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# Social Cash Transfer in Turkey

## Toward Market Citizenship

Ceren Ark-Yıldırım  
Marc Smyrl

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Ceren Ark-Yıldırım  
Department of Political Sciences and  
Public Administration  
Istanbul University  
Istanbul, Turkey

Marc Smyrl  
Faculty of Law and Political Science  
University of Montpellier  
Montpellier, France



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## CHAPTER 1

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# Introduction: Citizens, Markets, and Turkey

**Abstract** The concept of citizenship is typically divided into distinct components. Following the pioneering work of T.H. Marshall, we focus on social and economic citizenship. We ask in particular whether the “basic equality of membership” at the heart of Marshall’s definition of citizenship can be advanced by market-centered policies such as social cash transfer, even in cases such as that of forced migrants in which political or civil elements of citizenship are not present. Contemporary Turkey provides an ideal setting in which to investigate this question.

**Keywords** Citizenship • T.H. Marshall • Markets • Migration • Social cash transfer • Turkey

Why begin a book whose empirical studies focus on a very specific type of policy—cash transfer programs aimed at helping very low income households in Turkey meet basic needs—with a discussion of citizenship? The most fundamental reason is that policy never exists in isolation. As noted a generation ago by Hugh Hecló (1974/2010: 4), “Policy acquires meaning because an observer perceives and interprets a course of action amid the confusion of a complex world.” The existence of economic support policies is premised on a broader shared understanding. The answer to specific questions: *How—if at all—should assistance be extended to those who cannot provide for the basic needs of themselves and their families?*



*Who—if anyone—should provide this assistance?* depends on the answer to much more general questions: *What kind of society do we aspire to live in? Who is a member of that society? What does membership entail?* A central premise of this book is that answers to these questions are neither self-evident nor universal; they are specific as to time and place. To give meaning to contemporary cash transfer (CT) programs in Turkey, accordingly, requires several dimensions of contextualization. In this introduction, we focus on the broadest of these, the notion of citizenship regimes as a source of answers to questions about the scope and content of social membership.

## 1 WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A CITIZEN?

The literature on citizenship provides a rich starting point for considering questions relating to the limits and content of membership. In the simplest form of the concept, citizenship is a status—“legal recognition both domestic and international, that one is a member, native born or naturalized, of a state” (Shklar 1991)—that one does or does not have. The various strands of the citizenship literature, however, typically go beyond this restrictive notion to unpack the concept of citizenship into several components. Typically, this involves distinguishing status, on the one hand, from the practical content of that status, on the other hand. Thus, Joppke (2010) suggests that citizenship involves status, identity, and rights. Another variation on this theme is provided by Bartle (2006), who divides citizenship into rights, participation, and belonging. This exercise in unpacking seems necessary because the notion of legal status by itself does not encompass the range of meanings given to citizenship either in academic or in vernacular speech. In ordinary conversation, we often speak not only of citizens, but of “full” citizens or “good” citizens. In English-language usage, the notion of “citizenship” notably extends beyond the relationship between an individual and a national state; Americans in particular speak of being a (good) citizen of one’s local community or of the world (Smyrl 2013).

Even this type of unpacking is not enough. There is not only one way to be a “good” or “full” citizen. The answer to the question, “what does citizenship entail?” can only be understood in the context of a given citizenship regime. The academic debate with which we will engage in the chapters that follow focuses on contemporary “market citizenship,” distinguishing it both from the “industrial citizenship” of the twentieth

century and various preindustrial regimes. In making this distinction, it is important to stress from the outset that to speak of citizenship regimes at all is to impose generalizations from the outside. These labels do not correspond to any legal status of citizenship or explicit policy program. They seek rather to bring together features that to a greater or lesser extent became common in North America and Western Europe at particular moments in time. It is in this sense that we speak in terms of citizenship regimes as sets of conceptually coherent but loosely articulated policies. We will consider throughout this book the extent to which these labels are useful as a tool for understanding policy developments in Turkey. For now, we seek to sketch the general outline of the contrasting regimes.

A common feature of the general definitions noted above is a central place for objective rights, on the one hand, and subjective feelings and behaviors (identity, belonging, participation), on the other hand. While the psychological dimensions of identity and belonging are largely beyond the scope of this book, we are very much interested in rights and participation. What should citizens expect from state and society? How do state and society expect them to behave? The link with policy, here, is evident. Whether we see policy instruments as embodying “a bundle of dispositions” encouraging some behaviors rather than others (Majone and Wildavsky 1979) or as organizing a “a specific set of social relations between public authority and its intended audience” (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004: 13—our translation), they form a clear link between an overall vision of social purpose and a desired behavior. What, then, does this overall vision encompass? In the classic approach of T.H. Marshall (1950), to which we will return throughout this book, it begins with a set of rights, civil, political, and social, that make meaningful participation possible, and are thus logically prior to it. Taken together, these rights are meant to contribute to the “basic equality of membership” that, for Marshall as for many others, is the essence of citizenship. While we will revisit the question of civil and political rights in the specific context of international migration, our focus in this book is on what Marshall called social rights, which he defined as “the whole range of rights from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” (Marshall 1950: 11) It is important to emphasize that the equality for which Marshall is calling here is not an even distribution of wealth and income. He is arguing, rather, for

a society in which the guaranteed minimum is adequate for “civilized life.” It is access to this life, for him, that must be equal for all.

In this identification of “basic equality of membership” not only with legal equality but also with a certain way living, Marshall was far from alone. This belief was at the core of ethical arguments in support of post-1945 welfare states. At a more theoretical level, Rawls’ (1971) vision of liberal equality stressed not only universal civic and political rights but also equal opportunity to acquire socially valued goods—and insisted that preference should be given to redistribution in favor of those at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. More recent authors come to similar conclusion. Böhnke (2007) points out that poverty, discrimination, or handicap can be barriers to full citizenship if they bring limited social relation and a lack of social support. With membership comes responsibilities. The legal status of national citizenship, and increasingly of permanent legal residence or “denizenship” (Turner 2016) has always been associated with counterparts such as paying tax, obeying laws, and in many cases performing military service. Even when we go beyond this to consider, as we propose to do here, citizenship as centered on right and membership, Root (2007: 10) argues that meaningful membership involves not only securing one’s own rights but also accepting responsibility for others.

Accepting the proposition that citizenship should be identified with membership in a constituted community, and that this membership in turn requires a measure not just of legal but of economic equality and solidarity, leaves unaddressed the question of ways and means. How is membership to be achieved? For Marshall, it seemed evident that “basic equality of membership” with respect to social and economic status could only be achieved by ensuring the universal provision of not only the physical but also the social necessities of life, removing these from the sphere of market transaction to achieve what he called the “divorce of real and money income.”

Marshall was well aware that this program was at best imperfectly realized at the time of his writing; he proposed it as an aspiration and a challenge. From a similarly aspirational perspective, we propose to approach “market citizenship” as a regime that seeks to employ market-enhancing policy instruments to achieve “basic equality of membership.” It is fair to ask at least two questions in this context: “what does equality mean in practice?; and ‘membership in what?’

We share with Marshall (1950: 9) the starting point that “equality of membership” may be “consistent with the inequalities of social class.” Equality of membership does not imply a perfectly even distribution of wealth or status. It does imply that no one is systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the opportunity of gaining wealth and status. This, in turn, suggests the answer to our second question. In a market-centered society “equality of membership” rests on the freest possible access to the market, as consumers, producers, and workers. We are very close here to Sen’s (1981: 2) notion of the market as a set of entitlements: the right to the products of one’s trade, production, labor, or inheritance. Restrictions on what one can buy, where one can live, or whether and how one can work are barriers to such access. The challenge for public policy is transforming theoretical rights into actual capacity. As Sen (1981: 161) pithily puts it:

*If one doesn’t have much to exchange, one can’t demand very much, and may thus lose out in competition with others whose needs may be a good deal less acute, but whose entitlements are stronger.*

Rather than distinguishing real from money income, regimes based on market citizenship propose to ensure money income sufficient to acquire the social as well as physical necessities of life. In the logic of the market model, the ordinary source of income is employment. In cases where work cannot be found or provides inadequate income, the cash-transfer instruments at the empirical heart of this study represent a direct attempt to compensate for this income in a market-compatible manner.

This approach does not imply a diminished role for public authority. Rather, it suggests that state intervention should focus on ensuring adequate purchasing power for citizens. Direct transfer of “stimulus payments” to all citizens, as the US government did in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and again in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic of 2020 is an extreme but not unrepresentative version of such a policy. The bulk of this book will be devoted to a critical reflection on policies intended to ensure adequate “money income,” which naturally leads to an emphasis on their distinctive features. It is worth emphasizing from the outset, however, that this approach shares with what we might call the Marshallian vision of the welfare state a number of important features.

Both approaches are based on a core of rights, and in particular on the recognition of a right to meaningful economic participation and to a socially appropriate standard of living. In both cases, the starting point is

an assertion that persons with inadequate economic means cannot be full citizens (regardless of their formal status or identity), and that it is a central function of public authority to remedy this situation. It would be logically incorrect, thus, to contrast “rights-based” and “market-based” frameworks. What we can contrast are market-limiting and market-enhancing approaches to ensuring economic and social rights. Both approaches involve a selective use of market transactions; neither is absolutist. Marshall’s market-limiting framework leaves a place for a market sector once selected necessities are removed from it. Market-enhancing frameworks leave a place for the nonmarket instruments, such as the provision of money income as a form of public assistance that forms the empirical core of this book. As such, both frameworks must be distinguished from the imaginary extremes of market-less socialism, on the one hand, and state-less libertarian capitalism, on the other hand.

Each framework seeks to encourage the fullest extent of economic participation, and considers participation a key element of membership and a justification for economic intervention. In the Marshallian, or social-democratic, framework intervention takes the form of nonmarket access to a socially necessary minimum level of education, housing, healthcare, etc. In the market-enhancing framework, economic intervention can take the form of ensuring access to a socially necessary minimum level of money income. In both cases, policies of economic support can be justified on the ground that they are necessary elements of social citizenship in, both, the sense of “basic equality of membership” and of meaningful participation. In both frameworks, economic and social rights, and the policy instruments intended to support them are not necessarily coterminous with civil or political rights. Instruments that provide economic support and encourage economic participation can extend to all residents of a constituted group of states such as the European Union (EU), or to migrants to whom civil and political rights are denied.

In an example to which we will devote considerable attention here, the rights extended to migrants, including and especially those outside the usual legal process of voluntary immigration and naturalization, are frequently a topic of intense political conflict. To the extent that inclusion is attempted, however, the approach to social citizenship extended to migrants tends to be patterned on that already in place for those enjoying the civil and political status of citizen. In systems that follow a market-limiting logic of providing basic services such as health or education free at point of service to their own legal residents, the debate typically turns

around whether some form of this should be made available to migrants. Likewise, the turn to cash assistance for legal residents naturally suggests a similar approach for migrants.

The policy mix in the early twenty-first century typically contains both market-limiting and market-enhancing elements. There is a clear tendency in the past few decades, nevertheless, to privilege the latter. This observation forms the empirical starting point for this book. We choose Turkey as a setting because it provides examples of recently established CT programs aimed at both citizens and forced migrants.<sup>1</sup> These are administered by a wide variety of agencies including local and national authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental and para-statal organizations. This combination of a constant national social and economic context and considerable variation in implementation conditions makes it possible to identify and assess the key variables that mediate the outcomes of the instruments we study.

Based on an extensive meta-study of CT programs worldwide, and basing his definitions as we do on the foundations laid down by T.H. Marshall, Leisering (2019: 320) concludes that “cash transfer reflects a **citizenship approach to poverty**”—emphasis in the original. While welcoming this as an initial hypothesis, our approach throughout is to treat the compatibility of CT programs and meaningful citizenship regimes as an open question, subject to empirical answers. We also have the temerity to employ Marshall’s core concepts in a way that, were he still with us, he might well not approve. The policies we study purport to accomplish the ends he set out by means other than those he envisaged.

Whether these policies are ideal from the point of view of social theory is not the question we ask; they are the policies we have. While we discuss the perspective of Marxist and other external critics of the market economy, our principal goal is to produce an internal critique of the programs we study, assessing them in terms of the goals and objectives that they put forward for themselves and of the broader market framework of which they are a part. To this end, we seek to distinguish this study from both the critics of market citizenship and the cheerleaders for CT programming

<sup>1</sup>In both the academic and professional literature on the Syrian war, the term “refugee” is used as a functional equivalent of “forced migrants.” Despite the inexactness of this juxtaposition, we will follow this practice here, using both terms indifferently except when we explicitly invoke international treaty definitions of the term “refugee.” Also, unless explicitly noted, we will use the general term “migrants” to mean international migrants rather than those who move within their country of origin.

by remembering that, beyond the debate over abstract policy instruments, we should not lose sight of the way in which they are constructed and implemented in practice. As we noted above, Majone and Wildavsky (1979) remind us that policy instruments are at best “a bundle of dispositions” encouraging some behaviors rather than others. To this they add that dispositions are not destiny; one can, in a pinch, stir paint with a screwdriver or hammer nails with a shoe. Context matters: it is the focus of this book.

## 2 FROM LOCAL STUDIES TO GLOBAL HYPOTHESES

The research that produced this book was conducted as part of several distinct empirical research programs: completed, ongoing, or conducted with a view to proposing future projects. As such, it includes several different approaches, and is based on explicit methodological choices. We begin with a systematic consideration of competing interpretations of the interaction between citizenship regimes and instruments of social assistance (Chap. 2), and then discuss the application of this debate to Turkey (Chaps. 3 and 4). We also consider in a similar way the turn to cash-based assistance in the humanitarian context and its application to the Syrian refugee population in Turkey (Chaps. 5 and 6). From a foundation in the scientific literature, these discussions are further informed by a systematic survey of relevant Turkish and EU documentation. This provides the background critical to understanding and evaluating the practical policy examples that form the book’s empirical core. A secondary, but important, purpose is to provide readers interested in pursuing the issues we raise with a thorough and balanced survey of relevant sources.

Chapters 4 and 6 present the first-hand studies that constitute our original contribution to these debates. We use these to test assertions that emerge from the scientific and professional literatures, and to propose further testable hypotheses. It is important to emphasize from the outset the illustrative purpose of the case studies: we do not seek to provide either an encyclopedic survey of all cash transfer programs in Turkey or an all-encompassing vision of the issues facing international forced migrants. Our choice of this approach is informed by the questions we seek to answer: assessing “membership” or “inclusion” requires close observation—even if this necessarily restricts the ground that can be covered.

Complementing the documentary sources, our case studies are informed by interviews, as well as unstructured background conversations,

with program designers and administrators, and nondirective interviews with the recipients of social assistance, supplemented by participant observation of program procedures. These were carried out as part of several different research programs in 2014, 2019, and 2020. All interviews and observations were carried out by the authors, and done on the basis of anonymity and non-identifiability. For this reason, we do not give name or location of the two districts described in Chap. 4—referring only to an “urban” and a “rural” district. Similarly, we do not provide details about persons interviewed, citing interviews only by date.

For the two local cases in Chap. 4, a total of 49 unstructured interviews were carried out with officials of district municipalities, political parties, and district Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations as well as recipients of aid. In the case of the urban district, this was complemented by participant observations accompanying workers for competing parties over the course of a local election campaign.

In the case of cash assistance to Syrian refugees, a total of 18 unstructured interviews were carried out with persons directly involved in the design and management of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) the principal program of unrestricted cash transfer for forced migrants. In every case, the views expressed were those of the individuals interviewed and not of the institutions to which they belonged.

This was complemented by participant observation, carried out at the invitation and with the authorization of the World Food Program, with mixed WFP/TRC teams carrying out home visits in the context of the Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise intended to provide these agencies with information on the determinants of refugee vulnerability. Our observation was necessarily limited by language barriers but was carried out to the greatest extent possible with the assistance of Arabic-speaking members of the WFP/TRC teams with which the visits were made.

### 3 A NOTE ON CURRENCY CONVERSION

A ubiquitous problem faced in presenting historical economic data lies in determining the present value of monetary sums. Throughout this book, we present all monetary amounts as they existed at the time, that is, in local currency expressed in nominal terms. The following elements allow readers to approximate the contemporary value of these amounts. European



central bank data show the value of the Turkish Lira (TL) at between 2 and 3 for €1 between 2010 and 2014, between 3 and 4 for €1 from the start of 2015 through the first semester of 2017, and trending toward a further loss of value since then. At the time of this writing, in August 2020, the TL was valued at approximately 8.5 for €1.<sup>2</sup> A more useful contextualization is provided by reference to the evolution of the minimum wage in Turkey during the time covered by this study. According to OECD data, gross minimum wage rose from 750 TL per month in 2010, to 1275 TL per month in 2015, and 2030 per month in 2018.<sup>3</sup> The sums proposed by the various programs analyzed in this book, typically between 100 TL and 200 TL, must accordingly be understood as significant but nevertheless modest sums, even in the context of a low-income household.

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## Origins and Consequences of Market Citizenship

**Abstract** In this chapter, we establish the historical context needed to understand the place of cash transfer in contemporary market-enhancing social policy. To this end we outline the circumstances that led to the establishment of the twentieth-century regime of “industrial citizenship,” to growing criticism of it, and finally to the rise to prominence of a competing model, labeled (largely by its opponents) as “market citizenship.” We pay considerable attention at each step to the social and philosophical debates that surrounded this evolution, trying to understand not just how one citizenship regime was challenged and partially replaced by another, but why.

**Keywords** Industrial citizenship • Market citizenship • Income support • Incorporation regimes • Social cash transfer

How do abstract principles of citizenship translate into concrete programs of social support? To what extent do these apply to migrants who do not yet—and may never—attain the civic or political elements of citizenship? The answer to such questions, we argue in this chapter, is not determined once and for all but depends critically on the citizenship regime in place. A better understanding of how and why citizenship regimes have evolved over the past century is thus a necessary starting point.

## I THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CITIZENSHIP

The various types of “welfare state” established in Europe and North America after 1945 were reactions to the traumatic social transformations brought on by a century of industrialization and economic crisis, from the nineteenth century’s “hungry 40s” that form the backdrop of Engels’ study of the English working class, to the twentieth-century trauma of the 1930s’ “great depression.” Underlying the choices made in the 1940s and 1950s, however, were debates that went back much farther on the role of social class and both the effectiveness and the moral status of markets. It is in this broader historical context that we begin our story.

### 1.1 *The Rise and Fall of the First Market Society*

For T.H. Marshall, “social citizenship” (by which he meant integration into the economy) was made possible initially by the reduction of economic inequality subsequent to the rise of the industrial economy. While throughout he uses the language of social class, his sense of this term is far more English than Marxist. The existence of class, for Marshall, did not necessarily imply conflict any more than industrialization necessarily led to “pauperization.” Quite to the contrary, he noted that (in England at least) “[a] rise in money income ... altered the economic distance which separated the classes from one another, diminishing the gap between skilled and unskilled labor and between skilled labor and non-manual workers” (Marshall 1950: 46). At the same time, the rise in saving and the invention of progressive income tax blurred the distinction between the propertied classes and the rest, while the advent of mass-produced consumer goods contributed to a much more equal material standard of living than had ever been possible before. It was in this context that “the diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition” (46).<sup>1</sup> In Marshall’s logic, this ultimate abolition of inequality with regard to the essential elements of social welfare could only be achieved through limiting the scope of the market. The concrete examples he proposes focus on universal access to socially necessary goods and services, housing, education, and health, for example, and more generally to “the progressive divorce

<sup>1</sup> Marshall’s observations on this point are supported by the recent work of Piketty (2019), who notes that nineteenth-century economic inequality peaked in 1914 and fell precipitously starting in 1918. The post-1945 welfare states, in other words, were implemented in a world in which inequality had already declined significantly.

between real and money incomes” (81), that is, between market transactions and standard of living.

Using a different vocabulary to express a similar sentiment a generation later, this removal of socially necessary goods and services from the market was labeled by Esping-Andersen (1990) as “de-commodification.” In making this point, Esping-Andersen, much more than Marshall, emphasized an element of economic history that will prove central to the argument of this book: the relevance to the present of the economic and social heritage of preindustrial society. In such a society what we subsequently labeled social welfare was “only imperfectly commodified” in the sense that nonmarket forces played a determining role in defining access to socially necessary goods and services. “Thus, in the middle ages, it was not the labor contract but the family, the church, or the lord that decided a person’s capacity for survival” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 35). Esping-Andersen, here, echoes the sentiments of Marc Bloch (1939: 109) who, writing about the “first feudal age,” had noted that “Buying and selling were not unknown to the society of that time, but it did not live, as does ours, by buying and selling”—(our translation). The limited role for market transactions noted by these authors in premodern Western Europe is not an artifact of a distant period of history. Rather, it persisted well into the nineteenth century even in Britain, and longer elsewhere. Putting this statement back into Marshall’s vocabulary, we see that the “divorce between real and money income” was already present—or more to the point that the marriage between the two had yet to be fully consummated. Indeed, as Polanyi (1944/1957) famously chronicled, it was the move toward a social and economic system in which both the means of survival and the labor that allowed access to them were treated as commodities subject to a market price that constituted the socially disruptive “great transformation” of the nineteenth century.

It is noteworthy that among the opponents of this transformation were found the most conservative, as well as most revolutionary elements of European and North American societies. The subjugation of workers to market forces beyond their control was central to the Marxist critique of the capitalist system of production, but conservatives, as Esping-Andersen (1990: 36) points out, “opposed outright the principle of commodifying humanity” because they feared—rightly, we might add—that this “would lend a fatal blow to the perpetuation of the old order.” Nor was this fear a new one. Fontaine (2014: 144) in her study of the evolution of market relations in early modern Europe returns again and again to the

antagonism between the market and the aristocratic views of society. To enter into a market bargain with someone was, at some level to acknowledge him or her as a social equal. She points to the profound aristocratic resistance to the expansion of market transactions whose point of reference was “the validity of the exchange rather than the social rank of the persons involved”—(our translation). As seen from the summit of society, the market was a threat to “quality” in the social sense, and thus to social order more generally.

The twentieth-century welfare state can be understood as one of several possible responses to Polanyi’s “great transformation” toward the all-encompassing market that threatened both workers and aristocrats, an attempt to attenuate the market’s social costs while consolidating its productive capacity. When we take into account the multiple sources of opposition to the market, we understand why Esping-Andersen emphasizes that welfare state regimes had two distinct and not altogether compatible purposes: to decommodify labor and to support—or restore—“a system of stratification.”

### *1.2 The “Industrial” Model of Citizenship and the Twentieth-Century Welfare State*

In his 1967 study of “the new industrial state,” the economist J.K. Galbraith emphasized the largely successful counterattack against the all-encompassing market, not by labor but rather by major industrial corporations. Beside a “market system” made up of small firms, which really are subject to market rules, Galbraith posited the existence of what he labeled the “planning system” made up of firms whose position was quite different. The dominant position of the largest corporations largely insulated them from market forces, allowing them to devote their energies to ensuring long-term security rather than short-term profits. Support for social policies, in this context, came as managers saw the opportunity to “trade profits for protection against such undirected events with such unpredictable consequences as a strike and its accompanying effect on identification and motivation.” This was made possible in large part because the postwar era was the high-water mark of managerial—as opposed to shareholder—control of corporations, which meant, as Galbraith put it, that “those who make the decisions do not have to pay” (Galbraith 1967/1979: 240). Swenson, looking back on this moment a generation later, also emphasized the role of business interests in the establishment of the “regulatory

welfare state” from the 1940s to the 1970s, concluding that: “... changing alignments or sharing of interests across class lines, not a shifting of the balance of power favoring labor at capital’s expense, might be the most significant source of progressive change” (Swenson 2004: 3).

This is the world that gave rise to the model of “industrial citizenship.” As defined by Canadian legal scholar Henry Arthurs, in a text exactly contemporary to Galbraith’s *New Industrial State* but looking at the question from a legal point of view, this was a system in which “the worker lives increasingly in a world of rights and duties created not only by his employment contractual act, but by a process of public and private legislation.” (Arthurs 1967: 787) Such legislation set the terms of permissible employment contracts, and recognized the central role of labor unions in bargaining for them, as well as providing support for those who could not work due to accident, sickness, or old age.

A “formidable array of rights” (Marshall 1950), was indeed produced in twentieth century Europe and North America, but so was “a system of stratification.” (Esping-Andersen 1990) This took the form of corporatist governance of social policy in “conservative” regimes such as France and Germany, in which different professional groups received very different benefits. In the “liberal” United States and United Kingdom, stratification took the form of means-tested support programs, the social stigma of which was such that they were refused by some who might have been eligible for them—as is still regularly the case today in the United States (Esping-Andersen 1990: 58–65). Social democratic regimes faced a different set of challenges. The first, as Esping-Andersen points out, was overcoming the heritage of labor-union dominance that tended to segregate industrial workers into self-contained communities to the exclusion of all other classes. The prestige and power that such systems brought to unions made them reluctant to abandon it, despite the universalist aspirations of socialist ideology. It is noteworthy that Arthurs’ definition of “industrial citizenship” in Canada was explicitly limited to unionized workers, and did not include other types of employees, let alone all Canadians. The legal “rights and duties” that existed beyond the scope of employment contracts were seen, in this logic, as a natural extension of industrial relations; they served above all to ensure equal treatment across unionized sectors—not beyond them.

The move to universalism, moreover, brought challenges of its own. Even the most all-encompassing social democratic models saw the need to introduce earning-graduated benefits in order to retain the support of

higher earners (Hecló 1974: 227–283; Esping-Andersen 1990: 65–69; Steinmo 2013). The point of these arguments is not to suggest that redistribution in favor of workers, children, and the elderly was an illusion. It did indeed occur, especially in states following social-democratic models. Even in such systems, however, it was accompanied by continued inequality and consolidated social control.

Introducing the question of social control reminds us that often lost in critiques of the market are the social and human costs of the absence of markets, especially as these relate to interpersonal relationships. A world in which it was “family, the church, or the lord that decided a person’s capacity for survival,” to return to Esping-Andersen’s characterization of the preindustrial world, was a world of personal dependence. In such a world, the capacity to give was a source of power, understood as such by both givers and receivers at all levels of society. As seen from the top of society, we have Montaigne’s defense of the practice of venality: “to purchase an office is to give only money; to receive it as a grant is to give one’s self.”<sup>2</sup> The view from the bottom, on this topic at least, was not so different. Judith Shklar (1991: 83) in her essays on American citizenship evokes the joy and pride expressed by Frederick Douglass, escaped slave and subsequently a leader of the campaign against slavery in the nineteenth-century United States, at being for the first time paid for his labor, the “tremendous fact” that truly placed him “in a state of independence.” For the American former slave just as for the French aristocrat, to pay one’s own way was to be one’s own man.

In return for the protection it offered from market risk, the model of “industrial citizenship” displaced rather than eliminated dependence. From church, lord, and family, it was shifted to corporations, unions, and the public institutions of the welfare state. Individuals, whether in their role as workers or as receivers of services, were protected from the insecurity of the market, but at the price of accepting a passive role. As put by Julian Le Grand (2003), they were “pawns” and not “queens.” Le Grand emphasizes the extent to which, in Britain at least, the collectivist ethos of the 1940s and 1950s was translated into an increase in the power of civil servants, whose genuinely public spirited motivations in no way diminished—indeed strengthened by legitimating—their quest for control. In its public ideology and perhaps in its collective memory, this was the society that provides the model for Root’s (2007) ideal of citizenship, in

<sup>2</sup> Montaigne, *Essais* 3: 9.



which individuals accept responsibility for each other. In practice, however, the altruistic “knights rampant” (Le Grand 2003: 4) of the civil service took responsibility for everyone. Citizens, for their part, were expected to display a passive form of altruism through their uncomplaining willingness to accept the redistributive tax system that paid for it all. Le Grand’s observations rest on analytical foundations that go back a generation; in 1974, Hugh Heclo demonstrated through close empirical study of the policy-making process the extent to which British and Swedish social-policy bureaucrats worked to solve policy “puzzles” that they themselves had identified, rather than responding to any identifiable social or political demand. Looking to a subsequent generation of policy-making in Sweden, Steinmo (2013: 85) comes to similar conclusions, noting that: “the unique features of the Swedish political economy are the products of a particularly successful brand of social democracy that was invented by a particularly technocratic and remarkably autonomous governing elite.”

The industrial regime of citizenship was indeed “inextricably linked to the growth of the welfare state and social rights,” and an “element in the attempt to build a bridge between citizenship and class” (Fudge 2005, 632) through efforts to limit the commodification of workers. We are brought back to Marshall’s prediction of an increasing distinction between real and money income, and the ever-growing importance of the former. What Marshall and other proponents of the welfare state and the citizenship regime that accompanied it failed fully to appreciate was that this came at the price of agreeing to live by the rules of the paternalistic society and the industrial planning system; by the 1960s, this was a price that increasing numbers of citizens in Europe and North America were no longer willing to pay.

## 2 FROM INDUSTRIAL TO MARKET CITIZENSHIP

The regime of industrial citizenship was closely tied to the historical moment in which it arose; it was part of what historians of the twentieth century have long designated as the “post-war consensus” (Addison 1975) founded on trade union strength, Keynesian demand management, and the various models of the welfare state. As one after another of these elements were eroded, the industrial regime of citizenship itself was called into question.

## 2.1 *The Revolt against Industrial Citizenship*

Not all, even at the high point of the “industrial” system, were equally enthusiastic. The critiques and warnings of unrepentant liberals such as Fredrich Hayek are well known, but more ironic, as Le Grand (2003: 6) points out, is the fact that Keynes was at best a “reluctant supporter” of the welfare state that is too often associated with his name. The “welfare state” was many things, but it was “Keynesian” only indirectly and coincidentally. Keynesian macroeconomic management was meant to reduce the need for any targeted “welfare” policies on the part of the state by ensuring full employment; it depended fundamentally on the acquisitiveness of consumers, not the solidarity of citizens, for its organizing logic and economic engine. There can be no doubt, however, that the crisis of Keynesian demand management that erupted in the 1960s and paved the way for the liberalization of the 1980s coincided with and contributed to mounting pressure both on welfare state policies and, more generally, on the “industrial” citizenship regime. In addition to the economic crisis, however, it is critical to recall that the social transformations that ultimately led to the “neo-liberal turn” (Jobert 1994) toward a market model of society had a number of converging causes. The liberalism of the 1980s triumphed over an economic and social model that, by then, had been on the defensive for over a decade.

One line of attack was philosophical: the “critical sociology” associated with the Frankfurt school in Germany and the French “new left” of the 1960s. Taking for granted the economic success of “advanced capitalism,” these writers and activists sought to undermine its social and moral status: for them, “the impending crisis of capitalism was not one of *production* but of *legitimation*” (Streeck 2014: 14). Against the prison of lifetime employment in hierarchical firms, they promoted empowerment through workers’ collective self-management of those same enterprises. In a similar vein, the burgeoning environmentalist movements of this same period saw the danger not in the collapse of the industrial system but in its unchecked economic success, accompanied by mounting ecological damage.

Although it is generally understood as a critique of an economic and political model, the revolt against the postwar attempt to establish “democratic capitalism” (Streeck 2014) should also be seen, in the context of this book, as a growing rejection of the “industrial” regime of citizenship whose foundations were acquiescence to top-down control (of the

economy by large firms and of social policy by national governments) and to the centrality of the patriarchal family as the fundamental unit of social intervention. Along with the erosion of authority came a calling into question of the enforced uniformity that seemed to be the price to pay for the security of lifetime industrial employment and the assurance of a universal social safety net. As pointed out by Le Grand (2003: 8) "... it became increasingly apparent that many people—particularly but not exclusively the middle classes—wanted different kinds and different levels of services."

A second fundamental element of industrial citizenship, the patriarchal family associating a male "bread-winner" and a female provider of unpaid domestic services, was also under attack. This family model, especially but not exclusively in the "conservative" variants of the welfare state, had bridged the gap between policies tailored above all to unionized salaried workers and the aspiration to universal social rights. It was through their association with an employed man that wives and children, in this idealized model, had access to the rights and benefits of industrial citizenship. Feminist contestation of the patriarchal family necessarily brought contestation of the industrial model as well. An important manifestation of this was a massive turn by women to the market. To the consternation of neo-Marxists, "Beginning in the 1970s, women throughout the western world poured into labor markets, and what had been branded shortly before as historically obsolete wage slavery was now experienced as liberation from unpaid household drudgery" (Streeck 2014: 17).

Whether we understand these developments as a genuine social desire for greater individual autonomy (Le Grand 2003; Barnett 2005), or as a victory for the propaganda of the wealthy and a deplorable descent into collective false consciousness (Blyth 2002; Root 2007; Streeck 2014), the fact remains that industrial citizenship was well on its way to being rejected as a social model before the economy that supported it entered into open crisis. It was a much weakened economic and social order that was left to face the inflation and unemployment crises of the later 1970s. Between them, these brought down the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and opened the way to what proved to be a devastating counterattack from philosophical liberals and leaders of finance on both the managerial capitalism of the "new industrial state" and the paternalistic welfare programs central to "industrial citizenship."

## 2.2 *Toward a New Citizenship Regime*

On both sides of the Atlantic, the movement away from “industrial citizenship” was led by a coalition of financial interests and a generation of political leaders who were at once politically conservative and economically liberal. In the business world, this took the form of the devastatingly successful counterattack by shareholders and financial interests more generally on the managerial planning system of the “new industrial state” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Generally couched in terms of “shareholder rights” this became the new orthodoxy of “good corporate governance” by the 1990s, consecrated as such by a “Principles of Corporate Governance” produced by the OECD at the end of the decade (OECD 1999). From the “leveraged buy-outs” and “de-regulation” of 1970s America to the financial “big bang” of the 1980s in Europe, the “neoliberal turn” (Jobert, ed. 1994) was underway within the corporation. Quantitative study of its impact largely validated Galbraith’s hypotheses by showing that while managers left to themselves preferred a “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003), the threat of hostile takeover typically led to a fall in salaries and a reduction in capacity. The policy of ensuring labor peace through salary increases, fringe benefits, and guaranteed employment was increasingly a thing of the past. A point too often ignored in the literature on the resurgence of business influence in the politics of Europe and North America in the 1980s (Vogel 1989; Blyth 2002) is that this influence was wielded by corporations that had undergone, or were in the throes of, this internal revolution. What these new-model corporations wanted from government was very different from what their equally influential predecessors of the 1950s required, and high on the new list of demands was the reduction of the union influence that had been at the heart of the “industrial” regime of citizenship.

Political leadership converged with this economic movement after 1979. For Reagan, Thatcher, and those who emulated them, the inflationary crisis of the late 1970s provided the perfect pretext for action against both the entrenched power of labor unions and the expansion of the welfare state (Blyth 2002). The proximate result of this was the “supply side economics” of the 1980s, which provided justification for tax cuts and the deregulation of economic sectors ranging from banking to air transport. A far more lasting development went beyond popular economics: the concept of the market as an ideal of personal liberty and empowerment, in past decades largely the province of a small albeit influential group of

philosophical liberals ranging from Friedrich Hayek to Milton Friedman, had become by the mid-1980s a mainstream view, and would remain so for a generation.

While the attack on unions was remarkably successful, the outcome for the social policies that, collectively, had typified the various models of the welfare state was more nuanced. Many of the specific institutions and programs central to the postwar social model, from the US Social Security System to the British National Health Service proved surprisingly resistant to direct “retrenchment” (Pierson 1994). The broader regime of industrial citizenship, however, with its collectivist ideal, found itself with few active supporters. In its place grew a vision of individualized citizenship better suited to the resurgent market ideology. In this context, the history of the welfare state was reimagined by its critics in the 1970s and 1980s. From a heroic narrative of working class conquest, it was recast as a story of public sector hubris.

At the core of this new narrative were two distinct streams. At the broadest level was what Pierson (1994) called “systemic retrenchment,” subsequently better known and much studied as “austerity” (Blyth 2013; Schäfer and Streeck 2013). Among the founding documents of this stream was the 1975 Trilateral Commission report on “The Crisis of Democracy” (Crozier et al. 1975: 9), whose diagnosis could be summed up as: “The demands on democratic government grow, while the capacity of democratic government stagnates.” Numerous observers of all political stripes have pointed out that while the debate on “austerity” has raged for now almost 50 years, public spending has continued to rise. Change was more subtle but ultimately more important; the belief, central to the postwar ideal of industrial citizenship, in a state monopoly on the provision of welfare-enhancing services, has arguably never recovered. A second, more targeted stream of argument strengthened this effort to discredit the welfare state by claiming that actual harm was caused by attempts to secure welfare outside the market economy. The indisputably poor quality of some public services lent—and continues to lend—credibility to this argument. For welfare state supporters, the idea of de-commodified social services may evoke images of bright cheerful child-care centers, presumably somewhere in the suburbs of Stockholm. The frankly Dickensian analysis of the calculated cruelty of the New York City system of shelters for the homeless in the 2000s given by Bonnet (2019) serves as a reminder that what Polanyi referred to as the “workhouse test,” that is, the explicit policy of making the conditions of public assistance so degrading that only

the truly desperate will accept them, cannot be consigned to the history of a less enlightened time.

At the heart of the vision of citizenship that rose to prominence in the 1980s and remained dominant for a generation was a skeptical assessment of public action and a renewed belief in the empowering virtue of markets. At the societal level, this implied an end to efforts to impose a public sector monopoly on social services. From the return of “corporate social responsibility” and “social enterprise” to the rise of nongovernmental organizations and the trend to public–private partnerships, the idea that the state should be, at best, one actor among many in the social field became widespread. Religious groups, the public role of which some believed to have been relegated to distant history, played a part as well. In fact, they had never gone away, as attested by the prevalence of religiously affiliated schools in Germany and the United Kingdom, or the quasi-official role of the French *Secours Catholique* in working with irregular migrants. The renewed prominence in the United States of “faith-based initiatives” since the 2000s is likewise the recognition of a long-standing reality. Underscoring the compatibility of all of these with a certain vision of modernity, the nebulous but increasingly ubiquitous notion of “social innovation,” frequently put forward by the European Union, has emerged to encompass initiatives that combine the use of innovative technology with the systematic blurring of the lines between public and private. (Ark-Yildirim and Smyrl 2019)

At the individual level, this vision idealized the decision-making agent rather than the passive subject, valuing initiative rather than solidarity. The feminism of the 1970s, as we have noted, had anticipated this turn as large numbers of women found in salaried work outside the home not merely increased financial autonomy but, perhaps more importantly, personal and social validation. Individual autonomy was also at the heart of calls for change in public and professional services, ranging from individualized education programs to patient-centered medicine. In the field of economic development, individual empowerment increasingly displaced collective solidarity as the organizing principle. This took forms as diverse as the sale of public housing and other schemes to promote homeownership in Europe and North America, or micro-credit schemes and incentives for self-employment in developing economies. All of these had in common, to return to Le Grand’s evocative language, the presumption that citizens wished to be “queens” rather than “pawns” and that empowering them to achieve this was in the general interest. If the ideal citizens of the industrial

regime were the corporate manager and the salaried union member, the new model was the entrepreneurial property owner—even on a very small scale.

Marshallian “full equality of membership,” in this context, was centered on market participation. In a society that “lives by buying and selling,” as Bloch put it to mark the contrast with earlier ages, engaging in the petty market transactions of daily life becomes the clearest marker of the responsible adult citizen. Being one’s own man (or woman ...), in such a world, just as it had for Frederick Douglas a century earlier, implied paying one’s own way.

### 3 POLICIES FOR MARKET INTEGRATION

Critics of the market turn have typically pointed to the policies outlined above as exacerbating the marginalization of those who, for one reason or another, failed to live up to the neo-entrepreneurial ethos of the market regime. It does not follow, however, that a market-enhancing perspective is incapable of going beyond policies intended to provide opportunities for personal enterprise or to mitigate life accidents such as sickness or temporary unemployment. Market-enhancing policies can also seek to address issues of chronic poverty. In the terms we have used throughout this discussion, the former seek to prevent persons who would normally enjoy full social citizenship from losing it due to mischance not of their own making. The latter tackles the more difficult problem of including those who in Marshall’s terms lack the “modicum of economic welfare and security” necessary to “live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11).

#### 3.1 *From Income Maintenance to Cash Transfer*

The question of how best to accomplish this is not new. A major conceptual step, as described by Hecló (1974/2010) was taken in the first half of the twentieth century by the move from “relief” as an exceptional measure, with its uneasy mixture of charity and stigma, to “income maintenance” understood both as a right for those receiving it and as socially useful for the public at large. The development of unemployment insurance, but also of early forms of health insurance, such as the 1911 British scheme intended to replace earnings lost through illness or accident, can

be put into this category. Each sought to maintain “money income” rather than replacing it though the provision of services outside the market.

For contemporary proponents of such schemes, the key is to go beyond “income maintenance” to income creation through cash payments to low-income persons. This could, in principle, take the form of universal basic income, but while much spoken of, this has so far never been attempted.<sup>3</sup> Despite this, a point of view frequently found in academic writing on social policy is that anything short of a universal benefit represents, at most, a second-best solution. Thus, Buğra and Adar (2008: 91) propose that while policies such as universal old age and health benefits and non-means-tested income maintenance schemes are most compatible with citizenship, “in those socio-economic contexts in which poverty is a serious problem and resources are scarce, means-tested benefits may be the only way to prevent social exclusion due to the inability of certain segments of the population to gain access to basic minimum means of social integration.”

An alternative approach begins from the premise that if the ultimate goal is to protect citizens against poverty—or in the more sweeping terms of the UN’s sustainable development goals, to “eradicate poverty”—then means-tested benefits can be the most effective instrument for achieving universal protection against poverty. Returning, as we do, to Marshall’s construction of social citizenship, Leisering (2019: 57) emphasizes the point that “equality of membership” rests on the capacity to participate in social and economic life. It is this that must be universal, not access to a given public program. It is because of its potential to provide the capacity for participation to those who might otherwise lack it—bearing in mind Sen’s (1981: 2) reminder that those who have little to exchange can’t demand very much—that Leisering (2019: 320) concludes that a means-tested transfer of purchasing power not only meets the requirements of universality but can be considered a “citizenship approach to poverty.”

Grouped under the label “cash transfer” (CT), policy instruments of this sort are noncontributory schemes of social support through transfer of purchasing power to individuals. They are thus distinct both from social insurance (based on contributions) and from in-kind provision of goods or services ranging from free healthcare to the distribution of food

<sup>3</sup> It is sometimes argued that the redistribution of oil revenue in the state of Alaska through the Permanent Fund should be counted as an example of universal basic income (Raventos 2007).



packages. Examples of this approach in Europe, such as the French “active solidarity income” (*revenue de solidarité active*), rely on targeting resources to those who need them most.<sup>4</sup> Variations on the CT model have proliferated in the global south since the mid-2000s. Honorati et al. (2015) count some 130 low- and middle-income countries that have at least one non-contributory unconditional CT program (including poverty-targeted transfers and old-age social pensions). Similarly, 63 countries have at least one conditional CT program, compared with two countries in 1997 and 27 countries in 2008 (Bastagli et al. 2016). By another accounting, CT programs had reached 750 million people in low- and middle-income countries by 2010 (Molyneux et al. 2017: 1). The Cash Learning Partnership notes in the context of humanitarian assistance that

*The benefits of cash-based assistance have been shown to cut across multiple sectors. And opportunities have been identified to align CT Programs with major reforms at every level, from achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to strengthening social protection...* (CaLP 2020: 3)

Assessments such as these suggest that CT is the ideal social policy for the regime of market citizenship. Questions, however, remain on at least two dimensions: the first focused on the relative advisability of broad policy types and the second assessing empirical outcomes of specific programs.

In the first category is found the ongoing debate between proponents of “conditional” and “unconditional” CT. The debate is framed by a deceptively simple question: if the situation to be remedied is inadequate income, why not, to cite the evocative title of the study by Hanlon et al. (2010), “just give money to the poor,” and let them decide how best to spend it? The second half of the question gives away the answer most frequently put forward by proponents of conditional CT. It has been shown repeatedly that cash payments would be the most cost-effective way to provide “relief” (Marical et al. 2008), but from the perspective of those providing it, the idea of allowing “the poor” to spend it as they wish has more often than not proven unacceptable. We are once more confronted with the persistence of the moral stratification most recently encountered with the “knights rampant” of the de-commodifying welfare state (Le

<sup>4</sup><https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/N19775>

Grand 2003), but seen previously in the aristocracy's fear of loss of privilege based on moral superiority (Fontaine 2014). At the core of this moral paternalism is the deeply held belief that "the poor" must not only be "relieved" but "improved." The underlying fear is what Milton Friedman (1962/1982: 21) ironically pointed to as the problem with economic freedom: "It gives people what they want, rather than what a particular group thinks they ought to want."

Conditional CT encourages people to seek "what they ought to want" through cash incentives for socially approved behavior. Contemporary systems of conditional CT such as Brazil's much studied *Bolsa Familia* are contingent on actions such as sending children to school or pursuing job training. Proponents of conditional transfers point to their potential for encouraging longer-term social transformation and poverty reduction through building human capital. The popularity of such programs is undeniable; Morais de Sá e Silva (2017: 3) refers to conditional CT as "a magic silver bullet in the policy world." When it comes to assessing concrete outcomes, however, this same author takes a more measured tone, noting that in the case of Brazil there was consensus among officials that the *Bolsa Familia* was effectively an incomes policy, rather than an educational one. Evidence linking the program to longer-term educational outcomes is at best ambiguous. (137).

What can be done with the purchasing power transferred can also be constrained. Most common are programs that explicitly link purchasing power to food, from the SNAP food assistance program in the United States (Alderman et al. 2018) to the local cash-transfer schemes we will study in Turkey. The Turkish local programs discussed in Chap. 4 also embrace another common constraint: the designation of specific businesses in which purchases can be made. A final type of limitation is the link between CT and unrelated policy priorities. CT for Syrian refugees in Turkey, as we will see in Chap. 6, is presented as unconditional, but requires recipients to be registered with Turkish immigration authorities and imposes limits on their mobility within Turkey.

On the other side of the divide are programs not linked to behavior ("unrestricted" CT) or to specific purchases (multipurpose cash, or MPC). For Hanlon et al. (2010: 11) the choice is a starkly moral one: "Cash transfers are a direct challenge to the traditional belief, explicit or at least subconscious, that impoverished people are at least partly responsible for their plight." Low-income households, in this view, do not need to be

morally improved, or “nudged” into more productive behavior; they need to be economically supported.

Just as with conditional CT, empirical evidence concerning concrete outcomes is somewhat harder to come by than sweeping theoretical pronouncements. A sense of cautious optimism, nevertheless, seems to be emerging. Focused studies of unconditional CT programs in Africa have pointed to positive effects on early childhood nutrition (Agüero et al. 2007) or on economic outcomes and psychological well-being (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016). Other researchers have pointed to improvements in mental health (Kilburn et al. 2016; Angeles et al. 2019) or, more generally, to improved health and educational outcomes (Marinescu 2018). With respect to education, however, studies on unconditional CT, just like those of the conditional programs cited above, tend to assess “educational outcome” in terms of school attendance; evidence of improvement in educational attainment is much less evident. (Baird et al. 2014) Summing up the state of current knowledge, the 2020 report of the Cash Learning partnership cites evidence that:

*Cash is usually spent according to a hierarchy of needs—most immediate needs first (e.g. food, basic shelter, primary health) and other needs later (e.g. livelihoods, less essential goods).* (CaLP 2020: 106)

Bringing together these streams of evidence suggests that the distinction between conditional and unconditional cash may be less obvious in practice than in moral theory. Evidence from World Bank funded conditional CT programs in Turkey suggest that they do work to motivate families to send their children to school (World Bank 2006). A similar outcome, however, is reported for the unconditional CT for refugees in Turkey that will be our focus in Chaps. 5 and 6 (Maunder et al. 2018: 29). A recurring theme in reporting on these programs is that CT can help to overcome stigma. From Brazil, comes the view that the *Bolsa Familia* is first and foremost an incomes program:

*“The fundamental premise is that poor children are not in school because their families lack the means to do so. In the words of interviewee C16, “sometimes poor children do not attend school because they do not have basic items such as school uniforms.”* Morais de Sá e Silva (2017: 138)

Likewise from a beneficiary of the conditional CT program in Turkey: “It’s money we can spend on pencils, shoes and uniforms, so the children don’t feel humiliated at school” (World Bank 2006: 1). To return to the vocabulary proposed by Sen (1981), the problem is not one of supply or even of rights, but of (market) entitlement. In an example directly relevant to our final case, Baban et al. (2016: 10) make this point directly noting that in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey:

*The kimlik (registration card) enables Syrian children to have identical rights to Turkish children regarding the right to a free education in a Turkish school. However, as with health care, accessing this right can be more difficult in the everyday realities of Syrian families in the face of poverty, where families cannot afford to clothe and pay for the transportation costs of sending their children to school.*

The premise of unrestricted cash, supported at least partly by some of the studies cited above (Maunder et al. 2018; Marinescu 2018), is that this is a spending choice families will make as soon as they have the means to do so, with or without explicit conditions.

With this discussion, we are brought back to two of this book’s central points of focus. In the first place, it highlights the limited value of theoretical rights for those who do not have the practical means to access them. “Equality of membership,” as exemplified here by school attendance, depends on more than the existence of a universal school system. The explicit reference to Syrian refugees, moreover, reminds us that one of the questions we ask is whether and to what extent some elements of Marshallian social citizenship might be extended, using market-enhancing instruments such as CT, to migrants—including forced migrants. In general terms, this is the question of scope: Is assistance a right or privilege? If the former, how is it earned? If the latter, who is entitled to it—all workers, all citizens, all persons regardless of status? It is in this context that we turn to the question of migration in the following section.

### 3.2 *Market Citizenship and Migration*

A recurring criticism of Marshall’s model of citizenship is that it makes no allowance for—indeed takes no notice of—migration (Joppke 2010). Although this is self-evidently true with respect to Marshall’s empirical examples, it is much less so if we consider his analysis in the more abstract

sense employed in these pages. Here, Marshall's division of citizenship into distinct components proves surprisingly useful. If "citizenship" were seen as a binary question of status, an indivisible whole, it clearly could not apply to "non-citizen" migrants. The position we have taken throughout this book, however, precludes such summary dismissal. Instead, we follow not only Marshall but much of the contemporary discourse on citizenship by understanding it as a more complex and evolving array of rights and duties.

This starting point allows us to consider the prospect that the social and economic aspects of citizenship may have partial autonomy from the civil and political elements. Marshall's historical analysis provides a mirror-image argument in favor of this proposition through its demonstration that civil and political citizenship can, and long did, exist in the absence of economic and social rights. In this book, we reverse the perspective to ask a question beyond the scope of Marshall's analysis but not, we suggest, incompatible with his logic, namely, whether and to what extent the economic and social rights granted to migrants constitute elements of citizenship in Marshallian terms, as "basic equality of membership."

Granting the elements of "social citizenship" to migrants is far from obvious. It is no coincidence that the classic exponents of the mid-twentieth century European welfare states from Titmuss to Esping-Andersen make no more mention of immigration than does Marshall. Welfare states, as Freeman (1986: 52) pointed out a generation ago, are "by their nature meant to be closed systems" because "individuals who agree to share according to need have to experience a sense of solidarity that comes from common membership." Deploying a more instrumentalist argument, Rieger and Leibfried (1998: 375) suggest that "Only closure seemed to protect the massive investments in national human capital—the welfare state's move toward the education, health, and social state—and to increase the efficiency of political rule." Complementary to these arguments are those made by Castles (1989) about mid-twentieth-century Australia and New Zealand, where strongly egalitarian working-class culture and powerful labor unions—the perfect context for industrial citizenship—ensured high levels of social and economic equality without the need for extensive redistribution, through strong labor regulation and high wage levels made possible by an extremely restrictive immigration regime that prevented labor market competition.

In this context, it is a mark of the relative weakness of labor in Western Europe, even at the apogee of the industrial era, that the industrial regime

of citizenship proved to be not only open to migration but, in a dynamic unintended by its political architects, served as a stimulus for it as employers turned massively to immigrant workers as a way to restore a measure of flexibility to the labor market. (Freeman 1986: 55) Perhaps to the surprise of these same employers, however, "... guest workers without formal citizenship have been incorporated into various aspects of the social and institutional order of their countries" (Nuhoglu Soysal 1994: 2). For this author, this was attributable to an emerging model of "postnational citizenship" in which "what were previously defined as national rights become entitlements" legitimated by an emerging norm of "human rights as a world-level organizing principle" (3). Giving substance to these rights, however, was by no means automatic. Rather, it required an "incorporation regime" conditioned by "the institutional repertoire of the host political systems, which afford the model and rationale for both state and migrant action" (5).

The notion of an incorporation regime is one to which we will return in subsequent chapters, but in so doing two critical elements must be added to the analysis. Most obviously, we will focus on the features of the Turkish institutional repertoire that distinguish it from the European examples studied by Nuhoglu Soysal. A more radical question is to what extent a concept originally conceived for the case of guest workers can be adapted to the problem of refugees.<sup>5</sup> Access to employment is only the most obvious difference between guest workers and refugees, and the likelihood of their being treated differently not only from citizens but also from other migrants by host country institutions is significant. When we speak of an "incorporation regime" for refugees, thus, we do not imply that these will face a situation identical to that of the guest workers analyzed by Nuhoglu Soysal. Rather, we seek to underscore two key elements of her insight: that rights long associated with national citizenship are now strongly influenced by international laws and norms, and that the translation of legal abstractions into daily reality depends critically on the "institutional repertoire" of host countries.

<sup>5</sup>Throughout this volume and we will use the term "refugee" in the generic sense to designate involuntary migrants whose reason for leaving their country of origin was to flee violence or the threat of violence, as distinguished from other types of involuntary migrants such as victims of human trafficking. Only when explicitly noted will we use the term in the technical legal sense as defined by the successive Geneva conventions and their translations into national laws.

On one level, the various postwar international commitments from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent protocols would seem to provide a paradigmatic example of “human rights as a world-level organizing principle.” The Universal Declaration pointedly employs the word “everyone” to designate the holders of the rights it enumerates, avoiding all reference to citizens or residents. Among the rights held by “everyone” is to “seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (Article 14). While the 1951 Convention and its protocols subsequently attempted to impose a strict definition of “refugee” as a legal status,<sup>6</sup> the texts taken together suggest that even those denied this status cannot simply be expelled (the principle of *non-refoulement*) and that while they remain they are entitled to the same human rights as anyone else—including, if one takes the Declaration at face value, freedom of movement, equal access to public services, education, and employment.

Even before the Syrian crisis, the number of migrants classified by the UN as “international displaced persons,” whatever the legal status granted by their host country, numbered in the tens of millions. The example of the Palestinians, moreover, reminds us that such “displacement” can last for generations. Can any form of citizenship, even “postnational,” be applied to persons in this situation? It requires neither expertise in international law nor extensive knowledge of world affairs to discern that translation of principles into reality is far from automatic. As with the guest workers studied by Nuhoğlu Soysal, the question of national “incorporation regimes” is critical.

Experience in the past decades suggests that there is a close link between such “incorporation regimes” and domestic welfare regimes, although not exactly the one anticipated by Rieger and Leibfried (1998), as cited above. Rather than turning to closure to protect their “massive investment in national human capital,” contemporary states have generally chosen to extend certain economic and social rights to migrants, even in situations where these are not, or not yet, considered to be candidates for other types of rights. As a rule, moreover, the rights extended to migrants are

<sup>6</sup>According to the convention, refugee status applies to any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

patterned on those already in place for permanent legal residents (Sainsbury 2006), although they may not be identical. Leerkes (2016: 149) notes that in cases where migrants are considered to be illegally present in host states—after they have formally been refused asylum, for example—economic and social policies may be characterized by “relatively unattractive and, in some ways, quite archaic form of poor relief and pauperism control.” In cases where migrants’ presence is acknowledged, even provisionally, as legitimate by the host state, nonetheless, this same author acknowledges a tendency for the rights of immigrants—whether guest workers or refugees—to resemble those of citizens. Different welfare regimes, accordingly, will tend to produce different “incorporation regimes.”

While such isomorphism may be institutionally and morally coherent, it has proven politically problematic in numerous cases. Looking at the examples of Canada and Denmark, Kevins and van Kersbergen (2019: 13) suggest that there is a clear correlation between “inclusive” regimes of citizenship, with their focus on “broad solidarity and access to welfare state provisions” and strong political resistance to any broad rights-based “incorporation regime” for migrants. Political opposition to migrants claiming the status of refugees has become particularly strong. The irony here is that it is the institutional proclivity of states to pattern the attributes of “social citizenship,” in the Marshallian sense, of migrants on those of permanent legal residents (Sainsbury 2006) that may make states where social citizenship comes closest to Marshall’s ideal—and closest to the ideal industrial citizenship regime—reluctant to admit migrants in the first place, or that ensures that they will pay a high price in the form of political push-back if they should do so.

In the context of our broader argument, this observation leads to an obvious question. Would economic policies and a welfare regime closer to the ideal type of “market citizenship” make incorporating migrants easier? The observations of Kevins and van Kesbergen with respect to Canada suggest that this may be the case. Joppke and Morawska (2003: 27) likewise assert that “More market-based welfare states, such as the United States, where paths from school to work are much less regulated by public policies, allow more space for immigrants to incorporate themselves ‘on their own’ by applying their cultural and social capitals.” Looking to the European Union, Joppke (2010) notes a shift toward a “thinner” regime of social and economic citizenship for everyone, with fewer public services and a greater centrality of market approaches to policy. To the extent that



the twentieth-century welfare state, by focusing on de-commodification and social cohesion, made states and societies less able to integrate migrants—either refusing them altogether or consigning them explicitly (as in Germany) or implicitly (as in France or the United Kingdom) to a second-class status, moves in the direction of the more market-oriented pattern may make it easier not only to accept but also to integrate migrants. Bartle’s (2006) discussion of “market citizenship” in the EU following the implementation of the Single Market notes its link to free movement of persons among the member states of the Union. In such a scheme, the social and economic rights associated with citizenship are centered on being an active consumer, making choices in a competitive market place (Bartle 2006: 421). This shift to a market vision allows a market-compatible version of “social citizenship” to be extended to nonnationals. This, however, comes at a cost; Bartle’s conclusions are clearly critical of what he considers to be an impoverished citizenship regime. By designating market-compatible citizenship as “thinner,” Joppke is likewise staking out clear normative ground. He subsequently underscores this, referring to “citizenship light.” Even more explicit is the argument made by Turner (2016: 7) that the net effect of market reforms and migration is the general erosion of social citizenship so that “citizenship” and the “denizen” status of permanent noncitizen residents becomes in effect identical: “Denizenship is becoming more common not because citizenship is becoming more flexible, but because it is becoming weaker.” In taking this position, these authors join other critics of market citizenship, to whose views we now turn.

### 3.3 *Critiques of Market Citizenship and their Limits*

It is perhaps no coincidence that the term “market citizenship” has most frequently been used by critics of this new regime. For many of them, indeed, it seems to be intended as irony, bringing with it the strong presumption that the social and political relationships so labeled do not, in the best and truest sense, correspond to “citizenship” at all. In this way, Schild (2000: 276) states: “Because the cultural contents shaping these neo-liberal political subjects are none other than the liberal norms of the marketplace, I refer to such citizens as market citizens.” Under such conditions, she concludes that the weakening of collective bargaining laws and minimum employment standards calls the state’s commitment to economic solidarity into question. Noting the coresponding market turn in

social policy, Fudge (2005: 645) notes that “Increasingly, there is an obligation either to work or to engage in training as a condition for obtaining social assistance.” More insidiously, by insisting on treating people as individuals rather than as members of constituted groups, the market approach encourages the belief that people are equal by ignoring relevant differences among them, of which gender is only the most obvious (Schild 2000; Fudge 2001). In this way of thinking, the logic of distribution within society is changed as an expansion of the domain of the market necessarily leads to a contraction of social rights. In particular, the monopoly of both regulatory and redistributive action claimed for the public sector by partisans of the welfare state no longer applies (Fudge 2005: 645): “Government responsibility for the social welfare of its citizens is replaced with a new political and social order in which governments are only responsible for helping citizens to help themselves.” In such a system, citizenship is based on “active participation of clients as consumer in the delivery of services” (Schild 2000: 276).

Underpinning this generalized social critique is a practical point. The state has become, in the provision of social services, one of several partners along with philanthropic and professional organizations and, in some cases, for-profit enterprises. For Root (2007: 43), the participation of for-profit firms amounts to a “major structural change in citizenship.” Bonnet (2019) points out that even reliance on the nonprofit sector brings a loss of public control and the risk of policy capture by self-interested actors. In the Turkish context, Buğra and Adar (2008, 103) point to the increased role of philanthropic actors in social assistance as an erosion of citizenship.

Arguments about the loss of state monopoly in social services, however, rely for their critical force on an implicit historical comparison that is at best misleading. The twentieth-century welfare state in each of its variations was built through the cooperation of the state and private actors. In the American case, Hacker (2002) has detailed the rise of the “private sector welfare state” in the 1950s and 1960s, as major corporations established wide-ranging (albeit not universal) health and pension plans made possible in large part by tax incentives provided by the US federal government. The Bismarkian model, for its part, relied on the active participation of employers and labor unions. Even in France, the ideology of “dirigisme” and the myth of the “strong state” (Smyrl 2018) gave way to the reality of cooperation with the “social partners” along lines inspired by a corporatist, rather than a statist, vision (Merrien 1990). Even in those examples that seemed from the outside to approach most closely the collectivist ideal of state-led solidarity, the state was never alone. Steinmo (2013: 90)

emphasizes in the case of Sweden that the policies implemented by social-democratic governments of the 1950s and 1960s were explicitly pro-business, noting that: “The welfare state, in this sense, was intended not to compensate for the market but to help make it more efficient and more competitive.”

This rejoinder with respect to the role of the state is, in fact, one example of a larger problem with much of the critical literature on market citizenship: a tendency, at least implicitly, to compare an untarnished (and never realized) ideal of rights-based democratic citizenship with the tawdry practices of the market. This is as much a logical fallacy as its mirror image, the tendency of liberals such as Friedman and his disciples to blithely assert that the only alternative to their libertarian utopia is the Gulag. In the chapters that follow, we strive to compare like to like. In practice, this means contrasting the reality of Turkish CT programs to the corresponding reality of the policies (or policy vacuum) that they replaced. We seek to avoid the logical trap of comparing the messy reality of policy regimes and their associated instruments with the austere utopias of universal rights, be these of citizens or of migrants. To the extent that we consider broader principles, our purpose is to propose an internal critique of market-enhancing policies and instruments. We question their coherence and ask whether they advance in practice the social ideals that they themselves claim as justification.

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## The Turkish Context

**Abstract** In Chap. 2, we traced the emergence of a new and controversial model of citizenship centered on the market. We turn now to the national case that is the focus of this book, Turkey. The central question of this chapter is whether the transition to a market-based model of citizenship much studied in Europe and North America can be applied to countries like Turkey, typified by late industrialization and a distinct social welfare model. To this end, we consider the evolution of the operational content and context of social and economic citizenship in Turkey. In a final section, we expand the scope of reflection to discuss the situation of migrants, and the evolution of the Turkish “incorporation regime.”

**Keywords** Turkey • Economy • Social policy • Migration policy • Cash transfer programs

Whether we are looking at policies aimed at permanent legal residents or at recent migrants, we must be careful not to let Turkey’s position “at the edge of Europe,” whether this is understood geographically or institutionally, lead to unexamined assumptions about its policy trajectory. While the circulation of ideas and the emulation of instruments play an important role, we will focus on the dynamic of translation, which implies neither convergence nor recapitulation but rather a process through which ideas coming from outside are combined with already existing practices so as to

create new instruments or processes (Campbell 2004: 80). The outcome of translation is different both from the past experience of the system into which new elements are translated and from the external examples that provide the imported elements. Taking, as we will from here on in this book, the perspective of Turkey, we can say that our first chapter focused on defining and contextualizing the “ideas coming from the outside.” In this chapter, the focus shifts to “already existing practices.” Subsequent chapters will provide concrete examples of “new instruments or processes.”

As we consider the Turkish context, we will see that it is not static. Both with respect to social protection and to international migration, the “already existing practices” embodied by Turkish policy instruments are changing and evolving. The image we should retain, thus, is not so much the juxtaposition of two fixed patterns as the (partial) merging of two streams, each in motion and each with an original contribution to make to ultimate outcomes. These outcomes, in the context of our argument, are not limited to economic or political results. We seek to better understand the institutional context for the evolving question of integrating persons at the margins of society into a social and economic system whose government, since the 1980s has increasingly chosen a pro-market approach. By looking in some detail at economic and social policies, in other words, we define the background against which questions of Marshallian “social citizenship” can meaningfully be asked in Turkey.

## I RICH AND POOR: FROM ALMS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

We have noted already that the approaches taken by states to economic organization, on the one hand, and social protection, on the other hand, were closely integrated, if not always synchronized. While, the deep institutionalization of social protection models in Europe and North America encouraged the persistence in these areas of market-limiting approaches after these had been largely abandoned in the production sphere, significant albeit incomplete change was evident in the choice of social protection instruments as well. As we turn to the case of Turkey, we must ask the same questions in a different context. We turn first, accordingly, to a brief overview of the overall evolution of the Turkish economy since the founding of the Republic before turning to a more detailed analysis of the changing role of social protection policy and the instruments that embody it.

### 1.1 *The Turkish Economy: From Late Industrialization to State-Led Marketization*

The Turkish republic inherited from its Ottoman predecessors the juxtaposition of a largely rural economy with the international trading center of Istanbul. In 1923, the newly installed Kemalist regime ended the hegemony of Istanbul, moving the capital to Ankara and dividing the country into provinces headed by centrally appointed civil servants. Turkey's economy and population were decreased as a consequence of military conflicts, internal upheaval, and massive population transfers over the period spanning the Balkan Wars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, World War I, and the subsequent War of Liberation. The terms of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, formalized the situation, leaving a country that was smaller and less populated than the late Ottoman state had been.

During the single-party period, from 1923 until 1946 the Kemalist regime pursued a policy of “national developmentalism” similar to that of Latin American states such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Esen 2014). Centered on self-sufficiency in an environment marked by global depression and world war, Turkey remained a largely agrarian country, despite increasing strains to the rural economy made worse by a drought in 1928. After 1929, the effects of the Great Depression and World War II on the terms of trade of agricultural products put yet more strain on an already weakened economy (Buğra 2007: 39; Oktar and Varlı 2010). The strongly interventionist National Production Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*) was enacted in order to regulate price fluctuations in agriculture and prevent unjust profits. By this regulation, the property of small farmers and merchants engaged in foreign trade or the assets of industrialists could be seized (Oktar and Varlı 2010). Despite these problems, there was little rural-to-urban migration; urban population reached 25% only in 1950 (Buğra 2007: 39).

After the end of the single-party regime in 1946, governments dominated by the Democratic Party continued to give priority to the agriculture sector. The mechanization made possible in large part by Marshall-Plan aid and the more liberal international trade regime of the postwar world encouraged an export-led agricultural strategy. Supported by a coalition of large landowners and small-holding peasants, leading policies of this

period included distribution of land (Kepenek and Yentürk 2007: 108), expansion of low-interest credit, and price support through guaranteed state purchases of certain commodities (Öniş and Şenses 2007). Even so, increasing mechanization led to a decline in the need for rural labor and a corresponding incentive for migration toward cities.

A more radical break with the past came after the military coup of 1960, which ushered in a move from a broadly liberal policy centered on agricultural exports to a protectionist regime focused on import substitution industrialization policies. A period of planned development was introduced in which targeted state investment boosted the private sector. Supported by, both, industrialists and labor unions as well as the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy, this policy encouraged the production of consumer goods for domestic consumption (Koray 2008: 143–144). It also witnessed a significant increase in the rural-to-urban migration that had begun after 1950. The oil crisis in the 1970s coincided in Turkey with the limits of import substitution industrialization policy and unstable coalition governments. To deficits in the current account balance were added budget deficits, and increase in both external debt and inflation (Şişman 2017). Economic growth halted and then regressed; public investment declined; increased interest rates prevented the opening of new employment opportunities. A balance-of-payments crisis from 1977 to 1980 triggered an IMF-imposed structural adjustment program aimed at reducing state spending on subsidies. By the late 1970s, a renewed turn toward an open economy was underway (Bozkurt-Güngen 2018).

The 1980 military *coup-d'état* hastened the transformation of a system already in transition. Internalizing the spirit of the “Washington consensus,” import substitution was abandoned and the 1980s were dominated by export promotion through subsidies as well as a significant decrease in real cost of labor; formal wages failed to keep up with inflation, and low-wage informal employment was encouraged by the proliferation of small subcontracting firms in sectors such as textile and apparel (Buğra and Keyder 2006: 220). Turkey eliminated controls on foreign capital transactions and declared the convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989 (Boratav et al. 2001). The subsequent decade was marked by further pro-market reforms, as Turkey participated in the general enthusiasm for *laissez-faire* market economics that was at the time hegemonic in much of the world. This experience of unbridled economic liberalization brought results similar to those of contemporary Latin American states, as initially rapid

export-led growth foundered on obstacles of domestic inflation, which peaked at over 100% per year in 1994, and remained at double-digit levels until 2003, as well a rapidly devaluing currency whose value went from approximately 80 for US\$1 in 1980 to effectively valueless on international markets (over one million to the dollar) before being replaced by the New Lira in 2005.<sup>1</sup>

This period was brought to an end by the dual shock of a sharp economic crisis in 2001 and the national electoral victory in November 2002 of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—hereafter, AKP) representing the modernist wing of the Turkish Islamist movement led by Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a world emerging from the hegemony of the Washington consensus, “a modified version of neoliberal economic policies based on strong regulatory institutions and social policies designed to mitigate excessive inequalities,” was acceptable to international partners and politically successful (Öniş 2019: 5).

In the nearly two decades it has held power at the national level, the AKP-led government has embraced an increasingly state-led version of the market economy, shifting from “rolling back” the state to what Peck and Tickell (2002: 37) dubbed “roll-out neoliberalism” and defined as “the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.” In the Turkish case, this has focused on close links between the state and private investment partners. Large export-oriented firms proved a critical source of political support for the AKP government (Öniş and Şenses 2007). As they became increasingly transnational in its operations there emerged a growing alliance between, on the one hand, a growing group of transnational investors, export-oriented small and medium-sized businessmen and financial interests, and, on the other hand, growing segments of the new regulatory bureaucratic agencies, including institutions such as the Competition Board, Central Bank, and the Bank Regulations and Supervisory Board (Öniş and Şenses 2007: 15). Analysis by the OECD highlights the central role played by schemes such as “priority projects,” “large-scale projects,” and “strategic projects,” which can be supported by a wide array of direct public subsidies and preferential tax treatment (OECD 2018: 40).

<sup>1</sup>According to OECD historical data, the average exchange rate for 2001 was 1.228 million Turkish Lira to US\$ 1. [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-turkey-2002\\_eco\\_surveys-tur-2002-en#page1](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-turkey-2002_eco_surveys-tur-2002-en#page1).

This policy achieved a considerable measure of economic stabilization and renewed growth in the years following 2005, including well-above-average performance during the global downturn following 2008. During this period, per-capita levels of income and production were on a trajectory of convergence with the OECD average. Significantly, a number of indicators suggest that this growth was relatively inclusive. Dorlach (2015: 522) points to a growth rate of approximately 5% per year between 2006 and 2011 both for the Turkish economy as a whole and for the bottom 40% of the population. The same analysis, however, points out that, while encouraging growth, recent policies have done little to further redistribution. Taken together, taxes and public transfers in Turkey make one of the smallest contributions of any OECD state to bringing down the nation's GINI coefficient, which stood at approximately 40 in 2011, down only slightly from the estimate of 42.7 a decade earlier.<sup>2</sup> Also problematic in this period were high rates of unemployment, which remained over 10% (Yeldan and Ünüvar 2016) as well as persistently high current account deficit.

The elections of June 2011, which constituted the third successive electoral victory for the AKP can be seen as marking a further turn in Turkey's political economy). Pointing to the international emergence of a "Beijing consensus" of state-led and (politically) nonliberal capitalism, Öniş (2019) suggests that Turkish state capitalism has increasingly taken this path. The balance of power between the state and its private-sector partners has shifted in favor the former as the economy is largely penetrated by the increasingly intermingled apparatuses of the state and the AKP.

Whether attributable to this shift or to broader international trends, it is also notable that the post-2011 period has also witnessed the return of some traditional points of weakness of the Turkish economy, most notably inflation and currency depreciation, with the Turkish Lira losing approximately 75% of its value relative to the Euro between 2012 and 2020.<sup>3</sup> This

<sup>2</sup>Conventionally expressed on a scale of 1 (most unequal) to 100 (perfectly equal) the GINI coefficient is a broadly used measure of income distribution. Most recent available data from the World Bank estimate the coefficient for Turkey for 2018 to be 41.9, a level very similar to that of Argentina or the United States, but significantly more unequal than France or Germany (both approximately 32). (World Bank, GINI Index, consulted on 30 August, 2020 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/>.)

<sup>3</sup>[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy\\_and\\_exchange\\_rates/euro\\_reference\\_exchange\\_rates/](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/), consulted on 30 August 2020.

period was also marked by the Gezi Park protests of 2013 and more importantly the failed *coup d'état* of July 2016. The latter, especially, led to significant institutional transformation toward a more presidential system, institutionalized after the 2018 general elections. There was also a significant turnover in the civil service and in the state's relations with media, associations, and other private sector bodies as those suspected of participation in or sympathy for the coup were excluded.

For many analysts, this latest period is also marked by a reversal of the Europeanizing trend of Turkish economics and foreign policy (Öniş 2019; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). While there can be no doubt that Turkish accession to the EU is no longer being pursued actively by either side, we must be careful nonetheless in generalizing this point. Relations between Turkey and the EU have always been complex and are increasingly conflictual, but with respect to the policies of interest to this study, be they instruments intended to assist very low income families or the laws and regulations relating to migration and asylum, interaction between Turkey and Europe remains of the first importance. It is with this shifting context in mind that we turn our attention first to the evolution of instruments of social assistance and, in a following section, to Turkey's immigration regime.

### 1.2 *Social Welfare and Citizenship in Turkey in the Twentieth Century*

Going back to the nineteenth century, social welfare in Turkey as in Europe was a matter largely of local concern. Giving alms to the poor was at once a religious duty—in Islam just as in Christianity—and a source of patronage and influence for local notables. A central institution in this context, and one whose legacy is still highly relevant to the contemporary policy discourse, was the *vakıf* or philanthropic foundation (Buğra 2008). Gradual modernization of this system, again as Europe and North America with the partial exception of social-democratic Scandinavia, led to social policies sharply divided between those aimed primarily at the middle class and those for the benefit of low-income persons. In the case of the former, the evolution of policy from the 1940s to the 1980s resulted in a gradual and partial translation of the elements of industrial citizenship to Turkey, with instruments largely modeled on the “Bismarkian” systems of Western Europe.

The Turkish social security system after World War II (Buğra 2018) was organized according to occupational status and based on three public insurance schemes—the Social Insurance Organization (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, SSK) for formal workers, Civil Servants Retirement Chest (Emekli Sandığı, ES), and the Pension Fund for the Self-Employed (Esnaf, Sanatkarlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Olanlar Sigortalar Kurumu, BAĞ-KUR). In 1983, the fund for the self-employed was expanded to include independent peasant producers (Buğra 2018). All of these combined retirement pensions with health insurance. As with the “Bismarckian” systems of Western Europe, these instruments were neither universal nor egalitarian. General tax revenue did not contribute to the financing, which came exclusively from employees and employers.<sup>4</sup> Unpaid family workers and all participants in the informal sector remained outside of the system (Buğra and Keyder 2006). In an important departure from the Bismarckian model, however, there was no role for autonomous trade unions in the administration of the insurance funds (Yılmaz 2013: 60).

Additional elements of industrial citizenship were introduced following the adoption of the 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, which included for the first time the idea of the “social state” responsible for the well-being of its citizens. With the five-year development plans implemented from 1963 in the context of the push to import substituting industrialization, economic and social development was linked to the plan, and the duties and responsibilities of the “social state” were made more prominent. The 1963 Law on Trade Unions No. 274 and the Collective Labor Agreement Strike Lockout Act No. 275 recognized the legal right to strike. At the same time, the right to insurance coverage was extended to immediate family of workers (Buğra 2008).

In a first step toward broader coverage, the Law granting a pension to “Needy Powerless and Lonely Turkish Citizens over 65”<sup>5</sup> came into force in 1976. It provided cash benefits to the elderly and the disabled without relatives to provide for them. Beneficiaries of this scheme remained limited in number due to the conditionality on the absence of relatives. This remained the only means-tested social assistance program until 1992,

<sup>4</sup>This remained the case in France, to take one example, until 1990 when the *Contribution Sociale Généralisée* was introduced as a complement to worker and employer contributions.

<sup>5</sup>*The Law Regarding Putting Needy, Powerless And Lonely Turkish Citizens, Older Than 65 Years Old, On Salary*—65 Yaşını Doldurmuş, Muhtaç, Güçsüz ve Kimsesiz Türk Vatandaşlarına Aylık Bağlanması Hakkında Kanun dated 1 July, 1976 numbered: 2022.



when a means-tested scheme of health insurance, using the so-called “green card,” was put in place for low-income citizens (Buğra 2018: 321).

Of far more significance to the welfare of low-income persons prior to the 1990s were state policies for housing and agriculture (Buğra and Adar 2008: 26), which Eder (2010) has labeled “indirect welfarism” and which long succeeded in limiting the extent of “absolute poverty” in rural Turkey rather more effectively than in contemporary Latin America, and in avoiding the appearance of an urban under-class on the British or North American model (Pinarcioglu and Işik 2008). The second pillar of “indirect welfarism,” which became particularly important as rural-to-urban migration swelled was the systematic toleration of informal urban housing. As noted by Eder (2010: 162), the peculiar feature of informal urban housing in Turkey was that they were largely built on public land, “invaded and appropriated, mostly by the new migrants into the city.” Building and then selling such housing to more recently arrived migrants resulted in what Pinarcioglu and Işik (2008) have labeled “poverty in turns,” but which might just as well be seen as a clear path to economic upward mobility, at least for early arrivals. Toleration of this practice provided an effective if indirect housing subsidy for urban dwellers, while regular amnesties acted as capital transfers to squatters by transforming them into recognized property owners—a practice whose fading echoes can be seen as recently as 2018 (Ark-Yildirim 2020).

## 2 THE AKP GOVERNMENT AND REFORM OF SOCIAL POLICY

Erosion of “indirect welfarism” was evident since the liberal turn of the 1980s, under pressure from the growth of flexible employment, the commercialization of agricultural and urban land and the growing fiscal pressure on the state. This trend accelerated after the arrival to national power of the AKP in 2002. In addition to the direct cost of agricultural subsidies, both policies proved incompatible with the new government’s economic priorities. Product and input subsidies for agriculture, already in decline, were eliminated in the context of IMF-led restructuring after the 2001 budget crisis (Eder 2010: 163). The toleration of informal urban housing, for its part, clashed with the AKP government’s policy of using the urban property market above all as a magnet for investment (Kuyucu 2014).

While some former squatters benefitted from the acquisition of rights to the property they occupied (Ark-Yıldırım 2020), it became evident that there would be no toleration of renewed large-scale urban land appropriation—a question to which we will return in our discussion of the fate of Syrian and other forced migrants.

### 2.1 *Market-Compatible Instruments of Social Policy*

As it hastened the dismantling of the “indirect welfarism” of past decades, the AKP government moved to introduce new forms of targeted social policy. This was of particular urgency, for a government that counted on the electoral support of a significant portion of the low-income urban population, because the combined effects of the 2001 economic crisis and its own urban transformation policies risked introducing into Turkey urban poverty in the European sense. Taking a broad measure that includes pension and health programs targeted at the middle class, public social spending increased from 3.4% in 1995 to 12.5% of GDP in 2016. While remaining below the OECD average of 20.5% for 2016<sup>6</sup> this sharp increase is significant; we are not here in a context of “retrenchment.”

A starting point was the unification of the three branches of the social security system and, as of 2006, the addition of a measure of general tax revenue to its funding mix, albeit more modest than the European norm<sup>7</sup> (Adar 2007). The system was expanded to include citizens, and special access provisions for civil servants were largely eliminated. With respect to healthcare, those with incomes above one-third of the official minimum wage are expected to contribute to the health insurance fund. Below this threshold, the universal health system, which replaced the “green card” after 2008, provides access to healthcare with contributions paid by the government. Furthermore, children under the age of 18 will be covered by the health insurance scheme without having to pay premiums (Yentürk 2018).

This policy mix has been labeled “social neo-liberalism” (Öniş 2012), as pro-market economic policies were combined with significant redistribution, especially in the health and education sectors. Dorlach (2015:

<sup>6</sup> OECD, “Social expenditure statistics”: [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX\\_AGG](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG).

<sup>7</sup>The contributions are 5% and 3% of total contributions for social security and health insurance, respectively, while EU countries do not fall below 20% (Adar 2007).

525) expands on this insight by suggesting that the AKP government expanded policies typical of the “productive welfare state,” such as health, education, and active labor market policies (training schemes and public works), while retrenching the “protective welfare state” focused on passive labor market policies (unemployment insurance, workplace regulation, and toleration of labor union activities), agricultural supports and housing subsidies. These latter, significantly, are meant to “shield citizens from or in the market” (530).

At the same time, in a pattern consistent with the model of market citizenship sketched out in the Chap. 2, assistance to the poorest citizens has increased significantly. Among such programs, the social (i.e. noncontributory) pensions for the elderly and disabled, whose modest origins in 1976 we noted above, have been repeatedly expanded and reached some 1.3 million persons in 2018 (Öktem 2018: 29). Also notable are programs aimed at widows, children, or students. Adjusted for inflation, overall spending on means-tested social assistance increased by some 176% in between 2006 and 2017 and accounted for 7.3% of total spending on social protection programs by the end of that period (Yentürk 2018: 49). Marked in detail by a piecemeal approach that has produced a bewildering array of programs (43 as of 2019 by the official count of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services), the pattern that emerges is one of targeted social CT intended to empower low-income citizens to act within the market, making choices and accepting risk.

In terms of governance, these programs are coordinated and implemented by the Directorate General for Social Assistance (*Sosyal Yardımlar Genel Müdürlüğü*). This institution was established in 2004, under the name The Directorate General for Social Assistance and Solidarity, within the precursor of the present Ministry of Family, Labor, and Services. The financial resources for these programs come from several sources. As of 2020, eight of these programs are funded by the state’s general budget, 2 by the European Union, and the rest by the Fund for the encouragement of the social assistance and solidarity, whose operation is detailed in the following section (MoFLSS 2019). As of 2019, these programs collectively, reached some 3.3 million households and accounted for spending equivalent to 1.2% of Turkey’s GDP (Ministry of Family and Social Policies 2017: 136). While the sums transferred to a given beneficiary have always been modest, Öktem (2018) has estimated that their value in terms of purchasing power had stayed roughly constant through 2018.

Two national-level instruments were developed to manage this array of programs. Launched in 2010, the Integrated Social Assistance Information System (ISAIS) is a database and online management system that aggregates data from 22 public institutions and 112 web-based services, and makes it available to all public agencies involved in administering social support policies. These data are used to assess eligibility, disburse funds, and carry out audits for an array of national programs (MFSP 2017). In 2013, the PTT card, a multipurpose smart card, was developed as a common vehicle for user to access these programs. It can be used to withdraw cash, or directly for purchases in shops equipped with POS terminals. As of 2018, over 2 million Turkish citizens used this card (MoLFSS 2019: 150).

## 2.2 *Persisting Centrality of the Local Level*

From the perspective of this book, the relevant question concerning these examples of market-enhancing social policy relate less to their aggregate scope than to their impact on beneficiaries. Do they contribute, even incrementally, to creating or enhancing social citizenship, in the sense of “basic equality of membership” in a broader society? At the macro level, a number of elements suggest caution. Basing his calculation on the European Union’s “at risk of poverty threshold,” Öktem (2018: 62) concludes that, with the notable exception of some programs aimed at the severely disabled, the sums transferred are insufficient to lift beneficiaries out of poverty. Looking to program design, critical analysts have pointed out the fragmented nature of these programs and the often arbitrary definitions of eligibility perpetuate a logic of discretionary charity rather than of stable social rights (Buğra 2015), and do not include “a guaranteed minimum income policy in conformity with an the logic of citizenship” (Buğra 2018: 323), while others (Bahçe and Köse 2017) have chosen to define the increase in social transfer payments as an instrument of “pauperization” of the working class.

While significant, however, these elements do not directly address our central question. Returning as ever to T.H. Marshall, we are reminded that while the membership at the heart of social citizenship undeniably requires securing a “modicum of economic welfare and security,” its purpose is to allow all citizens to “live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11). To determine whether and to what extent social CT programs contribute to this ideal in

the context of the standards prevailing in a market-centered society, we suggest that it is necessary to ascertain how the citizens in question feel about it. For this reason, as set out in the introduction to this book, our initial empirical studies are situated at the local level, looking at cases in which means-tested programs of social CT using digital smart cards have explicitly replaced in-kind distribution. Doing this allows us to work on a manageable scale, and also to focus our analysis on the means of assistance—cash versus in-kind—rather than its quantity.

While we propose that this shift to the local level provides useful analytical clarity, it requires us to complement the global picture of the evolution of Turkish social policy given so far with an additional element of “already existing practices” (Campbell 2004), namely, the quite considerable institutional capacities for social assistance found in Turkey at the district level. The district is both a unit of government, with an elected assembly and mayor, and an administrative unit of the national state. Several districts typically make up a province, with the province taking the name of the largest city within it.<sup>8</sup> For “metropolitan cities” such as Ankara or Istanbul, which comprise regions all by themselves, districts can be thought of as largely self-governing urban boroughs.

The role of district municipalities in social assistance has gained importance since the mid-1990s. In the municipalities under its control, the Welfare Party—precursor to today’s AKP—invested heavily in social provision such as direct programs to distribute food, coal, and clothing (Akinci 1999). Municipal initiatives gained further momentum after the AKP came to national power in 2002. Particularly important in our context was the municipal law of 2005,<sup>9</sup> which introduced the possibility of partnerships for poor-relief activities with the private sector and philanthropic NGOs and of cooperating with the private sector in meting out social

<sup>8</sup> As of 2019, Turkey composed of 81 provinces: 30 metropolitan municipalities and 51 provincial municipalities, further divided into 921 districts. In metropolitan cities; a two-degree local administration model, metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities, has been established. In non-metropolitan provinces, as many as five levels can exist, including special provincial administrations, provincial municipalities, district municipalities, town municipalities (*belde belediyeleri*), and villages. (Karaarslan, M. (2015). Nasıl Bir Yerel Yönetim? 6360 Sayılı Kanun Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme. Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 17–18 (26–27–28–29), 123–162. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/duhfd/issue/23027/246195>, p. 131; TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2019 Yerel Yönetimler Raporu, Yerel Seçimlere Yönelik Değerlendirmeler/Öneriler) <http://www.mimaresk.org.tr/yonetim/dosyalar/632019134557R.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Municipal law 5393 of 2005, Official Gazette, no. 25874.

assistance. Within the framework of their own social assistance activities, this law allows municipalities to supplement their budgets with private donations (art. 59) as well as to employ volunteer workers (art. 75–77). With these new powers, some municipalities have been able to set up local social funds partly financed by contributions in cash or in kind made by local companies or charities, allowing them a considerable degree of autonomy in this area vis-à-vis the national authorities. The district municipality of U, which will provide one of the case studies of Chap. 4, is among those that initiated such an instrument. The reinforcement of central authority noted in the previous section has had an impact in this area as well. The Investment Monitoring and Coordination Presidency (*Yatırım İzleme ve Koordinasyon Başkanlığı*) was established in 2016 with authority to intervene in cases that “negatively affect the health, peace, well-being, public order, and security.” A 2018 presidential decree<sup>10</sup> further stipulated that municipalities must notify the Ministry of Treasury and Finance of their monthly budgets and can implement their programs only after approval by the Ministry.

A second, and more complex, institutional actor present at the district level is comprised of the national-level “Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity” (*Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu*—hereafter, Solidarity Fund) and the district-level “Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations” (hereafter SASFs) associated with it. We will encounter the SASF in one of our local cases, but also in the context of assistance to Syrian refugees. Created in 1986 to assist persons outside the formal social security system, the Solidarity Fund was significantly expanded by the AKP government after 2002. The 1986 legislation set up the Fund as an “umbrella organization,” potentially available as a source of financing for diverse social initiatives (Göçmen 2014: 98). The fund gained importance after the Marmara earthquake of 1999, when it managed a World Bank grant for reconstruction. After the economic crisis of 2001, conditional cash transfer (CT) aids provided by the World Bank were also distributed via the Fund (Buğra and Candaş 2011). In 2004, it was organized institutionally under “The Prime Ministry General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity.” Responsibility was subsequently shifted to the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. The Solidarity Fund’s resources are diverse, funding sources include 2.8% of

<sup>10</sup>The President of the Republic issued Presidential Decree numbered 17 on the scope of new Treasury Single Account, dated 8 August, 2018.

total income and corporate tax collection, 50% of the budget from traffic fines, and 15% of the revenue of the radio and television supreme council.<sup>11</sup> In principle, it can also accept private charitable contributions, but Öktem and Erdoğan (2018: 21–22) calculate from data that they acknowledge to be imperfect that these are probably negligible, below 1% of the Solidarity Fund’s annual budget.

The fund is led by a Board of Governors chaired by The Minister of Family, Labor, and Social Services. Also participating are representatives of the Prime minister and of the ministries of Interior, Finance, and Health, as well as the General Directorate of Social Assistance and the General Director of Foundations. CT forms an important and growing part of social assistance, accounting for 67.4% of total social assistance transfers in 2017,<sup>12</sup> 86% in 2018, and 93% in 2019 (Ministry of family report 2019). While the remainder still consists largely of in-kind distribution, public authorities increasingly are finding new ways to monetize aid to the poor.

The General Directorate conducts all its relations with citizens through 1,003 local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASFs) whose function is to provide social assistance to vulnerable and needy persons. While social assistance programs are designed centrally, they are implemented through the SASFs. Although these, like autonomous religious or charitable bodies, are legally included in the category of “foundation,” they cannot be categorized as NGOs but are more appropriately considered parastatal (Öktem 2018), because they are established by law and district governors serve as the chairman of their boards of trustees empowered to make their own decisions (Yılmaz and Yakut Çakar 2008: 3). As seen from the center, this structure takes advantage of local knowledge.<sup>13</sup> Working with the SASFs, from this perspective, ensures flexibility and speed and also a measure of enhanced control since SASF staff is contractual and can be kept or removed according to performance.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/sygm/hakkimizda/sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayan%C4%B1smayi-tesvik-fonu/>.

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=27622>.

<sup>13</sup> Interview, 2020.

As summarized by Aytaç (2013: 1218, 1234) each SASF has a board of trustees headed by the district governor. In urban areas the committees have 14 members, of which 7 are centrally appointed local civil servants, 3 are elected neighborhood head men (*muhhtar*), 2 are representatives from local nongovernmental organizations, and 2 are local philanthropists. As set out in a 2017 synthesis document prepared by a team of experts from the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and the World Bank (MFSP 2017), the executive committee serves as a critical link between national and local sources of information. Participation in means-tested social assistance programs is not automatic: potential beneficiaries must take the initiative. Those desiring assistance apply to their local SASF by completing a questionnaire that is cross-referenced with information available through the ISAIS to establish an income estimate, and then combine this with other variables such as demographic and geographic data to compute a “poverty score.” This, in turn, is compared with local cost-of-living estimates to determine whether or not an applicant is below the “poverty threshold” for their place of residence (MFSP 2017: 28). Eligibility is confirmed by an on-site visit of SASF staff whose task is to assess actual living conditions, including an estimate of the value of real and other property so as to determine “income status” on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (well-off). Information derived from inspections, in turn, is uploaded to the ISAIS. A decision is then made by the executive committee based on the sum of this information.

The effective discretion left to the executive committee remains an open question. Writing in 2013, Aytaç concluded that the committee is formally bound neither by the computer-generated scores nor by the reports of its inspectors. He noted its “authority to override certain formal eligibility requirements for enrollment, and /.../ enroll individuals who are formally not eligible but are considered needy” (Aytaç 2013: 1218). Our observations, carried out in 2019, showed less discretion with respect to national social programs. In the case of aid to forced migrants, the discretion allowed the executive committees is greater, as we will discuss in Chap. 6. Beyond the question of discretion, however, it is evident even from formal descriptions that the system depends for its effectiveness on the accuracy of the data supplied to it. This is a question, particularly with



respect to the reliability of on-site inspection, to which we will return with respect both to domestic programs and to programs for migrants.

### 2.3 *Does Cash Transfer Contribute to Market Citizenship? Avoiding False Comparisons*

Significantly, the symbolic legitimating reference for the Solidarity Fund and the district SASF's is not to a twentieth-century Western model but rather to Ottoman history. The preamble of the law that established the fund stated that:

*Islamic foundations, the most ancient and persistent institutions of the Islamic Turkish Anatolian civilization and the most beautiful examples of cooperation and solidarity for a thousand years, are the most progressive institution of our times in fulfilling social, economic and cultural needs.*

*... The honor of serving the part of society that is placed under the middle classes and who are without social security would be possible through the support of the charitable and self-sacrificing citizens alongside with our state.<sup>14</sup>*

The role of diverse actors was further strengthened in the 1980s and afterward by the increasing number of religiously motivated associations in the field of social aid distribution (Göçmen 2014) as well as the increasing role of municipal governments in that field, as noted above. Implementing this policy required making changes to municipal and tax legislation. Government allowed tax exemption from individual or firms who give money to NGOs engaged in food banking activities, and tax reduction from individual or firms who give the money to NGOs engaged in activity to alleviate poverty.<sup>15</sup> According to Buğra and Adar (2008: 103), this empowered role of nonstate actors, which “implies a change in the content of social rights, which come to be defined outside the formal boundaries of the citizenship relation.”

In the context that we have established for this book, two points of caution should be evident. In the first place, we must be careful to avoid

<sup>14</sup>Turkey, Parliament Deb., 454 (16 May, 1986) Proposed Law on the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity and the Report of the Commission on Plan and Budget, p. 3 (translation from Buğra and Candaş 2011: 520).

<sup>15</sup>Law numbered 5035 (25December, 2003) and 5281 (30 December, 2004). Donations made are also exempted from VAT. See also: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/fakirlere-yardim-eden-daha-az-vergi-odeyecek-7361419>.

confusing political rhetoric with effective policy. The glorification of private benevolence should be tempered evidence (Öktem and Erdoğan 2018: 21–22) of the limited budgetary impact of private donations. To the extent that private actors are indeed playing a larger role, moreover, what may at first seem like a peculiarly Turkish debate should be seen as part of the much broader discussion of the appropriate boundary between public and private in the provision of social assistance. Noting that “a hybrid combination of public and private funds for the provision of social welfare services played a crucial role in the social, cultural and economic life of the Turkic world from the 8th to the 19th century” Göçmen (2014: 95) emphasizes that “the idea of introducing a social-assistance institution modeled on *vakıfs* is significant for two reasons: it is based on Islamic principles and it emphasizes citizens’ duty to care for the poor.” In the second of these, we find a clear echo of the injunction that citizenship involves “accepting responsibility for others.” But what of the first?

The explicitly religious reference has been made much of by both sympathetic and critical observers (Öktem and Erdoğan 2018). It may be tempting to contrast this with twentieth-century welfare state ideology, which emphasized a shift in responsibility for social care away from religious authorities toward the secular state. We must avoid, however, the logical fallacy of comparing theory and practice as if they were the same thing. As we have seen, the ideology of state monopoly was at best imperfectly reflected in European and North American practice—and the quasi-public role of faith-based organizations remains important. The resurgence of religious symbolism and even the explicit participation of religious institutions in Turkey, thus, are less surprising—and less “Turkish”—than it might initially seem.

Going beyond the rather sterile debate on the state monopoly of social services, Buğra (2015) suggests that the evolution of the Turkish system harkens back to a “logic of charity,” the purpose of which is to allow those who are well-off to acquire moral virtue by temporarily relieving the suffering of the poor rather than a concerted effort to address the sources of poverty itself. This is not a criticism that should be dismissed out of hand—and it applies far beyond Turkey. In principle, it constitutes the exact opposite of Leisering’s (2019: 320) “citizenship approach to poverty.” Which of these best characterizes a given situation is an empirical question. It is a point to which we will return in the context of the local examples discussed in Chap. 4, but also in our subsequent discussion of humanitarian assistance.

### 3 TURKS AND OTHERS: THE EVOLVING INCORPORATION REGIME

Like its institutions of social support, the Turkish incorporation regime for migrants has undergone significant changes in recent years and continues to evolve. More than in the case of social policy, moreover, recent reforms to Turkish immigration policies bear the marks not just of diffuse policy emulation but of explicit policy transfer from the member states of the European Union, initially in the context of Turkish candidacy for EU membership and more recently due to agreements relating to Syrian and other refugees. As these will be our focus in Chaps. 5 and 6, we go into more detail in the pages that follow about this particular aspect of the Turkish incorporation regime, while providing only a brief outline of policies applied to other types of migrants.

#### 3.1 *A Restrictive Regime of Naturalization*

Turkish immigration policy emerges from the same history as the economic and social policies we have been considering. Two critical factors, in this context, are the inflow of ethnic Turkish populations in the 1920s and 1930s, and the emigration of Turkish workers and their families to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. From the first of these and from the period of the nationalist revolution and war of Independence more generally, came a theory and practice of nationality akin to Brubaker's (1992) description of "*volk*-centered" nationalism in Germany, in which the status of citizen was closely tied to ethnic identity. The experience of the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the notion that Turkey was a country characterized by surplus labor. How to employ this was a challenge to which first import substitution and emigration, and subsequently export promotion were proposed as responses, but the perceived need for imported labor that Nuhuğlu Soysal (1994) points to as central in shaping the "incorporation regimes" of Western Europe has no equivalent here.

In this context, immigration policy focused on assimilation, with the only groups allowed by right to settle permanently in Turkey being those of Turkish cultural or linguistic origin (İçduygu and Aksel 2013). The acquisition of Turkish nationality was largely limited to persons of Turkish

ethnicity and heritage and Sunni Muslim religion.<sup>16</sup> Change began with a 2003 law granting Turkish citizenship after three years of marriage to a Turkish citizen. Further reforms in 2009 granted citizenship to stateless children born in Turkey if they are unable to acquire their parents' citizenship (Koser Akcapar and Simsek 2018).<sup>17</sup> A 2010 implementation decision also made provision for naturalization after five years of uninterrupted residence in Turkey, allowed citizenship for those who owned real property, made investments, transferred their permanent workplace, or completed their education in Turkey. In each case, however, citizenship was not automatic; an application must be made in the prefecture of residence, and applicants must prove that they have sufficient means to provide for themselves and their family.<sup>18</sup> The acquisition of citizenship was also possible under “exceptional circumstances.” At the same time, however, persons with temporary or international protection status—who are at the heart of our discussion in Chaps. 5 and 6—were excluded from the law's provisions.

Article 12 of the 2009 law made explicit the criteria for “exceptional citizenship,” stating that this applied to persons recognized as migrants under the meaning of pre-existing laws (that is, persons of Turkish cultural or ethnic origin) and also to those who have already contributed and/or have the potential to contribute at an exceptional level to Turkish society in the fields of science, technology economy, social life, sports, culture and arts. To these were added, “persons deemed necessary for naturalization.” Alternatively, a 2016 amendment (number 2016/9601) specified economic conditions that could justify “exceptional status.” As further amended in September 2018,<sup>19</sup> these are:

- Making a permanent capital investment of at least 500.000 USD in Turkey
- Purchasing real property worth at least 250.000 USD and keeping it for at least 3 years

<sup>16</sup>The relevant laws were: Citizenship Law 1312 of 1928; Law on Settlement 2510 of 1934; Citizenship Law 403 of 1964.

<sup>17</sup>Citizenship law 4866 of 2003; Citizenship Law 5901 of 2009.

<sup>18</sup>April 2010 (Decision No. 2010/139) numbered 27544 - article 15.

<sup>19</sup>Türk Vatandaşlığı kanununun uygulanmasına ilişkin yönetmelikte değişiklik yapılmasına dair yönetmelik (Regulation on amending the regulation on the application of Turkish Citizenship law).

- Providing employment for at least 50 workers; having at least 500.000 USD or equivalent deposits in another currency in Turkish banks, provided there are no withdrawals for at least three years
- Keeping government debt instruments equaling at least 500.000 USD for three years

The acquisition of Turkish nationality through this process is by invitation. It can be initiated only by the government, not the potential beneficiary. Persons whom the government deems to be relevant after an evaluation process, are contacted directly and called for interviews (Koser Akcapar and Simsek 2018).

The legal aspects of Turkish citizenship—what Marshall would have called civic and political citizenship or more contemporary authors would designate as status as distinct from rights—remain difficult to acquire. But what of the elements of social citizenship that have been our focus throughout this volume? A central theme of our argument has been that these can, at least to a limited extent, be seen as decoupled from civic and political citizenship. This allows us to consider in Chap. 4 the possibility that, nationality status notwithstanding, persons unable to meet socially defined basic needs are less than full citizens. The mirror image of this argument allows us to ask whether and to what extent addressing the basic needs of forced migrants, confers on them a limited but significant measure of social citizenship.

### 3.2 *The Evolving Status of Internationally Displaced Persons*

The unanticipated and unprecedented population movement caused by the Syrian civil war, which began in earnest in 2011, came at a time when Turkish law and practice with respect to forced migrants was already evolving, and it has led to further rapid change. Turkey initially ratified the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention with both time and geographical limitations to apply only to persons coming from Europe before 1951. While the time limitation was removed by a 1967 Protocol, the geographical limitation was retained. Until 1994, the UNHCR was the only institution responsible for evaluating refugees' asylum claims and resettling them into third countries in Europe. A first change came with a 1994 regulation, prompted by large-scale movement of Kurds from northern Iraq, allowing for the possibility of granting "temporary asylum" to people from outside of Europe (Sarı and Dinçer 2017: 62). The definition of "asylum seekers"

was identical to the 1951 Convention's definition of refugees, without geographical limitation, but did not give rights, even theoretically, to permanent residence.

More sweeping changes followed the 1999 recognition of Turkey as an EU candidate with the stated intention of bringing Turkish law and practices into closer alignment with those of the European Union (Binder 2014: 83). A critical step in this reform was outlined in the 2003 *National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis Communautaires*, which was followed in 2005 by the *National Action Plan for Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Immigration* and the 2007 *Action Plan for Integrated Border Control*. Together, these have been seen as marking a “novel, external and technical character of the emergence of migration governance in Turkey” (Üstübcü 2019: 59). Implementing the principles contained in these plans took almost a decade, leading ultimately to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of 4 April 2013.

A central element of the *Acquis Communautaires* incorporated into the new law alongside the legacy of preexisting Turkish laws and practices noted above, was the provision of wider protection opportunities to migrants. Legal institutions directly inspired by EU law such as “administrative detention,” “accelerated procedure,” and “inadmissible applications,” made their way into Turkish law, along with the notion of Subsidiary protection status (Öztürk-Övünç 2017). Subsidiary protection can be provided for individuals who cannot be qualified either as “refugees” or as “conditional refugees” by the criteria of the Geneva Convention, but who also cannot be sent back to their country of origin because of the risk of death or torture. This status is not an interim status, such as conditional refugee status, and gives its recipient permanent settlement rights. These three statuses are considered collectively as “international protection status.” With respect to refugees, the geographical limitation version of the refugee status of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees still applies. That means refugee status can be granted only to people fleeing from “events occurring in Europe.” “Conditional refugee status,” adapted from the 1994 category “asylum seekers” can be given to persons who would qualify within the refugee definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention if they were from Europe. Persons with conditional refugee status are expected to settle in a third country. This is not a permanent status and is not intended to result in longer-term integration. Taken together, these three statuses—refugee, conditional refugee, and subsidiary protection—are known as “international protection status.”

Faced with the massive arrival of persons displaced by the Syrian conflict after 2011, a new set of instruments were gradually put in place. Syrians were initially defined as “guests” in Turkey, which is not a legal status under either Turkish or international law. It was announced that Turkey would grant Syrians Temporary Protection Status in October 2011 but this announcement was not initially followed by any law or regulation. When the number of Syrian refugees exceeded 100,000, as of October 2012 a directive was issued (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016), but it remained unclear what this meant in practice because the regulation was not made public. Clarification came with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection—LFIP and with the Regulation on Temporary Protection issued in October 2014 based on article 91 of LFIP. By the terms of this law, individuals entering Turkey directly from Syria were expected to apply for Temporary Protection Status (thus the commonly used acronym SuTP, for Syrians under Temporary Protection). Persons arriving from countries other than Syria may apply for one or another of the categories of International Protection. Recognition of these statuses is under the authority of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), as indicated by Law on Foreigners and International Protection.<sup>20</sup>

Temporary Protection Status (TPS) extends collective protection to migrants who cannot meet the criteria under the 1951 Convention when the determination of an individual’s status proves impossible. This status promises group-based protection, providing immediate protection from *refoulement* and guaranteeing basic minimum treatment. This status was applied by EU member states in the 1990s to persons fleeing from the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently formalized by Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, which set minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences. It constitutes the legal basis of temporary protection in EU refugee law, and as such was part of the *Acquis* translated into Turkish law. This translation was not complete, since Turkey does not set an upper time limit for the

<sup>20</sup> UNHCR initially provided support to DGMM for registration of international protection applicants and referral processes. As of 10 September 2018, UNHCR stopped registering foreigners wishing to apply for international protection in Turkey. [https://static.help.unhcr.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/09/06134921/UNHCR\\_ending\\_registration\\_leaflet\\_ENG.pdf](https://static.help.unhcr.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/09/06134921/UNHCR_ending_registration_leaflet_ENG.pdf).

duration of TPS, leaving this matter to the discretion of national authority (Öztürk-Övünç 2017). This point was further modified by the amendment of the regulation on temporary protection, numbered 1851, of December 2019 that vested this authority on this matter in the president.<sup>21</sup> Turkish law now defines temporary protection as a status that “may be provided to foreigners, who were forced to leave their countries and are unable to return to the countries they left and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx seeking immediate and temporary protection.” This status legally entitles those who hold it to public services such as education and health as well access to the labor market.

The choice of TPS status in the case of Syrians provides flexibility to the Turkish Government as it had for European Countries in the case of Bosnian refugees (Koser 2007). TPS is not a status defined in international law, but one governed by national and administrative law and regulations; no formal process is required in order to withdraw status and force repatriation. Even so, this distinction may be somewhat less important in practice than in principle. In Turkey, Sarı and Dinçer (2017: 75–76) argue that after failed coup of July 2016, the state of emergency increased detention and deportation of all migrants through Decree Law No. 676 dated October 2016. Article 36 of this decree explicitly facilitated the scope of deportation for national security reasons of people who have applied for or have received international protection status, which in this case proves no more secure than TPS. An additional regulation specified that persons with TPS could also be deported if they are found to have links with terrorist organizations. Although, the deported person can appeal, deportation can occur prior to any trial.<sup>22</sup>

Increasing use of TPS has been criticized as a weakening of the prior regime of refugee rights (Fitzpatrick 2000). While this is true in principle, the experience of repeated “refugee crises” of the twenty-first century suggests that the contemporary political climate of Europe and North America rules out any sweeping application of refugee status, in its strict 1951 definition, to large numbers of forced migrants. The German experience of 2015–2016, when over one million forced migrants, mostly from Syria, were allowed to enter the country with a majority subsequently granted permanent right of residence, is the outstanding current exception to this. With five years of hindsight, however, it may be the exception that proves

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2019/12/20191225-38.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.goc.gov.tr/sinir-disi-etme>.



the rule. Taking into account both the human and political consequences of this decision, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has famously and frequently repeated that it was the right thing to do ... and must never be done again.<sup>23</sup>

In Turkey as elsewhere, thus, TPS is the relevant policy instrument. Taking the provisions detailed above at face value, it would seem that the social rights granted are quite extensive, including notably access to health and education. In Turkey, as we will see, these have largely been provided. More generally, this enumeration of rights brings us back to the discussion in Chap. 2 on the notion of “denizens.” Should we conclude that the granting of TPS to millions of forced migrants has endowed them with at least the core elements of Marshallian “social citizenship,” albeit in the absence of civic and political citizenship?

One obvious note of caution comes from the very word “temporary.” Although the Turkish TPS regime does not envisage an explicit upper limit for length of stay, access both to market transactions and to social services is not intended to be permanent.<sup>24</sup> Beyond this problem of stability are others, and here the situation of forced migrants rejoins that of other low-income persons. Formal rights are one thing, daily life is another. We noted in the introduction that poverty, discrimination, or handicap can be barriers to full citizenship, whatever one’s formal status. What remains to be seen is whether and to what extent theoretical rights can be translated to practical “full membership” in a market society. Proponents of CT see this instrument as providing a solution to precisely this problem—Leisering’s (2019: 320) “citizenship approach to poverty.” In the chapters that follow, we look to concrete examples to consider whether and under what conditions this claim might be justified.

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<sup>23</sup> “Germany’s Refugee Influx: Did they handle it?” *The Economist*, 29 August 2020.

<sup>24</sup> Regulation on the amendment of the regulation on temporary protection, numbered 1851, dated: 25 December 2019, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2019/12/20191225-38.pdf>.

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## Cash Transfer with Turkish Characteristics: Two Local Examples

**Abstract** Having discussed the emergence of cash transfer (CT) as an instrument not only for economic assistance but potentially for inclusion in a market-centered society, and the policy environment of contemporary Turkey, we now bring these together through examination of two case studies of CT programs designed and implemented at the local level. By proceeding in this way, we are explicitly eschewing any claim to providing a universal treatment of social policy, or even of CT programs, in contemporary Turkey. Rather, we consider these cases with a view to highlighting the elements that seem most closely tied to particular outcomes, and then to generalizing these in the form of hypotheses applicable beyond Turkey.

**Keywords** Turkey • Local government • Social cash transfer • Outcomes • Social citizenship

As detailed in Chap. 3, the use of various types of CT instruments has become widespread in twenty-first-century Turkey. These include categorical programs aimed at widows, students, disabled persons, etc. There has also been an increase in conditional CT programs, such as those launched under the World Bank's Social Risk Mitigation Program (SRMP) in 2002 (World Bank 2008). The impact of such programs remains an open question. In the introduction to a World Bank sponsored study of the use of cash for food assistance, Alderman et al. (2018: 2) conclude that: "... cash

can, under the right circumstances, provide choice, empower recipients, and generate local economic multipliers.” But what are the right circumstances? And how, if it does occur, does such choice and empowerment translate into the type of inclusion conducive to the “basic equality of membership” at the core of Marshallian social citizenship?

It is to begin answering these questions that we turn to two case studies of unconditional CT designed and implemented at the local level. Our first case is a program led by the district Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF), while the second was put in place by a district municipality. In both cases, CT programs replaced existing schemes of in-kind food distribution. An important reason for our choice of these cases is that, unlike the World Bank’s Social Risk Mitigation Program, they are the result of Turkish initiatives at the local level, and emerge from local practice. Because they share the national institutional context detailed in Chap. 3, comparison between them can control for the effect of national-level institutions and laws, and notoriously problematic factors such as “national culture,” allowing us to focus on the differences that matter: elements of program design and concrete implementation that determine outcomes in practice. In order to preserve the anonymity of our interview partners, we do not identify the specific districts taken as examples, but rather give a general description of their location and situation. As the first is in a predominantly rural zone and the second in a major urban area, we will designate them as “R” and “U”, respectively.

## I THE CASE OF A RURAL DISTRICT

The district of R is largely rural: in February 2019 it had a population of approximately 61,000, of which one-third lived in villages and two-thirds in the capital city. Politically, the district and the province of which it is a part have been dominated since 2009 by the CHP, the center-left secular party in opposition at the national level. Our principal finding in this case was that the small scale and limited resources of authorities had several negative consequences. The number and training of social assistance workers was inadequate for evaluation of applicants’ needs; they produced data whose accuracy was difficult to assess. The district SASF depended for implementation on a private-sector contractor. This, in turn allowed the service provider to limit participating merchants to those already in its network, leading to higher-priced shops being chosen and limiting the

value of cash transfer. Authorities' attempts to monitor transactions, finally, were an administrative burden on participating shops. Failure to comply with monitoring requirements led to reimbursement to shops being withheld to the detriment of the program's sustainability.

### 1.1 *An Instrument for Individual Empowerment?*

In 2015, the district's SASF replaced the distribution of food parcels to the lowest income families with prepaid smart cards that allow them to purchase a defined set of products on the model of the "gift cards" sold by certain companies. The technical specifications of the card were modeled on those of the Electronic Platform for Public Procurement [Elektronik Kamu Alımı Platformu, EKAP] as well as electronic card suppliers such as Multinet and Sodexo. Since it did not have the technical resources to design such a tool itself, the SASF issued a call for tenders including both the physical aspects of the instrument (smart cards and the associated computer management system) and its commercial aspects (network of shops where the card would be accepted). In the end, only one company responded, probably because the scale of the district limited profits for large companies. The local foundation signed a contract with Multinet, which was replaced by Metropol in 2016 following suspicion that the former had links to the movement of Imam Fethullah Gülen, who was accused by the authorities of orchestrating the failed *coup d'état* in the summer of 2016.<sup>1</sup>

The use of the card, as originally conceived, was limited to the purchase of food during Ramadan and the Feast of Sacrifice (*kurban bayramı*). In 2018, 750 families were able to benefit from these cards, which had a registration number but did not bear the name or photo of the user. The card was reloaded in increments of 200 Turkish Liras (TL)<sup>2</sup> and could be used in the local branches of five national supermarket chains, selected by Multinet and then Metropol as part of their management contract. Certain items such as alcohol, tobacco products, jewelry, furniture and cleaning products could not be purchased with this card.

<sup>1</sup>Interview: 2019. For background on the failed coup, see: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/dakika-dakika-darbe-girisimi-15-16-temmuz-2016-40149409>, consulted 10 April 2020.

<sup>2</sup>See the discussion of currency conversion in Chap. 1.



The payment card program was financed from the national budget of the Solidarity Fund. Prior to launching the card program the local SASF received a monthly payment (*periodik yardım*) of TL 123,500 from the General Directorate of Social Assistance to ensure the payment of the salaries of its seven employees. Additional shares of aid were paid to the SASF on the occasion of Ramadan and the Feast of Sacrifice. In the past, these had financed the distribution of food packages; they became the source of funds distributed to the families through the prepaid cards.

From the point of view of the local foundation, the switch from in-kind donations to the social card program was justified in terms of the quality of the products available and the freedom of choice left to the beneficiaries. The foundation director explained:

*Before the food cards, we used to distribute food parcels during the holiday season. Although there are quality specifications in the food packaging process, the food was of very poor quality. We drank the tea that was in the food parcel, it tasted horrible. We told the companies that wanted to participate in the tender that they had to at least provide good quality tea. But another company won the tender, and the quality of the tea was poor.*

*One day I went to an old lady's house. She was very poor. She told me, "I looked out my window all winter long. There was a street vendor selling oranges and apples. But I can't even buy one."<sup>3</sup>*

As with all actions financed by the Solidarity Fund, whether in-kind or cash, information on low-income people is provided by Turkey's integrated Social Assistance Information System (ISAIS). Home visits to collect and maintain this information are at the heart of this system. These are carried out by inspectors employed by local foundations. According to official documentation, the visits are carried out at least once a year to allow for a consistent and objective assessment of needs (Ministry of Family and Social Policy and World Bank 2017: 23).

Reinforcing its market-enhancing perspective, the monetization of social assistance is closely integrated with the local economy. While the food parcels at the heart of the old system did not come from the local market, beneficiaries of the social card spend the resulting income in local shops, providing an indirect subsidy to the participating businesses. The

<sup>3</sup> Interview, 2019.

local authorities can, in principle, exert an important influence on local economic life by selecting the shops entitled to participate in this program.

### 1.2 *Problems of Implementation*

In practice, the procedures observed deviated significantly from the ideals of market citizenship. From the outset, the fact that the SASF had to call on external suppliers resulted in a delegation of the choice of participating businesses to the Multinet and then Metropol companies. In their role as service providers, they were the ones who selected the participating businesses from among their business partners. The selected shops were all branches of large national supermarket chains. This led directly to several problems.

From the perspective of the SASF, administration proved difficult. In order to monitor users and purchases, the Foundation asked participating businesses for an invoice for each purchase and a photocopy of the identity cards of the person making the purchase. If these were not provided, it refused to pay the merchant. The participating supermarkets proved unable or unwilling to collect the information required by the card providers who, in turn, were unable to provide it to the Foundation. This resulted in refusals to pay and reduced profitability for the suppliers. Finally, the Foundation itself did not have the human resources to carry out its part of the control procedures. Purchases related to each card had to be verified on a monthly basis. The Foundation's staff of seven people, two of whom were dedicated to the verification of card purchases, was insufficient for this task, which finally could not be carried out. This led to a weakening of the relation between system designers and service providers, to the detriment of the program's sustainability.<sup>4</sup>

A distinct problem, from the perspective of users, was limited choice. The restriction of the use of the card to the five supermarkets selected by the companies providing the program was also widely criticized by program users. "We cannot go to A101 or BİM [national discount stores]! There is a restriction of shops for purchase. We buy the same food with more expensive prices!"<sup>5</sup> Under these circumstances, some expressed a preference for the old system:

<sup>4</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Interview, 2019.

*There used to be food parcels. There was a lot of food in that parcel. Oil, dish soap, flour, dry food in large quantities! We couldn't buy the same amount with the card. It was better before. But, thank God for this anyway. (Fakat buna da şükür)!<sup>6</sup>*

A third set of problems were linked to the system of home inspection that was intended to verify the eligibility of users. Although the data found in the Integrated Social Assistance System (ISAIS) were used, the behavior of the social assistance inspectors showed considerable discretionary power. To some extent, this was built into the procedures; some items on the assessment forms were left to the inspectors' judgment: "did you find a negative attitude towards children in the family?"; "did you find a pattern of negative habits in the family?". In addition, inspectors sometimes chose not to apply the official questionnaire directly. The lengthy survey provided for in the procedure (49 questions) was usually completed by the inspectors themselves without the questions being asked directly to the respondents.<sup>7</sup> Inspectors, moreover, had no standardized procedures or protocols, nor any formal training on the technical or ethical aspects of assessing poverty and need. In practice, procedures were generated by the inspectors themselves and informally passed on within the inspection teams, with the more experienced inspectors teaching newcomers what they considered relevant. There was no guarantee that assessment would be consistent from one inspector to another.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, our interviews with card recipients suggested that inspections were carried out only once, to determine initial eligibility, and were not repeated afterward, contrary to official procedure.<sup>9</sup> Overall, the picture that emerged from the household visits is one of subjectivity rather than of the technical uniformity intended when the instrument was adopted. These visits were intended to provide additional information to the ISAIS. In the case of R, however, the impression of coherence and harmonization evoked by this system was misleading.

From the point of view of the director of the local foundation, the program was not considered a success.<sup>10</sup> In his view, the poorly educated beneficiaries, especially the older ones and those with disabilities, were not

<sup>6</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>9</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>10</sup> For all information in this paragraph: interview, 2019.

able to use the cards properly: many forgot the password associated with their card, while others did not understand that the card had a limited amount of money on it and tried to make purchases beyond the credit they had been given.

The gap between principle and reality was also evident from the point of view of program beneficiaries, but the reasons they gave proved to be quite different from that of the local authorities.<sup>11</sup> The use of the cards themselves—storage of access codes, etc.—did not seem to be a problem. Quite to the contrary these same people were already using the national PTT card. In their view, having money gave them more freedom in their choice of consumption, although the Foundation authorities did not anticipate the resulting choices. One disabled respondent thus managed to divert the use of the card to purchase medicines, which are normally excluded from accessible products, by the expedient of first purchasing food which he exchanged for cash with a neighbor, and then using the cash to purchase medication.<sup>12</sup>

Beyond such benign creativity, however, was a more general feeling of diffidence about the program and the way it was carried out. Did aid really go to the neediest? Some persons interviewed expressed a preference for informal employment, since the resulting unreported income did not enter into the determination of their eligibility for social assistance. Others recounted an anecdote—obviously unverifiable, but interesting for the point of view it typifies—that in the past year “party members were making lists, and then some people had their aid cut” leaving them with the feeling that any talk about aid might result in losing it.<sup>13</sup> The arbitrary nature of inspections, mentioned earlier, also led to perceptions of unequal treatment, opening the way to conflict and divisions among recipients.

The foundation director suggested that within the board itself civil society members were chosen by the mayor according to political affiliation.<sup>14</sup> Under such conditions, assistance might be subverted to serve elite interests rather than furthering individual equality. It is important to emphasize that no clear evidence either of political or of personal preferential treatment was offered. Even so, the suspicion, whether based in reality or rumor, that obtaining—and losing—assistance was largely arbitrary or could be influenced by political considerations, or that concealing

<sup>11</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>12</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>14</sup> Interview, 2019.

income was prudent, speaks of a program that contributed little either to empowerment or inclusion.

The Foundation's director, inspectors, and card users, each for distinct reason of their own, found the program to be dysfunctional. Acknowledging this result, the SASF decided in 2019 to end this experiment with an autonomous instrument and to adopt the PTT card as a tool for distributing aid. This choice had no impact on the sums distributed; recipients now have access to local aid on the PTT card, which most of them already used to access other State aid. The result saves resources for the Foundation, which no longer has to ensure technical monitoring, but also represented the end of any attempt to monitor the consumption behavior of the beneficiaries. The switch to the PTT card also ended the monopoly of the shops preselected by the supplier, which presumably allowed recipients to obtain food at better prices. The issues noted with respect to inspections determining who should or should not receive assistance, however, were not addressed and remain problematic.

## 2 THE CASE OF AN URBAN DISTRICT

In our second case, the urban district of U, the instigator of the program was the district municipality. Located in an urban area, the district had a population of 427,800 in 2018, having doubled in 10 years. This change in size compared to R is reflected in the means available. Where, in the case of R, only the district SASF, mobilizing a budget from the National Solidarity Fund, could envisage the implementation of a local social welfare policy, the U District Municipality could use its own budget, supplemented by private donations. The result was a system that did not need to call on an outside contractor; the district municipality was both financer and implementor. The resulting market-enhancing instrument, we find, resulted in a greater degree of integration into the local market. At the same time, however, it increased the political dependence of recipients on the municipality and the governing party; market inclusion in this case did not fully translate into individual autonomy.

### 2.1 *An Innovative Local Instrument*

A distinctive element of U's strategy is the early use of innovative social policy instruments as an additional means of inclusion for the poorest part of the population. The policy instrument was created in 2010—preceding

the World Bank's SRMP by two years. As in the case of R, a debit card was used as the program's vehicle, this time inspired by the limited-sum debit cards introduced by some banks for the younger segments of their clientele. The result was a permanent payment card that is regularly recharged by the municipality and used for purchases of food, clothing, school supplies, and some medical items such as wheelchairs. The card is given only to women on the basis of family income. In 2018, 5,500 families received the social assistance card for food.<sup>15</sup> The card is personal and carries a photo of the user. The card is topped up in installments of 200 Turkish liras (TL) with a supplement of TL 5 for each child between 6 and 18 years of age. If one of the parents is deceased, a supplement of TL 5 is added per child. The frequency of recharging the card depends on the per capita family income, so that poorer families receive more frequent assistance (cards are recharged every month instead of every three months or more). Those whose cards are recharged monthly also receive assistance for the purchase of clothing to the amount of TL 110 for each family member. As of 2018, 19,708 persons lived in households eligible for the card.<sup>16</sup> Users can check the amount available on their card at any time. There is no time limit for purchases; the credit is valid until it is exhausted. Criteria other than income can also be taken into consideration. People with disabilities can receive a credit for the purchase of necessary medical equipment; families who have lost their homes in a fire can receive an additional credit for the purchase of building materials.

As in the case of R, the payment card issued in U can only be used in shops selected by the municipality and equipped with a suitable card reader. Sixteen businesses in the district are accredited to accept the card for food and as many for clothing payments.<sup>17</sup> Participating businesses must hold a municipal license, have a space of at least 150 square meters, a bar code reader, and must not sell illegal items or food after its expiry date. Owners must have a clean criminal record and not employ any undeclared workers. The control effort is thus even more evident than in the instrument set up in R, since in this case it concerns local shops designated by the municipality, and not national supermarkets chosen by a private sector service provider.

<sup>15</sup> District municipality of U, annual report of activities, 2018.

<sup>16</sup> It is illustrative of the greater administrative capacity of U that, unlike in R, authorities had an accurate count of individuals—not just households.

<sup>17</sup> District municipality of U, annual report of activities, 2018.

One point in common with R is that the origin of the payment card was linked by its creators to local needs and in particular to certain proven dysfunctions of traditional systems of in-kind aid. An illustrative anecdote along these lines was told to us by the former deputy mayor of the district: during the distribution of Ramadan aid by the municipality in 2009, the dry chickpeas distributed in the parcels systematically ended up in the rubbish bins. After carrying out a survey in the neighborhoods, our interlocutor learned that the chickpeas were thrown away because of the cost of cooking them, considered too high by the beneficiaries. A female inhabitant reportedly told him that to cook these pulses she had to spend more than half of a gas bottle. Transformed into legitimizing narratives, these anecdotes take up the elements of choice that we saw in the first case. Here, as in R, we find support for the conclusions of Buğra and Keyder (2003), according to which aid in-kind generates considerable costs for public administrations, is ineffective for both producers and consumers, and is stigmatizing to those who receive it.

The consequences of the difference in resources from one local authority to another was evident in the management of the instruments. Whereas the District Foundation in R remained dependent on external for-profit service providers, the municipality of U internalized management and control activities. Information about users is collected by municipal employees who make home visits during which they fill out a 250-item questionnaire, 196 of which relate to the economic level of the household. According to an official of the municipal social services, these answers are entered into an online system created by the district municipality's officers, enabling them to follow-up each case in real time. This local mastery of the computer tool emerges as one of the most striking differences between our two cases.

Contrary to the result observed in R, the popular success of the payment card in U is not in doubt. While the residents of R were apprehensive about the inspectors' visit, fearing that these would take away the aid they were already receiving, we observed women in U queuing, sometimes for hours, to ask for home visits, which they hoped would open up the rights to the payment card.<sup>18</sup> This difference is explained by the fact that the visits in question were not made by representatives of the municipality but by (systematically women) AKP activists. In principle, these initial visits conducted by party activists had no official value; they had to be

<sup>18</sup> Recurring participant observation, 2014.

completed and validated by municipal officials. In the minds of the inhabitants, however, the two institutions were seen as one and the same.

This perceived role of a political party in selecting beneficiaries of a public program generates obvious questions of partisanship. Has social policy become no more than a means of rewarding political support? The explanation of the president of a neighborhood party organization could be interpreted in this sense when he says, “I know the problems in this neighborhood from A to Z. I try to prevent those who are not truly needy from obtaining the card.” Truly needy, or truly loyal, a cynical observer might ask?<sup>19</sup> Residents who supported the opposition CHP believed that they faced discrimination in obtaining the payment card. We did observe, however, that supporters of other opposition parties were among the card recipients. As one woman party worker told us: “Women tell me that they will vote for AKP now, even though their husbands do not. What do men know? They are never home!” There is no doubt that we are very far, here, from a world of neutral disinterested civil servants and universal rights. Political calculations are clearly made and openly discussed. In terms of objective output, however, this distinction may be less significant than one might initially imagine. The dynamic described by Piattoni (2001) in which a dominant party finds it in its long-term electoral interest to provide public services to the population at large, which we see at work here, brings results surprisingly similar to what a rights-based dynamic might generate.

## 2.2 *From Social Penetration to Local Knowledge*

The omnipresence of local workers and activists of the ruling party, the AKP, in low-income neighborhoods of the district was a constant of life in U after 2012. In addition to organizing political meetings and activities, they could be found at purely social gatherings such as weddings and funerals. As they were themselves residents of the neighborhoods where they worked, the party activists were easily accepted in all these circles. This strategy of local anchoring is not new in Turkey. White (2002) has shown that Islamist parties have, at least since the 1990s, perfected a

<sup>19</sup> Interview, 2012.



model of political action deeply rooted in everyday life. Like its predecessor, the Prosperity Party [*Refah Partisi*], the AKP communicates and personalizes its messages to local residents.

Significantly, many of the party workers active in low-income neighborhoods of U were also volunteers for religiously based foundations closely allied with the AKP at both the local and the national levels. This link, which is a frequently observed element of contemporary Turkish reality, has been criticized as reintroducing a “logic of charity” (Buğra 2015), into what should be a system based on rights of citizenship. While it is entirely possible that religious duty was easily allied with political expediency for many party workers, it remains that this dual role seems to have facilitated the construction of relations of trust between them and the poorest residents. Religious foundations, in the words of the local representative of one of these, “can act as a bridge between the people and the state” especially for those, such as internally displaced persons from eastern Anatolia, whose personal experience has led them to mistrust the government.<sup>20</sup> In the context of a means-tested program, this additional element of social penetration was also a source of information allowing aid to be targeted and its effects to be assessed.

This social anchoring of the party and its allies facilitated its effort to integrate inhabitants into the market while providing an essential relay for the municipal authorities who were thus informed of local conditions. The neighborhood president cited above who knew his neighbors’ problems “from A to Z” was not an isolated case. Information available to public authorities was not limited to official databases. Our observation left little doubt that the amount and quality of relevant information available to authorities in U was significantly superior to what we saw in R. How this information was used was a matter of some controversy. As noted above, residents who identified with opposition parties generally believed, rightly or wrongly, that AKP supporters were systematically given preference. The payment card system in U is not an ideal rights-based policy; even so, it is arguably more effective at promoting market integration than the system of in-kind distribution it replaced.

<sup>20</sup> Interview, 2014.

### 3 DID CASH TRANSFER PROMOTE MARKET CITIZENSHIP?

The first conclusion to be drawn from the divergent experience and outcome of the two programs described above is that we must be wary of sweeping generalization, whether it is about CT as an instrument, or Turkey as a context. While both cases present undeniable “Turkish characteristics,” shared elements interact with local differences to provide different official outcomes and subjective experiences. Both commonalities and variation help us to address the central question that emerged from the discussion in our first chapters: do the programs we observe use market-enhancing instruments to contribute to social citizenship? The simple answer is that both remain far from a perfect realization of this ideal; cash transfer on its own is not a guarantee of social citizenship, even in the context of a market society. Differences between the two cases, however, are significant.

The objective difference in conditions between R and U can be attributed, at least in part, to the evident difference in scale; the two districts differed by an order of magnitude in population. The result of this difference was evident in terms of system design and sustainability. The system in R was marked by the difference of interest between public authority and the private-sector service provider. Because it controlled the digital information system required to operate CT, Multinet imposed the choice of merchants already in its network without consideration of the needs of low-income people. This explains the diminished value of assistance compared to the old system of in-kind distribution. The outcome in U was more coherent, since the municipality retained control of the digital information system and was able to impose its own choice of participating merchants. This difference underscores the fact that the technical requirements of digital CT systems are beyond the capacity of small units that were able to carry out in-kind distribution.

Even if resources are available, how they are used is a matter of policy choice. Other things being equal, the shift to cash transfer tends to shift authority and decision-making capacity toward larger and more capable units, either public or private. The shift to a market-enhancing instrument, thus, is the very opposite of “policy on the cheap,” or a “retreat of the state.” Before we leap to the conclusion that bigger is necessarily better, however, the contribution of local knowledge to the success of cash transfer in U suggests that there may be a limit to optimal scale. This is a point to which we will return in the following chapters, when we look at the much larger nation-wide program aimed at refugees.

From the perspective of the recipients of assistance, and this is what really matters, our two cases strongly suggests that how CT programs are viewed depends on very practical matters. If, as in R, the move to cash translates to the purchase of less food than was in the parcels distributed before, it is unsurprising that the program was disliked. If, as in U, the practical consequences are positive, acceptance is more easily secured.

Beyond this, we have noted that among the critical questions to be asked of any social support program were: is assistance a right or privilege? If a right, then for whom? In both of our cases, the answer, at least in principle, was that assistance was a right for the poorest families; access was determined by need. Assessing actual need, however, is not a straightforward task; it requires both information and judgment. The experience of R shows what happens when this assessment is left to the discretion of untrained inspectors. The atmosphere was marked by suspicion and fear of losing benefits. Because undeclared income from informal work could be concealed, residents expressed a reluctance to take on formal employment. In U, authorities were better informed, both officially and informally through the networks of volunteers for the incumbent party. The problem, as it was perceived there, was a suspicion that people likely to support the governing party would receive preference.

In neither case did CT meet the standards either of a fully rights-based approach to social assistance or to unfettered access to the market. In the case of U, the establishment of CT contributed to increasing dependence on the party that dominates the municipality. It does not follow, however, that the shift from in-kind assistance to CT made no difference at all. While it would be absurd to suggest that the sums transferred were sufficient to bring about perfect equality, or even to lift recipients out of poverty, observation suggests that small but significant steps in the direction of inclusion did result. In the context of a market society, their “trade-based entitlement,” to return to Sen’s (1981) vocabulary, was undeniably increased. It is important, moreover, to remember that the alternative to this limited move toward market citizenship is not an ideal world of universal rights, but a reality of poverty and personal dependence on landlords and brokers. If even a small additional monthly income makes women less dependent on family or households less likely to fall into chronic debt to shopkeepers, the gain in autonomy is real. If CT, for all the limits imposed on its use, is less stigmatizing and provides more choice than in-kind distribution of food or clothing, the gain in dignity is just as real. Daily life is made more ordinary, closer to “the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11).

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## Cash Transfer and Humanitarian Assistance

**Abstract** In this chapter, we turn our attention to cash transfer (CT) as an instrument of humanitarian assistance for forced migrants in Turkey. We first consider the emergence of CT as a priority instrument for humanitarian assistance in the twenty-first century. We then sketch the political background of humanitarian assistance in Turkey for persons displaced by internal conflicts in Syria focusing in particular on the EU–Turkey agreements that led to the establishment of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) in 2016. In a final section we focus on the establishment as part of FRiT of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), the largest humanitarian CT program ever established by the European Union. We discuss in particular the program’s institutional complexity and the resulting risk of ambiguous consensus and conflicts of interest among the agencies involved in its design and implementation.

**Keywords** Humanitarian assistance • Humanitarian cash transfer • Turkey • European Union • Forced migration • ESSN

Understanding both the accomplishments and the limits of CT programs for forced migrants in Turkey requires a double exercise in contextualization. In this chapter, we look first to the rise of CT as an instrument of humanitarian assistance and then to the circumstances that led to the

establishment of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) for forced migrants in Turkey.

## 1 HUMANITARIAN ACTION, CASH-TRANSFER INSTRUMENTS, AND CITIZENSHIP

Turkish and international efforts to aid persons displaced by conflicts in Syria and elsewhere in southwest Asia were initially carried out in the logic of humanitarian assistance. To say this, however, opens a vast topic; the nature and meaning of “humanitarianism” and “humanitarian assistance” have changed significantly in recent decades. Before looking to the specific circumstances that eventually led to the establishment of the CT instrument at the core of this and the next chapter, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), we turn briefly to the evolution of humanitarian policy and instruments more generally. We begin by noting the emergence of initiatives blurring the boundaries between humanitarian intervention, social support, and development aid. In a second section, we consider the growing importance of CT as an instrument this new type of humanitarian assistance.

### *1.1 Humanitarianism, Social Protection, and Development*

Humanitarianism has its origins in altruistic efforts to “alleviate the suffering of distant strangers” (Barnett 2011). Its purpose was to “save life, alleviate suffering, and enable those suffering to maintain their human dignity during or after natural disasters and man-made crises” (Riddell 2007: 311). The principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality pioneered by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the nineteenth century are still cited by states and international organizations (IOs) as well as NGOs to justify short-term material distribution to meet basic needs as well as actions affording immediate legal and physical protection (Hoffman and Weiss 2018). Defined in this way, humanitarian assistance is distinct both from national social protection policies and the programs of development assistance pioneered by states and IOs after 1945. Social protection became, over the course of the twentieth century, one of the central components of citizenship and, as such, the province of national states and domestic politics. As for development aid, its potential to encourage the adoption of certain social and economic models rather

than others, and its frequent use as a tool of international political influence, go against the disinterested ethic of humanitarianism. Both social assistance and development aid, moreover, focus on action over periods, rather than in moments of emergency. Clear in principle, however, these distinctions are increasingly blurred; recent decades have witnessed the increased use in humanitarian settings of instruments that embody commitments to both social transformation and local involvement.

Short-term policy instruments for meeting acute needs have increasingly been found to be inadequate when humanitarian emergencies become protracted crises (Harvey et al. 2007). More generally, the move to a longer-term vision can be seen as part of the shift noted by Barnett (2011) from an “emergency” to an “alchemical” approach to humanitarianism. Emergency humanitarianism adheres to the ICRC’s principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Practitioners largely focus on immediate efforts to keep people alive and do not seek to transform the societies in which they act. Their priority is protecting a humanitarian space insulated from politics. Alchemical humanitarianism focuses on “addressing the root causes of suffering,” which necessarily implies a longer time horizon. It “operates with a less binding set of principles and treats politics as a necessary and at times even a welcome feature of humanitarian action” (Barnett 2014: 3). Humanitarian assistance, understood in this way, looks increasingly like aid for development.

Further eroding the distinctiveness of humanitarian assistance is an increasing move to “localize” humanitarian aid (Kraft and Smith 2019). This emerged from a diagnosis that sidelining local governments and NGOs by the internationally led structure typical of major humanitarian aid efforts was frequently a liability in coping with complex crises (Gingerich and Cohen 2015: 8). Reasons for this included the inherent limitation of humanitarian logistics (Coyne 2013) as well as the perceived need to take better account of local needs and priorities. Other, more political factors played a role as well. Writing two decades ago, Barnett (2001: 246) noted that UNHCR was encouraged to engage with potential refugee producing countries because recipient states “had tired of their obligations under refugee laws.” More recently, Üstübcü (2019) has labeled this strategy the “externalization of migration governance.” In such context, the policy environment of recipient states clearly matters, as these can be called on to act as policy makers, policy implementers, and service providers.

Whatever the underlying motives, the blurring of lines between humanitarianism, development, and social assistance has become the norm. This approach was formalized in a series of commitments and documents produced by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Among the “core responsibilities” put forward by summit participants was to move from “delivering aid” to “ending need”—which sounds very much like the UN sustainable development goal of “eradicating poverty.” To this end, an important role was given to the injunction; “reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems” ( World Humanitarian Summit 2016: 21, 22). The “New Way of Working” strategies put forward at the 2016 summit sought to transform principles into guidelines for action.

*The New Way of Working can be described, in short, as working over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors, including those outside the UN system, towards collective outcomes. Wherever possible, those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at national and local levels.* (UN-OCHA 2017: 6)

Through the “Grand Bargain” document, signed at the Summit’s conclusion, major governmental and humanitarian NGOs, committed to transfer 25% of aid to local actors by 2020, linking this explicitly to an effort to reduce people’s needs, risks, and vulnerabilities and to increase their resilience at the end of 3–5 years (UN-OCHA 2017: 6–7).

Recent policy documents by the European Commission (2019) and UNHCR (2019) confirm the convergence of humanitarian assistance and social protection. This is particularly clear in cases involving internationally displaced persons. In short-term crisis situations, “alleviation of suffering” (European Commission 2019: 12) can involve various forms of assistance or support ranging from physical protection to psychological support in cases of trauma. Once these are delivered, however, the problem is not over. In a protracted crisis, when refugees are not able to return home, addressing the “root causes” or their situation increasingly focuses on the host country. In such cases, a shift from short-run to more sustainable approaches is unavoidable. Increasing reliance on host-country social protection systems is often seen as the best option for providing it.

This has direct consequences for the question that has been our central focus throughout this book: social and economic citizenship. Yılmaz (2019) argues that in cases of protracted humanitarian assistance for forced migrants there may be convergence of the rights of immigrants and



host-country citizens. The dynamic of incorporation noted by Nuhoğlu Soysal (1994) in the case of guest workers, may thus be of relevance here. For Yılmaz, however, this is not necessarily a cause for rejoicing; like Turner (2019) whose argument about the convergence of citizen and denizen rights we saw in Chap. 2, he worries that the rights of migrants and citizens may converge toward a point that represents a weakened version of citizenship. It is important, thus, to better understand the content and context of policies aimed at forced migrants.

Critically, both the EU and UNHCR documents cited above stress that assistance should be provided in “a dignified way from the very beginning of a refugee crisis” (UNHCR 2019: 6). Along with the “convergence of rights” noted by Yılmaz, this emphasis on dignity brings us back to this book’s central notion: the potential for promoting social citizenship through market-enhancing instruments. There is no question here of material equality; the programs in question seek at best to alleviate “extreme poverty.” Even—perhaps especially—in the face of material inequality, however, being treated in a dignified manner, living the life of a “civilized human being” is at the core of Marshallian “social citizenship.” The question is how, in practice, this can be accomplished. For humanitarian assistance just as for domestic social policy, the answer increasingly is through cash-based programming.

### 1.2 *The Rise of CT as a Humanitarian Instrument*

An increased emphasis on CT programs is part of the “new way of working” in the humanitarian arena. The summary document of the 2016 summit makes this point explicitly:

*Another major trend was the important acknowledgement, by Member States and other stakeholders, of the potentially transformative power of cash-based programming, particularly in empowering affected people.<sup>1</sup>*

Signatories to the 2016 Grand Bargain pledged that 20% of assistance by 2020 would be channeled through local and national responders, with cash as an important instrument for doing so (Gentilini et al. 2018: 8). This was part of a broader trend. The High-Level Panel on Humanitarian

<sup>1</sup>[https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/WHSC\\_commitment\\_to\\_Action\\_8September2016.pdf](https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/WHSC_commitment_to_Action_8September2016.pdf).

CT published the report *Doing cash differently: How cash transfers can transform humanitarian aid*<sup>2</sup> in 2015. The following year, the United Nation’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) commissioned the World Bank to write a *Strategic note on Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts*.<sup>3</sup> The European Union has moved in a similar direction. In March 2015, the Council of the European Union adopted “10 Common Principles for Multi-Purpose Cash-Based Assistance to Respond to Humanitarian Needs”<sup>4</sup> receiving political endorsement in the resulting Council Conclusions<sup>5</sup> adopted in June 2015. These principles were translated into concrete policy directives through the *Guidance Note on the delivery of CT*, first issued in January 2017 and updated in November 2017.<sup>6</sup> Further consolidating this trend, the *Common Donor Approach* and the *Joint Donor Statement on Humanitarian Cash Transfers* were published in 2019, and several interagency collaborations were established (CaLP 2020: 36). As of 2019, the total value of humanitarian CT programs was estimated at US \$5.6 billion, up from US \$2 billion in 2015, accounting for 17.9% of total humanitarian assistance (CaLP 2020: 12).

Programs aimed explicitly at international displaced persons have followed this pattern, using debit cards, mobile vouchers, and mobile money to biometric technologies for identification purposes (Ford 2017). Looking specifically to programs aimed at Syrian refugees, examples include “Lebanon one-unified interorganizational system for E-cards” (LOUISE) launched in 2016<sup>7</sup> as a multipurpose platform allowing Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese to access food, winter, or education assistance. Other programs aimed at displaced persons include SCOPE, a debit card for displaced Iraqi families and Syrians refugees in Iraq; the UNHCR CT program in Jordan; an E-voucher scheme for supermarket shopping in Turkey put in place by the Danish Refugee Council for Syrian Refugees for the year 2014–2015, and the program that will be the focus

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.odi.org/publications/9876-doing-cash-differently-how-cash-transfers-can-transform-humanitarian-aid>.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/humanitarian-cash-transfers-final-copy-edited.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/concept\\_paper\\_common\\_top\\_line\\_principles\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/concept_paper_common_top_line_principles_en.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10184-2015-INIT/en/pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/guidance\\_note\\_cash\\_23\\_11\\_2017.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/guidance_note_cash_23_11_2017.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> <https://leb-louise.azurewebsites.net/about.html>.

of the following section: the Red Crescent Card for displaced persons in Turkey.

Justifying these decisions was a growing body of research on the impact of CT in humanitarian settings. From the donor perspective, provision of in-kind aid—shelter, seeds, and especially food—has drawn criticism. If in-kind distribution is prolonged, there is increasing evidence that harm may outweigh benefit as the capacity of local producers declines (Dreze and Sen 1991). CT instruments, in contrast, help to strengthen local markets and encourage local production. Where there is an acute local scarcity of food, there may be no alternative to providing it from outside. Even in these cases, however, problems may persist, such as delays in the aid arriving and inappropriate food being provided (Clay and Barry 2005). Mitigating these problems provided an initial incentive to shift to CT in cases of natural disasters as far back as the 1980s (Peppiatt et al. 2001) with larger-scale use made after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. It does not follow that CT is always appropriate. In a report prepared for the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers, Bailey and Harvey (2015: 3) note that:

*For cash, markets need to be functioning or able to recover quickly enough that an injection of cash will prompt traders and shopkeepers to make goods available.*

When it can be used, however, CT is seen by donors as reducing staffing and delivery expenses (Venton et al. 2015). The turn to CT as a domestic instrument of poverty reduction by low- and middle-income countries (Barrientos 2015; Hanlon et al. 2010; Honorati et al. 2015; ILO 2014) further facilitates its use by humanitarian actors. National programs can provide a readymade financial and IT infrastructure available to humanitarian agencies.

For recipients of aid, the conclusions of studies of humanitarian CT are similar to those of domestic programs cited in Chap. 2. Proponents of CT point to collective outcomes that sustainably reduce risks and vulnerabilities while improving resilience (Ford 2017; OCHA 2017). Various studies have shown reduction of negative coping strategies such as excessive debt, child labor, or systematic under-consumption (Lehmann and Masterson 2014); increased quantity and diversity of food (Bailey and Hedlund 2012); increased social capital (Slater and Mphale 2008); or decreased stress and anxiety (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2018). On a larger scale, however, Bailey and Harvey (2015) argue that there are few examples showing

positive consequences for local markets, with the exception of studies finding a positive multiplier effect of cash on local economy for Malawi (Davies 2007) and studies for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan (World Food Program 2014).

When CT is unrestricted, there remains the eternal question of whether beneficiaries will spend it appropriately. While little evidence has been found of inappropriate use of benefits, Bailey and Harvey (2015: 3) acknowledge that “the fungibility of cash means that grants may free up other income to be spent anti-socially and people are unlikely to tell survey enumerators about antisocial spending.” They go on to note, however, that “[d]oubts that recipients would use assistance wisely suggest some troubling biases within the international humanitarian community about how they view the people that they assist.” More to the point, in the context of this study, the same authors note that access to cash can have non-economic benefits.

*There is also an aspect of dignity—both in the choices it provides and in how it can be provided. Using an ATM or getting cash on a mobile phone is more dignified than queuing for a sack of maize. People experience devastating repercussions from disasters and their options on how to deal with these are constrained. While it would be a stretch to say that assistance is empowering in those circumstances, recipients commonly report that cash provides a sense of normality.*

A similar view was echoed in the European Commission’s report cited above:

*Those directly affected by conflict, disaster and displacement are often best placed to decide what they need. People can derive a sense of dignity and control over their situation through the provision of support through established, systematised (often cash-based) channels. (European Commission 2019: 31)*

As we have noted repeatedly, dignity matters. So does normality. The dignity that comes from paying one’s own way and being seen to do so—even if the money comes from humanitarian assistance—draws the link between the short-term focus on “alleviation of suffering” and the more general principles of market citizenship that have been at the heart of our analysis. Even if their presence is to be temporary, social and economic elements of market citizenship are increasingly what are proposed to the

recipients of humanitarian aid. In the context of this ephemeral social contract, assisted subjects are to be brought one small step closer to the ideal of self-reliant citizens by use of market instruments. Rather than being protected from the market by in-kind distribution and the provision of services, internationally displaced persons and other victims of humanitarian crises are to be empowered within it.

Desiring such outcomes is one thing: bringing them about quite another. As we noted in the case of the local programs analyzed in Chap. 4, the design and implementation of CT largely determines how they are perceived and whether they make any contribution to the empowerment of individuals as market citizens. We turn back now to these questions in the case of CT for forced migrants in Turkey.

## 2 CASH TRANSFER FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY

It is in light of these changing approaches to humanitarian assistance that we can situate the response to the forced migration of several million Syrians into Turkey. The proximate cause of action, however, was the political crisis triggered in the EU in 2015 and 2016 by the possibility of onward movement into the EU of these migrants. The design and implementation of the CT program, which provides the focus of Chap. 6, were clearly marked by these circumstances.

### 2.1 *Turkey, the European Union, and the Syrian Migration Crisis*

The Syrian civil war led to forced migration, with refugees arriving in the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey starting in 2011 and accelerating quickly in the following years (See Table 5.1).

The initial reaction of the Turkish government was to decline international assistance, preferring to cope with the situation on its own (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016; Gökalp Aras and Şahin-Mencütek 2016). This changed as the number of displaced persons mounted quickly over the course of 2012. The Turkish government realized that the cost of hosting refugees would be higher than projected. Public discontent linked to the presence and expense of refugees also increased (Kale et al. 2018). Turkey requested aid from United Nations, and was included in the UN's regional response plan. The Turkish government did not initially allow international agencies access to refugees camps; donors in turn declined to

**Table 5.1** Registered Syrian refugees in Turkey

<i>Year (January 1)</i>	<i>Number</i>
2012	9500
2013	148,441
2014	559,994
2015	1,552,839
2016	2,503,549
2017	2,274,500
2018	3,424,237
2019	3,622,366
2020	3,575,369

Source: UNHCR: Operational portal—Syrian Refugee Response—Turkey. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>

provide assistance in the absence of oversight, preferring to work through NGOs rather than governmental agencies (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016). As refugees began to move out of camps, Turkish and international NGOs offered different types of *ad hoc* assistance. Some of these were quite extensive: according to research carried out by Yilmaz (2019: 728): “the Human Relief Foundation, a faith-based humanitarian NGO based in Turkey, distributed food on religious holidays reaching more than 80,000 households during the Muslim feast of sacrifice in 2015.” Even so, the impression left by this early period was largely one of incoherence. In the words of an official of DG-ECHO:

*Aid in response of the Syrian emergency was initially uncoordinated. Different agencies offered different types of ad hoc assistance such as food, clothing or even in one case distributing washing machines.*<sup>8</sup>

This situation was altered radically by the direct involvement of the European Union starting in 2015. The initial context of EU-Turkey negotiations on immigration questions, as discussed in Chap. 3, was Turkey’s long-standing candidacy for EU membership, which had contributed to the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). A turning point for EU member states came when the Syrian conflict triggered large-scale secondary migration toward Europe (see Table 5.2). In response

<sup>8</sup> Interview, 2019.

**Table 5.2** Total arrivals of migrants to Greece (all nationalities; all statuses; all routes)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total arrivals</i>
2014	43,318
2015	861,630
2016	177,234
2017	63,310
2018	50,508
2019	74,613

Source: UNHCR—Operational portal—Mediterranean Situation—Greece. <https://data.2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>

to this new development, various member states put in place radically different policies with respect to migrants and asylum seekers ranging from Germany’s decision to accept several hundred thousand Syrians to the declaration by others that none could be taken at all (Batalla Adam 2017). Attempts to close the EU’s external border led to a surge in irregular crossing attempts concentrated on the Greek islands in the Aegean sea.

The refugee crisis on the Greek Islands in 2015 was the proximate cause of urgent negotiation between EU member states and the government of Turkey.<sup>9</sup> Media attention to this situation reached a symbolic peak with the widespread diffusion in September 2015 of the picture taken on a Greek beach of the body of a child who had drowned while attempting to cross with his family from Turkey. Pressure on European governments from public opinion made action necessary, but it was evident that this same public opinion ruled out any significant reopening of European borders. The only remaining options required increased cooperation from Turkey.

The starting point for negotiation was the Readmission Agreement between Turkey and the EU signed on 16 December 2013 and ratified by

<sup>9</sup>For details on the negotiations themselves, in which a leading role was taken on the European side by leaders of the German and Dutch governments, see Smeets and Beach (2020).

all parties in November 2014.<sup>10</sup> It committed Turkey to readmit any person who “illegally and directly entered the territory of the member state after having stayed on or transited through the territory of Turkey” (Art. 4.1.c), and imposed reciprocal obligations on the EU (Art. 6.1.c). Originally, the Agreement was due to come into effect in November 2017.

Renewed talks resulted initially in the EU-Turkey “Joint Action Plan” (JAP) of October 2015, through which the parties agreed to “supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey” and to “strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU.”<sup>11</sup> Acknowledging that Turkey had, to that point, spent over €7 billion of its own resources in dealing with the crisis, the JAP proclaimed the “intention” of the EU to mobilize “substantial and concrete new funds” (European Commission 2015a: 1). This was confirmed the following month with the commitment of up to €6 billion through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT).<sup>12</sup> This was followed by the decision taken at the EU-Turkey summit of November 2015 and ratified by the European Council in March 2016 to move up implementation of the readmission agreement to 1 June 2016.<sup>13</sup> The JAP also committed Turkey to “pursue the progressive alignment of Turkish visa policy, legislation and administrative capacities notably vis-à-vis the countries representing an important source of illegal migration for Turkey and the EU” (3). In practice, this meant closing Turkey’s land border with Syria, and imposing visa requirements for all Syrian citizens seeking to enter Turkey by sea or air, which was done over the course of 2016. A final step was taken with the Joint Statement of 16 March 2016, which announced that: “All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” and that “For every

<sup>10</sup>The formal title of the agreement was: AGREEMENT between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorization. (*Official Journal of the European Union* 7.5.2014—L 134/3).

<sup>11</sup>The JAP alluded to the possibility of liberalizing visa-free admission to the EU for Turkish citizens under the rubric of “commitments taken in other contexts” but made no further statement on the topic. The Joint Statement of 16 March 2016 stated the intention of the two parties that visa-free entry into the EU for Turkish citizens be effective as of June 2016. No more was heard of this, however, following the failed military coup in Turkey of July 2016.

<sup>12</sup>Articles 4 and 9 of the Commission Decision (C (2015) 9500) as amended by the Commission Decision of 10 February 2016.

<sup>13</sup>European Council Decision (EU) 2016/551 of 23 March 2016. *Official Journal of the European Union* 9.4.2016—L 95/9.



Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU”<sup>14</sup> (European Council 2016: 1).

Analysis of these negotiations and agreements, even in academic publications, has often taken a distinctly polemic tone highlighting—depending on the authors’ point of view—the failure of EU member states to honor their obligation under international law to accept asylum seekers (Aka and Özkural 2015) or the inadvisability of cooperation with the illiberal Turkish government (Martin 2019). For our purposes, however, what was done and how it was publicly justified matter more than what the underlying motives might have been. We propose, accordingly, to take seriously the stated reasons given for the policy instruments that followed from the JAP and the subsequent FRiT. Whether or not these reflected the true motives of governments, the reasons for action given in public statements and official documents that established the FRiT provided the standard by which the programs it funds would later be evaluated.<sup>15</sup> Of particular importance in this context, is the JAP’s statement that:

*Priority will be given to actions providing immediate humanitarian assistance; provision of legal, administrative and psychological support; support for community centers; the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey; improved access to education at all levels; but also actions supporting host communities in areas such as infrastructures and services.* (European Commission 2015a: 1)

“Enhancement of self-sufficiency, participation in the economy, social inclusion:” these are goals familiar from our discussion of CT programs and humanitarian assistance. They are also, we might add, at the philosophical core of the market citizenship model, which is explicitly being applied here to forced migrants. Notwithstanding the all-important qualifier “during their stay in Turkey,” with its reminder of the persisting uncertainty with respect to status, these are the public commitments according to which we propose to analyze and assess the Emergency Social Safety Net. Other possible motives such as the desire to keep refugees out

<sup>14</sup>The legal status of the EU-Turkey joint statement has been a matter of some controversy. The General Court of the European Union ruled in February 2017 that to the extent that a binding international agreement was made, the parties to it are the individual member states and not the EU as an institution. (General Court of the European Union: press release 19/17).

<sup>15</sup>For the distinction between motives and reasons, see Majone (1992).

of Europe are relevant only to the extent that they had an impact on program design or implementation.

A direct consequence of the negotiations and agreements discussed above was an order-of-magnitude increase in EU financial assistance to Turkey, formalized by the establishment of the FRiT with an initial budget of €3 billion—€1 billion from the EU's general budget and €2 billion in contributions from member states (European Commission 2015b; European Court of Auditors 2018)—committed in 2016. Projects focused on six priority areas: humanitarian assistance, migration management, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socioeconomic support. On 28 June 2018, the European Council agreed to launch a second €3 billion tranche of the Facility, using exclusively resources from the EU's own budget.<sup>16</sup> This second tranche funds projects running through mid-2025. As of early 2020, all operational funds from both tranches had been committed, €4.7 billion contracted, and €3.2 billion disbursed.<sup>17</sup>

As a trust fund to which both the European Union and its member states pledged contributions, the FRiT was governed by a steering committee containing a representative from each member state and two from the European Commission.<sup>18</sup> As we will see below, however, all spending from the FRiT was channeled through agencies of the European Commission and subject to their diverse rules and practices. Humanitarian aid was managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO), while other types of assistance (for health and education programs, for example) was provided through the preexisting Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) administered by the Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR). It is in the first category that we find the cash-transfer program that is at the heart of our empirical analysis, the Emergency Social Safety Net, or ESSN.

<sup>16</sup> Commission Decision of 14 March 2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 as regards the contribution to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. *Official Journal of the European Union*—2018 C 106.

<sup>17</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood\\_enlargement/sites/near/files/frit\\_factsheet.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood_enlargement/sites/near/files/frit_factsheet.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> Commission Decision C(2015) 9500, as amended by Commission Decision C(2016) 855.

## 2.2 *ESSN: A Multiagency Effort*

Like all EU humanitarian aid, the ESSN was placed under the overall responsibility of the Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO), which acted as the program's funding agency. It was not possible, however, for funds to be transferred directly to Turkish government agencies.<sup>19</sup> On-site implementation, accordingly, was delegated to the UN's World Food Program (WFP) working in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC). Various agencies of the Turkish government played key roles in administering the program.

These actors came together in a steering committee cochaired by representatives of DG-ECHO and the Turkish government—the latter role filled initially by Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and subsequently by the directorate for International Labor of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS). Day-to-day coordination was provided by a Joint Management Cell bringing together representatives of the TRC and the WFP country team. While participants underlined the importance of these fora, a representative of DG-ECHO<sup>20</sup> noted that coordination remained limited, and that, unlike assistance efforts for Syrian refugees in Jordan or Lebanon, no “humanitarian country team” covered all ongoing projects. From all participants interviewed came the clear impression that ESSN was unprecedented in its scope and duration, as well as in the number and diversity of participating agencies. Its dual origin as both response to a humanitarian emergency and political agreement to prevent onward migration were also recognized by European officials interviewed. For all of these reasons a closer look at the points of view, but also the prior experience, of key participants is of central importance if we are to understand how the program was designed and implemented in practice.

### 2.2.1 *The European Union*

A first critical observation is that the EU cannot be seen as a unitary actor. Initial negotiations and decisions that led to the establishment of the FRiT, from which funding for the ESSN was drawn, were the exclusive province of the Union's political leaders (Smeets and Beach 2020). Only

<sup>19</sup> According to the EU's humanitarian aid regulation (Reg. 1257/96) funding from DG-ECHO can only be transferred to international organizations or NGOs registered in the EU. This restriction was evoked spontaneously in multiple interviews by both Turkish and international officials.

<sup>20</sup> Interview, 2019.

after the JAP was finalized did the European Commission formally enter into the process. The Commission, however, remains a “multi-organization” (Cram 1994) whose component agencies vary in procedures and internal culture.

With respect to the ESSN, the primary European interlocutor from its inception in 2016 through 2020 was DG-ECHO. Its role within the Commission, dating back to before its promotion to a Directorate General in 2014, was strongly focused on short-term crisis response and emergency assistance.<sup>21</sup> As a distinct unit within the Commission since 1996, ECHO consistently sought to define its role in terms of the prevailing norms of humanitarian action. In terms of the debate alluded to in the first section of this chapter between an “emergency” and an “alchemical” vision, ECHO has clearly privileged the former since the early 2000s (Versluys 2008: 216). DG-ECHO was a party to the 2016 “grand bargain” and has internalized the imperatives of localization and sustainability.<sup>22</sup> Even so, its perspective was self-consciously “humanitarian” and short term. DG-ECHO officials and staff interviewed in both Brussels and Ankara insisted on the unusual nature of its involvement in a multiyear project. With regard both to CT and to localization, DG-ECHO positioned itself very much in the spirit of the times. Written into the Request for Proposals to potential implementing agencies was a requirement that the instrument retained for the ESSN should be multipurpose and unconditional, that requirements should be based on need, and that cash rather than food or vouchers should be distributed.<sup>23</sup> In keeping with its short-term perspective, however, DG-ECHO’s embrace of localization increasingly took the form of a search for “exit strategies” that would hand over responsibility to Turkish actors—an approach that put it at odds with some of the agencies in question.

Programs focused on health, education, and other “nonhumanitarian” initiatives were added to the activities of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) administered by DG-NEAR, whose internal rules and culture differed significantly from those of DG-ECHO. Established as the vehicle for assistance to the states on the EU’s periphery, DG-NEAR focuses on development and capacity building programs carried out over

<sup>21</sup>The acronym ECHO initially referred to the European Community Humanitarian Office, created in 1996.

<sup>22</sup>Interview, 2020.

<sup>23</sup>Interview, 2020.

years and decades. Its natural interlocutor is the national governments of partner states.

### 2.2.2 *The United Nations' World Food Program*

The lead implementing agency selected by DG-ECHO through a competitive bid process was the UN's World Food Program (WFP). Conceived in the 1960s as a vehicle for using US agricultural surpluses as an instrument of public diplomacy under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization, the WFP has evolved into a full-fledged agency of the United Nations and has been characterized as "the world's largest humanitarian agency" (Shaw 2011). While its focus remains on emergency food assistance, it—unlike DG-ECHO—also participates in longer-term development projects such as school nutrition programs. In the context of the ESSN, the WFP acted as a service provider, establishing and managing the system through which the resources made available by the EU could be distributed. It was also responsible for observing and evaluating program operations, and ensuring accountability to DG-ECHO in the latter's role as funding agency. As of April 2020, the WFP's role in the ESSN program ended, and the task of lead implementing agency was taken over by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

### 2.2.3 *The Turkish Red Crescent*

The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) is an organization with over a century of experience in dealing with both natural and man-made disasters.<sup>24</sup> It has 574 branches spread across the country with 1,500 registered volunteers.<sup>25</sup> Like many national Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations, the TRC has close and legally defined links with its national government.<sup>26</sup> While the TRC retains a partly independent status, it has been commissioned by the

<sup>24</sup> Founded in 1868 as the "Ottoman Red Crescent," the TRC is one of the oldest national organizations in the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement—and is at the origin of the use of the crescent symbol for movement organizations in Islamic countries.

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/06/Logframes/Europe/TR/Prof.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Regulation of Turkish Red Crescent Society indicates: "Varlığı zamanla sınırlı olmayan Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanının yüksek himayeleri altındadır." "the presence of Kızılay is not limited within a time period, working under the auspice of the Turkish presidency—author's translation) <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/02/20090219-1.htm>. For national disaster response plan, see: <https://www.afad.gov.tr/turkiye-afet-mudahale-planı>; For details of TRC funding, see: <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/2019-YILI-DERNEKLER-BEYANNAMESI-GELiR-GiDER.pdf>

national disaster response plan (Türkiye Afet Müdahale Planı), through which it has a legal duty to provide humanitarian aid; it receives a portion of its financing directly from the state.<sup>27</sup> Organizations such as this are accordingly sometimes classed as para-governmental or “quasi-NGOs.”

Critically, in the context of the ESSN, its close relationship with the Turkish government allowed it limited access to information maintained by Turkish authorities but denied because of national privacy legislation to the WFP or the EU.<sup>28</sup> As explained by local TRC officials,<sup>29</sup> the organization had partial and closely controlled access to the Integrated Social Assistance System, into which had been put data on Syrians registered under temporary protection; it was possible for designated individuals to obtain the passwords allowing them to access telephone numbers of approved ESSN beneficiaries, but not detailed personal information or registered address.

#### 2.2.4 *Turkish Public Authorities*

Central to the implementation of the ESSN was the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS), established in 2018 by merging the ministries of Labor and Social Security, and Family and Social Policies. Its core mission is to be an umbrella institution gathering the existing social assistance programs and social services as well as all the labor activities and social security related issues. Two of the ministry’s Directorates General—in charge of social assistance and international labor force policies, respectively—are particularly important for ESSN. Originally created in different ministries before the 2018 fusion, these Directorates General are seen by outside observers as maintaining distinct cultures and policy focus.<sup>30</sup>

The directorate General of International Labor Force was established in 2016 within the Ministry of Labor and Social Security after international labor force law numbered 6735. Its institutional history goes back to 2003. With the creation of Work Permit for Foreigners Law no 4817 dated 2003, it was established under General Directorate of Labor as Department of Work Permits for Foreigners. In the context of our case, it plays two critical roles. A representative of the Directorate cochairs the

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/2019-YILI-DERNEKLER-BEY-ANNAMESI-GELIR-GIDER.pdf>; <https://www.afad.gov.tr/turkiye-afet-mudahale-plani>.

<sup>28</sup> This restriction is a consequence of the Personal Data Protection Law (Law number: 6698 of 2016). The importance of this exclusive access to official data was evoked in multiple interviews.

<sup>29</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>30</sup> Interview, 2019.

ESSN steering committee. It also manages procedures for the granting of work permits.

The Directorate General of Social Assistance (Sosyal Yardımlar Genel Müdürlüğü) develops and coordinates poverty reduction and social assistance policies. In the context of ESSN, this unit maintains the database of participants. It is also coordinates the activities of the 1,003 local SAFs. These, in turn, play a key role as frontline agencies in contact with ESSN beneficiaries, processing approximately 65% of applications—the remainder being handled by the TRC. As noted in previous chapters, SAFs are locally governed bodies. Their autonomy creates the potential for different local implementation strategies, a point stressed by grassroots workers of the WFP and TRC.<sup>31</sup> From the point of view of national officials, this arm's length approach allowed the government to benefit from the local information held by the district foundations, as well as from their sensitivity to local social conditions.<sup>32</sup>

With respect to the evolution of social support for refugees, we will see in Chap. 6 that while the DG for Social Assistance has emphasized integrating the most vulnerable refugees into the Turkish social assistance system, the DG for International Labor Force has looked more to labor force participation as a medium-term solution.

Other Turkish public actors involved in the ESSN include the Disaster and Emergency Management of Presidency (*Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı*—AFAD), whose role was particularly important at the outset of the crisis, both in managing camps and, as cochair of the ESSN governing board, provided “oversight and strategic direction” for ESSN. The Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) has sole responsibility registration of forced migrants and certifies temporary or international protection status. As of 10 September 2018, UNHCR stopped registering and making referrals of foreigners wishing to apply for international protection in Turkey.<sup>33</sup> As of the end of 2019, DGMM was also responsible for centralizing the required address registration for persons under temporary or international protection.

<sup>31</sup> Multiple interviews, 2019, 2020.

<sup>32</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>33</sup> For all information in this paragraph WFP Turkey – ESSN Fact Sheet, December 2017: <https://data.2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62208>.

### 2.3 *ESSN: Product of Ambiguous Consensus*

The variety of actors involved in the ESSN and the prominent role played by DG-ECHO and the WFP might lead us to conclude that we have here a near-perfect example of what Sassen (1999) has described as “de facto transnationalising of migration policy.” To the extent that ESSN goes beyond the control of migration to address the basic needs of the refugees settled in Turkey, we might go farther to characterize it as “transnational social protection” (Levitt et al. 2017). A more critical framing of this policy focuses on the EU’s decision to externalize migration management and border control (Üstübcü 2019; Çetinoğlu and Yılmaz 2020). A political bargain, in this view, allowed European states to avoid their obligations under international law to admit refugees, empowering the Turkish government in the process (Martin 2019). Assessing such assertions is not the purpose of this book. It is important, however, to consider the consequences of the observation that, in the case of ESSN, a group of actors came together to design and manage a policy instrument, all the while differing in their definition of the problem to be solved, and on the policy’s ultimate goals. This dynamic is well captured by the concept of ambiguous consensus put forward by Palier (2004) to analyze situations in which broad support for the creation of an instrument does not coincide with clear consensus on its justification or ultimate ends.

As set out earlier, a number of distinct sets of reasons can be ascribed to the various organizations involved in conceiving, funding, and implementing ESSN, among them:

- Distributing humanitarian aid as a source of international prestige (for both Turkey and the EU)
- Preventing onward movement of migrants into the EU
- Distributing emergency humanitarian aid to ensure short-term survival of a large population of displaced people
- Ensuring the medium-term integration of forced migrants into their host society
- Facilitating the registration and control of migrants on Turkish territory
- Preparing and encouraging the return of migrants to their home country

We must be careful from the outset to avoid simplistic assumptions regarding how these reasons were distributed and how they interacted.



Most obviously, there is no monolithic “Turkish” or “European” point of view. Close observers of the ESSN note important differences of position within both Turkish and EU agencies.<sup>34</sup> Nor is there an absolute divide between public agencies and nongovernmental organizations. The interaction of policy goals also proves complex. Some, such as imposing registration and preventing onward migration, may be complementary. In other cases, there are clear contradictions: medium-term integration into the host country’s economy and society versus return to the country of origin. Just as significant are differences in emphasis that, while not outright contradictions, nonetheless pose problems for coherence: the distinction between a short-term approach to humanitarian assistance and a longer-term view that blurs the lines between humanitarianism, domestic social policy, and economic and social integration.

We will ask in Chap. 6, as we have throughout, whether and to what extent CT schemes can contribute to economic and social citizenship, understood not as a legal status but as the practical experience of integration into the society and economy of the place where one is residing. Our discussion of local cases in Chap. 4 strongly suggests that program design and implementation play a key role in determining the answer. A central question for the final chapter will be to determine to what extent the contradictions and ambiguities highlighted above matter in this context.

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<sup>34</sup>Multiple interviews, 2019 and 2020.

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## The Consequences of Ambiguity: Designing and Implementing the ESSN

**Abstract** The stated purpose of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) was to contribute to meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey. In the context of this book’s argument, we ask whether it achieved this goal but also whether and to what extent it contributed to extending elements of market citizenship to forced migrants. We conclude that while the ESSN’s CT program made a limited contribution to meeting basic needs and empowering displaced persons as consumers, other elements of market citizenship, or even “denizenship,” are lacking. With regard to its explicit targets, the effectiveness of ESSN was limited by the ambiguities of its design, linked to the different priorities of the agencies involved, which exclude some vulnerable persons from the program. More broadly, very limited access to the formal labor market remained an obstacle to fuller market citizenship.

**Keywords** Turkey • European Union • Syria • Refugee policy • ESSN • Outcomes

As detailed in the previous chapter, the humanitarian response to the emergency created by the mass forced migration of Syrians to Turkey, and the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) cash-transfer (CT) program in particular, were inextricably tied to the security-centered provisions of the broader EU–Turkey agreements. The ESSN, we concluded, is best

understood as the product of an ambiguous consensus, in which the various parties agreed on the creation of a policy instrument, but did so for different reasons and with different medium-term ends. In this chapter, we explore the consequences of ambiguity. We note in particular that it contributed to important departures from the logic and ideals of market citizenship. Particularly important were security-based restrictions on participation and an approach to determining need based on indicators generally recognized as imperfect. All of these, call into question the capacity of ESSN to function as a “citizenship approach to poverty” (Leisering 2019) even in the limited sphere of market integration and Marshallian “social citizenship.” In ongoing debates concerning the program’s future, as seen in the chapter’s final section, we find further evidence that the underlying ambiguities inherent in its creation have yet to be resolved. Critical among these are tensions among policy agendas of various Turkish agencies focused, respectively, on incorporating Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTP) into the Turkish economy, maintaining EU financial engagement for their social support, and encouraging repatriation to Syria.

## 1 FROM UNCOORDINATED INITIATIVES TO THE ESSN

The ESSN, when it was established in 2016, built on the experience and incorporated tools and procedures pioneered by an earlier generation of CT programs for forced migrants. The order-of-magnitude increase in scale of budget and beneficiaries led to significant modification to this starting point, and generated procedures that marked the program throughout its existence.

### 1.1 *CT Programs in the Initial Responses to the Syrian Emergency*

Cash assistance to out-of-camp refugees prior to 2015 was provided largely by NGOs, but was often patchy geographically, and ill-coordinated.<sup>1</sup> The Support for Life Association, a secular humanitarian NGO based in Turkey, implemented a CT program reaching approximately 54,000 households from 2012 to 2016 (Yilmaz 2019: 728). The Danish Refugees Council distributed cash voucher to refugees in Şanlıurfa and Hatay in 2014–2015. From an organizational standpoint, however, the most direct precursor of the ESSN was a program put in place for in-camp refugees by

<sup>1</sup>Interview, 2019

the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) from 2012 to 2016. Its origins go back to 2007, when the TRC started to distribute food packages collected from donors wishing to honor the religious requirement to provide an offering (*zekat*) for breaking of the fast to the needy at the end of Ramadan. This initiative soon encountered logistical problems typical of in-kind distribution. Food packages are heavy, around 20 kg, which created problem of transportation and increased the need for distribution personnel. In 2011, TRC created the *zekat kart* (*alms card*) for Turkish citizens to replace food packages.<sup>2</sup> This program was subsequently extended to Syrians. An important decision taken at the outset was to use a newly created vehicle the *Kızılaykart* (Red Crescent Card) for this purpose, rather than the existing *zekat kart*. Like the national PTT card, the *Kızılaykart* makes use of the capacity of chip-enabled smart cards to access multiple cash assistance program at the same time. Operations began in October 2012 as a pilot in-camp food assistance project in partnership with World Food Program (WFP), AFAD, and Halkbank.<sup>3</sup> Through this program, 65 TL per family member per month was provided via the *Kızılaykart* to all persons in the camp, without any additional conditions. The *Kilis Öncüpınar* camp was chosen as location for the pilot project because the camp was built out of containers, not tents, which did not allow expansion and kept the population stable. The program was extended to 14 camps as of July 2013, functioning as an e-voucher, with three shops designated in each camp and equipped with POS machine for payment.<sup>4</sup> Initially, AFAD determined the shops where money could be spent; WFP transferred the funds, TRC distributed the *Kızılaykart*, and Halkbank produced the cards and inserted them into its financial systems.

In addition to addressing supply-side problems such as food spoilage that are typical of food distribution, the *Kızılaykart* helped to resolve demand-side issues such as cultural and dietary differences. After a year of regular but monotonous food distributions, these were near to causing revolt in the camps especially in Karkamış and Altınözü.<sup>5</sup> An out-of-camp version of the program was launched in May 2015. The new plan was funded by WFP in four cities: Hatay, Antep, Urfa, Kilis, and then expanded to two more Osmaniye and Maraş. The *Kızılaykart* at that time functioned

<sup>2</sup> Interview, 2020

<sup>3</sup> Halkbank (people's bank) is a public-private partnership of which the Turkish state owns a majority share.

<sup>4</sup> E-vouchers enable recipients to make purchases up to the value of the voucher and are often for one-off use in designated stores, within a specified time frame.

<sup>5</sup> Interview, 2019.



as in the camps: usable only in designated shops.<sup>6</sup> Between 2015 and 2017, out-of-camp assistance was provided to approximately 300,000 refugees (160,000 from the WFP/TRC out-of-camp *Kızılaykart* and 140,000 through other NGO programs) (Maunder et al. 2018: 18).

### 1.2 *Establishment and Implementation of the ESSN*

An immediate outcome of the FRiT was a major reorganization of the actors and instruments of humanitarian assistance in Turkey. The establishment of the ESSN was intended to bring about not only an increase in the absolute amount of assistance but a consolidation and rationalization of these diverse initiatives.<sup>7</sup> The result was the largest single program to come out of the FRiT, indeed the largest humanitarian project ever funded by EU. As stated in its program documents, the purpose of the ESSN was to contribute to ensuring refugees' access to basic needs (food, non-food items, and services). A requirement of DG-ECHO from the outset was to use cash assistance as a vehicle of aid. Unrestricted and multipurpose cash was preferred to food vouchers or other more limited forms of assistance.<sup>8</sup> While not applicable to all situations, this was considered appropriate in Turkey because two critical conditions were met:

- Supply and distribution of basic needs items was not a problem
- There was a robust financial system in place (large banks with extensive ATM networks)

The instrument selected as a vehicle for CT was the preexisting *Kızılaykart*, which was transformed as a result from a de facto e-voucher into an instrument for multipurpose cash. The choice of this vehicle was symbolically important, as a sign that programs for Turks and those for migrants remained distinct. ESSN payments are made using the *Kızılaykart* by agreement with Halkbank, contracted by the TRC (Maunder et al. 2018). The TRC was put forward as the public face of this new program to avoid criticism by Turkish citizens for giving money to Syrians.<sup>9</sup> Using the PTT card, universally identified with Turkish public programs, might

<sup>6</sup>Interview, 2020.

<sup>7</sup>Interview, 2019.

<sup>8</sup>Interview, 2020.

<sup>9</sup>Interview, 2020.

create tension. Indeed, our experience of participant observation with TRC and WFP teams produced anecdotal examples of this sentiment from Turkish citizens encountered during the visits. Even the distinction between the two cards, let alone between Turkish and EU funding was not clearly understood, with several people expressing indignation that the TRC was helping Syrians rather than Turks.<sup>10</sup>

As of 2020, the *Kızılaykart* had become the common platform for a number of assistance programs. In addition to the ESSN, the card was used for targeted programs such as Conditional Cash Transfer for Education, which was launched in May 2017 and Adult Language Training was launched in 2019. It also kept its original function, dating back to 2012, as a vehicle for in-camp food assistance.

<i>Program</i>	<i>Participants as of February 2020</i>
In-Camp Food Assistance Program	54,700
ESSN	1,707,486
CCT for education	608,082

Source: Red Crescent Report February 2020 ([http://platform.kizilaykart.org/tr/Doc/rapor/KIZILAYKART\\_TR.pdf](http://platform.kizilaykart.org/tr/Doc/rapor/KIZILAYKART_TR.pdf))

The operational rules of DG-ECHO imposed a number of the central design features of the ESSN. One of these, as discussed in Chap. 5, was the multiagency nature of the program. While DG-ECHO, acting in the name of the FRiT trust fund and its steering committee, played the role of the funding agency, implementation was delegated to the WFP in partnership with the TRC. These, in turn, worked closely with Turkish authorities at both the national and local levels. Although it remained distinct, the ESSN was embedded in the infrastructure of Turkish national social assistance. The National Integrated Social Assistance System (ISAIS), managed by the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS) became the national database of all ESSN participants. The 1,003 local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF) were the frontline agencies, processing applications and carrying out inspection visits.<sup>11</sup>

For practical reasons, the procedure for ESSN could not be identical to that used with Turkish citizens. For citizens, information about income

<sup>10</sup> Participant observation 2020.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/sygm/genel-mudurluk/sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayanisma-vakiflari/>.

(from official employment) and assets are already in the SAIS, allowing SASF boards, as we saw in the case of R, to assess applicants with respect to a predetermined “poverty threshold.” For refugees, whose income cannot always be determined from data in the ISAIS as they may have income or assets outside of Turkey, the conditionality requirement of being unemployed was retained. Those employed with a valid work permit or who own registered assets in Turkey are formally ineligible to receive assistance (WFP 2019a: 1). How strictly this prohibition was followed is not clear; one official of the WFP interviewed acknowledged it but noted that “we will give it less importance.”<sup>12</sup>

As with the domestic CT programs discussed in previous chapters, the operational logic of the ESSN is one of needs-based targeting. In a context of imperfect and incomplete information about actual needs, however, the best that could be done was to establish observable indicators of vulnerability. Families wishing to participate in the program were required to submit an application form to the SASF of the district in which they are registered or, in certain districts where the Syrian population is particularly concentrated, to special offices set up by the TRC.

Formally, eligibility was determined by an assessment of economic vulnerability based on six demographic criteria, any one of which was considered sufficient to qualify a family without employment for ESSN.

- Elderly headed households if no other adults are present
- Single headed household with at least one child under 18
- Single women
- Families with 4 or more children
- Families with 1 or more disabled members (at least 40% disability)
- Families with a dependency ratio of 1.5 and above

The decision as to whether a family meets one or more of these criteria was taken by the board of trustees of the district SASF. Families who qualified through the demographic criteria were subsequently visited by home inspection teams from the SASF, as in the case with Turkish families requesting social assistance.

<sup>12</sup> Interview, 2019.

As of early 2020, the ESSN was used by over 1.7 million beneficiaries, selected from a pool of 2.7 million applicants.<sup>13</sup> A great majority (89%) of these is Syrian, but other nationalities are present as well: Iraq (6.9%), Afghanistan (3.4%), and Iran (0.2%). In light of these numbers, and of the fact that the Syrian migration was the precipitating event for the creation of ESSN there is a tendency, which we share, to refer generally to ESSN recipients as SuTP or simply “Syrians.” Just over half, (51.3%) are women (IFRC July 2020). The population of beneficiaries is predominantly young, with 60% under 18. Persons 18–59 years of age make up 37% of beneficiaries, while those 60 and over are only 3% (IFRC 2020). Of families receiving the card, the largest number qualified through having at least four children (41.7%) followed by families with a dependency ratio above 1.5, which make up 26.3% of households. Households with single-parent families with no other adults living in the household make up 14.13%. Households with at least one disabled person make up 9.2% of beneficiaries (IFRC, July 2020). Some families may fall into more than one of these categories. An additional 7.497 households, or 2.4% of the total, live in families that do not fit the formal demographic criteria and are included at the discretion of local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (IFRC, July 2020). The largest number of participants was found in Gaziantep (13.9%), Istanbul (12.2%), and Şanlıurfa (10.2%). The total amount spent on the ESSN Program had reached €1.4 billion as of June 2020 (TRC 2020) out of a potential budget of €1.725 billion.<sup>14</sup>

Participants in the program received the *Kızılaykart*, topped-up each month by 120 TL per family member.<sup>15</sup> Beneficiaries may receive an additional quarterly payment. For families that include severely disabled persons, this payment was 600 TL (WFP 2019b). The card could be used at any ATM machine in order to withdraw cash or to make purchases using a point of sale (POS) machine. The beneficiaries of each card were registered and identified by name. The identity of the cardholder was verified

<sup>13</sup>Except as otherwise noted, all data in this paragraph are taken from the Turkish Red Crescent Refugee Center Directorate Report, February 2020. [http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/ESSN\\_ENG.pdf](http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/ESSN_ENG.pdf). [http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/ESSN\\_ENG.pdf](http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/ESSN_ENG.pdf)

<sup>14</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA\\_19\\_6212](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212)

<sup>15</sup>See introduction for discussion of currency conversions. For the reasons set out there, we continue in this chapter the practice of defining assistance payments exclusively by their value in TL.

initially by a physical check and then monthly by telephone.<sup>16</sup> Each month the MoFLSS updated its list of beneficiaries. A WFP/TRC Joint Management Cell checked this for any problem, such as double registration. The card was blocked if an attempt was made to use it outside the country or if the monthly check did not confirm the presence of the cardholder. The card could also be canceled if it went unused for 6 months or more. Once the list was verified every month, it was forwarded to Halkbank for payment.<sup>17</sup>

The ESSN's immediate objective as stated by a 2018 independent evaluation report produced for the WFP was to "stabilize or improve living standards of the most vulnerable out-of-camp refugee households" (Maunder et al. 2018: iv). By this standard, the report found positive outcomes:

*ESSN beneficiaries are better off in terms of food security as measured by their food consumption score, while the food security of non-beneficiaries has declined. Debt has reduced after transfer for beneficiaries, with average debt per adult equivalent falling by TL 57 among beneficiaries and rising by TL 81 among non-beneficiaries. (29)*

The distinction made between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, however, suggests an obvious question: why are families with deteriorating nutrition and rising debt not included in the program? The reasons for this, it turns out, were embedded in design elements of the ESSN to which we turn our attention in the following section.

## 2 WHO IS ELIGIBLE? PROBLEMS OF REGISTRATION AND TARGETING

On the most immediate level, the ESSN clearly made an important positive contribution. But did it meet its larger goals? As expressed by the WFP:

*WFP Turkey's Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan builds on WFP's partnership with the Government of Turkey and other stakeholders to contribute to refugee households' ability to meet their basic needs, ensuring no vulnerable refugee is left behind. (WFP 2019b)*

<sup>16</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA\\_19\\_6212](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212)

<sup>17</sup>Interview, 2019.

More generally, as set out in the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP), the broader effort of which it was a part sought to promote integration of SuTP through “*the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in the economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey*” (European Commission 2015: 1). This objective brings us back to our central question: do CT instruments contribute to market citizenship? The situation of SuTP, we have argued, presents a particularly challenging test for the hypothesis that they might do so, since this is a case in which elements of Marshallian social citizenship would be provided in the absence of civil or political citizenship. Our discussion of “denizenship” in Chap. 2 suggests that this is not impossible, but did it happen in this case?

We suggest in the pages that follow that a number of obstacles have hindered progress in this direction. Central among these is the political imperative behind the 2015 deal, which was to stop the flow of undocumented migrants into the EU. The result of these original conditions can be seen in two of the program’s central features, the dependence on demographic criteria for eligibility and the link between eligibility and registration. Each has proven to be a barrier both to the short-term goal of “ensuring no vulnerable refugee is left behind” and to the broader objectives of social and economic inclusion set out in the JAP. These barriers are not a question of “theory and practice” or of “implementation failure” but, just as in the local cases studied in Chap. 4, of program design. In this context, the ESSN’s shortcomings are just as instructive as its successes. Both help to improve our understanding of the requirements for CT to contribute meaningfully not just to short-term survival but more importantly to broader and more sustainable social integration as a “citizenship approach to poverty” (Leisering 2019).

### 2.1 *Enforcing Security Priorities through Registration*

Ensuring that migrants did not attempt to enter Europe required that they be identified and fixed in place within Turkey. The requirements of the ESSN reflect this political imperative. Two distinct types of official registration are required in order to be eligible for ESSN<sup>18</sup>:

- All family members must be registered under temporary or international protection status.

<sup>18</sup> <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000104792/download/>

- All family members must have a residence registration in a city where they are permitted to live.<sup>19</sup> If members of the family are registered in different cities, they are not allowed to get ESSN. To obtain residence registration, families must prove that they have a legally recognized address.

Prior to 2016, the Turkey–Syria border could be freely crossed. The procedure for Syrians seeking TPS was to approach the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM) in the province where they settled. Applicants were asked to submit any available Syrian identity documents. In the absence of documents, Turkish authorities would provide registration based on the testimony of protection seekers (Özer 2015; Batalla and Tolay 2018) According to Baban et al. (2017: 91) the registration process was initially “chaotic” as different government offices applied “contradictory criteria” in registration, and the speed of registration varied among government offices. In the summer of 2015, the Turkish government sought to address this by issuing new identity cards for migrants, which caused delays in registration.

A major change to this process came in 2016, when Turkey moved to close its borders and imposed visa requirements for all persons coming from Syria, as well as to citizens of 18 additional countries entering into Turkey by air or sea.<sup>20</sup> The border closing was an explicit provision of the 2015 EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP), which stated that:

*In line with the Visa Roadmap requirements, pursue the progressive alignment of Turkish visa policy, legislation and administrative capacities notably vis-à-vis the countries representing an important source of illegal migration for Turkey and the EU.* (European Commission 2015)

The registration of migrants into the Turkish migration system is also required under the JAP. The March 2016 EU-Turkey statement emphasized the “achievement” of Turkish border control implementation such as “the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other

<sup>19</sup> Migrants with International protection status, can live only in so-called satellite cities according to the regulation of the implementation of LFIP article 3/hh. These are 51 small Turkish cities, which are outside of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

<sup>20</sup> Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda. [https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-12/third\\_progress\\_report\\_on\\_turkey\\_visa\\_liberalisation\\_roadmap\\_en\\_0.pdf](https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-12/third_progress_report_on_turkey_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_en_0.pdf)

nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police and enhanced information sharing.” Construction of a border wall began in 2016 and was completed in June 2018 (Batalla and Tolay 2018).

The 2016 migration reform also brought changes for SuTP already in Turkey. The registration process changed again and new restrictions on mobility were applied. According to this change, Syrians will get services and assistance only in the city where they were registered. Persons wishing to change their province of residence must apply to the provincial directorate of migration management in the province where they first registered in order to obtain permission to move to another. They must then apply to the PDMM of the new province to obtain a new ID card (Baban et al. 2017). Unauthorized travel can cause cancelation of status and loss of rights to social assistance.<sup>21</sup>

For families seeking assistance from the ESSN, registration under the rules of temporary or international protection is only a first step. Eligibility for the ESSN also requires all members of applicant families to have a legal proof of address in a single location. Obtaining this requires that the residence itself be recognized by local authorities. This poses a serious problem for those who cannot register their address into Turkish System. As a WFP grassroots official indicated to us, refugees who cannot afford to pay formal house rent and are living in informal housing without an official street address and/or not officially recognized by authorities as residential property.<sup>22</sup> WFP data suggests that such informal lodging includes tents, containers, unfinished buildings, shops, warehouses, and even caves (WFP 2017). Solutions to problems like this can only come from circumventing the system: according to another WFP official, local authorities will sometimes assign addresses to refugee families in order to allow them to register. However, this is dependent on local authorities’ willingness.<sup>23</sup>

Changing address poses a challenge. TRC puts payments on hold until the new address has been validated. This can force refugees to put up with abusive landlords or rent increases in order not to lose benefits (Maunder et al. 2018). Further complicating the situation, Istanbul and nine Syrian borders’ cities—Adana, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa, and Hatay—stopped registering new refugees in late

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/suriyelilere-yol-iz-in-belgesi-uyarisi-Jdnxk5PTCkqTKOx6q7-KyA>

<sup>22</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>23</sup> Interview, 2019.



2017 or early 2018.<sup>24</sup> Even for those already registered elsewhere in Turkey, relocating to Istanbul was stopped in 2018.<sup>25</sup> Citing the increasing population, the Istanbul Governor's Office announced that people under temporary protection registered elsewhere than Istanbul province needed to return to other provinces where they are registered no later than 20 August 2019.<sup>26</sup> According to the governor of Istanbul, this resulted in the departure of 97,255 Syrians from the city.<sup>27</sup>

The negative consequence of registration requirements on the ESSN's ability to reach all of the most vulnerable refugees is recognized by both the EU and the WFP:

*The programme did not sufficiently anticipate the challenges that unregistered households—who are also some of the most vulnerable—would face in becoming registered or include activities to address this.* (Maunder et al. 2018: 18)

*...despite substantial support to partners providing services directly (as a complement to the large programmes using government systems), DG ECHO has not been able to ensure full service coverage to a significant portion of the refugee population which is either unregistered, or registered and living outside its provinces of registration.* (DG-ECHO 2019: ix)

From our perspective, two broader observations are relevant. The first, as we have argued, is that the registration requirements that proved problematic from a humanitarian perspective were an integral part of the program's larger rationality. The second is that the restrictions on movement are antithetical to a fundamental principle of market citizenship. Returning to Sen's (1981) logic of market entitlements, we noted in this book's introduction that restrictions on what one can buy, where one can live, or whether and how one can work are barriers to market inclusion. The

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum-seekers>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-stops-relocating-syrians-to-istanbul-127084>

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-valiliginden-suriyeliler-ile-ilgili-onemli-aciklama-20-agustosa-kadar-sure-41281036>. Implementation of this decision was not applied fully during the Covid-19 crisis, resulting in toleration of SuTP who would otherwise have been sent away from Istanbul province, but public assistance remains denied to such persons. (Interview, 2020)

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-valisi-acikladi-97-bin-255-suriyeli-istanbuldan-ayrildi-41412205>

central place of such restrictions in the system design of the ESSN attests to the ambiguity of its inception: security concerns—both Turkish and European—influenced the life chances of refugees as or more than the JAP’s commitment to “the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey” (European Commission 2015: 1).

## 2.2 *Identifying the “most vulnerable” through Demographic Criteria*

A distinct issue in the design of the ESSN is the way in which assistance is allocated among those who have fulfilled the registration requirements discussed above. There are two distinct questions here: the decision to target aid to the “most vulnerable” rather than providing it to all registered refugees, and the specific means by which targeting is carried out. The first of these brings us back to the largely theoretical debate between the partisans of universal basic income and those of means-tested assistance. For the former (Buğra and Adar 2008), any deviation from undifferentiated treatment for all constitutes an affront to a rights-based model of ideal citizenship. The approach taken in practice by the “safety net” programs of Europe and North America relies on a different understanding of universality, understood as a “right to protection against poverty” as opposed to a “right to a given benefit” (Leisering 2019: 57). Means-tested programs can, in this view, be conducive to social citizenship if they are targeted to those who need them most. How this targeting should be done, however, is not self-evident. In the case of the ESSN, it posed a number of practical problems.

The term “vulnerability” as a determinant of priority for assistance recurs in all official descriptions of the ESSN, whether from the EU or the implementation partners. The way in which vulnerability is determined, however, is an artifact of the program’s history. The assessment report prepared for the WFP states that: “the scale of the refugee crisis in Turkey and the objective of rapidly scaling-up to reach over a million refugees meant that the targeting approach needed to be capable of identifying a large a number of refugees in a short timeframe” (Maunder et al. 2018).

The EU’s final evaluation report details the initial informational challenges faced:

*DG ECHO and its partners planned and implemented their initial projects with limited data and severe time constraints. The only planning information available in early 2016 was a dated disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD) study from 2013, and a patchwork of thematic or local academic studies and NGO surveys, none of which provided a full picture or at a level of detail useful for design and implementation of a large programme. Specifically, there was little disaggregated data available on women, children, elderly and disabled people. The EU's Facility Needs Assessment (2016), itself decries the lack of data: "the lack of comprehensive data that has been collected and/or shared on demographics and vulnerabilities is also a serious hindrance to assessing needs and designing programs and interventions."* (DG-ECHO 2019: 13)

Even the initial scaling-up of the program was complete, the same assessment estimates that the "exclusion error" attributable to the use of the demographic criteria was on the order of 5% (14).

In principle, it might have been possible to overcome this imperfect targeting through direct inspection. For Turkish citizens, as we saw in the case of R, eligibility is based on individual assessment using both nationally determined objective criteria—information in the ISAIS database and the "poverty score" calculated for each family—and locally organized on-site inspection carried out by the district SASF. An analogous procedure of on-site inspection was included in the design of the ESSN, with local SASFs once again tasked with carrying it out. An advantage attributed to this system by national officials, as we noted in the previous chapter, is the local knowledge provided by this decentralized system.

In practice, two important differences were evident between procedures used for the ESSN and those for domestic policy. In the first place, initial assessments of eligibility depend for the most part on the demographic criteria, since the ISAIS does not contain complete information about refugees' income or assets, and thus cannot be used to generate a "poverty score." The only information initially available through the ISAIS is whether refugees have a valid Turkish work permit or own property in Turkey, either of which eliminates them from ESSN eligibility (European Commission 2019: 3). Home visits for ESSN recipients were postponed until after they began receiving benefits—within 12 months of registration in order to ease the burden on the foundations (Maunder et al. 2018: 12). According to grassroots staff of the WFP, some foundations do not carry out house visits at all, but instead summon the family

for an interview in the office of the SASF.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, despite the presence of translators, cultural distance between Turkish social workers and forced migrants is necessarily greater than in the case of domestic programs. This goes beyond questions of nationality or language; the life experience of a long-term low-income resident of a Turkish community is self-evidently different from that of a family that has just gone through war and forced international migration. It seems reasonable to suggest, accordingly, that the advantage of using local agencies to assess vulnerability is less in the case of forced migrants than for domestic populations, or at the very least that significant differences may exist among local SASFs in this respect.<sup>29</sup>

For families denied assistance, there is no formal appeals process: the only option is to begin a new application (Maunder et al. 2018: 28). Claimants were not left entirely to their own devices, however. An informational call center was maintained by the TRC. While TRC staff could not revisit the decisions made by the SASF boards, they could advise claimants on how best to reapply and, in some cases, intervene on their behalf directly with the MoLFSS. If foundations reject applicants without examination, the ministry can intervene and advise the SASF to reconsider.<sup>30</sup> The boards have the final say in their districts, however; the ministry can only advise. According to the IFRC website, as of April 2020, TRC's ESSN hotline answered 1.2 million calls, sent more than 1.3 million SMSs and reached out to more than 85,000 refugees thorough its multilingual Facebook page.<sup>31</sup>

Even in the absence of any appeal mechanism, solution can sometimes be found in order to overcome problems of eligibility. DG-ECHO estimates an "exclusion error" of 5% and provides a discretionary allowance to district SASFs (DG-ECHO 2019: 14). This was created explicitly in order to find a solution to the problem that some vulnerable families would be excluded by the formal process. As of 2018, boards of trustees can decide to include some households (up to 5% of the total number of applications received by that SASF) that do not meet the demographic criteria (Maunder et al. 2018; TRC 2018). From the perspective of national authorities, however, this did not constitute an absolute right for

<sup>28</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>29</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>30</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>31</sup> <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/2020/04/28/5-ways-cash-assistance-transformed-humanitarian-response-refugees-turkey/>.

claimants; as noted earlier, eligibility determination remained under the authority of SASF boards, who could choose not to use it, leading to variation from one Foundation to another. For the frontline representatives of the WFP, failure to use the additional discretionary amount presented a problem. “When we see that they are not using their discretionary allowance, we open an issue.”<sup>32</sup> National-level officials had a different view, pointing out that it was important for the local foundations to maintain a reserve in the case of increased local demand. It was mistaken, in their opinion to consider the 5% as a target to be met.<sup>33</sup> It remains, however, that the 5% discretionary allowance is neither a legal target for foundations nor a right for recipients. Its use is left to the judgment, or eventually the compassion, of the program’s implementors.

At an anecdotal level, stories of perceived inequities are easy to find. Although he personally was an ESSN beneficiary, a man encountered during one of our participant observations indicated that “the real needy cannot get assistance.” One Syrian woman ESSN beneficiary indicated her vulnerability by explaining:

*I could not get card for a long time because I did not have a fourth child. I had difficulty to find enough to eat for me and my children. However, they did not give us the card. After, I had my fourth baby I got assistance. I was vulnerable at the time before this new baby. I should get the assistance at that time. I do not think that all vulnerable people benefit from this.*<sup>34</sup>

From the perspective of this woman, many necessary expenses such as utility bills and rent are constant and not related with the number of refugees. For those in the program, this issue is taken into account by the quarterly top-ups, which are proportionally larger for smaller families.<sup>35</sup> This cannot be applied, however, to a person such as this woman who does not qualify in the first place.

Beyond individual stories, a general limit to all such solutions is that they treat refugees not as holders of rights but as victims needing charity. The resulting logic of paternalism brings us back to our initial discussion of the justification for moving toward market-enhancing instruments of social support in the first place. These were meant to break the practice of

<sup>32</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>33</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>34</sup> Participant observation, 2019.

<sup>35</sup> Interview, 2019.

individuals being treated as helpless “pawns” by the all-powerful (even if altruistic) “knights” of the welfare state bureaucracy (Le Grand 2003). The blurred lines between state and nonstate actors in the case of ESSN do not obscure the fact that the “knights” are back in charge. Strengthening the elements of market citizenship in CT policy would require moving toward a regime with less scope for arbitrary decision. If we follow Leisering’s (2019: 57) logic of “universal protection against poverty,” promotion of equal rights is not incompatible with means-testing and targeting benefits to the most vulnerable, but it would require these to be identified in a more objective manner.

### 3 FROM AMBIGUOUS CONSENSUS TO UNCERTAIN FUTURE

We noted in Chap. 5 that the lines between humanitarian assistance and domestic social support are increasingly blurred. The case of ESSN illustrates that the reasons for this go well beyond the pragmatic altruism of the “New Way of Working.” Political context has a direct impact on policy design. The limits on eligibility explored in the previous section are direct consequences of this: a product of the short-term consensus that led to an instrument necessarily addressing both humanitarian and security concerns.

As the agreed programming period for the FRiT and the ESSN came to an end, unresolved questions at a more fundamental level emerged anew. Differences of interest between Turkey and the European Union are only the most obvious of these. Also important are ongoing tensions between different understandings of humanitarian assistance and, in particular, on what constitutes an “emergency.” Differences in priority were also evident among and within various Turkish and European agencies with respect to what form an “exit strategy” from ESSN should take. From ongoing debates at the time of this book’s writing, in the autumn of 2020, three possible scenarios could be discerned: one for continuing CT and two for transitioning away from it. For beneficiaries, however, what mattered most was the ongoing uncertainty perpetuated by the underlying divergences in priorities and principles among decision-makers.

#### 3.1 *CT as an Ongoing Necessity*

As of the summer of 2020, virtually all of the €6 billion total budget of the FRiT had been committed. With the Syrian–Turkish border effectively

closed, the number of registered SuTP in Turkey was no longer increasing.<sup>36</sup> Did it follow that the emergency was over? From the perspective of DG-ECHO, the structure of ESSN mandated that the program be temporary. Faithful to this logic, DG-ECHO was preparing to end its role in the program by the end of 2020.

*In line with long-standing humanitarian policies to promote local integration as a durable solution to displacement and more recent Turkish commitments to refugee solutions, DG ECHO's exit strategy is premised upon the GoTR taking on (or continuing) service delivery, in some sectors with support from DG-NEAR, and eventually integrating refugees fully within Government systems. (DG-ECHO 2019: 20)*

The support alluded to in this document took the form of a “top-up” of the ESSN from the EU’s 2020 budget (with the IFRC replacing the WFP as the implementing agency), followed by a grant to the Turkish MoFLSS of €245 million for continuation of social support to SuTP to begin in January 2021. In both cases, DG-NEAR was the designated EU funding agency.<sup>37</sup> What if any EU funding might follow this was uncertain. What seemed clear, on the other hand, was that ongoing support for forced migrants would be necessary into the indefinite future.

Our interviews, carried out in 2019 and 2020, found Turkish officials insisting on the importance of continued budgetary burden-sharing from the EU and contesting the relabeling of humanitarian assistance as development aid. The clear, and unacceptable, implication of this shift in European vocabulary, from this perspective, was a significant decrease in financial support.<sup>38</sup> This sentiment was acknowledged in Brussels: “We have a plan and a transition strategy. The Turks didn’t like this because transition implies exit, and end of EU support which they do not accept.”<sup>39</sup>

In the short term, the “transition strategy” proposed took the form of a support program modeled on the ESSN and using the same instrument, but aimed at beneficiaries deemed incapable of integration into the labor market. Significantly, there was disagreement between the EU and Turkish authorities as to what this program should be called. Officials of DG-NEAR,

<sup>36</sup> <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>

<sup>37</sup> Interview, 2020. The “top-up” amount was to be on the order of €485 million to be divided between ESSN and the Conditional Cash for Education program.

<sup>38</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>39</sup> Interview, 2020.

who would be called on to administer it from the European side, referred to it as a “direct grant” to the Turkish government, thus marking the distinction with the original ESSN and its indirect funding mechanism and emphasizing the goal of eventually integrating aid to forced migrants into the Turkish domestic social welfare system.<sup>40</sup> From the perspective of the MoFLSS, which would be called on to administer it, the program was better called “complementary ESSN” or C-ESSN, to highlight the continuity of the program and the European commitment to funding it. This nomenclature was officially adopted as of January 2021.<sup>41</sup>

This debate over labels was symptomatic of deeper disagreement over funding and, more generally, responsibility. Multiple interviews suggested that Turkish support for ESSN was inextricably linked to the Readmission Agreement. EU Burden-sharing, in this perspective, must continue as long as the agreement remained in place.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.2 *Beyond the Emergency: Two Contrasting “Exit Strategies”*

Beyond the EU–Turkey tension over whether and how CT for SuTP should be more deeply integrated into the Turkish social assistance system—and who should pay for it—two divergent strategies for more radical change illustrated the extent of uncertainty. Each of these sought to end the ESSN program as it had existed since December 2016. While one proposed to use support payments as incentives for SuTP to begin returning to Syria, the second accepted the long-term presence of Syrians in Turkey and sought to support their integration into the labor force. In both cases, the existing CT system would be used both for transitional assistance and as an incentive for desired action.

<sup>40</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/annexes/c\\_2019\\_5454\\_fl\\_annex\\_en\\_v2\\_p1\\_1040405.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/annexes/c_2019_5454_fl_annex_en_v2_p1_1040405.pdf).

<sup>41</sup> This point was made in a public statement by the Vice President of the MoFLSS, as reported in Milliyet, 17 December 2020. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/abden-turkiyedeki-siginmacilara-yonelik-780-milyon-euroluk-destek-6382340>. The program under this new name was signed on that day and went into effect on 1 January 2021. <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/january-2021-syria-crisis-humanitarian-relief-operation-09-03-2021-41886931.pdf>.

<sup>42</sup> Multiple interviews, 2019 and 2020.



### 3.2.1 *CT as an Incentive for Repatriation*

As of 2020, AFAD estimated that 150,000 Syrians had permanently returned to Syria since 2017 (in northern areas where there is a Turkish military presence).<sup>43</sup> In a 2018 speech, President Erdoğan announced his government's intention "...to secure all Syrian lands and ensure that all our guests return to their homes"<sup>44</sup> While no significant move in that direction was evident in the two years that followed, the possibility of using the Red Crescent Card as an instrument for repatriation was evoked in a 2020 interview with a TRC official.

*We can include a monetary incentive to return to Syria in the amounts transferred through the TRC card... we already used this kind of incentive to encourage people to move out of the camps. There are many PTT banks in Idlib and Afrin (in Syria), we can open more ATMs over there if needed. The people who go there can collect their cash. Return can become a condition. This is not an issue for this year, but for years to come. We are thinking about using TRC cards as part of a scenario for returning to Syria.*<sup>45</sup>

This approach also sought explicitly to ground planning about forced migrants in the broader context of historic Turkish migration policy. The centrality of this was emphasized by officials, who insisted that ESSN must ultimately be compatible with the national migration system.<sup>46</sup> While we have had occasion to note changes in the past decades, it remains that Turkish migration policy has never defined migrant integration from the perspective of creating a cosmopolitan community with equal rights. To date, efforts at longer-term integration have been limited to migrants of higher socioeconomic status or with Turkish ethnic or linguistic origins (Ark-Yıldırım and Özer-Yürür 2019). The explicit designation of migrants' status as temporary, in this context, takes on renewed importance, and repatriation is put forward as a rational next step.

<sup>43</sup> <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/some-150-000-syrians-have-returned-from-turkey-131108>

<sup>44</sup> Author's translation of "Seçimin ardından tüm Suriye topraklarını güvenli hale getirmeyi ve misafirlerimizin tamamının evlerine dönmelerini sağlamayı hedefliyoruz." <https://www.haberturk.com/ankara-haberleri/15742051-erdogan-secimin-ardindan-tum-suriye-topraklarini-guvenli-hale-getirmeyi-ve-misafirlerimizin>.

<sup>45</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>46</sup> Interview, 2020.

### 3.2.2 *CT and the Transition to Formal Employment*

A very different “exit strategy” was also being considered by both Turkish and international agencies, one premised on the prospect of eventually integrating a significant Syrian population for the longer term through gradual inclusion in the Turkish labor market. This strategy was premised on accepting the longer-term presence of Syrians on Turkish soil and gradually transforming them from recipients of aid into productive members of the economy. The 2018 “exit strategy from the ESSN program” report states that while direct assistance was required in the early phases of forced migration:<sup>47</sup>

*it is considered that it is the right time to incline for SuTP to labour market in a formal way with better skills and competences. Thus, it is believed that dependence of SuTP on social assistance will be lessened to a certain extent. Secondly, it is observed that SuTP are informally employed in the Turkish labour market. However, the entitlements derived from social assistance scheme makes transition from informality to formality more difficult. It is utmost necessary to manage a balance between conditions of social assistance scheme and formally employment for SuTP. (Presidency and MoFLSS 2018)*

An initial €50 million package of active labor market measures was financed by the first tranche of the FRiT. Building on this base in the second tranche of FRiT, DG-NEAR put together a package of measures collectively worth €465 million as part of joint projects with international partners and the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) to help skilled and semi-skilled people improve job and language skills through vocational training. Initial projects signed in December 2019 involved Expertise France and the International Center for Migration Policy Development (European Commission 2020: 12–13). This was intended to take its place in a gradual policy of transition through work incentives. Although open in principle to all registered forced migrants, it was expected that this aid would go primarily to existing ESSN beneficiaries (Revel 2020: 7–8). The role of İŞKUR, using a system already in place for Turkish citizens, is to act as a clearing house. Program participants, like

<sup>47</sup>Turkish and international officials interviewed suggested that this report represents above all the point of view of the Directorate of International Labor Force within the MoFLSS.

Turkish recipients of social aid, would go to İŞKUR to apply for a formal job. For the first year of employment, CT would continue.<sup>48</sup>

Implementation of this policy, however, seemed problematic for a number of reasons; integration of labor does not depend only on the social aid mechanism. The overall employment rate in Turkey is relatively low and it is estimated that, for Turkish citizens, one-third of employment is in the informal sector. Under these conditions, the overall efficiency of İŞKUR in matching Turkish workers with jobs has been limited (Yılmaz 2019: 730). For refugees, an additional barrier is obtaining the right to work at all. Turkey granted Syrian under temporary protection the right to work only in 2016, but only subject to a number of conditions:

- To be eligible for formal employment a Syrian under temporary protection must have been registered in TPS for at least 6 months.<sup>49</sup> For those under the conditional refugee status, the relevant date is six months after application.<sup>50</sup> Only for those with legally recognized refugee or subsidiary protection status is the right to work permanent. ID card serves as proof of this.<sup>51</sup>
- Employers must apply for work permit on behalf of any foreigners.
- For persons under TPS, work permits must be renewed annually.
- There is a quota for SuTPS in a given workplace: maximum 10% of total workers.<sup>52</sup> An additional quota of 5% is available for persons under International Protection.<sup>53</sup>
- Foreigners are not allowed to work in certain professions (such as lawyers, veterinarian, etc.),<sup>54</sup> others require prior official permission (health, education services providers).

<sup>48</sup> Interview, 2020.

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/media/6360/gecicikoruma.jpg>.

<sup>50</sup> [www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/](http://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/)

<sup>51</sup> [www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/](http://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/)

<sup>52</sup> <http://calismaizni.gov.tr/calisma-izni-hakkinda/gecici-koruma/>

<sup>53</sup> <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rcrt=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwi4xtTksfsAhVvC2MBHXX5Dt4QFjABegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata2.unhcr.org%2Fen%2Fdocuments%2Fdownload%2F67638&usq=AOvVaw0DJkRIBPFi10zQWVRbHlg9>

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/calisma-izni/turk-vatandaslarina-hasredilen-meslekler/>

In addition, formal employment requires employers to pay at least minimum wage and make the mandatory social security contribution. In practice, the number of work permits issued remains limited. For all foreigners it increased from 17,466 in 2011 to 145,233 in 2019 (MoFLSS 2019: 195), the last year for which data were available. This is still a small minority of a registered population of over 2 million SuTP of working age.<sup>55</sup>

Looking to the future, the scope of programs aimed at transitions to the formal workforce remains small compared to this potential population. Examples include a project by World Bank “Employment Support Project For Syrians Under Temporary Protection and Host Communities,”<sup>56</sup> and one by the FAO “Better Job Opportunities For Syrians and the Host communities,” which seeks to enhance the employment prospects of ESSN beneficiaries, but also of host country nationals. This is done by means of “certified vocational training courses in crop production, livestock and food sectors in the rural area,” but is projected to create only some 1500 jobs.<sup>57</sup> In the estimation of a WFP official,

*Even IFRC has gone from talking about “graduating” people to employment to talking about “referring” them to employment, that’s the only commitment they are making—very few refugees have actually gotten work permits, employers also prefer informal employees.<sup>58</sup>*

For this observer, this can be explained in part by economic conditions. “Construction is declining; the hospitality sector is also a big consumer of Syrian labor; so is the textile industry, which is also down.” The further downturn of the Turkish and international economy following the Covid-19 virus crisis of 2020 further weakened these same sectors. At the same time, financial and administrative barriers to formal employment persist, since employers must pay for work permit application. In practice, enforcement of the rules requiring workers to have an official permit is uneven. The European Commission, reports that 57% of ESSN beneficiaries and 67% of non-beneficiaries defined unskilled labor as their primary income source and estimates that between 750,000 and 950,000 Syrians

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>, accessed 17.04.2020.

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/employment-support-project-syrians-under-temporary-protection-and-host-communities-7005>

<sup>57</sup> <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/news/better-job-opportunities-farming-syrians-and-host-communities-10098>

<sup>58</sup> Interview, 2020.

worked in the informal sector as of 2018 (European Commission 2018: 55; 71). The World Bank estimated that in 2020 86% of working-age persons in the population of SuTP held some form of informal employment.

### 3.3 *From Social Assistance to Market Citizenship*

Bringing together these contrasting scenarios for the future of the ESSN allows us to regain a measure of critical and analytical distance from day-to-day operations of the program, and illustrates a number of more general points. From the humanitarian perspective, the tension between “emergency” and “alchemical” approaches (Barnett 2011) discussed in Chap. 5 is seen to be as much a question of organizational culture as of general philosophy, with DG-ECHO embodying the former approach while DG-NEAR, although avoiding the vocabulary of humanitarianism, was in effect promoting the second. To the extent that these lines were blurred in practice, this was a cause of expressed concern within both agencies, with officials from DG-ECHO emphasizing that “emergency assistance” could not go on indefinitely, while those from DG-NEAR stressed the importance of medium-term capacity building and systemic change.<sup>59</sup>

Where did this leave the recipients of aid? With onward migration ruled out for the foreseeable future and return to Syria at best a long-term objective, the question focused on their future within Turkey. Should social CT be seen as a permanent element in a “citizenship approach to poverty” or, conversely, is it at best a transitional element in a strategy focused on labor-force participation? The debate over the future of the ESSN puts into stark focus both the limits and the imperatives of both options.

We have noted the disparate origins of the Directorates General for Social Services, on the one hand, and International Labor force, on the other hand. It is the viewpoint of the latter that is found in the “exit strategy” report cited above.<sup>60</sup> Here we find an emphasis on shorter-term entry into the labor force and concerns that ongoing CT will ultimately be a disincentive to work—a distant echo of nineteenth- and twentieth-century debates over “outdoor relief.” This view was not universally shared, however. Others pointed out that, even if they reached their targets, projects for formal employment would provide work for a few thousand people, a tiny fraction of those potentially in need of jobs. In this perspective,

<sup>59</sup> Multiple interviews, 2020.

<sup>60</sup> Multiple interviews, 2019, 2020.

ongoing CT was a necessary element of the transition to meaningful participation.<sup>61</sup>

From this perspective, the priority was maintaining CT programs into the indefinite future, pinning hopes for inclusion on education and the gradual integration of multigenerational migrant families. With short-term access to the formal labor market extremely limited, only ongoing support through CT, in this view, could ensure that progress of this sort continued.

While diverging on means, however, these two approaches converge with respect to ultimate ends. The right and the means to engage in buying and selling—what CT programs at their best can ensure—is only one of the entitlements central to an active role in the market. The ability to work, Sens’s (1981) “own-labor entitlement,” is just as important. Wanting work, however, is not the same as having legal access to it. So long as protecting the domestic labor market takes precedence over incorporating migrants into it, market citizenship is truncated. CT can empower individuals only as consumers, not as workers or producers.

Beyond this debate, and whatever “exit strategy” eventually emerges, a defining feature of the ESSN was ongoing uncertainty, and this was a problem in and of itself. Citizenship-like rights, even if based on a status that is formally defined as temporary, have meaning only if they are perceived as stable at least into the humanly relevant medium term—the time it takes to raise a family, to establish a business, to acquire employable skills. Leisering’s (2019: 320) assertion that CT can constitute a “citizenship approach to poverty” makes sense only in such a context. The very real prospect that the future of social support for SuTP may be a victim of the ambiguous consensus at the origin of the ESSN without being replaced by generalized access to the Turkish labor market means that this tenuous extension to forced migrants of the right to that “modicum of economic welfare and security” necessary “to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11) may prove fleeting.

Bringing these points together with those made earlier in this chapter should not blind us to the contribution made by the ESSN not only to the short-term survival but to the potential for market integration of forced migrants in Turkey. Making good on that potential, however, transforming market-enhancing instruments of social assistance into elements of market citizenship, would require addressing limits and shortcomings evident in this case.

<sup>61</sup> Interview, 2019, 2020.

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## Does Cash Transfer Promote Market Citizenship?

**Abstract** The most obvious conclusion of this book is that there is no single Turkish experience. Nor can we reach definitive once-and-for-all conclusions about the impact of CT as an instrument of social assistance. Comparison among our cases highlights variables grounded in local conditions and policy design that help determine the outcome of CT projects, and whose relevance extends far beyond Turkey. Among these are human and financial resources, but also of the capacity for local knowledge. When these allow consistent and appropriate targeting, CT can provide an important step in the direction of inclusion and equality in a market context. It would be misleading, however, to believe that this instrument on its own is sufficient. At the core of market citizenship is the dignity conferred not only by paying one's own way, but also by earning one's own way: CT instruments work best as a complement to, not replacement for, access to the official labor market.

**Keywords** Social cash transfer • Citizenship • Rights • Outcomes • Labor market

The case studies presented in this book warn us away from any premature reification of national models, let alone of CT itself. We are brought back

instead to one of the starting points of this enquiry, the notion of policy instruments as tools:

*To say that something is a tool is to say that it can produce certain results under appropriate circumstances; it is not to say that it is drilling, sawing, or welding at any particular moment.* (Majone and Wildavsky 1979: 169)

What, then, are the appropriate circumstances in this case?

## I CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS

CT is not social policy on the cheap; even less is it a retreat of the state. In terms of resources, the actual sums transferred are only a starting point. Successfully targeting, management, and monitoring requires more administrative and technical resources than in-kind distribution of equivalent scope, and this in turn demands that programs be designed on an adequate scale. The lack of resources that proved problematic in R is largely attributable to its size—too small for the SASF to have the internal resources to manage it directly or to be of real interest to private partners. Bigger, however, is not necessarily better. While a national network of financial services provided by *Halkbank* allowed the ESSN system to function smoothly, the unprecedented scale of the program and the need for multiple partners to work together to scale it up in a short time using necessarily incomplete information contributed to a system design centered on imperfect indicators of vulnerability. The high institutional start-up costs of the system established a strong dynamic of path dependence, leading to this design being maintained even after the program's size had stabilized. Its sustainability should EU resources be withdrawn, finally, remains in question.

At any scale, information about the situation and needs of individuals is among the critical resources required for effective targeting. The cursory nature of home visits carried out by untrained inspectors in R contributed to inadequate information there. In the case of ESSN, officials interviewed claimed that training was provided for SASF inspectors, but the lack of any evidence for this in R suggests considerable local-level variation. A distinct set of challenges were unique to ESSN. The impossibility of knowing what, if any, assets migrant families might be able to access from Syria and the refusal of the Turkish government to allow implementing agencies full access to personal information contained in national databases combined

to hinder any systematic in-depth evaluation of impact at the individual level. The contribution to successful targeting made by local knowledge in U provides the mirror image of these situations. Getting this right is critical. For CT to contribute to social citizenship, aid must go to those who need it the most; more than that, it must be seen as doing so. Suspicion of political favoritism, of cheating by recipients (systematically failing to report informal income, etc.), or of flawed indicators of vulnerability detract from the principle of rights founded on need.

A second critical feature emerging from the case studies is the importance of coherence. The design and implementation of a policy instrument is seldom the work of a single agency. Even when it is, the example of the SASFs suggests that agencies themselves can be collections of individuals with diverse points of view. The question is whether those involved share a common goal. Departures from consensus, as in the diverging interests of public and private partners evident in R, detract from citizenship-enhancing outcomes. The case of ESSN is critical here for a number of reasons. Most obviously, the ambiguous consensus inherent in its origins influenced the conflict of goals evident in its implementation. Preventing migrants from reaching Europe and assisting the most vulnerable of them in Turkey are goals with at best imperfect overlap. Considering the presence of Syrians in Turkey as temporary or indefinite implies a different focus even in the short term. Integrating migrants into the labor market and restricting access to work permits is contradictory. All of these points of view, nevertheless, were present in one or another of the relevant Turkish, European, or International agencies. The persistent limits in the program's ability to reach all of the most vulnerable or to move participants beyond the most limited forms of market integration can largely be traced to this situation.

We must be careful, however, not to confuse the need for consensus on ends with other much less useful distinctions: those between public and private or between national and transnational.

A clear lesson of the case studies is the need to get beyond the increasingly sterile debate between empowerment and control. These are not contradictory; at the local level U illustrates high levels of both; R largely failed to accomplish either. The ESSN included elements of control through its registration and address requirements, but also measures of market empowerment through its use of unrestricted cash transfer. More importantly—and too often lost in the polemic over “rights-based citizenship”—all forms of citizenship imply a balance between empowerment and control, differing chiefly on the forms and locus of control. Premodern

society placed it in the hands of “family, church, or lord” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 35); the turn to the market was in part a struggle for liberation against these. The ideal of “industrial citizenship,” in turn, was a reaction to the perceived excesses of the market. It allowed a degree of decommodification but ushered in the control of civil servants, labor unions, or corporations. A market-centered approach offers yet another set of possibilities for striking this balance but, as illustrated in all of our cases, discretion and hierarchy can persist to the detriment of a fully rights-based model of market citizenship.

Another false dichotomy is between “public” and “private.” How should we conceptualize the role of private companies such as Multinet, or of hybrid enterprises such as Halkbank when they are incorporated into policy and perform a public function? Both acted as for-profit policy subcontractors, and presumably in their own interests. The contrasting experience of R and ESSN, nevertheless, shows us that this is not systematically good or bad. Effectively integrating a private partner is a technical question of program design, not an ethical one of “corporate social responsibility.” Even more vexing is any attempt to put parastatal bodies such as the SASFs or even the TRC into neat categories. Once again, what they do matters more than how they are labeled.

Similarly blurred boundaries are evident in the international sphere. How should we characterize the WFP? Formally a UN agency, it behaves as a not-for-profit corporation, competing for contracts and offering attractive careers in return for effective provision of services. On the public side, finally, there is no unified actor that can unambiguously be identified either with the Turkish state or with the European Union. In both domestic programs and the ESSN, Turkish public actors include local bodies and national agencies. Directorates found within a single ministry, can be the source of competing projects. The EU is represented in the ESSN by three distinct actors—political leaders for whom humanitarian budgets are a price worth paying to reach an agreement about migration, and the two DGs, ECHO and NEAR, with distinct missions, procedures, and internal cultures focusing, respectively on short-term humanitarian assistance, and medium-term development and national capacity-building.

Taking all of this together brings us back to the importance of coordination and consensus. What matters is not identity: public, private, charitable, international; any and all of these can work together effectively, as municipal authorities and civil society organizations did in U, or the WFP and TRC did in the case of ESSN. Whether they do so in practice in any given case proves to be among the most important indicators of policy success.

## 2 SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN CONTEXT

We began this book with a question: can market-enhancing instruments contribute to “equality of membership”? Our answer is cautiously positive. There is no doubt that, like the policy instruments of premodern and those of industrial societies, CT programs can be used as instruments of exclusion; some aspects of the experience of the ESSN illustrate this in direct and distressing ways. This does eliminate the potential of these same instruments to play a more constructive role. A very low-income family, whether Turkish or Syrian, given additional purchasing power through a digital CT card has a greater (albeit far from absolute) degree of autonomy in its consumption choices. More importantly, perhaps, the very act of purchasing necessities, rather than acquiring these through charitable gift or in-kind distribution, increases its integration into the economic and social life of its local community. The family’s life is made more ordinary, in the sense of being more similar to that of its slightly better-off neighbors. As such, this can be seen as a small but significant step away from stigma and personal dependence. The degree of market integration is clearly different across our cases. The two local examples retained strong nonmarket controls over what could be purchased, and where. With ESSN, assistance can be drawn in cash, removing this particular element of control, but others remain; program participation is used as an incentive for migrants to register and to comply with restrictions on movement. Despite all of these limits, however, each in its own way represents a small step in the direction of market citizenship. There is no doubt that CT instruments can and frequently do serve as a force for social discipline, but this too is an element of membership. Market-enhancing instruments of social policy, CT among them, *can* contribute to social and economic inclusion—if they are deployed at an appropriate scale; if sufficient financial, technical, and social resources are available; if they offer stability in the medium term; and if the agencies central to policy design and implementation share the goal of inclusion and actively work together to promote it.

The contribution made by CT is real; it is also necessarily incomplete in the very logic of the market itself. CT programs contribute to empowering and integrating individuals as consumers, but fuller inclusion and true equality of membership in a market-centered society requires participation as workers. We are brought back to the historical anecdotes evoked in Chap. 2. It is less burdensome, as Montaigne reminds us, to purchase

something than to receive it as a gift. True dignity in a market society, however, as the feminist movement of the 1970s rediscovered, implies earning one's own way. The final word goes to Frederick Douglas: "I am now my own master! The thought 'I can work for a living' placed me in a state of independence" (Shklar 1991: 83). Who better than a former slave to appreciate the market as a "social conquest" (Fontaine 2014).

In a coherent logic of market-enhancing policies, CT programs would go hand-in-hand with policies that facilitate fuller market participation, and in particular access to formal labor markets. To be effective, such policies require a significant degree of stability and medium-term legal security. Persons effectively limited to working in the informal sector or migrants uncertain of whether they will be able to remain in their host country are far from full membership, even in economic and social life. Critically, overcoming these barriers requires looking beyond the strictly economic sphere. In addition to economic support, integration into a market society requires an extension of legal rights which, to date, have been denied to the overwhelming majority of Syrian migrants in Turkey.

The ability to grant status, in the sense of legal rights, remains unique to states, and it turns out to be of the first importance. In the logic of Polanyi, politics defines the conditions in which markets operate, and accordingly determines the extent to which they can serve as instruments of inclusion. In the end, thus, we return to citizenship in the fullest sense. The final lesson of this study is that social and economic inclusion can indeed be pursued in advance of civil rights and political participation, but that these must ultimately follow. The interdependence among the elements of citizenship is inescapable. Cash transfer to very low income families is a useful step on the path leading ultimately to "market citizenship" as we have defined it, as effective equality of membership in a market society, but it is only a first step.

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