

THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA
1919—1924

VERHANDELINGEN
VAN HET KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT
VOOR TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE

62

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THE HAGUE - MARTINUS NIJHOFF 1972



I.S.B.N. 90.247.1334.X

PREFACE

The first incentive to write this book originated from a post-graduate course in Asian history which the University of Amsterdam organized in 1966. I am happy to acknowledge that the university where I received my training in the period from 1933 to 1940 also provided the stimulus for its final completion.

I am greatly indebted to the personal interest taken in my studies by professor Dr. W. F. Wertheim and Dr. J. M. Pluvier. Without their encouragement, their critical observations and their advice the result would certainly have been of less value than it may be now. The same applies to Mrs. Dr. S. C. L. Vreede-de Stuers, who was prevented only by ill-health from playing a more active role in the last phase of preparation of this thesis. I am also grateful to professor Dr. G. F. Pijper who was kind enough to read the second chapter of my book and gave me valuable advice.

Beside this personal and scholarly help I am indebted for assistance of a more technical character to the staff of the India Office Library and the India Office Records, and also to the staff of the Public Record Office, who were invariably kind and helpful in guiding a foreigner through the intricacies of their libraries and archives.

I also remember with gratitude Miss M. D. Wainwright of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who was the first to advise me in these matters. The staff of the library of the Technological University at Eindhoven was kind enough to facilitate my contacts with British libraries. Finally my thanks are due to Mrs. L. F. Richards for correcting my English manuscript, and to professor Dr. A. L. Vos for his readiness to supervise her work.

I am most grateful to the "Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde" for its willingness to publish my book as one of its "Verhandelingen", and to the Foundation "Oosters Instituut" for subsidizing this publication. My thanks are also due to the Netherlands Foundation

for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) which gave me a grant and thereby made possible my research in London.

Secondly, I should like to say something about the nature of this book and my object in writing it. Having become interested in Hindu-Muslim relations as a factor in the Indo-Pakistan issue, I found my attention drawn to the Khilafat movement in pre-partition India, since it was instrumental in bringing the two communities together for a short period. I was thus confronted with the question: what was the Khilafat movement? I did not find a very clear answer in the current literature. There are many books devoting a few pages, sometimes even a chapter, to the Khilafat movement, but none of these is quite explicit about its background and its importance for Indian Muslims. I set about finding an answer to these questions myself, and the result is presented in this book. But because my interest was focused on Hindu-Muslims relations, my research covers only the period up to the time when the Khilafat question ceased to be an issue in Indian politics.

Another point is that every student of a subject of Indian history who conducts his study and research in Europe accepts, by that very fact, certain limitations, as he is not able to consult archives in India and Pakistan. In my own case there was also a personal limitation, since I do not know any Indian languages. On the other hand, the London archives contain a wealth of material, and many Indians who played a role of some importance in the history of their country or took an interest in events, wrote and published their views in English, and this compensated, to some extent at least, for these limitations. But this does not alter the fact that my study can by no means pretend to be exhaustive; it cannot be more than a contribution to the study of a subject on which other historians will be able to throw more light.

A special problem was constituted by the orthography of Oriental words and proper names. Not being an Orientalist I did not want to make a false pretence of learning by borrowing an orthography that would meet all scholarly requirements; I preferred to adopt a simple system which has proved its practical usefulness. This I found in the system used by Sir Percival Spear in the third edition of the *Oxford History of India*, which generally consists in the Hunterian system of spelling but without making use of diacritical marks.

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There is one more person I wish to thank: my wife, who encouraged me to take up these studies and ungrudgingly left me to them for so many evenings, week-ends and holidays when I might have been with her and my family.

Eindhoven, *January 1972*

A. C. NIEMEIJER

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CHAPTER I

SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM IN INDIA

Nationalism is generally acknowledged to be one of the great driving forces — perhaps even the most powerful of them — in modern history. This statement will probably not meet with much opposition, but it might very well evoke a polite question as to its precise meaning, or even the blunt comment that it has no meaning at all. The problem is that no concise and acceptable definition of the concept of nationalism has been formulated thus far, notwithstanding the fact that a good many historians, and political theorists as well as practitioners, have attempted to find one.¹ Probably no definition combining conciseness with relevancy is possible in the case of a concept which, in common parlance, covers such disparate phenomena as the nationalism of revolutionary France about 1800, Italian nationalism about 1860, Indian nationalism about the beginning of our century, Russian nationalism in the era of Stalin, and African nationalism at present. For that reason, any general definition is apt to be lacking in substance, like this one quoted from H. Kohn, a well-known authority on the subject: "Nationalism is the state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state."² Apart from containing the word "nation", badly in need of definition itself if this definition of nationalism is to be of any use, this sentence does not convey very much. But this is a fact of which Kohn is well aware: his definition is not a conclusion, but only a starting-point for further argument.

But luckily we are not obliged to solve all the problems arising here. We are not primarily interested in nationalism as a general concept, but with its concrete shape in the Indian environment. Therefore, we will feel free to use the term "Indian nationalism" if we are able to make clear what we mean by it. In other words: we think we may be content with a very vague definition of nationalism if we are able to point out the special features of Indian nationalism as we see it.

We might start from the truism that nationalism is a kind of group loyalty. But, like every truism, this one, too, poses more questions than it answers. What exactly is the group involved? And has the loyalty it commands any special qualities when compared with other loyalties?

The group involved is, of course, the nation, but then, what is a nation? To this question, there are two kinds of answer, an "objective" one, defining the nation by more or less outward qualities like the possession of a territory, of a common language, culture, religion, history, and so on, and a "subjective" one, stressing the consciousness of a group that it is constituting a nation because its members wish to do so. In the first case, the nation is mainly looking backwards for its legitimation. This attitude suited many European nations which in the 19th century already existed as fairly homogeneous groups — we are thinking of the Germans, the Italians, the Hungarians for instance. With them, nationalism was an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation coincide.³ In the second case, however, it is the future which has to prove the nation's right to exist. This attitude had to be assumed by many recently acknowledged Asian (and African) nations made up of rather heterogeneous components, which had been brought together by foreign domination and were united mainly by the urge to get rid of it.

In the Indian context, the possibility of these different approaches is important because the choice between them, to some extent, determines whether further analysis will result in one or two (or even more) nations in India — the "two-nation theory" justifying the demand for Pakistan was based partly upon the "subjective" theory of the nation. Therefore, it is not surprising that an adversary of the partition of India, like A. R. Desai, bases his view on the "objective" theory; he calls the Muslim community in pre-partition India "a socio-religious group", or a "minority", and not a nation because it did not have a territory of its own, nor a language or an economy which it did not share with non-Muslim Indians.⁴ On the other hand, to a partisan of Pakistan, like K. K. Aziz, "the first and most prominent" of the conditions or beliefs making up nationalism is "the common group feeling which inspires the members of a nation."⁵ Several modern theorists show a tendency to lean towards the latter point of view. One of them is Kedourie, considering nationalism in the last resort as an act of the will;⁶ another is R. Emerson, writing: "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-

spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well.”⁷ Nor could it be contended that these theories are made up to accommodate the Pakistanis or some other of the “young” nations who recently claimed their place in the international community; they go back to, at least, Ernest Renan who, as early as 1882 already, wrote that “the existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day.”⁸ But it is the emergence of Pakistan which, in our opinion, makes it difficult to deny any relevance to the “subjective” theory when considering nationalism in pre-partition India.

It is the subsequent history of Pakistan, however, which demonstrates the restricted validity of the same theory. Evidently, the desire to constitute a nation which is held together only by that desire and by a common religion, does not provide the new nation with a very secure basis for further development. Another way of putting this is that the outward qualities stressed by the “objective” theory are most helpful in creating the sense of belonging together required by the “subjective” theory. But we should bear in mind that an imaginary possession of these qualities may, to some degree, replace their real presence. An imagined or invented common past may have the same effect as a common past legitimated by historical research; myth may stand for reality to a large extent. But it is very much open to question whether a nation could do wholly without a basis in factual reality.

Possession of a territory is considered as the least dispensable of these outward qualities. Territory “. . . is the only element, with the will of the population itself, whose presence is generally considered as the *sine qua non* of the realization of a nation.”⁹ The reason — or one reason, at least — might be that a territory is necessary for the establishment of a state, which is the political self-expression of a nation. The doctrine of nationalism, as Kedourie expounds it, “divides humanity into separate and distinct nations, claims that such nations must constitute sovereign states, and asserts that the members of a nation reach freedom and fulfilment by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation.”¹⁰ It is this separateness of nations that makes it impossible for any of them to accept being ruled by another nation. Nationalism can never be a purely “national” matter; it is always, to some degree, setting off the nation it is serving against other nations, or against foreigners.¹¹ Remarkably often it takes the form of a fight for freedom and independence, and quite naturally so in the case of colonial peoples. Anti-foreignism, notably anti-westernism, has been a clearly visible component

in Indian nationalism since the days of Tilak at least. A drawback of this tendency, however, is that the foreigner may become the scapegoat for all evils besetting the nation. This too may be observed in the case of Indian nationalism; not a few nationalist leaders told their followers, and probably thought themselves, that poverty and internal strife would cease once the British Raj was ousted from power. Anti-westernism, in most colonial relationships, was intensified by racial antagonism, which in India seems to have made itself felt, notably since about the year 1890, more strongly than before.¹²

The concept of a nation as a separate identity with a character of its own raises, for those who are becoming aware of this fact, the question as to the nature of this identity. In plain words: when a man realizes that he is an Indian and as such fundamentally different from Englishmen, he will be inclined to ask himself what exactly it means to be an Indian, or wherein his Indian-ness exists. It is only when some progress on this road has been made that the fight for political independence will make sense. Minogue describes nationalism as a three-stage process, consisting of an initial stage of stirrings, characterized by the search for a cultural identity, a second stage marked by the struggle for independence, and a third stage of national consolidation.¹³ This analysis of the process is quite appropriate, we think, in the case of Indian nationalism.¹⁴ Looking at it this way, we may call Rammohan Roy, the founder of the *Brahmo Samaj* movement, one of the first Indian nationalists, representing the initial stage of nationalism.

This observation leads to another, to which we have already alluded when comparing the two theories of nationalism: that nationalists are often championing nations which do not — or not yet — exist, a problem confronting nationalism notably in former colonies.¹⁵ Many nationalists, therefore, have declared themselves to be engaged in “nation-building”; in India we might cite the case of Gokhale, mentioning it as one of the aims of his Servants of India Society.¹⁶ The British often spoke slightly of Indian nationalists as “a microscopic minority” of the Indian people, or even denied the existence of an Indian nation. In a sense they were right, for early Indian nationalists were pleading the rights of the Indian nation in a time when national consciousness had not yet spread among the masses, and when they spoke about national rights, many of them probably had in mind only the rights of their own limited group. But it was not very statesmanlike to act upon the assumption that this situation would remain the same for ever, because a people not constituting a nation may become one.

Another aspect of the consciousness of a national identity is a sense of national dignity. Finding their own identity was the only way for colonial peoples to liberate themselves from the suffocating pressure exerted upon them by the rulers' example, which always started from the assumption that the rulers' civilization was a better one than that of the "natives".¹⁷ And the feeling of being second-rate subjects of a foreign power is considered by Emerson to be one of the strongest motivations of nationalism, far more important than any other kind of oppression or exploitation.¹⁸ In India this tendency is revealed by Tilak, advocating "militancy — not mendicancy" in dealings with the British rulers; it was also one of the prominent incentives of Gandhi's feelings and actions. His first full-time occupation with public work was occasioned by a law against which he revolted because, as he wrote: "It strikes at the root of our self-respect."¹⁹

Thus far we have tried to establish some aspects characterizing the concept of the nation, but it may be useful to ascertain as well what is not a nation. We started from the statement that nationalism is a kind of group loyalty — but there are groups other than the nation, also commanding man's loyalty: the family, the tribe, the caste, the religious community. In the context of our subject it is important to compare the nation with the religious community, since nationalism and communalism were rival forces in the last half-century of British rule in India.

W. C. Smith defines communalism in India²⁰ "as that ideology which has emphasized as the social, political and economic unit the group of adherents of each religion, and has emphasized the distinction, even the antagonism, between such groups."²¹ We would like to adopt this definition, though much is left unsaid by it. Smith follows it up with the comment that no definition of communalism remains valid for long, because the phenomenon is changing and developing; in the last years — he refers to the period from about 1940 to 1945 — it has developed into something that might be better called "nationalism". But unfortunately he does not make quite clear wherein this development lies, a question to which we will come back later. The first problem in our context, however, seems to be the growth of communalism from about 1900, a growth all the more remarkable because, on the face of it, it would seem that circumstances — foreign oppression suffered by all Indians alike — were propitious for engendering a sense of national unity. The explanation given by Smith for this phenomenon may be outlined as follows: (a) the Muslim middle class was economic-

ally backward as compared with the Hindu middle class, and (b) the British played off the upper and middle classes of one community against those of the other.²² This last part of his explanation actually means that he is denying that all Indians were suffering *alike*. Apart from British favouritism along communal lines which certainly occurred, but, in our opinion, was not quite as deliberate and consistent as Smith represents it, we may think here about the colour bar. Even this, though operative against all Indians, hampered mainly the westernized élite in their social and economic aspirations, far more than it did the lower classes. This may be one reason why nationalism originated among that élite rather than among the masses.

The explanation Smith gives for the growth of communalism is closely bound up with the view he takes of the causes of communalism itself. As such he enumerates "many and intricate factors: economic, religious, psychological, and so on."²³ But he makes it quite clear that from this group he singles out economic circumstances as "the efficient cause", whereas religion is "an accompanying factor."²⁴ This accompanying factor, however, is apt to be put forward by communal leaders or other interested parties (like the British) as the main cause, concealing by this means the real issue: "In fact . . . communal riots have been isolated instances of class struggles fought in communal guise."²⁵

True, these contentions should not be taken in too narrow a sense; in the course of his elaborate argument he introduces many reservations and elucidations. So it is clear that by "class struggles" he understands not only conflicts between different classes, like peasants and landlords, but also competition between various sections within the same class, for instance between the Muslim middle class and their Hindu counterparts. And speaking about religion as an "accompanying factor", he adds: "In emphasizing the fact that religion is not the efficient cause of communal riots, we do not mean to deny that when it is an accompanying factor it is an exceedingly important one."²⁶ But all the same, the tenor of his whole exposition with regard to the growth of communalism is that — apart from the role the British played — economic factors are by far the most important agents in the process. Here we think the author is somewhat one-sided, and, as a consequence, is underrating the part other factors may have played.²⁷ We consider religion as one of these; as another, the changes in the structure and distribution of political power in India. They were apt to be combined because of the religious aspects of worldly power in Islamic thought.²⁸

Nevertheless, the analysis given by Smith may contain a good deal

of truth. In the case of any political or religious movement it is very appropriate to ask: "Who is going to profit by it?", or: "Which result would be the most profitable for the leaders?" It seems highly probable that "the leadership of these movements, even though they assume an idealistic terminology . . . may well be in the hands of groups which fight in the first place to oust and supplant those who, in the traditional structure, had a monopoly of certain prominent functions."²⁹ These suspicions may be confirmed by the observation that the purely religious content of communalism tends to be somewhat meagre: religious practices, customs, rites, and ceremonies gain importance, at the cost of genuine convictions and spiritual attitudes.³⁰ We may safely assume that many members of the Muslim League were more concerned about opportunities for the Muslim upper and middle classes than about the interests of the Muslim community as a whole or about the future of Islam. The same, however, does not quite apply to revivalist movements. The Wahabi movement in India, though not communalist, prepared the way for later communalism by stressing the values of pure Islam as it saw them.³¹ Pan-Islamism in India found its adherents among the Deoband ulama as well as among members of the westernized middle class; it was not communalist in itself, but it gave an impetus to communal distinctions which could easily lead on to communalism.³² On the Hindu side, we may note the same effect with regard to the revivalist movement of the *Arya Samaj* which, quite understandably, found its following mainly in the Punjab, where the Hindus constituted a minority population.³³ In these cases we see what Dumont calls "the separative effect of revivalism."³⁴ Some leaders of these revivalist movements probably were motivated by genuine religious feelings; we think this is the case with at least some Khilafat leaders, like, for instance, the Ali brothers. On the other hand, the revivalist movements may have been used by political leaders who wanted to further their own worldly interests or those of the group they belonged to, but the following they recruited by emphasizing religious values and distinctions might be motivated by intentions other than those of the leaders. A process of this kind is, to our opinion, very aptly illustrated by the ultimate evolution of Muslim communalism in India. If this had not been, or had not become, anything more than the expression of a class struggle or of middle class competition, it would be difficult to explain the religious character Muslim nationalism in India assumed about 1940, and in this case the religious impulse came from the following rather than from the leaders.³⁵ Whether this religious impulse was strong

enough to create a viable "Islamic state" as Pakistan wanted to be is another matter — but we think the impulse was a reality, something more than a "guise". In other words, the following had given the movement a content other than that which many of its leaders may have wanted it to have.

Speaking about this development of communalism into nationalism we must say something about the difference between the nation and the community. In our opinion, an important point is their relationship to political power. A nation is considering the state as its natural expression in the political field, which means that a nation is either wielding sovereign power or is aspiring to do so. The religious community does not, as a rule, assume the same attitude. In a multi-communal state, like India was, the communities acknowledge the sovereign power of the ruler; in pre-partition India this was either an Indian prince or the British Raj. This situation influences their mutual relationship; conflicts between them are suppressed or settled by the sovereign power, and therefore the communities live mostly in a condition of enforced or voluntary compromise. Violence between them may occur, but is considered reprehensible.

The mutual relationship between nations is not the same. There is no authority above them. Nations with conflicting interests may compromise if they think it opportune, but violence is an accepted means of solving conflicts. The *ultima ratio* of the nation is war, or, in the case of a nation under foreign domination, revolt; the use of violence in the service of a nation is not looked upon as reprehensible, but as perfectly legitimate or even laudable.³⁶ The fact that violence became more and more accepted in intercommunal relations in the last decades of pre-partition India might perhaps be interpreted in the sense that the religious community was taking over the role of the nation, wanting to establish itself as a state.

These considerations may, partly at least, explain why a change in the structure and distribution of political power could not but influence the character of Muslim communalism in India.³⁷ Under the arbitrary rule of the princes in the pre-British period, and, thereafter, in those Indian states which maintained their "independence", communal conflicts could hardly manifest themselves.³⁸ When, in British India, princely rule was replaced by the rule of law, one consequence was that economic power became independent from political power; it was the middle class of merchants and bankers, mainly Hindus, which profited by this development, whereas the Muslim élite, whose position had been closely

connected with political power, lost its employment. The demand for privileges from this side was a natural reaction which had not to be invented by the British. This was one cause of the growth of communalist tension. Moreover, the British government, not wanting to interfere with religious matters — certainly not after 1857 — did not do much to suppress these tensions which, as a consequence, were able to come out into the open. But the most radical change was coming when a democratic government along parliamentary lines came into the offing, at first advocated only by Congress but, after the announcement of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1917, accepted as the aim of government policy. The prince had been replaced by the law; now the making of the law would — in a future which British officials hoped was very remote, but which Indians tried to bring as near as possible — be put in the hands of the Indians themselves.

But of which Indians? The Hindu upper and middle class, or the Hindu upper caste? The Muslim upper and middle class, or the Muslim religious leaders? Or an Indian upper and middle class, irrespective of creed or caste? These were the parties most likely to make a bid for power, and the Muslim upper and middle class, being the weakest and feeling unsafe, became intent on getting at least a share in sovereign power. This made them want an independent state,³⁹ and therefore they had to constitute a separate nation. But they then had to enlist the masses, and religion proved to be the most effective means to get a hold over them, evidently because their Muslim identity counted most for them. By this process, however, the nature of the political aspirations of the movement was also determined, to some extent at least: it became tinged with religion. This is how, in our opinion, Muslim communalism developed into Muslim nationalism.

The Khilafat movement probably did something to promote this development. In the first place, it made Indian Muslims fully realize what the loss of worldly power meant to them as Muslims; and, in the second place, by their participation in this movement they got entangled in international politics and therefore became aware that they had to act as the equals of other nations. This might have been, with regard to the Khilafat question, within the framework of an Indian nation, and many leaders, Hindu as well as Muslim, intended it to be so. Nevertheless, the Khilafat movement remained largely a communal movement; its failure furthered Muslim communalism, and, in its wake, Indian Muslim nationalism.

On the other hand, we should realize that this whole development

did not present itself at the time as an unescapable fate, predictable from the very beginning, since there were counteracting forces. Indian nationalism, of which Congress was the main political exponent, was perhaps the most effective of them. On the Muslim side, part of the westernized middle class was willing to co-operate with Congress, especially when, after about 1910, they got the impression that England was an enemy of Islam; we are referring here to men like the Ali brothers and Dr. Ansari. No less important was that the ulama — at least those of the famous Deoband school — distrusted the middle class communalist leaders and were not averse to co-operation with Congress.⁴⁰ Eventually they accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's theory of composite nationalism, aiming at an integrated alliance between Hindus and Muslims in an Indian nation, in which, however, both communities would preserve their own identity.⁴¹ But these forces opposing communalism were, in the last resort, not able to carry the Muslim masses with them.

After this digression on communalism and some of the problems related to it, we want to return to the concept of nationalism proper. We have yet to say something on the kind of loyalty that the nation commands. As we said before, nationalism as we see it is based upon the assumption that humanity is divided into separate and distinct nations — a division ordained and willed either by God or by Nature, or by both of them.⁴² The individual is seen solely as a part of the organic entity of the nation. The nation, or the national state, takes on a quasi-religious character, and the key-words referring to the relation between the individual and the nation, or between the citizen and the national state, are service and sacrifice.

National loyalty was called by Kohn the "supreme loyalty"; Emerson writes about a loyalty "overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a whole."⁴³ Nationalism is always in favour of "desperate struggles" and "heroic deeds", and often worships violence; it spurns "compromise" and tolerance. It does fight for national freedom, but individual freedom often fares badly when nationalism reaches its goal.⁴⁴ The nation is an imperious master; it is impatient of any rivals which might lay claim to supreme loyalty themselves, such as the religious community, class, or the individual conscience.

This disdain for any compromise and this leaning towards sacrifice and heroic struggles, condoning even political murder, are clearly to be

noted in Indian nationalism since about 1900 when the Extremists in Congress and the terrorists in Maharashtra and Bengal came to the fore. It is their rejection of compromise where the nation is concerned which surely entitles them to the name of nationalists, whereas Moderate leaders like Gokhale are sometimes considered as the exponents of "patriotism" only.⁴⁵ We do not agree with this latter view. A leader like Gokhale, devoting his life to the reform of Indian society, which meant for him at the same time an effort towards nation-building, may be called a nationalist even if his nationalism had not yet fully developed.⁴⁶ If we want to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism we should, in our opinion, primarily look out for the ideological background of the former, which is absent from the latter. We propose to apply the term "patriotism" to a kind of group loyalty of a more primitive and universal character, whereas nationalism, as we see it, is based upon a particular set of ideas.⁴⁷ Patriotism, therefore, is easily compatible with Islam, whereas to reconcile nationalism to Islam is much more difficult.⁴⁸ Patriotism will often be one of the elements contributing to the force of nationalism, and therefore it will often be impossible to distinguish between them in historical reality — but patriotism does not, by itself, constitute nationalism.

The same could be said of xenophobia or anti-foreignism which, like patriotism, is a very common reaction in any group brought into contact with other groups, and is not dependent upon any theory about these groups. Like patriotism, xenophobia will often be one of the incitements used by nationalism, but is not the same thing. Xenophobia is described as a basic trait of Hindu society by Nirad C. Chaudhuri⁴⁹ and he even writes about "xenophobic nationalism" already existing in India by the year 1000 A.D., but we prefer to omit the term nationalism in that case, because, from the examples quoted by him, it nowhere appears that the concept of an Indian nation, in the modern sense of the word, had been evolved by then.

The modern concept of the nation was introduced into India from the West in the 19th century. The contents given to the structure were, to a large extent, also of western origin. In this respect, two trends at least may be discerned: (a) a liberal trend, emulating the example set by the British national ideal, notable for its stress on reverence for the law, on individual liberty, and on the free consent of the governed as the basis for government, and (b) a revolutionary trend, inspired by Italian and Irish nationalism. The first trend determined the course of the leaders of Congress in its first three decades; the second one is

to be found among the Extremist faction which constituted itself about 1900. It is not surprising that the British rulers in India felt much more sympathy with the former than with the latter, and perhaps not only because it was easier to keep in check, but also because it was in conformity with what the British themselves thought possible or desirable in India, whereas they abhorred the revolutionary methods of men like Parnell and Mazzini.⁵⁰

This liberal trend in Indian nationalism decidedly lost much of its vigour and influence after the Surat split in Congress in 1907, the occasion of its last complete victory. But it remained strong enough to provide independent India with a democratic, parliamentary form of government after the western model, working better — at least if we judge it only according to its political merits — than in perhaps any other of the colonies which acquired independence after the Second World War and tried to set up a government of this kind. But it would be erroneous to depict Indian nationalism as a movement borrowing its orientation from the West only. Nationalism is always apt to look to the past for inspiration — in the origins of a culture its identity is most clearly visible, and moreover, by selecting a special part of the past, one may select just those values one is in need of.

In the nation's history, Indian nationalism found Hinduism which, from Rammohan Roy's days onwards, became one of the elements moulding it.⁵¹ This could be a reformist Hinduism like the *Brahmo Samaj's*, but since the beginning of our century this has been superseded by orthodox and revivalist varieties of Hinduism.

There is yet another way in which the impact of the West influenced Indian nationalism: by making room for it. In the old, traditional society no nationalism could come into being since the loyalties to the family, the caste or the religious community were supreme; these loyalties, moreover, were often regionally limited. The development of a capitalist economy provoked new social mobility and gave rise to a new middle class, while regional frontiers lost something of their former importance. The security of having a traditionally assigned place in society was lost by people whose lives were influenced by the social mobility, and they sought for a new security, originating from a new loyalty. Nationalism may thus be understood as a phenomenon of change in the social order.⁵² There can be little doubt that British trade and British rule were largely instrumental in bringing about this change in Indian society, but we should bear in mind that the Indian reaction to this development was greatly influenced by Indian traditions, and

that possibly the establishment of British rule only accelerated a process which had already started entirely without its interference.⁵³ Nor should we forget that it is not only a change in economic conditions which may cause the feeling that the social fabric of life has become too narrow and needs to be widened or even to be set on a wholly different course. Rammohan Roy's own experiences with child marriage and *suttee* probably suffice to account for his reforming zeal, and Shah Wali-ullah, in the early 18th century, was not moved by any stirrings of early capitalism, but by the dilapidation of the Mughul Empire, for which he sought a remedy by restoring the purity of Islam.⁵⁴

If we look upon nationalism as a reaction to the external pressure of western economic and political expansion — and this is certainly an aspect of it in former colonies in general, as well as in India's case in particular — we would see it as an indirect result of British rule. But another view is also possible: the British may be seen as the rulers who united India by providing it with modern means of communication embracing the whole country, by providing it with a language in which the westernized élite, *i.e.* the new national leaders, could exchange ideas, by providing it with an administrative and political unity such as it had hardly ever known before. It is a view held by many British authors,⁵⁵ and it is not illogical when we consider the state of division characterizing India when the British entered it, as compared with near-unity when they left. Nor is it illogical when we consider the many dividing forces still threatening India's national existence: "communalism, casteism and linguism" are, in independent India, still denounced as the three threats to unity.⁵⁶ Both aspects of this situation are expressed by Amaury de Riencourt in this way, writing about Indian nationalist leaders: "Forgetting, or wanting to forget, that the real unifying element in India was precisely English culture, many leading Indians carelessly stimulated the dividing forces that could tear India apart again; they awakened all the dormant centrifugal forces that lay deep in India and had been laid to rest by the unifying action of the British. They encouraged the profound cultural cleavages that split the Hindus from the Muslims . . . They also awakened the cultural separatism of the various provinces by reviving the vernacular literatures . . ." ⁵⁷

With regard to this opinion, some remarks seem to be called for. First, that "the dormant centrifugal forces" may have been stimulated not only by "leading Indians", but could also have profited by the contact with British civilization and culture. Just as some Indian authors are inclined to ascribe all evils in their country to British rule, in a

passage like the one quoted above there seems to prevail a tendency to blame the Indians themselves for everything that went wrong during the period of British rule. Secondly, we should not overestimate India's lack of unity. At least three times in its long history, India reached a stage of political unity nearly equalling that of the British period, and up to the spring of 1947 there seemed to be a fair chance of avoiding partition. But with respect to one of the dividing factors, linguism, we should like to point out two facts which, in our opinion, are significant. The first is that the nationalist movement increased the desire of linguistic communities to be recognized as separate units.⁵⁸ To some extent we may see here a parallel to the growth of communalism; one not unimportant difference is that, to our knowledge, the British have never been accused of having deliberately provoked linguistic discord. And the second is that some of the remedies proposed in themselves testify to an essential lack of unity: pleas were made both for accepting a "basic Sanskrit" as the *lingua franca* for India,⁵⁹ and for assuming Urdu in that capacity.⁶⁰

Resuming our argument, we state that some authors considered Indian national unity as the direct, but unintentional, result of British rule. We think there is some truth in this opinion, not contending, however, that it contains the whole truth. But there is yet another way of looking at it: the British may be seen as deliberate nation-builders. There is, indeed, a continuous thread running through British-Indian history, at least from the Mutiny onwards: the growth of representative and, after 1919, of responsible government, training the Indians in a "civilized" way of handling the country's government and enabling them at last to constitute an independent national state. Naturally, this thesis is to be found in the works of some British historians.⁶¹ An obvious objection to it would be that this thread — which is not an imaginary one — may be explained in a quite different way: not as the product of deliberate British intentions, but as a British reaction to a development the Government of India had neither foreseen nor desired, to wit the growth of Indian nationalism, which forced the government to grant concessions time and again, however grudgingly.

We think there is some truth in this view too. The objection that it seems to be inconsistent to claim two opposite explanations as (partly) correct, we should like to meet with the observation that British policy towards India was not always consistent itself. It was a product of rather heterogeneous forces and tendencies, the strength and character of which could vary from moment to moment. British policy towards India was,

therefore, not constant, nor could it be expected to be so when viceroys of so different a political outlook and personality as Lord Ripon and Lord Curzon were, within less than twenty years, relieving each other at the top of the Government of India.

So far we have discussed two possible explanations of the relation between British rule in India on one side, and national unity and nationalism in that country on the other. The latter, as we have seen, are considered by some to be either the direct or the indirect result of the former. But the opposite view is held as well, as we have already indicated in the previous paragraph. The British, it is then contended, regarded national unity and nationalism as the gravest dangers to their position in India and did their utmost to hamper their progress by a policy of divide-and-rule. It is, by the way, possible to combine these two views, though they seem to be mutually exclusive. British efforts to thwart Indian nationalism might be explained away as attempts to delay the advent of Indian national unity and independence until a time when India would be ripe for it — for India's own good, so to speak.

This theory of a divide-and-rule policy could assume several shapes, the most common of which are that the division took place along class lines — the British favouring the landlords above the peasants, or the *haute bourgeoisie* above the proletariat — or along communal lines, by playing off Hindus and Muslims against each other. These proceedings could also be combined, which is the interpretation of Nehru, writing: "A new class, the owners of the land, appeared; a class created by, and therefore to a large extent identified with, the British government. The break-up of the old system created new problems, and probably the beginnings of the new Hindu-Muslim problem can be traced to it."⁶² In the same context he speaks about "the deliberate policy, pursued throughout the period of British rule, of creating divisions among Indians, of encouraging one group at the cost of the other. This policy was openly admitted in the early days of their rule, and indeed it was a natural one for an imperial power. With the growth of the nationalist movement, that policy took subtler and more dangerous forms, and though denied, functioned more intensively than ever."⁶³ In the same vein W. C. Smith writes that after a period of having held the Muslims in disgrace, the India Office changed its attitude about 1870. But, he continues, "The India Office did not abandon its communal policy. It continued to play off the middle and upper classes of one community against those of the other, and in fact has steadily intensified such tactics ever since."⁶⁴ A psychological explanation is offered by Thornton,

arguing that British sympathies in India were more with the Muslims than with the Hindus and that therefore, whether by policy or by instinct, they were apt to side with the former against the latter.⁶⁵ But the reproach could take much cruder forms. Not unfrequently one may come across the charge that the British instigated Hindu-Muslim riots.⁶⁶ And this macchiavellism of the British could, in its turn, use more subtle devices; Muhammad Ali writes about Hindu leaders displaying "religious bigotry against Musulmans chiefly as the result of the deliberate mis-education in the history of Moslem rule over India given by the British Government."⁶⁷

But not only is there a variety of mechanisms seen to be at work in this connection; it is also the direction of a divide-and-rule policy that can be viewed in quite different ways. The aforementioned authors put roughly the following construction upon events: after the Mutiny the British distrusted the Muslims and consequently favoured the Hindus, but when, after about 1870, nationalism reared its head among the Hindus, the Muslims were restored to British favour, with the ultimate result of partition in 1947. But the opposite view is defended by an author like A. Aziz, who contends that after the Mutiny the Brahmins were chosen by the British to act as their underlings, and to keep the Muslims down. This policy was continued up to 1947; "Indian" nationalism was invented and supported by the British as a boon for the Brahmins, as by this device one hundred and fifty million people of the old races — non-scheduled castes and aboriginals — were put under the Brahmins' thumb.⁶⁸

Confronted with these rather sweeping statements of a sometimes diametrically opposed character, we should watch our step before accepting too readily this theory as an interpretation of British rule in India. On the other hand, a divide-and-rule policy seems to provide so obvious a pattern of rule for a foreign conqueror trying to keep his hold over a population showing a great deal of diversity, that it would have been amazing if the British Raj in India had not made use of it. But, if it was so obvious, why then was it no longer openly admitted?⁶⁹ And, if no longer openly admitted, might it be expected to be continued in fact? To get an answer to these questions, we think it advisable to examine the concept of divide-and-rule more closely; thus we might get some idea of the kind of relations it may explain.

A striking aspect of the theory, as it occurs in the historiography of British rule in India, is the clearly deprecating sense in which it is used; when mentioned, it is nearly always with a connotation of moral denun-

ciation — it is something like a term of abuse. This meaning is not necessarily implicit in it. When reading that Talleyrand in 1805 recommended to Napoleon a policy which would drive a wedge between Austria and Russia as well as between Russia and Great-Britain,⁷⁰ we do not think him a scoundrel because of it, but a shrewd statesman.⁷¹ In foreign politics, nothing seems to be amiss with the maxim. In that context, it is considered as an obvious expedient, and the more so since an alliance between foreign enemies would be, just like the divide-and-rule stratagem itself, an opportunistic move, recommending itself by a temporary community of interests, but not by any higher principle.

It is only when higher principles are at stake that the divide-and-rule policy acquires its repellent qualities, and these principles may concern either the object of the division or the nature of the rule. To begin with the last: we are not surprised when a despot adopts a policy of divide-and-rule towards his subjects, because we assume the relation between ruler and subject to be one of open or latent hostility; a despot has always to be on his guard against rebellion.⁷² In this, a despot's rule is like foreign rule: there can be no identification between subjects and ruler. But things are different with a more democratic kind of rule, which needs the consent of the ruled, and where the principles of representation, and responsibility of the government lessen the distance between the government and the subjects. The opposition under a democratic government has its own place: it will disagree with the government on certain issues, but it can identify itself with the kind of government and with the state it belongs to.⁷³ The relation between government and citizens is not that of "foreigners", as it is between a despot and his subjects, and therefore a democratic government can hardly "divide" the people it governs. It will, however, try to get as large a following as possible by persuading people of the correctness and efficacy of the policy it stands for, by implementing plans taking the wind out of the opposition's sails, by putting as favourable an interpretation as possible on the policies it realized thus far, and so on. By these and similar means it will attempt to win over part of the opposition, or groups which show a tendency to slide over to the opposition. These proceedings may occasion rather bitter altercations between the government and the opposition, but the ultimate aim should not be looked upon as bringing about a "division" of the people by which the government might ensure its stay in power. A government acting in that way could not pretend to enjoy the consent of the people. There is, of course, more to be said about this; we do not take into

account here class antagonisms within the people, but a democratic government acts upon the assumption that these can be solved in a satisfactory way, and, in a national state, they will indeed yield to the interests of national unity.

This is bringing up the point we mentioned first in our discussion of the circumstances conferring a repellent character on a divide-and-rule policy: the object of the division. In the field of international relations, a policy creating divisions is not disreputable because no "sacred unity" is affected by it. In 16th century Europe, in the age of the wars of religion, it was considered quite normal and not at all ignominious when German princes sought the support of the King of France against the German Emperor, or when Philip II of Spain backed the Ligue in its struggle with Henry IV of France. Philip's meddling with French affairs provoked some French patriotism, but he was never accused of damaging French national unity, which is not surprising, since the French state depended upon God, not upon the nation.⁷⁴ But Napoleon's meddling with German affairs provoked Fichte's "Reden an die deutsche Nation". When the nation is acknowledged as the natural and God-willed division of mankind, and as the organic group from which individuals derive their importance, any attempt to play off groups belonging to the same nation against each other is thoroughly reprehensible — it is a crime equal to lese-majesty in former ages.

The above is a very sketchy analysis of very complicated relationships, but it allows us to draw some tentative conclusions. In the first place, it explains why a divide-and-rule policy becomes "inadmissible" when (a) it is put into practice upon a people who are in the process of developing into a nation, conscious of its national identity and unity, and (b) when the ruling power is trying, or is pretending to try, to base its government upon more or less democratic principles. The question remains whether these conditions were prevailing in India.

We think both of them were, though perhaps not to the same degree, in the period we are mainly interested in, to wit the first quarter of the 20th century. We need hardly elaborate the fact that nationalism in India was, in those years, a growing force, even if it was threatened by equally growing communalist tendencies. This last circumstance would have made it particularly easy for the British to rely on the tactics of divide-and-rule — in fact they are, by some authors, accused of fostering communalism because they needed it as a prop for their own position, as we have seen above. But the nature of British rule in India was changing. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 were intended

by the Viceroy to introduce a "constitutional autocracy",⁷⁵ but they could not but lead on towards the introduction of a parliamentary system.⁷⁶ The latter was inaugurated, if only in a very modest form, in 1919.

Probably not a few members of the Anglo-Indian community⁷⁷ took a gloomy view of this development. They looked upon themselves as a white aristocracy in a foreign country, and, wide as the gulf might be between civilians and officials, they felt united in this respect.⁷⁸ They could hardly feel much sympathy with democratic institutions which would play havoc with their privileged position. In a way, the Government of India, being the summit of Anglo-Indian society, could not but sympathize with them.

But from two sides the Government was urged in a different direction. It was not only at the apex of the Anglo-Indian hierarchy; it was also an extension of the British nation, responsible to the Secretary of State for India, and, in the last resort, to the British Parliament. Since about 1900, India's rulers knew their autocratic position was threatened by political liberalism at home.⁷⁹ Moreover, the Government of India was confronted with the aspirations of the new westernized élite in India, appealing to the same liberal ideas and ideals the British were professing at home. Leaders like Gokhale, and even Gandhi up to about 1920, took these ideas seriously,⁸⁰ and since they were, to some extent, accepted as spokesmen for the people of India by the Government of India, they could not fail to have some influence on the mind and the behaviour of their rulers. These circumstances were creating a climate in which a divide-and-rule-policy could not thrive as it had done before.

No doubt the authoritarian, autocratic trends did not disappear, as they had a long tradition of colonial rule behind them. They were safe with the die-hards like Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Reginald Craddock, and general Dyer; they found expression in acts of repression⁸¹ like the Amritsar massacre and the wholesale arrests of November 1921. But the democratic trends asserted themselves too. Philip Woodruff, writing about the period after 1909, contends that the majority of the Indian Civil Service considered self-government as the inevitable and proper result of British rule in India.⁸² A less rosy view is taken by an Indian observer, H. N. Mitra, editor of *The Indian Annual Register*. He argues that the larger part of the I.C.S. assumed a hostile attitude towards the reforms of 1919, but even he notes the existence of a group of "mufassal moderates" among them, who were ready to give the reforms a fair chance.⁸³ The co-existence of these two schools of thought,

both of them represented in high quarters, confers a very ambivalent character on British rule in India during the period we are examining.⁸⁴ Therefore, it seems hardly probable that the divide-and-rule theory will provide a wholly adequate frame of reference for interpreting British policy during those years; some of its aspects call, we think, for an explanation in terms of a democratic government. Neither of these methods of explanation will be quite satisfactory, but to neglect either of them would probably mar our judgment.

As an example of British policy the interpretation of which would gain from a double approach, we might cite the reforms of 1909. It is possible to put forward a case that these were intended to drive a wedge between the Hindu and Muslim upper and middle classes;⁸⁵ but it is also possible to consider them as an attempt of the Government of India to bring about a "representation of interests" in the best style of Whig principles.⁸⁶ But our whole argument about the twofold frame of reference which the interpretation of British policy in India requires is aimed mainly at the years about 1920, that were taken up, politically speaking, by the reforms of 1919, the non-co-operation movement, and the Khilafat movement, constituting three closely interconnected problems. The principal authors of the reforms and the most important policy-makers with respect to British India were then Chelmsford and Montagu. The former was influenced by the Round Table group, which held that British colonial conquests had to result in liberty and self-government;⁸⁷ the latter had, in his first Indian budget speech in 1910, already declared⁸⁸ that terrorism had to be fought, but that His Majesty's Government was determined to encourage "legitimate aspirations" of the Indians. This decision seemed quite logical to him since he looked upon Indian nationalism as "a movement of Indian thought which had been inspired, directly or indirectly, by English ideas, to which the English and the Government of India gave the first impetus." For men like Montagu and Chelmsford a divide-and-rule policy along communal lines was unacceptable. They tried to get the "Moderates" — meaning those Indians who wanted to co-operate with the British Raj — on their side. But, in our opinion, we should not see this attempt in the perspective of "dividing" Moderates and Extremists, but rather of "convincing" an opposition that it was in the wrong. A reflection of Montagu's intentions we find in two letters,⁸⁹ in which he states that it is his aim to "convert" or "reform" the Extremists; among the latter he can discern a group of fine young men, desirous of social reform and a truly self-governing India, and he hopes to win them over

to co-operation with the recently announced reforms.

This does not mean that other approaches to the problems with which British rule in India was confronted in those years were lacking. Even if official British policy was formulated by men like Chelmsford and Montagu, it had to reckon with the men who would have to implement it, and a number of those were at variance with it. Apart from meeting with strong opposition on the part of British Conservatives, causing his downfall in February 1922, Montagu evoked the criticism of many members of the I.C.S.⁹⁰ And the tragedy of it is, we think, that even those Britons who felt genuine sympathy with India and its political aspirations, could never shake off an attitude of condescension towards the men they proposed to take on as partners.⁹¹

It was this condescension, this never-questioned assumption of the superiority of western culture and western values, which marred the lofty ideals of a government by consent of the ruled and the granting of self-government. Indian nationalism was accepted only in so far as it was nurtured by British ideas; Indians were only thought "fit" to manage their own affairs after they had adapted themselves to the standards of the British gentleman. It is hardly surprising that Indian nationalists did not quite relish the prospect of self-government, if getting it compelled them to renounce their own identity.

CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM IN 19TH-CENTURY INDIA

As we observed in the preceding chapter, Indian nationalism started as a cultural movement in the 19th century. This is not surprising; India's political life being wholly dominated by the British, political independence was unattainable, hardly visible even as a goal. This cultural movement first manifested itself among the Hindus who, having lost less than the Muslims in the process of subjection by the British, were in a better position to recover.

As Indian nationalism came into being in an encounter with the West, it was natural for the Indians to borrow from the West as well as to reject what the West had to offer. This pattern we may discern in all nationalist movements in India, but the extent to which either the former or the latter trend dominated them may differ greatly. In the first of these movements, the *Brahmo Samaj*, founded by the Bengali Brahmin Rammohan Roy in 1828, western influences are conspicuous: a rational monotheism, a leaning towards the moral precepts of Christianity,¹ an aversion from the social evils of latter-day Hinduism, such as *suttee*, female infanticide and child marriage. He insisted upon English as the best medium of public instruction, since the Sanskrit system of education was full of vain and empty subtleties.²

It should, however, not be forgotten that he never regarded himself as anything but a Hindu and wore the sacred thread of the Brahmins up to his death;³ he wanted to reform Hinduism, not to abolish it. Within the *Brahmo Samaj*, this double perspective occasioned tensions between Hindu conservatives and progressive reformers; the clash between these two sections led to several secessions and to the founding of the *Sadharan Brahmo Samaj* in 1878, which took a steady course towards constitutionalism and social reforms, and influenced Hindu social thought to a considerable degree.⁴

It was protest against this westernizing aspect of the *Brahmo Samaj* which gave rise to the *Arya Samaj*, founded in 1875 by Swami Daya-

nanda Sarasvati, who for some time had been influenced by *Brahmo Samaj* leaders. Whereas Rammohan Roy had been attracted by the Upanishads, Dayananda went to what he considered to be the real source of Hinduism, the Vedas, looked upon by him as the infallible, perfect and complete revelation. Whereas the *Brahmo Samaj* leaders pointed out the defects that Hinduism had acquired in a fossilizing society, and found their main inspiration in reason and Christian ethics, the revivalist movement of the *Arya Samaj* approached morality from a Hindu point of view and was not willing to acknowledge any debts to western thought. Whereas the *Brahmo Samaj* held liberal, broad-minded views with regard to Christianity and western culture, the *Arya Samaj* was intolerant in this respect; it held that all knowledge, secular as well as religious, was to be found in the Vedas.

Its followers believed that a scrutiny of the sacred texts would reveal the principles of all modern "western discoveries", such as the steam engine, the radio and the like, and that all great cultures of the world had their origin in India.⁵ In this hyperbolic pride in Indians and their culture, and in this total imperviousness to the opinions of modern western scholarship⁶ it is a typically nationalist movement. Wholly consistent with this judgment on the unique value of the Vedas were Dayananda's efforts to bring renegades back into the Hindu fold by means of *shuddhi* rites. It is not surprising that the *Arya Samaj* won its greatest popularity in the Punjab where the Hindus, being a minority, were more conscious of their identity which they had to defend against the Sikhs and the Muslims.

These doctrinal differences, however, do not keep the practical manifestations of the *Brahmo* and the *Arya Samaj* from bearing some resemblance. Both movements devoted themselves to the same kind of reforms, and both were characterized by a puritanical streak.⁷ So it is understandable that one author compares Rammohan Roy and Dayananda with Erasmus and Luther,⁸ and stresses Dayananda's stubborn fight against a degenerated Brahmanism, while another characterizes the relation between Roy's reformism and Dayananda's revivalism by drawing a historical parallel with the Dutch Remonstrants and Calvinists, the latter being less optimistic and tolerant than the former, and more disposed to looking back to a "Golden Age" of their religion.⁹

Both movements, the reformist and the revivalist as we may call them in a generalizing way, had several ramifications like the *Parthana Samaj*, the Ramakrishna Mission and the Theosophical Society, but we do not intend to go into the details of these. For our purpose it is important

to note some aspects of their impact on cultural and political trends of the first decades of the 20th century. Both of them helped to restore Indian self-confidence; the reforms they advocated could make Hinduism acceptable to the western rulers, and western admiration for the richness and subtlety of Hindu religious thought, as represented by Ramakrishna's disciple Vivekananda and by Mrs. Annie Besant, were a balm for battered Indian pride.¹⁰ Furthermore we may state that the revivalist movement got the upper hand about the beginning of this century.¹¹ The most notable consequence of this fact was the steady hinduization of the Indian nationalist movement, which brought it into conflict not only with the West, but also with dissentient groups among the Indians themselves. Muslims, of course, could scarcely be very enthusiastic about this development — this is an aspect we intend to deal with later — but neither were all Hindus. The revivalist movement appealed to the more westernized reformers in so far as it wanted reforms too, just as Luther appealed to Erasmus, but they could not be its whole-hearted supporters because of its anti-western and anti-rational tendencies. Moreover, the revivalist movement displayed a leaning towards violence and terrorism¹² which the westernizers could admire for its boldness and its readiness for self-sacrifice, but which in the last resort was unpalatable to them. And then there were, of course, Hindus who adhered to orthodox principles and were apt to regard revivalism as heresy. These tensions found their expression in the relation between Tilak and Gokhale — the revivalist and the reformer — and in later years between Gandhi and the younger Nehru. To them we might add Pandit Malaviya as representing the orthodox group, which organized itself in the *Hindu Mahasabha*.

At this point, however, we are approaching the purely political side of India's evolution in the last decades of the 19th century. Here a landmark is provided by the founding of the Indian National Congress which met for the first time in 1885 in Bombay. The initiative was taken by a retired Civil Servant, A. O. Hume, but we should mention that for a few years some purely Indian political associations had already been under way, the most important of which was probably Surendranath Bannerjea's Indian Association, founded in 1876 in Calcutta. Congress, in its first years, met with active support from the Viceroy Lord Dufferin, who took an interest in Hume's scheme and even corrected it; English officials, like Sir James Meston, attended its meetings. But after 1890 British official support was withdrawn; the Viceroy, who first looked upon Congress as filling the place of Her Majesty's most loyal opposi-

tion¹³ soon lost faith in it and styled it "seditious". Other Britons, however, such as Sir William Wedderburn and Sir Henry Cotton maintained a very friendly attitude towards Congress.

We have mentioned these origins of Congress in some detail because of the slur many Indian authors cast on the founding of the Muslim League in 1906, coming in the wake of the Simla deputation.¹⁴ British benevolence towards the Muslim League in these years is treated as something of an original sin from which the League could never free itself. In our opinion, Congress got in its first years certainly no less British, and even official British, patronage than the League, but we would not think of using this as an argument against the truly nationalist character of Congress in its subsequent career. Up to about 1905 Congress certainly took a loyal stand. It wanted reforms, but under the British aegis; it wanted increasing Indianization of the Services; but it was only in 1908 that it declared its aim to be obtaining "a colonial type of Self-Government" — a very moderate demand, we should think. It was not until 1920 that it changed this aim to "Swaraj by all peaceful and legitimate means", and only in 1929 did it ask for "complete independence".¹⁵

But in spite of this very moderate character of Congress aims in the first decades of its existence, the British attitude towards it developed into one of hostility and contempt. Dufferin already described it as the instrument of a "microscopic minority" of the Indian people;¹⁶ Curzon joined him in this opinion and declared it to be his belief that "the Congress is tottering to its fall";¹⁷ Chirol reproached it with its lack of interest in social problems.¹⁸ It is curious to note, incidentally, Gandhi's impression of his first acquaintance with Congress at the Calcutta session in 1901: he clearly thought it a rather pompous gathering without any interest for the problems of the common people,¹⁹ corroborating in this respect Chirol's estimate.

From its very beginning Congress took the stand that it was a national organization, representing all communities and condemning communalism. Notwithstanding this creed — and we would not doubt the sincerity of many who professed it — a certain hinduization of Congress came about. This was partly caused by the abstention of the Muslims who were dissuaded by their greatest leader, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, from participating in Congress activities. The Deoband leader Maulana Gangohi declared, when Congress started its work, that co-operation with Hindus was lawful for Muslims,²⁰ but his verdict carried less weight with the western-educated Muslims for whom it mattered: after some

years in the nineties which were marked by a fairly important participation of Muslims, their attendance dropped very considerably in the years after 1900.²¹ This development might encourage the supposition that the advice of the above-mentioned leaders was not all-important and that the Muslim attitude was primarily conditioned by a process which took place within Congress itself: the growing influence of the Hindu revivalist movement (increasing revivalism among Muslims themselves may have been a factor, too).

An exponent of this trend was B. G. Tilak, a Chitpavan Brahmin from Poona. Perhaps he should be called neither an enemy of Muslims,²² nor an enemy of Hindu reform,²³ but by using communal weapons in the national struggle, and by subordinating social reform to political agitation, he came certainly very near to being both. When in 1890 the Age of Consent Bill came up, putting an end to child marriage, Tilak waged a vehement campaign against it, not because he was an advocate of child marriage in itself — he did not marry off his own daughters before they were of age — but because he denied the British Government of India any right to meddle with affairs that concerned only the Indians themselves. As a symbol of Indian heroism and fighting spirit he propagated Shivaji — who was a famous warrior indeed, but one whose name had a bitter taste for Muslims, since he had treacherously killed his Muslim enemy Afzal Khan.

Tilak's excuse was that Shivaji was a Deccan hero and that, if he had tried to rouse northern India to political consciousness, he would have adopted Akbar as his hero.²⁴ Other instances of his activities which could not fail to antagonize Muslims were his fervent advocacy of the Hindu Ganpati festival and the Hindu Anti-Cow-Killing Society. One might say perhaps that Tilak was, essentially, an anti-British nationalist but that, by seeking communal support for his political ends, he did more to further communalism than nationalism. Thus the Muslims were repelled from Congress when Tilak and his Extremist friends became the rising force in this organization after 1900. Afterwards, the hinduization of Congress was continued by Gandhi, though in a far less provocative way. His concept of *satyagraha* and non-violence, his stress on hand-spinning and the use of *khaddar*, his language — he wrote about the "Cow of Khilafat" — were far more acceptable to Muslims than Tilak's revivalism, but made them feel uneasy all the same. Gandhi could, by no stretch of the imagination, be styled a communalist leader, but he had a greater appeal for Hindus than for Muslims.²⁵

So Congress, by far the most important political body in India

throughout its entire career, could not be the all-embracing national organization it claimed to be. In another respect it was very well suited for the part it intended to play. It was, until shortly before Independence, more a movement than a party and could accommodate several groups of widely divergent shades of policy and ideology, as long as they subscribed to the general Congress creed. In this way, Congress acted as the "umbrella" under which various groups and interests could be kept together, a role it had to fulfil in the years when the élite nationalism of the westernized minority was replaced by mass nationalism.²⁶ The *Hindu Mahasabha* for instance was a group within Congress until its exclusion in the mid-thirties because of its clearly communalist character; the communists formed a unit within Congress until 1945.²⁷ Certainly before 1930 Congress was not an exclusive party which admitted only members of a very definite conviction and so it was possible, even for leading politicians, to hold positions in Congress as well as in groups outside its fold.²⁸

But if these broad views of Congress made possible the co-existence of several factions within it, they did not prevent quarrels between them in which control of Congress policy and organization was at stake. About the turn of the century, Congress witnessed a growing tension between Moderates and Extremists, leading up to an open conflict and a split of Congress in 1907. The leaders of the Moderates were Gokhale, Sinha and Bannerjea; the foremost Extremists were Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Aurobindo Ghosh. These two sections in Congress represented different views on two main points: the ends of political action in India, and the means to be used. The Moderates were thinking along purely constitutional lines; they wanted no revolutionary change in the relationship between Great Britain and India because they felt that India had a lot to learn from its rulers, but only political reforms, to be got by means of persuasion and constitutional action. The Extremists wanted more; they were much more ready to sever the British connection,²⁹ and advocated boycott and passive resistance as the means of attaining their aims; if they did not recommend terrorism, they did not conceal their admiration for it. They wanted to assert their rights proudly, and branded Moderate tactics as "mendicancy". Underlying these attitudes were, on the Extremist side, a rejection of western values, and, on the Moderate side, acceptance of them as a model for reforming Indian society;³⁰ it was, perhaps, mainly this attitude which separated the two groups, since in practice their political formulae did not always widely diverge.³¹

Parallel with the increasing influence of the Extremists in Congress ran the rise of terrorism in Maharashtra (Tilak's homeland), Bengal and the Punjab in the years before and during the First World War. Certainly not all Extremists applauded terrorism, but there was a general feeling of sympathy with the resolute and self-sacrificing young men practising it, even among people who could not on principle approve of their actions. And sometimes one finds indications of something more than mere sympathy with terrorists on the part of otherwise law-abiding politicians.³² We might see in these attitudes a prelude to the problems which Gandhi's non-violence was to cause for a good many of his followers.

Another notable aspect of the terrorist movement was the almost total abstention from it of Muslims.³³ This should not surprise us when we realize that the national awakening among Indian Muslims in the 19th century could not follow the same course as it took among Hindus, owing to its start from a different position. About the middle of the century the Muslims had to realize that they were in a very critical situation. They "found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education shorn of its monetary value",³⁴ and then had to swallow the final blows in the annexation of Sind and Oudh and the abortive Mutiny, the aftermath of which put an end to the last shadow of their former rule. Perhaps all this would not have been so bad if the Hindus had found themselves in quite the same plight. But the Hindus had, partly at least, only exchanged Muslim rule for British; they had adjusted themselves better to the new circumstances and made better use of new opportunities it offered them in the economic field; they showed less aversion to English education than the Muslims and, consequently, were better qualified to get such posts as government allotted to Indians.

These aspects of the communal tangle in India are too well known for it to be necessary to dwell on them in any detail.³⁵ Less attention has been given to a fact that may very well have had a considerable influence, to wit a quicker rate of growth of the Muslim community in India than of that of the Hindus. This has been noted by M. L. Ferrar³⁶ and Gopal,³⁷ and neither of these authors looks to a higher birth-rate or lower death-rate for an explanation for this fact; both of them point to the attraction Islam has for low-caste Hindus and to the proselytizing character of Islam. This situation might well be the principal cause of the *shuddhi* activities of the *Arya Samaj* — purification rites by means of which persons who had been converted to other faiths

are readmitted to the Hindu caste system.

At any rate, Hindus and Muslims found themselves in different situations, and this may explain why, in the last decades of the 19th century, nationalism made headway among Hindus while Indian Muslims lagged behind, owing partly to their social and educational backwardness, and partly to the shocks which had dazed them and of which the Mutiny and its aftermath was the worst. It was mainly the upper and middle class Muslims who were affected by this situation, and the ulama were hardly prepared to give them very useful guidance in these circumstances, since they were not able to formulate new solutions for the new problems that arose.³⁸ A more promising lead was given them about 1870 by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the most prominent representative of Islamic liberalism in India in the second half of the 19th century.

Sir Sayyid, coming from a family of high esteem at the dying Mughul court at Delhi, felt a hearty and healthy contempt for the last emperor, Bahadur Shah.³⁹ He recognized that Mughul rule had only itself to blame for its replacement by British power, as the latter was a definite improvement.⁴⁰ He made it his object to dispel British suspicion towards Indian Muslims — who were mainly blamed for the Mutiny — and to reconcile his co-religionists with British rule, with a view to enabling them to profit from the social, economic, and educational possibilities it opened up. Theoretically, he therefore had to give an interpretation of Islam as not inimical towards western civilization and Christianity; by this means he could remove British suspicions,⁴¹ and at the same time do away with Muslim prejudices which he ascribed to Hindu influence and to corrupt traditions. Here, of course, he was on slippery ground.

In the educational field his greatest work was the founding of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which was started in 1875 with considerable help from the government and private donations from wealthy Muslims and Hindus. The college set out "to procure the acceptance of European science and literature as the basis of Mohammedan education. It has accomplished this by scrupulously providing for the religious offices of the pious Mohammedan youth."⁴² But another of its stated aims was "to make the Mussulmans of India worthy and useful subjects of the British crown."⁴³

In connection with our subject there are two main questions concerning Sir Sayyid's activities which we should try to answer. The first one is: what was his attitude towards the Hindu community and towards Congress? We have already mentioned the support for the Aligarh

project which he got from Hindus; the college was, for that matter, open to Hindus, as well as to Parsis and Christians. Seven years after its foundation the college had 259 pupils, among them 57 Hindus.⁴⁴ When formerly engaged in educational work — a Translation Society in which he took the initiative in 1864 — he sought the co-operation of Hindus too.⁴⁵ So we may conclude that he was certainly no enemy of the Hindu community. On the other hand, he very soon realized that the Hindus, being the stronger of the two communities, might easily endanger the position of the Muslims. This was as early as 1867, when Hindu leaders in Benares advocated the adoption of Hindu in Devanagari script in court matters, and the elimination of Urdu in Persian script — a proposal that was repeated some years later in the Scientific Society which had replaced the Translation Society.⁴⁶ Much more important, however, was the stand he took towards Congress, in which he dissuaded Muslims from participating. Why did he do so? Various explanations are given. He looked upon Congress as too critical an organization, too opposed to the British whose favour the Muslims needed, as is argued by W. C. Smith⁴⁷ and Nehru,⁴⁸ who deny that he regarded it as too preponderantly Hindu a body. In the light of his opposition to Hindu demands in linguistic matters, however, it seems probable that he feared at least certain sections of Hindu opinion,⁴⁹ and his rejection of representative institutions with elections after the British model, because the Muslim minority would then be at the mercy of the Hindu majority,⁵⁰ points in the same direction.

Some authors⁵¹ see in Sir Sayyid's attitude the effect of a sinister British influence, mainly that of Sir Theodore Beck, principal of Aligarh College from 1884 to 1893. This explanation, we think, is rather dubious, since Sir Sayyid must have been a very strong-willed man, with the courage to oppose not only a considerable part of his own community but British officials as well — not a person to allow others to make use of him.⁵² The most convincing explanation, to our mind, is to be found in the fact that Sir Sayyid was first and foremost interested in education, and did not want politics to divert the Muslim mind from this field,⁵³ particularly as he supposed that the Muslims, being the deposed rulers and inclined to self-pity, would be only too willing to play the part of critics of the British.

A second question is: what view did his co-religionists take of his activities? With his liberalism, Sir Sayyid was not really a man of the people. His ideas reached the large landowners, the professional class and the officials — a small but influential group. The peasants did not

come within their reach, and the lower middle class and the ulama were opposed to them.⁵⁴ His rationalism and reformism provoked vehement protests: he was called a heretic, an atheist and a Christian; *fatwas* were issued putting a ban on support for Aligarh College; he even got letters threatening him with assassination.⁵⁵ The most famous of his opponents was Jamal-ud-din Afghani, who attacked his readiness to co-operate with the British.⁵⁶ Sir Sayyid's admiration for the British, sometimes bordering on the excessive or even the ridiculous,⁵⁷ must have been irritating to some people. Nevertheless, there is no denying that within the small group of people mentioned before — and they were people who mattered — Sir Sayyid was held in great reverence. But did this influence go deep? W. C. Smith doubts this,⁵⁸ because the liberalism of Sir Sayyid and other congenial leaders was only applied to religion, not integrated with it. Therefore the liberal trend remained peripheral. Sir Sayyid's successors at Aligarh, Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk, sought closer relations with the ulama, and this resulted in a strengthening of Sunni orthodoxy in the College and a more conservative attitude in the first decades of the 20th century.⁵⁹

Another leader representing this gradual change was Amir Ali. Sir Sayyid had interpreted Islam in the light of western values, shedding a good deal of the content in the process; Amir Ali, author of *The Spirit of Islam*, tried to prove that authentic Islam and western values coincided. In the words of W. C. Smith, "Sir Sayyid . . . had written in his life of the Prophet an account of what Muhammad was not. Amir Ali presented what he was. Sir Sayyid had maintained that Islam was not inimical to progress. Amir Ali presented an Islam that is that progress."⁶⁰ These different points of view are mirrored by their respective attitudes towards the Caliphate. Sir Sayyid was certainly pro-Turkish, but mainly because he admired their efforts towards modernization.⁶¹ But when the Sultan propagated Pan-Islamism, hoping to interest non-Turkish Muslims in the maintenance of the Caliphate, Sir Sayyid warned his compatriots not to foster feelings towards the Sultan-Caliph of their own time which might have befitted them in the days of the first four Caliphs.⁶² Amir Ali, however, stressed the continuity of the Caliphate, with all its rights, up to modern times.⁶³

Sir Sayyid wanted to give a wider range than Aligarh College alone to his educational work by founding the Mohammanan Educational Conference in 1886. According to Albiruni,⁶⁴ this organization became the political mouthpiece of the Muslims too, but it was Amir Ali who tried to give Indian Muslims a communal political organization in his

Central National Mohammedan Association, founded in 1877, and this lead was followed by Mohsin-ul-Mulk with his Urdu Defence Organization of 1900,⁶⁵ and by Viqar-ul-Mulk with his Muhammadan Political Organization of 1903.⁶⁶

Thus the first years of the 20th century witnessed a slight but clearly discernible shifting of the balance between two trends of Muslim opinion: a liberal, westernizing trend and an orthodox, revivalist trend, with the latter getting the upper hand,⁶⁷ just as had happened among the Hindus some twenty years before.

The main representatives of religious revivalism among Indian Muslims in the 19th century were the so-called Wahabis and the Deoband school. The Wahabis in India were probably not closely related to their Arabian namesakes, but were the spiritual heirs of the 18th century Indian reformer Shah Wali-ullah of Delhi, who wanted to purify Islam and to return to its origins. But, like those of all early reform movements, his efforts were aimed in two directions: against internal decay and against external aggression, and not all adherents accentuated these aspects to the same degree.⁶⁸ Therefore, the name "Wahabis" in India is applied to men who would not all have liked to be identified with the same name. Sir Sayyid called himself "a thrice bitter Wahabi",⁶⁹ and defended the Wahabis against the attacks of W. W. Hunter in *The Indian Musalmans*. In Sir Sayyid's defence of them the Wahabis are shown as pure reformers: "In my opinion, what the Protestant is to Roman Catholics, so is the Wahabi to the other Mohammedan creeds."⁷⁰ But the Wahabis about whom Hunter wrote⁷¹ were fighters; since about 1820, certain followers of Shah Wali-ullah, like his son Abdul Aziz, and Sayyid Ahmad Barelawi, a disciple of this son, had organized an armed Muslim resistance against the Sikhs and, when the Punjab had been captured by the British, against the latter. About 1830 they had succeeded in setting up a little state in the N. W. Frontier region, with a Caliph of their own.⁷² This rebellion against the British, of course, was something of which Sir Sayyid could never have approved; nor could he have felt any sympathy with the rigid orthodoxy into which Shah Wali-ullah's reforming zeal had developed among the Wahabis.⁷³ So we see that the name "Wahabis" is used in widely divergent senses.⁷⁴

About 1870 the rebellion of these fighting Wahabis or *mujahidin* was largely suppressed by the British forces which, however, never annihilated it completely. Their main significance in relation to our subject seems to be that they operated with the concept of *dar-ul-Islam* and *dar-ul-harb*, and, declaring India to fall within the latter category,

had no other choice than *jihad* or *hijrat* — a theme recurring in the days of the Khilafat movement. About 1870, this concept lost something of its sting, because authoritative *fatwas* had assured the Indian Muslims that *jihad* in their case was not justified. One *fatwa* argued that India had not become *dar-ul-harb*; another one contended that it was no longer *dar-ul-Islam*, but that in the prevailing conditions Indian Muslims were bound to obey the new rulers. Hunter, explaining these arguments at considerable length,⁷⁵ concludes; “The Indian Musalmans, therefore, are bound by their own law to live peaceably under our Rule. But the obligation continues only so long as we perform our share of the contract, and respect their rights and spiritual privileges.”⁷⁶ There was the danger — changing conditions could revive the theme of *dar-ul-harb* and the connected ideas of *jihad* and *hijrat*, as happened in the days of the Khilafat movement.

This was probably the most important legacy the Wahabi movement bequeathed to Indian politics in the 20th century. Another point to be remembered, however, is that it kept alive in the minds of Indians and British the idea of an invasion by the Afghans or the warlike frontier tribes, a danger that had always lurked behind the Wahabi threat. This fear may have lost substance in an age of technical warfare, but it could be revived as late as 1947 when Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, was threatened by the Pathan tribesmen.⁷⁷

Among these *mujahidin* mingled fugitive rebels from the Mutiny; in the Mutiny itself traces of Muslim revivalism may be found.⁷⁸ But some of the former rebels changed not their place of action, but their tactics. Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi, who had fought at Shamli near Delhi in 1857, became the first head of the religious seminary founded at Deoband in 1867. The similarity of the aims sought by the Mutiny and the Deoband School is stressed by Faruqi: “Shamli and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and the same picture. The difference lies only in weapons. Now the sword and the spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue. There, at Shamli, in order to secure political independence and freedom for religion and culture, resort was made to violence; here, at Deoband, a start was made to achieve the same goal through peaceful means. There, for the cause of religio-political freedom individuals were used; here for that purpose individuals were to be produced.”⁷⁹ The programme of Deoband may be outlined thus: the education of students in strict observance of Sunni orthodoxy of the Hanafi School and the seeking of closer relations with the Turkish Sultan-Caliph.⁸⁰ So the Deoband

School stood for orthodoxy and rigid tradition,⁸¹ but politically, by its anti-British attitude, it was apt to be drawn towards Congress.⁸² Both these attitudes gave rise to an estrangement between the westernizing followers of Sir Sayyid and his Aligarh College on the one hand and the Deoband ulama on the other hand. It was only when Pan-Islamism became an important issue that they were able to find common ground, but it was to be expected that their alliance could never be quite cordial.

And it was precisely in the last decades of the 19th century that Pan-Islamism came to the fore, at least in all political discussions, speculations and calculations. Defining it, in a very general way, as a sense of unity of all Muslims, we may note at the same time that it existed mainly as a cultural, social and religious phenomenon, but that as a political reality it led a rather dubious existence. A sense of unity is natural to Islam; from this point of view Pan-Islamism may be called as old as Islam itself, being based on Quranic injunctions.⁸³ In the same vein Muhammad Ali treated it in his *Comrade*:⁸⁴ "If Pan-Islamism is anything different from every-day Islam, the Mussulmans do not believe in it." This view is more or less corroborated by assertions that, except for language, Muslims from different parts of the Muslim world felt at home within its whole reach: "The whole *Dar-al-Islam* was his country, other country he had none. His affections might centre on his native land, but his loyalty, and all the other sentiments which we associate with patriotism, were given to the Moslem world and its religious culture as a whole."⁸⁵ On the other hand, even in the religious-cultural and social field there existed animosities or more or less latent differences, as is stressed by Sir Harcourt Butler: "I have always maintained that pan-Islamism is a feeling and not a force. The Arab, the Turk, the Punjabi Muhammadan, the class that go to Aligarh and the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal have very little in common with each other and mostly despise each other."⁸⁶ But anyway, we may probably assume that the religious, social and cultural unity was more real than the political one.

So we are faced with a problem: was Pan-Islamism a reality or not? Butler's verdict: "a feeling and not a force", is not a very clear one, as a feeling may very well have great force.⁸⁷ We think the situation might be better expressed in this way: Pan-Islamism was a sense of unity, but not that unity itself,⁸⁸ and the sense was prevented from taking on full reality because it was based on a past and on a theory which had long since been caught up with by modern practice. Unity had been in full bloom in the days of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs, but after-

wards political unity was definitely lost and religious unity — with all its cultural and social aspects — began showing fissures like the Sunni-Shia schism. But nevertheless the old concepts were maintained⁸⁰ and kept the way open for a possible revival to take effect.

Another aspect of the problem is brought out by the question: was Pan-Islamism compatible with nationalism or not? We do not want to take into account here the larger question of whether Islam and nationalism could go together, and so we are confronted with a problem of much the same kind as would be posed by the relationship between Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism and nationalism. Then it is obvious that in a defensive phase, when Muslim peoples were trying to protect themselves from foreign domination, and when the position of Muslim power in general was so weak that the frequent incursions of foreign powers into Muslim territories could be interpreted as evidence of a great conspiracy against Islam as a whole, national resistance against these aggressions would welcome help from other Muslims. But when freedom from foreign domination and aggression was regained and sovereign Muslim states had been restored or had sprung into existence, as was more or less the case after 1920 — then the national egoism of these states would make Pan-Islamism a difficult goal to attain. Then, too, the special relationship between Islam and nationalism would come to the fore as a new problem. As Rosenthal puts it: "The real problem⁸⁰ only emerged on home ground after the external enemy . . . had been cleared from the old/new fatherland."⁸¹ This would explain why Pan-Islamism, after a period of relative strength between 1880 and 1920, lost ground to national aspirations after World War I. But it was, as we remarked before, in the nature of Islam that it would never be entirely lost sight of.

This situation must have made it rather difficult, for Muslim reformers and revivalists as well as for European observers, to get a clear view of the prospects of Pan-Islamism in the last decades of the 19th century. After about 1880 there was a tendency to activate Pan-Islamic sentiment for political purposes. These efforts came from two sides. The Sultan of Turkey, who was steadily losing territories and influence in North Africa and the Balkans, saw an opportunity of making good these losses on the Asian side by stressing his religious authority over all Muslims in his capacity of Caliph.⁸² At the same time certain reformers, troubled by the attacks on the Muslim world, looked for redress not only by means of internal reforms of Islam, but also by restoring the lost political unity of all Muslims.

Of the latter, the most notable was Jamal-ud-din Afghani who, incidentally, was not an Afghan but an Iranian by birth.⁹³ Alarmed by the encroachments of western imperialism on the Muslim world, he rejected mere Islamic traditionalism as well as imitation of the West as the means of stopping this process, but aimed at a reinterpretation of Islam, emphasizing a freer use of human reason and activism within the Islamic tradition.⁹⁴ Time and again he urged the Muslims to take their fate in their own hands, referring to Quran 13-11: "God changes not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves."⁹⁵ Pointing out the necessity of political and military strength, he countenanced nationalism among single Muslim peoples as well as Pan-Islamism.

One thing about Jamal-ud-din is certain: he was anti-British. In many other respects he is enigmatic. The impression he made, and wanted to make, on the general public in Muslim countries was that of an orthodox and devote Muslim. But there are good reasons to think that his innermost thoughts and his ultimate aims were quite different; that his orthodoxy and his show of devotion were intended to screen from the public eye his real convictions, which were those of a freethinker and a revolutionary.⁹⁶ Part of that screen seems to have been constituted by his well-known *Refutation of the Materialists* (1881), directed mainly against Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.⁹⁷ Nor is it quite clear how far his influence with Sultan Abdul Hamid II went, but probably it was a good deal less than his own utterances, and those of his friends and admirers whom he inspired, seem to suggest.⁹⁸ This may be explained partly by his character — he was an intriguer who was likely to see his own role in practical high politics as much more important than it really was — and partly by his disposition to speak and write in one tone when addressing himself to an élite or a western audience, and in quite another when seeking contact with the general public.⁹⁹ But even if his direct influence during his lifetime was more modest than is often believed, his influence afterwards certainly should not be underestimated, impressing itself as it did on the Islamic liberalism of his disciple Muhammad Abduh as well as on the more conservative revivalism of Rashid Rida,¹⁰⁰ and on the Indian poet and philosopher Iqbal too.¹⁰¹ But in most cases it was an influence emanating not from his deepest convictions but from his myth, as created by himself and his friends: the image of an activist but orthodox Afghani. By his teaching and his activity he made Islam the mainspring of solidarity, which was of the utmost importance in an age when ideologies like

Arab nationalism were not yet acceptable.¹⁰² The same might be said about Indian nationalism, though for different reasons, and Jamal-ud-din's influence on Abul Kalam Azad and the Khilafat movement is unmistakable.¹⁰³

Some of his success is very likely to have been due to the attitude of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. In the Turkish constitution of 1876 the latter stressed his role as Caliph,¹⁰⁴ and after the Turkish losses at the Berlin Congress of 1878 he sent out emissaries to Egypt, Tunisia, Afghanistan and India, and even to China and Java, to win the active support of the Muslims in those countries. It is difficult to evaluate the success his efforts met with; whereas Arnold does not think much of it,¹⁰⁵ Stoddard holds the opinion that he got results with many Muslim princes and notables, and certainly with the Muslim masses.¹⁰⁶ A circumstance adding to the difficulty is that several cross-currents existed in Pan-Islamism. The natural centre of the movement was to be found in Turkey, the largest Muslim power in the 19th century, but the traditional centre should be looked for in Arabia, the fountain-head of Islam. Jamal-ud-din did not even entirely rule out the possibility of an Arab Caliphate. Turkey was a westernizing power and therefore held a certain attraction for Muslims in European colonies, who had some knowledge of western institutions and admired them — but the very same fact made Turkey unpalatable for religious revivalists like the Senussis.¹⁰⁷ And on the other hand, the Sultan's government was, despite a show of liberalism, despotic and therefore unacceptable to liberal reformers. Even Jamal-ud-din Afghani, who centred his efforts round Turkey, thought Abdul Hamid unfit for this reason.¹⁰⁸ And when in 1908 Abdul Hamid lost his power to the Young Turks, the new rulers started with a Pan-Turanian orientation, but soon tried to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness — a difficult task.¹⁰⁹

Once more we return to our question: was Pan-Islamism a reality?, but now in another form: how real was it, and what results did it have? There are reasons for asking this question again: the various and sometimes conflicting sources from which the movement originated, and the fact that the same question was posed repeatedly in the years after 1900.

Those writers who pointed, as we have seen, to the natural tendency of Islam towards Pan-Islamism, declared too that Pan-Islamism as the West understood it, was "a bogey". Muhammad Ali concedes only the existence of a defensive reaction towards western attacks on the Muslim

world, but not of an aggressive movement.¹¹⁰ His anonymous biographer goes one step further and asserts that it is an exclusively religious, social, and commercial movement — perhaps, in a way, political, but without any diplomatic designs and never politically aggressive.¹¹¹ The same aspects of Pan-Islamism were accentuated by the Pan-Islamic Society in London, founded in 1903, and in connection with this tendency an inquiry among missionaries is mentioned which failed to produce any indication of an organization with clear aims.¹¹² We have already noted Sir Harcourt Butler's opinion on Pan-Islamism, and Ronald Storrs thought Pan-Islamism "mainly the creation of the India Office."¹¹³

In this dubious state of affairs we might turn to practical results, but there again we do not find much clarification. One may point to the Hijaz-railway, the construction of which between 1901 and 1908 was financed with contributions from the whole Muslim world, to the medical aid Turkey got from Indian Muslims during the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913,¹¹⁴ and to the stand the Libyans took when Turkey was attacked by Italy in Tripoli. Precisely these facts may have induced the Young Turks to accept Pan-Islamism.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, the declaration of *jihad* by the Sultan-Caliph in 1914 had scarcely any effect,¹¹⁶ and this was a test case of Pan-Islamism if there was one.

In the light of this conflicting evidence and the difference of opinions we might offer the following, tentative conclusion: in the years between 1880 and 1920 the Muslim world was drawn towards Pan-Islamism because circumstances were favourable. Muslims felt threatened, and religion was for them the first thing to turn to when seeking unity and support. In this respect, Pan-Islamism played a role analogous to nationalist movements— it acted as an "umbrella" under which various ethnic groups, class interests and shades of opinion, conservative as well as reformist, could assemble themselves when unity was the first thing that mattered.¹¹⁷ But it lost its appeal when nationalism came to the fore, a process already set in motion before World War I in countries like Egypt and Turkey, but accelerated, intensified and widened greatly by that war. Therefore it is understandable that in the first decades of the 20th century different views prevailed with regard to the prospects of Pan-Islamism; those who looked upon it as a force to be reckoned with had their good reasons, but those who thought its importance was being exaggerated had so too. It is only our hindsight which enables us to state that the latter view would in future be proved true, at least for the time being: the idea of Islamic solidarity did maintain itself as an undercurrent in Muslim nationalism.¹¹⁸

We said the Muslim world felt threatened, alluding to the fact that in the years between 1880 and 1920 it was everywhere on the defensive against western imperialism.¹¹⁹ We should now see how this fact affected Indian Muslims who were not directly threatened themselves. Even though they were not directly threatened, indirectly they were involved in several ways. Having lost their own independence, they must have felt sympathy with other peoples losing theirs; when these were Muslim peoples, a sentiment of Muslim solidarity was aroused in addition. But they felt concerned perhaps most strongly because of the part played by Great Britain, their own sovereign, in the attacks on the Muslim world. Notably the British attitude towards Turkey had changed for the worse and, Turkey being for many Muslims a symbol of Muslim power, this was particularly resented by Indian Muslims too. Through most of the 19th century England had acted as Turkey's ally — for instance during the Crimean War and even at the Berlin Congress, where Russian claims were rejected (not quite disinterestedly on Great Britain's part, since Disraeli brought home "peace with plunder"¹²⁰). In those years, Britain tried to stave off the partition of the inheritance of Europe's sick man. Gladstone, however, took the lead with a definitely anti-Turkish policy and this course was continued, with less moral indignation but with the same results, by the Conservative Foreign Secretary, Salisbury. So Turkey lost in the last decades of the 19th century part of its Balkan territories, Egypt and Tunis.

The anti-Turkish policy was part of a wider re-orientation of British foreign policy by which England sought an accommodation with Russia and France in view of increasing German influence in the Middle East.¹²¹ That this accommodation came about at the cost — partly — of Muslim territories like Persia, Turkey and Morocco was probably in the main accidental, but Muslims could hardly be expected to take a quite detached view of things. At the same time there was, for that matter, something of a change in the British attitude towards Islam, as Norman Daniel sets forth: more than in the previous period Muslim fanaticism, cruelty and despotism were decried, and an influential statesman like Lord Cromer pictured Islam as a primitive creed, utterly failing as a social system.¹²² In this picture Pan-Islamism figured as a sinister trait — and not the less so when it appeared to be irreligious into the bargain. That was the view Mark Sykes — a diplomat with access to the inner circle of British policy-makers — took of the Young Turks in 1915: "... cosmopolitan knaves ... who believe neither in Allah nor the Koran ...", but driving "... a revolutionary, anti-theological

pan-Islamic machine . . ." At the same time he expressed his doubts as to whether the Government of India were fully abreast of these trends.¹²³

In Pan-Islamism the Caliphate was apt to play a central role, since it was certainly the most obvious rallying point when it came to uniting all Muslims.¹²⁴ But before discussing the appeal it had for Indian Muslims in particular, we must say something about the Caliphate in general.

The institution of the Caliphate dated from the death of the Prophet (A.D. 632), when Abu Bakr was chosen as his successor. In 661 Muawiyah, the Umayyad Caliph, founded a hereditary monarchy in practice, but in theory the principle of the election of a successor was maintained.¹²⁵ In 750 the Abbasids took over rule from the Umayyads, but at the same time the splitting up of Muslim power began. The Abbasid Caliphate could not maintain itself either; it disintegrated, was brought down finally by the Mongols, and entirely independent Muslim kingdoms sprang up in India, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and Egypt, to mention only some.

The purpose of the original Caliphate had been "to maintain the unity of the Arabs, to retain divine guidance in their government, and to lend both unity and guidance a new continuity."¹²⁶ The theory on which these aims were based was relatively simple: sovereignty belonged to God but the practical exercise of it, meaning authority on earth, was vested in the Prophet Muhammad, and after him in his vicegerent, the *Khalifa*. It was his duty to implement the *sharia*, to defend the faith and the faithful, and to ensure their ability to live by the prescriptions of the *sharia*.¹²⁷ Muhammad being the last Prophet, whose message replaced all former revelations, there could be only one Caliph, implementing the one Divine Law.¹²⁸

Muslim political thinkers could not but see that a rift had opened between the theoretical ideal and historical reality. They held up the ideal, remote and faded though it might seem, and found means to interpret historical reality in terms of the ideal. Thus, when Abbasid power declined, they condoned usurpation of the Caliph's office and stressed the importance of the ulama as interpreters of the *sharia*.¹²⁹ Perhaps the most daring adjustment was Ibn Khaldun's, who saw the transformation of the Caliphate into the *mulk*, or temporal rule, as a sociological inevitability, but contended that even the *mulk* could preserve qualities of the former ideal¹³⁰ and accepted a plural Caliphate.¹³¹ But his ideas did not find favour with the ulama who could not accept petty dynasties as the partial heirs to the Abbasid Caliphate.¹³²

When in 1258 Baghdad was sacked and the Caliph put to death by the Mongol prince Hulagu, the Abbasid Caliphate was "restored" by the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt, but without any real power; it served only to legitimate their own position. Other Muslim rulers, too, sought an investiture by these "Egyptian" Caliphs, but not a few Muslim sovereigns took for themselves the title of Caliph. "The title of Khalifah seems . . . to have assumed a new significance; it certainly no longer implied descent from the house of Abbas or any claim to belong to the tribe of the Quraysh. The Muslim monarch now claimed to derive his authority directly from God, to be vicegerent of Allah, not a mere successor of the Prophet."¹³³

The rise of the Ottoman dynasty and the weakening of its rival powers in Persia and India restored former conditions to a certain degree: there was one great Muslim power and its ruler recovered some of the prestige of the universal Caliphs — he was no longer considered a Caliph among others. The rule of the ulama was fully acknowledged and orthodoxy was insisted upon; in return, the ulama became the staunch supporters of Ottoman rule. The classical theory of the Caliphate was revived.¹³⁴ But we do not think it necessary to give here a complete exposition of the theory of the Caliphate — nor, for that matter, would we consider ourselves competent to do so. But we do have to go into some of its aspects, because they received much attention at the time of the Khilafat movement.

The first of these is the question of whether the Caliphate should be looked upon as a political or a religious concept. It is difficult to give an absolutely unequivocal answer to this. Islam does not know the strict dividing line between religion and politics that is drawn by Christianity, nor the conflict between State and Church — if only because no Church in the proper sense exists in Islam. The Prophet Muhammad, at first the spiritual leader of the believers, became their temporal and political ruler as well, and that this new role was not a burden he had to take on by accident, but the fulfilment of his mission, is symbolized by the fact that Islamic chronology starts with the establishment of his community at Medina, where Muhammad had to fill both functions.¹³⁵ In this light it would seem logical to consider the Caliphate a concept in which the political and religious aspects were blended into complete unity. When after Muhammad's death, however, Abu Bakr became his Caliph (vicegerent or successor) and took over authority, it was with one exception: he succeeded him only in his capacities of ruler, judge, and commander-in-chief, but had no

spiritual powers, as Muhammad had been the last Prophet.¹³⁶ When it came to ascertaining the true meaning of Quran and *hadith*, revealed and transmitted truth, the community resorted to *ijma* (consensus), first of the community itself, then of the ulama.¹³⁷ The Caliph's role became that of defending the faith and implementing Divine Law; he had no religious but only political authority, though he certainly had religious functions.

After the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs — Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali — the different aspects of the office became less closely linked, and in the Umayyad Caliphate military power became the real basis of rule, but this actual disestablishment of the political and religious foundations of the State was never admitted theoretically.¹³⁸ This meant that the various Caliphs could (and did) emphasize the various aspects of their office in different ways. The early Caliphs held three titles: *Khalifa*, *Amir ul-Muminin*, and *Imam*; ¹³⁹ the first stressed his relation to the Prophet, the second accentuated his supreme authority as warlord and head of the civil administration, the last his religious functions. But not all Caliphs laid the same emphasis on each title. The Umayyad Caliphs were in the first place *Amir ul-Muminin*; the Abbasids, however, stressed their title of *Imam*. Sceptre and seal were the symbols of the Umayyads; for the Abbasids it was the mantle of the Prophet.¹⁴⁰

And it was not only the Caliphs who viewed the exact meaning of their office in different ways; European theorists were apt to do so too. So Gibb, for instance, writes: "The Caliph, by position and function, is the temporal embodiment of the Sacred Law in Islam; he is the person who is charged with the duty of maintaining its supremacy both against external enemies and internal rebels. Being himself bound by the Law, he may neither modify it nor interpret it in his own responsibility, but is concerned solely with the task of applying it, and in the carrying out of this purpose he is entitled to claim from all Moslems the same unhesitating obedience as they owe to the Law itself. His office is thus essentially a political one, but the sanctions on which his authority is based are primarily religious."¹⁴¹ There is no great difference between this characteristic of the Caliphal office and the one given by Arnold: "For the understanding of the status of the Caliph, it is important therefore to recognize that he is pre-eminently a political functionary, and though he may perform religious functions, these functions do not imply the possession of any spiritual powers setting him thereby apart from the rest of the faithful."¹⁴² Yet the attitude

of these authors is not quite the same; Gibb recognizes the claims the Caliph has to support from all Muslims, owing to the religious aspects of his office, whereas Arnold stresses the religious equality of the Caliph and other Muslims.¹⁴³

The point may be, in this case, that Arnold wanted to refute certain claims the Ottoman Caliphs had put forward since the 18th century, using to their advantage the fact that Europeans were inclined to think in terms of entirely separate functions between which Muslims never made sharp distinctions. By this means, they succeeded in getting accepted the contention that they held religious authority over Muslims outside their territory, since European powers supposed these claims to have no political consequences. When the Russians perceived that this religious authority, acknowledged by themselves in the aforementioned treaty of Küchük Kainarji of 1774, did have political implications, they wanted to delete the relevant clauses of the treaty in 1783.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, in the first decades of the 20th century the Sultan succeeded in getting similar clauses into his treaties with Austria (1908), Italy (1912), and Bulgaria and Greece (1913).¹⁴⁵ When after World War I the Ottoman Empire was carved up, whether these claims should be met or not became an important issue, and the India Office — one of whose top advisers in these matters was Arnold — wanted to exclude from the treaty of Sèvres any article on which the Sultan would be able to base pretensions to obedience of Muslims outside Turkey. This may explain why Arnold — and other contemporary authors like Snouck Hurgronje and Nallino, who were aware of the dangers of the position — assumes a very strict attitude, whereas Gibb, writing ten years later when Caliphal pretensions were no longer to be feared, used a less exclusive formula. And even in the years about 1920 not everybody was fully aware of the political implications of recognizing some kind of religious authority of the Caliph: the Government of India, for instance, was ready to give in to Muslim desires in this respect, and some Cabinet ministers in London at first took the same position.¹⁴⁶

Related to this whole problem is the question of whether the Caliph's position could be compared with the Pope's. Though this comparison had forced itself on many authors as early as the Crusades,¹⁴⁷ there seems to be an overwhelming case against it: the Caliph is not a priest working the miracle of the mass; he has no power to absolve sins; he has no authority to create, to judge, or to interpret religious dogma.¹⁴⁸

Considering this state of affairs, the Caliph could hardly be styled the "spiritual head" of Islam. Yet this was what was done by many

Muslims after the Ottoman Sultan had put forward his claim in the 18th century. This idea — encouraged by western misunderstandings about the nature of his position — found support with many Muslims, both inside and outside Turkey.¹⁴⁹ And if this view was correct, then the Caliph had to be “something more than a Pope”,¹⁵⁰ because of the close relations between religion and politics in Islam, and the Caliph’s obligation to defend the faith as a temporal ruler too.

Nor could the Caliph, if he was something more than a Pope, be “vaticanized”: the close interconnection of religion and temporal power did not permit this solution. And yet this was exactly what the Turkish government did in 1922. How could this come about? We will examine this question in fuller detail later, but we would like here to say one thing about it: the main reason seems to be that westernized Muslims clearly saw the drawbacks of the close connection between religion and politics, and since a constitutional and responsible government would be incompatible with the traditional conception of the Caliphate, they wanted to separate religion from temporal power. We may observe this trend with the Young Turks¹⁵¹ and, in a far less outspoken form, with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who warned his co-religionists not to confuse religious and political issues.¹⁵² This view was one of the causes of the neutral attitude most Muslims assumed when in 1914 the Sultan-Caliph called on their loyalty.

Thus we have established, if we may sum up the foregoing in a very generalized way, three views on the nature of the Caliphate. Western scholars, in conformity with orthodox Muslim opinion, regarded it as a predominantly political office, having religious implications but no religious authority. Westernized Muslims — though not all of them, certainly, — reached the conclusion that the Caliph should be “vaticanized” and his office be deprived of all political meaning. And lastly the Pan-Islamic view wanted to restore the Caliphate to all its possibilities, investing it with political and religious authority. But we should bear in mind that the attitudes assumed in practical politics do not always correspond to the theoretical views of those professing them. So the Agha Khan writes: “According to the Sunni School — the majority of Muslims — the Prophet’s religious authority came to an end at his death, and . . . Abu Bakr assumed only the civil and secular power.”¹⁵³ But in the same book he tells us how in 1920, together with Amir Ali, he advocated recognizing the Sultan’s “spiritual suzerainty” in the provinces the Ottoman Empire was going to lose.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, as we will see later, many Indian Muslims who had been the

staunch supporters of the view that the Caliph needed sufficient temporal power to enable him to fulfil his religious duties, rather easily accepted the fact that the Angora government deprived him of all temporal power. It is clear that political expedience often got the upper hand over theoretical objections.

Another question was whether the Ottoman Sultan rightly claimed the Caliphate or not: a somewhat complicated problem because several factors could be taken into account. A first point to consider is the attitude of the Shias, who generally hold that the Imamate descends by divine appointment in the apostolical line; they repudiate the authority of the believers to elect a spiritual head, and reject also military power, or conquest of *de facto* power as claims to religious leadership. They do not acknowledge the Prophet's successors as Imams; in consequence, to them the Sultan-Caliph of Turkey was nothing more than the ruler of a Muslim state. It was only the twelfth Imam, having disappeared but still living on "unseen but seeing", who could reappear and could re-establish the universal Caliphate.¹⁵⁵ This, however, is the theoretical position. In practice, the Shias were less averse to acknowledge the Sultan of Turkey as their leader. Abdul Hamid tried to win a following among Persian Shias and Jamal-ud-din made some efforts in that direction too; ¹⁵⁶ we have already observed how the Agha Khan, the religious leader of the Shia Ismaili sect, supported the claim of the Turkish Sultan to religious suzerainty over Syria, Arabia and Mesopotamia: two indications that the Sunni-Shia schism was not too important when after 1880 the advocates of Pan-Islamism centred their efforts round the Sultan-Caliph of Turkey.

But there were other things to consider. Very general among Muslims was the special admiration they felt towards the Caliphate of the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs.¹⁵⁷ This in their eyes was the ideal Islamic state, the "golden age" when Islamic ideals of democracy and social justice were realized — two values they felt Muslim society in the last part of the 19th century was badly lacking.

But when the fourth Caliph, Ali, met his death by murder, the Umayyads founded a temporal monarchy. Now two lines of reasoning could be followed. Even when realizing that the true Caliphate belonged to the past,¹⁵⁸ it was possible either to accommodate some of the facts to theory, or to formulate a new theory that better fitted in with the real facts. The first course was chosen by traditional Muslim thinkers, the second by Ibn Khaldun.¹⁵⁹ But then there was still another solution: if only the "rightly guided" Caliphs were true ones, they were succeeded

by rulers not deserving the title! In support of this view a saying of the Prophet could be referred to, that the Caliphate was to last for thirty years after his death. This argument was advanced by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and he concluded from it that certainly the Ottoman Sultan was no Caliph of Indian Muslims.¹⁶⁰

But even when accepting the view that the Caliphate in a more or less corrupted state had survived after its spell of pristine glamour and purity, one could raise other objections to the Ottoman claim on it. Did the Ottoman Sultans meet the requirements of a Caliph? There were quite a few of these, like being of blameless character, having sufficient knowledge of the *sharia*, being brave and intelligent, and so on¹⁶¹ — qualifications that were as reasonable to demand from, as they were easy to ascribe to, any candidate. But two requirements were of special significance: the Caliph should possess sufficient power to be able to protect the faith and the faithful, and he should belong to the tribe of the Quraish. The first condition constituted a strong argument in favour of the Ottoman Sultan; about the year 1900 he was the only Muslim sovereign who, to some extent at least, could shoulder this task. This was one of the grounds on which, twenty years later, the Khilafat leaders based their demand that the Sultan-Caliph should not lose too large a part of his territories, for if he did, he would no longer be able to perform the duties that went with his exalted office.

The second condition certainly made the Sultan's claim somewhat dubious, the more so because there was another ruler who did satisfy it: the Sharif of Mecca. But the Sultan's partisans could point out some facts in his favour. History had legitimated the position of Caliphs who did not belong to the Quraish, and secondly, it was not the Prophet himself who had said that the Caliph should be of this tribe, but Abu Bakr, and he had said so because in his time only a member of this tribe would command sufficient prestige.¹⁶² So it was possible to treat this requirement as a "technicality" which could not be a serious objection to the Sultan's claim,¹⁶³ and to most Indian Muslims some kind of allegiance to the Sultan-Caliph was fully acceptable.¹⁶⁴

Another fact — to be correct: an illusion, but an illusion one thinks to be true has all the appearances and effects of a fact — stimulating Muslim loyalty towards the Ottoman Sultan was the transfer of the Caliphate by the last Abbasid Caliph Mutawakkil to the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1517. After the sack of Baghdad the Abbasid Caliphate had been "restored" in Egypt, but the Caliphs in the next two and a half centuries were mere showpieces, serving only to legitimate the

actual Mamluk rulers. The Caliph's name was not even mentioned in the *khutba* (the Friday prayer), nor did his effigy appear on coins.¹⁶⁵ This restored Caliphate lasted until 1517, when Selim conquered Egypt and Mutawakkil handed over his office and its symbols — the Prophet's mantle, some hairs from his beard and the sword of Umar — to the victor. Thus, at least, runs the story of these happenings as accepted by Muslim historians in the 19th and early 20th centuries.¹⁶⁶

Even when accepted in this form, some objections could be raised — and in fact were raised by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and some of his followers — against the proceedings. Selim became master of Egypt by murder and treason; he waded through a sea of blood of true believers to reach his goal.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, Mutawakkil, a puppet of the Mamluks, having no real power, was no true Caliph — so how could he hand down an office he never really held?¹⁶⁸ And then there was the attack of modern western scholars who proved that the story of a formal deed of transfer in 1517 was a fiction, dating from the last part of the 18th century and propped up by the Ottoman Sultans because it served their political interest.¹⁶⁹

But notwithstanding these possible objections, the official story was generally accepted in the Muslim world, unshaken. It is curious to note how relatively little use was made of these arguments against it by Muslim adversaries of the Khilafat movement. Therefore we may assume that, on the whole, Indian Muslims in the late 19th and early 20th centuries considered the Ottoman Caliphate as valid. Once more we conclude that political and sentimental arguments counted for more than theoretical considerations.

This brings up a last question related to the Caliphate: why were Indian Muslims attracted by the idea of the Ottoman Caliphate, and what did it mean to them? In the Khilafat movement Indian Muslims played a more important role than any other Muslims outside Turkey; in the 19th century pro-Turkish sentiments were fairly common among Indian Muslims, as we pointed out in connection with the Deoband school. It was also the Pan-Islamic enthusiasm of his compatriots which prompted Sir Sayyid's warnings against confusion of political and religious issues. So we may assume that Turkey, the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism — three closely interrelated issues between which often no clear distinctions may be made, not even by the people attracted by them — held some significance for them.

One reason why Indian Muslims were perhaps more pro-Turkish than Muslims elsewhere, may be that Indian Muslims did not know

the Turks very well. The Arab peoples knew them better, and their acquaintance with Turkish rule could hardly make them love it. But side by side with this explanation there is probably another one, to which many authors on the subject call attention. Gopal writes: "The Turkish Empire, ruled by a Muslim Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, who also enjoyed the unique position of the Khalifa (Caliph), was the pride of most Muslims of the world, especially those whose primary loyalty was to the Khalifa, and not to the nation of which they were citizens."¹⁷⁰

Here it is suggested that an unsatisfactory situation with respect to national feelings could make Muslims susceptible to an extra-territorial allegiance. Now the identity of Indian Muslims was threatened by dangers from two sides: from the British, who had put an end to Mughul power, but also from the Hindus, who could smother the Indian Muslim minority if ever India became independent. Both dangers were apt to strengthen feelings of Muslim solidarity without regard to state frontiers, and to make Indian Muslims look for help and sympathy from Turkey. A clear example of the high hopes cherished by them in this respect was given by Amir Ali, who in 1909 told Morley that "any injustice and any suspicion that the British were unjust to Mohammedans in India would provoke a serious and injurious reaction in Constantinople."¹⁷¹ And though admiration for Turkey and Pan-Islamism, and attachment to the Caliphate are certainly not one and the same, the Caliph was the most obvious symbol to embody Islamic solidarity.

It is, of course, very difficult or even impossible to discern which of the two dangers mentioned figured primarily in orientating Indian Muslims towards an extra-territorial allegiance.¹⁷² The subsequent history of the Khilafat movement will produce evidence of the inextricable tangle of anti-British and anti-Hindu feelings in Muslim India.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS A HINDU-MUSLIM ENTENTE

In the preceding chapter we established the fact that since 1885 Congress had tried to give shape to a truly Indian nationalism but — partly at any rate — was prevented from doing so because the neo-Hindu renaissance brought an unmistakably communal trend into it.¹ This was the main reason why Muslims abstained more and more from participating in Congress.

In the first decade of the 20th century several things happened which could not but intensify the Hindu-Muslim antagonism. The first of these was the partition of Bengal in 1905, the scheme of which was announced by Lord Curzon in 1903. By 1900, the province of Bengal had 78 million inhabitants, and East and West Bengal contrasted sharply in economic development as well as in religion, East Bengal being poor and Muslim and West Bengal predominantly Hindu and more prosperous. In our opinion, Curzon's first intention was probably to realize an administrative improvement, wholly in keeping with his saying that "efficiency of administration" was "a synonym for the contentment of the governed."²

But it was not received in this spirit. Bengali political leaders regarded it as an attempt to crush the rise of Bengali nationalism and to alienate the Muslims from the Hindus.³ There was some reason for this supposition, as the Lt. Governor of Bengal, Sir Andrew Fraser, recommended the scheme for the political profit that might be gained from it: it would liberate East Bengal from the political influence of Calcutta with its Hindu Congress lawyers.⁴ And at any rate, a consequence of the partition was that a new province, preponderantly Muslim, was created, and so the Muslims gained influence in the process. Curzon must have been acquainted with the Lt. Governor's suggestion — but that does not prove that he adopted it himself, and certainly not that it became his main motive. His private letters to Hamilton,⁵ the then Secretary of State for India and an old friend of Curzon, never show any allusion to a secret aim of dividing Hindus and Muslims on this question or

anything of the kind, and Curzon does not seem to be the man to hide any such considerations if he had them, at least not in his private utterances.⁶ One striking aspect of the partition was that the opposition against it rose rather unexpectedly; it was only after it started that Curzon toured East-Bengal. Had Curzon been planning his measure as a subtle move in a political game, one would expect him to have prepared the whole business politically. One may wonder, of course, why he did not mind public opinion when it manifested itself rather loudly against partition, the more so because he used to defend his plans in London with an appeal to public opinion. Here we think Ronaldshay's explanation very plausible: Curzon had not much respect for Indian public opinion. He would decide for himself whether it had any value or not — if it was in conformity with his own opinion it had, and he would use it as an argument, but if it went against his own opinion it had not, and he felt entitled to ignore it.⁷

But whatever Curzon's intentions may have been, one effect of the partition certainly was that the Hindu-Muslim antagonism was stimulated. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who at this time made his first contact with Bengali revolutionaries like Aurobindo Ghosh, found them hostile towards Muslims because they lent themselves to the British political game.⁸ Nirad C. Chaudhuri mentions that it was in those years that something changed in the personal relations between Hindus and Muslims in Bengal, even among schoolboys: the Hindu boys did not look upon the Muslims as their comrades any longer, but as the representatives of a hostile group.⁹ Moreover, the partition promoted the alliance between westernized Hindus and religious revivalists, and therefore could not but repel the Muslims.¹⁰

A second event with most fateful consequences was the granting of a new instalment of reforms, known as the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, involving the institution of separate electorates and bringing in its train the founding of the Muslim League. It would not do here to go into all the details of this story, and we will confine ourselves to a brief exposition of some of the facts.

When Curzon left India in November, 1905, he was replaced by the Unionist Lord Minto. But Minto had hardly left England when Balfour's Conservative government lost office and so for the next five years Minto had to team up with the Radical Lord Morley as a Secretary of State for India. They inaugurated a new period in British-Indian history which Spear calls "Edwardian India" (1905-1914), characterizing it by two watchwords: "Freedom rather than discipline, autonomy

rather than efficiency".¹¹ Morley, who had discussed the situation in India with Gokhale several times, announced, on July 20, 1906, that reforms were being contemplated.¹² As it was clear that these would tend towards an enlargement of the elected element in the legislative councils, the Muslims realized that they should do something to safeguard their position. The Secretary of Aligarh College, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, wrote to Archbold, the College principal, expressing their wish to plead their cause with the Viceroy. On October 1, 1906, Minto received a deputation of thirty-five prominent Muslims, headed by the Agha Khan, at Simla. They urged the institution of separate electorates¹³ to ensure a fair representation¹⁴ of the Muslim minority and Minto gave them a reassuring answer.

In these circumstances the Muslim leaders felt that a political organization was needed too. For the time being, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy had only more or less vague plans, the definite moulding of which might call for Muslim pressure.¹⁵ At any rate, reforms would increase the importance of elections and so an organization was wanted to manage them. But apart from these considerations of current interest, Hindu revivalism had made the Muslims look for organization in order to safeguard what they felt to be their rights. As early as 1900, when Urdu lost its privileged position in the U.P., Mohsin-ul-Mulk founded the Urdu Defence Association, which was not merely a linguistic and cultural body but had political significance as well.¹⁶ In 1903 the Muhammadan Political Association came into being in the U.P.,¹⁷ and in the spring of 1906 Fazli-Husain founded in Lahore a Muslim League,¹⁸ which a year later was merged into the All-India Muslim League. This latter body had been founded at Dacca on December 30, 1906, by the same group of men who had taken the initiative for the Simla deputation. Its first secretaries were Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk, and from March, 1908 the Agha Khan was its Permanent President.¹⁹ One might say the League was characterized by this choice: an upper class Muslim, on excellent terms with the British.

Finally the proposed reforms took the form of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. The long lapse of time between the first plans and their final execution suggests some difficulties, which indeed did exist. Minto and Morley did not have quite the same ideas on the measures that were to be taken; in particular, Morley developed misgivings about separate electorates. This explains why it took a long time for the plans to mature and why a man like Gokhale, who as late as 1908 had welcomed the reforms,²⁰ denounced the Act in its definite shape, and

especially the regulations attached to it by the Government of India.²¹

The main interest these developments have for our subject may be expressed in two questions: what were the British intentions behind them?, and: how did they effect Hindu-Muslim relations?

Quite a few authors answer the former question in approximately the following manner:

1. The Simla deputation was engineered by the Government of India;
2. The founding of the Muslim League was prompted by the same;
3. The granting of separate electorates to the Muslims was inspired by the British desire to intensify communal tension between Hindus and Muslims.

These contentions of course are interrelated; they constitute the expression of a certain view of British policy in those years.²² The discussion in this case centers round two crucial points: Who did take the initiative for the deputation?, and: What did Minto aim at when he insisted on creating separate electorates?

As to the first point: none of the writers that suppose that the initiative came from Simla — or from Mr. Archbold, the then principal of Aligarh College, who was in close touch with Simla — is able to give definite proof of this assertion. The reception the deputation got from Minto proves that he welcomed it, but that in itself does not prove he provoked it. The first known letter referring to a possible deputation is one from Mohsin-ul-Mulk to Archbold²³ and it does not contain any evidence of being solicited by the recipient. A previous verbal request not alluded to is, of course, not out of the question, but if the deputation came about by deliberate British planning, it is hardly probable that no clear and unambiguous testimony to such a request should have emerged. As it is, accusations of this kind are conspicuously vague. Muhammad Ali, being among the first members of the Muslim League,²⁴ might have been in the possession of the facts and would not have desisted from making them public, but he substantiates his accusation that the deputation was a "command performance" only with the words: "From whatever source the inspiration may have come . . ." ²⁵ And did the men who went to Simla and afterwards founded the Muslim League, need much British prompting? We should think not, since the desire for privileges and the wish to organize politically had already existed for some years.²⁶ Therefore, we doubt whether deliberate British scheming may be assumed to be at the root of the Simla deputation and the subsequent founding of the Muslim League.²⁷

The question of British aims and intentions in creating separate

electorates is, of course, another matter, but in this respect too absolute proofs are not to be expected. We think the following interpretation²⁸ is, in itself, plausible. Separate electorates were planned and put through by Minto; Morley, who had at first approved of them,²⁹ afterwards had his doubts about the wisdom of the proposal and put forward another scheme. That Morley finally gave in to Minto in this respect may be caused by the fact that he did not see the reforms as a definite step towards parliamentary democracy; he looked upon the councils as a kind of *darbars*, where subjects could bring their wishes and grievances before the ruler.³⁰

Minto, however, in conformity with Whig principles, was looking for representation of the various interests. This was why he wanted to take into account not only the vocal middle class which mainly constituted the Congress, but other groups too. At first he considered a Council of Indian Princes; only later did he develop his scheme of separate electorates for the Muslims, the big landowners and the Chambers of Commerce. Repeatedly he said that he wanted to create a counterpoise, but this should not be explained in the sense of a Muslim counterpoise against Hindus, but as a counterpoise against the professional middle classes, which tended to monopolize the political voice of India.³¹ Minto was certainly suspicious of Congress, but it was especially the Extremist group in it that he distrusted.

On the other hand, Minto's remarks about the "counterpoise" might be interpreted³² in the sense of a Muslim counterpoise against the national movement of Congress, into which the emerging Muslim middle class would irresistibly be drawn if there were no separate electorates. It is clear that at least some people in government circles were thinking along these lines; Lady Minto's well-known entry in her diary³³ proves it. In our opinion, it is not at all impossible that these different intentions mingled in Minto's mind. After all, it must have been attractive for him to do what he thought was good for India as well as for the British hold over it.

The question remains: how were Hindu-Muslim relations affected by the founding of the Muslim League and the reforms? Here the answer is less difficult, as most authors agree on this point: they deteriorated. The Congress press criticized the birth of the new party³⁴ and in 1909 Congress passed four resolutions disapproving of the creation of separate electorates on the basis of religion.³⁵ These were to remain a stumbling block in Hindu-Muslim relations throughout the next decades — the period from 1917 until about 1925 excepted. Even

Gokhale, who tried to co-operate with the government and to work the reforms, and who acknowledged that provisionally separate electorates might be needed, thought that the reforms went too far in this respect.³⁶ But tensions increased not only between Hindus and Muslims, but also between Muslims themselves: the pro-British attitude displayed by the League did not find favour with the Deoband ulama,³⁷ and Jinnah, who was a member of Congress and in the next few years was going to earn for himself the reputation of being a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity, was considered by the Agha Khan as "our doughtiest opponent in 1906."³⁸

The Muslim League had set itself three tasks: promoting loyalty towards the British government, advancing the political rights and interests of Indian Muslims, and fostering good relations with other communities. But this did not mean that all its members intended meekly to accept everything that came from government;³⁹ men like Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk were high-spirited enough to voice a strong protest whenever they felt that justice was not being done to their cause. And precisely in the years preceding World War I they often experienced such a feeling. We have already mentioned how the Government of the U.P. in 1900 accepted Hindi as an official language and how consequently Urdu lost its privileged position. Mohsin-ul-Mulk reacted by founding the Urdu Defence Association, but by doing so incurred the anger of the Lt. Governor Sir Antony Macdonnell, who threatened to withdraw the government grant to Aligarh College⁴⁰ (of which Mohsin-ul-Mulk was the Secretary). The latter then wanted to resign from his post at Aligarh, but was finally persuaded by his friends to withdraw from the Association, which meant the early end of this movement. This conflict, and in particular the high-handed manner in which government handled it "hurt all self-respecting Muslims and paved the way for the success of those who were opposed to Sir Syed's policy."⁴¹

Aligarh College, originally intended to be a stronghold of Anglo-Muslim friendship, in the next few years became the centre of more conflicts. The first concerned the competence of the Principal and the European staff, and finally caused the retirement of Mr. Archbold in 1908. An interesting aspect of this struggle was that a society of former Aligarh pupils, the "Aligarh Old Boys", of which Shaukat Ali at that time was the Honorary Secretary, took the lead in the opposition — but it was not only the younger generation which took offence at British tutelage, for they were supported by Viqar-ul-Mulk (who had succeeded Mohsin-ul-Mulk after the latter's death in 1907), by the

Agha Khan and Amir Ali.⁴² And a few years later a scheme for raising the College to university status occasioned fresh difficulties with British authorities.⁴³ Aligarh College, in those years, certainly did not wholly deserve Shibli's abuse, who once called it "an institution for the training in slavery."⁴⁴

But in the meantime a more important matter had come up: the partition of Bengal was annulled. This setback to the Muslims was compensated for by the removal of the capital to Delhi, the ancient centre of the Mughul Empire, but nevertheless many Muslims were highly indignant at the proceedings; moreover, they felt that the Hindus by bitter and sometimes even violent opposition had got what they wanted, whereas Muslim loyalty had been rewarded by betrayal.⁴⁵ Some Muslim leaders tried to calm their followers down; the Agha Khan, Viqar-ul-Mulk and Amir Ali advised them to refrain from any protest against the decision.⁴⁶ The consequence was that younger and more radical elements — probably also representing a shift from Muslim upper class towards middle class⁴⁷ — got the upper hand in the Muslim League: the Agha Khan resigned as its President in 1912.⁴⁸ Influential Muslim leaders like Shibli and Abul Kalam Azad, both of them connected with the Deoband school, poured out their scorn and satire over the old Aligarh leaders.⁴⁹

All these happenings, by the way, do not suggest a divide-and-rule policy of the British in those years. If they had tried to unite Hindus and Muslims in an anti-British front, they could hardly have done better than rebuff the Muslims in the way they did. This, of course, is no proof as to their intentions, since the effects of a policy are not always those that are hoped for, but it is scarcely probable that British policy-makers, had they been intent on keeping Hindus and Muslims at daggers drawn, would have acted as they actually did. Rather than accuse them of malice, we might blame them for a certain naïveté or clumsiness, as was displayed by Lord Hardinge, Minto's successor as a Viceroy, advocating the reversal of the partition of Bengal by pointing out to Lord Crewe, the then Secretary of State for India, that this might bring Hindus and Muslims closer together.⁵⁰ He would not have expected that this unity was going to be of an anti-British disposition.

Nor was this all. In the same years British foreign policy left Turkey in the lurch and threw other independent or semi-independent Muslim states to the wolves. This of course is a very one-sided view of the facts, but it was the way Indian Muslims looked at things. As an example we quote Shaukat Ali: "England deliberately in the last few years

conciliated her European neighbours and brought them to her side, thus isolating her great rival Germany, but at the expense of the weak Muslim states. France was given a free hand in Morocco and Northern Africa, Persia was thrown over to Russia and she herself took the dainty morsel of Egypt. Turkey and the Moslem World were watching this change with pain and wonder. The result of all this was that gradually Moslems all over the world felt that they could not rely on England as a friend. The last Balkan War cleared the vision and gave unmistakable proofs of how things were being arranged.⁵¹

On the other hand, we should probably not exaggerate the anti-British feeling behind such utterances. Faruqi explains them⁵² as a composite reaction to Hindu revivalism, the Hindu solidarity which had been greatly increased by the partition of Bengal, the British policy with respect to Turkey, and the nationalist movements in Persia and Turkey which inspired Indian Muslims. This strange mixture of motivations may have caused some of the inconsistencies of Muslim behaviour. While denouncing British policy towards Turkey, Muhammad Ali in 1911 opened a relief fund for Turkish victims of the war over Tripoli (and later on of the Balkan wars). When he got news that medical aid would be particularly welcome, the fund was used to equip a medical mission headed by Dr. Ansari, who left India in December, 1912 and came back in July, 1913.⁵³ But it is interesting to note how Muhammad Ali, at every step he took with respect to his fund and the mission, sought official and personal co-operation from the British side, going as far as enlisting the Viceroy as a Patron of the Delhi Red Crescent Society and organizing his relief work through British consular officers. And when World War I broke out, the field hospital which had been financed out of the *Comrade* Turkish Relief Fund was presented to the Medical Service in India! This hardly suggests a consistent anti-British feeling — even though this was certainly one of the components of Muslim sentiment in India in those years.⁵⁴

This is not surprising when we realize that Muhammad Ali, like many of the young Muslim leaders who came to the fore shortly before the war, was an Aligarh pupil, and even if Aligarh had changed, it retained much of its founder's spirit.⁵⁵ Born in 1878 into a fairly well-to-do, but not rich, family of Muslim landowners in Rampur State, he went to school at Bareilly and afterwards to Aligarh, where he joined his six years older brother Shaukat. It was Shaukat who, after Muhammad's first success at Allahabad University, collected the money that enabled his younger brother to go to Oxford — a feat "nothing short of a

miracle", as the latter said.⁵⁶ At Oxford he failed to pass the I.C.S. examination and he left in 1902. It is, by the way, remarkable that quite a few young Indians who later came to the fore in the nationalist movement were unsuccessful I.C.S. candidates.⁵⁷ It must have been a painful experience for these young men, intelligent, ambitious, and enthusiastic, first to opt for identification with their foreign masters and then to be rejected.

Muhammad Ali got a second rebuff when in 1902, on his return to India, he tried to get a post at Aligarh College, but was rejected by the Principal, Morison, who thought him too self-willed and headstrong.⁵⁸ He then entered the service of the Gaekwar of Baroda, which he left in 1910 to set out on a journalistic career by starting the *Comrade*. "The *Comrade* — 'comrade of all and partisan of none' — was to . . . prepare the Musalmans to make their proper contribution to territorial patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour of their extraterritorial sympathies which is the quintessence of Islam."⁵⁹ These lines suggest the blend of Muhammad Ali's motives in this period of his life: communal, national and Pan-Islamic.⁶⁰ He wanted to serve the secular interests of his community, aspiring at the same time after good relations with the Hindu community, but warning the leaders of both communities that they should not think too much of inessential successes in this respect, nor "mistake aspiration for achievement."⁶¹ Sometimes he was rather bitter in his criticism of Hindu practices⁶² and he certainly did not fail to back up Muslim demands, for instance when arguing that Urdu should be the *lingua franca* of India.⁶³ After all, he was among the first seventy members of the Muslim League. That was why for some time to come he could not strike a definitely anti-British note; this is attested even by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who in 1910 advised him to go through with his *Comrade* project and in his memoirs wrote about it: "At first the tone was extremely humorous, but not anti-British."⁶⁴

Muhammad Ali made a good journalist. His arguing is clear and his style shows a happy blend of rational thinking, passion and wit. Even now some of his contributions make very pleasant reading, which can hardly be said about all journalistic production of some fifty years ago. His articles give evidence of an intelligent probing of the European press (British, French, German and Austrian newspapers) and of historical knowledge, but, remarkably enough, he seems to have lacked direct information from Muslim countries like Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, etc.⁶⁵ In addition to the *Comrade*, he published an Urdu paper, the *Hamdard*, and both of them met with a good reception, and not only

among the middle class; they must have evoked some interest among the lower classes too.⁶⁶

It was only during his internment from 1915 to 1919 that religion became important for him, and then all-important. From his *Autobiography* one gets the impression of a conversion.⁶⁷ He describes how the undisturbed calm of his enforced retreat, coinciding with a nearly fatal illness suffered by his wife from which she recovered "as by a miracle", brought him to introspection. "For the first time in my life I read the Quran through in an intelligent and comprehending manner . . . I could . . . truly say that a compensating Providence had seen to it that in losing almost all else I should at long last find life rich in content and purposeful, the real thing for the first time and no sham or simulacrum."⁶⁸ He calls himself "a convert", adding that precisely for this reason he was possessed by enthusiasm and wanted to preach Islam, the true faith of universal fraternity, exposing nationalism as "a narrow prejudice".⁶⁹ When he discovered similar ideas in the work of Wells, he "felt an unconquerable craving to go to Europe and preach Islam to these heathens who had set up races and nationalities and States as idols to worship in the temple that should have been dedicated to the one God, the ruler of an undivided mankind."⁷⁰ President Wilson's message confirmed his belief that a new era was dawning after the terrible nightmare of the war.⁷¹ An expectancy of salvation rings through his words. In the years to come the Caliphate was to him in the first instance a religious concept. His burial at the Mosque of Umar at Jerusalem on January 23, 1931 was truly in keeping with his personality.

His brother Shaukat, who with him became a leader of the Khilafat movement, was inspired by mainly the same ideals. Of more robust health — his brother Muhammad was a diabetic and often incapacitated by his ailment — he was certainly a competent organizer and capable of great devotion to a cause, but he was not a born leader; whereas Muhammad Ali might be called a general, "Shaukat Ali was a soldier and disdained the responsibilities of a commander."⁷²

Having taken his degree at Aligarh in 1896, he became an officer of the Opium Department where most of his colleagues, with whom he had very friendly relations,⁷³ were British. This is according to his own words, but that he cannot have been really anti-British in those years is corroborated by the fact that in 1911 and 1912 he acted as private secretary to the Agha Khan, who then toured India to collect money for raising Aligarh College to the status of a university.⁷⁴ He then left the Opium Department altogether, since, to quote his own

words, "I had set my heart on devoting the rest of my life to the service of my faith and my country."

We consider it significant that "faith" precedes "country"; it would seem that with Shaukat the religious bent developed somewhat earlier than with his brother. In 1913 he founded together with Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal at Lucknow the *Jamiat-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba* (Servants of the Kaaba Society),⁷⁵ which stated as its object "the preservation of the sanctity of the Sacred Places from violation, serving in every way the first centre of the Unity of Godhead . . . and safeguarding it from non-Muslim usurpation."⁷⁶ The means to attain this end would be mainly: the preaching of Islam, the establishment of Muslim schools and promotion of the *haj*. There would be members, contributing one rupee per year, and *shaidais* (votaries), who would be full-time workers for the Society. From the funds, one third should "be sent every year to the independent Moslem Government that is the Guardian of the Sacred Places on the strict condition that it shall be spent only on the service of such places . . ."⁷⁷ In about a year the Society got over 20,000 members, including about 2,000 women.⁷⁸

Clearly the *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* could not but raise some suspicion with the Government of India. It was a religious society, but not without its political implications. This was evident from a contribution by the founders in the *Comrade*,⁷⁹ in which they stated as their motive that Turkey was growing weaker and weaker, and that consequently the Holy Places were increasingly endangered. Moreover, one third of its funds would be made over to Turkey, as the Guardian of the Sacred Places, and who could guarantee that this money would not be spent on other purposes? And lastly, an organization with 400 "votaries" at its disposal — this was the number aimed at — would make an excellent instrument for espionage and illicit propaganda. So it is not to be wondered at that his *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* activities were the main reason for Shaukat Ali's internment. It is difficult to ascertain how good the grounds for these suspicions were⁸⁰ — but at any rate, becoming the collaborator of Abdul Bari and Mahmud-ul-Hasan after having been secretary to the Agha Khan is evidence of a notable shift of sympathies.

But anti-British feeling was a much stronger motive in the activities of Abul Kalam Azad. Born in 1888 at Mecca — his father had left India shortly after the Mutiny — he received a thoroughly traditional Muslim training, at which he excelled. About 1905 he became acquainted with the works of Sir Sayyid; he soon realized that knowledge of modern science, philosophy and literature was indispensable. He went through

what he himself calls "a spiritual crisis"⁸¹ when he had to break away from his traditional religious upbringing. This was the time when he became a member of the Muslim League⁸² about which, however, he soon lost his illusions.⁸³ He was then strongly influenced by Shibli, a former Aligarh professor who had left the college in 1898 to devote himself to the *Nadwat al-Ulama*, an organization of orthodox scholars opposed to Aligarh's liberalism in theology.⁸⁴ Shibli considered Abul Kalam Azad his disciple, his younger colleague and his successor. Both of them evinced the same blend of modernism, Islamic romanticism and Pan-Islamism which made them detractors of the Aligarh policy and anti-British, and therefore the potential allies,⁸⁵ politically, of Congress and Deoband but, with regard to religion, too modernistic to establish close ties with Deoband.⁸⁶

In 1908 Azad made a long journey through Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey where he had contacts with the Young Turks. Back in India he started the publication of an Urdu weekly, *Al Hilal* (The Crescent), reaching in two years a circulation of over 25,000 copies. From the outset its trend was anti-Aligarh, anti-British and Pan-Islamic; it devoted much attention to events in the Muslim world in general.⁸⁷

As a religious scholar, Azad was far more competent than Muhammad Ali⁸⁸ and he became the principal theoretician of the Khilafat movement. To him, one of the essentials of Islam is the international solidarity of all Muslims, and the Caliph is the instrument through which this solidarity is to be maintained. Aziz Ahmad summarizes his views on the Caliphate as follows: "The foundations of Pan-Islamic society rest on five sociological pillars: its adherence to a single caliph; its rallying to his call; its obedience to him; emigration from a *dar al-harb*, including a former Muslim territory occupied by non-Muslims; and *jihad* which could take several forms."⁸⁹ In Azad's view, the Caliph should be elected by all Muslims, but if an election is impossible, power may legally invest him; "... a *de facto* Caliph, in the eyes of Azad, enjoys all the prerogatives of a *de jure* Caliph."⁹⁰ Azad does not think that one family or race only is entitled to the Caliphate, and he is convinced that in 1517 Sultan Selim I legally took over the office from his last Abbasid predecessor. Indian Muslims owe allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphs; the Mughul Emperors were only "regional Caliphs" and when their power came to an end in 1857, the universal Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans remained unshaken.⁹¹

The concepts of *hijrat* and *jihad* indicate that Azad's notion of Muslim solidarity was political as well as religious,⁹² and that his approach

to the problems of Indian Muslims was not an altogether realistic one. Together with Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers he is numbered among the "Islamic romanticists"⁹³ who, however, played an ever greater role in Muslim India in the first two decades of this century. The personal relations between the foremost leaders, Azad and Muhammad Ali, probably were not always of the best. Bamford supposes that Muhammad Ali and Abdul Bari were jealous of Azad's growing influence,⁹⁴ and in a letter⁹⁵ to his brother Shaukat, Muhammad Ali complains of not wholly fair and charitable criticisms from Azad. On the other hand, Azad in his book on India's fight for freedom gives the impression of being utterly convinced of his own importance,⁹⁶ and quite capable of belittling his political friends.⁹⁷

One more Muslim leader who played an important role in those years was Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan, also known as the *Shaikh-ul-Hind*, who from 1905 was in charge of the Deoband seminary. He realized that the younger generation of Aligarh pupils showed a less subservient spirit, and acknowledged the ability of coming men like Muhammad Ali and Azad⁹⁸ whose support he wanted to enlist. In 1909 he founded the *Jamiat al-Ansar*, an organization of former Deoband pupils, directed by his disciple Obaidullah Sindhi, and in 1910 a mass meeting of about 30,000 Muslims was staged where Aligarh people met Deoband leaders.⁹⁹ But Mahmud-ul-Hasan's ultimate aim was to expel the British from India, with military support from Turkey and in close co-operation with Iran and Afghanistan;¹⁰⁰ he also kept in touch with the *mujahidin* on the Afghan border. His was a very militant brand of Pan-Islamism.

Surveying Muslim reactions in India in those years preceding World War I we may discern three main groups. First, the westernized middle class influenced by the Aligarh tradition, men like the Ali brothers, Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan who, disillusioned by the set-backs of the past few years, lost faith in British intentions and sought compensation in a feeling of Islamic solidarity. These were the men who came to the fore in the Muslim League after the Agha Khan had resigned as its President, without however wholly dominating it. Islamic solidarity brought them nearer to orthodoxy,¹⁰¹ and so they became the potential allies of the second group — the ulama, led by men like Abdul Bari and Mahmud-ul-Hasan, who wielded a much greater influence among the Muslim masses. Both groups by their anti-British feeling — much stronger with the second than with the first — were drawn towards the third group: westernized Muslims whose outlook was not communal,

but national and secular, and who sided with the Congress. About 1910 the leadership of this group had fallen to Jinnah.¹⁰²

In the prevailing circumstances it became obvious that politically minded Hindus and Muslims could join hands. In 1913 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt advised Indian Muslims to do so in a long letter to Sayyid Mahmud, which was widely published in India (first in the *Comrade*) and had a great impact on the Muslim mind.¹⁰³ It was, however, Jinnah who became the great "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". In 1913 he met Muhammad Ali and Sayyid Wazir Hasan in London and was persuaded by them to join the Muslim League; they wanted him "to bring the policy of the League into line with the progressive and national aims of the Congress."¹⁰⁴ In the same year the League's constitution was altered; henceforth it stated as its object "the attainment under the aegis of the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to India."¹⁰⁵ This was not quite what Congress wanted; the words "suitable to India" meant that the Hindu-Muslim problem required continuation of the separate electorates. Only a few years later this obstacle was overcome.

But though we may note an increasing feeling of irritation against the British on the part of Indian Muslims, their reaction at the outbreak of the war was very satisfactory to their foreign rulers, as they themselves acknowledged.¹⁰⁶ The latter may not have been amazed at the loyalty of the Indian Princes, who gave substantial support in money and men; one of them, the (Muslim) Maharajah of Bikaner, even went with his troops to Europe.¹⁰⁷ But that the medical outfit financed out of the *Comrade* Turkish Relief Fund was handed over to them, might have caused them some surprise; it proved that Pan-Islamic sentiment could yet be combined with pro-British sympathies.

But soon the question arose as to whether Turkey would participate in the war, and this meant quite a lot to Indian Muslims. Most of them probably wanted it to stay neutral; this at least is the purport of an article by Muhammad Ali, *The Choice of the Turks*.¹⁰⁸ Even if he told the British some disagreeable truths in it, its whole tenor was not anti-British; it was quoted with approval by the *New Statesman* and some other English papers.¹⁰⁹ And yet this article was made the reason for confiscation of the *Comrade's* security, which caused the *New Statesman* to publish an editorial on "Encouraging Mohammadan Loyalty". It was on Muhammad Ali's advice that Abdul Bari sent a telegram to the Sultan, begging him "either to support Britain or to keep neutral in this war",¹¹⁰ while Dr. Ansari and Muhammad Ali himself sent a similar

telegram to the Turkish Minister Talaat Bey.¹¹¹

When, however, Turkey entered the war in November 1914, it was as an enemy of Britain, and this put many Muslims in a quandary. In the third week of November the Sultan even declared *jihad*,¹¹² but this move met with remarkably little success. Some prominent Indian Muslim leaders declared it to be not a religious war at all, but a political one; consequently, Indian Muslims had to obey their sovereign, the King-Emperor.¹¹³

But nevertheless, this development put a severe strain on the Indian Muslims' loyalty, especially when Asquith in a speech used strong words and did "not hesitate to predict that (the Ottoman) Government will perish by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung the death-knell for Ottoman Dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia. With the disappearance of Turkey, there will disappear, as I hope and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions."¹¹⁴ After all, the Sultan of Turkey was the Caliph to whom most Indian Muslims felt that they owed at any rate a religious allegiance;¹¹⁵ it was exactly the fact of his being Caliph that was affirmed by most of them and questioned only by a few.¹¹⁶ To this reason was added disgust at Russia's alliance with the British Empire. Memories of British friendship for Turkey still existed, while Russia was looked upon as the arch-enemy of freedom and humanity, and the hereditary foe of Islam.¹¹⁷

From this moment we may date the Khilafat movement, in so far as some men centred their activities round the idea of assisting the Caliphate in its troubles.¹¹⁸ For the time being it was hardly organized and not co-ordinated. Khaliqzaman mentions¹¹⁹ the isolated activities of Maulana Abdul Bari at Lucknow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad at Calcutta, Mahmud-ul-Hasan at Deoband, and Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and the Ali brothers at Delhi.

Their action certainly made sense in that these men rightly suspected that the Ottoman Caliphate was in very serious danger — more serious indeed than most Indian Muslims realized, or than the British wanted them to realize. Lord Crewe stated this in a letter to the *Nation's* editor, Mr. Massingham: ". . . we cannot by any means afford to dispense with the advantage that we get — perhaps not quite legitimately — from the fact that Mahomedan opinion in India remains fairly steady simply because it is in a state of confusion about the future, and has by no means squarely faced the prospect, tolerably obvious and not unwelcome to us, of the final exit of the last great Moslem secular Power." There-

fore he did not want to clarify Britain's objects with regard to Turkey too soon, in order "to have it both ways", as he himself expressed it.¹²⁰

Now the Caliphate could very well be at stake in an action against "the last great Moslem secular Power." For quite a few years past Britain — or at least some Britons — had already been playing with the idea of an Arab Caliphate. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt was one of them, and the Ottoman Sultan in 1891 suspected that malicious plans were being hatched between the British government and Pan-Islamists like Jamal-ud-din Afghani.¹²¹ In 1906 the question was raised by an article in the *Spectator* which caused the Government of India to ask some authorities for an opinion; these, however, strongly advised against bringing up the matter of the Sultan's title to the Caliphate, since most Muslims would be suspicious of the intentions behind a move of this kind.¹²² In those years ideas like this were wholly speculative — but they took on a colour of alarming reality after the outbreak of the war, and especially when the British Government entered into negotiations with Sharif Husain of Mecca. As early as December 1914, Lord Kitchener told Husain's son, Amir Abdullah: "It may be that an Arab of the true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil which is now occurring."¹²³ Not a month later a former Second Secretary to the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid approached the British Foreign Office and suggested that Britain should support the creation of an Arab Caliphate under the Sharif of Mecca. The Foreign Office proposed to the India Office that they answer him along these lines: "His Majesty's Government would willingly give their support, if desired, to an Arab Caliphate of the true race, but the question of the Caliphate is regarded as a very sacred matter by Mussulmans and must therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be left entirely to Mussulman opinion to decide, without any outside interference which might naturally be resented by Mussulman sentiment."¹²⁴

The India Office, however, was far from happy with these proposals; a minute¹²⁵ drafted by Sir Alfred Hirtzel and J. W. Hose is written in a very critical tone. They considered the suggested declaration "unwise" as it would surely cause trouble with Indian Muslims, and probably with the lesser Arab chiefs too; they "doubt if the Foreign Office quite realizes wherein the Caliphate consists and what it implies." Accordingly, the reply of the Undersecretary of State for India was in the negative and stated that Lord Crewe "would be most unwilling that H.M.G. should commit themselves" in this way.¹²⁶

Apart from the more practical objections raised in the minute we would say that the Foreign Office seems to have overlooked — if only for convenience's sake — the contrast between “willingly giving support, if desired”, and “leaving the matter entirely to Mussulman opinion to decide”; it is not quite clear how both ambitions could be pursued at the same time. And yet this was exactly the pattern that British policy towards the Sharif of Mecca was to follow in the next years: giving him military and political support, thereby strengthening his chances and his desire to proclaim himself Caliph — and at the same time maintaining that it did not want to interfere in the matter, as Muslims should be absolutely free to decide on it as they liked. The adoption of this paradoxical position may well have been caused¹²⁷ by the misapprehension that the Caliphate had religious implications only.

Thus, notwithstanding the objections of the India Office, Sir Henry McMahon in August, 1915 assured Sharif Husain of the British Government's “approval” of an Arab Caliphate, resumed by an Arab of the true race (and these words alluded to Sharif Husain himself, being a member of the Quraish). This declaration, however, met with rather sharp criticism; Chamberlain, Lord Crewe's successor at the India Office, noted on November 15, 1915: “I grow more and more uneasy about Sir H. McMahon's proceedings. I presume that the Foreign Office are satisfied that he will not under any circumstances allow himself to be drawn into any intrigues about the Caliphate.”¹²⁸

Indian Muslims could hardly be acquainted with every detail of these goings-on, but neither could they be entirely kept secret. The Agha Khan protested to the Foreign Office and the India Office that Indian Muslims were not well disposed towards an Arab Caliphate.¹²⁹ But the Khilafat leaders mentioned before considered other possibilities of a more violent nature. Khaliqzaman narrates¹³⁰ how in December 1914 he joined the Ali brothers in an excursion to the tribal area on the North-West Frontier, in order to explore the arms factories in that region. These young men, as well as Mahmud-ul-Hasan, Obaidullah Sindhi and others were certainly thinking in terms of *jihād*. In the second half of 1915 Obaidullah left India and went to Kabul where he set up a “Provisional Government of India”, of which a Hindu, Mahendra Pratap, was to be the President. This Provisional Government of course contacted the German mission at Kabul and also Ottoman authorities; they kept in touch with these latter through Mahmud-ul-Hasan, who had gone to Mecca and there had met Enver Pasha, the Turkish War Minister. The whole thing resulted in what became known

as the "Silk Letter conspiracy".¹³¹ The Government of India may well have had some suspicions which they could not prove,¹³² but the conclusion of the Rowlatt Report's chapter on this matter is probably correct: "The facts narrated in this chapter establish clearly the anxiety of some Muhammadan fanatics to provoke first sedition and then rebellion in India. For the purpose of accomplishing their objects they seek to co-operate with the enemies of Britain." At any rate, this conclusion perfectly fits in with a conversation Khaliquzzaman reports having had with the Ali brothers in March 1915.¹³³ Muhammad Ali gave it as his opinion then that Germany's only chance of success lay in attacking the Suez canal and India: "Every bullet used in western trench warfare by Germany was money and energy wasted." It also tallies with Faruqi's opinion of the aims of Mahmud-ul-Hasan: "His programme consisted of . . . seeking the military support of Turkey to attack India through Iran and Afghanistan."¹³⁴

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Ali brothers were interned in May 1915.¹³⁵ In March 1916 Abul Kalam Azad was exiled; in his case too, relations with the conspirators at Kabul were suspected.¹³⁶ Matters did not get any better when in June 1916 the Arab revolt and Sharif Husain's declaration of independence became known. Mahmud-ul-Hasan, being at the time at Mecca, declared the Sharif to be a rebel and was promptly arrested, handed over to the British and interned in Malta.¹³⁷ When a British-owned newspaper, the *Calcutta Statesman*, stated that "Muhammadans generally were delighted with the news", this provoked strong protests from Abdul Bari as president of the *Khuddam-i-Kaaba*, and from the Council of the Muslim League, presided over by the Rajah of Mahmudabad.¹³⁸ But on the whole, the Government of India seems to have considered Muslim reactions to the event as not too unfavourable. Sir Vincent Lovett held that protests were "confined to the educated and politically advanced Muhammadans", but were "not taken up by the religious leaders."¹³⁹ This opinion was probably correct for the time being, but he underrated the possibilities of a future expansion to the masses, an error O'Dwyer admits.¹⁴⁰

The Muslim League's attitude in this matter was significant in that it made clear how far the League had evolved from its original stand of putting its trust in the British. Thus the chances of co-operation with Congress were increased. In 1915, Jinnah took the initiative in holding the Congress and League annual sessions at the same time at Bombay, where it was resolved that Congress and League together should draft a scheme for constitutional reforms after the war.¹⁴¹ This was done in

the next year, and at their Lucknow sessions in December 1916 the plan was adopted by both Congress and League.¹⁴² On the whole it meant a further development along the lines of the Morley-Minto reforms, with legislative councils, the representative character of which was stressed to a considerable degree, but an executive not responsible to these councils. Separate electorates were accepted by Congress and an agreement was reached as to the distribution of seats for the communities by which the Muslims got a weightage in the provinces where they constituted a minority, but abandoned their majority in Bengal and the Punjab. Moreover, they also gave up their right to vote in the general electorates.

Thus concessions were made by both sides, but the Muslims got the best of it. We think Coupland is right when he writes that it was mainly the Muslims who were shy of adopting a responsible government on the British parliamentary pattern, because in such a case they could be crushed by the Hindu majority.¹⁴³ On the other hand, Hindu Congress leaders like Gokhale — who died in 1915 — and Tilak, who once more came to the fore in Congress when Moderates and Extremists were reconciled, supported the plans.¹⁴⁴

The scheme was certainly set up with the best intentions as to fostering Hindu-Muslim unity and bringing Indian politics to an anti-British and national level, not a communal one. We may conclude this from the kind of opposition it met with. In the Punjab provincial branch of the Muslim League a quarrel broke out when the secretary, Sir Muhammad Shafi,¹⁴⁵ opposed the League's policy of co-operation with Congress as well as the League's denunciation of Sharif Husain's rebellion in 1916. The dispute caused a split in the Punjab Muslim League and Muhammad Shafi's party was disaffiliated at the Lucknow session.¹⁴⁶ Nor were all Hindus enthusiastic about the new policy; in Congress itself the concessions to the Muslims were opposed by some older leaders,¹⁴⁷ and the Hindu-Muslim entente was also condemned at a meeting of the *All-India Hindu Sabha* at Lucknow.¹⁴⁸

One might, however, well ask oneself whether the Lucknow pact did not contain some elements which could aggravate communalism. It was not based on a fusion of Hindus and Muslims into one political community; it was an agreement recognizing them as two distinct communities. One result of proceeding on this footing was that Congress would evolve in the direction of a communal Hindu organization,¹⁴⁹ although, according to Coupland, some Muslims did not dislike their concessions in the Lucknow pact because the communal character of

Indian politics was accentuated this way.¹⁵⁰ But at any rate, in 1916 the co-operation of the communities was placed on a practical basis; it was made conditional on certain agreements about which future negotiations were possible. This possibility was to be lacking when, in the years to come, their unity was to be put on a sentimental basis.

CHAPTER IV

THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT — ITS START AND ORGANIZATION

In the preceding chapter we noted, as early as the first months of 1915, something in the nature of a Khilafat movement, but without any organization to give it a definite form. It took shape only at the end of the war, but before turning our attention towards this development we have to consider the situation which had come about in India at this time.

It was a complex situation because the war had loosened many old ties. Perhaps the most familiar factor in it was economic stress. Prices of various necessaries of life leapt up, partly owing to British war demands on the transport system, partly to a series of bad harvests after 1917. We may safely suppose some connection between this situation of scarcity and high prices, and the death-rate of the epidemic of influenza which carried off millions of people.¹ The war had made a few Indians rich, but in general even the shopkeepers and the business community were quite dissatisfied with the economic and financial measures of the government.²

But though we need not doubt the economic pressure to which the Indian people was subjected in those years, it is another question to what extent this fact was responsible for political unrest in the same period. In our opinion Bamford, the official historian of the non-cooperation and Khilafat movements, is rather simplifying things when in his *Preface* he writes: "There is . . . no greater proof of the hollowness of these agitations than the manner in which they succumbed to improved economic conditions. The crops during the years 1922 and 1923 were good and financial stability was beginning to reappear. The result was the total failure of the agitations to survive the set-backs they incurred in 1922 . . ." ³ Here the soil of economic discontent which it seems reasonable to assume for these movements is given an importance which it would be difficult to prove it really had. True, economic grievances were vented,⁴ but they were never referred to in a marked

manner.⁵ Probably, the economic background of the agitation should not be overrated; at least, the public in those days were not greatly conscious of it. Another aspect of this situation is, we think, that political movements in those years did not — and could not — want to emphasize economic issues affecting the various classes in different ways. Congress wanted to be a “national” organization, and therefore avoided direct involvement in industrial strikes or agrarian agitation.⁶ The same probably holds good for the Khilafat movement too, originating in the Muslim community and trying to assemble all Muslims, irrespective of their social position. This being the structure of political life, there would not be much room in it for social or economic agitation.

Another factor was the mental climate created by the war and its aftermath. India had not been devastated like northern France, but it too had carried its burden of human losses and economic hardship. This was what Europe had made the world suffer, and civilized peoples in particular subjected by the West were quick to realize this. Malaviya, presiding over the Congress session of 1918 at Delhi, said: “The world, in particular the European world needed a correction and a change. It had been too much given up to materialism, and had been too much estranged from spiritual consideration.”⁷ President Wilson’s messages about a peace without victory and the principle of self-determination of course raised very practical hopes, but there was an expectation of something else, something more than practical results. Muhammad Ali expected that “after the terrible nightmare of this war it (*i.e.* Europe) could be easily awakened into a recognition of the kingdom of God in which every man would be a brother and a fellow-subject of God . . .”⁸ A Khilafat deputation that in January 1920 addressed the Viceroy said that if its demands were complied with, the world would be safe “not only for democracy but for God.”⁹ These, we think, are chiliastic accents, which we will meet time and again in the Khilafat movement.¹⁰

India, however, had its particular reasons to expect a new era. Mr. Edwin Montagu, who in the summer of 1917 had succeeded Sir Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State for India, on August 20 announced in the House of Commons that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.” This announcement was followed by Montagu’s visit to India¹¹ between November 1917

and April 1918, by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the Government of India Act of 1919.

We do not intend to go into the details of this instalment of reforms but some of its aspects deserve an examination in our context. First of all: why did the government make concessions to Indian demands? Undoubtedly, many British people considered it just and necessary to reward India for its war effort,¹² but Montagu had already been thinking along the lines evidenced by the recent announcement for some years, as appears from his Indian budget speeches in 1910, 1911 and 1912.¹³ And it was not Montagu alone who advocated reforms; Hardinge had done so in March 1916, and his successor Chelmsford had followed suit in November of the same year. He did so "in order to support Moderate Reformers, such as Sinha, and detach them from extremist Home Rulers, such as Mrs. Besant."¹⁴

This does not mean that the urge for reforms was unanimous in England. About the same time that Montagu declared in a speech that the trend of British policy in India was towards provincial autonomy, his direct superior, the Secretary of State Lord Crewe, accused by Curzon and Lansdowne in the House of Lords of aiming at a kind of federal Home Rule in India, had denied this.¹⁵ It is clear that at least two trends in British policy in India existed: some wanted to maintain a constitutional autocracy, and others, like Montagu, wanted to import a more or less democratic government on a western pattern.¹⁶ By an irony of fate it was Curzon, certainly not a champion of democracy for India, who introduced the formula "responsible government" in the declaration of August 1917.¹⁷

Montagu himself had his doubts as to the practicability of western democratic institutions in India. Touring India in 1912-13 he wrote from Madras: "One has here, as elsewhere among the majority of the educated Indians, a desire for more power. Not, I think, for more democracy; for, however horrible it may be for an Englishman of my way of thinking to learn, the clever Indian wants executive power and executive opportunity, but he is not a democrat."¹⁸ In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 he expressed another view: democratic institutions had to be tried, even if many considerations could be invoked against them.¹⁹ He looked upon the Hindu-Muslim problem as the most serious of these objections;²⁰ the Muslims, Montagu wrote in a paper for his cabinet colleagues, "have not yet learned to find themselves whole-heartedly Indian."²¹ In his view, parliamentary democracy for India was a goal it would take many years, many generations even, to

reach.²² And at the end of 1917, the Russian revolution was considered by him as a factor retarding Indian reforms: the revolution showed that the use of parliamentary democracy was something to be learnt; if not, all would go wrong.²³ We think it difficult, therefore, to maintain that the announcement of August 1917 was inspired by fear of the Russian revolution.²⁴ In the summer of 1917, the subsequent radicalization of the revolution was not quite to be foreseen, and when this quality manifested itself fully, the effect this had on Montagu was not apparently to precipitate the reforms in India.

At any rate, the announcement of reforms had come, and the long time elapsing between this and the moment of their realization kept India in a state of suspense in which at first a note of hope may have been prevalent. But the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report nearly coincided with that of the Rowlatt Report and, whereas it took over a year for the reform proposals to be translated into the Government of India Act, the Rowlatt Report was followed by the Rowlatt Act within a few months. Its aim was to give the Government of India a free hand in dealing with revolutionary activities when the Defence of India Act expired, six months after the concluding of the peace. Perhaps the government's desire to have at its disposal the legal means for dealing efficiently with conspiracy was, in itself, not unreasonable,²⁵ in view of the troubles caused by the *Ghadr* movement²⁶ during the war and the relations between Indian revolutionaries and Afghanistan, though, on the other hand, in the year 1919 "anarchical crime" was reported to be declining.²⁷ And bearing in mind that the special powers endowed by the Rowlatt Act were never made use of,²⁸ we might well ask whether this piece of legislation was so badly needed as to justify its enactment at a very inopportune moment. For it must be admitted that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the Rowlatt Report, regarded in their connection as being two expressions of the British view of Indian affairs, made rather odd reading: the former expressing faith in Indian possibilities for a democratic form of self-government, the latter being a clear indication of distrust.²⁹

The Indian reaction to the Rowlatt Act proved that this was very keenly felt. When the bill was introduced at the Legislative Council, all the non-official Indian members voted against it. Among others V. J. Patel, Malaviya, Surendranath Bannerjea and Jinnah took the floor³⁰ and the gist of their arguments may be summed up as follows: the bill was fundamentally wrong, giving powers to the executive that only the judiciary should hold, and it was highly inopportune after the

expectations that had been raised. Gandhi's response was to inaugurate a *satyagraha* campaign, now for the first time on an all-India scale. March 30 was fixed as the day for a general *hartal*.³¹ Agitation against the Rowlatt Act was one of the causes³² of the Amritsar tragedy, when General Dyer had his soldiers fire on a crowd and stopped only for lack of ammunition after 379 people had been killed. This "demonstration of force" was followed by utterly humiliating measures, such as floggings and the notorious crawling order.

These facts should, however, not only be seen as proofs of British colonial brutality but also of British fear. The Punjab Lt. Governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, looked upon the troubles at Amritsar, Lahore and other towns as the signs of a "widespread and well-organized movement";³³ he does not write about the Punjab "troubles" but about the Punjab "rebellion",³⁴ and about "the treacherous Afghan aggression of May, 1919 — intended to synchronize with the Indian rebellion of April, 1919."³⁵ O'Dwyer had been confronted with the *Ghadr* conspiracy in the Punjab during the war which may have made him over-anxious about conspiracies in general. However that may be, his statements are not free from exaggeration; even if there was a "movement", it certainly was not "well-organized", as is proved by the fact that the initial eruptions did not coincide on one or two days, but were dispersed over ten days. But neither were his suspicions wholly unfounded; even the Hunter Committee, which denied the existence of an organized conspiracy admitted connections with the Afghan invasion.³⁶ All this, however, may explain to some extent Dyer's and O'Dwyer's drastic action, but does not excuse it and quite understandably no Indian was inclined to do so. On the contrary, the absence of an unequivocal condemnation on the British side³⁷ infuriated India.

The Amritsar massacre certainly impressed itself very strongly on the Indian mind. By several authors it is looked upon as a turning-point in Indo-British relations "almost as important as the Mutiny".³⁸ To Gandhi, after Amritsar, the British government in India was a "Satanic Government" even if he had not lost all faith in the British constitution.³⁹ But probably for many Indians Amritsar was the startling event which brought out in full vigour feelings that had already been more or less openly revealing themselves for some years. At about the end of the war "a change of heart" took place. Woodruff expressly states that this had already happened before the Rowlatt Act had been drafted, and analyses it as a feeling of distrust.⁴⁰ The same phenomenon is noticed as early as June 1918 by Montagu in a Cabinet Paper: "Among the

politicians there is unfortunately a marked diminution in the belief in our sincerity and honesty of purpose . . . A belief that we make pronouncements that we do not carry out is rife in India.”⁴¹ And Reading, in 1922, wrote about “the change which the last six or seven years have produced in the general feeling of Indians. Racial hostility is perhaps less acute, and is certainly less obtrusive, than it was a year ago, but we still have to contend with the tendency to subject the intentions of Government to criticism tinged with suspicion.”⁴²

Moreover, there are indications that the “change of heart” came from both sides, British as well as Indian. The British perhaps lost something of their faith in themselves and in their imperial mission. One may ascribe this to the war that had corroded their strength and their morale;⁴³ one may see the cause in the liberal tradition that had “sapped and mined the colonial structure”;⁴⁴ one may, with moral indignation, blame the trend towards democracy, with its tendency “to shirk the responsibilities of Empire”.⁴⁵ Whatever the reasons, we think Nicolson is right when writing that after the war “a large number of British citizens suddenly ceased to believe with absolute conviction in the theory of Empire.”⁴⁶ Nor was it only the theory they ceased to believe in, it was the practice too. Woodruff points out that not only the Indian public felt aggrieved by the Amritsar massacre, but a considerable part of the British community did too — because they realized that no longer would the government shield its officials unconditionally, nor would England be ready to defend its colonies at any price.⁴⁷ This feeling found an emotional outlet in the subscription in favour of the dismissed General Dyer, but it manifested also itself in the form of a well-considered judgment, for instance when Sir Claud Jacob, a high official, stated “that he understood the policy of His Majesty’s Government was ultimately to hand over India to the Indians and surrender British rule in India.” True, this remark provoked a strong denial from Lloyd George in a cabinet session — but all the same, this denial was necessitated by the Prime Minister’s opinion that this misapprehension about British intentions in India “had now permeated through the whole of the British community in India, commercial as well as official.”⁴⁸

Another disquieting element in the situation was the attempted Afghan invasion of May 1919. During the war, the Amir Habibullah had maintained an attitude not inconsistent with British interests. He tolerated a German mission at Kabul, and the aforementioned Provisional Government of India as well, but he did not actively support them and, as Chelmsford wrote to Montagu, “foreign missions in that

capital have not got an encouraging record.”⁴⁹ But it was not without difficulty that the Amir maintained his neutral position, for *jihad* was reputed to be popular among the Afghans.⁵⁰ In February, 1919 the Amir was murdered, and succeeded by his son Amanullah who did not continue his father’s prudent and opportunist policy but, under pressure from the orthodox and Pan-Islamic war party,⁵¹ embarked upon a war with the British. After a few weeks the Afghans asked for peace and a provisional agreement was reached at Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919, but after that negotiations dragged on for more than two years before a definite peace was concluded at Kabul in November, 1921. It was rather favourable for the Afghans and the Government of India, which had handled the negotiations, was severely criticized for its mildness.⁵²

So we are confronted with a rather odd spectacle: a little country attacks its big neighbour, is defeated in a few weeks time and has to sue for peace, but gets off remarkably well after prolonged negotiations. The explanation seems not to lie in proportions of military strength, but in the political and psychological circumstances. For one thing, the British could only guess at consequences in India. There was a long tradition of unrest in the N.W.F.P., backed up by an organization in northern India. During the Great War, the idea of *jihad* had come more to the fore, and it was propagated now by the Amir.⁵³ What would be its effect in India? In 1919, it did not prove to be great, as we have seen; even a Khilafat leader like Dr. Ansari in May, 1919 recommended loyalty towards the Government⁵⁴ — but there remained an uncertain element in the situation. The Viceroy, in 1919, expected the Afghan invasion to improve the political climate in India, as neither Hindus nor Muslims would prefer Afghan rule to the British Raj,⁵⁵ but local authorities in the N.W.F.P. were less optimistic. Nor could their warnings be wholly flouted, as was proved when in the next years — from 1920 to 1922 — Khilafat leaders became less and less restrained and threw about suggestions of an Afghan-supported holy war. So during the whole period of the Indo-Afghan negotiations, an invasion remained something to be reckoned with and the government could not ignore it.⁵⁶

Finally, a circumstance that in the next few years became of paramount importance in Indian politics was Gandhi’s entrance into them. It would, of course, be preposterous to try and pass judgment on so complex and exceptional a personality as Gandhi in a few pages, but all the same we have to point out some of his qualities as they affected the political scene of India.

It was in 1915 that Gandhi returned to India, having acquired prestige as well as self-confidence by the success his *satyagraha* campaigns in South-Africa had met with.⁵⁷ In any case he had evolved a technique enabling the masses to hold themselves against a powerful government, "by fearlessness and truth and action allied to these."⁵⁸

On his return, however, he did not plunge himself into politics at once but founded his *satyagraha ashram* near Ahmedabad, where he took up two themes dominating the rest of his life: untouchability and hand-spinning, regarded by him not only as moral challenges, but as the levers with which to reconstruct the social and economic structure of Indian life. But in 1917 and 1918 he conducted some minor *satyagraha* campaigns, from Gandhi's own review of which⁵⁹ it appears, strikingly enough, that (a) not all of them were directed against the British, but at least one of them against Indian mill-owners, and (b) the ideal of absolute non-violence dictated by the concept of *satyagraha* could not be entirely maintained.

These actions gave him an enormous prestige with younger Indian nationalists like Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, and contact with the peasants. From this time onwards political action in India tended to become a mass movement, not confined to an élite of well-to-do intellectuals. Then came his action against the Rowlatt Act: a *hartal* throughout India on April 6, 1919.⁶⁰ But in this case too the masses could not be restrained and Gandhi confessed his "Himalayan miscalculation" in calling upon the people to offer civil disobedience before they had learnt the lesson of non-violence — a pattern which was to repeat itself in the years to come. But nevertheless, Gandhi's leadership was consolidated, and confirmed at the Amritsar Congress session in 1919, where he was even assigned the task of revising the constitution of the Congress.

Gandhi's ascendancy in the nationalist movement meant an intensification of the Hindu element in it. Congress leaders up till then were westernized to a great extent. Though it should not be forgotten that laying stress on things Hindu already dated from the *Arya Samaj* movement and Tilak's appearance on the political scene, there is no doubt that Gandhi by his person and his action strengthened this trend. Gandhi was among the first leaders to speak in his mother-tongue, Gujarati, or in Hindi, at gatherings where other prominent nationalists only spoke English.⁶¹ The hand-loom, the spinning wheel and *khaddar* became the symbols of his action. In 1909, in his booklet *Hind Swaraj*, he had completely condemned all western civilization. Yet this does not

mean that he was wholly anti-British. When in London as a young man, he tried to identify himself with the ruling race by taking dancing and music lessons, by dressing in fashionable English style, and so on.⁶² Even when he gave up his attempt and had spent many years in giving battle to British oppression, in 1918 he supported the British war effort by recruiting in Gujarat, in the very district of Kheda where he had recently conducted a *satyagraha* campaign against the fiscal policy of government!⁶³ Moreover, his whole philosophy of life forbade him to hate. Shortly before his imprisonment in 1922 he wrote an article: "Do I hate Englishmen?"⁶⁴ — a question he answered in the negative: he hated their system of government in India, not the men. For many of his followers this may have been too subtle a distinction, and even with Gandhi himself, who probably made his point in complete honesty, we think an utterance of this kind is evidence of an ambivalent attitude towards the British.

One of the big issues in Gandhi's political life became Hindu-Muslim unity. It would be hard to say what his motivations were — political necessity or his conviction that every true religion held eternal values not irreconcilable to each other.⁶⁵ Some incidents in his youth may be pointers to a much deeper psychological motivation, his search for masculinity.⁶⁶ But at any rate Indian unity and, in other words, the fight against communalism was one of his first concerns, to which he dedicated the very last years of his life leading up to his violent death in 1948. This does not mean that Gandhi wanted to give up anything of Hinduism; he did not want Hindu-Muslim unity to include inter-dining or intermarriage,⁶⁷ and in his language and actions he always remained a true Hindu.⁶⁸

But Gandhi was an extraordinary man and as such he provoked opposition as well as admiration. In our opinion, it is quite remarkable that Gandhi, who is praised by all other leaders who came into contact with him, never received unconditional praise. He is called a saint, a hero, an astute as well as a courageous politician, a sincere and incorruptible leader — but there is always a "but". Jawaharlal Nehru, who in the early twenties was completely under Gandhi's spell, recorded later on "his distress at the religious overtones . . . and the strange admixture of politics and religion."⁶⁹ Rammanohar Lohia, who certainly admired Gandhi greatly, writes: "On the other hand, I am now somewhat suspicious of certain aspects of Gandhi's philosophy or at least of some of his modes of action and organisation. These appear to have turned other men into heroes or extraordinary men of the flashy moment,

but to have brought out the worst in them in the normal routines of life . . . Was there an evil core of unbalance in Gandhiji's modes of action?"⁷⁰

It has often been said that Gandhi tried to be a saint and a politician at the same time, and that it is asking too much of a man to be both. But Gandhi himself proclaimed his ends to be primarily religious: "What I want to achieve — what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years — is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *Moksha*. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end."⁷¹ We should not wonder, therefore, that his political action sometimes annoyed his more exclusively politically-minded friends, and that words like "crank" and "faddist" have been used with regard to him.⁷² It is no use denying Gandhi's enormous influence on Indian politics after World War I but he aroused opposition too, even among his own followers. This may be one cause why his influence was not wholly unequivocal and why he could not be a truly stabilizing factor in Indian politics, bringing with him a feeling of triumph as well as of disillusion.

This, of course, may have been caused not only by his personal qualities, but also by the historical setting he had to operate in. Gandhi, as we already noted, inaugurated in India the era of mass movements. Congress had been an organization of the upper and middle classes; its nationalism had been the nationalism of a westernized élite. Tilak's communal agitation had already tended to engage the masses, but it was Gandhi who really introduced the masses as an active force in Indian politics. Consequently, Congress leaders were confronted with a new kind of nationalism, in which social and economic issues got another meaning than that which they used to have. The problem for the nationalist movement became, to quote Worsley, to provide an "umbrella"⁷³ under which the various classes could be kept together. Class issues, therefore, could not be stressed; we have already noted that about 1920 economic grievances hardly figured in political propaganda.⁷⁴ But the fact that conflicting class interests were not accentuated does not mean that they did not exist. Broadly speaking, we think that the westernized élite might have been content if they could have taken over political power, but that the masses would benefit from that change only if it were attended by a change in the social and economic structure of society. Or in other words: the élite wanted merely a political revolution, whereas the masses were in need of a social revolution.

Another question, however, would be whether all parties concerned were aware of this, and we are inclined to doubt it. True, there were signs betraying uneasiness among the upper and middle classes with respect to the consequences of mass action, but they remained rather vague: anarchy, defiance of all authority and violence were apprehended, but specific actions or issues were not mentioned. A case in point is the development of the no-tax campaign (directed against government) into a no-rent campaign (directed against the landlords), which seems to have been something of a surprise.⁷⁵ A surprise of this kind was facilitated by the fact that, in a colonial society, class antagonism could be argued away as an imperialist intrusion, alien to the society,⁷⁶ just like the Hindu-Muslim problem was dismissed by Congress leaders — and, in the years about 1920, by Khilafat leaders too — as the product of the British divide-and-rule policy, an evil legacy which would dissolve once British rule was overcome. Probably men like Gandhi, Nehru and Muhammad Ali believed this when they held out the glorious future to their followers — but this means that they were not aware of the real conflicts hidden beneath the surface of national unity. A similar lack of understanding on Gandhi's part may explain some of his errors, and some of the criticisms raised against him, too.

But we return to the Indian situation at about the end of World War I. It was made up of all the aforementioned factors — economic stress, hopes raised by the war and by the announcement of reforms, distrust of British intentions awakened by the Rowlatt Act and the Amritsar massacre, a shift in the psychological relations between British and Indians, the threat of an Afghan invasion, Gandhi's entrance on the political stage, the development of élite nationalism into mass nationalism. And then, lastly, one more question was looming up, primarily affecting Indian Muslims but soon forcing itself on all Indians: the treatment of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate after the war.

There certainly were reasons for their anxiety. Turkey had been completely beaten: when on the last day of October, 1918 the Sublime Porte capitulated, British armies — consisting, by the way, largely of Indian regiments that were made up mainly of Muslims — were occupying Palestine, the larger part of Syria and Mesopotamia. Allied war aims with regard to Turkey were not such as to reassure the Muslim mind. We have already noticed Asquith's speech of November 9, 1914, predicting the ruin of the Ottoman Government not only in Europe, but in Asia too.⁷⁷ Nor were some statements of a later date likely to set the Muslims at ease. Balfour had named as one of the British objects:

“The setting free of the populations subject to the tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilisation . . .”⁷⁸ — an object publicly confirmed by the Allied powers in an official communication to the American President.⁷⁹

But more hopeful declarations were not lacking. Immediately after the outbreak of the war with Turkey the Viceroy, authorized by His Majesty's Government, had declared that the Holy Places of Arabia, the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda would be “immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances.”⁸⁰ Balfour's statement of British war aims had been substantially altered by a speech of Lloyd George on January 5, 1918, in which he said: “Nor are we fighting . . . to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race . . . While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople . . . Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.”⁸¹

Finally, this passage corresponded with number twelve of Wilson's famous fourteen points,⁸² which also stated that the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire should remain Turkish, but that the subjected peoples should get “autonomy”. Wilson's formula was somewhat more elastic than the one used by Lloyd George.

Certainly these pledges were reassuring. A consequence in India was that recruiting for the army suddenly got better results; it leapt from an average of not quite 20,000 per month in the last three months of 1917 to more than 26,000 in the first three months of 1918. Whatever the correct explanation of this fact may be, it was looked upon as result of Lloyd George's declaration: “. . . the improvements may not unfairly be ascribed in some degree to the increased confidence resulting from the Prime Minister's pledge.”⁸³

Nevertheless, Muslims felt uneasy about Turkey's fate. Did Lloyd George's declaration really amount to a “pledge”? India Office func-

tionaries tended to deny this⁸⁴ and the Government of India took a similar line when in a circular letter to all Local Governments⁸⁵ it stated that it had been an offer of peace terms which, having been rejected by the Turks, was no longer operative. This rather dubious reasoning was kept up for two years, but at last it was disavowed by Lloyd George himself.⁸⁶ Thus a pledge it was — but what exactly did it mean? It could refer to the whole of Thrace and Asia Minor, or to those parts only which were inhabited predominantly by Turks. Nor did it shed much light on the future relations between the subject peoples whose national aspirations would be acknowledged in some form, and the new Turkey. This gave rise to the frequent use in the next years of the term “suzerainty” which may allude to very real power as well as to the mere shadow of it.⁸⁷

This mixture of well-founded anxiety and ambiguous assurances — which, since a settlement of the Turkish problem was delayed by the peacemakers at Paris, had ample time fully to develop — kept Indian Muslims in a state of incertitude. On the one hand they took British assurances to mean that the Ottoman Empire would not be “dismembered”; this view was taken by very loyal and pro-British Indian Princes like the Begam of Bhopal who wrote to the Secretary of State: “The speeches of some of the responsible ministers of the Crown were, furthermore, so worded that they were generally understood to mean that the Ottoman Empire was in no danger of dismemberment . . .”⁸⁸ On the other hand, they had good reasons to fear the worst for Turkey, as it was clear that not only England, but France and Italy as well looked upon Turkey as a victim ready for total plunder. In the spring of 1919 Italy invaded Adalia, France disembarked troops in Cilicia and the Greeks landed in Smyrna, advised to do so by Lloyd George.⁸⁹ It was impossible not to see the glaring discrepancy between British pledges and the facts.

This state of things, causing anxiety as well as a feeling that their war efforts had been completely forgotten by the British once they had emerged as victors, prompted the Indian Muslims to proceed to action. Their worry about Turkey’s fate first sought expression by way of their existing organization, the Muslim League. In its Delhi session of December 1918, a lot of attention was paid to the Caliphate question. Dr. Ansari was chairman of the reception committee and delivered a speech in which he qualified Sharif Husain of Mecca as a rebel, asserted that the Sultan-Caliph had discharged his duties to the satisfaction of the Muslim world, and that he was the only Muslim ruler capable of doing so in

the modern world. Therefore the *Jazirat-ul-Arab* was to remain under his rule. Fazl-ul Huq's presidential address contained only a few references to Turkey and the Caliphate, but on the second day a speech of Abdul Bari was read, in which he seconded a resolution asking for the evacuation of the Holy Places.⁹⁰

As Bamford remarks, the interest of the meeting lay in its display of Pan-Islamic enthusiasm and in the fact that the moderates in the Muslim League had obviously lost all control.⁹¹ The Rajah of Mahmudabad left the meeting after Dr. Ansari's speech "in disgust";⁹² when the latter moved a resolution asking the British Government to protect the Caliphate, Jinnah "raised a point of order and gave his opinion that under the Muslim League constitution it had no right to dabble in the foreign politics of the Government", and when the resolution was passed he too left the meeting.⁹³ And another remarkable fact was the role of the ulama, represented by Abdul Bari and a written message from Deoband. The (anonymous) author of the "Confidential Account",⁹⁴ referring to this fact, adds: "I was told by Khaliquzzaman . . . (one of the chief members of the Ansari-Sind party) that they were playing with fire in uniting with the *Ulemas*." He also points to the fact that some leaders considered Ansari to go too far, and continues: "It is believed that efforts would be made to carry on this agitation at a very high pitch with the *Ulemas* as their tools. Some even talked of making Maulvi Mahmud Hasan (who they said was returning) a vice-president of the League." And lastly Hindu-Muslim unity was stressed; a speaker mentioning Hindu acts of violence was "hooted down".

We have dwelt on this meeting at some length because we may already discern here some of the characteristics of the Khilafat movement, and at the same time perhaps find an explanation why this movement had to create its own apparatus: because the Muslim League sheltered too many trends of Muslim thinking that could not wholly approve of the movement, of its anti-British and Pan-Islamic aspects, and of its refusal to act politically on a narrow communal level only. The latter trend found, at the same time, another way to vent itself: the Congress. Simultaneously with the League session the Congress session of 1918 took place at Delhi. Here Hakim Ajmal Khan was chairman of the reception committee and in his speech he laid emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity and spoke at some length on the Caliphate question, offering thanks to Gandhi who had already written about it to the Viceroy, and had expressed his solidarity with Muslim feeling

in this respect.⁹⁵

Shortly afterwards another organization came into existence, the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind*. Once they had entered politics — we noted their appearance at the Muslim League session of 1918 — the ulama wanted to operate in the political field in their own right.⁹⁶ Their attitude was decidedly anti-British. They considered that it was the possession of India which made England extend its influence to the Muslim countries in the Near East; so there was no better way of liberating these countries from British interference than by expelling the British from India. To that end they wanted unconditional co-operation with Congress; as communalism was caused largely by British rule, the Muslims need not fear Hindu domination once India was free.⁹⁷ For some years ulama of different origins co-operated in the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama*,⁹⁸ but afterwards the Deobandis took hold of the organization.⁹⁹

The delay in settling the Turkish peace terms gave Muslim opinion ample time to get worked up. About September, 1919 Indian Muslims appear to have felt the need to make themselves heard by means of an organization created especially for the purpose of supporting the Caliphate. A Conference which met at Lucknow on September 21, or otherwise one meeting at Delhi on September 23, might be called the first Khilafat Conference;¹⁰⁰ both of them clearly did not emanate from the existing organizations like the Muslim League or the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama*, and at both of them the main topics of discussion were the fate of Turkey and the Caliphate. Shortly afterwards the Central Khilafat Committee was founded,¹⁰¹ with its seat at Bombay and Seth Chotani as president. On November 23 and 24 an All-India Khilafat Conference met at Delhi, presided over by Fazl-ul-Huq.¹⁰² Prominent participants were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Sayyid Husain and Abdul Bari, but it was not yet really an All-India affair, since the majority of the delegates came from the U.P., Rajputana, Sind and Delhi.¹⁰³

But once again Hindu leaders were present: Gandhi, who presided over the meeting on its second day, and Swami Shradanand, the *Arya Samaj* leader.¹⁰⁴ Resolutions were passed to boycott British goods and the peace celebrations. With respect to these resolutions Bamford points out "the commencement of Gandhi's influence over the Khilafat leaders", but a detail related by Khaliqzaman indicates tension between Gandhi and militant Muslims: "A resolution for the boycott of peace celebrations was opposed by Gandhiji who said that boycott was not the proper remedy. Maulana Hasrat Mohani said that we were not Satyagrahis; he

wanted to hurt the British by boycotting peace celebrations. The boycott of peace celebrations was accepted next day.”¹⁰⁵

Once more the Caliphate question was broached at the end of the year, when in December 1919 the annual sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League were held at Amritsar. At the Congress session the main issue was whether Congress would co-operate with the government in working the reforms. This problem had already created a split: most Moderates had left Congress when it condemned the reforms as being “inadequate, disappointing and unsatisfactory.”¹⁰⁶ Gandhi and Malaviya, however, still wanted to compromise and succeeded in obtaining a resolution to work the reforms on the basis of offering co-operation in the measure in which Government co-operated with the people.¹⁰⁷ But Gandhi also showed his sympathy for the Khilafat cause, even when other Congress leaders were still reserved about it.¹⁰⁸ At the Muslim League session, presided over by Hakim Ajmal Khan, the Caliphate question got much attention. The Ali brothers, recently set free, were among the principal speakers; Shaukat Ali reiterated his *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* vow, and Muhammad Ali too made a fervent religious appeal to the meeting.¹⁰⁹ And in the same week a Khilafat Conference was held at Amritsar, of which Shaukat Ali was nominated president. Here it was resolved to send a deputation to the Viceroy and another to England, headed by Muhammad Ali.¹¹⁰

In the first part of 1920 the organization of the Khilafat movement assumed a more definite shape. On February 15, 16 and 17 an All-India Khilafat Conference met at Bombay, presided over by G. M. Bhurgrī of Hyderabad, Sind.¹¹¹ A constitution for the C.K.C. was accepted. It should consist of 200 members and have its headquarters at Bombay. There should be provincial committees, but wherever these did not exist, the C.K.C. should work. Their task would be the collecting of funds — provisions were made for book-keeping, and the publication and examination of accounts — and the organization of conferences. There should be a quorum of 25 for the meetings of the C.K.C., special as well as ordinary ones. Of the members 54 should be from Bombay, 20 from Sind, 15 from Madras, 25 from Bengal, and the rest from other provinces. The president was to be Chotani; Shaukat Ali was one of the four secretaries.

The constitution was accepted in resolution no. 8, reading as follows: “That this Conference accepts the ‘Constitution’ of the Central Khilafat Committee for the next year, as approved by the Subjects Committee, and recommends that the ‘Constitution’ be accepted by all Muham-

madans." Resolution no. 9 reads: "That this Conference re-affirms all the resolutions hitherto passed by all the previous Conferences, and urges upon the Central Khilafat Committee to give practical effect to them without any further delay."

These resolutions and the constitution, considered together, suggest rather a loose organization. Clearly neither the Khilafat movement nor the Khilafat Conference was a party in the modern western sense of the word, as it did not seek acceptance of the C.K.C.'s constitution by "members" but by "all Muhammadans". On the other hand, it was something more than a trend in public opinion, since it established more or less regular meetings to give expression to public opinion, and an executive centre to give effect to resolutions.¹¹² But no party in the modern western sense would consider it necessary to reaffirm previous resolutions, for these would remain in force unless expressly revoked.

The Conference and the Committee, however, were not the only organs created by the movement. We hear about bureaux opened by committees;¹¹³ before long Khilafat Workers were mentioned, and presently Khilafat Volunteers too. An intelligence report from the U.P.¹¹⁴ reads as follows: "Enlistment forms for the Khilafat Workers' Association or the *Anjuman-Khuddam-i-Khilafat* are in circulation in many districts. They are signed by Hasrat Mohani. A person desirous of becoming a member has to sign a contract in four parts and to specify the amount of work he could do under six heads:

1. *Swadeshi*;
2. Resignation of titles, membership of Councils, etc.;
3. *Resignation of service to the English, including police and military service, stoppage of payment of taxes*;
4. Propaganda in villages;
5. Recruitment for the Association;
6. *Hijrat* or pecuniary help to the *Muhajirin*."

And then there were Khilafat "members". Mention of them is made, for instance, with respect to a Khilafat Conference held in April, 1920 at Manjeri in Malabar, where "certain men were appointed to collect 4 annas a head from those who wished to style themselves *Khilafat* members."¹¹⁵ The same source, however, points out the very fluctuating character of the organization: Khilafat committees were founded without giving any further sign of life, and people signing on four annas took no further notice of the movement.¹¹⁶

We think the difference between the members of the *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Khilafat* and those mentioned by Hitchcock in Malabar was the same as practised in Congress between the mass membership of the "primary" members and the far more restricted group of the "active" ones.¹¹⁷ On the level of mass membership we get the impression that no clear distinction was made in those years between Congress and Khilafat adherents. As we established before, it was not uncommon even to combine offices in the Congress organization with similar ones in the Muslim League, and the same rule applied to Congress and the Khilafat Conference and the C.K.C. Nor was this an incomprehensible situation, since Congress in the summer of 1920 fully accepted the Khilafat demands. This motivation is apparent in a letter¹¹⁸ Muhammad Ali wrote in May 1921, in which he gives a recapitulation of events since the summer of 1920. "The Khilafat question", he writes, "which began with the Musulmans (only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Indian population) gradually became, along with the Punjab atrocities question, a national question, and the greatest National Assembly in India (which had become truly *National* only now that the Musulmans too had come to join it nearly 35 years after its foundation) adopted the first steps of non-violent non-co-operation." Some pages further on he alludes to the so-called "Bezwada programme", accepted in a session of the A.I.C.C. on April 1, 1921, where it was resolved to enlist before June 30 one crore (= 10,000,000) of Congress members,¹¹⁹ and then continues his letter by describing his own efforts (and those of Gandhi and his brother Shaukat) in winning over these recruits. But one week after the Bezwada meeting, on April 7 and 10, an All-India Khilafat Conference met at Meerut which passed resolutions "binding Mussalmans to adhere to Non-co-operation and requesting them to join the Congress", and "urging the enlistment of one crore of Muhammadans and five crores of Hindus as members of the Khilafat and Congress organisations."¹²⁰ Though the organizations are named separately, it is remarkable that Muslims are "requested to join the Congress"; it would, moreover, have been most difficult to separate the enlistment of members at mass meetings harangued by Gandhi as well as by the Ali brothers. We may conclude that mass membership was considered to support Congress as well as the Khilafat movement.

Consequently, membership does not give us a very good clue as to the extent of the movement. Other indications in this respect might be the number of people attending meetings and the amount of money collected, but unfortunately these too cannot be given with any claim to exactness.

It is often impossible to discern which attendants at meetings had been drawn there by enthusiasm for the Khilafat movement, and which were primarily motivated by enthusiasm for *swaraj* or purely Congress aims; this, however, would seem to be the lesser handicap, since in those days many people did not make a very clear distinction between these themselves. But even the total numbers of persons attending meetings we know only by estimate, and then it is impossible to ascertain how far the numbers mentioned were influenced by propagandist intentions, either exaggerating or reducing them.

Numbers given in Indian sources tend to be very vague. A telegram¹²¹ from Madras on the second Khilafat day speaks about "the Hindu and Muslim citizens of Madras assembled in tens of thousands"; Muhammad Ali writes¹²² about his visit to Calcutta with Gandhi: "While there we addressed dozens of meetings (in one day no less than 8 or 9) and were listened to by hundreds of thousands of people." British estimates about the attendance at meetings vary greatly. Punjab intelligence reports of May 1920¹²³ mention Khilafat meetings at Multan on May 16 and 19, the first attended by only 150 persons, the second by about 4,000, but without giving any explanation for this difference. A Khilafat meeting at Bombay¹²⁴ was estimated at 10,000 Muslims. But while Indian estimates may tend to exaggerate numbers, British ones may tend to scale them down. Very often in British reports we find utterances like this one about the second Sind Provincial Khilafat Conference in February, 1920: "The attendance on the first day numbered about 15,000, but this number diminished considerably on the second and third days to about 7,000 and 4,000 respectively."¹²⁵

Observations of this kind might result from "wishful counting" but in many reports a context from which this might be surmised is lacking.¹²⁶ Therefore, even approximately accurate information as to the extent of the movement is not to be expected from these numbers. We may only say that many indications point to the fact that the movement met with broad sympathies, and that not only educated or well-circumstanced Muslims took part in it, but that it assumed the character of a mass movement. This is apparent from the large audiences at meetings, from the many places where these took place — mostly located in the Punjab, Sind, Bombay, the U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Madras — and from the observation that the movement was spreading to the villages too.¹²⁷

Nor is exact information as to the amount of funds collected available. References¹²⁸ to "a crore of rupees" probably refer to the Tilak Swaraj

Fund, for which the Bezwada programme had asked.¹²⁹ And though probably a considerable part of this sum came from Muslims,¹³⁰ and the money was at least partly spent on the Khilafat cause, we cannot look upon it as purely collected by Khilafatists for the Khilafat. But the Khilafat Committees also collected money for financing their own work and for assisting the Turks by means of issuing "Khilafat receipts" repayable when *swaraj* was attained. At the outset this work did not run very smoothly, at least according to British sources,¹³¹ but after some time it yielded better results. The All-India Khilafat Conference at Karachi in July 1921 passed a resolution "to collect 40 lakhs of rupees through sale of Khilafat receipts for aid of sufferers from Smyrna and *Muhajirin* and other national requirements."¹³² The Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian Princes probably also contributed large sums.¹³³ According to a notice in the press¹³⁴ the total Khilafat receipts amounted to Rs. 643,000 in 1920 and Rs. 2,100,000 in the next year. But the way in which the money was collected as well as the way in which it was used met with rather sharp protests after some time.

But perhaps a more interesting question would be what kind of Muslims supported the Khilafat movement. Our materials do not permit us to draw clear-cut conclusions, but it is possible to say something about it. We have already noted that the movement started as a communal one, trying to enlist the support of the whole community,¹³⁵ and we think it succeeded to a remarkable degree in doing so.¹³⁶ An indication as to the origins of its leadership is given by the list of 82 memorialists who sent a representation to the Viceroy, warning him that the Muslim community would stop co-operation with the government as of August 1, 1920.¹³⁷ Among them, we find 21 maulanas, 27 merchants and 2 contractors, 4 vakils and 9 barristers, 3 landholders, 3 journalists and 9 former magistrates.¹³⁸ In this list, the ulama and the merchants are conspicuous; ¹³⁹ professional men are not lacking, but the number of landowners is small.

The movement itself was not confined to these upper and middle class Muslims. At an early stage, it got the support of low class townspeople,¹⁴⁰ and later on we are informed that it spread among the peasantry.¹⁴¹ When, however, we hear about opponents, they come from the upper strata of society¹⁴²: "leading Lucknow Maulvis";¹⁴³ "leading Muhammadans of Nagpur";¹⁴⁴ "local Khans" in the N.W.F.P. opposing the *hijrat* movement;¹⁴⁵ "the educated classes";¹⁴⁶ "the Cawnpore Chamber of Commerce".¹⁴⁷ A correct inference, perhaps, would be that the most clear and frequent signs of aversion to a movement endangering not

only British rule in India but also the social order it had established, were to be found among those Muslims whose position was dependent upon that rule. We have already observed how the Rajah of Mahmudabad left a Muslim League session in disgust when Dr. Ansari all too clearly attacked British policy.¹⁴⁸ Another instance is offered by the Nizam of Hyderabad, who in the second half of May 1920 prohibited all Khilafat meetings in his state.¹⁴⁹ In a letter to Lord Chelmsford he explained his reasons. As a Muslim ruler, he wrote, he could not but feel sympathy for Turkey and the Khilafat, but, he continues, "... it is impossible for me to countenance proceedings that have avowed intentions of resistance, euphemistically called 'passive', to British authority — indeed against all authority." Public disorder and "lawlessness" were causing him grave anxiety, "both as an Ally and as a Ruler."¹⁵⁰

Some Muslim groups deserve our special attention in this context. The first are the ulama, whose attitude was important because it was they who could reach the Muslim masses. We have already seen that the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* supported the Khilafat movement; this would seem, perhaps, to be a matter of course, but it was not quite so. Binder points out¹⁵¹ two practical reasons for the attitude they assumed: they wanted to safeguard the Holy Places of Islam against Christian influences, and to protect the Muslim community from any westernizing trends which might easily follow in their wake. But on the theoretical plane their support was less secure: their concern was the *sharia*¹⁵² in the first place, and to equate the Sultan-Caliph's rule with that of the *sharia* was by no means easy, since he had given in to westernizing trends in many respects. Some considerations which made the Indian ulama withhold their support from the Pakistan movement in the forties might have made them do the same with regard to the Khilafat movement in the twenties.¹⁵³ The Khilafat movement had strong roots among the westernized Indian Muslims. In 1916, when Sharif Husain rebelled, the protest against him had been confined to the educated and politically advanced Muslims; it did not then spread among the masses because most religious leaders kept aloof.¹⁵⁴ It was only when some prominent ulama, like Mahmud-ul-Hasan and Abdul Bari, took up the Sultan-Caliph's cause that the rest gradually took their cue from them.

Furthermore, whereas generally the ulama favoured an alliance with Congress against the British, some distrust and fear with regard to Hindu intentions were perhaps never wholly lacking in their midst. Even when their meetings resulted in resolutions which took Hindu-Muslim unity for granted, in the discussions an anti-Hindu attitude

sometimes made itself felt.¹⁵⁵ That is, informers of British intelligence reported this to be the case, a fact which may cause some doubt as to the reliability of these rumours. But we would not dismiss them as completely false when we realize that Congress accommodated communalist as well as nationalist Hindus.

We need not doubt that most Indian Muslims sympathized with the cause of Turkey and the Caliph. That the Muslim masses, following the lead given by the ulama, showed their sympathy is not to be wondered at, but Muslim liberals too reacted in this way. Sir Theodore Morison, the former Aligarh Principal, wrote in 1919: "Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslem liberals are being driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism. Receptive though the liberals are to Western ideas, and averse though they are to Pan-Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies, Europe's intransigence is forcing them to make at least a temporary alliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist groups."¹⁵⁶ This analysis would perfectly fit Amir Ali, a Khilafat leader without becoming an Indian nationalist;¹⁵⁷ to a lesser degree perhaps the same might be said about the Agha Khan and a member of the Viceroy's Council, Muhammad Shafi, both of them pleading for Anglo-Turkish friendship which they regarded as being in the interest of Islam and the Muslims as well as in the interest of the Empire.¹⁵⁸ But some of these liberals were deterred from supporting the movement by the fact that it had recourse to "illegal" action and mass agitation. Jinnah should probably be placed in this category; he is characterized as a constitutionalist who did not feel at home in an ambience of non-co-operation and *Khaddar*-bearers.¹⁵⁹ Maybe another circumstance also had something to do with Jinnah's attitude: that he considered the Khilafat movement to be "a false religious frenzy" of which no good could ultimately come, either for India in general or for the Indian Muslims in particular.¹⁶⁰ A similar attitude was adopted by Fazli-Husain, who "was convinced that unconstitutional agitation of the kind conceived in the non-co-operation programme was to a large extent useless, and fraught with grave dangers", and who was "free from the hysterical bias which prevailed in some quarters." He resigned from the Muslim League when it accepted the principle of non-co-operation.¹⁶¹

Men like Jinnah and Fazli-Husain in a way might be considered as heirs to the political legacy of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Even when they took a course far more independent from British patronage than Sir Sayyid had done, in the last resort they wanted co-operation with

the British. At the same time, Sir Sayyid's views on Turkey, the Caliphate, and Arabian claims to it reverberated in contemporary pamphlets. In them we find opinions like these: Turkey and Islam are not identical, and other powers have diplomatic and commercial intercourse with the Sultan of Turkey, not with the Caliph; ¹⁶² the institution of the Caliphate is not a fundamental principle of Islam, because it is dependent on the will of the people, which Islam is not; ¹⁶³ the last Abbasid Caliph was not entitled to give away his office to Sultan Selim; ¹⁶⁴ why should the Sharif of Mecca not succeed to a title which the Sultan of Turkey had not been able to defend? ¹⁶⁵

The fact, however, that we may signalize some pamphlets turning against the Khilafat movement does not prove anything about the response they met with, and we doubt whether it was very great. ¹⁶⁶ An interesting instance is offered by Faizul Karim's pamphlet we quoted above — interesting because we know some of the reactions it provoked. It was rather sharply attacked in two other pamphlets ¹⁶⁷ and its author was accused of having written it at the instigation of the Government of Sind which also financed its publication and distribution, and of having acquired declarations of agreement from other ulama "by most crooked and questionable tactics." ¹⁶⁸ Though we do not get any further than accusations and counter-accusations and cannot therefore give a definite judgment on what precisely were the true facts of the case, we want to make some observations. Firstly, that it is quite possible that the government tried to mobilize anti-Khilafat propaganda; efforts of this kind are known. ¹⁶⁹ Secondly, that these pamphlets contain — as was to be expected — a lot of very personal attacks; it is difficult to judge how much truth accusations of that kind hold, but one gets the impression that old feuds and rivalries were being settled under the cloak of political convictions. Similar considerations may have determined attitudes towards the Khilafat movement in other cases too where no evidence of it has been left. And thirdly, it is most remarkable that in these early manifestations of the Khilafat movement no mention is made of co-operation with the Hindus or of *swaraj*. Almost on the contrary, Seth Haji Abdullah Harun, president of the Khilafat Conference in Sind — a man who in the years 1911-1913 was prominent in the Sind Red Crescent Society ¹⁷⁰ — is now complaining bitterly of having been lumped together "with extremists and Home Rulers. This, to say the least, is the unkindest cut of all." ¹⁷¹

Here we are touching on another theme claiming our attention in this context: the Hindu-Muslim fraternization, which was one of the

most striking features of this period in Indian politics. Generally Gandhi is reputed to have cemented this Hindu-Muslim unity by taking up the Khilafat demands, which he declared to provide "such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Muhammedans as would not arise in a hundred years."¹⁷² Whether we consider this to be a "clever stroke"¹⁷³ or what his moral duty prescribed him to do,¹⁷⁴ we should remember that Gandhi found his ground prepared by the Lucknow pact of 1916, at the same time admitting that what Gandhi attained went much further than this pact. The entente achieved in 1916 was a rational political agreement, but the years from 1920 to 1922 offered the spectacle of an emotional breaking up of traditional barriers of distrust and fear and religious practices, which can be described only by the word "fraternization".

But was this fraternization a reality? For some people we may assume it was — for those who had learnt to approach Indian politics on a national level, for men like Gandhi and the Nehrus on the Congress side, and Dr. Ansari, Abul Kalam Azad and the Ali brothers on the Khilafatist side. But for those Indians — Hindu or Muslim — who approached politics on a communal level, there could be an alliance but no true "fraternization"; one cannot escape the impression that when they went through the motions of fraternization, it remained at a superficial level. It is remarkable how much attention was paid to the problem of cow-killing. We here put forward two examples. One we borrow from Mahadev Desai who, writing about Abul Kalam's publications in *Al Hilal* shortly before the war, relates: "... the Maulana boldly told the Mussalmans that their insistence on the right of cow-slaughter was far from conducive to communal peace. His view was so strange in those days that even his intimate friend Hakim Ajmal Khan fell foul of him... It was only in 1920 that the good Hakim Saheb saw his error, confessed it to the Maulana, and became a whole-hogger in the matter like the Maulana himself."¹⁷⁵ The second is to be found in a message from Abdul Ghani,¹⁷⁶ assistant secretary to the C.K.C. at Bombay. It reads as follows: "Letters are received in Central Khilafat Committee office pertaining to strength of Hindu-Muslim unity. At Rangoon besides Muslim volunteers, twenty Hindu volunteers collected subscriptions for Khilafat Fund on occasion of *Id* and same was done in many other towns. But living example of Hindu-Muslim unity at Old Basti is remarkable in Indian history. Hindus of this town raised subscriptions. Purchased fat and beautiful cow and in big meeting presented it to Muslims. Muslims were so much impressed with it that they also purchased a cow. And presented both cows to Hindus to be kept in

Gaooshala as mark of Hindu-Muslim unity. This demonstration of feelings of brotherhood displayed by residents of Old Basti has set practical illustration for others. And if both communities entertain feelings of regard and respect for each other, our difficulties would soon be solved and with united efforts we shall be able to achieve our common object." Events like these may be significant symbols — but they are significant only when they represent a lasting reality. Whether they did this is, to say the least, open to doubt when we hear about the case of Swami Shradanand. He was an *Arya Samaj* leader who up to 1919 was hated by Muslims because of his attempts to win back Rajput Muslims to Hinduism, but who in May 1919 even addressed the Muslims in the Juma Mosque at Delhi.¹⁷⁷ Four years later, however, his work in the *shuddhi* movement was to cause his death at the hands of an outraged Muslim.

It might be supposed that we are quoting these examples to ridicule this aspect of the movement, or because of their special appeal to the westerner who is unable to see how important such pathetic expressions of good-will were in the Indian setting. We would like to answer, firstly that in our opinion this shallowness, this lack of reality belying the high hopes pinned on Hindu-Muslim unity, presents rather a object of tragedy than of ridicule, and secondly that some Indian observers see it in the same way. Muhammad Ali in 1913 had warned Hindu and Muslim leaders alike against "mistaking the accidental for the essential" and "drowning the problem in a deluge of words."¹⁷⁸ Khaliqzaman in his memoirs speaks of "the silly excitement" of the Muslims who took Swami Shradanand inside the mosque at Delhi.¹⁷⁹

Nehru spoke — some thirty years after the events — about "the artificial unity Gandhi had forged out of diverse discontents."¹⁸⁰ Certainly these authors did not judge things in the same way when they were actually happening, but even in 1921, when fraternization was in full swing, signs of distrust were never lacking. Distrust found its way too into historical reflection on the period; it is evident in the writings of R. C. Majumdar, stating that "the policy of Hindu-Muslim entente was merely an ingenious device on the part of the Muslim leaders to secure help against British imperialism... There was no reason to suppose, as subsequent events clearly proved, that the Muslim leaders were inspired by a genuine desire to make up their differences with the Hindus..."¹⁸¹

Distrust was to be found on both sides. Many Hindus feared the Muslims' willingness to resort to violence. Muslim leaders realized this

and tried to reassure them; this is clearly one of the intentions of the *Khilafat Manifesto* issued by the C.K.C. in May, 1920, declaring: "We wish to state in the most emphatic terms that in the joint Hindu-Muslim scheme of action there is at no stage of it any idea of doing violence secretly or openly. We recognise that the pressure must be peaceful and moral. We must evoke a sympathy by suffering. We wish to cultivate a world opinion in favour of our cause by inviting suffering on ourselves." ¹⁸² Apparently Gandhi's teachings had not been lost on the men who put out the *Manifesto*. A little further on they declared: "The Mussulmans of India will fight to the last man in resisting any Mussulman power that may have designs upon India" — hinting, undoubtedly, at the possibility of an Afghan invasion, which was not a gratifying prospect for Hindus. But only a few weeks before, Shaukat Ali had spoken at a Khilafat Conference at Patna ¹⁸³ where he professed himself to be a humble follower of Gandhi, at the same time, however, noting one difference between the Mahatma and himself: "The Mahatma was absolutely committed to *Ahimsa* and he would never deviate from it come what may. But they, the Mussalmans, could not bind themselves absolutely to the doctrine to that extent. According to their religion to kill and be killed in the name of God were alike *Satyagraha*. Their great prophet had practised *Ahimsa* for full 13 years and then he was given the strength to conquer his enemies by force of arms. The speaker felt it would be a crime indeed if their prowess were exercised for personal gain and aggrandisement, but if it was in the sacred cause of religion it was not only not a crime, but an obligatory duty. However, despite these differences they had decided to work together and eschew violence in every shape as long as joint action lasted. Mahatma Gandhi had told him that if he failed in his endeavours he would tell them so." And then Shaukat Ali went on to say "... that there were but two courses open to them in case of their failure — *jihad* or *hijrat*."

It is evident from the whole speech that non-violence was stressed, but with two reservations. It was not a matter of principle, but of tactics, just as in the case of the Prophet who practised *Ahimsa* only for lack of strength. And secondly, non-violence was adopted as long as joint action lasted, and this would come to an end if Gandhi's tactics failed to succeed. Once this point was reached, the ominous word of *jihad* reared its head. These conceptions recur in Khilafat declarations; the stress laid on the various elements in the policy may change, but violence as a possibility is never absent.

Unfortunately for Hindu-Muslim unity, occasions suited to the materialization of this possibility were not lacking either. In the summer of 1919 an Afghan invasion was imminent and, even after its failure, the idea kept haunting the Indian scene; in 1921, the Moplah rising stirred up emotions — here we are anticipating events which will be related later. Both occurrences were reported to lead to acrimonious altercations between Hindus and Muslims. To mention only two of them: in a meeting of the C.K.C. in 1920 “extremist Moslem leaders advocated joining any Afghan army that might invade India to drive out the British. Hindu leaders demanded explanation and made it clear that at first sign of such danger Hindus would cease to co-operate.”¹⁸⁴ And in a meeting of the C.K.C. on November 3, 1921 at Delhi, “. . . a heated debate was started by Hindu members regarding attitude of Khilafat leaders towards Moplah rebellion, and alleged tendency of Muslims towards violence. Report of debate discloses serious apprehensions on part of Hindus, especially in Sind. Ajmal Khan and Abul Kalam Azad assured Hindu members that they would ask all Mohame-dans to observe non-violence, but could give no further assurance.”¹⁸⁵ Even if the Moplah rising was caused mainly by harsh demands by Hindu landlords and moneylenders, the victims were surely not all of this class, and consequently it raised fears not confined to this class either.

On the Muslim side the big fear seems to have been that they were just used by the Hindus. We might quote two instances. The first one occurs in a report¹⁸⁶ on an article contributed by “A Muhammadan of Delhi” to the *Paisa Akbar* of May 6, 1919. He complains that the boycott of British-made cigarettes has worked out to the disadvantage of the Muslims who commanded the traffic, but in favour of the Hindus who fairly monopolized the traffic in *biris* to which the public has changed! Perhaps a more serious matter is signalled in an anti-Khilafat pamphlet¹⁸⁷: the Muslims think that non-co-operation is planned in their favour, but in Gandhi’s speeches the Punjab wrongs come first.¹⁸⁸ Indian Muslims now lead the way and are ready to sacrifice Aligarh University, but did the Hindu Benares University follow their example? “The Mohammedans, the weakest community, should think twice before plunging themselves heart and soul into non-co-operation”, the pamphleteer concludes his warning. Both stories are specimens of communalist thinking to which the motive of competition is not foreign, but we want to make the point that such tales evidently found a public in those days.

Before turning our attention to the action of the Khilafat movement

in the next years, in this chapter we want to establish the objects with which it started out. In a very general way we might say that its object was to safeguard Islam, represented by the Caliph and Turkey's secular power, but a more specific answer to the question seems to be called for. We propose to look for it mainly in the address presented by the Khilafat deputation before the Viceroy on January 19, 1920.¹⁸⁰ This deputation, created by the Amritsar Khilafat Conference of December 1919 was considered as the Indian counterpart to a Khilafat mission going to Europe. It wanted "to give a full and clear statement of the obligations imposed on every Muslim by his faith and of the united wishes cherished by Indian Musalmans regarding the Khilafat and cognate questions, such as those relating to Muslim control over every portion of the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, the Khalifa's wardenship of the Holy Places, and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." In a nutshell this one sentence contains the whole Khilafat programme. We want to call attention to the distinction made between "obligations imposed on every Musalman by his faith", and the "cherished wishes" of Indian Musalmans, for, as is explained in a passage further on: "Even the most cherished Muslim sentiment may be sacrificed in subservience to imperial demands . . . but the requirements of Islamic law are so definite and of such a binding nature that they cannot be reduced by a hair's breadth to suit the desires of the Allied and Associated Powers any more than they can be enlarged to further the mundane ambitions of Musalmans themselves." The last part of the sentence no doubt alludes to the "mundane ambitions" of Sharif Husain of Mecca which are repudiated. Stress on the religious character of the Muslim demands runs like a thread through the whole address; it begins in the sentence quoted when they are said to regard "the Khilafat and cognate questions" — apparently the Caliphate is what really matters, while the more tangible points are only its consequences. Or to express it more accurately: what a westerner would look upon as the practical consequences of a religious principle, in the Muslim mind is integrated in the principle itself: "The preservation of the Khilafat as a temporal no less than a spiritual institution is not so much a part of their faith as the very essence thereof and no analogies from other creeds that tolerate the lacerating and devitalizing distinction between things spiritual and things temporal, between the Church and the State, can serve any purpose . . . Temporal power is of the very essence of the institution of the Khilafat, and Musalmans can never agree to any change in its character or to the dismemberment of its Empire. The no less important question of the

Jazirat-ul-Arab ¹⁹⁰ over no portion of which can any kind of non-Muslim control be tolerated is equally clearly not one of Muslim sentiment but of Islamic faith. Similarly Islam also declares and defines the sanctity of the holy places of Islam and places this and similar matters beyond the uninformed interpretation of people of alien faith."

The religious character of Muslim demands, which made itself felt in aspects that by western standards would be considered to be purely temporal and political, explains their absolute and rigid nature. Montagu complained about this to Muhammad Ali, saying "that we had put our representative, as he apologetically called himself, in the most difficult position, because all representatives could negotiate and compromise, whereas in the case of our representative it was a case of satisfaction of every demand otherwise the alternatives of Jihad and Hijrat." ¹⁹¹ It also explains why western political leaders and diplomats could not get up much understanding for them.

Nevertheless, on some points the Khilafatists were ready to make allowances for other views. Integrity of the Ottoman Empire was important in more than one aspect. It concerned not only European Turkey, but also the non-Turkish minorities in Asia Minor and, lastly, the Arabs who had during the war proclaimed their independence. The Khilafat deputation spoke only about the Arab problem, but not in a way likely to raise much hope of a compromise: "As regards the integrity of the Khalifa's dominions we are painfully aware that some sections of the Musalmans of Arabia have in clear defiance of the laws of Islam stood out from the solid mass of the rest of the Muslim world. But instead of this being any argument against the latter it furnishes it with one more compelling reason for proclaiming the truth and in accordance with the divine declaration that all Musalmans are brothers, one to another, and the divine injunction to make peace between brothers, Indian Musalmans must seek to remove every existing misunderstanding and eliminate every cause of friction that may tend to separate Arab from Ajam, and Turk from Tajik. And it is the logical consequence of Islamic brotherhood . . . that principles of such universal application as that of self-determination should be applied to the Muslim no less than to the Christian and to the Asiatic no less than to the European." The meaning is clear: the Arabs must remain under Ottoman dominance and Indian Muslims should exert their strength to attain this end, on religious grounds. Only the last part of the passage points to a possible compromise: self-determination is a principle applying to the Arabs as well.

Two months later Gandhi formulated the same thoughts far more elastically: "Briefly put the claim is that the Turks should retain European Turkey subject to full guarantees for the protection of non-Muslim races under the Turkish Empire and that the Sultan should control the Holy Places of Islam and should have suzerainty over Jazirat-ul-Arab, *i.e.*, Arabia as defined by the Muslim savants, subject to self-governing rights being given to the Arabs if they so desire."¹⁸² And Muhammad Ali gave his opinion on the problem in the same sense: "The sum total of our claim is the restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum*. But we do not want to rule out political changes which would guarantee not only security of life and property to non-Turkish races, whether Muslim or Christian or Jew, but also opportunities of autonomous development."¹⁸³

But among these claims which wholly fitted in with the pattern of Pan-Islamism another note faintly made itself heard — that of nationalism. The Khilafat deputation concluded its address in the following way: Muslim loyalty to the Empire is conditional on the preservation of their religious freedom. A settlement unacceptable "alike to Muslim and non-Muslim Indians, now happily reunited shoulder to shoulder", would bring no peace because it would not be based on justice. "But if on the contrary India is won by a generous recognition of her fitness for managing her own affairs as a member of the British Commonwealth", Muslims will back Great Britain. Again the meaning is clear: severing the connection with the Empire is as yet out of the question; only in a somewhat later phase will the demand for *swaraj* be taken up. But the British are warned not to overlook the nationalist demands with which the Muslims are associating themselves.

CHAPTER V

ACTION

Naturally enough, in the period when the movement was taking shape and organizing itself, plans had been put forward as to what action could be taken to obtain its objects. Roughly, these plans could be put under two headings: persuasion and coercion. Under the first came the organizing of Indian public opinion and informing the government of it by publishing resolutions and addressing authorities; under the second came non-co-operation and, in particular for the Muslim community, *hijrat* and *jihad*.

But decisions would be made in Europe. Beyond the Government of India the British Government, British public opinion and even world opinion and the governments of the allied powers had to be reached. So at an early stage it was mooted¹ to send a deputation to Europe to explain the Muslim point of view and to convince the British cabinet of the gravity of the situation. This idea materialized in the appointment of a delegation, consisting of Muhammad Ali, Sayyid Husain, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadvi and Abul Kasim, which sailed from Bombay in February, 1920.

The deputation was granted two official interviews with cabinet ministers. On March 2 it was received by Lord Fisher, standing in for Montagu who was ill at the time, and on March 19 by Lloyd George and Lord Fisher; on both occasions India Office functionaries like Sir William Duke and Mr. Shuckburgh were present.² The first interview passed off in a very courteous way, since it consisted mainly of an exposition of the Muslim view by Muhammad Ali and provoked only slight objections on the British side; it ended on Lord Fisher's assurance that the British Government fully appreciated Muslim services in the war and would take the religious feelings of its subjects into account. "Indeed it is no secret", he concluded, "that the decision which has recently been taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to retain Turkish sovereignty in Constantinople has been to a large extent influenced by the desire of the British Government to meet the religious feelings of its

Muslim subjects in India." The second interview was pitched in a sharper key, as Lloyd George pressed Muhammad Ali to acknowledge that he was opposed to Arab independence, brought up against the Turks the atrocities in Armenia and Greece, and generally evinced no conciliatory attitude. Muhammad Ali afterwards complained about the Prime Minister having been "showing impatience throughout the hearing".³

The Khilafat demands put forward by the delegation did not differ from those discussed in the preceding chapter. Their religious foundation is again remarkable, the more so because on the British side there was little readiness to accept this view as the correct one. Officials at the India Office clearly considered the delegation's real object to be not so much to obtain better terms for Turkey — whatever the inspiration of this desire might have been — as to make political capital for purposes of agitation in India.⁴ Lord Curzon at about the same time looked upon the Khilafat movement in India only as "the result of a prolonged and desperate agitation".⁵

Muhammad Ali in his *Autobiography* rather convincingly describes⁶ the inspiration of his mission in another way: "It was certainly not politics that had lured me this time to Europe. The impulse was purely religious." He was advised by friends not to touch upon religious matters in Europe, since he would not meet with much understanding of them over there. "But how could we do that? We were not Turkish nationalists fighting for a little space in which their race could breathe and live. We were Indians . . . we were Muslim subjects of a Christian sovereign to whom we had tendered our temporal allegiance on the clear understanding that he would respect our religious obligations, and it was only our religious obligations that had compelled us to voice our protest against the annihilation of a temporal power which our religion required to remain unseparated from the spiritual head of the Islamic world. Religion, therefore, was the one thing that gave us a *locus standi* in the Council of the Allied and Associated Nations . . ." Moreover, he was convinced that the hatred of the Turks was basically an aversion to Islam, which Europe considered ". . . as a confused jumble of spiritual tags plagiarised from the older Semitic creeds of Moses and Jesus, and of oriental licentiousness, intolerance and tyranny."

This exposition, of course, as well as similar ones occurring in speeches delivered in England and France at the time,⁷ might be thought to have been made up for foreign consumption and not to reveal the author's true convictions. In the case of the *Autobiography*, however,

we do not think this very plausible, and it does not apply at all to an *Appeal to the Khalifa*,⁸ since its publication was avoided at the time for fear of causing difficulties to the addressee. It was actuated by the announcement of the draft treaty of Sèvres to the Turkish Peace Delegation at Paris, and the purport of the document was to implore the Sultan-Caliph to make his decision on acceptance or rejection of the treaty "not as the Padshah of Ottoman Turks but as the Captain of Allah's Army of the Moslems of every country and the Last Prophet of God." And the same might be said about Muhammad Ali's letter to his brother Shaukat from London in which he gives an account of his interview with Montagu, ten days before. He expressly states that this account is not to be published, since Montagu had made this a condition for talking freely. The questions that came up at this talk would be considered political by a westerner, but it is clear that to Muhammad Ali their significance was based on his religious convictions.

It is hard to tell whether the delegation scored any success. Muhammad Ali felt Montagu to be sympathetic to their cause but it was not him he had to win over, for Montagu had already been advocating a policy less hostile to Turkey.⁹ But he failed to convince Lloyd George and Curzon; the latter heeded French designs with regard to Constantinople far more than Muslim susceptibilities.¹⁰ As a staff member of the delegation puts it: the delegation "had the impression that nobody understood the Muslim point of view better than Mr. Montagu . . . But Lloyd George, Curzon and the gang composed of men like Bryce, Robert Cecil, Asquith and others who follow the traditions of Old Gladstone, are too strong for him."¹¹

In his *Autobiography*, when writing about his tour in England and France,¹² Muhammad Ali declares that he met with more attention and understanding than he had expected. Having visited the French author Claude Farrère, he wrote: "M. Claude Farrère, at least, understands that this is not a struggle only between Imperialistic exploitation and the Muslim faith, but between Mammon and God. He acknowledged to us that the battle we were fighting was not the battle of Islam alone, but of all religion; and that if the Khilafat was dismembered, it meant the negation of all faith."¹³ But this might well, on Mr. Farrère's part, have been an effusion of high-flown sentiment, and not a reality with any political consequences. Perhaps we had better listen to an estimate from the other side. A political intelligence officer giving an account of Muhammad Ali's political activities in Europe¹⁴ concludes that he sought the help of the Labour Party,¹⁵ but in vain; that he

found it impossible to gain the support of the French government; that he got some help from the Italians — his contacts with Turkey were assured via the Italian diplomatic bag — and had in Switzerland and Rome contacts with Muslims from Persia, Turkey and Egypt, with the purpose of getting in on an intrigue with Russia, Turkey and Germany. But these plans did not materialize.¹⁶

Nevertheless, while in Europe the delegation sometimes expressed its hope that things would take a more favourable turn. Shortly before the San Remo conference, Shaukat Ali announced¹⁷ that he had received a telegram from his brother from Rome that the situation was “more hopeful”, and on June 17 Muhammad Ali despatched another telegram: “Withdrawal of Treaty now confidently expected in England. God willing, Indian leaders’ courage, sacrifice and perseverance will yet win back the Khilafat Empire.” When this message, however, circulated in the Indian press, it provoked an official reaction from Lloyd George, saying: “. . . there is no intention of modifying the Turkish Treaty . . . In any case, the policy of the British Government will not be affected in the least by agitation in India.”¹⁸

On the whole it must have been with a feeling of having failed that the delegation returned from Europe. One of the consequences was that the Khilafat movement was going to lean more towards the nationalist side.¹⁹ But before paying attention to this development we must discuss a phenomenon in which the religious background of the movement appeared very clearly: the *hijrat* to Afghanistan in the summer of 1920.

The idea of *hijrat* was far from new since it had its roots in the *sharia*. It was based upon the distinction between *dar-ul-Islam* and *dar-ul-harb*. According to the classical theory of Islam the world is divided into two parts: one where Islam is established, and another where this is not yet the case. The latter is *dar-ul-harb* (= realm of war), and generally it is not permissible for Muslims to live in it, as they cannot do so according to the prescripts of Islamic law. So they should emigrate from it or make *jihad*. This, of course, is a simplification of a much more complicated matter; there existed many shades of opinion on the interpretation of these precepts, for instance as to the question whether everyone was obliged to take his leave from *dar-ul-harb* or that certain categories were exempted from this obligation, and also with regard to the nature of *jihad*, for the means of warfare could be taken to be spiritual as well as material, and a war could be a purely defensive or an offensive one. But for Indian Muslims the first question was: should India, after the British had destroyed the last vestiges of Mughul

power, be considered as *dar-ul-Islam* or as *dar-ul-harb*? And in the latter case, were the aforementioned obligations relevant to the situation? In the years after 1870, the general tendency among them had become to look upon India as not *dar-ul-harb*, or to consider *jihad* as not obligatory, provided the new rulers did not interfere in religious matters — as was solemnly promised in the Queen's declaration of 1858.²⁰

But the question posed itself afresh when the war in November 1914 found Turkey and the British Empire on opposite sides, and when the Sultan-Caliph proclaimed *jihad*. Could a country ruled by infidels who made war on the Caliph of Islam be styled *dar-ul-Islam* any longer? Many Indian Muslims escaped from this quandary by declaring the proclaimed *jihad* to be no true *jihad*, but not all of them were inclined to take this line of reasoning.²¹ And when after the armistice Indian Muslims became more and more convinced that Great Britain was the enemy of Islam, it got ever more difficult for them to remain loyal to the British government. The Muslim deputation to the Viceroy²² clearly stated Muslim loyalty to be conditional on the preservation of religious freedom, and in guarded terms warned him that Indian Muslims had to follow "the dictates of Islam, however the consequences may be." But Shaukat Ali, in his speeches in the first months of 1920, put things more bluntly: if the Caliphate was tampered with, there were but two courses open to them, *jihad* or *hijrat*.²³ And Abul Kalam Azad, together with other religious leaders, in 1920 issued a *fatwa*²⁴ declaring: "All Moslems who would like to fulfil Islamic obligations must quit India. Those who cannot migrate immediately should help the migrants as if they were themselves migrating from the country. The *Sharia* gives us no alternative course, except migration. Emigration from India before the war was desirable, but now it is mandatory. Only those Moslems can remain in India who are needed to carry on the struggle or have acceptable reasons against migration."

These exhortations were taken to the letter by a good many Indian Muslims. They were stimulated by a declaration from the Amir of Afghanistan who promised them an asylum in his country and every kind of help,²⁵ and the Afghan delegation at Mussoorie encouraged the movement.²⁶ The *hijrat* started in the spring of 1920; in the first days of May a *hijrat* office had already opened at Delhi.²⁷ The Government of India regarded it as a dangerous development, because all kinds of expectations and passions were roused in this way. At first the participation seems to have been rather unimportant; in June about 50 *muhajirin*²⁸ were reported to be in Peshawar, the main rallying-point

for people going to Afghanistan. But in July mention is made of 750 *muhajirin* arriving at Peshawar,²⁹ and one month later the government reported that thus far 18,000 of them had started on their way, at the same time, however, detecting indications of a check in the movement.³⁰ This check again seems not to have made itself really felt before the end of the month, as another report mentions 30,000 *muhajirin* who had started for Afghanistan.³¹ There is some reason to suppose that even a considerably greater number set out for Afghanistan, but we do not feel quite sure about that.³² It is certain, however, that not many of them reached their goal. The last *Weekly Report* referred to mentions a stream of returning emigrants who had found a "strong barrier across Khyber pass to prevent further unauthorised entry into Afghanistan." Apparently the Afghans had got alarmed at so great an influx of immigrants for whom they could not provide food and shelter. The whole movement collapsed in the next months and we hear mainly about the resettlement of disillusioned returning *muhajirin*, whose number was estimated at 75 % of those who had set out.³³

What kind of people had responded to the call for *hijrat*? Most of them came from Sind and the N.W.F.P., but the Punjab, the U.P., and Bihar and Orissa were represented too. They mostly belonged to "poorer classes", is the opinion of one author,³⁴ which might correspond with the "simple Moslems" about whom another writes.³⁵ Official reports give a somewhat more detailed picture: "At outset emigrants came from poorer classes with sprinkling of *intelligentsia* chiefly from towns, but movement has since spread to other classes" — but just which classes has been omitted, unfortunately. The same source mentions 1,000 *muhajirin* from Sind: "95 % labourers, loafers, and broken men." But not all of them were men of no consequence at all: "Religious excitement caused by stream of emigrants has begun to affect Government servants. One batch of emigrants included six sepoys and one havildar..."³⁶ In the Punjab a few governments clerks and minor officials resigned from their posts to perform *hijrat*, but were reinstated when they returned.³⁷ Briggs writes of "... comparatively few town-dwellers ... but every type of agricultural Moslem." He adds that sometimes the population of whole villages went, but sometimes only "the young and unruly rather than the older and steadier portions of the population."³⁸ But we may assume it was mainly men without property who went; landlords were even excused by the advocates of *hijrat* from participating in it.³⁹ This is suggesting that either the propertied classes were well represented in the Khilafat leadership or that, at least, the leadership

did not want to alienate those classes from the movement. But the failure of *hijrat* was to some extent ascribed to the fact that the emigrants were such as brought no economic gain to Afghanistan.⁴⁰

So the *hijrat* movement ended in failure and for a good many emigrants even in disaster. This brings up the question of responsibility. Who were the men stimulating the movement, and could they foresee the unhappy results? To begin with the last question: we think they could, for even if the Amir had tried to make good his promises, it is doubtful that he would have been able to do so on a large scale. Perhaps responsible leaders realized this; even Abul Kalam Azad, who is considered the chief theoretician of the Khilafat movement was reported as late as June 1920 to have opposed execution of the *hijrat* idea.⁴¹ A few days earlier Dr. Kitchlew also declared that only Abdul Bari was in favour of migration whereas he himself, since the C.K.C. had not yet come to a decision in the matter, was against it.⁴² Gandhi as late as July 1920 expressed himself as opposed to *hijrat*.⁴³ It seems that Abdul Bari, and perhaps the Ali brothers — but in their case reports are conflicting — were the most forceful supporters of the movement, and once the migration was well on its way other men could hardly dissent since it was a matter of religion.⁴⁴ So, even when the failure — and in many cases a fatal failure at that — was known, the C.K.C. did not disavow it, but even talked of resuming it after better preparations.⁴⁵ Jinnah's judgment on the Khilafat movement ("a false religious frenzy") might well have been caused by an episode like the *hijrat* to Afghanistan.

The *hijrat* movement, however, though at first causing the government some alarm, was of limited proportions as compared with the non-co-operation movement which started a few months later. Moreover, while the *hijrat* certainly had political consequences it must be regarded as primarily religiously motivated: Muslims had to migrate since they were not allowed to live according to the *sharia* under the infidel government which curtailed their religious freedom. It was surely a case where no sharp line might be drawn between religion and politics, but in our opinion the accent lay on the first aspect.⁴⁶

In the non-co-operation movement things were probably just the other way round. It certainly would not do to deny the religious undercurrent manifesting itself in it.⁴⁷ Gandhi's concept of *satyagraha* perhaps should be called a moral concept, but one based upon religion; the idea of non-violence coupled with it surely had its roots in religious views.⁴⁸ These ties with religion may explain the way non-violent non-co-operation took hold of the masses, but the objects it mapped out for

itself were plainly of a primarily political nature, such as righting the Punjab wrongs and obtaining *swaraj*, and its mode of action too lay mainly in the political sphere.

Some of the hesitation of Hindu leaders to accept non-co-operation may even be connected with its political character. Politics, after all, is mostly a question of obtaining practical results and seeking the best means to get as much as possible of what you want. So dissensions as to what means will give the best results are to be expected. In religion, however, everything is at stake; there is not much choice between eternal salvation and damnation, and therefore a willingness to go to extreme lengths is to be expected.

The Khilafat question for the Indian Muslims was a politico-religious one, and so it is not surprising that they were more ready to take bold steps than many Hindus. This at any rate, whatever the correct explanation may be, was the case. At the Khilafat Conference at Delhi in November 1919 Gandhi for the first time introduced the concept of non-co-operation,⁴⁹ when the Khilafat leaders were taking counsel together about the means of putting pressure on the government. But they disagreed on the point of non-violence, and Gandhi did not have his way in all respects.⁵⁰ It was only after deliberations between Gandhi and the foremost Khilafat leaders in January, 1920, that the Muslims were convinced that non-violence was not forbidden to followers of Islam.⁵¹ At the Khilafat Conference at Bombay in February, moderate Khilafatists like Bhurgri and Chotani still prevailed with their proposal to postpone a resolution on non-co-operation until the results of Muhammad Ali's mission to Europe were known,⁵² but at C.K.C. meetings at Bombay in April and May, 1920, the principle of non-co-operation was accepted and a committee was appointed to work out a scheme for its initiation.⁵³ In June, an All-India Khilafat Conference at Allahabad resolved to give effect to non-co-operation "without further delay"; the Viceroy, however, was given "a month's warning".⁵⁴

It is clear that in Khilafatist circles there existed some hesitation about setting in motion a machinery of such a nature that no one could exactly predict what results it would produce, whereas the risks incurred could not but be grave. We have already remarked⁵⁵ upon a certain reserve towards the movement among the higher strata of the Muslim community. Majumdar characterizes the mood prevailing in the C.K.C. in June as weary, timid and not at all bellicose; it was Gandhi and Shaukat Ali who spurred them on, and under the pressure of mass opinion they voted for the struggle.⁵⁶ And some leaders who at first

played a role of some importance in the Khilafat movement now shrunk back from it. Abdullah Koor, an honorary secretary to the C.K.C., resigned from this post, giving it as his reason that he considered the last stages of non-co-operation as unconstitutional and impracticable. Moreover, he argued, resigning from government posts would be suicidal to Muslim interests, since members of other communities would rush in to fill the vacancies.⁵⁷

But the fact remains that, whereas the Khilafatists accepted the non-co-operation programme without too much opposition towards it and in rather a short time, Congress took a longer time to do so, and was largely driven on by Gandhi's personal ascendancy and the help of his Muslim allies in Congress. The causes for this perhaps may be found by considering what the concept of non-co-operation meant, and especially what it meant to which people, since it is evident that not everybody saw it in the same light.

When the C.K.C. in April 1920 accepted the principle of non-co-operation, it did so in the following words: ⁵⁸

"It was decided that, when further action would become necessary, it should take the form of withdrawal of co-operation with the Government, step by step, in the order shown in the following plan which was drawn up by a special Committee of which Gandhi was the principal member:

- (1) All titles and honours to be relinquished.
- (2) Resignations by members of Councils.
- (3) Private servants to give up their jobs.
- (4) Resignations of subordinate Government servants including the Police.
- (5) Resignations of superior Government servants.
- (6) Withdrawal of Musulmans from the Army.
- (7) Refusal to pay taxes."

In a somewhat abbreviated form the same programme was accepted at Allahabad in June, where non-co-operation was envisaged as follows: ⁵⁹

- "(1) the resignation of titles and honorary posts.
- (2) the resignation of posts in the Civil services of the Government, the Police being excluded.
- (3) the resignation of service in the Police and the Army.
- (4) the refusal to pay taxes."

These programmes differ not insignificantly from what, a few months later was accepted by a special session of Congress at Calcutta: ⁶⁰

- “(a) surrender of titles and honorary offices and resignation from nominated seats in local bodies;
- (b) refusal to attend Government levees, durbars and other official and semi-official functions held by Government officials or in their honour;
- (c) gradual withdrawal of children from Schools and Colleges owned, paid or controlled by Government, and in place of such Schools and Colleges, establishment of National Schools and Colleges in the various Provinces;
- (d) gradual boycott of British courts by Lawyers and litigants, and establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid, for the settlement of private disputes;
- (e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia;
- (f) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to the Reformed Councils and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for election;
- (g) boycott of foreign goods.”

It is evident from these texts that the Khilafatists at that moment were prepared to go a good deal further than Congress. Their programme, including resignation from the police and the army and refusal to pay taxes, could bring about a revolutionary situation and was sure to evoke strong government opposition, whereas the Congress programme in this respect went no further than advising people not to offer themselves as recruits for the army, and then only for service in Mesopotamia — nothing like resignation from the police and the army, as the Khilafatists were planning. Nor did Congress at that moment talk about non-payment of taxes. These widely differing programmes reflect, we think, the differing attitudes of the Khilafatists and the majority of Congress towards non-co-operation and so may explain the wavering of Congress when it came to accepting non-co-operation or not.

To explain the situation we have to go back somewhat in our story. At the Amritsar session of Congress in December, 1919, the issue had been whether or not to co-operate with the government in working the reforms. Non-co-operation in that case would mean a purely constitutional opposition which was quite acceptable to many Congress-men and

to a leader like C. R. Das.⁶¹ But Gandhi and Malaviya at that moment were in favour of a compromise with government, and they got their way against a fairly strong opposition in Congress; it was resolved to offer the government conditional co-operation.⁶²

But in the next months non-co-operation acquired a wholly different meaning. In the shape it was now given by Gandhi and his Khilafat associates it would mean mass agitation, which the old Congress leadership did not like at all.⁶³ This was the concept of non-co-operation Congress was confronted with at the Calcutta session and to get it accepted, even in a mitigated form, Gandhi had to fight the resistance of leaders like C. R. Das, Lala Lajpat Rai and B. C. Pal.⁶⁴ Gandhi won, but some authors think that he would not have gained this "personal triumph" if Tilak had not died one month earlier.⁶⁵ The Muslim vote must have counted for something, and there is a story about Calcutta taxi drivers having been smuggled in to decide the vote.⁶⁶ The casting of the votes was remarkable: there were over 5,000 delegates at that session, of whom, however, not quite half voted. The resolution on non-co-operation was passed by 1,826 to 804 votes.⁶⁷

There may have been more than one reason for the negative attitude of some Hindu leaders. Lack of sympathy for the Muslim cause that was linked with the new tactics was probably not absent; in Khaliquzman's account of the Calcutta session the theme of Hindu distrust towards Muslims is evident.⁶⁸ But aversion to embarking upon a revolutionary course that they would not be able fully to control themselves may well have been the main factor determining the attitude of the old élite.

Yet another striking aspect of the Calcutta session's resolutions was the introduction into them of the concept of *swaraj*.⁶⁹ In the preamble of the resolution on non-co-operation its reasons were stated: (a) the Khilafat question, in respect to which "both the Indian and the Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Mussulmans of India", and (b) the Punjab troubles, after which the same governments had failed to punish the officers and officials responsible but had, on the contrary, exonerated O'Dwyer, while "the debate in the House of Commons and specially in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India." These reasons led up to the subsequent conclusion: "This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without the redress of the aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs

in the future is the establishment of Swarajya." Therefore non-co-operation was to be adopted "until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established."

One might argue that the acceptance of the idea of *swaraj* showed no less revolutionary a tendency among Congress leaders than among the Khilafatists. This, we think, would not be quite correct; as long as *swaraj* was not defined and the possibility of retaining the British connection was not excluded, it could mean something like dominion status, or even full responsible government in the provinces, which would not create a revolutionary situation directly affecting the masses, important as it might be for the old élite. In our opinion the important thing is that in this way non-co-operation was linked with a nationalist aim, and that this was accepted by the Khilafatists who at this time played a considerable part in Congress; vindicating national honour, after all, was definitely something other than making the world "safe not only for democracy but for God", as the Khilafat deputation to the Viceroy had described its ultimate goal. We do not mean to say that the Khilafat movement lost its religious character; the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* in November, 1920, even evolved its own religious basis for non-co-operation by issuing the *Mutafaqa fatwa* which declared that co-operation with the British, being enemies of Islam, was *haram* — forbidden by the *sharia*.⁷⁰ Here national honour was not hinted at! But all the same, the Khilafat leaders in Congress — the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and Umar Sobani among them — accepted that their religious demands were considered as being dependent upon securing recognition of India's national status. This means that at least among Khilafat leaders a considerable shift towards Indian nationalism had taken place.

It is difficult to assess how far non-co-operation was successful. It certainly found a propitious psychological climate. Resignation of titles and honours had already occurred before it had come up as the first item of the programme: Rabindranath Tagore had renounced his knighthood after the Amritsar massacre,⁷¹ and Hakim Ajmal Khan was the first to renounce his titles when doing so was only considered as a policy, but had not yet been resolved upon.⁷² And yet even this part of the programme, affecting not too drastically the lives of those falling in with it, was not an overwhelming success: in February, 1921, only 21 of over 500 titles and honours had been sent back.⁷³ The explanation might be that this part concerned men from the upper strata of society who were on good terms with the British — a group giving no proof

of the greatest enthusiasm for the nationalist cause or the Khilafat movement.

The boycott of schools was denounced as rather unpractical⁷⁴ in the press, but it certainly obtained some results. No doubt many people in those years were ready to make sacrifices, like the Hindu and Muslim teachers in Bombay municipal vernacular schools who were willing, we are informed, to work at a lower pay in national schools.⁷⁵ The biggest success was scored at Aligarh where, after a visit of Muhammad Ali and Gandhi, about 100 — possibly even 200⁷⁶ — students with some teachers left the Muslim university to found a National Muslim University, of which Muhammad Ali temporarily became the *Shaikh*. But Gandhi's efforts to obtain a similar success at the Hindu University of Benares failed completely because Malaviya and other Hindu leaders strongly opposed his plans.⁷⁷ And on the whole, Muhammad Ali confessed, "the success with the students was less than we expected."⁷⁸

Then there was the boycott of law-courts and of elections. Some prominent politicians gave up their practice as barristers, among them Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, and Khaliqzaman.⁷⁹ In November-December, 1920, elections were held for the Provincial Legislative Councils, the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The boycott of these elections is described as "moderately successful",⁸⁰ with great local differences: in Bombay only 8 per cent of the voters went to the polls, but at Lucknow some 60 and at Madras about 50 per cent.⁸¹

So we get, by and large, the picture of an action that was not an outstanding success, but on the other hand we should not form too low an opinion of it. It is hardly probable that, had it been an evident failure, the Nagpur session of the Congress and the Khilafat Conference in December, 1920, would have upheld the programme formulated four months ago.⁸² Perhaps its greatest success was that it created a state of mind which opened up other possibilities much more threatening to the government. This is expressed by Muhammad Ali, who writes: "The success of our movement can be measured partly by the love and affection inspired by Gandhi and his co-workers *in millions* of people — nay scores of millions if not hundreds of millions who had for centuries never been inspired by any personality or any propaganda. Our movement is the only *live* movement of the last two generations at least for it has moved the masses in their millions. But our movement is chiefly to be measured by the amount of *fear* that it has succeeded in removing. It was fear that had made 320 millions of people the slave of a hundred thousand Englishmen. That fear, thank God, is fast disappearing. India's

thraldom is sure to disappear after that. This is the truest measure.”⁸³

Another measure perhaps was the growth of the volunteer movement. The volunteers were by no means a new phenomenon; the Congress and the Servants of India Society had already made use of volunteer corps for some years. The All-India Khilafat Conference at Allahabad on June 2 and 3, 1920, resolved: “. . . that a *Khilafat* volunteer corps be organized, and its branches be established all over India so that they may collect subscriptions for the *Khilafat* fund . . . and also prepare the Indian public for the non-co-operation movement.”⁸⁴

These objects, however, differed from the tasks usually assigned to volunteer corps and the Government of India was clearly somewhat alarmed. It addressed a circular letter to all Local Governments, calling attention to the fact that formerly volunteer corps used to do social work, assisted the police in guiding processions, and so on, but that this year the movement had assumed “a somewhat sinister character”: it took to military discipline and was politically employed. Volunteers were drilled by former N.C.O.s from the Indian Army; “. . . officers were dressed in Turkish military uniform, i.e. khaki tunic and trousers, red tarbush with a crescent, Sam-Browne belts and swords.” The letter concluded by asking for the opinions of Local Governments.⁸⁵

At the same time the Government of India tried to reassure the Secretary of State about these developments.⁸⁶ But Montagu felt less secure about them; with reference to these reports he noted: “And volunteers in Ireland (North and South) started all the trouble”, and: “I am alarmed about these volunteer associations or what they may grow into.”⁸⁷ But the reports of the Local Governments⁸⁸ confirmed the Government of India’s opinion. Bombay expected some trouble from the volunteers, but the Punjab, Delhi and the U.P., where the movement was reported to be largest, still considered them as more or less harmless. Moreover, since the volunteer corps in former years had built up a good reputation, Local Governments thought it difficult to declare them unlawful. Montagu, however, continued to feel alarmed and considered it necessary to warn the Government of India against the dangers of the movement,⁸⁹ and in the last months of 1921 his anxieties proved to be well-founded.

Meanwhile, we should not forget that the Khilafat movement was caused in the first place by the dangers besetting Turkey and the position of the Sultan-Caliph. As we have seen, the attitude of the Khilafatists towards the British government hardened in the summer of 1920, and this probably resulted, at least partly, from the aggravation

of Turkey's plight. In March, Constantinople and the shores of the Bosphorus had been occupied by the Allies,⁹⁰ and in May the peace terms were made known. On this occasion the Viceroy addressed a message to the Muslims of India, expressing his sympathy with their feelings, and the Government of India issued a statement explaining why the peace terms could not have been more favourable for the Turks — but both Gandhi and Shaikat Ali declared that the time for non-co-operation had now arrived.⁹¹ And there was worse to come: in June and July, Greek troops occupied Eastern Thrace and advanced into Anatolia, and in August the Sultan's government signed the treaty of Sèvres.

But these events roused nationalist Turks. Kemal Pasha, who had been sent to Anatolia to control unruly troops, assumed leadership over them and in April, 1920 set up a counter-government at Angora. The events of the summer increased his following and all real authority in Turkey shifted from the Sultan and the allied military forces towards the new Angora government.⁹²

In the next months the position of the new Turkish régime was strengthened in several ways. In November, 1920, Venizelos was beaten at the polls and the following month a plebiscite was held in Greece, resulting in the return of ex-king Constantine. This was where the ways of the Allies parted. Lloyd George decided to go on backing the Greeks,⁹³ but France "had seen the significance of Turkish nationalism and changed sides."⁹⁴ The Angora government, moreover, since September 1920 was in contact with Soviet Russia and had got access to a source of supplies; this led up to a Turco-Russian treaty, which had already been preceded by a Turco-Afghan treaty and an Afghan-Russian treaty.⁹⁵ And meanwhile the French and the Italians were negotiating with Angora. It was only a matter of time before this development in favour of the new Turkey produced tangible results.

Two aspects of this development are of particular interest in this context. The first is that the British Empire had now manoeuvred itself into the position of being the only ostensible enemy of the Turks. It had never been easy for the Indian Muslims to believe that Turkey should have had to accept the harsh peace terms arrived at in the treaty of Sèvres if England had not really wanted it that way.⁹⁶ Initially, however, there seemed to be some excuse for it; when in Europe in the first half of 1920, Muhammad Ali had found no support among Great Britain's allies. But now, France and Italy were seen to be the friends of Turkey, whereas Great Britain concentrated its mediterranean fleet at Constantinople and assisted the Greeks.⁹⁷ The second aspect is that

what, strictly speaking, were successes for the Angora government, in India were considered at the time to be successes of the Ottoman Empire, and consequently of the Sultan-Caliph. Kemal Pasha could still be regarded as defending the latter's rights; the gap between their régimes was not yet evident.

Pan-Islamic and nationalist sympathies were curiously intertwined here. In the Turco-Afghan treaty, Turkey — Kemal Pasha's Turkey! — was complimented for having "set the example as the Guide of Islam",⁹⁸ and Khilafat meetings spoke about the Sultan-Caliph and Mustapha Kemal Pasha as allies.⁹⁹ So it is understandable that Kemal's successes put heart into the Khilafatists, but they had the same effect on all nationalists in the Middle East.¹⁰⁰ And in India the issue of *swaraj* in these months was accentuated, which means that Indian nationalism and Muslim solidarity at that moment coincided. We may witness this trend at a Lucknow Khilafat Conference in February 1921 and at the All-India Khilafat Conference held at Meerut in April of the same year. At Meerut the "... prevailing note was that Khilafat question had to be settled in India itself, Swaraj alone could solve problem. Indian Moslems should concentrate energies on winning freedom of India and then liberation of holy places would follow as natural course."¹⁰¹ But about the same time the incompatibility of Indian nationalism and Pan-Islamism was demonstrated in a speech of Muhammad Ali¹⁰² in which he declared that an Afghan invasion, if undertaken with a view to destroy the oppressors of Islam, would be supported by Indian Muslims — a pronouncement which caused a considerable stir.¹⁰³

Now that we have considered in some detail the Khilafat movement in action, we should pay attention to the government's policy with respect to it. But when speaking about "the government's policy" we should realize that the Government of India was not one person; it was an organism composed of several persons and official bodies. Its head was the Governor-General "in Council", which means that the members of his Executive Council had an important voice in many matters, and he also had to reckon with Local Governments, whose advice he sought when momentous decisions regarding the whole country had to be reached. And then the Government of India was not independent; it was, via the Secretary of State, responsible to the Westminster Parliament.¹⁰⁴ So when considering "the government's policy", we are dealing with a notion always subject to change under the various pressures to which it was exposed. It is not surprising that the government's policy was not always invariable; on the contrary, we think it is

far more amazing that with regard to the Khilafat movement it was as steady as we will find it.

Generally speaking we think that four ways were open to the Government of India when confronted with the political unrest in India after the war. It could resort to repression of the non-co-operation movement, into which the Khilafat movement and Congress were now merged to a great extent; it could reconcile the opposition by making concessions; it could do nothing and simply await the moment when the movement would collapse or peter out; and lastly, it could try a combination of some of these tactics. This last was the way the Government of India chose to follow. The main trend of its policy became "non-interference",¹⁰⁵ but parallel with it ran an attempt to reconcile Muslim opinion by specific concessions.

The first alternative, repression, was hardly compatible with the general trend of British constitutional policy in India which, after having stressed in the Morley-Minto reforms in 1909 the representative character of the Government of India, was now about to launch an experiment in responsible government. These changes in both the political and administrative machinery of government presupposed something like the consent — given either grudgingly or enthusiastically — on the side of the governed.

But this does not mean to say that there were no men in high office who would not have preferred repressive measures. We should look for them among those who thought British rule a blessing for India, since Indians were not fit to govern themselves.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, a democratic government in India was impossible,¹⁰⁷ and the autocracy it needed was apt to regard all opposition or even criticism as "seditious".¹⁰⁸ Hand in hand with this judgment went the disposition to consider all agitation as "artificial"; therefore the government should suppress it before it caused mischief.¹⁰⁹ A critic of this kind was Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who defended General Dyer, the "hero" of Amritsar.¹¹⁰ He compared the handling of the Moplah rebellion in 1921 with his own handling of the Punjab troubles in 1919: in Malabar the government hesitated to use force, with the result that the rebellion claimed some thousands of victims, whereas in the Punjab, where repression was resorted to at once, the total number of casualties remained under 500.¹¹¹ He accused the Government of India of acting weakly because it did not want to endanger the reforms.¹¹² One year after Amritsar he asked the government to empower him to apply the Seditious Meetings Act of 1911 to the Lahore area, a demand, however, which the government refused

to sanction, considering it desirable to avoid repressive measures.¹¹³ For this was what the Government of India wanted. They were “bad oppressors”, as Low puts it,¹¹⁴ and did not want to rely on force only. Or, in the words of Sir Valentine Chirol: “Force alone is no remedy” — that being the lesson he had learnt from the war and the years after it.¹¹⁵ Or, to quote Montagu in a letter to Lord Reading: “After all, we are governing human beings and not cattle . . .”¹¹⁶

Repression evidently was not the way the Government of India was going to deal with the situation. Were concessions to be made then to reconcile the opposition? Here we should distinguish between the two categories their demands could be classified under: the nationalist demands and the specific Muslim claims with regard to the Caliphate and the position of Turkey. We should, in our opinion, make this distinction though we cannot wholly separate the two, because the nationalist movement had adopted the Muslim demands, whereas the Khilafatists, by joining Gandhi’s Congress, were coming into the nationalist camp.

The nationalist aims were perhaps not very clear, as *swaraj* was their avowed but not yet defined object. Since, however, the Congress’ opposition towards the reforms of 1919 was mainly directed against the very limited character of the delegation of power — finance, justice and the police remained under the control of the provincial governors, while only the provincial departments of agriculture, education, public health and local self-government were allotted to responsible ministers¹¹⁷ — it would seem possible to extend the scope of this delegation. Only in practice it was not. Even a champion of Indian self-government like Montagu thought it would take a very long time before India could be wholly self-governing, and the Government of India Act of 1919 itself contained a clause setting a period of ten years before a new instalment of reforms would be considered.¹¹⁸ Moreover, concessions of this kind would mean a diminution of British power in India. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the British administration in India was willing to give up its position. It is possible to contend that, “. . . when the final Act (of 1919) was promulgated, the Government of India was able to relax in the knowledge that the actual effect of the reforms would be to leave authority where it had always been — in the hands of the British”,¹¹⁹ but also that the greater part of the I.C.S. looked upon the transfer of power which started in 1919 as something inevitable and right.¹²⁰ But however this may be, it was certainly much more attractive for the Government of India to make concessions with regard to the Caliphate and Turkey which would hardly affect their own

position, than to give in to nationalist demands which would be at their own expense. This at any rate was what was done: there was no question of concessions to the nationalist demands, but the Government of India was quite ready to support the Muslim claims.

This was evident from the very beginning. In the spring of 1919 Montagu accompanied the Indian delegation — consisting of Lord Sinha and the Maharajah of Bikaner — to the Paris conference, where the Indian Muslims' demands were put forward.¹²¹ But he did not feel that their wishes were really paid heed to, and in a letter to Curzon¹²² he complained about this: "I cannot convince myself that the Indian delegation at the Peace Conference has ever been seriously treated as they were promised they should be, for they have no opportunity of influencing the decisions about the territories they are interested in. You will find recorded in the British Empire Delegation Minutes in Paris that a promise was given that on any Commission or international body discussing the future of Turkey, the claims of India to representation would be met. They never have been . . ." In the same letter he objects to the fact that the Sultan's independence and sovereignty are not expressly acknowledged; if the treaty is going to mention only the King of Hijaz as an independent ruler, England will be accused of trying to substitute this king as Caliph for the Sultan.¹²³ Then he comes to the question of Constantinople and the Straits: "Is it absolutely impossible to convince you of the necessity for keeping our pledges? Are you unmoved by the united evidence which comes from India without exception that a form of peace such as you contemplate (in which you said at the Cabinet you were thinking of India) is likely to be disastrous to India in the present circumstances?"

When at about the turn of the year a decision on these questions was due, he bombarded the Cabinet with memoranda,¹²⁴ stressing again and again the Muslim susceptibilities which would be hurt by harsh peace terms, and referring to similar opinions expressed by the Viceroy and other authorities in India. In his weekly telegrams the Viceroy had indeed often pointed out the bad effect the treatment of Turkey had on Indian Muslims.¹²⁵ In January, 1920, a conference of Heads of Provinces was called at Delhi, where the Muslim situation was reviewed and which resulted in a report to the Secretary of State.¹²⁶ It was not an alarmist report; most governors and lieutenant-governors anticipated some trouble, but not very serious. All the same, the general feeling was expressed that concessions over Turkey and the Caliphate would clear up the Indian situation a good deal as far as the Muslims were

concerned. Even Sir Harcourt Butler, who in April, 1919 had expressed his desire of severe terms for the Turks, since these would put an end to any pretences of Pan-Islamism,¹²⁷ at the Delhi conference conceded that "the temperature was rising" and that possibly the army might be affected by the agitation.

That the Government of India did not disclaim the Khilafatists' demands may also be inferred from their readiness to facilitate the departure of the Khilafat deputation to Europe and to make it a somewhat official affair by receiving in audience a delegation from the C.K.C., the body that had resolved to send the deputation on its way.¹²⁸ In 1921 a second Khilafat deputation left for Europe and this one had an even more official status, since the initiative for sending it was taken by the Government of India itself.¹²⁹ The Khilafatists themselves — or at least some of them — were not entirely pleased with its constitution,¹³⁰ but it is clear that the Government of India wanted to impress the Indian Muslims' wishes on His Majesty's Government in London.

But in the British cabinet these views and the policy which would result from them had powerful enemies. Lloyd George was definitely anti-Turkish and Curzon, who held less rigid views about Turkey's future place in the world, at any rate wanted to expel the Turks from Europe.¹³¹ When on January 6, 1920, the cabinet decided that it would agree to Constantinople remaining Turkish, Curzon wrote: "I believe this to be a short-sighted, and, in the long run, a most unfortunate decision. In order to avoid trouble in India — largely manufactured and in any case ephemeral — . . . we are losing an opportunity for which Europe has waited nearly five centuries . . ." ¹³² It was Montagu and often Churchill who were pleading a revision of the treaty of Sèvres soon after its ratification, but the Prime Minister and Lord Curzon wanted to keep it.¹³³

So this is the picture we get of the Government of India's policy towards the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements: it did not want repression if it could be avoided, nor did it contemplate concessions to the nationalist demands, but it did advocate concessions to the Muslim claims and more or less championed the cause of Turkey and the Caliphate. But before turning our attention to the policy of non-interference we mentioned before, we think we should answer two questions with regard to the policy of concessions just discussed: (a) did the Government of India advocate acceptance of everything the Khilafatists wanted, and (b) was this readiness to meet, to some extent at least, the Muslim demands, an attempt to split up the Hindu-Muslim unity, or

in other words, was it an instance of the notorious divide-and-rule policy?

As for the first question, we have seen that the Khilafatists' demands went a long way. Their most extreme formula was Muhammad Ali's: "restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum*" in order to maintain the Caliph's power as a defender of Islam, but, if need be, he was willing to accept some form of autonomy for his non-Turkish subjects. In practice this would mean: (1) preservation of the Sultan-Caliph's sovereignty in Eastern Thrace (Adrianople!), Constantinople and the Straits, and the whole of Asia Minor, and (2) some kind of suzerainty over Arab territories like Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and the Arabian Peninsula where the holy places of Islam are located. The first item had Montagu's and the Government of India's support,¹³⁴ but the Sultan's suzerainty over the Arab peoples was a vexed problem.

The attitudes assumed with regard to it may be summed up as follows. The Government of India advocated recognition of the Sultan's nominal suzerainty over the pre-war Turkish Empire in Asia;¹³⁵ this was the line taken by Chelmsford who pointed out that, as things stood, the Sultan was considered to be a passive instrument in the hands of the Allies, and that by not recognizing him as the suzerain over his former empire the election of the Amir of Afghanistan was made a very real possibility, which would create potential dangers to India. It was also the line taken by Lord Reading who wrote that "Indian Moslem opinion, though becoming reconciled to fact that Arab portions of the Turkish Empire must remain autonomous, would like to see Turkish suzerainty restored over them in some visible shape, however shadowy in substance." He understood that territorial suzerainty was impossible, but suggested recognition of the Sultan's "religious suzerainty . . . over Mecca and Medina."¹³⁶

This proposal, however, was most positively contested by the India Office and the Secretary of State. They argued that to give the Sultan any kind of "spiritual" or "religious" authority over territories he would be losing, would open the door to political claims, as the distinction between temporal and spiritual authority was foreign to Islam; therefore, recognizing his spiritual authority would be repeating the very error committed by the Austrians, the Greeks and the Italians in their pre-war treaties with Turkey.¹³⁷ But matters were complicated by a pledge Lloyd George gave, probably unwittingly, to the second Khilafat deputation in March, 1921, when declaring: "You can assure the Moslems of India that there is not the slightest intention to interfere with the spiritual power of the Caliph in any part of the world."¹³⁸ Sir Alfred

Hirtzel of the India Office was evidently far from pleased with these words and wrote: "The Prime Minister had evidently been misinformed, and he gave this pledge without, probably, having all the facts before him. But a pledge is a pledge, and it will have to be kept. The question now is, how."¹³⁹

We may conclude from our summary that the Government of India was willing to satisfy most of the Khilafat demands, whereas policy-makers in London were less compliant. Now we come to our second question: how should we interpret this willingness? Was it an attempt to break up Hindu-Muslim unity? In our opinion, an absolutely unequivocal answer to this question cannot be given. Some indications might make us answer it in the affirmative. For one thing, it is so often that "a growing cleavage of the Hindu-Muslim unity", or "a rift in the Hindu-Mussalman lute", and the like are announced in reports, that one is tempted to suppose that these observations express their authors' wishes, in which case it would be quite possible that they lent a hand to provoke a development they desired.¹⁴⁰ Undoubtedly there were men pursuing this line of thought, as is testified by a letter from Montagu to Chelmsford. The latter had reported friction between Congress and the Muslim League,¹⁴¹ and Montagu answered¹⁴²: "I hope you will be able to follow up and let me have current news of everything tending towards friction inside the Congress itself. There is nothing I hate more in the ordinary course than harping on these differences between Hindu and Mohammedan out of which your and my opponents in policy have made their capital. But when on the other side we find the Congress, as it now is, pushing the doctrine of unity to an extreme for the sole purpose of embarrassing the British Government, we must make ourselves masters of the real facts."

A similar indication might be seen in a paper submitted to a conference of Heads of Provinces.¹⁴³ Its author suggested that Local Governments should arrange interviews with leading Hindus and Muslims: to exhort the latter to accept the Turkish peace terms, and "to warn the Hindus of the danger of displaying too much sympathy with the Khilafat movement, pointing out the encouragement which this movement, if it produces outbursts of internal disorder, will afford to the Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic forces outside India which coupled with tribal hostilities and the uncertain attitude of Afghanistan constitute such a formidable menace to the peace and prosperity of India. It may be noted in this connection that there is reason to believe that the Afghan Consul at Bokhara has been talking freely of the coming conquest of India by the

Afghans. In these conditions it is the duty of the Hindu not to excite with over-sympathy the fanaticism of his Moslem brother but rather to appeal to his common sense and the joint interest of India, Muslim and Hindu . . ." This harangue might be explained as a perfidious attempt to promote mistrust and discord between the two communities, but it should, we think, be read in another sense: the government does not advise the Hindus to withhold their sympathy from the Khilafat cause — it could hardly do so, since it professed such sympathy itself — but only their "over-sympathy" by which "Muslim fanaticism" might be excited, resulting possibly in "internal disorder". This explanation is supported by a change in the proposed text when the Viceroy sent a circular letter to all Local Governments.¹⁴⁴ Here the first sentence quoted reads: ". . . to warn the Hindu of the danger of supporting the Extremist Khilafat movement", suggesting that they should detach themselves from the extremists among the Khilafatists.

We consider this change in the text to be significant, for, whereas the indications for a divide-and-rule policy along religious lines are few, those pointing in another direction are abundant. In our opinion, the main object of the Government of India was to get the support of the "moderates", detaching them from the "extremists" — meaning those who would in any case side with maintaining law and order as opposed to those who would, if need be, resort to violence.¹⁴⁵ This, after all, was a traditional British policy towards the nationalist movement, ever since the extremists made their appearance in it about 1900, or at least since Minto's Viceroyalty.

Montagu had outlined it as early as 1910 in his first Indian budget speech when he spoke about "separating legitimate from illegitimate unrest" as "the root principle of government in India."¹⁴⁶ The fact that in those years most extremists were to be found among the Hindus and that the Muslims — at least those politically interested — were almost without exception moderates, could cause a semblance of a policy of playing off one community against the other.

- In this respect, by the end of the war the situation had changed: "extremism" was to be found among the Muslims no less than among the Hindus. Hindu-Muslim unity, however, by now had asserted itself by the Lucknow pact and Gandhi's action, and this fact might have suggested a policy of dividing the communities more strongly to the British than ever since the days of the Mutiny. But again we find Montagu expounding the necessity of "preventing the alienation of many, if not all, the Moderates", without any mention of Hindus and

Muslims.¹⁴⁷ The same theme was set forth by Sir Harcourt Butler in the summer of 1918: "It is our business to rally the moderates and those who are really anxious that some practical scheme of reform should be introduced at an early date. Otherwise the moderates will in all probability be swamped by the extremists . . . Of the extremists again, there are two parties. One, which has definitely made up its mind that the Europeans should leave the country; and the other, which cannot foresee when this will be possible. The latter may, by judicious handling, become moderates."¹⁴⁸

Time and again this idea is expressed or hinted at in the *Weekly Reports*.¹⁴⁹ Clearly the Government of India sought support among the moderates of both communities and did not coax only the Muslim moderates. Lord Reading gladly accepted Malaviya's intervention in his dealings with Gandhi and the Ali brothers, when in the summer of 1921 it became more and more evident that extremist Khilafatists would not stop at having recourse to violence, while it could still be hoped that Gandhi would keep his followers on the path of non-violence.¹⁵⁰ The Viceroy obviously regarded the Ali brothers as the most dangerous element in the situation, while co-operation with Gandhi was not yet out of the question.¹⁵¹ Playing off the Muslim community against the Hindu community, moreover, was on principle unacceptable to men like Reading and Montagu. Even when in December 1921 a crisis was impending, the latter wrote to the former: "Your letter shows, and I am grateful for it, how much you realise that it is my ambition to do all we can do for India in her aspirations towards nationhood."¹⁵² Indian nationalists of course might hold greatly different opinions about what could and should be done to promote Indian nationhood, but by no stretch of imagination could the Viceroy and the Secretary of State suppose that Hindu-Muslim discord would advance its cause.

Retaining and, if possible, increasing the support of the moderates was the object of the Government of India in those years, and the ways to obtain it were (a) concessions towards the Khilafatists, among whom were undoubtedly many "loyal"¹⁵³ Muslims, and (b) non-interference, an aspect of policy we still have to discuss. Non-interference as an answer to the rather violent speeches of Congress and Khilafat leaders was a policy decided upon in the spring of 1920. It was a new policy, as compared with the repression which had prevailed during the war,¹⁵⁴ culminating in the Rowlatt Act and the Amritsar tragedy. But this very climax made the Government of India realize that they did not want to rely upon "force, naked and undisguised". Moreover, Gandhi's creed

of non-violence did not call immediately for repression, and, lastly, the introduction of the new reforms made it imperative not to lose any goodwill the British Raj still possessed among Indians. So Chelmsford could write to Montagu in the spring of 1920: "I have pursued the deliberate policy of letting people talk, and I think it has resulted in the moderate portion of the community being thoroughly frightened by the speeches made by some of the fanatical extremists."¹⁵⁵ This motivation we meet again and again in the documents of those years: the plans of the extremists are so dangerous and so hopelessly impractical that more sober minds will turn from them, and so the agitation will dig its own grave.

Generally, the Government of India remained throughout convinced that they had hit on the right idea, as is evident from reports in the spring of 1920 and 1921.¹⁵⁶ In the last one, however, a certain reserve is noticeable: "We have decided that for the present no radical change in policy is required, but that Local Governments should be urged to instate prosecutions more freely under the ordinary law, not only against those guilty of incitements to violence, but also against persons whose speeches are calculated to produce feelings likely to lead to violence in the near future." And in a retrospective view on the whole episode of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements,¹⁵⁷ the Government of India motivated non-interference in a slightly altered way: "We were deeply impressed by the necessity . . . of carrying with us Indian opinion in the measures which we employed in dealing with the non-co-operation agitation. This agitation had its origin in feelings, sentiments and aspirations, which to some extent were shared too by its opponents, the moderates. Its goal, the attainment of *swaraj*, was also theirs; they too had been deeply affected by events in the Punjab, and the Mohammedans among them were in full sympathy with the aim, though not with the methods of the Khilafat movement. While we never lost sight of paramount necessity for the maintenance of law and order, we were convinced that, in the long run, a policy of combining patience, conciliation and the firm suppression of violence and disorder would eventually defeat a movement whose impracticable character was realized by all sensible men."

We have quoted this document at some length for two reasons. The first is that it testifies to the Government of India's realizing that non-interference was also called for because repression of the extremists would have alienated the moderates, being in sympathy with the aims of the latter. And secondly, it was this very aspect of the situation which

may have caused the near-failure of the government's policy to win the moderates over to its own side.

For it is evident that in this respect the Government of India and the Secretary of State were disappointed.¹⁵⁸ Repeatedly they pointed out that their "policy of allowing non-co-operation making itself ridiculous"¹⁵⁹ was rather successful, and we think it indeed was, in that more serious disorders were avoided — but the extremists in Congress and among the Khilafatists did not ridicule themselves so thoroughly as the government had hoped for. Therefore, the moderate element was probably prevented from siding with the extremists, but it did not side with the government either. The disappointment among the rulers was translated into complaints about the Indians being so "unreasonable",¹⁶⁰ or about their "racial consciousness",¹⁶¹ or about Indian unrest being "engineered".¹⁶² All these pronouncements in our opinion reveal that the men who made them underrated the force of the nationalist urge, or, in the case of the Khilafatists mainly, of religious feelings, which caused even moderate men to feel sympathy for the very extremists whose methods they abhorred.

But though non-interference did not bring all the profit the Government of India had expected from it, we think it was the wisest course they could have taken. And they did so against increasing opposition. The Viceroy and his Council¹⁶³ adhered to it, and by and large they got the support of the Local Governments. Not from all of them, however. The Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Craddock, did not stint his criticism of the government's policy, and Lord Ronaldshay of Bengal and Lord Willingdon of Madras also gave vent to a feeling of uneasiness about it.¹⁶⁴ One may discern a growing tendency on the part of Local Governments to have recourse to repression. In August, 1920, the Government of the Punjab asked for permission to put into effect the Seditious Meetings Act, but the request was refused by the Government of India.¹⁶⁵ In the same month, the Government of Madras wanted to refuse admittance to Gandhi, Shaukat Ali and Dr. Kitchlew, but was instructed to let them enter.¹⁶⁶ In April, 1921, the Government of the U.P. wrote that a prosecution of the Ali brothers was thought necessary: the policy of non-interference had been accepted in the hope that the trouble might abate, but this was not what had happened.¹⁶⁷ Low may be right when he writes that in March, 1921, "... however much Local Governments might have said that they agreed with the instructions they had received, they would almost certainly have fallen into line with the Government of India if it had gone over to a policy of repression."¹⁶⁸

And then, lastly, there were the British Government, the British Parliament and British public opinion. In the cabinet it was the Secretary of State who had to stand up for the policy of the Government of India. And though Montagu no doubt agreed with it on broad lines, he felt uncertain as to how far toleration of revolutionary speech-making should go. When the Government of India reported that Shaukat Ali, with respect to a possible Afghan invasion, had used language which would justify criminal prosecution, but at the same time announced that it was not going to take action against him, Montagu noted: "I should have thought that immediately a speaker, whatever his backing, recommends helping an invader, he should be prosecuted by ordinary law."¹⁶⁹

About the same time, he had to answer awkward questions in the House of Commons about Gandhi's not being arrested,¹⁷⁰ and when two months later in the House of Lords the government's proposal to condemn General Dyer's action at Amritsar was defeated, this meant an open denunciation of the Government of India's policy. But for some time to come the Westminster government accepted the principle that the way of enforcing law and order was something for local authorities to decide.¹⁷¹ It was only when things headed towards a crisis that it made ready to take matters in hand directly.

CHAPTER VI

CRISIS

One of the reasons why the Government of India was able to pursue its policy of non-interference towards the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements was, as we have seen, their non-violent character. Another was that the movement proceeded step by step: the first items of its programme, like the boycott of law-courts, schools and elections did not present any serious dangers to the government. When, however, the non-co-operators and the Khilafatists came nearer to violence and especially when they turned to the last item, non-payment of taxes, the government could hardly maintain its waiting attitude. In consequence of this development an external crisis was bound to come. But at the same time — we are speaking about the second half of 1921 — there were indications of a possible internal crisis threatening the unity of the movement, and partly for the same reasons.

Non-violence was the creed the movement professed, but it did not have the same meaning for all individuals and groups concerned. For Gandhi, we think, its meaning was predominantly moral and religious. Violence he regarded as evil, and since means and ends were “convertible terms”¹ in his philosophy of life, no good could come from the use of violent means.² Non-violence for him was also something positive; it was not the “weapon of the weak” as even some of his sympathizers might think,³ nor was it an expedient only, to be discarded when a better one came to hand — it was a value in itself.

A good many of his followers may have been moved by the same sentiments, but less strongly than he. This was why Gandhi experienced, from the very beginning of the non-co-operation movement, disappointments with respect to non-violence. He knew, from the moment he had confessed his “Himalayan” blunder with respect to the first big *hartal* in March-April, 1919, that he was playing with fire because the masses were not ready for a wholly non-violent movement. For some time the violence could take the relatively innocent shape of social boycott and the picketing of liquor shops and so on, but even this was sure to evoke

ill-feeling and might easily lead further on towards a slippery slope, ending in downright violence. The non-co-operation and Khilafat movements steadily came nearer to this danger, if only because of their growth; in the summer of 1921 they had, coupled together, truly become a mass movement.⁴

This brings us to another group of Gandhi's followers — the majority of Congress leaders, who had taken some time to be converted to the non-co-operation programme. They had, by accepting this programme, accepted the fact that politics in India were no longer the monopoly of their own élite from the upper and middle classes but had come within the reach of the masses. But actual political leadership remained, for the time being at least, in the hands of the old leaders, or younger men who came, however, from the same group. Though the number of peasant delegates increased about 1920⁵ the leadership, to be found in the A.I.C.C., was recruited from the same groups as before; "... upper caste Hindus and a fair number of upper class Muslims; most of them had had a Western education and followed the new professions."

The number of landlords was relatively small and tended to become even smaller in these years.⁶ Gopal Krishna, from whom we borrow these results of an analysis of Congress leadership in the period 1918-1923, sees one significant change: before 1920, Congress leadership was based upon social position, but after that year upon the willingness to renounce social position. We may assume, however, that in individual cases this change did not come about quite abruptly; the choice between social position and political leadership for many of these men may not have been an easy one and it would be only natural if some of them had tried to make the best of both worlds. This situation must have caused tension between leadership and following. Would the following dictate to the leadership the course of the movement, or would it be the other way round? In this state of things, the leadership must have been looking for a means to keep control over the mass movement, and non-violence may have been just what they wanted.

This aspect of political developments about 1920, to wit increasing tension between political leadership and mass following, has been stressed by R. Palme Dutt,⁷ and we think his analysis contains a good deal of truth. It is confirmed, to some extent, by facts we have already observed: the reluctance, especially among well-to-do Muslims on good terms with the British, to support the Khilafat movement when it turned out to be a rather radical mass movement; the relative lack of success of the boycott of honours and titles. We do not, however, entirely adopt his

analysis; his emphasis on class interests as the motive determining the attitude of the leadership is, we think, rather one-sided. No doubt, this motive was not absent; we will come across an instance where it is quite obvious. But other considerations very likely had some part in it, too. One of them was that a violent conflict with the British Raj would probably end in failure, perhaps in disaster. Another might have been that control of the masses was necessary for maintaining national unity; everything tending to bring out class antagonism had to be avoided. If, as Dutt contends, non-payment of taxes would "inevitably mean a No-Rent campaign",⁸ then it is hardly probable that this item could have been accepted at all by the Congress leadership at the Nagpur session in December, 1920.

It is curious to observe just how this item got on to the programme. As we have seen, it was not included in the non-co-operation programme accepted at Calcutta in September, which had met with considerable resistance. But at Nagpur, this rather important extension of the programme was announced in a very casual way,⁹ and it was advocated by C. R. Das, who moved the resolution in question, only as being "stronger, fuller and bolder than the Calcutta resolution."¹⁰ The question of its potential dangers to class interests does not seem to have come up.¹¹ We might infer that the point concerning non-payment of taxes was regarded as an additional weapon with which to fight government, and when the resolution was carried by acclamation we think we have to consider this a triumph for unity in the national struggle — Congress now had taken exactly the same stand as the Khilafatists in this respect — rather than a defeat for class interests. This does not mean to say that, as a matter of fact, class interests were not put in jeopardy by the decision but only that, in our opinion, the participants did not, or not primarily at least, consider things in that light. For the time being, national enthusiasm silenced the doubts they may have had.

Thus far, we have discussed Gandhi's attitude towards non-violence and also the view of Congress leaders with regard to it. Another important group whose attitude we must consider are the Muslim Khilafatists. To some degree, the motives determining Congress leadership must have held good for them also but, in our opinion, the religious character of their movement tended to make them less cautious with regard to mass action, eventually of a violent nature; especially the ulama wing may be supposed not to be afraid of losing their grip on the masses. Generally speaking, to the Khilafatists non-violence was not the same as to Gandhi; it was an expedient, to be used only because they were too weak to use

force.¹² They had accepted non-violence conditionally; they would cling to it only if it brought results.¹³ Their temper rose; the Angora government — which they still regarded as defending the Caliphate — was the whole time beset with dangers,¹⁴ and there was as yet no question of any willingness to revise the treaty of Sèvres. The threat of violence was always looming up in their declarations, and this might mean an assault on Hindu-Muslim unity since it was apt to assume communalist forms. If, as we have contended, control of mass action and the violence that might attend it, was necessary to maintain national unity in the teeth of class antagonisms, one might say the same with respect to communal antagonisms.

In the summer of 1921 the tone of speeches by some Khilafat leaders became ever more violent; this tendency was displayed at any rate by the Ali brothers, Hasrat Mohani and Yakub Hasan.¹⁵ It is hard to say whether their object in this was "forcing Mr. Gandhi into a campaign of violence",¹⁶ but it certainly put Gandhi in a quandary. If he wanted to save Hindu-Muslim unity he could not wholly disavow them, but by taking their side he would frighten away those Hindus who felt alarmed at the prospect of Muslim violence degenerating, possibly, into communalist violence; moreover, he would endanger a principle very dear to him.¹⁷ But he took this risk. In this connection we must pay attention to some conspicuous events of this episode, since they caused a considerable stir at the time: the talk about an Afghan invasion, the apologies of the Ali brothers, and their arrest.

In April 1921 Muhammad Ali delivered a speech at Madras¹⁸ on the duties of Indian Muslims in the case of an Afghan invasion. He said that if the Amir invaded India aiming at its subjection, Muslims should resist the attack; but if his object were to defeat the oppressors of Islam and the Caliphate, then it would be the duty of Indian Muslims to withhold all assistance from the Government of India, and even to fight the good fight for Islam side by side with the Afghans. This opinion, of course, caused a good deal of uneasiness among Hindus. Probably for that reason, some time later Muhammad Ali formulated his advice in a more cautious way: if any Power waged war against the Government of India to make India free, they would not render help to the government but would simply watch the fight, since they did not believe in violence.¹⁹ This corresponded with Gandhi's view, who wrote in *Young India*: "I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government; that is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime

to help the government, which has lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power. On the other hand, I would not ask India to raise levies for the Amir.”²⁰ But not even this reassured all Hindus; Malaviya was reported²¹ to scorn any idea of accepting Afghan help.

Muhammad Ali’s recanting probably should be seen in connection with his apologies. Very soon after his arrival in India Lord Reading had, in May 1921, six interviews with Gandhi²² in which he pointed out to the latter that, notwithstanding his professed creed of non-violence, some of his followers and close associates were using violent language, inciting other people to violence. Gandhi had to acknowledge that this interpretation could be put on some speeches of the Ali brothers, whereupon he told the Viceroy that he would ask them to put things right, as he was convinced that they did not really mean violence but merely had not been cautious enough in choosing their words. After that the Viceroy told him that should they apologize, he would stop the proceedings which the government was considering to institute against them.

When the Ali brothers declared that they regretted that some of their speeches might have been interpreted as inciting to violence, which had not been their intention, and when the Government of India made known that in the light of these apologies it had decided not to arrest and prosecute them, the construction the public put upon these events was, naturally enough, that the Ali brothers had apologized in order to escape imprisonment.²³ Reading was very pleased at his success, and considered that he had “seriously damaged” the reputation of the Ali brothers.²⁴ He went, however, a bit too far in exploiting his success,²⁵ and then found himself compelled to issue a declaration²⁶ stating that Gandhi had promised to use his influence upon the Ali brothers before the Viceroy had mentioned any intention of prosecuting them; “there was no desire to bargain.”²⁷ The real motive of the Ali brothers for apologizing probably was, as Muhammad Ali wrote: “. . . not to avoid prosecution, but to allay Hindu suspicions and in particular to prove to Gandhi that we have no personal pique . . .”²⁸ At any rate, Muhammad Ali had openly declared that he owed apologies only to his friends and not to the government,²⁹ and in his subsequent speeches he showed no less violence. The effect of his apologies upon Indian public opinion was considerably less than at first had been believed.³⁰

The rising temper of the Khilafat leaders and their readiness to challenge the government were demonstrated once more at an All-India Khilafat Conference held at Karachi on July 10, 1921; it was presided over by Muhammad Ali, but Gandhi was not present. Thirteen resolu-

tions were passed, most of them dealing with Khilafat matters.³¹ The conference professed its devout allegiance to the Caliph-Sultan, at the same time begging him to appreciate the services of Mustafa Kemal Pasha; it repeated the known demands of the Khilafatists and declared (resolution no. 7): "...that in the present circumstances the Holy Shariat forbids every Mussalman to serve or enlist himself in the British Army or to raise recruits for it, that it is incumbent on all Muslims in general and all Ulemas in particular to carry this religious commandment to every Muslim soldier in the British Army." It was this passage, coupled with the fact that by means of leaflets the Army was already being worked upon in this sense by some Khilafat leaders, which accounted for the arrest of the Ali brothers, Dr. Kitchlew and four co-workers in September. In November they were tried and sentenced to two years in prison.³²

The Congress activities of boycott of liquor shops and foreign cloth³³ and the use of *khaddar* were mentioned in only two of the resolutions of the Karachi conference; it does not seem to have had much use for these innocent forms of action. Nor did the word *swaraj* occur in the resolutions, but the notion did, and in a rather radical form. For resolution no. 7 went on: "This meeting further declares that in case the British Government directly or indirectly, secretly or openly, resumes hostilities against the Government of Angora, the Indian Muslims will be compelled in co-operation with the Congress to resort to civil disobedience and at the next session of the Congress at Ahmedabad to declare India's independence and the establishment of an Indian Republic." Whereas Gandhi had never defined *swaraj* and thus had kept open many possible interpretations of the concept, here it was given an interpretation, and an extreme one at that. It may have been no accident that Gandhi did not attend the Karachi conference. He could hardly have endorsed a resolution of this kind without frightening the more conservative among his Congress followers. They might have objected as much to the fact that an open conflict with the British was courted as easily as that, and without their having been consulted about it, as to the occasion chosen for it — peace or war with the Turks whose fate was not the first concern of all Indians.

The Ali brothers' arrest and trial constituted, to some extent, a change in the policy of non-interference which the Government of India had pursued thus far. But tampering with the army was considered a serious matter; the C.-in-C., Lord Rawlinson, asked for action on the part of the authorities, and the Viceroy and his Council could not but agree.³⁴

Local Governments concurred with that view, though two Indian members of the Government of Bombay advised against it. They argued, that just at the moment when the Greeks were pushing on in Anatolia, this prosecution would give the impression that England was bent upon the annihilation of Islam, and that, moreover, prosecution was not necessary since the force of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements was already on the wane.³⁵

So in the summer of 1921 we get the following picture of the relations between the Khilafat leaders and the majority of Congress leaders: the Khilafatists, besides concentrating on their special programme, were urging a more extremist line in the nationalist movement, while Congress was pressing for a more cautious advance and was more ready to compromise.³⁶ But the need for unity was acknowledged by both of them, as was evident from the stand Gandhi took with regard to the Afghan question, and the Ali brothers' readiness to pipe down somewhat on their former speeches; it was also the purport of talks at a meeting of the Congress Working Committee at Patna in August,³⁷ and of the resolutions of a C.K.C. meeting at Delhi in September.³⁸ But about this time Hindu-Muslim unity was heavily damaged by the Moplah rising which broke out in August.³⁹

The Moplahs (or Mappillas) were a community of very poor Muslim peasants on the coast of Malabar, living side by side with a nearly equally strong Hindu element, except in the district of Ernad where a sizable Muslim majority existed.⁴⁰ This district, the poorest of the whole area, became the centre of the rebellion⁴¹ after a period of agitation in the whole area. The Hindus, among whom nearly all of the landlords were to be found, were generally better educated and better off economically, many of the Muslims being low-caste Hindu converts. It was an area characterized by repeated troubles, the last important ones dating from 1894 and 1896, for which mainly poverty, ignorance and fanaticism were held responsible. The 1921 rebellion was preceded by some months of agitation during which riots occurred, as well as several cases of violence against people who refused to join the Khilafat movement or to close their shops when a *hartal* was proclaimed. On August 20 the police, assisted by soldiers, tried to arrest some people, which caused bloodshed and subsequent open rebellion. A "Khilafat King" proclaimed himself (for a time there were even two of them), setting up a reign that to some people meant terror — defiling of Hindu temples, forced conversion of Hindus, murder of Europeans, Hindus, public women, and some Moplahs who assisted the British — but to

others the elevation of Islam and social justice. Several regiments had to be called in and martial law was proclaimed, but it was not until January, 1922 that the worst was over, and for more than six months after that bands of armed rebels had to be rounded up. The official number of casualties was over 2,300; about 40,000 persons were arrested, of whom over 24,000 received varying sentences.

In the context of our subject some questions regarding this episode demand an answer. The first one is: does a "Khilafat King" mean that this rebellion was, purely and simply, a result of the Khilafat movement? Understandably enough, Congress and Khilafat leaders denied this, since nobody wanted to be held responsible for this outbreak of violence. The Working Committee of Congress declared that the forced conversions — of which it acknowledged only three cases — were the work of fanatical gangs opposed to the Khilafat and non-co-operation movements, and that the disturbances had only taken place in areas where Congress and Khilafat propaganda had been prohibited.⁴²

Muhammad Ali condemned the Moplahs in two speeches, and said he did not know the cause of the rising: agrarian troubles or provocations by the government.⁴³ W. C. Smith looks upon the Moplah revolt as "a class struggle fought in communal guise",⁴⁴ as essentially the fight of poor peasants (who happened to be Muslims) against oppressive landlords (who happened to be Hindus). Hitchcock does not suppose the Hindu landlords to have been especially oppressive at the time, but calls attention to a rise in the population about 1920.⁴⁵ This, in a poor agrarian area, is synonymous with extreme poverty and shortage of arable soil, and, whether oppressive or not, the landlord class may attract the wrath of the poor landless peasants. But, as Smith writes, the religious factor in cases like this is probably often the most conscious one, and is important because it embitters the conflicting parties. Therefore, the Moplah revolt, whatever its deeper roots may have been, manifested itself as a politico-religious outburst, fiercely anti-British and anti-Hindu.

This seems to be confirmed by the victims it claimed. About these, W. C. Smith writes: "... they (*i.e.* the Moplahs) attacked the police and the military ... they attacked their landlords and moneylenders, they attacked everyone in sight."⁴⁶ Hitchcock, who reproduces some fifty pages of what he calls typical Moplah trials, reaches the conclusion that "the Hindus were murdered as they refused to accept Islam and the Muhammadans for helping the troops."⁴⁷ In the trials quoted by him the killing of only one landlord is mentioned as such, but many

cases occur of Hindus who saved their lives by embracing Islam. The motives given by the accused are always related to the Khilafat cause and the expected downfall of the British Raj — oppressive landlords are not mentioned.⁴⁸ The Moplahs themselves seem to have experienced their revolt as nationalist (anti-British), as religious (they were “destroying sin and establishing a kingdom of good”⁴⁹), and as communalist (under Moplah rule there would be “no place for the Hindu”⁵⁰).

Perhaps we may sum up the case as follows. It would be absurd to say that what happened in Malabar was wished for by either the Khilafat or Congress leaders, but it would be equally absurd to contend that it was in no way connected with the Khilafat and non-co-operation movements, as a Congress enquiry concluded.⁵¹ This particular rising showed certain characteristics that were absent from former risings in the same area, like the burning of toddy and arrack shops,⁵² which was quite in line with non-co-operation propaganda. And Khilafat slogans, distorted in the simple Mappillas’ minds, certainly influenced the revolt. The ambiguous way in which Khilafat leaders spoke about non-violence was understood by the Moplahs as an advice to fight if they were strong enough;⁵³ the Afghans were supposed by the Moplahs to be already engaged in the conquest of northern India;⁵⁴ the British were reported to be bent on destroying the holy places.⁵⁵ The men who let loose these slogans, even if worded a bit more cautiously, among these ignorant people cannot entirely wash their hands of it — they were playing with fire.⁵⁶ And when the anti-government part of the movement gravitated towards violence, it was the better situated people — predominantly Hindus in this area — who dissociated themselves from it.

Another question is, whether the Government of India used the Moplah rebellion for widening the gulf between Hindus and Muslims, as has been asserted.⁵⁷ This certainly cannot be said about its official history. Hitchcock begins by stating: “But to call this a Mappilla rebellion is misleading, partly because of the large share some Hindus had in bringing it about, and partly because of the many Mappillas who had no share in it.”⁵⁸ He discerns⁵⁹ two phases in the troubles: (1) the Hindu phase, during which non-co-operation was stressed and it was mostly volunteers who were active, the Mappillas only helping them; the main object of the movement was then to damage the government; and (2) the Mappilla phase, when the Mappillas started an armed revolt against the British Raj, but soon turned also against the Hindus. This story could hardly reassure the Hindu community elsewhere in

India, but if the author had been trying to sow discord between the communities, he would not have divided the blame as he more or less does, moreover partly excusing the worst offenders, the Mappillas, by pointing out repeatedly their extreme poverty and ignorance.

This was a confidential account appearing only in 1925, but at the time of the troubles we do not find in official statements a tendency towards setting up one community against the other. When Sir William Vincent expounded his view on the events in the Viceroy's Council, he gave a carefully balanced picture, not putting all the blame on one side and explicitly discerning between extremist Muslim agitators whom he held responsible, and other Khilafatists whom he exonerated expressly from any guilt in the matter.⁶⁰ In our opinion, his speech constitutes another instance of the government's policy of drawing a line between moderates and extremists, but not between the communities. And when in the Madras Legislative Council the matter came up in September 1921, Lord Willingdon in a long speech only once mentioned serious Hindu-Muslim enmity, but emphasized the looting and destruction of public buildings, and the numerous cases of arson, extortion, robbery and murder.⁶¹

All the same, the whole episode could not but increase communalist feelings among the Hindus, and in our context perhaps the most important effect of the Moplah revolt was that it put a heavy strain on Hindu-Muslim relations.⁶² It represented a kind of violence which was the very thing many leaders feared a mass movement might lead them into. Mr. Andrews, Gandhi's close friend, explicitly stated that the very popularity of the movement brought out its defects and caused social tyranny against people who refused to participate in it. He disapproved of the burning of foreign cloth as giving proof of narrow nationalism and racism, and reports Tagore's profound disappointment with the movement: it "shouted" to him, Tagore said, and did no longer "sing".⁶³ On the Muslim side too, critical voices could be heard: the loose talk about *jihad* and an Afghan invasion were denounced, as well as the role Khilafat agitators had played in the Moplah rising.⁶⁴

On the other hand, the Congress machinery in the summer of 1921 came ever more under control of men ready to go extreme lengths, especially owing to the growing influence of the Working Committee.⁶⁵ At the same time, the number of volunteers increased and their activities became more alarming. In April, 1921, the Government of India considered enacting a law against "illegal drilling" and "the carrying of swords in urban areas, or by men in company, or on occasions of

meetings.”⁶⁶ In October the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that volunteers grew in numbers, but that he saw no dangers in this as yet.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, ten days earlier he had issued a letter to all Local Governments and Administrations, asking for information and their opinions on the volunteer movement.⁶⁸ Their answers to these questions were compiled into a lengthy report.⁶⁹ We quote here from the answer Delhi sent⁷⁰: “Present day volunteer movement is subtle in its working. Some general or special form of social service is the lure by which young men are induced to join a new formation. Where, as sometimes happens, this social service is rendered in a manner really helpful to public to which little or no exception can be taken, such as assisting strangers at fairs and places of pilgrimage, or helping in regulating processions, popular sympathy sides with volunteers, but experience has shown that, with few exceptions, organisers of these formations, having obtained adherents under the cloak of social service, and having inculcated a certain amount of cohesion and discipline, soon begin to divert their activities to directions in which they become a nuisance to law-abiding citizens and a danger to public peace. These activities have hitherto taken the form of attempts to usurp the functions of police, intimidations to enforce hartals and social and commercial boycotts, and organised demonstrations in the streets. Some of the corps are formed with no other intentions than these from their inception; others gradually develop these undesirable functions . . . In Delhi there can be no doubt that the ultimate objective is to combine the various ‘volunteers’ corps into one definite semi-military organisation. This is still a long way ahead. But the intention may be divined from their adoption of military titles, from Lieutenant to Colonel, for their leaders, and the general aping of military formations. A few of the corps occasionally turn out for drill in small batches under a paid retired drill instructor or an ex-constable of police. This is restricted to infantry drill without arms of any kind, and the drills are attended with great irregularity.”

Even if the worst features of reports like this proceeded more from surmise than from solid fact, it is small wonder that dangerous developments were feared and Montagu repeatedly expressed his anxiety with regard to them.⁷¹ Gandhi, who surely realized that he was playing with fire, did tread warily and shied back from declaring general civil disobedience implying non-payment of taxes. This, in its turn, would certainly lead to an open conflict with government and might prepare the way for social troubles from which all vested interests would suffer, thus endangering national unity in the struggle with the British. The

great thing was to restrain the mass movement which was being urged upon him.

At an A.I.C.C. meeting at Delhi on November 4, 1921, it cost him an effort to prevent the assent for starting the last phase of non-cooperation in such districts or provinces as would like to do so. Notably Hasrat Mohani advocated this, and at last Gandhi was compelled to announce its start in one district, that of Bardoli, for November 23.⁷² This would constitute a crucial test as well as a valuable object-lesson for further actions. In government circles the question was raised — not for the first time — whether Gandhi should not be arrested, but the Government of India decided that the time had not yet come; it wanted to wait for a moment when Gandhi had put himself palpably in the wrong.⁷³

But the situation got out of hand when the Prince of Wales visited the country in November. Some months before, Congress and Khilafat organizations had resolved to boycott his visit and to effect a general *hartal* throughout India.⁷⁴ On the one side, they seem to have been fairly successful in doing so⁷⁵: when the Prince disembarked at Bombay on November 17, they succeeded notably in that city and in Calcutta in paralyzing public life. On the other side, however, the principle of non-violence was, on this occasion, completely forgotten by the volunteers as well as the masses, and serious riots ensued: in Bombay alone there were 53 dead in a few days.⁷⁶ Once more Gandhi was proved to have overestimated the capacity of his followers for non-violent action; the Bombay riots broke out “contrary to all his confidence and almost triumphant expectation of a peaceful boycott.”⁷⁷ Again he repented, announced that he would fast until the Hindus and Muslims of Bombay made their peace with the other communities — and suspended the preparations for the civil disobedience campaign in Bardoli.⁷⁸ But yet again he was driven on by his following: the Congress Working Committee, summoned by Gandhi to consider the situation, resolved that civil disobedience was postponed, but not abandoned and that “all Non-Cooperation Volunteer Corps, Khilafat Volunteer Corps, and other non-official volunteer bodies, should be brought under central control and named National Volunteer Corps.”⁷⁹ The C.K.C. was asked to concur with this resolution.

But these very events — the increasing violence and the stronger organization of the volunteer movement — forced the government’s hand. It felt that it had to take action. Still refraining from wholesale arrest of all leaders for their part in the non-co-operation movement,

the Government of India could no longer completely adhere to the policy of non-interference. Local Governments were told that action on a more drastic and comprehensive scale was now required. In several provinces the volunteer corps were declared unlawful, and numerous political meetings were prohibited. Those who defied these orders were arrested, and in a few weeks some 30,000 people were imprisoned, among them prominent leaders like Lajpat Rai, Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das.⁸⁰ The greatest number of arrests, however, were made among the Khilafatists, who constituted the most turbulent element in the agitation and were consequently the greatest source of anxiety to the government.⁸¹

These large-scale arrests, however, provoked a reaction the government had not expected.⁸² They thought that moderate opinion would support these measures; after all, in Bengal the moderates had called for strong government action after the Calcutta riots.⁸³ It seems that here again the Government of India underrated the national character of the movement. The difference between moderates and extremists was mainly one of method, not of ultimate aims; therefore the moderates too resented the stern measures taken against the extremists. Moreover, government action was not leveled directly at violence, but at the volunteer corps and the political meetings from which government thought the violence originated; therefore the volunteers were outlawed and meetings prohibited. But in this way the issue had become one of freedom of association and of speech, and thereby the moral advantage had shifted, from a government that hitherto had pursued a wise policy of non-interference, towards a movement which defended democratic freedom. Another aspect of the development was that non-co-operation took on another appearance in the moderates' eyes: as a violent mass movement it was something fraught with social dangers, but now it presented itself as a respectable, purely political movement. Therefore the moderates, who for quite a time had been sitting on the fence, now seemed ready to come down on the extremists' side.⁸⁴

Reading had to try and recover some support from the moderates. This was essential to the continued existence of constitutional government in India and to the working of the reforms; moreover, it could put a check upon the plans of the violent extremists.⁸⁵

The situation was complicated by the impending visit of the Prince of Wales to Calcutta on December 24, which might lead to *hartals* and riots as serious as those of the previous month. The prospect did not appeal to either the Viceroy or the moderate leaders. Some of these, headed by Malaviya,⁸⁶ in mid-December approached Reading and

proposed the summoning of a Round Table Conference of nationalist leaders (moderates as well as extremists) and the Government of India, with a view to finding some compromise, and the Viceroy was inclined to embark on this course. This would mean that the government would set free the arrested volunteers, while the non-co-operators would stop agitation. But Reading realized quite well that there would be another price to pay. The proposed conference could not but confront his government with a demand for some kind of *swaraj*, and concessions in this respect were inevitable if it came to a conference at all. He told Montagu⁸⁷ that his immediate aim was to prevent demonstrations or *hartals* when the Prince was visiting Calcutta; but, however guardedly he was expressing himself, it was also clear from his message that he was considering amendments of the Government of India Act of 1919 — embodying the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms — speeding up the pace on the road towards Dominion status for India. Evidently he was willing to let Gandhi emerge the victor from the struggle, which proves that he felt he was fighting with his back to the wall.

But precisely the momentous character of the move he contemplated caused considerable opposition from some governors of provinces,⁸⁸ and also from the British cabinet. Montagu, though in favour of the proposed conference, at the same time wanted to warn the Viceroy against the danger of committing himself and the Imperial Government too far. Curzon and Churchill, however, were adamant in their rejection of what they characterized as something like a bargain: a good reception of the Prince of Wales for *swaraj*. It was they who carried the day: the cabinet resolved that no conference could be sanctioned for the time being.⁸⁹

Reading must have felt himself cornered, but he was saved from this impasse by Gandhi who, having at first consented to a conference without preliminary conditions,⁹⁰ now wanted the release not only of all arrested volunteers but also of the Ali brothers without giving any promises himself.⁹¹ By doing so he put himself in the wrong with the moderate leaders⁹² and, though they kept trying to bring about the desired conference, they became less inclined to slide over towards the extremist wing of the non-co-operation movement.⁹³

Nevertheless, the waves of political tension still ran high, as is evident from the tone prevailing at the annual sessions of Congress, the Khilafat Conference and the Muslim League, all of them meeting in the last days of December, 1921, at Ahmedabad.⁹⁴ In Congress, where Gandhi obtained a position of nearly absolute power,⁹⁵ on the one hand a trend was perceptible towards coaxing the moderate element by assuring them

that they were not obliged to subscribe to the whole programme of non-co-operation, and yet would be welcome in the movement. But on the other hand, the volunteers' pledge was altered. Thus far they had promised to maintain non-violence "so long as the policy of non-violence is continued by the nation"; henceforth they should declare that non-violence was the correct mode of action "as India is circumstanced". The new formula was less rigid and set the door ajar for violent action, since circumstances are more easily changed — or may be considered by individuals to have changed — than is the policy of a nation.

The government felt this to be an important development because, although violence was not advocated openly, there was strong pressure for taking actions which would almost certainly involve violence.⁹⁶ Congress adopted a resolution that individual and mass civil disobedience were the only means by which the existing government could be dislodged. Significantly, it was one of the Khilafat leaders who tried to urge Congress one step further. Hasrat Mohani put forward a motion at the Congress session that henceforth the Congress programme should be attainment of *swaraj* "by all proper and possible means".

At the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference sessions the same Hasrat Mohani tried to put through a resolution declaring Indian independence. At the Muslim League his attempt was warded off in the Subjects Committee, while at the Khilafat Conference it was ruled out by the president, Hakim Ajmal Khan — an action for which the latter was bitterly blamed.⁹⁷ Yet in his address to the Muslim League, Hasrat Mohani urged his audience to ask Gandhi that he should declare India an independent republic on January 1, 1922. At the same time he suggested changing the League's constitution in order to make it a mass organization. It is not surprising that both Reading and Montagu regarded the situation as most alarming, the more so because they were of the opinion that Hasrat Mohani's proposals fell through only on grounds of expediency, not of principle.⁹⁸

And while the various groups were still fencing for position — the extremists ready to risk violence, the moderates still trying to bring about a Round Table Conference, the Government of India hesitating whether it should arrest leaders like Mohani for mere speeches or not, and Gandhi being driven on by his followers but trying to hold them back — something had to happen, some action became inevitable because of the ever rising political temperature. One gets the impression of being a spectator of a war of nerves: whoever made the first move would give his opponent an advantage, but neither of the two principal parties in the

struggle could wait indefinitely. The Government of India had to reckon with the impatience of Local Governments⁹⁹ and the British cabinet,¹⁰⁰ whereas Gandhi's difficulty was, as Bamford puts it, of keeping the pot boiling without allowing it to boil over.¹⁰¹

It was Gandhi who lost the game. He was hard pressed from two sides: on his right by the moderate leaders, on his left by impatient extremists. In mid-January Malaviya and Jinnah convened a meeting at Bombay of about 300 Indian leaders, representing all shades of opinion. They still aimed at a conference with the government but Gandhi, who was attending as an observer, was not willing to make substantial concessions and so the meeting fell flat. Its president, Sir Sankaran Nair, left before the meeting was finished, issuing a letter to the press in which he stated his reason: talks with Gandhi and his party were useless, since Gandhi made demands which no government could admit.¹⁰² But from the other side Gandhi was urged to sanction the last phase of non-co-operation: the no-tax campaign. Preparations for it were already in progress in some districts in South-India, the Punjab, and the C.P.,¹⁰³ and it had actually started in the district of Guntur in Madras.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, however, it became evident that it would develop into something more than a move in the political game against the government, and that the landlords were threatened as well.¹⁰⁵ Gandhi instructed the Guntur district to stop the campaign, but he felt he could no longer wait; he was going to try out the no-tax campaign in the carefully prepared district of Bardoli where he could hope to remain in control.¹⁰⁶

In the first days of February¹⁰⁷ he issued something like an ultimatum to the Government of India, announcing his intention to launch civil disobedience at Bardoli within a week if the non-co-operators who were under arrest had not been released from jail by then. This was the move the government had waited for. They felt pretty sure that over the issue of civil disobedience, endangering the whole fabric of society and the state, they would find the moderates behind them; the outcome of the "Malaviya Conference" had given an indication to that effect. They issued a communiqué declaring their resolution to repress mass civil disobedience, and asking for the support of loyal citizens.¹⁰⁸ The hour of the great struggle had arrived at long last.

But events had already overtaken these moves. On February 5, a mob led by volunteers attacked a police station at Chauri Chaura in the U.P., killing and burning the entire staff of 23 men.¹⁰⁹ Gandhi repented publicly in *Young India*¹¹⁰ and, at the instance of moderate leaders,¹¹¹

called a meeting of the Working Committee, where civil disobedience was suspended until it could be trusted to maintain a completely non-violent character. At the same time, all action against the *zamindari* was explicitly repudiated; they were assured that "the Congress movement is in no way intended to attack their legal rights."¹¹² At the end of the month, the A.I.C.C. confirmed the Bardoli resolutions.

The motives for this decision may be interpreted in various ways. That the Congress leaders wanted an excuse for calling off an action the consequences of which they were fearing¹¹³ seems to be probable. But just which consequences did they fear? Was it the need to maintain non-violence at every price which inspired the Bardoli resolutions?¹¹⁴ R. P. Dutt argues¹¹⁵ that there was no question of violence or non-violence, because the non-payment of rent could not be called a violent action; he neglects, we think, the fact that if non-payment is not in itself violent, it will certainly cause violence, since neither the government nor the landlords could be expected to accept it meekly. The real issue, according to Dutt, was the protection of class interests: "The dominant leadership of the Congress associated with Gandhi called off the movement because they were afraid of the awakening mass activity; and they were afraid of the mass activity because it was beginning to threaten those propertied class interests with which they themselves were still in fact closely linked."

There is probably a great deal of truth in this, at least as far as "the dominant leadership of the Congress" is concerned. The "moderate" leaders, as we have called them in the preceding pages, may well have been motivated by this fear, though we would not proclaim it as their only motive. For one thing, they probably anticipated that no good could come from a violent conflict with the British Raj. Non-violence for them may have been something else than "petty-bourgeois moralising speculation and reformist pacifism" as Dutt considers it,¹¹⁶ but rather an expedient to be used by people without force at their disposal.

But we think it unlikely that Gandhi's case may be entirely thrown in with theirs. To begin with, non-violence had a special meaning for Gandhi and it seems to be questionable if, in his case, it may be wholly explained away as "a cover, conscious or unconscious, for class interests."¹¹⁷ And next, if Gandhi had been as intent as were the moderate leaders on eliminating the dangerous mass activity, why then did he not jump at the opportunity of reaching a compromise, which arose in mid-December?¹¹⁸ To a rational and realistic politician, this would have presented so obvious a chance to escape — and with honour — all

difficulties, that we are inclined to think that Gandhi's motive perhaps should be looked for not in the rational, but in the irrational sphere. In our opinion, one of the most remarkable features of Gandhi's public apology for what happened at Chauri Chaura is that he treated the whole matter as if it were something between God and himself: "God has been abundantly kind to me . . . I retraced my steps . . . I humbled myself . . . He (*i.e.* God) made me eyewitness . . . The humiliation was greater than in 1919. But it did me good . . .", and so on. Gandhi is speaking here not as a political leader, not even as a religious leader, but as a man mainly interested in his relation to God. Bearing this in mind, we are inclined to look for an explanation of Gandhi's part in the Bardoli resolutions in his feelings of guilt and his desire for punishment.¹¹⁹

But whatever the correct explanation may be, there can be little doubt that these events dealt a shattering blow to the non-co-operators' morale. The more moderate among them, those who had already doubted the desirability of civil disobedience, were confirmed in their doubts by the Chauri Chaura tragedy and the agrarian unrest connected with the no-tax campaign, and now questioned the soundness of Gandhi's whole strategy.¹²⁰ On the other hand, the extremists were deeply disappointed by Gandhi's sudden change of policy, and notably the Khilafatists felt that they had been betrayed.¹²¹ The non-co-operation movement, already endangered from within by increasing Hindu-Muslim distrust, now disintegrated as a consequence of the outburst of violence, of the class antagonism that had come out into the open, and of the ensuing Bardoli resolutions. The Khilafat movement, which had almost completely merged with the non-co-operation movement under Gandhi's leadership — and thereby with the nationalist movement — now disentangled itself, and in the next stage we will see it operating much more on its own. How fast the process of disintegration took place is proved by the fact that when Gandhi was arrested, four weeks after Bardoli, the event caused no stir at all.¹²² The crisis in India was over.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND BLOW

In the preceding chapter we nearly lost sight of the Khilafat movement as such since we were considering it mainly under the aspect of its merger with the non-co-operation movement under Gandhi's leadership. This simplification may be excused as it was this merger that made the political situation in India as explosive as to constitute a real threat to the Government of India, which came very near to capitulating before the nationalist pressure, or at least to considering a compromise which would have meant a victory for the non-co-operators. We should bear in mind, however, that the Khilafat and non-co-operation movements, though they had joined forces temporarily, were, in their origins, far from being one. So, when Gandhi was defeated in February, 1922 certainly this meant a severe blow to the Khilafatists, but not a deadly one. *Swaraj* which, for a short time, had seemed to be almost within reach of the nationalists, had receded again into the realm of unattainable illusions for the time being and by the end of March non-co-operation, to all intents and purposes, was no more,¹ even if the Congress leadership tried to salvage parts of the wrecked programme. But for the Khilafatists, non-co-operation and its main goal, *swaraj*, had been essentially no more than means, and their own specific objects had not vanished into thin air.

Therefore the Khilafat movement did not subside as promptly. It had provided the most violent and turbulent wing of the combined movement, and the position of the Angora government which, in the Indian Muslims' mind, was still identified with the defensor of Islam and the Caliphate, was far from secure. A great deal of activity was devoted by them to the collection of subscriptions for the Angora Fund,² and at the end of the year 1921 an amount of Rs 375,000 had already been remitted to Angora.³ About the same time, enthusiasm for the Khilafat cause was stimulated by a turn for the better in the situation of Turkey. Kemal Pasha, whose position had already been strengthened by Russian friendship, in October 1921 was backed by a more powerful ally: France,

with whom the Franklin-Bouillon agreement was reached.⁴ French troops evacuated Cilicia and Turkey recovered the Baghdad railway as far as it had been completed in the direction of Mosul. A few weeks later the Greek army on the Anatolian highlands was being shelled by Creusot guns and bombarded by planes made available by French sources.⁵ In the long run, of course, the improvement of nationalist Turkey's precarious situation was apt to lessen the tension between Indian Muslims and the British Government, since the former would no longer feel that their active support was badly needed. The first consequence, however, was that, from the moment of the Turco-French agreement, Great Britain appeared as the villain of the piece: the only great power still hostile to the new Turkey and backing its foes, the Greeks.⁶

But Great Britain showed two faces at least to the Indian Muslims' eyes: those of the Delhi and of the Westminster governments. The Government of India was in no doubt about the necessity of placating its Muslim subjects with regard to Turkey. Time and again Lord Reading emphasized the need to come to terms with Kemal Pasha and give in to the Indian Muslims' demands with respect to Thrace and Smyrna. Should Great Britain follow another course, he argued,⁷ the moderate Muslims' friendship would be lost. A clear and favourable definition of Great Britain's attitude was considered so urgent by the Viceroy, that he wanted to press his view on the Home Government in an unequivocal way. In a telegram to Montagu⁸ he summed up the three minimum Muslim demands which, in his opinion, should be granted: (1) evacuation of Constantinople; (2) acknowledgement of the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over the Holy Places, and (3) restoration of Thrace — including Adrianople — and Smyrna to the Turks. Moreover, he asked for permission to publish his telegram in India, in order to convince the Indians of the pro-Turkish attitude of the Government of India. Montagu wired his permission, thereby causing Curzon's wrath,⁹ and a few days later was forced to resign from the Cabinet. He was succeeded by the Conservative Lord Peel.

Why was Montagu dropped by his colleagues? The official reason was that he had acted contrary to the doctrine of cabinet responsibility by not consulting his colleagues when he granted the Viceroy's request. This, however, in a cabinet headed by Lloyd George, who had something of a reputation for acting without referring matters to his colleagues, could be no more than a pretext in Montagu's eyes.¹⁰ The real motives he saw in his Near-Eastern policy, which was at variance with the course the P.M. and Lord Curzon were steering, and in the political situation

at home: he felt he had been "thrown to the wolves", the latter being the die-hards among the Conservatives who resented the Irish settlement assented to by the government in December, 1921.¹¹

But though by Montagu's resignation Turkey and the Khilafat movement certainly lost an able advocate, Reading's action, in a certain sense, put the Government of India on a somewhat better footing with its Muslim subjects: the latter supposed that Montagu's dismissal was due to the British cabinet's dislike of his pro-Muslim policy,¹² and consequently were convinced that the Secretary of State and the Government of India had really tried to further the Muslim cause. This opinion persisted when in the next summer another crisis occurred in Turco-British relations.¹³

In the meantime the British cabinet was, to some degree, changing its attitude towards the Turkish problem. This, however, was probably due to the fact that it felt itself to have been outmanoeuvred by the French, rather than to any sympathy for the Turks or consideration for Muslim feeling in India. At the end of 1920, the cabinet still persisted in its position that no revision of the treaty of Sèvres was to be sought,¹⁴ but when it became evident that the change in power relations in Asia Minor necessitated a change in the political relations as well, the problem came up again in the cabinet. Here, to be sure, Montagu argued that the effect in India should be taken into account, but for Curzon British interests and British prestige in the Near East were clearly far more important: the Franklin-Bouillon agreement exposed Mosul to threats from the Kemalists, and an evacuation of Constantinople by the British forces was inadvisable because it would create an impression of weakness.¹⁵ When a meeting of the British, French and Italian ministers for Foreign Affairs was proposed in order to tackle the problem, Curzon circulated a paper among his cabinet colleagues in which he summed up the elements determining the coming negotiations: the attitude of France and Italy, the forces of the Greeks and the Turks, the willingness of the Allies to enforce a solution, the attitude of Russia, "... and lastly, the possible reactions in Irak and the Moslem world to an active support of Greece against Turkey, however arrogant and unreasonable the attitude of the latter may have been."¹⁶ When in March, 1922, this conference did meet in Paris, he showed himself once more a champion of a strong policy towards Turkey, whereas it was Poincaré who pointed out the bad effects harsh treatment of this country was bound to have on the Muslims in Morocco and India; again, when Curzon mentioned the Allied duty to protect Christian

minorities in Asia Minor, it was Poincaré who spoke about the necessity of special safeguards for the Muslim minority in Adrianople. But all the same Curzon was, by now, ready to restore Smyrna to the Turks and to divide Western Thrace between Turkey and Greece.¹⁷

The Paris conference did not have any practical results because neither the Greeks nor the Turks accepted the Allied proposals. In the summer of 1922, however, the shift in power relations materialized in a heavy defeat of the Greek forces in Anatolia; they were routed completely, and Smyrna was recovered by Kemal Pasha's army in August. But the Greek army had acted as a shield between the Angora forces and the very thinly manned British occupation zone on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus; now that this shield was broken, a clash between Kemal's troops and the British seemed to be imminent.

This development provoked the Chanak crisis of September, 1922. If the nationalist Turks were to attack the British positions, war was quite possible, if not inevitable: the British cabinet resolved to resist any attack and asked its Allies as well as the dominions for assistance in that eventuality.¹⁸ As a matter of fact, the Turks did not advance against them and war was avoided, but the whole episode became one of the final straws causing Lloyd George's downfall;¹⁹ a month afterwards, the Conservatives rebelled against him and Baldwin formed a Conservative cabinet, including Curzon for Foreign Affairs. A revision of the treaty of Sèvres could no longer be put off, and in November the Lausanne conference met.

This was the background of international events against which the development of the Khilafat movement in 1922 should be seen: the defeat of the Greeks and the gradual slackening of British resistance to Turkish demands. This picture of the international background should be completed with the main event on the Indian national level, which was Gandhi's defeat and the collapse of the non-co-operation movement.

This state of affairs resulted in a certain disarray among the Khilafatists. Their movement lost its unity and its purpose. The movement's leaders tried to keep it up by (a) stating Khilafat demands in an uncompromising way, and (b) upholding, as far as possible, Hindu-Muslim unity. But evidently it became less easy to maintain mass agitation at its former level,²⁰ and this may account for another fact — some readiness on the part of other people to endorse Khilafat demands. There are signs that the category of Muslims who in the previous period had dissociated themselves from the movement now openly supported its demands concerning Turkey and the Caliphate;²¹ the reason might

be that they perceived a less radical atmosphere among the members of the Khilafat Conference. That in May, 1922, the Muslim League could propose a joint special session of the League and the Khilafat Conference²² suggests the same.

The official line taken by the C.K.C. appears, however, from a statement issued on March 21, 1922, concerning the Khilafat demands.²³ It treated the restoration of Smyrna and Thrace as almost granted but laid special emphasis on a wholly unconditional restoration, without any financial or military control by the Allies; likewise, the independence of the *Jazirat-ul-Arab* — preserving the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over the Holy Places — while it was expressly stressed that this region too should be completely free from non-Muslim control. These demands were not new, except that in the acknowledgement of independence for the non-Turkish subjects of the former Ottoman Empire it was less equivocal than, for instance, the C.K.C. Manifesto of May, 1920.²⁴ From a subtle shift of emphasis like this it appears that the Khilafat leaders were not wholly unaware of what the nationalist Turkish victory meant for Ottoman and Caliphal pretensions in Arabia. But they formulated their demands in a way apt to keep up tension; the reason may have been that they wanted to exert pressure on the Paris conference which was about to start.

The second aim of the Khilafat leaders was to preserve Hindu-Muslim unity. This was the general tenor of resolutions passed at an All-India Khilafat Conference at Delhi on February 25 and 26, 1922, and at a *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* meeting at Ajmere in the first week of March.²⁵ But these resolutions were passed only after proposals of another purport had been jockeyed away; at Delhi "... another resolution, the effect of which was that Khilafat Committee should confine its activities to religious duty of upholding the Khilafat movement, while Muhammadans who also desired to take part in *Swaraj* movement should do so from platform of Congress, was deferred for consideration..."²⁶ We take this to mean that part of the Khilafat leadership wanted to loosen the alliance with Congress but failed to carry through their design. And the official line was again stressed when in May 1922 Motilal Nehru was elected as a member of the Working Committee of the C.K.C. in the place of Hasrat Mohani who had been arrested, while V. J. Patel was elected onto the C.K.C. in Gandhi's place.²⁷

But about the same time we find signs of growing Hindu-Muslim distrust in an increasing number. In the summer Abdul Bari gave it as his opinion that non-co-operation as a means for supporting Turkey was

no longer any use, and that *swaraj* would prove beneficial to the Hindus but not to the Muslims.²⁸ The Government of Bombay reported that the Provincial Khilafat Conference was no longer willing to co-operate with Congress,²⁹ and according to the Government of India the Khilafat leaders were suspected of being the tools of Hindu politicians.³⁰

But Muslim disappointment over Congress politics also took the shape of inciting the latter to adopt a more radical policy. At a joint meeting of the Working Committees of the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* and the C.K.C., the more fanatical members, "disgusted with the failure of the non-co-operationist movement to secure redress of the Khilafat grievances, were in favour of action on more drastic lines than hitherto attempted",³¹ and a resolution was passed that Congress should be asked to define *swaraj* as "complete independence".³²

It is clear that the Khilafat movement no longer presented itself as a solid block; several sections were contesting with each other for the upper hand. This may have been due, partly at least, to the disarray the movement was brought into by the failure of the non-co-operation movement, but another reason was, we think, that it was rapidly losing its character of a mass movement. We do not have at our disposal figures concerning the membership,³³ but if government interest in the movement is taken as an indication in this respect, there cannot have been much of it left in 1923: in an official account of the state of Indian affairs for that year³⁴ the Khilafatists were not even mentioned. This development meant that the leadership was no longer under pressure from the masses who had urged it on. Part of the leadership wanted to keep up an unvarying course of co-operation with the more radical among the Congress leaders; in this section we find the larger part of the ulama wing and most of the top leaders who had come to the fore in the years 1919 and 1920. But another section, including some of the top leaders — like Chotani — but more strongly represented in the lower echelons of the organization, was more inclined to give up Hindu-Muslim co-operation, and in consequence was dissociating itself from Indian nationalism.³⁵ At any rate, there came into being a gap between those who wanted to stay in the nationalist camp and those who had let themselves be carried away in that direction, but who now wanted to retrace their steps towards the religio-political origins of the movement.³⁶ An accidental cause of friction among the Khilafatists may have been the suspicion of misappropriation of considerable sums destined for the Angora Fund,³⁷ an affair causing some stir in the summer of 1922 and dragging on until 1924.

Further developments in Turkey could not really stimulate the Khilafat movement, although Turkish victories in the summer of 1922 and the ensuing Chanak crisis presented it with what seemed good opportunities. Many meetings were organized to discuss events in Turkey,³⁸ and steps were taken to set up an Angora Legion, to be drafted to Turkey.³⁹ But this plan seems not to have materialized, for in the last days of December it had to be resolved again to start the Legion, and a committee was elected to see to this.⁴⁰ So when the India Office inquired with some anxiety if nothing should be done about it, the Government of India, with perfect peace of mind, could announce that it had resumed its policy of non-interference.⁴¹ It was, by the way, hardly to be expected that after the meeting of the peace conference in November, 1922, the Angora Legion would be requested to take the field, and it is not surprising that the Government of India treated the Indian Muslims' protestations of willingness to take up arms as being of a purely verbal character.

Even if the Khilafat movement had not entirely collapsed, its sting had clearly been removed. And in the last months of the year events were coming which reduced its effectiveness further. On November 1, 1922 the Sultanate in Turkey was abolished; the Turkish nation was declared to be sovereign and the Turkish state to constitute the basis of the Caliphate. A fortnight afterwards the Caliph — former Sultan-Caliph — Mehmed VI was deposed, and was succeeded by his nephew Abdul Majid. Being no longer a Sultan, he was invested with the Mantle of the Prophet, but not girded with the sword of the founder of the Ottoman dynasty.⁴² To the untrained eye it would seem that he had lost all temporal power and had been "vaticanized".

This view would, in our opinion, have been very near the truth, too, but for a small possibility of looking at things in another way. True, the Turks had deposed a Caliph but this did not matter since they had elected a new one in keeping with traditional ways. That the Turkish constitution took away all temporal power from him was an entirely internal matter on which the Turks had to decide themselves. Their decision had no binding force for Muslims outside Turkey; the latter were free to interpret the new Caliph's power as they wanted, in conformity with Islamic Law. On the basis of this argument the ulama of the Azhar University at Cairo acknowledged Abdul Majid one month after his accession.⁴³

Indian Muslims went a bit further along this line of reasoning. In the first weeks of November they had been perplexed by the Kemalist

policy towards the Sultan-Caliph, and evidently not all of them were quite ready to accept what had been done.⁴⁴ Generally the fact was stressed that dethroning a Caliph and electing another one was perfectly within the rights of the Turkish people, but that separating temporal and spiritual power was quite un-Islamic. Was that, however, the intention of the Turkish people and its leaders? Chotani said he had full confidence in the doings of Kemal Pasha and the Angora Assembly, and men like Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan defended it openly. Their thought ran, we think, along the same lines as those sketched by Dr. Abdullah Suhrawardy from Bengal, who "... did not believe that Kemal Pasha aimed at the severance of the temporal and spiritual powers of the Khilafat, but rather desired the severance of the Rulership of Turkey (the Sultanate) from the Headship of Islam (the Khilafat). The Khilafat, liberated from the restraints and burdens of the Sultanate, would be stronger than before; the Khalifa would be enabled to claim the allegiance to his spiritual suzerainty of other Moslem States, and would have the support of the Turkish State in his demands for the maintenance of the dignity of the office of the Khalifa."⁴⁵ Similarly, the vice-president of the Madras Khilafat Committee hoped for the establishment of "a Muslim League of Nations" upon which the Caliph could call for assistance, if need be.⁴⁶

In our opinion these arguments are, to say the least, far-fetched, for who could guarantee that the Caliph would get "the support of the Turkish State"? The gist of what had happened was precisely that he could not be sure of this, since it was for the sovereign Turkish people to decide whom to support or not to support. And of course the Caliph might call for the assistance of a — for the present non-existent — Muslim League of Nations, but what power would he have to press his demands? These conceptions were, we think, based upon wishful thinking. Nevertheless, these views prevailed, at least in official Khilafat circles. The All-India Khilafat Conference at Gaya accepted what had been done and continued to profess its confidence in nationalist Turkey and its leader Kemal Pasha.⁴⁷ But the fact that in their first resolution they still used the title "Sultan", and that the withholding of temporal power from the new Caliph was passed over in silence reveals some embarrassment on their part. We think it is very much open to doubt whether many educated Muslims in fact believed what they said when evincing their confidence that all would be well with the Caliphate.⁴⁸ Khaliqzaman reports a conversation he had, at the beginning of 1923, with Muhammad Ali on the new position of the Caliph. He himself

doubted whether the Khilafat organization should be maintained when the Turks were throwing away the essence of the office; the Arabs too were in agreement with the newly created situation — so what could Indian Muslims do about it? “The Maulana agreed with most of what I said, but he was not a man to accept facts as facts . . . He did not share my pessimism. He said, ‘Keep the Khilafat Committee alive and continue to fight against the British to concede real independence to the Arab world with a view to “liberating the liberated”.’”⁴⁹

Disagreement among the Khilafatists with respect to the stand their organization should take in Muslim politics went together with disagreement on a matter of Indian politics. When the issue of the continuation of the boycott of councils came up at the Gaya sessions in December 1922, Congress was divided, and the Khilafatists in Congress were to be found on both sides of the fence: Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari were “no-changers” — *i.e.* among the party not wanting to abandon this item of the non-co-operation programme — whereas Hakim Ajmal Khan and Khaliqzaman joined the Congress Khilafat Swaraj Party of the “pro-changers”, headed by C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru.⁵⁰ The *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* session categorically condemned council entry,⁵¹ and the Khilafat Conference too declared against it, but this decision “was due no doubt to the unbending attitude of the Muslim divines who constituted the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema*.”⁵²

On the whole we get the following picture of Indian Muslim leadership at this moment: the middle class leaders were divided, some of them wanting to abandon the Congress alliance, others wanting to stick to it, but divided again as to which section of Congress to support; the ulama, however, were decided on keeping up an uncompromising stand, together with the more radical section of Congress. The ulama, moreover, seem to have been moving towards the position of exclusive Muslim leaders, putting aside the westernized middle class element; this, at least, is how we think we may interpret a passage in the presidential address given by Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman of Deoband at the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* session, which is reported by H. N. Mitra as follows: “The Maulana next dwelt upon the special responsibilities of the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema*. He claimed for it superiority over all other Muslim organizations or conferences in India and declared that in time to come it would represent a unique position in the world so as to lead Muslim opinion in religious matters, but as politics and religion were inseparable in Islam, the *Jamiat* was also competent to give the lead on political issues.”⁵³ Mitra traces their “stubborn” attitude with regard to the

boycott of councils to the fact that at that time the Lausanne negotiations seemed to be reaching a deadlock.⁵⁴

But in the first half of 1923 the Lausanne Conference did its work and produced on July 4, 1923 the treaty to which it gave its name. Smyrna, Constantinople and the greater part of Thrace — including Adrianople — were restored to Turkey, and its Syrian border was, in conformity with the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, shifted southward. Turkey, however, did not have its way with respect to Mosul which was assigned to Iraq, and to the Dardanelles, which were demilitarized. But on the whole, the new treaty fully honoured Turkey's military successes. Perhaps the most important aspect of the treaty was its constituting the first case of a post-Versailles treaty not dictated by the Allies, but achieved by discussion and compromise between powers meeting on terms of equality.⁵⁵

In our context, however, its most important aspect is the influence Indian Khilafatists had — or did not have — in bringing about this result. Opinions on this question differ. Lord Reading's biographer answers it in the affirmative, commenting upon the Viceroy's representations about Indian Muslim opinion, and judging it hardly exaggerated to say that "... Lord Reading played as important a part in shaping British policy towards Turkey as if he had been sitting at the actual Conference-table at Lausanne."⁵⁶ In the same vein, Chirol speaks about the Khilafat agitation as "one of the decisive factors"⁵⁷ of the Turkish success at Lausanne. A more recent author, K. K. Aziz, thinks that the pressure exerted by Indian Khilafatists forced the British Government to revise its attitude.⁵⁸

In our opinion, these statements are grossly exaggerated. The Khilafat agitation and protestations influenced, it is true, the Government of India, but had only a slight effect on the British Government. We have already referred to the stand Curzon took when a revision of the treaty of Sèvres was no longer avoidable,⁵⁹ and nothing leads to the conclusion that he changed this. Nicolson, who discusses the Lausanne settlement and Curzon's role in bringing it about in detail,⁶⁰ never once records that he took the Indian Muslims' susceptibilities into account. Enumerating Curzon's aims in the negotiations he mentions: the freedom of the Straits, retaining Mosul for a British mandate in Iraq, and breaking up the Turco-Russian friendship. This account is corroborated by Curzon's communications to his cabinet colleagues on the negotiations,⁶¹ in which the Indian Muslims' feelings are not considered, and the same observation may be made with regard to cabinet meetings where the

progress of the negotiations was discussed.⁶² And lastly Muhammad Ali, who might be expected to brag about results of the movement of which he had been the foremost leader, in his Cocanada Congress speech came to the same conclusion: "The Turks secured what they did at Lausanne not because of any regard on the part of England for justice to the Turks, or for the religious obligations and sentiments of Indian Muslims with regard to the Khilafat, but in spite of England's open hostility towards the Turks and utter disregard of the requirements of Islam."⁶³

Anyhow, the treaty of Lausanne must have provoked in a good many Indian Khilafatists the feeling that much of their programme had been granted and that more was not to be expected.⁶⁴ Muhammad Ali admitted that many of them thought that the peace of 1923 left them without any further task.⁶⁵ He himself denied this: England persisted in its anti-Islamic policy and had not honoured Muslim demands regarding the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*. So the Khilafat leaders tried — partly perhaps against their own better judgment, but partly in good faith — to keep up the movement. Its purpose in the new circumstances could be seen either as Indian nationalist — hence the attempts to maintain the alliance with Congress — or as Pan-Islamic, as is suggested in Muhammad Ali's exhortation "to liberate the liberated". But the movement had lost its capacity for carrying away the masses; henceforward it was a source of possible trouble for the Government of India, but it no longer constituted a real and direct threat.⁶⁶

Six months later, however, the final blow fell on the Khilafatists. Since the end of the 18th century the Ottoman Sultan-Caliphs, taking advantage of the fact that the distinction between temporal and spiritual powers of the Caliphate was accepted in Europe,⁶⁷ had tried to retain some political sway over former subjects now outside their territories by stressing their religious authority over them.⁶⁸ Notably Sultan Abdul Hamid II had done this, and not entirely without success. Now the Kemalists, who had seized upon the same conception of the Caliphate in order to deprive the Caliph of all temporal power, fell into the trap the Ottoman Caliphs had set for western powers. Non-Turkish Muslims, by their religious allegiance to the Caliph Abdul Majid, felt themselves entitled to meddle with what the Turks considered to be essentially Turkish affairs. In November, 1923, the Turks got two indications of this. The C.K.C. asked for passports for the members of three delegations which were to visit Turkey, the Hijaz and Iraq and Persia, in order to work out a common Muslim view on the situation of the Caliphate. These delegations, however, could not set out from India

since passports were refused to them.⁶⁹ But in the same month the Agha Khan and Amir Ali addressed a letter to Ismet Pasha, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, urging him to reconsider the situation of the Caliph and to place it on a basis which would restore the confidence of other Muslim peoples.⁷⁰

One month later, a more or less similar action was taken by the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* which in a resolution, though declaring its confidence in the Angora government, suggested the meeting of an international conference of ulama to settle the status of the Caliphate.⁷¹

This was more than the Turks were willing to put up with. On March 4, 1924, the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the Turkish National Assembly, an action quite in line with the secularization of Turkey's political structure which had been the aim of the Young Turks and the Committee for Union and Progress. It meant that henceforth Turkey's political outlook would be purely political and national, not religious or Pan-Islamic. The reasons for Kemal Pasha's new policy were made known in India by means of an interview with one of his friends.⁷² He said that Kemal Pasha considered the Caliphate as a danger to Turkey: it entailed the obligation to defend Islam, a task for which Turkey was not strong enough since Islamic solidarity was a word without practical consequences. In the last war the Arabs had fought the Sultan-Caliph, and Indian Muslims had given no more than verbal help, no actual support. So it was clear that Turkey should mind its own interests.⁷³ To the C.K.C. Kemal Pasha sent a formal explanation: "In fact Khilafat means Government which means State", he wrote, and so there was no need for an extra Caliphate office in the Turkish State. Moreover, he continued, "... the Khilafat office idea which has been conserved since ages to realise the basis of a united Moslem Government in the world, has never been realised, and on the contrary has been a constant cause of strife and duplicity among the Moslems, whereas the real interests accept as a principle that the social associations may constitute themselves into independent governments."⁷⁴ In plain words this seems to indicate that henceforward Turkey would mind its own interests and turn its back upon any kind of Pan-Islamic endeavour.

It is evident that this attitude came as a very nasty shock to the men who formerly had taken it for granted that Kemal Pasha's aims and those of the champions of the Caliphate were identical. They had done so on unsound grounds: in the Turkish National Pact of January, 1920, the Caliphate had been mentioned only once, and then incidentally in connection with Constantinople, which was called "the seat of the

Caliphate of Islam.” Besides, had they paid attention to the relations between the nationalist government at Angora and the Sultan-Caliph’s government at Constantinople, they would have found them very strained. Mehmed VI had lost a war, but hoped to win the peace by freeing himself from the power of the Committee for Union and Progress; he had lost no time in declaring the conduct of Kemal and his partisans contrary to religion. It is small wonder that the nationalists decided to depose Mehmed VI and to cut down the powers of his office, even if for the time being they did not advertise their designs, since the Caliphate was an instrument with which to rouse Pan-Islamic feelings and get the support of non-Turkish Muslims.⁷⁵

But the Indian Khilafatists, in their enthusiasm, did not stop to consider details like these. Therefore, when Mehmed VI was deposed and the Sultanate abolished, for the sake of appearances, we think, they displayed a cheerful mien; they were able to do so all the better because the Caliphate was a symbol of Pan-Islamism, but not Pan-Islamism itself — even if the symbol lost some of its outward glory, the thing itself might be thought to be unimpaired. But now the substance of Pan-Islamism was thrown away by the very men who had been considered as Pan-Islamic heroes, but after all turned out to be nationalist villains.

We should not be surprised, therefore, that comments of Indian Khilafatist leaders were bitter. The Muslim masses in India were not moved very deeply,⁷⁶ but the Khilafat leaders unanimously denounced the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate.⁷⁷ Once more they professed that they were not objecting to the deposition of a Caliph since they were not partisans of the hereditary principle, but the abolition of the office was called “fatal to the Moslem World solidarity” and “an act against the religion of Islam”. The Angora government was asked to promote the election of a new Caliph “possessing temporal and spiritual powers”,⁷⁸ and was warned that probably “a bloody revolution” against its own régime would be the consequence of its rash action. Also, an international Muslim conference was proposed to decide on the matter of the Caliphate.⁷⁹

All in all, their reactions were completely negative. Outside the Khilafat movement, it is true, some Indian Muslims approved of developments in Turkey. The poet-philosopher Iqbal thought the Turks were quite justified in taking this step, since they had done so by using the door of *ijtihad*,⁸⁰ and Khuda Bakhsh welcomed it as ending a fiction, and ushering in modern as opposed to medieval ideas.⁸¹ But these modernists did not constitute an important section of Indian Muslims

in those days. The Khilafat movement as a political force had already lost its mass appeal; now it also lost its very *raison d'être* and, consequently, its aim. Its leaders lost their following⁸² and became divided among themselves.

Theoretically, some roads were open to the Khilafatists, but in practice these did not lead anywhere. They could take the course indicated in Muhammad Ali's words⁸³ about continuing the fight against the British with a view to "liberating the liberated". But any endeavour in this direction was rather problematic. In the first place: Indian Muslims did not have much understanding for Arab nationalism. Their condemnation of the Arab revolt of 1916 had, to be sure, veered round gradually to accepting "self-governing rights" or "autonomous development" for Arab peoples under Ottoman suzerainty,⁸⁴ and then to "complete independence, preserving the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty over the Holy Places."⁸⁵ But "complete independence" in the second formula only meant elimination of British influence; it is evident that Indian Khilafat leaders never accepted Arab independence in as positive a sense as the Turkish nationalist régime had done as early as January, 1920.⁸⁶ And second: how many Indian Muslims really wanted to continue the fight against the British? Anti-British sentiment, though by no means absent, was, as we see it, perhaps not the most essential element in the Indian Khilafat movement.⁸⁷ Moreover, the Lausanne settlement had largely satisfied many Indian Muslims. A majority among the upper and middle class Muslim leadership were inclined to seek support in the British connection once more.⁸⁸ The Muslim League, which had lapsed into relative insignificance in the preceding years, came to the fore again and it was no longer opposed by the Khilafatists when it concentrated on communal demands.⁸⁹

After the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, however, the question of Arab independence became mixed up with the question of reviving the Caliphate. The Ottoman Caliphate had met an important requirement: it commanded sufficient temporal power to defend Islam. This, at least, was what Indian Muslims thought or pretended to think; we have already seen that the leaders of the Turkish successor state were of a different opinion. But in the treaty of Lausanne this successor state had also definitely given up another and no less important prerequisite: sovereignty — or even suzerainty — over the territories where the Holy Places were located. After the deposition of Abdul Majid the possibility of an Arab Caliphate — looming in the background even since Sharif Husain's revolt⁹⁰ — had suddenly acquired a character of reality.⁹¹

Or perhaps, it only seemed to do so. Of the Arab princes, the king of the Hijaz was the prominent candidate, being a member of the Prophet's tribe of the Quraish and holding the dominion of the two most venerated Holy Places, Mecca and Medina. But his pretensions to being a leader of all Arabs were taken in the wrong way by other Arab chiefs, the most important of whom was the Wahabi ruler of Najd, Ibn Saud. And to many Muslims Husain was stigmatized as a tool of the British and a traitor to Pan-Islamic solidarity. This feeling was particularly strong among Indian Muslims, but was not lacking among others.⁹²

Husain's hand was more or less forced by the abolition of the Caliphate: a few days after this event, he accepted an election to this office by Transjordanian and Palestinian Muslim notables.⁹³ But this step met with vigorous protests from the Wahabis, and from Egypt and India too. This was the moment Ibn Saud had waited for to secure his own dominance in Arabia; moreover, since the British cut short their subsidies to Najd, he had nothing to lose by taking action against his rival for supremacy.⁹⁴ Under the pretext of wanting to ensure the pilgrimage to Mecca he attacked the king of Hijaz, and after a campaign of less than two months had occupied all his adversary's territories, except for Medina and two ports.

Ibn Saud's action was applauded by the Indian C.K.C.⁹⁵ Up to a point their attitude was quite consistent with their former denunciations of Husain.⁹⁶ But on the other hand, the puritanical Wahabis were not very suitable allies for Indian Muslims, either westernized and modernist, or conservative. In particular the Wahabis' aversion to certain rituals and religious monuments could easily hurt Muslim sentiment in India and elsewhere.⁹⁷ Once more the Khilafat leaders became divided among themselves on the occasion of the conflict between the Arab rulers. Sufis and Sufi ulama became the partisans of Husain, whereas a Sunni section backed Ibn Saud.⁹⁸ Or, as another author puts it, the "secular section" of the Khilafatists, led by Muhammad Ali, became opposed to the "theological section" led by Abdul Bari.⁹⁹ But we do not think the dividing lines between the groups were very clear; from Khaliquz-zaman's account we get the impression of quarrels rather than a conflict over principles, and personal likes and dislikes may have played their role. At any rate, the approval Ibn Saud's action met with at the Belgaum Khilafat Conference session in December, 1924, and the Moradabad *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* session in January 1925 seems to have been far from unanimous.¹⁰⁰

The tensions provoked by the struggle for supremacy in Arabia resulted in the complete failure of an Islamic congress which Ibn Saud tried to convene at Mecca in the last month of 1924. Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and Iraq declined his invitations; the Indian C.K.C. was the only official body to send a delegation.¹⁰¹ The C.K.C., however, was absent from the Caliphate Congress meeting at Cairo in May, 1926.¹⁰²

So, after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the whole question of restoring the office became mixed up with inter-Arab rivalries. Now, by its very nature, the Caliphate was apt to constitute not only a theoretical and theological issue, but a practical and political one as well. It was connected with political realities and therefore influenced, to some degree, by power relations. This had been the case in the years before 1924 too, only then it had been connected with an anti-western, anti-British policy which appealed to Indian Muslims as it called on Muslim solidarity. After 1924, however, becoming entangled with inter-Arab conflicts, it was not Muslim solidarity which was at stake, but a variety of ramifications of Arab nationalism and dynasticism, which could hardly be of great importance to Indian Muslims. Khilafat leaders who had dug their heels in over the problem could continue to trouble themselves about it, but the Caliphate question ceased to exist as a factor in Indian politics.

We conclude: there was no longer any future for the Khilafat movement in Indian Muslim politics. The issues had changed, and Indian Khilafatists could not adjust themselves to the new situation without giving up principles constituting the foundations of their movement. We should bear in mind, however, that another important characteristic of the movement had been its leaning towards Indian nationalism and Hindu-Muslim unity. Could it not turn down a road towards that goal?

Once more we turn towards Muhammad Ali's Cocanada speech¹⁰³ for a first analysis of the feasibility of a programme based on Hindu-Muslim unity after 1923. His audience at the Cocanada session, we imagine, cannot have been very optimistic after his exposition. The speaker begins by observing that something has changed for the worse; he refers to communal riots in Multan, Agra, and Saharanpur. Then he points out how futile the quarrels leading up to such frightful bloodshed mostly are: they centre round *alams*, and *pipal* trees, and so on; "it is not the love of our religion that makes us quarrel with our fellow-countrymen of other faiths, but self-love and petty personal ambition." But the remedies he recommends are not very impressive. One of them

is to lower the price of mutton, so as to diminish the Muslim demand for beef. When *swaraj* is attained, the government should economize on military expenditure, and use the savings to promote the breeding of sheep and goats. But for the time being he advises the Muslims to give up cow-killing voluntarily. Not without suspicion he mentions the *shuddhi* and *sanghatan* movements,¹⁰⁴ denouncing all conversion under pressure. On the other hand, as a follower of Islam, itself a proselytizing religion, he has to acknowledge every religion's right to do mission work, and as a tentative solution he suggests dividing India into missionary regions.

His whole treatment of the subject gives the impression, not of an inspired leader trying to find new and bold solutions,¹⁰⁵ but rather of a man baffled by a problem and polishing up old devices to find a way out of an impasse. We do not say this in an attempt to ridicule him: it was a problem baffling all Indians trying to solve it,¹⁰⁶ and Muhammad Ali's attitude of all but despondency was not to be wondered at. All authors on the subject of Hindu-Muslim relations in those years agree to the fact that communal riots were increasing sharply from about 1923, or 1922 even.¹⁰⁷ Its main causes they see in the possibility of self-government, which made leaders in both communities realize the interests that were at stake;¹⁰⁸ in the failure of Congress leaders to offer an inspiring lead after the collapse of non-co-operation;¹⁰⁹ in the failure of the united Hindu-Muslim efforts to attain either *swaraj* or the rescue of the Ottoman Caliphate, resulting in frustrated emotions discharging themselves in riots.¹¹⁰ None of these explanations, of course, excludes the others, nor can any of them be proved strictly, but all of them are, in our opinion, plausible.¹¹¹ And anyway, the increasing number of riots was a sure sign pointing to a deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations. Another sign, perhaps even more ominous, was that Gandhi in May, 1925, declared himself incompetent to do anything about it.¹¹²

Another aspect of the same phenomenon was constituted by the revival or founding of communalist organizations. The Muslim League, which had led a shadowy existence between 1920 and 1924, held a meeting at Lahore in May, 1924, with Jinnah, who had never supported Khilafat action, as president. Nevertheless, a good many Khilafatists were present, feeling that their own movement was "on its last legs".¹¹³ Muslim fear with regard to Hindu dominance found expression in resolutions that (a) *swaraj* should have the form of a federal central government with autonomous provinces, and (b) no re-arrangement of provinces should be allowed by which the Muslim majorities in

Bengal, the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. might be impaired.¹¹⁴ Both of these resolutions point to the communalist re-orientation of the Muslim League, as compared with its attitude at the time of the Lucknow pact.

Nor was communalism absent on the Hindu side. The *Hindu Mahasabha*¹¹⁵ — dating from 1906 or 1907 — had not been influential thus far. The Congress policy of seeking an alliance with the Muslims, however, drew the more communally orientated Hindus in Congress towards the *Mahasabha*, which called its first major sessions in 1923 and 1924. Its main object was to stress Hindu traditions and principles, but, as these had played a large part in Indian nationalism since the days of the *Arya Samaj* and Tilak,¹¹⁶ it could for quite a long time defend itself against the accusation of communalism by styling itself nationalist.¹¹⁷ Its anti-Muslim sentiment, however, was unmistakable, and could not fail to provoke Muslim distrust.¹¹⁸

The *Hindu Mahasabha* was active in the field of mission work too, which in Hinduism took the form of *shuddhi* (purification), intended to reclaim Hindus converted to Christianity or Islam. This had been for a long time one of the objects of the *Arya Samaj*, which now was joined by the *Mahasabha* in this activity. The latter organization also promoted the *sanghatan* movement, encouraging drill and athletic exercise, in order to train a rising generation that would be able to defend Hindu interests against the Muslims.¹¹⁹ Undoubtedly, the *sanghatan* movement's scope was wider than that; generally, its aim was to strengthen the cohesion of the Hindu social structure,¹²⁰ but it did show a military trait — not unexpectedly, one might add, at a time when communal rioting became a constant danger, and when the bugbear of Indian Muslims assisting an Afghan invader was still alive.¹²¹

Since the *Mahasabha* leaders remained in Congress and were even playing an important role in it, the Muslims' faith in Congress protestations of goodwill towards them could not be great. And it was not only communally orientated Muslims who gave vent to suspicions; we have already observed a man like Muhammad Ali showing them, and at last even Deoband, despite its deep-rooted nationalist sympathies, was effected by the *shuddhi* and *sanghatan* movements.¹²²

Therefore, the developments in Hindu circles provoked reactions among the Muslims — the *tanzim* and *tabligh* movements.¹²³ *Tanzim* (organization) was started by Dr. Kitchlew in the summer of 1923 and adopted by the C.K.C. in 1924; beside Dr. Kitchlew, Shaukat Ali became its foremost leader. It was not anti-Hindu on principle, but, being the counterpart of the *sanghatan* movement, it could easily slide

in that direction and it did create unrest among Hindus. The *tabligh* movement, also organized in the summer of 1923, was the counterpart of the *shuddhi* movement: it promoted Muslim missionary activities. It assumed larger proportions than the *tanzim* movement; only the most stalwart Khilafatists, like the Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad, kept aloof from it.

Generally speaking, we think we may observe in those years some disposition of nationalist feelings, both among Hindus and Muslims, to a polarization towards communal feelings, apt to develop into downright communalism. It would, in our opinion, be senseless to put the blame for this deplorable process¹²⁴ on one side. Calling the *tanzim* and *tabligh* movements Muslim "reactions" towards the Hindu *shuddhi* and *sanghatan* movements, we might seem to put the blame on the latter. The use, however, of the word "reaction" is only justified by the fact that the latter movement started first, but we should bear in mind that Hindu "action", in this case, might very well be considered an answer to the fear of what Muslims might do eventually. Therefore it is, we think, impossible to decide which party started all the trouble; it is, probably, erroneous even to think in terms of "starting trouble", since the resulting trouble was not intended.

But it is not surprising that various efforts to restore unity¹²⁵ fell flat in this political climate. The contemporaries were not able to take a dispassionate view of the process, and accusations were brandished about. Muhammad Ali, still loyal to Gandhi, attacked Lajpat Rai and the "moderate" Congressmen who, lacking contact with the Indian people themselves, had followed Gandhi because of his appeal to the masses; they had never really supported the Khilafat cause, and now, by joining the *Hindu Mahasabha* exposed themselves as communalists.¹²⁶

Stumbling blocks on the road towards unity were chiefly the kind of future government the parties would tie themselves down to — federal or not — and the form of electorates — joint or separate. That questions like these, having been settled in the Lucknow pact, came up afresh is in itself a sign that communal tension had reappeared. The hesitating, wavering attitude of an Indian nationalist like Muhammad Ali concerning these problems is evinced by two articles he published in the *Comrade* a month apart.¹²⁷ In the first, he proposes joint electorates as the ultimate goal, but considers separate ones indispensable for the time being; in the second, however, he advises his co-religionists to abandon communal representation from now on. *Swaraj* will prove to be the remedy for all ills from which communal relations are suffering

in the present situation. But if Muslim hopes on these points should be belied under *swaraj*, "... there is nothing that can prevent the Muslims from seeking and securing justice through Civil War or through Civil Disobedience." If leaders had to advocate unity by pointing out such means of redress, it is small wonder that they did not succeed.

So the Khilafat movement, having lost its primary goal, the Caliphate, now found the road towards its secondary one blocked too. Of its prominent leaders, Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari remained within the Congress fold;¹²⁸ the Ali brothers in the long run severed their relations with it and became its virulent critics.¹²⁹ The movement went to pieces in an atmosphere of disputatious squabbles.¹³⁰ Significantly, it was a question in which Indian nationalism was at stake — the Nehru report of 1928¹³¹ — which caused so much discord among the remaining Khilafatists that no All-India Khilafat Conference could be called afterwards.¹³²

We intend to conclude our account of the Khilafat movement by two quotations from Muhammad Ali, demonstrating how difficult it was to reconcile this movement with Indian nationalism. The first one¹³³ is borrowed from his address to the last All-India Khilafat Conference, presided over by himself: "Islam means peace, and nationalism means war. God made Islam to link all mankind in one family and one community. This is my communalism. All mankind is divided into nations each being enemy of others. This is your nationalism which leads to war... My communalism is to bring all into the fold of Islam by loving persuasion and service. The Koran says that there is no government but the government of God."

The second is far more matter-of-fact and brings home its truth very effectively. It comes from the last address he delivered in his life, at the Round Table Conference in London, on November 19, 1930. Referring to "the old maxim of 'divide and rule'", he told the British: "But there is a division of labour here. We divide and you rule"¹³⁴ — the words of a man completely disillusioned in his fight for unity.

CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATION

In this, the last chapter of our study, we want to discuss some general questions like: what was the nature of the Khilafat movement, what were the reasons of its collapse — questions very much interrelated — and what were its results?

In order to come to grips with these problems, we might start from one the answer to which would not seem to be at all in doubt: was the Khilafat movement anti-British? If we pay attention to the vehement language in which British policy was denounced by, for instance, the Ali brothers, we can well understand that the Government of India's officers were complaining bitterly of their "objectionable", "inflammatory" and "seditious" speeches. They had good reasons to stress the anti-British character of the movement — if the intention to oust all British power from India¹ is not to be called anti-British, what else might be? And yet there is something more to be said about it.

In the first place, the Khilafat movement and the upsurge of Indian nationalism which it helped to reinforce in the years between 1920 and 1923 are not to be considered as isolated events. They had their place in a movement of a far wider range: the anti-western reaction among several Asian and, to a lesser degree, some African peoples after the war of 1914-18.² The ensuing conflicts coincided with religious and racial contrasts, but these differences, according to Toynbee, masked the real conflict which he considered to be one between different cultures. Perhaps we should view the situation in a still wider perspective, and look upon these conflicts as originating in an effort towards emancipation from foreign domination,³ an effort availing itself of all possible conflict-matter: economic, political, religious, cultural, and so on whatever presented itself. It was a reaction turning mostly against western powers, those being the foreign masters to get rid of, but it could also turn against Asians, as is proved by the Arab revolt against Turkish rule, and anti-Japanese sentiment and action in China. For this reason, the new nationalism in Asia and Africa was charged with dangerous

possibilities for all minorities, except those that deliberately threw in their lot with the majorities among whom they lived.⁴

It is in this perspective that we should see the situation of Indian Muslims about 1920. They were, considered in the structure of India as a whole, a minority — and were they willing to throw in their lot unconditionally with the Hindu majority? In the non-co-operation movement a good many of them did: religious and middle class leaders as well as the masses. As we have observed, among middle class and notably among upper class Muslims there was some reserve in this respect. But, whatever other reasons for an anti-British attitude they may have had, the immediate cause of their alliance with the Hindus was British policy towards the Sultan-Caliph and Turkey, which roused their anger as Muslims. This reason, however, would for the most part disappear if Great Britain and Turkey were to bury the hatchet, as they did at Lausanne in 1923. For many Khilafatists, we think, the anti-British tendencies of their movement were more or less accidental. This does not apply to all of them — not to those who had other reasons as well: middle class Muslims who felt thwarted by British rule and British exploitation of India,⁵ and Muslim divines who rejected British rule and British civilization as inimical to Islam.⁶ These leaders contended that the only means of saving the Caliphate and Turkey would be Indian independence.⁷ But by 1923 this assumption had proved to be only partly correct, for Turkey at least was saved — and the stubborn Khilafat leaders lost their following.

Indian Muslims, certainly, could take up the Indian national cause for its own sake. They were Indians too, and an effort to expel the British from India would be quite in keeping with the general anti-foreign trend. But who would succeed to British rule? The Indians — or the Hindus? Would ousting one foreign master from power not mean setting up another “foreign” master in his place? This fear, it seems, was never wholly absent from the Indian Muslims’ mind; we find it even among those who were willing to co-operate with the Hindus. Therefore their alliance with the majority was never unconditional: it started with the Lucknow pact, carefully stipulating the rights of both communities in a future, self-governing India, and when in 1928, with the Simon Commission in sight, an effort was made to resume Hindu-Muslim unity, it was the Nehru report, envisaging a change in these conditions on which the attempt broke down. The Government of India may have done something to promote discord by encouraging the setting up of a “loyal” separate Muslim League,⁸ but it was able to do so

because many Muslims resented the Nehru report. Distrust with regard to Hindu aims was never absent on the Muslim side.⁹

In this situation, the British foe might become a British ally. The vast majority of the Indian Muslim community probably never lost its awareness of this fact, even though it was, temporarily, drowned in the tumult of protestations of Hindu-Muslim unity and anti-British sentiment — a sentiment which was not lacking either among Indian Muslims. But it is exactly the temporary character of these anti-British cries which makes us doubt, not their sincerity, but their essential quality. The Ali brothers, as young men, had admired the British and from about 1930 onwards sided with the British again.¹⁰ Some Khilafatists took their leave from the movement at an early stage, perhaps partly because they did not want to be mixed up in a mass movement, but also partly because of the anti-British attitude it displayed openly; other men, like Amir Ali and the Agha Khan, fully sympathising with Turkey and the Caliphate and pleading their cause, wholly abstained from the Khilafat agitation in India; others again, like Chotani, did play an important part in this agitation, but were considered by the Agha Khan not to be unreservedly anti-British.¹¹ Their attitude may have to do, in most of these cases, with the fact that these men belonged to the upper strata of Muslim society, and their position was more or less dependent on the British-established order in India. But there are indications that other men, too, could at least consider striking a less anti-British attitude than they did in public.

An unexpected example is offered in this context by Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan, the head of the Deoband seminary. Mr. Silberrad, the Collector in Saharanpur, had an interview with him in August, 1920, and after the Maulana's death in November, 1920, another with Habib-ur-Rahman, head of the Arabic school at Deoband, in January, 1921. Mahmud-ul-Hasan was reported to have said, "... that the real and only essential grievance is as regards the Hedjaz, that rightly or wrongly the Mahomedans have it firmly fixed in their minds that the Sharif of Mecca is merely a puppet of the English, and that consequently the Holy Cities are practically under our control; and that if they would be convinced otherwise all the life would be taken out of the agitation, and that he himself, if Government would take steps to convince them of this, would exert all his influence to support Government both in India and across the frontier." Asked as to how he and the Indian Muslims generally could be convinced of this, he replied, "... that the Sharif must be told to make peace with the Caliph, and accept in some

measure at least his suzerainty . . . He said that all the rest of the late Turkish Empire, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Syria, Palestina, etc., did not matter in his eyes, or in the eyes of the genuine Mahomedan, and that he would say so clearly and publicly once there was a definite promise about the Hedjaz. That Shaukat Ali and Mahomed Ali's influence was a very ephemeral matter compared with his. His suggestion was that he should moot the idea to his immediate friends, and let it spread gradually, but he was most insistent that no word of it was to be made public through Government or otherwise than through him, as in such case much of his influence as the author of the arrangement would be gone; also the extremists would oppose it, as depriving them of the power of making political capital out of Mahomedan religious discontent."

In the second interview, Habib-ur-Rahman corroborated the Maulana's opinion. "Given assurances on these points . . . he says the ulemas would support Government, and would be followed by all the religious Mahomedans; he does not pretend that it would reconcile the irreconcilable element, such as the political (as opposed to the religious) leaders, *e.g.*, Ansari, Ajmal-ul-Mulk and Shaukat Ali, but he says that all the real sting would be taken out of the agitation among the Mahomedans." This second interview added one note lacking in the first: "Habib-ur-Rahman told me that he and the Ulema generally strong(ly?) objected to action of some of the leaders in subordinating their religion to Hindu-Mohamedan unity; *e.g.*, he specially mentioned with strong disapprobation Shaukat Ali's wearing a *tilak* of sandalwood at Madras, and the proposal to abandon *qurbani*."

We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports on these talks, but their significance is less certain.¹² They might be taken as a shrewd attempt to hoodwink a government official with regard to genuine opinions and intentions, but they may also point to the fact that even among prominent religious leaders the possibility of calling off the anti-British policy could be considered. And we take it that the reasons hinted at were real: they distrusted the more westernized "extremist" leaders of the "political" group,¹³ and they feared to lose something of their own Muslim identity in the alliance with the Hindus.¹⁴ It is, after all, hardly probable that a movement of such momentum would have been sustained only by negative — in this case anti-British — feelings; its very volume and intensity justify a search for some positive contents. Of what nature were these? We think it was a movement of a group searching for its own identity and trying to assert it. In the words of Binder, the Khilafat movement was "a

supraterritorial justification of the separateness of Islamic society in India.”¹⁵ Or, to quote an expression from Watson, it was “the struggle of the Indian Muslims to create a world in which they could live Islamically as Indians”.¹⁶

But both of these definitions¹⁷ point to some troubles lying ahead for the Khilafatists. They were not only Muslims and, on that account, Pan-Islamists, but Indians too — they were bound by two loyalties. Was it possible to combine these? Some leaders, evidently, thought they could do so. As an instance we quote from Abul Kalam Azad’s presidential address to the Ramgarh Congress session in 1940: “I am a Musalman and I am proud that I am a Musalman. I have inherited the glorious traditions of thirteen centuries of Islam. I am not prepared to see an iota of this perish. The teachings of Islam, its history and traditions, its art and sciences, and all that can be epitomized as Islamic culture is my treasure; and it is my bounden duty to protect and preserve it. As a Muslim in a particular religious and cultural sphere I possess an individuality on which no encroachment is acceptable. Yet, with all this, I have another feeling too, and this feeling is the creation of the realities of my life. Islam is in no way opposed to this. It is, as a matter of fact, a guide on this path. I feel with pride that I am an Indian. I am an element of the indivisible United Indian Nation; an inalienable element, without which the image of its greatness remains incomplete; and, in no circumstances, can I give up this position.”¹⁸

For the Maulana, evidently, there existed no conflict between his first loyalty, towards Islam, and his second, towards India; on the contrary, the former was “a guide on the path” towards the latter. But Abul Kalam Azad was a complex personality who could combine Pan-Islamism with Indian nationalism, and even he had not always seen fit to do so — in 1913 he had still rejected political co-operation with the Hindus,¹⁹ and it was only in the days of the Khilafat movement that he had developed his ideas about composite nationalism.

Not all Indian Muslims, however, could follow him along this path. The Deoband ulama and the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama* did,²⁰ but when the enthusiasm of the years 1920-1922 had died away, the Muslim intellectual élite as well as the masses refused to take this lead,²¹ since it did not offer them much guidance in the tragic conflict of communalism in the face of Hindu revivalism and superior strength.²² Even in the Khilafat days most of them probably had not been able wholly to identify themselves with India. The emblem of the Khilafat delegation stationery was made up of two overlapping circles of equal size, with

the word "Khilafat" in one, and the word "India" in the other.²³ In this emblem we see a clear indication of a potential conflict of divided loyalties — a conflict which, some years afterwards, was also expressed in words by Muhammad Ali: "I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and the other is the Muslim world."²⁴

If we were to apply this metaphor to Abul Kalam Azad's view of the same problem we would see concentric circles. Though we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Muhammad Ali's declarations of Indian nationalism in his Khilafatist years, we think it probable that he never went quite as far in this respect as Abul Kalam Azad; in his heart he always remained "Muslim first, Indian afterwards."²⁵ Perhaps, if the combined effort of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements had resulted in some definite success, Indian nationalism might have got more firmly entrenched among Indian Muslims.²⁶ The failure of this effort, however, was an impediment to the realization of this possibility.

In these observations we have, strictly speaking, already given our answer to the question of whether the Khilafat movement was nationalist or not, and mainly in the negative, at least when we think in terms of Indian nationalism, though we admit that it may have presented chances in this respect. One might call it nationalist in a very general way, in that it was anti-foreign, and strove for independence, and wanted to decide by itself its relations to other nations — but it had not quite decided which specific nation to set up in independence. Therefore, its relation to Indian nationalism was never a perfectly happy one, even if some of its leaders wanted to direct it on that course and their adherents were not unwilling to follow them.

The Caliphate, however, was something affecting the Muslim community in India primarily, but in itself it held no importance for the Hindus; for the latter, it derived its importance from the fact that it offered them an opportunity of gaining Muslim friendship. Gandhi, explaining his attitude concerning the Khilafat movement in a letter to the Viceroy,²⁷ wrote: "I consider that as a staunch Hindu wishing to live on terms of the closest friendship with any of my Mussalman countrymen, I should be an unworthy son of India if I did not stand by them in their hour of trial." The Khilafat movement was for Gandhi, we cannot but conclude, an opportunity to cement Hindu-Muslim unity. However sincere his sympathy for his Muslim compatriots may have been, even in his case an element of opportunism was not lacking, and

undoubtedly with many of his co-religionists the ratio between sincere friendship and opportunism — men like Lala Lajpat Rai and Malaviya — will have been less gratifying. This makes us understand why the word “artificial” is so often used with regard to Hindu-Muslim unity in those years.²⁸ It might have been a natural unity if it had been focused on ends purely Indian — always supposing that both communities could agree on what the desirable ends were — but aimed at the preservation of the Caliphate and the power of Turkey, it certainly did contain an element of artificiality.

If for these reasons Indian nationalism was a difficult proposition for the Khilafatists, their Pan-Islamic starting-point also kept them from accepting other nationalisms — at least to some degree. Their repudiation of Arab nationalism as led and exploited by the Sharif of Mecca may partly be explained by their disgust for his British advisers in Cairo, but it also had to do with their indignation over the Sharif's betrayal of the Sultan-Caliph. It is remarkable that Turkish nationalism met with their complete approval as long as it maintained a semblance of Pan-Islamism and, when exposing its secular aims, was not at once vehemently condemned. The Arab conqueror Ibn Saud, too, found favour with many of them because he was expelling indirect British influence from the Holy Cities, but without any Pan-Islamic intentions. In both of these cases, however, they accepted the facts not as Khilafatists but rather as ex-Khilafatists, when their movement was disintegrating. Therefore these instances might constitute an indication that the Pan-Islamic feelings of the Khilafatists were less strong and pure than they would have had it appear — and perhaps sincerely believed themselves. This was another reason for British observers to dub the Khilafat agitation as “artificial”²⁹ — an opinion which, by the way, was very apt to make them underrate its force. Perhaps we may characterize this aspect of the Khilafat movement as follows: it was a movement which might have taken the road towards some form of Muslim nationalism, if it had not started on the wrong — *i.e.* Pan-Islamic — foot.

By this we mean: the Indian Khilafat movement started as a communal movement trying to consolidate Muslim solidarity. By emphasizing this solidarity it strengthened the group consciousness of the Indian Muslim community. But since its direct object was a question of foreign policy — or at least a question that was treated as such by other interested parties, like Great Britain and Turkey — it stressed the need for an Indian Muslim foreign policy of its own. It questioned the validity

of British supremacy in this respect. Muslim loyalty to the Empire was declared to be "conditional" on the preservation of their religious freedom,³⁰ which in this case compelled Indian Muslims to repudiate British foreign policy. In other words, their need for independence was stressed, their need to acquire a status that would enable them to act in their own right in international relations. This status might have been won by Indian independence if Indian Muslims had felt that they could rely on the good faith of their Hindu compatriots. As it was, however, distrust with regard to Hindu intentions never wholly disappeared, and therefore the Indian Muslims were more or less thrown back on themselves. This feeling may not have been equally strong in all sections of the Muslim community; the middle class leaders probably were more open to it than the ulama, but it determined the attitude of the larger part of the community. In this situation they might have developed the feeling of being a nation, with a right to complete independence, if they had not been hampered by their Pan-Islamism, which prevented them from concentrating on their own particular interests and on their own identity as a specific group of Muslims.³¹

The next question we must pay attention to is whether the Khilafat movement was primarily a religious or a political movement. In a certain sense, this is a sham problem because of the inseparability of these categories in Islamic thought; we have observed, for instance, how the demand for "religious suzerainty" was taken up by the Sultan-Caliph precisely for the sake of its political implications. Yet we cannot ignore the question completely, since at the time the problem was put in those words.

But we consider it mainly a terminological problem. We refer to the case of Muhammad Ali, stating that religion was his sole *locus standi* when pleading the cause of the Khilafat³² — whereas Lord Curzon was of the opinion that "... Constantinople is the symbol to the East not of spiritual predominance, but of political power."³³ The contradiction implied in these assertions arises from the fact that the former is using the word religion in an Islamic sense, including things temporal as well as spiritual, while the latter is using the word political in a western sense, which is completely secular.

Not quite the same case is offered by the interviews between Mr. Silberrad and the Deoband leader Habib-ur-Rahman,³⁴ when the latter distinguished between religious as opposed to political leaders. Here the difference is, it would seem to us, related to the question of ends and means. "Political" should be understood as referring to leaders whose

protestations of Islamic faith masked their true end, Indian nationalism, and who subordinated their religion to Hindu-Muslim unity, while "religious" is the characteristic reserved for leaders for whom Indian independence was a possible, an ultimate means to ensure the freedom of the Indian Muslims to live according to Islamic law. In this case it would, in our opinion, be appropriate to speak about Khilafatists who identified themselves with their fellow-Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike, and those who clung primarily to their Muslim identity. In this sense, we think, the words are also used by Muhammad Shafi, a member of the Viceroy's Council, writing³⁵ about the "complete misapprehension" prevailing in certain quarters in England, "... that the Khilafat movement in India is not religious but is part of the political movement for Indian Swaraj." He adds that, if the Caliph's religious suzerainty over the Holy Places of Islam were recognized, "... the religious sentiment of at least the vast majority of the Indian Mussalmans will thereby be satisfied and an immediate split between Gandhi's Swarajists and the Khilafat Party will almost automatically follow."³⁶

Discussing the nature of the movement we have, at the same time, approached a solution of the problem of its sudden and complete collapse. This is a subject on which many authors make some observations; we found a coherent treatment of it only in Watson's study. The remarks most often to be met are (a) that Gandhi's sudden cancelling of the non-co-operation movement caused a fatal frustration, and (b) that the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate deprived the movement of its very base. Both observations are, in our opinion, undoubtedly correct, but we do not think they explain everything.

One might try to distinguish between external and internal causes of the movement's collapse. Under the first head would be listed, probably, both factors just mentioned because both of them could hardly be influenced directly by the Indian Khilafatists. But considering them, therefore, as external causes would betray a shallow judgment; after all, the choosing of an ally whose aims differ from one's own — accepting even the leadership of this ally — and of a cause the survival of which one may oneself hardly influence, is not a wholly external factor, but one pertaining to one's own nature. A really external cause might be found in the improvement of economic conditions,³⁷ and we would not deny the possible influence of this factor,³⁸ but there is no proof whatever that the Khilafatists were aware of it themselves and therefore we are not inclined to attach too much importance to it. We think we should look for the causes of its downfall mainly in the nature of the movement

itself. Another reason for seeking the cause of the Khilafat movement's demise in the patient's constitution itself is the fact that its fellow-patient, the non-co-operation movement, did survive, and after some years arose from its sickbed, to confront the Government of India with fresh troubles.

In Watson's opinion, the Khilafat movement was realistic in its approach to communal relations in that it correctly appraised the necessity of Hindu-Muslim unity if it wanted to wrest any concessions from the British;³⁹ on the other hand, he admits that he Khilafatists judged the problems arising from this attempt at unity hopelessly impractically, acting as "visionaries" or in an "intoxication".⁴⁰ We are inclined to agree with him on both points, but subject to the reservation that the latter restriction deprives the first statement of much of its worth. According to him, the movement's failure was mainly due to the fact that its stated objectives: the rescue of the Caliphate and *swaraj* for India were unattainable at short notice; it was lack of any short-term achievements that killed the movement.⁴¹

Here we do not quite agree with him. We think he is right when he declares that the Caliphate was not to be saved, because it was an antiquated notion in which the majority of the Muslims outside India was no longer interested; we will return to this point later. Nor was *swaraj* to be attained in those years as Watson defines it: he is thinking in terms of complete independence, and it seems improbable that Great Britain could be forced to concede this to India at this juncture. But the notion of *swaraj* was a very elastic one. If the combined Hindu-Muslim effort had succeeded in wresting major concessions from the British — and in December, 1921, it came very near to this⁴² — these might have been conceived as representing *swaraj*. Looked at in this way, *swaraj* was not as unattainable as Watson considers it, and the problem becomes one of why the movement proved unable to obtain this limited form of *swaraj*. In our opinion, the reasons should be sought in the vulnerable character of Hindu-Muslim co-operation, and in the tensions arising from the fact that what had developed into a mass movement was commanded by a middle-class leadership not quite happy about the kind of following it had got.

But first we will discuss why the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism no longer constituted suitable objectives for a religio-political movement in those days. Several authors remark upon the disparity between the sphere of thought and sentiment the Khilafatists were moving in, and their sphere of action.⁴³ Their ideal of Pan-Islamism was based upon

a romantic view of Islamic unity at the time of the four "rightly guided" Caliphs,⁴⁴ but they had to act in a world where this unity was hailed from motives which had little to do with Islam, and therefore stunted a healthy growth of Pan-Islamism. In this respect, the Indian Muslims were out of tune with their age and their environment, without however realizing this.

A disparity of this kind will always be, to some degree, the lot of a revivalist movement, but it may be lucky enough to strive for the realization of its ideals in a world not wholly unsympathetic to them. But Pan-Islamism was a dying cause,⁴⁵ or perhaps we had better say that it was fading away from the realm of realities into that of remote possibilities.⁴⁶ This was why the abolition of the Caliphate was a death-blow to the Khilafat movement: if Pan-Islamism had been a reality in the Muslim world at large, the Khilafatists might have found another outlet for their endeavours, another symbol for their aspirations. But they were out of touch with the religio-political realities outside India.⁴⁷ They did not know that Abdul-Hamid II, as well as his enemies, the Young Turks, thought only about the safety of his own throne and the preservation and greatness of Turkey, when propagating Pan-Islamic unity. We have already noted that Muhammad Ali's *Comrade*, before the Great War, was not well-informed about other Muslim countries;⁴⁸ also there was the complete lack of knowledge among Khilafatists with regard to the secular turn taken by Turkish nationalism, and about the force of Arab nationalism. Even an observer like the Agha Khan, who was in a position to have access at every kind of information, was surprisingly ill-informed about these matters, and consequently could blunder naïvely.⁴⁹ Thus the extra-territorial Muslim loyalty was limited to "a one-way traffic"⁵⁰: neither Turks nor Arabs cared much about the troubles of their co-religionists. On the other hand, their attitude was perhaps not quite undeserved: the Indian Muslims' Pan-Islamism was, probably not to a little degree, inspired by selfish motives. They wanted solidarity to profit by it, for they felt in need of support against British power, and insecure vis-à-vis the Hindu majority. In Turkey, at least, there was a feeling that Indian Muslims had not given any support to the Turks in their hour of need.⁵¹ So the Indian Pan-Islamists could hardly complain about not finding much understanding of their needs outside India. The argument may be not quite correct, since Indian Khilafatists really did exert themselves to help Turkey after the war, but if this was the way the Turks looked upon it, it proves once more the disparity between the Indians' own view of their role and its

appraisal by other Muslims.

Another instance of the erroneous estimate the Indian Muslims made of the world they were actually living in is shown by the high hopes they pinned on Afghanistan. This was understandable in 1919, when Amir Amanullah encouraged them and made war on the British power in India. But even then Indian Khilafat leaders might have realized that the Afghans stood no chance against a modern, well-equipped army, and the masses might have gathered as much from what demobilized soldiers told them. And when we see talk of an Afghan invasion still being raked up in 1925, we may state once again: the Khilafat leaders were out of tune with the world they were living in. The same circumstance, we think, partly explains the Khilafat leaders' encouraging the *hijrat* to Afghanistan. They were taking a grave responsibility, for they should have known better than to send their followers on this quest, but we should see their attitude in the context of the climate of self-delusion prevailing in their midst.

Perhaps the most fatal error resulting from their romantic illusionism was constituted by their supposition that Hindu-Muslim unity had only to be proclaimed to be a fact. The alliance with Gandhi and Congress was hailed as Hindu-Muslim unity achieved, but this rosy picture was revealed to be largely fictitious. In our opinion, B. M. Chaudhuri's statement that this alliance showed "the realities of Hindu-Muslim unity when it is based on action and struggle and the tremendous possibilities of that unity when the communities realise that they are bound by ties of common sorrows and sufferings and actuated by the spirit of nationalism",⁵² is a little off the mark: it takes for granted that conditions were fulfilled which actually were not, or at least not sufficiently. Hindus and Muslims were suffering only partly from the same wounds, and the spirit of nationalism was not absent, but it did not prove strong enough to overcome the spirit of communalism. A common success might have given them a tremendous push towards nationalism, but this did not materialize. On the other hand, the same common success might have constituted the starting-point for a further struggle between the poor masses and the propertied classes, and this may have been a reason why these classes preferred communalism to nationalism.

Thus far, we have been stressing the "romantic" aspects of the Khilafat movement, the aspects which made it lose touch with the realities of its own age and environment. But it would not do to describe the Khilafatists as out and out romanticists, living wholly in a world of their own making. Had this been the case, they would probably have

scored no more than a literary or a verbal success. As it was, they led a movement of great, if temporary, force, and therefore they cannot have been completely unaware of the world around them. For a long time, politics in India had been the province of the upper and middle classes only; it was only about 1920 that the masses were drawn into them, and it was the merit of the Khilafat leaders that they were able to rouse the Muslim masses. Mass participation proved to be an effective means of pressure upon the British Raj. But it would seem that the Khilafat leaders were not able to handle their own success in this respect. Roughly dividing the leaders into two groups — the westernized middle class group and the ulama — we think that the former shied back from the unruly character of its own following, whereas the latter were too deeply and too exclusively immersed in religious issues (or the religious aspects of political issues) to keep a hold on them. These inner contradictions, provoking tensions even during the movement's heyday, made it disintegrate when the hopes of a startling success had been lost.

How far, actually, did its success go? We should distinguish here between at least two fields in which the Khilafatists sought success. The first was that of the Allies' policy towards Turkey and the Caliphate. We need not dwell on this subject very long, because we have discussed it in the preceding chapters. Our conclusion is that the Khilafatists succeeded by and large in bringing the Government of India to taking up their demands. This in itself, perhaps, would not have needed much Khilafatist pressure, but at any rate it was due to that pressure that the Government of India expressed Muslim feelings with great emphasis in London.

The Khilafatists, however, failed almost completely in impressing their views on the British Government, which was the authority that really mattered. Khilafat agitation probably counted for something in the British decision regarding Turkish rights in Constantinople in January, 1920, but we have our doubts concerning the veracity of British declarations that this decision was largely influenced by the desire not to hurt Muslim susceptibilities.⁵³ In the cabinet meeting deciding this question,⁵⁴ the Indian Muslims' feelings were certainly taken into account, but we get the impression that military considerations and rivalry with France were of no less, probably even of greater importance. At any rate, British allowances for Muslim feeling were not great enough to keep the British Government from occupying the same city two months later. And the change-over from the treaty of Sèvres to that of Lausanne was entirely due to Turkish military successes and

the British desire to restore British influence in the Near East.⁵⁵

The second field to consider is that of Indian politics. On this account the judgement will be influenced by what one thinks to be the essential aim of the Khilafatists. On the face of it, this would seem to be the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity, in order to strengthen Indian nationalism — irrespective of whether Indian nationalism was, for the Khilafatists, and end in itself or a means to get a stronger lever on the British policy regarding Turkey and the Caliphate. If considered this way, there is no reason for exultation. Notwithstanding its promising start, Hindu-Muslim unity was fatally injured by the riots the masses indulged in, and by the mutual distrust caused by the failure of their combined efforts. Congress, it is true, did retain a prominent Khilafat leader like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who was no mean asset to his party; some other Khilafat leaders constituted the Nationalist Muslim Party, operating within Congress, but often in conflict with majority decisions about Congress policy.⁵⁶ But these leaders did not, in the long run, succeed in retaining their following.⁵⁷

Thus far, our account of the Khilafat movement's success has not been impressive — rather distressing, one would think, when considering the sacrifices made in its name, and the expectations it provoked in its heyday. This, we think, is the reason why not unfrequently it has been judged succinctly in words like “tragic”, “fantastic self-sacrifice”, “wasted energies”, and so on.⁵⁸ But, as we argued before, the Khilafat movement's aims in Indian politics were too complicated to be expressed in the one notion of “Indian nationalism”; it contained germs not only of this, but also of some kind of Muslim nationalism. Indian Muslims themselves could hardly be aware of this, and certainly not be articulate about it, since no adequate theory of nationalism, reconciling their Pan-Islamic sentiment to the exigencies of a world in which nationalism was the coming force, had yet been offered to them. They had to wait for Iqbal, who argued that “. . . in the existing world situation Islam could best survive neither by narrow nationalism nor in the naive dream of re-establishing a universal state, but in a multi-national free association, in something like a League of Nations of Islam.”⁵⁹ This “multi-national pan-Islamism”⁶⁰ was perhaps what some Khilafatists had dimly envisaged in the early twenties. Reacting to the abolition of the Turkish Sultanate, by which the Caliph lost his temporal power, they had voiced the idea of a “Muslim League of Nations”, still linking it, however, with the institution of the Caliphate,⁶¹ whereas Muhammad Ali, some years later, showed himself to be as averse to nationalism as ever.⁶² So

we need not wonder that Iqbal, though attracted at first to the Khilafat movement, was soon repelled by the naiveté of its leaders.⁶³ But we do not think it improbable that this movement may have prepared the Indian Muslims for taking up Iqbal's ideas and the movement for Pakistan in the thirties.⁶⁴

This we may consider a success of the Khilifaf movement, but we should bear in mind that this success was no less devoid of tragedy than the lack of success we were pointing out before. One aspect of the movement was its highly emotional character,⁶⁵ which made it unruly, undisciplined and apt to get out of hand — qualities not recommending it to middle-class leaders. This, we think, was one reason why Jinnah abstained from it. "Jinnah's ideas about Muslim nationalism can be judged by his neutralist attitude towards the Caliphate movement which had affected virtually all Moslems. He believed that a false religious frenzy coloured Indian political activity, which would ultimately do more harm than good to India in general and Moslems in particular"⁶⁶ — this is Malik's opinion, the key words of which are "religious frenzy". As a westernized Muslim leader, Jinnah did not care for a great influence of the traditional religious leaders in politics; but as a man of compromise — and his subsequent career should not make us forget that he was a man of compromise until about 1930 — he had no less dislike of the passions which would upset cautious and reasonable solutions of complex problems. And lastly, Jinnah had entered politics as an Indian nationalist and a member of Congress. He may well have feared that religion by itself did not constitute a sufficient basis for any nationalism. We have characterized the Khilafat leaders as men living in dreams and illusions — and the kind of Muslim nationalism which thrived on the soil prepared by their movement may well have inherited something of their lack of realism. The subsequent history of Pakistan proves that the problems it provoked were at least grossly underestimated.

But Muslim League leaders may well have drawn from the events between 1919 and 1924 the conclusion that, in order to get a hold on the Muslim masses in India, one had to make an emotional appeal to Islam. This could not fail to bring about in their following enthusiasm, but hatred as well. In preparing the way for Muslim nationalism the Khilafat movement was pointing to the future, but also to its ugly aspects.

SAMENVATTING

Ter inleiding bespreken wij enkele algemene aspecten van het nationalisme zoals zich dat in Brits-Indië ontwikkelde. Daarbij komt met name aan de orde de verhouding tussen nationalisme en communalisme, als een belangrijk facet waarvan wij de relaties zien tussen deze stromingen enerzijds en de staat anderzijds, waardoor het aannemelijk wordt dat communalisme zich ontwikkelen kan tot nationalisme als de rol die de staat speelt in de samenleving verandert. Tevens komt ter sprake de houding die het Britse bestuur aannam tegenover het opkomende nationalisme. Een veelvuldig voorkomende opvatting is dat het een verdeel-en-heers-politiek voerde maar wij betogen, zonder het bestaan daarvan te ontkennen, dat een dergelijke politiek moeilijk te verenigen was met de democratiseringstendens die sinds Curzons bewind het bestuur over Brits-Indië begon te kenmerken.

Daarna volgt een schets van de opkomst van het Indisch nationalisme in de 19e eeuw, voornamelijk onder de hindoes en leidend tot de stichting van het *Indian National Congress*. Bij de Indische moslims, althans bij de onder westerse invloed komende elite, bestaat in diezelfde periode de neiging toenadering te zoeken tot de Britten; dit is de weg die Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan hun wijst. Deze meent dat de moslims hun culturele en maatschappelijke achterstand ten opzichte van de hindoes moeten inhalen en sticht daarom het *Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College* te Aligarh. Daarnaast ontstaat bij de moslims een groeiende belangstelling voor het Pan-Islamisme; dit krijgt aanhang zowel onder de eerder genoemde groep als onder de ulama, met name die van Deoband. In het Pan-Islamisme neemt de idee van het Kalifaat een voorname plaats in als symbool van eenheid, van vroegere macht en van een islamitische renaissance, waarbij men vooral teruggrijpt op het voorbeeld van de eerste vier "recht geleide" kaliefen.

In deze situatie verslechtert omstreeks 1900 de verhouding tussen hindoes en moslims. Een symptoom is dat de moslims zich steeds minder inlaten met het *Congress*; factoren die de verwijdering bevorderen zijn o.a. de verdeling van Bengalen en de door Morley en Minto ingevoerde hervormingen van 1909. De moslims stichten in deze periode een eigen

politieke organisatie in de *Muslim League*. Na ca. 1910 echter wordt de verhouding tussen de beide groepen beter. Een belangrijke rol speelt hierbij het feit dat de verdeling van Bengalen in 1911 ongedaan wordt gemaakt, als ook de Engels-Russische toenadering, waarna Engeland Turkije niet meer steunt in zijn conflicten met Italië en de Balkanstaten. De Indische moslims gaan Engeland zien als een vijand van de Islam.

Een eerste climax bereikt deze ontwikkeling als Turkije in 1914 de zijde der Centralen kiest. Dan reeds ontstaat er, doch voorlopig nog vormeloos en ongeorganiseerd, een begin van de Khilafat-beweging in acties van de gebroeders Ali, Abdul Bari, het hoofd van de Deoband-school Mahmud-ul-Hasan, e.a. In deze Khilafat-beweging verbindt zich de wens om steun te verlenen aan het Kalifaat en Turkije met nationalistische tendensen. De beweging krijgt een verdere stimulans door de Arabische opstand tegen Turkije in 1916, waardoor het Osmaanse Kalifaat bedreigd wordt en een herstel van het Arabische Kalifaat, maar dan geheel onder Engelse invloed, naderbij lijkt te komen. In de *Muslim League*, die tot omstreeks 1910 vertrouwd had op het Engelse bewind, breekt de opvatting door dat toenadering tot het *Congress* noodzakelijk is, en in het *Lucknow Pact* van 1916 worden deze beide organisaties het eens over de hervormingen die zij samen zullen nastreven: een programma van grotere invloed van de Indiërs in het Brits-Indische bestuur, waarbij echter de communale rechten van de moslims gewaarborgd worden.

Als in 1918 de oorlog beëindigd is spitsen de verhoudingen zich toe. Factoren die hierbij een rol spelen zijn de economische moeilijkheden en de prijsstijgingen in de jaren 1917-1921, de bij de moslims heersende angst dat Turkije geheel verdeeld zal worden door de Geallieerden waardoor het Kalifaat alle feitelijke macht zal verliezen, de vijandelijkheden met Afghanistan, de hoop die Engeland wekt door de Montagu-Chelmsford-hervormingen aan te kondigen, daartegenover de dreiging van onderdrukking van alle Indisch nationalisme door de Rowlatt Act, en tenslotte het optreden van Gandhi, onder wiens invloed de politieke activiteit in Brits-Indië een ander karakter krijgt.

Nu organiseert de Khilafat-beweging zich in de *Khilafat Conference* en het *Central Khilafat Committee*, die in nauwe samenwerking met Gandhi opereren. De *Muslim League*, die zich gematigder opstelt, treedt politiek op de achtergrond, maar naast deze organisaties ontstaat de *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind*, een organisatie waarin de ulama van Deoband de toon aangeven en die nauw samenwerkt met de Khilafat-beweging en het *Congress*. Deze samenwerking krijgt gestalte in de non-coöperatie-

beweging, die in de loop van 1920 haar programma formuleert en leidt tot een voor Brits-Indische verhoudingen vrijwel unieke verbroedering tussen hindoes en moslims. De moslims, wier meest op de voorgrond tredende leider in die tijd Muhammad Ali is, komen steeds dichterbij het Indisch nationalisme te staan, daar zij bij de Britse regering geen gehoor vinden voor hun eisen betreffende Turkeije en de positie van de kalief.

Deze non-coöperatie-beweging wordt een echte massabeweging. Deze ontwikkeling roept spanningen op. De leiding blijft grotendeels nog in handen van figuren uit de middenklasse met gevestigde belangen welke direct of indirect samenhangen met het Britse bewind, terwijl een groot deel van de volgelingen minder behoefte heeft die gevestigde belangen te ontzien. Er ontstaan interne tegenstellingen zowel in het *Congress* als onder de moslims, blijkend o.a. uit het feit dat juist hooggeplaatste moslims zich weer van de Khilafat-beweging gaan distancieren. Ook de verhouding tussen hindoes en moslims wordt weldra op de proef gesteld, onder meer doordat de Khilafatisten de neiging vertonen in hun acties verder te gaan dan het *Congress*. Dit blijkt bij voorbeeld uit hun bereidheid om de non-coöperatie uit te breiden tot de weigering om belasting te betalen — een stap die door het *Congress* pas later in het non-coöperatie-programma wordt opgenomen. Ook zijn het vooral de Khilafatisten die aandringen op een volledige onafhankelijkheidsverklaring en de uitroeping van een Indische Republiek als de Britse regering hun eisen niet zou inwilligen. Ook spelen zij met de gedachte van *jihād* met hulp van Afghanistan. Tenslotte vormt de Moplach-opstand in 1921 een belasting voor de relaties tussen hindoes en moslims.

De Brits-Indische regering neemt tegenover de non-coöperatie- en Khilafat-beweging in hoofdzaak een afwachtende houding aan, in de hoop dat de beweging zich belachelijk zal maken door de extravagantie en onuitvoerbaarheid van haar eisen. Lord Chelmsford bepaalt zijn houding duidelijk in deze zin en Lord Reading, de nieuwe onderkoning sinds april 1921, tracht aan deze lijn vast te houden. Er zijn zeer weinig aanwijzingen dat de Brits-Indische regering getracht zou hebben hindoes en moslims tegen elkaar uit te spelen in een verdeel-en-heers-politiek; daartegenover is het zeer duidelijk dat Chelmsford, Reading en de Engelse minister voor Brits-Indië, Montagu, geprobeerd hebben de gematigde elementen uit beide groepen voor zich te winnen door niet repressief op te treden, door te wijzen op het belang van de hervormingen die Engeland in de *Government of India Act* van 1919 toch al doorvoerde, en door tegemoet te komen aan de eisen van de Khilafat-

beweging waar dit kon. Met name betrof dit de Britse houding jegens Turkije en het Kalifaat; de Brits-Indische regering en Montagu bepleiten voortdurend een milde behandeling van Turkije en herziening van het verdrag van Sèvres. In het Britse kabinet vinden zij echter vooral Lloyd George en Curzon tegenover zich.

Dat de Brits-Indische regering zich deze houding veroorloven kan komt o.a. door de geweldloosheid die Gandhi predikt en van zijn volgelingen en bondgenoten eist. In de herfst van 1921 echter lijkt deze geweldloosheid in het gedrang te komen. *Congress*- en Khilafat-vrijwilligers treden agressiever op; het bezoek van de Prins van Wales aan Bombay leidt tot ernstige onlusten. Dan kan de regering haar afwachende houding moeilijk langer handhaven, temeer daar zij kritiek ontmoet bij conservatieve elementen in eigen kring, in de Britse regering en in het Parlement. In november gaat zij over tot massale arrestaties, die vooreerst echter geen ander resultaat hebben dan dat de gematigde elementen in Brits-Indië naar de zijde van de extremisten overhellen.

Reading heeft dan ook het gevoel met de rug tegen de muur te staan en is medio-december tot onderhandelingen bereid, waarop ook gematigde leiders als Malaviya en Jinnah aandringen die in een openlijk conflict met de Brits-Indische regering geen heil zien en de revolutionaire tendenties in de massabeweging vrezen. Vooral door Gandhi's hardnekkige houding echter komt het niet tot onderhandelingen; het blijft overigens de vraag of de Londense regering Readings politiek gedekt zou hebben, daar onderhandelingen tot duidelijke concessies aan de nationalistenvrouwen zouden moeten leiden. Een aanwijzing voor de verhoudingen binnen het Britse kabinet vormt Montagu's ontslag in februari 1922.

Wanneer Gandhi dan de actie om geen belasting meer te betalen aankondigt voor het district Bardoli neemt de Brits-Indische regering aan dat de gematigden haar zijde zullen kiezen en verklaart zich hier tegen met alle middelen te zullen verzetten. Vóór het evenwel zover komt, vindt het incident van Chauri Chaura plaats, waarop Gandhi de non-coöperatie-beweging voorlopig afgelast.

De non-coöperatie-beweging stort nu volledig ineen. De Khilafat-beweging, die er nauw mee verbonden was, krijgt ook een ernstige klap, maar kan zich toch langer handhaven. Haar specifieke doeleinden immers lagen grotendeels buiten de nationalistische beweging, en Turkije en het Kalifaat hebben nog steeds hulp nodig. Wel is inmiddels de situatie van Turkije minder benard geworden. Het regiem van Kemal Pasha heeft het verzet georganiseerd tegen het verdrag van Sèvres en

alle daarmee samenhangende inbreuken op Turkse rechten, zoals de Griekse inval in Smyrna en Anatolië. Het heeft daarbij de steun verworven van Sovjet-Rusland en eveneens, zij het in mindere mate, van Frankrijk en Italië.

Wanneer in de zomer van 1922 de Grieken verslagen worden dreigt er even een gewapend conflict tussen Engeland en de troepen van Kemal Pasha. Dit wordt voorkomen, maar deze crisis wordt wel een van de oorzaken van de val van Lloyd George's coalitie-regering. Nu verzet Engeland zich niet langer tegen herziening van de vrede van Sèvres, en in 1923 wordt dit verdrag vervangen door dat van Lausanne.

In deze situatie kan echter de tegenstelling tussen het oude Turkse bewind van Sultan-Kalief Mehmed VI en het nieuwe van Kemal Pasha niet langer verborgen blijven. Kemal Pasha zet de seculaire politiek van de Jong-Turken voort, een feit dat tot dusver aan de aandacht der Khilafatisten ontsnapt was. Op 1 november 1922 wordt het Sultanaat in Turkije opgeheven; de scheiding tussen wereldlijke en geestelijke macht van de kalief, waartegen de Khilafatisten zich altijd verzet hadden, werd daarmee een feit.

Anderhalf jaar later wordt ook het Kalifaat in Turkije afgeschaft, waarna koning Husain van Hidjaz zich tot kalief laat uitroepen. Husains pretenties echter vallen in de Arabische wereld niet in goede aarde en de Arabische vorst Ibn Saud verovert Husains koninkrijk.

Daarmee wordt de Kalifaatskwesitie losgemaakt van een anti-westerse tendens en komt te liggen in een sfeer van inter-Arabische rivaliteiten. Zij verliest haar belang voor de meerderheid der Indische Khilafatisten, afgezien van enkele hardnekkige leiders zoals de gebroeders Ali. Daar de inmiddels — na het falen van de non-coöperatie-beweging — toegenomen spanning tussen hindoes en moslims ook een concentratie op het Indisch nationalisme voor de Khilafatisten bijzonder moeilijk maakt, verloopt de hele beweging in de jaren 1922-1924. Enkele leiders vinden aansluiting bij het *Congress*, andere bij de *Muslim League*, die haar rol als representatieve moslim-organisatie weer gaat hervatten.

In het laatste hoofdstuk trachten wij de plaats te bepalen die de Khilafat-beweging inneemt in de Brits-Indische politieke geschiedenis. Wij zien haar als een beweging welke anti-Britse karakter sterker leek dan het was, daar dit grotendeels veroorzaakt werd door de anti-Turkse politiek van Engeland; als deze laatste herzien werd, kon ook de anti-Britse tendens van de Khilafatisten minder op de voorgrond treden. Wij zien haar verder als een duidelijk religieus-getinte beweging — daardoor met de mogelijkheid om in communalistisch vaarwater terecht

te komen — maar ook als een beweging die duidelijke nationalistische trekken vertoont. Dit nationalisme echter kon zich moeilijk ontplooiën, doordat het licht in conflict kon komen met de Pan-Islamitische tendens van de beweging, en tevens doordat het op een tweesprong stond tussen Indisch nationalisme en moslim nationalisme. Als de non-coöperatie-beweging succes had opgeleverd, was de Indisch-nationalistische tendens onder de Khilafatisten misschien versterkt, maar het falen van die beweging had een averechts gevolg: het leidde tot onderling wantrouwen en tot gevoelens van frustratie.

Tenslotte stellen wij ons de vraag, in hoeverre de Khilafat-beweging succes had. Dit lijkt ons zeer gering. De concessies die Turkije verwierf — en die het Kalifaat niet redden — waren eerder te danken aan Engels-Franse (en later ook Engels-Russische) rivaliteit, en aan de militaire successen van de Turkse nationalistten, dan van een wens van de Britse regering om rekening te houden met de gevoeligheden van haar moslim-onderdanen in Brits-Indië. Het blijvend belang van de Khilafat-beweging lijkt ons voornamelijk, dat zich hier voor het eerst sinds lange tijd een politieke massabeweging onder de Brits-Indische moslims had geopenbaard, en dat hierbij een beroep op de Islam zulk een grote rol speelde. Het lijkt ons dan ook waarschijnlijk dat zij een zekere invloed had op de latere beweging ten gunste van Pakistan.

NOTES CHAPTER I

1 For an anthology of their endeavours see L. L. Snyder, *The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in its Meaning and Development*, Princeton N.J., 1964.

2 H. Kohn, *Nationalism, its Meaning and History*, Princeton N.J., 1955, p. 9.

3 K. R. Minogue, *Nationalism*, London, 1969 2), p. 12.

4 A. R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay, 1948, p. 351.

5 K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan, A Study in Nationalism*, London, 1967, p. 13.

6 E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London, 1966 3), p. 81.

7 R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation; the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples*, Cambridge Mass., 1960, p. 102.

8 Quoted by Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

9 L. Dumont, "Nationalism and Communalism", in *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, no. 7, March 1964, p. 66.

10 Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

11 As is argued by K. R. Minogue, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

12 Agha Khan, *The Memoirs of Agha Khan, World enough and Time*, London, 1954, pp. 24-28.

13 Minogue, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-28.

14 We do not, however, agree with Minogue when he writes that in India the third stage hardly existed at all; the reorganization of the states in the mid-fifties was, we think, a crucial point in the consolidation of the nation.

15 Emerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95. For Dumont (*op. cit.*, p. 47) this fact even constitutes one of the differences between nationalism and communalism: the latter always refers to existing communities, while the former may refer to a nation in the making.

16 T. V. Parvate, *Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, Ahmedabad, 1959, p. 191.

17 As is argued by A. P. Thornton, *Doctrines of Imperialism*, New York, 1965, pp. 158-59. The same point is stressed by N. Daniel, *Islam, Europe and Empire*, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 467 and 480.

18 *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

19 Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, paperback ed., London, 1966, p. 116.

20 We wish to point out here that we are speaking throughout about communalism in India only. Communalism may, perhaps, occur in every

multi-communal society, but, according to circumstances, it will acquire other connotations than it has in India.

21 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India, a social analysis*, London, 1946 (sc. 1947), p. 157.

22 *ibid.*, pp. 163 and 166.

23 *ibid.*, p. 158.

24 *ibid.*, p. 176. The difference between these denominations is not very clear. Perhaps the term "accompanying factor" was chosen only because a "non-efficient cause" would reveal the confusion too clearly. But confusion there is, we think, and it may be occasioned by the fact that, in the course of the chapter, the author changes roles. When writing about the "many causes" of communalism (p. 158), he goes on: "The question as to which of these factors is the most important, presumably means *which is the most accessible to change*. Given any other meaning, the question is both unanswerable and unimportant." This observation, we think, would fit in with the argument of a politician who is deploring communal discord and is trying to change the situation. Then indeed he should have the economic factor in mind as the most accessible to change, since he is looking for a solution, a remedy. But in the ensuing analysis the author assumes the role of the theorist, who is out for truth, for an explanation, and then other factors might be brought into prominence with good reason. As it is, the comparative "importance" of the different "causes" and "factors" gets a double meaning, which makes for confusion. This confusion, in its turn, gives rise to a certain one-sidedness.

25 *ibid.*, p. 175.

26 *ibid.*, p. 176.

27 We should mention here at once that Smith has revised his opinions about communalism in India. We think it necessary, however, to set forth our objections all the same, (a) because his book is enjoying great authority (and rightly so, we would like to add if it would not seem too arrogant on our part), and (b) because to our knowledge he has expressed his own criticism with regard to his former theories about communalism only incidentally in two footnotes in a later work (*Islam in Modern History*, Princeton N.J., 1957, p. 53, fn. 19, and p. 210, fn. 5). There he treats his former explanation of the growth of communalism as "perhaps not invalid as far as it went", but "one-sided".

28 An aspect stressed by W. C. Smith in *Islam in Modern History*, ch. I.

29 We are quoting here from W. F. Wertheim, "The Trading Minorities in Southeast Asia", in *East-West Parallels, Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia*, The Hague, 1964, p. 77. In two chapters in that book he treats questions closely related to that of communalism in India, but drawing his materials mainly from other Asian countries.

30 This point is stressed by C. Manshardt, *The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India*, London, 1936, pp. 122-23. Cf. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 182, and L. Dumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

31 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 162.

32 We intend to use the term "communal" in a neutral sense (pertaining to a community), whereas the words "communalist" and "communalism" always have a connotation of aggressiveness against other communities. The words are used in the same way by W. C. Smith (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 226), and by D. E. Smith (*India as a Secular State*, Princeton N.J., 1967 2), p. 454). Another author on the subject, Clifford Manshardt (*op. cit.*, pp. 51 and 120) writes about a "healthy" communalism as opposed to a "narrow and selfish" one, a terminology which for clarity's sake we do not adopt. — Another matter is that in everyday politics it may be difficult to distinguish between "communal" and "communalist" policies and politicians; Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan offers an instance of a man in dealing with whom many authors are confronted with this problem (Cf. R. Gopal, *Indian Muslims, a political history (1858-1947)*, Bombay, 1959, p. 53; B. M. Chaudhuri, *Muslim Politics in India*, Calcutta, 1946, pp. 8-9; Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, Lahore, 1950, pp. 39 and 76; W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 25-26 and p. 169).

33 B. N. Pandey, *The Break-up of British India*, London, 1969, p. 33.

34 Dumont, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

35 As is stated expressly by W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 209-10.

36 There is, of course, the concept of a supra-national authority like that of the League of Nations and the U.N.O., based upon a sense of supra-national unity, but it was, certainly in the period up to 1945, a concept rather than a real force. Nationalism was hardly, if at all, cramped by it. It is only when this sense of supra-national unity and the corresponding authority grow strong enough that violence will no longer be accepted in international relations.

37 We follow in part the argument of L. Dumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-56.

38 This cause of the (relative) absence of communalist troubles in the states is also put forward by Sir Reginald Craddock, *The Dilemma in India*, London, 1929, pp. 13-14, and by W. R. Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India*, New Haven, 1938, pp. 334-35.

39 This, of course, was the last phase of the process. It was preceded by the desire to get an independent India with a federal structure and a weak centre.

40 See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London, 1963, pp. 43 and 70.

41 See A. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan*, London, 1967, pp. 188-90.

42 Kedourie relates these ideas to the thinking of Kant, Fichte and Herder; *op. cit.*, pp. 29-55.

43 *op. cit.*, p. 96.

44 Kedourie, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-7; cf. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52, quoting John Stuart Mill.

45 As is suggested by D. Argov, "Moderates and Extremists; Two

Attitudes towards British Rule in India”, in S. N. Mukherjee, ed., *The Movement for National Freedom in India*, London, 1966, p. 20. Argov's contribution abounds in quotations proving the self-assertive, aggressive and uncompromising qualities of the Extremists' nationalism.

46 Gokhale and his political friends did not yet think in terms of “independence”, but only of “colonial self-government”.

47 This is the distinction made by Kedourie, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

48 In the latter case, two ideologies are confronted with each other. In a national state, Islam is no longer the all-pervading spiritual force in state and society since national unity may overrule it, for instance when all citizens, whether Muslim or not, are placed on an equal footing in their relation to the state. See E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 65.

49 *The Continent of Circe*, London, 1967, pp. 408-420.

50 This point is stressed by Kohn (*op. cit.*, pp. 51-52 and 123-25) as well as by Kedourie (*op. cit.*, pp. 131-32).

51 This is one of the theses of S. N. Mukherjee in his “Introduction” to the aforementioned volume edited by him (see pp. 14-15). Cf. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, London, 1951, pp. 436-40, giving as his opinion that the liberal tradition in Indian nationalism was weak and gave way increasingly to Hindu traditions.

52 This is done by Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 101; cf. Minogue, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85 and 149-52. See also W. F. Wertheim, writing: “Nationalism is not a ‘universalist’ ideology; but it does express the sense of living in an ‘expanding universe’ to those whose outlook formerly did not extend beyond the restricted ‘universe’ of their tribe or local community.” (*op. cit.*, pp. 93-94).

53 As is argued by S. N. Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 16. He points to the fact that the ownership of land as a *de facto* right already existed in many parts of India before the British land regulations. But when he writes that “the growth of the market society in India . . . was somewhat related to the establishment of the British Raj in Bengal”, we think he is grossly understating the facts. A country where the economic and social conditions favourable to the growth of nationalism did arise far more independently of the western impact would seem to be Japan (cf. E. O. Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present*, London, 1964 3), ch. VIII).

54 See Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

55 K. K. Aziz, in *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963, p. 19, refers to this theory as one of the “myths” into which British thinking about India was canalized and stereotyped.

56 D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 454, fn. 1.

57 Amaury de Riencourt, *The Soul of India*, London, 1961, p. 294.

58 In conformity to what Emerson (*op. cit.*, p. 329) states as a general phenomenon in plural societies when nationalism enters the scene. The Home Rule League and Congress accepted linguistic boundaries defining their “provinces” about 1920, and after independence the same principle was applied to the administration of the country. See

also B. G. Gokhale, *The Making of the Indian Nation*, London, 1960 2), p. 168.

59 Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, New York, 1946, p. 159.

60 By Muhammad Ali; see Rais Ahmed Jafri, ed., *Selections from Mohammad Ali's Comrade*, Lahore, 1965, pp. 281-94 (hereafter referred to as *Selections from Comrade*).

61 See S. N. Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

62 Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 303. Nehru's views on the origins of landlordism are somewhat at variance with those of Mukherjee quoted above (fn. 53). The former, blaming the British for the abuses in Indian society, has to stress the importance of their interference with it; the latter, attaching more importance to purely Indian factors in Indian history, is not able to lay everything at the door of the British.

63 *ibid.*, p. 305.

64 *Modern Islam in India*, p. 166.

65 A. P. Thornton, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-76. This sympathy would be based upon their appreciation of the "military races" who were predominantly Muslims — a judgment which in itself might constitute another of the "myths" summing up Indo-British relations.

66 See for an outright accusation Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 381. But it is suggested too by T. V. Parvate (*op. cit.*, p. 47) and by B. M. Chaudhuri (*op. cit.*, p. 30). R. Gopal declares (*op. cit.*, pp. 158-59) that police instigation is not to be proved, but that Jinnah held the opinion that the police provoked the riots of 1922, 1923 and 1924. But when he is quoting Jinnah, it appears that the latter mentions misunderstandings and partial behaviour on the part of the police — which is not the same as "provoking" and "instigating" riots.

67 In a letter dated May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said (enclosure to a private letter from Montagu to Reading, dated 26.1.1922; Mont. Coll., vol. 13).

68 See A. Aziz, *Discovery of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964 2), pp. 310-24. A similar view is held by A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League — Yesterday and Today*, Lahore, 1948, pp. 15-16. We do not think this theory has much value as an interpretation of the historical facts, but signalize it as a ramification of the divide-and-rule thesis.

69 At first it certainly was. For some instances see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 162, and B. N. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

70 See Duff Cooper, *Talleyrand*, ch. VI, para. 2.

71 That Talleyrand is usually looked upon as a highly immoral man is for quite different reasons.

72 A curious instance is provided by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who told the British that the Mutiny was caused in part by their army policy: they did not keep Hindus and Muslims apart in their native regiments. And then he pointed to the example given by the Persian ruler Nadir Shah, maintaining Afghan as well as Persian armies, and playing them off against each other. Now Nadir Shah's rule is known as an example

of despotism, which makes it an appropriate illustration of our case. See G. F. J. Graham, *The Life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan*, Edinburgh, 1885, pp. 54-55.

73 As is indicated by the "governments of national unity" springing up in war time, like Viviani's Cabinet of the "union sacrée" in August 1914, and the Coalition Cabinet in Great Britain in the spring of 1915. Opposition groups outside the pale do occur, of course, like the communists were, to some extent, in many western democracies before World War II and once more after the beginning of the Cold War. But these groups are tolerated by reason of their relative insignificance; if they were too large they would explode the democratic framework.

74 See R. Mousnier, *L'assassinat d'Henri IV*, Paris, 1964, p. 104 and app. 9.

75 R. J. Moore, *Liberalism and Indian Politics 1872-1922*, London, 1966, p. 88.

76 See R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem 1833-1935*, London, 1942, p. 44.

77 We are referring to the Englishmen in India, who, during the period of British rule, spoke about themselves as "Anglo-Indians".

78 An aspect stressed by Francis G. Hutchins, *The Illusion of Permanence, British Imperialism in India*, Princeton N.J., 1967, especially in ch. V, "British Indian Society: A Middle Class Aristocracy". Cf. B. N. Pandey, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

79 See Hutchins, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200. Cf. R. Iyer, *Utilitarianism and All That, The Political Theory of British Imperialism in India*, London, 1968, p. 56.

80 For Gokhale, see Parvate, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 and 154. As for Gandhi and other Congress leaders, see Penderel Moon, *Gandhi and Modern India*, London, 1968, pp. 85-86.

81 "The Shadow of Reform and the Substance of Repression" is the title given by R. J. Moore to the chapter he devoted to the period of Lord Minto's viceroyalty (*op. cit.*, pp. 80-101).

82 Philipp Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India*, vol. 2, *The Guardians*, London, 1954, pp. 219 and 225.

83 In an article, "The I.C.S. Revolt", *I.A.R. 1920*, pp. 211-23. With the word "mufassal" he is denoting those members of the I.C.S. who were posted in the inland districts.

84 See R. Iyer, *op. cit.*, p. 52, writing about the period after 1870, and noting the "sharp contrasts between Lytton and Ripon, Dufferin and Curzon, Reading and Irwin".

85 As is done by W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 171, and, more recently, by B. N. Pandey, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-79.

86 This thesis is held by R. J. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-22.

87 This definition of their aims is Iyer's, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

88 In 1910 Montagu was Under-Secretary of State for India. For an account of his speech see S. D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu. A Memoir and an Account of his Visits to India*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 39-44.

89 Letter of 4.3.1919 to Lord Ronaldshay, and letter of 8.3.1919 to Lord Chelmsford; quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-203.

90 See for instance a letter from Sir Harcourt Butler, then Lt. Governor of the U.P., to Geoffrey Dawson, chief editor of the *Times*. He is stating that many I.C.S. officials consider Montagu as "dishonest", a judgment which he himself does not share. But he is leaving no doubts that he thinks the reforms "hopelessly impracticable" (letter of 4.12.1918; Butler Coll., vol. 50).

91 We may observe this attitude even with Montagu, who on the one hand condemned the haughty "bridging-the-gulf" parties organized by his compatriots (Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 310), but on the other hand could not discern any truly Indian, un-English elements in Indian nationalism as far as he wanted to patronize it (*ibid.*, p. 293). See also N. Daniel, noting a growing condescension towards Muslims, once fear of the Turks had vanished (*op. cit.*, p. 65). Cf. Nirad C. Chaudhuri's absolutely negative judgment on E. M. Forster's novel, *A Passage to India* (in *The Continent of Circe*, p. 93).

NOTES CHAPTER II

1 In 1820 Rammohan Roy published a tract, *The Principles of Jesus: The Guide to Truth and Happiness*.

2 B. Walker, *Hindu World, an Encyclopedic Survey of Hinduism*, London, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 311-12.

3 R. C. Majumdar a.o., *An Advanced History of India*, London, 1967 3), p. 872.

4 *ibid.*, p. 875.

5 B. Walker, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 270.

6 An illustration is to be found in R. M. Agarwala, *The Hindu-Muslim Riots, Their Causes and Cures*, Lucknow, 1943, p. 34, writing that Dayananda has "conclusively proved" that the Aryans were the original inhabitants of northern India.

7 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, pp. 213-15.

8 P. Spear in *The Oxford History of India*, Oxford, 1967 4), p. 731.

9 W. F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movements in South and Southeast Asia", *op. cit.*, pp. 140-41.

10 See R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 881, on Vivekananda. The theme is more elaborated by J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, London, 1918, pp. 354-64.

11 See Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, p. 206, and R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 879.

12 This aspect of the revivalist movement has been amply treated by Sir Valentine Chirol in his *Indian Unrest*, London, 1910. He may not be the most impartial judge of terrorist theories and activities, but the passages he quotes from journals like the *Kesari* and the *Yugantar* (pp. 16-23 and 91-95) make us understand that the Government of India took repressive measures (pp. 96-99). Even Gokhale "accepted the Press Act as inevitable" (S. R. Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement 1905 to 1910*, Oxford, 1964, p. 115).

13 See Satyapal and Prabodh Chandra, *Sixty Years of Congress*, Lahore, 1964, p. 183. Some of Dufferin's successors, like Minto and Hardinge, took his lead and called Gokhale "leader of the opposition", a name against which Gokhale protested, because the Indian "opposition" never had any chance of replacing the government, as is the case in western democracies (see T. V. Parvate, *op. cit.*, p. 287).

14 See Faruqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 48 and 104-5; also R. Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-101.

15 Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Bombay, 1946, vol. 1, p. 53.

16 R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 889.

17 Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, London, 1928, vol. 2, p. 151.

18 Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-57. His reproach is a consequence of his view that Congress represented not the people, but only the western-educated middle class. His opinion, however, that political agitation was something quite different from the social and religious reform movement of the preceding years (p. 199) does not seem to be to the point; we prefer to regard both of these activities as the expression of a process of national awakening. On the other hand, we think him to be quite right when he writes that the attention paid to politics hampered the movement for purely social reforms.

19 These are not Gandhi's exact words but it certainly is the impression he conveys in his *Autobiography*, pp. 186-91.

20 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

21 See S. R. Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 2 and app. I, p. 221, where the number of Muslim participants in Congress sessions in the years from 1885 to 1910 is given. Cf. D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 89, who certainly is not set upon decrying a communalist attitude of Congress.

22 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 170; cf. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

23 D. M. G. Koch, *Herleving; Oorsprong, Streven en Geschiedenis der Nationalistische Beweging in Britsch-Indië*, Weltevreden, n.d. (1922); (*Renaissance; Origin, Endeavour and History of the Nationalist Movement in British India*), pp. 229-30.

24 R. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

25 This, of course, is only a sketchy comparison of Tilak and Gandhi, about which more could be said. Gandhi may be said to have taken over Tilak's role by laying stress on the mass character of the nationalist movement, but differed from him in that he abhorred violence and considered Hindu-Muslim unity as being of paramount importance. See D. S. Sarma in M. D. Lewis, ed., *Gandhi, Maker of Modern India?*, Boston, 1965, pp. 10-11.

26 P. Worsley, *The Third World*, London, 1967 2), p. 62.

27 See Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation, the Indian National Congress*, Chicago, 1967, p. 40. M. Brecher, in his *Nehru, a Political Biography*, holds that even in the mid-fifties Congress kept this character of being a movement (p. 495).

28 Jinnah, for instance, who was already a member of Congress, in 1913 became a member of the Muslim League too; Choudry Khaliqzaman was in 1917 Joint Secretary of the Muslim League, and was at the same time elected a member of the All-India Congress Committee.

29 Tilak did not go so far, his aim being *swaraj* within the Empire; Aurobindo Ghosh and Lajpat Rai advocated complete independence. See D. Argov, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

30 This point is stressed by Sir Valentine Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 and 199.

31 It would not do to emphasize the difference between the two groups too strongly. Tilak, convicted in 1908 for writing articles inciting to violence in his paper *Kesari*, was, according to Parvate (*op. cit.*, pp. 260-61), not an advocate of violence on principle, while Gokhale gave a very broad meaning to the concept of "lawful and constitutional action", including passive resistance and even non-payment of taxes (*ibid.*, p. 459).

32 Something like a working agreement between constitutionalists and extremists plus terrorists in the years before 1918 is suggested by Rammanohar Lohia, *Guilty Men of India's Partition*, Allahabad, 1960, p. 70. Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, in his *In Search of Freedom*, Calcutta, 1967, sketches a sometimes very vivid, if somewhat incoherent, picture of the Bengali revolutionary movement since about 1910. The exactness of his memories, committed to paper almost half a century after the events took place, is of course questionable, but his narrative rings true. He mentions, among others, Choudry Khaliqzaman and C. R. Das as men who were inclined to help the terrorists (pp. 205, 211). Nirad C. Chaudhuri notes "the existence of a tradition of private murder for revenge among the Bengali gentry", which might have influenced this tendency (*The Continent of Circe*, p. 103). So we are inclined to view with some caution the assertion of *The Oxford History of India* that "the movement naturally caused alarm, but it was in fact the work of very small bodies unsupported by the main mass of political India" (p. 772). The fact that Congress afterwards adopted non-violence as its creed may well have made us lose sight of the importance of violent groups.

33 This is the generally accepted opinion of writers on the subject. See Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom, an autobiographical narrative*, Bombay, 1959, p. 4; J. Ch. Chatterji, *op. cit.*, p. 57; Sir Valentine Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

34 As the editor puts it succinctly in H. A. R. Gibb, ed., *Whither Islam?*, London, 1932, p. 190.

35 By this we do not mean to say that these aspects are without their problems. Why, for instance, did Muslims show less inclination than Hindus to attend English schools? Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan stated four reasons: their political traditions, social customs, religious beliefs, and poverty (G. F. I. Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-20). R. Gopal (*op. cit.*, pp. 31-35) argues that, firstly, Muslim backwardness with regard to education did not apply to the whole community, but only to the aristocracy, who were landowners and as such less interested in modern education than the rich Hindu middle class in the towns. The poorer classes of Muslims, however, did not keep themselves aloof from English education, but they could not pay for higher education. Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 14) mentions still another factor which kept well-to-do Muslims away from the new schools: government policy, which did not give them jobs even when they were qualified for them.

We do not feel able to decide how much weight should be attached to each of the causes to which these authors refer for an explanation. For our purpose it is enough to establish that, at least among those who mattered in politics in those times, Muslims, as compared with Hindus, dropped behind in this respect.

36 See the chapter contributed by him to H. A. R. Gibb, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-81. He quotes the Agha Khan, who rather optimistically supposed that he could see the day coming when the Muslims would constitute one-third of the Indian population.

37 *op. cit.*, pp. 5-11.

38 As Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 37) states with regard to the founders of the Deoband school. We could see as an instance the difficulties a cautious modernist like Shibli met with in his own circles (*ibid.*, p. 51).

39 Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

40 See J. M. C. Baljon, *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, Leiden, 1949, p. 4, quoting Sir Sayyid's Urdu biographer, Hali.

41 As an instance of this we may mention his theory of *jihad*; see Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-10, and Baljon, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

42 Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

43 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 20.

44 Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

45 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

46 *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

47 *Modern Islam in India*, p. 25.

48 Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

49 This is suggested by Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

50 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 and 44.

51 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, mentions it as a possibility. Far more positive about it are B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 9, and Mahadev Desai, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, Agra, 1940, p. 43.

52 This view is shared by Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Baljon, *op. cit.*, p. 93; Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

53 This is the motive stressed by Baljon, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89, and by Muhammad Ali in his presidential speech at the Cocanada Congress session in 1923; see Afzal Iqbal, ed., *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, Lahore, 1954, p. 251 (henceforward referred to as *Select Writings and Speeches*).

54 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 27.

55 Baljon, *op. cit.*, p. 70, and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-4.

56 Jamal-ud-din's attack was not directed against Sir Sayyid's religious liberalism, as is argued by Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, Berkeley, 1968, pp. 67-73.

57 Examples to be found in Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-85, in his long letter from London to his friends of the Scientific Society at Aligarh, dated 15.10.1869.

58 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 59-68.

- 59 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 and 114.
- 60 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 49.
- 61 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 57. See also Sir Sayyid's aforementioned letter to his friends at Aligarh: "The Mohammedans of Egypt and Turkey are daily becoming more civilised, and it is matter for congratulation that the bigotry of the Turks — bigotry which is the cause of foolishness, barbarism and decay — is daily decreasing . . . in Turkey and Egypt the women are daily becoming better educated." (Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 90).
- 62 Baljon, *op. cit.*, p. 76, fn. 27.
- 63 Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* (ampl. and rev. ed. of 1935), London, 1964 8), pp. 122-33.
- 64 *op. cit.*, p. 35.
- 65 *ibid.*, p. 88.
- 66 Wasti, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.
- 67 Cf. W. F. Wertheim, "Religious Reform Movements in South and Southeast Asia", *op. cit.*, p. 141.
- 68 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 45-46.
- 69 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 and 52.
- 70 Quoted by Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
- 71 W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen?*, London, 1871, is still an essential work on the Indian Wahabi movement. Qeyamuddin Ahmad (*The Wahabi Movement in India*, Calcutta, 1966, p. 329) criticizes Hunter on the ground that the latter characterizes it as communal, whereas he himself stresses the assistance of Hindus in the remittance of money to the frontier (p. 327). In our opinion, he puts too much stress on this help, which was of secondary importance, in his endeavour to depict the Wahabi movement as a national movement. The conflict with the Sikhs may have been rather accidental, as he contends (pp. 324-25), and their anti-British disposition was what really mattered, but all the same it was a movement which had its roots in a puritanical Islamic ideology.
- 72 Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Washington, 1963, p. 170.
- 73 *ibid.*, p. 175.
- 74 A. Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-2, alleges that the British gave the name of Wahabis to the fighters to make them repulsive; cf. Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-91. These authors prefer to call them *mujahidin*, but assure us at the same time that Shah Wali-ullah was their spiritual father.
- 75 *op. cit.*, pp. 123-38.
- 76 *ibid.*, p. 143.
- 77 This contingency was notably stressed by V. P. Menon. British correspondents even wrote about the planned capture of Amritsar and New Delhi (quoted by Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir, A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay, 1966, p. 121, fn. 32).
- 78 According to Faruqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
- 79 *ibid.*, p. 23.

80 To whom they could give allegiance since the death of the Caliph of the *mujahidin* in the N.W. Frontier region in 1831, who had no successor; H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

81 This is stressed by Faruqi, *op. cit.*, notably pp. 79-80.

82 *ibid.*, p. 43.

83 As is pointed out by Zafar Ali Khan in an article in *Comrade* of 14.6.1913; see *Selections from Comrade*, pp. 297-99.

84 A survey of his articles on this subject is given by himself in his *Written Statement*, filed during his detention in 1918 (ICP 206 of Jan., 1919).

85 As Gibb (*op. cit.*, p. 21) writes about the Muslims and the Muslim world before World War I. The same assertion is made by W. W. Cash, *The Moslem World in Revolution*, London, 1926, p. 10. But after the War he notes a distinct change: the concept of nationality is establishing itself, superseding the concept of Islamic unity (*ibid.*, p. 12).

86 In a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 7.7.1916 (Butler Coll., vol. 49). Butler's judgment may well be influenced by his wish to take a strong stand against what he regarded as Muslim pretensions in those years, but we do not think that we may wholly dismiss it as accidental; it is an opinion he repeats over and over again in his letters, and he was certainly a man with wide experience of the Indian Muslim world. At the time he was Lt. Governor of the U.P.

87 As Butler admits himself in *India Insistent*, London, 1931, p. 38: "Panislamism is perhaps a feeling rather than a force . . . but it is unquestionably a sentiment which, at times, produces powerful reactions in India."

88 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, p. 82.

89 See Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 36, and L. Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley, 1961, pp. 20-21.

90 *i.e.* of the relationship between Islam and nationalism.

91 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

92 This policy may already be dated from the Turco-Russian treaty of Küchük-Kainarji in 1774 (see Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 35, and T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford, 1924, p. 165), but in connection with India it seems to be of no importance before about 1880. Another question is whether any, and if so how much, religious authority over non-Turkish Muslims was the Sultan-Caliph's due. This aspect will be discussed later.

93 Keddie, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7. It is a matter of some importance in connection with his religious background — Sunni-orthodox or Shia.

94 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 50-51.

95 We are quoting after A. J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, London, 1964 2).

96 E. Kedourie, *Aghani and Abduh, An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam*, London, 1966, p. 45.

97 This is one of the main theses — and argued very convincingly — of Keddie's book, where a full translation of the *Refutation* may also be found.

- 98 Keddie, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31; Kedourie, *Afghani and Abduh*, pp. 5-6.
- 99 Keddie, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19 emphasizes this point.
- 100 *ibid.*, p. 3.
- 101 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, p. 51.
- 102 As is argued by Sylvia Haim, quoted by Keddie, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Kedourie's opinion is that Afghani's action resulted in "the transformation of religion into a political ideology"; *op. cit.*, p. 63.
- 103 Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*, London, 1967, pp. 129-30.
- 104 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
- 105 *ibid.*, p. 175. He gives two reasons: the Caliph's ambassadors often did not know the language of the countries they visited and their propaganda was contrary to Sunni orthodoxy, which holds that the Caliph should be of the Quraish. This second argument may be valid in Arab countries, but in our opinion it is hardly so in India, where Sunni Muslims certainly did not press this point.
- 106 Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam*, New York, 1921, p. 67.
- 107 *The Rise of the Turks. The Pan-Turanian Movement* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office), London, 1919, p. 25.
- 108 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
- 109 *The Rise of the Turks. The Pan-Turanian Movement*, pp. 64-68.
- 110 *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 55.
- 111 *Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial*, Madras, 1921, pp. 58-59. The rather confused distinction between political and diplomatic activity might mean that, according to the author, it will not meddle with practical politics.
- 112 *The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement* (Handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office), London, 1918, pp. 59 and 63.
- 113 Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, London, 1937, p. 96. This opinion may reflect the animosity between the India Office and British officials in Egypt, where Storrs made his career.
- 114 Though these facts are belittled by some authors (*e.g. The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement*, p. 63), and positively valued by others (*e.g. Gibb, op. cit.*, p. 43). We prefer to share the latter view, as financial aid proves something more than spirited declarations.
- 115 This explanation is suggested in *The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement*, p. 68.
- 116 In our opinion Stoddard exaggerates the results of this declaration (*op. cit.*, p. 73-74). The way he explains its relative ineffectualness — many influential Muslims realized that this Holy War was "made in Germany", and the Young Turks were looked upon as Europeanized renegades — means in fact that Pan-Islamic solidarity did not stand up against other considerations.

117 This observation is made by Keddie, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

118 This is the conclusion reached by Gibb when speculating in 1932 on the future of the Muslim world (*op. cit.*, pp. 338-45).

119 *ibid.*, p. 41.

120 The expression is Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's, quoted by the Earl of Lytton, *Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, A Memoir by his Grandson*, London, 1961, p. 23.

121 See A. P. Thornton, *For the File on Empire*, London, 1968, pp. 235-39.

122 Norman Daniel, *op. cit.*, pp. 423 and 469-70.

123 *Policy in the Middle East, Memorandum by Sir Mark Sykes to Director of Military Operations*, p. 5 (PSM, B 217, IOR).

124 With the possible exception of the Shias — a point to which we will return.

125 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

126 Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

127 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

128 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

129 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

130 See Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqadimmah*, transl. by Franz Rosenthal, 3 vols., New York, 1958-1960, vol. 1, pp. 427-28 and 448-49. For Ibn Khaldun's theory of the Caliphate and the *mulk*, and its implications for modern theories of the Islamic and the Muslim state, see E. I. J. Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-27.

131 Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 338 and 392-94.

132 Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

133 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

134 Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

135 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 15-16.

136 C. Snouck Hurgronje, "The Caliphate" in *Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. 6, p. 439 (earlier published in *Foreign Affairs*, III, 1, Sept. 1924).

137 H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism*, London, 1953 2), pp. 95-96.

138 *ibid.*, p. 109.

139 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

140 *ibid.*, pp. 26-31.

141 Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, p. 36.

142 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

143 For instance when writing that the Caliph in his role of Imam may lead the faithful in their prayers, but that any believer might do the same (*ibid.*, p. 14).

144 *ibid.*, p. 166.

145 *ibid.*, pp. 177-78.

146 They might have referred — as do some Indian Muslim authors — to the example set by the British Government in 1857, when Sultan Abdul Majid was asked for a *fatwa* inciting Indian Muslims to loyalty (cf. H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 234). It was, of course, a case often mentioned by the Khilafatists.

147 Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-69.

148 *ibid.*, pp. 170-71; cf. Snouck Hurgronje, *op. cit.*, pp. 437 and 445.

149 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 173; cf. Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 57. We find this view expressed by Amir Ali, writing about the Caliph: "He combines in his person the spiritual and temporal authority which devolves on him as the vicegerent of the Master." (*op. cit.*, p. 125). Further on he calls him "the supreme Pontiff".

150 As Muhammad Ali put it to Lord Fisher, when received by the latter in London on March, 2, 1920; see Mohammed and Shaukat Ali, *For India and Islam*, Calcutta, 1922, p. 31.

151 See Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-61, on the thinking of Ziya Gökalp. But the same conclusions could be reached by other ways too; see *ibid.*, pp. 85-102 for an orthodox Islamic argument to the same effect.

152 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

153 *op. cit.*, p. 179.

154 *ibid.*, p. 154. This inconsistency is not to be explained by the Agha Khan's not being a Sunni.

155 Amir Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-19 and 346.

156 *The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement*, pp. 44 and 58.

157 This was especially the case of reformers like Iqbal (W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 12-13 and 117), but Smith is showing it as a general trend too (*Islam in Modern History*, p. 35. Cf. Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 39).

158 As the jurists of the Hanafi School and the historian al-Maqrizi did; see Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

159 See above, p. 40.

160 In a series of six Urdu articles, written in connection with the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Translation into English to be found in Kazi Siraj-ud-din Ahmed, *The Truth about the Khilafat*, Lahore, 1916; see pp. 3 and 11.

161 An enumeration is to be found in *The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement*, p. 42 and in M. H. Abbas, *All about the Khilafat*, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 16-21.

162 M. H. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 23. The argument is already to be found with Ibn Khaldun (*op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 396-402). He links up the conditions of having sufficient power and being of Qurashite origin; when the Quraish no longer fulfilled the former, the latter became void, according to him.

163 M. H. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 26. It might also be called an "academic difficulty" (Muhammad Ali, *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 178).

164 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

165 Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

166 We find it for instance with Amir Ali (*op. cit.*, p. 132).

167 See Kazi Siraj-ud-din Ahmed, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-47.

168 This argument is used by Abdul Ghani, *Thoughts on Caliphate*, Karachi, 1919, p. 8.

169 A clear exposition of the facts is to be found in Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-47.

170 Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

171 *ibid.*, p. 110.

172 Various authors hold different views on this question. The motive of Hindu danger is stressed by K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 116, and by Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Continent of Circe*, pp. 238-39, whereas the anti-British trend of Indian Pan-Islamism is brought out by Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 128, Nehru, *op. cit.*, pp. 408-9, and W. W. Cash, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-29.

NOTES CHAPTER III

1 This is the opinion of Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, p. 232, and Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 81, Faruqi is quoting Nehru's *Towards Freedom*: "... many a Congressman was a communalist under his national cloak."

2 Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 328. M. Edwardes supposes the same intention on Curzon's part (*High Noon of Empire, India under Curzon*, London, 1965, p. 211).

3 As is also done by B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 12. W. C. Smith (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 170) is more cautious and says that this effect "had perhaps been planned". Gopal (*op. cit.*, pp. 92-95) sees the motive as the wish to hold Hindus and Muslims apart, but his argument is not convincing. On the one hand he contends that prominent Muslims were also opposed to the partition, but on the other he admits that "politically the educated people of the two communities had been falling apart for several years before the Partition."

4 D. Dilks, *Curzon in India*, 2 vols., London, 1969-70, vol. 2, p. 201.

5 As quoted by Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, ch. XXIV, "The Partition of Bengal", pp. 320-29.

6 Dilks' judgment on the matter (*op. cit.*, p. 204) is as follows: "The extent to which Curzon and his colleagues were swayed by political motives will remain a subject of argument. Partition had first been taken up to secure more efficient administration. Probably that desire dominated throughout."

7 Edwardes (*op. cit.*, p. 214) mentions another fact which may have been of some influence: it was only after October, 1905 that the real effect of revolutionary propaganda in Bengal manifested itself in murderous assaults. K. K. Aziz (*Britain and Muslim India*, p. 38) offers another explanation: Curzon toured East Bengal to sound public opinion, and in these Muslim districts did not meet with much opposition. But we think it highly improbable that Curzon or his advisers did not realize that in West Bengal public opinion would not be the same.

8 "The revolutionaries felt that the Muslims were an obstacle to the attainment of Indian freedom and must, like other obstacles, be removed." (Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 4).

9 *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, p. 233.

10 Edwardes, *op. cit.*, p. 213. Wasti (*op. cit.*, pp. 30-31) comes to the same conclusion.

11 *op. cit.*, p. 771.

12 R. J. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

13 It was, incidentally, not the first time that these had been suggested: Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan had done so as early as 1883 (Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 36 fn. 1). L. Dumont (*op. cit.*, p. 58) even mentions the demand for special privileges as early as 1852.

14 They even wanted something more than that: the number of Muslim representatives should not only take into account their numbers, but also their political and military importance (Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 34). Now this argument about their importance could be used by the Hindus, or any other community, equally well, if we replace "military" by "economic" or "cultural", and so on. Another argument they put forward was better: the system of mixed electorates left the Muslims under-represented in the councils (as is conceded by Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 109), and in the Senates of the Indian universities (Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 76). And above all, they wanted to be represented by true Muslims, and not by "a Hindu with a beard", as it is put by Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 209).

15 Which was certainly exercised, as the Agha Khan testifies: "For Syed Amir Ali and myself, 1907 was a period of what I can best describe as guerrilla warfare, whose aim was to keep Morley up the mark. We won in the end, but it was hard going." (*op. cit.*, p. 104).

16 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-90.

17 Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

18 Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: a political biography*, Bombay, 1946, pp. 95-96. Fazli-Husain was not a communalist, but opposed the opinion of Hindu revivalists that Indian nationalism required "a revival of the Aryan religion and Nagri characters." (p. 65).

19 A fairly detailed account of the founding of the Muslim League is to be found in Wasti, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-83; App. III lists the members of the Provisional Committee appointed at the Dacca session of 1906.

20 W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

21 Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 93; Parvate, *op. cit.*, p. 319. Some details on the regulations are given by D. Rothermund, *Die Politische Willensbildung in Indien 1900-1960*, Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 64. He stresses the influence of the I.C.S. on the reforms.

22 As is to be found with Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98; B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-16; Satyapal and Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 178; W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 171; Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 48. Muhammad Ali, in his presidential speech at the Cocanada Congress session of 1923, declared: "There is no harm in saying now that the Deputation was a 'command' performance". (*Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 254).

23 Dated 4.8.1906; quoted in its entirety by Wasti, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63.

24 Wasti, *op. cit.*, App. III.

25 *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 254. Another instance of vagueness is constituted by S. A. Husain, writing about a "secret message",

but not mentioning from whom or to whom it went (*The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, London, 1965, p. 55).

26 See above, p. 51.

27 We concur with Wasti, who devotes a long passage of his book to the history of the Simla deputation (*op. cit.*, pp. 61-76). A strong point in his case is that Minto on 19.9.1906 wrote to Morley that he did not yet know what the deputation was going to ask on 1.10! A letter from Minto's private secretary Mr. Dunlop Smith to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, dated 13.9.1906, points to the same direction.

28 Which is the one given by Moore, *op. cit.*, ch. VI; cf. Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

29 As is evident from some documents referred to by Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

30 Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

31 Rothermund (*op. cit.*, p. 64) reports that Muslim as well as Hindu barristers were eliminated from the political stage by expert handling of the regulations. He characterizes the result of the reforms as a *Ständestaat* (p. 78), which corresponds to the "representation of the various interests" we referred to.

32 As was recently done by B. N. Pandey, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-79.

33 Referring to the deputation and mentioning an official who had written her that the Viceroy had pulled back 62 million people from joining the seditious opposition; cf. S. A. Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

34 Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

35 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

36 Parvate discusses Gokhale's views in detail (*op. cit.*, pp. 311-19).

37 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

38 *op. cit.*, p. 94.

39 A comparison with the first years of Congress forces itself on the student and has, for that matter, often been expressed. Loyalty did not mean servility. In the case of the Muslim League the evolution towards an attitude of criticism seems to have been even more rapid than with Congress.

40 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

41 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

42 On these conflicts see *ibid.*, pp. 102-8.

43 Mentioned by the Agha Khan (*op. cit.*, p. 114), and in more detail by Muhammad Ali in a contribution to *Comrade* of 2.8.1913 (*Selections from Comrade*, pp. 300-304).

44 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

45 K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 78; he quotes a very succinct summary of their feelings by Sir Reginald Craddock in the words: "No bombs, no boons". See also Choudry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 17-18; Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

46 This is how K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 82, represents the facts. In respect of the Agha Khan his view is undoubtedly

correct. In his own *Memoirs* the latter tells the story of the Delhi *Durbar* of 1911 without any heat (pp. 120-21); Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, p. 18) mentions him as the only leader approving of the reversal of partition. As to Viqar-ul-Mulk, we have some doubts. Albiruni (*op. cit.*, p. 111) quotes an article of his in the *Aligarh Gazette* of 20.12.1911, in which he strongly denounces the reversal. But at the same time he is trying to dissuade the Muslims from joining hands with Congress, and this may have put him in the wrong with the younger radicals in the League. Notable, on the other hand, is a contribution of Muhammad Ali in *Comrade* of 6.4.1912 (*Selections from Comrade*, pp. 266-73), written in a very objective tone and trying to weigh the benefits of the decision against the losses.

47 Cf. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 195.

48 Agha Khan, *Memoirs*, p. 95.

49 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, pp. 124 and 135.

50 His letter of 25.8.1911 to the Secretary of State is quoted by K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 78.

51 Authorized version of the presidential address delivered in Urdu by Shaukat Ali at the Khilafat Conference, Madras, 19.4.1920 (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. V, p. 11). This view, expressed in 1920, does not substantially differ from contributions by Muhammad Ali in *Comrade* before the war, for instance an editorial of October, 1911: "Great Britain and the Muslim Kingdoms" (*Selections from Comrade*, pp. 250-56). The same sentiments are given vent to by Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 17. A more realistic view regarding the Balkan wars was expressed by the Agha Khan (*op. cit.*, pp. 127-29), but he mentions "a storm of protest from Muslims all over India" evoked by his comments.

52 *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

53 Disillusioned, according to W. C. Smith (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 197). One of the mission's members was Khaliqzaman in whose account (*op. cit.*, pp. 20-26) no disillusion is noticeable. But then he was at the time a young man of about 23 years old, who perhaps was more interested in action for its own sake than in results.

54 A good deal of information on the organization of the Relief Fund and its medical mission to Turkey is to be found in Muhammad Ali's *Written Statement* filed during his internment in December, 1918 (ICP 206 of Jan. 1919, pp. 34-40). He had, of course, every reason then to put the most favourable interpretation on his actions, but on the other hand he quotes abundantly from letters, publications and official sources and could not permit himself to tamper with the facts.

55 Muhammad Ali never wholly condemned Sir Sayyid's policy, even if he found fault with it. See his Cocanada Congress speech, 1923 (*Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 251-52) and his contributions to *Comrade* of 23.1. and 1.2.1926 on "National Muslim Education" (*ibid.*, pp. 413-31).

56 Most of these particulars are borrowed from Muhammad Ali's

Autobiography, to be found in *Selections from Comrade*, pp. 29-94. As a prisoner in Karachi (1922) he wanted to write a life of the Prophet, but lacking the necessary materials he ended by writing his own life.

57 Azim Husain, whose father Fazli-Husain was one of them, lists some examples, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

58 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

59 *Autobiography*, in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 39.

60 Albiruni (*op. cit.*, pp. 154-55) contends that originally he did not plan to give much attention to events outside India, and that his attitude changed under the influence of Abul Kalam Azad. But in its first year, when Azad had not yet started publication of *Al Hilal*, the *Comrade* contained already quite a number of editorials on foreign affairs. Moreover, at Aligarh Muhammad Ali had been an admirer of Shibli, who glorified Islam and its past outside India (Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 49; *Autobiography*, in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 34).

61 "Hindu-Muslim Relations", in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 296.

62 "Anti-Cow-killing Agitation", *ibid.*, pp. 257-58.

63 "The Lingua Franca of India", *ibid.*, pp. 281-94.

64 Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It, 1885-1925*, London, 1926 3), p. 175. The author was not the man to miss any "seditious" intentions in an Indian press organ.

65 This may explain his sometimes erring judgment on Muslim affairs outside India. He thought, for instance, that the Young Turk movement had altered the "balance of power" in the Levant, and that consequently the Turks would no longer be willing to put up with trespassing upon their rights in Egypt (articles in *Comrade*, 1911, on Albania and Egypt, *Selections from Comrade*, pp. 232-38 and 239-44).

66 When in 1914 the securities for both papers were confiscated, "a house to house canvass (was) conducted among butchers and low class Muslims, and I understand that about Rs. 4,000 has so far been collected." (*Fortnightly Report from Delhi Province, 19th November, 1914*; PSP 4265/2/1914). In our view a considerable amount of money.

67 Muhammad Ali was certainly an emotional man. When in 1912 he got news that Bulgarian troops stood 25 miles from Constantinople, he considered suicide (*Autobiography*, in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 40). Nehru, who felt much affection for him, called him "most irrationally religious" (quoted by Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 94).

68 *Autobiography*, in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 52.

69 *ibid.*, p. 60.

70 *ibid.*, p. 63.

71 *ibid.*, p. 65.

72 This judgment is Khaliqzaman's, who knew the brothers intimately (*op. cit.*, p. 169). At the Karachi trial in 1921 and also when requesting release from their internment in 1918, it was clearly the younger brother who took the lead, while the elder followed suit.

73 For most of these and following particulars we have to rely on his *Written Statement* filed in November, 1918 (ICP 206 of Jan. 1919).

One might wish for a more impartial source, but its bias is to some extent neutralized because it answers the *Statement of the Charges against Mahomed and Shaukat Ali* (*ibid.*).

74 The Agha Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

75 The Deoband authorities promised to help the Society if it succeeded in establishing itself. Abdul Bari and Shaukat Ali conferred about it with Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan (*Record of Interview with Shaukat Ali at Chindwara on the 6th December, 1918*, ICP 206 of Jan. 1919, p. 4).

76 Shaukat Ali, *Written Statement*, p. 6.

77 *ibid.*, p. 7.

78 *ibid.*, p. 9.

79 Quoted at length, *ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

80 The *Statement of the Charges* against the brothers (pp. 10-11) mainly rests on suspicions but refers to two "proofs" which unfortunately are not added to the document. In the *Record of Interview* with Shaukat Ali in 1918 the whole question of the *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* was gone into in detail, but the interneer was not confronted with any proofs, and so we consider it likely that suspicions were the only thing to go by.

81 Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

82 In 1906, according to Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

83 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

84 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-92.

85 According to Aziz Ahmad it was only about 1920 that Azad participated in the nationalist movement (*op. cit.*, p. 187).

86 Abul Kalam Azad considered Aligarh an institution for "job hunters", according to Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 123. Albiruni may not be the fairest critic of Shibli and Azad, as he wrote his book, we feel safe in saying, "in defence of Pakistan". In his picture Azad and Shibli figure as shrewd and ambitious politicians. But in our narrative about their activities and attitudes we rely on Faruqi (*op. cit.*, pp. 49-53) and W. C. Smith (*Modern Islam in India*, pp. 211-12) as well.

87 M. Desai, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

88 According to S. A. Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Since Azad wrote almost exclusively in Urdu, we have to depend on second-hand knowledge in his case. An exposé of his religious thinking is to be found in Husain's book, pp. 93-98; his political ideas are rendered more fully by K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, pp. 175-76; Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37, and H. Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-34. Azad himself, in his *India Wins Freedom*, hardly touches upon his activities regarding the Khilafat movement. An interesting characteristic of his personality and his career is given by Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-94.

89 Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

90 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

91 *ibid.*, p. 234.

92 In our opinion, Husain's interpretation (*op. cit.*, p. 89) that Azad looked upon the Caliphate as the religious centre only of the Muslim

world, is not plausible. It may be correct after 1922, when Turkey abolished the Caliph's political functions, but not before then.

93 By H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 229. But Azad was probably too complex a personality to be labelled in this way, as Rosenthal suggests, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

94 P. C. Bamford, *Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements*, Delhi, 1925, p. 169. The author was Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Home Dpt., and composed this confidential publication by order of the Government of India.

95 Dated 6.5.1920 from London, and enclosed in a letter from Chelmsford to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 10.

96 See for instance pp. 84-85 and 88, where he gives details about his arrest in 1942, the only relevance of which is that Azad figures in them.

97 This opinion is Khaliquzzaman's (*op. cit.*, p. XII). The author knew Azad well, but when he wrote his book had become the latter's political adversary. But the same trait is suggested by Rammanohar Lohia (*op. cit.*, pp. 42-43), whose book was originally intended to be a review of Azad's autobiography.

98 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

99 The aim of the *Jamiat al-Ansar*, according to Malik (*op. cit.*, p. 229) was to bring about closer relations between Deoband and Aligarh and to sap Aligarh's loyalty. Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 56) holds that its aims never became quite clear, but he too mentions in this context the efforts towards a better understanding between Deoband and Aligarh (*ibid.*, p. 58).

100 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 229. See also *Report of the Sedition Committee* (commonly referred to as the *Rowlatt Report*), Calcutta, 1918, pp. 126-27. It is, by the way, remarkable that only 10 out of about 130 pages of this Report dealing with sedition before and during the war are devoted to Muslim activities.

101 On this development at Aligarh College see Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

102 S. A. Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

103 The Earl of Lytton, *op. cit.*, p. 191; Blunt's letter is quoted in full, pp. 182-90. Sayyid Mahmud was a young Indian Muslim who, having finished his studies in England, came back to India in 1912. After 1946 he was a Minister of State in India.

104 S. A. Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

105 Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

106 For instance the then Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, in his *My Indian Years 1910-16*, London, 1948, p. 88, and O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

107 K. M. Panikkar, *His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner*, London, 1937, pp. 150-62.

108 In the *Comrade* of 26.9.1914 (*Selections from Comrade*, pp. 498-524).

109 *ibid.*, p. 43.

110 Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

111 Quoted in full in Muhammad Ali's *Written Statement*, p. 34.

112 Full text of the declaration in J. C. Ker, *Political Trouble in India*, Calcutta, 1917, pp. 297-98.

113 See W. W. Cash, *op. cit.*, p. 28; the Agha Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 134-35; a declaration of the Ali brothers, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, made in November, 1914 (PSP 4265/2/1914). But there were differences; the latter only denounced disobedience to the British Raj and did not mention active help, whereas the Agha Khan urged Muslims "to stand loyally by the western Allies", and accepted political missions on their behalf himself.

114 Speech of 9.11.1914 at the Guildhall Banquet, as reported in *The Observer* (Lahore) of 18.11.1914.

115 This is clear from press comments in the *Muhammadi* (Calcutta) of 13.11.1914, the *Mussalman* (Calcutta) of 12.11.1914, and *Al Hilal* (Calcutta) of 11.11.1914.

116 The *Dainik Chandrika* (Calcutta) of 15.11.1914 mentions Dr. Suhrawardy as denying the Sultan's title to the Caliphate, and the aforementioned issues of the *Muhammadi* and the *Mussalman* clearly were written to combat views like his.

117 Sir Muhammad Shafi, in a memo of 1921, states that in 1912 he had already expressed this view towards Lord Hardinge (memo enclosed to a letter from Reading to Montagu, 3.11.1921, Mont. Coll., vol. 14). See also *Statement of the Charges against Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali*, pp. 6-7.

118 Throughout this study we use the word "Caliphate" to designate the institution, and the word "Khilafat" when we mean the political movement which aimed at supporting the Caliphate, but had at the same time other ends in view, even if the latter were not always explicitly stated, or even realized by its adherents.

119 *op. cit.*, p. 30.

120 Letter of 5.1.1915; PSP 4786/1914.

121 N. R. Keddie, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

122 Sir Alfred Lyall a.o., *The Sultan and the Khaliphate*; PSM D 178, IOR.

123 See *Minute* by Mr. Clarke of the India Office, summarizing some records on this question; PJP 1951/1917.

124 Letter from Foreign Office to Undersecretary of State for India, dated 4.1.1915; PSP 53/1915.

125 Of 5.1.1915; *ibid.*

126 Draft of letter to the Foreign Office, 6.1.1915, *ibid.*

127 As is suggested by D. G. H. (Hogarth) in *Arab Bulletin* 49 of 30.4.1917, pp. 191-92.

128 For these particulars see the aforementioned *Minute* by Mr. Clarke.

129 *ibid.*

130 *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32. He does not offer any proofs, but his rather circumstantial narrative is not in itself improbable.

131 See *Rowlatt Report*, pp. 124-27; Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-25.

132 For instance when they accused Muhammad Ali of having written a letter in Persian to the Amir of Afghanistan, which he denied (*Written Statement*, pp. 46-47 and 53). In the *Rowlatt Report* this accusation is not mentioned, and Muhammad Ali supposed that the Rowlatt Committee had found it untenable, or at least unprovable. The Government of India realized that many Indians "appointed" by the Provisional Government at Kabul could not have been consulted as to their appointments (*Rowlatt Report*, p. 126).

133 *op. cit.*, p. 34.

134 *op. cit.*, p. 55.

135 The main charge against them was: anti-British and pro-Turkish activities, and it was stated that, had they desisted from these after the outbreak of the war, taking action against them would not have been necessary (*Statement of the Charges against Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali*, p. 1). Muhammad Ali himself declares that his having incurred the severe displeasure of Sir James Meston, Lt. Governor of the U.P., was the principal cause of his arrest (*Written Statement*, pp. 43-45). The various motives do not exclude each other.

136 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

137 Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-26.

138 *ibid.*, p. 127. The Rajah of Mahmudabad was an influential *taluqdar* in Oudh.

139 Sir Vincent Lovett, *A Short History of Indian Politics*, Govt. Press of the U.P., 1918, p. 115. The same opinion is voiced by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 127, admitting however that "the general feeling seems to have been one of depression and fear."

140 O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

141 The initiative in these years came from the Muslim side. Coup-land (*op. cit.*, p. 47) mentions "the younger members of the League"; according to Muhammad Ali (*Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 270), his brother Shaukat and he himself proposed the simultaneous Bombay sessions. Jinnah's role is stressed by S. A. Husain (*op. cit.*, p. 68) and by Rothermund (*op. cit.*, p. 73). Support of Azad is mentioned by Albiruni (*op. cit.*, p. 196) and by Azim Husain (*op. cit.*, p. 99).

142 Full text in Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, App. II, pp. 623-26. He nowhere mentions Jinnah's name in connection with the "Lucknow pact", but then Jinnah was no longer popular with Congress leaders when this book was written.

143 *op. cit.*, p. 48.

144 Rothermund, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

145 Muhammad Shafi, who became a member of the Viceroy's Council, was for years to come the leader of the Muslims supporting government.

146 Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-22; Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

147 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

148 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 128. We suppose the *Hindu Mahasabha* is meant, or a group connected with that body. Bamford characterizes the members as Hindus "who put their religion before politics".

149 This judgment is Gopal's, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

150 Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

NOTES CHAPTER IV

1 The cost of living index (1914 = 100) rose to 154 in 1918 and to 173 in 1921, only descending to 154 again in 1923 — and wages were lagging behind (*India during the Year 1923-1924*, pp. 185-86). For some more details on the situation see Sir Valentine Chirol, *India*, London, 1926, p. 183, and D. M. G. Koch, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-84.

2 Rothermund, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

3 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. XIII.

4 See for instance the report on a meeting at Sialkot on 27.6.1920, attended by about 10,000 Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, with as principal speakers Lala Lajpat Rai, Dr. Satyapal and Maulvi Zafar Ali Khan; HDP 71 of Aug. 1920, pp. 27-46.

5 If they had indeed been important, one would expect them to have been referred to in documents like Gandhi's *Khilafat Manifesto* of March 1920 (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920), or in the *Khilafat Manifesto* of May 1920 issued by the Central Khilafat Committee (Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-57). But they were not. Boycott of British goods, already considered in November 1919 (Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 145), should be seen mainly as a political weapon; it was discouraged in Gandhi's *Manifesto* as a form of violence. In *India during the Year 1920*, p. 142, mention is made of nearly 200 industrial strikes, of which "some probably were not unconnected with non-co-operation", but the vast majority were thought to have only economic origins.

6 Gopal Krishna, "The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923", in *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXV, 3 (May 1966), p. 429.

7 Quoted by Satyapal and Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

8 *Autobiography (Selections from Comrade)*, p. 65).

9 As quoted in the *Justice* (Madras) of 26.1.1920.

10 As Rothermund (*op. cit.*, p. 95) observes with regard to the non-co-operation movement.

11 It was his second visit to that country. Extracts from his *Indian Diary* were published in 1930, and are inserted in his biography by S. D. Waley.

12 This was admitted by Montagu himself (Waley, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19); it was also a reason for Indian nationalists to support the war effort (M. Edwardes, *British India 1772-1947*, London, 1967, p. 197). Perhaps the most famous nationalist to take this line was Gandhi, admitting as

much in a letter to Lord Chelmsford (quoted by Penderel Moon. *op. cit.*, p. 73).

13 His budget speeches as Undersecretary of State for India are quoted at some length by Waley, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-44, 48-50 and 53-54.

14 *ibid.*, p. 132.

15 This was in the spring of 1912. *Ibid.*, p. 51; cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

16 Among them could be reckoned the men of the Round Table group, like Lionel Curtis, Sir William Marris and Lord Meston (see W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 86).

17 Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 164-76.

18 Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

19 Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

20 *ibid.*, p. 56.

21 CP G.T. 4877 of 15.6.1918.

22 Montagu to Lloyd George, 17.7.1917, quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.

23 Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

24 As is done by Zafar Imam, "The Effects of the Russian Revolution on India, 1917-1920", in S. N. Mukherjee ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

25 This is the opinion of Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

26 This was a revolutionary movement, mainly operating among the Sikhs. But how dangerous was it for the British Raj? The Rowlett Report expatiates on it, but in the *Oxford History of India* it is called not a movement, but a conspiracy, "troublesome rather than dangerous" (p. 780).

27 *India during the Year 1919*, p. 152.

28 R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, Calcutta, 1963, p. 4; cf. *Oxford History of India*, p. 785.

29 This view is also taken by Woodruff (*op. cit.*, p. 228), and by Edwardes, *British India 1772-1947*, p. 200.

30 *Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council* of 6.2.1919.

31 It was put off for a week, but in Delhi by a mistake the original date was maintained. The first casualties were in Delhi.

32 *Report on the Punjab Disturbances*, p. 8.

33 O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

34 The title of ch. XVII of his book, pp. 263-317.

35 *ibid.*, p. 118.

36 *Report on the Punjab Disturbances*, p. 29. O'Dwyer's thesis throughout his whole book is that the Government of India's mild attitude towards the troublemakers in 1919 and after was inspired by their anxiety not to spoil the climate for the reforms, and that in particular an investigation that might reveal treason was suppressed for reasons of political "expediency". For the first part of this thesis textual proof is easily to be found, but not for the second. Confidential publications (*India and Communism*, Govt. of India press, Simla, 1933, p. 20, quoting a former publication by Sir David Petrie, *Communism in India 1924-1927*, Simla, 1927) confirm that the Intelligence Bureau did not

really believe that external contacts had much to do with the Punjab troubles in 1919.

37 An official censure of General Dyer by the British Government was carried in the House of Commons by 247 to 37 votes, but failed to pass in the House of Lords by 86 to 129 votes. And a public subscription to compensate the General for his dismissal brought in about £ 25,000.

38 Thompson, Edward and Garatt, quoted by Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 63. Edwardes expresses himself still more strongly: "... even more decisive than the Mutiny"; *British India 1772-1947*, p. 202.

39 According to C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, London, 1929, p. 64. We should remember, though, that even after Amritsar Gandhi advocated co-operation with the reforms.

40 Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

41 CP G.T. 4877 of 15.6.1918.

42 Reading to Montagu, 6.12.1922, quoted in CP 4378. One might object, however, that Reading was not in the best position to compare the situation in 1922 with that in 1915 or 1916, as he did not have first-hand knowledge of India then.

43 As is suggested by A. P. Thornton, *Doctrines of Imperialism*, p. 204. He is quoting A. T. Wilson's book on his experiences in Mesopotamia between 1917 and 1920.

44 *ibid.*, p. 195. Thornton is speaking there about decolonization after World War II.

45 As is done by Lord Lloyd in his *Egypt since Cromer*, quoted by Sir Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy*, London, 1934, p. 21.

46 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

47 *op. cit.*, p. 242.

48 Cab. Concl. of 10.2.1922, app. III; Cab. 23/29.

49 In a letter of 8.10.1919. Cf. another letter from Chelmsford to Curzon, of 6.9.1919 (both letters in Mont. Coll., vol. 9).

50 Hardinge, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

51 R. C. Majumdar a.o., *An Advanced History of India*, p. 899.

52 See for instance some letters from Montagu to Chelmsford, dated 11.6.1919, 31.7.1919, and 1.11.1919 (Mont. Coll., vol. 3). Cf. the judgment of Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-60.

53 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 141. The Viceroy, in a proclamation of 10.5.1919 with regard to the Afghan invasion, accused the Amir of soliciting support from a rebellion in India. Cf. *India during the Year 1919*, p. 9.

54 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

55 Chelmsford to Montagu, 14.5.1919, and 21.5.1919 (Mont. Coll., vol. 8).

56 Cf. *Weekly Report* of 28.4.1920, on contacts between Khilafat agitators and the Afghan delegation at Mussoorie.

57 Though perhaps his success was in no small part due to Gokhale's intervention, and to a railway strike the government of Smuts had to

cope with at the time — as is intimated by Penderel Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

58 This is how Nehru characterizes Gandhi's message to the Indian people (*op. cit.*, p. 361).

59 Quoted by Andrews, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-26.

60 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 162, reports it as being successful, except at first in Bengal.

61 Penderel Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 and 67.

62 E. V. Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi*, Princeton, N.J., 1967, p. 139.

63 Penderel Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72; Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 370-72.

64 Quoted by Andrews, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-47.

65 Both motivations are to be found *ibid.*, pp. 56-57 and 62-64.

66 This interpretation is given by Wolfenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 81 and 85. Strangely enough, the author pays no attention to Gandhi's alliance with the Muslims about 1920.

67 Andrews, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

68 Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

69 Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 74. Cf. Walter Crocker, *Nehru, A Contemporary's Estimate*, London, 1966, pp. 63 and 141.

70 *op. cit.*, p. 43.

71 Gandhi, *op. cit.*, p. XII.

72 It is not surprising that an English biographer like Penderel Moon should use such words, but we find them also used by Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, p. 401, and the Congress leaders' disgust at Gandhi's stress on *khaddar* is recorded by Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

73 *op. cit.*, p. 62.

74 See above, p. 70.

75 This point will be discussed in more detail in ch. VI.

76 See Worsley on the general aspects of populism, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.

77 See above, p. 63.

78 In a letter to President Wilson, dated 18.12.1916; quoted by Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

79 Quoted by Lord Curzon, CP 392 of 4.1.1920.

80 Declaration of November 2, 1914. Indian Muslims regarded this as a pledge which would affect post-war conditions too; it was repeatedly referred to after the armistice, for instance in Dr. Ansari's presidential address to the Muslim League session of December, 1919 at Delhi (PJP 1424/1919).

81 As rendered by the *Times*, 6.1.1918.

82 Contained in his message to the U.S.A. Congress, 8.1.1918.

83 These were the words used by an I.C.S. official in a report on Muslim opinion (PSP 1491/1920).

84 They considered it not a "pledge", but "an explanation of war aims to the Labour Party" (PJP 7596/1919).

85 Letter of 10.2.1920 (PSP 1822/1920).

86 In a speech in the House of Commons, 26.2.1920; this was only after the cabinet had agreed to letting Turkey retain Constantinople.

In the cabinet meeting of 6.1.1920, when this question was being discussed, a very curious argument regarding this "pledge" of Jan. 5, 1918 had been introduced: "It was recalled, however, that this statement had been made with a view to its effect on the war rather than on an eventual peace, and that it contained offers to other Governments besides the Turks which had not been fulfilled." (Cab. Concl.; Cab. 23/20).

87 A Madras Khilafat meeting on 20.3.1920 sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, expressing its hope of peace terms "that will fully insure the integrity of Turkey and the suzerainty of the Sultan Khalifa over the federated autonomous Muslim states of Arabia Syria including Palestine and Mesopotamia." But what interpretation should be put on the words "suzerainty" and "autonomous" in this text? (PSP 380/4/1919).

88 In a letter of 15.3.1920 (PSP 380/4/1919). A letter from the Nizam of Hyderabad, dated 16.3.1920 (*ibid.*) is written in the same vein. Mr. Shuckburgh, a high official at the India Office, noted in a minute covering these letters that, if "loyal" and "sensible" persons like the Begam and the Nizam speak in this way, it should be clear that generally far too high hopes had been raised, with the consequence that later on England would be accused of a breach of promise.

89 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

90 These details are borrowed from Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-33.

91 *ibid.*, p. 135.

92 "A Confidential Account of the Proceedings of the Session", PJP 1424/1919.

93 Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 43. The author's narrative of the events is largely corroborated by Bamford's account as well as by the "Confidential Account"; only it is striking that Khaliqzaman in his own report plays a far more important part than in the other two. He may have had a tendency to overrate his own importance.

94 Referred to in fn. 92, above.

95 In a letter of 27.4.1918, quoted by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

96 K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 179.

97 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 70, outlines their programme and their ideas in this way.

98 Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

99 K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 179.

100 Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, pp. 47-48) gives this name to the Lucknow Conference which, according to him, he himself organized. It is called a "Muslim Conference" by Bamford (*op. cit.*, p. 140) and by H. N. Mitra who dates it Sept. 22 (*I.A.R. 1920*, pp. 250-51). According to Khaliqzaman, at the Lucknow Conference "practically every province and city was represented", and a resolution was passed to form an All-India Central Khilafat Committee.

The Delhi Conference is listed by Mitra as the first Khilafat Conference (pp. 251-52); he gives the text of a resolution to send a deputation to England and, if need be, to America. Mitra, composing his

review at the time of the events, may be a more reliable witness than Khaliqzaman, writing some 40 years after them.

Bamford dates the first real Khilafat Conference Nov. 23, at Bombay. On the other hand, he admits that provincial Khilafat Committees had already been founded before this.

Other authors, like S. A. Husain (*op. cit.*, p. 70) are vague about the date of the first Khilafat Conference, while Aziz Ahmad (*op. cit.*, p. 135) mentions Muhammad Ali as its founder "after his release from prison". This cannot be quite correct, since Muhammad Ali was still under arrest in November 1919. His anonymous biographer (*Muhammad Ali. His Life, Services, and Trial*, p. 125) also states that an organization had already been set up before the Ali brothers were set free.

101 Hereafter to be referred to as the C.K.C.; Bamford gives the name of its president as Mahomed Jan Mahomed Chotani (*op. cit.*, p. 73).

102 A Bengali Muslim League leader; see above, p. 82.

103 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

104 These are mentioned by Bamford; Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, p. 49) also lists Motilal Nehru and Malaviya.

105 *ibid.* These different interpretations Khaliqzaman and Bamford put on the relations between Gandhi and his Muslim friends will return later: some authors look upon Gandhi as the agitator who led the Muslims on, others consider Gandhi to have been carried away by Muslim fanatics.

106 Majumdar a.o., *An Advanced History of India*, p. 980.

107 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-80.

108 It is hard to say exactly when Gandhi resolved to espouse the Khilafat cause. His letter of 27.4.1918 to the Viceroy was couched in rather general terms. Bamford (*op. cit.*, p. 143) quotes an intelligence report according to which in March 1919 he came to an understanding with Abdul Bari about Hindu support for the Caliphate, but we do not find any other mention of this. At the Delhi Khilafat Conference and at Amritsar, however, he openly showed his sympathy.

109 On this session see Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-7. He states that the Ali brothers "quickly indicated that they had no feelings of gratitude towards Government" — but one might well ask why they should have had them!

110 The Amritsar Conference is not mentioned by Bamford, but only by Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 52. His account, however, is corroborated by the text of the address of the Khilafat deputation which waited on the Viceroy on 19.1.1920 (PJP 3723/1920). There is only a personal detail which is not confirmed: that the Ali brothers congratulated Khaliqzaman on his initiative in founding the Khilafat Conference.

111 A fairly substantial report on this meeting is contained in a telegram, dated March 1, 1920, from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Special Dept., to Mr. McPherson, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Dept. (PJP 3723/1920). See also Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.

112 We do not think this an uncommon situation under Indian conditions; this kind of organization broadly followed the pattern of the early Congress organization and of the Muslim Educational Conference, a creation of Sir Sayyid dating from 1886. It is only to prevent misapprehension on the part of the western reader that we remark upon it.

113 The Provincial Khilafat Committee in Bengal, for instance, opened a bureau headed by Abul Kalam Azad, at a salary of Rs. 800 per month; but this is mentioned only at a later date (Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24.10.1920; PJP 150/1921).

114 Dated 19.5.1920; HDP no. 345 of Febr. 1921.

115 According to R. H. Hitchcock in a confidential publication, *A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921*, Madras, Govt. Press, 1925, pp. 18-19. The author was a District Superintendent of Police in the Malabar region, but his official history of the rebellion gives the impression of aiming at a certain detachment and of being reliable. The four-annas membership was a well-known phenomenon in Congress too.

116 *ibid.*, p. 20.

117 See Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

118 To Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome; enclosure to a letter from Montagu to Reading, dated 22.12.1922 (Mont. Coll., vol. 13).

119 See on the Bezwada programme also Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-28, quoting the resolutions of the A.I.C.C. meeting. It is expressly stated that "four-annas members" are meant.

120 *ibid.*, p. 166.

121 Mentioned above, fn. 87.

122 In his letter mentioned in fn. 118.

123 Quoted HDP 345 of Febr. 1921, pp. 72-82.

124 On Sept. 18, 1919; mentioned in a telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, of 15.10.1919; PJP 5450/1918.

125 In the report mentioned before, fn. 111.

126 In the case quoted above it is fairly clear that the purpose is not to belittle the force of the movement, and so we are inclined to accept the numbers given.

127 As reported from the Punjab (HDP 71 of Aug. 1920, para. 4), from the U.P. (HDP 345 of Febr. 1921), and from Bihar (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. VI).

128 By Zia-ud-din Ahmad Barni (*Selections from Comrade*, p. 198), and by Mahadev Desai, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

129 And had this amount really been collected? Gandhi announced that it had on June 30, 1921, but Bamford writes: "There is good ground to discount a considerable proportion of these claims" (*op. cit.*, p. 31).

130 Zia-ud-din Ahmad Barni (*op. cit.*, p. 198) contends that they were foremost in contributing this sum.

131 See *Weekly Reports* of 29.1.1920; 25.2.1920; 26.6.1920. In the report of 25.2.1920 the sums are mentioned which each province promised to contribute: Sind and Bengal 5 lakhs of rupees each, the U.P. 4 lakhs, and Bombay 11 lakhs.

132 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 171. Forty lakhs equals 4,000,000 rupees, which would be £ 400,000 (the exchange rate in 1921 was Rs. 10 to £ 1; cf. *India during the Year 1921*).

133 According to a press notice mentioned by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

134 *The Bombay Chronicle* of Febr. 1, 1922.

135 "All Muhammadans"; see above, pp. 84-85.

136 W. J. Watson notes "a striking degree of unanimity among the Muslims" in this respect (W. J. Watson, *Muhammad Ali and the Khilafat Movement*, p. 30; unpublished M.A. thesis of 1955, available at McGill University Library, Montreal).

137 Letter of 22.6.1920; HDP 101 of Sept. 1920, app. IX. It is, unfortunately, only one specimen, and its composition is to some degree obviously a product of chance, since 23 of the signatories come from Trichinopoly, among whom were 15 merchants. As Trichinopoly was not the main centre of the Khilafat movement, this must mean that in this case there was a very active member who made as many people of enough importance sign as he could lay hands on.

138 Four signatories did not list their occupation.

139 The president of the C.K.C., Chotani, also was a wealthy merchant.

140 See above, p. 58.

141 See above, fn. 127; also *Weekly Reports* of 15.1.1921 and 21.6.1921.

142 The reason for this might be, of course, that opponents from among the lower classes were of little interest for our informants, but if there had been considerable numbers of them, we feel that official observers would have remarked on this.

143 Reported by Sir Harcourt Butler in a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 20.4.1919; Butler Coll., vol. 49.

144 In July 1920; HDP 27 of Nov. 1920.

145 *Weekly Report* of 4.6.1920.

146 *ibid.*, 21.6.1921.

147 *ibid.*, 13.11.1921.

148 See above, p. 82.

149 PSP 5313/1920. The contents of this letter may also explain his ambiguous attitude, viz. opposing a movement to which he had contributed money.

150 Letter of 13.6.1920; PSP 5825/1920.

151 Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

152 Faruqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

153 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-94, suggests this comparison. Cf. Faruqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18, writing about the attitude of the Deoband leaders who, however, were the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama's* leaders too.

154 See above, p. 66.

155 For instance at an Ulama Conference at Delhi in Nov., 1920; see CP 2220 of 27.11.1920. This source reported "... much acrimonious discussion as to co-operation with Hindus and as to Moslem attitude

towards Gandhi.”

156 In a contribution “England and Islam” in *The Nineteenth Century and After* of July, 1920; quoted by Stoddard, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

157 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 53.

158 See Agha Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-62, and Muhammad Shafi’s memo on “The need for Anglo-Mahomedan Union in the interests of the British Empire”, mentioned before, p. 209, fn. 117.

159 Nehru, as quoted by Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

160 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 250. His biographer M. A. H. Ispahani, in *Qaid-E-Azam as I knew Him*, hardly mentions Jinnah’s attitude towards the Khilafat movement, but quotes (p. 122) as a very characteristic opinion of Jinnah’s that “sentimental nonsense and emotion have no place in politics”.

161 Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-6.

162 *The Khalifate Agitation in India; by a Student of History*, Madras, 1922, p. 11.

163 Abdul Ghani, *Thoughts on Caliphate*, Karachi, 1919, p. 3.

164 *ibid.*, p. 8. Cf. Agha Mohammed Sultan Mirza, *An essay towards a better understanding of the Caliphate*, Delhi, 1920, p. 17. The same opinion is held by Maulana Faizul Karim, *Facts about the Khalifate*, Karachi, n.d. (1919), p. 8.

165 *The Khalifate Agitation in India*, pp. 12 and 33.

166 To denounce Khilafat in those days is considered “certain political suicide” by Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

167 *The Khilafat Day in Sind*, Karachi, n.d. (1919), and Shaikh Abdulaziz Mahomed Soleman, *Anti-Khalif Intrigues in Sind*, Sukkur, 1919.

168 Soleman, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

169 See for instance a letter from Sir Harcourt Butler to Lord Chelmsford, dated 20.4.1919; Butler Coll., vol. 49.

170 Soleman, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

171 *ibid.*, p. 29.

172 Quoted by Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

173 W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 312. For British authors this is a common way of looking upon his decision; cf. Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

174 As Gandhi did himself in his *Khilafat Manifesto* of 10.3.1920. He does not use the words “moral duty”, but calls it a just cause which he could not but support.

175 M. Desai, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

176 Date uncertain, but very probably from the summer of 1920, as it figures among reports on events in June and July of that year in HDP 25 of Nov. 1920.

177 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

178 In an article on “Hindu-Moslem Relations”; *Selections from Comrade*, pp. 295-96.

179 *op. cit.*, p. 45.

180 Quoted by Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

181 *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 63.

- 182 Full text of the *Manifesto* in Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-57.
- 183 A detailed account of this meeting and Shaukat Ali's speech in HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. VI.
- 184 *Weekly Report* of 19.6.1920.
- 185 *Weekly Report* of 9.11.1921. One might ask, of course, how far these reports are to be trusted since they could only have been put together with the aid of informers. But then the Government of India had little reason to give these reports if they did not feel fairly sure they were reliable, and the matters reported are quite probable in themselves.
- 186 Given in a letter from Government of India to Secretary of State, 2.6.1919; PJP 4002/1919.
- 187 Agha Mohammed Sultan Mirza, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.
- 188 It is curious to note that Majumdar (*History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 76) reproaches Gandhi for subordinating his whole policy to the Khilafat cause; the Punjab wrongs and *swaraj* were aims only hitched to it later on!
- 189 Full text given in *Justice* of 26.1.1920; PJP 3723/1920. Members of the deputation were, among others, the Ali brothers, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari, Seth Chotani, Abul Kalam Azad, Hasrat Mohani, Dr. Kitchlew, Gandhi and Swami Shradanand. It had been actuated by information coming from the Agha Khan, to the effect that Turkey's fate was to be decided in the next month (Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 148).
- 190 The meaning of this term is explained by Muhammad Ali as follows: it is the "Island of Arabia", surrounded by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. So it contains not only Arabia, but also Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine ("India's Message to France", text of an address given in Paris on 21.3.1920, *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 159).
- 191 In an interview on April 26, 1920, reported by Muhammad Ali in a letter to Shaukat Ali dated London, 6.5.1920 (enclosure to a letter from Chelmsford to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 10).
- 192 In his *Khilafat Manifesto* of 10.3.1920.
- 193 In "India's Message to France", *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 160.

NOTES CHAPTER V

1 The first mention we found of this was at the Muslim League session at Delhi, December 1918 (Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 134), but the proposition was repeated at several meetings in the autumn of 1919. In one of these, the Delhi meeting of September 23, reported in *I.A.R. 1920*, pp. 251-52, even the members of such a deputation had been designated, among them Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari and Chotani. But a definite appointment of the members of the first Khilafat deputation took place at the Amritsar Khilafat Conference of December 1919 (see Muhammad Ali, *Autobiography*, in *Selections from Comrade*, p. 69; cf. Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 148).

2 *Verbatim* records of both interviews in Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, *For India and Islam*, pp. 27-50 and 51-61.

3 In his letter to Shaukat Ali, referred to above, p. 97.

4 See minute of 3.3.1920 by Mr. Shuckburgh on the reception of the Khilafat delegation by Lord Fisher (PSP 380/5/1919), and a memo by the Political Intelligence Officer attached to the India Office, dated 10.1.1921 (PSM B 361, IOR).

5 CP 392 of 4.1.1920.

6 *Selections from Comrade*, p. 70.

7 At Paris on 21.3.1920; London, 22.4.1920 (a meeting presided over by George Lansbury); Scarborough, 2.7.1920 (*Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 157-62; 183-93; 197-204).

8 Addressed to the Sultan-Caliph by the Khilafat delegation from Paris, 28.5.1920. It was published only in 1924 in the *Comrade* (full text given by Bamford, *op. cit.*, app. F, pp. 243-50).

9 In a War Cabinet meeting of 14.8.1919 (Cab. 23/11) he opposed taking away Adrianople from Turkey; in CP 326 of 18.12.1919 he adjured his colleagues to let Turkey retain Thrace, Constantinople and Anatolia without any restrictions.

10 As is evident from CP 392, Curzon's answer to Montagu's aforementioned paper.

11 In a letter to Shaukat Ali of 29.4.1920; enclosure in a letter from Chelmsford to Montagu, Mont. Coll., vol. 10.

12 *Selections from Comrade*, p. 71.

13 Quoted by M. H. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

14 See above, fn. 4.

15 Reasonably enough, since in the summer of 1920 the Labour

Party opposed, forcefully as well as successfully, the government's anti-Soviet policy (see L. C. B. Seaman, *Post-Victorian Britain 1902-1951*, London 1967 2), pp. 112-13). But Muhammad Ali may have reached the same conclusion as Nehru did, that the Labour Party's anti-imperialism did not quite apply to the British Empire (Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 292).

16 These intrigues are not mentioned in his *Autobiography*, nor by his anonymous biographer in *Muhammad Ali; his Life, Services and Trial*, nor by M. H. Abbas in *All about the Khilafat*. The latter pays a lot of attention to the delegation's doings in Europe and does mention Muhammad Ali's visit to France, but he does not breathe a word about his contacts in Rome and Switzerland. The explanation might well be that it was considered unwise to advertise these activities, and their not being talked about is hardly a proof against their existence. The above-mentioned memo for the India Office in our opinion is quite reliable; several times its author states that he could not check a certain item, which makes us all the more ready to accept as true the facts he does have no doubts about. The part on Muhammad Ali's visit to Switzerland and his connection with Russia are confirmed by another report for the India Office, *Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia* by Major Bray (in CP 1990 of 18.10.1920).

17 At a meeting in Patna on 25.4.1920 (HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. VII).

18 Muhammad Ali's telegram and Lloyd George's reaction in PSP 5080/1920. Bamford too notes (*op. cit.*, p. 158) this revival of optimism among the Khilafat delegation, ascribing it to their confidence that France and Italy promoted a less anti-Turkish policy than did Great Britain.

19 See W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 200; S. A. Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

20 See for Hunter's exposition of these problems above, p. 32; cf. Arif Hussain, *Pakistan, Its Ideology and Foreign Policy*, London, 1966, pp. 12-13.

21 See for instance the records of the interviews with the Ali brothers in November and December, 1918; ICP 206 of Jan. 1919.

22 See above, p. 98.

23 Speeches at Patna on April 24 and 25; HDP 100 of Sept. 1920.

24 Full text in English in H. Malik, *op. cit.*, app. B, pp. 343-44.

25 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 158. We have not found the text of the Amir's declaration, but this was how at least one Maulvi represented it in a meeting attended by over one thousand Muslims at Amritsar in May 1920: "Amir Aman Ullah had declared that every *muhajir* would be given 8 *jaribs* of land free of revenue for 3 years, one mound of flour monthly and free quarters." (HDP 71 of Aug. 1920).

26 *Weekly Report* of 24.5.1920.

27 *ibid.*, 7.5.1920.

28 *ibid.*, 4.6.1920.

29 *ibid.*, 17.7.1920.

30 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12.8.1920.

31 *Weekly Report* of 21.8.1920. It is hard to say if these numbers are correct, but the reports do not give the impression of either belittling or exaggerating the movement; they seem to aim at an objective presentation of facts. Some authors (A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 136; H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 238) quote the number of 18,000 as the total of emigrants; A. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 17, gives the number of "about 50,000 people", but without mentioning any source; Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 158, reports a total of about 20,000, which also figures in a letter from Lord Chelmsford to Montagu (of 11.8.1920; Mont. Coll., vol. 11). But since evidently the movement was rapidly expanding in July-August 1920, it is not at all improbable that in the ten days after Lord Chelmsford wrote his letter another 10,000 Muslims were swept away by it, bringing the total up to the 30,000 mentioned in the *Weekly Report* of 21.8.1920.

32 W. C. Smith (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 203) quotes, without any further comment, an article by F. S. Briggs ("The Indian Hijrat of 1920", in *The Moslem World*, vol. XX, 1930, pp. 164-68) writing that "the numbers have been variously estimated between five hundred thousand and two million", but without mentioning sources of these "various estimates". He adds: "The latter estimate is certainly beyond the mark, but there is little doubt that the numbers were considerably over the lower estimate."

Briggs, living at the time at Peshawar, was an eyewitness to the *hijrat* and we do not entirely reject his testimony, but the data his estimate is based upon may easily have misled him. The only facts mentioned by him are (a) that for days the passenger trains arriving at Peshawar were full of *muhajirin*, and (b) that for more than a week the *muhajirin* were setting off in groups of varying strength, on foot but with bullock carts carrying the old and the infirm, and more than half of them passed in front of the author's bungalow.

We consider it as hardly probable that something like half a million people, traveling leisurely (in companies and with bullock carts) could have passed that bungalow in something like ten days — but it is easy to misjudge the total number of people marching in not strictly organized formations. Moreover, if really considerably more than half a million people had concentrated in Peshawar before starting on their journey, would not a serious food problem have arisen? Briggs does not mention that, but writes about "villagers from the neighbourhood, who offered food to the Muhajirin" — a casual statement which would fit in far better with some tens of thousands than with hundreds of thousands of people.

33 *Weekly Reports* of 2.10 and 9.10.1920.

34 Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

35 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

36 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12.8.1920.

37 Tel from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27.11.1920.

38 *op. cit.*, p. 165.

39 Report on a Khilafat meeting at Amritsar on May 28, 1920; HDP 71 of Aug. 1920.

40 *Weekly Report* of 8.11.1920 on a meeting of the C.K.C., where the situation was talked about in this way.

41 *Weekly Report* of 4.6.1920.

42 At the aforementioned Amritsar Khilafat meeting; HDP 71 of Aug. 1920.

43 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

44 This is suggested by Kaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 56, and Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-46.

45 *Weekly Reports* of 27.8.1920; 11.9.1920; 8.11.1920.

46 Lord Chelmsford in a letter to Montagu put it differently: "The movement has been — though no doubt initiated from political motives — a religious one, and the poor misguided folk who have left their homes have left them because they genuinely thought that they were bound to do so on religious grounds." (Letter of 19.8.1920; Mont. Coll., vol. 11).

47 We have already pointed out the "chiliastic" trend Rothermund discerns in it; see above, p. 70.

48 Especially in Jainism, which was firmly entrenched in Gujarat where Gandhi grew up.

49 Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-2. Majumdar (*History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 57) mentions Gandhi's *Khilafat Manifesto* of March, 1920, as containing the first definite elaboration of the doctrine.

50 See above, pp. 83-84.

51 Accounts of these talks are somewhat conflicting on personal matters. It seems to be clear that Azad, Abdul Bari, the Ali brothers, Ajmal Khan and Gandhi took part in them, but just who of them pleaded the acceptability of non-violence for Muslims remains a matter of doubt. See M. Desai, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43; Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Gandhi, *op. cit.*, p. 414; Khaliqquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

52 See Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50, and the circumstantial account of this meeting in PJP 3923/1920.

53 *ibid.*, p. 152; cf. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 143. According to Khaliqquzzaman, it was accepted at a Khilafat Conference in Meerut in the first week of Febr., 1920, but this cannot have been definite, since a decision was still postponed at the February meeting in Bombay, some ten days later. The Meerut meeting is also mentioned by Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 9, but not by Bamford.

54 HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. IV, contains a circumstantial report on this meeting. HDP 101 of Sept. 1920 gives the text of the ultimatum the C.K.C. sent to the Viceroy on June 22, announcing the start of the action on August 1 if their demands had not been met by then.

55 See above, p. 89.

56 Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, pp. 73-74.

57 Koor's letter of resignation was published in the *Amrika Bazar Patrika* of 24.5.1920. Cf. HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. II, where the names of some more Muslim dissentients are mentioned.

- 58 According to an account in HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. II.
- 59 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 60 *ibid.*, p. 17. The text is also to be found in Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, pp. 84-87.
- 61 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 62 Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-5; Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-80.
- 63 Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 428. He states this with reference to the Amritsar Congress, but this aspect was then not yet as important as it became in the summer of 1920.
- 64 Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 189. Montagu stated: "... some men are leaving the Congress as a result of the decision", but these were not the renowned leaders (CP 987 of 15.10.1920).
- 65 Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 426; Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 66 See Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 828, fn. 24 a. He does not absolutely reject the story, but doubts whether the aid of the taxi drivers could have been decisive.
- 67 Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 429; cf. Montagu in CP 987.
- 68 Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56; cf. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
- 69 According to Khaliqzaman the concept of *swaraj* was introduced by B. C. Pal, "under a misconception that the Muslims would not accept it" (*op. cit.*, p. 55).
- 70 Full text of an English translation of this *fatwa* to be found in Bamford, *op. cit.*, app. G, pp. 251-55. Cf. *Weekly Report* of 5.12.1920.
- 71 Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 342. Tagore, however, later on expressed himself critically with regard to the non-co-operation movement.
- 72 *Weekly Report* of 7.4.1920.
- 73 According to Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 432. An official account the Government of India forwarded to the Undersecretary of State in March, 1921, gives a similar picture; PJP 150/1921.
- 74 There may have been another side to this disapproval: fear of the radicalizing influence the students might have on politics. Something like that comes through in the presidential address of C. Vijiaghava-chariar at the Nagpur Congress session of 1920; *I.A.R. 1920*, pt. III, pp. 138-39.
- 75 PJP 150/1921.
- 76 This number of 100 students — out of a total number of 1,500 — is given in a government report (*Weekly Report* of 27.11.1920) and by Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, p. 57). Muhammad Ali himself, in his letter of May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome, speaks about 200 to 250 students; Watson (*op. cit.*, p. 63) gives the number of 250. The National Muslim University was soon afterwards called the *Jamia Milliah* and later on was removed to Delhi.
- 77 *Weekly Reports* of 27.11 and 5.12.1920.
- 78 In his aforementioned letter to Dr. Said in Rome.
- 79 Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 59. After giving up his practice he invested some 50,000 rupees in a cloth emporium, but this proved a

failure; his political friends bought quite a lot, but only on credit.

80 By W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18. He specifies that it was more successful in the towns than in the countryside, more among Muslims than among Hindus, and more for the Legislative Councils than for the Council of State (where the census was extremely high).

81 *Weekly Report* of 5.12.1920. Koch (*op. cit.*, p. 433) also mentions Bombay's 8 per cent., but reports also 32 per cent. in the Punjab and 33 per cent. in the U.P. He considers these results satisfactory for the government. After all, at the 1952 elections the percentage of voters was only about 50! (*Oxford History of India*, p. 786, fn. 2).

82 On these sessions Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-25 and 163. Montagu expressed hope that the limited success of the action would lead to a reversal of the policy at the Nagpur session (CP 987 of 15.10.1920). He evidently underrated the success.

83 Postscript to his letter to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome.

84 An account of this meeting in HDP 100 of Sept. 1920, app. IV. This was resolution no. 6. But in January, 1920, a Khilafat Volunteer Corps was already mentioned at Delhi (*Gazette of India* of 9.12.1920).

85 Letter of 22.10.1920 to Local Governments and Administrations; PJP 570/1921.

86 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24.10.1920 and 15.1.1921; *ibid.*

87 The first note is not dated (probably Jan. 1921); the second one is of 7.2.1921; *ibid.*

88 Compiled into an account dated 17.2.1921; *ibid.*

89 As appears from an annotation on a minute of 1.4.1921; *ibid.*

90 M. Beloff, *Imperial Sunset*, vol. 1, *Britain's Liberal Empire 1897-1921*, London, 1969, p. 303.

91 Their statements in *The Pioneer Mail* of 21.5.1920, which also contains the full text of the Viceroy's message and the communiqué of the Government of India.

92 Beloff, *loc. cit.*

93 The main responsibility on the British side was probably his. For the Turks, "Curzon's own recipe was force in Europe: consent in Asia" (E. Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956*, London, 1965 3), p. 53). So he had not favoured the Greek occupation of Smyrna nor their action in the hinterland (Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 271).

94 Monroe, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

95 On these treaties see A. J. Toynbee, "Relations between British India, Soviet Russia, and Afghanistan, 1919-1923", in *Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923*, London, 1927, pp. 385-87 (henceforward referred to as *Survey 1920-1923*); cf. Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

96 This was the gist of a speech delivered by Chotani at the Khilafat Conference at Bombay on 16.2.1920; *Weekly Report* of 19.2.1920.

97 This at least was what Chotani complained about; *Weekly Report* of 9.11.1921.

98 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

99 Thus for instance a conference at Lucknow in February 1921, and

one held at Karachi in the same month; see Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-65.

100 Monroe, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

101 *Weekly Report* of 20.4.1921.

102 Delivered by him at Madras on 2.4.1921; Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

103 Which will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

104 This enumeration contains only the most important officials and bodies involved in the process of policy-making in India; in the background was the less easily traceable and definable factor of public opinion, in England but also in India, where matters were complicated further because there was not only British and Anglo-Indian public opinion, but Indian public opinion as well. Some part of this found expression in the Legislative Assembly.

105 This is the main thesis of a seminar paper by D. A. Low on *The Government of India and the First Non-Co-Operation Movement 1920-1922*, delivered in October 1963 at the Australian National University; a copy of this paper is available at the I. O. L. Low relies largely on materials in the National Archives of India and reaches conclusions confirmed in broad lines by those in the London archives. But his attention is mainly focused on Gandhi and the Congress leaders, whereas ours is more concentrated on the Khilafatists and the government's attitude towards them. This circumstance may also explain why Low hardly mentions the attempts to reconcile Muslim opinion by meeting the Muslim demands (*see Bibliography*).

106 Like Sir Reginald Craddock, the then Governor of Burma, after having been the Home Member on the Viceroy's Council from 1912-17. His book *The Dilemma in India* (London, 1929) is one song in praise of the British Raj, the protector of the poor.

107 As is set forth by Craddock, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15 and 136-37. But we noted some doubts with regard to this point even with the very liberal-minded Montagu; see above, p. 71.

108 Cf. Chirol, *India*, p. 104. The number of files indexed under the head "sedition" in the Judicial and Public Papers is indeed amazing! Chirol, by the way, should not be identified with this brand of criticism himself.

109 Craddock, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 and 191-92.

110 O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-25.

111 *ibid.*, pp. 306-8.

112 *ibid.*, p. 318. It is one of the theses of his whole book.

113 HDP 71 and 72 of Aug. 1920. O'Dwyer's request was dated 12.7.1920.

114 *op. cit.*, p. 4.

115 In a letter to Sir Harcourt Butler of 15.9.1921 (Butler Coll., vol. 52). Chirol, of course, was not the Government of India but, repeatedly contributing to *The Times* on Indian affairs, he may be taken as representing a strong current in English public opinion.

116 Letter of 1.9.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 13.

117 The distinction made could be defined as between "law and

order” and “nation-building” departments; *Oxford History of India*, p. 788.

118 And when in December 1921 Lord Reading contemplated speeding up this process, he was rebuffed by the government in London, as we will see in the next chapter.

119 Edwardes, *British India 1772-1947*, p. 199.

120 Woodruff, *op. cit.*, pt. II, ch. I.

121 Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 209; cf. Agha Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

122 Dated 28.8.1919; PSP 380/4/1919.

123 He had already raised this point in a War Cabinet meeting on 20.8.1919, as appears from an *Extract from Minutes* appended to the letter.

124 CP 326 of 18.7.1919; CP 382 of 1.1.1920; CP 432 of 6.1.1920.

125 *Weekly Reports* of 18.2.1919; 17.4.1919; 6.5.1919; 26.6.1919; 13.7.1919; 15.9.1919; 29.9.1919; 15.10.1919; 20.1.1920; 19.2.1920.

126 An account of this meeting in *Mont. Coll.*, vol. 10.

127 In a letter to Lord Chelmsford of 22.4.1919; *Butler Coll.*, vol. 49.

128 See above, pp. 96-98.

129 The Agha Khan (*op. cit.*, p. 155) writes that it was proposed in the Viceroy's Legislative Council, whereas Muhammad Ali (*Selections from Comrade*, p. 72) speaks about the Government of India.

130 As appears from Muhammad Ali's article "Save us from our Friends" (*For India and Islam*, pp. 70-84), where he judges Mr. Hasan Imam, the deputation's chief spokesman, rather harshly. But he considered it a success that the government was compelled to include Chotani and Dr. Ansari among its members (see his letter of May, 1921, to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome).

131 He expounded his views at length in CP 392 of 4.1.1920, which was a refutation of Montagu's CP 382 of 1.1.1920.

132 Quoted by Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 270.

133 *Cab. Concl.* of 2.12 and 13.12.1920; *Cab.* 23/23.

134 As is evident from the documents referred to above, fns. 124, 125, 126.

135 Telegrams from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 2.9.1920 (CP 2209) and 23.9.1920; PSP 3324/1920.

136 Telegram of 22.4.1922, quoted in a memo by Sir Alfred Hirtzel (PSM B 372, IOR).

137 This position is outlined in two memoranda by Sir Alfred Hirtzel, one of 13.9.1922 (referred to fn. 136), the other of 7.4.1922 (PSP 4995/4/1919). He refers to reports of Dr. Arnold on the matter, who held the same opinion (see above, p. 43).

138 A *verbatim* account of its reception by the P.M. (accompanied by Mr. Philip Kerr) in PSP 4995/4/1919.

139 In his memo of 7.4.1922.

140 On the other hand, local authorities could hardly want serious trouble between the communities, and might try to bring about a *modus vivendi* when tension rose too high. This course of events was reported from Bihar and Orissa (*Weekly Report* of 25.2.1920).

141 Letter to Montagu, 5.1.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 5.

142 On 25.1.1921; *ibid.*

143 Held on January 22, 1920. A copy of the proceedings and of the paper in Mont. Coll., vol. 10.

144 Text to be found in telegram from Viceroy, Home Dept., to India Office, of 2.2.1920; PSP 380/5/1919.

145 It was this aspect of the antithesis between the two groups which was increasingly stressed in these years. But the concept of "moderates" and "extremists" it always somewhat hazy; for another definition of it see below, in the quotation from Sir Harcourt Butler's letter of 3.7.1918.

146 See Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

147 In two letters written in the summer of 1917 to his predecessor, Sir Austen Chamberlain; quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

148 Confidential letter to all Commissioners of Divisions (*i.e.* of the U.P., where Sir Harcourt Butler was Governor) of 31.7.1918; Butler Coll., vol. 49.

149 *Weekly Reports* of 4.12.1919; 18.3.1920; 13.8.1920; 21.6.1921; 18.11.1921.

150 Reading did not doubt Gandhi's sincerity when professing non-violence. See his letter of 19.5.1921 to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 14. Cf. Reading, Second Marquess of, *Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading*, 2 vols, London, 1942-45, vol. 2, pp. 196 and 304-5.

151 See his letters of 7.7. and 14.7.1921 to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 14. Cf. Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 199.

152 Montagu to Reading, 15.12.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 13; cf. Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 191-92.

153 We mean "loyal to the British connection", as this was the kind of loyalty that counted for the Government of India.

154 Mainly in the period 1912-1917 when Sir Reginald Craddock was Home Member, as is set forth by Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3. We follow here his exposition of the change of policy about 1919-1920.

155 In a letter of 19.5.1920; Mont. Coll., vol. 10.

156 *Weekly Reports* of 28.4.1920 and 20.4.1921.

157 Circulated among the British Cabinet as CP 4378 of 28.12.1922.

158 And this means that the insight exhibited in the document quoted above was, to some extent, wisdom after the event.

159 Montagu in CP 987 of 15.10.1920.

160 Montagu to Reading, 1.2.1922, quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 264. Cf. another letter from Montagu to Reading of 6.7.1921 (Mont. Coll., vol. 12) about Malaviya's attitude: "It really is astonishing to me that intelligent persons like Malaviya can still harp on their ambition to have a definite time limit announced for Swaraj."

161 Montagu in a letter to Lord Willingdon, 9.9.1920, quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

162 Chelmsford to Montagu, 23.4.1919 (Mont. Coll., vol. 8). He admits that he does not know how or by whom it is engineered.

163 In the Council, an important part in these matters fell to the

Home Member, Sir William Vincent. The Finance Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey, expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the policy; see Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 10.

164 *ibid.*, p. 9. Lord Willingdon even went to the length of writing “a private letter in scathing terms” to the Secretary of State on the subject (CP 987).

165 HDP 71 and 72 of Aug. 1920.

166 HDP 127 and 128 of Aug. 1920. For two more similar cases see HDP 423 and 424 of April 1920, and HDP 252 and 253 of Jan., 1921.

167 Letter of 25.4.1921; PJP 3469/1921.

168 Low, *op. cit.*, p. 10. On the other hand Lord Reading, shortly after his arrival in India, had the impression that no local Government was very willing “to bell the cat” (to proceed to action) in case the Government of India wanted to institute proceedings against men like the Ali brothers or Gandhi (Letter of 12.5.1921 to Montagu; Mont. Coll., vol. 14).

169 In a *Minute* of 12.5, covering *Weekly Report* of 7.5.1920; PJP 5450/1918.

170 Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

171 CP 987 of 15.10.1920.

NOTES CHAPTER VI

1 Gandhi, as quoted by W. J. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

2 Wolfenstein (*op. cit.*, pp. 211-12) emphasizes this point in his analysis of *Hind Swaraj* which he considers a basic text of Gandhism.

3 Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

4 In April 1921 the so-called Bezwada programme had been accepted, stating as one of its aims to enlist 10 millions of Congress members before June 30 (see above, p. 86). The Government of India were well aware that this changed the situation (see Low, *op. cit.*, p. 10; cf. *Weekly Reports* of 15.1.1921 and 8.2.1921). Another matter is that the objects aimed at in this programme had not been realized in full. But, according to Gopal Krishna (*op. cit.*, pp. 419-20), "the achievement was not small": by the end of 1921 Congress had about 2 millions of members.

5 Gopal Krishna, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

6 *ibid.*, pp. 424-25, where an analysis is given of the professional and social status of A.I.C.C. members in the period 1918-1923.

7 R. Palme Dutt, *India To-Day*, London, 1940, pp. 305-7.

8 *ibid.*, p. 306. We doubt whether this "inevitably" is quite correct. Gandhi had, as early as 1918, in the Kheda district conducted a limited no-tax campaign with some success, but there had been no question of a subsequent no-rent campaign; see Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-67, and Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73. Moon calls it the Kaira district.

9 Vijiaraghavachariar, in his presidential address, said about the programme only: "As we all know it consists of several items and a few more items are also intended to be added to them"; boycott of schools was, according to him, "the most important item in the programme".

10 *ibid.*, p. 181.

11 Specific objections may have been raised, of course, in private talks and closed committees. Something of the kind may be suspected when we hear about Gandhi (*ibid.*, p. 183), declaring that he had received a message from Malaviya, who because of illness could not attend the second day's meeting. "The Pandit had seen a copy of non-co-operation resolution but he was not all in favour of it and if he had been in Congress he would have noted his respectful protest."

12 A clear pronouncement of this in Muhammad Ali's letter of May 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome: "We acknowledged that with our limited resources in arms... and our demoralised condition

as a slave nation, we could not challenge England with the weapon of brute force." Lack of sufficient force was a normal excuse releasing Muslims from their obligation to wage *jihad*.

13 See for Shaukat Ali's views in this respect p. 94, above.

14 Khilafat leaders like Abdul Bari, Abul Kalam Azad and the Ali brothers stressed the need of helping the Angora government. See *Weekly Reports* of 1.7.1921; 11.7.1921 and 9.9.1921. Cf. Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 168 and 176.

15 Complaints about them in *Weekly Reports* of 7.3.1921; 20.4.1921; 22.5.1921 and 9.9.1921. Cf. Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-74.

16 As is supposed by Lord Reading's biographer; *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 194.

17 This is also the view taken by Sir Penderel Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

18 Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

19 *Weekly Report* of 22.5.1921. But according to *Weekly Report* of 1.7.1921, he returned very nearly to his original words in an article in the *Bombay Chronicle*.

20 Quoted by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

21 *Weekly Report* of 22.5.1921.

22 A detailed account of these talks in Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 197-99.

23 This was the course of events suggested by Reading (*ibid.*, p. 198), and expressly stated by Low (*op. cit.*, p. 11).

24 See his letters to Montagu, of 9.6.1921 and 14.7.1921; Mont. Coll., vol. 14. The same opinion was held by Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

25 This is the opinion of an anonymous author belonging to the Anglo-Indian community, expressed in an article "An Artful Apology" by A Sahib (*National Review*, Oct. 1921). It is also the view taken by Muhammad Ali in his letter of July 23, 1921 to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said in Rome.

26 Full text in tel. of August 2, 1921; PJP 1724/1921.

27 That there was indeed no bargain is borne out by another private letter from Muhammad Ali to the same friend in Rome (of May, 1921), when he clearly did not yet know the outcome of the interviews, but awaited "either a conference with the Viceroy preparatory to a settlement as we desire or arrest and transportation for life — if not death!"

28 See his aforementioned letter of July 23, 1921. Avoiding prosecution would, by the way, hardly be in line with his usual behaviour.

29 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

30 *Weekly Report* of 1.7.1921.

31 Full text in Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-72.

32 Full text of the judgment in PJP 4946/1921. A *verbatim* record of Muhammad Ali's defence in *Selections from Comrade*, pp. 97-128. This defence was based throughout upon the protection of religious beliefs and practices promised in the Queen's proclamation of 1858 and the King's proclamation of 1908. Muhammad Ali declared that his trial centred round the question: "Is God's law for a British subject to be more important than the King's law — a man's law?"

33 Congress at this time wholly concentrated on these items of its programme, and on "the imprisonment, without defence, of innocent men and women" as the means to attain *swaraj*. See the resolutions of the A.I.C.C. in July 1921 at Bombay; Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34.

34 Low, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

35 Their objections in a telegram from Government of Bombay to Government of India, dated 26.8.1921; PJP 4946/1921.

36 This view is in conformity with rumours reported by Bamford (*op. cit.*, pp. 29-30) that the Reading-Gandhi talks in May would possibly lead to a compromise, that Gandhi and Motilal Nehru were in favour of this, but that Lajpat Rai was less keen and that Muhammad Ali's minimum demands were very high. Compromise was also hinted at in Muhammad Ali's letter (see above, fn. 27), which proves that the rumours reported by Bamford were not quite unfounded.

37 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

38 Here extremists urged the adoption of civil disobedience at once, but were persuaded to wait until the Hindus and Congress supported them; *ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

39 For our account we rely mainly on Hitchcock's aforementioned confidential publication, *A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921*, which gives the impression of being a well-informed as well as a fair narrative. Besides this we consulted a parliamentary paper, *Telegraphic information, etc., regarding the Moplah Rebellion, 24th August to 6th December*, Cmd. 1552 of 1921.

40 Hitchcock (*op. cit.*, pp. 15-16) gives the following numbers: in the whole area 705,000 Hindus to 600,000 Muslims, but in the Earnad *talug* 165,000 Hindus to 240,000 Muslims.

41 *ibid.*, p. 18.

42 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

43 *For India and Islam*, pp. 2 and 5.

44 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 175.

45 Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 17, 175-76. H. N. Mitra, however, writes about "Hindu Zamindars making new dispositions of their land", by which the poor peasants were hard pressed; *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, p. 187.

46 *op. cit.*, p. 203. There seems to be some contradiction in these pronouncements; the last part of the sentence suggests that the killing was quite indiscriminate, which is belied by the first part. From Hitchcock we get the impression that British and Hindus were indeed indiscriminately killed. This impression is confirmed by H. N. Mitra's account, quoted above.

47 Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

48 Though Hitchcock reports that the tenancy question played some part in the agitation.

49 W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 203. He is also referring to the "chiliastic" character of the revolt.

50 Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 190. Cf. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 156, reporting that the Moplahs rejected Gandhi's leadership because he was a *kafir*.

- 51 Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
 52 Hitchcock, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
 53 *ibid.*, pp. 19 and 27.
 54 *ibid.*, p. 21.
 55 *ibid.*, p. 19.
 56 Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, p. 58) admits realizing this — but in an account written some 40 years after the events.
 57 In the declarations of the Working Committee of Congress, quoted without any comment by Sitaramayya (*op. cit.*, p. 216). It is also suggested by Muhammad Ali in the speeches referred to above (fn. 43), by Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 74) and by W. C. Smith (*op. cit.*, p. 176).
 58 *op. cit.*, p. 3.
 59 *ibid.*, p. 48.
 60 He delivered his speech on Sept. 5, 1921; full text in Cmd. 1552 of 1921.
 61 Full text of his speech in PJP 4946/1921.
 62 On this effect of the Moplah revolt see *Weekly Report* of 9.11.1921, reporting discussions in the C.K.C. Cf. Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-57, and O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, p. 331, quoting Gandhi and Sankaran Nair.
 63 Andrews, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-57.
 64 *The Khilafat Agitation in India*, pp. 40-42 and 58-63.
 65 According to Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 38, 40.
 66 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16.4.1921; PJP 570/1921.
 67 Tel. of 21.10.1921, *ibid.*
 68 Letter of 11.10.1921; *ibid.*
 69 Forwarded to Sir William Duke, the Undersecretary of State, on 8.12.1921; *ibid.*
 70 Which the Government of India considered as "probably typical of conditions in other large towns in Northern India."
 71 Notes of Montagu, dated 12.10.1921 and 14.11.1921, *ibid.*
 72 For an account of the Delhi meeting see *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 208-14; cf. Low, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
 73 *ibid.*
 74 Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 39, 178.
 75 As usual, it is difficult to assess just how far their success went. Reading tended towards thinking the visit a success (letters from Montagu to Reading, 24.11.1921, Mont. Coll. vol. 13, and from Reading to Montagu, 28.11.1921, *ibid.*, vol. 14). But he may have sought to minimize the boycott's effectiveness, like the press in England did (letter from Chirol to Sir Harcourt Butler, 24.11.1921, Butler Coll., vol. 52). The prince himself certainly did not consider his visit a big success (see his letters of 1.1.1922 to Montagu, and of 28.12.1921 to Reading, quoted by Waley, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-66). It was probably a case of the Government of India having feared worse, and the prince having expected better. On the other hand, the riots in Bombay and Calcutta were directed against people who did not boycott the visit, and therefore the boycott's success cannot have been complete (Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43).

76 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 221, specially mentioning the "militant" Khilafat volunteers.

77 Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

78 Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

79 Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 25.11.1921; PJP 570/1921. The meeting was attended by, among others, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Umar Sobani and Dr. Ansari.

80 See Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 43, and Low, *op. cit.*, p. 13. Both authors agree that the riots constituted the cause of the new stage of government policy.

81 *Weekly Reports* of 18.11.1921; 6.12.1921; 12.1.1922; 26.1.1922.

82 Low, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

83 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

84 This interpretation of the moderates' attitude in broad outline corresponds with the one given by Bamford and Low. Something of the kind was, at the time of the events, foreseen by Montagu (letter of 30.11.1921 to Reading, Mont. Coll., vol. 13). Majumdar (*History of the Freedom movement in India*, vol. 3, pp. 139-40) lists some branches of the Liberal League who, impressed by the repression since November, were leaning towards non-co-operation.

85 Cf. Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 242: "The Viceroy was indeed far from dismissing as unfounded the opinion held by many competent observers, notably Sir George Lloyd, that Mr. Gandhi's preaching of non-violence was no more than a cloak for plans aimed at an ultimate revolution by violence." From his correspondence with Montagu we do not get the impression that he regarded a development of that kind as very probable, but he certainly appreciated the importance of Indians objecting against the extremist proposals which could lead towards a revolution (see letter from Reading to Montagu, 5.1.1922, Mont. Coll., vol. 14).

86 Malaviya's is the name mentioned most often in this connection, but Bamford lists Jinnah also as one of the men involved in these negotiations (*op. cit.*, pp. 44, 46, 67). H. N. Mitra mentions Mrs. Besant and Fazl-ul Huq as members of the deputation (*I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 260-61).

87 In a lengthy telegram of 18.12.1921.

88 Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15, gives details regarding this aspect.

89 In a conference of ministers on 20.12.1921; see Cab. 23/29, containing also the full text of Reading's telegram of 18.12 to the Secretary of State, and of the Imperial Government's answer of 20.12.1921. Montagu's draft for this answer was considerably altered. He had his dissent from the opinion of his colleagues put on record.

90 According to Reading's telegram of 18.12.1921.

91 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

92 Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 145, mentions especially Das as being angry that Gandhi had lost this chance.

93 Low, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

94 Detailed accounts of these sessions in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 393-453; see also Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-48 and 179-81.

95 The word "dictatorship" is used by Bamford, but also by Reading and Montagu in their letters. Majumdar (*An Advanced History of India*, p. 982) speaks about Gandhi's "sole executive authority".

96 Bamford (*op. cit.*, p. 47) even writes about the appearance of a "violence party".

97 From H. N. Mitra's report on this conference (*I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 452-53) it appears that the motion was ruled out on account of a technical objection, and that nearly half of the delegates were in favour of accepting it.

98 Letter from Reading to Montagu, 5.1.1922 (Mont. Coll., vol. 14).

99 Sir George Lloyd of Bombay was the most insistent of the Governors; Low, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Cf. Reading's letter of 5.1.1922 to Montagu.

100 The cabinet was already pressing for Gandhi's arrest in October (Cab. Concl. of 12.10 and 20.10.1921; Cab. 23/27), but in January it did so again (Cab. Concl. of 20.1.1922; Cab. 23/29; cf. Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 264). The reason why the Government of India did not comply with these wishes was that they felt the time had not yet come; they were quite willing to arrest Gandhi, but wanted to do so at the most propitious moment. O'Dwyer's allegation that "it was the threat of resignation by two Governors that compelled Lord Reading's Government to enforce the law in 1922 against the arch-criminal, Gandhi" (*op. cit.*, pp. 393-94) is not sustained by the private correspondence between Reading and Montagu, where so serious a threat would almost certainly have come up. Bamford's contention (*op. cit.*, p. 75) that "Government had held their hand in the hope that his (*i.e.* Gandhi's) inclination towards non-violence would deter him from a path leading to violence", sounds very benevolent, but rather hypocritical: it was only a question of picking the right moment. We should bear in mind that Gandhi was at long last arrested only in March, four weeks after having called off civil disobedience for an indefinite time because of the violence it would entail.

101 *op. cit.*, p. 68.

102 An account of this meeting (the "Malaviya Conference") in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 276-86; Sir Sankaran Nair's letter is reproduced pp. 286-90. Cf. Low, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 243.

103 *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 302-3.

104 *ibid.*, p. 305; cf. R. P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

105 This is evident from the so-called Bardoli resolutions (no. 6): "Complaints having been brought to the notice of the Working Committee that ryots are not paying rents to the zamindars..." At the "Malaviya Conference" such specific complaints had not been raised; there had been only talk about "impending chaos and disorder".

106 Not only because this district had been carefully prepared, but perhaps also because the *ryotwari* system prevailed there, under which land revenue is paid by the cultivators directly, and not by the intermediary of the landlords or *zamindari*. So no damage to the position of the landlords was to be feared. This consideration may have played a role in

Gandhi's choice, but there is no evidence that this point had been raised in previous discussions. And could Gandhi hope that the no-tax campaign would not spread to other districts where *zamindari* interests would be injured? Or that success in the district of Bardoli only would be sufficient to bring the government to its knees?

107 He sent a letter to the Government of India on Febr. 1, and issued a manifesto on Febr. 4. See Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, pp. 151-53; *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 292-95; R. P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 313. Both Majumdar and Dutt speak about an "ultimatum", though the wording was rather moderate in tone.

108 Full text of this communiqué of 6.2.1922 in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 295-97; cf. Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

109 The volunteers were on their way to picket a bazaar, owned by a loyal *zamindar*, but proceeded through the police station grounds; see tel. of 9.2.1922 from Viceroy, Home Dpt., to Secretary of State, quoted in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 348-49.

110 Full text of his article in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 310-15.

111 Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 156, mentions Malaviya and Jinnah among the leaders with whom Gandhi consulted.

112 Full text of the Bardoli resolutions in *I.A.R. 1922*, pt. I, pp. 307-8; also in Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

113 This is Bamford's explanation, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

114 As is suggested in resolutions nos. 1 and 2.

115 *op. cit.*, pp. 317-18.

116 *ibid.*, p. 307.

117 *ibid.*, p. 317.

118 It is, of course, uncertain what results the non-co-operators could have gained by negotiations with Reading. We have already observed (see above, p. 139) that Reading met with opposition in the British cabinet and among his Governors. But Indian leaders at the time probably thought their chances of obtaining a substantial gain pretty strong.

119 An aspect of his personality that is stressed by Wolfenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.

120 See Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 and 21.

121 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 237; cf. *Weekly Report* of 1.3.1922. In the same sense also Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-91, and Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

122 *Weekly Report* of 26.3.1922.

NOTES CHAPTER VII

1 This is Low's opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 20), corroborated by CP 4378 of 28.12.1922, in which the Government of India looked back on political unrest in the last years. At the time of the events, however, the government was less sure about their adversary's demise, and supposed that the non-co-operators wanted only a few months' rest and then would start afresh (*Weekly Report* of 26.3.1922). Nor, of course, was Congress immediately ready to acknowledge its defeat.

2 Manifestos of Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari to support the Angora government are mentioned in *Weekly Report* of 1.7.1921; the first explicit mention of the Angora Fund we found in Bamford (*op. cit.*, p. 190) in September 1921. At that time the despatching of volunteers to Angora was also being discussed, but it was not until a year later that this matter became of some importance.

3 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 190, quoting a statement of accounts by the C.K.C.

4 On this agreement see A. J. Toynbee, "The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement", in *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. 1, pp. 457-64 (henceforward referred to as *Survey 1925*). On Curzon's reactions to it Cab. Concl. of 1.11.1921 and 22.11.1921 (Cab. 23/27).

5 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

6 That Khilafat leaders took this view was observed in *Weekly Report* of 9.11.1921. That this was realized on the British side too is proved by a telegram from the Viceroy to Montagu (dated 11.10.1921, even before the agreement had materialized; full text in CP 3412), and from the trend of discussions at the cabinet meeting of 1.11.1921, referred to above.

7 In the above mentioned telegram in CP 3412. Sir George Lloyd addressed Montagu in a telegram of 15.10.1921 (CP 3423) in the same sense, and we also find this line of thinking in a letter from the Commissioner of Sind to the Bombay Government (circulated by Montagu in CP 3592). Cf. *Weekly Reports* of 9.11.1921; 18.11.1921; 6.12.1921; 11.2.1922.

8 Dated 28.2.1922 (PSP 4995/4/1919). Before despatching it he had asked all local Governments to give their opinion on the step he was about to take. All of them dutifully concurred, except Sir Reginald Craddock who, however, had no Muslim problem worth speaking of in Burma.

9 See Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-68, quoting a letter from Curzon to Sir Austen Chamberlain.

10 He said so in an address to his constituency at Cambridge, as reported by the *Times* of 13.3.1922. There was something more to it than that, however. The Government of India publicly propagated a policy conflicting with the line taken by the British Government. From a dominion this might have been acceptable, but India was not a dominion — that is, not yet. One might see in this affair one of the steps by which British India was going to assert its dominion status.

11 In the main we think this explanation correct, but why was it Montagu who had to be sacrificed? In this connection the attacks on his Indian policy might be more telling than the general Conservative loathing of the way the Irish problem had been handled. Some two weeks before his dismissal he had been exposed to fierce criticism in the House of Commons by Joynson-Hicks and Rupert Gwynne, two Conservatives conspicuous for their support for General Dyer (see Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 269). Generally, the die-hards thought the Government of India's and Montagu's policy far too lenient (see K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 107), and this view was gaining ground in the cabinet as well (see Cab. Concl. of 20.12.1921 and 9.2.1922; Cab. 23/29). The cabinet may have thought that Montagu was no longer an asset; this, exactly, was how Sir Valentine Chirol thought the land lay (letter of 18.1.1922 to Sir Harcourt Butler; Butler Coll., vol. 52). Moreover, the Conservatives may have jumped at the opportunity to get rid of a Liberal in the Coalition government; this was what Lord Reading thought (Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 228). And lastly, there was no love lost between the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and for India: their relations were often rather strained (Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 216; Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Waley, *op. cit.*, ch. XII).

12 K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 101; Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 230; Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 197, quoting a resolution of the C.K.C. The same opinion was expressed by Muhammad Ali in his presidential address to the Cocanada Congress session in December 1923 (*Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 286).

13 K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, p. 100.

14 Cab. Concl. of 13.12.1920; Cab. 23/23.

15 Cab. Concl. of 1.11.1921 and 22.11.1921; Cab. 23/27.

16 CP 3571 of 19.12.1921. It would seem to be significant that Iraq was mentioned by name, but that India was not!

17 *Minutes* of the Paris conference on 22-26 March, 1922; PSP 1503/1922. Cf. Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-69; Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 287-88.

18 Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-73.

19 Seaman, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

20 The Government of India observed "an almost equally marked decline" of the Khilafat agitation as in the case of the non-co-operation movement (CP 4378 of 28.12.1922). Cf. *Weekly Reports* of 11.4.1922; 3.7.1922; 18.7.1922.

21 The Agha Khan in January, 1922, had already written Montagu a letter offering his help in bringing about a better understanding over Turkey between Indian Muslims and the British Government, and told him that, to this end, he would try and get the support of "people like Chotani, Ansari, Kidwai and no end of other sincere Turcophiles like myself and yet not fanatics" (letter of 14.1.1922, Mont. Coll., vol. 13). On 25.2.1922 the Agent in Baluchistan forwarded a strongly pro-Turkish address from the *sardars* of Baluchistan, pointing out at the same time that these men were thoroughly loyal subjects (PSP 4995/4/1919). The same might be said about the non-official members of the Punjab Legislative Council who drafted a *Memorial* dated 27.3.1922 (*ibid.*).

22 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

23 Text *ibid.*, p. 195.

24 Text *ibid.*, pp. 154-57. Here "retention of Turkish suzerainty over Jazirat-ul-Arab with self-Government for the Arabs if they so desire" was demanded.

25 On these meetings Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-92.

26 *Weekly Report* of 11.3.1922. Bamford reports similar difficulties in the ulama conference at Ajmere.

27 Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 199 and 201.

28 In a letter to Chotani, quoted by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 204. Letters of similar purport from Kidwai to Chotani and Ansari, *ibid.*, p. 206.

29 *Weekly Report* of 18.7.1922.

30 As reported in a lengthy telegram, dated 3.10.1922, from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State; PJP 6080/1922. One might remark that all those reports came from the British side. But probably the British themselves thought they were reliable — the documents quoted above were not for publication.

31 *Weekly Report* of 3.7.1922.

32 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 201, giving an account of the same meeting.

33 Such as we have for Congress, the membership of which dropped between the end of 1921 and March 1923 from nearly 2,000,000 to a good 100,000 (Krishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-420). Possibly the falling off in the number of Khilafat adherents was less abrupt, but according to the government it was considerable (CP 4378 of 28.12.1922).

34 *India during the Year 1923-1924*, Cmd. 2311 of 1924.

35 The different attitudes of top leaders and those lower down in the organization are suggested by the participation of Muslims as delegates at Congress sessions and as members of the A.I.C.C. The percentage of Muslim delegates at Congress sessions dropped from 10,9 in 1921 to 3,6 in 1923, but the percentage of Muslim members of the A.I.C.C. in the same years rose from 10,2 to 25,2 (Krishna, *op. cit.*, p. 422).

36 *Weekly Reports* of 26.3.1922 and 3.7.1922.

37 This might, of course, be a symptom rather than a cause of friction. Information on these financial irregularities and Chotani's part in them in Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 and 207-8, and in *Weekly Reports* of 1.9.1922 and 16.11.1922. It is hard to discern how much of allegations

like these would be slander, and how much was based on truth. But probably Chotani's handling of the fund was incorrect, as appears from a circumstantial article in the *Bombay Chronicle* of 17.2.1924 about the way things were settled at last, and the notes of an India Office official on the matter (PJP 1471/1924).

38 Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 207, and *Weekly Report* of 18.10.1922.

39 Its first mention we found in *Weekly Report* of 29.9.1922.

40 Telegram of 6.1.1923 from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, reporting on the All-India Khilafat Conference at Gaya; PJP 6082/1922.

41 Telegrams of 18.12.1922 and 2.2.1923 from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, *ibid.* In the same vein a letter from Sir William Vincent to Muhammad Faiyaz Khan, a member of the Legislative Assembly, *ibid.*

42 Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

43 Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 53.

44 See *Weekly Reports* of 16.11.1922; 4.12.1922 and 17.12.1922. Also a telegram from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, dated 16.11.1922, sampling a good many tentative opinions offered by prominent Indian Muslims. One not acquiescing in the *fait accompli* was the Agha Khan, who proposed sending a committee to inquire into the Turkish government's intentions (PJP 1651/1922).

45 *ibid.*

46 *ibid.*

47 On the Gaya meeting see *I.A.R. 1923*, pt. I, pp. 917-29; cf. tel. from Viceroy, Home Dept., to Secretary of State, dated 6.1.1923 (PJP 6082/1922), and Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 54.

48 W. C. Smith writes that after the decision of the Turkish National Assembly most educated Muslims understood that the Khilafat had gone (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 205).

49 *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69. These recollections, of course, may be coloured by the author's afterthoughts but their trend is, on this point, in keeping with the opinion of W. C. Smith, and also with the contents of Muhammad Ali's address at the Cocanada Congress session in December 1923.

50 An account of the Gaya Congress session in *I.A.R. 1923*, pt. I, pp. 872 a - 872 o.

51 *ibid.*, pt. I, p. 940.

52 *ibid.*, pt. II, p. 55.

53 *ibid.*, pt. I, p. 939.

54 *ibid.*, pt. II, p. 56.

55 See Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 324, and Muhammad Ali in his Cocanada Congress address, quoting Curzon (*Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 289).

56 Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 232.

57 *India*, p. 222. A similar judgment, but less incisive, in W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

58 *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 36.

59 See above, p. 146.

60 *op. cit.*, pp. 282-349.

61 Notably CP 46/23 and CP 63/23.

62 Cab. Concl. of 5.2.1923 and 6.2.1923; Cab. 23/45.

63 *Select Writings and Speeches*, p. 290. His tone may be influenced by his tendency to paint England as black as possible, but the factual contents of his statement are correct, we think.

64 Both Ronaldshay (*op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 343) and Nicolson (*op. cit.*, p. 349) declare that the treaty restored Anglo-Turkish friendship and had a good effect on the attitude of Muslims in other countries; cf. Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 374-76. Indian Muslims, however, did not show much enthusiasm. A batch of expressions of thanks for the treaty (PSP 4995/7/1919) is not impressive by its numbers, and most of them originated either with persons or bodies of an official character (*e.g.* the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Muslim members of the Legislative Assembly), or with Indian communities outside India (*e.g.* Hindus and Muslims in Mozambique!).

65 *Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 286-87.

66 This is indicated too by the frequency of reports from the Government of India to the India Office in London. At first these were fortnightly; from December 1919 onwards they became *Weekly Reports*; in the summer of 1922 these became fortnightly again, but from March, 1923, onwards the series was stopped. It had been, as the Under-secretary of State remarked in a note (PJP 1358/1923) an arrangement made in a time of great anxiety, and now that the situation was more normal — writing this, we take it, with regard to both the non-cooperation and Khilafat movements — the expenditure for these long telegrams was no longer necessary.

67 Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 and 178.

68 See above, p. 43.

69 One of the reasons the Government of India gave for this refusal was that it was uncertain whether these delegations would be welcome in the countries referred to (PJP 2074/1924).

70 On this letter Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 57-58. It provoked sharp protests in Turkey; Ismet Pasha denied its authors any competence in the matter broached, as they were (a) foreigners, and (b) Shias.

71 *ibid.*, p. 59.

72 Published in the *Daily Telegraph* of 14.3.1924, and circulated by the Indian press.

73 The same argument is repeated by Khaliqzaman (*op. cit.*, p. 202) as given to him some 15 years afterwards in a conversation with the Turkish ambassador in London.

74 Text of Kemal Pasha's letter in the *Pioneer Mail* of 14.3.1924. The first reason he gives is the only one mentioned in the Turkish law embodying the abolition of the Caliphate (text in Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 575). It is a very succinct way of expressing the completely secular character of the Turkish republic.

75 On the relations between Mehmed VI and Kemal Pasha and his followers see Toynbee, *ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

76 Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 276. It is also the main tenor of the answers the Government of India got after having asked on 12.3.1924 for the opinions of all Local Governments on the impression created by the Turkish National Assembly's action (PSP 1135/1/1924).

77 A good many of their comments were collected on 14.3.1924 from the *Pioneer Mail* (PSP 1135/1/1924). The collection contains the views of, among others, the Ali brothers and Dr. Ansari, and the answer the C.K.C. sent to Kemal Pasha when the latter had notified them of the events.

78 This demand proves that, although Indian Khilafatists had resigned themselves to the severance of temporal and spiritual powers in November, 1922, the matter still rankled in their mind.

79 A conference had already been mooted by the deposed Caliph Abdul Majid himself; see Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 61.

80 See M. L. Ferrar in Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, p. 207.

81 S. Khuda Bakhsh, "The Awakening of Islam", in *Moslem World*, vol. XX, 1930, pp. 5-15. On the author and his place in intellectual Muslim India see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 32-35.

82 The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State that by 1925 the Ali brothers had lost nine-tenths of their influence (Reading, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 308). Gopal (*op. cit.*, p. 128) states that about this time most Muslim leaders and the Muslim masses as well gave up the idea of the Caliphate, as being a lost cause.

83 Quoted above, p. 152.

84 See above, p. 98.

85 See above, p. 148.

86 On the Indian and Turkish reactions towards Arab nationalism see Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 47-48; cf. above, p. 65.

87 In the next chapter we will discuss this aspect in some detail.

88 Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 63, writing about "the moderate majority of Indian Muslims".

89 H. N. Mitra, *I.Q.R. July-December 1924*, p. 12.

90 See above, p. 64.

91 A clear exposé of developments in Arabia since about 1900 in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-324, to which we owe much in the next pages.

92 Storrs (*op. cit.*, p. 178) estimated that "90 per cent. of the Moslem World must call Husain a renegade and traitor to the Vicar of God."

93 Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 64-65. Liddell Hart, in his *T. E. Lawrence: In Arabia and After*, paperb. ed., London, 1965, pp. 393-94, holds a different opinion with regard to the role that Husain's son, Amir Abdullah, played in his decision.

94 From the accounts of both Toynbee and Liddell Hart it seems to be clear that the British dropped King Husain when he assumed the Caliphate, though formerly they had encouraged him to do so. Probably they considered his alliance no longer an asset because of the rivalries he provoked.

95 Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 297 and 304.

96 For instance in a message to all pilgrims to Mecca and Medina in the summer of 1920; HDP 27 of November, 1920.

97 Shaukat Ali, though supporting Ibn Saud, protested vehemently against Wahabi offences in this respect at the Islamic congress at Mecca in 1926; Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 314.

98 According to Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

99 A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 139. This distinction probably coincided to some degree with the one made by Khaliquzzaman, since the theologians of Deoband as well as those of Farangi Mahal were close to each other in their veneration of orthodox Sufis and opposition to Wahabis (*ibid.*, p. 107).

100 H. N. Mitra in *I.Q.R. July-December 1924*, pp. 493 and 509.

101 Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 304.

102 *ibid.*, pp. 84-86. Neither did delegations from Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Najd appear at this congress.

103 In which a lengthy passage was devoted to this subject (*Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 291-311).

104 About which we will say more below, pp. 161-62.

105 According to Watson (*op. cit.*, p. 73), he was in this speech "unable to offer any new constructive program for achieving Indian aims."

106 Even Abul Kalam Azad had, a few months earlier, declared in Congress that "Hindu-Muslim unity was only seen on the surface and in the Congress, and that the real work was still to be done in the country and outside the Congress pandal." (*I.A.R. 1923*, pt. II, p. 208).

107 S. Abid Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 92; Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 75; W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 172; W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

108 Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Chirol, *India*, p. 289; Clifford Manshardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 84.

109 Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 84. He might have quoted Muhammad Ali's Cocanada speech!

110 Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 84; W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 172.

111 Yet another explanation is given by Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 158: the police were instigating the riots. He admits that no proof of this can be offered, but in our opinion it is not even quite plausible, at least not as an explanation pointing to a really important factor in producing the phenomenon. After all, the riots increased only when the gravest danger to the British Raj had passed and when, therefore, the turning on of so poisonous a tap had become more or less superfluous.

112 Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

113 The expression is Khaliquzzaman's, who was one of them (*op. cit.*, pp. 76-77).

114 Khaliquzzaman mentions that Muhammad Ali and he himself were among those opposing the latter resolution.

115 A useful précis of the *Hindu Mahasabha's* early development in D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-60. He dates its first manifestation 1907;

Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 48, dates it 1906. At any rate its birth nearly coincided with that of the Muslim League, to which it more or less constituted a reaction.

116 V. D. Savarkar, the *Mahasabha's* most prominent theorist in the twenties and thirties, had started as a protégé of Tilak (D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 455). About 1924, the organization's foremost leaders were Pandit Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai.

117 D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 455; W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 186.

118 As is clear from Muhammad Ali's Cocanada speech, referring to the founding of Hindu *akharas* (training institutes), which at the *Hindu Mahasabha* session had been advocated by Malaviya (*Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 306-7).

119 This is the way Chirol (*India*, p. 292) formulates its object.

120 D. E. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 457-58.

121 See Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6, quoting a letter from Lajpat Rai in 1924 and a speech of Dr. Kitchlew in 1925, proving that such ideas were still toyed with among Muslim leaders, and feared by their Hindu counterparts — who, two or three years before, had stood on the common platform of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements!

122 A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

123 On these movements see an article by Dr. Y. B. Mathur, "Tanzim and Tabligh Movements in Modern India — Before its Partition into India and Pakistan", in *The Islamic Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1968, pp. 22-25 and 40-43. Cf. Chirol, *India*, p. 292, and Manshardt, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

124 Deplorable, that is, both from a nationalist and a humanitarian point of view. Downright communalists, of course, should have applauded it, but as a matter of fact most Indian leaders deplored, if not the process itself, then its results.

125 An account of the All Parties Conferences trying to patch up Hindu-Muslim unity in the years 1924-1928 in Manshardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-80, and in Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-7.

126 In an article "In Defence of Gandhiji's Leadership", published in the *Comrade*; in *Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 373-89.

Another notorious case of reciprocal accusations occurred when after the communal riots of 1923 Gandhi and Shaukat Ali were designated by Congress to investigate the causes — they could not agree on which party the main blame should be put (Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 275).

127 Muhammad Ali, "The Challenge to our Love of Freedom" (Jan. 1925, *Select Writings and Speeches*, pp. 329-51), and "Communal Representation" (Febr. 1925, *ibid.*, pp. 355-69).

128 Although Dr. Ansari became a very critical member, several times on the point of leaving Congress: in 1929 (see Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 108), and again in 1932 (see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 215).

129 K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 175. Cf. S. Abid Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 73 and 85. Two other leaders had died in 1926: Abdul Bari and Hakim Ajmal Khan.

130 On these internal quarrels in the last years of the organization see Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98, and Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-9.

131 The Nehru report was presented by a Congress committee presided over by Motilal Nehru, instructed to draft the principles of an Indian constitution. Two important features of the report were that it proposed a central government only federal in name and joint electorates. On this report and the debates it provoked see Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-96; Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-34; Gopal, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-202 and 211-13.

132 S. Abid Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

133 Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

134 *Selections from Comrade*, p. 137.

NOTES CHAPTER VIII

1 See above, p. 140, on Hasrat Mohani's motion.

2 See Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, pp. 1-2. Nicolson, *op cit.*, pp. 157-58, writes about "... six separate revolts ... of the East against the West" — the Egyptian revolt of March 1919, the Afghan War of May 1919, the hostilities with Kemal Pasha from 1919 until 1923, the Iraq rebellion of July 1920, and the Persian nationalist movement from 1919 until 1925; he did not consider these events to be co-ordinated, but neither were they unrelated. He sums them up under the head of "the Islamic revolt" (p. 167), which, however, does not account for anti-western movements in Russia and China in the same years.

3 On anti-foreignism as a feature of Asian nationalism see J. Kennedy, *Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1968, pp. 83-85.

4 As is pointed out by Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 19. He is referring to the fate of, among others, the Armenians and the Kurds. As a lucky exception he mentions the Kopts in Egypt, who took to the Egyptian nationalists' side unreservedly.

5 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 171 and 195.

6 On the attitude of Abul Kalam Azad and the Deoband ulama see Faruqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 and 55.

7 See above, p. 114.

8 The foremost leader of which was Sir Muhammad Shafi. S. Abid Husain (*op. cit.*, p. 73) observes British interference with respect to this development, but he leaves no doubt that the government was able to interfere because many Muslim Leaguers were suspicious of Hindu intentions. Cf. K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 40.

9 See above, pp. 93 and 148-49.

10 K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 73.

11 See above, p. 241, fn. 21.

12 The accounts of these interviews, dated 1.11.1920 and 16.1.1921, are enclosed in two letters from Lord Chelmsford to Montagu, dated 17.11.1920 (Mont. Coll., vol. 11), and 2.2.1921 (Mont. Coll., vol. 5). The Viceroy, evidently, was in no doubt about the reliability of these reports; it is highly probable that the first account was referred to as a "suggestion ... secretly made to local authorities by Maulana Mahmud Hasan" in a telegram from Viceroy, For. and Pol. Dept., to the Secretary of State, dated 23.11.1920 (PSP 3324/1920). This reference is introduced with the observation that "... loyal Indian Muslims are

groping for solution which will enable them to reconcile loyalty with religion.”

On the other hand, it might be argued that Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan was a tired and sick man at the time of the interview, and therefore was not himself. This, however, would not explain that in the second interview another leading Maulana of Deoband pursued exactly the same line of thinking.

Yet another explanation might be that, on the Deoband side, these talks were not in earnest, since they started from assumptions the Deobandis thought would never come true. In this case the talks would only prove that the British supposed that they had better chances with Deoband than they really had. But even then the talks may contain opinions not entirely alien to the Deoband leaders; there is no reason to doubt their reserves with regard to the westernized middle class leaders and to some sections of Hindu opinion.

13 The opposition between these two sections of the Indian Muslim community: the orthodox ulama and the westernized leaders of the Aligarh type, was an old one; see above, p. 34.

14 Even on the part of Mahmud-ul-Hasan some reserve with respect to Hindu-Muslim unity is noted by Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

15 Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

16 Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

17 Which, of course, are not identical; the former stresses the “separateness” of the Indian Muslims more strongly than the latter.

18 Quoted by Faruqi in D. E. Smith (ed.), *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton, N.J., 1968, p. 138. Though dating from a later period than that of our study, we think the Maulana’s words in 1940 express the attitude he developed in the early twenties, as is also the opinion of Aziz Ahmad (*op. cit.*, p. 187).

19 A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

20 *ibid.*, p. 190.

21 *ibid.*, p. 189 and 193.

22 This is how Rosenthal (*op. cit.*, p. 193) puts it.

23 Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

24 Quoted from his Round Table Conference address (*Selections from Comrade*, p. 138).

25 This is stressed by Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

26 This is also Watson’s opinion, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

27 Dated 22.6.1920; HDP 101 of Sept., 1920.

28 Not only by the British officials who had to cope with it, but also by more recent authors like Nirad C. Chaudhuri (*The Continent of Circe*, p. 241) and Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 67). Majumdar (*History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, pp. 60 and 65) explicitly disapproves of Gandhi’s policy on this account; he accuses Gandhi of having “forsaken the ideal of Indian nationalism” by giving his support to an extra-territorial, Pan-Islamic movement. Nehru (as quoted by Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 75) judged less harshly, but also spoke about “the artificial unity which Gandhi had forged out of diverse discontents.”

29 Chirol, *India*, p. 221; Curzon, quoted approvingly by Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 99; Lord Chelmsford called it "engineered" (see above, p. 124).

30 In the address of the Khilafat deputation to the Viceroy; see above, pp. 96-97. The same theme recurs in Muhammad Ali's defence in the Karachi trial in 1921 (*Selections from Comrade*, pp. 100-102).

31 This is, perhaps, not too far from the meaning of W. C. Smith's statement: "The Khilafat Indians were in fact struggling for something; yet they thought they were struggling for something else, for the Turkish *Khilafah* about which they really knew little. The trouble with a wrong ideology is that it is inefficient." (*Modern Islam in India*, p. 207). If their real aims were not clear to them, we think this was caused by the fact that they were wavering between Indian nationalism and some form of Indian Muslim nationalism.

32 See above, p. 100.

33 In CP 392 of 1.4.1920.

34 See above, pp. 166-67.

35 In his memorandum of 2.11.1921, enclosed in a letter of 3.11.1921 from Reading to Montagu (Mont. Coll., vol. 14).

36 This is about the same expectation as professed by the Deoband leaders quoted above, pp. 166-67.

37 This factor is mentioned by Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. XIII. The index for the cost of living (1914 = 100) descended from 173 in 1921 to 154 in 1923; see above, ch. IV, fn. 1.

38 Which, by the way, would only be external if bad economic conditions were not instrumental in causing the movement itself.

39 Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

40 *ibid.*, p. 85.

41 *ibid.*, p. 84.

42 Here, of course, we are speculating about what might have happened if something had occurred which in fact did not occur. We feel entitled to do so because Indian leaders in those days had the feeling that their goal was within their reach. When the talks between Malaviya and Reading in December, 1921 broke down on Gandhi's adamant attitude, C. R. Das is reported to have said that the chance of a lifetime had been lost (according to Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol. 3, p. 145).

43 Cf. H. Malik (*op. cit.*, p. 228), writing that in the years between 1912 and 1935 the Muslims "... toyed with the seemingly grand, but actually futile ideas of Pan-Islamism"; he lists the Khilafat leaders among the "romanticists" (*ibid.*, p. 229). A. Hussain (*op. cit.*, p. 17) describes their outlook on life as "a kind of dream reality", and characterizes the movement as "perilously romantic" (p. 153). Cf. also Faruqi (*op. cit.*, p. 54). We have already noted the "wrong ideology" W. C. Smith ascribes to the Khilafatists (see above, fn. 31).

44 According to Watson, Muhammad Ali's interpretation of the Caliphate was based upon the pattern of the "rightly guided" Caliphs (*op. cit.*, p. 53).

- 45 See W. W. Cash, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 50 and 72.
- 46 See Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, p. 345.
- 47 This is also Watson's opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 81).
- 48 See above, p. 57.
- 49 See Toynbee, *Survey 1925*, p. 57, about his and Amir Ali's intervention in favour of Abdul Majid in November, 1923. In his *Memoirs*, the Agha Khan speaks of Arab nationalism as being fostered artificially (p. 152).
- 50 B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
- 51 See above, p. 155.
- 52 B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.
- 53 As was declared by Lord Fisher, see above, p. 99; cf. Lord Curzon's complaints, p. 118 above. Lord Fisher, however, was trying to convince the Khilafat deputation of Great Britain's noble intentions, and Lord Curzon was venting his annoyance at not having got his way with regard to Constantinople; he may have been inclined to lay this at the door of what he thought the least reasonable considerations.
- 54 Cab. Concl. of 6.1.1920; Cab. 23/20.
- 55 See above, pp. 153-54.
- 56 See W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 213-15; K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, p. 192; Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
- 57 It is hard to arrive at an exact picture of the influence they exerted on the Indian Muslim community in the late twenties and the thirties; W. C. Smith thinks more of it than does K. K. Aziz. But there can be not much doubt that, when their influence was put to the test in the years before partition, they could not commend a following carrying real weight.
- 58 B. M. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 1; Chirol, *India*, p. 222; H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 238; A. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 324.
- 59 This is a summary of Iqbal's thinking on this account as given by Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
- 60 *ibid.*
- 61 See above, p. 151.
- 62 See above, p. 163.
- 63 Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
- 64 This is, we think, also what is meant by K. K. Aziz, writing (*The Making of Pakistan*, p. 115): "... it was only now that they felt, with unprecedented intensity, that they were Muslims first and Indians afterwards. This was a triumph for Muslim nationalism, for it provided a base on which other unities could be built. And this, as far as we can see, was the only permanent contribution of the Khilafat movement to the larger problem of nationalism. It was a contribution, however, which no historian can afford to underestimate or to ignore."
- 65 This is also remarked upon by Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
- 66 H. Malik, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

ABBREVIATIONS

- Butler Coll. — Sir Harcourt Butler Collection, IOL
- Cab. Concl. — Cabinet Conclusions (followed by number of series and volume in PRO)
- CP — Cabinet Paper, PRO
- HDP — Home Department Proceedings, Political, IOR
- ICP — India Confidential Proceedings, Political, IOR
- IOL — India Office Library
- IOR — India Office Records
- Mont. Coll. — Montagu Collection, IOL
- PJP — Judicial and Public Department Papers, IOR
(followed by number of file and year)
- PRO — Public Record Office
- PSL — Political and Secret Department Library, IOR
- PSM — Political and Secret Department Memoranda, IOR
- PSP — Political and Secret Department Papers, IOR
(followed by number of file and year)

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