

In pursuit of societal harmony

**Reviewing the experiences and
approaches in officially monolingual
and officially multilingual countries**

**Conference
Proceedings**

EDITORS

**Ludmilla A'Beckett
Theodorus du Plessis**

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**Reviewing the experiences and approaches in officially
monolingual and officially multilingual countries**

A selection of papers on language legislation presented at the
International Conference on Language Policy in Multicultural and
Multilingual Settings, Mandalay, Myanmar, February 8-11, 2016



**Ludmilla A'Beckett
Theodorus du Plessis**

EDITORS

***sb* SUNBONANI
CONFERENCE**

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Published by Sun Media Bloemfontein (Pty) Ltd.

Imprint: SunBonani Conference

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First edition 2017

ISBN: 978-1-928424-12-3 (Print)

ISBN: 978-1-928424-13-0 (e-book)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928424130>

Set in Cambria 10/15 pt

Cover design, typesetting and production by Sun Media Bloemfontein

This printed copy can be ordered directly from: media@sunbonani.co.za

The e-book is available at the following link: <https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928424130>

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FOREWORD

This collection contains a selection of papers that were presented at the International Conference on Language Policy in Multicultural and Multilingual Settings, Mandalay, Myanmar, February 8-11, 2016. The majority of the papers were delivered in a special conference panel, *“In Pursuit of Societal Harmony: Reviewing Experiences and Approaches in Officially Monolingual and Officially Multilingual Countries”*, hence the chosen title for this published record of the proceedings.

Our thanks go to the Scientific Committee of this conference for reviewing the abstracts of the papers included in this collection and to the reviewers of the final papers for undertaking a blind peer review and for providing the editors with useful feedback.

We would like to express our gratitude to the convenors of the conference Language policy in multicultural and multilingual settings Professor Lo Bianco and Doctor Yvette Slaughter from the Organising Committee for their assistance in organising this panel. We would also again like to thank our reviewers for their time and valuable suggestions. We acknowledge the scholarly input of the following people:

Associate Professor Johnson David Cassels (University of Iowa, USA); Professor Wannie Carstens (North-West University, RSA); Professor Robert Greenberg (University of Auckland, New Zealand); Professor Dimitry Kochenov (University of Groningen, the Netherlands); Professor Joseph Turi (International Association of Language Law, Canada); Professor Richard Powell (Northwestern University, USA), Associate Professor Finex Ndlovu (University of New England, Australia), Associate Professor Qu Changliang (Dalian University of Foreign Languages, People’s Republic of China), Associate Professor Paolo Colluzzi (University of Malaya, Malaysia), Doctor Elzbieta Kuzborska (Association of Polish Academics, Lithuania), Doctor Ewa Chilinsky (European Centre for Minority Issues, Denmark), Doctor Ekaterina Protassova (University of Helsinki, Finland), Associate Professor. Svitlana Revutskaia (The Academy of National Guards, Ukraine), and Professor Ghil’ad Zuckermann (University of Adelaide, Australia).

In pursuit of societal harmony

We also appreciate the logistical efforts undertaken by Mrs Jani de Lange of the Unit for Language Facilitation and Empowerment at the University of the Free State in finalising the manuscript and our gratitude goes to SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein for producing such a fine product.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the University of the Free State.

The Editors

Melbourne and Bloemfontein

October 2017

INTRODUCTION

Language policy is traditionally viewed as a powerful tool for achieving social cohesion (Blackledge, 2000; Pavlenko, 2008, Lo Bianco, 2010). However, on the one hand, different countries view their linguistic goals differently and, hence, they adopt dissimilar measures to promote their vision of social justice. On the other hand, the elements of the language policy include various steps and aspects, which could be prioritised or neglected.

The purpose of these proceedings is to overview the diversity of approaches in language policy, undertaken by different, officially monolingual and multilingual countries, across the globe. These proceedings are concerned with legacies of two historical developments: colonialism and communist aspirations (Maurais, 1991; Pavlenko, 2008; Skutnabb-Cangas, 2012). It presents a level playing field for comparing post-colonialism and post-communism, which are perceived by different scholars either as identical or dissimilar phenomena.

In these proceedings, we focus on the case studies which highlight the similarities and differences in implementing various aspects of language policy, as well as on the discrepancies between the envisaged goals and language habits among populations resistant to change.

The sociolinguistic activities we consider, herein, include:

1. principles, provisions and scope of language legislation (Turi, 1994; Du Plessis, 2011);
2. bridging gaps between legal provisions and rooted language practices (Maurais, 1997; Lo Bianco, 2010);
3. safeguarding national cultural heritage and its ethnic composition (Greenberg, 2004; Pavlenko, 2008; Williams, 2008);

4. civil obligations of language maintenance imposed by the state on its citizens (Blackledge, 2000);
5. prestige and the treatment of official languages in different environments (Turi, 1994; Du Plessis, 2011);
6. protection and drift of linguistic borders (Pavlenko, 2008; Greenberg, 2004);
7. imposition of language norms on native speakers (Greenberg, 2004).

Unfortunately, their negative by-products can overshadow the good intentions underlining some policies. Both monolingual and multilingual policies have their downsides. Therefore, the proceedings takes into account both the unforeseen impacts of zealous imposition and the slack implementation of language laws. Attention to negative impacts of provisions, made in good faith, empowers scholars and law-makers with recognition of risk factors.

The proceedings are comprised of six presentations, dealing with language legislation and practices in Europe, Asia, Africa and North America. Ludmilla A'Beckett and Theodorus Du Plessis of the University of the Free State in the South African Republic, develop a framework for assessing principles of language laws in their paper, *Shall we compare 'apples' and 'oranges'? Measuring the scope of the language legislation in Ukraine and South Africa*. Their paper is concerned with recognising representations of major functional domains of official language(s) and cataloguing major tools for the implementation of the law. This paper provides salient examples of the opposite perspectives in language policy and dissimilar foundations for nation building: Ukraine attempts to monolingualise the public domains of the country, while South Africa seeks to multilingualise its society. This paper also initiates discussion of functions, treatment, equity and prestige associated with the notion of the official / state / national language(s).

Amelie Hien of Laurentienne University, Ontario, Canada and Abou Napon, University of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (West Africa), continue the discussion of the meaning of 'official language' and the consequences that flow from such a status in their paper, *Language policies and access to information and services. Comparative study of Ontario (Canada) and Burkina Faso (West Africa)*. Burkina Faso treats its official language as the lingua franca between its ethnic groups and in this capacity it may malfunction as a vehicle for transmitting vital information. The Canadian province of Ontario uses two parallel vehicles of official and institutionalised communication, and, hence, members of their society have better chances and channels for the realisation of their linguistic

needs. Monolingual and multilingual language policy, in these places, give different results for recipients of information.

Ana Paula Dias, of the Centro de Estudos das Migrações e das Relações Interculturais Universidade Aberta, Portugal, overviews the discrepancies between the language law in Macao and the rooted language practice where two language communities have very little interaction or common interests, in her paper, *Policies and Realities about language in Macau*, Macao is a subject to two judicial systems – the Portuguese and Chinese ones, respectively – but language practice has developed independently of the legal provisions from both systems.

Maya Khemlani David of the University of Malaya, Ceasar Dealwis of the MARA University of Technology and Kuang Ching Hei of the University of Malaysia in their paper, *Language policy and language use in multilingual Malaysia*, look at the reality on the distribution of languages and their functions in Malaysia. The country achieved its independence in 1957 as Malaya and then united with North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore in 1963 to become Malaysia – Singapore was expelled from it in 1965. At present, English, as the language of the former colonists, functions as the unofficial official language, and retains its function of a language of interethnic communication overshadowing Malay, the national language in the country. Chinese and Tamil retain their status of major minority languages while many indigenous languages require state efforts on revitalisation. The authors seek to determine whether the imposition of a national language policy in multilingual Malaysia has resulted in acceptance of the national language in its capacity as a medium of instruction, and as a lingua franca in a number of domains, particularly in educational settings. They conclude that the existent public preferences lead to social processes which might undermine national unity.

Jala Garibova of the Azerbaijan University of Languages, Azerbaijan, will discuss language options available for citizens of this post-Soviet country, in her paper, *Linguistic landscape in Azerbaijan: Policy, attitudes and choices*. Over 92 per cent of the population speaks Azerbaijani and, hence, Russian has not been considered as a threat to the language of the titular nation. Russian and English play significant roles in the public domains of education and intercultural communication. However, attitudes toward languages and the state policy differ.

Nonna Danchenko of the IPU, New Zealand, considers the Soviet legacy in Latvia and attempts of the Latvian government to safeguard the titular nation and its cultural legacy from possible political interventions by the Russian Federation in manipulating the

Latvian Russophone community, in her paper, *Nation building and bilingualism in Latvia: An historical perspective*. The ethnic tensions between the two communities, namely Russophone and Latvian, is a by-product of attempts to monolingualise the Latvian public space. Latvia also offers an interesting case study of the strict requirements for linguistic citizenship, requirements that leave around 12% of its population being stateless persons. The imposition of the language test, not for migrants, but for residents, is a controversial practice which should be carefully monitored.

Vuk Vukotić of the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language, Lithuania, analyses another aspect of language policy – standardisation of the official language – in his presentation, *The nation-building linguist: On the status and ideologies of language planning institutions in post-1990's Croatia and Lithuania*. On top of removing a hegemonic language and its legacy from public spheres, some post-communist countries have launched a campaign for the purification of their official language. Enforcing language standards has been perceived to be a tool for promoting national values and cementing the language community. If Croatia has to re-invent its language to seal its linguistic borders, and to dissociate itself from Serbia, Lithuania seeks to protect its language from the influence of Polish and Russian, as well as from inventions by “incompetent” language users. The paper explores the motivation and activities of language “experts”.

This proceedings show that the post-communist trend in the language policy has been vastly represented by attempts to eliminate the language, and even the cultural legacy of the formerly hegemonic nation/s in countries emerging after the collapse of the system. Officials in post-communist countries link the harmonisation of a society with the idea of homogenising its population, and prioritising the cultural legacy of the titular nation. However, the Ukrainian law introducing languages of minorities as regional (i.e. official in the regions where minorities reside) could be perceived as an attempt to recognise the language diversity in the Ukrainian territory but was at discord with the view of nationally conscious Ukrainians “One nation-one language”. On the other hand, Azerbaijan makes ostensible efforts to promote the language ideology of plurilingualism. At the same time, post-colonial countries are more tolerant of the language of their colonisers but do not sufficiently promote the institutionalisation of their indigenous languages. The case of Macao, though, shows a slack implementation of provisions from the former colonisers and from the kin-state which again regains the power over its estranged province. The absence of visible efforts to follow any legal pattern has resulted in a communication gap between the communities.

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PART ONE
**Post-colonial and
comparative perspectives**

SHALL WE COMPARE 'APPLES' AND 'ORANGES'?

MEASURING THE SCOPE OF THE LANGUAGE LEGISLATION IN UKRAINE AND SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors strive to measure the scope of the language legislation in Ukraine and South Africa, and develop a framework for assessing principles of language laws. The authors offer case studies, in order to illustrate opposing perspectives in language policy and draw on dissimilar foundations for nation-building. The paper provides an overview of major functional domains of official language(s) in the two countries, and looks at setbacks in the implementation of the language law. Ukraine attempts to monolingualise the public domains of the country, while South Africa seeks to multilingualise its society. This paper also initiates the discussion of functions, treatment, equity and prestige, associated with the notion of the official/state/national language(s).

1. INTRODUCTION

From time to time, scholars and politicians turn to a comparison of documents on language legislation. A particular need may involve checking precedents or finding paragons. The comparative studies of the legislative provisions can also facilitate the adoption and adaptation of beneficial practices. In addition to these comparative studies, language planning experts are interested in gauging the strength of legal requirements and the identification of ill-reputed procedures. However, the language legislation documents do not display a uniformity in their organisation. A variety of structural and formal differences could be observed, as such legal documents reflect peculiarities of a sociolinguistic landscape and the specific needs of a nation. For this reason, it would be

desirable to establish some kind of common ground, a grid of properties, against which we can profile the peculiarities of each legislation.

The idea of developing a framework for gauging provisions, in different pieces of language legislation, is not new. Maurais (1991) suggested a basic schema for comparing legislation in five Soviet Republics and Quebec. He examined similarities and differences in countries with different strategies in language planning and, thus, created a precedent for further comparative studies of national legislations, worldwide. Maurais' analysis avoided application of legal or legalistic perspectives, but drew attention to basic sociolinguistic principles underlying legal texts. Maurais (1997) refined the schema.

Du Plessis (2012) modified this sociolinguistic foundation for contrasting differences and similarities in bills and language legislations, which were, collectively, a subject of public discussions in South Africa, between 2003 and 2012. He introduced a typology to describe differences in manifestation of the aforementioned sociolinguistic components in the texts of bills and legislation. The measuring scheme was applied to a comparison of the *South African Languages Bill (SALB II)*, which was gazetted for public comment in October 2011 (RSA 2011), the *South African Languages Bill (SALB I)*, which was published for public comment in 2003 (DAC 2003) but then, later on, withdrawn, and of the final product of these bills, i.e. the *Use of Official Languages Act, 2012* (RSA 2012). This comparison revealed relatively small differences between *SALB II* and the final Act, but more significant differences between these two and *SALB I*, which suggested that *SALB I* would have become a "better" Act, if not replaced by its successors.

The aim of this paper is to test and further develop the existing typology of gauging sociolinguistic differences in the language legislation of two countries with contrasting sociolinguistic goals. The typology is applied to a juxtaposition of two central documents, the *Use of Official Languages Act (UOLA)* of South Africa, with *On the principles of the state language policy (PSLP)* from Ukraine (see Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady 2013), both published in 2012.¹ Both legislative documents were received with strong criticism.² The Ukraine language law was adopted after a brawl in the Ukrainian Parliament, and street

1 The scope of this paper does not allow us for considering provincial language acts

2 When we have been preparing this paper for publication the Ukrainian Parliament passed two legislative documents which invalidated the power of PSLP. On 23 May 2017 The Law on languages in broadcasting was adopted. The Law requires the nationwide TV Channels to broadcast 75 per cent of content in Ukrainian. On 25 of September 2017 President Petro Poroshenko signed the new law on education. The law envisages that all secondary education in public schools will be taught in Ukrainian from September 2020. Even though PSLP was not officially revoked or annulled by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, most of provisions of PSLP became invalid. Thus the analysis of the Ukrainian language Law does not represent the real situation in Ukraine any longer.

protests and reproaches from the Venetian commission. However, an attempt to repeal this legislation in 2014 was used as an excuse for the Russian annexation of Crimea, and fueled the ongoing fighting in Eastern Ukraine. South Africa's language law was adopted after successful litigation that compelled government, in 2010, to promulgate legislative measures to regulate and monitor the use of official languages. Extensive public discussion and criticism followed the court ruling, in the case concerning the "best" language act to adopt. Critics claimed that an earlier draft, the *South African Languages Bill of 2003*, was a better draft than the 2011 version, which became the basis for the current act.

The controversial acceptance of language legislation in these two countries prompts the question: Are the grounds for the criticism similar? What is the nature of objections against the language law? This question is highly relevant, given the fact that Ukraine and South Africa seem to pursue opposite linguistic goals. Section 6(1) of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*, declares 11 official languages and requires government to function in "at least two" of these. Article 10 of the *Constitution of Ukraine, 1996*, claims that Ukrainian is the only state language in the country. In other words, independent Ukraine attempts to monolingualise public domains of the country, while South Africa, apparently, seeks to multilingualise its society. However, language practices in both Ukraine and South Africa are exactly opposite to those envisaged in their constitutions: Ukraine is, in reality, a bilingual country, while South Africa has a tendency to move towards the use of English as the dominant language.

The comparison of such language laws, embodying non-identical state objectives, provides some challenges for the existing typology for comparing language legislation. This paper, therefore, seeks to refine a measuring instrument for evaluation of the scope of the language legislation, and its impact on the linguistic practices in society.

2. SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Ukraine

To the delight of sociolinguists, Article 5.6 of PSLP states that research work on the language policy should be encouraged and promoted by the state. Article 5.7 adds that Ukraine should facilitate the international exchange concerning issues in national language policy, as well as in respect to languages that function in two or more countries. But the question can be raised: why would Ukraine view research on language policy and languages with multinational status, as its state priority?

To answer this question, we need to look to Ukrainian history (Wilson, 2002; Magocsi, 1996; Subtelny, 1988). For several centuries, while many other nations in Europe enjoyed movements leading to the formation of the nation-state, Ukraine was broken into pieces by various empires. The Ukrainian territory was divided between different mega-states, among which Russia played the most imperious role. The movement for national liberation could not succeed in the partitioned territory. Other nations looked down on Ukrainians, calling them “a stateless nation” (Wilson, 2002). The partitioning of the Ukrainian territory came to an end with the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Soviet Union, which expanded after the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of 1939. In the Soviet Union, which included fifteen Republics, Russian was dominant in official and academic settings, whereas the Ukrainian language played a marginal and regional role. International observers commented on the sociolinguistic landscape in the USSR: “The done thing, in the Soviet Ukraine, was to speak Russian if you became educated.” (*Guardian Weekly*, 4 Nov. 1990, p 9, cited from Blommaert & Verschueren, 1992:371). In 1989, several years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, along with many other Republics (Maurais, 1991), proclaimed Ukrainian as its sole state language, even though the formulation of this legislation acknowledged a special status for Russian, which will be further explained.

In 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved and Ukraine gained its chance to become an independent country. Among the primary goals of the newly-born state, was the intention to create a modern nation, and to liberate Ukraine from Russian cultural dominance (Strikha, 2006). This goal envisaged the gradual removal of the Russian language from the Ukrainian social space (Pavlenko, 2008a, b).

The Ukrainian Constitution was adopted later, in 1996, and it again recognised Ukrainian as the sole state language. Russian was demoted to a language of national minorities. The Ukrainian language became the focus of linguistic and sociocultural efforts, directed at the revival and restoration of all its functional domains (Bilaniuk, 2005; Pavlenko, 2008a, b; Bilaniuk and Melnyk, 2008). As much as in many other European countries (Pulinx and Van Avermaert 2015:339), Ukrainian policy makers and nationally-conscious citizens became concerned with the meaning of national identity, with the maintaining of social cohesion and with safeguarding national, cultural and linguistic heritage. Many nationally-conscious Ukrainians perceive the national language as the main factor of cementing the nation. For instance, a former President (Yushchenko) who was in office from 2004 to 2010, was especially keen on elaborating on this idea:

The language is a glue of the nation. Only the sole state language, the sole history and the common church can guarantee the independence and prosperity of the country (Yushchenko, 2010).

Most of the nationally conscious Ukrainians considered language to be the pillar of nationhood, and invested their trust in promoting social conditions in which the knowledge of Ukrainian would be a prerequisite for obtaining other social benefits. In other words, language was considered as the unifying factor which would warrant the required social integration.

On the other hand, the population of Ukraine was not, and is not, uniform in its language preferences. The Eastern and Western Ukraine did not have a long history of living together, as the Ukrainian East, South, and Centre stayed with the Russian/Soviet Empire, longer than its Western parts, previously absorbed either by Poland or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Correspondingly, the pro-Russian and Russophone sentiments permeated the ideological claims of politicians, who supported the sizeable electorate in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Hence, pulling the safety net out from under the Russophone population, often causes disturbance even among the people who, otherwise, could be loyal to the state. Under the circumstances, the linguistic pressure could be considered a destabilising factor, rather than “the glue to the nation”.

Among sociolinguists, there are different views regarding how much personal liberty can be sacrificed for the sake of reviving so-called “oppressed” or “endangered” languages. Maurais (1997) argues in favour of limitation of personal rights and imposition of the affirmative language policy, when the status of language was weakened. Ryazanova-Clarke (2014:9) warns that the linguistic discrimination, disguised as affirmative action, can lead to the strategies of resistance identified either as political mobilisation or an open conflict resulting in violence. Therefore, the “one nation-one language” model, although it is highly popular among scholars, lawyers and politicians, has often been undermined by various societal factors including mobility in the globalised world.

The 1989 *Law on the Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic* (LLUSSR) (Zakon pro movy Ukrainskoi SSSR, 1989), remained in force until 2012, although, judging from some of the comments by Ukrainian academics (A'Beckett, 2013:26), many Ukrainian citizens were unaware both of its scope and of its Soviet past. Formulations of this legislation allowed dual linguistic practice, in other words, a choice of either Russian or Ukrainian, in various spheres of social life, as well as recognising the rights of other minorities to use their own languages. According to LLUSSR, Russian had the status of

the language for multiethnic communication in Ukraine and, thus, it was also tacitly accepted as an official language in Ukraine.³

Moreover, Article 6 of LLUSSR stipulated that a lack of knowledge of Russian or Ukrainian should not be a reason for militating against a citizen's job prospects.

There were many attempts to introduce a more stringent law, warranting the removal of Russian in the society.⁴ The Law *On the Languages in the Ukrainian SSR* has been amended with the help of various legal initiatives from the Government. Special decrees by the Cabinet, resolutions of the Constitutional Court, the directives of Professional Councils and other legal documents, specified requirements for mass media outlet's registration, recognition of language competence among public officials, education and legal proceedings. Hence, many articles of LLUSSR became *de facto* invalid as they were overridden by new court rulings and government resolutions. Novel state regulations, introduced during the time of President Yushchenko in office, upheld limitations on the use of Russian (Interfax Ukraine, 2010).

Yushchenko's administration caused frustration amidst the Ukrainian broad public at the end of his presidential term. His "clumsy" efforts in the national revival were unpopular in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, and the confused Ukrainian electorate gave a sufficient number of votes to his former rival – Viktor Yanukovich (Besemeres, 2010 a). As a presidential candidate, Yanukovich promised his supporters that he would introduce the legislation which would equalise the status of Russian and Ukrainian (Focus. ua 2012). During his time in office he revoked many decisions made by his predecessor and endorsed the bill which later became PSLP. The new legislation made Russian a regional language in 13 out of Ukraine's 27 regions. It followed the initiative of many regional authorities in the south and east of Ukraine, who issued decrees, giving Russian the status of regional language to offset Yushchenko's policy of ukrainisation (A'Beckett, 2012:166). During discussion of this bill, a brawl between members of the party of Regions and the opposition erupted in the Ukrainian Parliament (Nayem, 2012). PSLP was passed by the Parliament after a heated public stand-off, violations of

3 From a private communication with Professor Joseph Turi, the President of the International Academy of Language Law.

4 For instance, the bill "The State Language in Ukraine" was introduced in 2006 but it has been removed from the portal of the Ukrainian Parliament similar to other bills introduced prior to 2007. See also the following publications in Russian RIA NEWS (2006). *Ukrainskie chinovniki budut sdavat' ekzamen po ukrainskomu iasyku*. [Ukrainian officials should pass the Ukrainian language test]. Retrieved from <http://grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.109255.html> (accessed 13 February 2016).

Parliament's procedures and presidential promises to intellectuals on taking measures for reviving Ukrainian.

The promotion of Russian was viewed as an attempt at pleasing "newly" elected President Vladimir Putin, and the "neglected" Russophone voters of Regions and Communists, before the Parliamentary elections of 2012 (Stern, 2012; Elder, 2012). PSLP provided that, alongside Russian, regional or minority languages would include Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldovan, German, Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim and Krymchak. At least 11 of these regional languages enjoy privileges in their kin-states. The language law introduced by Yanukovych and his Party of Regions⁵ (Nayem, 2012, Yatsenyuk, 2012) was another step toward their ultimate self-destruction, which was exacerbated by their problematic foreign policy, jailing of political opponents and violent suppressions of public protests.

The passing of the new legislation evoked strong criticism from the Ukrainian public and officials (Nayem, 2012; Yatsenyuk, 2012), who held a belief that the introduction of this legislation divided the country and undermined social stability.

Nevertheless, when Yanukovych fled the country and his own party denounced his legacy, a Parliamentary proposal to repeal the law served as a pretext for the Russian government and the so-called "volunteered" militants defending the Russophone population in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. It could be argued that the hybrid war in Ukraine was initiated by those who were convinced that they would become "an oppressed minority", and by those who were engaged in a propagandist campaign against the "nationalist state", which infringes on the rights and freedoms of parts of the population sympathetic to Russia. It was not so much the existence of the law, but an effort to revoke it, that became the turning point in the division of the nation which was, anyway, at a constant risk of provocative actions from the potent neighbouring state. Directly after the revocation of the legislation in the Ukrainian Parliament, OSCE Commissioner on National Minorities warned the Ukrainian authorities that the decision "to cancel the 2012 law on the 'Principles of the State Language Policy'" (PSLP) could lead

5 The bill "On principle of language policy" was introduced by two deputies from the Party of Regions (the Party of President Yanukovych) Serhiy Kivalov and Vadim Kolesnichenko. See the official site of the Ukrainian Parliament https://archive.is/20121224020127/w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?pf3511=41018 (accessed 13 August 2016). The leader of the Parliamentary faction of the Party of Regions Olexandr Yefremov made a statement "We shall return to language matters" which can be accessed at the site of the Ukrainian online newspaper *Kyivska pravda*. See <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/05/24/6965246/> (accessed 12 August 2017).

to further unrest, especially in a context where language policy is such a divisive issue” (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). At the same time, the Commissioner admitted that the 2012 law was unbalanced, and did not meet European standards (OSCE, 2014).

It should be noted that the language practice in Ukraine is now regulated by the newly-issued Acts of Parliament and decisions of local authorities rather than by PSLP (Interfax Ukraine, 2017). The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is still considering whether PSLP is at conflict with the Constitution since October 2014, even though the Law was not officially repealed.

The context, in which the attempt to invalidate PSLP was made, deserves some attention, since it is easy to fall into the fallacious assumption about “the coup of extremists” that took power in Ukraine, upon Yanukovych’s escape from Ukraine. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (the so-called Venice Commission) voiced a strong criticism of the draft of this bill on the ground that it does not sufficiently support the development of the Ukrainian language (Council of Europe, 2011). The Venice Commission underlined that “the use and the protection of languages has been, and remains, a complex and highly sensitive issue in Ukraine, which has repeatedly become one of the main issues in different election campaigns and continues to be subject of debate – and sometimes to raise tensions – within the Ukrainian society” (Venice Commission, 2011).

It was not an isolated episode of the criticism of Ukrainian law-makers by the Venice Commission. The European Commission for Democracy through Law expressed serious concerns regarding the Law on Government Cleansing in Ukraine (Lustration Law), after its passing in Parliament during 2014, when the regime of Yanukovych was ousted and the Parliament expressed its willingness to be committed to the carrying out of democratic reforms (Council of Europe, 2015). The Law of Ukraine, on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) regimes, which was passed by the Ukrainian parliament on the 9th of April 2015, was also criticised by the Venice Commission, on the grounds that it could lead to obstructing free expression and democratic elections (Council of Europe, 2015). Hence, the passing of flawed legislation was not a unique feature of Yanukovych’s regime. Moreover, the language bills and laws could hardly ever satisfy a heterogeneous society as a whole. Scholars and lawyers quite often express dissatisfaction with implementing even the carefully drafted legal provisions.

Many Ukrainians do not see any other sociolinguistic model for the development in the Ukrainian independent state, except for “one language – one nation”. The Russian example, strengthened by examples of officially monolingual development in other influential states, has been perceived as a proper role-model to copy from. Experiences of other countries, such as Ireland, Canada, Belgium and Finland have not been discussed much in public debates. Judging from debates on language matters in social media, such as Facebook, Odnoklassniki, V kontakte, Regional fora, Parliamentary discussions and publications in the Ukrainian press, any defence of official multilingualism in Ukraine, which, nevertheless, exists *de facto*, is frequently equated to the betrayal of Ukrainian sovereignty and a support to Russian revanchist plans.⁶

It is very interesting to see whether the South African case of the official endorsement of multilingualism can represent a real challenge to the Ukrainian view that the model “one nation, one language” is the best possible scenario for maintaining political independence and ensuring social cohesion. At the same time this contrastive analysis also provides an opportunity to gain experience in evaluating possible gains and losses in implementation of controversial language acts.

2.2 South Africa

Unlike Ukraine, South Africa attempts to achieve social cohesion by different means, i.e. by developing official multilingualism. Ironically, despite its pluralistic ethnic makeup and the absence of the titular nation, the South African Republic enjoyed a longer history of independent statehood than Ukraine. It proclaimed independence in 1961, which was 33 years prior to the first Ukrainian statehood under the titular nation name. However, the language front in South Africa was mainly marked by the struggle between two colonial languages – English and Dutch (until the 1950's), and English and Afrikaans, thereafter. Seemingly, a compromise between two conflicting linguistic choices was reached when 9 Bantu languages were included in the founding principles of the South African constitution, adopted in 1996. Coincidentally, this was also the year of adopting the Ukrainian constitution. Official multilingualism was chosen as an anti-racism tool to promote reconciliation (Lourens 2015).

Why did the comparative question arise with regard the South African language act? This question partly relates to a feeling or perception about what constitutes “the best”

6 See in this regard the opinion of the prominent Ukrainian writer Yury Zhadan “ We fight not for Ukrainian but against Russian”. Can be accessed at <http://www.politnavigator.net/my-boremsya-ne-za-ukrainskij-yazyk-a-protiv-russkogo-pisatel-majjdanshhik.html>. (17 August 2017).

possible language legislation for South Africa. In turn, the question stems from the quest for a national language act for the country, that has dominated discourses about language management, ever since the establishment of the eleven-language official dispensation after 1994. It is a rather productive discourse that, in actual fact, has resulted in different versions of draft language legislation being produced, culminating in the *Use of Official Languages Act, 2012* (RSA 2012). The first of these versions, the South African Languages Bill (DAC 2003), promulgated in 2003 but withdrawn in 2007, was considered by many a “better” draft than its successor, tabled in 2011 (RSA 2011), in response to a court order (C.J.A. Lourens vs. Die President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika e.a. 2010) requiring government to institute legislative measures in order to manage the new language situation. The said court order ended a historical litigation process, dating back to 2008 and spearheaded by an attorney, named Cornelus Lourens (C.J.A. Lourens vs. Die President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika e.a. 2010).

One needs to understand the overall South African legal framework that it uses to manage its eleven official languages. The South African constitution was adopted in 1996, two years after the watershed 1994 elections, when a broadly representative democratic dispensation came into being.

In terms of language, two types of clause are of particular relevance, a clause dealing with the status and treatment of the official languages, and clauses dealing with language rights (including rights concerning non-discrimination on the basis of language, freedom of association and of self-determination, as well as rights to language in education and in court). The latter group of (individual and collective) rights fall within the category of universal language rights, taken into consideration the qualification by Skutnabb-Kangas (2012), who would include the right to education in the official language of one’s choice, as the South African constitution indeed provides. For our purposes, we are particularly interested in how the official language clause should be understood, given the fact that South Africa is an exception on the African continent, regarding a multilingual official languages dispensation.

The official languages clause, before and after 1996, differs significantly (see Webb 2002:52). We see this first and foremost in terms of the type of language regime. The pre-1996 language clause established what has been termed statutory bilingualism (in English and Afrikaans) (Devenish 1990), a legal construct that has been replaced in the post-1996 language clause by what (Cowling 2003) describes as a “minimum constitutional requirement”. In others words, it is a conditional requirement that government should use a minimum of (any) “two official languages”. These different

types of language regime naturally determine the principles of official language treatment. Before 1996, equal treatment (“50/50”) was entrenched as principle, whilst after 1996, some very ambivalent and even vague principles have been introduced, i.e. the advancement of previously marginalised languages and treatment that reflect parity of esteem and equitability (Du Plessis and Pretorius 1999). Put in general terms, the comparison suggests that South Africa has moved from a pre-1996 situation of relative certainty to a post-1996 situation of relative uncertainty, as far as official language treatment is concerned. It stands to reason that decision-makers, officials and others that are faced with language challenges, on a daily basis, would strive towards (and prefer) certainty. One does not have to be very ingenuitive to guess that English could easily become the perceived instrument with which to achieve such stability.

A second question that arises is why South Africa needs a language act, *per se*. This further question stems from a peculiar provision in the (final) South African constitution. Section 6(4) of this law, requires of the “... national government and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures ...” to “... regulate and monitor their use of official languages” (RSA 1996). Although this provision does not specifically call for a national language act, the *Use of Official Languages Act* (UOLA) is, according to popular opinion, considered a fulfilment of this particular legal obligation. By proceeding with drafting a revised language bill, the national government appears to have interpreted the 2010 court order to imply exactly this. To be sure, the court order finds that the “... national government is negligent with implementing measures to monitor the use of official languages” and, therefore, instructs the appropriate minister (that is, in this instance, the Minister of Arts and Culture) to meet this obligation within two years (C.J.A. Lourens vs. Die President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika e.a. 2010). No specification is given of what meeting this obligation entails. In other words, the court did not specifically instruct the national government to adopt a national language act.

3. SOCIOLINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE OF UKRAINE AND SOUTH AFRICA – A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY

As our comparative study has started long before the actual juxtaposition of the legislative documents, one needs to visualise characteristics of sociolinguistic landscape, which are relevant to the contrastive analysis. First of all, relevant sections of the national constitution usually define the direction of state language policy. The polar directions have been represented by monolingual and multilingual commitments of the two states

concerned. Hence, the first item we have to look at when we profile the sociolinguistic landscape of the countries, is the constitutional language dispensation.

However, the state goal has been proclaimed within the context of a particular distribution of language groups across the national territory. Consequently, the real linguistic composition needs to be shown. This parameter represents the quantitative display of different language groups residing in the country.

Then we turn to the actual language practice – how different groups of the population communicate with each other in the country. Consequently, the field “Language practice” has been introduced. The legal requirements for communication in institutional settings do not always coincide with the actual practice. Hence, the field “Legislative provisions for language practice” was introduced to see official “needs” in the countries, as opposed, to the existing linguistic habits of the population.

Finally, we have to compare sets of beliefs which motivate the official language policy, i.e. which sociolinguistic model has been chosen as an inspirational guide. Thus, the field “Dominant language ideology” has appeared. The summary of comparisons between Ukraine and South Africa is presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Comparison of sociolinguistic landscape in Ukraine and South Africa

Sociolinguistic aspects	Ukraine	South Africa
Constitutional language dispensation	Monolingual	Multilingual
Linguistic make-up	29% Russian, 70% Ukrainian, 1% of other 17 languages	22% Zulu, 14% Afrikaans, Xhosa 16%, 10% English, and 7 other languages from 8% to 1%
Language practice	Non-accommodating bilingualism with uneven competence	English as a default language
Legislative provision for language practice	The sole official language +18 regional languages; Institutionalising the use of the language	11 official languages but an unspecified choice of three languages would suffice; institutionalising the use of languages (officially, but without clear guidance)
Dominant language ideology	One nation-one language, protection of the cultural heritage of the titular nation, the national language is the guaranty of the national sovereignty	All official languages should enjoy parity of esteem and promote reconciliation

This table is a convenient and compact way to represent a contrast between linguistic challenges, wants and needs, in both countries.

4. COMPARISON OF PSLP AND UOLA

The background for adopting language law in both countries shows that most of the criticism against the linguistic legislation has been launched from judicial perspectives, and also relates to compliance with the country's constitution. However, in this paper, we would like to examine how language acts in different countries were organised and what the scope of the government involvement was in prescribing the use of official language(s). In other words, we look at language legislation from sociolinguistic perspectives, and try to evaluate the overall impact of the law on various public domains.

Comparing language legislation, from a sociolinguistic point of view, departs from two sets of principles. Based on the work of Maurais (1991; 1997), we can distinguish between structural and contextual sociolinguistic principles. Structural principles relate to the minimum provisions a language act should contain. They deal with either fundamental arrangements about a language regime, such as domain-related official language directives – determining the language of communication with citizens, the language in education, the linguistic requirements of immigrants or citizenship, and so forth. Contextual principles relate to matters regarding language planning and implementation. In this paper, we are primarily interested in structural principles.

Turi (1994) defined the following public domains of the language use: legislation, administration, the judiciary and education. However, upon assessing the provisions of the Ukrainian language legislation, it is possible to augment the functional domains to also include the language of mass media and public services (see also Maurais 1991; 1997). Thus the comparison can evaluate the clarity of rules regarding language use in education (which also includes the language of research and science), local and central administration or language of communication with citizens (which also includes languages used in referendums, elections, public offices etc.), the judiciary (use of languages in courts by public notaries, offices of internal affairs, etc.), regulation of mass media activities (e.g. requirements for obtaining licenses on broadcast and publications, distribution etc.) and public services (e.g. medical services).

In Table 4.1, we present the public domains which have been addressed in PSLP and UOLA. We can also estimate the clarity and presence of minimum provisions in each domain.

The legislative domain is one of the most important for measuring the symbolic importance of the language in society, since it gives us an indication of the value assigned to the language(s) by the most prestigious institution of the country, Parliament. It also reflects the prescription concerning language use, in the local and regional legislative/administrative bodies, as there is a different system of local and regional governance in Ukraine and South Africa. Upon comparing the regulations for the use of language(s) in legislative bodies of both countries, it can be stated that the Ukrainian provisions are nearly exemplary in their clarity, while the South African statements lack the power of specificity. PSLP, in its Article 9, stipulates that the language of Parliament and official documents is Ukrainian, but that speakers are allowed to use regional languages in the Parliament and are entitled to interpreting services. UOLA, to the contrary, uses general terms, i.e. that national departments, national public enterprises and public entities “should” adopt a language policy which complies with Section 6(3)(a) of the constitution. However, there is no clarity regarding the question of whether acts of Parliament should be translated in all 11 official languages (C.J.A. Lourens vs. Die President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika e.a. 2010).

Moreover, Article 10, 11 of PSLP regulates the issue and circulation of documents at the state (the country as whole) and local legislative and administrative levels. Article 12 contains provisions for Elections and Referendums. However, UOLA places the responsibility for implementing language recommendations, in such instances, on a National Language Unit – the public body with the power to make decisions in relation to the use of languages in different instances and on all occasions.

Extending the legislative domain to the administration of the state (country) and regional level, it can also be said that PSLP gives very clear specifications of which languages should be used in administrative offices. The state administration should use the official language, while local administrative bodies should use both the state language and regional languages (in 6 subsections of Article 11, Article 8 there are statements regarding the requirements for public officers of the local and state levels). Article 7 clarifies the rules for establishing regional languages. It states that the regional language can be adopted if there is more than 10% of the local population speaking a language different to the official one, and/or the decision on the regional language has been passed by the local administrative body. UOLA, in comparison, gives very vague indications regarding the language of administrative offices. Article 4b stipulates that the national department / entity / enterprise should identify at least 3 languages in use for the government purposes. It is unclear which language(s) should be used for communication between different administrative units.

In the judiciary sector of public life, PSLP clearly defines the available choice of languages: the state language Ukraine-wide, and regional languages in the areas which recognise regional languages. There are also provisions on the necessity to make available translators and interpreters if clients require them. The interpreting services should not come at extra cost for clients, but the reality is most likely to be different. The Ukrainian corruption is notorious in the West, and not many changes have taken place since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 (Bullough 2015). On his visit to Ukraine, US vice-President Joseph Biden told the Ukrainian Parliament that “corruption eats Ukraine like a cancer” (Chadwick 2015). PSLP eliminates possibilities for discriminatory treatment. However, the reality can be different, from what we can infer from reading PSLP. Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 of PSLP specify the language(s) of court proceedings, language requirements for judges, language of investigations, prosecutors, legal assistance, public notaries and business contracts. UOLA is silent on all these matters. As per usual, all complicated matters should be resolved upon “recommendations” of the National Language Unit (Article 6), clearly a rather vague formulation, as are most of the others – in fact, vagueness is probably UOLA’s most striking feature!

The next important public domain of language usage is education. There is no difference between the usual ratio of regulations in PSLP and UOLA.

PSLP gives detailed descriptions of options available in primary, secondary, and high schools, technical and special schools and in tertiary education (Article 20). All primary, secondary, general and high schools are obliged to provide opportunities for educating children in both state and regional languages, if they are located in the area where regional languages function. In private schools, any other language of education can be accepted, according to the wishes of the school proprietor, such as English, German or French. Tests for completion of high school can be offered either in the state or regional languages of the area. In addition to the regulations in the system of education, there is also a list of options offered in sciences and arts (Article 21, 23). Scientists and scholars have a choice of publishing their research opuses in the state language, in regional languages or in foreign languages. Ukrainian, Russian and English have been nominated as the languages of information technology. Cultural events can be conducted in the state, regional or foreign languages, according to wishes of the organisers of the events. Foreign films can be dubbed or subtitled in the state language, but also in regional languages, if there is a local and market demand. UOLA does not mention any of this. Choices in the domain of education, science and arts seem to not be connected to any needs of the society as a whole or its regional fragments.

Maurais (1991) also paid attention to linguistic aspects of immigration. This aspect has started gaining popularity in the language law only recently. Estonia's Language Act could be regarded as a prototypical case of handling linguistic aspects of immigration. PSLP did not follow the example of Estonia, as it would be very hard to implement the testing of potential migrants in this relatively big country with a diverse linguistic makeup. However, Article 20.1 requires learning Ukrainian in capacities necessary for integration in the Ukrainian society. UOLA does not contain any provisions, in this respect.

The language of the mass media has been a very popular issue in Post-Soviet countries (cf. Smith, 2008: 15). Part 4, Article 24 of PSLP gives detailed provisions about TV and radio broadcast, printed media, and acquired media production. Every person is entitled to access the informational products in the language of a person's choice. The priority is given to issuing and circulation of products in the state language, and also in regional languages. Ukraine does not present any obstacles to the emergence of informational products in foreign languages. The use of languages should be commensurate with the demand and numbers of the groups interested. This Article was seriously criticised by the Venice Commission, on the grounds that the development of the state language was not sufficiently promoted (Venice Commission 2011). The Venice Commission required the amendment of this section of the legislation, and the insertion of the ration of 60 percent of the informational product by the state language, and only 40 percent for the rest of languages. It should be noted that this ration previously existed in the time of President Yushchenko. Nevertheless, many Russophone broadcasters and TV presenters managed to set up their businesses in Ukrainian broadcast corporations. In practice, the ratio was not easy to monitor and regulate. Moreover, recently introduced bills could override the positions of PSLP. For instance, on 27 January, the Minister of Culture and the Deputy Premier, Minister Viacheslav Kyrylenko, introduced the controversial bill No 3822, on quotes for broadcasting music. According to the Bill, 75% of played music and songs should be either in Ukrainian or written by Ukrainian authors. The bill evoked a protest from many Ukrainian artists and public figures (Bagraev 2016; Censor.net 2016), however, the fate of the bill is unclear at this stage, although Kyrylenko is not the Minister of Culture, but retains the position of the Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs. Hence, positions of the language legislation are often vulnerable to new legislative initiatives, as they can cancel the provisions of the language law. As before, UOLA does not specify anything in relation to the ration of broadcasting, or languages used in the press. A separate broadcasting act deals with the language dispensation at the South African Broadcaster (SABC), as extensively dealt with by Du Plessis (2006).

PSLP suggests solutions for other aspects of the social life which UOLA does not address at all. First of all, there are sections of PSLP which provide guidance regarding the presentation of names – toponyms, anthroponyms, patronymics and family names. The personal name should be presented according to the rules of Ukrainian in passports and other ID documents. However, if the name holder wishes it, the regional rendition of this name can accompany the official presentation of it. Article 28 lists the options available for the rendition of personal and family names, as well as patronymics. The names of places should be written in the state language, and duplicated in regional languages, if there is any need or demand for it. Article 27 clarifies this issue and provides the rules for transliteration. Article 13 sets up the set of documents, which can contain renditions of the name in the state and regional languages. It also acknowledges the possibility of issuing documents about education in two languages, upon the request of the prospective document holder. UOLA is silent upon the issue of name presentation. Also, UOLA does not mention anything about the language of military services. Article 29 of PSLP specifies that the state language is the only one which can be used by military personnel, either in writing or orally. Another aspect, which is missing in UOLA, is that of the branding and marketing goods. According to PSLP, Article 27, the use of the state language is compulsory for the distribution of goods within the territory of Ukraine. Any other languages can be added to the description in Ukrainian, if the producer or distributor so wishes.

At the end it, can be added that PSLP considers criminal charges and administrative responsibilities for breaches in implementation of the law and deliberate violations. However, Article 32 does not specify the consequences. UOLA mentions, in passing, that the National Language Unit must monitor and assess the use of official languages and the compliance with legislation by different national organisations (Article 8 b, c). However, nothing was said about penalties for breaches. The broadcasters' controversial former Chief Operator, Hlaudi Motsoeneng, during 2016, attempted to enforce a 90% local content rule, one of a range of measures that eventually led to his fall from grace (Claymore, 2017).

This comparison of requirements for language use, in different public domains in Ukraine and South Africa, shows that, apparently, the language law is better structured in Ukraine. Every citizen can clearly see what he or she can expect from the state to ensure his/her language rights. That, however, does not mean that the implementation of the law has been observed by all public bodies. Many regional authorities in Ukraine refuse to implement the law or to give regional status to some languages, e.g. in Ivano-Frankivsk,

Ternopil', Lutsk and many others (UNIAN, 2012; RBC- Ukraine, 2012; Volyn' Post, 2012). Clarity of the law, clearly, does not warrant compliance with the letter of law.

In Table 4.1, it is possible to see a comprehensive summary of the two language acts.

Table 4.1 Comparison of PSLP with UOLA. Comprehensive summary.

Domains of the language(s) functioning	PSLP	UOLA
Legislative	Clear provisions regarding the language(s) in use in Parliament (Article 9), for the documents and bills of the state and local legislative / administrative bodies (Article 10, 11), for elections and referendums (Article 12).	<p>A provision in abstract terms that national departments, n. public enterprises and n. public entities, should adopt a language policy which complies with the section 63 (a) of the Constitution (Article 4)</p> <p>There is still no clarity regarding the question of whether Acts of the Parliament should be translated into all 11 official languages (C.J.A. Lourens vs. Die President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika e.a. 2010)</p>
Administration	Clear provisions regarding the state administration (the state language) and local administration (state language+regional languages) if there is more than 10% of the population and/or the decision on the regional language from the local administrative body, provisions on language requirements for public officers (6 subsections of Article 11, Article 8, Article 7 on the rules of establishing regional languages).	A vague provision that the national, department, entity, enterprise should identify at least 3 languages in use for the government purposes (Article 4b), it is unclear which languages should be used for the communication between different administrative etc. units
Judiciary	Clear provisions regarding the language(s) of court proceedings, language requirements for judges etc., language of investigations, prosecutors, legal assistance, public notaries, business contracts (Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19).	No provisions whatsoever. To rely on recommendations of National Language Unit (Article 6)

Domains of the language(s) functioning	PSLP	UOLA
Education	Detailed description of options available in primary, secondary, high schools, technical and special schools and tertiary education (Article 20). In addition to the regulations in the system of education, there is also a list of options offered in sciences and arts (Article 21, 22).	No provisions
Linguistic aspects of immigration	No special article regarding linguistic citizenship. However, Article 20.1 requires the learning of Ukrainian in capacities necessary for integration in the Ukrainian society.	No provisions
Language of mass media	Part 4, Article 24, gives detailed provisions about TV and radio broadcast, printed media, and acquired media production. Basically it can be interpreted as the freedom to broadcast in any language. A former Minister Of Culture tries to repeal this article, through introduction of the bill on the ratio of broadcasting where 75 per cent would be allocated to the Ukrainophone cultural products.	No provisions
Toponyms and names	Article 27: The state language must be used for presenting geographic names which can be complemented by renditions in regional languages. It also includes rules for transliteration. Article 28 lists the options available for rendition of personal and family names, as well as patronymics. Article 13 lists options regarding ID documents. The rendition of the names should be given by relevant authorities upon agreement with the owner of the name. The use of the state language in presenting names is compulsory. Other languages are optional.	No provisions
Language of military forces	Article 29 requires the use of the state language in all forms of communication within the Ukrainian State Army.	No provisions
Language in IT	Article 22 names Ukrainian, Russian and English as languages of IT services.	No provisions
Branding and marketing goods	Article 26 requires branding of all products for distribution in Ukraine to be branded in Ukrainian. Information in other languages about the product are optional.	No provisions
Medical services	No provisions.	No provisions

5. CONCLUSIONS

The comparison of structural components of the language legislation, in Ukraine and South Africa, has brought the following issues to the fore:

1. Despite being a highly controversial document, in its compliance with the Ukrainian Constitution and in relation to expectations of the nationally conscious Ukrainians, envisaging the model of “one nation-one language”, PSLP contains clear regulatory provisions for the major public domains, as well as options for ascertaining language rights in the society.
2. To the contrast, UOLA presents normative declarations in abstract terms.
3. The responsibility for implementing PSLP in Ukraine has been handed over to the Parliament (Parliamentary control), Cabinet (the main responsibility) and regional administration.
4. In UOLA, the decision-making power has been transferred to a special body – the National Language Unit (NLU), which has subsidiary units in national departments, entities and enterprises. If PSLP presents rights and responsibilities of citizens and executive bodies, UOLA defines the authority of NLU in general terms.

The comparison of the two legal documents also allows for drawing on some similarities in the sphere of language policy making. For instance, it can be inferred that, in Ukraine and South Africa, there are sensitive public topics which politicians try to circumvent, when making decisions. In such cases, the practical solution has been designed, so as to avoid any unpleasant allusion to a disturbing theme in the public mindset. In Ukraine, such disturbance can be caused by acknowledging the wide-spread use of the Russian language and influx of Russophone products. Any reference to the existing language practice, and an attempt to view it in terms of language rights of the Russophone population, can be perceived as a departure from the national interests, and an abandonment of the national sovereignty. To camouflage the legalisation on the use of Russian, the law on regional languages has been introduced. However, in practical terms, the law did not change much in the society. There was no special need to design a specific piece of legislation for the protection of the minority and regional languages, since the rights of national minorities were acknowledged by the Constitution and through the ratification of the European Charter on Minority Languages. The pleasing statements, regarding the respect of language rights of different language groups, have not changed the real attitude of the Ukrainian State toward languages other than Russian. It is hard

to find any evidence that the human capital has been raised and resources have been allocated to the development of languages without support of their kin-state, e.g. Gagauz if we take the view that it is a separate language but not a dialect of Turkish. The Ministry of Finances initially issued a warning that the implementation of the new law in all its aspects would require additional expenditures in billions of hryvnas. Particularly, the part of the law which stipulates that the ID documents can contain records of names in different languages.

In South Africa, the uncomfortable issue is the legacy of Apartheid. To get rid of this legacy and to promote indigenous languages, the law, equalising eleven languages in esteem and treatment, was passed. However, in practical terms, there has not been any program to put this equity into operation. Abstract formulations of OULA lack practical values, and do not provide any functional guidance. The claim of the parity of esteem and treatment of eleven languages is inconsistent with the requirement of arbitrary choice of three languages for any national department, entity and enterprise. Under the provision, English can always dominate as a default arrangement and (as all-powerful colonial language) minimise chances of other languages functioning as an intermediary between different language groups. The language rights of individuals have not been specified, and the framework of measures, aimed at enhancing esteem and treatments of local languages, has not been set up either. Such is the price for choosing politically correct formulations, at the expense of practical solutions.

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LANGUAGE POLICIES AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND SERVICES: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ONTARIO (CANADA) AND BURKINA FASO (WEST AFRICA)

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Abstract

Burkina Faso is a country located in West Africa, and is a former colony of France. French is its official language, although spoken by barely 22% of the population of about 18 million in 2016. This language, which is consecrated by the country's constitution as the official language, is alongside approximately sixty different national¹ languages which have a very limited use in official spheres.

In Ontario, Canada, French is also spoken by a minority, approximately 4.8% of the total population of about 14 million. However, and even though this province is mainly an Anglophone province, French has acquired some rights and the francophone community is provided, for example, access to government services in that language, under the French Language Services Act.

This paper will be based on a comparative study of the language policies, and the use of French, in these two regions. It will also analyse, in both regions, the status and the importance given to French, particularly in the areas of education, administration, communication and access to services. The study will also try to shed light on the degree of interaction between French and the contacted languages in the two study areas.

1 We use 'national languages' in respect to the languages of indigenous population in the country

Finally and, in the light of information to be uncovered, this study will try to advocate for better management of the education system, conscious that access to services, whatever they are, is very strongly influenced by the level of education and information. In this advocacy, particular attention will be paid to the situation in Burkina Faso, where the enrollment rate of 63,2% (2008-2011), and the literacy rate of 28,7% (2008-2012), are very low.

1. INTRODUCTION

Burkina Faso, former colony of France in West Africa, has a population of more than 18 million, but very low school enrollment and literacy rates; respectively 63,2% (2008-2011) and 28,7% (2008-2012) (UNICEF, 2017). With about sixty different languages in its territory, its official language is French, even though only 22% of its population (according to the highest estimate) speak this language (OIF, 2014). As for Ontario, it's predominantly an English-speaking province, but it has a Francophone minority group, which constitutes less than 5% of the population (OAF *et Fondation Trillium* 2015).

Our objective, through this paper, is to conduct a comparative study between these two regions: one in Africa, Burkina Faso, and the other one in North America, Ontario. First, we will focus on the status of French as well as the interaction between French and other languages in these two regions. Then we will analyze the use of these languages in the spheres of education, administration, communication and access to services. Finally, and in the light of information to be uncovered, this study will try to advocate for better management of the education system, particularly in Burkina Faso.

In order to achieve the above objectives, we will analyse the language policies and the regulations that exist and guide actions in these different spheres, in Burkina Faso and in Ontario.

2. SETTING THE CONTEXT

Burkina Faso is a landlocked, multilingual country, situated in West Africa. Its neighboring countries are: Mali to the North and West, Niger to the East, Benin to the Southeast, Togo and Ghana to the South, and Côte d'Ivoire to the Southwest. It has a population of about 18 million people on an area of 274,220 km². Its official language is French, but it has approximately sixty national languages. These identified national languages are spoken by about 13.5 million people, living in 8,200 communities, mainly in rural areas (85%).

The national languages of Burkina Faso belong to these three families:

- The Gur or Voltaic group (over 60% of the languages)
- The West-Atlantic group (one representative: Fulfulde);
- The Mande group (20%).

In addition to these three language families, there are also: the Hamito-semitique family with Berber and Chadic subfamilies where are languages like Tamasey, Hausa and Dogon. These different languages, carrying a variety of cultures, have been marginalised during the colonial period and continue to be marginalised today.

As for Canada, the population is one of nearly 36 million people (35,985,800 in October 2015; Statistique Canada, 2016). It is a bilingual country, with English and French as official languages. At the 2011 census, which established that the Canadian population stood at 33,121,175, data concerning knowledge of languages are as follows: 22,564,665 for English alone, 4,165,015 for French alone, 5,795,575 for English and French and; 595,920 who know neither English nor French (Statistique Canada, 2011a).

Aside from the two official languages, and approximately sixty Aboriginal languages (Algonquian, Inuit, Athabaskan, siouennes and Iroquoian language families, etc.), there are nearly 200 immigrant languages (mother tongues² or languages of home use, from international migration waves) that are listed on Canadian territory. These immigrant languages constitute 23 major language families. Three of them, Roman languages, Indo-Iranian languages and Chinese languages, have more than one million speakers. For example, in the Roman family, Italian and Spanish, together, gather over 400,000 speakers. In the Indo-Iranian family, Persian totals about 177,000 people, Punjabi (the largest immigrant language in Canada) 460,000, Urdu has 194,000, while Hindi and Gujarati each have a little more than 100 000 speakers (Statistique Canada, 2011).

If English and French are the two official languages, they have differentiated use throughout the ten provinces and the three territories of Canada. Thus, there is only one entirely officially bilingual province, New Brunswick, about constitutional point of view, and one French-speaking province, Quebec, about provincial point of view. However, in Quebec, French and English are the languages of legislation and of the courts. The other eight provinces are mainly English speaking ones. So, outside of federal jurisdiction, the provinces which are mainly unilingual have laws and language policies that guide the use of the second official language at a provincial level. The 3 territories are bilingual (Yukon and Northwest Territories) or trilingual (Nunavut).

2 The first language learned in childhood and still understood at the time of the census.

Canadian bilingualism is, therefore, an institutional bilingualism, a bilingualism of the federal institutions. As part of this work, we will focus the dynamic of languages in the province of Ontario only.

Mainly Anglophone, Ontario is the most populous province in Canada, with nearly 14 million (13,850,090 in December 2015, Statistique Canada, 2016). This population, slightly lower than that of Burkina Faso, is spread over a much larger area: 1,076,395 km².

Francophones in the province (Franco-Ontarians), numbering 611,500 (OAF et Fondation Trillium, 2015), is a minority group (Roy, 2006). However, even if this number represents a small proportion (4.8%) of the total population of Ontario, it is the largest official language minority community in the country, and the second largest francophone community in Canada, after Quebec (bearing in mind that Quebec is the only officially francophone province). The Francophone population of Ontario is very diverse, because the province has the largest number of Francophone immigrants in minority language situation, in the country (Houle, Pareira *et* Corbeil 2010).

2.1 Small history of the French in Burkina Faso and Ontario

In Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), during the colonial period, the use of a language other than French was forbidden in school. To this must be added that the ordinances declaring illegitimate indigenous cultural practices. Thus, there has been a cultural oppression and repression, in order to “prepare the natives to enter the world of modern civilization”, as De Bel Gisler (1981:131) states:

Dans cette œuvre de salubrité et de sécurité publique, l'école jouera un grand rôle. S'il est question de faire connaître, d'imposer la langue et la culture de la classe dominante, il fallait obligatoirement instruire les masses de leur infériorité, les dépouiller de leur parole, les contraindre au respect du noble et du beau langage.³

The consequences of such a policy have been severe for different states, after the independence. In the case of Burkina Faso, the colonial action had created a linguistic vacuum around the French. French had the privilege of exclusivity, when it came to written languages. As for Burkina Faso languages, they were confined to the ghetto of

3 Personal translation: In this work of wholesomeness and public safety, the school will play a big role. If it is question of awareness, to impose the language and culture of the ruling class, it was necessary to educate the masses of their inferiority, strip them of their speech, and force them to respect the noble and the beautiful language.

orality. Faced with this situation, none of them was able to take over from the French language at independence.

It is also important to note that this situation has been encouraged by the Country politicians, who were not concerned about language problems. The latter were interested only in political independence, forgetting that any true independence must be political, linguistic, cultural and economic.

In addition to this, the desire not to break the umbilical cord that links France to its former colonies, must be included here. This desire materialised with the birth of the *Francophonie*. The purpose of the *Francophonie* is, in some way, to perpetuate the influence of the French language in the world and especially in Africa, all of which leads Chaudenson (1989: 10) to state that Africa is the future of the *Francophonie*. This set of facts, that led Burkina Faso's leaders to choose and maintain French as the official language, had an impact on the use of languages in Burkina Faso.

In the province of Ontario, French is an official language of education and of the courts. Moreover, in Ontario, French and English are the languages of the public legislative Acts. But, despite the fact that the Francophone presence in Ontario dates back 400 years, the use of French in Ontario's provincial institutions has encountered many obstacles in the past. For example, in the education sector, an Act, Regulation 17, was adopted in 1912, in order to restrict the use of French and to impose English as the sole language of instruction in elementary schools, attended by young Franco-Ontarians. Faced with this assimilative decision on linguistic, cultural and identity plans, the Francophone community of the province assumed a position of fierce resistance against this law. To break this resistance, the provincial government replied with another law, Regulation 18, which threatened reprisals (individuals' dismissal, stopping government subsidies to schools, etc.), not only on teachers but also on recalcitrant students. As the resistance was far from fading and was increasing with time, the Ontario government had no other choice, after a few years of tussle with the Francophone community, than to establish bilingual primary schools in 1927, in which French was the main language of instruction. As a result of it not being renewed in 1944, Regulation 17 disappeared from the province bylaws. Gradually, we note a strategy of openness of the province toward French. There will be, in particular, as indicated by Hien and Reguigui (in press):

- Expansion of radio and television networks, in French, to a greater number of Ontario communities and the creation of the educational channel TFO;
- Creation of French-language high schools, financed by public funds in 1968;

- Recognition of French as co-official language of the Ontario courts in 1984;
- Adoption of the 1986 French Language Services Act, that guarantees the provision of administrative services in French by the Ontario government in designated areas;
- Opening of the first French college of applied arts and technology in 1990 (*La Cité collégiale* in Ottawa), followed by the creation of two other establishments in 1995 (*Collège Boréal* and *Collège des Grands Lacs*).

3. OVERVIEW OF LANGUAGE POLICIES IN BURKINA FASO AND ONTARIO

In Burkina Faso, there is no explicit document on language policy for languages in the country. In the Constitution, it is only stipulated that French is the official language of the country and that law establishes the promotion and the formalisation terms for national languages. Regarding the situation of French, everything is clear; what is not clear is what concerns national languages. Nothing was said about the functional distribution and the use of national languages. The few actions, related to national language promotion, are observed in the bilingual schools and adult literacy centers in which learners are taught in national languages. Some of the national languages are also used in television and radio to relate news from time to time.

In Canada, and the state of Ontario, various laws exist and govern the statutes and usages of English and French. Section 2 of the Official Languages Act of 1969, Section entitled “Declaration of status of languages, says”:

English and French are the official languages for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada, and possess and enjoy equality of status, as well as equal rights and privileges pertaining to their use in all the institutions of the Parliament and Government of Canada.

The 1969 Official Languages Act is no longer in effect today. It was repealed and replaced in 1988 by the new Official Languages Act that reaffirms the status of Canada’s official languages as French and English, in the preamble to its chapter 38, which concerns the status and use of these languages in these terms:

WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada provides that English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada provides for full and equal access to Parliament, to the laws of Canada and to courts established by Parliament in both official languages;

AND WHEREAS the Constitution of Canada also provides for guarantees relating to the right of any member of the public to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in either official language;

AND WHEREAS officers and employees of institutions of the Parliament or government of Canada should have equal opportunities to use the official language of their choice while working together in pursuing the goals of those institutions;

(...) (Government of Canada 2016)

Furthermore, Section 16 of the Constitution Act of 1982 also recalls the Canadian institutional bilingualism that we mentioned above: “English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada” (Canada 2016).

It is, nevertheless, important to note that only the areas of federal jurisdiction are covered by these laws. Within provinces and territories, only the institutions belonging to the federal government are subject to bilingualism. Ontario is mainly an English speaking province, and the use of French in areas of provincial jurisdiction will be guided by various provincial laws. We will mention some of them, in the following sections, namely the French Language Services Act (FLSA) which is *la Loi sur les services en français*, and language policies in the field of education, called *les politiques d'aménagement linguistique (PAL) en éducation*.

4. THE STATUS OF LANGUAGES IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

In Burkina Faso, taking a position for the exclusivity of French also had the motivation that only this language could allow Burkina Faso to open up to the outside world and, therefore, to Western civilization. With this, the leaders of the education system encouraged the teaching of French. This teaching, therefore, will keep the content and methods of colonial education, while using teachers from Burkina Faso. This type of education was based on an incorrect assessment of student needs. On this subject, Dumont (1989:84) points out that:

[En Afrique, aucune méthode de français, fût-ce de français langue étrangère, ne parviendra jamais à combler le fossé qui sépare l'école de la vie parce que le seul moyen de réconcilier l'élève africain et son milieu social, ce n'est pas de lui apprendre une langue étrangère mais bien de lui enseigner à lire et à écrire dans sa langue maternelle.]⁴

This rejection of the national languages is one of the bases of the low enrollment rates in the country. Gross enrollment ratio in primary school was 63.2% between 2008 and 2011 (UNICEF, 2017). As children have difficulties to master the French language, very few are able to reach the the sixth grade. In this regard, Naba (1994:11) argues:

[Des 12,9 % d'enfants qui ont eu la chance de passer une journée de leur vie dans une salle de classe, 55,74 % redoublent entre la première et la sixième année scolaire ... 11,77 % sont admis à l'entrée en sixième ... 88,33 % sont remis à leurs parents, selon la formule consacrée.]⁵

How many students failed the exams, meaning the end of primary school for having obtained a zero for dictation? For psychologists, these failures are related to the fact that native language is discouraged early in childhood, which is harmful to the development of cognitive activities. Indeed, by removing from them the possibility of using their familiar languages, and by imposing on them a redundant communication tool with which to start school, they fall into a situation where it becomes impossible to properly understand, and express their feelings and/or interests.

The instruction given by way of the French language is acculturating, insofar as it encourages students to reject their crops in favor of French culture, abandonment of traditional rites, rejection of traditional and community-orientated ways of life for new behaviors and new habits, etc. In short, school, in its current form, shapes hybrid men straddling two cultures: French culture and national culture. From the first crop, citizens of Burkina Faso only have some reference elements, and from the second, it remains at almost nothing. In order to improve the situation, bilingual schools, which use French and one of the many national languages, according to the localities, have been proposed. The first series of experiments with bilingual schools was carried out from 1979 to

4 Personal translation: In Africa, no method of teaching French, even French as a foreign language, will never succeed in bridging the gap between school and life because the only means of reconciling African student and his social environment, is not for him to learn a foreign language but to teach him to read and write in his mother tongue.

5 Personal translation: From the 12.9% of children who have had the chance to spend a day in their life in a classroom, 55.74% repeat a school year between the first and sixth grades ... 11.77% succeed to the exam which will take them to the next grade (first grade of the secondary school) ... 88.33% are returned to their parents, as the saying goes.

1984. Some others followed afterwards. Then, in 2002, a circular allowed parents and communities to ask if they wanted bilingual schools instead of their standard schools. Despite this openness, there was no real plan for a systematic integration of national languages into the formal education system (Nikéma and Kaboré-Paré 2010). Then, an Orientation Law in 2007 (Burkina Faso, 2007) stipulated, in its Section 10, that, “The languages of instruction used in Burkina Faso are French and national languages in both pedagogical practice and assessment.” But, how does one make a choice between all the languages? How does one make arrangements to equip languages, in order to make them suitable for teaching? How does one train teachers in these different languages? Let us bear in mind that Burkina Faso has about sixty different national languages.

In Ontario, the situation of education for the Francophone minority is different. First, there is a federal law that protects the education of the Francophone minority in their language. Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), enshrined in the Constitution Act of 1982, deals with education in the language of the official language minority. It guarantees minority language education rights to French-speaking communities outside Quebec, and also in Ontario. This Section 23 obliges all Canadian provinces, and Ontario therefore, to give instruction in the minority language, while specifying the conditions of application:

(1) Citizens of Canada

- (a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside, or
- (b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada, in English or French, and reside in a province where the language in which they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province, have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction, in that language, in that province.

(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction, in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language (Canada 2016).

In other words, every citizen, with French as his/her mother tongue, has the right to enroll his/her children in an Ontario French-language school, as long as he/she has received primary education in French, or if any of his/her children has received or is

receiving primary or secondary school instruction in French. Children whose parents have the status of “French-language rights-holders”, according to Section 23 of the Charter, can benefit from education in French in Ontario. However, the applicability of this law is framed, as it is also written that the right “applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of minority language instruction (...).”

However, if there is a French school system, even if one does not meet the conditions listed above, one can submit an application to the coveted school board. In Ontario, public funds finance four school systems, two in French (the French-language public system and the French Catholic system) and two in English (Ministère de l'éducation de l'Ontario, 2016).

To allow the French language school to fulfill its mission, language planning policies *Les politiques d'aménagement linguistique (PAL)*, have been developed; early for elementary and secondary education (2004) and then to post-secondary education and Training (2011).

The language planning policy for post-secondary education and training in French language (2011) aims, among others:

to enhance the sustainability of francophone culture¹ within Ontario's pluralistic francophone milieu. Because of the central role language plays in culture, the policy framework focuses on strategies for enabling French-language and bilingual institutions to promote and expand the use and knowledge of French and ensure the provision of services in French

In both language planning policies (2004 and 2011), the will to protect and promote the vitality of French language and culture in minority communities, in Ontario, clearly appears next to the training to be provided. Indeed, among the main objectives, these policies aim to:

- Provide in French schools, a quality education adapted to the minority setting.
- Train young francophones to be responsible, competent and proud of their linguistic and cultural identity.
- Increase the capacity of the learning community to support the linguistic and cultural development of the community.

- Expand and enrich the francophone environment through solid partnerships among school, family and the community.
- Increase the vitality of ontarian educational institutions by promoting, among others, the recruitment and retention of students in French-language schools and thus contribute to sustainable development of the Francophone community. (Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities 2016).

5. LANGUAGES IN ADMINISTRATION, COMMUNICATION AND SERVICES

In Burkina Faso, given its status of official language, French is omnipresent in the political, economic and social life of the country. Therefore, it has a certain prestige among both literates and illiterates.

French is the language of social promotion and employment. Being able to speak French, even poorly, or having a degree, is the key to social promotion. French also makes the law of the labor market. For example, between two people seeking a manual job in administration, the one who can speak French, even moderately, will be given the position.

In relation to this, we say that the illiterate are gnawed at by the desire to obtain instruction in French. Consequently, it is common to hear the following words from the illiterates “you have to speak French to be respected.” Even worse, people who cannot read or write in French are often considered ignorant or uneducated; which is not true, as one can obtain a good education without having formal instruction in a school. Thus, the Burkinabe society is stratified in two ways: on the one hand, the ones with formal education, who represent the modern world and modernity, the “light”, and on the other hand, the illiterates and peasantry attached to tradition, synonymous to “darkness”.

In this context, there is a latent conflict between social classes in Burkinabe society. The first category, which represents about 22% (OIF, 2014), gives the right to decide for the other members (78%) of the population. All of this occurs as if everything that is good for intellectuals is good for the illiterate peasantry. In this context, unfortunately, all citizens cannot participate actively in the debates related to the life of the nation.

Indeed, there are some actions for the protection of linguistic and cultural heritage. For some time, we see that some municipalities and, most recently, the Ministry of Literacy and Non-Formal Education are trying to establish the mapping of national languages.

Thus, in the municipality of Loumbila, for example, and in some other services, there are signs with indications in Moore, Dioula and Fulfulde for: “National Assembly”, “Ombudsman of Faso”, “Economic and Social Council”, etc.

The goal of such an action is to encourage the promotion of an environment of literacy in the national languages of Burkina Faso. In addition to this, they want to allow neo-literates to use their learning achievements, and encourage those who are educated in French to be interested in national languages. But these punctual actions have no significant effect, to the extent that the main language of advertising is French. So, we note that some timid actions are carried out to safeguard the linguistic and cultural heritage, vis-à-vis globalisation, but nothing is done, specifically in order to bring citizens to accept and promote the linguistic and cultural diversity in politics and public administration. Yet, is the acceptance of others, despite their differences, not a guarantee of social harmony?

Regarding access to information and services, Burkina Faso, like most French-speaking countries in Africa, has embarked on the path of democracy from 1990. However, the main support for public debate is still in the official language, namely French. But this language is spoken by only a small fraction of the population – about 22%. To communicate with the population, few politicians make use of local languages. It is understandable, in these circumstances, that messages in French cannot reach the majority of the population. We are, therefore, in a situation of non-transparency and inaccessibility to information. This situation is, unfortunately, exploited for other purposes by some politicians, in their so-called democratic game. Indeed, aware that people are unable to read and understand the political programs offered to them in French, some leaders will resort to demagoguery and deceit, in order to solicit the vote of the electorate. Thus, they act as though everything that is good for French speakers is good for speakers of national languages, who are, in fact, excluded from discussions concerning the life of the nation.

5.1 Canada / Federal level

Through the Official Languages Act of 1969, Canada recognises English and French as having equal status in the federal government. Also, Section 20 of the Constitution Act of 1982 (Canada, 2016), and Section 2 of the Official Languages Act, are designed to enforce the use of both official languages in federal institutions. For instance, Section 20 of the Constitution Act of 1982 explains the use of languages in obtaining services or information in government institutions.

20. (1) Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any head or central office of an institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or French, and has the same right with respect to any other office of any such institution where
- (a) there is a significant demand for communications with and services from that office in such language; or
 - (b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that communications with and services from that office be available in both English and French.

(Canada, 2016).

Section 2 of the Official Languages Act also aims to enforce the use of both official languages in federal institutions, namely regarding their “use in parliamentary proceedings, in legislative and other instruments, in the administration of justice, in communicating with or providing services to the public and in carrying out the work of federal institutions” (Government of Canada, 2016).

5.2 Canada / Provincial level in Ontario

Since the aforementioned Acts are not mandatory, neither for the provinces nor the municipalities in the areas within their own competence, Ontario will have other laws to guide the use of French at a provincial level. We will only mention, here, the Ontario French Language Services Act (FLSA), enacted in 1986 and implemented in 1989.

The French Language Services Act is part of a set of legal provisions, which serve to guarantee and preserve the linguistic rights of Franco-Ontarians. More concretely, the FLSA ensures that Franco-Ontarians are entitled to receive various services in French (driving license, birth certificates, information, etc.) within government departments and agencies in Ontario, within areas designated for this purpose. There are currently 26 designated areas under the FLSA across the province. Any area of the province may apply for designation under the FLSA as long as at least 10 percent of its population have French as their native language, or if it’s an urban center of at least 5,000 Francophones. Besides government institutions, an organisation, based in a designated area of the province, can also apply to become a French services provider.

Regarding the Ontarian municipalities, they have no obligation to offer services in French because they are not subject to this Act, unless they are related by a special agreement with the province, to deliver services on behalf of the latter.

On July 1, 2011, Ontario Regulation 284/11, “entitled Provision of French language services on behalf of government agencies”, entered into force to compel third parties providing services on behalf of the provincial government to respect the FLSA (FLSA, 2016).

To ensure the compliance and enforcement of the FLSA, mechanisms are set in place. For example, the French Language Services Commissioner of Ontario was created in 2007, and acts as an ombudsman for the purposes of the FLSA. He/she receives citizen complaints, conducts investigations and makes the necessary recommendations, not only to ensure the availability of services in French, but also to ensure compliance with the criteria of the active offer of these services (availability, accessibility, visibility and advertising of services in French). This means that the mere existence of the FLSA is no longer sufficient. Therefore, the French Language Services Commissioner, in a Special Report, “recommends that the Minister Responsible for Francophone Affairs propose an amendment to the French Language Services Act to include a provision or provisions relating to the obligation of active offer, including a definition of the concept.” (OFLSC, 2016: 9). There is, thus, always a critical look taken at the laws in place, in order to improve them.

Other provincial legislations, such as the Law on Services for Children and Family, the Law on the Integration of the Local Health System, to mention only a few, guarantee rights of access to services in French, in Ontario.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper aimed, first, to compare the status and the use of French in Ontario (Canada) and Burkina Faso (West Africa) and, second, to grasp the realities and the consequences of language policies on the ground, in access to services in different domains.

In Burkina Faso, the language policy, for what exists, does not take into account the views of the citizens. This is not the case in Ontario, where the language policies are more democratic, and take into account the concerns of different populations.

The consequence of these policies is that, in Burkina Faso, we are witnessing the gradual death of the national languages, spoken by nearly 85% of the population, and the supremacy of French, which is spoken by less than approximately 22% of the population. In contrast to this, in Ontario, there is the promotion and defense of French in an English-dominant environment, while Francophones are less than 5% of the population. Also in Ontario, language, culture and Franco-Ontarian identity are preserved. Therefore, we

deem it an urgent and important matter, and that Burkina Faso should formulate a real language policy for safeguarding its linguistic and cultural heritage.

In Ontario, language policies in education, next to the training to be provided, the will to protect and promote the vitality of the language and French culture in minority communities in the province appears clearly.

In Burkina Faso, national languages should be included in formal education. Thus, people will learn about national languages and their culture. First, they will be introduced to the transcription of national languages and, secondly, receive information on the habits and customs of the country. Additionally, they will obtain better services in their native languages. And if the information is accessible in local languages, that would allow all citizens to participate in public debates. That will enable them, at the same time, to break down the barrier between the intellectual world (defender of Western cultures) and the rural world (defender of national culture), while promoting national languages and cultures. However, a number of choices should be made, as it is impossible, with the country's scanty resources, to equip and effectively use 60 languages while giving them the same status in all areas.

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POLICIES AND REALITIES ABOUT LANGUAGE IN MACAU

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Abstract

In a multiethnic, multilingual and apparently intercultural society like Macao, there is a blatant contradiction between the official discourse on language(s), the monolingual reality, the ultimately monocultural practices reflected in the voluntary isolation of different social groups, and the merely superficial accommodation of different cultures involved. The education system has never had and still does not have a written language policy directed at the development of multilingual and intercultural citizens, able to understand similarities and differences, who question the relative nature of their own cultural identity and inevitably develop multiple perspectives on the world around them. This paper offers an overview of the sociolinguistic landscape and practices of teaching foreign languages in Macao.

1. INTRODUCTION

Even before the transfer of sovereignty of Macao from the Portuguese Republic to the People's Republic of China, which occurred on 20 December 1999, Rocha (1998:30), at the time Director of the Tertiary Education Services Office, states that "If we accept that Macao is a multicultural society, so everything should flow from this feature: Its laws, its institutions, its schools and their curricula".¹

In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the broad linguistic landscape of Macao, the general legislation, concerning language (Basic Law in Article 9, Chapter I), and the specific language legislation applied to the educational system (Language Education Policies in the area of Non-tertiary Education in SAR of Macao, Ten Year Plan for the

1 My own translation from Portuguese.

Development of Non-Tertiary Education (2011-2020), Law No. 11/91/M, Decree-Law No. 38/94/M, Decree-Law No. 39/94/M, Administrative Regulation No. 15/2014 – Curricular Organization Table of Regular Education of the Local School System) will be discussed in this paper.

In actual fact, the teaching and learning of foreign languages, and the role of the population in this kind of exchange, cannot be understood when disconnected from the Special Administrative Region of Macao (SARM)’s history, the ethnic composition and the language(s) of the population, the official languages adopted in the region, its economy and prevailing industry sectors, the employment policies and the organisation of education systems which are, as this paper will attempt to demonstrate, inevitably interrelated variables, which are cause and consequence of the current situation.

The sociolinguistic scenario in Macao and Hong Kong is described by Yan & Moody (2010:295) as

... multilingualism in Chinese overlapping with multilingualism in English and other foreign languages. Macao is a diverse linguistic environment where languages as diverse as Chinese, Portuguese, English, Japanese, Korean and French are spoken. Macao also hosts a wide collection of Chinese dialects, such as Cantonese, Hakka, Fukien (Hokkien), Shanghainese and northeastern dialects.

The latest available data, pertaining to the linguistic composition of Macao, are taken from the Census 2011 and reflected in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Linguistic composition of Macao population

Age group and sex	Total	Chinese				Portuguese	English	Tagalo	Others
		Cantonese	Mandarin	Fukienese	Other Chinese dialects				
MF	539 131	449 274	27 129	19 957	10 653	4 022	12 155	9 415	6 546
Total M	258 237	217 390	12 410	10 001	5 129	1 880	4 886	4 010	2 531
Total F	250 894	231 84	14 719	9 956	5 504	2 142	7 269	5 405	4 015

Note. Adapted from Statistics and Census Service of Macao – Macao SAR Government, Census 2011, Tables. Other demographic characteristics, p. 65 <http://www.dsec.gov.mo/Statistic.aspx?NodeGuid=8d4d5779-c0d3-42f0-ae71-8b747bdc8d88> [Retrieved August 2013]

Regardless of the official status of the languages used in Macao, the table above shows that Chinese (Cantonese, Mandarin, Fukienese and other dialects) is the language spoken by the majority of the population, followed by English, Tagalog, other unspecified languages and Portuguese.

This paper will consider the three most relevant languages in Macao, in terms of the number of speakers, presence in the school system and social value, i.e. the official languages and the main languages used by the population – Chinese, Portuguese and English, which correspond to three written languages (Chinese, Portuguese and English), as well as four spoken languages (Cantonese, Pŭtōnghuà, Portuguese and English).

The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, the terminology will be debated, then the official languages and the languages spoken in Macao will be presented and their *de facto* status explained. The English language, which is not and never has been an official language in the region, is also discussed, in order to understand how those languages have been taught in the education system, and how it affected the choice of the language of instruction in schools, as well as the study of foreign languages, in Macao. Finally, the policies and the main legislation regarding the teaching of foreign languages in Macao will be presented, in an attempt to clarify the predominant monolingual profile of the society of Macao.

2. TERMINOLOGY

We elucidate now some key terms that will, repeatedly, be recalled, and we explicate the understanding of the terminology used. The concepts we will discuss include the following terms: language, mother tongue, official language, national language, foreign language, language of instruction and bilingualism. The understanding of these concepts is important, not only because sometimes they are unclear or vague, but also because, in the sociolinguistic landscape of Macao, we need to distinguish the phenomena of the languages that are decreed by law as official and the ones that are effectively used in the daily life. We also need to discuss the term “Chinese” to realise to which variety we are referring to, since, tendentiously, it is assumed that Chinese and Mandarin are equivalent, ignoring its division into several major dialect groups and that Standard Chinese (known in China as *Pŭtōnghuà*) is a form of Mandarin Chinese.

The everyday use of the term “language” associates it with different meanings; in this work its use lies in the Saussurean meaning of “langue”. The definitions of “official language” and “national language” often overlap. According to *Etnologue* (2014), a national language is “The language [that] is used in education, work, media, and government at the national level.” In the *Statistical Glossary of Terms The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (2002), it is described as a “Language in widespread and current use throughout a specific country or in parts of its territory, and often representative of the identity of its speakers. It may or may not have the status of an official language.” The same document defines an official language as “the language that has legal status in a particular legally constituted political entity such as the State or part of the State, and that serves as a language of administration.” The distinction between official language and national language will be used in accordance with the *Glossary*, keeping in mind that an official language can or cannot be a national language, as is the case of Portuguese in Macao.

The definition of “mother tongue”, in monolingual contexts, is often ambiguous; in multilingual context, it is even more complex. The term will be used as proposed by Crystal (2008): a language that a human being learns in childhood up to 5 or 6 years. The author uses the term “native speaker” to designate the individual who, in childhood, acquired a particular language and has intuitions and safer judgments about its use.

The term “language of instruction” refers to the language used for communication and transmission of knowledge: “The language of instruction in or out of school refers to the language used for teaching the basic curriculum of the educational system” (UNESCO, 2003:14).

As for the understanding of the term “foreign language”, Crystal (2003) notes that it is possible to distinguish the first language from the second language (a language other than the mother tongue, used for a specific purpose, such as education or government-related purposes); distinguishing it from foreign language (which has no special status). Sequeira (2007:4) defines “foreign language” as a “language studied at school, in a context that is not the official language, referring this concept to a community of speakers outside national or territorial boundaries”.² The term is used in this sense, but examined in relation to Mandarin/ *Pǔtōnghuà* and Portuguese in Macao, whose status implies some contradictions, *vis-à-vis* the suggested definition; Portuguese, being an official language, is learned at school but is not the mother tongue of the majority

2 My own translation from Portuguese.

population. On the other hand, the variant of Chinese decreed in the *Macao Basic Law*, as the official language, is not specified.

“Chinese” and “Mandarin”, being terms profusely used interchangeably, in fact, are not. Chinese is commonly perceived as a single language, but it is the non-Chinese that relate to regional languages spoken in China this way when, in fact, “Chinese” has different variants and dialects, the most common being Mandarin and Cantonese. “Chinese” is, therefore, a generic term designating a macro language of China (*Ethnologue*, 2014; Yue, 2003), that includes Chinese Gan, Chinese Hakka, Chinese Huizhou, China Jinyu, Chinese Mandarin, Chinese Min Bei, Chinese Min Dong, Chinese Min Nan, Chinese Min Zhong, Chinese Pu- Xian, Chinese Wu, Chinese Xiang and Chinese Xiang Yue. The terms “Mandarin”/ “Mandarin Chinese”/ “guóyǔ” designate a group of related variants or dialects, spoken in northern and southwestern China. When the Mandarin group is seen as a single language, as often happens, it has more native speakers than any other language (approx. 1.2 billion). However, a northeastern dialect speaker and a southwestern dialect speaker can hardly communicate, except through the standard language (*pǔtōnghuà*), mainly due to differences of tone. Still, the variation within Mandarin is slighter than the major variation that exists among other varieties of Chinese.

Mandarin is inaccurately referred to as the official Chinese language. In fact, throughout the history of China, the country’s capital stood, habitually, in the Mandarin language area, making it a very influential dialect. It is since the 14th century that some Mandarin variant served as a national *lingua franca*. In the early 20th century, a standard form, based on the Beijing dialect, mixed with elements from other dialects of Mandarin was adopted as the national language. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, the new Republic of China wanted to standardise the common national language and the dialect of Beijing was chosen. This dialect was originally called *guóyǔ*, but after the change of power to the People’s Republic of China, the name was replaced by *pǔtōnghuà* in 1955. *Pǔtōnghuà* designates the only official language of China: the pronunciation standard is based on the Beijing dialect, and the vocabulary comes from the diverse group of Chinese dialects spoken in northern, central and southwest China. It is a national language, which means it is used in education, at work, in media and government at national level. It is the official language taught in all schools in mainland China and Taiwan. Approximately 70% of Chinese speakers speak it as their mother tongue.

Political change has influenced the sociolinguistic situation of the Chinese language in Macao. Prior to Macao’s return to Chinese sovereignty, few local people spoke the standard dialect of Mainland China. After 1999, Mandarin has become one of the most

popular means of communication between local people and the continent, moreover due to the influx of tourists, immigrants and temporary work permit holders from Mainland China. Language legislation, in the form of the *Law of the PRC on the language spoken and written Standard*³ in 2001, also reinforced the normalisation and standardisation of the spoken norm and written Chinese language, in order to strengthen its role in public activities and promoting economic exchanges and cultural cooperation between all nationalities and Chinese regions.

“Cantonese” or “Chinese *yue*” is a regional language, which means it is used in education, at work, in the media and in the government. It is spoken mostly in Canton, Macao, Hong Kong, in the east of Guangxi and the provinces of Hainan and Hunan; only Mandarin surpasses it in number of speakers. While many speakers of Cantonese understand Mandarin, they experience difficulty speaking it. Although scholars differ on the classification of Cantonese as a language or a dialect, in this paper, it will be used with the designation “language”, as in the Statistics and Census Service of Macau.⁴

Finally the definition of “bilingualism” – the notion of commanding two languages can be explained in terms of context or social function and, in terms of level of skill involved. Regarding the first, bilingualism in the school context is described by Baker (2006, *passim*) as “elective bilingualism” (individuals who choose to learn another language) within a majority linguistic context. As Baker states that there is no simple classification possible, this paper supports the definition of Crozet & Liddicoat (1999:118) – that bilingualism consists of “having some ability to use two (or even more) languages”.

3. THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES AND THE LANGUAGES SPOKEN IN MACAO

The peculiarities of the relationship between Macao and Portugal are visible in the way certain language issues have been officially addressed.

Água-Mel (2012) refers to various types of bilingualism: «natural bilingualism» (exposure to two or more languages in the family or at school), «voluntary bilingualism» (for political or economic reasons, the speakers use a non-native language), «impersonal bilingualism» (the language is adopted exclusively for political reasons and is rarely, if

3 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Database of Laws and regulations, Administrative Laws, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383540.htm [retrieved January 2014].

4 Statistics and Census Service of Macau, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/home_enu.aspx.

ever, used by the population) and «decreed bilingualism» (the use of language in certain contexts, e.g. in the public administration of a country or region), and adds:

The Special Administrative Region of Macao ... meets at its tiny space all examples of bilingualism mentioned above and even presents peculiar linguistic characteristics as those identified by sociolinguist Andrew Moody. According to this researcher ... out of the administrative structures of the territory, the Portuguese language has a *de jure* status as the English language enjoys a *de facto* status (2008:4).

In other words, the Portuguese is imposed by decree but its use is not widespread among the population and its learning is only undertaken by residents who wish to work in the civil service. Moody adds that the adoption of Portuguese as an official language allowed, on one hand, to keep the civil servants jobs with language skills in Portuguese and on the other, to exclude candidates from the Mainland or the Administrative Region of Hong Kong ... highly qualified but without the necessary language requirements (i.e. knowledge in Portuguese) to fill the desired places in Macao public administration. (2008:7).⁵

In early May 2012, the Civil Service and Administration Bureau of Macao issued a written rule to all government departments, titled “Attention to the Public Information Disclosure”. It stated that both Chinese and Portuguese were the official languages of SARM, and that both had equal dignity; so the authorities asked the government to use Chinese and Portuguese on department websites and in other forms of communication. The rule was discreet, but still widely attracted public attention. There were even newspaper articles criticising it, not only about public funds being wasted, but also because it was felt as an attack on national pride (as Portuguese is seen as a language of colonisation by some sectors of the population).⁶

In fact, the discussion of Chinese and Portuguese as official languages of Macao, and about their status, is not new. There are different points of view, whether in academia or in society, and the intense debate over the years does not seem to reach a consensus. A brief analysis of the functioning of the Portuguese language and the Chinese language, in a territory officially monolingual for so long (Portuguese was the official language during the 400 years of Portuguese rule), enlightens the understanding of the current

5 My own translation from Portuguese.

6 A Wu (2012). Civil Service Bureau Proposing Ridiculous Guideline on Public Information Release, a Thought-Provoking Move and Motivation of a Waste of Public Fund and Impairment to National Dignity. *Jornal Informação (Son Pou)*. 18 May 2012.

situation in MSAR. During the period of Portuguese rule, together with the imposition of Portuguese as the official language in the official and administrative sector, there was a downgrading of Cantonese, the mother tongue of the majority of Macao residents.

The Portuguese and Chinese governments agreed, during the transition process, to maintain Portuguese as an official language until 2049. Following the negotiations, Article 9 of the Basic Law (Chapter I) defines the status of the official languages of Macao in this way: “In addition to Chinese, can be also used the Portuguese language by the executive, legislature and judiciary authorities of the Special Administrative Region of Macao, as the Portuguese is also an official language.” (sic). The understanding of this document requires some attention to detail and wording. For instance, Xu Chang (2013) draws attention to the fact that such a provision legislates the commitment taken by the Chinese Government in paragraph 2, point 5 of the *Joint Declaration of the Government of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the PRC on the Question of Macao*, made in 1987.

Pacheco (2009) notes that the wording “can be also used the Portuguese language” (sic) shows immediately that the status of the two languages is different, clearly providing a secondary space for Portuguese (as it means that it can be used, but it’s not required). Also Xiao Weiyun (1998:185) alleged in Unit 16 of *Lectures on the Basic Law of Macao*: “These two sentences indicate on the one hand you can use either the Chinese language as the Portuguese language, both having the status of official languages; on the other hand, they also indicate the direction and the prevailing status of the Chinese language. This is quite explicit ...” The dominance of Chinese, and the secondary status of Portuguese, have been recognised by many authors, e.g. Shuven Wang et al. (1993), Yang Jinghui and Li Xiangqin (1996). On the other hand, the law refers to “Chinese” without specifying which variant is meant, and this has compelling repercussions in terms of education and, consequently, for the language panorama in Macao.

Despite its colonial status, which has disappeared, and Portuguese being used by a minority, the language still plays an important role in the legal system of Macao. The latter is Portuguese-based and a product of the Roman-Germanic family of legal systems. The five classic codes, including the *Civil Code*, the *Commercial Code*, the *Civil Procedure Code*, the *Penal Code* and the *Code of Criminal Procedure*, which form the Macao legal system and underpin the authority structure, are written in Portuguese. Only the *Commercial Code* has an unofficial English version (Sheng, 2004). As almost all laws, decrees, regulations and normative documents enacted during the Portuguese

administration remain in force, legal professionals who wish to practice in Macao must be proficient in Portuguese.

However, Macao has a linguistic context, one that is rather more complex and heterogeneous, contrasting with official or “decreed” bilingualism (Chinese and Portuguese). In fact, Cantonese is the mother tongue of most of its citizens, as indicated in Table 1.1 (see Introduction). Cantonese is also the mother tongue of Hong Kong residents. In both regions, in the written language, traditional characters are used, making it difficult to be read by Chinese citizens from other regions, which use simplified writing. The rapid population increase in the MSAR, due to the entry of immigrants, generated a great linguistic diversity in Chinese, there.

Calvet (1996:64) points out that the Chinese “do not understand each other ... when they speak their first language. ... In addition to minority languages, around fifty, spoken by about 5% of the population, there is a larger whole, the Han group, consisting of eight different languages ... divided into 600 local dialects”.⁷ The People’s Republic of China (PRC) multilingual territory is therefore also undeniably multilingual in Chinese. Blachford (2004:99) states that *pǔtōnghuà* is a “chief unifying tool” whilst Taylor & Taylor (1995) and Pacheco (2009) consider the adoption of *pǔtōnghuà* in the PRC as a language policy strategy to deal with the huge diversity of the Chinese language, which could block the goal of reaching national linguistic unity.

This linguistic diversity (and also ethnic and cultural) is reflected in Macao, according to data from the Statistics and Census Service of Macau in the 2011 Census:⁸

... The 326,376 individuals who were born outside Macao amounted to 59.1% of the total population (...). By place of birth, 255,186 individuals were born in Mainland China, accounting for 46.2% of the total population ... The 226,127 natural Macao accounted for 40.9% of the total population, while the 19,355 natives of Hong Kong amounted to 3.5% and the 1835 natural Portugal occupied 0.3%. The number of natural individuals of other countries and territories has grown substantially due to the influx of non-resident workers. Please note that 14,544 people were natives of the Philippines, 7199 Vietnam 6269 and Indonesia, bringing together 5.1% of the total population. As for the distribution by continent, 1942 were born in Europe (except Portugal), 2252 in America, 959 in Africa and 672 in Oceania.

7 My own translation from French.

8 Statistics and Census Service of Macau – Macao SAR Government. Overall results of Census 2011. “Other demographic characteristics. Place of birth, p. 62 <http://www.dsec.gov.mo/Statistic.aspx?NodeGuid=8d4d5779-c0d3-42f0-ae71-8b747bdc8d88>, [Retrieved August 2013]

The same document states the following about Macao:

449,274 people speak Cantonese as a common language, representing 83.3 % of the population aged less than 3 years ... the people who spoke Mandarin (5.0%) and English (2.3%) as current language increased respectively 3.4 and 1.6 percentage points compared to 2001. This increase is mainly due to immigration and an increase in the number of non-resident workers. ... As regards the field of other languages, 41.4 % spoke Mandarin, accounting for 14.7 percentage points compared to 200, while 21.1% spoke English and 2.4% Portuguese.⁹

This means that more than 80% of the population speaks its mother tongue, Cantonese, while the remaining residents speak different languages, according to their origin, and 21% of the population uses English as its *lingua franca*.

The *de facto* status of the official languages is evident in the percentage of its speakers: almost 90% for Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin) and 2.4% for Portuguese. A report of the Macao Public Administration Services illustrates this situation. The Government resolution 113 states that the administration of the SARM shall consider within its policy “promoting the use of the Chinese language as an instrument for improving relations between management and the public”, but in spite of the official bilingualism, Chinese is dominant, and some documents are available to the public only in the official Chinese version; the use of Portuguese is restricted almost exclusively to the wording of official documents. There are also cases in which they are available only in the English version and often “the language used in intercultural communication in the public sector is not, as might be expected, the Portuguese, but the English” (Água-Mel, 2012:415). In terms of academic research and publication in Macao, Mandarin is the preferred language (Yan & Moody, 2010; Noronha & Chaplin, 2011).

In today’s China, *pǔtōnghuà* is the official language and the government is strongly committed to its standing, in fact, as the national language. However, dealing with so many variants of the Chinese language, and targeting for the linguistic unification of the country, is not simple. The panorama described about China and Macao, is furthermore characterised by a strong ethnic diversity and multilingualism. It reflects in the difficulty in establishing and planning a written language policy for Macao, as well as a language of instruction in its education system (Berlie 1999; Lai K. 2002; Bray & Koo 2004; J Huang 2006; Young 2009).

9 Idem ibidem.

4. THE STATUS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Bolton (2003) affirms the existence of a long and rich history of English in Macao, even before the establishment of Hong Kong as a British colony in 1842, strengthened by the continuous exchange of trade and infrastructure between the two territories, until today. Indeed, much of the English used in Macao infrastructures (media, education and to some extent in the civil service) was strongly influenced by British Hong Kong. The spread of English as a universal language and *lingua franca*, in Mainland China, is also clearly observable in Chinese education, where English has become one of the languages of the curriculum (Adamson & Feng, 2014; Feng 2007, 2011; Ruan & Leung, 2012). The prestige of English is high in the PRC, even though it is not used in everyday life, as the language is associated with social mobility, despite significant dissimilarities in terms of access between urban and rural contexts (being the supply scarce in the latter).

The Macao linguistic scenery is analysed by various authors. Harrison (1984), for example, points out that not even being a native, official or second language, English is the second most important language in Macao, after Cantonese. He is supported by Moody (2008:4):

... there is a widespread use of English within the government at various levels. Even the Basic Law is available in both of the two official languages, Portuguese and Chinese, and in English. Although English does not have a *de jure* official status, the availability of the Basic Law and other official documents in English suggests that the language nevertheless enjoys a *de facto* status within government agencies in Macao, the extent to which has rarely been examined.

This author points out that 44 government institutions (70%), providing services on the Internet, use English in addition to Chinese and Portuguese. The Internet is dominated by English in websites directed abroad, but it can also be seen in websites for communication within the Macao community: the Legislative Assembly, the ID Department, the Monetary Authority of Macao, Macao Prison, the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau, and the Office for the Energy Sector Development, all have websites in English – so it can be said that the language holds a *de facto* status as an additional working language of the Macao government.

Yet, the reality of the English language is nonetheless contradictory. Noronha & Chaplin (2011) address the fact that Filipinos form a significant part of the labor force in Macao (around 20 000), and Filipino women, mostly maids, being chosen by Chinese and Portuguese families, precisely because of their intercultural communication skills

and command of English. Many work as nannies and are “important English language providers” in Hong Kong and Macao. Groder (2008) also points out that Filipinos form the largest group of non-Chinese foreigners in the territory, and considers them the group with the highest qualifications and the lowest illiteracy rate, a finding agreed to by Simpson (2012: 17-18):

These Filipino workers often capitalise of their English language proficiency and disposition for intercultural adjustment to secure expatriate work ... their ability to communicate in an international language ... Their stability is their labor flexibility tied to their linguistic adaptability. Physicians work as nurses, school teachers tend bar, college-educated woman toil as domestic works.

As tourists visiting Macao are mainly Chinese and Asian, and the game industry has been operating mainly in the Chinese market, the command of foreign languages among residents and local workers is not regarded as essential. It is precisely workers from the Philippines (and the Nepalese and Indonesian) supplying this gap. Noronha & Chaplin (*ibid*: 416) report as follows on the subject:

While it is evident that proficiency in Chinese and English is perceived as an important asset for education and employment prospects in Hong Kong, this is not demonstrated in the provision of vocational education in Macao. ... Since the expansion of the casino industry, with its predominantly Mainland Chinese market, the key workplace environment in Macao is more attuned to proficiency in Chinese over English.

These authors cite a recent inquiry about the casino labour market, in which 88.8% of job advertisements alluded to a command of Chinese as selection criterion, and only 54.5% to a command of English. Nevertheless, they also claim that English is the language used in the tourism sector to communicate with foreigners who do not speak Chinese, so it is also associated with job requirements. They point out that “(i)t is known that English is widely used by those in the service sector especially for hospitality, tourism, and banking, but there is evidence that English is also used for intercultural communication in the public sector – even in government departments” (*idem*:415), confirming that employers often turn to non-Chinese workers who can master English: “there is a significant number of ethnic minorities employed in professional as well as skilled occupations.” (*ibidem*)

Zandonai (2009:45) gives an account of the increasingly widespread use of English as the language of intercommunication between the different ethnic groups, a phenomenon that reaffirms a common practice among Chinese and Portuguese, long rendered into

English as a vehicle for everyday communication, given the mutual ignorance of each other's languages:

... the use of English now seems to have occupied new spaces and gained new strength with the arrival of native English speakers who have been somewhat responsible for the phase of internationalisation the city has undergone behind the development of the casino industry. As a result, English has not only been asserted as the local *lingua franca*, a status that it had been granted, or had imposed, since the 19th century in the trade outposts of Asia and Oceania, but it has also considerably reduced the chances of Portuguese, the once regional *lingua franca* (Boxer, 1948), regaining appeal with non-Portuguese speakers. Proof of this is the fact that Chinese schools offering students the possibility of pursuing their education within an English section outnumber those offering a Portuguese section by far.

Pacheco (2009) states that the complexity of the language landscape of SARM is due to the accelerated growth of the tourism industry, which triggered an increasing number of immigrants. In this multilingual context, there is public recognition of the importance of English as the language of survival and work. This author, however, points out that, despite, the breakthrough in the tourist sector, the proficiency in English of most of the population is low. This can be seen while trying to speak the language in Macao, namely with taxi drivers and receptionists in hotels, little competent in English, which undermines or prevents communication. Nevertheless, she considers the process irreversible, given the status of the language in the international arena. English is used as an international medium of instruction in several local institutions, for instance, at meetings and events held in various schools. It is used alongside Chinese as "official" work language in oral and written communication in these institutions. She remarks that "... it can be seen, however, a slow and gradual option to use the Chinese language ... in some important events in Macao, such as conferences and even 'job presentations'" (idem: 51)

A 2007 report on language training in Hong Kong and Macao, produced with the support of the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong, concludes:

With respect to the language training market, Macao is largely untapped territory i.e. language suppliers seldom come to Macao, residents must travel to Hong Kong to obtain support and there is little competition ... At present, the \$2.5-million "study abroad" program represents the largest share of the language market. Because Macao is mostly dependent on Hong Kong for services, it can be considered a secondary market.

Forces driving the English language market in Macao include the recent opening up of the gaming and tourism industries, which has led to a boom in casino construction. The number of expatriate workers in the country is growing and the gaming industry wants its workforce to be English-speaking. English is the third language spoken by the Macanese. There is little government funding for English language training.

These are crucial aspects for understanding the educational policy, and the variables that affect the Macao education system, regarding the teaching of foreign languages and their value to the population. Indeed, the MSAR economy, the main business sectors, the employment policies, the ethnic composition and language use of the population, the official languages and the organisation of the educational system contribute to the situation that in the MSAR people speak Cantonese, *pǔtōnghuà*, other Chinese dialects (predominantly Fukienese), English, Filipino (essentially Tagalog), Thai, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Portuguese, without sharing a *lingua franca*:

The Chinese, depending on where they come from, speak dialects of its provinces, as well as Cantonese and/or *Pǔtōnghuà*; Filipinos speak their mother tongues, Tagalog, English and, depending on the employer, Cantonese or Portuguese; the Macanese or 'sons of the soil' speak Cantonese and *Pǔtōnghuà*, English and/ or Portuguese. This linguistic 'disarticulation' reflects a community that is built on the basis of groups that rarely mix with each other (Água-Mel, 2012:13-14).¹⁰

On the other hand, the Macao labour market hinders the recruitment of non-residents, thereby protecting its human resources. Macao students do not need to work hard at school, learn foreign languages or invest in higher education, because they have guaranteed access to a job (European Commission, 2012; Morrison, 2004:5): "Entrance requirements for higher education in Macao are frequently low. If students can enter the university premises so easily then the pressure in high academic achievement is reduced." The gaming sector absorbs a large number of students with secondary education and pays them higher salaries.¹¹

The striking diversity presented above sets a scenario of a rather complex linguistic territory, and accentuates the urgent need for a thorough investigation into the implications in terms of language policy. As Pina Cabral & Lourenço (1993:19) state, "Macao is a complex territory. One cannot say that there are two or one or two

10 My own translation from Portuguese.

11 Penny, Lam Kin Kuan (2014) "I Repeated" <http://pontofinalmacau.wordpress.com/2014/10/21/quando-o-dinheiro-e-facil-e-difcil-pedir-aos-alunos-para-estudarem/> [accessed in October 2014].

identifiable cultures. This cultural complexity is structured by two axes – one ethnic, another linguistic. These two axes, however, do not match”.¹²

5. THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN MACAO

A Western system of education was introduced in Macao in the 16th century, when the College of St. Paul, the first European university in China and Southeast Asia, was founded by the Jesuits to help form missionaries for the region. The college offered higher education courses, recognised by European universities and to improve the linguistic competence of the missionaries, included language courses in the curriculum for religious studies (Bolton 2002; Sheng 2004). Grasping the present-day educational reality requires a clear understanding of the fundamental aspects that historically configured it.

Prior to 1999, the Portuguese presence in Macao, as well as its political status, influenced the way education developed. Its main feature was the “near-zero intervention of the Portuguese administration in the educational policy design in the territory” (Rosa, 1998:13). The education system was characterised by limited resources and the lack of an organised structure, resulting from the little interventionist role played by the Portuguese government (Jeong, 2002; Rosa, *ibidem*). The Portuguese administration has provided only non-tertiary education for Portuguese residents and for the children of its employees, through public schools. The children of the general population did not have free and universal education, making it even harder for these local poor people to climb the social ladder.

This attitude of the Portuguese administration, whose actions unfolded almost exclusively based on the Portuguese education system, resulted in the rise of non-state initiatives that developed private educational structures with tenuous relations with local authorities. According to Pinto (1987:20):

... Macao administration did not take the initiative to meet the educational needs of the Chinese population and this allowed other institutions to take its tutelage. It was how it has been developed in Macao an educational reality with several autonomous centers. And what we find there at the end of the eighties is not a centralized or decentralized educational system, but a polycentric one.¹³

12 My own translation from Portuguese.

13 My own translation from Portuguese

The existence of a highly privatised education system would not, by itself, imply little participation by the state. However, in Macao, that fact was accompanied by a virtually complete independence of the different educational institutions, regarding the administration. The relationship between the two structures was merely bureaucratic and administrative, founded through procedures aimed at obtaining permits and financial support.

Private schools were not supported, controlled or even monitored by the government. Many of them were run by religious organisations, others by social services organisation and commercial enterprises. The structures were imported, with or without adaptation, from Portugal, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, the dropout rate was very high due to the precarious economic situation and lack of student motivation. Tertiary education only began in 1981 with the University of East Asia, a private institution, one which fragmented into three institutions of higher education, 10 years later, two public (University of Macao and Macao Polytechnic Institute) and one private (International Open University of Asia and Macao) (Rocha 2010).

The dependence of the Macao education system on the outside included the Portuguese system, following fully the programs designed in Lisbon. Education programmes did not adapt to local circumstances, neither by teaching Portuguese, nor by the inclusion of substantive references to Macao reality. In fact, only long after the transition of Macao, did the Portuguese School include the Chinese language in its curriculum (Decree No. 940/2009 of 20 August).¹⁴

In general, the school system before the establishment of the MSAR can be divided into two main phases, separated by the publication of Law 11/91/M of 29 August 1991, instituting the general framework of the education system in Macao. Prior to the enactment of this law, the Portuguese administration has solely controlled the curriculum of public schools (significantly less so in the private schools). Following the enactment of the *Education Act*, the Portuguese Government launched three decrees-law, related to the curricular organisation of the various levels of education between 1994 and 1997, in order to standardise the disciplines and course load in public schools; it also functioned as an orientation for private schools.

Subsequently, the transition and the *Basic Law of the MSAR*, the Article 121 of Chapter VI, Culture and Social Affairs declare:

14 *Diário da República*, 1st series – No. 161-20 August 2009 Ordinance No. 940/2009 of 20 August, <http://dre.pt/pdf1s/2009/08/16100/0547405481.pdf> [accessed June 2014]

The Macao Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on education, including policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination system and the recognition of literary and academic qualifications, boosting the development of education.

Indeed, after the handover by the Portuguese, a major government task was to make the education sector more cohesive. Today, Macao is the first territory in the Greater China where a free education system prevails, and has prevailed for 15 years. The SAR government legislates, directs, coordinates and evaluates the different types of higher and non-higher education. This is done through the Tertiary Education Services Office, responsible for the design and formulation of policies for higher education in Macao, and the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau, respectively.¹⁵

Over the past few years, efforts have been made to improve the school curriculum and to meet the needs of society in the 21st century. An example is the implementation of Law No. 9/2006, the Fundamental Law on Non-tertiary Education, that attempts to unify the education system and standardise the number of years frequented by students in different educational systems. However, the fact that the education system is made up of official and private schools (of the local and non-local school system), and 86% of Macao's schools are private, limits the ability of the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau to intervene in the adopted teaching model.

Note that there are no uniform or external final exams likely to provide a reference on the quality of schools and student learning in Macao (Bray & Koo 2004; Morrison & Tang 2003). Each school offers its own certificates of general secondary and upper secondary education, which are the only credentials of Macao students at the end of their study. To help students obtain qualifications recognised by other educational authorities, some schools offer preparation classes for public examinations for students who wish to pursue studies in Mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan. Schools that follow the British education system require students to obtain the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or approval in the Cambridge International Examinations (CIE). Overall, more than 95 % of the population finishes their education in private institutions; by contrast, less than 5% of the population studied in public education institutions (DSEC, 2013).

15 Government Information Bureau of the Macao SAR Government, *Macao Yearbook 2013*, <http://yearbook.gcs.gov.mo/index.php?lang=E&page=yearbookinfo> [accessed June 2014].

Even though the non-tertiary education institutions are supervised by the Youth Affairs Bureau, the support and guidance appear insufficient. Without centralised curricula, public examinations and clear guidelines from the government, each school has its own goals, missions and concerns related to the education values (Yee, 1990; Bray & Hui, 1991; Koo & Ma, 1994; Choi & Koo 2001). Such non-unified education system causes many problems that were not solved by the Macao SAR government after 1999, when the political situation changed (Lao 1999; Choi & Koo, 2001). As a result, students who graduate from different types of primary, secondary and tertiary institutions vary greatly in terms of abilities and knowledge and their skills are frequently questioned and criticised. Before the transition period, the Portuguese administration did not want to take control over these issues. At present, the Macao SAR Government does not seem to know how to have control over them.

6. LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Bray & Koo (2004) discuss the topic of the language of instruction, reinforcing the aforementioned universal perception about the lack of interest in education that took place in Macao during Portuguese rule. The portrait already outlined reflected in the languages of instruction used by Macao schools: an alternative way to classify Macao schools was the language of instruction, as some institutions operated in Portuguese, others in Chinese and others in English. Moreover, the government also created a hybrid group of “Luso-Chinese” schools; these institutions, with nine remaining in the region, used Chinese and Portuguese as vehicular languages. They were created to provide a merger between the two main cultures involved (Western and Chinese) but never achieve the desired results.

Before the transition, Portuguese was the only means of communication between Chinese officials and the Portuguese administration (Sheng, 2004). Passing the Portuguese examination was a requirement for the Macao people who wanted a prestigious, stable and well-paid job in the public administration sector:

Over the period of colonization, Macao did not teach the colonial language for the masses. Instead, schools only offered the language for the Portuguese or ‘Macanese’, individuals with mixed Portuguese and Asian ancestry. These were also the same individuals also offered the highest government official positions and had the greatest political and socioeconomic power (Edmonds & Yee, 1999:803).

The Chinese language was made official in Macao in 1991, i.e. more than 400 years after the settlement of the Portuguese in the territory and four years after signing in Beijing the *Joint Declaration of the Government of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Macao*. The Portuguese and Chinese languages, protected in the *Joint Declaration* (1987) and the *Basic Law* (1993) through their status as official languages of Macao, were never taught as official languages in the education system: the Portuguese language was not taught in Chinese schools subsidised by the Portuguese authorities or was only occasionally taught; and the Chinese language was not taught in Portuguese official schools, except as a dull option.

The teaching of Portuguese in Macao, as part of the curriculum, began in the 70s, but it was in the 80s, in the pre-handover environment, that its implementation was stronger and more dynamic. During this period some primary schools and high schools taught Portuguese; at an early stage, the teachers who taught the language were mostly primary school teachers and, later, high schools teachers recruited from Portugal. Few had specific training in teaching Portuguese as a foreign language and the majority had qualifications in different areas (Rodrigues, 2004):

Portugal ... did not adjust to the new realities and the new times, and a language policy in line with the constantly evolving Europe was virtually non-existent. It was the experience of teaching Portuguese as a mother tongue in Africa that was transported to the Macao context. Since Macao was under Portuguese administration, the language teaching at an early stage was seen on the same level as a mother tongue. Although there has been an effort to change this situation, the 80's did not alter the myths that had already been installed for teaching/ learning Portuguese for Chinese students (Martins, 2012: 36).¹⁶

After Macao's handover in 1999, this offer got smaller. The extinction of the Pedro Nolasco Commercial School and the Macao High School led to the opening of the Portuguese School of Macao, the only to offer curricula identical to Portugal and teaching the students from 1st to 12th grade in Portuguese. At present there are some private schools that teach the Portuguese language as an option or an extracurricular activity. The knowledge and use of Portuguese in Macao is thus characterised by Young (2009:418) as follows:

Regarding the use of Portuguese in education, those people who are not familiar with the education system in Macao might take it for granted that Macao people are Portuguese literate. The truth is, however, with the exception of those who studied in government grammar schools, most Macao people did not learn

16 My own translation from Portuguese.

much Portuguese in school. During the transitional period, the Portuguese government started to subsidise the teaching of the Portuguese Language and the publication of Portuguese newspapers in order to promote Portuguese learning (Lam, 2004; Rosa, 1989). In post-colonial Macao, a few Portuguese-medium schools offer summer Portuguese language courses. Nevertheless, most Chinese-ethnic local people can only use a few Portuguese words and phrases for very basic communication.

As for the teaching of English, considering the history of Macao and the fact that it was a meeting place between East and West (Sheng, 2004), the first interaction with English speakers occurred in the mid-17th century. Qu (2007:350) certifies: "According to Bolton (2002), the first contact with English occurred between the Chinese and English traders, and the first (missionary) schools to teach English were established in Macao in the 1630s, shortly before the First Opium War." The first schools to use English as a working language in China were established in Macao in the early 19th century (Bolton, 2002; Sheng, 2004). However, as English has never been an official language in Macao, the Portuguese administration in the colonial period did not promote the learning of this language.

With the change of its political status in 1999, Macao doesn't perceive Portugal anymore as the only door to access to the West. Currently, in addition to bi-lateral relations with more than 120 countries, Macao is also a member of several international economic organisations, including the World Trade Organisation and the Asia-Pacific Economic Zone. Ieong (2000) argues that ignoring the English language today means losing enormous business opportunities and that with no English it is unlikely for Macao to fully internationalise. The author suggests the issue for public discussion, placing the emphasis on learning English:

"During the ruling of Portugal, Macao has failed to establish an English environment. However, ignoring the importance of English today means losing tremendous business opportunities. Also, without an English environment, Macao is unlikely to go internationalised. Hence, we should put forward this issue for public discussion and encourage every household to place emphasis on learning English. In fact, to promote English and appropriately develop Portuguese education are not contradicting to each other. However, if we have to choose between English and Portuguese, we should prefer English." (Ieong, 2000:97-98)

Even though English is not an official nor second language in Macao, Moody (2008:8) states that, similarly to what happens in public administration, that

... English maintains a *de facto* official status within the Macao educational system. Unlike the civil service, however, this status is codified within government educational law that puts English on an equal level with Chinese and Portuguese as a possible medium of instruction. A school that chooses English as the MOI [medium of instruction] would presumably find the choice approved as easily as one of the two *de jure* official languages as a medium of instruction.

English is, therefore, the language of instruction in several schools and is taught from kindergarten to the end of upper secondary education, since many parents admit that a good command of English is important for the future of their children. Overall, it is taught as a compulsory subject from pre-school to secondary school, and is also the language of instruction at several higher education institutions. Several prestigious private schools emphasise the use of English as one of the languages of instruction (alongside Chinese), in order to stay competitive:

... even though Chinese is the most widely used medium language of instruction for Macao students (85.7%), 13.4% of Macao students are enrolled in schools that use English as the medium language of instruction. But most, if not all, of Macao's Chinese-medium secondary schools teach English as a subject. The 2006 Bycensus (DSEC, Macao, 2007) reports that 16.6% of the population can use English. Considering, however, that 13.4% of Macao students are enrolled in English MOI schools and that nearly all of the remaining 86.6% of students study English as a subject, the percentage of English speakers in the territory will undoubtedly rise dramatically in coming years (Moody, *idem*: 8-9).

Nevertheless, likewise to what occurs in Portuguese education, without a centralised curriculum, public examinations or clear government guidelines, the various institutions have established their own curricula, materials and approaches to English language learning, based on their various origins. As a result, secondary school students who graduate from different schools acquire different levels of competence in English. Even after 15 years of language learning in Macao schools, "many students are unable to speak in sentences and are afraid to try" (Tang, 2003:209). The author identifies and highlights the following main issues: lack of motivation, outdated methodology of teaching, which is represented by the emphasis on grammar issues at the expense of communication, and the pressure by excessive testing.

Young (2009:418) confirms this analysis, and adds:

Almost all Macao students are English-knowing although their proficiency level varies widely ... As over 80% of the schools are private educational institutions,

their survival depends upon the support of students, and more importantly, parents ... The students' English learning motivation is an instrumental one. Their proficiency level is perceived to be one of the indicators of the school's performance and credential (Education and Youth Affairs Bureau, 2006; Sheng Kung Hui Macao Social Service Centre, 2005). A comparison of the figures over the past decade shows a rise of English medium and a drop of Portuguese medium schools (sectors).

Noronha (2011:411) sums up the teaching of the major languages present in the Macao education system, from the pre-transition period to the present, saying that “[it] has been, and continues to be, polarised by preferences, priorities, and politicization”. During the Portuguese rule, the Portuguese language and cultural identity was valued, and the only alternatives were the English language learning environments within and outside the territory's education system. After the handover, the emphasis was put on Chinese as the medium of learning in schools. Noronha (idem, ibidem) adds that the priority given to the use of *Pǔtōnghuà* as the national language over Cantonese (the language of the majority ethnic group in Macao) is further complicated by the exclusivity of Chinese and Portuguese as the official languages for careers in Macao. So, for ethnic minorities, proficiency in English offers more inclusive prospects for achievement and success, and the author concludes that the education policy in Macao lacks coherence and commitment.

In addition to the outlined panorama, the language teachers are employed directly by private schools, with different academic and linguistic competences – they can be native or non-native, may belong either to companies such as language centers or be hired individually; for the Portuguese language, it is either the Center of Languages, a body of the Youth Affairs Bureau, that places teachers in private schools, or they are hired directly. As for public schools, teachers are selected through external entrance examinations, which are announced in the Official Bulletin; usually they are hired on an annual basis and the process consists of a written test (50%), a pedagogical practice proof (30%) and a professional interview (20%). The juries of these entrance examinations are selected by the Youth Affairs Bureau officials, and evidence is made case by case, which favors subjectivity, given the high inevitable social pressure in a city of 30 km², where people from the same professional sectors know each other well and decisions are often influenced by social relations, in general.

Note that, although *Pǔtōnghuà* is the medium of instruction in China, the definition of the language of instruction in Macao is more complex, as the Law 9/2006, Article 37 [the *Fundamental Law on Non-tertiary Education*] states:

1. The public schools must adopt one of the official languages as a medium of instruction and provide students the opportunity to learn the other language;
2. Private schools may adopt as languages of instruction either the official languages or other languages;
3. The adoption of other languages by the private schools shall be subject to prior assessment and recognition by the department responsible for education of the existence of suitable conditions for this purpose;
4. Private schools adopting other languages as medium of instruction should provide students the opportunity to learn at least one of the official languages.

The difficulties in establishing a language of instruction may be partly justified by statistical data on the composition of the Macao population, and also by the absence of a proper and universal education system in Macao, which uses British, Chinese or Portuguese systems. According to the report of Industry Canada (2007), Chinese is the medium of instruction in Macao's private schools, with *Guangdonghua*¹⁷ used in up to 70% of classrooms, with *Pǔtōnghuà* being used in the others. Five schools provide education in Portuguese. There are 13 schools that use English as a medium of instruction, including local schools, which offer an English section and a Chinese section, and there are four International Schools offering the same. There are very few pre-primary schools offering courses with English as the medium of instruction; St. Anthony's English Kindergarten is an exception. English is used in the secondary sections of seven local schools. Many of these schools also devote instructional time to teaching *Pǔtōnghuà*.

This means that the vast majority of schools have Chinese Cantonese as the language of instruction, followed by English and Portuguese. Chou (2009:i) also states that “[the] Portuguese language is never popularized. Most schools adopt Chinese (Cantonese) as their medium of instruction. English education, which is of limited use to the casino-based economy focusing on Chinese gamblers until recently, is not strongly promoted”.

In fact, most of Macao's non-tertiary Chinese schools have used, and continue to use, Cantonese as the vehicular language, instead of Mandarin (the official language of

17 Cantonese.

PRC). Bray & Koo (2004) report, however, that the schools run by the Macao Chinese Education Association use Mandarin to teach Chinese subjects, such as Chinese history. This association has always been an ally of mainland China and, therefore, more inclined to use Mandarin. In addition, because the government of Macao was inattentive, schools might employ teachers from mainland China, willing to work for much lower wages than their local counterparts.

According to official figures, in 1989/90, 36.5% of teachers in Macao were Chinese nationals (Macao, 1991). Later statistics indicated place of birth rather than nationality; but in 2001/02, 41.1% of Macao's teachers were recorded as having been born in mainland China (Macao, 2003). Many, of course, were long term residents and had thus become Macao citizens, but others were relatively recent migrants. (Bray & Koo, 2004:229)

Therefore, the question of the language of instruction has evolved, largely by “default”, in the absence of an overview and government management. The ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of Macao, that could be a distinct added value to exceed what Chou (2009:i) identifies as “Macao people's identity [that] does not have an obvious international dimension”, can be summed up as follows:

Contrary to recent regional trend for bilingualism or even multilingualism as forms of identity construction and instruments of reform and socio-economic development, the education system of the MSAR continues to promote monolingualism to almost all grade levels. There are several secondary schools with English, Chinese and Portuguese “sections” and higher education institutions whose language of instruction is Portuguese or English, but there is no real bilingualism policy or even an attempt to implement it (Água-Mel, 2012).¹⁸

7. POLICIES AND LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING

In 2008, the document *Non-tertiary Education: Language Education Policy* was prepared for discussion by the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau. It sets out a number of general principles about the framework, objectives and measures to be implemented in this area. However, it did not result in new legislation or in any concrete action in addition to the reproduction of some of the principles contained therein in documentation and institutional sites, reflecting a purely formal attitude and not a critical intervention on language teaching in the context of Macao's language policy.

18 My own translation from Portuguese.

The latest publication by the Education and Youth Affairs Bureau about the non-tertiary education policy, whose objective is to “determine the direction and development goals for the future” (Appendix V:14), is the *Ten Year Plan for the Development of Non-Tertiary Education (2011-2020)*, in which the only mention of the goals for this period and level of education, concerning foreign language teaching, is as follows:

2.2.1 Language proficiency

Effectively enhance student’s reading interest, written expression ability, writing skills and literacy accomplishment. Students who graduate from secondary education need to be able to use at least one foreign language proficiently, while those with the Chinese language as the medium of instruction can speak fairly fluent Putonghua (p. 85).

The official policy documents, governing the education in Macao, predate the transition: the Law No. 11/91/M, 29 August, for higher education, the Decree-Law No. 38/94/M, which features “in flexible and open way, the guidelines for curriculum development for pre-school education, the preparatory year for primary education and primary education” and the Decree-Law No. 39/94/M on the “guidelines for curriculum development for secondary general education”.

Meanwhile, in the Administrative Regulation No. 15/2014, the Curriculum Framework for Formal Education of Local Education System, was published on June 25, 2014. It introduces some changes pertaining to foreign languages, most notably by not mentioning Portuguese as a second optional language, but rather that it is not yet in force. Its phased implementation is started from the academic year 2015/2016 in Kindergarten. Thus, the decree-laws dated from 1994, and the curriculum they recommend for the various levels of education, including pre-school as well as in primary and secondary school, is still governing the operation of educational institutions, as Table 7.1 illustrates.

Table 7.1 Curriculum guidelines. Source: Decree-Law n°. 38/94/M, Annex III

PRESCHOOL EDUCATION		
Training Areas	Communication and expression development activities in mother tongue, especially in speaking, graphics and understanding.	
Workload can vary between a minimum of 23 and a maximum of 36 weekly school times.		
PREPARATORY YEAR FOR PRIMARY EDUCATION		
Training Areas	Activities for the initiation of language learning; may begin a second language.	
Weekly school times (minimum and maximum): 8-10		
PRIMARY SCHOOL		
AREA		
BASIC ACQUISITIONS	GUIDELINES	<p>B. Option dependent of the Language of Instruction of the Educational Institution.</p> <p>C. The Private Educational Institutions can choose one of the following languages: Chinese, Portuguese or English. The Officials of the Educational Institutions are governed under the terms of Article 37 of Macao's Education Act.</p> <p>It is suggested to deepen the educational environments conducive to learning a 2nd language, taking into account the ages of the children and teaching methodologies.</p>
2.1. LANGUAGE		
2.1.1. LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION (B)		
2.1.2. SECOND LANGUAGE (C)		
2.2. MATHEMATICS		
1st to 4th year – 18-20 school times		
5th to 6th year – 19-22 school times		
The duration of each school time is defined between a minimum of 25 minutes and a maximum of 35 minutes.		

From Table 7.1, it can be concluded that:

- In Kindergarten, the learning of a foreign language is not offered;
- In the preparatory year for primary education, the possibility it is mentioned of starting a “second language”, with a total of 8 to 10 weekly school slots for mother tongue, and learning the second language being up to the school to manage;
- In primary education, the “second language” is mentioned and the options are specified: Chinese, Portuguese or English. The school slots proposed for “Basic

Acquisitions” include mother tongue, second language and mathematics, and it’s up to the school to manage the slots indicated for the 1st and 2nd phases of this cycle;

- In primary education, the wording “it is suggested to deepen the educational environments conducive to learning a second language, taking into account the ages of the children”, leaves it to the school’s discretion when to start this cycle, which, incidentally, is clearly pointed out in Articles 5 and 6 of Decree-Law No. 38/94/M (emphasis added):

In the preparatory year for primary education, educational institutions can, according to the resources available, provide the initiation of learning a second language in a playful perspective, safeguarding the development of communication skills in the language of instruction in which they administer the education. In primary education, schools can start or continue the learning of a second language, taking on more formal and structured learning in the 5th and 6th grade, and although not obliged to do so, should be the privileged territorial official languages.

This led the public and some private schools to only introduce the second language in the 5th year of primary education, similarly to the Portuguese education system until 2005/2006 (when the program English Generalisation began in the 3rd and 4th years of the 1st cycle of basic education), the foundation for the Macao model.

Note, also, that the highlighted text above, in 4, proves what has been said before, namely that the official languages in Macao are, in fact, foreign languages for the population. Complexifying this, the Basic Law declares “Chinese” as the official language of Macao, not specifying which Chinese language is intended, Mandarin or Cantonese. As about 83% of the population use Cantonese as mother tongue, this is the vehicular language in the majority of Macao schools – not the same situation as in the PRC, where *Pǔtōnghuà* is, simultaneously, official language and vehicular language of education, in formal terms.

8. CONCLUSION

Without a long-term commitment and a language policy solidly conceptualised at government level, it is difficult, in a complex society like Macao, where the fashionable slogan about the promotion of multiculturalism and multilingualism is often heard, to concretise its value and effective language training for residents. The rapid demographic and economic growth of Macao has revealed areas where immediate results are more difficult to attain. However, to achieve the required goals, the strategic planning of foreign language policy should be conceptualised in the medium or long term. Although

the results are not immediate, they remain throughout the generations. It, therefore, urgently requires the indispensable reflection on some issues related to the teaching and learning of different languages, i.e. i) the intended goals behind the teaching and learning of a particular language; ii) the level of proficiency of that language in Macao, to be reached in accordance with the objectives set and the identified needs; iii) the teaching and learning hours advised to reach the levels set out in the various frameworks (Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, the HSK and PSC¹⁹ for Mandarin, etc.); iv) the analysis of the adequacy of the course load in educational institutions; v) the strategies for language preservation in a context where immersion is limited to the classroom, among others.

Professor Maria José Grosso, from the University of Macao, interviewed by the newspaper *Plataforma Macao* (21.11.2014), says:

Rethink the teaching of languages requires knowledge of the various educational realities in order to give concrete answers; the absence of a comprehensive plan leads to the exhaustion of the people involved in the process and the stagnation of knowledge itself and, worse than that, favors the monolingualism, the hegemony of a language, and in the long run results in the disappearance of languages and the values of power they represent.

Although multilingualism and multilingual education have existed for centuries, the new millennium brought about a renewed interest around this educational option. The ethnolinguistic diversity, the inequality, the communication and the intercultural contact and the political and economic interdependence are realities that are more global than ever in today's world, and that pressurise education systems. Now, as throughout history, multilingual education offers better possibilities to prepare future generations to take part in building more just and democratic societies in a globalised and intercultural world. However, without proper planning of the status and role of languages, this will not be achieved automatically.

Indeed, multilingual and multicultural education involves (1) using and valuing more than one language in teaching and learning, (2) recognising and valuing the understanding and intercultural dialogue between different experiences and culturally different world views, and (3) taking into account the knowledge that the students bring

19 The HSK (Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì) is the Chinese proficiency test or standard examination Chinese, the only standardised test proficiency in China in standard Chinese language to non-native speakers, as foreign students and Chinese overseas. Vd. http://english.hanban.org/node_8002.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanyu_Shui ping_Kaoshi. The PSC (Pǔtōnghuà Shuǐpíng Ceshì) is a proficiency exam in Mandarin. Vd. <http://www.cbs.polyu.edu.hk/exam.html>

to the classroom, and moving towards their full participation as indispensable actors in society. This applies to the local, national and global level (Hornberger2009). In addition to these basic features, there are many issues and facets related to multilingual education that require coordinated responses, such as policy and implementation, programs and curriculum projects, classroom practices, pedagogy and professional teacher development, without neglecting the contributions of empirical research on this topic in various regions of the world.

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LANGUAGE POLICY AND LANGUAGE USE IN MULTILINGUAL MALAYSIA

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Abstract

This paper seeks to determine whether the imposition of a national language policy in multilingual Malaysia has resulted in acceptance of the national language in its capacity as a medium of instruction, and as a *lingua franca* in a number of domains, particularly in educational settings. The authors conclude that the existent public preferences lead to social processes which might undermine national unity.

1. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MALAYSIA

As a developing country, Malaysia is made up of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). It has an estimated population of 31 million, comprised of 50% Malays, 25% Chinese, 10% Indian and 15% indigenous people who are mainly from Sabah and Sarawak. As a multi-ethnic, multicultural country, the principal languages spoken by those in Peninsular Malaya are Malay, English, Mandarin, and Tamil. In the case of Sarawak, Malay is the most commonly spoken dialect, but Malay and English are generally used by those in Sabah (generally by the higher social and economic class).

According to the Ethnologue Report of Malaysia (retrieved December 01, 2016), the number of individual languages listed in Malaysia is 139 with 137 living languages and 2 with no known speakers. It was also reported that the number of individual languages

listed for Peninsular Malaysia is 41, 52 for Sabah, and 44 for Sarawak (2 with no known speakers). Of these living languages noted, 112 are spoken by the indigenous groups and 22 are spoken by non-indigenous groups. This statement seems to imply that there are clearly marked languages between the indigenous and the non-indigenous people of the country. As Malaysia not only comprised of a multi-ethnic community, including its indigenous people, it is currently difficult to say that these indigenous languages are only spoken by the indigenous groups, respectively, as more and more of the younger Malaysians are also learning to speak languages other than their own, for instance, Malaysian Malays learning Mandarin or Malaysian Chinese learning Malay. In the current context of Malaysia, Malay is not only spoken by the Malays but also other non-Malays, while English, once considered a colonial language, is presently spoken by many Malaysians, including the major dominant ethnic groups, as well as migrants and international students, who are studying in the country. Some non-Chinese Malaysians can also speak a popular Chinese dialect, similar to Cantonese or even Tamil, although they are in the minority. Nonetheless, among the Malaysian ethnic communities, especially among the more conventional and conservative ones, their mother tongue is still preserved, depending on the domain in which it is used. For instance, Malay is still spoken in many Malay households, the various Chinese dialects (Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, Teochew, and Foochow) are still spoken by many Malaysian Chinese, depending on the location of the speakers, while Tamil is also being used widely in various domains (see Saravanan, 1994). Among some Malays, dialects of the Bugis or Javanese, or variations of dialects like Kelantan Malay, Terengganu Malay or Negeri Sembilan Malay are still widely used as well. According to the Ethnologue of the World Report (Lewis, Gary, & Charles, 2016), eleven of the languages mentioned above are considered institutional, possibly used only in institutions for knowledge dissemination, six (Names not mentioned specifically) of these are deemed to be developing and eight are considered as being vigorous. Adding further to this is that 93 of these 137 languages are “in trouble”, suggesting that their use is on the decline or, due to the lack of their use, while 16 of these languages are on the verge of extinction, it is seriously implied that speakers of these languages are becoming smaller in number. Based on these descriptions, it can be assumed that the adjectives, “vigorous”, “in trouble” or “dying”, are pointing out how active these languages are. Assuming that these adjectives refer to the active use of these languages and, in contrast, the less active use of these languages, it would seem that language may be seen as being “alive”, when it is actively used by the people who know how to use these languages. In the context of Malaysia, it is observed that a number of speech communities in Malaysia are also shifting away from the habitual use of their respective heritage languages (David, 1996; Pillai, 2006, Kuang, 2007).

The term “heritage language”, used in the context of this paper, is defined as a language an individual grows up speaking at home but, due to migration to another country, that language is no longer as commonly used as it used to be by these speakers, when in the host country. As a consequence of the host country’s language policy and practice, these individual speakers, hence, revert to using more of the of the host country’s dominant language, and less of their heritage language, the use of which may, then, possibly be confined to the home ground, with family members. As the dominant language of the host country takes over as the main language of communication, the speakers’ competence in this language grows and, so, they become more comfortable with it. This phenomenon, therefore, can render the heritage language less spoken because it is the minority language.

According to Kelleher (2010: 1), “heritage language is used to identify languages other than the dominant language/s in a given social context”. Kelleher (2010) illustrates this by saying that, in the context of America, which has few overt language policies to begin with, any language, other than English, that is used by the speaker, could be seen as a heritage language for speakers of those languages because English is the primary language used in America. This occurs within the domains of government, education, and public communication. In the context of this paper, the term “heritage language” is taken to refer to any particular language or dialect that was once the main language or dialect, spoken by family members prior to their geographical move. As a result of that move and developing competence in the host country’s language, the younger speakers, especially, become less attached to their heritage language.

The claim that heritage languages are at risk, in the Malaysian context, is evidenced by the fact that more and more speakers of minority groups in the country, such as Thais, Arabs, Filipinos and so on, are increasingly using either Malay or English to communicate (for details of these communities in Peninsular Malaya see David, Cavallaro & Coluzzi, 2009). The loss of these minority language speakers could also result in the loss of their culture and ethnic identity (David & Dealwis, 2009). Minority languages may also be affected by the language policy held by a country.

2. LANGUAGE POLICY

A language policy of a country captures specific decisions concerning the use of languages in the polity, and this usually exists in the form of a written document. According to the Canadian Encyclopaedia (Canada, 2006), language policy concerns official efforts to affect the relative status and use of one or more languages. Elaborating on this is

a lengthier explanation, provided by Schiffman (2005), which came to the conclusion that language policy is, primarily, not just the explicit embodiment of rules, but that it is also one that comprises a wider framework, influenced by covert and implicit roots of each linguistic culture. Schiffman (1996) focused on the minority regions of certain countries, as a way of demonstrating how minority groups deal with the issue of official languages. Specifically, Schiffman (1996) mentions that language policy concerns decisions encompassing rules, regulations and guidelines about the status, use, domains and territories of languages and the rights of speakers of the aforementioned languages. Nonetheless, language policies vary, from country to country, depending on the country's political status and the government controlling it.

In the context of this paper, language policy is defined as an official decision made by the government of a country "either through legislations, court decisions, executive actions or other means, to determine how a particular language is used, cultivated, learnt and maintained" (Crawford, 2000, p.1). Shohamy (2006) talked extensively about language policy. She noted that language is an ever-changing, dynamic and open entity, and as such, serves as an individual's personal expression of self. Any control by any authority to delimit or control its use is, therefore, unjustified (Shohamy, 2006). Thus, any language policy, or even the absence of a written language policy, is, in effect, a language policy (Shohamy, 2006). This phenomenon reflects the social, political, and economic context of public education, besides influencing what each generation brings to the task of educating its children (Huebner, 1984). In other words, the constitution of a language policy in any country can have great impact on its population, its youth in particular. The section below illustrates the context of Malaysia.

3. MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY

When Malaya gained its independence in 1957, the official national language chosen was Malay. This language was chosen in the hopes of maintaining unity, and promoting easy and effective communication within that society, which was made up of various ethnic groups, back then. The rationale was that the many immigrants who had chosen to settle down in what was then Malaya, had also brought with them distinct languages, beliefs and value systems (Gill, 2014), and if these settlers were not integrated into the system, there would be a lot of disharmony, due to the lack of common languages in which to communicate. At the point of independence, the leaders had foreseen that the key to create unity among the diverse peoples of Malaya, was through the use of a common language. As such, making Malay the national language would serve that purpose. Acting

as a catalyst, Malay was perceived as the common communicative pathway that would increase interactions between the majority and minority groups, within the country. Upon achieving independence, the name adopted for the country became Malaysia. Being placed geographically and strategically along the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia also served as an important trade route for travellers of commerce, particularly in the early days, thereby contributing to the historical importance of Malay becoming a trade language and the *lingua franca* (Paauw, 2009).

This decision to make Malay the national language of Malaysia, in view of the country's location, was influenced by the use and popularity of the Malay language between Malay traders and their foreign partners, at the time. Nonetheless, at that time, Bazaar Malay (Asmah Haji Omar, 1985; Collins, 1989), a low variety of spoken Malay, was typically used. It is generally believed that as a pidgin, the Bazaar Malay variety was the result of influences of other languages spoken, at that time, by Malay, Indian, Arab, Chinese, Portuguese, and Dutch traders. Today, Malay is spoken by 60.5 million people in 13 different countries (AWL, retrieved on 4 December 2016). In his report, Ghazali, (2010) notes that the government has been successful in ensuring that its entire people are, at least orally, proficient in the national language, in the case of Malaysia and its multi-ethnic communities.

4. MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION USED IN MALAYSIAN NATIONAL SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL VERNACULAR SCHOOLS

Malaysia has a total of 10,154 schools, and an overall total of 5,120,802 children attending them (Ministry of Education, Malaysia 2015). In 2013, the percentage of children in Malaysia, who were documented as attending schools, were noted as 0 to 4 year olds - 25%, 5 to 9 year olds- 29%, 10 to 14 year olds- 29% and 15 to 17 year olds - 18% (Ministry of Education, Malaysia 2015). From these figures, it was further noted that the breakdown of the racial percentage of pupils that attend schools are: Malays – 55.2%, other Bumiputras – 13.9%, Chinese – 18.4%, Indians – 6.2%, others – 0.8% and non-Malaysians – 5.4% (Ministry of Education, Malaysia 2015). This shows that those attending school, regardless of their respective school types, are exposed to the common languages of Malay and English, in addition to a vernacular language. However, this multilingual exposure is confined to the domain of education.

In discussing the schools of Malaysia, it is necessary to mention the education system of the country. Malaysia has an education system that is comprised of two main types of schools: national and national type schools. Children attending national schools

are taught, primarily, in the medium of Malay or Bahasa Malaysia. Others, attending national type schools, which are also known as vernacular schools, are taught in the vernacular languages of either Mandarin or Tamil. This is a phenomenon unique to of the Malaysian education system. In addition to this system, Malaysia also permits the operation of private schools, which tend to cater to those who are either better endowed economically, or families who intend to send their children overseas for higher education. Those attending private international schools are taught in the medium of English, with Malay usually serving as one of the subjects on offer. With such a phenomenal diversity of schooling systems existing in the local context, it could be deduced that, even though Malay may have been designated as an official national language, Malaysia also adopts a liberal language policy which allows for minority or other institutional languages, like English or Mandarin, to be used in its education system (Gill, 2008:4). Presently, Malaysia also permits private independent Chinese schools, private international schools, and local religious schools to operate.

According to the Vernacular Schools Report of 23 April 2012 (ASLI-CPPS REPORT, April 2012) a total of 1,200 Chinese primary schools and about 523 Tamil schools currently exist in Malaysia. Of children who attend school, the report notes that over 650,000 were found to be attending vernacular schools. Of this figure, it was reported that 95% of Chinese children go to Chinese medium schools, and about 55% of Indian children go to Tamil schools. Although schools are literally places where children go to acquire knowledge and skills, the ASLI-CPPS report (ASLI-CPPS REPORT, April 2012) mentioned that these vernacular schools are “not just centres of learning but also community centres that assist in the dissemination of cultures and in the enriching of the national heritage”. Nonetheless, some people view this kind of education system as unhealthy, as it allows the respective ethnic groups to function on their own, without the need to mingle and integrate with the other ethnic groups, viewing it as “a hindrance to national unity and integration” (Jayasooria, April 2012, p.4, ASLI-CPPS REPORT).

Apart from the figures quoted for vernacular schools, it was noted that many Malay children also attend religious Islamic schools, which have grown in number over the years. Arabic features as an important language in these schools. The education situation in Malaysia, thus far, seems to be implementing the notion that, as an official and national language, Malay must be learned by all children attending school. Based on the types of schools currently existing in Malaysia, it can be assumed that the government is attempting to reach out to all young people via the school system. While Malay serves as the medium of instruction in national schools, it must be taught as a subject in national

schools (vernacular schools), including private schools. All foreign students in Malaysian public universities are also required to achieve a passing grade in Malay before they can graduate. The other language of importance, English, although without any official status, has always been considered an important second language in the country. It is the language of business, international trade and diplomacy. Minister after minister has emphasised its importance. English is also taught as a subject, both in national and national vernacular type schools. This peculiar linguistic dichotomy also prevails at institutions of higher learning.

Universities in Malaysia are either public (government owned) or private. While there has been a constant change of language use at a tertiary level over the years, currently, the language policy for universities has become more consistent. Perhaps because of the country's mission and vision to achieve a developed nation status by 2020, English is used to teach scientific subjects in some public universities, although the scenario may differ in newer public universities. Private universities, in contrast, especially those who have two and one (two years in the country and one year abroad) course-programmes, seldom need to grapple with this issue as a number of their undergraduates will need to go abroad and continue their education at a foreign university. In this regard, English is important in private universities.

As English becomes the medium of instruction for students of higher learning, it also creates a chasm between learners from less privileged backgrounds, who may come with a lower level of confidence in English, in comparison to those from urban regions who have a more grounded use of the language.

5. UNITY

Returning to the issue of vernacular schools, it appears that some quarters in the country are of the opinion that vernacular and religious schools do not promote unity among the peoples of Malaysia. Consequently, they recommend the disbanding of vernacular schools. This call for making all schools in Malaysia of one type only caused friction among groups of educators who feel that, without the vernacular schools, the multi-ethnic cultures and traditions of Malaysian society would be lost. Nonetheless, the call for the disbanding of vernacular schools is not possible, as vernacular schools are guaranteed in the Malaysian Constitution.

6. HISTORY OF MALAYSIA'S EDUCATION SYSTEM

In 1951, before Malaysia gained its independence from the British, the education system in Malaya was devised to give British Malaya a structured education system, with the aim that the need for vernacular (Chinese and Tamil) schools would decrease. Vernacular schools, in the earlier days, were started by early immigrants who grouped themselves together and developed an education system for their children so that knowledge, language and culture could be passed on. In fact, early Chinese learning methods and syllabi were adopted from China.

Likewise, Tamil schools developed in the early days because immigrant Tamils were mostly working on plantations owned by the British. The schools were set up to sustain the immigrant workers and their families with syllabi also being borrowed from India.

Over time, national schools would have a bilingual (Malay and English) system, while national vernacular schools would have a trilingual (Chinese or Tamil, Malay and English) system. This enabled national schools to maintain Malay as the official medium of instruction. Meanwhile, national type or vernacular type schools chose their official medium of instruction, based on their students' ethnic backgrounds but, nevertheless, also offered Malay and English subjects, which are taught in schools.

British Malaya, prior to independence, had decided to adopt the Razak Report (see Report of the Education Committee, 1956). This report made it clear that, although the intention of the government was to gradually introduce Malay as the national language, it also intended to maintain other local languages, and certainly, it also aimed to ensure that every child would be able to function in more than one language. Non-Malay children were to be encouraged to acquire Malay, while Malay children were to be encouraged to acquire English, which was to be a compulsory subject in all schools (Gaudart & David, 1993).

However, since the formulation of the national language policy in 1956 (see Report of the Education Committee, 1956), there have been several changes to the education system, in terms of the medium of instruction; there have been constant debates about the use of English when teaching certain subjects such as mathematics and science in English. In 2003, it was decided that mathematics and science would, in fact, be taught in English. However, in 2012, after receiving feedback from parents and schools, that policy was abandoned and the government chose to revert back to Malay as the language medium for all subjects. Naturally, it caused much discontent among parents and confusion among students, as well as teachers. In the recent 2016 Budget Speech by the Ministry of

Finance of Malaysia (2016 Budget, MOF), the Prime Minister announced a dual-language Immersive Programme for 300 pilot schools, which would be given the option to teach science or mathematics in English or Malay, to year one and year four pupils. Some schools welcomed this option because many of their students and teachers were more proficient in English, while other schools preferred using Malay.

7. EFFECTIVENESS OF MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY

When Malay was chosen as the national language, it was seen as a way of uniting the various communities and ethnic groups in Malaysia (see earlier section). It can, indeed, be seen from the above that using Malay as the *lingua franca* helps to facilitate inter-ethnic communication. Many young speakers, like the so-called “Millennials” and “Gen Ys”, are more proficient in the language than the so-called “baby boomers”. However, with the recent changes made in the education system, it seems that there is now a move to develop a socio-economic divide between the schools that students attend and the language of instruction employed.

Those who only have Malay language proficiency will find employment in small, family-owned businesses, or in public/ government services. As they are more proficient in Malay and less proficient in English and other vernacular languages, they would have difficulty in finding employment in the private sector, where knowledge of English and other vernacular languages is required. They would miss out on opportunities provided for studying or working abroad, and getting higher paying jobs and promotions. It has been reported, in local newspapers, that unemployed graduates were mainly those from public universities, where Malay is the medium of instruction. It was also noted that, of these unemployed graduates, many were those from religious academies, where the language of instruction was Malay and Arabic, and where their majors were in Islamic subjects. Many of these graduates were more proficient, not only in Malay but also Arabic, the language of the subject they were majoring in.

8. BILINGUAL SPEAKERS

As stated previously, most Malaysians attend schools where (at least) Malay and English are taught and, in addition, some are taught in their respective mother tongues or vernacular languages. Malaysians are, therefore, generally bilingual or trilingual speakers, who are able to speak the national language (Malay), their mother tongue (Chinese, Tamil or Malay), and/or English. Naturally, these Malaysians tend to have better prospects in finding employment. This is because there are more opportunities for jobs in

the private sector for those who can speak Malay, English, and either Mandarin or Tamil, thus preferably, trilinguals. Some employees may even be paid higher wages because they are able to communicate in two or more of the ethnic languages, as it allows the companies to have 'niche' employees that can target diverse segments of the Malaysian population. The advantage that bilinguals or trilinguals have, in the job market, has created a socio-economic gap between those (monolinguals) proficient only in Malay and those (bilinguals or trilinguals) who know English and other vernacular languages, as well (see Lim, 2008; Lee et al., 2010 and Hanafiah, 2012 for more discussions).

The cause for this is easily explained. As an international language, English is used in commerce, trade and businesses, both in the private sector within the country and also internationally. Therefore, knowing only the national language (Malay), or only other ethnic languages (Mandarin or Tamil), is a disadvantage to many. Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Malay Mail Online, September 18, 2014), the longest serving Prime Minister of Malaysia, said that, "mastering the English language is crucial to progress, especially in the fields of science and mathematics". He argued that, in the current day and age, the English language is a global language, the *lingua franca* between different peoples and nations and that much of the accumulated knowledge of mankind comes to us in the English language. If we only master Malay, we cannot actively move forward in the world, especially in science, technology and international trade and commerce. Dr Mahathir (Ibid.) added that there are new discoveries made every day in science and technology by researchers and, in order to not fall behind, it is necessary to have a good command of the English language. The national language has its place and importance. "... but it is a fact that in order to master the fields of science and mathematics we must master the English language" (Silva, 2015, p. 12).

The fact is that many Malaysians, especially those in the middle class, know that while it is important to know the national language, it is also important to become fluent in English (Malaysia Today, 24 September 2016). Those who are proficient in English are more eligible to be hired by companies conducting both domestic and international trade and, thus, earn more than those who only have the national language. This, in turn, allows those who are proficient in English to enter into Malaysia's higher income society, widening the socio-economic gap that already exists among Malaysians (Malaysia Today, September 24, 2016).

So, whilst having Malay as the national language may satisfy nationalistic aspirations and also facilitate inter-ethnic communication, a lack of proficiency in the English language is an obstacle to learning and employment and access to business opportunities both

at home and abroad. Having a knowledge of languages, other than Malay and English, will also be advantageous from an employment and business perspective. The fact that English-educated or English-proficient Malaysians enjoy better paying jobs in the private sector (Hanapiah, 2012), also creates social tension. Nevertheless, there are other factors that also contribute to disunity or ethnic and religious tension, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them here.

9. THE EXTENT OF THE GAP BEING CLOSED

While the national language policy was implemented with the aim of uniting the multi-ethnic people of Malaysia, the ability to communicate, in itself, does not necessarily promote unity. People choose the language they converse in based on the group they are communicating with. The middle class are generally, more proficient in the English language, and they tend to communicate in English, regardless of their ethnicity. Nonetheless, the other socio-economic groups' levels of English proficiency are more divergent in language choice. In other words, some are communicatively proficient, while others are less communicatively proficient, albeit the use of colloquial words and expressions to convey meanings.

Malaysians (the Malays, Chinese and Indians – for details of the Indian response, see Mukherjee & David, 2011) will generally use English or their ethnic language, or a mixed code (see Pillai, 2006; David, 2009; Zaid & Mac, 2009), when speaking to members of their own ethnic community. The explanation for this is a simple one and does not imply disunity or a lack of unity. In the Malaysian context, English is the language of higher learning and of the private sector. There is a substantial number of Malaysians, of all ethnicities, who are fluent in English. Among this group, English serves as their *lingua franca* because they are more comfortable with the language (Lee, Lee, Yaacob & Wong, 2010). However, when the same group of speakers need to interact with other groups, they could switch to Mandarin, Tamil or other ethnic dialects (Lim, 2008), if these languages are common in their linguistic repertoire. If not, they are more likely to fall back on their limited Malay, even if the other speaker is a non-Malay (e.g. Indian). It has been noted at bus-stops, where the average Malaysian waits for his/her transportation, Malay tends to be used as a *lingua franca* between an Indian and a Chinese speaker (Asmah Haji Omar, 1982). Likewise, a Malay speaker would also be heard using Malay to converse with a Chinese or an Indian speaker (see Burhanudeen, 2006).

The education system in Malaysia has contributed, to some extent, to the socio-economic gap. The idea for national schools was to firstly provide students with a standard form

of education by using the national language, and also to enable the various ethnicities to interact with one another. Creating unity through national schools, to some extent, has been effective. However, many believe that the acceptance of government, vernacular, religious and international schools has also divided the society and created a larger socio-economic gap. This is because the gap widens between those who are only fluent in the national language, and those who are bilingual or trilingual with English as a strong second language.

Therefore, it is evident that Malaysia's objective to implement its national language policy has not entirely achieved the objectives that it aimed for. This is not because of the choice of Malay as the national language, but more because of the failure to recognise the economic value and importance of English and other languages.

Malaysian ministers have emphasised the importance of maintaining Malaysia's national language while incorporating measures to advance English fluency within the school system. Many Malaysians do feel a sense of pride in their national language and understand the importance of knowing their national language. However, they also recognise the importance and economic value of knowing English and other vernacular languages. In fact, in November 2015, Sarawak's (a state in East Malaysia) Chief Minister announced English as an official language alongside the Malay language policy (Malay Mail Online, November 18, 2015)

Undeniably, Malaysia has diverse peoples, each with its own unique language and culture. It would be tragic if these languages and their linguistic cultures were lost because no effort was made to support and sustain such diversity. To some extent, the government has had the dominant languages (Iban and Kadazandusun) in East Malaysia taught. But many minority languages, like Mahmeri and Kanaqand, incidentally some of the languages of the first peoples of the country, are diminishing. Identity is partly built on language and (possibly ethnic) culture, and there is much that is wise and beautiful which is embedded in each language. This underlines the need to preserve diversity. It is also possible for children to be bilingual and trilingual without much effort. Given the diversity of its people, given the importance of vernacular languages, and given the value of both the national and international language, as well as the necessity of preserving the Malayan heritage of diversity in languages, stronger efforts pertaining to multilingualism should be encouraged in the schooling system.

10. ACTUAL LANGUAGE USE ACROSS ETHNIC GROUPS IN A NUMBER OF DOMAINS

In looking at the domain of education, David and Lim (2012) discussed the ramifications of the use of a mixed code for social interactions between young people of different ethnicities in Malaysia. One of the original aspects of the study was the extension of the notion of code-switching to include alternating between different varieties of English: Standard English for classroom interaction, where the teacher is a participant, and Malaysian English, which tends to be more code-mixed, for peer-to-peer informal interaction.

David and Lim (2012) also reaffirmed that code-switching and the use of Malaysian English, as a variety, is a widespread practice by Malaysians, whether at home, with friends, at school or in the workplace. This is despite the fact that all have gone through a process of being taught the standard variety in classrooms. Malaysian youths, being multilingual, have a wide range of languages in their verbal repertoire. Based on this, there is a tendency, for youths of Malay origin, to use Malay among themselves, and for youths of Chinese descent (and brought up to use their home language or dialect) to use Cantonese (or any other dialects) with their Chinese friends outside the classroom. However, there are instances, too, where Malaysian youths, regardless of ethnicity and linguistic ability, use a mixture of languages as a *lingua franca* among themselves, but this is often confined to less formal settings, like outside the classroom. Code-switching between English and Malay, or vice versa, and mixing conversations with Chinese or Tamil words, seems to prevail in their interactions (see Lim, 2008)

Studies (Jayum, 2006; Yee and David, 2010) of classroom interactions have shown those youths of Malay, Chinese and Indian origin, who come from vernacular schools or from the outskirts of towns, tend to avoid socialisation with youths from another ethnic groups. Perhaps out of insecurity, they often slip into choosing a friendship group, based on their own ethnicity. Consequently, they use their preferred language to signal their membership within that group. However, if they were placed in a group made up of other ethnic groups, it was observed that the Indian youths might choose a language which they think others in the group can follow. Sometimes it could be in their limited English and sometimes in their well-versed Malay. In other observations, it was also noted that the Malays preferred using Malay in both inter- and intra-group interactions (as had been the case in the bus stop setting), whilst the Chinese and Indian youths might use English, albeit a non-standard variety, characterised by code-switching, especially in intra-group interactions.

Code-switching, therefore, is a phenomenon which is highly salient in on-going debates about medium of instruction issues in Malaysia. In this regard, we conclude by stating that Malaysian classroom discourse practices should reflect more closely the multilingual realities outside the classroom, in which teachers and students live their daily lives. Code-switching is not only found in the school context, but also wherever people congregate. Inevitably, as Malaysian youths advance into tertiary education, they take with them the use of the mixed code to the new environment.

Focussing on Tamil undergraduates, Muthusamy and Rajantheran (2011), identified the various communicative functions of code-switching. They observed that code-switching occurred both in formal (classroom teaching) and informal (classroom discussion) contexts. Tamil undergraduates frequently use Tamil as the matrix language in formal discussions, while English, also still functioning as the embedded language, becomes more prominent in informal discussions. Kow (2003) had also made a case for code-switching as a pedagogical strategy in teaching English in Malaysia when she discussed a number of related studies, which have shown the pedagogical utility of such a mixed discourse in the language classroom.

In the social domain, it appears that the Indian community in Malaysia is gradually accepting the fact that their ethnic language is not necessary in order for them to maintain their cultural identities. The fact that one can still preserve one's identity is made clear through other cultural markers of identity. Although the younger generation of Tamils have not abandoned their ethnic language, the use of the language has declined with age (David & Dealwis, 2009). For instance, the language of communication among Tamils belonging to the 18-29 year age group is no longer standalone Tamil, but a mixture of Tamil and other linguistic codes that are in their verbal repertoire. As with the Malayalees (Nambiar, 2007) and Punjabi (David, Naji, & Kaur, 2004) communities in Malaysia, there are signs that English will, eventually, be more dominant than Tamil, among the younger generation, who are better educated and have better socio-economic status in comparison to the older generation. In fact, the use of English in the home domain is increasingly dominant among urban Indians, as they have realised the economic value of the language, and encouraged their children to master it.

According to Sankar (2011), Tamil is a language of a minority group in Malaysia. As such, it is not the language of economic and social mobility. This is echoed by Pillai (2006), who said that the Portuguese Eurasians in Malaysia used English as a first language, and only the older generation of Portuguese Eurasians still speak Kristang. This finding supports the view that English has become a dominant language among the Portuguese

Eurasians in Malaysia. They have established English as their first language; in other words, it was mentioned as their first choice of language as a code of communication.

As for the family domain, in all the studies conducted on Indian communities in Malaysia, it is noted that all the younger urban respondents, who were educated in the Malay medium of instruction, spoke English in the private domain, such as with family, relatives and friends. However, it is noted that it is often not the standard variety of English.

Code-switching is a common phenomenon in urban Malaysian homes, even among urban Malay civil servants, whose children attend Malay-medium schools. Burhanudeen (2006), in discussing the language choice of urban bilingual Malays in Kuala Lumpur, states that the use of the ethnic language is most dominant with grandparents, whilst English, by itself or mixed with Malay, is preferred for interaction with siblings.

The family domain is an important domain in which to determine the importance of the national language in unofficial domains. Families need to make decisions: should one use Malay, the national language, or English, an international language, or one's ethnic language, or a mixed discourse consisting of more than one language (David, 2009). More educated Malaysians are using English, not only at home, but also in social domains for various reasons. For instance, English is preferred because it is a language of prestige. Other reasons are, as noted by Pillai (2006) who said that, if Malaysia needs to adopt the technological advancement introduced by the West, and if Malaysians want to be included in the global community, then English should be accepted in order to achieve these goals.

In Chinese families, one would also expect that the Chinese dialects would be used with parents and siblings, as well as with the extended families of grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, since the family domain is usually considered the last bastion of ethnic language use. However, Ting and Hung (2008) found that, even in the Foochow-dominant town of Sibul, located in Sarawak, there is a shift towards speaking Mandarin with children in Foochow families, where both parents were Foochow and used Foochow for social and work connections. In addition, results of personal communication with a Mandarin educationist, Wong, T.S (June, 2016), at a Malaysian public university, also revealed that the Malaysian Chinese speakers have, generally, shifted from their dialects to Mandarin as their preferred home language. For economic reasons, the Chinese have realised the importance of Mandarin as a language of utility, with which to do business with China and Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Chinese in Malaysia also see the importance of mastering English, as it provides them with an advantage to pursue tertiary education

and jobs abroad. Their preferred choice of English is also driven by the fact that they could foresee it as an important language in their future studies and careers. However, this younger generation of Chinese does not see the importance of learning Malay, apart from getting the compulsory pass in their major school examinations such as the *Sijil Peperiksaan Malaysia* or SPM (a major secondary final year examination that is equivalent to O-level). This is because most Chinese end up in Government secondary schools, where Malay is used as the language of instruction. These students acquire proficiency in Malay and many can use Malay at a high level of fluency. To them, the national language, Malay, is relevant after school when communicating with non-English speaking Malaysians.

In the religious and cultural domains, the heritage languages of the various ethnic groups are maintained as an indicator of ethnic identity. For example, among the Indians, the Tamil Iyers (a minority ethnic group in Malaysia – see Lokasundari, 2004) were able to retain their identity through their dress, food, rites and rituals, and through their customary practices (Sankar, 2011). As for the Malays who are also Muslims, the dominant language used in the religious domain is Malay, supported by Arabic.

The Chinese, who are mostly Buddhists and Taoist, would use Mandarin or their dialects during worship. English has always been used among Christians in Malaysia in their places of worship. In many churches, masses are also available in Bahasa Malaysia, Mandarin, Tamil and indigenous languages. Although, the Bahasa Malaysia version of their Holy Bible and the use of the Arabic word “Allah” (Arabic reference to God) is banned in Peninsular Malaysia, it is agreed to in the Malaysia Agreement of 1963 (see the 18 point Agreement) that Sabah and Sarawak (the two states in East Malaysia) are allowed religious freedom.

11. CONCLUSION

The Malaysian government had aimed for Malay as the national language of a diverse multilingual, multi-ethnic and multicultural country, to foster national unity and rally a diverse population around a single language. However, that has not proven to be altogether true. The desire to maintain ethnic languages and cultural identity is strong, and has resulted in the emergence of vernacular schools. Additionally, the value and importance of the English language has caused many parents to emphasise the learning and use of the English language. History also shows that national integrity, and the aspiration of successful nationhood and nationality cannot, necessarily, be established through authoritative, assimilationist, top-down policies which come in the form of a

monolingual ideology or cultural hegemony. Rather, equitable distribution of resources in a uniform, classless education system, and a genuine democratic and egalitarian form of political system is the only real way to bring about solid and sustainable nationhood. Most importantly, if the state acknowledges, accepts, and celebrates the languages of its people, and views linguistic-cultural diversity as a resource rather than as a problem, citizens of all ethnicities and cultures will, naturally, be inclined towards patriotism and nationhood.

Education can play only a subsidiary or supporting role to promote unity. Each component of a plural society can achieve equal levels of proficiency in a common language and yet still remain divided. A well-known academic, Kumaran Menon (personal communication, October 30, 2015) is of the opinion that a common language can only foster or support unity among the different components if other elements of society do not work to keep them apart, wittingly or unwittingly. In fact, language, even a common language, becomes the supreme dividing force when intrinsic divisions are artfully maintained for political ends or otherwise. For instance, if language, in education, is used to put down minority races, or to present a skewed view of history to achieve political or religious objectives, the result could be resistance. It is clear, therefore, given the sociological and political background of a diverse society, that a common language by itself, cannot work the miracle of unity. In fact, language in these circumstances becomes a divisive instrument because, for instance, it brings these other inequalities into sharper relief. It is no surprise that, after almost 50 years of a national language policy, the Malayan government still discusses ways of creating unity.

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PART TWO
Post-Soviet and
Post-Communist studies

LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE IN AZERBAIJAN: POLICY, ATTITUDES AND CHOICES

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Abstract

This paper discusses language options available to citizens of Azerbaijan, another post-Soviet country. Over 92 per cent of the population speaks Azerbaijani and, hence, Russian has not been considered as a threat to the language of the titular nation. Russian and English play significant roles in the public domains of education and intercultural communication. However, attitudes toward languages and the state policy differ.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses language policy development and the resulting language attitude and choices in Azerbaijan, after the country gained independence in 1991. Azerbaijan is one of the most linguistically diverse post-Soviet countries and, therefore, has always been at the center of the discourse about language vitality and linguistic rights. As will be discussed in this paper, language policy in independent Azerbaijan has been shaped, first of all, by the political, economic and socio-cultural priorities of the State. These priorities also became strong factors in forming language attitudes and behaviour patterns, within both the titular and the minority populations. However, language practices were not only affected by political or socio-economic conditions. There have been other factors, such as the role a language can play in identity construction, and in the cultural or religious self-expression, availability of languages in the education system, migrations, and the rate of integration of remote communities in the mainstream society. All these priorities, conditions and factors were also important for the maintenance and functioning of languages as well as their intergenerational transmission. Through the analysis of the legislative framework, education policy and available socio-cultural domains for the functioning of languages, this paper attempts to shed light on the overall language

ecology in the post-Soviet Azerbaijan, with specific focus on good practice, challenges and potential for better policies in certain areas.

The evidence included in this paper is drawn from official sources, as well as from the responses of informants during interviews and surveys. Some of the conclusions are based on empirical data, collected from observations and direct experiences.

2. LANGUAGES AND LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES: GENERAL INFORMATION

The Azerbaijani language, which is the language of the titular nation, belongs to the Oghuz group of the Turkic language family, and there is a high degree of intelligibility between Azerbaijani and Turkish. In fact, before the 1937 Constitution was adopted in Soviet Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani language was known as *Türk dili* – “Turkish/Turkic language”(the word *Türk* is translated into English as both “Turkish” and “Turkic”). The term *Azərbaycan dili* “Azerbaijani language/Azerbaijani”, formally introduced only with the adoption of the above-mentioned Constitution and some follow-up official documents, was an artificially created term which combined the geographical and ethnic concepts. It is common belief that the change of the name was politically motivated, with an underlying purpose of creating an ideological gap between Azerbaijan and Turkey. This is the reason for some Azerbaijanis still disagreeing with, and expressing disappointment about, the term *Azərbaycan dili*, basing their argument on the fact that the name literally means “the language of Azerbaijan” (Zamanzade, 1999:21).

Besides the largest Turkic-speaking titular population, Azerbaijan is a home to numerous other indigenous ethnicities, speaking North-Caucasian, Kartvelian, and Indo-European languages. The majority of the North-Caucasian and Kartvelian speaking communities live on the border with Russia and Georgia. Some Indo-European (in particular, Iranian) speaking communities inhabit the coastal areas of the Caspian Sea. But the majority of the population speaking an Iranian-group language, the Talysh, live on the borderline with Iran. Another Iranian-group language speaking community, Kurds, had to abandon Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions following the occupation of these regions by Armenia, and are now dispersed throughout Azerbaijan. In general, in different sources, the number of ethnic or national minorities is reported to be between 60 and 80 (Azerbaijan: Ethnic Diversity, Peaceful Co-existence and State Management. 2014).

It should be noted that the term Azerbaijani, as an ethnic term, is used to refer to the titular, Turkic-speaking population of Azerbaijan. As stated by some researchers, “in

Azerbaijan, it is only the Azerbaijanis who make claim to the label ‘Azerbaijani’” (Isaxanlı H, Rust VD, Vahdati Y, Abdullayev A, Madatova M & Grudskaya I. 2002:106). Minorities, whether indigenous communities or migrants, do not usually refer to themselves as Azerbaijanis except for the cases when they imply their citizenship or societal membership. There is, however, a different opinion on this: some experts think that the primary self-identification for minorities is connected with Azerbaijaniness, and that ethnic-based self-identification is secondary for them. This opinion mostly stems from the responses of some minority members who identify themselves first as Azerbaijani during surveys, interviews, or census-taking. We do not know, however, whether or not answers provided by people of minority grouping, during formal questioning, would be motivated by their willingness to emphasise their affiliation with Azerbaijan as their native land. On the other hand, as Isaacs R & Polese R state, “individual construction, as all social phenomena, depends on context ...” (Isaacs & Polese 2016:1), and we do not know how these people prioritise their multiple identities in different contexts.

During an oral interview with the Khinalug community representatives, we witnessed that some respondents identified themselves, first, as Azerbaijani and then as Khinalug (or Ketch as they call themselves), while for others, their Khinalug identity was prior to that of Azerbaijani. As the former groups consisted mainly of younger people (up to 40), one might relate their answers to the newer trend among younger generations of Khinalug, who were born or went to school after Azerbaijan’s independence and whose self-identification was influenced by the statehood ideas, as well as the spread of Azerbaijani as the official language. While this may be true, we also revealed that the respondents’ self-identification with Khinalug, and their self-identification with Azerbaijan, is not the same thing for them. When the respondents were further asked to explain the difference between the two identities, the answers were generally as follows: “We say we belong to Khinalug because this is what our ethnic roots are. But first of all, we belong to Azerbaijan because we are citizens of this state, and this is our motherland.” In any case, minorities’ self-identification with Azerbaijaniness, as a shared identity, is strong, sufficiently conscious and positively perceived within their communities. From this point of view, the case of Azerbaijan, where the affiliation with citizenship and the shared motherland does not suppress ethnic affiliation, and where minorities can openly express their ethnic or national belonging, can serve as a good example of diversity management and preservation. As Fautre indicates, “Azerbaijan has not only considerable strategic importance, it also has symbolic value as an example of openness and exchange.” (Fautre 213:1-2)

The statistics of the Soviet period reveals a stable increase of Azerbaijanis between 1926 and 1989 (62,1% in 1926, 58,4% in 1939, 67,5% in 1959, 73,8% in 1970, 78,1% in 1979, 82,7% in 1989) (Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2016: table 1.11, p. 54). This dynamic is an outcome of several migrations and deportations to and from Azerbaijan during the Soviet times, and a possible understating of the number of minorities in the Soviet times census.

According to the 2009 census, which is the most recent one, Azerbaijanis and minorities comprise 90,6% and 9,4% of Azerbaijan's population respectively (Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2016: table 1.11, p. 54). The above-mentioned factors related to the Soviet times have naturally also affected the post-Soviet dynamics of demographic changes. However, the growth of the titular nation in the post-Soviet times is also affected by additional factors, such as the influx of refugees from the Azerbaijani-populated regions of Armenia in the late 1980's and early 1990's, departure of a considerable size of Russians and other Russian-speaking urban minorities, following the break-out of the Soviet Union and the demotion of the status of Russian, as well as out-migration of Armenians from Baku, following the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

A certain degree of confusion exists in the representation of census results, in particular, in terms of consistency between different sources. The data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official site appears to be incomprehensive, as it does not include some minorities cited in other sources (Ethnic Minorities. Cultural Diversity in the Republic of Azerbaijan. <http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/content/114>). The official data from the State Statistics Committee cite more numerous minorities, while including some smaller ones (for example, Budukh and Rutul) in the category of "Other Nationalities" (Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan, 2016: table 1.11, p.54). The Rutul language is also missing from the official site of the Multiculturalism Committee of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a3.html). In addition, none of these local sources specifically disintegrates indigenous and non-indigenous (immigrant etc.) groups. There are various other local sources which indicate some other ethnic groups (i.e., Assyrians, Romani and Molocans) not appearing in the official data (Ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan <http://archive.is/co0aW>).

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned contradictions, regarding the representation of census results, the official 2009 census, which has been produced by the Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, has allowed for a possibility to indicate smaller and less popular groups. As is stated in the Third Opinion of the Committee on Azerbaijan, adopted on 10 October 2012, "Minority representatives confirmed during their visit that they had

been encouraged during the 2009 census to freely indicate their ethnic background and numerically smaller minorities such as Quiz, Khanbalik and Budge, indeed registered for the first time as a separate group.” (Third Report on Azerbaijan, 2013:10).

There also exist discrepancies with and among international sources. Some languages, cited as indigenous languages in one source, are indicated as migrant languages in another. For example, Clifton reports, besides Azerbaijani, 15 indigenous languages, including six Indo-European languages (Armenian, Khalaj, Kurdish, Mountain Jewish/Judeo-Tat, Talysh, Tat/Muslim Tat), eight North Caucasian languages (Avar, Budukh, Khinalug, Kryts, Lezgi, Rutul, Tsakhur, Udi), and one Kartvelian language (Inghiloi/Georgian) (Clifton 2013:198-199). The web edition of *Ethnologue*, on the other hand, classifies Georgian (or Inghiloi) as one of the 17 migrant languages in Azerbaijan (the others being Assyrian Neo-Aramic, Belarusian, Dargwa, Erzya, Iranian-Persian, Karachay-Balkar, Korean, Lak, LishanDidan, Ossetic, Polish, Pontic, Romanian, Tabasaran, Tatar, Turkish, Ukrainian), and additionally cites the Akhvakh language – a dormant language in the North of Azerbaijan, which is not found in many other sources of information (<https://www.ethnologue.com/country/AZ>). Another issue is whether the Judo-Tat (or Juhuri) and Muslim Tat should be treated as separate languages, or simply as dialects. There is a degree of unintelligibility between Muslim Tats and Judo-Tats, which, according to Huseynova, Gryunberg, Grimes and Davidova, may be caused by religious differences (see: Clifton, Deckinga, Lucht & Tiessen 2003: 93-94), and according to Miller, by geographical distance (see: Clifton *et al* 2003: 94), however, difficulty in mutual understanding also exists among the Northern, Central and Southern varieties of the Muslim Tat, which, nevertheless, are not treated as separate languages.

A list of 18 regional and minority languages is offered in a publication by the European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI), in accordance with the ECRML principles of recognising regional and minority languages. As stated in the publication, “According to the definition in Article 1.a of the ECRML, the concept ‘regional or minority languages’ means languages that are (i) traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and (ii) different from the official language(s) of that State. It does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants.” (Chylinski & Hofmannova, 2011:23-24). In accordance with this definition, ECMI identifies the following regional and minority languages in Azerbaijan: Armenian, Avar, Budukh, Georgian, German, Juhuri, Khinalug, Kryz, Kurdish, Lezgian, Russian, Rutul, Talysh, Tat, Tatar, Tsakhur, Udi, and Ukrainian. Besides this, ECMI cites the Yiddish

language spoken in Azerbaijan, but defines it as a non-territorial language, probably due to relatively recent (late 19th c.) migration of Ashkenazi Jews to Azerbaijan, and to the fact that the Yiddish speakers are dispersed throughout the country, with the majority inhabiting in big cities. The German language, however, is cited as a territorial language, although the temporal distance between the German migration (early 19th c.) and that of the Ashkenazi Jews, is not so great. In general, the existence of diverse classifications could be contributing to the fluidity of the distinction between territorial and non-territorial (and, accordingly, between indigenous and non-indigenous) languages on the one hand, and between migrant and non-migrant ones on the other.

We should, nevertheless, note that, in parts, the Soviet times census data are also confusing and incompatible. For example, the statistics for the Talysh population – another important indigenous group after the Lezgi – draws attention, in that that the numbers reveal inconsistency and logical gaps. As it stands, the 1926 and 1939 census data provide the numbers 77,323 and 87,519, respectively, which drops incomprehensibly to 85 in 1959, and slides down to 0 in 1970 and 1979. In 1989, in only ten years, the number of the Talysh people rises to 21,169 (and subsequently reaches 76,841 in 1999 and 112,000 in 2009). This can be explained by the fact that, during the above-mentioned years, many Talysh representatives declared themselves as Azerbaijanis, either voluntarily or under certain political conditions. On the other hand, some minorities were not specified and were included in the category of “Other nationalities”, which makes it difficult to follow the growth dynamics of some groups that have eventually made their way to the post-Soviet census in Azerbaijan (for example, Kryzs, Khinalugs), or to international scholarly or official sources (such as Budukh). We should note that this fact may have created further confusion in regard to the post-Soviet census as the denial of ethnic background may be a continuing and intergenerationally transmitted tradition for some families. If this is so, then this has certainly affected the reliability of the declared number of ethnic minorities in the post-Soviet census.

3. DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR: CHANGES IN MONOLINGUALISM, BILINGUALISM AND PLURILINGUALISM PATTERNS

The post-independence changes in patterns of monolingualism, bilingualism and plurilingualism emerged as a response to nationalisation tendencies, promoted by the government's language policy, as well as to the incentives of global integration and market economy (Mammadov 2009:68-69). For example, Russian monolingualism was

quite a widespread phenomenon during the Soviet times, both among Russians and Russian-speaking urban minorities (immigrants), and urban Azerbaijanis. At this time, Russian monolingualism is extremely rare, if not non-existent, even among Russians in Azerbaijan. It is being replaced by Azerbaijani monolingualism.

The gradual disappearance of Russian from language repertoires of even Baku families is linked, in the first place, to post-independence education policy in Azerbaijan. As Russian was no longer taught as a required subject and was offered only as a foreign language of choice, fewer and fewer children were electing it at schools and Universities: preference was given to the English language. Moreover, schools and Universities were initiating study programs in English to attract more local and international students, and to increase their international profile and marketability.

Bilingualism, with its various patterns, has always been typical of Azerbaijan. The widest-spread forms of it during the Soviet times were Azerbaijani-Russian and Russian-Azerbaijani bilingualism. For the capital city of Baku the Russian-Azerbaijani bilingualism with Russian as L1 was more typical. However, in comparison with the Central Asian countries, the Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism with the Azerbaijani language as L1 was not rare, as well. The reason for a considerable amount of bilingual people with Azerbaijani as L1 was due to the availability of higher education in the Azerbaijani language, during the Soviet times. In Central Asia, by comparison, higher education was almost exclusively in the Russian language (Schulter 2003:20-21; Fierman 2009:87-91). Thus, in big cities, and in particular, in Baku, Azerbaijani was used as L1, mostly among those bilingual people whose language of education at secondary school and university, was Azerbaijani.

Today, Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism is slowly changing to the Azerbaijani-English model, particularly among younger individuals. We should, however, note that the Azerbaijani-English bilingualism is not as widespread, even in Baku, as was Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism during the Soviet times. Azerbaijani-English bilingualism is still restricted to a narrow group. The difference is that Azerbaijani-Russian bilinguals, during the Soviet times, lived mainly in big cities, particularly in Baku, while Azerbaijani-English bilingualism, today, may also be encountered outside of urban places.

The other form of bilingualism in the Soviet times was indigenous language-Azerbaijani/Russian bilingualism, which was mostly spread in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. The choice of Azerbaijani or Russian as L2, in these bilingual repertoires, depended on the geographical location inhabited by ethnic groups. In the areas bordering Iran, the

second language of choice was Azerbaijani, as the language of instruction in these lands was Azerbaijani. In the Northern part of the country bordering Russia, Russian, as the second language and the language of instruction, was spread only in some of the regions, while, for the majority of the indigenous communities in those regions, Azerbaijani, not Russian, was the language of instruction and, hence, the second language.

Bilingualism did not exclude plurilingualism. In remote areas, plurilingual people were represented more by males than by females. This was linked to the fact that males, as breadwinners, were involved in outside family activities, more than females. In the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, where Russian was used as the second language, males were also fluent in Azerbaijani, while there were not many plurilinguals among females or children.

Learning more foreign languages and not to restricting foreign language repertoires only to English has also become quite a noticeable tendency today. Therefore, peculiar models of plurilingualism, such as Azerbaijani-English-foreign language 2, have been emerging as part of the post-Soviet language behavior patterns. Depending on the family background, the plurilingual youth either include Russian in their language repertoire, or totally ignore it. People coming from peripheral families, where Russian did not make its way to language repertoires and, thus, did not become part of identity, consider English and/or other foreign languages sufficient for education, professional development and global integration. These Azerbaijani-speaking children often resort to Turkish instead, especially in the face of lacking resources in English, or if they wish to have access to resources which they can acquire more easily (due to high proximity between Azerbaijani and Turkish).

However, it is also observable that, even though many Azerbaijani-speaking students avoid learning Russian before the end of their undergraduate studies (the observation of University groups, where the language of instruction is Azerbaijani, shows that the number of students who understand and/or speak Russian will hardly exceed 10% of the entire class), they start taking it more seriously when they take the next step in their education or career progress. For example, many students think about learning Russian after they start graduate studies or begin to work. The major factor encouraging students to start learning Russian is related to the continuing social prestige of the Russian language. There is still a considerable number of people, in particular among elite groups in Baku, who speak Russian and strongly identify with the Russian culture. Moreover, many of these groups are still politically and economically powerful, prestigious, and consider themselves (and are perceived as) culturally dominant. Therefore, although the

government offices basically do not require Russian for recruiting, and although the level of the competence in Russian has been drastically decreasing with each year, even in Baku, due to the reduced school hours and lack of language environment, many private companies, especially well-paying financial and service institutions, whose clients are mostly Russian-speaking elites recruit people with the Russian language. This is a strong stimulus for many young people, in particular those who pursue their career in the private sector, to include Russian in their language repertoire. A survey held among 120 graduate students, at a University in Azerbaijan in 2013, has revealed the following results: six students indicated that Russian held no importance their lives. Four students mentioned that Russian was helpful for their university studies. Thirty-eight students indicated the importance of Russian for future employment, and forty-three noted its social and cultural prestige. Five students indicated that Russian was useful in the face of insufficient literature in Azerbaijani. Sixteen students provided several arguments (employment, study, and social prestige) in favor of Russian. Twelve students indicated various other reasons (such as historic bonds of Azerbaijan with Russia, usefulness of knowing as many languages as possible, etc.) in support of Russian. On the other hand, this puts a considerable number of young people into a disadvantaged position and naturally shapes certain disagreement with the policy of these structures. Refusal to speak Russian, and refusal to accommodate Russian speakers, is also observable within the young generation who treat Russian – in this case – a language of the pre-existing Empire.

As far as regional minority languages are concerned, the majority of the indigenous communities have strong feelings towards their native languages and consider speaking in the mother tongue as an expression of ethnic identity. These languages are well preserved within homes and the transmission to younger generations is stable in the family environment and compact neighborhoods within relevant regions. Such intergenerational transmission is difficult outside but not within the regions. The reason is that the attitude is somewhat different among minority members who leave their communities and move to bigger towns: they consider that their children should learn Azerbaijani rather than the native language. These parents avoid speaking the native language at home especially in the presence of their children so that the children pick up Azerbaijani as early as possible. Interestingly, when asked which language was more important for the future of their children, a considerable size of parents said it was English adding that the children would learn their native language, as well as Azerbaijani, anyway.

The use of indigenous languages as a means of communication, outside of families, is also stable. These languages are broadly used for communication within indigenous groups who have established small or medium businesses outside of their regions. The Talysh language, for example, is actively used for communication among fruit and vegetable vendors in Baku markets, as well as in grocery stores, which have opened in big cities by farmers from the subtropical South, which is famous for its resource-rich land.

However, a lack of motivation to learn the native language is observed among the younger generations of indigenous groups: they often complain about the school curricula and wish that they could take more Azerbaijani or English classes, instead of minority language classes. One of the interviewees, from the Talysh community, noted that the children do not want to learn the Talysh language at school, although the language is part of the curriculum. A few University students, native speakers of Northern minority languages, noted, during a survey, that they would refrain from speaking their native language in front of their Azerbaijani peers, as it might be considered disrespectful speaking a language which is not understood by other people present during a conversation. A degree of caution against minority languages is observable among a very restricted number of Azerbaijani students, which seems to be part of their general caution against any language that can, according to their perception, pose a threat to Azerbaijani. In particular, the survey revealed that this kind of attitude existed among students from Azerbaijani-speaking families, who manifested less tolerance to both minority languages and international ones, including Turkish and Russian. Their argument was based on the fact that there was colonial domination by Russian over Azerbaijani, during the past two centuries, whose continuing social prestige, according to their opinion, should still be considered a threat to the development of Azerbaijani. On the other hand, these students considered Turkish as a potential threat to the independent development of Azerbaijani, referring to a frequent shift among Azerbaijanis to Turkish, in casual communication.

Nevertheless, in general and in public opinion, the view of multilingualism as an asset has been growing in comparison with earlier years. As mentioned earlier, the conflict around the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where ethnic Armenians lived, cost Azerbaijan 20% of its territory very soon after the country's independence. Some separatist tendencies, among certain political groups from within borderline indigenous communities in the South, followed in the mid-1990's. These factors had contributed to some caution against allowing much space to minority languages, as they were seen as a possible beginning of separatist tendencies. This kind of approach was based on the perception that "... an ethnic model of nation-building ... is ... normally not the best one in order to survive and

flourish as a nation.” (Kolsto 2014:11). In particular, languages existing on Azerbaijan’s border with Russia and Iran were collectively seen as a possible threat to the integrity of the country.

With time passing, it is possible to see people avoiding generalisations in political issues, and treating territorial traumas as being separate from languages and cultures. This has increased, particularly recently after the establishment of the Center for Multiculturalism in Azerbaijan in 2014, and enhanced discourse about multiculturalism as a value. The perception of Azerbaijan as one of the most tolerant countries has had a positive impact on the public opinion: multilingualism is becoming a socio-cultural heritage that Azerbaijanis take pride in. The survey conducted among 50 University students revealed that the majority of respondents (92%) saw the co-existence of many languages, cultures and religions as a positive sign. Almost all of the respondents noted that they were proud of Azerbaijan’s tolerance towards various religions and ethnicities. About forty students stated that they considered multiculturalism as a great stimulus for the peace and harmony in the country. Six students, however, associated multilingualism with European languages, rather than with those inside the country.

4. LANGUAGE POLICY AND LEGISLATION

Azerbaijani is the sole official and state language of Azerbaijan. The country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Before the establishment of Soviet power in 1920, Azerbaijan had enjoyed a brief independence period, when it existed as the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) from 28 May 1918 to 28 April 1920 (Garibova and Asgarova 2009: 192). During the Soviet period, in spite of the fact that Russian was thriving and dominating in new spheres in social and political life, as well as entering the niches (official correspondence, education etc.), filled solely by the Azerbaijani language during the ADR period, there were still many domains where Azerbaijani was in formal use, alongside Russian. Russification did come to Azerbaijan, but its effects were not as sweeping as they were in Central Asia, due to many pre-existing and current historic, socio-linguistic, demographic and geo-political factors. The fact that Azerbaijan was among the only three Soviet sovereign states (the others being Georgia and Armenia), where the native language had an official status under the Constitution, could, itself, be viewed as an outcome of these specific conditions. This, in its turn, contributed to the use of Azerbaijani in the spheres of education, media, as well as public and office use, side by side with the Russian language except for a few cases (i.e., giving a speech at Communist Party meetings or submitting doctoral dissertations), where Azerbaijani

could not compete with Russian. (Garibova 2009:11-14; Fierman 2009:88-91; Fierman and Garibova 2010:435-437). As Isgandar Isgandarov, the former deputy Minister of Education of Azerbaijan remembers, “All documents, meetings and conferences were held in Russian. If someone couldn’t speak Russian at a Communist Party meeting, he was never given the floor, no matter how brilliant or worthy his ideas were.” (Isgandarov 2000:68-69).

As far as the minority languages in the Soviet Azerbaijan is concerned, they did not enjoy any special status. However, ironically, the fact that Azerbaijani had the official status and was used in many domains, particularly in higher education (in comparison, for example, with Central Asian Republics) (See: Fierman 2009: 90), was able not only to keep Azerbaijani alive, but also to save minority languages from disappearance under Russification. (Qaribova 2017:284). In other words, while the Azerbaijani language was used in official domains, in reality, it was not sufficient to ensure professional career development in urban places, where the knowledge of Russian was a must. Therefore, integration of minority communities from remote regions, where Russian was not easily accessible, in the mainstream life of the bilingual Baku, was much harder during the Soviet time than it is today. This predicted the dispersion of compact communities, thus contributing to the preservation of their languages and cultures. Although there were a number of migrations from rural places to Baku during the Soviet years, due to political and other reasons, which also contributed to the strong status and active use of Azerbaijani at that time, the size of immobile indigenous communities who preserved their compact way of living was also considerable. In fact, the Soviet census data reflect that the percentage of the minority population was almost stable (with slight increase or decrease), during the span of almost 70 years. For example, the number of the Lezgi population – the largest indigenous group in Azerbaijan increased from 37,263 (1.6%) in 1926, to 171,395 (2.4%) in 1989. The number of Avars grew from 19,104 (0.8%) in 1926 to 44,072 (0.6%) in 1989 (Muradov & Baxış 2013:76,113,129).

The first decade after the declaration of Azerbaijan’s independence, the years from 1991 to 2000, was the period when the status elevation of the Azerbaijani language was in the center of the language policy design. The status elevation was instrumental, as the language was a strong symbol, enabling the facilitation of national and social integration. Language was as strong as, if not stronger than, other symbols (such as state symbols, including the flag, national anthem, etc., or narrative construction/reconstruction around history, literature, etc.), which were resorted to, in order to enhance national integration. The status elevation had a broad-scale legislative support. This was the major tool, along

with narrative-building, corpus intervention, and promotion of the visibility through language display techniques, to ensure an effective implementation of the pursued state language policy. The legislative framework was the main mechanism for promoting and enabling “nationalization through language” initiatives. The legislation focused, first of all, on the normalisation and standardisation issues. In 1991, the Law on the transfer from the Cyrillic-based to the Latin-based alphabet, was issued. The new Constitution declared the Azerbaijani language the official language of the country. The laws and legal acts following the new Constitution also contained provisions, protecting the status of the Azerbaijani language. Furthermore, language-related topics were part of the identity-related narrative. There was a large-scale discourse launched through media, education policy and literature. Language became part of the overall nation-building discourse with much emphasis on its protection, development and respect (Garibova 2009: 22-24).

It is worth noting that the protection of minority languages was included in the legislative documents at the earliest stages of the independence of Azerbaijan. In 1992, a Presidential Decree, “On the state support for the protection of rights and freedoms and development of languages and culture of national minorities, small peoples and ethnic groups living in the Republic of Azerbaijan”, was adopted. The Decree laid the foundation for the teaching of minority languages at secondary schools (Decree on Ethnic Minorities 1992. http://www.e-qanun.az/alpidata/framework/data/7/f_7762.htm).

Besides, the Law on Education, adopted in 1992, specifies the right of ethnic minorities to receive instruction in their native languages:

Article 6. Language of Instruction

6.1. The Language of Instruction in Azerbaijan’s educational institutions is Azerbaijani.

6.2. According to the needs in the society (community) and to the desire of the citizens and founders of educational institutions, instruction can be provided in languages or minorities as well as in foreign languages provided that the State standards are observed and the Azerbaijani language, literature, history and geography are part of the curriculum.

This approach was maintained in the 1995 Constitution, as well as post-Constitutional laws and legislative acts, which also provide for non-discrimination (and in some cases, for promotion) of minority languages, through the rights of communities to use their native languages in various domains. Article 21 (Official Language) of the Constitution states:

I. Azerbaijani language is official language of the Azerbaijan Republic. Azerbaijan Republic provides development of the Azerbaijani language.

II. Azerbaijan Republic ensures free use and development of other languages spoken by the people.

Article 45 (Right to use mother tongue) of the Constitution of the Republics of Azerbaijan guarantees the use of, and non-discrimination against, mother tongue on the territory of Azerbaijan:

I. Everyone has the right to use his/her mother tongue. Everyone has the right to be educated, carry out creative activity in any language, as desired. II. Nobody may be deprived of right to use his/her mother tongue (The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan. http://azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_e.pdf).

Furthermore, although the Language Law recognises the Azerbaijani language as the official language of instruction in Azerbaijan, it also provides for the possibility of instruction in languages other than the State language (i.e., Azerbaijani language), as envisaged by legislation. However, no specification of “the ways envisaged by legislation” is provided in the text of the legislation.

The language policy of the post 2000's was marked by more practical steps and implementation efforts. Many important goals were set during the first phase, but not implemented, due to various reasons, and were accomplished during this phase after the Presidential Decree of 2001, on the Implementation of the Azerbaijani Language and of the Language Law of 2002. For example, the real and actual transition to the Latin-based script took place during this period, although the official decision regarding the change of alphabet had been taken as early as 1991. This period is characterised by the shift of the focus from the status elevation and promoting the language as a symbolic power to developing a strategy to solve practical problems encountered in the course of the policy implementation. Discourse over linguistic problems (such as technical problems of the transition to Latin, terminological gaps in newly emerging fields of industry, lack of resources and infrastructure for teaching Azerbaijani, stylistic inadequacy of Azerbaijani used in advertisements, language policy of international corporations functioning in Azerbaijan etc.) increased. The Presidential Decree placed a strong emphasis on the development of de-facto functions of Azerbaijani in as many domains as possible, and enhancement of the language corpus so that it would become fully functional (Decree on the Improvement of the Implementation of the State Language. <http://www.e-qanun>).

az/framework/3568). The Decree was followed by a large-scale resource development initiative.

The policy and legislation of this period was still mostly focusing on the State language, and the national language is viewed as a key instrument to facilitate nation-building and social integration. The opening sentence of the Language Law, adopted in 2002, is a good example of this kind of perception: “The Republic of Azerbaijan considers that the use of the Azerbaijani language as the state language is the main attribute of Azerbaijan’s independent statehood, and therefore takes care of its use, protection and development, and creates favorable grounds for the fulfillment of needs of Azerbaijanis all over the world for the national and cultural self-expression in the Azerbaijani language” (Law on the State Language. <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/1865>).

In the first place, the Language Law requires that the official documentation and correspondence in all state and governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations, business structures, and education and cultural bodies, be conducted in the State language. The State language is also the language of education. The official media, services sector, courts and other legal bodies, notary public, formal correspondence with international corporations and diplomatic structures in Azerbaijan is also to be conducted in the Azerbaijani language. Any correspondence in another language should be followed by its translation into the Azerbaijani language. All official events that organised by the State, as well as governmental and local municipal structures, are to be conducted in the State language. This provision does not, however, apply to events of an international calibre, nor to those organised by the above-mentioned agencies in foreign states. This means that the status of the state language encompasses that of an official language, as well.

The position of Azerbaijani is also firmly secured within other laws, which require, for example, that a larger space be provided for Azerbaijani in visual advertisements, that imported goods contain the Azerbaijani translation of technical characteristics or product descriptions, or that movies or programs, in foreign languages on TV or Radio, be transmitted with the translation or dubbing into Azerbaijani (Garibova & Asgarova 2009: 196-197).

Almost all legal acts and documents contain provisions, guaranteeing that any action or propaganda against the state language, its use and development, be considered a legal violation. For example, Article 533 of the Code of the Azerbaijan Republic on Administrative Violations states:

Propaganda against, and the resistance to, the use and development of the State language, attempts to limit the sphere of its application, as well as any act of prevention to the implementation of the Azerbaijani Latin alphabet in the Azerbaijan Republic entails imposition of penalty on natural persons in the amount from 1000 to 1500 manats, on officials – from 2500 to 4000 manats, and legal entities – from 12000 to 16000 manats one hundred fifty to three hundred manats (Code on Administrative Violations. <http://www.e-qanun.az/code/24>).

This approach is maintained in many similar legal acts.

This period is also characterised by the provision of a larger space to minority languages, and a more tolerant attitude towards Russian. Almost all legislative acts, where language use is discussed, do contain provisions concerning minority languages, existing on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic. The main focus of these provisions is ensuring non-discrimination of these languages and their speakers.

The Law on the State Language (2002) ensures the rights of minorities to use their languages in certain official settings, such as courts, legal-administrative proceedings and notary offices (Garibova & Asgarova 2009:201). Article 127 (X) of the Law lays the foundation for provisions on non-discrimination in further legal acts:

In the Azerbaijan Republic legal proceedings are carried out in the State language of the Azerbaijan Republic or in a language of majority of population in a specific area. Persons-participants of legal proceedings not knowing the language of proceedings have the right to be acquainted with materials of proceedings, to take part in legal proceedings using interpreter, to make statements in the law court in their native language.

Furthermore, Article 11.9 of the Law states:

If, according to the provisions of the Law on Notary Service, a person applying for notary service does not know the State language, or requests that the procedures be taken in a different language, the notary officials are allowed to produce the texts in the language desired by the applicant, or to have the texts translated into such desired language (Garibova&Asgarova 2009: 202).

All other relevant laws, accordingly, where language use is mentioned, provide for non-discrimination of minority languages. In regions densely inhabited by indigenous or other minorities, legal and administrative procedures are conducted in Azerbaijani and/or the regional language. Translation and interpreting is guaranteed for minorities, who

do not speak or understand the Azerbaijani language, to communicate and understand communication, in certain instances such as court, notary public, etc. For example, Article 49 “Language of execution of cases on administrative violations” of the Code of Administrative Violations states:

49.1. The execution of cases on administrative violations in the Azerbaijan Republic shall be performed on Azerbaijanian language or the language of dominant population of certain territory.

49.2. Persons who participate in the execution of administrative violation case who do not know the language shall be granted the right to witness, provide explanations, submit claims or petitions in their native language or any other language they know as well as the right use translator services in accordance with procedures stipulated by this Code (Code on Administrative Violations <http://www.e-qanun.az/code/24>).

Furthermore, Article 26 (the language used in criminal proceedings) of the Code on Criminal Procedures in the Azerbaijan Republic states:

26.1. Criminal proceedings in the courts of the Azerbaijan Republic shall be conducted in the official language of the Azerbaijan Republic or in the language of the majority of the population in the relevant area.

26.2. In the event that the parties do not know the language used in court, the judicial authority shall guarantee the following rights to them:

26.2.1. Their right to use their mother tongue;

26.2.2. the right to use the services of an interpreter free of charge during the investigation and court hearings, to be fully familiar with all documents relating to the case and criminal prosecution and to use their mother tongue in court.

26.3. The rights of parties who do not know the language used in criminal proceedings, as provided for under Article 26.2.2 of this Code, shall be secured at the expense of the budget of the Azerbaijan Republic (Code on Criminal Procedures <http://www.e-qanun.az/code/14>).

Certain amendments, made after the 2000’s to existing laws, also guarantee a broader inclusion of minority languages. As such, by an amendment made in 2003, the following provision was removed from Article 6 (The Use of the State Language in TV and Radio Broadcasting) of the Language Law of Azerbaijan, adopted in 2002:

All TV and Radio broadcasting companies established and operating on the territory of Azerbaijan, independent of their property form, shall translate their programs in the State Language (Law on the State Language. <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/1865>).

Several other laws also echo this tendency. For example, the last sentence in Article 26.4 was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure of Azerbaijan, with the amendment made in 2001:

26.4. The judicial authority shall provide the relevant persons with the necessary documents in the language used during the trial. Persons who do not know the language used during the trial shall be provided with the necessary documents in the language they know (Code on Criminal Procedures <http://www.e-qanun.az/code/14>).

Some newer laws adopted contain more generalised mention of minority languages in comparison to the previous versions of these laws. The Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Education (2009), for example, provides, as does the Law on Language mentioned above, for the use of languages other than Azerbaijani in education without categorising these languages into minority, foreign or other groups, while the previous law (1992), as we have already seen, had a specific mention of minority languages and foreign languages. In particular, Article 7 (Language of Study) of the 2009 Law states as follows:

7.1. The language of instruction in educational institutions of the Azerbaijan Republic is the state language – the Azerbaijani language.

7.2. In exceptional cases (international treaties, or based on the agreement with a respective executive authority), at the request of citizens and founders of educational institutions, the instruction can be delivered in other languages under respective state standards of education on condition that the Azerbaijani language, literature, history, and geography will be instructed, as well (Law on Education <http://edu.gov.az/az/page/72/302>).

Besides, the Law on Education of 1992 contained an instructive provision, ensuring the right to choose the language of instruction: “Article 6.3. The right to select the language of education is ensured by way of establishing classes and groups within relevant procedures and creating conditions for their activities.” The Law of 2009 does not contain any such instruction.

The Language Law of 1992 also contained provisions specifying ethnic languages, which are absent from the 2002 Language Law. As such, Article 3 of the 1992 Law stated:

The citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan are guaranteed the right to choose the language for education. Nationalities and ethnic minorities, living on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan have the right by means of governmental bodies of the republic to organize the pre-schools, secondary schools or separate classes, groups in their native language.

Furthermore, Article 15 stated:

Besides the State language, other languages may be used in the mass media on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (Law on State Language. 1992. <http://www.azerb.com/az-law-language.html?i=1>).

Nevertheless, The state language (which was named Turkic in 1992), was considered the language of interethnic communication. Thus, Article 1 stipulated:

The Turkic language as the state language of the republic is used in all spheres of political, economic, public, scientific and cultural life and functions for international communication on the territory of the republic. The learning of the Turkic language by the representatives of other nationalities is appreciated and they get support for it (Law on State Language 1992. http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_dil.pdf).

This function of interethnic communication is absent from the Law adopted in 2002, although the new Law requires the knowledge of the Azerbaijani language for every citizen of Azerbaijan:

Each citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic shall know the state language (Law on the State Language 2002. <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/1865>).

However, in general, the analysis of the amendments to legislation, containing language-related provisions, shows an interesting dynamics: language strategy has been moving from almost exclusive concentration on the state language to allowing space to, and recognising the existence of (to various degrees depending on the sphere), other languages. In some cases, it is not done by explicit recognition of minority languages, but rather by replacing exclusive focus on the state language by more general, all-comprehensive statements.

Azerbaijan ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPN) in 2000, and signed but had not yet ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), in 2001. As it was noted in the Report of 2010 of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the PACE, the lack of funds from the

State Budget is a major problem, due to which Azerbaijan does not consider itself ready to ratify ECRML (Report of PACE 2010:10).

Azerbaijan has made declarations in terms of both documents. Regarding the FCPN, Azerbaijan has made the following declaration: “The Republic of Azerbaijan, confirming its adherence to the universal values and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, declares that the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and implementation of its provisions do not imply any right to engage in any activity violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty, or internal and international security of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.157 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/157/declarations?p_auth=RWkinwIO&coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_enVigueur=false&coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_searchBy=state&coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codePays=AZE&coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codeNature=10).

Furthermore, in connection with ECRML, Azerbaijan has made the following declaration: “The Republic of Azerbaijan declares that it is unable to guarantee the application of the provisions of the Charter in the territories occupied by the Republic of Armenia until these territories are liberated from that occupation” (Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.148 http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148/declarations?p_auth=mOVPBE6i).

The post-2010 years in Azerbaijan’s language policy can be seen as the period where internationalisation and diversification tendencies dominate. The 2010 State Program for developing communication and information technologies has a special emphasis on broader use of Azerbaijani in cyber space, and the use of enhanced IT technologies for the protection of cultural heritage (State Program 2010. <http://www.president.az/articles/564>). The 2013 Presidential Decree on the Adoption of a State Program on the Use of the Azerbaijani Language, in conformity with the requirements of Globalisation and on the Development of Linguistics in Azerbaijan, also focuses on developing electronic resources in Azerbaijani, ensuring its wider use in cyber space, and modernising research in the sphere of Azerbaijani Linguistics (State Program 2013. <http://www.president.az/articles/7744>). This period is also marked by the declaration of multiculturalism as Azerbaijan’s state strategy, which, undoubtedly, impacted the language, the education policy and planning. Language policy, concerning minority languages, has been gradually shifting from tolerance to promotion and development. This is seen in rather than tolerance and non-discrimination only. Since the Committee

of Multiculturalism was established in 2014, the development of corpus and resources for minority languages has intensified, and the political discourse has been allowing wider space to the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity in Azerbaijan. The year 2016 was declared the year of Multiculturalism in Azerbaijan, which also accelerated these initiatives.

5. MINORITY LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION

Besides Azerbaijani, Russian and Georgian are currently used as languages of instruction in Azerbaijan. The instruction in Russian is a tradition continuing from the Soviet times: Russian schools (or Russian groups in secondary schools) exist, not only in regions populated with ethnic Russians, but are common to other areas, in particular to big cities. The Georgian language is taught as a language of instruction in regions populated with Inghiloyts (about 9900 people, according to the 2009 population census).

There are 16 Russian schools with 3,910 pupils, 6 Georgian schools with 673 pupils, 321 mixed Azerbaijani-Russian schools with 100,089 pupils, 3 mixed Azerbaijani-Georgian schools with 359 pupils, and 1 mixed Azerbaijani-Russian-Georgian school with 103 pupils, receiving education in Georgian and 90 in Russian. In total, 337 schools in Azerbaijan offer instruction in Russian to 103,999 pupils, and 10 schools offer education in Georgian to 1,135 pupils. The schools are located in Gakh (7 schools), Zagatala (2 schools) and Balakan (1 school) (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Education. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a6.html).

Some schools offer instruction in international languages. Thus, there are 592 students studying in Turkish schools, 2,126 students in English schools and 77 students in French schools.

Besides, there exist 1,764 pre-school institutions in Azerbaijan; in 248 of them, 8,347 children receive instruction in Russian, and in 7 of them, more than 300 children study in Georgian. There also exist 435 kindergartens operating in the Russian language, and 17 in Georgian.

In the territory of the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Armenian language is used as the language of instruction. However, as Azerbaijani organisations or experts cannot access the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh area, the relevant data cannot be collected from this region (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Education. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a6.html).

Other minority languages are not used as languages of instruction but are taught as ethnic languages in relevant regions. Azerbaijani is taught for 2-3 hours per week at these schools. The languages of minorities are taught in grades 1-4 of secondary schools (except for Lezgi, which is taught in grades 1-9) located in the relevant regions, and the hours allocated to the instruction of these languages are 2 hours per week. In one of the schools of Baku, Hebrew is taught from 1 to 11th grades.

The statistics of the minority language instruction is as follows: Lezgi language – 12325 pupils in 98 schools; Talysh language – 19010 pupils in 225 schools; Avar language – 1489 pupils in 22 schools; Tsakhur language – 492 pupils in 5 schools; Udi language – 183 pupils in 3 schools; Kurdish language – 42 pupils in 2 schools; Khinalug language – 109 pupils in 1 school; Hebrew language – 74 pupils in 1 school. In total, 33719 pupils receive instruction in their native languages, in 357 secondary schools (<http://www.anl.az/down/meqale/xalqcebhesi/2016/dekabr/520960.htm>).

Since independence in 1991, funds have been allocated by the Ministry of Education for preparing curricula for the teaching of minority languages, and publishing books, textbooks, dictionaries and reading materials. According to the Regulation of the Ministry of Education on “Textbook Policy in the General Education System”, adopted in 2006, “Textbooks for the general education schools are being published in Azeri language (main language), in other languages of teaching, as well as in the languages of the national minorities ... The Ministry can place orders with individual authors and publishing houses for the publication of a textbook” (Textbook Policy. 2006. <http://edu.gov.az/en/page/162/3192>). The main focus in the textbook initiative has been, in follow-up to the curriculum requirements, on the series of ABC books and language textbooks, titled “Mother tongue” for the 1st-4th grades of secondary schools. Such textbooks have been published for Lezgi, Talysh, Udi, Tat, Khinalug, and Avar languages (Qədirov 2016:5). Besides, the Ministry of Education prepared teaching aids and guidelines, as well as other support materials to facilitate effective teaching of these languages. Among those examples are “On teaching Talysh”, “Talysh-Azerbaijani school dictionary”, “Lezgi-Azerbaijani-Russian dictionary”, “Methodic guidelines (teacher’s book) for the ABC in Tat”, etc. (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Education. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a6.html).

Curricula and textbooks for subjects other than language were also prepared for schools offering instruction in Russian and Georgian languages. Between 2008 and 2014, 258 original and translated textbooks and teaching guidelines were published for the 1st-11th grades of Russian language schools. In 2014, textbooks in Mathematics, Life Sciences, IT,

Music and Art, were translated for the 1st-3rd grades of Russian and Georgian secondary schools (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Education. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a6.html).

To facilitate the minority communities' ability to choose native language instruction for their children, preparatory classes are offered at regional secondary schools, where children receive native language instruction. 595 preparatory groups have been established in relevant regions where 8,539 children receive native language instruction.

In 2003, the Ministry of Education started a joint project, entitled "Education Policy and National Minorities", in cooperation with the Council of Europe. The purpose of the project was to assist Azerbaijan in designing legislation regarding the education of national minorities, and to prepare recommendations concerning the minority education policy (Qarayeva 2012:10-11).

6. MINORITY LANGUAGES WITHIN A SOCIO-CULTURAL MILIEU

The legislation contains provisions providing space for media outlets and broadcasting in languages of ethnic minorities. According to Article 12.3 of the 2004 Law on Public TV and Radio of Azerbaijan Republic, public broadcasting should include programs in the languages of ethnic minorities living in Azerbaijan (Law on Public TV and Radio 2004. <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/5546>). In accordance with this, public TV and Radio of Azerbaijan Republic established a Department of Programs for National Minorities (<http://modern.az/az/news/69528/#gsc.tab=0>). Furthermore, under Article 21.1.11 of the Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting, an application for a special license for broadcasting should specify, among other things, the intended language of the programs, which, in itself, legitimates broadcasting in a language other than Azerbaijani. However, Article 32.0.6 of the same Law, which requires that the State language be used in the programs, can be interpreted as imposing a barrier to the use of other languages. This contributes to the contradiction within the Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting. Article 32.0.6 of the Law also contradicts the above-mentioned Article 12.3 of the Law on Public TV and Radio (Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting. 2002. <http://ict.az/az/content/122>).

There are five local TV and Radio channels functioning in the areas of compact residence of ethnic minorities (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Media. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a7.html). The Azerbaijani State Radio, on a monthly basis, broadcasts programs in languages of ethnic minorities in the following volume: in the Talysh

language (1.20 minutes), in the Kurdish language (1. 20 minutes), in the Lezgin language (1. 20 minutes), in the Georgian language (2. 40 minutes), in the Armenian language(1.30 minutes), and in the Russian language (15 hours). Another state-owned radio station, *Araz*, systematically broadcasts news in various languages. Programs of this radio station are transmitted in Russian on a daily basis, in Georgian on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, in the Kurdish language on Tuesdays and Thursdays, in the Talysh language on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and in Armenian on Mondays and Saturdays every week (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Media. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a7.html).

There exist newspapers and magazines in the languages of ethnic minorities. However, out of more than 30 newspapers and magazines, 15 are published in Russian (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a7.html). This poses the question of whether Russian should be treated in the same sense of priority as other minority languages in this sense, and whether the facts about the usage of Russian in media could, in reality, exemplify the space taken by minority languages in this domain.

In 2009, Azerbaijan joined the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005, “On the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions”. Following the signing of the Convention, intensive activities have been carried out in diverse regions of Azerbaijan to demonstrate and promote the customs, folklore, culture and art of various ethnic groups. A biannual festival, “Azerbaijan – native land”, supported by the Heydar Aliyev Foundation and “Ictimai” TV is held in Baku, where representatives of various ethnic minorities are invited to Baku to present and perform samples of their art and folklore. Each time the Festival, which is broadcast internationally, with translation into English, hosts about 500 participants from all ethnic regions of Azerbaijan. (Azerbaijani Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity. http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a5.html). The folklore and ethnic culture is also taught at 41 children’s music and art schools in the regions densely populated by ethnic minorities. The Department of the Folklore of Ethnic Minorities was established in the Folklore Institute of Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, in 2012. The Department deals with the collection of folklore samples for the purpose of preservation and research.

The establishment of community cultural centers is another domain where minorities can use their language practically. There are various centers functioning, including the Talysh cultural center, the Kurdish cultural center, the Lezgi cultural center, the Lezgi mythology center, the Tsakhur cultural center, the Avar Association, named after Sheikh Shamil, *Orayin* Udin cultural center, the Azeri Tat cultural center, the Budikh cultural center, the Slavic cultural center, the Russian community association, the Khinalug cultural

center, the Azeri Tat Community Association, the Azerbaijani Georgian Association, the Society of Azerbaijani Ukrainians, the Society of European Jews of Azerbaijan, the German National-Cultural Association, the Society of Azerbaijani Jews, the International Judaic Center, and the Motherland society of Meskheta Turks. The central government of Azerbaijan allocates funds for establishing such centers and does not charge for the facilities used for these purposes. The protection of the sites of historical and cultural heritage, belonging to indigenous people, is among the priorities of the State within the Multiculturalism strategy. Examples of this are the Albanian Church in the village Kish, in Shaki, and the Christian Church in the Nic village, inhabited by ethnic Udis, in Gabala. In the Arkivan village of the Masalli region, the 19th century Mosque, belonging to the Talysh people, was restored.

7. LANGUAGE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSIES

In many cases observed throughout the world, policy implementation is not always able to keep pace with policy declarations and strategy design. This deficiency, in causal relationship between policy formulation and its implementation, is defined as “weak linkage” by Romaine (Romaine 2002:199-206). Azerbaijan was not an exception to such “weak linkage”, which was due, first of all, to the lack of a comprehensive implementation mechanism. This, in turn, was making it difficult to predict objective problems impeding implementation, such as the lack of resources (mostly in earlier years), literacy challenges posed by the shift to a different alphabet system, lack of quality mechanisms in corpus development, gaps in the integration of language policy with education or cultural policy, etc. In the case of Azerbaijan, separately adopted implementation strategy would be the major factor triggering actual fulfilment of formulated policies. This is because Presidential decrees, orders or instructions, given to lower instances (ministries, committees) in follow-up to the adoption of a law, State program or various kinds of legal acts, facilitate actual implementation as they set concrete deadlines, formulate measurable goals and describe more direct steps related to funding and delegation of authorities. An example of how this mechanism works is the above-mentioned 2001 Presidential Decree on the State language, which ensured the actual shift to the Latin-based alphabet, as it contained direct instructions to the relevant ministries.

In some cases, a high degree of formality was observed in language policy and planning initiatives. An example of this would be the establishment of the Language Committee in 2001 (Order on the State Language Committee. <http://www.e-qanun.az/alpidata/>

framework/data/4/f_4411.htm). From the very beginning, the Committee's activity was rather formal, and it was not sufficiently active in solving language issues. First of all, the Committee included very high-ranking officials, who were too busy to engage in language policy-making. Moreover, almost two-third of the Committee members were not linguists. The Committee also included a number of well-known poets and writers, who were advocates of the promotion of the Azerbaijani language against the Russian dominance, even during the Soviet times, and their position would focus mostly, if not exclusively, on the position of the State language. Reports indicate that the Committee is not even active today. As such, Prof. Ismayil Mammadov, a member of the Committee, who is also affiliated with the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, admits that the Committee has not held any meeting for a long time. He states that language issues are rather brought up at Scientific or Academic Councils of Universities, or at the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (<http://az.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/2415373.html>). The Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences is also involved in the corpus-building issues. The terminology section of the institute was also productive in the Soviet times, and its post-Soviet successor draws from the experience. In addition, there is a language committee in the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which drafts laws and legislative acts for adoption by the Parliament.

The issues concerning minority languages also mostly stem from the lack of a proper implementation mechanism. As already discussed above, the State strategy of Azerbaijan, in terms of minorities, is based on the philosophy which goes far beyond tolerance. This strategy focuses on diversity as an asset and value, which will benefit minorities but which will also promote Azerbaijan as one of the world's most multicultural centers. The government of Azerbaijan also bases its economic and socio-cultural strategy on multiculturalism. The government is aware that, by investing in the economic and socio-cultural development of remote regions, populated by indigenous peoples and developing tourism in those places, Azerbaijan also has a good chance of enhancing its economic potential, and contributing to its democratic profile. In fact, the popular parlance often makes a reference to "multiculturalism as a brand of Azerbaijan". It is true that with the adoption of a State program on multiculturalism, which ensured the implementation of a complex of activities, it was possible to better promote the study, use and develop indigenous languages. However, the multiculturalism strategy of the State, which has gained huge emphasis in the political discourse, has not been fully aligned with relevant implementation tactics in certain areas. There are still a number of issues that need to be solved. One of the major factors is that, as a young

democracy, Azerbaijan lacks experience in such language planning, that would create the best balance among functions of different languages through prestige planning (See: Haarmann 1986:88-91; Zhao & Liu, 2007: 113), accommodate all or most of the needs of diverse languages and their speakers, and step beyond the “no-policy” policy (Fishman 2006:318; 325). For example, the programs of activities that follow the strategy announcement, are sometimes declarative and quite unbalanced. There is no doubt that many of the initiatives (such as teaching of the subject of Azerbaijani multiculturalism, organising seminars on multiculturalism in Azerbaijan, publishing books dealing with the sources of Azerbaijani multiculturalism, etc.) included in the plan of activities of the Multiculturalism Center, are very important to shape the attitude of the majority group towards minority languages and cultures. However, more targeted actions also need to be included in this plan, in order to address the real needs of promoting minority languages and cultures, and to raise awareness of such needs within a broader population.

On the other hand, despite the willingness at State level, and overall positive attitude towards multiculturalism within the society, the local perception of the basic concepts of multiculturalism (such as the promotion of languages, language rights, language-identity relationship) may be different from the perception of these concepts by and within the international community. Therefore, there is a risk of conceptual transformation of any State strategy when it is put into implementation. It seems, at times, that decision-makers at lower levels perceive the State strategy of multiculturalism as one covering international rather than indigenous languages and cultures. Or, the expression “promotion of indigenous languages” can be perceived simply as an initiative which does not go beyond the State’s investing in the corpus development or resource establishment for minority languages, without any need to promote efforts by policy-implementation agencies at lower level (for example, schools). This is the reason for the possible misunderstanding and communication gaps observed between international experts and lower-level local agencies, when they discuss problems concerning minority languages. Hence relatively slow dynamics of shift from tolerance-oriented to promotion-oriented policy (see Tonkin 2007:210) towards indigenous languages.

Moreover, although the legislation is quite comprehensive and detailed in regard to the use and protection of minority languages, its implementation lags behind. For example, the legislation provides for the right of minority people to use their languages in court proceedings, notary public and similar instances. However, there is still a need to develop more resources (such as the translation of codes, major laws or other official

documents) in minority languages, in order to ensure the de-facto and efficient use of these languages, in relevant instances (Chylinski & Hofmannova 2011:26).

Besides, despite the legislative provisions ensuring the promotion of minority languages in media and broadcasting, the number of hours allocated to TV and radio programs in these languages is not sufficient. This does not allow a higher degree of awareness of these languages and their speakers. Additionally, the promotion policy needs to be more balanced and avoid favouring stronger languages, as much as possible. As has been mentioned above, while the time allocated to indigenous minority languages is very limited – a few hours a month for each language– the proportion of the programs in Russian is much greater. It also becomes obvious from other initiatives, that the already more advantageous languages and cultures (for example, Russian, Hebrew/Jewish) receive better focus and attention than those which cannot enjoy the same advantage.

As far as gaps in the legislation are concerned, we should note that there is no specific law dealing solely with minority issues. The 1992 Presidential Decree is the only document, and no further legal acts or official documents were issued afterwards, although the Decree did require the adoption of a special law, dealing with the rights of ethnic minorities. Recommendations made to Azerbaijan by international organisations and monitoring groups also emphasise the importance of a comprehensive and all-inclusive legislation, which would facilitate co-operation among various authorities, in terms of minority questions. Improvement of the legal basis for the strategy of multiculturalism is also required within the above-mentioned Plan of Activities of the Multiculturalism Center, which was adopted as a follow-up to the 2016 Presidential Decree, declaring the year 2016 as the Year of Multiculturalism, in Azerbaijan (Plan of Activities 2016. <http://azertag.az/store/files/TADBIRLAR.pdf>).

Despite some gaps, the Azerbaijani legislation manifests a high level of compliance with the provisions of the ECRMS and FCPN (Chylinski & Hofmannova 2011:35-49). The lack of rules allowing official documents to be drafted in regional or minority languages is shown as the main inconsistency with the provisions of the above-mentioned documents. As such, Article 13 of the ECRML provides for the possibility of using regional and minority languages for producing documents, relating to social and economic activities (such as employment contracts, payment orders, safety regulations etc.), which is not supported or facilitated by provisions of relevant legal acts of Azerbaijan (Chylinski & Hofmannova 2011:48-49). The only real exception is the Law on Notary, which allows the drafting of the notary documents, within the possibilities available, in the language

other than Azerbaijani, if the applicant does not understand the State language (Law on Notary.1999. <http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/107>).

We have also noted that legislation does provide ethnic minorities with the right to establish pre-school institutions and schools in their native language, and there have been genuine measures undertaken by the Ministry of Education, and other authorities, to develop resources for minority languages and schools, in regions inhabited by ethnic minorities. However, there are still outstanding problems with resource development and capacity building for these schools. The availability of qualified teaching staff and modern textbooks is still an issue. More investment is needed to prepare experts in teaching and researching indigenous languages, including those from among the indigenous communities, themselves. In addition to this, more resources need to be developed, following the increase in the number of the schools where the indigenous languages are taught during the past years (for example, the number of the schools where the Lezgian language is taught has grown from 94 to 126). Besides, some of the resources are outdated, and some languages are taught on the basis of textbooks published more than 20 years ago. The Talysh, Lezgi and Udi languages are in a more advantageous position, from this perspective, as the ABCs and language textbooks for these languages are relatively new (2006 and 2010). However, more needs to be done for other, less represented languages. This problem has recently been raised by the Ministry of Education, which is a positive sign. It was noted, during several discussions with representatives of the Ministry, that a strategy is being developed for modernising the teaching of minority languages, and aligning it with the Bologna principles, as well as improving the quality of textbooks.

Also, some respondents referred to the formality of native language classes by stating that, at some schools, the minority language classes are informally replaced by other subjects, particularly by those which are included in school exit exams, or university entrance exams. It is true that this kind of decision could have been taken by schools in follow-up to requests from children or parents. Nevertheless, these steps should be strongly discouraged by school administrations.

Furthermore, the provision of the 1992 Decree on Minority Issues, whereby universities are required to train specialists for teaching indigenous languages, has not yet been fulfilled. The indigenous languages are usually taught by native speakers, who do not always happen to be qualified language teachers (<http://ethnoglobus.az/az/index.php/xalqlar/l-zgil-r/item/339-l%C9%99zgi-dilind%C9%99-d%C9%99rslikl%C9%99r%C9%99-ehiyac-var>). There is hope that the teacher preparation for teaching indigenous

languages will soon start within the Caucasian Studies undergraduate program, which will be offered by the Azerbaijan University of Languages, starting from the academic year of 2017-2018.

Some comments would also be relevant regarding instruction in minority languages. In the villages populated with indigenous communities, the native language competence of pre-school children is, generally, very high. On the other hand, children also learn the Azerbaijani language from an early age. They usually pick up the language in their environment through communication with their native Azerbaijani peers, and have a certain amount of exposure at home, where parents start a bilingual (Azerbaijani and native language) environment, closer to the school age. The establishment of touristic enterprises, in the territories inhabited by ethnic minorities, has also encouraged and facilitated the broader spread of Azerbaijani in these regions. Parents also consider learning Azerbaijani very important, and they ensure the child becomes bilingual by the school age. During interviews with several families, the parents noted that they speak both the native language and Azerbaijani, so that the child could understand and speak Azerbaijani by the time he/she begins school. The conversation with children of pre-school age, in many regions, reveals their competence as being sufficient in Azerbaijani to start school. They have sufficient vocabulary and a stable structure in Azerbaijani, although their Azerbaijani competence cannot naturally compete with their native language competence, unless their parents have completely switched to Azerbaijani at home. An important credit should probably be given to the Soviet-times literacy traditions, which encourage the parents to prepare their children for school from an early age. The preparation also includes the teaching of the official language. Thus, by the schooling age, the children, while being able to speak their native language, also develop necessary competence in Azerbaijani, in order to start school. As Clifton states, since independence, minority language – Azerbaijani bilingualism is a broader-scale phenomenon among minorities, as a result of wide-spread use of Azerbaijani, as the official language and this must have led researchers to the conclusion that a large-scale shift to Azerbaijani was occurring. However, Clifton also claims that his field research shows the contrary, i.e. diglossic situation, rather than overall shift, was the case. According to Clifton, language vitality is higher than expected (or claimed), due to language ecology, language policy and legislation providing rights to minorities, corpus development in minority languages, textbooks and dictionaries, as well as the teaching of minority languages at secondary schools (Clifton 2013:214). As far as instruction in the native language is concerned, the majority of the local population views the native language instruction as an obstacle in inegration into mainstream society. They think

that their children become bilingual from early childhood, and that the language is well kept within the family and the community. They consider this sufficient for the preserving of the native language, and do not usually support instruction in the native language.

The observation of children's language repertoire within more remote communities, for example, in Khinalug, reveals a somewhat different picture. While the Azerbaijani language competence of children above 9-10 years old is quite solid, the pre-school children show little or no competence at all. Some of them can answer very basic questions, such as "What is your name?" or "How old are you?" and do not go far beyond this type of conversation, in Azerbaijani. Out of 20 children of pre-school age, in Khinalug, about half had this type of limited competence. Only three children were able to answer more complex questions, such as "Where do you live?" or "What have you had for breakfast?" or "Who bought you such a nice cap?" The rest did not react to the questions. It was not quite clear whether the children's limited communication ability was only due to their low competence in Azerbaijani, or if there were other reasons behind this, such as general linguistic competence, shyness, etc. Some parents stated that their answers would be better and clearer if they were asked questions in the Khinalug language. Some said that the children were shy to speak. We, in fact, asked the parents to repeat the questions in Khinalug each time. In some cases, children still remained silent. In other cases, however, they answered the questions.

The community members say that, generally, the children start learning Azerbaijani when they start school, and that it takes them 3 to 4 years to become fluent in Azerbaijani. There is a big effort from parents to help children with their studies in Azerbaijani. As soon as the children start school, the parents start using more Azerbaijani at home, especially when they assist the children with their studies.

It seems that when there is a strong need, schools unofficially teach in two languages, thus, informally allowing bilingual instruction. The school administration in Khinalug mentioned that, in many cases, if the children have low competence in Azerbaijani, teachers switch to Khinalug, and that this informal bilingual instruction usually continues for three or four years. Some of the teachers think that bilingual instruction is important because, while children struggle with learning correct Azerbaijani for several years, they lag behind in the program. Moreover, when they study, they put a lot of effort into producing literary texts in Azerbaijani, and this gets prioritised over the content. According to the teachers, all this affects the children's learning capacity and overall educational outcomes.

8. CONCLUSION

The brief study of the linguistic landscape of Azerbaijan has generated a number of implications and suggestions. The increased role of the Azerbaijani language in the political, economic and social life of Azerbaijan has produced an overall shift to Azerbaijani, both from Russian and from lesswidely-spoken languages. This has affected language practices, in particular among younger generations. However, the shift has influenced the functionality of Russian, and that of minority languages, differently. So, although Russian still enjoys high social prestige among a restricted group of urban elites, its functional scope has been shrinking. In Azerbaijani-speaking families, children have no or little pressure from parents to learn Russian, and in the language repertoire of younger generations, Russian is now easily replaced by other international languages, i.e. English or Turkish. Outside of the above-mentioned elite groups, where Russian is an important social marker, the possession or lack of competence in the Russian language is not, generally, associated with the prestige factor. Russian has certainly retained considerable functional importance as well, and a proficiency therein is required in order to obtain employment positions in certain industries. However, within Azerbaijani-speaking families, Russian has ceased to be a language learned from early childhood and spoken alongside Azerbaijani.

The effect of the shift on minority language vitality is not similar to the case of Russian. Currently, the shift to Azerbaijani has not brought to the loss of minority languages, and there is still widespread bilingualism in indigenous regions. This is true, that the growing prestige and usefulness of Azerbaijani, as well as the increased opportunities for the youth to participate in high-profile, local and international events, has caused some reluctance on the side of minority children (e.g. schoolchildren) to learn their native languages. Nevertheless, these languages are well sustained in the home environment, and many parents do their best to ensure that their children learn, and develop a strong identity with, the native language and culture.

However, the dynamics of the change in language practices could, potentially, alter the situation. Therefore, the current sustained bilingualism should not be seen as a guarantee of language vitality in the future, and serious steps should be taken, in order to predict language shift and potential language loss. The lack of motivation on the side of young children should be seen as an alert, as it could bring further disruption to the intergenerational transmission of indigenous languages. On the other hand, sustained bilingualism is encountered mainly in rural areas and, in urban settings, these languages are under a bigger threat (Friedman 135). Besides, funds allocation to, and resource

development in the research and recording of the most endangered languages is crucial, in order to prevent their complete loss.

More needs to be done in terms of motivating children to use their native language(s). Among possible tools are publishing engaging books with interesting content, which could be used as reading resources besides the language textbooks in or outside the classroom. Schools could be more productive in creating monolingual situations, e.g. initiating games or other activities, where only the native language is used. The quality of the instruction of minority languages should be enhanced, and more resources need to be developed for this purpose. For certain communities, especially for isolated ones, relevant models for bilingual education in early school years should be considered.

The necessary amendments need to be made to the existing legislation to reflect the policy dynamics. A comprehensive law concerning minority languages, possibly followed by a special implementation strategy, would be a useful platform from which to address the outstanding minority language problems, in various domains.

As we have seen from the above discussion, the stated problems in responding to certain minority language needs are linked to implementation challenges and changes in language practices, but not to the official policy itself. As Clifton indicates, “since independence, shift from less-widely-spoken languages to Azerbaijani has accelerated in spite of the fact that there has been no official push to force people to use Azerbaijan” (Clifton 2013:216). Unfortunately, in some cases, some international organisations and monitoring groups refer to alleged ethnic discrimination, and these references are usually based on unjustified reports. For example, it often seems that the real reasons for legal action are not sufficiently analysed if this action is taken against a representative of a minority group: the action is, often, automatically interpreted and reported as a human rights violation or discrimination (see the comments of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Third Opinion on Azerbaijan of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities. 2013).

It is also true that Azerbaijan’s profile as one of the best models of multiculturalism and diversity management is growing. This is due to the State policy, which regards linguistic and cultural diversity as an asset, rather than as a problem for Azerbaijan. As stated in a report on ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan, “if the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of Azerbaijan has not caused serious problems so far, it is due to the culture of tolerance that prevails in the country and that is strengthened by a number of political mechanisms” (Azerbaijan: Ethnic Diversity, Peaceful Coexistence and State Management. 2014:75).

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NATION BUILDING AND BILINGUALISM IN LATVIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the sociolinguistic landscape and language policy developments in post-Soviet Latvia. This paper focuses on the fate of the Russian language, which is Latvia's current principal minority language. It shows the impact of the new language legislations on the two language communities (the indigenous and Russophone ones). The paper also provides an overview of the state agencies, which are involved in the language planning initiatives in Latvia.

1. INTRODUCTION

Both the language and citizenship legislation, as well as the the policies that go with them, have been at the center of heated political debates, ever since Latvia officially seceded from the USSR on 6 September 1991. The independence was proclaimed in Latvia even earlier – on 4 May 1990. The move was supported by the democratic elections of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, which later regained its original name – the Latvian Saeima. The debates were sparkled with a varying degree of intensity at different national and international institutions, e.g. at the Latvian Parliament, in mass media (in both Latvian and Russian), and at EU parliamentary sessions. It should be noted, in relation to the latter, that Latvia became an EU member in 2004.

The implementation of the new Latvian language policy has been associated with the intention of the titular nation to integrate the Russophone minority, the largest community among other non-indigenous groups (e.g. Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, Ukrainians and others) into Latvian society. On the other hand, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the policies led to the deprivation, in the Russian-speaking minority, of some of their personal liberties and political rights. The controversy encoded in

the language and citizenship legislation has become the subject of public, media and scholarly discussions (cf. Karklins, 1998; Volkov & Kuzheleva, 2000; Ozolins, 2003; Priedite, 2005; Hogan-Brun, 2006; Filei, 2014; Zepa, 2006; Dragile, 2014; Linderman, 2015; Cheskin, 2013a; Cheskin, 2016b). Several topics of these discussions, such as the speed of transition from Russian to Latvian, grievances of the largest minority group, implementation of the transition by some agencies and institutions, will be discussed in this paper.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This paper focuses on several issues that have emerged in the public debates. The assumption that the Russian language came to Latvia with the Russian army and Soviet rule is hard to accept, if we examine language contacts traditionally maintained on the territory of contemporary Latvia. The historical overview can show that Latvians always resided next to other language communities, and maintained close relations with them. Since time immemorial, Latvia's geographical position ensured that it was on the crossroads of busy trade routes with Northern and Western Europe, across the Gulf of Riga, and the Baltic Sea in the West, and also with Russia, along the river Daugava in the East. Russian loanwords in the Latvian language testify to the long-term contacts between the Slavic and Baltic tribes (Semenova & Graudina, 1977; Guild, 1978; Kļaviņa, 1997). For example, the Latvian word for Russians comes from the name of one of the ancient Slavic tribes that used to live side by side with Latvians. The Slavic people, referred to as 'krievichi', moved away, but the name stayed in the Latvian language as 'krievi', i.e. Russians. As far back as the 17th and 18th centuries, there were strong ties enduring between Russian merchants and the local population. As a result, some Russian words were borrowed by the Latvian language, e.g. 'Vaznīca' (божница 'church'), 'grāmata' (from the Russian грамота, which, in one of the word's senses, means 'literacy', and in Latvian refers to 'book'), and many other words denoting everyday or church life, the latter being emphasised by Plakans (1995:9).

When the first cities developed along the trade routes, Russian merchants established their own station outside Riga, called the Russian Court, as early as in the 13th century (circa 1231). As Riga grew, this became part of the city. There were other merchant settlements in Riga, primarily German, Polish and Swedish, a result of the fact that those countries, at different points in time, had attempted to dominate the Baltic territory. Following those waves of historical dominance, there were prolonged periods of commercial contacts with the aforesaid linguistic communities.

As a member of the Hanseatic Trade League, Riga had both tradesmen and craftsmen leagues. For centuries in Riga, a busy seaport, it has been possible to hear languages other than Latvian. Among these, German and Russian are historically counted as the two most influential ones. Bishop Albert from Germany, with his army of merchants, crusaders and churchmen, was the first to come and take over the Baltic littoral at the beginning of the 13th century, and convert the local tribes to Christianity (Plakans, 1995). Thus it was only natural that the first attempt to use Latvian in writing and to lay the foundations of its orthography was made by a German priest, Georgs Mancelis, in order to translate the Bible into Latvian, in 1631.

The first Russian school in Riga was established in 1759, by Catherine the Great, to provide education for the children of a growing Russian community. In the 17th and 18th centuries, many Russian families of 'Old Believers' moved from Russia to Latvia, to escape persecution for their religious practices. These moves and settlements were more spontaneous than systematic. Nevertheless, they did give impetus for the evolution of more permanent language contacts.

The spontaneous character of contacts changed drastically with the Russian victory over the Swedes in the Northern War (1710 -1721), in which Russia gained control over the Baltic coast, and Latvia became part of the Russian empire. Although, with the Treaty of Nystad (1721), Peter the Great confirmed the privileged position of the Baltic Germans, with their language and the Lutheran Church in the Baltic provinces, and it was also the start of a more organised and systematic flow of Russians to Latvia, including members of the ruling classes, bureaucracy, clergy and educated professionals. It also gave further impetus to the development of crafts, trade, industry and education. We can assume that developing Latvian trade and administrative centres needed more than one language for different purposes and in various circles, eventually leading to the widening of the sphere of practical use of each language.

After the Russian Revolution, many 'White Russians' (people who wanted to escape the new communist dictatorship) moved to Latvia, primarily to Riga. This gave rise to further consolidation of the Russian community, there. Newspapers were published in Russian, and Russian banks, clubs and societies of mutual support were formed. There were Russian schools and theatres in Riga, as well as in some other major cities. The Latvian culture, as well as the cultures of national minorities, existed side by side during that period, although the influence of the latter was starting to decline.

The first books printed in Latvian in the early XVI century were all of a biblical nature (Viksninš, 1973; Plakans, 1993). Towards the middle of the XIX century, with the spread of education in Latvian, books dealing with Latvian folklore, poetry, and literature, as well as early newspapers, started appearing in Latvian, and it was the Latvian language that received the impetus for growth. Plakans (1993:207) holds that the language hierarchy in Latvia was challenged, in favour of Latvian in the nineteenth century and, even though Russification policy was introduced at the end of it, the number of new books published, annually, in Latvian, rose from 181 in 1884 to 822 in 1904, and the total print runs of these increased from 168,000 items in 1884 to over five million in 1904 (Plakans, 1993:215). It should be pointed out that, by the end of the XIX century, Latvia enjoyed a high level of literacy, i.e. 92%, according to the all-Russian census of 1897, compared to only 30% outside the Baltic provinces of Russia (Pistohlkors, 1990:24).

The first tertiary institution, 'The Polytechnical Institute of Riga', was opened in Riga in 1862, where German was the first language of instruction (Leimanis, 1972) then it was replaced by Russian in 1896 after the Russian tsar Alexander III introduced Russian as the compulsory language of government, administration and education. Eventually, instruction was provided in Latvian to be followed by both Latvian and Russian during the Soviet rule. It still exists and is known today as Riga Technical University (RTU website). Latvian has become its language of instruction with some courses taught in English as well. After the fall of the Russian empire the Republic of Latvia proclaimed the establishment of the University of Latvia, which was the first in the world to present the opportunity to gain higher education in the Latvian language (University of Latvia website). Later, both Latvian and Russian were used on par during the Soviet rule, with the Ministry of Education of Latvian SSR setting the numbers for each stream. Thus, the overview demonstrates that Riga, like some other bigger cities, developed as a multilingual hub, using a combination of languages in speech and in print, in addition to Latvian.

The acquisition of independence and the proclamation of the Republic of Latvia, on 18 November 1918, provided the opportunity for the Latvian language to enter all spheres of human life and activity. It led the way to its use in a variety of public domains where, previously, either German or Russian had been used, areas such as banking, politics, tertiary education, science, engineering and law. This was an event of great historic, socio-economic, socio-political and linguistic significance that enhanced the Latvian people's feeling of self-value, national pride and historical justice.

Latvia lost its independence as the result of the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact. For a short period, from 1940 to 1941, Latvia became part of the USSR, along with Estonia and Lithuania, its northern and southern neighbours. Soviet troops defeated Germans on the Eastern front in WW2, and created conditions for the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union, as one of its fifteen republics, which led to the language reversal and “steady limiting of the scope of national language use” (Kaplan, Baldauf, 2005:7). It was only in 1990 that Latvia regained its independence. The authors point out that “over the course of 20th century alone no fewer than six major language regimes can be identified as having occurred in the Baltic States ranging:

- from intense Russification followed by brief liberalisation during tsarist times,
- to the re-assertion of national languages during the first period of independence,
- to the return of a different incarnation of Russification during the first period of Soviet occupation in 1940-1941,
- to the imposition of German during the Nazi occupation in 1941-1944,
- to the return of Soviet Russification under the guise of the socialist equality of languages from 1944 to the late 1980s/early 1990s and
- to the subsequent reinstatement of the three Baltic languages as sole national languages in their respective territories” (Kaplan, Baldauf, 2005:8).

The succession of these regimes could have only increased the resolve of the Latvian people to homogenise their language space, in favour of their titular language.

Looking back at post WW2 Soviet Latvia, one has to admit that, although the teaching of Russian within its boundaries did not replace schooling in students’ native Latvian, it did affect the scope of the Latvian language use, as Russian was the dominant language in all fifteen former republics of the USSR. Besides, while Russian schools enjoyed 10-year schooling, there was 11-year schooling for pupils at Latvian secondary schools, which caused long-term resentment on the part of Latvian schoolchildren and their parents. The extra year was to compensate for time that had been spent studying Russian language, history and literature over and above other regular school subjects taught in the mother tongue. As a rule, Latvian children attended Latvian schools, and Russian children attended schools offering instruction that was in Russian. In mixed families, and because Russian language fluency in the Soviet era provided more opportunities and a greater range of tertiary level subjects, some chose Russian educational institutions,

with Latvian learned outside the classroom, but these were exclusive cases, rather than a trend. Thus, during the years of the Soviet annexation of Latvia, education was provided in two languages, Latvian and Russian at all educational levels: pre-school, primary, middle, secondary and tertiary.

In Russian schools, however, Latvian was not given an equal level of importance. The number of bilingual Russians was relatively small, since there was little motivation to master Latvian, and Russian school leavers could obtain higher education in their mother tongue, both in Latvia and across the entire USSR. Although Latvia had a network of institutions of higher learning, it also had, like any other republic, its quota for both university and post-graduate education, whereupon school leavers or university students of both Latvian and Russian descent could gain their graduate and post-graduate degrees in Russia, in any subject of their choice.

At the tertiary level, education was delivered in Latvian and Russian, but at the same time, there were a number of tertiary institutions which provided higher education, either primarily or exclusively in Latvian. These were the Academy of Arts, the Conservatoire and the Architecture Department of the Polytechnic Institute, institutions which trained the cultural elite of the country. However, most subjects at the Latvian State University, and other institutions of higher learning, had Latvian and Russian streams that followed the same curriculum, the only difference being the language of instruction.

The breakup of the Soviet Union was the turning point that changed the lives of millions, not only within the boundaries of former Soviet territories, but in the world as a whole. Primarily, however, it brought about many political, social and linguistic changes in the lives of people who, for years, had been indoctrinated into feeling 'Soviet', because it was believed that being part of the USSR overruled the national identity or ethnicity of its people (cf. Pavlenko 2008a, 2008b, Ryazanova-Clarke 2014). In the USSR, passports had two separate fields, one stating citizenship – USSR, and the other showing nationality or ethnicity, such as Latvian, Estonian, Russian, etc. The latter was about to be eliminated under Brezhnev and be turned into 'Soviet' for the nationality graph, but numerous objections prevented it (Nationalities Policy under Brezhnev, Materialy XXIV s'ezda KPSS). Russian was used for all communication between the USSR's multiple ethnicities. Thus, it did not come as a surprise that post-Soviet countries, on the whole, emerged as a 'contested linguistic space' (Pavlenko, 2008a:275). When the former Soviet republics announced that the language of the titular nation would be the official language of the newly independent state, the Russian language fell by the wayside. For the Latvian people, shaking off Soviet rule was a kind of reincarnation of their independence.

It was only to be expected that Latvia, like the overwhelming majority of the newly independent states, rejected Russian as a second official language. Thus, the fate of Russian-speaking minorities within these states became a controversial and, to some degree, confrontational issue. The previous asymmetrical bilingualism, where more Latvians learned Russian than Russians learned Latvian, had to be reversed in favour of the titular nation.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN LATVIA

Latvia can serve as an example of a country where the purist language ideology defines power relations in society. The main components of this ideology consist of beliefs that the social cohesion can be achieved through the use of the sole national language by all members of society in all domains of social life, and that unwillingness to acquire and use this language represents a threat to social cohesion (the components of this language ideology can be found in Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015). This section provides an overview of language and citizenship policies in Latvia.

The first constitution of the Republic of Latvia, passed by the Saeima in 1922, when the Republic was born, stipulated that Latvian was to become the official language of the new state. This provision was overruled during the Soviet annexation. Later, in September 1988, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) passed a document, entitled 'On the Status of the Latvian Language', which ascertained the widespread use of the Latvian language in the new historical context. The Latvian language required to be adopted by all government offices, as well as by science and education. The decision was enshrined in law a few months later, in May 1989, and the status of Latvian as the country's official language was judicially confirmed (Hirsa, Joma, Klava & Valdmanis, 2008). After Latvia broke away from the USSR and proclaimed its independence on 4 May 1990, this law was revised, and on 31 March 1992, its new amended version, entitled 'The Law on Languages', was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia. The status of Latvian as the official language was further confirmed on 6 November 1998 in the Latvian Constitution (Satversme), where it was named the one and only state language.

Article 1 of Official Language Law stipulates rights and obligations of Latvian citizens to protect their cultural heritage, including their language and the right to use Latvian in all domains of social life (Official Language Law, Section 1.1,2,3,5), as well as to achieve the social cohesion through integration of national minorities, who are entitled to retain the right to use their mother tongue or other languages (Official Language Law, Section 1.4).

The Constitution contains 26 articles. The final two articles outline new institutions and commissions, charged with implementing the law on the country's State language.

The language law was extensively discussed by the Presidium of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and then by the Latvian Saeima. Numerous amendments were introduced to the original text. The international scholarly community actively commented in English, Latvian and Russian on the complexity and seriousness of issues raised by this legal document (Hogan-Brun, 2006; Hogan-Brun, Ozolins, Ramoniene, Rannut, 2007; Newcity, 2014; Ozolins, 2003; Pavlenko, 2008; Schmid, 2008; Priedite, 2005; Hirska, Joma, Klava, Valdmanis, 2008; Volkov and Kuzhelna, 2000; Leishkalne, 2005). The scholarly discussions were mostly concerned with minority rights and obligations, social cohesion, quality of education in languages other than Latvian, language requirements for citizenship and the general process of linguistic assimilation and social integration.

With respect to both the Latvian government and its people, the Language Law was intended to reverse the situation where, by the end of Soviet rule and its pro-Russian policy, there were more Latvians who could also speak Russian than there were Russians who had learned Latvian. The 1989 USSR census revealed the following numbers: Latvians – 1,387,757, Russians – 905,515, Russian speakers – 1,133,298 (USSR State Statistics Committee 1991). This situation had a practical reason – Russian was the language of all multi-ethnic communication within the USSR; and several subjective reasons – the lack of motivation for Russians to learn Latvian, and Latvians' need to learn Russian for work opportunities and social interaction within Latvia and in the wider Soviet sphere.

Parallel to language legislation, Latvia passed the law on citizenship and naturalisation. 'The Resolution of the Supreme Council on Renewal of Republic of Latvia Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization' was passed on 15 October 1991, reinstates the citizenship law of 1922. As a result, national minorities who moved to Latvia during the Soviet regime, and their descendants, some of whom were born in Latvia, received their education in Latvia, and contributed to a large degree to its economic development *de jure*, lost their legal status and became non-citizens.

With this law, the situation for the Russian minority reversed overnight. They were separated from Russia by national borders and faced an uneasy choice: stay, learn the Latvian language, pass the citizenship exam and enjoy all the rights of the country; go back to Russia and apply for citizenship in the Russian Federation; or continue living in

Latvia as non-citizens, without the right to take part in either national or local elections, or to travel to EU countries (until 2007, when the EU revised its rules).

In fact, the number of industrial enterprises decreased in the early 90s, and many Russian workers chose to leave the country. Those who stayed and were bilingual chose, on an overwhelming scale, to take the citizenship exam. Others started learning the language in order to write the citizenship exam, as there were new language requirements for all applicants for Latvian citizenship. Similar to the A (basic), B (intermediate), and C (advanced) levels for jobs (an overview of levels of fluency can be found in the next section), potential citizens had to attain a level of fluency, marked by understanding information of a social and official nature; freely asking and speaking about social topics; fluently reading and understanding instructions and other everyday texts and writing an essay of a social nature (to a topic supplied by the Commission) (Citizenship Law Latvia, Chapter 3 Sections 19 & 20).

4. STATE AGENCIES DEALING WITH LINGUISTIC ISSUES AND LANGUAGE POLICY

Thus, it was imperative for the Latvian government, after its proclamation of independence from the USSR, to reverse the language situation through legislation. To ensure the effective implementation of its language law, the Latvian government established a network of government, local and volunteer bodies. The State Language Commission was created by the President. At the same time, the Ministry of Justice took control of The State Language Centre, The Experts' Commission of the Latvian Language, The Toponymy Commission and The Latgale Orthography Commission, while the Ministry of Education and Science controlled The Terminological Commission affiliated to the Academy of Sciences, The Terminology and Translation Centre, The State Language Agency, The State Agency for the Latvian Language Development, and The Language Certification Commission. They all need to cooperate, in order to ensure the development of new terms and notions to move with the times and enrich the Latvian language on the one hand, but retain its indigenous character on the other.

The Language Centre was founded in 1992 to maintain state programmes for preserving the Latvian language, ensuring that it is used appropriately in all its domains. It received further impetus for growth, and its status was further enhanced in 2000 when the Cabinet of Ministers approved the 'Statutes for the State Language Centre' that ensure both the development of the Latvian language and the protection of it. Thus, Article 1 of these Statutes stipulates that, "while implementing the state policy, control over compliance

to normative acts and supervision in state language issues, (it) ensures preservation, protection and development of the Latvian language” (Latvia, Legislation. Statutes of the Language Centre, 2000). Since it functions under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice, its prime role is to ensure that the language law is implemented to optimum effect, with appropriate measures to come into force when the law is not adhered to. It is also charged with the organisation of State Proficiency Language tests, and the overall supervision of the language policies implementation. Out of the entire State infrastructure sustaining the titular language policy, it is this Centre that often receives bad publicity for imposing fines on people when they do not uphold the language law in public spaces. In April this year the Mayor of Riga, Nils Ushakovs wrote on his personal Facebook page that he was fined yet another time for responding, in Russian, to school children questions in Russian (Krane, 2017). Generally speaking, it stands to reason that the language used in question is echoed in response, but not in view of Latvian law, even when the question is posed by children in their mother tongue. To improve its public image and promote its steps in the right direction, the Language Centre’s website asserts that the number of imposed fines has decreased, compared to 2015 as the Centre does not consider them to be the most effective way of imposing the language law (VVC, 7.02.2017). Nonetheless, this practice, though narrower in scope, still continues. An earlier media report stated that “... in the first half of 2016, The State Language Centre launched 249 cases and fined 180 individuals for language offences, including 139 people for failing to speak Latvian while performing official state duties” (Meduza Project, 28 July 2016).

The State Language Commission was created in 2002, on the initiative of the former president, Vike-Freiberg, to set out and coordinate the state language policy, to monitor the language situation in the country and develop appropriate strategies, as well as to carry out staffing and budget planning within the agency. The primary goal of the State Language Commission is ‘to identify strategic directions for language policy on the basis of all-encompassing, situational analysis-based research’ (Latvijas Valsts Presidents).

The current Ministry of Education and Science is charged through different commissions and agencies, with the implementation of various titular language programmes. The task of the Terminological Commission, whose history goes back to 1947, is to work out Latvian terminology for the abundant new words and phrases, which find their way into life and language. It has 28 departments, each dealing with its own specific area, such as medicine, demographics, computer science, etc. For example, a word as universal and essential as ‘computer’, is actually relatively new. While most languages, including Russian, have simply taken the word ‘computer’ as their own, it is translated into

Latvian as 'dators'. For whatever reason, though, 'mobile phone' is simply transliterated as 'mobilais telefons'. The Translation and Terminology Centre translates international documents, puts forward suggestions for the unification and standardisation of terms used in law and administration, works out translation methodology, and provides consulting services for EU terminology. It also deals with some contentious language issues. According to Lyons (2003), Latvia's Translation and Terminology Centre has come up "with 51,000 new Latvian words", 'dators' being one of them.

The State Language Agency considers the status and growth of the national language and national minority languages. The guidelines for its activities and planning are discussed by the Cabinet, and presented in a special document. At present, the Official Language Policy Guidelines for 2015-2020, approved by the Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Science, are being implemented. The document provides the current situation in cultural policies, establishes links and priorities and sets the actions, tasks' priorities and policy objectives. It envisages not only to promote and ensure the use of the Latvian language in the public space of Latvia, but to strengthen the skills of the Latvian language for Latvians living abroad, national minorities, non-citizens, new immigrants, as well as to strengthen Latvian identity and the sense of belonging to Latvia for Latvians living abroad (Official Language Policy Guidelines for 2015-2020: 6). A twenty-five-page-long document provides a thorough analysis of the current language situation in the country, as well as strategies for further implementation of language policy in Latvia, in its legal, pedagogical, linguistic and participatory aspects, accompanied by the action directions and tasks (*ibid.*: 22). Following the envisaged Guidelines the Agency carries out its activity in the following areas: consulting on the Latvian language issues, sociolinguistic research, and popularisation and promotion of the Latvian language beyond Latvian borders. It is also in charge of the 'Programme for language development.' It is actively involved in the compilation of dictionaries and reference books. The Agency promotes the use of terminology in Latvian, and the development of a Latvian terminology database. It works in close cooperation with the Latvian Language Institute of the Latvian University, as well as other national research centres. To account for its work, it has published a number of papers, such as the collection of sociolinguistic papers, entitled 'Valodas Situācija Latvijā 2010-2015' (2016), and 'Valodas ideoloģija un plašsaziņas līdzekļi' (2014).

The 'State Agency for Language Development' was established in 1995. It offers a range of Latvian language courses and classes, some of which are free. It also sets out methodologies of Latvian language teaching for schools and adults, and organises events to promote Latvian language learning.

The Language Certification Commission is in charge of the assessment of language skills. Its database monitors improvement in personal language development, and provides certificates for immigrants and national minorities who have successfully passed a language test.

The language test must be taken by national minorities if they seek employment in Latvia, irrespective of their citizenship status. This test can be taken at three different levels: A (basic), B (intermediate), and C (advanced). Each level has the same four parts: reading, writing, listening, and speaking. The examinee receives a certificate, which is produced primarily for employment purposes, to verify results. The basic level consists of tasks concerning reading, writing, listening and speaking, adequate for performing day-to-day activities in Latvian. Intermediate level is suitable for those who are ready to carry out professional tasks in Latvian, e.g. to understand popular science texts, speeches at a normal speed, and to be able to express and comprehend attitudes toward different issues. The advanced level certifies the language competence almost on par with native speakers (see *Valsts Valodas Prasmes Pārbaudes Saturs/ State Language Proficiency Testing N/D*).

The high standard required for Latvian language proficiency in minority groups has created a situation where gaining employment is primarily determined by one's language skills. There is a register of the language proficiency level required for each job. In some cases, the 'official' level for a job is unjustifiably high, and limits employment opportunities for language minorities, with the current job market being as tight as it is. Thus, native speakers have a much better chance of securing high-level jobs in politics, and in society in general. For example, there was a much-publicised case, cited in an article by Michael Newcity (2014) about Ingrida Podkolzina, whose name had been removed from an electoral list of candidates because she had not attained the 'C' level in Latvian. Apparently, a slogan which was popular in the early 1990s – 'Latvia for Latvians!' – has not lost its relevance, and official support of minorities could be mere political correctness.

The language test is a legal requirement for all non-citizens, with the exception of those who obtained their higher education in Latvian educational institutions, using Latvian as their study language, or who obtained their school education in at least 60% of the curriculum subjects, and gained the required level in a centralised exam in Latvian and literature. Eventually, more and more school-leavers, of Russian descent, will be able to gain citizenship this way.

5. RUSSOPHONE MINORITY IN LATVIA

It should be noted that Russian speakers are not always represented by ethnic Russians. Since Russian was the language of inter-ethnic communication in the Soviet Union, members of different ethnic groups often switched to Russian and could even regard Russian as their mother tongue. Among these speakers of Russian, one can find Jews, Ukrainians, Belorussians and other ethnicities. Here is how Blommaert and Verschueren (1992: 360) comment on the popular denominator, “Russian-speakers”: “Russian speakers’ can obviously be no more than a residual category, an extremely heterogeneous group of people who may come from all over the Soviet Union, united by the fact that they speak Russian.” Hence, the denominator “Russian-speakers” represents a formation of the Soviet society. As such, “Russian speakers” often creates an opposition to different ethnic groups and natives of the territory. The notion of “Russian speakers” being heterogeneous by nature, stands in opposition to the homogenous nation states. Hence, Latvia, like most post-Soviet, newly-independent states, is focused on removing its heterogeneity through integration.

Today’s stringent citizenship policy can be attributed to the fact that the Russophone population in Latvia increased significantly during the Soviet occupation, growing from 10.5% of the total population in 1935 (206,499) to 34.0% in 1989 (905,515). That naturally raised concerns within both the Latvian government and its people about the eventual fate of the Latvian nation, its language, culture and identity. As a result of a firm and consistent pro-titular language policy, the percentage of non-citizens living in Latvia had dropped to 12% (257,377) in July 2015, compared to 29% (approximately 730,000) in 1995, when the naturalisation process began. As of 31 July 2015, 143,061 persons had been granted Latvian citizenship through the naturalisation procedure (Centralas statistikas parvaldes datubazes. Retrieved 03.04.2017).

As the result of the implementation of the Language Law, the Russian language has been forced out of many public domains. All legal acts, documents, forms, and all information, such as street signs and transport information, both visual and oral, are now available only in Latvian, as is tertiary education. There is a brief news summary, in Russian, on local television. Other than that, all television broadcasts and programmes are in Latvian, although Russian speakers, thanks to modern technology, can subscribe to a variety of Russian channels on cable television, or can access them online. There are still five Russian-language newspapers published in Latvia, although print editions, as is happening around the world, are gradually being phased out by online editions.

The aspect of Latvia's official language policy which arousing most concern, on the part of the Russophone minority, is education. The complexity of educational context and educational reform in Latvia are thoroughly researched by Silova. As she observes (Silova, 2006:172), "The transfer of global discourse was skilfully used by local agency to reach other ends, including reconciliation of international pressures for democratization and "multiculturalization" with the local politics of Latvinization". Adding salt to the wound, the Latvian government has recently made a number of as-yet-rhetorical attempts to have 80% of schooling in Russian schools, actually done in Latvian. According to media reports, this model is surreptitiously being implemented in some Russian schools as an experiment, a move which has been met with staunch opposition on the part of the Russophone community.

If this does, in fact, become the new standard, then the only subjects taught in Russian will be Russian language and Russian literature, raising concerns about the quality of education in other subjects, as well as the general intellectual development of Russian children. President Vike-Freiberga did not share such concerns when she proclaimed the purpose of the reform program as one to guarantee "each and every child, regardless of nationality," (the ability to be able to) "freely speak Latvian after graduating from school. Therefore, everyone would have an equal opportunity to make their career both in the state and private sector" (Schmid, 2008:11).

The Russian-speaking community, through the limited public forums available to them, has made several attempts to require a commission to assess the quality of education in subjects which are taught in Latvian, currently 60% of subjects. To date, this has not generated a response which satisfies the Russian speakers. It remains up to individual schools to decide how to distribute the 60% ratio, although several models of bilingual education have been developed by the Ministry of Education. According to the Latvian Law on Education (1998), the introduction of its bilingual-education policy began in the 1999-2000 school year, in accordance with Article 9, which states that "the language for acquiring an education in state and municipal institutions shall be the state language". As a result, elementary school, previously taught in the mother tongue, "began to work on the basis of a minority education programme in two languages." (Zepa et al, 2006:27). Four bilingual-education models are offered to choose from. The freedom for a school to choose the most desirable model is methodologically justified and highly commendable, but it is often limited by the availability of teaching staff, as the generation of bilingual teachers who completed their bilingual education before 1990, has now been succeeded by a generation that was educated only in Latvian.

As we can see, education in the titular language is one of the cornerstones of Latvia's integration policy. That being said, it is also a source of disagreement between the two communities. The negative attitude to education reform, however, does not suggest a negative attitude towards bilingualism, on the part of the Russian community (cf. Schmid, 2008). As Leishkalne (2005) points out, it is clear that the conflict between the state and the Russian-speaking community is not about the requirement to teach and learn Latvian, but about the speed at which this requirement is being introduced into school education.

6. ENGLISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF INTEGRATION INTO THE NEW WORLD ORDER

While the Latvian government appears to focus on its resolute language policy for minorities, the country's total population has continued to decrease. In 2015, for the first time since the 1950s, the total population of Latvia fell below 2 million. Compared to the 1990 population, that is a 25% decrease. It stands to reason that much of the decrease can be attributed to Russians who would not tolerate the status of being non-citizens, but there are two other significant factors – a low birth-rate among Latvians, and emigration to more-developed countries of the EU, primarily Britain, Ireland and Sweden, in search of a better life. It is noteworthy that the Latvian parliament had to introduce an amendment to its citizenship law, so that children born to Latvian citizens abroad, would be granted Latvian citizenship. To further diminish the threat to the future of the Latvian language posed by emigration, the Latvian government has worked out a strategic plan for the period of 2015-2020, which envisages a set of measures to increase its link with Latvian diaspora, through diplomatic and other channels, and has created a Diaspora Policy Working Group, affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. It is a timely move because, according to the estimates by the Foreign Ministry for 2012, about 370,000 Latvian nationals are permanently residing outside Latvia, most of them having emigrated in the past decade (Diaspora Policy in Latvia 24.03.2004).

To follow this trail further, one has to admit that a new kind of bilingualism is emerging, i.e. proficiency in Latvian as the mother tongue, along with English as a global language. For the Russophone community, it suggests aspiration to acquire three languages, i.e. Russian, Latvian and English. Along with other European languages, English has always been in the curriculum of both Latvian and Russian schools and tertiary institutions, but there was little motivation to study it when the country's borders were closed. However, once borders started opening in the early 1990s, the appeal of English was hard to resist.

Thus, many of Latvia's schools of higher learning, both government-financed and private tertiary institutions, have started introducing English as a language of instruction. Some private schools offer only limited education in English, while others, like the Stockholm School of Economics (founded in 1994), provide tuition exclusively in English. Parallel to the growing number of tertiary-level courses offered in English, the number of private English-language schools has also proliferated. This combination of private initiative and state support has given rise to a new kind of bilingualism, one which is governed by the need for integration into both European and world communities.

7. CONCLUSION

To conclude, Latvia, after gaining its independence in 1990, has moved a long way towards developing as a nation and promoting its titular language, not only within, but also outside of the country. One can hear the Latvian language spoken at EU sessions and debates. As one of the EU's 27 members since 2004, Latvia has its interpreters in Strasburg. For now, that is a great boost for the language and a source of pride and prestige for the country. But if we look at the republic from within, then we can say that the primary goal of the Latvian government, that of restoring and sustaining Latvian as the sole language of public communication, is not always welcomed with equal enthusiasm on the part of minorities. While the minorities welcome the idea of bilingualism, they have concerns about the speed at which the policy is being implemented, particularly in school education.

It can be argued that, to overcome the complex Soviet legacy in Latvia, in terms of both nation and language development, the government must resolutely pursue its top-down policies, responding to the aspirations of Latvian people but top down policies, even when successful, come at a price for the language community that is being targeted, particularly at the beginning of their implementation. Only time can heal the wounds they have brought. In the case of Latvia, the welcome signs of healing are in the pipeline. Cheskin's recent comprehensive research (Cheskin, 2000), based on a wide range of sources, including newspaper articles, focus-group discussions, survey data, news articles from political parties and interviews with Latvian politicians, reveals that the younger generation of Russians in Latvia has accommodated itself much better to the present policies and are better prepared to march along with them. Nevertheless, some flexibility in reference to minorities, could go a long way. As it is, until now, Latvia managed to avoid serious clashes between language communities.

Schmid (2008:9) suggests: “Despite its difficult historical and political heritage, Latvia was able to escape violent ethnic conflicts and under pressure from the EU, OSCE, and CoE fashion a language law that met the requirements of the international community, if somewhat grudgingly”. At the same time, some media reports suggest, that the stringent policy toward speakers of the non-native language can alienate the community, rather than lead to a linguistic assimilation (Roxburg, 2005, see also Pavlenko, 2008a). It is always debatable whether the social cohesion can be achieved through minimising public benefits for those who did not master the official language, or through granting official status to the language of a sizeable minority, as it happened in Finland, recognising the rights of 6 per cent of Swedish speakers.

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THE NATION-BUILDING LINGUIST: ON THE STATUS AND IDEOLOGIES OF LANGUAGE PLANNING INSTITUTIONS IN POST-1990S CROATIA AND LITHUANIA

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Abstract

The national language became the central distinguishing feature of some nations that gained independence after the fall of the Berlin wall. In two such countries, Croatia and Lithuania, 'pure language' became a national value very quickly, and campaigns for the purification of language were started. Through these processes, language experts were included in a much broader process of building up a new national identity, and a number of new language planning (LP) institutions were established, for this reason. The aim of this paper is to compare the legal status of LP institutions, as well as the ideologies behind their work on LP in Croatia and Lithuania. The comparative study is structured around several factors (1) legal documents, reports and programmes concerning LP and LP institutions, (2) professional publications in the field of what I, here, call Croatian/Lithuanian 'post-1990 language planning scholarship'¹ – articles that describe, comment on and provide future plans for LP; and (3) news articles concerning issues in LP and LP institutions. These are used to illuminate the legal status and ideological positions that guide the work of LP institutions in Croatia and Lithuania.

1. BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDY

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and of Yugoslavia, countries with newly regained independence faced the challenge of building up a modern democratic state. Apart from a new political and economic system that had to be established, national

1 The term is used in this article to refer to a field of study that emerged in both countries after the 1990s. The foci of this field include setting goals of language planning in relation to the new political and social environment, defining 'linguistic issues', which come with the new political circumstances, such as language use in public/media, language status etc. They also present the work that has been done in language planning, provide theoretical grounds for language planning work and/or give recommendations for future language planning efforts.

identity had to be re-imagined, by means of establishing a new civic culture, symbols, re-thinking the school system, etc. In this last, cultural dimension of nation-building, language played a great role, especially in the two countries which are the subject of this study – Croatia and Lithuania. Both are considered unique cases of identity planning through language, because of the radical corpus planning efforts that started from the 1990s. The Croatian linguists engaged in purification the Croatian language from, at first, Serbian loanwords, then words from Bosnian (or words of Turkic/Arabic origin), Russian (and Old Church Slavic) and English languages (Turk & Opašić 2008). The Lithuanian linguists had, on the other hand, already been engaged in certain purist practices during the Soviet period, possibly influenced by the pre-Second World War linguistic tradition in Lithuania (Vaicekauskienė 2011:107). But what truly intensified after the regaining of independence was the legal power of the linguistic institutions, which were now authorised to penalise incorrect language use in many spheres: public and in printed media (including spoken language on TV and radio), as well as larger publications such as novels and schoolbooks. The fines today are set between 86 and 434 euros for the first time, and between 173 and 434 euros for repeated violations of the Code (RLA 2013, art 91⁽¹⁾ to 91⁽⁷⁾).

Of course, these practices were not invented *ex nihilo*, after the regained independence, but originate from a tight connection between the linguistic traditions and political history in the two societies. The main similarity on the level of practices is that they are based on a tradition of linguistic purism, that reaches over a century into the past, which has continued in the period of regained independence (for further information on purism in these two societies, see Langston & Peti-Stantić 2011; Turk *et al* 2008; Greenberg 2004 for Croatia; Vaicekauskienė 2009; Spires 1999; Tamaševičius 2016 for Lithuania). Purism can be said to be a cognitive scheme, which, in the case of language, sees some of its “elements as ‘pure’ (therefore desirable) and others as ‘impure’ (therefore undesirable)” (Thomas 1991:19).

As language became a national value, the linguists who work at LP institutions were entangled in the process of shaping the new societies’ superstructure. In spite of being guided by the idea of purism, LP institutions exhibit a number of legal, structural and functional differences, especially in their relation to the state and state projects. Lithuania presents a case of a very successful establishment of permanent LP institutions (as much as three of them are legally recognised as LP institutions), while Croatia can be seen as a case where the establishment of such institutions mostly failed, in spite of the generally recognised public need for some kind of language regulation (only one had

been established, but it was closed after only seven years). The main aim of this paper is to provide a detailed, comparative account of LP institutions in Croatia and Lithuania and the ideals and ideologies that have guided their work in the period after the regained independencies.

The individual objectives of this paper are, first, to compare the developments of institutions themselves (their formal and legal basis, including how/if they changed in the period starting from 1990 until today) and second, to compare the scholarship on LP that guides the work of LP institutions. The material is based on legal texts, laws, agreements made in LP institutions and ‘post 1990s language planning scholarship’, consisting of articles taken from the journals that specialise in normative linguistics, ‘language culture’² and language planning (Croatian *Jezik: Časopis za kulturu hrvatskoga književnoga jezika* [Language: Journal for the Culture of Croatian Literary Language, my translation] and Lithuanian *Gimtoji kalba* [The Mother Tongue, my translation]). The articles from Croatian journals were mostly obtained through the official Scientific Portal of the Republic of Croatia (*Hrčak*), others acquired individually or through direct contact with the author. The Lithuanian journals were obtained through an online corpus of professional and public texts about language in the period of 1960-2010, *Apie kalbą 1960–2010 m. periodikoje. Šaltinių rinkinys*. (About Language in the Period of 1960-2010. A Collection of Sources), created within the project of *Lietuvių kalbs: Idealai, ideologijos ir tapatybės lūžiai* (Lithuanian Language: Ideals, Ideologies and Identity Shifts, official English name).

2. DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE PLANNING INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOLARSHIP IN CROATIA AND LITHUANIA

In this section, I first present a brief history of LP in Croatia and Lithuania, then the current status of LP institutions, and lastly, I analyse the Croatian and Lithuanian ‘post-1990 language planning scholarship’. Section 2.1 presents this in the Croatian, and section 2.2 in the Lithuanian context. Section 2.3 provides a comparative discussion of the results.

2 The term in both Lithuania and Croatia (as well as many other East and South-East European countries) is largely based on the notion that language is a cultural/national good, in need of care and protection. This view of language “marginalizes language in use, instead putting the stress on language as a cultural artefact” (Davies 2008:436)

2.1 Croatia

Croatia had become an independent state in 1991, after a long history of subordination to larger state formations. The state of Croatia, in territorially various forms, has enjoyed varying levels of autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918), the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (until 1941) and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1991), but a modern nation-state, in its current form, was only constituted after the break-up of Socialist Yugoslavia.

Historical background

On a larger historical scale, one of the central questions in Croatian LP was the relationship with neighbouring peoples and their languages. The dominant attitude of Croatian linguists, through generations, has moved from an 'unificationist' ideology in the 19th century, towards a 'separationist' ideology in the 20th century (cf Badurina & Matešić 2011). In the period of 19th century romanticism, a group of Croatian intellectuals, headed by a prominent linguist, Ljudevit Gaj, were the leaders of a pan-(Southern-) Slavic 'Illyrian movement', which sought to bring all Southern Slavs together in a single nation-state. This group was instrumental in establishing the first standard language of the region, by making an agreement over a common literary language in 1850, with two prominent Serbian linguist (lexicographer Vuk Karadžić and historian-philologist Đuro Daničić) and one Slovenian linguist (Franc Miklošič, a prominent historical linguist). This agreement was made in Vienna, as most of the population of these three peoples lived in Austro-Hungary, and a need for the South Slavic people to have their literary language had been present for some time before that. This first standard came to be known under different names, such as 'Illyrian', 'Serbian-Croatian-Slovene' and 'Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian'.

The Pan-Slavic ideas were slowly abandoned in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which disappointment for this project grew, as this 'Kingdom of South Slavs' was becoming more centralised in Belgrade and, eventually, the King introduced a dictatorship in 1929. The national concerns slowly rose above the super-national ones in this period. After World War II, in the 'Titoist' period of 1945-1990, Croatia was one of the republics in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. In this period, the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian language policy was the official policy, which sought to bring Croatian and Serbian standard languages closer together (Slovenian had been separated as a different standard, but Croatian and Serbian standards were based on the literary agreement of 1850). This meant that agreements had to be made between linguists from Belgrade and

Zagreb over a common standard language. However, their ideologies differed – Serbian linguists sought to bring the Croatian (Western) and the Serbian (Eastern) variety³ of Serbo-Croatian together, and also sought to have more control over both languages (Greenberg 2004:29). Robert Greenberg’s research has shown that Croatian linguists had the opposite intentions – during this period, a number of small, but symbolically strong differences were introduced into the Western standard (Greenberg, 2002:49). Here, we also see divisions between linguists in Croatia: some keener on cooperation with the Serbian side, while others sought to separate the standards, a tension which will be discussed in further detail in the next section.

The official separation of the two standard languages was realised after the break-up of Yugoslavia, when new institutions were established in order to create and facilitate the new Croatian standard language.

Language planning institutions after 1990

The new Croatian constitution defined the Croatian language as the official state language (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, art XII.), but the linguists did not agree on what the new standard language should be like. While there was consensus regarding certain LP issues, the linguists split into groups over the issues of orthography and lexicographical practice. The main factor of division was connected to the issue of a new orthographical manual for school. In Croatia, it is common to issue so-called ‘orthographical dictionaries’, which consist of two main parts, a list of orthographical rules and a dictionary – a list of words with correct spellings (in original, they are called *Pravopis*, directly translated as ‘orthography’. Here, I prefer the translation ‘dictionary’ to ‘manual’, because the wordlists occupy a proportionally large part of the dictionary). In the text of the paper they will be referred to as ‘dictionaries’.

Two circles of experts were formed in the 1990s: one centred around a few professors University of Zagreb’s department of Croatistics, and the other one at the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts and the Institute for the Croatian Language and Linguistics. Already then, the linguists from the University of Zagreb opposed a major orthographical reform suggested by the Academy. This reform was largely based on an infamous *Hrvatski pravopis* [Croatian orthographical dictionary] (my translation) from 1971 (Greenberg 2004:125), an illegally printed dictionary that was controversial, due to the name (at the time, the official name of the language was Croato-Serbian), the

3 Serbo-Croatian in the period 1945-1990 had two *de facto* standards, which were called the Eastern (used primarily in Serbia) and the Western (Used primarily in Croatia and Bosnia).

spelling system, as well as the lexicon that diverged greatly from what was agreed upon with the Serbian linguists (some lexical units were based on pre-Yugoslavian Croatian purist ideals, which, for the authorities, was indicative of nationalism and separatism). The dictionary was forbidden by the authorities, and never reached the general public in Croatia. A copy was printed in London by a group of Croatians living there; some draft versions were left in Croatia, labelled 'for internal use only' (ICLL 2015a). After the university professors opposed the re-issue of this dictionary in 1992, the division became clear: Nataša Bašić, one of the linguists working at the Academy, states: [the actions of the Zagreb [university] department in 1992 strengthened the enemies of the Croatian orthographical dictionary in the media, and became their scholarly protectors] ("Svojim je postupkom 1992. zagrebačka Katedra izravno osnažila protivnike Hrvatskoga pravopisa u medijima i postala njihovim znanstvenim zaštitnicima") (Bašić 2012:60, my translation). As there was no agreement, each group published its own dictionary with different solutions, thus there are two competing dictionaries of Croatian circulating on the market.

However, it was the latter, Academy-based group (together with the Institute for the Croatian Language and Linguistics) that managed to establish the Council for the Norms of the Croatian Standard Language in 2005.⁴ It was established as an advisory body of the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport and was assigned a leading role in matters of language. This institution enabled the Academy-based linguists to have an infrastructure of now three institutions that would function as a 'language academy' (Langston *et al* 2011), meaning that they actively engage in LP efforts and function like a traditional academy, such as the *Académie française*. It includes work on the language norm, codification of new words and terms, surveillance of language use and 'language culture' (see footnote 2). The opening of the Council also envisioned an opening of a "State office for language-advisors", which would language-check all state documents (creating a system of *language control*), but such an institution was never opened (Bašić 2012:64). The aspirations of the language experts to establish a powerful LP institution system were not fully realised.

The turbulent period around the establishment of the Council is well documented in literature and provides indications about the power struggles it faced. It was under a

4 Note: In this paper, only this Academy-based group will be the object of research. The other group of university professors did have an influence on language policy because of the publication and re-issues of their orthographical dictionaries, but they have published almost no papers about language policy. This study currently has to be limited to that group of linguists, who have been, to a certain degree, successful in institutionalising new LPIs in the post 1990s period, and have published papers about standard language and language planning.

government led by a centre-right party (Croatian Democratic Union), that the Council was instituted. However, the government did not accept the absolute power of the Council to decide upon the norms, which caused dissatisfaction among the linguists working in the Council. This was clear already when one of the first decisions of the Council was made, namely that “I will not” should be spelled *ne ću* instead of the earlier *neću* (as two separate words, rather than one). This seemingly marginal difference in spelling actually has very strong ideological connotations, as the preferred spelling of “I will not”, in the Yugoslavian period, was the single word *neću*, and the banned *Croatian orthographical dictionary* from 1971 suggested the phrase to be constructed in separate words (*ne ću*):

“Povratkom HDZ-a na vlast 2003. otpočelo je u Hrvatskoj novo agonijsko razdoblje. (...) Kada je ono (...) donijelo odluku (...) da se piše nesastavljeno ne ću, tadašnji premijer Ivo Sanader požurio je obznaniti hrvatskoj javnosti kako politika ne će određivati jezične norme, ali da on kao građanin ne će pisati nesastavljeno ne ću(...) te da je možda ipak još prerano donositi konačnu odluku. (...) Iako je odluka, kako se vidi, već bila donesena, nije se uklapala u Sanaderovu pravopisnu želju.” [With the return of the Croatian Democratic Union to power in 2003, a new period of agony began. (...) When it [the Council] (...) decided that (...) *ne ću* shall be spelled separately, the Prime Minister of the time, Ivo Sanader, hurried to explain to the Croatian public that politics shall not decide upon language norms, but that he as a citizen will not spell *ne ću* as two separate words, so that it may be too early to make such a decision (...) Even though the decision, as we can see, had already been made, it did not fit into Sanader’s orthographic wish (...).] (Bašić 2012:63, my translation)

The Council’s decisions were controversial from the very beginning, which might be the reason their decisions were taken with great caution by the politicians, and it might have affected its stability.

Seven years after its establishment, this institution was dismissed (in 2012) when a new, centre-left government came into power. The head of the Council commented publicly that the decision to dismiss the Council was political, and the news media entitled the news as “They shut us down, because they are bothered by the spirit of Croatian language” (Vuković, 2012). Again, the political context surrounding the event reveals the influence of politics on LP institutions. The minister dismissed the Council approximately six months after his party (Socialdemocratic Party) formed government. This could mean that the work of this group of linguists, and their ideological stances, were valued differently by different political parties, and could be indicative of the fact that linguists were asking for the support of certain politicians. Looking back at the

political difficulties the Council faced, Bačić provides an interpretation of the political events that took place: The Socialdemocratic Party is blamed for a [comprehensive dissolution of state institutes and institutions with national suffixes. Even the existence of a Croatian people and Croatian language as historical phenomena is being denied] (“sveobuhvatnom rastakanju državnih instituta i institucija nacionalnoga predznaka. Počinje se osporavati čak i samo postojanje hrvatskoga naroda i hrvatskoga jezika kao povijesnih pojavnosti.”) (Bačić, 2012:62, my translation). The author continues to criticise the Socialdemocratic party about opening space for what is seen as dangerous for the Croatian language: the Yugoslavian/Serbo-Croatian sentiments, left-wing ideologies and undesirable international pressure – she refers to critics of Croatian LP institutions, that support the name ‘Serbo-Croatian’, for some of them even claiming to be helped by editors of pro-Yugoslav media and the “the Soros foundation” (Bačić, 2012:62).

A previous study (Langston *et al*, 2011:348) has shown that, the Institute for the Croatian Language and Linguistics and the Academy, have worked together (along with the Council), but analysis of contributions to the journal, *Jezik*, in the post-2012 period, shows a further division among these two institutions. In 2012, after the Council was dismissed, the Institute abandoned their traditional ally, when a new head was elected in the Institute, a linguist called Željko Jozić. He announced that the first main task under his leadership would be to solve the issue of there being two quite different dictionaries on the market (ICLL 2015, b). When the dictionary was presented for public debate, it met with criticism from the Academy-based linguists, because it compromised in orthographical solutions between the other two competing ones, and did not follow the agreements of the (at the time, already former) Council for the Norms of the Croatian Language Standard (Bačić, 2014). The hostility between the two institutions escalated quickly, as newspapers soon published that Jozić accused that [Croatian bigotry and envy have won in the Academy] (“U HAZU-u su pobijedili hrvatska zadrstost i jal”) (Piteša, 2013.). The Institute also answered to the criticism in the journal, *Jezik*, and presented their new and theoretical grounds for a new dictionary. It was not grounded in the works of the Academy-based group of linguists, but in fresh doctoral dissertations, and works of Lada Badurina and Mihaela Matešić from the University of Rijeka (cf Badurina & Matešić, 2012). In the aftermath, the same minister that dismissed the Council now recommended the Institute’s new dictionary for use in elementary and high schools. The Academy now lost the leading role in LP, but as new actors have emerged, future development will show whether a more permanent LP institution will be constituted in Croatia, or whether the power will be exchanged between different institutions depending on the political party in power.

Post-1990 Croatian language planning scholarship

This section will review the scholarship with regards to the corpus, status, acquisition and prestige planning efforts. The corpus planning efforts in Croatia, in the 1990s, have been well described by both local and international scholars, so this section will review those and continue to the unique aspects of Croatian LP scholarship.

In corpus planning, the first words that were to be purified were those from Serbian (Pranjković, 1997), as well as those that had to do with communist ideology, such as the word for “worker” (*radnik* became *djelatnik*) (Kapović, 2011:108). ‘Anglicisms’ came second, as it happened in many other places in the 2nd part of the 20th century, due to the fear of globalisation; a negative attitude towards them had been present in the Yugoslav period as well (Truk *et al* 2008). Also corrected were some ‘Germanisms’, ‘internationalisms’, words from Russian or Church Slavonic origin (Štrkalj 2003:176-177), words from Arabic and Turkish, via Bosnia (Greenberg, 2004:124). On the other hand, words from Italian, Hungarian and French origin tend to be labelled ‘adoptees’, and many of them were kept in their original form (Greenberg, 2004:123). The main LP principle, here, is probably that of reformist purism (Thomas, 1991:79) – desirable vs. undesirable words are chosen, according to the linguistic identity the ‘purifier’ seeks to create (the identity should be clearly separated from all geopolitical enemies and associated languages, which have had a history of domination over Croatian, along with a new, global threat – English).

Status planning is not a very prominent topic in the journals which I have examined, but ‘prestige planning’ is accentuated. According to the head of the Council, Radoslav Katičić, the goals of this institution included fixing the “deeply disturbed” relationship of the Croatian people towards their standard language:

“(…) koliko god imamo valjano izgrađen i dobro razvijen jezični standard, odnos hrvatske jezične zajednice prema njemu duboko poremećen. Nedostaje joj uravnotežene jezične svijesti i samosvijesti. (...) Vijeću se stoga postavljao zadatak (...) uravnoteživanj[a] shvaćanja o svojem standardnom jeziku u našoj kulturnoj javnosti.” [... even though we have a well-build and developed linguistic standard, the relationship of the Croatian linguistic community towards it is deeply disturbed. There is a lack of a balanced linguistic consciousness and self-awareness. (...) The Council is, thus, posed with the task of (...) balancing out the understanding of our own standard language in our cultural public.] (Katičić, 2012:162, my translation)

A central goal of post-1990 Croatian language planning scholarship was to develop a new tradition in standard language and LP studies. Having had almost no fully independent LP institutions, the Croatian linguists sought to distance themselves from the LP scholarship that had been imposed upon them, mostly, as they feel, from Serbian linguists and Croatian linguists that cooperated on the joint Serbo-Croatian language project. The new scholarship arises from the need to define the concept 'Croatian language', which had not been known as a separate language in the world before that.

First, Croatian linguists distance themselves from what he calls 'the neo-grammarians' understanding of standard language as based on a single dialect (Katičić, 2009:33), which is claimed to be dominant amongst Serbian linguists. They stress that the Croatian standard language has a three-dialect-based history, that dialects are mixed with standard language in everyday speech, and what defines the Croatian standard language is the history of communication between Croats from different parts of Croatia (Katičić, 2009: 34). The choice of 'the nation as a whole' as the basis is more favourable to define the new a standard language than just a dialect. Had that basis been 'dialect', the language would have been based on the same dialect as Bosnian and Serbian standards (all are based on the neo-Shtokavian dialect, which covers a big part of Bosnia, Eastern Croatia and Western Serbia), thus it is less suitable for distinguishing Croatian as a separate language from Bosnian and Serbian.

This can also be seen in a decision about the names 'Bosniak language' and the 'Bosnian language'. When Bosnia and Herzegovina separated from Yugoslavia, the term 'Bosnian language' was suggested by Bosnian linguists. However, both Croatian and Serbian authorities readily dismissed this name, as they stressed that 'Bosnian' is an umbrella term for all peoples living in Bosnia, including Croats and Serbs (they often call themselves 'Bosnian Croats' and 'Bosnian Serbs', respectively). They claim that 'Bosniacs' is the only acceptable term for the Muslim population, and conclude that their language should be called 'Bosniac' language. Here we see the domination of the one-nation-one-language principle. One of the leading Croatian linguists, a theoretician of standard languages, Dalibor Brozović, argues that language policy should follow the "pretensions of the people" (Brozović, 1999:13) and, therefore, Bosniacs may call their language 'Bosnian', but the Croatian language should recognise only the name 'Bosniac language', because this is in Croatian national interest – to protect the feelings of those Croats living in Bosnia (Brozović, 1999). Brozović's views on language naming is indicative of the fact that linguistic trends are obliged to follow the state priority that seeks to protect all Croats – linguistically and otherwise.

Croatian LP scholarship also actively plans the status of Croatian language in international academia (aiming to replace the old term Serbo-Croatian). This is visible in another group of articles, consisting of reviews of foreign publications that concern the Croatian language. On one hand, Leopold Auburger, a German slavist, was praised by Dubravka Sesar (a linguist and a member of the Academy) for his work concerning the struggle of the Croatian language against what he termed ‘Serbocroatianism’ (Sesar, 2010). Auburger’s detailed study presented ‘Serbocroatianism’ as a concept used to dominate the Croats and Croatian language, by forming ties with [*panserbism* with ideological elements of truly ethnic and optionally declared Serbianism, as well as Greater-Serbian external political expansion] (“*panserbizam s ideološkim čimbenicima realno etničkoga i opcijski deklariranoga srpstva kao i velikosrpska vanjskopolitička ekspanzija*”) (Auburger, 2009:11, my italics), and [state-political Yugoslavianism] (“*državopolitičkim jugoslavizmom*”) (Auburger, 2009:259, my translation). Originally published in 1999, Auburger’s publication became highly quoted in LP scholarship and he became an external member of Academy in 2000. In a similar way, the work of Robert Greenberg “Language and Identity in the Balkans”, came down under very heavy criticism in Croatian LP scholarship, for talking about Serbo-Croatian as an autonomous language. Nataša Bašić, a linguist at the Academy invited the “American dilatant”, Greenberg, to examine the differences on the ‘linguistic level’ (Bašić, 2009:22), rather than to write a book about a language that never even existed, meaning Serbo-Croatian (Bašić, 2009:15).

Another aspect of LP scholarship has to do with planning the ideological grounds for the new standard. This is best exemplified through what Sjepan Babić and Sandra Ham (members of Council for the Norms of the Croatian Language Standard) termed, “orthographic wars”, a series of newspaper-mediated debates between linguists about the two competing orthographical dictionaries (Babić & Ham, 2005). Babić, one of the original authors of the famous 1971 ‘Croatian orthographical dictionary’, has provided a detailed criticism of the competitor’s orthography. Through this article we see the Babić group’s ideological position: He criticises the inclusion of words that have been either imposed upon the Croats (such as *sport*, which, according to him, was introduced during Yugoslavian times, instead of *šport*), the lacking Croatian equivalent-words next to certain foreign ones and also criticised the lack of explanations of ideologically laden words, such as a word that signifies one of the partisan movements in Serbia during World War II, *četnik*: The competitor describes the word *četnik* as “a member of the pro-Serbian monarchist military forces during World War II”, but Babić sees it as problematic that there is no mention of “a war criminal, a fascist” (Babić, 2000:177). He finally states that the competing dictionary imposes an ideology of Serbo-Croatian, because of

solutions that are similar to those of Yugoslavian-era dictionaries (Babić, 2000). A clear goal of this group's LP efforts is not only to plan the identity through language, but to form the new linguistic norm, in accordance with a new pro-Croatian ideology, and erase the unificationist Yugoslavian ideology from LP.

In conclusion, the agenda of Croatian linguists of LP institutions and their work on Croatian LP scholarship entailed the following: 1) to provide theoretical grounds that would define Croatian as an autonomous language, and practical suggestions for the purification of the Croatian standard language, 2) to raise awareness about the importance of a standard Croatian language, stress the necessity of using "correct" standard language and to promote the work of the language advisors, 3) to create a new theoretical concept for a standard language in order to dismiss the one from Yugoslavian times (the new one is based on the idea that standard language is a social construct, created from communicative practices amongst members of the same nation).

2.2 Lithuania

"Kalbą reikia pirmiausia tvartyki kitais būdais, nors kam ne kam gali padėti ir baudos. (...) Geruosė namuosė ant sienos kabo diryas, bet vaikai kasdien nepliekiami, kartais užtenka diržą parodyti arba vien primineti ..." [Language should be primarily managed with other means, but someone could be helped by a fine. (...) In good homes, there is a belt hanging on the wall, but the children are not spanked every day, sometimes it is enough only to show the belt, or just to remind [them of it] ...] (Urnėžiūte, 1992:29, my translation)

The above quote is from a 1992 interview with Parnas Kniūkšta, first head of the newly opened Department of Language Culture, at the Research Institute on Lithuanian Language. The word "belt" is used as a metaphor for the Language Inspectorate, which was going to be established soon after.

Lithuanians share a history of domination by other larger countries, and had some degree of autonomy under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. During a period of 150 years, Lithuanian LP went from being an idea in nationalist movement magazines, to the most extensive system of language control and surveillance in Europe today.

Historical background

The first ideas in Lithuanian LP were sparked by purist thoughts, that can be traced to mid-19th century, when one of the first issues of the Lithuanian magazine *Auszra* [Dawn] invited to purge German and Slavic words from Lithuanian (Tamaševičiaus, 2016:244). Towards the end of the 19th century, an independent Lithuanian state became a planned project, and the Lithuanian intelligentsia that led it, took special pride in the Lithuanian language because its ancient features were sparking interest among Western linguists (Spires, 1999:491). Later, some independent LP efforts took place during the first Lithuanian Republic (1918-1940). Since most Lithuanians were, at least, bilingual (mostly in Russian, Polish or Yiddish), and the prestige of the Lithuanian language was not high, LP focused mostly on status planning, increasing the language's prestige. To this end, it was quite successful (Spires, 1999:495).

The LP efforts in the independent Republic of Lithuania were interrupted by World War II, but continued in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania (1945-1988), where the first formal LP institution, the Lithuanian Language Commission, was instituted in 1961. Šepetyš (2012:45) shows that this Commission was dependent on the Lithuanian Communist Party, which initiated and halted the work of the Commission a repeated number of times in the period between 1961 and 1987 and that their work was heavily influenced by the political decisions made in Moscow (Šepetyš 2012:45). Lithuanian linguists, who were working at this institution, upheld a prescriptivist attitude towards language, which presented language cultivation and correct use of language as a matter of personal "moral decency, education and even hygiene" (Tamaševičiaus, 2016:247).

LPs after 1990

The Lithuanian Parliament first proclaimed the Lithuanian language to be the "state language"⁵, and continued passing more language-regulating laws, which foresaw more LP institutions.

The Lithuanian Language Commission grew into the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language in 1993, a fully independent LP body, to which the tasks of language regulation,

5 The translation of the phrase "*valstybinė kalba*" could also be "*national language*", as the word "*valstybinė*" often denotes "national", as well as "state / owned or governed by the state". Here, I will use the term 'state language', as this is the official English translation. It is important to note that any of the translations differs greatly from the phrasing found in the Croatian law, which defines only the 'official language'. The Lithuanian phrasing could suggest obligatory use of language in all spheres of life within the state, while the Croatian phrasing suggests a clear limitation to the state apparatus only. This is confirmed in the comparison of the results (see 2.3) – Lithuanian language planning institutions legally have a much broader sphere of influence.

norm-creation and “directions for the care of Lithuanian language” were entrusted (LSL 1995, art 20). They also provide expert opinions on all questions concerning language policy.

A separate, fully independent, nation-wide institution was established in 1995, namely the State Language Inspectorate, which controls the implementation of the Law on the State Language, from 1995 (RLA 1995). Since this Act deals with both status and corpus issues, the Inspectorate has the role of language surveillance and the right to penalise incorrect language use and use of non-state languages. The maximum fine today amounts to 434 euros, and can be sent to institutions, companies, organisations or individuals that make a language mistake listed in The List of Great Language Errors (RLA 1997). The list consists of eight chapters, ranging from lexical over inflectional to pronunciation errors. It includes approximately 456 individual points, each representing a micro-category (many include multiple words/phrases/morphemes, so the total number of individual prohibited linguistic items is far greater). From a legal point of view, the Inspectorate is the most powerful institution of language control in whole of Europe, since they can coercively and directly influence all public language use. Apart from imposing fines, the Inspectorate can also give recommendations, warnings and demands from institutions, to report back on improvement in language use, in order to avoid fines. These warnings and recommendations are, perhaps, as powerful as the fines – one journalist of the Lithuanian national television service, Jogailas Morkūnas, was replaced on the morning show he was hosting because of the warning of the Inspectorate about the incorrectness of his language; due to another similar warning, one reporter’s time on air was reduced, as the television station promised that his reports would be read by professional news hosts, instead of him reporting directly to the camera (Pupkis, 1996:5).

Another part of the system of LP institutions includes two departments at the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language: first, The Centre of Terminology provides a database of “Lithuanian cognates” of new words that stem from foreign languages, and second, the Centre for Standard Language Research (formerly called “Department of Language Culture”) is the main centre of LP scholarship. Their articles are published, primarily, in a journal that specialises in standard language and LP, *Gimtoji kalba*, often quoted by the Commission in its reports and agreements on the linguistic norm. Many of the articles in these journals fall under the category of ‘Lithuanian language planning scholarship’ and this will be discussed in more detail in a further section below.

An additional aspect to be considered is how the efforts of LP institutions, in Lithuania, extend behind the traditional LP system of state apparatus. The extensive system of

surveillance, supported by law, requires any business or state institution working with language to take extra care regarding norms. Many publishers, media houses and marketing/public relations agencies employ language experts to avoid problems with the Inspectorate. News presenters undergo extensive training in correct speech, in order to avoid their employer⁶ getting fined. Additionally, all municipalities are obliged, by law, to employ a 'language editor' or 'language manager' (Lith. *Kalbos tvarkytojas*), who assists in the writing and revision of documents. They also perform a function of control, because they can warn about and penalise incorrect language use at municipality level (SCLL 2004, art 3. and 4.). The active work on LP is, thus, sustaining a proportionally large (for a small country like Lithuania) market for language-correction and language-advisory jobs. The journal *Gimtoji kalba* also reports on the additional needs of the market, such as: creating a term bank, an onomastic database, the development of language technologies (Smetonienė 2004), publication of more exemplary handbooks on the use of standard Lithuanian (Stundžia 2007), to name a few.

Finally, there is one non-governmental organisation that has a role in the system of LP institutions. This is, namely, the Lithuanian Language Society, an organisation with origins in the pre-war period of Lithuanian independence, revived in 1988. It functions as a place that joins together distinguished scholars (mostly Lithuanian philologists) with a great number of pro-active school teachers, people with language-related professions and language enthusiasts; they establish cooperation and plan language awareness activities. Apart from the capital, this society has branches in 12 cities in Lithuania. It also issues the journal *Gimtoji kalba* [The mother tongue] mentioned earlier, a journal most quoted by the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language. All issues are announced at the website of the Commission and many of its decisions quote articles from *Gimtoji kalba* (especially during the first few years). Moreover, membership of these institutions overlap to a certain degree with the positions in Commission (its most prominent members are Bonifacas Stundžia, Albinas Drukteinis, also the core members of Commission – its first head, Albertas Rosinas, was an honorary member). So, in spite of being non-governmental organisation, the Lithuanian Language Society is highly influential and presents the interests of a large community of linguists, loyal to state-guided LP efforts. It is, therefore, useful to examine it more closely, which will be done in the next section.

6 In case of journalists and book authors, the principle of the State Language Inspectorate the case that the individual is not fined, but rather the whole institution, and the journalist is warned (SLI 2012).

Post-1990 Lithuanian language planning scholarship

Earlier Lithuanian publications on LP included romantic explanations of the relationship between language and nation; Jolanta Zabarskaitė's 1991 article calls for a rejuvenation of the Lithuanian language, creating a culture in Lithuanian, and also warns that coming generations will not be able to write correctly, but also read poetry in Lithuanian (Zabarskaitė 1991:3). This shows some of the first impulses that the main problem of the future language policy will be to revive the user of Lithuanian. Fighting against 'the foreign' and for 'the domestic' is mentioned as a principle that is necessary for national freedom: [The time has come to unite to fight foreign drafts, to find the fresh air of free thought for our spirit and our language] ("Atėjo metas išvien gintis nuo svetimų skersvėjų, drauge ieškoti dvasiai ir kalbai tyro laisvos minties oro") (Zabarskaitė 1991:4, my translation). As Russian was the language of prestige in Lithuanian society, linguists stressed the need for an aggressive, united language policy, when every citizen [who at least somewhat cares for the fate of the mother tongue, must acquire a feeling of linguistic defence] ("... kuriam nors kiek rūpi gimtosios kalbos likimas, privalo išsigdyti kalbinės ginties jausmą") (Miliūnaitė 1994:10, emphasis in original, my translation).

By the end of 1992, the Commission for Education, Science and Culture at the Parliament started to prepare a Law on State Language, (SCLL 2015c) which foresaw regulation, control and penalization of improper language use (RLA 1993, art 3), as well as the establishment of an independent State Language Inspectorate (RLA 1995, art 25). The question naturally arose of what is to be defined as undesirable and penalizable language use. Soon after, Rita Miliūnaite and Danguolė Mikulėnienė from the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language, then published an article entitled "*I pagalbą valstybinei kalbai*" [In Aid of the State Language] in the journal *Gimtoji kalba*, which featured an extensive list of Great Language Errors (Mikulėnienė & Miliūnaitė 1993). This list later became the "List of Great Language Errors", and it was "aiding the state language" in the sense that it presented a ground for the work of the future Inspectorate. The list is largely based on the linguist Danguolė Mikulėnienė's (who was the secretary of the Lithuanian Language Commission at the time, and later served as head of it from 1998 to 2002) book, *Kaip nereikia kalbėti* [How you shouldn't talk] from 1991, a guidebook for the spoken and written norm, while Rita Miliūnaitė added grammatical errors (Urnėžiūtė 2014).

The lists of language errors has been updated much since then (about 456 micro-categories, as mentioned above), and is available on the website of the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language (SCLL 2015b). A detailed analysis of what qualifies as a "language mistake" is beyond the scope of this paper, as each category refers to several

normative publications, largely in the mentioned journal *Gimtoji kalba*. I will rather focus on the general principals of codification, which are laid out in the works of Rita Miliūnaitė, who later became the head of the Centre for Standard Language Research (at the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language):

“Jei svetimas žodis nėra tarptautinis, o atėjęs iš vieno kurios kalbos (dažnai per tarpininkus) ir turi lygiaverčių lietuviškų atitikmenų, tokią konkurenciją vertintina tik neigiamai.” [If a foreign word is not international, but came from a certain language (usually through intermediaries) and has a Lithuanian equivalent, that kind of competition should always be evaluated negatively] (Miliūnaitė, 1995: 5, my translation).

The purist attitude is not of the absolute kind, were anything foreign is considered to be negative (the kind that George Thomas (1991) called ‘xenophobic purism’), but rather limits itself to ‘culturally foreign’ elements. But not all ‘domestic’ linguistic material is welcome either, as the use of dialects is strongly discouraged. Miliūnaitė explains that standard language is neutral, while insertions of dialects and other languages into standard language is motivated by some interest (Miliūnaitė, 1994:6), and the more official the communication is, the less such insertions should be allowed (Miliūnaitė, 1994:7).

When the normative framework (based on the Law on the State Language and the extensive lists of errors) for the work of the LP institutions was laid down, the publications turned to pointing out the most problematic areas of language use that needed more control. These were to become the main objects of LP in practice. First and foremost, the traditional threshold of normative language needed to be protected – the media. Previous research on language ideologies in Lithuania has shown that the media has been the target of LP institutions, throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet period, as they were the only ones who could use something remotely close to a fully “standard language”, which, in Lithuanian LP scholarship, is defined as an unachievable ideal (cf Vaicekauskienė, 2011, Tamaševičius, 2013, Čičirkaitė, 2012). The almost unreachable ideal of standard Lithuanian is formally theorised by Rita Miliūnaitė in 1994: By relying on Haugen’s classical model of standardisation, Miliūnaitė talks about ‘codification’ as the process which defines the “ideal language” (Miliūnaitė, 1994:4). She defines this concept for the Lithuanian context by referring to a pre-war issue of *Gimtoji kalba* from 1936, where the standard language is defined as [ideal language, to be pursued by all Lithuanians] (“ideoloi, visų lietuvių siektinoji kalba”) (*Gimtoji kalba*, 1936:49, as quoted in Miliūnaitė, 1994).

To achieve something close to an ‘ideal’ language in the media is still the main goal of LP institutions’ work, and my analysis confirms the findings of Tamaševičius (2012), that linguists see the media as the most problematic area, and also of Vaicekauskienė (2012) that there is great influence of the LP institution-sponsored ideology of correctness on the media. One of the most influential linguists in Lithuania, Aldonas Pupkis, the honorary chair of the Lithuanian Language Society, wrote a number of publications in the period of 1994-1996 in *Gimtoji kalba*, which laid down the grounds for the attitudes of LP institutions towards the new, commercial media (where language was used much more freely than in Soviet times). These include long lists of errors and their correct equivalents, as well as comments about “horrible advertising language”, where the linguist suggests LP institutions to have the strictest possible attitude, including fines (Pupkis, 1994:3-4). Throughout the years, normative journals had been giving recommendations for language policy based on the errors they identified in language use. Even 10 years later, the same linguist identifies the same problems, and even uses concrete names of TV journalists and pointed out the repetitive errors:

“Kas iš to, kad, pavyzdžiui, LTV žurnalistė Salomėja Pranaitienė labai sengiasi (...) o rezultatų beveik jokių. Sengiasi gerai tarti ir kartais nentūraliaį tampo žodžius Jūratė Anilionytė (LTV). Bet jos visa artikuliacinė bazė nėra išlavinta, tarimas nešvarus, yra kalbos defektas (priebalsio s tartis)”, [So what if, for example, the Lithuanian Television journalist Salomėja Pranaitienė is trying hard, (...) the results are almost none. Also trying to pronounce correctly, and sometimes stressing word unnaturally is Jūratė Anilionytė (LTV). But in her case, the whole articulatory base is not formed, her pronunciation impure, there is a language defect (of the sounds s)]. (Pupkis, 2007:3, my translation)

Similarly, linguists report on the improving conditions on language correctness, for example, in scientific publications (Stundžia, 2007), but continue to identify areas where language use is not correct enough. The LP institutions had a two-year project during the years 2013-2014, where they analysed language of higher education, dissertations, master thesis and textbooks, and concluded that the language use was of “insufficient quality” (SCLL 2015a).

Status planning has not been the focus of language planning scholarship, partially because the Law on the State Language foresees uses of the national language in detail: including names of companies, public events, signs, documents in companies, courts, and schools (LSL, 1995). When it comes to the use of other languages, Miliūnaitė claims that speakers of minority languages have to become “multilinguals”, explaining that [varieties of the languages of other nations are normally used in private communication] (“Kitos

tautės kalbės āpraiškos (...) paprastai vartojamos bendraujant praviačiai”) (Miliūnatiė, 1994:6, my translation, underscore in original). The idea that speakers of minority languages have to become as proficient in Lithuanian as Lithuanians is also found in the Lithuanian Language Society (the organisation that publishes *Gimtoji kalba*, see 2.2.2.). In their “statement about public language use”, where they call for a more correct media language, they end the statement with an elevation of this issue to the highest level:

“Tautietii! Suprask ir atlik pareigā gimtajai kalbai! Pilieti! Suprask ir atlik pareigā valstybinei kalbai!” [Fellow Lithuanian! Understand and fulfil your duty to your mother tongue! Fellow citizen! Understand and fulfil your duty to your national language!] (LLS, 2013.)

In the Statute of the Lithuanian Language Society, we find a verbalisation of values promoted by the LP institutions: they include “2.2. Rūpintis valstybinės kalbos įtvirtinimu visose viešojo gyvenimo srityse” [2.2. To care for the entrenchment of the national language in all spheres of public life] and “2.3. Rūpintis visų sričių bendrinės kalbos vartojimo taisyklingumu ir bendrinės kalbos normų sklaida, skatinti vartoti stilistiškai tikslingā kalbā” [2.3. To care for the correctness of the national language in all areas and to promote of the national language norms, use of stylistically correct language] (my translations).

In conclusion, the overreaching goal of the Lithuanian LP institutions are the promotion of the ‘ideal’ Lithuanian language for all citizens of Lithuania. The neutral and abstract nature of the standard language is used as an argument for prescriptivist practices, the main issue is incorrectness of language in many spheres of life. The LP scholarship is also grounded in the one-nation-one-language ideal. Some evidence suggests that, since the LP institution system sustains a large job market for language-trained professionals, another goal might be the enlargement of the system itself.

3. SOME COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

When it comes to the legal status of LP institutions, there is a noticeable difference in the level of institutionalisation of LP practices. In Croatia, the only permanent centres of LP are part of the academia, and the only professional commission was instituted within the ministry responsible for education (only to be dismissed later). Lithuanian LP institutions are more permanent, firstly, because the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language was established by Parliament, and secondly, it also has the scholarly support of a large academic institution (The Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language) and a nation-wide, non-governmental organisation (the Lithuanian Language Society). The

degree of institutionalisation of LP practices in Croatia directly depends on the political parties and figures in power, and probably on their relationship to the linguists and how much the value of the linguists' is attributed by the politicians. The Lithuanian LP institutions have achieved a high degree of independence, gaining even the legal status of experts on issues of language that give recommendations and expert opinions to the Parliament and the government.

Another explanation for this difference could be that 're-building the nation through language' might have been much easier for the Lithuanian linguists. Croatian is very closely related to its neighbouring languages, there is mutual intelligibility and there is a (foreign and domestic) literature that treats Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian as the same language, or refers to them as Serbo-Croatian. Lithuanian identity has had a (undisputed) language as the central distinctive factor of national identity both historically and in the period of newly restored independence. The old linguistic fascination with Lithuanian leaves little place for doubt about the importance of Lithuanian as a national artefact in the new conditions of liberal democracy. It is also worth mentioning that some research has shown that the main distinctive feature of the Croatian identity historically was religion, while language was "added" to the identity by the secular elites in the 1990s (Dragojevic, 2005:79).

Croatian linguists, concerned with the standard language, have ideologically disagreed on essential matters of LP and are divided into smaller groups, very likely in accordance with political support they were receiving. This might have been the cause of the failure to institutionalise institutions outside of the academia. The Lithuanian linguists are mostly in agreement over issues of LP. The informal non-governmental organisation (the Lithuanian language society) could have played an important role here. Very few linguists raise their voice against the fundamental work of LP institutions (so far two professional linguists and one politician have initiated debates about the ideologies of LP institutions). (cf Tamaševičius, 2016). It is also possible that the perception of the language contributed to this. The question of how similar Croatian is to Serbian, in public and academic circles, is quite controversial, while most linguists and citizens of Lithuania have no doubts about the uniqueness of Lithuanian as a language in the world.

The importance of the national language for each speaker and the nation/country stands as a central ideological point for both LP institutions, and the main argument for their establishment. Neither of the LP institution systems are officially responsible for minority or other languages in the country, only for the national language, which is promoted as a value in itself. This is much connected to the aspect of nation building that has to do

with identity planning, and both linguists have, to a certain degree, managed to put the issue of language and identity on the agenda of daily political life, and gained support from political actors (though much broader in Lithuania). The analysis also showed that the efforts of LP institutions sustain and enlarge a market of language-related jobs. More research would be needed to confirm whether this is a real goal, especially in the case of Croatia, as the linguists have not yet been successful in institutionalising a permanent language surveillance institution.

This research, much like previous ones, has shown that Lithuania has a more-or-less uninterrupted history of prescriptivism since the Soviet times, in which state projects and LP scholarship are joined (Vaičekauskienė, 2016). This could be due to the fact that the school of LP has not changed since the Soviet times – the same linguists and their students assume leading roles in LP institutions. In Croatia, LP changed essentially after 1991, and the radical changes were not accepted by the linguistic community, in general. This could be one of the factors of success of Lithuanian LP actors to achieve great power. Another possible aspect to be considered is the difference in the conception of what a “state” or “official” language is. In most post-Soviet countries, the term “state language” is used, which introduces the concept of the state and how much power a state should have in general, while in Croatia the term is “official” language, which refers much more narrowly to the state apparatus and official communication between institutions.

The understanding of the notion “standard language”, which is the sole object of LP institutions’ work in both countries, differs to the degree it is required for the goals of LP. Lithuanian linguists base their notion of standard language on correctness and their main ‘foe’ are language errors. Croatian linguists base their notion of standard language on “Croatian-ness”, and aim to purge not just foreign words, but ‘foreign’ and ‘enemy’ ideologies. This could be the consequence of a much more serious and traumatic event – the war against Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Bosnia. Whether linguists were involved or engaged in this level of political activities, or guided by negative feelings for their ex-Yugoslavian neighbours, would need to be confirmed in future research.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this paper was to compare the formal and ideological aspects of LP institutions in Croatia and Lithuania, through an analysis of legal, scholarly and newspaper data on LP institutions and LP practices.

Formally, LP institutions in Croatia depend on the government and the political allies of language experts, while LP institutions in Lithuania enjoy an autonomous status, provided by a law passed by the Parliament. Croatian LP institutions can have varying degrees of power, but they do not have permanent authority. Lithuanian LP institutions are recognised as permanent bodies of experts with authority in linguistic issues.

Linguistic purism in its raw form – removal of all foreign elements from a language – is not accepted as a LP principle in both of the two countries. Language experts, directly or indirectly, call for a ‘moderate’ purism that serves the strategic goal – identity planning.

In Croatian LP scholarship, the main goal of LP institutions’ work is to promote a political ideology of an independent Croatia with an autonomous language (an openly verbalised one-state-one-language ideal). This is ultimately pursued because it serves to protect the Croatian people from what is perceived as an external threat (globalisation, geopolitically unfavourable countries), as well as from ideological dangers (Serbian nationalism, Yugoslav unificationism, Socialist ideology). In Lithuania, the main goal of LP institutions is based on a linguistic ideology – that standard language *is* the ideal language (an openly verbalised ‘standard language ideology’ (Milroy, 2001)). Purism is combined with idealistic prescriptivism, and they are mostly oriented against internal threats – the speakers of the Lithuanian language. The main goal of LP institutions is to increase the language culture and to bring the speakers of Lithuanian closer to the perfect standard language.

It should be noted that, in both cases, the material showed that LP institutions care for both the political (a strong status of the nation and its language) and the linguistic (maintenance of standard language) ideals, described in the two paragraphs above, but the priorities are different. This could be due to the status of institutions (the Lithuanian one has more power), or the political environment (the fact that Croatian used to be called Serbo-Croatian in academia worries linguists, the status of Croatian as a separate language in the EU was uncertain).

The fact that different ideological goals are actively pursued, shows what aspect of the current situation is seen as unfavourable by the linguists – Lithuanian linguists are concerned about the insufficiently correct use of Lithuanian by the speakers and deterioration of language in the media, while Croatian linguists are concerned that the Croatian language does not enjoy an autonomous status, within Croatia or the world.

Both LP institutions aim to spread awareness of the national language as a value in itself. Some evidence suggests that they also seek to sustain the market of language-correcting

and language-advising jobs, both in the private and public sector (publishing, media, state institutions etc).

Both LP institutions are based on similar understanding of the standard language as a system beyond language users. Croatian linguists describe it as a “social system” that, unlike a dialect, is a social product of written and spoken interaction, while Lithuanian linguists describe it as an ideal that can almost never be practically reached, but that should, nevertheless be pursued. The notion of standard language is build up in LP scholarship in order to justify the main goal of LP (promoting a fully independent Croatian language/improving the correctness of Lithuanian in use). LP scholarship also lays out their understanding of dialects: Croatian linguists understand dialects as a source for written and standard language; the standard language is a system, to some degree, based upon dialects, but also “governing” the nation as a whole. On the other hand, Lithuanian linguists tend to view all elements connected to dialects as motivated uses of something that is not neutral, while use of the standard language should always be neutral. The value of the dialect in Lithuanian LP scholarship is not diminished, but the use of dialectal features in the standard language is discouraged.

Limitations: The research did not look at LP institutions practice (publication of dictionaries, guidebook, issuing of fines, warnings, surveillance), but rather just at the descriptions of those practices, many of them written by those who, themselves, work at LP institutions, which means that not all aspects of their work have been covered by the paper. For both countries, I have looked into the publications of the “dominant” group of linguists, those loyal to LP institutions, but also took some criticism into consideration in the discussion. In the Croatian case, the actual power of the group has changed immensely over time, from having a government-recognised Council, until 2012, to splitting into two groups in the period after that. However, the Council did include linguists from all over Croatia, some of different political and linguistic ideologies, thus some results of the research might also be generalisable for linguists outside of this group.

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6. APPENDIX

CORPORA USED IN THIS PAPER ARE TAKEN FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCE:

n.d. Scientific Portal of the Republic of Croatia *Hrčak*. <http://hrcak.srce.hr/>
[Retrieved 10 January 2016].

In pursuit of societal harmony: Reviewing the experiences and approaches in officially monolingual and officially multilingual countries contains a selection of papers on language legislation that were presented at the International Conference on Language Policy in Multicultural and Multilingual Settings, Mandalay, Myanmar, 8-11 February 2016.

The editors, both members of the International Academy of Language Law / Académie internationale de droit linguistique, brought together presentations that deal with language legislation and practices in Europe, Asia, Africa and North America.

The contributions show that the post-communist trend in language policy has been vastly represented by attempts to eliminate the language, and even the cultural legacy, of the formerly hegemonic nation/s in countries emerging after the collapse of the system. In doing so officials in these countries tend to link the harmonisation of a diverse society with the idea of homogenising its population, and prioritising the cultural legacy of the titular nation. In contrast, some post-colonial countries are more tolerant of the language of their colonisers but consequently do not sufficiently promote the institutionalisation of their indigenous languages. Furthermore, the absence of visible efforts to follow any legal pattern in this regard often result in a communication gap between government and the various communities.

In pursuit of societal harmony therefore challenges from different perspectives the populist notion of 'one nation-one language', revealing the inherent shortcomings of attempting to establish unity through something as abstract as language without constructively addressing the actual, and mostly gross, inequalities and resulting divisions in many societies. The contributions to this Proceedings suggest that by pursuing social harmony through an alleged common language many countries unwittingly emphasise social inequalities and division and even cultivate the basis for resistance. Scholars that work in the field of language legislation and the sociology of language and readers interested in comparative studies will find the collection of papers presented in this Proceedings an interesting read.



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