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*Alexandre Coello de la Rosa
and João Vicente Melo*

The Jesuit Encounters with Islam in the Asia-Pacific

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By

Alexandre Coello de la Rosa
João Vicente Melo



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Preliminary Note

The authors have conceptualized this book jointly. Alexandre Coello de la Rosa authored Parts 5, 6, and 7; João Vicente Melo authored Parts 2, 3, and 4. Both of us co-authored Parts 1 and 8. The contents are discussed more extensively in articles and book chapters previously published by the authors.

For Part 4, see João Vicente Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c.1580–1615* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

For Part 5, see Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “No es esta tierra para tibios’: La implicación de los jesuitas en la conquista y evangelización de Mindanao y Joló (siglo XVII),” *Historia Unisinos* 23, no. 1 (2019): 47–61.

For Part 6, see Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “La topografía del conocimiento jesuita en Filipinas: La *Relación* (1654) del padre Francisco Combés, s.J.,” *Libros de la Corte* 24 (2022): 185–208; de la Rosa, “Diplomáticos y mártires jesuitas en la corte de Kudarat (Mindanao, siglo XVII),” *Espacio, tiempo y forma: Serie IV, historia moderna* 33 (2020): 323–46; de la Rosa, “Los jesuitas como mediadores culturales en el sur de Filipinas (Mindanao, Joló), siglo XVII,” in *Ciudades atlánticas del sur de España: La construcción de un mundo nuevo (siglos XVI–XVIII)*, ed. Juan José Iglesias Rodríguez, José Jaime García Bernal, and Isabel M^a Melero Muñoz, (Seville: Edit. Universidad de Sevilla, 2021), 419–36.

For Part 7, see Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “Políticas geo-estratégicas y misionales en el sur de Filipinas: El caso de Mindanao y Joló (siglo XVII),” *Revista de Indias* 79, no. 277 (2019): 729–63.

The Jesuit Encounters with Islam in the Asia-Pacific

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Abstract

This book explores the strategies adopted by the Jesuit missions under the Portuguese and Spanish patronage before Islamic powers such as the Mughal Empire in South Asia and the expansion of Islam in the Southeast Asian peripheries. Based on a comparative perspective, this book examines the interconnections between the Jesuit proselytizing activities and the imperial projects of the Iberian crowns in Asia, highlighting the role of the Jesuit missionaries operating in Asian Islamic settings as diplomatic and cultural mediators.

Keywords

Jesuit missions – Mughal Empire – Bijapur – Philippines – Portuguese Empire – Spanish Empire – cross-cultural exchanges – cross-cultural diplomacy

1 Introduction

The history of the contacts between Jesuits and Islam in Asia was mostly shaped by the colonial and commercial encounters between the Portuguese and Spanish in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Catholicism was one of the hallmarks of the identity of the two Iberian crowns (united between 1580 and 1640). Portuguese and Spanish control over territories and populations in the Americas, Asia, and Africa involved the implementation of policies based on the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, their religion), which meant that no religion other than Catholicism was to be tolerated throughout their extended kingdoms. Religious conversion was thus an essential

instrument to promote the local population's political and cultural integration into the Iberian monarchies.¹

During the early modern period, the conversion of gentile or pagan souls, as well as the defense of Christianity against Muslim infidels and Protestant heretics, became the leitmotif of Tridentine Catholicism in Asia. As the first global religious order, the Society of Jesus assumed a central role in the task of spreading Western civilization through Catholic missions,² especially in frontier spaces where Iberian Catholicism faced Muslim communities in Asia. Far from being autonomous agents vis-à-vis metropolitan political power (in particular, the crown), the Jesuits were strongly tied to the institutions of secular power (governor-generals, viceroys, audiencias, municipal cabildos) in Goa and Manila (called "Intramuros," the walled city) through the Iberian system of patronage of overseas religious activities, the Portuguese *Padroado real* and the Spanish *Patronato regio*. This system of royal patronage allowed the Iberian crowns to exercise a vast spiritual jurisdiction. Besides the privileges of creating bishoprics, appointing members of religious orders, or managing ecclesiastical revenues, royal patronage extended the ability of the Iberian crowns to interfere in regions beyond the formal frontiers of their overseas territories. In other words, the *Padroado/Patronato* allowed them to develop a vast ecclesiastical geography, which, thanks to the canonical jurisdiction of Iberian-backed prelates and the missionary structures operating outside the formal empire, promoted an articulation between the *Padroado/Patronato* and Iberian expansionist ambitions.

Missionary activities in areas outside formal Portuguese or Spanish jurisdiction were thus often articulated with commercial and political goals defined in Goa, Manila, Lisbon, or Madrid. Besides their proselytizing undertakings, religious brothers and priests were expected to perform other tasks such as facilitating contacts between Iberian and local officials, supporting and monitoring the activities of Iberian traders, and gathering all sorts of relevant

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- 1 Adriano Prosperi, "L'Europa cristiana e il mondo: Alle origini dell'idea di missione," *Dimensioni e problema della ricerca storica* 2 (1992): 189–220, here 189–92; Aliocha Maldavsky and Federico Palomo, "La misión en los espacios del mundo ibérico: Conversiones, formas de control y negociación," in *Monarquías ibéricas em perspectiva comparada (séculos XVI–XVIII): Dinâmicas imperiais e circulação de modelos político-administrativos*, ed. Ângela Barreto Xavier, Federico Palomo del Barrio, and Roberta Stumpf (Lisbon: Universidade de Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2018), 543–90.
 - 2 This concept of Western civilization draws on a narrative that seeks to represent a quintessential (European) identity in a linear time, based on Christian values that aspired to a universal status. On this particular issue, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965).

information on local social, political, and economic structures. Such employment of religious agents in diplomatic affairs had been a common practice in the European diplomatic repertoire since the consolidation of Christianity in the early medieval period. The prestige of the church, the transnational networks of the religious orders, and their advanced scholarly education made priests particularly apt to perform diplomatic services.³ These intermediary functions as diplomatic and cultural mediators often made Jesuit missionaries an integral part of local political and social contexts, encouraging them to adapt to complex realities in different imperial and missional spaces. These local realities cannot be analyzed independently, because they were not experienced as such, and missions and missionary institutions cannot be understood without analyzing the imperial spaces in which they were established in a global context.

In this book, we explore the strategies used by the Jesuit apostolate before the consolidation of Islamic powers such as the Mughal Empire in South Asia and the expansion of Islam in the Southeast Asian peripheries, not only from a missional perspective but from a political one. This makes it necessary to go beyond a *national* vision—Spain versus Portugal, and vice-versa—and adopt a comparative perspective that integrates spaces marked by diversity, like the Portuguese Estado da India (which at its zenith included Goa, Hormuz, Southern India, Malacca, Macao, the Moluccas, Mozambique, and Mombasa), with others situated in the Asian peripheries of the Pacific (Moluccas, the Philippines), where from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries emergent northern European Protestant powers such as the Netherlands and England defied Iberian overseas hegemony. In order to assess Jesuit experiences in different Islamic societies in Asia, we explore five case studies covering the Persian Gulf, the subcontinent, and Southeast Asia: the Jesuit efforts to implement the policies of political and cultural homogenization in Portuguese-held Hormuz (Part 2); the Jesuit missionaries employed as informal ambassadors at the court of Bijapur (Part 3); the Jesuit missionary and diplomatic enterprise at the Mughal court between 1580 and 1773 (Part 4); the early missionary exploits in the Philippines and the Moluccas (Part 5); and the Jesuits' involvement in the conflict between the Spanish authorities and the Moro population in Mindanao and Sulu (Parts 6 and 7).

3 Isabella Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134–35.



FIGURE 1 Map of India y João Teixeira. In Jerónimo de Ataíde and João Teixeira, *Taboas geraes de toda a navegação, divididas e emendadas por Dom Ieronimo de Atayde com todos os portos principaes das conquistas de Portugal delineadas por João Teixeira cosmographo de Sua Magestade* (1630).

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, PUBLIC DOMAIN

2 Jesuits and Islam in the Portuguese Estado the Índia

With the arrival of Francis Xavier (1506–52) in India in 1542, the Jesuits would become the vanguard of the Portuguese *Padroado* in Asia. The exploits of the Navarrese missionary in the Goan hinterland, South India, Moluccas, Malacca, and Japan allowed the Jesuits to develop a presence in most regions under the jurisdiction of the Portuguese and where the Estado da Índia had commercial or expansionist interests. In areas under direct Portuguese control, the Jesuits would be active elements in the implementation of a series of political and administrative measures that sought to eradicate all non-Christian elements and integrate the local population into structures of imperial domination

by transforming their social and religious habitus.⁴ Religious conversion was regarded as an essential instrument to integrate diverse ethnic and religious territories or communities into the institutional, legal, political, and cultural order of the Portuguese crown.

During the governorships of Martim Afonso de Sousa (1500–64, in office 1542–45) and D. João de Castro (1500–48, in office 1545–48), the Portuguese authorities promoted the destruction of temples and mosques to accelerate the Christianization of Goa. In 1543, one of the instigators of this policy, the vicar-general of Goa Miguel Vaz Coutinho (d.1547), claimed that, with the assistance of a local convert named Fabião Gonçalves, he had achieved “the destruction and removal of all temples and idolatrous shrines of Goa.”⁵ In 1567, the establishment of the Goan Inquisition and the edicts issued by the first provincial council of Goa enhanced the policy of aggressive Christianization of Goa and its hinterland. The council aimed to turn Goa into a true Catholic society and sought to marginalize the non-Christian populations: Hindus and Muslims were forced to live in “ghettos,” and their religious ceremonies were banned. To avoid contamination from heathens and infidels, the council forbade all Christians to “befriend or converse with infidels.”

The conversion of Muslims, although part of the proselytizing work of the Jesuit missionaries in the Goan mission fields, often relied more on the effects of the aggressive and discriminatory policies against the Muslim minorities living under Portuguese jurisdiction than on any meticulous or well-planned conversion strategy. Immediately after the conquest of Goa in 1510, Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515) promoted the destruction of all mosques to eliminate the presence of religious and political elements loyal to the Sultanate of Bijapur, as well as to prompt the Christianization of the city. While Albuquerque implemented a pragmatic policy of religious tolerance toward Hindus, in an attempt to gain local support and co-opt local human resources and knowledge to the Estado da Índia, the local Muslim minority, due to its affinities with hostile Islamic powers like Bijapur and the Ottoman Empire, were the target of several discriminatory measures that reduced their agency and ultimately encouraged

4 Ângela Barreto Xavier, *A invenção de Goa: Poder imperial e conversões culturais nos séculos XVI e XVII* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2008), 343.

5 Doc. 103, “Carta do Vigário-Geral Padre Miguel Vaz a El-Rei, Cochim, 6 de Janeiro de 1543,” in *Documentação para a história das missões do padroado português do Oriente*, ed. António da Silva Rêgo (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colónias), 343.

their expulsion. For example, the land estates belonging to Muslims were confiscated and given to Portuguese settlers.⁶

Despite the Portuguese authorities' repressive policy, a Muslim minority still resided in Goa and its hinterland. Thus, in 1545, the Jesuit Nicoló Lancillotto (d.1558) complained that the destruction of temples and mosques was not enough to eradicate an Islamic and Gentile presence in Goa, mentioning that "there are no more pagodas, [but] there is an infinite number of Moors [i.e., Muslims], Gentiles, and bad Christians that this land seems to be a Babylon, because everyone lives as one wishes."⁷ Twenty years later, however, the situation seemed to have changed. Around 1564, the Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul, Daniele Barbarigo (d.1575), reported that in Goa "there is not even a single Moor of the Muhammadan sect."⁸ Barbarigo's words were somewhat exaggerated. In his *Itinerario* (1596), Jan Huygen van Linschoten (1563–1611), who served as secretary of the archbishop of Goa, D. João Vicente da Fonseca (1530–87), between 1583 and 1588, mentions that in Goa there still resided "many Heathens, Moors, Jews, and all strange nations bordering thereabout, every one of them using several customs, and superstitions in Religion."⁹ Many of these Muslims, however, were not originally from Goa but, as François Pyrard de Laval (1578–1621) noted in his account, "from all the coasts of India, as from Gujarat, Persia, and elsewhere."¹⁰

Linschoten's and Pyrard de Laval's observations thus highlight a persistent Muslim presence in Goa, albeit one formed essentially by mobile mercantile agents from other regions. This is confirmed by the available data from the Goan Inquisition. Based on the *Reportorio* compiled by the inquisitor João Delgado Figueira (c.1585–1654), Charles Amiel and Anne Lima estimate that, among the processes and *autos-da-fé* executed by the Holy Office of Goa between 1561 and 1621, around eighteen percent involved Muslims or cases of crypto-Islamism.¹¹

6 Doc. 3 in *Bosquejo historico das comunidades das aldeas dos concelhos das Ilhas, Salsete e Bardez*, ed. Filipe Nery Xavier (Bastora: Typographia Rangel, 1903), 194–96.

7 Doc. 7, "P. Nic. Lancillottus S.I.P. Martino de Santa Cruz S.I., Goa 22 Octobris 1545," in *Documenta Indica* [henceforth DI], ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHST, 1948), 1:45.

8 "Relazione dell'Impero Ottomano del clarissimo Daniele Barbarigo tornato bailo da Costantinopoli nel 1564," in *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ed. Eugenio Alberi (Florence, 1844), 3:9.

9 Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies: From the Old English Translation of 1598* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1885), 1:222.

10 François Pyrard de Laval, *The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1888), 2:38.

11 Charles Amiel and Anne Lima, *L'Inquisition de Goa: La relation de Charles Dellon (1687)* (Paris: Chandeigne, 1997), 71.

Hormuz constituted an exception in the anti-Islamic policy adopted by the Portuguese authorities in Asia. Although a part of the Estado da Índia, Hormuz enjoyed the status of a protectorate. After Albuquerque's annexation of the Kingdom of Hormuz in 1515, a treaty of vassalage was signed between Turan Shah IV (r.1514–22) and Manuel I of Portugal (1469–1521, r.1495–1521). Per the treaty, Turan Shah surrendered his kingdom to the Portuguese crown but maintained his status as the ruler of Hormuz in exchange for a yearly tribute and on the condition that he and his successors would return the kingdom whenever the Portuguese crown requested. This arrangement meant that every successor of Turan Shah had to be confirmed by the Portuguese captain of Hormuz, who represented the authority of the Portuguese monarch. At the same time, the Kingdom of Hormuz was gradually demilitarized, while Portuguese garrisons replaced the local military structures. This dependence on the approval of the Estado da Índia restricted the local leaders' autonomy and forced them to accommodate the regional interests of the Portuguese crown. Indeed, in 1543, the Estado da Índia took full control of the local fiscal structures when, claiming that the king was unable to pay his tribute, it took control of the custom house of Hormuz. Although the king of Hormuz continued to make appointments to key administrative posts—after receiving Portuguese approval—the integration of the kingdom's fiscal machinery into the Estado da Índia made Hormuz a *de facto* dominion of the Portuguese crown.

Xavier regarded Hormuz as an important mission field for the Jesuits. The strategic position of the city in the Persian Gulf could be used as a platform to launch other missions in the Arabian Peninsula and Safavid Persia. In 1549, he appointed Gaspar Barzeus (also known as Kaspar Berzē Kaspar Barzäus, or as Kaspar Berse [1515–53]), a former Dutch soldier who, after serving under Charles V (1500–58, r.1519–56) in Italy and France, migrated to Portugal, where he joined the Jesuits around 1546.¹² The instructions Xavier gave to Barzeus were essentially concerned with monitoring and protecting the local Christian community, as well as building a rapport with royal officials. The nineteenth paragraph mentions that Barzeus “should take care of the conversion of infidels if you have enough time.” The emphasis was to promote “a universal welfare and not to give too much attention to individual particularities.”¹³

12 Eduardo Javier Alonso Romo, “Gaspar Barzeo: El hombre y sus escritos,” *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 77, no. 153 (2008): 63–92.

13 Doc. 80, “Instructio pro P. Barzaeo, armuziam prefecturo,” in Francis Xavier, *Epistolae S. Francisci Xaverii aliaque eius scripta*, ed. Georg Schurhammer and Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1945), 2:92.

Barzeus's letters from Hormuz mainly describe his routine according to the instructions he received from Xavier, but he also reports on his proselytizing activities, especially those targeting Muslims and Jews. The Dutch Jesuit mentions his frequent public debates with mullahs and rabbis, as well as a series of activities that aimed to Christianize the public space.¹⁴ This strategy also included the regular performance of processions and other public acts of devotion.¹⁵ In a letter from 1549, Barzeus reported that every day, after Mass, he gathered "five or six hundred souls to teach them the doctrine: women, men, children, and slaves to whom I explain the articles of the faith, commandments, mortal sins, and all the holy scriptures, and then I make them say the doctrine altogether." Barzeus also had public disputes with local Muslim sages. However, as he recognized in his 1549 report, "so far I have not been able to elucidate the Moors." According to Barzeus, the public performances he organized caused an impression and contributed to some conversions. He mentions that some Muslims imitated the neophytes and sang Christian doctrine on the streets "as if they were Christians, and one Moor converted in this way."¹⁶ Local Muslim clerics also started to emulate some elements of the Catholic rituals performed by Barzeus such as prayers for the souls in purgatory, and some Muslims even started to use holy water when entering the mosque or reading the Qur'an.¹⁷

Barzeus's initial strategy of Christianizing the Hormuzian public space paved the way for a confrontational strategy that aimed to eradicate the Islamic presence in the city. In 1550, Barzeus caused turmoil when he occupied a mosque in the outskirts of Hormuz and transformed it into a Christian chapel. The local Muslims reacted violently. According to Barzeus, "millions" of angry Muslims besieged the mosque "praising Muhammad and demanding vengeance for the injury made by the kaffirs, as they call us." Barzeus's decision to occupy the mosque sought to "encourage" those who have converted "to forget the religion of Muhammad," but it should be analyzed as an attempt to replicate in Hormuz the aggressive policies of Christianization implemented in Goa.¹⁸ Indeed, Barzeus, who arrived in Goa in 1542, was a direct witness to the destruction of temples and mosques promoted during the tenures of Martim Afonso de Sousa and João de Castro. As the Dutch Jesuit explained in a letter to

14 Doc. 87 B, "P. Gaspar Barzaeus S.I. Sociis S.I. in India et Europa degentibus, Armuzia 10 Decembris 1549," in *DI*, 1:650.

15 Doc. 87 B, *DI*, 1:650.

16 Doc. 87 B, "P. Gaspar Barzaeus S.I. Sociis S.I. in India et Europa degentibus, Armuzia 1 Decembris 1549," in *DI*, 1:630.

17 Doc. 87 B, *DI*, 1:680.

18 Doc. 26, "Gaspar Barzaeus, S.I., Sociis Conimbricensibus, Armuzia 24 Novembris 1550" in *DI*, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: Monumenta Historica Soc. Iesu, 1950), 2: 88.

Henrique de Macedo (dates unknown), the head of a Portuguese embassy sent from Goa to the Safavid court, his decision to occupy a mosque was motivated by the fact that Hormuz was a possession of the Portuguese crown and therefore a territory that needed to be fully integrated into the Portuguese political and religious apparatus.

In a letter addressed to the Coimbra college, Barzeus mentioned that, before he occupied the mosque, he wrote a letter to the king of Hormuz complaining that João III's (1502–57, r.1521–57) "holy intention to ban the muezzin's call for prayer has not been executed."¹⁹ Barzeus also informed other local Muslim luminaries that he had reported to Lisbon that Hormuz was not following the religious policy of the Portuguese crown. He also threatened that if the call to prayers was not stopped, he would seize the mosque and place a cross on the minaret. "To scare the Moors," the Dutch Jesuit organized a procession with a group of catechumens bearing crosses and singing litanies. The procession stopped in front of the king's palace to place even more pressure on the local authorities. Barzeus had an audience with the king, who granted him all honors, including the rare privilege of sitting on the throne. The king asked for Barzeus's forgiveness and promised to stop the muezzin's call. Barzeus's bold maneuver seemed to add more pressure to the attempts made by the Dutch Jesuit and Portuguese authorities to accelerate the conversion of the king of Hormuz. In a letter dated March 24, 1550, the interim governor of the Estado da Índia, Jorge Cabral (b.1500, in office 1549–50), informed Barzeus of his efforts to persuade Turan Shah II to convert but noted that "the king fears that by becoming a Christian he might lose his realm."²⁰ Cabral's involvement in the conversion of Shah Turan II indicates that Barzeus's approach to Hormuz relied on the combination of a traditional top-down approach with a confrontational strategy that, through the potential mobilization of the Portuguese administrative and military apparatus, sought to prompt the conversion of the local Muslim population.

However, the ambivalent political arrangements that characterized Portuguese sovereignty in the Kingdom of Hormuz led the crown to adopt a more careful attitude toward its Christianization. The reaction of the local Muslims to Barzeus's occupation of the mosque concerned the Portuguese royal officials in Hormuz. Antagonizing a predominantly Muslim population

19 Doc. 93, "Carta do Padre Gaspar Barzeo aos religiosos de Coimbra, Ormuz, 24 de Novembro de 1550," in *Documentação para a história das missões do padroado português do Oriente*, ed. António da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1992), 4:533.

20 Doc. 10, "Georgius Cabral, Indiae gubernator, P. Gaspari Barzaeo S.I., Armuziam, Goa 24 Martii 1550," in *DI*, 2:28.

ran the risk of inciting the local rulers to rebel and reject the political arrangements that characterized Portuguese sovereignty in the Kingdom of Hormuz. A worried Tomé Serrão (dates unknown), the city's *ouvidor* (judge), reported to João III that the Jesuit missionary had caused a "great scandal" (*grande escandlo*) among the locals. According to Serrão, as soon as Barzeus arrived he met the king of Hormuz to announce his intention "to demolish the minaret and seize the great mosque to make it a Christian church and demanded the king close the minaret and stop the prayer calls in all mosques."²¹

The incidents of 1550 and the reaction of the Portuguese crown made Hormuz a problematic mission field for the Society. Aware of the reticence of the Portuguese authorities to enforce the conversion of local Muslims, the Jesuits would gradually lose their interests in Hormuz. Barzeus would be replaced by the Jesuit Gonçalo Rodrigues (1523–64) in 1551.²² Rodrigues, however, had several health problems and would eventually be replaced by António de Herédia (b.1513) in 1553. Both Rodrigues and Herédia continued the strategy delineated by Barzeus. In a letter to Ignatius of Loyola (c.1491–1556), Herédia reports the regular performance of processions and other public acts of devotion. Despite his reports of conversions, especially of women, Herédia complained that the religious and ethnic diversity of Hormuz made his task extremely difficult. As he explained to Loyola, Hormuz was a city in which "Christians, Moors, Jews, and Gentiles live altogether, and in some houses, there is one daughter that is Christian, whereas her mother and sisters are Moors. And I try to remedy and thwart this the best I can."²³ After gaining the approval of the Portuguese captain of Hormuz, one of the solutions exploited by Herédia was the creation of an exclusive neighborhood for unmarried Christian women. The initial intention was to terminate the communication between converted women and their Muslim relatives, but gradually, as Herédia reported, "the rest of the Christian people moved to these streets," contributing to the formation a distinctive Christian quarter in Hormuz. Herédia's plan replicated the Iberian policies of communal segregation that were also being implemented in Goa.²⁴

Herédia would also continue to target the local royal family. In 1554, he caused some turmoil after converting four female members of the king's household. The Jesuits initially presented these conversions as an encouraging

21 Doc. 3150, "Carta que escreveu o ouvidor de Hormuz, Tomé Serrão, a El-Rei D. João III," in *Gavetas da Torre do Tombo* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1965), 5:39.

22 Gordon Nickel, "Gonçalo Rodrigues," in *Christian–Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, ed. David Thomas and John Chesworth (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 7:837–41.

23 Doc. 26, "P. Antonius de Heredia S.I.P. Ignatio de Loyola, Armuzia 20 Octobris 1554," in *DI*, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1954), 3:104.

24 Doc. 26, *DI*, 3:104.

sign of the imminent conversion of Shah Turan II. Herédia's health problems, however, would halt the progress made in Hormuz, and in 1556 he returned to Goa. The mission then entered a period of decline. The recurrent health problems of the missionaries and the lack of involvement of the Portuguese authorities gradually reduced the mission to the spiritual comfort and monitoring of the Portuguese soldiers and officials stationed in Hormuz, though there were occasionally some encouraging signs that suggested that the mission still had the potential to be renewed: in 1560, in the annual letter from the province of Goa, Luís Fróis (1532–97) reported that in eighteen months Aires Brandão (c.1529–63) had been able to convert fifty souls, “a number that in proportion is the same as the many conversions we make here in India, because in Hormuz there are many Moors, all very attached to their perverted sect.”²⁵ Among those converted by Brandão was a lady of the Hormuz royal household.²⁶

Three years later, however, the province of Goa reported that only meager progress had since been made in Hormuz. The city was in “a land of frontier and war, where the only fruit is to confess and preach to the soldiers stationed there, and for this task, the Dominican friars who are there are enough.”²⁷ Moreover, Ottoman ambitions in the Persian Gulf were dissuading the local Muslims from adhering to Christianity, as the possibility of an Ottoman takeover of Hormuz reduced the appeal of conversion as a means to access the social and political privileges enjoyed by Christians in the Portuguese territories.²⁸ In 1565, the recurrent health problems and deaths of the members of the Hormuz mission led the Jesuit hierarchy in Goa to openly discuss the possibility of closing the mission,²⁹ and three years later, the mission closed.

3 Diplomacy and Proselytizing in the Deccan: the Jesuit Missions to Bijapur (c.1561–1667)

While the Hormuz mission stagnated in the early 1560s, an invitation made by Sultan Ali Adil Shah of Bijapur (d.1579, r.1558–79) in 1561 paved the way for another Jesuit contact with an Islamic polity in South Asia. The sultan's invitation was part of a diplomatic policy that apparently sought to

25 Doc. 94, “Fr. L. Fróis S.I. Ex Comm. Sociis Lusitanis, Goa 1 Decembris 1560,” in DI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1956), 4:739.

26 Doc. 94, DI, 4:739.

27 Doc. 111, “P. Antonius de Quadros S.I.P. Iacobo Láinez, Praep. Gen. S.I., Cocino 18 Ianuarii 1563,” in DI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1958), 5:741.

28 Doc. 111, DI, 5:741.

29 Doc. 111, DI, 5:741; Doc. 37, “P. Francisci Borgiae, Praep. Gen. S.I., instructio prima pro visitatore Indiae, Roma 10 Ianuarii 1567,” in DI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1962), 7:191.

normalize relations between the Estado da Índia and the Sultanate of Bijapur. Albuquerque's conquest of the Bijapur-held port city of Goa in 1510 initiated a long history of clashes, diplomatic exchanges, and occasional collaboration between the two polities.

Between the late 1550s and early 1560s, the relations between the Estado da Índia and Bijapur went through a brief phase of appeasement. During this period, Ali Adil Shah I, the successor of Ibrahim Adil Shah I (d.1558, 1534–58), made a series of overtures to form a Luso-Bijapur alliance against the Ottoman Empire. One of his preferred interlocutors in the Estado da Índia was the archbishop of Goa, D. Gaspar Jorge de Leão Pereira (d.1576, in office 1560–67), with whom the new sultan established a regular correspondence while Gaspar Jorge served as interim governor. The archbishop suggested that the diplomatic correspondence between Goa and Bijapur would benefit from the establishment of a Jesuit mission at the sultan's court. Ali Adil Shah's embassy to Goa had two aims. The first was to normalize the relations with the Estado da Índia. Portuguese support to Miyan Ali (also known in the Portuguese sources as Meale [d.1567]), one of the pretenders to the Bijapuri throne, and other factions opposed to the ruling family contributed to Bijapur's political instability. At the same time, the pro-Safavid Shi'a rulers of Bijapur feared the Ottoman exploits in the Indian Ocean. Between 1556 and the early 1560s, Ottoman troops and fleets made important progress in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.³⁰ The interest of the Sublime Porte in the Indian Ocean caused some apprehension among the Shi'a rulers of Bijapur, who feared that their religious affiliation and alignment with Safavid Persia could encourage an Ottoman expedition against Bijapur.

According to Fróis's annual letter, Ali Adil Shah's embassy sought to obtain the archbishop's permission "to send two or three well-learned [*doutos*] priests because the sultan wanted to perform a debate between our fathers and his mullahs."³¹ The archbishop arranged an embassy to Bijapur headed by Francisco Lopes (dates unknown), a merchant with good connections in Bijapur, who would be accompanied, as requested by the sultan, by members of three religious orders: the Franciscan António Pegado (dates unknown), the Jesuit Gonçalo Rodrigues (1523–61), and one unnamed Dominican friar. The embassy also included a group of Portuguese who traveled from Goa to Bijapur, possibly motivated by commercial interests in the sultanate.

30 Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 107–16.

31 Doc. 43, "P.L. Fróis S.I. ex comm. ociis Lusitaniae et Europae: Goa 1 Decembris 1561," DI, 5:280.

Rodrigues's three letters from Bijapur are the first detailed European accounts of the sultanate, which was very much an unknown territory despite the contacts and clashes between the Portuguese and Bijapur instigated by the conquest of Goa in 1510. There was little information available on Bijapur's geography, natural resources, economic structures, and military capacity. Rodrigues was thus a privileged observer of Bijapur. His letters reveal a concern with providing detailed information on the military apparatus of the sultanate, with descriptions of the fortresses and garrisons encountered by the embassy, but especially with the geography and the agrarian structures of the Bijapuri hinterland. Rodrigues's letters often referred to the advantage that the Estado had of occupying territories controlled by the *Idalcão*, as the sultans of Bijapur were identified by the Portuguese sources. The soil of the provinces visited by the Jesuit missionary were not exploited to their full potential. Rodrigues suggested that if these lands were in Portuguese hands, their fertility would be maximized:

The land that we crossed along our journey has good airs, good waters with fresh streams, an infinite number of cattle, and it seems that it would provide large quantities of wheat if it was cultivated, because the soil sticks like lard, being extremely dark, and some of it is nicely muddy with no rocks and plains extending as far as the eyes can reach.³²

The first audience with the sultan was disappointing for the Catholic priests. Ali Adil Shah delayed the meeting and forced the Portuguese legation to wait for the following day. Rodrigues was only able to speak with Ali Adil Shah during the second audience, which, once again, the sultan delayed for some hours. Rodrigues and his companions offered to Ali Adil Shah a Bible "bound in golden velvet" and one edition of St. Thomas Aquinas's (1224/25–74) *Summa contra Gentiles*. Pegado made a brief commentary on the two books and "a humble and benevolent discourse" on the reasons for the presence of the Catholic priests.³³ However, the main topic of conversation between the sultan and the priests was the possibility of a Luso-Bijapur alliance against the Ottoman Empire, as Ali Adil Shah was willing to help the Estado da Índia's activities against the Great Turk in the Indian Ocean.

Besides alluding to the formation of a Luso-Bijapur entente against the Great Turk, the sultan asked three questions about Christianity, which, in Rodrigues's

32 Doc. 23, "P. Gundisalvus Rodrigues S.I. sociis goanis, Belgaum, 23 Martii 1561," DI, 5:133.

33 Doc. 24, "P.Gundisalvus Rodrigues S.I. P. Antonio Quadros S.I.Bijapur 7 Aprilis 1561", DI, 5: 142.

words, were “base” (*baixas*) and “fatuous” (*fatuas*).³⁴ Instead of an inquiry on theological issues, Ali Adil Shah wanted to know if Jesus Christ established clothing rules, forbade the consumption of wine and elephant meat, and, finally, if it was sinful for Christians to drink urine. After the priests replied to the three questions, the sultan gave them robes of honor.

After this audience, Rodrigues and the other members of the embassy left Bijapur. The hope of establishing a Jesuit mission in the sultanate was immediately abandoned. Following the 1561 embassy, Ali Adil Shah I directed his foreign policy toward the formation of an alliance with other Decanni sultanates against the Hindu empire of Vijayanagara, an ally of the Estado da Índia. The collapse of Vijayanagara encouraged Ali Adil Shah to invade the Estado da Índia in 1570, besieging Goa for almost one year.

Luso-Bijapur diplomatic exchanges would gain a new impetus in the mid-1650s. In 1654, Muhammad Adil Shah (r.1627–56) sent an embassy to Goa led by one Malik Yakut, mentioned by Governor Brás de Castro (1653–55) as a eunuch who served as governor of Ponda. The embassy had three goals. The first was to halt the frequent skirmishes between Portuguese and Bijapuri troops in the Bardez district. The second was to acquire a highly valuable jewel in Goa. The third was to invite the Society of Jesus to send a mission to Bijapur.³⁵

Yakut returned to Bijapur with one Jesuit missionary. The Jesuit chosen for the mission was António Botelho (1600–70?), who had previously worked at the Mughal court. Botelho was not only entrusted with the task of preparing a Jesuit mission at Bijapur but also to serve as an emissary of the Estado, with the Jesuit missionary receiving instructions to deliver a present and a letter from Brás de Castro to Muhammad Adil Shah.

At Bijapur, Botelho formed an interesting tandem with Yakut, whom Brás de Castro referred to as someone with personal concerns in promoting the Estado's interests. The two were able to obtain a *firman* (edict) from Muhammad Adil Shah ordering the *nayaka* of Ikkeri, Shivappa (r.1645–60), to end the siege of the Portuguese-held port of Honnavar. Instigated by Botelho and his courtier, the sultan also issued another *firman* asking the Portuguese authorities to send the Jesuit Gonçalo Martins (1599–1669) with the guarantee that the arrival of a new Jesuit missionary would prompt Bijapur to punish the ruler of Ikkeri.

34 Doc. 24, “P.Gundisalvus Rodrigues S.I. P. Antonio Quadros S.I., Bijapur 7 Aprilis 1561”, DI, 5: 142.

35 For an overview of the Jesuit dealings in Bijapur between the 1654 and 1656 see Henry Heras, “Some Unknown Dealings between Bijapur and Goa,” Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 8 (1925), 130–146.

Brás de Castro decided to send Martins to Bijapur with credentials as a special envoy and a set of instructions regarding the issues that ought to be discussed with the sultan. Martins would also contact and deliver presents from the viceroy to other relevant courtiers, including those known to be hostile to Portuguese interests. One of Brás de Castro's main concerns was to avoid a conflict in the districts of Bardez and Salsete. When Martins left Goa, Bijapuri troops entered Bardez. The invasion lasted until the arrival of the Jesuit at Bijapur, when Muhammad Adil Shah ordered the immediate retreat of all Bijapuri troops. In a letter to the Portuguese viceroy, the sultan complained that the invasion was instigated without his knowledge by the Bijapuri governors of Bardez and Salsete. The apologies given by Muhammad Adil Shah and the presence of Botelho and Martins at the Bijapuri court compelled Brás de Castro to halt a Portuguese counterattack.

The diplomatic and religious mission of Botelho and Martins in Bijapur also sought to thwart the activities of Matheus de Castro (1594–1677), the Goan Brahmin who established the first Propaganda diocese in Bijapur. Castro was *persona non-grata* in Goa. After being refused admission to the Franciscans in Goa due to his ethnic background, he traveled to Rome in 1625 where he became a protégé of Francesco Ingoli (1578–1649), the secretary of the Propaganda Fide. Some years later, in 1631, he was ordained as an Oratorian priest. Castro returned to Goa as a Propaganda missionary entrusted with the task of setting up a mission in Portuguese Asia, but the refusal of the Portuguese authorities to allow him to operate in the Estado da Índia forced him to travel again to Rome in 1636. One year later, the Propaganda Fide appointed Castro as bishop of Crisopolis and as apostolic vicar of Bijapur.³⁶

The antagonism between Castro and the Portuguese royal and ecclesiastical authorities encouraged him to lobby Bijapur and the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, or United East Indian Company) to invade Goa. Strategically located in the border town of Bicholim, Castro was able to establish contacts with sympathizers in the Portuguese territories and closely monitor the Estado's political and military movements, becoming both a disturbing presence for the Portuguese authorities and a privileged, well-informed partner for the Dutch and Bijapuri. The overtures made by Muhammad Adil Shah toward the Estado da Índia were perceived by Castro as a threat. In 1653, he published *Espelho de Bramanes* (Mirror of Brahmins), a short treatise appealing for an uprising of the Goan Brahmins in response to the discrimination

36 Ângela Barreto Xavier and Ines G. Županov, "Ser Brâmane na Goa da época moderna," *Revista de história* 172 (2015): 15–41, here 20–24.

promoted by the Portuguese authorities.³⁷ When Castro finished his treatise and circulated it in Goa, Bijapuri troops invaded the districts of Bardez and Salsete. This coincidence, as Patricia Souza de Faria has noted, suggests that Castro was probably one of the instigators of the invasion.³⁸

Muhammad Adil Shah's death in 1656 encouraged the Mughal emperor Shahjahan (1592–1666, r.1628–58) to launch a new expeditionary campaign against Bijapur in 1657. The Mughal invasions prompted a Maratha insurrection that would pave the way for the emergence of the Maratha Confederacy and accelerate the decline of the sultanate throughout the 1660s and 1670s. The crisis afflicting the Adil Shah rulers generated an internal perception that religious orthodoxy was necessary to avoid the disintegration of the Bijapuri polity.³⁹ This new political and religious scenario reduced the interest of the Adil Shahs in making new overtures vis-à-vis the Portuguese Estado da Índia and the Jesuits. Indeed, the political instability of the sultanate made Bijapur an unattractive mission field. In 1686, the sultanate was finally incorporated into the Mughal Empire.

4 Hoping for a New Constantine: the Jesuit Mission to the Mughal Court (1580–1773)

In 1578, following a similar approach to the one employed by Ali Adil Shah of Bijapur, the Mughal emperor Akbar (1542–1605, r.1556–1605) sent an embassy to Goa requesting that the viceroy and the Jesuits (“Chief Fathers of the Order of St. Paul”) send “two learned priests” to the Mughal court, as well as “the principal books of the Law and the Gospel,” to teach and discuss Christianity at the Mughal court.⁴⁰

Akbar's interest in Christianity and the Jesuits derived from a combination of different objectives. The presence of Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court could be used to establish a channel of communication with the Estado da Índia and to obtain new ideological sources for the emperor's political

37 Ângela Barreto Xavier, “O lustre do seu sangue: Bramanismo e tópicos de distinção no contexto português,” *Tempo* 16, no. 30 (2011): 71–99, here 95.

38 Patricia Souza de Faria, “Mateus de Castro: Um bispo ‘brãmame’ em busca da promoção social no Império asiático português (século XVII),” *Revista eletrônica de história do Brasil* 9, no. 2 (2007): 30–43, here 37.

39 Richard Maxwell Eaton, *The Sufis of Bijapur 1300–1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 242.

40 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Armário Jesuítico, Livro 28, “Farman to the Jesuits of Goa, December 1578,” fols. 88^v–89^r.

projects. Throughout the 1570s, Akbar implemented a series of reforms that sought to affirm the emperor's authority and centralize power by restructuring the ruling elites, harmonizing the administrative apparatus, and expanding the fiscal system.⁴¹ Akbar's efforts to affirm imperial authority also involved the development of an ideological project based on notions of universal rule and divinely sanctioned kingship.⁴² One of the first expressions of the Akbari ideological project was the *mahzar* (edict) of 1579 that recognized the emperor as the supreme authority in religious matters or, as Abu'l-Fazl (1551–1602) put it in the *Akbarnama* (Book of Akbar), "the commander-in-chief of the spiritual world."⁴³ The proximity between the dates of the *mahzar* and the embassy to Goa indicates that Akbar's requests for "two learned priests" sought to provide elements from different theological and intellectual traditions to the Akbari ideological project. There was also an intention to reinforce the cosmopolitan dimension of the Mughal court, which tended to enhance notions of Mughal universal sovereignty. The Jesuits could easily be integrated into the group of the "elite *sayyids*, great *shaikhs*, eminent scholars, ingenious doctors, and agreeable courtiers of various classes," intellectuals who came from "the various communities of Hindustan, from among the masters of excellence and perfection, and men of the sword and the pen."⁴⁴

The presence of Jesuit missionaries also offered Akbar an opportunity to maintain a fluid correspondence with the Portuguese authorities. The Estado da Índia was regarded as a potential obstacle to the consolidation of Mughal sovereignty in Gujarat and Bengal. The annexation of Gujarat allowed the Mughal Empire to access the maritime routes linking the subcontinent with the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Swahili Coast, and the Southeast Asian ports. The new Mughal maritime ambitions, however, stumbled on the *cartaz*, the naval passes imposed by the Estado da Índia. The intrusive and violent nature of the *cartaz*, as well as its association with Portuguese claims to the lordship of the "Seas of India," thus became a serious obstacle to the development of

41 M. Athar Ali, *Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society, and Culture* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62; Jos Gommans, *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2002), 85; John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 59–68.

42 See for example Ebba Koch, "How the Mughal Pādshāhs Referenced Iran in Their Visual Construction of Universal Rule," in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 194–209.

43 Abu 'l-Fazl, *The Akbarnama of Abu'l Fazl* (Kolkata: Asiatic Society, 2000), 3:394.

44 Quoted from Kinra Rajeev, "Handling Diversity with Absolute Civility: The Global Historical Legacy of Mughal Ṣulḥ-i Kull," *Medieval History Journal* 16, no. 2 (2013): 251–95.

Mughal maritime activities.⁴⁵ The Estado's interference in the local maritime trade and the naval transport of South Asian pilgrims in the *haji* was also perceived as a serious challenge to Mughal imperial sovereignty. At the same time, the Portuguese ports of Daman and Diu were regarded by many Mughals as strategic if total control of Gujarat was to be secured. Indeed, while a Mughal embassy arrived at Goa, Akbar instructed the governor of Bharuch, Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan (d.1583, in office 1573–83), to prepare “an army to capture the European ports.”⁴⁶ According to the *Akbarnama*, the emperor wanted to control the totality of Gujarat and “remove the Firangis who were a stumbling-block in the way of the pilgrims to the Hijāz.”⁴⁷

As in Gujarat, Mughal authority across Bengal was not consolidated. Although the Estado da Índia had no formal presence in the region, the network of informal Portuguese settlements in Bengal known as *andies* (a derivation of *bandar*, the Persian word for port) constituted a potential obstacle to the affirmation of Mughal sovereignty. Private Portuguese traders frequently took advantage of Bengal's instability to evade Mughal taxation. The *andies* were also the home to Portuguese and Indo-Portuguese renegades who offered their services as mercenaries or operated as pirates.⁴⁸ The control of the *andies* or their formal submission to Mughal sovereignty thus constituted an important demarche to ensure the stability of a province worryingly depicted by the *Akbarnama* as the “House of Turbulence” (*Bulgha Khana*).⁴⁹ Indeed, Akbar's interest in the Society of Jesus was instigated by the activities of António Vaz (dates unknown) and Pedro Dias (dates unknown), two Jesuit missionaries sent in 1576 by the bishop of Cochin to assist the informal Portuguese settlements in Bengal. Fearing the hostility of the Mughal authorities toward the semi-autonomous *bandéis*, the two missionaries encouraged the Portuguese communities of Bengal to accept Mughal taxation in the region by refusing to confess and absolve those who had not paid their taxes. Reports of the collaborative posture of the two missionaries reached Akbar, who praised the Jesuits for being “men of justice and

45 For a brief overview of the development of the Mughal “maritime dimension” and its impact on early Luso-Mughal relations, see Jorge Flores, *Nas margens do Hindustão: O Estado da Índia e a expansão mogol, ca. 1570–1640* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2015), 51–160; M.S. Renick, “Akbar's First Embassy to Goa: Its Diplomatic and Religious Aspects,” *Índica* 7, no. 1 (1970): 33–47.

46 Fazl, *Akbarnama of Abu'l Fazl*, 3:409.

47 Abu 'l-Fazl, *Akbarnama of Abu'l Fazl*, 410.

48 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 35; George Winius, “The ‘Shadow Empire’ of Goa in the Bay of Bengal,” *Itinerario* 7, no. 2 (1983): 83–101.

49 Fazl, *Akbarnama of Abu'l Fazl*, 3:427.

reason.”⁵⁰ During his exchanges with Pedro Tavares (dates unknown), the captain of the Portuguese *bandel* of Satgaon (Saptagram), Akbar made several inquiries about the Jesuits and the possibility of receiving a group of missionaries at his court to discuss Christianity. Tavares suggested inviting Gil Eanes Pereira (d.1614), the Jesuit priest responsible for the Satgaon parish. Pereira initially believed that his presence at the Mughal court was related to the negotiations concerning the status of the Portuguese *bandéis* in Bengal. However, after several meetings with Akbar he realized that the emperor had an interest in Christianity and noted that his relations with the Mughal clerical authorities were notoriously tense.⁵¹ Indeed, Akbar asked Pereira to teach him Portuguese and write “new books” on Christianity in Persian. As well as writing him a now lost catechism based on the Dominican Bartolomé Carranza’s (1503–76) *Comentarios sobre el catecismo Cristiano* (Commentaries on Christian catechism [1558]), Pereira also advised Akbar to write to Goa requesting “scholarly priests who would teach and show him the holy scriptures.”⁵² Pereira’s suggestion sought to exploit Akbar’s intention to establish contacts with the Estado da Índia and the Catholic Church through the launch of an official mission composed of well-trained missionaries with good connections with the Jesuit hierarchy and the Portuguese authorities.

Akbar’s request for “two learned priests” led the viceroy to consult the archbishop of Goa and the bishops of Cochin and Malacca, the main religious authorities of the Estado da Índia. On November 10, 1579, the prelates of India decided to send a mission to the Mughal court. In the proclamation that launched the mission, the archbishop of Goa, D. Fr. Henrique de Távora e Brito (d.1581), suggested that Akbar was meant to be “a new Constantine for the total ruin of the sect of Muhammad” (*outro Constantino pera total ruína da seita de Mafamede*).⁵³ Such optimism not only derived from Akbar’s request but also from a series of rumors circulating in Goa about Akbar’s imminent conversion, devotion to the Virgin Mary, and fondness of European garments.⁵⁴ The *firman* and these rumors contributed to the perception that Akbar was, to paraphrase Sanjay Subrahmanyam, a Prester John in the

50 Doc. 90, “Duarte de Sande to the Coimbra College, Goa, 7 November 1579,” DI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: IHSI, 1970), 11:677.

51 Doc. 90, DI, 11:596–97.

52 Doc. 90, DI, 11:597–98.

53 Doc. 91, “Praelatorum Orientis lusitani votum de suscipienda a Iesuitis missione ab imperatore Akbar petita, 10 November 1579,” DI, 11:681.

54 Doc. 89, “Antoni de Montserrat to Everard Mercurian, 26 October 1579,” DI, 11:650.

making, a ruler ready to embrace Christianity and join Portuguese efforts against the Islamic presence in South Asia.⁵⁵

After the approval of the mission to the Mogor, the Jesuit provincial appointed three missionaries: Rodolfo Acquaviva (1550–83), the son of the duke of Atri and nephew of the Jesuit superior general Claudio Acquaviva (1543–1615, in office 1581–1615); Antoni de Montserrat (1536–1600), a Catalan-born Jesuit who had served as a tutor at the Portuguese royal court; and Francisco Henriques (1538?–97), a Persian convert and Jesuit novice from Hormuz. The names of the three missionaries were fully approved by Viceroy Luís de Ataíde (1571–80, in office 1568–71, 1578–80). Before the missionaries' departure, the viceroy had a meeting with Rodolfo Acquaviva. The rendezvous was a public statement of the Estado's support for the "great enterprise," as well as a reminder that the mission was not just a religious project but a diplomatic venture that made the three Jesuits the eyes and ears of the Estado da Índia at the Mughal court.

As Távora e Brito mentioned in the proclamation that launched the mission, the Jesuits sent to the Mughal court had the task of making Akbar a new Constantine. The emperor and his inner circle were the main targets of the mission. Throughout their days at the Mughal court, the three Jesuits would follow a top-down strategy, a *modus operandi* adopted by other Jesuit missions at courtly milieux. This approach had been theorized by Ignatius when the Jesuits embarked on their first mission to Ethiopia. In his instructions to the missionaries destined to the lands of the Prester John, Ignatius asked them "to obtain a familiarity" with the ruler and develop a relationship of friendship "through all honest means."⁵⁶ Once the missionaries gained the emperor's trust and favor, they should explain to him that his salvation was only possible through the Catholic faith. The Jesuit should also target the grandees with the same "exercises."⁵⁷ After convincing the local elites, the Jesuits would try to persuade local scholars and theologians to "accept the Catholic truths."⁵⁸ During their contacts with the literati, missionaries should ensure that the local intellectual and religious elites were not forced "to abandon things that

55 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Mughals and Franks: Explorations in Connected History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 68.

56 "Minuta delle istruzioni che S. Ignazio diede ai suoi missionari d'Etiopia," in *Notizia e saggi di opere e documenti inediti riguardanti la storia di Etiopia durante i secoli XVI, XVII e XVIII: Rerum ethiopicarum scriptores occidentales inediti a saeculo XVI Ad XIX*, ed. Camillo Beccari (Rome: Casa Editrice, 1903), 1:240.

57 "Minuta delle istruzioni," *Rerum ethiopicarum*, 240.

58 "Minuta delle istruzioni," *Rerum ethiopicarum*, 242.

they esteem.”⁵⁹ After convincing the political, intellectual, and religious elites, the Jesuits should encourage the public to adhere to Catholicism.⁶⁰

Due to the language barrier and their limited knowledge of Mughal India's social and religious subtleties, the missionaries initially participated solely in the religious debates organized by Akbar. The discussions with Muslim, Hindu, and Jain theologians, however, gradually introduced the missionaries to the complex political and religious scenario of the Akbari reign. The letters of Montserrat and Rodolfo Acquaviva reveal the increasing antagonism between the emperor and the Sunni orthodox mullahs and the existence of an influential group of heterodox courtiers led by Abu 'l-Fazl that was close to Akbar and sympathetic to the Jesuits. Despite the language barrier, the Jesuits became part of a select group of courtiers who had the important function of reading works on religion and history to the emperor. Besides reading these works, the missionaries also had the task of drafting letters destined to Goa and translating the correspondence from the Estado da Índia. The Jesuits' proximity to Akbar's inner circle allowed them to contact relevant courtiers and officials, exploring other opportunities to use their faculties at the service of the Mughal elite.

The meetings between Akbar and the Jesuits were not exclusively dedicated to religious matters. The missionaries were asked to talk about Portuguese and European history or explain the imagery and themes in the artworks they brought from Goa. Among the books, engravings, and printings carried by the missionaries were works by Philip Galle (1537–1612), an engraving of Albrecht Dürer's (1471–1528) *Small Passion* and *Virgin and Child* (c.1510), a retable of Our Lady, a copy of *Saint Luke Madonna*, a copy of Abraham Ortelius's (1527–98) atlas *Theatrum orbis terrarum* (Theater of the orb of the world [1570]), and a first edition of the Polyglot Bible (1572) by Pieter van der Borcht (1530–1608). The images of the title pages of the latter volume—two allegorical compositions evoking Philip II (1527–98, r.1556–98) as a personification of *Pietas Regia* (royal piety) and *Pietatis Concordiae* (harmony of piety), or in other words an exaltation of the Iberian Habsburg monarch as a pious universal ruler who sought the union of different peoples⁶¹—exposed to Akbar and his successors new possibilities to enhance the iconographical and allegorical repertoire associated with Mughal imperial authority. European Christian art recurred to biblical metaphors and symbols that were easily recognizable to an educated

59 “Minuta delle istruzioni,” *Rerum ethiopicarum*, 242.

60 “Minuta delle istruzioni,” *Rerum ethiopicarum*, 242.

61 See Ebba Koch, “Being Like Jesus and Mary: The Jesuits, the Polyglot Bible, and Other Antwerp Print Works at the Mughal Court,” in *Transcultural Imaginations of the Sacred*, ed. Margit Kern and Klaus Krüger (Leiden: Wilhelm Fink, 2019), 197–230, here 199–200.

Islamicate audience, and very similar to the allegorical motifs explored in Mughal imperial art.⁶² The links between Catholic iconography and Indo-Persian Islamicate symbols of power suited the efforts made by Akbar and his successors—in particular Emperor Jahangir (1569–1627, r.1605–27) and Shah Jahan I (1592–1666, r.1628–58)—to affirm a system of imperial rule based on divinely sanctioned kingship.⁶³ As Ebba Koch notes, European Christian art also provided a neutral medium that allowed the mobilization of Hindu and Muslim artistic traditions to develop a new heterogeneous visual language that could attract different sections of the Mughal population.⁶⁴

Although the reports sent by the three missionaries suggested that Akbar could be converted, the mission's failure to make a single convert was an appalling result. In 1581, the provincial of Goa, Rui Vicente (1523–87), summoned Henriques to Goa to present a report and discuss the evolution of the mission. In 1582, while the Jesuit hierarchy assessed the continuity of the mission, Montserrat and Acquaviva reported that the Mughal emperor had revived his interest in Christianity. This “fresh zeal,” as the Jesuit missionaries term it, coincided with two relevant events. The first was Akbar's successful expedition against his half-brother, Mirza Muhammad Hakim (1553–1585, in office c.1556–85), the ruler of Kabul whose adherence to Sunni orthodoxy and strict observance of Chaghatai traditions attracted the support of discontented Mughal officials, priests, and courtiers.⁶⁵ The other event was the arrival of an Ottoman embassy to Fatehpur in the spring of 1582. Akbar perceived the Sublime Porte's diplomatic maneuver as a sign that the Ottoman Empire was ready to interfere in South Asia and hinder the expansionist and maritime Mughal project. Moreover, as the conflict with Mirza Hakim (r.1553–85) revealed, Mughal Sunni orthodox officials and courtiers were receptive to overtures from other Islamic rulers. Suspicions of an Ottoman attempt to disturb the Mughal court or incite a rebellion may thus have been another reason for Akbar's hostile treatment of the Ottoman embassy, which, according to Montserrat, “went up in smoke.”⁶⁶

The possibility of an imminent Ottoman intervention in the region encouraged Akbar to organize an embassy to King Philip I of Portugal (1527–98,

62 Gauvin Alexander Bailey, *The Jesuits and the Grand Mogul: Renaissance Art at the Imperial Court of India, 1580–1630* (Washington, DC: Freer Gallery of Art, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, 1998), 11–12.

63 Bailey, *Jesuits and the Grand Mogul*, 11–12.

64 Koch, “Being like Jesus and Mary,” 199–200.

65 Munis D. Faruqi, “The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of the Mughal Empire in India,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48, no. 4 (2005): 487–523, here 501.

66 Antoni de Montserrat, *The Commentary of Father Monserrate S.J. on His Journey to the Court of Akbar*, ed. and trans. Sardar S.N. Banerjee and John S. Hoyland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), 205.

r.1580–98). An alliance or the prospect of a partnership between Philip II and Akbar had the potential to dissuade the Sublime Porte from pursuing expansionist ambitions in South Asia. Apart from negotiating an alliance, the main goal of the embassy was to introduce Akbar to the European diplomatic theater. After meeting Philip II, the Mughal legation would travel to Rome to greet the pope and discuss the continuity of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court. The embassy would be formed by Montserrat; Saiyid Muzaffar (dates unknown), a Turani nobleman close to the Sunni orthodox factions; and ‘Abdullah (dates unknown), the courtier who had led the 1579 Mughal embassy to Goa. The composition of the embassy—a missionary sponsored by the Portuguese crown (Montserrat), an envoy familiar with the Portuguese authorities (‘Abdullah), and a courtier linked to the orthodox factions (Saiyid Muzaffar)—sought to aggregate different sensibilities and interests.

The embassy, however, turned into a fiasco. Muzaffar abandoned it during a sojourn in Surat and became a political exile in the Deccan sultanates. The remaining envoys, Montserrat and ‘Abdullah, would never embark for Lisbon. Viceroy Dom Francisco de Mascarenhas (in office 1581–84) delayed the departure of the Mughal embassy to gain enough time to define a coherent strategy with Philip II vis-à-vis the reception of the Mughal ambassadors and the matters to be negotiated. The outbreak of a rebellion in Gujarat in 1583, an event that affected much of Akbar’s military and diplomatic efforts between 1583 and 1584, made the embassy a minor concern for the Mughal emperor. As Montserrat sarcastically noted, twelve months after arriving at Goa, the Mughal embassy “was entirely abandoned and delivered over to eternal oblivion.”⁶⁷

Montserrat’s return to Goa prompted the end of the first mission. Based on the reports he received, Father Ruy Vicente believed that he had “clear evidence” that Akbar’s interest in the Jesuit was only motivated by “reasons of state, in order to be able to negotiate his businesses with the viceroy.”⁶⁸ After a long negotiation with Akbar, Vicente persuaded the emperor to allow Acquaviva to return to Goa on the condition that the Society of Jesus would send other missionaries, with the least possible delay to resume the mission.⁶⁹

On November 26, 1582, amid the disappointment of the Jesuit hierarchy and the interest of the Portuguese authorities in obtaining valuable information

67 Montserrat, *Commentary*, 191.

68 ANTT, Livro 28, Jesuitas, “Novas que vierão da Índia Oriental no anno de 1582,” fols. 167–71; doc. 86, “Novas que vierão da Índia Oriental no anno de 1582,” in *Documentação para a história das missões do padroado português do oriente*, ed. António da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996), 12:796.

69 Jorge Flores and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery: Portuguese Copies of Akbar’s Documents, 1572–1604* (New Delhi: Embassy of Portugal, 2003), 70.

on the Mughal Empire, Montserrat wrote a brief report on Akbar's policies and personalities. Entitled *Relaçam do Equebar, rey dos Mogores* (A report on Akbar, king of the Mughals), the report also included information on the organization of the Timurid court, Mughal warfare, and the geography of the territories controlled by Akbar. The contents of the *Relaçam* suggest that it was not only destined to the Jesuit hierarchy but above all to the Portuguese crown. Montserrat's report is very similar to the dispatches sent by Portuguese diplomatic agents and officials scattered across South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, it is striking that the *Relaçam* does not mention the proselytizing activities of Montserrat, Acquaviva, or Henriques, essentially focusing on the emperor and his court and armies.

Montserrat also wrote the *Commentarium mongolicae legationis* (Commentary on the embassy to the Mughal court), a more detailed and ambitious account of the Mughal Empire and the Jesuit activities there. In Montserrat's own words, the *Commentarium* would "correct, explain and reconcile [...] many passages of those Geographers and Historians who have written about India and Arabia" and help "those who are devoted to the study of learned and polite writers."⁷⁰ The *Commentarium* was therefore destined for a readership beyond the Society of Jesus and the Portuguese colonial authorities, instead being intended for a vast audience of European scholars, humanists, and armchair cosmographers interested in Asia's geography and natural history.

In 1591, after another request from Akbar, which included a substantial gift of money to the Jesuit College of Goa and the provincial,⁷¹ Fathers Duarte Leitão (d.1592), Cristobal de Vega (1561–99), and Estevão Ribeiro (d.1611) were sent to Lahore. But the mission was canceled a few months later. The missionaries' sudden return frustrated everyone in Goa and Lahore:

The three missionaries left Goa with much applause from the viceroy, the noblemen, and other laypeople, as well as the prelates and priests, who had with pleasure offered to do this mission for the viceroy. Everyone was in suspense, desiring greatly to receive the good news they expected, but then, after just a few months, against all expectations, they returned without any order or permit, against the will of the Mughal himself, who only allowed them to leave after they had sworn on a missal that they would return.⁷²

⁷⁰ Montserrat, *Commentary*, xviii.

⁷¹ Doc. 84, "Annual Letter of the Province of India, Goa 1590," D1, ed. Joseph Wicki and John Gomes (Rome: MHSI, 1981), 15:526–27.

⁷² Doc. 129, "Fr. J. Gomes S.J., to Fr. Cl. Acquaviva S.J., Goa, November 16, 1594," D1, ed. Joseph Wicki and John Gomes (Rome: MHSI, 1984), 16:825.

Jorge Gomes's (d.1596) words highlighted the fact that the mission of Mogor was not only a religious affair but also an important diplomatic enterprise. As well as converting Akbar, the missionaries were expected to ensure fluid, direct, and stable communication between the emperor and the Estado da Índia. One of the most problematic aspects of Vega's and Leitão's behavior was precisely that they neglected the mission's diplomatic dimension, putting at risk the relations between Akbar and Goa. The second mission's hasty end brought into question the Jesuits' ability to deal with complex mission fields where the geopolitical interests of the Iberian crowns were at stake. In addition, the sudden end of the Mughal mission threatened the continuity of the Estado's support for other Jesuit enterprises in relevant mission fields where Lisbon and Madrid had vested interests, such as Ethiopia, China, and Japan. Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606), who believed that the most promising mission fields of Japan and China should be the Society's main priorities, bitterly noted to Claudio Acquaviva that the failure of the second mission corroborated his negative perception of the potential of the Mughal court: "In my judgment, the mission of *Mogor* should be avoided, because we already have experience of what the Mughal [Akbar] wanted."⁷³

The frustration generated by the failure of the second mission led de la Vega to write a long letter to Claudio Acquaviva explaining the reasons behind their decision. According to de la Vega, after a long deliberation, Leitão, the mission's superior, opted to end the mission due to the many obstacles posed by Akbar's behavior and religious policies. The Mughal emperor was not on the verge of becoming a new Constantine, as many hoped, but planning to establish a new religion:

This barbarian is so proud that he acts as a prophet and a legislator, claiming that the law of Muhammad is over and that the world is now without a true law, and that it is necessary to have another prophet to institute a new one, and that he, among everyone else, is the more qualified to do this. And as such, he is publicly adored as a prophet with such insolent praises that many times I heard people calling him God in public.⁷⁴

De la Vega was not completely wrong when he wrote that Akbar acted as a "prophet and a legislator"—a clear reference to the affirmation of the emperor's temporal and spiritual authority. The second mission arrived at Lahore when the Akbari imperial ideology and its ritual apparatus had reached their

73 Doc. 50, "Alessandro Valignano to Claudio Acquaviva, Macao, 15 November 1593," DI, 16:270–71.

74 Doc. 50, DI, 16:480–81.

maturity. The 1590s were the years when the production of imperial chronicles such as the *Akbarnama* cemented the figure of the *padshah* as a universal ruler. Thus the members of the second mission were privileged—and bewildered—witnesses of the complex process of affirmation of a distinctive Mughal imperial power and political identity.

The abrupt end of the second mission was consequently a story of frustrated expectations. Whereas the Jesuit missionaries believed that their presence would incite Akbar's immediate conversion and guide the emperor in the Christianization of his empire, the Mughal emperor expected the missionaries to contribute to the development of his ideological project.

In 1594, Akbar sent another embassy to Goa. Although Portuguese and Mughal sources do not mention this embassy in detail, Pierre du Jarric (1566–1617) and Luis de Guzmán (1544–1605) state that the ambassador presented a letter from the emperor requesting a new mission to the Mughal court.⁷⁵ The fiasco of the second mission meant that the Jesuit provincial, Francisco Cabral (1528–1609), was extremely reluctant to organize another mission; however, according to a letter from Gomes Vaz (d.1610) to the Jesuit superior general, Cabral was forced to send missionaries due to the persistent pressure and blackmail of Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque (1547–1602, in office 1591–97), who threatened to send a mission from another religious order, since “there were other priests who were wishing and requesting it.”⁷⁶ Cabral ultimately dispatched Jerónimo Xavier (1549–1617), the grand-nephew of St. Francis Xavier; Manoel Pinheiro (1556–1619), an Azorean-born missionary with the reputation of being a hard worker; and Bento de Góis (1562–1607), a thirty-two-year-old Portuguese who would pioneer the Jesuit exploits in Tibet.

Akbar welcomed the members of the third Jesuit mission “with much honor and love” and recommend that they learn Persian to facilitate communication and avoid interference from interpreters.⁷⁷ The first letters sent by Xavier, Pinheiro, and Góis reported a series of encouraging signs. In Xavier's words, the emperor was “totally departed from Muhammad.” Although Akbar adopted the “gentile” practice of venerating the sun, he also revered Jesus and the Virgin Mary and even participated in Christian celebrations “on his knees, with his hands raised as if he were a Christian king.”⁷⁸

75 Pierre du Jarric, *Histoire des choses plus mémorables* (Bourdeaux, 1610), 2:463; Luis de Guzmán, *Historia de las misiones que han hecho los religiosos de la Compañía de Jesus* (Alcalá, 1601), 1:257.

76 Doc. 141, “Gomes Vaz to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 25 November 1594,” DI, 16:890.

77 Doc. 19, “Jerónimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 20 August 1595,” DI, 16:69.

78 Doc. 19, DI, 16:69.

Prince Salim, the future emperor Jahangir, also showed “much love” and helped the missionaries in their dealings with the emperor. One of the reasons for Salim’s support for the Jesuit mission was his interest in European art. The prince commissioned the painter accompanying the three missionaries to produce an image of the Virgin Mary and instructed a Mughal sculptor to make copies of artworks brought by the Jesuits.⁷⁹ Xavier saw the Mughal interest in European art as a potential avenue for the conversion of the local elites. Courtiers frequently asked the Jesuits to provide them with original artworks from Europe or Goa. The demand was such that Xavier asked Claudio Acquaviva to send to Agra high-quality artworks to satisfy the demands of members of the imperial family and other relevant courtiers.⁸⁰

Like the members of the first mission, Akbar made Xavier, Pinheiro, and Góis part of a select group of courtiers who had the important function of reading works on religion, philosophy, and history to the emperor. Besides reading these works, the missionaries were often charged by the emperors with writing letters destined for Goa, reading and translating the correspondence from the Estado da Índia, and writing religious or philosophical treatises in Persian. Although this privileged access to Akbar’s inner circle was encouraging and an indicator of prestige, which suggested the possibility of becoming a protégé of the ruler or influencing his decisions, there were some disadvantages, as the emperor’s entertainments included local artistic performances that clashed with the Jesuit moral code. Jerónimo Xavier, for example, complained that the female dancers who entertained the emperor’s inner circle often forced the three missionaries “to turn our back to them, [and] the Mughal [emperor] finds it very strange that we do not raise our eyes to a spectacle that caught the attention of the hearts and eyes of many.”⁸¹

The Jesuits’ ascension at the Mughal court seems to have coincided with the improvement of their language skills. As Jerónimo Xavier reported in 1596, the “main and only occupation” of the missionaries was the study of Persian. After a year at Lahore, their linguistic skills improved considerably, and “although we have some travails for the lack of idiom and still need someone to translate into Portuguese, with the help of God we now have less need of an interpreter.”⁸² It was also in 1596 that the Navarrese missionary presented to the emperor a selection of passages from the New Testament translated into Persian.⁸³

79 Doc. 19, DI, 16:70.

80 Doc. 19, DI, 16:71.

81 Doc. 72, “Jeronimo Xavier to Francisco Cabral Lahore, September 8, 1596,” DI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: MHSI, 1988), 17:558.

82 Doc. 72, DI, 17:542.

83 Arnulf Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History, 1956–1998* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 34.

The positive reception of these translations, considered to be the first work of Catholic literature in Persian, encouraged Xavier to develop a proselytizing strategy that sought to engage the Mughal intellectual elites through the elaboration of treatises written in Persian exploring the neo-Platonic culture shared by Islam and Christianity.⁸⁴ Jerónimo Xavier thus developed an “accommodationist” approach similar to the one implemented by Valignano in Japan and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) in China.⁸⁵ The Mughal interest in Christian theology and Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy encouraged Xavier to explore local intellectual traditions deemed as suitable to Christian doctrine and produce a series of literary works based on a selective presentation of information on Europe and Christianity. Around 1597, Xavier prepared two treatises, the *Aīnā-I haqq-numā* (The truth-revealing mirror) and the *Fuente de vida* (Fountain of life). Both works were originally written in Portuguese and then translated into Persian. The *Fuente de Vida* is a dialogue between a Jesuit, a philosopher who personifies Akbar, and a Muslim scholar representing the Mullahs on the differences between Islam and Christianity.⁸⁶ At the same time, the production of these works allowed the Navarrese missionary to model himself as a Mughal courtly scholar in the manner of Abu'l-Fazl (1551–1602) or Abdus Sattar (d.1620?), two leading Mughal intellectuals whose works and activities contributed to the centralizing and religious policies of the emperor. Xavier often collaborated with these and other Mughal intellectuals: his *Mir'at al-Quds* (Mirror of holiness) and the *Aīna-yi Haqq-numa* (Fountain of life), for example, were written in collaboration with Abdus Sattar.⁸⁷

84 Gauvin Alexander Bailey, “The Truth-Showing Mirror: Jesuit Catechism and the Arts in Mughal India,” in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*, ed. John W. O'Malley et al. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1999), 1:380–401, here 384–85; Arnulf Camps, *Jerome Xavier and the Muslims of the Mogul Empire: Controversial Works and Missionary Activity* (Schöneck: Nouvelle Revue de Science Missionnaire, 1957), 97.

85 Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Diálogo religioso, mediación cultural o cálculo maquiavélico? Una nueva mirada al método jesuita en Oriente, 1580–1640,” in *Jesuitas en imperios de ultramar: Siglos XVI–XX*, ed. Alexandre Coello, Javier Burrieza, and Doris Moreno (Madrid: Silex, 2012), 35–63, here 47.

86 Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History*, 21.

87 See *Mir'at al-quds (Mirror of Holiness): A Life of Christ for Emperor Akbar; A Commentary on Father Jerome Xavier's Text and the Miniatures of Cleveland Museum of Art, Acc. No. 2005.145*, ed. Pedro Moura Carvalho, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston (Leiden: Brill, 2012); *Fuente de vida: Tratado apologético dirigido al Rey Mogol de la India en 1600* (San Sebastián: Universidad de Deusto, 2007). On Xavier's Persian works, see Ángel Santos Hernández, “La obra literaria persa de un jesuita navarro: El P. Jerónimo Javier,” *Estudios eclesiásticos* 29, no. 113 (1955): 233–50. Also see Arnulf Camps, “Persian Works of Jerome Xavier, a Jesuit at the Mughal Court,” in *Studies in Asian Mission History, 1956–1998* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 33–45; Edward Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mughal* (London: Burns, Oates

Akbar's decision to transfer the court from Lahore to Agra in 1598 forced the Jesuits to reorganize the mission. To avoid hampering the limited but encouraging progress made in the city, Pinheiro remained in Lahore, while Xavier and Góis followed Akbar to Agra. Without the presence of the emperor and his courtly milieu, Pinheiro targeted new plebeian targets and cultivated close relations with local officials to guarantee the necessary political protection for his proselytizing activities. Pinheiro's investment in a popular mission was not merely the consequence of Akbar's decision to move the court to Agra, however. The failure of the two previous missions to produce converts was seen by the Jesuit hierarchy as an indicator that Mughal India was far from being a promising mission field. Although the Jesuits recognized that Christianity generated intellectual curiosity at the Mughal court, the reports sent by the missionaries highlighted the difficulties that many Muslims had in accepting concepts such as the Holy Trinity.⁸⁸ The problem not only seemed to be due to the complexities of Christian theology but also because of the failure to define an efficient proselytizing strategy. As a worried Xavier confessed, while reporting the first stages of the Agra mission, "the Moors certainly see us as inept instruments for such hard hearts."⁸⁹ This initial perception of failure was also the factor that encouraged Xavier to successfully develop an Indo-Persian Christian literature to present Christian doctrine in an accessible and familiar way to Mughal courtiers and literati.

Confronted with difficulties in attracting the upper echelons of the Mughal polity, Pinheiro targeted other Muslim and Hindu strata. Christian art, charity, and political networking were at the center of a strategy that sought to make Christianity more attractive to the local populations and ensure the incorporation of the Catholic Church into Lahore's civic life. Encouraged by the positive reaction of the Muslim and Hindu popular strata to the images displayed by the Jesuits and their religious ceremonies, Pinheiro invested in the organization of "sumptuous," "solemn," and "beautiful" religious ceremonies during important moments of the Catholic festive calendar such as Christmas and Easter.⁹⁰

& Washbourne, 1932), 203–21; Henry Hosten, "Fr. Jerome Xavier's Persian Lives of the Apostles," *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 10, no. 2 (1914): 65–84.

88 Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o padre provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6 de Setembro 1604)," in *Documentação ultramarina portuguesa* [henceforth DUP], ed António da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), 3:22.

89 Doc. 2, DUP, 3:22.

90 Doc. 2, DUP, 3:23–24.

Pinheiro's decision to focus on the lower strata of Mughal society seems to have been opposed by Xavier. In a letter to Claudio Acquaviva dated September 9, 1602, Pinheiro mentions that Xavier disapproved of his strategy:

The father [Jerónimo Xavier] had many concerns, but he did not say a word, because he does not like that I make Christians, especially among the Gentiles, and it will be a mistake to demean these conversions as some of ours, who judge from *interioribus*, have done, since it for this reason that this mission has been discredited in India.⁹¹

These words suggest an apparent tension between the two visions of the *modus operandi* that should guide the Mughal mission. Xavier favored the traditional Jesuit top-down approach, conceiving the emperor and the court as the only real targets of the mission. Rapid and successful Christianization of the Mughal Empire would only be possible if the Jesuits were able to convert Akbar and other relevant figures of the Mughal elite. As the head of the body politic, the emperor could establish Christianity as the official religion or encourage other relevant social or political actors to embrace Catholicism. If the emperor was reluctant to convert, the conversion of relevant courtiers and officials had the potential to create an influential Christian elite that could create the necessary political conditions for the ruler's conversion and subsequent Christianization of Mughal India. As in other mission fields such as China, Japan, and Ethiopia, the missionaries should concentrate their efforts on infiltrating non-Christian political structures and promote conversion "from within."⁹²

For Xavier, despite the encouraging numbers reported from Lahore, Pinheiro's "popular mission" threatened the success of the top-down strategy developed at the imperial court. The association of Catholicism with the lower strata of Mughal society, in particular low-caste Hindus, had the potential to reduce its appeal to the Muslim and Hindu Mughal elites. Indeed, in 1607, Xavier complained that most of the Lahore converts were "common and low people" (*gente comum e baixa*).⁹³

As his comments to Acquaviva suggest, Pinheiro aimed to establish a native Christian community in Lahore that could safeguard the mission and, simultaneously, establish the Catholic Church as an integral part of the Mughal

91 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu [henceforth ARSI], Goa 46, "Manuel Pinheiro to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 9.IX.1612," fol. 44^r.

92 Ângela Barreto and Ines G. Županov, *Catholic Orientalism: Portuguese Empire, Indian knowledge (16th–18th Centuries)* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 148.

93 Doc. 7, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o padre provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia, Laor, 25 de Setembro 1604," DUP, 3:97.

sociopolitical landscape. Indeed, the formation of native Christian communities, and the role of the Jesuits as their spiritual leaders, allowed the missionaries to pose as domestic political actors and explore different ways to engage with the Mughal polity and its elites.

Pinheiro's strategy in Lahore revolved around an implicit acknowledgment that the Jesuit missionaries were part of a subordinate minority, the Christian community, and an inferior polity, the Hispanic monarchy. Pinheiro's progressive "Mughalization" was thus part of a proselytization strategy that sought to reach all strata of Mughal society and form a solid local Christian community as well as guaranteeing political protection and some degree of influence in his host society. The Mughal authorities encouraged his "Mughalization" in an attempt to integrate the different *firangis* (Franks, Europeans) into the Mughal political order. Pinheiro's language skills and direct access to Portuguese and Mughal officials led him to be viewed as a viable mediator between the Mughal polity and a diverse Christian community formed by European Catholics, Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, Georgians, and Syriacs. Indeed, the imperial *fir-mans* and other privileges granted to Pinheiro suggest an attempt to implement something resembling the *millet* system developed by the Ottoman Empire. Shah Abbas (1571–1629, r.1588–1629) was engaging in similar experiments with the Carmelite and Augustinian friars in Safavid Persia around the same time.⁹⁴

Akbar's death in 1605 and the ascension of Salim to the imperial throne as Jahangir, the "seizer of the world," prompted profound changes in the composition of the Mughal court and nobility. The reconfiguration of the court instigated a rebellion led by the emperor's son, Khusrau (1587–1622), whom dissatisfied factions saw as a viable alternative to Jahangir. As Xavier bitterly noted, the rebellion and the need to control the Mughal governmental apparatus forced Jahangir "to give himself to government" and neglect the "things of letters and debates" in which the missionaries participated during Akbar's reign. Jahangir had also sworn that he would "obey the law of Muhammad to win and keep the support of the Moors,"⁹⁵ and the emperor's proximity to the Sunni orthodox factions thus led Xavier to fear that the missionaries would be marginalized by the new regime.⁹⁶

After suppressing Khusrau's rebellion, Jahangir made a series of friendly overtures toward the Jesuits and the Estado da Índia. The 1606 annual letter of

94 John M. Flannery, *The Missions of the Portuguese Augustinians to Persia and Beyond (1602–1747)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 248–49.

95 Doc. 6, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o padre provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Lahore, 25 de Setembro 1606)," DUP, 3:67.

96 Doc. 6, DUP, 3:67.

the Mughal mission reported that Jahangir was planning to send an embassy to Lisbon and Madrid headed by Naqib Khan (dates unknown), a courtier “who is not hostile toward the Portuguese.”⁹⁷ In 1608, Pinheiro was appointed to join a Mughal embassy to Goa led by Muqarrab Khan (d.1640), the *mutassadi* (governor) of Khambhat and one of Jahangir’s closest aides. Pinheiro and Muqarrab Khan would forge a long political partnership and personal friendship that led to one of the most curious and enigmatic episodes of Luso-Mughal relations—the secret conversion of Muqarrab Khan to Catholicism in 1611. Jahangir’s apparent plans to send an embassy to the Iberian Peninsula were part of a strategy that aimed to enhance Mughal international prestige but above all sought to ensure the Estado’s neutrality in the Deccan at the precise moment that Mughal troops sought to annex Ahmednagar.

The embassy, however, was initially canceled by the Portuguese authorities upon reports of Jahangir’s willingness to concede trade privileges to the English East India Company (EIC). Governor André Furtado de Mendonça (1558–1611) instructed Pinheiro to return immediately to Goa and ordered the suspension of all trade between Portuguese and Mughal ports. The boycott was followed by a series of skirmishes between Portuguese and Mughal troops near Daman, which led many Gujarat-based merchants to pressure both sides to restore contacts.⁹⁸ Fear of a large-scale conflict and the pressures from Gujarati and Goan businessmen persuaded Furtado de Mendonça to resume diplomatic contacts with Jahangir. The governor vested Pinheiro “with powers to discuss war and peace.”⁹⁹ During the negotiations with Muqarrab Khan, Pinheiro was able to persuade Jahangir to annul the concession of trading privileges to the EIC.

This normalization of Luso-Mughal relations would be followed by another apparent overture from Jahangir, when the emperor allowed the conversion to Catholicism of his nephews, the three sons of Prince Daniyal (1572–1605)—Thamuras (dates unknown), Baysungjar (dates unknown), and Hoshang (1604–28). The three princes were under the tutelage of Francesco Corsi (1573–1635) and Jerónimo Xavier. For the Jesuit missionaries, the conversion of three members of the Mughal royal family represented a coup that put their mission in Agra on a par with the more successful Jesuit exploits in China, Japan, and Ethiopia. Jahangir’s decision reanimated the hopes of the emperor’s conversion

97 ARSI, *Goa* 33 I–II, “Annual Letter of 1606,” fol. 188^v.

98 Fernão Guerreiro, *Relação anual das coisas que fizeram os padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas missões*, ed. Arthur Viegas (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1942), 3:23.

99 Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), Cod. 49–v–18, “Da missam do Mogor,” fol. 332^r.

and the formation of a Luso-Mughal entente. In a letter dated December 29, 1610, Viceroy Ruy Lourenço de Távora (1556–1616) reported the baptism of the three Mughal princes to King Philip III (1578–1621, r.1598–1621), mentioning that they would be christened as Carlos, Henrique, and Filipe—the names of the previous and current monarchs of Portugal and Spain. The connection with the Iberian crowns was even more explicit due to Jahangir's wish to have Philip III as the godfather of Filipe. For the Jesuits, the baptism of the Mughal princes had the potential to enhance the status of Christians in Mughal India.

A somewhat more anecdotal example of the lobbying made by the missionaries to improve the prestige of the Christian community is Jahangir's decision in 1609 to allow the Jesuits to celebrate the conversion of new Christians in public with the same honorary privileges granted to those who converted to Islam. The story behind this privilege, however, exposes the Jesuit missionaries' subaltern position at the Mughal court. In 1609, Jahangir allowed an Armenian Christian who had converted to Islam to parade the streets of Agra riding an elephant with great pomp. Aware of the implications of the symbolic dimension of the public honors granted to someone who converted from Christianity to Islam for the local Christian communities, Xavier asked the emperor for a similar privilege to those who converted to Christianity. Jahangir agreed upon the condition that the convert should ride an ass, imitating the triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem. Xavier noted that in Europe this could be considered a humiliation. Jahangir reconsidered and allowed Christian converts to be carried by elephants, but only if the Jesuits rode an ass, a condition they accepted. By forcing the Jesuits to participate in a ceremony involving elements with negative connotations in the European symbolic repertoire, the emperor exposed the fragile position of the Jesuit missionaries as figures that were utterly dependent on the benevolence of the Mughal authorities.¹⁰⁰

The conversion of Jahangir's nephews was probably one of the greatest fiascos of the Jesuit exploits at the Mughal court. After a few years, the three Mughal princes reverted to Islam. The Jesuits explained this setback as another case of Muslim untrustworthiness, but the meteoric conversion and defection of the three princes seemed to have been influenced by complex and subtle political maneuvers that Corsi and Xavier were unable to grasp. Jahangir's surprising decision to allow his nephews to convert to Christianity should be analyzed as a move designed to alienate three potential rivals to the Mughal throne by altering their religious affiliation while offering the advantage of making a friendly overture to the Portuguese Estado da Índia, the patron of

100 ARSI, Goa, 33-1, "Annual Letter 1610," fol. 307^v. See also: Camps, *Jerome Xavier and the Muslims of the Mogul Empire*, 188.

the Jesuit mission. The baptism was also conceived as a public event that exposed the subordination of the *firangi* and the Christian communities to the Mughal polity.

While revisiting the apostasy of the three Mughal princes, Xavier concluded that the baptism of the emperor's nephews was a stunt that demonstrated Jahangir's ability to manipulate the Portuguese authorities and the Jesuits.¹⁰¹ Besides revealing Jahangir's dissimulative approach, the failed conversions reinforced Xavier's doubts about the true intentions of the neophytes from Islam. Evoking the edicts that ordered the expulsion of the Moriscos, the Navarrese missionary stressed that the conversions of Muslims to Christianity were often dissimulative acts motivated by personal gain. Despite this problem and the discouragingly low number of conversions, the Jesuit mission in Mogor was necessary to support the local Armenian, Orthodox, and Catholic Christian communities. According to Xavier, the functions of spiritual supervision and political representation performed by the missionaries were a guarantee they would not convert to Islam.¹⁰²

One of the reasons for the apostasy of the three Mughal princes was the deterioration of Luso-Mughal relations between 1613 and 1615. In 1613, a Portuguese fleet seized the *Rahīmī*, a ship owned by Maryam-uz-Zamani (d.1623), Jahangir's mother.¹⁰³ This incident triggered a violent Mughal response. In retaliation, Jahangir ordered the arrest of all Portuguese residing in Mughal territories and the confiscation of their property, a measure that sought to disrupt the commercial networks linking Goa to other South Asian hubs. The Jesuit missionaries were another target. On July 8, 1614, the churches of Agra and Lahore were closed, and the financial support granted by the Mughal treasury was canceled.¹⁰⁴ To make matters worse, the missionaries were ordered to leave Agra within eight days. Cast out from the court, without their residence and funds, the Jesuit missionaries were in a dire situation. The lack of regular funding from the Mughal treasury reduced the Jesuits to poverty and prevented them from maintaining their charitable works, a key instrument of Jesuit proselytizing in Lahore and Agra. Besides impeding the activities of the missionaries, Jahangir's retaliation weakened a heterogeneous Christian community, which suddenly lost the agents who represented its interests at the Mughal court.

101 ARSI, *Goa* 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to Francisco Vieira, 25.XII.1613," fol. 81^v.

102 ARSI, *Goa* 46-I, fol. 81^v.

103 Ellison B. Findly, "The Capture of Maryam-uz-Zamānī's Ship: Mughal Women and European Traders," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 108, no. 2 (1988): 227–38.

104 Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren, Chaul, 4 December 1615," in Henry Hosten, "Eulogy of Father Jerome Xavier, s.j., a Missionary in Mogor (1549–1617)," *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 23 (1927): 123.

As the Florentine Jesuit Corsi noted, the emperor's measures generated many fears among the local Christians, who "day and night shed tears [...] at being departed from their shepherds."¹⁰⁵ Many feared a wave of repression against the Christian community. Corsi, for example, mentions that "some merchants from Venice, Poland, and Armenia discreetly closed their houses."¹⁰⁶

The marginalization of the Jesuit missionaries, who to all intents and purposes were the representatives of the Estado da Índia at the Mughal court, pointed toward a diplomatic breakdown with the Portuguese authorities. To confirm this rupture, Jahangir also ended the symbolic affiliation between the Portuguese monarchy and the Mughal imperial family, forcing the three baptized Mughal princes to apostatize.¹⁰⁷ The return of Jahangir's nephews and Philip III's godsons to Islam was thus a symbolic gesture that not only terminated the links between the Mughal polity and the Catholic Church but above all materialized the collapse of Luso-Mughal relations by ending the spiritual kinship between the Mughal princes and the Iberian monarch.

The events of 1612–15 marked a change in Luso-Mughal relations as well as in the status of the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court. The clashes between Jahangir and the Estado da Índia, together with the inability of the Portuguese authorities to thwart Dutch and English activities in South Asia, hampered the Jesuit mission. Due to their status as informal representatives of the Portuguese crown, the fortunes of the Jesuit missionaries became increasingly dependent on the ups and downs of Luso-Mughal exchanges. The ascension of Shahjahan (1592–1666, r.1628–58) in 1628 would further aggravate the fragility of the Jesuit position.

According to José de Castro (1577–1646), Jahangir's successor had no interest in Christianity but allowed the presence of the Jesuit missionaries as long as they did not convert Muslims.¹⁰⁸ A report from a Portuguese informer in Surat corroborates Castro's statement, mentioning "that the Mughal king summoned the Jesuits, the Dutch, and the English and told the fathers that they could not make more Christians in his lands and that those who have already converted could remain Christians."¹⁰⁹ Besides being uninterested in Christianity, Shahjahan's reign was marked by several clashes with the Estado da Índia. In March 1630, the capture of two Mughal ships, including one belonging to

105 British Library (BL), Cotton MS, Titus B VII, "Letter from Francesco Corsi," fol. 111^r.

106 BL, Cotton MS, Titus B VII, fol. 111^r.

107 Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren," *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 23 (1927): 123.

108 ARSI, Goa 46–I, "José de Castro to Claudio Francesco Septalio, 20.XI.1630," fols. 119^r–120^v.

109 Doc. 100, "Das cousas q soube del Rey Mogor, Surrate, 27.X.1629," in *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, ed. Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar (Bastora: Tipografia Rangel, 1953), 1:284n3.

Shahjahan, prompted another conflict between the Estado da Índia and the Mughal Empire. When news of the ships' capture reached Agra, the emperor ordered the arrest of all Portuguese living in Surat, including the Jesuit missionaries residing in the city. The Estado replied by arresting all Gujarati merchants based in Goa and seizing their assets. The conflict would be solved after the two sides signed two treaties in September and November 1630 establishing the condition for the circulation of ships between Mughal and Portuguese-controlled ports.¹¹⁰

Besides the tensions with the Estado da Índia regarding the maritime interests of the Mughal Empire in Gujarat, the informal Portuguese settlements in Bengal, the so-called *bandéis*, were also a source of friction. The interests of these Luso-Asian communities often collided with the Mughal imperial apparatus in the region. The support given by some *bandéis* to several local uprisings, and especially the rebellion of Shahjahan against Jahangir between 1624 and 1625, generated the perception at the Mughal court that these semi-autonomous Portuguese settlements had to be fully incorporated into the Mughal Empire.

During the first years of his reign, Shahjahan imposed a series of restrictions on the residents of the *bandéis*, including the prohibition to carry guns.¹¹¹ In 1632, Mughal troops sieged and occupied Hughli, the main informal Portuguese settlement in Bengal. Most of the population was captured and paraded in a triumphal entry in Agra. Initially a trading post that supported the dealings of Portuguese and Luso-Asian merchants in the Ganges Delta, Hughli rapidly evolved to become an important port in the Bay of Bengal. Shahjahan's decision to capture Hughli should thus be seen as part of a strategy to enhance Mughal sovereignty in the region, as well as an attempt to subdue European trading and maritime activities across the empire. Indeed, the capture of Hughli was exploited by Mughal propaganda well into the eighteenth century as an event that affirmed imperial authority over a foreign—and rebellious—threat.¹¹²

The events of 1630 and 1632 had immediate consequences for the Jesuits. According to the correspondence of the Jesuit mission, the priests suffered several abuses from the Mughal authorities. On January 6, 1633, Mughal guards raided the Jesuit church at Agra. On February 23, the church was closed, and the missionaries were placed under arrest for four days. On March 6, the church was raided once again, and the Jesuits were placed under arrest for a

110 Jorge Flores, *Unwanted Neighbours: The Mughals, the Portuguese, and Their Frontier Zones* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), 140–43.

111 Doc. 100, "Das cousas q soube del Rey Mogor," in *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, 1:284.

112 Flores, *Unwanted Neighbours*, 225.

period of one week. During his arrest, Castro was beaten by Mughal guards. Shahjahan's actions against the Jesuit mission should be analyzed as part of a retaliatory maneuver against the Estado da Índia that sought to pressure the Portuguese authorities to accept Mughal terms regarding freedom of navigation in the Seas of Hindustan, as well as to encourage the incorporation of the *bandéis* into the Mughal Empire.

In 1636, Shahjahan issued a *firman* ordering the closure and dismantlement of the Jesuit church at Agra. The stones of the demolished church could be used by the Jesuits to "build a dwelling house for themselves." Despite the operational and logistical problems caused by the emperor's decision, the *firman* did not affect the Jesuits' other properties, establishing that the "buildings, houses, and cemetery belonging to the European fathers [...] and whatever more they have constructed themselves after the legal purchase by virtue of different documents, in accordance with the past custom, should be left to them." Shahjahan also allowed the local Christian community to use the other Jesuit buildings without interference "in times of birth, marriages and sickness, and for prayer." The *firman* sought to close a period of marginalization and repression against the Jesuit missionaries, coinciding also with the improvement of Luso-Mughal relations. Indeed, notwithstanding the incidents in Gujarat and Bengal, Viceroy Count of Linhares (1585–1647, in office 1629–35) reported in 1635 to Philip IV (1605–65, r.1621–65) that he had a "good correspondence" with the Mughal emperor.¹¹³

However, as António Botelho (1600–70?) noted in his account of the Jesuit mission during the final years of Shahjahan's reign, the emperor's decision to dismantle the church was largely motivated by the unruly behavior of the captives from Hughli. Based on the testimony of his confrères who served in the mission during the 1630s, Botelho mentioned that the religious services performed at the Jesuit church at Agra attracted large crowds from "the people from Bengal" who were often involved in "many disturbances and brawls."¹¹⁴ These frequent disturbances of the public order led the Muslim clerical authorities of Agra to petition Shahjahan to act against the "Franks who lived with such liberty as if they were in their own lands, behaving against the religion

113 Doc. 152, "Conselho sobre a destroição do porto de Ogolim em Bengala e ida de Gaspar Pacheco da Mesquita aquellas partes e sobre Luis de Mello de São Payo ser escusado da Armada do Norte, e sobe se seria conuenient dar licença a quatro armadores de Cochim para hir as prezas, e sobre as pazes del Rey de Candea, 11 de Março de 1633," in *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, 1:462n1.

114 BL, Add. MS 9855, "Relação das Cousas mais notáveis que observei no Reino do Gram Mogor," fol. 43^r.

of Muhammad.”¹¹⁵ Although Botelho’s account relates the dismantlement of the Jesuit church as an ultimate consequence of orthodox Muslim pressures, he offers a nuanced narrative of Shahjahan’s attitudes toward the Jesuits, highlighting the influence of the problematic behavior of the local Christian community in the emperor’s decision.

The legal problems in converting Muslims and the hostile behavior of the Mughal authorities forced the Jesuit mission to limit its activities to the pastoral care of the small Christian community and invest in the conversion of Hindus. This strategy is well patent in the activities of Heinrich Roth (1620–68), the Swabian missionary who joined the Mughal mission in 1653 and invested in the production of texts in Sanskrit. Roth’s works, which included the composition of a grammar and the translation of Sanskrit texts that reached a European audience thanks to its inclusion in Athanasius Kircher’s (1602–80) *China monumentis, or China illustrata* (Amsterdam, 1667), were thus part of the development of a new proselytizing strategy. Unable to convert Muslims, the Jesuit missionaries reinvested in targeting not only the lower-caste gentiles, following the example of Pinheiro’s popular mission in Lahore, but also the Brahmins and other upper castes by engaging with gentile high culture.

Shahjahan’s orders against the conversion of Muslims were confirmed by his successor, Aurangzeb (c.1618–1707, r.1658–1707), who issued an edict preventing the conversion of non-Muslims to other non-Muslim religions. Aurangzeb’s decision in 1679 to reintroduce the *jizya*, the tax targeting non-Muslims, was another setback for a mission that suffered from several financial problems. After persistent lobbying from the Jesuits and several diplomatic approaches made by the Estado da Índia, Aurangzeb exempted the Jesuits and the Christian community of Agra from paying the *jizya*.¹¹⁶ Despite these obstacles, the Jesuit missionaries were able to make some conversions. The annual letter of 1671 reported that the Christian community counted six hundred members and mentioned 250 baptisms, including forty adults, “mostly from the gentile castes, but there were also some from a Muslim background [*raça de mouros*], the majority were slaves belonging to Christians, and the other [baptisms] were the offspring of Christians.”¹¹⁷

An annual letter from 1686 written by one of the members of the Mughal mission, Inácio Gomes (d.1696), describes a bleak scenario. Aurangzeb was the

115 BL, Add. MS 9855, fol. 43^r.

116 Maclagan, *Jesuits and the Great Mughal*, 123–24.

117 Doc. 19, “Relação da missão do Mogor do 1666 até 1671 inclusive,” DUP, 3:225.

“finest henchman of Muhammad” (*o mais fino sequaz de Mafoma*).¹¹⁸ The emperor’s religious policy posed a risk to the meager progress made by the mission since the reign of Akbar. Alluding to the efforts made by Rodolfo Acquaviva, Jerónimo Xavier, and “other past Padres,” Gomes commented that despite the

many works in Arabic, Persian, and Hindustani to end the blindness of the Muslims, as well as the works written in Sanskrit, the political language of the Gentiles, to enlighten them, the results of these works never reached one-third of the travails, because the conversion of Muslims, besides taking a lifetime, was hindered by the mullahs who are the *mes-ters*, *cacizes*, and *saderes*, like bishops and inquisitors of the things of the Muhammadan sect, and they are so absolute that there is no royal edict or provision against their interests.¹¹⁹

Despite the problems faced by the mission, Gomes mentioned some secret conversions among Hindus and even Muslims, reporting the celebration of ninety baptisms in 1686.¹²⁰ The Christian community of Agra registered three hundred individuals, and Gomes estimated that in Delhi there was a similar number of Christians. These communities were small but heterogeneous, formed by “different castes of people, because some are foreigners [*adventicios*], partly European, partly Indians from different nations, or their descendants, being almost naturalized in these lands; while others are natives whom God brought to the community of his church through many means.”¹²¹

Gomes’s report reveals the stagnation of the mission and the abandonment of any engagement with Islamic or Hindustani literary and intellectual traditions. The hostility toward or lack of interest in Christianity revealed by the rulers who succeeded Jahangir, together with the waning influence of the Estado da Índia in South Asia, made the Jesuits’ position at the Mughal court increasingly precarious. At the same time, the Jesuit hierarchy’s perception that the mission at Mogor was an unsuccessful venture also contributed to a lack of investment in the human resources allocated to the mission. Indeed, since the reign of Shahjahan, the mission lacked high-profile members with a standing comparable to Jerónimo Xavier or Rodolfo Acquaviva.

118 Doc. 20, “Carta do Padre Inácio Gomes para o Padre Gaspar Afonso provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia, Agra, 7 de Setembro 1686,” DUP, 3:241.

119 Doc. 20, DUP, 3:232.

120 Doc. 20, DUP, 3:232.

121 Doc. 20, DUP, 3:233.

The Society of Jesus maintained the mission due to its utility as a diplomatic instrument of the Portuguese crown. Despite the challenges during the reigns of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb, both Mughals and Portuguese used the mission as a channel of communication. Aurangzeb and Shah Allam (1643–1712, r.1707–12), for example, appreciated the intermediary role of missionaries such as António Magalhães (d.1702), José da Costa (d.1685), and João de Abreu (1669–1721?). In fact, the diplomatic dimension of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court would be determinant for its survival during the turbulent years of the gradual collapse of the Mughal Empire after Shah Allam's death in 1712. During the late 1720s and early 1730s, Manuel Figueiredo (d.1753), the superior of the Jesuit mission at Agra, was involved in several diplomatic exchanges, including a joint Jaipur–Mughal embassy sent to Lisbon in 1729.¹²²

As the Mughal Empire deteriorated, especially after the invasion of Nadir Shah (1688–1747, r.1736–47) in 1739, and the Estado da Índia faced a process of reconfiguration after the loss of the Província do Norte to the Marathas in the same year, the Jesuit mission became almost irrelevant for the foreign policy of the two declining powers. Without solid political and financial support, the Jesuit missionaries explored other potential mission fields in regions such as East Bengal, Jaipur, and Narwar, albeit with little success.

5 Jesuit–Islam Interaction in the Southern Philippines and the Moluccas (Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries)

Conquered by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511, the Portuguese port of Malacca (Melaka) provided the Jesuits with an important base for proselytization in Southeast Asia in the Maluku Islands. The so-called Spice Islands were regarded by the Portuguese authorities as a key region to ensure a monopoly on the spice trade. Francis Xavier visited Maluku in 1546 and reported optimistically that the Moluccas could be an important mission field if the Society of Jesus established a residence in the archipelago.¹²³ Xavier's initial optimism, however, would rapidly turn into frustration. Portuguese expansionist projects in the region prompted the hostility of local Muslim rulers, especially those of Tidore, Ternate (or Terrenate), and Moro. The association between the Jesuits and the Estado da Índia inevitably dragged the missionaries into the clashes

122 *Gazeta de Lisboa Occidental*, no. 10, March 10, 1729, 80; Amandio Gracias, "Uma embaixada científica portuguesa à corte dum rei indiano no século XVIII," *Oriente português* 19–21 (1938): 187–202, here 191.

123 For an overview of the *Padroado* Jesuit missions in Moro, see John Villiers, "Las Yslas de Esperar en Dios: The Jesuit Mission in Moro 1546–1571," *Modern Asian Studies* 22, no. 3 (1988): 593–606.

opposing the local rulers and the Portuguese, and Maluku would become one of the main sites of Jesuit martyrdom in Asia. One of the most celebrated martyrs was Afonso de Castro, who, after being captured by the Muslim ruler of Ternate in 1557, was crucified, eviscerated, and decapitated in 1558. In the annual letter of 1559, Fróis presented Castro's martyrdom as a "glorious triumph" and celebrated it as an example of Jesuit sacrifice for the defense and expansion of Christianity against "tyrant Muslims" (*mouros tiranos*).¹²⁴

The conflicts between the Portuguese Estado da Índia and Ternate were a serious obstacle to the Maluku mission. The reports sent by the missionaries throughout the 1560s and 1570s presented a dire scenario in which many members of the local Christian community apostatized or perished in the wars against Ternate. In 1575, the expulsion of the Portuguese from their fortress in Ternate put an end to the Jesuit activities in the region. In Malacca, the union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580 generated the expectation of a relaunch of the mission with the prospect of support from the newly founded Manila and even from Mexico. However, the failure of the previous Jesuit enterprises in the Moluccas and the inability of the Portuguese authorities to restore a solid territorial presence in the archipelago terminated any hopes of a Jesuit mission backed by the Portuguese *Padroado*, especially after the Spanish conquest of Ternate in 1606.

The Philippine Islands, or the *Islas del Poniente* (Islands of the West), were incorporated into the "Spanish empire"¹²⁵ later than the greater part of the territories in the Americas, and they remained a frontier space characterized by conflict until their separation from Spain in the late nineteenth century.¹²⁶ Superior General Acquaviva firmly advocated advancing missionary work in frontier spaces and imposed the learning of indigenous/local languages among all the Jesuits in overseas provinces, the Philippines being no exception.¹²⁷

The Society arrived in the Philippines in 1581—the first Augustinians had arrived in 1565—attracted by the alluring image of those "frontier spaces." As

124 Doc. 80, "Scholastic Luís Fróis s.j., by Order of Fr. Provincial, to the Jesuits in Europe, Goa, November 1559," in *Documenta Malucensia*, ed. Hubert Jacobs (Rome: MHSI, 1974), 1:287.

125 Although the notion of "empire" constituted a powerful idea that led to overseas expansion, we are fully aware that neither Spain nor Portugal ever officially spoke of their possessions as such (Anthony Pagden, "Afterword: From Empire to Federation," in *Imperialisms Historical and Literary Investigations*, ed. Rajan Balachandra and Elizabeth Sauer [New York: Palgrave, 2004], 255–71, here 259).

126 Eberhard Crailsheim, "Las Filipinas, zona fronteriza: Algunas repercusiones de su función conectiva y separativa (1600–1762)," in *Intercambios, actores, enfoques: Pasajes de la historia latinoamericana en una perspectiva global*, ed. Aarón Grageda Bustamante (Hermosillo: Universidad de Sonora, 2013), 136–52.

127 Paolo Broggio, *Evangelizzare il mondo: Le missioni della Compagnia di Gesù tra Europa e America (secoli XVI–XVII)* (Rome: Carocci, 2004), 79–145.

agents of a project of universal evangelization, the Jesuits integrated themselves into a Christian community—*corpus mysticum*—constituted by different corporations or “bodies” whose interests did not always coincide. Moreover, the Spanish crown prioritized the commercial dimension of the conquest, while the Jesuits aspired to expand the Catholic faith among the Muslim and gentile peoples.¹²⁸ The campaigns led by Miguel López de Legazpi (c.1503–72) and Martín de Goiti (1534–75) had arrested the thalassocratic expansion of the Borneo sultanate toward more southern zones, launching a process of Christianization in the southern region in which the Jesuits took an active part.¹²⁹

During their first few years in the Philippines, Jesuit missionary work was focused on concentrating the disperse and independent barangays (the basic Tagalog political unit) in the Manila area into nucleated settlements that would facilitate their evangelization as well as increase the production and collection of tribute.¹³⁰ The process, known as *reducción*—for it “reduced” natives from a state of freedom from morals and Christian knowledge, as well as demographic dispersion, to the state of civilization represented by nucleated settlements—created *doctrinas de indios*, ecclesiastical districts akin to parishes in which a priest indoctrinated or taught the indigenous congregation. The Jesuits eventually renewed their ideal of apostolic nomadism,¹³¹ organizing “flying missions” to the interior and, after 1595, sending “long missions” to connect the Manila “center” with the “peripheries” located in the then-called Pintados (the Visayas Islands, in the central Philippines, currently the provinces of Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Negros, Panay, Masbate, and Mindoro).¹³²

128 Manel Ollé, “El Mediterráneo del mar de la China: Las dinámicas históricas de Asia oriental y la formación del modelo colonial filipino,” in *Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso, Josep Maria Fradera, and Luis Alonso Álvarez (Madrid: CSIC, 2001), 1:59–72.

129 Isaac Donoso, “Manila y la empresa imperial del sultanato de Brúnei en el siglo XVI,” *Revista Filipina* 2, no. 1 (2014): 14–24.

130 Horacio V. de la Costa, S.J., *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 154–55.

131 John O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 32–34.

132 According to the royal decree of June 17, 1595, Philip II asked Pope Clement VIII (1536–1605, r.1592–1605) to erect Manila into an archbishopric in which four mission areas were to be ministered by the religious orders then present. The Augustinians would administer Pampanga and Ilocos; Camarines and Tayabas were to be incorporated into the Franciscan province of San Gregorio Magno; both Augustinians and Jesuits would evangelize the Visayas; and the provinces of Pangasinan and Cagayan, as well as the Chinese residents of the Manila *parian* and *alcaiceria* would be integrated into the Dominican province of Santísimo Rosario de las Filipinas (John L. O'Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565–1700* [Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 1967 (1959)], 49–50).

The Convent of the Order of Christ was the venue for the Cortes de Tomar, which in 1581 formalized the Iberian Union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns, a dynastic union that became effective in these kingdoms' Asian domains in 1582. This revived the "question of the Moluccas," a debate over the legitimate possession of the legendary Spice Islands in virtue of the Treaty of Tordesillas signed by the two countries in 1494. In 1575, Babullah, the sultan of Ternate, expelled the Portuguese from the island after a four-year war with troops commanded by Don Diogo de Azambuja (1432–1518), bringing half a century of Portuguese presence to an end. Although the Portuguese resettled in the neighboring islands of Tidore and Ambon, their positions there were quite vulnerable, and in 1582, Don Manuel Pereira de Villas-Boas (dates unknown) went to Manila to ask Governor-General Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa (d.1583, in office 1580–83) for assistance.¹³³ That same year, Captain Juan Ronquillo del Castillo (1558–1617) led the first of several unsuccessful campaigns to reconquer the Moluccas. The appointment of Governor-General Gómez Pérez das Mariñas (1539–93, in office 1590–93) was expected to alter these results, and it might have done so if he had not died suddenly in 1593 in the midst of a campaign to conquer Ternate. His demise effectively ended the Spanish hopes of monopolizing trade in the so-called Spice Islands, with their clove and nutmeg production. Instead, Spanish expansion was redirected down south, and the period between 1595 and 1599 saw a slow process of penetration and colonization of the Islamic domains in Mindanao and Sulu (Jolo, in the Spanish sources).¹³⁴ The government in the Philippines believed that to check the *razzias* or raids of Malay Muslims (referred to by the Spanish as *moros* [Moors])¹³⁵ that threatened the security and prosperity of the island of Luzon, it was vital to settle the great island of the south, Mindanao.¹³⁶

133 José Luis Porras Camúñez, ed., *Sínodo de Manila de 1582/Domingo de Salazar* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 95–96.

134 Oscar L. Evangelista, "Some Aspects of the History of Islam in Southeast Asia," in *Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines*, ed. Peter Gowing (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 16–25, here 22.

135 The first to refer to the Malay peoples of the Philippine lowlands or coasts as *moros* was López de Legazpi (1502–72), who used this term to differentiate them from those of the interior, most of whom were regarded as pagan or gentiles (Wenceslao E. Retana, "Notas," in Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, ed. Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera [Madrid: Polifemo, 1997], 40). For a critique of the use of the concept *moro*, see Isaac Donoso, "Concepto asiático de Moro," *Revista del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos* 44 (2016): 39–60.

136 Luis A. Álvarez, "La política de Legazpi y su proyección: La formación del proyecto español en las islas Filipinas, 1565–1593," in *España y el Pacífico: Legazpi*, ed. Leoncio Cabrero (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2004), 1:437–64, here 439.



FIGURE 2 Mapa de la isla de Mindanao, donde se fundó el presidio de Zamboanga (Archivo General de Indias MP-Filipinas, 11)
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, PUBLIC DOMAIN

The sultanate of Maguindanao, founded by Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan (r.1520–43) (who came north from Malaysia) in the mid-sixteenth century in the southeastern coast of Mindanao, was one of the main allies of the dynasty that ruled Ternate and that had turned the Portuguese out. The island of Mindanao was so central for the Moluccans that they used to refer to it as Maluku Besar, that is, Big Maluku.¹³⁷ There is also evidence that Quranic instructors from Malacca and Ternate participated in the Islamization of “Big Maluku.”¹³⁸ They also sent forces to aid the sultanate in the wars that would soon pit the sultanate against the Spanish.

The conversion of the natives of Maguindanao, Slangan, Matampay, Lusud, Katittwān, and Simway to Islam had followed Kabungsuwan’s conquest and settlement of the coastal areas of modern-day Maguindanao province and Davao City, from the peninsula of Zamboanga to the bay of Sarangani.¹³⁹ And despite the missionaries’ forays in southern Mindanao, Islam had continued to spread across the population that lived near the Pulangi River and its tributaries.¹⁴⁰

The natives of the southern Philippines became the mimetic desire of both the Islamic Sultanate of Brunei and the Catholic Spanish in Manila. This mimetic operation, well defined by René Girard (1923–2015), was oriented toward producing new followers in the global age. Spanish and Moros were rivals because they converged on an object of desire, the natives, unwilling to be shared.¹⁴¹ Religious unity configured a unitary community with a shared identity, the “Christian people,” or *gens totius orbis*, in Tertullian’s (c.155–c.220 CE) words, which turned Islam into the Iberians’ primary alter. In his famous *De Indis* (On the Indies [1532]) and *Relectiones theologicae* (Theological readings, dictated in 1539 but first published in 1557), the Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1483/86–1546) argued that people had an inalienable right to move about freely outside their country of origin if they conducted

137 Jean-Noël Sánchez-Pons, “Misión y dimisión: Las Molucas en el siglo XVII entre jesuitas portuguesas y españoles,” in *Jesuitas e imperios de ultramar (siglos XVI–XX)*, ed. Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, Javier Burrieza Sánchez, and Doris Moreno (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 81–102, here 88. Our translation.

138 Najeeb M. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion* (Beirut: United Publishers, 1973), 37.

139 The area known as Maguindanao, along the margins of the Pulangi River, had the strongest presence of Islam in Mindanao Island (Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History*, 13).

140 The Spanish referred to the Pulangi River as the Great River of Mindanao.

141 For an interpretation of the “mimetic desire,” see René Girard, *To Double Business Bound: Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

themselves peacefully (*ius communicationis et societatis humanae*).¹⁴² Moreover, any attempt to harass recent converts to the Christian faith was an attack against the Catholic Church, and the Christian prince or governor from the missionaries' country of origin had the right to declare a defensive or offensive war to punish the abuse against his subjects. The Jesuits of Manila used this argument to encourage and support the Spanish project to conquer the Spice Islands, which were in the heretic hands of Muslims, arguing that the Christian natives who lived there were defenseless. But they also wanted to check the growth of "the Muhammadan sect" through the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. To them, this was indeed a just war (*ius belli*).¹⁴³

It was in this expansionist context that *Adelantado* Don Esteban Rodríguez de Figueroa (1529/40–97) obtained a royal license in 1595 to conquer the Pulangi River Delta, the center of political power in Mindanao, having committed himself to procure the establishment of Spanish towns in the island by the end of three years.¹⁴⁴ Accompanied by Captain Juan de la Jara (dates unknown) and the Jesuit Juan del Campo (1563–97) and Brother Gaspar Gómez (1552–1622), the *adelantado* left Iloilo in February of 1596 with fifty vessels, 214 Spanish soldiers, and fifteen hundred native allies.¹⁴⁵

However, it was not so much ideological antagonism as commercial rivalry that ultimately led to a military confrontation in the southern Philippines.¹⁴⁶ Upon his arrival in Mindanao, Rodríguez de Figueroa and his men subjugated the region of the Butuan (Agusan) River in the northeast, where they expected to find cinnamon, as well as the island of Sulu, whose inhabitants, administered by *encomendero* captain Don Pedro Briceño de Oseguera (d.1585), had

142 Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio de Indis* (Madrid: CSIC, 1989).

143 Alonso de la Peña Montenegro, *Itinerario para párrocos de indios* (Madrid: CSIC, 1995), 1575.

144 According to the *Relación* of Father Diego de Bobadilla, Philip IV promised Rodríguez de Figueroa ten thousand vassals as payment for his services (Diego de Bobadilla, *Relación de las gloriosas victorias que en mar, y tierra an tenido las armas de nuestro invictíssimo Rey, y Monarca Felipe IV, el Grande, en las islas Filipinas, contra los Moros de la gran Isla de Mindanao, y su rey Cachil Corralat, debajo de la conducta de don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, caballero de la orden de Alcántara, y del Consejo de Guerra de su majestad, gobernador y capitán general de aquellas islas* [Mexico City: Imp. de Pedro de Quiñones, 1638], fol. 10^r).

145 Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, ed. Francisca Perujo (Mexico City: FCE, 2007), 52. Other sources indicate that the expedition had four hundred Spaniards and more than four thousand natives (Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 10^r).

146 Francisco Franco Sánchez and Isaac Donoso, "Moriscos peninsulares, moros filipinos y el Islam en el extremo oriental del imperio español: Estudio y edición de la *Primera* [y *Segunda*] *Carta para la s.c.m.r acerca de los mahometanos de las Philipinas* de Melchor de Ávalos (1585)," *Sharq Al-Andalus* 20 (2011–13): 553–83, here 565.

rebelled. As a reward for their services, the *adelantado* asked for *merced* or a grace consisting of a two-life term *encomienda* (a territorial grant with a number of unfree laborers attached, which would further legitimize his prerogative to exploit all the lands that he managed to conquer), as well as the title of governor of Mindanao, and the right to found the corresponding doctrines. However, he died without enjoying these privileges and fell in the battle to conquer the so-called Buhayanes.¹⁴⁷ Before his death, he had built a presidio—a defensive military establishment—in the port of La Caldera (1596), which was abandoned in mid-1598,¹⁴⁸ prompting attacks from a confederation of Muslim leaders headed by the Maguindanao *datu* (chieftain) Salikula (r.1585–97) and Bwayan Sirungan (or Silongan [r.1597–1634]), first rajah of Buayan (or Buhayen), on Spanish positions in the Visayas as early as 1599.¹⁴⁹

In the midst of the processes of globalization in the Asia-Pacific—or mundialization, as Serge Gruzinski calls it¹⁵⁰—the United East Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie [VOC]) burst aggressively into East Asia, establishing links with the Muslim kingdoms and sultanates of Mindanao, Johor, and Aceh in the western part of the island of Sumatra.¹⁵¹ Hoping to counter the Spanish expansion, Ternate's rulers offered their lands to the emergent empires of northern Europe as places from which to attack the Spanish positions in the Philippines. This would allow the Dutch and later the English to wrest the monopoly of clove and other Moluccan spices from the Iberian empires.¹⁵²

Conflicts between Spaniards and Dutch extended to the South China Sea, becoming a destabilizing factor that injured the well-established trade between the province of Fujian and the island of Luzon and encouraging contraband and illicit trade between other ports and the Asian continent.¹⁵³ In

147 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 56; Bobadilla, *Relación*, fols. 10^r–10^v. The Spanish referred to the native Muslims under the rajah of Buayan as Buhayanes.

148 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 121–23, 152.

149 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 58–59, 122–23.

150 Serge Gruzinski, *Las cuatro partes del mundo: Historia de una mundialización* (Mexico City: FCE, 2010 [2004]). See also Geoffrey C. Gunn, *First Globalization: The Eurasian Exchange, 1500–1800* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

151 Founded in 1602, the VOC monopolized Dutch trade in Asia and functioned as a company-state (Charles R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800* [London: Hutchinson, 1965]).

152 Antonio Espino, “Ingleses y neerlandeses en la lucha por el dominio del Océano (siglos XVI y XVII),” in *España y el Pacífico: Legazpi*, ed. Leoncio Cabrero (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2004), 2539–66, here 560.

153 Manel Ollé, “Manila in the Zheng Clan Maritime Networks,” *Revista de cultura = Review of Culture* 29 (2009): 91–104.

October 1600, the ships *Mauritius* and *Eendracht*, which had come through the Strait of Magellan in 1597 under the command of Olivier van Noort (1558–1627), attacked bay of Manila.¹⁵⁴ Their object was to take the cargo of the Chinese junks that were engaging in trade with the Philippines, as well as of the galleon *Santo Tomás* that had left the port of Acapulco en route to Cavite. However, the galleon sank near the Philippines before reaching its destination. Soon afterward, in 1601, Jacob van Neck (1564–1638) entered the Asian seas with a fleet that devastated Manila and proceeded to block the port of Macao on the coast of Guangdong,¹⁵⁵ making it as far as the Japanese coast.¹⁵⁶

The Jesuits were involved in the project of conquering the Moluccas (Ternate, Tidore, Ambon) militarily and spiritually. According to Jean-Noël Sánchez-Pons, the Jesuits were particularly committed to this project because those islands “remitted directly to the mythical missionary heritage of Saint Francis Xavier” that took him to Ceylon, Malacca, the Moluccas, Japan, and China, where he died on the island of Shanghuan (1552).¹⁵⁷ But the vice royal government of Goa had been incapable of upholding the Portuguese interests in the sultanate of Ternate, and this led Father Giacomo Antonio Marta (1559–1629), *visitador* (visitor) of the Moluccas mission, to give his blessing to an intervention by the governor-general of the Philippines in the Spice Islands.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, not all Muslim sovereigns or *reyezuelos* (little kings) were in league with one another, and they often allied with foreign powers to protect themselves from stronger or more ambitious sultans. In 1601, both Sultan Mole (r.1599–1627) from the island of Tidore and the Portuguese captain Rui Gonçalves de Sequeira (dates unknown) asked the governor-general of the Philippines, Don Francisco Tello de Guzmán II (1532–1603, in office 1596–1602), for assistance in defending the Iberian settlements in the Moluccas from the Dutch threat.

The expedition was undertaken by the new governor-general (in office 1602–6), Don Pedro Bravo de Acuña (d.1606), who benefited from Brother Gaspar Gómez’s (1552–1622) information about the military strength of the sultanates of

154 Pedro Ortiz Armengol, “La incursión naval holandesa en aguas de Filipinas,” in *España y el Pacífico*, ed. Antonio García Abasolo (Córdoba: AEEP, 1997), 73–84.

155 José L. Betrán and Eduardo Descalzo, “Allende los mares: La *Historia de la Provincia de Filipinas* del padre Pedro Chirino, 1581–1606,” in *Les jésuites et la monarchie catholique (1565–1615)*, ed. Pauline Renoux-Caron et al. (Paris: Éditions Le Manuscrit, 2012), 315–65, here 323.

156 Charles R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals from Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), 62–63.

157 Sánchez-Pons, “Misión y dimisión,” 90.

158 Miguel Rodrigues, “¿Gestión de la distancia o reajuste de jurisdicciones?: La propuesta de fundación de un tribunal del Santo Oficio en las Filipinas por el jesuita Francisco Velho (1658),” *Histórica* 43, no. 2 (2019): 17–58, here 22–23.

Ternate and Tidore.¹⁵⁹ Bravo de Acuña organized an armada of 150 well-armed men with one carrack and three large frigates under the command of Spaniard Juan Suárez Gallinato (d.1615), a captain who had recently returned from harassing the rebels of Butuan in northern Mindanao, where the Jesuits had had a residence since 1600.¹⁶⁰ The armada was supposed to reinforce the fleet of Captain Furtado de Mendonça, which had left Goa with fifteen hundred men of war and was headed toward the Moluccas. But, after unsuccessfully attempting to conquer the Javanese port of Banten, Furtado de Mendonça's fleet stopped at the island of Ambon, which was under Portuguese control. Expecting reinforcements from Malacca, they asked the Manila authorities for their help as well, hoping to deal a final defeat to the sultan of Tidore and renew the Portuguese presence on Tidore island. The delegation sent to the Philippines was headed by the Jesuit André Pereira (dates unknown) and Captain Antonio Fogaça (dates unknown),¹⁶¹ confirming the Society's interest in the evangelization of the Moluccas and its role as a spearhead in the expansion south of the Philippines. Charged with the evangelization of the Visayas, the Jesuits feared the advance of Islam throughout that region. For this reason, they procured the involvement of the Philippine government in the defense of the Moluccas as a frontier space.

As stated earlier, Governor-General Acuña responded vigorously, sending a combined Spanish–Portuguese fleet on January 20, 1603. On March 3, the Spanish–Portuguese forces (420 soldiers distributed in four companies) disembarked in Talangame, but after being attacked and subjected to a siege, a junta was convened on March 21 to decide whether to retreat.¹⁶² According to Antonio de Morga (1559–1636), their failure to conquer Ternate, which they besieged for many months, was caused by a lack of supplies. In any case, the Portuguese went back to the islands of Ambon and Banda, while the Spanish returned to Manila, arriving in early July 1603.¹⁶³ Two years later, in 1605, a twelve-galleon Dutch armada under the command of Captain Esteban Drage (dates unknown) arrived in India, expelled the Portuguese, took over the

159 As Crailsheim pointed out, Brother Gaspar Gómez “acted as spy for the Manila government in preparation of a later attack on Ternate” (Eberhard Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith: Jesuit Mediators in the Inter-polity Relations between Christians and Muslims in the 17th-Century Philippines,” *Philippiniana sacra* 56, no. 168 [2021]: 375–408, here 380).

160 Biblioteca del INAH, Fondo Jesuitas, Rollo 1, Carpeta III, Exp. 1, fols. 8^r; 12^v–13^v.

161 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 171–74.

162 Antonio C. Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas: Estudio del asentamiento español en las islas Molucas y su influencia en los territorios circunvecinos” (PhD diss., UNED, 2021), 97.

163 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 182.

islands of Ambon, Ternate, and Tidore, and entered into an alliance with the sultan of Tidore.¹⁶⁴ Upon receiving the news, Philip III wrote to the viceroy of New Spain ordering Governor-General Acuña to do all that was necessary to expel the Batavians from the clove paradise.

This expedition was, finally, a success. In February 1606, the governor organized a second Spanish–Portuguese campaign with “five naves, four galleys, three galliots, four sampans, three *funearas*, two English barges, two brigs, a flat-boat for the artillery, and thirteen tall frigates, with thirteen hundred Spanish professional soldiers and captains and officers, adventurers and swashbucklers.” One of the largest expeditions organized in the Philippines,¹⁶⁵ it left Iloilo toward Mindanao, where Father Melchor Hurtado (1571–1607) was trying to broker a peace treaty with Rajah Silongan from Buayan and Sultan Laut Buisan (r.1597–1619) from Maguindanao,¹⁶⁶ and Governor-General Acuña’s forces continued on their way to Ternate. On April 10, 1606, the sultan of Ternate capitulated, the Dutch were expelled, and the fortress built and abandoned by the Portuguese was taken by the Spanish. To defend the island, Acuña left a garrison of six hundred soldiers and officers with two galliots and two sampans under the command of *Maestre de Campo* Don Juan de Esquivel (dates unknown). He then returned victorious to Manila, where he died before the year was out, probably assassinated by poison.¹⁶⁷

The Jesuits Lorenzo Massonio (1556–1631) and Pereira, exiled in the college of Cebu, were afraid that the governor-general of the Philippines would extend his authority over the Moluccas.¹⁶⁸ They hoped to revitalize the project of establishing a vice-province that would gather the Jesuits under the Portuguese orbit to which they belonged (Malacca, Ambon, and the Moluccas).¹⁶⁹ But this was not to be. Acuña’s victory over the sultan of Ternate, along with Spanish sovereignty over the Sultanate of Tidore, granted the Spanish the *de facto*—if not *de jure*—government of the coveted clove islands.¹⁷⁰ On October 29, 1607, Philip III issued a royal decree placing the Moluccas under the military government of Manila while leaving the trade in Portuguese hands.¹⁷¹ Since then,

164 Fernando Díaz Esteban, “Trabas holandesas al comercio español con Oriente,” *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 205, no. 2 (2008): 181–208, here 194.

165 Morga, *Sucesos de las islas Filipinas*, 202.

166 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 384.

167 Espino, “Ingleses y neerlandeses,” 555.

168 Eduardo Descalzo Yuste, “La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas (1581–1768): Realidad y representación” (PhD diss., UAB, 2015), 170.

169 Rodrigues Lourenço, “¿Gestión de la distancia,” 22–23.

170 Rodrigues Lourenço, “¿Gestión de la distancia,” 21–22.

171 Manel Ollé, “Entre China y la Especiería. Castellanos y portugueses en Asia oriental,” in *España y Portugal en el mundo (1581–1668)*, ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw and José Antonio Martínez Torres (Madrid: Polifemo, 2014), 369–90, here 381.

the expeditions with the annual subsidy sent periodically to the Moluccas—the succor or *situado*—left from Manila in *pataches*, galleys, or frigates.¹⁷² The Dutch tried to assist the defeated sultan of Ternate and get their hands on this *situado*, but they did not succeed.¹⁷³ They were apprehensive about the Castilian expansion in the Orient, which they viewed as an intervention into their areas of influence.¹⁷⁴

In 1605, the Society of Jesus's vice-province in the Philippines had been granted independence from that of New Spain. Its first provincial, Father Gregorio López (1561–1614, in office 1605–14), wrote a letter to Superior General Acquaviva on June 14, 1612 expressing his discomfort with the great expenses that the conservation of the Moluccas entailed.¹⁷⁵ Despite the leading role that the Jesuit order played in the negotiations between the Maluku rulers and Governor-General Acuña, the provincial was not sure whether the spice archipelago would be part of the Spanish Acapulco–Manila axis or that centered on Portuguese Goa. These commercial axes connected the metropolitan centers of Madrid and Lisbon with the Asian markets through the viceroalties of New Spain and the Estado da Índia. However, “the tyranny of distance,” using Jorge Flores's words, conditioned all policies.¹⁷⁶ In any case, given the small amount of fruit obtained from the Moluccas, López believed that the province's priority should be the defense of the Visayas and the pacification of Mindanao, especially since Hurtado, who had been sent by Governor Acuña in 1605 to parley with the sultans of Mindanao, had returned to Manila in September 1606 with a peace treaty.¹⁷⁷ The provincial thus declared that the Moluccas diverted attention from the island of Mindanao, which had not “yet been pacified.”

This was a similar conclusion to that reached by Philip III regarding the Asian territories as a whole after having signed the Treaty of London (1604) that ended the Anglo-Spanish war and the Twelve Year' Truce in Antwerp (1609–21)

172 Frigates and *pataches* were medium-sized sailing vessels. See Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 128–97.

173 Pedro Murillo Velarde, S.J., *Historia de la provincia de Filipinas de la Compañía de Jesús: Segunda parte que comprehende los progresos de esta provincia desde el año de 1616 hasta el 1716* (Manila: Nicolás de la Cruz Bagay, 1749), fol. 149^v.

174 Andreu Martínez d'Alós-Moner, “La Compañía de Jesús en Oriente (1580–1640),” in Shaw and Martínez Torres, *España y Portugal en el mundo*, 391–417, here 397.

175 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 342.

176 Jorge Flores, “The Iberian Empires, 1400 to 1800,” in *The Cambridge World History: The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE: Part I; Foundations*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, and Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 6:271–96, here 286. More recently, see Guillaume Gaudin and Roberta Stumpf, *Las distancias en el gobierno de los imperios ibéricos: Concepciones, experiencias y vínculos* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2022).

177 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 388.

that was supposed to cease the hostilities between the United Provinces and the Spanish. That is, that the Asian empire was an onerous weight that diverted the crown's attention from its interests in Europe and the Americas. Thus, the Spanish monarchy progressively reduced its military support of the Moluccas even as the attacks of the Dutch continued (despite the formal truce).¹⁷⁸ In 1607, the Dutch settled in Fort Malay (Malayu), renamed Fort Oranje, a few kilometers from the Spanish city of Nuestra Señora del Rosario on the island of Ternate. Between 1607 and 1610, the Dutch extended their control over the Moluccas, conquering up to eight bastions, including the island of Tidore.¹⁷⁹ In 1613, the Spanish lost the fort of Marieko and the region of Moro in Tidore, but they still maintained some forts on the island of Ternate, which were entirely dependent on the rice and other supplies imported from the Philippines. The governor of Iberian Tidore (in office 1612–17), Don Jerónimo de Silva (d.1617), uncle of the contemporary governor-general of the Philippines, explicitly acknowledged the VOC's superiority in the region.¹⁸⁰

Starting in 1614, the VOC's military campaign focused on capturing Spanish vessels on their way from Acapulco as well as the dozens of Chinese junks that regularly went from the southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian to Manila between March and June to trade a substantial quantity of exotic goods, such as silk, porcelain, and other commodities.¹⁸¹ To counter these attacks, Don Juan de Silva (d.1616), governor-general of the Philippines (in office 1609–16), a renowned soldier who had been an officer of the Spanish army in Flanders, organized an expedition that was to rout the Dutch from the Moluccas once and for all. Composed of ten galleons and four galleys with about two thousand Spaniards, five thousand native soldiers, and six Jesuits,¹⁸² Silva's plan was to join a Portuguese expedition sent from the viceroy of Goa and attack the Dutch stronghold of Java before going on to the Moluccas. When he arrived on Portuguese territory on February 25, 1616, he discovered that the Portuguese forces had been lost to attacks by the Dutch. The governor, who had been ill even before receiving this severe blow, died two months later in the city of Malacca. The military expedition was thus frustrated, and it returned to Manila, its troops decimated by illness. The VOC, reinforced by the arrival of ten vessels under the command of Joris van Speilbergen (1568–1620),

178 Martínez d'Alós-Moner, "La Compañía de Jesús en Oriente," 396–97.

179 Espino, "Ingleses y neerlandeses," 555.

180 Sánchez-Pons, "Misión y dimisión," 93.

181 Manel Ollé, *La empresa de China: De la armada invencible al galeón de Manila* (Barcelona: Acantilado, 2002), 24–28.

182 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fols. 1^v–3^v.

attacked Manila Bay in April of 1617, but the forces of Ronquillo del Castillo defeated them at the Battle of Playa Honda.¹⁸³

In 1620, Don Alonso Fajardo de Tenza (d.1624), governor-general of the Philippines (in office 1618–24), knight of Alcantara and member of the Flanders War Council, wrote to Philip III lamenting that the authorities in New Spain did not meet the military needs of the Philippines. With only two hundred soldiers, divided into three companies, “most of them *mestizo* and *mulatto* lads, all part Indian,” without combat experience, the archipelago was in dire need of new, trained soldiers from Portobello and Nombre de Dios.¹⁸⁴

In 1621, when the Twelve Year Truce was officially over, the VOC renewed its attacks on Spain’s Caribbean and East Asian territories with the direct support of the House of Orange.¹⁸⁵ After establishing an operations headquarters in Batavia (1619), in present-day Jakarta, the governor general of the Dutch East Indies Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629) conquered the coveted Banda Islands, the exclusive producers of nutmeg and mace in the region.¹⁸⁶ The Dutch commercial strategy again focused on trying to capture the galleons that arrived regularly at the port of Cavite, from the Embocadero or San Bernardino Strait and Cape Espiritu Santo, blockading Manila Bay between January 1621 and May 1622 but with no success.¹⁸⁷ In 1622, the English occupied the strategic island of Hormuz, so-called Portuguese Gibraltar. The loss of the last of Afonso de Albuquerque’s great conquests, located at the south of the Persian Gulf, posed a new threat that made it even more necessary for the Spanish and the Portuguese to defend their Asian possessions by working together.¹⁸⁸

183 According to Diego de Bobadilla’s *Relación*, in 1616 “the [Mindanaos] left with a powerful armada, having become allied with the Dutch, who came with ten galleons and entered the Manila Bay on All Saints Day, but by the next April 17, 1617, they were then defeated and destroyed by our armada, whose general was Don Juan Ronquillo” (Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 11^r).

184 Archivo General de Indias [henceforth AGI], Filipinas 7, R. 5, N. 61. See also Oswalt Sales Colín, “La escasez de soldados en las Filipinas de la primera mitad del siglo XVIII,” in *Estudios sobre América: Siglos XVI–XX*, ed. Antonio Gutiérrez Escudero and María Luisa Laviana Cuetos (Seville: AEA, 2005), 775–95, here 787.

185 “Carta de Alonso Fajardo de Tenza sobre asuntos de gobierno,” Manila, August 15, 1620 (AGI, *Filipinas* 7, R. 5, N. 61).

186 Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 626–27. See also Dauril Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond 1540–1750* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 166.

187 Espino, “Ingleses y neerlandeses,” 556–57; Alden, *Making of an Enterprise*, 166.

188 Rafael Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia (1580–1680): Declive imperial y adaptación* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 37, 53.

In this political context, the cosmographer and church procurator of the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1559–1621?), wrote a *Memorial* (Madrid, 1621) in which he defended the conservation of the Philippines before those who advocated abandoning them due to their remoteness and the expenses their maintenance entailed.¹⁸⁹ The religious orders appealed to the king's commitment to not abandon his subjects, for natives who had converted to Catholicism should be under the protection of the Catholic monarch.¹⁹⁰ And although Superior General Muzio Vitelleschi (1563–1645, in office 1615–45) showed less missionary zeal than his predecessor, Acquaviva,¹⁹¹ he was aware that abandoning the Philippines would make all Spanish and Portuguese territories in Asia and the Americas vulnerable to increased Dutch attacks—and the possibility of Catholicism's loss of Asia.¹⁹² The world was characterized by a global military competition in which the Iberian positions in Asia and the Americas were a prized target for rising imperial powers such as the Dutch and the English, and in which each power sought to control a greater part of the trade of spices, sugar, and slaves. The solution, according to the well-informed procurator, lay in a “better management of that trade—whose tax revenues were not negligible—and [a] war against the Dutch until he was made to finally retreat.”¹⁹³

From the end of the sixteenth century, the island of Mindanao had been known for its natural resources, including wax, *algalia* (civet musk, an oily fluid of pungent odor), and, especially, cinnamon.¹⁹⁴ By that time, Islam had entered the southern Philippines, not by force of arms but through the presence of cross-cultural Muslim traders who arrived from Borneo following established commercial routes.¹⁹⁵ Manila's diocesan power sought to counteract this Islamization process by sending religious orders with a marked

189 John N. Crossley, *Hernando de los Ríos Coronel and the Spanish Philippines in the Golden Age* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011).

190 Of the 2,400 Spaniards in the 1620 census, 816 were soldiers and 584 were women (Nicholas P. Cushner, *Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines* [New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1976], 35; Luis Suárez, *Historia general de España y América* [Madrid: Rialp, 1990], 9/2: 131–32).

191 Paolo Broggio, “La questione dell'identità missionaria nei gesuiti spagnoli del XVII secolo,” *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 115 (2003): 227–61.

192 Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia*, 9.

193 Cited in Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia*, 9.

194 Pedro Chirino, *Relación de las islas Filipinas y de lo que en ellas han trabajado los padres de la Compañía de Jesús* (Rome: Esteban Paulino, 1604), fol. 81^r.

195 John Villiers, “Manila and Maluku: Trade and Warfare in the Eastern Archipelago 1580–1640,” *Philippine Studies* 34, no. 2 (1986): 146–61, here 149; Eberhard Crailsheim, “Trading

missionary profile. On June 22, 1622, Pope Gregory XV (1554–1623, r.1621–23) founded the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda Fide), but as Ernest J. Burrus (1907–91) rightly points out, “this pontifical organization did not succeed in breaking the regal Spanish and Portuguese monopolies.”¹⁹⁶ That same year, the bishop of Cebu, Don Pedro de Arce (1560–1645), charged the Jesuits with the evangelization of the island of Marinduque,¹⁹⁷ and they eventually participated as military chaplains attached to the armies that were organized to suppress the rebellious natives or defend the fort from the maritime attacks of the Dutch and the Malay Muslims. On February 6, Governor-General Fajardo divided the island of Mindanao into two areas of influence: the part on the northeast and east of the imaginary line between the Cape of Sulawan to that of San Agustin was assigned to the Recollects, even though he personally held very little sympathy for that order, with the other part being left in Jesuit hands. Following the governor’s division, between 1623 and 1625, the bishop of Cebu assigned four Augustinian Recollects to the islands of Cuyo and Palawan, which the southern Malay Muslims periodically harassed.¹⁹⁸

Adopting Vitoria’s principles on internationalism, the Augustinian friar Miguel García Serrano (1569–1629), archbishop of Manila (in office 1618–29), who was “singularly sympathetic toward the Society of Jesus,”¹⁹⁹ agreed with the Jesuits that the coastal populations of Luzon and the Visayas needed protection from the raids and pillages of Malay Muslim “pirates” who took money, goods, and captives to sell as slaves.²⁰⁰ A vast number of highly committed missionaries was necessary if Mindanao and Sulu were to be evangelized. For

with the Enemy: Commerce between Spaniards and ‘Moros’ in the Early Modern Philippines,” *Vegueta* 20 (2020): 81–111, here 84–88.

196 Ernest J. Burrus, s.J., “Pius V and Francis Borgia: Their Efforts on Behalf of the American Indians,” *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 41 (1972): 207–26, here 225.

197 Archdiocesan Archives of Manila [henceforth AAM], 1.C.7 Libro de Gobierno Eclesiástico (LGE) (1620–1729), Folder 3 (1620–27), N. 30. fol. 18^r.

198 On July 12, 1628, Governor Don Juan Niño de Távora confirmed this division. However, as Ángel Martínez Cuesta points out, this agreement did not resolve the tensions between these two orders (Ángel Martínez Cuesta, O.A.R., *Historia de los agustinos recoletos* [Madrid: Institutum Historicum Augustinianorum Recollectorum, 1995], 1:378–80).

199 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 55^r; 233^r.

200 As Manel Ollé points out, “the use of the label of pirate in the historical sources is charged with conceptual confusion, patriotic subjectivity, and the strategic aim of delegitimizing competitors and enemies” (Manel Ollé, “El factor europeo en la dialéctica entre comercio, contrabando y piratería en las costas de China de los siglos XVI y XVII,” in *Tribute, Trade, and Smuggling: Commercial, Scientific, and Human Interaction in the Middle Period and Early Modern World*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014], 55–74, here 55).

this reason, the archbishop wrote to Philip IV on July 23, 1623 praising the work that the Jesuit missionaries were conducting in those islands and asking him to send “a good boatload of these servants of God, who with their good example and learning are quite edifying.”²⁰¹

The archbishop himself suffered an attack on November 9, 1625 when he was visiting the Christianized towns of the Visayas. According to the *Relación de las gloriosas victorias* (Report of the glorious victories) by the Jesuit Diego de Bobadilla (1590–1648):

The year 1625, while Archbishop Don Miguel García Serrano was visiting the Partido of Bondoc, Camucones [also known as Tirones, the inhabitants of a number of islands under the king of Burney] came one morning to the town [Cabotagan], and the archbishop did much to escape through those forests, although they robbed him of all that he had, and the silver and the episcopal insignias [*pontificales*].²⁰²

The Camucones were joined in this attack by the Joloans of the Sulu archipelago then under the rule of Borneo, who were allied with Muhammad Dipatwān Qudrāt (or Kudarat, better known in Spanish sources as Cachil Corralat [1581–1671]), son of Sultan Buisan and seventh sultan of Maguindanao (r.1619–71).

In 1624, the Dutch had opened a factory in in southwestern Hermosa (Formosa in present-day Taiwan).²⁰³ Two years later, the Spanish from Manila occupied the north of the island. But resources and men for the defense of several enclaves, such as Macao, from which Manila could easily be accessed, were already stretched thin.²⁰⁴ In August of the same year, seven Dutch ships ravaged the coasts of Mariveles, forcing the audiencia of Manila, which between 1624 and 1625 held the reins of the government, and the magistrate Don Andrés de Alcaraz (1560–1622), who was in charge of the archipelago's

201 AGI, *Filipinas* 74, cited in Isacio Rodríguez, O.S.A., *Historia de la provincia agustiniana del Smo. Nombre de Jesús de Filipinas* (Valladolid: Ediciones Estudio Agustiniano, 1986), 18:61–64.

202 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fols. 13^r–13^v.

203 José Eugenio Borao, *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavor* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009).

204 In a letter sent to Philip III on December 10, 1621, Fajardo had already expressed concern over the declining population of Macao and a possible Anglo-Dutch invasion (Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898* [henceforth BR] [Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903–9], 20:131).

military command, to organize a fleet of five galleons and two galleys to expel them from the region.²⁰⁵

Although there were no attacks in 1626, the war against the Mindanao Muslims was a constant, as was their refusal to accept Christianity.²⁰⁶ On June 29, 1626, the new governor and captain-general of the Philippines Don Juan Niño de Távora (d.1632, in office 1626–32), *comendador* of Puerto Llano of the Order of Calatrava and member of the Council of War,²⁰⁷ arrived in Manila accompanied by six hundred Spanish infantry and some captains who were veterans of the Flanders campaigns, greatly increasing the Spanish military capacity.²⁰⁸ A few months later, he organized a junta in the Jesuit Colegio Máximo de Manila to which leaders of all the religious orders were invited along with several civil and military authorities, with the aim of coming up with solutions to check the attacks perpetrated by Sulu's Datu Atchen (also known as Ache or Achen) and his Joloans against the islands of Camarines.²⁰⁹ That same year, Pope Urban VIII (1568–1644, r.1623–44) granted special indulgences to the Jesuits who were working in the missions²¹⁰ in recognition of the great difficulties they faced given the periodical attacks from the Camucones and Joloans, who caused great harm to the Christian population.

After listening to the declaration of the Neapolitan Jesuit Fabrizio Sarsali (1568–1645), Governor-General Niño asked Cebu's *alcalde mayor*, Don Cristobal de Lugo y Montalvo (dates unknown), to direct an expedition against the Joloans who were harassing the Visayas, "destroying their temples and profaning the holy images."²¹¹ A pious Christian who had the sympathy of the Society of Jesus, Lugo was appointed lieutenant captain-general of all the provinces

205 Diego de Oña, s.j., *Labor evangélica: Ministerios apostólicos de los obreros de la Compañía de Jesús; Segunda parte*, ed. Alexandre Coello de la Rosa and Verónica Peña Filiu (Madrid: Sílex, 2021), fols. 240–241^r.

206 "Relation of 1626," cited in BR, 22:134.

207 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 31^v.

208 Antonio Espino, "Una frontera de ultramar: El estado defensivo de las Filipinas en tiempos de Carlos II, 1665–1700," *Magallánica: Revista de historia moderna* 4, no. 8 (2018): 131–56, here 133.

209 Father Diego de Oña described Datu Ache as "a very valiant and intrepid young man, who sometimes with a single *joanga* [a type of watercraft] dared to go alone to the Pintados Islands, where he caused great harm, robbing haciendas, burning churches, and taking Indian captives" (Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 459^r).

210 "Jubileo mediante el cual se conceden indulgencias especiales por el papa Urbano VIII a los jesuitas que se encuentran en misión." These indulgences could be earned once a year for seven consecutive years. Rome, June 8, 1626 (Biblioteca del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, INAH, Fondo Jesuitas, Rollo 1, Carpeta 4, Exp. 2, 1 fol.).

211 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 312^r.

of the Visayas.²¹² He left with a force of two hundred Spaniards and seventeen hundred natives and arrived at the port of Sulu on April 22, 1628.²¹³ He and his men proceeded to destroy entire villages, burning their mosques, sepulchers, and *joangas*, and, according to a *relación* that he wrote himself, they continued on to the island of Taguima, and from there to the main town on the island of Basilan, where they also defeated the Samales (also known as Lutaos, from *lutang*, meaning to float, in Tagalog). From there, they reached Zamboanga (Sambuwangan), the frontier area in the western border of Mindanao. In the words of the Jesuit chronicler and historian Diego de Oña (1655–1721), “the destruction was such, that they could not get back on their feet in many years.”²¹⁴

The Islamic authorities thus blocked the project of spreading the universal principles of Western (Catholic) civilization in the southern Philippines. The missionary experience among Muslim communities was anything but pacific, placing Islam “outside” the boundaries of the Spanish empire. However, it was not so much ideological antagonism as commercial rivalry that ultimately led to armed aggression between Islamic sultanates and Spanish forces in the southern Philippines. As we shall see in the next Part, diplomacy and war were not polar opposites but two faces of Spanish statecraft in the Asia-Pacific.

6 Mindanao, Sulu, and the Spanish–Moro Wars (Seventeenth Century)

As shown in the previous Part, the Jesuits were tireless in their desire to control what Angela Schottenhammer and François Gipouloux call the “[East] Asian Mediterranean.”²¹⁵ During the first three decades of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit provincials organized “long missions” to connect the “center”—Manila—with the geopolitical and cultural “peripheries” constituted by the Visayas—the provinces of Samar, Leyte and Bohol, Negros, Panay, Masbate, and Mindoro—and later, Mindanao and Sulu. In 1629, Archbishop García Serrano tasked the Jesuits with the administration of the presidio of Oton (or Iloilo) on the island of Panay, from which the Spaniards fought the Muslim maritime

212 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 33^r.

213 De la Costa gave another date: April 27, 1628 (de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 323).

214 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 313^r.

215 Angela Schottenhammer, ed., *The East Asian “Mediterranean”: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce, and Human Migration* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008); François Gipouloux, *La Méditerranée asiatique: Villes portuaires et réseaux marchands en Chine, au Japon et en Asie du Sud-Est XVI^e–XXI^e siècle* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2009).

attacks.²¹⁶ The Spanish authorities were unable to check the rapaciousness of the Muslim *razzias* upon the “Christianized” population of the Visayas, but they were also worried about the possible relations that those Malay Muslims could establish with the Dutch administrators of Batavia, whose fleet threatened and harassed Manila.²¹⁷ Some experienced admirals and polymaths, such as Duarte Gomes Solís (1562?–1632), Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1559–1621), Diogo Lopes Lobo (dates unknown),²¹⁸ and especially the Portuguese captain André Coelho (dates unknown), had advised Philip IV about “the creation of a strong fleet of twenty galleys in Manila to defend the strategic Sunda Strait, thus uniting all the Portuguese defenses with those of Spain, which were, in his opinion, too separated.” However, his call for greater communication between the Portuguese and Spanish-impinged territories of this part of the globe went unheeded.²¹⁹ In 1630, the *de facto* Dutch occupation of Formosa and Batavia (present-day Jakarta) threatened the trading relations between Manila and the Portuguese of Goa and Macao, two of the main enclaves of the Estado da Índia that channeled a great part of the Asian trade.²²⁰

The Philippines was thus between two fires, and the Augustinian Recollect missions (province of Calamianes; northeastern Mindanao) as well as those of the Jesuits (the Visayas) became bulwarks of a well-planned military strategy to guarantee the Spanish occupation of the southern Philippines.²²¹

For this reason, the head of the Manila archbishopric in vacant see, Friar Pedro de Arce (in office 1630–34), placed the evangelization of the islands of Ilog, west of Negros, and the foundation of the residence in Dapitan (1631), in the western coast of Mindanao, in Jesuit hands.²²² In charge of these projects was Father Rector Pedro Gutiérrez (1593–1651), whom the natives apparently

216 Jaime Salvá, “Misioneros jesuitas a Filipinas,” *Misionalia hispanica* 5 (1948): 505–41, here 505–6.

217 Josep M^a Fradera, “La formación de una colonia: Objetivos metropolitanos y transacciones imperiales,” in Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso, Maria Fradera, and Alonso Álvarez, *Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico*, 1:83–103, here 89.

218 See José Miguel Ferreira, “(In)Visible Identities: Diogo Lopes Lobo and the Portuguese Presence in Manila in the Mid-seventeenth Century,” *Bulletin of Portuguese Japanese Studies* 2, no. 1 (2015): 61–76.

219 José Antonio Martínez Torres, “‘There is but one world’: Globalization and Connections in the Overseas Territories of the Spanish Habsburg (1581–1640),” *Culture & History Digital Journal* 3, no. 1 (2014): 43–57, here 53–54.

220 Manel Ollé, “Chinos, holandeses y castelhanos em Taiwan (1624–1684),” *Revista de cultura* 11 (2004): 82–98.

221 Alexandre Coello, “Políticas geoestratégicas y misionales en el sur de Filipinas: El caso de Mindanao y Joló (siglo XVIII),” *Revista de Indias* 79, no. 277 (2019): 729–63.

222 John Blanco, “Idolatry and Apostasy in the 1633 Jesuit Annual Letter,” in *The Spanish Pacific, 1521–1815: A Reader of Primary Sources*, ed. Ricardo Padrón and Christina Lee (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 127–29.

“loved so much” that they wrote to the governor-general asking that he never be removed from their side.²²³ Don Pedro de Arce was also satisfied with the Mexican priest’s work, because on June 24, 1632 he wrote a letter to Philip IV expressing his mistrust of secular priests as ministers of indigenous parishes, for these men were lax and independent, and arguing in favor of missionary orders such as the Jesuits, for only they were capable of subjecting “the many thousands of infidels” that inhabited the surroundings of Manila and the Visayas.²²⁴ Their work was especially difficult in the context of the attacks by Malay Muslims.

Despite having signed a peace agreement with the Spanish, the Maguindanao sultan Kudarat took advantage of the distance that separated Manila from the Visayas to send an armada of twenty-two vessels and fifteen hundred men. This expedition wreaked havoc among the native population.²²⁵ In 1634, Camucones, Mindanaos, and Joloans attacked the towns and villages of Dapitan—the future Misamis province—in northern Mindanao, before continuing on to Malabohoc (Maribojoc) and Inabanga, on the island of Bohol. In December, eighteen *karakoas* and fourteen hundred warriors attacked the island of Leyte,²²⁶ ravaging the towns of Cabalian, Sogon, Canamucan, Baybay, and Ogmuc (Ormoc)²²⁷ and killing, among their many victims, the Jesuit Juan de Carpio (1583–1634).²²⁸ This led interim governor-general Don Juan Cerezo de Salamanca (d.1635, in office 1633–35) to ask the provincial of the Society of Jesus, the Burgos-born Juan de Bueras (1583–1646), to assist him in recruiting two thousand native warriors for an expedition that was to be sent from Dapitan with seventy ships and fifty Spanish soldiers and officers. However, as Father Diego de Oña (dates unknown) lamented in his *Labor evangélica* (Evangelical work) the Spanish naval squadrons in Cebu and Iloilo were incapable of fully routing the enemy or preventing further attacks.²²⁹

223 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fols. 778r, 595r, 599r–602r.

224 Pedro de Arce, “Carta del obispo de Cebú, gobernador del arzobispado de Manila de las islas Filipinas, al Rey Nuestro Señor,” 2 fols., Manila, June 24, 1632 (Biblioteca Nacional [henceforth BN], Sala Cervantes, R/33375/28).

225 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 500r.

226 *Karakoas* were light outrigger warships whose shallow drafts allowed them to navigate through and to areas that were inaccessible to the heavier and larger European galleys and galiots (Nicolás Rodríguez, “Las galeras en Filipinas: Guerra, comercio y disciplinamiento social [1580–1650],” *Historia social* 87 [2017]: 149–66, here 153–56).

227 Said mission was founded in May of 1597 by Fathers Alonso Rodríguez (1570–1610) and Lionardo Scelsi (1567–1598) (de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 161).

228 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fols. 826r–839r.

229 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 500r.

The turning point came that very year of 1634, when the Madrid-born Jesuit Melchor de la Vera (1585–1646), rector of the Carigara residence²³⁰ and a skillful architect, assisted in the construction of a well-made fort and palisade. His design and techniques were applied in the construction of the presidio of San José de Zamboanga (June 23, 1635), located on the western tip of the island of Mindanao, which the Spanish authorities had decided to construct in their attempts to check the Malay Muslim attacks.²³¹ Father de la Vera himself and Father Gutiérrez were in charge of the spiritual care of the Spanish and peace negotiations with Sultan Kudarat.²³² In December 1636, Don Bartolomé Díaz Barrera (dates unknown), governor of the new presidio, and Sergeant Major Nicolás González (dates unknown) organized an armada of five *karakoas* that defeated the eight-vessel squad commanded by Tagal (1619–71), Kudarat's captain general, who died along “with more than three hundred *moros* who never gave up, even though they were invited to do so and keep their lives.”²³³ According to Bobadilla's *Relación*, the victory was obtained thanks to the bravery of the Spanish captains, the precision of their muskets, harquebuses, and other firearms, the intervention of Divine Providence, and, above all, the existence of the presidio of Zamboanga, without which “there would have been no engagement with the enemy.”²³⁴

On February 2, 1637, an armada was sent from Manila with eleven sampans to attack Kudarat's domains in central Mindanao. The expedition was led by Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (1587–1660), a renowned military man, member of the Order of Alcantara since 1626, former governor of Panama (in office 1632–34), and president of the Audiencia de Manila (in office 1635–44). The pretext was the rescue of three Augustinian Recollects—Fathers Juan de San Nicolás (dates unknown), Alonso de San Agustín (dates unknown), and Francisco de Jesús María (dates unknown)—and a *corregidor* from Cuyo Island who had been captured in April 1636.²³⁵

Following the maxim of Flavius Vegetius Renuat (*fl.* fourth century)—“*si vis pacem, para bellum*” (if you want peace, prepare for war)—the expedition arrived at Zamboanga on February 22, and on March 3 it continued on to Mindanao, which was sixty leagues away, to defeat and conquer Kudarat's headquarters. The relationship between Hurtado de Corcuera and the Society

230 René B. Javellana, S.J., “The Jesuits and the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines,” in O'Malley et al., *Jesuits*, 1:418–38, here 430.

231 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 12^v.

232 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 390–91.

233 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 15^r.

234 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fols. 15^r–15^v.

235 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 14^r.

of Jesus was more than cordial. He had the unconditional support of Jesuits such as Marcello Francisco Mastrilli (1603–37), Melchor de Vera (1585–1646), and Juan de Barrios (dates unknown), who were on the expedition's flagship alongside Hurtado de Corcuera and assisted him as confessors, translators, and even soldiers. Moreover, he named this military expedition Saint Francis Xavier. Indeed, writing hundreds of years later, Jesuit historian Horacio de la Costa (1916–77) referred admiringly to Corcuera as “the last conqueror.”²³⁶

Under “the protection of Francis Xavier,” this military hero, whom the Dominicans referred to as “the devil’s son” and “the scourge of God,”²³⁷ managed to take Kudarat’s famous Cerro.²³⁸ According to Bobadilla, Governor-General Corcuera was welcomed back in Manila at the end of May 1637, and he, his retinue, and soldiers were received as heroes. Behind them marched “the captive *moros* and *moras* taken in Mindanao, the women and children without shackles, and the men in chains.”²³⁹ The celebrations lasted days, and triumphal arches decorated with eulogistic verses were erected.²⁴⁰ On July 15, a theatrical representation entitled *Gran comedia de la toma del pueblo de Corralat y conquista del Cerro* (Great comedy of the conquest of the town of Corralat and the conquest of Cerro) written by the Jesuit Jerónimo Pérez (dates unknown) was performed in the Cathedral of Manila to a large audience, with one glaring absence: the archbishop of Manila, Hernando Guerrero (1567–1641, in office 1635–41), OSA.²⁴¹

The decline in trans-Pacific commercial trade between 1615 and 1670 coincided with the economic depression of New Spain.²⁴² This general crisis,

236 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 377–403.

237 William J. McCarthy, “Cashiering the Last Conquistador: The ‘Juicio de Residencia’ of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, 1635–1644,” *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 1, no. 1 (2013): 35–61, here 42.

238 Marcelo Francisco Mastrilli, *Carta del padre Marcelo Francisco Mastrillo, en qué da cuenta al Padre Juan de Salazar, provincial de la Compañía de Jesús en las islas Filipinas, de la conquista de Mindanao* (Mexico City: Imp. Pedro de Quiñones, 1637), fol. 21r. The greater part of the Muslim forces, including Kudarat, were not in the lowland town but in the highland Cerro. Hurtado de Corcuera and his forces began their ascent on March 17, 1636 and defeated the enemy forces on the following day (Mastrilli, *Carta*, fols. 24r–31r).

239 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 37v.

240 *Memorial de D. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, hablando de sus servicios en el Perú y Filipinas* (BN, MSS R. 37–346. H–A 10999 2).

241 Bobadilla, *Relación*, fol. 40r. On the tensions between Governor Hurtado de Corcuera and Archbishop Guerrero, see Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “Conflictividad y poder eclesiástico en el arzobispado de Manila, 1635–1641,” *Estudios de historia Novohispana* 68 (2023): 135–67.

242 Carmen Yuste López, *El comercio de la Nueva España con Filipinas, 1590–1785* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia & UNAM, 1984), 31–34.

together with the definitive prohibition of direct trade between Manila and Peru between 1638 and 1640, encouraged the conquest and evangelization of the southern Philippines, where the Spanish hoped to offset the losses caused by the decrease in trade with the capture of men to sell as slaves.²⁴³ Although Governor-General Corcuera found himself embroiled in several cases of corruption, his 1637 military success was followed by another one: on May 31, 1638, he again made a second triumphant entry into Manila after conquering the island of Sulu, one of the main islands of what is now called the Sulu Sea, with an expedition of six hundred Spaniards and three thousand natives. However, this did not secure the general support of the colony, nor did it ensure the expansion of the Spanish in the southern Philippines. In 1638, Mongkay (dates unknown), the rajah of Buayan, signed an alliance with the sultans of Ternate, and later Sulu, who allied themselves with the Dutch to expel the Spanish from the Philippines.²⁴⁴ In the meantime, Archbishop Hernando Guerrero related that these expeditions had been very costly, while Governor-General Corcuera stated that they had cost the Royal Treasury nothing at all.²⁴⁵

In 1639, the fort of Sabanilla was founded, close to the mouth of the Mindanao River (also known as the Rio Grande de Mindanao).²⁴⁶ That same year, the governor of Zamboanga, Don Pedro de Almonte (dates unknown), led an expedition against Sulu, decimating Muslim villages and freeing their Christian captives.²⁴⁷ The ulterior object of expeditions and building forts was to protect the Philippines in a political context in which Saidi Berkat (dates unknown), sultan of Tidore (r.1640–57), had aligned himself with the Dutch and forbidden the sale of clove to the Spanish.²⁴⁸

243 The direct trade between Manila and Peru—without the obligatory stop in Acapulco—had already been forbidden in a royal decree of 1582, but it had continued illegally until 1630. Moreover, in 1593 another royal decree limited trade between Manila and Acapulco to the two annual three hundred-ton galleons (Bonialian, “La historia económica del Pacífico,” 77–99).

244 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 392.

245 In the letter written by Hernando Guerrero to the king (Manila, 3 August 1638), he directly accused the governor of lying about the cost of the military expeditions (AGI, *Filipinas* 74, N. 122). The letter is reproduced in Paulino Díaz Rodríguez-Alonso, O.S.A., “Episcopologio Hispano-Agustiniano. Ilmo. y Rvmo. Sr. D. fr. Hernando Guerrero,” *Archivo histórico hispano agustiniano* 2, no. 7 (1914): 171–74.

246 Ruurdje Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989), 33; Isaac Donoso, *Historia cultural de la lengua española en Filipinas: Ayer y hoy* (Madrid: Editorial Verbo, 2012), 206.

247 Francisco Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580–1792,” *Philippine Studies* 34, no. 3 (1986): 257–86, here 265.

248 Villiers, “Manila and Maluku,” 154.

Spain's loss of hegemony in Europe was also replicated in its overseas territories. By then, the Pacific had stopped being a "Spanish lake"—if it ever was, as Pierre Chaunu (1923–2009)²⁴⁹ and Mariano Bonialian²⁵⁰ shrewdly remarked—to become a frontier area in the Spanish empire. The Dutch used the resulting disruptions in trade with Macao, coupled with the decline in trans-Pacific trade (1640–70), the unrest caused by the fall of the Ming Empire, and the independence of Portugal in 1640, to launch new offensives.²⁵¹ On January 12, 1641, the VOC finally succeeded in expelling the Portuguese from the Strait of Malacca, a key crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the Chinese seas, and Governor-General Corcuera could do nothing about it.²⁵²

In December 1642, Don Gonzalo Portillo (dates unknown), governor of the forces at Hermosa Island (1640–42), informed Corcuera of the loss of the port of Santísima Trinidad and the fort of San Salvador, at the north of the island, to the Dutch. This loss added to the increasing vulnerability of the Philippine archipelago, and especially its capital, Manila, vis-à-vis the VOC.²⁵³ Afraid, the residents of Manila wrote a memorial, printed in 1643, that expressed their profound trepidation about the future of Spanish sovereignty over the Philippines, for the Dutch had not only taken the island of Hermosa but also the trading monopoly with the Japanese that the Macao Portuguese had held.²⁵⁴ Their fears were not unfounded, for the economic well-being of the islands suffered even as they remained within the Spanish realm. According to Oswalt Sales-Colín, the decrease of the Philippine maritime forces after 1645 was informed by the "continuous harassment" suffered by the Spanish possessions in the Pacific.²⁵⁵

249 Pierre Chaunu, *Las Filipinas y el Pacífico de los Ibéricos, siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII* (Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, 1976), 25.

250 Mariano A. Bolianian, "Acapulco: Puerta abierta hacia el Pacífico, válvula secreta del Atlántico," in *Relaciones intercoloniales: Nueva España y Filipinas*, ed. Jaime Olveda (Zapopan, Jalisco: El Colegio de Jalisco, 2017), 127–46, here 136.

251 Charles H. Parker, *Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age, 1400–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91–92.

252 On February 16, Philip IV ordered Governor Hurtado de Corcuera to do what he could to protect that Portuguese plaza without neglecting the defense of the Philippine islands (AGI, *Filipinas* 330, L. 4, fols. 138^r–139^v).

253 AGI, *Filipinas* 330, L. 4, fols. 164^v–167^v.

254 AGI, *Filipinas* 28, N. 32.

255 Oswalt Sales-Colín, "Apuntes para el estudio de la presencia 'holandesa' en la Nueva España: Una perspectiva mexicano-filipina, 1600–1650," in *Memorias e historias compartidas: Intercambios culturales, relaciones comerciales y diplomática entre México y los Países Bajos, siglos XVI–XX*, ed. Laura Pérez Rosales and Arjen van der Sluis (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2009), 166–67.

During this same period, the Society of Jesus abandoned its dream of settling in Japan, whose rulers had adopted the extreme isolationist policies of Sakoku (1639). Japan's seclusion made it impossible for religious orders to found new missions. From their bases in Macao and Manila, the Jesuits shifted their gaze toward Mindanao. Indeed, despite the Philippine authorities' desire to bring the "great island" of the south into the Catholic fold—especially the Jesuit provincial and the commissary of the Holy Office in the district of Zamboanga (1641), Francisco Colín (1639–43)—their evangelization was until then largely superficial, and only a few areas in the southwest were controlled by Jesuit missionaries and Augustinian Recollects in the northeast. To advance the island's evangelization, Philip IV authorized Jesuit procurators Bobadilla and Simón (or Simone) Cotta (1590–1649) to continue their evangelizing labor in Dapitan, Zamboanga, and other parts of the island of Mindanao.²⁵⁶ On July 15, 1641, an expedition left Seville for New Spain with forty-three young Jesuits to continue the missions that Xavier had established in the territories of China and Japan and that Ricci and Valignano had later expanded.²⁵⁷ Two years later, on July 7, 1643, forty-seven Jesuit missionaries left Acapulco for the Philippines, arriving in Manila on August 6.²⁵⁸

The new governor-general of the Philippines, Don Diego Fajardo Chacón (d.1658, in office 1644–53), who had arrived in Manila on August 16, 1644, had instructions to resist Dutch hostility in Asia and break any alliance between the Dutch and the Muslims.²⁵⁹ He named Toledo-born Don Francisco de Atienza Ibáñez (dates unknown) warden and governor of the presidio of Zamboanga.²⁶⁰ That same year, the sultan of Sulu signed a commercial alliance with the VOC, bringing the Dutch threat even closer to the Philippines and its capital. At that time, even though there were still more than five hundred Spanish soldiers and several officers assigned to the Moluccan fortifications, such as Nuestra Señora del Rosario de Ternate, the United Provinces of the Netherlands had pushed the Spanish out from the Spice Islands,²⁶¹ and there was even a debate on the convenience of maintaining these garrisons. The Real Audiencia recommended abandoning them because of the cost of their maintenance, which totaled thirty thousand *pesos fuertes* (so-called pieces of eight) a year, while the

256 AGI, *Filipinas* 340, L. 5, fols. 67^v–68^r.

257 Andrew C. Ross, "Alessandro Valignano: The Jesuits and Culture in the East," in O'Malley et al., *Jesuits*, 1:336–51.

258 ARSI, *Philip*. 4, fol. 18^v.

259 Crailsheim, "Negotiating Peace and Faith," 396.

260 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 109^v; de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philipippines*, 398.

261 Campo López, "La presencia española al sur de Filipinas," 350.

five hundred soldiers with their military supplies and the best artillery in Asia procured no material benefits for the crown and no spiritual benefits for the islands' Muslims.²⁶² However, Governor-General Fajardo decided to maintain the Spanish presence in the archipelago, and, unlike his predecessors, who had sent the provisions that it needed with galleons as military escorts, he ordered that such provisions be delivered exclusively by sampans and small boats, thus reducing their transport cost.²⁶³

The shortage of specialized soldiers, military supplies, and vessels forced Governor-General Fajardo to reduce the military campaigns of his predecessor and attempt diplomacy.²⁶⁴ In this context of crisis, the Jesuits played an indispensable role as privileged political interlocutors.²⁶⁵ On June 24, 1645, the governor-general sent Don Francisco de Atienza, the governor of Zamboanga, and Father Alejandro López (1604–55), rector of the residence of Zamboanga since 1643, to sign a peace treaty with Kudarat and other leaders of the river delta in central Mindanao who had expressed a desire to reach some sort of agreement with the Spanish.²⁶⁶ The treaty determined the new borders and required involved parties to keep the peace.²⁶⁷

Scholars such as Louis Cardaillac (1933–2015) argue that this and similar treaties were motivated by *taqiyya*, or dissimulation, a Qur'anic strategy by which Sunni Muslims and the Moriscos in sixteenth-century Spain, with Qur'anic sanction, could defend themselves from the Christian threat.²⁶⁸ However, it is difficult to determine whether the Muslim leaders in the southern Philippines were following the same approach while signing peace treaties with the Spanish. Besides assuring mutual assistance in armed conflicts, the 1645 treaty was advantageous for the Spanish. First, it authorized Jesuit

262 AGI, *Filipinas* 22, R. 1, N. 1, fol. 509r.

263 Campo López, "La presencia española al sur de Filipinas," 181.

264 In 1646, Governor Fajardo wrote a letter to King Philip IV lamenting that the soldiers sent from New Spain consisted of "boys, the oldest no more than twelve years old, who make nothing but expenses and trouble" (Sales Colín, "La Inquisición en Filipinas: El caso de Mindanao y Manila. Siglo XVII," in *Inquisición Novohispana*, ed. Noemí Quezada, Martha Eugenia Rodríguez, and Marcela Suárez [Mexico City: UNAM, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2000], 1:255–70, here 265).

265 Ana M^a Rodríguez-Rodríguez, "Retorno a Zamboanga: Estrategias imperiales ante el Islam en las islas Filipinas," *eHumanista: Journal of Iberian Studies* 40 (2018): 374–88, here 378; Alexandre Coello, "Diplomáticos y mártires jesuitas en la corte de Kudarat (Mindanao, siglo XVII)," *Espacio, tiempo y forma: Serie IV; Historia moderna* 33 (2020): 323–46.

266 De la Rosa, "Diplomáticos y mártires jesuitas," 323–46; Crailsheim, "Trading with the Enemy," 88; Crailsheim, "Negotiating Peace and Faith," 395–96.

267 Crailsheim, "Negotiating Peace and Faith," 396.

268 Louis Cardaillac, *Morisques et chrétiens: Un affrontement polémique (1492–1650)* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1977). See also Devin Stewart, "Dissimulation in Sunni Islam and Morisco Taqiyya," *Al-qantara* 34, no. 2 (2013): 439–90.

missionaries to settle in Mindanao to preach the Gospel (“persuadir públicamente”), allowing them to build a church and residence in Simuay. This town held the sultan’s court, and the Jesuit presence there would not only facilitate evangelization but also the reestablishment of trade relations.²⁶⁹ And second, it let the galleons that departed from New Spain unload in Caraga, in north-eastern Mindanao, where the Spanish kept a fort, making it easier to avoid capture by the Dutch.²⁷⁰

But *razzias* from Sulu continued, and the Spanish had to send more troops to forts and presidios of vulnerable areas that were distant from the Manila “metropolitan center.” It was clear that the constitution of a political space in the southern territories depended on the Spanish being on good terms with the Muslims. However, establishing diplomatic relations with Sulu’s Muwallil Wasit, also known as Rajah Bongsu (in office 1610–50),²⁷¹ proved to be more complicated than with the sultan of Maguindanao. On June 27, 1645, two Dutch warships under the command of Captain Lucas Albertsz (dates unknown) had stationed themselves off the island of Sulu to intimidate the Spanish forces.²⁷² Seeing this as an opportunity to rid the island of the Spaniards, Salicala (or Sarikula [dates unknown]), Sulu’s heir to the sultanate, asked for the support of the United Provinces of the Netherlands “to shake off the violent rule of Spain,” but the Spanish defeated the Dutch attackers sent from Batavia.²⁷³

Soon afterward, on April 14, 1646, the governor-general signed a peace and friendship agreement with the sultan of Sulu, which included peace, mutual assistance, and freedom of religion. Besides allowing the Jesuits to proselytize and ransom Christian captives, the sultan agreed to pay an annual tribute of “three junks, eight-fathom-long, filled with rice and placed in Zamboanga in his forces, in gratitude [to the Spanish] and as a sign of brotherhood, for having had the kind-heartedness of giving him and letting him keep this island.” As the Jesuit Francisco Combés (1620–65) remarked, his confrère, Father López, played such a fundamental role in signing the treaty that it was hard not to conclude that “a priest is worth more than any Spaniards.”²⁷⁴ With this agreement, the Dutch influence was broken in Sulu, and the Spaniards abandoned

269 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fols. 149^r–153^v. See also Francisco Demetrio, S.J., “Religious Dimensions of the Moro Wars,” *Mindanao Journal* 3 no. 1 (1976): 49–61, here 61; Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy*, 36.

270 Sales Colín, “Apuntes para el estudio de la presencia ‘holandesa’ en la Nueva España,” 167–68.

271 R. Joel de los Santos Jr., “Reflections on the Moro Wars and the New Filipinos,” *Mindanao Journal* 3, no. 1 (1976): 22–34, here 26.

272 Díaz-Trechuelo, cited in Sales Colín, “Apuntes para el estudio de la presencia ‘holandesa’ en la Nueva España,” 165.

273 Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 149.

274 Cited in Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 397.

their military post. Finally, trade between the Sulu Muslims and the Spanish of the presidio of Zamboanga was renewed.²⁷⁵

Despite the agreements signed with Kudarat thanks in great part to the efforts of López, “whose words are listened to as if he were an oracle,” the Mindanao Muslims resisted the presence of missionaries in their domains.²⁷⁶ From the presidio of Zamboanga, six Jesuits had done much to advance conversion, but Kudarat remained opposed to Christianity. According to the Jesuit annual letter of 1646–49 written by Provincial Francisco de la Roa (1592–1660, in office 1644–46):

One of the greatest princes of the kingdom of Mindanao sent an envoy to one of our fathers so that if he were to speak with Corralat [Kudarat] before his caciques, he should not speak of the Christian religion or say anything to him, because it was feared that the king would forbid him to deal with the priests if it seemed that he was fond of things of the faith.²⁷⁷

The Spanish Visayas were still endangered by *razzias*, and the possibility that Malay Muslims would enter into alliances with the Batavia-based Dutch still threatened Spanish sovereignty over the Philippines. Between 1645 and 1646, the VOC sent four fleets with which it laid siege to Manila, blocking the arrival of the galleons to Cavite. However, in April 1646, commanding a force that included two large galleons (*Encarnación* and *Rosario*), albeit with untrained soldiers, Governor-General Fajardo expelled the Dutch in the famous battles of Playa Honda.²⁷⁸ Between 1646 and 1648, no ships came from New Spain, so that neither communications of any sort nor the Philippine *situados*—extant since 1606—were received.²⁷⁹ In June 1647, under the command of Admiral Martin Gertzen (dates unknown), a Dutch fleet of twelve vessels penetrated the Sulu

275 “Capitulaciones asentadas con el Sultán Rey de Mindanao por el capitán don Francisco de Atienza Ibáñez, alcayde y gobernador de las fuerzas de Zamboangan, el día 24 de junio de 1645” (Arxiu Històric de la Companyia de Jesús a Catalunya, FILHIS-024, E.II, b-088, “Relación de los moros de Mindanao,” Cuadernillo 161a, fols. 170^v–179^r). See also Francisco Combés, s.j., *Historia de Mindanao, Joló y sus adyacentes: Progressos de la religion, y armas catolicas*, ed. Wenceslao E. Retana with the collaboration of Pablo Pastells, s.j. (Madrid: Imp. de la Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1897), 443–44; Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fols. 150^v–152^v.

276 Combés, *Historia de Mindanao y Joló*, 427; de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 444–45.

277 ARSI, *Philip*. 07–2, fol. 69^r.

278 María Baudot, “Lampón, puerto alternativo a Cavite para el galeón de Manila,” *Vegueta: Anuario de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia* 20 (2020): 28–29; Crailsheim, “Las Filipinas, zona fronteriza,” 146.

279 Sales Colín, “La Inquisición en Filipinas,” 265.

Sea and reached Manila Bay, attacking the port of Cavite (where the galleons were built) and plundering the coastal towns of Mariveles (the “Boca Grande” of Bataan), Abucay, and Samal, in the province of Pampanga.²⁸⁰ Again, they were defeated by Spanish and Filipino sailors and driven away to their possessions in Batavia, having lost their admiral.²⁸¹

In 1648, Spain and the United Provinces signed a series of treaties—the so-called Peace of Westphalia—by which the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) came to an end. However, while the treaties brought a sustained period of relative concord in Europe, in Asia the VOC continued its attacks on Spanish positions in the Moluccas and against Spanish vessels.²⁸² And the Spanish did not turn the other cheek. On July 18, 1649, the Spanish governor of the Moluccas presidio, Don Pedro Fernández del Río (in office 1648–50), led an expedition of 250 Spaniards and six hundred natives against the Malay fort of Ternate (built in 1607) and the Dutch clove plantations in Tidore.²⁸³

Trade and communication between the Spanish positions in Asia and New Spain had been temporarily impaired during the war, but they had been permanently hindered by the loss of many strategic territories. This problem was added to others that were a permanent nuisance, such as the sporadic loss of galleons at sea (for instance, the *San Luis de Francia* in 1646²⁸⁴ and the *San Francisco Javier* in 1651),²⁸⁵ with the consequent loss of the *situados*. Typhoons, Malay Muslim raids, native revolts, and earthquakes, including the terrible Luzon earthquake of November 30, 1645, made these lands an increasingly undesirable destiny.²⁸⁶ By the 1650s, Manila’s defenses, which had been reinforced by Governor-General Corcuera in 1642, were in a state of disrepair. The islands’ residents were mobilized by their religious ministers to defend themselves against the attacks of the Muslim “pirates.”²⁸⁷

Governor-General Fajardo, a member of the Order of Santiago, was an austere man with a penchant for politics.²⁸⁸ If at the beginning he had been

280 Pablo Pastells, S.J., *Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo General de Indias (AGI)* (Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1938), 9:lxix–lxxx.

281 Lucio Gutiérrez, *La historia de la iglesia en Filipinas (1565–1900)* (Madrid: Mapfre 1992), 187.

282 Villiers, “Manila and Maluku,” 161; Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 400.

283 Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 217.

284 Juan Gil, *Mitos y utopías del descubrimiento* (Madrid: Alianza, 1989), 2:234.

285 Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 185.

286 Pastells, *Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas*, xcvi.

287 Sales Colín, “La Inquisición en Filipinas,” 266.

288 Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines* (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), 50.

reticent about the Jesuits' "particular way of proceeding," he ended up praising them, especially López, who convinced him of the importance of strengthening the Jesuit presence in Zamboanga. In 1649, López succeeded in baptizing Kudarat's second son, who did not live long. Despite this loss, Governor Fajardo thought the Jesuits' presence altogether more necessary.²⁸⁹ However, the sultan began to mistrust the Jesuits because of their efforts to convert members of his family and some important ministers and generals, like Orangkaya Ugbo (dates unknown), who later sided with the Spanish. In a letter to the Council of the Indies of May 1651, the governor-general lamented that, unlike the Jesuits, the Dominicans and the Franciscans (members of the pontifical Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide [Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith]), who arrived at Manila, could not wait to continue on to Japan and China, where they indeed had gone in 1631 and 1633 respectively.²⁹⁰ On the contrary, the Jesuits directed their efforts to the south, especially during Japan's self-imposed isolation, which lasted into 1854.

To "open" the eyes of Fajardo's successor, Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara (1603–83, in office 1653–63), the Jesuits wrote "trusted reports" about the natural wealth of those lands, hoping to stir in him a desire to protect and expand the Spanish presence in the Visayas by aligning his and the government's interests with the Society's desire to evangelize the southern Philippines, which were threatened by the sultans of Mindanao and Sulu.²⁹¹ Father Francisco Combés's (1620–65) *Relación de las islas Filipinas* (Relation of the Philippine islands [Manila, 1654]), for example, described the Philippine islands' inhabitants and their beliefs as well as the known flora and fauna and their uses, without neglecting to describe the potential riches of the southern archipelagos. The *Relación* included a complete catalog of the fruits and their qualities (appearance, color, flavor, size, abundance, and even digestibility). Regarding native culinary customs, Combés pointed out that many Mindanao natives

289 Father Alejandro López spoke with Governor Fajardo in 1646. The governor increased the economic *socorro* (mainly provisions, goods, money) sent to the Jesuits in Zamboanga in order to support two additional missionaries, taking the total to six (Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 151^v).

290 Several historians have pointed out that for many regular missionaries, particularly the Discalced friars, the Philippines were a stepping-stone to the coveted destinies of China and Japan (see O'Phelan, *Hispanization of the Philippines*, 43–44; James Cummins, "Two Missionary Methods in China: Mendicants and Jesuits," *Archivo Ibero-Americano* 38, no. 149–52 [1978]: 33–108, here 38–40; and Jaime Górriz, "La Compañía de Jesús," in *España y el Pacífico: Legazpi*, ed. Leoncio Cabrero [Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2004], 2:359–76, here 362).

291 Alexandre Coello, "The Governor's Blindness: Francisco Combés, S.J., and His *Relación de las islas Filipinas* (ca. 1654)," *Philippiniana sacra* 56, no. 167 (2021): 71–98.

“refuse to eat beef, because they say it smells.” And elderly natives in general were repelled by home-reared pork “because of the filthiness of its taste and the stench of its food,” but they were not displeased by wild pigs or boars.²⁹² The circulation of knowledge about the natives’ eating habits signaled to readers their level of conversion and civilization. Combés’s *Relación* sought to fulfill the task entrusted to him of providing the most complete information to the governors of all that he encountered, but the motivations behind this elaborate natural history were ultimately geopolitical and strategic: to inform the authorities about the food sources that would be available for Spanish soldiers and missionaries were they to embark upon the conquest and evangelization of these “spiritual gardens.”²⁹³

Combés’s *Relación* reflects the Jesuits’ engagement in the missionary growth in the southern Philippines. In 1654, Kudarat sent four hundred warriors to the Moluccas to side with the Dutch against the Spanish. That same year, López, the most important diplomatic agent of the previous years, proposed the establishment of an episcopal see in Zamboanga to spread the faith among the Muslims.²⁹⁴ On December 13, 1655, López and Father Juan de Montiel (1630–55) were martyred by Balatamay (dates unknown), the ruler of Buayan in upriver Cotabato, who was probably acting on behalf of his uncle, Kudarat.²⁹⁵ Eberhard Crailsheim argues that López’s insistence on the construction of that church and the establishment of a mission in Simuay led to his death.²⁹⁶ Be that as it may, after the massacre of the Spanish embassy, Kudarat called his neighboring sultanates of Ternate, Tidore, Makassar, and Sulu to arms in a jihad against the Spaniards.²⁹⁷ Governor-General Manrique de Lara was short of troops for

292 Francisco Combés, *Relación de estas islas Filipinas, dividida en tres partes, y un discurso de las Malucas al ilustrísimo Señor don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, del hábito de Calatrava, del Consejo de Guerra de su majestad, su gobernador y capitán general en estas islas Filipinas, y presidente de la Audiencia y Chancillería Real que en ellas reside Manila, segunda parte, cap. 3, 1654* (Biblioteca del Palacio, Madrid [Spain], MS 2/3062).

293 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *Católicos y puritanos en la colonización de América* (Madrid: Fundación Jorge Juan & Marcial Pons, 2008), 249.

294 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 401.

295 Alonso de Andrade, *Varones ilustres en santidad, letras y zelo de las almas de la Compañía de Jesús* (Madrid: Joseph Fernández de Buendía, 1667), 6:649–80, 692–98. See also Matthias Tanner, *Societas Jesu usque ad sanguinis et vitae profusionem militans, in Europa, Africa, Asia et America, contra Gentiles, Mahometanos, Judaeos, haereticos, impios, pro Deo, fide, ecclesia, pietate: Sive vita, et mors eorum qui ex Societate Iesu in causa fidei & virtutis propugnatae, violenta morte toto orbe sublati sunt* (Prague: San Clementem, 1675), 430–32.

296 Crailsheim, “Trading with the Enemy,” 81–111; Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 401.

297 Coello, “Diplomáticos y mártires jesuitas,” 329; Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 400.

waging an open war against the Muslims, but he did so on December 2, 1656, when the sultan of Sulu joined the sultanate of Maguindanao.²⁹⁸

On July 24, 1658, Manrique de Lara wrote to Father Magino Solà (1604–59?),²⁹⁹ lamenting that the Philippines were devastated and, as a result, there was a grave danger of losing the islands. The governor-general pointed to the devastation caused by the constant battles with the Dutch and the Malay Muslims, the civil wars between the Tartars and the Chinese that led to the end of the Ming dynasty (1438–1644), and, most especially, the delay³⁰⁰ or insufficiency³⁰¹ of the *situados* of the previous three years (1656, 1657, and 1658). The report that he wrote to the king in “On the Ecclesiastical and Secular State of the Philippine Islands” (1650) certified the archipelago’s dependence on the *situado*.³⁰² Their balance and stability depended on the punctual reception of this succor sent from Acapulco, and the fact that it did not always arrive and was not always sufficient hindered the defense of the islands. In these times governed by the sign of Mars, the governor-general, aged fifty-five, asked to be relieved of his office because of his growing ailments.³⁰³

Defending the overseas territories was an onerous task for a deficit-ridden treasury that did not have enough money to sustain more soldiers, especially

298 Crailsheim, “Negotiating Peace and Faith,” 400.

299 Not to be confused with Magino Solà “the elder” (Manresa, 1644–Manila, 1696). Our Magino Solà was born in Girona in 1604. He arrived in the Philippines in 1632 and was posted in San Miguel in 1655, before returning to Madrid as procurator to the court (1656) (Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 607, 617, 722). They were probably uncle and nephew, but this is not confirmed in the archives. De la Costa confuses them, mentioning only one Magino Solà (the elder) in his *Catalogue of Members of the Mission, the Vice-Province, and Province of the Philippines, 1581–1768* (de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 664).

300 According to Alonso, after signing the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the *situado* was sixty percent lower than it had been (Luis A. Álvarez, “Repartimientos y economía en las Filipinas bajo dominio español, 1565–1815,” in *El repartimiento forzoso de mercancías en México, Perú y Filipinas*, ed. Margarita Menegus [Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora & Centro de Estudios sobre la Universidad, UNAM, 2000], 170–216, here 174; Álvarez, “La administración española en las islas Filipinas, 1565–1816: Algunas notas explicativas acerca de su prolongada duración,” in *Repensar Filipinas: Política, identidad y religión en la construcción de la nación filipina*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso [Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2009], 79–117, here 92–94).

301 Espino, “Una frontera de ultramar,” 136.

302 Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, “Traslado de una carta que el señor don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, gobernador y capitán general de las Islas Filipinas, y presidente de la Audiencia Real, que en ellas reside, escribe al padre Magino Solà, de la Compañía de Jesús, residente en la Real Corte de Madrid, con fecha en Cavite, 24 de julio de 1658” (ARSI, *Philipp.* 11, fols. 359^r–366^r).

303 ARSI, *Philipp.* 11, fol. 365^r.

after signing the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) with France.³⁰⁴ It should not surprise us, then, that on May 17, 1662, before that year's succor had arrived, Manrique de Lara convened a military junta in Manila—the Junta General de Guerra y Hacienda—that reached a momentous decision: to abandon the military posts in the Moluccas and the Jesuit missions of Ternate.³⁰⁵ On November 8, 1662, Governor Don Fernando de Bobadilla Gatica (dates unknown) received instructions to dismantle the presidio of Zamboanga and hand it to two Samal leaders, Don Alonso (or Fernando) Macombong (dates unknown) and Don Oráncaya Ugbo (or Orangkaya Ugbo [dates unknown], a former general of Kudarat who had converted to Christianity). The troops were transferred to Manila, where they caused not a few disturbances.³⁰⁶ But the protests of the Christianized Filipinos, who upon baptism and the payment of some form of tribute or stipend were automatically vassals of the king of Castile,³⁰⁷ delayed the execution of the governor-general's orders to abandon the fort of Nuestra Señora del Rosario in southwestern Ternate³⁰⁸ until May 2, 1663. They also left the forts in the provinces of Calamianes and Mindanao (Tandang, on the eastern coast; Iligan, in the north; and, most importantly, Zamboanga, in the southwest). The six thousand Samales, or Luatos, who lived in these spaces, were left to their own devices.³⁰⁹

304 Pablo Fernández Albadalejo, *Historia de España*, vol. 4, *La crisis de la monarquía*, ed. Josep Fontana and Ramón Villares (Madrid: Crítica-Marcial Pons, 2009), 360–61; ARSI, *Philipp.* 11, fol. 364^v.

305 Combés, *Historia de Mindanao, Joló y sus adyacentes*, 610–13.

306 Delor Angeles, *Mindanao: The Story of an Island (A Preliminary Study)* (Davao City: Sant Pedro Press, 1964), 39–40; Ana M^a Rodríguez-Rodríguez, “Old Enemies, New Contexts: Early Modern Spanish (Re)-Writing of Islam in the Philippines,” in *Coloniality, Religion, and the Law in the Early Iberian World*, ed. Santa Arias and Raúl Marrero-Fente (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014), 137–58, here 148.

307 Miguel de Benavides, O.P., “Ynstrucción para el gobierno de las Filipinas y de cómo lo an de regir y gobernar aquella gente,” in *Cuerpo de documentos del siglo XVI sobre los derechos de España en las Indias y las Filipinas*, ed. Lewis Hanke (Mexico City: FCE, 1943), 203–260, here 212.

308 “Copy of the letter of December 9, 1662 from Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, to the governor of the military post of Terrenate, informing him of the decision to withdraw the forces that guarded that presidio to resist Koxinga, tyrant of the coasts of the kingdom of China and giving him instructions on the steps to be taken with the Dutch governor of Malayo to guarantee the Spanish property and dominion over those ports and squares [...]” May 6, 1667 (AGI, *Filipinas* 9, R.2, N. 34); “Informe de Sabiniano Manrique de Lara sobre haber retirado las fuerzas de Terrenate,” Madrid, October 8, 1666 (AGI, *Filipinas* 201, N. 1, fols. 6^r–12^v). See also Hubert Jacobs, S.J., *Documenta malucensia* (Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1984), 3:617.

309 Ana M^a Prieto, *Filipinas durante el gobierno de Manrique de Lara (1653–1663)* (Seville: CSIC, 1985), 136–37; Cesar A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Diliman, Quezon City:

The governor-general justified that “pitiful abandonment,” as Combés defined it,³¹⁰ by arguing that the Philippines were under threat of an imminent invasion led by Zheng Chenggong (1624–62), prince of Yanping (in office 1661–62), known in the Spanish sources as Cogseng, Pumpuan, and Koxinga, which ultimately never occurred because of Zheng’s unexpected death on June 23, 1662.³¹¹ Contemporary historians, such as Antonio C. Campo López, have questioned the traditional historiography, which tends to accept Combés’s theses that abandoning these military posts was a personal and politically unjustifiable decision by Governor-General Manrique de Lara.³¹² According to Campo López, the governor-general of the Philippines decided to abandon the Moluccas because of “the high cost of their maintenance, and their lack of economic benefit (above the traditionally accepted excuse of the threatened invasion of Manila by the Chinese Koxinga).”³¹³

The definitive retreat from the southern presidios led to an increase in the corsair activities of the Malay Muslims, generating further instability in the region.³¹⁴ The Jesuits lamented the governor-general’s decision and elevated their protests to the Society’s superior general, Gian Paolo Oliva (1661–81, in office 1661–81),³¹⁵ insisting on a “just war” to protect the region’s innocents and recovering and fortifying the Zamboanga presidio to prevent the spread of Islam. In 1665, after Lent, Combés left for Europe to negotiate these and other matters in Madrid and Rome.³¹⁶ Father Diego Luis de San Vitores (1627–72) advocated for the establishment of a vice province in the “Islands of the Thieves” (the Mariana Islands), whose inhabitants—“a docile and peaceful

Philippines University Press, 1999 [1973]), 113, 181; José A. del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada en Filipinas: El gobernador Fernando Valdés Tamón (1729–1739)* (Seville: CSIC, 2012), 66–67.

310 Combés, *Historia de Mindanao y Joló*, 631.

311 ARSI, *Philip*. 04, fol. 45. See also José Miguel Herrera Reviriego, “‘Dominar estas islas sería dominaros a vos mismo’: Las relaciones de colaboración y dependencia entre los Zheng y la gobernación de Filipinas en el marco de la paz de 1663,” *Obradoiro de historia moderna* 31 (2022): 1–19, here 8.

312 Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 220.

313 Campo López, “La presencia española al sur de Filipinas,” 684.

314 Prieto, *Filipinas durante el gobierno de Manrique de Lara*, 116.

315 For Wenceslao E. Retana, the object of Francisco Combés’s *Historia de Mindanao y Joló* (Madrid, 1667) was none other than showing his disagreement with the retreat of the Spanish from the forts of southern Mindanao, making it known “how much the domination of Mindanao” mattered to Spain (Retana, “Prólogo,” *Historia de Mindanao y Joló*, xviii). See also Oña, *Labor evangélica: Segunda parte*, fols. 1405–6; Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la provincia de Philipinas*, fol. 275^r.

316 ARSI, *Philip*. 04, fols. 49^r; 53^r; ARSI, *Philip*. 07–11, fol. 835^r.

people”—were yet to be evangelized.³¹⁷ In 1665, San Vitores wrote a *Memorial* from his post as missionary in the Philippines, where he had been stationed since 1663, arguing that the Marianas would be converted

without any temporal or spiritual or moral resistance of those who have given enough to overcome in other parts, because neither has the damn sect of Muhammad, who has been so encumbered in this archipelago entered there nor have they idols, nor religion or any sect of which they are concerned, nor worship to the sun or the moon or something else.³¹⁸

To secure Spanish hegemony over the Philippines, the natives' loyalty to the crown had to be procured, and the religious orders were key in this effort.³¹⁹ Through the Royal Patronage (*Real Patronato*), the crown had assumed the duty of establishing and maintaining the church in the Americas and the Philippines as well as protecting its ministers in their evangelizing labors through forts and presidios. This was the pillar upon which the power of the Spanish crown rested in Asia.

On May 11, 1666, Father Luis Pimentel (1612–89), procurator general of the Philippines (in office 1659–65),³²⁰ wrote a *Memorial* asking for the reestablishment of the Zamboanga presidio, and before the year was out (on December 30), the queen regent Maria Christina (1634–96, in office 1665–75) published a royal decree ordering the governor-general of the Philippines, Don Diego de Salcedo (d.1669, in office 1663–68), to do so. The decree proclaimed that the presidio in “Samboagan [*sic*], in the islands of Mindanao, is the only check to the proud boldness of those *moros*.”³²¹ A few weeks earlier, on December 7, the governor-general had been asked to convene the Junta General de Guerra to debate the need to reestablish said presidio.³²² With the publication of the *Historia de Mindanao y Joló* (History of Mindanao and Sulu [Madrid, 1667]), dedicated to Don Agustín de Cepeda Carnacedo (?–1677), the last governor of the Ternate presidio (in office 1661–63), Combés demanded the return to a space that had been sown with the blood of martyrs.³²³ He recreated an

317 ARSI, *Philip*. 14, fols. 57^r–59^v.

318 AGI, *Filipinas* 82, N. 8.

319 Antonio García-Abásolo, “Formación de las Indias orientales españolas: Filipinas en el siglo XVI,” in *Historia general de Filipinas*, ed. Leoncio Cabrero (Madrid: Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica, 2000), 169–205.

320 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 435.

321 AGI, *Filipinas* 201, N. 1, fols. 131^r–135^v.

322 AGI, *Filipinas* 201, N. 1, fol. 136^r.

323 Jacobs, *Documenta malucensia*, 3:506.

“unrealistic image of evangelizing success” whose objective was to reinforce the fortitude and the corporative spirit of the Society over the aspirations of the Recollect order, thereby demonstrating sufficient authority over an archipelago that in truth was never entirely colonized nor evangelized.³²⁴ The book also reflected the Jesuits’ anxieties about losing missionary ground from a “theology of war,” one that, according to Ana M^a Rodríguez, ended up consolidating a dichotomic image of antagonistic cultures.³²⁵

Despite the royal decree, the debate over the reestablishment of the presidio of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza of Zamboanga continued during the governments of Don Manuel de León (1615–77, in office 1669–77), Juan de Vargas (d.1690, in office 1678–84), and Gabriel de Curuzeláegui y Arriola (1632–89, in office 1684–89). As we have seen in this Part, Christian–Muslim diplomacy seemed to have failed. As we will show in the following one, it was not until 1718 that the presidio was reestablished, resulting in a new stage of the “Moro” wars.³²⁶

7 Mindanao, Sulu, and the Spanish–Moro Wars (Eighteenth Century)

At the turn of the eighteenth century, Mindanao, Sulu, and the adjacent islands served as strategic points from which ships could easily reach the Moluccan archipelago as well as the rest of the islands that now form Indonesia. Franciscan historians, like Fr. José Torrubia (1698–1761), proposed the rehabilitation of the presidio of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zamboanga as the only way to continue with the material and spiritual conquest of the Philippines.³²⁷ In 1712, Governor-General Don Martín de Ursúa y Arizmendi (1653–1715, in office 1709–15) convened a Junta de Guerra to reestablish the presidio. Doing so would serve a dual objective: first, to help the Spanish priest set up missions in the area; and second, but no less important, to turn it into a bulwark in the southern Philippines.³²⁸ In 1718, Madrid ordered Governor-General Don Fernando Manuel de Bustillo Bustamante y Rueda (1663–1719, in

324 Ana M^a Rodríguez-Rodríguez, “Mártires, santos, beatos: Discursos de lo extraordinario en la expansión católica en Filipinas,” *Philippiniana sacra* 56, no. 169 (2021): 697–714.

325 Rodríguez-Rodríguez, “Old Enemies, New Contexts,” 137–58.

326 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 66–67.

327 Jorge Mojarro, “Colonial Spanish Philippine Literature between 1604 and 1808: A First Survey,” in *More Hispanic Than We Admit 3. Quincentennial Edition, 1521–1820; Filipino and Spanish Interactions over the Centuries*, ed. Jorge Mojarro (Quezon City: Vibal Foundation, 2020), 423–64, here 449–50.

328 AGI, *Filipinas* 332, L-11, fols. 368^rff.

office 1717–19)³²⁹ to reestablish the presidio.³³⁰ The governor-general had been forced to send an armada to defend the islands of Negros and Cebu, which were constantly attacked by Malay Muslims from Mindanao and Melanao. For Isaac Donoso, this confirms the presidio's strategic value as a military bastion.³³¹ In any case, it seemed that the Maguindanao and Sulu sultanates were in a process of expansion through forms of violence based on corsair activity and slave-trafficking, in a space that James Warren names the Sulu zone, to underline the ascendancy of the sultans of Sulu.³³²

In 1718, the sultan of Sulu ceded part of the territory he possessed on the island of Palawan (or Paragua) to the Spanish, who built the presidio of Labo in the southeastern half of the island, in the present-day barangay of Labog. From there, they could watch and defend the town from hostile vessels launched from Borneo.³³³ But in 1720, during the interim government of Archbishop Francisco de la Cuesta (1658–1724), when the fort was still practically brand new, Manila's Junta General de Guerra y Hacienda demolished it, supposedly to concentrate their forces in Zamboanga.³³⁴ The Recollects complained bitterly, arguing that their missions were left to the mercy of "Joloes, Borneyes, Tidores, Camucones, Macazares, and Mindanaos." The decision was also severely criticized by Captain Juan Antonio de la Torre (dates unknown), who had served in the province of Calamianes—to which Labo belonged—for many years.

329 Bustamante's government was cut short when he was murdered, along with his son, during a mutiny on October 11, 1718. That same week, the governor had been excommunicated by the archbishop, who had then been arrested on the governor's orders. Upon Bustamante's death, the archbishop assumed the interim government of the archipelago. According to Josep M^a Delgado, the motives behind Bustillo Bustamante's unresolved murder could be related to the changes in the rules that governed the Manila galleon produced by the royal decrees of January 8, January 11, and June 20 of 1718, which reduced the sale of Asian products, especially cloth, in New Spain, causing great harm to the Philippine economy (Josep M^a Delgado, *Dinámicas imperiales [1650–1796]: España, América y Europa en el cambio institucional del sistema colonial español* [Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2007], 101).

330 Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy*, 177–181; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 66–67; Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 242.

331 Donoso, *Historia cultural de la lengua española en Filipinas*, 208.

332 James F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981).

333 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 56, 62.

334 AGI, *Filipinas* 227, fols. 13^v–14^r. See also the letter sent by the archbishop of Manila, from his post as interim governor, to Philip IV, on July 14, 1721, in which he spoke of the continuation of the orders to reestablish the presidio of Zamboanga on the site that the kings of Sulu and Mindanao had freed up for its construction (AHCJC. FILPAS–078, 1721, fol. 98^r). See also del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 56–57; Pedro Luengo, "La fortificación del archipiélago filipino en el siglo XVIII: La defensa integral ante lo local y lo global," *Revista de Indias* 77, no. 271 (2017): 727–58, here 741.

Indeed, the Muslims became strong in the southern tip of Palawan, building a fort in Ipolote. The vicar provincial of the Augustinians, friar Benito de San Pablo (dates unknown), lamented that the province of Calamianes had fallen into the hands of Sulu pirates, who “harassed the coasts of the province of Calamianes and the island of Mindoro.”³³⁵

In December 1720, the sultan of Sulu, Badar ud-Din (r.1718–32), attacked the Zamboanga presidio and placed it under siege from January to April 1721. The Spanish reacted by organizing a punitive expedition in 1721 under the command of Don Juan Antonio Fernández de Rojas (1671–1729), a civil and military engineer born in the Canary Islands, but this expedition failed.³³⁶ The following year, Don Francisco de Cárdenas Pacheco (d.1740) privately organized a company of fifty men and three ships to counter the activities of the Malay Muslim corsairs that besieged the coasts of Alutaya, Cuyo, and Mindoro.³³⁷ In 1723, Don Andrés García (dates unknown) led another military campaign that ended in disaster. However, that same year, the new governor-general, Don Toribio José Cosío y Campo (1665–1743), marquis of Torre-Campo (in office 1721–29), organized a much more costly—and more successful—expedition under the command of the governor of Manila’s Fort Santiago, Don Juan de Mesa y Aponte (dates unknown), who recovered the fort of Sabanilla of Tuboc, which had been abandoned in 1663 along with the rest of the Spanish presidios of Mindanao.³³⁸ These incursions strengthened the notion, later defended by Wenceslao E. Retana (1862–1924), that Muslims had to be “attacked in their own nests, as had been done in the times of Corcuera.”³³⁹

Sulu’s sultan, Badar ud-Din, signed a new peace treaty with the Spanish in 1726.³⁴⁰ But the following year, Muslims attacked the Christians in Cebu, on the coasts of Mindoro, and in certain regions of Mindanao. In 1730, an expedition of twenty vessels and three thousand well-armed men, under the command of Badar ud-Din’s brother, the king of Tawitawi (nicknamed *Bigotillos*, or Little Mustache [dates unknown]), attacked the islands of the southern Philippine archipelago. First, they razed the small island of Dumarán, north of Palawan,

335 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 76–77.

336 Fray Joseph Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política, en que se trata de la extensión de el Mahometismo en las Islas Filipinas* [...] (Madrid: Imp. de Alonso Balvás, 1736), 48–49.

337 AGI, *Filipinas* 118, N. 9.

338 Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política*, 49.

339 Retana, “Prólogo,” xx–xxi.

340 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 56–57. On December 2, 1720, Datu Balasi attacked the fort of Iligan with three thousand Malanaos, Tausogs, and Buayenes (Ghislaine Loyre, “The Spanish Fort of Iligan: 1750–60,” *Philippine Studies* 35, no. 2 [1987]: 163–74, here 169).

taking many captives and attacking the historical fort of Santa Isabel of Taytay. They then burned the church, the convent, and the town before retreating to the fort that they maintained in Ipolote in southern Palawan.³⁴¹

For their part, the Spanish, under the command of Governor-General Don Fernando Valdés Tamón (1681–1742, in office 1729–39), and with the approval of the audiencia, increased the presence of soldiers in the presidio of Zamboanga to the six hundred men that had originally been stationed there. An experienced military man, the governor hoped that this would discourage Sulu attacks on the province of Calamianes. The fleet was also increased to seven galleys, and they and the men were better equipped and financed.³⁴² Despite the poverty of the Philippine treasury, the governor-general was convinced that it was necessary to check Malay Muslim attacks by “taking the war into their own territory.”³⁴³ Therefore, on June 6, 1730, he convened the Junta General de Guerra, which decided to send 150 men with supplies and weapons to assist the defenders of the fort of Santa Isabel that were under attack.³⁴⁴ On June 28, a report was written to the Council of the Indies detailing the construction of four new coastguard galleys³⁴⁵ for the defense of Calamianes and two more to patrol the area around Zamboanga. But the delay in the Manila galleon’s arrival and its indispensable succor forced the governor-general to delay his plans—which included the expeditioners’ upkeep and the construction of another fort in the port of la Caldera, in southern Mindanao, to be populated by families from Bohol³⁴⁶—since the Real Audiencia de Manila opposed paying for them.³⁴⁷ Faced with the audiencia’s opposition, the governor-general

341 Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580–1792,” 417; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 59–63; Suárez, *Historia general de España y América*, tomo 11–1, 544; Martínez Cuesta, *Historia de los agustinos recoletos*, 1:539.

342 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 69; Eberhard Crailsheim, “Missionaries and Commanders: The Jesuits in Mindanao, 1718–68,” *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 9, no. 2 (2022): 207–28, here 214.

343 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 70–71.

344 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 61.

345 Galleys were ideal for intercepting enemy ships, although oarsmen were usually either slaves or convicts condemned to hard labor, which means that their loyalty was limited (del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 71). In the Philippines, they were used to protect the coasts from Malay Muslim “pirates.” See Rodríguez Castillo, “Las galeras en Filipinas,” 153–66.

346 AGI, *Filipinas* 227, fols. 13^v–14^r.

347 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 67. Arguing that the royal coffers of the Viceroyalty of New Spain had scarce funds, the audiencia of Manila responded to a dispatch of the king written on March 29, 1725 by stating that increasing Manila’s coastguard galleys from four to six was enough protection from possible invasions or attacks, and that it was not necessary to build another fort in la Caldera (the first dated from 1597) nor to

requested assistance from the natives' provincial governments, which contributed with a generous gift of twelve thousand pesos of eight-real coins, some weapons, and slaves.³⁴⁸

The resulting expedition was placed under the command of Guipúzcoa general Don Ignacio de Iriberry (dates unknown).³⁴⁹ The greater part of the fleet—constituted by the four galleys built in 1730, commanded by Iriberry himself, Admiral Don Manuel del Rosal (dates unknown), and Captains Don Pedro Zacarías Villarreal (dates unknown) and Don Andrés de Palacio (dates unknown)—left Manila on March 4, 1731 and were joined by several frigates, sampans, and *karakoas* after they had reached the presidios of Yloylo and Zamboanga.³⁵⁰ First, they razed the island of Talobo, a league away from Sulu, destroying the town and its salt flats. They then arrived at the fort of Bual, killing the local *datu*, before continuing on to the island of Capual, where they sacked crops and salt flats and destroyed villages. They finally reached the port of Sulu on April 23, 1731, but the number of soldiers was insufficient for mounting attacks on the sultan's own island, so they retreated to the presidio of Zamboanga. From there, they carried out more attacks, before returning to Manila in June.³⁵¹

In November 1731, Don Pedro Zacarías Villarreal, who had remained in the presidio and would later be named its governor (1739),³⁵² led another campaign, this time to provide assistance to the sultan of Maguindanao, Amir al-Din (r.1710–33) (Muhammad Jafar Sadiq Manamir/Maulana Diafar Sadicsa Manamir in the Spanish sources). His nephew, son of Bayan ul-Anwār, Muhammad Tahir Ud-din (known as Malinog [d.1748] in the Spanish sources), had risen up against the Maguindanao sultan—who was by then allied with the Spanish—and proclaimed himself the sultan of Salangan, with the support of the *datus* of thirty towns along the Pulangi River.³⁵³ The Spanish expedition, constituted by two galleys and two sampans, joined the Maguindanao sultan's forces, which were completed by “eleven large ships and thirty medium-sized ones, commanded by two princes of his, with many people and weapons.”

populate the surrounding area with families from Bohol (*Carta de la Audiencia de Manila al rey, Manila, 9 de julio de 1731*, AGI, *Filipinas* 227).

348 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 71.

349 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 71.

350 Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política*, 49–50; Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol,” 416; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 72.

351 Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política*, 49–51; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 72–73.

352 Vicente Rodríguez García, *El gobierno de don Gaspar Antonio de la Torre y Ayala en las islas Filipinas* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1976), 58–59.

353 Donoso, *Historia cultural de la lengua española en Filipinas*, 199–204; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 57, 99.

After laying waste to towns and fields on their way, they reached the town that housed Malinog's court, a "large town, defended by six fortresses that had thirty cannons," and although the combined forces of Amir al-Din and Zacarías Villareal defeated Malinog, they neither killed nor captured him.³⁵⁴ On their return to Zamboanga, the Spanish fleet attacked Basilan,³⁵⁵ causing great losses to the population, before returning to Manila in June 1732.³⁵⁶

While the Augustinian Recollects tried to defend their missions in the province of Calamianes, the Jesuits regarded the process of the conquest and evangelization of the islands under Spanish sovereignty as finished. They therefore sought to extend the Spanish presence to the southern extreme of the archipelago and incorporate these islands into the Philippines. In 1728, the Sicilian Jesuit Pedro José de Zissa (or Sisa [1687–1754]) rector of the *colegio* of Zamboanga, complained that there were only two priests for a population of 2,299 souls, between the baptized and catechumens, and he asked that more missionaries be sent to the region.³⁵⁷ Important members of the Society in Manila recommended abandoning the small and marginalized mission of the Marianas in order to focus on the more abundant and numerous "spiritual gardens" of the great island of Mindanao, where illustrious martyrs, such as Juan de Carpio, imitated Christ's death and passion with exceptional suffering and devotion.³⁵⁸ Governor-General Valdés Tamón, however, did not share the Jesuits' desire to strengthen the Spanish presence in Mindanao.³⁵⁹

In 1734, the governor-general faced two different fronts in the conflicts with the Malay Muslims. On the one hand, on June 11, 1733, the continued assaults of the Sulu sultanate on the province of Calamianes forced the Junta de Guerra to send two small galleys to the island of Palawan to augment the Taytay garrison with twenty-five more men while they studied the construction of a new stone fort in the town of Tagusao. This measure placed the governor-general in the orbit of the Augustinian Recollects, whose provincial, as we saw, recommended establishing a presidio in Palawan and had succeeded in having a fort there between 1718 and 1720—the demolished fort of Labo. On the other hand, the internecine conflicts in the Muslim sultanate of Mindanao provided an opportunity for Spanish intervention. Another meeting of the Junta de Guerra,

354 Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política*, 53.

355 The island of Basilan, evangelized by Father Pedro Gutiérrez, was "the granary of Sulu and Mindanao" (Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fol. 1276^r). In 1725, a treaty between the Spanish and Sulu authorities ceded Basilan to the Spanish, but this did not reduce the number of attacks (Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 244).

356 Torrubia, *Disertación histórico-política*, 87–90.

357 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 120–21.

358 Oña, *Labor evangélica*, fols. 832^v–839^r.

359 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 66–69.

on September 5, 1733, ended with the decision to send an armada of four galleys (*Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, *San Felipe*, *San Carlos*, and *San Fernando*) under the command of Sergeant Major Don Francisco de Cárdenas Pacheco, with 2,750 men, most of whom were Visaya natives. This expedition left Manila on September 30 and stayed close to the Mindanao coast, intimidating the Sulu enemies until it reached the island of Basilan, which served as its headquarters. On the way back, the Spanish captured the Dutch vessel *Langerak*, which was suspected of assisting the Muslim rebels.³⁶⁰

In 1734, the sultan of Tamontaka, Amir ud-Din Hamza (also called Amiril and Muhammad Khair ud-Din [in office 1734–55]), received Spanish assistance in his struggles against his cousin and rival, Prince Malinog, who might eventually be supported by the Dutch.³⁶¹ Soon after, he signed a peace treaty with Spain, which secured the alliance of the small kingdom of Tamontaka that had been established by Amiril's father, Amir al-Din.³⁶²

On October 25, 1735, the Jesuit Pedro Murillo Velarde y Bravo Valdivia (1696–1753), named *visitador* of the coastal missions of Zamboanga and Dapitan, recommended the conservation of the presidio of Zamboanga and the settlement of more native Christian families in its surrounding area.³⁶³ Governor-General Valdés Tamón thought that said presidio should never have been established, given the high cost of its maintenance, but that it had to be conserved now that it had been created. According to him, a garrison of six hundred men and a small armada of six galleys headquartered in Zamboanga was the only means available at present to check the advance of the Sulu sultanate.³⁶⁴ However, this measure was never carried out. According to Ángel del Barrio Muñoz, the governor took the matter to the Junta de Hacienda and ordered the *alcalde mayor* of Cebu to carry out the projected transfer of Bohol families to Zamboanga. These men were to be relieved of tribute payments, polos, and other personal services for a period of four years.³⁶⁵ That same year, Philip v (1683–1746, r.1700–46) approved the governor-general's plans, confirming the Society's wish to increase the Christian flock in the southern Philippine islands.³⁶⁶

In 1735, when Datu Lagasan, the son of Badar ud-Din, assumed the throne of Sulu, he became Sultan Mohammed Azim ud-Din I (better known in Spanish sources as Alimuddin [r.1735–48, 1764–74]) and expressed his desire to send an

360 AGI, *Filipinas* 242, N. 1, fols. 10^rff.

361 AGI, *Indiferente* 146, N. 99, fols. 1^r–4^r.

362 Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 215.

363 ARSI, *Philip*. 3, fol. 200^r.

364 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 66–69.

365 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 121.

366 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 114.

embassy to negotiate peace with the Spaniards.³⁶⁷ A year later, the princes of Mindanao wrote to Governor-General Valdés Tamón assuring him that they also hoped to sign peace treaties with the Spanish.³⁶⁸ But hostilities had neither gone down in number nor intensity in the previous years, and in fact, both Spanish and Dutch galleys had been seized by Muslim corsairs. According to Retana, dominating the southern coasts cost the Spanish “rivers of blood and silver.”³⁶⁹ On February 1, 1737, a peace treaty was signed between the Sulu representatives and the Spanish authorities in Manila, which reproduced most of the content of the treaty signed in 1725. Both sides promised to return all prisoners of war, respect trade, and assist each other in case of attack by a third party.³⁷⁰

This peace treaty did not, however, end the incursions of Malay Muslim corsairs, who continued harassing Spanish positions in Mindoro and Calamianes. For their part, the Jesuit superiors in Manila continued their dream of participating in the foundation of a Spanish protectorate in the sultanate of Maguindanao (or Tamontaca).³⁷¹ They hoped to spearhead the penetration of the island of Mindanao from a permanent and reinforced Zamboanga presidio. Sulu’s sultan Alimuddin I had by then become an indispensable ally to check the advance of the “perfidious” Malinog, whose stringent opposition to the Spanish from his small kingdom in the interior of Mindanao hindered the spread of Christianity in the region and caused instability in Alimuddin’s own sultanate.³⁷²

The native parishes, villages, and churches of the Visayas fell prey to constant raids and plunder. Faced with the necessity of protecting them from Muslim corsairs and enemies, the Jesuit missions, as well as those of the Recollects, were indispensable elements in the stabilization of the frontier and key actors in the consolidation of Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago. It

367 Eberhard Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas: Guerra, comercio y ‘piratería’ en las relaciones entre Filipinas y los sultanatos colindantes a finales del siglo XVIII,” in *Anhelos de cambio: Reformas y modernización en las Filipinas del siglo XIX*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Gruoso and Xavier Huetz de Lemps (Madrid: Polifemo, 2021), 513–42, here 518.

368 Eberhard Crailsheim, “The Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu: Festivities for the Consolidation of Spanish Power in the Philippines in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century,” in *Image—Object—Performance: Mediality and Communication in Cultural Contact Zones of Colonial Latin America and the Philippines*, ed. Astrid Windus and Eberhard Crailsheim (Münster: Waxmann Verlag GmbH, 2013), 93–120, here 96.

369 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxii.

370 Crailsheim, “Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu,” 96; del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 133–34.

371 Del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 96–104.

372 Rodríguez, *El gobierno de don Gaspar Antonio de la Torre*, 200.

was precisely this “frontier” condition, as described by Crailsheim,³⁷³ which defined those missions as links in a militant, aggressive church that threaded together the religious, the civil, and the political in a single institution before Islam.

In 1738, Father Joseph Calvo (1681–1757) wrote several reports and letters recommending the transfer of the Spanish population from Manila to Zamboanga, which had not yet been carried out, declaring it of strategic importance for the defense of the island of Mindanao, and, therefore, the Philippines. He declared that this “big island” had been one of those that “the great apostle Saint Francis Xavier” had evangelized, and therefore, the Jesuits were compelled to defend the Christians who lived there. Belying the Jansenists’ accusations that the Jesuits were only interested in prosperous societies such as those of Japan, Siam, or China, Calvo’s project demonstrated that the Society’s commitment to evangelization was equally strong in relation to spaces such as those of Mindanao and Sulu.³⁷⁴ Checking the advance of Islam in the southern Philippines was a Jesuit priority.

However, the presidio of Zamboanga and the peace treaty with Sulu was not enough to curb the corsair activities that blighted the Visayas.³⁷⁵ The only solution to stop these attacks from Mindanao and Sulu and evangelize those islands populated by gentile “enemies of Christ” was to enact a series of reforms to introduce “the faith among the *moros* without the need to use arms, for they are not as stubborn in their sect [here] as are those of Africa, and many have in times past converted to Christianity.”³⁷⁶ The Society’s superiors accordingly concentrated their efforts on defending the small Christian community of Mindanao from the Malay Muslim corsairs, whose lootings in the Visayas had continued despite the Spanish presence in Zamboanga.³⁷⁷

The first reform, according to Calvo, was to encourage the population of Mindanao and Sulu by Spanish families. But this was no easy task. The only ones willing to abandon the comforts of Manila were the poorest soldiers and captains. To entice “the most honorable and worthy” settlers, Calvo recommended handing out ten galleon *boletas* (tickets) to married soldiers and four to each single soldier, as a recompense for their willingness to conserve and defend the progress of the Catholic faith in those islands.³⁷⁸ The second reform

373 Crailsheim, “Las Filipinas, zona fronteriza,” 136–52.

374 Coello, “Políticas geo-estratégicas y misionales en el sur de Filipinas,” 729–63.

375 Crailsheim, “Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu,” 96.

376 AGI, *Filipinas* 227.

377 Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 243.

378 Carmen Yuste López, *El comercio de la Nueva España con Filipinas, 1590–1785* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1984), 20–21.

was to encourage triangular trade between Manila, Mindanao, and New Spain based on cinnamon. Settlers could use their *boletas* to directly engage in this trade.

Calvo was not alone in suggesting reforms that would increase the productivity and profitability of overseas territories. In the early 1740s, a body charged with revising imperial procedures, headed, among others, by economist Don José del Campillo y Cosío (1693–1743), proposed a series of important changes in the government and trading policies of the Indies to increase the profits obtained from the labor and natural resources of the crown's possessions, including suppressing Cádiz's monopoly as well as the *estanco* or monopolist character of the consulates of Lima, Mexico, and the Philippine Islands.³⁷⁹

In 1742, the fiscal of the Council of the Indies accepted Calvo's suggestion regarding the transfer of Christian families to Mindanao but rejected the proposal that they should be allowed to send cinnamon to New Spain.³⁸⁰ Despite the monarch's interest in fomenting the cultivation of cinnamon in Mindanao, the Cádiz Casa de Contratación (House of Commerce) and consulate rejected this ambitious reform so as not to harm the interests of the galleon traders, organized around the consulate of Mexico City.³⁸¹ The center of the Philippines, that is, Manila, constituted the basis of a trading monopoly with China and Southeast Asia via Acapulco that the merchants of New Spain did not want to lose. Since the Pacific Route, the crown had protected the rights of the residents of Manila to participate in that lucrative business,³⁸² and it did not want to confront them when, after 1740, the regime progressively transformed the galleon-based trading monopoly into a predominantly Iberian space of circulation in an "international ocean" in which all kinds of exchanges between New Spain and the Philippines took place, not just economic, but social and cultural.³⁸³

379 Miguel Luque, "El progreso de las Filipinas en el pensamiento económico del siglo ilustrado: El plan general económico [...] y el recuerdo amigable, instructivo [...] de don José Basco y Vargas" (manuscript), <http://www.economia.unam.mx/amhe/memoria/simpomio14/Miguel%20LUQUE.pdf> (accessed February 18, 2023).

380 AGI, *Filipinas* 227, fols. 1^r–26^r.

381 On June 9, 1742, Philip V wrote a letter to Governor Don Gaspar de la Torre to encourage cinnamon cultivation not only in Mindanao but in Manila as well (del Barrio Muñoz, *Vientos de reforma ilustrada*, 291).

382 Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 132.

383 Karen Wigen, "Oceans of History: Introduction," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (2006): 758–80; Mariano A. Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784)*; *La centralidad de lo marginal* (Mexico City: COLMEX & Colegio Internacional de Graduados & Entre Espacios, 2012), 367–448; Bonialian, "El

In the meantime, the English presence in the Pacific had increased. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–15) ended with the granting of the *asiento de negros*—the right to sell slaves in Spanish territories—to Great Britain and so hobbled the Dutch merchant navy that the English soon became the preeminent European mercantile power. English vessels threatened the regular traffic of the Manila–Acapulco galleons, as the two countries found themselves at war quite often in the first three decades of the eighteenth century, from 1718 to 1720, and again from 1727 to 1729.³⁸⁴ Toward 1739, conflicts between the Spanish government and Great Britain’s South Sea Company, which had the *asiento*, led to another Anglo-Spanish conflict, the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739), which became enmeshed in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48). All this impeded Calvo’s proposed triangular trade project. In 1740 and 1741, no galleons arrived in Manila from Acapulco, and the Philippine authorities hoped that the 1743 galleon would bring the royal *situados* of that year as well as those of 1741 and 1742.³⁸⁵ However, the 1743 galleon *Nuestra Señora de Covadonga* was seized by English commander George Anson (1697–1762) in the Cape of Espíritu Santo after a protracted combat, and its cargo brought the English a million and a half pesos. This great loss led the Spanish crown to again debate whether it made sense to maintain a far-flung territory whose costs seemed to outweigh the benefits.³⁸⁶

On February 13, 1744, the Council of the Indies approved another peace treaty with the sultan of Maguindanao, and that same year, the Jesuits of Manila pressured Philip v to allow them to expand their work in the southern Philippines. The monarch sent letters to the sovereigns of Sulu and Mindanao acknowledging them as kings—he referred to the latter as king of Tamontaca—urging them to convert, and to allow for the propagation of the Catholic faith in their lands and the erection of churches wherever the missionaries deemed it convenient. In 1745, the Sicilian Francisco Sassi (or Zassi [1708–34]), rector of Zamboanga, handed these royal letters to the sultan of Maguindanao, Pakir

Pacífico colonial: ¿Una Economía Mundo?,” in *Tribute, Trade, and Smuggling: Commercial, Scientific, and Human Interaction in the Middle Period and Early Modern World*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 109–32, here 128.

384 María Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo, “Las Filipinas, en su aislamiento, bajo el continuo acoso,” in *Historia general de España y América: América en el siglo XVIII; Evolución de los reinos indios*, ed. v.v.a.a. (Madrid: Rialp, 1984), 129–53; Alan Frost and Glyndwr Williams, “The Beginnings of Britain’s Exploration of the Pacific Ocean,” *Mariner’s Mirror* 83 (1997): 410–18.

385 Rodríguez, *El gobierno de don Gaspar Antonio de la Torre*, 176–79.

386 Iván Escamilla, “Nueva España como puente transoceánico del imperio español en el discurso criollo del siglo XVIII (1694–1762),” in *Nueva España, puerta americana al Pacífico asiático: Siglos XVI–XVIII*, ed. Carmen Yuste (Mexico City: UNAM, 2021), 251–82, here 274.

Maulana Kamza (r.1749–76), while Father Ignacio de Arcada did the same with the sultan of Sulu, Alimuddin I.³⁸⁷ Immediately afterward, the interim governor of the Philippines, the Dominican friar Juan de Arechederra Tobar (1681–1751, in office 1745–50), sent the Jesuits Juan Moreno (1691–1759) and Ignacio de Arcada as emissaries.³⁸⁸ His object was to establish the bases of new missions in Mindanao and Sulu, but the king of Maguindanao opposed the project, and the emissaries discovered that the Muslims were in fact reorganizing to break the peace with Spain.³⁸⁹ The reaction of Alimuddin I in Sulu was completely different. In 1746, after meeting with his court, who delegated all responsibility to his sovereign decision, he accepted the proposal made by Provincial Pedro de Estrada (1680–1748) of allowing the Jesuits José Villielmi (Josef Wilhelm [1710–48]) and Juan Anglés (1699–?) to preach the Gospel.³⁹⁰ On May 5, 1748, Alimuddin arrived at Zamboanga to retrieve the two Jesuits, but since Villielmi had died, Anglés was accompanied by Father Patricio del Barrio (1718–52).³⁹¹

This decision did not please all of his subjects, many of whom resented his sympathy for Christianity. The pressure placed on Alimuddin to alter this attitude was so strong that the Jesuits soon found themselves relegated by *ulemas* (interpreters of religious knowledge in Islam) and *datus*, who were adamant that Alimuddin's son, Muhammad Israel (dates unknown), should be instructed in Qu'ranic law.³⁹² Their situation deteriorated when Alimuddin's brother, Bantilan (1748–63), rose up against him with the intention of reneging the peace treaty with the Spanish. Alimuddin escaped with seventeen ships and many men to Zamboanga, and from there he continued on to Manila to request the assistance of the Spanish to regain his throne. He arrived on January 3, 1749, and two weeks after his entry in the capital, Governor-General Arechederra suggested that the Sultan be baptized. He eventually succeeded,

387 Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 244.

388 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 546, Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 215.

389 María Fernanda García de los Arcos, *Estado y clero en las Filipinas del siglo XVIII* (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana/Iztapalapa, 1988), 16–17; García de los Arcos, "¿Avanzada o periferia? Una visión diacrónica de la situación fronteriza de Filipinas," in *Fronteras del mundo hispánico: Filipinas en el contexto de las regiones liminares novohispanas*, ed. Marta M^a Manchado and Miguel Luque (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2011), 47–70, here 57–58.

390 Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 215–16.

391 Father Wilhelm was highly esteemed by the sultan of Sulu because he spoke Arabic as well as Malay. He died in 1748 and was substituted by Jesuit Patricio del Barrio (1718–?) (Charles E. O'Neill and Joaquín M^a Domínguez, s.J., *Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús: Biográfico-temático* [Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, 2001], 2:1424).

392 Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 216.

and on December 1, 1749 Mohammed Azim ud-Din I was baptized as Fernando I, in honor of Spain's own Ferdinand VI (1713–59, r.1746–59).³⁹³ The event was commemorated with great pomp and flair, although the Jesuits mistrusted the sincerity of the recent convert.³⁹⁴ By then, a new governor-general had been named, Don Francisco José de Ovando (in office 1750–54), but he did not take office until 1750.³⁹⁵ When he did, the sultan reiterated his request for assistance, and that same year a squadron departed from Manila with the purpose of reinstating Alimuddin (now officially called Fernando I) as sultan of Sulu, under the command of Field Marshal Ramón Abad (dates unknown).³⁹⁶ Aboard the frigate *San Fernando*, the dethroned monarch sent two letters to the sultan of Maguindanao (or Tamontaca). In the first, he asked him to consent to have missionaries preach the Gospel; in the second, written in Arabic, he told him not to pay heed to his first letter, for the Spanish had forced him to convert, and asked him instead to act upon this matter according to his conscience.³⁹⁷

When Pedro Zacarías Villarreal, the incumbent governor of the Zamboanga presidio, discovered Alimuddin's disloyalty on August 3, 1751, he ordered the sultan to be sent back to Manila in shackles.³⁹⁸ Thus, in 1751, Alimuddin, a Spanish ally, was revealed as a traitor; Sulu was ruled by an independent king hostile to the Spanish; Maguindanao had also broken its peace with the Spanish; and corsairs were sent to attack Spanish vessels. The *situado's* arrival continued to be irregular, and there was no money to ensure the employment of competent officers nor to procure the artillery and modern vessels necessary to carry out successful military campaigns against the corsairs.³⁹⁹ Ovando, who came from the navy, knew perfectly well the precarious conditions of the Philippine military apparatus. According to his report:

In the Cavite arsenal there are two rotting vessels, one dilapidated and with a broken-down keel, and the other eaten away by *anay*; a dismantled frigate; three *pataches* that might work as cargo boats; a small schooner; a barge with many dislocations; six "sea horses" of such defective

393 Retana, "Prólogo," xxiii; Crailsheim, "Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu," 93–120; Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 217.

394 Crailsheim, "Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu," 110.

395 Javier Ortiz de la Tabla Ducasse, *El marqués de Ovando, gobernador de Filipinas (1750–1754)* (Seville: CSIC, 1974).

396 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 548.

397 De la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 548–49; Crailsheim, "Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu," 98.

398 Crailsheim, "Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu," 98.

399 Retana, "Prólogo," xxv. Francisco Mallari, s.J., "The Spanish Navy in the Philippines, 1589–1767," *Philippine Studies* 37, no. 4 (1989): 412–39, here 421.

construction that they are utterly unserviceable, and five small useless boats.⁴⁰⁰

Since it was not possible to restore the fleet with the available means, and the attacks of gangs of corsairs and pirates needed to be checked, in October 1751 the Junta de Guerra decided to grant *patentes de corso* (letters of marque and reprisal) to all the Spanish subjects of the archipelago who sailed under a Spanish flag, “authorizing them to seize whatever vessels, gold, pearls, and silver they can take from the Muhammadans, and seize and enslave as many men, women, and children as are in them, without having to pay a fifth of the proceeds nor any other tax to the Royal Treasury.”⁴⁰¹ According to Retana, this policy was illegal, not only because it legitimated pillage but because it went against Spanish legislation in the Philippines, which neither approved nor protected slavery.⁴⁰² In any case, the policy was ineffectual, for Spanish subjects did not throw themselves into a “holy war” against the Sulu, Tirun, and Malanao raiders. In fact, in 1753 the Visayas were full of “small armadas of *moros* that bring desolation everywhere they go. All talk is about the robberies, burning of towns, seizure of ships, kidnappings, and insults that the *moros* carry out in our domains.”⁴⁰³ The marquis of Ovando led a punitive charge to check these attacks himself, but he ultimately sent Captain Don Antonio Faveau Quesada (dates unknown), who, unsurprisingly, did not succeed in his mission.⁴⁰⁴

Things got so bad that in 1754 “not only the islands near Sulu, but even the provinces closest to the capital” were attacked with “blood and fire” by Malay Muslims who “killed religious, Indians, and Spaniards, massacring and robbing towns and capturing thousands of Christians.”⁴⁰⁵ The Christian population of the Visayas and Mindanao suffered greatly under the corsair attacks of Camucones, Malanaos, Tirones, Joloans, and Maguindanaons. It was no coincidence that the Jesuit chronicles of the period, such as the *Relación of the Valiant Defense of the Natives of the Visayas of the Town of Palompong in the Island of Leyte, of the Province of Catbalogan in the Philippine Islands, against the Arms of the Mohammedans of Ylanos and Malanaos* (Manila, 1654), praise the heroic resistance of the Christian natives of the Philippines, urging

400 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxv; Mallari, “Spanish Navy in the Philippines,” 419.

401 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxv. See also Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas,” 518.

402 Mallari, “Spanish Navy in the Philippines,” 420.

403 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxvi; de la Costa, *Jesuits in the Philippines*, 549.

404 Mallari, “Spanish Navy in the Philippines,” 421.

405 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxvi.

them to remain firm and not abandon their villages.⁴⁰⁶ At the end of his term, Governor-General Ovando had the sad privilege of leaving the islands in the worst condition they had ever been.

In 1754, the new governor-general of the Philippine Islands, Don Pedro Manuel de Arandía y Santisteban (1699–1759, in office 1754–59), placed a Jesuit priest at the head of the squadron, “father-commander” José Ducós (1724–60), who, according to the chronicles, behaved with great valor and prudence.⁴⁰⁷ Under his command, the squadron seized more than 150 Muslim vessels, destroyed some towns, took innumerable Muslim captives, and five hundred Christian slaves were freed.⁴⁰⁸ The participation of Ducós in this violent expansion of Hispanic sovereignty belies the Jesuits’ role as peaceful intermediaries between societies in conflict. It also demonstrates the Society’s interest in extending its presence in the southern islands of the Philippine archipelago. In 1755, the Spanish and the sultan of Sulu signed a peace treaty. Trade—legitimate trade, piracy, and privateering—was reestablished between both sides, but the pressure of many anti-Spanish *datus* ended up breaking it.⁴⁰⁹ Arandía had also sent Captain Don Pedro Gaztambide as ambassador to Mindanao. Anchored before the city of Cotabato, in a well-armed galley, he took letters to the sultan of Maguindanao (or Tamontaca) that demanded that he respect the treaties and that he refrain from assisting the Sulu in their frequent attacks on the Spanish.⁴¹⁰ Gaztambide was well received by the sultan, but upon his return, he had to fight against a fleet of Maguindanao, Maranao, and Iranun (or Ilanos) people from the province of Batangas, which was led by one of the sultan’s men. His galley, which only had one hundred men, faced thirty-nine *bangkas* (lashed-lug boats, with or without outriggers) manned by more than three thousand men, of whom more than 2,500 perished.⁴¹¹ According to Retana, the Spaniards, who had a great love for founding heroes such as Viriatus (180–139 BCE), who kept the Roman legions in check for years, or El Cid Campeador (“The Champion” [c.1043–93]), who defeated Muslim enemies even after his death, found another such hero in Captain Gaztambide, the new national hero of the Philippines.⁴¹²

406 Crailsheim, “Missionaries and Commanders,” 217.

407 Crailsheim, “Missionaries and Commanders,” 220–24.

408 Crailsheim, “Missionaries and Commanders,” 223.

409 Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas,” 518, 528.

410 Agustín Santayana, *La isla de Mindanao, su historia y su estado presente, con algunas reflexiones acerca de su porvenir* (Madrid: Imp. de Alhambra y Comp., 1862), 34.

411 Santayana, *La isla de Mindanao*, 35–36.

412 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxviii; Santayana, *La isla de Mindanao*, 36.

But the worst was yet to come. Between 1762 and 1764, Manila was occupied by the British under the command of General William Draper (1721–87) in the context of the Seven Years' War (1756–63).⁴¹³ Manuel Antonio Rojo del Río Lafuente (1708–64), archbishop of Manila (in office 1757–64) and interim governor of the Philippines from 1761 to 1762—and close friend of the Jesuits—was harshly criticized for his failure to organize the defense of the capital as well as for having signed the transfer of the islands to Great Britain and offering to pay two million pesos as further compensation.⁴¹⁴ Taking advantage of this desperate situation, the Malay Muslims of the south intensified their attacks, and Alimuddin used the opportunity of the occupation to recover his lost freedom.⁴¹⁵ The former sultan had convinced the Spanish in Manila that his conversion to Christianity was sincere, and in 1764 he was placed as commander of an important part of the Spanish fortifications. At the first chance he got, Alimuddin surrendered himself and his post to the enemy, and an English officer gave him a ship with which he reached his native Sulu to reclaim the throne from his nephew Bantilan, who relinquished it without a fight.⁴¹⁶ Alimuddin expressed his gratitude to the British, sending them letters granting them the northern coast of Borneo and the islands of Tulayan and Balambangan, which were under Sulu sovereignty.⁴¹⁷

On February 10, 1763, Spain, France, and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Paris, which brought an end to the Seven Years' War.⁴¹⁸ The following year, the English left Manila. The governors-general of the Philippines, harassed by the attacks of Maguindanaons, Maranaos, Tirones, and Iranun, improved the islands' defenses, but this failed to foil such attacks.⁴¹⁹ The following year, 1764, Archbishop Rojo fell prey to melancholy and died on January 30. Two years later, the *audiencia's* fiscal Don Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes (1723–1802) requested the expulsion of the Society of Jesus, arguing that the Jesuits had handed the archipelago over to the British “in connivance with Rojo del Río.”⁴²⁰

413 Nicholas P. Cushner, ed., *Documents Illustrating the British Conquest of Manila, 1762–1763* (London: University College London, Gower St., W.C.1, 1971), 43–127.

414 Escamilla González, “Nueva España como puente transoceánico,” 277.

415 Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas,” 519.

416 Crailsheim, “Baptism of Sultan Azim ud-Din of Sulu,” 100.

417 Retana, “Prólogo,” xxviii; Descalzo Yuste, *La Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas*, 245.

418 Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas,” 519.

419 Crailsheim, “Ambivalencias modernas,” 519–20.

420 Escamilla González, “Nueva España como puente transoceánico,” 278.

8 Conclusion

In 2002, Talal Asad remarked that “Europe did not simply expand overseas; it made itself through that expansion.”⁴²¹ In their respective Asian territories, throughout the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the Iberian crowns used violence and other forms of coercion as practical methods for the spread of the Catholic faith. Jesuit martyrs performed cohesive functions as tools of propaganda as they began dying violently at the hands of the Moros, thereby reinforcing Islam as Spain and Portugal’s primary alter. However, diplomacy was always necessary to create alliances and build coalitions to keep the balance of power. As the case studies considered in these pages show, the Jesuits played a fundamental role not only as educators and missionaries but also as intermediaries between Christian and Muslim communities.⁴²² The fact that Jesuits were employed as diplomatic agents, as well as military commanders, demonstrates the intimate relationship between diplomacy and war up to the eighteenth century.

The five case studies examined in this book reveal that Jesuit approaches to Islam in Asia tended to respond to the necessities of the colonial projects of their patrons. This profound articulation between Jesuit missionary ventures and the Iberian colonial apparatus is well patent in the approach developed by Barzeus in Hormuz. Following the *modus operandi* beyond the aggressive policies of Christianization implemented in Goa and its hinterland, Barzeus designed a confrontational strategy that relied on the mobilization of the repressive resources of the Estado da Índia. However, the complex political arrangements that sustained the Portuguese protectorate over the Sultanate of Hormuz prompted the adoption of a policy of religious sufferance that frustrated Barzeus’s plans. Faced with the Portuguese authorities’ unwillingness to coerce the local population to convert to Christianity, Barzeus persisted in a confrontational strategy that sought to force Portuguese officials to intervene in support of the Jesuit mission. Barzeus’s determination to implement an aggressive policy of Christianization not only reflects the influence of the Goan experience, which followed the model of spiritual conquest and extirpation of idolatry adopted by the Spanish authorities in Mexico and Peru, but also a lack of interest in engaging with Islam. Like many other early

421 Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?,” in *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 2002), 209–27, here 220.

422 Crailsheim, “Missionaries and Commanders,” 227.

sixteenth-century Jesuits, Barzeus was immersed in a long polemical tradition that presented Islam as a heretical sect or a false religion that distorted the fundamental principles of Christian doctrine.⁴²³ These views on Islam were also reinforced by the geopolitical competition between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. The threat of the Great Turk and the perception of Islam as a risk to Christian integrity suggested the need to develop an aggressive approach that resorted to coercive methods to eradicate a dangerous heretical sect and encourage its followers to conform to Christian truth. Barzeus's confrontational strategy in Hormuz followed these guidelines. For the Dutch Jesuit, it was not possible to engage with Islam. The Muslim population of Hormuz constituted a threat to Christianity and the interests of the Portuguese crown. It was thus necessary to compel the local "Moors" to convert in order to integrate them into Christendom and the sociopolitical order of the Portuguese monarchy.

The involvement of Jesuit missionaries in the diplomatic exchanges between the Portuguese Estado da Índia and Islamic polities such as Bijapur and the Mughal Empire would encourage the development of less confrontational approaches toward Islam. Operating outside the Estado da Índia's sphere of influence, and without access to its instruments of coercion, the missionaries stationed at the Bijapuri and Mughal courts sought to identify and explore commonalities between Christianity and Islam. At the same time, local interest in European art and Christian theological and philosophical works prompted missionaries such as Jerónimo Xavier to develop a sort of "accommodationist" approach that aimed to build acceptable bridges between Islam and Christianity through the adoption of local literary traditions or the manipulation of shared links between Indo-Persian and Catholic iconography. The Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal Empire, for example, often resorted to the reverence paid by Muslims to Jesus, Mary, and St. John the Baptist, investing in the distribution of artworks related to them. More than an attempt to establish an interfaith dialogue with Islam, these Jesuit efforts sought to engage with the specific conditions of Indo-Persian courtly milieux. Following the principles of the top-down strategy theorized by Ignatius, by engaging with Indo-Persian high culture, the missionaries sought to attract the local elites and trigger the widespread conversion of the rest of the population. The success of the top-down strategy relied on the ability of the Jesuits to operate within a courtly

423 See, for example, Emanuele Colombo, "Jesuits and Islam in Early Modern Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of Jesuits*, ed. Ines G. Županov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 349–78.

environment, gain access to the ruler and his inner circle, establish partnerships with relevant courtiers or officials, and use their expertise or talents at the service of the ruler. In the case of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court, the establishment of patron—client relationships with prominent figures allowed the missionaries to secure a more or less stable presence that lasted until the dissolution of the empire.

In the Southeast Asian world, the bitter Spanish–Moro wars (the so-called “Moro Wars”) ushered in a period of tension and conflict against the Muslim Sulu, Maguindanao, and Brunei sultanates. Spanish bureaucrats and religious authorities always regarded Muslims as intruders to be expelled from the Philippines. Military confrontation was the inevitable result of almost a millennium of waging war against them in the Mediterranean. However, it was not so much ideological antagonism as commercial rivalry that ultimately led to armed aggression between Islamic sultanates and Spanish forces in the southern Philippines. To wield sovereignty over the southern islands of the Philippines to evangelize the natives and explore and exploit the natural resources of the land, it was imperative to have the Muslims acknowledge the Spanish dominion, whether by diplomatic means or by force. To achieve this goal, Jesuits López and Montiel were sent to the court of Kudarat, but they were martyred in 1655. What was really at stake was the control of trade in the Sulu Sea. In the end, war prevailed because of many factors, such as the military expeditions of Spanish governors-general (i.e., Pedro Bravo de Acuña, Juan de Silva, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera), the martyrdom of brothers and priests, the restoration of the presidio of Zamboanga, as well as the ongoing piracy in the archipelago’s waters, which lasted until the eighteenth century.

The expulsion of all Jesuits from Portugal and its overseas territories in 1759 triggered the end of the Jesuit missions in Asia. The repressive measures adopted by the Portuguese authorities not only ended the Jesuit activities across the Portuguese empire but also prompted a revamping and reorganization of the *Padroado* missionary structures in which the Jesuits were replaced by other religious orders. Portuguese anti-Jesuit policies would also be followed by the French and Spanish crowns in 1764 and 1767 respectively. In Spain, the Council of Castile, led by Rodríguez de Campomanes, conducted a veritable “witch hunt” against the Jesuits and their followers.⁴²⁴ Following the dramatic

424 Teófanos Egido, “El siglo XVIII: Del poder a la extinción,” in *Los jesuitas en España y el mundo hispánico*, ed. Teófanos Egido, with Javier Burrieza and Manuel Revuelta (Madrid: Marcial Pons & Fundación Carolina, 2004), 225–78, here 272–73. See also Enrique Giménez López, *Tempestad en el tiempo de las Luces: La extinción de la Compañía de Jesús* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2022), 9–26.

1767 expulsion of all Spanish dominions, the Society of Jesus was forced to leave the Philippines in 1769 after its arrival almost two centuries earlier from the Viceroyalty of New Spain.⁴²⁵

While the Jesuits were able to continue their exploits in territories outside Portuguese or Spanish control, the papal suppression of the Society on July 21, 1773 (*Dominus ac redemptor*) terminated the remains of the Jesuit missionary enterprise in Asia.⁴²⁶ The two missionaries who remained in Mughal India, for example, were replaced by Carmelites. In the Philippines, the Jesuits' expulsion resulted in the turnover of the Mindanao and Bohol missions to their biggest competitor in the region, the Recollects, as well as the distant Mariana Islands.⁴²⁷ The archbishop of Manila, Basilio Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufina (1728–87, in office 1767–87), and the majority of religious orders were carried away by broader and competing anti-Jesuit forces before and after the publication of the edict of expulsion on November 1, 1769.⁴²⁸ In the southern Philippines, the new missionaries strove to earn the Catholic flock's trust amid Muslim hostilities that, far from decreasing, further escalated from 1770 onward.⁴²⁹ The time of the Jesuit revival came in 1859, when Queen Isabella II (1830–1904, in office 1833–68) requested they return to the Philippines to carry out the evangelization of Mindanao and Sulu, which enthusiastically accepted as they always thought of those islands as entirely theirs.⁴³⁰

425 Santiago Lorenzo, *La expulsión de los jesuitas de Filipinas* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999).

426 Paul Shore, *The Years of Jesuit Suppression, 1773–1814: Survival, Setbacks, and Transformation*, Brill's Research Perspectives in Jesuit Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

427 Crailsheim, "Missionaries and Commanders," 228. The antagonism between Jesuits and Recollects for the exclusive right to minister in Mindanao dated back to the seventeenth century (Charles Henry Cunningham, *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as illustrated by the Audiencia de Manila [1583–1800]* [Berkeley: California University Press, 1919], 418); (Rodríguez-Rodríguez, "Mártires, santos, beatos," 697–714). However, while the Recollects strove to evangelize northern Mindanao, they never devoted more than minimal personnel and resources to the Marianas missions so that the major imprint of conquest culture took place during the Jesuit period (Alexander Spoehr, "Conquest Culture and Colonial Culture in the Marianas during the Spanish Period," in *The Changing Pacific: Essays in Honour of H.E. Maude*, ed. Niel Gunson (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1978), 247–60, here 254).

428 Teófanos Egido, "Oposición radical a Carlos III y expulsión de los jesuitas," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 174, no. 3 (1977): 529–45.

429 Retana, "Prólogo," xxix.

430 María Aguilera, "La reimplantación de la Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas: De la restauración a la revolución filipina (1815–1898)" (PhD diss., UAB, 2018), 121–30.

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