UNIVERSITY COLLEGIALITY AND THE EROSION OF FACULTY AUTHORITY

Edited by Kerstin Sahlin
and Ulla Eriksson-Zetterquist

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RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS

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UNIVERSITY COLLEGIALITY AND THE EROSION OF FACULTY AUTHORITY

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INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

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FOREWORD

Research in the Sociology of Organizations (RSO) publishes cutting edge empirical research and theoretical papers that seek to enhance our understanding of organizations and organizing as pervasive and fundamental aspects of society and economy. We seek provocative papers that push the frontiers of current conversations that help to revive old ones, or that incubate and develop new perspectives. Given its successes in this regard, RSO has become an impactful and indispensable fount of knowledge for scholars interested in organizational phenomena and theories. RSO is indexed and ranks highly in Scopus/SCImago as well as in the Academic Journal Guide published by the Chartered Association of Business Schools.

As one of the most vibrant areas in the social sciences, the sociology of organizations engages a plurality of empirical and theoretical approaches to enhance our understanding of the varied imperatives and challenges that these organizations and their organizers face. Of course, there is a diversity of formal and informal organizations—from for-profit entities to non-profits, state and public agencies, social enterprises, communal forms of organizing, non-governmental associations, trade associations, publicly traded, family owned and managed, private firms – the list goes on! Organizations, moreover, can vary dramatically in size from small entrepreneurial ventures to large multinational conglomerates to international governing bodies such as the United Nations.

Empirical topics addressed by *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* include: the formation, survival, and growth or organizations; collaboration and competition between organizations; the accumulation and management of resources and legitimacy; and how organizations or organizing efforts cope with a multitude of internal and external challenges and pressures. Particular interest is growing in the complexities of contemporary organizations as they cope with changing social expectations and as they seek to address societal problems related to corporate social responsibility, inequality, corruption and wrongdoing, and the challenge of new technologies. As a result, levels of analysis reach from the individual, to the organization, industry, community and field, and even the nation-state or world society. Much research is multi-level and embraces both qualitative and quantitative forms of data.

Diverse theory is employed or constructed to enhance our understanding of these topics. While anchored in the discipline of sociology and the field of management, *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* also welcomes theoretical engagement that draws on other disciplinary conversations – such as those in political science or economics, as well as work from diverse philosophical traditions. RSO scholarship has helped push forward a plethora theoretical conversations on institutions and institutional change, networks, practice, culture,

power, inequality, social movements, categories, routines, organization design and change, configurational dynamics, and many other topics.

Each volume of *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* tends to be thematically focused on a particular empirical phenomenon (e.g., creative industries, multinational corporations, entrepreneurship) or theoretical conversation (e.g., institutional logics, actors and agency, microfoundations). The series publishes papers by junior as well as leading international scholars, and embraces diversity on all dimensions. If you are a scholar interested in organizations or organizing, I hope you find *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* to be an invaluable resource as you develop your work.

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Professor Michael Lounsbury

Series Editor, *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*

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INTRODUCTION: UNIVERSITY COLLEGIALITY AND THE EROSION OF FACULTY AUTHORITY

Kerstin Sahlin and Ulla Eriksson-Zetterquist

ABSTRACT

Recent changes in university systems, debates on academic freedom, and changing roles of knowledge in society all point to questions regarding how higher education and research should be governed and the role of scientists and faculty in this. Rationalizations of systems of higher education and research have been accompanied by the questioning and erosion of faculty authority and challenges to academic collegiality. In light of these developments, we see a need for a more conceptually precise discussion about what academic collegiality is, how it is practiced, how collegial forms of governance may be supported or challenged by other forms of governance, and finally, why collegial governance of higher education and research is important.

We see collegiality as an institution of self-governance that includes formal rules and structures for decision-making, normative and cognitive underpinnings of identities and purposes, and specific practices. Studies of collegiality then, need to capture structures and rules as well as identities, norms, purposes and practices. Distinguishing between vertical and horizontal collegiality, we show how they balance and support each other.

Universities are subject to mixed modes of governance related to the many tasks and missions that higher education and research is expected to fulfill. Mixed modes of governance also stem from reforms based on widely held ideals of

governance and organization. We examine university reforms and challenges to collegiality through the lenses of three ideal types of governance – collegiality, bureaucracy and enterprise – and combinations thereof.

INTRODUCTION

The higher education and research system is both accommodating and reproducing a continuous dilemma. On the one hand, following Humboldtian ideals, research and higher education is expected to be run by autonomous interrelated academic communities in a system often described as collegial governance. On the other hand, research and higher education is an instrument for the fulfillment of certain goals external to the academic community, and governance and control are tailored for this purpose, typically in line with bureaucratic or enterprise models. As a consequence of this continuous dilemma, universities and the higher education system of which they are a part become contexts where various governance models intersect. Different ways of governing express different aims of higher education and research and hence different views on what is to be governed, by whom and with what means.

Universities are among the oldest and most sustainable institutions on earth. Since the first universities were established more than a millennium ago, we have seen astonishing growth in higher education and research worldwide, especially during the past 50 years (Frank & Meyer, 2020). At the same time, throughout their long histories, academic systems all over the world have experienced recurrent transformations in the ways they are governed. These transformations have followed societal and political changes, waves of organizational reforms, and shifts in the nature of stratification among faculty, students, and administrators. Research on recent governance transformations has shown how higher education and research have been subject to rationalization and organization according to widely held bureaucratic and enterprise (often also termed as managerial) ideas and ideals (Barnes, 2020; Czarniawska, 2019; Fleming, 2020; Hüther & Krücken, 2016; Krücken, 2011; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Macfarlane, 2005; Marginson, 2000; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Musselin, 2018; Parker & Jary, 1995; Ramirez, 2006, 2010; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016b; Tuchman, 2009). These reforms do not seem to have followed a grand plan, but have been introduced piecemeal and have only partly been tied to changed missions, tasks, and roles of research and higher education. Even so, it is clear that changed modes of governance have both been driven by and driven changes in the missions, roles, and tasks of higher education and research. Modes of governance change both what is to be governed and by whom.

Studies of individual universities, national university systems and international comparisons have documented and analyzed governance changes, what

drives them and with what consequences. As is the case more generally in studies of changed and reformed governance, we argue that studies involving universities focus more on what is new than on what is left behind, dissolved, or torn down. Previous and challenged modes of governance are likely to be taken for granted or referred to as well-known. It may even be the case that the lack of clarification and analysis of those challenged forms of governance make them less likely to be sustained. Recent changes to university systems, debates on academic freedom, and changing roles of knowledge in society all point to questions regarding how higher education and research should be governed and what roles scientists and faculty have.

Rationalizations of systems of higher education and research have been accompanied by the questioning or erosion of faculty authority and challenges to collegiality. But what is collegiality, and how can it work in practice? What role does it presuppose for academic faculty and other groups (such as administrators, students, members of broader society, etc.) in governance processes? What conditions are necessary for collegiality to work and how does collegiality as a mode of governance change with changed conditions and when mixed with other modes of governance? We see a need for a more conceptually precise discussion about what collegiality is, how it is practiced, how collegial forms of governance may be supported or challenged by other forms of governance, and finally, why collegial governance of higher education and research is important.

Papers in the two volumes of this special issue develop notions and understandings of collegiality; describe and analyze how collegiality is challenged, but also translated and practiced in different settings around the world; and provide insights into procedures that result from encounters between diverse modes of governing. Articles range from historical accounts of university reforms and the practice of collegiality over time, studies of current governing practices and challenges, and conceptual developments of collegiality, to normative accounts of how collegiality can be practiced in contemporary systems of higher education and research as a way to uphold the integrity and quality of those systems. Both volumes adopt a comparative lens to developments related to university governance and collegiality. While most papers are based on studies in individual countries or individual university settings, comparisons across settings reveal interesting dynamics of globalization, homogenization, and variation.

The first volume concentrates on challenges to collegiality and the erosion of faculty authority. Scholars analyze global waves of reforms, ways in which various managerial modes of organization and control come to reshape universities, and how these interplay with the changing missions of universities. The political context also challenges collegiality and partly erodes faculty authority. The second volume directs our attention to limitations to collegiality and analyzes how collegiality is revised and perhaps even restored. A normative discussion of this volume centers around how collegiality may be revitalized. An argument supporting a return to collegiality – both in the analysis of developments of systems of higher education and research and in the actual governing of universities – runs through this volume.

The authors of this double volume are affiliated with universities in more than 10 countries representing six continents. In addition, several authors have had experiences in several other countries. Contributors have collaborated on this three-year project in workshops, both in real life and over Zoom during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, studies and papers have been shaped in a continuous dialogue, ensuring that a thematic comparative perspective runs through both volumes. These thematic comparisons are visible throughout the volumes. Related questions are addressed in several papers, and as the many cross references show, the contributions partly build on each other. We end the special issue with a paper collectively authored by the contributors to both volumes that outlines an agenda for future research on collegiality and discusses practical implications for today's universities.

We continue this introduction with a review of definitions of and motivations for collegiality. We distinguish between two dimensions of collegiality: horizontal and vertical. To distinguish collegiality from other forms of governance, we analyze ideal types and use them to further explore both what academic collegiality is and how it interplays with or is challenged by other modes of governance. We revisit some of the recurrent waves of reforms of academic systems that have swept the globe over several centuries and show how these have led to changes in both what is to be governed, how, and by whom.

These reviews also show that collegiality is seldom clear and precisely defined. Rather, collegiality is often referred to as the old way of governing – that which is challenged. In this way, collegiality has largely assumed its meaning in opposition to the introduction of new ways of governing. To illustrate this further, in the introduction to the second volume, we ask if there ever was a golden age of collegiality. We continue by addressing limitations and often raised critiques of collegiality. We seek to sort out which limitations are related to collegiality and which limitations are typical parts of organizing, regardless of how it is governed. We conclude with a discussion about how academic collegiality can be maintained, updated, and revised to serve the purpose of independent knowledge inquiry.

In this introductory paper, we also present the thematic comparative perspective that runs through both volumes. We conclude by summarizing the papers in this first volume.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COLLEGIALITY

Collegiality is far from a theoretically specified concept, even if, as we will revisit, important contributions have aimed at specifying its core (e.g., Bennett, 1998; Denis et al., 2019; Lazega, 2020; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2014; Waters, 1989; Weber, 1922/1978). The word "collegiality" has at least a double connotation. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun "collegiality" refers to (a) "collegueship, the relation between colleagues"; and (b) "the principle of having a collegium."[1] Whereas the first definition has thesaurus connections such as "society," "society and the community," "social relations," "association, fellowship, or companionship," and "colleagueship," the second is related to society

in the meaning of authority, rule, or government, in the sense of a "deliberative, legislative, or administrative assembly," among others. Further browsing of dictionaries uncovers definitions including "friendly relationships" between people working together (Cambridge Dictionary[2]), "cooperative relationship of colleagues," and participating in government, as in "participation of bishops in the government of the Roman Catholic Church in collaboration with the Pope" (Merriam Webster Dictionary[3]).

In research on collegiality, we usually find aspects of both meanings. However, we argue for a need to analytically distinguish between the two. Such a conceptual distinction lays the groundwork for seeing how various aspects of collegiality condition and balance each other. Here, we conceptually distinguish between what we term vertical and horizontal collegiality.

Vertical collegiality concerns decision-making structures within a formal organization and a set of rules. Along the vertical dimension, collegial decision-making is organized around faculty authority. It involves university boards, senates, and committees; the selection of *primus/prima inter pares* as academic leaders (Lazega, 2020, p. 10); and rules for the promotion and appointment of professors, resource allocation, recruitment, new curricula, etc., with faculty participation in these decisions.

Horizontal collegiality involves social relations or companionship and encompasses dynamics among communities of peers in departments and universities, reviewers of academic outputs, conference attendees, and scholarly networks. Hence, horizontal collegiality is not confined to university boundaries, as peer relations span such boundaries. Even though dictionaries list "friendly relationships" as a synonym for collegiality, we want to emphasize that this is not what horizontal collegiality is about. During the collaboration that led to these volumes, the friendly sociable aspect of collegiality was sometimes referred to as "tea room" collegiality, as in having a tea with a colleague during a relaxing break. Instead, in horizontal collegiality, the norms of the institution of collegiality as described below are enacted, activated, and reinforced.

Horizontal and vertical collegiality are interdependent. Peers provide reviews, critiques, and advice that inform decisions about tenure and promotion, recruitment, etc. Moreover, peers are mobilized to elect individuals for formal positions in universities, research councils, and other academic bodies. The vertical collegial structure is also based on legitimacy from the horizontal collegium. In other words, vertical and horizontal collegiality presuppose and balance each other. Formal collegial decision-making in universities draws on the existence and activities of the broader scientific[4] community.

Definitions of Collegiality

Before we return to these two aspects of collegiality and how they relate to each other, we review definitions of collegiality found in research on universities. The sociologist Malcolm Waters (1989, p. 956) summarized the collegial principle as:

> Collegiate structures are those in which there is dominant orientation to a consensus achieved between the members of a body of experts who are theoretically equal in their levels of expertise but who are specialized by area of expertise.

He elaborated this definition by spelling out six organizational characteristics of collegiality based on works by Weber and Parsons. First, the organizing of collegiality is based on the use and application of theoretical knowledge. This knowledge is specialized, differentiated, complex, non-routinizable, and requires regular maintenance. Authority, then, is based on expertise. Bodies of experts are expected to control and participate in decision-making. Second, "members of collegiate organizations are conceived of as professionals" (Waters, 1989, p. 956). These members are not regulated by contract, self-interest, or outside interests, but by their vocational commitments. They begin their careers as "apprentices" and are socialized into the collegium. A third principle is formal egalitarianism. Because members of the collegium are specialists within performance-based organizations, comparing performances is "frequently difficult" (Waters, 1989, p. 956). Formally, members are equal in the sense that no field of expertise or competence is subordinate to others, yet they are stratified when searching for prestige in terms of attracting resources and talented recruits. A fourth principle is formal autonomy:

> Collegiate organizations are self-controlling and self-policing; that is, they are not subject to direction from any external source once they have been constituted. Formal autonomy has two aspects. The first is freedom of action in relation to the pursuit of professional goals. Groups of colleagues are free to do research, to instruct others, and to communicate findings or other forms of knowledge insofar as these things are relevant to professional standing. Collegiate organizations are ideally facilitative rather than authoritarian systems, in which performance standards are established interpersonally and informally rather than by formal rule. (Waters, 1989, p. 958)

Waters (1989, p. 958) termed the fifth principle "scrutiny of product." Following the self-policing and egalitarian aspects, "there must be maximum stress on peer evaluation and informal control. The products of the work done by colleagues must be available for peer review" (Waters, 1989, p. 958). Peer review includes, for instance, written opinions and oral dissemination, consultation, and second opinions to ensure collegial deliberation. The last principle, "collective decision making" implies that administrative acts and subsequent decisions by collegial bodies are legitimate only when all members participate in the process, and when it has the "full support of the entire collectivity" (Waters, 1989, p. 955). As every member is highly specialized, no individual has complete knowledge about the problem or issue at hand. Hence, consensus must be achieved, or as formulated by Waters (1989, p. 969), "internally egalitarian and consensus governed and specifies individual autonomy for members." To accomplish this, collegiate organizations often have complex committee systems. When procedures for democratic voting replace consensus, they function as a means for "the protection of minorities in committees" (Waters, 1989, p. 959).

We find related definitions in subsequent studies. In their study of collegiality in universities, Tapper and Palfreyman (2014) listed four core elements, including: (a) the federal structure between different departments and institutions within the university; (b) the notion that academics – as experts – establish policies and the mission of the university; (c) intellectual collegiality, including the task of understanding the purpose of research, both as it is conducted among colleagues

and how it is disseminated to the wider community; and (d) "commensality," the process of socialization among faculty and students that creates a sense of community and "long-term institutional loyalty" (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2014, p. 28).

Lazega (2020, p. 11) elaborated definitions of collegiality further, and more clearly related them to:

> non-routine and innovative work, formal equality among heterogenous members trying to self-govern by reaching agreements in committee work and – in the absence of true hierarchy – using personalized relationships to create various levels of collective responsibility and make this coordination work. Regularities in such relationships build relational infrastructures, and these relational infrastructures are key for peers to manage committee work, helping them prepare, if not make decisions upstream of the formal meetings.

Collegiality has been defined as a behavioral norm (Macfarlane, 2005, 2007) and a sense of community and commensality – that is, being socialized into a particular setting or community so that members share a long-term loyalty to the work conducted and to the community as such (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2014), or "the glue that holds an academic community together" (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014, p. 161). Such definitions also connect collegiality to professionalism (Waters, 1989) and to "academic citizenship." Moreover, collegiality builds upon a nurturing leadership that can contribute to a collegial spirit and foster loyalty among academics beyond their local setting to the whole university and the broader academy (Macfarlane, 2007). A few definitions limit collegiality to respectful behavior at work, but in the contexts of university studies and governance studies, such definitions are rare (see, e.g., Seigel, 2004).

Collegiality also has been defined as a characteristic of the work process of academics (Bennett, 1998) supported by norms and values shared among peers (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019). Emphasizing the relationships between scholars even further, Bennett introduced collegiality as a relational model that challenges individuality on behalf of the community. Scholars are not independent from each other. As Bennett (1998) put it, in the academic world, others are means and ends. This requires self-confidence in terms of individual worth, but also explains how relations with others help to reinforce, expand, and sometimes transform this experience of worth. Bennett (1998, p. 24) wrote:

> Challenged by insights of others, rather than isolated from them, the individual absorbs and evaluates these perspectives and finds they may enhance his or her own freedom and creativity. Others are no longer just associated, but companions and colleagues … Sufficiently secure, one is able to provide others with the conditions that enable them to grow in their diversity and uniqueness, even as they provide these conditions for oneself.

As Bennett noted, this requires an understanding of a relational academic community. Irrespective of the size of this community (ranging from a department to a wider research community), this "collegium is the primary context of connectivity and reciprocity among its constituent members" (Bennett, 1998, p. 27). Within this context, newcomers are socialized in line with "commensality" as expressed by Tapper and Palfreyman (2014) and Waters (1989) second principle of professionalism.

A collegial system is built so as not to give all the power to individual persons, but forms a system where individual leaders and their measures are subject to

questioning and testing, much like the work of scholars and research results. This does not mean that academic leaders in a collegial system are expected to be weak. Quite the contrary, leaders are expected to take action based on scientific argumentation and scientific qualifications (Bennett, 1998; Goodall, 2009; Lamont, 2009). It is truly a meritocratic system designed to be independent of individual interests to protect academic freedom. Knowledge should always come before interests.

While several of the definitions above focus on university settings, definitions of collegiality apply to other kinds of work and organizations as well. Weber (1922/1978) foresaw modern applications of collegiality in supreme authorities, agencies, and advisory bodies – that is, in contexts where there is an interest in limiting the power of specific groups and individuals, and a preference for shared power and cooperation across multiple groups without a dominant leader. Lazega (2020), for instance, highlighted how collegial principles can be applied in the construction of new markets (demanding personalized relationships), the executive suite in large bureaucracies (private corporations and public governments) and the Catholic Church. Waters (1989) on the other hand, documented collegial governance in the context of research centers, cultural networks, and human welfare service fields. Other examples include architecture firms, law firms, and parts of the financial market (e.g., arbitrage) (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a).

As we continue to elaborate our definition of collegiality, we focus on university settings. The definitions above range from formal structures of universities and their decision-making processes to norms that guide the missions and values of universities as well as interactions and work processes. We end our review of definitions with a quote from Kant (1794, p. 1) that captures many of the above-mentioned aspects:

> Whoever it was that first hit on the notion of a university and proposed that a public institution of this kind be established, it was not a bad idea to handle the entire content of learning (really, the thinkers devoted to it) by mass production, so to speak – by a division of labor, so that for every branch of the sciences there would be a public teacher or professor appointed as its trustee, and all of these together would form a kind of learned community called a university (or higher school). The university would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such), and accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions through its faculties … smaller societies, each comprising the university specialists in one main branch of learning): to admit the university students seeking entrance from the lower schools and, having conducted examinations, by its own authority to grant degrees or confer the universally recognized status of "doctor" on free teachers (that is, teachers who are not members of the university) – in other words, to create doctors.

What Kant (1794, p. 1) described is the collegial university: a system of self-governance "to handle the entire content of learning (really, the thinkers devoted to it) by mass production," with a "certain autonomy" based on the cognitive understanding that "only scholars can pass judgment on scholars." Kant reminds us that collegiality is a mode of governance that puts faculty members in the driver's seat – that is, it builds on faculty authority.

Collegiality as an Institution

The definitions above use different words and conceptual framings, but together they paint a comprehensive picture of what collegiality is. Collectively, they show

that collegiality cannot be reduced to a certain organizational structure or specific behaviors. We read the definitions above as pointing to various aspects of collegiality as an institution of self-governance: an institution that includes formal rules and structures for decision-making; normative and cognitive underpinnings of identities and purposes; and specific practices. A definition of collegiality as an institution of self-governance points to the importance of a largely taken-for-granted repetitive practice that is underpinned by and reinforces normative systems and cognitive understandings (Greenwood et al., 2008).

Before we return to horizontal and vertical aspects of collegiality, we elaborate briefly on the institutional perspective in this context. Here, we build on March and Olsen (1995) institutional perspective of governance as constituted by basic practices and rules, individual purposes and intentions, and a common system of meaning, as articulated in their book, *Democratic Governance*:

> In an institutional perspective, governance involves creating capable political actors who understand how political institutions work and are able to deal effectively with them (Anderson, 1990, pp. 196–197). It involves building and supporting cultures of rights and rules that make possible the agreements represented in coalition understandings. It involves building and supporting identities, preferences, and resources that make a polity possible. In involves building and supporting a system of meaning and understanding history. (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 28)

This builds on

> a view of human action as driven less by anticipation of its uncertain consequences and preferences for them than by a logic of appropriateness reflected in a structure of rules and conception of identities. (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 28).

It also builds on a:

> view of governance as extending beyond negotiating coalitions within given constraints and rights, rules, preferences and resources to shaping those constraints, as well as constructing meaningful accounts of politics, history, and self that are not only bases for instrumental action but also central to concerns of life. (March & Olsen, 1995 p. 28)

As an institution, collegiality is thus inhabited both by formal structures and "by people doing things together" (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Hallett and Ventresca (2006, p. 213) pointed to the importance of how:

> on the one hand, institutions provide the raw materials and guidelines for social interactions ("construct interactions"), and on the other hand, the meanings of institutions are constructed and propelled forward by social interactions. Institutions are not inert categories of meaning; rather they are populated with people whose social interactions suffuse institutions with local force and significance.

Structures for collegial decision-making, in other words, are not sufficient for collegiality to be upheld. Jepperson (1991) emphasized the importance of activities to institutional maintenance and institutional development. Institutions are enacted and reinforced through myriad supporting and reproducing practices. Studies of collegiality then, need to capture structures and rules as well as identities, norms, purposes, and practices. In the sections below, we describe two central meanings and practices of the collegial institution before summarizing vertical and horizontal collegiality from an institutional perspective.

A System for Knowledge Inquiry

A central mission of higher education and research is to preserve, advance, and provide knowledge (Bennett, 1998), and to ensure the continuation of knowledge inquiry (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014; Kristensson Uggla, 2019). The collegial institution is based on this perceived mission with an emphasis that those with knowledge expertise are also those who should be in control – not least as a way of ensuring the advancement of knowledge remains free and independent from being distorted or controlled by external interests.

Knowledge inquiry is never made in isolation, even though much research output is attributed to the efforts of individual scholars and many prizes for scholarly work are given to individuals; likewise, research is at times depicted as solitary work, with individual scholars working undisturbed (Bennett, 1998; Kristensson Uggla, 2019; Merton, 1942). Yet, scientific work is based on "indebtedness to the common heritage and a recognition of the essentially cooperative and cumulative quality of science" (Merton, 1942, p. 123). For example, Nobel laureates are rewarded for their individual path-breaking contributions to knowledge that benefits the world. In speeches, these laureates regularly thank both their close colleagues and their more distant predecessors, and even competitors (see www.nobelprize.org/the-nobel-prize-organisation/the-nobel-foundation/). Stephen Rowland (2008, p. 353) claimed that this intellectual commitment – "a shared love of knowledge" – is among the outcomes distinguishing the collegium from the corporation, and enthusiasm for academic subjects is to be passed on to students.

Ideally, a system for knowledge inquiry includes all tasks required for critical and constructive scrutiny, and for knowledge development. To enable this, a primary commitment among scholars is to learn. That is, knowledge inquiry cannot involve acquiring power, establishing friendships, or pursuing other personal advantages for their own sake, but must always be balanced with scrutiny and checks and balances. It is a community built upon reason and reciprocity (Bennett, 1998), or as pointed out by Meyer and Quattrone (2021, p. 1376) in their call for how to advance collective understanding given unprecedented global and social challenges: "more reciprocal critique within the boundaries of a constructive dialogue rather than ceremonial citation or turf battles." Guiding the inquiry, learning, and possible knowing is the process of peer review; thus, "claims to knowledge and truth are always to be supported by arguments that embody reasons" (Bennett, 1998, p. 33). As presented by Merton (1942) under the label "communism": methods and new knowledge are to be scrutinized through peer review, and then made public. This way, scientific knowledge can be improved, but also diffused (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971).

Academic Citizenship: Between Vertical and Horizontal Collegiality

In his classic text based on a lecture from 1917, Weber discussed the conditions for an academic career and made some comparisons between the United States and Germany. Despite promoting the bureaucratic "specialist" in texts such as *Economy and Society* (Rhoades, 1990), in other texts Weber described specialists as "cultivated" and as responding to a calling or pursuing a vocation. In a

footnote, he explained what he meant by science as a vocation, or *Wissenschaft als Beruf* in German. *Wissenschaft* includes all academic disciplines, not only the (natural) sciences; *Beruf* would colloquially be translated as "profession" but the root *rufen* refers to "vocation" or "calling" (Weber, 1917/2004, p. 1). Such a calling has been seen as pivotal for scientific work, defined as a means "to fulfill one's purpose in life such that the work becomes an end in itself" (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1059). This also sets the conditions for what it is to be a scholar, to be member of a faculty.

Among other things, Weber emphasized the dual aspect of the task that lay ahead of scholars, to both conduct scholarly work and to teach. When success was measured by the number of students attracted to a course, "crowd-pleasing" actions were to be expected, thereby risking to set quality aside. Complementing this is the "inner vocation" involving hard work that may lead to "inspiration" and complete devotion to the subject, but also the expectation that knowledge outputs will be advanced and possibly superseded and abandoned by future generations of scholars.

Following Weber's notion of science as a vocation, we see that academic citizenship is fundamental in academic work. Academic citizenship is central in most definitions of collegiality, including, for instance, "service to students, colleagues, their institution, their discipline or profession, and the public" (Macfarlane, 2007, p. 264). When viewing academic work as a calling, and a scholar as a member of a faculty, tasks such as editorial work, peer reviewing, participating in examination committees, serving as head of a department or dean, etc., are all part of the vocation even if these tasks, in times of increased measurements and numerical control, are not often accounted for as part of ordinary work. Academic citizenship thus translates Merton's (1942) CUDOS norms – communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism – into practice. Furthermore, it can be noted that both vertical and horizontal collegiality require faculty engagement and commitment to be effective (Denis et al., 2019).

Peer review is a core practice of collegiality. As in other forms of academic work, we find a combination and balance of critical scrutiny with a common aim, identity, and understanding. Moreover, peer review systems tend to be partly regulated by written rules and procedures yet also rely on professional assessment and discretion (see, e.g., www.vr.se/english/applying-for-funding/how-applications-are-assessed.html#Eightprinciplestosafeguardquality).

The peer review system was used by medical journals as early as 1731 (Medical Essays and Observations, published by the Royal Society of Edinburgh) (Lund Dean & Forray, 2018), and then introduced as a more general process for academic publications in the late eighteenth century, aiming to provide authentication, foster public confidence, and confer legitimacy to published manuscripts (Brewis, 2018; Zuckerman & Merton, 1971). Among scholars, peer reviews are seen as a service to the community for the public good, as part of the collegial commitment, and as a component of the free, unpaid, and often unnoticed labor of academia (Brewis, 2018). It is a task of academic citizenship. Such a process is not necessarily harmonious, and is likely to involve tense debates and disagreements in the search for the best arguments to support the creation of new knowledge (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014). When new evidence is found, arguments

are corrected. In short, peer review should be based on the Mertonian norm of organized skepticism (Merton, 1942). As noted by Ludwik Fleck in 1935, during such a process a new, albeit temporary, consensus is established (Harwood, 1986).

In more recent work, scholars have discussed the vulnerabilities of the peer review system. For instance, Lund Dean and Forray (2018) noted that authors decline to take on reviewing assignments, even when they have submitted manuscripts for possible publication in the same journal (in this case the top-tier *Journal of Management Education*). They concluded that because peer review is not a formal working task, a central part of the academic citizenship expected from scholars risks being deprioritized. Indeed, journals frequently encounter difficulties finding scholars to conduct peer reviews, and in a system with high competition not only among scholars, but also among publications, many journals take shortcuts and try to find less time-consuming ways to subject work to scrutiny.

The Vulnerability of Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Collegiality
Drawing on our review of definitions of collegiality, and on the distinct nature and interdependence of vertical and horizontal collegiality, we summarize the section on collegiality as an institution of self-governance with a few remarks on its vulnerability in the contemporary university landscape. We have emphasized that as collegiality forms an inhabited institution of academic work, the conduct of individual faculty – academic researchers and teachers – is shaped by collective norms upheld in practice by the collective of academics. It is a meritocratic system in which leaders and decision-makers represent science and the scholarly community. Collegial organizing ideally includes an organizational structure with leaders who have the support and confidence of their colleagues and are elected by them (i.e., the principle of *primus inter pares*). Academic leadership is viewed as an act of service to the community (Lazega, 2020; Waters, 1989). Collegiality presupposes and builds on relations among scholars as a form of self-governance in the pursuit of knowledge advancement. To accomplish this, independence from the undue influence of external interests is yet another fundamental priority. Such governing structures may be found to a smaller or larger extent throughout systems of higher education and research, for example, in universities and research institutes, research funding bodies, and national and transnational policy units.

Moreover, we have pointed to the interplay of vertical and horizontal collegiality. Vertical collegiality comprises rules, regulations, and organizational bodies that prescribe the control and participation of faculty in decision-making. This decision-making also needs to be supported with horizontal collegiality, as peers are mobilized for reviews, scrutiny, advice, and support.

When defining collegiality in these ways, it also becomes clear that challenges to collegiality have grounds in revised governance, which can be driven by politics, as well as shifting organizational ideals and changing cultures and identities within universities. Challenges can also stem from views of scientific work in broader society and among scholars. We have already briefly touched upon some of these challenges, but revisit them below.

Many studies on changes in and threats to universities concern challenges to and the possible undermining of vertical collegiality. Formal collegial bodies such

as senates and faculty boards have been restructured or eliminated according to enterprise and bureaucratic ideals. Administrators have taken on more strategic roles. Along similar lines, strategic management personnel increasingly control the recruitment of leaders and academic staff, educational programs, assessment criteria, etc., rather than faculty. Decisions have been centralized and increasingly are imposed from the top-down. These developments have followed the erosion of faculty authority and exacerbated it. Developments follow similar trends in most places, with some variation. A complete breakdown of vertical collegiality can occur if university decision-making is placed exclusively in the hands of strategic managers, and administrators and faculty (teachers and researchers) become subordinated employees.

Challenges to horizontal collegiality have not been subject to as much research. From the discussion above, however, we can conclude that horizontal collegiality may also be undermined as additional layers of administration and enterprise ideals are introduced into the system. This development may lead to a more instrumentalized view of knowledge with less appreciation for the facts that science and collegiality may take time and horizontal collegiality may not be easily measured. Perhaps even greater threats to collegiality include the potential for scholars to stop seeing (a) knowledge as a common or public good (see Calhoun, 2006); (b) each other as colleagues in the face of intensifying competition; (c) value in participating in collectives of scientists; or (d) each other or scholarly work as trustworthy.

MIXED MODES OF GOVERNANCE

In the introduction to this article, we characterized universities and systems of higher education and research as places where various modes of governance intersect, and where the many tasks and missions that higher education and research are expected to be fulfilled. This characteristic is captured by the concept of the multiversity (Kerr, 1963; see also Krücken et al., 2007). Mixed modes of governance also follow from reforms based on widely held ideals of governance and organization (see Olsen, 2007).

Reforms Challenging Collegiality

Over several centuries, waves of reforms of academic systems have swept the world. These reforms have been driven by new roles applied to universities, expanded systems of higher education and research, as well as shortcomings in existing governance and new ideals for what constitutes appropriate and effective governance. Recently, higher education and research systems have been experiencing a profound wave of reforms punctuated by enterprise ideas (Barnes, 2020; Czarniawska, 2019; Hüther & Krücken, 2016, 2018; Marginson, 2006; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Musselin, 2018; Ramirez, 2010; Rowlands, 2015; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010; Wedlin & Pallas, 2017). Management positions have expanded with a stronger emphasis on hierarchy, more well-defined boundaries between universities as organizational actors and their environments, and more rigorous

performance measurements at the organization level (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Musselin, 2018; Ramirez, 2010). As a result, the control and governance mechanisms of many universities are now modeled after other kinds of organizations; hence, from a governance perspective, universities have come to be seen as less unique.

Reforms tend to be tied to changes in the missions, tasks, and roles of research and higher education (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Collini, 2012; Oliver-Luneman & Drori, 2021). Even when this is not the case, it is clear that changed governance has both been driven by and exacerbated the erosion of faculty authority (Fleming, 2020; Rowlands, 2015). Changes in university governance are sometimes described as a shift from collegiality to enterprise management (Marginson, 2006; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Rowlands, 2015). Discussing the US context, Tuchman (2009) analyzed the development of corporate universities, with, for instance, an expanded focus on branding work. In the UK, the development of the "McUniversity" is one such example (Parker & Jary, 1995), and in Finland, enterprise ideals in academia have been discussed in relation to how the introduction of performance measurement systems (PMS) threatens to disrupt the very ethos of academic work (Kallio et al., 2016). Reporting from a research project on management practices in Australian higher education, Marginson (2000) found that outside forces pressured universities to change their governance structures, and subsequently, their academic traditions. These impinging forces included "government programs and funding systems, mass student participation, industry involvement, and global markets" (Marginson, 2000, p. 29). With the introduction of business norms and enterprise-like modes of management and control, universities became "less sure of themselves" (Marginson, 2000, p. 31). Interviews with university leaders about this process also showed how collegial ideals and practices had limited resistance to enterprise models. Marginson wrote (2000, p. 31):

> Over and over again it became apparent that those in positions of greatest influence in the universities were often fixated on simplistic outside norms of good management. There was a loss of the sense of the distinctive character of universities, a forgetting of what it is that they do, and what makes them different to other institutions, and an undue faith in generic organizational models. There is more here than just benchmarking for excellence. Being useful to business is interpreted as being like business.

Governance practice of today's higher education and research is partly a result of a shift in governance ideals, but it is also characterized by a mix of models accompanied by plural and partly contradictory missions, ideals, and identities (Cloete et al., 2015; Krücken et al., 2007; Sahlin, 2012). Collegial forms of governing, where faculty play the main role, are retained to different extents. This raises questions about the importance and quality of collegiality, how collegiality is combined with other modes of governance and the relationship between collegial governance and the roles of research and higher education in society.

Three Ideal Types of Governance: Enterprise, Bureaucracy and Collegiality

Weber's (1922/1978) ideal types can be used to flesh out the central aspects of governance forms to enable an analysis and comparison of changes in and

combinations of contemporary modes of governance employed in university contexts (also see for instance Lazega, 2020; Parker & Jary, 1995; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a, 2016b). The ideal types discussed here are enterprise, bureaucracy, and collegial governance.

First, a caution on ideal types: Models of organizational governance are often discussed in ideal terms, as perfect scripts for how to run operations. Calling such scripts ideal types, Weber saw them as conceptual tools to be used for a specific purpose. Over time, these Weberian types have been much debated – for instance, whether they should be seen as substantive conclusions or as methodological tools (Udy, 1959) – but they have also been seen as "overly abstract and general, better suited to classification than explanation" (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 85). There is no doubt, however, that if the ideal types are part of a theoretical scheme that is applied to a practical context, they also can serve as a tool for explaining what actually happens (Olsen, 2014).

Possibly the best-known organizational ideal type is Weber's (1922/1978) ideal concerning bureaucracy. According to the bureaucratic ideal, roles, and routines are in focus and positions are filled with individuals who fulfill their regulated tasks. Orders are hierarchical, roles are distinguished between leaders and subordinates, and staff members are thoroughly trained for specialized work within their areas of education and expertise. As Weber emphasized, as an ideal, bureaucracy is the most efficient way to run a government according to rational standards. A core part is also that all co-workers identify with the rationale – that is, they internalize and uphold the culture of bureaucracy (Weber, 1922/1978).

As stated above, less recognized is that Weber also discussed collegiality as an ideal type for organizational governance, primarily as a method to create a hierarchy that can both control experts and limit the control of monocratic or autocratic leaders (see also Lazega, 2020; Waters, 1989). Collegiality is then described as self-governance among peers who use their own formal structures and rely on collective responsibility as a management tool (Lazega, 2020). Whereas bureaucracy includes rules and routines, collegiality becomes an ideal type for work run by bodies of deliberation that come to include work that is non-routine and innovative (Lazega, 2020).

As much of Weber's work was aimed at promoting bureaucracy (Kaube, 2019), which was well-suited to prospering mass production at the time, this also led to a disregard of the full-fledged theory of collegiality as a way to explain collective action, as Lazega (2020) pointed out. Waters (1989, p. 945) explained that this was because Weber did not integrate the "collegial social structural arrangements created by professional groups." Instead, by analyzing collegiality as an organizing principle "almost entirely in negative terms," Weber anticipated that collegiality would retreat and be supplanted by bureaucratization. The latter, enabling both "rapid decision making and efficient administration" (Waters, 1989, p. 946), would be beneficial for the political sphere and for public agencies, as a start.

The enterprise ideal assumes a hierarchy based on charismatic leadership (Fleming, 2020; Weber, 1922/1978). An organization is perceived to acquire a unique identity as an actor, not as a member of a community, collective, or a platform for professional groups (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Krücken & Meier, 2006;

Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Ramirez, 2010). Organizational boundaries are therefore important (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). A manager in the enterprise/ paternalistic system stands the risk of seeing oneself as more important than colleagues; that is, colleagues are no longer equals, but subordinates to the power-holder (Fleming, 2020).

Ideal types and theoretical concepts form frames of reference, not only for scholarly analysis, but also for developing practice (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000, pp. 721–722):

> The abstract and general concepts of theorists have a considerable practical impact. Theoretical concepts are based on the study of the actions, descriptions and interpretation of practitioners. Once formulated they are often reintroduced later into the world of practice. There they are compared with current practices and used to determine what is good or bad, what is lacking and needs to be done. Concepts traveling back and forth in this way, between theory and practice, are a common feature of late modernity (Giddens, 1990). Theoretical concepts are used for developing practice as well as theory.

With this insight in mind, we find that the introduction of enterprise ideals into university settings has largely perverted the ideals of bureaucracy and collegiality, both in practice and in driving organizational development. Bureaucracy and collegiality both have given space to enterprise, and in this process, have become less distinct as modes of governance.

To sum up, in our reading of the literature, the three ideal types help us distinguish between different modes of governance. When comparing the three ideal types, we can distinguish between different ways of coordinating and leading operations, different purposes for organizing, and how an organization is constructed in relation to the operations to be governed. Bureaucracy and enterprise are both hierarchical forms of coordinating. The bureaucracy is coordinated with rules. Staff members are specialized to perform regulated tasks. The leader supervises and ensures that rules are followed. The organization is an instrument or agent working on behalf of others. In Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson (2000, p. 732) words:

> Companies can be seen as instruments of their owners, subsidiaries as instruments for their parent companies, departments as instruments for head-office, or public services as instruments for the politicians. Entities of this instrumental kind, working on behalf of others, can be described as agents: they act as agents for their principals.

Enterprise leadership is charismatic, operations aim for targets and they are coordinated with strategies. The organization thus operates as an actor.

Using the same distinguishing aspects, in the collegial ideal type, operations are coordinated by the community, and led by a *primus inter pares* who is held accountable to the collegium. The community, or collegium, is composed of highly specialized experts and different types of expertise are seen as complementary and formally equal. Taken together, the collegial ideal for organizing differs from bureaucratic and enterprise ideals. Instead of rules and routines being set by the manager, the ideal is self-governance, including all members. This means that decisions are to be made in consensus.

In the next section, we reflect upon reforms of universities, and challenges to collegiality by adopting the lenses of these ideal types.

Enterprise and Bureaucracy

A quick look at universities through the lenses of the three ideal types – bureaucracy, enterprise, and collegiality – reveals growth in bureaucracy, later combined with the enterprise ideal, largely at the expense of collegiality. We can observe an expansion of managers and enterprise ideals, and with this, an increased focus on strategic planning, policies, formulated mission statements, and developed performance measures, not least at the organization level. A number of reforms along those lines have already been mentioned above and we will return to studies of such reforms below. However, before turning to that discussion we want to stress that challenges to academic collegiality are not a recent development. Moreover, these challenges arise not only in response to external pressures and externally initiated reforms, but also from changes in the practicing of science. In *Science as a Vocation*, Weber (1917/2004) anticipated the transition of science from a calling to work structured by the conditions of bureaucratization. These conditions were applied in the first half of the 1900s, for instance in large science departments in Germany focused on medicine and natural sciences, as well as in universities in the United States (Lee & Walsh, 2022).

Exploring the change from basic science as an independent enterprise conducted as a craft by "freely collaborating professionals or of teachers and their students and unskilled technicians" to larger research teams, Hagstrom (1964, p. 243) anticipated a number of trends that now are part of daily life at universities. Hagstrom noted that research teams with more scientists would be more likely to be centralized and run by administrators who would advocate for a focus on budgets over scientific results, and require support from society rather than the scientific community. He explained that if such teams were managed by industries, they would valorize maintaining the secrecy of research results, rather than sharing them according to the Mertonian ideals of "scientific communism" (Merton, 1942). While it is possible to construct teams to avoid competition and confirm the evaluation of the problem at hand, such collaborations can also be established to build upon different specialized skills. However, doing so creates a new situation for research – namely, the division of labor (Hagstrom, 1964).

More recently, Walsh and Lee (2015) reported how bureaucratic structures have come to be employed by large research groups with "greater division of labor, more standardization, and more hierarchy" (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1069), whereas "traditionally, university labs or research teams have the dual function of producing science and producing scientists who are fully trained to become future PIs" (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1062). As a consequence of increasing bureaucratization, the ratio of supporting scientists is increasing; it is becoming more attractive to employ postdocs than PhD students who require support and training. This is leading to deskilling, as fewer students are being developed into fully integrated scientists; it is also leading to marginalization (Lee & Walsh, 2022). Similar developments have been reported by Gerdin and Englund (2022), who found that PMS enable new ways of governing academic work; even if they express appreciation for top researchers publishing in top-tier journals, such systems risk homogenizing scholarship and restricting academic autonomy and freedom. PMS standardizes an ideal for academic performance in terms of the "most efficient input/output

ratios," thereby replacing the traditional values of academic work. The present development of increased specialization and a "cadre of supporting scientists" (Lee & Walsh, 2022) is reinforced by competition for funding and the introduction of new ways to demand and measure productivity (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019; Lee & Walsh, 2022).

Much discussed and studied are the NPM university reforms, with an imitation of organization models from private enterprises. Consequently, the models of control and governance of universities have been elaborated based on the model used by corporations (Dearlove, 1995; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Rhodes, 2017; Tuchman, 2009). As part of this, PMS organized around the quantification of perceived research value serve as a foundation for the resource allocation system (Aguinis et al., 2020). Within the enterprise governing model, management positions have expanded with an emphasis on more hierarchical forms of management (Rhodes, 2017), strengthened boundaries between the university as an organization and its environment, and performance measurement at the organization level (Aguinis et al., 2020; Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Krücken & Meier, 2006).

Organizational performance, measured as outputs and/or key performance indicators is crucial, as the enterprise university is seen as a producing entity operating in a market, in competition with other organizations (Fleming, 2020). As Fleming (2020, p. 1306) put it, "Universities now adopt a corporate ethos, with business schools exemplifying the trend, including all-glass faces and dark business attire." In this situation, students become customers, pushing for satisfaction and value for money (Tuchman, 2009).

The prevalent practice of counting A-journal publications is one example of a PMS. Instead of rewarding new knowledge and research content – that is, applied methods, collected field material, findings, and consequences for theory and practice – the focus has shifted to "playing the game" of publishing in A-journals (Aguinis et al., 2020; Butler & Spoelstra, 2012; Fleming, 2020). As concluded by Rhodes (2017), "metrification" drives researchers to ask the question, "What should I study and present in order to get the legitimate credits from the REF/RAE[5] audit?" Attempts to publish in A-journals resemble sports competitions. One "wins" the game and earns respect by successfully publishing articles in A-journals, which replace peer assessment by functioning "as a proxy for evaluating the quality of the research output" (Aguinis et al., 2020, p. 137).

As an illustration of the different ideal types, Kristensson Uggla (2019) discussed how the economization of contemporary universities also leads to a mix and subsequent conflict between different systems of competition. Even if markets and scientific development are both based on competition, the underlying rationales and goals of these systems are different. Market competition aims to increase efficiency, but also to confer legitimacy and provide processes for checks and balances. Within science – and the collegial ideal – neither competitors nor winners are the main focus. Instead, the focus is on vetting ideas and making contributions to knowledge development that will sustain over time.

The discussion above suggests that modes of governance tend to be translated into practice in relation to each other, and with such translations, certain modes

may be seen as subordinate to others. Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016a, 2016b) found islands of collegiality in a university system otherwise characterized by bureaucratic and enterprise modes of governance. Similarly, Lazega (2020, p. 9) found "collegial pockets" in larger bureaucratic organizations. Governance modes may be mixed because one form of governance is challenged by another that is seen as better or more appropriate; however, various modes of governance also may support and complement each other. Bureaucracy and collegiality have become complementary modes of governance in universities, public sector organizations, and professional organizations more generally. Lazega (2020) argued that such a combination allows for both rule-following (bureaucracy) and innovation (collegiality).

The ways in which modes of governance connect and interplay depend largely on how these modes are understood in practice (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019). For example, even with formal structures reflecting the diverse ideal types of governance described above, individual leaders tend to operate – and link and blend – diverse modes of governance. In this way, faculty members, as well as individual leaders and decision-makers at all levels are interlocutors between their colleagues and between diverse modes of governance. Even when leaders are elected in collegial processes, they cannot be assumed to automatically see their work as a service to their community; equally possible is a scenario where academic leaders align with management and adopt more enterprise approaches to governance. The positions leaders and faculty take in this liminal governance space at different levels have clear consequences for the space and structure of collegiality and how it connects with other modes of governance.

Democracy or Consensus

Several decision-making and advisory bodies of universities are both seen as collegial and democratic bodies, and these forms of governance are sometimes both mixed and confused (Olsen, 2007). While in Sweden we have seen that academic democracy has partly been strengthened at the expense of collegiality (Ahlbäck Öberg & Boberg, 2023), in other settings "academic democracy" has been weakened and marginalized together with a weakened collegiality. In Australia, it has been reported how the development of more enterprise and bureaucratic forms of governance eroded the foundations of democracy (Rowlands, 2015), but also how democratization and bureaucratization, when applied simultaneously within universities, operate in conflict with each other (Barnes, 2020). Even if sometimes assumed to be an issue of democratic voting procedures, collegiality is politically different from democracy. Furthermore, even if academic democracy may sound appealing, collegiality avoids such decision-making by drawing on consensus. We also note that neither bureaucracy nor paternalistic enterprise forms of governance include democratic decision-making. As Weber (1924/1978, p. 362) contended:

> There is absolutely nothing "democratic" about collegiality. When the privileged classes had to guard themselves against the threat of those who were negatively privileged, they were always obliged to avoid, in this way [i.e. via collegiality], allowing any monocratic, seignurial power that might count on those strata to arise.

Lazega (2020, p. 13) explained this based on his reading of Weber:

Thus, Weber understands the social and political world as an organizational space. In his view of collegiality, he considers it an attempt to guarantee respect of deontological rules, but not in a social vacuum – that is, inside bureaucratized settings where hierarchy, power differentials and domination represent a micropolitical reality with which deliberative bodies must contend.

Lazega (2020, p. 14) also described the collegial work to achieve consensus as:

attempts to focus and "harmonize" different points of view, to make them converge towards a single perspective thanks to debate and discussion, provided consensus is not idealized as adhesion but defined as an initial and temporary fiction serving as basis for cooperation … remaining challengeable and revisable.

In this search process of building consensus, a collective basis for decision-making will be established, as the process brings together a great variety of competencies, experiences, and judgments. A core in knowledge inquiry as enabled by universities, is to apply different and opposing perspectives, and to use the collegial process with openness for participants to critique and question each other with the aim of surfacing the best ideas and continuing the conversation.

Mixed Modes: Tensions, Tradeoffs, and Complementarities

Comparisons across countries and across universities reveal that governance modes mix differently in different settings. Collegiality, as an old and largely taken-for-granted mode of governance, has developed differently across settings. Enterprise and bureaucracy models also translate differently across settings. Comparisons show more clearly both how those mixes form and with what impacts, both for collegiality as a mode of governance and for the role and operations of higher education and research.

To develop our understanding of how diverse modes of governance mix, we have followed Weber's suggestion and gone beyond ideal types, partly in response to contemporary scholarly conversations about how to best understand the plurality of institutions, or what is often referred to as institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). While much of this literature initially emphasized the competing nature of logics, many scholars such as Quattrone (2015, p. 411) began to question

a key assumption in the organizations literature that the dynamism of institutional logics and practice variations is the result of rivalry among logics and actors, of tensions and institutional shifts, and of the agency of institutional entrepreneurs.

As Lounsbury et al. (2021) argued, we need to appreciate the complex ways in which logics interrelate, and to study logics as phenomena in their own right. Thus, we should be open to changes and dynamics following struggles and translations of practical arrangements and procedures of each governance mode. The ways in which governance ideals translate into practice and how governance modes mix are highly dependent on how various modes of governance are understood. To capture this, articles in these volumes report on reforms that challenge and transform collegiality around the world. In addition, they analyze reform histories and they show how collegiality is understood in practice and in relation to other modes of governance.

Studies of developments worldwide point to similarities and global waves of reform. At the same time, it is clear that ideas and ideals are translated differently, and reforms are mixed and integrated with existing systems in various ways. To study the drivers and impacts of such global themes with local variation (Drori et al., 2014), comparisons must be contextualized. This leads us to develop thematic comparisons based on articles that have documented similar and diverse developments around the world.

THEMATIC COMPARISONS IN TWO VOLUMES

Henrik Björck (2013) has suggested that collegiality should be viewed as an "essentially contested concept" (Connolly, 1974/1993; Gallie, 1956). Like other concepts often characterized as essentially contested, such as democracy or social justice, definitions of collegiality tend always to be value-laden. While many seem to agree on the meanings of such concepts on an abstract and generalized level, those same concepts are subject to contestation, and disagreements surface when it comes to their translation in practice. Moreover, as a contested concept, collegiality is largely defined and discussed in contrast to other modes of working and modes of governing. In this way, collegiality is always contextualized and formed in time and place. Björck (2013) noted that collegiality is becoming more frequently used and more clearly expressed when procedures that have largely been taken for granted and institutionalized are challenged by new forms of organization, control, and governance.

Thus, we can expect to find different considerations, challenges, and practices in the name of collegiality, depending on the situation and context. The papers in this volume point to differences in challenges, as well as understandings, procedures, contexts, and governance mixes. Contributors develop notions and understandings of collegiality; describe and analyze how collegiality is translated and practiced in different settings around the world; and provide insights into procedures that result from encounters between diverse modes of governing. We ask: What are the roles of scholars and academic knowledge in the governance of higher education and research, and how do these reflect and influence the aims and roles of research and higher education? We also direct attention to what collegiality does and examine how collegiality changes with the field of higher education.

SUMMARY OF PAPERS IN VOLUME 86

Collegiality and the Rise of Organizational Actors

Anna Kosmützky and Georg Krücken analyze a recent transformation of university governance. Their study concerns the highly prestigious research clusters funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). These funding schemes have profoundly changed patterns of academic cooperation and competition. Universities and individual scholars participate in this competition to acquire ample resources for research and bolster their respective scientific reputations.

Self-organizing has been replaced with contractualization and large-scale cooperative research. Ultimately, the authors anticipate a further weakening of collegial bonds, not only because universities and the state have become more active in shaping the nature of academic competition and cooperation, but also because of the increasingly strategic and individualistic orientation of academic researchers.

Lisa-Maria Gerhardt, Jan Goldenstein, Simon Oertel, Philipp Poschmann, and Peter Walgenbach focus on changes in job advertisements for professorships in Germany from 1990 to 2010. This is a period when higher education institutions underwent a transformation from loosely coupled systems to more centrally managed organizations. Central to this ongoing development is the increasing competition for resources and reputation, driving higher education institutions to rationalize their structures and practices. Findings show that the requirements stipulated by universities for professorial positions have become increasingly differentiated (and measurable) over time. In this context, competitive aspects, such as third-party funding, international orientation, or publications, have particularly come to the fore and grown significantly in importance. The authors discuss these findings in light of an increasing managerialization of universities, which has a direct effect on collegiality. They argue that the differentiation of professorial job profiles leads to even more formalized appointment processes and may push collegial governance into the background.

Seungah Lee and Francisco Ramirez study the extent to which universities across the world have become organizational actors. Utilizing an original dataset of a sample of 500 globally oriented universities worldwide, the authors find that these universities have created international, development, and legal offices. Their findings show how these indicators of "getting organized" reflect formalization among universities worldwide, but with clear regional differences. They further suggest that the expansion of organizational actorhood in universities would influence both horizontal and vertical collegiality. For example, the rise of diversity offices and greater pressures to recruit more diverse faculty could lead such offices and senior diversity officers to influence faculty recruitment and hiring decisions. State-engineered resistance to these offices and to the curriculum may undercut faculty governance norms, as well as shared norms of conduct and academic freedom more broadly. Likewise, increased internationalization and the rise of international offices that promote international collaborations could encourage horizontal collegiality that transcends borders. More broadly, the theoretical question is whether becoming an organizational actor leads universities to concentrate on horizontal rather than vertical collegiality.

In the present discourse of university politics, collegiality has come to be viewed as a slow force that is seemingly inefficient and conservative compared to popular management models. Concerns have thus been raised regarding the future prospects of such a form of governance in a society marked by haste and acceleration. One way to put this contentious issue into perspective is to consider it in the light of the long history of the university. Hampus Östh Gustafsson, a historian of science, derives insights about the shifting state of collegial governance through a survey of an intense period of reforms in Sweden c. 1850–1920 when higher education was allegedly engaged in a process of modernization and

professionalization. The analysis is structured around three focal issues for which collegial ideals and practices, including their temporal characteristics, were particularly questioned: (a) the composition of the university board; (b) the employment status of professors; and (c) hiring or promotion practices. Pointing at more structural challenges, this study highlights how collegiality requires constant maintenance paired with an awareness of its longer and complex history.

While the university as an institution is a great success story, concerns are repeatedly expressed of the crises in higher education usually associated with the organizational transformation of universities. Regardless of one's normative assessment of these observations, the institutional success of the university has been accompanied by the emergence of universities as organizational actors. Hokyu Hwang reflects on how these changes could alter the university as an institution, using the Australian higher education sector as an example. Hwang explores how universities as organizational actors, in responding to the demands of its external environment, set in motion a series of changes that redefine highly institutionalized categories within the university and, in doing so, radically remake the university as an institution.

Collegiality in a Political Context

Relations in university settings are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, class, and gender. In South Africa, transformation imperatives have radically changed the complexion of the country's university campuses while entrenching political imperatives. As a consequence, universities have become highly politicized spaces. This is not new. What is new is a communication environment characterized by real-time, global, networked digital communication, and the uptake of digital media platforms (including social media). Francois van Schalkwyk and Nico Cloete explore the effects of politicization and new modes of communication using the case of a controversial article published in a South African journal and the ensuing polemic. They conclude that the highly personal nature of communication that is propelled by digital communication has a direct impact on collegial relations within the university.

Wen Wen and Simon Marginson reflect on university governance, academic culture, and collegial relations in the People's Republic of China. The authors discuss those elements that are distinctive to China and their historical roots (scholarly, Imperial, 20th century Republican, post-1949) as well the similarities between universities in China and in the Euro-American world. The paper explores aspects such as the transformations engendered by system building and World-Class University construction at scale, relations between universities and government, the dual leadership structure, and the explosive growth in China of research publishing and collaboration.

Comparing development in Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA, Pedro Pineda explores the increase in temporary academic positions. Globally, the university sector has grown rapidly since the 1950s. With this development, Pineda shows, the share of temporary positions has increased exponentially in Colombia and Germany, whereas the number has stayed relatively stable in the USA since 1980 but has increased since 2012. In Chile, the number of temporary positions

has decreased since 2012. The insecurity of temporary positions has implications for collegiality. Temporary staff are largely excluded from vertical collegial processes and their participation in horizontal collegiality appears unstable as well.

NOTES

1. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/36304?redirectedFrom=collegiality#eid.
2. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/collegiality.
3. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collegiality.
4. In this text, "science" is used in the broader sense of the term, which includes the humanities and social sciences as well as natural sciences and medicine, as in the German term *Wissenschaft*.
5. The UK system for evaluation of excellence of research (Research of Excellence Framework, previously Research Assessment Exercise).

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SECTION 1

COLLEGIALITY AND THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS

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GOVERNING RESEARCH: NEW FORMS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN ACADEMIA

Anna Kosmützky and Georg Krücken

ABSTRACT

Traditional studies in the sociology of science have highlighted the self-organized character of the academic community. This article focuses on recent interrelated changes that alter that distinctive governance structure and its related patterns of competition and cooperation. The changes that we identify here are contractualization and large-scale cooperative research. We use different data sources to exemplify these new patterns and discuss the illustrative role of research clusters in German academia. Research clusters as funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) are both a highly prestigious scarce good in the competition for reputation and resources and a means of fostering cooperation. Our analysis of this German example reveals that this new institutional configuration of universities as organizations, academic researchers, and the state has a profound effect on organizational practices. We discuss the implications of our empirical findings with regard to collegiality in academia. Ultimately, we anticipate a further weakening of collegial bonds, not only because universities and the state have become more active in shaping the nature of academic competition and cooperation but also because of the increasing strategic and individualistic orientation of academic researchers. In the final section, we summarize our findings and address the need for further research and an international comparative perspective.

 Keywords: Academia; science; universities; collegiality; governance;
 competition; cooperation; research cluster; large-scale collaboration

I. INTRODUCTION

Competition and cooperation in academia are not new phenomena in the twenty-first century, but in recent years they have taken on greater significance in science and higher education. Currently, we are witnessing an extension and evolution of news forms of competition and cooperation across different disciplines and areas of research as well as in various national science and higher education systems. In this article, we use scientific research – and in particular the relationship between competition and cooperation contained therein – as a springboard for investigating changes in academia that raise questions about governance and collegiality. This is largely because scientific research is at the core of academic activities and transcends disciplinary, national, and organizational boundaries. With our research, we complement existing investigations on academic collegiality that focus on formal and informal structures in universities as well as related legal-administrative changes. Such structures and changes will be reconstructed in our empirical analysis of scientific research clusters in German universities.

This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section deals with classical accounts and recent changes in competition and cooperation. Against the backdrop of traditional studies in the sociology of science, which have highlighted the self-organized character of the academic community, we focus on recent interrelated changes that alter that governance structure of research and associated patterns of competition and cooperation. Here we identify an emerging new institutional configuration of universities as organizations, academic researchers as strategic actors, and the state. In the third section, we use different data sources to exemplify these new patterns and discuss the role of contractualization and research clusters as a means of fostering cooperation in German academia. Research clusters as funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft; DFG) are a highly prestigious scarce good in the competition of universities and academic researchers for reputation and resources. The fourth section discusses the implications of our empirical findings with regard to collegiality in academia. On the basis of our analysis, we anticipate a further weakening of collegial bonds, not only because universities and the state have become more active in shaping the nature of academic competition and cooperation but also because of the increasingly strategic and individualistic orientation of academic researchers that is spurred by contractualization. In the fifth and final section, we summarize our findings and address the need for further research with an internationally comparative approach.

II. COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: CLASSICAL ACCOUNTS AND RECENT CHANGES

Competition has traditionally played a strong role as a mechanism of self-governance in science as individual scientists vie for discoveries and the recognition they bring. Classical studies in the sociology of science have focused on competition among individual academic actors and within the scientific community at large.

They have described the race for discoveries, the emphasis on publishing, and the related recognition, all of it very similar to market competition, as a self-governance mechanism that creates systemic cohesion and is based on the norm of the individual independence of the researchers. Likewise, competition has also been acknowledged for its contribution to risk-taking by researchers in their investigation of less popular or niche topics. Thus, competition is responsible for both exploitation and exploration in science (Bourdieu, 1975; Hagstrom, 1965, 1974; Merton, 1973; von Hayek, 1968). At the same time, scientific research has traditionally fostered collaborative efforts whereby scientists become interdependent and form groups to solve problems and share data (Beaver & Rosen, 1978, 1979a, 1979b; de Solla Price, 1963; Hagstrom, 1965). While competition and cooperation might at first glance seem to be quite different or even antithetical forms of social interaction, they are often in fact intimately interconnected.

There has been an intensive debate over competition and collaboration in the traditional sociology of science (e.g., de Solla Price, 1963; Hagstrom, 1965; Merton, 1973; von Hayek, 1968), although from an empirical standpoint these studies have generally favored the natural sciences and given the humanities and social sciences far less attention. Classical studies have shown that a great deal of scientific research requires the efforts of multiple parties and that scientists often become interdependent and cooperative to win the race for discoveries and recognition. Beyond this, academics also look to the support of their colleagues to improve their knowledge and skills or to gain access to research facilities, data, and networks, which in turn will improve their chances of solving problems and ultimately achieving success individually or together (Beaver & Rosen, 1978; Hagstrom, 1965). Hagstrom (1965, p. 91) described the relationship between the competitive and cooperative mindset in his classical study as follows: "Before a man can be considered for such an agreement, he must have shown possible competitors that he can compete and can be trusted." Scientific competitiveness in terms of reputation – as demonstrated, for example, by the number of citations or publications to one's name – has therefore been seen as one of the prerequisites for cooperation, with trust being the other.

The fact that the organization, epistemic cultures, working styles, and academic identities in different research areas differ from each other was also the subject of later classic sociological studies of science (Becher & Trowler, 1989; Henkel, 2000; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Whitley, 1984). Traditionally, scientific work in the natural sciences has been based on a division of labor and more collaborative than is the case in the social sciences and humanities. Scholars in the humanities, for example, have tended to work in an individualistic style rather than cooperatively in teams, which means they have generally relied on libraries, collections, and archives instead of sharing data and equipment. As for the division of labor, epistemic trust, and collective knowledge, these are subject to different conditions in the natural sciences relative to the humanities and social sciences (Klein, 1996; Mauthner & Doucet, 2008; Wagenknecht, 2016).[1] However, it must also be acknowledged that digitalization has changed knowledge production and scholarly communication across disciplines (Gold & Klein, 2019).

We deliberately started our investigation into new forms of competition and cooperation and the role of collegiality therein by drawing on classical accounts in the sociology of science. In these accounts, the starting point is the academic community and more specifically its self-organized character. Both competition and cooperation stem from the reputational structure and the work organization in science as a whole. While competition for new knowledge and the attendant recognition is inherent to the scientific system, independent of the discipline or research field, the need for cooperation is not equally distributed across disciplines and fields but rather bound to the concrete organization of work. In this regard, and following the aforementioned literature, the natural sciences differ profoundly from the humanities and the social sciences given that research in the former often requires the joint efforts of scientists and access to research facilities to improve the competitive position of the individual researcher. This means that competition leads to cooperation based on the necessities of autonomous academic communities.

With this in mind, we would now like to highlight broader changes that have occurred in very different national systems roughly since the 1990s. These changes – three in particular – have altered the interrelation between competition and cooperation. *First*, universities now position themselves more actively as both competitive and cooperative collective actors in their own right instead of mainly providing an organizational framework for the competitive and cooperative efforts of individual scientific actors. An important part of this new role for universities is the increasing use of target agreements with their professors. *Second*, the state is increasingly using competition as a governance instrument. In the same way as universities use target agreements with their professors, the state employs target agreements with its universities, thereby fostering a broader trend toward contractualization in science and higher education. *Third*, with regard to individual academics, more dimensions of scholarly activities (e.g., research funding, research cooperation, teaching, stays abroad, public engagement) have become scarce goods for which academics compete. Even though the last of these changes is reflected most acutely in the sociology of science and especially the field of science studies, prior research has typically paid scant attention to the university as an organizational actor with its own aims and ambitions.[2] Therefore, we will begin with changes at the organizational level.

Universities have transformed themselves into strategic and competitive organizational actors, thereby causing them to move away from the traditional concept of a loosely coupled expert organization. This trend has been analyzed in detail both theoretically and empirically (Christensen et al., 2019; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Whitley, 2008). These same studies have also shown that this trend is by no means unequivocal as universities are still "specific organizations" (Musselin, 2007) and their actual strategic capacities vary broadly (Thoenig & Paradeise, 2016). At the decentralized level, then, the modern university is nevertheless more than the sum of its parts, be they individual academics, institutes, or departments. The university as a whole engages in a multitude of strategic efforts that collectively result in the construction of an individual organizational identity,

increasingly hierarchical structures, the creation of managerial capacities, and the ever-increasing formation of specialized administrative units for observing relevant environments along with their internal processes and units. Parallel to this internal dynamic, competition has become of paramount importance, and universities compete among themselves for a variety of scarce goods (e.g., reputation, personnel, financial resources, and students). For several decades, analyses of this development have concentrated on the United States (Berman, 2015; Birnbaum, 2000), but more recently their scope has expanded to Europe and other parts of the world (Musselin, 2021). As we will later see when analyzing the German case, some competitive processes initiated by the state do, however, require cooperative efforts by universities and their academic members as a prerequisite for participation.

State activities have changed. With the advent of New Public Management reforms, states have increasingly begun to use competition directly as a governance instrument. This shift has been analyzed for different European national systems (Bleiklie et al., 2017) as well as for Latin America (Pineda, 2015) and Asia (Jung et al., 2017). Naidoo (2018, p. 611) speaks of competition as an "unquestionable orthodoxy" in the British higher education system. Following Szöllösi-Janze (2021, p. 244), competition

> in an orderly way creates legitimate inequality, which from the competitors as well as society as a whole is accepted as just. Competition, in other words, is a machinery for creating legitimate, socially accepted inequality.[3]

This argument is particularly true for state activities in the field of science and higher education, where meritocratic ideals largely prevail. It is in these very same field that failure and the resulting inequalities among individuals and universities can be expected to have a higher degree of legitimacy relative to other fields of state politics like healthcare or social welfare. One such example of these state activities is a shift from block grant funding to a more competitive allocation of resources (Whitley et al., 2018). States have likewise initiated an increasing number of competitive processes for allocating research funding at the national and supranational levels (Aagaard et al., 2020; Auranen & Nieminen, 2010; Gläser & Laudel, 2016). These developments have spurred a trend toward large-scale research projects that are often multi- or interdisciplinary, involve multiple institutions, and are internationally cooperative (Bozemann & Youtie, 2020; Kosmützky & Wöhlert, 2021; Olechnicka et al., 2019). It should be noted here that political agendas can be quite visible in states' funding schemes for research on grand challenges (Kaldewey, 2018).

Among individual scientists, competition has grown in volume and scope. The "publish or perish" imperative, which has already been analyzed extensively in the Mertonian sociology of science (Lofthouse, 1974; Merton, 1968), has become more granular and specific as scientists increasingly compete for scarce space in highly ranked journals, related citations, and inclusion in publication databases. Starting as early as the PhD level, the publication imperative has become of central importance – including the growing debate about first authorship. Furthermore, other aspects of research like third-party funding

have become more widespread as an academic activity and performance indicator not only in the natural sciences but also in the humanities and social sciences. As a result, conducting research today is in large part a matter of designing, launching, and carrying out research projects with specifically dedicated resources (Besio, 2009; Torka, 2009), and researchers spend far more time writing grant proposals than they did in the past (Gross & Bergstrom, 2019; Serrano Velarde, 2018).

The imperative to compete also creates new requirements for cooperation. Academics build cooperative networks strategically to increase their chances of securing external funding, and they compete – not just in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and related fields (i.e., STEM+) but also in the social sciences and humanities – for prestigious grants and the ability to participate in large-scale collaborative projects (Borlaug & Langfeldt, 2020; Ekström & Sörlin, 2022; Hellström et al., 2018). Changes like these are increasingly shifting the nature of cooperation from traditional informal cooperation and collective problem-solving without funding (or with institutional funding) to formal cooperation with competitive project funding (Georghiou, 1998; Sacco, 2020). Long ago, the seminal laboratory study by Latour and Woolgar (1979) identified the procurement of external grants as the exclusive task of the head of the laboratory, yet, in the years since, grant-seeking as an academic activity has become widespread for researchers at all levels and across disciplines. The competition for external funding has even extended to junior scientists, both for the basic ability to conduct research and as a reputation marker (Waaijer et al., 2018). For academics across the board, so it seems, self-identifying as a member of an academic community – be it a discipline or a particular school of thought – has taken a backseat compared to highlighting one's individual performance along different dimensions of competition.

Although we have described broader trends across national systems up to this point, their actual configuration is bound to specific national characteristics. For the German system, some peculiarities have to be taken into account, namely, those which limit the power of the state and the university organization over the academic profession and its individual members (Hüther & Krücken, 2013, 2018). To begin with the legal structure, one should recall that academic freedom in Germany is constitutionally guaranteed. Article 5.3 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) states, "Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free." In a number of judgments, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has interpreted the freedom of research and teaching as an individual right, thereby protecting individual academics, and in particular university professors, from state and organizational intervention. Complementary to this, the vast majority of professors at public universities are civil servants (Beamte) who have lifetime tenure and cannot be dismissed by the organization with ease. However, it is possible to sanction professors who do not align their professional activities with that of the organization. University leadership can exercise control over resources (e.g., personnel, equipment), although this source of power is limited as most resources have to be acquired externally through third-party funding. Far more effective is

to incentivize professors through the new remuneration scheme (W1–3 salaries) that came into existence in 2006 and supplanted the previous, more egalitarian scheme. Under the new scheme, professors can obtain regular performance bonuses from their universities by, for example, creating new study programs or participating in cooperative large-scale research. Through this method, there are ample opportunities for the university as an organization to exercise "soft coercion" (Courpasson, 2000) in academia and to shape the research and teaching activities of its members.

Another peculiarity of the German system lies in the federal structure of higher education and science policy, which leads to the proliferation of competitive activities initiated by the state. Legal regulation and financing of universities is basically the responsibility of the 16 states (Länder). As state governance through law is not an option for the federal government, there are far fewer constraints when it comes to competitive funding, which more closely resembles both the structural constraints and related policies of the European Union *vis-á-vis* its member states. Governance through competitive funding in Germany encompasses all major activities at universities, such as research, teaching, and innovation, not to mention specific funding programs on internationalization, gender equality, family friendliness, or science communication. Large programs like the Excellence Initiative (renamed the Excellence Strategy in 2016) explicitly foster cooperation within universities and with partners from non-university research organizations.[4] Furthermore, the Excellence Strategy in particular spurs competition among the 16 states and universities given that individual states create competitive programs for universities at the state level in order to strengthen their competitiveness at the federal level. In Germany, the three relevant actors outlined so far – universities, individual academics, states – converge in altering the traditional configuration of competition and cooperation by their particular focus on research clusters. Their role will be elaborated in the next section.

III. THE ROLE OF RESEARCH CLUSTERS IN GERMAN ACADEMIA

In this section, we illustrate the relationship between new forms of competition and cooperation based on developments in German academia, specifically by looking at highly competitive and collaborative research clusters.[5] This illustrative example aims to show that the research cluster as a scarce good is very influential in the competition for reputation and resources and in the overall competitive institutional configuration of German academia. It has also had a profound influence on recent changes in the interrelations between individual academics, universities as organizations, and the state. The increasing clustering of research spurs the contractualization of research between the German states and their universities as well as between universities and their professors.

Whereas collaborative research groups are an elemental form of collaboration and knowledge production (Hackett, 2005), research clusters are in fact a special

form of group as well as of collaboration. Research clusters are large-scale collaborative research projects designed around long-term basic research. They are organized in a modular and decentralized fashion and based on a division of labor that consists of several sub-projects with their own principal investigators (PIs). At the same time, the goals and activities of the sub-projects contribute to the overarching aims of the research cluster itself. Research clusters may be disciplinary or interdisciplinary, and, depending on the larger aims of their research, the sub-projects might be interlinked to a lesser or greater extent in terms of content and mutually (in)dependent research activities (for a more detailed description, see Hückstädt, 2022).

The most prestigious research clusters that typically bring with them the greatest gain in revenue and reputation and also determine the status position of German universities are the so-called *Coordinated Programmes* funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), which have a highly competitive application process. We focus on such DFG programs for research clusters as an empirical example, namely, the programs for Clusters of Excellence (Exzellenzcluster; EXC), Collaborative Research Centres (Sonderforschungsbereiche; SFB), and Transregional Collaborative Research Centres (Transregios; TRR) as well as what are known as Research Units (Forschungsgruppen; FOR). Research clusters from these programs are located at German universities, but researchers from non-university organizations, such as the Max Planck Institutes, at which a considerable share of cutting-edge fundamental research in Germany is carried out, can be and are typically involved (Buenstorf & Koenig, 2020).

The DFG funding programs for research clusters were established in the 1960s to promote research in universities in select research areas. They expanded quickly on account of increasingly scarce basic state funding for universities. The shortage of state funds in the 1970s resulted in additional research in universities being funded primarily through special focus areas for cutting-edge research, especially in interdisciplinary fields and in fields of "new" technologies (e.g., microelectronics, biotechnology). This was done not only through the DFG funding programs but also by the state ministries, which established competitive programs to promote special focus areas and research priorities in universities, particularly in the form of new interdisciplinary areas and priorities (Mayer, 2019). In conjunction, the income from third-party funding at universities became a performance indicator. The German Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat, WR) pointed out in the 1980s that third-party funding is an essential element in ensuring the quality of research at universities because it is typically awarded through competitive processes (WR, 1982, 1985). In the mid-1990s the Council recommended accordingly: "Competition for third-party funding is the most important way of allocating research resources on the basis of performance. The volume of third-party funding must therefore be increased" (WR, 1996, p. 10). Together these developments put universities in a mode of competition not just for basic research funding but also for cutting-edge (interdisciplinary) research priorities in the form of research clusters (Mayer, 2019).

Third-party funding along these lines – and especially DFG funding for research clusters – has therefore become more than a simple enabler of research but is nowadays also considered a key indicator of the organizational research performance and reputation of German universities (Gerhards, 2013; Mayer, 2019). In general, the third-party income of German universities tripled from public sources and quadrupled from private sources (industry and others) in the 20 years between 1995 and 2015 (Dohmen & Wrobel, 2018). German higher education institutions, especially universities with a high proportion of research, now increasingly derive their resources from third-party funding. Between 1995 and 2015, the share of third-party funding of the total budget of German higher education institutions "increased from 23% to nearly 50%," according to Dohmen and Wrobel (2018, p. 131, see also WR, 2023). They point to the "disproportionate importance of the DFG as an additional source of income" (Dohmen & Wrobel, 2018, p. 124). As the analysis by Mergele and Winkelmayer (2022) shows the Excellence Initiative made a pronounced contribution to greater disparity in the distribution of absolute amounts of DFG funding among universities.

Research Clusters: A Competition for Resources and Reputation Among Universities

In the late 1960s, the DFG established Collaborative Research Centres (SFBs) for collaborative long-term and large-scale research of up to 12 years. These clusters were expected to strengthen research in universities and to contribute to the development of special focus areas by means of interdisciplinary and inter-institutional cooperation. A total of 56.85 million euros (converted from German marks) in funding for the first 17 research clusters was awarded in 1968.[6] By 1980 the number of clusters had grown to 120 (with total funding increasing to 135.2 million euros, converted from German marks) and today has reached 294 (with a total of 872.9 million euros in funding) (DFG, 1980, 2021).[7]

The most prestigious DFG funding program for research clusters is part of the Excellence Strategy (formerly known as the Excellence Initiative), which has decisively shifted science policy in Germany even further away from the traditional egalitarian approach and toward a competitive approach (Möller et al., 2016).[8] To date there have been three rounds in which Clusters of Excellence among other programs have been funded (2006–2007, 2012, 2019). A fourth round with funding decisions to be determined by 2024 has just started. Clusters of Excellence can receive funding for up to 14 years. Although only universities are able to submit proposals for this type of research cluster, the funding program also explicitly aims to foster collaboration between universities and non-university research organizations (Buenstorf & Koenig, 2020; Möller et al., 2016).[9]

The funding program for Research Units (FOR) has existed since 1962, which predates the Collaborative Research Centre program by several years. It provides funding to – comparatively speaking – smaller and more short-term research clusters (up to six years when the program started, nowadays up to eight years). This program therefore contributes less to the total amount of university funding from the DFG and likewise has less influence on the organizational structures of universities.

Nevertheless, it still ranks among the most prestigious and competitive third-party funding programs in Germany today.

Since the establishment of the DFG funding programs for the aforementioned clusters, they have invariably grown in number. So, too, has the competition to participate in these clusters. Fig. 1a–c provides overviews of the number of research clusters (SFB, EXC, FOR) between 1980 and 2020 and their distribution by major scientific fields. As Fig. 1a shows the number of SFB clusters grew considerably in the program's early stages and has remained fairly steady at more than 250 for the past 20 years. The Excellence Initiative and later Excellence Strategy have added many additional Clusters of Excellence since 2006 (Fig. 1b). The funding program for FOR clusters has added about 200 more research clusters in the past 20 years (Fig. 1c).[10]

Hand in hand with the growth of clusters, the competition for such clusters has intensified over the years. The approval rate for SFB clusters, that is, the number of approved applications in relation to the total number of applications submitted, gives an indication of the selectivity and competitiveness of a program. While 120 out of 124 total applications (97%) were approved for funding in 1980, the approval rate for SFB clusters has since declined precipitously (DFG, 1980, p. 132). It was 37% in 2008 and 25% only four years later (DFG, 2014, p. 21). The average approval rate for Clusters of Excellence is quite similar. In 2016, the DFG received a total of 195 proposals for Clusters of Excellence from 63 universities. Of these, just 57 clusters from 34 universities were eventually approved for funding in 2019 (DFG, 2019, p. 5).[11]

But as Fig. 1 also shows, there are stark disciplinary variations in the number of research clusters, particularly for SFB clusters. The distribution of SFB clusters across the major scientific fields has been highly uneven since the beginning of the funding program. In the early days, this unevenness was attributable to a lack of applications in certain areas, given that the highly collaborative and modular research activity of these clusters is better suited to the research style of the natural sciences than the social sciences and humanities (DFG, 1980). Nowadays, the disparity also stems from differences in the approval rate. In 2005/2006, the approval rate of SFB clusters in the humanities and social sciences was only 9% (compared to 46% in the natural sciences and 53% in engineering and 40% in the life sciences) (DFG, 2010, p. 21); but it has increased in the years between 2005 and 2012 to 25% (compared to 45% in the natural sciences and in the life sciences and 33% in engineering) (DFG, 2014, p. 17). Compared to SFB clusters, the approval rates for Clusters of Excellence do not differ that strongly between major scientific fields: 18% of the applications for Clusters of Excellence in the humanities and social sciences were approved for funding in 2018 compared to 35% in the natural sciences, 26% in the life sciences, and 21% in engineering (DFG, 2019, p. 9). The convergence of approval rates might be related to the fierce competition for Clusters of Excellence.

Research clusters in the three funding lines differ not just in terms of their selectivity of approval but also in terms of size, duration, and funding. The average funding for SFBs is about two million euros per year (DFG, 2021). The typical annual funding for Clusters of Excellence is about 8.5 to 10 million euros

a: SFB Clusters

b: EXC Clusters

c: FOR Clusters

■ Humanities and social sciences ■ Life sciences ■ Natural sciences ■ Engineering ■ Clinical clusters

Fig. 1a–c.   DFG Research Clusters (SFB, EXC, FOR) from 1980 to 2020
Grouped by Major Scientific Fields.

(DFG, 2019).[12] The average funding for Research Units is about 900,000 euros per year (DFG, 2021). These numbers indicate that research clusters are not just a matter of organizational reputation for universities but rather an important source of income for their research activities. Large German universities with "Excellence" status typically have two to three Clusters of Excellence and about two or three times as many SFB clusters. In addition, they are also home to several Research Units.

Research Clusters: Consequences at the Organizational Level

Research clusters are not just a scarce good and highly desired object of competition. The successful application for such clusters also has far-reaching consequences within universities. Research clusters, and particularly Clusters of Excellence and SFBs, determine universities' long-term recruitment strategies and their appointments of professorships.[13] In most universities, research activities in existing or planned clusters are strengthened through the reassignment and expansion of professorships. A DFG report from 2014 on the development of SFBs mentions the appointment of nine new professorships in the neurosciences related to an SFB cluster at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU Munich), but this is clearly an exception. Typically, SFB clusters appoint just one or a handful of new professorships (ranging from W1 to W3 salary tiers) prior to establishing a cluster or during its operational lifetime (DFG, 2014). This situation is somewhat augmented for Clusters of Excellence. Although most of the newly hired scientific staff are early career researchers (e.g., PhDs and postdocs), a considerable number of new professorships are also created for EXCs. For the 37 Clusters of Excellence in the first two rounds of funding, 147 tenured professors and 55 W1 junior professors were appointed (Sondermann et al., 2010). Thus, it is not surprising that increases in the third-party funding of Universities of Excellence are concomitant with increases in the number of professors (Mergele & Winkelmayer, 2022). Nevertheless, cluster-based professorships have direct consequences for the disciplinary composition of universities, the size of departments, and their balance of power in universities. For example, research clusters as organizational units occasionally demand representation with full voting rights in the academic senate, in which traditionally the departments and disciplines of a university are represented. This indicates a shift, however slight, in the balance of power.[14]

In addition to direct consequences such as these, there are indirect consequences that influence the hiring criteria of professors and the organizational expectations of their roles. What we have found in our empirical investigation of competition and cooperation in the German science and higher education system is that the skills required to establish and apply for such research clusters as well as the corresponding ability to cooperate has become a typical role expectation of professors and a criterion for their appointment. This extends far beyond the appointment of professors who are specialized in the cluster's particular area of research. It also shows a more widespread adoption of the approach commonly found in the natural sciences, where large-scale cooperation has played a strong role for decades.

To illustrate these expectations, we draw on interview material from a research project (2019–2022) that sought to investigate cooperation among German universities and more specifically how universities support and foster the research cooperation of their members.[15] In this project, universities were sampled, using the criteria-driven sampling method (Schreier, 2018), according to six important characteristics of German universities (i.e., socio-geographic location, age, size, type/disciplinary profile, research reputation, and state) to achieve a certain degree of representativeness of the selected cases for the German system. The data consists of 20 interviews with vice presidents of research and heads and staff of offices for research support (Forschungsförderabteilungen) in nine German universities.

When asked in the interviews how research cooperation is supported by the university, the vice presidents focused on the hiring processes and the attraction of professors. Other means and measures were also discussed, but the appointment of professors (and postdoctoral researchers to some extent), the hiring processes, and role expectations of professors were a recurring theme in the interviews. Their focus on such appointments is not entirely surprising given that universities as organizations depend on the research performance of their members when competing for research cluster funding.[16] What is striking, however, is their focus on what we have termed *cluster-ability*. We will use three quotes from interviews with the vice presidents to illustrate what they expect of the professors they hire and their "cluster-ability."

One vice president mentions that the university adjusted its hiring strategies more than a decade ago and since then "it's always about the ability for large-scale collaboration." The same vice president goes on to explain these newer role expectations in more detail:

> So, there are universities that sometimes make decidedly different appointments; they would prefer a Leibniz Prize winner, the lone wolf. For us, it is always about the willingness to get involved in large-scale research clusters, the potential for large-scale collaboration. So, this is actually a question in every appointment process.

It might be a matter of social desirability or merely a coincidence that in none of the universities that we investigated was hiring scientists with loner characteristics ever mentioned. Solitary scientists still exist, of course, but it seems that the modern professor of any discipline should work – or be willing to work – in a highly cooperative manner and should be interested in and capable of working in research clusters.

A quote from another interview expresses more precisely that a major concern is not only a candidate's willingness and interest but also that they have the scientific reputation (referring to one's standing in their field of research) that is needed to be part of a research cluster.

> So, appointing people who would not be in a position to participate in an SFB or even better, of course, in an excellence cluster or something like that, you don't really need to appoint them. So, we pay attention to that and the departments do that as well.

Universities that are oriented toward Clusters of Excellence favor professors with the specific ability to apply for such clusters, or at least for SFB clusters,

which are seen as a stepping stone for future Cluster of Excellence applications. The final quote that we will use to illustrate organizational role expectations of professors suggests potential tensions between organizational rationales and the research interests of individual academics. The organizational rationales that are addressed in the quote ("joining forces" with colleagues from their own university, "new collaborations," "new topics") point to research clusters. The willingness to get involved in such collaborations is apparently not taken for granted but is rather described as requiring a sufficient degree ("enough") of open-mindedness:

> When it comes to recruiting new professors, the focus is also placed on whether the person has the ability and willingness to either initiate such research clusters or to participate in them. So, one then also actually looks at the extent to which these people whom one hires are already networked, what prerequisites they bring with them, and then in the interview, of course, whether they are open-minded enough that they could also imagine perhaps joining forces with people who are already at the university or also, so to speak, to take a step outside, to say, yes, I am also quite willing to enter into innovative new collaborations and also to get involved in new topics, scientific topics.

About 40 interviews with university presidents and vice presidents from two ongoing research projects on competition in the German science and higher education system support these findings on the importance of cooperativeness and "cluster-ability" as hiring criteria and these new expectations as to the role of professor.[17] From these interviews that are particularly focused on competition among universities as organizations, we learn that although competition for hiring the professors themselves has traditionally existed in the academic system, this now has a new instrumental focus and a related legitimation pattern: At the organizational level, the competition for professors is now seen as a means to attract prestigious research clusters.

This instrumental orientation toward hiring a highly cooperative top scientist in order to secure competitive funding is also expressed by the fact that German universities often use individual target agreements with professors as part of the professorial W-salary. These agreements set incentives for certain performance benchmarks through bonuses. The research-related performance that is typically incentivized, besides that which brings in third-party funding in general, is applications for research clusters, and particularly DFG research clusters, in the role as lead PI, the ostensible spokesperson of the cluster. Should those applications be successful, universities tend to add (permanent) performance bonuses onto the individual salary or offer research bonuses as one-time payments. The following quote from a target agreement illustrates a permanent bonus that has been granted for the successful acquisition of an SFB cluster.

> The Presidential Board of the University [name of university] grants Prof. [name of professor] a permanent performance bonus of 3 levels (each 220 € per month) from the month of the approval for a DFG Sonderforschungsbereich, for which Prof. [name of professor] is the spokesperson. (Target agreement with a professor of a Germany university, anonymized)[18]

Research Clusters: An Object of Competition Among the German States

Research clusters are presently the objects of fierce competition not only among universities but also in the political arena among the 16 German states.

The expectation to cooperate and its contractualization that we have described above for universities in relation to their academic staff is also reflected in the target agreements between universities and their states. In many cases, target agreements between states and universities concern, among other things, the acquisition of Clusters of Excellence or SFBs. This is likely because Clusters of Excellence are a highly desired scarce good in the political competition between states. However, their actual distribution is exceedingly uneven. Some states (e.g., Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Saarland) currently have no Clusters of Excellence based in their local universities at all. The development of research clusters is typically financially supported by the states, and therefore universities that are located in financially strong states have some competitive advantage. Nevertheless, states with fewer financial resources also try to incentivize research clusters and cultivate the research capacity for Clusters of Excellence in the future through target agreements. To illustrate this, we offer quotes from select target agreements between German federal states and universities.

The following quote is from the target agreement between the state of Lower Saxony and the University of Göttingen for the period 2017–2021. The University of Göttingen is a large, traditional university with a reputable scientific standing and a comprehensive spectrum of disciplines, including medicine. The university was awarded the title University of Excellence as part of the Excellence Initiative in 2006 but lost it in 2012. The state of Lower Saxony stepped in and supported the university's research projects with 30 million euros. Nevertheless, not enough Cluster of Excellence applications from the University of Göttingen were successful in the following round (2018) of the Excellence Initiative. To be eligible for University of Excellence status and its related funding, a university needs to be successful with at least two Cluster of Excellence applications, but three out of four of these applications from Göttingen were not. The following paragraph from the target agreement (excerpted from the section on research) for 2017–2021 must be considered in this context.

> The goal is achieved when the University of Göttingen has applied for or extended at least five profile-building research clusters (at least 3 SFB) in existing research areas in 2021 and when the university in addition has applied for two research clusters in thematically new areas. (Universität Göttingen, 2017, p. 7)

However, the states do not sign target agreements exclusively with the large and established top research universities. Goals related to research clusters can be found in the target agreements of universities of any reputation and research capacity, albeit adjusted for scale. The following example is from the target agreement for the University of Erfurt for 2021–2025. The University of Erfurt is a small (6,000 students) and recently founded university (1993, but with historic roots in the fourteenth century) in Eastern Germany with a focus on the humanities and social sciences. In the section titled "Strategic Goals" in the "Promotion of Research Clusters" subsection of this agreement, the university declares that it "will continue to actively acquire third-party funding for research clusters in the future" (Universität Erfurt, 2021, p. 5). This declaration is quite vague but

followed by a detailed step-by-step plan for each year. Their goal by the end of 2025 includes applications to the DFG for Research Units and an SFB cluster as well as applications for less prestigious research clusters and research clusters funded by other means [e.g., the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), European Union (EU), VolkswagenStiftung (VW)].

> Application for at least eight research clusters, e.g., DFG research group, BMBF directive funding, or EU or other funding institutions (VW, etc.) as well as for the establishment of a research training group or an SFB by the DFG. (Universität Erfurt, 2021, pp. 5–6)

Universities that are not yet ready to initiate clusters themselves are instead incentivized to cooperate with other universities in applications for research clusters. Universities that lack even the capacity to cooperate in research clusters are encouraged and supported to first and foremost build this capacity through targeted appointments of professors, by developing special profile areas and administrative research services, and by creating competitive intra-organizational research seed funding.

IV. DISCUSSION: CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON COLLEGIALITY IN ACADEMIA

We began our investigation into the relationship between competition and cooperation in academia by focusing on theoretical and empirical research conducted in the sociology of science. These studies highlighted the strong role of competition and cooperation and their interrelatedness in academia. While cooperation is by and large seen as an uncontested aspect of academia, the role of competition in academia provokes highly charged debates among proponents as well as critics who see competition as a cause and effect of managerialism. Both fall short of acknowledging that – compared to public administration, for example – competition is not something entirely new that had to be instilled from the outside into universities and its members (Krücken, 2021). What *is* new, however, is the configuration of governance actors (i.e., state, universities, and academic researchers) and the related modes of governing research. Table 1 summarizes the broader changes in research governance and the role and relevance of research clusters therein as analyzed in Sections II and III.

The competition for research clusters can be seen as the primary mode that shapes the competitive institutional configuration in German academia. It is embedded in a broader process of the construction of competitive actorhood in academia, one that goes hand in hand with the individualization of both academics and universities and loosens collective and normative ties between them.[19] As the example of large-scale collaborative research in German universities has shown, this highly competitive format for scientific cooperation does not stem solely from academic communities and their self-organized character. Rather, this format is driven to a large extent by universities as organizational actors and new funding opportunities provided by the state. Both changes are accompanied by contractualization. They induce systemic changes in governance and likewise

Table 1. Summary of Main Findings.

Broader Changes of Research Governance	Role and Relevance of Research Clusters
Competition as a governance instrument of the state; shift toward competitive research funding; contractualization	Fostering of research cluster competition and cluster-ability of universities
Universities as strategic and competitive organizational actors; contractualization	Clusters as a highly valued scarce good (funding and reputation), fostering of research clusters and cluster-ability of professors
Increased competition among individual academics	Clusters as a highly valued scarce good (funding and reputation); strategic and individualistic orientation

have an impact on collegiality in academia. The overall amount of competitive funding for cooperative research has increased significantly in recent decades, and the currently very prominent Excellence Strategy is only the result of a much longer process. We have traced the beginnings of competitive large-scale collaborative research funding back to the 1960s, and its evolution over this period has gradually given rise to increasing competition among universities and researchers for those funds. From the point of view of both universities and researchers, large-scale collaborative research is seen as a rich font of resources at a time when there is far less non-competitive block funding for universities from the state and funding for researchers provided directly by their universities is also on the decline. At the same time, highly competitive mechanisms like the three different DFG funding lines for research clusters are a strong symbolic indicator of scientific reputation both at the organizational and individual level.

Universities use these reputation markers in their dealings with the state but also to distinguish themselves from other universities, to build their profiles, and to aid in their recruitment processes of academic staff, professors in particular. Individual researchers meanwhile use these markers when negotiating with their universities for additional financial and personal resources. And, naturally, the German states use them in the ever-increasing political and economic competition among themselves. As we have shown in Section III, all disciplines and fields of research are presently involved in the competition for research clusters, even if the statistical chances of securing this type of funding are much lower in the humanities and the social sciences than in the natural and life sciences. The strong focus on research clusters as a scarce and highly desired good also affects traditional forms of collegiate governance. In some universities, research clusters and their representatives have a seat in the academic senate, a traditional collegiate decision-making body that should ideally contribute to the unity of academia by giving an equitable voice to various departments and disciplines. Likewise, in many universities, the university leadership has created informal and influential groups that give advice on universities' overall research strategies. They consist of professors who are held in high esteem for their research, namely, heads of research clusters. Such practices are obviously shifting the balance of power in universities.

At the interface of the organization and individual academics, the recruitment of professors is of particular interest. There is ample literature on the professor's

habitus, their fit into the department, and the expected role of new professorial recruits (e.g., Bourdieu, 1988; Musselin, 2009; Teichler et al., 2013). What we described in Section III are, however, characteristics that constitute "the good colleague" given the fundamental importance that university leadership places on cooperation and "cluster-ability." Here, the willingness and ability to work with other departments and research organizations is highly sought after in the hopes of attracting prestigious research clusters and their related funding. This expectation is clear and can once again be found across all disciplines and fields of research. Although we did not investigate this aspect further, we assume that this expectation might produce tensions between both individual and organizational research agendas. It could also generate friction between the university leadership and the departments that field the search committee and where internal "rules of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 2) concerning the "good colleague" prevail. While university leadership fosters new professorial recruits that are expected to play a strong role in large-scale research clusters that typically span departmental and disciplinary boundaries, at the departmental level other characteristics define the "good colleague." Relevant characteristics in this respect are a commitment to teaching, participating in academic committees, and upholding disciplinary standards as well as being a good match with local colleagues, their way of "doing things here," and not standing out too much compared to her or his colleagues.

Where competition and cooperation in academia are concerned, the shift toward a plurality of governance actors is accompanied by a shift in the mode of governance. Instead of collegial norms that largely remain implicit and are conveyed via long-term generational and socialization processes among the members of academia, we can see a contractualization of the expectation to cooperate. As part of this process, the main instrument the state uses to foster cooperation on behalf of universities is the same as the one, which universities employ with their members: target agreements. As we have shown in Section III, target agreements at both the organizational and the individual level encourage the pursuit of competitive yet collaborative large-scale research funding and the reputation that comes with it. Typically, the primary target of these formal agreements is applications for DFG-funded research clusters, which generate considerable financial resources and garner elevated status for all parties involved. Though applications are the aim, what is perhaps most interesting is that their success is not always an explicit goal.

Given the high degree of individual academic freedom in Germany noted in Section II, the power of university leadership over its members is limited, although target agreements under the new remuneration scheme clearly incentivize research cluster applications. In addition, there is a structural asymmetry between universities and their members. Universities as organizations depend on the research performance and the active participation of their members in the broader competition for research clusters because they can only succeed on the basis of these factors. On the individual level, the situation is rather different. Individuals can pursue their research agendas independently, including applications they might make for prestigious cooperation projects, thereby bypassing

the organization. However, competitive funding for research clusters increasingly requires the application to come from the university proper, not individuals or a group of researchers, as in the case of research clusters funded by the Excellence Initiative and the subsequent Excellence Strategy. Furthermore, as research clusters come bundled with a large amount of resources and a high degree of academic prestige, individual researchers themselves have a vested interest in applying for research clusters, even if this happens to be mostly at the organizational level.

We remain skeptical about whether these new forms of competition and cooperation in German academia might lead to a renewal of academic collegiality. On the contrary, they might serve to weaken collegial bonds instead. To be sure, research clusters, which often are interdisciplinary in character, do foster academic exchange and understanding across fields, disciplines, and departments. As a result, horizontal collegiality and related aspects concerning academic life might experience a renewal on an interdisciplinary level.[20] A sense of belonging to a vibrant research community that transcends disciplinary and departmental boundaries can certainly evolve among those involved. This might also facilitate intra-university discourse. However, the question of what happens when funding lapses remains open. As the motivation of all actors (i.e., individual academics, universities, states) to participate is rather strategic, driven by an individual and organizational means–end rationality and supported by means of contractualization, we do not expect long-term commitment to common goals to emerge beyond the research cluster itself. Under these premises, individual academics, as the basic units of academic collegiality, are rather prone to pursuing their own strategic agendas by focusing on new topics and related opportunities for cooperation, both within and beyond the organizational boundaries of their universities.

When we turn our attention to vertical collegiality, the picture is less clear. All competitive funding for prestigious research clusters heavily involves the academic community, especially through peer review in the selection process of clusters. At the same time, governance actors have multiplied and changed. The university as an organizational actor has become a powerful player, and by initiating and shaping competitive processes that also involve some degree of cooperation, the state has become a more active player. This kind of interrelated, multilevel governance structure is certainly more heterogeneous and open to external influences than traditional academic self-governance.

V. CONCLUSION

Although the sociology of science has investigated the interrelation between competition and cooperation in academia for some time, the nature of this dynamic and its associated forms have undergone considerable change in the past few decades. A competition imperative has changed the institutional configuration of science and higher education systems around the world. By the same token, the proportion of competitive research funding has increased in many countries. In Germany specifically, competitive research funding has not only significantly increased but third-party funding in general has also become a leading

performance indicator for universities as organizations. As we have shown, the mode that most actively shapes the overall competitive institutional configuration of German academia is the competition for highly selective and prestigious cooperative research clusters funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Competition in Germany means to compete for prestigious grants for cooperative research clusters, a process in which both universities and individual academics take part to acquire ample resources for research and bolster their respective scientific reputations. The German states also have a vested interest in prestigious research clusters as they are themselves in political and economic competition with each other. They therefore strongly support and fuel the competitive processes in academia.

This competition for prestigious research clusters is not without consequences within German universities. Our analysis points to nascent changes in traditional power balances in universities as a result of what one might call *cluster professorships*. Furthermore, candidates' "cluster-ability" has become a significant criterion in hiring processes and an organizational role expectation of professors in all disciplines and fields of research. This indicates changes at the organizational level but also points to potential related changes in professional roles and identities. Last but not least, the mode of contractualization for such clusters between universities and states as well as universities and individuals might further cultivate individualization and competitive actorhood. One can easily imagine that such changes would also impact collegiality – most likely in ways that could alter or weaken rather than strengthen it.

On the basis of our findings for German academia, one might ask how these new forms of competition and cooperation unfold in the institutional configuration of other national science and higher education systems. Moreover, one might also inquire as to how they might affect academic research in different disciplines and research fields. While competitive research funding now plays an increasingly strong role in many different national systems, the specific way performance is measured and reputation is assigned differs by country. Other European systems measure performance and assign reputation less through collaborative large-scale research and more through publications and societal impact, such as the UK with its Research Excellence Framework (REF) procedures (Watermeyer, 2016). Therefore, we assume that the interrelation between competition and cooperation in academia in the UK differs from other countries to some degree. Here, the traditional, individualistic style of scientific work that has long been associated with the humanities might be still valued more – as long as one can point to prestigious publications and demonstrate societal impact. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that different patterns of cooperation are stimulated by the competitive institutional configuration of academia in the United States. There, the dominant form of competition among universities seems to be for resources and revenue from tuition fees and endowment funds, whereas the competition for third-party funding is only of real importance in the natural sciences (Berman, 2015; Brint, 2018). This type of configuration might lead to an emphasis on the natural sciences in the competition for resources for research. Conversely, across all disciplines it might also lead to greater emphasis on cooperation in teaching and

graduate education. Other interesting comparative cases would be post-socialist countries such as Poland or Latin American countries such as Brazil, which come from a tradition of strong state control of science but are also now moving toward a more competitive institutional configuration (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Likewise, countries that have emerged as strong global economic players in recent decades and, in an effort to catch up with leading scientific countries and world-class universities, have invested fiercely in their science and higher education systems (e.g., Korea, China; Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004; Braun Střelcová et al., 2022; Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009) would be very intriguing cases for comparison. The same holds true for universities in Africa, where research agendas are heavily shaped by international organizations (Cloete et al., 2018; Mkandawire, 2011). The country-by-country differences in these institutional configurations would shed additional light on how they shape the interrelation between competition and cooperation in academia as well as the related modes of governance and collegiality.

NOTES

1. Although the division of labor has traditionally distinguished the natural sciences from the humanities, exchange, and cooperation have played a strong role in the latter as well, for example, in institutes for advanced studies or in discussion and reading groups (Ekström & Sörlin, 2022; Fleck et al., 2019).

2. For an analysis of the global development towards organizational actorhood, see Lee and Ramirez (2023, Vol. 86).

3. All quotes from German sources have been translated by the authors.

4. For an analysis of the effects of the Excellence Initiative launched by the French government, see Harroche and Musselin (2023, Vol. 87).

5. From this point onward, we use the term *collaboration* to denote a specific type of cooperation among the large-scale research clusters. In all other cases, we use the term *cooperation* as an umbrella term for various kinds of joint activities in science and higher education.

6. Adjusted for inflation, the funding spent in 1968 would today be 236 million euros; the funding spent in 1980 would today amount to 342 million euros.

7. Today, Collaborative Research Centres (SFBs) can be funded for up to 12 years. Many of the early clusters were funded for 15 years, some up to 17. Up to the late 1990s, SFBs were located exclusively in one university (or neighboring universities), but in 1999 the TRR program was established. It allows researchers from up to three locations to work together in a research cluster (DFG, 2010). TRRs are counted as SFBs in Fig. 1.

8. The German Excellence Strategy is jointly funded by the German federal and state governments and organized by the DFG and the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat). Within the Excellence Initiative/Strategy, there have been three funding lines: graduate schools promoting doctoral researchers, Clusters of Excellence, and institutional strategies that advance development on a university level (known as Universities of Excellence). The funding program for graduate schools was discontinued in the third round of funding (Imboden et al., 2016).

9. The 37 excellence clusters approved in 2018 cooperate in total with 43 Max Planck Institutes, 12 Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft institutes, 14 from the Helmholtz Association, 17 from the Leibniz Association, as well as 30 other non-university research institutions (DFG, 2019).

10. We compiled the data for Fig. 1 from DFG annual reports and from the DFG database GEPRIS. We would like to thank Joelle Wirtz for assisting with the data collection.

11. At the core of the selection process in all three DFG research cluster programs is a peer review process involving national and international peers. The decision process for all three programs is organized as a two-step procedure. In the first step, the cluster initiative submits a concept paper or short proposal, for which the DFG organizes a peer review process. If successful in the first step, the cluster initiative submits a full proposal in the second step for which the DFG organizes an on-site review (DFG, 2010, 2019). The DFG does not regularly report first-stage applications in their annual reports. Therefore, we had to rely only on the DFG's own calculations of approval rates for the programs.

12. Additionally, a program overhead allowance of 22% is granted to all three forms of research clusters. Universities can also apply for a university allowance of one million euros for a Cluster of Excellence (750,000 euros for the second cluster, 500,000 for each additional cluster) to strengthen the governance and the overall strategy of the university (DFG, 2022).

13. For an analysis of changes in the job requirements of German professors, see Gerhardt et al. (2023, Vol. 86).

14. In some universities, research clusters demand seats with voting rights in the academic senate. At the University of Jena, for example, such demands have led to three seats for professors from the university's so-called profile lines: light, life, and liberty (Universität Jena, Grundordnung, 2019).

15. Funding for the project "Relational Quality: Developing Quality through Collaborative Networks and Collaboration Portfolios" (Q-KNOW) was awarded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung; BMBF) (grant number 01PW18011A). We would especially like to thank Sarah-Rebecca Kienast for her contribution to conducting the interviews and analyzing the data. We would also like to thank Eva Schick for her support in preparing the interview transcripts for analysis.

16. Unlike in the interviews with vice presidents, hiring processes do not play a role in the interviews with the heads and staff of offices for research support. They focus primarily on the various research funding measures initiated and implemented by their office.

17. Both projects are part of the "Multiple Competition in Higher Education" (FOR 5234) Research Unit, which is funded by the DFG, the "Multiple Competition in Research and Teaching" project, and the "Competitive Positioning of Universities and Their Members" project. For further information, see https://www.uni-kassel.de/go/FG-multipler-wettbewerb.

18. The amount granted for achieving each level is regularly adjusted according to state salary regulations. It typically increases over time.

19. Here one can identify a strong link to theoretical and empirical investigations of the global construction and proliferation of actorhood in neo-institutional studies (Hwang et al., 2019; Jepperson & Meyer, 2021). For an early account on actorhood and competition, see Hasse and Krücken (2013). According to neo-institutional research, actorhood and social embeddedness are by no means antithetical to each other. On the contrary, modern actors can only be understood by reconstructing "their practical embeddedness in taken-for-granted culture and relationships" (Meyer, 2009, p. 39). This implies that individual actorhood in academia is strongly associated with the current emphasis on cooperation but not with loner characteristics.

20. For the distinction between horizontal and vertical collegiality, see Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2023, Vol. 86).

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THE MANAGERIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN GERMANY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CHANGES IN JOB ADVERTISEMENTS FOR PROFESSORSHIPS IN GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, 1990 TO 2010

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ABSTRACT

Higher education institutions have undergone a transformation over the past few decades, from loosely coupled systems to more centrally managed organizations. Central to this ongoing development is the increasing competition for resources and reputation, driving higher education institutions to rationalize their structures and practices. In our study, we focused on changes in job advertisements for professorships in Germany from 1990 to 2010. Findings showed that the requirements stipulated by universities for professorial positions have become increasingly differentiated (and measurable) over time. In this context, competitive aspects, such as third-party funding, international orientation, or publications, have particularly come to the fore and grown significantly in importance. We discuss these findings in light of an increasing

managerialization of higher education institutions, which has a direct effect on collegiality. We argue that the differentiation of professorial job profiles leads to even more formalized appointment processes and may push collegial governance into the background.

Keywords: Managerialization; higher education; universities; professorships; job advertisements; Germany

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, universities worldwide have experienced increasing competition for students, researchers, financial resources, and reputation (Engwall, 2020; Wedlin, 2020). At the same time, national and international rankings, which have driven this trend, have become increasingly important in higher education (Ramirez, 2010; Sahlin, 2013; Wedlin, 2006; Wilbers & Brankovic, 2021).

In response to these competitive pressures, universities have grown more managerialized and have become organizational actors (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Drori et al., 2003; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Lee & Ramirez, 2023, Vol. 86; Oliver-Lumerman & Drori, 2021; Ramirez, 2010; Ramirez & Christensen, 2013), that is, autonomous, goal-oriented, and accountable entities (Bromley & Meyer, 2017; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013). The managerialization of universities – that is, the implementation of managerial practices – is, at the same time, a consequence and driver of rationalization (i.e., the construction of new means-ends-relationships). This is made evident in the rising use by universities of standardized metrics to measure their academic excellence, including third-party funding, publications, patents, and graduates (Krücken, 2020; Ramirez, 2010). Indeed, to improve their competitive position, universities systematically measure their research output (Aguinis et al., 2020; Engwall et al., 2023; Marques & Powell, 2020) and engage in reputation management (Christensen et al., 2019; 2020; Ma & Christensen, 2019).

In such an increasingly competitive environment, a university's academic staff, particularly its professorial staff, is a key resource for its strategic positioning. Consequently, performance expectations from universities' institutional environments are passed on to the academic staff to ensure uniform goal orientation. Indeed, most university performance criteria strongly depend on the performance of the university's professors (Engwall et al., 2023). Consequently, the appointment of professors is a highly significant decision for universities (Harley et al., 2004; Harroche & Musselin, 2023, Vol. 87). It is, therefore, not surprising that recent studies have underscored that academic recruiting processes are affected by managerialization (Harley et al., 2004; Mantai & Marrone, 2023; Reymert, 2022).

Despite this recent research on the reactions of universities, we know relatively little about how the requirements for professorships have evolved over time and how the new requirements may affect collegiality in universities. Understanding this long-term trend is crucial, as these new requirements may have strong and

frequently direct effects on the behavior of the professoriate as well as on relationships and collaboration between professors. Thus, the increasing managerialization apparent in academic recruiting may challenge and erode academic collegiality as the modus operandi of universities (Kallio et al., 2016; Mignot-Gérard et al., 2022; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016, 2023, Vol. 86).

The purpose of our research is to study how the managerialization of higher education has changed the requirements for applicants to university professorships. Based on this analysis, we draw conclusions about the consequences for collegiality in universities. Empirically, we focus on how job requirements for professorships have changed over time by performing a descriptive analysis of the total of 579 job advertisements for professorships in Business, Economics, and Sociology at German universities published in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 in *Die Zeit* – a German weekly newspaper in which professorships are generally advertised. In our study, we consider these job advertisements to be a statement of a university's expectations of its future professors (Mantai & Marrone, 2023).

In this context, Germany is a fruitful research setting for two reasons. First, there is a historically rooted academic model based on collegial governance (Hüther & Krücken, 2016; Kehm, 2013), which was expected to be strongly affected by rationalization efforts associated with competition. Second, in German universities, this new form of rationalization is apparent but still ongoing. In this regard, Germany is also an interesting context for discussion of the potential unintended consequences of these developments.

Our findings show that the requirements listed in job advertisements for professorships have become more differentiated and measurable. Competitive aspects such as third-party funding, international orientation, or publications have particularly become increasingly important. These requirements reflect the core criteria that define a successful academic in the modern university and, in the aggregate of all professors, the criteria of a successful university. More specific and measurable requirements make the appointment process more manageable with regard to the goals of the university and thus reflect attempts to rationalize. At the same time, the implementation of measurable criteria may affect academic collegiality within the faculty in terms of the two dimensions of collegiality elaborated by Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2023, Vol. 86), that is, the role of faculty in decision-making processes (vertical collegiality) and social relations and companionship based on shared norms (horizontal collegiality), which we will subsequently discuss in more detail.

GERMAN UNIVERSITIES IN TRANSITION

The Historical German Academic Model

Higher education systems and the academic labor market are historically anchored and nationally specific (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Ramirez, 2010). Despite the homogenization efforts under the Bologna reforms of 1999, they differ considerably between European countries (Dobbins et al., 2011; Musselin, 2005).

In Germany, higher education was particularly influenced by the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. It is characterized by

> the combination of research and teaching; academic freedom (often expressed as *Lehr- and Lernfreiheit*); education rather than training; the idea of the unity of science and scholarship; and the community of students and teachers. (Östling, 2020, p. 63)

The role of the academic community is thereby central not only to research but also to the governance of universities, as universities in Germany are traditionally understood to be self-governing communities of scholars (Dobbins et al., 2011). That is, a high level of academic autonomy and strong self-administration protect the interests of the professoriate and reflect academic collegiality as the modus operandi in German universities (Enders, 2001; Hüther & Krücken, 2016; Schimank, 2005). In line with this, within the traditional collegial academic governance system, a university rector was "primus inter pares," elected by the academic community, and charged with representing the professoriate's interests, without intervening in the core activities of teaching and research (Enders, 2001; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016). Such rectors typically act based on a collegial approach, as they commit to serving the academic community (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016).

This historical academic model enjoyed a strong reputation worldwide (Östling, 2020) and is largely shaped by its traditional recruitment, promotion, and appointment policies (Enders, 2001). The traditional postdoctoral academic university career in Germany was characterized by a habilitation system (Hüther & Krücken, 2018). This system typically consisted of three phases: first, the preparation for habilitation, usually in a temporary civil servant position; second, attaining a habilitation and subsequently becoming a so-called "private lecturer" (*Privatdozent*), authorized to teach but not endowed with a professorial position; and third, after successful application, appointment to a professorship or a chair at another university by the respective federal state (Enders, 2001).

The appointment procedures at German universities are historically regulated by the government of each federal state (Ferlie et al., 2008) and differ considerably in detail between these. However, a commonality is that academic self-administration plays a central role (Kleimann, 2019) and, as a general pattern for these procedures, the following applies (see for more detail, Enders, 2001; Hüther & Krücken, 2018): An appointment commission is established by the faculty, composed of professors, representatives of the mid-level academics (*akademischer Mittelbau*), an equal opportunities officer, and student representatives. The position and key requirements for the specific professorship are then defined and subsequently announced in a public job advertisement. The appointment commission reviews the application documents and invites prospective candidates for interviews and oral presentations. Following this, the appointment committee asks external reviewers (professors in the field of the advertised professorship at other universities) to evaluate the remaining candidates. The resulting shortlist of candidates for the vacant position must then be confirmed by several academic bodies, including, for example, the academic senate. Historically, the federal state

(its Ministry of Education) chose one of the applicants and offered this person a *Ruf* (a call). More recently, in several federal states, the appointment decision has been delegated to the university leadership (Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Schimank, 2005). Negotiations between the candidate and the university determine the final appointment of the new professor.

Against the backdrop that German professors receive permanent employment contracts (i.e., an appointment as a tenured civil servant) and enjoy a high degree of academic freedom (Enders, 2001; Hüther & Krücken, 2018), it is not surprising that the appointment procedures were and still are strictly regulated by the government of each federal state (Ferlie et al., 2008; Hamann, 2019). Nonetheless, in the traditional appointment system, the faculty was granted a central and decisive role in the selection of appropriate candidates.

Rationalization and Managerialization
Attempts in German Universities

The traditional German academic model is now contrasted by a new rationality, characterized by a much more managerial understanding of the university, in which competition for resources and reputation has become central (Drori et al., 2016; Gumport, 2019; Harley et al., 2004; Y.-N. Lee & Walsh, 2022).

A number of events have contributed to this development. First, several reforms over the past several decades were particularly significant for developments in higher education in Germany. This began in 1998 with the fourth amendment to the Framework Act for Higher Education (*Hochschulrahmengesetz*), which served to equalize the academic systems between the federal states (Hüther & Krücken, 2018). In addition, the pan-European Bologna process for harmonizing student programs, initiated in 1999, facilitated comparison and competition between universities throughout Europe (Enders, 2001; Fischer & Kampkötter, 2017; Hüther & Krücken, 2018). Second, with respect to research activities, international rankings, which began to flourish in the 2000s and 2010s (Hedmo et al., 2001; Sahlin, 2013; Wilbers & Brankovic, 2021), further drove competition between universities around the world, including in Germany (Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Krücken, 2020). Third, from 2000 on, the German "Excellence Initiative" (*Exzellenzinitiative*) particularly underscored the need to strive for excellence. This initiative was the German government's response to the EU's Lisbon Program of 2000, in which the EU member states committed to investing in their education and science systems to make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. The Excellence Initiative was intended to strengthen Germany as a center of science, improve its international competitiveness, and make top-level research at German universities visible. A total of 4.6 billion euros in funding was thereby made available to the 44 German universities that successfully applied to the program (Fischer & Kampkötter, 2017; Hüther & Krücken, 2018). The Excellence Initiative pushed competition between universities and reinforced the focus on excellence in research and corresponding measurable performance indicators (Fischer & Kampkötter, 2017; Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Kehm, 2013; Krücken, 2020; Östling, 2020).

To meet the new expectations and demands emerging from this competition, formal organizational structures and processes were accordingly rationalized at German universities (Hüther & Krücken, 2016). German universities thereby experienced a "shift from a loosely coupled, decentralized expert organization to a strategically acting, managed organization" (Krücken, 2020, p. 165). Indeed, an increasing differentiation of organizational units was seen in universities; they prepared mission statements (Oertel & Söll, 2017) and shifted toward a more professional, management-oriented governance system (Hamann, 2019; Krücken, 2020; Reihlen & Wenzlaff, 2016; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016). University leadership is now increasingly staffed with managers, that is, university presidents often come from outside the individual university and are responsible for ensuring progress with the competition-oriented goals of the university (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016). Not surprisingly, an award for the best university manager (i.e., president) of the year has been established in Germany. It is awarded, for example, for the integration of structural elements typically found in business organizations, such as sustainability management, into the formal organization of a university. This finding is in line with Bromley and Meyer's (2021) observation that universities, as organizational actors, are expected to expand their goals and vision beyond their core purpose (e.g., by addressing sustainability and health protection issues).

Although the academic community in Germany still maintains significant influence and decisions are still made rather collegially compared to other countries (Krücken, 2020), in the new paradigm, university leadership gains power and influence relative to the academic community. For example, some responsibilities for research and teaching agendas have shifted from the academic community to university leadership and the external actors with whom it has contracted (Ferlie et al., 2008; Fleming, 2022; Musselin, 2005). It is argued that these developments have weakened the role of the academic community in decision-making within universities (Kehm, 2013).

These developments have also affected procedures for the appointment of professors, which have changed since the 2000s (Hüther & Krücken, 2018). Power in the professorial recruitment process has shifted from the faculty and the state to university leadership (Hamann, 2019). Subsequently, university leadership has aimed to rationalize professorial recruitment, for example, by providing appointment guidelines and criteria to which the faculties must adhere. The collegial decision-making process has thus been altered by managerial practices to formalize it in line with the new competitive goals of the university. Moreover, final decision-making power in appointment procedures is increasingly concentrated in the president's office (Hamann, 2019). As Harley et al. (2004, p. 337) describe:

> It is suggested that the introduction of strong management structures, modern management techniques, performance related pay, the abolition of lifetime employment, and the evaluation of teaching and research would make universities competitive and efficient organizations.

These rationalization efforts by the university are said to diminish the role of the faculty community in selecting future colleagues (Harley et al., 2004; Reymert, 2022; van den Brink et al., 2013).

ANALYSIS OF JOB ADVERTISEMENTS FOR PROFESSORSHIPS AT GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, 1990–2010

In light of these developments in the higher education system, how should researchers demonstrate and investigate this focus on the new rationality at German universities? In our study, we analyze job advertisements for professorships and examine how the tasks and requirements that universities communicate to applicants have changed over time.

We argue that academic job advertisements represent the qualifications universities are seeking and therefore reflect what they consider to be their organizational needs with respect to their competitive goals (Mantai & Marrone, 2023; Rafaeli & Oliver, 1998; Reymert, 2022). The announcement of a vacant position in public job advertisements is part of the appointment process, and, as illustrated above, these processes may be superficially diverse but are similar at their core. We will, therefore, not analyze in great detail the complex decision-making processes and criteria applied in the selection of applicants (for an overview of studies on this, see Hüther & Krücken, 2018). This is because we neither can generalize as to who may be responsible for the emphasis on specific requirements in academic job advertisements, nor is this crucial for our study. On the contrary, we argue that recurring patterns in academic job advertisements should be understood as socially constructed. They result from implicit or even unconscious isomorphic processes that reflect a variety of expectations, demands, and actors in society (Rafaeli & Oliver, 1998).

With regard to the changes at universities outlined above, we thus argue that the job advertisements will be found to be increasingly shaped by managerialization and competition (Mantai & Marrone, 2023). Indeed, we assume that the requirements in job advertisements correspond to a large extent with the ongoing changes to the understanding of the objectives of universities (Bromley & Meyer, 2021) in the sense of a means-ends relationship. To succeed competitively, universities define criteria in job advertisements that favor their competitive position. The criteria in job advertisements, thus, represent a proxy for the imagined relationship between means (specific profiles of future professors) and ends (favorable competitive positioning of the university).

Data and Analysis

The data in our study are based on job advertisements for professorships at German universities published in *Die Zeit* – the central outlet for academic job advertisements in Germany – in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. This time period was chosen because it covered periods of major change in the German higher education system, as illustrated above (Hüther & Krücken, 2018).

We focus our analysis on professorships in the social sciences as we consider them to be a "middle ground" in the context of the rationalization trend: between the natural sciences, where research excellence has long been measured (Enders, 2001) and the humanities (in Germany, termed *Geisteswissenschaften*), where this is

not yet common. We consider disciplines in the social sciences to be a fruitful context in which to observe the impact of the current rationalization attempts. Within the social sciences, we chose disciplines that are particularly relevant in Germany in terms of size (student and staff numbers) and are sufficiently similar (overlapping research areas). We therefore focus on the disciplines of Business Administration, Economics,[1] and Sociology. There is a particular affinity within the Business Administration and Economics areas for a more market-oriented understanding of the university and there has been an increasing push for excellence there.

Table 1. Examples of Job Requirement Coding in the Job Advertisements.

Requirement	Coding Examples
Research	Representation of the discipline in research
	Should be designated in research in the field of the position
	Be proven by research work
	Research achievements at the international level
Teaching	Represents the subject in teaching
	Teaching experience
	Teaching in the above fields
	Teaching on a high didactic level
	Qualification with regard to assigned teaching duties
	Participation in the teaching program
Habilitation	Proof of habilitation in economics
	Be proven by a habilitation
	Habilitation is a requirement for employment
Doctoral degree	A doctorate is a prerequisite for employment
	Doctoral degree required
	Scientific achievements (doctoral degree)
	Should hold a doctoral degree
International orientation	International research and practical experience
	Research achievements at the international level
	Projects at the international level
	International relations
	International network
	International research collaborations
Foreign language skills/ teaching in English	Command of the English language at an appropriate level
	Ability to offer courses in the English language
Third-party funding	Third-party funding is expected
	Experience in the acquisition of third-party funds
	Implementation of third-party funded projects
Publications	Proven through relevant publications
	Scientific publications
	Evidence of outstanding scientific qualifications through publications in high-quality international journals
	Relevant publications in national and international journals
Participation in academic self-administration	Willingness to actively and constructively participate in self-governing bodies of the university is required
	Participation in academic self-administration of the university
Practical (non-academic) work experience	Practical professional activity outside the university sector
	Professional practice in a field corresponding to the subject to be represented
Pedagogical skills	Recruitment requirement is pedagogical aptitude
	Appropriate pedagogical aptitude
	Should have the necessary pedagogical aptitude

Our data collection and analysis can be characterized as follows: First, we collected all job advertisements for university professorships related to business administration, economics, and sociology for the selected years. In a few cases, the assignment of a job advertisement to one of the aforementioned disciplines was not immediately clear, for example, when the position involved not only aspects of business administration but also of communication sciences. Such cases were then examined more closely (e.g., regarding assignment to a specific faculty) and accordingly included in or excluded from the dataset. The final dataset included 579 job advertisements from 81 universities in Germany.

Next, we carefully read all job advertisements to gain a better understanding of their content and structure. We then looked more deeply into the job-related descriptions provided in the job advertisement, that is, the tasks and requirements, which are the central subject of our study.[2] In a subsequent step, we developed codes for these. We began with an open coding scheme and coded 50 job advertisements from each year. Following discussion, we then standardized the coding criteria, resulting in 11 requirement categories (see Table 1), including more general tasks (e.g., research and teaching) and formal criteria (e.g., habilitation and doctorate) as well as concrete requirements (e.g., publications, third-party funding).[3]

Third, based on this coding scheme, we trained two student research assistants, who manually coded all job advertisements independently. In addition, we collected general information from each job advertisement, for example, the name of the university, the federal state in which the university was located, the field and focus of the individual professorship, the type of professorship, and the temporary/permanent status of the position. Once coding was complete, we reviewed the coding with the student research assistants and discussed differences until we ensured the coding was consistent.

CHANGES IN JOB REQUIREMENTS FOR PROFESSORSHIPS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING RATIONALIZATION IN GERMAN UNIVERSITIES

We began our analysis by obtaining a more precise overview of whether and in what way the number of coded job requirements per job advertisement for a professorship in Germany had changed over time. The results are provided in Table 2. While job advertisements in the 1990s were shorter and more vague, in the two more recent decades studied, they included more explicit and specific requirements. For example, while a job advertisement in 1990 mentioned an average of 2.38 of the 11 coded requirements (i.e., mainly the general tasks of teaching and research), in 2010, the number had more than doubled to an average of 5.14 requirements per job advertisement.

This trend is illustrated by the two examples of job advertisements provided in Figs. 1 and 2. Both are job advertisements for professorships in sociology. The first, from 1990, is relatively short and vague. The second, from 2010, is much longer and more detailed, with an extensive catalog of specific requirements.

Table 2. Number of Job Advertisements Analyzed Per Year, with Minimum, Maximum, Mean, and SD Number of Job Requirements for Each Year (Max. = 11).

Year	Number of Job Advertisements Analyzed	Number of Requirements Per Job Advertisement			
		Min.	Max.	Mean	Median
1990	96	0	6	2.38	2
1995	96	0	5	2.83	3
2000	90	0	7	3.67	4
2005	114	0	8	4.15	4
2010	182	0	10	5.14	5

Christian-Albrecht University of Kiel

Professorship (C 4) in Sociology

The Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences has a vacancy for a beginning in the 1990/91 winter semester.

Applications are sought from academics who, in addition to general Sociology, are also qualified in the field of empirical social research and in areas related to Economics.

We especially welcome applications from qualified female academics.

Applications, including the customary documents, must be sent by July 2, 1990, to the **Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the Christian-Albrecht University of Kiel, Professor Dr. Jürgen Hauschildt, Olshausenstraße 40, D-2300 Kiel 1.**

Fig. 1. Example of a Job Advertisement for a Professorship in 1990, Translated and Replicated by the Authors Based on a German Language Job Advertisement by Christian-Albrecht University of Kiel, Published in *Die Zeit* (1990, Issue 24, p. 55). The Representation Is Not True to Original and the University Logo Included in the Original Is Omitted.

Not only did the overall number of coded requirements per job advertisement change over time, but so did the frequency with which particular requirements occurred in the job advertisements sampled. Table 3 shows these findings, providing the average frequency of each requirement during our observation period. Fig. 3 shows a graphical illustration of this development. The line graph indicates that the time window chosen for the analysis was well-suited, as from 1995 to 2000 and on, major changes in the requirements communicated to applicants can be observed. As previously stated, from the mid-1990s on, reforms and initiatives, such as the Framework Act for Higher Education, the European Bologna process, and the German Excellence Initiative, significantly affected the German academic system (Enders, 2001; Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Krücken, 2020; Östling, 2020). This had a noticeable impact on the content of job advertisements for professorships.

In the following sections, we illustrate the changes to the requirements for professorships over time. In particular, we describe the traditional core tasks of professors in Germany, that is, research and teaching, and the traditional

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UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH

W2 Professorship in Political Sociology

The University of Bayreuth is a research-oriented university with an internationally competitive and interdisciplinary-oriented research and teaching profile. The Faculty of Cultural Studies at the University of Bayreuth has a vacancy for a tenured including permanent civil servant status, beginning on October 1, 2011.

Applicants should have a proven track record of research in the fields of political sociology, social structure analysis, and institutional studies as well as relevant publications in national and international journals. An international comparative quantitative orientation with a focus on North American studies as well as experience in the acquisition of third-party funding are expected. International research and teaching experience is desirable. Duties of the position include teaching responsibilities in the Faculty of Cultural Studies and the Faculty of Linguistics and Literature, especially in Sociology, History, and English Studies. Active contribution to the focus on "Central Europe and the Anglo-Saxon World" and the development of social-science-oriented graduate programs are expected as well as the ability to offer courses in English.

Requirements for employment are a completed university degree in sociology, possibly also in history or political science, pedagogical aptitude, doctorate and habilitation or proof of equivalent academic achievements, which may also have been earned in activities outside the higher education sector or in the context of a junior professorship. At the time of appointment, the candidate must not yet have reached the age of 52. The State Ministry of Science, Research, and the Arts may allow exceptions in urgent cases in agreement with the State Ministry of Finance (cf. also Art. 10 para. 3 p. 2 BayHSchPG).

The University of Bayreuth aims to increase the percentage of women in research and teaching and therefore strongly encourages female academics to apply. In 2010, the University of Bayreuth was re-audited by the Hertie Foundation as a family-friendly university.

Preference will be given to severely disabled persons with the required qualifications.

Applications, including curriculum vitae, academic background, list of publications, research and teaching concept as well as a list of third-party funding acquired should be sent **by January 31, 2011** to the Dean of the Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth.

Fig. 2. Example of a Job Advertisement for a Professorship in 2010, Translated and Replicated by the Authors Based on a German Language Job Advertisement by University of Bayreuth Published in *Die Zeit* (2010, Issue 50, p. 7). The Representation Is Not True to Original and the University Logo Included in the Original Is Omitted.

formal requirement for attaining a professorship in the German academic system: the habilitation. We additionally show that with the move away from the habilitation system, the doctoral degree has become a more central formal requirement for professorships, accompanied by an increasing demand for pedagogical skills. We also make reference to several job requirements that appeared more frequently in job advertisements from 1995 to 2000 and on. We summarize these as "new competitive requirements," as they reflect the increasingly competitive orientation of universities. Finally, we focus on a criterion that, we argue, should always have been self-evident for professorships but that tended to appear more frequently over time in job advertisements: participation in academic self-administration.

Table 3. Mean Frequency of Occurrence of Job Requirements Over Time.

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Research	0.69	0.75	0.87	0.90	0.95
Teaching	0.71	0.77	0.89	0.93	0.91
Habilitation	0.46	0.66	0.62	0.49	0.34
Doctoral degree	0.23	0.22	0.38	0.37	0.51
International orientation	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.47	0.49
Foreign language skills/teaching in English	0.01	0.01	0.17	0.23	0.43
Third-party funding	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.40
Publications	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.47
Participation in academic self-administration	0.04	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.14
Practical (non-academic) work experience	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.03
Pedagogical skills	0.15	0.24	0.37	0.34	0.48

Fig. 3. Frequency of Occurrence of All Coded Job Requirements Over Time.

Traditional Characteristics and Formal Requirements

In keeping with the Humboldtian tradition, teaching and research are the main missions of German universities (Engwall, 2020; Krücken, 2020). Thus, academic distinction in the areas of teaching and research is the central requirement for attaining a professorship (Östling, 2020). Indeed, our findings support this: In the job advertisements analyzed, research and teaching were the most frequently listed requirements across all years; in 2010, both appeared in more than 90% of job advertisements (see Fig. 4). This finding is not surprising, as research and teaching are still considered the central tasks of universities and professors. However, these requirements are abstract and leave open precisely what is expected, for example, the results of a professor's research activity.

Occurence of the Job Requirements Over Time

Fig. 4.   Frequency of Occurrence of Research, Teaching, and Habilitation
Requirements Over Time.

In the traditional German academic career system, the habilitation was the primary formal requirement for applicants to a professorship for demonstrating experience in research and teaching (Enders, 2001; Harley et al., 2004; Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Musselin, 2005). In 1995, 66% of the job advertisements analyzed called, therefore, for a habilitation (it was not even explicitly mentioned in every job advertisement, because it was a formal criterion for attaining a professorship).

Obviously, the importance of the habilitation has decreased significantly. In 2010, it was required in only 34% of job advertisements (it is no longer a legal requirement, i.e., criteria considered to be equivalent may be substituted). This trend of the decreasing relevance of the habilitation was observed earlier in the natural sciences, where, to demonstrate the qualifications necessary for a professorship, publications, and third-party funding were being substituted for the formal habilitation (Enders, 2001).

The Move Away From the Habilitation System

In order to better understand the substitutions German universities now accept in lieu of the habilitation for applicants to professorships, we plotted the occurrence over time of the requirement for a doctoral degree and the demand of pedagogical skills, as compared to the requirement for the habilitation (see Fig. 5). As our results show, with the move away from the habilitation system, reference was made to the doctoral degree as a minimum requirement of formal qualification

Occurence of the Job Requirements Over Time

Fig. 5.   Frequency of Occurrence of Requirements for Habilitation,
            Doctoral Degree, and Pedagogical Skills Over Time.

and proof of a candidate's competence in research. However, what cannot be proven by a doctoral degree – in contrast to the traditional habilitation – is teaching experience.

To compensate for this, in tandem with the rise of the doctoral degree as a minimum formal requirement, there was an increased call for pedagogical skills – that is, by 2010, the prevalence of pedagogical skills as a requirement increased from 15% to 48%. In Germany, pedagogical competence was historically proven through teaching trials held before the members of a faculty, that is, the professors, at the time of habilitation. With the erosion of the habilitation and a stronger focus on research accomplishments, the requirement for pedagogical skills may now be met in other ways, for example, through certified participation in pedagogy courses or, as in the American model, through student evaluations.

New "Competitive" Requirements

As the requirement for habilitation vanished as proof of an applicant's aptitude, new requirements arose. These, as we argue, reflect the orientation of universities toward international rankings and competition in the market for academic knowledge.

As can be seen in Fig. 6, since 1995, the international orientation of candidates as well as their foreign language skills, including the ability to teach in English, have become more relevant for professorial appointments. This indicates an

Occurrence of the Job Requirements Over Time

Fig. 6. Frequency of Occurrence of "Competitive" Requirements Over Time.

increase in both the internationalization and international competition of universities (Krücken, 2020).

From 2000 on, a sudden increase could be observed in the occurrence of two further requirements: publications and third-party funding. As illustrated in Fig. 6, in the 1990s, these requirements were not relevant, but in 2010, they appeared in over 40% of the job advertisements. Both are measurable criteria that refer to (actual or potential) research output. While publications in top-tier journals display research achievements, third-party funding indicates candidates' outstanding research ideas and the financial resources that will accompany them. These requirements replace the habilitation as a formal criterion and facilitate a quantitative comparison between applicants. While the habilitation had been a binary criterion, performance measures, such as the number of publications in top-tier journals or the acquisition and level of third-party funds, are competition-oriented and enable an easy comparison between candidates.

Overall, the increasing relevance of these four requirements in job advertisements is hardly surprising as universities have needed to compete in international rankings and excellence in research has become the ultimate goal (Krücken, 2020; Paradeise & Thoenig, 2013).

Formalization of a Formerly Self-evident Fact

At first glance, it seems surprising that participation in academic self-administration – a historically self-evident fact in the job profile of a professor – has recently been listed more frequently in job advertisements. However, the increase in the

demand for participation in academic self-administration in the job requirements, from 4% in 1990 to 14% in 2010, is significant.

Since decision-making within the faculties of German universities has been and remains characterized by a collegial approach (Krücken, 2020; Schimank, 2005), participation in university self-administration is not only a natural part of a professor's job profile but also an opportunity to represent the interests of the professoriate and to epitomize collegiality (Harley et al., 2004). So, why would it be necessary to explicitly list this task in job advertisements? One explanation may be that this matter-of-course activity had to be made more explicit so as not to be pushed to the background in job advertisements that increasingly focused on numerous criteria in the areas of research excellence and internationalization. Nevertheless, compared to these "competitive" requirements, participation in academic self-administration is of subordinate importance in job advertisements.

DISCUSSION

Analyzing job advertisements for professorships at German universities from 1990 to 2010, we observed increasing differentiation as the mean number of coded job requirements increased over time. Our findings further demonstrate that internationalization and competitive, market-oriented criteria, especially in terms of measurable research output, have gained relevance in academic recruiting. The hiring of professors in German universities has always been organized "to rank a set of external candidates to find the best one" (Enders, 2001, p. 11). Nevertheless, as a result of increasing attempts to standardize job requirements, the criteria for who "the best" qualified person is and the means by which this qualification can be demonstrated have changed significantly. We argue that the more recent requirements placed on applicants for professorships reflect the central criteria constituting the definition of a successful academic in the modern university and, in the aggregate of all professors, the criteria considered to reflect a successful university today. A large body of literature on higher education has documented changes at universities that correspond to our findings, which we briefly discuss below.

First, scholars of higher education have observed an increasing competition for resources and reputation (Engwall, 2020; Hüther & Krücken, 2016; Wedlin, 2020) and a growing relevance of national and international rankings (Christensen et al., 2019; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Ramirez, 2010, 2020; Wedlin, 2006; Wilbers & Brankovic, 2021). Consequently, to keep up with the competition, the strive for excellence (especially in research) and strategic positioning (preferably in the top positions of rankings) has become more relevant (Marques & Powell, 2020; Ramirez & Tiplic, 2014). Triggered by this, the measurement of (research) performance and the comparison of this performance between scientists and universities has become an established practice (Aguinis et al., 2020; Brankovic et al., 2018; Engwall et al., 2023; Marques & Powell, 2020). The standardization and use of performance measures in universities have increased, and government funding for German universities is increasingly based on performance indicators (Kehm, 2013).

Further driven by the Excellence Initiative, German universities strive for excellence and increasingly focus on high-quality research (Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Kleimann, 2019; Krücken, 2020). A recent study in France indicates that such excellence initiatives have implications for academic hiring (Harroche & Musselin, 2023, Vol. 87). Further, third-party funding has become a more relevant performance indicator within universities both at the organizational and the individual level (Kosmützky & Krücken, 2023, Vol. 86) and is visible in recent academic job advertisements as well (Mantai & Marrone, 2023).

Similar developments have also become evident in the job requirements for professorships, as publications and third-party funding are more frequently called for. Both criteria serve as measurable indicators of research excellence (Aguinis et al., 2020) that allow for comparison and competition between candidates as well as for ranking universities. One could argue that the requirement for publications in top-tier journals is merely another, perhaps more modern, version of the research requirement. However, we do not support this interpretation. The requirement for such publications does, of course, reflect the desire for excellent research. Nevertheless, while the older and broader "research" requirement allows latitude in the interpretation of how an applicant's ability to do outstanding research may be demonstrated, the newer "competitive" requirements provide hard criteria by which to measure outstanding research and communicate those expectations to candidates. Accordingly, scholars have already observed that measurable research performance (i.e., top-tier journal publications) rather than the actual quality of the research content, has become central to the evaluation of scientific work (Aguinis et al., 2020; Lutter & Schröder, 2016).

Second, internationalization has become increasingly important for (German) universities (Kehm, 2013). The identities of universities have shifted away from being national institutions toward becoming organizational actors focused on the greater world, with their own goals and missions, which expand beyond the historical university aims of research and teaching (Bromley & Meyer, 2021; Engwall, 2020; Krücken, 2020; Mizrahi-Shtelman & Drori, 2021). In this way, internationalization, in the context of cooperation with international researchers and students, has emerged as a new institutional mission (Krücken, 2020). Modern organizational actors, which is what (German) universities are becoming, must be oriented toward the world, and they must convey this orientation to the outside world (Drori et al., 2014; Mizrahi-Shtelman & Drori, 2021). The need to be international becomes apparent in the job advertisements for professorships at German universities as well, where international orientation, as well as foreign language skills and the ability to teach in English, are increasingly required of candidates.

Third, the increasing managerialization of universities has driven the use of more standardized criteria and the focus on "competitive" requirements. University presidents – as managers, not as rectors acting as "primus inter pares" – have been given more power and are expected to guide their universities to excellence. As Engwall et al. (2023, p. 7) describe, "such reputation stands largely on the research output produced by researchers at the individual level." The standardization of performance profiles thereby offers more control over hiring decisions,

enables comparison, and initiates competition between researchers. Vague job descriptions have thus been transformed into explicit, operationalizable requirements. The ability to compare performance measures aids university leadership in finding those candidates who may help to raise the university's ranking in the medium term (Engwall et al., 2023; Reymert, 2022). New professors with outstanding publication histories are seen as supporting the university's claim to excellence and increasing its competitiveness in national and international rankings (Harley et al., 2004). The level of third-party funding acquired serves as a criterion for measuring the quality of a candidate's research ideas. Moreover, candidates who are able to acquire third-party funding provide an additional benefit to the university in the form of the additional financial resources the new professor brings with them. The exploitability of research activities has thereby become more central to universities in their efforts to compete. Consequently, these factors increasingly made their way into job advertisements, observable as current key (research) performance indicators, such as top-tier journal publications or acquisition of third-party funding. Given this development, it is no wonder that currently, the acquisition of additional external funding and the future publication of papers in top-tier journals (usually within a defined time period) following appointment are regularly part of agreements with newly appointed professors in Germany. Achievement or non-achievement is thereby linked to the new professor's salary in the appointment negotiations. Universities are thus embracing the ideas, regularly used in businesses, of management by objectives (MBO) and performance-based compensation (Birnbaum, 2000; Decramer et al., 2013) to increase the performance of the university. The selection process for professors is thus less geared toward finding a candidate who fits in well with the faculty than it is toward strategically improving the university's position in the national and global competition between universities for resources and reputation.

Implications for Collegiality

We argue that the managerialization of universities affects the requirements placed on applicants for professorships and subsequently has a significant effect on collegiality as the modus operandi of universities (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2023, Vol. 86).

First, as requirement profiles become more specific and differentiated, the authority of faculties in the decision-making process of the appointment procedure may be diminished. Faculties continue, of course, to have a high degree of autonomy in formulating requirements for job advertisements for professorship – however, in doing so, whether intentionally or not, they are constrained by isomorphic processes and a socially constructed understanding of what comprises the desired skills and attributes for professors. Appointment decisions are of utmost importance for faculties and universities. Professors at public universities in Germany are civil servants and are generally tenured. Vague job descriptions and requirements, as found in the past, had an advantage in collegial decision-making: they offered latitude for interpretation and opportunities for evaluating an applicant holistically based on numerous aspects, future collegial cooperation

being one of them. However, collegial governance in the old appointment system brought with it disadvantages – for example, when collegial decisions did not lead to the selection of the best candidate but to the appointment of close colleagues or even friends – something that needs to be discussed as the dark side of collegiality (Eriksson-Zetterquist & Sahlin, 2023, Vol. 87). Nevertheless, defining more differentiated requirements does not necessarily lead to an optimal selection but rather to a selection based on previously defined criteria considered to be central and intended to make it possible to compare individual scholars. As Musselin (2005, p. 146) describes,

> [I]n Germany, departments threatened by the suppression of posts "decide" to modify their scientific and pedagogical aspirations and, consequently, the profile of the candidate they are looking for. The academic profession has more and more to cope with institutional constraints and their integration into "its" criteria, which is an insidious way of lessening academic independence.

Thus, faculty members have less freedom to choose candidates who best fit their academic community (Reymert, 2022; van den Brink et al., 2013). An examination of the actual selection criteria and decision-making processes was, of course, not a part of our study. However, if the job advertisements reflect the desires of the managerialized university (Mantai & Marrone, 2023), it stands to reason that these are the criteria that also play a role in the selection of candidates. Moreover, it can be assumed that applicants to professorships are naturally aware of this development and adapt their behavior to the requirements demanded by universities. This may be especially true for younger career scholars who do not yet have a tenured position within the academic system.

Second, by adhering to clearly defined requirements, collegiality, since it cannot easily be measured, may recede into the background (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2023, Vol. 86). This could undermine the central role of collegiality as the modus operandi of universities. The requirements listed in job advertisements for professorships have a signaling effect on the academic staff. What is first and foremost expected are publications in top-tier international journals and the acquisition of third-party funding rather than engagement in academic self-governance and a collegial, collaborative approach within the university setting. Studies have already shown that with the increasing use of performance measurement systems, publications in top-tier journals have become the non-plus ultra for evaluating research (Biagioli, 2018), which is apparent within recruiting as well (Aguinis et al., 2020). The focus on research metrics that came along with the increasing rationalization of science and universities may change the self-image of academics and lead to a goal displacement in favor of research output (Denis et al., 2023, Vol. 87; Harley et al., 2004; Y.-N. Lee & Walsh, 2022), thereby challenging the classical values of academic work, for example, academic autonomy (Gerdin & Englund, 2022; Harley et al., 2004; Kallio et al., 2016; Mignot-Gérard et al., 2022).

As Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist point out in the introduction to this volume, collegiality can be understood in two dimensions: horizontal and vertical. We assume that both dimensions are affected by the developments described.

With regard to the vertical dimension, which refers to formal university decision-making structures based on collegial governance (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2023, Vol. 86), we have discussed the implications for the professorship appointment process associated with shifts in authority related to increasing managerialization. There may further be a lack of incentive for academics to participate in self-governance, both because it provides fewer rewards than other aspects of the professorial role and also as a consequence of the diminishing power of academic voices within the university setting. There is already initial evidence of this in Canada (Denis et al., 2023, Vol. 87). This reluctance to participate could further weaken the formerly powerful role of the academic community within university governance and may lead to an increased number of formal management positions in the central university administration.

The developments described also have implications for the horizontal dimension of collegiality, which is characterized by relationships and interactions within the academic community based on shared norms (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2023, Vol. 86). Although horizontal collegiality is part of the scientific community in general, here, we focus on the specific aspects that occur within the university setting. In Germany, the common anchor point for academics has been and remains not so much the individual university (as an organization or employer) but rather the collegial environment of the scientific community beyond the boundaries of the university (Krücken, 2020). As the collegial approach within universities gives way to increasing rationalization in terms of competition and efficiency, members of the university community become more like loose actors, with little emotional attachment to their university (Östling, 2020) and, in a sense, may become only temporary participants, with a minimum level of necessary commitment. The resulting erosion of the intra-university community, that is, the loss of horizontal collegiality, may change the image of the university from a collegial and self-administrating academic community to an administrative framework for research and teaching, with professors as employees (Harley et al., 2004). Thus, even if the increasing competition makes the managerialization of universities appear rational (rational in the sense that there is a goal to be reached by specific means), this development clashes with the German understanding of the university as a self-governing community of scholars (Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Östling, 2020).

The new goal-oriented university organization, however, requires committed staff to keep pace with increasing international competition. To compensate for the attenuating influence of collegiality, universities need to attract and bind academic staff in other ways. Indeed, current attempts include compensating for the loss of collegiality by increasing the identification and commitment of academic staff with the university as a modern organization and employer. For example, German universities increasingly offer "dual-career" options for professors. Incoming professors are thereby provided support in settling in with their family at the university location, for example, arranging a job for a spouse or finding suitable schools for their children. Universities also advertise a collegial atmosphere, but hidden behind this description is not the classical understanding of academic collegiality but rather the amiable cooperation of "university employees" in a professional context.

Cooperation, however, does not imply commitment, and cooperation is not necessarily linked to collegiality (van Schalwyk & Cloete, 2023, Vol. 86). As Kosmützky and Krücken (2023, Vol. 86) describe in their analysis of research clusters in German academia, cooperation among researchers (within and across universities) has become increasingly desirable. Nevertheless, these new forms of competition and cooperation (Kosmützky & Krücken, 2023, Vol. 86) may shift the focus of academic staff even more toward the acquisition of third-party funds (which requires proven excellent, highly ranked research) and away from the lived experience of academic collegiality at the university and department level. Scholars thus point to the question of whether the rationalization of scientific work may affect the vocational attitude of academics (Y.-N. Lee & Walsh, 2022), a critical factor in scientific work.

CONCLUSION

Our intention is not to romanticize the old German university system as it certainly had (and has) deficits in terms of the appointment processes of professors as well as the evaluation of research achievements. However, in our study, we intend to point out the possible unintended consequences of the managerialization of universities, which may diminish collegial cooperation. What overarching conclusions can now be drawn from the findings presented and discussed in the previous sections? We believe that three aspects are particularly worth considering and may also open the door for future research.

First, although we believe our research setting reflects a general trend, our analysis is focused on one national context, three disciplines within the social sciences in Germany, and five points in time. Thus, future studies should further analyze more recent trends and compare them across disciplines and national settings to obtain a more comprehensive picture. In their recent article, Mantai and Marrone (2023) analyzed academic job advertisements from 2016 to 2020 for different disciplines and from different countries using a Big Data approach, which provides initial insight into more recent trends in job advertisements for academics at all career stages. In line with our observations, they find that for senior researchers, research activity, teaching, publication record, and international orientation are central requirements. However, another criterion directly linked to the pursuit of excellence stands out in their analysis: the candidate's ability to demonstrate achievements and awards (Mantai & Marrone, 2023). Nevertheless, as their study is focused on career progression, the authors do not engage in a deeper discussion of the implications of their results for academic work within universities, which, from the point of our study, would be valuable.

Second, it would be interesting to see whether the developments we are observing in the social sciences are also taking place, perhaps with a time lag, in the humanities. In this context, the trend toward competitive requirements in job advertisements, especially publications in top-tier journals, may risk bias for subjects and subject groups in which the journals are particularly well-positioned in relevant rankings. Conversely, candidates whose disciplines are not represented in

high-impact journals, or are covered in non-ranked journals, are systematically disadvantaged – their research performance cannot be evaluated in a standardized manner and requires subjective and collegial assessment by the appointment committee. One might ask, somewhat provocatively, whether in the future, regardless of discipline, publications in high-ranking journals will be weighted more heavily than expertise in the given field. Isolated indications of the possibility of such a development already exist. However, it is unclear whether this is a general trend. To gain a deeper understanding of these relationships, further research is required, including the specific process followed by universities for filling professorships.

Third, future research should investigate whether a countermovement to the developments described has emerged and whether some universities are ignoring the recent developments. These studies could focus on factors that encourage these behaviors. They could build on a large number of existing studies in the context of organization and higher education research that deal with the question of which factors (both at the organizational and the institutional level) make the adoption of certain structural elements more or less likely (e.g., Birnbaum, 2000; Decramer et al., 2012; Fay & Zavattaro, 2016; S. S. Lee & Ramirez, 2023, Vol. 86; Oertel, 2018; Oertel & Söll, 2017; Rahman et al., 2019; Sammalisto & Arvidsson, 2005; Schulz et al., 2022; Su et al., 2015). Key questions could include, for example, which universities were the first to include certain requirements in the job profiles of professors and whether certain characteristics of these universities – for example, high position in rankings, their size, the context of their institutional founding, or regional competition with other universities – explain the likelihood of adoption.

As a final thought, the differentiation of job profiles may also provide an opportunity to bring about a return to collegiality (Eriksson-Zetterquist & Sahlin, 2023, Vol. 87). As an analog to a few vague requirements, a multitude of nuanced criteria may allow for individual evaluation and prioritization. This may return autonomy to the academic community and offer the opportunity to preserve collegiality.

NOTES

1. In the German-speaking academic world, *Wirtschaftswissenschaften* (as an umbrella term for the field of economics) is typically divided into *Betriebswirtschaftslehre* (business administration, i.e., the management of businesses and organizations, including fields such as accounting, finance, and marketing) and *Volkswirtschaftslehre* (economics, i.e., the broader study of the economy as a whole, including, e.g., macroeconomics, microeconomics, and economic policy).

2. As our focus was on the portion of the job advertisement related to the professorial job profile, we did not analyze information regarding the announcing university, the handling of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) aspects, nor the application documents requested. With regard to DEI aspects, discrimination in the filling of vacancies is prohibited by German law. In some job advertisements, there is additional information on this with respect to two groups, namely women and/or disabled persons. Across all the years analyzed, some job advertisements contained the information that women were particularly encouraged to apply and/or that severely disabled persons will be given preferential consideration provided they have the same qualifications.

3. Going forward, we use the term "requirement" as an umbrella term for all types of job-related tasks and requirements in the job advertisements and as interchangeable with "criteria."

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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GLOBALIZATION OF UNIVERSITIES AS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS?

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to ascertain whether and to what degree universities are becoming organizational actors globally. Utilizing an original dataset of a sample of 500 globally oriented universities, we explore how universities have increasingly become organizational actors as is the case of American universities. We consider the following indicators of university transformation into organization actors: development or institutional advancement, diversity or inclusion, legalization, and internationalization goals and structures. We find that these globally oriented universities have created international, development, and legal offices. Surprisingly, nearly half of the universities in our sample also have diversity offices. These "getting organized" indicators are somewhat similar to what holds for American universities, suggesting that there is globalization of organizational actorhood among universities. At the same time, however, we find that there are pronounced regional differences, especially when it comes to organizing around diversity and legal affairs.

 Keywords: Universities; organizational actor; globalization; institutional advancement; diversity; legalization; internationalization

INTRODUCTION

Much of the literature on organizational developments in academia presupposes the ascendancy of universities as organizational actors (Krücken & Meier, 2006;

Ramirez, 2010; Ramirez & Christensen, 2013). Throughout much of their history, universities were associations of professors and students linked in a guild-like fashion with little by way of a distinctive and differentiated organizational backbone (Clark, 2006). With the advent of the age of nationalism, universities were increasingly linked to national cultures and imagined to be the primary vehicles through which these cultures were conserved and transmitted (Readings, 1996). Universities and academic systems were also increasingly compared, typically highlighting differences – from Flexner (1930) to Ben-David and Zlockzower (1962). However, these differences were mostly discussed in terms of institutional or systemic differences in orientations, for example, states versus markets (Clark, 1983), with less focus on whether and to what extent universities were becoming organizational actors.

Much of the earlier literature emphasized the primacy of historical legacies and their enduring influence on universities circumscribed by national boundaries. More recent studies, however, recognize transnational influences on universities. At times, they celebrate transnational influences as blueprints for upgrading universities (Clark, 1998). Other times, they critique these external pressures on universities and the demise of valued distinctiveness (Mazza et al., 2008). What is evident is that universities, in varying degrees, are subjected to transnational standards in addition to their historical legacies. In organizational parlance, university routes are influenced by both their organizational roots and the changing rules of the game in the organizational fields within which they are situated. For many universities, the templates of excellence to which they are attuned are generated by epistemic communities without borders, from European Commissions to the American-based Council for Advancement and Support of Education (Ramirez, 2020, 2021). Not surprisingly, many studies now examine national and global influences in higher education (Marginson, 2006; Marginson & Rhoades, 2002).

The more limited aim of this paper is to ascertain whether and to what degree universities are becoming organizational actors, that is, goal-oriented entities that are choosing their own actions and can thus be held responsible for what they do (Krücken & Meier, 2006). First, we explore the ways in which universities in the United States have increasingly become organizational actors based on previous studies that examine the rise and professionalization of diversity, development, and legal offices in relation to broader sociocultural changes such as the increasing inclusion of people (Furuta & Ramirez, 2019; Gavrila et al., 2022; Kwak et al., 2019; Skinner, 2019; Skinner & Ramirez, 2019). Next, we examine the same indicators of organizational actorhood with an also original, international sample of what we are calling more globally oriented universities. We discuss similarities and differences in organizational actorhood between the American and the global samples. More specifically, we assert that universities worldwide undergo elaboration and expansion of formal technical structures in the direction of greater isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). We further examine the expansion of organizational actorhood of universities as it relates to institutional management and leadership, for example, not only in the creation of offices but also in the appointment of senior administrative leadership positions. We then discuss the implications of organizational actorhood, which involve new categories of professionals

and academic management positions, on vertical and horizontal collegiality, that is, governance and conduct norms (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2023, Vol. 86; van Schalkwyk & Cloete, 2023, Vol. 86). Lastly, we sketch some research directions designed to better understand why some universities are more likely to present themselves earlier as organizational actors.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS

We start from the premise that global organizational expansion has become a significant dynamic in our world (Bromley & Meyer, 2015; Meyer & Bromley, 2013). What this means is that all sorts of problems are imagined as requiring solutions that involve a lot of "getting organized." What this further means is that all sorts of entities are imagined as having expanded capacities to organize successfully. The latter has been analyzed as the social construction of agency (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). What fuels global organizational expansion is a set of interrelated cultural beliefs that favor an activist and optimistic worldview in search of progress. These beliefs are at the heart of diverse self-improvement projects earnestly pursued by entities that vary from couples seeking to have better relationships to corporations engaged in how to become more socially responsible exercises to states organizing and re-organizing in pursuit of sustainable development goals. A more passive reliance on received wisdom in interpersonal, business, and political realms is undercut by the activist thrust of these cultural beliefs. A once reasonable "good enough" or "do not rock the boat" outlook looks quaint or even reactionary in light of the overwhelming optimism in the agentic capacities of a range of entities.

Taken together, these cultural beliefs have facilitated the rise of goal-oriented entities with strategies for attaining these goals and differentiated structures to facilitate their attainment, that is, organizational actors. Not surprisingly, mission statements have become ubiquitous presentations of the self on organizational web pages, often crafted with the aid of consultants (Powell et al., 2016). In earlier eras, it would have been unimaginable, even laughable, for universities to have mission statements. However, mission statements are now quite common (see Oertel & Soll, 2017, for the case of Germany; see Morphew & Hartley, 2006, for the USA; see also the chapters in Engwall, 2020). Mission statements, we contend, are but one manifestation of the transformation of universities into organizational actors, as Krücken and Meier (2006) and Kosmützky and Krücken (2015) convincingly demonstrate.

Universities vary in when and to what degree they moved toward becoming organizational actors, that is, an entity endowed with its sovereignty, purposes, and identity while simultaneously accountable to others in the environment (Bromley & Meyer, 2015; Krücken & Meier, 2006). Absent the steering authority and influence of a national ministry, a national professoriate, or a coalition of these forces, American higher education institutions struggled for recognition and legitimacy, resources, and survival (Labaree, 2017). This was a complex

struggle because there were multiple grounds for legitimacy as well as multiple revenue sources. Reputation management involved both embracing the category university but also finding a niche of one's own (Christensen et al., 2019). The land grant universities, for example, benefited from the legitimacy inherent in conforming to the category university but also operated within a niche that involved direct ties with agriculture and industry (Gelber, 2011). For example, the University of California at Berkeley was established to provide instruction in a broad range of domains, including industrial pursuits. In the American context, there was no sharp line between what really constituted a university and university-appropriate fields of study and other forms of education. More specialized colleges evolved to become universities, and some did not even need the label to be recognized as universities, for example, the Massachusetts and California Institutes of Technology. Of course, studies related to industrial pursuits could also be undertaken within some elite universities, in engineering and business, for instance. What has been called the "practical arts" have begun to dominate the American educational landscape (Brint et al., 2005). A similar evolution is taking place in Europe, as technical universities command greater attention, though drawing critical reactions (Geschwind et al., 2020; Karseth, 2006).

Universities have never been as unchaining as some of both their critics and apologists have claimed. However, the rate of change may be greater among entities imagined to be organizational actors. Organizational actors, we contend, are more likely to emerge in a cultural milieu that facilitates an activist and optimistic orientation. The peculiar character of American higher education has been much discussed, with much attention given to its earlier expansion driven by competitive dynamics facilitated by political and educational decentralization (Collins, 1979, 2000; Rubinson, 1986). However, what has been insufficiently emphasized is that the competitive dynamics presupposed universities as goal-oriented organizational actors bolstered by activist and optimistic cultural beliefs. Earlier, American universities indulged in setting goals and developing strategies to attain these goals (see Lowen, 1997, for the case of Stanford). Nowhere is this proclivity clearer than in the history of university-initiated fundraising in American higher education (Skinner, 2019). There is really no comparable historical development in other parts of the world, but as we shall later see, organizational expansion is indeed globalized.

Working with a national probability sample of American universities, Skinner and Ramirez (2019) find that virtually all of these have a development or institutional advancement office by 2020. The organizational commitment to seek resources from multiple sources is now a taken-for-granted feature of American higher education. They also find that almost 80% of these universities have an office that signals a commitment to diversity or inclusiveness (Gavrila et al., 2022). These offices are at the center of all kinds of pressing issues today. Perhaps not surprisingly, the legalization of the university is reflected in the fact that six out of 10 universities have their own distinctive legal offices. In addition to these organizational developments, more universities are engaged in crafting and recrafting mission statements (Morphew & Hartley, 2006) as well as in enhancing their international profiles (Buckner, 2019).

All these developments reflect the intensification and normalization of the status of organizational actorhood of American universities. These ongoing elaboration and expansion of organizational structure reflect the ways in which universities act strategically, respond to broader sociocultural changes, and position themselves with regard to their competitors. The establishment of development, diversity, and internationalization offices is an expansion of the organizational actorhood character of modern universities, as these offices perform a variety of tasks that were previously not regarded as part of the university's responsibility (Krücken & Meier, 2006). At issue, however, is whether any of these developments has global traction or all are distinctively American. We contend that universities worldwide come to look more like idealized American universities, as American universities dominated global rankings in the late twentieth century. Our aim is neither to suggest that the American university model is one that universities should be aspiring to nor that the organizational actorhood of American universities leads universities around the world to become "more American." Rather, we posit that the dominance of American universities in the global rankings results in the idealized American research university becoming a globally favored template of excellence (Ramirez, 2010; Ramirez & Tiplic, 2014). The pressures to learn and follow organizational policies and practices of more highly regarded American universities, then, leads universities worldwide to enact features of American universities theorized to lead to their success, resulting in universities being increasingly transformed into organizational actors in the direction of isomorphism.

In what follows, we briefly consider the following indicators of university transformation into organization actors: development or institutional advancement, diversity or inclusive, legalization, and internationalization goals and structures. We look at these four offices as indicators of organizational actorhood in order to build on previous studies that observe the rise and expansion of these offices in American universities as organizational actors (see, e.g., Gavrila et al., 2022; Skinner, 2019; Skinner & Ramirez, 2019) and consider the extent to which these indicators of organizational actorhood have globalized. These four indicators of university organizational actorhood are of interest to us because they have become almost taken-for-granted features of American universities. Furthermore, the issues of fundraising, diversity and inclusion, internationalization, and the subsequent need for legal counsel are increasingly discussed within an increasingly globalized higher education market (Wedlin, 2020). Hence, examination of a global sample of universities from comparative perspectives provides insights into the extent to which universities worldwide adopt and emulate features of the idealized American university in response to global pressures to become organizational actors.

DATA

To identify a globally representative sample of higher education institutions, we conduct a simple random sample of 500 universities from the population of universities that participate in the 2020 Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings. This sampling design implies that each observed university

in the THE World University Rankings has an equal probability of being drawn, meaning that the sample will perfectly represent the 2020 THE population. In other words, the sample of universities in this analysis is neither world-regionally representative nor nationally representative, as the representativeness of the THE population is at the individual university level, not at aggregate levels. Nonetheless, THE states that the response rate of universities as represented in its rankings is "statistically representative of the global academy's geographical and subject mix" (Times Higher Education, 2019, p. 9), suggesting that universities with missing data on the reputational survey measures are effectively random, introducing \no bias into these universities that remain in the population of globally ranked universities.

An alternative way to sample universities would have been to implement stratified sampling and ensure that all countries present in the THE population were also present in the sample. Initially, stratified sampling was a desirable design feature. However, given that the median number of universities per country is 6 in the population of THE universities, we found that there would not be enough universities per country to have a sufficiently powered research design that could observe differences between any two countries, on average. Thus, we proceeded with a simple random sampling of 500 universities, which represents a random sample of universities that participate in the global higher education landscape via rankings. We assume that the universities in our sample are globally oriented universities, that is, universities that view themselves as participating in a global arena. Our rationale for examining a sample of globally oriented universities, as opposed to national samples of universities, is this: globally oriented universities are more likely to be attuned to templates of excellence, observing, and imitating processes and trends of "role models," that is, highly ranked, world-class universities. In other words, if we do not observe evidence of organizational actorhood in this sample, then we likely will not observe such patterns in other universities.

The resulting distribution of universities in our sample by region is as follows (Table 1):

Once we drew our sample of 500 universities, we then collected data about the organizational structures of the universities directly from the universities'

Table 1. Number of Universities in the Sample, by Region.

	No. of Universities
USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand[a]	126
Western Europe (excluding the UK)	72
Central and Eastern Europe	37
Latin America & Caribbean	23
East and Southeast Asia	106
South, West, and Central Asia	27
Sub-Saharan Africa	8
Middle East and North Africa	26

[a]We group the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand given their similarities as liberal welfare, "Anglo" states compared to other Western European states that are more social democratic or conservative corporatist regimes.

websites, allowing for navigation to secondary or tertiary levels of the website hierarchy to obtain the necessary data. Data collected include whether the universities had development, diversity, legal, or international offices, the names of the office, and contextual information on these offices for all sampled universities.

We identified development offices as those charged with responsibilities generally encompassing or managing annual giving, corporate giving, foundation relations, planned giving, major gifts, and campaign fundraising, in addition to incorporating other advancement activities outside of fundraising, such as alumni relations, public relations, and government relations (Skinner & Ramirez, 2019; Thelin & Trollinger, 2014; Worth, 2002). We collected data for whether or not a university has established a diversity office by using terms such as "diversity," "multicultural," "equity," "equal opportunities," or "inclusion" to reach the correct web page based on relevant literature and previous studies (Kwak et al., 2019). Legal offices, that is, offices that formally provide generalized legal services for university-specific matters and sit internally within the university (Furuta & Ramirez, 2019), were identified using similar approaches for other offices. We identified international offices as those engaged in a broad array of activities such as internationalization, international collaboration, international student support, and oversight of global programs for students and faculty. Since the kinds of activities that fall under "international" are varied and different, with some being more associated with public relations and advancement and others more with student services, it was not uncommon for us to find multiple international offices within a single university. In this paper, we use a binary code for whether or not the university in our sample has an established office that engages in any international activity.

In considering how these offices were identified and coded, it is important to note that we focused on the function of the offices and not merely the names of the offices. In other words, we did not simply search for "development" or "diversity" offices but rather looked at organizational charts and structures of the universities to identify offices that are tasked with carrying out organizational goals around development, diversity, internationalization, and legal affairs. Illustrative examples of the names of different offices fulfilling functions carried out by development, diversity, legal, and internationalization offices can be found in the Appendix.

This suite of data was collected between 2020 and 2021 and required concerted efforts from the authors of the study, research assistants, and volunteer coders. When possible, we drew data from university websites in their primary language of instruction, coded by individuals who were proficient in the language. For university websites for which we do not have a proficient reader of the language, we relied on a combination of English websites and computerized translation services to code the data.

DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

In what follows, we attempt to ascertain *to what extent have development, diversity, international, and legal offices been institutionalized in universities worldwide*? Tables 2 and 3 depict the proportion of universities that have established

Table 2. The Proportion of Universities With Established Offices, by Region.

	Development Office	Diversity Office	International Office	Legal Office
USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	0.937	0.825	0.952	0.802
Western Europe (excluding UK)	0.417	0.625	0.944	0.639
Central and Eastern Europe	0.351	0.027	1.000	0.649
Latin America & Caribbean	0.304	0.435	0.957	0.696
East and Southeast Asia	0.764	0.255	0.858	0.340
South, West, and Central Asia	0.593	0.259	0.556	0.185
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.875	0.250	0.875	0.429
Middle East and North Africa	0.360	0.040	0.560	0.280
USA	1.000	0.952	0.952	0.905
Global Average (excluding USA)	0.606	0.381	0.872	0.503
Global Average	0.663	0.465	0.882	0.563

Table 3. The Proportion of Universities With Senior-level Administrative Staff in Respective Office Areas, by Region.

	Sr. Development Officer	Sr. Diversity Officer	Sr. Int'l Officer	Sr. Legal Officer
USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	0.740	0.516	0.532	0.484
Western Europe (excluding UK)	0.278	0.352	0.722	0.208
Central and Eastern Europe	0.405	0.000	0.595	0.432
Latin America & Caribbean	0.130	0.174	0.565	0.609
East and Southeast Asia	0.217	0.075	0.260	0.066
South, West, and Central Asia	0.519	0.148	0.296	0.148
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.125	0.000	0.250	0.250
Middle East and North Africa	0.375	0.000	0.080	0.000
USA	1.000	0.778	0.619	0.762
Global average (excluding USA)	0.319	0.161	0.432	0.201
Global average	0.419	0.251	0.457	0.281

development, diversity, international, and legal offices and administrative staff from these offices at the senior leadership level, respectively, across regions. In our analysis, we separate universities in the United States from those in other Western countries because we postulate from the literature that an American model of higher education is most expansive in terms of organizational form and is one that diffuses to universities organization in other countries. Within the West, we further distinguish between universities from an "Anglo" background from other Western universities to see whether organizational developments in these "Anglo" universities are more similar to those that characterize American universities. Overall, we find that development, diversity, international, and legal offices are present in an overwhelming majority (>90%) of the American universities in our sample.[1] This suggests that the presence of these offices is taken-for-granted in globally oriented American universities. Furthermore, across the world, we find that the most prevalent office is the international office, followed by development, legal, and diversity offices. The same trends are observed for senior administrators.

When we observe these trends by region, we find that international offices are most prevalent in the Americas and Europe, with over 90% of universities in the West, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe having established international offices. Over 80% of universities from East Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa in our sample have established international offices, and over 50% of universities in South, West, and Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa have established international offices.

The high proportion of universities in our sample with international offices is unsurprising, especially given how universities throughout the world increasingly strive to be "world-class" and "internationally competitive" (Buckner, 2019). Moreover, international offices usually encompass various functions, from overseeing internationalization efforts and international scholarly and institutional collaborations to facilitating international student services and study exchange programs. In fact, we find that there is variation in the extensiveness of university international offices, as one university's international office may only focus on international academic collaborations with other institutions, whereas another's international office may be primarily dedicated to supporting international students. The wide variety of international and internationalization efforts pursued by universities worldwide likely contribute to the high prevalence of international offices globally (see the chapters in Oh et al., 2016).

Unlike that of international offices, we find greater variation in presence of diversity, development, and legal offices across regions. Consistent with previous studies that examined the prevalence of these offices in American universities (De Wit, 2002), we find that the highest percentage of development, diversity, and legal offices are found in "Anglo" universities. In fact, we observe that the proportion of these offices is significantly higher in the "Anglo" universities compared to all other regions.

American universities have been more entrepreneurial, and for a much longer span of time (Etzkowitz & Zhou, 2008; Skinner, 2019), so it is unsurprising that high proportions of development offices are found in "Anglo" universities that include American universities. The relatively high presence of development offices in East Asian (76.4%) and sub-Saharan African (87.5%) universities that participate in THE rankings can be explained by how these universities often follow and are influenced by the American higher education model, which has been viewed as a "model of excellence" (Clark, 1998). Lower proportions of development offices in Continental, Western Europe (41.7%), Central, Eastern Europe (35.1%), Middle East (36.0%), and Latin America & the Caribbean (30.4%) may be explained by how the majority of universities in our sample are public institutions that are mostly, if not solely, funded by the state. The public status of American universities has not impeded them from creating development offices because the distinction between the public and private sectors is weaker in the United States, with many American public higher education institutions engaging in entrepreneurial fundraising activities (Skinner & Ramirez, 2019).

When it comes to diversity offices, we find that it is only in the West that a majority of universities have established a diversity office, with 82.5% of "Anglo" universities and 62.5% of Western European universities (excluding UK universities)

having diversity offices. The significant difference between Continental, Western European universities and Anglo universities (i.e., those in the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) suggests that the presence of a diversity office is more likely in countries that have experienced social movements that have generated efforts to be more inclusive of minorities, and indigenous, and historically marginalized populations. The high prevalence of diversity offices in American universities (95.2%) compared to that rest of the world is unsurprising, as universities in the United States have responded to the civil rights movements of the 1960s to establish dedicated diversity-related offices on their campuses (Gavrila et al., 2022). The relatively high prevalence of diversity offices in Canadian, Australian, and New Zealander universities is also unsurprising given the history of the Aboriginal civil rights movement and subsequent efforts to respect and be more inclusive of aboriginal/first nations populations. Global norms around diversity, equity, and inclusion have influenced universities, especially those in the West, to establish such offices on university campuses. However, the influence of global norms on the organizational actorhood of universities is indeed uneven (Pineda, 2023, Vol. 86; Pineda & Mishra, 2022).

This is in contrast to other regions of the world that may be either more ethno-racially homogeneous (e.g., East Asia) or where social movements centered on equity, diversity, and inclusion have not had much societal influence (e.g., MENA region) to pressure organizations to respond. In fact, we find that the establishment of diversity offices is even less prevalent in non-Western parts of the world, with 43.5% of universities from Latin America and the Caribbean having diversity offices, and less than 30% of universities in East Asia, South, West, and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa having diversity offices. Furthermore, we find that less than 1% of universities in the Middle East and North Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe regions have established diversity offices.

Globally, we find that about half of the universities in our sample have established legal offices. As is the case for development and diversity offices, we find that the greatest presence of legal offices is in the "Anglo" universities (80.2%), where extensive linkages between society and universities and the rise of empowered individuals in universities who are conscious of their rights as individuals (Furuta & Ramirez, 2019). We, in fact, find that the highest proportion of legal offices within the "Anglo" states are in the United States (90.5%), possibly suggesting that universities in other Anglo states are following the American model and transforming into organizational actors compared to universities in other parts of the world. We also find low proportions of universities with established legal offices in regions where universities may not be as deeply embedded in society or as influenced by global and national norms around individual rights (42.9% in sub-Saharan Africa, 28% in the Middle East, and 18.5% in South, West, and Central Asia). This suggests that country/societal contexts may influence the extent to which universities transform into organizational actors, reflecting the impact of historical legacies or the greater capacities of university professors to reaffirm alternative communal university models (see Jandrić et al., 2023, Vol. 87).

The presence of a senior administrator in university leadership whose roles and responsibilities are dedicated to development, diversity, international, or

legal matters provides further insights into the extent to which universities place importance on these issues. Having dedicated senior administrators in these areas, as opposed to simply establishing an office or department, displays greater commitment and prioritization to matters of internationalization, development, diversity, and legal affairs. Next, we examine the extent to which universities that see themselves as participating in a global arena have appointed senior administrators in these four areas.

Consistent with the above findings, we observe that the highest presence of senior administrators for development, diversity, and legal affairs is in "Anglo" universities, with the highest proportion being in American universities. The contrast between Anglo universities and other universities, especially when it comes to development and diversity officers is stark. We find that whereas 74% of "Anglo" universities in our sample have a senior development officer, senior development officers are clearly less in place in other parts of the world. The difference is even more evident when comparing the prevalence of senior development and diversity officers in US universities with global averages that exclude the United States. This is consistent with our previous findings. If it is the case that many of the universities outside the United States are public institutions, then it may be that public universities do not see as much of a need to appoint senior development officers compared to private universities that face greater pressures to fundraise. Indeed, another related study finds that there is great commonality across public and private universities when it comes to engaging in any form of fundraising but that there is much variety with respect to having a centrally coordinated, administrative role dedicated to fundraising activities, such as the senior development officer (Skinner et al., 2023).

Likewise, we find that there is a significant gap between the proportion of senior diversity officers in American universities compared to that in non-American universities. Whereas 77.8% of American universities in our sample have senior diversity officers, there is a low presence of senior diversity officers outside the United States. What is perhaps surprising is the relatively low presence of senior diversity officers in the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (51.6%), considering the high presence of diversity offices in these universities. Nonetheless, we find that the prevalence of senior diversity officers in the Anglo states is almost double that in Western Europe, further affirming how universities in these countries are more similar to those in the United States compared to the rest of the world. We also do not find presence of senior diversity officers in universities in Central and Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. Given that the diversity office is a relatively new organizational feature of the university, and its founding was tied to social movements, historical developments, and social structures in the United States, it is unsurprising to find the low presence of senior university leadership for these offices in other parts of the world.

Consistent with earlier findings where we found that international offices had the highest prevalence globally, we find that the senior administrator for international affairs is the most commonly found senior officer of the four offices, suggesting that international affairs have become a more institutionalized organizational feature of the university globally than other offices. Unlike patterns for

other senior officer positions, however, we find the highest presence of senior internationalization officers in Continental, Western Europe (72.2%), suggesting that universities in these countries may most actively engage in internationalization. Given that our sample is comprised of globally oriented universities that participate in the THE rankings, it may be that our findings are biased, as one may expect universities that have a more global orientation to have not only devoted offices but also senior administrators to oversee international affairs.

With regard to senior legal officers, we find a high presence of senior legal officers in American universities (76.2%) like that for other senior administrator offices and in Latin America and the Caribbean (60.9%). We do not observe a high presence of senior legal officers in universities in other parts of the world. Surprisingly, we find that only 20.8% of universities in Continental, Western Europe have a senior legal officer. The low presence of senior legal officers in Europe may be due to universities outsourcing legal matters or due to senior legal officers being seen as a direct threat to the autonomous self-regulating university template much revered in Western Europe.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the twenty-first century, universities increasingly look like organizational actors. They have goals and plans to attain these goals. They advertise who they are through mission statements, and they increasingly establish differentiated and specialized structures in the pursuit of goals. These developments emerged earlier in the United States, and much of the literature emphasizes the hypercompetitive decentralized environment within which American universities operated. This paper adds to this literature by pointing to the cultural milieu that informed the competitive dynamics, that is, the cultural beliefs that favored an active and optimistic orientation. The earlier and more extensive expansion of higher education in the United States was not just due to a lack of central checks on agreed-upon standards on what is a university but also driven by the presence of cultural beliefs that fostered bottom-up "getting organized." These cultural beliefs have intensified and normalized American universities as organizational actors.

The core question this paper asks is whether there is evidence that universities globally are becoming organizational actors. We address this question by looking at a random sample of universities that participate in the THE world rankings. We assume that their participation indicates that these universities are more attuned to global templates of excellence and international influences than the vast numbers of universities that have not been involved in these rankings. If what were once more distinctively American cultural beliefs have increasingly globalized, these universities are more likely to be favorable receptor sites.

Our findings support globalization but also the persistence of the differences hypotheses. By 2020, most universities have created international, development, and legal offices. Surprisingly, nearly half of the universities in our sample also have diversity offices. These "getting organized" indicators are somewhat similar to what holds for American universities. However, there are pronounced regional differences in our study. To cite but one example, an organizational focus on

diversity is evident in the North American region but not in other regions. In our study, globalization is most pronounced as regards international and development offices. This suggests low levels of insularity and high levels of concern regarding resources characterize these universities. The international office may simply be the formalization of the often-cosmopolitan outlook of universities and not at all an American-inspired innovation. The development office, though, appears to be much more an imported innovation with American roots.

Protestations about too much administration notwithstanding, American universities typically focus on horizontal collegiality issues. A hypercompetitive environment raises concerns about faculty recruitment and retention. The notion, "we are a congenial group" is an attractive card to play, and what it means is that we get along and maybe even support one another. What it does not mean is that we are a self-governing faculty. All hiring, tenure, and promotion decisions are ultimately subject to review by a more central body in what is clearly a hierarchy. To be sure, many universities give professors de facto authority on academic decisions while leaving fiduciary and related matters in the hands of differentiated administrators (Ramirez, 2021). Vertical collegiality issues appear to be of greater concern in universities with guild-like roots, though the growth of the administrative strata and a corresponding managerial logic may reach a tipping point that generates vertical collegiality concerns in American universities as well (Gerber, 2014).

Nonetheless, it is presumable that the expansion of organizational actorhood in universities would influence both horizontal and vertical collegiality. For example, the rise of diversity offices and greater pressures to recruit more diverse faculty could lead such offices and senior diversity officers to influence faculty recruitment and hiring decisions. Diversity, equity, and inclusion training by the diversity office to encourage more diverse faculty hires, for example, could influence both horizontal and vertical organizational governance collegiality and even contribute to tensions between or focus on particular forms of collegiality. State-engineered resistance to these offices and to the curriculum may undercut both faculty governance norms as well as shared norms of faculty conduct, and more broadly, academic freedom (Lerch et al., 2023; Schofer et al., 2022). Likewise, increased internationalization and the rise of the international office that promotes international collaborations could encourage horizontal collegiality that transcends borders. More broadly, the theoretical question is whether becoming an organizational actor leads universities to concentrate on horizontal rather than vertical collegiality, that is, on conduct rather than governance norms. This paper suggests one way of measuring university organizational actorhood via identifying differentiated offices and leadership positions. Further research is needed to gauge levels of vertical and horizontal collegiality.

We conclude with two caveats. First, this study and some of the studies referred to are cross-sectional in their design. They cannot tell us through what processes these universities ended up with the offices they now display. One way of tackling this issue is to identify the start dates (origins) of these offices and employ event history models to identify which variables influence the adoption rates of each office. This study can be undertaken with universities as units of analysis within a nation. This is precisely what has been undertaken with the adoption of diversity

offices for American universities as the dependent variable of interest (Gavrila et al., 2022). Parallel studies in other countries would reveal whether similar or different influences are at work. We find that elite universities are early adopters of diversity offices in the United States. But would this be true in other countries?

A second caveat is that this study only shows that universities have or do not have these offices but not what these offices actually do. We know there is much variation in what international offices entail (Buckner & Stein, 2020). This is also likely the case with respect to diversity offices, with some driven by gender (see Oertel, 2018, for the case of Germany) and others by race-based equity issues (as was the case in the United States). More fine-grained longitudinal studies of these organizational developments are much needed, as in the ethnographic study of decision-making in an admissions office in an American college (Stevens, 2009).

Though different in their use of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, studies focused on changes over time are much needed. These studies will enable us to draw more nuanced inferences on the impact of globalization on higher education worldwide. Despite its limitations, this study suggests which university organizational developments are more similar and which continue to display distinctiveness across various regions of the world. The globalization of universities as organizational actors is more evident in some domains and some regions.

NOTE

1. The percentage of development, diversity, international, and legal offices for American universities in our sample is higher than that found by Gavrila et al. (2022) in their sample of American universities. This can be explained by the different sampling of American universities. Whereas Gavrila et al. draw from a national probability sample, we in this paper focus on a global sample of universities that participate in the Times Higher Education rankings. Therefore, it can be presumed that the American universities in our sample are, on average, more globally oriented and elite compared to those that appear in the national probabilistic sample of American universities examined by Gavrila et al. (2022).

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APPENDIX

An illustrative list of development office names

Office of Development
Office of Development and Alumni Relations
Office of University Advancement
Office of Institutional Advancement
Office of Fundraising and Community Relations
Alumni and Donor Relations
Department of Development and Planning
Division for External Relations and Development
University Foundation

An illustrative list of diversity office names

Office of Equity, Diversity, and Disability
Office of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
Office of Equity, Inclusion, and Compliance
Department of Equity and Inclusive Communities
Equal Opportunities Department
Gender Equity Unit
Office of Multicultural Programs

An illustrative list of international office names

International Affairs Office
International Office
International Strategy and Partnerships
International Programs
International Relations Office
Office of Global Affairs
Office of International Cooperation
International Student Services
Office of International Affairs and Collaborations
Global Initiatives
Internationalization

An illustrative list of legal office names

Legal Office
Office of Legal Affairs
Office of Legal Services
Office of the General Counsel
Office of Legal Advice
Office of the Attorney General
University Counsel

A SLOW FORM OF GOVERNANCE? COLLEGIAL ORGANIZATION AND TEMPORAL SYNCHRONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SWEDISH UNIVERSITY REFORMS

Hampus Östh Gustafsson

ABSTRACT

In the present discourse of university politics, collegiality has come to be viewed as a slow force – seemingly inefficient and conservative compared to popular management models. Concerns have thus been raised regarding the future prospects of such a form of governance in a society marked by haste and acceleration. One way to bring perspectives on this contentious issue is to perceive it in the light of the long history of the university. In this article, I derive insights about the shifting state of collegial governance through a survey of an intense period of reforms in Sweden c. 1850–1920 when higher education was allegedly engaged in a process of modernization and professionalization. Drawing on recent work in historical theory and science and technology studies (STS), I revisit contests and debates on collegiality in connection to a number of governmental commissions. Focusing on the co-existence – and collisions – of multiple temporalities reveals that overcoming potential problems associated with heterogeneous rhythms required an active work of synchronization by

universities in order to make them appear timely, as higher education expanded along with the mounting ambitions of national politics, focused on centralization, efficiency, and rationalization. The analysis is structured around three focal issues for which collegial ideals and practices, including their temporal characteristics, were particularly questioned: (a) the composition of the university board, (b) the employment status of professors, and (c) hiring or promotion practices. Pointing at more structural challenges, this study highlights how collegiality requires a constant maintenance paired with an awareness of its longer and complex history.

INTRODUCTION

A popular Swedish encyclopedia once stated that the "collegial system is considered to have the advantage of a more thorough consideration of cases, but also the disadvantage of their slower processing" (*Nordisk familjebok*, 1911, p. 543).[1] Similar notions echo in today's discourse about university reforms. Instrumental pressures to increase efficiency have long haunted the modern research universities, depicting them as "tired" institutions. Time thus has come to be treated as something burdensome rather than as a valuable resource, thereby transforming it into a central problem of university politics (Rider, 2016; Wedlin & Pallas, 2017b, p. 299). In line with such an approach, collegiality is commonly blamed for being cumbersome and slow. This has motivated organization theorists and others to probe whether this form of governance can survive in a society increasingly marked by haste and acceleration, a shift that has not left academia untouched (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a, pp. 87, 103, 127; see also Bauman, 2012; Rosa, 2013).

In many cases, "slow collegiality" is contrasted with other forms of governance, such as more "modern" management models, particularly with the emergence of New Public Management in the late twentieth century. Marketization and the rise of the audit culture are seen as going hand-in-hand with a general temporal acceleration (e.g., Bjuremark, 2002, p. 22; Burneva, 2022, p. 25; Shore & Wright, 2004, 2015). Moreover, democratic practices also tend to speed up the rhythms of academic life as the university sector is forced to adapt to brief parliamentarian cycles (Ahlbäck Öberg et al., 2016, pp. 9–10). In current discourse about university reform, collegiality, on the other hand, is typically described as resistant to change, embodying a nostalgic longing for idealized pasts (Barnes, 2020, p. 151; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a, pp. 26–27, 34; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, pp. 30–31). But does this depiction really hold sway if the longer history of universities is considered?

While previous research has noted how collegial ideals were strained by new institutional reforms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

(Frängsmyr, 2017), few empirical studies have systematically explored the temporal critique of collegial organizations as a recurring theme in the history of universities. As noted in recent literature, it is imperative to historicize collegiality (Barnes, 2020). In line with this view, I demonstrate how a better knowledge of past negotiations of collegial ideals and practices may contribute to a revised understanding of the prospects of a collegial system today. To that end, I ask: Which conditions – including temporal ones – are required for this form of governance to function well and secure organizational legitimacy in the modern politics of knowledge (*cf*. Suchman, 1995)?

A CONTESTED CONCEPT AND THE NEED FOR SYNCHRONIZATION IN AN ERA OF MAJOR REFORM

It took until the late twentieth century for the multilayered and contested term "collegiality" [*kollegialitet*] to be ideologically condensed and become part of the Swedish vernacular, particularly taking off in the context of new reforms in the 1990s, as pointed out by Henrik Björck (2013, p. 10) in an important study of its conceptual history (see also Boberg, 2022, p. 29; Rider et al., 2014, p. 13; Sundberg, 2013; Wedlin & Pallas, 2017a, pp. 10–11). A century earlier, the term typically was employed more pluralistically. University boards and faculties, as well as other institutions, were referred to as colleges, as the general Swedish public administration had been based on a system of collegially governed bodies ever since the seventeenth century. So, rather than treating collegiality as an ideal type (shaped by the current use of the term), I adopt a more flexible approach in this article to avoid anachronisms. Charting how collegial notions were interpreted and mobilized in various ways, it is imperative to take the broader semantic landscape into account. Different versions or closely-related concepts, such as "collegial system," "colleges," "colleagues," "collegialism," etc., were regularly employed by professors and other scholars, indicating how they clearly perceived the university as a solid, yet multifaceted collegial organization.

While historically often regarded as an over-arching form of governance, collegiality today tends to materialize as "pockets" or "islands" within university organizations. Swedish state universities are generally based on a dualism, as management and collegial forms of governance blend or co-exist in shifting proportions (Sahlin, 2012, p. 199; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a, p. 11; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2017; see also Lazega, 2020, p. 47). Most commentators, however, characterize collegiality as a waning phenomenon. In Sweden, recent debates have turned particularly intense as an abrupt process of de-collegialization has unfolded at a majority of institutions of higher education (Ahlbäck Öberg & Boberg, 2022, 2023). The most immediate driver of this process is the so-called "autonomy reform" of 2011, which deregulated collegial governance through faculty boards, and thus, in practice, promoted local centralization and line management. This development toward institutional autonomy,

which paradoxically endangers academic freedom on various levels, has also been observed in other Nordic countries (Nokkala & Bladh, 2014).

While the recent controversies have incited careful examinations of collegial conditions at Swedish universities, most studies have been relatively short-sighted, focusing primarily on the period after a major university reform in 1977. At that point, Sweden passed its first formal university law, which imposed a more centralized and standardized organization and strengthened ties between universities and societal recipients, for instance by incorporating additional public representatives into their local governance structures. The reform was seen as an epochal shift, marking a radical departure from traditional academic discourse. In line with that narrative, the previous organization of universities has been described as relatively static (e.g., Bjuremark, 2002, p. 33; Svensson, 1980, p. 39; Unemar Öst, 2009, p. 118). There are good reasons to nuance this picture, which falls into an archetypal dichotomic pattern, reminiscent of Mode 1 versus Mode 2, or Humboldt versus the mass university (Josephson et al., 2014, pp. 13–14). Even though the explicit use of the term collegiality is limited to recent decades, similar – and significant – debates on the university as a collegial organization do have a long history.

By examining a period of major reforms in Sweden that saw higher education undergoing a process of purported "modernization" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I show that the collegial organization was considered an obstacle to change on several occasions. It received criticism as several segments of Swedish public administration successively abandoned the seventeenth century collegial system, especially in the 1870s, by placing governmental agencies under the authority of single directors. University reforms in the late nineteenth century were generally fueled by liberal political currents that sought to impose this new and more managerial pattern of the national public administration on universities (Agevall & Olofsson, 2019, p. 79; Boberg, 2022, p. 22; Gribbe, 2022, pp. 10–11). In his doctoral dissertation, historian Göran Blomqvist (1992) outlines these organizational changes at the universities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the shifting state of academic freedom. Identifying a fundamental tension between ideals of autonomy and heteronomy, Blomqvist demonstrates how the conditions of universities became subject to change in a constant interplay with societal transformations. Looking at one aspect of these processes of change throughout the period in question, I contribute to this previous research on the organizational history of Swedish universities by addressing how the collegial governance at universities was reformed and debated with respect to temporal implications.

Issues of academic temporalities are still noticeably underexplored, despite a surge of anthropological, philosophical, and sociological inquiries into topics such as "academic timescapes" and "cultures of speed" in recent years (e.g., Kidd, 2021; Vostal, 2021), which are frequently linked to the "slow science" movement (e.g., Berg & Seeber, 2016; Salo & Heikkinen, 2018, p. 87; Stengers, 2018). Here, I approach the temporal features of collegiality through a special focus on the work of *temporal synchronization* conducted by a broad range of agents during

the period in question. Assuming the co-existence of multiple temporalities at given points in time, in line with the works of Reinhart Koselleck (2018), historian Helge Jordheim (2014, 2022) stressed that societies are marked by rhythms that constantly need to be synchronized with each other. There is no given "insynchness" in history; social cohesion must be generated and maintained through active efforts. This insight obviously is salient at the organizational level and informs my analysis of contests of collegial ideals and practices, which, along with their diverse temporalities, were jeopardized by attempts to impose new temporal standards and make universities more homogenous and efficient.

As a dynamic arena, the university hosted a range of often colliding and seemingly incompatible times as academics had to take on a number of diverse roles and responsibilities (Ylijoki & Mäntylä, 2003; see also Clark, 2006). Synchronizing these times was critical to establishing the public legitimacy of the collegial organization. Universities, however, often exhibited a reactive pattern as they were forced to "keep up" with reforms implemented in other public sectors. With the general institutional expansion of the national university system (which in hindsight was rather small relative to the postwar period), the conditions of scholarship had been significantly transformed by the early twentieth century.[2] The steadily growing university system was reorganized in order to fit into a rapidly changing society. This adaptive process included the meticulous work of synchronization, perhaps particularly visible in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century, as this period was characterized by numerous attempts worldwide to synchronize various times and establish coherent temporal standards (Ogle, 2015).

In empirical terms, this article illuminates discussions on the state of the collegial organization and its temporal entanglements in the context of a particularly intense period of university reforms (c. 1850–1920). Previously, the two Swedish state universities, that is, Uppsala (founded in 1477) and Lund (1666), had been regulated by statutes from the seventeenth century. Novel university statutes introduced in 1852, 1876, 1908, and 1916 were developed by governmental commissions and thus carried authoritative weight as they sought to balance dominant views, even though they did not fully represent public opinion. On the contrary, the commission reports provoked plenty of debates, and the proposals were not necessarily executed (Agevall & Olofsson, 2019, p. 91). This study, however, is not primarily concerned with the political processes as such, but rather with more fundamental discussions and how they evolved over time. The respective commission reports, together with some specific instances of fervent public debate, thus constitute the main sources for this analysis. Even if all commissions largely supported collegial ideals on a general level, they opened up discussions on which shape collegial governance should take in practice, and how it could be incorporated into wider narratives of modernization.

In the empirical sections that follow, I explore debates about three focal issues that constituted significant challenges to the collegial organization and its temporal qualities: (a) the composition of the consistory (or university board); (b) the employment status of professors; and (c) hiring or promotion practices.

Afterwards, I offer some concluding remarks on the implications of temporal conflicts and synchronization for academic governance and university politics more generally. Already in the first empirical section, I show how debates about collegial governance exposed tensions between narratives of "modern society" and "traditional" ideas of the university.

CONSISTORY COMPOSITION (AND THE CONSTRAINED IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY)

The two state universities, Lund and Uppsala, clearly adhered to German academic traditions and drew much of their legitimacy from the education of civil servants who were absorbed by the Swedish apparatus of public administration. Notably, the universities were still small scale. Located in minor cities, they significantly influenced their immediate surroundings (Svensson, 1980, pp. 19–21). Yet, one of the main tasks of university commissions in the late nineteenth century was to integrate them more thoroughly into an increasingly centralized national organization.[3] Until that point, universities and the state had commonly been regarded as separate spheres with some mediating links, such as the Chancellorship, meaning that a chancellor represented the university against the government in Stockholm.[4] As the government invested more in higher education, the formal political dependence of universities increased. Opinions of government and parliament could not simply be ignored (Blomqvist, 1992, p. 106).

The university commission of 1846, formally chaired by crown prince Carl (chancellor of both universities), was a milestone in this regard, even if the activities of universities already had been debated and criticized in previous decades. The commission included one professor each from Lund and Uppsala, and two secretaries. Its main task was to synchronize activities at the universities according to a more uniform framework, aiming to replace their seventeenth century constitutions (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, p. 4). The new statutes, which were completed in 1852 by the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, have been described as a Swedish *Magna Charta*, as they codified long-standing practices of collegial governance. At the same time, however, they marked the start of an era of transformation in which a number of these collegial foundations would be called into question (Fehrman et al., 2004, p. 115; Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 10, 73, 2017, pp. 36–37; Tersmeden, 2016, p. 84).

A main issue discussed by the 1846 commission was the so-called academic jurisdiction, traditionally motivated according to a principle of "peers judging peers" (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, p. 10). Since the seventeenth century, Swedish universities had been incorporated into the general public administration, but they were still allowed to function as autonomous corporations maintaining their own civil–criminal jurisdictions (Hedmo, 2017, p. 40). As noted by the commission, there were strong protests in Uppsala when this system became subject to debate. It was perceived as a collegial cornerstone, but according to the commission members, universities could no longer function as "a republic within the state" with exclusive privileges. They argued that it would be more efficient if

the academic staff spent their time fully on scholarly matters, and thus recommended the abolishment of the jurisdiction, as it was perceived as an antiquated phenomenon in a modern state (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, pp. 10, 31–32). Partly implemented with the 1852 statutes, this abolishment was eventually completed in 1908, in the wake of another (1899) commission (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 81–82).

The investigation of the academic jurisdiction warrants some closer scrutiny. By means of historicization, the 1846 commission sought to demonstrate that any composition of teachers as colleagues at a university was not universally given. Its report included a flashback to the founding of Uppsala University in 1477, stating that it had been constructed as a blended model based on the universities of Paris, where the teachers were in charge and the institution functioned as a unified entity, as well as Bologna (and Padua), where the students elected the governing body of the university and individual faculties functioned more independently. The commission thus argued that medieval academic jurisdictions had varied considerably in character, concluding that an autonomous jurisdiction should not be seen as inseparable from any general "idea of the university" (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, pp. 12, 17–31). This distancing from – and relativization of – a universal idea of the university (Karlsohn, 2016) is interesting as an argumentative strategy, as it portrayed the state of the collegial organization as historically shifting and dependent on diverse local models. In a similar fashion, organizational entities, such as faculties, were described as contingent products, rather than as abstract derivations from science as such. It was thus not obvious exactly which specific collegial constellation that was needed by a university for being functional (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, pp. 47–55). This deconstruction of traditional defenses of university autonomy created space for maneuvering and political intervention.

A large part of the upcoming reforms focused on the governance structure of universities, as their traditional "guild structure" was criticized as anomalous in a modern, professionalized society. In particular, a transition from broad "republican" assemblies to limited representative bodies seemed urgent as universities grew. As noted by Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016b, p. 3), the local board or "consistory" [*konsistorium*] structure was "reshaped through a number of reforms," ultimately taking the form of "corporate-like boards with an external chair and a large share of external members" in the twentieth century. The renegotiation of the consistory's function and composition begun already in the nineteenth century, however, as this type of body was frequently criticized for being lethargic and conservative, and this criticism surfaced in other countries as well (Gerbod, 2004, p. 120). But according to a principle of complete representation of full professors as indisputable members of the local board – in contrast to so-called "extraordinary" professors, docents, administrative staff, and students – Sweden stood out in international comparison.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Swedish consistory composition was heavily debated, not least as non-permanent academic teachers began to organize collectively in order to improve their working conditions and gain the right to participate in the university governance (Blomqvist, 1992, pp. 246–247,

1993, p. 216). A new commission, established in 1874 and chaired by archbishop and Uppsala pro-chancellor, Anton Niklas Sundberg, sought to further pursue the ambition of the 1846 commission to minimize differences between the two state universities. In line with a general trend toward scholarly specialization, the new commission expressed doubts about the common assumption that individual professors had sufficient knowledge regarding the development of basically all disciplines, at least within their own faculty. As their peer authority was questioned, a need for a more realistic division of work emerged, creating incentives for the construction of smaller, specialized assemblies (*Förslag till statuter*, 1875, pp. 13–14, 21). This, however, provoked intricate questions as to which issues should be delegated or continue to be treated as common collegial concerns. As summarized by sociologist of education, Lennart G. Svensson (1980, p. 49): "The idea of a unity of sciences [was] shattered into pieces due to purely organizational reasons."

As a first step toward a new division of work, the 1846 commission had proposed a practically oriented *Collegium Oeconomicum* as a supplement to the *Consistorium Academicum*. The 1874 commission continued along this line, and also suggested a division of the academic consistory in two parts, *major* and *minor* – an order maintained until the 1960s (*Underdåniga förslag*, 1852, p. 42; *Förslag till statuter*, 1875, p. 5; see also Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 75–76; Gribbe, 2022, p. 14). This successive split, codified by the 1852 and 1876 statutes, marked a departure from the German, or Romantic, idea of the university as a genuinely organic system, characterized by a continuous interaction of its dynamic parts as one large although diverse unit (e.g., Readings, 1996). In terms of organization, the university was now increasingly embodied by separate representative or specialized units that did not require the physical presence of all professors upon every collective decision.

The major consistory was supposed to include all full professors and still carry the main responsibilities, but it would be free from dealing with most ongoing affairs. The minor consistory would consist of a limited group of elected representatives who would serve three-year terms. It was only with explicit hesitation, however, that the 1874 commission formulated this proposal. If the consistory was no longer entirely composed of equal peers, it was feared that the very "idea" of the university would be in danger, reminding us that this idea was the object of repeated negotiations. The most salient reason why the commission continued to champion this reorganization ("irrefutably needed") was that the meetings had begun to steal too much time from "higher" scholarly duties. In Uppsala, the single board system required the attendance of all full professors at more than 30 meetings per academic year, lasting approximately three hours each. This was described as a slow process and a "waste of time and resources" with "detrimental" effects on the quality of decision-making, for instance as consistory members did not have enough time to prepare for all of these meetings (*Förslag till statuter*, 1875, pp. 6–7; see also Blomqvist, 1993, p. 210). Genuine collegial practice began to require inordinate amounts of time from scholars that could no longer be justified as the university grew.

In an article in the periodical *Svensk tidskrift* [*Swedish Journal*], Lund history professor Claes Theodor Odhner criticized the statutes proposed by the

1874 commission, and demanded even more radical solutions. He agreed with the commission, however, that the consistory seemed fragmented and unable to act with proper authority. More generally, he emphasized that the distinctive pluralism of bodies within the academic structure of governance caused an "unnecessary retardation," thereby reinforcing the critique of collegial slowness ("Universitetsreformer," 1875, pp. 459, 496). A similar criticism was voiced over 20 years later. In 1898, Lund librarian and PhD Elof Tegnér initiated another debate in an article published in *Nordisk tidskrift* [*Nordic Journal*], arguing that it was necessary to modernize Swedish universities. This was in line with a common opinion that the novel statutes in 1876 had not implemented anything radically new. For instance, media accounts highlighted that "the *collegial governance* of faculties and consistories" had not been thoroughly reformed, thus forcing important issues to pass through the "purgatory of several colleges" ("Universitetsförhållanden," 1898). Tegnér's article was likewise interpreted as an attack on the foundations of the collegial organization that he found old-fashioned. The consistory at universities had no equivalents, Tegnér claimed, not even internationally. Swedish universities were likened to heavy machinery, as decisions about academic matters were not made "in haste," given the large number of parallel collegial bodies that were dealing with the same issues. To keep pace with more wealthy European nations, Tegnér advocated more efficiency and less reverence to traditions. He claimed that a more authoritative vice-chancellor role in line with the vertical structure (or "monarchic" model) of other governmental authorities would increase the speed of decision-making and reduce the societal isolation of universities (Tegnér, 1898, pp. 186–199; see also Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 82–84).

Tegnér's ideas were radical. Professor of literary history, Henrik Schück (1898a, 1898b), protested against the depiction of the consistory as an overly time-consuming collegial body, claiming that Tegnér's negative view resulted from contingent, local conflicts in Lund (see also Hjärne, 1898b). Yet, Tegnér's most prolific critics shared some of his basic assumptions. History professor Harald Hjärne (1898a) granted that there were, indeed, too many competing collegial bodies at the universities, causing "all sorts of lingering formalities and an often completely unnecessary delay." The question was rather whether this should be seen as a necessary evil or not. As these discussions raged, a new commission, chaired by bishop Gottfrid Billing, was appointed in 1899. Although acknowledging the problems of temporal efficiency addressed by Tegnér, this commission did not accept his proposals, claiming that autonomous governance was foundational to the very idea of a university (Frängsmyr, 2010, p. 86). Nevertheless, the commission discussed further reforms, suggesting that the major consistory would be replaced by a university council, and that a smaller consistory (consisting of the vice-chancellor, pro-rector, and five elected faculty members) would deal with ongoing administrative issues (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 9–13, 73–76). This aspiration toward a representative system was framed as a natural step in line with the process started in 1852. The successive reform proposals were thus incorporated into a grand, liberal narrative of progress, even though conservative voices warned that changes should not be introduced too swiftly as they could endanger the (slow) organic development of universities (*Förslag och*

betänkanden, 1901, pp. 271–272). The principle of indirect representation, based on democratic elections, was met with repeated skepticism. This is not surprising, as these discussions played out before full democracy was introduced in Sweden. Several commentators pointed to the risk that various factions would form, indicating how frictions between collegiality and democracy have been central in the modern history of universities (Blomqvist, 1992, pp. 246–247; see also Ferlie et al., 2009, p. 11).

The new university statutes of 1908 ultimately struck a compromise by blending two categories of membership in the major consistory: some would be included based on years of service and some would be elected. These statutes were revised in 1916 in the wake of another commission of 1914; after that, no new university statutes were adopted in Sweden until 1956. The work of the 1914 commission thus marked the end of a period that saw several reforms of the consistory. Despite some loyal defenses, the universal idea of a university was partly deconstructed in order to enable such organizational change. Taken together, the reforms can be seen as part of an ongoing revision of time-honored collegial principles to synchronize Swedish universities with broader developments in society.

PROFESSORIAL STATUS (AND THE DILEMMA OF REPRESENTATION)

The expansion and societal adaption of universities turned the question of who should be counted as a colleague into a contentious one. As university structures became increasingly complex, conflicts of interest grew between various groups (Blomqvist, 1992, p. 332). A key point of contention was whether or not other teachers should be counted as true colleagues to full professors.

The 1908 blended model of consistory membership produced some practical differences in Lund and Uppsala. One reason as to why the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs had summoned a new commission already in 1914 was because such a heterogenous system was deemed unsustainable in the long run (*Betänkande med förslag*, 1914, pp. 3–4). In the ensuing discussions, a practice solely relying on the principle of democratic election was depicted as a potentially too drastic shift in the history of universities: the automatic consistory membership of professors, as "given by nature," continued to be defended as foundational to preserving the universities as collegial and autonomous institutions. There were, for instance, concerns that professors would care less about common university matters if they were not obligated to participate in its governance, and that administrative staff eventually would dominate the consistory at the expense of the combined scholarly expertise of professors from all disciplines.

However, trust in the universal competence of professors was no longer self-evident. The 1874 commission questioned the idea that all professors possessed identical competences, or "skills required for a man of governance" (*Förslag till statuter*, 1875, p. 10). Based on that premise, and also in order to cause less disruption to the scholarly work, the commission suggested extending the temporal terms of the rectoral office, which hitherto had ambulated based on a pattern of

one year (and prior 1840, only one semester), as well as transforming this role into an elected position, instead of letting professors take turns based on their age of service (Blomqvist, 1993, pp. 206, 210; Frängsmyr, 2010, p. 16; Gribbe, 2022, p. 14). As a consequence, philosopher Carl Yngve Sahlin remained in office as vice-chancellor of Uppsala University for no less than 13 years after the implementation of new statutes in 1876, thus marking an abrupt break with previous rhythms, and conferring significantly more authority to this position. To address the "necessity" of securing long-term stability, while still maintaining collegial governance, the 1899 commission suggested a system of overlapping mandate periods in the consistory (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, p. 86) even though such a system would further complicate the work of synchronization, with yet another set of temporal entities to master. It is thus plain to see why a more professionalized, long-term leadership was embraced in an attempt to enhance coherence and efficiency in the long run (Tersmeden, 2016, p. 84).

Doubts about the universal competence of professors also permeated discussions on the relationship between different teacher categories. A system differentiating between full professors and extraordinary professors (without chair) had been introduced after some parliamentary debates in the 1870s. In practice, the latter replaced the older category of academic adjuncts. Ever since the seventeenth century, these had functioned as a reservoir of staff constantly available to fill teaching positions as needed and to ensure the professorial rejuvenation. In practice, adjuncts had perpetually worked for universities under precarious conditions. After gaining more rights, this growing group of teachers began to demand even greater influence, and by the turn of the century, critique of the 1870s statutes amassed (Blomqvist, 1992, p. 264, 1993, p. 205; Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 93–94).

The 1899 commission eventually sought to abolish the distinction between full and extraordinary professors entirely. Such a move would necessitate a "transformation of the collegial governance and administration" as the sheer number of professors attending meetings otherwise would become unmanageable, and too time-consuming (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 62, 71). If all extraordinary professors were automatically granted access to the major consistory, there would be 62 members in Uppsala and 49 in Lund – too many to fit around the table in the consistory room (Frängsmyr, 2017, p. 33). Since assemblies of this size would not be appropriate for the execution of administrative functions, the commission instead sought to make the minor consistory, or individual faculties, responsible for administrative matters. Lund professor of history, Sam Clason ("Utdrag af protokollet," 1907, pp. 11–12), commented on the reforms suggested by the subsequent 1906/07 commission:

> in our time, marked by strong demands of simple and quick reforms of public administration [it would seem] completely absurd to delegate administrative to colleges of circa 50 to 70 members. No matter which forms that would be selected to let these collegial members inform themselves about the issues in question … an unnecessary time delay and … often unnecessary costs would follow, and the entire process would potentially prevent decisions from being made within reasonable timeframes completely.

Similarly, the 1899 commission also concluded that beyond a certain limit, the quality of decisions would not improve with larger decision-making bodies:

"No one can deny that in their current composition, these colleges claim more university teachers than is required" (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 71–73).

In this way, changes to the collegial status of university employees depended significantly on practical circumstances, such as the ability to hold meetings in certain places, within certain timeframes. There was agreement regarding the need to impose an upper limit to the size of the professor collegium at the two universities to maintain efficiency. This may be compared with the Karolinska Institute, a specialized medical institution in Stockholm established in 1810, which was also discussed by the 1899 commission. Due to the smaller scale of this university with a single faculty, the model of a full assembly of teachers could still be maintained, and there was no similar need to distinguish between various types of professors (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 229, 252). Professor of medicine Frithiof Lennmalm noted that Karolinska's limited size protected the institution from potential conflicts between various collegial bodies (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, p. 17). However, the 1899 commission remarked that an organization also required a minimum size in order to truly function in a collegial fashion (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, p. 74). Taken together, these reflections indicate that collegial reforms typically were motivated according to quantitative considerations or practical administrative needs.

Debates on the collegial hierarchy turned particularly heated with the 1906/07 commission. In line with previous proposals, the existing system of various professor categories was deemed unsustainable in the long run (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, pp. 79–96). In many cases, extraordinary professorships had been created for economic reasons. As some new disciplines were founded, it would have been appropriate to install full professorships, but extraordinary professors offered a cheaper alternative. In practice, extraordinary professors thus often conducted the work expected by full professors, but under much worse conditions. This injustice provided a rationale for erasing the boundary between the two categories. As they were basically doing the same things, it seemed strange to exclude some of them from the main collegial bodies. At least, there was some consensus that all of them deserved to take part in the election of chancellor and vice-chancellor. The 1906/07 commission therefore proposed the construction of a broader plenary assembly for such purposes that automatically included all professors (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, pp. 79–95). This new collegial body was established as a complement to the representative bodies of the major and minor consistories with the new statutes in 1908. At the same time, extraordinary professors were finally equated with full professors from a governance perspective, as full professors were no longer automatically members of the consistory (Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 87–88; Svensson, 1980, pp. 39–40).

Once again, these reforms were legitimized via their incorporation into grand historical narratives. The 1906/07 commission claimed that the existing system of extraordinary professors had not kept pace with rapid scholarly specialization (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, pp. 82–84). The collegial organization thus had to be synchronized with two parallel meta-narratives that structured the national politics of knowledge: (a) a story of a seemingly unstoppable specialization at the universities; and (b) a story of an increasingly (time-)efficient and professional

apparatus of public administration of modern Swedish society. Collegial practices had to be synchronized with the ideal patterns of change established by these narratives. One means was to maintain properly sized collegial bodies. With the experience of academic expansion, power seemingly had to be divided and concentrated within smaller collegial assemblies. As claimed by the 1906/07 commission, a more representative system would "result in substantial advantages with regard to a rapid, hands-on and continuous handling of issues" (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, p. 90). Concrete temporal gains thus motivated the reformation of universities at the aggregated level.

THE "PROMOTION MACHINERY" (AND THE TROPE OF "RETARDATION")

What perhaps brought temporal issues to the forefront of collegial discussions most markedly was the promotion and appointment of professors. According to Elof Tegnér (1898, p. 202), hiring procedures exasperated collegial negotiations. These negotiations clearly involved a synchronization of temporalities, as they were driven by a pressure to increase the speed of academic activities. They also addressed further questions regarding the limits of professorial expertise. For instance, concerns were expressed regarding the power balance between individual professors and faculties, and also whether external peers should be invited or not (Blomqvist, 1992, p. 248). In light of ongoing institutional expansion and scholarly specialization, it was no longer seen as convincing to argue that all professors should be able to assess candidates from all disciplines, not even within their own faculties. It was furthermore doubted whether they could remain unbiased in cases where internal candidates were weighed against external ones. A specialized peer review process had been introduced with the 1876 statutes, partly removing authority from the general collegium of teachers (Frängsmyr, 2017, p. 38). Was specialist knowledge supposed to trump the collegial ideal, based on a generalist ethos, of universally competent professors at a specific university? Until this point, full professors had been obliged to take on peer commissions, typically without compensation as they were perceived as honorary tasks. With an increasing burden of administrative duties, however, it was frequently argued that such activities should be duly compensated, particularly if the aim was to accelerate them (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 18, 94–95; SOU, 1922:17, pp. 196–197).

Moreover, the 1899 commission suggested that "age of service" should be taken into account in cases of several applicants, indicating that university politics had to include plans for the long-term supply of knowledge. The very existence of this commission was particularly motivated against a number of difficult and protracted promotion issues in the 1890s. On several occasions, peer reviews had resulted in completely opposite assessments, which threatened to undermine collegial self-evaluation. As an alternative option, a system based on direct calls with handpicked candidates was suggested to save time and reduce conflicts. Despite doubts as to whether such a procedure would fulfill the requirements

of legal certainty (Frängsmyr, 2010, p. 16), the commission was adamant that reform was necessary to accelerate appointment processes and develop a more centralized and uniform system, for instance, by creating a joint promotion committee with representatives from both Lund and Uppsala. This indicates how the safeguarding of collegial unity at a specific university had to be weighed against the value of broader collegial cooperation among scholars at the national level (and beyond).

According to the 1899 commission, the unwieldy temporal conditions at universities did not have any equivalents in other sectors of civil service. Within the existing system, appointment and promotion issues had to pass through several formal bodies (peer review, faculty, consistory, chancellor, monarch/government). Even if it was seen as reasonable for academia to operate according to special timelines in many situations, this hiring procedure was denounced as exceptionally complex and slow. There were fears that such employment mechanisms would be detrimental to university teaching, for instance leading to a frequent use of locum tenens (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 18, 101, 119–121).

The commission conducted a survey by comparing professor appointments in Sweden 1886–1899. At Uppsala University, 12 of 38 seemingly normal cases had taken more than two years to settle. Only four professors were appointed within a year. In Lund, 7 of 23 cases extended beyond two years. Particularly problematic, according to the commission, was the custom of giving candidates at least six months to improve their qualifications after the announcement of a vacancy before making hiring decisions. This phenomenon, referred to as "specimen time," was a remnant from an older era when scholars could apply for all positions within their own faculties, thereby switching disciplines in just half a year. However, qualification requirements had increased rapidly, and this practice was seen as obsolete. It was suggested that the specimen time should be reduced to three months, ideally reducing the timeline for recruitment and hiring without compromising the integrity of the peer review system (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 99–100, 125–130).

Further attempts to accelerate the speed of these practices would follow. The 1906/07 commission was for instance very specific in suggesting that applications should be submitted before 12 p.m. on the 45th day after a vacancy had been announced in the newspapers (*Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, p. 17). Likewise, the 1914 commission, while reluctant to introduce an upper time limit, wished to create economic incentives to speed up these processes (*Betänkande med förslag*, 1914, pp. 7–8). The ensuing 1918 commission proposed that submissions for professor positions should be received within 30 days, and the vacancy itself should be announced by the vice-chancellor within eight days. The peer review process would then be limited to a maximum of four months before a recommendation was submitted to the faculty dean (SOU, 1922, pp. 14–19). In this fashion, the introduction of new temporal standards or "normal times" was discussed in order to ensure efficiency.

In these debates, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s, "retardation" [*tidsutdräkt*] emerged as a key term. The slowness of "the academic promotion machinery" together with long-term vacancies were seen as threatening the interests of the

government. Since universities belonged to the public sector, they had to adjust to the practices of other governmental authorities, which were explicitly aiming to minimize vacancies (SOU, 1922, pp. 7, 137–138, 151–152). This underscores how different organizational logics clashed as the collegial academic ethos was weighed against public efficiency.

The 1918 commission interestingly conducted some transnational comparisons in order to highlight deficiencies of the Swedish appointment system. Just like the 1899 commission, it also looked into the past in order to evaluate the state of the current organization in temporal terms. In the seventeenth century, it turned out that appointments had been relatively rapid – 5.4 months, on average – but this was not entirely positive, since the swiftness had resulted from limited formalization and the government often bypassing university bodies. In the eighteenth century, the average was 7–10 months; and from 1800–1876 it increased to 13–16 months. After that, appointment times increased even more. From 1877–1919, the commission concluded that the average time had increased to 20 months in Uppsala and 19 months in Lund. Despite some measures taken with the statutes of 1908, the previous decade had only seen some marginal improvement, and the latest statutes of 1916 seemed to have had no effect (SOU, 1922, pp. 79, 93–95, 137–161).

The commission compared these appointment times with that of the Karolinska Institute, which was approximately two months shorter, on average, apparently due to the limited number of retarding collegial passage points at this smaller institution. More complex collegial systems like Lund and Uppsala, however, were defended as guarantors of quality. Even if the Swedish academic employment system had no equivalent regarding its "slowness and unwieldiness," the commission stated, it probably stood out in terms of objectivity and accuracy. So, in the end, the 1918 commission suggested that the existing system should be maintained at large, particularly to capitalize on accumulated collegial knowledge and experiences (SOU, 1922, pp. 162–167). But what is fascinating to note in connection to the ideas presented by the various commissions is how the temporal implications of academic collegial ideals and practices became a problem on the level of national politics.

The collegial organization collided with the ministry of ecclesiastical affair's desire to impose a unified and centralized university policy and reduce the costs of higher education, which could be achieved by shortening study cycles (Blomqvist, 1992, p. 378). The minister of ecclesiastical affairs in the early twentieth century, Hugo Hammarskjöld, wished to further activate professors and better synchronize the eight-month academic year with the full calendar year. This provoked outrage, as it was interpreted as an attack on professors (and students) for being "lazy" ("En ukas," 1909; Frängsmyr, 2010, pp. 89–90). In a similar fashion, there had already been quarrels about the professors' temporal commitments in the 1870s. In his aforementioned article, Claes Theodor Odhner (1875) highlighted the vast number of exams that professors had to supervise – in some cases more than 200 per year, requiring up to 12 hours a week. Odhner feared that this would exhaust the limited scholarly assets of a small nation like Sweden. Academic teaching thus had to be reformed with

respect to temporal efficiency. Benchmarking against German universities where students typically earned their degrees in a stipulated "normal" time of three years, he suggested reducing degree completion time at Swedish universities, especially given high indebtedness among the young ("Universitetsreformer", 1875, pp. 472, 481, 489). Numerous stipulations of temporal frames were necessary to keep the university functional as a complex organization, and issues related to saving time were frequently brought up as part of the ongoing work of temporal synchronization.

COLLEGIALITY TAKES TIME (AND SPACE)

The various commission reports contained notions of particular academic chronologies which collided with and were expected to give way to more "modern" requirements of efficiency (e.g., *Betänkande med förslag*, 1914, pp. 11–12; see also Rider, 2016, p. 3). In this concluding section, I will discuss some general implications of the synchronization performed to close such gaps between opposing organizational logics and temporal rhythms.

The discourse of university reforms included temporal synchronization work on the level of national politics as well as local universities. Just like today, nineteenth century scholars were multitaskers, combining research, teaching, and administration. They followed individual schedules, and professors tended to be rather involved in additional public commitments related to, for instance, politics and culture. A main challenge was ensuring that administrative or governance tasks did not consume all resources and distract staff from core scholarly duties. Keeping the small scale of these universities in mind, it obviously had consequences if a single professor was absent from his regular tasks for a long period. Due to institutional expansion and a more manifest professional ethos, it seemingly became more difficult to combine all the various roles in traditional ways.

Apparently, the collegial system was easily combined with short time horizons as long as universities were relatively small and comprehensible as organizations. Both Lund and Uppsala were small cities. Brief temporal cycles functioned seemingly well in such confined spaces.[5] In this regard, it is striking that the 1899 commission spent considerable time discussing whether teachers should be expected to live in these cities or not. University politics thus contained some very distinct spatial aspects, including the (biopolitical) power to regulate the physical presence of staff and students. The latter group had to report to the vice-chancellor within eight days after their arrival, and commonly had to adhere to strict attendance requirements. Not even the vice-chancellor was allowed to leave town for more than eight days during the semester without special permission, indicating the detailed nature of temporal regulations. Prior to the digital era and the advent of tools such as Zoom, it was important to be physically present, as collegial meetings could be summoned on short notice, sometimes only one day beforehand (*Förslag och betänkanden*, 1901, pp. 1, 8, 11, 48, 59–60; *Utredningar och förslag*, 1907, pp. 8, 25, 43).

On a certain scale, collegial governance could appear relatively flexible and efficient. Ongoing expansion as well as increasing political and administrative ambitions at the national level complicated the work of synchronization as collegial practices had to keep pace with a more diverse range of factors and rhythms established in other sectors of public administration (Svensson, 1980, p. 51). This indicates that the question of whether collegiality is slow or not, is highly context-dependent, just as universities are socially embedded. Moreover, questions of time and speed are – as we all know – relative. Their interpretations are fundamentally dependent on constant battles of narratives. Is a certain process framed as slow or not? Popularized concepts and metaphors, such as "retardation" and the likening of academia to heavy machinery, were often employed in highly strategic ways, thereby contributing to the depiction of collegial governance as an obstacle to change. In the eyes of many politicians and reformers, the modern state had no time for collegial "purgatories." This change in attitude reflected the successive transition from a state with a large number of collegial organizations co-existing in the public administration to a situation where the university stood out as a collegial bastion (Boberg, 2022, p. 22). As a hypothesis, I would suggest that a general pluralistic conception of collegiality was replaced by a more consecrated view of the universities as a unique organization with collegial governance structures (albeit reformed).

While universities have been commonly perceived as resistant to external pressures of efficiency and speed until recent decades (e.g., Murphy, 2015, pp. 137–138), my analysis shows that challenges to collegiality have a much longer history. They were part of a structural tendency to rationalize the expanding higher education system to keep up with socio-political changes. To some extent, the current challenge of managerialism can thus be interpreted as a recent framing and enhancement of an old problem. It is imperative to keep this long trajectory in mind and illuminate the key historical mechanisms at play. Together with the political aims of efficiency and rationalization, it was typically practical circumstances, such as the time spent on meetings every semester that made reforms seem urgent in nineteenth century Sweden, rather than appeals to some higher purpose or an idea of the university itself. On the contrary, beliefs in such an idea had to be renegotiated to conform with the practical necessities of efficiency and appropriate timeframes for decision-making.

This aspect of collegiality, as dependent on local, practical, and temporal conditions, should be incorporated into ongoing debates, which tend to stick to rather abstract notions, often taking collegiality as a given principle and an intrinsic good. Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016a, p. 21) rightly emphasized the need for constant maintenance in order to make collegiality viable in the long-term. Temporal synchronization should be an integral part of this active maintenance. After all, the empirical cases presented in this study were examples of attempts to create a functional and legitimate basis for the collegial organization of Swedish universities at the turn of the twentieth century while preserving scholarly integrity, particularly by earnestly tackling issues of temporality. Despite reforms, the collegial system managed to thrive, as power largely remained with professors. My study thus showcases examples of compliance but also resistance to larger

organizational trends. It was no doubt a difficult balancing act to retain autonomy while incorporating managerial ideals of the wider public administration in order to seem legitimate and "modern."

Because the organization of higher education and research differs between countries, it is imperative to be sensitive to specific and shifting political contexts, including reforms (Krücken et al., 2007). Even though the empirical cases presented in this article are limited to national debates (and some very local contexts), universities obviously participate in a much broader global project that has been operating for centuries. Just as it takes time to create and maintain a collegium, it has taken vast amounts of time to form the complex organizations we still refer to as universities (Bennett, 1998, p. 41; Frank & Meyer, 2020). As proclaimed by Stefan Collini (2012, p. 199): "we are merely custodians for the present generation of a complex intellectual heritage which we did not create – and which is not ours to destroy." At first glance, this statement might seem overly conservative, but the temporal dimensions required for generating a sound intellectual – and collegial – culture cannot be underestimated. Slow or not, universities should not abandon collegial organization structures too quickly.

NOTES

1. Translations of Swedish quotations into English are made by the author.
2. For the first time in 200 years, the number of students began to increase radically. For example, there were 1,500 students and approximately 70 teachers at Uppsala University in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1910s, this number had increased to 2,415 students and 160 teachers (Frängsmyr, 2017, p. 37; Segerstedt, 1983, p. 11, 51). The period also saw the installment of new university colleges in Gothenburg and Stockholm.
3. Here, it should also be mentioned that the Swedish Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs (from 1968, Ministry of Education), which is responsible for matters of education and science, was established in 1840.
4. From 1859 onward, the Chancellorship of Lund and Uppsala was held by the same person, typically a member of the royal family. There were also local deputies, called Pro-Chancellors – positions held by bishops.
5. Interestingly in this respect, the mid-nineteenth century saw recurring discussions, divided along a conservative–liberal axis, on whether to move Uppsala University to the capital of Stockholm.

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THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL ACTOR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNIVERSITY AS AN INSTITUTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE OF AUSTRALIA

Hokyu Hwang

ABSTRACT

While the university as an institution is a great success story, one hears the constant chatter of the crises in higher education usually associated with the organizational transformation of universities. Regardless of one's normative assessment of these observations, the institutional success of the university has been accompanied by the emergence of universities as organizational actors. I reflect on how these changes could alter the university as an institution, using the Australian higher education sector as an example. In doing so, I explore how universities as organizational actors, in responding to the demands of their external environment, set in motion a series of changes that redefine highly institutionalized categories, and, in doing so, radically remake the university as an institution.

Keywords: University; institution; actor; Australia; enterprise; organization

INTRODUCTION

Through its institutional history, the university's mission expanded. For Cardinal Newman (1893, p. ix), a university is "a place of teaching universal knowledge" whose mission is "the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement", and, therefore, there was no place for research in the university. The modern research university, first emerged in Germany, came to encompass both advanced teaching and research (Clark, 2006; Flexner, 1930/1994; Wellmon, 2015). Later, the American variant embedded the research university into society, opening universities up to broader swathes of society and their practical needs (Cole, 2009; Kerr, 2001; Ramirez, 2006a), entrenching the tripartite mission of the university: education, research, and impact or engagement (see, e.g., Douglas, 2016). The socially embedded university (Ramirez, 2020) has gone global and has become the basis for the ubiquitous global rankings of universities, which now include "impact" (see *Times Higher Education*'s Impact Rankings 2022 incidentally topped by Western Sydney University in Australia).[1]

The expansion of higher education has been nothing short of transformative (Schofer et al., 2021). All indicators attest to the global success of the university. Everywhere universities have multiplied, and enrollments have grown (Frank & Meyer, 2020; Schofer & Meyer, 2005; Pineda, 2023, Vol. 86). As national systems transition from the elite, mass, and, in some cases, to universal phase (Trow, 1970, 1973), higher education becomes increasingly a routine feature of one's "lifelong learning," for example, as reflected in the Australian government's earnest push for "micro-credentialing" especially during and after the COVID pandemic.[2] Incorporating more and more knowledge domains and societal roles and ways of performing those roles into its boundaries, the university as a global institution has been a great success story.

Paralleling these developments, the university as social organization has undergone a dramatic change. To borrow Clark Kerr's (2001, p. 31; see also Marginson, 2016) wonderful metaphors, the university, once a "village with its priests" as a place of teaching and learning, became an "industrial town" with the incorporation of research, which evolved into a "city of infinite variety" depicted in the idea of a "multiversity." This transition from a village to a city is a massive, qualitative shift, according to Kerr (2001, p. 31):

> "The Idea of a Multiversity" is a city of infinite variety. Some get lost in the city; some rise to the top within it; most fashion their lives within one of its many subcultures. There is less of a sense of community than in the village but also less of a sense of confinement. There is less sense of purpose than within the town but there are more ways to excel. There are also more retreats of anonymity – both for the creative person and the drifter. As against the village and the town, the "city" is more like the totality of civilization as it has evolved and more an integral part of it; and movement to and from the surrounding society has been greatly accelerated. As in a city, there are many separate endeavors under a single rule of law.

The multiversity is an internally heterogeneous and differentiated organization with porous boundaries, and, therefore, is not a coherent entity held together only by its belief in itself (Krücken et al., 2007). Marginson (2016, p. 25) mused that maybe there is nothing that holds together such a multiplex

entity. Clark Kerr (Marginson, 2016, p. 27), foreshadowing what was to come later, observed the university's "name" and its reputation could serve such a purpose:

> All parties in the multiversity have an interest in the growth of institutional status ... . Students want to gain access to selective institutions, and as graduates they stand to benefit from the multiversity's name. Faculty want to work in high-status universities. Industry wants to follow the research strength as well as brand power. Donors want to back a winner. University presidents guard the institutional reputation closely.

In the last few decades, in stark contrast to the older image of universities as loosely coupled, organized anarchies (Clark, 1998; Cohen et al., 1972), we have observed the transformation of universities into "complete organizations" with identity, rationality, and hierarchy (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000), giving rise to the "actorhood imperative" or the "calls for action in the name of the self" (Bloch, 2021, p. 489). Often described as the formalization and rationalization of universities (Kim et al., 2019; Ramirez, 2006a, 2006b; Ramirez & Christensen, 2013) or an organizational or managerial turn (Krücken et al., 2013; Krücken & Meier, 2006), the university becomes "an integrated, goal-oriented, and competitive entity, in which management and leadership play an ever more important role" (Krücken, 2020, p. 163). This transformation is part of the expansion of formal organization into many domains in society and the subsequent proliferation of actors (see also Bromley & Meyer, 2015; Drori et al., 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2020; Hwang et al., 2019).

Although the global institutionalization of the university means that universities around the world share a lot in common with one another, universities are also creatures of national systems, and there is much organizational heterogeneity. Similarly, concrete manifestations of organizational actorhood of universities could be highly variable. As universities respond to the pressures and demands from their environments, they actively engage in initiatives that alter the very nature of the university and its work in research, teaching and impact. In this paper, I reflect on how organizational actorhood precipitates the redefinition of the university in light of the experiences of Australian universities. In doing so, I hope to re-examine the changing idea of a university once again.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES

When we look at the history of the Australian higher education system as presented by the historian of higher education Hannah Forsyth (2014), the success of the university and higher education is clear with the expansion occurring in the second half of the twentieth century (For the global trend, see also Schofer & Meyer, 2005). In 1857, there were only two universities in Australia (the University of Sydney and the University of Melbourne) with about 140 students. In the twenty-first century, the Australian higher education has reached the status of a high participation system. Universities Australia (2022) reported that in 2020, close to 1.5 million students studied at 39 universities across the country. 28.1 per cent of these were

international students.[3] Australia's top 8 research-intensive universities rank highly in the global rankings.

During this period of expansion, the character of Australian universities has changed as well. Marginson and Considine (2000, pp. 3–9) used the term, the enterprise university, to capture the "main features of the new kind of higher education institution" and a "new phase in the history of the university," which involved "the remaking or replacement of collegial or democratic forms of governance with structures that operationalise executive power" (p. 9). Describing the managerial transformation of universities, particularly the rise of the university's administration as the central locus of decision-making and power, they announced that "[f]orms of university governance and academic work that survived previous restructures are now under more direct assault" (p. 3).

In the last 20 years, Australian universities have become even more hierarchical and managerial, creating a clear "division between the top layer of university government and the rest of the university community" (Forsyth, 2014, p. 131). Forsyth (2014) traced back the development of the centralized, hierarchical managerial structure of Australian universities to deregulation and the subsequent proliferation of rules that replaced direct state control with a different monitoring and accountability structure. The new system gave more autonomy to universities and concentrated executive power in the role of Vice-Chancellor (VC) who was to be held accountable. The increasing size of universities, the growing complexity of compliance requirements as well as the on-going incorporation of societal demands have led to what Forsyth (2014, p. 125) called "the DVC (deputy vice-chancellor) epidemic."

A generic DVC used to support the VC. As universities respond to their growing number of external stakeholders and societal demands, however, new roles are created, resulting in an increasingly more elaborate division of specialized labor at the top of the organizational hierarchy. DVC of Research & Enterprise at UNSW Sydney, for instance, provides strategic leadership and support to the Vice-Chancellor and President in the generation of external research income and improving UNSW's overall research performance, and in attracting and retaining outstanding academic staff.[4]

DVC of Research & Enterprise leads the Division of Research with three Pro Vice-Chancellors or PVCs (in Research, Research Infrastructure, and Research Training). The latest addition, with a heightened emphasis on societal impact (and equity, diversity, and inclusion or EDI), is the DVC for EDI to run and manage the new division specializing in EDI (for an overview of the development of EDI/DIE within contemporary universities, please see Lee & Ramirez, 2023, Vol. 86).

The rise and expansion of the upper echelon of the university's leadership centered on the VC role reflect the concrete manifestation of university actorhood in Australia – that is, the emergence of the university's administration as a locus of decision and action. Therefore, fundamental to understanding what is happening in Australian universities is the university's leadership which interprets and responds to external pressures and trends and, in doing so, shapes

the organizational reality and conditions of academic work. Marginson and Considine (2000, p. 8) observed:

> In recent years there has been a concentration of decision-making at the point of institutional management and leadership. Certain decisions once made by national or state government, about resource deployment for example, have been transferred to the universities themselves. Other decisions once made by academic units are now determined from above by professional managers and technicians. Many see this concentration of nodal power as overdue, as essential to the effective running of universities in the manner of government departments or business firms. Others see it as the primary cause of what they perceive as a crisis of university purposes and values.

While the emergence of the university's administration is a global phenomenon, the extent of executive power and the degree to which that power is exercised vary significantly across national higher education systems. Regardless of one's view of the desirability of this development, however, university actorhood, at least as it manifests itself in Australia, entails several important implications for not just collegiality but also for the transformation of the university as an institution regarding the core missions of the university and how they are achieved.

Even at the time of the publication of *The Enterprise University* (Marginson & Considine, 2000), some of these trends were clear. University leaders and administrators were managers well-versed in "a language imported from the corporate world" (Connell, 2019, p. 125; Hil et al., 2021). Marginson and Considine (2000, p. 9) described them as "generic rather than localised managers" managing "according to 'good practice.'" While seeking or enjoying "operational separation from the internal context," Marginson and Considine (2000, pp. 9–11) further reported, "[w]ithout exception the university leaders in our study saw collegial forms of decision-making as an obstacle to managerial rationalities." This view for collegial governance is consistent with "a discernible decline" they observed in the role of the academic disciplines in governance. The disciplines, and the collegial culture and network which sustain them, are often seen as a nuisance by executive managers and outside policy-makers.

The new centralized, hierarchical structure, then, has installed a new managerial class at the organizational echelon that is culturally distinct from the rest of the university or at least the academic staff. One indicator of the rise of this administrative or managerial class in Australian universities is the size of remuneration packages offered to university leaders. One figure from 2012 showed that the 20 highest paid VC in Australia collectively earned $18 million (Forsyth, 2014). The relatively high executive compensation in Australia perhaps speaks to where on the scale of "corporateness" Australian universities fall. For instance, Michael Spence, the current President and Provost of University College London was the highest paid VC in Australia at AU$1.6 million during his tenure at Sydney University before he took a "pay cut of more than 50 per cent" for his current position.[5] Finally, the fact that the current VC whose highly successful career includes stints as the education secretary in New South Wales and the managing director of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation "is not a scholar and does not have a doctorate" says a lot about the role of VC in Australian universities.[6]

While the division between the top echelon of the university hierarchy and the rest at Australian universities seems clear, the constitution of the rest has been changing as well. One of the striking trends, paralleling the "decline of the faculties" in university governance, is the changing composition of university personnel. For instance, Forsyth (2014, p. 138) reported that at the Australian Catholic University, the number of students increased by 56 per cent between 2008 and 2013. During the same period, the academic staff grew only by 24 per cent, while the general staff by 67 per cent. Croucher and Woelert (2022, pp. 166–167), analyzing the data on university workforce in Australia from 1997 to 2017, painted a more complex picture:

> [T]he proportion of non-academic staff of universities' overall workforce (FTE) remained remarkably stable, remaining close to 57% if excluding and close to 55% if including casual staff over the entire period. This stability is despite the fact that universities' overall workforce grew by around 50% (full-time or part-time staff only) or close to 60% if including casual staff.

What really changed was the composition of non-academic staff. In broad strokes, "there has been a striking and uniform growth in management-rank positions, concurrent with a substantial decline in lower-level and less expansive support roles" (Croucher & Woelert, 2022, p. 159).

The changing composition reflects the professionalization of non-academic workforce in universities. From technology transfer and research management to financial administration and student affairs, it is common to find highly qualified non-academic professionals on university campuses (for instance, see Beerkens, 2013, for the case of research management). This is a particular type of professionalization in which managerial knowledge and experiences in the corporate sector are highly valued, however (see Hwang & Powell, 2009, for a similar development in the US non-profit sector). Croucher and Woelert (2022, p. 172) observed that:

> [M]anagerial techniques and solutions originating in the corporate sector become seen to be readily applicable to universities … leading to a proliferation of management-focused non-academic staff roles over time as one key element of a broader "corporate" transformation of academic and non-academic work processes at Australian universities.

They concluded that in Australia "the legitimate ideas of the university as a specific, academically focused institution has largely given way to the notion of the university being an organization like any other" in what they termed "a broader 'corporate' transformation of academic and non-academic work processes at Australian universities" (Croucher & Woelert, 2022, p. 172). All in all, academics, now, have less support, but more paper work.

In this context, the university as an institution begins to lose its distinctiveness. In this new corporatized campus, with the inflow of managerial professionals, many institutionalized features of the university begin to change. Tensions surface in universities, arising from the convergence of conflicting logics and values. For instance, in an effort to save on rent, one Australian university announced that it will introduce "hot-desking," "ejecting academics from their own offices where they meet with students and store their large book collections."[7] Academics, in turn, are unhappy about the decision. It is not just that offices for academics will

disappear, but the decision will alter faculty–student interactions and relationships. Certainly, there will be fewer books on university campuses, transforming – perhaps undermining – what we associate with the university.

Changes are also directed at other taken-for-granted features of the university such as students, academics, courses, research, disciplines, etc. (Meyer et al., 2007). One of the more recent developments at the heart of the university's institutional core, driven from the very top of the organizational hierarchy as part of strategic initiatives, is the increasing differentiation of academic roles especially at, but not limited to, research-intensive universities. The creation and expansion of the teaching- or education-focused academic roles mean unbundling of research and teaching (Bennett et al., 2018; Crossley, 2021; Godbold et al., 2022a; Goodman et al., 2020).

The expansion of the education-focused academic role is not limited to Australia, as observed in the rise of teaching/education-focused roles in the United Kingdom, the United States, and in Canada (Probert, 2015). Data from the Department of Education, according to Bennett et al. (2018, p. 272), suggest a rapid growth of teaching- or education-focused academics in Australia: 339 per cent from 2007 to 2016. Rogers and Swain (2022, p. 1048), based on more recent data from the Department of Education, reported that "the number of full-time and fractional full-time teaching-only positions increased from 1163 to 4988 FTE … In the same period, the number of research-only positions increased by 2449 FTE," while the number of positions that combine research and teaching increased from 26,840 to 27,507. The data suggest that the rise of the "education-focused" academic role has been going on for quite some time. After a brief break during the COVID pandemic, the pace has picked up again. For instance, my own university started its own, "Education-focused career model" driven from the top in 2017, and the number of "EF community members" has grown to 400 since.

The factors driving this development are many, including the increasing demand for higher education in Australia due to the massification of higher education and the importance of international students for Australian universities as well as heightened competition over resources and rankings (Probert, 2015). These factors still exist, and, therefore, the trend will likely continue. The change process has not been smooth, however. One of the few studies that examined the introduction of the education-focused model in Australia reports:

> [T]he uncertainty surrounding career paths for teaching academics, who noted the absence of career or promotion scripts. Respondents noted also an absence of role models within the professoriate. They expressed widespread concerns about developing the traditional academic skills required to transition between roles and institutions. (Bennett et al., 2018, p. 272)

Despite the difficulties associated with the introduction of a new model, universities are committed. My own university, for example, has created (1) a support structure around the community of practice for education-focused academics and provided (2) professional development opportunities and resources (Whitton et al., 2022).

The rise of the education-focused academic role means fewer and fewer teaching–research combined academics and contributes directly to the decline

of the "tripartite role of academics in teaching, research and service activities" (Macfarlane, 2011, p. 59). It is not clear that the combined or balanced academics will become extinct, but the current trends and the rationale for the introduction of this new model suggest a sea change and a different approach to academic work. Bruce Macfarlane (2011, p. 59; see Crossley, 2021, for a view against the "all-rounders" model) argued that "all-round academics" that combined "all elements of academic practice are being displaced by 'para-academics'… who specialise in one element of the tripartite academic role."

The rise of "para-academics" parallels broader changes in the composition of university personnel, particularly the inflow of managerial and other professionals into universities. In the context of increasing differentiation of academic roles, we have also seen the proliferation of education design professionals. They do not teach in classrooms themselves or do research on any substantive areas – other than pedagogy and education technology, but they promote teaching effectiveness and student experience by supporting academics. Designers view academics as "content providers" and approach teaching in a highly standardized way with a view toward making content more relevant and accessible to students (e.g., shorter and fewer readings, multimedia contents, more authentic assessments and activities, etc.). However, the pursuit of improved teaching and better learning outcomes in this way diminishes disciplinary distinctiveness and emphasizes practical knowledge and career readiness. Academics are not mere "content providers," but are knowledge producers embedded in disciplinary communities with different cultures, practices and routines. Education-focused academics are both expert teachers and researchers of teaching (or scholar of learning and teaching), and, some have argued, are in the process of development of a "hybrid teacher-academic developer identity" (Godbold et al., 2022b, p. 1). The centrality and meaning of teaching vary across these groups.

These developments diversify the academic workforce and introduce tensions among the diverse set of colleagues. Macfarlane (2011, p. 63) suggested that there are two routes to becoming para-academics. Support staff see their roles upskilled by the addition of activities while academics see their roles "deskilled from all-round academics." At any rate, all-round academics lose much autonomy and authority, especially in teaching and other areas being claimed by para-academics, as the education-focused academic role becomes institutionalized in the university hierarchy.

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS A UNIVERSITY NOW?

The societal centrality of higher education and the university as its institutional embodiment are nicely captured in the metaphors of sieve, incubator, temple, and hub (Stevens et al., 2008). The university offers something for everyone, as Clark Kerr suggested in his notion's of the multiversity. While the important societal roles performed by universities have become highly institutionalized, this success has been accompanied by the transformation of the university into an organizational actor. In this context, Marginson and Considine (2000, pp. 6 –7) argument about Australia and the "Enterprise University" was prescient:

[T]he Australian case is distinguished not because higher education here is different from the rest, but because in Australia the common global trends showed themselves rather early, and have been carried further and more consistently than in many places. As such, the Australian case might provide other nations with a forecast – and a warning – of where the common pattern is taking them.

Marginson and Considine (2000, p. 5) argued that the Enterprise University's mission is its own prestige and competitiveness, and other matters including academic identities are "subordinated to the mission, marketing and strategic development of the institution and its leaders." Perhaps the motivation for the two *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* volumes devoted to collegiality and the whole genre of literature deploring the dire state of higher education and universities in crisis around the world are the proof. The transformation of universities into organizational actors has the potential to undermine the university as an institution or at least to change it substantially.

In this paper, I have reflected on the organizational transformation, particularly the rise of the university administration as the locus of decision and action, which itself is a major institutional change and has further consequences for institutional change in universities. The rise of the education-focused academic role as a category at the expense of the traditional, all-round academics changes the nature of academic work and the meanings and practices of the academic profession. This is a result of the university leadership's strategic decision to improve productivity, efficiency, and quality.

A larger point is that universities, recast as organizational actors, could potentially alter the university as an institution. Maybe this is just the nature of the institution that stood the test of time by responsively incorporating ever-changing societal demands. The institutional success of the university has obscured this aspect. The changing knowledge content is a good example. Critical and liberal education is being displaced by practical and skill-based knowledge. The usefulness of useless knowledge carries less and less currency in contemporary universities (Flexner, 2017; Ordine, 2017). This is reflected at the university level in terms of disciplinary representation. Arts and humanities have been disappearing; maybe some social sciences will follow. In response to the COVID-induced crisis, my own university merged three faculties (Arts and Social Sciences, Art and Design, and Built Environment) to form a new faculty of Arts, Design, and Architecture. (Note that social sciences is not even included in the name of the new faculty.) The Business School came out more or less unscathed. One could say it was the triumph of job readiness over the pursuit of beauty, truth, and meaning of life. A more neutral observation would be the withering away of the disciplines. Chad Wellmon (2015) in his book *Organizing Enlightenment*, documented the historical emergence of the research university in Germany and its organization along disciplinary lines. The current development may be the beginning of the last chapter in that history. If disciplines are in danger, the look of the university will fundamentally change.

The rise of impact is another area in which the university is changing, particularly as it relates to research. Scholars used to think about engagement or impact as a third mission after research and teaching. This may be a little premature, but there is a growing tendency to redefine the ultimate purpose and value of research

and teaching in terms of impact. So if we think about the historical evolution of the university from teaching to research and beyond. Is the current obsession with impact a harbinger of what's to come? Is the impact university replacing the research university? Many Australian universities are currently incorporating or integrating the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals into everything they do from operation to teaching and research. If the impact rankings published by *Times Higher Education* are any indication, Australian universities are doing great. Universities and science have been and should continue to be an important part of the collective fight against climate change. However, I have a strong suspicion that *Times Higher Education*'s impact rankings have something do with this development. Moreover, the university as an organizational actor tends to have an evaluative stance on these sorts of things, turning everything into a performance metric, and academics are increasingly encouraged to integrate SDGs into their teaching and research. There is a push back particularly from the research side of the university and faculty. The struggle is not really about whether universities should have a role in this, but about academic freedom, an important ingredient of the university as an institution. Should impact define research? Or should they be loosely coupled? The construction of the university as an actor has potential to redefine radically the university as an institution. Therefore, the question, again, is: What is a university?

NOTES

1. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/impactrankings
2. According to OECD's (2021, p. 2) report on the extent of micro-credentials among its jurisdictions, "[m]ost definitions of micro-credentials denote an organised learning activity with an associated credential – the credential recognises a skill or competency that has been acquired through an organised learning process and validated through an assessment. Consequently, the term 'micro-credential' is commonly understood to refer to both the credential itself and the education or training programme which leads to the credential award."
3. https://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/220207-HE-Facts-and-Figures-2022_2.0.pdf
4. https://www.unsw.edu.au/about-us/our-story/governance-leadership
5. https://www.smh.com.au/national/are-heads-of-australian-universities-worth-a-million-dollars-20201120-p56gga.html
6. https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/mark-scott-to-be-next-vice-chancellor-of-sydney-university-20210312-p57a2h.html
7. https://www.smh.com.au/education/uni-hot-desking-plan-expected-to-save-11-million-20211208-p59fqz.html

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SECTION 2

COLLEGIALITY IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT

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COLLEGIALITY AND COMMUNICATION: THIS TIME IT'S PERSONAL

Francois van Schalkwyk and Nico Cloete

ABSTRACT

Relations in university settings are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, class, and gender. In South Africa, transformation imperatives have radically changed the complexion of the country's university campuses but have also entrenched political imperatives in its universities. As a consequence, the university is a highly politicised space. This is not new. What is new is a communication environment characterised by real-time, global networked digital communication and the uptake of digital media platforms (including social media platforms). We explore the effects of politicisation and new modes of communication using the case of a controversial article published in a South Africa journal and the ensuing polemic. Drawing on both institutional theory and Castells' description of the network society, we conceptualise collegiality along two dimensions: horizontal collegial relations which exist for the purpose of knowledge creation and transfer which, in turn, depends on self-governance according to a taken-for-granted code of conduct; and vertical collegiality which describes collegial relations between academic staff and university management, and which is necessary for the governance of the university as a complex organisation. We conclude that the highly personal nature of communication that is propelled by digital communication has a direct impact on collegial relations within the university. The motivations of both university academic staff and management, as well as the public, extend

beyond stimulating collective debate in the service of knowledge production to serving individual and/or ideological agendas as the communication of science becomes politicised. While issues pertaining to collegiality in South Africa may at first glance appear to be unique to the country, we believe that in a globally transforming academy, the South African case may offer novel insights and useful lessons for other highly politicised university systems.

Keywords: Collegiality; governance; university; communication; South Africa; Network society

INTRODUCTION

Globally, the idea of university collegiality is assumed to be under threat (Moran et al., 2021). Collegiality has been painted as companionship and cooperation among academic colleagues who share responsibility, implying that researchers and teachers are governed by the collective group of professional academics of which they form part (Waters, 1989; Weber, 1922/1978). According to Burr et al. (2017) collegiality can be defined as the relationship between individuals working towards a common purpose within an organisation. They point out that the concept has its origins in the Roman practice of sharing responsibility equally between government officials of the same rank to prevent a single individual from gaining excessive power.

The main culprit undermining collegiality is most often seen to be the phenomenon of managerialism or new public management, which assumes that efficient management can solve almost any problem; and that practices which are appropriate for the conduct of private-sector firms can also be applied to public-sector organisations. Managerialism, in contrast to collegiality, does not provide opportunities for exploring consensus because it promotes responsiveness and compliance with authority (Dearlove, 1997; King, 2004). Collegiality emphasises trust, independent thinking and sharing between co-workers, encouraging autonomy and mutual respect with benefits for organisational efficacy (Donohoo, 2017).

If one thing can be concluded from the international research project on university collegiality that forms the basis of this special issue on collegiality in the university, then it is that the post-modernists were on the money: context (still) matters. To illustrate, it might come as a surprise to some that not all universities have a tenure system for academic appointments. Many universities may have senates and councils, but how they are constituted and their relative authority in relation to other emerging governance structures (such as boards) varies considerably – sometimes even within the same country. The term 'collegiality' in China is anathema; something more akin to 'professorial or departmental governance' is more familiar. And the COVID-19 pandemic exposed a variety of institutional responses by universities to the lockdowns and other restrictions imposed by governments across the globe. The summary dismissals and cutbacks in Australian higher education, for example, were unprecedented. We therefore

open this paper on university collegiality in South Africa with two context-setting events before suggesting and testing a framework for understanding collegiality in contemporary universities; a framework that optimistically draws on two different sociological approaches. We then present a case of a highly politicised South African university where communication related to both university governance and scientific matters take place in the public domain. The consequence of heterogeneous communication spaces such as the social media as a threat to university collegiality is explored.

BACKGROUND

The first context-setting event took place on 15 March, 'the ides of March' – the day on which, in the year 44 BC, 60 conspirators, led by Brutus and Cassius, assassinated Julius Caesar in the Roman senate. On the same day in 2022, we invited 10 scholars – all of whom are familiar with a senate of different kind – to spend a day together in Cape Town to discuss the topic of collegiality at South African universities.

It soon became apparent that there was less interest among the attendees in institutional policy and forms of collegial governance, and a greater appetite for discussions related to issues of communication, interpersonal trust and identity politics, all of which were described as unsettling collegial relations at South Africa's universities. The tone of the conversation resonated with Macfarlane's (2016, p. 31) observation that 'ventriloquizing the values of collegiality has become a performative riff in academic life'. And with Moran's claim of the vacuousness of collegiality as captured by what he calls the Tinkerbell effect: that the collective act of believing in collegiality, sometimes despite the evidence, brings it into being (Moran et al., 2021).

The second event took place in a soulless room in the economics department at the University of Cape Town (UCT). The event marked the launch of a new book on the topic of amnesty negotiations during South Africa's transition to democracy. Jeremy Seekings played host to the prominent political scientist and author. Seekings' wife, Prof. Nicoli Nattrass, was in attendance. During question time, amidst robust deliberations on the concept of amnesty, a sudden attack erupted from the right flank of the room. Seekings was accused of being a racist. An Angolan postdoc calmly and eloquently pleaded with the attacker to follow protocol. Another more vocal attendee implored the chair to silence the disruptor. Security was called. None was at hand. The reason for the unprovoked war of words? Nattrass (2020a) published an article in which she claimed to have established that black South Africans are disinterested in studying biological sciences. Seekings was a proxy target. Clearly, two years hence, the article still stuck in the craw of some academics at the university.

Several key points emerge from the events of March and November 2022. First, the rise of individualism and identity politics in South Africa has led to demands for a renegotiation of the taken-for-granted norms of scientific institutions (including universities) and this, in turn, is undermining constructive communication.

'Transformation' – increasing the numbers and proportions of black South African students and staff in higher education – is presented as a zero-sum policy, implemented by following a top-down management model and a focus on numbers but few actual targets. It could be argued that this makes for an untenable situation in which all university policies and processes must comply with transformation imperatives without a clear idea of what the endpoint might look like, a state of affairs that has been described as 'transformation impossible' (van Schalkwyk et al., 2021). Of direct relevance to the notion of a collegial university, is that transformation is being implemented within an institutional culture of underlying tensions which can and have been described as 'toxic' and have on occasion erupted into open 'culture wars'. The consequence is an erosion of the idea of the collegial university.

While a romantic notion of a collegial paradise lost was squarely rejected by the March group, it would be equally dangerous to resort to a type of 'collegial extremism' in the form of warrior tribalism in universities, of the kind that appears to be taking root at some South African universities.

It remains unclear in South Africa how the tension between the personal and the collective, between identity politics and shared norms, will be resolved, both in the university and in science more broadly. What became clear from the two events is that, in the interim, collegiality is at best under threat and at worst a social relic in South African universities.

From the above background, we identify three key phenomena related to collegiality in changing university systems. The first is that collegiality is both relational and institutional. Relational thinking 'is an invitation to challenge social phenomena, to think in terms of fluid social processes rather than isolated individuals or external and solid structures' (Dépelteau & Powell, 2013, p. xv). Collegiality should be understood as an emergent social phenomenon that cannot be produced by an individual (or by an organisation) itself, but derives through social interaction with others, accumulated in embedded resources in social networks (Lin, 1999). At the same time collegiality flourishes or wilts in the institutional domains of science and the university. Second, relations in university settings are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, class and gender. In South Africa, transformation imperatives have radically changed the complexion of the country's university campuses over the past 20 years but have also entrenched political imperatives in the country's universities. Third, the university as a highly politicised space is not new. What is new are the consequences of the politicised university in the context of a changed communication environment characterised by real-time, global networked digital communication and the uptake of digital media platforms (including social media platforms). The highly personal nature of political communication has a direct impact on collegial relations within the university. The motivations of both university academic staff and management, as well as the public, extend beyond stimulating collective debate in the service of knowledge production to serving individual and/or ideological agendas as the communication of science becomes politicised.

While the issues raised above and at the Cape Town meetings may not necessarily be unique to South Africa, we believe that South Africa is currently a place where issues of trust and identity politics are experienced most acutely, and perhaps all the more so in a transforming academy. The South African case may therefore offer novel insights and useful lessons in other highly politicised university systems.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: OPERATIONALISING RESEARCH ON UNIVERSITY COLLEGIALITY

Lazega (2020) regards collegiality as one critical dimension that accounts for social change; the other is bureaucracy. In the case of the university, the separation is perhaps not as clear-cut, at least not in historical terms. The university is a different, if not special, organisational case. Historically speaking, the university, at least following the Humboldtian model, constituted an organised space for the practice of science. It was self-organised and, relatively-speaking, chaotic (Clark, 1986). What bureaucratic structures were put in place were occupied and ruled by (former) academics. As levels of investment in universities and, consequently, levels of accountability, increased (particularly in the period following the Second World War), hierarchical organisational structures became institutionalised (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Parker, 2011; Zapp, 2017). At the helm of the university have emerged specialised professionals tasked with managing its performance in order to report to and satisfy external stakeholders' (investors') expectations, while 'below' academics continue to do their academic work in what Clark (1986) called the 'academic heartland'. One outcome of the rise in professional management and administration personnel at universities is that academics are being crowded out from the operational governance of the university.

This development remains partial rather than wholesale. Depending on the national (or provincial) context, senates may still wield some power and the leadership of universities and faculties are still in the hands of academics (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014). Academics, as part of their academic duties, are still expected to participate in committees and other decision-making structures set up to run the university. Whether the objective of these structures is increased efficiency (in economic terms) or the protection of scientific standards (to ensure the truth-seeking objectives of the university), will vary depending on non-academics' participation in the governance of the university and, of course, their own ideas of what the university as an organisation should achieve. In reality, neither financial nor intellectual imperatives dominate, and what plays out is most likely a combination of the two, with varying levels of dominance depending on local and national socio-economic context (see Jansen, 2023, for an extreme imbalance between scientific and economic objectives at selected universities in South Africa; one that results in the plundering of universities to serve the economic needs of impoverished communities).

In line with the above understanding, and following the discussions of the research group, we concur that collegiality can be conceived across two dimensions.

Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2023, Vol. 86), set out these two dimensions of collegiality: one arranged horizontally, and which relates to relationships between colleagues (often in the same sub-organisational unit or knowledge field), and the other arranged vertically, and in which relationships within organisational decision-making structures are comprised of both colleagues and other members of the same organisation. Horizontal collegiality is guided by a code of conduct while the vertical collegiality by a code of governance.

Vertical collegiality describes collegial relations between academic staff and university management (some of whom are former academics, although this may increasingly not be the case). Vertical relations exist for the purpose of organisational governance. Horizontal collegiality describes relations between academic staff, typically within faculties, departments or other organisational sub-units home to academics. Horizontal relations exist for the purpose of knowledge creation and transfer which, in turn, depends on self-governance according to a taken-for-granted code of conduct. These collegial relations extend beyond the university, most typically within defined fields of research specialisation and across a growing global network of scientists. Organisational collegiality is therefore place-bound to a greater degree than horizontal collegiality which most-often functions in a space of information flows, in effect, networks of scientific communication.

We present this graphically in Fig. 1. We place two contexts in which collegiality is shaped along the two axes: university–institutional and relational–science. We also indicate different governance outcomes dependent on the relationship between organisational and self-governance at any given university. In other words,

Fig. 1. Horizontal and Vertical Collegiality in the University.

we suggest that different configurations of strong and weak governance along each axis is possible and will result in different types of university collegiality:

1. University collegiality characterised by compliance to the command and control exerted at the level of organisational governance. In other words, strong organisational governance and weak self-governance, resulting in academics acquiescing to demands of university management and leadership. Hence: 'tame academics'. It should not be assumed that organisational governance is necessarily corporatist or market-driven, although this seems more likely than not to be the case.
2. University collegiality as stable – where both organisational and self-governance are seen to be strong, and where academics appear to be able to exist and function relatively comfortably in both governance domains thus exhibiting 'quantum' properties. As with most two-axes frameworks or models, the top-right quadrant may be seen as the ideal state. However, we do not suggest that is necessarily the case.
3. University collegiality characterised by strong self-governance with weak governance of the organisation. Academics in this scenario as seen to operating as relatively chaotic from an organisational point of view, which is not to suggest that they are not able to be productive.
4. University collegiality that is weak both in terms of self- and organisational governance, likely to be characteristic of a university in which both academics and management are frustrated (because of their ability to complete tasks) resulting in inertia.

Collegiality presents as an ideal social phenomenon through which to consider the interaction of relational and institutional social structures (Dusdal et al., 2021) or, more specifically between science as a communication network and the university as an organisation, two social spaces in which academics interact with one another on a daily basis as they pursue their overarching task of making new discoveries to establish new truths about the world.

Science arranged as a relational arrangement (i.e., network) of interconnected truth-seekers first emerged as a consequence of its shift to the public domain and the resultant axial role of communication (lectures, letters, articles and books) in the creation and validation of new scientific knowledge (Eamon, 1985). Communication between scientists gave rise to a formal publication system (academic journals), peer review and other mechanisms for the self-regulation of knowledge production (Eamon, 1985).

In a social system that is largely autonomous (science has carved out a monopoly over the validity of truth claims), self-regulated, and dependent on voluntary participation in many of its core activities (e.g., participation in the assessment of claims and in the formal evaluation of peers), norms are particularly salient and necessary in binding together the community of scientists (Anderson et al., 2007).

Whether the Mertonian norms still have a bearing on the behaviour of scientists may be questioned as their communication landscape has been disrupted fundamentally with the emergence of digital communication technologies and a global network.

Attention-seeking methods – often laden with emotion – have emerged as particularly effective, in a network in which anyone can communicate instantly and globally (Castells, 2009; Williams, 2018). Thinking, reflecting, placing oneself in the shoes of the other – dialecticism – and developing arguments over a period of reflection and revision that do not slide along on blame, slip into personal attributions and are not subject to the *kairos* of the digital world, are largely being lost. In the past, newspaper sub-editors were the gatekeepers: they checked facts, asked for evidence and penned headlines, and implicitly toed the institutional ideological line. The oversight of some journal editors plays an equally important gatekeeping function. The mediating role of these gatekeepers is now largely lost in the media and can no longer to be assumed in the case of academic journals. With it, due caution being applied to what is published is no longer self-evident. This is the democratising promise of open science, but it is not without risk, notably the misuse of unsettled science for ideological or nefarious ends.

In South African universities, identity politics is further destabilising and disrupting relations to the point at which it is no longer supportive of the productive communication. These changes are, as a consequence, undermining collegial relations as communication tends to serve self-interests or, at least, narrow interests, rather than the interests of the collective.

Merton's norms of science point to a particular understanding of the organisation of science – its institutional nature. Institutionalised science mainly assumes its structure in the form of the university. A rich literature exists which explores the institutional nature of the university. The main criticism of neoinstitutional theory is that does not adequately account for the agency of actors that function within institutional domains, and account predominantly for stability rather than for change. This has seen the development of new institutional theories (e.g., institutional logics, strategic action fields). However, attempts to apply multiple theories, including those that account for the new communication landscape in which science operates, are few and far between (Dusdal et al., 2021).

Nevertheless, if collegiality is nurtured and diffused through tacit social mechanisms (Bennett, 1998; Palfreyman & Tapper, 2014), then it seems plausible to persist with sociological theories to best understand its persistence, change or demise. Such theories must account for what Lazega (2020, p. 1) describes as 'our organisation societies [that] create a new of technocratic social order constructed through social engineering in which digital platforms [are] … reformatting individual and collective activities'. He suggests that what is needed is a redefinition of organisations through the joint regulation of 'stratigraphies' of collegial and bureaucratic regulation. Digital platforms are premised on new forms of communication; technocratic social order speaks to organisational structure. Joint regulation and stratigraphies imply the combination of different levels and types of thinking within a social arrangement. And, finally, as noted above, communication cannot be side lined in a study of the university as an organisation ostensibly designed to serve science.

Few attempts have been made to integrate communication into neoinstitutional approaches in organisational studies: attempts that do not cherry-pick

component parts of each theory to create an artificial amalgam. As Cornelissen et al. (2015, pp. 4–5) write:

> [G]reater attention to dynamics of communication has the potential to enhance the richness and explanatory power of our theories and models of institutions … where speech and other forms of symbolic interactions are not just seen as expressions or reflections of inner thoughts or collective intentions, but as potentially formative of institutional reality.

Ocasio et al. (2015) note that while communication in particular contexts has typically been considered as instantiating or reproducing institutional logics, the reverse argument, that communication constitutes logics, holds great potential for advancing our understanding of the durability and change of logics. Ocasio et al. (2015) formalise and elaborate theory on how specific processes of communication demarcate cognitive categories of understanding, help individuals form collective bonds or relationships around those categories, and link these categories to specific practices and experiences. These processes constitute the basis of how cognitive categories become culturally shared and conventional in institutional settings. The assumption is made that the communicative constitution of such categories is central to the establishment of common vocabularies of practice as well as broader institutional logics, or value sets and behaviours that are seen to govern practices in a particular setting.

Cornelissen et al. (2015) introduce the concept of 'communicative institutionalism'. They describe communication as a process through which collective forms such as institutions are constructed in and through interaction, instead of being a conduit for enacting discourses. They argue that attempts to bring communication into institutional theory tend to fall short because they do not account adequately for how communication constitutes the basis for institutional maintenance or change.

Such studies still subscribe to the view that institutions constitute the dominant form in which society is organised. They maintain a separation between institutions as one form of social organisation and, for example, networks as another. The various approaches do not attempt to bring together the two types of social organisation into either a single or complex-relational social structure. Nor do they explore the possibility of new organisational forms and theories, a possibility that is left open by Ashcraft et al. (2009, p. 22) who see communication as

> the ongoing, dynamic, interactive process of manipulating symbols toward the creation, maintenance, destruction, and/or transformation of meanings, which are axial – not peripheral – to organizational existence and organizing phenomena.

And yet, there are many similarities, just as there are notable differences between institutions and communication networks. Cornelissen et al. (2015) and Castells (1996) regard communication as formative of social organisation. The difference is that in the former the social form assumed is the institution and, in the latter, a network. Both networks and institutions are social arrangements consisting of social actors. The behaviour of actors in both institutions and networks are prescribed by logics in the case of the former and by programs in the case of

the latter. Both have self-defined rules for inclusion and, by implication, exclusion. Neither is dependent on individual actors for their survival.

There are differences also. Networks are more adaptable and flexible – they can rapidly delete and add nodes to adapt to external shocks. Institutions are also resilient but because they are risk-averse and slow to adapt. In other words, institutions are cumbersome, their default position is to resist change emanating from external pressures. Control in networks is arranged horizontally or, to be more precise, is determined by the position of some nodes/actors in relation to others. Control in organisations is arranged vertically with actors occupying higher positions exerting control over those below them.

Two sociological perspectives are therefore brought to bear on the collegiality framework: neoinstitutionalism and the network society. These are broad theoretical swathes representing different ways of thinking about the social world rather than neatly articulated sociological theories. They also are 'practiced' in different scientific disciplines. Two specific schools of thought within each approach and with equal explanatory promise stand out from the more expansive approaches: the institutional logics perspective advanced by Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury and others (Thornton et al., 2012), and Manuel Castell's work on the network society (Castells, 1996, 2009). They are selected because they are grounded in two key issues directly relevant to collegiality.

Institutional logics speaks to issues of organisational governance within the institutional domain of the university, a domain in which multiple logics (professional, market, corporate) compete. Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p. 101), drawing on their previous work, define institutional logics as the

> socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences.

More recently, Haveman and Gaultieri (2017, p. 2), define institutional logics as

> systems of cultural elements (values, beliefs, and normative expectations) by which people, groups, and organizations make sense of and evaluate their everyday activities, and organize those activities in time and space.

Institutional logics are socially constructed, based on a shared, interpersonal understanding of social objects. Each institution has a central logic that can be used to explain relationships on individual, organisational and societal levels. Importantly, 'organizations create constraints and opportunities for individual action, while societies create constraints and opportunities for organizational action' (Haveman & Gaultieri, 2017, p. 11; see also Friedland & Alford, 1991). Because society-level institutions may have contradictory logics, the theory accommodates for agency – individuals and organisations can play institutions off against each other and interpret logics in a manner to achieve a desired goal (Friedland & Alford, 1991).

Castells' theory of the network society speaks to issues of the functioning of science as a global, real-time communication network. It is within this network that the academic professionals employed by universities do much of their work. Castells (2009) proposes the existence of multiple global communication networks that are shaping society. The different communication networks function

according to different programs, programs that are determined for each network by those who exert network-making power (Castells, 2009). Castells (2004, pp. 32–33) describes the creation of network programs and the centrality of communication in this process as follows:

> In the network society, culture is by and large embedded in the processes of communication, […] with the media and the internet at its core. So, ideas may be generated from a variety of origins, and linked to specific interests and subcultures […]. Yet, they are processed in society through their treatment in the realm of communication. And, ultimately, they reach the constituencies of each network on the basis of the exposure of these constituencies to the processes of communication. […] [T]he process of communication in society, and the organizations of this process of communication (often, but not only, the media), are the key fields in which programming projects are formed, and where constituencies are built for these projects. They are the fields of power in the network society.

A network is therefore defined by the program that assigns its goals and rules of performance. A network's program consists of codes for the evaluation of performance and criteria for success or failure in the network. To transform the outcomes of any specific network, a new program emanating from outside the network must displace the existing program of the network, and control over communication is a key determinant in the outcome of any attempted displacement.

To be clear, in conducting academic work, there is no primacy of institutional logics over network programs. The logics of institutional domains co-exist with network programs which, in turn, shape the flows of information in different communication networks. This is analogous to existing in a quantum state – academics are required to navigate the institutional logics that permeate the university as organisation while simultaneously navigating the network programs that define their communication in the global community of university academics. For now, it remains an empirical question how network programs are formed and, of relevance, whether their formation takes shape under the influence of pre-existing institutional domains and their associated logics.

For science, and in the organisational setting of the university, the emergence and entrenchment of digital communication networks in society have had a series of impacts on its communication. The digitisation of the traditional media and the advent of online social networks have further disrupted the communication of science (Brossard, 2013; Scheufele, 2013; Southwell, 2017) and are likely to continue to play a part as the use of social media (or similar future communication technologies) in the general population becomes normalised. As socially constructed space, the relationships between social actors in the networks of communication in the age of information (Castells, 2009) and attention (Williams, 2018; Wu, 2016) is the key to understanding collegial relations within universities that are increasingly part of the global science network.

METHODS

A relatively recent event provides the 'data' for our study. The event relates to the publication of a controversial journal article by an academic at the UCT in the *South African Journal of Science* (*SAJS*). UCT is the oldest university in South

Africa and the most prestigious university in Africa, if the global rankings are anything to go by. It is certainly one of the most research productive universities in South Africa. In apartheid South Africa, UCT was a white, liberal university, often in opposition to the ruling Nationalist government. Any claims that it is a highly politicised university are therefore not new. The journal article in question and the ensuing controversy was selected because it surfaces a number of underlying issues which need to be addressed from a broader sociological perspective and it provides an informative case to explore the nuances of university collegiality in South Africa.

The data comprises the official statements, publications and the public polemics that followed the publication of the paper. These are listed in Appendix 1. We draw on several documentary exhibits to study both vertical and horizontal collegiality, while being mindful of their possible intersection.

The approach of relying on the rhetoric and discourses prevalent in primary source material is an approach aligns with recommendations by Cornelissen et al. (2015, pp. 23–24) that:

> One potential application of studying discourse and rhetoric in connection with institutions is analysis of the communicative construction of institutional logics … [A] promising avenue concerns the study of multi-level phenomena like institutional maintenance and transformation where at macro-levels of analysis logics can be seen as structuring dimensions whereas at micro-level of analysis logics may be more like discursive or argumentative flows.

The word 'flows' here is key. It opens up the possibility of analysing at the macro-level the influence of institutional logics on actors (e.g., the university) and the networked flow of information (communication) between those actors (e.g., in science), while acknowledging that there is both a duality and interaction between macro-level logics and micro-level communication. In this manner, the publication of a single controversial paper (the action), triggers communication events that are likely to leave traces which are informative about the nature of vertical collegiality – in the response of university leadership, management and staff – and about horizontal collegiality – in the responses of university academics primarily directed at their peers. The former takes place within an institutional context governed by logics whereas the latter takes place in a global communication network governed by a program of truth-seeking.

'THE NATTRASS AFFAIR'

The case study under examination is the publication of a controversial journal article – 'Why are black South African students less likely to consider studying biological sciences?' – by UCT eco-economist, Prof. Nicoli Nattrass.

The Nattrass article, labelled an exploratory study and published in the *SAJS* as a 'commentary' in May 2020, claimed that the reasons black students are less likely to consider studying biological sciences are associated with materialist values and attitudes to local wildlife (including pets) (Nattrass, 2020a).

The first salvo was launched by UCT's vice-chancellor who tried to pressure the journal's editor into withdrawing the article. An almost simultaneous

pincer-like attack came from the anonymous Black Academic Caucus (BAC) at UCT (Moosa, 2020). Their letter, published on Twitter, opened with the line 'Racism in the academic space has reared its head once again'. The main intention of the statement was to express cultural and political outrage. The response of the both the university executive and the BAC were framed by politician Belinda Bezzoli and others as a violation of academic freedom.

Nattrass' counter-attack was no less vitriolic nor any more concerned with science than the BAC's criticism. She claimed that the BAC has been transformed from a disruptive movement – albeit one that had had its productive moments – into a clandestine grouping which resembled the secretive, influential and highly divisive Afrikaner Broederbond, a group that had guided the ruling National Party during apartheid (Nattrass, 2020c).

The Nattrass commentary touched a raw historical nerve. According to Cloete (2020), comparing the BAC to the nefarious Broederbond was as outrageous as claiming that 'blacks' don't want to study biological sciences (see also Benson et al., 2020; Morris, 2020). Nattrass' accusations and defence of herself gained some media traction. Her Broederbond analogy was repeated; and she was portrayed as a lone academic, suffering a level of persecution endured by Jewish academics.

The absurdity of these arguments – how they misread power relations and deliberately produced distorted historical analogies – was well argued in a response by a group of progressive academics. They asserted that the unsubstantiated ahistoricisms, with their tendentious inversions of black/white, Jewish/German, represented part of a broader conservative discourse. A discourse that sought to weaponise academic freedom to prevent any threats to white privilege at universities.

Others pointed out that, from a purely scientific point of view, Nattrass' exploratory study broke the basic rules of social science research: generalising to a whole population from a small unrepresentative sample, and linking it to a racial stereotype. Nattrass was accused of doing bad science (see, e.g., Adesina, 2020a; McKaiser, 2020; Mothapo et al., 2020; Seale, 2020). In his review of the controversy, Crowe (2020) stated that 'No academic familiar with conservation biology has endorsed the Commentary as biologically, educationally or sociologically valuable research'.

Others responded in terms of rules of engagement and academic freedom (e.g., Essop & Long, 2020a, 2020b; Saunderson-Meyer, 2020). Nattrass (2020b, 2020c) denied that she claimed the sample was representative, despite referring to 'black' students in the article's title, implying validity for a whole population. She also drew attention to the fact that the article had sailed through the university's ethics review committee. Nattrass' claimed, *inter alia*, that the UCT Executive had 'broken down' and that there were 'inadequate formal channels' (Crowe, 2020). She described its actions as an 'unprocedural and prejudicial witch-hunt' and an 'abuse of power' in its 'public condemnation' of her and her research (Crowe, 2020). The Executive's statement was a 'totally inappropriate public statement of censure in advance of any substantive investigation' (Crowe, 2020). Nattrass chose to respond to the Executive and to her attackers in an open letter (published in the media) (Nattrass, 2020c; also see Plaut, 2020), on radio (Radio 702, 2022) and in

the journal (Nattrass, 2020c) in which her article first appeared (although there was also clearly private correspondence between Nattrass and the university).

The Psychological Society of South Africa and others called for the article to be retracted. The *SAJS* opted not to retract the article amidst the controversy (Kretzmann, 2020). Instead, it published in a Special Issue (July 2020) 12 responses to the Nattrass article. Two responses defended her right to publish, without commenting on the methods Essop & Long, (2020b) and Midgley, (2020), wrote political rather than methodological responses); while the other 10 rejected her article, raising the question of how the journal could publish a 'study' of such poor quality. Criticisms were mounted about the sampling method; the misinterpretation of the data; the lack of knowledge about the literature on career aspirations of black students; and the fact that black students are very well represented in biological and wildlife courses at many other universities. Three responses included the phrase 'bad science' in their titles and a fourth, by a prominent South African higher educationalist, called the study 'intellectual laziness and academic dishonesty'.

The *SAJS* did release a statement that in addition to publishing the special issue, it would review its policy regarding the publication of commentaries, which do not require peer review

> to distinguish more clearly between 'views regarding scientific challenges or opportunities that have arisen out of research experiences' and those that 'present the summarised results of research projects, or comments on such research findings, that have direct policy implications and/or immediate social value'. (Carruthers & Mouton, 2020)

One notable response to the article was penned by two black academics (Essop & Long, 2020a, 2020b). They wrote that the UCT Executive and the BAC do not speak on their behalf. Since universities are, by design, places of 'discomfort' at which academic, political and social boundaries are tested, uncomfortable questions are posed and received truths are challenged, they were 'not offended' by the article. They went on to state that the BAC tweets and the UCT Executive Statement are 'outrage porn' typical of social media that has 'clearly begun to infiltrate the academic project. And that is a prospect that should concern us all' (Essop & Long, 2020a).

DISCUSSION

The case of the Nattrass Affair reflects a fundamental contradiction: attempts by South African universities to create non-racial collegial campuses while at the same time research continues to hone in on racial demographics that perpetuate a discourse of difference, competition and historical categorisation. To provide some structure to a discussion of this inherent contradiction in the light of the Nattrass Affair, we present the insights be gained by considering for each of the main actions during the Affair, how the process may have unfolded differently, that is, in a manner that indicates strong and stable organisational and self-governance. Or, stated in terms of the specific interest of this paper, how could the matter have been handled in a collegial manner?

1. *The publication of the article*

One of the recurrent recommendations from the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) has been that the *SAJS* format is the ideal, that is, it accommodates book reviews, research letters, commentaries, editorials and other short interventions. The objective of this catholic scope is to broaden content in line with the Academy's open science policy. The journal's 'front section' has achieved this goal, evident in the Nattrass' commentary that attracted thousands of views and that generated the non-peer-reviewed special edition in which the merits and demerits of the study were debated.

In an ideal situation, when confronted with the article submitted by Nattrass, one would assume that the editor would have reached out to colleagues at the journal to seek their advice on whether (or how) to publish it. Presumably they would have advised against publication based on the empirical nature of the article which does not appear to be suitable as a commentary (Cherry, 2022), or to give the author the option to resubmit as an article which would then be subject to peer review. A less sympathetic editor may simply have rejected the article based on the generalisations made from a small sample defined in terms of race.

That the article was not peer reviewed lets the academic community off the hook. But it does not account for the decision-making processes of the journal. Of concern are claims of personal networks influencing editorial objectivity, founded on the fact that Nattrass and the editor concerned had previously worked together as co-authors. While this claim may be reaching at straws, it is the first possible instance of personal influence in decision-making in place of a decision taken in the interests of science. In relation to collegiality, it hints at the risk of convivial decision-making in the self-governed community of scientists – and without scientific merit as a shield, the commentary is all the more likely to trigger a polemic of identity politics.

SAJS is a fully open access journal and the commentary was therefore openly accessible via the *SAJS* website. On the one hand, it could be argued that its accessibility increased exposure to the article. On the other hand, it raises questions about the diversity of actors drawn into the polemic and whether this dislocated the subsequent communication into other networks that fed off the attention that the controversy attracted rather than the scientific (de)merits of the article following what appeared to be failed self-governance in the scientific community.

In sum, the publication of a potentially contentious article without peer review and open accessibly, exposed weakened self-governance (horizontal collegiality) in this particular case.

2. *The Cast of Commentators*

Participating in the ensuing debate were university management and leadership; academics from multiple disciplines and universities, in their individual capacities or as representatives of academic organisations; ASSAf and *SAJS* representatives; journalists and politicians. Such a diversity of actors inevitably pushes communication beyond a communication network with a singular program (e.g., truth-seeking; responsible information sharing) into the lowest-common-denominator

communication network: social media (compromised of well-known social media platforms but also the online news media inextricably linked to those platforms). In the social media network, attention is the overarching program (Williams, 2018; Wu, 2016), and attention is more readily corralled by small, highly active groups (van Schalkwyk, 2019). Communication also tends to become highly personal and socially distanced, removing any rules of engagement and potentially leading to a level of brutishness unlikely to occur in face-to-face encounters. Scientists are not spared. Networked digital communications surrounding contentious and sensitive political issues are more likely to creative rifts between academics; rifts that can unsettle collegial relations in the workplace.

The contemporary communication landscape clearly places new and greater responsibility on scientists and their institutions, who are increasingly active in communicating with the 'end user' and who are not always well-prepared to deal with the dynamics and potential risks of such engagement. During the heated debate that ensued about vaccination in Italy in 2016, an immunologist who had committed to engage in discussion through his own Facebook page eventually decided to abruptly cancel all comments by claiming, 'Here only those who have studied can comment, not the common citizen. Science is not democratic' (Bucchi, 2018, p. 892).

And yet scientists are drawn to and are encouraged to participate in the (social) media (Weingart et al., 2021). To some extent, the benefits are obvious. The new media provides a relatively pervasive and user-friendly network with low barriers of entry. Participating in these communication networks makes possible connections across the scientific community, possibly useful in the dissemination and discovery of new truth claims, and for crossing paths with potential collaborators. In effect, the (social) media provides a new mechanism for community-building, for nurturing collegiality. At the same time, however, the (social) media as a global online communication network does not follow the same program as the global science network. It is a space of information flows where organised dogmatism, rather than organised scepticism, flourishes because of the social media's attention imperative.

Again, communication in a network of heterogeneous actors and devoid of any generally established and accepted rules of engagement has the potential to disrupt self-governance and undermine collegial relations.

3. *The Actions of BAC*

The BAC from the outset might have been attuned to the communication dynamics described above by releasing their statement on Twitter. In an ideal situation, the BAC may have chosen to communicate in private with the university executive or with the journal's editor; and resorting to other communication channels only in the event that their initial attempts proved ineffective. Either way, the BAC was probably always more interested in the Nattrass article for its political value rather than as a lesson on the importance of the scientific method. As such, it always stood to benefit more by directing the debate towards a highly heterogeneous, (relatively) unregulated communication network. Journalist Paul Trewhela (2020) points to the possible dangers for collegiality and the university:

> When academics at a university hide their names in a political group before they go on Twitter to condemn a commentary in *The South African Journal of Science* by a professor at the same university … then that university is on a downward slope.

Strategic communication choices aside, the evident non-existence or non-use of existing formal organisational channels of communication between the BAC and UCT's executive, suggests weak or ineffective organisational structures to support the governance of the university.

4. *The Actions of the University Leadership (Executive)*

Ideally, the university would have communicated its response to the BAC, and its position in relation to an article published by one its own, within the organisational communication channels of the university. It may also have instituted a formal review of ethics clearance processes at the university. As it happened, it chose to release a public statement, thereby keeping the debate active outside of the university in the unregulated communication networks with different programs.

The position taken by the university leadership comes across as duplicitous, and therefore typically political rather than scientific. On the one hand, it seeks to placate the BAC and avert any further escalation of the matter by siding with the BAC and distancing the university from the article. On the other hand, it affirms the use of academic fora for robust debate. This position is, however, somewhat weakened given that the statement was made after attempts by the executive to have the article retracted. A similar tactic was followed by the BAC – it sent a letter to a senior *politician* calling on him to withdraw the publication from the *SAJS*. This shows a willingness on the part of the executive (and the BAC) to step outside of organisational governance procedures to meddle in and politicise the established communication practices of the scientific network. It is difficult to see how such action can be construed as strong organisational governance or, at least, governance in the interests of science and the academics of UCT.

5. *The Actions of the Ethics Committee*

One of Nattrass' arguments in her defence was that her research (and by implication her article) had gone through and been approved by the relevant organisational structure within the university responsible for ethical clearance. In simple terms, the ideal would have been for the research ethics committee to have turned down Nattrass' application on grounds of a weak and/or unethical methodology. If it was a preliminary study, as claimed by Nattrass, then final approval could have been subject to a revised methodology after a pilot study. The reality reveals further evidence of ad hominin organisational governance.

What emerged during the Nattrass Affair, with particular reference to the process of ethical clearance, was a vitriolic exchange between Nattrass and the DVC for research at UCT. Their communication was characterised by personal attacks, perhaps again made easier for the anomic nature of the communication. Nattrass accused the DVC of having a 'conflict of interest' and 'hijacking' the investigation into her potentially inappropriate actions. She called for the DVC to consider 'resigning' because the DVC had 'taken the leading role in the flawed process

leading to a flawed statement', 'wrestled control over the Research Misconduct investigation away from the responsible faculty, in violation of the university's procedures' and 'initiated an investigation into me, with what can reasonably be seen as the objective of providing post hoc justification' (all extracts from Nattrass' open letter to Prof. Sue Harrison on 19 June 2020, quoted in Crowe, 2020).

In the relation to the actions of the ethics committee and the ensuing exchanges during the polemic, informal and personal tête-à-têtes and point-scoring are evident in place of depersonalised, constructive communication directed at resolving the issue at hand.

6. *The Decision by SAJS Not to Retract the Article*

Instead of withdrawing the paper, *SAJS*' editor-in-chief and its Editorial Advisory Board chairperson published a special issue of *SAJS* titled 'The Intellectual and Social Critique: The Role of the *South African Journal of Science*'. They argued that publishing a special issue was in 'the interest of fair scholarly discourse' and that it 'facilitated wide participation by publishing this unprecedented special issue' (Carruthers & Mouton, 2020). It remains unclear whether 'widening' debate was in any way more effective than retracting the article. The decision by *SAJS* could easily be read as prolonging a political debate, something one might expect of a news outlet and not of a journal expected to take decisions informed by the scientific merits of the article. Such a strategy invited a diversity of actors and opinions into the debate at the expense of reasoned and reasonable debate intent on reaching consensus based on the scientific merits of the article.

7. *Nattrass' Communication Tactics*

Nattrass claimed that her open letter addressed to the UCT DVC of research (19 June) was necessitated by 'a series of [unanswered] emails and detailed private letters'. She described the executive's actions as an 'unprocedural and prejudicial witch-hunt' and a 'public condemnation' of her and her research (Plaut, 2020).

Seale (2020) questioned Nattrass for responding in the media to criticism of her commentary. Her approach reads as strategic in that it exploits many communication channels – both within and without those of the university. It also often reads as personally charged.

8. *Decision by Some Academics to Speak Out*

Academic rules of engagement suggest that criticism should at first have been raised in *SAJS*: 'If Nattrass' commentary was so ill-informed, it should have been coolly dismantled in the pages of the *South African Journal of Science*' (Essop & Long, 2020a). Science progresses through dialogue, dialectical argument and debate. Essop and Long (2020a) cautioned that 'it is significant that intellectuals now see fit to take their first responses to news outlets rather than academic journals'.

Both examples emerge in the Nattrass Affair. Some academics took up the opportunity to write critical responses in the special issue of *SAJS*. Others – all

former UCT academics – came to Nattrass' defence (Welsh et al., 2020). They were 'deeply disturbed' by the Executive's complaints to the *SAJS* about the Commentary and emphasise Nattrass' caveat that the Commentary is 'exploratory' and its findings 'tentative'. Regardless of the Commentary's scholarly merits, 'the reaction of UCT's executive to the article was extraordinary' because

> it claimed that that it was offensive to black students at UCT, to black people in general and could be inferred as racist in character. Nattrass's academic history argues strongly for rejecting any such characterization. (Welsh et al., 2020)

Their 'principal objection to the executive's action' is the belief that 'it – or an influential group of students or academics can block the publication or circulation of an article'. They 'reject in principle the executive's right to engage in this form of censorship'. They conclude as follows: 'The episode amounts to a violation of academic freedom, which is protected by Section 16(1)d of the Constitution. We look forward to hearing UCT's Academic Freedom Committee's views' (Welsh et al., 2020). The article was published by the academics on the website Politicsweb.

9. *Silent Students*

Tomaselli (2021) notes that in the case of the UKZN merger which resulted in squeezing the academic project between centralising managerialism and an alienated labour force, students were muted. The UKZN merger took place before the (re)mobilisation of students and recurring activism – particularly at UCT – following the protests of 2015. Recent student activism has injected identity politics into university life, destabilised staff relations, and left many a university management uncertain about how and which university constituency to placate. Surprisingly, the student voice is absent from the Nattrass Affair. Perhaps the fact that the affair played out during the COVID-19 pandemic when campuses were closed provides part of the explanation. Not that this would have prevented students from using the event for political gain on social media platforms.

10. *Silent Academics*

As indicated above, some academics did speak out. Few of them were, however, active members of UCT's academic staff at the time. In other words, little was heard from within the academy, either from academics in their individual capacities or via any of the formal organisational structures available to them for doing so. Two UCT deans spoke out against the Nattrass article, and on neither occasion was there the kind of response that one would have expected from academic quarters. As Cherry (2020) observed:

> In universities – which are collegial institutions – executives, deans and departmental heads can make statements […] but they are expected to consult widely before doing so. They are also answerable to the university senate, faculty and department, respectively: any of these bodies could request retraction of a statement which it deemed inappropriate or unfair. But none appears to have done so.

Cherry (2020) concludes his commentary on the response of UCT academics as follows: 'For the silence from Nattrass's own colleagues at UCT is deafening.

Are they really convinced that she acted in bad faith, despite all evidence to the contrary? Or are they petrified of retribution?' Fear may account for the BAC's anonymity. A chaotic and unsupportive response from the UCT executive and a few academics on a highly political topic, may have instilled fear in most academics. It is hard to believe that they would not have been aware of the furore. However, Tomaselli (2022) writes:

> If nothing else, silence is not a characteristic response within South African universities. But we do need to restore or recreate rules of engagement if we are to keep dialogue in play and to strengthen universities as cauldrons of dialectical collaboration as we face down multiple interacting crises that incorporate issues of identity in scientific discourse and practices previously unaccustomed to such discursive insertions.

Silence (and inaction) are not typical evidence of strong and effective organisational governance. On this basis, the case of the Nattrass Affair appears to be indicative of weak organisational (vertical) governance.

11. *Returning to the Collegiality Framework*

In the case of UCT, an analysis of the communications surrounding the Nattrass Affair shows that organisational governance is fractured. A highly politicised academic group chose to engage the university's executive anonymously via a social media platform. The university executive chose to communicate in public fora, as did the author of the article that stirred the controversy. The author claimed that internal communication structures for resolving conflict were engaged and found wanting, and that the organisational structure that approved her research was a space for protecting the personal reputations of the executive while rubbishing her own. The executive also stepped outside of its own lane when it approached the *SAJS* with a request to retract the article, seemingly in a move to protect the university rather than letting the science communication system deal with the matter on the basis of the article's scientific merit.

This situation not only created confusion in the academic heartland, it also created a more widely held perception that the university lacks decisive leadership, effective organisational structures for managing the university, and, as a consequence, that the academic project of the university is under threat. When its own academics publish articles and books about the chaos and demise of their university, they add more fuel to the fire. In other words, the traditionally dominant logic-tensions between the professions, market and the university as corporation (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) are added to and disrupted by the logic of politics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). This suggests an organisation-level interplay between contradictory logics, and while these logics may place limits on the choices available to individuals, groups and organisations, they also provide the opportunity for actors to construct and reconstruct logics in new ways (Haveman & Gaultieri, 2017). In short, based on the case presented in this paper, organisational governance at UCT is being derailed (or renegotiated) and appears to be highly personal, which is to say, highly politicised.

The picture in the communication network of science reveals greater decisiveness and a lesser degree of politicisation. But it is not without its own problems.

The personal relationship between the author and journal editor raises a possible red flag. Certainly, the decision to publish Nattrass' research as a non-peer-reviewed commentary is questionable. And the decision not to retract the article and to publish a special issue for 'wide' interest could be contested but it did, at the very least, create a moderate(d) space, within the rules of the game, for communication between academics.

The above suggests, at least in the case of the Nattrass Affair, weak organisational governance combined with relatively strong self-governance, although there is some evidence to support weakening self-governance as communication shifts into new communication networks in which information flows are propelled by programs not necessarily aligned with the scientific endeavour. According to the proposed framework, the resulting outcome in terms of collegiality at UCT, is a state of relative chaos characterised by entitled academics, moving towards a state of inertia characterised by academics frustrated by weak governance.

CONCLUSION

Universities are becoming more heterogenous – in post-apartheid South African universities relations are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, class and gender. This may be beneficial for the global science network if, as Castells (2009) suggests, communication networks are defined by and depend on heterogeneity to function effectively. Without difference, networks collapse into a single, large node to become a collective or a commune rather than a network (Stalder, 2006). A diversity of nodes (or would-be nodes) in the global science network poses a possible threat to science as new social movements (that in effect drive their own political agendas) attempt to introduce new epistemologies (e.g., decolonised knowledge) to challenge the program of the network (i.e., scientific knowledge). As Cloete (2020) writes:

> This episode certainly raises questions about the state of social science at UCT; and, even more seriously, exposes a racial/cultural fault line amongst academics. Within the larger academic corpus there are (presumably) minority groups such as the rather populist BAC which, unlike Fanon and Biko, seem not to concentrate on analysis, but rather on diagnosing and declaring racism. Ensuring desirable degrees of collegiality within such a conflicted late postmodern environment driven by identity politics is a challenge to normal science.

Whether these challenges can reprogram the network, or whether they will ultimately be excluded, is an open question. The possible outcome of just enough diversity to create highly polarised communes is equally concerning.[1]

What this does suggest in terms of collegiality, is that collegiality in the global science communication network is one that is likely to be more diverse and will not resemble communes, collectives or even tribes that minimise difference and value consensus. This also implies that scientists who participate in and contribute to the self-governed global science communication network are to a large extent buffered from the goings on in their local university. Not so in the case of organisational governance.

It certainly emerges that heterogeneity is posing challenges for organisational governance. The Nattrass version certainly paints a picture of an organisation struggling to govern, a concern echoed more recently by others (see, e.g., Benatar, 2021; Davis, 2022). It could well be that greater heterogeneity in a highly politicised climate such as the one that prevails in South Africa, poses a greater threat to existing power structures or to institutionalised cultures within the university. This is reminiscent of Trow's conundrum of advocating for massification and diversity while clearly being anxious about the impact on elite institutions (his own included).

In both cases – self-governance and organisational governance – different communities talk past one another. Rules of engagement, whether those that emerge from expected practice in science or from the prevailing logics steering decision-making in the university, are too readily ignored when the university becomes a highly politised space. One of the attendants at the March meeting once said by way of an urgent reminder to South African universities, their leaders and academics:

> A university is where reason triumphs over rage, where our common humanity matters more than do differences. … When you refuse to meet and engage with your academic colleagues because they hold different opinions from you or are even critical of your work, then you undermine the idea of a university. (Jonathan Jansen, as paraphrased by Swingler, 2019)

Relying on an understanding of the network society and its emphasis on communication networks is a relatively novel approach to explaining a social phenomenon – collegiality – situated within an institutional setting – the university. To avoid unproductive and toxic environments for its academics, South Africa's universities will have to respond more constructively to the contradiction of promoting collegiality within a redress policy framework that promotes (and reinforces) apartheid-era racial and ethnic stereotypes over logics and a program that place at their centre and give rise to communication that supports the truth-seeking endeavours of science rather than the personal gains of politics or the attention-seeking motives inherent in popular digital communication networks. In closing, these are challenges not only for South African universities; universities across the globe must increasingly deal with political intrusions from across the spectrum in a radically altered communication landscape.

POST-SCRIPT

As we were putting the finishing touches to this paper, a new book titled *Corrupted: A Study of Dysfunction in South African Universities* was published in South Africa (Jansen, 2023). The book describes how several South African universities have become wracked by chronic stakeholder conflict, captured councils, ongoing student protests, violent confrontation and campus closures. These universities are typically located in poorer areas of the country, and they are sites of ruthless competition for scarce resources. Presumably under these extreme conditions, the notion of collegiality takes on a completely different meaning.

NOTE

1. See, for example, https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/.

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APPENDIX 1: SOURCE MATERIAL

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GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE UNIVERSITIES

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on governance in higher education in China. It sees that governance as distinctive on the world scale and the potential source of distinctiveness in other domains of higher education. By taking an historical approach, reviewing relevant literature and drawing on empirical research on governance at one leading research university, the paper discusses system organisation, government–university relations and the role of the Communist Party (CCP), centralisation and devolution, institutional leadership, interior governance, academic freedom and responsibility, and the relevance of collegial norms. It concludes that the party-state and Chinese higher education will need to find a Way in governance that leads into a fuller space for plural knowledges, ideas and approaches. This would advance both indigenous and global knowledge, so helping global society to also find its Way.

 Keywords: Higher education; higher education system; governance; government higher education policy; regulation of higher education; China; university autonomy; academic freedom

INTRODUCTION

Is there or can there be a distinctive Chinese higher education? On one hand China has the oldest continuous higher education tradition in the world, if 'continuous' is interpreted broadly. The state academies that trained scholar-officials have been traced back as far as the Western Zhou dynasty (1047–772 BCE). On the other hand, when China began to build modern universities at the end of the Qing dynasty (1636–1912 CE), in terms of form they were transplants from the West. German, British, French and United States' (US) prototypes left their mark. Japan was another influence. Later, after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949 Soviet Russian models of higher education and research were dominant for a time. Still later, in the global opening after 1977, US institutional models patterned reform and development, and the Shanghai ranking launched in 2003 (Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), 2023) defined the 'world-class university' in terms of the norms of the Anglo-American science university.

China's universities now excel in the ARWU ranking. One interpretation is that China does Western science very well. Yet China has a matchless scholarly heritage, and science and higher education grew more rapidly after the mid-1990s than they have ever done in a Western (Euro-American) country, indicating an indigenous dynamic (Marginson, 2011).

The East/West patterning is read in various ways. Mei Yiqi, an influential president of Tsinghua University, said in 1941 that 'today's Chinese higher education, tracing its origin, is actually imported from the West'. However, he added:

> The system and the spirit are two different things. As far as the system is concerned, there is certainly no similar structures in the history of Chinese education. But as far as the spirit is concerned, the experience of civilized mankind is more or less the same, and there is a lot to share.

('**今日中国之大学教育**, **溯其源流**, 实自西洋移植而来, 顾制度为一事, 而精神又为一事。就制度°言, 中国教育史中固不见有形式相似之组织, **就精神言**, 则文明人类之经验大致相同, 而事有可通者' 。《大学一解》) (Mei, 1941)

Moving in the other direction, today's party-state in China calls for world-class universities with 'Chinese characteristics' (Kirby, 2022). This raises the question of what are those Chinese characteristics, and whether they are ancient, or modern, or both. For Rui Yang (2022b), a feature of Chinese culture is its capacity to take in multiple elements and develop new combinations. The practical reconciliation of diverse ideas, as distinct from the Euro-American habit of singular, universalising frameworks and methods, is itself a core Chinese cultural trait (Hayhoe, 2011). Yang sees Chinese universities as creatively fusing indigenous and Euro-American elements. In future this will enable them 'to bring into the global community aspects of their rich educational and cultural heritage' (R. Yang, 2022b, p. 117) – providing they fully engage with that heritage. Only when Chinese universities reach their own deep roots can they achieve luxuriant leaves (Wang, 2004; Yang, R. 2011b).

The strands of East and West are each multiple and part of both the past and the present. China's higher education is shaped by Chinese statecraft, Confucian self-cultivation in the home, and social relations both continuous and ever

changing (Wen, 2013), plus twentieth century Leninism which entered China from Russia, neoliberal modernisation and new public management, and state-driven internationalisation (Wen et al., 2023). The point is though that the reconciliation is China-determined. 'The emphasis on agency and diversity is essential to understand the Chinese reinvention of tradition in a context of global modernity' (Muhlhahn, 2019, p. 350).

This paper focuses on governance in higher education in China. It sees that governance as distinctive on the world scale and the potential source of distinctiveness in other domains, though that latter potential is yet to be fully realised. Governance takes into account culture and structure, and social relations and human behaviours that are affected by both (Bess, 1988). The paper discusses government–university relations and the role of the CCP, centralisation and devolution, institutional leadership, interior governance, academic freedom and responsibility, and the relevance of collegial norms. But first there is a prior question: *how* to understand and investigate higher education governance in China.

The Western-Centric Lens

The 'West' is a loaded, constructed, and debateable concept (Hall, 1992). There is internal diversity and differences among the West in terms of governance, autonomy and academic freedom. For example, in terms of university governance there exist at least four different models, Humboldt, Napoleon, US and UK, and there exist various traditions of and perceptions towards institutional autonomy and academic freedom. There have been historical variations and there are significant differences among countries. However, for many non-Western countries, the West is both hegemonic and threatening, powers that have created damage and inspire caution, as well as models that have left imprints and still need to be learnt from or collaborated with (Marginson & Xu, 2022). Westerners have also taken attitudes to China that have been similar, all positioning Western tradition as superior. It is in this sense that the West/non-West distinction is important and is applied in this paper.

In a comparison of 20 higher education systems, Shin and Kim (2018, pp. 232–233) establish three categories in relation to governance. The first is 'collegial governance' in which managers control finance and personnel while the faculty are supreme in other domains. This category includes only Japan, Taiwan and Finland. In the second group, 'managerial governance', managers are the main actors in decision-making but faculty exercise some influence. This includes the Anglophone and most European systems, Brazil and Argentina, and South Korea and Hong Kong SAR in East Asia. In the third category 'bureaucratic governance' is characterised by 'strong managerial power with state influence and minimal influence from academics' and 'strong top-down decision-making patterns'. This group includes Mexico, Malaysia and China. But does context play any role in the comparison? Can all systems be validly arranged on a single grid on the basis of a fixed set of criteria? Is the role of government in higher education a constant differing only in quantity? Are grass-roots power and top-down decision-making power always zero-sum in relation to each other?

After two years in China from 1919 to 1921, the foremost Euro-American philosopher of education in the twentieth century, John Dewey, reached the conclusion that 'China can be understood only in terms of the institutions and ideas which have been worked out in its own historical evolution'; and Chinese politics 'has to be understood in terms of itself', not translated into an 'alien' political classification (Wang, 2007, p. 76). Harvard historian John Fairbank stated that 'our first requirement, then, if we are to understand China, is to try to avoid imposing a European scale of judgment' (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 47). Ka Ho Mok (2021) comments that

> the conceptual tools adopted from international literature with very different historical, institutional and political orientations would not be appropriate for analysing the unique state-education market and university relationships in China.

Harvard political scientist Elizabeth Perry (2020) may disagree. For her the fundamental explanatory categories are the Manichean US distinction between free democracy and authoritarianism. In this mode of thought egalitarian social democratic Finland is equivalent to plutocratic United States, where money controls both sides of the aisle, and the non-contestable polities are also of a type. Perry's contribution is to modify the ideological assumption that higher education can only flourish under liberal democracy. She notes that 'authoritarian' regimes also foster higher education.

> As in the imperial past, authoritarian rule in China today is buttressed by a pattern of educated acquiescence, with academia acceding to political compliance in exchange for the many benefits conferred on it by the state. (p. 1)

One sign of this 'political compliance' is that 'faculty are urged to prepare policy papers for submission to party and government agencies' (p. 15). In Perry's eyes this function, seen as a virtuous public contribution in systems all over the world, takes on sinister implications when the receiving government is an 'authoritarian' communist party-state.

The term 'authoritarian' shuts down Perry's obligation to look properly at governance in China. Instead she expands on her claim about 'authoritarianism', referring to Russia's 5-in-100 programme for creating world-class universities, higher education in the Gulf States, and even cutting-edge technologies in North Korea (p. 18). The contexts, systems and outcomes are not the same as China. None have built higher education and science as China has done. But they are necessary to Perry's argument, in which all non-contested polities occupy a lower-level twilight world where government is essentially Machiavellian and the whole faculty is craven and smitten by the Stockholm syndrome. The underlying assumption is that the further the distance between a given higher education system and the US system, the more the former must be in deficit. The narcissist framing indicates how the commentator positions herself. It also perpetuates the old unequal order. As Muhlhahn (2019) remarks: 'Constructing and upholding difference between the Westerners and the Chinese, or between the centre and the periphery, has long been identified as a key tenet of colonial rule' (p. 105).

The present paper is closer to Dewey and Fairbank than to Perry. Governance and faculty relations in China can be understood only by closely engaging in the historical context and the present specifics. Sweeping Western-centric norms will not be employed.

Essence of Higher Education

There is another aspect to the 'how' of understanding higher education governance which again invokes cross-cultural differences. Western analyses focus mostly on formal structures, less on culture and behaviour and still less on purposes. Discussing the governance of the country, ancient Chinese philosophers considered not the 'regime', the form of the political system, but the 'Way', the goal and operation of the political system which was the essence of political power. In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods (770–221 BCE) scholars had different views – Confucianism valued the people, Legalism valued the emperor, Mohism universal love and Daoism noble souls – but all took the Way as the starting point for discussion. Even given monarchy as the political system, ideas and methods of governing the country, and the outcomes of governance, could be very different (Wang, 2012).

The same is true of contemporary higher education. The Western question is: 'what is the model (idea) of the university?' Daoism (道) asks the ontological question of 'what is the nature of University?', and believes that only by mastering the nature and the law of University could a university develop harmoniously with its outside environment. Confucianism asks axiological questions such as 'what ideals, values, missions and goals should universities pursue?' One answer is that: 'The way of Great Learning lies in the enlightenment of brilliant virtues, the remoulding of people, and the pursuit of ultimate goodness' ('大学之道在明明德, 在亲民, 在止于至善', 《大学》). Both Daosim and Confucianism questions are more reflexive and creative in relation to the nature of the university, and are useful in the West as well as in the East. There is something too fixed and would-be eternal about Newman's (1852/1982) *Idea of a University*. All higher education has purposes that it is moving towards; it is not being but becoming as the Dao states. Continual self-conscious reform and improvement are part of every kind of modern university.

TRADITIONS OF GOVERNANCE

Marginson and Considine (2000, p. 7) provide a definition of university governance that might apply in both East and West. It is concerned with the determination of values inside universities, their mission and purposes, patterns of authority and hierarchy, and the relations of universities as institutions to the different academic worlds within and the worlds of government, business and community without. However, despite the many resemblances between universities in the Euro-American and Chinese worlds, they are situated in political

cultures that are substantially different. This generates variations in the role of government in higher education, institutional autonomy and academic freedom (L. Yang, 2022a).

Western States and Higher Education

Western governance is rooted in divided powers and a limited state. Modern Euro-American society is divided between government-as-state, the seat of political authority; the economic market; public civil society; and the individual, who enjoys an ill-defined normative primacy. Within the state there is a further division between executive, legislature and judiciary. The authority of the law provides a binding coherence. The Euro-American state has a capacity for focused intervention but the boundary between the state and all other spheres is endemically contested, tense and unstable. The medieval university developed from the church in the space between the church and the city/state, becoming incorporated in its own right. It was another part of the division of powers, in a varying relation with the state that became its main funder: in some countries part of government and in others located between state and civil society, and everywhere with a partial and problematic autonomy.

As noted, from these starting points there have been significantly different Western (Euro-American) traditions in higher education. But one Western tradition has been especially impactful in the non-Western world. In the twentieth century, in which higher education moved into the mainstream of societies, the practices of universities in many countries were influenced by the US American ideology of a system-market in which executive-steered institutions raised part of their own revenues, and focused on their own growth, performance and status as measured by student demand, research outputs and social/economic links. In Clark's (1998) concept of the 'entrepreneurial university' the research and teaching institution is an active builder of organisational power, status and revenues through engagement with external stakeholders and markets, though it still rests on the epistemic capacity of the 'academic heartland'. Higher education became partly shaped by neoliberal and new public management reforms that imagined institutions as business firms. Summarising trends in higher education governance, Shattock (2014, p. 185) noted the common use of state steering from a distance via mechanisms including planning and targets, competition for funds, performance measures and accountability/audit. In those European systems where universities had been closely integrated with the state, there was part-separation, though the extent of devolution varied. In many systems the executive leadership on universities was more professionalised. More universal was the growth of administrative functions and the partial evacuation of the former faculty role in governance, especially in decisions on finance and priorities.

Berdahl et al. (1971) distinguish the 'substantive autonomy' of universities to determine their own goals and programmes from 'procedural autonomy' to determine how these are achieved. Neoliberal reform often enhances state control over the goals of higher education, while enhancing institutional capacity in procedural execution. At the same time mechanisms that micro-manage performance, such as research audits, cut into both forms of autonomy.

Roots of the Party-State in China

China's governance tradition is that of a comprehensive state, not divided powers and a limited liberal state. Government, politics and statecraft are customarily supreme over all other domains including the landowning aristocracy in Imperial times, merchants and the economy, the cities, the professions, the military and religion (Gernet, 2002; Zhao, 2015). The law in China is 'a tool of administration in general' and never independent of central state power. 'The idea of the separation of powers could not take root in the absence of the supremacy of the law' (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 185, 241). Unlimited dynastic states typically oscillate between periods of openness and grass-roots expression, and periods of tightening control and closure. In the CCP period these oscillations have been marked.

The comprehensive Sinic state was not invented by the CCP. The archetypal state, comprehensive and centralising, was that of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) which first unified China territorially. The chief minister of the Qin, Li Si, wanted to 'make the state the sole source of education and truth'. The Warring States period had seen notable intellectual diversity, but privileging the comprehensive over the partial, Li 'identified all-encompassing truth with Qin-imposed unity' (Lewis, 2007, p. 208). The Qin standardised written language and measures. It also murdered non-conforming scholars and burned their works. Later generations of scholars rejected the Qin but the comprehensive state tradition and its characteristic blending of state and society, private and public, had been established.

Except during the Republic from 1911 to 1949 when Western forms were intermittently used, in China's long history there has been no discursive limit to the authority of the state and no rival authority is permitted (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 28; Muhlhahn, 2019, p. 77). Potentially the state can freely surveil people's lives and intervene as it sees fit. Civil society in China has always been smaller than in the Euro-American polities, more closely managed and with only intermittent freedoms. The autonomy of cities and urban-based groups potentially threatens unity and order in the state (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 257).

While this form of state is not formally contestable it incorporates a mechanism for downward accountability that dates from the Western Zhou dynasty (Zhao, 2015, pp. 52–55); less agentic than episodic elections but fostering an ongoing responsiveness. The emperor presided over *tianxia,* the world without border, on the basis of the mandate of heaven (*Tianming* 天命), which was understood as a supreme moral force. Over time *Tianming* came to be seen in terms of the welfare of human beings. 'The mandate was dependent on the ruler's ability to educate the people and to offer protection from human and natural harm'. If the emperor ceased to rule wisely or justly criticism and rebellion would follow (Muhlhahn, 2019, p. 38). This might signal the end of the dynasty. In the first three decades after 1949 the CCP's overriding objective was the creation of a socialist society. Following the famine induced by the Great Leap Forward and the destabilisation of the Cultural Revolution, which jeopardised the Party's claim to *Tianming*, 'the core mission of the CCP as a ruling party' became 'making China strong and prosperous' (p. 543), as in the

imperial polity. Growing opportunities in an expanding higher education system serve to align people's welfare and access to social and geographic mobility with national economic prosperity.

In addition to the comprehensive state, a second Chinese tradition that affects higher education governance is collectivism. China's culture has been shaped by Confucian notions (L. Yang, 2022a) in which hierarchy establishes order: elite control is seen to promote prosperity and harmony. This is accompanied by a collectivist culture in which relationships among people are based on reciprocal responsibilities and a consensual moral orientation. The older vertical collectivism was foundational to the early stage of socialist construction under the CCP in the 1950s. At first the higher education system and associated policy formulation were closely controlled by central government ministries and provincial governments with a top-down approach, and this kind of collectivism is still embedded in the culture of university governance. The slogans 'being red and professional' (又红又专) and 'being compliant and productive' (听话出活) are still used in Tsinghua University today.

The early Chinese communists were inspired more by Russian Leninism than Marxism. With its method of democratic centralism, in which all party members were committed to carrying out the agreed strategy and tactics, Leninism was especially effective as a mode of disciplined organisation focused on specific goals (Liebman, 1975). The early communists were also strong nationalists and saw in Leninism the means of creating a modern nation-state able to sustain national independence and development (Muhlhahn, 2019, pp. 256–257). In the outcome the post-1949 Leninist state has proven more potent than the imperial state. Whereas the active writ of the emperor traditionally stopped at the level of the village, in the first decade after 1949 the CCP began to establish itself at every level of society, so that society and government could scarcely be distinguished. 'The Party injected itself into local society, and interacted deeply within it'. This not only established one-party rule, it 'also produced a community of unprecedented social unity and stability' (p. 373). Party networks and governmental institutions are closely engaged, with leaders at each level often holding simultaneous appointments in both structures: hence the descriptor 'party-state' (p. 372).

For most of its history the party-state has exhibited 'resilience, flexibility and pragmatism' without compromising top-down central control (Lai, 2016, p. 301) or opening its internal decision-making to scrutiny. Approaches to governance are nuanced according to locality and social sector and are not fixed but continually evolving (Stromseth et al., 2017, p. 276). The party-state enables ad hoc local adjustment and from time to time, experimentation (Muhlhahn, 2019, p. 363). Local and provincial level officials mostly have discretion, while continuing to be accountable up the line. Keeping tabs on them is an ongoing issue and the party-state uses selective transparency and consultation, mobilising local populations in the scrutiny of policy implementation by lower-level officials. This leads 'simultaneously to improved governance and more effective one party rule' (Stromseth et al., 2017, p. 4).

Devolution and Dual Leadership

Selective devolution embedded within firmly maintained central control has a long history in China. While Leninism does not have a good worldwide track record as a stable mode of governance, it has flourished in China because it has become hybridised with traditional imperial statecraft with its wealth of historical lessons and methods of how to manage a large and diverse country in which grass-roots initiative is inevitable and necessary. For example, following the history of rebellion in the borderlands under the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) developed a localised political elite that was Academy trained and locally assigned by the centre of the state. Local officials depended on central support for career progression. 'Localisation and the consolidation of unified imperial power appear to be positively correlated' (Blockmans & De Weerdt, 2016, p. 311). This approach continued under the Ming (1368–1644 CE) and Qing dynasties and essentially is still in use.

In addition to centrally managed devolution, successive Imperial dynasties typically used dual structures of leadership, to pluralise the flow of information upward to the emperor and diminish the potential for concentrated power. Under the Qin emperor each territorial commandery was headed by a governor but there was an imperial inspector to watch the governor (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 56). At the start of the Western Han the chancellor dominated the bureaucracy; by the end the supreme commander and the imperial counsellor had become equally important (Zhao, 2015, p. 287). In the Song dynasty a military complex operated alongside the civil administration. Each had different social origins and while the administrators tended to conservatism, the military officials were capable of arbitrary action (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 110–111). Under the Ming the palace eunuchs ran a shadow administration alongside and often in conflict with the civil service, which had different social and regional origins. Each informed on the other (Gernet, 2002, pp. 406–407). The non-Chinese Manchu Qing dynasty used dual appointments: 'The formula was to have capable Chinese do the work and loyal Manchus check up on them' (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 148). Manchu governors-general were paired with Chinese governors. They 'duplicated one another's efforts and monitored one another's adherence to central directives. A similar structure was found at lower levels of the bureaucracy' (Muhlhahn, 2019, p. 45). Meanwhile, censors reported to the emperor on both sets of officials (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, p. 149). By comparison the dual leadership of today's Chinese universities, with party secretary alongside the president and an expectation of harmonious collaboration, is simpler. It is significant that the dual system has roots not only in the Leninist practice of political commissars as co-leaders with army commanders, but longstanding Chinese statecraft.

All of this suggests that the Sinic tradition of deep devolution and bottom-up initiative, located in a framework of top-down central control across heterogeneous sites, and with inbuilt checks and balances such as dual leadership structure and multiple administrative functions, provides important clues to the 'Chinese characteristics' that render today's university governance as distinctive on the world scale. In the post-Cultural Revolution era, the late 1970s and

beyond, universities have exhibited advanced and growing levels of institutional and individual responsibility, and faculty have exercised freedom in research development and international relations – in most disciplines their scope for action is similar to that of their counterparts elsewhere – while targets are met, government policy objectives are achieved, and the party-state maintains stable political control. Devolution does not mean autonomy in the form of independence. While the brilliant Jixia Academy in the Warring States period was notable for its institutional independence and contending epistemic diversity (Hartnett, 2011) this was not the typical Chinese form of higher education. In China issues of university autonomy play out within the boundary of the comprehensive party-state rather than at the junction between state and civil society as in the Euro-American polities.

Higher Education and Statecraft

The role of education in statecraft grew with each successive dynasty, beginning with the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) that followed the Qin. The Han state joined Confucianism, the formation of people in virtuous conduct, to Legalism that embodied state power. Education and self-cultivation in Confucian virtue became necessary to political order and universities became the moral centre of society. The Han Confucian Master Dong Zhongshu stated:

> In ancient times, when emperors ruled the country, they made education a top priority. Setting up higher learning institutions in the country for education, setting up schools in cities and towns for education, using benevolence to guide the people, encouraging the people with righteousness, and discipling the people with etiquette. So although the punishment was light at that time, there was no violation of laws and regulations. This is because education has brought good customs and spirits.

(立大学以教于国, 设庠序以化于邑, 渐民以仁, 摩民以谊, 节民以礼, 故其刑罚甚轻而禁不犯者, 教化行而习俗美也。) （Ban, 2007, p. 563）

As supreme ruler, the emperor was both embodiment of knowledge and representative of virtue. With the growth and refinement of the Academy learning and the system of election of state officials, the notion of 'being practical' (经世致用) in the Confucian tradition was combined with the social sentiment of actively entering the world. This jointly bred the tradition of 'learning to be excellent is to be an official' (学而优则仕). This institutionalised the cooperation between academic power and administrative power still in evidence today.

Whereas the CCP began in 1921 by rejecting Confucianism as counter-modern, in the last three decades the party-state has positioned contemporary China as in continuity with the achievements of classical Chinese culture (Muhlhahn, 2019, pp. 543–544). Here Confucian education provides a formula for embedding the faculty and the student/graduate in the larger network of social relations. Confucianism refers to 'cultivating one's moral being first, and then cultivating one's family together, then unifying the spiritual pursuit of the nation, and finally pacifying the world' （修身、齐家、治国、平天下） (Zhu, 1996). The foundation of social order is the manner in which the relational and role-bearing Sinic

individual is nested in expanding concentric circles of social relations, from individual to family, to community or workplace, to the state and to *tianxia*. Tradition on one hand legitimates the intervention of government in academia, while on the other hand it also reproduces in individual scholars an ambition and desire to participate in public affairs and serve the state beyond academia.

In the late nineteenth century, with a growing number Chinese scholars returning from Western countries, certain Euro-American ideas of 'academic freedom', 'institutional autonomy' and 'collegial relations' began to be introduced to China, creating a new strand in higher education governance. For example, in 1912, when Cai Yuanpei (later president of Peking University) was the president of the Ministry of Education, he drafted and promulgated regulations that laid down the basic principle of 'professor governing university' for the Chinese university system, which may have been influenced by the Humboldtian model. The then president of Tsinghua, Mei Yiqi realised this principle by establishing policies that respected professors and their opinions. However, 'professor governing university' lacked cultural and social foundations. It encountered many practical difficulties, especially after the CCP took power in 1949, becoming replaced by the 'system of president accountability' and finally 'president accountability under party secretary's supervision'.

After the reform and opening up period began in the 1980s, China's universities also were affected by Anglo-American ideas of neoliberalism and academic capitalism, including the development of corporate-style universities, partly raising their own finances, competition between institutions and between persons, and the administered performance management of faculty. Like other governments, the party-state found that these instruments facilitated global competition, modernisation, growth and the management of expectations and behaviours, while being malleable to purpose, enabling it to vary and nuance governance while enhancing its control. Neoliberalism also introduced new issues and problems, as will be discussed.

CHINESE GOVERNANCE TODAY: SYSTEM, INSTITUTION AND ACADEMIC LIFE

In the first period of CCP authority in the 1950s higher education was patterned by the Soviet model. Research was largely separated from teaching and degree programmes and located in academies dedicated to the purpose. Many universities were developed on specialist lines and placed under the control of the relevant ministries. The state assigned graduates to jobs. Governance was top-down, with negligible institutional autonomy and academic discretion. Then in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) the universities were turned upside down. They became highly politicised. Student selection and often, faculty appointment were on the basis of class orientation and political stance not intellectual merit. Nevertheless, at the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 higher education was still an elite activity in quantitative terms, enrolling 1 per cent of the school leaver age group (World Bank, 2023).

Reform and Opening Up

There is a long distance between that system in the 1950s–1970s and today's higher education in which 60 per cent of school leavers are enrolled, China is the world's largest producer of science, its top universities lead high citation papers in engineering, physical sciences and mathematics (Marginson, 2022), and graduates find their own jobs. In developing China's higher education the deep popular commitment to Confucian educational cultivation has become combined with focused state policies and an ever-growing level of national investment (Marginson, 2011). The key moment was the restoration of Deng Xiaoping to the party leadership in 1977 (Vogel, 2011). Deng took control of policy on higher education and science. He saw original science and technology in China as key to national advance in agriculture, industry and military affairs. He attacked a tendency in the party-state to advocate practical technicians at the expense of theory (p. 203), emphasising the need for research to achieve scientific breakthroughs (p. 201). It was essential, he stated, to depoliticise the universities, and to encourage their engagement with Euro-American and Japanese institutions in order to stimulate capacity building in China. Deng's 'crossing the river by feeling the stones' was applied in higher education and science as well as the economy. However, if local agents were to 'feel the stones' they had to be empowered and encouraged to do so.

Hence opening up the universities was accompanied by governance reforms that broke decisively from the Soviet model, drawing on the Sinic heritage of selective devolution within continued central control. Deng emphasised that faculty should be fostered and regulated rather than suppressed. 'Science had no class character; it could be used by all classes and all countries despite their different political and economic systems' (Vogel, 2011, p. 201). It was enough that scientists were loyal to the country and the party (p. 202).[1] In the universities he established a new distribution of authority in which state control was counter-balanced by scientific expertise in directing the work. This laid the basis for today's dual system of governance, with party secretaries alongside academic leaders at each level. At the same time, Deng's bottom line was always the maintenance of Party control. He supported the maximum devolution and democratisation consistent with that condition (p. 250).

Chinese returnees from US and European universities also played a crucial role in not only introducing curricula from Western universities but also introducing Western ideas in governance. Western governance models, especially from the US, also affected CCP administrative members through MBA programs in Chinese universities, which were usually delivered by returnees, and were further transmitted into party and government agencies through policies papers submitted by returnees (Lefébure, 2020). This Western influence in governance also favoured bottom-up institutional responsibility and faculty agency.

Deng's farsighted combination of bottom-up agency with top-down power and control was the basis of the exceptional development of higher education and science in China. Both parts of the mix were essential. Top-down control integrated higher education into the machinery of state so that it was lifted up by China's national trajectory and strengthened on an annual basis by growing

budgets. Bottom-up agency enabled development of the work of higher education in teaching/learning, scholarship and research. Scientists and other faculty were free to connect to international colleagues and encouraged to learn and share. Science in China expanded in conjunction with the rapid expansion of the global science network via the Internet which emerged in 1989. The 'national/global synergy' (Marginson, 2018) quickened both the growth of national capacity in science and technology and its global connectedness, bringing Chinese universities to the world. Within 30 years China became a first rank knowledge power. Both parts of Deng's formula, top-down and bottom-up, were equally essential and if either one had been diminished the achievement would have been lost.

Deng's devolution has been installed in three ways. First, in relations between national and provincial governments. Second, in relations between government and institutions. Third, in internal governance within institutions, in the intellectual freedoms of faculty.

National and Provincial Government

Many of the Soviet-style specialist universities under separate ministries were merged into comprehensives under the ministry of education; and while the top institutions have stayed under national control at that ministry, responsibility for many others was transferred to provincial governments. Transfer to the provinces began in 1958 (Wu & Li, 2019) but accelerated from the 1990s onwards. Whereas in 1996, 62 central ministry offices administered 366 higher education institutions, by 2006 the number of centrally run institutions had shrunk to 111, of which 73 were governed by the Ministry of Education (Shi & Wu, 2018, p. 59). The provinces were able to adjust development interventions so as to better meet local needs. They also found themselves carrying more of the costs. Here higher education reform intersected with the larger reform of the economic relation between the centre and the provinces in the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, including new tax sharing arrangements. China's provinces now have more autonomy than those in the former Soviet system (Wu & Li, 2019) or in Russia today.

The central government assigns tasks to provinces by the means of administrative contracts and encourages local officials to perform on the basis of a championship-like promotion system. Economic performance targets are set by central government (Lai, 2016, p. 12). The higher education enrolment rate, one component of provincial government's higher education development plans, is used as an evaluation criterion. Provincial universities have played the main role in expansion. Provincial universities/colleges increased from 759 (74.3 per cent of all institutions) in 1998 to 1,737 (93.6 per cent) in 2016. In 2016 they accommodated 93.2 per cent of college students in China.

Institutional Autonomy and Self-Mastery

The second kind of devolution has been the corporate reform of institutions. In 1985 the central government began to loosen its tight control over institutions and in 1993 it signalled a desire to step back from direct management. Institutions

gained more discretion in faculty recruitment (Li & Yang, 2014). The 1998 Law on Higher Education was a watershed moment, when universities gained the formal right to become a 'legal person'. In 2010 the Ministry of Education's '2020 Outline' enhanced the role of academic councils in disciplinary construction and academic evaluation (Shi & Wu, 2018, pp. 58–59). Governmental administrative powers that have been delegated to universities include teaching plans, curriculum development, infrastructure construction, and the purchase of equipment. Institutions also gained increased discretion in determining research priorities (Li & Yang, 2014, p. 44), though interviews by Tian and Liu (2020) indicated disagreement between government officials and university leaders on the extent of autonomy in research policy. The two universities with special national status, Tsinghua and Peking, have gained more operational autonomy than other institutions, including power over student selection.

As in all neoliberal system reforms, devolved responsibility has been accompanied by stepped up accountability and a part transfer downwards of fund raising. The Ministry began discipline rankings in 2002 and a five-year evaluation cycle in 2003 (Shen & Ma, 2018, pp. 146–147), the result of which was taken as the base for government funding distribution.

In recent years, there has been a sharp decline in the proportion of university income from government sources (Fig. 1). At Tsinghua University, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Tongji University, the state provided less than 30 per cent in 2018 (Fig. 2). For Tsinghua, the percentage is 20 per cent today.

Surveying education policies over a 30-year period, Wen (2013) finds that the role of the party-state has moved from direct control to facilitation. Government has switched from being the major sponsor, provider and regulator, of higher education to being one of the sponsors, providers and regulators, but in the decentralisation of university governance and management it has maintained ultimate control (Shen & Ma, 2018; Wen, 2013; Zha, 2011).


*Fig. 1.*   Proportion of University Income by Source, 1998–2017.

Fig. 2. Proportion of University Income by Source, 2000 and 2018, Eight Institutions.

In understanding these changes the question of interpretive lens is crucial. Through the Anglo-American lens, where the relation between state and universities is understood in zero-sum terms and institutional autonomy presupposes separation from the state, there has been little change in China. The universities are still firmly nested in the state. The Chinese lens identifies a substantial shift, from close and direct national control in the 1950s to a marked and arguably more Chinese devolution on the basis of regulated autonomy. There has been a parallel development in relation to academic freedom, though this varies by discipline.

Hayhoe (1996) states that the Anglo-American category of 'institutional autonomy' is inappropriate in the context of China which the legal potential for separation is absent. Government–university relation is more accurately defined in terms of *zizhu,* meaning 'self-mastery'. Noting that under the presidential accountability system China's institutions retain corporate and academic discretion, though supervised by the party-state through the presence of party secretaries in the leadership, Li (2016) refers to the *Zhong-Yong* model of self-mastery. 'This model of governance is unusual in that it has incorporated some key values and norms of Western autonomy while simultaneously serving and promoting state interests' (p. 10). University leaders and faculty have substantial scope for action in fulfilling their institutional roles. This constitutes procedural autonomy in the Western sense, states Li (2016, p. 12). Leaders and faculty can also become directly involved in CPP leadership on campus, 'paralleling the traditional role of scholar-officials' in China.

> So long as the political vision and mission of higher education institutions is kept in line with the ideological interest and mandate of the CPP … institutions can enjoy much freedom of self-mastery. Combined with political correctness that is defined by the CPP regime, this aspect of self-mastery may be described as 'substantive autonomy'. Self-mastery as a core value and norm of university governance has created much space and dynamism for Chinese higher education institutions (Li, 2016, p. 12).

Not all commentators see Chinese self-mastery as equivalent to substantive autonomy (e.g. for Li & Yang, (2014, p. 28), the latter is narrowed by the neoliberal reforms). Perhaps Chinese self-mastery and Western autonomy are best understood as incommensurate. But the point is that there is much scope for proactive positive action within the political parameters. While the top-down element has the last word, the bottom-up element does have agency.

The state is never wholly absent. China has used tuition charges and the selective growth of the private sector to share the cost of system expansion but Mok (2021) highlights the extent to which the neoliberal mechanisms are closely managed by the state. Market forces do not determine the quality and quantity of provision; and the degree of freedom exercised by non-state institutions rests on the degree of trust that they have established with state officials. Mok endorses the analysis of Li (2016). By conforming, universities in China 'legitimise the state power to develop them as prioritised' (Mok, 2021, p. 8). Thus the universities 'are enabled to miraculously transform themselves in a short period of time and gradually become global leaders … though they may have to sacrifice autonomous freedom in some ways' (p. 8).

Internal Governance

Euro-American universities exhibit a two-way structure in which administration is coupled with faculty. Executive leaders are primarily but not universally drawn from academic ranks. The length of their tenure, mode of selection and extent of their professionalisation vary. In parts of Europe and Japan executive leaders are elected and may have shorter tenure in post. Anglophone leaders are more likely to be appointed and share in the institution's managerial culture. China is closer to Anglophone patterns than those of Europe and Japan, its academic leaders are normally trained and expert in the tasks of management, but with a variation. It exhibits a three-way structure with a Party section headed by the party secretary, an administrative section headed by the institutional president, and an academic section.

Shi and Wu (2018) describe internal governance in more detail. The Party section includes the institution's party committee of senior administrative and Party leaders and connects to its analogues in each level of the institution, including schools, departments and administrative sections; teacher and student unions; and units such as the office for senior administrator selection and appointment, and the office for publicity. Successive structural reorganisations have strengthened the roles of the party committee and party secretary. The administrative section leads institutional operations. Under the president it includes the vice-presidents and heads of administrative divisions. The academic division comprises the faculty senate and the academic council. The size and roles of these bodies varies by institution, but the council normally includes central academic leaders and discipline-based deans. Shi and Wu (2018) note that the Party and administrative sections tend to overshadow the academic section, though some universities want to strengthen the academic section (p. 64).

Shen and Ma (2018) suggest that the academic bodies play a larger part in governance at Peking University than is the case at many other universities (p. 152).

However, the PKU Academic Board is less significant than the US Faculty Senates. It is 'the consulting agency in academic affairs' (p. 149). Its basic function is to approve discipline-level hiring and promotion. Professors have a larger role in schools and departments, especially in personnel matters, than in central university bodies. They lack the crucial 'power to allocate funds and resources' in the hands of the institution's central administrative staff (p. 152).

An Example: Tsinghua University

At Tsinghua University there are similar organisational structures at each of the university and faculty (discipline) levels, such as academic committees, committees of tenured professors, degree evaluation committees, and teaching committees.

The academic committee has the highest authority. It decides, deliberates, evaluates and advises on academic affairs. The matters decided by the committee of tenured professors include faculty recruitment and promotion. The degree evaluation committee is concerned with the awarding of degrees; the teaching committee handles teaching and curriculum.

Fig. 3 uses the example of recruitment of faculty members at Tsinghua. The academic committee issues the recruitment announcement. The dean, department chair and party secretary make the initial screening of resumes. The selected candidates present their representative research, every tenured professor have a 30–60 minute conversation to the candidates, and then international peer review


Fig. 3.   Faculty Recruitment Process in Chinese Universities: The Case of Tsinghua.

Source: Drawn by the first author.

is conducted. After all information is gathered, the dean or department chair report to the tenured professor committee, and the final result is submitted to the joint party and government meeting for further discussion and approval.

This governance structure contains centralisation and exhibits partial decentralisation. The centralised aspect mainly relates to administrative contexts. For example, the Party and Government Committee dictate the basic process of talent recruitment. The decentralised aspect mainly relates to the academic context. For example, the tenured professor committee exercises autonomy in disciplinary planning. Hence the academic community enjoys only partial autonomy in implementing decisions. Centralisation of power by the administration through the use of isomorphic structures between departments and the university, as here in personnel management, is a manifestation of democratic centralism in university governance.

The structures include both formal and informal arrangements. The formal structures are the standardised and institutionalised organisational bodies and their mechanisms, such as the academic committee and the joint meeting of the party and government. The informal structure contains everyday activities like the faculty luncheon and the afternoon tea meeting held by the dean and party secretary, which enable communication and interaction among faculty members and students and are an effective supplement to formal structures.

This description of structures does not fully capture behaviours, meaning the ways that faculty and administration conduct themselves in their respective roles. For example, in governance at the discipline-level the dean (department chair) and the party secretary, professors, assistant professors, postdocs, students, and administrative staff all have differing roles. The key roles are dean, party secretary and tenured professors. The party secretary is responsible for the ideological work of teachers and students, such as recruitment of party members and political study. The dean or department head is responsible for the guidance of academic development, allocating work to faculty members, human resources allocation, and setting the curriculum. In large schools or departments there may also be academic heads of sub-specialties, authorised to arrange teaching programs and other administrative work. In formal terms the academic council is the highest academic body, but in practice decision-making power in academic arrangements is exercised by the committee of tenured professors.

Dual Leadership Structure

Hence the university president and party secretary sit alongside each other and lead different offices and committees within the institution (Li & Yang, 2014, p. 33). There are overlaps in membership and numerous points at which communication is facilitated. The dual leadership structure runs throughout the institution. The party-state describes the prevailing system of governance as the 'presidential accountability system under the leadership of the party committee' (Shi & Wu, 2018, p. 64). The university president is vice-chair of the party committee and in that respect subordinated to the party secretary. Actual relations between the two vary from institution to institution but the formal terms the ultimate authority lies with the Party. Shen and Ma (2018, p. 149) state that an explicit division of

power between the president and the party secretary avoids power conflict, while joint meetings between the Party commission and the president-led administration have greater authority than meetings in the president's office. This continues the Sinic tradition in which the university is ultimately located within a state which never ceases to wield comprehensive responsibility.

Nevertheless, the administrative and academic heads of the institution and its units embody specialist knowledge and carry large and multiple responsibilities. Internal governance would be less than functional if the dual structure was vertical. Hence at the discipline-level at Tsinghua, the party secretary and dean are on equal footing with no prior power. The party's role is implicit, mostly to assist the dean to grasp the overall political direction. At a standing body called the 'joint meeting of the party and government', or 'the office of the party secretary and dean' the party secretary and dean inform each other of their recent work and build cooperation and mutual support for each other's activities. The joint party-administration meeting is the highest administrative body with decision-making power.

Both the party secretary and the president are appointed by the party-state though not always at the same time. In large research universities, operating within a system in which the institution is actively and continually networked into multiple parts of the party-state, both roles are very demanding. The particular mix of personalities and attributes, and the extent of each person's experience in the institution, helps to shape the division of labour. For example, a party secretary may focus primarily on external relations with government and party organs, and other stakeholders such as industry, while the university president manages administrative and academic affairs. Alternatively, an experienced party secretary who knows the institution well may take a role roughly akin to provost in the US universities, internally managing personnel and administration while the president builds world-class academic performance. A party secretary exercising effective relations within the party-state can foster trust and protect the institution from unwanted intervention, increasing its scope for action; or alternately may maintain firm surveillance and exercise external political control over the inner activities. Effective party secretaries probably do all of these things at different times.

Academic Freedom and Intellectual Freedom

Faculty conduct is always conditioned by the historical and social context (Zha & Shen, 2018). In the West with its tradition of a limited but powerful state, many issues play out in tension between the state and other agents. In China the role of the state is more ubiquitous, more taken for granted and less likely to be problematised at a given time. Academic agency is often understood as being expressed with and within the state, rather than being manifest outside or against the state. The various Euro-American ideas of academic freedom, such as the US notion of unconstrained expression of independent expertise specific to the discipline, and the French and German idea of freedom of faculty to organise their work, do exercise some influence but on the whole are 'not a good fit for China' (Hayhoe, 2011, p. 17). Sinic relations between the scholar and the state are much older than the medieval university, the Enlightenment and American legal case law in relation to tenure and academic freedom.

Fairbank and Goldman (2006) remark that Confucian scholar-officials were close to state power but defenceless before it. 'They had no power base of their own except as they remained loyal to the ruler or joined in factions formed by like-minded colleagues' (p. 160). Yet they were expected to do more than carry out the will of the ruler. They were expected to 'advise the ruler' and 'in time of need to remonstrate with him' (p. 360). Under some dynasties the function of fearless criticism was structured into the imperial order. From time to time, notably under Tang Emperor Taizong (598–649 CE), officials named *jianguan* were expected to generate comments and criticisms of Imperial policy (Zhao, 2000). The *jianguan* were granted routine freedom of expression and protected from punishment (Chen, 2001).

Mencius interpreted the pleasure of learning and study in terms of a sense of self-satisfaction, *zide* (自得). Here *zide* was a realm of freedom. The pleasure of learning and study was the pleasure of self-restraint; only in this way could a person achieve spiritual emancipation, and reconcile personal freedom with the constraints of politics. By learning, succeeding in the Imperial examination and serving as an official, the scholar could reconcile and identify with the regime and was therefore freest to think and act. However, Lee (2012, p. 402) points out that the connotation of *zide* also underwent a transformation during the Ming dynasty. At a moment of national crisis, self-reflecting Chinese scholars understood that *zide* did not materialise independently of the state and society. The person-oriented clause 'learning is for oneself' took on social significance. As the saying went: 'The rise and fall of *tianxia* is the responsibility of every person'. The moral self-sense of the scholar merged with the sense of responsibility for the world and the state. Thus, on the one hand, Chinese intellectuals were able to pursue the inner peace they longed for in the self-sufficient world of knowledge, and on the other hand, when the external reality deviated from their moral ideals, these intellectuals were obliged to revolt in the face of the secular ruling authority, making sacrifices when necessary. This deeply rooted Confucian thought still influences how today's Chinese scholars perceive academic freedom, especially in social sciences and humanities.

The Sinic and Euro-American traditions agree on the inner freedom of the self. No faculty want to be told what to think. The differences are in the social expression of the self. Sinic scholars enjoy significant intellectual authority, more than that of their Anglo-American counterparts, derived from the historical status attached to success in examinations and the educational and civic responsibilities that they exercise. Freedom is understood primarily in terms of Berlin's (1969) positive freedom rather than the negative freedom, freedom from constraint by the state that dominates Anglo-American ideas of academic freedom. Far from being solely theoretical, protected from the world, scholarship and research in China are expected to support action for the public good, if necessary ranging beyond the specialised field of knowledge. Hayhoe (2011) labels the more proactive concept 'intellectual freedom'.

Hence there are differing limitations in the freedoms of each tradition. Euro-American faculty can express themselves openly in their field of expertise but

can be also ignored, critics on the sideline. Sinic faculty are more centrally positioned. What they say matters and they may have a larger intellectual canvas. However, while they have self-determination they do not have self-realisation. They must account for the effects of what they say, including the implications for the party-state. Hence they have a larger scope for free expression behind closed doors, inside the party-state, than in the public arena or perhaps the classroom. The clearest difference between the two traditions is in the nature of criticism of the regime. (Note that in the discussion in the West questions of academic/intellectual freedom often become confused with questions of political freedoms, as in relation to Hong Kong SAR. Though the Hong Kong democracy campaigns are located primarily in the universities their content is largely that of a political movement rather than a defence of academic freedom.) As noted, Sinic tradition does provide for open scholarly criticism when necessary and sees this as a moral duty.

Collegiality

There is no parallel term in Chinese for 'collegiality', with its double meaning of horizontal academic respect, grounded in epistemic identities, and also faculty (and primarily professorial) power in the running of the university. There is no Chinese tradition of independent discipline-based governance by faculty or professorial meetings with resource allocation power. The analogues used most frequently are 'professor governance' (教授治校、教授治学) and 'college/department governance' (院系治理). Elements of collegial culture were imported into the Westernising universities during the Republic, along with ideas of university autonomy and academic freedom, but vanished in the 1950s when higher education was remodelled along Soviet lines. Since the 1980s, as noted, the faculty element in governance has been formalised, though the scope for decision-making by the academic section on finance, resources and priorities is limited by the administrative and Party sections. Many faculty in China are engaged in discipline-based international networks. Perhaps it is there that flat relationships based on shared knowledge and academic agendas are most apparent. International relations are less bound by Sinic tradition, the state and local hierarchy, freeing scope for independent action.

Within China a quasi-collegial element is maximised in both formal and informal terms at the level of the discipline in teaching and research. It can be undercut by entrepreneurial faculty who pursue their self-interest in the marketplace, using the university and its reputation to build external business while minimising their obligations to and solidarity with their colleagues as well as to institutional management and culture. A parallel problem is that some professors of outstanding accomplishment seek to monopolise resources with limited concern for the co-development of the academic community. The potential for flat collaboration is also weakened by administration-oriented systems for valuing, assessing and organising faculty work that prioritise quantity metrics over intellectual content, and social and educational purpose, and set colleagues in competition with each other.

OBSTACLES AND LIMITS

Altbach (2016) and Kirby (2017, 2022) suggest that Chinese universities have an inflexible and ineffective governance system, itemising the role of the party-state. Altbach sees this as a 'glass ceiling', a limit on free thought and creativity. Kirby believes it might block China's institutions from taking a world leading role in the twenty-first century. The implication is that if Chinese universities looked like US universities, all would be well. It is not so simple.

The party-state mode of organisation has proven adept in managing widespread devolution and selective grass-roots initiative and experimentation, while both sustaining exceptional rates of growth and performance improvement and managing risk. 'Crossing the river and feeling the stones' has proven an adept method. It is pushing scholarly credibility to breaking point to argue or imply that China's success has occurred despite, rather than because of, its political system and mode of higher education governance (Marginson, 2022). In that respect Perry (2020) is more sophisticated, because her narrative renders China's higher education performance compatible with the political system, though ultimately her account is no more explanatory because it stereotypes both higher education and the regime.

Within universities, an immediate concern about governance is the unclear division of power and responsibility between Party and administration. While the regulations provide for both the organisational power of the party to implement political leadership of universities, and the administrative authority exercised by the president, this hardly resolves the question 'who has the most authority over university governance?' The relationship can work well because the persons involved make it work but this is not always the case. In some colleges and universities the power and the boundaries are not at all clear. There are frequent conflicts, instances of multiple administration commands that contradict each other, and problems and responsibilities being evaded by passing them across the divide.

An equally important concern is the endemic weakness of the academic section. This is a crucial issue because it houses the agency of faculty, the essential bottom-up element in Deng Xiaoping's formula for the growth of higher education and science. Observers agree that the academic component of governance is continuously threatened with displacement by the Party section and the administrative section, even in institutions such as Peking University where academic culture is relatively strong. 'The administrative power dominates the academic power' (Shi & Wu, 2018, p. 67). Long habits of collective compliance may reinforce this tendency among faculty. But why should teachers and students be motivated to participate in the present governance? Further, there is little collaboration across disciplinary boundaries because each discipline represents a separated silo of resources. Governance can be remade to strength the scope and authority of faculty assemblies at each level, and to encourage cooperation across disciplines, without sacrificing goals and coherence.

Other limitations derive from the application of neoliberal and new public management reforms in China. This plays out in both the internal and external domains of governance.

In internal governance, the prevailing evaluation culture is associated with tension between the quantity and quality of academic outcomes, and hence between administrative goals and academic standards. Rigid metrics and excessive demands for output reshape and limit the multidimensional value of academic activity, which again threatens to eat into the bottom-up capability of faculty to shape creative initiatives.

Externally, neoliberal systems are associated with a macro process of homogenisation, as in other countries. After three decades of reform and opening up, external governance has moved from a dual structure of 'government–university' to a triad of 'government–university–market' but governance is market-like rather than a market (Zhang & Zhang, 2018). The market competition mechanism, which is merely one of the means used by the state, as not freed up the institutions. The state, not decentralised market actors, is the sole source of performance accountability. In setting out to build world-class universities the government has applied resources to a limited group of universities and disciplines and measured their performance to determine whether they progress to the next funding round. A few universities have developed rapidly in a short period of time, but the process has installed a utilitarian orientation based on ranking and quantitative indexes. Homogenous evaluation does not distinguish between types of institutions. All universities compete for ranking to the neglect of their autonomous missions. Some colleges and universities deviate from talent cultivation by using research output as their sole assessment criterion (Cao, 2019; Yi, 2021). Provinces tend to follow strategies of institutional isomorphism. Each has established its own 'mini-985' project and 'mini-211' project and made every effort to promote those universities to national recognition and world-class status. The use of a single evaluation criterion reduces the potential diversity, dynamism and innovation in building first-class universities. Worse, it places in question the essential purposes and missions of the universities. Is their Way to be defined and driven by university ranking agencies with their handful of thin criteria?

The use of homogeneous criteria for evaluation, including bibliometric data, have also entrenched the Western disciplines at the expense of epistemic innovation. China benefits from the absence of the characteristic Western (Platonic) split between pure ideas and applied knowledge, and from a tradition in which multiple and hybrid thought has bred continuous creativity and adaptations. But as noted, its modern disciplines and mode of knowledge organisation have been imported from the West. The uniform focus on global publication benchmarks tends to suppress knowledge that draws on Chinese rather than American-European meta-approaches, often reducing Chinese 'indigenous' papers to Chinese that have been interpreted through the lenses of Euro-American theories, methodologies and academic sensibilities. There is more work in national language in fields like social sciences and medicine (where Chinese scholars are under-represented in the English-language global literature), than is often realised. However, the disciplines have yet to be reworked as living Chinese tradition; and the project of uniting Western and Eastern epistemologies, though exciting and much discussed in abstract, is still embryonic in practice (Wen et al., 2022).

CONCLUSION

In his review of *The Chinese idea of a university* Rui Yang (2022b) states that 'Chinese societies will never be fully Westernised, nor should they be. Many foundational differences between Chinese and Western cultural values make it impossible to fully assimilate each other' (p. 126). Notwithstanding the fact that universities all over the world share common elements, Chinese and Western universities cannot become the same as each other. If they were, valuable diversity and some potential for unique contributions would be lost.

The governance structure of higher education in China is unique and instructive. It combines traditional dynastic statecraft with Leninist party-state organisation and selected but influential elements of the Euro-American university. Its structures often resemble Western models but its essence is its own and distinct. In making its Way forward it has worked with a potent combination of top-down policies and funding and bottom-up agency with freedom in global learning, with scope for initiative in 'crossing the river by feeling the stones' China's higher education relies on the talents of teachers and researchers as well as university presidents and party secretaries. Trust between the party-state, university leaders and administrators, and faculty, is a precious resource and has been crucial to China.

The case of China shows that universities nested in the state can enhance their outcomes in some respects. Self-mastery and the positive freedom of faculty have been associated with exceptional growth and continuous improvements in quality. While top-down controls are not rarely wholly welcome there is agreement on essential purposes. Universities and faculty support the project of national rejuvenation that drives the party-state and believe in the potential for China to make a larger global contribution in future. This is a normative basis for the present system. However, if governance can be reformed to allow the universities to advance in the direction of larger bottom-up initiative and intellectual diversity, including the social sciences and humanities, their contribution to the nation and the world can be enlarged.

In the longer term the ability of the universities to teach and share with the Euro-American West, by developing new knowledge that combines Western science and social science with Chinese Confucian thought and understanding, while continuing to be open to and to learn from Euro-America, is key to the future world influence of Chinese universities. Chinese thought is ahead of the West in certain philosophical areas. It has overcome the theory/practice divide that dogs Euro-American universities and continually problematises their outputs; and Confucianism and Daoism embody a deep understanding of both the relations between man and nature, and relational human society in which the individual is always socially nested. If these starting points are to springboard a larger contribution, the party-state and Chinese higher education will need to find a Way in policy and governance that leads into a fuller space for plural knowledges, ideas and approaches. This would advance both indigenous and global knowledge, so helping global society to also find its Way.

NOTE

1. The full quote in Chinese is: '对于他们, 只要不是反党反社会主义的, 也要团结教育, 发挥他们的专长, 尊重他们的劳动, 关心和热情帮助他们进步'.

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THE SOCIAL CREATION OF TEMPORARY ACADEMIC POSITIONS IN CHILE, COLOMBIA, GERMANY AND THE USA

Pedro Pineda

ABSTRACT

I historically compare changes in institutional frameworks creating academic positions linked to temporary employment by analyzing university employment statistics in Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA. I find that temporary academic positions were institutionalized through the creation of previously inexistent academic categories called a contrata *in Chile,* de cátedra *in Colombia, "junior professor" without tenure in Germany and "postdoc" in the USA; used in higher education and employment laws since 1989, 1992, 2002, and 1974, respectively. Under institutional frameworks demanding the maximization of students and research, universities have increasingly contracted academics through temporary contracts under rationales that differ between regions. In Colombia and Chile, public university leaders and owners of private universities contract such teaching positions to expand student numbers through lowering costs. In Germany and the USA, employment insecurity is mostly driven by temporary scientific positions under a main rationale of scientific expansion. The share of temporary positions has increased exponentially in Colombia and Germany in recent decades, whereas in the USA there has only been an increase since 2012. Moreover, in Chile, the share of permanent positions has decreased since 2012. The common trend is one of isomorphism of vertical academic structures sharing a pyramidal form, with a wide base of academics working under conditions of contractual insecurity. Such trends follow a rationale for maximization of student numbers as*

well as administration, and scientific production that is in tension with prioritizing wellbeing and improvement of academics' working conditions. Yet, in these environments, the institution of tenure in the USA and recent Chilean regulations on accreditation represent mechanisms counteracting precarious employment.

Keywords: Job security; temporary employment; part-time faculty; tenure; employment patterns; accreditation

INTRODUCTION

The foundational work of Burton Clark (1986) comparatively described the position of academics in different countries in relation to the state and the market. However, he did not reflect on the positions of different subgroups of academics. More recent works have considered the conditions of academics at the lowest seniority levels and concluded that working conditions in universities in Chile (Cantillana-Baranados & Portilla-Vasquez, 2019), Colombia, Germany (Graf et al., 2020; Keil, 2019), and the USA (Gaughan & Bozeman, 2019; Jacoby & Boyette, 2020; Stromquist, 2016) have deteriorated. However, these approaches concentrate on national cases and do not consider possible common trends across countries framed by theory. A few comparative analyses have also reported that academic short-term employment is increasing, but these studies are based on non-representative samples (Castellacci & Viñas-Bardolet, 2021; Stromquist et al., 2007). To date, no international study comparing a representative number of universities has compared temporary and insecure academic employment.

Neo-institutionalist theories offer interesting insights into understanding hypothetical cross-national patterns in academic employment. Inspired by the socio-constructivist approach of Berger and Luckman (1966/1991), neo-institutionalists understand the creation of social roles, such as those of academic positions in relation to historical conditions framed by cultural ideologies enabling their social legitimacy. This explanation differs from a functionalist and Marxist understanding of the creation of academic positions due to demands from the economy (Hout, 2012; Salmi, 2009) or the exploitation of the elites in a capitalist system (Means, 2015; Standing, 2011). Frank and Meyer (2020) identify cultural materials spreading throughout the world, which may relate to common practices in higher education governance. I propose that these also have an effect on temporary academic employment.

This attention in higher education expansion may occur to the detriment of prioritizing the job security of their academics. The benefits of expanding enrollments and scientific production through contracting academics in the lowest positions may be easier to monitor in the short term than the loss of job security in academia (Musselin, 2012). Thus, academic employment may not be on the agenda of those in government, university leadership, and private university owners more interested in fostering university funds through higher student numbers and numbers of publications. The growth of a university may also be linked to the expansion of its administration in charge of offering student services and writing

administrative reports (Avenali et al., 2023; Lee & Ramirez, 2023, Vol. 86), such as those needed for program accreditation (Schneijderberg & Steinhardt, 2019) under the assumption that these activities further invigorate growth. In turn, these monitoring activities may consume vast resources (Meyer & Bromley, 2014) that could otherwise be used to strengthen the academic profession and improve job security of academics. So, at least some degree of similar trends over time can be expected in contracting practices across countries.

In this paper, I merge databases from four different countries and analyze them in relation to changes in laws and regulations on academic employment at universities. I aim to address the following questions: Are there common trends in the creation of temporary employment positions? Has the creation of new employment categories in the context of expansion of higher education and science led to increasing or decreasing precarious employment in academia? Comparing such trends in four national contexts allows for theorizing about practices and rationales that may be at the base of similar contracting schemes. This aim is reached by the combination of cross-country data on contract types. I analyze, descriptively, the trends in academic employment in Chilean, Colombian, USA, and German universities between 1980 and 2018. I trace historical trends in light of changes in regulations of academic employment, placing emphasis on the social creation of new temporary positions in academia in the last decades.

After explaining my theoretical framework and my comparative approach, I discuss different rationales and practices related to temporary academic employment. On the one hand, the rationale to maximize student enrollments through lowering costs for teaching may explain why Chile and Colombia have a great majority of academics working in the new temporary positions (*profesor a contrata* and *profesor de cátedra*). On the other hand, in Germany and USA, increasing scientific outputs and access to competitive and temporary research grants explain a large proportion of the growth of short-term hiring practices through the new temporary positions (junior professorships without tenure and "postdocs"). The rationales of maximization of student numbers and scientific outputs are in tension with concerns for the employment prospects of academics at universities. To conclude this paper, there is a discussion on the social creation of new temporary academic positions and vertical academic structures in terms of isomorphic trends, which are driven by a rationale for maximization of student numbers, administration, and scientific production – to the detriment of academics' working conditions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical reflections about academic employment tend to anchor characteristics of universities in national trends. They explain academic employment trends in national histories (Clark, 1986), in the functions of academic structures for the labor market (Hout, 2012; Salmi, 2009) or in the utilization of distributed capital across different social groups (Means, 2015; Standing, 2011).

Neo-institutionalists, for their part, tend to argue that there is less cross-national variation (isomorphism) in higher education, because of the import of common ideas and practices framed by wider ideas (Zapp & Ramirez, 2019). As a result, the convergence of organizational structures due to the adoption of similar practices of organizations searching for legitimacy (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) may also occur in university employment practices. In this work, I understand isomorphism in terms of: (a) the creation of similar academic positions across countries; and (b) similar forms of academic structures across universities using these academic positions. I am interested in temporary academic positions and vertical academic structures, that is, academic structures having a larger base of academics working under temporary positions in the lowest part of the social pyramid.

I presuppose that data on academic employment shows academic structures with increasingly more academics working under temporary positions. Legal frameworks may enable these different forms of employment contracting. Common theoretical explanations to such a trend are: (a) higher education expansion (Schofer & Meyer, 2005), private higher education (Buckner, 2017), and science expansion; and (b) the increase of administrative staff consuming resources (Avenali et al., 2023; Lee & Ramirez, 2023, Vol. 86; Musselin, 2012), which could be used for academic contracts.

First, the expansion of higher education (Schofer & Meyer, 2005) and science (Drori et al., 2003) since the World War II is related to a belief that higher education has an intrinsic relationship to the progress of societies. During the last two decades the expansion of higher education has been driven by a foundation or growth of private universities that has exceeded the foundation of public ones in all regions of the world (Buckner, 2017). These may find it more difficult to acquire incomes by increasing their tuition costs and acquiring additional incomes from the state. Without state support or other sources, private universities may offer different employment contracts, with the aim of reducing labor costs coupled with spending more on student services and marketing activities (Kezar et al., 2019).

Second, the recent expansion of universities has also been related to the expansion of administration in higher education. Universities may reallocate resources to administrative activities to respond to increasing needs of information and reporting.

> The expansion of proto-legal and accounting systems into the environment generates further elaboration: Modern classification and accreditation doctrines require extensive formal organization and can lead to costly reform initiatives. (Meyer & Bromley, 2014, p. 380)

Resources aiming to improve the image of universities through accumulating accreditation certificates or diversifying student services may be redirected at the expense of investment in job security (Schmidt, 2012). If the new administrative activities are not necessarily intrinsically embedded in the universities' academic activities, then it is possible that the resources needed to pay for consultancies, to prepare for evaluation reports or to write applications for external funds, are being allocated to the detriment of investments in the academy, including the

creation of permanent working conditions for university academics, which is more costly than temporary employment. Alternatively, accreditation could be theoretically more coupled with stable working conditions, if the conditions for accreditation conceptualize and enforce good working conditions for academics (Schmidt, 2012) as a condition to guarantee continuity in the curriculum.

Third, new managerial doctrines may seek the expansion of science through competitive and temporary funding schemes that could have a positive impact on scientific production to the detriment of secure academic employment. A fundamental problem imagined by those implementing such doctrines is that a presumed lack of resources associated with massification and increasing costs exists and requires new forms of delivering scarce funds (Paradeise et al., 2009).

This managerial approach may establish short-term research projects and programs suitable for evaluation, rather than direct funding under the bureaucratic approach to higher education funding. So, a strategy to strengthen the research production of a university or a research institute is through exponentially hiring postdocs and doctoral students working on short-term projects (Krücken & Kosmützky, 2023, Vol. 86). Governments and university administrators aiming to expand science through short-term funds may support such strategy. Senior academics can also make use of such competitive funds and offer temporary positions while pursuing their research programs, also benefiting their own professional careers. By so doing, the expansion of higher education and science influenced by a managerial logic may also expand temporary positions in academia. The academic labor market will become increasingly segmented by different types of positions (Bauder, 2005; Gaughan & Bozeman, 2019). If norms and regulations do not counter this trend, the new managerial doctrines will be related to academic structures with a low number of higher ranks and a majority of academics in lower ranks, with short-term employment relationships.

METHOD

The method of this study involved the comparison of four cases using descriptive statistics and putting emphasis on the analysis of their regulatory frameworks.

Cases

I undertook a systematic comparison, specifically using the difference method (see Ebbinghaus, 2009), and selected countries with different trajectories in higher education, but with similar employment patterns in terms of the proportion of academics in temporary positions (see Table 1). Investigating Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA allowed for viewing temporary employment in countries within education traditions historically dissimilar, including Latin American, Humboldtian, and the USA. These differ in their educational traditions and the participation of private higher education, which may play a role in the development of employment schemes.

In Latin America, Chile, and Colombia have been influenced by the Spanish and French traditions as well as by the reforms based on the Manifesto of the

Table 1.   Similarities and Differences of the Case Studies.

		Chile	Colombia	USA	Germany
Similarities	*Temporary positions*	67.6% (SIES, 2020)	82.1% (SNIES, 2020)	55.6% (IPEDS, 2023)	81.4% (ICEland, 2021)
Differences	*Tradition*	Latin American (Spanish, French, Humboldtian, Entrepreneurial)		USA, entrepreneurial university	Humboldtian
	Enrolment in private universities	66.7% (SIES, 2020)	50.7% (SNIES, 2020)	25.1% and 3.9% (IPEDS, 2023)	1.8% (ICEland, 2021)

University of Córdoba (Pineda, 2015). In Latin American countries, these reforms have had an enduring impact on higher education through the form of governance called *cogobierno* (co-governance). Before this, historically, the Latin American tradition did not include a high proportion of academics in tenured positions. A further similarity of Chile and Colombia is the implementation of neo-liberal policies in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively. Universities in Germany are influenced by the Humboldtian tradition that provides power and autonomy to their professors, who are legally classified as public servants (*Beamte*). This tradition gives regional governments and the university leadership limited room to negotiate different types of contracts for professors (de Boer et al., 2007). German universities also have more flexibility in deciding upon shorter contracting terms of research assistants that reflect new forms of funding. Despite these pressures for more rationalization, there is currently less of a managerial trend in Germany compared to other countries in the Anglo-American world (Bleiklie et al., 2017; Krücken et al., 2013).

Universities in the USA are a mixture of European traditions, significantly influenced by the British university tradition and, later, by the Humboldtian ideal (Meyer, 2016). Universities have also become more entrepreneurial. They largely operate in a much more competitive environment, where they do not rely on stable funds, but rather, competitive ones, external donors, and student fees (Clark, 1998). In the USA, the differentiation between public universities and private universities is decreasing in terms of funding sources (Ramirez, 2002).

Statistics on Academic Employment

I analyzed the descriptive statistics on academic employment and other indicators of the current trends in higher education. The data included total numbers of academic and permanent contracts, student enrollment, administrative staff, accreditation, and publications from four countries with data being merged from nine databases. In the context of this research, temporary positions are indicative of job security, a construct that also involves subjective perceptions of insecurity (De Cuyper & De Witte, 2007) relevant for my study, but that I cannot measure directly with the available data I have on permanent or temporary types of contracts. Permanent employment is differentiated from temporary employment and defined by contract of indefinite duration, derived (or not) from the status of public servant.

Permanent employment was compared through calculating the percentage of permanent academic employment (simplified to tenured academics). I standardized permanent employment as equivalent to regular (*planta*) academics in Chile (SIES, 2020), regular contracts of indefinite duration (*a término indefinido*) in Colombia (SNIES, 2020), contracts of indefinite duration (*unbefristed*) in Germany (ICEland, 2021), and "all ranks with faculty status tenured" in the USA (IPEDS, 2023). I focused on job permanency, because other variables that indicate changes in academic employment, such as part-time employment, were not available for all countries, and other variables of welfare, such as workload and wellbeing, are usually not found in higher education databases. I have not included tenure-track professors as secure positions in the USA, because the continuation of their contacts is neither secured nor classified as such (IPEDS, 2023). Examples of non-permanent employment are the so-called *a contrata* in Chile, the *de cátedra* in Colombia, the German *junior professor* without the possibility of tenure, or the *adjunct professor,* lecturers and research assistants in the USA (postdoctoral researchers are not identified in the IPEDS). I have also included the total number of enrolled students as a proxy measure of the expansion of higher education (see Schofer & Meyer, 2005). In addition, I have traced the number of administrative staff: *personal administrativo* in Colombia, full-time non-instructional staff in the USA and *Verwaltungspersonal* in Germany, but these data are not available for Chile. This is, as a general indicator of the administrative apparatus theoretically related to insecure employment of academics (see Musselin, 2012). I have also differentiated between the public and the private sectors and the private for-profit sector in the USA, which is believed to offer more insecure conditions (Kezar et al., 2019). This sector is said to exist in Latin American countries (Levy, 2012), but only informally and cannot be found in the databases of Chile and Colombia.

The dataset comprised data from 56 Chilean, 78 Colombian, 103 German and 418 USA universities from official sources in each country (ICEland, 2021; IPEDS, 2023; SIES, 2020; SNIES, 2020). I selected all the higher education institutions officially categorized as universities, using the legal capacity to grant doctorates as a common criterion to maintain comparable cases. For the USA, I selected the doctoral schools according to The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (2020). This selection made it possible to rule out universities, such as a number of business schools and law schools, with no emphasis on research, the activities of which might be compatible in nature with part-time faculty. In the case of Germany, I did not include any of the eight clinical faculties, so I was able to compare similar types of organizations on a national level. Colombia only has data available on the types of contracts since 2008 (SNIES, 2020) while for Chile, data were only found from 2010 onward (SIES, 2020). It was necessary to request the information from the Ministry of Education, because the SIES database has information on employment dates, but not on types of contracts. Germany only has aggregate information from 1992 to 2004 and information by university since 2018 (ICEland, 2021). The data available for the USA date back to 1980, a date that frames the time limits of my analysis. Data on accredited programs were retrieved from the respective accreditation offices form Chile (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación, 2020a), Colombia (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación, 2020),

Germany (Akkreditierungsrat, 2020), and the USA (U.S. Department of Education, 2020). Historical data were not available for Germany. I also collected data on the citable documents in Scopus for each country (Scimago, 2023).

Governmental Regulations

I also studied the regulations affecting academic employment. These included Higher Education and Science Laws, Labour Laws, and court decisions (see Table 1). The documents I analyzed were issued by governments, judges, and accreditation agencies compiled in 27 documents. The criterion for selecting documents was their regulation of academic contracts. I looked for the moments of creation of key temporary positions in the regulatory frameworks of each country.

Analysis

I applied descriptive statistical analysis considering changes in academic employment regulations at universities in the four countries, which was my second source of information. I interpreted all the manuscripts as documentary evidence (Scott, 1990) of the creation of new types of academic positions and the job security they offer.

RESULTS

I will now interpret the descriptive statistics of each country in relation to changes in the national institutional frameworks creating new insecure academic positions. The statistics for each country are presented independently before discussing the commonalities and differences found in academic employment trends.

Chile

The hiring of academics in Chile has occurred largely through permanent positions in similar proportions at public and private universities (24.1% and 23.1%) (Fig. 1). The lower part of the graph shows that this form of hiring occurs in an environment of expanding enrollment, particularly at private universities. In Chile, the proportion of students in private universities grew from 57.0% to 66.7% (2005–2018) (SIES, 2020; see Fig. 2). Scientific production has also grown substantially from 1,776 to 14,355 (1996–2018) (Scimago, 2023).

Within a poorly regulated system established by the military government, regulations for contracting academics mostly depend on the hierarchies established by each university within the labor regulations of its public or private sector (República de Chile, 1980). In both the public and private sectors, there is the modality of contracting by hours or part-time contracts. In the public sector, in general, there are the categories of *planta*, *a contrata* and *por honorarios* (regular, contracted, zero-hours-based) (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1989/2005) that also apply to universities. The difference between public official working as regular and contract (*planta* and *a contrata*) had a long-standing tradition (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1953; Ministerio del Interior, 1925) that later translated to higher education. Labor relations in this sector are regulated by the Administrative Statute that divides academics into personnel with permanent contracts and short-term jobs that are temporary, up to two years (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión

Permanent Jobs in Chile

Fig. 1. Permanent Jobs in Chile.

Students in Chile

Fig. 2. Students in Chile.

Social, 1990/1993). On the other hand, in private universities academics are subject to the Labor Law (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social, 1990/1993), which allows for temporary contracts but these become permanent after a second extension.

Fig. 1 also shows a slight increase in the percentage of permanent employment in the period for which data is available, from 23.4% in 2010 to 32.0% in 2018. The only new regulation issued in this period was in the area of accreditation. The National Accreditation Commission (CAN), created in 2006 to replace the National Undergraduate Accreditation Commission (CNAP), established among its evaluation criteria whether these institutions have mechanisms that ensure a "quality academic offer" for the development of teaching, research, and transfer (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación, 2013). Accredited programs increased from 1,344 to 2,889 between 2011 and 2018 (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación, 2020a), representing 11.5% to 20.7% of the total numbers of programs, respectively. The accreditation program is mandatory in the areas of medicine, education, and doctoral programs in general. The Comisión Nacional de Acreditación (CNA) makes explicit mention of academics' contractual conditions: "The course or program has a faculty – a nucleus of dedicated and tenured professors – that together direct and provide sustainability to the educational project over time" (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación, 2014, p. 22, author's translation). Likewise, reports on the results of the institutional accreditation processes reveal that the number of full-time professors in relation to the number of students is having an increasing influence as a norm for determining the quality level of academic programs.

Institutional accreditation, in turn, is maintained based on four mandatory areas or dimensions: teaching and results of the educational process; strategic management and institutional resources; internal quality assurance and links to the environment; and a voluntary one (research, creation, and innovation). In recent years, institutional accreditation has been established as a requirement for access to public funding. For example, in one of the recent institutional accreditation reports, the CNA highlights that in the university under evaluation "full-time academics increased by 31% and academics with contracts between 33 and 43 hours, grew by 34% during the evaluation period" (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación, 2020b).

Accreditation enables universities to apply for demand-side subsidies, such as state-guaranteed loans. The law regulating such loans (Ministerio de Educación, 2005/2012) established in 2012 that only students from accredited programs could access them. More recently, the normative pressures to obtain accreditation were reinforced after the new Higher Education Law (Ministerio de Educación, 2018) established a mandatory and comprehensive program accreditation, to a random group of undergraduate and graduate programs determined by the National Accreditation Commission (CNA). Within these institutional frameworks, universities, especially private ones, may have increased the proportion of academics with full-time contracts in order to respond to the growing demands for accreditation.

Colombia

Temporary employment in Colombia was not allowed before the 1990s. The previous regulations established that the "professor" in charge of "chairs or elective courses" could teach less than 10 hours per week (Presidente de la República

Permanent Jobs in Colombia

Fig. 3. Permanent Jobs in Colombia.

de Colombia, 1980). National regulations used to limit academics' temporary employment at least in public universities. However, during the Gaviria government, temporary employment without workload limits became legal.

There is a decrease in the percentage of academics with permanent contracts between 2008 and 2018, from 20.6% to 17.9% (Fig. 3). This trend is paralleled by an increase in enrollments at private universities, a slight increase at public universities, and an exponential increase of more than three times in administrative staff in the same period. Permanent employment in higher education in Colombia is mostly found among professors at public universities: 24.5% of university academics in this sector have a permanent position as opposed to 12.7% at private ones. The decrease in permanent staff contrasts with the increase of student enrollments in 36.1% since 2008 and enrollments in the private sector, from 45.8% to 50.7% (2008–2018) (SNIES, 2020; see also Fig. 4). Administrative staff has increased from 11,852 to 39,757 (see Fig. 5). There has also been an exponential increase of scientific activities published in scientific publications, from 579 in 1996 to 12,625 in 2019 (Scimago, 2023).

Differences between the provision of temporary employment by private and public universities are framed by laws on higher education and employment. In the public sector, in Colombia, professors may acquire the employment status of public officials (República de Colombia, 1992). Permanent employment at public universities is regulated by a centralized salary system, with national promotion norms contained in Decree 1279 of 2002 (Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2002). Once a mandatory probationary period (established by each university) is over (República de Colombia, 1992), the dismissal of a professor from the staff occurs only under conditions of force majeure that can always be countersued (Pineda & Seidenschnur, 2021).

Students in Colombia

Fig. 4.   Students in Colombia.

Administrative Staff in Colombia

Fig. 5.   Administrative Staff in Colombia.

Temporary employment is also possible in private universities for the *professor de planta*. In this sector, professors can have 10-month contracts that can be renewed in the 13th month (two months without pay), without any prospect of permanent employment, such as employees in other sectors have (República de Colombia, 1992). Even a professor who enters the ranks of tenured professor can be unilaterally removed through paying compensation that was reduced during the reform of the labor code through Law 50 during the administration of César Gaviria. This law also allowed short-term contracts for work contracted (Congreso de Colombia, 1990) under a rhetoric of employment flexibility and increased competitiveness for foreign capital (Bocanegra Acosta, 2014). A new labor policy reform approved by the Uribe administration (Congreso de Colombia, 2002) reduced these penalization costs. Under this newer regulation, private universities can grant permanent contracts that they can dissolve at any time following normal labor legislation that does not distinguish between employees in different sectors.

Employment by the hour without any time limit was legalized in the Higher Education Law of 1990, during the neoliberal government of Gaviria, which normalized the *professor de planta* as different from the *professor de cátedra* (regular and zero-hours-based) (República de Colombia, 1992). While the same word "*cátedra*" is used and the main areas of the curriculum can be taught, this academic rank is different from the *catedrático* in Spain, which is the highest level of the professorial rank. While the *professor de cátedra* was, by law, a freelancer, the Constitutional Court (1996) established that an employment relationship existed that required the payment of a proportion of the health insurance and pension contributions (Corte Constitucional, 1996). The additional legal mandate of the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional, 1999) to hire for the full semester and not for a number of hours, and to retain the professor for specific extraordinary tasks, is usually not fulfilled by private or public institutions. Insecure employment is also regulated by so-called "occasional professors," who also do not have indefinite contracts.

The decreasing trend in job security in Colombian universities does not seem to have been affected by regulation of higher education through accreditation. Accredited programs started in 2008 and have increased to 1,595 (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación, 2020) (15% of programs were accredited in 2018). In theory, accreditation in Colombia represents a mechanism for regulating temporary employment. The accreditation standards applied since 1998 require permanent contracts for the faculty as a central criterion for the accreditation of programs and institutions (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación, 2013, 2014). Universities are currently debating whether the accreditation commissions will require a certain percentage of permanent contracts from some universities, after the President of the ESAP university announced in the Senate that this university was required to have at least 300 tenured professors (Senado de la República, 2020). The accreditation processes do not seem to reflect general trends, but rather, isolated cases in light of the declining trends in academic employment at universities.

Germany

The increase in temporary academic positions in Germany occurs along with the expansion of university enrollments and scientific production. While the total number of academics working at German universities increased from 106,062 in 1992 to 283,771 in 2018 (Fig. 6), the decrease in the proportion of permanent jobs is remarkable. In 2018, only 18.6% (52,702) of jobs were permanent, without major differences being observed across the public and the private sector (Fig. 6). Permanent employment of professors who automatically became civil servants used to be the most common form of contract in German universities. Academics with permanent positions represented 52% of the total number of academics in 1992. In parallel, universities have also increased their administrative apparatus from 232,611 to 267,130 administrative staff since 2008 (Fig. 8). Private enrollment increased from 1% of the total student enrollment in universities in 2005 to 1.8% in 2018 (ICEland, 2021; see also Fig. 7). Publications have also more than doubled, from 75,933 to 169,741 (Scimago, 2023).

The increase of temporary jobs in Germany is at least partly related to the limitation of employment duration at universities introduced by the Academic Employment Act (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2007). This law attempts to regulate the academic career by introducing the time limits that exist in the USA. Employment contracts for research positions other than that of professor or for a limited number of professors hired on an unlimited basis (*Lehrkräfte für besondere Aufgaben*) with a teaching function are limited to six years before and six years after the doctorate. Another position in charge of research and teaching tasks is the research assistant (*Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter*). The research


Fig. 6. Permanent Jobs in Germany*.

Students in Germany

Fig. 7.   Students in Germany.

Administrative Staff in Germany

Fig. 8.   Administrative Staff in Germany.

assistant is often called "postdoc," if he or she has attained a doctoral title. In job advertisements, it is often the case that "postdoc" positions are offered on the basis of a few months to some years, often with temporary contracts ranging from 50% to 100%. The percentage of employment offered depends on the funds and duration of research projects. It is a common practice that, based on the available funds of a project senior academics calculate the nominal workload and number of research assistants, either "pre-docs" or "postdocs."

The modification of the higher education law had already created the so-called *junior professor* without a mandatory possibility of a stable position (Deutscher Bundestag, 1976/2002). This position is, in practice, divided into a "tenure track" or "non-tenure track." The junior professor has a similar status to that of assistant professor in the USA, but with the difference that they do not necessarily have a long-term expectation of tenure, as is the case with the latter. Some junior professors have been appointed through the use of competitive funds, such as from the Excellence Initiative (Krücken & Kosmützky, 2023, Vol. 86). Only 20.6% of junior professors (150) in 2018 are in tenure-track positions (ICEland, 2021).

Thus, this modification of the higher education law in 2002 revoked the rule previously introduced by labor law (Deutscher Bundestag, 1985) that scientific institutions should provide factual reasons for contracting through temporary contracts. A main reason for contracting under a temporary contract could be the aim of facilitating an academic qualification. Short-term contracts had been promoted by the government of Gerhard Schröder through a further modification of labor law (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996a) and a discourse about the need for an "employment-friendly flexibilization of labor law" that relieves companies from additional wage costs detrimental to employment (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996b, p. 1, author's translation).

The German university continues to be organized hierarchically around the position of the professor in charge of a specific topic, different from a department-based organization with different professors specializing in various topics. The numbers show that the law limiting the duration of employment has not been accompanied by the creation of new permanent jobs and it has exacerbated the hierarchical structure in German universities.

The decrease in secure employment in Germany is also related to the so-called "pacts" for higher education and science. These consist of funding programs that allocate new resources for research and teaching (Mayer, 2016). These pacts have been in place since 2005: the Pact for Research and Innovation since 2005, the Excellence Initiative since 2005, the Pact for Higher Education since 2007, and the Pact for Quality in Teaching since 2011. These programs are associated with a growing expectation that academics obtain research funds and increase the numbers of doctoral graduates. These funds are also considered in the funding agreements of states (Länder) and their universities and the use of performance indicators on research and teaching (Hüther & Krücken, 2018). Remuneration schemes of professors also commonly include performance bonuses depending on achievements such as creating new study programs or cooperating in large-scale projects (Krücken & Kosmützky, 2023, Vol. 86). However, these funding programs have a limited effect and a short duration, because the federal government

has established these performance criteria in their funding strategies. As a result, the jobs created with these resources are also temporary.

Despite 2,389 academic programs being accredited in 2018 (Akkreditierungsrat, 2020), the accreditation processes, implemented since 1999 (Akkreditierungsrat, 1999), do not seem to have had a positive effect on permanent employment. This trend seems decoupled from the rhetoric of accreditation being about securing human resources to provide conditions for quality assurance (Schneijderberg & Steinhardt, 2019). However, critics of accreditation claim that, in the long run, it fails to create standards for good quality university education. Schneijderberg and Steinhardt (2019) found that the definition of educational quality is polysemic across states (Länder) and only some emphasize teacher indicators, while others stress other aspects, such as teaching metrics, civic goals, promoting student diversity, or economic goals, such as employability. Possibly, the relatively low influence of accreditation in Germany is related to the low level of recognition among academics themselves (Baumann & Krücken, 2019). They raise arguments based on the principle of academic autonomy to dispute accreditors, usually with less respected positions.

United States

The USA has comparatively high rates of permanent employment, while maintaining a small growth of student numbers by almost one fourth since 2003 (Fig. 10) and almost duplicating scientific publications from 350,675 in 1996 to 604,776 in 2018 (Scimago, 2023). The last 40 years show a pattern of permanent employment, where between 36% and 44% of academics in 1980 and 2018 had indefinite contracts (Fig. 9). The criticisms of the recent deterioration in working conditions in the USA (Kezar et al., 2019; Stromquist, 2016) seem to be valid, but only for the last decade, where permanent employment has decreased from 47.9% to 44.4% since 2012 (Fig. 9). If this trend in deteriorating job security continues,

* The universities providing data on permanent contracts in the USA were various until 2012, whereas from this year onwards all universities were providing them.

*Fig. 9.* Permanent Jobs in the USA*.

Fig. 10. Students in the USA.

permanent employment at USA universities may become as scarce as in other countries. The security of academics occurs in a context of increasing enrollment and an exponential increase in administrative staff from 267,987 in 1993 to 298,556 in 2018 (Fig. 11).

The higher proportion of academics with a permanent contract is largely explained by the institution of tenure that exists at both private and public universities. This shared regulatory framework explains the similar proportion of professors with permanent employment conditions in both sectors. Private for-profit universities seem to drive insecure employment, but with only a small effect proportional to their participation in higher education in the USA. Only a small percentage of academics working at these universities are employed on a secure contract basis. However, this sector only has 3.9% of enrolled students (starting with 0.9% in 2005) and does not appear to be a major force in driving insecure employment (IPEDS, 2023).

An environment of weak central regulation and competition of external funds brought forward the practice of tenure as an initiative promoted by academics to secure academic freedom from the pressures of politicians and donors. Thus, the relationship between academics and the university has been regulated by the principle of academic freedom extended during the 1940s through academic unions and faculty associations, with bargaining capacity for improving working conditions, such as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) (Dobbie & Robinson, 2008; Rhoades, 2019) and more recently, by postdoctoral unions following the one created at the University of California (Camacho & Rhoades, 2015).

Fig. 11.   Administrative Staff in the USA.

Tenure at private universities began to be publicly discussed after Professor Edward A. Ross at Stanford was fired, because of opinions affecting the interests of the university's founders in 1900 that gave rise to the AAUP in 1915 (Ginsberg, 2011). After World War I, universities often had procedures that prevented owners and the administration to arbitrarily dismiss a professor, even before the basic principles of academic freedom were explicitly declared. Academics organized to disseminate those principles formally in 1940, when the AAUP and the former Association of American Colleges (today, AACU) published the "Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure" (American Association of University Professors, 1940/1978). The prosperity and subsequent growth of higher education between 1945 and 1970 coincided with the acceptance of criteria for university promotion and tenure. The courts played an important role in this process and in 1972, the Supreme Court established through two landmark cases (Board of Regents State Colleges versus Roth, 1972; *Perry* v. *Sindermann,* 1972) that academics in tenure track had the right of due process before being dismissed or their contracts not being renewed.

The right to tenure or a tenure track, though, did not apply to the nascent category of the postdoctoral researcher, which was established by the National Research Act (Congress of the United States of America, 1974). This law provided funds for "pre- and postdoctoral training" in bio-medical and behavioral sciences. Only later, these positions would be created in other disciplines, including the social sciences and humanities. Even in the 1990s, postdocs were labeled and defined differently, with different academic status and benefits, including job classifications defining a postdoc in terms of "volunteer" (Micoli & Wendell, 2018). Postdocs were not always recognized as having an academic position.

In regard to accreditation, another invention to regulate higher education in the USA, it is difficult to assess its influence on higher education since it has been historically stable throughout the whole period for which I have data. Accredited programs were 274 in 2000 and rose to 370 in 2018 (U.S. Department of Education, 2020). Accreditation has existed since 1952, when the government began to financially support institutional accreditation; federal recognition of accreditation was formalized in 1968 (Brittingham, 2009). In the government, the Federal Department of Education is responsible for certifying accreditation agencies (Harcleroad & Eaton, 2005) and in general, in the USA, this is voluntary. However, having institutional and/or program accreditation status is often relevant to professional licensing and access to federal financial assistance. In many cases, accreditation is granted by institutionally based associations at the federal and regional levels, whose members pay fees.

When accreditation is performed by USA agencies, information about financial conditions are requested by the accreditors (Barrett et al., 2019). Accreditation is also formally related to the job security of academics, but often appears as a secondary, rather than primary criterion. Wilkerson (2017, p. 136) finds that "full-time or part-time teaching assignments" are common indicators of "faculty quality" in accreditations from the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) and the regulations of the USA Department of Education (USDE). However, these are secondary to other indicators, such as "evidence of faculty competence, including training/experience, faculty role in curriculum development and evaluation, as well as numbers of faculty in relation to student enrollments" (Wilkerson, 2017, p. 136). The articulation of these guidelines with academic employment and the influence of these visits on academic employment practices of universities *in toto* requires investigation.

ANALYSIS: NEW TEMPORARY ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND CONTRACTING PRACTICES

Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA established new temporary positions in higher education and employment laws since the 1989, 1992, 2002, and 1974, respectively. The systematic comparison also shows similar patterns in all the studied countries in terms of a majority of the faculty being under temporary contracts. Under these institutional frameworks, universities have developed different practices under a similar rationale to expand higher education and science to the detriment of increasing permanent contracts for academics. I will examine both isomorphic trends in the creation of academic positions and vertical academic structures, as well as the different practices linked to these trends.

Isomorphism in the Creation of New Insecure Academic Positions Following Rationales of Higher Education and Scientific Expansion

As I had anticipated, there is a growing isomorphism in the creation of similar academic positions in national laws in terms of temporary academic employment. In all the four focal countries, new unstable academic positions now representing the

majority of academics working in universities in each country have been created. Insecure academic employment was created under the National Research Act (Congress of the United States of America, 1974), the labor regulations covering higher education (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1989/2005), the Higher Education and Labor Law in Colombia (Congreso de Colombia, 1990; República de Colombia, 1992) and the German Academic Employment Law (2007). These new insecure temporary academic positions were socially created under the influence of a neoliberal agenda and managerial doctrines that promoted labor insecurity in academia. These were introduced during the Pinochet and Gaviria governments in Chile and Colombia and during the influence of NPM in Germany during the 2000s, but were not completely alien to the USA. The new forms of regulation of academic employment were articulated with other key laws and court interventions that I summarize in Table 2.

The labels that create these laws vary according to the national languages: *a contrata*, *por honorarios* in Chile; *de cátedra*, in Colombia; the junior professor without tenure and the *Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter* who have finished their doctoral studies ("postdoc") in Germany; or the postdoctoral researcher called "postdoc" emerging in the USA and a term now recognized in all countries. These positions were created while permanent positions remained unchanged, such as the *Professor Asociado* and *Professor Titular* in Chile and Colombia (but only in the public sector), the Professor in Germany (under the W2 and W3 categories), the Associate and Professor in the USA, and some special cases of lecturers and research assistants with indefinite contracts. In all four countries there is a hiring plan in which most of the faculty is employed in a situation of insecurity. The terms of these positions also hint at the rationales for their creation. While Germany and the USA were oriented toward creating new research positions in universities to expand scientific production, the categories in Chile and Colombia refer to teaching positions enabling the growth of academic programs and student numbers.

Isomorphism in Academic Structures Based on Different Practices

Universities in the four countries studied may be isomorphic in terms of academic structures having a majority of academics working in universities under insecure positions. Chile, Colombia, and Germany represent countries where the vast majority of academics are working in a situation of labor insecurity, while in the USA a majority also now works in insecure positions.

In all the case studies, except in the last decade in Chile, the increase in the size of higher education went along with a decrease in the job security of academics. However, universities have developed different practices under rationales that explain similar trends in the low proportions of non-permanent academics. In Colombia and Chile, leaders of public universities have been staffing their universities under a managerial logic searching for maximizing efficiency contract *profesores de cátedra* and *profesores a contrata*. In the studied Latin American countries, similar patterns of employment mainly based on insecure schemes in the universities with different university traditions are explained by the influence

Table 2. Comparison of New Forms of Higher Education and Employment Regulation.

	Chile	Colombia	Germany	USA
Higher Education and Science Laws	• Law descentralizing ranks and remuneration in universities (República de Chile, 1980) • Programme Accreditation (2006) • Higher Education Act (2018)	• Decree 80 of 1980 limited the hours of hourly contracts • The Higher Education Law (1992) standardizes the division between *planta* and *cátedra* teachers • Decree 1279 of 1992 establishes that academics' salaries are based on rank and results • Programme Accreditation (1998)	• Higher Education Act (1976/1999/2002) that created the temporary position *junior professor* without the option of tenure • NPG-influenced Pacts for Higher Education and Science allocate funds by competition • Programme Accreditation (1999)	• Morrill's Laws (1862) • Bayh-Dole Act (1880) • National Research Act creating the category of the temporary position of *postdoctoral researcher* (1974) • Programme Accreditation (1952)
Labour Laws and court decisions	• The administrative statute (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1989/2005) creating the categories *planta, a contrata* and the temporary positions *por honorarios* and *a contrata* applicable to universities • Labour law limiting temporary employment in the private sector to two years (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social, 1990/1993)	• Law 50 of 1990 that decreases contract termination costs and allows for temporary employment • Law 789 of 2002 that further decreases costs for unilateral contract termination	• Academic Employment Law (2007) which regulates the *Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter* (scientific assistant) without a doctorate or with a doctorate ("postdoc")	• Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940/1978) later applied by the Supreme Court in 1972 (Board of Regents State Colleges versus Roth, 1972; *Perry v. Sindermann*, 1972)

of forms of hiring that privilege the use of the market logic over traditional forms of academic employment. The "taxi professor" of an academic working to cover the expansion of public universities and economically benefiting the owners of private universities is the dominant model for academic employment in contemporary universities in Chile and Colombia.

In Germany and the USA, some temporary staff cover teaching, but insecurity is mostly driven by temporary scientific positions in competitive, short-term research projects under a main rationale of scientific expansion. In Germany, as in the rest of continental Europe, the self-governance of professors as an ideal has allowed them to maintain high power and influence on boards of trustees, presidents, and academic senates (Engwall, 2018). But even there the academic body has been segmented, which has given rise to a majority group of academics whose job prospects are uncertain. At the contemporary German university, it is accepted and expected that each professor will be in charge of several doctoral students, research assistants without a doctorate, and the research assistants with a doctorate ("postdocs") – many of whom have part-time employment positions that often do not correspond to the real invested time. Given the proportion of tenured academics, research assistants usually do not have good chances of secure employment prospects in academia. Depending on their disciplines, they may also not be enhancing their chances of obtaining secure jobs outside academia.

On the other hand, there is the USA where universities have maintained a much higher proportion of secure academic employment when compared to the other studied cases. The social institution of tenure, which has served as a defence against the expansion of higher and private higher education, now also protects against the emergence of a huge administrative apparatus. Public and private universities in the USA hire much of their academic staff on secure terms, with the exception of for-profit universities. This seems to have been changing since 2012, possibly driven by the increasing contracting of postdoctoral researchers who are not entitled to a tenure track. Academic tenure contributes to the claim of rights by the adjunct faculty in relation to standards attained by the tenured faculty (Rhoades, 2019). The inclusion of such rights in the negotiation of bargaining agreements could explain the observed trend where job security is maintained or at least has not deteriorated to the levels observed in the other three studied countries.

The different trends in the growth of accreditation and administrative staff also seem to indicate that increasing managerialism demanding the growth of administrative structures may have different effects in each country. For Colombia and the USA, the increase of the administrative apparatus measured as administrative staff and accreditation is exponential. It is possible that universities have been redirecting resources toward administrative activities that they have saved by means of granting just temporary contracts for academics. In Germany, the increase of job insecurity of academics has not occurred along with an exponential increase in its administrative apparatus. Here, new forms of temporary and competitive funding between universities, such as the so-called "pacts" for higher education and science, may have led to the accelerated creation of temporary jobs, but without an increase in administrative staff.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the expansion of higher education intertwined with influential managerial doctrines seems to relate to isomorphic trends of insecure positions and their use by universities to enroll more students and produce more knowledge. This pattern occurs unless mechanisms to protect academics' working conditions are in operation. University tenure and/or accreditations explicitly demanding secure employment conditions exemplify institutionalized countermeasures. Countries with different educational traditions, such as Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA, share similarities in having created insecure academic positions between 1974 and 2002. Universities then used (and further promoted) the social acceptance of these positions through contracting academics to occupy them. As a result, universities from countries with different educational traditions share vertical academic structures, isomorphic in terms of having most academics contracted into temporary positions.

Despite this fundamental similarity, academic structures do differ in terms of the type of new positions at the base of their hierarchies. New insecure positions, such as the professor *a contrata* or *de cátedra* in Colombia, mostly engage with teaching. They also often do not have any representation on governance bodies and academic senates. Thus, the social acceptance of these positions as the most common type of contracting also contradicts principles of collegial governance. In the Latin American context, in Chile, but not in Colombia, the government has made some modifications through including academic job security under the evaluation criteria of accreditations. These are, then, needed by universities as a signal for quality in the market for students, academics, and grants, while also obtaining governmental funds via scholarship programs.

In Germany and the USA, some temporary staff working as instructors or lecturers cover teaching. However, the new categories involving the creation of the junior professor without tenure track, or the "postdoc" are primarily linked to augmenting research activities through positions that are less expensive than professorial positions (Gaughan & Bozeman, 2019). First established in the natural sciences for training in laboratories, the position of the postdoc was then exported to other academic communities. Now, so-called full-time and part-time postdoc positions are offered also within the social sciences and humanities, where trained scientists may later have comparatively higher difficulties in developing a career outside academia (van der Weijden et al., 2015). Young scholars work in temporary scientific positions for research in competitive, short-term research projects, where the rules of the game are driven by a main rationale of scientific expansion. These activities may contribute to the research agenda and the academic career of senior academics protected by their tenured or professorial status (civil servant in public German universities), but clearly, at the same time, are a driver of job insecurity. Also, in an environment of scientific expansion, the educational and training value of postdoctoral researchers is being displaced by an expectation to contribute to publications, while career mentoring and frequent advisor interaction has been often minimized or become non-existent (Gibbs et al., 2015; Miller & Feldman, 2016).

The change in the rules of the game and the new contractual schemes show great similarities across universities with such different traditions can be explained by the common denominator of a world culture (Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer & Ramirez, 2013). Created after World War II and more influential after the Cold War, these cultural ideas promoted doctrines linked to administrative efficiency and the expansion of higher education and science as a symbol of progress. This article adds to the literature by contributing the insight that the rationale for maximization of student numbers, administration, and scientific production is occurring together concomitantly with the creation of greater numbers of temporary academic positions. These new positions are cultural constructions in the same way that universities in continuous expansion are also social inventions. Contracting practices under new institutionalized employment categories creates tensions with former and new procedures promoting labor security in academia.

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