

African Navies

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Introduction

This chapter analyses the state of non-South African (SA) Southern African Development Community (SADC) navies and related maritime security capabilities since the end of the Cold War and apartheid eras with special focus on Angola and Mozambique. It discusses the challenges and prospects facing these non-SA SADC navies in fulfilling their mandates. According to Timothy Walker, maritime security in the African context refers to “the prevention and absence of maritime crimes for African communities – both states and non-states – as well as the enabling of African communities to achieve greater levels of human security.”¹ Similarly, the Brenthurst Foundation notes that maritime security from an African perspective entails “anything that creates, sustains, or improves the secure use of Africa’s waterways and infrastructure that supports these waterways.”² Accordingly, it includes “a vast range of policy sectors, information services and user communities, including maritime safety, search and rescue, policing operations, operational safety for offshore oil and gas production, marine environmental monitoring and protection, navy operations support.”³ In the same vein, maritime security has a significant bearing on stability and economic development.

Noteworthy is the fact that maritime security lacks an internationally agreed definition. This has resulted in some scholars maintaining that the concept of maritime security “depends on the perspective of the ‘end user’ and it broadens as far as the relevant stakeholders get involved. Still, contemporary maritime security is directly linked and interdependent with human security and development.”⁴ In the words of Christian Bueger:

Maritime security concerns the economic development of coastal states: the benefits of a country’s exclusive economic zone, including fishing and off-shore resource exploitation, can be realized only within effective maritime security regimes. Insecure waters can have a considerable negative impact on trade flows and transport costs. Maritime border disputes, if unresolved, carry a high potential for military escalation up

to the level of interstate war. Actors threatening or challenging state governments, including transnational criminal organizations and illegal traffickers of humans, weapons, ammunitions or goods, thrive on maritime instability.⁵

Cognisant of the foregoing exposé, the role of the navy in Angola and Mozambique inevitably includes complementing other arms of the defence forces and ensuring maritime security in their respective countries' coastlines for the furtherance of their stability and economic development.

Scholarship on SADC navies has mainly discussed various aspects⁶ with South Africa being the centre of scholarly focus.⁷ Among other countries in southern Africa, Angolan and Mozambican navies are yet to receive significant attention in academic circles except for tangential mentioning in studies focusing on different issues of either African maritime security in general⁸ or SADC and its member states' armed forces.⁹ In its discussion of the challenges and prospects of non-SA SADC navies in the post-Cold War era with special reference to Angola and Mozambique, this chapter seeks to highlight the key issues affecting these countries' naval capabilities and how they in turn affect SADC's maritime security potentiality. It also identifies important lessons that could form the foundation for improving the SADC region's approach to maritime security in future.

The chapter consists of four sections. After this introductory part, I focus on the significance of the cases of Angola and Mozambique and a brief literature survey of the state of SADC and African maritime security. After that, the discussion turns to the capabilities and challenges of the Angolan and Mozambican navies. The last section is the conclusion which also delves into the key lessons for SADC navies drawn from the experiences of Angola and Mozambique.

The Significance of Angola and Mozambique and a Brief Literature Survey of the State of SADC and African Maritime Security

Angola and Mozambique are significant case studies of non-SA SADC navies' maritime capabilities in that they share a number of similarities. Apart from both countries being former Portuguese colonies, they experienced civil wars soon after their independence, which had a bearing on their naval capabilities during and after the Cold War. The two countries also belong to the SADC region and are supposed to be among the key countries contributing to the region's maritime security strategy and capability given that they, apart from South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Seychelles, Comoros, Madagascar, and Democratic Republic of Congo, are coastal or littoral states and have navies.¹⁰ Angola and Mozambique also suffer from a common problem of trafficking, which, according to Mark Blaine and Michelle Nel, is exacerbated by "the absence of adequate patrol capabilities in harbours and coastal waters of the SADC."¹¹

Despite the aforementioned similarities, the maritime domains and challenges of Angola and Mozambique are different, as are those of other SADC countries. According to the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy, Africa's maritime domain encompasses:

all areas and resources of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on an African sea, ocean, or African lakes, intra-coastal and inland navigable waterways, including all African maritime-related activities, infrastructure, cargo, vessels and other means of conveyance. It also includes the air above the African seas, oceans, lakes, intra-coastal and inland navigable waterways and to the oceans' electromagnetic spectrum as well.¹²

In this light, Angola is one of the four SADC countries – Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Namibia – making Atlantic littorals while Mozambique is, among other countries in the region namely, South Africa, Tanzania, Madagascar, the Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, located adjacent to the Indian Ocean.¹³

Again, noteworthy is the fact that though SADC ties Angola and Mozambique and 14 more countries together, it has aggravated the challenges facing these countries' navies in that it has "a rather rudimentary and out-of-touch understanding of its own maritime security threats, as evidenced by its maritime security strategy, Operation Copper and its more recent approach to insecurity in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique."¹⁴ Though the revised SADC Maritime Strategy is yet to be publicised, it prioritises "the eradication of Somali piracy in Southern Africa; securing the west coast of Southern Africa; and securing Southern Africa's vast rivers and lakes."¹⁵ A major weakness of the SADC's present approach to maritime security is that it "is largely based on securing the maritime borders of the region and facing piracy as an external threat."¹⁶ One critic points out that the SADC maritime strategy is "strictly military rather than an integrated strategy that maps how regional security and development policies and priorities could be achieved in a common and mutually beneficial fashion."¹⁷

On the other hand, Operation Copper represents an effort to implement SADC's fledgling maritime strategy, which began in 2011 in response to the rise of piracy activities in the region.¹⁸ It remains a SA-led and dominated initiative and response to piracy in the SADC region and has been extended to other maritime threats. The fact that Operation Copper is largely pursued and supported by South Africa results in its success being solely dependent not only on that country's resources but priorities, interests, and aspirations.¹⁹ This gives credence to the view that the SA navy remains the solely credible naval force in the SADC region.²⁰ However, from a maritime security perspective, equally disturbing is the fact that the post-1994 SA Navy has been inadequately funded with far-reaching implications on its ability to maintain its position as the single formidable and dependable naval force in the region.²¹

In addition, piracy is just one of the maritime security threats in the SADC region. According to Timothy Walker, “the Southern African maritime domain is now the site of an increasing number of sophisticated transnational crimes and criminal networks involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal fishing.”²² For example, Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho states that except for Mauritania, Namibia, and South Africa, sub-Saharan African countries suffer from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing mainly due to lack of “efficient policies to counter IUU, and the means to enforce them, including patrolling capabilities.”²³ The continued lack of a coherent, robust, and well-coordinated SADC maritime security strategy is one of the main reasons why the regional economic community delayed in intervening to deal with the insecurity problems in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. Though there is no consensus regarding the causes of the insurgency in this part of Mozambique,²⁴ that country’s own weak state capacity and failure to appreciate the connection between inshore conditions of poverty and maritime security are primarily to blame.²⁵ This reinforces the observation that both African states and international donors have given insufficient attention to maritime dangers “and how maritime borders and regional waters can be protected and policed.”²⁶ Consequently, according to critics,

SADC’s maritime strategy appears to be an emergency response to an external threat that reached Southern African waters, a response that, despite being seemingly effective in the short term, reveals an unclear conception of maritime security, and a narrow approach to achieving it.”²⁷

As Mark Blaine and Michelle Nel observed, “the complexity of maritime security coupled with a lack of capacity challenges any African state in securing its maritime domain on its own.”²⁸ This underscores SADC’s need for the development of a holistic maritime security strategy as an appropriate regional instrument to enable the coordination of inter-state policies and deployments targeting sufficiently addressing a wide range of maritime insecurity.

The foregoing discussion dovetails with Augustus Vogel’s observation that the recent growth in security threats in the African maritime domain is worsened by the misalignment of the security edifices on the continent.²⁹ He argues that intergovernmental collaboration and the development of a coast-guard function is needed to sufficiently address the matter. He suggested five dimensions that separate coastguards from navies as outlined in Table 8.1, which was synthesised by Blaine and Nel.³⁰ The last column displays the present-day state of affairs in Africa, indicating the fact that the majority of the maritime forces are more linked to coastguards compared to navies. To Vogel, the contemporary maritime security situation in Africa requires that assets should be matched with demand, inter-ministerial partnerships need

Table 8.1 An outline of navies versus coastguards and the reality in Africa

	<i>Coastguard</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>African Maritime Forces</i>
Missions	Maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection, and border security within EEZ	War, international sea lanes, and foreign policy on high seas or outside national boundaries	Primarily maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection, and border security within EEZ, some foreign policy and peacekeeping abroad
Assets	Tugs, patrol cutters, aids to navigation, harbour patrol and other small boats, fixed and rotary wing aircraft for search and rescue	Amphibious landing ships, surface combatants, vessels for aerial warfare, submarines, support vessels	Hodgepodge of donations, corvettes, small patrol boats, some amphibious landing craft and submarines
Bureaucratic affiliation	Various: Homeland Security, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport	Ministry or Department of Defence	Ministry or Department of Defence
Training	Operations of assets, coastguard missions	Operation of assets, war	Operation of assets, war
Partnerships	National (judicial, fisheries, ports etc.)	Military (army, air force, etc.)	National (judicial, fisheries, ports, etc.)

Source: Blaine and Nel (2009, 114).

to be increased, and countries must embark on effective capacity-building programmes in the maritime domain.

Akin to Vogel, Prabhakaran Paleri contends that the role of coastguards is to protect the maritime domain through duties not chiefly connected to war.³¹ Though navies conduct fighting in war contexts, coastguards work in “other than war” milieus by enforcement and employment in the interest of the country within the maritime geographical area. A coastguard can be categorised as an armed force with powers of law enforcement though it cannot be classified as a combat force. It is authorised to work for the maritime community with its power integrated in the mandate. Still, a middle ground position, as suggested by Vrey and Blaine, displays that navies have proved that their roles cannot undergo radical changes but just refinement and prioritisation in line with the demands at hand and tasks assigned by political players.³² This dovetails with Joachim Krause and Sebastian Bruns’ assertion

that unlike other means such as civilian diplomacy, armies, and air forces, “naval forces are considered and employed as inherently flexible, mobile, and scalable – and thus serve to support the ends of security policy.”³³ The discussion now turns to focus on the capabilities and challenges of Angolan and Mozambican navies.

The Navy in Angola and Mozambique: Capabilities and Challenges

The discussion in this section begins by focusing on the Angolan navy’s capabilities and the challenges or threats it faces before turning to Mozambique. Its central argument is that despite numerous efforts by the two SADC member states to improve their navies’ capabilities to fulfil their mandates, they continue to lack the capacity to secure their own maritime domains, which extends to their failure to play a meaningful role in the region.

Angola

In Angola, the navy is one of the main branches, apart from the army and air force, constituting the Forças Armadas Angolanas, Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), which was established following the end of that country’s civil war in 2002. The Angolan Navy consists of 1000 personnel representing 1% of the country’s 107,000 armed force personnel.³⁴ Its “nine ocean patrol vessels, amphibious vehicles, a small naval air contingent and an equally small but growing force of marines” display a serious deficit in “maritime security capability, given the huge maritime area and coastal area over which the navy is expected to ensure security and guarantee the country’s sovereignty.”³⁵ Among the priorities of the FAA include “to acquire the capacity to safeguard the country’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)”, which is primarily the province of the navy.³⁶ Apart from a 1,600 km coastline and vast EEZ stretching around 320,000 km², Angola has “the navigable part of the Zaire river for large ships and the other rivers in the interior for small vessels.”³⁷ According to Pedro Seabra and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Angola’s “maritime boundaries with neighboring countries remain undefined. Adding to the complexity of this scenario are the country’s sizeable offshore oil reserves and their importance to Angola’s national revenues.”³⁸ The significance of maritime security in Angola is evident in that the country’s oil comprises 92% of its exports, 80% of government revenue, and 40% of gross domestic product, the bulk of it from offshore fields, and 80% of it was predicted to be coming from “ultra-deep” fields by 2012.³⁹ On the other hand, the fishing industry is not only an important source of foreign earnings for the country but 50% of protein intake by its people.⁴⁰ This shows that Angola requires not only an adequately equipped naval force able to execute its duties but also one with the capability to deploy in combined operations involving the three branches of the FAA.

The navy’s capability to fulfil its mandate as a branch of the FAA is largely questionable. For instance, the Angolan Navy lacks adequate resources for

the protection of the EEZ. As Ana Leao and Martin Rupiya note, “without adequate vessels – ocean patrol boats, corvettes or frigates – and maritime reconnaissance and patrol planes, it is impossible to fulfil this essential task.”⁴¹ This is against the reality that “an important part of the country’s wealth lies in the maritime zone – fisheries, oil and other minerals....”⁴² Representing another key threat to the Angolan navy’s capability has been “the spreading of patrolling responsibilities by different entities – oil companies, the Ministry of Fisheries, the maritime police, the navy and possibly others” resulting in the lack of coherence and efficiency, and making a quick and adequate reaction to threats not only challenging but expensive because of duplication and overlap of roles.⁴³

The weaknesses of the Angolan Navy are worsened by the fact that though army and air force combined operations have been carried out successfully including during that country’s civil war, the navy has no history of doing that with either of the two other branches of the FAA. In fact, the weak position of the navy dates back to the Angolan civil war. According to Leao and Rupiya,

During the civil war, due to the strength of the land component, the navy was neglected to the point where it was never equipped with appropriate ships and landing craft. Besides sporadic transport and logistical support for the forces, either by sea or river, the few experiences in the field of naval operations combined with land forces involved the marines.⁴⁴

The Angolan Navy is yet to fully develop its capabilities. Angola’s lack of a significant naval or coastguard capability to deter or counter increasing maritime crimes was displayed when pirates left the more secured Gulfs of Aden and Guinea to operate in less risky regions including Cabinda in the 2010s.⁴⁵ Indeed, Angola is exposed to different maritime concerns including:

the protection of oil platforms, natural gas wells, and shipping lanes, which make up the main source of national revenue... But occasional skirmishes in Cabinda, near the DRC, are also brought up as a continuous source of concern. Cases of illegal fishing and illegal immigration stemming through the Congo River also figure high as potential security risks.⁴⁶

Moreover, the attack on the Greek tanker *Kerala* in Angolan waters in 2014 not only displayed the equipment gaps of the Angolan Navy but strengthened lingering concerns and perceptions of the country’s exposure to security threats deriving from the sea.⁴⁷

The above vulnerabilities of Angola’s maritime domains saw the country, in recent years, seeking to improve the capacity of its navy through a number of initiatives. As Luis Manuel Bras Bernardino observes, Angola’s small

naval capability amid growing maritime threats compelled it to develop and invest “in new equipment and specialised crew training as a way of finding a balance between operability and representation among the other armed forces instruments.”⁴⁸ For example, between 2013 and 2019, Angola sought to expand its small navy by ordering and acquiring three HSI 32 patrol craft, a long-range offshore patrol vessel and a short-range patrol vessel of Vigilante-1400 and Vigilante-400 models from France, and two patrol boats, radars, and six helicopters (four AW139s and two A109Ks) from Italy.⁴⁹ In 2016, the Angolan Navy received four Super Dvora Mk III patrol craft while in 2017 its Cessna Citation jet was delivered following some modifications to maritime patrol configuration including the fitment of a Seaspray radar from Israel and three C295MP maritime patrol aircraft were ordered from Spain in 2018.⁵⁰ In 2019, the Angolan Navy awarded Namibia’s Namdock a contract to repair and maintain its vessels, train its crew, and related services.⁵¹ The Angolan government has also upgraded its port facilities, and in May 2019 awarded a 270 million euro contract to Mota-Engil from Portugal to modernise facilities at Soyo. The main work to be done included “dredging, the construction of quays and buildings and other infrastructure.”⁵² Prior to these efforts to maintain and expand the Angolan Navy’s fleet, it consisted of “four Mandume class (Bazan Cormoran) fast attack craft, ten patrol boats, three fisheries patrol vessels (operated by the navy on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries), and several LDM-400 landing craft.”⁵³

Despite the preceding efforts by Angola to improve its naval capabilities, it continues to be incapacitated in many ways and is accused of not doing enough to enhance the SADC region’s maritime security. For example, though Angola is a key participant of the SADC Standing Maritime Committee charged with the responsibility to enhance the region’s maritime security, “it remains far more focused on West African and Gulf of Guinea-focused maritime security issues than on those of Southern Africa.”⁵⁴ Angola also lacks a hydrographic office and continues to rely on hydrographic information produced by Portugal.⁵⁵ Additionally, the spirited modernisation efforts of the Angolan Navy are yet to reverse the fact that “the navy accounts for little over 1 percent of the total budget for the Angolan Armed Forces, and the country’s main vessels are still operated by the Ministry of Fisheries.”⁵⁶ Again, Angola’s weak military capacity in general has forced the country to commit itself to offer military support to its regional neighbourhood without the capacity to do so. The country has a history of numerous ill-fated experiences in most of its efforts to assist its regional neighbours such as DRC, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. It also retracted its expression of interest to send troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).⁵⁷ Consequently, Angola’s weak naval capability can be viewed as an extension of the general feeble military capacity of the country.

Mozambique

Akin to the FAA, the navy is a branch of the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM), Mozambique Defence Force, apart from the army and air force, established after the end of that country's civil war in 1992. Upon their establishment in 1994, Mozambique's naval forces were trained by Portuguese instructors.⁵⁸ Out of a 30,000 strong force, the navy was made up of 2,000, while the army had 24,000, and air force had 4,000 men.⁵⁹ According to *Military Balance*, the Mozambican Navy's inventory consists of only 14 patrol and fast patrol boats.⁶⁰ Among the main roles of the Mozambican Navy include conducting "a variety of missions as part of the Armed Forces of the state and reinforces the activities of the other services" and safeguarding the country's 2800-kilometre-long coastline and territorial waters and EEZ which are found in the Indian Ocean.⁶¹ Patricio Yotamo further notes that maritime elements of security in Mozambique seek:

To secure the movement of people and goods in conditions that are free from risk, the protection of the natural resources of the country at sea and in waterlogged areas, compliance with national and international legislation relating to the use of the sea, and the protection of the national sovereignty of Mozambique.⁶²

This shows that Mozambique, akin to Angola and any other SADC coastal or littoral state, needs to have a strong naval capability to guarantee its stability and economic development.

The Mozambican Navy, similar to the air force, remains without capability to fulfil its mandate. The incapacity of the FADM as a whole was displayed in the wake of the 2000 floods. The then-president Joachim Chissano told the media that the country was not able to efficaciously respond to the disaster because the navy solely remained "with 'no boats but only with sailors' and an air-force with pilots but no aircraft."⁶³ In 2009, Rear Admiral Patricio Yotamo admitted that

As a country Mozambique does not possess a powerful capacity to assert its maritime or naval power, while as a result of its unique history, long coastline and its natural resources at sea, the sea is of much value to the state and coastal activities have traditionally been very important to its people.⁶⁴

That the FADM as a whole is ill-equipped was laid bare by the International Crisis Group when it noted that there has been serious under-investment in Mozambique's armed forces, resulting in its reliance on the Wagner Group and Dyck Advisory Group mercenaries to respond to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado.⁶⁵ Noteworthy is the fact that though the whole of FADM suffered from lack of investment during the late 1990s into the 2000s, the navy suffered

immensely through a corruption scandal “in which state-backed companies took on more than \$2 billion in questionable debt guaranteed by the state to finance the purchase of maritime assets” but none was delivered.⁶⁶

Akin to Angola, also revealing the fact that Mozambique lacks any naval or coastguard capability to deter or counter increasing maritime crimes, Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho observes that pirates, particularly Somali pirates, chose to operate “inside the Mozambique Channel, where surveillance was much softer and the risks far less” in the wake of increasing surveillance and security in the Gulf of Aden since 2008.⁶⁷ The lack of adequate naval assets witnessed Mozambique being mainly able “to provide personnel on board SA Navy ships involved in Operation Copper.”⁶⁸ For Hamad B. Hamad, though Operation Copper was launched in pursuit of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) among South Africa, Mozambique, and Tanzania to deal with the piracy challenge in the Mozambican Channel, “Tanzania and Mozambique contributed almost nothing, with South Africa financing the entire operation, including the deployment of its naval vessels in the region.”⁶⁹

In recent years, there have been efforts targeting improving the capacity of Mozambique’s navy. For instance, Mozambique entered into “an agreement in September 2013 to purchase six patrol and interceptor vessels for its navy designed for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism activities and countering illicit trafficking.”⁷⁰ In 2014, the country also bought 30 fisheries patrol ships to the tune of €200 million from France.⁷¹ Among the two deliveries of major conventional arms Mozambique received between 2016 and 2020, one included “two Fast Interceptor patrol boats from India.”⁷²

Although all the aforementioned investments were important for Mozambique to make in order for the country to boost its deterrence capacity in the maritime domain, the country is still incapacitated to ensure maritime security, evident in its continued reliance on South Africa to stem the tide of piracy and the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The Mozambican navy is also still lacking in many areas. For example, according to Emily Estelle and Jessica Trisko Darden, the Islamist insurgents’ basic naval capability posed serious problems to the Mozambican Navy’s 200 personnel and 11 patrol boats.⁷³ The significance of naval capabilities in fighting the insurgents in Cabo Delgado province was displayed by some commentators who considered the deployment of the South Africa Navy’s SAS Makhanda strike craft in Pemba, Mozambique, in early August 2021 as heralding a clear “battle plan to rid the area of a brutal insurgency.”⁷⁴ This South Africa Navy’s strike craft was joining a tiny maritime contingent of the Southern African Development Community’s intervention brigade better-known as the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

Almost similar to Angola, another challenge is that Mozambique continues operating with a small hydrographic office with no hydrographic information production capacity. This has left the country’s navy continuing to rely on hydrographic information produced by the United Kingdom.⁷⁵ Put together, there is no doubt that Angola and Mozambique continue to lack the

capacity to secure their own maritime domains, which extends to their failure to play a meaningful role in the SADC region regardless of their numerous efforts to improve their navies' capabilities so that they fulfil their mandates.

Conclusion: Lessons and Way Forward to Improve SADC Navies

This chapter has focused on the non-SA SADC navies' capabilities and challenges using the cases of Angola and Mozambique. It demonstrates that despite some efforts targeting modernisation of naval equipment and infrastructures by the two SADC member states to improve their navies' capabilities to fulfil their mandates, they continue to lack the capacity to secure their own maritime domains, which extends to their failure to play a meaningful role in the region. The main challenges affecting these two countries' naval capabilities include, but are not limited to, insufficient patrol capacity in their harbours and coastal waters, failure to appreciate the link between inshore conditions of poverty and maritime security, lack of hydrographic offices, and inadequate budgetary support. Beyond doubt, these challenges affect SADC's maritime security potential. The weak naval capabilities of Angola and Mozambique have significantly contributed to the lack of an up-to-date and robust SADC maritime strategy and capability because the two are among the sub-region's coastal or littoral states with navies. Given the inadequacies of non-SA SADC navies, especially those of Angola and Mozambique discussed in this chapter, the following three key lessons can be drawn to improve the region's future approach to maritime security.

First, a holistic rather than a strictly security-based approach to maritime security is required. As discussed in this chapter, an exclusively security-based approach is inadequate because, among others, sources of maritime insecurity go beyond the piracy threat. Maritime security is inextricably linked to the broader stability and economic development of the entire country, hence the region's maritime strategy needs to essentially reflect that. In fact, SADC's maritime security strategy needs to emphasise the role of non-security stakeholders and espouse good governance practices in the regional economic community's member states. Maritime security issues, akin to any other security concern, should not be solely a purview of politicians and the navy and other branches of the armed forces. Society, particularly coastal communities, needs to be considered in the development of a holistic maritime strategy given the nexus between inshore conditions and maritime security. The insecurity in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province has displayed the need to address poverty conditions in coastal areas and prevent the rise of not only maritime insecurity but also general instability in that country in particular and region in general.

Second, the SADC member-states, especially coastal ones, need to assume larger roles and duties and ease the burden on South Africa alone for a truly regional and effective maritime security strategy to be seen to be in force. This is informed by the fact that ensuring maritime security is likely to bring huge

benefits to the entire region consisting of both coastal and landlocked countries, particularly when trade and other economic enterprises such as tourism and fishing are put into perspective. The fact that landlocked states need the ocean for trade suggests that there is need to find ways in which Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana should also meaningfully participate in ensuring maritime security in the SADC region.

Lastly, SADC countries' defence budgets should be proportionately expanded to meet the demands and costs of maintaining an effective navy capable of ensuring maritime security. As the discussion on the cases of Angola and Mozambique has shown in this chapter, among other challenges, the navy is insufficiently resourced in terms of financial, material, and personnel resources, resulting in it failing to have the requisite capacity to fulfil its mandate.

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Notes

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