and third are in Christ the God-man. 5. And although he can have the first and second from the human nature, he can have the third only by reason of the divine person, and thus, in Christ, to be a person is not by reason of the human nature. 6. For the notion of person is taken from the more excellent property, with the greater dignity. 7. But the property in Christ with the greater dignity belongs not to the human nature but to the divine person. 8. For this reason it follows that there is no assumption of a person. 9. For the distinction of persons should be according to that which is found to be most noble in the persons. 10. Since, therefore, because in the assumed man it is most noble to be the Son of God, it follows that personal distinction is in him in virtue of his being one person with the Son of God.³⁴

2. Both Christ’s soul and body are singular, separate from bodies and souls. But 3. they are not incommunicable, since they come together to constitute some further thing – Christ’s human nature. This human nature is incommunicable, since (presumably) it does not come together with anything to constitute a third. (I comment

33 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C4 (n. 35), Solutio, p. 55a, summarizing Boethius, *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, c. 2, in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae; Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana (Munich; Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2000), pp. 212–14.

34 SH IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C4 (n. 35), Solutio, p. 55a-b. For the view that the nature is singular and incommunicable, but lacking in highest dignity, see Odo Rigaldus, *In Sent.* III, d. 5 (MS OBB lat. 208, fol. 366ra).

on its designation here – ‘this man’ – in a moment.) And 4–5. the person has both singularity and incommunicability in virtue of his possession of a singular and incommunicable nature. But 6–7. he has dignity from his person as such – for which reason 8. the human nature does not count as a person.

On the face of it 10., the question is this: in virtue of what is the assumed man a person? But this way of talking (of an assumed man) while traditional, is misleading – as is referring to the assumed nature as ‘this man’ (see 3. above). What is really at stake is this: in virtue of what is the man (Christ, the God-man) a person? And the answer is that he is a person in virtue of whatever is highest in him – that is to say, being the Son of God. In which case, the argument goes, it cannot be the case that a person was assumed.³⁵ Overall, then, the line of reasoning about dignity goes like this. Something is a person in virtue of whatever is their highest property. In standard human cases, it is rationality. But in the case of Christ it is the Son of God. So it is in virtue of the being the Son of God (and not, say, of rationality) that Christ is a person.

Compared with the later discussions that I outline in the remainder of this essay, these distinctions are rather messy. In particular, the incommunicability criterion seems to be too restrictive: we would expect incommunicability, I think, to entail that the human nature lacks incommunicability (precisely because it is drawn to the *esse* of the Word, and thus seems to be a paradigm case of something that would be communicated to another). So the *Summa*’s authors seem to suppose that communication requires at least one of the following two features: jointly ‘constituting one *esse*’, with another; or constituting one thing distinct from either of the components – both of which are satisfied in the body-soul case. And neither is satisfied in the Christological case, since (as we have seen) the only communication is from the Word to the human nature (just as the only communication in the grafting case is from the tree to the shoot); and the human nature and the Word do not constitute something distinct from the Word (just as a tree and a shoot do not constitute something distinct from the tree). An odd by-product of this discussion is the claim that a shoot, grafted or not, is both singular and incommunicable.

The *Summa* makes one further innovative claim that turns out to be important in later debates – and, furthermore, one which seems inconsistent with the notion of incommunicability as thus far adumbrated. An objection explores this notion in the following way:

If it is said that person includes in itself incommunicability with another, either this should be understood according to act or according to power (*potentiam*). If according to act, then the soul separated from the body would be a person. If according to power, then no human being will be a person, since each could be united to God in person.³⁶

³⁵ For the issue, see *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C4 (n. 35), Solutio, p. 55a.

³⁶ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar4 (n. 53), Ad quod sic 5, p. 77b.

Actual incommunicability is failing *de facto* to be communicated to something else. If this is sufficient to make a rational individual a person, then the soul will be a person. Incommunicability ‘according to power’ is necessarily failing to be communicated to something else. If this is the mark of personhood, then no human being is a person, since any human being is possibly communicated to the divine person, by being assumed.

Here the notion of incommunicability is taken to be incompatible with being hypostatically united to the divine person – in line with what I take to be later usage (something I explore in subsequent sections of this paper). The reply does not query this, but seems rather to assume it:

‘Incommunicability’, in the definition (*ratione*) of ‘person’ is said not only by the privation of the act, but also by the privation of an aptitude or disposed potency: but not by the privation of a first potency – as Augustine says, that ‘in the rib there was that from which could be made a woman, but not that from which she was made’³⁷ – which is to say, that there was a potency which is in every creature – namely, an obediential potency (*possibilitas obedientiae*) such that the creator can make from [the creature] whatever he wants – but that there was not there an aptitude or disposed potency. Hence it is that, since in human beings and angels there is no aptitude to union with the Son of God or with something else, there is in them the incommunicability which is required for being a person.³⁸

Perhaps in this inconsistency we see signs of the *Summa*’s status as a committee document.

But still, setting aside worries about the coherence of the two accounts of incommunicability (and, indeed, the perhaps dubious reading of Augustine), the clarification offered here is important. The idea is that any human nature is possibly communicated to the divine person (as the objection supposes): it has an ‘obediential potency’ such that God ‘can make from the creature whatever he wants’ – including supernatural actions such as assuming the nature hypostatically. (The *Summa* does not make this explicit, but clearly its definition of ‘person’ requires that any such assumed nature would cease, on assumption, to be a person. As we shall see, this point is made explicitly by Duns Scotus sixty years later, building on and clarifying what is set out in the *Summa*.) But not only is actual incommunicability required for being a person; so too is an inclination for incommunicability. Persons are naturally such unless prevented by some supernatural divine activity (such as assumption, as in the case of Christ’s human nature). Thus they lack ‘an aptitude or disposed potency’ for assumption.

At one point, the *Summa* highlights an additional feature required for being a person: independence. An objector worries that the notion of existing *per se* – the mark of personhood in rational creatures – requires not being united to anything

³⁷ Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram*, IX, c. 18, n. 34, ed. I. Zycha, CSEL, 48/1 (Prague; Vienna: F. Temp-sky; Leipzig: G. Freytag, 1894), p. 293.12–15.

³⁸ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, C3, Ar4 (n. 53), Ad obiecta 5, p. 79a.

else.³⁹ The *Summa's* reply: existing *per se* requires not being *dependent* on anything else; but it does not require failing to be united to anything else. But 'the Son of God in this union is a *per se* being, because his hypostasis or person does not depend on the human nature.'⁴⁰ The *Summa* does not go on to make the further, related, claim, that there is a sense in which the human nature depends on the divine person – understandably, because on the face of it dependence is a created relation, and the *Summa's* view is that there is no such thing in the case of the Incarnation. As we shall see, however, this move was quickly made by those of the *Summa's* earliest readers who disagreed with the authors on this issue.

It is worth noting something that this account leaves unclear. The characterizations of subsistence thus far offered are all negative: failing to be communicated, failing to be hypostatically dependent. It is not clear whether these state merely necessary conditions for subsistence, or necessary and sufficient conditions. As we shall see, Scotus – who was clearly familiar with these portions of the *Summa* – takes a stand: they are necessary and sufficient. And the account does not make it clear whether or not that lack of an aptitude is supposed to be merely privative, or whether it involves too an aptitude for subsistence. As we shall likewise see, this became a small bone of contention among the Franciscans too.

Thomas Aquinas

The Hypostatic Union

The closest and most immediate follower of the Christology of the *Summa* is not a member of the Franciscan order, but rather the Dominican Thomas Aquinas. What is most distinctive of the *Summa's* view, as I see it, is the claim that the union between the human nature and the divine person is immediate. This insight forms the central pillar of Aquinas' account of the metaphysics of Christology. He argues that the union cannot be accidental, on the grounds that

That which comes after complete *esse* comes accidentally unless it is drawn into the communion of that complete *esse* (*nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi*) (...). But the Word of God had, from eternity, complete *esse* according to hypostasis or person, and the human nature came to him in time – not assumed to one *esse* as that belongs to nature (as the body is assumed to the *esse* of the soul), but to one *esse* as that belongs to hypostasis or person. And for this reason the human nature is not united to the Son of God accidentally.⁴¹

³⁹ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), arg. 1, p. 82a.

⁴⁰ *SH* IV, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), Ad objecta 1, p. 84a.

⁴¹ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2. All references to Aquinas are to the text available at <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>.

Here, in place of the *Summa*'s claim that the human nature is drawn into the communion of the *unity* of the person, Aquinas claims that the human nature is drawn into the communion of the *esse* of the person. This provides Aquinas with a way of theorizing the union that is not open to the *Summa*, since Aquinas has a carefully worked out philosophy of the relation between *esse* and nature into which the case of the Incarnation can slip more or less seamlessly.⁴²

As he sees it, there is a distinction between (individual) nature and *esse* in every creaturely case. Thus, Aquinas holds that there is a sense in which such an individual substance is a *composite* of essence and *esse*: 'Since in God alone is his *esse* his quiddity, it is necessary that, in any creature, be it corporeal or spiritual, there is found quiddity or nature and its *esse* (...) and thus [a creature, be it corporeal or spiritual,] is composed from *esse*, or that by which it is (*quo est*), and that which is (*quod est*)'⁴³ – where, clearly, 'that which is' is essence, individualized and actualized in virtue of its relationship with its *esse*. This passage gets us composition. Elsewhere, Aquinas argues for distinction too: 'it is clear that *esse* is other than essence or quiddity – unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its *esse*.'⁴⁴ In the Christological case, the human nature lacks its proper *esse*, and receives instead the divine *esse*. And this is what it is for the human nature to be hypostatically united to the divine person. Hence Aquinas' famous view that there is only one *esse* in Christ.⁴⁵

In line with this, Aquinas is clear that the union between the human nature and the divine person is immediate:

In the union of the human nature to the divine, there cannot fall a medium formally causing the union, to which the human nature would be joined before being joined to the divine person: just as between matter and form there does not fall a medium in *esse* which is in matter before substantial form is, otherwise accidental *esse* would be prior to substantial *esse*, which is impossible. So between nature and *suppositum* there cannot fall any medium in the way outlined, since each conjunction is to substantial *esse*.⁴⁶

Again, the notion of union in *esse* allows Aquinas to provide something closer to a theory of the hypostatic union than the authors of the *Summa* manage. Here, it is the conjunction of the human nature with the 'substantial *esse*' of the divine person that explains the lack of a 'medium of necessity' (to use the language of the *Summa*).

⁴² Aquinas uses the image of grafting, but not in such a way as to allow it to model the hypostatic union, or to do any metaphysical work. *In Sent.* III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 c: 'The incarnation is compared to grafting: for just as, in a case of grafting onto a trunk in which there was one branch by nature, another branch is added by grafting, so in the same person in which there was by nature the divine nature, there is a human nature by union. But it is impossible for God and a creature to come together in one genus or species, although it is possible by analogy.'

⁴³ Aquinas, *In Sent.* I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 c.

⁴⁴ Aquinas, *De ente*, c. 3.

⁴⁵ See Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 17, a. 2.

⁴⁶ Aquinas, *In Sent.* III, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2 c.

Aquinas agrees with the *Summa* that this communion in *esse* is brought about by a divine action, with a corresponding passion in the human nature.⁴⁷ The *Summa* argues for two further related claims: first, that there is no created relation between the human nature and the divine person; and secondly, that there is no created relation between the human nature and the divine nature. Aquinas, as we have seen, holds that the first union is achieved by communion in *esse*. But he holds that the result of this union is a created relation in the human nature with the divine nature as its end term.⁴⁸ His reason is that the union began to be in time, and thus requires a change on the part of the creature.⁴⁹ Presupposed here, I think, is that the union of the natures cannot be a kind of uncreated communion (the divine nature is not communicated to the human in the way that the divine *esse* is): it is, thus, something created.

The Nature of Subsistence

There is another small but noteworthy difference between Aquinas and the authors of the *Summa* too. According to the latter, as we have seen, dignity is taken to be one of the defining features of persons. Aquinas abandons this last vestige of legally-inspired definitions of ‘person’. An objector reasons that since ‘personhood pertains to dignity,’ it follows that Christ’s human nature must be a person given that it is ‘not of less dignity in Christ than in us.’⁵⁰ Aquinas’ reply subordinates dignity to subsistence, and makes lack of subsistence the Christologically salient feature of Christ’s human nature:

Personhood necessarily pertains to the dignity and perfection of a thing to the extent that it pertains to the dignity and perfection of something that exists *per se*, which is understood in the name of person. But it is of greater dignity for something that it exist in something of greater dignity than itself. For this reason it follows that human nature in Christ is of greater dignity than in us, since in us it exists *per se* as it were, and has proper personhood, whereas in Christ it exists in the person of the Word.⁵¹

Here personhood is associated not with dignity but with its absence.

I think it likely, however, that Aquinas would agree with the authors of the *Summa* in those sections in which they maintain that Christ’s human nature is incommunicable. Having quoted Boethius’ definition of person (as ‘individual substance of rational nature’),⁵² Aquinas includes incommunicability in the scope of in-

⁴⁷ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7 c.

⁴⁸ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 8 c.

⁴⁹ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7 *sed contra* and c.

⁵⁰ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 2 obj. 2.

⁵¹ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2.

⁵² See e.g. Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 2 c.

dividuality.⁵³ And in line with this he associates communicability with the property of being ‘predicable of many *supposita*.’⁵⁴ Christ’s human nature does not have this feature. But Aquinas never says explicitly whether Christ’s human nature is communicable or not.

Bonaventure

The situation in Bonaventure is more complex. First of all, the *Summa* is clearly more important for his overall Christology than it is for Aquinas’: Bonaventure summarizes and develops a number of the discussions found in the *Summa*, as I shall show in a moment. But, secondly, Bonaventure expressly rejects the *Summa*’s central insight, so masterfully developed by Aquinas: the immediacy of the union between human nature and divine person.

Bonaventure repeats precisely the *Summa*’s account of the four kinds of union *simpliciter* (both natures destroyed; one nature destroyed, the other predominant; both natures preserved but mutually dependent; both natures preserved but one predominant), and, just like the *Summa*, sees the last one of these as relevant to the Christological case:

Only in this fourth kind of union is the divine nature united to the human: for since there is no repugnance between the divine nature and the human, there is no transmutation of the one to the other; and because there is no mutual dependence, there is no constitution of a third nature. But because there is the predominance of the one nature (i.e. the divine), it is necessary that the divine nature draws (*trahat*) the human nature to unity. But it cannot draw to unity of nature without transmutation and conversion. Therefore it is necessary that it draws it to unity of person, and that there is one and the same hypostasis of the divine nature and the human, so that the human nature is as it were grounded and substantiated in the divine trunk (*stipite*). And for this reason the union is greatly like the union which is by grafting. It is perhaps (*fortassis*) on account of this that Blessed James says, ‘Receive with meekness the engrafted Word.’⁵⁵

The presence of the quotation from the epistle of James shows that it is the *Summa*, rather than the *Glossa*, that is Bonaventure’s source. His treatment of text, incidentally, is, in its apparent hermeneutical agnosticism, perhaps a bit more plausible than the *Summa*’s. But with one exception the terminology is very close: the human nature is drawn to unity of person by the predominant nature (the divine). The exception is the talk of substantification, which is new, and which, as I shall show in a moment, Bonaventure understands very differently from the way the *Summa* construes the relation between the human nature and the divine person.

⁵³ See Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4.

⁵⁴ Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2.

⁵⁵ Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum (In Sent.)* III, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1 c, in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), vol. III, p. 158a.

Like the *Summa*, Bonaventure speaks of a bond (*vinculum*) between the natures.⁵⁶ But in sharp contrast to the *Summa* – which identifies this bond simply as the uncreated divine person – Bonaventure identifies it as a relation:

The divine person can be made a *suppositum* of human nature merely by a relation of the human nature to him: which relation does not imply anything new in the divine person, but only in the assumed nature, where there is not only denoted to be a relation (*respectus*), but also a unification (*convenientia*) in form: and this cannot be brought about without composition, or some change.⁵⁷

The idea is that there is change or composition in the human nature. (I am not sure what precisely Bonaventure has in mind by ‘*convenientia* in form’: perhaps it is just the hypostatic union of the natures, but the language is not sufficiently specific to allow us to be sure.)

Elsewhere, Bonaventure is more specific, identifying this relation as one of a certain sort of dependence in the human nature:

Just as God, who is in a creature by essence, presence, and power, depends in no way on [the creature], but rather the creature depends on him as on a conserving and sustaining cause, so God, when he is in a rational creature by union, does not depend on [the creature], but rather, contrariwise, the rational creature depends on the divine hypostasis, and is sustained in him as nature is sustained in person.⁵⁸

A number of things emerge from this passage. The human nature depends on the divine person, not in a causal sense, but in the way that a nature depends on a person. And this dependence can be characterized as ‘being sustained’ – which I take it is synonymous with the substantification that Bonaventure talks about in a passage quoted above.

The relation that Bonaventure is talking about is construed by him in terms that resemble the Aristotelian category of relation: specifically, Aristotle’s non-mutual relation in which the reality of the relation is found in merely one of the two *relata*. Thus, he gives a number of typical Aristotelian and Boethian examples of such relations: his beginning to be similar to someone in virtue of his being white by the mere generation of someone else white, ‘without any change made in me [viz. Bonaventure];’ or ‘the similar example posited by Boethius, about left and right,’ in which something begins to be to the left of something else merely in virtue of the motion of the other thing – merely Cambridge changes, as we would say.⁵⁹

The analogy to creation is taken by Bonaventure to provide a way of characterizing the structural features of the dependence relation. In particular, like creation, it

⁵⁶ See Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2 ad 1 et 2 (III, p. 161b).

⁵⁷ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 6, a. 2, a. 1 ad 3 (III, p. 159a).

⁵⁸ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1 c (III, p. 10a).

⁵⁹ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3 (III, pp. 10b-11a). The issue is treated similarly in Odo Rigaldus, *In Sent.* III, d. 6 (MS OBB lat. 208, fol. 369va).

turns out that the dependence relation is not strictly speaking a categorial relation, since these really differ from their subject, and such is not the case for either kind of dependence (being created, being hypostatically sustained). Thus, Bonaventure claims that creation differs merely ‘in reason (*ratione*)’ from the creature itself;⁶⁰ and I take it that the same is true of hypostatic dependence too. They are what later philosophers would label ‘transcendental’ relations: relations that belong in some sense to the substance of the thing. As Bonaventure puts it, ‘the union of the natures is strengthened by such a bond (*vinculo*) that there never was brought about, nor could be, a separation.’⁶¹ Still, we are in a very different Christological world from that of the *Summa*, or of Thomas Aquinas.

Duns Scotus

The Hypostatic Union

Scotus develops Bonaventure’s insights about the dependence of the human nature with scrupulous metaphysical care. Here is the classic statement of his view:

Although it is difficult to see that some dependence could be such, nevertheless all of this can be made clear in some way in a subject and an accident. For an accident has a two-fold relation to its subject or to its substance: namely, 1. of what informs to what is informed (and this necessarily includes imperfection in the informed subject, in that [the subject] has some potentiality with respect to qualified (because accidental) act). It 2. has another [relation] as of what is naturally posterior to what is prior (on which it depends as on a subject, rather than as a cause, because if it has the subject as some kind of cause, it has it as a material cause, and this to the extent that it informs it). If therefore these two relations between an accident and a subject are distinguished from each other, the one is necessarily directed to a subject under the notion of imperfection in the subject, namely, potentiality, whereas the other does not necessarily posit any imperfection in [the subject], but merely natural priority and sustaining (*substantificatio-nem*) with relation to the accident. And the relation which is the dependence of the human nature on the divine person is most similar to this [relation of accidental dependence].⁶²

Whereas Bonaventure simply gestures towards an analogy for the hypostatic union (‘in the way that a nature depends on a person’), Scotus develops a fully-fledged

⁶⁰ See Bonaventure, *In Sent.* II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2 (II, p. 34b).

⁶¹ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 6, a. 2, q. 3 c (III, p. 163a-b).

⁶² Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio (Ord.)* III, d. 1, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 15–16, in Duns Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, eds. C. Balić et al., 21 vols (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1950–2013), vol. IX, pp. 6–7. For extensive discussion of the passage, see my *Communicatio idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates*, Changing Paradigms in Systematic and Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 6–8; see too my *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 5; for earlier medieval developments along the same lines, see Cross, *Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, chs. 3–4.

model for the kind of relation he has in mind: the relation between a substance and an accident. Scotus' strategy is to distinguish different components in this relation, and then show which are applicable to the hypostatic union. Thus, the human nature cannot inform the divine person, since 'informing' is a technical term for a relation that involves the actualization of potentiality in a subject: and God is pure act, lacking all potentiality. But it can depend on the divine person in the way in which an accident depends on its substance. The relevant sense of 'dependence' is not causal, since every cause-effect relation between God and creatures has the entire Trinity as its end term, and only one divine person is incarnate.

Unlike causal dependence relations, the relevant dependence relation is sufficient to ground predication ('is man' predicated of the divine person, and accidents predicated of their substances):

Although not every dependence is sufficient for making true a predication of what depends on what it depends on, that [dependence] which is of a nature, as communicable, on a *suppositum*, as hypostatically sustaining [the nature], is sufficient for making true a predication of the nature (thus dependent) of the *suppositum* on which it depends. This is clear in the case of an accident (thus dependent) on the *suppositum* of the substance on which it depends.⁶³

The idea is that the relevant dependence/sustaining relations are sufficient for predication: if whiteness depends on Socrates, then it is true that Socrates is white, and if a human nature depends on the divine person (here labelled a 'suppositum', the technical Scholastic term for something that cannot depend in the relevant way), then it is true that that person is man.

In the text just quoted, Scotus introduces a third notion: communication. It turns out, in fact, that communication is the notion that distinguishes this kind of dependence from other forms: 'The unity or union of the human nature to the Word is a certain dependence, or consists in the kind of dependence that a nature, as communicable, has to some incommunicable subsistent.'⁶⁴ Scotus discerns two basic types of communication:

Something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that that to which it is communicated is it, or by information, such that that to which it is communicated is not it, but is by it. In the first way the universal is communicated to the singular, and in the second way form to matter. Thus a nature, as it is in itself and in its definition, is communicable in either way, that is to many *supposita* such that each of them is it, and also as that by which (*quo*), as a form, by which the singular or *suppositum* is a being in a quidditative way, or has a nature. And a *suppositum* is incommunicable by the opposed two-fold incommunicability.⁶⁵

⁶³ Duns Scotus, *Quodlibetum (Quod.)* q. 19, n. 15, in Duns Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Wadding, 12 vols (Lyons: Durand, 1639), vol. XII, p. 513.

⁶⁴ Duns Scotus, *Quod.* q. 19, n. 3 (Wadding, XII, p. 493).

⁶⁵ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 379–80 (Vat., II, pp. 345–46). See also *Ord.* III, d. 1, p. 1, q. 1, n. 49 (Vat., IX, pp. 21–22).

The first kind of communicability – ‘communicability *ut quod*’ – is the relation that obtains between a whole individual essence and the *suppositum* of which it is an essence. Spelling this relation out requires a great deal of Scotist metaphysics that would distract me from my purpose here, so I ignore it in what follows. The second kind – let me label it ‘communicability *ut quo*’ – is that by which something ‘is a being in a quidditative way’: it is that which explains the fact that something is of a given kind, or has a particular accidental feature.

In contrast to both the *Summa* and Aquinas, then, Scotus holds that the human nature is communicable: it is the kind of thing that can be somewhat akin to an accidental property of a substance. And this, it seems to me, is much neater than the association of incommunicability and individuality which we found in the two 13th-century texts just mentioned.

The Nature of Subsistence

Thus far the discussion has moved a long way from the *Summa*, and has developed precisely those lines of thinking in Bonaventure that are most remote from the *Summa*’s own approach. But there is one striking element of Scotus’ thinking that is evidently owed directly to the *Summa*: what it is for a nature to subsist. Here is what Scotus says:

We should distinguish between actual, possible, and aptitudinal dependence. And I call ‘aptitudinal’ that which is always in act (as it is of itself), in the way that a heavy object is naturally always at the centre [of the world], where it would always be (as it is of itself) unless impeded. And I call ‘possible’, unqualifiedly (*absolute*), that in which there is no impossibility from the repugnance or impossibility of the terms (and this possibility can be even with respect to a supernatural active power, not merely a natural one). And although the negation of actual dependence alone is not sufficient for what is proposed, for there is no created nature or entity to which it is contradictorily repugnant to depend on the Word), nevertheless the negation of aptitudinal dependence can be conceded in the created nature that is in itself personated in the Word, otherwise it would rest in a created person violently, as a stone rests high up violently. And thus this negation, not merely of actual but of aptitudinal dependence, completes the notion of person in an intellectual nature, and of *suppositum* in a created nature. Neither does this aptitudinal independence posit repugnance to actual dependence, because although there is no aptitude for depending in such a nature, there is an obediential aptitude, for that nature is in perfect obediential [potency] for depending through the action of a supernatural agent. And when this dependence is given to [the nature], it is personate by the personhood on which it depends; and when it is not given, it is formally personated in itself, by the negation, and not by something positive added to the positive entity by which it is this nature (*haec natura*).⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 1, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 45–47 (Vat., IX, pp. 20–21), text emended in accordance with both the majority of MSS and good sense.

Scotus, then, takes a stand on an issue that the *Summa* leaves ambiguous: not only do natures fail to have an inclination for dependence; they have a positive inclination for independence.

The next thinker to consider this question explicitly is Ockham. He opts for the more neutral reading of the *Summa* on this point (though there is no evidence that he read the text directly): ‘The assumed nature does not remain there [viz. united to the Word] violently, because it does not have an inclination to the opposite, which is required for something’s being violent (...). The reason is that nothing is properly inclined to something unless that thing is positive’⁶⁷ – that is to say, unless the item to which the inclination is directed is positive. And here, I think, we see the end of the tradition of the *Summa Halensis* in medieval Franciscan Christology.

⁶⁷ William of Ockham, *Reportatio* III, q. 1, in Ockham, *Opera Theologica*, eds. I. Lalor et al., 10 vols (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1967–86), vol. VI, p. 37.17–19, 23–24.

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The Passions of the Will and the Passion of Christ in Franciscan Theology from the *Summa Halensis* to Duns Scotus

Abstract: This chapter examines how the *Summa Halensis*' analysis of Christ's sorrow was adopted and modified by later Franciscan theologians. According to the teaching of Jerome, which Peter Lombard made available to medieval theologians, Christ's sorrow arose from an involuntary reaction to his physical suffering. In order to expand upon Jerome's account, the *Summa Halensis* develops an elaborate map of Christ's soul by drawing on psychological principles found in Augustine and John Damascene. 13th century theologians debated whether Christ could experience sorrow over his own suffering not just as a natural and instinctual reaction, but also as the result of freely willing that he not suffer. An obstacle to asserting this would be any implication that Christ did not will by his human will what God willed him to will. Richard of Middleton, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Duns Scotus do affirm that Christ in some way freely nilled his own suffering, and experienced sorrow over it because of that. In different ways they employ the account of Christ's soul outlined in the *Summa Halensis* to avoid any implication that Christ fell into sin by freely nilling his own suffering.

The Gospel of Matthew reports that Jesus experienced sorrow in the Garden of Gethsemane (26:37–38): 'he began to be sorrowful [*coepit contristari*] and troubled. Then he said to them, "My soul is sorrowful [*tristis*] to the point of death.'" Jerome offered an influential interpretation of this passage when he stated that Christ experienced the propassion of sorrow rather than a full-fledged form of that passion. One difference between a propassion and a full-fledged passion is that a propassion does not overwhelm one's ability to use reason. A propassion, moreover, is an involuntary reaction, and thus not morally blameworthy. Peter Lombard made Jerome's interpretation of Matthew 26:37–38 available to 13th-century theologians, who widely accepted it.¹

Yet in the *Summa Halensis* the analysis of Christ's sorrow is not limited to Jerome's idea of a propassion. While the *Summa Halensis* certainly maintains that Christ's reason is not disturbed or overwhelmed by his sorrow, it describes Christ as experiencing sorrow in ways that go beyond an involuntary reaction to suffering.

¹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (*Sententiae*), bk. III, d. 15, c. 2, in *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 3–4 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), vol. 2, p. 99. I thank Lydia Schumacher for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

The *Summa Halensis* identifies a soteriological motive for its way of exploring Christ's sorrow. Drawing on its interpretation of Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*, the *Summa* teaches that Christ had to suffer in every part of his soul in order to make satisfaction for sin. Christ experienced not only bodily suffering, but also suffering over the sins of others and suffering over the misfortunes that befell others. To determine how this suffering led to sorrow in Christ, the *Summa* provides a map of Christ's soul that is based on psychological principles drawn from Augustine and John Damascene. It takes from Augustine the distinction between higher and lower reason. Following John Damascene, the *Summa* further distinguishes between *ratio ut ratio* and *ratio ut natura*.

While the account of Christ's sorrow in the *Summa* proved influential, later Franciscans also made various modifications to what they received from the *Summa*. The main area of disagreement concerns how to explain Christ's sorrow over his own physical suffering. Is his sorrow over this only the result of a natural reaction to bodily harm or does it in any sense arise from a reasoned judgment about his suffering? The Franciscans considered below resolve that question by considering how Christ's human will stands in relation to that suffering. Over time there is a transition from thinking of Christ's sorrow over his own bodily suffering as arising only from a natural wish for union between his body and soul to an account that also attributes sorrow over this to Christ because of what he freely wills. This transition begins with Richard of Middleton's account of sorrow in the lower part of Christ's will, but Matthew of Aquasparta and Duns Scotus even attribute sorrow to the higher part of Christ's will as his will is a free power. For these later Franciscans there is a sense in which Christ freely wishes not to suffer, and this becomes one of the sources for the sorrow he experiences on the Cross.

Summa Halensis

According to the *Summa Halensis* there are three ways that Christ could experience sorrow or sadness over his own bodily suffering:

There is sorrow [*tristitia*] from a will of dispensation or according to propassion, which is turned toward sensuality without a disturbance in reason, and in this way there was sorrow in Christ. In addition to this, as will become clear, we can consider reason-as-nature [*ratio ut natura*] and reason-as-reason [*ratio ut ratio*]. If *ut natura*, then in this way there was sorrow according to his reason; but if *ut ratio*, then in this way there was not sadness in his reason.²

In this passage the *Summa* uses Jerome's category of propassion to describe one form that Christ's sorrow can take. This form of sorrow arises from pain in the sensitive

² Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 39), Respondeo, p. 63b.

powers of the soul. For Christ it occurs as a result of a ‘will of dispensation’ since he freely took on a human nature that could experience physical pain.

The other forms of sorrow ascribed to Christ are described in terms drawn from John Damascene. His distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ roughly amounts to the distinction between the natural appetite for certain goods and the reasoned choice to pursue certain goods.³ Reason-as-nature concerns reason insofar as it united to the body, and it is because of this union that reason suffers when the body suffers.⁴ It is natural for reason to react to any bodily harm by wishing that that harm was not occurring.⁵ This natural nilling of bodily suffering can give rise to passions such as fear and sorrow. The *Summa* does not comment on how this form of sorrow is related to the propassion of sorrow, even though the way that each is described makes them seem to be either identical or at least closely connected. As we shall see, Bonaventure considers the connection between these two descriptions of Christ’s sorrow.

Taking reason in the sense of reason-as-reason, however, is to consider reason as it is capable of transcending the body. Reason in this sense includes free acts of the will.⁶ In this way, there is no sorrow in the reason of Christ insofar as he freely wills his own suffering for the sake of human redemption. Thus, even though the *Summa* frames the issue of Christ’s sorrow as a question of whether it is in his reason, it resolves this question by reference to what Christ wills by his human will.

Following Augustine, the *Summa* adds a further distinction to its consideration of reason according to which reason is divided into a higher and lower part.⁷ Augustine makes this distinction in his *De Trinitate* XII. It is also found in the *De spiritu et anima*, a 12th-century work that 13th-century Franciscans often attributed to Augustine.⁸ The distinction between higher and lower reason is also mentioned by Peter Lombard in the second book of his *Sentences*, where the Lombard is examining

3 John Damascene, *De fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, II.22, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 132–42. For more on the place of this distinction in the *SH* and the earlier writings of Alexander of Hales, see Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘The Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales,’ *The Thomist* 71 (2007), pp. 1–38 (esp. 20–22).

4 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Ad obiecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Item, timor secundum rationem est dupliciter: quia est considerare rationem ut naturam, secundum quam unitur corpori et naturaliter per hoc compatitur.’

5 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Solutio, p. 64a: ‘Est enim timor naturalis per modum naturae, quo modo dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod “timor naturalis est, nolente anima dividi a corpore” etc., “propter quod anima naturaliter timet et agoniam patitur et refugit mortem” velut natura morbum.’

6 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Ad obiecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Et est considerare rationem ut rationem, secundum quod non se habet ad corpus, immo actum habet extra corpus. Primo modo habet naturalem ordinem ad corpus, secundo modo est in ordine ad Deum voluntarie.’

7 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo, p. 200b: ‘Dicendum sine praeiudicio, quod est considerare rationem dupliciter, secundum quod dicit Augustinus quod ratio dividet se in duo, in superiorem et inferiorem secundum duplicem comparisonem.’

8 *De spiritu et anima* 11 (PL 40:787).

the human soul. Peter Lombard characterizes the distinction between higher and lower reason in the following way: ‘Reason is a higher power of the soul, which, so to speak, has two parts or differences: the higher and the lower. According to the higher it attends to the contemplating and consulting of heavenly things; according to the lower it attends to the disposition of temporal things.’⁹

While the Lombard himself does not employ Augustine’s distinction when writing about Christ’s human soul, the distinction was commonly employed in 13th-century Christological writings. Nevertheless, the distinction between higher and lower reason does not play a prominent role in either Augustine’s philosophy of mind or the cognitive theories of medieval theologians, and for this reason it can be difficult to understand precisely what distinction is being made. Moreover, in the Middle Ages some authors associated the distinction with Avicenna’s doctrine of the ‘two faces of the soul.’¹⁰ The distinction between higher and lower reason in the *Summa*’s treatment of Christ, however, does not correspond exactly to either Augustine’s distinction or Avicenna’s. For Augustine lower reason was concerned with the historical and the particular, but for the *Summa* that falls under the domain of sensation and imagination. For Avicenna one face of the soul was theoretical reason, the other face practical reason. Yet according to the Christology of the *Summa*, the higher/lower distinction is not one between theoretical and practical reason. To make sense of how the *Summa* employs the distinction, we should construe higher and lower reason as including both theoretical and practical reason, but distinguished in terms of their object. Thus, higher reason involves the intellect and will knowing and loving God, an eternal object, while lower reason involves knowing about and choosing created objects. The *Summa* incorporates this distinction into its own Christology because it can help explain how Christ was simultaneously a *comprehensor* and a *viator*.¹¹ He was a *comprehensor* insofar as the higher portion of reason enjoyed the beatific vision, but a *viator* through his lower reason which was focused on thinking about and judging temporal matters and created realities.¹²

When examining whether sorrow can be located in the higher or lower part of Christ’s reason, the *Summa* indicates that it has a soteriological motive for considering this question. According to an objection, Adam sinned in both the higher and lower parts of reason, and was punished in each part. The objection concludes, therefore, that ‘Christ ought to satisfy according to each part.’¹³ To answer the objec-

⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, d. 24, c. 5 (n. 1) (Brady, 1:453–54).

¹⁰ Robert Mulligan, SJ, ‘*Ratio Superior* and *Ratio Inferior*: The Historical Background,’ *The New Scholasticism* 29 (1955), pp. 1–32, on pp. 15–16.

¹¹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5 (n. 146), p. 203b.

¹² On the joy of the beatific vision in the higher part of Christ’s reason, see *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), *Respondeo* 3, pp. 200b-1a; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar4 (n. 145), *Contra*, p. 202a-b, and *Respondeo*, p. 202b.

¹³ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), *Ad quod sic obicitur* 1, p. 200a. Similar arguments are found in Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Duns Scotus.

tion, the *Summa* joins the distinction between higher and lower reason to the distinction between reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature.¹⁴ Thus, higher and lower reason can each be construed *ut natura* and *ut ratio*.

The *Summa* uses this way of dividing Christ's reason to interpret Matthew 26:38, where Christ says there is sadness in his soul unto death. The *Summa* cites Jerome's claim that Christ experiences sadness over the effect that his suffering will have on his apostles. His apostles will be scandalized by this suffering, and it is this that causes sadness in Christ.¹⁵ The *Summa* aligns Jerome's interpretation to the divisions of the rational part of the soul that it has introduced. This sadness is in the reason of Christ insofar as reason is taken *ut ratio*. For Christ freely wishes his apostles not to be scandalized, and insofar as what he desires does not come about, he experiences sorrow. This sorrow, moreover, is in the lower portion of reason.¹⁶ Thus, in the lower portion of Christ's reason *ut ratio* there is sorrow over the sufferings of others.

Christ's intellect and will were united to God in the beatific vision in the higher portion of his reason, and more specifically, in the higher portion taken *ut ratio*. Thus, there could be no sorrow in this part of Christ's soul. Yet the *Summa* allows that there is sorrow over his own bodily suffering in the higher portion insofar as the higher portion is construed *ut natura*. For even the higher portion of reason *naturally* wishes to remain united to its body, and thus sorrows over the opposite.¹⁷

There is one remaining way that sorrow can be attributed to Christ, according to the *Summa Halensis*. On the Cross, Christ utters the opening words of Psalm 21, when he cries out, 'my God, my God why have you forsaken me?' According to the *Summa*, this indicates some type of painful separation from God. It does not indicate any severing of the hypostatic union, but rather separation from the consolation of the beatific vision. This separation, however, does not occur in the higher part of his human reason, which continues to fully enjoy the beatific vision even at this moment on the Cross.¹⁸ It occurs in Christ's lower powers. According to the *Summa*, the joy of the beatific vision that Christ experiences in the higher part of reason in some way provided consolation to his lower powers, but this consolation ceased on the Cross.¹⁹

14 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), p. 200b.

15 This aspect of Jerome's interpretation is not included in Lombard's *Sentences*, but it is found in Jerome's commentary on Matthew. Peter Lombard, however, does attribute a similar interpretation to Hilary of Poitiers (see Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III, d. 15, c. 4 [Brady, 2:102–3]).

16 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 1, p. 200b: 'Unde Hieronymus Matt. 26:38, *Tristis est anima mea* etc.: "Contristatur propter scandalum Apostolorum." Et hoc intelligendum est de inferiori ratione; scandalum vero non est solum in ratione ut natura, sive metus scandalum, quem habebat, ut dicit Hilarius, sed in ratione ut ratio.'

17 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 1, p. 200b: 'In superiori autem parte fuit passio ut est natura, non ut est ratio.'

18 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 201a. See also SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5 (n. 146), p. 203a-b.

19 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 200b.

The type of sorrow that Christ experiences at this moment does not neatly fit into the schema the *Summa* has developed for analyzing Christ's sorrow. Indeed, instead of employing the *ut natura/ut ratio* distinction, or even the full distinction between higher and lower reason, the *Summa* highlights the distinction between higher reason and the lower powers.²⁰ Prior to the resurrection the grace of the beatific vision did not fully spill over to Christ's body. Yet the *Summa* seems to be claiming that for most of his earthly life, Christ's sensitive powers enjoyed some diminished share in the fruits of the beatific vision. Although Christ's body did not enjoy full impassibility, it enjoyed greater impassibility than a normal human body. It seems, therefore, that the *Summa* is not interpreting the cry of dereliction in a way that makes it about psychological suffering that would arise from a belief that one has been distanced from God.²¹ Instead the cry of dereliction seems to indicate an intensification of bodily suffering that results from his lower powers not benefiting from the grace of the beatific vision. That this is so is also suggested by the *Summa's* reference to Psalm 34, where the psalmist says, 'All my bones shall cry out: Who, O Lord, is like me?'²² If the bones of this passage stand for the whole body, then the cry of dereliction is an expression of sorrow arising from bodily suffering rather than psychological distress.

Some elements of how the *Summa Halensis* examines Christ's sorrow are found in Alexander's *Glossa* and his *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*.²³ Yet there are also notable differences in how Christ's sorrow is treated in these earlier works. For example, his *Glossa* makes a distinction between Christ's higher and lower reason, but, when speaking of Christ's sorrow, it does not introduce a distinction between his reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature. Also, the *Glossa* uses the term *tristitia* in a different way from the *Summa*. The *Glossa* reserves the term *tristitia* to refer to the compassion Christ felt for the suffering of others, while it uses the term *dolor* to refer to the passion Christ experiences on account of his bodily suffering. Thus, *dolor* is linked to sorrow arising from the sensitive appetite, and *tristitia* to sorrow arising from the rational part of Christ's soul. The *Glossa* locates *tristitia* in the

20 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 200b: 'Dicendum quod Christus ante passionem gaudebat in superiori parte rationis, et ex hoc erat influentia ipsius viribus inferioribus, a quibus remota est consolationis influentia in passione.'

21 For an interpretation of this part of the *SH* that emphasizes the psychological torment of the Cross, see Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 223–26.

22 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 201a: 'Sed constat quod non intelligit de separatione unionis, sed de separatione consolationis influentis super inferiores vires, quam etiam spirituales viri bene sentiunt, dicentes secundum Psalmum: *Omnia ossa mea dicent: Domine quis similis tibi* etc.'

23 For more on Christ's sorrow and joy in the writings of Alexander of Hales, see Cristina Motta, 'Piacere e Dolore del Cristo nella Riflessione Teologica del XIII Secolo,' in *Piacere e dolore: Materiali per una storia delle passioni nel Medioevo*, eds. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio (Florence: SISMEL, 2009), pp. 187–95.

lower part of Christ's reason.²⁴ Finally, the *Glossa* does not attribute suffering in any way to the higher part of Christ's reason, thus indicating that Alexander at this stage did not consider it imperative to attribute suffering to every part of Christ's soul.²⁵

In his *Disputed Questions*, Alexander undertakes an extensive examination of Christ's passibility.²⁶ In its explanation of where suffering was located in Christ's soul, the *Disputed Questions* not only makes use of the distinction between higher and lower reason, but also the distinction between reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature.²⁷ Also, the *Disputed Questions* emphasizes the passibility of each part of Christ's soul because of a concern to show that Christ makes adequate satisfaction.²⁸ Thus, even Christ's higher part of reason can suffer insofar as that part is considered *ut natura*.²⁹

Even though Alexander's *Disputed Questions* examines the passibility of Christ's soul, it says much less than the *Summa* about specific passions like sadness and fear. In a few places in the *Disputed Questions*, Alexander does speak of the *dolor* Christ experiences because of his physical suffering. There is also mention of the 'dolor of compassion' that Christ experiences over the suffering of others, but this is not explicitly placed in Christ's lower reason.³⁰ A passing reference is made to *tristitia* in an objection directed against attributing suffering to the higher part of Christ's reason, where he experienced the joy of beatitude.³¹ Indeed, the passion that receives the most explicit attention in the *Disputed Questions* is joy. Alexander often mentions Christ's joy and asks whether it compatible with suffering (*passio*) in the soul without attending to any specific negative passions such as fear or sadness.³² Thus, one of the main developments in the *Summa* over the *Disputed Questions* is its more extensive examination of the particular negative emotional reactions of Christ to his suffering and a more systematic examination of where emotions like sorrow are located in Christ's soul.

Boyd Taylor Coolman has proposed a different way of describing the change that occurs in how the *Glossa* understands Christ's sorrow from the account given in the *Disputed Questions* and the *Summa*. According to Coolman, Alexander's *Glossa* limits

24 Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Glossa)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1954), vol. III, d. 15 (n. 4), pp. 151–52.

25 Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 15 (n. 4), p. 152: 'Dicendum quod Christus non habuit tristitiam secundum superiorem partem rationis, quoniam secundum illam continue contemplantur Deum Patrem; sed habuit tristitiam secundum partem rationis inferiorem.'

26 Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater' (QD)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960), q. 16, pp. 237–74.

27 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 48), p. 246.

28 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 44), p. 244; see also *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 5 (n. 52), p. 248.

29 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 48), p. 246.

30 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 6 (n. 56), pp. 249–50.

31 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 46), p. 245.

32 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (nn. 74–77), pp. 259–60.

Christ's sorrow to the sensible part of his soul and thus limits his sorrow to his own bodily suffering. Coolman writes,

In his *Glossa*, then, Alexander neatly divides Christ's continual beatitude from his emerging sadness, confining the former to the superior part of reason, the latter to the inferior part, the sensible soul, associated directly with the body. Christ's sadness, moreover, is largely self-referential, pertaining to his own sense of immanent suffering and death.³³

Coolman bases his interpretation on what Alexander writes in *Glossa* III, distinction 15 (n. 4).³⁴ Coolman further argues that it is only in the *Disputed Questions* that Alexander first posits any type of sorrow in the rational part of Christ's soul, and also the first time Alexander claims that the suffering of others becomes an object of Christ's sorrow.³⁵

My disagreement with Coolman's interpretation of this part of the *Glossa* is based partly on a more fundamental difference over how to interpret what the *Glossa* means by the lower and higher parts of reason. Coolman takes lower reason to be identical to the sensitive powers of the soul, and higher reason with the rational powers of the soul. Yet it seems that the *Glossa* takes higher and lower reason as both different aspects of the rational part of the soul. In support of this, I would point out that in the passage from the *Glossa* under examination, Alexander asserts that Christ did have compassion for his brothers, but denies that this compassion is either in his sensuality or in the higher part of reason. It is not in his sensuality because this compassion does not originate in the sensitive powers of the soul, and it is not in his higher reason because that part of his soul was absorbed by the joy of the beatific vision. Thus, it was in his lower reason, and thus in the *Glossa* there is indeed a rational form of sorrow attributed to Christ that is other-directed.³⁶ What is new beginning with the *Disputed Questions* is attributing some form of sorrow to the higher portion of Christ's reason, but that requires uniting the distinction between higher and lower reason to the distinction between *ratio ut natura* and *ratio ut ratio*, which does not occur in the *Glossa*'s treatment of Christ's sorrow.³⁷

³³ Coolman, 'The Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales,' p. 15.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 15 (n. 4), pp. 151–52: 'Christus in continua iucunditate fuit fruendo Patre Deo. Qualiter ergo tristis fieri potuit? Augustinus: Dolor est sensus propriae corruptionis. Sed propriam corruptionem sensit Christus; ergo dolorem habuit.—Nemo propriam carnem odio habuit; ergo Christus voluit removere nocivum a propria carne. Sed talis voluntas fuit dolor; ergo Christus doluit.—Compassio fuit cum fratribus; non secundum sensualitatem: ergo secundum rationem; et ita in Christo erat tristitia rationalis.'

³⁷ There is, however, an allusion to that distinction in the treatment of Christ's fear in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 15 (n. 12), p. 155.

Bonaventure

Bonaventure adopts the same psychology that is presented in the *Summa Halensis* whereby the rational part of Christ's soul is divided into higher and lower reason, and the *ut natura/ut ratio* distinction is applied to both portions of reason.³⁸ Bonaventure also follows the teaching of the *Summa* as to where in the soul of Christ sorrow is to be located. Nevertheless, Bonaventure's examination of the sorrow of Christ differs from that of the *Summa* in three main ways.

The first difference concerns the terminology Bonaventure uses for Christ's sorrow. In *In Sent.* III, distinction 15, Bonaventure examines specific negative passions that are attributed to Christ, such as *tristitia*. When, however, Bonaventure turns in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16 to examine the passibility of Christ's soul, he asks about Christ's *dolor* rather than his *tristitia*. We have seen that Alexander's *Glossa* distinguished *dolor* and *tristitia*, using *dolor* for sorrow arising from one's own physical pain, and *tristitia* for sorrow over the suffering of others. This way of distinguishing *dolor* from *tristitia*, however, is not at work in Bonaventure's switch to the term *dolor*. Instead of using *dolor* exclusively for sorrow arising from bodily suffering, Bonaventure tells us that he is using the term *dolor* in the way Augustine uses it. Bonaventure writes, 'Just as Augustine says in *The City of God*, there is a twofold *dolor* in the soul: one, which is in the soul according to itself, and another which is in the soul from the flesh.'³⁹ Thus, for Bonaventure, *dolor* can refer to sorrow that one experiences because of the suffering of other people.

In practice Bonaventure treats *dolor* and *tristitia* as interchangeable. For example, the verbs *tristatur* and *contristetur* are used in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16, when speaking of *dolor* in Christ.⁴⁰ Also, one of the arguments in *In Sent.* III, distinction 15 for ascribing *tristitia* to Christ is nearly the same as one of the arguments in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16 for locating *dolor* in the soul of Christ. In *In Sent.* III, distinction 15, Bonaventure argues that Christ loved and desired the salvation of the human race, but experienced *tristitia* over the refusal of some human beings to accept the offer of salvation.⁴¹ In *In Sent.* III, distinction 16, this idea is expressed in a similar way: 'concerning that *dolor* that is in the soul of Christ according to itself, there is no doubt that Christ suffered according to reason. For he suffered with us and sorrowed over our sins; and this *dolor* was in his rational will proceeding from a consideration

³⁸ For more on Bonaventure's use of the distinction between higher and lower reason, see R.W. Mulligan, SJ, 'Portio Superior and Portio Inferior Rationis in the Writings of St. Bonaventure,' *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955), pp. 332–49.

³⁹ Bonaventure, *Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum (In Sent.)* (Quaracchi: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 1887), III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.

⁴⁰ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 and ad 4, p. 353b and p. 354b.

⁴¹ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 15, ar. 2, q. 2, arg. 3, 338a.

of reason, namely from a recognition of our sins.⁴² Both passages claim that there was sorrow over the sins of the human race in the rational part of Christ's soul.

Although Bonaventure investigates Christ's sorrow in both *In Sent.* III, distinction 15 (ar. 2, q. 2), and distinction 16 (ar. 2, q. 1), these two parts of his commentary do have different emphases. In distinction 15, Bonaventure is concerned to ascribe sadness to Christ and show that such an emotion is compatible with Seneca's view of the wise man, whereas in distinction 16, Bonaventure primarily seeks to locate more particularly where in Christ's soul sorrow can be found and to identify the reasons for this sorrow. In distinction 16, Bonaventure argues that there is sorrow in Christ's reason-as-nature over his own bodily suffering, and that the sorrow he experiences in this way is in both higher and lower reason.⁴³ Yet his own bodily suffering does not lead to sorrow in his rational will or in his reason-as-reason.

A second place where Bonaventure differs from the *Summa Halensis* over Christ's sadness is his attempt to relate the propassion of *tristitia* to the *tristitia* ascribed to Christ's reason-as-nature. The *Summa* set out three ways Christ might experience sadness without explicitly examining what connections might exist between the propassion of sorrow and the sorrow that can exist in one's reason. Bonaventure argues that the propassion of sorrow leads to sorrow in Christ's reason-as-nature.⁴⁴ Bonaventure recognizes, however, that the standard way of describing a propassion as something that does not disturb reason seems to conflict with the claim that sorrow is in some way in Christ's reason.⁴⁵ According to Bonaventure, when sorrow over one's own bodily suffering reaches reason through the mode of nature it can remain a propassion so long as one's rational will is rightly disposed towards that suffering.⁴⁶ If Christ's reason had become dominated by this sorrow, then he would have nilled his bodily suffering by his free human will. Yet this is precisely what Christ does not do. As Bonaventure writes,

To be stirred up [*perturbari*] is to become dominated, but one can experience passions, and overcome them. This is what happened in the soul of Christ, which according to reason-as-nature

42 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, p. 354a: 'Et utrumque dolorem constans est in anima Christi fuisse; et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali erat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex recognitione peccatorum nostrorum.'

43 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1–2, pp. 353–57.

44 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.

45 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, arg. 5, p. 353b: 'Item, cum passio attingit usque ad rationem, non tantum est propassio, immo est completa et perfecta passio, quae non potest cadere in sapientem, iuxta quod probat Seneca et Hieronymus dicit. Aut igitur Christus sapiens non fuit, aut si fuit, anima eius secundum rationem carni compassa non fuit.'

46 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, ad 5, p. 355a: 'Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non aufert rationem propassionis.'

was experiencing the passions of the body with a most acute *dolor*, but according to deliberative reason, he was overcoming these bodily passions with a virtuous joy.⁴⁷

A propassion arises in the sensitive appetite, but a human being will have some sort of response to a propassion in the rational part of his soul, and how one judges the propassion will determine whether or not one becomes dominated by it. Since Christ only has a natural wish not to suffer, but rationally willed his suffering, his propassion of sorrow did not develop into a full-fledged form of sorrow.

A third notable difference between Bonaventure and the *Summa Halensis* occurs when Bonaventure explains how there can be sadness in the higher part of Christ's reason. Bonaventure notes that it is the common opinion of the masters that Christ suffered even in his higher reason.⁴⁸ He also sees that it is necessary to attribute suffering to the higher part of Christ's reason, if Christ is going to cure the whole sinful soul of human persons.⁴⁹ Yet Bonaventure highlights the difficulty of doing this since it would require ascribing both sorrow and joy to the higher part of Christ's reason: 'it is difficult to understand how in the soul of Christ there was *dolor* and joy according to the same power and the same part of that power.'⁵⁰

To understand their compatibility, Bonaventure begins by explaining how joy and sadness are not necessarily contrary affections.⁵¹ According to Bonaventure, Christ's joy and sorrow are not directed at the same object.⁵² Christ experiences joy over the beatific vision, but sadness over his bodily suffering. Thus, they are not contrary affections. It is also important for Bonaventure that Christ's joy and sorrow are not in the higher part of his reason in the same way. Joy from the beatific vision is in the higher portion insofar as his reason is taken as reason, while sadness is in the higher portion of reason as a nature. Thus far Bonaventure follows the approach of the *Summa Halensis* in ascribing sorrow and joy to the higher part of Christ's reason, but Bonaventure introduces a further distinction to his own account of Christ's higher reason. Corresponding to the *ut ratio/ut natura* distinction, Bonaventure describes the higher portion of reason as having a *per se* object and an object *per accidens*.

The *per se* object of higher reason is the divine essence, and its *per accidens* object is whatever is occurring in the body to which it is united. Taking the higher portion of reason *ut ratio* gives its *per se* object as the beatific vision, but this does not preclude it from having a different object accidentally. Higher reason has an object in

47 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, ad 5, p. 355b. Although this idea is not expressed in the *SH*, something similar to it is mentioned in Alexander's *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 6 (n. 56), p. 249.

48 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.

49 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356a.

50 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356a.

51 For more on this aspect of Bonaventure's Christology, see Cristina Motta, 'Piacere e Dolore del Cristo in S. Bonaventura,' *Doctor Seraphicus LVI* (2009), pp. 17–30.

52 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356b.

this other way because of its connection to the body, and thus sadness is attributed to the higher portion *per accidens*, and not *per se*.⁵³ Where this goes beyond the *SH* is in Bonaventure's description of the higher portion as not having a single eternal object, but rather a proper and accidental object. Bonaventure seems driven to make this distinction between a proper and accidental object of the higher portion because of the difficulties involved in bringing together what had been independent psychological principles from the works of Augustine and John Damascene. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Duns Scotus criticizes the idea that sorrow can properly be attributed to the higher part of reason, if it is only attributed to it in virtue of something incidental.

Richard of Middleton

Richard of Middleton differs from his predecessors in his understanding of how there is sadness in Christ's reason-as-reason. Bonaventure, for instance, attributed sorrow to Christ's reason-as-reason only over the suffering or defects found in other people. Richard, on the other hand, argues that in the lower part of Christ's *reason-as-reason* there was sorrow over his own suffering. According to Richard, lower reason considers good and evil in comparison to lower causes.⁵⁴ By lower reason Christ viewed his own suffering in reference to his own innocence and in reference to the viciousness of those inflicting that suffering. Richard writes that all of these considerations 'were displeasing to his will, and thus it is clear that in the lower portion of his intellective part there was sorrow for his bodily sufferings, as that part is considered both *ut natura* and *ut ratio*.'⁵⁵

There was no sorrow in Christ's higher reason-as-reason over his own suffering because higher reason considers good and evil in relation to the will of God. As Richard observes, 'in the [higher] intellective part of Christ's soul there was no sorrow, because inasmuch as his intellect apprehended the suffering of his body as pleasing to the divine will for redeeming the human race, the will of Christ was rejoicing over the suffering of his own body.'⁵⁶ God's will that Christ's passion serve as the means of human redemption is known in the higher part of Christ's intellect, and since Christ's human will conforms to the divine will, Christ experiences no sorrow over his own suffering in the higher part. In the lower part of his intellect there is suffering, not because of a lack of conformity between the human and divine wills of Christ, but

⁵³ Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356b.

⁵⁴ Richard of Middleton, *Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi questiones subtilissimae (In Sent.)* (Brescia: Vincentium Sabbium, 1591; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1963), III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 169a.

⁵⁵ Richard of Middleton, *In Sent.* III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 169a: '(...) voluntati displicebat, et ita patet quod in inferiori portione partis intellective fuit tristitia pro corporis passione: et in quantum consideratur, ut natura et in quantum consideratur, ut ratio.'

⁵⁶ Richard of Middleton, *In Sent.* III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 169a.

because that suffering is looked at from a different perspective. Instead of being considered as the means of human redemption, the lower portion views it as a result of the sinful choices of his persecutors. In this way, his suffering was even displeasing to his will *ut ratio*.

Matthew of Aquasparta

In one of his quodlibetal questions, Matthew of Aquasparta asks whether there was sorrow in Christ over his own suffering in the higher part of reason. Matthew's resolution of this question involves extensive citation from different works of Augustine that leads to a striking departure from how his Franciscan predecessors understood the place of sorrow in the higher portion of Christ's reason.

Matthew cites Augustine's claim that there can be a twofold *dolor* in the soul. He describes the first form of *dolor* as arising in the soul from the suffering of the body. In this way, there was sorrow in the higher part of Christ's reason as it is a nature.⁵⁷ The other form of *dolor* is called *tristitia*. Matthew claims that *tristitia* arises in the soul when something happens that is contrary to one's will. Matthew cites Augustine in support of this understanding of *tristitia*: 'Another *dolor* was in the higher part (...) and this *dolor* is called *tristitia*, which Augustine defines in the same place [*City of God* XIV.15], when he says that "*tristitia* is the refusal of something that befalls us unwillingly."⁵⁸

According to Matthew, Augustine's understanding of sorrow should lead one to hold that Christ did experience sorrow over his own bodily suffering in the higher part reason, and this sorrow, moreover, is present not only *ut natura*, but also *ut ratio*.⁵⁹ While this conclusion is a departure from the teaching of his predecessors, Matthew's defense of it is similar to the explanation that Richard of Middleton gives for attributing sorrow to the *lower* portion of Christ's reason. Both Richard and Matthew note that Christ viewed his suffering as unjustly inflicted upon him and as something that dishonored God, and for these reasons freely willed it not to occur.⁶⁰ To support his position that this should lead to sorrow in *higher* reason-as-reason, Matthew points out that Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* that it does not only pertain to higher reason to contemplate an eternal object, but also to consider lower things in light of the eternal reasons and to judge lower things in their light. According to Matthew, when Christ consults the eternal light in the

57 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones disputate de incarnatione et de lapsu aliaque selectae (Questiones selectae)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1957), q. 5, p. 211.

58 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211.

59 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211: 'Et iste utique dolor fuit in parte superiori, non solum ut natura, sed ut ratio.'

60 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211.

higher portion of reason, he sees that his suffering is displeasing to God, and thus it also comes to be displeasing to Christ in his human nature.⁶¹

Yet Matthew nonetheless agrees with Richard of Middleton that Christ also rejoices over his own bodily suffering insofar as it is chosen in conformity with the divine will. Matthew argues that there is no contradiction in Christ simultaneously rejoicing and grieving over his suffering in the higher part of reason because Christ looks at his suffering under two different *rationes*.⁶² Christ was saddened over his suffering insofar as he saw it as the result of vicious and unjust actions that are displeasing to God, but he rejoiced over it insofar as it was pleasing to God as a means of redeeming the human race.⁶³ Matthew, then, differs from Richard not in positing that there are two different *rationes* under which Christ's reason can bring his suffering, but in positing that both of these are in the higher portion of Christ's reason, and that they lead him in different ways to both nill and will his suffering.

Matthew recognizes that it seems contradictory to posit joy and sorrow in Christ's higher reason even under two different *rationes*. To address this concern, he argues that there is an order between Christ's joy and sorrow insofar as his sorrow is a cause for his joy.⁶⁴ Matthew likens the relation between joy and suffering in Christ to the way that a penitent person rejoices over being forgiven and yet simultaneously feels sorrow for his sins. The joy experienced by such a person depends on experiencing sorrow for one's sins, and in this way the sorrow of a penitent is material with respect to his joy.⁶⁵ Similarly, Christ can experience sorrow over the sins of others, including sorrow over how those sins lead to his own suffering, and at the same time rejoice because he is making satisfaction for those sins.

The ideas that Matthew is drawing on here about sorrow being matter for joy and the penitent person being a model of the compatibility of joy and sorrow are similar to ideas found in Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Richard of Middleton.⁶⁶ Yet

61 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 212: 'Aeterna autem lex, quae est voluntas Dei, consulta utrum debeat sibi displicere Dei inhonoratio, respondet quod sic; consulta utrum compatendum sit peccatis hominum, pro quibus perpetuo damnantur, respondet quod sic; consulta utrum debeat de iniquitate Iudaeorum tristari, pariter respondet quod sic. Ergo manifestum est istum dolorem sive tristitiam esse in parte superiori, cuius, ut dictum est secundum Augustinum, non solum est contemplari vel inspicere, sed etiam illas consulere rationes.'

62 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 6, p. 215: 'Ulterius, etiam de eodem gaudere et dolere, consolari et tristari non est inconueniens, secundum aliam et aliam rationem et considerationem.'

63 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 6, p. 215: 'Unde simul de passione dolebat ut iniqua ex parte Iudaeorum infligentium, et gaudebat quia Deo accepta et placita; simul dolebat aspiciendo ad causam quia pro culpa, et gaudebat aspiciendo ad finem quia culpae reparativa.'

64 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 6, p. 216: 'Etsi enim corpori patienti compatiebatur et condolebat humanae infelicitati, tamen de isto dolore gaudebat, dum per hoc pro peccatis nostris satisfaciebatur et voluntatem Patris implebat.'

65 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 6, p. 216.

66 Alexander of Hales, *QD*, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 5 (n. 54), p. 249; Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356b; Richard of Middleton, *In Sent.* III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169b.

Matthew employs this line of thinking in a new way, when he invokes it to support his claim that Christ's *higher* reason-as-reason simultaneously experiences joy and sorrow.

Duns Scotus

Unlike the Franciscans discussed above, Duns Scotus does not attribute sorrow to the higher portion of Christ's reason insofar as that part is taken *ut natura*.⁶⁷ According to Scotus, this would be to attribute sorrow to the higher part in virtue of something that is incidental to it.⁶⁸ Of course, one of the attractions that this way of attributing sorrow to Christ held for the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure, and Richard of Middleton was its ability to account for sorrow in Christ's higher reason without in any way implying that Christ did not freely will his passion. As we have seen, Matthew of Aquasparta begins to depart from this approach insofar as he allows that in a certain way Christ does freely will his own passion in higher reason. While Scotus follows in the direction of Matthew, he develops a more nuanced account of how sorrow can be attributed to the higher part of Christ's soul.

Scotus points out that determining whether there could be sorrow in the higher part depends on how one characterizes that part. Scotus distinguishes two ways of considering the higher portion of the soul. According to the first way, Christ's higher reason and will solely regard an eternal object. In a broader sense, the higher part of the soul considers temporal things in relation to the eternal. In this broader sense, higher reason judges things according to the eternal rules, and the will wills whatever it wills in reference to eternal things. Like Matthew of Aquasparta, Scotus refers to what Augustine says about higher reason in *De Trinitate* XII as support for taking the higher portion in this broader sense.⁶⁹

There could be no sorrow in Christ's higher part taken in the narrow sense, but when taken broadly, it is possible to ascribe sorrow to Christ's higher portion. According to Scotus, the sins of others cause sorrow in the higher part of Christ's will.⁷⁰ Scotus also states that sorrow could arise in Christ's will over evils that are

67 For more on Scotus' understanding of the emotions, see Olivier Boulnois, 'Duns Scot: Existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?' in *Actes du colloque de l'ENS Saint-Cloud: Les Passions*, ed. P.F. Moreau, Documents, Archives de Travail et Arguments, 23 (CERPHI: Saint-Cloud, 1998), pp. 281–95; Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 265–72; Dominik Perler, *Feelings Transformed: Philosophical Theories of the Emotions, 1270–1670*, trans. Tony Crawford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 73–95.

68 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (nn. 20–21), in *Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, vol. 9, eds. B. Hechich, B. Huculak, I. Percan, and S. Ruiz de Loizaga (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2006), pp. 483–84.

69 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 73) (Vat., 9:511).

70 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 75) (Vat., 9:511).

‘disagreeable to his own supposit or to other persons loved by him.’⁷¹ It is in this area where Scotus will broach the question of Christ’s sorrow over his own bodily suffering. It is important to notice that Scotus more sharply distinguishes than Matthew of Aquasparta sorrow over the sins of others from sorrow over one’s own bodily suffering. As we have seen, Matthew holds that Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering because he sees it as unjustly inflicted upon himself. For Scotus, this way of describing Christ’s sorrow would fall under sorrow over the sins of others, rather than sorrow over his own bodily suffering.

To determine whether Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering, Scotus asks whether Christ nilled his bodily suffering according to any of the four ways that sorrow can arise in the will. According to Scotus, there can be sorrow in the will: 1. when something that is simply unwanted occurs; 2. from a naturally disagreeable object; 3. from an object disagreeable to the sense appetite; and 4. from an object that is conditionally nilled.⁷² Of these four ways, all but the third are possible for the higher part of the will. The higher will can absolutely or conditionally not want something. The higher will is also naturally inclined to want certain things whose opposites will cause sadness in it. Yet the higher will is not conjoined to the sense appetite, and so the third way that sadness could arise in the will does not apply to it.

Scotus argues that Christ experiences sorrow over his bodily suffering according to the second way that sorrow can arise in the will since such suffering is a naturally disagreeable object. To explain how this is possible Scotus distinguishes between the will as having a natural inclination and the will as a free power. Scotus writes, ‘it is clear concerning his will as a nature that he willed the good for his person and did so with respect to what is eternal – and what he did not wish for happened, and what was not wished for was contrary to his *affectio commodi*, and this is sufficient for sorrow.’⁷³ Christ’s natural will wished for bodily integrity and wished for this in a way that was consonant with his orientation to the eternal. Since this wishing was ordered to the eternal, it is an act of the higher portion of his will.

Christ’s will as a free power, however, did will his passion. Thus, he did not experience sorrow over it to the extent that he freely chose to suffer in accord with the *affectio iustitiae*.⁷⁴ His wish to suffer was an absolute wish, and thus there was no sorrow in Christ’s will with respect to the first way that there can be sorrow in the will.

Yet Scotus argues that Christ conditionally wished not to suffer. According to Scotus, suffering is not choice-worthy in itself, and so he wills it on the condition that certain goods can only be achieved by undergoing suffering.⁷⁵ In this way,

⁷¹ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 75) (Vat., 9:511).

⁷² Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (nn. 47–60) (Vat., 9:498–505).

⁷³ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 95) (Vat., 9:518).

⁷⁴ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 98) (Vat., 9:519–20).

⁷⁵ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 104) (Vat., 9:522).

then, there is even sorrow in Christ's higher will as it is a free power.⁷⁶ Thus, Scotus like some of his predecessors holds that Christ simultaneously experiences sorrow and joy because of what he freely wills, but he explains this in a new way by invoking the distinction between absolutely and conditionally nilling something. This perhaps expresses with greater precision the distinction that Matthew of Aquasparta was making between willing and nilling suffering under two different *rationes*.

When Scotus considers whether there was sorrow in Christ's lower will, he attributes sorrow to it for many of the same reasons that he attributes it to his higher will. Thus, Christ's lower will experiences sorrow over the sins of others and sorrow over his own bodily suffering insofar as he conditionally nilled them.⁷⁷ Scotus also attributes sorrow to Christ's lower will as a natural power, but he does so in a way that is different from how he describes the sorrow in Christ's natural will as it is in the higher part of his soul. In the lower part of his soul, Christ's natural will is conjoined to his sense appetite, and suffers when it suffers. As Scotus writes, 'it is clear that [the lower will] as a nature or as conjoined to his sensitive appetite did suffer by being saddened.'⁷⁸ In this way Scotus preserves something of the idea common to his predecessors that Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering in *ratio ut natura*.

Conclusion

Jerome's idea of a propassion proved an attractive, but inadequate, account of Christ's sorrow for the *Summa Halensis* and subsequent Franciscan theologians. The strength of Jerome's theory was its ability to explain how Christ could have genuine human emotions and yet still conform to the Stoic model of a wise man. While this remained an important aspect of 13th-century accounts of Christ's sorrow, the authors considered above also showed interest in examining Christ's sorrow in response to the idea that making satisfaction for sin requires suffering in each part of his soul, and that this suffering would lead to sorrow.

The *Summa Halensis* offered a well-developed account of the sorrow of Christ and subsequent Franciscans followed its lead and freely made use of the tools the *Summa* provided to explore this topic. Augustine's idea of higher and lower reason loomed large in this way of considering Christ's sorrow. Also, the idea of sorrow as arising when something occurs contrary to one's will is very much in accord

⁷⁶ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 101) (Vat., 9:520–21): 'Tertio, videndum est de portione superiore ut libera est, et de nolitione condicionali vel habituali (et dico "habitualem" in cuius actum voluntas prona est ex se exire nisi aliud obstet). Sic videtur dicendum esse quod illa portio noluit passionem, id est noluisse quantum in se fuisset si omnia prospera et iusta secundum se appetibilia aequae fuissent sine ea.'

⁷⁷ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (nn. 83, 107) (Vat., 9:514, 522).

⁷⁸ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 106) (Vat., 9:522).

with Augustine's thoughts on the emotions. As Peter King observed, '[for Augustine] emotions are intimately bound up with the will.'⁷⁹ Moreover, in some ways there is an increasing Augustinianism beginning with Matthew of Aquasparta and continuing with Scotus. Both of them highlight Augustine's notion that the higher portion of reason can be taken in a strict or broad sense, and both of them emphasize how taking it in a broader sense allows one to attribute sorrow over his own suffering to the higher portion of Christ's will.

While 13th-century Franciscan theologians looked to Augustine for an understanding of the soul and the emotions to help them address questions about Christ's sorrow, their use of Augustine provides additional verification for Lydia Schumacher's claim that the early Franciscan school represents much more than an unoriginal repetition of Augustine's ideas.⁸⁰ As we have seen, the *Summa* and subsequent Franciscans united parts of Augustine's understanding of the soul with that of John Damascene's. Also, Augustinian psychology and the Augustinian account of the passions adopted by these Franciscans was used to answer a question that Augustine himself never posed, namely, whether there was sorrow in every part of Christ's soul. That question arose from an interpretation of Anselm's soteriology found in the early Franciscan school that connects making satisfaction with undergoing suffering. Finally, the originality of how Augustine's ideas were used by these Franciscans is also evident in those places where they offer different accounts of where and why sorrow is to be located in Christ's soul. As we saw, for example, there was disagreement among the Franciscans over how to attribute sorrow to the higher part of Christ's reason and will. Thus, the *Summa Halensis* inaugurated a new way of thinking about Christ's sorrow, but it did not initiate a static tradition.

⁷⁹ Peter King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 170.

⁸⁰ Lydia Schumacher, 'New Directions in Franciscan Studies,' *Theology* 120:4 (2017), pp. 253–61; and idem, *Early Franciscan Theology*, ch. 1, pp. 1–29.

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Franciscan Identity, Poverty and the Rational Will: From *Summa Halensis* to John Duns Scotus

Abstract: In *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Bonnie Kent concludes that historians of philosophy might well enlarge the context within which they consider how scholastic thinkers develop their insights on virtue, human freedom and moral character. This paper focuses on the famed Franciscan Poverty Controversy as backdrop to the terminological shift from free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) to freedom of the will (*libertas voluntatis*). The question of Franciscan identity as it relates to poverty (*usus pauper*) may shed additional light on the context within which friars deepened their understanding of rational human freedom. Textual evidence traces out the evolution of the concept of human rational freedom from the *Summa Halensis* through Peter John Olivi to John Duns Scotus.

At the close of her important study on 13th-century ethics,¹ Bonnie Kent notes that historians of philosophy would do well to enlarge the context within which they consider how scholastic thinkers develop their insights on virtue, human freedom and moral character. A larger context, she argues, informs a different reading of the project of philosophical reflection after 1277. In particular, Kent targets the common narrative of Aristotle vs. Augustine. While offering a dramatic lens, this narrative fails to account for what we find in the texts themselves.

In what follows, I suggest that this all too familiar narrative also overlooks an important debate within Franciscan circles, namely, the growing tension over *usus pauper*, commonly known as the poverty controversy.² In what follows, I propose to shift our attention toward this more internal Franciscan dynamic as a way of recasting the ‘story’ of the development from free will (*liberum arbitrium*) to freedom of the will (*libertas voluntatis*). I suggest that the question of Franciscan identity, specifically as it relates to vowed poverty (*usus pauper*) may shed additional light on the

1 Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

2 I have explored this question in several earlier publications. See Mary Beth Ingham, ‘Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom: Duns Scotus’s Contribution to the *Usus Pauper* Debate,’ *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), pp. 337–69; idem, ‘Scotus’s Franciscan Identity and Ethics: Self-Mastery and the Rational Will,’ in *John Duns Scotus, Philosopher: Proceedings of the Quadruple Congress I*, eds. Mary Beth Ingham and Oleg Bychkov (Münster: Aschendorff, 2010), pp. 139–55.

context within which Franciscans explored and developed their deeper understanding of human freedom as rational.³

When we recall that the 13th century was the critical first century of the Order's growth, we recognize the central importance of Franciscan identity, particularly in the context of university education and the professionalization of the friars. The evolution from an earlier, traditional and inherited understanding of free will in the *Summa Halensis* through Peter John Olivi to John Duns Scotus points to the way their own reflection and debate on the vow of poverty gave birth to the affirmation of a will that is free because it is rational, and rational because it is free. What is more, the rational dimension of the will emerges within a focus on self-dominion as key to free choice and poor use. This indicates that the emergence of freedom as central to human dignity, otherwise known as Franciscan voluntarism, may be traced not only to the growing integration of Aristotelian metaphysics – along with the various condemnations – but (and perhaps even more significantly) to a controversy within the Order.

Two questions frame our investigation. First, how might we understand the textual and conceptual shift from *liberum arbitrium* in the early texts to *libertas voluntatis* at the close of the century? And second, how might we account for the central role played by Anselm's *De casu diaboli* for a thinker like John Duns Scotus in the first decade of the 14th century? I argue that the shift that takes place within the Franciscan understanding of the will involves a re-casting of key elements inherited from the *Summa Halensis*, informed by concerns related to the defense of mendicant life during the final decades of the 13th century.

Peter John Olivi (1248–98) was a central figure in the poverty controversy. Olivi's argument in favor of rational freedom as self-mastery provides the conceptual bridge between the reflections prior to 1270 and those following, especially as the century nears its close. Olivi's focus on the nature of poverty as poor use (*usus pauper*) links the Franciscan vow to the dignity of human rational freedom. His thought witnesses to two important developments in the argumentation: the terminological shift from *liberum arbitrium* to *libertas voluntatis* and the use of Anselm's *De casu diaboli* as source text for prolonged reflection on the nature of freedom as essential to human dignity and original rectitude.⁴

Greater attention to the poverty debate, and the key role played by Peter John Olivi, contributes to a deeper understanding of the development from *liberum arbitrium* to *libertas voluntatis* throughout the 13th century. The debate allows us to

³ I do not wish to underestimate the importance of the integration and critique of Aristotelian thought, nor do I wish to diminish the impact of the various condemnations throughout the 13th century. I simply wish to add another layer of context as backdrop to our study of the texts themselves, specifically as it relates to the central role of *De casu diaboli* in the arguments found in Olivi and Scotus.

⁴ While Bonaventure's argumentation had responded to external criticism, Olivi was writing for the friars. See David Flood, OFM, 'Poverty and the Gospel,' *Franciscan Studies* 64 (2006), p. 12.

trace and re-cast the dynamic Franciscan affirmation of a rational will capable of self-restraint, ordered loving, conversion, friendship, and generous self-gift: in short, the fullest realization of the Franciscan (Olivi) and human (Scotus) vocation as intended by the followers of the Poor Man of Assisi.

***Summa Halensis*: What is Free Choice?**

In order to trace the development from free choice to freedom in the will, we identify three seminal aspects in the *Summa Halensis* that open the way for Olivi and, by extension, Duns Scotus. These elements are first, the identification of free choice with self-dominion and self-mastery; second, the affirmation of deeper concept of freedom as indifference; third, the recognition of continuity between human and angelic freedom. The reconfiguration and development of these elements, within the context of the internal Franciscan debate, illustrate how the capacity for self-dominion, originally identified with free choice, undergoes a transformation to become the central act and perfection of rational freedom.

This transformation is made possible thanks to Peter John Olivi and the debate surrounding Franciscan poverty. Olivi's work re-casts the three aspects of the Franciscan position, using them to defend the vow of poverty, understood as detachment from influences of the material world. Faithful observance of the vow of poverty as self-restraint (*usus pauper*) is essential to develop that self-mastery required to follow Christ. Finally, the transformation of these elements begun by Olivi helps to inform positions taken by John Duns Scotus in his defense of the rational will.

The treatise on free choice, *De libero arbitrio*, that appears in book II of *Summa Halensis* sets out an initial Franciscan position on free choice that identifies it with self-mastery and self-dominion.⁵ While this position is not textually dominant, it does thread through the various dimensions of the argumentation. The argument, 'Whether free choice is called free from the part of reason or of will,'⁶ opens with an initial reference to Phillip the Chancellor who, citing Augustine, defines free choice in terms of self-mastery: 'Nothing is so in our power as is the will.' For this is freedom: self-dominion.⁷ Phillip's definition and approach on the nature of free choice and its deeper foundation

5 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris inrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), II, P1–2, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3 (nn. 389–416), pp. 466–90.

6 *SH* II, P1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M2, C3 (n. 398), pp. 476–77: 'Utrum liberum arbitrium dicatur liberum ex parte rationis vel voluntatis.'

7 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M2, C3 (n. 398), p. 476a: 'Quia quod voluntatem domini sumus actuum nostrorum; unde dicit Augustinus: "Nihil est ita in potestate nostra sicut voluntas;" sed illius est libertas principaliter, cuius est dominium actuum suorum; ergo, cum voluntas sit huiusmodi, libertas primo et principaliter erit voluntatis.'

in the will's freedom informs and guides the solution to this question. Indeed, his argumentation appears verbatim at several points.⁸

Free choice includes both rational and affective dimensions. *Liberum arbitrium* is called 'free' because it is in the will and called 'choice' because it is in reason.⁹ Since it governs primarily reward and/or punishment (merit or demerit), there is both a cognitive dimension and a voluntary dimension. The rational act of free choice is truly an *arbitrium*, an arbitration, rather than a judgment (*iudicium*). Free choice does not deliberate according to moral law. Rather it chooses rationally. And this requires that free choice act independently of material influences and external coercion. This immateriality and deep freedom is the ground for the essential act of free choice: self-mastery.

As the reflection continues, the deeper freedom that undergirds free choice as self-mastery is revealed: it is freedom from necessity and coercion. This deeper freedom, only found in the will, makes free choice 'free'. Here is a foundational 'freedom from' which admits of no degree of greater or lesser. It is the freedom that rational creatures share with God. This deeper freedom is more capacity than activity and is not to be confused with consent or acceptance.¹⁰

The emphasis on self-mastery and the affirmation of a deeper dimension of freedom from coercion enables the authors to affirm continuity in the possession and exercise of free choice *pre* and *post-lapsum*. In the present state, we enjoy the same free choice that Adam knew in the state of innocence and that Christ knew during his life on earth.¹¹ This free choice is none other than the capacity for self-mastery grounded on our immateriality (freedom from compulsion). This capacity holds the key to merit or demerit. Indeed, citing Augustine, the authors argue that were this sort of freedom not present in man's original state, there would be no similarity between the human state *pre* and *post-lapsum*.¹² The question closes recalling Bernard's distinction among types of freedom: freedom of nature (equally directed at good or evil) is not the same as freedom of grace which enables the will to exercise flexibility, despite its tending toward evil *post lapsum*.

The identification of an equal degree of freedom in all rational creatures makes possible the affirmation that human free choice belongs to the same order of perfection as angelic free choice. This identical perfection is based upon freedom from coercion, made possible by the spiritual essence of the beings in question. Inevitability of choice (for good in the case of angels and for evil in the case of demons) does not remove their

8 As Lottin notes, the influence of Phillip here is twofold: on Alexander's *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio* and John of La Rochelle's *Summa de vitiis*. See Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1957), vol. 1, pp. 127–30.

9 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti 3, M2, C3 (n. 400), p. 478a.

10 *SH* II In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C3 (n. 399), p. 477b.

11 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C5 (n. 406), p. 483.

12 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C4 (n. 405), p. 482a.

free choice. This is because angels are not forced to choose the good, nor are demons forced to choose evil.¹³

In a series of questions in In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, the authors lay out eight points related to angelic free choice and the extent to which any aspect is shared by human free choice. Angels and demons possess a natural will (as do we).¹⁴ This natural will holds the natural desire for happiness (and here the authors reference Anselm's *De casu diaboli*). They affirm that angels do indeed possess free choice because every creature is changeable (*vertibilitas*), either in being or in choice. Since angels do not change their essence, they are changeable via choice. And this is free will.¹⁵

Since angels are intellectual (not rational) beings, Augustine's definition of free choice (as 'a faculty of reason and will which chooses the good with the help of grace, and fails to choose the good when grace is lacking') would not apply to them.¹⁶ However, in their solution, the authors appeal to John Damascene and extend the term 'rational' to include intellectual. Indeed, since mastery of acts (*dominus actuum*) is part of the capacity for free choice, then angels do exercise mastery over their own acts. Finally, one can differentiate between capacity and activity when it comes to free choice. Even though one has the capacity of vision, one might not actually see an object that is invisible. Capacity remains even in the absence of activity.¹⁷

A more difficult question arises in terms of equivalency of angelic free choice and human free choice.¹⁸ In the body of this question, the focus turns to levels of freedom (*libertas*), not free choice. Counter arguments point to angelic nobility as grounds for their superior level of freedom. In the solution, the authors lay out Bernard of Clairvaux's three types of freedom: freedom from compulsion/necessity, freedom from sin, freedom from suffering. It is only the first freedom that is shared equally by men and angels. The other two freedoms require divine assistance and the vision of glory. In reply to the argument based on nobility, the authors clarify that facility in acting (freedom) is a function of simplicity in essence. Angels enjoy greater freedom of action because they are simpler beings. It is only in this sense that their freedom is superior to ours. Here we see how the capacity/activity distinction has played out. Like the angels, we have the first type of capacity for freedom (freedom from compulsion). However, be-

13 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C3 (n. 404), p. 481a-b.

14 SH II, P1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, M1, C2 (n. 152), p. 200.

15 SH II, P1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, M2, C1 (n. 153), pp. 202–3.

16 This quote actually comes from the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum* and was attributed to Augustine by Peter Lombard, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, 3rd eds. (Grottaferrata, Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), bk. 1, d. 24, c. 3, p. 453. There is a version of this quote in the authentic Augustine's *De corruptione et gratia* 1, but not with the exact wording: *Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere*.

17 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 154), pp. 203–4. This example is taken from Anselm's *De libero arbitrio*.

18 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 155), pp. 204–6.

cause we are embodied beings, our activity is less free, just as one might possess the capacity for sight and be unable to see an object.

These distinctions between angelic and human freedom/free choice reappear where our moral changeability becomes more problematic because of our bodies. In heaven, however, we will not experience such impediments. Angelic freedom (*libertas arbitrii*) is in the will and identical to human freedom insofar as both are free from compulsion.¹⁹

Finally, the principle of free action in both angels and men is the same: *posse in bonum*.²⁰ The suggested second capacity (*posse in malum*) is not from the first principle. Rather, it is from a defect in willing and diminishes freedom. To the question of when angels and demons exercised free choice (in the first instant of their existence), the authors reject the simultaneity of existence and choice. The good angels were not always good, nor were the evil always evil. At an instant other than their coming into being, they chose to love or to hate God.²¹

These arguments contained in the *Summa Halensis* reveal the following. First, we note the importance of the tradition and traditional authorities. Phillip the Chancellor and Bernard of Clairvaux influence the argument in subtle ways. Both his identification of free choice with self-mastery and his exploration of the deeper foundation for free choice in a type of neutral indifference to good or evil, point to how important Phillip's writings were on this question. Likewise, the threefold distinction of freedom taken from Bernard of Clairvaux reveals how monastic sources played an important role for these early Franciscans. Nevertheless, while important, all these authorities contribute to ambiguity of focus, between free choice and freedom.

Second, the identification of choice with freedom as proper to immaterial beings undergirds their emphasis on freedom *from* as key to understanding freedom in rational creatures. This points to 'freedom from compulsion' (or necessity) as proper to rational creatures by virtue of their immateriality and rational capacity for abstraction and deliberation. This foundational freedom is indifferent and equally shared among spiritual beings.

Finally, the affirmation of a common, equally shared 'freedom from compulsion' invites continued reflection on angelic and divine freedom as paradigmatic for deeper analysis. This affirmation opens the argumentation to the sorts of reflections found in Olivi and Scotus, who make greater use of Anselm's *De casu diaboli*.

Peter John Olivi: *Usus Pauper* and Self-Dominion

As Franciscans became more influential throughout the 13th century, they were challenged to defend their mendicant way of life as validly Christian. Secular masters

¹⁹ *SH* II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (nn. 156–57), pp. 206–7.

²⁰ *SH* II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 158), p. 208.

²¹ They make reference to instants of time, but no reference to Anselm's *De casu diaboli* or the two affections.

challenged Franciscan (and Dominican) life as unchristian and dangerous. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio defended the Franciscan practice of poverty against such external critics and detractors in his *Disputed Questions on Evangelical Perfection* (1256) and *Defense of the Mendicants* (1269). This defense reached a highpoint when, during the latter half of the 13th century, the polemic within the order focused on the notion of ‘poor use’. A key figure in the debate was Peter John Olivi.

Scholars such as Ernst Stadter,²² David Burr,²³ David Flood, OFM,²⁴ and François-Xavier Putallaz,²⁵ have provided much on the historical and philosophical aspects of Olivi’s position on the nature of freedom. Freedom in the will is central to the argument for human dignity. It is the basis for his position in the *usus pauper* controversy. For reasons that are still largely unclear, Olivi was condemned twice: once in 1283 and posthumously in 1299.²⁶ After 1299 Olivi’s work could be neither read nor taught.

Despite his condemnation, Olivi’s influence on the friars was powerful. His role in the development of the notions of freedom and the will may be traced to his position on poverty as ‘poor use’ rather than simply non-possession.²⁷ ‘Poor’ or ‘restrained use’ requires the very reflexive self-mastery and indetermination that Olivi defends in his *Treatise on Evangelical Perfection* and his *Commentary on Sentences*. Reflexive self-mastery requires a rational will.

Self-dominion is a central concept in Peter John Olivi. In his *Treatise on Evangelical Perfection*, question 8, Olivi lays out clearly how the will’s dignity and superiority support his position on poverty as requiring restrained use of goods (*usus pauper*), over and above their non-possession.²⁸ The vow of poverty, with its essential element of restrained use, is not merely an imitation of the practice of Jesus and his apostles (as Bonaventure had held); it is also, and importantly, perfective of human persons. The truth of this assertion is discovered immediately via personal reflection and at-

22 Ernst Stadter, *Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit: Die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung zwischen Bonaventura und Duns Scotus* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1971).

23 David Burr, *Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the Usus Pauper Controversy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

24 David Flood, OFM, ‘Franciscan Poverty (A Brief Survey),’ in *Nicolaus Minorita: Chronica. Documentation on Pope John XXII, Michael Cesena on the Poverty of Christ*, eds. Gedeon Gál and David Flood (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1996), pp. 31–53.

25 François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolent liberté: Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle* (Freiburg: Éditions universitaires; Paris: Cerf, 1995).

26 Burr, *Olivi and Franciscan Poverty*, pp. 146–47.

27 Non-possession was Bonaventure’s central distinction in his *Defense of the Mendicants* in 1269. Olivi defends *restrained* use as essential to Franciscan poverty.

28 Burr, *Olivi and Franciscan Poverty*, p. 43. The text itself is early. Burr dates it between 1273–75, showing the influence of the mendicant controversy, Bonaventure’s *Apologia pauperum*, and John Pecham’s *Tractatus pauperis* on Olivi’s approach to the question. Burr identifies this question, along with its partner question 9, as possible sources for what would develop into the poverty controversy. What follows is condensed from a fuller development in Ingham, ‘Self-mastery and Rational Freedom.’

tention to one's inner state. Anyone attentive to an inner struggle to master her desires or to perform a difficult task is immediately aware of her innate dignity as a being capable of self-mastery.²⁹

Olivi defines the highest state of poverty as *usus pauper*: the restrained use of goods. This state conforms to the natural human will considered according to its rectitude. The source for this rectitude lies within the will itself: in the natural freedom by which the will is able to master itself. This innate power for self-mastery expresses itself in a twofold manner: in its ability to control and move beyond its own desires as well as in its ability to be free from compulsion and the lure of external goods, moving beyond things of this world. Both internally (in self-restraint) and externally (in its independence from compulsion), the will expresses its natural freedom and demonstrates a two-fold superiority to the order of nature.³⁰

The will's natural state of reflexive self-mastery was lost when innocence was lost. The vow of poverty provides the therapeutic remedy. 'Poor use' enables the will to return to its original rectitude: complete self-mastery and restrained use of the goods of the world. Olivi defends the Franciscan way of life as that which helps the will recover its excellence and all its dignity: its breadth, length, and height.³¹

If his *Treatise on Evangelical Perfection* focuses on the native dignity of the human will, Olivi's Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* more fully defends freedom as self-mastery. Beyond the identification of self-mastery with free choice in the *Summa Halensis*, Olivi identifies self-mastery with personhood and self-possession;³²

29 J. Schlageter, OFM, *Das Heil der Armen und das Verderben der Reichem: Petrus Johannis Olivi, OFM, De Frage nach der höchsten Armut* (Werl: Dietrich-Coelde, 1989), p. 125: 'In hoc etiam clamatur altitudinem; quia – cum conatur ad eam aut appetendam aut de facto habendam – semper sentit se indigere fortissimo conatu et semper in appetendo et assumendo eam sentit se elevari ad aliquid valde arduum et valde de natura sua difficile. Hoc autem omni conanti ad eam est et esse potest probatissimum per experientiam vivam.'

30 Ibid., p. 125: 'Naturalis enim rectitudo voluntatis nostrae clamatur eam altam et sibi consonam; tum quia naturalem habet libertatem qua omnibus mundanis superferatur et superferri appetit per modum cuiusdam dominii naturalis. Unde per naturam non determinatur voluntas nostra nec persona nostra plus ad hoc quam ad illud nec ipsa re de vi naturae plus ad hunc quam ad illum.'

31 Ibid., p. 125: 'Quandocumque igitur voluntas nostra declinat ad inferiorem statum seu modum se habendi ad temporalia, quam sit status et modus altissimae paupertatis, tunc aliquo modo declinat ab altitudine suae naturalis libertatis et coartatur latitudo suae naturalis capacitatis et divaricatur uniformitas suae intellectualitatis pro eo quod tunc applicat et coartat et associat se ad aliqua istorum inferiorum sive propria sive communia modo quodam infimo et stricto et distractivo seu difformi respectu suae altitudinis et latitudinis et uniformitatis seu abstractionis.'

32 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum (Quaestiones)*, eds. Bernhard Jansen (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1926), vol. II, q. 52, p. 200. This identification with reflexive self-possession appears again in II, q. 59 (Jansen, p. 526): 'Personalitas seu persona est per se existentia in se ipsam plene rediens et consistens seu in se ipsam perfecte reflexa.'

it is the will's ability to dominate itself.³³ Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is only possible because the will possesses the capacity for this deeper reality of self-possession and self-dominion, both externally and internally. Indeed, the will's relationship to itself, its reflexivity, reveals the way in which it is a self-mover. Without its natural freedom, no such self-dominion, no such self-movement would be possible.

In addition, nothing can act reflexively immediately toward itself, unless it is first turned toward itself as mover to what can be moved, for to reflect on oneself is to move oneself. However, no power can move itself toward itself or toward another, unless it has dominion over itself, as will be shown in what follows. One cannot have such dominion, over oneself or another, if one is not free.³⁴

For Olivi, the will is free because it is constituted as a self-reflexive power, capable of self-dominion. Olivi provides several important examples of our awareness of our acts of self-mastery. It is often the case that we experience an act of conversion toward an enemy, wherein we move ourselves to love someone we had previously despised. Anyone able to do this, to refrain from one act (aversion to one whom we dislike) and to move toward another (loving that person despite our natural aversion), possesses power and dominion over both modes of action. In such a case, there is both self-restraint (a first act of self-dominion) and self-movement counter to natural inclinations (a second act of self-dominion). This second act requires mastery over appetites, against whose inclinations one could restrain oneself. This, he concludes, is what is meant when we speak of freedom in the will.

For indeed, we frequently experience that we move ourselves toward those things we had previously avoided and hated, such as loving one's enemy. Any power which can hold itself back from one act and move beyond it toward another act is free toward inclining and not inclining, since it has the power and dominion over both acts. Indeed, one would not be able to restrain oneself against one's appetite and inclination, unless the restraining power had dominion over the appetite against whose inclination it restrained itself; and in the same way it could not move itself toward that which it hated and avoided, unless it had dominion over that hatred and over that flight.³⁵

33 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 54 (Jansen, p. 249): 'Libertatem etiam sine voluntate ponere est omnino impossibile, cum libertas nihil aliud sit quam dominativa facultas ipsius voluntatis.'

34 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, pp. 324–25): 'Praeterea, nihil potest se reflectere immediate ad se, nisi sit prius conversum ad se ipsum sicut motor ad mobile, nam sic reflectere se est se ipsum movere. Nulla autem virtus potest se ipsam movere nec ad se nec ad alia, nisi habeat dominium super se, sicut in sequentibus magis tangetur. Dominium autem nec in se nec in aliis habere potest, si non est libera.'

35 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 325): 'Experimur etiam quod frequenter se ipsam impellit et movet etiam ad res quas prius refugiebat et odio habebat, ut ad amandum inimicum suum. Sed omnis potentia quae ab actu potest se retinere et retrahere et ad eundem actum impellere est libera ad tendendum et non tendendum tanquam habens potestatem et dominium super utrumque. Posse etiam se retinere contra appetitum et inclinationem suam non posset fieri, nisi potentia retinens haberet dominium super appetitum, contra cuius inclinationem se ipsam retinet; et eodem

Such capacity for self-restraint is most certain and evident to anyone attentive to her inner states. This capacity reveals the deeper capacity for freedom that constitutes the natural dignity of the will. Freedom for self-movement is most evident when we reflect upon personal conversion: the ability to act against our inclinations. The fall of the virtuous person from virtue as well as the vicious person's conversion from vice depends upon the ability to resist and master one's natural inclinations. In both cases, the person acts against habit or inclination. The virtuous person acts contrary to years of virtuous living. The vicious person acts contrary to her own strengthened and habitual inclinations toward vice. In each case, there are really two acts involved. The first act is that of self-restraint: stopping the habitual inclination. The second act is the act of self-movement: toward vice or virtue. Yet whatever the outcome, the act of self-restraint is identical in both cases. Because the will possesses this self-dominion, it 'can impel and move and withdraw itself and the other faculties and active powers subject to it.'³⁶ The will alone, in its capacity for self-mastery and self-dominion, determines itself.

Unlike the presentation in the *Summa Halensis*,³⁷ Olivi focuses on Anselm's *De casu diaboli* as the basis for his analysis of human rational freedom and free choice. I suggest that the emerging importance of this text can be more fully explained as a response to the growing debate of the poverty controversy. In order to ground reflexive self-mastery, Olivi makes use of an Anselmian source which outlines the deeper constitution of a rational will. This turn to Anselm has been prepared by John of La Rochelle's affirmation that all rational beings share a common freedom from compulsion.³⁸

Olivi's focus on the freedom of the angelic will helps to demonstrate how important his defense of freedom *at the moment of choice* is for his defense of vowed poverty as 'poor use'. In volume II, question 42, he takes up and critiques the traditional position that the will is free in regard to future contingent acts, not in regard to past

modo non posset se ipsam impellere ad id quod odit et fugit, nisi haberet dominium super illud odium et super illam fugam.'

36 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 58 (Jansen, p. 410): 'Sicut enim ex praecedenti quaestione [q. 57] patet, necesse est quod liberum arbitrium habeat rationem primi motoris et talis quod posit se et alias potentias et virtutes activas sibi subiectas impellere et movere et retrahere, et hoc non solum, quando nullum est impellens ad contrarium, sed etiam quando est ibi aliquid inclinans ad contrarium. Unde et potest agere contra inclinationem suorum habituum, aliter virtuosus non posset declinare a virtutibus ad vitia nec alium.'

37 Where Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, Anselm's *De predestinatione et libero arbitrio*, and Bernard's *De gratia et libero arbitrio* are the primary source texts cited for the discussion of human free will. See above, nn. 17–18. Anselm's argument in *De casu diaboli* appears briefly in the discussion of angelic free will only. See above, n. 15.

38 The argument originates in John of La Rochelle's *Summa de vitiis*, where freedom is tied to the rational faculty, which is independent of matter, capable of abstraction and deliberation. Once again, the point is made that this independence is foundational to the self-mastery that is identified with free choice. Rational deliberation, key to freedom, differentiates rational from irrational creatures, who are moved by appetite and non-deliberately. *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C2 (n. 403), p. 480a-b.

or present acts. This question as we know deals with the fall of the angels and whether this was at the moment of their creation or subsequent to it. As Olivi demonstrates, unless the angels were free at the moment of their action by means of a naturally prior freedom (as distinct from a temporally prior freedom), they could not have acted freely, nor could they have merited punishment.

This naturally prior freedom in the angelic and human wills makes possible the self-movement that Olivi deems to be key to the possibility of self-mastery. This self-movement is the result of the will's highest indeterminacy regarding its objects, its acts and its mode of acting.³⁹ The will's *indeterminacy* is, Olivi argues, a primary datum of experience. Once again, self-reflection reveals the way in which we do not act as do animals. For we are aware (*sentiremus*) that in a given moment when we act according to our inclinations, at that very instant we might not act as we do. And conversely, we know that at the moment we do not act that we have it in our power to act.⁴⁰ This self-awareness is the deepest and most evident proof that we ourselves are a potency to act independently of external determination. The will's freedom is this *indeterminatio*, undetermined by anything other than itself.

Olivi identifies three traditional categories for objects of willing: the uncreated good, the twofold division of created goods into the just and the beneficial (*iusti et commodi*), and the category of pleasurable or delectable goods. These objects can be understood by the will as ends or as means leading to an end. For example, the will can establish an object as an end for itself that had, hitherto, not been seen as an end.

Olivi completes his discussion with the example of friendship. When we begin to love someone with the love of friendship, the beloved is loved, now for the first time, for himself alone. In this example, we not only shift our attention to a new object of love but, additionally, we alter our own mode of loving. In this act of a conversion in loving, the person moves herself from seeing another as a means to seeing him as an end. Now the other is loved as an object of intrinsic value and for himself alone. Once again, here is an act that reveals the extent to which our will is not determined by the object as presented by the intellect. We are free (indetermined) to exercise con-

³⁹ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 326): 'Voluntas enim habet summam indeterminationem respectu obiectorum et actuum et modorum agendi.'

⁴⁰ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 327): 'Respectu etiam actuum est valde indeterminata. Si enim in hora agendi et dum agit sic esset inclinata ad illos actus sicut sunt cetera agentia ad suos: tunc quando agimus aut in ipso initio actuum non sentiremus in nobis quandam potestatem et facultatem in promptitudine valentem non agere id quod agit. Hoc autem certissime omnis homo sentit apud se, etiam – quod maius est – in his ad quae multum homo afficitur et multo affectu trahitur. Unde indubitanter homo sentit in se habere quandam potestatem quae non sic est determinata ad agendum, quando agit, et ad non agendum, quando non agit, quin, quando agit, possit id non agere, et quin, quando non agit, possit id agere.'

trol over our acts of loving and over the modality of those acts. This sort of indetermination would be impossible to the will, were it not free.⁴¹

Olivi ties the indetermination of the will to its independence from external factors and to its own power over itself and its own acts of loving. The shift from loving an object according to the category of use (*commodi*) to the category of intrinsic value (*iustitiae*) requires that the will perceive the higher order of justice, that it restrain and regulate itself relative to the orders of use and delight. The order of justice belongs to those beings who possess freedom.

For one would not be able to raise oneself to an intrinsic good, unless one could perceive the order of intrinsic goods and unless by the love of intrinsic goods, the will could restrain itself and regulate itself from *commodi*, from goods of use, and from delectable goods. Now one who does not have freedom cannot participate in the order of justice, nor can one restrain oneself from the above according to the order of justice without freedom, because if such [restraint] is not done freely, it ought never be called just or according to justice.⁴²

Olivi reiterates what is at stake here: it is not simply the ability to love goods of justice for their own sake, it is the ability to restrain oneself and to move toward a conversion in loving certain goods anew. This means, quite simply, that the person recognize something/someone as worthy of love for itself alone, and without regard to personal gain or ambition. To see such an object as an end in itself, to love that object with a love of friendship requires the highest form of freedom as self-mastery. It also requires the will's absolute indeterminacy from external factors that might compel it to love a certain object in a certain way.⁴³

In the presence of several goods of equal value, there is no reason we can give, other than the will's freedom, adequately to explain why the will chooses one good over another. And, Olivi concludes in response to a possible objection, this affirma-

41 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 326): 'Respectu quidem obiectorum, quia potest in omne quod habet aut habere potest rationem boni et etiam in omnem rationem boni ab intellectu cogitabilem. Potest enim in rationem boni increati et in rationem iusti et commodi et in rationem boni delectabilis et potest in finem et in ea quae sunt ad finem et potest sibi finem praestituere quae prius non habebant respectu eius rationem finis, utpote, quando de novo aliquem quemcunque incipit diligere amore amicitiae in quo quis diligitur propter se et sui gratia. Sed hanc indeterminationem seu ambitum impossibile est eam habere sine libertate.'

42 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 326): 'Non enim poterit ad bonum iustitiae se elevare, nisi possit percipere ordinem boni iustitiae et nisi amore boni iustitiae possit se refrenare et regulare ab amore boni commodi seu utilis et ab amore boni delectabilis. Order autem iustitiae non est participabilis ab eo quod nullam habet libertatem, nec refrenare se a praedictis secundum ordinem iustitiae potest fieri sine libertate, quia si non fit gratis et libere, numquam debet dici fieri iuste seu secundum iustitiam.'

43 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 326): 'De novo etiam praestituere sibi aliquid ut finem seu ut propter se dilectum impossibile est sine libertate, quia non erit dare quid sit eam ad hoc necessario trahens. Illud enim quod eam traheret haberet necessario rationem finis, et tunc finis non iam de novo praestitueretur, sed prius esset praestitutus, nec novus amicus diligeretur propter se, sed potius propter illum finem qui voluntatem traheret ad amorem amici.'

tion does not reduce the human will to arbitrary action, like that of animals. Animals do not deliberate nor do they judge among objects, as we do. Here again, introspection reveals to us why, in a particular instance, we choose between two goods. The animal appetite is continually moved by nature to act in the way it does.⁴⁴

Indeterminacy, self-mastery, modalities of loving, goods of justice and happiness: all of these are part of the primary data of introspection, made possible by the will's self-reflexive capacity. Olivi ties all these aspects together with a single example, the single most evident manner by which we are able to affirm our own freedom. It is the act of conversion in the modality of the will's act, namely, the love of friendship for someone previously loved according to personal advantage. This shift within the will, a conversion in loving, a shift of perspective from self to other, from selfishness to generosity, is the singular and most evident example that distinguishes the human will from that of animals, who do not deliberate over goods to which they are attracted, nor are they capable of loving something according to its intrinsic goodness.⁴⁵

Without freedom in the will, which Olivi refers to both as free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) and as freedom of choice (*libertatem arbitrii*), no friendship, whether among humans or with God, would be possible. Human society as well as religion would be impossible, not to mention voluntary human associations such as religious orders whose members profess poverty. Indeed, without the will's freedom, we would be nothing more than 'intellectual brutes'.⁴⁶ No one of sound mind would dare conclude to the pessimism and 'intolerable falsehood' in denying the will's freedom.⁴⁷

44 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 327).

45 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 330): 'Propter quod non dicimus quod bruta ament proprie aliquid amore amicitiae, sed solum amore concupiscentiae aut complacentiae, non solum quia nihil gratis possunt amare, sed etiam quia se ipsa non possunt alteri donare sicut amicus dat se ipsum amico. Quisquis enim potest per vim amicitiae dare se ipsum alteri ut amico: oportet quod super se ipsum plene reflectatur et in manu cuiusdam sui potestativi consensus se ipsum sic teneat et habeat ut per ipsum eundem consensum plene se suo amico det et uniat; nihil enim potest donari, nisi prius in plena facultate et dominio dantis habeatur, unde sua solum dat homo et non aliena. Si igitur donationes huiusmodi et praedictum actum consensus manifeste in nobis esse sentimus, et indubitanter intra nos experimur nos quaedam operari a nobis tanquam a nobis: indubitabile debet esse libertatem arbitrii seu voluntatis nos habere.'

46 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 338): 'Patet igitur quod hic error omne bonum humanam et etiam divinum exterminat, et si quis ad praedicta attendat, advertere poterit quod omni facinori et impudicitiae et iniquitati habenas totis viribus laxat. Nec mirum, quia, ut ita dicam, it quod proprie sumus, personalitatem scilicet nostram, a nobis tollit nihilque amplius nobis dat nisi quod simus quaedam bestiae intellectuales seu intellectum habentes.'

47 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 338).

John Duns Scotus: Self-Mastery and the Rational Will

As he develops his position on rational freedom in the will, John Duns Scotus emphasizes two aspects we have seen, both in the *Summa Halensis* and in Olivi's discussion in his *Treatise on Evangelical Perfection*: that the will possesses a natural dignity and that this natural dignity is constituted by its rational capacity for self-restraint and self-mastery. Like his Franciscan predecessors, Scotus asserts that a correct understanding of the will's natural constitution is key to understanding its dignity. In a move that brings together Olivi's first two arguments (natural rectitude and the state of innocence), Scotus emphasizes that the 'native freedom of the will,' constituted by its two affections, is not lost through original sin.⁴⁸ In this, Scotus goes beyond what Olivi had proposed. The will retains the natural dignity and constitution it possessed in the state of innocence.

We find evidence for Scotus' understanding of rational freedom in three areas: the identification of freedom and self-mastery, the role of the angelic being, and the freedom of the blessed.

Freedom and Self-Mastery

Scotus identifies the will as a self-mover in *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* IX, question 14 with both an oblique reference to Olivi's position in volume II, question 58 (he is listed among *multis* who have defended the will's freedom),⁴⁹ and the example of what Scotus himself means when he calls the will a self-mover. At the end of six examples of self-moving powers, he presents the will which 'can not choose (*non velle*) what the intellect shows it.'

⁴⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 6, q. 2 (n. 49), in *Opera Omnia* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1951–2013), vol. 8, pp. 48–49.

⁴⁹ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristoteles*, bk. IX, q. 14 (n. 62), in *Opera Philosophica*, eds. Robert Andrews et al. (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997), IV, p. 649. The editors refer 'multis' to James of Viterbo, *Quodlibeta* 1, q. 7, in *Jacobi de Viterbio Disputatio prima de quolibet*, eds. E. Ypma (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1968), pp. 88–102; Gonsalvo of Spain, *Quodlibeta* 8, in *Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi* IX (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1903 ff.), pp. 114–23; and Peter John Olivi, *Summa* II, q. 58 in *Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi* V (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1903 ff.), pp. 409–14.

Again, if some other action is naturally presupposed and does not occur, then the agent will not act. Finally, if it is a free agent, it is able of itself to refrain from acting. (...) A sample of the sixth is the will, which need not choose what the intellect shows it.⁵⁰

Significant in this passage is the identification of the act as *non velle*, or that by which the will does not choose what the intellect presents it. This sort of act is possible, thanks to the two affections that constitute the will. The result is a self-moving cause capable of that reflexive act of self-restraint. This sort of reflexive causal action appeared in Olivi's discussion of the will as free potency in volume II, question 57. But what does not appear in Olivi's text is the act of *non velle*, the positive act of self-restraint that Scotus identifies within his Aristotelian reflection, and as a development over his own earlier, *Lectura II*, distinction 25 treatment of freedom in the will.⁵¹

This third act of the will, the *non velle*, is central to Scotus' position on the rational will as sole cause of its own act of willing. This is an act of self-restraint that reveals not just the will's ability to choose among opposites external to itself, but to govern and restrain its own movement, including its own modality (intensity) of acting. Indeed, this important act of self-restraint is possible, as Scotus explains further in question 15, because of the deeper metaphysical category of rational potencies at the heart of reality, a category to which the will alone belongs.

Aristotle's metaphysical categories of rational/irrational potencies enable Scotus to explain not just self-restraint and self-mastery in the will, but the way in which the act of self-restraint is grounded in the will's own nature as rational cause. Now Olivi's position can be made to make even better sense, with the help of Aristotle and the Aristotelian metaphysical categories of rational and irrational, or, as Scotus explains (perhaps with a nod to the *Summa Halensis*), free and natural.⁵² Aristotle enables

⁵⁰ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* bk. IX, q. 14 (n. 126) (Andrews, IV, p. 673): 'Si iterum alia actio naturaliter praesupponatur suae, illa non posita, non aget. Si tandem est liberum, ex se potest non agere. (...) Exemplum sexti: intellectu ostendente aliquid, voluntas potest illud non velle.'

⁵¹ The *Lectura* discussion is extremely interesting in this regard. In this text, Scotus refers (at n. 64) to Olivi's argument for freedom in Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones II*, q. 58 (Jansen, p. 417), in reference to the will's indeterminateness toward multiple volitions. In his own solution at this early stage of his career, however, Scotus identifies free will (*liberum arbitrium*) only with the two acts of the will: *velle et nolle*. And he concludes, 'in hoc consistit liberum arbitrium, sive in nobis sive in angelis.' John Duns Scotus, *Lectura II*, q. 25 (n. 70), in *Opera Omnia* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1951–2013), vol. 19, p. 253. The argument found in his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* clearly enables Scotus to deepen his own reflection on the will's freedom and its self-mastery in three acts of the will.

⁵² John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum IX*, q. 15 (n. 22) (Andrews, IV, pp. 680–81): 'But there is only a twofold generic way an operation proper to a potency can be elicited. For either [1] the potency of itself is determined to act, so that so far as itself is concerned, it cannot fail to act when not impeded from without; or [2] it is not of itself so determined, but can perform

him to see how to establish indetermination as the *sine qua non* condition for self-determination. Only when the will is undetermined by anything other than itself, lying thereby outside the order of natural causal determinism, can the act of self-movement take place.

The rational will is a *sui generis* causal principle that is not determined by anything other than itself. Scotus can now incorporate Aristotle's causal categories into his argument, thereby providing the metaphysical foundation for what human introspection reveals. Scotus offers the same method of proof as had Olivi: the evidence of self-awareness.⁵³ Aristotle's metaphysical discussion and distinction among potencies have now been transformed thanks to the paradigm of angelic willing (Anselm) in service to Franciscan poverty (Olivi).

Scotus' treatment of the will's freedom in *Ordinatio* I, distinction 39 offers by far the strongest connection to Olivi that can be found in his texts. In this argument, carefully studied by several scholars in recent years, we find what has come to be identified as the theory of 'synchronic contingency', the possibility of the will to act otherwise than it does at the very instant it acts. Scotus refers to this sort of possibility in *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (IX, q. 15, n. 30),⁵⁴ where he appeals to immediate personal experience of the ability to will otherwise, at the very instant of willing.⁵⁵ In respect to the same temporal instant, the will is capable of acting in an opposite manner or ceasing to act as it did because of the natural priority of the capacity to act otherwise.⁵⁶

Two late texts of Scotus confirm the importance of this insight. His final Parisian teaching on book II, distinction 25 presents the angelic example. This passage is chronologically parallel to the *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* and Quodlibetal discussions.⁵⁷ It names two of the three authorities (Aristotle and Anselm) and

either this act or its opposite, or can either act or not act at all. A potency of the first sort is commonly called "nature", whereas one of the second sort is called "will".'

⁵³ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IX, q. 15 (n. 30) (Andrews, IV, pp. 682–83): 'The proof here is *a posteriori*, for the person who wills experiences that he could have nilled or not willed (*non velle*) what he did, according to what has been explained more at length elsewhere about the will's liberty.'

⁵⁴ See n. 52.

⁵⁵ Stephen Dumont's 'The Origin of Scotus' Theory of Synchronic Contingency,' *Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), pp. 149–67, links this argument carefully to Olivi's original discussion of angelic freedom (Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 42 [Jansen, pp. 702–14]) and human freedom (Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 [Jansen, pp. 305–94]) and of the requirements necessary for the fullness of freedom in a self-moving cause.

⁵⁶ Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 (Jansen, p. 348): 'Et respectu eiusdem nunc et secundum illam prioritatem naturalem in ipso eodem nunc fuit prius naturaliter potens ad exeundum in actum oppositum seu ad cessandum ab ipso quam fuerit ponendus in actu ipse effectus.' Dumont aligns this text with a near identical citation from Scotus. See Dumont, 'The Origin of Scotus' Theory of Synchronic Contingency,' p. 165.

⁵⁷ Alluntis and Wolter date the Quodlibetal questions between Advent 1306 and Lent 1307; see *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, eds. F. Alluntis and A.B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton Uni-

yet relies principally on a third person not named: Olivi both in his affirmation of self-mastery as the heart of freedom and in his critique of Anselm's argument of *De casu diaboli*.⁵⁸ In this text, as I have argued elsewhere,⁵⁹ we find Scotus' most mature position on the rational will as that capacity for free self-determination that functions with the intellect as a 'complex cause'. The indetermination he initially inherits from Olivi becomes, thanks to Aristotle's causal distinction, the self-determination that is the heart of freedom.⁶⁰

The Anselmian Angelic Being

In *Ordinatio* II, distinction 6, Scotus integrates Anselm's angelic being into an argument that reminds us of Olivi's reasoning. The two affections constitute self-mastery: the *affectio iustitiae* controls the *affectio commodi*. The higher affection represents the free dimension of the will, that by which it is able to control itself (*se refrenaret*) in all its appetites and inclinations. This innate freedom distinguishes will from operating along the lines of other natural powers, sense knowledge as well as 'mere intellectual appetite,' once again recalling Olivi's critique of the intellect without a will.⁶¹

Scotus returns to this point in his *Reportatio Parisiensis* II, distinction 6, identifying the *affectio iusti* with the will's freedom as the specific difference of human nature.⁶² In this passage, the Subtle Doctor brings together Olivi's insight about the will's natural rectitude and self-mastery and Anselm's insight about freedom (as the rectitude of the will *propter se servata*). Note that, in the *Summa Halensis*, these two had been distinguished as free choice from the freedom of glory. But for Scotus, self-mastery now defines original justice. Without missing a beat, Scotus

versity Press, 1975), p. xxvii. The editors of the *Quaestiones* date the final questions to late in Scotus' teaching career. See *Opera Philosophica*, III, pp. xlii-xlvi.

58 John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II, 25 (n. 20), in *Opera Omnia*, eds. L. Vivès and L. Wadding (Paris: L. Vivès, 1891), vol. 23, p. 128a-b.

59 See Mary Beth Ingham, 'The Birth of the Rational Will: Duns Scotus and the *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Book IX, q. 15,' *Medioevo* 30 (2005), pp. 139–70.

60 Ernst Stadter claims that Olivi is also the source for Scotus' notion of superabundant sufficiency in this text. See *Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit*, p. 300. While this may be true, I do not see within Olivi's texts the sort of *non velle* we find in Scotus' *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*.

61 As I argue in 'Did Scotus Modify his Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 69:1 (2002), p. 108, Scotus casts the *affectio commodi* as an intellectual appetite, thereby intellectualizing the gradual creation of the angelic being. This move brings him closer to Olivi's position (in Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones* II, q. 57 [Jansen, p. 338]) on 'intellectual brutes' and distances himself from Anselm's original use of the *Gedankexperiment*.

62 John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II, d. 6 (n. 9) (Vivès and Wadding, 22:621).

here affirms the continuity of freedom, understood as self-mastery, from this world to the next.⁶³

Like Olivi, Scotus affirms the dual presence of the two Anselmian affections as constitutive of free choice. Importantly, these two affections help to explain the way in which the will is capable of self-restraint and self-mastery. They now take the foundational place that the ‘neutral’ notion of freedom (*libertas*) held in the *Summa Halensis*.

Anselm’s treatment of angelic freedom mediated by Olivi provided Scotus with the conceptual frame needed to deepen his understanding of how rational freedom is self-mastery. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* enables him to establish the metaphysical framework of rational causality to which the will belongs.⁶⁴ Here we discover the philosophical heart of Scotus’ position on rational freedom as self-mastery. The initial discussion of the will as a self-mover in *Questions on the Metaphysics* IX, question 14, is a prelude to the fuller presentation of Aristotle’s metaphysical distinction of rational/irrational potencies in question 15.

What’s more, the Aristotelian analysis enables Scotus to go even further in his Franciscan reflections. He can now distinguish more carefully between that *indeterminatio* that is imperfect and the *indeterminatio* that is perfect, a *superabundant sufficiency*. A being which is indeterminate in this second sense, explains Scotus, determines itself.

I reply: there is a certain indeterminacy of insufficiency, based on potentiality and a defect of actuality, in the way, for instance that matter without a form would be indeterminate as regards the actuation given by the form. There is another indeterminacy, however, that of a superabundant sufficiency, based on unlimited actuality, either in an unqualified or a qualified sense.⁶⁵

The divine will now emerges within this philosophical discussion as the exemplar of the perfect indeterminate will: the unlimited actuality of rational freedom. Quodlibetal question 16 makes this point even more clearly. In this text, Scotus argues for the fullness of freedom as the capacity for self-mastery. The power of the will to com-

⁶³ This informs a reading of how Scotus deals with the freedom of the blessed. See Mary Beth Ingham, ‘De Vita Beata: John Duns Scotus, Moral Perfection and the Rational Will,’ *Johannes Duns Scotus 1308–2008: Die philosophischen Perspektiven seines Werkes*, eds. Ludger Honnefelder et al. (Münster: Aschendorff, 2011), pp. 379–90.

⁶⁴ Tobias Hoffmann’s ‘The Distinction Between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 66 (1999), pp. 189–224, presents an extremely helpful discussion of Scotus’ position and how it influences his understanding of the will’s self-determination.

⁶⁵ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, IX, q. 15 (n. 31) (Andrews, IV, p. 683): ‘Responsio: est quaedam indeterminatio insufficientiae, sive ex potentialitate et defectu actualitatis, sicut material non habens formam est indeterminate ad agendum actionem formae; est alia superabundantis sufficientiae, quae est ex illimitatione actualitatis, vel simpliciter vel quodammodo.’

mand other powers includes its own power to suspend itself.⁶⁶ Quodlibetal question 16 mirrors the *Metaphysics* IX, question 15. Scotus refers to Aristotle's categories of rational and irrational potencies, as well as to the important distinction between natural and free causes. He identifies the will's indetermination as most perfect when it appears as self-determination. Finally, he affirms the truth of the nature of freedom in a manner similar to his earlier discussion, as well as to Olivi's arguments: no reason can be given other than 'this is the will' and the will wills in this manner.⁶⁷

Like Olivi, Scotus identifies freedom as grounded in the will's self-mastery as a reflexive power. The natural will, constituted as it is by the two Anselmian affections, has all it needs for its own self-regulation and, thus, for its own perfection. It is in its nature as a sole rational potency that the human will distinguishes itself from all other beings.

The metaphysical grounding for this rational will is discovered, claims Scotus, when we turn with Aristotle to the orders of causality at the heart of reality. The rational order alone is self-determined because it is undetermined by natural causality. The ability of the will to move itself is based upon its reflexive capacity for self-restraint. This act of self-movement and self-determination, based upon the natural capacity for self-restraint, is perfected in self-mastery, as a superabundant sufficiency.

The Freedom of the Blessed

The freedom of the blessed in heaven also exhibits the excellence which is self-mastery.⁶⁸ Throughout the discussion of *Ordinatio* IV, distinction 49, article 6, Scotus refers the reader to a fuller treatment of this issue found in book I of the *Sentences*.⁶⁹

In distinction 1 of book I, he had considered the question of the necessary relationship between the intellect's vision of the ultimate end and the will's enjoyment or love (*frui*) for it. In all three versions of this text, Scotus defends the following: first, that there is no necessary relationship between the vision of God and love for God; second, that while the will cannot *nolle* (or reject) an object in which there is no defect, there is no contradiction in the will's a) turning the intellect

⁶⁶ John Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* 16 (n. 4) (Alluntis and Wolter, p. 373): "Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself" (Augustine, *Retractions* I, 9). This should be understood as referring to the will's action rather than to the will itself. It is in the power of the will that by its command another power act or refrain from acting, for example, that the intellect refrain from considering at least that object whose consideration is necessary for issuing the command. Hence it is in the power of the will that it does not act regarding that specific object. I do not understand this in the sense that the will could voluntarily suspend all its activity. It could voluntarily not will that object and still have another volition, viz., one that reflects on its own act, for instance, "I will not elicit an act as regards that object." This can well happen; otherwise the will could not suspend any act after deliberating.'

⁶⁷ John Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* 16 (n. 9) (Alluntis and Wolter, p. 379).

⁶⁸ A fuller development of this argument can be found in Ingham, 'De Vita Beata.'

⁶⁹ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 49, pt. 1, q. 6 (n. 340) (Vat. 14:374–75).

away or b) exercising the act of *non velle*;⁷⁰ third, that charity, the supernatural dimension of the beatific vision, is required for the complete realization of the will's perfection, and therefore, despite the fact that the will can do all this on its own, there is still a difference between the happy life of a person *pro statu isto* and that of the beatitude of the blessed. Throughout his discussion of the beatific vision and its relationship to the will in these texts, Scotus makes use of the threefold act of the will: *velle/nolle/non velle* (and therefore the Anselmian discussion of freedom in the will) in order to ground his position on the perfection of human freedom.

The will's ability to turn the intellect away is only one manifestation of the freedom of the blessed. The other is found in its ability to refrain from loving God. This latter act is sufficient to defend the sort of freedom Scotus needs to ensure that there is absolutely nothing necessary (i. e. determined) about the beatific vision.⁷¹ Indeed, as he argues in the *Reportatio* version, just because the human will cannot *nolle* a perfect being such as God, this does not imply that its choice to *velle* is necessary.⁷² Scotus depends heavily in this text upon Anselm's affections and upon the acts of *velle/non velle* as the operative pair of alternatives for the blessed, rather than *velle/nolle*.

The background reason for which Scotus presents these arguments is his rejection of the Aristotelian theory of happiness that defines human perfection narrowly, in terms of only two affective experiences: desire and satisfaction. According to the Aristotelian approach, either the human person is in a state of desire/longing or in a state of repose/satisfaction. Scotus argues that this approach neglects the most important act of the will: the act of friendship (an act belonging to the *affectio iustitiae*). His discussion of human freedom in heaven is grounded upon the possibility of acting out of the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) rather than the love of possession (concupiscence). This act of love is not passive, nor does it depend upon the

⁷⁰ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 1, pt. 2, q. 2 (n. 118), in *Opera Omnia* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1951–2013), vol. 16, p. 100: 'Item dico quod duo sunt actus voluntatis positivi, scilicet nolle et velle; et licet nolle non sit nisi respectu alicuius quod habet rationem mali, vel respectu obiecti defectivi, tamen voluntas potest negative non velle obiectum in quo est nihil mali nec ratio obiecti defectivi quia sua libertas est ad contradictoria; unde licet non potest nolle beatitudinem, potest tamen non velle illud.' See also *Ordinatio* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2 (n. 92) (Vat. 2:66–67) and *Reportatio* I-A (n. 35), eds. Wolter and Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2004), p. 97.

⁷¹ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A (n. 36) (Wolter and Bychkov, p. 98): 'Dico ergo quod voluntas viatoris omnem volitionem libere elicit, et non necessario. Nisi enim nos haberemus illam promptitudinem voluntatis, quam vocat Anselmus "affectionem commodi," non concluderemus ex hoc necessitatem in actu volitionis. Nunc autem talis promptitudo velabilitas non potest dici necessitas; ergo, etc.'

⁷² John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A (n. 40) (Wolter and Bychkov, p. 99): 'Ad tertium dicendum quod falsum assumit eo quod voluntas quidquid vult, sive bonum ut est obiectum in communi sive quodcumque bonum in particulari, non vult illud necessario sed contingenter. Probabile tamen est quod ubi non inveniret defectum aliquem boni non posset illud nolle – qui est actus contrarius ipsi velle, et est actus positivus; sed non ex hoc sequitur: "ergo necessario vult illud," vel "non potest non velle illud."'

possession of the object. Rather it is an act of the will, one which the will continues (from its side) and God sustains (from the divine side).

Understood against the two acts of the will (*velle/non velle*) in the case of the beatific vision, the will of the blessed is not *prevented* from acting, nor does Scotus ever affirm this. Indeed, the angelic will is strengthened and sustained by divine action. It continues in the act that it is performing. Indeed, were God to act in such a way as to obstruct the intellect from the vision of any other object, this action would still not prevent the will's freedom understood as self-mastery in the act of *non velle*: that is, the ability to restrain its own act of love.

The perfection of freedom in heaven lies completely within the will's natural power to master its own actions. This power is defined by the relationship of the two Anselmian affections and the capacity for *non velle*. It links the perfection of the blessed in heaven to the perfection of human dignity and the dignity of human action on earth. The freedom of the blessed must be as perfect as the will's freedom *pro statu isto*.

Conclusions

The evolution from free choice to rational freedom within the Franciscan tradition has multiple contours and influences. The common narrative, which reads these texts through the lens of Aristotelian reception and condemnations, shows significant discontinuity between the thought of the early Franciscans of the *Summa Halensis* and those working at the century's close. This narrative suggests that a significant break occurs with John Duns Scotus, who departs from an earlier, more traditional understanding of free choice to defend a more radical position on human freedom.

However, when these same texts are read through the lens of the poverty controversy, we can identify significant points of continuity and development within the tradition. Indeed, rather than departing from the tradition, Scotus may be said to re-affirm the key tenets of his predecessors: the centrality of self-mastery, the foundational freedom from compulsion, and the dignity of rational creatures.

The lens of *usus pauper* enables Olivi to take up several key elements from the *Summa Halensis* and deepen them by means of a focus on the angelic will. This focus points centrally to Anselm's analysis of rational willing in *De casu diaboli* rather than in his *De libero arbitrio*. Both the identification of free choice with self-mastery and the affirmation of the continuity among rational creatures enable Olivi to make central a text that was peripheral for the earlier Franciscans. This reframing to focus on the angelic will opens the context to allow for a shift in the understanding of freedom and its relationship to free choice. Now, and beyond the debate around poverty, a nuanced paradigm enables Duns Scotus to go even further in his reflection on the rational nature of freedom.

Indeed, the continuous reflection on self-mastery as key to their understanding of free choice threads throughout the 13th century. Self-mastery assumes greater sig-

nificance in the writings of Peter John Olivi, insofar as the vow of poverty requires the capacity for self-mastery and self-restraint. As noted earlier, Phillip the Chancellor was the primary source for the initial Franciscan identification of free choice with self-mastery. Phillip's influence through John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales continues in Olivi and Scotus.

What is more, the search for a deeper explanation for the capacity for self-mastery can be identified throughout the tradition. In the *Summa Halensis*, this explanation is found in the affirmation of a deeper freedom of indifference. This neutral freedom is distinct from free choice, defined not as indifferent, but rather as 'flexible' and 'changeable', yet still oriented toward the good. In Olivi, the deeper explanation is found in the analysis of angelic freedom. In Duns Scotus, the deeper explanation is found in the Aristotelian causal structure of rational and irrational causes.

Finally, the continuity among rational creatures, affirmed by John of La Rochelle, opens the door for Olivi to focus on the angelic will. His critique of Anselm is the groundwork for his affirmation of human dignity and its tie to freedom as self-mastery. Anselm's *De casu diaboli*, now a central text for the tradition, provides the deeper framework for the capacity for self-restraint. It also provides Scotus with a framework to defend the will's dignity *pro statu isto*.

Peter John Olivi's analysis of the will in defense of poverty, thanks to the central role played by Anselm's *De casu diaboli*, provides the shift Scotus needs to deepen his reflection on the nature of human dignity and rational freedom. I suggest that Scotus sees his own work as furthering the Franciscan project of evangelical poverty. In defense of poverty, he grounds the will's freedom on its capacity for self-determination. This capacity depends upon freedom from external necessity or coercion.

In the *Summa Halensis*, free choice and freedom were distinct, as imperfect from perfect. By the time we arrive at Scotus, and thanks to Olivi, the centrality of self-mastery and Anselm's two affections explain how freedom and free will can be understood in terms of each other. Rather than explain free choice in terms of freedom, Scotus explains freedom in terms of free choice, especially in heaven. The perfection of freedom is the perfection of free choice, itself the perfection of self-mastery. And now, thanks to Aristotle, the data of human experience is given philosophical and metaphysical grounding.

The role of Aristotle in Scotus' reflection on the question of the will's freedom, the metaphysical categories of rational causality, and the identification of the three acts of the will (*velle/nolle/non velle*) point to Scotus' own original response to this question and to the voices within the Franciscan tradition with which he was familiar. Scotus takes up, and by transforming Aristotle's notion of rational causality, develops his own position on the will's dignity and freedom, one that might serve to ground a more solid theoretical position on poverty as *usus pauper*. If Scotus' reflection and teaching on the rational will was influenced by the poverty discussions during the last half of the 13th century, then his own particular notion of human freedom may hold far more than an affirmation of the will's *indeterminatio*.

If we can read Scotus' position on rational freedom against the backdrop of a Franciscan reflection on the nature of poverty as *usus pauper*, then his thought benefits from both external and internal influences essential to a proper reading of the Subtle Doctor and perhaps of many later Franciscans on rational freedom.

Externally, Aristotelian causal categories would have provided him with much of the conceptual framework he needed to think about what was most important in his life: his own Franciscan vocation. Internally, the debate over *usus pauper* and the influence of Olivi on Scotus' understanding of rational freedom would have given him the focus he needed to develop his thinking more carefully. It also suggests that his theory may have developed, not as a radical affirmation of freedom, but rather as a philosophical defense of the mendicant way of life. Together, internal and external historical factors break open a wider and richer narrative within which we discover continuity and discontinuity. In response to challenges to their own identity, Franciscans after 1270 continued to reflect upon and develop complex notions of free will and rational freedom as conditions for the possibility of their authentic following of their founder: their central vow of poverty.

Volker Leppin

What is Later Franciscan Theology? Ockham and the Early Franciscans

Abstract: Although the traditions of particular religious orders had an impact on shaping individual theologies, contemporary debates were influential as well. This can be seen in the case of the Franciscan William of Ockham (d. 1347). While reading the *Sentences* in Oxford, he developed an understanding of theology that fit quite well with current debates between the university masters and the mendicant orders. Though there are not many explicit references to the earlier Franciscans in his work, the few quotations from the *Summa Halensis* in his *Commentary on the Sentences* can be divided according to those that attribute the *Summa* to an anonymous group of scholars who represent a broader consensus opinion, on the one hand, and at least one quote, on the other hand, where Ockham seems to contradict Alexander of Hales' views on theology. In this case, however, it becomes clear that Ockham might have known the position of the *Summa* only by the means of other Franciscans, in particular, William of Alnwick. Thus, speaking about a Franciscan tradition in the Venerable Inceptor's work involves speaking about a broken tradition.

The study of medieval theology generally assumes the importance of the religious orders of the period and the different intellectual traditions associated with them. For example, the Franciscan tradition of thought would begin with Alexander of Hales or the *Summa Halensis* and lead subsequently to Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. Obviously, there is a basis in the social reality of medieval academic education for reconstructing the history of theology this way: orders provided study houses for their members, where they received their initial training in the subject matter. This was true not least of the Franciscans, and it stands to reason that in the Franciscan houses of studies, Franciscans were read more than scholars working in other traditions.

For at least two reasons, however, one might query whether this way of telling the history of theology, namely, in terms of order traditions, is the right one or indeed the only right one. The first reason concerns the historiography of research concerning medieval members of the orders. For a long time, research in the field of scholastic theology was dominated by scholars who themselves were members of a particular order. Thus, the great editions of Dominican authors were prepared by Dominicans; the editions of key Franciscan works were provided by Franciscans. The same is true as regards research about them. In that light, one might ask if the idea of specific order traditions simply reflects the conditions under which modern research on these traditions was undertaken, that is, within the religious orders

themselves, which were concerned with writing their own history and advancing the ideas that they themselves regarded as important.

The second reason is that research in recent decades, whether by Jacques LeGoff, Alain de Libera or others, has laid a stronger emphasis on the social realm of universities as the context for the development of both concepts and methods of thinking in this period.¹ When we approach William of Ockham in this light, we might ask if the Franciscan school really formed the horizon of his thinking, considering that we do not find Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure mentioned in the index provided by Franciscan editors to his *Quodlibeta*, the least restricted theological work that he produced. In terms of Franciscan influences, Ockham's contemporaries, above all, Walter of Chatton (d. 1343), who taught during Ockham's time in Oxford, seem to be much more at the background of his arguments than such earlier members of the order. Furthermore, one might ask if the problems Ockham discussed were really raised by his order tradition or if they were a product of the current intellectual situation, e. g. the condemnation of radical Aristotelianism in Paris and England in the 1370s. In light of these considerations, the following will not only deal with the question of Ockham's relationship to the older Franciscan school, but also with the question concerning which motives in general made him think and argue in particular ways.

The Franciscan Context of Ockham's Teaching

The life and thinking of William of Ockham shows that there was no real dichotomy between academic training undertaken in the context of an order or in the university context, for a simple reason. As a Franciscan teaching at the university, Ockham nonetheless lived in the house of his order and possibly even offered his lectures there.

Le Goff has made us aware of the fact that the overall medieval idea of mendicants living in their houses and giving lectures for university students was not without problems.² A certain rivalry arose from the simple fact that mendicants could give lectures for free while secular masters were accustomed to being paid by their students. This economic reality might not have been the only reason for the problems between mendicants and secular clerics at medieval universities, but it was one of them. Another possible reason concerns the fact that members of an order represented a coherent group at the university with a certain influence in its council while secular clerics tended to be there as mere individuals.

¹ Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, trans. Teresa L. Fagan (Cambridge, MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). Alain de Libera, *La philosophie médiévale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2017).

² Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*.

There is evidence of conflicts between the two groups not only in Paris, which has been the focus of Le Goff's analysis, but also in Oxford. In fact, the main agents there were not the Franciscans but the Dominicans, though there is some reason to assume that the two mendicant orders shared some common interests.³

These derived in part from the exemption they enjoyed when it came to taking the equivalent to an undergraduate degree in the faculty of arts in Oxford. By papal decree, the university had to accept those brothers who had attended an arts course in their order's study house, as for example Ockham might have done.⁴ This was particularly important for the Dominicans who were not allowed to study the arts at the university.⁵ Now, as we know from an appellation of the Dominicans written in 1311, the university council in the beginning of the 14th century gave new power to a statute of 1252 that did not allow anyone to attend a higher faculty at Oxford who had not graduated from the faculty of arts.⁶

Only a majority of all regent masters of the university was able to free an individual of this requirement. Furthermore, decisions on this score had to be taken on a case-by-case basis, which meant that several times, the masters actually denied access to Oxford University to brothers from the Dominican order who had studied at one of the order's study houses. The question became even more complicated as it was the preliminary for a higher course of study in theology. Against protesting Dominicans, the majority of masters claimed that no one should be allowed to hold lectures on the Bible before having lectured on the *Sentences*, which the Dominicans regarded as a perversion of doctrine.⁷ In this requirement, one might discern a preference for philosophically skilled teachers at the university over what the secular masters might have seen as simple-minded mendicant brethren.

Institutionally, all these measures can be seen as an attempt to strengthen the unity of the university against the centrifugal powers of the orders, particularly the Dominicans. Such measures were underpinned by polemics against the services of the Dominicans as well as against their lectures.⁸ Here, as well as in the instruction to hold academic celebrations in the central church of the university instead in the mendicant convents, the Franciscans came into the picture.⁹ For they supported the Dominicans in opening up their own church so that the friars preachers could protest this decision.¹⁰

³ For the following, see Volker Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham: Gelehrter, Streiter, Bettelmönch*, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012), pp. 42–47.

⁴ Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, p. 20.

⁵ H. Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers vs. the University,' in *Collectanea*, ed. M. Burrows, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), vol. 2, pp. 193–273, on p. 217.

⁶ Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers,' p. 217.

⁷ Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers,' p. 218.

⁸ Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers,' p. 220.

⁹ Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers,' pp. 223–25.

¹⁰ Rashdall, 'The Friars Preachers,' p. 242.

Here, we begin to understand what all these conflicts meant for a young Franciscan theologian such as William of Ockham. Presumably Ockham entered Oxford University in 1308, which meant that he witnessed the conflicts mentioned above and had to feel himself somehow involved in them.¹¹ After all, he seems to have studied at the order's house in London and so would have benefitted from the exemption from studying in the faculty of arts.¹² All this has to be taken into account in order to understand his new concept of the coherence of arts and theology, as I argued years ago.¹³ To him, logic or dialectics alone was enough to ensure the validity of a science, especially theology. What Ockham implied here regarding the University of Oxford at the time, consequently, was that a teacher in a higher faculty like theology did not need to have studied all issues of the *artes*; for such a one, rather, a smaller, more concentrated curriculum in logic sufficed. In theoretical terms, Ockham here argued for the position of the Dominicans and, with them, the Franciscans, in the current conflicts at the university.

In light of these considerations, the question of a Franciscan school emerges as far more complicated than it initially appears if we tell the story of a school leading from the *Summa Halensis* to Ockham. At the same time, however, it is over-simplistic to assume that Franciscans took part in the larger academic debates of their times without any special reference to their religious order. Both contexts are relevant, namely, that of the university and of the order; but the intellectual history of the order cannot be reduced to either one. The Franciscans and mendicants overall were part of the university. But they were a special kind of part. This leads to the question if and how Franciscan theology might have shaped Ockham's theology in general.

The *Summa Halensis* in Ockham's Commentary on the *Sentences*: Evidence and Problems

At the outset, one has to admit that the number of quotes from Franciscan theologians in Ockham's Commentary on the *Sentences* which I will focus on for the purposes of the following argument, is not overwhelming. This is particularly astonishing given that the edition of Ockham's work was prepared by Franciscans, whose aim was, following to the work of Philotheus Boehner, to show that there was no reason to see Ockham as a heretic or weak thinker in terms of metaphysics.¹⁴ Thus, there

¹¹ Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, p. 34.

¹² Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, p. 34.

¹³ Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, pp. 47–63.

¹⁴ Philotheus Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1958).

was already an interest to include his work within the broader Franciscan tradition. But obviously this did not produce a greater number of identified quotations.

The few quotations of or allusions to the *SH* can be divided into those that refer to an anonymous group of scholars who represent a broader consensus, and at least one quote where Ockham seems to contradict Alexander of Hales. In evaluating the first small group of quotes which describe the *SH* as part of the common consensus, however, one has again to be aware of some methodological problems. First of all, we have to consider whether Ockham had actually read in the original the authors whose works he quotes in his Commentary on the *Sentences*. Obviously, he had not. This is clear at least in the case of the patristic authorities he quotes. A comprehensive analysis of Ockham's citations of the Fathers has shown that in his whole Commentary, there are just four quotations in total that cannot be found in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard or in the *Glossa ordinaria* according to the Migne text: one to Jerome, one to Augustine, and two to Gregory the Great.¹⁵ Taking into account the poor state of the latter edition, this could indicate that Ockham might have obtained all these quotations second hand, not reading the originals on his own, even if this cannot be known for sure.

This might point to the fact that Ockham even during his time in Oxford had limited access to library resources. Now, if we assume that the reason for this was a lack of books in the friars' house nearby the city, it does not automatically follow from this that Ockham did not read the Franciscan authorities in the original as we might assume that they at least were present in the order's library.

Nevertheless, even here, we have reasons to assume that Ockham did not read the original Franciscan sources. This can be shown in his *Sentences* Commentary book 1, distinction 26, question 1, on the distinction between the persons of the Trinity. Interestingly, among the possible answers to this question, Ockham refers to a position which states that the persons are distinct firstly in virtue of their properties and secondly because of their relations.¹⁶ Among all four positions referred to by Ockham, this is the only one that mentions not just one, but two components of the distinction. Additionally, it gives them in a distinct order. Taking this in account, the editors of Ockham seem to be right to stick to Bonaventure as source for this peculiar position.

¹⁵ See Volker Leppin, *Geglaubte Wahrheit: Das Theologieverständnis Wilhelms von Ockham*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 63 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), p. 214, n. 252.

¹⁶ William of Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 4, eds. Girard L. Etzkorn and Francis E. Kelley (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1979), p. 143, 14–16: 'Tertia quod prima distinguuntur per proprietates absolutas et quasi secundo per relationes.'

In his commentary on the *Sentences*, the Franciscan master had dealt with the question, ‘Is the substantive “person” for the divine used according to substance or according to relation?’¹⁷ He responds:

As ‘person’ implies both the supposit and the property, it is necessarily understood according to substance as well as to relation. And although it is expressed according to substance as well as to relation, it is more principally expressed according to substance.¹⁸

Here, one can see the opinion Ockham refers to, even if the wording is of course different. This can be explained easily, as the Venerable Inceptor takes his phraseology not from Bonaventure, but from Duns Scotus.¹⁹ This means, at least here, that he knew the essence of Bonaventure’s thoughts on the matter not by reading him in original but through his contemporary’s report. Things become even more complicated, however, if we take into account the fact that neither Ockham nor Scotus mention Bonaventure’s name here. In that sense, Ockham might not have been aware that the opinion he dealt with here originally came from Bonaventure.

This leads us to the second problem which springs from the tradition of research in this field. As mentioned above, the edition of Ockham’s work which hints at the views of earlier Franciscan authorities was made by Franciscans. As all of the references to such Franciscans in this context are made anonymously by Ockham himself, the identification of the authorities not only reveals Ockham’s indebtedness to his Franciscan predecessors, but also the Franciscan editors’ knowledge of the Franciscan tradition. For this reason, we have to be quite cautious in linking Ockham to the earlier Franciscan school. To summarize the above:

1. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Ockham does not mention the names of Alexander and Bonaventure, even when he seems to refer to their ideas.
2. When he refers to their positions, it is not clear that he did this deliberately.
3. When he refers to their position deliberately, it is not clear if he derived it from the original text or learned it through contemporaries quoting them.

17 Bonaventure, *Opera Theologica Selecta*, ed. Leonardo M. Bello (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934), vol. 1, p. 344: ‘Utrum nomen “persona” in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.’

18 Bonaventure, *Opera Theologica Selecta*, vol. 1, p. 346: ‘Cum ergo persona utrumque importet, scilicet suppositum et proprietatem, necesse est dici secundum substantiam et secundum relationem. Et cum dicatur secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, principalius dicitur secundum substantiam.’

19 Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 4, p. 147, 10–12: ‘Omni relatione aliquid refertur formaliter, igitur paternitate divina aliquid refertur formaliter; sed non essentia, igitur suppositum.’ See also Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 26, q. 1 (n. 33), in *Opera omnia*, ed. C. Balić (Vatican City: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 10–11: ‘Relatione aliquid refertur formaliter (...) sed essentia non refertur realiter, ergo suppositum tantum refertur.’

Ultimately, this is not much to go on, but it is still enough to allow for a closer look at Ockham's relation to the *SH*.

The *Summa Halensis* as Representative of a Common Consensus

The problems discussed above imply the following: we do not know if Ockham intentionally referred to earlier Franciscans when he referred to a consensus viewpoint. We can only observe that his understanding of the consensus view often has a lot in common with earlier Franciscan theology. In fact, the *SH* is not identified very often in Ockham's Commentary on the *Sentences*. Nevertheless, in light of the objective of this volume, I will concentrate on the *SH*. Indeed, we can find some passages where Ockham might have seen the *Summa* as a representative of the consensus view:

1. The first one occurs in Ockham's first book on the *Sentences*, distinction 1, question 1. Following Peter Lombard,²⁰ Ockham here deals with the question of *uti* and *frui* and asks if everything different to God should be used.²¹ Ockham here infers a special neutral act, which involves neither enjoying nor using, in a strict sense at least.²² This means that there are some acts in which something is neither loved as the last end nor refers to anything else beyond itself.²³ According to Ockham, this act is not only neutral regarding the question of *uti* or *frui*, but it is also morally neutral, neither good nor bad.²⁴

At this very stage in the discussion, Ockham seems to make use of an argument found in the *SH*, again not referring to Alexander of Hales by name, but maybe seeing him as part of the group of 'scholars and Saints.'²⁵ Here, he refuses the argument that any act that would not be accompanied by circumstances which make it good would by consequence be evil, because, following this argument, there would not be any neutral act in between these two.²⁶ If this argument was right, Ockham ar-

²⁰ See the discussion of *uti* and *frui* in the *Sentences*, bk. 1, d. 1, c. 2–3; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), vol. 1, pp. 56–61.

²¹ William of Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, ed. Gedeon Gál (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1967), p. 371, 3: 'Utrum tantum omni alio a Deo sit utendum.'

²² Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 375, 6f.

²³ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 376, 23–25: 'Ad primam dico quod est actus talis medius quod aliquid amatur nec tamquam finis simpliciter ultimus nec actualiter refertur in aliud.'

²⁴ The question of morality is raised in Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 376, 12–14. In his argument, Ockham does not explicitly state the moral neutrality, but the discussion, especially in Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 378, 11–19, presupposes it.

²⁵ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 378, 23: 'Secundum doctores et Sanctos.'

²⁶ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 378, 16f.

gues, ignorance would not excuse moral malice, because it does not count among the circumstances making an act good. This position, however, would contradict what the scholars and saints said, namely that ignorance would sometimes (*aliquando*) excuse all.²⁷ This view can indeed be found in the *SH*, where conditions are listed under which ignorance excuses evil and under which it does not. The reasons why it excuses include invincible ignorance, caused by a natural defect, or ignorance of the divine law, as far as nothing is affected that would be necessary for salvation.²⁸ In this regard, the *Summa's* position is in accord with others like Thomas Aquinas, who in his Commentary on the *Sentences* writes that ignorance may excuse sin ‘*vel in toto vel in parte*.’²⁹ Here we might assume that the *Summa* is implied together with others who held this position. However, we do not have any reason to assert that Ockham even knew that the *Summa's* position was a representative of what he held to be a common consensus.

2. The situation is similar in the case of the other issue where the editors refer to Alexander's position as one that is included in the consensus: in *Sentences* I, distinction 27, question 1, even the editors themselves mention Thomas alongside Alexander. The topic in question is the assumption of four relations in God: fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and passive spiration.³⁰ Obviously, these relations are not only affirmed by Alexander in his commentary on the *Sentences*,³¹ but also by Thomas in his *Summa* I, question 28, but with different wording.³² Ultimately, therefore, we have to admit what somehow was clear in the beginning: if Alexander or the *Summa* is included in an assumed consensus, this would imply that he is not the only one to hold this position. As he is not mentioned by name, consequently we

²⁷ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, pp. 20–24.

²⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), III, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, C7 (n. 324), Solutio, p. 328: ‘Ad quod dicendum quod ignorantia quaedam excusat et quaedam non excusat. Est enim ignorantia invincibilis ex casu, in quam non incidit homo ex sua culpa, vel ex debilitate naturae, et haec excusat. Est iterum ignorantia iuris divini vel canonici, et haec excusat simplices quoad quaedam quae non sunt necessaria ad salute essentialiter.’

²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Sent* II, d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, Solutio, in *Thomae Aquinatis Scriptum super libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, 4 vols (Paris: P. Lethieloux, 1929), vol. 2, p. 560.

³⁰ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 4, pp. 193, 22–194, 4.

³¹ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–57), vol. I, p. 266, 5–17: ‘Sunt proprietates personales hae tres: paternitas, filiatio, processio. (...) Sunt iterum relationes quatuor, scilicet tres proprietates personales et communis spiratio, quae nominator hoc nomine “spiratio” vel “principium”.’

³² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa* I, q. 28, a. 4, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia: iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-), vol. 4, p. 326: ‘Relatio autem principii generationis in viventibus perfectis dicitur paternitas; relatio vero procedentis a principio dicitur filiatio. Processio autem amoris non habet nomen proprium (...). Sed vocatur relatio principii huius processionis spiratio; relatio autem procedentis, processio.’

cannot be sure that his identification given by the editors would have been in Ockham's mind in any way.

Arguing with the *Summa Halensis* about the Frame of Theology

However, there are perhaps more interesting cases than those where the consensus opinion to which Ockham refers is that of the earlier Franciscans. These concerns passage where Ockham actually discusses their positions or what he assumes to be their positions. We find at least one case in which the *SH* does not represent a kind of consensus, but possibly lays behind a position referred to by Ockham and later rejected by him. This is the case in the question whether theology is a speculative or practical science. As Ulrich Köpf has shown this was a common question in the theory of theology from the 1240s on, which drew inspiration from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. To understand Ockham's argument here, one has to take into account that he was not able to answer the question directly, because his concept of science did not grasp an academic discipline as a whole. In his answer to question 12 in the Prologue of his *Sentences* commentary, he clearly says: 'Theology is not just one knowledge or science.'³³ Instead, he sees theology as a number of different forms of knowing or scientific habits which among themselves differ insofar as they are either practical or speculative:³⁴

So I say, that a certain part of theology is practical because it deals with our works, taking our works to be everything which is in our power, whether deeds or done things; and the other part is speculative, because it does not deal with things like these.³⁵

Obviously, this position denies the possibility of a purely practical theology as well as a totally speculative one. With the latter, clearly, the *SH* comes into the picture. In fact, the *Summa* did not inquire about the speculative or practical kind of theology as later theologians did.³⁶ In fact, it knew about the problem and, as Ulrich Köpf says, coined a number of phrases which later on would often be repeated.³⁷ A speculative science, according to the *Summa*, would recognize something true as true and some-

³³ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 337, 17–18: 'Ideo aliter dico ad quaestionem quod theologia non est una notitia vel scientia.'

³⁴ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 337, 18–20.

³⁵ Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 338, 15–18: 'Dico igitur quod aliqua pars theologiae est practica, quia est de operibus nostris, accipiendo opera nostra pro omnibus quae sunt in potestate nostra, sive sint operationes sive operata; et aliqua est speculative, quia non est de talibus.'

³⁶ Ulrich Köpf, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert*, Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 49 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974), p. 197.

³⁷ Köpf, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie*, p. 197.

thing good as true, while a practical one would understand something true as good in a moral sense.³⁸ Thus, the difference is that speculative sciences pertain to knowledge of what is true, while practical sciences have to do with moral goodness. In theology, by contrast, the knowledge in question sees what is true as true as well as what is true as good, but good not in a moral sense, but as a gratuitously given good.³⁹ In that sense, theology is neither practical nor speculative, even if it tends to be more speculative or even speculative to a higher degree.

This model could not stand long at a time which became increasingly accustomed to the distinction practical and speculative sciences in discussions of theology. In order to understand Ockham, consequently, we must again take into account that his engagement with other positions was largely focused on his own contemporaries. It seems as if at least one of the authors Ockham dealt with was William of Alnwick.⁴⁰ The latter was a Franciscan master in Oxford about 1316/17,⁴¹ that is, shortly before Ockham started reading the *Sentences* there (1317–19).⁴² In this position, he might have been of some influence on Ockham, representing the slightly older generation which, like Ockham himself, was influenced by the important master Duns Scotus.⁴³

Now, Alnwick not only himself regarded theology as a speculative science, but he also claimed Alexander of Hales to be a supporter of this theory:

There is a fourth opinion, holding that theology considered in itself is a speculative science, which for the moment I hold (...). The opinion mentioned also seems to belong to master Alexander of Hales and not only master Henry of Ghent, for Alexander says in *Summa* P1, Q1, that a theoretical science is of its own kind and therefore theological science is speculative of what is highest.⁴⁴

38 SH I, Tractatus introductorius Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta, p. 5: 'In aliis vero scientiis speculativis scilicet est acceptatio veri ut veri et etiam boni ut veri; in practicis autem moralibus, etsi sit acceptio veri ut boni, non tamen ut boni gratuiti, sed moralis.'

39 SH I, Tractatus introductorius Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta, p. 5: 'Est enim verum ut verum, et est verum ut bonum; utrumque est a Spiritu Sancto. Sed cum accipitur verum ut bonum, illud bonum aut est ut bonum morale aut ut bonum gratuitum. Si est gratuitum: sic est assimilatio ad Spiritum Sanctum, qui est bonitas (...) hinc est quod anotonomastice dicitur haec doctrina edita a Spiritu Sancto.'

40 See the references in Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 325, n. 2, and p. 328, n. 1.

41 Manfred Gerwing, 'Wilhelm von Alnwick,' in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, ed. Robert Auty (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), vol. 9, col. 161.

42 Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, p. 39.

43 See William J. Courtenay, *Schools & Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 189.

44 William of Alnwick, *In I Sent*, prologue, q. 2: 'Est opinio quarta, quod theologia secundum se considerata est scientia speculativa, quam ad praesens teneo (...). Praedicta autem opinio videtur esse magistri Alexandri de Alys et non solum magistri henrici de Gandavo, dicit enim Alexander in summa, P1, Q1, quod theoretica est sui generis et per consequens est theologia summi speculative;' Assisi, Biblioteca comunale 172, fol. 16r; fol. 18; see also Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 325,

William argued further with the first question of the *Summa*: the *Summa* here taught theology to be a science of its own accord (*sui gratia*).⁴⁵ For him this term might have been appropriate to express what he regarded as the excessive speculation in Alexander's argumentation outlined above. For the *Summa*, this was the core argument to conclude that theology was wisdom in the tradition of Augustine.⁴⁶ But for William of Alnwick, the argument received a new orientation within an Aristotelian framework. To him, a science on its own could be nothing other than a speculative science.⁴⁷ Thus the argument became full and quite supportive for him: Alexander of Hales, as he saw and summarized him, held the position that theology is a speculative science, even if in a more historical context we might deny this to be true.

The important consequence for Ockham is this: even if he might have read some passages of the *Summa* in its original – though, as noted above, we cannot be sure he did so – he would have done this through the lens of his Franciscan surroundings as a result of which he also believed the *Summa* held the theory of theology as a speculative science.

When Ockham himself declared that the theology was not such a science, therefore, he did this with the intent to disagree with Alexander of Hales. In the end, the disagreement with his older contemporary was not a question within the order's tradition, however. Rather, it followed from the new understanding of truth, which was developed by Ockham against the background of increased understanding of logic:⁴⁸ 'This has to be admitted: truth is a true proposition, and falsehood is a false proposition.'⁴⁹

This was the reason why Ockham understood a science not as a complex organic whole, but as a collection of true sentences, which again led to the consequence that no prediction of 'practical' or 'speculative' could be made concerning the whole science, but only for sentences in it. Ultimately, he had to disagree with the *SH*, because he had a completely different understanding of what a science was, and this had to do with reasons unrelated to the order.

n. 2, with some differing readings of the manuscript; I heartily thank Prof. Thurner, Grabmann-Institut München, for giving me access to a copy of the manuscript.

45 *SH* I, Tractatus introductorius, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2.

46 *SH* I, Tractatus introductorius, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2.

47 See above, n. 44.

48 See Matthias Kaufmann, *Begriffe, Sätze, Dinge: Referenz und Wahrheit bei Wilhelm von Ockham*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 40 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 194–98.

49 William of Ockham, *Opera philosophica*, eds. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál, and Stephen Brown (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1974), vol. 1, p. 131, 245: 'Haec est concedenda veritas est propositio vera et falsitas est propositio falsa.'

Order Traditions and University Developments: A Complex Story

It is interesting enough that the most direct connection between Ockham and his older Franciscan fellows can be observed in the question as to whether, to what extent, and how theology is a science. On the one hand, this is interesting, because it links the discussion immediately with Ockham's commitment to the Franciscan interests at the University of Oxford. As outlined above, the quarrels at the university at least somehow were concerned with the question of the way to study theology, and Ockham dealt with this in his presentation of theology as a science in broader sense, based on the importance of logic in it.

Furthermore, it is interesting, because with his concept of theology, Ockham not only reacted to the situation at his university, but he also dealt with the radical Aristotelianism, usually referred to as 'Latin Averroism'.⁵⁰ Usually, the condemnation in Paris in 1277 is seen as the climax and breakdown of this movement, but it had also affected England, as evidenced by the condemnations of Aristotelian theses by Robert Kilwardby in 1277 and by John Peckham in 1286.⁵¹

However, this condemnation leads directly to discussions among Franciscans at the beginning of the 14th century who had a focus other than the early Franciscan tradition. Obviously, Ockham took notice of the events on the Continent. For example, he seems to refer to article 204 and 219 in *Sentences* II question 14.⁵² Even more importantly, in *Sentences* I distinction 17, question 5, he obviously quoted Parisian thesis 124 when he said: 'The soul of Christ (...) according to a certain article is more perfect than Jude's soul.'⁵³ The thesis judged in Paris had been: 'Some intellects are more noble than others.'⁵⁴ Number 124 is among the few sentences in the docu-

50 For the concepts see Volker Leppin, *Theologie im Mittelalter* (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), p. 120.

51 For Kilwardby's condemnation, issued in Oxford on 18th March 1277, see *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, eds. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols (Paris: Delalain Frères, 1889), vol. 1, pp. 558–60; for Peckham, see *Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Iohannis Peckham, Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis*, ed. Charles Trice Martin, 4 vols (London: Longman, 1885), vol. 3, pp. 921–23.

52 William of Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 5, eds. Gideon Gál and Rega Wood (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1981), p. 324, 3–5: 'Exemplum primi, ponendo quod angelus non sit in loco per operationem – propter articulum – sed per substantiam suam,' which seems to refer to art. 204: 'Quod substantie separate sunt alicubi per operationem;' see Kurt Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277: Das Dokument des Bischofs von Paris übersetzt und erklärt* (Mainz: Dieterich, 1989), pp. 248 and 219. *Ibid.*, p. 260: 'Quod substantie separate nusquam sunt secundum substantiam.'

53 William of Ockham, *Opera Theologica*, vol. 3, ed. Girard Etzkorn (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1977), p. 487–88: 'Anima Christi (...) secundum unum articulum est perfectior anima Iudae.'

54 Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, p. 200: 'Quod inconueniens est ponere aliquos intellectus nobiliores aliis.'

ment of 1277 where a reason is assigned for the condemnation. Here it reads: ‘This is an error, because in this case, the soul of Christ would not be more noble than the one of Jude.’⁵⁵ Clearly, Ockham refers to this argument.

With this, again, we can come closer to his immediate context as a field where the articles were discussed. In his critique of Ockham, Walter of Chatton referred to Ockham’s argument concerning the soul of Christ and the soul of Jude. Explicitly he went back to the Paris condemnation discussing if this had to be understood regarding the substance of the soul or regarding the accidents.⁵⁶ Now, Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358), a student of Ockham, again reported Chatton’s argument, and in trying to resolve it, he seems to have asked Ockham for it.⁵⁷ So he refers directly to him, writing: ‘With his own hand at the margin of my manuscript Ockham writes.’⁵⁸ Adam, following Ockham, now adds an argument against Chatton, in which Ockham shows that the Paris condemnation here did not deal with the question of substance or accident, but with the question whether the soul is bound to a body or not.⁵⁹ Actually, he was right in this, as the argument within thesis 124 goes like this: ‘Because a difference between souls cannot derive from the bodies, it has necessarily to derive from the intelligences.’⁶⁰ At this point, it is not interesting whether Ockham was right or Chatton. What we can see here is that the Paris condemnation was of striking current importance to Ockham. Moreover, we see a dense texture of authors discussing this condemnation and its consequences. There was a heavy debate and a vivid intellectual atmosphere in Oxford and around in the beginning 14th century.

This ultimately shows that it was important to Ockham to understand Aristotle as correctly as possible, and to offer an interpretation of Aristotle as seen in the theses condemned in Paris that was provoking for theology but claimed to give a more accurate interpretation of the philosopher. This gives the background against which Ockham explained that seeing truth as a matter of not more than sentences, was exactly the right Aristotelian understanding.⁶¹ The battle he fought was not merely about the Franciscans or the university. It was about the right understanding of Aristotle after 1277.

This, indeed, leads back to the introduction of this paper: as has been shown, a background in earlier Franciscan thought might be taken for granted for a Franciscan in the beginning of the 14th century, who held his lectures in a friars’ house. But the

55 Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, p. 200: ‘Error, quia sic anima Christi non esset nobilior anima Jude.’

56 Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 29*, n. 2.

57 See the proemial letter to him in the *Summa logicae*: Ockham, *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, p. 1, 5 ff.

58 Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 29*, n. 2: ‘Ockham (...) manu sua in margine reportationis mee.’

59 Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 29*, n. 2.

60 Flasch, *Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, p. 200: ‘Quia cum ista diversitas non possit esse a parte corporum, oportet quod sit a parte intelligentiarum.’

61 Ockham, *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, p. 131, 241–43.

impetus behind his arguments, the challenge of paving new ways in theology, was derived from other factors, including the situation in the university and the new understanding of Aristotle, as documented in the condemnation of 1277.

Epilogue: Franciscan Theology in Ockham

The effort to discern Ockham's connection with the early Franciscan school produces rather complex results. Ockham was trained as a Franciscan, and, as far as we can discern, he identified as a Franciscan, at least in the quarrels at Oxford University. But his Franciscan commitment can rather be seen in his discussion with contemporary Franciscans as Duns Scotus, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham, than in a deeper reception of the earlier doctors.

Nevertheless, he felt more and more obliged to a peculiarly Franciscan understanding of theology. Jürgen Miethke speaks of a 'Franciscan option' in Ockham's political theology.⁶² In 1328/29, Ockham began counselling Emperor Louis the Bavarian in his struggle with Pope John XXII.⁶³ Louis himself had taken up some Franciscan ideas in the so called 'Minorites' excursus' in his appellation of Sachsenhausen, given on 24th May 1324.⁶⁴ In this document, Louis denied the legitimacy of John's papacy. Among the reasons he mentioned was a discussion of poverty, obviously inspired by Franciscan spiritualist ideas. So, when Ockham together with some other Franciscans fled from the Pope's court in Avignon, where he had been under accusation for approximately four years, the Emperor and the Franciscans saw themselves as natural allies fighting together against the Pope.⁶⁵

In the last two decades of his life, Ockham spent his time mainly developing a political theory about poverty, church and empire, and indeed, there is much evidence for Miethke's idea of a Franciscan option in these writings. As he has shown, Ockham laid the basis for his later thoughts in his famous *Opus nonaginta dierum*, which bears this name, because Ockham claimed to have written it within not more than ninety days.⁶⁶ Here, he positions himself in the discussion about Franciscan poverty. His aim was to show that John XXII had presented himself as a heretic condemning the Franciscan poverty. Obviously, here he identified himself with

⁶² Jürgen Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 536.

⁶³ Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, pp. 181–83.

⁶⁴ Ludwig IV, 'Appellatio tertia: Forma posterior, 24.5.1324,' in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum* 5 (Hannover; Leipzig: Bibliopolis Hahnianus, 1909–13), p. 752, 32, n. 910; for the authors, see Eva Luise Wittneben, *Bonagrata von Bergamo: Franziskanerjurist und Wortführer seines Ordens im Streit mit Papst Johannes XXII*, *Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought* 90 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. 251–53.

⁶⁵ See Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, pp. 181–82.

⁶⁶ William of Ockham, *Opera politica*, ed. Hilary S. Offler (Manchester: University Press, 1963), vol. 2, p. 857, 459f.

the order's tradition. Clearly an important figure in the conceptualization of poverty had been Bonaventure, being the order's general minister for a while. Even more, reflecting on poverty, Ockham paved the way for his later theories of imperium and sacerdotium.⁶⁷ So, indeed, there is no doubt, that the later Ockham was heavily committed with his Franciscan identity. Even more, Miethke could show that Ockham's concept of the church was not invented completely anew, but to a certain degree followed Ockham's nominalist or better, conceptualist understanding of universals.⁶⁸

The argument above might add a somewhat biographical line from the early Ockham to the latter; as shown above, Ockham was somehow involved in the quarrels at his university. There is some reason to assume that this was the reason for the harsh break in his career. As is well known, he bears his honorific title '*Venerabilis inceptor*' not as an expression of his efforts as the originator of new thinking, but by juridical reasons.⁶⁹ He had become an *inceptor* by beginning his doctoral exams, and he remained an *inceptor* for his whole life, because he never finished these exams. The reason for this was the accusation by former Oxford Chancellor John Lutterell.

Lutterell had resigned as a Chancellor latest in 1322, and among the reasons for this were the conflicts with the mendicants.⁷⁰ It seems as if Ockham became the scapegoat for all these problems: Lutterell collected comprehensive accusations against him and did not relent even when he could not bring the process to an end in England.⁷¹ He then transferred the process to the papal court. His accusation was a mixture of philosophical, metaphysical, and theological questions, among them most important the sacrament.⁷² This is the reason why Ockham had to enter Avignon.

However, before this, Ockham was involved again in his order's policy, and he began to feel his order protecting him: as Girard Etzkorn has shown, there was a kind of 'prelude' to Avignon in England.⁷³ 'Certain masters' (*aliqui magistri*) asked Ockham to explain himself.⁷⁴ Etzkorn has highlighted that the tone of the investigation was more friendly than accusatory.⁷⁵ By this, we might understand that the order tried to open the chance of avoiding a papal process, and Ockham might have tried to use this opportunity, writing his treatises about the sacrament.⁷⁶ However, the proc-

67 For the parallels see Volker Leppin, 'Ockham/Ockhamismus: Ockhams politische Theorie,' in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* 25, eds. Gerhard Müller et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), pp. 14–16.

68 Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, pp. 511–13.

69 Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, p. 30, n. 110.

70 John Lutterell, *Die Schriften des Oxforder Kanzlers Iohannes Lutterell: Texte zur Theologie des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*, ed. Fritz Hoffmann (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1999), p. 124.

71 John Lutterell, *Die Schriften*, p. 124.

72 John Lutterell, *Die Schriften*, pp. 150–53.

73 Girard Etzkorn, 'Ockham at a Provincial Chapter, 1323: A Prelude to Avignon,' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 83 (1990), pp. 557–67.

74 Etzkorn, Ockham at a Provincial Chapter, p. 566.

75 Etzkorn, Ockham at a Provincial Chapter, p. 566.

76 Leppin, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, pp. 114–19.

ess went its way, and Ockham could not avoid going to Avignon. But here, in the midst of his academic interests, he had felt what it meant to be a lecturer at university as well as a brother of an order. The way led directly from his Franciscan-inspired thoughts about theology to the accusation – and so to Avignon. This might have been a reason why he became aware of the order's concerns and in the end showed preference for the Franciscans.

José Meirinhos

Intellectus agens triplex distinguitur: Early Franciscans and Avicenna in Petrus Hispanus' Theory of the Agent Intellect in the *Scientia libri de anima*

Abstract: The understanding of the nature and functions of the intellect became one of the main problems of the 13th-century Latin reception of Aristotle's *De anima*, which highlighted similar difficulties to those already felt by the Greek and Arab commentators in their struggle with those brief, laconic, cryptic pages where that faculty of the soul is discussed. Those early difficulties were increased by the reception of this theory in the already doctrinally-saturated vocabulary of the Augustinian tradition, where the demands of Christian theology and anthropology dominated the understanding of the soul-body relationship, perception, and the explanation of the activity of the rational soul as illumination. Petrus Hispanus' *Scientia libri de anima* addresses those difficulties with a long-winded theory of the faculties of the soul, which silently appropriates Avicenna's *Liber de anima* and other sources so as to explain human life, sensation, and knowledge. Here we discuss the explanation of the agent intellect, which allows us to observe how John of La Rochelle and Franciscan philosophy more generally inspired Petrus Hispanus' position.

Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis' *Scientia libri de anima* offers a detailed discussion of the human soul, its existence and faculties.¹ The intellect is the key concept for understanding human knowledge and action. Treatise II, chapter 7 introduces a brief account of the agent intellect that seems eccentric in its time and cannot be found in Aristotle or in Greek and Arabic philosophers, who seem to be his main sources in other parts of this work.

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1 Pedro Hispano, *Obras Filosóficas I: Scientia libri de anima*, intro. and ed. Manuel Alonso Alonso (Barcelona: Juan Flors, 1961), henceforth Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*. I do not use the first edition Pedro Hispano, *Scientia libri de anima*, ed. Manuel Alonso (Madrid: CSIC, 1941), and, as the intellect is not directly addressed, I will not take in consideration the *Commentary on the De anima* attributed to Petrus Hispanus: Pedro Hispano, *Obras Filosóficas II: Comentario al De anima de Aristóteles*, ed. Manuel Alonso (Madrid: CSIC, 1944).

In fact, the agent intellect is threefold: the first is the power of the creator, radiating [its light] above the human intellect, and illuminating itself as well as the things that come from it, which by itself it is impotent to reach. The second is the separate intelligence producing in the intellect certain revelations through the influence of its intervention. The third is the power of the intellectual soul included in itself, emanating from it, reducing the intelligible forms, imprinted in potency in the possible intellect, to the act of intellection, that is related to the presentation of intentions.²

In the next pages I want to discuss this threefold division of the agent intellect, which is intended as a defence of the human possibility of knowing, in three respective ways, the totality of intelligible beings. The author wants to assure the reader that 1. all knowledge possessed by the human soul is acquired; 2. all knowledge, properly so called, is certain and true in virtue of having been attained by unerring faculties or agents; 3. the whole of the intelligible realm can be known by the human intellect, including other and higher intelligent natures, which are not attained through perception. Thus, the agent intellect is the *nexus* not only of the human soul and the totality of intelligible and sensible forms, but also of the soul and the creator as the intelligent absolute cause of everything.

We can straightforwardly recognize here the claim that the human soul has not one but three intellective agents: God, the separate intelligence (or separate intelligences), and the individual agent intellect. In different ways, these intellects actualize the possibilities of intellection and the perfectibility or enhancement of the human soul: by illumination, by induction, and by abstraction. Petrus' detailed explanation of the human soul through the systematization of its faculties, which culminates in the domain of knowledge within this threefold division of the agent intellect, has textual antecedents that lead us in the first place to an Aristotelian problem and Avicenna's solution. But, for obvious reasons, we cannot find this division in any of those sources. As I will argue, it is John of La Rochelle who lurks in the background. If this is the case, we need to reassess the traditional interpretation of the doctrinal position of Petrus Hispanus' *Scientia libri de anima* and its date of composition.

Three main points will be discussed concerning the *Scientia libri de anima*: firstly, a general characterization of this ambitious handbook on the human soul; secondly, the theory of the agent intellect, on account of which this work was considered an exponent of the so-called 'Avicennized Augustinianism'; thirdly, I will propose to connect this theory and some other positions of Petrus Hispanus to John of La Rochelle's works on the soul. This leads at the end to an hypothesis on the dating of

² Pedro Hispano, *Scientia* II.7 (ed. Alonso, p. 62, 13–21): 'Intellectus vero agens triplex distinguitur: primus *virtus creatoris super intellectum humanum irradians* ipsumque illuminans ei seipsum ac res ipsum excedentes, ad quarum capacitatem est inoprensus declaratum. Secundus est *intelligentia separata* ei ex sui officii influentia quasdam revelationes inducens. Tercius *virtus anime intellective sibi insita*, ab ipsa emanans, formas intelligibiles in potentia intellectui possibili impressas ad actum intellegendi reducens, qui ad presentationem spectat intentionum' (my emphasis).

this eclectic work, which stresses the direct influence exerted on it by early Franciscan thought on the soul.

Petrus Hispanus' *Scientia libri de anima* as a Handbook

The identity of this Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis is not of momentous importance for the present discussion, although it is hugely important in dating and contextualizing the *Scientia libri de anima*, where the author identifies himself as 'philosophicae sublimitatis gubernator, medicinalis facultatis decor ac proficue rector.'³ The only proposed dating was by René-Antoine Gauthier,⁴ although this was not supported by arguments and took for granted the identity of this Petrus with the Portuguese Petrus Juliani, who became Pope John XXI in 1276, an identification that is far from well-documented.⁵

Apart from an overlooked reference by Nicolaus Antonius, in 1788, it was Martin Grabmann who, in 1928, made known the existence of the *Scientia libri de anima* in a Madrid manuscript.⁶ In 1937–38, Grabmann published a study of the possible intellect and the agent intellect in the *Scientia*, editing the three chapters of tractate X on

3 The *colophon* of the manuscript edited by Alonso reads: 'Ego igitur Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis liberalium artium doctor, philosophicae sublimitatis gubernator, medicinalis facultatis decor ac proficue rector in scientia de anima decrevi hoc opus praecipuum componendum.' Pedro Hispano, *Scientia* XII 8 (ed. Alonso, p. 498, 6–9).

4 René-Antoine Gauthier, 'Préface,' in Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri de anima*, in *Opera Omnia* XLI.1 (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1984), p. 241*b: 'Pierre d'Espagne l'a sûrement écrite après avoir enseigné la médecine, sans doute au cours des séjours qu'il fit au Portugal entre 1250 et 1260.'

5 See José Meirinhos, 'Petrus Hispanus,' in *Medieval Science, Technology and Medicine: An Encyclopedia*, eds. T.F. Glick, S.J. Livesey, and F. Wallis (New York; London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 388–92; idem, 'Giovanni XXI, papa,' in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2000), vol. 55, pp. 600–11. The traditional account identifying Petrus Hispanus and Petrus Juliani/Pope John XXI can be read in Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), *Tractatus, Called Afterwards Summulae logicales*, ed. Lambertus Marie de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. XXIV–X–XLII.

6 *Inter alia* Martin Grabmann, 'Reciente descubrimiento de obras de Petrus Hispanus (Papa Juan XXI, d. 1277),' *Investigación y Progreso* 2 (1928), pp. 85–86; idem, 'Ein ungedrucktes Lehrbuch der Psychologie des Petrus Hispanus (Papst Johannes XXI. † 1277) im Cod. 3314 der Biblioteca Nacional zu Madrid,' *Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft* 1 (1928), pp. 166–73. Manuscript: Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, MS 3314, ff. 3ra-67va, see José Meirinhos, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Hispani: Os manuscritos das obras atribuídas a Pedro Hispano* (Lisbon: Gulbenkian, 2011), no. 351. After Alonso's editions, the work was discovered in another incomplete and anonymous manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, 6433, ff. 77ra-123vb (text finishes at tr. IX, ch. 5); Meirinhos, *Bibliotheca*, no. 557.

the intellect (5. possible intellect, 6. agent intellect, 7. separate agent intelligence),⁷ so as to place its author in relation to ‘Avicennized Augustinianism (*augustinisme avicennisant*)’, a philosophical trend according to which Étienne Gilson had sought to group those Latin authors that identified the Augustinian illuminating God with Avicenna’s Agent Intellect, explicitly conflating the two authorities.⁸ With the papers published by Gilson a decade earlier in hand, Grabmann emphasized the same conclusion reached by Gilson *en passant*: in 1277, Pope John XXI sparked the Parisian condemnation of Aristotelian positions, so as to uphold the ‘Avicennized Augustinian’ views he supposedly defended years before, in his own works on psychology and natural philosophy signed as Petrus Hispanus.⁹ Grabmann uses the *Scientia* as a proof that Petrus is simultaneously Avicennian on the possible intellect and the separate intelligence, and Augustinian on the agent intellect.¹⁰

It is under this doctrinal identification, highlighting the Avicennian presence in the theory of the intellect, that the work would come to be praised. It underwent two successive editions by the Spanish Jesuit and Arabist Manuel Alonso,¹¹ which raised some interest mostly in the Iberian Peninsula (*inter alia* João Ferreira¹²). In *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Gilson himself pays attention to this work for the first time, changing its doctrinal label but not the main conclusion. Gilson remarks that, ‘Peter takes sides with the representatives of the Avicennian tradition.’¹³

7 Martin Grabmann, ‘Die Lehre vom intellectus possibilis und intellectus agens im *Liber de anima* des Petrus Hispanus des späteren Papstes Johannes XXI,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age* 11 (1937–38), pp. 167–208, publishes tr. X, ch. 5–7 (intellectus possibilis; intellectus agens; intelligentia agente separata) and tr. XIII, ch. 8. The study itself is mainly a paraphrase on these texts.

8 Étienne Gilson, ‘Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 1 (1926), pp. 5–127; idem, ‘Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 4 (1929/30), pp. 5–149; idem, ‘Roger Marston, un cas d’augustinisme avicennisant,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 8 (1933), pp. 37–42; see here p. 42 on both conditions that must be filled for one to be considered an adherent of this doctrinal position.

9 Gilson (‘Les sources gréco-arabes,’ pp. 106–7) quotes a short excerpt on the Avicennian theory of the two faces of the soul from Petrus’ attributed commentary on the *De animalibus* discovered by Grabmann in another Spanish manuscript, and links its positions to the syllabus condemned by the pope in Paris in 1277. The commentary is now published in Peter of Spain, *Questiones super libro De animalibus Aristotelis: Critical edition with introduction*, ed. Francisca Navarro Sánchez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015); see XII, 10, pp. 291–93, which concludes that the intellect cannot know the First directly, but only by its effects, through abstraction.

10 Grabmann, ‘Die Lehre vom intellectus possibilis,’ pp. 173–74, 180; Grabmann identifies the author of the work with Pope John XXI, also asserting its relation to the 1277 Parisian condemnation (p. 181).

11 See n. 1. Alonso is silent on that question, not even mentioning Avicenna in the brief reference to sources, see Manuel Alonso, ‘Introduction,’ in Pedro Hispano, *Obras Filosóficas*, p. XLVI.

12 João Ferreira, *Presença do augustinismo avicennizante na teoria dos intelectos de Pedro Hispano* (Braga: Editorial Franciscana, 1959).

13 Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 320.

While acknowledging that it is not highly important to know whether we should call this doctrinal complex ‘Augustinian’ or give it some other name, what seems to him more relevant is that ‘one of its most typical representatives, Peter of Spain, happens to be the pope who, under the name of John XXI, would later bring about the condemnation of 1277.’¹⁴ And mostly he stresses that, even if not identifying the separate agent intelligence with the God of St Augustine, ‘he states its existence and its illuminating functions just as they are described in Avicenna,’¹⁵ and hence, Gilson coined a new and unique label for the work: ‘To our personal knowledge, this is the only known case of straight *Latin Avicennism*.’¹⁶

In the last edition of *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, Fernand van Steenberghen adds yet another suggestion to this kind of labelling competition: ‘Quant à l’orientation doctrinale du traité, on y trouve un aristotélisme teinté d’augustinisme et d’avicennisme.’¹⁷ And nothing more is said on the work’s doctrinal position, which Steenberghen considered ‘une véritable somme de psychologie, le plus ancien exposé systématique de la psychologie aristotélicienne,’¹⁸ but without suggesting a context or a date of composition.

What we see in these studies is that the chapter on the separate agent intelligence (X, 7) seems to be taken as a unique identifier of the work, in a decontextualized way that ignores the much more nuanced theory of the human intellect that Petrus proposes.

The general Avicennian tenor of the work, in fact not limited to the question of the intellect, has been straightforwardly confirmed by the detailed analyses devoted to the *Scientia* by Dag Hasse in his *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West*. Upholding the dating proposed by Gauthier, Hasse echoes in fact Gilson’s last word when stating that the *Scientia* is ‘perhaps the most Avicennian work written in the West,’¹⁹ which belongs to the final period of Avicenna’s influence among the Latins.²⁰

14 Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 323.

15 As we shall see, this separate Agent Intelligence has not exactly the same function as in Avicenna.

16 Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 681–82, n. 44. It must be noted that in none of his studies did Gilson consider Petrus Hispanus as an Augustinian Avicennist, as in fact he fails to meet both criteria to be one of them (he accepts a limited role for God as agent intellect and never quotes Augustine and Avicenna as his source).

17 Fernand van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Louvain-La-Neuve: Peeters, 1991), pp. 138–40, section devoted to ‘La littérature philosophique à Paris,’ even if nothing is said or confirmed about the place of composition of this work. A short paragraph is dedicated to the *Scientia*, pp. 139–40: ‘As regards the doctrinal orientation of the treatise, one finds there an Aristotelianism tainted by Augustinism and Avicennianism.’

18 Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, p. 136.

19 Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), p. 55: ‘The *Scientia libri de anima*, dating between 1250 and 1260, is perhaps the most Avicennian work written in the West.’ It is a work that ‘is most heavily indebted to Avicenna’s *De anima*’ (p. 59).

20 On the decline of the influence of Avicenna’s *Liber de anima* in the West, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Aristotle versus Progress: The Decline of Avicenna’s *De anima* as a Model for Philosophical Psychol-

The study of the work around one doctrinal point overshadowed all its other unique features, some of which include its structure, omission of sources, style and peculiar mode of exposition, extensiveness, and detailed classification of faculties. Steenberghen and Gauthier had very judiciously concluded that the author ‘entreprend de faire le point des connaissances de son temps sur l’âme,’²¹ in the words of Gauthier. Right from the Prologue, Petrus Hispanus is quite explicit, stating that in this work he wishes to present ‘the sentences of truth about all questions’ on the soul, in a compendious and thorough exposition (*compendiosam ac perfectam [...] traditionem*), dispensing with research discourses or disputes, which he claims to have already published elsewhere.²² Consequently, he forgoes the discussion of other authors’ positions on each issue; wishing simply to state, in true and unambiguous sentences, a complete knowledge (*perfecta notitia*) of the soul.²³ Henceforth, he offers a personal work, silently compiling from others, not only avoiding questions and further discussion of opposing positions, but also reducing arguments, for the sake of providing classifications and divisions, definitions, and examples. At the end of the blazing *colophon* describing his career (see n. 3), he reiterates that he made this ‘excellent book *componendum*’ (*in scientia de anima decrevi hoc opus praecipuum componendum*), that is, with materials drawn from other authors. Since he is only interested in *scientia* and not in authority, he refrains, in the whole work, from quoting any authority. However, this is not to say he does not paraphrase or literally quote sources, Avicenna among them. Dag Hasse identified more than 110 quotations from Avicenna’s *Liber de anima*, from all parts of the work on a massive scale,²⁴

ogy in the Latin West,’ in *What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?*, eds. J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26 (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 871–80. Avicenna’s 12th-century Latin translation is published in *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, 2 vols, ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven: Peeters, 1968–72).

21 Gauthier, ‘Préface,’ in Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri de anima*, 241*: ‘Undertakes to take stock of the knowledge of the soul from his time.’ (Trans. Schumacher)

22 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, Prologue 5, 7–13: ‘Ad nostrae igitur thronum mentis curiosa necnon executione digna ascendit intentio, ut de natura animae differentiarumque eius *compendiosam ac perfectam ordinarem* traditionem, ut, postquam sermones inquisitivi sub disputationis examine procedentes in aliis operibus a nobis editis sint praemissi, in hoc ergo negotio omnium inquisitionum veritatis sententiae certis summis ac brevibus concludantur,’ translated in Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, pp. 57–58: ‘Hence the inquisitive intention, which is worth pursuing, arose to the throne of our mind that we should provide a comprehensive and perfect account of the nature of the soul and its differences, so that after investigative discourses proceeding under the examination of the disputation [method] had been published by us in other books and had been sent out in advance, in this work the sentences of truth about all questions are brought.’

23 Petrus Hispanus, *Scientia*, Prologue 5, 14–28.

24 Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, pp. 59–60. See n. 274: ‘The quotations come from the following chapters of Avicenna’s *De anima* (the number of quotations is given in brackets after the chapter number): I,1 (1); I,4 (3); I,5 (37); II,1 (3); II,2 (2); II,3 (13); II,4 (9); II,5 (2); III,3 (1); III,4 (1); IV,1 (12); IV,2 (1); IV,3 (7); IV,4 (3); V,1 (2); V,2 (1); V,3 (1); V,5 (3); V,6 (8); V,8 (2).’ All these quotations are identified in the *Index locorum*, pp. 234–314.

which are used tacitly as Petrus' own teaching, concluding that, 'Avicenna's philosophy is integrated into the *Scientia* to such an extent that there is hardly a single chapter in Avicenna's book which is not quoted or somehow adopted by Petrus.'²⁵

The work's structure also reveals its sources. It is neither a paraphrase of Aristotle's *De anima*, nor does it follow that work's structure. The main structure coincides with Avicenna's *Liber de anima*. The content is briefly summarized in *Scientia*'s prologue.²⁶ The first tractate is on the essence and existence of the soul (tr. I = Avicenna's I,1–4); the second contains a summary of the faculties to be discussed (tr. II = I,5); then the author devotes three treatises, respectively, to each one of the three main parts of the soul (tr. III–XI = II,1 – V,6), while the last two are dedicated to the same subjects of the final chapters in Avicenna's *Liber de anima*: the distinction of the organs (tr. XII = V,8) and the opinions of ancient authors on the soul (tr. XIII = V,7). Throughout the *Scientia* content and subject matter are added from other authors, none of whom are quoted by name. For each topic discussed, Petrus seeks to reach a definition, sometimes after lengthy inquiry, while drawing on different sources. As he avoids the presentation of different positions, in this regard, his work certainly does not take as a model any of the works on the soul by John of La Rochelle, who in the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* (c.1233–35)²⁷ and in the *Summa de anima* (c.1235–36)²⁸ devotes considerable space to the different theories of the soul and its faculties (less in the *Summa* than in the *Tractatus*). By examining the details of this work, we will verify that John of

25 Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, p. 59. On the next page, Hasse describes the preferred and the ignored Avicennian theories: 'he is not interested in Avicenna's more theoretical discussions of the notions of substance, form and perfection, or the Flying Man (1,1–3); he quotes almost every page of Avicenna's account of the faculty of touch (11,3), but makes fewer use of the chapters on the other senses and very few of the third book on vision he is interested in the internal senses, but leaves out the theories of dreams, sleep and waking, prophecy and divination (IV,2 and IV,4), which belong to the *Parva naturalia* tradition; and he adopts theories on the intellect, but not the discussions of the incorporeality, individuation and immortality of the soul (V,2–4).' (Hasse, *ibid.*, p. 60). In fact, Petrus discusses some of these Avicennian theories, but not in the expected places, as is the case for the 'Flying Man argument,' in an original move used as an argument for the existence of an internal speech of the soul; see José Meirinhos, *Metafísica do homem: Conhecimento e vontade nas obras de psicologia atribuídas a Pedro Hispano (século XIII)* (Porto: Afrontamento, 2011), pp. 193–97.

26 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, Prologue 5, 14–20: 'In hac igitur sciencia tradetur *perfecta notitia* substantie anime, differentiarum, virtutum, operum, proprietatum et omnium dispositionum, que ei insunt ex natura propria et corporis subiecti, et procedet *hystoria circa animam intellectivam separatam et circa eius perpetuam et inmortalem existenciam* et organorum distinctiones assignabuntur. Antiquorum vero opiniones in fine operis proferentur' (my emphasis).

27 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964).

28 John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques-Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

La Rochelle is a main guide on the appropriation of Avicenna²⁹ and a literal source of many ideas and definitions.³⁰

Petrus offers a more symmetric structure than Avicenna and organizes the science of the soul around three main questions: the substance of the soul, comprising the discussion of its existence and essence; the description of the soul's faculties; and the relation of the faculties to its organs and objects. These are also the main subjects of John of La Rochelle's *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima*, which Petrus emulates in the treatises devoted to the sensitive and intellective faculties (the first tractate of each set deals with the proper essence and existence of each one). And, perhaps inspired by the treatise on the human being in the *Summa fratris Alexandri*,³¹ or other theological works on the soul, he adds, for the sensitive and the intellective souls, separate tractates on their active faculties (respectively, treatises VIII and XI), including the discussion of free will and happiness,³² but omitting biblical or explicitly religious questions.

The Question of the Threefold Agent Intellect

Cognition and volition are explained by 13th-century authors as the output of a variable number of soul's faculties. The threefold agent intellect theory is the locus of the possibility of knowledge. Re-reading Petrus as quoted above, some questions must be raised: why is a threefold agent intellect necessary? How does it relate to the individual human soul? Is this an original doctrine from Petrus Hispanus? How is it justified and developed in the *Scientia*? Is there a discussion on how the three agents and the corresponding kinds of mental content interact? Are there non-cognitive consequences of this threefold division of the agent intellect?

Ever since Aristotle's laconic and obscure statement on the agent intellect in *De anima* III.5, that brief chapter has never ceased to fascinate, not only for the possibilities it opens up for a cogent explanation of true human knowledge, but also for the host of difficulties that the division of the intellect into passive and active powers raises. The history of the problem and the different solutions proposed by

29 On Avicenna in John of La Rochelle's works on the soul and in the *Summa Halensis*, see Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, pp. 47–54; on Avicenna's psychological ideas that will be influential in early Franciscan theories of knowledge, see Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 68–75.

30 As an example, Petrus Hispanus' chapter on the definitions of the soul is excerpted from John's *Tractatus*, collecting 11 different definitions; see Meirinhos, *Metafísica do homem*, pp. 66–71.

31 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol II, In 4 ('De homine'), pp. 384–784.

32 The tendency to add the discussion on free will is apparent in other Latin psychological works on the soul, as in John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, eds. Daniel A. Callus and R. W. Hunt, intro. and trans. Michael W. Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 26, pp. 212–28.

Greek, Arabic and Latin commentators still need to be retraced step by step.³³ It is one of those stages, characteristic of the Latin reception of Aristotle in the first half of the 13th century, which Petrus Hispanus here presents in epitome, as part of a broader theory of the human knowledge and its relation with what exists.

To my knowledge, this tripartite division of the agent intellect is not expressed in such clear terms by any other author. Even Petrus, when explaining how the intellect works (in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of treatise X), does not repeat it in the same concise manner,³⁴ even if these three chapters must be read as its development in the framework of a general explanation of human knowledge. In itself knowledge is the union of the receptive power with a received content, insofar as they are proportionate. This is the reason why only spiritual substances, totally deprived of matter, can know as they can receive all the forms. In Petrus' wording, knowledge is the actualization of a capacity to receive the forms of external things by abstraction.³⁵

Concerning knowledge, after having expounded the workings of sense perception, Petrus Hispanus mainly follows the Avicennian theory of the five inner senses to explain abstraction from sensation and the formation of intentions of non-sensible things.³⁶ Being the operation of a sensible capacity, and as their objects are sensible forms, at this level there is not yet knowledge. Regarding knowledge of the material things, the soul is purely potential, as a *tabula rasa* with no signs as yet inscribed upon it. Representations or images generated through perception are received by the possible intellect, but they require a capacity in act, the agent intellect, in order to become actually known, that is to say absolutely deprived of their individual, material and sensorial markers.³⁷

However, Petrus does not confine the human intellect to knowledge by abstraction of the potentially intelligible forms and the *intentiones* received from the internal senses. The intellect, being immaterial and in act, is in its turn able to know by its

33 Jean Jolivet, 'Étapes dans l'histoire de l'intellect agente,' in *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, eds. Ahmad Hasnawi, Ali Elaramni-Jamal, and Maroum Aouad (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), pp. 569–82.

34 In treatise II, Petrus offers in 12 chapters a general and condensed presentation of all the faculties of the soul. After this presentation 'secundum viam generalem' (p. 43) he goes to detail each one through 'sermones speciales' (p. 77) in treatises III to XI. There is no exact coincidence in the classification of the faculties of the soul in these two parallel approaches. This is probably a consequence of the incomplete harmonization of the sources employed.

35 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, VI, 3–4 (sensible apprehension and abstraction); X, 2 (intellectual substance and cognition).

36 On external perception and the five senses: tr. II, 4 and VI. On the five internal senses 'sensus communis, ymaginatio, ymaginativa, estimatio et memoria:' tr. II, 5 and VII. On knowledge and on what follows about intelligent substances, see Meirinhos, *Metafisica do homem*, pp. 105–9.

37 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 6 (ed. Alonso, p. 379, 3–10): 'Intellectiva vero anima omnium rerum ex perceptionis actu capax cunctarum effigierum est receptiva et ideo ad sui perfectionem duplici eget virtute possibili et agenti. Nam cum ipsa ad omnium intelligibilium obiectorum susceptionem habeat potestativam aptitudinem, que ex seipsa ad actus non deducitur, exigit virtutem activam, que obiecta ad actum operationis et virtutem susceptivam ad actum perceptionis perducit.'

own powers other intelligible natures unattainable by sense perception. This is evidently a non-Aristotelian addition, legitimized by some Neoplatonist commentators. Petrus' argument is twofold and necessitarian: the intellect was created in order to understand the totality of what there is, and, as an intelligent nature, it could not but know whatever there is that may amount to knowledge. What the possible intellect receives from the imagination becomes universal knowledge when actualized by an agent capacity, which concludes the process of abstraction. The higher intellectual entities, absolutely deprived of sensible parts, are unavailable to the senses, but, in virtue of their intelligible nature, they act directly on the intellect, through its active power, by illumination or inducing the forms in itself. In order to know these different kinds of entities, the human intellect requires the help of different proportionate agents. Hence the intellect's three agents mentioned above.³⁸ The first one is the power of the creator (*virtus creatoris*), sometimes designated in the text as *Intelligentia prima* or by other names that bring out its primacy; as a pure intellectual being it radiates light over the human intellect, illuminating itself and the realities that exceed the intellect, thus making them knowable. The separate intelligence, which is here mentioned as a singular *intelligentia separata*,³⁹ but in several other passages is suggested to exist in greater number, induces revelations in the agent intellect.⁴⁰ And the lower agent is the active power proper to the human intellect, being connatural to the intellect itself (*virtus anime intellective sibi insita, ab ipsa emanans*). This one actualizes the intelligible forms, imprinted in potency upon the possible intellect, and by its nature is by itself knowable.

This hierarchy of agents present in human intellection is in accordance with the hierarchy of really existent intelligent substances.⁴¹ The first substance, that creates everything, knows everything as its cause and through exemplar forms in itself, without reception of sense data, by presence and without diversity. The second intelligence(s) knows through contemplation in the light of the first one and, by its nature, can represent the intelligible things. And finally, the intellect knows everything by the reception of species from external things and, being deprived of organs, needs the contribution of the internal and external senses and the abstraction of the perceived corporeal forms to achieve knowledge.

³⁸ See n. 2. On the presentation of the threefold agent intellect theory and its origin in John of La Rochelle, I summarize with some additions Meirinhos, *Metafísica do homem*, pp. 133–46.

³⁹ It must be noted that the name *intelligentia agens separata* is only used in the tabula of treatise X (ed. Alonso, p. 345, 27) and in the marginal title of the chapter itself (ed. Alonso, p. 385, 1–2). In the text the name 'intelligentia separata' is used; see also p. 385, 21, etc.

⁴⁰ Some examples are provided here, with the caveat that the name in each case can stress different aspects or entities: 'primas intelligentias' (I, 4; ed. Alonso, p. 34, 1), 'intelligentie increate' (VI, 2; ed. Alonso, p. 156, 6), 'intelligentias creatas' (V, 1; ed. Alonso, p. 156, 7–8) 'intelligentia secunda' (VI, 3; ed. Alonso, p. 161, 8), 'intelligentie' (IX, 3; ed. Alonso, p. 309, 10), 'separate intelligentie' (X, 6; ed. Alonso, p. 384, 25, and XI, 1; ed. Alonso, p. 432, 3).

⁴¹ Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, VI, 3 (ed. Alonso, p. 161, 3–18).

The threefold agent in human intellection is in harmony too with the threefold order of things that can be known,⁴² each one in correspondence with one sort of agent, a perfect homology between the intelligibles and the intellectual powers, both distributed on three levels.⁴³ The *dispositions of the first essence* concern the creator of everything: they are beyond the human intellect (*super intellectum sunt*), and, since the intellect cannot elevate itself to them, it requires extrinsic illumination (*extrinseca perlustratione indiget*). The *separate created essences*, to which the human intellect is elevated with the aid of the created intelligences themselves. And the *inferior things*, whose representations come from perception, for whose knowledge the action of the human intellect suffices.

The triple cognitive agent power of the human soul mirrors⁴⁴ precisely the posited order and ontological diversity of all knowable entities. Since the human intellect is like a blank page, the corresponding agents are required to generate or receive the intelligible forms. Even more important is the upshot of the enumeration: in all and each one of these acts, the presence of the agent intellect is required. The agent intellect is a feature present in any individual human soul, which needs all three agents to achieve its end, the knowledge of all kinds of knowable natures.

This grounds an optimistic epistemology, according to which everything the world comprises can be properly received and known by the human intellect. The confidence in the creator of everything is the master principle of the organization and the coherence of science, as a cognitive mirror of nature. This runs as a series of assumptions supporting each other. Everything was created by an intelligent being, and thus everything is intelligible, so there must be a high created capacity with all that is necessary to acquire knowledge of everything. The science of the soul is devoted exactly to explaining how this capacity is structured.

When elaborating on knowledge, in treatise X ('De virtutibus intellectivis apprehensivis'), Petrus Hispanus devotes successive chapters to the possible intellect

42 See pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Claraval?), *De spiritu et anima* 4 (PL 40:781–82): 'Per rationalitatem habilis est illuminari ad aliquid cognoscendum infra se et supra se, in se et juxta se. Cognoscit siquidem Deum supra se, et se in se, et angelum juxta se, et quidquid coeli ambito continetur infra se.' This is quoted by John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione*, II.15, 83; idem, *Summa de anima*, II.4, c. 63, 191.

43 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, p. 386, 19–29): 'Rerum vero triplex ordo distinguitur. Primus est rerum ad *dispositiones prime essentie* omnium conditoris spectantium, que super intellectum sunt, ad quas vero, ad ipsum et eius proprietates cum intellectus nequeat elevari, eius *extrinseca perlustratione indiget*. Secundus est rerum comparium ad *factas separatas essentias* spectans, ad quas *ex create intelligentie officio elevatur*. Tertius in *infimis rebus* consistit, ad quarum comprehensionem *eius sufficit industria*. Sed in hiis omnibus operibus agentis virtutis interne officium necessarium est' (my emphasis). Another presentation of the three kinds of objects of the agent intellect: *Scientia*, X, 6 (ed. Alonso, p. 384, 2–16). See also Ferreira, *Presença do agustinismo avicenezante*, pp. 43–44.

44 The intellect is a *speculum mundi* that fulfils itself in the contemplation of all the archetypes, 'in rerum omnium exemplarium contemplatione perfectur ad instar speculi mundi' (*Scientia*, X, 6, ed. Alonso, p. 380, 18–22).

(ch. 5), the agent intellect (ch. 6), and the separate agent intelligence (ch. 7). As regards active powers, only the agent intellect and the separate agent intelligence are actually and separately discussed. The author did not intend to wholly adopt the Avicennian theory of the intellect, but instead integrates it in a comprehensive theory of the threefold agent intellect. However, Petrus does not reserve a chapter for treating the illumination by the first intelligence, or the creator. Some questions can be raised about the meaning of such an absence: does illumination through the first intelligence not belong to intellectual apprehension? Is it outside philosophical enquiry? We can surmise this union with the creator as love pertains properly to the volitional soul, where we can find a dedicated capacity of the soul for innate desire and ascent to the creator of all things: *theophilosia*.⁴⁵

There is no room for doubt that the *Prima intelligentia* is the creator of all things,⁴⁶ whether in its role of producer *ex nihilo* of all there is, or in its function as the light of the human intellect. There is no confusion here with the *Intelligentia agens separata*, a created second intelligence (or a set of intelligences) that can be an agent of the human intellect, alongside the *first intelligence* and the proper agent of the intellect. This is clear in the explanation of the agent intellect who: 1. illuminates by its own light the intelligible species received in possible intellect from the sensitive potencies;⁴⁷ 2. as it was created to know the supreme cause by turning to it its face, only in this act achieves its highest end;⁴⁸ and 3. also contemplates the separate substances to which it conforms, and thus the separate substances manifest to the

45 ‘Theophilosia’ is an active intellectual faculty above *synderesis*, mentioned only by Petrus Hispanus and just once. See *Scientia*, XI, 7 (ed. Alonso, p. 442, 21–22); cf. José Meirinhos, ‘De l’intellect à la Theophilosia: La plus haute réalisation de l’âme chez Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis,’ in *Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intellecto e imaginação na Filosofia Medieval* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 1113–29, whose arguments I partially resume here.

46 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 6 (ed. Alonso, p. 382, 28–30): ‘Intellectus primus omnia cognoscit, omnia distinguit, omnia regit, atque movet nec ab eorum contactu operis patitur debilitatem.’ The first intelligence or the creator of all things has a multitude of names in the *Scientia*, but *Deus* is never used. For some examples, Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, p. 219, n. 784, and a more complete list in Meirinhos, *Metafísica do homem*, p. 132, n. 277.

47 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, pp. 379, 27–380, 4): ‘Est igitur intellectus agens virtus anime intellective intelligibiles species in intellectu possibili virtutibus sensitivis susceptas lucis sue illustratione illuminans, a materialibus ac accidentalibus appenditiis eas detegens, ad sue essentie puritatem redigens et de potentia ad intelligendi actum perducens.’

48 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, p. 380, 6–12): ‘Hec igitur virtus pure lucis fulgore precellens ad summe cause cognitionem extendi nata est, ad eius splendorem supremum dirigens aspectum. Cum enim intellectiva anima notitie eius capax sit, in cuius solis aspectu supremum suscipit complementum, neque in creaturarum comprehensione eius sistit industria, cum sua excellencia super omnia sublimetur.’ Petrus accepts the Avicennian doctrine of the double face of the soul (*Liber de anima*, I.5, ed. Van Riet, vol. I, pp. 94–95) that was particularly influential in Franciscan philosophy; J. Rohmer, ‘Sur la doctrine franciscaine de la double face de l’âme,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 2 (1927), pp. 73–77. See also John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, I, c. 45 (ed. Bougerol, pp. 146–47).

soul their nature and the archetypes of things.⁴⁹ It is because the agent intellect is completely devoid of mixture with material things, and also contemplates higher realities that Petrus defines the intellectual soul as ‘immortalis, separabilis, perpetua, inmixta,’⁵⁰ that evokes Aristotle’s description of the agent intellect.⁵¹ The theory of the threefold agent intellect also intends to be a solution for this description, while making the agent intellect a faculty proper to each individual human intellect.

In discussing the separate agent intelligence, Petrus’ theory is akin to Avicenna’s, but he subscribes neither to the exclusivity of its action, nor to the theses of direct illumination of the forms in the imagination for their actualization in the possible intellect. A small passage can show how Petrus, without quoting any author, presents and rejects their position and, in the same movement, stresses his own position. We must understand the three parts of the argument, first expounding an explanation (*estimatur* [...] *unde dicitur* [...]), but concluding with a remark (*verum* [...]) that counters the Avicennian theory of the separate intelligence, admitting the reception of other intelligible objects in human souls:

It is believed (*estimatur*) [by someone, not mentioned] that the soul’s agent substance is identical with the intelligence of the last order. That is why it is said (*unde dicitur*) that a separate simple substance actualizes the intelligible forms, communicating them to the intellect and illuminating it with its irradiation, to achieve the intellection. However what is true (*verum*) is that the intellectual soul receives intelligible impressions from all creatures as well sometimes from both the first and second intelligences.⁵²

Stressing again the differences between these three agents of human intellection, Petrus claims, albeit briefly, that the agent intellect can perform the acts of cognition and of thinking in the human soul by its own power. It is the function of the agent intellect to illuminate the possible intellect, which it can do by way of its own light,

49 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, p. 380, 16–24): ‘Eadem vero virtus substantias separatas comprehendere nata est, quibus ipsa anima est conformis. (...) Similiter separate substantie suam naturam et rerum exemplaria anime per huius virtutis officium representant.’

50 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, p. 383, 25–26).

51 Aristotle, *De anima* III.5 (403a17), trans. vetus: ‘Et hic intellectus separatus, immixtus et impassibilis, substantia actu est;’ trans. arabo-latina: ‘Et iste intellectus etiam est abstractus, non mixtus neque passibilis, et est in sua substantia actio;’ Averroes, *Commenatrium magnum in Aristotelis De anima*, ed. Crawford, p. 440.

52 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 7 (ed. Alonso, pp. 386–87): ‘*Estimatur* autem illa agens substantia intelligentia ultimi et infimi ordinis, quae animae intellectivae intimior ipsi intelligibilia sua illustratione revelat ut lux ad colores ad formas intelligibiles comparata. *Unde dicitur* substantia simplex separata formas intelligibiles ad intelligenda actum perducens, ipsas intellectui copulans et sua irradiatione ipsum illuminans, ut ad intelligendi perveniat complementum. *Verum* intellectiva a singulis craturis intelligibiles suscipit impressiones et quandoque ad infimas et a prima et a singulis intelligentiarum ordinibus influentias (...) suscipere iudicatur’ (my emphasis). This text continues the one quoted in n. 44.

together with that light which it draws from the first intelligence or the separate intelligence.⁵³

The theory of the three agents of human intellection is in itself a doctrinal complex that seemingly eludes all historiographical labels, on account of its combination of a variety of sources that are hard to classify. In any case, it is neither 'Avicennized Augustinianism', nor does Petrus subscribe fully to Avicenna's theory of the agent separate intelligence, nor to the pure Augustinian theory of illumination, and above all, he does not quote any one of these sources.

The Threefold Agent Intellect in the First Half of the 13th Century

This tripartition of the agent intellect is to be distinguished from the tripartition of the intellectual soul of Aristotelian origin which was made central by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who spoke of a material intellect, intellect *in habitu*, and agent intellect.⁵⁴ Petrus' tripartition concerns the agent intellect only, not the intellect itself.

Petrus Hispanus brings into his discussion the actual possibility of human knowledge and thinking. And his way of expressing himself suggests that the threefold agent intellect was more or less familiar to his readers. Its general thrust seems to respond to at least three concerns also present in other philosophical doctrines on the soul discussed during the first half of the 13th century: 1. the philosophical tendency to accept the spontaneity of the human soul concerning knowledge and action implies the presence of an agent intellect proper to the individual person, and thus rejects the idea that intellect or any of its parts is common to all mankind; 2. acknowledging the necessity of an assisting or higher illumination that makes knowledge and even contemplation of the transcendent possible is a consequence of the conception of the human intellect as created and is related to the abstraction of sensible forms,

53 Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, X, 6 (ed. Alonso, p. 380, 24–28): 'Huius vero virtutis industria impresiones a summa causa et separatis substantiis susceptas possibili intellectui reddit, a quo ad virtutes sensibiles interiores et ab hiis in exteriores secundum ordinem derivantur.'

54 Alexander Aphrodisias, *On the intellect*, in *Two Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect*, trans. F.M. Schroeder and R.B. Todd (Toronto: PIMS, 1990), pp. 46–48: 'Intellect, according to Aristotle, is threefold. One type is material intellect (...). Different again is [the intellect] once it is engaged in thinking and is in a state of possessing thought and is capable of acquiring by its own capacity the forms of objects of thought (...). The third intellect, on the other hand, in addition to the two already described, is the productive intellect through which the material intellect enters a state of possession, and this productive intellect is analogous, as Aristotle says, to light;' Latin translation in Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *Liber de intellectu et intellecto*, ed. Gabriel Théry (Paris: Vrin, 1926), pp. 74–75: 'Dixit Alexander, quod intellectus apud Aristotelem est tribus modis: unus est intellectus materialis (...). Sed intellectus habet alium gradum, cum scilicet intelligit et habet habitum. (...) Tertius autem est praeter duos praedictos, qui est intelligentia agens, per quam intellectus materialis fit, ut habeat habitum.'

which prevents the soul from elevating by its own powers to this higher order of knowledge; 3. as the soul places the human being at the confluence of the higher and lower realities, the intellect, through its agent capacity, is the *nexus* that can achieve its perfect state by knowledge, and then, by the free action that depends on knowledge, can ascend to the origin of all things.

Since the author claims to have written the *Scientia* by compilation (*componendum*), that is, taking its positions from different sources, let us then attempt to trace the origins of this particular explanation of the agent intellect in his Latin predecessors. It is absent in works of more decisive Aristotelian or Avicennian influence, such as Gundassalinus' *Tractatus de anima* or John Blund's *Tractatus de anima*. Things tend to change when we approach texts on the soul written around 1220 and 1230.

In the anonymous *De potentiis animae et objectis* written about 1230, we find the assertion that there is an agent intellect for each and every person, and that this intellect is part of the substance of the soul, rejecting simultaneously that the agent intellect is any sort of separate substance that radiates over the possible intellect. For the anonymous author, the human intellect has in itself the capacity to know material things. However, the illumination by a higher entity is also considered necessary for the knowledge of intelligible realities, which the intellect is by itself incapable of reaching.⁵⁵

In this position, which responds to the assertions of some anonymous philosophers who defended the separateness of the agent intellect, we can find the same three elements that Petrus would develop: the autonomous individuality of the human agent intellect, the need for illumination by the higher created substances (the intelligences) in order to acquire full-blown knowledge of them, and the indispensability of divine light to attaining understanding of the divine essence. This explanation accommodates the theory of the separate agent intelligence, with a limited function, but denies its intervention either in the knowledge of lesser realities, for which the human intellect suffices, or in the direct contemplation of the divine essence.

We find a similar position in the *De anima et de potentiis eius*, from about 1225, which the editor, René-Antoine Gauthier, considered to be a source of the aforementioned treatise. Here the interest of the anonymous author is to distinguish between

55 *De potentiis animae et objectis*, ed. Daniel A. Callus, 'The Powers of the Soul. An Early Unpublished Text,' *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 19 (1952), pp. 131–70, cf. p. 156: 'Fuerunt tamen quidam philosophorum qui dixerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam a substantia anime, et per irradiationem sui super possibilem fieri intellectum possibilem in effectu. Sed oportet intelligere quod non requiritur talis irradiatio intellectus agentis et separati super intellectum possibilem, nisi quantum ad quedam intelligibilia ad que non potest intellectus ex se, sicut sunt ea que de divina essentia intelliguntur divino modo, et quibus humana ratio repugnare videtur. Et preter hec sunt alia quibus intelligendis indiget intelligentia separata, que licet possit comprehendere, non tamen ita ad plenum quemadmodum intelligentie que sunt supra ipsam, sicut accidit de ordinibus angelorum et de custodia eorum et de potestate super semina rerum corporalium.'

the possible intellect and the agent intellect, exactly as Petrus will do later. The two proper acts of the agent intellect are 1. to abstract the *species* from the phantasms, and 2. to *organize* the abstracted *species* in the possible intellect. Such a claim of the intellect's cognitive autonomy demands explicit rejection of Avicenna's theory, which placed the agent intellect outside the soul. For the anonymous author there is no doubt: the agent intellect is a power of the soul, it performs intellection when it wants – for the phantasms are always present to the soul – and the intellect that abstracts the *species* from them is a power of the soul.⁵⁶ For the anonymous author the agent human intellect is in fact twofold.

These two brief works on the soul (*De potentiis animae et objectis*, c.1230; *De anima et de potenciis eius*, c.1225) present a clear assertion of the individual nature of the agent intellect, which possesses an inherent power of abstracting intelligible forms. According to Bernardo Bazán, this defence of the autonomous nature of the active intellect cannot be considered as a side product of an erroneous reading of Averroes,⁵⁷ as some scholars supposed, but instead is an original contribution of Latin philosophy to the Aristotelian tradition in the first half of the 13th century.⁵⁸ Bazán also stresses that Franciscan theologians 'embraced the thesis of the agent intellect as a faculty of the soul,'⁵⁹ and among other texts of the first half of the 13th century he quotes the *Commentary on the De anima* attributed to Petrus Hispanus,⁶⁰ but not the *Scientia*.

56 *De anima et de potenciis eius*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, 'Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225). Introduction et texte,' *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 3–55, see pp. 51, 446–52, 463: '<*De intellectu agente*> Est autem talis comparatio agentis ad possibilem qualis est comparatio lucis ad uisum. Sicut enim lux facit resultare speciem coloris de ipso colorato in oculum, ita intellectus agens abstrahit species a fantasmatis, quas preparauit ei intellectus materialis, et facit eas quodam modo resultare in intellectu possibili. Vnde duo sunt actus intellectus agentis: unus est abstrahere species a fantasmatis, alius est species abstractas ordinare in intellectu possibili. / *Et in hoc erravit Avicenna*, quia posuit intellectum agentem separatum ab anima, puto intelligenciam siue angelum, sicut sol est separatus a uisu. Set *non est dubium hunc intellectum esse potenciam anime*, cum in potestate anime sit intelligere quando uult: ex hoc enim sequitur quod et fantasmata sunt semper ei presentia, et intellectus agens qui abstrahit species a fantasmatis est copulatus anime sicut potencia eius. Quod patet in visu per contrarium, quia non videmus album quandocunque volumus, quia vel lux semper non est presens, vel si lux est aliquando presens, ipsum album poterit esse absens. / Hec de intellectu agente dicta sunt, scilicet quod duo sunt actus eius et quod ipse est potencia' (my emphasis).

57 That was the thesis of D. Salmán who introduced the label 'First Averroism' in a pair of studies on John of La Rochelle's theory of the intellect: D. Salman, 'Note sur la première influence d'Averroes,' *Revue neoscholastique de philosophie* 40 (1937), pp. 203–12; idem, 'Jean de la Rochelle et l'Averroïsme latin,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 16 (1947–48), pp. 133–44.

58 So it cannot be labeled as 'First Averroism'; see Bernardo Carlos Bazán, 'Was There Ever a "First Averroism"?', in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2000), pp. 31–53.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

In *De potentiis animae et objectis* and in *De anima et de potentiis eius* two questions are left in suspension: how to understand the separate agent intelligence, and how to account for the fact that the human intellect is simultaneously agent to the abstraction of the intelligibles of lower things, and receptive of intelligibles already existent?

John of La Rochelle will provide an answer to both problems, which leads us directly to Petrus Hispanus and the theory of the ‘threefold agent intellect’ in the human soul. In the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* (c.1233–35),⁶¹ while undertaking to demonstrate the existence of the agent intellect, he relies on Avicenna to show that the intelligible requires that a power already in act make the potential forms become actualized in an act of intellection. For that, there must necessarily be *in us* an agent intellect endowed with this active power, whose activity is described as illumination.⁶² Hence a problem emerges: is that agent intellect separate from the soul or is it a power of the soul? If it is separate, is it a created intelligence, like an angel? Or is it the non-created intelligence, that is, God?⁶³

John of La Rochelle’s answer is based on a series of arguments that depart from Avicenna’s authority to affirm the necessary existence of the agent intellect. But the reply to these questions implies the construction of an eclectic position on the nature of the agent intellect, which appeals to different authorities, explicitly quoted. First of all, the agent intellect is *the uncreated intelligence*, or *God*, under the authority of Augustine’s *Soliloquia*, showing that God is, God has intellection, and God brings about intellection of other things; and this last reason shows that it is agent intellect, whose illumination (according to the authority of the *Gospel* of John) is not appropriate to the understanding of the sensibles, but rather of the intelligibles.⁶⁴ The agent intellect too is *the created intelligence or angel*, in this case relying on the authority of Dionysius and other authors on the *manifestatores* (or the angels), as they are light and

61 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), see II, ch. 19 ‘De intellectu agente, opponendo primo,’ ch. 20 ‘De responsione et objecta,’ pp. 88–91. In the *Summa de anima*, dated around 1235–36, John includes the same chapters. See also John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques-Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), ch. 116 ‘Vtrum intellectus agens sit separatus,’ pp. 277, 27–280, 75. This same section on the agent intellect is discussed in Denise Ryan, *An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind/Body Dichotomy: Jean de La Rochelle on the Soul and its Powers*, PhD thesis (Maynooth: National University of Ireland, 2010), pp. 227–31, stressing its dependence on Avicenna.

62 For our period and Avicenna’s influence on Augustinian intellectual illumination theory, see Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) pp. 85–109 (‘Divine Illumination in Transition (AD 1109–1257)’).

63 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, pp. 88–89: ‘De intellectu autem agente, quoniam sit, sic probatur ab Avicenna (...) necessario igitur in nobis est agens <intel>lectus.’ See also *Summa de anima*, ch. 115, p. 277

64 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 89, 668–67: ‘Quod vero sit intelligentia increata, que est Deus, sic probatur (...).’ See also *Summa de anima*, ch. 116, p. 277, 4–13.

a proportionate light to the human intellect, so they can also be an agent intellect.⁶⁵ And finally, the agent intellect *is not a separate faculty of the human soul*, on the authority of Augustine (in fact pseudo-Augustine, since the quoted text is from the *De spiritu et anima*), as in the human soul there is a light imprinted by creation for the knowledge of intelligible realities; and that light is precisely the agent intellect, and as such is not separated from the substance of the soul.⁶⁶

Supported by these authorities, John of La Rochelle is then in a position to answer the question of whether or not the agent intellect is separable.⁶⁷ His answer is guided by Augustine (once again, the *De spiritu et anima*) and will accommodate all three modes of the agent intellect as they actualize all kinds of intelligibles: those that are beyond it (God), those that are above it (the angel), those that are internal to it (the soul itself), and those that are below it (sensible things).⁶⁸

And to grasp these intelligibles, the human intellect is informed by different active capacities: God's illumination is necessary to understand the divine essence and the persons of the Trinity, 'and of those intelligibles that exceed the human intellect, God is said to be entirely agent intellect;'⁶⁹ the angel's illumination is necessary to understand things that are above the soul (the angelic essence, powers, orders and activities), and in this case 'the angel can be said to be the agent intellect, as it instructs the human intellect;'⁷⁰ an *innate light* is sufficient for the soul to under-

65 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 89, 678–93: 'Quod autem intellectus agens sit intelligentia creata, que est angelus, probatur (...)' See also *Summa de anima*, p. 278.

66 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 90, 694–704: 'Quod autem intellectus agens non sit separatus a substantia anime, immo sit quedam differentia uirtutis partis intellective probatur per Psalmistam (...)' See also *Summa de anima*, p. 278.

67 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, chap. XX: 'De responsione ad obiecta,' pp. 90–91; see also *Summa de anima*, pp. 278–79.

68 Dag Hasse, despite being more interested in the theory of the Separate Intelligence, discussing apprehension of different kinds of intelligible object, noted briefly the relation between the *De anima et potentiis eius*, the *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, John's three agents of the souls, and the *Summa fratris Alexandri*; see Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, pp. 201–2.

69 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 90, 710–19: '(...) dicendum ergo quod ad intelligenda ea, que sunt supra se, sicut sunt ea que de diuina essentia et trinitate personarum intelliguntur diuino modo, indiget anima irradiatione ab ipsa luce prime ueritatis eterne super supremam uim suipsius que dicitur mens uel intelligentia, de qua dicit Augustinus in libro *De spiritu et anima* quod, nulla interposita natura formatur ab ipsa prima ueritate. Respectu igitur huius summe ueritatis [cf. *Summa*: uirtutis summe] et respectu horum intelligibilium que excedunt humanum intellectum omnino, dicitur Deus agens [cf. *Summa*: intellectus agens] et huiusmodi illuminatio est gratie infusio ad contemplanda diuina.' See also *Summa de anima*, p. 278.

70 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 90, 719–24: 'Ad cognoscenda uero ea, que sunt iuxta se, ut sunt angelice essentie, uirtutes et ordines et operationes, indiget anima reuelatione angelica [add. *Summa*: siue instructione], et in hac operatione [cf. *Summa*: comparatione] intellectus angelicus posset dici agens respectu intellectus humani, in quantum instruens, sed hoc non respicit supremam faciem intellectus humani que est ad eterna et increata, sed uirtutem inferiorem.' See also *Summa de anima*, p. 278.

stand itself, its faculties, *habitus*, science and virtues (for this purpose, the soul does not require an external agent, and so it is able by itself to know that it is);⁷¹ finally, the human agent intellect knows the things that are below itself, and in order to understand these things, the illumination of a separate substance is not necessary, ‘sufficing the inner light, which is the agent intellect, supreme faculty of the soul.’⁷² This explanation is not a standard one, and Leonard Bowman considered ‘ambiguous’ this use of the expression agent intellect ‘to refer to anything that simply influences the soul in its act of knowing.’⁷³

John of La Rochelle’s explanation of the different kinds of intelligibles, and of the aids the soul needs to grasp them, provides the sources that allow us to understand how he built this tentative solution (*solutio sine praiudicio*). The Latin authorities are especially relevant here, above all, Augustine or pseudo-Augustine.⁷⁴ In this way, knowledge intimately binds four levels: 1. an intrinsic abstractive power of the intelligible; 2. the knowledge of the soul as present to itself; 3. the separate agent intelligence; 4. the direct illumination by God. This is precisely the position held by Petrus Hispanus, except that it replaces the angel with the separate agent intelligences and omits the Augustinian sources, relying mostly on Avicennian terminology; yet paying heed to the observation of John of La Rochelle when he warns that the reception of this light does not correspond to the superior face of the soul. In fact, the latter is turned towards what is eternal, and, in the end, the separate intelligence (or the angel) is still a creature. It is this cautionary remark that will lead Petrus to constantly introduce restrictions on the theory of the separate agent intelligence, always placing first intelligence above it, which should be indeed the ultimate end for human contemplation, and not attributing to the separate intelligence any special role in the abstraction of the sensible forms stored in imagination.

71 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 90, 727–91, 731: ‘Ad cognoscendum uero ea que sunt intra animam, ut est ipsa anima et potentie ipsius et habitus scientie et uirtutes, non indiget anima lumine extrinseco; sed lumine innato cognoscit se esse, se posse ratiocinari, sentire, se scire aliquid uel ignorare, iustam uel iniustam esse, per conuersionem ad se.’ See also *Summa de anima*, p. 278.

72 John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, p. 91, 732–39: ‘Ad cognoscenda uero ea que sunt infra se, non indiget similiter lumine intelligentie que sit extra se. Cum enim natura intellectus humani superior sit rebus corporalibus, superior etiam incorporalibus que sunt in ipsa ut in subiecto, utpote potentie, habitus, dispositiones et affectiones, ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est necessaria illuminacio substantie separate, sed sufficit lumen internum quod est intellectus agens, uis anime suprema, de quo fit hic sermo.’ See also *Summa de anima*, p. 279.

73 Leonard J. Bowman, ‘The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century,’ *The Modern Schoolman* 50 (1973), pp. 251–79, esp. 256; for John of La Rochelle see pp. 255–57.

74 After another solution absent in the *Summa de anima* (*Tractatus* II, ch. 21: ‘De alia solutione cum quadam additione’) John presents the theory of Avicenna on how agent intellect illuminates sensible forms in imagination and acts upon possible intellect (*Tractatus* II, ch. 22: ‘De operationibus intellectus agentis et possibilis,’ *Summa* ch. 117: ‘De operatione intellectus agentis’).

John of La Rochelle discusses in detail the threefold agent intellect identifying the bunch of sources from which it was composed, as a new solution for some. As we have seen, the anonymous author of the *De potentiis animae et objectis* briefly presents the same theory. Daniel Callus demonstrates with the section on the intellect of the *De potentiis* that John depends on it.⁷⁵ But it could be much more plausible that the anonymous' short version is a summary of John's detailed presentation of the theory in both his works. In this case he must be credited for being not only the source of Petrus Hispanus but also for the creation of the theory itself, which was probably summarized in the *De potentiis animae et objectis* and developed with more systematic consequences in the *Scientia libri de anima*.

Remnants of an Unfinished Debate and Some Hypotheses

This explanation of the agent intellect echoes in the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, which to some extent summarizes and rephrases John of La Rochelle's discussion in his *Summa de anima* on the agent intellect in the human soul.⁷⁶ The question on the cognitive rational power⁷⁷ presents, in its two first members, three main divisions of the soul's intellectual powers: pseudo-Augustine's *De anima et spiritu*, John Damascene's, Aristotle's.⁷⁸ Lexical issues have some importance, namely the equivalences or distinctions between *intellectus*, *mens*, *ratio*. The Aristotelian-Alexandrian division – material, possible, and agent intellect – is received so as to explain the origin of the intelligible forms in the intellect, through abstraction from sensible images.⁷⁹ Combining Aristotle – assimilated to Avicenna – and Augustine, abstraction and illumination are two possible ways for the soul to access, respectively, the forms present in material beings and the pure intelligible forms. Having established that the possible

75 Callus, 'The Powers of the Soul,' pp. 140–43. Bougerol added that the *Summa de anima* section on the internal senses quotes the *De potentiis* twelve times (*Summa de anima*, ed. Bougerol, p. 32). The question deserves another look as to ascertain who quotes whom, as it is not implausible that John of La Rochelle's work antedates the *De potentiis animae et objectis*.

76 Lydia Schumacher, 'The *De anima* Tradition in Early Franciscan Thought: A Case Study in Avicenna's Reception,' in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 155–69.

77 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, pp. 446–64: 'De vi rationale cognitive.'

78 *SH* II, Q3, Ti1, M1–2, pp. 446–59. See Margaret M. Curtin, 'The Intellectus Agens in the Summa of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), pp. 418–33.

79 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 368), Solutio, pp. 447–48: '[Divisio] Augustini [sc. ratio, intellectus, intelligential] accipitur secundum differentias formarum intelligibilium simplicium, illa vero quae est Philosophi accipitur secundum modum proveniendi ad cognitionem illarum formarum intelligibilium quae veniunt ad intellectum per abstractionem a phantasmate sensibili. (...) divisio Philosophi, quae est secundum triplicem intellectum, materialem, possibilem et agentem, respicit proprie formas intelligibiles abstractibiles a conditionis sensibilibus.'

and the agent intellect ‘*sunt duae differentiae in anima rationali*,’ the *Summa* is more interested in ascertaining whether this agent intellect can grasp or attain the intelligibles above the soul, or if it is a power above the intellect illuminating it (and thus in itself separate). For the Summist, the intellect is in act not because it knows everything from the beginning (‘*non quia [...] omnes formas a principio intelligit*’), but rather because it is illuminated by the first agent (‘*ab agente primo illuminatur*’). This illumination does not encompass all intelligible forms, but only some of them (‘*quarundam*’), and, as the agent intellect is illuminated by the first agent, the same mode illuminates the possible intellect.⁸⁰ Therefore, the mute and modified evocation of John of La Rochelle is enough to sustain by exclusion that a separate agent is not necessary to know all the intelligibles, as the soul itself can actualize and thus know forms received by abstraction; the higher help is needed only for those intelligible objects above the soul.⁸¹ An external agent of the human soul is not ruled out, as it is necessary to access intelligible forms not received through the internal senses.

In the *Summa Halensis*, the former philosophical explanation on the agent intellect of the human soul,⁸² composed by John of La Rochelle under the authority of Aristotle, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Scripture, is used only briefly, without mentioning all the three agents of the soul, mostly to confirm that the Aristotelian division of the intellect does not prevent access to all kinds of intelligibles. The human agent intellect grants the reception of forms by abstraction and by illumination from a higher intelligence, thus ensuring that human reason has the power to achieve supernatural knowledge through a natural and individual faculty.

In a much more elaborate and extended way, this is exactly what Petrus Hispanus tries to do with his *Summa philosophica de anima*. In the *Scientia*, the threefold human agent intellect and the three kinds of intelligibles pervade the discussion of the rational soul. His full use of John’s pluralistic interpretation of the human agent intellect is combined with a more Avicennian theory regarding the role of the internal senses and of the possible intellect – but at the same time limiting the scope of the Avicennian theory of the separate intelligence, which is admitted simply as one of the agents in the human intellect.

Further research is needed to verify how much this pluralistic theory of the agent intellect spread in the first half of the 13th century, when and how it faded away.⁸³ To

⁸⁰ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1 (n. 372), p. 452.

⁸¹ See the interpretation and discussions about this piece of the *Summa* in Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West*, pp. 217–18, and Schumacher, ‘The *De anima* Tradition in Early Franciscan Thought,’ pp. 165–68.

⁸² The *Summa* names as ‘*investigatio philosophica*’ the study of the soul as a ‘*tabula nuda*’, that is to say, as regards Aristotelian abstraction from senses and the workings of the possible intellect. *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 369), p. 449.

⁸³ Looking at the dossier presented by Étienne Gilson, the authors after John of La Rochelle do not seem to share his pluralistic theory of the agent intellect, limiting themselves to the variant identify-

this day, it was only traced in a summary form in the *De potentiis animae et objectis*, in a fully-elaborated form in John's works, and integrated in a systematic theory of the faculties of the soul in Petrus Hispanus' *Scientia libri de anima*.

In his *De anima*, c.1240, William of Auvergne rejects both the agent intellect as a part of the soul and as a separate intelligence, thus rejecting the fundamentals of John and Petrus' threefold theory, which is not directly addressed.⁸⁴ The Anonymous of Gauthier, who commented the *De anima* in Paris c.1246–47, seems to be already a distant echo of this discussion.⁸⁵ On *De anima* III, 5, this master raises the question '*quid sit intellectus agens*,' presenting opinions of non-identified authors (*quidam*). One of them is the position of '*magni clerici et antiqui*,'⁸⁶ who identify the agent intellect with the 'Prima causa', but the master proposes arguments that contradict this possibility.⁸⁷ As a second argument to show that agent and possible intellect are the same in substance but distinguishable by reason, he recalls the opinion of those who say that the intellect is possible as it is inclined towards phantasy, and agent as '*intelligit substancias simplices et spirituales, ut Primum et intelligencias, quod secundum se aptus natus ad intelligendum eas*' (as it understands simple and spiritual substances, such as the First and intelligence, because it is apt naturally to understand them of its own accord).⁸⁸ This opinion does not deserve any further discussion and ap-

ing the agent intellect with God, under the authority of Augustine and Avicenna, that defines as such the 'Avicennized Augustinianism'. See Gilson, 'Pourquoi S. Thomas,' pp. 89–111, and Gilson, 'Roger Marston,' p. 42, where a provisional list of its supporters is offered: William of Auvergne and Adam of Marisco, Roger Bacon, John Peckham, Roger Marston, Vital du Four. I thank Lydia Schumacher for pointing out to me that the threefold agent intellect theory is not traceable to theologians such as Hugh of St. Cher, Roland of Cremona, William of Auxerre, or even Alexander of Hales. Philip the Chancellor too discusses the separability of the agent intellect in the traditional way. See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, ed. Nikolaus Wicki, 2 vols (Bern: Francke, 1985), I, pp. 193, 232, 270, 437, and Salman, 'Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l'Averroïsme Latin,' pp. 139–42 on how John took from Philip the discussion on *ratio*.

84 See William of Auvergne's *De anima*, composed c.1240, part III of the *Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale*, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, 2 vols (Paris: Apud Joannem Lacaille, 1674, repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), which rejects the agent intellect theory in VII, 3–5. See also William of Auvergne, *De l'âme* (VII, 1–9), intro. and trans. Jean-Baptiste Brenet (Paris: Vrin, 1998), pp. 98–120; William of Auvergne, *The soul*, intro. and trans. Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000), pp. 428–43. Brenet discusses in detail William's position against the agent intellect theories (pp. 14–20).

85 Anonymi, magistri artium (c.1245–50), *Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata* (*Ms. Roma Naz. V. E. 828*), ed. Rhenatus A. Gauthier, *Specilegium Bonaventurianum*, 24 (Grottaferrata, Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1985).

86 On the meaning of 'antiqui' as applied by authors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon and others to the precedent generation of 13th-century Parisian theologians (roughly active from 1200 to 1240), see Marie-Dominique Chenu, 'Notes de lexicographie philosophique médiévale. Antiqui, moderni,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 17:1 (1928), pp. 82–94, esp. pp. 86–87.

87 *Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata*, pp. 468, 264–469, 293.

88 *Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata*, pp. 470, 330–471.

pears only as secondary support for a very different discussion than the one engaged in by John, the *Summa Halensis* or Petrus. Other literal or question commentaries on the *De anima* would ignore the triple nature of the agent intellect once proposed by John of La Rochelle and seconded by Petrus Hispanus. The association of the human agent intellect to a higher illumination does not disappear at all, even when interpreting Aristotle. According to Gilson, Thomas Aquinas was the first to explain that the created agent intellect is sufficient to generate human knowledge, thus avoiding Avicennism and Augustinian illumination.⁸⁹ In any case, for Thomas the action of the human agent intellect is a ‘kind of participation in intellectual light by separate substances,’ making potentially intelligible forms actually intelligible.⁹⁰

A quick browse through the commentaries of many masters of arts on *De anima* shows how the discussion has shifted or is completely ignored. In the words of Siger of Brabant, when discussing the human intellect, as he proceeds as a philosopher, what he seeks is to understand the intention of the philosophers, rather than the truth of the problem.⁹¹ Other masters of arts from the 13th century share the same epistemic attitude, but invoke with a certain detachment, as a mere argument to discard, the possibility that the human soul can know separate intelligibles through the illumination of a separate intellect. The anonymous of Steenberghe (c.1273–77, Paris) denies that the ‘Primum’ can illuminate the possible intellect, as the intellect is not a separate substance, but rather a part of the soul itself.⁹² The Anonymous of Bazán (c.1272–77, Paris), relying on Aristotle, cannot accept that the intellect that

⁸⁹ Gilson, ‘Pourquoi Saint Thomas,’ pp. 120–21.

⁹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri de anima*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 41–1, (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1984), III, 4: ‘Quod intellectus agens non sit substantia separata,’ p. 221, 164–65. English translation in Thomas Aquinas, *A Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima*, trans. R. Pasnau (New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 368. See also *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 79, ar. 4 (‘Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae’): the solution contrasts the position of the philosophers and the one ‘secundum documenta fidae nostrae’ identifying the separate substance with God, the creator of the soul and the reason why ‘the human soul participates in intellectual light (anima humana lumen intellectual participat)’. A parallel discussion is found in Aquinas’ *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, ed. B. Bazán, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 24–1 (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1996) ar. 5 (‘Utrum intellectus agens sit unus et separatus’), Solutio: the agent intellect proper to the individual soul abstracts the phantasms from their material conditions; thence, it is like a power participating in a superior substance, God ‘quasi quaedam virtus participata ex aliqua substantia superiori, scilicet Deo.’ See also *ibid.*, ad 6.

⁹¹ Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, ch. VII, 101, in Siger de Brabant, *Quaestiones in tertium de anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi*, ed. Bernardo C. Bazán (Leuven: Peeters, 1972). For the preferability of faith when philosophical uncertainty subsists concerning the separability and multiplication of intellect, see ch. VII, 108. For the whole debate on the nature of the agent intellect and its noetic implications in a range of philosophers and theologians, see Antonio Petagine, *Aristotelismo difficile: l’intelletto umano nella prospettiva di Alberto Magno, Tommaso d’Aquino e Sigeri di Brabante* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2004).

⁹² *Quaestiones in De anima*, III, 17, in *Trois commentaires anonymes sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote*, eds. Maurice Giele, Fernand van Steenberghe, Bernard Bazán (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), pp. 121–348, on p. 334, 33–42.

animates a body can directly understand the separate substances, as it only knows through phantasms, and the separate substances are known only through their effects, never directly.⁹³ In the words of the Anonymous of Vennebusch (c.1250–60, Paris), ancient philosophers diversified their positions about the agent intellect following Aristotle and adapted their positions to the letter of Aristotle's texts; thus, it seems to him that it would be tedious to enumerate all the different positions (even so, many of them are presented in several sub-questions, despite their heavier focus on ancient, rather than contemporary, authors).⁹⁴

While some authors, mostly theologians, seek to substantiate the possibility of access to the divine through natural cognitive faculties and contemplation, in the commentaries on Aristotle research tends to focus on textual interpretations and their consequences. Nonetheless, there were some strong reactions to the peripatetic reading of *De anima*, as is the case with some of the positions condemned in Paris in 1277.⁹⁵

In these commentaries and questions on the *De anima* of the second half of the 13th century, the separateness of the agent intellect and the nature of its intelligible objects continue to be the central concepts in the discussion of the possibility of accessing or forming true cognitions. But an eclectic approach is no longer in favor; the discussion is now centered on Aristotle's *De anima* III.5 and its interpreters, above all Averroes (as Avicenna is usually not recognized as a convincing Aristotelian commentator). In the last quarter of the 13th century, even among theologians, divine cognitive illumination theory would hardly survive philosophical criticism.⁹⁶

Petrus Hispanus' work on the soul emerged in a different context, prior to the rise of commentaries in the Faculty of Arts. He is guided by a framework laid down by John of La Rochelle's *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae* and applied to a structure identical to Avicenna's *Liber de anima*. But, unlike John of La Rochelle's works, Petrus' *Science of the Soul* carefully eliminates any authority or references to authors and avoids any open discussion of different solutions for the same issue. This new reading justifies the title *Scientia libri de anima* or the *Science of the book* (of Avicenna) *on the soul*.⁹⁷ John presented Avicenna's noetic psychology

⁹³ *Quaestiones in De anima*, III, 14 (*Trois commentaires*, pp. 349–517), p. 495, 56–71.

⁹⁴ *Ein Anonymer Aristoteleskommentar des XIII. Jahrhunderts: Questiones in tres libros De anima* (Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, cod. lat. 367), ed. Joachim Vennebusch (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1963), q. 67, pp. 290–303, here p. 297, 235–37; for a systematization of all the presented positions, see Vennebusch's introduction, pp. 64–65.

⁹⁵ See also Bernardo Carlo Bazán, 'Conceptions on the Agent Intellect and the Limits of Metaphysics,' in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, eds. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 28 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 178–210.

⁹⁶ Robert Pasnau, 'Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination,' *Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1995), pp. 49–75; Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, pp. 181–208.

⁹⁷ 'Scientia libri de anima' is the title of the work in Madrid's manuscript incipit (*Scientia*, Prologue, 3). The name given in the explicit is 'Liber de anima' (*Ibid.*, ed. Alonso, p. 498).

in the chapter devoted to the faculties of the soul according to the philosophers;⁹⁸ likewise, Petrus took directly from Avicenna's *Liber de anima* a great deal of theories, without limiting himself to their positions, as is the case with the role of the agent intellect and the separate intelligence, and thus heavily reshaped their nature and functions in more Augustinian terms.⁹⁹ Other non-Avicennian elements in Petrus come from John's psychological works, as is the case for several positions close to John Damascene. In his *compendium*, Petrus does not hesitate to intersperse faculties not discussed by Avicenna (free will, *synderesis*, etc.), because they seem to him indispensable to an integral treatment of the soul's actions, objects and organs. So the work has much more than Avicenna, not unlike John's *Tractatus* and *Summa*.

There are no reasons to identify Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, whose academic *cursum* is described in the *colophon* of the *Scientia libri de anima*, with Petrus Juliani, the future Pope John XXI. Hence, there is no need to find a 'void period' in Juliani's career to date this work, as Gauthier seems to have done, dating it between 1250 and 1260 in Portugal. On the other hand, without a reasonable explanation, it is not plausible to suppose that the work was written in a moment where it would be perceived as outdated, in times when direct interest in Aristotelian texts and their rigorous interpretation, with the assistance of Averroes, was burgeoning – all this is practically absent from the *Scientia*. And there is no evidence that this work is somehow a reaction to these new tendencies, because they are not in fact opposed. More likely the work was written in the years immediately following the composition of John of La Rochelle's psychological works, published successively between 1232 and 1236. Hence, a date before 1240 seems much more plausible for the *Scientia libri de anima*, being a testimony to the immediate influence of the Franciscan philosophy and particularly of John of La Rochelle's works. If this hypothesis is correct, the theory of the threefold intellect had a very short life, surviving no more than a decade, fading away with the Avicennian interpretation of the intellect, no more accepted as a way to reconcile Aristotle and Augustine.

Read in this way, the *Scientia libri de anima*, whose author does not seem at first sight to bear any direct relation to the Franciscan environment, can be considered as a product of the Franciscan reception of Avicenna's thought and the construction of a theologically-informed philosophical psychology. Petrus accept other elements from many other origins, producing a systematic and integral exposition of the human soul, while assuming a philosophical perspective framed by a creationist position. The human being's highest active faculty leads by its ascent to divine contemplation,

⁹⁸ John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, pt. II, 1.1, pp. 70–103: 'De diuisione potentiarum anime secundum philosophos, specialiter secundum Auicennam.'

⁹⁹ It is quite significant that Petrus, in the brief summary of the work included in the Prologue, highlights the research (*hystoria*) on the separate intellectual soul ('et procedet hystoria circa animam intellectivam separatam et circa eius perpetuam et immortalem existenciam'), suggesting a special concern with the topic, but without making explicit the sources and to what degree he is modifying them. See Pedro Hispano, *Scientia*, Prologue, 5, 17–19.

through an innate desire for God described by Petrus as *theophilosia*. The philosophical theory of the human intellect was recast so as to be consistent with this ultimate spiritual end, divinizing human beings both by knowledge and love. This is another clear consequence of the theory of the threefold agent intellect, as access to God is granted by its proper illumination, necessary to the fulfilment of this highest faculty.

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Alexander of Hales in the *Book of Conformities* of Bartholomew of Pisa

Abstract: Knowledge of Alexander of Hales was spread by the late 14th-century work of Friar Bartholomew of Pisa, *The Book of Conformities*. This includes chapters on Franciscan theology and major Franciscan scholars, among whom Alexander figures prominently. His *Summa Theologica*, especially its third book, provides authoritative support for the author's views on the life of Christ. Hagiographical interest in Alexander as a figure of exemplary Christian life also appears in the work, as does the Parisian title honoring him as the 'fount of life'. Attention is given to his decision to relinquish the status as a secular master at Paris to join the newly founded Order of Friars Minor, an event considered miraculous by Bartholomew. His collaboration in a commentary on the Franciscan Rule receives admiring attention. The *Book of Conformities* declined in popularity after its critique by Luther in the mid-16th century, diminishing its importance as a vehicle for disseminating knowledge of Alexander and his writings.

In the years between 1385 and 1390, Bartholomew of Pisa, a Friar Minor, wrote a very long book about the similarities between the life of Christ and the life of St Francis of Assisi. The title he gave to the work was *The Book of the Conformity of the Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the Life of our Holy Father Saint Francis*. When the book was finished he submitted it to the Franciscan Minister General, friar Enrico Alfieri, and in 1399 the General Chapter of the Order, meeting in Assisi, gave official approval for its distribution.

The book explores forty similarities between events in the life of Jesus and in the life of Francis, organized according to the form of a tree, an image of which was included with the original text and specifically mentioned in the decree of approval. This tree has twenty branches and each branch bears two fruits, one describing an aspect of the life of Christ and the other a similar aspect of the life of Francis. These forty similarities or fruits are called 'conformities', giving rise to the common name for this work: the *Book of Conformities*.

The *Conformities* is divided into three books, corresponding to major divisions in the life of Christ: the Incarnation, Nativity and early years in book one; the years of public ministry, his Passion and death in book two; and the Resurrection and Ascension in book three. In the first part of each fruit or 'conformity', that in which some aspect of the life of Christ is explored, ample space is dedicated to questions of biblical texts and their interpretation, as well as questions of a philosophical or theological nature. On a range of such questions Bartholomew, a master of theology himself, offers the views of many *auctoritates* on the matters under discussion. Among these

authoritative interpreters of scriptural, philosophical, and theological matters he includes with a certain regularity the writings of master Alexander of Hales, whose *Summa Theologica* clearly had been carefully studied and was easily recalled by the author. (Bartholomew considers Alexander as the author of the *Summa*, while acknowledging the work of others in completing it after his death.)

The popularity of the *Conformities*, especially in the libraries of the Friars Minor, is attested by the large number of its extant manuscripts, making it an important vehicle by which aspects of Alexander's thought reached a readership that was probably wider than that of his *Summa*. Three print editions of the *Conformities* in the 16th century (Milan, 1510, 1513; Bologna, 1590) guaranteed its broad diffusion throughout the following centuries. We even find it listed among the few books included in the supplies destined for the first Franciscan missions in Cumaná (in today's Venezuela) and Mexico in the early 16th century.

In the 1540s the work was harshly criticized in the polemics of the Reformation over Catholic veneration of the saints. The German author Erasmus Alber parodied the work in his *Der Barfüßser Mönche Eulenspiegel und Alcoran* (with a preface by Martin Luther).¹ Alber's critique concerned the hagiographical sections of the *Conformities*, those concerning St Francis, rather than the theological sections citing Alexander's works on the person and life of Christ.

Despite its popularity in earlier years, the *Book of Conformities* gradually fell from favor in the 17th century as the Bollandists and their *Acta Sanctorum* pioneered a more critical approach to saints and their legends. But the work of Friar Bartholomew remains important nonetheless for its very accurate transmission of the writings of St Francis and many early Franciscan hagiographical texts, as well as references to the works of Alexander and other early Franciscan authors. These are some of the reasons which prompted its publication by the friar Editors of Quaracchi in a modern scholarly edition in the early 20th century.²

Alexander Among the Franciscan Authors in the *Conformities*

In several places friar Bartholomew considers questions of learning and displays his respect for his scholarly friar-predecessors, even providing lengthy lists of important

¹ Erasmus Alber, *Der Barfüßser Mönche Eulenspiegel und Alcoran mit einer Vorrede D. Martini Luth[eri]* (Wittenberg: Hans Lufft, 1542).

² *Analecta Franciscana* (AF) vols IV, V (Quaracchi: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1906, 1912). The first translation of the *Conformities* to be published is the English version by Christopher Stace, to whom I am indebted for the English citations used here: Bartholomew of Pisa, *The Book of the Conformity of the Life of Blessed Francis to the Life of the Lord Jesus, Our Redeemer*, trans. Christopher Stace, 3 vols, *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, vol. IV, pt. 1–3 (Hyde Park NY: New City Press, 2020). AF IV-V pagination is indicated in the text.

Franciscan authors and their works. He also addresses theological questions himself as part of his overall project of comparing the life of Francis to that of Christ, and he uses the writings of those Franciscan authors (among many others) to shed light on the problems he poses. While not his most frequently cited *auctoritas* (that honor goes to Bonaventure) master Alexander receives very honorable treatment in Bartholomew's work.

The *Book of Conformities* in its account of the life of Francis (the second part of each conformity) closely follows Bonaventure's account in his *Legenda maior*. So it is not surprising that Bonaventure should be cited also on theological issues of the work (the first part of each conformity).³ Other theological *auctoritates* are invoked regularly by our author: Augustine, above all, along with Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory the Great, and many others. The earlier medieval tradition is represented by Anselm, and especially the Victorines, Hugh of St Victor most frequently. As for 13th- and 14th-century authors, among the Dominicans Thomas of Aquinas receives frequent mention,⁴ as does his teacher Albert the Great.

Among the Franciscans, Bonaventure's mentor Alexander holds a place of special honor, but he is also surrounded by his contemporaries Anthony of Padua, John of Wales, John of La Rochelle, William of Melitona, Odo Rigaldus and Robert of La Bassée. Among the authors of the generations following Bonaventure, whether teaching at Paris or elsewhere, Bartholomew refers to Peter Auriol, John Duns Scotus, Alexander of Alexandria, Gerard Odonis, Peter John Olivi, Bertrand of La Tour, and Elias of Nabinaux. In Conformity VIII, the Pisan author assigns some of these important scholars to 'the order of doctors' in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, with the great English master in first place:

There are and have been holy brothers of the order of doctors: for example master Alexander of Hales, master John of Wales, St Anthony, and his companion Luke, and many others.⁵

If we turn our attention specifically to the role assigned to Alexander of Hales in the pages of the *Conformities* we see him mentioned in two different contexts. The first is his appearance in the various lists of important Franciscan authors, with information concerning his life and works scattered through several of the individual conformities. The second context is that of specific theological topics examined in the first part of each Conformity, that concerned with the person and life of Christ.

³ The edition used here is *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, 11 vols (Quaracchi: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1882–1902).

⁴ Edition used here is *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, 39– vols (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882–).

⁵ *AF* IV, p. 363.

Bio-bibliographic Information about Alexander

A succinct early reference to Alexander is given in the course of Bartholomew's description of the friars of the English Province in Conformity XI:

In this Province of England there are and have always been brothers especially ordained to recite the Divine Office, celebrate Masses and perform the other duties of our Order, and for this reason God has increased their numbers, their temporal goods and their learning. For the province has always had a profusion of masters and excellent brothers. Master John Scotus was of this province, the 'Subtle Doctor', whose intellectual reputation will never die, and who composed many works. So too was master Alexander of Hales, although he lived a long time in Paris.⁶

Other bio-bibliographic references are to be found in Conformity VIII in Bartholomew's listing of important friars buried at Paris:

In the same place lies master Alexander of Hales, who is called 'the fount of life', and who wrote a very important treatise on theology⁷ which was approved by the Lord Pope Alexander IV⁸ and sixty masters of theology in Paris.⁹ He is also said to have composed many commentaries on Holy Scripture and ordinary glosses. His entry into the Order of Lesser Brothers was miraculous, his remaining in it was miraculous, and he died a glorious death.¹⁰

Bartholomew already knows of a 'nickname' for Alexander as *fons vitae*, 'the fount of life'. The earliest evidence we have for this title comes to us from an Oxford manuscript, Canonici Misc. 525. As Roberto Paciocco explains it, this 'saints' catalog' of the Franciscan Order was composed in the same years that Bartholomew was writing the *Book of Conformities*.¹¹ The manuscript's origin can be traced to today's Albania, and

⁶ *AF IV*, p. 547; see also *AF IV*, p. 339, and A.G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892).

⁷ His *Summa Theologica* (hereafter *Summa*) or Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48).

⁸ Bull, *De fontibus Paradisi* (28 July 1256): *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. Giacinto Sbaraglia (Rome: Propaganda Fide, 1761), vol. II, p. 151; *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, eds. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols (Paris: Delalain Frères, 1889), vol. I, p. 328.

⁹ Conformity XI (*AF IV*, p. 543).

¹⁰ *AF IV*, p. 309.

¹¹ Roberto Paciocco, 'Il codice Canon. misc. 525 e il Catalogo del 1385–93,' in his *Da Francesco ai catalogi sanctorum: livelli istituzionali e immagini agiografiche nell'Ordine Franciscano (secoli XIII–XIV)*, *Collectio Assisiensis 20* (Assisi: Edizioni Porziuncola, 1990), p. 148: 'Item frater Alexander de Alles, qui sic subtiliter in theologia locutus est et habunde, magister in eadem (universitate) Parisiensi quod fons vite vocatus, ab Alexandro 40 speciali bulla in toto opere suo super sententias in ecclesia approbatus est; et Minorum ordinem ingressus, ag(gra)vatus perseveravit orans, vidit Christum ut puerum magnam crucem lineam baiulanten, a quo cum vellet ipsum iuvare audivit quod sibi dici: "vade, vade, quia laneam quam super te habes ag(gra)varis portare" et statim disprens confirmatus in Ordine hoc devote referens sancte finivit.'

its contents include the *Speculum perfectionis* (the so-called Sabatier text), and a kind of Franciscan miscellany, *Liber notabilium gestorum beati Francisci et sociorum sive discipulorum in ipsius legenda omissorum*. The text of particular interest here, on ff. 184r-92v, concerns the burial places of notable friars, and entitled *De sacris beatorum fratrum tumulis*. It was written between 1385–93 in the Province of Dalmatia (the former Sclavonia) possibly in the friary of Durazzo (Durrës). That this is the first document to mention the title of honor assigned to Alexander does not mean, of course, that the title itself only came into use around the time of Bartholomew's composition, but the *Conformities* became a means by which such an epithet for the English master would become more widely known.

The Story of Alexander's Conversion

Bartholomew's mention of master Alexander's decision to join the Friars Minor and remain with them as 'miraculous' refers to the accounts of his change of vocation, an event that provoked great enthusiasm in the Franciscan house of studies in Paris. Alexander's 'conversion' refers to his decision to change his ecclesiastical status from that of a 'secular master', a canon of St Paul's in London and later archdeacon of Coventry, to that of a member of a religious community, the Friars Minor. This remarkable change of direction in the master's career receives attention in Conformity XI, as Alexander is pictured making his choice in the context of competition for new members between the new mendicant Orders at Paris:

This master entered our Order in miraculous fashion, for, although he loved our brothers, he had determined to enter the Order of Preachers because it was not so rigorous as ours.¹²

Conformity IX, dedicated chiefly to an explanation of the friars' Rule, considers how 'the Lord Jesus brought many to the observance of this Rule when they entered the Order.' There follow several notable examples including Ralph of Rodington, Bishop of Hereford, and John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem, and Alexander himself:

Master Alexander of Hales also entered the Order as the result of a divine revelation. He had asked the Lord to tell him what Order he should enter and received the response that he should enter the Order of those who were first to come to him in the morning seeking alms, and when the Lesser Brothers arrived first, he at once became a Lesser Brother.¹³

¹² AF IV, p. 543.

¹³ AF IV, p. 429. See a more extended account in Arnald of Sarrant, *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Minorum*, in AF I, pp. 218–19. There, Alexander had bound himself to accede to any request made 'for the love of the Blessed Mary.' Knowing this, a woman told Cistercian monks to use this formula to persuade him to join their Order. Conversing with him, however, they forgot to use it, as subsequently did some Dominicans, but a Franciscan who came there to beg used the words by

Bartholomew mentioned that Alexander's remaining in the Order was also miraculous, and in Conformity XI the fuller account of that miracle is given. In his later years, we are told, Alexander regretted his decision to join the friars, 'since he was old and had lived a life of luxury.' He had already made the decision to leave the Franciscans because of the 'rigidity of the Order' which he found intolerable. But, having recourse to prayer, he asked for divine guidance in his decision. In a dream, like a Parisian Jacob, he saw many friars climbing a ladder from earth to heaven. But as he tried to ascend the ladder, despite his best efforts, he was unable to climb beyond its mid-point. He then understood that the ladder represented the Order he was about to leave, and only by persevering in it would he reach his goal.

Realizing therefore that if he persevered in the Order he would finally go to heaven, he thereafter remained in the Order. With his life, eloquence and learning, his writings on theology and his commentaries on Holy Scripture, he enlightened not only France but the whole of Holy Church, and as a result of this he was deservedly called 'the fount of life'.¹⁴

Alexander as Friar: Commentary on the Rule of the Friars Minor

Within the Order he joined, Alexander is especially remembered for his work on an early commentary on the Rule of the Friars Minor, the so-called *Commentary of the Four Masters*, described by Bartholomew in this way:

Brother Robert of La Bassée was a great teacher of Holy Writ; he wrote on the *Sentences*, and together with Alexander of Hales, Rigaldus, and John of La Rochelle sent a declaration of the Rule to Brother Haymo the General Minister.¹⁵

The Commentary in question¹⁶ was commissioned to respond to a series of questions regarding the interpretation of the Rule of the Friars Minor as approved by Honorius III in 1223 (the so-called *Regula bullata*). The text (composed in 1241–42) has the 'four masters' as its corporate author, and does not distinguish as we might wish between the contributions of individual authors. Working with Alexander, who had joined the Order only five years earlier, the commission included his confrère John of La Rochelle, also a master of theology (by 1238), a co-worker of

chance, and so persuaded him to become a Lesser Brother. (A similar story is told earlier of Brother Adam of Oxford, in Thomas of Eccleston's *Chronicle*, in *AF* I, p. 224.)

¹⁴ *AF* IV, p. 543.

¹⁵ *AF* IV, p. 337.

¹⁶ *Expositio quatuor magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241–1242)*, ed. L. Oligier (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1950); now see also 'The 1242 Commentary' (or 'Commentary of the Four Masters'), in *Early Commentaries on the Rule of the Friars Minor (13th–14th Centuries)*, ed. David Flood, vol. 1 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2014), pp. 1–30.

Alexander who succeeded him as Regent Master in 1241. A younger scholar was named to the group, Odo Rigaldus, a Bachelor still lecturing on book II of the *Sentences* at the time of his appointment: he was later to become Regent after John's death in 1245. The fourth member of the group, Robert of La Bassée, was also a Bachelor at the time he was asked to participate in the commission's activities. He would later become an important author of scriptural commentaries, and is mentioned by Bartholomew of Pisa as a scholar in his own right elsewhere in the text. In Conformity IX, in its detailed explanation of the Rule and its commentaries, the superior (*custos*) of the Custody of Paris, Godfrey of Brie is also mentioned as a co-worker of Alexander on the commission, in addition to the 'four masters'.¹⁷

Alexander's Theological Works in the *Conformities*

In Conformity VIII, after a lengthy treatment of friars notable for their holy lives, Bartholomew turns to a listing of friars who are remembered for their learning. The very first to be mentioned in what would become a long list is our English master:

Brother Alexander of Hales, who was of English nationality, lectured for a long time at Paris, and composed a very important *Summa* of theology which he divided into four parts.¹⁸ And since he was the first to do this, what is amazing about this *Summa* is not only the depth and immensity of its learning, but its discovery of so many doubtful issues and titles of questions, and it was for this reason that in Paris he was called 'the fount of life'. This master also commented on and expounded more or less the whole of Holy Scripture. His theological works were approved in a bull of the Lord Alexander IV and sixty masters at Paris.¹⁹

The reference here to the *Summa Halensis* and its organization ('titles of questions') points to what Bartholomew considered the innovative structure of this work of Alexander and his collaborators. The use of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as the basic text for comment in a master's lectures on theological topics is not mentioned, and by the late 14th century was simply identified with the study of theology itself, as illustrated by Bartholomew's remarks regarding 'the study of theology, i. e. the book of *Sentences*' (below), as if the two were identical.

Alexander's early reputation as a biblical scholar also earns a mention, though a generic one, among influential Franciscan commentators. The esteem in which his commentaries were held leads Bartholomew to rank him alongside the eminent scholars of the previous 150 years of Franciscan exegesis:

¹⁷ AF IV, p. 379.

¹⁸ SH, and *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I-IV* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1979).

¹⁹ See also AF IV, p. 336.

There were also other brothers, who, together with those masters named above, wrote a variety of different works. In order to recount them succinctly, leaving aside the study of theology, i. e. the book of *Sentences*, if we speak of Holy Scripture and of the brothers who commented on the whole of it, they are as follows: master Alexander of Hales, master Nicholas of Lyra; and those who were not masters: Brother Pontius Carbonelli and Brother Peter of John.²⁰

It is high praise for Alexander to be mentioned with Nicholas of Lyra, author of the influential early 14th-century *Postils* on the Bible. But mention of the works of a Catalan contemporary of Nicholas, Ponç Carbonell may be unexpected. Though enjoying an excellent reputation in the 1300s, his works are relatively unknown today though he, like his confrère Nicholas, commented on the whole of the Bible with a series of *catenae* of important authorities.²¹

The Reputation of Alexander among Scholars

Alexander's reputation as a Scripture commentator depended in part on an Apocalypse commentary formerly attributed to him. When Jean of La Haye published that commentary, the engraver who created the frontispiece of the work pictured Alexander, clothed in the habit of the Friars Minor, as he lectured to a small group of students seated on a single bench before his elevated lectern. Among them are two figures identified as the Seraphic Doctor (Bonaventure) and the Angelic Doctor (Thomas).²² Though not historically accurate in its portrayal of the two great medieval thinkers seated side by side at the feet of Alexander, the image does capture an enduring perception of the master's influence on subsequent scholarship at Paris. His oft-quoted opinion of Bonaventure, his former pupil, is mentioned in Conformity VIII, as the Seraphic Doctor's burial at Lyons is described:

When a youth, he was saved from the jaws of death by a miracle of blessed Francis; he entered the Order, and was so conspicuous for his good character and integrity that master Alexander of Hales said of him once that in him Adam seemed not to have sinned.²³

This relationship of master and disciple is reflected in the Christological sections at the beginning of each Conformity. There Bartholomew will most often cite Alexander on a topic and immediately afterward the views of Bonaventure, Thomas and others, according him a certain priority. Conformity XI, in describing the resting-place of friar

²⁰ AF IV, p. 340.

²¹ See Alexander Fidora, 'Ponç Carbonell and the Early Franciscan Reception of the *Pugio fidei*,' *Medieval Encounters* 19 (2013), pp. 567–85, on pp. 570–71.

²² *Alexandri de Hales ... Eruditissimi Commentarii nusquam impressi, in Apocalypsim Sancti Joannis*, ed. Jean of La Haye (Paris: Bertier, 1647); engraving bears the caption: *Angelicum docuit doctorem, Seraphicumque, Ergo spiritibus doctior angelicis.*

²³ AF IV, p. 305.

saints and scholars, also testifies to a special regard for Alexander among the Parisian masters after his death in 1245:

The Custody of Paris has the place of *Paris*, which was built by Brother Agnellus of Pisa, who was the first Custodian of Paris, and then became the Minister of England. In this place lies master Alexander of Hales, who, although English by birth, lectured in Paris for many years. This master is regarded with more veneration than any other in the University of Paris, and his work, which was approved by seventy-two masters who appended their own signatures and seals, and finally by a bull of the Lord Pope Alexander IV, is all kept in the sacristy of the convent at Paris.²⁴

Bartholomew's most important affirmation here, that of the high regard in which Alexander was held at Paris, seems well-founded. And papal esteem for his work is amply demonstrated in the fulsome praise of Alexander IV when he wrote to the Minister Provincial of France a decade after Alexander's death in the Bull *De fontibus Paradisi* (28 July 1256), urging that the *Summa* be completed by another friar, William of Melitona.²⁵

More controversial is Bartholomew's mention here of the *Summa*'s approval by six dozen Parisian masters, a remarkable assertion increasing the number (sixty) reported earlier in Conformity VIII.²⁶ Whether the smaller or the larger number, such reports were dismissed as fables by Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain in their *Chartularium* of the University of Paris.²⁷ But the Quaracchi editors of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, in their apparatus for the critical edition, pointedly noted that, according to the same *Chartularium*, forty Parisian masters and experts approved the *Ars brevis* of Raymond Llull in 1310.²⁸

Alexander on Theological Questions: The Person of Christ

In Conformity XVIII, our Pisan master of theology considers questions related to the person of Christ, and specifically the kinds of knowledge Christ had. There he explores the affirmation that besides the knowledge that Christ's soul possessed in the Word, he also possessed created knowledge. On this point Alexander's opinion, from distinction 14 of book III,²⁹ is simply listed along with similar ones from Bona-

²⁴ AF IV, p. 543.

²⁵ BFr vol. II, p. 151; *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, p. 328.

²⁶ AF IV, p. 309.

²⁷ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, p. 329, note.

²⁸ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* II, p. 140.

²⁹ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C1 (n. 116), pp. 163–64.

venture³⁰ and Thomas.³¹ But Alexander's specific view on these two kinds of knowledge, uncreated and created, is highlighted:

Alexander says, loc. cit., q. 13, that 'the knowledge of Christ's soul (the first as well as the second type already mentioned, that is, uncreated knowledge and his created, beatific knowledge), is not sequential, but comes in a single vision, because it occurs in contemplation of the Cause, which is God, in which it sees everything at one and the same time, in accordance with what the Apostle says at 1 Corinthians 13:12: "Then I shall know even as I am known."'³²

Three additional kinds of knowledge in Christ are then explored briefly, and for each one Alexander's position is cited first,³³ followed immediately by that of Bonaventure,³⁴ demonstrating how close the disciple remains to the thought of his master on these matters.

The third kind of knowledge is that 'through the most perfect grace of union,' by which Christ knows all that regards the salvation of humanity more perfectly than prophets or angels. By a 'fourth knowledge' the intelligible species of all things are imprinted by the Word upon the soul of Christ, though in Alexander's view such knowledge did not allow it 'to survey everything simultaneously.'³⁵ Finally, Alexander and 'other doctors' posit a *fifth* kind of knowledge:

Alexander, loc. cit. q. 13,³⁶ names it after the suffering nature assumed by Christ, and Bonaventure, book III, distinction 14, question 8,³⁷ and *Breviloquium* part II, chapter 6 who refers to it as 'sense experience';³⁸ and because the senses do not perceive anything except in the presence of an object, it follows, as he says, that with the experience of the senses, which in book III he also calls 'experiential', he did not perceive all things simultaneously, but now some and now others.³⁹

Besides the importance of the *Summa Halensis* in this detailed examination of questions on Christ's knowledge, it also contributes substantially to Bartholomew's consideration of other types of questions. Among those for which Alexander's work provides an important point of reference are inquiries about the ways in which Christ's Transfiguration reveals the future state of the beatified body in heavenly glory.

30 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* pt. IV, c. 6, in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), vol. V, pp. 246 ff. *AF* V, pp. 150 ff.

31 Aquinas, *Summa* III, q. 9 (*Opera Omnia* 11:138–47), on Christ's knowledge generally; q. 10 (*Opera Omnia* 11:148–56), on the beatific knowledge of Christ's soul.

32 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C5 (n. 120), pp. 170–71. *AF* V, p. 151.

33 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C2 (n. 117), *Solutio*, p. 166.

34 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* pt. IV, c. 6 (V, p. 247).

35 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C5 (n. 120), p. 170.

36 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C2 (n. 117), *Solutio*, p. 166.

37 Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* III, d. 14, ar. 3, q. 2, in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), vol. III, p. 322.

38 Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* pt. II (= pt. IV) c. 6 (V, p. 246).

39 *AF* V, p. 152.

The Transfiguration and its Anticipation of Beatitude

In considering Christ's Transfiguration in Conformity XV,⁴⁰ Bartholomew explores several theological problems or 'difficulties', for which Alexander's work offers helpful solutions. In summary form, Bartholomew presents the difficulties by asking a number of direct questions, and follows these with their resolutions, relying on the evidence of the *auctoritates*. The following will give an idea of this question-and-answer method familiar to students of Scholastic theology.

With regard to the brightness described by the evangelists in their account of Christ's appearance at the Transfiguration the question arises: 'Where in the subject did this radiance inhere?' Alexander's reply is given in two parts: that brightness 'inhered in his body,'⁴¹ while the external visible radiance seen on his clothing 'came from the brightness shed upon it by his face.'⁴²

And, since the Lord's body also had the qualities of subtlety and agility, 'When he chose to demonstrate the beatitude of his body, why did the Lord reveal this to the Apostles by his endowment of clarity rather than by his other endowments?'⁴³ Here the first part of the answer is, quite simply, that he had already revealed other qualities like subtlety in his birth and agility in his walking on water. 'Therefore it remained for him to reveal this endowment, i.e. that of clarity.' And it is Alexander's *Summa* that demonstrates that the other qualities listed are in fact consequences of that clarity:

For light passes through transparent bodies without suffering loss, and so it is quite subtle. It appears suddenly in many different forms, and so is quite agile. It is not contaminated when passing through contaminated things, and so is impassible, as Alexander says, part III of question 21.⁴⁴

As the questions about the transfigured body of Christ continue, the next is about color: 'How could this clarity occur while he retained his former color?' Alexander's affirmation resolves the question because, with respect to light, 'color is a material thing,'⁴⁵ and precious stones show us by experience that 'color and brilliance occur together.' And if we wonder how 'such glorious clarity could be in a mortal body,' the answer is that, since these qualities of a transfigured body are discrete, God in His omnipotence, 'could temporarily grant one without the other.'⁴⁶

⁴⁰ *AF* V, pp. 61–62.

⁴¹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C3 (n. 182), p. 254.

⁴² *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C4 (n. 183), pp. 255–56.

⁴³ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C8 (n. 187), p. 261.

⁴⁴ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C8 (n. 187), p. 261.

⁴⁵ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C2 (n. 181), p. 253.

⁴⁶ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C5 (n. 184), p. 257.

Master Bartholomew reminds us of his own erudition at this point as he invokes the views of Hilary of Poitiers⁴⁷ and Haymo of Auxerre,⁴⁸ who say ‘this clarity was a hundred times brighter than the sun.’ And if that was the case, ‘Why did it not light up the whole world?’ Bartholomew derives his answer from the *Summa Halensis*, though without revealing it as his source: this clarity on the Lord’s body ‘was revealed through his own volition’ and was ‘manifested to those whom he chose.’ It did not light up the entire world because ‘it was not set in the proper place’ for that to occur. In this sense it was like a lamp, which ‘does not give light unless in an appropriate place.’⁴⁹ The only authority whom Bartholomew does cite in this regard is Augustine, who provides the closing argument in his *Letter to Paulina*: ‘As it is in our power to see corporeal things, so it is in the power of spiritual beings to enable us to see them or not.’⁵⁰

The question of light continues to absorb Bartholomew’s attention as he considers the wonder of the Transfiguration. His next question touches on a scientific question about the functioning of the human eye. If our eyes cannot look directly at the sun ‘because of its brilliance,’ how was it that the Apostles were able to look at the bright light on Christ’s body without harm to their eyes? Drawing on the *Summa*, Bartholomew gives us ‘Alexander’s answer’:

we cannot look at the sun, because its heat destroys the inner moisture of the pupil of the eye. But glorious clarity does not overwhelm and destroy the vision, rather it comforts and strengthens and delights it, and thus they were able to look at it.⁵¹

After answering these questions, Bartholomew turns to the question of the appearance of Moses and Elijah on the mountain with Christ, as described in Matthew 17:3: ‘Behold, there appeared Moses and Elijah talking with him.’ In this regard he wonders if this means that Moses rose from the dead. ‘Alexander’s answer’ here is a clear ‘no’. ‘His soul was certainly there, but it was not necessary for his body to be there.’ He appeared ‘through God’s power,’ just as angels can appear ‘in a body they assume:’ he appeared in this way ‘because we cannot see a spirit with our bodily eyes.’⁵² And the fact that it is Elijah who appears with Moses, rather than another figure, for example, Enoch, poses a different kind of question. Here ‘Alexander’s answer’ is that in this transfiguration Christ wished ‘to display the glory of the resurrection and the work of redemption that was to come,’ something explicitly communicated only after the flood (e.g. from Abraham onward). In Enoch’s time, that mystery was believed only implicitly, ‘so he was not summoned.’⁵³ Bartholomew adds that, in

⁴⁷ Hilary of Poitiers, *Commentarius in Matthaem* c. 17 (PL 9:1014; SC 258:62).

⁴⁸ Haymo of Auxerre, *Homilia de tempore* 34 (PL 118:222–23).

⁴⁹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C6 (n. 185), p. 258; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C9 (n. 188), p. 263.

⁵⁰ Augustine, *Epistola ad Paulinam de videndo Deo* (PL 33:597–98; *CSEL* 44:297).

⁵¹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C9 (n. 188), *Solutio*, p. 263. *AF* V, p. 62.

⁵² *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C8 (n. 187), p. 261.

⁵³ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C8 (n. 187), p. 261. *AF* V, p. 63.

any case, Moses already knew all about the first age of humanity by divine revelation, so another witness like Enoch was not necessary.

To conclude this series of questions about the Transfiguration, Bartholomew mentions the opinions of Ambrose and Jerome about the appearance of Moses, namely, that he was brought back to life temporarily. But Alexander disagrees with the two Western Fathers on this point, and Thomas⁵⁴ shares the opinion earlier taught by Alexander: ‘he appeared in another body which he temporarily assumed.’⁵⁵

Of all the places in the *Conformities* where Friar Alexander’s thinking is used to explain aspects of the life of Christ, its section on the Transfiguration and the treatment of light there must rank as one of the most influential pieces of the *Summa* for Bartholomew. The remaining theological questions that draw considerably on Alexander’s work pertain to problems of soteriology.

The Redeeming Work of Christ: *The Conformities*, Book Two; *Summa Halensis*, Book Three

Alexander’s *Summa* is cited in regard to soteriological questions, notably its treatment of the infinity of Christ’s merit in the work of salvation (in Conformity XXXII).⁵⁶ Bartholomew first presents Bonaventure’s view of the question, taken from book III of his *Sentence* commentary, where merit is linked to the dignity of a person. Since in Christ the person is infinite, Christ has infinite merit.⁵⁷ Bartholomew then goes on to note that the same view can be found in the works of a later author like Peter Auriol,⁵⁸ in that of Bonaventure’s contemporary, Thomas Aquinas,⁵⁹ and in the third book of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.⁶⁰

In a similar vein, Bartholomew explains that Christ’s life is supremely loved by God. And he uses Alexander’s explanation from book III in these terms: since Christ’s life is that of God, it is supremely loved by God, more than anything other

54 Aquinas, *Summa* III, q. 45, ar. 3, ad 2 (*Opera Omnia* 11:432).

55 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti1, C8 (n. 187), p. 261.

56 AF V, pp. 421 ff.

57 Bonaventure, *Commentarium in IV libros Sententiarum* bk. III, d. 13, q. 2, conclusio, in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), vol. III, p. 279b.

58 This is likely d. 13, q. 2 in Peter Auriol, *Petri Aureoli Verberii Ordinis Minorum Archiepiscopi Aquensis S. R. E. Cardinalis Commentariorum in Tertium Librum Sententiarum* (Rome: Luigi Zannetti, 1605), pp. 416 ff.

59 Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libro Tertio Sententiarum* d. 18, ar. 6, q. 3, solution I, in S. Thomae Aquinatis *scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. Maire-Fabian Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1933), vol. III, p. 576.

60 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M4, C2, Ar2 (n. 139), p. 192.

than God.⁶¹ From this he draws the conclusion that Christ delights in his own life more than any creature could delight in anything.⁶²

This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that Christ's offering of his own life was an infinite gift to God.⁶³ Following the development of Alexander's thought, grounded in satisfaction theory, our Pisan author emphasizes three elements of satisfaction. First, he speaks of how much was paid in satisfaction, and identifies this with the intensity of Christ's pain at the separation of body from soul at the moment of death. Second, he examines the means of payment, here identified as that pain 'beyond all reckoning' and the death that followed, as suffered by one who was the Son of God. Third, he explains the reason for this satisfaction, which in Christ was a love that is 'boundless', making such satisfaction as in itself is 'beyond all reckoning'.⁶⁴

On another soteriological question, Christ's Passion and the work of redemption are presented in the *Conformities* as understood through the lens of the *Summa Halensis*. Quoting Paul in Titus 2:14 and the Book of Revelation 5:9, Bartholomew argues that by Christ's Passion 'our redemption was wrought and accomplished.' In this, following a popular theory of redemption, in book III Alexander affirms that 'to redeem is to recover what is one's own for a just price;⁶⁵ and so 'Christ redeemed us, and recovered us when we were slaves, by paying the price, that is, himself.'⁶⁶

Predictably, Bartholomew does not present innovative arguments or diverge in his theological opinions from the teaching of his *auctoritates* in these matters of redemption and satisfaction. And among the many authors available to him in the late 14th century Alexander's work remained a consistent and respected point of reference.

The Third Book of the Conformities: The Glorification of Christ

In its third book, the *Conformities* addresses questions regarding Christ's Resurrection. In several places the treatment of these questions in the *Summa Halensis* forms the basis for Bartholomew's presentation of the theological issues involved. Among the questions are several regarding the properties of a risen body, with Alexander's arguments not only stated but also traced back to their origins, frequently in the writings of Augustine.

⁶¹ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M4, C2, Ar2 (n. 139), p. 192a.

⁶² AF V, pp. 421–22.

⁶³ AF V, p. 422.

⁶⁴ AF V, p. 422.

⁶⁵ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), p. 209.

⁶⁶ AF V, p. 424.

One example concerns the question of the food eaten by the risen Christ in the company of the Apostles. The question is posed simply in the *Summa*: ‘What happened to the food?’ Alexander’s solution is put forward,⁶⁷ as well as its foundation in Augustine’s solution, namely that the food was transformed into vapor, ‘a spiritual form’, as happens with water when exposed to the sun’s heat.⁶⁸

In a similar vein, the more general question of Christ’s body and its qualities after the Resurrection is addressed. For example, ‘How could Christ’s body be handled, when he was impassible?’ Turning to Alexander for enlightenment, Bartholomew explains that Christ’s risen body can be touched ‘if he wishes, and not if he does not.’ Alternatively, one can say that such an impalpable body can be touched only ‘supernaturally’ but not ‘naturally’.⁶⁹

Moving through the events following the Resurrection in the New Testament accounts, the Pisan master turns once again to the *Summa fratris Alexandri* for an explanation of the Ascension, and the place of Christ in glory, ‘at the right hand of the Father,’⁷⁰ pondering Hebrews 1:3ff. The treatment of the question in the *Summa* makes a distinction between the expressions ‘to sit’ and ‘to be’ at the Father’s right hand. Alexander explains that sitting conveys ‘unity and equality’, ‘communion’, and ‘a particular sharing of beatitude,’ with God the Father, and such a place of honor is suitable for Christ alone. But the more general expression, ‘to be’ at the Father’s right hand can appropriately be used in reference to all the saints in heavenly glory. As with the earlier treatment of the question on the Transfiguration, so in these questions on the glorified Christ the works of Alexander provide respected solutions to the problems, great and small, posed by a fellow Franciscan theologian.

Conclusion

The examples given here can serve to illustrate the varied ways in which the theological work of Alexander, as reflected in the *Summa Halensis*, provided a reliable point of reference for a Franciscan master like Bartholomew more than a century after the work’s composition. The diffusion of manuscripts of the *Summa* and the wide distribution of its later printed editions testify to its use among friars and others studying and lecturing in theological schools over several centuries. But beyond that specialized audience, appreciation of Alexander’s thought and veneration of his memory derived also from such popularizing works as the *Conformities*, likely read by an audience broader than that of theologians. In its theological discussions at the beginning of each of its forty conformities of the life of St Francis to that of Christ, Bartholomew

⁶⁷ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti2, M2, C3 (n. 196), p. 277.

⁶⁸ Augustine, *Epistula* 102 (49), *Sex quaestiones contra Paganos*, q. I (PL 33:372; CCSL 31B:11).

⁶⁹ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1 (n. 194), *Solutio*, p. 274.

⁷⁰ SH IV, In1, Tr7, Q2, C1 (n. 207), p. 293.

lomew of Pisa's *Book of Conformities* offers a worthy tribute by a late 14th-century master to his early 13th-century predecessor Alexander, 'king of theologians' and 'fount of life'.

William J. Courtenay

Gabriel Biel and the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The paper explores the use made of the *Summa Halensis* as a source in the 15th century for Egeling Becker's *Canonis misse expositio* as revised and disseminated by Gabriel Biel. Despite Biel's reputation as an Ockhamist and a leading proponent of the *via moderna*, the views of Alexander of Hales as reflected in the *Summa Halensis* prove to be the major source on which Biel relies for his Eucharistic theology. In addition, the study notes major differences between the Koberger edition of the *Summa Halensis* (Nürnberg 1481–82 and Lyon 1515–16), which Biel used, and the edition published at Venice in 1575 and Cologne 1622.

When, some sixty years ago, I joined Heiko Oberman in editing Gabriel Biel's *Canonis misse expositio*, it became quickly apparent that the *Summa Halensis* was one of the major sources for Biel.¹ That led me to the critical edition of the *Summa Halensis*, only to find that the fourth book, the section of the work that Biel used to discuss questions on the Eucharist and the canon of the Mass, had not been edited by the Franciscan fathers at Quaracchi, who discontinued the project after the publication of book III in 1948. The reason, or so I heard, was that the editors were interested in publishing the work of the first Franciscan scholastic theologian, Alexander of Hales, as they earlier had produced a multi-volume critical edition of the works of Bonaventure, and research in the 1920s proved that the *Summa Halensis* was not a work of Alexander himself but of others in his school. Moreover, the last part of the *Summa Halensis*, book IV, was the work of a student of Alexander, William of Melitona, compiled in the late 1240s and close enough to the life and teaching of Alexander to be Alexandrian, if one may use that expression, but not the work of Alexander himself.² It is certainly the case, however, that Gabriel Biel understood the *Summa Halensis* (a title he did not use) as the work of Alexander, including book IV, as did other theologians in the 14th and 15th centuries.

Whatever the reason for book IV not having been included in the critical edition, it made my editing work more difficult. As an American graduate student at the time, my access to manuscripts was limited. For the *Summa Halensis* I used the Lyon edition of 1516. More limiting was the fact that I could not avail myself of the editorial

¹ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, ed. H.A. Oberman and W.J. Courtenay, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Abteilung für Abendländische Religionsgeschichte, Mainz, vols 31–34 (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1963–67).

² For a recent discussion of these matters, see Hubert Philipp Weber, 'The *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum* by Alexander of Hales,' in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 79–109, esp. pp. 79–83.

work of the Franciscan fathers in identifying the works and location of the sources cited in book IV of the *Summa*.

Let me begin with information on Gabriel Biel and the *Canonis misse expositio*. Biel was born at Speyer am Rhein in Rheinland Pfalz. He took his master's degree in arts at Heidelberg in 1438, followed by theological study at Erfurt (1442/43, 1451) and Cologne (1453 sqq.), before taking a position as Domprediger (cathedral preacher) at Mainz in 1458, a post that included a non-voting position in the cathedral chapter as the *vicarius* of the archbishop, literally his eyes and ears. Supporting Diether von Isenburg for the archbishopric of Mainz in 1461, who lost out to Adolf von Nassau, whom Pope Pius II appointed, led to Biel's exile to the village of Kiedrich in the Rheingau as pastor, from which he returned to his position in the Mainz cathedral the following year, after his reconciliation with Archbishop Adolf. He remained in the Mainz cathedral until the beginning of 1466. A few years later he joined the Brethren of the Common Life, a priestly order known also as the *Devotio Moderna*, at Butzbach in Hessen, then moved to their convent at Urach in Baden-Württemberg. From there he went to teach theology at the recently founded University of Tübingen in 1484, where he lectured on the canon of the Mass as well as the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. He subsequently retired to a nearby house of the Brethren at Einsiedel, where he died in 1495.

The *Canonis misse expositio*, which Biel gave as lectures at Tübingen in 1485 or 1486, and which was printed at Reutlingen in 1488, was not strictly speaking his work, which he acknowledged in his introduction. The work was originally composed by his friend, Egeling Becker from Braunschweig, whom he first met at Erfurt in the 1440s when Egeling was studying arts (1440–45) and subsequently theology (1445–53) and Biel taught in the arts faculty while studying theology (1443–53). Egeling was licensed in theology at Erfurt and took a position as lecturer at the Mainz cathedral and chaplain of its chapel dedicated to St Martin. After receiving his license in theology at Cologne, Biel joined Egeling at Mainz as cathedral preacher in 1458. It was for students preparing for the pastoral ministry that Egeling, *famosissimus magister* as Biel called him, composed his lectures on the canon of the Mass, *ad clericos*. Either because of its popularity or because Egeling commissioned a copy to be made, a manuscript of the work was completed in 1464 at the Benedictine monastery of St Albans just to the south of Mainz. Egeling also built a reputation as a preacher, and while Biel left Mainz in the late 1460s to join the Brethren of the Common Life, Egeling accepted a prebend at the Carthusian monastery of St Michael near St Albans monastery, from which he moved to the Carthusian house of St Maria at Strasbourg where he died in 1481.³

³ For Biel's biography see the introduction in *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, vol. I. pp. vii–ix; William J. Courtenay, 'Gabriel Biel as Cathedral Preacher at Mainz and his Supposed Sojourn at Marienthal,' *Research Studies of Washington State University* 33 (1965), pp. 145–50; idem, 'Zur Chronologie der Schriften Gabriel Biels von 1462 und zu seiner Rolle in der Mainzer Stiftsfehde,' *Trierer Theologische Zeits-*

Biel no doubt took his copy of Egeling's *Canonis misse expositio* with him on his peregrinations across central and southern Germany in the following years. Needing to instruct theological students at Tübingen, all or most of whom would have been preparing for the priesthood, Biel reworked his copy of Egeling's lectures. As Biel described his contribution, he omitted little, added much, and changed a bit (*paucis omissis, pluribus additis ac mutatisquam*).⁴ The work met a demand. It came at a time of intense interest, particularly in Germany, in the Mass and Eucharistic theology.⁵ It was published in 1488 while Biel was still teaching at Tübingen, republished in 1499 at Tübingen and again in 1510 at Basel, and acknowledged by Martin Luther to be one of the most influential works in his early theological training.

Fortunately two manuscript copies of Egeling's Mainz lectures have survived, which allows us to compare the two versions of the work.⁶ What is of particular interest is that most of the citations to Alexander (that is, to the *Summa Halensis*) were added by Biel and were not part of what Egeling used in preparing his lectures at Mainz, at least they were not acknowledged as such. Moreover, where Egeling was often vague on the precise location of the material in the work he was citing, not only with the *Summa Halensis* but with most of his sources, Biel filled in book and chapter, or question, member, and sometimes the precise article in the case of the *Summa Halensis*. Egeling knew and used the *Summa Halensis*, but not nearly as much as Biel. In fact, the *Summa Halensis* was the single most important source for Biel in understanding the theology and ritual surrounding the Mass. Manuscript copies of book IV of the *Summa Halensis* are not as common as for the other three books. Since Biel cites, paraphrases, and quotes sections from all four books of the *Summa Halensis*, he obviously had access to a complete copy of the work in the form that was used for the early printed editions. In fact he used the edition that was published by Anton Koberger in Nuremberg in 1481–82, since he cites passages according to question, member, and often article. All manuscripts of the *Summa*, according to Riccardo Saccenti in private communication, are divided into questions, sometimes separating major questions and sub-questions, but not further divided into members and articles. This is also true of the printed edition of *SH* III in 1475 at Venice.

While it is of course possible that the transition in organizational structure from 'questions only' to 'questions, members, and articles' occurred in a late 15th-century manuscript now lost, it is far more likely that this new structure was created by Koberger, perhaps to bring the work in line with the structure of *Sentences* commenta-

chrift 74 (1965), pp. 374–76. On Egeling Becker see Adolph Franz, *Die Messe im Deutschen Mittelalter* (Freiburg: Herder, 1902), pp. 537–550.

⁴ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, vol. I, p. 4.

⁵ The best work on the subject remains Franz, *Die Messe im Deutschen Mittelalter*.

⁶ Egelinus' version of *Canonis misse expositio* survives in Cologne, Stadtbibliothek, GB fol. 99, copied in Mainz at St Alban's monastery *extra muros* in 1464, and Frankfurt, Universitätsbibliothek cod. 93, copied at Frankfurt by Johannes Bomersheym, BA, in 1470.

ries. Biel knew the *Summa Halensis* not under that title but cites it simply as ‘Alexander de Ales’ (dropping the ‘H’). But since Biel cites the book, question and member where the citation can be found, and his citations correspond perfectly with the 1482 edition, he can only be referring to that edition of the *Summa Halensis*, not to what is known as Alexander’s Gloss on the *Sentences* or Alexander’s *Quaestiones disputatae*, edited in 1951–57 and 1960 respectively.

It is important to recognize that Biel was using a very different edition from that published in Venice in 1575 and Cologne in 1622. The Quaracchi editors of the *Summa Halensis* in the introduction to volume I, although they critically edited the text from manuscripts, as is proper, noted with regret that early printed editions were hard to find in libraries, and that the Cologne edition, which they used for comparison with the manuscripts, had a very different structure as well as a confused and inferior text.⁷ Marcia Colish, in a paper given at an earlier meeting of the *Summa Halensis* project, expressed the same objections to the Cologne edition, which she consulted for Alexander’s and William of Melitona’s Eucharistic doctrine alongside Alexander’s disputed questions and his Gloss on the *Sentences*.⁸ What the Quaracchi editors failed to observe, or at least did not mention, is that the Koberger edition, published three times between 1481/82 and 1515/16, has a very different structure from the Cologne edition they examined. Book IV in the Venice edition of 1575 divides the material into 35 questions and the Cologne edition divides it into 32 questions. The Koberger edition of 1481/82, by contrast, is 360 folios in length and divides the text into 114 questions, more than three times as many. Similar differences between the Koberger edition and the Venice/Cologne edition exist for the previous three books. The difference between these editions is the structure into which the text is divided,

7 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologia (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), I, p. xi: ‘Variae quidem decursu saeculorum huius operis prodierunt editiones, nempe solius Libri III Venetiis 1475, totius vero operis, nempe Librorum IV, Norimbergae 1481–82, Papias 1489, Lugduni (Norimbergae) 1515–16, Venetiis 1575–76, Coloniae Agrippinae 1622. Ast, ut compertum est, editiones illae rarissime iam inveniuntur et nimis mendis librariis scatent. Sic editio Coloniensis, quam collationi codicum subiecimus, vitiis multis laborat, cum editores modo omnino arbitrario illud opus tractarint, parum curantes de fide codicum; multas quippe easque saepe magnas habet omissiones, quaestiones insuper ipsas earumque divisiones contra ipsum textum Alexandri arbitrarie distribuit, ita ut difficile evadat ipsam ibi invenire pulcherrimam structuram ab auctore clare indicatam.’

8 Marcia L. Colish, ‘The Eucharist in Early Franciscan Tradition,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), p. 320: ‘Book IV [Cologne edition of the *Summa Halensis*] abridges and dilutes positions earlier taught by William and Alexander, omits arguments of both masters, and introduces arguments contradicting rules which, following Prepositinus, they enforce. The *Summa*’s organization and coverage of Eucharistic topics are odd. Only two of the thirty-two *quaestiones* in Book 4 treat the Eucharist. In between articles 2 and 3 of member 5 in ques. 10, and occupying some 35% of the space devoted to the Eucharist, William inserted a *Tractatus de officina missae una cum expositione Orationis dominicae*, which appears only to concern the Lord’s Prayer. But he also places some topics on the administration of the Mass in the middle of *quaestio* 10.’

questions and sub-questions in the Koberger edition and questions, members, and articles in the Venice/Cologne edition.⁹ While this does not affect a future critical edition of book IV of the *Summa Halensis*, which should be done from the manuscripts, it does affect how that text was understood and used in the transition years from the late Middle Ages into the early modern period, before the text was restructured.

The *Summa Halensis* was not only a major source for Biel in and of itself; it was also a guide to and a source collection of citations from pre-1220 Eucharistic thought. Biel got many of his citations of Hugh of St Victor, Innocent III, and decretals in canon law from the *Summa Halensis*. It also functioned as a source for teaching doctrine and ecclesiastical practice to parish priests, for which it was well-suited. While the *Canonis misse expositio* is structured by the actual Latin text of the Mass and the questions that those words and *Sentences* suggested, many sections of the *Canonis misse expositio* at times move parallel to the sequence of questions raised in the *Summa Halensis*.

The range of issues in the *Canonis misse expositio* runs from theological concerns, such as the nature and operation of transubstantiation, the moment in the words of consecration when transubstantiation takes place, to philosophical issues, such as the semantics of the words of consecration and the meaning of the Aristotelian categories of quantity, relation, and place as they apply to the Eucharist; to practical concerns of a priest, such as to what happens if he mispronounces the words of consecration, or forgets them, or has semen emission the night before he celebrates the Eucharist, or what happens to the body of Christ if the reserved host is nibbled by a mouse; to concerns that parishioners might have, such as having forgotten before receiving the Eucharist to confess one or more acts that might constitute sin, or whether a woman could receive the host during the period of menstruation, or the validity or efficacy of receiving the Eucharist from a priest who might himself be in a state of sin.

The *Canonis misse expositio* is structured in terms of lectures, 99 of which were given in the course of one academic year. The citations from Alexander begin in *Lectio* I and from there on occur in almost every lecture. As would be expected considering the subject matter of the *Canonis misse expositio*, Biel has only one quotation from the first book of the *Summa Halensis*, five from book II, fourteen from book III, and almost two hundred from book IV. Biel, far more than Egeling Becker, viewed Alexander of Hales, whose thought he saw embodied in the *Summa Halensis*, as one of the major theologians of the previous three centuries. Moreover, he saw Alexander as the doctor through whom Innocent III's Eucharistic theology was made known and whose leadership in treating questions concerning the Eucharist was followed by both Bonaventure and Thomas. Biel saw no serious split or conflict

⁹ The precise relationship of the manuscripts and editions has now been worked out by Riccardo Saccenti in a forthcoming article in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* entitled 'Manuscripts and Printed Editions of Book IV of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.'

between Franciscan thought and the thought of Thomas. Bonaventure, Thomas, Richard of Middleton, Scotus, and Durand were in many respects the heirs of Alexander of Hales' great *Summa*.

Considering the large number of places and issues where Biel drew upon the *Summa Halensis*, I am going to consider only a small group, particularly places where Biel seems to have profited from that source, or where on occasion he disagrees with conclusions in that work. As to where Biel profited, he took most of his citations of Hugh of St Victor and Innocent III as well as many citations from canon law along with scriptural and patristic sources from the *Summa Halensis*, with acknowledgement, as was noted earlier. Subsequent sources Biel drew upon were Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Giles of Rome's *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, Duns Scotus, Durand of St Pourçain, Ockham, Jean Gerson, Antoninus of Florence, and somewhat less frequently William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne, Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta*, Peter Palude, Francis Mayronis, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini.

I want to begin my survey of how Biel used the *Summa Halensis* in the discussion of Eucharistic theology with the two topics Marcia Colish examined in her paper on the Eucharist in early Franciscan thought.¹⁰ The first topic concerned the theories of what happens to the substance of bread at the moment of consecration and conversion into the substance of the body of Christ. The second topic was how the accidents or species of bread and wine, after the conversion of the substance of bread, can continue without inhering in a subject or substance. Both topics were reshaped by the adoption of Aristotle's distinction between substance and accidents and the promulgation of the doctrine of transubstantiation at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.

Aristotle's distinction of substance and accidents solved a major question that had caused so much controversy in the 9th to 12th centuries: how could bread and wine be transformed into the body and blood of Christ without their looking like and tasting like flesh and blood? Or, if they continued to appear to be and taste like bread and wine, in what sense were they the body and blood of Christ? Since for Aristotle we never physically encounter a substance, only its accidental qualities of shape, color, texture, and taste as perceived by the senses, that explains how the substance of the body of Christ can be present under the species of bread and wine without the proper accidents of a human body. The accidents of bread and wine have remained although the substance has changed.

Yet Aristotle's distinction also entailed the view that accidental qualities cannot exist without inhering in a substance. Eucharistic doctrine, on the other hand, maintained that after conversion the accidents of bread and wine did not inhere in their former proper substance or in the substance of the body of Christ, lest it be subject to change and decay. The substance of the body of Christ was present without its proper

¹⁰ Colish, 'The Eucharist in Early Franciscan Tradition,' pp. 303–24.

accidental qualities. This belief violated the entire Aristotelian understanding of how substance and accidents relate. Thus Aristotle's theory of substance and accidents explained how, after conversion, the bread received by the communicant still looked and tasted like bread. On the other hand, if Christian doctrine was true, that accidents could exist without inhering in a substance, and did so day after day on altars across the Christian world, a fundamental tenet of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics was not true in all cases.

Simply saying it was a miraculous action of God in which the normal rules of nature were suspended or did not apply was not a sufficient answer for theologians and probably for most Christians of that age who bothered to think about it. The faithful wanted to know *how* transubstantiation worked, preferably in a way that made some rational sense, and theologians felt it was incumbent upon them to provide answers. As Biel remarked, while simple faith was sufficient for most Christians, theologians '*in scholastico gymnasio*' were required to understand and explain doctrine.¹¹ In that context four theories were put forward by Peter Lombard, three of which were repeated by Innocent III. One theory was that the substance of the bread remained alongside the body of Christ after consecration.¹² This avoided affirming that accidents could exist without inhering in a substance, although it did not explain how the substance of the body of Christ could be there without its accidents. This theory was called 'remanentism' or 'remanescence' because the substance of bread remained, or 'consubstantiation' because two substances then existed in the same place simultaneously. This solution avoided the metaphysical problem, at least for an Aristotelian, of accidents not having a substance in which to inhere, but it raised a whole new problem in light of Aristotelian physics and the common understanding of how things operate in nature, namely two substantial bodies (bread and the body of Christ) occupying the same space at the same time. While theologians believed that such occurred in the case of the birth of Christ, when he passed through the birth canal without destroying the physical sign of Mary's virginity, or when after the Resurrection Christ physically entered the upper room when the door was locked, those were one-time miraculous events, not something that happened daily on every altar.

A second theory was that the substance that had been bread became or was transformed into the body of Christ, or the 'flesh' of Christ as Biel expressed it.¹³ This would be the conversion of one substance into another in a strict sense. The third theory, as mentioned by Innocent and retained in decretals was that, at the moment of consecration, the substance of bread ceased to exist there, and the substance

¹¹ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLIII (vol. II, p. 148).

¹² *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XL (vol. II, p. 98): 'Una quod panis substantia manet simul cum corpore christi, et nihil preexistens ibi ante consecrationem desinit esse.'

¹³ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XL (vol. II, p. 98): 'Secunda tenet quod substantia que fuit panis primo, postea est caro christi.'

of the body of Christ took its place.¹⁴ This theory did not specify what happens to the substance of bread, simply that it ceases to be there. A fourth theory added by Lombard according to Biel, which in a sense explained what happens to the substance of bread, was that it is annihilated or resolved into prime matter.¹⁵ Biel was taking these theories from Innocent III's *De sacro altaris mysterio* and Lombard's *Sentences*, not from the *Summa Halensis*, since the latter, which used Innocent's work, does not list them in this way.

Biel rejected the first and last theories, remanescence (or remanentism) and annihilation, as did most theologians. He understood transubstantiation as the third theory, where the substance of bread ceases to be there and the substance of the body of Christ takes its place, rather than the second theory where one substance is made from or converted into another. And he insisted that 'all catholic doctors' held this third view, presumably including Alexander, although he did not name Alexander in that context.¹⁶ For this 'ceasing' of the substance of bread he uses the term '*desitio*', coined for this purpose by scholastic theologians. That 'ceasing', however, should not be understood as a return to pure nothingness, as before the creation of the world, but as a 'ceasing' because of the succession of a different substance, the body of Christ. This is why the term 'annihilation' does not apply. Nothing that is converted into something else, although it ceases to exist, is annihilated.¹⁷ Despite the fact that the words of consecration occur across a succession of time, however brief, the conversion or replacement of one substance with the other is instantaneous and not part by part.¹⁸

But in what do the accidents of bread and wine inhere? How could they continue to exist without a subject or substance in which to inhere? Sympathetic to the Aristotelian need for accidents to inhere in something, Thomas argued that the Aristotelian category of quantity, conceived as the shape of a thing devoid of matter or any substance, in this case the shape or holographic form of the bread, continued to exist

14 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XL (vol. II, p. 98): 'Tertia tenet quod substantia panis ibi desinit esse et manent accidentia tantum, sapor, color, pondus, et similia, et sub his accidentibus incipit esse corpus christi.'

15 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XL (vol. II, p. 98): 'Quartam opinionem addit Magister ubi supra, quod panis substantia non convertitur sed annihilatur, vel in preiacentem materiam resolvitur.' Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), vol. 2, lib. IV, d. 11, p. 298: 'Quod si est, quid ergo fit de substantia panis et vini? Illi dicunt vel in praeiacentem materiam solvi, vel in nihilum redigi.' This opinion was already mentioned by Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* II.8.9, PL 176 (Paris: Migne, 1854), col. 468b.

16 In Alexander's and William of Melitona's view, as stated in the Venice edition of the *Summa Halensis*, Q10, M5, Ar3 (Lyon edition, IV, f. 189rb), there is no specific mention of three or four theories of conversion.

17 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLI (vol. II, p. 119): 'Nihil quod convertitur in aliud, quamvis simpliciter desinat esse, annihilatur.'

18 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLII (vol. II, pp. 135–36).

after sacramental conversion and the accidents of bread inhered in that form rather than in a substance. Biel followed Ockham, who believed that the category of quantity, like all categories except substance and qualities, were descriptive of things, not things in themselves, rejected that solution and maintained instead that the accidents are upheld by the power of God without need for an actual substance.

Numerous other questions arose in the context of transubstantiation and the words of consecration. An obvious one, already touched on, was: at which instant in the pronunciation or prolation of the words of consecration did conversion take place? If conversion requires the entire phrase, ‘hoc est corpus meum,’ then conversion is not instantaneous but gradual, replacing the substance of bread piece by piece or by degrees. But if conversion is instantaneous, as would seem proper, what word or syllable triggers conversion?¹⁹ Following the *Summa Halensis* closely, Biel states that at the moment of consecration, the whole of the substance of bread ceases to be there and is succeeded by the whole of the body of Christ.²⁰ There is no piece-by-piece transformation. If one objects that pronouncing the sacramental words takes time and thus conversion cannot happen in an instant, Biel employs the response from the *Summa Halensis*. Divine power operates in the prolation of the words, not by the succession of words but at the end of the spoken words. Consequently, the instant of conversion comes at the completion of the words of consecration, which would be the last syllable of ‘meum’.²¹

Another question was whether or not a mispronunciation of those words would prevent transubstantiation, or whether transubstantiation would take place if only the phrase ‘hoc est corpus meum’ were said without the contextual words preceding it that make clear those were the words of Jesus. On both of these questions Biel drew upon the *Summa Halensis*. Concerning the first, if the priest said ‘hoc est colpus meum’ or ‘corpu meum’ but intended to pronounce the words correctly, conversion would take place. If he intended the mistake for some reason, there would be no conversion.²² In the second case, ‘hoc est corpus meum’ by itself, without the preceding

19 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLII (vol. II, pp. 135–38), from *Summa Halensis* IV, Q38, M6 (Lyon edition, IV, f. 178r).

20 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLII (vol. II, p. 136): ‘Manifestum est quod totum convertitur in totum, et ita fit corpus Christi totum simul presens speciebus panis et non pars post partem, et ita non successive, et per consequens instantanee, id est totum simul.’

21 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLII (vol. II, p. 136): ‘Dicitur ergo quod in fine prolationis verborum incipit esse corpus Christi sub speciebus panis et desinit esse panis. Et si diceret licet virtus divina convertens sit infinita, tamen operatur ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium que non potest esse subita. Ad illud respondet Alexander, licet virtus divina operetur ad verbi prolationem, non tamen secundum prolationem successionis operatur, enim virtus divina non nisi prolatis verbis sed non durante verborum prolatione. Operatur autem in fine prolationis et non ante, quia ita placitum est sue omnipotenti voluntati.’

22 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XXXVIII (vol. II, p. 84) from *Summa Halensis* IV, Q33, M3, Ar3 (Lyon edition, IV, f. 132r).

words that provide the context, those words would refer to the body of the priest and conversion into the body of Christ would not take place.²³

Another non-Aristotelian position was created by the belief that the entire body of Christ could be in heaven and simultaneously in every host and every fragment of that host on every altar and as received by every communicant. The only difference is that in heaven the substance of the body of Christ is there with its proper accidents, while on the altar or as consumed by the faithful, it is only the substance. Although at the beginning of his discussion, Biel quotes a long passage from Ockham's *De sacramento altaris* without mentioning Ockham's name, Biel's main discussion is drawn directly from the *Summa Halensis*, again with a long quotation and acknowledged as the opinion of the 'doctor irrefragabilis Alexander.'²⁴

Neither the author of the fourth book of the *Summa Halensis* nor the two authors of the *Canonis misse expositio* were concerned only with technical theological questions surrounding transubstantiation. Both works were concerned with ritual, with the performance of the Mass, and with questions that concerned both priests and communicants. This included the preparation of the altar, its censing, when it is kissed by the priest, the position of the hands and arms of the priest at various points in the ceremony, bowing, and making the sign of the cross.

In understanding the meaning and implications of the opening words of the canon of the Mass, *Te igitur clementissime pater*, in Lectio 20, Biel draws upon the *Summa Halensis*.²⁵ All citations to and quotations from the *Summa Halensis* were not part of the text as composed by Egeling Becker but were added by Biel in his revision. Although Becker knew and occasionally cited the *Summa*, most of the citations and quoted passages were added by Biel. Both Becker and Biel began their discussion of the opening words of the canon of the Mass with the significance of the letter 'T' in *Te igitur*. The shape of the letter represents the cross and brings to mind the sacrifice of Christ, an image repeated each time the word 'Te' occurs in the text. At another point Biel mentions the times when the priest is to make the sign of the cross, the most important of which is when he comes to the word 'corpus' in 'Hoc est enim corpus meum.' In fact, the emphasis in discussing the words and Sentences in the text of the Mass is to make priests aware not only of the meaning and importance of the words they recite, but also the symbolism with which they are often linked.

Biel draws upon the *Summa Halensis* in discussing other questions that were raised with regard to transubstantiation. For example, what happens if a mouse gains access to the reserved host and nibbles on what to the mouse appears to be

²³ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XXXVIII (vol. II, p. 78): 'Prefata autem verba "hoc est corpus meum" prolata a sacerdote sine aliis precedentibus adiunctis, non significant corpus Christi, sed significant magis corpus sacerdotis proferentis, quia per "meum", "corpus" restringitur ad corpus loquentis.'

²⁴ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLIII (vol. II, pp. 146–49) from *Summa Halensis* IV, Q40, M3, Ar4 (Lyon edition, f. 186r).

²⁵ *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XX (vol. I, pp. 174–81).

bread?²⁶ Does the mouse actually consume the body of Christ? If so, what happens to the body of Christ in the digestive system of the mouse? If not, what substance is being consumed, since one seemingly cannot consume simply accidents? One theory was that although the substance of the body of Christ would enter the stomach of the mouse, it would not be subject to digestion because under the species of bread it was not there *dimensive* and therefore could not be injured, polluted or corrupted.²⁷ As the *Summa Halensis* put it, the animal does not eat the body of Christ sacramentally nor even carnally, because it cannot come in contact with the substance but only with the species.²⁸

But because it diminishes the dignity of the sacrament and is offensive to pious ears to suggest that the body of Christ could be in the stomach of a mouse or *in cloaca*, Bonaventure offered another explanation that might be called reverse transubstantiation, namely that in the instant at which the mouse nibbles the host, the substance of the body of Christ ceases to be there and becomes again the substance of bread.²⁹ Biel preferred what he took to be Alexander's solution and the common opinion, namely that the body of Christ could not be digested as food because it was not material in that sense and lacked dimensions.³⁰

Biel also, following the Venerable Bede, asks what one should do in the case of someone who, presumably by reason of illness or a guilty conscience, vomits after receiving the host, and one is able to pick out the species of bread among other food that might be ejected? In such a case, if the communicant is able to retake

26 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, pp. 78–79, 82–84), from *Summa Halensis* IV, Q53, M2 (Lyon edition, f. 215v). The latter text, as mentioned by Biel, also uses as an example a hungry pig gaining access to the host. While it is easy to conceive how a church mouse at night might come upon a consecrated host, the highly unlikely event of a pig doing so was added to make the problem more repulsive and therefore of more concern to the faithful.

27 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, p. 79): 'Unde concedunt illi, si mus vel porcus traicit species in ventrem, etiam corpus Christi sub speciebus descendit et manet, donec manet forma panis, nec tamen ex hoc corpus Christi polluitur aut digeritur, seu in partes discernitur, sicut nec in sumptione eius ab homine, quia corpus Christi nec attingi potest, quia est sub speciebus non dimensive, nec ledi aut inquinari, quia est gloriosum.'

28 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, p. 79): 'Et videtur Alexander dicere, quod non manducat corpus Christi sacramentaliter, quod verum est, nec proprie carnaliter, quia non attingit corpus sed tantum species.'

29 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, pp. 82–83): 'Quod videtur sibi derogare sacramenti dignitati, etiam pias aures abhorreere audire, quod corpus Christi est in ventre muris, aut in cloaca, ideo opinionem tenentem quod corpus Christi non descendit in ventrem muris, sed sumptum a mure desinit esse et substantia panis redit. (...) Sed cum fuerit in ore vel ventre muris, non est ordinabile ad usum manducationis humane, et sit desinit ibi esse sacramentum et corpus Christi.' Cf. Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi: in librum IV*, vol. 4 in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1889), d. 13, ar. 2, q. 2, p. 308.

30 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, p. 83): 'Inter omnes has opiniones opinio Alexandri, Thome, Richardi videtur verior et communior.'

the host without nausea or repeat of vomiting, then the host should be re-administered.³¹ How that would not re-induce vomiting is beyond me.

The question of what happens to the body of Christ in the digestive system of the mouse becomes more immediate when asked regarding any communicant who receives the body of Christ. When does it enter the soul, and does it remain the body of Christ as it passes through the body or change at some point so as not to be subjected to digestion in the stomach and intestines and excreted from the body?³² Biel, following the *Summa Halensis*, considers a number of explanations, such as the sacrament is food for the soul, not the body, so digestion does not enter the picture; or being a non-dimensive substance, it is never subject to digestion; or that if it is, it ceases to be the substance of the body of Christ at some point in the process, before swallowing, or on entering the stomach, or after leaving the stomach, but certainly at some point before being excreted from the body. If it remains the body of Christ in the early stages of digestion, can one adore it in the mouth or stomach of a communicant, just as one would the reserved host?³³

Biel even draws on the *Summa Halensis* in explaining the appearances of the physical body of Christ, as child or adult, or in the form of a lamb, on the altar where the host should be.³⁴ The issue was not whether such apparitions occurred, since they firmly believed that they did. The issue was how one determined whether these visions were from God or from the imagination of the human mind, or a diabolical illusion. Following Alexander, Biel argued that such apparitions might be sent by God to help someone weak in faith believe in the sacrament. But such a scene should not be contrived by human effort lest through skepticism it erodes the faith.³⁵ Moreover, if the apparition is of a corrupted and blackened body, as happened in the March of Treviso across many days, as recounted in the *Summa Halensis*, such an apparition cannot be from God but only from human design or diabolical operation.³⁶

When I edited Biel's *Canonis misse expositio* those many years ago, I noticed that he cited and used the *Summa Halensis* frequently, but I did not until now fully appreciate to what extent he relied on that source. It was not merely Biel's major source. He viewed it as a work that drew together the orthodox teaching on the Eucharist up to

31 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, p. 83): 'Unde si eiicitur per vomitum et discerni possunt species panis ab aliis cibis simul emissis, et sumi potest sine nausia et periculo vomitus iterati, tunc debent sumi sicut verum sacramentum.'

32 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, pp. 79, 82); *ibid.*, Lectio LXXXVIII (vol. IV, p. 170).

33 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, pp. 83–84).

34 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LI (vol. II, pp. 292–96).

35 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio LI (vol. II, p. 293).

36 *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, based on *Summa Halensis* IV, Q53, M4 (Lyon edition, IV, f. 217r-v).

the beginning of the 13th century and shaped the thought of much that followed. Biel repeatedly asserted that later theologians, such as Bonaventure, Thomas, Richard of Middleton, Scotus and the other prominent doctors of the 13th to 15th centuries, followed the lead of Alexander.³⁷ And because of the prominence given to the *Summa Halensis* in Biel's *Canonis misse expositio*, it can be claimed that the *Summa Halensis* exercised considerable influence in the waning years of the fifteenth century. Although Biel is often called a nominalist and a disciple of Ockham, whom he cited approvingly and called 'clarissimus doctor,' the *Summa Halensis* was Biel's most frequently cited source, while Thomas Aquinas was the second most cited. For all of these reasons book IV of the *Summa Halensis* needs to be edited. And while the edition should be done by collation of the manuscripts of the fourth book that have survived, I suggest as a guide the Koberger edition of 1482, which was the one Biel himself knew and used in order to revise Egeling Becker's *Canonis misse expositio*.

37 For example, *Gabrielis Biel Canonis misse expositio*, Lectio XLII (vol. II, p. 135): 'Ad quod est una responsio doctorum omnium, quia ut dicit Alexander, IV par., quest. xxxviii, mem. vi.' Lectio XLV (vol. II, p. 171): 'Per hoc consequenter dicit Alexander, quest. 40, par. iv, mem. 2, a. 2, et post eum sanctus Bonaventura.' Lectio XLVII (vol. II, p. 221): 'Nam Alexander de ales, par. IV, quest. 34, m. 1, et post eum beatus Thomas.' Lectio XLVIII (vol. II, p. 233): 'Hanc opinionem Innocentii et Glose allegate doctores communiter non approbant. Et contra eam arguunt Alexander de ales, par. IV, quest. xxxiii, et post eum beatus Thomas et alii pluribus.' Lectio XLVIII (vol. II, p. 246): 'Ad congruitatis ostensionem et obiectorum solutionem notat sanctus Bonaventura, post Alexandrum.' Lectio LII (vol. II, p. 309): 'Hec est sententia Alexandri ubi supra, cui satis concordant sanctus Thomas et sanctus Bonaventura.' Lectio LXXXIV (vol. IV, p. 81): 'Huic opinioni prime, que est Alexandri, concordat sanctus Thomas et Richardus, Durandus, et communiter moderniores doctores.'

Riccardo Saccenti

The Reception of the *Summa Halensis* in the Manuscript Tradition until 1450

Abstract: The survival of a large number of manuscripts of the *Summa Halensis* allows scholars to gain an understanding of the multiple frameworks and cultural environments in which this text was received, from its composition in the 1240s to the first printed edition at the end of the 15th century. This chapter peruses the manuscripts of the *Summa* with a view to assessing the process of the text's composition and circulation. The study takes into account multiple dimensions of the text's reception, including the historical development of theology in the early decades of the 13th century; the process of the composition of theological writings; the material production of manuscripts within the university milieu and the institutionalization of the so-called *pecia* system; and the various ways in which theological texts were used in the university and in the convents of the religious orders. All these elements help to reconstruct the circulation of the *Summa*.

In 1474 the German merchant John of Cologne created a new commercial partnership with another German businessman, Johannes Manthen.¹ The new company was based in Venice where John of Cologne had travelled for work since 1468: in fact, in that same year he is registered in Cologne as a Hansa merchant who traded Italian goods such as Venetian glass and luxury products. In 1471 John engaged in a new kind of profitable activity: he formed a partnership with Wendelius of Spira who had taken over the printing business from his brother Johannes. After Wendelius' death in 1473, John of Cologne decided to carry on with the production of printed books, which was rapidly becoming a growing economic sector and had found a quite favorable cultural and economic environment in Italy, and particularly in Venice.

In the same year as its creation, 1474, the new company *Johannes de Colonia sociusque eius Johannes Mantheni* printed what was titled 'the solemn work of master Alexander of Hales, a highly renowned theologian of the order of the Minors, on the third book of the *Sentences*.'² The following year the company twice reprinted the book attributed to Alexander of Hales, which was in fact the third part of the

¹ See Christian Coppens, 'Giovanni da Colonia, aka Johann Ewylre/Arwylre/Ahrweiler: The Early Printed Book and its Inventions,' *La Bibliofilia* 116 (2014), pp. 113–20. See also Angela Nuovo, *The Book Trade in the Italian Renaissance* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013). See also Martin Lowry, 'The Social World of Nicholas Jenson and John of Cologne,' *La Bibliofilia* 83 (1981), pp. 193–218.

² Alexander of Hales, *Super Tertium Sententiarum* (Venice: Johannes de Colonia et Johannes Manthen, 1474).

Summa fratris Alexandri. Six years later, the prestigious German printing company of Anton Koberger in Nuremberg started the publication of the entire *Summa* under the title of *Summa universae theologiae*, the first volume of which was printed on the 24th of January 1481, while the printing of the fourth and last book was accomplished on 23 August 1482.³ In 1489 another important printing company, the one created in Pavia by Francesco Girardenghi and Giovanni Antonio Berretta, published the entire *Summa fratris Alexandri* as a result of an editorial project financially supported by the noble lady Franceschina Beccaria.⁴

This rapid survey shows that from the first printing in 1474 to the end of the 15th century, the *Summa* was edited three times, and on several occasions these editions were also reprinted.⁵ This suggests the existence of a strong interest in this work attributed to Alexander of Hales within the intellectual milieu of the time. More specifically, the advantages of the printed book as a means to increasing the circulation of a text matched the cultural appeal of some specific writings within a different disciplinary field. Still, in the late 15th century, that is, in the flourishing years of Humanism and Renaissance, the great Franciscan theological *Summa* was read and studied among theologians together with other medieval 'classics', such as Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*. The central place of the *Summa fratris Alexandri* in the ideal theological library of the late Quattrocento can be seen both as a turning point and as a final achievement in the history of the diffusion of this text: the printing improved the already consistent circulation of the *Summa*, but at the same time, it changed it, because it inserted this text into a new kind of approach to the written text.⁶

3 Alexander of Hales, *Summa Universae Theologiae: Pars 1–4* (Nuremberg: Anton Koberger, 1481–82). On Koberger see Oskar van Hase, *Die Koeberger: Eine Darstellung des buchländerischen Geschäftsbetriebes in der Zeit des Überganges von Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, 2 vols (Leipzig: Breikopf & Härtel, 1885); Ferdinand Geldner, *Die deutschen Inkunabeldrucker*, 2 vols (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1968), vol. I, pp. 162–67; Adrian Wilson and Joyce L. Wilson, *The Making of the Nuremberg Chronicle* (Amsterdam: Nico Israel, 1976), pp. 175–79; Janet I. Freeman, 'Anton Koberger's First Books: Paper Stocks and Sequence of Printing,' *The Princeton University Library Chronicle* 55 (1994), pp. 308–22.

4 Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica: Pars 1–4* (Pavia: Joannemantonus de Brirretis et Franciscus Gyrardengus, 1489). See also Arnaldo Ganda, 'Girardenghi Francesco,' in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2001), vol. 56, online at [http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/francesco-girardenghi_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/francesco-girardenghi_(Dizionario-Biografico)/); Alfredo Cioni, 'Beretta, Giovanni Antonio,' in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1967), vol. 9, pp. 51–53, online at http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-antonio-beretta_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/; Anna G. Cavagna, 'Una operazione editoriale a Pavia a fine Quattrocento: Il caso Beretta-Girardengo-Beccaria,' *Bollettino della società pavese di storia patria* 82 (1982), pp. 48–58; Tullia Gasparini Leporace, 'La società tipografica Bretta-Girardengo (1479–1492) nei documenti inediti coevi,' *La Bibliofilia* 50 (1948), pp. 24–52; Enea Gualandi, 'La tipografia di Pavia nel secolo XV,' *Bollettino della società pavese di storia patria* 59 (1959), pp. 43–83.

5 For a general survey on the printed editions of the *Summa Halensis* see Irenaeus Herscher, 'A Bibliography of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), pp. 434–54.

6 Some essential remarks on the connection between the early printed editions and the manuscript tradition of the *Summa* are offered in the contribution of William Courtenay in this present volume.

The survival of a great number of manuscripts of the four parts of the *Summa* allows us to set up an enquiry on the multiple frameworks and cultural environments that this text went through, offering a unique perspective on its nature and value in the later middle ages. The history of a work certainly consists in its origin and the *intentio auctoris*, but it also involves of its reception. As the studies of the Quaracchi editors have already clarified, the ‘reception’ of the *Summa fratris Alexandri* was linked to the composition of its four parts.⁷ Moreover, precisely this early mix and overlapping of composition and reception influenced both the development of the ‘editorial’ enterprise and the way it was received within its intellectual context, particularly among the theologians. In the long run, however, it also affected the realization of the modern printed editions, whose textual differences depend on the manifold manuscript tradition of each part of the *Summa*.

Therefore, using as a starting point the precious work done by the Quaracchi editors between the 1920s and the 1940s, a study of the manuscripts of the *Summa* becomes a means of assessing the process of the text’s composition and circulation. Certainly, this kind of research requires the scholar to take into account multiple factors: the historical development of theology as a discipline in the early decades of the 13th century; the composition of the theological writings in this same period, based on sources and materials which are linked with the scholarly activities of a master; the material production of manuscripts within the university milieu; the institutionalization of the so-called *pecia* system; and the multiple ways in which theological texts were circulated and used in the university, the network of convents of the religious orders, and in private libraries.

By considering all these elements, this contribution aims to deepen understanding of the circulation of the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and the influence of this Franciscan text, particularly in the second half of the 13th century. In fact, moving through the manuscript tradition and focusing on some key manuscripts makes it possible to offer a survey of the different roles that the *Summa* assumed in the theological field in the decades from the early 1240s to the beginning of the 14th century.

A closer analysis of this issue, mainly focused on book IV of the *Summa*, will be the subject in a forthcoming study. What emerges from the preliminary results of this examination, and Prof. Courtenay’s research confirms, is that the Koberger edition introduced the structure according to *quaestiones*, *articuli* and *membra*, which will remain as the major set up of the *Summa* but is not present in the manuscripts.

⁷ See Victorin Doucet, *Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summae Fratris Alexandri*, in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, Tome A; idem, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), pp. 26–41, 274–312; idem, ‘De *Summa fratris Alexandri Halensis* historice considerata,’ *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 40 (1948), pp. 1–44; idem, ‘Autour des Prolegomena ad *Summam fratris Alexandri*,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 43 (1950), pp. 196–200; Igantius Brady, ‘The *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (1924–1928),’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977), pp. 434–47; Bernhard Geyer, ‘Der IV. Band der *Summa* des Alexander Halensis,’ *Franziskanische Studien* 31 (1949), pp. 1–14.

The development of the Franciscan life in Paris, and specifically in the university, offers the general cultural framework for studying the manuscripts so that these fragments of the now lost picture of the late medieval understanding of the intellectual monument which is the *Summa fratris Alexandri* can become the subject of a sort of restoration.

Learning and the Franciscans

Written between 1267 and 1268, Roger Bacon's *Opus Minus* contains a famous yet severe critique of Parisian theology.⁸ The author, who in 1255 had joined the order founded by Francis of Assisi, underscores the problems with the attitude of the Parisian masters towards theology. He notes that they lack the knowledge of key disciplines such as mathematics, and that they frequently subordinate theological discourse to philosophical reasoning. In addition, the Parisian faculty of theology is the place where lecturing on the *Sentences* overtook lecturing on Scripture, was skewing the teaching priorities of theologians. Bacon adds that such a questionable theological approach grew up in Paris because of the distorted reception of the thought and method of two notorious figures whose mastery was overestimated by their contemporaries. The first of these Parisian masters was Alexander of Hales, who was firstly archdeacon and secular master, and later joined the Franciscan Order in 1236, becoming the veritable intellectual authority among the Minor Friars. Bacon explains:

At that time the order of the Minors was young and neglected by mankind, and he [i. e. Alexander] edified the world and exalted the order. Since his joining, the friars and others praised him to the heavens and gave him authority over the whole intellectual education and ascribed to him that great *Summa* which is too heavy a burden for a single horse, and that he himself did not

⁸ Roger Bacon, *Opus Minus*, in *Fratris Rogeri Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita*, ed. J.S. Brewer (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859), pp. 311–90. On Roger Bacon and his engagement with the development of the Franciscans, see William J. Courtenay, 'Franciscan Learning: University Education and Biblical Education,' in *Defenders and Critics of Franciscan Life: Essays in Honour of John V. Flemming*, eds. M.F. Cusato and G. Geltner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 55–64; *Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays*, ed. J. Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Timothy J. Johnson, 'Roger Bacon's Critique of Franciscan Preaching,' in *Institution and Charisma: Festschrift für Gert Meville*, eds. F.J. Felten, A. Kehnel, and S. Weinfurter (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), pp. 541–48; idem, *Franciscans and Preaching* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210–1517)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); idem, 'The Franciscan School System: Re-assessing the Early Evidence (ca. 1220–1260),' in *Franciscan Organization in the Mendicant Context: Formal and Informal Structures of the Friars' Lives and Ministry in the Middle Ages*, eds. M. Robson and J. Roehrkasten (Berlin: Lit, 2010), pp. 253–79.

make but others did. However, it was ascribed to him out of respect and it was called the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.⁹

Beyond the critical tone of the text, Bacon's quotation offers some useful insights for reconstituting the historical and cultural context, namely, that of the Parisian university in the second quarter of the 13th century, in which the *Summa* first came into the light. In fact, Alexander of Hales' joining of the order marked a turning point in the relationship between the Franciscans and the university.¹⁰ This latter is the place where theology prepared to definitively assume the contours of a science, and it represents an institution which had the status of a guild of masters and students. Within this context, the daily scholastic activity had a predominantly oral form, based on the study and interpretation of textual *corpora* which fused together teaching and doctrinal development. From the beginning of the 13th century a complex process had determined the evolution of the teaching of theology in Paris. Robert of Courçon's statutes in 1215 and Gregory IX's bull *Parens scientiarum* in 1231 can be seen as the major witnesses to this progressive attempt to define the specific epistemological features of theology and to establish a proper pedagogical framework for its teaching in Paris.¹¹

The university inherited the practices of the late 12th-century schools, particularly those established within the cathedral chapter of Notre Dame and descending from the mastery of Peter Lombard. The notorious threefold distinction between lec-

⁹ Roger Bacon, *Opus Minus*, ed. Brewer, p. 236: 'Novus fuit ordo Minorum et neglectus a mundo illis temporibus, et ille aedificavit mundum et ordinem exaltavit. Ex suo ingressu fratres et alli exaltaverunt in coelum, et ei dederunt auctoritatem totius studii, et adscripserunt ei magnum Summam illam, quae est plusquam pondus unius equi, quam ipse non fecit sed alii. Et tamen propter reverentiam ascripta fuit, et vocatur *Summa fratris Alexandri*.'

¹⁰ See Neslihan Senocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209–1310* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2012); Hubert P. Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2003), pp. 11–41; Marco Arosio, *Aristotelismo e Teologia da Alessandro di Hales a San Bonaventura* (Rome: Liamar, 2012).

¹¹ On this, see Luca Bianchi, 'Les interdictions relatives à l'enseignement d'Aristote au XIII^e siècle,' in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle: Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109. Actes du colloque international*, eds. C. Lafleur and J. Carrier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), pp. 109–37; Stephen J. Williams, 'Repenser l'intention et l'effect des décrets de 1231 du pape Grégoire IX sur l'étude de *libri naturales* d'Aristote à l'Université de Paris,' in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, eds. Lafleur and Carrier, pp. 139–63; Luca Bianchi, *Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'université de Paris (XIII^e–XIV^e siècle)* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999), pp. 103–27; idem, 'Aristotle as a Captive Bride: Notes on Gregory IX's Attitude towards Aristotelianism,' in *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge des Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter: Von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis*, eds. L. Honnefelder, R. Wood, H. Dreyer, and M.-A. Aris (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2005), pp. 777–94; Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 64–101. On Robert of Courçon's intervention in 1215 see Jacques Verger, *Culture, enseignement et société en Occident aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1999), pp. 120–22.

turing, disputing, and preaching that Peter the Chanter outlined in his *Verbum abbreviatum* summarizes the different oral practices of a master of theology and provides an image of what the university inherited from the pedagogical development of the 'long 12th century'.¹² The written witnesses of such diverse oral activities are fixed in the lectures, in the disputed questions and in the sermons. In several cases, both the disputed questions and the sermons are collected in order to provide doctrinal materials, but also to offer useful models for the practice of these oral activities, particularly in the case of sermons. The collections of disputed questions had evolved into the genre of the *Summa* whose aim was to bring together the fruit of a master's disputing activity according to a specific thematic order usually shaped according to that of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.¹³ That text offered contents and examples to theologians for the practice of their own discipline. In the decades between the 12th and the early 13th centuries, this discipline evolved into a certain kind of wisdom and science with its own canon of authoritative sources, including the Bible usually accompanied by the *Glossa* together with Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and Peter the Chanter's *Historia scholastica*.¹⁴

Roger Bacon's account of Alexander of Hales' joining of the Franciscans and of the composition of the *Summa* ascribed to him refers to such an historical and cultural framework. This latter can be better understood by mentioning two other historical features which rapidly came to impact the cultural history of the early 13th century. As Herbert Grundmann noted in a still seminal article, whose basic in-

12 See Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum*, I.1, ed. M. Duthion-Boutry (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 4–11.

13 See on this Palémon Glorieux, 'L'enseignement au Moyen Âge: Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 35 (1968), pp. 65–189; Claire Angotti, 'Le début du *Livre des Sentences* comme manuel de théologie à l'Université de Paris,' in *Université, Église, Culture: L'Université Catholique au Moyen-Âge: Actes du 4^{ème} Symposium Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 11–14 mai 2005*, ed. L. Roche (Paris: Centre de Coordination de la Recherche de la FIUC, 2007), pp. 59–126; Philipp Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's 'Sentences'* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2007); Marcia L. Colish, 'The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century,' in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Gründler*, ed. N. Van Deusen (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), pp. 1–26; idem, 'From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the *Summa*: Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130–1215,' in *Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales*, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1994), pp. 9–29; Riccardo Saccenti, 'Questions et Sentences: l'enseignement entre la fin du XIIe et le début du XIIIe siècle,' in *Les Débuts de l'enseignement universitaire à Paris (1200–1245 environ)*, eds. J. Verger and O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 275–93.

14 See Marta Borgo, 'L'enseignement des *Sentences* pendant la première moitié du XIIIe siècle,' in *Les Débuts de l'enseignement universitaire à Paris*, eds. Verger and Weijers, pp. 295–314; Mark J. Clark, *The Making of the 'Historia Scholastica', 1150–1200* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015); Lesley Smith, *The Glossa Ordinaria: The Making of a Medieval Bible Commentary* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009).

tuition was later on developed by John Baldwin, the *studium* became from the 12th century a veritable power in its own right: ecclesiastical and civil careers required a high-level education.¹⁵ Knowledge, like kingship and priesthood, had become a source of authority, and the new ‘social’ status that accompanied it required a juridical form and a recognizable structure. Therefore, as the political *potestas* and the ecclesiastical *auctoritas* had their social and legal profiles, so the masters determined their own status. The term *studium* does not simply designate some cultural practices but refers also to a guild which claimed its own *libertas* and presented itself as a *societas* within the economic, social, political, and religious network of Latin Europe.

The presence of new religious orders, especially the Dominicans and the Franciscans, is weaved together with this process of institutionalizing knowledge. Both the Preachers and the Minors offer a religious answer to the evangelical instance that agitated the developing European society and that was rooted above all in the cities, where the schools and the universities were located. The urban context, to which both scholastic culture and the spiritual and religious experience of the Franciscans belonged, was the crossroads of historical tensions and expectations. Therefore, the university, that is, the place where knowledge meant power and material wealth, became the scene of one of the attempts to embed the ideal of evangelical poverty into the social fabric of Latin Middle Ages, with traumatic and conflicting consequences which determined the further evolution of university structures.

A Franciscan ‘Team’ of Masters

Roger Bacon’s reference to the role of Alexander as the one who set up the intellectual tools of the order and that ‘exalted’ it with respect to the previous reputation of the Minors, testifies to a new scholarly focus among the Franciscans. According to the *Opus Minus*, the social profile of Alexander, before he joined the order, perfectly matched the ‘ideal type’ of the university master: a quite learned cleric in charge of an ecclesiastical office, that of archdeacon, which combined prestige, power, and the wealth that came from the revenues connected to it. Despite the moral quality of Alexander – Roger notes that he was ‘a good man’ – the abandonment of this privileged social status following his joining of the order did not correspond to a renunciation of the practice of teaching theology based on the forms and contents of the master’s activity.¹⁶ In a certain sense, what master Alexander brought to the order

15 Herbert Grundmann, ‘Sacerdotium – Regnum – Studium: Zur Wertung der Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert,’ *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 34 (1952), pp. 5–21; John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); idem, ‘Le context politique et institutionnel,’ in *Les Débuts de l’enseignement universitaire à Paris*, eds. Verger and Weijers, pp. 17–26.

16 See Roger Bacon, *Opus Minus*, ed. Brewer, p. 325.

in terms of wealth was not just his own personal prestige but mainly the capability to develop theological knowledge at the level required in the university. Through Alexander the Franciscans became acquainted with the combination of lecturing, questioning, and preaching, and with the custom of circulating ideas and doctrines not only through oral teaching but also through written texts.

The use of the *Sentences* as the basis for theological teaching and the acquaintance with the *Gloss* became part of the daily activity of the Parisian Franciscan masters along with a whole set of practices that were oriented towards teaching by elaborating a theology and towards elaborating a theology by teaching.¹⁷ This included also the habit of collecting the written results of this work, trying to give them an orderly and systematic shape that reflected the structure of the teaching activity and making these materials useful for other masters and students, or for the *lectores* in other Franciscan convents outside Paris. The intellectual prestige of Alexander, who according to Roger Bacon was the first theologian who institutionalized the practice of lecturing on the *Sentences*, certainly explains the key role he acquired in the Parisian convent as the one responsible for the organization of scholastic activities.¹⁸

Bacon's critical remarks on the Parisian theological milieu and on the role attributed to Alexander offers some interesting indications regarding the learning activities of the Franciscans in Paris. His note concerning the authorship of the *Summa* ascribed to the master suggests that this vast and complex work was the result of the intellectual activity of several figures who belonged to the Franciscan order. More specifically, Bacon explicitly says that the *Summa fratris Alexandri* was put under the name of this master because of the prestige he had among his own religious brothers. In addition, he offers an indication concerning the origin of the materials collected in this work: the absence of any use of the disciplines and authorities which, according to Bacon, were crucial for the proper development of the biblical sciences, such as natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics, matches the description he gave of the standards of the theological production of the time at the University of Paris. Therefore, the *Summa* belongs to a genre of works that were quite common within the university of the first half of the 13th century and consisted in the collection of the written fruits of the teaching activity of the masters. Alexander of Hales, who contributed significantly to shaping the intellectual life of the Friars Minor on the model of his own teaching experience, rapidly became the name which signified not just the activity of a single master, but rather the engagement of a team of well-trained theologians, probably including some of his pupils and coordinated by himself.

17 See Hubert P. Weber, 'The *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum* by Alexander of Hales,' in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard*, ed. P. Rosemann (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), vol. 2, pp. 79–109.

18 See Roger Bacon, *Opus Minus*, ed. Brewer, pp. 325–29.

A significant witness to the introduction of this sort of working team in the Franciscan community in Paris is the composition of *The Rule Commentary of the Four Masters*, which was composed in 1241–42 in response to Haymo of Faversham's request for the Parisian masters of the order to explain the doubtful passages of the Franciscan Rule.¹⁹ The four theologians involved in this enterprise were Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Robert of La Bassée, and Odo Rigaldus, all based in the Franciscan convent in Paris. This group was probably at the origin of the composition of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, which consists in a collection of the written products of the teaching activity not just of Alexander of Hales but also of the group of Franciscan theologians that recognized his intellectual authority. In this sense, Alexander is the name that conceals the work of a group of masters engaged in a reorganisation of the results of the teaching activity of the first generation of the Parisian masters of the Friars Minor.

Therefore, the *Summa* appears to be a collective work, whose composition comes from the contemporary editorial activity of at least two editors.²⁰ In 1948 François-Marie Henquinet published an article where he disclosed in advance the major conclusions that the Quaracchi editors reached on the issue of the authorship of the text.²¹ As Victorin Doucet soon after confirmed in the *Prolegomena* to the critical edition of the third book of the *Summa*, John of La Rochelle was the editor of the first and third parts of the text while another author, whom Henquinet called *frater Considerans* and could be Alexander himself, composed the second part of the work.²² The careful study of the text has confirmed this image of a simultaneous 'work in progress' of the first three parts of the *Summa*, evidencing the existence of important links and cross references between the first and the third parts and within the sections of the second part. This, together with the clear evidence that John of La Rochelle's writings are the direct source for large sections of parts I and III, contributes to explaining that the text originated from the practice of collecting notes and written materials from the Friars Minor present in Paris who taught theology.

Two other findings confirm this situation. First is the fact that the text of the *Summa*, included the first three books, with the exception of two later additions when Alexander and John died in early 1245. This suggests that these volumes were simultaneously composed and that Alexander himself could have had a role

¹⁹ See *Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241–1242): Accedit eiusdem Regulae textus cum fontibus et locis parallelis*, ed. L. Oliger (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1950); Dieter Berg, *Armut und Wissenschaft: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Studienwesens der Bettelorden im 13. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1977), pp. 72–73.

²⁰ An essential analysis of the place of the *Summa* within the Franciscan intellectual milieu of the 13th century is provided by Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

²¹ François-Marie Henquinet, 'Fr. Considerans, l'un des auteurs jumeaux de la *Summa Fratris Alexandri* primitive,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 15 (1948), pp. 76–96.

²² Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. ccclx–ccclxvii

in this activity, and that his death, together with that of John of La Rochelle, effectively halted the compilation of the text. The second relevant piece of evidence is Alexander IV's bull *De fontibus paradisi*, which asked the Minors of the province of France to finish the *Summa*, which at that time did not include a volume on the sacraments.²³ Dated to 7 October 1255, the papal document must also be read in the context of the clash between seculars and mendicants in Paris, following the publication, in that same year, of William of Saint-Amour's *De periculis novissimorum temporum*. Facing the challenge to the rights of the mendicants to hold chairs in theology, the bull strongly supported the Franciscans. As a close associate of Gregory IX, Pope Alexander sided with the Friars Minor in this polemical confrontation, acknowledging the *Summa* as a veritable witness to the capability and legitimacy of the Franciscan engagement in teaching theology. The papal text informs us that in 1255, the *Summa* was still unfinished, but it was renowned among the masters, a situation which suggests an early circulation of the first three volumes of the text.

The Individual Books and the Whole Summa: The Multifarious Circulation of the Text

The reference to the peculiarity of the process of the composition of the *Summa* provides some essential elements for dealing with the manuscript tradition of this work. In fact, it clarifies that this work belongs to the quite specific cultural environment which results from the convergence of the Franciscan religious and spiritual attitude and the structures and practices of the early 13th-century Parisian university. This remark helps to explain the multifarious circulation of the text which does not involve it as a whole but rather pertains to each of the parts of the *Summa* that started to be copied or used when their composition was still in progress.

The Quaracchi editors already noted that several chapters of the second part of the *Summa*, that is, the one composed by *frater Considerans*, are copied in the manuscripts Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France 15652 and 15702.²⁴ These two manuscripts collect a series of notes, records and texts dating from 1240–45 and stemming from the Parisian faculty of theology. In both of the manuscripts, the excerpts from the *Summa* cite quotations from William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*, Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, and a large amount of *reportationes* of lectures on the *Sen-*

²³ Doucet, *Prolegomena*, p. ccxxxviii. See also Robert Prentice, 'The *De fontibus paradisi* of Alexander IV on the *Summa theologica* of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), pp. 350–51.

²⁴ Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. cccxlv–cccliv; Marie-Dominique Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers de l'Université de Paris vers 1240: Description du manuscrit Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15652,' *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIII^e siècle: Première Serie* (Paris: J. Vrin; Ottawa: Institut d'études médiévales, 1932), pp. 11–39.

tences of the major Parisian masters of the early 1240s, as well as several of their disputed questions or *quaestiones quodlibetales*.

The two manuscripts were written by the same hand, and they are precious witnesses to the intellectual life at the Parisian faculty of theology in the fifth decade of the 13th century. The presence of chapters from the *secunda pars* among texts that refer to the teaching activity suggests that the contents of the *Summa* not only belong to the same environment but also circulated among the Parisian masters and were linked to the theological discussion and not just to the composition of a written text.²⁵ This latter enterprise was part of the whole intellectual life of its authors who were certainly engaged with teaching theology. The two manuscripts contain texts from the whole group of Parisian theologians in the early 1240s: Peter the Archbishop, Stephen of Puilly, John Pagus, Odo Rigaldus, Adam of Puteorumvilla, Bertrand of Bayon, Albert the Great, and Odo of Rosny, and John of Moussy, who all lectured on the *Sentences* in this period as bachelors; Walter of Chateau-Thierry, Peter Lamballe, Gueric of St Quentin, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who were regent masters.

As regards the details of the manuscripts, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15702 is a copy of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in whose margins the anonymous student recorded the teaching of the masters and bachelors whose lectures he attended and continued to collect materials in the notebooks which now form the manuscript 15652, so that the two manuscripts together offer a picture of the 'learning story' of this student of theology as well as of the teaching of this period, which was already strongly based upon the use of the *Sentences* as a textbook and as one of the pillars of the doctrinal development of the theological discourse.

The *Summa fratris Alexandri* is part of this cultural framework and quite significantly its excerpts cite the records of the Parisian masters in the margins of Peter Lombard's text in the manuscript 15702. The Quaracchi editors suggested that such a feature is a witness to the existence of a written early version of the *Summa* circulating in the 1240s in Paris. The excerpts from the *Summa* are placed in the margins of the second book of the *Sentences* and all belong to the second part of the *Summa*, the one focusing on the theological issue of creation, on the doctrine of the four causes, on angels and demons, on original sin, and on the role of the will. These notes in the manuscript 15702 have their continuation in those recorded in manuscript 15652, where the students took notes from the chapters of the second part of the *Summa* dedicated to the soul.

A closer look at the literary form of these quotes from the *Summa* offers some important information about the kind of 'text' with which the student could have dealt. In the *tabula* of the contents which introduces book two, where the distinctions dedicated to the creation of the human being are listed, the student copied the corresponding chapter of the *Summa*.

²⁵ Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. cccli-ccclii.

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15702, fol. 56rb

De *Summa Alexandri*. Queritur cum dicitur Gen. I in operibus sex dierum: ‘masculum et feminam creavit eos,’ quare dixit ibid. II: ‘Non est bonum esse hominem solum, faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.’

Dicendum quod primum dictum fuit per anticipationem, non quia facti fuerunt in opere sex dierum, sed ut ostenderetur quod cum uterque condebantur, ad imaginem Dei condebantur, quia imaginem †...† uterque a Deo, non mulier a viro et hoc secundum spiritum qui a Deo conditus est.

SH II, PI, In3, Tr3, Q2, Ar1 (n. 315), p. 378

Potest autem quaeri secundum ordinem. 1. Primo propter quid dictum est: ‘Non est bonum hominem esse solum,’ cum iam dixerat: ‘Masculum et feminam creavit eos.’

(...)

Ad primum dicendum quod illud quod dicitur de masculo et femina, per anticipationem dictum est, non quia tunc simul facti sint in operibus sed dierum, sed ut ostenderetur quod tam masculus quam femina, cum condebantur, ad imaginem Dei condebantur, quam imaginem non accipiebat mulier a viro, sed uterque a Deo, secundum spiritum, qui a Deo conditus est.

In the beginning of the next folio, where the list of the contents of the second book of the *Sentences* mentions the issue of the *vestigium*, the student copied another disputed question from the *Summa*.

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15702, fol. 57rb

Alexander. Hic queritur de vestigio, quod similiter refertur ad rationem cause, quia creatura dicitur vestigium creatoris. Quod dicitur multipliciter. Opus enim Dei dicitur multipliciter de operante et de operato; si vestigium dicitur multipliciter Dei, ergo vestigium multipliciter.

SH II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, M2 (n. 34), p. 44

Consequenter dicendum est de vestigio, quod similiter refertur ad rationem cause: dicitur enim creatura vestigium ipsius Creatoris.

(...)

Ad primum sic obicitur quod multipliciter dicatur: 1. Opus enim dicitur multipliciter de ipso opere operante et de re operata; ergo, cum opus dicatur vestigium, vestigium dicitur multipliciter de ipsis actionibus et de rebus quae aguntur, cum de utrisque dicatur, sicut patet ex praemissis.

The Latin of the Parisian manuscript appears simpler than that of the *Summa*, showing how this latter is the result of a process of careful revision and the rearrangement of the language as well as the structure of the argument. These features can be explained as the result of a summary made from an early written version of a text

that the Parisian student himself refers to as ‘Alexander’s *Summa*’. However, the literary and stylistic characteristics of the text seem closer to the record of an oral discourse than to a written text: the scholar could have attended a lecture where a written version of the second part of the *Summa* was used by the master in his lecture on Peter Lombard’s text. This can explain the presence of these excerpts in the margins of the *tabula* of the second book of the *Sentences*.

Certainly, the manuscripts 15652 and 15702 of the Bibliothèque nationale witness to the existence of an early version of the *Summa* in the early 1240s, when Alexander of Hales was still teaching and was probably overseeing the collection of materials which would become the *Summa fratris Alexandri*. In addition, the contents and features of the textual excerpts of the two manuscripts highlight the close connection of the text with the living teaching activity of masters and bachelors. In fact, already in the years of its composition, the ‘working version’ of the *Summa* circulated and was used to lecture on the *Sentences*. Moreover, Peter Lombard’s work was the very center of theological studies, and the contents of the *Summa* used as if they were part of an authoritative lecture on the *Sentences*, particularly the contents of the second book.

If we consider these remarks together with the fact that both the first and the third parts of the *Summa* were composed by John of La Rochelle, who mainly collected and reorganized materials which come from his own teaching activity, it is clear that these very early manuscripts of the text ascribed to Alexander of Hales directly link both its origin and early reception to the daily teaching of the Franciscan masters and bachelors in the early 1240s. Therefore, the composition of this vast and comprehensive collection of theological materials, organized under the leadership of Alexander of Hales, was deeply linked with lectures and disputes on the *Sentences*.

The *Summa* and its Circulation through the University System of ‘*pecia*’ Manuscripts

Henquinet and Doucet stressed the fact that the *Summa* started to circulate in the 1245 version.²⁶ The two Parisian manuscripts examined here witness to an early circulation of the text according to a close link between teaching activity and the use of the contents of the *Summa*, so that before 1245, the composition of the text and its use by masters and bachelors were parts of one and the same intellectual praxis. At the moment of the death of both John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales a copy of the three existing parts of the *Summa* was already available for copyists. Among the manuscripts of parts one and two of the *Summa*, some still show the structure and contents of the 1245 text: they do not have the additions which accord-

²⁶ Henquinet, ‘Fr. Considerans,’ pp. 95–96; Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. ccclxix–ccclxx.

ing to the Quaracchi editors date from the intervention of William of Melitona, who also prepared much of the fourth part concerning the sacraments.

The section *De missione visibili*, at the very end of the first part of the *Summa* is omitted in the following manuscripts:²⁷

Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 105;
 Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 106;
 Cambridge, Trinity College Library 377;
 Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 24, dex. 03;
 Laon, Bibliothèque Municipale 141;
 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15751;
 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3033;
 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3034.

To this list can be added the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15750 which was copied by one and the same hand according to the 1245 version of the text and was later on integrated with a final ‘cahier’ containing the *De missione visibili*.²⁸ At the very end of the manuscripts, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15751 and Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 24 dex. 03, 15th-century hands note that the text, ending with the words: ‘(...) *licet magis proprie in gratiae prima donatione*,’ would continue in a following ‘cahier’ absent in these manuscripts.²⁹

A similar situation concerns the much larger addition of the two treatises *De corpore humano* and *De coniuncto humano*, which are placed at the end of the first section of the second part of the *Summa*. Such additions are omitted in these manuscripts:³⁰

Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 107;
 Cambridge, Trinity College Library 377;
 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 13426;
 Pavia, Biblioteca Comunale 263;
 Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiano B VII 110;
 Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 703.

The manuscript Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1384 explicitly attributes the long addition to William of Melitona (fol. 63r). In the case of both parts one and two of the *Summa*, there are *pecia* manuscripts which contain the 1245 version of the text: namely, the manuscripts Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3033 for part one and the manuscript Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 107

²⁷ For a description of these manuscripts, see *SH I*, Prolegomena, pp. xii–xxi; for the specific feature of the content of the enlisted manuscripts see *ibid.*, p. xxiv.

²⁸ See Doucet, *Prolegomena*, p. xvi.

²⁹ See Doucet, *Prolegomena*, p. xix.

³⁰ For a description of the following manuscripts see *SH II*, Prolegomena, pp. x–xvii.

for part two.³¹ Therefore, already the 1245, still incomplete version of the *Summa* was the subject of copying activity and of circulation based on the *pecia* system and the work of the Parisian *stationarii*.

Alexander IV's intervention in 1256 to support the work of a new 'team' of masters led by William of Melitona, whose aim was to complete the *Summa*, offers a precious chronological reference for both the setup of the fourth part of the text as well as for the completion of the additions to the first and second parts. Therefore, after the middle of the 13th century, the number of *pecia* manuscripts considerably increased for all the parts of the *Summa*.³² Its circulation in the University of Paris according to this specific system of copying manuscripts is connected with multiple ways of using the text, and still maintains some traces of the complex process through which it was assembled in the early 1240s.

This is the case with the manuscript Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 359, a mid-13th-century manuscript containing the first part of the *Summa* (fols. 2ra–116rb) and Bonaventure's *De Scientia Christi et de Trinitate* (fols. 117r–132r).³³ In the first folio a hand different from the copyist transcribed the index of the *quaestiones* of the *Summa*. The text of the work is then distributed into two columns, each of 60 lines, and presents rubrics added to all the paragraphs. The manuscript presents evidence of *peciae* and it can be linked with the university milieu. Several corrections are placed in the margins by a careful reader. Quite significantly, this is the only known manuscript of the *Summa* that does not ascribe the text to Alexander of Hales. Rather the *rubricator*, in the very beginning of the *incipit* explains that the manuscript contains the first part of an organized collection (*summa*) of disputed questions concerning Peter Lombard's *Sentences* whose presentation is ascribed to 'the Friars Minor'. Therefore, this manuscript does not link the *Summa* to the major intellectual figure of the Franciscan theological milieu of the time but rather stresses that its authorship is collective.

All the other manuscripts explicitly indicate Alexander of Hales as the figure linked with the composition of the text. The manuscript Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 24 dex. 02, contains the first part of the *Summa*, attributing the text to Alexander.³⁴ This manuscript, which belonged to the library of the Franciscan

31 On the two manuscripts see Giovanna Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), p. 239.

32 See Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, pp. 238–44. Doucet and the Quaracchi editors record some indications of the *pecia* marks in their description of the manuscripts of the different parts of the *Summa*. However, in the 1930s and 1940s, the knowledge of the features of the *pecia* system as well as their relevance in the process of textual transmission was just at the beginning (Destrez's pivotal work dates to 1936; see Jean Destrez, *La "pecia" dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIII^e et du XIV^e siècle* [Paris: J. Vautrain, 1935]). A careful re-examination of the manuscripts of the *Summa* allows us to reconsider the value of the manuscripts and their relevance with respect to the philological issues connected with the text and its historical development.

33 See *SH I*, Prolegomena, p. i; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, p. 239.

34 *SH I*, Prolegomena, p. xii; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, p. 238.

convent of Santa Croce, has explicit signs of *pecia* in its margins, thus revealing that the *exemplar* from which it was copied was divided into 72 *peciae*. Another manuscript of the *prima pars*, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14529, is also the product of the *pecia* system but it comes from an *exemplar* with 42 *peciae* and is therefore different from the one of the Florentine manuscripts.³⁵

A closer analysis of the *pecia* manuscripts of the *Summa* shows more specifically how the text was available at the *stationarii*. Even if the manuscript tradition refers to the *Summa* as one text divided into parts, each part of the text has its own manuscript tradition which involves the existence of different exemplars as well as further divisions of the text, to allow the copyists to easily deal with the enormous number of folios. While the first part of the *Summa* appears to be a unique textual unit throughout the manuscript tradition, the second part is divided in two textual units. This division was followed by the Quaracchi editors in their decision to publish the *prima secundae* and the *secunda secundae* of the *Summa* as respectively volumes II and III of the edition of the text.

As for the modern edition, also in the case of the medieval copyists, the decision to divide the second part and to create distinct exemplars for each textual unit was probably due to practical reasons and not to doctrinal issues, since the *secunda pars* is always presented as a whole. The manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 784 contains the whole second part of the *Summa*, but it is the result of the reunification of the copies of the *prima secundae* and of the *secunda secundae*: there are, in fact, explicit indications of *peciae* which differently number each of the two parts.³⁶ Therefore, the *prima secundae* (fols. 1ra – 162va) is copied from an *exemplar* of 95 *peciae* and at fol. 159rb shows the mark of the beginning of the last *pecia*. The *secunda secundae* (fols. 165ra – 362vb) starts after some blank folios and refers to a second series of 95 *peciae*. Quite interestingly, the manuscript of the Mazarine Library records also the name of one of the copyists. At fol. 183r in the lower margin, a note explains: ‘Hugo de Biston. incepit in xiii^a pec. secunde partis.’ The same name is mentioned again at fol. 212va.

A similar division in multiple textual units, each one dependent on an *exemplar*, is evident in the case of both the third and the fourth parts of the *Summa*. The first unit of the third part, which includes the section on the Incarnation, depends on an *exemplar* of 38 *peciae*; the second textual unit, containing the treatise on laws, depends on an *exemplar* of 78 *peciae*; the third textual unit, which includes the treatise on grace, refers to a division in 15 *peciae*; the fourth textual unit contains the treatise on virtue and comes from an *exemplar* of 11 *peciae*.

Even if a large number of manuscripts present the third part of the *Summa* as a whole, it is possible to identify the different textual units and the series of *peciae* from which they come.

35 SH I, Prolegomena, pp. xv-xvi; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, p. 239.

36 SH II, Prolegomena, p. xv; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, pp. 239 – 240.

Manuscript	I ^a III ^{ae} (38 <i>peciae</i>)	II ^a III ^{ae} (78 <i>peciae</i>)	III ^a III ^{ae} (15 <i>peciae</i>)	IV ^a III ^{ae} (11 <i>peciae</i>)
Florence, BML, Plut. 24 dex. 05	fols. 5ra–70v	fols. 71ra–216vb	fols. 217ra–244vb	fols. 245ra–265ra
Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, 785	fols. 1ra–59ra	fols. 55ra–158ra	fols. 159ra–178rb	fols. 179ra–191va
Paris, BnF, lat. 15328	fols. 1ra–43rb	fols. 43rb–136rb	fols. 137ra–154va	fols. 154va–169vb
Todi, Biblioteca Comunale 87	fols. 5ra–42rb	fols. 43ra–134vb	fols. 134vb–152rb	fols. 152rb–164rv
Vienna, ÖNB 1503	fols. 5ra–69vb	fols. 71ra–225vb	fols. 226ra–258rb	—

Some other manuscripts suggest also the independent circulation of each textual unit. For instance, the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3037 contains only the first unit of the third part, that is, the treatise on the Incarnation.³⁷ By contrast, the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3036 collects a copy of the other three units of the *tertia pars*: II^a III^{ae} fols. 1–111; III^a III^{ae} fols. 113–133; IV^a III^{ae} fols. 133–147.³⁸

The fourth part of the *Summa*, composed under the supervision of William of Melitona, is divided into three textual units: the first contains the study of the notion of the sacrament and the section on baptism and confirmation; the second one contains the section on Eucharist; the third unit contains the rest of the fourth part. Already in this case the manuscript tradition presents a clear distinction between the copying of the three exemplars into which the *quarta pars* has been divided.

Manuscript	I ^a IV ^{ae} (54 <i>peciae</i>)	II ^a IV ^{ae} (17 <i>peciae</i>)	III ^a IV ^{ae} (?)
Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, D.XV.1	fols. 1ra–87ra	fols. 87ra–117ra	
Cambrai, BM 433	fols. 1ra–111ra	fols. 111ra–152ra	fols. 152ra–211
Florence, BNCF, Conv. Soppr. l.3.9	fols. 121ra–194vb	fols. 195ra–228vb	
Paris, BnF, lat. 15328	fols. 179ra–266vb	fols. 267ra–347va	fols. 247va–446rb
Reims, BM 472	fols. 1–116v	fols. 117r–218r	fols. 218r–235

As it was involved in the *pecia* system of copying, the *Summa* was rapidly spread within the university, becoming a text available for both masters and students, and more importantly a text used by theologians. Manuscripts of the *Summa* are, in fact, present in the library of the College Sorbonne, such as the series Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15334–15336, and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale

³⁷ Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. xxiv–xxv; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, p. 241.

³⁸ Doucet, *Prolegomena*, p. xxiv; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, pp. 241–43.

de France, lat. 15329–15333.³⁹ Both these two groups of manuscripts were part of editorial projects on the *Summa*, in specific, one and the same hand copied the manuscripts 15334–15336. The same happened with the manuscripts Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15750–15753,⁴⁰ which contain the whole *Summa* and belonged to one of the major masters of theology in Paris, Gerard of Abbeville. This secular master possessed a second copy of the *Summa*, namely, the one distributed in the two manuscripts Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15327–15328.⁴¹

The *Summa* was thus part of the cultural milieu of the University of Paris, but it was present also in the libraries of the convents of the Franciscan Order. Manuscripts of the *Summa* were preserved in the library of the convent of Santa Croce from the end of the 13th century, while the early 14th-century catalogue of the library of the convent of Saint Francis in Pisa lists a copy ‘in four volumes’ of the *Summa*. Moreover, a copy of ‘the whole *Summa* of Alexander in four volumes’ was present in the library of the Dominican convent in Pisa from 1278.⁴² In that year, the friar Proinus, son of the lord Orlandini de Fabro, gifted his own library to the convent. Proinus had done his own theological studies in Paris and was of the same age of Thomas Aquinas, and with Aquinas had been made general preacher of the order on the occasion of the general chapter of Naples in 1260. The wealth of his father allowed Proinus to collect a private library, which reflects the theological and, more broadly speaking, religious culture of a learned Dominican friar who had received an education in theology at Saint Jacques and later on lectured on theology in some of the major *studia* of the order. Quite significantly, Proinus’ list includes Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. Albert the Great’s writings, philosophical texts, Aquinas’ commentary on the *Sentences*, and the reference works in canon law.

The presence of copies of the *Summa* in specific places such as the library of the Collège Sorbonne or in private libraries of masters such as Gerard of Abbeville and of a famous *lector* and preacher as the Dominican Proinus di Orlandini de Fabro, confirms the picture that emerges from a rapid survey of the manuscript tradition: the existence of an important circulation of the *Summa* within the intellectual elite that was educated in the university or in the *studia generalia*.

³⁹ SH II, Prolegomena, pp. xi–xii.

⁴⁰ SH I, Prolegomena, p. xvi; Doucet, *Prolegomena*, pp. xxv, cccxli; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, p. 239.

⁴¹ SH I, Prolegomena, pp. xiii, xiv; Murano, *Opere diffuse per exemplar et pecia*, pp. 241, 244. On the private library of Gerard of Abbeville and its attachment to the College de Sorbonne, see Palémon Glorieux, ‘Bibliothèque de Maîtres parisiens: Gérard d’Abbeville,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 36 (1969), pp. 148–83; Richard-H. Rouse, ‘The Early Library of the Sorbonne,’ *Scriptorium* 21 (1967), pp. 42–71, 227–251. See also Stephen M. Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation*, 2 vols (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017).

⁴² A digital edition of Proinus’ list is available at <http://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/pisa/croni50.htm>. See also Ferdinand Pelster, ‘Die Bibliothek von Santa Caterina zu Pisa, eine Büchersammlung aus den Zeiten des hl. Thomas von Aquin,’ *Xenia Thomistica* 3 (1925), pp. 249–80.

The Plurality of Manuscripts and their Multifarious Circulation

More than two centuries after the completion of the text, the different forms that the *Summa fratris Alexandri* assumed in the early printed editions from the second half of the 15th century mirrored the complex process of its construction and circulation. The two Parisian manuscripts, BnF lat. 15652 and 15702 offer an interesting view of what can be identified as the very first phase in the history of the *Summa* and its circulation between 1240 and 1245. They show how the writing of this text was organized by a team of masters and bachelors under the name of Alexander of Hales, who was himself directly involved in creating this collection of materials and could be the author of the *secunda pars*.

Certainly, the construction of the *Summa*, whose first three parts were collected simultaneously in the early 1240s, was directly linked with the teaching activity of the Franciscan masters in Paris. A confirmation of this comes from the presence among the sources of the first and third parts of John of La Rochelle's disputed questions, which mirror the oral form of the master's teaching and whose contents were rearranged in a more literary form in the *Summa*. The use of the *secunda pars* as a gloss on the second book of the *Sentences* further confirms that the materials that became part of the *Summa* were used in teaching by oral quotations or by reference to early manuscript copies of the text.

The death of both John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales in 1245 left the work unfinished but did not stop its circulation. The early version of the *Summa* was involved in the *pecia* system of copying, initiating an initial line in the manuscript tradition which preserved the 1245 version of the text marked by the absence of the treatise *De missione visibili* in part one, and of the treatises *De corpore humano* and *De coniuncto humano* as well as of the whole fourth part. After Alexander IV's intervention, William of Melitona and the new team he led finalized the collection of the materials that form the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and inserted this new version in the university milieu.

Roger Bacon, in his quite polemical style, adds a note to his critical account on Alexander's work: 'In addition, he says, an exemplar [of the *Summa*] putrefies among the friars and lays untouched and not read in these times.'⁴³ Despite the unfriendly judgment of the *Doctor Mirabilis*, an analysis of the manuscript tradition shows that the four parts of the *Summa* were widely available around the third quarter of the 13th century as one of the relevant texts for the intellectual activity of the intellectual milieu of the universities and the *studia* of the mendicant orders. In this period the *Summa* became part of the group of writings available at the *stationarii*, but more im-

⁴³ Roger Bacon, *Opus Minus*, ed. Brewer, p. 327: 'Immo exemplar apud fratres putrescit et jacet intactum et invisum his temporibus.'

portantly, it was included in a sort of 'ideal library' which was shared by the theologians in the second half of the 13th century. This explains its presence not only in the libraries of institutions such as the Collège Sorbonne but also in the private manuscript collection of a master such as Gerard of Abbeville or in that of an important figure of the Dominican order in Italy such as Proinus.

This multifarious circulation of the text is consistent with its influence on contemporary theological debates, and its features clearly emerge from the manuscript tradition. This shows the diverse form of the reception of the text and its perception throughout the centuries as a unified work ascribed to Alexander of Hales. Such a sense of the coherence of the *Summa* probably comes from the very origin of the text, which was the result of a process within which different activities such as teaching, thinking and editing written texts were all involved together. A first survey of the manuscript tradition seems to suggest that throughout medieval centuries and still in the late 15th century, the *Summa* was seen as a series of parts which were distinct but not separated. The contents of this text, under the prestigious name of Alexander of Hales, remained important in theological discourse, highlighting the practices of lecturing, disputing, and elaborating new doctrines that dominated at the time, transforming the status of the *Summa* itself into that of a 'classic' of 13th-century scholastic theology.

Oliver Davies

Science, Philosophy and the Authority of the Early Franciscan *Summa Halensis*: Learning from the Past for the Sake of the Future

Abstract: It is generally accepted that the *Summa Halensis* is an authoritative text insofar as it faithfully reproduces and reflects upon the earliest forms of Franciscan life. But might it not be authoritative in another way too? Contemporary science casts light on many of the systems that shape our sociality and the production of community. Insofar as these scientific understandings converge with the practices and teachings of Franciscan life as detailed in the *Summa Halensis*, this becomes a text which begins to show an unusual authority. The nature of the transcendentals, the structure of our freedom in ethical decision-making, and natural law, are all areas in which an extensive convergence appears between the Franciscan text and the science of today. This has important implications for our contemporary reception of this text, but it also makes a significant contribution to the on-going dialogue between science and religion.

Inevitably the question of authority will be in play in some way when we read a text. What kind of authority is this text claiming; what kind of authority does it have? How should we read it? These are questions that are bound up with issues of authorship and genre in every age, even though they are differently structured in the medieval period than they are today, not least with respect to authorship. The topic at the center of the present study however is whether the early Franciscan *Summa Halensis* (*SH*) may have a particular authority in our own contemporary world, which may make it a key text for study today by Franciscan and non-Franciscan alike? We can note that it is a highly innovative text, arguably the first of the medieval *Summae* introducing an integrated and large-scale ‘philosophical theology’. It is a text also which unusually was written by more than one hand (the principal authors were Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle).¹ And it is permeated by the spirit and charismatic life of St Francis of Assisi, whose inheritance flourishes of course down to the present day. The *Summa Halensis* as a whole can be construed as an attempt to represent in pedagogical form the deeply influential Franciscan charism which extensively shaped the medieval world from the early 13th century.

The new Franciscan movement experienced exceptional levels of growth between 1209 (with 12 friars) and 1260 (with 30,000 friars), and Franciscan friars

¹ Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 4–9.

had a global reach, extending even to China, by the end of the 13th century.² And it is salutary to recall that in 1992, St Francis was chosen by Time magazine as one of the ten most influential human beings of the last millennium. From the perspective of the afterlife of these texts however, the *Summa Halensis* appears to lack entirely the kind of authority enjoyed by the widely used *Summa Theologiae* of St Thomas Aquinas which has repeatedly generated new forms of reception down to the present day. In contrast, this Franciscan text has remained largely in its original Latin and has not been much read outside specialist scholarly circles. The historical profile of the *Summa Halensis* is considerably less than that of later Franciscan theologians such as Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, who themselves were less central to our medieval inheritance than was the Thomist tradition. The question of a renewed authority for this text today is a bold one, therefore.

But textual authority comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, and today we have at least one source of authority which has only very recently taken shape. We are accustomed to the considerable though also, from a humanistic perspective, piecemeal authority of empirical science, but today an altogether new kind of interdisciplinary science is emerging which is unlocking some of the primary dynamics of human sociality and our power of bonding. This is based in mainstream neuroscience, but extends into evolutionary biology and even into specific areas of physics, where the human is in play.³ Of course, the history of the dialogue between science and the humanities has at times been an uneasy one. It may be however that with a new form of scientific interdisciplinarity contributing to our self-understanding as human, we can at last benefit more broadly from the conversation between science and the humanities precisely in those areas of practice – such as our uses of language, our reason and our freedom for instance – which appear to be most fundamental to human life and identity.

A growing priority today is the development of more powerfully critical understandings of human identity as social in order to correct what appears to be a significant imbalance between our technological inheritance on the one hand and our social and environmental values on the other. Arguably we need something akin to a ‘second enlightenment’, though with its focus now in our social rather than exclusively technological inheritance. With its close proximity to the historical community and values of St Francis and the early Franciscans, the *Summa Halensis* may be an ideal resource for such a renewed ‘enlightenment’. To the extent that the *teachings* and *practices* of this text coincide with our interdisciplinary scientific anthropology today, the *SH* can potentially contribute in important ways to the mediation of that

² Arnulf Camps and Pat McCloskey, *The Friars Minor in China 1294–1955* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, St Bonaventure University, 1995).

³ Daniel Kahneman’s work on judgment and decision-making played an important role here, which began in the 1970s; see especially Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,’ *Econometrica* 47:2 (1979), pp. 263–92. In 2002, Kahneman was joint recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

science and to its broader reception. In the context of the need for such a ‘second enlightenment’, it may be a text which can potentially be shown to have a new kind, and perhaps a new level, of authority.

Neuroscience and the Self

The dramatic rise of neuroscience over the last fifty years or so has, in particular, changed the format of tenacious debates within Western culture around questions of the mind-body relation. The dualist inheritance of Western rationalism in the modern period has become increasingly untenable in the light of new understandings of the human brain as a complex unity of multiple informational systems. These are so closely bound up with how we know and experience the world, that separating mind and body, body and world, becomes impossible. The debates, rather, concern the terms of the interrelation of these elements.

An important voice in the history of this revolution is that of James J. Gibson whose ground-breaking study *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*⁴ set out the principle that human perception occurs within specific environments within which *affordances* (‘opportunities to engage with our environment in ways that reflect our needs and plans’) deliver ‘a conception of perceiver and environment as co-defined and co-dependent.’⁵ In the words of John Teske:

Embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply and inescapably rooted in our bodily interactions with the world. Our finite, contingent, and mortal embodiment may be not only supportive, but in some cases even constitutive of emotions, thoughts, and experiences. (...) The body plays a central role in shaping the mind even as it requires the latter’s control systems to move and act in a real world. ‘Thought is action in rehearsal.’ Cognition is assembled from neural, bodily and environmental components, including our social relationships. Cognitive dynamics are dominated by interaction.⁶

A second milestone was the publication of *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch.⁷ Here there is now the conviction that it is possible to bring together the intricate detail

⁴ James J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).

⁵ Dave Ward, David Silverman, and Mario Villalobos, ‘Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism,’ *Topoi* 36 (2017), pp. 365–75, on p. 366.

⁶ John A. Teske, ‘Neuroscientific Background to Embodied Cognition,’ International Society for Science and Religion (ISSR) website, ‘Human Nature and Embodied Cognition: Abstracts from the Conference,’ accessed January 13, 2020, <https://www.issr.org.uk/projects/human-nature-embodied-cognition/>.

⁷ Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

of neuroscience with high level phenomena, and specifically with ‘lived human experience’. As the authors put it:

The new sciences of mind need to enlarge their horizon to encompass both lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. Ordinary, everyday experience, on the other hand, must enlarge its horizon to benefit from the insights and analyses that are distinctly wrought by the sciences of mind.⁸

We can read this statement as an implicit claim to the possibility of a new kind of relation between science and humanistic disciplines, pointing to the inclusion of ‘lived human experience’, and so also to the possibilities of ‘enlightenment’. There are however two deficits in this project as set out in *The Embodied Mind*. The first is that they are writing at the earliest stages of the discovery of the pre-thematic (unconscious) ‘social cognition system’, with its unparalleled speed and interactive density of exchange of social information. It is this which underpins our human powers of face-to-face bonding. Its importance is underlined by later research which shows the fundamentally social character of our embodiment, and the extent to which this is framed in pre-conscious, yet highly evaluative systems.⁹

The second deficit is methodological, and it already points to the very considerable challenges that will inevitably arise in any such ‘enlightenment’ project. The phrase ‘lived human experience’ does not give us the content which defines that experience. It is entirely appropriate that *The Embodied Mind* should define ‘experience’ here in terms of Buddhist meditative techniques. But why should such practices be detached from their traditional cultural matrix? Religions are long term communities which resist ossification through forms of social transformation that are embedded within the practices and teachings that sustain traditions. Arguably the characteristic feature of religions is not their ‘experience’ so much as their ‘pro-sociality’.¹⁰ To what extent then can we regard the practice of meditation in Buddhism as formative of tradition? There are long term religious traditions which do not make such meditative practices the focus of their community.

It is the difficulty of giving precise, critical meaning to ‘lived human experience’ that comes into view here. It may be that we can establish a more constructive point of departure if we allow the resources of interdisciplinary science to come into play.

8 Varela, Thompson and Rosch, *The Embodied Mind*, p. xv.

9 Chris Frith, ‘Social Cognition,’ *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 363:1499 (2008), pp. 2033–39; Uta Frith and Chris Frith, ‘The Social Brain: Allowing Humans to Boldly Go Where No Other Species Has Been,’ *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 365:1537 (2010), pp. 165–76; Rogier B. Mars et al., ‘On the Relationship Between the “Default Mode Network” and the “Social Brain,”’ *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 6 (2012), pp. 1–9; Wanqing Li, Xiaoqin Mai, and Chao Liu, ‘The Default Mode Network and Social Understanding of Others: What Do Brain Connectivity Studies Tell Us,’ *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 8:74 (2014), pp. 1–15.

10 Ara Norenzayan et al., ‘The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,’ *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 39 (2016), pp. 1–65.

If neuroscience can offer us a latitudinal perspective of present time and anatomical space, for instance, then this can be complemented with the longitudinal perspective of our past and our becoming which belongs to evolutionary science. Only by working with both equally central scientific perspectives on the human shall we be able to frame a more satisfactory investigation of how ‘lived human experience’ can be defined. In the following subsection we shall begin to allow these two key disciplines of the human to inform each other.

Enactivism

Broadly then three streams of neuroscientific thinking have emerged with implications for the nature of the self since the publication of *The Embodied Mind*, all of which come under the title of ‘enactivism’. The first, ‘sensorimotor enactivism’, focuses on the immediate interactions between the agent and the environment, ‘explaining the intentional and phenomenal characteristics of perceptual experience rather than a general account of the mind.’¹¹ Typically this emphasis shuns higher-level, phenomenal or philosophical readings, and centers upon adaptations of living organisms through ‘predictive processing’ in environmental perception. It is of limited interest for those interested in developing high-level humanistic responses to recent neuroscience.

The second, ‘radical enactivism’ or ‘Radically Enactive Cognition’ (REC), marks a point of departure which shares the general concern today to contest the prioritization of a self-sustaining cognitive rationalism, with its suggestions of an untenable dualism.¹² Indeed, REC seeks to ‘cleanse, purify, strengthen and unify a whole set of anti-representational offerings,’ where ‘representational’ implies formally cognitive as distinct from automatic, biological, adaptive responses. REC has an extrinsic rather than intrinsic understanding of representational content (or ‘knowledge’), arguing that it is language and the ‘scaffolding of our socio-cultural capacities’ which explicitly lends representational content to the structures of meaning which are implicit within biological systems.¹³ There is a good case for the view that language plays a key role in establishing representational content in modern human beings. But here we encounter a difficulty. The linguistic sign consists both of the materiality of words which are spoken as sound or written as shape, and the concepts which are embedded in or through words. The radical hiatus between biology and representation in REC raises the question as to whether due account has been given to the material nature of the linguistic sign itself, and specifically to the embeddedness of advanced language, as material form, in the human brain.

¹¹ Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos, ‘Varieties of Enactivism,’ p. 370.

¹² Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin, *Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds meet Content* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017).

¹³ Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos, ‘Varieties of Enactivism,’ pp. 370–73.

From the perspective of a humanistic ambition to integrate the interdisciplinary science of the human and ‘lived human experience’, in the interests of an ‘enlightenment’, it is the third, ‘enactivist’ school which shows most promise. ‘Autopoietic enactivism’ seeks to ‘ground cognition in the biodynamics of living systems.’ An example here might be the way in which an organism such as a bacterium feeds upon the sucrose in its environment:

That sucrose is a nutrient is not intrinsic to the status of the sucrose molecule; it is, rather a *relational feature*, linked to the bacterium’s metabolism. Sucrose has significance or value as food, but only in the milieu that the organism itself brings into existence.¹⁴

This perspective involves commitments to ‘the strong continuity of life and mind – the view that the organizational structures and principles distinctive of mind are simply enriched versions of the structures and principles grounding life itself.’¹⁵ This third form of ‘enactivism’ is also that which is specifically associated with the human social cognition system. This system has played a central role in developing understandings of the human not only as relational and social, but also as linguistic.

Enactivism and the Social Cognition System

We can define the social cognition system in terms of the ‘study of information processing in a social setting.’¹⁶ In the words of Ivana Konvalinka:

When we interact with another person, our brains and bodies are no longer isolated, but immersed in an environment with the other person, in which we become a coupled unit through a continuous moment-to-moment mutual adaptation of our own actions and the actions of the other.¹⁷

These multiple reflex interactions occur at speeds well below the threshold of conscious perception, but they nevertheless communicate to consciousness a sense of ‘rapport’.¹⁸ As ‘complex, multi-layered, self-organizing,’ they sit within the early

¹⁴ Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos, ‘Varieties of Enactivism,’ p. 369.

¹⁵ Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos, ‘Varieties of Enactivism,’ p. 370. Here ‘autopoietic enactivism’ shows a considerable debt to the sophisticated philosophy of Hans Jonas, who develops the principle ‘life can only be known by life,’ thus assimilating ‘life’ and ‘mind’. See Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology*, trans. L. Vogel (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ Frith, ‘Social Cognition,’ p. 2033.

¹⁷ I. Konvalinka and A. Roepstorff, ‘The Two-Brain Approach: How Can Mutually Interacting Brains Teach Us Something About Social Interaction?’ *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 6, no. 215 (2012), pp. 1–10, on p. 2.

¹⁸ Linda Tickle-Degnen and Robert Rosenthal, ‘The Nature of Rapport and its Nonverbal Correlates,’ *Psychological Inquiry* 1:4 (1990), pp. 285–93.

motor system, involving sets of mutual responses ranging from eye movement, facial expression, posture and gesture to the synchrony of brain waves, breathing and pulse: a subtle and pervasive ‘alignment of behaviour’ which includes ‘synergies, co-ordination and phase attraction.’¹⁹ Empathy, affectivity, and evaluation all combine with high levels of pre-thematic reflexivity, involving self-monitoring and monitoring of the other, as well as any third party observers who may be present, during this process of many and diverse forms of ‘internal information processing.’²⁰ Here too evaluative processes integrate first-hand knowledge of the other gained in the moment and a second-hand, associative knowledge acquired from other sources.²¹

Within the ‘social cognition system’ then, the evaluative protocols of one person are densely exposed to the evaluative protocols of another. Such a system has to be understood as a form of pre-thematic reflexivity which is extensively conditioned by an environment of interactive, physical-social complexity. Moreover, this is an environment in which pre-thematic and thematic activity combine in the sense that those brain areas which are associated with advanced social reasoning are also extensively integrated within pre-thematic, reflex-centered social networks. From an ‘enactivist’ perspective, Di Paolo and De Jaegher refer to social cognition not only as ‘self-organizing’ but also as our ‘participatory sense-making’ of the human other.²² These two terms capture the binaries of objectivity and subjectivity, self and other, self and world.

The enactive phrase ‘participatory sense-making’ neatly straddles the pre-thematic on the one hand, and close *conversation* between self-aware, linguistic subjects on the other.²³ These are continuous systems, therefore, but they are distinct in the extent to which our recently evolved advanced linguistic consciousness allows us *freely* to choose whether or not we shall engage with the other person and for how long.²⁴ We should think of our advanced linguistic consciousness then as evolving out of the pre-thematic, interactive, informational exchanges of our social cognition, bringing a wholly new power of conscious decision-making. But our advanced language does not remove us from materiality. Rather, it constitutes a domain of freedom which is operative precisely *within* the material world order. From the perspective of classical rationalism, the challenge has been how to explain the relation between body and mind (between efficient causation and consciousness), which David Chalmers has called ‘the hard

19 E. Di Paolo and H. De Jaegher, ‘The Interactive Brain Hypothesis,’ *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 6:163 (2012), pp. 1–16, on p. 1.

20 L. Schilbach et al., ‘Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience,’ *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36:4 (2013), pp. 393–414.

21 R.J. Seitz, M. Franz, and N.P. Azari, ‘Value Judgments and Self-Control of Action: The Role of the Medial Frontal Cortex,’ *Brain Research Reviews* 60:2 (2009), pp. 368–78; B. Kuzmanovich et al., ‘A Matter of Words: Impact of Verbal and Non-Verbal Information on Impression Formation in High Functioning Autism,’ *Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders* 5 (2011), pp. 604–13.

22 Di Paolo and De Jaegher, ‘The Interactive Brain Hypothesis,’ pp. 1, 2–4.

23 Ezequiel Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari, and Hanne De Jaegher, *Linguistic Bodies: The Continuity Between Life and Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018).

24 Nicholas Shea, ‘Concept-Metacognition,’ *Mind & Language* (2019), pp. 1–18.

question'.²⁵ From an autopoietic enactivist perspective however, the question is rather different: 'how do mind and matter work together?' This sits well with the question of our freedom, since it is difficult to ask what freedom is. It is wiser to phrase the question in terms of 'what makes us free?' What is at work in us when we feel, act and think in ways which we experience as free?

Advanced Modern Language

It was the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure who first argued that when we speak or write, we necessarily choose our spoken or written words (*paroles*) from within the system of language (*langue*) itself.²⁶ Those with whom we speak will hold us responsible for what we say, just as we will hold others responsible for what they say. Allowing ourselves to become fully present in our words when we speak with others is fundamental to communication, negotiation and trust, and so also to human flourishing. Here de Saussure is pointing to the fact that it is this power to choose our words which sets us free. How then do words give us that freedom?

Our question concerns the origins of advanced modern language which gives us the advanced linguistic consciousness of anatomically and behaviorally modern human beings. Talon sticks appear in the archaeological record from around 20,000 years ago which point to emergent skills of mathematics.²⁷ We see evidence for the presence of complex and coordinated social spaces, complex burials, and, arguably for the first time, full reproductions of the human face from around 10,000 years ago.²⁸ It was in this period of the Neolithic that a relatively sudden growth in population size occurred, reflecting the change from a nomadic to an agrarian economy. The need for new forms of cohesion, in larger groups, may also underlie the presence of ritual.²⁹ Vittorio Gallese has argued that the occurrence of forms of systematic or pre-planned violence from around 10,000 years ago also points to

25 David J. Chalmers, 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,' *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2:3 (1995), pp. 200–19.

26 F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. R. Harris, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1986), pp. 9–10, 15.

27 J. de Heinzelin, 'Ishango,' *Scientific American* 206 (1962), pp. 105–16.

28 Ian Kuijt, 'The Regeneration of Life,' *Current Anthropology* 49:2 (2008), pp. 171–97. Arguably the reproduction of the face of another is bound up with the fifth of Robin Dunbar's five forms of intentionality; see Robin Dunbar, *The Human Story* (London: Faber and Faber, 2004), pp. 41–76.

29 Robert N. Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 1–43; C.S. Alcorta and R. Sosis, 'Ritual, Emotion and Sacred Symbols,' *Human Nature* 16 (2005), pp. 323–59; Robin Dunbar, 'The Origin of Religion as a Small-Scale Phenomenon,' in *Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict*, ed. Steve Clarke et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1–21.

the presence of advanced language since a generation needs to be raised who can name another group as ‘non-human’.³⁰

Of course, the relatively recent appearance of advanced linguistic consciousness needs to be placed against the background of more basic processes which come into view much earlier in our evolutionary history. For instance, the first evidence for the working of stone tools dates from 3.3 million years ago, near Lake Turkana in Kenya.³¹ These techniques involved the capacity to ‘see’ a tool, or a better tool, hidden in the stone. Tool making and tool use already show a certain structure involving the internalization within the brain of an external object (here the external stone becoming a tool in the hand) from one perspective, and the penetration of the mind into the environment through applying the tool, from another, potentially doing so in imaginative ways which reshape our environment. Only a creature with imagination can internalize the world, and yet also enter into our environment, shaping it from within. We can link this structure with the fundamental principle of ‘inhalation-exhalation’ as found in biology, with the original emergence of multicellular eukaryotes as a prelude to life, or indeed with the consumption of sucrose by the microbe quoted in the section on autopoietic enactivism above. In contemporary evolutionary thinking (‘the extended evolutionary synthesis’), this structure is represented by the powerful concept of ‘niche-construction’ as a property of all life.³² Living creatures move and so interact with the environment, undergoing change.

It is difficult for us to understand today, however, just how extensive tool making and tool use must have been in the hunter gatherer communities of our evolutionary past. The ‘lithic landscapes’ discovered by archaeologists suggest widespread processes of apprenticeship, learning and teamwork, involving carrying, storing and preparing stones, at all levels of society.³³ With its complex sequences of percussive

30 V. Gallese, *New Scientist* 221:2952 (2014), p. 1.

31 Agustin Fuentes, *The Creative Spark: How Imagination Made Humans Exceptional* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017), p. 31.

32 The ground-breaking work in this respect is F.J. Odling-Smee, K.N. Laland, and M.W. Feldman, *Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). Our human niche-construction is distinctive in what has been called a ‘ratcheting effect’, in which our sociality and our technology alternate and combine as drivers of brain development; see C. Tennie et al., ‘Ratcheting up the Ratchet: On the Evolution of Cumulative Culture,’ *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences* 364:1528 (2009), pp. 2405–15.

33 D. Stout and T. Chaminade, ‘Stone Tools, Language and the Brain in Human Evolution,’ *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences* 367:1585 (2012), pp. 75–87; E.A. Cartmill et al., ‘A Word in the Hand: Action, Gesture and Mental Representation in Humans and Non-Human Primates,’ *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences* 367:1585 (2012), pp. 129–43; Peter Hiscock, ‘Learning in Lithic Landscapes: A Reconsideration of the Hominid “Toolmaking” Niche,’ *Biological Theory* 9:1 (2014), pp. 27–41. It is estimated that it would take ‘ten to twenty five pounds of stone and about 50 to a 100 flake tools’ to strip the meat from a small wildebeest, which committed these small communities to very high levels of co-operation (Fuentes, *The Creative Spark*, p. 62).

'strikes', its repetition and imitation, tool making and use also points forward to the large-scale learning of 'words' (as sounds and later as the shapes of writing) and the sequencing of syntax.³⁴

The extent of the leap to advanced modern language can be judged by the fact that one of its primary characteristics is the 'arbitrary' nature of the link between words and their meanings. With some few exceptions, our advanced language shows no 'natural' association between words and what they mean (as occurs in 'biological' language for instance). The neurologist and philosopher Andy Clark observes that these internalized words and phrases of advanced modern language are in effect so many 'material objects' that 'press minds like ours from the biological flux.'³⁵ In their tool-like nature, they are 'potent real-world structures' (of sound or shape) which ground the 'neural wet-ware' of consciousness, helping us to consolidate and objectify through material form what it is that we think.³⁶ The material properties of words are internalized in the so-called 'semantic system' in the cortex, where they are also networked with their respective concepts.³⁷ Even the most intuitive and advanced mathematical computations have been found to show a material base in language.³⁸ It seems then that the sense we have of being free in what we choose to believe or do, cannot take place in some 'detached' or 'abstract' space but must in fact always take place immersively, within the material contexts of language, embodiment and world.

Freedom and the Material Sign

As human beings, we appear to have a capacity to enter ever more deeply into our environment, through this ability to 'see' in the world around us what is not there but which *could* be there. And we have a parallel capacity to internalize what is outside or beyond us, both in tool making and use, and in language learning and use. Tool use and language use represent two sequential levels of 'niche-construction' then in our evolutionary history.³⁹ But here we are confronted with a different kind

34 D. Lombao, M. Guardiola, and M. Mosquera, 'Teaching to Make Stone Tools: New Experimental Evidence Supporting a Technological Hypothesis for the Origins of Language,' *Nature: Scientific Reports* 7:11 (2017). Published online 31 October 2017. DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-14322-y.

35 A. Clark, *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 44–60.

36 Clark, *Supersizing the Mind*, p. 56.

37 A.G. Huth et al., 'Natural Speech Reveals the Semantic Maps that Tile Human Cerebral Cortex,' *Nature* 532 (2016), pp. 453–58. Published online 27 April 2016. DOI: 10.1038/nature17637.

38 A. Clark, 'Language, Embodiment and the Cognitive Niche,' *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10:8 (2006), pp. 370–74; S. Dehaene et al., 'Sources of Mathematical Thinking: Behavioral and Brain-Imaging Evidence,' *Science* 284:5416 (1999), pp. 970–74.

39 Christ Sinha, 'Niche Construction, Too, Unifies Praxis and Symbolization,' *Language and Cognition* 5:2 (2013), pp. 261–71.

of question: if niche-construction is about ‘being at home’ in our environment, how then can we be at home in the linguistic consciousness which now defines us? We can frame this question differently. If advanced language sets us free, how then can we be *at home* in this universe when on all sides we appear to encounter material limit, whether as weak or ill, as confined or excluded, as tired or hemmed in, as vulnerable or mortal? And we also appear to be surrounded by the unending complexity of the world which disrupts our power to make clear decisions.

But interdisciplinary science may have something to contribute here. Today we know that there is indeed a point of unity between mind and body, mind and world, and it is precisely this internalized system of signs which constitutes language within us. These signs are both physical, located at precise points in the brain, and also constitute the self-possessing, free consciousness that we are. What practices might there be then arising from this structure which allow us to experience this unity, and ‘at homeness’, even if we cannot *understand* it?

We are at home where we *practice* the unity of body and mind. And we practice this unity where we consciously or freely celebrate the materiality of signs as these exist within us. Through ritual or ritualistic practices, in which we speak, sing, chant or write (calligraphy) with others, we are tacitly agreeing with others to highlight, even to *celebrate*, the materiality of the sign.⁴⁰ This may enhance the meanings of the words used or, alternatively, it may serve to reduce their semantic importance, even to the extent of excluding their conceptual meanings. But in their use of repetition, rhymes, rhythms, harmonies, synchronies, music and dance, we can say that ritualistic practices foreground the material rather than the semantic properties of language as signs.

This certainly sets ritual apart from conventional discourse. In effect, ritual emphasizes the *non-controlling*, openly social, dimensions of language and so allows our advanced language – which in its relation to tools is itself a primary system of control – to become saturated with the deep, fast, interactive harmonies and synchronies of the human social cognition system. In ritual practices the ‘local’ face to face harmonies of our biological relating are enhanced and extended within an expanded environment, setting up a repeated harmonic resonance which can shape even larger scale societies.⁴¹ And of course we also find such repetition in

⁴⁰ The philosopher Wilfred Sellars argued that we are inextricably caught between ‘the manifest image of the “man in the world,”’ which is our personal experience, and the ‘scientific image’ which derives from rigorous experimental resources; see Wilfred Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,’ *Frontiers of Science and Philosophy*, ed. Robert Colodny (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), pp. 35–78. A modern scientific understanding of the linguistic sign as that which can become the object of our intentional celebration, potentially offers a practice-centered account of the overlap between these two images.

⁴¹ Gary Bente and Eric Novotny, ‘Bodies and Minds in Sync: Forms and Functions of Interpersonal Synchrony in Human Interactions,’ in *Handbook of Communication Science and Biology*, eds. Kory Floyd and René Weber (Routledge: Taylor & Francis, 2020).

the arts (with rhyme, for instance) or in dance with rhythm. Such communal emphasis upon the material medium of communication, which all human beings profoundly share, marks out the spaces in which we can experience an ‘at homeness’ in the world as advanced linguistic consciousness. If tool use marks the first occurrence of our evolutionary ‘internalization-externalization’ dynamic, and advanced language is the second occurrence of this dynamic, then arguably its third occurrence takes place when linguistic consciousness freely practices and displays its unity with material embodiment by celebrating the materiality of the sign. Here freedom affirms its source as freedom, thus – in practice – embracing the unity of free self and material world, in a way that points forward to a cosmic understanding of the self.

Freedom and Reason

But ritualistic practices in themselves cannot complete the sense we have of belonging in the world. For such a completion we have to consider the processes of reasoning which are at the center of our linguistic consciousness. We are defined in our humanity by the power of discernment, judgment and decision. We can argue then that it is at the point of judgment and resolution that we most truly become ourselves, as self-possessing, intelligent consciousness in a complex world. But as embodied consciousness, we are also contextual creatures. How we reason is also influenced by the contexts in which we reason.

It is the work of mind to reason towards decision and judgment. But in fact there are three distinct ways in which we commonly do this. In each of these three moments, mind resolves itself in the context of judgment, and we realize ourselves as free. The first of these occurs where we adopt the posture of an *observer*, as we do in scientific judgments for instance. To be an observer is to impose a certain distance between ourselves and the world (epitomized in the act of measurement). Here we can tolerate minimal complexity since what counts is that we have a reliable answer. We may have to prioritize reducing the complexity by refining the question, and we may need to extend the deadlines. As far as possible, the outcomes of ‘theoretical reasoning’ need to be irrefutable. Here the process of arriving at valid judgment manifests a certain kind of freedom and so also ‘at homeness’ in the world, but it is one which is *conditional*. It depends upon the narrowing down of the question and so also the relative controlled exclusion of the world, in order to strip out and to manage the complexity which would otherwise disrupt this kind of reasoning. The freedom which is characteristic of theoretical reasoning is a freedom *from*.

The second way in which we make ourselves at home in the world through reasoning, resolution and coming to judgment is when we act as *agent*. But again, this is only a conditional ‘at homeness’. In this case, we are concerned with *doing* and so also with ‘practical’ reasoning: how can I reasonably get what I want or need in

this situation? How can I meet my body's needs?⁴² Once again the sheer complexity of reality will threaten to undermine our capacity to reason in ways that allow us to be fully at home in the world. In this case we reduce situational complexity by *filtering* it through the lens of my own needs and wants. I do not have to engage with the world's complexity except in so far as it is the context in which I pursue my specific needs. In fact, when I reason concerning how to act in dynamic, social situations, in pursuance of my goals, my practical reason can never deliver the secure knowledge which is retrievable through my theoretical reasoning in questions of science for instance. For the agent, in the flow of life, there can only be the balance of probabilities. Here there is no irrefutability, since the world's complexity cannot be wholly excluded. But there is the *irreversibility* of what I may finally choose to do. We make ourselves at home in the world then through practical reason, but once again we do so only *conditionally*. This 'at homeness' now manifests not as a freedom *from* but rather as a freedom *to*.

Our third kind of reasoning then, which we can call 'community reasoning', is altogether of a different kind. Here it is presupposed that I am reasoning in the presence of another human being. Since I am seeking to come to a decision inclusively, *with* them, rather than exclusively *about* them, I can no longer 'reduce' the complexity of the other person by either turning them into a statistic or by instrumentalizing him or her, in the light of my own needs and desires. Rather, in my 'community reasoning', I shall need to recognize the equality of the other *unconditionally*, which means to say with the openness we associate with the bonding of *friendship*.

The difference between the openness of 'community reasoning', with its freedom *in*, and the conditional openness of our freedom *from* and freedom *to*, is that it locates us as self-aware, self-possessing consciousness precisely within the activated social cognition system, with the unparalleled densities of its information exchange.⁴³ The processes of evaluation in our social cognition are unconditionally open-ended forms of openness as mutual 'participative sense-making'. Moreover, the foundations of our social cognition are centrally self-organizing, so that our freedom *in* the body is simultaneously our freedom *in the world*. Our freedom *in* relationship, through renunciation of control, opens into the freedom of our deep belonging in the world and at homeness in this world. Given the nature of the self-organizing harmonics of the social cognition system, perhaps we can even say that in this openness of belonging, with its mutual recognition of equality, the world itself, with its deep-set and originary harmonies, is effectively *receiving* us.

⁴² On 'practical' or 'motive reasoning', see Paul D. Janz, *The Command of Grace: A New Theological Apologetics* (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2009), pp. 79–95. Janz discusses what he terms 'finality of non-resolution' as a committed remaining with the impossibility of conclusive rationalization, as in the case of tragedy for instance, in Paul D. Janz, *God the Mind's Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 19–23.

⁴³ Schilbach et al., 'Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience.'

The Physics of Symmetry

This brings us to the science of physics, and the theme of ‘symmetry’. Symmetry denotes repeating patterns in which the same figures and proportions occur (such as the wings of a butterfly, or the two, almost identical halves of a human face). Physicists distinguish between ‘translational symmetry’ (the laws of physics are the same everywhere, and do not change with time), for instance, and ‘rotational symmetry’ (the kettle does not cease to be a kettle, when it is turned around). The strangest and most direct kind of ‘translational symmetry’ is found in the speed of light, which is a constant. It remains the same for us regardless of the speed at which we may ourselves be travelling when we measure it. This insight is a key element in Albert Einstein’s 1905 paper on ‘special relativity’. We can see the effects of this ‘translational symmetry’, or ‘translational invariance’ as it also called, in the case of a car engine, following Andrew Steane, who states: ‘The workings of the engine do not change – they are invariant – when the location of the car is changed or “translated” from one place to another.’⁴⁴

The image of a car engine working in more than one place may seem entirely normal to us. Of course, the engine will not work when the ambient temperature drops below a certain degree or above another. But within these limits, the car does work and so we can say that its status as a harmonious system, which accords with the laws of physics, is preserved. The same kind of system, with its supporting mathematical equations, can be reproduced many times, as happens on the car engine production line. Individual car engines are harmonic systems which accord with physical laws and their mathematical expressions, and for as long as this system can be preserved, they will work. But as Steane stresses, such a system can only be produced since we live in a universe *which allows such systems to occur*.

It is often said that cause and effect, or efficient causation, is the dominant logic of the universe: how one thing affects another. But in reality, there are two systems at work. In addition to efficient causation, we need also to take account of the second, which is symmetry:

The symmetry principle already makes its contribution before we ever write or discover the formulas and equations, because it places conditions on what sorts of equations could make sense. And science is all about making sense, or finding the sense that can be made. Symmetry principles in fact play an important role, because they amount to meta-laws which express higher-level principles that basic laws of motion must respect if they are to make certain types of sense.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Andrew Steane, *Science and Humanity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 24.

⁴⁵ Steane, *Science and Humanity*, p. 25.

There are two dimensions in play here then. The first is the individual parts of the car engine, each of which needs to work in an appropriate way. But secondly there is the whole: all the parts together:

The truth of the whole in this example is the simple but important observation that the functioning of a car engine does not depend on the location of the car. The truth of the parts is the behaviour of the pistons and fuel and the equations that describe them. The physics and chemistry of those motions have *translational invariance* [my italics], and this is an important, insightful, and simplifying observation that gets to grips with the big picture without needing to trouble about the details. This truth about the whole is not negated by the truths about the parts.⁴⁶

Were symmetry not present,

then the engine would depend on the location of other things after all, and therefore could not be described only in terms of itself and its immediate environment. So the claim that the symmetry 'just happens' to emerge from the equations of motion of the car engine is wrong. As soon as you even suppose that there is an equation for the car engine, it must have this symmetry.⁴⁷

Steane states further regarding the history of physics during the modern period:

Much of the progress in fundamental physics in the twentieth century can be seen as a sequence of triumphs of reasoning from symmetry. Furthermore, these insights survived the huge transition from classical to quantum physics that took place in the twentieth century. That is a very striking fact. It illustrates that the symmetry principles have a validity in their own right, independent of the underlying language (that is, classical properties or quantum operators) in which they are expressed. As Philip Anderson (Nobel Prize for Physics, 1977) put it in a famous paper: 'it is only slightly overstating the case to say that physics is the study of symmetry.'⁴⁸

He also emphasizes for us here that:

The symmetry principle is first a guide, and then, in a certain hard-to-express but beautiful sense, it 'inhabits' the equations of physics. The concrete phenomena that are in the world are a sort of physical embodiment of the symmetry principles. By moulding our mathematical notation, such insights shape the very way we 'see' the world.⁴⁹

In conclusion then, there are two kinds of causation: efficient causation which builds from below and symmetry which seemingly descends 'from above', enabling the possibility of 'translational invariance' and, with that, the emergence of discrete 'things' (composed of parts). If we are to be part of a 'world', then things need to remain in existence long enough for us to identify them. But things must not last forever. Between the two there is a habitable world.

⁴⁶ Steane, *Science and Humanity*, p. 25.

⁴⁷ Steane, *Science and Humanity*, p. 25.

⁴⁸ Steane, *Science and Humanity*, p. 28.

⁴⁹ Steane, *Science and Humanity*, p. 28.

In sum, the term ‘symmetry’ refers to the principle of connectedness, which allows ‘translational invariance’ to occur, lending our world stability, or existence. That this is a basic principle of existence is borne out by the fact that light itself displays an absolute degree of ‘translational invariance’. The speed of light (around 300,000 kilometers per second) is invariable everywhere in the universe and, as stated, this is unaffected by our own speed at the point of its measurement. It follows then that ‘symmetry’ is not a mere construct or ‘way of seeing things.’ It is rather a fundamental law of the universe: the primary law even which conditions all else, making ‘world’ itself possible, and all the things that are within it. And we see that symmetry as simplicity and beauty.

Human Identity and ‘Translational Invariance’

Since we are embodied forms in a material universe, the rules of ‘translational invariance’ will apply to us too, though now in ‘human’ ways. We can cite the fact that the millions of cells which constitute the body are constantly being renewed while my body remains my own. I essentially remain the same person I was when I was growing up far away from where I am now, all those years ago. My continuing identity over space and time then shows that I am by nature ‘translationally invariant’. But within this continuation, something else lurks which is the extent to which I grow as a person, undergoing or meeting change and yet still remaining the person I am; or indeed *becoming* the person I can potentially be. Life constantly challenges us, and we find we have to make important social decisions about the values we hold and how we shall act. Our ability to act with integrity, points to our constancy within change. We are different then from engineers who build car engines in that human ‘translational invariance’, beyond its natural occurrence, is something we have to ‘create’ ourselves. And we do that through processes of decision-making which determine the kind of person we are and the kind of person we can be. Here constancy and responsibility are in play as vitally important social factors.

Furthermore, the neuroscience of free will and decision-making suggests that harmony (which presupposes symmetry) is in fact also a key factor in the ways in which we change, grow or ‘become’. Robert Kane, a leading scholar in this field, describes the ‘hot’ conditions of conflicting possibilities of identity which exist when we are confronted with a significant ethical challenge. These represent ‘movement away from thermal equilibrium – in short a kind of stirring up of chaos in the brain that makes it sensitive to micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level.’⁵⁰ The human brain is ‘a parallel processor (...) which can simultaneously process different kinds of information relevant to tasks such as perception or recognition through dif-

⁵⁰ Robert Kane, ‘Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem,’ in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. Robert Kane, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 387.

ferent neural pathways.’ This processing capacity is ‘essential to the exercise of free will.’⁵¹

There are two complementary systems in play here. The first is ‘bottom-up’ and conflicted, with competing possibilities of action and therefore identity, while the second is ‘top-down’, leading to harmonization, integration and the global unity of the self.⁵² We make such ethical decisions by inhabiting the different competing images of the self as these combine and re-combine in the brain. These inform our ethical decision-making as inherent possibilities which can subtly be explored.⁵³ The key to difficult ethical decision-making, in which none of the initial possibilities appear to allow resolution, is time, effort and finally the formation of new neural pathways in the brain through the top-down effect. These create the possibility of a new future and identity, and they constitute ‘growth’.

To be human therefore is to be repeatedly challenged by the need to change in the face of a changing world, but in ways which show that what deeply identifies ‘me’ for others (and for myself), remains a constant. Here ‘translational invariance’ is in play in the human person: indeed, it is at the core of who we are and our sense of being at home in the world. In such key moments of decision-making, most of us will seek the advice of those who know us well. This deeply rooted pursuit of the ‘right thing to do’ marks us out as creatures who are capable of attaining high levels of harmonization in the brain. Such processes of harmonization which straddle the subjective-objective divide allow us an enhanced sense of belonging in the world, and, with that, a more secure and potentially productive openness to the future.

Contemporary Science and the *Summa Halensis*

What kind of echo, if any, do we find of this contemporary scientific account of our human sociality in the strongly social early Franciscan text we know as the *Summa Halensis*? Firstly, we need to recognize that it does indeed have unusual contexts. The philosophies and religious imagination of the *SH* were constructed in direct dialogue with the charismatic life of St Francis of Assisi. The early growth and long-term flourishing of the Franciscan Order suggests that the early teachings and practices of the Order must have extensively harnessed the highly productive, species-wide structures of our human embodiment. The *SH* becomes an *authoritative* text, however, if it is established that the early Franciscan practices and teachings recorded here resonate positively with our contemporary science, and in more than incidental

⁵¹ Kane, ‘Rethinking Free Will,’ p. 390.

⁵² Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, *Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁵³ Robert Kane, ‘Libertarianism,’ in John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Dirk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 5–43; Kane, ‘Rethinking Free Will,’ pp. 384–401.

ways. We are looking then for evident convergence between science and text in significant themes. If this does indeed appear to be the case, then we may still judge that this is purely the result of chance. But it would seem more likely that Francis did indeed lead a distinctive life in which the structures of the human, which is to say our capacity to belong deeply in the world, came into view with exceptional force and particular clarity.

The *SH*, which is based upon the extensive imitation of St Francis of Assisi, then becomes the reflective product of that dynamic and encounter. Of course, we also have to consider whether further factors may have been in play here, such as the rise of the ‘vow’ as distinct from the ‘oath’, with its commitment to a non-enclosed religious life.⁵⁴ Unlike the monastic orders, the mendicant structure of the religious life allowed the followers of St Francis to observe him in all kinds of different contexts of living, which must have enriched their understanding of his vocation. Early Franciscan tradition was distinctive in its repeated emphasis on the production of biographies and records of personal encounter with their charismatic founder, as it was in the tendency of the Franciscan authors of the *SH* to think ‘like a community, not merely as a group of scholars who happened to be working at the same institution.’⁵⁵ The text of the *SH* is altogether more heuristic and exploratory than the Dominican *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas for instance, in which the pedagogical lucidity and thematic unity of the text is the dominant formal structure. It may be too that the influence of the Islamic thinker Avicenna among the Franciscans in the early decades of the 13th century added a more concrete perspective, of encounter and interruption, than was typical of the later Aristotelianism. We can add here the particularly radical nature of the early Franciscan vow of poverty which may, starkly, have highlighted the theme of freedom.⁵⁶

Three Areas of Continuity

There are distinctive factors surrounding the production of the text of the *SH* therefore. But the key question concerning its authority for us today is focused in three particular areas of innovation. These are central to the philosophy and theology of the *SH* and the early Franciscan theology which it supports, as well as being of in-

⁵⁴ John of La Rochelle’s understanding of the importance of the vow in Franciscan life played an important part in the formation of the legal structure of the Franciscan Order. The dependence of the vow upon the Papacy, as enacted commitment to God, allowed the mendicants greater freedom of movement within the society of the day. See R. Saccenti, ‘Beyond the Positive Law: The Oath and Vow as a Theological Matter Between the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Century,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher, Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 251–74.

⁵⁵ Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, pp. 41–54, 29.

⁵⁶ I am grateful to Mary Beth Ingham, CSJ for this insight.

terest from the perspective of contemporary science. The first of these concerns the philosophy of the ‘transcendentals’ as this classical Greek theme was developed by the early Franciscans. The second is the very strong Franciscan account of ‘freedom’ which begins in the *SH* and flowers in Scotus, while thirdly we will consider their understanding of ‘natural law’.

The ‘Transcendentals’

Religions tend to be heavily invested in cosmological accounts of reality, and nowhere does this come more clearly into view than in the medieval engagement with the theme of the ‘transcendentals’. This begins with the work of Philip the Chancellor in his *Summa de Bono*, dating from the 1220s, perhaps during the lifetime of St Francis himself (1181–1226). Philip adapts the classical, principally Platonic, inheritance with his construction of a medieval ‘science of metaphysics’.⁵⁷ Jan Aertsen identifies five elements here: in the first place ‘being’, followed by the three terms of ‘one’, the ‘true’ and the ‘good’, each of which is ‘convertible’ with the others and should help us to understand the properties of ‘being’ in the formation of a science of metaphysics. Aertsen’s fifth element here is ‘epistemology’ and the fact that these transcendental terms ‘come first’ in so far as they ground our experience of the concrete world as such.⁵⁸

The *SH* is distinctive in the central role that it gives to the transcendentals. Another Franciscan text (which is believed to have been written by a student of Alexander of Hales) also innovates in that it unequivocally emphasizes the role of beauty as a further transcendental term which integrates the other transcendental terms of oneness, truth and goodness in the grasping of being as such.⁵⁹ This particular view does not become an established part of Franciscan tradition, but nevertheless there is a repeating emphasis on aesthetics and aesthetic reasoning in the thought of Bonaventure and Duns Scotus for instance.⁶⁰

In Scotus the concept of theology as a ‘science of praxis’ has a central role. This roots his anthropology in space and time and in our embodied human particularity. But Scotus also develops an innovative metaphysics of particularity or what he calls *haecceitas* (‘this-ness’). *Haecceitas* signals that we cannot define real things through

⁵⁷ For an overview of this term, see Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 1–11.

⁵⁸ Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 10–11.

⁵⁹ Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 169. The text referred to is the *Tractatus de transcendentalibus entis conditionibus* (Assisi, Biblioteca Communale, Cod. 186), in *Franziskanische Studien* 41 (1959), pp. 41–106.

⁶⁰ In the case of the *Itinerarium*, Denys Turner attributes the emphasis upon beauty to Bonaventure’s ‘interiorized hierarchy’; see Denys Turner, *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 102–34.

the language either of ‘matter’ or ‘form’ alone, but neither can we define them through ‘matter and form’ in combination (as was the norm). This also is too abstract. Rather, his term *haecceitas* points to real things as being a *particular* combination of both ‘matter’ and ‘form’ in this space and time.⁶¹ Scotus’ emphasis on particularity and ‘this-ness’ yielded a new metaphysics of ‘things’: spatio-temporal objects which endure. Scotus also holds that such objects participate in the beauty of the original divine creation.⁶²

In effect then, Scotus’ ‘scientific’ innovation of a *haecceitas* which inheres in real and particular things, structured in complex space and time, and which are beautiful, stands as a parallel to the harmonies and supporting cosmic ‘symmetry’ of our contemporary physics. We would call this ‘translational invariance’ today. In the previous section we addressed the question of a human form of ‘translational invariance’, pointing to the harmonies of top-down reasoning in demanding decision-making as we struggle to discern the right thing to do in complex situations. Here neuroscience freely uses the language of harmonics, and the integration of contrasting harmonic systems. But in a further parallel, Scotus too speaks of moral decision-making in terms of ‘beauty’ and ‘harmony’.

Scotus tells us that ‘the moral goodness of an act is a kind of decor it has, including a combination of due proportion to all to which it should be proportioned (...) and this especially as right reason dictates should pertain to the act.’⁶³ What mediates between the concrete particularity of the real and the sublimity of heaven is the harmonic order of moral reasoning which, for Scotus, manifests a love not for ‘advantage’ but rather for ‘justice’.⁶⁴ For Scotus, right reasoning here expresses due proportions which manifest as beauty through right relations. Wolter summarizes Scotist ‘moral goodness’ as ‘a kind of moral beauty or comeliness. (...) Like beauty, it “is not some absolute quality,” but rather a harmonious relationship of many items (the faculty of the will, the object it seeks, the conditions under which it does so etc.’⁶⁵

Scotus does not speak of the *pulchrum* or beauty in terms of the ‘transcendentals’ then, but he does understand ‘real things’ as harmonic structures of ‘this-ness’ (reflecting the original creation) and the human self as capable of conforming to harmonies through ‘right reasoning’ which is a reasoning of *right relations*. Moreover, in his engagement with ‘moral reasoning’, it seems that Scotus is concerned with

⁶¹ See Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction* (Washington DC: Catholic University Of America Press, 2004), pp. 108–16. See also Oliver Davies, *Theology of Transformation: Faith, Freedom and the Christian Act* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 202–5.

⁶² Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 19.

⁶³ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 17 (nn. 62–67), in Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, p. 167.

⁶⁴ Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, pp. 39–41.

⁶⁵ Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, p. 47.

what we might call ‘human translational invariance’. In fact, we can suggest that he is concerned here both with finite, situational change which maintains the integrity of our personhood over time and space and with *infinite* ‘human translational invariance’, whereby the human begins to participate in the infinite life of the Creator.

For Scotus then, the sublimity of the vision of God in heaven, on the one hand, and the structures of the concrete real on the other, are connected by our own rootedness in the here and now, which is the domain of our moral decision-making. He develops a cosmic image of creation which pivots around our human capacity to *will the right thing*, in the order of concrete decision-making, thus grounding processes of reasoning which manifest right relations in the nature of reality itself.

Freedom

As we have seen, our evolutionary history suggests that the emergence of advanced language is late, and that freedom of choice is an intrinsic property of our advanced linguistic consciousness. The power of reasoning and coming to judgment is itself a function of advanced language and manifests for us as the sense that we are free in what we think and do. Early Franciscan traditions are permeated with the thematic of freedom (which may indeed reflect the existential weight of the vow of radical poverty), whereby what is believed is governed as much by the will as it is by reason. The will has the power to choose either good or evil. It shapes how we see the world.

As noted above, evolutionary science and the neuroscience of decision-making suggest the primary role of control in our advanced linguistic consciousness. This cuts two ways however. The structure which is in play here is the ‘inhalation-exhalation’ effect which means that the internalization of tools leads to new levels of penetration into the environment. Advanced language constitutes the second phase in this key evolutionary dynamic of niche construction. The internalization of thousands of ‘signs’ allows the linguistic mind to penetrate into the environment, hugely expanding our sense of being in a ‘world’. Advanced language both shapes reality and receives it.⁶⁶ It is this receptivity of our linguistic consciousness which allows the speaking other to enter into us (as part of the world around us) through the social cognition system, in ways that give us access to how they think and feel. With the emergence of advanced language from within the social cognition system, we begin to know the mind of the other and become capable of joint decision-making.

As we saw earlier, it is this dynamic of the primary reception of the other which shapes the different kinds of reasoning we do, as either ‘theoretical reasoning’, ‘practical reasoning’ or, most significantly, ‘community reasoning’. It is only in the third of these that we accept the priority of the communicating presence of the human other which is established in the social cognition system, at the level of our pre-thematic

66 Rowan D. Williams, *The Edge of Words* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2014), pp. 66–94.

embodiment, to determine the nature of our conscious decision-making. This now includes the other, not as an object to be subjected to my control, but rather as a person who is recognized as a ‘friend’.

The key dynamic here lies in the difference between instrumentalizing or control-orientated modes of reasoning and the refusal of this, through the determination to make a properly open or non-controlling decision. Of course, instrumentalizing or control-orientated modes of reasoning have their place, but our social viability calls for open interpersonal relations which manifest respect and equality and are foundationally inclusive. For Scotus, three kinds of freedom predominate: *velle* (‘I want’), *nolle* (‘I don’t want’) and *non velle* (‘my mind is still open’).⁶⁷ *Velle* and *nolle* both point to a form of self-interested possessiveness (*affectio commodi*), while the third kind of willing is a conceptual innovation which points to our capacity not to come to premature judgment but rather to remain open in our moral questioning. This is termed *affectio iustitiae*, or ‘love for justice’.⁶⁸ Both Robert Kane and Duns Scotus are concerned with human freedom, exercised in contexts of complex moral judgment, and each, in their own terms, points to the primary structure of human integrity as maintaining an open responsiveness in the face of the complex real. The philosopher Paul Janz captures this very well when he describes it as ‘a finality of non-resolution’ where ‘finality’ points to a ‘decision for openness’ in which we accept a demanding situation unreservedly and resolve to ‘stay with it’.⁶⁹

In a way that recalls for us quantum theory in our own times, Scotus holds that the whole of the created order is contingent and free. He believes, with Augustine, that the divine will itself is creative and free, and so the radical freedom in our moral choosing is the product of our own createdness, itself reflecting the original divine free will by which the world was created and is held in being.⁷⁰ It is only because the world is contingent and free that human beings can also be free within contingency and can discover in this freedom their own reciprocal mode of moral creativity.⁷¹

Finally, in parallel with the ‘infinite human translational invariance’ of the previous section, we can see here too a theological version – in this case the Trinity – which lends thinking about ‘justice’ a universalist dimension. The Franciscans

⁶⁷ Ingham and Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus*, pp. 146–72.

⁶⁸ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 6, in Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, pp. 295–302. For a discussion of this text, see Allan B. Wolter, ‘Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus,’ in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 148–62. See also Simon Francis Gaine, *Will There be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability and Beatitude* (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2003), pp. 119–36.

⁶⁹ Paul D. Janz, *God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 19–23.

⁷⁰ See John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 7 and *Ordinatio* III, suppl. dist. 37, in Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, pp. 195–207.

⁷¹ *Ordinatio* II, dd. 34–37, q. 5, n. 96, in Ingham and Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus*, pp. 138–45.

were drawn by the concept of *condilectio* as ‘shared love’ or ‘co-love’. As Lydia Schumacher states this: ‘co-love occurs when a third is loved by the two in harmony and collectively (*concorditer et socialiter*) so that the two persons’ affects are fused to become one because of the flame of love for the third.’⁷² This is a version of Trinitarian theology, which originates in Richard of St Victor, and which places a particular emphasis on the ‘third’ beyond the dyad of the ‘inter-face’. We can read this today as a particular appeal to the cultural extension of love, as based in the social cognition system, into larger scale modern society, along the axis of a universalist ‘love for justice’.

Natural Law

Finally, we come to the question of ‘natural law’ which was a fundamental topic of debate throughout the medieval period. It has proved difficult to defend this idea in the modern period however, with our greater awareness of the diversity of ethical systems and the challenge of defending any kind of normativity. The understanding of the *SH* is that ‘natural law is knowledge of the eternal law impressed in the soul.’⁷³ We read: ‘as the image, which is in the seal, impresses, and the image which is in the wax is impressed and is the image of that which is in the seal, so it is here, because the eternal law impresses, and the natural law is impressed in the soul.’⁷⁴ In Riccardo Saccenti’s summary, ‘the eternal law is received by rational creatures and thus it is made present to their minds through impression rather than through an autonomous search on the part of reason itself.’⁷⁵

Here the force of *impressa* or ‘impressed’ is considerable, since this is a physical image and contrasts with Thomas Aquinas’ later definition of natural law as being grounded in our powers of reasoning. Thomas defines natural law in terms of the ‘participation of the rational creature in the eternal law.’⁷⁶ This means that it is ‘not something received by rational creatures but (...) [is itself] a product of reason’: a form of knowledge produced by the practical intellect.⁷⁷

The debates around natural law have concerned the locus of law in us, to which we respond through conscience or a sense of the right thing to do. The later Aristo-

⁷² Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 174.

⁷³ Riccardo Saccenti, ‘From the “lex aeterna” to the “leges addictae”’: John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis*,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, ed. Lydia Schumacher, Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 227–50, on p. 245.

⁷⁴ Saccenti, ‘From the “lex aeterna” to the “leges addictae,”’ p. 245. Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, P2, In2, Q1, C1 (n. 241), Ad obiecta 2, p. 340.

⁷⁵ Saccenti, ‘From the “lex aeterna” to the “leges addictae,”’ p. 245.

⁷⁶ *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 91, a. 2, cited in Saccenti, ‘From the “lex aeterna” to the “leges addictae,”’ p. 248.

⁷⁷ Saccenti, ‘From the “lex aeterna” to the “leges addictae,”’ p. 248.

telian account prioritizes reason or mind as producing a form of moral knowledge which is not practice-orientated or habit-forming knowledge but rather rationally-constituted understanding which shares in the nature of eternal law. The *SH* on the other hand, envisages the locus of natural law in us to be bound up with the material concept of *impressa*.

Today's neuroscience offers a very different conception of 'conscience' and 'law'. Freedom of choice is a function of our advanced linguistic consciousness, while the strong sociality which is a central part of our evolutionary inheritance is 'pre-thematic' and embedded within the interacting, participative, complex systems of our social cognition. The first choice we have to make as free agents is whether and to what extent we shall allow ourselves as conscious, self-possessing mind to conform with our own other-orientated social cognition which is already a 'given' of our biology. As we have seen, as conscious agent we like to retain control, while an unconditional acceptance of the other entails at least a significant loosening of control. There is an inevitable tension then between those systems that support self-possessing consciousness with its power of choice, on the one hand, and the deep-set, participative, pre-thematic systems which are our long-term inheritance on the other.

The concept of a natural law which is 'impressed' in us – with all the associations of this word with materiality and embodiment – sits well with the distinction between pre-thematic social cognition and self-aware decision-making. We *have* to allow our social cognition to bond with the social cognition of others, if we wish to have any close allies and friends. But at the same time, this 'law' is not something that we devise for ourselves. Rather it is a given of time and space and of our long-term evolutionary history. Our social cognition system constitutes an open-ended, inclusive, interactive and evaluative center in us which grounds our capacity for social bonding, where we will to consent to renounce manipulative control over the other. Here the body's prior 'option for the other' is in play. In this sense our social cognition system *functions* in a way parallel to the medieval concept of 'natural law'.

And there is a final dimension to natural law here. In the *SH*, natural law is associated with 'divine commands'. These are culturally mediated, moral imperatives which directly address the thinking mind. The combination of pre-thematic, inherited social cognition, and its 'option for the other,' with the divine commands of a religious culture such as that delineated in the *SH*, secures the strong interplay between body and mind: the pre-thematic and the conscious self. Such explicit moral imperatives within the community then allow for ever deeper levels of freedom, expressed in the personal unity of body and mind, which begin to take us beyond virtue ethics.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Lydia Schumacher, 'Divine Command Theory in Early Franciscan Thought: A Response to the Autonomy Objection,' *Studies in Christian Ethics* 29:4 (2016), pp. 461–76.

Conclusion

The original sources drawn upon in the scientific sections of this article reflect high levels of epistemic authority, based in the empirical scientific method. This is necessarily a specialist discourse. The questions being addressed however increasingly concern significant dimensions of human existence as such. They engage our deep history in both evolutionary and neuroscientific terms and clearly they potentially constitute a valuable resource for our self-understanding today.

To the extent that there is found to be a congruence between contemporary science and early Franciscan thought, as represented by the *Summa Halensis*, we can legitimately speak of the latter as an authoritative text whose significance goes beyond its own times, reaching even to our own. But what follows from this? Of course, such authority underlines the potential reception today of early Franciscan philosophical and theological resources, as more is retrieved and communicated. This is a religious text which can potentially combine with science in innovative ways, for a religious readership. But this brings a second question into play. The *Summa Halensis* is not just a religious text: it is also an anthropological one, within a cosmic framework which resonates with science today.

The phenomenon of 'enlightenment' presupposes a configuration of science and culture in combination. This was the character of the Enlightenment which shaped Western modernity. We may be entering a period of second Enlightenment, however: one based not in the technological side of our human evolution but rather in the social side. If this is the case, then entirely new dialogues between science and social traditions may be on the horizon. Such traditions, with the *SH* a prominent and perhaps exceptional case, will be needed not only as resources for understanding our past but also for shaping our future. An Enlightenment is produced through the combination of science and culture, and the shape of a *social* Enlightenment will rely upon long term textual sources which can encode the new science within liberating and imaginative narratives. These may be able to foster community within large scale populations and between large scale populations in our global spaces. The narrative, imaginative, and practical styles of religious traditions can be powerful drivers of social change. If our new scientific self-understanding as human can be discretely supported by a text such as the *Summa Halensis*, then it might even be possible to develop a new kind of scientific genre: one in which a social kind of scientific knowledge is transferred into populations through the skills of image and narrative, with authority.

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Oleg Bychkov is Professor of Theology at St Bonaventure University, New York. He has a diploma in Classics from the University of Moscow, Lomonossov, and a PhD in Medieval Studies from the University of Toronto. Bychkov has various degrees of command of twelve languages, most recently adding Sanskrit, Arabic, and Farsi. His main focus is the intellectual history of aesthetics, including sensory perception and cognitive theory, from antiquity to modernity, with a focus on medieval aesthetics. A subsection of his study of aesthetics is theological aesthetics, both medieval and modern. Bychkov has published a number of books—as author, editor, or translator—mostly related to the history of aesthetics. One of his fundamental projects has been editing and translating John Duns Scotus' Parisian Lectures (*Reportatio Parisiensis*), an ongoing effort. Most recently, his interests have shifted towards medieval non-Western aesthetics and cognitive theory, specifically to interactions between Indian (Hindu and Buddhist) and Islamic (Arabic and Persian) cultures in Central Asian areas in the Middle Ages.

William J. Courtenay, PhD Harvard, is the Hilldale and Charles Homer Haskins Professor emeritus of Medieval History at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research field is medieval intellectual history, including the history of medieval philosophy and theology and the history of universities, particularly the University of Paris. Among his publications are *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England* (1987), *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (1990), *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century* (1999), *Rotuli Parisienses: Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, 3 vols. (2002, 2004, 2013), and *Ockham and Ockhamism* (2008). He is a fellow of the Medieval Academy of America, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Royal Historical Society, and the British Academy.

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