RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN

Edited by
Antonio Herrera and Francisco Acosta

Rethinking the History of Democracy in Spain

Focusing on the processes of political socialisation and democratisation that took place in Spain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this book brings together specialists who propose the need to rethink the contemporary history of democracy in Spain to build a new narrative.

To do so, the authors go down to the local level, where they are able to trace a political culture that forged the foundations of a process of political "modernization" much more complex than what conventional historiography has conveyed, even though it was not always transferred institutionally to the national level. The idea of a rural Spain that was backward, apolitical, violent and unprepared for democracy gives way to a more interesting history which, while recognising the peculiarities of the country and the important limitations to democracy, shows examples that could help build a new narrative closer to those of other neighbouring countries.

Aimed at contemporary historians interested in Spain and Europe, the book also addresses the debates faced by other social scientists on the concept of democracy. This dialogue between history, sociology and political science is particularly present in a special final chapter featuring a discussion of democracy and its application to Spanish history.

Antonio Herrera, is a senior lecturer of contemporary history at the University of Granada (Spain). His areas of research include social mobilisation, rural and peasant conflicts, and the making of democratic political cultures in contemporary Spain.

Francisco Acosta, is a senior lecturer of contemporary history at the University of Córdoba (Spain). Interested in issues related to Franco's repression and the recovery of democratic memory in Spain, he is currently co-leading a research project on democracy and the rural world in contemporary Andalusia.

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Introduction

The (not so) exceptional history of democracy in contemporary Spain

Antonio Herrera and Francisco Acosta

The historical explanation for the great "Spanish miracle" that allowed the country to join the club of democratic nations after the death of the dictator General Franco has a long-standing tradition. The miraculous vision of Spanish democratisation in the 1970s stems from the widespread belief that the country was characterised until that moment by secular backwardness (economic, social, cultural and political). This alleged backwardness was the subject of study by historians who were constructing a narrative of continuous failure compared to other countries and other models of development. After 40 years of dictatorship, preceded by a terrible civil war, the country finally embraced democracy, in the context of a third wave of global democratisation. Apparently, Spain not only achieved this goal in the 1980s, but, because of its previous trajectory which made this transition unthinkable, it also became a role model for many,[1] given the apparently peaceful and consensual nature of the transformation.[2]

The miracle was more remarkable if we expand the time frame and take into account the supposedly undemocratic path taken by the country in the nineteenth century. After the glimmering light of the 1812 Constitution drawn up in Cádiz, Spain barely managed to develop a liberal political model similar to that of other surrounding countries, thus hindering modernity, understood as industrialisation, through which the country needed to move. The strength of institutions excessively attached to the Old Regime, such as the Catholic Church, the army and a monarchy reluctant to change, hampered progress. The "dysfunctional" nature of Spain's nation-building process compared to France tautologically "verified" this tortuous path. Flashes of democracy such as the *Sexenio Democrático* (1868–1874), a six-year period that encompassed the First Republic (1873), appeared as extemporaneous, strange episodes typical of a backward, primitive society, subject to revolutionary whims and, therefore, unprepared for the development of a modern democracy. The First and Second republics seemed to be islands in the middle of an ocean in which democracy was conspicuous by its absence.

In 1921, James Bryce made a brief reference to Spain in his voluminous analysis of the democracies of the time. Throughout the nearly 1,200 pages of his two volumes, he dedicated chapters to France, Switzerland, Canada,

the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The few references to Spain were limited to pointing out the little interest that the masses had in politics and democracy:

> Today the masses are, or could be if they asserted themselves, master of the political situation everywhere in Europe; though in some countries, such as Spain and Rumania, they have scarcely yet seemed to realize their power.[3]

In just a few short lines, the British historian summarises the canonical reading of the contemporary political history of Spain. For him, the First Republic had been a strange accident, and the few sociopolitical mobilisations seen in the first few decades of the twentieth century were limited to a specific space in the country. A country marked in general terms by political apathy and *caciquismo*. A pity, he said, in the case of a nation so old and prosperous at other times:

> In Spain a republic, hastily set up in 1873, gained so little support that it was quickly followed by a restoration of the old monarchy; and when in 1890 universal suffrage was established the gift excited little interest and has made little practical difference to policies or to administration, though in few of the Eastern seaports socialist and Anarchist groups are occasionally enabled by it to return a few members of extreme opinions. Elsewhere constituencies are controlled, and elections manipulated by local Bosses (commonly called *Caciques*), whose rule, a source of profit to themselves, is acquiesced in the bulk of the citizens. There could hardly be a more instructive refutation of the notion that a taste for the exercise of political rights is a natural characteristic of civilized man than this indifference to politics of an ancient nation which has produced wonderful explorers, conquerors, and statesmen, and made splendid contributions to literature, learning, and art.[4]

In his opening statements, Bryce notes that by democracy he understands "nothing more nor less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes".[5] In this sense, it is unsurprising that he did not include Spain among his case studies. However, decades later, after almost the whole twentieth century had passed by, it is striking that this reading was still maintained in more sophisticated comparative studies that moved beyond conventional electoral analysis and which were starting to refute clichés about the democratic immobility of the rural world and the "peripheries" of capitalism. We are referring here to the collective work published in 1996 by Eduardo Posada-Carbó, which highlighted the active and sometimes buried sociopolitical and electoral dynamics of civil society under institutionally restricted forms.[6] It is remarkable that the chapter dedicated to Spain[7] is focused on the stagnation of voters and fraud rather than on any political

dynamism (more or less hidden), partly conveying once again an exceptional image of Spanish sociopolitical history.

In the same book we have just mentioned (Posada-Carbó, 1996), Frank O'Gorman highlighted the existence of a rich local electoral culture in England throughout the contemporary age, dating back as early as 1688. For O'Gorman, this early local electoral political culture would partly explain the success of British electoral reforms in the 19th century.[8] The British historian understood this electoral culture as a precondition for the development of advanced forms of political representation. Although from there he derives a fairly linear and modernist conception of the process of democratisation itself, this is certainly a different perspective from that traditionally proposed in the case of Spain.

In this book, the chapters dedicated to Latin America showed the complexity of participatory processes in the encounter between new and old formulas of political representation at different scales. In most cases, the focus was on electoral aspects, sometimes discovering "unexpected" innovations at these latitudes. In any case, the centrality of the electoral debate in early times and in "peripheral" and eminently rural areas was highlighted. Hence, Eduardo Posada-Carbó spoke about the surprises that history sometimes gives us[9] when we are able to explore other views, in this case using the local perspective and municipal sources. Thus, analysis, for example, of the phenomenon of *caciquismo* looking only at governmental action and exclusively using national sources, makes fertile ground for the construction of a partial account, filling in knowledge gaps with prejudices and clichés. This seems to have been the case in Spain.

The supposed exceptionality of Spain, in both 1921 and 1996, is inserted into the development of a linear approach to the history of democracy linked to a reading that is excessively attached to theories of "modernisation", understood as a successful standard of sociopolitical development resulting from liberal capitalist models of production.[10] For a long time, the main object of study for many Western historians has been economic growth and whether this was able to shape a bourgeois ruling class, or failing that a proletariat, that eventually led the country along the path of modernity and progress. In a historiographical account that highlighted the image of a people accustomed almost in their nature to clientelism, the thrust of the argument revolved around the "paradigm of failure", first agrarian and industrial, but also social, political and even of identity.

In Spain, the origin of this paradigm is found in the visions of *Regeneracionistas*, intellectuals who lamented, like Bryce, the drifting of Spanish politics after a "glorious" past and who, also like Bryce, laid the blame for the great ills of the nation on *caciquismo*.[11] Thus, a comparative account was forged of backwardness that focused on agriculture and also permeated part of the government reformism approved during the Second Republic.[12] The regenerative diagnosis of Joaquín Costa[13] or Pascual Carrión[14] offered a good fit for those who sought to explain the Spanish Civil War as a result of

previous unresolved problems. Descriptions of political life such as that given by Gerald Brenan in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which subsequently inspired hugely influential historians such as Eric Hobsbawm or Raymond Carr, described Spain as follows:

> The first thing to notice is that Spain is one of those countries with an undeveloped, primitive economy which is divided by a fairly definite line into two sections. Above are the upper and middle classes, say one-fifth of the population, who vote, read newspapers, compete for Government jobs and generally manage the affairs of the nation. Beneath are the peasants and workmen, who in ordinary times take no interest in politics, frequently do not know how to read and keep strictly to their own affairs. Between these two completely different worlds there is a gulf, imperfectly filled by the small shop-keepers and artisans.
>   These two classes lived side by side in towns and villages, but without any very close contacts. The lack of education and the backwardness and inertness of the economic structure prevented any upward movement from one to the other.[15]

The absence of a balanced society around solid middle classes on which to structure democracy, and the supposed impossibility of building a democratic space of exchange and political confluence, fuelled exclusionary, defensive and authoritarian, or revolutionary political radicalisms depending on the case. Hence the identification of Spain, and especially Andalusia, with subversion and revolution. From this, deductions were also reached regarding the scant democratic culture acquired throughout the contemporary era by the peasant classes and, in short, following a circular argument, their incapacity for modern democracy.

Bryce's interpretation of failure and exceptionality, shared by Spanish Regenerationist historians and Hispanists such as Brenan,[16] was also perpetuated among intellectuals of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.[17] During these decades, scientific analysis replaced the essay, but the essential conclusions did not change. Influenced by theories of dependence and underdevelopment, historians continued to seek the roots of this supposed backwardness and the culprits of subalternation and dependence and so on until more recent times.[18]

To a large extent, this entire narrative of failure and objective inability/incapacity for democracy is rooted in and generated from the historical interpretations and readings of the politically dominant sectors, referring to groups that, through State control, were in a position to sanction a particular reading of the past. In other words, they were able to construct a self-legitimising discourse. This is what happened during the Restoration (1874–1923) when the "oligarchies" – using the concept of Regenerationism of the time – justified the *coup d'état* that liquidated the *Sexenio Democrático* (1868–1874) in the name of order and stability; or when, in the twentieth century, Francoism

effectively built and socialised for 40 years an account of republican extermination, after claiming victory in a civil war provoked by fascism itself.

On the other hand, as we said before, the democratic transition of the 1970s was no less convulsive, violent, unstable or uncertain than other periods of establishment of democracy, such as the *Sexenio Democrático* in the nineteenth century or the Second Republic. The difference is that in these two cases the triumph of different forms of reactionary and regressive regimes, liberal and totalitarian, made it impossible to know if it would have been possible to build a model discourse of success, such as that of the Transition.[19]

What is striking is not the fact that discourse about the failure of democracy in 1868 or in 1931 has been constructed by political sectors opposed to democracy, but, in the Spanish case, the persistence of this discourse and its roots even in the Transition. Fortunately, in recent decades, this narrative of the supposed incapacitating gene for democracy has been revised with new contributions, which we will discuss later, although its impact is still present in the collective imagination.

Another problem with this interpretation of the history of democratic failure in Spain is that it has privileged the national perspective, neglecting the local scale of analysis and ignoring all those experiences, discourses and sociopolitical practices that over time have operated outside the central process of nation building. We are referring to a series of experiences and practices of political learning that, although apparently limited to the local or municipal level, when viewed together, help us to understand the existence of an original, novel and sometimes surprising type of political culture, related to the process of political "modernisation" and, sometimes, processes of democratisation.

This book brings together a series of specialists who challenge this conventional narrative. Far from the ungrounded clichés and myths of backwardness, and after years of research into the history of Spain, this book focuses on the processes of political socialisation and democratisation that took place in Spain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors have focused on the local level where they are able to trace a political culture which, although it did not always transfer institutionally to the national level, nonetheless helped lay the foundations of a process of political "modernisation" that was much more complex than depicted by conventional historiography. The idea of a rural Spain that was backward, apolitical, violent and unprepared for democracy gives way to a more complex history which, while recognising the peculiarities of the country and the important limitations to democracy, offers examples that could help build a new narrative similar to that described for other neighbouring countries.

The book is the result of several research projects, some of them ongoing, and, in part, the product of a meeting of experts that took place in the middle of the pandemic (June 2021) under the title "Rethinking Democracy in Contemporary Spain (19th and 20th Century)". Therefore, the chapters included here deal not only with different periods and spaces but also with diverse

concepts of democracy. However, they all share a common line of argumentation and interpretation that gives coherence to the book. All contributions have at least one common denominator: the analysis of the local scale when explaining the emergence of democratic political cultures. In all the chapters, the municipal sphere is approached as a space where it was possible to forge a democratic culture, which may have been more or less sophisticated, more or less conscious and more or less connected with other spaces.

Evidently, the book is not merely a collection of case studies. Each of them seeks to transcend the level of local chronicle and, when considered all together, they contribute to the new efforts launched years ago to revise a historical narrative for Spain based on exceptionality.[20] Indeed, the book is part of a global renewal of the history of democracy that is challenging the conventional narrative, which has been too closely tied to the concept of modernisation and which has therefore left peripheral regions of the centre of capitalism on the sidelines. In recent years, in line with declining confidence in this political model and growing political discomfort, new research has emerged to challenge the traditional view, or at least seeking to broaden the perspective taken in order to understand its complexity. Some of this new research looks at the role played by social groups or geographical spaces that have not been considered within the institutional history of democracy. Years ago, Muhlberger and Paine[21] highlighted "quasi-democratic" political practices in places far from the centres traditionally understood as the birthplace of democracy in its modern version. John Markoff pointed to the multicentric origin of democracy some years ago,[22] and other authors found more "progressive" political practices in Latin America in the years of independence than those developed at the same time in the United States or England.[23] Two Australian authors coordinated a book whose title is very suggestive in this sense, *The Secret History of Democracy*, in which we can find several examples that clearly show the possibility of tracing formulas of political organisation that today we could classify as democratic or democratising due to their egalitarian character.[24] More forceful are the 800 pages in which John Keane sets out to dismantle the classical history of democracy and pay more attention to areas, spaces and collectives hitherto invisible in the historical narratives.[25]

This review has recently continued with the work coordinated by Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, who have focused on the evolution of the concept of democracy in different territories from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century.[26] This same perspective is taken in the book by Kurunmäki, Nevers and Velde.[27] Both volumes have a chapter devoted to Spain, in which they clearly opt for a narrative far removed from the idea of exceptionality and closer to a narrative on the development of liberalism similar to that proposed for other European countries.[28] Mark Lawrence's book also describes a new Spanish history of the nineteenth century which, even with its peculiarities, is close to the sociopolitical development of the rest of southern Europe.[29] Therefore, from the perspective of the history of concepts and

history "from above", the narrative about contemporary Spain, especially in the nineteenth century, has begun to break away from the cliché of exceptionality. The work of Florencia Peyrou and Juan Simal has also contributed to these efforts. Among other things, these authors have shown how internationalised the political world views present in Spain during the nineteenth century were.[30]

Lawrence points out that local histories continue to dominate Spanish academic publications today,[31] which we do not feel is negative in itself although, as he points out, we think it is necessary to combine these histories to give coherence to a new narrative that transcends the local or regional geographical space. With this book, we hope to contribute to this deconstruction of the history of contemporary Spain that calls into question the exceptionality in Europe also in terms of the process of democratisation. The contribution is not limited exclusively to the history of concepts. It does not place so much emphasis on the "intellectual" history of democracy, irremediably associated with the "elites" but seeks an approach to the construction of democratic political cultures also through the political praxis associated with more or less educated working-class sectors.

It is still a necessary exercise, given that, despite the incipient historiographic renewal, the narrative of failure and exceptionality is still widespread. First, we will examine this known history of democracy in contemporary Spain, which, from the national level, encompasses the recognised milestones of the process. We will then propose a new reading based on a broad and dynamic conception of the processes of democratisation that emphasises the local scale.

The well-known (national) history of democracy in Spain

The crisis of the Old Regime in the early nineteenth century in Spain accelerated in the context of the so-called War of Independence against the Napoleonic troops. The liberals who had gathered in Cádiz drafted a constitution (1812), which recognised indirect universal suffrage and marked a milestone in history after the path undertaken in the United States and France. They were embarking on a path of progress that would be drastically interrupted on numerous occasions thereafter. Thus, after the first brilliant flash of Spanish liberalism, which was able to set the pace for European constitutionalism, Ferdinand VII, backed by the country's traditionalist forces, abolished the Constitution and abandoned this initial liberal path.

However, the wick of liberalism had been lit among sections of the army who felt ill-treated by the monarchy and, by means of a *pronunciamiento* (military rebellion), forced the king to reintroduce the Constitution. With the success of this coup in January 1823, a supposed new Spanish tradition was also consolidated, one of military *pronunciamientos* that from then on would largely determine the designs of the country and which have often been read

as a precedent of the coups staged in the twentieth century that ushered in the two dictatorships: Miguel Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco.

Unlike other countries, in Spain liberalism did not achieve sufficient continuity to grant the political stability that would have led the country down the path of economic progress. The Industrial Revolution, in addition to the lack of environmental conditions to adopt the British manufacturing model, seemed difficult in such an unstable context. In 1823, conservative forces, supported by the coalition of the "Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis", restored "absolute" power to the monarch and abolished the Constitution and with it the progressive advances it recognised.

After ten years of dark absolutism (1823–1833), the death of Ferdinand VII opened up a debate on his succession, which resulted in the beginning of a civil conflict between the supporters of Isabel, who succeeded her father Ferdinand, and those who supported the enthroning of her brother, Carlos. Three great waves of Carlist wars washed over Spain the course of the nineteenth century, feeding into the idea of a country unable to move beyond a warmongering tradition that did not help to consolidate a possible peaceful path towards liberal-bourgeois progress, as if this path were written somewhere. Some of the progressive advances which Isabel's monarchy was forced to concede from 1833 onwards could be explained purely by this need to rely on liberal sectors against Carlism.

Based on this idea of the limitations of progress, a narrative was constructed in which conservative forces, clinging onto tradition, blocked modernity. In this context, the supposed mission assigned to the bourgeois elites to build a modern state apparatus, functional to their economic interests and more or less centralised, failed. The local authorities continued to wield too much authority and the problem of *caciquismo*, of the so-called *notables*, became entrenched until it was understood as both a cause and a consequence of the country's supposed backwardness.

Analysis of this type, based on the theses of failure, is not lacking in Spanish historiography. The book coordinated by Salvador Forner on democracy and modernisation in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries includes José Varela Ortega's study on the origins of democracy in Spain, framed between the dates of 1845 and 1923.[32] In this book, an interpretation was proposed that, following the conceptual framework developed decades previously by Joseph Schumpeter, assimilated the functioning and practice of democracy to the market rules of supply and demand.[33] This volume also contained another long-term interpretative study (1847 to 1930) that, following the theories of modernisation, emphasised obstacles, deficiencies and limiting factors that prevented the "normal" development of democracy in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spain.[34] In both studies, the same conclusion was reached: the history of democracy and processes of democratisation in Spain had largely been a history full of obstacles and dark areas, where successes were few and far between, largely as a consequence of a social reality marked by the hegemony of rural spaces defined in

terms of backwardness and in which civil society did not appear to demand change. When the grassroots sectors mobilised, they did so in revolutionary terms and, therefore, far removed from the moderate parameters of modern democracies.

In the interpretation of the limiting factors of progress, the shadow of events in the nineteenth century stretched into the twentieth century. *Pronunciamientos* were the prelude to the coups staged by Primo de Rivera and Franco. The Carlist Wars seemed to announce the existence of a supposed fratricidal tradition that would be corroborated with the outbreak of Civil War, and the pre-eminence of the *notables* would end up being the great problem of *caciquismo* and political clientelism, associated with the biggest thorn in Spain's side: the backwardness of its agriculture.

In this reading, the First Republic (1873), even though it was inserted within the six-year period of democracy known as the *Sexenio Democrático* (1868–1874), constituted an ephemeral and isolated progressive episode, soon replaced again by a conservative monarchist regime. The restoration of the Bourbon monarchy succeeded in establishing a lasting peace in exchange for major concessions that limited the path to democracy. Universal male suffrage, reinstated in 1890, was a farce. *Caciquismo*, political clientelism and fraud were rife among an illiterate population with little interest in politics. In this context, working-class sectors were forced into subversive positions. Fearful of this radicalism, liberals, conservatives and monarchists supported the 1923 military coup staged by Miguel Primo de Rivera, who also presented himself as the nation's redeemer following the setbacks suffered by the army in Morocco.

After seven years of dictatorship, the "advent" of the Second Republic came in the spring of 1931. We highlight the term "advent" because it is a term that is still used when talking about this democratic period, even among current historians, and which denotes the idea of a sudden, surprising, unexpected arrival or appearance. Therefore, again, it is a tautological explanation, short-term, unstable and lacking in consensus. It is a historical period still full of controversy for its historiographical link to the Civil War. Even today, the instability of the Second Republic, the "radicalness" of its reforms in a society that was supposedly not prepared, is presented as the cause of the outbreak of the conflict. Forty years of dictatorship, in a democratic Europe that was building the welfare state at the time, definitively marked the failure of democracy in Spain and verified the supposed exceptionality of the country. Thus, it is possible to understand that once again the transition to democracy after the death of the dictator in 1975 was understood as an unexpected surprise.[35]

Obviously, this is a rushed account that does not do justice to the numerous investigations that show the enormous complexity of each of these moments, which continue to be the subject of in-depth historiographical debates. But it helps us to outline, albeit briefly, the position of democracy in the generalist meta-narratives that transcend debate and academic research and feed into fierce political-ideological positions today.

Clearly, we are not refuting much of what was expressed in this brief review. Nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism, of course, was marked by the weight of conservative forces, by military *pronunciamientos* and by the outbreak of the Carlist wars. Of course, the Bourbon Restoration cannot be described as a democratic regime despite having formally reinstated universal male suffrage in 1890. Naturally, we are not denying the weight of political clientelism and *caciquismo*, the drama of two dictatorships and a civil war that transformed the country. However, what we are proposing is that, despite all this, it seems possible, based on new current research and using a new conceptual tool, to expand on and complete this narrative by proposing other levels of analysis to incorporate new perspectives to understand and interpret the history of democracy in Spain and perhaps, more broadly, in southern Europe.

Given this image, we can ask ourselves some key questions that largely guide the work of the researchers included in this book. What was happening in most of the towns and villages, where the majority of people lived, while these coups, *pronunciamientos* and dynastic conflicts were taking place? Did the peasants really stay out of politics? And out of local politics as well? Was democracy (or its failure) just a matter for the political elites? Did people not think, act or construct politics in their daily lives? Did they not harbour hopes for change and share world views around how to manage their lives?

Obviously the scope of this volume is limited, and we cannot propose answers to all the questions, but we are focusing here on issues such as the analysis of some of the experiences – episodes as we often call them in this volume – that would demonstrate the existence of a kind of underlying "democratic tectonics" that we can trace throughout the contemporary period and which helps to unseat some of the unfounded prejudices that have for so long fed into the narrative of failure and exceptionality in Spain's contemporary history.

What democracy are we talking about?

At this point, readers can already imagine that in this book, rather than approaching democracy as a static concept, as a system of government with a series of formally established norms and rules, we will talk about democratisation, that is, the historical process of building democratic cultures and political practices that, to a large extent, can sustain the institutionality of formal democracy and its continuity over time. In this sense, the spatial unit of analysis does not have to be the nation or, at least, not only and exclusively the nation. Thus, we believe it is possible to examine some continuities over time as Pamela Beth Radcliff shows in her text. We can identify a certain municipalist tradition throughout the contemporary age in Spain, a tradition that could also have its correlates in political practice but logically developed at the local level.

We are fully aware that the concept of democracy and/or democratisation in the nineteenth century is not the same as in the twentieth century. Not even the same at the start and in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is clearly impossible to establish a linear and homogeneous narrative of the democratisation process if we take into account complex historical phenomena such as nation-building, changes in forms of protest, the existence or lack of political opportunities in various sociopolitical frameworks and structures, or changes in collective identities over time. Therefore, in this book, readers will find different formulations on the concept of democracy. However, there are two issues common to practically all the chapters and which have to do, on the one hand, with a dynamic, broad and substantive conception of the democratisation process and, on the other, with the protagonism given to the local scale in the formation of democratic principles and values.

Democracy is by definition a changing and dynamic concept that depends on the complex historical relationship between different agents (rulers, reformist elites, social movements, etc.) at different levels (institutional, informal, local, national, etc.). Authors such as Geoff Eley and John Markoff have shown that the ideal and democratic forms of government, both today and yesterday, have been and continue to be the concrete result of different complex combinations between three spaces/actors: institutional, political action and civil society.[36] Taking into account these complex interrelations on different levels, we know that democracy did not necessarily evolve in a linear and progressive way. We also know that the relationships between the demands and pressures of social movements for the expansion of rights and political participation, and the role of the ruling elites in their attempts to limit social action or achieve popular conformity, occupy a central place when it comes to explaining the evolution of democracy, its institutions and processes of democratisation, where historically advances and setbacks coexisted.[37]

In this relational conception of democratisation processes, there are informal political expressions and, consequently, actors sometimes not present in conventional narratives of the history of democracy. This does not mean discarding the more formal arguments and definitions emanating from classical political philosophy but rather incorporating and combining the institutional/formal elements traditionally considered (parliament, constitution, suffrage, periodic elections, political pluralism, political freedoms) with others of an informal/non-institutional nature (active citizenship, popular demand and pressure, effective exercise of rights). Thus, there is room not only for direct and conscious actions in decision-making processes, such as voting – both institutional and extra-parliamentary – but also for others, classified by Scott as "infrapolitical"[38] and by Bayat as "non-movements"[39] and which include a whole range of forms of protest, resistance, unintentional performance or even individual criticism. Actions that in isolation may not tell us much, but which can acquire meaning when analysed together and in their proper context.

Spanish historiography, in research that spans long periods of time, has focused especially on the institutional framework, attending to the discourse and action of the elites. Much less attention has been paid, with the exception of the late Franco period and the Transition, to the role that working-class social mobilisation played in these processes, which also, as shown in other examples, created democratic practices, patterns of behaviour and discourses.[40]

Less attention has also been paid to the local scale of analysis, where such practices also took place. In nineteenth-century Spain, the local community constituted not only an early unit of political participation but also a space where different groups – traditionally forgotten, silenced or confined to the back room of the history of democracy – practised forms of popular action and participation, in many cases alternative to and/or clashing with "official" ones. These actions and discourses, sometimes connected at national and international levels, had transformative potential not only for the practice of local politics but also for the perception and construction of democratic political cultures and traditions. In the twentieth century, many of these accumulated experiences became a sustenance and source of inspiration, not only for the definition of alternative political models, more grassroots and democratic in nature but also for the definition and construction of a Nation proposal with greater protagonism of "the people". All within a complex, interactive relationship, not without obstacles and difficulties, with the ruling elites and with the other reformist political and social actors.

In this book, Pamela Beth Radcliff points out that in nineteenth-century Spain, a very important part of the democratic tradition was linked to municipal political practices, where local spaces and governments had acted as privileged vehicles for experimentation with self-government, representation of community interests and direct participation. In short, the municipality as a school for citizenship and as a terrain for democratisation,[41] as a privileged space to analyse the construction and socialisation of collective identities and democratic political cultures.

<p style="text-align:center">❋❋❋❋</p>

This book is organised into nine chapters, written by specialists in the contemporary history of Spain, structured across three parts and a special final "epilogue". The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) is very conceptually loaded and aims to show the importance of going down to the local level to discover a little-known democratic political culture in Spain. The *first chapter*, written by Professor Radcliff, offers a new perspective on the book's proposal regarding the existence of a local tradition of "democratic" political culture that can be traced back to nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spain. She takes a historical journey that starts with the 1812 Constitution, continues through the *Juntero* movement, the progressive political actors in the 1830s, the federal republicans during the *Sexenio* (1868), the anarchists at the beginning of the twentieth century and during the Civil War and the end of Franco's regime.

The author describes proposals and episodes which, although they generally turned out to be "losers" in the political struggles, contributed to situating the local space in the people's collective memory as a privileged place for the definition and projection of alternative political projects – a place where democracy, social revolution, communitarianism and local power become intertwined and offer a theoretical and practical alternative to the models/proposals of representative democracy designed and/or wielded by the political elites from the spaces of central power.

These municipalist-oriented movements and their struggles for self-government, the author claims, should be incorporated into the history of the construction of democracy in Spain, which will evidently entail a re-reading not only of the processes of democratisation but also of contemporary Spanish history itself, at least in its political-institutional dimension.

While the first chapter provides an overview of the entire contemporary era, the *second chapter*, written by Antonio Herrera and John Markoff, focuses on the twentieth century, although it begins at the end of the nineteenth century. They propose a new reading that, without diminishing the disaster of the Civil War, points to the possibility of drawing lines of continuity between the three moments recognised as democratic in Spain's contemporary history: the *Sexenio* (1868–1874), the Second Republic (1931–1939) and the democratic transition after Franco's dictatorship (1975–1982). They point out that the local political culture studied for nineteenth-century Spain was also present in the twentieth century and that, far from being an uncomfortable vestige of the past, understood as a delaying factor in modernisation, it was a characteristic of the democratisation process that took place in Spain. A process on a local scale that helps us to understand why formal democracy succeeded both in the 1930s and in the 1970s.

Second part (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is devoted to analysing episodes of sociopolitical mobilisation in different areas of southern Spain, considered by traditional historiography as a symbol of backwardness, in order to link them to the promotion of democratic political culture. These episodes show that the rural world and the local level were not politically inert. Political dynamism and social mobilisation were also part of life in the municipalities.

Third chapter by Guy Thomson can also be situated within the re-reading and renewal of Spanish political and social history. By analysing the Spanish Democratic Party in the context of Andalusia in the mid-nineteenth century and the grassroots reaction, the author reflects on the relationship between popular mobilisation and democratisation. Using the paradigmatic example of the uprising in the town of Loja (Granada province) in July 1861, Thomson shows how in the 1850s significant and permanent changes took place in popular political action, affecting not only large cities and urban centres but also villages and other rural parts of Andalusia. The increase in social tensions and conflict, together with the presence of local social and political leaders of popular and peasant origin, explains the insurrectional history – which took place in many places in southern Spain

between 1850 and 1860 – and which ended up being linked to the history of democratisation.

Francisco Acosta's *fourth chapter* is based on the idea that democracy was an ideology and a sociopolitical movement partially excluded from the liberal state-building process in Spain during the nineteenth century. This process followed the standards of a conservative model that left any possibility of gaining access to power to insurrection. However, exclusion did not prevent the articulation of a democratic movement that is becoming increasingly better known, thanks to advances in historiographical research. Based on the analysis of the popular uprisings that took place in southern Spain in the 1850s and 1860s, this chapter proposes a new reading of rural social protest. Beyond their interpretation as an expression of class struggle or as primitive or pre-modern sociopolitical movements (understood as pioneers of agrarian anarchism), episodes such as those that took place in El Arahal (Seville) in 1857 or in Loja (Granada) in 1861 are the most significant expressions of a much broader, complex and multifaceted movement in its social and political dimension. These social expressions show how democracy was a response by rural society to the consequences of the development of liberalism in rural areas, and how it was the experience of these protests that ended up dividing the democratic movement itself.

In the *fifth chapter*, Ángel Duarte Montserrat shows that the rural and peripheral province of Córdoba in southern Spain witnessed a cycle of intense and continuous sociopolitical mobilisation between 1890 and 1930. This collective action contributed to the wave of democratisation that culminated in the Second Spanish Republic. This process was based on traditional and new forms of conflict and negotiation between modernising rural political elites and the "people" upgraded to the status of political and social actors. The author explains the processes registered over the course of four decades in a scenario often neglected by general historiography and shows their causal relationship with the political revolution (Second Republic) that succeeded on 14 April 1931.

When viewed together, these three last studies reveal a line of democratising tension that would weave together contemporary Spanish history giving it a certain continuity from the point of view of that other "secret history" of democracy that Isakhan and Stockwell spoke about.[42] Of how this, in a process that was not without challenges, contradictions and conflicts, has been shaped by a series of historical events, social struggles and political transformations in diverse historical contexts depending on the different actors, social dynamics and the political circumstances of each moment.

The third part includes three chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) devoted to analysing democratisation processes outside Spain, precisely in order to better contextualise the Spanish case. This is not a comparative exercise, but it does show that the book's central line on the importance of democratisation from a local perspective also applies to other parts of the world that have also been removed from conventional narratives on the history of global democracy.

Sixth chapter, by Claudia Guarisco, a specialist in Latin American history, deals with the complex impact of early liberalism in Mexico and Peru and is consistent with the rest of the book in focusing on the local scale, where the variety of "municipalist" experiences, beyond the political project designed in Cádiz, sometimes involved the application of cooperative and inclusive political practices with respect to indigenous citizens. The text provides a good example of how in a distant context from the power of the central State, where the latter had a limited capacity to impose homogeneous responses, local communities articulated diverse, even opposed, responses to an external democratising input, in this case the legislation drawn up in Cádiz.

The *seventh chapter* manages the same innovative perspective by proposing, from the perspective of local political praxis, a complex reading of *caciquismo* in different Mediterranean countries. Luigi Musella focuses on the process of political modernisation in Mediterranean countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, critiquing the unilinear and hegemonic interpretation of the process of state-building that has privileged formal aspects and neglected informal powers. The author points out that the artificial separation between formal and informal aspects when studying the process of political "modernisation" has blurred the image of a world in which traditions and non-institutional sociopolitical relations have been viewed as a symbol of backwardness. He focuses on the figure of the *notable*, who, far from being anachronistic, extemporaneous and immobile, is a key figure in terms of understanding the "modernising" process itself, insofar as he was part of the clientelism network inherent to any contemporary political system. In this sense, the author claims that to properly understand the mix of formal and informal aspects in the political transformation process, we should look more to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East and less to European countries whose analytical and methodological framework is constrained by a linear vision of the political modernisation process that neglects the informal aspects.

In the last chapter of this section, **Chapter 8**, Jesús Ángel Redondo Cardeñoso focuses on Portugal, analysing how Portuguese republicanism at the beginning of the twentieth century promoted various forms of collective action to mobilise the popular classes. The text traces the most important expressions of collective mobilisation promoted by republicanism in the district of Évora, a region in the interior of the country, between 1908 and 1915, among which rallies, festive demonstrations and popular riots stand out. In short, as in the rest of the chapters of the book, this chapter provides evidence that shows that the grassroots groups in the rural regions of the interior of the Iberian Peninsula actively mobilised to promote democratising political changes during the "long" nineteenth century.

In addition to these eight chapters, there is also a *ninth chapter* in the form of a special epilogue, which contains the comments of six other internationally renowned experts who actively participated in the meeting: Robert M. Fishman, Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Joe Foweraker,

Florencia Peyrou and Salvador Cruz. We are aware that this is not a standard chapter, but we consider it worth publishing. The comments of these experts were made after a careful reading of the texts and in response to a few specific questions that were put to them in writing before the meeting. First, they reflected on the narrative of Spanish history with which they were familiar and the extent to which they thought it should be revised following the proposals in the previous chapters. Second, they reflected on the relevance of approaching other spaces and scales than those traditionally used to study the processes of socialisation and political democratisation. Their critical perspectives on the concept of democracy, the complexity of its diachronic analysis, the importance of geographical scales and their contributions on the democratising nature of the different social mobilisations they are familiar with go far beyond the interest that the book may have for specialists in Spanish history.

Funding

Notes

1 Gunther, 1992.
2 An early critical perspective on the theory of consensus and moderation in democratic transitions can be found in Bermeo, 1997. Evidence that the Spanish transition was in no way free of violence is provided by Baby, 2018.
3 Bryce, 1921: 567.
4 Ibid., 600–601.
5 Ibid., viii.
6 Posada-Carbó, 1996.
7 Dardé, 1996: 201–222.
8 O'Gorman, 1996: 17–32.
9 Posada-Carbó, 2008.
10 Sirera Miralles, 2015.
11 Regenerationism is recognised as a set of ideas that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advocated the total social, political and economic regeneration of the country after the so-called great disaster that led to the loss of the Spanish colonies in 1898. The aim of the reforms was to alleviate the supposed national and international decline of the country. One of the biggest culprits for this decline was seen to be agriculture, and thus Regenerationists established a close link between Andalusia and *caciquismo*, as a paradigmatic expression of political backwardness. For an understanding of the phenomenon, see Pan-Montojo, 1998. On the idea of decline in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the loss of the colonies, see Saz, 2016. A grounded critique of the idea of

decadence associated with the problems derived from the "agrarian question" is given in Pujol et al. 2001.

12 Robledo, 2022.
13 Costa, 1901.
14 Carrión, 1932.
15 Brenan, 1960: 85–86.
16 For Brenan (1960: 89), "*the Spanish pueblo has a totally different character to any other body of peasants and labourers in Europe*".
17 In the 1960s, the first Spanish translation of Brenan's book, published in Paris, was quickly introduced clandestinely into Franco's Spain and became a very popular text among members of the democratic opposition to Franco.
18 Tusell, 1976; Varela, 1997. A critique of these interpretations of failure focused on the case of Andalusia can be found in González de Molina, Herrera, Soto, Cruz, and Acosta (2007) and Herrera, González de Molina, Cruz, and Acosta (2012).
19 In the same years in which Cánovas closed down democracy in Spain, the France of the Third Republic, that Bryce does include in his catalogue of democratic nations, emerged in a complex and uncertain scenario, not without anti-democratic threats and on the ashes of the great convulsion and repression of the Paris Commune in 1871.
20 Townson, 2015.
21 Muhlberger and Paine, 1993.
22 Markoff, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2015.
23 Posada-Carbó, 2008; Aguilera Rivera, Posada-Carbó, and Zimmermann, 2022.
24 Isakhan and Stockwell, 2011.
25 Keane, 2009.
26 Innes and Philp, 2013.
27 Kurunmäki, Nevers, and Velde, 2018.
28 Fernández-Sebastián, and Capellán, 2018; Fernández-Sebastián, and Rosales, 2018
29 Lawrence, 2020.
30 Peyrou and Simal, 2018.
31 Lawrence, 2020: 3.
32 Varela, 1997.
33 Schumpeter, 2010.
34 Carnero, 1997.
35 A good summary of Spanish contemporary history from the perspective of an Anglo-Saxon historian can be found in Radcliff, 2017.
36 Eley, 2002; Markoff, 2015.
37 Markoff, 2015.
38 Scott, 1990.
39 Bayat, 2010.
40 Della Porta, 2009.
41 Duarte, 2006.
42 Isakhan and Stockwell, 2011.

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Part I

Rethinking democratization in Spain from local perspective

1 Municipalism and democratization in modern Spanish history

Pamela Beth Radcliff

The connection between municipalism and democracy has become common currency in what we might call the 'local turn' in contemporary radical democratic theory and practice. But historians, at least in the Spanish case, have not yet fully explored the longer-term historical relationship between municipalist discourse and practice and democratization since the birth of modern constitutional government.[1] The municipality had a formal role in democratization as the site of governance through which most citizens accessed the expanding participatory structures of the constitutional regimes. It also had an informal role as the site of locally based popular mobilization, from juntas to social movements, strikes, boycotts, riots and insurrections, often staged by protagonists with little access to formal channels. And finally, it has had a role as part of what I call the municipalist imaginary, a set of discourses that has situated the foundations of political liberty and democracy in the local political sphere. This article argues that municipalist discourses played a recurring, if minority, role in debates about the nature and substance of Spanish democracy, from the first constitutional debates of 1810 to the municipalist platforms of the present. With the understanding that both municipalism and democracy are contested and unstable concepts that evolved over time, there was significant overlap in the claims and principles across these discursive fields.[2]

At the same time, the practice and the imaginary of local politics remained closely intertwined in Spanish political culture, particularly within the realm of counter-hegemonic or minoritarian movements. Thus, as the dominant political movements of the nineteenth century embraced centralization of state power and dismissed the 'local' as an archaic and fragmented site that slowed the consolidation of the modern nation state, subaltern movements often took refuge in the local as an alternative site of mobilization and power, both formal and informal. In turn, the praxis of local politics fueled the municipalist imaginary or the conviction that the municipality should be the cornerstone of the democratic political community constructed from the bottom up. On the discursive level, municipalist ideas played a consistent role in debates about the territorial structure of the constitutional state, the nature of democracy and the virtues of

federalism versus centralism.[3] In other words, the 'local' was both a *de facto* space of modern politics and the object of theorizing by a range of thinkers and movements from liberals to democrats, republicans and libertarians. While the terrain of local, municipalist and democratic politics did not always overlap, there was enough common ground to include their interrelationship as a feature of the nonlinear history of democracy in Spain.

There is no question that all of these movements and claims were relative 'losers' in the long-term political struggles over the location of authority and decision-making in the construction of the modern democratic state in Spain. But what they created is ongoing tension about the territorial structure of the democratic political community as constructed 'from above' or 'from below' that was never resolved, despite an institutional structure that reinforced centralization at nearly every major turning point. Thus, rather than a linear progression away from the 'local', the conflict keeps recurring, with municipalist discourses waxing and waning in relation to competing political currents, primarily regionalism and the hegemonic statist parties.[4] The upshot has been a recurring pattern of counter-hegemonic municipalist discourses that has competed with regionalist and statist discourses to define the aspirations and qualities of a democratic polity and society. Under this general umbrella, there have generally been two faces of the municipalist imaginary: a liberal version that defended municipal autonomy as the best defense of liberty against state tyranny and a radical version that viewed municipal politics as the channel for popular mobilization and the site of citizen education and empowerment.

The ongoing relevance of municipalist discourse has been bolstered by recent trends in radical democratic theory and practice. While concepts from Henri Lefebvre's 'right to the city' to Murray Bookchin's 'libertarian municipalism' have been part of the global political vocabulary for several decades, they have moved from the periphery to the center in an age of disillusionment with nation states and globalization.[5] 'We are living in a municipalist moment', proclaims a 2020 article in *Dissent*.[6] Although there is variation, municipalist projects today argue for dramatically reducing the scale of governance, through local autonomy and direct citizen participation in the institutions that organize and structure their everyday lives in the pursuit of more substantive democratic practice.[7] The global organization Fearless Cities brings together activists, local officials and organizations in order to 'defend human rights, democracy and the common good', according to their website, and they recently published a book on municipalist projects in action around the world.[8] Within Spain, *La apuesta municipalista*, published in 2014 by a group of scholars and activists called Observatorio Metropolitano, asserted that 'all the democratic projects in Spain revolve around municipalism'.[9] The 'municipalist turn' entered mainstream Spanish politics in the 2015 local elections, when the coalitions Ahora Madrid and Barcelona en Comú gained control of their city governments with 'citizen platforms' that were taken up by groups in a number of other cities, such as Zaragoza and Valencia.[10]

The proliferation of municipalist movements has paralleled a growing scholarly interest in the local political sphere as an important continuing site of modern politics, along with regional and national governance.[11] According to Engin Isin, cities continue to play many functions in the daily lives of their inhabitants, both as the providers of basic services and as the physical space where residents enact their 'public selves'.[12] As a result, cities 'remain the strategic arena for the development of citizenship', according to Holston and Appadurai.[13] Cities, thus, become 'spaces of belonging' that challenge the state's 'hegemonic processes of assembling or fixing identities'.[14] In other words, there has been a renewed interest in the local political sphere as a staging ground for more substantive democratic political identities and practice.

However, while the 'local turn' in democratic theory has increased the attention to municipalist ideas, historians are still in the process of dismantling the classic teleologies that have long minimized the local sphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a residual space of premodern politics. The association between local and archaic may be one of the last vestiges of the familiar modernization story about political development that was codified in social science research of the mid-twentieth century. This teleology posited a normative shift in the locus of political authority, claims-making and citizenship from the local to the nation state.[15] While many aspects of modernization theory have been critiqued, the consolidation of centralizing and homogenizing states has persisted as a general marker of political modernity, especially in Europe. In Continental Western Europe, from the French Revolution to the construction of the welfare states and the European community after World War II, the major political forces viewed the state as the engine of progress, the representative of the national will and the main forum for citizen participation. Further, with a few exceptions, most of the hegemonic parties embraced a process of top–down political integration that homogenized the population into individual citizens or social classes through ever-expanding state institutions. And modernization theorists, whether liberal or Marxist, viewed this scaling up as both normal and a measure of progress. From this perspective, communalisms, localisms and provincialisms were viewed as threats to the modernizing and later democratizing project of the liberal state, all associated with lower levels of political maturity and sophistication.[16]

So how do we distinguish this municipalist imaginary from the other related concepts about the territorial division of the modern state, such as federalism, decentralization, localism and regionalism? The municipality can play a central role in federalist or decentralization projects, but not necessarily. Federalism in its various forms focuses on the nature of the relationship between political units, whatever their identity. Decentralization is the devolution of powers from the state to provincial and/or local governments, while the concept of municipalist autonomy derives its legitimation from local liberties. Municipalism is most often conflated or confused with localism, but the latter concept implies an inward-looking perspective, in which

local identity and privileges are defended without any interest in forming part of a larger community. In municipalist projects, local power is a jumping off point not the end goal. Regionalism is obviously distinguished from municipalism by the larger territorial unit. In many federal or decentralization projects, the municipality and province or region were both links in the chain of government institutions, with greater or lesser emphasis placed on the one or the other. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of the decentralization/federal projects were focused almost exclusively on the region as the basic unit, as in the emerging regionalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Significantly, Regionalists based their claims on distinct cultural, linguistic and historical features of their region that justified autonomy and devolution, while municipalism defines a political space that is local but universal.

Within these parameters, the municipalist imaginary or discourses constituted an available language of democracy that a range of political movements adopted and adapted over the course of the past two centuries.[17] The first modern era of municipalist theory and practice opened with the constitutional debates of the Cortes of Cádiz in 1810–1812 and culminated in the local cantonal revolutions of the First Republic of 1874. During this period, the defense of local liberties and autonomy became a core feature of the liberal, democratic and republican opposition to the centralized construction of the liberal state. In the early nineteenth century, the radical liberals who formed the Progressive party in the 1830s were the main defenders of local liberties, but by the mid-nineteenth century Democrats and Federal Republicans had taken up the claim of the autonomous municipality as a core building block of what was explicitly defended as the democratic political community. After the collapse of the First Republic in 1874, one of the main threads of municipalist discourse developed within the libertarian movement, in which the concept of the 'free municipality' existed in dialogue with syndicalism from the First International to the Civil War of the 1930s to define the egalitarian society of the future. After the Franco Dictatorship, the municipalist language of democracy reappeared in the citizen movement of the 1970s and 1980s, drawing on Henri Lefebvre's 'right to the city'. And finally, the first self-proclaimed municipalist movements emerged as an important voice within the 15M Indignados movement in the twenty-first century. The point is not to claim a coherent thread from 1810 to 15M but to map a set of concepts and claims that could be, and were, drawn on to challenge the dominant centralizing models of liberal and democratic governance.

Municipal autonomy and political liberties from the Cortes of Cádiz to the First Republic

The central role of the municipality in Spain's constitutional system emerged in the first debates over the 1812 Constitution, between defenders of local government autonomy and centralizers. In this period, before the widespread

adoption of the languages of democracy, the heart of this debate was the question of representation, liberty and participation in the constitutional system.[18] For defenders of autonomous municipal governments, they were direct elected representatives of the community interests of the pueblos. For centralizers, the only representative body of the 'nation' was the Cortes, or Parliament.[19] More than just an administrative technicality, these opposing positions embodied competing blueprints for the construction of the constitutional nation state. Over the next several decades, the argument for and against municipal autonomy became a key signifier in nineteenth-century debates over the parameters of liberty, representation, citizenship and democracy. While the centralizing position emerged as dominant, that position was challenged by the defense of municipal autonomy at every major transition moment, from 1820–1823 to 1840–1843, 1854–1856 and, most dramatically, the *Sexenio* (1868–1874).

What explains this symbolic weight of the municipality? One source of its perceived importance was the central role played by the municipality in the historicist narrative of Spanish constitutional culture.[20] For most deputies, the origins of Spanish constitutional culture were found in their own past rather than in the natural rights discourse of French constitutionalism.[21] And within this historicist discourse, embodied by the works of the oft-cited historian and jurist Francisco Martinez Marina, municipal charters or *fueros* and the local freedoms they codified created *little republics*[22] that occupied a pre-eminent space in the genealogy of national and personal liberties. Citizens enjoyed *civil equality and liberty*[23] and participation in governing: 'the people gathered and met to deliberate and had great influence on the business and issues of public utility'.[24] As a result, these local institutions were the basis of the Spanish constitution and main defense against feudal domination and tyranny:

> Knowledge of the Cortes held in the Middle Ages, although very important, does not have as much influence on national customs and ancient Spanish law as that of the ordinances and laws of the commons or municipal charters; precious monuments in which the most essential points of our jurisprudence and public law of Castile in the Middle Ages are contained.[25]

In other words, the main source of constitutional law was not the Parliament but the municipalities. Because of the close link between municipal and national liberties, the destruction of the former by royal despotism led inexorably to the destruction of the latter: 'the glory of municipal autonomy and national liberty were totally eclipsed and extinguished forever'.[26] For the defenders of municipal autonomy in the nineteenth century, this heroic past demonstrated that municipalities deserved a privileged status in the constitutional system. Equally important, it provided the proof that autonomous municipalities were the best guarantor of national and personal liberties.

Another source of the continued symbolic weight of the municipality in the nineteenth-century political discourse was the growing pattern of local revolutionary uprisings, or *juntismo*, that provided ongoing evidence for theorists of the vibrancy of the local political sphere.[27] This evidence helped consolidate a link between popular mobilization, autonomous municipalities and democratization, especially among democratic and republican theorists. Increasingly, defenders of municipal liberties included this more contemporary evidence in their arguments, often alongside the classic evocation of medieval *fueros*. For example, in his speech against the municipal law of 1870, Emilio Castelar insisted that 'our peoples. . . . They are peoples of inspiration, capable of performing the greatest wonders, the miracle of a sudden transformation, in those times when they are agitated by revolutionary electricity'. At the same time, he acknowledged the role of the heroic past in creating this capacity:

> The Cortes of Cadiz at the time of their meeting invoked the memory of those cities of the Middle Ages, true municipal republics that destroyed the servitude of the land and created the common state. The Cortes were well aware that Spain was able to resist Bonaparte's fortune at one time and everywhere, because absolutism had not succeeded in eradicating our municipal life at its roots.[28]

The main protagonists in the nineteenth-century debate were the conservative liberals on one side and progressive liberals, democrats and federal republicans on the other side.[29] For the conservative liberals of the Moderate party (1830s–1860s), the nation was a single indivisible entity and the state was its representative. Drawing on the French doctrinaire philosophy of Guizot, they defended the necessity of a centralized administrative and political structure that would consolidate the bonds holding the nation together. The state was the agent of progress that both homogenized the population into individual citizens and rationalized the institutional structure of government. In this vision, federalism, localism and provincialism were all dangerous centripetal forces of fragmentation, exemplified by the experience of the overseas 'provinces' declaring independence, which stoked the permanent fear that autonomy and separatism were two sides of the same coin rather than distinct options. Within this framework, the Moderates rejected the concept of representative and autonomous local governments as impediments to the consolidation of the nation state. Instead, they insisted that local governments were mere administrative bodies of the executive branch of the State, a status institutionalized in the 1845 municipal regime, which also limited suffrage and placed a state-appointed mayor at the top, in confirmation of this hierarchical chain of command.

Conversely, for the Progressive and later Democratic and Republican parties, the municipality was the privileged historical site of liberty and participation upon which the nation state was to be constructed in tiered territorial

units.[30] Although their ideologies differed on other points, such as monarchy versus republic or socialism versus individualism, they shared a set of ideas about the foundational role of local power and the independent municipality as the cornerstone of a free people.

Within this framework, local governments had to be autonomous political units representing the collective interests of the *pueblo* and responsible to that community, not the state. At the head of this autonomous unit should be an elected mayor, not an appointed official representing the state. The other aspect of municipal autonomy was citizen participation, inscribed through voting but also through institutions like the militia, comprising male citizens under the authority of the local government, and the constituent assembly of all citizens that would be convoked to approve major decisions like annual budgets. Through this participation, municipalities became schools of citizenship, helping individuals develop their political selves.

One of the most important liberal theorists was Joaquín María López, who defended municipal power as a brake on state tyranny. As a Progressive party representative in the debates of the 1830s and 1840s, he defended a constitutional system of five powers that he borrowed from the French liberal theorist Benjamin Constant.[31] Lopez defined the fifth municipal power as an essential ring in the chain of constitutional power:

> [M]unicipal power is a positive power, separate from all others, independent of them, and must be recognized as such . . . because local interests, entrusted to the vigilance and protection of municipalities . . . are linked to the great chain that forms the whole of public interest.[32]

As in Constant, its independence was based on the principle of an escalation of spheres of interests and competences: '[W]hat touches everyone must be treated, and for the same reason, that what touches only some, these and not others are the ones who must treat it'. Confirming Constant's impact, he ends his first lesson with a quote from him:

> Individual bonds strengthen, not weaken the general ties...multiply, then the connections that bring men together; personify the nation in all areas, and let your local institutions act as mirrors that reflect the general will.
>
> (pp. 94–95)

But, in contrast to Constant, Lopez draws on the historicist argument first raised in the Cortes of Cádiz. That is, he legitimizes municipal power through its origins in the Spanish municipal system of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, which protected the liberties of the towns and the kings against feudal oppression. As he concluded, 'the principle of autonomy of the municipalities was always the constitutional law in Spain' (p. 93). In contrast to the argument that they no longer needed to serve this role in the new constitutional

epoch, when the 'people' were in charge of the nation, Lopez insisted that municipal independence was still crucial to serve as a brake against the return of despotism in whatever form.[33]

The best example of the democratic and republican version of the municipalist imaginary was the federal republican theorist Francisco Pi y Margall, who also translated the most renowned European federalist text, Paul Pierre Proudhon's *Principe Federatif*, into Spanish in 1868, on the cusp of the democratic revolution that would culminate with the cantonal local revolutions.[34] In the Prologue, he celebrates Proudhon's federalist principle as the key towards moving away from the authoritarian formation of nations through absorption of smaller units and towards greater liberty. He includes both provinces and municipalities in his concentric structure of a nation built from the bottom up, but the latter constitutes the basic and the most 'stable' and 'substantive' political unit (p. 316). Thus, the individual 'entered public life' through the municipality, which was the first political society, 'a complete and independent whole. It is a nation in miniature', as he writes in *Las Nacionalidades* in 1877, after the collapse of the First Republic.[35]

From Proudhon, he took the idea of the horizontal construction of the larger nation through the voluntary and reciprocal pacts between these autonomous municipalities. Through local pacts, the municipalities would join provinces, and these in turn pacted to form the nation. Pueblos set the conditions and scope of local autonomy, so in theory, each unit could withdraw at any time from the nation, although he insisted this would not happen.[36] This extreme voluntarism constitutes the municipalist version of Ernst Renan's famous quote in 'What is a Nation', that its existence was a daily plebiscite. Instead, cities have been 'violently incorporated' into nations through the misguided belief that the state is the source of all authority, with local governments as simply agents of that authority.

Pi also agrees with Proudhon that any stable federal system must include greater economic equality, a point that will distinguish radical municipalist discourse going forward. Thus, in his Prologue to Proudhon's text, he insists on the necessity of applying the federalist principles of solidarity, reciprocity, division of labor and greater equality to the economic as well as the political sphere. If the 'social revolution' and 'political revolution' were not moving forward together, he concludes, the federation would not hold together.[37]

While he draws on Proudhon's theory, Pi y Margall shares the same historicist claim of other Spanish theorists that municipal autonomy is also a recuperation of a deeply rooted tradition of autonomy enjoyed by Spanish towns in 'other long lost times of greatness and glory'.[38] Like all nineteenth-century defenders of municipal liberties, Pi provides a historical narrative of local power and autonomy from the Middle Ages, codified in the municipal charters or *fueros*. The free cities were eventually subordinated with the victory of absolutist monarchists, but, as Castelar had noted, their spirit had been revived in the nineteenth-century local and provincial revolutions in 1808, 1820, 1835 and so on, culminating in 1868 and the Federal

Republic of 1873. Significantly, it was this long history of independence and the 'natural tendency to try to recover their autonomy' that explained the federalist turn of the 1868 revolution.[39] Finally, also like other Spanish theorists, his narrative about the history of municipal autonomy is at the same time the history of Spanish liberty and democratic tradition. In other words, municipal autonomy is the embodiment of Spanish democracy and liberty and the starting point for any free political community.

Municipal autonomy and democracy from the Restoration to the Civil War

The collapse of the Federal Republic in 1874 inaugurated a period in which municipalist ideas were pushed from the center of political debates to the margins. The 'lessons' drawn from the turbulent *Sexenio* period reinforced the centralizing 'statism' of the moderate Restoration liberals, confirming that decentralization, popular mobilization and federalism were recipes for disorder and dissolution. The structure of local government returned to the Moderate model of administrative units subordinate to the state's authority, and most former federal republicans in Catalonia turned to regional nationalism, while other republicans adopted centralist frameworks. During the last decades of the Restoration, there were several failed proposals for municipal law reform that aimed at greater decentralization but not always democratization.[40] Even when democratic parties regained the political initiative during the Second Republic in 1931, none of the major national parties viewed municipal autonomy as a key priority in establishing a new democratic and republican government. In contrast, they continued with the statist tradition, but this time in service of their massive social reform and secularization projects.[41] The 1931 Constitution did recognize the autonomous status of municipalities (as well as regions) as representative bodies, along with direct election of the mayors, but formulating a local government law did not make it onto the ambitious list of priorities during the first left republican/Socialist government (1931–1933). The conservative version that was passed in 1935 during the second Bienio contained several important centralizing features, like the authority of the State to remove mayors.

During this period from the late 1870s to the 1930s, one of the main standard bearers of the defense of local liberties were the libertarian or anarco-communists. Although on the margins during the Restoration, the Republic opened a new era in democratic discourse, between parliamentary and revolutionary democracy, in which libertarian municipalist ideas constituted one version of the future utopian society.[42] The division within the historical anarchist movement was whether the fundamental community unit should be the *municipio libre* (free municipality) or the trade union. For anarcho-syndicalists, the trade union was the core unit of the future libertarian society, but for anarcho-communists it was the municipality. In Spanish libertarian circles, Pi y Margall as well as Proudhon, Kropotkin

and Reclus were most influential among the anarco-communist wing of the movement. From the 1910s, with the foundation of the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT),[43] the anarcho-communists were generally in the minority, but debates over the structure of the future society between and among the two positions continued through the civil war. While there was general consensus about the role of trade unions in organizing production and consumption in the future egalitarian society, there was more debate about the role of the municipality or the commune. Would the municipality be superseded by the syndical structure? Would it remain as a complementary structure or, the third position, would it be the key unit of the self-governing federation?

The most important anarcho-communist theorist of the *municipio libre* in the 1930s' debates was Federico Urales. Although the 'apolitical' anarchist position formally eschewed all governmental structures, the *municipio libre* was the 'point of departure' for the social revolution, the embodiment of the local community that formed the basic unit of the anarcho-communist society. In contrast to the 'specialized' units based on industrial trades, Urales argued, the municipality was a more inclusive 'living body', or *cuerpo viviente*.[44] It was the municipality that would be the unit through which the community would move from private property to working together for the common good. As such, the anarchist *municipio libre* differed from its republican counterpart in its radical economic egalitarianism and its anti-nationalism, but shared the basic blueprint of a *federación de municipios libres y dueños de sus destinos* ("federation of municipalities that are free and masters of their destiny").[45]

Linking Urales to the Spanish municipalist tradition was his defense of the historicist claims that the *municipio libre* was rooted in the *fueros* of the '*municipal republics of the Middle Ages*'. While anarchists believed these aspirations were universal, it is notable that he still chose to highlight the same historical narrative as his nineteenth-century liberal and republican predecessors. Similarly, an editorial in the anarchist periodical *Solidaridad Obrera* titled 'la autonomia local', relates the familiar history of medieval local liberties crushed by absolutism. The genealogy of their recovery began with the cantonalism of the First Republic and Pi y Margall's local autonomy but was then passed to the CNT, which was framed as the privileged interpreter of this ancient but still vibrant tradition.[46]

In the May 1936 CNT Congress, on the eve of the Civil War, Urales's position marked one pole of a wide-ranging debate on the parameters of the future libertarian society.[47] On the other extreme was the syndicalist Abad de Santillán, who viewed the trade union as the only rational and modern organizational structure.[48] In between were those like Isaac Puente who defended some sort of hybrid that incorporated both unions and free municipalities or communes.[49] The final document adopted the compromise version that included both unions and municipalities. However, at the time and in subsequent historiography, the municipalist position has usually been dismissed as utopian, in contrast to the rationalism of the syndicalist position.[50] Partly as

a result, there is little scholarship focused on how and where municipalism might have informed revolutionary experimentation in localities where anarchist organizations played a central role in the summer of 1936. Most of the earlier historiography highlighted only the syndicalist role in collectivizations or worker-run production.[51] But the collapse of state institutions likely provided a fertile space for anarchist municipalism as well as syndicalism, thus providing the opportunity structure for continuing the long-term dynamic between theory and practice.

Framing the social revolution as a municipalist moment was in fact one of the claims of the Catalan theorist Felipe Alaíz. He published the most substantive defense of the anarchist *municipio libre* in a series of 20 pamphlets, which were later collated in a book titled *Hacia una federación de autonomías ibéricas*.[52] He was a member of the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI) and CNT, who participated in the debates within Spain in the 1930s, but published them in 1946 from exile in France. One of the pamphlets, titled 'the Spanish Municipality from the Roman Era', revisits the historicist narrative of municipal liberties. Another, titled 'The Municipality: Locus of the Open Assembly' ('El Municipio, mandatario de la asamblea abierta'), defines the assembliest mode of participation and decision-making. A third, titled 'The local Federation Is the Municipality' ('La Federacion local es el municipio'), develops the idea of the municipality as the core unit of the federation. And finally, another pamphlet elaborated a template of rights and responsibilities for a new 'municipal charter' or *fuero* that would organize and structure the future society.

In terms of the role of the municipality in the future society, Alaiz provided a more elaborate outline of the specific features of the anarchist *municipio libre* than Urales had sketched out. The common denominator with non-anarchist municipalism was the conviction that the municipality was the basic natural social unit, an 'irreducible grouping' that transforms individuals into social beings through *vecindad* (local residence). Each autonomous unit would then federate regionally and nationally to form the Iberian Confederation of Autonomous Libertarian Communes.

What made them specifically anarchist was the rejection of the concept of 'municipal powers' delegated from the citizenry, even for this most basic political unit. Electoral democracy would be superseded by plebiscitary and participatory democracy, with the open general assembly as the permanent source of sovereignty and the collective author of the municipal charter or *fuero* that would define the parameters of 'convivencia'. The assembly would nominate representatives but without an executive power or paid employees. One can see the tension between pueblos and cities in his municipal imaginary, not as a result of archaic ruralism but of the concern that this direct democracy couldn't be scaled up to the level of the city. The question of scaling up is definitely an unresolved tension in anarchist municipalism and, one might argue, in direct democracy theory in general.

Municipal autonomy and democracy from the Franco regime to the present

After the defeat of the Republic and the crushing of political liberties under a new authoritarian regime, a new wave of municipalist discourses emerged decades later. During the Francoist dictatorship, municipal governments functioned once again as subordinate administrative units with an appointed mayor. These city governments had little autonomy to deal with the challenges of the regime's liberalization of the economy from the late 1950s, which opened a period of dramatic growth, industrialization and massive migration to the cities, with little in the way of regulation, oversight or redistributive welfare policies. In this context, the local urban environment emerged as the object of rights claims for a new generation of civic associations demanding decent housing, sewers, paved streets, schools and green spaces, especially in the burgeoning neighborhoods on the outskirts of major cities.[53]

These neighborhood associations (AAVV) emerged as practical sites, in a context in which the local 'place', as opposed to the national or the global, was really the only accessible object of rights claims. During the political transition of the late 1970s, however, theorists began to transform this practical experience into a 'citizen movement' democratic platform that included the classic municipalist ideas of local autonomy and direct citizen participation.[54] In contrast to the top–down process of democratization occurring at the state level, citizen movement activists argued for a bottom–up process. Thus, the city government would be the institutional apparatus from which to start the democratization of the rest of the state institutions.[55] In the words of one activist,

> this fundamental grass roots power . . . is the hinge around which the transformation of the social structure and the progress of history rotates. Only by resolving this problem of power at the grass roots level is it possible to imagine a new society.[56]

In contrast to the authoritarian Francoist city government, they fleshed out the parameters of an 'alternativa democrática municipal',[57] a concept that signaled the contested terrain of democratization during this liminal moment.[58] The goal of this democratic alternative would be to transform the lived environment so as to benefit the collective interests of ordinary citizens through municipalization of services, urban planning, the social right to housing, public infrastructure, collective transport, public green spaces and even promotion of the social life of neighborhoods.

The anarchist version of the *municipio libre* also re-emerged as a minority voice in this debate, as articulated in the introductory editorial to a bulletin with that name, in April 1978. In this alternative view, the associations would displace the elected local governments as entities of direct democracy and self-direction (*gestión*) that would constitute the true

municipio libre. From the anarchist perspective, the local governments remained part of the apparatus of the state, with powers delegated from above. Instead, the neighborhood associations should be empowered with the organization of community life, beginning with barrio-level assemblies, which would pass along their agreements to the Federation of AAVV at the municipal level.

This anarchist vision was distinct from the Socialist- and Communist-influenced citizen movement theorists, who viewed the AAVV as channels for citizen participation but working in conjunction with elected city governments. The common ground across the left was some version of citizen participation and direct democracy to recapture local governance for the population from the capitalist elites, as articulated poetically in Henri Lefebvre's 'right to the city'.[59] In any case, neither of these visions of municipal autonomy and direct democracy informed the 1985 municipal law.

In the early twenty-first century, the dynamic shifted again in favor of the principles of decentralization, direct democracy and local autonomy, now explicitly framed within what is called the 'new municipalism'. The culmination of popular mobilization in the 15M/*indignados* occupation of city centers across Spain in 2011, which brought millions into the streets to protest the economic crisis and the government's austerity measures, further nurtured the favorable context for a municipalist democratic alternative. As summarized by the 2014 manifesto, *La apuesta municipalista*, 'if we take the institutions that are closest to the citizens, ie, the municipalities, and convert them into centers of direct decision making, we can create a democracy deserving of the name' (p. 143). Political scientist (and now Minister of Universities) Joan Subirats, a long-time supporter of direct democracy and decentralization, adopted the municipalist label in his 2016 book, *El poder de lo próximo: las virtudes del municipalismo*. He argued that municipalism was the best path to achieve democratic transformation and called for a new urban agenda that would free local governments and reinvigorate citizen participation. In his conclusion, Subirats evokes a concept that has always been central to the municipalist imaginary, which is the *local community* as the core cohesive unit of political life.[60]

Conclusion

Building up from the foundation of an independent local community, municipalist discourses since the Cortes of Cádiz have imagined an alternative constitutional structure constructed 'from below', in contrast to the statist models of the hegemonic centralizing forces. The recent resurrection of a self-proclaimed 'new' municipalism as the preferred path to 'substantive' democracy completes the historical arc that opened in the early nineteenth century. While proponents did not always explicitly frame this imaginary in relation to greater democratization, municipalism evolved as one of the

consistent and recurring 'languages of democracy' in Spanish political discourse. The demands for local autonomy, decentralization of power and channels for citizen participation invoked the pursuit of liberty, equality, representation, citizen empowerment and community welfare, all relevant to debates over the nature and parameters of a democratic society in the broadest sense. At the same time, the recurring relevance of the local political sphere in staging democratic and popular movements reinforced the theoretical claims regarding the privileged space of the 'local' in the ongoing process of democratization. Whether in their liberal or radical versions, municipalist ideas have shared the conviction that keeping power, authority and decision-making close to citizens' everyday lives is more likely to result in policies that benefit the community as a whole. While not constituting a seamless thread from Cádiz to 15M, municipalist discourses provided an available language of democratic renewal that gained traction in liminal moments of crisis or transition.

The point is not to defend or advocate for municipalist projects as inherently more democratic or progressive than state-centered ones or to predict what will happen to the current 'municipalist turn' in democratic discourse. Instead, the goal is to incorporate the counter-hegemonic municipalist discourses into the contested and multifaceted evolution of Spanish democracy. The fact that a version of the municipalist imaginary has reappeared in many counter-hegemonic visions of Spanish democratic culture over the course of the modern period suggests an ongoing dynamic or tension that has never been resolved. From this perspective, the municipalist call to rebuild democracy from the bottom up is likely to remain a feature of the ongoing work in progress that constitutes Spain's democratic tradition.

Notes

1 For example, the 'local' doesn't appear as one of the sites of analysis in Innes and Philp, 2018a, 2018b; Kurunmaki, Nevers, and te Velde (2018: 1). For a different approach to the municipalist tradition, see Radcliff, 2021.

2 Jussi Kurunmaki, Jeppe Nevers and Henk te Velde challenge the classic linear narrative of democracy and historicize the institutional and constitutionalist version that dominated Anglo-Saxon scholarship in the second half of the twentieth century. Instead of a 'single mainstream development of democracy [there is] instead an abundance of democratic rhetoric' (2018: Introduction, 10). Likewise, on the municipalist.org website (http://municipalist.org/what-is-municipalism), Devin Balkind admits that the definition is still up for grabs. Dictionary definitions are no more helpful, limited to the concept of, and advocacy for, local self-government. On the evolution of the concept of democracy in the Spanish case, see Fernández-Sebastián and Rosales, 2018.

3 There is excellent scholarship on federalism, but the local sphere doesn't always emerge as a special category of analysis. See Suárez Cortina and Ridolfi, 2013; Suárez Cortina, 2016; Peyrou, 2010.

4 There is now a large literature integrating provincial and regionalist movements into political modernity in Spain. For example, see Forçadell Alvarez and Romeo Mateo, 2006; and Augusteijn and Storm, 2012.

5 Significantly, both Lefebvre's (1969) and Bookchin's (1987) ideas have been invoked in recent movements and publications. Bookchin's essay on libertarian municipalism has been republished in a recent posthumous collection (Bookchin and Taylor, 2015). On the proliferation of 'right to the city' movements, see Sugranyes and Mathivet, 2010.

6 Forman, Elia, and van Outryve, 2020.

7 On the 'new municipalism' in Europe, see Caccia, 2017.

8 *Fearless Cities: Municipalist Politics in Action*, www.fearlesscities.com/en/about.

9 '[S]obre el municipalismo gravitaron los proyectos de democracia en el país' (Observatorio, 2014: 19).

10 Rubio-Pueyo, 2017.

11 See Umbach, 2008. In the introduction, Maiken Umbach makes the case that local politics needs to be studied as a modern phenomenon in its own right.

12 Isin, 2000.

13 Holston and Appadurai, 1996.

14 Diouf and Fredericks, 2014.

15 Apter, 1965; Rustow, 1967.

16 José Ortega y Gasset provided the classic portrait of Spain as a country in which extreme localism had undermined the modern state-building project. For a more recent articulation of this view, see Fusi (1994).

17 I employ discourses and imaginary to identify a 'basket' of ideas and concepts that were not explicitly framed as municipalist movements until the late twentieth century. See the 'languages of democracy' in Kurunmaki, Nevers, and te Velde (2018: Introduction).

18 Innes and Philp (2018b) argue that it is in the first several decades of the nineteenth century that the term is appropriated and disseminated into political discourse and practice.

19 *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias*, discussion of Titulo IV, Cap I Ayuntamientos, (10–01–1812: 2589–2597).

20 Romeo Mateo, 2014.

21 There were exceptions such as José Cangas Arguelles (1811). It is an anti-historicist argument, based on the legitimacy of the Cortes on 'the luminous writings of modern philosophers' and not on the medieval Cortes which were 'controlled by a handful of men, and by representatives divided *por brazos*'.

22 'When and on what grounds the people or third estate began to be considered as an essential and primary part of the political representation of these kingdoms' (Martinez Marina, 1996: 118).

23 *Ensayo histórico crítico sobre la legislación y principales cuerpos legales de los reinos de León y Castilla, especialmente sobre el Código de las Siete Partidas de don Alonso el Sabio*. Libro 5: Cuadro del Sistema Legal de los Fueros Municipales y Análisis de sus leyes' in Martinez Marina, 1966. The essay was first published in 1808, with a second edition in 1834, a third in 1845, with extracts published in 1836–1841.

24 'Discurso Preliminar' in Martinez Marina, 1996. It was first published in 1813.

25 Martinez Marina, 1966: 66.

26 'De los poderes que los concejos conferían a sus procuradores y de los oficios que en su virtud debían estos desempeñar' in Martinez Marina, 1996: 221.

27 Martí Martinez and Romeo Mateo, 2006.

28 Castelar and Pi y Margall, 1870.

29 For an analysis of these lines of division, see Castro, 1979.

30 Romeo Mateo, 2006.

31 López, 1987. The book includes a series of lectures that the author gave in the debates of 1834–1836 and that he published in 1840. Two of the 13 lessons were dedicated to municipal power. Constant was translated into Spanish in 1820 (Constant, 1820).

32 'Del poder Municipal' in López, 1987: 83.
33 'Segunda del poder municipal' in López, 1987: 101.
34 Proudhon, 1868.
35 Pi i Margall, 2009: 170; Rivera García, 2006: 319.
36 Pi i Margall, 2009: 318.
37 Pi i Margall, 1868: 13.
38 Pi i Margall, 2009: 141.
39 Pi i Margall, 2009: 279.
40 Some conservative liberals like Antonio Maura took up limited decentralization as a solution to *caciquismo* and electoral corruption, and debates emerged around his proposed laws in 1903 and 1907, but neither was implemented.
41 On the effort to implement this agenda through local institutions, see Alejandro Quiroga, 2019.
42 On the debates between parliamentary and revolutionary democracy during the Republic, see Fernández-Sebastián and Rosales, 2018. The anarchist *municipio libre* was then recuperated by twenty-first century municipalists as part of their own genealogy: see Edo, 2001 and Observatorio, 2014.
43 The anarchist trade union in Spain.
44 'El municipio libre y dueño de su término', *El Luchador*, 13–02–1931. Reprinted in Urales, 1988. My thanks to Andrew Lee for locating this article.
45 From a pamphlet titled 'Los municipios libres (Ante las puertas de la Anarquia)', originally published by *La Revista Blanca* in 1932. Reprinted in Urales, 1988.
46 Included in the Appendices of Oyón and Romero, 2017.
47 For a summary of the debates, see CNT, 1978.
48 Abad de Santillán, 1978.
49 Puente, 1932.
50 Evans and Stainforth, 2022.
51 Significantly, Paniagua (1982) on *la sociedad libertaria* states without providing evidence that the majority of collectivizations in both industrial and agrarian zones followed the syndicalist model. In his 2008 book, he argues for heterogeneity and urges historians to revisit the collectivization studies, most of which were carried out in the 1970s–1980s.
52 Alaiz, 1993.
53 For a more elaborate version of this argument, see Radcliff, 2016. For a micro-study, see Ofer, 2017.
54 See, for example, Borja, Tárrago, and Biox, 1977; Angulo, 1976: Ramírez, 1977; Rodríguez Villasante, 1976; Castells, 1977.
55 González Casanova, 1976: 30.
56 Rodríguez Villasante, 1976: 54.
57 Rodríguez Villasante, 1976: 67.
58 Fernández-Sebastián and Rosales, 2018: 151–152.
59 The first Spanish translation of *El derecho a la ciudad* appeared in 1969 (Lefevbre, 1969) followed by several new editions in 1973, 1975 and 1978.
60 Subirats, 2016.

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2 Following in the tracks of democracy to reinterpret the history of the twentieth century in Spain

Antonio Herrera and John Markoff

Challenging the traditional narrative

The title of this chapter shows our interest in tracking down the deep roots of Spain's twentieth-century democracy. Most scholars agree that its establishment has been the fruit of long historical processes and that, therefore, democracy did not suddenly emerge, spontaneously, out of nothing.[1] This is our point of departure. In twentieth-century Spain, we can clearly identify two moments in which formal democracy triumphed over other possible forms of government. We are referring to the launching of the Second Republic in 1931 and to the Democratic Transition that followed the death of Franco in 1975. No one would doubt that these are the two moments of democratic triumph in twentieth-century Spain, the latter of which has endured until the present moment.

It seems generally accepted that the roots of the Democratic Transition must be sought in the last years of Francoism, when social mobilisation, some clandestine, began to chip away at the dictatorship and lay the groundwork for change, to open the way.[2] Our retrospective analysis gets much more controversial when we are addressing the Second Republic. However, after years researching the rural world and studying what took place in local arenas,[3] we think we may recognize that in both cases, well before the installation of democratic institutions at the national level, there had been an intense process of accumulation of social capital and of democratization in rural Spain in which the local arena played crucial roles.[4] What is more, if we take note of recent research, it seems possible to track a process of political socialization and intense democratization across the entirety of the contemporary era at the local level. The '*Sexenio Democrático*' period (1868–1874), including the First Republic (1873), was also preceded by an intense sociopolitical mobilization that drew on the democratic political cultures of its time.

This perspective breaks with many of the clichés about backwardness that dominate a good part of what has been written about Spain's modern history, a backwardness said to radically distinguish Spanish history from the modern democracy of northwest Europe. Perhaps the notion of an atypical and distinctive history has been more engagingly exotic than a history that has

followed the same patterns as the majority of countries in Western Europe. The story of a backward-looking elite intermittently challenged by utopian revolutionaries operating in an exceptionally polarized society is much more dramatic. The romantic image of a handful of 'primitive rebels' (as Hobsbawm[5] dubbed them) reacting spontaneously against social injustices, making use of older protest repertoires (in Tilly's[6] terminology) or demanding an agrarian reform that arrived late – and in a very defective manner, to boot (as described by Malefakis[7]), retains its attractive power. This is a much more exotic image than is the history of a society on its way to 'modernization' just like other European places and whose social, political and cultural processes resembled those of other places. This 'primitive rebellion',[8] this 'Spanish labyrinth',[9] this 'long siesta'[10] has fed into accounts based on backwardness in various domains – economic, social, cultural and political – that have been the object of tautological arguments to explain the *fracasos continuos*, the continual failures, of Spanish history at its brief, vain moments of constructing democracy until we get late into the twentieth century when wise elites joined together to bring Spain into modern Europe.[11]

In this catastrophizing narrative, it is usual to identify Spain's agriculture and its rural world more generally as the prime causes of all the evils that the past handed on to the future,[12] This equating of rural Spain with backwardness has impregnated a great part of the historiographical discussion of many analyses of the Iberian South. Andalusia, with the largest population of any of the regions in Spain and with the second-largest geographical extent, has been widely seen as an archetype of backwardness because it was an eminently agrarian zone until a very short time ago. It has been the object of simplistic analyses, plagued by clichés. This is why we have been interested in centring our own research on Andalusia.

Recent research does not support the common image. The Andalusian rural world experienced an extended political socialization that at times contributed to democratization. To elaborate this assertion, we must first introduce a conceptual clarification. Our interest as historians resides more in the process of democratization, not in some fixed definition of 'democracy'. Democracy has always been what philosopher W. B. Gallie[13] called an 'essentially contested concept' about whose meaning there will never be consensus. Democracy, therefore, could reasonably be regarded as advancing in some ways by some, while others could equally reasonably think the opposite.[14] Recent research has shown that each of the characteristics often attributed to modern democracy have different historical paths and not a single one: citizenship with equal rights, governments accountable to a mass public, competitive political parties, broad civil liberties, absence of slavery, mechanisms for popular voice or restraints on the arbitrary deployment of state power. Universal male suffrage and women's suffrage, for example, have historically had complex relationships with each other, did not proceed on the same timetables and were not pioneered in the same places.[15] So also for such bedrock principles as social equality and individual liberty. As Gallie

pointed out, different scholars will differ in the weight they give such characteristics, making it impossible to achieve a consensual definition of democracy that will stand for all time, or even for very long. In addition, as Gallie does not point out, from the moment in the late eighteenth century that democracy entered the vocabulary of political struggle, social movements have continued to criticize current institutionalizations of democracy in the name of a democracy as yet unachieved and have therefore been part of the many struggles over definitions that will never end.[16]

In this spirit we think it important to see that democratic processes at the local level can coincide in time with authoritarian processes at the national level. This means recognizing that there may be democratization in places with no formal democracy deliberately constituted and democratizing processes more evident in local arenas than in national ones.[17] Of course, this argument also applies conversely. Democratic processes at the national level can coexist with authoritarian conditions at more local levels. That means it is possible to find a de-democratization process – in the sense of emptying democracy of much of its significance in people's lives – despite the continuation of still existing formal democratic institutions.[18] In the spirit of Gallie, we want to stress the multiplicity of plausible meanings of democracy and how they work together or against each other is terribly important.

These considerations encourage us to look at two periods in Spanish history widely understood to be far from democratic – The Bourbon Restoration (1874–1931) and Late Francoism (1964–1979) – and see if it is possible to find democratizing processes within them. The period of the constitutional monarchy of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII (1874–1931) cannot be described as democratic, despite the continuous existence of universal male suffrage since 1890. The political system based on the alternation in government of two liberal parties was rigged through the falsification of elections and the use and abuse, in the form of *caciquismo*, of political patronage.[19] In the same way, we cannot speak of democracy for Franco's regime (1939–1975), despite his insistence on describing the system as *democracia orgánica* (organic democracy).[20] However, in both cases, and especially if we look at the local level, at a certain point political cracks or opportunities opened up, through which a process of political socialization of a democratic nature began to develop. Under the government of Sagasta's liberal party, a reformist openness began, which took the form of the creation of the Comission of Social Reforms[21] in 1883, a new Code of Commerce (1885), a new law on associations[22] (1887) and a new civil code (1889). In the case of Francoism, while maintaining a rigid political and police control system until the day of the dictator's death, a new phase began in the 1960s which also offered new possibilities of sociopolitical organization for groups opposed to the regime. We are referring, for example, to the 1964 Law on Associations which, although it did not contemplate associations of a political nature, opened a small crack that encouraged democratic political socialization. That is why we need continuously to think about territorial scale. Democratization can

happen on a different spatial scale from that of the apparently homogenizing process of nation building. We are interested in what is also happening on the margins of the nation state.[23]

Charles Tilly[24] asserted that, although there have been instances of democratic practice on a local scale that preceded national democracy, there does not appear to have been any connection between these local practices and the democratic practices eventually adopted by European national states.[25] Nevertheless, more recently, some scholars have been pointing out that in many parts of the world, in various historical epochs, local practices, reasonably characterized as democratic, have been developed.[26] Building on this key insight and on this scholarship, David Stasavage[27] argues for an important negative relationship. The construction of the modern democracy of the national states, with its distinctive characteristics, was built on the destruction of the older, local democracy that was more a barrier than a nurturant of our modern states. The rise of the new, modern democracy of some of the states was tied to the downfall of the old, local democratic practices, as his title *The Decline and Rise of Democracy* summarizes it. We are convinced that Tilly is simply mistaken about a general absence of connection of the local and national levels and, at least for the Spanish case we are exploring, that the connections are even more complex than the opposition that Stasavage emphasizes.[28] In fact, for Spain, we argue that local democratization and struggles for local democracy have been deeply interconnected with the achievement of formal democracy at the level of the national state and that democratic advances and retreats at the national level cannot be understood without paying attention to the local arena.

It is possible to search for democratizing actions in local arenas in Spain. In fact, in recent years, relevant historical works have been rapidly accumulating. These works show a lively tradition of local political practices linked to the construction of democracy. Historians could go back at least as far as the Cortes of León in 1188 to point to an innovation reasonably called 'democratic' in the Iberian Peninsula.[29] Although this may appear an audacious contention,[30] it is surely at least plausible. Much other work has pointed to the very strong role of local identities in Spain and to how these local identities have animated the development of forms of organization and collective action at the local level despite the governmental centralization of the Bourbon reforms in the eighteenth century and of the so-called national state-building processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This view is developed in the book of Pamela Beth Radcliff[31] that builds on new perspectives, for example from Isabel Burdiel[32] and, especially, the work of Guy Thomson,[33] and emphasizes the existence of strong local popular mobilization during the period in which Spanish liberalism developed in the nineteenth century. There were local juntas, secret societies more or less linked to specific political tendencies (including 'democrats' and 'republicans' who developed party organization with those labels, and later 'anarchists', who rejected parties but developed other organizational forms based on labour

organizations and local communities), citizen militias, municipal councils (and other organizational forms). These organizations were sometimes able to pressure local and national powerholders in a democratizing direction.

We may add to these the considerable evidence of still other forms of protest and mobilization that were very widespread at the end of the nineteenth century in small towns and villages. This included struggles for the recovery of what had been communal lands and the numerous demonstrations against the hated *impuesto de consumos* (consumption tax). We can complete the picture of a rural world and a local arena that are extremely dynamic and very far removed from the myth of immobilism. Several recent works corroborate this new image of a politicized local arena that shows Spain to have been very poorly described by the cliché of exceptionality. The works of Florencia Peyrou, Juan Luís Simal,[34] Javier Fernández-Sebastián and Gonzalo Capellán[35] also have shown that the cultural politics of liberal Spain were very little different than what took place in the rest of Europe. Juan Antonio Inarejos[36] also showed that in the countryside in Castilla La Mancha there was a very rich and varied culture that was very far from the primitivism and political indifference with which it is generally credited. For the specific instance of Andalusia, the work of Guy Thomson[37] clarifies a great deal. Thomson studies the political ideas and actions of the popular classes through the study of three towns (Loja, Antequera and Alhama) as does the research of Santiago Jaén[38] on the province of Jaén.

These practices now being researched for the nineteenth century couldn't have disappeared overnight. We think that some part of this local political culture remained present in the twentieth century. Far from constituting an uncomfortable vestige from a past largely understood as a major barrier to modernization – with modernization including the development of forms of governing at the national level that are today regarded as democratic – local processes were important aspects of democratization as they developed in Spain. It is essential to understand these local processes in order to understand the triumph of the formal democracy of that national state for both the 1930s and the 1970s, the former an only transient victory, the latter more durable. But let us not be dismissive of the transitory character of the Second Republic. If we recall the general European context, in other countries in Europe democracy was being overthrown by varying combinations of threatened conservative forces, activist militaries and fascist movements. Uniquely in Spain, a government fell to make way for democracy while much of Europe was headed in the opposite direction.[39]

It is our contention that local struggles had much to do with this. In the years immediately preceding the installation of formal democracy at the national level, we encounter a significant social and political mobilization that is especially noticeable if we descend to the municipal arena. For the Democratic Transition, there has been much attention paid to social movements in the late Franco period, but vital rural movements have been relatively

neglected.[40] For the Bourbon Restoration, such movements have hardly been noticed at all and when they have been dealt with, they have been read as retrograde remnants of the past.[41]

To clarify what kind of local actions we consider as democratizing in terms of their possible impact, we will highlight just a few examples. For the Restoration period, the well-known case of the protest actions against the *impuesto de consumos*, which we mentioned earlier, is quite illuminating.[42] During the first days of August 1890, 400 women from the small town of Zahara (Cádiz),[43] with a total population of 2,345,[44] protested the application of this tax that had been in force since the tax reform of 1845 (although with some interruptions). This was an indirect tax on basic commodities, such as food, beverages, fuel or salt, and was particularly burdensome for the grassroot classes, as well as less equitable than other, direct taxes.

In the same month, after several days of demonstrations with flags in the streets shouting *Viva la Libertad* (cheer for freedom) and *Muerte a los consumos* (death to the consumption tax), a riot in Linares (Jaén) ended with an assault on the home of the local managers of the tax.[45] Also in the same year, in the city of Jaén, the Guardia Civil (Military Police) killed one worker who took part in a riot against this tax and wounded three others. Four Civil Guards were injured, two by firearms and two by thrown stones.[46] In May 1893, several demonstrators in the town of Atarfe (Granada) stormed the town hall and dragged the king's portrait along the ground to protest against the increase in these taxes.[47] A few years later, in October 1897, another 200 people demonstrated in the town of Iznájar (Córdoba) with the slogan *abajo los consumos* (abolition of consumption tax),[48] and that same year a group of day labourers from the town of Villaviciosa (Córdoba) demonstrated for the same reason.[49] A few months earlier, several Civil Guards were injured by stone-throwing by residents of Antequera (Málaga) who had assaulted the tax collection offices,[50] as had also happened in April of that year in the town of Teba (Málaga)[51] and in the provincial capital too.[52] The police had to make a great effort to control the riot that took place in the town of Lucena (Córdoba), where around 700 workers set fire to the tax offices.[53]

These are just a few of the hundreds of examples that can be found throughout Andalusia in the final decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. In isolation, these events would not have the significance as episodes of democratization that we give them, but when analysed as a whole, it becomes clear that they are collective (or individual) actions that clearly show an active civic population, mobilized and willing to exert pressure to obtain solutions from the political forces in the face of situations of manifest inequality. These apparently unconnected protests often succeeded in getting the tax suspended locally, but they also managed to put the debate on the tax on the public agenda at the national level. After intense parliamentary debates, the law abolishing the consumption tax was finally passed in June 1911, although a transitional period was established until 1920.

Even clearer are the examples from the 1970s. If we look only at the national level, we could fall into the error of thinking that until 2007 there was no serious initiative in Spain to recover the historical memory of the tens of thousands of victims of the civil war and Franco's regime.[54] We could go back to the beginning of the twenty-first century and take note of the actions of the first associations for identifying the killed. However, a look at the municipal level reveals the enormous anticipation of civil society on this issue. As early as 1979, we could read in some local newspapers, but not in national ones, public announcements to find relatives who had not been heard from since the end of the war. Also in the late 1970s and early 1980s we find the first initiatives to recover the bodies of relatives who had died during the war in order to bury them in their locality. For example, Manuel Nozaleda Mata, a baker linked to the 'Sindicato de Obreros del Campo' and the 'Candidatura Unitaria de Trabajadores', who became a councillor on the Osuna town council in April 1979, managed to bring the remains of his relatives from Ecija. These social initiatives had their political counterpart when the first democratically elected local governments[55] also began early on to consider the need to change the names of the streets, eliminating the nomenclature created during the Franco regime which referred to Franco's military. This was also the case in Osuna.[56] The streets 'José Antonio' (Primo de Rivera), 'General Franco', 'General Mola' and 'General Queipo de Llano' returned to their old names 'Sevilla', 'La Silla' and 'Aguilar' names with which the majority of the population identified themselves. The proposal to change the signs on these streets was approved in May of 1979 with only the councillors from UCD party and one from PSOE voting against.[57]

What happened in Osuna is not an exception. Many other towns restored the names of the streets in this way at the beginning of 1980s, more than 20 years ahead of the national legislation regulating the management of the symbolism of the dictatorship.

Through these and many other local actions we study the existence of a certain democratizing legacy that can be tracked down in municipal arenas. Recently, economic historians interested in democracy as something that facilitates economic growth have been recognizing the importance of this historical legacy of democratic practice.[58] While economic development is not our primary focus, we coincide with this scholarly trend on the long-term significance of a past democratic development, although our own focus is on the accumulation of civic experience locally.

Social capital or democratic political apprenticeship?

When we refer to the accumulation of the experience of citizenship, we will remind some readers of the concept of Social Capital, but this imprecise concept on too many occasions is excessively reductionist in being applied exclusively to the formation of associations. The pioneering work of Putnam[59] gave this concept concrete form through ingenious deployment of

many empirical indicators that showed how different were Italy's north and south. Since this work, many have argued that a dynamic civil society, where confidence and cooperation outweigh individualistic attitudes, favours the flourishing and maintenance of a robust democracy. Putnam has continued to elaborate these themes with imaginative new empirical materials.[60]

Although his arguments about Social Capital have had considerable influence, Putnam has received serious and intelligent criticism about his linear perspective.[61] Among these critiques the most interesting, yet the least developed, concerns the absence of sociopolitical conflict in his analysis. For him and for many of his followers, the unique, or at least the major and most powerful, instrument for accumulating Social Capital is a propensity to form associations. We suggest, however, that protest even without some publicly visible sustaining organization is well worth considering. The protest forms that Scott[62] called 'infrapolitics' or the collective action Bayat[63] categorized as 'nonmovement' are also vehicles for the accumulation of political experience. Bayat, for example, argues that under highly repressive political conditions, the development of organizations with names or offices, employing the services of publicists and lawyers, openly lobbying officials for desired policies or organizing public protests, is too dangerous and therefore extremely inhibited. Under such circumstances, however, people learn to conceal their motives and their actions but may be aware of others doing the same thing, so there is collective action that does not announce itself as such.[64] Historians have been showing that these sorts of actions that the theorists of Social Capital have not very much taken note of are exactly what is most common in the rural world, informal and sometimes subterranean action with little overt organizational structure. Concealing grain is far more common than rioting against the exactions of the state or the landlord, evading conscription is more common than rioting against it, pretending to misunderstand the laws is more common than openly calling for new laws. Reminding landowners of their claims to paternalistic care in hard times for those who work their land is far less dangerous than organizing to defy them, let alone to remove them. It is often only when there are these moments of open defiance that we take note, but more hidden forms of defensive collective action sometimes lay the groundwork on which such overt protest rests. And individual uncoordinated actions may matter too. An anonymous act of arson against a predatory landlord may be less likely to trigger an unwelcome occupation of a rural community by the state's armed force. Methodologically, it may be hard to distinguish among (1) a genuinely solitary action, (2) an action taken in awareness of other such actions with no collective planning or formally constituted organization (Bayat's nonmovement) and (3) a successfully executed plan by a successfully clandestine network (perhaps an instance of Scott's infrapolitics). Scott and Bayat have demonstrated that outward conformity to systems of domination should not be confused with inner acceptance of its moral legitimacy. And they have shown that out of the hidden experience of resistance, common understanding of common injustices may

lay the groundwork for later overt protest and organized action. From our experience researching the Andalusian rural world, we believe that it is possible to find evidence of this type of protest, sometimes linked to a rich process of democratization.

Because of its formal character, the easiest way to recognize Social Capital, understood as an indicator of democratic robustness, is to take note of associationism. To be more precise, it is possible to distinguish, as Boix and Posner[65] do, between vertical and horizontal organizations and to also distinguish between organization that produces public and private goods. But even if we make these distinctions, we are leaving out many other forms of collective action whose impact on the construction of democracy may be crucial. So we will not speak of Social Capital but of a democratic political apprenticeship.[66] Of course, associational practices, to the extent they favour collective action and cooperation, may be sources of accumulated experience, of political apprenticeship, but this is not, as we have indicated, the unique means to arrive at this. To only pay attention to the most formal aspects of collective action or of protest will result in a distorted image.

What we find in the rural world is a political apprenticeship that is sometimes a democratizing one that is not limited to associational experience (although that is part of it). There are other forms. We are speaking of actions that are sometimes more open and challenging and sometimes concealed; we are speaking of actions that appear as acts classified as criminal and of actions that appear as reactive, even reactionary. But there are also occasions on which social injustices are denounced and on which initiatives are proposed to improve conditions of life or work, or sometimes just demands for meeting survival needs. Many such actions, some of which generate conflict, may contribute to a democratic culture based on cooperation and mutual confidence among equals, just as much as certain actions in urban arenas. Some portion of this apprenticeship may remain within the local arena, in part because local people may lack confidence in other arenas identified with domination and injustice, but this should not lead us to underrate their capacity to foster the democratic political apprenticeship we are discussing.

What exactly are we looking for?

Making this conception of the democratization process operational for a specific space and time is proving to be a huge challenge: how to draw coherent and relevant conclusions from the sum of scattered local democratization episodes? Clearly, we are not starting from scratch. Our methodology draws on what has been called Protest Event Analysis.[67] But we expand the kind of events we record beyond protest or even beyond 'contentious politics' because we are also interested in exploring whether the formation of civic associations may underlie protest later on. And we are interested as well in infrapolitics and non-movements (to the extent that we can track forms of

action that were intended to fly below the authorities' awareness and that therefore may be hidden from historians as well).

Using newspapers and periodicals, we collected hundreds of possible episodes or events of democratization that could have taken place in any Andalusian localities during the two historical periods we have mentioned (1874–1931 and 1964–1978). Although we already have information for the second of these periods, we have focused our attention for the moment on the first of them. Given the material impossibility of analysing dozens of newspapers for such a broad chronological cut-off, we have selected those years in which there was apparently a greater frequency of journalistic use of terms such as 'protest', 'strike', 'meeting', 'riot', 'demonstration', 'conflict', 'uproar', 'insurrection', 'riot', 'denunciation' and 'agitation'. From here, we have selected 20 years and currently have more than 1,600 events or episodes from the serial search for terms such as 'protest', 'strike', 'riot' and 'demonstration'.

We are aware that this is only a part of the overall picture and for this reason we have zoomed in more detail on the analysis of some specific cases (localities) as if using a magnifying glass. We reconstructed the social and political life of four Andalusian towns and their surrounding countryside: Osuna in the province of Sevilla, Baena in the province of Córdoba, Montefrío in the province of Granada and Arcos de la Frontera in the province of Cádiz for the two time periods. This choice is built on several criteria: the representation of multiple provinces, including in Upper and Lower Andalusia, commonly held to be sites of distinctive cultures; variation in the distribution of property, since the distinction between smallholding peasants and *latifundio* workers plays such a deservedly large role in Spanish historiography; variation in town size and, of course, availability of sources.

Making use of varied sources,[68] we try to reconstruct the sociopolitical life of each of these localities during the two periods on which we are focused. We have especially focused on four large themes:

1. We noted any evidence of association, including political parties, labour organizations or cultural associations, and whether these were clandestine or in accordance with the laws and policies of governmental institutions.
2. We tried to trace social and political conflicts, whether within or between formally constituted institutions – including the institutions of government (local, regional or national) – as well as forms of collective protest and also individual protest that might be signs of infrapolitics (following Scott) or symptoms of social discontent.
3. We measured electoral behaviour, not simply recording election results but studying social processes surrounding those elections, public debates, meetings, fights, complaints and police actions.
4. We recorded activities that could, in Spanish, be referred to as *promoción social* (literally social promotion), actions aimed at improving society, actions that would fit our broad notion of civic and political apprenticeship,

including forms of sociability that might potentially be advancing democratic values. Here we need to be taking account of the material context in which these actions take place, including changes in population size, migration patterns, land use, the structure of ownership of land and of animals, available labour force, the active population engaged in various activities, the agricultural calendar, the level of wages and changes in that level.

The sources utilized vary by epoch and geographical scale and are not identical for our four localities. They include newspaper series, archival materials: from the national archives,[69] the provincial archives[70] of Granada, Sevilla, Córdoba and Cádiz, and, of course, the municipal archives of our four localities that have enormous original and precise information on the political, economic, cultural and social institutions of each.[71]

How to identify episodes of democratization?

Beyond identifying our cases and sources, we want to say something about the theoretical concerns that have guided us and in particular what sort of democratizing episodes and actions were are searching for.[72] We do not want to simply presume that any collective action whatsoever is part of some democratizing process, while we wish to be open to the possibility that some forms of collective action not usually presumed to be such actually were. Nor do we want to simply presume that any act of individual resistance was inherently democratizing, but we want to be open to the possibility that it was. Was the formation of an association of smallholders, of the kind of social club the Spanish call a *casino*, of a reading group, of a film club a democratizing action? Do protests over the price of tomatoes deserve the same consideration as a strike, or a citizens' meeting to voice grievances, or a demonstration to demand rights? This is a central theme of our research that requires us to work out the extent to which such episodes and processes were able to nurture a democratic political culture. And we have to bear in mind the very important critique of Social Capital theory for sometimes simply assuming that associationism and a vibrant civil society are inherently, unambiguously and invariably foundations for democracy. Today we know that such phenomena can also be linked to the fascisms that emerged in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.[73]

We started our research by taking note of several fundamental aspects of the sociopolitical life of the localities: associationism, conflictivity, elections and what we can broadly called projects of sociopolitical and cultural development – *promoción social*. But we soon realized that not all associations have any democratizing character (and some have quite contrary characteristics); we soon realized that while conflicts are part and parcel of democratization,[74] not all episodes of conflict may reasonably be called

democracy-promoting (just think of the fascist movements of the past – or present – century); we soon realized that not all of the many forms of mobilization around elections were clearly democratizing (e.g., just think of anti-democratic parties contesting elections) and final, we of course realized that not all initiatives to create developmental infrastructure or establish cultural projects had a democratizing intention or consequence. These considerations make it necessary to specify clearly what we mean by a democratizing episode. Boix and Posner[75] point out that it is obvious that not all forms of association generate Social Capital or at least the same kind of Social Capital. In our own work we refer to collective action and not simply the formation of organizations. As we have explained, important forms of collective action are not tied to formal organizations or have even avoided formal organization. As important as is the long scholarly tradition of focusing on publicly visible episodes of making claims, this does not cover all experience of acting collectively. By virtue of public visibility, self-identified protest is likely to leave a lot of traces that constitute data, but we want to avoid taking methodological convenience to the point of narrowing our theoretical horizons. So, while we will be paying attention to organizational presence in our localities and will be using newspaper sources, police reports and judicial actions to identify publicly visible protests, we hope to learn enough about our research sites to identify human action, whether collective or individual, that challenges local structures of domination, whether overtly identified as such or not. We do not at all see ourselves as challenging the vast literature on public, organized protests but as complementing it.

Therefore, to be precise in defining what we mean by democratizing action, at least three theoretical issues need to be addressed:

1. *The purpose of the action.* We need to consider the overt purpose of a particular collective action, its intended impact and the sorts of norms and messages that it overtly embodies. Important clues will be the publicly stated claims being proposed, but we need to be careful. The public claim to be defending democracy may need to be supplemented by archival evidence to see if the purpose was to destroy democracy. To get the contrast, we can use other clues about the organizational identity of key actors. Obviously, as Boix and Posner[76] pointed out a generation ago, one ought not to take actions impelled by the Ku Klux Klan or the Nazi party as acting on behalf of democracy, no matter what is on the signs carried in some particular demonstration. In the case of the post-Reconstruction Klan in the United States, its close association with the Democratic Party in the south of the United States – it is not too extreme to characterize it as the armed, violent wing of the Party[77] – ought not to have us coding its actions as a democratizing force despite the party's self-label. So, we need as deep an understanding of the local contexts as we can acquire in order to decide what is and isn't democratizing. Such organization may be said,

in our sense, to be part of a political apprenticeship, but certainly not a democratizing one.[78]

2. *The internal organizational culture of the action.* For us, it is important to consider the possibility that some actions may have a greater or lesser capacity to support a democratic political apprenticeship to the extent that the action itself is a site of cooperation among equals, that is to say, for example, that an organization advocating for greater equality that is itself characterized by an egalitarian culture may be a better candidate for a democratizing organization than one that is itself a site of domination, let us say, by inegalitarian relations of social class within the organization. A concrete example based on the forms of organization of two specific rural localities in Nicaragua may serve to illustrate the importance of this criterion. Nadia Molenaers[79] shows that at the local level the relationship Putnam claims between associational density and Social Capital gets very blurry if we pay attention to the difference between vertical and horizontally organized association. The 'vertical', those marked by hierarchical relations involving economic coercion – *caciquismo* – or with hyper-powerful leaders, have little or nothing to do with any democratizing apprenticeship found in organization based on mutual confidence and horizontal organizations.

One implication of this consideration for our research is that we will pay more attention to anarchist organizations in our research sites than is warranted by a certain tendency to dismiss them as democratizing actors on the grounds that the apoliticism for which Spanish anarchists have been so noted meant that they were more of a destabilizing 'antisystem' force in the Second Republic than a democratizing one.

3. *The promotion of public interest.* It also follows that we will need to try to distinguish between collective actions that advocate, consciously or not, and openly or not, for the provision of goods and public services that may benefit the entire community and those that are aiming to provide what many political scientists call 'private goods', that is, goods that will favour certain members of the community and especially those that favour those who participate in a particular organization or specific action. Once again, Boix and Posner[80] already warned about this distinction in their critique of Putnam. This question has been much explored in the many discussions of the free-rider problem in social movements, in which, let us say, a worker who avoids the risks of joining a clandestine union may benefit if less risk-averse comrades win benefits for all workers. One common result is that movements may try to offer so-called selective incentives for participants that are at some odds with claims to serve a broader citizenry than themselves; otherwise, why should anyone run the risks of activism rather than let someone else do it?[81] We may hark back to discussions of political systems all the way back to classical antiquity, when classical authors found political systems to be good, whether they were based on the rule of one

person, of a few, or of many, when the ruler acted in the interests of the whole community and bad when the ruler acted simply in self-interest.[82] This means that we will need to endeavour to identify what older traditions of political philosophy might have called civic virtue, something that cannot transparently be read from banners and press conferences, since scoundrels may be good at feigning virtue.

Applying these ideas to our study at two historical moments, we found a rich collection of democratizing processes at the local level. After decades of domination, *caciquismo* and political clientelism, a democratic political culture could develop, locally, and was a basis upon which an institutional democracy – the Second Republic – could be established. Our wager is that beneath a formally non-democratic national system of power, the Bourbon Restoration of 1874–1930, Spain was experiencing, at least at the local level, a democratic apprenticeship. This same idea serves as well for analysing the last decades of the Franco dictatorship. Democracy was not born out of nothing with the death of the dictator Franco on 20 November 1974. The majority support for democracy that Spanish society showed with the approval of the Constitution in 1978 cannot be understood without paying attention to a type of political culture that had been gestating in the last years of the dictatorship. It is necessary to pay attention to open and clandestine episodes of democratization played by students, workers and other urban activists of various ideological allegiances, but also attention to what was happening locally in the countryside throughout Spain.[83]

Funding

Notes

1 Eley, 2002; Gerring, 2011.
2 Castells, 1983; Pérez Díaz, 1993; Fishman, 1990; Balfour, 1989; Foweraker, 1989; Tarrow, 1995; Molinero e Ysás, 1998; Trujillano, Domínguez and García, 2003; Quirosa, 2011; Herrera and Markoff, 2011.
3 If we take note of the broader research team of which we are a part, the research on which we draw here has extended over decades. For more on this group of researchers on the rural world, consult the web page of Grupo PAIDI HUM- 681 (Regional Government. Junta de Andalucía) 'Memoria de Andalucía. Política, Sociedad y Medio Ambiente en los siglos XIX y XX' at https://grupodeestudiosandaluces.ugr.es/datos_inicio.
4 We have been participating in a project on 'Socialism and the Agrarian Issue (1888–1988)', in which we have been researching the specific role played by the

socialist movement in twentieth-century rural Spain, exploring more than its theoretical position on the so-called Agrarian Question and the well-known and controversial Agrarian Reform. We also studied its social activism and its demands, the social conflicts in which it participated, and its organizations, both its union (Unión General de Trabajadores-UGT) and its party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE) as they acted in local arenas (Herrera, 2007; Cobo, 2007; Acosta Cruz and González de Molina, 2009).

 5 Hobsbawm, 1959.
 6 Tilly, 1995.
 7 Malefakis, 1970.
 8 Hobsbawm, 1959.
 9 Brenan, 1943.
10 Simpson, 1995.
11 As Hirschman (1981: 155) pointed out about Latin America, in some places there has been a certain propensity among intellectuals to *fracasomanía*, as he called it. It means an 'obsession with failure' that imagines national history as one misfortune after another.
12 An analysis of this historiographical reading and a pioneering critique of this perspective can be found in Pujol et al., 2001.
13 Gallie, 1956.
14 Dan Slater's (2013) analysis of the deep political conflict in Thailand during the twenty-first century is instructive. He shows that the bitterly opposed movements in that country do not represent 'democracy' versus 'authoritarianism' but rather a democracy that stresses 'vertical accountability' to electorates and therefore great power to an elected president versus a democracy that stresses 'horizontal accountability' among state institutions to limit untrammeled executive authority, resulting in an unstable careening among different democratic conceptions.
15 Markoff, 2003.
16 Markoff, 2017 and 2019.
17 The numerous events of democratization at the local level described by Asef Bayat (2021) in Egypt and Tunisia in the context of the Arab Spring can be used as an example.
18 We write this in awareness of a growing number of scholars who have pointed out that in the supposedly consolidated democracies of Western Europe or North America there are growing signs of deterioration despite constitutional structures that are legacies of past democratizations (Rosanvallon, 2011; Mounk, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Innerarity, 2019). The recent annual global surveys by Freedom House, for example, note a global deterioration over the past 15 years, including in such places as the United States.
19 Varela Ortega, 2001; Villares and Moreno Luzón, 2009; Moreno Luzón, 2012.
20 Moradiellos, 2000; Riquer, 2010.
21 Institution to study the living and working conditions of the working class and to propose legislative reforms to improve them.
22 In practice, as early as 1881, the liberal government itself, through the Ministry of the Interior, allowed the workers' associations to come out of hiding by means of a circular letter.
23 In this chapter, we will not be concerned with the challenge posed to nation state-centred conceptions of democracy and of the history of democracy posed by the transnational processes and transnational institutions increasingly important for any discussion of democracy in recent decades. See, for example, Smith, 2008.
24 Tilly, 2007: 192.
25 Tilly, 2004: 36.
26 Valuable surveys of relevant literature: Isakhan and Stockwell, 2011 and 2012.

27 Stasavage, 2020.
28 Although the big guiding argument of Stasavage stresses the supersession of local democracy by radically different national democracy, he also shows that where there is strong evidence for local democratic practices that preceded the encounter with the expanding West, including the brutal colonialist assault on indigenous political institutions, it turns out that modern, post-colonial, state-level democracy is stronger. In other words, this suggests a positive and important contribution of indigenous democratic self-rule to the democratic character of post-colonial states.
29 The literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also has helped shape our perception of the strength of the local from very distant times. *The Siege of Numantia* by Miguel de Cervantes or *Fuenteovejuna* by Lope de Vega are very powerful demonstrations of the strength of local traditions of self-rule, and we note that Cervantes's play is set in 133 BCE. It is noteworthy that later centuries saw these works as Spanish classics and the Spanish government commemorated Numantia in 2017.
30 In light of frequent claims in English-speaking milieux that England's Magna Carta is an early, if limited, move towards rulers acknowledging limits to their authority and a step towards representative institutions, why should it seem daring to take note of something similar on the territory of what is now the country of Spain, something that happened 27 years earlier than in England? Keane, 2009: 169.
31 Radcliff, 2017.
32 Burdiel, 1998.
33 Thomson, 2010.
34 Peyrou and Simal, 2018.
35 Fernández-Sebastián and Capellán, 2018.
36 Inarejos, 2008.
37 Thomson, 2010.
38 Jaén, 2016.
39 The deviant character of Spain's embrace of democracy in 1931 was only underlined when Europe's still-democratic states failed to support its democratic government when attacked by powerful anti-democratic forces in 1936. So this is a rather striking instance where Spain's democratic history is exceptional, after all.
40 Herrera and Markoff, 2011.
41 Herrera, Markoff, and Villa, 2013.
42 A comprehensive study for Zaragoza is Lucea, 2009.
43 *El Guadalete* (Cádiz), 08–05–1890. p 1.
44 Censo de población, 1887 [Population census] Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es/inebaseweb/pdfDispacher.do?td=193925&ext=.pdf).
45 *Diario de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 05–08–1890, p. 2.
46 *Diario de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 19–08–1890, p. 1.
47 *La Crónica Meridional* (Almería), 28–05–1893, p. 3.
48 *Diario de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 19–10–1897, p. 3.
49 Diario de Córdoba (Córdoba), 28–04–1897, p. 1.
50 *La Provincia* (Almería), 03–04–1897, p. 1.; *El Guadalete* (Cádiz), 2–04–1897, p. 3.
51 *El Comercio de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 12–04–1897, p. 3.
52 *El Comercio de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 05–04–1897, p. 3.
53 *El Comercio de Córdoba* (Córdoba), 22–04–1897, p. 2.
54 *Ley 52/2007, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura* [Law 52/2007, which recognizes and extends rights and establishes

measures in favour of those who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and dictatorship]. *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (BOE. núm. 310, 27/12/2007). www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2007/12/26/52/con.

55 The first democratic elections for the town councils took place in April 1979.

56 'El Ayuntamiento informa', *El Paleto,* 14–01–1979.

57 *Pleno del Ayuntamiento* 31/05/1979. *Actas Municipales del Ayuntamiento* [Municipal Records of the Town Council] Archivo Histórico Municipal de Osuna (AHMO).

58 Gerring, 2011.

59 Putnam, 1993.

60 See e.g. Putnam and Garrett, 2020.

61 Boix and Posner, 1996; Tarrow, 1996; Ostrom, 2000.

62 Scott, 1990.

63 Bayat, 2010.

64 Sometimes the regime, aware that this is happening, cracks down, which may trigger open, collective defiance in defense of what had been surreptitiously gained.

65 Boix and Posner, 1996

66 Some might prefer to use an expression like 'school of citizenship'. We favour the concept of 'democratic political apprenticeship' because we are referring to a social process that can infuse among citizens the values of a democratic culture. Moreover, the concept of 'school' leads to thinking about a schoolteacher who imparts appropriate knowledge, while the concept of an apprenticeship lets us think about the possibility of a self-taught apprenticeship, which may not have been launched by wise intellectuals from a modern urban milieu deliberately instructing the rural world. We take the question of whether rural people are self-taught, have learned from urban people without that having been an intentional project of the urbanites or have developed new views and practices under deliberate urban tutelage as precisely that, a question, and since all three processes are conceivable, it is a question requiring empirical research that may yield different answers in different times and places. The evidence for Spain in the nineteenth century shows that rural protest varied in the extent and nature of participating urban actors (see the contribution by Acosta in this volume).

67 Koopmans and Rucht, 2002; Hutter, 2014; Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar, 2019; Romanos and Sádaba, 2022.

68 As mentioned, we have consulted the national, regional and local press; the holdings of each of the municipal archives; records of town government actions (*actas capitulares*); oral interviews with democracy activists for the post-Franco transition and judicial decisions from each of the towns. All these materials have been digitized and classified in various way and entered into several databases (Access, Excel and Nvivo).

69 We have been able to consult the Archivo del Ministerio de Trabajo (Madrid), the Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura (Madrid), the Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) and the Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares).

70 In the provincial archives, we have been able to consult the *Boletín Oficial de la Provincia* that includes, for example, the election results of each province. Among judicial records, we have consulted the *Libros de Sentencias* where we have been able to access all the denunciations for crimes in the four localities between 1882 and 1929 that were transmitted to provincial jurisdictions. This has been an exceptionally valuable source enabling us to know what sorts of crimes were the most common among the agrarian population (theft, arson, confrontations with the authorities, homicide, assaults). We have thus been able to reconstruct a good deal of the social and economic problems of these localities.

71 Beyond the *Actas Capitulares*, we have been consulting police archives, documentation from the Rural Guard, minutes of the local associations, municipal rules, public announcements and edicts, the levying of taxation, the management of trash and noise and also documentation of employer recruitment of workers. In addition, there are records dealing with food shortages, seasonal unemployment and social conflict between labourers and landowners.

72 Space limitations do not allow us to explain in detail all the sources and methodology developed in these projects that have taken more than eight years. These will be described in a series of future monographs. Here we prioritize theoretical issues surrounding a possible re-reading of the history of democracy in Spain.

73 Riley, 2010.

74 Markoff, 2017.

75 Boix and Posner, 1996.

76 *Ídem*.

77 Foner, 2014: 425.

78 We recognize at the outset that applying this theoretical criterion in practice may be challenged by the public claims of one or another actor. Which is to also say that systematic procedure needs to be complemented by research judgement. We may add that democratic actors may seriously disagree among themselves about just what democracy is, since from the moment the term escaped from the philosopher's study at the end of the eighteenth century and became part of the very language of conflict, the term itself has been deeply contested, something as true of early nineteenth-century Spain as anywhere else. Fernández-Sebastián and Capellán, 2018; Fernández-Sebastián and Rosales, 2018. We therefore have no intention of trying to convince anyone that we have a superior definition of democracy but only to explain what we will mean by it in this research (Markoff, 2011, 2017, 2019) and to explain as well why we are interested in what actors in our localities seem to mean by this word whenever they deploy it.

79 Molenaers, 2003.

80 Boix and Posner, 1996.

81 Olson's (1971) seminal account of the significance of the free-rider problem contended that there was a fundamental deficiency in Marx's account of class conflict because Marx had no way of explaining why any individual worker would voluntarily participate in a risky class-based struggle. But Lichbach (1998) has shown how there are actually an enormous number of ways of resolving the 'dilemma' as he called it and we will hope to discover empirically how this played out in our research sites.

82 As yet another indication of how democracy has always been an essentially contested concept; for some classical authors 'democracy' was the name of the good version of rule by the many, but for others it was what the bad version was called (Aristotle called the good version 'constitutional rule').

83 Groves et al., 2017.

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Part II

Social mobilization and democracy in Southern Spain

3   Democracy and political action in Southern Spain, 1848–1874

Guy Thomson

In this chapter, I explore how Andalusia provided fertile ground for the Spanish Democratic Party, a loose grouping of 'advanced' Progressives, utopian socialists and republicans established in the wake of street and student protests in Madrid and provincial cities in March and May 1848. The appearance of a new political force on a scene monopolized by Moderados (Moderates) and Progresistas (Progressives) since the end of absolutism with the death of Fernando VII in 1833 disrupted politics and galvanized public debate over the two decades prior to the fall of Isabel II in 'La Gloriosa' of September 1868 which ended Bourbon rule. Several features of the strategy and behaviour of the Democratic Party in Andalusia will be explored.

First, following the restoration of Moderates to power in July 1856, Democrats and advanced Progresistas, having been sidelined and faced repression during the Progressive Biennium (1854–1856), expanded their focus from the traditional centres of the republican movement in Madrid, Aragón, Catalonia and the Levant to Andalusia, historic home of Liberal *pronunciamientos* since the War of Independence. Without eschewing a historic reliance on disaffected generals in the liberal army, Democrats and advanced Progressives embraced a new model of insurrection in which armed civilian volunteers who would occupy the vacuum left in local power following the abolition of National Militia in July 1856.[1] This insurrectionary model was inspired by Mazzini's 'action' strategy which called upon civilian volunteers to take up arms in the struggle for Italian unification under a democratic republic.[2] Spanish democracy's southern turn also echoed the tactical shift of the Risorgimento from the cities of Liguria and Lombardy towards the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, signalled by the (failed) uprising of Carlo Pizacane in Naples in 1857.[3]

Secondly, despite tight control over elections by Moderado and Liberal Unionist provincial governors throughout Andalusia, Democrats and advanced Progressives nevertheless involved themselves in elections occasionally with favourable results particular under the Liberal Union (1858–1863). The Revolution of Loja in July 1861, Spain's first Democratic uprising without Liberal army involvement, broke out six months

after Democrats and advanced Progressives had made gains in several towns throughout eastern Andalusia, including taking control of Granada's second city of Loja (only to be removed upon pressure from Madrid).[4]

Thirdly throughout much of the region, Moderado domination assumed a personal character due to the influence of leading moderate chieftain General Ramón María Narváez. Since his brutal 'pacification of La Mancha', campaign in the Sierra Morena and reaction of the 'Reserve Army' of Andalusia in 1836, the 'Espadón de Loja' had worked to create a personal fiefdom by placing family and friends in civil and military governorships throughout Andalusia, from Granada to Seville. The repressive side of the Narvaista project in Andalusia was demonstrated by the harsh punishment of rebels and sympathizers following the failed insurrection of April 1857 led by Sixto Cámara. Even among leading Moderados, the *escarmiento* (harsh lesson) following the uprising was considered excessive and counter-productive since it undermined the legitimacy of the Monarchy and fostered a cult of heroic sacrifice among Democrats in the region, centring in particular on Sixto Cámara who died in 1859 aged 37 on the Portuguese border in an attempt to lead Andalusia in anti-quinta rebellion.[5]

Finally, repression following the Biennium required Democrats to organize in clandestinity. Due to the restrictions on suffrage association and the press under Moderate and Liberal Unionist governments, the party developed a clandestine organization based on the Italian Carbonari model. Andalusia's large compact agro-towns containing thousands of day labourers (*jornaleros*) proved particularly susceptible to clandestine organization, local leaders taking advantage of Andalucian traditions of communal solidarity and popular resentment of the newly propertied local elites who were benefitting from the disentailment of seigniorial, communal and municipal lands.[6]

The programme of the Democratic Party and its diffusion

It is not hard to understand the popularity of the reforms proposed by the Democratic Party in its founding meeting in the Madrid home of Antequera Progressive Manuel María Aguilar in 1849, a programme expanded during the subsequent 20 years to re-emerge in the manifesto of the Federal Republican Party in 1868. This manifesto included reforms such as abolition of the hated *quintas* (army draft), *matrículas del mar* (obligatory service in the Navy) and sales taxes on basic provisions (*consumos*); freedom of assembly and association, complete freedom of the press; administrative decentralization; universal male suffrage; a single chamber representing the sovereign nation; separation of the Church and the State and freedom of conscience; free and secular education; completion of the civil disentailment (*desamortización*) with a fair distribution (*reparto*) of the communal lands among users; a Republic as the only form of government appropriate to modern times (although this could not be announced publicly before 1868), moreover, a Federal Republic – 'The United States has given us the example, let us imitate

them'; Iberian union between Spain and Portugal; a rejection of colonialism and imperialism and dissolution of the standing army and its replacement by volunteer militias.[7]

It should be noted that, aside from the appeal of the programme, the means for its popular diffusion expanded exponentially during the 1850s and 1860s: national newspapers – three Democrat dailies, *El Pueblo, La Discusión* and *La Democracia*, a proliferation of cheaply printed catechisms, biographies, novels, lithographic portraits of democratic heroes (Sixto Cámara, Garibaldi, Mazzini, Juárez, Lincoln, etc.), carried to the provinces by an improved postal service. Thanks to the electronic telegraph, editors in Madrid enjoyed the luxury of receiving daily news from correspondents in the remotest provinces and towns. Correspondents, such as Rafael Pérez del Alamo in Loja and Santiago de Ochoa in Jaén, acquired influence, even celebrity status, far beyond their immediate territories as well as recognition from the leaders of the party in Madrid.[8]

The point is how the people of Andalusia responded to the Democrat programme, to clandestine organization and to the call to arms. The failure of all the Andalusian democratic insurrections, between the first attempt by Sixto Cámara and Romualdo de la Fuente in the port of Málaga in November 1856 and the republican uprising of December 1869 led historians until the 1970s to see Democracy in the South as an exotic plant on barren soil. In his inaugural speech at the First Andalusian History Congress in December 1976, Cádiz historian José Luis Millán-Chivite, in response to the questions of who were Andalusian Democrats during the second half of the nineteenth century and what were they attempting, asserted that it could not be affirmed that a democratic movement existed at the village level as Democrats comprised a minority of intellectuals and liberal professionals, concluding that there was no democracy in Andalucía, merely democrats born there who failed to formulate proposals for Andalucians or for Andalucía. As a result, conspiracies followed the party line set by militants and were not a response to demands arising from Andalucian needs, adding that, in his opinion, the region's Democrats, no matter how idealistic they were in their social attitudes, used 'land-hungry' peasants for 'bourgeois' political ends.[9]

Despite this scepticism about the existence of such a thing as modern democracy in nineteenth-century Andalusia, it is interesting to note that at this same conference, held at the beginning of today's democracy, seven papers dealt with the issue of democracy in nineteenth-century Andalusia, including three specifically on the short-lived republican uprising in Loja in July 1861.

In a second paper on 'The Andalusian Revolutionary Generation in 1868' at the same congress, Millán Chivite, after identifying the great 'pro-hombres' of nineteenth-century Andalusian liberalism, democracy, republicanism, federalism and socialism – Emilio Castelar, Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Nicolás Salmerón, Francisco de Paula Candil, Segismundo Moret, Cristino Martos,

Nicolás María Rivero, Rafael Pérez del Álamo, Roque Barcia and Fermín Salvoechea, Ramón Cala, José Mesa Leopart – felt obliged to conclude that the dynamic commitment in which the Andalusian Generation lived was 'centrifugal'. It did not crystallize into harmony ('sintonía') or social dialogue, which, like a kind of communicating vessel ('vasos comunicantes'), would connect the various strata of society. On the contrary, misunderstanding raged among people of the same region.[10]

Hence, for the Cádiz historian, there was no Andalusian democracy but Andalusians who were democrats, in the face of a mass of 'plural and unknown' people, and between them, a social, cultural and political vacuum.

This pessimistic view resembles the contemporary view of Antonio Guerola, civil governor of Málaga between 1857 and 1862 (and later of Cádiz, Granada and Seville) who observed that Málaga had a seasoned revolutionary reputation since the terrible times when civil and military governors were assassinated and their bodies dragged through the streets. He argued that there were revolutionary elements since the tertulias were allowed in most of the towns and the democratic ideas that took root in Spain during the Progressive Biennium had advanced throughout the province, especially in the capital and Antequera. What were fortunately missing were leaders who could command popular support and who possessed the ardour and perseverance of the Catalan and Aragonese, asserting that the softness of the Andalusian sun had infiltrated even revolutionary preparations.[11]

Hence, although Guerola testified to the existence of an Andalusian democracy, leaders of any moral quality were lacking, the civil governor holding a low opinion of the Málaga's Democratic leader Romualdo Lafuente, actor, playwright and companion of Sixto Cámara with whom he planned Málaga's anti-draft uprising in November 1856. In response to a warning from the Ministry of Government of a possible uprising in Andalusia during the summer of 1858, Guerola replied:

> [L]et me tell you that I am on full alert to avoid an outbreak (*grito*) here as I consider that this is best for the Government, better this than to triumph (as we would triumph) against twenty insurrections once they have been declared. However, so far nothings as come to light . . . as the great men of democracy (*los prohombres de la democracia*), who are worth very little, show no signs of having any money. It is possible that he (Lafuente) has arrived in the city, not to plot but to gamble at Carratraca's thermal baths where this vice prevails, even though I am pursuing him to death. A few days ago I learned that a Democrat had exchanged lottery tickets for gold and this immediately alarmed me, but when I sought the origin of the money I found it belonged to a famous gambler called 'Lafuente'.[12]

Hence, 'Democracy' meant little more to Guerola than delinquency and demagoguery, as is evident from his descriptions of the 109 Málaga municipalities (88 of which he visited, mostly on horseback), written at the end

of his five years as civil governor in 1862 and part of whose fragments we detail next:

Almogía:	I have visited this town twice. There is quite a bit of democracy in it, especially in the hamlet of Arroyo del Coche, whose chief was a barbarian nicknamed Lechuga . . .
City of Antequera:	[I]t used to be subject to the influence of the nobility; and yet Antequera is now the town most feared because of the democracy it is home to. . . . There are many revolutionaries . . . Antequera has tended to suffer from a plague of thieves, and it is one of the points in Andalusia where ancient protection is dispensed to famous thieves by town girls *(las señoritas del pueblo)* . . . I have visited Antequera many times . . .
Villanueva de Cauche:	Small town, with democratic ideas and where the absurd theory of distributing property was brewing. I did not visit it . . .
Archidona:	[A] rural town; Democracy is fairly widespread. I visited it several times . . .
Villanueva de Algaidas:	Small, insignificant town of rustic people. It is infiltrated with democratic ideas . . .
Villanueva del Rosario:	[T]he same state as the previous town.
Villanueva de Tapia:	[T]he same state as the previous one . . .
Villanueva de Trabuco:	The same as the previous towns; very sluggish with everything. I visited it. The town council and secretary were in the kitchen of a private house. Government papers alternated with the plates and pots . . .
Alfarnate:	When the events in Loja happened, democracy grew there. I visited the town . . .
Casabermeja:	A bad, rustic town with democratic ideas. . . . I visited it . . .
Comares:	Also a barbaric, rustic and democratic town, infamous in my time for a brutal insurrection against the mayor, which required me to go there. There are no people of substance . . .
Periana:	Disastrous town: barbaric, rustic, very democratic and an abandoned administration; it has some proprietors, simple, respectable but cowed by the scoundrels. It became notable in the events of Loja. . . . In the square of this town they executed the famous Abaita (abeítar/blacksmith), thief and revolutionary. I visited it.[13]

Research on the politicization of rural areas in southern Spain suggests that, by ignoring the relationship between leaders at the national, intermediate

and local levels – the 'communicating vessels' – Millán Chivite and Guerola underestimated the extent to which the advent of the Democratic Party represented a significant and permanent change in political life, not only in the larger cities but also in smaller towns and rural areas. A little further north in Castilla-La Mancha, Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz has shown that this was also the case stating that there were Republicans in eminently rural provinces in the Peninsular's interior, but (they were) not silent, demobilized or burdened by inertia. He adds that, in hiding for most of the period, they (Republicans) deployed a network of local committees, exercised significant influence over certain spheres of political socialization and took part in the internal debates that shook democracy, heralding the split of the *Sexenio*. Sacrificing their differences to a common objective and united by different symbolic elements, deployed under the watchful eye of the government, this organization went underground once the insurrectionary path to access power was irreversibly adopted.[14]

In order to go deeper into how this democratic-republican apprenticeship took place and what form it took, the following reflections are based on my study of the borders between Córdoba, Málaga and Granada from the beginning of the Progressive Biennium in 1854 to the Bourbon restoration in 1875.[15] I also draw on the work of Manuel Morales Muñoz on the cities of Málaga and Antequera, the work of Santiago Jaén Milla on Jaén and that of Iñarejos Muñoz on Castilla-La Mancha. These contiguous regions, stretching from the Mediterranean almost to Madrid, show very similar patterns in the reception of democratic ideas and forms of political organization. In fact, some of Jaén's Democrats belonged to the same Carbonari society as their neighbours to the south, 'La Venta Nacional', established in 1856 with its 'Revolutionary Centre' in Granada.[16] Jaén Milla lists three features of the physical and human environment of Jaén that help explain the growth in support for the Democratic Party in these provinces under Isabel II: mountainous terrain, local leaders from both the middle and working classes and large concentrations of day labourers in agro-towns and provincial capitals and salaried workers in mining towns such as Linares. These conditions existed in equal measure to regions of Granada and Málaga to the south. Of particular strategic importance for Jaen's Democrats was the Sierra Morena where the Merino family of Despeñaperros would disrupt routes between Madrid and eastern Andalusia during Liberal revolutions and Demo-republican insurrections from 1830s to 1870s.[17]

Despite the novelty of the organization of the new party, its utopian programme and use of modern communications, the growth of Democracy in Andalusia, from its beginning during the repression of the Moderate Biennium (1856–1858), formed part of the existing system of rivalries, both between the historical parties (Moderates and Progressives) and within them. It was the intensification of these rivalries in the face of the appearance of new parties – Democrats (1849), Liberal Union (1858) and Neo-Catholics (1862) – in the context of a changing international panorama, above all the challenge to the Papacy raised by the Risorgimento, which made this period

so politically vibrant. The entry of Spain into new colonial ventures in Morocco, Indochina and Mexico and the Caribbean (on the tail of Napoleon III) under O'Donnell's Liberal Union (1858–1863) brought an additional element of tension as demand increased for recruits for the army. Resentment towards the discriminatory system of *quintas* was a major source of popular support for the Democrats and the trigger for insurrections throughout this period.

Economic factors must also be taken into account when explaining the growth of popular support for the party. This was the end of more than a century of uninterrupted population growth above the national average experienced throughout the region. The disentailment (*desamortización*) of municipal properties and commons in 1855 aroused popular expectations of land reform (*reparto*) and accelerated employment in agriculture, especially the olive in this region. A boom in road and rail construction increased demand for labour, encouraging day labourers to demand better wages and working conditions, such as the abolition of piecework. The region experienced its first modern strikes with workers skilled at using mutualist associations and clandestine networks to strengthen their demands.

Hence, this was a period of rapid social and economic change that brought an increase both in physical mobility – for example, of workers employed in building roads and railways – and in their expectations of personal material improvement. At the same time, people were becoming better informed; one of the pledges made by those swearing into a secret society was to buy a Democratic newspaper to enlighten their section, as well as to acquire a rifle, ready for the call to arms.

Despite the appeal of the Democrat's programme, the effectiveness of its clandestine organization and its efficiency in distributing news and propaganda, there was very little chance of the success of any Democrat-led insurrection in Andalusia or elsewhere in Spain at this moment. La Gloriosa triumphed in September 1868 only after a prolonged conspiracy among Progressives, Liberal Unionists and Democrats, backed by a significant part of the armed forces. All other demo-republican uprisings – 1856, 1857, 1859, 1861, 1864–1866, 1869, 1874 and 1886 – failed. In fact, the only uprising that was successful in occupying territory for more than a few days was in July 1861, when Granada's second city fell to columns of volunteers led by Democrat leaders from Loja and 40 or so smaller towns.

Given this poor record of success, one might reasonably wonder why the Republicans and Democrats continued to plan and mount insurrections until long into the Bourbon restoration. Still the best reflection on this question is Demetrio Castro Alfín's 'Republicanos en armas, Clandestinidad e insurreccionalismo en el reinado de Isabel II' a period during which 'radical Liberals, Progresistas and Demo-republicans never had . . . any scruples in mounting insurrections and engaging in armed violence as necessary and morally licit means to achieve political objectives'.[18]

Castro and other historians, including the rebels themselves,[19] have offered a range of explanations for why people took up arms in such unpromising

circumstances. Among other motivations, they include an exaggerated understanding of the strength of the clandestine organization as well as a complicity between the rebels and local municipal authorities. The expectation of having the support of a military garrison or a prominent officer could be a further reason (a mysterious 'retired colonel' was rumoured to be behind the Loja uprising in 1861, General Blas Pierrad was behind movements in Madrid in 1866 and in Catalonia in 1869 and Nicolás Estévanez joined Republicans in Jaén in 1874). The prestige and charisma of Democrat leaders such as Sixto Cámara should also be mentioned, and other factors such as coercion on the part of Carbonari instigators, fear of ostracism by other Society members, male bravado and fear of being branded a coward.

Facts such as widespread possession of firearms among workers in the Andalusian countryside (Guerola stated that in Málaga '[n]o one travels on horseback without a shotgun, no one lives in the wilderness without a rifle'[20]) and the habit of labourers with working and travelling in large groups that could easily become armed bands[21] are added motivations.

Last but not least, should be mentioned the recent experience of military service among returning *quintas* or those who had signed up for Reserve Army established by O'Donnell during the African War (1859–1860) not ignoring 'the impulsiveness (*irreflexivo*) and recklessness of republican insurrectionalism' which Castro mentions.[22]

This culture of recklessness was encouraged by the arbitrary response of the State to the challenge of Democracy, marked by systematic electoral fraud and violence in favour of official candidates, judicial persecution, arrests and deportation to overseas *presidios*, often followed by Royal pardons with returning Democrats using their amnesties as badges of prestige and immunity.

Focussing on what combination of these factors best explains the behaviour of Andalusian Democrats, it is worth inserting a rebel's account 'how things happened' offered to a friend only ten days after the suppression of the 'Revolution of Loja' in July 1861:

> You already know . . . that I have never got mixed up in politics; but a friend lent me a book about the life of Garibaldi and reading it I became so enthusiastic as everyone else did. Then I was approached to become involved in a conspiracy and I said I didn't want to; but one night they caught me in an inn and after one drink after another they signed me up, telling me that the blacksmith (*albéitar*) of Loja was braver even than Garibaldi himself, that we were going to strike gold and defeat the Moors ('que íbamos á ganar el oro y el moro'), and that we were all going to become property owners. My luck was that on the day after the pronouncement I found out that everything was a ruse to compromise respectable men and I returned home.[23]

Although this letter reveals more about the democratic sociability in Loja in 1861 than the reasons why someone should take up arms against

the government, certain indications reveal it as a typical statement of his time. The fact that 'Garibaldi's Life' passed from hand to hand suggests an informed public reacting to international events, sensitive to their local significance. The bar where that converted Garibaldino, fortified by alcohol, was enlisted suggests a democratic sociability in which people commented on events and debated ideas. In 'el albéitar de Loja', the plotters followed a local – and even more daring – imitation of Garibaldi, whose prestige as municipal veterinarian and local correspondent of Democrat newspapers gave weight to the party's promise of property titles, tax reductions and an end to the draft. Finally, although the reluctant rebel makes no mention of it, the courage – or Castro's 'revolutionary recklessness' – of his comrades-in-arms would have been reinforced by belonging to a revolutionary brotherhood of like-minded members, in this case 'The Society of Peaceful Fellows' ('La Sociedad de Habitantes Pacíficos'), Loja's Carbonari association that doubled as a mutual aid society.

Very few interpretations of the Loja Revolution in July 1861 present an explanation that does not underline the desperation and poverty of the rebels.[24] However, Pérez del Álamo's version of events shows a strict emphasis on order, legality and attention to proper municipal protocol. This was confirmed by Fernando Garrido in 1869 when he described the revolution as 'a meeting of individuals who went to deliberate'. Some years later, the republican historian Miguel Morayta described 'that crowd (*bullanga*) which, more than a revolutionary movement, seemed more like a great gathering of people in good spirits'.[25]

Although the rebels only held Loja for five days before abandoning the city to the regular army, this was an extensive regional rebellion revealing both the impact of Democratic propaganda and organization and the extent to which the right to rebel against authority deemed illegitimate had become a central part of the region's political culture. Although Loja and Málaga military commissions between July and October 1861 tried men from 43 towns, covering a wide area, many of those who were tried and convicted had not even left their homes, much less reached Loja. The geographical scope of the insurrection was limited to towns a day's march from Loja, where the Carbonari societies were strong and well organized. First-hand reports of the occupation of Loja at the beginning of July record the presence of rebels from 20 towns.[26] Although the sociopolitical environment differed between each town, clandestine leadership and the relationship between chiefs and Carbonari affiliates shared common traits.

What we find in medium-sized cities such as Loja, Antequera, Colmenar, Archidona, Iznájar and Alhama, in smaller towns such as Algarinejo, Cuevas de San Marcos, Villanueva del Tapia, Santa Cruz de Comercio, Ventas de Zafarraya, Alfarnate, Periana, Cútar and the like, and even in the farmhouses and the hamlets (numerous in the jurisdiction of Iznájar), is a kind of 'springtime of the pueblos'. At the local level, although the ways in which 'democracy' was organized and expressed varied, common traits are evident

everywhere. Democratic propaganda was carried to the towns by outsiders or by locals employed in trades that required mobility: veterinarian-blacksmiths, doctors, school teachers, musicians, comedians, actors and Zarzuela singers, tailors, hat sellers, stagecoach operators, carters and muleteers and the like. Seen by the authorities as a plague infecting the body politic, in reality Democracy was more banal: a network of association and sociability, united by the reading of democratic newspapers, radiating out from larger to smaller population centres.[27]

In a larger city like Loja, this centre might be a circle/gathering of enlightened people: the apothecary, the doctor, the veterinarian, the bookseller and newsboy, a lawyer, and even women (both Castelar and Garibaldi had female disciples in Loja).[28] In smaller towns, the centre might be an educated or charismatic individual, a merchant, shopkeeper, workshop proprietor, small landowner, an estate foreman ('mayoral' or 'capitán de cuadrilla') able to rally day labourers, a veterinarian-blacksmith, a muleteer or stagecoach operator. Once established in a town, 'democracy' developed around the secret society following initiation rites borrowed from the Italian Carbonari. Normally initiations were carried out in locations at some distance from the town centre, such as a farmhouse, an oil mill or a winery. Although society's initiation rites might be terrifying to fragile minds, these secluded places and secrecy also served for camaraderie, recreation, drinking, discussion of news and conspiracy.[29] The secret society disguised itself behind a mutual savings society to legalize the collection of contributions and for the provision of benefits in case of illness or unemployment. These associations tended to grow more in towns where there was no confessional competition, from a priest or from a good 'patrón' or landowner. Indeed, the growth of Democracy in rural areas during this period can partly be explained by the decline of Catholic pastoral care and the paucity of clergy outside the provincial capitals and medium-sized towns. In some ways, Democrat leaders, with their dark suits, catechisms, newspapers, propaganda and promises of a democratic redemption and a happy future, resembled the Catholic clergy. Democracy came to mimic the functions and occupy the spaces that were previously the domain of the Catholic Church. In Antequera, several parish councils were infiltrated by Democrats, and in this city, as well as in Alhama and Loja, members of the mutual societies took advantage of brotherhoods, confraternities and religious processions to demonstrate their strength and display discipline. In Periana, even the priest, Gabriel De Navas, an exclaustrated monk who had returned from America, alias 'El Cura Bueno', encouraged these sociabilities. In Loja, the 'Society' had chosen the patron saint of the city to protect its members.[30]

Closing remarks

In my book I attempted to place the 20 years between the Bienio Progresista and the First Republic (1873–1875), the period covered by Pérez del Álamo

in 'Dos Revoluciones Andaluzas' (1873), in a broader regional context. The leader of Loja's Democrats shows how the July 1861 uprising arose from a complex combination of factors. No simple town riot, even less a violent outbreak of poor and desperate rural workers, the Loja Revolution was orderly and carefully planned. Columns of rebels marched to Loja from their villages in their Sunday best brandishing carefully embroidered banners inscribed with democratic slogans, accompanied by wind bands, and sharing similar values and political objectives. A manifestation of the insurrectionist strategy of the Democratic Party, the uprising resembled the insurrection of the Montagnards in the south of France against the dictatorship of Napoleon III in January 1852 or the 'squadri de piccioti' in Sicily who joined to Garibaldi's red shirts in April 1860.[31]

Despite its brief life, the orderly character of the Loja Revolution provided Progresista and Democrat leaders in Madrid and in exile with evidence that an insurrectionist strategy could count upon widespread active support from armed groups in cities, smaller towns and rural areas of the South. Andalusia's Democrats came to be seen as valuable as 'scouts' (*batidores*) and they lent a social dimension with democratic trappings to their broader multi-party strategy of removing Moderados from power. The Glorious Revolution would not have been the same without these 20 years of political apprenticeship in the region chosen to initiate the national uprising. On 21 September 1868, a full week before General Serrano, helped by 1,700 Seville Volunteers of Liberty commanded by Pérez del Alamo, defeated government forces at Alcolea (Córdova), bringing the Bourbon monarchy to an end, a Democrat uprising in the streets of Granada prompted the flight of the military garrison, one of only five entirely civil (without the participation of the military) uprisings that took place in a provincial capitals during the Glorious Revolution, and the only one in Andalusia (apart from Paúl y Angulo's failed attempt in Cádiz).[32] This 20-year legacy enabled federal republicans to establish an appreciable presence in the politics of the region throughout the *Sexenio Democrático* and into the Bourbon Restoration. Only with the consolidation of the 'peaceful turn' (*turno pacífico*) and the 'demilitarization of the administrative sphere' (Castro) after the failure of Brigadier Villacampa's republican insurrection in 1886 did the insurrectionary option lose its appeal.[33]

At the start of the twentieth century, leaders of the new socialist party looked back to the middle years of the nineteenth century with renewed interest, praising Pérez del Álamo, now aged 80, as an example of selfless and effective leadership, a model for the new generation. An obituary on the cover page of *El Heraldo de Madrid* shortly after his death on 15 January 1911 praised the Loja veterinarian's ability not only to inspire the masses but also to organize, mobilize and, above all, to control them in the heat of an insurrection.[34]

Shortly after his death, the city council of Arcos (where Pérez spent his last years as a social reformer) named a street after the Loja blacksmith, and at the accompanying ceremony 'Sr. Veterinary Professor Don Rafael Pérez del

Álamo' was remembered as one of the greatest figures of the country in the nineteenth century,

> 'not only because of his great love of freedom and his proud heritage but, more than that, because of his altruism, honesty and greatness of soul demonstrated in all his acts. Head of a great popular movement, he was the owner of a region for many days and knew how to make his followers respect property, honour and life, a beautiful example that leaders of the masses should always imitate. Always generous and good; I have seen him, aged almost a century, working for a family to which he had no ties other than those that great souls always voluntarily bestow on the less fortunate'.

Portraits of Pérez del Álamo hung on the walls of 'most public institutions' in Arcos until the end of the Civil War.[35]

Notes

 1 Castro Alfín, 1976; Peyrou Tubert, 2008a; Higueras Castañeda, 2016; Álvarez Junco, 1988; Canal, 2000.
 2 Thomson, 2015a, 2015b, 2008b; Pascual Sastre, 1997, 2002.
 3 Pizacane is credited with initiating the proto-anarchist school of 'propaganda by deed', the belief that 'ideas arise from actions, not the other way around' (Graham, nd); Mazzini had encouraged Francesco Crispi to prepare armed bands to support the landing of volunteers at Marsala as early as 1850–1851, instructing the Sicilian democrats again to the same effect in 1856 and 1859 (Mack Smith, 1994: 80, 118, 136).
 4 For the 1860 municipal election in Loja in which Democrats triumphed, see Thomson, 2017a.
 5 Garrido, 1860.
 6 Thomson, 2008a.
 7 'Manifiesto político de la Junta Nacional del Partido Democrático Español, Madrid, 1 de febrero de 1858', in Lida, 1973: 123–128; Peyrou, 2008b.
 8 Jaén Milla, 2014: 83–89, 142.
 9 Millán-Chivite, 1979.
10 Frustrated in his search for an organic democracy in Andalusia, Millán Chivite, however, identifies at the end of his paper the existence of a category of leaders characterized by

> the 'plural and unknown (plural e ignoto) man', lost in the anonymity of a movement, and whose names we do not know but whose voice was recorded in the Minutes of the First Spanish International. These 'nameless' Andalusians, typified in a 'moral person' (persona moral), were also conscious of a personal commitment, coming to exert a leading role in the dynamics of contemporary Spanish society. They were workers, especially from the countryside, of a modest cultural level and with a great, profound and hidden feeling of being exploited. . . . Precisely, encompassing the September Revolution, this plural man, representative of a good part of the rural and urban workers of Andalusia, awoke from a long slumber.
> (Millán-Chivite, 1977: 18)

11 Guerola, 1995.
12 Guerola, 1995: 1069–1071.

13 Guerola, 1995.
14 Inarejos Muñoz, 2006, 2008.
15 Thomson, 2015b.
16 On the eve of the Revolution of Loja, the neo-Catholic paper *El Pensamiento Español* estimated between 80,000 and 100,000 affiliated to secret societies in Málaga, Granada, Córdoba and Jaén, and between 4,000 and 5,000 just in Antequera. These figures were considered grossly exaggerated by the newspaper *El Pueblo* (*El Pueblo*, 03–07–1861 and 11–07–1861).
17 Jaén Milla, 2016.
18 Castro Alfín, 1976.
19 The most complete explanation by a contemporary of a democratic uprising is the account of the Loja Revolution of July 1861 by its leader, Rafael Pérez del Álamo, published in Seville in 1872. There are two re-editions: Calero (1982) and another with an introduction by Jose María de los Santos (Pérez del Álamo, 1986).
20 Cited in Castro Alfín, 1976: [37].
21 Circulars issued to Democratic leaders in 1867 and 1868 warned supporters to avoid acting individually or as part of a 'large mass' and recommended groups of 10 to 20 men linked 'by intimate friendship or knowledge of the workplace' led by a chief, preferably with tested military experience, who was expected to visit an agreed location daily to receive news and orders (Castro Alfín, 1976: 37).
22 Castro Alfín, 1976: [38].
23 *La Correspondencia de España*, 16–07–1861.
24 For the historiography of the Revolution of Loja, see Guy Thomson (2008a).
25 Garrido, 1869: vol. 3, 544; Morayta, 1895: vol. 8, 218.
26 Biblioteca de la Academia Real de Historia (BARH), Narváez II, Legajo 85, Expediente 9, 'Memoria de la sublevación en Loja el año 1861', and, Legajo 23, Expediente 20, anonymous epistolary fragment without date but in the handwriting of José María ('Pepe') Narváez, nephew of General Ramón María Narváez, Duke of Valencia.
27 Thomson, El nacimiento de la política; Thomson, 'Democracia: The Cult of Heroic Self-Sacrifice', pp. 943–947.
28 Thomson, 2015a: 324–325.
29 In Loja initiations and meetings of the society took place at a small casa de campo Pérez del Alamo had constructed at the exit of city in the area known as Huertas Bajas (Del Rosal Pauli and Derqui del Rosal, 1987: 172); in Casabermeja, Tomás González (alias) Cromwell used his oil press at the Lagar de los Moles for initiations and meetings of the Society (Guerola, 1995: 1170–1174); initiations in Antequera mainly took place within the city although meetings of the 'Sociedad Carbonaria Republicana Garibaldina' were held at the 'Quinta', a large 'casa de campo' belonging to the Aguilar family on the north-eastern edge of the city, well situated next to the route taken by numerous *jornaleros* on their way to work on the *cortijos* of the vega; initiations to the 'Mosca' society of Villanueva del Rosario took place in the graveyard (Álvarez Curiel, 1996: 46).
30 Galdós tells how at the beginning of the rebel occupation of Loja, Moderados in flight to Granada tried to take with them the image of Our Lady of Charity. But, according to Galdós using a memoire sent to him by Pérez del Álamo (and never returned!):

   [I]t was not possible for them to remove the image from the pedestal that had supported it since time immemorial. Neither with wrenches nor with any kind of device were they able to detach it. The pedestal and Virgin were so heavy that even a hundred thousand pairs of oxen could not have removed them, not even the sound of a duro ("el canto de un duro"), a sign that the Lady did not want any dealings with the Narvaistas (the family and friends of Ramón María Narváez), and resolutely protected the democratic

blacksmith Rafael Pérez. As Diego Ansures (the protagonist of Galdós's book) at first did not believe this story, it was verified with oaths and gestures by an old gypsy woman who came from Loja, adding that Rafael already had more power than the holy angel of his name.

(Pérez Galdós, 1979: 24)

31 Thomson, 2017a, 2017b.
32 Thomson, 2015a.
33 Castro Alfín, 1976: 29; in his review of Captain Casero's account of General Villacampa's 1896 republican uprising, 'Recuerdos de un revolucionario', Valencian socialist Luis Morote rejected the term 'revolution' to describe any of Spain's nineteenth-century *pronunciamientos* which he insisted were merely attempts to change governments. But he made an exception of Pérez del Alamo's revolution which 'forty or so years ago attempted agrarian collectivism', an acknowledgement for which the Loja blacksmith thanked Morote in a letter in August 1908 in which he included a message to ' my many friends':

> I carry the weight of eighty three years with good spirit and relative vigour. I write and read without spectacles. I don't shake. I eat when I want to, without my sleep ever being disturbed by poor digestion. I do everything without any help, and I have firmly resolved not to allow myself to die until I see the saintly liberty of the Republic, the future happiness of my patria and the love of my loves ('amor de mis amores') firmly and permanently implanted.

(*El Heraldo de Madrid*, 14–08–1908 and 21–08–1908)

34 *El Motín,* 26–01–1911; *El Heraldo de Madrid*, 18–01–1911.
35 Thomson, 2015a: 430–438.

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4 Democracy and social protest in rural Andalusia in the nineteenth century

Notes on a process of political modernization

Francisco Acosta

After the failed experience of the 'Bienio Progresista' (1854–1856), some people – in democratic nomenclature – reneged on their support of the progressive liberals in power and eventually converged in their claims for civil rights, and significantly the rights of association and universal suffrage, in the proposals – clearly rooted in liberalism – of fledgling Spanish political democracy in 1848.[1] After the restoration of 'moderantism' in 1856, democratic republicanism opted for the revolutionary route to impose its political programme. Between 1856, when there was already resistance to the liquidation of the 'Bienio' regime, and 1868, when 'La Gloriosa' ushered in a new stage in politics, the republican democrats fought on in secrecy, through successive attempted assaults on power in the form of insurrections and uprisings.[2]

This feverish subversive democratic activity began in November 1856, when Sixto Cámara and Romualdo Lafuente attempted to incite an expeditionary force, formed by *quintas* (recruits) who were to be deployed in Africa but who were based in Málaga, to rebel. In April of the following year, an attempted Republican armed insurrection, with branches in different parts of the peninsula, was dismantled.[3] In the summer of 1857, the moderate government used excessive force to repress an attempted uprising in Andalusia, described by one of the most important Republican leaders of the time as a 'formidable movement . . . the first spark through which democracy tested its vitality without compromises, mixtures or speculation' (Garrido was referring to its autonomy with respect to the progressives), 'revealing, through its acts, proclamations and manifestations, the Republican and social nature of that revolution'.[4] Although the rebellion was unsuccessful, episodes of violence had a great impact on public opinion, as did the events in the town of El Arahal. In February and also in the summer of 1858, respective conspiracies orchestrated by Cámara and Lafuente to be launched in Málaga were quashed. Sixto Cámara, the leading democrat activist of the period, was killed in another attempted uprising in the summer of 1859, with epicentre in Badajoz, from where it was meant to immediately spread to Andalusia and then throughout the rest of Spain. In 1861, Loja – in Granada – witnessed the most successful democratic republican insurrection. Nevertheless, it also eventually

failed. Another attempted insurrection in April 1863 also failed; in fact, it did not even take place. And again in July the same year, with the same fate. Another rebellion broke out in May 1864 with epicentre in eastern Andalusia. It was broader in scope than the purely democratic rebellion as it was initially fuelled by fallout from a conspiracy instigated in the army by the progressives. However, it was also unsuccessful. Other failed uprisings took place in July 1866 and August 1867, planned jointly by democrats and progressives.

The events in El Arahal in 1857 and the 1861 revolution in Loja have attracted the interest of historiographers and have been analysed using different traditional methodologies, ever since the time of the events. This article attempts to add some perspective to these events. However, we are unable to describe both episodes in detail here. For more detailed information, please refer to bibliography on this subject, in particular the reconstruction by Thomson,[5] undoubtedly the most documented and detailed reconstruction of these events available.[6] To provide minimum information to readers unfamiliar with these events and help them advance through this text, it is perhaps important to explain that the republican column that departed Seville in the summer of 1857, in an attempt to incite several rural villages in the province of Seville to rebel, sparked, upon its arrival at the town of El Arahal, a popular reaction that resulted in the burning of municipal and private archives and public offices. Similar events occurred when the column passed through other towns such as Utrera or Paradas, although the events in El Arahal were greater in magnitude due to the participation of local citizens, the scale of the fires and the subsequent repression. Four years later, in 1861, and also in the summer, an irregular armed force of around 6,000 men from approximately 40 towns in the provinces of Málaga, Granada and Córdoba concentrated in the city of Loja. Commandeered by a local leader, they occupied the town for four days under the Republican flag, before later dissolving without further violence. In contrast to the response in El Arahal, government repression was fairly moderate. The movement was structured in the form of a secret democratic society that had been working actively to capture popular support in the area since 1856.

From the 1870s, Spanish historiography in general, and Andalusian one, which at the time largely ignored the methodological proposals of a political history in decline, in a historiographical panorama dominated by proposals emanating from social history, defended both episodes as relevant expressions of agricultural social protest and reaction in Andalusia in the nineteenth century. Thus, the episodes in Utrera-El Arahal in 1857 and the Loja Revolution of 1861 were historiographically enshrined as milestones of the Andalusian agrarian social movement and were interpreted within the framework of a history of the workers' movement inspired strongly by Marxism.[7] Thereafter, the interpretations and explanations of both episodes varied depending on the circumstances in terms of their causes, consequences, the course and nature of the events or the attributed dimension. In fact, this historiographical interpretation of revolutionary episodes in Andalusia describes, projects and

enriches earlier takes on this period of history, which in the early decades of the twentieth century had already begun to analyse worker-inspired peasant struggles.[8] Díaz del Moral is undoubtedly its most brilliant exponent (1995 [1929]). In his history of Andalusian peasant uprisings, Díaz del Moral uses the worker's movement as a common thread to link the peasants' struggle during the Bolshevik triennium (1917–1919) with the events in Loja, El Arahal, the 1868 insurrection, the 1873 events in Montilla, 'La Mano Negra' (The Black Hand), the peasant attack on Jeréz and the agrarian struggles of the early twentieth century. In fact, the interpretation of major agrarian reactions in Andalusia as *worker-inspired movements* can even be found many recent analyses.[9]

The social perspective of the events of 1857 and 1861 and the need to understand them within the context of the history of the workers' movement, combined with the more or less rigid use of class-based analytic categories, have given rise, in our view, to certain interpretative biases on at least two levels:

1. By neglecting the democratic-republican factor, used as the explanatory axis of other studies,[10] social historiography propitiates what could be described as a de-contextualization of the aforementioned peasant movements. Most analyses, but not all,[11] highlighted the democratic-republican background of the episodes but attributed little value to the political factor among the relevant interpretative variables.[12] The result offers a somewhat disjointed and isolated image of both episodes despite their chronological proximity; this impression is further accentuated by the different course of events in El Arahal and Loja. And this despite the fact that it was precisely their interrelationship with the republican insurrectionary process that made them analytically coherent, without ever undermining their purpose as a form of social expression of the working classes in rural areas in Andalusia.

2. The excessively institutional and classist approaches of social movements, by failing to identify in the aforementioned peasant movements any characteristics regarding the inherent *modus operandi* and form of organization of the conscious workers' movement, labelled these movements as primitive and pre-modern sociopolitical expressions.[13] In many cases, they were identified as spontaneous rebellions,[14] primary class struggles,[15] precursory movements of the intervention of the working class in Spanish history[16] and even the genesis of Spanish trade unionism[17] and the Spanish workers' movement. According to Nuñez de Arenas,[18] who refused to classify them as deliberate acts of the workers' movement, they were purely 'impulsive' outbreaks and lacked clear direction and purpose;[19] Bernaldo de Quirós[20] also typified the peasant rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century as part of the dynamics of the articulation of the workers' movement but attributed the peasant rebellions of Arahal and Loja to an initial period prior to the organization of the masses into workers' parties, a

phase that began with the penetration of the 'International'. The fortune of 'primitivism' transcended the confines of social historiography and can also be found in the context of more political historiography.[21]

These approaches have largely been overtaken or re-contextualized by new historiographical perspectives and by the application of new theoretical frameworks and conceptual resources. In contrast to the rigid, highly influential classist interpretations of the 1970s, there was a tendency for the more ductile and diffuse notion of working classes or groups to be imposed when describing the much more complex and transversal reality from the sociological, labour and political standpoints of *those below*.[22] In recent years, studies of demo-republican political radicalism[23] and, more recently, the articulation of republican political cultures in the mid-nineteenth century[24] give us an insight into the rapprochement and interaction between urban middle-class 'demo-republicanism' and the elements, discourses, consciousness and demands of the working classes. In another order, the debate on the primitivism of peasant protest was settled in our country by the critical review of the work of Hobsbawm.[25]

A recent work by Thomson, published originally in 2009 and then in Spanish in 2015, examined in depth the aforementioned line of interrelations between politics and popular groups, analysing the progress of rural agrarian society in Andalusia towards what he calls 'modern politics'. The aforementioned author's perspective is interesting, given the little research into the historical processes of democratic socialization in our historiography, although French historiographical studies focusing on the historical processes of political socialization in rural communities have been firmly consolidated at European level since the 1960s following the pioneering work of Agulhon.[26] Thomson clearly goes beyond the strictly social- and labour-related framework of the analysis and, regarding the events of interest here, proposes an interpretation of the episodes of 1857 and 1861 in relation to the key aspects of a process in which local Andalusian communities, through and thanks to republican democracy, gradually became involved in modern forms of national politics. In this regard, he coincides with the critical considerations of some Andalusian historiographers who have argued the lack of substantiation of historiographical topics such as the political demobilization and apathy of Andalusian agrarian societies.[27] Thomson dates the beginning of the process of political modernization to the mid-nineteenth century, which would make the process in Andalusia, and also in Spain, coincide with similar processes in other neighbouring countries.

The Progressive Biennium marked a 'broadening of politics'[28] that transcended the urban sphere to encompass local communities. The political regime favoured the free circulation of ideas and news and the promotion of different types of associations, not only political but also mutual or recreational. As a result, working-class sectors of society had the opportunity to participate in the public and political spheres through new codes and

mechanisms. This broadening of the political arena was curtailed after the end of the biennium. But its clandestine nature did not mark the end of the process of democratic inculturation. This followed its course through various mechanisms such as oral and written propaganda,[29] the support and backing of workers' claims or mutual assistance through electoral activity when political circumstances and insurgent actions allowed. The result was the incorporation of broad sectors of the working class into what Thomson described as 'modern politics'.

This description was accurate in the case of Loja, but in our view it cannot be confirmed in the case of El Arahal. In our opinion, both episodes were substantively different, were related in different ways to republican insurrectionary activity, played different roles in the revolutionary cycle of democracy and therefore took on different meanings in the democratization process proposed by Thomson. In short, in our opinion, the events in El Arahal were only circumstantially related to the democratic uprising, which merely served as a window of opportunity or fuse to spark a popular local reaction, although the explanations for this event are completely unrelated to the discourse or political practice of democracy in the mid-nineteenth-century Spain. In our view, the aforementioned factors did not play a role in the modernization process proposed by Thomson nor were they aligned with its development.

Review of the concept of modern politics

We share Thomson's proposal and we have already highlighted its historiographical interest. However, the use of the adjective *modern* to describe the political situation resulting from the process of popular politicization in Andalusia, suffers, at least in the sense attributed to the term in Spain, from the lack of a specific teleological definition of the historical process and invariably remits to the process of old, pre-modern, archaic or primitive politics when defining earlier forms of politics. From a broad perspective of politics, understood as social activity designed to facilitating decision-making, every community has political resources, and these are expressed in more or less informal and institutionalized practices and mechanisms geared to facilitating decision-making (political system). This system is a product of and simultaneously defines and shapes the different levels of social relations (economic, gender and cultural). The different groups in a community usually articulate codes, discourses and repertoires of action in order to take decisions on different available options, the nature and purpose of the final decision adopted and the actual structure of the political system. These codes are legitimized and underpinned by values, principles and interests and tend to shape political cultures. All communities have a political system and political cultures. And these are neither modern nor archaic cultures but instead effectively reflect and comply with the framework of possibility (potential decisions) and decisional spectrum (universe of issues on which decisions have to be taken)

at each moment. All the parameters of this system evolve and change through history in response to the appearance of new actors, the broadening of the framework of possibility or the decisional spectrum, the consequent mutation/adaptation of political cultures and the adaptation/response of political systems to new conditions.

What one might describe as the transition to – in the words of Thomson – 'modern politics' would correspond to the reformulation and adaptation of the political sphere developed in plot-based agrarian societies as a consequence of the dual revolution. The development of the liberal state and agrarian capitalism established/imposed a new political system, fostered the emergence and establishment of new political cultures and broadened the framework of possibility and the decision-making spectrum. This constituted a radical and revolutionary change that, among other things, broke up the local space of political significance, limiting the relative autonomy that had characterized this level until then. Working-class groups adapted quickly to the new circumstances but they did not do this alone. In agrarian communities, the process of learning new languages and discourses, the adaptation and development of new instruments of protest and action and the assimilation and construction of new codes of political meaning and action responded to external stimuli. Democratic republicanism was one of the political responses/tools/cultures that proposed new discourses and codes of action which rural communities embraced, adapted to and adopted in their process of relocation in the new liberal political system. But there were others. The means of adaptation differed and varied. Some groups engaged in a politicization mediated through patronage and despotism. The penetration of republicanism in rural Spain was a prolonged phenomenon that began very early[30] and was more intense than believed until recently.[31]

The process of politicization, that is the socialization of new political cultures or elements of same, was not a vertical or one-way process. Instead, there was mutual impregnation. Indeed, the peasant uprisings in El Arahal and Loja allow us to propose a hypothesis as to what extent the contact of republicanism with rural communities in the context of the insurrectionary cycle of the 1850s and 1860s did not stimulate (or foster?) an internal debate within republicanism on the problems of the rural areas. Ultimately, we are referring to debates about property, thus contributing to the division between the socialist branch, defended by Pi y Margall from the pages of *La Discusión*, and the individualist branch, with Emilio Castelar as its main representative.

El Arahal or the limits of the political socialization process

On 30 June, the town's inhabitants, taking advantage of the presence of the republican column from Seville when it entered the town, set fire to and destroyed the municipal archive; two permanent offices also located in the town hall building; three other clerks' offices, which were in use; the archives

of the administrator of the House of the Duke of Osuna and the Revenue Administration Office. The local casino, owned by the Duke of Osuna, was also burned and the houses of the wealthy were sacked and looted. Earlier, similar incidents had occurred when the same column passed through the town of Utrera, and attempts were made to repeat them later in Paradas, but never on a scale of the events in El Arahal. The repression resulted in 17 shot, 60 local citizens imprisoned in Seville for sentencing and more than 30 fugitives.[32] In addition to the foregoing, 'the consequences of the punishment are becoming evident because some of the mothers and wives of the men shot have already died'.[33]

The social unrest that broke out in 1857 in some towns in Seville's countryside, most notably in El Arahal, were not part of the republican plan of action. The pattern of events differed from that of attempted democratic insurrections of the time, whose immediate objective was to unite forces and resources and gain support in different towns, as part of a coordinated action with simultaneous uprisings in different places[34] but never to spark reactions of social violence such as those that occurred. This was also evidenced by the fact that the republican leaders and direct advocates of the uprising immediately distanced themselves from the events, which can only be explained by their desire not to associate their ideals with the social reactions that took place in El Arahal, although they openly recognized their presence in La Carolina, another site of insurrection in 1857, where the events did follow the established *modus operandi*.[35]

Nor did the events in El Arahal follow the same pattern as the uprisings by peasants fighting for their livelihoods. Nevertheless, the year 1857 is associated with one of the most serious periods of crisis in Spain in the nineteenth century, and although riots did break out in the area as a result of shortages and lack of resources following the traditional pattern of such grassroots reactions,[36] this was not the case in El Arahal.

Even though the moderate opinions of those in power, in order to justify the exemplary nature of the government's response,[37] attempted to link the events to the diluted socialism of 'demoralized people, those who can unfortunately be found in almost all towns, even the smallest, and if they are unfamiliar with the theoretical socialism of the dreamers of our time, they see in change that other practical, infinitely more horrible socialism',[38] to our knowledge there was no evidence of democratic republicanism or socialism, unless this is understood to correspond to demands for repartition, awareness of social injustice and hatred of the wealthy.

At the time of the events, it was already clear that the events had to be deciphered according to internal codes and that the attempted republican insurrection had only sparked social conflicts and a struggle of latent interests in the population.[39]

The Duke of Osuna, the main landowner in the area, has been identified as the instigator of the events.[40] The aforementioned hypothesis is possible but not plausible, and recently recovered archive documentation does not

suggest that this was the case, definitively shedding light on the events, as if these were already not clear, and providing certain details. The correspondence between the administrator and the Duke of Osuna clearly identifies the insurgents: 'proletarian residents, protected or sheltered by the republican faction', who he later associated with 'all local agricultural labourers, and quite [a few] artisans'. They were contrasted with 'the honest residents and the farmers class and landowners, the clergy and the employees and all people harbouring human sentiments'.[41]

The reasons for their anger also offered no room for doubt. The ultimate objective of the revolts was the repartition of communal property usurped by the Duke of Osuna in the municipality.[42] The burning of documents was not a general and abstract reaction against the principle of ownership, as some have chosen to believe, but rather a specific and direct attempt to erase all traces of property belonging to the Duke de Osuna, with whom the town council had maintained a dispute since 1838, and which the duke had managed to block by means of political trickery via a provincial councillor and fellow settler.[43] The town council claimed from him 670 bushels of vacant and own land, cattle tracks and easements that had been unlawfully attached to the duke's lands.[44]

In his private correspondence, the administrator indirectly recognized that there was a basis to the municipal demands,[45] but the people obviously failed to achieve their objectives. In fact, the opposite was true: the administrator declared that the documentation relating to the disputed properties had been burned. The landowners in El Arahal succeeded in convincing the government to initiate a process to restore their properties in the municipality, and as the administrator rightly pointed out, the foregoing represented the perfect opportunity 'to ensure perpetual ownership for the current owners', highlighting that thereafter 'the latter had to be the authentic and binding deed of ownership valid in the future'.[46]

The events in El Arahal and their repudiation by the democrats marked the limits of insurrectionary activity, considered a right in republican political culture,[47] namely a right to land, and offer us an insight into where the boundaries lay between the democratic small bourgeois conception and the moral economy of the popular agrarian classes. The egalitarian sense of social justice, the hatred of the wealthy or the desire for revenge unleashed after the events[48] were mechanisms of popular social reaction that were not yet subsumed or articulated or processed in an ideological discourse or a social, general, abstract programme of social transformation geared to achieving control of the state political system. It was at this level that the triumphant revolutionary liberals concentrated power, and the sphere in which, through the law, the process of capitalist liberal socio-economic transformation of the organic traditional peasant communities was also articulated. Democratic-republican political culture offered tools and proposals for articulation at that level, and Thomson describes the mechanisms and strategies that were used to make rural popular classes more socially aware of the aforementioned

instruments in the 1850s and 1860s, although El Arahal is the counterexample of that process.

The peasant uprising in Arahal must still be explained as a local phenomenon, as a microcosm where individuals sought and found solutions for their problems. The political culture of the arsonists in Arahal developed in a spectrum of possibility and a decisional framework that still presupposes sufficient local autonomy to resolve (make decisions on) the litigation in their favour. The documentary records were burned to destroy all traces of the particular usurpation of communal lands and thus promoted a new municipal distribution of same. This had occurred before with collectively owned land managed by the town council. Now the opportunity for a new distribution of land depended on the recovery of the seized lands, which were additionally affected by an unsolved lawsuit.

The 'El Arahal' episode does not conform to the classification proposed by Thomson nor does it conform to the one proposed by Bernal, when he used it as an example of how, after 1854 with the outbreak of the Biennium, the peasant masses of Andalusia trusted – albeit unsuccessfully as it turned out – that there would be a solution to the land problem through political action from above, and hence the support of the 1854 uprising, as well as those in 1857 or 1861.[49] In our opinion, 'El Arahal' is an example of political action *from below*.

The case of Loja in 1961 is different. The peasant's underlying demand was the same: namely land distribution, but the strategy changed. In Loja, unlike in El Arahal, there had been no episodes of direct action, insofar as political socialisation through the secret society and previous experiences had led to the assimilation of ideas such as organisation, joint action (the peasants moved from their localities to Loja) and the seizure of central power (republic and democracy). This does not mean that the Loja rebels, especially those belonging to the more modest groups, did not have a simple perception of the republican and democratic discourse, which often did not go beyond the mere association republic/distribution or democracy/egalitarianism. The case of Alhama cited by Thomson is proof of this. In that locality the insurrection had the most explicitly agrarian objectives, with recruitment specifically aimed at landless labourers and with an on-the-spot allocation of land to be allocated to each in the future land distribution.[50]

The dual uprising: Loja in 1861

The Loja revolt was completely different in nature to that in El Arahal, at least insofar as its republican and democratic component cannot be called into question. Despite certain noteworthy misconceptions in this sense, its relationship with democratic sectarianism is undeniable.[51] In fact, the carbonari secret society, which had been operating since 1856, not only articulated *de facto* all the insurrectionary activity of the Democratic Party until 1868, but it also became the main vehicle for proselytizing and socializing democratic

and republican principles in Andalusia at the time.[52] Reminiscent of the Fourierists, the society was led by socialists or associationists, a socially oriented faction sensitive to the political and material emancipation of the popular classes, which, in the image of the Italian carbonari societies reorganized by Mazzini in Young Italy, attempted to capture support through measures such as the reduction of society membership fees and even their suppression in the case of most needy.[53]

The aforementioned society was the backbone of the Loja rebellion of 1861. All historiographers who have studied this event have highlighted the so-called peculiarity of the dual sociopolitical orientation of the uprising. Thus, the doctrinal and political objectives and orientations of the petit bourgeois leadership differed from those of the popular peasant bases of the movement. For the peasant groups, the main factor triggering the revolutionary activity in 1861 were undoubtedly the claims to land. The expectations and fears generated by the *desamortización* (disentailment) process among the peasant groups fuelled the mobilization of these groups in defence of often conflicting interests, such as those of the tenants of communal lands who saw an opportunity to have access to property, in contrast to those of others who feared that the confiscation process would take away their right to enjoy the use of communal property, vital in their precarious subsistence economies.

Promises of land and distribution undoubtedly played a key role in the enlistment of peasants and day labourers in democrat ranks. Thomson documents several specific cases.[54] This was undoubtedly favoured by the social orientation of insurgent republicanism and eventually led to the association in popular imaginary of republicanism and democracy with the distribution of land.

However, we know that the republican leadership's position was far removed from these socializing prerogatives. Pérez del Alamo's first declaration of intent solemnly declares respect for property as one of the flags of the revolutionary movement of 1861.[55] In case of doubt, in 1863, the democrats of Loja aligned with the democratic liberals against socialism:

> Democracy in Loja does not contain in its midst even a single socialist, nor anyone who differs in a single point on the purity of democratic dogma. . . . Composed in its totality of hard-working and honourable workers, each dependent on what he obtains from the sweat of his brow, never for one moment has he considered appropriating that which does not belong to him in order to form a mob of good-for-nothings instead of a numerous group of free men. . . . Socialism, by calling into question wealth honourably earned or obtained by families, by desiring that the poor man should enrich himself at the expense of the rich, the idler at the cost of the industrious, is the worst of all despotisms.[56]

The movement's failure prevented the substantiation of these internal contradictions, which we are inclined to believe were more in keeping with the

duality of the soul of the democratic movement than with a deliberate desire to exploit popular groups for the benefit of the revolution.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the experience of republican democracy in the Andalusian insurrections of 1857 and 1861 contributed to the rethinking of some of its tenets, or the extent to which they contributed to its internal political differentiation. In other words, to what extent was this an example of feedback and osmosis between political cultures. Some studies have already examined in depth the processes of interaction of republicanism with the urban proletariat and how such contact enabled the latter to embrace tenets and demands that were alien to them.[57] Were the cases studied here examples of a comparable a process? Certain data would support this hypothesis. A comparison of the republican manifestos or programmes of the period reveals that while Sixto Cámara made no mention, in Zaragoza on 5 April 1857, of peasant demands beyond a general reference to 'poor labourers',[58] barely a year later, on 1 February 1858, the Political Manifesto of the National Committee of the Spanish Democratic Party, after the events in El Arahal, after the (drafting of the) catalogue of civil and political rights, outlined an emancipatory social programme for the working classes that included the confiscation of all civil and church properties, and the removal of all vacant lands, common lands and crown lands from the census.[59]

We are inclined to consider that elements such as peasant claims for land had an impact on Spanish republicanism by aggravating the division between the individualist wing, the so-called democrats 'of order' and the socialist current that endured the brunt of the uprisings in 1857, a more socially oriented sector of republicanism that subsequently developed a different political programme.[60] The experience of the Sexennium enabled this popular republicanism to develop its first great political instrument, the Federal Republican Party, whose programme united civil democracy (specifically, Pi y Margall's Proudhon version) and part of the social programme deriving from workers' internationalism, but also the programme stemming from local insurrectionary experience in previous decades.

Funding

Notes

 1 Castro Alfín, 1994; Peyrou, 2002, 2006; Miguel González, 2007.
 2 Eiras Roel, 1963; Castro Alfín, 1996; Lida, 1972.
 3 Moliner Prada, 1994.
 4 Garrido, 1868–1869: 3, 342.

5 Thomson, 2008, 2015.
6 For a critical review of the historiography on the Loja revolution, Suárez Verde-guer (1985) continues to be a useful source.
7 Núñez de Arenas and Tuñón de Lara, 1970; Tuñón de Lara, 1972: 143 ff., Calero, 1971 and 1976: 12 ff., Bernal, 1974; Sánchez Diana, 1975; Gutiérrez, 1978; Sánchez Jiménez, 1980; Jutglar, 1982.
8 Bernaldo de Quirós, 1973 [1919], Carrión, 1972 [1932].
9 Entrena Durán, 2001; Serrano del Rosal, 2000; Gómez Casas, 2006.
10 Pirala, 1875–1879; Garrido, 1868–1869; Pérez del Álamo, (1872); Bermejo, 1872; Hennessy, 1966; Guerola, 1995.
11 For example, Jutglar (1982), obviating all political aspects of the events of 1857 and 1861, evaluates these events entirely out of context from republican insurrectionalism, treating them merely as capital expressions of the radicalism of peasant upheaval in their demands for land.
12 According to Tuñón de Lara, in the case of El Arahal '*we cannot rule out the hypothesis* that republican groups coming from urban centres incited the basic discontent of workers in the countryside' (1972: 143). Pascual Carrión, in line with Guichot and Bernaldo de Quirós, attributed the foregoing to the first propaganda of advanced ideas, without ever actually considering these to have been directly instigated by the democrats and attributed the events to more social than political reasons. (Carrión, 1972 [1932]: 19 ff.). In social historiography, only Lida's (1972) hypothesis is an exception in this sense, since although this author also considers the events in Andalusia in 1857 and 1861 to have been part of the initial development of the proletarian movement in Spain, he explains them fundamentally according to their link with the agenda of democratic insurrectionism. Surprising examples in liberal historiography include the work by Guichot, who was even unaware of the demo-republican nature of the 1857 revolt and claimed to be unaware of its organization and purposes even though the revolt was mentioned by the protagonists themselves in the press of the time (Guichot y Parody, 1869–1871: 8, 79).
13 Hobsbawm, 1983 [1959].
14 Tuñón de Lara, 1972: 143 ff.
15 Calero, 1987
16 Díaz del Moral, 1995 [1929].
17 Serrano del Rosal, 2000.
18 Núñez de Arenas and Tuñón de Lara, 1970.
19 Gutierrez, 567.
20 Bernaldo de Quirós, 1973: 144 ff.
21 González Calleja, 1994.
22 Recently, the very operability of the concept of class identity has been questioned as a basic characteristic of the workers' movement. Spiegel (2006). For a formulation of this interpretation, see Pérez Ledesma (1997), Somers (1996a, 1996b), Joyce (1994) and Cabrera, Divassón, and Felipe (2008). For the Spanish case, see Felipe (2009). For other countries, Joyce (1994), Scott (1999) and Lockman (1994).
23 Castro Alfín, 1994, 1996; García Rovira, 1989; and Romeo, 1995.
24 Barnosell, 1999, 2006; Peyrou, 2002, 2008a; Miguel González, 2007; Andreu Miralles, 2011.
25 González de Molina Navarro, 1996.
26 Agulhon, 1970; Weber, 1976; McPhee, 1992.
27 Herrera et al., 2012.
28 Thomson, 2015: 61.
29 The Minister of Governance, Nocedal, stated, in the Senate on 9 July 1857, during discussions of the draft law on the printing of the inflammatory publications,

books against the throne, society and religion that had circulated in Andalusia prior to the uprising of the *partidas* (irregular armed rural guards) in La Carolina, 'books which, for the first time in Spain, reached day labourers living in our countryside, books which, together with other causes, have given rise to these upheavals' (*La Discusión*, 10–07–1857).

30 Piqueras and Chust, 1996; Duarte and Gabriel, 2000; Villena Espinosa, 2004.
31 Inarejos Muñoz, 2006; Jaén Milla, 2014.
32 Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), Fondo Histórico de la nobleza, C. 1292, D.278–292, Letter to the Duke, dated 31–08–1857). Hereinafter we will refer to this source as 'AHN' and the date of the letter.
33 AHN, 18–07–1857.
34 The expedition that left Seville, commanded by Caro and passing through the Sevillian countryside, was one of the foci of a wider sedition that had ramifications in La Carolina and Despeñaperros (Jaén), in the city of Málaga, the only place in Andalusia where the state of emergency established after the attempted insurrection of 1857 was maintained, until September 1858, and Málaga province (Benaojan, Morón, Ronda, Arenas) (Pirala, 1875–1879: 6, 325 ff.), in La Mancha (Rodríguez Solís, 1892–1893: 482), without forgetting certain newspapers in Córdoba (*El Clamor público*, 30–06–1857) and Huelva (*La Esperanza*, 04–07–1857). *La Ibería* (02–07–1857) also reported troop movements in Maeztrazgo, Serranía de Ronda and Montes de Toledo.
35 The press reproduced a letter dated 30 August published in *A Civilizaçao* by Bernardo García, one of the leaders of the Republican committee that had taken refuge in Lisbon. In it he confessed to having been in the area around La Carolina between 26 and 30 June as he 'had, more or less directly, certain revolutionary commitments in the provinces of Andalusia' but declared that he did not have any connection with the events in Seville. He, like other democrats such as Sixto Cámara, disowned these events as he considered them to breach all the rules and commitments which the democratic revolution had to embrace. According to Sixto Cámara, the causes, which he did not mention, distorted the local organization by denaturalizing the purpose of armed propaganda, depriving it of the support of the democratic bases and Sixto Cámara himself, leading it to failure (*La Discusión*, 09–09–1857). Garrido (1868–1869) also exculpated the democratic leadership of the events in Seville, arguing that the excesses were one-off events and served, in his opinion, as an alibi for the unusually violent government repression.
36 Parejo Barranco, 1980.
37 Díaz del Moral, 1995 [1929].
38 *La Iberia*, 14–07–1857.
39 Guichot y Parody, 1869–1871: 80.
40 Jiménez Perez, 1972.
41 AHN, 05–10–1857.
42 According to the administrator, the insurgents shouted

> "death to the Administrator and his children for refusing to share the land with us" – . . . , "because these proletarian people have a jury and they will use it, the they will kill me and my children the first chance they have, because we have not distributed our estates among them".
>
> (AHN, 02–07–1857)

43 AHN, 18–08–1857.
44 AHN, 27–08–1857.
45 'Today', he wrote to the duke on August 22,

> more than ever, it is necessary to exercise extraordinary vigilance and more than perpetual zeal, every year, and if necessary every six months, visit all the

country properties bordering those that were vacant and own [property], which are today in the hands of private owners, bordering with the lands of His Excellency since the latter, at the first opportunity, at the smallest opportunity, at the slightest oversight, will break a boundary, push a milestone, render a right of way unusable, all for their own benefit to incorporate them into the lands they already own; in contrast to what they did when these lands were common and vacant, when they would take every opportunity to add them to the lands of Your Excellency, because in that way they would enjoy exclusive use of same; this continues to be the case, and hence the arguments used by the Town Council in 1838, when it initiated the lawsuit and measurement of the land.

46 AHN, 27–08–1857.
47 García Rivera, 2006.
48 Activities to raise money and collect food and clothing for the needy initiated by 'leading and well-to-do persons' to help widows, mothers and families of those affected provoked an angry popular reaction led by women, and as a result

> when women in different neighbourhoods received this news, they were upset, they objected to receiving such aid as the Lords offered this relief because they were scared that one day people would seek vengeance, and then they would pay; men with the same intentions, albeit reserved, but driven by those intentions, which are infinitely worse, will prompt them to perpetrate more excesses than they were capable of committing.

This climate of social confrontation prompted many important families to abandon the town and settle in Seville and Carmona (AHN, 05–10–1857).
49 Bernal, 1974: 114 ff.
50 Thomson, 2015: 236.
51 Pérez del Álamo, 1872. Eiras Roel (1962: 306) questions this society's involvement in the events of 1861, based on the testimonies of Pérez del Alamo and Guerola. Based on Garrido's (1868–1869) opinion, for whom the events of Loja were an isolated and incidental event unrelated to the republican leadership, argued that there was no evidence to link the events of Loja to the carbonari organization. Surprisingly, Roel was unfamiliar with the work of Pérez del Alamo and disdained that of Rodríguez Solís (1892–1893) who related the events of Loja with Carbonarism.
52 Thomson, 2015; Guerola, 1995.
53 Eiras Roel, 1962.
54 Thomson, 2015: 230, 319.
55 Pérez del Álamo, 1986: 65.
56 Thomson, 2015: 321.
57 Eiras Roel, 1960; Felipe, 2011.
58 Lida, 1972.
59 Garrido, 1868–1869: 81 Notes.
60 Eiras Roel, 1960, 1963; Duarte, 2004; and Martínez Gallego, 2005.

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5 Republican democracy in the southern periphery of Spain

The province of Córdoba (1885–1919)

Ángel Duarte Montserrat

A brief note on the role of republicanism in contemporary Spain

Historical republicanism, despite the brevity of the few moments it governed the institutions of State, proved to be a key factor in the achievements and frustrations of democratisation in contemporary Spain and Andalusia. This has been evidenced by a cluster of studies of revised Spanish political and social history.[1] Republicanism channelled many of the plural experiences of resistance to practices of exclusion and expropriation of rights and property which, in the process of shaping the liberal order, affected the lower social classes and a fair number of the enlightened and professional middle classes.

Republicanism, as a plural political project (its diversity breaches the brittle frontiers of liberalism, socialism and anarchism), as a reformist social movement with an interclass composition, and on account of its secularising culture, played a central role in Spanish political life from 1840 onwards. It did so for over a century, albeit mostly on the outer limits of the institutional sphere. Republicanism was present in parliamentary activity while at the same time operating in the field of play created with the emergence of the nation state and the market economy. This was where the consolidation of a public space suitable for discursive skills took place, one forced to assume a growing repertoire of modes of collective action that ranges from traditional riots to new forms of protest and public intervention of subjects designated as a 'people'. In the view of the first democrats this must be a 'republican people' that would acquire consciousness through intense practices of citizenship.

In Spain, republicanism offered a horizon of hope for those who have been deprived of secular rights or are considered outside the demos, because they lack property or 'capabilities', and therefore are excluded from the design of policies that affect the general public. It is also attractive to elements of the enlightened petty bourgeoisie at the local level and attracted key professional sectors in the life of municipalities. It operates as hope, therefore, from below and above.[2] Among the lower echelons of society – rural day labourers, artisans or employees of workshops – the republic would provide a space for leadership and, at the beginning, a kind of palingenesis of fraternity: the

day in which the fourth estate becomes present as a lead actor. The advent of republicanism is conceived as the starting point for an age of fairer distribution of the social product resulting from the expansion of republican freedoms to socially regimented individuals.[3] Along with this interpretation, the mesocratic voices of the provincial capitals and mid-sized cities in Andalusia, linked to Freemasonry, freethinking or more revisionist pedagogical currents, believe in slow-paced republican action that paves the way for the triumph of reason in the mentalities of citizens. Doctors, teachers and lawyers became propagandists for republican democratic principles within the framework of cultural, educational and journalistic enterprises, essential for the development of popular sociability. In any case, the radicalism of the democratic conception of the republic does not admit a mechanical relationship with social status. Revolutionaries and reformists were present throughout the sociological arc referenced here briefly.

    All of the above began in the 1830s and 1840s. Some previous, isolated voices had spoken out in the early moments of the liberal revolution. In the 1840s, the intended outcome was already clear: to achieve political democracy, to seek incorporation into the political body of the nation of the fourth estate and to complement achievements in the arena of formal legal equality with the resurgence of fraternity.[4] Between that moment and 1868, in a singularly active way, Andalusia witnessed the processes of electoral and associative learning – if not insurrectionist or revolutionary – of democracy.[5] From 1868 to 1873, the democratising process accelerated until the arrival of the First Republic in February of this last year. Regardless of what happened in the capital and, by extension, in the nation, the first republican manifestation in the larger municipalities of Córdoba province unfolded in accordance with the expectations laid down over previous decades: in Montilla, and this was not the only town where this occurred, news of the arrival of the republic resulted in assaults and fires set in municipal authority buildings and even the murder of some of the richest men in the town, of *caciques* who tried to flee for their lives.[6] In those months, tensions related to the access and distribution of resources and powers gave rise to the proclamation of a federal and social republic in numerous Andalusian municipalities, which stunned many of the first-hour democrats and facilitated, with the fall of the First Republic and the arrival of the Bourbon Restoration (1923/1874), a liberal, albeit unequivocally de-democratising, parliamentary regime.

    Previous politicisation and democratisation ensured, however, that in times of renewed social control and strong political exclusion, republicanism was a refuge that sustained a culture of resistance, collective action, continuous political learning and democratisation.[7]

The virtuous link as a truncated possibility

At the end of the nineteenth century and in the first three decades of the twentieth century, the possibility of linking the various emancipatory proposals

of modernity, including republicanism, was explored in multiple scenarios, although it gave rise to unfinished historical processes. From the republican revolution of 1910 in Portugal, to the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 in Argentina, as to the repercussion of proposals made by Leonard T. Hobhouse in England in 1920, the constitutional formulas that underpinned the Weimar Republic, democratising initiatives spread beyond moderate and doctrinal elite liberalism. Along the insurrectional path, after imperial collapses or through legislative initiatives, in addition to liberal roots – national sovereignty, limits on political power – developments were proposed by democracy in terms of rights and responsibilities, and mass participation in decision-making was ensured, substantiated in citizenship. The instruments used range from the universalisation of male suffrage – with the hope that 'people want to vote'[8] – and the purging of existing electoral practices to the encouragement of other forms of collective intervention in the public sphere. Liberalism and democracy were linked to the emancipating perspective of a republicanism that shared decades of collaboration with social networks of day labourers, workers and artisans. Without annulling class identity, connections were based on the concept of the people and citizenship and on aspirations to participate in some form of equitable social reform.

In Spain, this circuit, experienced in the six-year period of democracy known as the *Sexenio Democrático*, (re)appeared as a possibility during the Bourbon Restoration, from the reforms of the long liberal government of 1885.[9] This window of opportunity for democratisation was limited by the stability of the governing logic of constitutional liberalism (the liberal-conservative elites left the King in charge of appointing the executive which then secured an obsequious/obedient legislature) and by the accommodation of patronage and oligarchic clientelism to innovations in the rules of play. In addition, democratisation was conditioned by the effects of late century colonial and agrarian crises and was altered in its relation to the intermediate bodies in which it was produced, as a result of the emergence of sub-state nationalisms that challenged the political-administrative centralisation of the liberal State.[10] From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, peripheral particularisms breathed life into processes of *nation building without state*. The municipality and the province were joined by regions and their demands for federal and/or pre-nationalist autonomy as territories of democracy.

If we accept that all *democratisation* goes beyond the limits of institutional policy, the process examined here had some key milestones that support the relevance of analysing those decades as the time frame of a wave in which intense pressure was placed on official policy from below and from the periphery. Although the list provided here is by no means exhaustive, it is worth remembering the paternalistic overtones of Regenerationist initiatives (1895–1906) with which the end of century crisis was addressed and the paradigm of Spanish *backwardness* normalised. However, we also propose to interpret, in terms of democratisation, a set of different events, all associated with the intention of inducing the metapolitical equalisation of

people. If we admit such a starting point, the list is expanded and includes the peasant uprising of Jerez in 1892, the subsistence riots that in Córdoba and towns around the province led to the proclamation of a 'state of war' – rioting continued to be a mode of angry protest among those excluded from the egalitarian principle – or the new 1902 general strike in Barcelona. It also incorporates, as assets of democratisation, the electoral successes of renewed republicanism or the Catalanist mobilisation around 1906. A decade later, we are faced with the articulated accumulation of parliamentary, military and social demands that took place in the spring/summer of 1917 in an attempt to open a constituent process and, last but not least, the agrarian social conflict of the Bolshevik Triennium (1918–1920) in the countryside of Córdoba. This last episode, moreover, coincided with the height of the industrial conflict that culminated with general strikes in Barcelona, employer lockouts and *pistolerismo* (gun law) in the streets. Once again, a host of social and political energies that tested the limits of late liberal politics were interconnected in the Spanish peripheries. The decisive point came in around 1920 when, beyond liberal democracy, there was a purging of suffrage, an intensification of political debate and, moreover, thanks to the organisational patterns of the workers' and peasants' movement, a new correlation of forces was generated in the labour market along with a democratising contingency within companies and, occasionally, in the modes of negotiating the bases of agricultural work. All this underlies and provides an explanation for the immediate authoritarian response deployed in the form of a military dictatorship, that of Miguel Primo de Rivera, corporatist, obsessed with the notion of *public order*, and aggressively nationalising in its approach (1923–1930).

After this parenthesis, the culmination of the democratising cycle was reached with the arrival of the Republic on 14 April 1931. The second of the republican crystallisations forged a system of representation and participation that, interpreted by its actors in a teleological way, ended a century of battles: democratising in the political arena, decentralising in the territorial sphere, reformist in the social arena and secularising in the cultural sphere.[11] A constituent convention sustained in high-intensity citizenship would seek to tackle the challenges of the future and the shortfalls of the past. This was a revolution for reform. The wave, in Andalusia and Spain, ended up colliding with the tensions that the *true republic* – different from the *possible republic* – generated within Spanish society and became weakened in the *storm of the world*.[12]

Democratisation in the periphery

Despite the wealth of historical studies of the province of Córdoba and its districts, this geographical area has been passed over in the narratives of democratisation and nationalisation that address the national-state

framework and attribute a clichéd narrative of continued sociopolitical backwardness to peripheral agricultural regions. As a rural borderland area in the South, backwardness is attributed to such areas, in contrast to the central transformative role assumed by metropoli and industrialised regions.[13]

In contrast to this cliché, in Córdoba from 1890 to 1930, democratic-republican political practice was complex and intense and a long time in the making.[14] Despite the frustration experienced in January 1874, republican-ism continued to enjoy numerous active attachments in all the provinces of Andalusia. In the medium term, this became fundamental. It is this sustained grassroots vitality that explains why, half a century later, with the arrival of the Republic in 1931, the expectations placed on republican democracy as a useful tool for the reappropriation of usurped goods and rights, in Córdoba and its rural hinterland, enjoyed such a high degree of consensus. It also took hold because of the conviction held by the lower sectors of society and broad swathes of the liberal professions, including teaching and journalism, that the achievement of a genuine democracy would be impossible with monarchical institutions standing in the way. These institutions, which identified with the interests of elites, were willing to back authoritarian and anti-liberal institutional solutions in times of crisis.

The episodes of democratisation had multiple triggers and expressions, but in the case of Córdoba, they were substantiated by three decisive elements: (1) the democratic politicisation of broad sections of the lower classes, with a highly virulent derivative in the cultural competition of clericalism/anticlericalism; (2) the central role that the city and the province played in the articulation of a brand of *Andalucismo* caught between democratic and social universalism and cultural nationalism and (3) the intensity of social agitation among the peasant classes, and its correlation within the industrial working classes at a time dominated by the appeal of a general strike as a weapon against forced unemployment and hunger among urban proletarians and day labourers.[15] These three processes, none of which can be reduced to a single event, affected Spain's agendas in the first third of the twentieth century and framed many of the experiences of conflict and mediation between collective subjects. In addition, as dynamics of learning and democratic practice, they were presented with factors favourable to the reversal of the circumstances of national decline – Spain had been included since 1898 in the catalogue of *losers* in the imperial race or *dying nations*[16] – as well as social inequities. In other words, for the nation and in terms of labour and employment, these three characteristics confirmed the emancipatory potential of democratic action that questioned the existing order.

Whereas in the first decades of the twentieth century, these expectations were related to political-social struggles in the interior of the country, after the conclusion of the Great War and following the impact of the Russian revolution, we now find the influence of the principle of nationalities,

reconsideration of the role of the State in economic life and the echoes of a reformist republican constitutionalism. Neither republican traditions nor Cordoba's *Andalucismo* or the collective action of day labourers, tenants or small rural landowners, were moving on the plane of theoretical ideals. Instead, all normative endeavours were focused on the fair distribution of the social product and its correlation with the problems of extending republican freedom throughout the social body.

Republican Córdoba

In the municipalities of Córdoba province, the Republican movement was reactivated in the 1880s, thanks to liberal legislation. Republican gatherings came out of hiding and expanded the repertoire of action beyond conspiracy. As in the rest of the country, the movement was marked by the divisions experienced in 1873. Doctrinal clarification around three core ideas – the social question, the territorial problem and the legal or insurrectionist methods of political intervention – led to the formation of up to four parties. There would be no shortage of meeting points for all of them, as well as for the many *loose* Republicans, in the form of unions, electoral coalitions and, at the most ambitious times, *mergers*. These dynamics ultimately tied with the republican-socialist conjunctions of 1909 and 1931.

The concrete planes in which this struggle took place and left a mark in the medium term are those of local sociability, the constant and transcendent connection with national politics and the lesson that, even occasionally, electoral endeavour yields tangible results. After the enactment of the Associations Act, federal republican committees and centres were set up and were sometimes called *Republican Workers*, in recognition of their composition and their vocation. Whereas, up until 1905, the presence of 359 federal republican committees had been documented in other towns around Andalusia, the proliferation of these committees in the following years meant that the main municipalities of Córdoba province also had their own. In many localities, they coincided with the slow and somewhat difficult, in Córdoba, development of socialism.[17]

In some municipalities, next to the local tavern or the place where the advanced federal would gather, there was another group that included republicans who, given their noble status, felt threatened by the protagonism of internationalism and cantonalism of 1873. They were fearful of revolutionary municipalities becoming core cells of the political and social body, as well as of militiamen and cantonalists challenging hierarchies of all kinds. On more than one occasion, and because both revolutionaries and governments found themselves on the margins of official political life, they banded together in a single centre that, in turn, welcomed associations of workers and day labourers, some of them inspired by anarcho-syndicalism. Republican physical space, and here we should include the space provided by Freemasonry,

provided a practicable refuge (to exercise the right of assembly, legal assistance) for workers and day labourers affected by waves of repression.

At these centres, the main headlines of democratic journalism and works penned by Republican publicists were read aloud, the strategy pursued when negotiating the foundations of labour were discussed and anticlerical diatribes and reproaches of despotic practices were vented. In other words, those gathered were informed, comforted and prepared for mobilisation. Republicans linked municipal popular sociability with an agenda that promised to: (1) overcome structural deficits – street lighting, paving, trees, sewage; (2) address the abandonment of schools, markets, health care, pharmacy or asylum; (3) influence the labour market and (4) reactivate cultural activity by overcoming the indoctrination of those who, because of their status as learned people, should become champions of progress. Teachers, doctors, veterinarians, secretaries of the city council must escape their stupor and participate in the spaces of democratic learning together with a people keen, it was assumed, for knowledge and skills that would ensure growing autonomy from oligarchic elites.[18]

These same Republicans participated, or were represented, in the federal assemblies meeting in Zaragoza (1882 and 1883)[19] and later, in 1888, in the meeting in Madrid that culminated the process of reorganising federalism as a party for the masses and endowing it with regional constitutional projects for the future emancipated nation. In those years, the region was confirmed as the linchpin of the national body, as the key geography for political philosophy that sustained the bottom–up organisation of sovereignty through successive synallagmatic and commutative pacts. In 1882, Francisco Pi y Margall, at the head of the federalist movement, warned: 'Here *fueros* are regional, not provincial'.[20] In 1883, the federalists gathered in the town of Antequera in Málaga took into consideration a regional project that five years later was adopted as an Andalusian Constitution in the aforementioned Madrid assembly.[21] Federal regionalisation, based on the inalienable freedom of the individual and their incorporation into the public sphere through the municipality, was proposed as an alternative to the moderate liberal provincialisation of the State, a power that is wielded omnipotently from the centre over the territory.[22] In keeping with other regional constitutions, Andalusia's constitution offered a broad treatment of political rights including women's suffrage. Ultimately, this was nothing more than a reflection of the active and autonomous presence of women in Andalusian social protest. In addition, compared to those in other regions, the project placed greater emphasis on the establishment of social rights: it prohibited child factory work, established minimum health and safety regulations and held the employer responsible for all this. As José Acosta Sánchez pointed out, the most interesting and peculiar thing is the objective of social justice openly pursued by the Federation, since it speaks of increasing general welfare and 'establishing in principle social equality and preparing for its definitive advent, consisting in the economic independence of all'.

The chronology of republicanism in Córdoba was synchronised with that of the whole of Spain and spanned over 1890, 1893, 1903, 1909 and 1917.[23] Democratic associationism was unstable, and its greatest thrust coincided with times when political liberalisation overlapped with cycles of social mobilisation. The period between 1890 and 1893 was exemplary in this regard. These years saw: (1) the extension of suffrage; (2) outside and local speakers' identification at rallies between democracy and the republic, both associated with expectations of improvement in municipal life, (3) demonstrations around 1 May accompanying the labour crisis resulting in concentrations of thousands of protesters willing to 'develop the agreements of the Paris Congress in a climate of major labour (peasant and union) conflict'. Auditoriums of theatres and republican societies filled with growing expectations and people taking to the streets and claiming victory, albeit partially, in the first elections held under the Universal Suffrage Act of 26 June 1890.

The circuit is easy to grasp. In April, Córdoba was declared to be a province infected by phylloxera. The impact on the labour market in the districts of Montilla and Córdoba facilitated the reactivation of the Republic: 'Numerous circles, casinos, or republican centres were founded (Rute, Bujalance, Montoro, and Palma del Río) or revitalised (Villafranca, Baena, and Aguilar)'. On 1 February 1891, the federal republican J. Palma won the seat for the district of Montilla while in the provincial capital, the support of the federal republicans for the conservative republicans allowed the latter to obtain good results. In the municipal elections of May that year, ten Republican councillors were elected, compared to seven dynastic conservatives and two reformists. Success was achieved 'both in neighbourhoods with a strong sociological component of day labourers, and especially in those with an artisanal presence'.[24]

Disappointment with electoral pledges came soon afterwards, due to the dilution of the Republican voice in parliament and the limited possibilities to intervene in the administrative machinery of the municipality. This did not mean, however, that the attraction of suffrage disappeared from the instrumental repertoire of popular mobilisation, due to the material and symbolic possibilities it offered. A decade later, between 1902 and 1903, a second prominent moment came in the proliferation of republican and working-class societies in Córdoba. The situation was marked by drought, plagues of locusts and the reduction of crop land and crops. In July 1902, the Minister of the Interior, the liberal Segismundo Moret, charged the Social Reform Commission to prepare a report on the situation of agricultural workers in Andalusia and Extremadura. More reports were drawn up in the following years, given the persistence of the crisis.[25] There was no work available, and day labourers resorted to ancestral subsistence methods – from hunting birds to clandestine olive-picking at night. The Minister of the Interior, Antonio Maura, put down the riots harshly – students in the city, day labourers in the countryside – but was respectful of electoral rules. Demonstrations took

place in the most important municipalities of the province, demanding work: Posadas, Montoro, Baena, Cabra, Pedroche, Fuente-Tójar, Belalcázar and the like. Throughout Spain as a whole, 1903 was, electorally speaking, the year of the successful Republican Union of Nicolás Salmerón.[26] In Córdoba, during the intervening decade, the network of personal and association contacts survived a secular deficit – the inability to build a party – and did so in the municipal space. There, along with propagandists of disorder, Republican speakers toured the municipalities to proclaim the good news that the monarchy had been overthrown and all the great things that could be expected from the republic. They came together with 'immediate demands for an increase in wages and a reduction in working hours' and were in tune with the speaker who cried out to assure them, in times of crisis, the protection of the internal labour market.[27]

In the partial municipal elections of 1903, an additional circumstance should be noted, an anecdote that illustrates the opposing logics of the national and the local, of the ideological and the daily struggle for democracy: the tin worker Ramón Hidalgo, Fusión Republicana candidate and militant socialist, was elected councillor. A few months later, he was expelled from the small local socialist group. What was inconceivable in partisan terms, due to the doctrinal provisions established, was, in practice, a reality: republicanism provided a meeting ground for the popular and working-class elements and their supporters in local life.[28]

The year 1909 was another key year in the chronology of republican democracy in Córdoba. A figure such as Eloy Vaquero[29] gives us some clues in this regard. In the same year in which the events of Barcelona's Tragic Week occurred, Vaquero was seduced by one of the populist restorers of Spanish historical republicanism: Alejandro Lerroux. Vaquero subscribed to Lerroux's newspaper, *El intransigente*, and joined his fight against Catalan nationalism. He stood behind the people, yes, but also behind the army or the Republicans of America who supported the 'boss', born in La Rambla (Córdoba), in his proposal to put 'determination, talent and virility' at the service of popular emancipation. It would be a matter not only of toppling a throne but of raising the people 'to the peak of the prosperity of glory'. That glory became an expectation after the propaganda tours and as a reality within reach following the triumph of the republican candidates in the municipal elections.[30]

Political struggles were intertwined with social confrontation. For republicans at that time, it was difficult to refer to the class struggle without putting it in quotation marks. The subjects of this struggle were farmers and day labourers. Farmers were classified as having a minimum number of animals, whereas day labourers had to subsist through their own manual labour alone. In their view, competition lay in securing the lease of a certain number of bushels in the farmsteads of the municipality. This confrontation, which from the republican point of view turned out to be fratricidal, neutralised the questioning of the social domination of *señores* – in other words, of the

ownership of extractive elites who were based in Madrid where they lived 'so richly from the income of a land' that they did not know.

In 1909, Vaquero wrote 'to the Farmers' in the name of 'a few rebels'. In the text, he used republican arguments in the classical sense of the term. Beyond negative freedom is positive freedom: 'We are slaves who apparently enjoy some freedom. For a man to be truly free, his stomach must be free from imperious subordination to another'. He then goes on to clarify that in Córdoba the majority of the population worked for others. There were also a few *riquillos*. This imprecise category referred to those who had come to amass enough wealth to emancipate themselves from low unreliable wages, but they should not be confused with great landowners. They were of the people. And yet they bickered with one another, 'and it does not occur to them how exploited and servile they both are, and that it is in their best interest to unite against the common foe'. A complex foe that subjected the people to double extractive pressure: that of great inherited land ownership and with it that of an alien State levying taxation that did not serve to guarantee education and freedom, and thereby elevate the homeland, 'but to sustain this wicked regime'.[31] The emancipatory horizon had to be a federal republic that would return the land or transform the rent into a census redeemable in instalments. In the meantime, they should work towards creating an enlightened and educated society and foster cooperativism.[32]

By that point, a whole generation of reformist and republican leaders, a fair few of whom ascribed to some lodge had constructed a narrative in which agrarian conflict merged with the fight for democracy, strikes and riots, rallies and confrontations with Catholic authorities and those attending religious processions. Beyond this narrative, associative bodies multiplied. Some were real and consistent, others more ephemeral, some were registered in the Registry of Civil Government Societies without having a life of their own. Many of these entities responded to a dream that appeared to be achieved in the municipal elections held on 12 May 1909: to create networks and promote local electoral triumphs to realise the 'hope that proletarian aspirations could be channelled and developed within a renewed republicanism' based on interconnected municipalities.[33]

Andalucismo, republican democracy and peasant unrest

In Andalusia in the first third of the twentieth century, social liberalism and the federal republican thread were reflected, albeit partially, in *Georgism* and *Andalucismo*. Both proposals brought together the planes of liberal democracy and social reform, in a republican conceptual framework.[34] This meeting showed its full potential, as well as its limitations, in the 'Manifesto to the Nation' published in the magazine *Córdoba* on 13 June 1917 and in the Regionalist Assembly held in the city in 1919.[35]

The starting point for that Córdoba *moment* was 13 November 1916. That day, Blas Infante, 'the admirable publicist' who would eventually become the

leading intellectual reference of historical *Andalucismo*, gave a lecture at the Republican Workers' Centre in Córdoba. The turnout was 'extraordinarily numerous'. Among those in attendance, workers constituted the main nucleus, but, according to the *Diario de Córdoba*, there was also 'an important representation of teachers, doctors and other intellectual elements', the synthesis that was claimed as the protagonist of democratisation and "for the dignification of our poor Spain" since the beginning of the century. In the event, the decadence of cities and their deleterious effect on Andalusia was discussed. From within a city marked by agrarian conflict, Infante proclaimed: 'Andalusia is my city'. Córdoba, both Roman and Arabic in origin, had been relegated as it had expressed the will to promote regional patriotism and work 'for the union of the Andalusian provinces'. Now it should resume its efforts. The negligence and arbitrariness of centralised power and its suspicion of democracy had forged a 'collective municipal consciousness'. To achieve this, Blas Infante argued that it was necessary to go beyond representative democracy, proposing mechanisms of participatory democracy sustained on means of "direct excitation", such as referendums for municipal projects and policies (prior information to the residents) and public discussion "in places like the public square, with turns to speak for the neighbors" of the "detailed monthly accounts of the Municipalities".[36]

The proposal called for the creation of a people available for politics based on the prior satisfaction of material subsistence needs: 'It is not circumstances of political-administrative tyranny that prevent the manifestation of that consciousness among Andalusians [which reconnects the individual to the most elementary ideals of social life]; it is the economic-social circumstances that produce this result. The Andalusian people are economically enslaved, and virtues such as civics are borne of freedom.' In order to create a people, the first task was to redeem Andalusians economically, 'impoverished of body and spirit by misery and fear of misery, which leads them enslaved to the feet of the territorial chief and the political chief'.[37] In concrete terms, this meant turning the day labourer into a farmer and neutralising the extractive elites: 'the lords of the court', plutocrats, oligarchs. And finally, recalling, in accordance with *Georgist* assumptions, Blas Infante asserted that the barbaric right of land ownership is the negation of the *right to property*, which belongs to all men in their relationship with nature.[38]

In short, the Córdoba manifesto of 1917 called for the formation of a republican political subject, the Andalusian people, which, in the exercise of positive freedom, would be oriented towards the pursuit of the common good, would assume reason as the instrument and progress as a social objective. The manifesto advocated a republican political subject that would reappropriate what had been denied over the course of a century by doctrinaire liberalism, by industrialisation and by the processes of disentailment of the land. Republican *Andalucismo*, in this context and in Córdoba, was a resource to support the possibility of social reform, from the municipality and the region, without attacking acquired rights, although placing the emphasis on elevating fraternity out of its current eclipsed state.

The proposal would be framed against a backdrop of previous experience, of Infante and early *Andalucismo*, of the concrete possibilities of preparing the subject for emancipation. Infante was speaking four years after the creation of a National Federation of Agricultural Workers in Córdoba, which had federated nuclei in municipalities such as Espejo and Castro del Río. He did so a few months after *Los Nuestros*, an anarchist magazine, was distributed among the day labourers of Córdoba by prominent anarchists Isabel Hortensia Pereira and her companion Salvador Cordón.[39] The words of Infante were eventually heard in the months that the Córdoba countryside became one of the epicentres of social revolt in the whole of Spain. The conflict held a prominent place in the Andalusian collective imagination: conflict defined as a problem affecting day labourers in a context of large agricultural estates. Anarchism, republicanism and federal democracy, all shared a cultural background that, to some extent, framed the protest. An autonomous protest in its modalities and nuances of pressure and negotiation, an itinerant protest, that places us in front of a specific modality of resource learning, that operates in the formation of a class and a people, a people-citizenship with a clear vocation to influence not only their living and working conditions, but also the politics and the social order that frame and condition them.[40] The peasant element became once more the nucleus of a larger body encompassing teachers, miners and all manner of artisans.[41] The promoters of this movement were very varied. Although one of its aspirations was land ownership against the backdrop of land concentration among a few owners, it also had a lot to do with the concrete improvement of benefits obtained in exchange for labour.

The Guadalquivir valley was a major hotspot in shaping this geography of social action. It was also during the second decade of the century the region that showed the first signs of overcoming the agricultural and livestock crisis. This was a time when the agrarian bourgeoisie 'practised a monopoly and exhaustive control over the labour markets' and deployed a series of hierarchical and coercive strategies of hiring labour in order to guarantee the profitability of its farms. A situation to which agricultural workers responded incorporating languages, symbols and cultural materials from socialism, libertarian tradition and republicanism tied in with the agrarian social struggle.[42]

What is relevant, for our purposes is that this implicit democratic learning took place against the presumed economic backwardness and all that was associated with it, in particular a revolutionary character, that was supposedly archaic and predisposed to rioting. Far from the stereotypes of subalternity and negativity, these modes of collective defence of interests revealed a rationality that combines pressure with dialogue, an orderly temporal sequence, and the overcoming the limits of localism with a capacity to connect different municipal districts. This dynamic facilitated the slow, irregular, but inexorable, construction of a single collective body.

A democratising circuit, virtuous but unstable

From the outset, in all parts, the liberalism–democracy–republicanism association faced centrifugal pressure that confined its operability. In Córdoba, framed by the social processes outlined here, a concrete human group was formed, both in political and personal terms, which sought to navigate the turbulent waters of the social and political crisis of the early twentieth century. It did so through its condition of reformist mesocracy, seeking to explore ways of overcoming the exclusion and expropriation of rights through a democratic approach. The collective had a plural composition and a few decisive common traits: having emerged in the 1880s, this group had a solid university education and a high intellectual level. They were active members of democratising groups (republican, socialist or regionalist); they had a continuous and active presence in Córdoba's social scene (from freemasonry to academies); they tried to intervene, without great success, in the crises of 1917 for a type of social capital that would enable the establishment of real democracy; they reached the zenith of visibility and political responsibility during the Second Republic and, finally, they saw their biographies cut short or severely constrained as a result of the civil war.[43]

The centrifugal pressure stemmed from the turbulent decades that spanned the new century and the transformations in the State–society relationship established during the course of World War I and the beginning of the Russian Revolution. The mobilising capacity of the State, its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness and crisis) in managing the resources necessary for victory in times of war and in terms of the successful completion of nationalisation, led a significant part of republican democracy to rethink its conception of the role of property and the market, of private and public spaces and, of course, of trade unionism. I am referring to the reconsideration of liberal heritage among a good many left-wing Republicans and the extreme defence of the latter among many other democrats, liberals and those with aristocratic leanings, who had always sided with the camp of Spanish republicanism.

Neither Infante, from Seville, nor the hotspots that spread in Córdoba around Vaquero, Azorin, Castejon or Jaén were oblivious to the readings of the period that led to a reconsideration of trade unionism and even to its incorporation into the centre of the political debate explored here. Strictly speaking, this history raises, once again, the convenience of connecting these works, in their theoretical foundations and in their methodological leanings, comparing them with the processes of conflict analysed so well by more recent historiography.[44] The successive struggles maintained during the previous 25 years between political institutions and oligarchies determined to maintain or increase their positions of power and authority, on the one hand, and those who sought to reverse that logic and fight for an emancipatory and progressive project that, for Vaquero as for other Republicans of his time, was, in substance, a struggle that began with the modern age itself and in which land

was the crux of the matter in Andalusia and Spain.[45] A liberating programme that stretched back more than a century but which in the new century acquired a very precise meaning in the face of the expropriations suffered as a result of the oligarchic response to the end-of-century crisis. Faced with the new formulas of exclusion and domination, the people were called upon to sustain a momentum in favour of social reform and to construct democracy 'for themselves'. Or, if we are seeking a formula that would incorporate both registers, the people demanded democratisation.

The re-oligarchisation initiated in 1923 left in a larval state materials and networks that, after the dictatorial parenthesis, would tie in with subsequent endeavours. In the countryside as well as in the cities, the combination of liberalism–democracy–republicanism was perceived, as it became more concrete in April 1931, as a genuine political revolution. Niceto Alcalá Zamora, a liberal from Córdoba who moved over to the republican camp, expressed it in the following terms, on 14 July of that same year, at the inaugural session of the Constituent Cortes (Parliament): 'Triumphant revolution is the last of our political revolutions that closes the cycle of the others, and the first, and, we would hope, the only social revolution that will pave the way to justice'. The expectation was that 'if we were the ones who paid the highest price for political transformation [in the preceding century], we would be the ones for whom social transformation would be the easiest'.[46] A conservative and a republican, Alcalá Zamora, was speaking in the Parliament as president of the executive branch of the Second Republic. Over the subsequent months, the vagueness, hesitations and reservations regarding the autonomy of the collective subject that responded to the voice of the people all contributed to the political defeat of that dawn of social republicanism in 1931.[47]

Notes

1 Berjoan, Higueras Castañeda, and Sánchez Collantes, 2021.
2 Duarte, 1997; Sánchez León, 2022.
3 Bertomeu and Domènech, 2005: 4.
4 Domènech, 2019.
5 For the neighbouring province of Málaga, in those two decades, the categories of people who faced repression by the authorities were as follows: 24 per cent rural workers, 20 per cent professionals (from teachers to lawyers or doctors, including military personnel), 2 per cent ranchers and 54 per cent tradespeople (Morales Muñoz, 2020).
6 Casas Sánchez, 2018.
7 Peyrou, 2023.
8 Expression used by Roque Sáenz Peña in the presentation of Law No. 8,871 to Argentine Congress.
9 In 1881, with the formation of the first liberal-constitutionalist cabinet of the Restoration, republican parties became legalised once more, and the workers' movement promoted the Workers' Federation of the Spanish Region. The liberalising package included the Associations Act in 1887, the Jury Act in 1888, the Civil Code of 1889 and the Universal Male Suffrage Act of 1890.
10 Pro, 2019.

11 Cruz, 2014.
12 Halperin Donghi, 2003.
13 Cruz Artacho, 2016: 43.
14 Sánchez Collantes and Higueras Castañeda, 2020. On internationalism, see Peña and Vadillo, 2022.
15 Acosta Ramírez, 2020: 67–68.
16 *The New York Times*, 18–05–1898: 6.
17 López Estudillo, 2001a, 2001b; Caro Cancela, 2006,
18 The testimony refers to Montalbán, in the rural south of Córdoba (Vaquero, 1987: 12–14).
19 *Diario de Córdoba*, 01–06–1882: 3, for representation.
20 *Diario de Córdoba*, 03–06–1882: 2. *Fueros* refer to historic territorial legal codes. See Piqueras, 2014 and Jutglar, 1976.
21 For the representation of Córdoba, see Arias Castañón, 2017.
22 Sánchez Collantes, 2015: 201–221, esp. 207–208; Saornil, 1883. Eduardo López y López represented Córdoba in Saragossa, in Jutglar, 1976: vol. II, 1011–1018.
23 Synchrony in Anchorena Morales, 2002.
24 Barragán Moriana, 1993. For more on outsider and native speakers, see Díaz del Moral, 1995 [1929]: 263–274.
25 Barragán Moriana, 1999.
26 Duarte, 2007.
27 In June 1902, the peasants of the town stood against farmers employing foreign workers in the harvesting of cereals crops. They formed picket lines, took control of access to the city and only days later '[t]he Guardia Civil ensured that whoever wanted to work in agricultural activities could do so' (Vaquero, 1987: 35).
28 Caro Cancela, 2006; Barragán Moriana, 2000: 105–110; García Parody, 2002: 128–129.
29 Juan Ortiz says that he was 'the son of a small landowner from Montalbán, who besides cultivating the land, ran a modest tavern of his own, equipped with a billiard table after which the establishment was named' (Ortiz Villalba, 1987: 189). Vaquero later evolved towards conservative republicanism that in 1934 would take him all the way to the Ministry of the Interior in early October 1934, coinciding with the Revolution of Asturias (Hidalgo Lerdo de Tejada, 2013).
30 Vaquero, 1987: 29. Fascination with Lerroux in Andalusia was not an isolated phenomenon. See Álvarez Rey, 2007.
31 Vaquero, 1987: 39–40.
32 López Estudillo, 2006: 75.
33 Vaquero, 1987: 44.
34 Martín Rodríguez, 2014; Arcas Cubero, 1980: 47–48.
35 García Parody, 2014: 13 ff.
36 *Andalucía, revista mensual editada por el Centro Andaluz de Sevilla*, December, 1916: 1 ff.
37 *Andalucía, revista mensual editada por el Centro Andaluz de Sevilla*, December, 1916: 5.
38 *Andalucía, revista mensual editada por el Centro Andaluz de Sevilla*, December, 1916: 7. In the constitution of the Centro Andaluz Cordobés, there was a collective composed of writers, lawyers, teachers of the Normal School, archivists of the Tax Office and secretaries of the Chamber of Agriculture.
39 Morales Muñoz, 2015.
40 The Triennium is re-evaluated in Cruz Artacho, 2018, and Acosta Ramírez, 2019.
41 Maurice, 2007; Morales Muñoz, 2015.
42 Cobo Romero and Ortega López, 2017.
43 García Parody, 2002, 22–25.

44 Barragán Moriana, 1990, 2000; Cruz Artacho, 1994.
45 Robledo, 2022.
46 *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de la República Española*, 14–07–1931: 3.
47 Cobo Romero and de Paula, 2021.

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Part III

Municipalism, rural world and democracy outside Spain

6 The projection of Spanish liberalism overseas

Pueblos de indios and citizenship in Mexico and Peru

Claudia Guarisco

This paper explores the Indigenous populations of the Valley of Mexico and Lima and the impact of Spanish liberalism on them. The impact was evident, above all, in the establishment of constitutional councils known as *ayuntamientos*, in the years 1812–1814 and 1820–1821. The process faced two central problems. First, conflict between the new local government bodies, based on the principle of legal equality, and a society divided hierarchically between Indigenous peoples, Spaniards (Peninsular and Creole) and Mestizos. Second, the novelty of the Spanish system of representation, supported by indirect voting in the second degree, clashed with strongly entrenched local political customs, such as restricting the vote to a small group of notables, Indigenous acclamations of the collective, rotations and turn-taking. It was the Indigenous population itself that developed the solutions to these problems, adapting the new formal institutions to a tradition they were not willing to forget. In neither of the two cases examined here did the institutions of participation in local government managed to impose themselves fully. However, in the Valley of Mexico, citizen laws were more successful in regulating Indigenous behaviour than in the South American continent. In New Spain, many of the customs and values of Indigenous tradition facilitated the transition while simultaneously allowing for the rooting of praxis in the past. In Peru, the changes were much smaller. In addition, insurgency and counterinsurgency deepened these divergent experiences even further.

The issue of the Indigenous population in Ibero-America and Spanish citizenship received a great deal of attention from historians throughout the early years of this century. Subsequently, although not cancelled, its popularity declined mainly due to the difficulty of locating new sources, as well as their nature. These are, for the most part, fragmentary and are found in very different branches of the archives, such as confraternities, justice and taxation. In many cases, the documents are not even catalogued, which makes reconstruction work extremely slow and laborious. Even so, the contributions made to the impact of Spanish liberalism (rooted in the Constitution of Cádiz) overseas have been important, and currently there is a general representation of the process. In this chapter, in addition to presenting the main

contributions made in this regard, I will summarise the findings that, from a comparative perspective, are broadly developed in a book I published more than a decade ago.[1]

Cádiz and political citizenship

The arrival of the first citizen institutions in Latin America took place in the midst of the events that unfolded in Mainland Spain between 1808 and 1823. During that period, the French invasion provided the necessary conditions for Spanish liberals to replace divine justifications for power with the new idea of national sovereignty. This would very soon take shape in a partly monarchical and partly republican government, which was codified in the 1812 Constitution, also known as the Constitution of Cádiz. This Charter rooted membership of the Nation in proximity with regard to the people.[2] At the same time, it endorsed the binding nature of laws, as well as the broad participation of society in matters of public interest, through representatives elected by vote and in three arenas: locally (in constitutional councils – *ayuntamientos constitucionales*), provincially (in provincial councils – *diputaciones provinciales*) and nationally (through the legislative chambers known as *Las Cortes*). It was in the bodies of local self-government, as Nettie Lee Benson (1955)[3] initially noted, that the lower echelons of the old Hispanic American societies had their first encounter with political citizenship.

The Constitution of Cádiz made *ayuntamientos* an important part of the government machinery. These were neighbourhood organisations that were charged with managing certain public services, maintaining order and exercising certain judicial and extra-judicial tasks, such as conciliation. The liberal spirit of the Constitution of Cádiz was manifested in the wide margins of decision-making power granted to local government bodies, as well as in their establishment over a socially varied population, albeit similar in the eyes of the laws that were intended to govern them. That spirit was also evident in the popular election of *alcaldes* (mayors), *regidores* (councillors) and *síndicos* (administrators), albeit it through an indirect system of voting in the second degree.

This indirect system in the second degree meant that the population would vote for electors, who then had to decide who would hold municipal office. This mediation meant that, in the first stage, voters were watched by secretaries and returning officers in charge of receiving and counting the ballots. This not only minimised dissent but also left the way open for important decisions to be left in the hands of the local elite. In those years, the democratic ideal was not yet on the horizon of politics. What was sought then was to restrict royal power through institutions that regulated a greater and more effective participation of society. And that was fully compatible with an electoral system that inhibited complete voting freedom and, at the same time, encouraged the reproduction of social hierarchies in local government bodies. According to the new laws, constitutional *ayuntamientos* had to be established in

populations with no fewer than 200 residents or heads of households. There was, however, no upper limit. In addition, smaller municipalities had to have one *alcalde* and two *regidores*, and the larger ones had a maximum of two *alcaldes* and twelve *regidores*. The number of electors ranged from 9 to 25.[4]

The municipal laws established in Cádiz were operational between 1812 and 1814, when Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne, which had previously been in the hands of the French. In 1820, the monarch was forced by Spanish liberals to put them into operation once more. In Spanish America, they remained partially in force until the former imperial possessions gained their Independence. Their establishment was an important challenge for the Indigenous population. The aim was for the Indigenous peoples to leave behind their 300-year-old *cabildos* and join with Spaniards and Mestizos in the new local government bodies. What the sources show is that the Indigenous peoples of New Spain enthusiastically adopted and adapted the new rules of local political participation. However, the Indigenous populations of Peru decided not to do so. Tradition partly explains these behavioural differences. The presence of customs and values rooted in something similar to the new institutions was a central element in the experience of New Spain and its absence in Lima. In other words, Indigenous populations in Mexico had all the elements to understand the new institutions and adopt them creatively. In contrast, nothing in the cultural background of Indigenous Peruvians helped them to give a similar response to the challenge of political change.

The experience of the Valley of Mexico

Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, Indigenous populations in the Valley of Mexico lived in parishes, each composed of several villages or *pueblos*. A *pueblo* consisted of a larger nucleus (*cabecera*), which was surrounded by smaller units called *sujetos*. One of the *cabeceras* was, at the same time, head of the parish, known as the *cabecera parroquial*. *Cabeceras parroquiales* were small political, economic and religious centres, interconnected by paths. They were also linked to Mexico City by land and through a complex canal system. The church and the local authorities were located there. Furthermore, although royal laws had prohibited the practice from the sixteenth century onwards, Spaniards and Mestizos who worked in commerce and trades also lived in these *cabeceras parroquiales*. A given number of parishes constituted a *partido* or district, under the royal authority of the *subdelegado* (local administrator). Several *partidos* made up an *Intendencia*, governed by an *intendente*.[5]

On the other hand, each *pueblo de indios* or Indigenous settlement had its own *cabildo* or *república*, which was the smallest unit of colonial government. Indigenous *cabildos* were totally different organisations from the *cacicazgos* or chiefdoms. In the Valley of Mexico in the late eighteenth century, *caciques* were not important political actors, unlike the authorities of the *república*. Representation was corporative and territorial. The authorities

consisted of a *gobernador* (governor) in charge of the *pueblo* and as many *alcaldes* (mayors) as required. If the *pueblo* was composed of five *sujetos*, in addition to the *cabecera*, there were six *alcaldes*. Officials were appointed in electoral processes without general participation. The only ones who enjoyed the right to vote were the *principales*. This group was composed of past *gobernadores*, *alcaldes*, a few *caciques* and elders, who voted annually for the representatives of the *pueblo*, considering two things. First, they must have contributed to the management of the *cofradías* (confraternities). Second, they must be generous, sharing their wealth with the poor Indigenous peoples of the parishes and funding religious worship. In addition, the votes of the *principales* must be agreed by the *Indios del Común* (the lowest echelon of colonial society), manifested through the acclamation that they made of the new authorities.[6]

The roles performed by *cabildo* officials included the administration of justice in small matters and the organisation of some public works, such as the repair of the church, for example. They also had to collect the food and wood that Indigenous peoples were required to give to royal troops as they passed through their villages. An additional task was the raising of Royal Taxes. However, while carrying out their tasks for the benefit of the monarchy, Indigenous *gobernadores* and *alcaldes* led a silent but firm defence of the peoples' lands.

From the sixteenth century onwards, Indigenous peoples had received certain quantities of land from the Crown. There were two types of lands: community and distribution. Community lands were rented to outsiders or worked collectively. When necessary, the money obtained was used to pay the taxes that the Indigenous peoples owed to the king. They were also used to feed the Indigenous people who repaired the parish buildings, as part of the public services they were required to provide. Finally, the money obtained from community lands was also used to pay the local teacher. Distribution lands, on the other hand, were received by each Indigenous man in order to feed his family.

Until the end of the eighteenth century, the administration of community lands was partly left to the Indigenous peoples themselves to manage. From 1790 onwards, the Bourbon monarchs tried to strip them of that control. However, the attempt was not entirely successful because *gobernadores* and *alcaldes* managed to keep certain portions of land out of sight of royal officials. It is not known exactly how much land this might have been. There is only evidence of the fact, and that the Indigenous representatives led the resistance, not through violent means, but through peaceful means, such as the *Spiritualisation of Community Goods*. This custom consisted of arbitrarily assigning lands, animals and even community plots to the confraternities and, consequently, removing them from civil jurisdiction, dedicating what they produced to religious feasts, as well as to fixing, repairing and even building temples. The phenomenon also led to a change in the name of goods, from belonging to the community, to belonging to

the 'confraternities', 'lands of the saints or church', 'goods of saints', 'confraternities' or 'pious work' or 'devotion', indistinctly. According to Indigenous law, control of confraternity lands was a task pertaining to the Church. In practice, however, that control was very weak, because most of the confraternities were spontaneous associations, established independently of the religious authorities. The main objective was to fund worship and the celebrations of saints. And that was something that the local clergy could not go against, if their goal was to avoid conflict and maintain the legitimacy of their authority.[7]

Finally, another important task performed by *gobernadores* and *alcaldes* was to represent Indigenous peoples on merchant councils. Throughout the eighteenth century, Indigenous officials developed the custom of participating alongside Mestizos and Spaniards in these assemblies. They were held in the *cabecera parroquial* or parish capital and were linked to *tianguis* or Indigenous markets. Whenever *tianguis* took place, small merchants of all classes and castes had to pay a tax to the *subdelegado* (local royal administrator), the so-called ground right, in exchange for permission to set up stalls, baskets and awnings where fruits, grains and some manufactured items were sold in the local square. It is not clear how this tax was collected by the *subdelegado* or its legal ground. What is clear from the sources is that sometimes the merchants did not agree with the amounts of money the royal administrator demanded. Consequently, the Indigenous peoples, through their *gobernadores* and *alcaldes*, as well as Mestizos and Spaniards, joined in the councils to negotiate with the royal authority what they considered the right amount for ground rights.[8]

The arrival of citizen institutions in 1812 marked the end of local political organisation. As citizens, Indigenous and non-Indigenous neighbours had to band together in a single constitutional *ayuntamiento* or town council. However, the reality was more complex. About a hundred *ayuntamientos* were established over the Indigenous parishes of the Valley, while the old *cabildos* remained. Electoral processes were carried out in a calm and orderly fashion. Mestizos and Spaniards obtained the positions of *alcalde*, while the old Indigenous *gobernadores* became *regidores*. When the laws left no room for all the *gobernadores* of the parish to become *regidores*, the number of *regidor* positions available was multiplied. This distribution of authority was the result of a deal. Spaniards and Mestizos desired the highest positions in local politics for themselves. Until then, they had not had the opportunity to be part of the government formally. Spanish *cabildos* had been only available to high-ranking Spaniards, and the Indigenous *cabildos* were only for the members of this class. On the other hand, the Indigenous peoples wanted to retain control of their lands and saw their old *cabildos* and authorities as essential elements for that purpose. At the same time, they wanted to be part of the new order. In order to achieve their goals, the native population of the Valley gave their votes to the Mestizo and Spanish residents so that they could occupy the positions of *alcaldes* and *síndicos* (local administrator). In

return, the latter pledged to respect the old Indigenous political organisation. The deal also meant that the old Indigenous *gobernadores* were elected *regidores* of their respective villages.[9]

Unlike probably the rest of New Spain, the process of municipalisation among the Indigenous peoples of the Valley did not follow solely ethnic considerations. Moreover, the institutional hybridisation implemented was less instrumental than historians have generally argued.[10] There was, on the contrary, loyalty to the new laws, parallel to their old community identities. For that reason, they appropriated and adapted the rules of the constitutional *ayuntamiento* to their traditions. Hence, also, they undertook the complex negotiations around the formation of administrative management, alongside Mestizos and Spaniards, as well as their willingness to contribute to the maintenance of the government. Much of that loyalty to the political organisation was embedded in old cultural values that endorsed participation in local matters of public interest, alongside other social groups.

The appropriation and adaptation of new municipal laws by the Indigenous inhabitants of the Valley was possible as they knew how to vote and relied on natural representation.[11] Furthermore, they were used to participating in decision-making processes with members of the Spanish ruling class and the caste system. The only element for which they had no references was the proportional character (a certain number of souls in relation to the posts) of the new laws of representation. And what they did was put aside that aspect of the constitutional monarchy and implement their old territorial and corporative forms in their place. In the municipalities formed in the Indigenous settlements of El Partido of San Juan Teotihuacán, for example, the number of offices decreed by the Charter did not coincide with the number of neighbourhoods and districts they spanned. So, the Indigenous inhabitants fought to multiply the number of *alcaldes*, *regidores* and *síndicos*, so that each component of the village would have its representatives. Thus, according to the *subdelegado*, and although the size of the neighbourhood did not require it, the Indigenous inhabitants had insisted on having between two and three *síndicos*,

> because to one village, in order to form an *ayuntamiento*, another and two others had been added, [and] because they did not agree that a single *síndico* should attend to all those from outside their village, and to avoid discord, each village appointed its representative.

The *subdelegado* added that it was impossible to organise them according to the law, 'because these peoples and villages did not serve the commandment to love thy neighbour'.[12]

In the case of Peru, it was the absence of practices and customs of joint participation and voting that hampered the appropriation of new citizen institutions in the creative way developed in the Valley.

The experience of Lima

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Indigenous inhabitants of the *Intendencia* of Lima also lived in villages that were part of *parroquias* (parishes). However, each parish had only one Indigenous *cabildo*, and not several, as was the case in New Spain. Moreover, the system for selecting representatives was not based on voting, but on turn-taking.[13] That meant that every year an adult man from each of the villages in the parish was required to hold the post of *alcalde* or *regidor*. As in New Spain, the *cacicazgos* or chiefdoms in Lima were separate organisations from Indian *cabildos*. The difference is that in Peru, *caciques* still maintained some of the vigour they had had in the past, because they had managed to remain in charge of collecting royal taxes and demonstrated their efficiency in that task.

Similar to the situation in Mexico, the Indigenous inhabitants of Lima did not live alone in their parishes, but with a few Mestizos and Spaniards who had settled in the administrative capital (*cabecera*) of the parish. These were small traders and artisans who, despite their proximity to the Indigenous residents, did not develop a common culture of participation in local public affairs with them. Consequently, when the new citizen institutions made their appearance, the Indigenous peoples of Lima decided to stay on the sidelines, changing the name of their *cabildos* to *ayuntamientos constitucionales*. Mestizos and Spaniards, on the other hand, established their own municipalities, according to the new laws.[14] At a higher level, the provincial council (*diputación*), theoretically in charge of local government bodies, was never established in Lima, while the old *subdelegados* lost virtually all their authority. This weakening of the colonial government was soon recognised by the Indigenous peoples, who embarked almost immediately on a process of territorial expansion. For example, they began to distribute the king's lands that were available in the parishes and to freely administer the community and confraternity lands.[15]

The Indigenous inhabitants of Lima did not adopt or adapt the first citizen institutions because the political tradition they had developed over previous years left no room for them. They had no elections. Moreover, and most importantly, they did not have institutions linking them to other social components. Joining with Mestizos and Spaniards in the *ayuntamiento*, voting for common representatives and taking decisions together must have seemed impossible to them.

Tradition and social interaction

Traditions are created and sustained by social contexts. If the institutions that promote political cooperation among the different social groups were absent in Lima, this was because the social fabric of which they were part lacked ties to unite them. In the Valley of Mexico, the opposite was true. Commerce was the social force responsible for uniting the residents of the parishes throughout the eighteenth century.

The Indigenous inhabitants of the Valley lived off the lands granted to them by the Crown, although not under a regime of autarchy. Part of their crops were used to feed their family. Another part was reserved for exchange, for example, a few chickens, pigs, turkeys and fish. They also sold pulque, salt, wood, stone and some manufactured goods. They used to take all this to the markets of Mexico City, reaching them on foot, by donkey or using the canals that linked the countryside with the capital of the Viceroyalty. More importantly, residents of the parishes participated in bustling markets known as *tianguis*, held in the parish administrative capitals. It was this ancient institution that gave them the opportunity to develop sustained interaction with Mestizos and Spaniards. Such interactions gave rise to a sense of local community, which allowed them to build institutions such as boards of trade. Without these periodic and vigorous interactions, Indigenous political culture would have remained closed.

The commercial experience of the Indigenous residents of Lima was very different. Instead of *tianguis* they had *tambos*. *Tambos* were tents located in the parish administrative capitals, where not only the natives but also the passengers and members of the royalist army could get products such as bread, cheese, meat, wine and spirits. They were usually built on community land. Those who ran the *tambos* were known as *tamberos*, and trade took place by means of auctions. The *tambero* was obliged to pay a kind of rent, distributed as follows: certain amounts were given to the local priest, for worship. Another portion went to the *subdelegado*, who used it to help the Indigenous peoples with the payment of royal taxes. The rest was sent to the *Caja General de Censos*, which was the central office in charge of administering Indigenous finances. According to the law, there should only be one *tambo* in every parish and no one, except the *tambero*, had the right to have an oven to bake bread or bring it from the city. Anyone who broke this law could lose their goods.

All Indigenous inhabitants, Mestizos, Spaniards and even freed Pardos (triracial, descended from black slaves, Indigenous and white ancestry) could participate in the auctions held at the *tambos*. The only requirement was that they had the economic capacity to stock them sufficiently. According to the laws, Indigenous inhabitants should take preference in such auctions. If there were two or more Indigenous candidates, then the one who lived in the parish should take preference. If there were two Indigenous candidates living in the parish, the one who was born there had a greater chance of becoming the next *tambero*. The *subdelegado* was ultimately in charge of the auctions. However, when the results were not satisfactory for any of the parties, they could submit their complaints to the *Superior Gobierno*, whose authorities would investigate the situation and, if necessary, arrange a new auction. Although the Indigenous inhabitants had the greater right to manage the *tambos* over the Mestizos, Pardos and Spaniards, *tamberos* usually came from non-Indigenous groups, sometimes legitimately in the eyes of the native population and sometimes illegitimately. When this was the case, illegal commerce was established, known as *recauderías*.[16]

In short, in Lima, local commerce was far from favourable to the emergence of political customs common to Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. Instead, it blocked them. And it was the absence of a tradition of cooperation in the interaction with power that largely veiled the appropriation of Spanish citizen institutions. But that was not all. The wars of independence (1820–1824) exacerbated this tendency in local governments. In the Valley of Mexico, in contrast, the counter-insurgency struggle strengthened the hybridisation between past and present.

War

As Christon Archer has established, the insurgency in New Spain constituted an agrarian social movement, which became political.[17] In addition, far from being deactivated in 1816, it moved from El Bajío to the current states of Guerrero and Veracruz, where it continued to operate until approximately 1821. That year, Agustín de Iturbide brought together realists, insurgents, traders, businessmen and members of the main constitutional *ayuntamientos* in a coalition, and announced the independence of the former Viceroyalty. That decision was reached after the Spanish members of parliament rejected the proposal on equal representation of the Americans.

Later, a constitutional Monarchy, with Iturbide as its chief executive, was established. However, when he tried to impose direct taxes and forced loans among the population of the Mexican Empire, he began to lose popularity. Those negative feelings grew when Congress was closed. Soon after, army officers, supported by regional elites from provincial councils, reinstated the Congress elected in 1822 and created a legislative assembly called the *Junta Nacional Instituyente* to call elections. In the meantime, Iturbide was forced to resign. On 7 November 1823, a General Congress was installed, and its members prepared the Constitution of 1824, through which Mexico emerged as an independent, representative and federal republic.

During all of these events, the Indigenous peoples living in the Valley of Mexico were probably not loyal to the king, the nation or Iturbide but to the local political order established as a result of interactions between power and custom over nearly three centuries. The offensive coming from El Bajío prompted them to implement their recently acquired citizen obligations. It was the fear of insurgent attacks that led them to unite with Mestizos and Spaniards on constitutional *ayuntamientos* and organise counter-insurgency under the leadership of the royal bureaucrats of the districts (*partidos*) or *subdelegados*. For a long time, the Bourbon rulers had been trying to create militias but without success. It was under the pressure of war that this goal was achieved. As the regular army was not enough to stop the insurgency, Viceroy Venegas ordered the participation of Spaniards, Mestizos and Indigenous inhabitants in the defence of the Viceroyalty. Most of the time, civic militias defended only the parishes, but in some cases, they were recruited

by the *subdelegados* to support the royalist army distributed throughout the *Intendencia* of Mexico.

The militias were hierarchical defensive organisations led by wealthy Spaniards. The troops were composed of Mestizos, Spaniards and Indigenous inhabitants. They also had administrative bodies called *juntas de guerra*. In these assemblies, the population of the parish participated, regardless of their social origins. The objective was to reach agreements on the nature of the contributions that, as citizens, they had to provide. That is, whether they would provide money or serve in the militias, and in what proportions. After making their decisions, treasurers were elected and letters were sent to Mexico City, requesting veteran members of the Royal Army to train the men who would be in charge of defending the villages.[18]

In the Viceroyalty of Peru, the story was very different. Between 1820 and 1824, the old *Intendencia* of Lima was taken by the armies of Martín and, later, Bolívar. In 1820, when Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela established the Constitution of Cádiz for the second time, San Martín and his army arrived. Unlike Bolívar, San Martín was in charge of organising the territory of what would be the new Republic of Peru and spreading the independence project. It was Bolívar who, a couple of years later, would win the decisive battles against royal power. San Martín combined the institutions of the constitutional monarchy with the older ones of the *Intendencia* and local customs. He thought that in this way he could achieve two goals. First, minimise sources of conflict among the population under their authority. And, second, ensure the steady flow of resources from the parish to the liberating army. The measure was successful while there was a military force preventing the advance of royal troops and eroding the legitimacy of the Monarchy among the residents. This was achieved through the demonstration of the liberating army's might and powerful anti-Hispanic discourse.

San Martín divided the coastal section of the *Intendencia* into two administrative areas: Lima and the Coast and installed a *presidente* as the highest authority in each of them. In the Mountains, he decided to maintain the old territorial divisions and placed *gobernadores* in the districts of Yauyos, Huarochirí and Canta. The *presidentes* of the Coast and the *gobernadores* of the Mountains assumed the functions of the old *intendentes*. To perform their duties, they had the help of mid-ranking officers who were also called *gobernadores*. The obligations of these 'little' *gobernadores* were the same as those of the *subdelegados*, but their power extended only to the parish and not to the whole *partido* or district.

Among the Indigenous population, the 'little' *gobernadores* were old *caciques* who saw in the independence struggles a good opportunity to regain the strength they had lost under the constitutional monarchy. There were also some constraints on the basis of their loyalties. For example, in 1821, the *presidente* of the Coast, Don Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente, threatened the 'little' *gobernador* of Chilca (Cañete), Cacique Don Juan Nepomuceno Manco, in the following terms: '[Y]ou are responsible with your person,

position and wealth, if you do not provide me in four days, as I have ordered, with a hundred men capable of fighting for the homeland, as well as twenty mules'.[19]

The most important task of the *cacique-gobernadores* of Independence was to raise contributions among the Indigenous population. They also had to form and lead the Indigenous militias, called *montoneras*. To accomplish their task, they had the help of Indigenous *alcaldes*. Between 1820 and 1824, the Indigenous *cabildo* maintained its old structure and functions, adding to these the recruitment of soldiers for the war. This was a completely new task. In the past, the Indigenous population had been exempted from military obligations. The *montonera* militias of Yauyos and Huarochiri were very famous at that time. They were commanded by *cacique-gobernadores* like Don Ignacio Ninavilca, who were under the authority of the governors of those districts. In Yauyos, for example, Governor Tadeo Téllez selected his subordinate governors from the Indigenous nobility, gave them weapons and went with them to the Indigenous settlements to talk about the Independence project. When he deemed it appropriate, Téllez also gave weapons to the Indigenous inhabitants of the villages. In addition, he made the local clergy his ally, tasking them with spreading the ideas of Independence among their parishioners. The clergy were generally in favour of the separatist project. This was partly due to the Purification process that began as soon as San Martín arrived in Lima. This process consisted of bringing rural parish priests to the City of Lima in order to indoctrinate them into the new political creed.[20]

Although well regarded, the *montoneras* were not stable organisations. They rested on the personal interests of the *caciques* and on the alliances they could establish with the Indigenous *alcaldes*. They were not seen as members of a respected Indigenous nobility, but as powerful men; armed and supported by the liberating army. On the other hand, the link between *cacique-gobernadores* and higher authorities had the same problem. The governors in charge of the districts of Yauyos and Huarochirí – Tadeo Téllez and Marcelino Carreño – had to face the constant insubordination of their *caciques*, who coveted their positions.[21] On the other hand, San Martín promoted the creation of municipalities among Mestizos, freed Pardos and Spaniards, with their own governors in charge. The institutions that structured these municipalities were inspired by the laws on the *ayuntamientos* of the constitutional monarchy.[22]

Conclusion

In short, the Indigenous populations of the American continent faced the challenge of political change sparked by the crisis of the Spanish monarchy in different ways. The particular path followed in each case was, to some extent, determined by the 'living' past of their individual cultures. That is, tradition. In Mexico, the Indigenous inhabitants showed greater willingness to cooperate with Mestizos and Spaniards in the establishment of *ayuntamientos*. And

they did indeed collaborate, as they possessed a collective memory full of customs and values that showed compatibility with the new forms of local political participation. Such cooperation was also possible as the new rules of the game were able to adapt to old traditions and interests. Appropriation and adaptation offered appropriate mechanisms to safeguard community lands and a lifestyle built on them over centuries, albeit at the price of abolishing the principle of legal equality. In the case of Peru, in contrast, the Indigenous culture did not possess any such 'mirror' in which the new institutions could be reflected in some way.

Local commerce is at the heart of the different traditions analysed here. Widespread continuous commercial interactions allowed the Indigenous inhabitants of the Valley to find an opportunity to create a common cultural political space. Local trade was part of Mesoamerican civilisation. It existed before the arrival of the Spaniards and, after the conquest, it adapted to the new context of the Viceroyalty. It was in the purchase and sale of oranges and baskets that the Indigenous population became familiar with other social groups. And it was this familiarity that led them to build common institutions that would facilitate the appropriation of Spanish citizenship. Counter-insurgency in the Valley of Mexico added depth and strength to that process. In contrast, Indigenous inhabitants in the *Intendencia* of Lima did not have the opportunity to build a dense and fluid network of relations with Mestizos, Pardos and Spaniards. Moreover, royal institutions, with their small monopolistic trades, did not contribute to that end. The exchange of goods carried out in the *Tambos*, instead of having the power to unite the parishioners, separated them. Without interactions, it was difficult for any sense of community or common institutions to emerge. The struggles for independence increased the political distance between Indigenous and non-Indigenous.

The theses we present here cannot, however, be generalised to the Viceroyalty of Peru and New Spain. Within both territories of the Monarchy, there were different experiences. Studies such as those of Karen Caplan have shown, for example, that in Oaxaca, the transition from *cabildo* to *ayuntamiento constitucional* was resolved in a similar way to the Valley of Mexico. The difference was that the old *repúblicas* were not 'merged' in the *cabildos* through *regidores* but co-existed in parallel. In addition, they continued to maintain their old autonomies as far as elections are concerned. Royal authorities, as well as the Mestizos and Spaniards in the region, did not see the need to try to take things in another direction. The legitimacy of the royal authorities depended on the recognition of those freedoms. In addition, the main products of the region – cochineal and cotton – were the result of work carried out within *pueblos de indios* settlements and provided most of the income of the non-Indigenous population, through exportation. In Yucatán, in contrast, the Indigenous population refused to establish constitutional councils together with the Spanish and Mestizos residing in the province. The relationship between them was one of conflict, as the two latter groups fought to expand their farms at the expense of Indigenous labour and lands.[23]

The presence of insurgent armies in some areas of New Spain, between 1812 and 1814, gave rise to another municipal variant. In Tierra Caliente, Veracruz, for example, the insurgent leaders decided to keep the Indigenous population organised around their old *repúblicas*. At the same time, they promoted the creation of similar organisations among the Mestizo population. Although the elections for the Insurgent Congress of Chilpancingo took place under a regime similar to that of Cádiz, the Constitution of 1812 had no impact on the formation of local government bodies.[24] After the reconquest of the territory in 1813, at the hands of the royalist army, some constitutional *ayuntamientos* were created, informed theoretically by Spanish institutions. In practice, however, they did not respond to them, but rather *alcaldes* and *regidores* were subject to military authority, their main function being to supply food to royalist troops.[25]

Regarding the Viceroyalty of Peru, Gabriella Chiaramonti and Victor Peralta have documented a favourable trend towards the adoption of the Spanish electoral system set out in the Cádiz Constitution, in urban and/or Mestizo areas.[26] In more Indigenous areas, however, the establishment of *ayuntamientos* faced serious problems. In some cases, the Indigenous inhabitants were reluctant to join with members of other classes and castes in a single local governing body. In other cases, it was the Spaniards who opposed it.[27] Situations such as these have led Nuria Sala i Vila, Henri Favre and Danielle Demelas to affirm that the local government bodies defined by the Cádiz Constitution served, in general, for Spaniards and Mestizos to exercise their dominion over the Indigenous population.[28]

The picture of the impact of these Spanish institutions of local government, therefore, is fragmentary and varied. The experiences of Lima and the Valley of Mexico are impossible to generalise with one another or within each Viceroyalty. At most, some correlations could be established. First, insurgent movements inhibited the encounter between the Indigenous population and Spanish political citizenship. Second, the existence of local economies that articulated the different classes and castes in the same productive and/or commercial processes spontaneously promoted interaction between the Indigenous population and Spanish citizens. Third, the customs and values shared between Indigenous and non-Indigenous, built over nearly three centuries, favoured the establishment of new institutions of participation. These, however, coexisted simultaneously with tradition, so the Constitution of 1812 can hardly be seen as a clear breaking point in the histories of Mexico and Peru.

Notes

1 Guarisco, 2014.
2 Art. 5. 1, Ch. II: About the Spaniards, Tit. I: About the Spanish Nation and Spaniards (Díaz Rico, 2016: 31).
3 Benson, 1955.

4 *Decreto del veintitrés de mayo de 1812, inserto en el bando emitido en México el catorce de junio de 1820.* Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), México, Ayuntamientos vs. 163 and 168.

5 Tanck de Estrada, 1999, 2005; Gibson, 1967; Guarisco, 2014.

6 Carrasco, 1961, 1975; Gibson, 1967.

7 Guarisco, 2011: 117–119.

8 Guarisco, 2011: 135–138.

9 Guarisco, 2011: 277–285.

10 According to Antonio Annino, for example, when the Constitution of Cádiz suppressed the Indigenous *repúblicas*, the inhabitants of the villages felt unprotected. In order to guarantee their communal integrity in the face of the legal equality proclaimed by liberalism, they then proceeded to appropriate municipal institutions. Annino calls this a 'territorial revolution'. Through this process, Indigenous peoples would have managed to conquer a form of full self-government and complete control over the material resources of their territories (Annino, 1995, 1999, 2003).

11 With this term, Bernard Manin refers to aristocratic and oligarchic formulas of the Old Order, present at the dawn of modern representation (Manin, 2019).

12 *Expediente sobre la formación del ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan Teotihuacán, 1813.* AGN, México, Ayuntamientos, vol. 141, exp. 4.

13 Guarisco, 2011: 91–93.

14 Guarisco, 2011: 167–171, 270–276.

15 Guarisco, 2011: 167–168.

16 Guarisco, 2011: 146–158.

17 Archer, 2003, 2000, 1994.

18 Archer, 2003: 141–145.

19 *Corte Superior de Justicia. Cuaderno Primero Corriente de los seguidos por varios vecinos del pueblo de Chilca, sobre la separación del gobernador Don Juan Nepomuceno Manco por haber franqueado varias veces al ejército enemigo. Ica, octubre 29 de 1824.* Archivo de la Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, D5872, ff. 3–4v.

20 Guarisco, n.d.

21 Guarisco, n.d.

22 Guarisco, n.d.

23 Caplan, 2003.

24 Ducey, 2007.

25 Ducey, 2007.

26 Peralta, 2005; Chiaramonti, 2002.

27 Peralta, 2005; Favre, 1983.

28 Sala i Vila, 1992; Favre, 1983; Demélas, 2003.

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7 Modernisation and democratisation in Mediterranean countries

Luigi Musella

Preface

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, converging trends in seven areas of the world provided the idea that the political landscape of the world was changing: (1) the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s; (2) the replacement of military dictatorships with elected civilian governments throughout Latin America from the late 1970s to the late 1980s; (3) the decline of authoritarian governments in parts of the East and Southern Asia from the mid-1980s; (4) the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s; (5) the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991; (6) the decline of single-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s and (7) a weak but discernible trend towards liberalisation in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s.

The causes, forms and rhythms of these different trends varied widely. But they shared one dominant feature: the simultaneous movement from dictatorial rule to a more liberal and often more democratic government. Although they differed in many ways, these trends influenced and, to a certain extent, built on each other. As a result, they were seen by many observers, especially in the West, as parts of a larger whole, a global democratic trend, which, thanks to Samuel Huntington, became widely known as the 'third wave' of democracy.[1] These events, in fact, led to a new analytical framework, a model of democratic transition, derived mainly from the interpretation of the changes taking place. To some extent, they also linked with the early academic work on 'transitology', especially with the studies of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter.[2] As the third wave spread, democracy promoters conceived this model as a universal paradigm for understanding processes of democratisation. It became omnipresent in US political circles as a way of talking about, thinking about and designing interventions in processes of political change around the world. This has remained remarkably constant, despite many variations in those models of political change and a stream of increasingly diverse academic views on the course and nature of democratic transitions.[3]

The paradigm of such transition has been somewhat useful during a period of momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world. But it is increasingly evident that the reality no longer conforms to this model. Many countries, which policymakers and aid workers continue to call 'transitional', are not in transition to democracy and are not following the model of the democratic transitions underway. Sticking to the paradigm beyond its usefulness can, therefore, be misleading. But, above all, it can be misleading to believe that democracy can be the inevitable end point for all countries, despite the personal, ethical and political attitudes that would wish for it. After all, democracy, although widespread, represents an ideal type and not a real and concrete system of government. There are many contradictions in many countries, even in those considered to be the highest expression of democracy, and they end up representing a wake-up call for the scholar, whose task is to explain the continued presence of non-democratic models, resistance and archaism in democratic systems themselves.

At this point, a reflection on 'democracy' becomes essential. Democracy has increasingly come to mean a method or set of procedural rules for the constitution of government and the formation of political decisions. Democracy is compatible with different doctrines but entails specific values. Primarily, it highlights the main rules of the game: the highest political body must be composed of elected members, other institutions must be composed of elected members, voters must be all adult citizens, who enjoy a vote whose value is equal for all. Voters are free to vote who they want, the majority vote counts, minority rights must be guaranteed and the government must enjoy the confidence of parliament. For all these rules, one must always take into account the possible discrepancy between the utterance and the way they are applied. Certainly, no historical regime has ever fully observed all these rules and, for this reason, it is legitimate to speak of more or less democratic regimes.

> It is not possible to establish how many of these rules must be observed for a regime to be defined as democratic; it can only be said that a regime that observes none of them is certainly not a democratic one, at least as long as the procedural meaning of democracy is held to be true.[4]

In fact, according to Carothers,[5] if one then assesses the real progress towards democracy, of the almost 100 countries considered to be 'in transition' in recent years, only a relatively small number, probably less than 20, are clearly on the road to a successful and well-functioning democracy, or at least have made some democratic progress. There are a few in Central Europe and the Baltic region: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia and in South America and East Asia, notably Chile, Uruguay and Taiwan. Those that have made somewhat less progress but seem to be advancing include Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Brazil, Ghana, the Philippines and South Korea. Most third-wave countries did not achieve the results of a democracy. In a small number of countries, the initial political awakenings have clearly failed and authoritarian regimes have consolidated,

as in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Togo. Most of the 'transition countries', however, can neither be considered dictatorial nor oriented towards democracy. They are in a political grey area. They have some features of democratic political life, including at least limited political space for the opposition, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from a serious democratic deficit, often including poor representation of citizens' interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuses by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low level of public trust in state institutions and persistently poor institutional performance of the state. Corruption, then, seems to be dominant. In some cases, there is criminality that conditions and directs political choice.

Analyses of the ways in which democracy is established are obviously not easy to identify. And the category of democracy itself does not seem to be able to serve as an analytical paradigm, except to restate in research what is already known through the values of democracy. Nor can a useful paradigm use democracy as a reference and yardstick. The transformations of political history are embodied in the civilisation, culture and way of feeling of the countries, regions and territories being studied. I follow here the example of Bernard Crick, who has surprisingly written:

> It is often thought that for this 'master science' [i.e. democratic politics] to function, there must already be in existence some shared idea of a 'common good,' some 'consensus' or consensus juris. But this common good is itself the process of practical reconciliation of the interests of the various . . . aggregates, or groups which compose a state; it is not some external and intangible spiritual adhesive. . . . Diverse groups hold together, firstly, because they have a common interest in sheer survival, and, secondly, because they practise politics-not because they agree about 'fundamentals,' or some such concept too vague, too personal, or too divine ever to do the job of politics for it. The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself.[6]

That is to say, according to the suggestions that we receive from political anthropology and from the many studies on non-European and non-North American countries, an institutional and participatory process cannot be taken for granted and a development model cannot be transferred from one country to another. The formation of certain state and democratic institutions does not always lead to the disappearance of traditional political forms and is not mechanically accompanied by an economic and social transformation. Nor does it necessarily follow that a certain political-institutional level corresponds to a defined articulation of elites and/or a defined articulation between classes and social groups. Finally, the formation of a democracy as well as that of a state is by no means an irreversible process; indeed, history has shown us that previously[7] experienced institutions can always regress.

An element that often seems to prevail in the literature on politics and the many forms that link it to civil society, such as parties, patronage, notables, the organisation of consensus, participation and public opinion, is that everything must be assessed taking into account a very specific standard. This standard links to two Weberian ideal types: traditional-patrimonial power and rational-legal power.[8] This not only underestimates the relationship with the state, but, above all, the possibility that realities may exist, in which forms of power involving rational institutions coexist with informal and particularistic political behaviour.[9] Many researches developed on even very different contexts and chronologies, which include countries in Latin America, the Middle East, Mediterranean Europe, Western Europe, Africa, and some areas of Asia,[10] have shown that not only is this co-presence prevalent but that, above all, empirical cases tend to suggest more elastic categories involving less linear processes. One could speak for many countries of a 'patrimonialisation' of the state, such as to determine 'a kind of hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy'.[11] And this would also apply to more recent years, for which the category of 'neo-patrimonialism' becomes useful,

> a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, while exercising those powers . . . as a form . . . of private property.[12]

In short, for many countries, these are 'hybrid' state forms, in which customs and patrimonialist forms coexist and mix with rational-legal institutions.[13]

This is also the context of Mediterranean areas.[14] Tradition has shown a great capacity to adapt to the new forms of power and, above all, it has shown that 'movement' and 'transformations' can be generated and forge modern institutions. The notable, the *cacique*, the patron, the client and the like, and the clientelistic, clan and family relations, are always alive or reappear in new forms. Hence, while re-proposing models that have long been counted among the 'backward' ones, it is important to analyse actors and institutions that seem to resemble them. In fact, 'traditional' or 'pre-democratic' actors and behaviours adapt to different political and historical moments and adhere to different social and environmental circumstances. And even when they do not reappear in past forms, they take up the substance with which they shape 'modernity'. It is no coincidence, then, that in the new elites of political parties that emerged in the early years of the twentieth century, it is always the largely archaic behaviour that defines their prevailing characteristics. The figure of the notable, the *cacique*, the patron and so on, like informal politics, in order to be fully understood, must, then, be grasped in that cement of social and ethical-political order that completely eludes a linear and progressive vision of the history of politics. Indeed, only in it is it possible to recognise and grasp the reasons for permanence. To this end, it becomes crucial to overcome those

negative aspects associated with them. A power that is often found to be aggregating rather than dissipating within society.[15] In many cases, it is clear that clientelism, particularism, transformism and so on, have determined a chain of social solidarities, psychological and moral bonds, that means conventions of values and principles that have had a broad projective profile; they have generated dynamism and transformation. They have given rise to historical phases of political and civil life characterised by a high level of participation and commitment. And this also goes beyond the profound political and institutional differences that exist between countries, one of which is certainly between those that have reached a good stage of democratisation and those that live in reactionary regimes. But what can encompass and, to some extent, compare them is a political and civil culture that contains precisely formal and informal rules combined and mixed differently in individual contexts. Indeed, the case of North African and Middle Eastern countries makes it possible to broaden the paradigms usually used restrictively for European countries and bring them more in line with a reality that is becoming democratised but retains archaic elements. Elements that adapt to modernity and shape it according to the many requirements of a process that is always of an ethical-political nature, in the Crocean sense of the term.[16]

Politics of the *notables*

A significant figure for understanding the intersections between formal and informal power, particularly in more advanced Mediterranean countries, is that of the 'notable'. The Venetian 'commendatore' of the early 1900s, as described by Antonio Fogazzaro in his novel *Piccolo Mondo Moderno*, was precisely one of these individuals and was considered a 'powerful' man. He enjoyed the spontaneous and interested deference of many of his fellow citizens. He knew how to negotiate, advise and suggest with tact, smiling with his face and deftly managing all the signs he could dispense with his hands and voice. He directed and guided the endless strategies that his acquaintances and their relationships could produce. The former mayor 'inspired a great deal of sympathy in him', and he thus endeavoured to offer him the best advice every Sunday after mass. As a result, he often found himself discussing the typical affairs related to his position. It was therefore a matter of combining public and private interests, personal and familial connections with those of public interest but to do so, it was necessary to know the facts and even the psychologies of all involved. It was essential to understand where it was convenient to intervene, in what manner and with what methods. Often, it was not so much a matter of how much, but how.[17] The intermediation of notables was also linking the local community to the state, a way for the masses to influence administrative decisions that concerned them. This possibility was given in exchange for the electoral support that clients bestowed upon their patrons, who were, in turn, in direct contact with state officials and served as vote brokers to the most important voters. Significant in this

regard is the case of the Greek shepherds of the Epirus Mountains described by Campbell. 'When he cannot reach or influence an official, the shepherd appeals to his "patron" or to the patron of one of his relatives if that person is powerful. This patron, in most cases a lawyer, exercises a political role'. As a member of the liberal professions, the lawyer could recommend his clients' business to the attention of various acquaintances who had the ability to assist him. In return, the lawyer could guarantee his clients' political support for local or national elections.[18] The processes that led to the dissemination of state culture and public institutions in the periphery, therefore, ended up being shaped by a traditional mentality that resisted and adapted to the modernisation of politics. The same processes were taking place in Spain, as Cruz Artacho recounts. Perhaps, in spite of or along with the peculiarities that must be noted in each specific case, the transition process towards democracy in Spain differed from the others only in its lengthy duration, as well as its traumatic character, which was especially pronounced from the mid-1910s. Characteristics or specificities of the Spanish case, in general, have also been explained based on what has been defined as an obvious lack of demand for democratic practices within civil society or as a consequence of the power's failure to offer such practices. Although, in this regard, I would like to add that this has been true for many countries. Specifically, the relationship between peasants and politics during the Restoration period has been contextualised in terms of the lack of demand for democratisation. In general, *caciquismo* (local despotism), often associated with electoral fraud, becomes the guiding axis when attempting to explain the functioning of the political system during the Restoration period. *Caciquismo*, in turn, was the product of a combination of factors, among which some stood out, such as the high degree of illiteracy among the population or the equally evident passivity or the demobilisation of the traditional rural society, which was the majority throughout the national territory at that time. To sum up, on the one hand, *caciquismo* defines and explains the political system and, in particular, its limits, problems and contradictions; on the other hand, it has been explained as the product of the weight exerted by tradition and backwardness, the latter identified with the rural world. Consistent with this, the position and/or attitude of peasants towards electoral events could be summarised in a few lines: as the main culprits, both due to their contempt for politics and their natural apathy, in the generalisation of electoral fraud and abuses that have produced an oligarchy to which they were subordinated through multiple patronage and/or clientelistic relationships. In this way and through this means, the peasants have become passive protagonists of a political reality that they have both endured and consolidated. It is not surprising, in this overall framework of reflections, that the long-standing presence of electoral fraud and *cacique* practices in Spain until the twentieth century is attributed, among other things, to the enormous weight that the rural world continued to hold, which was expanded, if possible, with the introduction of universal male suffrage. As Forner[19] emphasised, referring to the low level of urban concentration

observed in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century compared to what happened in other areas of the European context, the modernisation of political behaviours was associated with the expansion of phenomena, such as industrialisation and/or urbanisation, which were so little widespread in Spain at the time. The low importance of the urban population has generally led to a low degree of political socialisation and, consequently, to the persistence of traditional political behaviours.[20]

The notable has often derived his power from a solid economic and social base which has then often been transferred onto a political plane. Over time, however, notables of such origins have largely been replaced by the middle class. The latter have generally never had the same power as the former notables within civil society. While the political power of the former was thus determined, in many cases, by other powers, the power of middle-class personalities derives either from their specific professional skills or from occupying institutional political positions (local authorities, central government bodies). In the case of notables, social power generated political power, while for middle class personalities, political-administrative power generated socio-economic power. Holding institutional positions allowed for gains on the economic and social levels. In social and economic practice, these new classes, however, have adopted the typical behaviours and language of the notable. Hence their need to show and even flaunt their own wealth. Therefore, while the traditional definition of the notable can be used, the concept of nobility appears equally useful.[21]

The French case is significant in this regard. Médard was already mentioning the strict nature that the use of certain categories was and suggested, considering empirical evidence, not only the mixing of contrasting behaviours in politics but also the need for greater flexibility in identifying and describing them. Thus, even for France, one could not speak of an era of notables, an era of parties and so on. Concrete cases, such as those of Jacques Chaban Delmas and Jacques Chirac, with very different career paths and *cursus honorum*, demonstrated not only the flexibility of clientelistic behaviours that were present in more or less archaic moments of politics and mixed with apparently more modern political forms but also the constant presence of notables in the organisation of consensus. He spoke of three generations of notables in the history of French politics. Notables who in some cases were such by virtue of the traditional attributions given to these social actors, but who in others had become so either through the use of political resources or through the use of the administrative apparatus of the state. In the most recent generations of politicians, he saw the transformation of national resources into local resources and the transformation of politicians who were born as professionals or high officials of the state into mediators and notables. This demonstrated how the social dynamics typical of the notables' world could not be confined to narrow spatial or temporal contexts.[22]

Frédéric Sawicki, building on Médard's work, reaffirmed the importance of distinguishing the role of the notable who draws resources from the

socio-economic sphere from that of the holder of an institutional position, as well as from that of one who draws their power from their position in a political party. There is, in fact, a difference between the loyalty that arises from being a landowner or an entrepreneur and that which arises from holding an institutional role (such as a member of parliament, councillor or mayor) or from being the leader of a party or faction. These differences not only allow for the distinction of different types of clientelistic practices according to the properties of the politician who carries them out but also raise questions about the institutional conditions that favour the prevalence of one type or another. However, clientelism performed by notables, institutional clientelism and party clientelism do not represent different historical stages corresponding to economic and social stages. It is therefore easy to find the coexistence of these forms in different historical and social realities.[23] In many cases, a combination and use of clientelistic practices can be found, including the most traditional ones, while still preserving rational logics, leading Grémion and Muller to speak of 'notable managers'.[24] Similar observations, but primarily on a cultural, behavioural and relational level, seem to arise from the Spanish case as well.[25]

The thesis, still associated with Max Weber, that politicians by profession have succeeded the notables, and that the arrival of the former would have marked the end of the latter, needs to be revised.[26] Above all, we need to reconsider the concept of a linear and univocal view of a complex process. The notables have not given way, as if they were actors of a bygone era. On the contrary, in many cases, they have adopted the methods of professionals. The disappearance of some notables, the disappearance of forms of authority associated with land ownership and private assistance, cannot be confused with the disappearance of notable relations as a whole. Professional politicians, on the other hand, have appropriated some of the political actions of notables. They have used the methods of notables, not without combining them with their own methods of mobilisation.[27] In this context, the terms patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism well express the behaviour of an individual who, having reached a public office, uses their position and prerogatives as if they had inherited them or as if they had long been in their possession.[28]

Italian history itself shows extensively that the change of the political class has never been radical. Very often, the struggle has been between an old minority and a new one, but this has never led to a transformation of the methods, forms and instruments for the preservation of power. It has been, therefore, a circulation of elites. In fact, the process has never occurred as a true replacement but rather as the merging of new elements with the old. Even when a real process had to be faced from one political system to another, the new political class sought to assimilate the ways of the notables within the new methods, such as the party, for example. This is why we can find the notabilary model, especially regarding the gathering of consensus and the management of relations between voters and parliament, even in the political representation forms of the late post-war period. In some ways, even the capitalisation of politics during the 1980s played a functional role for a

political model that had already proven successful within Italian society. A model that finds its reasons in civil culture. A culture that continues, despite the socio-economic reasons for the notable of the late 1800s coming to an end, to consider certain symbols, resources and exchange methods important for power management and, ultimately, to recognise and reinforce power only to those who demonstrate the ability to manage it in the concrete practice of politics and in the representation of themselves. The profound reasons behind why there has been a recurrence of notable behaviour by the ruling political class should be sought in the generally oligarchic nature of all leaderships, whether of liberal, fascist or republican age.

The persistence of such 'notability' features in the actions and behaviours of the political class cannot have but profound reasons. In particular, using Weberian categories, one can say that this phenomenon falls within the configuration of a patrimonial or neo-patrimonial type of State. That is, a State that sees the contradictory and variable combination of patrimonial-traditional domains and legal-rational domains, typical also of countries not fully responding to the development of the Western world. The State of many European countries cannot be fully considered a patrimonial State, according to Weberian categories, but a State in which a patrimonial-type culture has had and still has great weight. Perhaps for this reason, it is better to define it as a neo-patrimonial State. All government authority and resources dependent on it continue to be conceived as possible advantages for private purposes. The idea of neo-patrimonialism encompasses a variety of different but connected practices, such as nepotism, clientelism, patronage, personal ties, corruption and, precisely, notability. Therefore, the history of European states is the history of states that have been strongly influenced by a personalistic culture, which has led to the joint presence of clientelistic-personal forms and forms typical of a modern State, to the failure to distinguish between public and private domains, but also to the failure to respect such a distinction in practice. In short, the personal and private use of public office has always been a distinctive feature. Hence, the origins of widespread corruption, which is not only related to large contracts and phenomena of considerable size but also to the small-scale practice of more peripheral public offices. Rationality has always been understood as a way to legitimise power, but never to shape it.[29]

Familism, clanism, tribalism

The blurring of boundaries between formal and informal has never been more evident than in the privatisation of power, that is, the tendency to favour kinship relationships in the design of dominance, recruitment within dominant circles and entrusting the fate of states or other political institutions in favour of family or clan. This is primarily the case in countries that could be said to be at the extreme end of a characterisation. The return to dynastic practices is an extreme form of this trend, evident in pre-revolutionary Middle Eastern states (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen) but not entirely absent in

the European Mediterranean. Ironically, some Arab monarchies have undergone smoother transitions than Arab republics. Anwar Sadat consolidated his succession to Nasser in 1970 by eliminating potential rivals such as Ali Sabri, Sha'rawi Jum'a and Muhammad Fawzi. Nevertheless, it took almost a year before he could be completely secure, with the victory in the October 1973 war against Israel that made him almost a 'pharaoh'. Like Nasser, Sadat never attempted to design a dynastic coup like his successor, Mubarak. Abdullah II of Jordan succeeded his father, flanking his uncle, the old Crown Prince Hassan. Once on the throne, he also quickly removed the choice made by his father of the Crown Prince, his half-brother Hamza. However, the hereditary rule has always been part of Jordan's constitutional framework, despite the absence of clear rules regarding the process. In Syria, following the death of President Hafez al-Assad in 2000, it took several hours to modify the country's constitution and facilitate the hereditary succession of his son Bashar. However, Bashar was not his father's first choice. In Kuwait, the 2006 staged 'coup' demonstrated that Al-Sabah was the true orchestrator. Even Lebanon, often considered to have a higher democratic standard than other Arab states, has not been immune to 'family politics' in recruiting political leadership. Here, confessionalism and family have worked together to reproduce semi-feudal forms of politics.[30]

The Egyptian 'sovereigns' after 1952, starting with Mohammed Nagib, were all military officers. The Camp David Accords of 1979 represented a period of 'civilization' of the military. Mubarak's Minister of Defense, Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, followed this process. He engaged the military in economic activities related to the production of goods oriented towards the civilian economy and ambitious military industrial programmes. He became popular in the 1980s and was even considered a likely presidential successor, but he was removed from his post in 1989. Similarly, Amr Moussa was also considered a possible replacement for Mubarak before being 'banished' to head the Arab League in 2001. High-ranking and popular officers retired to become governors, special state advisers or diplomats. No other name was associated with succession until Gamal Mubarak, who seemed to be on track to become Egypt's next president. Therefore, it was necessary for his father to have planned for succession, which was initiated with the constitutional amendments of 2005. Moreover, Gamal became the only aspirant from the Mubarak family. His older brother, 'Alaa, found his way into business.

In Libya, on the other hand, Saif al-Islam, son of Gaddafi, did not have an 'official' status in the political structure of Libya. Moreover, Gaddafi himself continued to assert that he was not the president. Saif obtained hundreds of millions of dollars to finance his charity foundation, which carried out many humanitarian interventions and conflict resolutions. Only the powerful male siblings who held positions in security, namely al-Mu'tasim Billah and Khamis, represented potential rivals for succession. The former was responsible for the military and security apparatus and held the position of National Security Advisor. The latter, most likely under the aegis of Mu'tasim, strengthened a

special force (SF) brigade. The despotic-military matrix, entirely constituted by blood ties, became vital for the consolidation of Gaddafi's power, providing strength in the transfer of future power from father to sons.[31]

Syria offers a more detailed articulation. In the early 1950s, after centuries of sociopolitical marginalisation, the Alawi community in the coastal region of Latakia emerged as one of the most influential factors. The group of Alawi army officers, which had significantly joined the Ba'ath coup in 1963, laid the foundations of a political system based on clan and sectarian membership. Hafez al-Asad, in 1970, managed to seize power, and from then on, the 'Alawi' factor played a crucial role in its maintenance. Quickly, Alawi officers who were members of allied clans with al-Asad or related to the president found themselves at the helm of newly created paramilitary forces, whose sole task was to protect the regime. According to Batatu,[32] Alawi officials constituted 60 per cent of the second level of power in Syria (the closest to Hafez al-Asad). Within this limited context, eight officials were affiliated with the president's clan (Kalbiyya), while four came from his wife's (Haddadin) clan. Of these 12, seven had direct familial relationships (blood ties or acquired through marriage) with the president: Rifaat (his brother), Adnan Makhluf (his wife's cousin) and Shafiq Fayyad (his cousin) became, respectively, the leaders of the defence forces, the Republican Guard (RG) and the third armoured corps.

Sectarian affiliation and, even more importantly, familial ties became crucial factors in the selection of leaders of the RG, SF, Defense Brigades and Presidential Security, led since 1987 by Basil al-Asad, the president's eldest son and designated heir. Basil's political and military ascent began in the second half of the 1980s, when a series of manoeuvres and adaptations within the regime were made by al-Asad Sr. to facilitate succession. In 1994, Basil's premature death forced the president to change his plans. In the same year, the appearance on the scene of the family's second son, Bashar, marked the beginning of a new phase.

Under Bashar al-Assad, a mix of continuity and change came to characterise Syria's power structure. The overlap of hidden informal powers and exposed formal powers remained virtually unchanged, while unlike in the past, the former was no longer dominated by a single absolute leader. The regime remained in the hands of an oligarchy composed of members of the al-Assad family, some of their relatives and allies, a handful of officials in control institutions and a few older men who had survived the purges of the previous regime. At the same time, only members of the president's family remained in charge of the most sensitive positions, while the Sunni element was confined to formal institutions without real decision-making power.[33]

Even Arafat and his collaborators deliberately relied on traditional relationships and appealed to the support of the family/clan in order to consolidate their leadership. The official rhetoric surrounding the Palestinian National Authority focused on the creation of a new Palestinian state through the separation of judicial, legislative and political power and, therefore, the

establishment of an effective and independent administrative state apparatus. However, the new institutions were administered by those who already held power in traditional clan structures. Families close to Fatah, such as Qura'i in Abu Dis, the al-Farra family in Khan Yunis or the Shaka'a family in Nabus, acquired new power or consolidated their traditional local positions. Until 2005, leaders in municipalities and village councils were not elected but appointed by presidential decrees. A similar procedure governed the management of the 16 governmental districts into which the West Bank and Gaza Strip were divided. This system allowed Arafat to control local communities while at the same time empowering his loyalists. This family/faction-based policy continued the previous strategy of the 1970s and 1980s when Fatah gained a prominent position in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by providing economic support to loyal families.[34]

Final thoughts: the idea of 'state'

What has been discussed so far challenges not only the paradigm of transition but also the idea that the process towards democratisation can follow stages and, above all, can constitute a linear and almost inevitable path towards the formation of a modern state. Such an attitude, according to many scholars, was due to the prevailing attention paid to the formal at the expense of the informal, stemming from the 'analytical obsession'[35] centred on the state and that characterised the Western academic world. The issue, as shown by the cases we have previously referred to, is then related precisely to the idea of the state. An idea that needs to be deeply revised. Now, the state is certainly a highly structured reality, with precise borders and spaces, and with internal hierarchies among social strata. This does not detract from the fact that all of these characteristics remain dynamic and are transformed. Even stateness is always active, always in passive and/or active action, and not at all to be considered as an acquired fact forever. The state, moreover, is not just hierarchy, law, force and the like but also internalisation of a shared conception of relational life or, in any case, in conflict with particularisms and resistances. And it is only in the context of a mobile reality, with many lives, that one can understand everything that contrasts with stateness. Crime, bandits, local potentates, feuds and factions, clientelism and everything that a Weberian vision would include in a pre-state world are part of those factors that oppose stateness, but that in the end end up being part of it. The state, therefore, any state, never ends up reaching a point of arrival, fixed borders, a given hierarchical order. This explains why the Western model remains important, but, to understand its deep reasons, the models of recent states, those of the 'third world', those belonging to other cultures cannot be excluded. On the other hand, even what is now being referred to as the 'erosion of the state' cannot be absolutised nor can the internationalisation and globalisation be taken for granted as phenomena tending to overcome the state structure. The construction of a state has always encountered contrasts and resistances on its path.

One cannot think that, once established, the state has found its stability, its fixity. In some way, one could speak of a process, certainly with foundational moments, never finished and in continuous transformation. Each moment has always had a multitude of rivals deposed, such as 'princes, bishops, dukes, bandits',[36] kings, dictators, officials and mayors. The new ruling classes have always had to engage in the work of combining, consolidating, neutralising and manipulating intricate political relationships.

In the formation, reconstruction and construction of the state, within a framework that makes the process of state assertion itself relative, war also plays a significant role. In an essay from many years ago, Charles Tilly explored the relationship between state formation and armed conflict, likening it to organised crime.[37] Both, according to the scholar, are phenomena driven by coercion and entrepreneurial self-promotion. In terms of organised violence, state agents pursue the making of war, the making of the state, protection and taxation, and a central role of the state remains to eliminate or neutralise rivals within its own territory. In the formation of the monopoly of violence, therefore, violence is passed through. If the protection of the racket represents organised crime at its best, making war and building a state, the 'quintessence' of racket protection with the addition of legitimacy, qualify as the best form of 'organised crime'. Tilly has emphasised the analogy to reflect on the fact that, without legitimacy, all generals and statesmen would be considered murderers or thieves. On the other hand, at least in light of the European experience of recent centuries, generals and statesmen appear more similar to oppressors and criminals than to men who have contributed to the somewhat utopian idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market responsive to consumer will, and the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations elicit a certain type of government. This reminds us of the knowledge value that countries on the path to democratisation can have for us. More generally, it provides us with a new key to interpreting European countries.

Notes

1 Huntington, 1991.
2 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986.
3 Berins Collier (1999: 5) argues that a similar transition paradigm has prevailed in the scholarly writing on democratisation. The transitions literature, as this current work has come to be known, has as its best representative the founding essay by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), which established a framework that is implicitly or explicitly followed in most other contributions.
4 Bobbio, 2014: 243.
5 Carothers, 2002: 9.
6 Rustow, 1970: 363.
7 Eisenstadt, 1983.
8 Weber, 1980: vol. 1: 212 ff., 226 ff.
9 Relevant references, regarding this topic, that find the gist of Middle Eastern countries' politics in the intermingling of formal and informal power can be seen in Anceschi, Gervasio, and Teti, 2014.

10 Erdmann and Engel, 2006.
11 Médard, 1996: 84.
12 Clapham, 1985: 48.
13 Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 62.
14 With regards to this point, see Camurri, 2012 and Mastropaolo, 2011. A research that keeps being relevant is Briquet, 1997. More recent research is Mattina's, 2016.
15 For a different point of view on these themes, see Piattoni, 2001, 2005; Briquet and Sawicki, 1998.
16 Promotori di siffatta storia – writes Benedetto Croce – sono i ceti o gruppi che si chiamano dirigenti, e gli individui che si dicono politici o uomini di stato' therefore 'promuovere l'interesse generale e gli ideali politici . . ., è l'ufficio degli uomini di stato e delle classi dirigenti.
    Not a story about an élite, but a story about individuals, social classes and groups that adequately project the spirit of a nation, the level of civilization of such a nation and its ethics. 'La vera storia' – writes again Croce – 'è storia dell'individuo in quanto universale e dell'universale in quanto individuo'. Individual/individuals, thus, through politics exhaustively express the myriad of aspects that the society they live in displays and that they are an expression of (Musella, 1979).
17 Fogazzaro, 1923: 193–261.
18 Campbell, 1964: 64–67.
19 Forner, 1997.
20 Cruz Artacho, 2003: 33–48.
21 On this matter, Grémion, 1976; Lagroye, 1973; Tudesq, 1973; Médard, 1981.
22 J. F. Médard, 1981.
23 Sawicki, 1998: 227.
24 Grémion and Muller, 1990.
25 Cazorla Pérez, 1992. For a review, Moreno Luzón, 1995.
26 Regarding this matter, see the juxtaposition between Harold Lasswell and David Easton embedded in the introduction of Anceschi, Gervasio, and Teti, 2014.
27 Garrigou, 1998: 64–65; Phélippeau, 1997.
28 Dagher, 2002.
29 On neo-patrimonialism and these phenomena, see Eisenstadt, 1973, and Clapham, 1985.
30 Sadiki, 2014: 13–14.
31 Sadiki, 2014: 16.
32 Batatu, 1999.
33 Trombetta, 2014: 29–31.
34 Alone, 2014: 44 ff.
35 Dittmer, Fukui, and Lee, 2000.
36 Tilly, 1984: 27–28.
37 Tilly, 1985.

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8 Republican political mobilisation of the working classes in southern Portugal

The district of Évora between 1908 and 1915

Jesús Ángel Redondo Cardeñoso

For a long time, historiography has been dominated by a vision that basically identified (and thereby limited) political participation in liberal regimes of the 'long' nineteenth century,[1] with the freedom to exercise the right to vote. As a result, the political History of that period frequently marginalised the lower classes in studies because it was thought that they remained outside the political game, since they either had no right to vote (because of the persistence of census suffrage) or, if they enjoyed this right (because universal suffrage was passed early), they did not exercise it with full freedom, since their will was hijacked by the elites through various strategies of political and social control and electoral manipulation. Furthermore, this image was more closely associated with countries (southern Europe, Latin America) or geographical areas (rural regions) stereotyped in terms of their political (enduring authoritarianism and tendency towards military coups or 'civil warring'), economic (scarce industrialisation) and cultural backwardness (illiteracy and religiosity or clericalism).

Fortunately, in more recent years, a large body of research has emerged to qualify this pejorative vision, highlighting that the absence, restriction or hindrance of the right to vote did not exhaust the channels of political participation open to the common people in the nineteenth-century liberal regimes.[2] In this regard, undoubtedly, one of the main forms of non-institutional political participation available to the popular classes in contemporary times – and, possibly, the most dramatic and spectacular – was collective mobilisation.[3] In fact, since the end of the eighteenth century, there have been many examples of popular uprisings that were promoted and/or used by various political sectors – mainly opponents – to promote changes in government and/or political regime.[4]

In the specific case of the Iberian Peninsula, one of the main actors that promoted popular political mobilisation among the working classes during the 'long' nineteenth century was republicanism. In Spain, for example, recent research has shown that republicans promoted collective political events (rallies, demonstrations, etc.) with significant levels of participation from the poorer sectors of society,[5] seeking to legitimise their action and political

discourse in the face of Restoration politics which, although this system of government passed universal suffrage in 1890, was characterised by favouring demobilisation, corruption and caciquism (boss rule) to neutralise political plurality and the free exercise of suffrage.

In Portugal, where universal suffrage was not passed either during the nineteenth century or during the early decades of the twentieth century,[6] the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) was also one of the main promoters of citizen mobilisation, organising and holding mass political events such as rallies and demonstrations.[7] In doing so, it sought to attract (and platform) the support of the middle and lower classes in order: first, to confront the monarchist regime and the political system of *Rotativism*, which also used different mechanisms and strategies to try to neutralise any hint of pluralism and political freedom of citizens, and later, once the First Republic had been declared, to legitimise its government action against opposition sectors.[8] This mobilising action of republicanism contributed decisively to ensure that the Portuguese policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to paraphrase Rui Ramos, was no longer a game reserved for the king and the political elites.[9]

However, despite the significant advances made, historiography specialising in the analysis of popular political mobilisation during the 'long' nineteenth century in both Iberian countries has focused mostly on the study of urban, cultural and social environments, and very little research has turned its attention to what happened further inland in the rural regions of the Peninsula. Therefore, to complement the main objective of this book, which seeks to shed light on processes of political socialisation and democratisation in the south of Spain by focusing on the local level,[10] in this present text, we aim to show how, during the early 1900s, there was also a significant level of political mobilisation of the lower classes in the rural regions of southern Portugal.

Specifically, in order to define the scope of our work, we have focused on the district of Évora, in the region of Alentejo. The chronological time frame encompasses the period from 1908 to 1915, so as to span the crisis of the monarchy (1908–1910) and the promulgation and construction of the First Republic (1910–1915), a period of intense political activity.

The research has been based on tracing and analysing the expressions of collective popular mobilisation promoted by the PRP in the district of Évora between 1908 and 1915, by consulting the regional and local newspapers of the district.[11]

However, before exploring this subject in further depth, we will first provide a brief socio-economic overview of the district of Évora and the region of Alentejo, so as to better contextualise the proposed research.

Socio-economic overview of the Évora district in the early twentieth century

The district of Évora, together with the districts of Beja, Portalegre and part of Setúbal, is part of the Alentejo region, which extends south of the River

Tagus occupying almost the entire southern half of Portugal.[12] Like the whole of the region, in the early twentieth century, the district of Évora was eminently rural and was defined by two major characteristics: it had an agricultural economy based on wheat crops, complemented by the cultivation of olive groves, vineyards and cork oak groves that dominated the arboreal landscape of the region, and land ownership was highly concentrated, meaning that Alentejo was (and is) dominated by large estates.[13]

As a result of this marked *latifundism*, the social structure of the district is highly polarised so that, together with a small group of large landowners, and a slightly larger group of farmers who farmed their own land, there was a very large mass of rural day labourers who obtained their economic livelihood almost exclusively from selling their labour by the day. The living conditions of these rural labourers bordered on subsistence since wages were very low and work was highly seasonal, conditioned by crop growing cycles and changes in the weather, which meant that their income would decline and/or be scarce not only in years of poor harvests but also at times of the year when there was little demand for labour in the fields, such as winter.[14] Therefore, it was not surprising that, in these negative situations, many rural workers in Alentejo were forced to resort to begging or petty crime to support their family.[15]

As if that were not enough, the poor living conditions of Alentejo's lower classes were compounded by high illiteracy rates in the region,[16] which stood at around 80 per cent, well above the average rate in Portugal which, in 1911, was around 70 per cent,[17] and, of course, exacerbated by the scant opportunities for social promotion available to the poorest classes.

This context largely explains why Alentejo bore witness to many of the most important episodes of social conflict that occurred during the twentieth century in Portugal, shaping the collective memory of the country as a whole, as reflected in the acclaimed novel by José Saramago titled *Levantado do chao*.

The first and one of the most prominent social conflicts that took place in Alentejo in the 1900s was the wave of strikes led by rural workers in the region between 1911 and 1912, which had a special impact on the district of Évora, and caused a substantial reverberation in historiography of this period,[18] among other reasons, because repression of the Alentejo strikers was the last straw, triggering the first general strike in the history of Portugal, called in January 1912.[19]

However, as we will see next, beyond this important socio-labour mobilisation, which has already been covered extensively by historiography, during those years in the district of Évora, there was also a remarkable popular mobilisation that was eminently political in nature, which manifested, according to the documentation, through three main forms of expression: public rallies, festive demonstrations and popular riots. Let us begin with the first.

Rallies: the first popular political mobilisations of republicanism in the district of Évora

After the failed republican revolt of 1891 (with the subsequent repression) and the poor electoral results achieved by republican candidates during

the early twentieth century, the PRP saw the need to extend its influence beyond the country's major cities, to which its political activity had largely been confined up until that point. So, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the PRP set up numerous republican centres in many different parts of the country. But these centres were not established as mere elitist political clubs, characteristic of nineteenth-century liberal politics. Instead, they sought to organise educational, cultural and philanthropic activities to involve and engage the lower classes, and, above all, they developed significant political activity through various tools of mass politics, such as the publication of newspapers (local and regional) and the organisation of rallies and propaganda demonstrations.[20] Evidently, the clear objective behind this was to expand the Republican political programme and discourse to the bulk of Portuguese society, including those who could not vote.

The creation of republican centres in the district of Évora dated back to the 1880s, when local republican candidates established temporary republican centres for the 1881, 1883 and 1887 elections. However, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the PRP founded the first permanent republican centres in the region: in 1906, the Democratic Republican Centre 'Liberdade' in the city of Évora and, in 1907, the Republican Centre 'Heliodoro Salgado' in Vendas Novas. In 1910, on the eve of the revolution, other republican centres were set up in Extremoz, Borba and various localities within the *Concelho* (municipality) of Montemor-o-Novo. In addition, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, republican newspapers were founded in the district, such as *Democracia do Sul*, published in Montemor-o-Novo from 1900 onwards, and *A Voz Pública*, founded in the city of Évora in 1904.[21]

As was the case elsewhere in the country, the republican centres established in Évora began to organise the first political events to mobilise the popular classes. These included electoral rallies, both in towns that were the capital of the surrounding *concelho* (which is where mainly these centres were located) and in small villages of the surrounding areas. In this regard, the PRP organised a particularly important rally campaign for the April 1908 elections, which ultimately marked a turning point for the Portuguese republican movement.[22] In the district examined here, not only were meetings held in Évora and Vendas Novas (the two towns that then had a permanent republican centre) but also in some villages around the district capital (São Manços, Azaruja, São Miguel de Machede and Alcáçovas).[23] Undoubtedly, this propaganda tour enabled republican candidate Evaristo Cutileiro to win the most votes in the *concelho* of Évora (although not enough to make him the most voted for candidate in the whole district).[24]

These electoral campaigns took place during the run-up to the municipal elections of October 1908, when the republican candidates held new rallies in Évora, São Manços and São Miguel de Machede[25] and, above all, for the legislative elections of August 1910, when the republican candidates redoubled their efforts and organised rallies throughout practically the entire

district, both in the city of Évora and various nearby villages (São Man-
ços, São Miguel de Machede, Nossa Senhora de Machede and Azaruja), as
well as in other localities within the district, from *concelho* administrative
capitals (Montemor-o-Novo, Vendas Novas, Arraiolos, Estremoz, Borba) to
small towns and villages (Santiago do Escoural, Cabrela, Vimieiro, Igrejinha,
Alcáçocas, Pavia, Cabeção).[26]

However, it should be noted that the republican centres of the district also
organised rallies, or other similar political events (public meetings, confer-
ences, etc.), outside of electoral periods. These included, for example, the
meeting held on 26 July 1908 in Évora to discuss 'the famous liquidation of
adiantamentos'¸ at which famous leaders of Portuguese republicanism spoke
(such as Afonso Costa and Bernardino Machado), and which was attended
by republican delegations from almost all *concelhos* in the district, with an
estimated attendance, according to the press, of 6,000 people.[27] Another no-
table event was the rally organised in Vendas Novas on 22 August 1909,[28]
which was part of the anti-clerical campaign carried out by the PRP that year,
which reached its peak at the huge anti-clerical demonstration held in Lisbon
on 2 August.[29]

At these rallies, republican leaders would typically launch into frenzied
harangues, decrying the corruption and clericalism of the monarchist regime
and making grandiose promises, clearly demagogic and populist in tone,
which outlined an idyllic republic where the working classes would live free
from material shortages:

> stoking passions, exploiting the misery of the working classes, firing
> them up with promises of the imminent improvement of their situation
> under the republican regime, convincing them that soon we will all be
> equal in all things, even *in heart and mind*, speaking a great deal about
> freedom, a magic word that sparks great enthusiasm in every heart and
> is usually so misunderstood.

They were told a great deal about tax cuts or reductions, about the lower-
ing of prices on basic items or even whetting their appetites with promises
about taking from the rich to give to the poor and so on, as we can see in
excerpts of their speeches and we can infer from way in which some poor
wretches with whom we have spoken extol the regime, and from the prom-
ises made, intended to sooth them that they will soon reap a thousand for-
tunes that they do not currently have.[30]

Moreover, not infrequently, to make such promises more credible, republi-
cans invited workers' leaders to participate in their rallies.[31] One such example
was António Moura, president of the Class Association of *Corticeiros* (cork
workers) of Évora, who played a prominent role in the electoral campaign
run by the republicans of Évora in August 1910[32] (and who, shortly after,
went on to play a leading role in the social conflicts that spread throughout
Alentejo during the first few months of the Republic). In his speeches, the

Corticeiro leader took the opportunity to spread his working-class ideology, as he did at the rally held on 20 August 1910 in Montemor-o-Novo, where António Moura:

> addressed the workers present, and explained to them the reason why he wants a Republic, while at the same time urging them to free them-selves from the *overlords* who enslave them, convincing them of the duties and rights that belong to them and of the *great* social force that they constitute. The working class, which produces everything, has the right to be free and independent, elevated and dignified, and must take action as swiftly as possible against the threats and revenge of electoral caciquism that, even while it pays so poorly for labour, still seeks to exploit the workers' conscience by forcing them to vote for the monar-chical lists.[33]

In summary, we see how, even before the proclamation of the Republic in October 1910, republicanism had incited remarkable political activity in the district of Évora, mobilising the common people both in the district capital and the *concelho* administrative capitals and in small villages.

This political activity of Portuguese republicanism intensified with the ar-rival of the new regime.[34] A good example of this is the new electoral cam-paign run by the PRP for the constituency elections of May 1911 (in which it faced little competition due to the lack of coordination among pro-monarchy parties), during which it organised almost 20 rallies in the district of Évora, both in the capital itself and in other localities throughout the district, includ-ing once again small villages.[35]

However, once the Republic was proclaimed, the dominant republicanism took advantage of the recourses of power to use and promote other forms of popular political mobilisation, such as the aforementioned festive demon-strations and popular riots.

Festive demonstrations: state-backed popular political mobilisation

For many years now, French historiography has analysed the revolutionary festival as one of the most remarkable forms of collective mobilisation since the origins of Modernity, considering it a direct precursor to the public dem-onstration.[36] These studies have influenced different historiographical fields, such as Spain, where the existence of political festivities dates back to the nineteenth century[37] and continues well into the twentieth century. This is clearly illustrated by the 'revolutionary popular festival' that spread to differ-ent cities and towns in the country after the Second Republic was proclaimed in 1931.[38]

Similarly, in Portugal, there have also been festive demonstrations since the nineteenth century,[39] as shown by the civic processions organised to com-memorate the day of Camões's death (10 June), a celebration that at the end

of the nineteenth century was especially linked to the liberal and republican sectors.[40] Likewise, the country experienced its own 'revolutionary popular festival' after the First Republic was proclaimed on 5 October 1910[41] (more than 20 years before the Spanish example).

One good example of this was the city of Évora itself, where, following news of the triumph of republican revolutionaries after their uprising in Lisbon, the shops closed and hundreds, even thousands, of individuals took to the streets to celebrate the arrival of the new regime. Among them were groups from the working classes, as shown by the 'large number of workers who, leaving work at noon, were prepared to lose the afternoon in order acclaim the republic'. Most of the protesters gathered in front of the municipal chamber, where the red and green (republican) flag was hoisted while the crowd cheered the fatherland and the republic and sang revolutionary anthems (such as *A Portuguesa* or *La Marseillaise*)[42] to the accompaniment of music played by different bands. In the late afternoon, local Republican leaders who arrived from Lisbon were greeted by 'a huge crowd that stretched from Geraldo Square to the arch of the Carthusian Monastery'. The party continued into the early hours of the morning and ended with speeches by the new council leaders who were hailed by the crowd.[43] Similar scenes took place in Montemor-o-Novo, Vendas Novas, Reguengos and Alandroal, as well as in small villages such as Cabrela and Escoural.[44]

All the crowds that gathered together to welcome the Republic, spreading throughout the country, from large cities to small villages, are clear evidence that the republican propaganda campaigns carried out during the last years of the monarchy had had a remarkable influence on the political culture of broad swathes of Portuguese society.[45]

The obvious mobilising potential of these festive demonstrations did not go unnoticed by the republican authorities who, once in power, strongly promoted the celebration of public holidays on certain commemorative dates to renew and strengthen the republican spirit of society. These included: 31 January, in commemoration of the republican uprising of 1891; 1 December, turning the pro-monarchy celebration of the Restoration of Independence into Flag Day and, above all, 5 October, to celebrate the anniversary of the triumph of the 1910 revolution.

On the first anniversary of the Republic, on 5 October 1911, the authorities organised various parades in numerous localities around the district of Évora. In the district capital, a festive demonstration was held, involving the main authority figures and large groups of members and representatives of various institutions and associations of the city, including the Republican Volunteer Battalion and various class associations (including the recently created association of rural workers), to the accompaniment of music played by various bands and fireworks.[46] That same day, similar festive demonstrations were also held in Montemor-o-Novo, Estremoz, Mora and Reguengos.[47]

However, despite the initial success, over time and, above all, with the progressive frustration felt among the working classes when they saw that

the Republic did not solve their immediate problems (as promised by republican speakers at their rallies), the popular following of these commemorative festivities declined significantly, and celebrations marking the anniversary of the Republic ended up becoming simply an institutional act with little press coverage.

Furthermore, republican authorities did not just organise festive demonstrations to commemorate important dates but also used this form of political mobilisation to show the popular support enjoyed by the Republic, especially when it was 'attacked' by opposition political sectors, as well as those of the Republic, such as the pro-monarchy attacks of 3 October 1911 and 3 July 1912.

In fact, after the first pro-monarchy attack occurred, the republican authorities of Évora published a manifesto calling 'the people of Évora, indistinctly, to a great demonstration in support of the Fatherland and the new democratic institutions that have happily consolidated in this beautiful and glorious country'. A few hours later, a crowd marched through the streets accompanied by music and cries of 'Long Live the Fatherland and the Republic, and down with traitors' until they reached the municipal chamber, where the authorities made various speeches from the balconies, cheered on by those present.[48] This popular mobilisation against the first pro-monarchy attack was completed two days later, on 5 October, when, as noted earlier, massive celebrations were held around the district to commemorate the first anniversary of the 1910 revolution.

Similarly, the following year, after learning of the defeat of the second pro-monarchy attack, the authorities of Évora organised a new demonstration that was supported 'by many people' and was accompanied by the military band, during which there were cries of 'Long Live the Republic, the Fatherland, and the Army', and speeches were made 'advocating the defence of the Fatherland and condemning the traitors' actions', which were 'warmly received'.[49] Again, on this occasion, similar demonstrations were organised in other locations around the district such as Vendas Novas, Estremoz, Vila Viçosa, Arraiolos and Redondo.[50]

Another reason for festive demonstrations was the overthrow of authoritarian governments that, with the support of republican minority splinter groups (evolutionists and unionists), tried to topple Afonso Costa's 'democratic party', which had not only assumed both the official name and the political legacy of the PRP but also had an almost incontestable monopoly over the political, electoral and institutional power of the country.

This was the case of the government led by General Pimenta de Castro, in power between January and May 1915 with the support of evolutionists and unionists, which ruled on the basis of presidential decrees, without taking parliament into account. Faced with this 'dictatorship', the 'democrats' pursued an insurrectionist strategy that culminated in the military coup of 14 May 1915, overthrowing Pimenta de Castro and return the government of the country to them.[51]

News about the triumph of the revolution of May 1915 was received in Évora with the organisation of a festive demonstration that 'cheered on the Fatherland and the Republic' and moved through the main streets of the city.[52] Two days later, on 16 May, similar scenes were repeated when another demonstration was organised 'with a huge turnout of people' to celebrate the swearing in of the 'democratic' councillors who had been dismissed during the government of Pimenta de Castro.[53] Such events were also held on these days in other parts of the district, both in administrative capitals, such as Montemor-o-Novo and Borba,[54] and in small towns such as Alcáçovas, where two demonstrations took place: the first was held on the 14th, when republican supporters gathered in the square to raise the red flag and cry 'Long Live the Fatherland, the Republic, the Navy, and the Portuguese Republican Party', and the second one took place on the 15th, 'which no republican, old or new, missed'.[55]

Popular riots: tumultuous political mobilisation of the masses

However, when defending the new regime, the PRP (first) and the 'democratic party' (later) did not just mobilise the popular classes through peaceful festive demonstrations, such as those we have just seen, but they also used collective actions of a tumultuous and sometimes even violent nature.[56]

A good example of this was the reaction that the first republican governments had against the unusual waves of strikes promoted by the Portuguese workers' movement towards the end of 1910 and throughout 1911 (and which, as pointed out earlier, had a remarkable impact on Alentejo, where there were numerous strikes by rural workers during the summer of 1911 and the winter of 1912). The social unrest of the first months of the Republic reached such an extent that even the new authorities feared that this strike agitation would irreparably destabilise the regime:

> This past week has been particularly fertile in terms of strikes. Some happily are over; others continue.
>
> Recording this fact, we cannot but regret it as it seems to us an unfavourable moment for movements that in some ways might hinder the consolidation of the new regime, an endeavour that surpasses all others in importance as it is in the greater interests of the Fatherland.[57]

In the midst of this state of opinion, the first republican governments did not hesitate to put down the various strike movements that ensued with great force.[58] This repression was manifested in the district of Évora especially in the wake of the strike convened by workers of the *Companhia dos Caminhos de Ferro do Sul e Sueste* in January 1911, which republican heroes tried to defeat by mobilising grassroots support for the PRP. Indeed, when the railway strike broke out, in the city of Évora, for example, the railway and telegraph stations were taken 'by armed people'.[59] In Estremoz, for its part, a group of republican supporters occupied the station and premises of the *concelho* and, later, those of Borba and Vila Viçosa as well, where there were

demonstrations of republican exaltation in which local republican leaders made speeches 'against the strikes [and] exalting the people, for the magnanimous way they had proceeded to end the strike'.[60] In Montemor-o-Novo, the authorities of the *concelho* ('helped by many people from Escoural') took the stations of Escoural and Casa Branca and, later, formed a battalion of volunteers including around 50 'recognised republican citizens' to 'preserve and defend the Republic'.[61]

Likewise, republicanism also mobilised its grassroots support tumultuously in the face of attacks and conspiracies from pro-monarchy sectors. This was the case, for example, after the pro-monarchy attack of 1912, which was repelled by the army, the Republican National Guard (GNR) and, also, volunteer battalions formed in the northern provinces of the country.[62] Over the course of the following days, along with the festive demonstrations explored in the previous section, popular harassment took place in the district of Évora against certain individuals who were arrested as suspected conspiratorial collaborators. One such individual was the Count of Ervideira, who was escorted to the prison of Évora 'by a force of the republican guard, a civic agent, and many people' who 'accompanied the retinue, protesting with violence', or that of Major Montez, considered the leader of the conspiracy in the south of the country, who was met by 'large numbers of people' at Évora railway station 'who made a raucous manifestation of displeasure', 'rebuking him harshly, while crying Long Live the Fatherland and the Republic'.[63] Other similar popular harassment took place in Vendas Novas and Estremoz.[64]

Even more violent events occurred in Évora after the so-called Second *Outubrada*, a small pro-monarchy uprising that took place in October 1914 in Mafra and Torres Vedras, which was quashed by the authorities without any major setbacks. Again, as on previous occasions, when news of the conspiracy reached them, the republican sectors of Évora organised a demonstration on the evening of 8 October, which 'soon became very imposing, with elements from all parties, for the sole purpose of hailing the Republic'. However, during the course of the march, shots were (allegedly) fired at the protesters from a pharmacy belonging to the owner of the pro-monarchy newspaper *Noticias d'Évora*. Immediately, the demonstration turned into a riot. Protesters stoned the building and some also fired weapons into the building, fatally injuring one of the occupants. Later, after the GNR dissolved the riot in that part of the city, several groups of rioters regrouped in the square where the newsroom of *Noticias d'Évora* was located, stormed the building, destroyed the machinery and burned the furniture they took from inside on a large bonfire out in the street.[65] As a result of all this, the pro-monarchy newspaper had to suspend its publication for several months and did not go to press again until February 1915 (now with a new owner).

A third cause behind the tumultuous mobilisation of republican grassroots supporters was their reaction to authoritarian governments such as that of General Pimenta de Castro who, as stated previously, ruled between January and May 1915 based on presidential decrees that neglected the Parliament.[66]

One of Pimenta de Castro's most controversial measures was the enactment of Decree No. 1488 that allowed the government to dissolve institutions and public administrations that did not obey the executive's orders. Based on this decree, 59 municipal chambers were dissolved throughout the country controlled by the 'democratic party', including Lisbon and Évora.[67]

When news of this decision reached Évora, the 'democratic' corporation of the city convened a protest rally on 28 April 1915 in front of the municipal chamber building, where 'successive cries of Long live the Republic, the union of republicans, down with the dictatorship' and the like could be heard. The next day, the new council was due to be sworn in (made up of evolutionists and unionists), so from early in the morning, numerous groups of 'democratic' republicans gathered once more both inside and in front of the municipal chamber. When the new authorities arrived, they cried 'Long live the Republic and unleashed protests against the dictators' and, shortly after, when the civil governor appeared, they shouted out 'Down with the traitor to the Republic'. To quash the protest, the governor ordered law enforcement to evict the crowd from the municipal chamber and the adjacent square, resulting in violent clashes between guards and protesters, in which several were wounded.[68] Over the following days, there were new protests in Évora related to the dissolution of the chamber: on 1 May, a protest rally was held in the city's Democratic Centre, and on 6 May, a new rally was organised in front of the municipal chamber,[69] but in both cases events unfolded peacefully, and there were no incidents.

Finally, as we know, the military uprising of 14 May succeeded in overthrowing Pimenta de Castro and returning the power to the 'democratic' party,[70] which, as we saw earlier, was celebrated in Évora and other localities around the district with much rejoicing and jubilation.

Conclusion

The early twentieth century in Portugal was marked by great political turmoil and notable social conflict. Although during those years both the monarchical and republican regimes did not pass universal suffrage, this did not prevent Portugal's common people from actively participating in the political life of the country and continuously mobilising in streets and squares, not only in big cities like Lisbon and Porto but also in small towns and villages further inland. Much of this popular political mobilisation was driven by republicanism.

Indeed, through the specific example of the district of Évora, characterised by the pre-eminence of agrarian activity, large estates, poverty and illiteracy, we have seen how during the last years of the monarchical regime, Portuguese republicanism organised numerous mass political acts, such as public rallies. Such events had a major impact in the periods leading up to elections, when PRP candidates embarked on propaganda tours of cities and towns in the region, in which even leaders of the incipient regional labour movement

participated, and which were attended by numerous individuals from the working classes who became aware at such events of republican ideology and political culture.

Another form of collective popular mobilisation promoted by republicanism in the early twentieth century in the district of Évora was the festive demonstration, originating in the 'revolutionary popular festivals' that followed the triumph of the revolution of 5 October 1910, when thousands of citizens of Évora took to the streets of various localities in the district in the midst of cheers, speeches and music to celebrate the proclamation of the Republic. These same scenes were repeated on a recurring basis over the following years to celebrate commemorative dates, such as the anniversary of the 5 October revolution itself, or to publicly display popular support for the Republic (and the 'democratic' party), against pro-monarchy insurrections and conspiracies or attempted authoritarian coups supported by the evolutionary and unionist minorities to topple the PRP from power.

Finally, there was also significant popular mobilisation through tumultuous and even violent actions, especially against the 'enemies' of the Republic, such as pro-monarchy sectors or attempted authoritarian coups, but also the workers' movement, as was the case in Évora when the railway strike broke out in January 1911.

In short, in contrast to the historiographical cliché that links a lack of mobilisation or even political apathy to the notion of 'backward' countries or geographical areas, in reality, in the agrarian regions of southern Portugal, there was also significant political mobilisation at the end of the 'long' nineteenth century, with the popular classes clearly playing an active role.

Funding

Notes

1 Here we fully assume the celebrated term coined by Hobsbawm that identifies the existence of an 'historic' nineteenth century that extended from the crisis of the *Ancien Régime* at the end of the eighteenth century to the outbreak of World War I (Hobsbawm, 1987).

2 Numerous studies have shown the importance of collective popular mobilisation in the 'long' nineteenth century: from the classic work of Bermeo and Nord (2000) to the more recent works of Fradkin and Di Meglio (2013) on Latin America, or Palacios Cerezales and Luján (2022) on Europe. With regard to the

specific case of Spain, beyond this book, this subject has also been addressed in studies conducted decades ago (Pérez Ledesma, 1990: 170–179), as well as very recently published studies (Sánchez León, 2022).

3 An aspect analysed extensively in Tilly, 2003.
4 In this sense, we should recall the popular mobilisations that took place in France during the year 1789 (Rudé, 2018: 117–137).
5 In this regard, for example, see Sánchez Collantes, 2019 or Anchorena Morales, 2022.
6 In fact, the first fully democratic elections held in Portugal were those of 25 April 1975, after the Carnation Revolution.
7 See, for example, Palacios Cerezales, 2011: 186–189.
8 A history of Portuguese republicanism can be found in Catroga, 2000.
9 Ramos, 1993: 226. On political mobilisation in liberal Portugal, see Pinto and Almeida, 2000.
10 This was where, after all, the daily political experience of individuals took place (Confino, 2006; Carasa, 2007).
11 The list of newspapers consulted is: *Notícias d'Évora*, *A Voz Publica*, *O Democrático*, *O Carbonário*, *A Formiga*, *O Meridional*, *A Folha do Sul*, *Democracia do Sul*, *O Jornal d'Estremoz* and *O Ecco de Reguengos*.
12 See the map at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Alentejo,_region_of_Portugal.svg (viewed on 10 January 2023).
13 Fonseca, 1996; Fonseca and Santos, 2001.
14 On the social conditions of Alentejo: Cutileiro, 1977; Cabral, 1977; and do Carmo, 2007.
15 Cutileiro, 1977: 89–105. In this sense, Pereira (1980: 135) characterised the crime and criminality that existed in the region as a 'latent social revolt'.
16 Gameiro, 2006.
17 Correia, 2013: 1191–1192.
18 Pereira, 1983: 21–76; Brito Pereira, 1983; Redondo Cardeñoso, 2018.
19 Pereira, 1983: 72–74; Palacios Cerezales, 2011: 226.
20 Samara, 2009a: 66–68; Carvalho, 2013.
21 Frota, 2010; Samara, 2010: 158–159; Fonseca, 2013: 181.
22 Farinha, 2013: 718.
23 *A Voz Pública*, 28–3–1908 and 04–04–1908.
24 *A Voz Pública*, 11–04–1908.
25 *A Voz Pública*, 24–10–1908.
26 *A Voz Pública*, 07–08–1910, 11–08–1910, 18–08–1910, 21–08–1910, 25–08–1910 and 28–08–1910; *Democracia do Sul*, 13–08–1910, 20–08–1910 and 27–08–1910.
27 *A Voz Pública*, 01–08–1908. *Adiantamentos* were payments made by the State, without parliamentary control, to satisfy the unbudgeted expenses of the Royal Household.
28 *Democracia do Sul*, 28–08–1909. *Paço* refers to Ribeira Palace in Lisbon, which was the official residence of the Royal Household.
29 Catroga, 1988: 236–239.
30 *Notícias d'Évora*, 08–04–1908.
31 Samara, 2009b: 154.
32 *A Voz Pública*, 11–08–1910 and 28–08–1910; and *Democracia do Sul*, 20–08–1910 and 27–08–1910.
33 *Democracia do Sul*, 27–08–1910.
34 Carvalho, 2013: 767.
35 *Notícias d'Évora*, 21–05–1911, 23–05–1911, 24–05–1911, 25–05–1911 and 26–05–1911; *O Meridional*, 23–05–1911, 14–05–1911 and 28–05–1911; *O Carbonário*, 27–05–1911; *Democracia do Sul*, 27–05–1911; and *O Jornal d'Estremoz*, 27–05–1911.

36 Ozouf, 1976.
37 For example, the studies of Fuentes Aragonés, 2014; and Roca Vernet, 2016, 2018 and 2021.
38 Juliá, 1999: 75–76.
39 Palacios Cerezales, 2011: 115–116.
40 João, 2011: 21.
41 Valente, 1982: 120; Farinha, 2013: 719.
42 In contrast to the monarchist flag, this was blue and white.
43 *A Voz Pública*, 06–10–1910.
44 *Democracia do Sul*, 08–10–1910 and 22–10–1910; *A Folha do Sul*, 08–10–1910; 12–10–1910 and *A Voz Pública*, 13–10–1910.
45 Samara, 2010: 282.
46 *Notícias d'Évora*, 07–10–1911 and *A Voz Pública*, 08–10–1911.
47 *Noticias d'Évora*, 05–10–1911; *O Jornal d'Estremoz*, 07–10–1911; *O Meridional*, 08–10–1911; and *Democracia do Sul*, 12–10–1911.
48 *Notícias d'Évora*, 04–10–1911.
49 *Notícias d'Évora*, 11–07–1912 and *A Voz Pública*, 11–07–1912.
50 *Democracia do Sul*, 13–07–1912 and *O Meridional*, 14–07–1912.
51 Serra, 2009: 116; Palacios Cerezales, 2011: 235–236; Navarro, 2013 y 2014.
52 *A Voz Pública*, 16–05–1915.
53 *Notícias d'Évora*, 18–05–1915; *A Voz Pública*, 21–05–1915; *O Democrático*, 23–05–1915.
54 *O Meridional*, 16–05–1915 and 23–05–1915; *Democracia do Sul*, 20–05–1915; *O Jornal d'Estremoz*, 22–05–1915.
55 *Democracia do Sul*, 20–05–1915.
56 Palacios Cerezales, 2011: 230–232, and 2012; Torre Gómez, 2014.
57 *A Voz Pública*, 20–11–1910.
58 Torre Gómez, 2014: 1132.
59 *O Carbonário*, 15–01–1911.
60 *O Jornal d'Estremoz*, 21–01–1911.
61 *A Folha do Sul*, 18–01–1911; *Democracia do Sul*, 21–01–1911 and 28–01–1911; *O Meridional*, 22–01–1911.
62 Santos, 2010: 150–162.
63 *Notícias d'Évora*, 19–07–1912 and *A Voz Pública*, 18–07–1912 and 21–07–1912.
64 *Democracia do Sul*, 13–07–1912 and 20–07–1912, *O Meridional*, 14–07–1912 and *A Folha do Sul*, 17–07–1912.
65 *A Voz Pública*, 25–10–1914.
66 Serra, 2009: 116; Navarro, 2013.
67 Navarro, 2011: 128–129.
68 *Notícias d'Évora*, 29–04–1915 and 30–04–1915; *A Voz Pública*, 01–05–1915; and *O Democrático*, 02–05–1915.
69 *A Formiga . . .*, 09–05–1915.
70 Navarro, 2013.

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Special epilogue

9 The history of Spanish democracy under debate

*Robert M. Fishman, Eduardo Posada-Carbó,
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Joe Foweraker,
Florencia Peyrou and Salvador Cruz Artacho*

As noted in the Introduction, most of the texts included in this volume were presented and discussed at a seminar held in June 2021. The purpose of the seminar was to submit these papers for assessment by specialists from different disciplines in order to enrich and expand the debate on the issues at hand.[1] The commentators were given the texts in advance and were asked to formulate several questions or critical reflections that were central to all the texts or to several of them.[2] We also wanted to know if, based on what they had read in the texts, they believed a re-reading of the history of democracy in Spain – beyond the well-worn clichés about its exceptionality in the international context – to be plausible, that is, if they felt it was necessary to update the narrative constructed so far. Second, they were asked to reflect on the question of spaces of analysis when understanding the processes of democratisation in history. We asked them about the relevance of applying a local perspective to understand democracy. In the first part of the session, the six participants developed their respective comments, in order, in the second part, to engage in an open debate. This present chapter is the result of those fruitful discussions, which we felt were worth incorporating into the book. In this sense, we beg the reader's indulgence regarding the inclusion of a final epilogue, different from the rest of the chapters as it is the result of a series of oral contributions later transcribed and minimally adapted, obviously, maintaining the authorship of the commentators.

Democracy, democratisation and history: narratives and spaces of analysis

Robert M. Fishman

I would like to concentrate mainly on two of the texts included in this volume, although in a sense I believe that the comments are largely applicable to all of the contributions in the book. Indeed, I found all of the chapters enormously interesting, with insightful analysis, great depth and many elements in common. I will focus on the chapters authored by Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*), on the one hand, and Antonio Herrera and John Markoff

(*Chapter 2*), on the other hand. Some of the comments relate to my interests as a social scientist concerned with the analysis of democracy, raising questions of a theoretical nature. But what may perhaps be the most suggestive comment has to do, above all, with the importance of managing the historical perspective in such an analysis. I started out as an undergraduate student of history, later as a graduate student of social science, focusing on the study of democracy with a historical perspective. In the context of this volume – and the larger intellectual enterprise to which it contributes – I would like to suggest that when we compare something that happened in the nineteenth century, or earlier, to something that happened in the twentieth century, or something that happens in one country to something that happens in another, it is advisable to 'historicise' or contextualise history. I say this because, as is rather obvious, seemingly parallel phenomena or processes have an impact and should be provided a scholarly reading that depends on the temporal and spatial coordinates in which they occur.

In addition, I would like to applaud the emphasis placed by the papers included in this book on the local and the municipal spheres. A bottom–up approach to historical analysis – the basis for much of the important original work in this volume – offers many insights and I fully subscribe to this sensitivity. However, having said that, I would like to introduce three or four clarifications or nuances.

The first point I would like to suggest is simply that it is useful to distinguish between the local and municipal spheres as an institutional context, on the one hand, and as a process and way of acting, on the other. They are not exactly the same thing. Sometimes actors who would prefer to have power at the State level resign themselves to, or settle for, the possibility of holding power at the municipal level, simply because it is the only institutional context open to the possibility of a progressive actor exercising power. In that sense in some instances of what we read as municipalism there may be an element of opportunity or, if you prefer, of institutional sensitivity to what is possible. Municipalism as an idea – in contrast to municipalism as the result of a structure of opportunities and constraints – may instead be based firmly on principles and on a desired way of doing politics, one that is linked to certain preferred processes. And I think it is always appropriate to distinguish between one and the other.

Furthermore, I would like to stress another point that I think is also relevant. It is important to underline the fact that emphasising the local sphere does not always mean the same thing. And here I would like, on the one hand, to consider the importance of Tocqueville's classic thesis. Tocqueville was not the greatest progressive in the history of Western thought, but he was a democrat and a liberal, and for him the municipal sphere was hugely important. He did not greatly believe in the central power of the State and yet there are municipalists who think that it is possible to interweave the local with the national and transnational levels. Therefore, it is always necessary to distinguish between a version of municipalism, which is localism to the extreme

and which rejects the State level, and another version that seeks to intertwine these two objectives or scenarios.

In one of my books called *Democracy's Voices*,[3] I try to explain why these two different framings of 'the local' develop and to show how even in the same region of Spain, at the same time, there are different versions of mobilisation at the local or municipal level that reflect one or the other version. These two framings or 'discursive horizons' involve ways of either intertwining or blocking the possible connection or nexus between the local, the national and the transnational. So, here I think there is a subject that deserves more empirical and analytical emphasis.

As a third matter, I would also like to stress that the emphasis on the local level is always important. I believe that in terms of democracy it helps us to discover, on the one hand, the desirability of bottom–up participation and also as a strategic matter the usefulness of this way to build democracy when it is difficult or even impossible to achieve power at the national level. However, having said that, for a democracy to function fully, there must be freedoms, guarantees and possibilities for democratic action at the State level. It is therefore very important not to lose sight of the level or importance of the central State, even when we focus on forms of participation, initiatives and a certain vision or discourse that emphasises the importance of the local level, bottom–up politics and the municipality.

I would now like to look at the last idea I wish to highlight or suggest. It has to do, as I pointed out before, with the importance of contextualising history or perhaps of 'historicising' history, although this term may have different meanings or readings. What I basically mean here is that a strategy that might be very convincing and plausible in the nineteenth century, building democracy gradually, from the bottom up, can be more complicated and problematic in the twentieth century, when democracy has already emerged at the central State level. For example, when, as with Franco, an undemocratic indeed anti-democratic regime tries to repress democratic demands or expressions at the local and municipal levels, these do not have the same relevance or potentiality as those that occurred in the nineteenth century, when there had been no experience of a democratic state like the Republic, in the Spanish case. Everything has more or less potential in different social contexts and especially in different historical contexts.

History is dynamic. Society varies from one local context to another, but history varies constantly. And I think it is very important that we incorporate into our analysis the changing nature of the cultural, institutional and, above all, interactive contexts of political actions. It is true, of course, that collective action (and bottom–up collective action) is absolutely the key in democratisation and at times in de-democratisation. This is clear from the chapters we see here. Antonio and John have particularly stressed this point, but we can see it in other papers as well. This relational or interactive aspect is absolutely the key, but the crucial elements of these interrelationships are progressively changing over time. And that is why I think it is very important to

incorporate into our vision a theorisation of the changes that are developing, taking place often at the central State level. On this point, I believe that our great reference for the historical analysis of democracy and collective action, Charles Tilly, was not as successful as certain other theorists and scholars of democracy. In other words, I believe that one of our great challenges is to maintain and deepen all the efforts we encounter in these papers, but without losing sight of the type of analysis that political scientists conduct, which distinguishes between different types of regimes. Doing this with a dynamic historical vision, always understanding that what happens in one historical moment will have points or elements that run parallel to what happens in another historical moment but without losing sight of the fact that such parallels can also conceal very deep differences and contrasts due precisely to the great moments of transformation which mean that, for example, the attempt to achieve democracy in Spain in 1976 was profoundly different from the attempt to achieve democracy in Spain in 1931.

History is not just another discipline; it constitutes a constant process of transversal or overarching change that must be taken into account in any social analysis.

I am very grateful for the opportunity to participate in this encounter and for the possibility of reading these fascinating papers.

Eduardo Posada Carbó

I would like to raise three general questions specifically addressed to the papers that I read with great pleasure and from which I learned a lot. First one on the language of democracy and the following two on the requirement set by the organisers who asked us to speak about constructed historical narratives and the issue of the spaces of democracy.

We must begin by discussing the very concept of 'democracy', which is inevitable, especially when dealing with history over the course of two centuries, something to which Robert Fishman has also alluded, and I also agree that it is a necessary reflection to avoid problems of anachronism and, of course, teleology.

Do we rely on definitions of social science that we apply retrospectively to the nineteenth or early twentieth century, or do we follow analyses guided by the language of contemporaries themselves? This is a reflection also motivated by my own experience in the field. I began to study and write electoral history and the history of democracy based on social science concepts, and from 2005 onwards, I started attending the seminar organised by Joanna Innes and Mark Philp in Oxford on 'Re-Imagining Democracy'.[4] And, really, since then I have been making reviews in my own work, which, without of course disassociating from the discussions of social sciences, is becoming increasingly attentive to what contemporaries themselves said about democracy. And I find it very difficult sometimes to do one without the other. That is, we are constantly returning to the social sciences, but in our historical

analyses we stumble upon some very interesting discussions, and the great challenge for historians is to try to enter into the mindset of those who were leading politics, what they understood when they talked about democracy and what were their conceptions about democracy, which, at any given moment were translating into political institutions and practices. So we can see a very clear relationship, beyond conceptual history, between concepts, and as they evolve, with decisions on how to create institutions or how to develop political practices at any period.

This reflection is particularly pertinent, of course, when studying the history of 'democracy', given its nature as an *essentially contested notion* to use that clichéd concept. So, how do we approach its study when the same contemporaries in the nineteenth century appropriated the word but with different meanings, not to mention the fact that since the second half of the twentieth century, we have been immersed in the discussion between popular democracy, bourgeois democracy and formal democracy. Castelar and Pi y Margall are a typical case in point, which we can see in some of the papers included here. While Castelar defended a liberal conception of democracy, Pi y Margall was talking about a more substantive conception identified as socialism. Consequently, there were divergences in their conceptualisation within the same democratic family.

I think Martin Conway's recent book on democracy in the twentieth century in Europe illustrates a way of approaching this history very well because every history of democracy involves discussing the concept of democracy.[5] It is difficult, therefore, to disassociate oneself from the contemporary discussion of democracy, because it is the very notion of democracy that is in dispute. In Spain, there is another additional problem, just as in the United States, and we see it in the papers we have read here. There are places where one political party adopted the word as its own name (American Democratic Party from the late eighteenth century onwards, but much more prevalent from the 1820s onwards with Jackson). When this happens it may be difficult for historians to demarcate the history of the Democratic Parties with the history of democracy. And this, for example, can substantially complicate the assimilation of issues such as the defence or the identification of the Democratic Party with slavery. That is why if one wants to explore the history of democracy in the United States, the history of democracy associated exclusively with the history of the Democratic Party is quite complicated. And reading some of the chapters referring to the nineteenth century, sometimes I was not sure whether their authors were studying the history of democracy or the history of the Spanish Democratic Party. Possibly both, but I believe that we must make an effort to draw a precise distinction.

This refers to the first point, where we would inevitably need to address the very complex issue of the conceptualisation of democracy itself, an issue that may well have prevented historians until recently from studying democracy. Precisely at the launch of Joanna Innes and Mark Philp's book on the Mediterranean, *Re-imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean*, Joanna

offered a reflection in this regard.[6] Democracy until recently was a subject for social scientists. With very few exceptions, historians addressed the history of democracy. I can give a couple of examples. Some put me in mind of a meeting with Robert Fishman at the University of Notre Dame, in a meeting we organised with Samuel Valenzuela about elections at the origins of democracy. When we went to discuss the theme of the book that was supposed to come out of the conference, half of the participants suggested that we should not put democracy in the title. We were analysing elections, but for some people what we were studying had nothing to do with democracy. Hilda Sabato's book on the Republic in the nineteenth century does not use the word democracy, except to refer to today's democracy.[7] She talks about the Republic. I asked the question about the omission of 'democracy', where elections and public opinion were examined. She said, 'No, no, my book is not about the history of democracy. I'm on something else, the history of the republic'.[8] We still find great resistance among many historians to address the history of democracy and part of this difficulty lies in the fact that we do not know precisely what democracy is. Then we enter into a normative discussion. I sometimes think that historians are very reluctant to enter into these normative discussions unless we are dealing with intellectual history or conceptual history.

The second point that I want to raise focuses on the narratives constructed about the history of democracy in contemporary Spain and its dissemination inside and outside Spain, which is what our colleagues asked us to do. It is very interesting. What was the narrative as seen from the outside? I reviewed the book by Charles Seymour and Donald Paige Frary, published in 1918.[9] I think it is the first 'global' history of democracy to be written, before James Bryce.[10] A comparative history in two volumes of how the world voted. I had not read the section on Spain. I knew Latin America very well, but the stereotype is quite similar. I don't have time to read them, but the stereotypes are fantastic: popular indifference to democracy or the cliché that Spain does not have the wealth or background of self-government that other nations possess. There are five or six pages that hammer home all those stereotypes that the chapters of this book are challenging.

It is very refreshing to read the papers to see how far we are now from that narrative by Saymour and Frary. They were stereotypes developed from a rather Eurocentric, Atlanticist, Anglo-Saxon vision, if you will, of what democracy was, where a handful of countries saw the birth of democracy, self-government, freedom, as if they possessed that nature; they were destined to be democratic. It would be worth knowing what James Bryce said about Spain because his chapter on Latin America also maintains the same tone of Saymour and Frary, full of racist connotations understanding that these 'inferior' races cannot commit themselves to self-governance.

However, it is important to ask ourselves if, within the revisionist path that I find refreshing and which I also subscribe to, we are not running the risk of going to the other extreme. That is to say, instead of apathetic masses,

we are now arguing that they were super-democratic masses. *Caciquismo* disappears from the texts, although there are obviously allusions to it, for example in the text of Luigi Musella and some others, but in those cases the figure of the *cacique* appears to be something we have moved beyond, and now we are talking about something else. I think it is important to revise perhaps, but at the same time, understand certain limitations. The masses are not always democratic. I think the twentieth century is full of examples where the masses did not support democracy. Let us remember Argentina in the 1970s, for example, or the masses who supported Pinochet's coup.

And finally, very briefly, the question of the spaces of democracy, look-ing at the scales of analysis when studying the history of democracy and the proposal of municipalist culture. Like Robert Fishman, I also welcome this. I come from regional history, and the first book I wrote about history is the history of Barranquilla in Colombia, so I come from regionalism, and it seems to me that these contributions demonstrate a tradition of munici-palist struggles that is quite evident. As is, historically speaking, the certain affinity between decentralising and federalist tendencies with democratising processes. Although it is not clear, I think, whether this relationship was inescapable.

Pamela Beth Radcliff warns about the links between regionalism and the *fueros* that refer back to semi-feudal privileges. And wasn't *caciquismo* often an obstacle to democratising processes? *Caciquismo* is local and municipal or cantonal power. What I want to suggest, and here I would also share Fishman's observation, is that the central State sometimes offers liberalising paths. It is difficult to accept this when one comes from regionalism. For example, in the case of Colombia, it was the issue of security that opened my eyes to the fact that the central State can be oppressive in some things, but oppression sometimes comes from regional mechanisms and oppressive forces that are regionally entrenched.

On the other hand, there is always the risk of approaching the history of democracy from isolated municipalist perspectives. This is not the case of Guy Thomson's work on Andalusia where the Garibaldi connection is made clear nor is it the case of papers on exile, which are dealt with very well by Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina and which are also closely linked to the history of democracy in the Mediterranean and Spain in the nineteenth century.[11]

There is one final reflection that I would like to offer on the idea of not tak-ing the issue of municipalism to the extreme with democracy. And it has to do with the conception of demos, the conception of the people and whether this conception will be limited to the municipality or whether it can be un-derstood to be associated with the region or the nation. I believe that the con-ception of demos is extremely important for understanding the democratic pathways that manage to solve problems and allow democracy to move for-ward. Because if democracy, or the conception of demos, is restricted to those with whom we identify racially or regionally, the problem arises of placing

ourselves in opposition to others. This identification of demos taken to its extreme in municipalist or cantonalist studies can be non-democratising. On the contrary, it can create obstacles to democratising processes.

These would be my main observations with regard to the texts I have had the opportunity to read.

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán

These papers are fascinating because they show, I believe, the complex relationship between historical processes analysed at the local level and democracy as an emerging form of government in the twentieth century. One thing I appreciate is that there is no teleology in these works, but rather a series of political moments with uncertain implications. Often the actors who appear in these studies were not necessarily seeking to promote democracy as their immediate goal, as the example of the insurrection of 1857 analysed by Francisco Acosta (*Chapter 4*) suggests, but they contributed to political change, nonetheless. At other times, in contrast, these actors did believe that they were building democracy according to the parameters of their time, as Eduardo Posada-Carbó mentioned, but the historical evolution of these projects may have led to an authoritarian result despite their aspirations. So, I think this historical uncertainty is particularly interesting in these papers and is greater when we consider the question of scale, insofar as the papers raise the question about the extent to which these local-level political processes ultimately contributed to a Spanish national democratic project.

The main point I would like to highlight is that the democratising mechanisms we find in these papers are extremely diverse. And this suggests to me that in the construction of historical narratives it is advisable to think of these local processes, perhaps, as moments of experimentation with contingent consequences, very varied and uncertain, which occur in different niches of political action, as well as in the context of the creation of historical narratives, rather than as part of a unified genealogy of Spanish democracy.

To explore this idea, there are three questions that I think span all the papers, which I would like to analyse in greater detail. First, how do we know if a historical event is indeed a democratising event? I believe that this point is the key and in part relates to the issues raised by Eduardo Posada-Carbó. Second, what is the relationship in the collective imagination, in the discourse, and in political practice between local democracy and national democracy? This is the problem of spaces and scale. And finally, what is the relationship, not between local democracy and national democracy, but between processes of democratisation at the local level and processes at the national or even international level? I would like to explore these three questions to analyse the diversity of these processes.

The first question implicit in most of the papers is: how do we know when a historical process contributes to the process of democratisation in the long run? And this question interests me a great deal because it is linked to the

concept of a democratising episode that appears in the work of Antonio Herrera and John Markoff (*Chapter 2*). I believe that this question is essential to define this unit of analysis of a democratising episode. And in this sense, I think it is worth thinking perhaps of a typology of democratising episodes and not to think of all democratising episodes as one thing. Here the complexity comes about because these episodes can, in the first place, operate in different dimensions of democratisation. Second, they can operate positively or negatively on the process, promoting the process of democratisation. And, third, they can operate with various registers of inclusiveness.

I would like briefly to develop these three ideas. First of all, I believe that democratising consequences can occur in three dimensions that are not always aligned with each other in the historical process. First, they can contribute to the process of democratisation in the creation of a society of equals that is necessary for the eventual construction of an inclusive citizenship, and this is the most purely democratic component of this political system. Second, these events can collaborate in the creation of a rights-based society that is necessary so that political projects, even those initially identified as democratising, do not evolve towards the arbitrary exercise of power. This is the most liberal component of democracy. And finally, these processes can collaborate in the creation of institutional procedures for sharing power, such as elections and legislative councils. I think this is the most operational and republican component of democracy in practice.

Now, these three dimensions are necessary for democracy, but they are often in tension and conflict. The work of Francisco Acosta (*Chapter 4*) highlights, for example, how Republican leaders had to navigate the tension between the search for greater social equality in land distribution and the idea of a political order based on law, for example. Democratising processes can then operate in any of these three dimensions and can often generate tensions.

Second, in any of these three dimensions events can occur with a positive sense, because there is an explicit attempt to build a democratic order. For example, in the municipalist projects mentioned by Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*) or in the sociability networks mentioned by Guy Thomson in his work (*Chapter 3*). But also, and I think this is the key, these processes can operate with a negative sense because they contribute to the destruction of authoritarian order without necessarily proposing a democratic alternative. In this sense, I think that the contrast made by Francisco Acosta between the two uprisings, 1857/1861, is interesting. And Guy Thomson's idea of insurrectionary democracy has a particularly interesting ambiguity here, in this negative role of the destruction of authoritarian order.

And, third, and perhaps more importantly, I think it is key that democratising events can operate with different registers of inclusiveness. And I would like to highlight this perhaps as the most important point in the conceptualisation of democratising events because I believe that there are events that represent a moment in which a collective actor demands recognition, agency or empowerment, and these moments are often seen as democratising

moments par excellence. However, there is another second type of moment, also very important, in which an actor who pursues recognition or power (or has power) recognises another. My impression is that this moment of recognition of the other, recognition of the legitimacy of the other, rather than the moment of self-mobilisation, is always the historical key to the democratisation process.

The second common question in these papers refers to the relationship between levels of government, to the question of the relationship between spaces of democracy. And I think there are two possible answers to the question of the relationship between spaces. One possible answer is that the municipality is the natural space for the construction and exercise of democracy. It is the space where substantive democracy is achieved in contrast to the formal democracy of the State. Both Robert Fishman and Eduardo Posada-Carbó referred to this issue. I believe that this reading is mentioned in the papers of Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*) and Antonio Herrera and John Markoff (*Chapter 2*), and in this model, local democracy somehow achieves an authenticity, which is not possible at the State level, at the national level. However, there are three implicit tensions, I think, in this first answer that I would like to investigate. The first is that local sovereignty generally conflicts with the pursuit of equality and redistribution. The example of school districts in the United States is enlightening. There are school districts with poor schools, school districts with rich schools and until the 1950s there were school districts with schools legally segregated by race. And this is an example where greater local sovereignty clashes with the principles of equality that we seek in democracy.

This brings me to the second issue, which is that for local democracy to be possible, political decentralisation has to be accompanied by administrative decentralisation, which is a transfer of functions, and for this in turn to be viable, it must be accompanied by economic decentralisation, which is a transfer of resources. So, as Robert Fishman suggested in his commentary, this inevitably places municipalities, especially from the twentieth century onwards, and the regions, provinces, states and the like, however we call them, within the framework of a national political game in which the negotiation of a fiscal pact implies a relationship between the local government, the national government and, in the case of the European Union, eventually the supranational government.

A third tension is, I believe, in the way the municipal sphere is imagined collectively as an urban space. I am not going to linger on this point too much, but there is a tradition that holds until the end of the eighteenth century in which the space of democracy is the space of the city; even the space of the Republic, according to the Italian experience, is the space of the city. However, the municipal democracy we are talking about does not necessarily emerge in cities. And here I find the point that Guy Thomson makes in his work (*Chapter 3*) particularly interesting, which is that, in rural areas where there is not an ecclesiastical hierarchy, that is where secret democratic

societies flourish, not necessarily in the city. So these tensions suggest to me that there is an alternative response to the relationship between levels of national and local democracy. Local democracy is not necessarily more authentic, but it is freer. The local space is possibly the space for experimentation, both institutionally – and I'm thinking here of participatory budgeting in Latin America – and socially. Some experiments are successful, others are infeasible or show unexpected authoritarian sides. But local democracy, in this second alternative, allows us to test the waters before increasing the scale of a political project to the national level.

Finally, and in conclusion, I believe that the third question implicit in these works has a more dynamic perspective and refers to the relationship between the local and the national, not between democracy at these levels, but between the process of democratisation at these levels. And I think there are also two possible answers here that are implied differently in several of the papers. The first possibility is that local political experiences represent the construction of a social base or a local organisational infrastructure that feeds an eventual democratising process that is national in its scope. This ground-up construction can require long periods of gestation, and, in my reading, that this seems to be the process implicit in the text by Antonio Herrera and John Markoff (*Chapter 2*). The point highlighted by Robert Fishman, which I think is interesting, is that this kind of process was possibly viable in the nineteenth century, but it was not as viable in the twentieth century.

The second possibility, I think, is perhaps the reverse, which is that local political experiences, on the other hand, reflect the local appropriation of processes being developed at the national or even international level. Francisco Acosta (*Chapter 4*) emphasises the learning of new rural repertoires as a result of broader organisational processes, and Guy Thomson (*Chapter 3*) highlights in his work the influence of 1848 and the Italian experience on local Spanish dynamics. So, this top–down integration mechanism, as it were, is more immediate and direct, has no generic effect, but it is also functional to national democratisation by synchronising experiences at different levels.

I know that in my commentary I have introduced a wide range of conceptual distinctions, which do not point to an abstract and unified conceptual framework, but rather the opposite. My point is that I believe all these parameters define historical niches and that historical processes, the political processes you are studying, have contributed to the process of democratisation in particular niches, but they might not have contributed to the democratisation process in other niches, and so perhaps conceptualising these niches can be particularly useful and relevant.

Joe Foweraker

The few things that I have in mind to say this afternoon already have a strong degree of overlap with the comments of Anibal Pérez-Liñán, Eduardo Posada-Carbó and Robert Fishman. We are invited to understand all these

events and episodes that the papers analyse and describe in such magnificent detail as a process of democratisation, and we are invited to view this democratisation as a process of political learning. I'm going to address just three questions. The scope of my questions is inevitably constrained by my limited knowledge of Spanish history.

The first question that arises from the papers is how does this political learning take place? The papers present us with a simple choice between associationalism, on the one hand, and political conflict, on the other. I believe that both things must be important to the process. If we take Guy Thomson's chapter (*Chapter 3*) as an example, he seems to bet initially on conflict. There was the clandestine organisation of the Spanish Democratic Party, insurrectionary strategy, civil and popular uprisings and so on. One imagines that if democratic learning is taking place, it is happening through these civil and popular uprisings, and we are invited to consider this as democratic learning. However, from my reading of the papers, these struggles mostly appear to be defensive, aimed at defending the community against *caciquismo*, repression, taxes, military recruitment and so forth. The only proactive or positive element that is present in the papers is the demand for the return of common lands or, more broadly, the *reparto de la tierra* (land distribution). But we are also prompted to consider that perhaps there is also an element of association, social and civil networks, for the purposes of mutual aid and education. Although, as described in Guy's chapter, this appears differentiated to some degree from popular struggles. It seems more like an educated, perhaps more bourgeois activity that runs parallel to the other activities.

The second question that arises in my mind, which has already been touched upon, is what, if anything, these very disparate struggles, conflicts and uprisings have in common. This remains largely unresolved, but Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*) certainly highlights the fact that there is a shifting predominance of different political and ideological currents and strains in different places and at different times: republicanism, federalism, anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism and so on. It's not clear to me how all these things should or can be assimilated into the notion of democratic learning. Francisco Acosta (*Chapter 4*) may have an answer when he says that engagement in popular struggle, whether defensive or proactive, changes the conception of the 'people' who – following Foucault – now become the subjects, not merely the objects, of their own history. There is a process of learning in the sense of achieving a different identity and becoming political protagonists. Or, differently, it may be that what all these struggles have in common is that they are anti-state or revolutionary? Or perhaps they are all struggles in defense of community and community rights? All these possibilities seem to be present in the papers. Is there any possible resolution to this debate?

And finally, there is the key question highlighted by Anibal Pérez-Liñán: What is it that makes these conflicts, these struggles, democratic or democratising? Naturally, if they are indeed all democratic or democratising, then that would resolve the question of what they have in common. Are they all

democratising experiences? And what is it that makes them so? Is it sufficient that the Partido Demócrata Español has 'Democratic' in its title? Is it sufficient that it has a radical and certainly democratic programme, including universal suffrage? I'm not sure that Guy Thomson is at all convinced that it is sufficient. Furthermore, if the Partido Demócrata Español insists, as it does, on an insurrectionist strategy to usher in democracy, then we enter a difficult debate over means and ends, and the kind of historical events and experiences that can count as truly democratising.

Francisco Acosta (*Chapter 4*) confronts this question by suggesting that some popular struggles can count as part of the democratic process, but others cannot. And Antonio Herrera and John Markoff (*Chapter 2*) set out their own criteria for what may or may not make these struggles and experiences democratising, including movement from exclusion to inclusion and especially participation in political decision-making. Subsidiary criteria consider whether the institutional protagonists are organised around horizontal rather than vertical relations, and whether collective action aims to promote and defend public goods rather than private goods. But I'm not entirely convinced that any of these criteria provide us with a definitive threshold for deciding when and where these struggles count as democratising, and when and where they do not.

For many years, I have studied what I call popular movements in the modern period, looking at them in a broadly comparative context. And for me, the shift point, the watershed, always comes with the encounter between social mobilisation – involving political struggle of different kinds – and the development of a language of individual rights, and this proposition holds true across very different times and places. These things, along with the growth of the modern state and other factors, seem to develop simultaneously in history. In a comparative context, the emphasis on individual rights, rather than communal rights, often appears to be the key to transforming specific and local demands, motives and ideas into a common and general process of democratic struggle. In sum, there is now collective action to press for individual rights, whether civil or political. It's a bold statement, and I offer it as an attempt to establish some kind of threshold – though I admit that it may appear at first sight to be a rather restrictive condition, given the huge variety of the historical record in this regard.

But there is no doubt that historical contingencies also play a significant role here, as highlighted in Luigi Musella's chapter (*Chapter 7*) and in the contributions of Anibal Pérez-Liñán and Robert Fishman. Different organisations and actors have different agendas, and there can be crosscutting and overlapping interests. Not everyone gets what they want, but even those with no clear idea of their goals can sometimes play a significant role in the democratic process. The corollary is that organisations and actors do not themselves have to be inherently democratic to advance democratic goals nor do the ideas that motivate their actions. It's a complex process, with historical contexts always open to different outcomes in different degrees.

It should therefore come as no surprise that a reading of these papers can reveal contradictory messages, for it is the democratic process itself that is ambivalent and contradictory. This is the crucial contribution of Luigi Musella's approach to the process. One take-home conclusion of his discussion is that processes of democratisation are only ever partial in their contents and outcomes. In other words, the formal rules of democratic procedure can never entirely supplant the informal rules associated with clientelism and patrimonialism writ large. On the contrary, they combine and interact in myriad ways, both historically and in the contemporary context. Additionally, any process of democratisation – and this is where most democratic theory falls short – can only be understood in relation to the antecedent and parallel process of state formation, which can both constrain and enable the development of democracy. Even where democracy finally emerges, the process is always incomplete, with the procedural and behavioural values of democracy compromised by patrimonial and clientelistic structures and practices. This syncretic combination routinely creates a porous divide between the public and private spheres, with significant consequences for the reach and efficacy of democratic governments and democratic values.

Luigi Musella knows this better than I do, but there is a good Italian pedigree to this argument. For example, post-*Resorgimento*, the introduction of electoral processes in the *mezzogiorno* did little to loosen the grip of deeply entrenched clientelist networks and may have even reinforced them. There is much more to say in this direction, but I'm sure I've taken quite enough of your time. Thank you again for inviting me to join the conversation.

Florencia Peyrou

I found the texts really interesting. I enjoyed reading them. I think they address one of the most interesting points that we could work on right now in the history of Spain in the nineteenth century, which is precisely the politics or democratisation of the rural world. And they are also working on the line, which I believe is a common purpose to all of us here, of situating Spain within normality, if there is such a thing. Many very interesting things have already been said, and I am going to focus a little more on the history of Spain in the nineteenth century.

It is clear that in order to attend to the processes of democratisation, we must pay a great deal of attention to local spaces. Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*) points out in her chapter how municipalism is at the heart of democracy and I would say it is a key piece. The local space is at the centre of the constant tension that exists in modern democracy between representation and direct participation. It is a current debate, how to articulate the way of doing politics in a large state. Thus, municipalist proposals try to facilitate participation. The question of how we guarantee that participation, how that participation is designed remains an unresolved conflict. For years we have had a hegemonic vision of what representative democracy was, but as we

have seen in Spain since the 15M movement of 2011, this question of partici-
pation can always return to the forefront. Pamela Beth Radcliff (*Chapter 1*)
explains it very well: the whole movement and how a political party has been
formed out of this very question.

I think that a comparative approach with other latitudes would be very
interesting here. How are these types of issues discussed in other countries? I
am thinking, for example, of the tradition of French municipalism. It would
be interesting to analyse the circulation of all these models and analyse where
Spain is within this amalgam.

The texts presented here also highlight the strength of republicanism in
the rural world and that it was more important than had previously been
thought. This has already been demonstrated in papers such as that of
Santiago Jaén or Juan Antonio Inarejos.[12] In other words, there are papers
that are moving in that direction, but there is still a lot to be done. Repub-
licanism was a very important force in the rural space and that, I think, is
a Spanish peculiarity. I believe – perhaps I am going out on a limb here –
from what I have read that it did not happen this way, for example, in the
case of France or Italy at that moment in time. That is to say that Spanish
republicanism achieved significant force in the rural world. I do not want
to go to the other extreme either; Eduardo Posada-Carbó has flagged the
danger of assuming that 'they are all Republicans or all Democrats', but
it was much stronger than has usually been believed. And I think this
is evident during the six-year period of democracy, the so-called *Sexenio
Democrático* (1868–1874), which is a relatively under-researched period
of time still, which I think is a key piece to understanding the dynamics of
the nineteenth century.

This force of republicanism has much to do with its defence of federalism
since it appeared in the public space in the 1840s. Federalism is a term that
basically refers to administrative decentralisation if we follow Tocqueville's
idea in *Democracy in America* about political centralisation and administra-
tive decentralisation. The notion of municipal autonomy is defended, and
much of the success of the republican discourse in the rural world derives
from that defence of municipal autonomy, closely related – and this has been
pointed out by Manuel González de Molina, it is not my idea – to the tre-
mendous importance of municipalities in the management of resources and
in the distribution of land, which is one of the central issues of the texts.[13]
That is, republicanism does not have a strong agrarian or rural discourse, but
it enters the rural world, in local spaces, through that defence of municipal
autonomy.

Furthermore, right from their origins, since they appeared in the public
sphere in the 1840s, Republicans defend the realisation of an alternative
model of expropriation. A model that is not associated or linked only to so-
cialists. Here I disagree slightly with something that Francisco Acosta points
out (*Chapter 4*). In other words, this model of expropriation is defended by
all sectors of republicanism. An alternative land distribution model, which

has nothing to do with the attack on private property. It is not exactly the same.

Among the topics covered by the texts I see two dimensions. On the one hand, there are local spaces in which politics occupies a fundamental place, which are not demobilised, as pointed out on many occasions. There is strong political practice. And, on the other hand, there are some republican sectors that defend democracy in the nineteenth century – and I want to link this to another issue that has already been pointed out in the comments. It is the only force that defends democracy until 1870 and beyond. A certain conception of democracy, of course, in the context of a very restrictive regime, in which the local arena, indeed, is almost the only space where movement is seen. It is the sectors that defend this conception of democracy, those that manage to connect with the aspirations, anxieties or fears of an indeterminate number of inhabitants of the rural world, of popular sectors that mobilise at any given moment. Democrats and Republicans will contribute to spreading democratic discourses and practices and to the extent that this is so, they will in a way also contribute to the nationalisation of politics.

In this sense, I would nuance Guy Thomson's idea that the growth of democracy has to do with the absence of a pastoral clergy. Not because this is not so in the spaces he has studied, but because it gives me the feeling that somehow with that conception a very top–down vision is maintained, very much of politics spreading down towards the masses, in contrast with this other idea that there is a series of discourses that connect and that, as shown in other papers, are understood or translated and reinterpreted, adapted, in short, by the sectors that receive them.

There is a very interesting speech given by MP Eugenio Garcia García in the *Cortes* during the *Sexenio* in which he talks about – and which ties in with something I will say later – what he thinks Federalism means for those popular sectors: that the inhabitants of a village can take and do whatever they want. We make, we take and we make all the reforms we want to and there are no institutions.

Republicans act as mediators, they mobilise, they frame, but they will always find themselves torn between that mobilising vocation and the fear that the thing will get out of control, which indeed happens in the town of El Arahal (Seville). But in order to understand these movements, and I'll finish up here, we must take into account what Eduardo Posada-Carbó initially pointed out, that is, what democracy means for these sectors. I get the feeling that the texts do not pay much attention to the changing meanings of democracy or to associated concepts such as participation, freedom, equality or people. If we look at this, I am not fully convinced by the difference that Francisco Acosta points out in his text (*Chapter 4*) between bottom up and top down, especially the latter aimed at taking central power. Throughout this period, Republicans defended a concept of democracy in the local space directly and immediately. That's what I was saying before. This could be seen

during cantonalism, that is, it is the immediate action of 'we are carrying out reforms now'.

On the other hand, it was not a fully inclusive democracy either. The secret societies formed throughout this period that I have studied were quite hierarchical. Taking all this into account, I am very interested in the idea of democratising episodes as laboratories in which to analyse the forces, the dynamics at play, the discourses, the various and unnecessary developments that succeeded those episodes or the consequences that they could have, but at the same time, the causes of future consequences might also not have those goals initially. That is, if we take into account that conception that I believe we share, of democracy as a dynamic process, subject, of course, to unwanted consequences, even to involution, but which can also be configured from causes that did not intend it to happen, then I do not see as much use in the previous theoretical clarifications that Antonio Herrera and John Markoff make at the end of their text (*Chapter 2*), although, logically, we can debate them. So, when I read about the Catholic citizenship studied, for example, by Inmaculada Blasco,[14] I saw in those Catholic women in the twenties that through their struggle they were building a type of citizenship and shaping a political participation that may be at the root of conceding women's right to vote. But if we make the models so clear from the beginning, in such a rigid way, it seems to me that it will be difficult to enter that whole mass of history that is always an unformed mass where we find tremendous variety. In this sense, the question that remains is: how to explain the processes of democratisation starting from a concept that is not restrictive? In other words, starting from a concept that is not the current one, because now we are living within a concept, we have a hegemonic concept, but there is more. If we start discussing what democracy is right now, we will not agree either. So how can we start with a concept that is useful for exploring the past? How can we understand these processes by taking into account those changing visions, changing meanings and constant debates that have taken place throughout the nineteenth century around democracy? How can we use an operational definition that allows us to enter those twisting pathways, those meanderings of history to understand how these processes are produced?

In any case, I think the work being done, which is the key to the renewal of history, of the vision, at least, of the nineteenth century, is important.

Salvador Cruz Artacho

I will try to tackle two questions that have been raised: accounts and spaces. I would like to begin by reaffirming what has already been said about the relevance of the local perspective and the municipal perspective for the analysis of democratisation processes in contemporary Spain. I think it is relevant due to a number of issues that I will raise at the end, but it seems to me that it is also relevant in relation to the narratives and images that, as Eduardo Posada-Carbó pointed out, were in still place at the start of the twentieth

century about the functioning of democracy focused on exceptionality or the supposed incompatibility of democratic modernity with the Spanish political reality. He also stated that this image was already quite different from that of present accounts. However, I am not quite so sure about that. I think it is still present in Spanish historiography, and we do not have to go very far. In manuals published not long ago on contemporary Spanish history we see that democracy has occupied a very secondary or somewhat irrelevant place. I believe that some of the reasons for this absence have to do with a fondness for the exceptionality with which it has been built and with which many passages of contemporary Spanish history have been repeatedly defined. This has also been joined by arguments of backwardness and the reality of failure. Exceptionality, backwardness and failure, therefore, become a cocktail that contrasts the historical reality of contemporary Spain with solid progress along the path of modernity and, therefore, with solid progress towards the construction of democratic societies.

In the 1970s, there are accounts – some continue into the present day in certain areas and media – that conclude with the statement that there was a kind of congenital incompatibility between Spanish history and political cultures and democracy, mainly in studies that have focused on the twentieth century and specifically between the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. It has already been pointed out here that arguments surrounding the prolonged existence of phenomena such as *caciquismo*, or political clientelism, become in these accounts evidence used to justify the veracity of this narrative about the failure of democratic modernisation in Spain. A narrative that is constructed through an exercise in which a social and political context is highlighted, defined by prevailing agrarianism, the protagonism of rural collectives and by the idea of backwardness. All this would have its corresponding political derivatives: apathy, demobilisation, networks of clientelism, which generated unbalanced and deferential relationships that systematically benefit the interests of the oligarchies and which harm citizens' capacity for political action and electoral response. This would explain the reality of the political system and of certain elites who control the market of politics, monopolising and reaching agreements regarding public supply, exclusively wielding executive power, controlling the legislature and setting in motion a highly centralised and hierarchical political-administrative machinery at the service of their interests. This, together with the generalisation of fraud, would determine the veracity of the supposed congenital incompatibility of Spain's historic reality with democracy, at least in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.

This is an account that is not 'neutral' – and which in some cases still endures today – in which, ultimately, the problem is identified with a supposed weakness of civil society, which in this context would have failed in its role as promoter of the democratisation process. Consequently, the root of the problem, to put it very briefly and not spend too long on this now, would not be the lack of public supply on the part of the institutions and political agents, which was rickety, but

supposedly existed, but the absence of civic demand. This absence of demand ultimately justified the permanence of a form of *caciquismo* that guaranteed, more or less perfectly, the functioning of political reality, and also enabled, evidently in a demobilised environment, the party political and partisan usufruct of power, building parliamentary majorities based on the interests of the elites.

In this sense, I believe that the text proposed by Luigi Musella (*Chapter 7*) on this debate about the relationship between tradition and modernity, which he situates in the Mediterranean area, gives us some keys, and even provides some arguments, which we may find useful and interesting in refuting this type of interpretation of Spanish political reality in the twentieth century, on the alleged failure of political modernisation and democratisation, and on those responsible for that alleged failure.

There are very recent papers that continue to defend this narrative today without making practically any changes to the arguments. It is true that there is no reference to alleged evidence or ethnic roots, but it is still maintained that the culprits or the reasons that explain the weaknesses, obstacles and difficulties faced by the process of democratisation must be sought in apathy, in the demobilisation of the working classes. Even when there is evidence that they are mobilised – in a context marked by prevailing agrarianism – it is claimed that they do so always or preferably with revolutionary proposals and behaviours, with anti-democratic proposals that place them at the extremes of the demo-liberal tradition. This is how narratives are constructed, from El Arahal, through to Loja, the cantonalist uprising, the events of Mano Negra, the peasant assault on Jerez, the cycle of peasant struggles of 1902–1905, the Bolshevik triennium and so on and right up to Casas Viejas in the Second Republic. Hence, a common thread is constructed where the most obvious (most characteristic) manifestation of the forms and repertoires of protest and mobilisation of the working classes, fundamentally of the rural working classes, is carried out in a revolutionary and also anti-democratic way, which does not generate any kind of condition or precondition for the flourishing and development of democratic culture.

I believe that approaches such as those presented in these chapters, as well as the examples compiled around the episodes of democratisation at the local scale, offer a great deal of evidence that calls into question the benignity or veracity of this type of narratives. Where they were supposedly not found, where there were no examples of flourishing democratic cultures, where everything was clientelism, where everything was the deference of *caciquismo*, now we find that even though clientelism and *caciquismo* have not disappeared there, there are also episodes of democratisation that I believe allow us to find and build a common thread towards another interpretation of the history of the construction of democracy in Spain that will allow us, in turn, to create a vision of Spanish contemporary history with other key building blocks and means. In my opinion, the texts by Pamela Beth Radcliff, Antonio Herrera and John Markoff and Guy Thomson are moving in this direction. I understand that they are all headed in the same direction.

In order to introduce some elements that I believe may be relevant to the debate, I would draw attention to three issues, which I shall only mention briefly now.

The first deals with questions of space. The recovery of the micro space – I think Anibal Pérez-Liñán has pointed this out before – should not only focus on the dimension of the local but also focus on the rural: the rural sphere as a building space for democracy. This places us in the debate on the supposed 'natural' spaces associated with the construction of democratic cultures. As we know, the more traditional view linked these democratic cultures to modernity, to the expansion of bourgeois society, to the urban sphere and the capitalist market. However, here we have evidence that this is not necessarily the case. In this sense, research carried out in recent years on electoral behaviour shows that even from an electoral point of view this is not so.[15] It reveals how a good portion of electoral adhesions to what we might consider, in the context of political disputes, to be democratic proposals are not located in urban areas, among the urban middle classes, but in small municipalities mostly composed of farmers and day labourers. This highlights the fallacy of the argument that in the process of building democratic cultures and democratisation, the rural world occupied a very marginal place or was not present at all.

In relation to the rural world, I would like to raise the second question. Bearing in mind Putnam's work[16] on the construction of social capital, linked to the existence of phenomena of associationism and the like, I believe that what we have is a space where conflict occupies a central place as a tool and vehicle for building democratic culture and democratisation. In this sense, the studies of Antonio Herrera, Francisco Acosta and other historians in the group that have been working for a few years now on the rural reality of Andalusia show that associationism can become a vehicle for promoting attitudes of cooperation and solidarity, but that rural conflict itself also becomes a vehicle – not necessarily a direct equation – that builds solidarities and cooperation mechanisms that can then be translated into democratic promotion. In relation to conflict as a vehicle for the construction of democracy in rural areas and in local spaces, I am struck by the fact that, especially when we talk about the twentieth century, not so much the nineteenth, in these accounts the Left and the republican demo-liberal tradition are present, but socialists less so, when in reality of southern Spain in the first one-third of the twentieth century, socialism is building channels of participation and leadership of conflict in the rural area; in short, it is also building democratic culture. This happens in Spain. If I am not mistaken, Luigi Musella will also be able to confirm this, this also occurred during the so-called *Biennio Rosso* in many parts of the Italian agri-industry. I believe that they are also part of this process of building democracy.

Finally, and this has already emerged, reiterating the argument of the local space as being key in the construction of democracy can lead us to a kind of opposition with the national sphere. I think that to understand this local/

national relationship properly, or at least that is the impression I have, I think we must think not of a relationship of opposition but rather of a relationship of mutual influence, interrelation. Normally, what has prevailed in Spanish political history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in its more traditional accounts, has been a top–down vision from the national down to the local. I believe that the perspectives presented in this meeting allow us to complement that top–down vision with a more complex interpretation, where protagonism in the process of building political cultures does not necessarily have to emerge and cascade down from central institutions and certain national actors. Instead, they can also, and we believe this to be so, be built and developed at local levels, sometimes also influencing the discourses of national political actors, or they can even end up transforming those discourses by incorporating certain popular world views and local traditions. I believe that this makes the relationship between the local and national spheres a much more complex relationship than might be suggested in terms of the primacy of one area over another.

Debate for a new research agenda on democracy

Ángel Duarte Montserrat

Simply to open the debate, I will focus on three issues. Before that, I would like to thank all the commentators for their work, reading and analysing the texts. They have probably raised more questions, but at the same time they have done something that has been particularly fruitful, which is to frame these new questions within clearer, more substantive analytical frameworks that will improve our research.

A number of questions occurred to me, which I would like to put on the table. First of all, it seems to me that in processes of democratisation, understood in the broad sense of term, it would not be a bad idea to reclaim what we normally remove from the democratising process, which is apathy. Apathy as a characteristic of low-intensity democracies that, not in the nineteenth century but progressively, are being built and end up generating dynamics of criticism at the same time. Normally we tend to focus on moments in which experiments occur – experimental moments according to Anibal Pérez-Liñán – in which there are conflict processes, in which, in a very chronologically limited way, which apparently burn out quickly in time, high intensity expressions of citizenship occur. As in the column that reaches El Arahal from Seville and to which Francisco Acosta refers in his chapter (*Chapter 4*), when there is an episode of a certain meta-political equalisation of the inhabitants of the municipality, of those who participate in the revolt. But I think we must also insist on the importance of apathy and the interplay of contrasts recorded amidst the slow construction of low-intensity citizenship.

On the other hand, we have those experimental moments in which a certain peak is reached, probably fading away, but which leaves a layer below

the surface. It leaves a substratum in the language of democracy and in the memory of democracy, in the collective memory of subjects who have an experience fundamentally in the local environment, but not only in the local environment. I believe this is important because it reappears later in democratising political battles, during the *Sexenio*, but also during the Restoration and the first few decades of the twentieth century.

Second, I think we are very reticent when it comes to talking about conflict. I am not at all clear that in the process of democratisation, episodes of violence, and I will use the term, can't contribute to the constitution, no longer of a framework of meta-political equality, but the abrupt liquidation of forms of domination or exploitation that are understood to block full participation in decision-making.

Finally, I would like to make a comment on Salvador Cruz's last contribution. I am not sure about this disconnect between socialism and republicanism as democratic political cultures. The socialists that I am coming across in my research at the moment in Córdoba are people who come from a world where popular struggles have been closely shared, connected with regard to materials, values, forms of collective action and forms of social action, with a plebeian republicanism that feeds on memories like those of El Arahal or Loja.

Antonio Herrera

I have a lot of questions about your comments and the texts themselves, but I have managed to group them into three, relatively simple ones.

The first has to do with something fundamental that was raised at the beginning by Robert Fishman, and that I think that in general all of us who are present at this seminar would agree with and that is the importance of the historical context. Of course, there are obviously many texts in this seminar that cover a very broad period of contemporary history and when it comes to pinning down many of the ideas raised in the texts and comparing contexts, we might fall into the trap of anachronism or presentism. But precisely for this reason I believe that it is necessary, and we seek not only to study the discourse or the very concept of democracy and how it has evolved and changed over time but also to study political practice, that is, more or less democratic political actions in each context. There is no contradiction between one thing and another. I think that is what we are trying to do: to study precisely in its context the most material part of democracy. And that is why I feel the need to emphasise this material part, since almost all texts speak in one way or another of inequality, of equal access, for example, to resources or to decision-making on resources. They talk about exclusion or inclusion in that decision-making. In many cases we look for actions that are somehow related to cooperation and not to competition or individualism. And here we can find common questions. And why do we seek this? Because they are indeed the expressions of working classes or groups we are talking about.

Unfortunately, we cannot ask anyone from the nineteenth century, and the sources do not give us many clues about those working-class groups that we are now looking at with a magnifying glass on the local scale. What remains is to study conflict in its material context, protest in its material context or associationism, of course, in each of these contexts. That is where I believe that, as Eduardo Posada-Carbó said, we actually run the risk of moving to the other extreme by idealising democratising capacity in local areas. I understand that criticism. And indeed, I agree that we must be careful in this, but we must, I believe, combine both strands. The concept of discourse analysis, obviously, and the material part, which must not be forgotten.

The second question is a very brief one. I think they are not just moments of experimentation. We should not understand the episodes we are talking about, episodes of democratisation, only as moments of experimentation or as laboratories, since we encourage those who understand these episodes as laboratories or failed experiments of democratisation, as extemporaneous experiments. Oddities within a pre-written normalised history. Thus, we fall into the trap once more of the narrative of backwardness. The reading again would be that these are moments of experimentation in contrast to the right and proper construction of modelled representative liberal democracy. I sincerely believe that many of these episodes that we see at the local level are an integral part of the process of democratic construction, even on the national scale. Florencia Peyrou said, and I think this needs to be said without too much fuss, that they also construct the Nation from the local scale, obviously. Of course they do. A very clear example of this is in the text by Guy Thomson (*Chapter 5*), which explains how what happened in Loja had a direct influence on the formation and construction of the Democratic Party in Spain.

The Socialists who, through Kautsky's influence, end up assuming a very, let's say, top–down discourse, focusing on the workers and very insensitive to agrarian problems, become permeable to social mobilisation, mainly trade unions, but to bottom–up social mobilisation, in other words, from the local level. And in the end, they build an agricultural programme and realise that an agricultural programme must be built, no matter how much the worker prototype was that of a factory worker. In other words, the national political dimension is also built from the local level, and there are examples in many different moments of history. No one could fail to notice that, in the most recent period, from the democratic transition onwards after the death of Franco, what we call the Recovery of Historical Memory was born at the local level and from municipal actions of the first democratic municipalities in 1979 and 1983. And yet there was no National Historical Memory legislation in Spain until 2007. That is, again another example of how the push comes from the local level, building towards the national. That is to say, I think they are not only extemporaneous episodes, more or less strange, but rather they are an inherent part of democratic construction.

Third, and finally. Of course, as it is very difficult to classify episodes of democratisation, most of us have taken the easy route, perhaps following the influence of Robert Putnam, to associationism, which is the 'easiest' expression to understand and easier to study. And we have reached another element that Salvador Cruz mentioned, and which Joe Foweraker also pointed to, and which I believe to be fundamental: conflict. That is, social conflict also generates a democratic culture. It is possible to study conflict. It is a source that is often more indirect, but we must try to incorporate it into the analysis. And, therefore, and now the reference here is Florencia Peyrou, it is necessary to theorise, not so much democracy as a definition but the process of democratisation. And I agree with her: being flexible, especially when we are looking at the rural world. Otherwise, we will not be able to understand the process of democratisation. But being flexible, I think that we must inevitably talk about this kind of thing, theorising about the processes of democratisation, making, as Florencia Peyrou puts it, the processes of democratisation operative. And hence John Markoff's and my own interest in our text (*Chapter 2*) in proposing a classification, establishing criteria, as Aníbal Pérez-Liñán himself has also sought to do in his suggestive contribution, without laying down a single and exclusive definition of the democratisation process.

Pamela Beth Radcliff

I will raise three points. The first has to do with the question of definitions, in this case, between localism and municipalism, a distinction that is not present, for example, in Francisco Acosta's chapter (*Chapter 4*). It seems important to me to distinguish between the local space as a place of political practices and municipalism as a collective imagining of what happens in this local space. And I also find the relationship between the two concepts interesting, because municipalism emerges partly because of the tradition of the local space as a site of political practices. In this sense, municipalism is in part a product of this practical tradition and therefore the fruit of a dynamic relationship between theory and practice, and this seems to me an interesting question.

The second point concerns the distinction between the nineteenth and twentieth century. As Robert Fishman has said, practices in the nineteenth century are not the same in a context in which there was no democratic state versus what happened in the twentieth century in contexts such as Franco's dictatorship or the period of democracy. I absolutely agree, but for me the question is why movements, in the nineteenth or twentieth century, return to local power at different historical moments, as a collectively imagined space where we can make democracy. That is the question. What does municipal power mean in the debates about participation and representation? As Florencia Peyrou said, those debates that are still ongoing have not been conclusive; we are still having them today and, therefore, it seems clear that there is a temporal continuity in the return to the municipal space within the

collection imagination, something different from the space as a site of political practices.

And the third question concerns the need to problematise certain issues. The unitary pathway of political modernisation has been a recurring theme in several of the texts, and I think it is very important. Because as far as teleology is concerned, political modernisation predetermines our concept of the process of democratisation. Following, for example, someone like Tilly, a process of democratisation has been suggested to begin at the local level and ends at the national level and is understood to be a process in which the national progressively replaces the local. There is a teleology of development. But what I think we are establishing here is that there is a permanent interrelationship, between the local and the regional and the national and the transnational as well. And in this relationship, there is not one pathway that ends at the end of history; it is an interrelationship whose directionality changes at different political moments.

If you will allow me, I would like to add a brief fourth point, or slight nuance. I agree that it is important to identify who the political subject is: the individual, the community, the class, the nation, but there is also a distinction between the collectively imagined political subject and the political subject of protests or associations at the local scale.

Luigi Musella

Thank you for organising this seminar, which I have found very enriching and useful. I also have three points that I would like to comment on. The first, on the concept of democracy. I believe that the term democracy is very ideologically charged and, like many of the terms used in political history, it runs the risk of not being able to analyse concrete facts as well as of idealising them. I believe that, if we want to analyse the facts and often national situations concretely, we find ourselves very often facing interwoven relationships between traditional and modern worlds. I am convinced that often even undemocratic forms, such as clientelism or *caciquismo*, actually contribute to the democratisation process. This applies to democracy, but it also applies to other terms. Personally, I would prefer to talk about political participation, as I think it is a broader and more elastic term that often allows us to understand returns. It is not true that we are always moving towards democracy: there can be returns, steps forward and back, reconstructions and decompositions of the State. It is not always a point of arrival, but often a point of return. And we must bear that in mind. That is my first point.

My second point concerns the role of the *notable* in the democratisation process. It is very useful, in my opinion, to include this figure as a social actor in our analysis. The *notable* is often associated with the rural world and agrarian society, but not always. Even those who are not landowners can assume behaviours and demeanours that make them resemble a *notable*. The French use the term *notabilité* to refer to this. This leads us to the problem

of contextualising, as Eduardo Posada-Carbó said at the beginning. I think that through the figure of the *notable*, we can compare, for example, the nineteenth-century nobleman with someone who plays the role of the *notable* in the twentieth century, with lawyers who assume the behaviour of a *notable*. That is my second point.

The third and final question has to do with the idea of the sequence followed by historians, since we often tend to operate as if we had precise stages, as if there were a finality, a teleology, in history. In reality, if we return to the theorist who gave us many of these categories, Max Webber, he defined power as the possibility for an actor within social relations to follow his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which he supports that power. That is why, in my opinion, there are forms of consensus, not only in democracy at the institutional level but also in the organisation of consensus, even in dictatorial regimes, in other words also in regimes that we often consider undemocratic. But a regime is always maintained if it somehow has the legitimacy of those who allow themselves to be led. Rebellion occurs when the subordinate does not recognise power, but when there is correspondence between those who lead and those who are led, there is somehow a transfer.

Antonio Herrera

I wanted to ask Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, in relation to his contribution, a few questions concerning the operation of the concept of democratisation itself. When quote unquote 'trying', and with the necessary flexibility that Florencia Peyrou advocated, to classify episodes of democratisation, I think we should be clear at least when these events democratise and when they do not. And among the different criteria, you said at one point that they have a positive sense or a negative sense, but I'm not sure exactly what you meant. What John Markoff and I argue in our chapter (*Chapter 2*) as positive or democratising are actions or episodes that in some way, consciously or unconsciously, provide public goods and services versus other types of actions that provide goods and services, say, of a private nature. And this allows us to carry out a reading of the process we are trying to analyse in the twentieth century of two very different realities. On the one hand, the oligopolisation of power, the concentration of power in a few hands, with tools and instruments, such as *caciquismo* or political clientelism, which are instruments for precisely that of the oligopolisation of power, even if it is changing scale right now, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or, in contrast to this, the process of democratisation.

Obviously, this is much more complex, but you must have a mental scheme to try to pin it down in the episodes we are analysing. That is where we see that positive sense towards democratisation, although there is obviously no predefined path. And the other process, let's say, of concentrating power in a few hands, more exclusionary and therefore in a negative sense, has to do with the provision of goods and services in general terms, public

or private, which is something that, I think, Joe Foweraker himself high-lighted and which he found interesting. I don't know whether that is your idea, or whether the positive and negative aspect means something differ-ent. Or if you are talking about radicalism and moderation in the process of democratisation.

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán

I can quickly respond to the distinction I made between positive and nega-tive contributions. I think they have to do with what you are saying about positive contributions. There are processes, it seems to me, that are the most distinctively democratising, in which the process or event constructs a democratic infrastructure in some way, creating this network of public goods provision or creating an organisational network that is then activated at a certain moment. And often, as Florencia Peyrou pointed out, this is in-tertwined with different conceptions of democracy that emerge at different times. But my reference to the negative contribution has to do with a form of contribution to the democratising process, which is less evident, but which connects with the issue that Ángel Duarte referred to earlier on about the role of violence. There are processes that do not necessarily have a democratising objective per se, which do not necessarily invoke a democratic discourse but which fulfil the function of destroying the previous order, even if they prom-ulgate an alternative order that would not be democratic. They are functional in destroying or destabilising the previous order, that order of concentrated power. I believe that these forms of destabilisation or destruction of the previ-ous order, although their credentials may not be as democratic as the others, sometimes make an unexpected contribution.

Robert M. Fishman

What I want to say has to do with the points raised by Antonio Herrera and also with what Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has just mentioned. I would like to suggest, first of all, that I fully agree with Aníbal Pérez-Liñán that a revo-lutionary or violent action that destroys elements of the conservative and undemocratic order can contribute to democracy without intending to do so. But having said that, if we compare revolutions, we also see that quite generally there are some revolutions that give rise to democracy and there are others that do not. I have seen this in my work comparing the Portu-guese and Spanish cases. The fact that the Portuguese revolution of 1974 was such an important experience for democracy has to do with the fact that the historical process intertwined the revolution, on the one hand, with all that it involved, and on the other hand, the construction of new democratic institutions based on the calling of free elections. Therefore, the experience of a revolution that destroys the old order can lead to something that is very much in line with what Ángel Duarte commented on before, which is the

rapid creation of a high intensity citizenship. And a revolutionary experience can have that experience.

In this sense, one of the readings he advised is Sewell's great work on the storming of the Bastille and the creation of a new discourse, and the idea of revolution, at that time.[17] I think that Sewell's article is fundamental, and it posits how some historical episodes of great intensity manage to change the culture in a fast and profound way. And I think that has a lot to do with what Ángel Duarte was indicating, which I found immensely important.

But it is also true that some experiences that initially seem very promising for democratisation end up being very disappointing in the end. We have the current case of Nicaragua. We have the case of Egypt and many other cases. And in that sense, I believe that the tendency to study hopes and aspirations, deep experiences based on mobilisation, is enormously important. But it is not appropriate to lose sight of the relevance of institutions at the State level and of the legal guarantees of freedom, which is another issue indicated earlier or highlighted by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. In that sense, I believe that our work should intertwine different types of analysis: an analysis that focuses strongly on mobilisation at the municipal or local level; an analysis that focuses on the way in which these mobilisations interrelate with politics at the state level; an analysis that focuses on cultural transformation, and so on. I think one of the great advantages of history is that it has a very holistic view, intertwining very much of the human experience. And if I can ask anything from my historian friends, please never lose that holistic view of human experience.

Joe Foweraker

I just wanted to respond a little to this current conversation. Anibal Pérez-Liñán's contribution is very valuable, as well as Robert's response to that. I think he is right that struggles or conflicts at the grassroots level can undermine authoritarian or autocratic forms of government and open the way to democratisation processes. We do not have to look very far for an example, which is Spain in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. The emergence of *Comisiones Obreras* and the critical role played by the Spanish Communist Party, one of the more authoritarian organisations to emerge from that process, worked to penetrate and colonise the apparatus of the Sindicato Vertical through a process of legal and extra-legal struggle. This comprehensive, institutional expression of Francoism was systematically penetrated by opposition forces, which did not necessarily mean that their demands were democratic, certainly not in the early years. Nor did it mean that the actors were motivated by democratic ideas or that the organisations involved were themselves democratic.

But there is a transformation process where demands that are originally material, having to do with work conditions, life conditions and survival, get translated into a democratic language of demands for civil and political

rights, partly because of the repressive response of the regime itself. So, this is not a single moment in time, like the attack on the Bastille, but a process that gradually turns into a democratising process, although it did not begin as such. Such a process can be slow and stretch over many years, and it is in that stretch that we see the political and democratic learning that has been eloquently explored here. That is part of the ambivalence and contradictory nature of these processes.

Without the building of the organisation of *Comisiones* as a grassroots level, we wouldn't have had these very high degrees of social mobilisation at the national level in the early 1970s, which provided the impetus for the Transition after Franco's death. Many ideological currents were running through those movements, anarchist, socialist, communist, Catholic and many more. But a formal idea of democracy was not immediately available in the minds of the actors, although these were imbued with elements of ideology, traditional struggles and political loyalties. But the process produces the product, and the product is not immediately available in the minds of the actors.

Francisco Acosta

I will also follow the unwritten precept of briefly presenting three questions, some of which I suspect have already been addressed. I would like to start by commenting on a term, that of democratic or democratising episodes, recurrent in the texts and in the debates that we are looking at. Certainly the proposal of Capoccia and Zibblat,[18] who popularised the notion in an article, seemed very suggestive, although we note that it might require some nuancing, insofar as the concept of 'episode' can refer to an accidental, one-off or extraordinary event – in a sense, exceptional. However, we understand that in the nineteenth century there is a continuing democratising practice, which manifests itself in the case of agrarian societies in the form of protest and systematic resistance against the model, implementation and deployment of agrarian liberalism in southern rural societies. This process has a continuous, systematic response, in the form of such democratising expressions, very diverse, very varied in nature, as we tried to show in several of the texts. However, they converge in this democratising perspective or in this democratising character, contributing to the growth of a political culture that will nourish Spanish democracy in a broad and diverse sense.

I would like to raise a second question concerning spaces and scales of analysis and the interrelations between the central sphere of power and the local spheres in the Spanish historical process of the past two centuries. Radcliff makes a very brilliant effort to summarise some of the key aspects of that interrelation between the central and the local spheres. A conflictive interrelation in the case of Spain. The different versions of Spanish liberalism that articulated the State during the nineteenth century shared a distrust – even a fear – of the local level, which did not, however, prevent mutual impregnation from occurring between the two spheres. For example, the national

sphere, the socialisation of the nation is clearly, at least in my view, a top–down impregnation, from the central to the local. The local sphere does not produce that idea of the nation, which ends up being assimilated more or less effectively according to the territories. And yet we have also seen some examples of bottom–up impregnation starting in the local sphere. Democracy itself, understood, for example, as equality, as a demand for material equality, is a bottom–up impregnation towards the State that must be assimilated into a complex and not always easy process.

One last idea. It seems to me that in all the contributions and approaches we are making here there is an underlying current political debate or that is currently present in the public sphere, which is the tension – and we return again to the question of concepts – between different perspectives of democracy and democratic. A tension between what we might call a communitarian or communalist democracy, more direct, and which we seem to glimpse in certain local practices during the nineteenth century, and a more formal democracy that has historically been substantiated in its representative liberal version. And I do not know if this tension is appropriate or explanatory and operative in analytical terms, and in what sense it might be, in the issue that concerns us.

Antonio Herrera

I wanted to talk about something that Robert Fishman has raised. I fully agree with him – and I think in general all of us here do – in his assessment that we must always combine the two strands of this process of democratisation that we are talking about, and not forget the obviously institutional part and the national scale, which is certainly fundamental. We certainly do not disregard these aspects of national construction and national institutions. What is being proposed by the working group that supports a good many of the papers we are discussing is that this part of the National State Building Process has been almost the only perspective studied, that is, the most developed aspect among Spanish historians and sometimes almost exclusively. I think Pamela Beth Radcliff puts it very clearly in her text. What we are arguing is that, in this process of national construction that has to do with the dynamics of democratic construction, with advances, with setbacks, with waves, of course, with dictatorships, the local sphere also participates, and it does so actively. In other words, it is not an accident, but the local level has an impact on this articulation of Spanish institutional arrangements. We are not trying to contrast the national and local part of construction; we are simply trying to incorporate into the discourse and the story of the political construction of Spain the importance of the local scale, be that greater or lesser, but undoubtedly important. And this is very clear in our specific case, that for years now we have been studying the rural world that has been marginalised in a country that up until the 1960s was eminently rural. Studying the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century and excluding the

rural world means not understanding the history of democracy. Our working group began with the need to incorporate the rural world into the study of politics, to incorporate it into discourses about the past. We started by seeing that rural subjects were not apathetic and then we saw that, not only were they not apathetic, but they participated, of course, in a broad concept of politics, effectively not restricted or merely institutional.

I would like to finish by highlighting the results of a project led by Salvador Cruz and in which some of us were involved, where we dismantled some of those clichés about political apathy.[19] We analysed all electoral results at the municipal level from universal suffrage in 1890 to the transition years. That is to say, what each municipality in Andalusia voted for, just over six hundreds of them, for a hundred years. And we saw how widely accepted standard interpretations were called into question, such as the assumption based on interpretations such as those of the great historian Javier Tusell referring to the period of the Restoration in Andalusia (1874–1923), who argued that the progressive vote that supported non-dynastic options (Republicans and Socialists) came mainly from the urban world. When analysing the election results, we were surprised to see that most of the votes for Republicans or Socialists, obviously minority compared to the parties in office, did not come from urban areas, large or middle-sized cities but mainly from towns and villages in Andalusia, which constitute the rural world.

I think it is necessary to add this part to the best-known account of the political history of Spain, which until now has not been fully incorporated into the most widely known and disseminated narratives.

Manuel González de Molina

It is an honour for me to be here, because I am learning a lot this afternoon from everything being discussed. I would like to reinforce something that has already been said. I think that often when we talk about this issue, we confuse or tend to confuse collective agency in demand or in search of a process of democratisation, on the one hand, and institutional areas, on the other hand. When we talk about institutionality, we must talk about the regulation of social relations and that has a different territorial framework depending on where we are in history. This seems to me to be very relevant, and we have learned it from political ecology, precisely because they are essentially small and territorially very localised areas that mark the decisions taken regarding the management of natural resources, not only natural but also social. And insofar as the centre of social relations is essentially local, the fight for access to decision-making has to be a local fight as well. Consequently, this implies that, first, democratic practice cannot be seen from top to bottom as it has traditionally been viewed but must be seen locally and across a very broad dimension of time. And consequently, we have to talk about democracy or democratic practices from the agrarian revolution onwards and in traditional communities and peasant communities where there have been very clear

dynamics of co-management, of collective management development. There is too much literature backing this to try and argue that the only exclusive area of decision-making is that of the State.

I also believe that we must separate the scope of agency from institutionality. In terms of agency, we must distinguish between those that seek an explicit claim to participate in decision-making and which we could consider relatively democratic, and others – I think it was Aníbal Pérez-Liñán who raised this – that actually have a positive impact on access to decision-making, even if, from the perspective of its formulation, they do not contain this element. Well, I could give my own example as an anti-Francoist militant associated with the Communist Party and organisations on the far left, where what we really wanted was to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. And, let us say, therefore, intended or unintended, that would be another matter, we managed to get the Franco regime to evolve, even if there was, if not expressly, at least *de facto*, a democratic rupture. I mean by this that institutionality must be clearly separated from collective action.

And as for institutionality, we must separate certain historical moments from others to know where decision-making capacity is concentrated. Right now, for example, in a globalised world, we would have serious problems locating this within the Nation State. I believe that this issue is also perfectly established, although post-Trump, there has obviously been a return to the sphere of the Nation State, but in general terms, globalisation has meant another leap of scale in terms of where institutionality is located.

I say this simply because I believe that political ecology raises certain criteria and, let's say, gives some 'advice', which could be very useful in establishing a historical analysis of democracy in a temporal dimension.

Robert M. Fishman

I would just add a few words very briefly. I strongly agree and I think we all agree on the great importance of rural mobilisation in Andalusia, and in large mainly agricultural areas of Spain, and on the great importance of these mobilisations for progressive movements and for democracy. But what I wanted to suggest succinctly is something that I think is in the spirit of much of the research presented by the historians here, and which has to do with the importance of distinguishing between mobilisations that try to seek and deepen solidarity with those living in other environments, other localities, other social situations and those that instead almost completely lose sight of the search for and defence of solidarity and which concentrate exclusively on the concrete lived experiences of the localities where people are mobilised. I believe that this difference is both old and very current, with very profound consequences for democracy. The mobilisation of those who seem socially to be more or less similar can be a mobilisation that builds bridges with other actors who are in other situations, other localities, other circumstances. Or it can give up on that effort, and I think the consequences are profoundly

important and that historians can contribute a lot in terms of understanding the pathways that give rise to one way or the other.

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán

I think we have two hypotheses on the table that are very interesting for historical research. One is the one that Robert Fishman just mentioned, which is the idea that social mobilisation is democratising when it builds solidarities beyond the immediate demands being made. And the other one, which I think is similar but perhaps analytically different, is the one that Joe Foweraker put forward at the beginning, which is the idea that social mobilisations are democratising when they articulate a discourse of rights. I think it is very interesting to put these two hypotheses together as a research project. I would also venture a third idea that I think has been floating around in this conversation and which is latent in much of the work, especially in the work of Guy Thomson (*Chapter 3*). It is not fully articulated in the chapters, but it has been very present in this conversation, and it is the idea that social mobilisations build, beyond rational discourses on democracy, affective bonds that later constitute social actors. And perhaps this is also a potential research hypothesis.

Joe Foweraker

Well, just to add one or two points. Anibal Pérez-Liñán was kind enough to pick up on one of the points that I made earlier regarding solidarities. When I referred to a language of rights (this is in relation to what Robert Fishman has to say about solidarity being built out of the community or workplace), I do not see these things as mutually exclusive in terms of their analytical power. The language of rights, understood as an ensemble of civil and political rights, draws on distinct traditions that have coalesced historically around liberal and democratic strands, and the historical encounters between them. They provide a universal toolbox that proves to be strategically economical and effective wherever you are, whatever your specific struggle and whatever kind of motivations you have. All of that can be assimilated to this common language of rights, which has the crucial historical role of providing specific struggles with a general language of communication and a way of bringing disparate and separate demands together under a common umbrella. But this does not exclude solidarities emerging from community or workplace that may precede, coincide with or follow encounters between social mobilisation and a language of rights. The process of learning a common language of rights does not exclude these communities and solidarities, however they are built, because these can create the capacity for mobilisation and learning. Thus, I do not see these things as mutually exclusive but as symbiotic.

The other tiny thing I wanted to bring to the conversation is the rural landscape of Spain, which has been much commented on. Of course, part of

the huge research effort of your project has been to complicate that question and say, no, this is not a simple world of *campesinos* and *jornaleros*. It is far more differentiated and complex than that. I just simply wanted to support that point because all those years ago when I was interviewing people in El Marco de Jerez (Cádiz), I was interviewing people who formed part of a tradition in one of the oldest working classes in the world, older than the working class of Manchester, England. That's just one tiny example of the huge variety and diversity of rural Spain and, of course, of rural Andalusia, which is very different from the west to the east, from the mountains to the plains, and much else besides.

In terms of the general conversation that I tried to promote, drawing on Luigi's chapter, what struck me strongly at the time (especially with reference to El Marco de Jerez), and also to many British historians of Andalusia, is that it provides an extraordinary panoply for the study of these kinds of questions, the things that we are talking about today, because of the enormously stark divides between oligarchy, on the one hand, and *lo popular*, on the other. The oligarchy of Andalusia must have been, historically speaking, one of the most visible, one of the most arrogant, one of the most shameless in the world. Indeed, *'los señoritos' de Jerez* could be said to have provided a perfect parody of what an oligarchy should look like!

Antonio Herrera

I fully agree with you. The difficult part is not only studying the rural world or its complexity. What we are finding is how difficult it is to convey that complexity to our fellow historians. Sometimes political scientists and sociologists and anthropologists understand it better than our fellow Spanish historians who, I don't know why, are reluctant to incorporate the rural world into their narratives. And they are still talking about backwardness, delay, very simplistic ideas, when with an exercise such as the one you did for the pre-transition period in El Marco de Jerez, you saw that complexity immediately. In other words, the challenge is not the research itself, but to effectively convey it. And I think we are putting forward evidence here today that there are enough elements to build another story. Otherwise, without incorporating the rural world and its complexity, we will not understand history, in this case of Spain.

Pamela Beth Radcliff

I wanted to make another distinction of terms. I don't remember who introduced the concept of political socialisation in their text as a parallel process to democratisation, but it is not the same thing. Part of your project on Andalusia insists on the political socialisation of the population in the nineteenth century, which is something different from a process of democratisation. Democratisation requires a prior process of political socialisation and may or

may not be intertwined. In the debate between, for example, intentions and results, we must distinguish, as many people here have done, between democratic ideology and the processes and practices they produce.

I really liked Ángel Duarte's concept of high-intensity citizenship. This is a process of political socialisation, of producing episodes in which the person becomes a high-intensity citizen. And that is not always democratising, but it can be channelled, and the result can be democratising. Well, that's the argument that I make in the book on democratic citizenship during the Franco regime.[20] In those associations, people did not have democratic ideas at the beginning, but they followed practices that generated a process of political socialisation between them, and the result was a high-intensity citizenship that was hard for the Franco regime to control.

Antonio Herrera

Precisely on this I would comment on a question, since we have had many previous debates regarding what you've just said and hence our endeavour to differentiate concepts. Indeed, fascists were also high-intensity citizens. Hence the difference made in the text by Francisco Acosta or in that of John Markoff and me, between the process of political socialisation and that of democratisation. Not all processes of political socialisation generate a democratic culture. In fact, the opposite can happen. In the inter-war period, there was a very strong process of political socialisation, among others, of peasant sectors, which, as we know and have studied, end up embracing fascism and fully anti-democratic options. The possible keys to determine which actions effectively generate democratic political socialisation and which generate political socialisation that we could not classify as democratic, could be, as we said before, in the levels of inclusion or exclusion, in the participation that is being proposed, which future project is proposed or, effectively, whether they provide public services and goods or not. That is why John and I tried at the end of our text (*Chapter 2*) to establish some classification criteria, among other reasons because of what you said, to differentiate very clearly between one process and another, since they are different. Democratisation is a form of politicisation, but it is not the only one. Of course, our episodes, which we include in the project and are analysing, are processes of democratic politicisation.

Notes

1 The participants were Robert M. Fishman, sociologist and political scientist (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Eduardo Posada Carbó, historian (University of Oxford); Anibal Pérez-Liñán, political scientist (University of Notre Dame, USA); Joe Foweraker, political scientist (University of Oxford), Florencia Peyrou Tubert, historian (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) and Salvador Cruz Artacho, historian (Universidad de Jaén). Ángel Duarte, historian (Universidad de Córdoba), and Manuel González de Molina, historian (Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain), also participated in the debate.

2 The texts of Jesús Redondo Cardeñoso, Claudia Guarisco and Ángel Duarte were incorporated after the seminar when compiling this volume so they were not debated in the Seminar. However, because they share the same approach and methodological line, the editors feel that the comments are also applicable to these three texts.
3 Fishman, 2004.
4 See https://re-imaginingdemocracy.com/re-imagining-democracy-the-global-project/.
5 Conway, 2020.
6 Innes and Philp, 2019.
7 Sábato, 2021.
8 Posada-Carbó, Hébrad and Sábato, 2022.
9 Seymour and Paige Frary, 1918.
10 Bryce, 1921.
11 Isabella and Zanou, 2016.
12 Jaén Milla, 2014, 2016; Inarejos Muñoz, 2006.
13 González de Molina, 1995.
14 Blasco, 2018.
15 Cruz Artacho, 2014.
16 Putnam, 2000.
17 Sewell, 1996.
18 Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010.
19 Cruz Artacho, 2014.
20 Radcliff, 2019.

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Contributors

Salvador Cruz Artacho is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Jaén. His work mainly focuses on political-electoral history, political socialisation processes and their relationship with mobilisation and socio-labour conflict in twentieth-century Spain. His work has helped to revisit the phenomenon of *caciquismo*, dismantling clichéd views and myths, especially about the rural world. His studies are contributing to promote a revised reading of contemporary Spanish history. His most recent books include: *Socialismo y democracia en el campo (1890–1930): Los orígenes de la FNTT* (Ministerio Medio Ambiente, 2009); *El mundo del trabajo en la conquista de las libertades* (Universidad de Jaén, 2011); *Andaluces contra el caciquismo. La construcción de la cultura democrática en la Restauración* (Centro Estudios Andaluces, 2012); *Atlas electoral de Andalucía, 1891–2008: El voto al Congreso de los Diputados en los municipios* (Universidad de Jaén, 2014); *Andalucía en el labertino español: Historia del proceso autonómico andaluz* (Centro de Estudios Andaluces, 2017).

Jesús Ángel Redondo Cardeñoso is a lecturer of contemporary history at University of Valladolid (Spain). His areas of research include social mobilisation, rural and peasant conflicts, mainly during the first decades and the 1970s of the twentieth century. He had been a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Santiago (Chile) and the Interdisciplinary Centre for History, Culture and Societies (University of Évora, Portugal). He has published several books about rural and peasant conflicts in different regions of Spain (*1904. Rebelión en Castilla y León*, Valladolid, Universidad de Valladolid, 2013), Chile (*Tierra, trabajo y libertad: Conflictos campesinos e indígenas en la provincia de Cautín (1967–1973)*, LOM, 2017) and Portugal (*República, pan y trabajo: Movilización política, protestas sociales y resistencias cotidianas en el Alentejo: el distrito de Évora entre 1908 y 1918*, CIDEHUS, 2021). He is also the author of several articles about these same topics in different journals as *Historia Agraria, Historia Crítica, Historia y* Política, *Historia Social, European History Quarterly* and *Rural History*.

Robert M. Fishman is a CONEX-Marie Curie professor of political science and sociology at Carlos III University. Fishman was previously a professor of sociology and Kellogg Institute fellow at the University of Notre Dame in the United States, and prior to that, was an associate professor of government and of social studies at Harvard University. Fishman's books include *Democracy's Voices* (Cornell University Press, 2004), Winner of Honorable Mention for Best Book (2005) of the American Sociological Association's Section on Political Sociology; *Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spai*n (Cornell, 1990) and (with Anthony Messina) *The Year of the Euro* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). Fishman's articles have been published in the *American Sociological Review*, *World Politics, Politics and Society, Comparative Politics, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Studies in Comparative International Development, Contributions to Political Economy and South European Society and Politics* as well as *The New York Times*. His latest book has been published by Oxford University Press under the title *Democratic Practice: Origins of the Iberian Divide in Political Inclusion* (2019).

Joe Foweraker is an emeritus fellow of St Antony's College, University of Oxford, and honorary professor at the University of Exeter. He was Oxford's first professor of Latin American politics, and while at Oxford served first as director of the Latin American Centre and subsequently as head of the School of Interdisciplinary Studies. Previously he had been a professor of government at the University of Essex. In the past, he spent many years of fieldwork in Brazil, Spain and Mexico, publishing monographs on these three countries with Cambridge University Press in 1981, 1989 and 1993. There were also many publications on social mobilisation and citizenship rights in Latin America, including books with Lynne Rienner (1990), Pluto Press (1995) and Oxford University Press (1997). More recently, his work has been mostly dedicated to comparative research on democracy, leading to a series of articles on the quality of democratic government, an edited *Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought* (Routledge, 2001), and a co-authored textbook *Governing Latin America* (Polity, 2003). His current research deploys classical democratic theory to analyse the nature of Latin American democracy.

Antonio Herrera is a senior lecturer of contemporary history at University of Granada (Spain). He was previously lecturer at the universities of Jaén and Pablo de Olavide (Seville). He is the author of the book about the Transition to democracy in Spain *La construcción de la democracia en el campo* (MAPA, Madrid, 2007), co-author of the book *Social Movements and The Spanish Transition. Building Citizenship in Parishes, Neighbourhoods, Schools and the Countryside* (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017) and author of several articles on the processes of democratisation in Spain (*Mobilization, An International Quarterly*; *Research in Political Sociology*; *Ayer*; *Historia Agraria*; or *Historia Social*). He is currently directing,

with Professor John Markoff, a research project on social mobilisation and democracy in Spain.

Claudia Guarisco is an anthropologist (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Peru), with an MA in history (FLACSO Ecuador), and PhD in history (El Colegio de México). She is currently an associate researcher at the FRAMESPA laboratory, Université Toulouse 2 – Jean Jaurès/CNRS. Her research has focused on the social and political study of indigenous populations in colonial Mexico and Peru and on the impact of the processes of liberalisation and national independence on these populations in the first one-third of the nineteenth century, paying attention to the recurrent collective actions deployed by these communities facing the processes of political change. Among her works are 'Cabildos indígenas, democracia y autonomía Lima 1770–1812' (*Investigaciones Sociales*, 2004); 'Pueblos de indios e independencia. Una visión comparativa de los casos de México y Perú' (in *Las experiencias de 1808 en Iberoamérica*, 2008); 'The 1812 Constitution and the Indians of Nueva España and Perú' (*Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies*, 2012) and *La reconstitución del espacio político indígena. Lima and the Valley of Mexico during the crisis of the Spanish Monarchy* (2012).

John Markoff is an emeritus distinguished professor at University of Pittsburgh. He received a BA from Columbia College in 1962 and a PhD from Johns Hopkins in 1972. Prior to taking a position at University of Pittsburgh in 1972, Markoff taught at the City College of New York. He has also done research at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, Spain. He has received several academic awards and honours in the fields of sociology and history such as the 'Distinguished Career in Political Sociology Award' (2020) of the Political Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association. He has published several books on democracy, including *Waves of Democracy. Social Movements and Political Change* (Paradigm, London, 2015, 2nd ed.). He is the author of more than 120 contributions and articles in high-impact journals in sociology, history and political science. He has published several books and articles on the French Revolution and has also written on Latin American politics.

Ángel Duarte Montserrat is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Córdoba (Spain). Previously he was a lecturer and researcher at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and the Universitat de Girona. His main lines of research have revolved around republican political culture in Spain and Mediterranean Europe, sub-state nationalisms – with special attention to Catalan nationalism – and Iberian migrations and exiles in contemporary times. In recent times, he has focused on democratisation processes, being co-editor, together with Patrizia Dogliani and Maximiliano Fuentes, of 'Itinerarios reformistas, perspectivas revolucionarias' (2016) and coordinator of 'Ayuntamientos y cuestión municipal: El poder

local en la Andalucía contemporánea' (2022). He is the author of numerous monographs, including *La República del emigrante: la cultura política de los españoles en Argentina* (1998) and *El republicanismo. A political passion* (2013), for which he won that year's Association of Historians of the Present award.

Luigi Musella is a professor of contemporary history at University of Naples 'Federico II' in Historical Studies Department (Italy). His areas of research include history of European integration, political history and clientelism in Italy. He is the author of books *Clientelism* (Naples, 2000), *Trasformismo* (Bologna, 2003), *Craxi* (Rome, 2007), *The Power of Politics: Parties and State in Italy (1945–2015)* (Rome, 2015), *A New Institutional Paradigm: The Historical and Cultural Reasons for the Construction of the European State* (Rome, 2022) and *Tangentopoli* (Naples, 2022). He has been a visiting scholar at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme of Paris and PhD professor at Universidad Internacional de Andalucía (Spain).

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán is a professor of political science and global affairs. His work focuses on democratisation, political institutions, executive–legislative relations and the rule of law. He is the author of *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America* and of *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall* (with Scott Mainwaring). His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, Paraguay's National Council for Science and Technology and Uruguay's National Agency for Research and Innovation, among other institutions. He co-edits the *Kellogg Series on Democracy and Development* at the University of Notre Dame Press with Paolo Carozza, and was editor-in-chief of the *Latin American Research Review*, the scholarly journal of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) in 2016–2021.

Florencia Peyrou is an associate professor at the Department of Modern History of Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Her research focuses on nineteenth-century Spanish Democratic and Republican political cultures. Her research interests also include the history of citizenship, politicisation and democratisation processes, as well as gender discourses and the public/private divide within nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism. She has authored *Tribunos del Pueblo: Demócratas y republicanos en el período isabelino* (Madrid, 2008) and *La Primera República: Auge y destrucción de una experiencia democrática* (Madrid, 2023). She has also co-edited (with Carmen de la Guardia and Pilar Toboso) *Escribir identidades: Diálogos entre la historia y la literatura* (Madrid, 2020).

Eduardo Posada-Carbó is a professor of the history and politics of Latin America at University of Oxford. The history of democracy in Latin America from a comparative perspective is his main field of research. He

has been Tinker professor of Latin American history at Chicago University, Cogut visiting professor of Latin American studies at Brown University and visiting fellow at the Kellogg Institute in the University of Notre Dame. He is involved in an international study of the concept of democracy and its developments over time and the institutions and practices historically associated with 'democracy'. His research therefore covers a wide range of related subjects, including the history of elections, citizenship, constitutions, the press and public opinion, popular politics and civil associations.

Pamela Beth Radcliff has been a professor in the Department of History at the University of California, San Diego since 1990. She received her BA from Scripps College (1979) and her PhD from Columbia University (1990). She is the author of several books and numerous articles on popular mobilisation, gender and women's politics and civil society in twentieth-century Spain. She has published three single-authored books: *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijon* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–1978* (Palgrave, 2011) and the *History of Modern Spain, 1808–Present* (Wiley Blackwell, 2017; Spanish edition with Ariel, 2018). She is currently researching the history of municipalist discourse in Spanish political culture.

Francisco Acosta is a senior lecturer of contemporary history at University of Córdoba (Spain). He is the author of the award-winning book *Senado y senadores en el reinado de Alfonso XIII* (*Díaz del Moral* prize in 1998). His research focuses on the social and political history of Spain. He is also co-author of the book *Socialismo y democracia en el campo. Los orígenes de la Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra* (Madrid, 2009) and editor of the book *La aurora de rojos dedos. El trienio bolchevique desde el Sur de España* (Comares, 2021). Also interested in issues related to Franco's repression and the recovery of democratic memory in Spain, he is currently co-leading a research project on democracy and the rural world in contemporary Andalusia.

Guy Thomson is an emeritus professor at the University of Warwick. Thomson specialises in nineteenth-century Mexican and Spanish regional history with a particular emphasis on popular and middle-class culture, religion and politics. Recent publications include *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain. Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–75* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); '"Democracia": The Cult of Heroic Self-Sacrifice and Popular Mobilization in Southern Spain, 1849–1869', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* (April 2017); '"Democracia": Popular Liberalism in Sicily, Mexico, Spain and Colombia, 1848–1894' in *Nationalism and Transnationalism in Spain and Latin America, 1808–1923* (University of Wales Press, 2017), edited by Paul Garner and Angel Smith; 'Benito Juárez

and Liberalism', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History* (Oxford University Press, 2018) and 'Democracy in Mexico' in *Reimagining Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1780–1870* (Oxford University Press, 2023) edited by Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Joanna Innes and Mark Philp.

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