Kristina Kamp · Ayhan Kaya
E. Fuat Keyman
Özge Onursal Beşgül *Editors*

Contemporary Turkey at a Glance

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Local and Translocal Dynamics

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Content

Preface

The series »Contemporary Turkey at a Glance« seeks to promote the work of young researchers committed to the study of contemporary Turkey. As series editors, we particularly wish to present interdisciplinary research that searches for holistic perspectives on the political, social, and cultural transformations of the country. This first volume of the series is based on the international conference *Contemporary Turkish Studies at a Glance – Topics, Institutions and Future Perspectives,* which took place at Istanbul Bilgi University on October 13 and 14, 2012.

The conference and this volume were realized thanks to a close cooperation between the European Institute at Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul Policy Center, and Network Turkey. Further partners included the British Institute, Ankara, the French Institute of Anatolian Studies, the Netherlands Institute for Higher Education, Ankara, and the Institute of Turkish Studies, Georgetown University. Our special thanks go to our colleagues at Stiftung Mercator, who funded and supported the event and this publication through the project *Network Turkey – Academic Community for Turkish Studies.*

We would also like to thank the key note speakers and panel chairs, as well as the researchers who presented their work, and of course, the attendees who contributed with their critical questions and comments. We personally thank the coordinator of the conference and co-editor of this volume, Kristina Kamp, for her engagement. Furthermore, we are grateful for the support of co-editor Özge Onursal Beşgül, Aslı Aydın and Refika Saldere from Istanbul Bilgi University as well as Susan Rottman and Kerem Öktem from Network Turkey, for their professional support.

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We are grateful for the support of the institutions and individuals who have cooperated with us in the last two years. Their efforts and engagement have made this volume possible.

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Introduction

In the last twenty years, Turkey has witnessed significant social, cultural, and political change. This transformation has been visible in all walks of life and sectors of society, from political ideologies to the institutional set up of the state. As the country is changing, so is the academic literature, which has been expanding in parallel to Turkey's growing economy and differentiating society. In this collection, 12 authors seek to elucidate the dynamics of this transformation from a distinctively interdisciplinary perspective with a focus on innovative conceptual approaches, and with the aim to introduce new methodologies to the study of modern Turkey.

The volume deals with the most important fault lines of Turkey's complex society. The contributors focus on issues of citizenship, religion, politics, gender, minority rights, the dynamics of transnational movements, and the growing importance of the Turkish diaspora. Inspired by the debates on deliberative democracy and by critical theory, the authors aim to revisit existing concepts, models, and methodologies to overcome binary explanations of protest and contestation against the state. The emphasis here is on the interactive nature of contestation in heterogeneous multi-organizational fields and multi-national settings. Established dichotomies of East and West, modernity and tradition, and secularism and Islam are put to the test.

This collection has three aims. The first is to re-examine ethno-cultural and ethno-religious relations in Turkey with a critical perspective on nation building. Some authors suggest that Turkey has now entered a phase of coming to terms with its troubled past and that this process provides some hope for a deepening of the country's democratic culture. The second aim is to shed light on social, political, and cultural movements, and to investigate the way these groups challenge constructed notions of the public, by the Turkish state. We need only to remember the Gezi protests of May–June, 2013 to see the extent to which some citizens of the

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Turkish Republic wish to play a greater role in shaping this public space. Developments in the field of Kurdish and Alevi rights, the changing role of religion in the public, and the increasingly visible presence of LGBT activists are all manifestations signifying how the ideology of the state and the ruling party is being challenged. Third, the authors emphasize that the debates on identity, citizenship, national belonging, ethnicity, religion, and culture are no longer territorialized, but have taken on transnational and trans-local qualities.

The essays of the volume's first section deal with efforts of *Appropriating the Past.* They focus on distinct practices that actors employ in order to challenge established official narratives.

Eray Çaylı discusses the role of architectural memorialization and particularly the contested memory politics of the ›Sivas Massacre‹. Sites of massacres can be pacified and controlled by techniques of ›museumification‹, and this is precisely what state agencies have been doing with the museum they established in the former Madımak Hotel. The outcome of such state action is that rather than commemorating the victims, such museums become symbolic markers for the government's rather shallow democratization discourse. Çaylı proposes the notion of a ›witness site‹, where past events are not only remembered, but where evidence is gathered and testimonies are narrated.

Caroline Tee explores the liminal space between conflict and incorporation in her study on Alevi engagement with hegemonic majority discourses. Exploring different positions within the contemporary Alevi Movement, her case study presents an Alevi group from Erzincan, which differs from other Alevi groups in that they reveal their openness to negotiation with authorities.

Belin Benezra's institutional history of family planning in Turkey traces the roots of this policy back to the founding years of the Turkish Republic. She shows how family policies have always been in the service of the state's larger demographic and political needs. This trend, she remarks, is also reflected in the most recent neo-liberal health reforms. With the aim to ensure the sustainability of state pensions, family planning has now been almost dropped in the discourse employed by leading AKP cadres.

The second section, *Challenging Authority,* explores the fields of public contestation and negotiation of identity. The authors reconstruct the ways whereby authority is challenged in the public sphere and map emerging repertoires of social action.

Laura Tocco criticizes the concepts of civil society, which have dominated the Turkish debate thus far, and proposes a perspective influenced by the work of Marx and Gramsci, which have also been very widely used in the analysis of politics and society in Turkey. Tocco argues that the Turkish Republic was built as a typical case of class hegemony. Her analysis of articles from the feminist weekly

Kadın Gazetesi reveals Kemalist undertones in the debate over women's rights, asserting the hegemonic state even in what is commonly assumed to be a movement critical of state intervention.

Doğu Durgun and **Elif Kalaycıoğlu** provide a comparative analysis of Muslim women's organizations on the one side and LGBT groups on the other, looking into shared claims for citizenship and the possibility for alliance building. Their study suggests that actors can indeed transcend binaries such as republican/liberal, equality/difference, and public/private, if the conditions of a shared interest are present.

İpek Gencel Sezgin posits that identities are in no way essential, but contingent and unpredictable. This is also true, she argues, for political Islam and other political ideologies. Sezgin explores the recruitment patterns of the National Outlook Movement and of right-wing networks in Kayseri between 1960 and 1980, and examines their practices and identity frames. She detects a very large overlap between the two networks. Reconstructing the movement's identity as the combined product of conscious efforts and unintentional processes, she draws attention to the interplay of the national and local levels in the political field.

Feyda Sayan-Cengiz shows how lower middle class working women with headscarves struggle with hegemonic narratives about them, and how they seek to subvert those narratives by differentiating themselves from what they call the ›really conservative‹. This chapter strongly suggests that contrasting the headscarf as a symbol of Islamic identity against the once hegemonic ideal of secular women has become obsolete both in theoretical and public debates.

Anne Schluter finds a comparable trend in the language choices of Kurdish workers in Istanbul. Her findings illustrate how Kurds use both Turkish and Kurdish to achieve differentiated sociolinguistic goals and to cater to different audiences. Her paper provides linguistic evidence that the two languages are more likely to be representative of compatible rather than competing identities.

The final section on *Transnational Dynamics* extends beyond the territory of the Turkish nation-state. The contributions in this section illustrate how the global presence of citizens of the Turkish Republic as well as communication and transport technologies enable them to both reproduce and challenge the territorially-defined identities across national borders.

Özlem Altan Olcay and **Evren Balta Paker** explore a recent practice among Turkish elites. In order to acquire a second citizenship for their children, some families opt to give birth in the United States. The authors conceptualize the case as ›market embedded transnationalism‹ in which citizenship becomes commodified, as it can be obtained through market mechanisms. In this vein, it can be inferred that the meanings of transnational citizenship are shaped by commodification and market performance, hence contributing to existing inequalities in novel ways.

Çiğdem Bozdağ pays attention to the important role of digital mass media for migrant communities as they help to maintain networks with their countries of origin. Attempting to fill the gap of research in this field, she provides examples from two cases, which illustrate how digital media intensifies transnational practices at the micro level and changes the character of migrants' encounters with Turkey in their everyday lives.

Exploring the example of Bulgarian Turks, **Nevin Şahin-Malkoç** studies the adaptation strategies of immigrants in Göçmen Konutları (Migrants' Houses). Göçmen Konutları is a residential area in Istanbul initially built for Bulgarian Turkish refugees, who arrived in Istanbul in the late 1980s. This community is now bordering on another residential area, Başakşehir, which is popular among conservative Muslims. Şahin-Malkoç illustrates how the memories from Bulgaria are revived, how the transnational immigrant identity is reproduced, and how physical and social isolation fosters the contestation of »homeland« and »dreamland«.

The volume finishes with **Doğuş Şimşek's** discussion of young Turks and Kurds in London. She investigates how relations with the country of origin, the city of residence, and local neighbourhood are constructed through everyday life experiences. In particular, she discusses how the engagement of Turkish and Kurdish youth, with these three spatial levels, influences the definition of their sense of self and belongingness to the country of origin and the country of residence.

The complexity of Turkish society, culture, and politics, and its on-going transformation call for interdisciplinary perspectives. This volume comprises a variety of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches to Turkish Studies. The findings of the twelve authors of this book contribute significantly to providing an enhanced understanding of contemporary Turkey. Furthermore, this book generates new research questions and stimulates further in-depth analysis.

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Architectural Memorialization at Turkey's ›Witness Sites‹: The Case of the Madimak Hotel

Eray Çaylı

Background and Context

In Turkey, the second half of the 20th century was marked by a series of military interventions in politics. This period, which also witnessed several atrocious events or phenomena, has had a long lasting political and sociopsychological impact in the country. Dubbed by many ›the coup era‹, the period is a major reference point for present-day political discourses and social struggles pursued by various actors. Among these actors is the ruling Justice and Development Party *(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)* who, in their decade old rule, have adopted a discourse of post-coup democratization[1] and of ›coming to terms with‹ the ›coup era‹. But the ruling party has not been unchallenged, as their discourse has been highly contested by rights-seeking communities who identify strongly with the victims of the coup era's atrocities. Representatives of these communities have called for the government to publicly acknowledge the state's responsibility in the atrocities. Moreover, they call for the law to hold perpetrators legally accountable, in order to enable a redress of what they regard as the »continuing injustice« (Çandar 2012). A number of judicial and legal shortcomings suggest, however, that their demands are far from being met. These include unresolved court cases, cases that ›lapsed‹ due to the statute of limitations, limited investigations that failed to account for offi-

1 A case in point epitomizing the government's discourse is an op-ed article written in 2011 for the *Guardian* by the government spokesman Bülent Arınç. In this article, the spokesman suggests, »Turkey has now left the coup era behind« and »democracy and democratic institutions in Turkey are firmly established.« Entitled »Mandate for a new Turkey,« Arınç's article was published the morning after Turkey's June 12th general elections, in which his AKP received 50 percent of the popular vote. *http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/13/mandate-for-a-new-turkey*

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cial authorities' role in the atrocities, and numerous perpetrators who have managed to flee justice.[2]

These vast judicial and legal shortcomings have, in a way, caused the site of contestation over the past to move from courts of law to ›witness sites‹ – a term I will develop and use in this paper to refer to Turkey's sites of atrocity.[3] Today, each of these sites is inseparably associated with a particular atrocity, whose victims' legacy is claimed by a specific community. What is more, each community has demanded that ›their‹ witness site be turned into a museum in memory of victims. Although the majority of these demands are yet to be met, and most witness sites continue to serve their original purposes, they have recently become subject to projects of architectural transformation. But, in the case of those projects which have in fact been realized, the overall function resulting from the transformation has not always been overtly commemorative.

A prime example of Turkey's witness sites is the Madımak Hotel in the city of Sivas. On July 2nd, 1993, the hotel witnessed the event known today as the ›Sivas Massacre‹, when a rioting mob set fire to the hotel while individuals invited to the city for a culture festival were still inside. As a result, 37 civilians, 33 of whom were festival guests, perished. The festival was organized by an association representing Turkey's Alevi, a religious cum spiritual community whose practices and rituals differ fundamentally from those followed by the Sunni – the demographically predominant sect of Islam in Turkey. Members of the Alevi community are also the ones today to identify strongly with the victims of the atrocity. Although the 1993 arson attack is believed to have been the work of what seemed to be a Sunni Islamist fundamentalist mob, the then state authorities have also been blamed by associations representing the community for failing to prevent the events despite their presence at the scene of crime. But these authorities remain yet to be tried and sentenced, as the aforementioned judicial and legal shortcomings have also been brought to bear in the case of the Sivas atrocity.

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2 Each of these legal shortcomings pertains also to the court case on the Sivas Massacre. See Euronews. 14 March 2012. Turkey judge drops case against Sivas hotel fire suspects. Available online at *http://www.euronews.com/2012/03/14/turkey-judge-drops-case-against-sivas-hotel-fire-suspects* Last accessed 30 September 2012.

3 Such sites include the Madimak Hotel where 37 were killed by arson on July 2nd, 1993; the Diyarbakir Prison where tens of Kurdish political inmates were tortured *en masse* over the years that followed the 1980 coup; the recently museumified Ulucanlar Prison where key revolutionary figures from the 1970s leftist student movement were hanged; and Yassıada, the island off Istanbul where the trials of then-ruling *Demokrat Parti* members took place after the 1960 coup (three of those tried therein, including the then prime minister Adnan Menderes, were later sentenced to death and executed). All of these sites are subject to current museumification demands, debates and/or projects.

Concurrent with these shortcomings, the years that followed the atrocity saw the Madımak Hotel emerge as a site of contestation. The site first underwent repair to be relaunched as a hotel. A few years later a charcoal grill restaurant opened in its ground floor. Over the years, it was subjected to Alevi associations' unmet demands for museumification – namely for a ›Museum of Shame‹ – and their onsite demonstrations of this demand. In the face of accumulating pressure, state authorities decided in 2010 to expropriate and transform the building. After a very secretive process in which the wider public was completely uninformed about the site's upcoming function, the transformation was completed in the spring of 2011, and the building was inaugurated as a ›Science and Culture Center‹. The intended audience for the new center is elementary school children, as it hosts a children's library, audiovisual rooms, and labs for simple science experiments.

The state's unwillingness to accede to the demand for Madımak's museumification, along with the aforementioned judicial and legal shortcomings, has foregrounded the commemorative demonstrations held in Sivas on the atrocity's anniversary as »the arena where the court case is being held.«[4] In addition to being the platform where the demand for museumification has been promulgated, these demonstrations have also seen the raising of other Alevi demands for ›equal citizenship rights‹.[5] As part of my fieldwork over the past year and a half, I attended the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations in Sivas to study both the recent transformation of the Madimak Hotel into a ›Science and Culture Center,‹ and its impact on the way in which the demonstrators related to the atrocity through the site where it took place. I have studied the ›Science and Culture Center‹ also outside anniversa-

4 This is how Kemal Bülbül referred to the Madımak Hotel and its vicinity when he addressed demonstrators during the on-site mass commemoration held on July 2nd, 2012 in Sivas. Bulbul is the current president of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association, the main Alevi organization pursuing the Sivas case on both social and legal platforms. Members of this association include families of the Sivas Massacre victims.

5 These demands include the abolition of The Presidency of Religious Affairs (in Turkish: *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı,* the state institution representing the highest Islamic religious authority in Turkey, established in 1924 following the abolition of the caliphate), the official recognition of Alevi places of ritual as religious facilities, and the removal of mandatory religion lessons in secondary school curriculum. See Karabat, Ayşe. 8 November 2008. Rallies across Turkey highlight Alevi demands. *Today's Zaman.* Available online at *http://www.todayszaman.com/news-158159-rallies-across-turkey-highlight-alevi-demands.html* Last accessed 30 September 2012. For further discussions of the atrocity's role in identity formation among members of the Alevi community, see Şahin, Şehriban. 2005. The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion. *Current Sociology* 53,3: 465–485 (in the case of community members in Turkey), and Yıldız, Ali Aslan and Maykel Verkuyten. 2011. Inclusive victimhood: Social identity and the politicization of collective trauma among Turkey's Alevis in Western Europe. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 17,3: 243–269. (in the case of community members abroad).

ries and conducted participant observation and semi structured interviews at the site, as well as at other relevant memorials and commemorative events in different settings in Turkey (in the cities of Sivas, Izmir, Ankara, Hacıbektaş, etc.) and abroad (in London). My initial findings from the field raise significant challenges for discussions around Turkey's sites of atrocity. Although my fieldwork has encompassed a range of events and sites, in this paper I will discuss these challenges only in light of my work during the last two onsite commemorations in Sivas.

The challenges presented by my case concern both the public debate on Turkey's sites of atrocity and their scholarly discussions. The former challenge calls for a problematization of the demand for ›museumification‹, and for a nuanced understanding of this notion which would better relate to the particularities of the current situation in present-day Turkey. The latter challenge concerns established theories on materiality and memory, which are often uncritically deployed whilst attempting to discuss, what I call, Turkey's witness sites. But first a brief theoretical discussion is needed in order to explain why and how these challenges are worth addressing.

Theory

To be sure, issues surrounding sites of atrocity and their memorialization have long been of interest to scholars. But these issues are believed to have recently – in the postwar years – become a topic of much larger sociocultural relevance. Seeking to capture the essence of this increasing relevance, scholars have come up with terms such as »obsession with memory« (Huyssen 1995: 1–9), »the global rush to commemorate atrocities« (Williams 2007) and »the memory boom« (Winter 2006). Postwar years have indeed seen a ›boom in production,‹ as much more has been written on the topic and much more built, for that matter, in the form of monuments, memorials and museums. The question arises, however, as to whether and how the scholarly understanding of materiality's role has evolved to cope with this increase in the sociocultural relevance of memory – especially the nuanced form it takes in different contexts. In order to address this question briefly, in this paper I will discuss two seminal examples: first, Alois Riegl's »The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Origin,« (Riegl 1982 [1903]) dates back to the early years of the 20th century and is therefore meant to represent a pre-World Wars approach. The second work, Pierre Nora's *Realms of Memory* (1996a), on the other hand, is a postwar text which has had immense scholarly influence over the last two decades.

In his essay, Alois Riegl distinguishes between intentional and unintentional monuments. Among the two categories, the latter seems fit for Turkey's witness sites as it is meant to comprise sites that owe their memorial significance not to

the intentions of their designers and builders, but to the events they witnessed during their post construction lifetime. Riegl then discusses the significance of unintentional monuments via the notion of ›value‹, where he distinguishes between »present-day value« and »commemorative value« (Riegl 1982 [1903]). He suggests that the present-day values of monuments have to do with purposes different from commemoration as they deny the memorial function of the monument. An example of present-day value, for Riegl, is use-value, in other words the practical functional performance of the object. For commemorative value, on the other hand, Riegl gives the example of age-value which »manifests itself . . . in the corrosion of surfaces, in their patina, in the wear and tear of buildings and objects« (Ibid: 32). In brief, Riegl argues that while use-value requires the upkeep of the unintentional monument against the traces of time, those very traces in fact also give the monument its commemorative value.

In his 1996 work *Realms of Memory,* Pierre Nora suggests a distinction between *lieux de mémoire* (places of memory) and *milieux de mémoire* (realms of memory) (1996a). For Nora, *lieux de mémoire* are places »where memory is crystallized« and they exist »because there are no longer any *milieux de mémoire,* settings in which memory is a real part of everyday experience« (1996b: 1). According to Nora, the latter term refers to a proto-modern era when memory was much more a part of everyday life, whereas the former indicates the modern condition when society's relationship with the past started evolving into a spatially and temporally bound experience. Monuments, memorials, and commemorations are among Nora's prime examples for this shift with which the task of remembering, according to him, began to be delegated to artefacts, and therefore became institutionalized, sanitized and rid of its potential to transform the present.

Although these two influential works were written in different periods of the 20th century – respectively before and after the so called »memory boom« (Winter 2006) – and seem to have a different take on issues surrounding memorialization, a comparative analysis suggests that both work from a particular understanding of temporality. Considering time only as linear progression, they assume that the relationship between materiality and memory is marked, almost unconditionally, by a fundamental contradiction between ›the past‹ and ›the present‹. For Riegl, this contradiction is more of a physical nature: how effectively the built environment connects the present to the past depends on the material traces it bears of the chronological progression of time. Put bluntly, the more ruinous the better, where the ›ruinousness‹ is measured in terms of *chronos* – of time as a quantitative factor.

In Nora's theory, the presence of the understanding of temporality as linear progression is of a methodological nature. He argues that there is a fundamental contradiction between »the commemoration of the national type« and that of »the patrimonial type« (1996b: 632). For Nora, the former type belongs to a by-

gone era – namely, to proto modern times – when commemoration was a much more pervasive part of everyday life. But today's sites of memory, according to Nora, are merely patrimonial artefacts. ›Embodying‹ the past and, in that, effectively sealing it from the present, these artefacts are devoid of any possible potential of transforming the everyday. As such, their significance in the present, for Nora, is only as static and deadlocked objects – as ›heritage‹. This dichotomization of ›the old paradigm‹ versus ›the new‹ is itself symptomatic of Nora's particular understanding of temporality which he shares with Riegl. In short, both scholars work from an understanding of temporality only as linear and irreversible progression, which results in their presumption that the act of memorialization is complicated by an irreconcilable gap between the two binary temporalities of ›the past‹ and ›the present‹. This shared understanding points to a legacy that has survived the 20th century in which the attitude toward the concept of memory is believed to have undergone immense change as the concept acquired much larger sociocultural influence.

Undoubtedly, these oft-cited ideas are of help when it comes to understanding certain social, geographical and cultural contexts. But can they be applied indiscriminately to all contexts? In fact, Nora's ideas have been frequently employed by scholars discussing what I call Turkey's witness sites. The most recent case in point is an article by Fırat and Topaloğlu (2012) where the authors discuss as a *lieu de mémoire* the Diyarbakır Prison which, very similarly to the Madımak Hotel, is a site associated with atrocious phenomena dating to the so called ›coup era‹, and has been subject to unmet demands for museumification (see endnote 3). I would like to argue that such uncritical application of Nora's ideas (and those of many other historians who work from a similar premise regarding their understanding of temporality) does not suffice to account for the wide range of ways in which different social and political actors with a stake in the discussion around Turkey's witness sites experience temporality. This insufficiency is most evident in the annual onsite commemorations of the Sivas atrocity.

Case study

Commemorations held in Sivas on the massacre's anniversary are the prime platform where the multifaceted nature of the relationship between materiality and temporality surfaces. Organized annually by Alevi associations, these events have, over the years, become something of a tradition and grown into a mass demonstration type of event. They have served as the main venue where the demand for the former Madımak Hotel's museumification has been visibly and intensively raised. But since the redesign of the site as Science and Culture Center, the criti-

cal focus of these demonstrations has not been limited only to the state's refusal to meet the demand for a ›Museum of Shame‹. It has expanded to include also the site's redesign and its particularly controversial aspects, such as the ›list of victims‹ which includes the names of the two perpetrators who died during the 1993 arson.

A typical July 2nd demonstration in Sivas begins in the morning with participants arriving in Alibaba, which is reputedly ›the Alevi neighborhood‹ of central Sivas. Characterized by large scale domestic and international migration (Sokefeld 2008), members of the Alevi community see the annual demonstrations in Sivas as something of a reunion. The first venue of this reunion, Alibaba, is the meeting point where community members coming from different parts of Turkey and Europe congregate each year at the local *cemevi* (the Alevi place of worship and ritual – literally, ›house of gathering‹), prior to their march toward the former hotel. The demonstration proceeds along a two kilometer route stretching from the neighborhood down to the site where the atrocity took place, and it ends therein with the laying of flowers. This route is striking in the way it cuts across the city center while also marking the continuing presence of the local Alevi community in central Sivas.

At their outset, commemorations in 2011 and 2012, which were held after the site of the 1993 atrocity underwent transformation, were not very different from their earlier counterparts. However, as they progressed, both bore remarkable particularities. These had to do with a precaution taken by state authorities, namely their setting up of barricades en route to the former hotel. The reason for this precaution, state authorities argued, was the risk that demonstrators could resort to vandalism in protest against the site's redesign. In 2011, such a barricade was set up a few hundred meters in front of the building, which had sparked immense dispute amongst the demonstrators. The following year, a barricade was first placed a kilometer ahead of the building, preventing demonstrators from approaching not only the former hotel but also the central square in Sivas. After a negotiation between the organizers and the then governor of Sivas, the barricade was moved back to the front of the Science and Culture Center where it had been set up a year ago. While this move was presented by the organizers as a gain, it in fact normalized the barricade as part and parcel of the built environment in and around the Science and Culture Center, making a significant impact on the ways in which demonstrators experience the site.

For many of the individuals who identify with the victims of the Sivas atrocity, the law enforcement's setting up of barricades on commemoration day bears a bitter resemblance to the events of July 2nd 1993. This resemblance was most evident in the confrontation which took place at the barricade in 2011. While state authorities argued for the risk of demonstrators wanting to approach the building in or-

der to vandalize it, Alevi associations had already decided that they would refrain from entering the Science and Culture Center. Representatives of these associations put this forth as a symbolic performance of their refusal to confer legitimacy to the site's recent redesign. However, they still wanted to reach the building's entrance, not only to repeat the flower laying ritual, but also to hang a sign they had especially made for this demonstration, which bore the phrase ›Madımak Museum of Shame‹. As this sign was carried forward from hand to hand in turn to ›trespass‹ the barricade, the police reacted first by pushing back the front row and then by using teargas. Despite its excessiveness, the police's use of force did not incite much backlash, except the very brief reaction of a few young activists. At this moment, leading figures of the community were addressing the crowd from atop the demonstration bus. Stressing the importance of peacefulness and nonviolence in their culture with explicit references to historic events and personas, they cautioned the demonstrators to remain calm regardless of the police's attitude. The already minor physical confrontation was thus brought to an end. After final speeches by leading figures of the community, most of whom commented on the law enforcement's attitude as »a continuation of previous massacres and of the centuries long tyranny of hegemonic powers,« the demonstration ended.

It is important to note that, in the geography that hosts today's Turkey, the relationship between the Sunni and the Alevi have been marked by frequent contestation and periodic episodes of violence targeting the latter (Neyzi 2002). As seen in the speeches mentioned above, this troubled history, in turn, makes many members of the Alevi community talk of the Sivas Massacre as not the first of its kind, but rather the most recent one in a long chain of atrocities. One of those previous atrocities is indeed considered as more directly related to the Sivas Massacre – the execution of Pir Sultan Abdal. He was a 16th century minstrel who is known to have been critical of the Ottoman state administration and is believed to have later been hanged in Sivas by the governor. The 1993 culture festival in Sivas, whose guests were targeted by the arsonist mob, was named after Pir Sultan, while also a state sponsored sculpture reputedly depicting him was erected in a public square in Sivas the night before the festival. On July 2nd, prior to setting the hotel on fire, the arsonist mob defaced this monument and demanded its toppling. This is known as something of a threshold moment when the mob's fury translated, for the first time that day, into physical violence. Arguably trying to reduce the escalating tension which would later result in the arson, the local municipal and state authorities decided collectively to meet the mob's request and brought them the toppled monument as proof. This is believed to have further encouraged the perpetrators, instead of pacifying them. Today, Pir Sultan continues to be a prominent sacred figure for Alevis, and to denominate events organized and associations established by the community.

The confrontation which took place around the barricade in 2011 thus involved the evocation of a particular theme in Alevi religious narratives. The evocation was possible thanks to the community leaders' explicit reference to historic personas as they addressed the demonstrators, to their comparison of the law enforcement's attitude with previous atrocities in history, and finally to the resonance their efforts found with the demonstrators. The theme in question pertains to the concept of ›passive‹ or ›nonviolent martyrdom‹ which, according to scholars of Alevism such as Reinhard Hess (2007), is one of the most significant motifs in Alevi narratives. As Hess demonstrates, in Alevi culture it is possible to speak of a martyrology – a lineage of sanctity whose links consist not of birth, but of tragic death during acts of dissidence against the perceived oppressor (Ibid). While the 16th century minstrel Pir Sultan is considered a prominent martyr – in Turkish, a *şehit* – victims of the Sivas Massacre, regardless of whether they were Alevi or not, are also spoken of as martyrs within the community (Ibid: 281).

There are various elements of the built environment where this martyrology can be traced. Foremost among these is a group of ›Sivas martyrs memorials‹ dedicated to individual Alevi victims of the Sivas Massacre, and built by associations in the respective village from which each victim hails. Also among these elements is an example from outside Turkey: the London memorial to the Sivas Massacre. Situated in Stoke Newington Common in the Borough of Hackney, which also hosts a significant Alevi population, this memorial was built in 1997 but fell into neglect for many years only to be discovered in September 2011. Upon their discovery, directors of the London Alevi Cultural Centre immediately reinaugurated the memorial under the new name ›The Memorial to Pir Sultan Abdal and the Sivas Martyrs‹. It is not only this new name which bears the lineage of martyrs and incorporates the massacre victims into that lineage, but also the London Alevi Cultural Centre's proposed extensions to the memorial, which include a sculpture depicting Pir Sultan, the prominent figure of Alevi martyrology.

In his book *Remnants of Auschwitz,* Giorgio Agamben argues that most attempts of relating the past in the present are complicated by what he calls »a lacuna« between the idea of testimony as narration and that of testimony as witnessing (Agamben 1999: 33–6). Considering the concept of martyrdom an attempt to remove this lacuna, he reminds that in Greek the word *martis* refers both to ›witness‹ and ›martyr‹ (Ibid: 26). Agamben suggests two ways in which the concept of the ›martyr‹ bridges this lacuna. The first has to do with the root verb of *martis,* which means ›to remember‹ (Ibid). According to Agamben, this refers to a person who has witnessed an event, and is ›cursed‹ with its memory and thus with the imperative to narrate it. The second has to do with the idea of testimony as past tense experience, to a person's complete witnessing of a deadly event such as the Holocaust. Here, the use of the concept of martyrdom helps to give mean-

ing to the incomprehensible, and explain the inexplicable (Ibid: 27). Similarly, in Turkish, the word *şehadet,* a loanword from Arabic, refers all at once to the concept of testimony as narration, to that of martyrdom, and to the condition of bearing witness. In the case of the onsite commemorations of the Sivas Massacre, then, the evocation of *şehadet* has a twofold effect. First, it helps narrate the atrocity – in other words, give meaning to the incomprehensible. Second, it helps reconcile the lacuna between this present day narration and testimony as past witnessing.

Concluding Remarks

Having drawn attention to the intricate ways in which the theme of *şehadet* affects the demonstrators' experiences in and around the former Madımak Hotel, I would like to conclude by raising two points. The first has to do with museumification as a particular strategy of relating to the past. Focusing narrowly and often solely on this strategy, the public debate around sites like the former Madımak Hotel considers museumification as something of a *sine qua non* for memorialization. But the debate lacks a nuanced understanding of how museumification can function vis-à-vis the particularities of the context of Turkey. These particularities demand attention to the wide range of meanings the site conveys for different actors – pedagogic, legal, political, redemptive, spiritual, to name a few. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that a discussion of architectural memorialization with respect to the case of the former hotel cannot be confined only to the desiderated museumification of the site. For demonstrations such as the one in Sivas are not only venues for demanding architectural memorialization, but also function in and of themselves as a distinct form – a tactics[6] – of such memorialization. By theorizing these tactical interventions as a particular form of architectural memo-

6 Here when I speak of ›strategies‹ and ›tactics‹, I build on Michel de Certeau's understanding of these two notions as the two distinct ways in which a subject acts in relation to an object (Certeau 1984: 34–9). Certeau's distinction between the two notions has to do with the dynamics between time and space. For Certeau, »strategies are actions …[that] … privilege spatial relationships,« and they »attempt to reduce temporal relations to spatial ones« (Ibid: 38). Tactics, on the other hand, »are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to time« (Ibid). Which of Certeau's two lines of action serves better to explain museumification, or, any permanent architectural transformation, for that matter? Such transformation entails the delimiting of space and separating that site's territory from its exteriority. A permanent spatial rearrangement, it favors space over time. These characteristics demonstrate that, whether in the form of a museum or a ›Science and Culture Center‹, permanent architectural transformations, especially when they are implemented in a top-down manner, are to be called, in Certeau's terms, a strategy. Which of Certeau's two lines of action, then, could help understand the commemorative demonstrations that take

rialization, I aim to expand the focus of the ›public‹ debate on museumification. In contexts characterized by judicial and legal shortcomings and ongoing rights seeking processes, adhering to such a narrow focus runs the risk of paradoxically victimizing the very individuals who identify with the victims. This in turn creates a further unfair presentation of these individuals, who in fact very actively participate in commemorative demonstrations, as deprived of agency.

Secondly, the case of the former Madımak Hotel problematizes the direct application of established theories on the relationship between materiality and memory onto the context of Turkey's witness sites. The case suggests that the boundaries between what is spoken of binarily as ›the past‹ and ›the present‹ can be far more blurred than those suggested by scholars like Riegl and Nora. This blurriness is all the more evident in the nonlinear, often even cyclical, way in which actors who identify strongly with the massacre's victims experience temporality at witness sites. These sites enable such experiences due to their ability to effectively help overlap different temporalities – which, in the case I discussed, are ›Sivas Massacre time‹, the historical ›Alevi martyrdom time‹ and the time of the ›here and now‹, to name a few. The word ›witness‹ in the notion of ›witness site‹, then, does not only refer to the site's own quality of past witnessing. In a context characterized by judicial and legal shortcomings, the word refers also to the site's present-day quality as a quasi-legal forum where evidence is elicited and testimonies are performed as narratives.

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place each year in Sivas? These demonstrations are modes of action which appropriate space in order to link different temporalities, such as ›Massacre-time‹, ›martyrdom-time‹, the time of the ›here-and-now‹, etc. To link the everyday to the past in such manner is – similarly to Certeau's notion of ›tactics‹ – to prioritize time over space.

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On The Path of Pir Sultan? Engagement with Authority in the Modern Alevi Movement

Caroline Tee

The Alevis are an Islamic minority group in Turkey, whose precise numbers are difficult to ascertain (Shankland 2003). Their interpretation of Islam is generally considered ›heterodox‹ by the Sunni Muslim majority, and it has never been officially recognized by the Turkish state. The Alevi tradition or Alevilik[1] is a syncretistic one, combining Sufi mysticism, elements of pre-Islamic shamanism, and the central conceits of Shi'i Islam – namely, adulation of Imam Ali and mourning for the martyrs of the Battle of Karbala (Birge 1994; Melikoff 1998). Traditionally, the Alevis lived in isolated, rural communities, with a concentration in the mountainous regions of central and eastern Anatolia (Andrews 2002). In the middle of the last century, many Alevis began to migrate to Istanbul and other big cities in the west, as well as to Europe, and today the community is largely an urban and diasporic one.

The term ›Alevi Movement‹ refers to the activities underway in the Alevi community over approximately the last 20 years, aimed at reviving and reformulating its Alevi identity and traditions (Kehl-Bodrogi 1988; Vorhoff 1995). Religious, cultural and socio-political elements are all playing an important part in the movement, and its major goal is official recognition of Alevilik by the Turkish state.[2] There is a closely associated movement amongst the sizeable Alevi diaspora in

1 I use the Turkish term Alevilik to refer to the Alevi tradition throughout this paper. This is because it conveys a sense of its holistic nature, made up of religious, cultural and historical elements. The English terms ›Alevism‹ and ›Aleviness‹ are, I believe, relatively limited by their individual emphasis on the political and cultural aspects of the tradition respectively.

2 The AKP government instigated an initiative called the Alevi Açılımı (Alevi Opening) at the start of its second term in office in 2007. In its concluding report in the spring of 2011, the basic demands of the Alevis (recognition of cemevis as official places of worship; abolition of compulsory religious education in secondary schools; opening of a museum of remembrance at the Madımak Hotel in Sivas) remained unmet. See Köşe (2010).

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Western Europe (namely Germany), which faces, and is influenced by, different political and societal influences (Massicard 2005; Sökefeld 2008). In this paper, I focus on the Turkish Alevi Movement, and the ways in which it is negotiating with authoritarian discourses on national and religious identity in Turkey, as well as with institutions of religious and political power.

Protest and the subversion of religious and political authority are traits often associated with the Alevis. The iconic image of the subversive folk poet Pir Sultan Abdal, raising his *saz* aloft in defiance, is easily recognizable in Turkey as an Alevi symbol. This paper explores the legitimacy of this stereotype of rebellion. It presents an ethnographic exploration of how one Alevi group, the Derviş Cemal Ocak from Erzincan, is reformulating its Alevi identity by actively engaging with certain aspects of authoritarian discourses on ethnicity and religion in modern Turkey – namely, Turkishness and self-identification as Muslim. It situates this group within the wider, national framework of the modern Alevi Movement, and the different approaches to engagement with authority represented within it.[3]

Minorities in the Turkish Republic: Çağaptay's ›Zones Of Turkishness‹

A helpful framework for understanding the issue of engagement with authority in the Alevi Movement is provided by Soner Çağaptay's identification of three ›zones of Turkishness‹ in the Kemalist construction of Republican national identity (Çağaptay 2006). Çağaptay delineates an ›inner zone of Turkishness‹, which is defined by ethnic Turkishness and religious identification with Sunni Islam. The majority of the population belongs within this ›zone‹, wherein they have close relations with the state and easy recourse to engagement in the public sphere. In the second ›zone‹, in an approach inspired by the Ottoman millet system, are those whose religious identification is the same, i. e., Sunni Muslim, but whose ethnicity is non-Turkish (i. e., the Kurdish Sunni population). In the third and outer ›zone‹, and experiencing the most comprehensive sense of exclusion, are non-Muslims living within the territorial parameters of the modern Turkish nation-state (i. e., Jews and Christians). Çağaptay states that:

3 A full ethnographic study of the Derviş Cemal Ocak, from which selected material is presented here, has been published by the author elsewhere. See ›Holy Lineages, Migration and Reformulation of Alevi Tradition: A Study of the Derviş Cemal Ocak from Erzincan‹ in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* December 2010, 37, 3, 335–392.

> … today, in the scheme of concentric circles of Turkishness, the further away a group is from the center, the more unaccommodating is the state toward it. Only when a group is located in the innermost, ethnic zone, does it enjoy close proximity to the state. Moreover, while groups from the religious layer are expected to move into the inner ethnic core, groups from the territorial zone are strictly confined to the hostile margins of society. (Çağaptay 2006: 160)

The location of the Alevis within this framework is variable, and contingent on a number of complex and inter-related factors. First of all, the Alevi population is made up of both Kurdish (Kurmanji and Zaza[4]) and Turkish-speaking populations. Whilst excluded from the ›inner zone‹ because of their non-identification with Sunni Islam, the Turkish Alevis nonetheless come closer to qualifying than their Kurdish counterparts on account of their Turkish ethno-linguistic affiliation. The Kurdish Alevis, by contrast, are comprehensively relegated to the ›second zone‹ because of both their non-Turkish ethnicity and their distance from Sunni Islam.

Furthermore, the Alevi community is fragmented over the issue of Alevilik's rightful inclusion within the parameters of Islam. This constitutes one of the major debates within the modern movement, wherein certain Alevi groups locate the origins of the Alevi tradition in early Islamic history, yet others identify pre-Islamic and Anatolian influences as the major determinants of its development. There is therefore potential for different Alevi groups to move either inwardly, towards the ›inner zone‹ of Islamic (albeit not Sunni Islamic) religious identity, or outwardly, towards the ›territorial zone‹ inhabited by relatively disenfranchised non-Muslims.

Modes of Engagement in the Alevi Movement Nationally

There are two broad ideological trends visible within the Alevi Movement in Turkey today, each represented by a major institutional voice and each apparently negotiating its relationship with the metaphorical ›inner zone of Turkishness‹ in rather a different way. The first group is, broadly speaking, represented by the Istanbul-based Cem Vakfı, which was founded by İzzettin Doğan, a professor of international law, in 1995. It presents Alevilik as a religious tradition situated firmly within the parameters of Islam and based on Turkish culture. It appeals to the religious authority of the Qur'an as well as the cultural heritage of Turkic saints in its articulation of ›Alevi Islam‹. This is explained on the Cem Vakfı website:

4 Zaza is a northwest Iranian language. See Paul (1998).

> The birth of the Alevi understanding of Islam was inspired by the views of those saintly possessors of wisdom, the best interpreters of the Koran, Hoca Ahmet Yesevi, Ebul Vefa, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Yunus Emre, Mevlana, Pir Sultan Abdal and the [other] Anatolian saints. Islam came to Anatolia through this interpretation.[5]

The Cem Vakfı is broadly conciliatory in its approach to official authority, and is open to dialogue with the Directorate of Religious Affairs, within which it seeks representation and provision for Alevilik as a valid Islamic tradition alongside the Sunni one. Its approach to achieving recognition is based on an appeal to the powerful twin criteria of national identity and citizenship, namely Turkish ethnicity and Islamic religious identity, and as such its trajectory is an inward one, seeking proximity to the ›inner zone‹.

The Alevi-Bektashi Federation, or ABF, is another major voice within the Alevi Movement today that represents a noticeably less conciliatory and more overtly politicized discourse. Founded in Ankara in 2002, it is an umbrella organization listing 31 affiliated Alevi groups. Like the Cem Vakfı, the ABF seeks official recognition of Alevilik by the Turkish state, but rather than engage with the Directorate of Religious Affairs, it demands its abolition on the grounds that its existence violates the principles of secularism. It generally refutes the interpretation of Alevilik that roots it in Islam, and espouses a thesis of origins as a pre-Islamic, and sometimes proto-socialist tradition. Ali Balkız, president of the ABF until March 2011, explained Alevilik in the following way in an interview with *Radikal* newspaper in 2002:

> Alevilik is a communal phenomenon that was shaped in Anatolia from a variety of beliefs, ways of life, philosophies and cultures that originated in Central Asia, Khorasan, Mesopotamia and the Middle East. It is an independent way of interpreting and understanding nature, society and God.[6]

It is possible that Alevis from follower lineages are attracted to the ABF more than those of sacred (leader) lineages,[7] and it has a considerable membership amongst Kurdish and Zaza Alevis who often stress their Kurdishness and Zazaness as well as their Alevi identity. The ABF represents an Alevilik that is less concerned with

5 http://www.aleviislamdinhizmetleri.com/alevilik_nedir.asp. Accessed 01-08-12. English translation by the author.

6 Article by Muray Aksoy in *Radikal* newspaper, 22 February 2002. English translation by the author.

7 The Alevi community is organized according to sacred (dede) and non-sacred lineages, which are decided by birth. On the religious organization of Alevi society, see Shankland (2003) and Yaman (2004).

engagement with central authority, which plays down the origins of the tradition in Turkish culture, and is reluctant to situate itself within the parameters of Islam. Accordingly, its trajectory is an outward facing one, wherein proximity to the ›inner zone of Turkishness‹ is not sought, and accordingly it occupies a place closer to what Çağaptay calls the ›hostile margins of society‹.

Ethnographic Case-Study: The Derviş Cemal Ocak

This paper presents an ethnographic approach to understanding the internal dynamics of the Alevi Movement, and the factors influencing its different approaches to engagement with the Turkish state. It explores the case of the Derviş Cemal Ocak, an Alevi group from Erzincan that is currently engaged in reviving and reformulating its Alevi identity and traditions. Broadly speaking, this group is aligning itself with the Cem Vakfı discourse on Alevilik and identifying itself as part of a religious tradition based in Islam with a strong sense of Turkish cultural origins. The foci of its revival activities are reinstated religious ritual (namely, the central ›*cem*‹ ceremony), restoration of sacred sites, and collation and codification of its oral history and narrative of origins. Revival activities began in around 2000, and have gathered pace considerably since 2010. They are administered from Istanbul, where many members of the *ocak* have lived since the middle of the last century. The information that I present here is taken from two years of ethnographic fieldwork amongst the Derviş Cemal Ocak at various locations in Turkey between July 2009 and June 2011.

History of the Derviş Cemal Ocak

The term *ocak* denotes, in Alevilik, an extended family of religious leaders who claim descent down a sacred lineage (van Bruinessen 2000). These leaders are known as *dede(s)*. A network of *ocaks* constituted the backbone of traditional, Anatolian Alevi society, which was organized according to the affiliation of non-sacred, follower lineages to particular *dedes*. The Derviş Cemal Ocak takes its name from a 15th century Anatolian holy man, Seyyid Derviş Cemal, and its members trace their descent through him to a 13th century companion of Haci Bektaş Veli, called Seyyid Cemal Sultan, and before him to the Prophet Muhammad.

Until the onset of mass migration, which began in around 1960 and continued until the 1990s, the *ocak* was concentrated around its spiritual and geographical center, the village of Zurun – renamed Çayıryazı in the Republican era but still referred to within the *ocak* by its Ottoman name. Zurun is located high in the

Figure 1 Map showing the distribution of the Tanyeri villages with Derviş Cemal dede residents in south-eastern Erzincan.



remote mountains of south-eastern Erzincan, near to the modern-day border with Tunceli.[8] It is at the centre of a cluster of six villages, known as the Tanyeri villages, which were all traditionally inhabited by Zaza-speaking, Derviş Cemal *dedes.* Zurun is the so-called *›serçeşme‹,* or source, of the *ocak,* a term which demarcates it as the place where charismatic spiritual authority is located. Since its settlement, probably in around the 16th century, it has been the home of the *Şeyh Dede,* the head of a hierarchy of *dedes* within the *ocak,* believed to be a direct descendant of Derviş Cemal and possessor of *›keramet‹,* or the ability to perform miraculous acts. The last great *Şeyh Dede* in popular memory was İbrahim Demir, to whom acts of *keramet* are attributed and who died in 1936.

8 Tunceli is the new name that was given to Dersim in the 1930s, at the time of major civil unrest in the region.

The *ocak* seems to have been fairly typical of many eastern Alevi groups during the rural era, in terms of its independence and the apparently extreme degree of geographical as well as social isolation (Yaman 2006). Many ›lead *dedes*‹ from *ocaks* in the Dersim region would turn to one another for the provision of spiritual oversight and accountability that is essential to all Sufi traditions. Although an Alevi dede is considered a religious leader, he is also considered a disciple of the Alevi Way *(yol),* and therefore in need of the oversight of a spiritual master *(pir)* himself. In the case of the Derviş Cemal Ocak, there does not seem to have been a bi-lateral local arrangement with other *ocaks;* rather, the *ocak* apparently maintained some kind of institutional link with the Bektaşi convent in Nevşehir. This is perhaps not surprising given that the *ocak* traces its decent to one of the companions of Hacı Bektaş Veli who was sent out from that convent. It is, however, unusual for an eastern Alevi group to have had links with the *Bektaşis,* whose influence was generally stronger amongst the Turkish Alevis in the west of Anatolia (van Bruinessen 1997; Karakaya-Stump 2012).

Migration

Religious life in the *ocak* suffered enormously during the era of mass rural to urban migration. Alevilik could not, and did not, transfer easily from its small, rural village locations to the relative anonymity of large, urban centers (Shankland 2003). Like the rest of the Alevi community nationally, in the mid-20th century the practice of the *cem* ceremony and other associated aspects of religious life in the *ocak* fell into decline. Members were scattered through migration primarily to Istanbul (Kartal and Bağcılar), and Germany (Frankfurt), but there are also Derviş Cemal people in Izmir, Antalya and other parts of western Turkey as well as in other Western European countries. According to the broad trend amongst the Alevis in the 1960s and 70s, many Derviş Cemal people were politically active within the leftist movement during that era.

Revival in The Ocak

A turning point came for the *ocak* in 2000, when a group of individuals, now residing in Germany, decided to restore the *tekke* of the Şeyh Dede in Zurun. The *tekke,* which had been derelict for decades, was rebuilt as a modern *cemevi.* The movement to revive and reformulate *ocak* tradition and identity has gathered pace in the last two years. In February 2010, members of the *ocak* living in Istanbul organized a *cem* ceremony in Bağcılar Cemevi to which they invited all members of

Figure 2 Derviş Cemal Ocak cem ceremony at Bağcılar Cemevi, Istanbul, February 2010. (Photograph by the author)

the *ocak* to attend. The *cem* was well attended, by around 500 people, and it appeared on the national Alevi TV channel, Cem TV, a few weeks later.

The *cem* revealed a popular desire for the *ocak* to re-group and reclaim it traditions and practices, and as such an official association *(dernek)* was established shortly afterwards. Its title was ›The Association for Solidarity, Proliferation and Protection of Seyyid Cemal Sultan Culture‹; in early 2012, it was upgraded to the status of *vakıf* (pious trust). This trust is currently directing the *ocak's* revival activities. Besides the resurrected *cem* ritual (the February *cem* in Istanbul has since become an annual event), it has also been overseeing the restoration of certain sacred sites. It has also been collating and informally publishing the oral histories and miracle narratives that are associated with these sacred sites through official *ocak* websites and a modest *ocak* magazine.

Its interest in the religious and cultural aspects of its Alevi heritage and identity align the activities of the Derviş Cemal Ocak with the interpretation of Ale-

vilik espoused by the Cem Vakfı. Its members are largely choosing to identify themselves as ›Alevi Muslim‹, in line with the Cem Vakfı's definition of Alevilik as a Turkish interpretation of Islam. This relatively conciliatory approach to defining itself today is interesting, given the *ocak's* origins in the restive Tunceli region, and its potential for experiencing a certain marginalization on account of being a Zaza rather than a Turkish speaking group. Neither of these features would seem to preclude easy engagement with mainstream discourses surrounding religion, ethnicity and citizenship in Turkey today.

Dede Heritage as religious Legitimization

The *ocak* is, however, finding scope for engagement and, I suggest, it is doing this by revisiting and emphasizing its dede identity. The narrative of sacred descent makes it possible for the *ocak* to claim both Turkish ethnicity and religious legitimacy within the boundaries of Islam. This narrative is based on a common interpretation of Anatolian Alevi history that begins with the migration of Hacı Bektaş Veli from the Central Asian region of Khorasan in the 13th century (Yaman 2004). Hacı Bektaş was accompanied on this journey into Anatolia by a number of Turkic holy men, known as the Horasan Erenleri, or ›enlightened ones from Khorasan‹. These holy men reputedly intermarried with descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through Imam Ali in Khorasan, thus combining their Turkic ethnicity with the charismatic sanctity of Muhammad's lineage.

The Derviş Cemal Ocak trace their descent back to Seyyid Cemal Sultan, one of the Khorasan Erenleri, whom oral *ocak* history tells us to have been one of the closest companions of Hacı Bektaş and resident with him at the convent in Nevşehir. The story of Seyyid Cemal Sultan forms one of the cornerstones in revived *ocak* identity, partly through the re-telling of his life and special association with Hacı Bektaş Veli, and partly through a focus on redeveloping the site surrounding his tomb. The story of Seyyid Cemal Sultan was told to me by various *dedes* within the *ocak*. It also appears in the Velayetname of Hacı Bektaş:

> Sultan Hacı Bektaş Veli had three hundred and sixty companions who served in his presence during his lifetime. When he died, each of these companions left for the place to which the Sultan (Hacı Bektaş) had sent them. Of all the companions, the Sultan loved Seyyid Cemal Sultan the most [….]. The Sultan commanded: »My Cemal, after I have died, buy a donkey and leave here. The place where the wolves eat your donkey is the place which we are giving you for your home. Later on you will have a son, and he will walk across water.« After the Sultan died (c.1271/2), Seyyid Cemal Sultan bought a donkey and set off. By and by, he came to Altıntaş. It was an unbelievably beautiful

> place – extremely verdant and well-watered, with lush meadows and a river. Seyyid Cemal liked the place very much, and wanted to rest a while. He sent his donkey off to the river, and laid down for a nap. When he woke up, he saw that the donkey had been eaten by wolves. Straight away, he remembered the words which the Sultan had spoken, and so he settled there, got married and had a son. He called his son Asildoğan. (Author's translation)

The association with Hacı Bektaş is important to the *ocak,* for it affords it crucial legitimization and a claim to sanctity. The village of Altıntaş that is referred to in the narrative is near the modern day town of Döğer, in the western province of Afyonkarahisar. It is unusual for an *ocak* from the Dersim region to have a history in western Anatolia.

This tomb did not play an important part in the religious life of the *ocak* during the rural era, and was rediscovered only about three years ago. There is currently an extensive *ocak* project underway to renovate and develop the site. Building work began in the summer of 2011 to structurally overhaul the existing buildings, (which include the tomb itself, as well as an outhouse), and also to build a cemevi,

Figure 3 The tomb of Seyyid Cemal Sultan at Döğer, Afyon. (Photograph by the author)

a guesthouse and an *aşevi* (kitchen) for the preparation of sacrificial food when the *ocak* is gathered together there. The tomb in Afyon has also become the site of an annual *ocak* festival, which will shortly be returned to in more detail.

Seyyid Cemal had a son called Asildoğan, whose life and miraculous exploits also feature in oral *ocak* history. Asildoğan is said to have travelled extensively around the Sea of Marmara, and is reputed to have demonstrated *keramet* by walking across the water at Çanakkale. This is, again, a shortened version of the story as it appears on an *ocak* website:

> Seyyid Asildoğan left the Altıntaş (Döğer) region to spread the message to the people, and headed to Çardak, opposite Gallipoli. He wanted to cross over to Gallipoli. That region was Greek in those days, and the Greek boatmen there would not give Seyyid Asildoğan a boat. Neither would they take him across in one of their own boats. The boatmen left the shore and set out for the open sea. After a while, they looked back and saw that Seyyid Asildoğan, whom they had left on the shore, was coming towards them, walking on the water. They realised that this man was ›enlightened‹ (ermiş), and they immediately turned back to the shore, took Seyyid Asildoğan into their boat and delivered him over to Gallipoli on the other side. Just as the Sultan (Hacı Bektaş) had told his father he would, Seyyid Asildoğan demonstrated keramet by walking on water. (Author's translation)

›Keramet‹ (Miracle) Stories

This story is one of many oral narratives that are being revisited and written down by members of the *ocak* today that features *keramet,* or miraculous activity, being performed by a holy ancestor. These narratives often culminate with the ancestor providing irrefutable proof of his supernatural powers to a previously skeptical audience – in this case, Greek Christians, but more commonly, Sunni Muslims. The ancestor is often then exonerated of unjust charges that have been brought against him. Michael Gilsenan, anthropologist of the Middle East, has observed the tendency of such miracle stories in the wider Islamic region to fit this pattern, noting that, «(they) break the normal pattern of things and force opponents to admit their error. The notion of challenge and contest is very strong.« (Gilsenan 1973).

Emphasizing these narratives of sacred descent from the Prophet Muhammad and of *keramet* demonstrate, on the one hand, a desire within the Derviş Cemal Ocak for religious legitimization according to Islam. The reason their ancestors were able to perform such apparently miraculous feats is that they are allegedly heirs to the charismatic authority of the Prophet of Islam himself. This brings the

ocak into a central position in terms of its ability and willingness to engage with the Sunni majority, on the grounds that they share a common Islamic foundation. In contrast, other Alevi groups, and especially those affiliated to the ABF, prefer to maintain a peripheral position in this sense, and to avoid entering into religious negotiation on these terms altogether.

On the other hand, however, the notions of challenge and contest that are central to these *keramet* stories indicate a degree of subversion. Whilst there is a common idiom of Islam in this reading of Alevi history, it is used mainly to show how (Sunni) outsiders have misunderstood and mistreated the Alevis. The desire for the recognition of Alevilik, which accompanies the telling of these stories today, is founded on this centuries-long narrative of injustice and discrimination. The voice of protest in them is therefore quite important.

Sacred Sites in Ocak Revival

Asildoğan's grave is believed to be in the town of Simav, near Beyce in the province of Kütahya. It was not until two generations after Asildoğan that Derviş Cemal, for whom the *ocak* is named, lived. He is said to have migrated from Muğla, in western Anatolia, to the town of Hozat in Dersim in the 15th century. Derviş Cemal did not settle in Hozat, but reportedly fled to Erzincan under persecution from Sultan Selim I in the early 16th century. The grave of Derviş Cemal is near Zurun, outside the village of Bulmuş. Despite being located in the centre of the Derviş Cemal homeland, the grave of Derviş Cemal does not seem to have featured prominently until recently, and when I was there in 2009 and 2010, many members even struggled to identify where it was. Although it has recently been covered by a new concrete edifice, the site is still much smaller and considerably more remote than the tomb complex of Seyyid Cemal in Afyon. It is clearly the Afyon site that attracts the most attention and provides a geographical focus for the *ocak* in its revival activity. It is playing host to a newly instated, annual *ocak* festival, called the Seyyid Cemal Sultan Anma Töreni, or memorial ceremony. The first festival took place in May 2009 and has happened every year since. When I attended it, in May 2010, there were upwards of 500 people there, most of whom had come from Istanbul.

The festival was dominated by religious and cultural elements. It was, first and foremost, an organized ›*ziyaret*‹, or small-scale pilgrimage, to the tomb of Seyyid Cemal Sultan. Most people who attended visited the tomb to offer prayers there. There was also a large *kurban,* or sacrifice, carried out. Sheep were slaughtered, and a communal meal of sacrificial food was prepared and consumed together. The sacrifice would normally take place alongside a *cem* ceremony, and indeed, the *ocak* plans to run a *cem* at the annual festival as soon as the building work is com-

Figure 4 Seyyid Cemal Sultan Memorial Ceremony, May 2010. (Photograph by the author)

pleted and there is a suitable space to do so. The cultural aspects of the festival included the singing of Alevi poetry to *saz* accompaniment by various *aşıks,* and the performance of the *semah.* This was carried out by a youth-group from a cemevi in Istanbul who, as is common within the Alevi movement today, take regular evening classes in dancing the *semah.* For the performance, they wore the traditional Anatolian folk costume often adopted by such groups, since the *semah* began to be performed publically in the Alevi revival.

There was evidence of a muted and conciliatory attitude towards political authority. The AKP Minster for Culture, Ertuğrul Günay, came from Ankara and made a brief speech about the historical significance of the tomb site and of the cultural value of the festival, which was largely warmly received by participants. Furthermore, the committee of the *ocak* association had sought – and gained – the co-operation of the local AKP council both in order to hold the festival, and to approve its plans for the redevelopment of the site. Like most Alevis, individuals in the *ocak* generally support the CHP and dislike the religiously conservative nature of the governing AKP. They do, however, seem comfortable engaging and negotiating with the AKP when it is deemed necessary to do so.

The tomb of Seyyid Cemal Sultan has become a central motif in the renewal of Derviş Cemal Ocak identity and corporate life in the 21st century. It is attracting

a degree of interest that has meant the focus of contemporary *ocak* activity, rather than being in the Erzincan homeland of Zurun, is instead hundreds of miles away in western Turkey. The appeal of the Afyon site can be understood on a number of different levels: firstly, it emphasizes the *ocak's* direct association with Hacı Bektaş Veli and the western *Bektaşis,* something which brings it to a relatively ›central‹ position both religiously and politically. (The *Bektaşi* Order represents in many ways a more conciliatory face of Alevilik that has been historically much closer to central political power). This association distances the Derviş Cemal Ocak from the comparatively rebellious and independent Kurdish Alevi tribes in the east. Secondly, the narrative of Seyyid Cemal Sultan that is represented by the tomb site embeds the origins of the Derviş Cemal Ocak in Turkish history and culture. This situates the group centrally in terms of its claim to ethnic identification with the aforementioned ›inner zone of Turkishness‹. The third and fourth factors concern the geography of the site: it is located in a relatively ›safe‹ part of the country in the southwest, rather than in proximity to the still-restive Dersim region; and finally, it is practically much more accessible to members of the *ocak,* now living in large numbers in Istanbul, than the relatively distant Erzincan homeland.

Concluding Remarks

In sum, the case of the Derviş Cemal Ocak presents us with evidence that some Alevis are finding ground for engagement with powerful, semi-official narratives surrounding religious and cultural identity in Turkey today. The *ocak* still rejects and subverts the Sunni interpretation of Islam and, in that sense, defines itself according to the age-old juxtaposition of the ›Sunni other‹. It is also, however, perhaps expedient to emphasize those aspects of its corporate identity that offer it the potential for engagement with that ›other‹. Accordingly, its actions challenge the popular stereotype of rebellion associated with the Dersim Alevis. For the Derviş Cemal Ocak, it is largely its dede heritage that is making this possible, giving it recourse to negotiate proximity to Çağaptay's ›inner zone of Turkishness‹ by stressing its Turkish cultural identity and Islamic religious affiliation. The prospects for Alevis of Kurdish or Zaza ethnicity, who are also of follower lineage, to approach similarly central ground, seem relatively bleak. Excluded from the so-called ›holy trinity of Sunni-Muslim-Turk‹ (Kaya 2010), it seems likely that they will continue to seek Alevilik's official recognition from a relatively peripheral place in Turkish society. Whether or not either approach will prove fruitful remains to be seen.

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The Institutional History of Family Planning in Turkey

Belin Benezra

This paper examines the development of family planning in Turkey between the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the 2000s. The aim is to show how the concept of family planning and its institutional framework have changed over the years. It is crucial to look at why family planning is used in a particular context and period, the aim behind the policy, and what purpose it really serves. Analyzing the different names that are given to this concept is a way to reflect on the ideological discourse.

It will be argued that family planning has been shaped by different discursive aims and different state policies in Republican Turkey. Historically, it has been employed as a tool in pro-natalist population policy and anti-natalist population planning. Moreover, from time to time, the changes in the formulation of this concept have been attempts to adapt to changes in the international context, particularly in the transformation of population policies. In this sense, the transformation of family planning should be thought of within an international context and the changes in conjecture.

The present work examines the establishment of family planning programs and the transformation of this concept. In order to reflect on this change, the institutional and historical backgrounds will be particularly considered. State policies will be at the center of the present study due to its decisive role in shaping the concept of family planning in the Turkish context. This study makes use of historical data on the institutional and discursive changes in family planning concept, and also utilizes semi-structured interviews. Other sources related to legislation which cover instructions, regulations, laws, especially from 1965 to 1983 in which all the institutionalized process of the family planning took place, have also been consulted. In addition to this, I worked with the strategic plans of the Ministry of Health *(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlık Bakanlığı)*. I also focused on all of the five-year

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development plans since 1963. Moreover, the conferences, seminars and their reports gathered in those years served as primary sources.

Unlike a number of industrialized countries, such as United States and the UK, a popular demand for access to contraceptives never occurred in Turkey as a movement within the broader context of women's liberation. The tendency towards contraceptives in Turkey was always state imposed, not in the form of a bottom-up movement as could be observed in United States and the UK. The institutional history of family planning, and its connotations within the state ideological discourse, has never been a major area of research in the social sciences in Turkey. The issue has been researched and documented only in medical studies by medical specialists, not by social scientists. Therefore, the former's focus has always been on the medical aspects including the technique, usage, quality and accessibility of family planning services, without any reference to the ideological-discursive basis of family planning as a concept. The social science literature in Turkey, as a result, lacks studies on family planning which employ the historical-holistic perspective. The present study is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. Because of the decisive change in the state policy of family planning – from pro-natalist to anti-natalist – the historical periodization has been divided into two parts: pre-1960s and the post-1960s.

Before discussing family planning in Turkey in its historical context, it is necessary to define the concept of family planning. Family planning is defined as, »[…] policies that allow individuals and couples to anticipate and attain their desired number of children and the spacing and timing of their births. It is achieved through use of contraceptive methods and the treatment of involuntary infertility,« (WHO, 2012). At a 1968 UN conference, it was accepted that »parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children« (Connelly 2008: 238). Also, at an international conference on population in 1984 in Mexico City, this approach was reaffirmed by a unanimous vote by the countries at this conference.

In the 1960s, the developmentalist perspective and Neo-Malthusian approach were dominant in policy-making. To the developmentalist approach, demographic concerns such as uncontrolled population growth, urbanization, and immigration were added during the 1970s. By the 1980s, the health concern (for whole body) moved to the center of family planning initiatives. In the 1990s, the rise of human rights discourse on the global scale caused reproductive health to gain further importance. Family planning began to be conceived as a part of reproductive health. In neither of these periods were feminist sensitivities and gender specific considerations granted their due importance. During the first decade of the 2000s, the emphasis on family planning declined in the state discourse. This was a result of the transformation in the health system initiated by the AKP regime, character-

ized by a neoliberal attitude to health services, in accordance with the world-wide economic trends.

It is necessary to mention that the agenda of The Progressivist Women's Association *(İlerici Kadınlar Derneği)* in 1975 is an exception which gave voice to women's demand and support for abortion. However, their political agenda was never put into action for fear of challenging the core values of society (Kılıç 1998: 351–353). Compared to the United States and the UK, a sustained feminist movement concerning family planning and right to abortion has not occurred in Turkey.

Pro-Natalist Policy, 1923–1960

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, until the 1960s, pro-natalist policy was the dominant approach in population policies. The aim of the pro-natalist policy was to replenish the losses sustained during the Turco-Italian War *(Trablusgarp Savaşı 1911–1912),* the Balkan War, the First World War, and the War of Independence. In these fifteen years, there were millions of deaths in the country. Illnesses such as typhus, malaria, and smallpox also accounted for a high death rate (Akın & Sevencan 2006: 1–14). There was a need for a new generation of citizens loyal to the Turkish state, manpower for the economy, and soldiers for the army. The aim was to develop the country in the shortest time possible to catch up with the industrialized countries. The Turkish Republic wanted to compensate the population loss by promoting reproduction among families.

Within this framework, pro-natalist policy was seen as sine qua non in the state's reproduction politics. For this purpose, the import of contraceptives was prohibited, abortion was made illegal, as was promoting contraceptive methods, providing informational materials and educating people. Large families were promoted, to the extent that financial incentives were provided.

The Turkish population policy after 1930 was modeled after the Italian pro-natalist population policy. Similar to Italy, Turkey tried to actively promote pro-natalist policies through political speeches, newspaper articles, and translations of the related Western literature such as articles into Turkish. The promotion of pro-natalist policies was a strict and well-planned state program (Güriz 1975: 51).

The laws that were enacted by the government and policy makers in Turkey require examination. In the Turkish Criminal Law passed in 1925, abortion was a punishable crime, except when the life of the pregnant woman was in danger (Tezcan et al. 1980). The Penal Code of 1926, which was adapted from the Italian code, made abortion illegal. Induced abortion remained a crime. The minimum age of marriage was 18 for men and 17 for women (Özbay, manuscript to be published in 2012; Güriz 1975: 143; Özberk 2006). The legal marriage age was reduced

to encourage birth. According to Akın (2007), »the Laws on Local Administration and on Municipalities, passed in 1929 and 1930, respectively, imposed several obligations on local administrations to implement the population increase policy by improving public health, establishing free maternity hospitals, and distributing medicines to the poor for free or at low cost«.

In addition, the 1930 Law on General Hygiene *(Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu)* was the most obvious legislation in relation to the pro-natalist position of the Turkish government. As indicated, it mandated that the Ministry of Health encourage births by granting monetary awards or medals to women who had six or more children. Moreover, it also prohibited the import, production and sale of contraceptives (Özbay, manuscript to be published in 2012; Akın, 2007). In 1936, the Turkish government increased the penalties for abortion and punished any action that attempted to avoid birth. In addition, family planning education was forbidden. The Law of Public Health required that birthing services be free in state hospitals. In 1938, the minimum age for marriage was further reduced to 17 for men and 15 for women (Piyal 1994: 2). Also, it gave the priority for land distribution to families with many children. In 1944, the government gave public sector employees modest child support payments. In 1949, the government provided income tax reductions based on the number of children (Güriz 1975). In 1953, penalties for abortion were again increased (Özbay, manuscript to be published in 2012; Akın 2007; Güriz 1975). During the pro-natalist period, a number of laws granted tax exemptions for parents (Güriz 1975).

As seen above, a number of legal changes were introduced to support the pro-natalist policy in that period. Moreover, health policies were also used to support the population policies in Turkey in that period. This imposition of this certain ideology worked in two ways: by prohibiting contraceptives it sought to halt population loss, and it instead incentivized families to produce as many babies as possible. Women did not have ownership or autonomy over this aspect of their lives. According to Karaca Bozkurt (2011: 68), the voices and opinions of women directly impacted by these laws were not solicited. In particular, women and their needs were ignored. The responsibility of the reproductive rights of women did not belong to women – the decision to have a child was a part of state laws and pro-natalist policies. The government held sway over women's bodies and women's decisions about reproduction. However, this period should not be judged by today's cultural and ethical standards. Turkish politics during that time were generally insensitive to gender issues at all levels of decision-making and state policy.

During the Second World War, pro-natalist policy was useless because of the socio-economic climate the war caused. However, from 1945 to 1960, there was a significant demographic change. After 1945 nearly all developing countries experienced population booms. The largest factor in this was not high fertility rates, but

a decline in fatality rates. Improved health conditions, living conditions, good nutrition, developed health services, and better housing helped increase life expectancy, while the average age of death rose (Sönmez 1980: 2).

This, in turn, created the problem of controlling over-growing population rates especially in developing countries. According to Karaca Bozkurt (2011), the Neo-Malthusian population approach (see endnote 1) that was formed by reshaping the Malthusian population approach argues that rapid population growth is a barrier to development. This approach was used for controlling rapid population growth rates of developing countries, especially after the Second World War. The Turkish population policy was also affected by that trend, responding to the need for a shift from pro-natalist to anti-natalist policy for development considerations.

The increased cost of rearing children, the decreased benefits of having many children, and the lack of adequate family planning services led to an increased number of abortions in the late 1950s. Abortion became a crucial medical and social problem in Turkey (Tezcan et al. 1980).

Following the global trend in population planning programs triggered by the population boom, together with the negative results of abortions, the state was prompted to change its population policy. This process extended into the mid-1960s. In 1952, the Maternal and Child Health Organization, within the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (MHSA), was established.

The need to obtain permission for contraceptives came under scrutiny. A key figure in this was Dr. Zekai Tahir Burak, a gynecologist from Ankara. According to him, although abortion was prohibited by law, many women attempted to abort by themselves, or with the help of other people in unhealthy conditions. Thus, this led to a high rate of maternal deaths. He recommended the legalization of abortion (Akın 2007). On the basis of his recommendation, the Ministry of Health charged a commission to investigate these claims (Güriz 1975: 88). The findings showed that, despite its illegality, many doctors were taking bribes to perform abortions, and that many women needed to be hospitalized for the consequences of unsafe abortions. In addition, there was a high rate of mortality amongst these women. The findings substantiated Dr. Zekai Tahir Burak's claims. The commission recommended a change in law to legalize abortion, and that certain provisions should be made to allow access to contraceptive (Özberk 2006; Akın 2007).

Overall, the pre-1965 official policy was characterized by a pro-natalist policy. The period witnessed important legal changes together with some government incentives for larger family, as described above.

From Pro-Natalist Policy to Anti-Natalist Policy in Turkey

Upon the advice of the commission the Ministry of Health, the State Planning Organization decided to focus on changing the population pro-natalist policy to an anti-natalist one. In November 1960, the State Planning Organization decided to add family planning to the First Five-Year Development Plan. Although the new population policy was stated in the First Five-Year Development Plan, the Population Planning Law had to wait until 1965. According to the First Five-Year Development Program aimed for 1963–67 (published in July 1962, during the ninth İnönü government), the following recommendations were made:

a) Abolition of the law prohibiting the spread of information and materials related to contraceptives. Legalization of the import and sale of contraceptives.
b) Personnel employed in health services (doctors, nurses, midwifes, health officers, nurse assistants) will be trained in population planning. Courses on population planning will be added to curricula.
c) Health service personnel will be responsible for providing population planning education and materials free of charge.
d) Population planning education will be provided in the context of existing opportunities.
e) Contraceptives and pills will be provided at low prices and distributed to the poor free of charge (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1963: 73).

The First Five-Year Development Program and policy change in the 1960s aimed to achieve economic growth goals with the help of a developmentalist approach. In 1961, according to Akın, when the preparations for the new population planning law began, there was close collaboration between the Ministry of Health and NGOs (Akın 2010). In 1963, the Family Planning Association was established by the government with 20 branches. It helped to develop educational curriculum and operated several clinics after the enactment of the Law on Population Planning in 1965. Moreover, the Population Council, United Nations Population Fund, the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) played important roles in promoting population and family planning programs in developing countries in the 1960s (Hartmann 1995; Özberk 2006).

After these preparatory steps, the Turkish government developed a new law to provide the legal framework for a nationwide family planning program. The turning point from pro-natalist to anti-natalist policies was the enactment of the Law on Population Planning in 1965 (*Nüfus Planlaması Hakkında Kanun, no.557,* 1 April 1965), first known as the Population Planning Directory *(Nüfus Planlaması*

Genel Müdürlüğü), in 1965 under the Ministry of Health. The overwhelming influence of state policy indicates that family planning was not a grassroots movement. Rather, as with many other political and social issues in Turkey, such as women's suffrage, birth control and family planning policies, it was a top-down campaign. The legislative process has not been an answer to a demand from below. Instead, it has been a part of state population policy and integration with the international and historical contexts.

In addition to this, no feminist movement contributed during this initial phase of family planning and legalization of contraceptive methods. This process has been determined by the state and the changes in the international context, such as some worldwide agreements. The presence of a coordinated feminist movement pushing for these reforms was not apparent in Turkey, as it was in the US or UK. While in most Western countries the demand for birth control has been framed as a right to personal freedoms, in Turkey the arguments have been based on the danger of maternal death, and the population issue, as defined by leading doctors, demographists, and government bureaucrats. Historically, it has been the state – within which women have been under-represented – that has been the arbiter of reproductive rights.

According to the Population Planning Law *(Nüfus Planlama Kanunu)* the term »Family Planning« meant: the right of each individual to have the number of children he desires and to procreate at the time of his choice. This right may be exercised solely by the use of contraceptive methods. Except in cases where medical intervention is essential, the interruption of pregnancy shall be prohibited, sterilization and castration are being likewise prohibited (The Law on Population Planning »Nüfus Planlaması Hakkında Kanun«, no. 557, *Resmî Gazete,* 1 April 1965).

Law no. 557 of 1965, guaranteed the right to have the desired number of children, the importation of birth control methods, support for health education of couples, and the supply of free birth control services in public health organizations (Güngördü 2003; HUIPS 2004, as citied in Döngel 2006: 11).With the help of the Population Planning Law, women gained the right of protection against unwanted pregnancies. However, women who became pregnant against their wishes did not have a chance to undergo abortion by their own accord. Because of this, in effect, women did not have control of their own bodies. In this way, women's rights were, actually, not fully protected by state law.

Population and annual growth rates show the slowness and partial ineffectiveness of the early phase of the population planning program.

After the enactment of the law, there was a small increase in population growth, despite expectations to the contrary. At the same time, developmental plans gained importance in state policies. The state's anti-natalist policy was aimed at attaining a certain degree of development, as laid out in the Five-Year Devel-

Table 1 Population in Turkey

Year	Population
1960	27 755 000
1965	31 392 000
1970	35 605 000

(TUİK, Population, annual growth rate of population and mid-year population estimate, 1927–2000; Piyal, 1994: 4)

Table 2 Annual Growth Rate of Population in Turkey

Period	Annual population growth rate (‰)
1955–1960	28.5
1960–1965	24.6
1965–1970	25.2

(TUİK, Estimations of population growth rate, 1927–1985; Piyal 1994: 4)

opment Plans. The state codified laws, promoted the use of contraceptives and pushed education reform in an attempt to help modernize Turkey.

It is important to stress the consequences of the developmentalist perspective and its impact in order to explain population policy in Turkey within a larger international context. According to Akın (2007: 1), in the 1960s, primarily developed countries had discussed the negative effects of uncontrolled population growth on economic and social development. The developmentalist approach, which was dominant in the 1960s, continued to have influence during the 1970s. The 1970s were characterized by the rise of the demographic approach in social policy (Akın 2010: 1). However, because of the continuation of the practice of self-induced abortion (despite its prohibition), and its negative consequences on women's health due to the lack of appropriate facilities and resources, both policy makers and researchers were compelled to reconsider the population policy that focused on developmentalist approach.

An important point, that should be stressed, is the change in the terms used in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968 – 1972). In this plan, contrary to the first one, the term »family planning« was used instead of the term »population planning.« In addition to this, the plan put an emphasis on the extension of the family planning program. Furthermore, there were several goals in the Second Five-Year Development Plan directed at the practice of family planning Turkey. It was emphasized that regional mobile teams for villages should be created. Family planning education became more important than before. One proposition was to put emphasis on sexual health education. In order to achieve this goal, information was disseminated through radio and newspaper. Moreover, family planning education program was to be pursued in schools and in the military (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1966).

There was a decline in the annual growth rate of the population in the second half of the 1970s. This was likely due to the beginning of the family planning pro-

Table 3 Annual Growth Rate of Population in Turkey

Period	Annual population growth rate (‰)
1960–1965	24.6
1965–1970	25.2
1970–1975	25.0
1975–1980	20.7

(TUİK, Estimations of population growth rate, 1927–1985; Piyal 1994: 4)

gram. In addition to this, the UNFPA supported reproductive programs in Turkey by 1971, as well.

According to the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973–1977), mother and childcare services were not at the desired levels (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1972). The plan stated that the integration between health services and family planning program would resolve this. Importantly, the integration between mother and childcare and family planning issues was suggested. This was the first time that mother and child health in the context of family planning was mentioned (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1972; Bulut 1979: 21). This change widened the scope for family planning programs throughout the country.

The 1970s were marked by the demographic approach to the population/family planning issue. The developmentalist approach continued to have influence during the decade as well. The demographic approach to family and population planning was somewhat hindered by the heterogeneity between various parts of country (east – west, rural – urban). Another area of concern with the demographic approach was the high fertility rate, despite the legalization of contraceptives.

The New Era for Family Planning and the Neo-Liberal Transformation

In 1978 (6–12 September), the International Conference of Primary Health Care met in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan. At this conference, the need for »health for all« was expressed for the first time. The focus was on the need for better and more accessible primary health care, including family planning. Moreover, it also focused on providing promotive, preventive, curative, and rehabilitative services. This call to action was enshrined in the publication of the Declaration of Alma-Ata (Declaration of Alma-Ata 1978). At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of

the 1980s, the concern was high maternal mortality rates. Two solutions were suggested: preventing the traditional contraceptive methods usage, and reducing the unsafe abortions.

Preventing the traditional contraceptive usage, and revaluating the modern contraceptive usage, had a significant impact on reducing maternal mortality rate. Research has shown that the prevalence of modern methods of contraception and the maternal mortality ratio has a negative correlation. When the use of modern contraceptive methods prevails, maternal mortality rate declines. As a result of those two major problems mentioned above, the modification of the First Population Planning Law (1965) was seen as necessary. With the collaboration between the Ministry of Health, NGOs and universities, all advocacy activities and the scientific evidence from research helped prepare the enactment of the new law. The new law was completed by the General Directorate of Mother and Child Health – Family Planning, in light of these efforts and findings, and the bill was submitted to the Parliament for consideration (Akın 2010). On 24 May 1983, the new (second) Population Planning Law (no. 2827) was passed: authorizing trained non-physicians to insert intrauterine devices (IUD), legalizing abortion up to 10 weeks on request, allowing trained general practitioners to terminate pregnancies, legalizing surgical sterilization for men and women on request, and establishing intersectoral collaboration to provide family planning services throughout the country (see Akın 2007: 87).

The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979–1983) was published in 1979 by the State Planning Organization. Mother and child health and the family planning issue were examined under the headings of »Health« and »Tools for Economic Objectives« (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1979: 463). With the 1982 constitution, the institution's name, was the Population Planning Directory, was transformed into the General Directorate of Mother and Child Health and Family Planning *(Ana Çocuk Sağlığı ve Aile Planlaması Genel Müdürlüğü)*. Slowly, the »population perspective« gradually lost its value, but »mother and child« welfare became increasingly important at the policy level. A shift in emphasis and discourse was taking place.

Although reproduction is directly linked with sexuality, this connection was nearly always ignored and left untouched in the Turkish context of family planning. Foucault (2003) claims that sexuality can be discussed in several areas. One is medical discourse, as a health issue. Science became a very powerful tool with which to discuss sexuality. As seen, Turkey was not ready to examine sexuality, or the sexual freedom of the individual, especially that of women. Thus, family planning, which is necessarily inextricably linked with sex and sexuality, was discussed within a health discourse. The focus was on maternal health and its consequences for the whole of society, which was still a population issue. Turkey and »Turkish feminists« did not discuss sexuality within this framework in the 1980s. Neither

»the language« nor sexuality was a subject of concern. Reconceptualization came to Turkey relatively late (as seen in the recent abortion debate of 2012). Discussions of employment and visibility in the public sphere were acceptable topics of public discussion, but in the 1980s sexuality remained taboo. Western, progressive attitudes concerning women's health and reproduction began to influence Turkey's policies. The Turkish state followed and adopted international approaches towards women's health and family planning. Quality of life became valued above purely demographic concerns.

In the 1990s, the World Bank's focus on the demographic perspective began to change, and it reacted to countries which targeted demographic goals and developed incentives or punishment methods to achieve these demographic goals (Hartmann 1995). It would be inaccurate to suggest that the health approach of the 1980s was totally discarded in the 1990s. However, family planning started to be conceived of in terms of human rights and health. According to Hardon (1997: 4), during the 1980s and early 1990s, the rationale behind population programs was criticized by the international women's health movement. They challenged the aim that focused on reducing fertility in developing countries, »They took issue with the belief that limiting family size is a societal responsibility that takes precedence over individual well-being and individual rights« (Hardon 1997: 4). Their goal was to empower women to control their own fertility and sexuality, while minimizing health problems. The movement criticized the aim to deliver contraceptives primarily to married women as a tool to reduce fertility. They articulated that this type of action was a way of manipulation, and this manipulation prevented free choice, which is embedded in the reproductive rights declarations. In addition to this, they put an emphasis on the issue of male responsibility on family planning and the needs of adolescents (see Hardon 1997: 4).

These demands later were effective in the preparatory period of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) (1994) and its decisions. It was the largest intergovernmental conference on population and development ever held. The ICPD differed from the other conferences in terms of its approach to the population issue. In this conference, the traditional population approach was eschewed in favor of a »humanist« approach. In addition, this conference gave priority to the individual's reproductive rights and reproductive health, and emphasized gender equality in this process. After the conference, the Program of Action, which will be fully enacted by 2015, was produced and ratified by Turkey (Karaca Bozkurt 2011).

According to the conference resolutions, reproductive health included family planning and contraceptive methods. According to Özbay (1994), reproductive health is related to the social and economic environment, and the status of individuals within their environment. The availability of medical services is just one of

these aspects of reproductive health. The solution for the problems of reproductive health is to correct more inequalities in societies and improve the basic quality of life. The focus point would be not just to improve women's health and the medical system, but it should go beyond those. The problem of women's subordination, in all social institutions, should be tackled, the conference concluded (Özbay 1994: 17). The conference members believed the fertility management needed to be founded within the services that aimed at enhancing reproductive health, not at reducing fertility.

Male responsibility and participation in reproductive health was another key topic at the conference. The intention was to create greater parity between men and women in the family planning process. Prior to the conference, Turkey mostly had focused on mother and child health. There was an agreement at the conference that this focus needed to be widened to encompass the role of men; however, the issue was not discussed in the development plans. In the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1990–1994), family planning was conceptualized in two ways: »population« and »health« (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1989). Later on, in the Seventh Five-Year Development (1996–2000), family planning was presented under the heading »Population and Family Planning« (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1995).

The final step in the changes concerning family planning in Turkey was the restructuring of the health care system to reflect the influence of neoliberal policies, as initiated in 2003 by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The effect of these changes has become the focus of debates, while family planning per se has slipped to the background. Indeed, family planning has not been studied within the context of the transitions in the health system. The reproductive health approach continues at both the international level and in Turkey as well. However, family planning services, which are a part and necessary component of reproductive health, are discounted in the new Turkish health system. In addition, recently, a new legal amendment (Law no. 663, November 2011) was introduced related to the organizational work schema of the Ministry of Health. At present, the precise details remain unclear, but the ongoing structural change in the General Directorate of Mother and Child Health – Family Planning is a key element of this amendment. Lastly, a speech by the director of the Ministry of Health aptly summarizes state's approach to family planning in the 2000s. In 2007, the director said, »yes to reproductive health but no to family planning«.

Overall, state policies from 1923 to 1960 centered on pro-natalist policies. The concept of family planning did not exist during this period. After that period, according to Ayşe Akın (2007)[1] throughout the world in the 1960s, beginning in de-

1 Prof. Dr. Ayşe Akın, who is head of Başkent University Research and Implementation Center on Woman-Child Health and Family Planning (BUWCRIC), specializes on public health,

veloping countries, people began to discuss and be concerned with the negative effects of uncontrolled population growth on the economic and social circumstances of their countries. Such was the case in Turkey as well. This concern was mainly spurred on by the developmentalist perspective and Neo-Malthusian approach in policy-making. Family planning and contraceptives were only introduced by the Turkish state in the form of anti-natalist policy in the post-1960s period. To the developmentalist approach was added the demographic concerns such as uncontrolled population growth, urbanization, and immigration during the 1970s. The concept of family planning was always discussed only in relation to these issues.

By the 1980s, the direction of the discussion had changed – family planning moved to the centre. This could rightly be seen as a turning point. In the 1990s, the rise of international human rights discourse elevated the issue of reproductive health. Family planning began to be conceived of as a part of reproductive health (Akın 2010: 1). Contraceptives were no longer seen only as a demographic tool to adjust the population growth, but rather as a crucial aspect of women's health in general. During the 2000s, family planning was somewhat sidelined as a result of the neoliberal transformation in the health care system initiated by AKP's neoliberal attitude to health services which were in accordance with the world-wide trends.

In conclusion, Turkey has made marked progress in family planning to date (see Appendix). However, continued efforts are required to prevent unwanted pregnancies, and fulfill the need for family planning. In order to do that, the social status of women has to be improved, and public policies need to be designed with gender sensitivity at the forefront. Finally, Turkish society must strive toward viewing women not only as mothers, but rather as active, autonomous citizens capable of self-determination over their own reproductive rights.

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obstetrics and gynecology. She has carried out clinical research and programs abroad and in Turkey. The Malthusian approach began to be used to explain the rapid population growth in developing and undeveloped countries after the Second World War. The Neo-Malthusian approach began to consider the relationship between low quality living conditions and high fertility rates. Although, Malthus had rejected contraceptives in principle, earlier neo-Malthusians thought that high population rates were a crucial reason of poverty. Because of that, they supported birth control among the needy in order to decrease poverty in the country.

Appendix

Table 4 Contraceptive Use, Selected Years: Percentage of Married or Cohabiting Women Aged 15–49 Using Contraception

Method	1963	1978	1983	1988	1993	1998	2003	2008
Any method	22.0	50.0	61.5	63.4	62.6	63.9	71.0	73.0
IUD	0.0	4.0	8.9	17.1	18.8	19.8	20.2	16.9
Pill	1.0	8.0	9.0	7.6	4.9	4.4	4.7	5.3
Condom	4.3	4.0	4.9	8.9	6.6	8.2	10.8	14.3
Surgical sterilization (female)	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.2	2.9	4.2	5.8	8.3
Coitus interruptus	10.4	22.0	31.1	31.0	26.2	24.4	26.4	
Other	12.0	12.1	8.6	10.2	3.2	2.8	4.1	
Total effective-method users	5.3	18.0	27.2	32.3	34.5	37.7	42.5	46.0
Total ineffective-method users	22.4	32.0	34.2	31.0	28.1	25.5	28.5	27.0
Unmet need for contraception	–	–	–	–	12.0	10.0	6.0	
Abortions per 100 pregnancies	7.6	16.8	19.0	23.6	18.0	14.5	11.3	10.0

(Source: TDHS data)

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Civil Society in Turkey: A Reading of *Kadin Gazetesi* through a Gramscian Lens

Laura Tocco

The Concept Of Civil Society In Turkey: Liberal Approaches

As everywhere, the concept »civil society« has been the subject of intense scrutiny and vigorous debate in Turkey. Following Turkey's 1980 coup d'état, »civil society« became a central theme of academic literature, and over recent decades different groups have sought to define it through their own ideological lenses. In Turkey, as in the world at large, this field has been dominated by liberal approaches that support the dichotomy between strong-state and weak-civil society. Even if there are different conceptions inside liberal approaches, there is a clear and common background shared by these views. Firstly, civil society is perceived as an autonomous sphere, able to support itself and generate itself. Furthermore, the faculty of civil society encouraging individuals' participation in civil life is perceived as a kind of control mechanism over state's action. Finally, the liberal concept recognizes »equality before the law«, that is the equality of conditions among all elements of the society.

According to this view, the state has the duty to govern the rules ensuring the framework of legal equality where people exercise their rights.[1] Generally speaking, Western tradition regards civil society as the set of economic activities outside of state control. In other words, from this point of view, economic activity delineates the border between civil society and the state. On the other hand, in

1 In the Western world, the tradition of liberalism was not always linked to the duality of civil society-state. For example, the in natural law's tradition, »civil society« is a synonym for »political society« and state. For example, for John Locke (1632 – 1704), father of classical liberalism, civil society was not a separate entity from the state. See, Istituto Giovanni Treccani – della Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1998, Headword »Società civile«, Roma: Istituto Giovanni Treccani. Available online at: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/societa-civile_%28Enciclopedia-delle-Scienze-Sociali%29/.

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several Turkish works (Heper 1985, Mardin 1973, Keyman 2005), economic activities are not thought of as a parameter to identify the notion of civil society. Turkish literature seems to reinforce the dichotomy of a strong state versus a weak civil society. Indeed, this tradition emphasizes the role of the state as the dominant entity in society while dismissing the role of the economic sphere (see Onbaşı 2008). With regards to this point, following Onbaşı's work (2008),[2] we can focus on the Turkish debate. Regarding the comprehension of civil society, there are different approaches considering the strong state-weak civil society dichotomy, such as the socio-historical approach or the state-tradition approach. The former, represented by Şerif Mardin, takes into account peculiarities of social history and social evolution. So, the coupling of strong state-weak civil society, perceived as a result of specific socio-historical conditions, stresses Turkish social history and seeks to understand the state tradition from the point of view of social history.[3] Otherwise, according to state-tradition formulation represented by Heper,[4] state structure prevents the development of civil society, thus, the weakness of civil society is the result of the strong state which is also an obstacle to democratic consolidation. While Mardin shows that each society has a specific project in relation to its historical route, Heper takes into consideration the state structure as the reality.[5]

Another part of socialist thought that is shared with the liberal tradition is the usage of the concept of civil society. In fact, since the 1980s the idea of civil society has been one of the most important points on the leftist political agenda. Socialist intellectuals started supporting the idea that the struggle between the two realms is the most important characteristic of socio-political life in Turkey. Thus, this perspective, combining the liberal with the socialist approach, conceives of the strong state as responsible for preventing the development of civil society – as civil society would necessarily pluralize and limit the jurisdiction of the state. Among other intellectuals, Murat Belge, Ahmet İnsel and İdris Küçükömer subscribe to this view.

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2 The first part of the article is based on Funda Onbaşı, 2008. Civil Society Debate in Turkey: a Critical Analysis, PhD diss., Middle East Technical University.

3 For more information about this approach, see Şerif Mardin, 1973. »Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?«. *Daedalus,* 102: 169–190. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114; Şerif Mardin, »Civil Society and Islam«, In *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison,* edited by John A. Hall, 278–300. Cambridge: Polity Press.

4 For more information about this approach, see Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1985); Metin Heper, 1992.»The ›Strong State‹ And Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective.« In *Democracy and Modernity,* edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, 142–164. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

5 See Ali Rıza Güngen and Erten Şafak. 2005. »Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in Turkey.« *Journal of Historical Studies* 3: 1–14. URL: http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/grad/Issue_3/Gungen&Erten_Abstract.htm.

However, other leftist literature represents the liberal-republican tradition. According to this thought, »citizenship« should be restored on the basis of the individuals' political participation and their claims. Thus, civil society is the place where individuals realize their active citizenship. Fuat Keyman, a leading thinker of this tradition, in his *Değişen Dünya Dönüşen Türkiye* (2005),[6] asserts that civil liberties do not emanate from an individual's ability to resist the actions of the state. Rather, he argues, referring to the concept of participatory citizenship, liberties should be considered as tools for scrutinizing social processes.[7] Together with Fuat Keyman, İlhan Tekeli is considered a leading thinker in the liberal-republican tradition. In his *Katılımcı Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları* (2004), he states that the world has been challenging the ways to live in a democracy such that every individual should behave as an active citizen and social actor accountable to the whole of society.[8]

Gramscian Approach to Civil Society

According to Karl Marx, civil society is the set of material relations that is the sphere of socio-economical life marked by uneven conditions. As the state is the realm where every individual has the same rights, in modern societies the political-juridical framework does not correspond to material conditions. So, the juridical structure sets only an illusory equality. At the same time, the state, in representing the interests of the dominant class, plays the role to consolidate the uneven relations of power trying to maintain the bourgeoisie's authority.[9] In Marx's opinion, material and economic relations are marked by forces of production and represent the entity of civil society and thus »the anatomy of civil society has to be sought in political economy« (Marx 1976: 4).

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6 About this approach, see Fuat Keyman, *Değişen Dünya Dönüşen Türkiye* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005); Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, 2003. »Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses.« *Citizenship Studies.* 7,2: 219–234. URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1362102032000065982; Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu. 2005. »Citizenship, Identity, and the Question of Democracy in Turkey.« In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences,* edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, London, New York: Routledge.

7 Quoted in F. Onbaşı, Civil Society Debate in Turkey: a Critical Analysis, 235. See Fuat E. Keyman. *Değişen Dünya Dönüşen Türkiye.* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005).

8 Quoted in Onbaşı, Civil Society Debate in Turkey: a Critical Analysis, 236. See İlhan Tekeli, *Katılımcı Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları* (Ankara: Ayrıntı Basımevi, 2004).

9 Bobbio Norberto, Nicola Matteucci and Gianfranco Pasquino. 2004. *Dizionario di Politica,* Headword »Società civile«. Torino: UTET.

According to Gramsci, civil society refers to the place where cultural and political hegemony is embedded. As Burgio states, the concept refers »to the ideological structure of the dominant class, which implies the material organization of intellectual and moral hegemony: newspapers, journals, publishing houses, schools, libraries, clubs and every kind of entity able to shape public opinion, including architecture, urbanism and toponymy« (Burgio 2003: 31). We can see the supremacy of the dominant class in two actions: domination and direction. A state, or dominant class, can use domination, that is coercive force, but, at the same time, it needs to persuade society of its pretension of being obeyed and respected. To reach this aim, the dominant class has to direct society's mind including it in its ideal cause. So, the concept of civil society refers to the domination of one class over others through a cultural and ideological operation. This kind of control is not executed by coercion, but rather by creating a consensus within the society (Burgio 2003).

In other words, hegemony is a phenomenon that tries to build a mutual code of values and civil society, and is functional to people in an ideological and cultural way (Bobbio 1976). In his *Prison Notebooks,* Gramsci writes about fixing two superstructural levels: the first, »civil society«, is the group of private entities; the second is the »political society« or »the State«. Whereas the level of civil society corresponds to the direction which the dominant group exercises through civil society, the level of political society corresponds to the domination that the same group exercises through political society. For this reason, direction, or hegemony, having its place in civil society, tries to gain the masses' consent, while domination, having its place in political society, employs coercive force to gain people's consent (Anderson 1976). Differently from Marx, in Gramsci's opinion, civil society does not belong to the base, but rather to the superstructure.[10] Thus, the organization of civil society is not only the expression of the economic-social structure, but also a tool of intellectual influence. Concerning this, the concept of state refers to the political society, or dictatorship, or coercive structure that implies a direct domination. Actually, Gramsci associates the state with a specific social

10 *What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ›levels‹: the one that can be called ›civil society‹, that is, the ensemble of organisms commonly called ›private‹, and that of ›political society‹ or ›the state‹. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of ›hegemony‹ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ›direct domination‹ or command exercised through the state and ›juridical‹ government.* Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni dal carcere,* (Torino, Einaudi, 1975). Given this, Bobbio (1976) states that for Gramsci, civil society is »*not all material relationship (which means a base) but all ideological and cultural relationship; not the whole of commercial and industrial life but the whole of spiritual and intellectual life*« Norberto Bobbio, *Gramsci e la concezione della società civile* (Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976).

group which is the strongest economic group, or rather the state, that is made up by state apparatuses (strictly speaking), and by hegemony's private system of the dominant class. So, the state is the set of practical and theoretical activities that the ruling class uses to justify itself and to gain the consent of the ruled (Burgio 2003). Briefly, the idea of civil society is conceived of as the intellectual and moral direction coming from the bourgeoisie that has gained political authority. Thus, the bourgeoisie, building a social code of values, tries to direct society in order to consolidate its approval.

Challenging the Hegemonic View

Although the majority of academics in Turkey have joined the liberal project, there are important studies that challenge the dominant view. One of these critical investigations [11] follows Marx and Gramsci's approaches and the idea concerning the uneven relations of power, inequalities, domination and marginalization. Following Onbaşı's work, among the Turkish scholars dealing with this kind of approach, Galip Yalman (2002), speaking about civil society, stresses the economic and material inequalities, criticizing the dualism between state-civil society. In his works, civil society is falls in considered to be the realm of economic relations. Actually, the balance reached by class forces is preserved within state and civil society representing the struggle between different classes.

On the other hand, Necmi Erdoğan (2000) challenges the dominant view of civil society analyzing the role of organizations adhering to Kemalism. Through analysis of discourses and practices, Erdoğan explains that the non-official Kemalism is not an expression of Kemalism, but is instead what he terms *Sivil Kemalizm,* which refers to a renewal of the official ideology. Regardless, the common values of those organizations clearly show their support for Kemalism. Indeed, they try to create a context in favor of the official ideology, persuading people to accept their values.

This approach showing the dialectical relation between state and civil society, as entities steadily shaped by the conflict marking socio-political life, criticizes the fact that the dominant view overlooks the uneven relations of power and the consequent struggle in civil society. Such an approach provides us with unique insight into the complex nature of this reality. In addition, by calling attention to the

11 Among these critical approaches, there is also a critical perspective representing the communitarian-republican concept of civil society which is seen as the place where individuals can experience civic friendship and love of community. This tradition is represented by Sarıbay, 2000.

historical process, the theory of hegemony can be used as a key to interpret history and analyze social phenomena. Far from considering the reality as a monolithic block, the Gramscian perspective understands the factual basis as a process wherein different factors interact with one another. Actually, it takes into consideration the economic base and its attendant inequalities. Because it recognizes reality as historically determined, it examines the cultural complexity and the individual motivations that stand behind the human acts overtaking the strict duality of state-civil society. In fact, history is considered in all of its aspects – from the economic system, to social relations, from the political and legal system, to morality and ideology.

Turkish Nation and Hegemony

Gramsci's evaluation concerning state and civil society provides us with an important tool for analyzing the Turkish context. According to the Gramscian perspective, Turkey can be studied as a socio-political entity built to create a citizenry acculturated to authority. Turkish history supports the argument that the dominant class established hegemony in the state, revealing that the use of coercive power alone cannot succeed in conquering the consent of the masses (Öncü 2003). In this context, hegemony represents the »class religion«[12] spread by the social group that dominates economic activities. Hegemony is the accessory of the dominant group whose aim is to amass power. This kind of control is deeply rooted in an economic structure and denotes the supremacy of one class over others. From the economic field, it extends its influence to political and cultural institutions. Thus, we can see the modern Turkish state as the place of hegemony and the ruling class. Then, the form of the state and its activities reflected the dominant class's domination, both in state and in society. Turkish history shows that dominant groups and classes have governed the form and the activities of the state. So, the economically powerful classes have always wanted to establish their hegemony.

In the War of Independence (1919–1922), Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the modern country, emerged as the uncontested leader of the Turkish Resistance. Not only military and bureaucratic classes, but also provincial Committee of *Union* and *Progress* (CUP) organizations and the Muslim bourgeoisie, supported his efforts. Furthermore, the nationalist leadership showed the revolutionary movement as a fight marked with religious overtones. Declaring the fight against Christians, it sought to gain the support of the Muslim population and was recast an

12 Oppenheimer 1914: 264, quoted in Ahmet Öncü, 2003. »Dictatorshi plus hegemony: A Gramscian analysis of the Turkish state.« *Science & Society,* 67, 3: 306.

anti-colonial struggle (Öncü 2003). World War I and the War of Independence (1919–1922) entailed strong changes in the demographic composition of Anatolia, which lost most of its commercial strata. So, the conflict between bureaucracy and Christian bourgeoisie turned into the expulsion of the latter from the field of social struggle. When Turkish nationalism established the Republic, Anatolia changed in aspect, but not in content. The bureaucracy that had saved its privileges during Ottoman times renewed its role in the country by building a new political apparatus: bureaucracy won the battle between traditional bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. As the control of the state appeared compact and powerful, the surviving commercial class was too weak to create an autonomous group in opposition to the bureaucracy. In fact, nationalism became a »remunerative choice« (Keyder 1987: 82) since the Muslim population hoped to fill positions vacated by departing Greeks. For this reason, merchants and landlords endowed Turkish nationalism with a strong social base.

This alliance between native bourgeoisie and the military-bureaucratic class led the country towards a new definition of the political system. The nationalist group, using its ideology as an anti-liberal economic project, selected the strategy of no-capitalism development. So, the winning class preferred the »bureaucratic reformism« (Keyder 1987: 2) instead of a capitalistic option, and it exaggerated the authoritarian characteristic of the country. The small local bourgeoisie, complicit in the coalition of power, had the potential to lead an autonomous development, but, at that time, did not have sufficient resources to finance this project. Because of the increasing weight of non-native funds, the 1929 crisis exaggerated the weakness of the bourgeoisie. Hence, the alliance between bureaucracy and indigenous commercial classes could remain without leading to a conflict over distribution (Keyder 1987).

During the Republican period, the form of the capitalist state and its activities reflected the hegemony of the prevailing class in state and society. The dominant class transformed the country from above and started building the tools to enforce consent. This process led to a network of associations that defined a process of »cultural fabrication«.[13] Consequently, ruling was not only domination exercised over civil society, but it was also a way to acquire consent.

During the 1930s, the process of »bureaucratic reform« reached its climax. Policy measures aimed to colonize society by building a system based on the role of the state and a strictly ideological apparatus under the control of the author-

13 »Tension occurs because while the citizenry's belief and the authority's claim should correspond at the same level, the equivalence of belief with claim is never totally actual but rather always more or less a cultural fabrication« (Ricoeur, 1986: 13) quoted in Öncü, Dictatorship plus hegemony: A Gramscian analysis of the Turkish state, 308.

ity. The new press law, university reform and the new labor law were part of this tendency. Furthermore, since 1931, during the Congress of the historic Republican People's Party-RPP, the single party regime became more clearly defined. This kind of politics shared something with the fascist regime, but, at the same time, it was marked by features of state »dirigism«. This strategy of *étatism* sought to bring political, social and economic sectors under state control, and it was characterized by a strong anti-liberal attitude.

However, on the one hand, fascist ideology represented the reaction of social evolution that attempted to break the contemporary establishment while saving conservative and old values. On the other hand, *étatism,* working to extend the role of the ruling class and arranging a coalition with the newly developing bourgeoisie, exemplified the continuity between Republic and Empire (Keyder 1987).[14]

The Break of the Government's Coalition

World War II put an end to the *étatist* era. During wartime, capital accumulation became an important element in breaking the historical coalition between bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Actually, until 1950, politics had been the most important issue shared between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. During the 1940s, the increasing capital accumulation split the equilibrium within the coalition of power that began to break down (Keyder 1987). As bureaucracy was not able to save the old alliance, the bourgeoisie, aware of its increasingly important role, no longer wished to compromise. In fact, since 1946 the struggle between social forces had become more explicit. The bourgeoisie had reached a greater level of maturity and started calling for economic and religious reforms. After the war, inflation increased and dissatisfaction spread throughout Turkey. Religious people complained about secular policies and intellectuals started asking for freedom of speech and press. In this context, religious freedom stood as a metaphor for indignation against the dominant leadership.

In addition, widespread social tension persuaded the bureaucracy to make a choice within the international context. Actually, during wartime, Turkey had maintained an ambiguous position. However, when it was clear that the Axis Powers would lose the war in February 1945, Turkey declared war against Germany

14 In fact, *étatism* was marked by the attitude to negotiate inside the confines of the élite, whereas fascism was characterized by the strong mass mobilization. Also for this reason, we cannot call the Turkish system a fascist regime, however, we can speak about the »fascistisant« elements that characterized the Turkish regime. See Cağlar Keyder, *State and class in Turkey: a study in capitalist development* (London, New York: Verso Books, 1987).

and Japan. This allowed Turkey to move into closer alignment with the West and, as a result, President İnönü chose the soft shift to a multiparty system congruent with the USA and with Western liberal principles: in 1945 it signed the United Nations Charter, and in 1952 it joined NATO. This strategy allowed Turkey to access American funds and foreign capital contributing to the country's capital accumulation.

Thus, when the multiparty period started in 1946, the Democratic Party (DP), born from the RPP rupture, represented the exclusion of the military and bureaucratic classes from the hegemonic bloc. Within the struggle between social forces, central authority worked to strengthen its force, while the social context showed its peculiar fragmentation in different blocs of power. As previously noted, the new discourse focused on using Islam as tool for manufacturing political consent by joining the religious demands of the rural population and economic and political interests of workers (Öncü 2003). For this reason, a more mature bourgeoisie organized its mobilization on the basis of free market and religious promises. Its project of capitalism contrasted with the kind of capitalism promoted under bureaucratic protection. Actually, until then, bureaucracy had succeeded in reducing internal subordination to the capitalist market. However, after increasing capital, the bourgeoisie could constitute the resistance against dominant class hegemony. This bloc of opposition consisted of different elements of society that supported the DP during elections in the 1950s. That helps explain why these years were marked by harsh debates between the DP and the RPP, which were vying for popular approval.

Analyzing Kadin Gazetesi using a Gramscian Perspective

In 1934, women were granted the right to vote and started taking part in the political process. This achievement had several consequences. This accomplishment was perceived as an achievement which encouraged women to exercise their rights as citizens, and not simply as subjects. While women became aware of their ability to affect public policy, their participation was strictly defined and proscribed by male political leaders and intellectuals. In 1935, the Turkish Women's Association, which had been established in 1924, was closed following the regime's advice. Actually, the corporatist approach denied the existence of a conflicting social class interest in favor of a corporatist model of society. Thus, the government controlled women's movements, worker's associations and other cultural clubs. This »state feminism« attitude speaks to build a system where schools, newspapers, media, press and tools of mass communication were instrumental in shaping Turkish attitudes in accordance with Kemalism (Arat 2000; Durakbaşa 1998).

In spite of the radicalism of creating a space for women in the public domain, Kemalism sought to encourage a kind of activism equivalent to its model. So, by removing every kind of activity out of the control of the state, it attempted to create a kind of legalized feminism whose aim was to define the borders of legitimate actions. These measures led to the glorification of »woman« as a symbol of Westernization and modernization. Thus, this kind of emancipation marked a historical split with the Ottoman past, and defined Turkey as a Western country (Al-Ali 2002). The relation between women's claims and modernization had an emblematic meaning. The regime's propaganda promoted an image of the Republican woman characterized by »national mission, love of duty« and by feelings of »belonging, gravity, modesty, severity« (Göle 2004: 110). Women were cast as the protectors of modernization, which therefore made them instruments of Republican ideology.

A Case Study: Kadin Gazetesi

Starting from the approach described above, the relation between hegemony, civil society and consent will be explicated. Examining the feminist journal Kadın Gazetesi,[15] I will try to answer the question of how the journal helped transmit the regime's ideology and how domination can have a place within civil society.

Kadın Gazetesi was a weekly founded in 1947 by a group of intellectual women, among those İffet Halim Oruz, who was the first Turkish female journalist. The periodical was established to voice women's demands, thoughts, feelings and ideas. The journalists did not deny the contribution of Atatürk, and they also acknowledged the influence of the Republican period on women's intellectual growth (Yaraman 2001).

In this part of the article, I am going to analyze some writings published in 1947 and 1948 showing how the system adopted by the Republican hegemony sought to mold Turkish consciousness. Because of that, an investigation of the role of women, as seen through the lens of one of their own journals, helps us understand some aspects of Turkish civil society. Indeed, the historical-political reading of the newspaper allows us to better comprehend how state ideology can place itself in civil society. This approach affords an in-depth look at a given context. By focusing on the historical process, it is not limited to a superficial examination of the facts, but encompasses the profound complexity of society and its factors - including the role of the authorities and of the masses, individual motivations, polit-

15 Kadın Gazetesi, founded in 1947, published until 1979. Periodicals are preserved in the archives of Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi and in those of Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul.

ical struggles and the dynamics of power. Moreover, it highlights the importance of political strategies and the potential for weaker groups to build a new political strategy. By looking at the motives underlying individuals' behavior, this approach attempts to explain how an idea can take root in society. In this manner, the case study puts the individual and his relations in central focus. Thus, it allows us to comprehend the relationship between the economic base and human consciousness, and to understand the underlying reality.

Kadın's influential publications from different columns relating to domestic policy, foreign policy, society, culture and fashion were collected and analyzed. Each section offers news using different ways of reporting, such as stories, cartoons, political analysis, opinion writings, pictures and letters. The first edition of the journal appeared on March 1, 1947. In the center of its front page it shows an image of Mustafa Kemal, the father of the country. This depiction clearly communicated the political orientation of the journal, unequivocally portraying Mustafa Kemal as the hero of the nation. Next to the picture, in the article *Çıkış Amacımız*[16], the journal's founders, İffet Halim Oruz, Emel Gürler, Münevver Ayash, Fürüzan Eksat, Nimet Selen and F. Elbi,[17] explain Kadın's mission, stating their devotion to the Republic. More precisely, they describe the national revolution as a step that helped woman achieve a high level of personal realization:

> The Republican revolution has given us the place in an advanced international womanhood. Turkish women's blood and soul contributed successfully to this process. The journal is not interested in Turkish past womanhood, it does not need to discuss about equality between man and woman. Kadın Gazetesi deals with social and sexual issues. It debates about science, art, and ideas that are instrumental to womanhood's emancipation and that will be useful to the country and family. Turkish feminism movement will always find in Kadın a place for its feelings, points of view, and ideas. (…) Our biggest aim is to become the root and the place for woman's sensitiveness and compassion.[18]

The founders explain the importance of women's feelings in social, economic and cultural events. Further to that, their commitment to advancing the cause of women was explicitly stated as well. As this operation calls for republican womanhood, it implies the personal sacrifice for the sake of the country. The articles ex-

16 March 1, 1947, n. 13. *Çıkış Amacımız.*

17 Birsen Banu Okutan. 2007. »Women and Nation in Turkey« *Kadın Gazetesi* (1947–1950) and Kadın Sesi (1957–1960),

18 March 1, 1947, n. 1. *Çıkış Amacımız.*

press respect and devotion for Atatürk or, as a poem from Kadın states, »the hero most important in history«.[19]

Mindful of his formidable legacy, the journalist uses poetical expressions and nostalgic tones, such as the article, »He is with us!«[20] that describes Atatürk as a warm and smiling father whose first matter concerns childhood issues. Specifically, according to the articles, women have the important charge of educating children in compliance with national values. Narrating the announcement of Atatürk's death, the journalist describes the pain and the agony felt by the entire Turkish community. The memory of those moments reminds the readers of the national tragedy as a fact shared by every Turkish citizen. It is for that reason that on November 8, 1948 the journal published an article entitled »Womanhood is crying«.[21] Despite the pained tone of the article, it nonetheless sought to encourage Turkish consciousness through this tragic event.[22] In another writing, Kadın expresses the devotion to the successor of Atatürk, the President İnönü:

> Estimable President *İnönü* is our most powerful support. *İnönü* is Atatürk's closest friend from revolutionary period; he is the person who together with Atatürk improved this revolution and continues to do so.[23]

In the section *Dünya Karikatürleri,* a comic depicts[24] the women's evolution from the time of marriage onward: she gets married, she wears pants, she goes to war and she goes to vote – while her husband is shown taking care of their children. It presents a model of womanhood very different from the one rooted in the historical imagination of the country. It shows, in fact, a woman who almost replaces a man in his typical duties. Regarding mothering, the journal discusses the significance of the role of women in the maintenance of the nation. This is also important in order to teach national consciousness to the next generation. So, mothering means teaching Republican values, Turkish traditions, and the love of country.

Concerning the Cyprus issue, Kadın explains the importance of its defense. Maintaining a strong Turkish presence in Cyprus is of paramount concern, according to the article, and this helps to solidify Turkish values around this issue:

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19 November 8, 1948, n. 89 *Atatürk.*
20 May 24, 1947, n. 13. *O bizimle!*
21 November 8, 1948, n. 89. *Kadınlık Ağlıyor.*
22 November 8, 1948, n. 89. *Yine Atam İçin.*
23 Okutan, »Women and Nation in Turkey,« 56.
24 Okutan, »Women and Nation in Turkey,« 56

> Cyprus, I have fallen in love with your land. You have flowed into my longing breast like poison. We are unable to abandon you.[25]

Kadın explains that Turkish Cypriots feel great pride and the strong devotion to Turkish nation:

> In Cyprus there is the eternal Atatürk's spirit. (…) We saw the respect for Atatürk and the faith for *İnönü* in every place when we went to Cyprus.[26]

The newspaper clearly communicates that, the nation is perceived of as a family where a woman sacrifices herself for the benefit of Turkey. Thus, the country is like a huge community where women act as leaders, working for the sake of the nation. In this pursuit, their priority is safeguarding society's interests generally, instead of being limited to specific realms such as domestic duties. She takes care of her community, as well as her home. She looks after her husband and children as well as Turkish citizens, and she teaches love of state and national values. The Turkish woman, in raising children in line with patriotic feelings, encourages passion towards her homeland. Actually, the ideal woman »prepares necessary nourishment to the nation, home, and child but with the pride of completing her success like a sovereign«.[27]

According to Kadın, women's empowerment means national advancement. Indeed, women's self-actualization is instrumental to the development of the nation. This process leads to a model of Republican womanhood that embraces the modernization in a Turkish way. In fact, this woman is loyal to the founding father and glorifies the İnönü period and the transition to multiparty period. On the other hand, she believes in Western women's emancipation and she advocates for modern feminist values as exemplified in the Western world. Regarding this issue, Kadın speaks about the cooperation with the American women's movement, which involved regular meetings. In 1949, the journal launched a worldwide column in English dedicated to an international campaign for advancing the cause of women and to its connection with Turkish movements.

Kadın focuses on the role of women in building the nation. Women are seen as transmitters of culture, and they help define social and cultural parameters. As stated by Kemalist propaganda, playing an active role in the national struggle, women have become national actors. During the Independence War, they proved

25 Okutan, »Women and Nation in Turkey,« 66
26 October 25, 1948, n. 87. *Kıbrıs Notları. Atatürk ve İnönü Sevgisi.*
27 Okutan, »Women and Nation in Turkey,« 53.

their allegiance to the country, giving their lives to the cause of national victory. In the article, »İstiklal Savaşında«, the author explains her self-sacrificing feeling:

> All Anatolian women sacrificed their lives, blood, jobs in the independence war and through their incredible sacrifice and heroism, they showed that they are real mothers of Turkey.[28]

Kadın's message encourages women to be modernized, free from religion and forward looking. May 19th was designated as the date that religion was divorced from national interests, laying the foundations of the secularist Republic. In fact, the article *19 Mayıs*[29] states the importance of secularism and cautions against anti-secular forces that threaten the revolutionary spirit. Mainly, the article speaks to the nation's youth reminding them of the importance of May 19th, as well as admonishing them to maintain nationalistic sentiments and to perpetuate national values in history.

Embracing the Kemalist moral code, the journal acts on Turkish memory and arouses national emotions. It tries to undercut the opposition's attempts to galvanize broad social support against state ideology. In fact, the aim of the journal seems to manage the challenge between classes. The articles described above, speaking about women's rights, refer constantly to the founder, the nation, the Cyprus issue, Westernization and the War of Independence – all topics related to state ideology.

It is evident that the issue of women's rights is used as a proxy through which the Republic is lauded and promoted. By the end of the 1940s, a more consolidated opposition increased its role and started to organize resistance based on universal tenets of economic and religious freedom which unified different social classes. On the one hand, this social fragmentation accentuated Kemalist values in opposition to religion and free market, which came to be seen as emblematic of the opposition. In fact, the market and the religion were the two issues used by the bourgeoisie to mobilize opponents of Kemalism against bureaucracy which had sought to decrease the dependence of the internal market on capitalism. For this reason, the journal, working on women's issues, simultaneously seems to have supported the continued hierarchical class model.

28 August 18, 1948, n. 25. *İstiklal savaşında.*
29 May 24, 1947, n. 13. *19 Mayıs.*

Conclusion

Kadın Gazetesi engaged with discourses related to nation, homeland, democracy, issues of modernization and Americanization. It sought to promote and disseminate the image of a new, emancipated, modern woman, which, in turn, implicitly promoted Western and democratic values. The women's movement, vis-à-vis its promotion in Kadın Gazetesi, was an effective tool through which republican values were propagated and spread. Republican tools of hegemonization succeeded in defining a model of femininity in line with Kemalist ideology that encouraged, »an educated professional at work, a socially active woman engaged in organizing clubs and associations, a properly trained mother and wife, a feminine woman dressed in gowns and dancing at ball« (Arat 2000: 16). Thus, Kemalism produced the tools to hew a new cultural direction. Women's liberation was one area where Turkish ideology sought to impose its values while the celebration of women was related to attempts to broaden the Kemalist sphere of influence. The journal gives a platform with conservative segments of Turkish civil society which then contributed to preservation of the dominant class' role. The state's support for the women's movement, as promoted through the journal, was an effort to broaden its sphere of influence. . In other words, it represented s not only the dominance of one social class over others, but also the ability of the dominant class to project its own way of seeing the world.

Finally, the old Kemalist formula of legitimation left an imprint that has slowly faded over time. The new corporate interests that now occupy a central position in society can be seen in its place. Indeed, in co-opting the old hegemonic structure, corporations have filled it with their own ideas. In fact, the strong emergence of capitalism has affected the new configuration of class alliances and the consequent phenomena of hegemony. Thus, even if the old Kemalist hegemony has not totally disappeared, it is clear that the forces and the relations of production, the division of labor and the conditions of work have been significantly altered. For this reason, we can use the same tools of analysis to look at the modern strategies of embedding intellectuals, media, schools, politicians, foreign media, writers and journalists.

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New Turkish Citizenship? Contestation of Muslim Women and LGBT Organizations

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In the last two decades, Turkey's citizenship regime has come under increasing challenge from various segments of society. Falling largely in line with the civic-republican tradition, the gendered, ethnically exclusionary and secular citizenship notion in Turkey traditionally prioritized duties and obligations over rights, and therefore a passive and obedient citizenry (Kadıoğlu 2005). The »common good« of the republican state was defined through an elite consensus as progress towards contemporary Western civilization. The definition of the ideal citizen as a secular-Sunni, male, heterosexual Turk led to the subordination of women, ethnic and religious minorities, as well as sexually marginalized groups, and pious Muslims. Most of these groups organized themselves into social movements in the 1990s and 2000s, in connection with the dynamics of globalization and efforts toward European accession. Some introduced their claims of self-preservation and realization within the emancipatory possibility of inclusive citizenship, while others had a more communitarian focus (Keyman and İçduygu 2003).

In this paper, we focus on two groups of challengers to the existing notion of citizenship – the LGBT (Lambdaistanbul, Kaos GL and the Association of Social Policies, Sexual Identity and Sexual Orientation Studies (SPOD) and Muslim Women's Associations (AK-DER and Başkent Women's Platform). While these groups have moments of divergence in their conceptualization of the political, they share important similarities in their invocation of inclusive citizenship, fundamental rights and freedoms, and the nondiscriminatory state. We argue that such claims, which project radical heterogeneity, can be accommodated only by a radical democratic polity (Mouffe 1992, Mouffe 1995, Lister 2003), by which we understand a constant contestation of competing conceptualizations of the common good.

This contestation is to take place within a dialogical framework, which requires the »common recognition of a set of ethico-political values« (Mouffe 1992:

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79). The set of values is an overarching normative framework that does not substantiate a universal concept of common good, but instead comprises mechanisms for discussing the competing concepts. It is the »grammar of conduct,« constituting the loyalty of citizens to one another and to living together, where living together is understood as a good in itself. A radical and plural democracy, argues Mouffe, requires the creation of a chain of equivalences between groups that engage in democratic struggles (Mouffe 1992: 70). This chain of equivalences moves beyond the »false debate« between the liberal conception of a collection of individuals with no common purpose and the republican conception of a single common good (Mouffe 1992: 75). Instead, the citizenry, whose members are »engaged in many different purposive enterprises and with differing conceptions of the good,« share a common recognition of a set of ethico-political values (Mouffe 1992: 79). It is through this shared set of values and a common self-understanding as radical democratic citizens that different groups and struggles can create a chain of equivalences (Mouffe 1992: 79–80).

Within this framework, the common grammar of conduct is underlined by the acceptance of the principle »freedom and equality for all,« (Mouffe 1992: 75) and is inclusive of the ethico-political principles of the polity (Ibid 81). At the theoretical level, this necessitates overcoming the binaries of liberal/republican, public/private, and equality/difference that have been at the center of citizenship debates. Thus, we turn first to these binaries. We then analyze the ways in which the Muslim Women's and LGBT associations transcend them. We conclude by arguing that while the transcendence of such binaries is necessary for a radical democratic polity, it might not be enough. Although both groups challenge a substantive common good by their emphasis on liberal rights, the prejudice, which we mention below, still remains. It is yet to be seen whether a joint stand will be established by seeing each other as co-eval actors, struggling for a common democratic polity.

Three Binaries of Citizenship Debates

The civic-republican and liberal-individualist conceptualizations of citizenship have largely dominated the debate on citizenship. Civic republicanism assumes the moral priority of community to individual, whereas the liberal-individual tradition is founded upon the primacy of the individual (Rousseau 1978; Rawls 1972; Dworkin 1977; Pocock 1995). The former brings to the fore the language of duties and obligations to the community, and the liberal language of citizenship emphasizes individual needs and entitlements. In the republican public sphere, individuals come together and collectively engage with the creation of the political. Activities and practices, such as work, military service and taxes become basic tenets

of citizenship. The liberal citizenship is rather a legal status based on and guaranteeing rights and freedoms, where a minimal state is the guarantor. Prioritizing the community, the republican tradition fails to acknowledge the liberal contribution on the protection of individual rights. The liberal tradition, on the other hand, fails to offer a noninstrumental, public-spirited answer to the question of coexistence. Yet, the two traditions can be reconciled through a perspective that recognizes the gains of the liberal democratic revolution, while reestablishing the lost connection between ethics and politics through republican notions of public-spiritedness and civic virtue (Mouffe 1992: 75).

In Turkey, the civic-republican tradition has historically dominated. The promotion of the common good created a »militant« citizen to the detriment of individual rights (Keyman and Üstel cited in Kadıoğlu 2005: 9–10). Within this framework, liberal individualism has aided the emancipatory efforts of many groups. The principle of the right to life, and freedom of conscience and belief have been utilized by sexual minorities and Muslim women in their campaigns for an inclusive citizenship. While both groups utilize liberal tenets, the public debate over Islam and homosexuality during 2010 demonstrates that liberal conceptions do not necessarily extend beyond particular interests to create a wider political community. Consequently, the societal vision of prominent Muslim intellectuals, such as Hilal Kaplan,[1] and some LGBT activists, fell short of the establishment of a common »grammar of conduct.« Such understandings of a wider community could be better provided by republican notions.

The debate on the inclusion of excluded groups has been viewed through the equality vs. difference binary prism. The projection by dominant groups of their particularities as universal results in the construction of certain groups as »different,« and, subsequently, their exclusion from »value-neutral« public space. Republican citizenship leads to this exclusion through the conceptualization of a single public space, where citizens share a substantive idea of the common good and interact as a homogeneous group. Liberalism tries to overcome it by prioritizing equal opportunity towards the removal of barriers to equality (Longo 2001: 270). However, liberalism fails to recognize that the problems of participation in the public sphere are multiple and interconnected (Fraser 1992). For instance, liberalism promotes the participation of women in politics through mechanisms such as quota requirements. Yet, it fails to acknowledge that women often undertake unpaid domestic and care work. A reframing of the equality/difference debate is therefore necessary. In doing so, we should remember that equality does not need to mean sameness, and difference does not mean inequality per se. Instead,

1 For Kaplan, see http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/islam-ve-escinsellik-meselesi.htm, available on October 28, 2012.

equality through recognition of differences is possible. Indeed, radical plural democracy points to this possibility. It acknowledges that even though segments of society are perceived as different, they can participate equally without the imposition of sameness. Lister (2003) points to this possibility through distinct understandings of difference, namely strong and weak. The strong version sees as essential differences amongst groups of individuals, whereas the weak version stresses the constructed nature of difference in biological and socio-cultural terms. A non-essential conceptualization of difference recognizes the possibility of change as well as equality through difference.

Lastly, the division of public and private is at the crux of the constitution of the political. Both the liberal and republican traditions of citizenship have their respective constructions of the public and private spheres. For the liberal tradition, the private is the sphere of particularities, difference, and morality. It is protected by the state. The public sphere is nonmoral and political, and devoid of these particularities. The republican tradition sees the public as the embodiment of the common good. The private, on the other hand, comprises important institutions such as family and religion, yet insofar as the public actively creates citizens it imbues the private. Both traditions have been challenged by the feminist scholarship (Pateman 1988; Fraser 1992; Lister 2003). Feminist theories demonstrate how the public-private distinction is based on, and sustains, culturally intelligible norms of femininity and masculinity, and the hierarchies between the two. The construction of the public as masculine and the private as feminine leads to the exclusion of women and sexual minorities from the public sphere. In challenging this dichotomy, the excluded groups advocate that their particularities, which had been relegated to the private sphere, are, in fact, political matters. Arguing that the private/public dichotomy reproduces the hierarchy between groups, some began to form »subaltern counterpublics« (Fraser 1992). Civil society organizations created a forum of discussion where groups sought to expand and pluralize public space. However, counterpublics that are themselves »homogeneous« fall short of the radical democratic approach which imagines, »the creation of a chain of equivalences between different democratic struggles« (Mouffe, 1992: 70). In other words, even if they are not necessarily in coalition, the democratic struggles are expected to operate within an awareness of each other and a common »grammar of conduct.«

We have tried to argue that a debate on citizenship that takes place through multiple dualities is inadequate in conceptualizing an inclusive and nonhierarchical polity. In pointing out the limitations, as well as the contributions of these debates, we have suggested a radical democratic polity as a meaningful way of moving beyond the limitations. We believe that a radical democratic polity is fundamentally tied to human agency and autonomy because it recognizes both the importance of fundamental rights in enabling such autonomy, as well as the signi-

ficance of public participation towards the full realization of human agency. With this theoretical framework in mind, we now turn to our case study.

Transcending the Binaries: Muslim Women's and LGBT Organizations

The first attempts to organize activities for sexual liberation began with, and were subsequently prohibited by, the governorship of Istanbul in 1993. Soon after, Lambdaistanbul began to organize itself as a solidarity association in Istanbul. In Ankara, Kaos GL began to publish its magazine in September 1994. Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul opened cultural centers in 1999 and 2002 respectively. Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul were officially recognized as an association in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Pembe Hayat and Istanbul LGBTT, which focus on transgender individuals' rights, followed suit. Finally, SPOD was established in September 2011. Due to municipality and governorship bans, the first pride weeks and gatherings were organized in LGBT bars and clubs. Still, the organizations enabled the formation of associational life, resulting in established collectivities in the 2000s. The Europeanization process, and the accompanying funds, opened up a space for capacity building. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a citizenship discourse was introduced, claiming LGBTs' individual, political and social rights. The organizations began to publicly voice these demands through demonstrations, pride parades and by setting up booths to distribute information. The first public appearance of LGBTs was on the May 1st demonstration of 2001 in Ankara. Two years later, the first pride parade was organized in Istanbul with the participation of approximately 50 people. Since then pride parades have been organized annually. The growing contestation of the socio-cultural and political system can be observed throughout 2000s, exemplified in the last parade, which gathered a crowd of approximately 5,000 people. Currently, several LGBT organizations operate in multiple provinces.

Başkent Women's Platform was one of the five platforms established in different cities in 1995, as a result of meetings with conservative associations.[2] Its activities initially focused on combating discrimination faced by Muslim women as a result of both conservative and modern prejudices. With the 28 February 1997 coup, the headscarf ban became another important focus for advocacy. AK-DER was established in the aftermath of the 28 February coup, and it has focused on advocating on behalf of victims of the ban.[3] Both associations carry out aware-

2 http://www.baskentkadin.org
3 http://www.ak-der.org

ness-raising and advocacy activities through a variety of tools such as conferences, sit-ins in front of universities, legislation proposals, and publication of reports. Some of the other Muslim women's organizations, such as Şefkat-Der[4] and Özgür-Der,[5] which were established around the same period, have slightly different foci. Şefkat-Der has concentrated on charitable activities, whereas Özgür-Der has pursued more Islam-centric advocacy. However, both the Platform and AK-DER are closely connected to the processes of globalization and Europeanization in their discourse and practice.[6] While they have chosen not to utilize the European Union to maintain neutrality, they have looked to Europe for collaborations, best practices and anti-discrimination resources concerning women.

Individual Rights for an Inclusive Public

These groups consider Turkey's republican model of citizenship to be homogenizing and monolithic in its conception. The exclusively secular and heteronormative public involved the repression of headscarf wearing women and LGBTs in the pursuit of western contemporary civilization and »properly« established families as the basic units of the republican society. The groups utilize liberalizing reforms in Turkey that have been influenced by globalization and Europeanization, in order to present their challenges. Freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of association and organization, and freedom of conscience protect and ensure that these groups are able to articulate their claims of belonging and participation.

Several closure cases, filed by governorships in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir against the LGBT organizations were countered by demands for freedom of association. The closure case of Lambdaistanbul[7] in 29 May 2008 demonstrates how a singular notion of the common good impedes the public participation of LGBTs. The Governorship referred the Office of Associations to investigate Lambdaistanbul's preamble. The Office declared that the preamble violated the patriarchal structure, the sacred character of the family and religion, and »public morality.« Claiming their right to form associations, and invoking the liberal notion of citizenship through individual rights protection, Lambdaistanbul appealed the decision, which was annulled on 5 May 2010. Yet, the final decision in favor of Lambdaistanbul admonished that the organization can be closed if it »encourages, exhorts

4 http://www.sefkatder.org
5 http://www.ozgurder.org
6 Soysal diagnoses a similar trend for Muslim associations in Europe in the first half of 1990s. (see Soysal 1997)
7 For details, see http://bianet.org/biamag/bianet/114196-lambdaistanbula-karsi-kapatma-davasi-kronolojisi, available on June 12, 2012.

and diffuses different sexual orientations.« Such vague definitions pose structural legislative and judicial problems for LGBT groups. These groups resist the state elite's definition of the common good through slogans such as »whose morality is the common morality.« LGBT organizations argue that LGBTs face problems in accessing public services due to the lack of an explicit recognition of »sexual orientation and sexual identity,« relying on the liberal notion of human rights.

Muslim women's associations invoke freedom of conscience and freedom from discrimination in contesting the republican notion of citizenship. The 28 February 1997 military intervention, which was based on February 28th decisions of the National Security Council, was a turning point in the struggle for inclusion. The decisions set out a general framework for the full implementation of laws for the maintenance of laicism in Turkey. These laws included the law on attire, which punishes the wearing of the headscarf in public places defined as »state spaces.« Its rigorous enforcement resulted in the expulsion of headscarved women from institutions of higher education, and certain professions such as public servants and officials, teachers and lawyers. Başkent Women's Platform has argued that rights and freedoms are not granted by the state, but are a fundamental part of being an individual. For both the Platform and AK-DER,[8] the choice for women to wear a headscarf should be understood within the framework of fundamental human rights, freedom of belief and conscience. The Platform thereby places the burden of proof on the state, which cannot arbitrarily restrict rights and freedoms. AK-DER argues further that in exercising fundamental rights shared by all citizens, including the right to work, receive education and health services, individuals should be left free in their choice of clothing.

These groups also reveal the limitations of the liberal horizons. For Muslim women, the inadequacy of liberalism begins with the contradiction that whereas liberalism defines rights, such as the headscarf, as private, their exercise might be public.[9] This contradiction has led Muslim women's associations to conceptualize a democracy that is inclusive in a sense that extends beyond their particularity. AK-DER has put forth a proposal for inclusive education, which recognizes the right of all ethnic and religious groups to give and receive education in their mother tongue and in accordance with their traditions.[10] The Platform has entered

8 See »Why is the headscarf banned?«: http://www.ak-der.org/basortusu-neden-yasak—2008.gbt. and also »Headscarf: The Problem that cannot be Covered,« http://www.ak-der.org/kitap.gbt., available on June 12, 2012.

9 Secreteriat General Neslihan Arıbulut Akpınar's »Preface« to »Headscarf: The Problem that cannot be Covered,« http://www.ak-der.org/ortulemeyen-sorun-basortusu---kitap---onsoz.gbt., available on June 10, 2012.

10 http://www.ak-der.org/insan-haklari-ve-ihlaller-ekseninde-bir-ornek-turkiyede-basortusu-yasagi-sorunu.gbt, available on June 10, 2012.

into feminist and anti-militarist alliances. Within these collaborations, it has carried out investigative fieldwork with human and women rights organizations in the case of Uludere airstrikes, in which 34 civilians were mistaken for PKK members and killed in aerial bombings, and has demanded public accountability.[11] AK-DER participated, with other civil society organizations, in fieldwork to investigate markings of Alevi houses in Adıyaman.[12] In the resulting report, AK-DER asked for an in-depth investigation of the incident, and its implications for peaceful coexistence of different religious groups. Such cooperation is present in the case of LGBT organizations, SPOD and Kaos GL, and Lambdaistanbul as well, and involves collaboration with feminists and Kurds (i. e., participation in The Democratic People's Congress), carrying Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish placards in demonstrations, and coalitions with anti-militarist groups in the case of conscientious objectors. These collaborations demonstrate a public spiritedness and desire for a more inclusive citizenry.

Equality in Plurality

The citizenship discourse and practice of these groups transcended the difference/equality binary by arguing that equality through difference is possible. Their non-essentialist conceptions of difference have allowed them to recognize their own shifting and plural subject positions. Herein lies the promise of the equivalence of democratic struggles, as well as the possibility of a common »grammar of conduct,« essential for a radical democratic polity.

LGBT organizations demand equal recognition through difference, as witnessed in publicized court cases filed by individuals and organizations. The case of referee Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ is one such example.[13] Dinçdağ was discriminated against by the Trabzon Board of Referees and Turkish Football Association when he took a report of exemption from military service based on his sexual orientation. The Board of Referees decided on the basis of the private statute of the Association that those who do not fulfill their compulsory military service due to »diseases« cannot be a referee. The lawyer of Lambdaistanbul and Dinçdağ claimed that the decision was extra-legal since homosexuality is not considered as a disease by the Constitution. The claim was made for equal rights to serve as citizens.

11 For collaborations and Uludere investigation see: http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?cat=11 and http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?page_id=115, available on June 10, 2012.

12 For the report, see http://www.ak-der.org/adiyamanda-alevi-ailelerin-ikamet-ettigi-evlerin-isaretlenmesi-ile-ilgili-inceleme-raporu.gbt., available on June 12, 2012.

13 See http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/135982-gey-hakemin-hukuk-mucadelesi, available on June 12, 2012.

They pointed out the systemic reasons of unemployment in the LGBT community, and especially the transgender community. In doing so, they focused their critique on the nonrecognition of the equal capabilities that LGBTs have, which do not allow these individuals to work in the jobs they freely choose. The organizations voiced their claims to be treated as individuals with equal capacities through campaigning on individual cases of discrimination in the work place. They insisted that they were different in terms of their sexual orientation, but equal in terms of human agency, autonomy and capacity.

The exemption of GBT individuals from military service further demonstrates how these organizations strategically claim their equality within a polity. Kaos GL raises its claim for the constitutional recognition of conscientious objection.[14] It demands the state to consider GBT individuals who do not want to do their military service under the rubric of conscientious objection. This initiative acknowledges both the ability of GBT individuals to do their military service if they wish, and the right of GBT individuals to claim their own differences if and when they do not wish to do their military service.

LGBT organizations' contribution to the equality/difference debate is further tied to the conception of radical democracy. Queer politics, which recognizes identity in nonessentialist and intersectional terms, brought about the recognition of various subjectivities within the community (Seidman 2001). The horizontal and democratic decision-making process in initiatives, the positive discrimination for women/transgenders within the LGBT meetings, and the collaboration of different LGBT organizations within democratic platforms, points to the recognition of different subject positions within the community. Recognition of intersectionality also resulted in the expansion of concerns, as manifested in SPOD's data collection of socio-economic status of LGBT people living in Turkey and social policies.

Muslim women's associations have defended the right to education and work of women with headscarves with an »equality through difference« platform. AK-DER defines one of its missions as »working towards enabling individuals to live, work and receive education without compromising their beliefs,« where such a compromise is defined permanently or temporarily by taking off their headscarf.[15] In other words, equal access should not require relinquishing one's difference. Instead, there is a demand to exist in the public space with a freely formed identity.[16]

14 Maddeye Ek: LGBT realitesi tanınsın! http://www.kaosgl.com/sayfa.php?id=10216, available on June 12, 2012.

15 AK-DER mission statement: http://www.ak-der.org/misyon.gbt., available on June 12, 2012.

16 For Özipek, see: http://www.ak-der.org/insan-haklari-ve-ihlaller-ekseninde-bir-ornek-turkiyede-basortusu-yasagi-sorunu.gbt and Benli: http://www.ak-der.org/hukuki-boyutlariyla-turkiyede-basortulu-kadinlara-yonelik-ayrimcilik—bolum1-.gbt, available on June 12, 2012.

What is at stake in the recognition of difference is »the ability of the individual to determine his/her identity … This is not limited to the right to have an identity in private spaces but includes the freedom to choose how the person wants to be perceived by the state and present herself to the others.«[17] The Platform has identified both the conservative and the secular segments of society as publics that covered women encounter through their difference.[18] As articulated in their vision statement, the problems encountered by these women arise out of both the religious interpretations that strengthen the traditional role of women and the modern prejudices against religious women. In advocating for the equality of these women, AK-DER has focused on the equal right of citizens to become public servants, except in the cases of crimes punishable by law. For them, neutrality is not to be sought in the attire but instead in concrete decisions they make. Both AK-DER and the Platform objected to the limited joint proposal by AKP and MHP for the relaxation of the headscarf ban[19] by arguing that difference is not to be recognized conditionally, which makes future reinterpretation and marginalization a possibility.[20]

In arguing for equality through difference, both groups rely on a nonessentialist, or in Lister's terms, a weaker notion of difference. This understanding of difference is inseparable from their unique position as »women« and »Muslims,« enabling different alliances. The Platform's founding member, Özden Gültekin, points out how the movement grew out of Muslim women's discontent with the traditional roles expected of them, and their desire to not only establish families, but also to work.[21] Platform members initially felt unwelcomed by secular feminists as they began to participate in women's human rights meetings. This difficult position has in time transformed into a wide array of alliances, with feminist groups on issues of women's rights, antimilitarist groups within the scope of the Kurdish question, and other Muslim associations around issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AK-DER has been vocally critical of the disregard for Muslim women's perspective in the laws targeting the problems they face. Much like the

17 See http://www.ak-der.org/hukuki-boyutlariyla-turkiyede-basortulu-kadinlara-yonelik-ayrimcilik—bolum1-.gbt., available on June 10, 2012.

18 For Mission Statement, see: http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?cat=6, available on June 10, 2012.

19 For AK-DER's proposals, pronouncements and activities, see: http://www.ak-der.org/egitim-hakkinin-engellenmesi-ile-mucadele-yollari.gbt, and http://www.ak-der.org/faaliyetlerimiz.gbt., available on June 10, 2012.

20 For AK-DER's criticism, see the preceding endnote. For Başkent Women's Platform's criticism, see: http://www.yeniasya.com.tr/haber_detay2.asp?id=12238, available on June 12, 2012.

21 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=188#more-188, available on June 10, 2012.

Platform's Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal,[22] who criticized the AKP for instrumentalizing Muslim women, AK-DER's Secretary General, Neslihan Akbulut Arıkan, has recognized that most of the reactions to their campaign on the inclusion of headscarf wearing candidates in parliamentary elections came from the pious segments.[23]

A New Public and Counterpublics

The separation of the public and private is integral to the definition of the political. In Turkey, the challenge to existing public space began in the late 1980s with the claims of Alevis, Kurds and religious groups (Bozarslan 1997). They created a space for the later emergence of ideational claims of the other movements (i. e., feminists and LGBTs in the 1990s).

LGBT organizations subscribed to the feminist perspective that the »personal is political.« They politicized everyday life experiences to challenge the implicit heteronormative contract leading to a particular public. The demand for state policies to prevent hate crimes, such as awareness-raising measures, protection by lawyers and the police force, is one example of this struggle. The dialogues between LGBT organizations and several ministers,[24] and the resulting parliamentary motions[25] for the investigation of governmental activities towards the prevention of hate crimes are some of the outcomes. The critique includes legal obstacles to LGBT couples forming families. Nonrecognition of nonheterosexual relations by social policies, based on family composition, is diagnosed as the main obstacle to LGBTs. Although there is still not a collective demand for gay marriage, one female-to-male transgender woman with a pink identity card and a self-identified gay man with a blue identity card, both KAOS GL activists, challenged the heteronormative mentality of state by attempting to legally marry.

In 2009, the heteronormative character of the state was strenuously contested after the former state minister for women's affairs Selma Aliye Kavaf's statement that, »homosexuality is a biological disorder, a disease […] it is something that

22 http://t24.com.tr/haber/hidayet-sefkatli-tuksal-akp-de-basortulu-kadinlari-itibarsizlastirdi/188261, available on June 11, 2012.

23 http://www.ak-der.org/12-nisan-2011.gbt., available on June 11, 2012.

24 Nursuna Memecan (AKP), Sebahat Tuncel (BDP), Sırrı Süreyya Önder (BDP), and Mehmet Sevigen (CHP) are some ministers that the organizations contacted; http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/115501-tuncel-meclis-lgbtt-orgutlerini-de-muhatap-almali, available on June 12, 2012.

25 See Sebahat Tuncel's parliamentary motion; http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/121143-bdpli-tuncel-hukumete-nefret-suclarina-karsi-ne-yaptigini-sordu, available on June 12, 2012.

should be treated.«[26] In response, LGBT organizations raised their concerns about the representation of their interests at the state level. They insisted that ministers should be neutral towards different sexual identities. Lambdaistanbul filed a court case against Kavaf, advocating that such actions of state officials violate the impartiality of the state and increases the possibility of hate crimes towards already »victimized« groups. The statement »transgender killings are political,« problematizes the state's reluctance to consider it as a political issue. Gay individuals, such as Baki Koşar, and Ahmet Yıldız, who were murdered, as well as several other killings targeting the transgenders, have been brought up in anti-hate crime campaigns.[27] Ahmet Yıldız's case is considered the first gay honor killing. Lambdaistanbul and Kaos GL counter the separation of public and private, which legitimizes honor killings. Acknowledging that these problems can be ameliorated through the politicization of LGBT individuals, SPOD carried out courses on various political issues.[28] In a radio broadcast, a SPOD representative argued that these courses aimed at encouraging future representatives of LGBTs in the parliament.[29]

Muslim women's associations establish the private-public connection through a focus on domestic violence. Both AK-DER and the Platform, share a conservative emphasis on the sacredness of the family. However, they depart from a conservative interpretation that prioritizes the family in all instances by arguing that domestic violence is unacceptable, and is a public matter. Both have put forth amendment proposals to Turkey's domestic violence law. In its proposal, AK-DER argues that at the moment of violence, the family has already dissolved, and it is the responsibility of the state to protect the vulnerable individuals, namely the women and children.[30] They argue that mechanisms preventing domestic violence do not increase divorce rates. Rather, these mechanisms intervene in moments when the marriage has already departed from its normal course. Arising out of women's lived experiences, the proposal demands the inclusion of unmarried couples who cohabit like a family.,[31] It further argues for the prevention of the violent actor from going not only to the home and workplace, but to all places that

26 http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/03/07/bakan.kavaf.escinsellik.bir.hastalik/566620.0/index.html, available on June 12, 2012.

27 http://bianet.org/bianet/lgbtt/138402-homofobiye-karsi-mucadelenin-sembolleri

28 For the activities of SPOD, see http://www.spod.org.tr/, available on June 12, 2012.

29 The program can be accessed on http://www.spod.org.tr/turkce/spod-acik-radyodaydi/, available on June 12, 2012.

30 See http://www.ak-der.org/ailenin-korunmasina-dair-kanun-tasarisi-hakkindaki-gorusler—2006.gbt, available on June 11, 2012.

31 This demand for inclusion is likely to be rooted in the existence of couples who are united by a religious marriage. Yet, it is also rooted in the lived experiences of women.

the woman frequents, such as the children's school, as well as the prevention of the police from turning away women victims of violence by saying »it is a private matter.«

The two associations point out that patriarchal gender norms imbue pervade both the public and private. They result in either the formulation of discriminatory laws or the discriminatory implementation of laws. The Platform has pointed out that in both secular and Islamist regimes, traditional gender norms negatively affect laws on women's inheritance.[32] The AK-DER underlines that because since until recently properties could be owned under men's name only, the nonrecognition of this inequality in divorce laws resulted in ignoring women's contribution to the acquisition of mutual property, and making divorce a difficult decision for them.[33] Similarly, the AK-DER has proposed that family courts automatically grant the payment of a basic level of alimony to the women, starting with the post-violence separation of the spouses.

Lastly, Muslim women contest the particular conceptualization of »public space« *(kamusal alan)* as »state space.« In other words, in the aftermath of the 28 February coup, the narrow public space of the Turkish republic received a new gradation that further narrowed by exclusion through its identification as a state space, where women with the headscarf could not be employed as public officials, serve in courts as lawyers, or receive higher education. In contesting this exclusion, the AK-DER has argued that since all nonprivate space is de facto public, and since a group of citizens cannot be confined to their homes, the solution lies in opening up the public space in its entirety to women with headscarves. The public space is also challenged by the formation of counterpublics. The associations themselves have been important in this respect,[34] providing a separate space for Muslim women, who were included in Islamist mobilizations mainly through »social work,« to discuss and place on the public agenda their experiences of discrimination. The AK-DER organized counter-public days, with other civil society organizations, thereby defining counter-public as a space of communication.[35]

As demonstrated above, both groups use juridico-political instruments to push for a more inclusive public space, while at the same time posing more fundamental questions about the masculine essence of public. Yet, Muslim Women's Organizations emphasize the sacred character of the family while, conversely, this sacredness becomes an impediment to the LGBTs. Thus, although they have en-

32 For meeting notes, see http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=61, available on June 12, 2012.

33 See http://www.ak-der.org/ailenin-korunmasina-dair-kanun-tasarisi-hakkindaki-gorusler—2006.gbt, available on June 10, 2012.

34 For notes from a field visit, see http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=61, available on June 11, 2012.

35 http://www.ak-der.org/1-eylul-2007.gbt, available on June 11, 2012.

gaged in dialogues on specific issues, for a more democratic plural polity to be established, there is a need to move beyond the constructed moral hierarchy between the sacred and the nonsacred.

Solidification of Claims: Proposals for a New Constitution

Muslim Women's[36] and LGBT[37] organizations have actively participated in the new constitutional process which was initiated in the aftermath of the 2010 elections. Both affirm the importance of the inclusive, transparent, democratic, and accountable constitution making process. The demand is for inclusive citizenship that extends to other minorities' rights, such as Kurds, disabled people, Alevis, and non-Muslims. Muslim women's groups extend this also to the elderly and the sickly, but not to sexual minorities. The Platform explicitly argues that citizenship should be removed from all ethnic, religious and cultural concepts, without disregarding difference. This neutrality demand also comes out of the surveys that SPOD conducted with LGBTs, who stress the necessity of an ideology- and ethnicity-free constitution. The state is defined as the guarantor of the individual rights and freedoms, not granting, but instead ensuring, the practice of rights by citizens. Some of the concrete proposals are the clear regulation of hate crime by law. The Platform argues that the headscarf ban should be considered a hate crime. LGBTs are additionally cognizant of the ways in which vague constitutional terminology – public morality, propriety and public peace – have been used against LGBTs.

For the secular nature of the state to be established, Muslim Women's Organizations stress that the ability to become a public official should not be conditioned on one's attire. The demand for the state to be neutral vis-à-vis religious and non-religious attire moves Turkey closer to secularism as it is practiced in many other European countries. Similarly, LGBT organizations demand that the state consider secularism at the universal level – although what »universal« means is not clearly defined. Both groups also voice their desire for a welfare state; however, Muslim women's organizations argue that welfare policies should focus on creating gender equality through not only the empowerment of women, but also on the protection of family as a unit. For their part, LGBT organizations argue that social policies should take as their basis the individual rather than the family. It is only LGBT or-

36 For the AK-DER's proposal, see: http://www.ak-der.org/akderin-yeni-ve-sivil-bir-anayasa-icin-onerileri.gbt. For Başkent Women's Platform, see http://anayasaizleme.com/yenianayasa-aonerileri/, available on June 11, 2012.

37 For the SPOD's, Kaos GL's and Pembe Hayat's proposals see: http://www.spod.org.tr/turkce/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SPoD-Anayasa-Raporu.pdf, available on June 12, 2012.

ganizations that argue for positive discrimination, such as quotas for women. The Platform, on the other hand, proposes the application of a »Belonging Scale« to monitor the employment policies of the public and private sector vis-à-vis gender, attires, ethnicity, cultural and philosophical identification. Both emphasize the extra-legal restriction of rights as an impediment to the participation of marginalized groups in public life. Muslim women's organizations argue that fundamental rights can be subject to restriction only in line with the constitution and through laws. Kaos GL further emphasizes the injustice of punishment without a legal basis.

Finally, both situate their demands within the framework of international laws and norms, including human rights. The SPOD and Pembe Hayat argue that the state should consider Yogyakarta Principles: the implication of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity; the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999; and the European Council Directive 2000/78. Başkent Women's Platform, AK-DER, SPOD, Pembe Hayat and Kaos GL also refer to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, to which Turkey is a signatory.

Conclusion

We argue that the transcendence of binaries by these groups creates the possibility of a radical democratic conceptualization of the polity. These groups use liberal notions of self-protection, self-realization and self-esteem to challenge the republican notion of Turkish citizenship without losing sight of public-spiritedness. The advocacy of equality within plurality results from an acknowledgement of intersectional subject positions, and enables an ethico-political stance. The first glimpses of this stance are observed in the mutual participation in campaigns targeting violence against women, reform efforts to the penal code, and a curb on military spending. These groups blur the boundaries between the public and the private, and constantly redefine the political from different sides, yet through similar mentalities which indicate their ability to transform the polity to an open-ended process. The open-ended reformulation of the polity, the equivalence of democratic actors through a common ethico-political identification, and an awareness of public-spiritedness with continued respect for individual rights, bring us to a radical democratic possibility in which plurality is recognized in social, political and economic spheres.

Nonetheless, we should be cautious about lingering difficulties towards their dialogical engagement. We have pointed to the Muslim women's sacralizing of the family, and the hierarchy this creates as an obstacle to dialogical engagement

with LGBTs as equals. Further, while beyond the scope of discussion in this paper, there have also been instances of difficult engagement in the recent past (i. e. LGBT organizations' objections to Hilal Kaplan's presence in a conference on hate crimes), arising out of unfavourable newspaper articles she had written on homosexuality. Thus, we recognize the existence of tensions among these groups. These tensions are real, but not definite and inevitable impediments to a common »grammar of conduct.« Indeed, there have been instances where both groups manage to support one another despite the pressure of conservative groups. When the signature of Kaos GL in AK-DER's campaign, «28 Şubat 1000 Yıl Süremez, Kaldırın Başörtüsü Yasaklarını,« disturbed certain conservative groups, AK-DER and Başkent Women's Platfrom activists called Kaos GL activists personally and explained their difficult situation, while also making their excuses. The groups managed to find common ground. Finally, Kaos GL took back its institutional signature for a favorable outcome in the campaign. Yet Muslim women activists proposed that LGBT activists sign the petition individually with their institutional affiliation attached to their names. The process ended with a common acknowledgement that »both groups need to acquire more experiences together in their struggle against a world where these conservative groups could bear both groups' demands for living together.«[38]

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38 For a detailed account of AK-DER, Başkent Women's Organization and Kaos GL activists, see http://www.kaosgl.com/sayfa.php?id=4413, available on February 27, 2012.

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Islamist Party Identity in Right-Wing Milieus: The Case of the National Outlook Movement in Kayseri (1960–1980)

İpek Gencel Sezgin

Introduction

How do Islamist[1] collective actors draw symbolic boundaries that differentiate »us« from »them« (Silver 1997) and sustain collective action? This paper revisits that question through a study of the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi, MG) parties[2] between the years 1960 and 1980. Focusing on local right-wing networks in a central Anatolian town, Kayseri, differential recruitment[3] to the MG from these milieus, and the agency, action and interaction of the MG elites and activists within and outside the movement, it proposes a relational and localized perspective on the process of Islamist collective identity construction, i. e., symbolic boundary making.[4]

Current research on Islamist collective actors criticizes its predecessors for treating Muslimness as an *a priori* identity and »tak[ing] material and cultural

1 The term Islamist will be defined subsequently.

2 National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, NOP) and National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, NSP). The movement adopted the name MG later, by the mid-1970s, and its members identified themselves mostly through reference to the party names *(»Nizamci«* and *»Selametçi«).* This paper will use Milli Görüş (MG) to facilitate reading and underline the continuity in the movement.

3 The concept of differential entry/recruitment refers to the question of divergence in entering an incipient or long standing movement among the individuals populating a common area, network, group, social class, etc. In other words, it deals with the question of why and how a movement can recruit some individuals but not others. While socio-political and historical-institutionalist perspectives attribute differential entry to social-economic frustrations and/or aspirations of particular classes, having adopted macroperspectives they also forego micromobilization processes and ignore political, institutional, generational, ideational (the saliency of other subidentities) and organizational factors at play.

4 This paper is based on the parts of the author's larger PhD project on political engagement patterns of Islamist movements between 1960 and 1980.

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factors as additive,« neglecting »how they are intertwined and articulated« (Tuğal 2002: 90, see also Wiktorowicz 2004 and Munson 2001). Drawing mainly on Social Movement Theories, but also other neo-institutionalist, relational and constructivist perspectives, this new corpus demonstrates that identities of Islamist collective actors are not ascribed, but acquired. It argues that the identity process was shaped through changing formal and informal political institutions, various forms of material and symbolic interactions, and resources within the political field. The current literature, thus, opens the black box of both the political field and the Islamist movements, and paves the ground for studying changes and ruptures through time and space. While this study aims to follow in these footsteps, it also seeks to fill what appears to be a lacuna.

The new corpus treats Islam merely as a pool of resources, symbolic boundary formation as a creative but straightforward process, and, with notable exceptions, largely ignores the (inter)action, resources and constraints at the local level of the movement's context. As Salwa Ismail demonstrates, neither is Islam ahistorical, nor is Muslim society a homogenous body (2003: 15–26). She draws upon Sami Zubaida's analyses that reject the view of Islam as a coherent sociological and political entity, and of Islamic cultural products as constants in Muslim majority societies. Under an apparent unity, which blurs the boundaries, Islam is subject to various rival interpretations at any time and place, and Muslimness, while being shared by other members of the society, is also a subjectively defined individual identity (Ismail 2003: 16, Zubaida 1995: 151). Plurality of »Islams« and Muslimness, in turn, implies that any redefinition of Muslimness through a differentiation process of a group or individual entails a »dynamic power and resistance« (Ismail 2003: 17). Studying Islamist symbolic boundary formation, and understanding its complex and dynamic nature, requires thus taking into account power relations and resistance at the local level, as these inevitably influence identity process of an incipient or developing collective actor.

The term Islamist is, thus, used as an analytical tool to differentiate such collective actors as MG from other Muslims and understand their interactions. Islamism can be defined as formal or informal activities bearing direct or indirect influence on the power relations and institutions of the political field(s) and on the (re)distribution of material and symbolic resources controlled by state institutions through the intensive use, (re)interpretation and articulation of traditions, signs and symbols, and oral and written sources of Islam in novel ways (Ismail 2003: 2) in order to create and sustain mobilization. This definition has two analytical uses: first, whether or not a collective actor seeks to refashion the state and society based on Islam ceases to be relevant for analysis as it makes room for multifaceted and dynamic goals, as well as recognizes that these groups interact with and influence the political fields notwithstanding their »true« intentions. Sec-

ond, problems related to the use of the terms »Muslim« or »Islamic«[5] are avoided. Since Muslimness both creates certain homogeneity and is subject to various definitions and accompanying power struggles, a collective actor cannot be singled out as Muslim without denying Muslim subjectivity (or authenticity) to others. Nor particularities of one »Muslim« group vis-à-vis other organized and unorganized Muslims can be understood. The adjective Islamic, in turn, when used for a collective actor inadvertently reproduces its members' claims of being the true vehicle or expression of Islam, which creates similar analytical problems with the usage of »Muslim«.

Based on these (re)conceptualizations and a relational analytical framework, this paper tackles the issue of MG's Islamist identity construction as follows: how did the MG's identity that sustained its mobilization at the local level emerge? Was MG a predetermined and aggregated result of a cultural/religious (or economic) cleavage between the center and periphery? Did the MG's identity emerge only in opposition to the »center«? How did local networks, social and spatial settings, and power relations during the late 1960s and 1970s influence the process? Can Islam be considered merely as a resource in the identity construction of an Islamist collective actor? This paper argues that Islamist identities such as the MG identity a) are not preconceived, pre-collective action and pre-political, instead, b) they are shaped in relation to not only national level, but also the local environment and its power relations, c) they emerge through both conscious efforts and subliminal processes. Conscious efforts of mobilizing actors render Islam a »constraint« when the actors meet the »resistance« of existing organized and unorganized Muslims (or other Islamists for that matter), which, in turn, impact the way in which Islamists draw their symbolic boundaries.

The paper is organized in three sections. The first section introduces the local right wing networks from which MG recruited its activists and addresses the question of differential recruitment. The second section examines the creative and subliminal aspects of MG's symbolic boundary formation within the rightwing milieus where the MG elites and activists targeted to recruit from and then competed with the members of already established right wing collective actors such as the incumbent Justice Party (JP), Risale-i Nur Students (RNS)[6] and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). The last section provides a brief overview of the research findings and its implications.

5 Unless, of course, they are defined in relation to non-Muslim collective religious actors.

6 The *RNS,* or the Nur students constituted an Islamist »new religious movement«. The movement was organized around the writings and persona of its leader Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1873–1960). The term new religious movement refers to those religious, or spiritual collectivities that display novel and even unorthodox teachings and behaviors that may or may not draw upon established religious institutions.

Research for this essay is based on in-depth interviews (and oral histories)[7], a study of MG publications, local and national newspapers (1960–1980), memoirs of various political actors and court files. In-depth interviews were conducted with national and local MG entrepreneurs and activists, and local leaders and activists of such groups as Yeni Asya branch (the largest group before its further split) of Risale-i Nur students, the RNS, Akıncılar[8], Büyük Doğucular[9] and major non-Islamist parties (Republican People's Party (RPP), JP and NAP). Overall, data gathered on 38 MG activists, 12 JP activists[10], four NAP activists and 17 non-MG Islamists, helped to highlight the frontiers of the right wing milieu in Kayseri in the 1960s and 1970s.

Right Wing Milieu and Differential Recruitment in Kayseri

Local social networks constitute »frontiers of the *milieu partisan* [the social settings of the party activists], which is considered as the set of relations consolidated between groups whose members, though not necessarily aiming at participating in the construction of the political party, contribute to [its establishment] through their activities« (Sawicki 1997: 24). In other words, while they facilitate and inform the mobilization processes through helping information flow, facilitating contact with individuals and rendering their constituents predisposed to sympathize with certain ideas and frames (Diani and McAdam 2003), not all, in fact few of its members, can be recruited as activists. Providing a thick description of the networks from which MG recruited its activists and analyzing differential recruitment/entry to MG a) reveals the heterogeneity and power relations of the »periphery« and b) highlights the context within which MG activists constructed their identity in relation to the other members of these networks.

7 Although most of the participants gave their consent for the publication of their names, to protect their privacy only codes or previous affiliations will be used as identification.

8 Akıncılar, or the Raiders, was the semi-autonomous youth organization of MG.

9 Büyük Doğucular, or the Members of the Great East was an informal network of young Islamists, mostly members of the National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, known by its famous acronym the MTTB) who regularly met and discussed various political and literary issues around the views of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek published in Büyük Doğu (the Great East) Magazine.

10 Interviews with the JP activists entailed 6 face-to-face and 6 telephone interviews. Two interviews were from Konya, which helped to understand Kayseri case better.

Local Networks, Social and Spatial Settings in Kayseri

To begin with, four main professional categories appeared among the studied 38 MG official and unofficial[11] leaders and activists in Kayseri: civil engineers/building contractors (8), skilled craftsmen working in factories or in their workshops (mostly ironworkers, machinists, fitters, but also carpenter or woodworkers) (6), traders in fibers, textiles, carpets (6), and finally men of religion (5)[12] working in mosques or religious vocational schools.[13] The professional relations within which the MG activists were embedded did not necessarily entail business relations. Individuals exercising similar or related professions might know each other from vocational school, university, factory, or from some other social setting in which their professional affinity or common areas of interest brought them into contact.

As far as the business networks are concerned, one should take into account the economic context of the late 1960s and 1970s. During those years, a quantitative and then qualitative increase in the building sector (Abadan-Unat et al. 1975: 290–304)[14], coupled with a similar increase in small workshops oriented towards production of construction and household items (van Velzen 1977: 173) led to lively commercial activity among civil engineers/building contractors, skilled craftsmen (for woodwork or ironwork), transporters, traders in building materials, such as paint, plaster or in raw materials such as wood and iron (Abadan-Unat et al. 1975: 290–303 and van Velzen 1977: 53). There was also a parallel rise in the furniture sector entailing relations between furniture makers (carpenters) and traders in »formica, hardboard, foam and rubber, upholstery textiles, etc.« (van Velzen 1977: 57).

Professional and business connections involved also such rightwing-dominated organizations as the Association of Craftsmen Unions *(Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği),* Kayseri Chamber of Commerce, and the Kayseri Chamber of Industry. While the leaders of these associations were local JP elites and the JP mem-

11 Not all initial leaders of the local MG took executives posts in Kayseri.

12 Among the men of religion, one was the director of the Prayer Leader and Preacher School and a literature teacher in a vocational school in Kayseri in the 1960s before moving to Ankara.

13 There were also three individuals trading in auto parts or repair, one trading in wood, one worker (unspecified), six professionals (two pharmacists, one optician, one technical draftsman, one manager and one lawyer), one grocery store owner, and one trader (unspecified) (*Milli Nizam Partisi Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası,* 1971)

14 The term »qualitative increase« refers here to professionalization of the construction business.

bers constituted the majority of the rank and file, all colors of the rightwing were present.

Religious networks, in turn, involved relations between men of religion and lay Muslims. Most men of religion were employed by the state in local mosques, the Advanced Institute for Islam, and the Prayer Leader and Preacher School. Traditional religious scholars were preaching or teaching religious subjects in various mosques scattered around town or in their homes. The *Naqshbandi*[15] disciples of Mahmut Sami Efendi of Erenköy or Yahyalılı Hacı Hasan Efendi formed another religious network, which was connected, sometimes even overlapping with the latter two.[16] Several smaller religious charity organizations, usually led by the local JP elites, allowed the formation of relations outside the boundaries of basic religious practices (i. e., prayers, funerals, and Qur'an classes).[17]

Finally, the network of »native« Kayseri families *(yerliler)* as a source for MG activist recruitment needs to be mentioned. In Kayseri, families which claimed to be the original habitants of downtown Kayseri formed a network apart, which transcended political, social and economic positions and statuses of individuals. They all knew each other at least by name, had some connection with each other through marriages, business partnerships or »Vineyard house« neighborhoods in the outskirts of the Erciyes Mountain.[18]

Politico-cultural associations and an informal local institution called »*oturma*« (literally: sitting) were the two social settings where the above mentioned networks converged, and rightwing ideational elements produced and reproduced. In such associations as the Turkish Cultural Association *(Türk Kültür Derneği)* or Büyük Doğu Club, students of high schools and Advanced Institutes for Islam and Education, men working in the factories, marketplace or in the industrial zone attended conferences of famous right wing poets and writers, read right wing publications (especially *Büyük Doğu*), or just chatted informally at association head-

15 Naqshbandiyya is a *tarikat,* or a mystical brotherhood, which dates back to 14th century India. The Naqshbandi brotherhood has historically been organized in various autonomous, even independent, branches in various regions in Turkey (and elsewhere). Tarikat literally means path an individual who enters a brotherhood, then chooses a particular path to travel to God under the spritual leadership of the religious leader.

16 Until the mid-1970s, in Kayseri, the *Nur* student community, then quite small, was neither well-known nor much appreciated within these religious circles.

17 Kayseri hosted a high number of professional and religious associations. In 1968, there were 359 religious associations including 263 organizations for construction of mosques (Yücekök 1971: 178–188 and the Appendix).

18 Symbolic differences did not mean a strict exclusion of the non-natives, or »the peasants.« To diversify and extend their social capital the natives tried to assimilate them and the »peasants« tried to blend in. For capital reconversion and »nobility« reproduction see (de Saint Martin 1993)

quarters. Together with the above-mentioned professional, business and religious associations, they organized major right wing demonstrations in Kayseri.[19]

Oturma, regular informal meetings of a group of men or families, brought together members of different networks in the intimate setting of individuals' homes. In some cases, they harked back as long as 50 years.[20] Originally a »native« tradition, *oturma* was the social context that enabled men who had got acquainted and grew affection for each other within various contexts to deepen their relationships into life-long friendships. *Oturma* members were not necessarily from the same business networks, nor from the same professional milieus. Even their political allegiances could differ.[21] As such, this institution provided an ideal context for exchanging news or ideas on the city's social, economic, and political life.[22] In fact, the national MG elites were able to get access to some influential local men who had been frequenting various *oturma* groups in town. Their acquaintances and friends of Kayseri origin in the Islamist engineer-civil servant circles in Ankara and Istanbul formed the early bridges between the national and local levels. Once a relationship was established, the *oturma* began to serve as a platform where the MG ideational elements, notwithstanding the actual rate of participation into the MG and the way in which specific actors received them, could circulate and penetrate into the right wing networks.

Finally, two types of socio-spatial settings, the workspaces and the downtown mosques, constituted the everyday context of most MG activists and the other members of the networks. Within the ancient marketplace *(çarşı)* and the old industrial zone *(sanayi)* in downtown Kayseri, tradesmen, small shop and workshop owners, with or without business dealings, established relations by virtue of being neighbors, belonging to a native Kayseri family, coming from the same subdistrict of Kayseri, or frequenting the same mosque for mid-day and afternoon prayers.

The mosques within or close to the marketplace (Camii Kebir and Hunat Camii), on the other hand, brought together the vicinity's small traders, craftsmen,

19 A news item that appeared in a local ultranationalist daily on the Rise Up *(Şahlanış Mitingi)* meeting of 1968 in Kayseri provides a laundry list of these associations. *Yeni Sabah,* March 30, 1968.

20 The longest standing *oturma* group mentioned in the interviews has been around for 52 years

21 It should, however, be noted that members would belong either to rightwing or leftwing. Leftwing *oturmas* do not seem to be prevalent. Either there were less »native« leftwing members, or they preferred public places like the city club, restaurants or coffeehouses.

22 An insightful discussion of *oturma* demonstrates how this institution has evolved over the years so as to substitute for formal and informal open public channels of local policy making such as political parties, associations, urban spaces. While previously they were social resources for political parties, today they (particularly those of the rich that convene at the outskirts of Erciyes) have become the dominant institutions overpowering even the political parties. (Doğan 2007: 242–252).

engineers, and others. for prayers and provided a relaxing environment where small talk, exchange of information and news regularly took place.[23]

Differential Recruitment/Entry to MG in Kayseri

By 1969, shortly before the establishment of the NOP, Islamist party entrepreneurs, under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, began to shape and disseminate their mobilization and identity frames at the national and local levels of the political arena. On the one hand, they echoed their unorganized Islamist predecessors of the 1950s and early 1960s. They called for material and moral development of the country, defined the nation as primarily »Muslim« without abandoning »Turkishness« and claimed to represent this nation. On the other hand, they brought two major novelties to this frame, distinguishing them from the contemporary and past Islamists. These novelties aimed at recruiting the members of the right wing milieus, particularly discontented JP activists and sympathizers.

First, the MG elites, based on their own experiences at the national level of politics and inspired also from the rising left, created an economic injustice component. They claimed that the large businesses of Istanbul and Izmir were favored at the expense of »Muslim« Anatolian small and medium enterprises, and got most of the foreign credits, bank credits and investments.[24] Second, they introduced direct political engagement through the establishment of a political party as a religious duty and a historical responsibility to the Muslim ancestors. The MG was not a simple partisan enterprise, but rather a collective action of people who »shared the same religious faith« to establish »the National Order« and unity, and fight against vanity and blasphemy through solidarity, cooperation and bonds of love.[25] A faithful Muslim would fight against »injustice and evil« through »selfless political action« (Aksay 1971: 18–19).

A right wing ethos emphasizing Muslimness and Turkishness, piety and a peripheral position vis-à-vis the administrative and economic centers were common to *all* the members of rightwing networks. Thus, the call for moral and material development and injustice frames had the potential for mobilization within these milieus. Yet, relatively few members of these networks joined the MG ranks as ac-

23 It should be added that collective morning prayers organized by the Islamist daily *Bugün* all over the country took place in Hunat Camii, bringing together not only the regular mosque community but also participants from greater Kayseri and neighboring towns.

24 For a discussion of how they constructed their economic injustice frame by the late 1960s see (Gencel Sezgin 2013: 88–91).

25 Hüseyin Abbas at the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli in October 6, 1970 (*Milli Nizam Partisi Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası,*1971).

tivists or supported its parties in the elections. Even *Naqshbandis* did not show much interest until the mid-1970s, most refusing to vote for the MG parties, let alone becoming new party's activists.[26] Three interrelated intervening factors seem to explain the differential recruitment at the periphery: to begin with, individuals' structural position within the *local* economic and political networks needs to be taken into account. That is, it was not the marginalization vis-à-vis the »center« *per se,* but the relative marginalization which seems to be a factor for different levels of interest to the new party initiative (see also Gould 1998: 36–53). While the discontented JP local executives (owners of small and medium businesses), delegates and members (mostly small merchants and craftsman) were peripheral vis-à-vis Istanbul and Ankara, unlike the (future) MG activists, they occupied the center of socio-economic and political life in Kayseri. The JP circles, who made up the majority of the right wing milieus, dominated the local Municipal and General District Assemblies, the local chambers of commerce and industry, and enjoyed extensive clientelistic ties thanks to JP's incumbency (see also Gencel Sezgin 2013: 84–87, 91). Small and medium sized business owners controlled even the professional associations of small shop owners and artisans and siphoned their resources (Bianchi 1984: 136).

Second, a prior engagement to, or identification with, a collective actor, or its lack thereof (»multivalent influences at the individual level«), seems to have played a role in the decision to participate in MG (Kitts 2000: 252). For instance, the JP activists were deeply entrenched in all religious networks, some were as pious as or more pious than the future MG activists,[27] or equally situated at a peripheral position within the periphery. However, joining MG would mean betrayal of their cause and their history. Since the Democrat Party years, especially having endured immense pressure following the coup d'état of 1960, they had acquired a strong sense of collective identity against the state elites represented by the RPP and the military.

Third, *ceteris paribus,* generational factor, political parties' organizational and symbolic institutions, and perceptions of the MG actors of these parties seem to have created a potential pool of recruits without prior party identification. Existing major right wing political parties, perceived as either too competitive (JP) or too authoritarian (NAP), failed to integrate ambitious and dynamic professional young men at the beginning of their social and economic careers. The intensity of

26 Interviews with local MG and JP activists 2006–2009. Islamist and conservative newspapers, particularly *Bizim Anadolu,* sympathetic to MG in its early years, did not report any sizeable groups of delegates and executives leaving the JP or the NAP.

27 For instance, the pious JP activists worked in (and even presided over) the same religious associations with the Islamists.

JP's intra-organizational competition required extensive social, economic and political capital. The MG activists, who were simply too young to have accumulated such capital,[28] and lacking direct connections with the national centers to accumulate in the foreseeble future, despised JP's factional disputes and perceived JP activists as selfish individuals engaged in petty politics. The NAP, in turn, seemed to be unable to accommodate new ideas and individuals with potential for leadership. Moreover, it was blamed (though tolerated) by most members of the right wing milieu as the perpetrator of violent acts in the town, a condition that had particularly repelled the MG activists.[29]

The attributes of individuals who joined MG were as follows: socially and economically upwardly mobile, religious and relatively young shop owners, artisans, engineers, and traders without prior engagements to collective entities. As was also the case for the NSP parliamentary candidates (Toprak 1981: 105–107), they were professionally successful, mostly well educated, and were *not* traditional shop owners and artisans who had been impacted negatively by modernization and deployed religion to contest the power-holders. Nevertheless, they had limited and dependent access to the networks that tied the periphery to the center, and to the center of the periphery. Thus, it was *not* their »deep interest in religion« which distinguished them from their counterparts,[30] but a sense of injustice they experienced at the local level vis-à-vis the dominant members of their networks. Hence, MG elites' frames of injustice and material and moral development, and their call (and promise) to change the status quo with a »noble cause« attracted them. They did not constitute a »counter elite« with deeper religious sensibilities as of yet. The counter elites, as shall be seen in the next section, were a product of MG collective identity formation.

28 According to the documents in the MNP's Constitutional Court trial records of 1971, the average age of the official founders of the MNP's Kayseri Central District organization was 28.5 while the executives of local JP were in their late 40s (Gencel Sezgin 2013: 91, 98). See also (Tachau 1973: 286).

29 The NAP appealed more to traditional shop owners or artisans, and mainly vied for the attention of even younger generations in schools.

30 Having studied the educational and professional backgrounds of the parliamentary candidates from the NSP and compared them to the candidates of other political parties, Binnaz Toprak concludes that the NSP's contenders were different from others in their »deep interest in religion, in fact, »counter elites« (1981: 107–108). However, a closer look at the candidates from Kayseri and Konya shows that the majority in the NSP's electoral lists were mainly the local elites of the NSP with no or little chance to be elected. As a matter of fact, despite their educational and professional backgrounds, they had had limited access to the above mentioned networks.

MG's Islamist Identity Formation at the Local Level

In studying »organized racism,« focusing on white supremacist groups in the United States, Kathleen Blee argues that since »whiteness« is an ambiguous, »unmarked«, even an »invisible« category in a white-dominated society where existing policies and goods that benefit the whites »are seldom acknowledged as racial in their intent or consequences« and only »non-whites« are remarked through »otherness« (2002: 56), the racist groups have difficulties in trying to draw and justify the boundaries of both whiteness and their collectivities. The whiteness is identified with »political commitment as much as biology« (2002: 63) and the whites are »those who act on behalf of the white race as a whole – and those who are steadfast personal friends …« (2002: 71).

For the MG elites and activists, the secular(ist) attitudes of the elites of the existing right and left-wing parties, the military and judicial bureaucracy, and the existence of Kemalist secularism as the dominant component of the national political field's *doxa,* facilitated the drawing of symbolic boundaries through the adoption of Islamic signs and symbols.[31] (Re)defining the nation as primarily Muslim, public displays of basic religious rituals such as daily prayers, ablution, fasting and emphasis on conservatism regarding gender roles, and finally denying Muslim subjectivity to the elites of the mainstream parties,[32] with the white supremacist groups: the invisibility of Muslimness in a Muslim dominated society. While claiming to represent the right-wing dominated social networks and Muslims, the NSP's local activists began to differentiate themselves and their Muslimness from other (pious) Muslims. In other words, they had to distinguish themselves from other Muslims of their locality to avoid blurring boundaries without, however, creating a rupture that could have endangered their pretension to represent the Muslims.

Specifically, in order to make sense of their being together, and to draw more »solid« symbolic boundaries, the MG activists strived to become »good« and »honest« Muslims[33] worthy of representing the Muslim nation. First, the MG elites' reconceptualization of Muslim as a politically conscious and active subject

31 For a discussion on how Islamist frames can both reproduce and challenge the *doxa* of the Turkish political field see (Çınar and Gencel Sezgin 2013: 335–338).

32 For instance, according to the report of the Government Inspector at the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük in May 31, 1970, Hüseyin Abbas attacked prime minister Süleyman Demirel saying »He pretends to be Muslim, [but he is actually] a freemason« (*Milli Nizam Partisi Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası,*1971).

33 Among the interviewees »iyi« (good) and »dürüst« (honest) were the two adjectives used frequently together with the word »Muslim« in order to refer to fellow activists and to some non-MG friends and acquaintances.

was internalized by MG activists, despite their thitherto aversion to party politics. They achieved a certain level of homogeneity where non-stringent-movement resource as well, and individuals began to compete with each other in being »good Muslims.«

Ismail argues that religious orthodoxy (i. e., stringency) of the Islamists entailed adopting »an evaluative grid whose main components are the ideas of truth and falsehood, and the categories of *halal (licit) and haram (illicit)*« (2003: 62). Within the Kayseri context, in fact, in Anatolia, while piety of an individual was in the eye of the beholder, as the interviews with both the MG and non-MG activists revealed, the most stringent Muslim of or thought to be socially inappropriate, pretentious or even heterodox. While the outcome was different for the individual MG activists, they shared the following properties: first, they became dissatisfied with the »basic« Islamic rituals, and jointly and individually tried to accumulate knowledge of the Hadith and Sunna to be able to apply them meticulously in daily life. As the words of an interviewee illustrates:

> We were inviting religious masters (Hocaefendiler) to our oturma sessions. We were trying to learn Islam. I learned Islam during that period … Previously, even though I was doing my daily prayers, I had not known Islam.[34]

Second, in their daily lives they introduced the use of religious signs and symbols in novel ways and situations. For instance, men started to grow beards, women began to veil before marriage, and they began using the Islamic salutation »Esselamun Aleykum« not only in face-to-face interactions but also in telephone conversations, which clearly differentiated the MG activists from ordinary Muslims, at times, provoking reactions.[35] Third, their definition (and perception) of individual piety was extended so as to cover not only their own religiousness but also the behavior of the immediate family, principally the children. Most of the pious local elites of the JP (i. e., those who joined the activities of religious associations, regularly performed daily prayers, fasted during the Ramadan and made their pilgrimage) had displayed a liberal attitude towards the actions and choices of their daughters or sons regarding religious matters, though not necessarily their wives. The MG activists, in contrast, had been personally involved in the religious education and direction of their children trying to render them »conscious« and »honest« Muslims. The following excerpt appeared in a Konya based MG newspaper during the early months of the MG mobilization and reflects how the behavior of the immediate family could be used for multiple purposes: to measure the level

34 Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006.
35 Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006.

of religiousness among the pious, to attract the religious among the ranks of the MG and persuade them to buy an MG-affiliated newspaper - a symbol of both religiosity and belonging to the collectivity:

> »Imagine a head of the family; he is a quite pious (mazbut) person. He fulfills his religious duties regularly. He also became a pilgrim (hacı). Both his wife and his daughter accommodated themselves to his lifestyle. While the wife is sincere in her conformity, the daughter follows the orders of his father willy-nilly. A particularity of this head of the family is also his tenderness towards his children. Consequently, he has to put the newspaper with promiscuous photos in his pocket and bring it home. Despite that neither the wife nor the daughter wears skirts above their knees[36] … one day, by accident, this honorable head of the family comes across with his daughter in the street. Surprise, the skirt of the daughter is a miniskirt … Yes the pilgrims, the masters (hacılar, hocalar), honorable heads of the family: choose carefully the newspaper you would bring home.«[37]

Finally, they avoided, to the best of their ability, the social environments where they might have to mingle with the opposite sex, or with those who consume alcoholic drinks. This form of religious stringency was not necessarily a result of a traditional education or culture. Nor was it a simple emotional recognition of the need to differentiate oneself. Since the MG elites increased the value of the »religious card« in circulation within the local political field, it was also the result of the pressure on the part of the MG activists' rivals who challenged them to live up to the total Muslim identity they declared to possess. A very illustrative example was the change of attitude of an MG local executive when a newspaper published his photos taken during a dinner party organized for the alumni of his university. Though he was not drinking alcohol, he had not seen any harm in sitting at a table with his old friends who were drinking, and he even danced with them. Using the photos of him at the table and dancing, the newspaper insinuated that the MG activists were not as Muslim as they pretended to be, but were merely »using Islam« to attract votes. Although his fellow MG activists did not reprimand the executive, he (decided to) never set foot again in a similar social environment.[38]

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36 One should draw attention to the fact that while the proper measure for Islamic modesty was a skirt below the knees for the Islamists of the years under consideration, today, the Islamist and non-Islamist religious women barely show their ankles.

37 Ziya Tanrıkulu, »Ölçü, Gazete seçmek,« *Türkiye'de Yarın,* November 11, 1969

38 Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006. Korkut Özal, the NSP Minister of Food, Agriculture and Stockbreeding in the First National Front Government (I. Milliyetçi Cephe), in 1975 was involved in a similar incident. First nationally distributed JP supporter

The religious stringency, and the call for political engagement through the establishment of a political party, were valuable symbolic resources for activist mobilization. It was through committed activists that the MG could attract further members and the voters. However, at least during the period under consideration, even among the pious, the activists risked heterodoxy, which may have helped the secularist elites stigmatize the incipient movement.

Conclusion

Focusing on the right wing milieus, differential recruitment to the MG, and the practices and identity frames of the MG activists, this paper examined the formation and construction of the MG's collective identity from a relational and localized perspective. The adoption of religious stringency and redefinition of Muslim as a subject engaging in party activism were the major components of MG's Islamist identity that emerged and developed within the context of power relations of local networks.

Based on the fieldwork data, it can be concluded that, first, MG's Islamist identity emerged and developed not only in opposition to the secularist elites of the center, or at the national level politics, but also in action and interaction within the local networks, social and spatial settings. Second, Islam presents both a pool of resources and a *constraint* for an incipient religious collective actor. On the one hand, MG elites and activists innovatively tapped into rich Islamic signs, symbols and traditions to challenge the national power holders and to articulate local demands *with* the national level of politics. Moreover, they recruited further activists and acquired a sense of »we,« dotted with political responsibility, altruism, empowerment, affection. On the other hand, to the extent that Islam was a shared and contested source among Muslims within the right wing networks, and a valuable capital within the movement itself, within the context of the late 1960s and 1970s, it pushed MG activists to borderline social and political heterodoxy while claiming to represent those very networks and the »Muslim Nation« – that is, orthodoxy. Finally, examining the identity process at the local level demonstrates that the route to the establishment and consolidation of MG was neither linear nor predetermined. MG cannot be considered a direct and aggregate result of a cultural (or economic, for that matter) cleavage between the center and periphery, or an *a priori* Muslim identity.

Tercüman and then Yeni Asya published his photos raising a glass at a state event in Germany. *Yeni Asya,* May 1, 1977.

The case at hand, thus, shows that Islamist identity processes are, a) dynamic and formed in action and interaction *during* mobilization not before, b) products of both creative/intentional and unintentional/subliminal processes, c) multifaceted, as they are shaped in relation to both national elites/centers and within local environments. As far as today's Turkey is concerned, the empirical and analytical insights gained from studying the MG case in Kayseri are relevant to the extent that they provide a starting point to examine the emergence and establishment of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an off-spring of the MG. The divisions among the elites of the MG, the impact of state interventions to its parties, and the eventual establishment of the AKP have been subject to scholarly and journalistic analyses. The local level is yet to be extensively studied. The AKP networks include not only the majority of the decades old MG circles, but also non-Islamist right wing social and political groups. To understand whether and how these networks merged to bring about the AKP and its non-Islamist, avowedly »conservative-democratic« collective identity, necessitates examining how and why the dominant center-right party (the continuation of the JP, the True Path and the Motherland Parties) networks lost their central position and dominance at the periphery. How did their gradual material and ideational disappearance affect the MG activists and their identity process, and vice versa?

Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, MG activists and members had been enjoying easier and more stable access to the state controlled resources at and through the local level despite the frequent and extreme difficulties the party organization faced at the national level thanks to party closures. How did becoming a member of the center of the periphery, increased material and symbolic resources, and the gradual establishment of clientelistic ties with ideationally divergent groups and individuals affect the MG's identity and eventually contribute to the formation of the AKP? Answering this question would provide a more complete picture of the transformations and continuities within the MG and the AKP.[39]

Capturing fully the changes and ruptures within Islamist movements, especially the cases of »moderation/radicalization,« and addressing the puzzles of competition and cooperation among various Islamist and non-Islamist actors in time and space require abandonment of ideational essentialisms and structural determinisms. A localized and relational perspective would potentially facilitate this endeavor.

39 Cihan Tuğal's study of the ex-MG, new AKP networks in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul is an excellent and early example of such an approach (2009). Weaving his analysis from the bottom up, and focusing on the transformations and continuities within the lives of individuals and networks, he reveals the »passive revolution« that Turkey has been experiencing for the last decade.

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Headscarf in the Context of Precarious Work: A Critical Approach to the Headscarf Discussion in Turkey

Feyda Sayan-Cengiz

This study examines the role and meaning of the headscarf in the working lives of lower-middle class saleswomen without a university degree. The focus is on how lower middle class women with headscarves working in sales jobs relate to the Islamic identity that is associated with the headscarf, and how they handle the connotations of the headscarf in the context of their precarious, insecure, low-paid, temporary jobs. Much has been written about the politics of difference revolving around the headscarf in Turkey, especially with regard to the exclusion of the headscarf from the state monitored public sphere, as well as the political struggle of educated women with headscarves against this exclusionary, homogenizing public sphere. I investigate the relevance of the arguments formulated through a politics of difference framework in the context of lower middle class women's working lives. More specifically, I critically investigate the argument that the wearers of the modern, urban headscarf consciously underline Islamic identity through their use of the headscarf, and »sharpen their identity by labeling themselves Islamists« (Göle 1997 b: 89). How do the assumptions raised by the visibility of the headscarf unfold in the labor market for sales jobs? How do the women with headscarves respond to those assumptions, and how do they relate to the Islamic difference that is supposedly visualized by the headscarf? First, I revisit the current literature on women, Islam and headscarves in Turkey through a critical examination of the politics of difference framework. After laying out the methodological and conceptual concerns and detailing the fieldwork, I continue the critical inquiry of the dominant frameworks in the literature in light of the findings of my research.

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Literature on Women, Islam and Headscarves in Turkey: The Politics of Difference Framework

The discussion of women and Islam in Turkey took a new turn in the 1990s in light of the increasing visibility of Islamist politics, and due to the rising popularity of the headscarf debate. As opposed to the inclinations to dismiss Islam as a residual influence that is supposed to wither away in the course of modernization, the increasing recognition of the influence of Islam in providing a coherent social »ethos« in Turkish society (Mardin 1986) moved religion to a more central position in social science research in Turkey. This also inspired a discussion on the effect of Islam on gender identities and gender relations, with new academic sensitivity to the potential of Islamic culture in terms of producing new discourses and ways of life in interaction with modernity.

This academic sensitivity, along with the rising interest in the increasing visibility of young, urban, educated women with headscarves in urban public spaces, spurred new research interest in women who display Islamic identity in the 1990s. There was an attempt to counter detractors of the headscarf who contended that it was »evidence« of Islamist political manipulation, a sign of false consciousness, and patriarchal oppression. In defiance of these assertions, the wearing of the headscarf increasingly started to be taken as a declaration of authentic[1] identity, challenging the homogeneous and exclusionary public sphere, the hegemony of Westernization, and the traditional image of the docile Muslim woman.

Scholarship has helped to frame this debate, and there has been a remarkably strong emphasis on Islamist politics of difference and the emancipatory potential of these politics of difference for women who would define themselves as religious Muslims (Göle 1993, 1997a, 1997b, 2003, İlyasoğlu 1994, Özdalga 1997, 1998, Arat 2005). The role of the headscarf has been emphasized as the loaded symbol of politics of Islamic difference. The headscarf has been interpreted as a means of struggle for the recognition of Islamic difference as opposed to the homogenizing and exclusionary aspects of the modern, secular public sphere (Göle 1997a, Çayır 2000, Suman 2000) designated to exclude »non-Westernized Muslim population« (Göle 1997a: 65). Viewing the headscarf through the »politics of difference« framework highlights its resistance aspects, and attributes an emancipatory role to the headscarf by locating those who wear it at the center of political activism, thus provid-

1 Charles Taylor (1994) describes authenticity as the search of the modern self for an original way of being human: »There is a certain way of being human that is *my* way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But this notion gives a new meaning to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for *me*« (Taylor 1994: 30).

ing them with the opportunity to enter the public sphere without compromising respectability (Göle 1993). This line of argumentation also suggests that the modern, urban wearers of the headscarf bear the promise of transforming the traditional gender roles attributed to Islam by establishing moral autonomy through »conscious Muslim woman« identity.

Çayır (2000) argues that the politics of difference pursued by Islamists should be understood within the broader shift from an emphasis on equality towards recognition of difference, a trend which is increasingly apparent within social movements. Parallels are drawn between actors of new social movements, especially the feminist movement, and women wearing the headscarf (Göle 1993,1997a, Çayır 2000, Suman 2000). Nilüfer Göle also employs the term »the veiling movement« (Göle 1993: 83,1997a: 73). The analogy builds on the »difference« debate – it is argued that, similar to the second wave feminists who refused to be assimilated to the »universal« category of »human being,« and took pride in their differences, women with headscarves resist assimilation to hegemonic norms of Westernization and modernity. According to this argument, taking pride in the excluded and stigmatized headscarf symbolizes this resistance through accentuating Islamic difference (Göle 1997b, 2003, Çayır 2000, İlyasoğlu 1994), and the headscarf is argued to be the means through which religious Muslim women »sharpen their identity« and »label themselves Islamists« (Göle 1997b: 89).

The literature that frames the headscarf issue within the politics of difference discourse is undergirded by a strong focus on »cultural fissure« as the defining factor of social stratification in Turkey. Many studies which analyze the increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere in Turkey underline the hierarchy between Islamists and secularists almost as the defining form of social stratification (Göle 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2003, Bilici 2000, Çınar 2008, Navaro Yashin 2002). For example, Göle (2000) draws an analogy between the social stratification in Turkey and the caste system in India in order to accentuate the fissure between, what she calls, »secular and Islamist fronts« (90–91). In her account, this fissure does not manifest itself in the form of horizontal class stratification, but as a vertical stratification that cuts across classes, dividing the society as »white Turks«, which refers to the secular camp, and »others«. Bilici (2000) agrees and contends that the public sphere in Turkey is defined by status groups instead of class stratification, dominated by bureaucrats and state officers instead of the bourgeoisie. According to this argument, those who have the upper hand in this stratification maintain their cultural hegemony by excluding Islamists on the basis of cultural difference (Bilici 2000).

The lines of argumentation summarized above result in a view of the headscarf as the signifier of a collective identity constituted by a fundamental cultural difference. Nancy Fraser's criticism of the increasing focus on identity and issues of cul-

ture in political struggles and scholarship provides a useful framework to establish a critical view of the headscarf discussion in Turkey. Fraser argues that the politics of difference discussion started as an insightful response to the »difference blindness« of the dominant liberal paradigm, but in the 80s and 90s turned into a popularized tendency to focus all political claims-making on recognition of cultural difference and identity (Fraser 2000). Among the problems brought about by this exclusive focus on cultural identity, cultural difference and its recognition, is the reification of group identities. Reification of group identity, according to Fraser, »puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture« (Fraser 2000: 112), branding criticisms to that culture as inauthentic, and obscuring intra-group power relations. Seyla Benhabib (1999, 2002) shares this concern and contends that the tendency to presume solid boundaries around groups and seek »recognition« for groups based on fixed identities leads to overlooking the power relations and contradictions within groups. Moreover, it leads to ignoring the complex cultural dialogue within societies. The risks involve the reification of social segregation and the formation of group enclaves (Fraser 2000).

In the case of the headscarf discussion in Turkey, focusing exclusively on »cultural difference« loads the headscarf with heavy meanings of collective identity, as pointed out by Fraser and Benhabib. This comes at the cost of essentializing and reifying an identity for women with headscarves. It also leads to overlooking nuanced negotiations around the experience of wearing the headscarf, and ignoring how differences based on class as well as social and cultural capital among women with headscarves influences this experience. It should be granted that the headscarf discussion in Turkey has been shaped along the lines of this theoretical framework for good reason. The priority was accounting for the predicaments faced by university students with headscarves who were banned from university education, and their struggle to transform the homogeneous, state monitored public sphere. Yet, whereas the context has changed towards diversified meanings of the headscarf, the literature in Turkey has remained slow and limited in responding to the transformation.

The transformation in women's experiences of displaying Islamic identity has been analyzed with regard to the accumulation of wealth among rising Islamic bourgeoisie, and the concurrent transformation from collective to individualized identities among Islamists (Çayır 2008). The most salient response of the literature on women and Islam in Turkey has been in terms of focusing closely on the changing consumption patterns of Islamic women. This focus surfaces in two kinds of analysis: first, consumption is analyzed as the realm of symbolic struggle between Islamists and secularists (Bilici 2000, Navaro-Yashin 2002). Secondly, the changing consumption patterns among Islamists are under scrutiny for they are taken to both influence and indicate the transformation of Islamism (Sandıkçı and

Ger 2007, Gökarıksel and Secor 2010). In both analyses, the changing consumption of clothing items and flourishing personal styles among women with headscarves is a favorite theme. These analytical frameworks differ from the »politics of difference« framework because, rather than a collective identity, they focus on the diversification of Islamic woman identity, and its classification through taste (see Sandıkçı and Ger 2007). Yet, these analyses are limited in the sense that there continues to be an almost exclusive focus on middle class women's experiences. Moreover, there is a resilient focus on cultural difference and its claim for a higher status with regard to society's norms, which is manifested through Islamic women's increasingly sophisticated consumption choices.

I argue that the almost exclusive focus on cultural difference displayed by middle class Islamic women in the literature stems from the resilient emphasis on cultural difference as the predominant source of constituting collectivities, as well as viewing culture based stigmatization as the predominant form of injustice in Turkey. Moreover, the focus on university educated, middle class women with headscarves, as well as Islamic intellectual and activist women, results in a limitation in terms of capturing the contested roles and meanings of the headscarf among less educated, lower middle class women.

I contend that it is necessary to critically investigate the strong focus on »politics of cultural difference« in the literature regarding women, Islam and headscarves in Turkey. I argue that the »politics of difference« framework tends to attribute loaded connotations to the headscarf and reify an identity for a supposed category of »women with headscarves«. I contend that movements pursuing politics of difference ultimately aim to render that difference as »unmarked«. Because »marks« stem from the gap between hegemonic norms in society and individuals who possess differences in their bodies, ethnic identities, clothes, and so on. Yet, the core of the criticism against politics of difference, that invests itself in the accentuation of cultural identity, is that it works against the objective of »unmarking« difference. Instead, the difference is being essentialized and reified.

This paper examines the implications of the emphasis on »group difference« for lower middle class working women with headscarves, and how they deal with the condition of being »marked«. One of the most salient themes brought up by the saleswomen with headscarves who contributed to this study as interviewees, is the desire to be *unmarked.* The desire to be unmarked surfaces in the face of the attributions and expectations pertaining to the »appropriate« ways in which a woman wearing a headscarf is supposed to appear and behave, as well as what she is supposed to represent in the context of the retail labor market. This paper raises questions with regard to the ways in which the literature depicts women with headscarves as a »group«, and interrogates the ways in which the headscarf is highlighted as the »mark« of this group difference.

The Structure of the Field and Methodological Concerns

The critical inquiry of the »politics of difference« framework in this paper relies on the findings of qualitative research conducted with lower middle class saleswomen wearing the headscarf in five cities of Turkey: Gaziantep, Denizli, Kayseri, Istanbul and Ankara. The fieldwork was conducted between October 2008 and April 2012,[2] and consists of focus group research, in-depth interviews, short interviews conducted with saleswomen, and participant observation. Focus groups and in-depth interviews were conducted with saleswomen with and without headscarves, as well as with employers in both large and small scale retailers. Participant observation took place in different shopping settings in each city, ranging from shopping malls to traditional bazaars and *tesettür* stores.

The experiences of research participants with regard to the role and meaning of the headscarf in their working lives as saleswomen are central to this study. Yet, I aim to locate these experiences in relation to the structural constraints and possibilities related to wearing the headscarf in the retail labor market. Scott (1992) points out that excessive reliance on experience as »the authentic source of knowledge« bears the risk of essentializing and naturalizing identity (27). To guard against this tendency, she suggests analyzing the processes of construction of experience. In line with Scott's warning, the main methodological concern of this study is to locate the experiences of research participants with a perspective sensitive to the processes of formation of their experiences related to working life. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the field with regard to the working settings in which women with headscarves are employed as saleswomen, and from which they are excluded.

The fieldwork demonstrates that there is a demarcation among shopping settings when it comes to employing women with headscarves. Shopping malls and chain stores selling globally or nationally well known brands usually do not employ women with headscarves in sales positions. There are only a few exceptional brands and some shopping malls in which one might see women with headscarves. Still, even in shopping malls where one might see women with headscarves in sales positions, they are employed in kiosks, rather than stores. It is far more likely to see saleswomen with headscarves in small scale, family owned retailers, and *tesettür* chain stores. The *tesettür* chain store Tekbir, for example, employs women with headscarves exclusively. Compared to small scale retailers, chain stores and shopping malls offer sales staff better chances of career advancement and social

2 Part of the research was funded by TUBITAK, and was conducted by myself and two professors, Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu and Dr. Aslı Çırakman. From 2009 on, I proceeded with my own fieldwork for my dissertation.

security, as well as more flexible working hours. Working in a small scale retailer, on the other hand, is more often than not, defined by approximately 12 hour working days, if not longer, with no lunch break and only one day off in two weeks. Sales jobs in small scale retailers tend to not offer the chances of professional advancement, in contrast to chain stores where it is possible to become a branch manager, or seek employment in higher echelons of management in retail. More often than not, saleswomen working in small scale retailers work without social security. As of April 2012, the average salary of a saleswoman working in a small scale retailer in a central bazaar in Istanbul was around 600 TL (approximately 220 Euros), whereas the minimum wage is 700 TL.

The narratives of saleswomen with headscarves are replete with stories of being refused employment by large scale retailers and shopping malls. In many cases, they are explicitly told that the headscarf is the reason of their rejection. The general manager of a major shopping mall in Istanbul explained to me in an in-depth interview that in the shopping mall he manages, women with headscarves are not employed as saleswomen. Actually, he put it in other terms: He said that they *may be* employed, on the condition that they agree to take off their scarf during working hours. However, women can work with their headscarves on as cleaning ladies in the malls. The saleswomen with headscarves who participated in this research worked either in small scale retailers, or *tesettür* chain stores, particularly Tekbir and Setrms. Similar to their colleagues in large scale retailers, the women working in *tesettür* stores were insured, and had better working conditions in terms of working hours, wages, and career prospects.

The majority of the saleswomen with headscarves who participated in the research were either 8-year elementary school or high school graduates, with an income lower than the minimum wage. Almost all of them represented the first generation of women in their families who worked outside home.

The Findings and How They Relate to »Difference«

The findings of this research highlight the discontent of saleswomen with headscarves as a result of being marked out as different, and the commensurate stereotypes that go along with wearing the headscarf. They particularly tried to distance themselves from the expectation that they should display a coherent religious identity devoid of contradictions. Fatma Barbarosoğlu, an Islamist intellectual female writer, defines the symbolic meaning of the headscarf as »the project of perfection« (Şişman 2000: 15). »The project of perfection« refers to the notion that a woman who wears a headscarf should necessarily and by definition adhere unerringly to Islamic precepts. Moreover, according to Barbarosoğlu, a woman

with a headscarf should be aware that every attitude she displays is potentially attributed to the collectivity of women with headscarves. The kind of religiosity Barbarosoğlu expects from women with headscarves reflects the well known argument that Islamic faith is not just a matter of what one believes. Rather, it is about cultivating an Islamic way of living (Saktanber 2002). Barbarosoğlu's use of the concept »the project of perfection« encapsulates the belief that the headscarf necessarily connotes deeply rooted religiosity that permeates one's life and identity to its core. The concept »project of perfection« also highlights how essential it is for women with headscarves to underline that they are different from secular women in the public realm. The concept is particularly interesting for the purposes of this paper, not only because it points to widespread expectations from women with headscarves, but also because it highlights exactly the kind of essentialization of identity that many participants of this research found frustrating.

Among the salient themes permeating the research data was discontent with being judged with regard to the expectations raised by the visibility of the headscarf. These expectations, ranging from the expectation that a woman with a headscarf performs the prayers, to abiding fully by rules of *tesettür* clothing, were found confining. The frustration with these expectations especially surfaced at points where the perceived necessities of working life made it difficult to fulfill them.

Pınar[3] was among the participants who voiced such discontent. She is a 23-year-old married woman selling lingerie at a narrow counter in the entrance of a crowded and lively arcade in Denizli. She expressed the idea that the expectations raised by the headscarf sometimes contradicted the necessities of business:

> People expect covered women to be honest all the time. Maybe because they think our religious conviction is stronger. They do not want us to lie at all. Of course I do not lie, but there may be times when I do not tell the full truth. For example, if there is a cheaper product and a more expensive one and they are both of the same quality, I try to sell the more expensive one. This is called business. We are doing business here. I grew up in this business, and this is how I learned.

Pınar's honest declaration reflects her frustration with the gap between what people expect her to be and the flexibility she needs in order to »do business«. A similar sentiment was voiced by many other participants, who thought that displaying »perfect religiosity« was expected only from them, and not from men, who would call themselves religious Muslims. Moreover, what constitutes »perfect re-

3 The names of the participants used in this essay are pseudonyms in order to protect anonymity.

ligiosity« was defined without taking into account their experiences. It was as if the visibility of the headscarf made them responsible for leading an Islamic life and setting examples of how to be a religious Muslim, a responsibility that they found constraining. This sense of constraint was also reflected in the discrimination they faced in their search for jobs as saleswomen. Many respondents thought that some employers did not want to employ them because of certain assumptions: for example, according to one respondent, employers thought that when a woman is covered, she would refrain from communication and would be silent and reclusive. Another respondent said that the headscarf was assumed to indicate that the woman wearing it would be incapable of giving advice on fashion. Or, at least, the customers would not take their advice seriously. This assumption was confirmed by some of the employers who participated in the research. What was more interesting was that even those employers who have many customers with headscarves hold these kinds of assumptions as well. Another assumption among employers was that a saleswoman wearing a headscarf would alienate customers because the store would lose its »neutral«, that is, »unmarked« stance.

The role of the headscarf in terms creating a »mark of difference« on those who wear it has been analyzed before with regard to how it subjugates women to the public gaze (Çınar 2008). It has also been argued that women with headscarves are labelled as »overly religious« and perceived as declaring their non-neutrality – excluding them from the image of »unaffiliated« or »productive modern citizens« (Gökariksel and Mitchell 2005: 150–151). The assumptions of employers about women with headscarves are in line with these arguments. Yet, rather than looking into why employers hold these assumptions, this paper aims to put the focus on how, and through what kind of discursive strategies, women with headscarves respond to these categorizations and assumptions.

The findings of the research indicate that one of the most popular ways of responding to these assumptions is to mitigate the loaded connotations of the headscarf by arguing that some women may cover their head to declare an »overly religious« identity, but that that is not their own intention. This response surfaces in narratives which develop a fragmented conception of the practice of covering defined in terms of »degrees«. According to this conception, only some women are »fully covered« *(tam kapalı)*. The concept of »fully covered«, which appears in the narratives of many participants of the research, refers to women who exclusively wear long overcoats, big headscarves, or chadors, and who avoid interaction with men. More often than not, the participants of the research tended to distance themselves from the »fully covered«, and sometimes referred to themselves as »half covered,« as opposed to »fully covered«. One of the participants who emphasized her distinction from the »fully covered« was Zarife, an 18 year old single woman working in a pastry shop in Istanbul, Bayrampaşa: she donned the head-

scarf at the age of 11, and emphasized that she wears the headscarf »only for God,« as opposed to those »who just want to show off with their headscarves«, or those who cover »because of family pressure«. Before the pastry shop, she had worked as an assistant in a pharmacy for two years, but when the pharmacy went out of business, her job applications to other pharmacies were turned down. She strongly believes that she was discriminated against due to the headscarf. She was aggrieved by this because she thought that working in a pastry shop was a loss of status compared to working in a pharmacy. As a young single woman who wanted to find her future husband herself, and not through arranged marriage, she was also disappointed with boys of her age who would refrain from talking to her, as they assumed she would stay away from friendship with boys. She emphasized that she liked socializing, going to cafes, seeing movies, enjoyed having friendly relations with boys, just like her uncovered friends, and did not want to be regarded as different from them. She had a particularly memorable way of formulating the degree of her religiosity:

– My religiosity is the size of a teaspoon.
– Why, what does that mean?
– If I were a tablespoon … I mean if I had devoted myself to my religion completely, if I had not been working, I could have done it with a tablespoon. I could even have done it with a ladle. But I cannot imagine myself in a chador.
– So being religious with a ladle means wearing the chador?
– Yes, with the face veil and gloves and all. They do not talk to men. That seems a little ridiculous. I would not like to be like that.
– Then you are happy with your teaspoon of religiosity?
– Yes I am, very happy.
– And you want to go on like this?
– Maybe I could do a little more than the teaspoon. But not too much more … I would not take on the chador. Imagine when it is summer, the sun will come out, it gets so hot (chuckles).

Even though she defined her religiosity as a »teaspoon«, for Zarife taking off the headscarf was not an option, as she thought of it as an inseparable part of her religious conviction. This was not the case with all the research participants. Some thought that the headscarf could be negotiated, especially in order to find employment in public sector jobs. Selin, a 21-year old single woman working in a tesettür store in Denizli, was one of them. Similar to Zarife, Selin was also disappointed with the status of her job as her real aspiration was to become a policewoman, and she was ready to take off her headscarf in order to reach that aspiration. She took the exams to become a policewoman, but failed. Afterwards, she

took off her headscarf in order to work in a private security company. However, she realized that the job in that private security company did not offer any career prospects, therefore it was »not worth uncovering«. Following her experience at the security company, she put her headscarf back on and applied for her current job in the tesettür chain store, where she was immediately hired. She felt lucky to have found a sales job in a *tesettür* chain store, which has much better conditions than sales jobs in small scale retailers. This job pays almost as well as the job in the private security company, and she has social security as well. While explaining her choice of uncovering for a job that is »worth it«, she referred to her religiosity as »belief in the inside«:

– My dream was to be a policewoman. I took the exams. For those exams I took my headscarf off, I even had to show my legs and arms of course, because in those interviews they have to look at your body … You have to do this stuff to become someone.
– You did not become a policewoman?
– No, I could not pass the exams.
– But if you became one, you would take off your headscarf?
– Of course I would. My family may be covered people but we are not of those people who think that religion is in the headscarf. It is something inside of you. It is not about covering on the outside, it is about belief in the inside.

Selin did not want to be misunderstood as someone who bargains her religiosity for a career. Therefore, in her narrative it is possible to see the effort to break the perceived link between religiosity and the headscarf in order to make the point that taking off the headscarf does not mean compromising religiosity. This is why she distances herself from those »who think that religion is in the headscarf«, and formulates her religiosity as »religiosity in the inside«. The tendency to decouple the headscarf from the meanings attributed to it was a common tendency among the research participants. This tendency should be analyzed with regard to the context of their working lives, in which the women with headscarves feel discriminated against in their search for employment and excluded from jobs with better career prospects due to the headscarf and the essentialist meanings attributed to it.

Besides the effort to distance themselves from the »fully covered« and to further distance the headscarf that *they* themselves wear from the assumed meanings, the research participants also displayed the tendency to emphasize blurred lines between the states of »being covered« and »being uncovered«. Selin underlined that she was »not born with a headscarf«:

> People seem to think that we were born with headscarves. It is so strange … It is a matter of respect, I respect uncovered people and they should respect me. Because this

> headscarf actually has no function, it is just something I prefer. You may put it on or not. And some of those who wear it are not even modest either … What I mean is that, these are just periods for me: I passed through an uncovered period now I am in a covered period.

Selin's expression of how the headscarf is »just something she prefers, with no function« is a crystallized expression of a common pattern among research participants' narratives which points out the tendency to formulate the headscarf as *just a choice* of clothing among many other choices. Zübeyde, a 21 year old married woman selling women's clothes in a clothing shop in Denizli, thought that the headscarf was only an indicator of modesty and ›ladylike behaviour‹. She contended that taking it off on some special days would not compromise her modesty, as long as she was careful about her behaviour, and did not wear miniskirts and low-cut blouses.

> I am covered, but for example, I will take off the headscarf for my sister-in-law's wedding. We are not covered that solidly, me and my family. There are some families … once covered, they do not accept uncovering. That is not the case for me … This is like a matter of taste. Some like this kind of skirt, some like it shorter, some like it longer. Covering is like that for me.

Similar to Selin, Zübeyde also refers to her headscarf as only a matter of taste, a choice of clothing among many other choices, such as choosing this or that length of a skirt. Actually, the length of a skirt is not devoid from socially loaded meanings either. Yet, the point is that, both Selin and Zübeyde tend to stay away from any »load« attributed to the headscarf, which may result in rendering them »different« from what they perceive as the mainstream and socially accepted norms of modest womanhood. Instead of underlining and highlighting a »difference« of identity implied by the headscarf, they subscribe to a discourse that defends »convergence« towards the image of a woman who behaves and dresses modestly. This image includes women without headscarves as well, but on the condition that they abide by certain norms of modesty. Defining norms of modesty is a very contested issue among women with headscarves, as manifested in categorizations such as »fully covered« vs. »half covered«. Zübeyde introduces another categorization: those who are »solidly covered« and will not take it off once they wear it, and those who may take off the headscarf on special days, or for the sake of higher status jobs, »to become somebody« as Selin puts it. At this point it is necessary to emphasize that not all research participants were as comfortable with the idea of taking off their headscarves on occasion as Selin and Zübeyde. Some participants said their families and relatives would take it very badly in case they at-

tempted to uncover. Others also scorned the attitude of taking the headscarf on and off and regarded it as an indicator of weak conviction. Even though these differences in the issue of »uncovering« signify important fault lines among women with headscarves, it should be underlined that the overarching pattern among research participants was to complain about and avoid what they found to be essentializing and confining assumptions about the headscarf.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed how the assumption that the headscarf should connote an Islamic identity and difference unfolds in the lives of lower middle class women without a university degree in the context of their working lives. With reference to the theoretical discussion on the politics of difference and to the research findings, I have critically investigated the argument that the headscarf is a way of asserting an Islamic identity and declaring ›difference‹ against the grain of the homogenizing public sphere. I have looked into how the lower middle class, working saleswomen with headscarves relate to the discourse of difference and whether they view their headscarves as an assertion of identity and difference. The research findings indicate that, in contrast to the arguments found in a large body of literature on women and Islam in Turkey, which view the issue through a politics of different framework, the participants of the research found it difficult to accept many of the connotations attributed to the headscarf. There was a strong tendency to avoid a discourse of difference by underlining that wearing the headscarf has a contingent, not essential or absolute, meanings in their lives. Rather than constructing their identity by wearing the headscarf, the motivation was to decouple the presumed links between cultural and religious difference and the headscarf.

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Competing or Compatible Language Identities in Istanbul's Kurdish Workplaces?[1]

Anne Schluter

Introduction

> »There are so many Kurds in Istanbul, but people don't speak freely … maybe only in Tarlabaşı or in the periphery. The number of Kurdish-speaking people is always decreasing … I've traveled a lot to understand [Kurdishness] … I'm back in Istanbul to show that Kurdish is also a language of Istanbul. I would like to change the perception of Kurdish in the minds of people from Istanbul. We (Kurds) have been here since 1453 …«

Such is the perspective of the Kurdish-Turkish owner of, quite possibly, the only restaurant in Taksim that markets itself as bilingual Turkish and Kurdish.[2] The restaurant's Kurdish-Turkish bilingual menus, multilingual music and newspaper selections, and the owner's free alternation between the two languages reflect the owner's stated intention of creating a space in which Kurdish and Turkish identities can co-exist. In practice, however, this concept does not translate into an effective business model: the customers who enter the restaurant are few; the large majority of those who stay are Kurdish. The owner concedes that his balanced

1 This project was funded by a grant by the Mirekoc Foundation.

2 Both scholarly and more informal analyses of Kurdish language and culture in Turkey often separate the locally spoken code into two main dialects: Zaza and Kurmanji. Some, principally those who identify with a Zaza identity, however, reject classification of Zaza as a Kurdish subgroup. In the context of the current study, the participants come from exclusively Kurmanji backgrounds. Mention of the Kurdish language in this study refers to the Kurmanji dialect. In the context of the study, Kurdish and Kurmanji are used interchangeably to represent the same (non-Zaza) population in Turkey. In the context of the literature review, the original authors have not made this distinction, so ›Kurdish‹ generally refers to both Zaza and Kurmanji ethnicities.

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treatment of Turkish and Kurdish contributes to his Turkish customers' malaise; nevertheless, he continues to use and display Kurdish conspicuously because, he contends, removing traces of Kurdish from his interactions with customers would ›force him to change his identity.‹ Furthermore, he juxtaposes his language choices with the implicit Kurdish language self-censorship which he claims to be common practice among Kurdish workers serving customers in Istanbul's restaurants. Workplace language policies generally do not explicitly forbid the use of Kurdish in front of customers; however, workers perceive management-imposed pressures on their language choices according to his account. Those workers who do not resist this pressure are careful to speak only Turkish in front of their customers; those with deviant language choices experience reprimands.

Research Questions

The current investigation analyzed Kurdish workers' language choices when interacting with Kurdish co-workers in a more empirical way than the interview with the Turkish-Kurdish restaurant owner highlighted above. It examined the concept put forth by the above interviewee: do Kurdish employees, in fact, minimize their Kurdish language use in high visibility workspaces when they know that Turkish clientele can overhear them? In doing so, do these workers take on a monocultural and monolingual Turkish identity in front of customers? Moreover, does this linguistic identity projected in high visibility contexts contrast with the identity projected in low visibility contexts? If there is a contrast, how can participants' identities be characterized linguistically?

Through these questions, the study explores linguistic identities among Istanbul-resident Kurdish workers in terms of their language choices at their workplaces. The selected participants are Kurdish-Turkish bilinguals who come from predominantly Kurdish regions but make their living in Istanbul at Kurdish-owned restaurants that serve Turkish and foreign clientele. Somer's (2004, 2005) notion of rival identity is examined in the context of this population. This study adds to the literature through its emphasis on the linguistic means of performing these identities. Analysis of the participants' Kurdish, Turkish, and mixed utterances provides linguistic support for Somer's assertion that many of Turkey's Kurds do not subscribe to exclusively rival notions of identity.

Review of the Literature: Language and Identity

As the example of the restaurant owner mentioned above suggests, such language choices represent an important component of identity among Kurdish-Turkish bilingual migrants from Turkey's Southeast. The literature that assesses the link between minority groups' language choices and their ties to their communities supports this belief: »Three fundamental factors – race, religion, language – partake of a power that no other possible factors of ethnic identities have: language …transcends all other elements insofar as it has the power to name, express, and convey them« (Abou 1981: 33). Fishman (1989: 217) considers language to be the »supreme symbol system [that] quintessentially symbolizes its users …« Furthermore, language choices provide insight into the strength of fellow in-group members' connections to their roots. These choices are »suffused with moral implications, with judgments of good or bad, with specifications … in terms of which one is evaluated and in terms of which one evaluates others vis-à-vis the fulfillment of own-group membership requirements« (Fishman 1989: 28). Dabéne and Moore (1995: 23) thus characterize minority language choices as »the emotional cement in in-group recognition and the determinant of in- and out-group boundaries«. The current study thus analyzes the language choices of Istanbul-resident Kurdish-Turkish bilinguals who have migrated from Turkey's Southeast as a lens through which to view this population's perceptions of their place and freedom of expression within Turkish society.

Language choices can be highly contentious and politicized, as in such well-documented cases as Catalan, Basque, Irish, Hebrew, and Canadian French.[3] These tensions arise from traditional links between language and nationalism. With two languages in a given state, dueling nationalisms may arise. As Billig (1995) argues, »the concept of ›a language‹ – at least in the sense which appears so banally to ›us‹ – may itself be an invented permanency, developed during the age of the nation-state. If this is the case, then language does not create nationalism so much as nationalism creates language« (Billig 1995: 30). In a similar way, Auer deconstructs the notion of language as a symbol of collective identity which originated with the creation of nations: »it is assumed that there is a ›natural‹ link between a nation and ›its‹ language« (2007: 2).

3 See Woolard 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 2006 for analysis of Catalan and Spanish. Heller 1995, Laport 1984, and Oakes 2000 are good resources for exploring the sociolinguistic situation of French in Canada. Cooper 1989 discusses language planning situations that affect minority languages across various national contexts.

Language Policy in Turkey

The founding of Turkey, and the standardization of the Turkish national language, similar to its European nation-state models, was based on a monocultural and monolingual identity. The young Republic's language campaign included associations between this new language standard and the high moral standing of Turkish identity. In speaking the Turkish language, the nation's founder claimed that Turkish citizens embodied the nation's character: »The Turkish language, the heart and mind of the Turkish nation, is a sacred treasure that contains the morality, the traditions, the memories, the interests, in short, everything that forms the Turkish nation« (Kaplan 2002 in Coşkun et al. 2011: 26). In this way, speaking the language represented an inextricable component of Turkish citizenship. Indeed, as Landau (1990) asserts, »Language reform constituted part of broader objectives of designating nationalism, secularism, and modernization as the primary means of creating a new polity and a new nation-state«(1990: 139). Further evidence of the ties between Turkish nationalism and use of the Turkish language could be found in the »*Vatandaş Konuş!*« (Citizen Speak!) Campaign of 1928, in which slogans such as, »Speaking a language other than Turkish in Turkey means violating Turkish law,« and, »Only Turkish must be spoken in the land of the Turks« were placed throughout the public transportation system (Coşkun et al. 2011: 31). According to both political and public discourse, therefore, language choice was reflective of a citizen's loyalty to a single, unified Turkish republic.

More recent echoes of the same vision can be found in parliamentary discussions about Kurdish language rights, in which politicians blame the split-up of the Ottoman Empire on its multi-cultural approach. During the last few years, Prime Minister Erdoğan has invoked the same association between Kurdish language rights and separatism by asserting that Kurdish as a language of instruction would threaten the unity of the Turkish Republic. Within this concept, language choices reflect identity choices. In the eyes of many, these identity choices compete with Turkish identity.

A recent example in which the Kurdish language was perceived as a challenge to Turkish national identity can be seen in the case of the July 2011 Jazz Festival concert that featured, among others, the Kurdish singer Aynur Doğan. In the aftermath of the deaths of thirteen Turkish soldiers at the hands of the PKK in Silvan, clear linguistic repercussions appeared in Istanbul. Once Aynur Doğan had taken the stage, and her language had been identified as Kurdish, audience members reportedly threw bottles and other projectiles at her. This behavior was combined with nationalistic rhetoric that referenced the earlier events in Silvan. The singer was forced to leave the stage as a result. These vocal adversaries proved threatening enough to silence the singer. Within the context of this incident, as-

sociations between the Kurdish language and its perceived terrorist connotations were juxtaposed against Turkish nationalist ideologies.

Ethnicity and Identity in Turkey

The literature cites such problematic ethnic identities as a by-product of political discourse. In the case of Yeğen's (1999) analysis of Turkish state discourse, it is the state's attempts at modernizing, centralizing, and secularizing Turkey that compete directly with the traditional, peripheral, and religious realms in which Kurds generally constructed their identities. At the same time, the Turkish state's exclusion of more moderate Kurdish voices has contributed to the dominance of more extreme Kurdish voices and inhibits a comprehensive understanding of the spectrum of possible Kurdish identities (Somer 2002). When these extreme Kurdish voices act or speak accordingly, they commonly bring out nationalists in the Turkish population. The resulting situation is polarization. Identities that arise out of this context, according to Somer's (2004, 2005) characterization, are rival (endogenous) identities which contribute to continued conflict.

Somer (2004, 2005) outlines an alternative to these rival notions of identity with the conceptualization of ›compatible identity‹ in which members of a group define themselves through traits that are common to other identities. Contrary to common popular and political discourse's framing of Kurdish identity as competitive with Turkish identity, evidence from demographic surveys suggest that many Kurds do not adopt this perspective. This point is supported by the reminder of the bilingual and bicultural reality in which the majority of Kurds function: they are exposed to two different languages and cultures from school age onwards. Interactions with the state and, for most, interactions at the workplace require acquisition of Turkish and acculturation within the Turkish system. Findings from minority language literature compliment this perspective: linguistic boundaries – similar to cultural boundaries – are not highly distinguishable in everyday use between speakers with the same language background (Gardner-Chloros 1995). The context of the current study is one such place in which Kurds draw on their Turkish language skills. The data address Istanbul-resident Kurdish workers' performance of linguistic identity in the workplace and finds support for Somer's assertion that many of Turkey's Kurds do not subscribe to exclusively rival notions of identity.

Methods: Operational Definition of High Visibility vs. Low Visibility Jobs

The research questions outlined in the introduction contrast workers' choices to use Kurdish or Turkish in high vs. low visibility contexts. These terms require greater explanation for the purposes of this study. A *high visibility* job was one in which workers spent seventy percent or more of their work time in places that were open to customer-worker interaction. Their interactions with their colleagues thus had the potential to be overheard by customers at least seventy percent of the time. This study limited the worksites to eating establishments; therefore, waiters, managers, and dining-room-situated cooks qualified for this category. Their language choices were contrasted against those of workers in *low visibility* jobs. Participants who qualified for this classification worked in more enclosed environments. Their potential for worker-customer interaction represented ten percent or less of their work time. In the context of the current study, the majority of these participants worked as cooks in closed kitchens. An additional job in this category included dish washer. Furthermore, language data was collected exclusively in the high visibility/low visibility context to which the workers were assigned. The procedure section below outlines this aspect of data collection within the larger framework of the study's procedural method

Procedures

The study explored the language practices of 30 Kurdish-Turkish bilingual migrants from the Southeast of Turkey in the context of centrally located Istanbul eating establishments. The language policies and practices of ten eating establishments came under scrutiny, and workers' stances vis-à-vis the language policies at their worksites also served as a primary focus. Participants were given recording devices and instructed to activate them during 1–2 hours of peak working time. The use of naturalistic language was emphasized; however, in some cases participants needed to create new recordings when the research assistant deemed their language use patterns as contrived for the purposes of the recording. Upon collection of these recordings, the research assistant transcribed the text and translated all Kurdish portions into Turkish. Language use patterns found in transcripts from *low visibility* working environments were compared against those from *high visibility* working environments. Interviews with the workers attempted to determine the degree to which the participants' language choices adhered to their own notions of language appropriateness. Consultation with the transcripts, in combination with observations of the workplace and interviews with the workers' super-

visors, helped to inform the reliability of the data from the interviews, by serving as a form of triangulation.

Participants

Thirty male native speakers of Kurmanji Kurdish from the Southeast of Turkey who were living and working in Istanbul at the time of the study contributed data. Participants' hometowns included: Diyarbakır [N = 6], Silvan [N = 5], Şırnak [N = 1], Muş [N = 2], Mardin [N = 4], Ağrı [N = 7], Hakkari [N = 1], both Silvan and Diyarbakır [N = 2], Iğdır [N = 1], and both Isparta and Diyarbakır [N = 1]. Their language abilities in Turkish and Kurmanji were relatively equal. All of them had migrated to Istanbul in search of work. Their residence in Istanbul ranged between eight months and twenty-four years. Their ages ranged between 19 and 39, and their level of education did not exceed that of secondary school. In terms of their religious background, participants were all Sunni Muslims.[4] These descriptions represent characteristics of individual participants that took part in the study. The discussion now turns to the workplaces that employed them.

As the study measured Kurdish language use between Kurdish co-workers, all participants had mostly (if not all) Kurdish co-workers. In addition, in all cases, the managers of these participants were also Kurdish migrants. Efforts were made to analyze workplaces that were not located in predominantly Kurdish districts. These districts were limited to two: Taksim, a commercial and social center of Istanbul, and Rumeli Hisar Üstü, a predominantly student-centered district. Although the study aimed to find locations that catered primarily to (non-Kurdish) Turkish and foreign clientele, the selected workplaces still attracted a number of Kurdish clients.

Results

Data analysis began with the transcription and categorization of specified linguistic (pragmatic) elements present in the recorded workplace conversations. It continued by identifying the themes that emerged in the interviews. After compiling the data from these two sources, the researchers compared them to one another to

4 The importance of controlling this variable was made clear from the results of the pilot study in which members of the Sunni Kurmanji Kurdish population often viewed Alevi Kurmanji Kurds as a separate population.

check for any inconsistencies and overlaps that existed. Workplace observations also helped to inform this analysis.

The pragmatic data from the transcripts contributed to numerical data about the frequency of specified discourse functions and the language(s) used to achieve them. These functions under scrutiny included the following: 1) Instances of clarification, confirmation, and/or verification; 2) complaints, provocations, reproaches, or threats; 3) communications of a more personal nature; 4) attempts to emphasize and/or insist; 5) flattery and charming formulaic devices; 6) joking/teasing; 7) commands; and 8) job-related requests.

For each transcript, the primary researcher recorded the total number of utterances that qualified as examples of one of the eight discourse functions under scrutiny. These utterances were assigned to their relevant discourse category and split further into two parts: One represented relevant utterances that took place in Kurdish, and the other part listed the same information for Turkish. Out of the total number of utterances in each category, analysis focused on the percentage represented by tokens from each language. These percentages were then grouped together with others that came from transcripts in the same job visibility group.

High vs. low visibility group membership differences contributed to important language use differences. For seven of the eight categories, workers in low visibility jobs preferred using Kurdish to Turkish to a much greater extent than their counterparts in high visibility jobs. The only category for which the trends were reversed was in flattery/formulaic devices, and this difference was less than ten percent. Figure 1 highlights the language use pattern differences between the two groups in a comprehensive way: it combines all of the data from the eight categories into a single between-group comparison of the total number of utterances under scrutiny. As these data derive their percentages from a much larger number of data points than the individual category results (147 total utterances for the low visibility group and 159 total utterances from the high visibility group), they are more robust than those across individual categories. Based on the substantial differences between group A's and Group B's language preferences in Figure 1, job visibility appeared to be an important variable related to Kurdish vs. Turkish language choices across the eight discourse categories. As Figure 1 shows, the tendency to use Kurdish for the given discourse purposes was more than three times greater among members of the low visibility group than among members of the high visibility group.

Interview questions probed the reasons for which workers made the language choices highlighted in Figure 1. The combination of the interview and transcript data highlighted the functions of the two languages in participants' utterances. These data contributed to a greater understanding of the individuals' linguistic identity.

Figure 1 Percentages of Kurdish versus Turkish utterances across all levels



In terms of the linguistic identity participants projected in front of customers, interview findings supported the trends from the transcript data that suggested a strong preference for Turkish. Workers in the dining room differed in their characterization of their language choices vis-à-vis workplace language policies: some claimed to adhere to implicit workplace rules while others claimed personal choice. However, when probed further about these personal choices, interviewees' responses suggested self-censorship. One such response follows: »We don't give customers the opportunity to get offended by our Kurdish language use; we make sure that they [the customers] don't hear us speaking Kurdish.« Interviews with cooks who worked in both open and closed kitchens stated that an open kitchen affected their language choices, and that the possibility of being overheard by customers led to greater Turkish use in open kitchens. Cooks from enclosed kitchens reported feeling the constraints associated with a Turkish-language dining room policy when they passed into the dining room. Some of these cooks had brothers working in the dining room. Communicating with their brother in this setting required a switch to Turkish, which they reported as feeling quite unnatural. Although managers were not in favor of a monolingual workplace policy as they were all Kurdish themselves, they recognized the potential for alienating customers through Kurdish language use and, thus, expected their workers to speak

Turkish in front of customers. With the supplementary information provided by these interviews, the transcript results point to diminished use of Kurdish in the visible work space due to fears of offending customers.

While the above picture contrasts largely Turkish linguistic identities in visible work contexts with largely Kurdish linguistic identities in less visible work contexts, a comprehensive understanding of workers' language choices goes beyond this binary distinction. For, workers' language choices in enclosed kitchens, which could have featured exclusively Kurdish if the workers had chosen, also featured Turkish. Likewise, the majority of open kitchens and dining rooms investigated in the study were not the exclusive domains of Turkish. Thus, as bilingual members of two language communities, the participants relied on both languages to express their full meaning.

A closer look at workers' language choices in this context suggests that social distance played an important role in inducing Kurdish vs. Turkish language use – social proximity was linked with increased Kurdish language use on the one hand, while anonymous or power-driven exchanges were linked with Turkish language use on the other hand. This link reflects the traditional relationship between the shared minority language and high rankings on the solidarity scale in the language attitude literature (Cavallaro & Chin 2009).

Connections between anonymity and Turkish language use vs. solidarity and Kurdish language use can be illustrated through waiters' and managers' interactions with their customers. Throughout the workplaces investigated, an important exception to the Turkish-language dining room policy emerged in employees' use of Kurdish language to accommodate the Kurdish-speaking customer. In the face of receiving loyal, returning Kurdish customers, restrictions about the use of Kurdish appeared to fade away. Indeed, when workers at these establishments described their customer base, they generally referred to a portion of Kurdish customers who kept returning to the restaurant primarily because of the Kurdish-friendly environment. Conversations with some of these customers suggested this technique to be effective: they generally passed by various restaurants with very similar food to frequent these eating establishments that received them in Kurdish. The Kurdish-speaking customers felt a stronger personal tie to the employees of restaurants that received them in their mother tongue. In other words, the Kurdish language transmitted solidarity between its speakers.

A counter-example helps to highlight this link more fully. One eating establishment did not receive their Kurdish customers in Kurdish because they did not make an effort to get to know their customers. The majority of their customers were single males who did not have kitchens. This place offered inexpensive prepared food to satisfy their goal of feeding themselves in the most efficient manner possible. As a result of these minimal ties between staff and clientele, the dining-

room's environment was marked by anonymity. This relatively high social distance between customers and employees overlapped with exclusively Turkish language choices in the dining room. These findings complement those from the eating establishments mentioned previously, in which customer-employee solidarity was associated with Kurdish language use.

The dynamics of power vs. solidarity, and their connection to language choices, could be seen in participants' complaints. When uttered by a higher status employee, this speech act emphasized the social distance between managers and workers, and, in agreement with the high vs. low social distance distinction, managers preferred to use Turkish to transmit these messages. An illustrative example of this assertion of authority can be seen in an excerpt in which an angry manager fires his delivery boy in Turkish. Although the delivery boy speaks minimal Turkish and registers confusion, the manager presses on with his complaints in Turkish until he tells the boy to go home. These language choices draw on links between Turkish and official communications that have been deeply rooted in the participants' experiences. By using Turkish in these contexts, Kurdish managers reproduced the Turkish-Kurdish hierarchy familiar to their workers.

Complaints could take on a very different kind of illocutionary force when they were uttered by speakers of lower or equal status. In contrast to their function described above, these types of utterances generally appealed to their listeners' shared experience in a negative situation. One such example included a conversation between two cooks in which one complained about a problematic refrigerator that always spoiled the vegetables. Unlike the one-sided complaints of the managers, this exchange featured a two-sided discussion in which both participants constructed meaning equally. Complaints with these characteristics transmit solidarity as they attempt to strengthen workers' unified stance during a difficult moment. In this way, too, expressions that minimized social distance took place in Kurdish.

According to these findings, Kurdish and Turkish both play prominent roles in the participants' linguistic repertoires, suggesting a hybrid linguistic identity. Although customer presence is shown to affect workers' language choices, in the transcript and interview results cited previously, these findings suggest that sociolinguistic factors are also at play.

Conclusion

In order to contextualize the findings of the current study, it is necessary to revisit the research questions. They focused on the following lines of inquiry: do Kurdish employees minimize their Kurdish language use in public workspaces when they

know that Turkish clientele can overhear them? In doing so, do these workers take on a monocultural and monolingual Turkish identity? Moreover, does this linguistic identity projected in areas open to the customers contrast with the identity projected in the enclosed environment of the kitchen? If there is a contrast, how can participants' identities be characterized linguistically?

According to the transcript results, a large majority of the between-worker utterances in high visibility work spaces took place in Turkish. This finding contrasts with the low visibility between-worker transcript data in which the majority of utterances took place in Kurdish. Based on these data, it is possible to identify a link between workplace visibility and Kurdish vs. Turkish language use. Interview data with various participants in different positions and their managers confirmed that a fear of alienating customers represented a primary reason for this tendency. In this way, it is possible to claim that participants projected a more Turkish linguistic identity in visible environments and a more Kurdish identity in less visible environments.

At the same time, analysis of the transcripts provided evidence that these classifications were not categorical. Utterances in both workplace contexts, in the majority of cases, indicated a reliance on the two languages to accomplish the full range of speakers' linguistic objectives. Speakers' intention for their utterances in terms of reducing or increasing social distance emerged as an additional predictor of their language choices. A comprehensive interpretation of the results, thus, pointed to participants' exploitation of the two linguistic codes at their disposal to heighten communicative nuance.

Although the high vs. low visibility workplace distinction emphasized restrictions placed on language use, the preceding discussion suggests a complementary relationship between participants' use of Kurdish and Turkish. Participants' interviews alluded to the societal pressures that dictated language choices in open environments, and this remains an important topic. However, a number of the participants revealed themselves to be crafty language practitioners who took advantage of the two linguistic resources they had at hand. The use of Kurdish to welcome Kurdish customers is an important example of this phenomenon. It is open to discussion whether the workers represented powerless individuals who were controlled by implicit language rules, or whether their utterances near customers represented an additional example in which they used their full linguistic resources to achieve a desirable end. In this case, their projection of a Turkish identity in public spaces led to monetary profits.

Regardless of the relative position of workers' language behavior in the context of local cultural hierarchies, the findings suggest that participants' language identities are bound to both Turkish and Kurdish. Their simultaneous exploitation of two linguistic codes to enhance meaning adheres to Gardner-Chloros's (1995) ar-

gument against the discreteness of codes and identities among bilingual members of minority groups. If language is indeed a marker of identity, these data suggest a Turkish-Kurdish dual identity rather than an exclusively Turkish or Kurdish identity among participants. In this way, the data support Somer's (2004) findings that suggest the presence of Kurdish identities that are compatible with Turkish identities among many of Turkey's Kurds.

Directions for Future Research

In order for the above findings to be considered generalizable to the specified population, the same research questions need to be investigated by implementing more robust data collection procedures. Using a larger sample size could potentially help to derive data that is more representative of the target population. However, more demographic information about the Kurdish migrant population in Istanbul needs to be established, first in order to estimate the percentage represented by the sample and, as such, these data's correlation to overall trends within the population. Finally, it would be beneficial for future investigations to employ random sampling instead of the snowball sampling technique used in this study. Future studies can inform the current study by building off of the current study's qualitative findings and improving on its limitations.

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Market Embedded Transnationalism: Citizenship Practices of Turkish Elites[1]

Özlem Altan Olcay, Evren Balta Paker

This article aims at contributing to discussions on meanings and experiences of transnational citizenship by focusing on the emerging practice among Turkish elites acquiring US citizenship. Utilizing their cases, we explore the following questions: what does the case of privileged minorities, who now have the chance to verify their claims to transnational identities by official means, tell us about the shifts that citizenship has gone through in recent decades? How do their stories contribute to emerging meanings of citizenship at the juncture of market economies and transnational pressures?

This study concerns a transnational process, whereby »natural« citizens of one country use various sources of capital at their disposal to opt to give their children citizenship in another, more industrialized one. This case speaks to the expanding literature on transnationalism and transnational citizenship in two interrelated ways. On the one hand, one line of thinking on transnational citizenship concerns itself with the disappearance of social rights at the level of the nation-state as a result of the erosion of state economic capacities. This viewpoint considers the philosophical frameworks and practical possibilities for the extension of citizenship rights beyond national borders. A second group of thinkers conceptualize transnational citizenship in response to growing numbers of immigrants. In their view, in a world of increased cross-border mobility, the institutions and experiences of citizenship are becoming pixelated and are blurring nation-state borders. Thus, while both strands of literature concern themselves with inequalities, they discuss separately the effects of market economies and migration trends.

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This paper aims to help reconcile these competing literatures. It conceptualizes the case of privileged minorities, who are able to mobilize resources to acquire a second citizenship for their children, as market embedded transnationalism. It argues that we need to consider the ways in which meanings of transnationalism can become part of market performances and, therefore, contribute to existing inequalities in novel ways. The case of Turkish elite women giving birth in the United States reveals a unique trend of citizenship acquisition because this type of citizenship emerges as a result of calculations of future expectations of benefits. It is obtained as a result of successful maneuvering within market mechanisms. This citizenship, which allows transnational mobility for its owners, is a property to be utilized when needed, and as such assumes and exacerbates inequalities between those who can obtain it and those who cannot.

Methodology

The paper is based on three methodologies of data collection. First, at the conclusion of the research project, we will have conducted 40 in-depth interviews with Turkish families in which the mother has given birth in the United States for the purpose of acquiring US citizenship for the children. Snowball sampling is used to select interviewees. This is a purposive sample, which aims to achieve diversity in terms of time of birth, couples' occupations and connections to the United States. We have also achieved some variation in terms of social class. For the second means of data collection, we have conducted interviews with representatives of tourism companies that organize packages for the expectant families. Finally, we are in the process of completing textual analysis of blogs and websites on which families share their experiences with this process.

In the following sections, we first review the relevant literature on transnational citizenship, arguing for the need to bring the contributions of the two complimentary trends in it together; that is, those who look at it from the perspective of the impact of economic globalization and those who approach it from within migration studies. Then we describe the process through which transnational citizenship emerges in this particular case in an attempt to make the argument that it is embedded in market mechanisms. It is market embedded transnationalism because this citizenship is physically transformed into a good, becoming part of the workings of the layers of economic transactions. Finally, we also conceptualize this citizenship as market embedded transnationalism in the words of our informants, laying out their perceptions of transnational citizenship.

Market Embedded Transnationalism

There is an impressive literature on transnational citizenship, the breadth of which is beyond the scope of this paper. We would like to engage with two of its underlying themes: first, the relationship between market forces and citizenship rights, and, second, on the relationship between cross-border mobilities and transnationalization of citizenship. Both processes are argued to challenge to citizenship regimes, which have historically evolved as a bundle of rights and obligations within the borders of nation-states. While one focuses on the erosion of social rights in an era of neoliberal globalization, the other focuses on inequalities emerging in a world of migration. Our goal in this paper is to point to a third dynamic. By explaining the mechanisms through which transnational citizenship can become a marketable good, we aim to bring together discussions of market forces and transnational citizenship.

The first set of writings focus on how market pressures erode citizenship rights. This approach to citizenship can be seen as rooted in two classical works, by T. H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi. Almost all discussions on citizenship continue to start with Marshall, who in *Citizenship and Social Class* ([1949] 1992), argued that the relationship between the state and the citizen has involved the acquisition of three kinds of rights: civil, political and social, in consecutive centuries starting from the 18th century. Inspired by this work, scholars have discussed citizenship as a bundle of rights that individuals have in return for their acceptance of nation-state frameworks.[2] Marshall's essay was motivated by the tension that capitalism created among different classes, conceptualizing citizenship as a mechanism through which class-based inequalities could be mollified. In this sense, we see in his work the beginnings of this literature's concern for the relationship between economic regimes and citizenship models.

Polanyi's *Great Transformation* is not directly about citizenship. Rather, in this work, he makes the argument that societies have historically always institutionalized relations of reciprocity and redistribution (2001 [1944]). However with the emergence of market economies, he argues that economic activity becomes disconnected from the rest of the social fabric. If market logics eventually prevail over all aspects of our lives, and as land, labor and money are commodified, a real dan-

2 Throughout the fifty-plus years since its publication, Marshall's conceptualization has been intensely criticized. Scholars have argued that it is impossible to understand the changes that citizenship has gone through without paying attention to social mobilizations that demanded expansion of rights and the contingency of rights acquired – that is, how they can be reversed (Turner, 1984; Roche, 1994). They have also drawn attention to persistent inequalities among different groups in society despite the universal claims of citizenship rights (Brubaker, 1992, Turner, 1990, Yuval-Davis, 1993; Lieberman, 1994).

ger for the survival of societies materializes. Today, there has been a resurgence of attention to Polanyi, given that the current context is epitomized by the emergence of market societies (Buğra and Ağartan 2007).

The literature on citizenship in a neo-liberal era brings together the discussions initiated by Marshall and Polanyi. These studies question the risks of market society and explore how responsibility for things that were once considered social rights, such as access to education and health and retirement benefits, are shifting away from governments to individuals. Accordingly, an increase in market power has disrupted the balance of power between state, market and citizens (Somers 2008: 2). The growing moral authority of the market has meant that social inclusion is no longer an inherent right, but an earned privilege (Somers 2008: 3). In fact, welfare states have at best been in stagnation, and at worst in the process of being dismantled. This has led scholars to discuss the possibilities for defining transnational standards for rights, advocated by transnational institutions of regulation, but still implemented at the level of nation-states (Faist 2009: 23). In a more general sense, these signal a move from citizenship rights to a human rights regime beyond nation-states (Falk 2000; Pogge 2002; Shafir and Brysk 2006). Overall, this scholarship is concerned with the transformation that state institutions have gone through in the age of neo-liberalism and how this compares with traditional understandings of citizenship. It draws attention to mechanisms of economic globalization that generate and reproduce increased vulnerability at the level of the nation-state. In this sense, the focus is usually on socially excluded groups, with institutions of transnational citizenship being suggested as panaceas for their problems.

A second line of literature investigates the increasingly transnational character of citizenship in an age of globalization and increased migration. As more and more people live and die in countries where they were not born, new citizenship regimes are bound to emerge because of the need to respond to new questions of political belonging. Bauböck, for instance, argues for increasing the possibilities for multiple citizenships, provided that citizens-to-be can fulfill some conditions of belonging in the social fabric (1994). His theory of transnational citizenship promotes overlapping memberships in nation-states in order to reduce inequalities between »natural« citizens, »naturalized« citizens, and denizens. Along the same lines, others have also questioned the seemingly »natural« link between nation-states and citizenship, given the history of struggles everywhere to attain and expand citizenship rights. Accordingly, similar struggles are ongoing today at the transnational level, transforming meanings and institutions of citizenship (Kaya 2011; Thelen 1999–2000). As Sassen argues, contemporary struggles at the transnational level show that citizenship is an unfinished institution. It embodies the potential for change and adaption to changing circumstances, especially as a result

of globalization (2003). These studies highlight the ways in which citizenship, as an institutional set of mechanisms, and as lived practice among immigrants, has blurred nation-state borders (Soysal 1994). Normatively, they highlight the potential for more inclusive processes of transnational belonging, which legally means pushing for states' acceptance of dual citizenship (Brondsted Sejersen 2008).

These two lines of inquiry share a concern for existing and increasing inequalities. They both turn to various conceptualizations of transnational citizenship at the nation-state level as a way to ease tensions, respectively, between markets and social rights or migrants and citizenship rights. We argue, however, that there is another dynamic to be explored if we bring together discussions of markets and migration. For this purpose, we approach the concept of »transnational citizenship« as a property (Shachar 2009) for which market forces can be mobilized in order to disaggregate the bundle of rights and obligations (Benhabib 2005). Shachar (2007, 2009) compares birthright citizenship to an inherited property, arguing that both contribute to the reproduction and exacerbation of existing inequalities. In the case of birthright citizenship, these inequalities are between nations. We propose to use this conceptualization to discuss the case of elites with multiple passports. Ong refers to this situation as »flexible citizenship,« (1999), a practice among the transnationalized business classes, whose multiple passports and residency permits allow them to unbundle the spaces where they live, work, go to school, pay taxes, inter alia (2005). Our focus, too, is on the socially privileged; more specifically, on those who can utilize market mechanisms to broaden their citizenship rights. This group benefits from the marketisation of citizenship and the transnational processes that exert pressures on nation-states. Citizenship, for these groups, is still an exclusionary right, which requires membership in a particular political and/or social body – usually conceived of as a nation state. However, their membership is now a strategic one. In this study, we approach the ability to acquire multiple passports, become transnational, and unbundle rights and obligations as an exit strategy, unavailable to the majority of people. We also further our argument by conceptualizing transnational citizenship as a status symbol (Bali 2002) and a luxury good (Grewal, 2005), which signifies the privileges of local elites. Thus, discussing the ways in which transnational citizenship is embedded within market mechanisms allows us to shed light on a complex dynamic, less easily captured when the discussion separates out the two. We call this process ›market embedded transnationalism‹. The focus on market embeddedness not only underlines how transnational processes are rooted in market mechanisms, but also highlights how transnational citizenship can stem from and exacerbate already-existing inequalities.

Markets, Babies, Dreams

Citizenship tourism has now become a viable possibility, first and foremost, due to the increased legal acceptance of dual citizenship by nation states. This is in contrast to the early twentieth century international consensus, which generally sought to disallow dual nationality. This earlier view was enshrined in international law, specifically in the Hague Convention of 1930, which signaled its chief aim as »the abolition of all cases both of statelessness and of double nationality.«[3] Subsequently, the citizenship regimes of the majority of nation states reflected this early twentieth century consensus (Martin 2000: 27). However, this hostility toward dual nationality began to change in the last quarter of the twentieth century so that by the 1980s a handful of states allowed dual citizenship. By 1998 the number was 55, and by 2001, 93 (Brondsted Sejersen 2008: 542). Today, more than 100 states accept or tolerate dual nationality, and the trend towards allowing this status has accelerated significantly.

Historically, both the Turkish and US citizenship regimes reflected the »one nation, one person« principle. However, in 1981, the Turkish Nationality Act was amended to remove obstacles to dual citizenship for Turkish citizens as long as the person acquiring a second citizenship informed the government (Keyman and İçduygu 2003).[4] On 29 May 2009, a new citizenship law was enacted that clearly acknowledged Turkish citizens' right to have multiple nationalities.[5] In the case of the United States, several Supreme Court rulings make loss of US citizenship vir-

3 *Convention On Certain Questions Relating To The Conflict Of Nationality Laws The Hague* – 12 Nisan 1930. http://eudocitizenship.eu/InternationalDB/docs/Convention%20on%20certain%20questions%20relating%20to%20the%20conflict %20of%20nationality%20laws%20 FULL% 20TEXT.pdf, (accesses July 15, 2012). In the cases of dual citizenship, Article 4 of Hague Convention advocates what is known as the *Master Nationality Rule,* which gives states the right to treat that person as if he or she were *solely* a citizen or national of that country. This includes the right to impose military service obligations or to require an exit permit to leave.

4 Article 22/III of the 1964 Citizenship Law. This amendment was basically a response to the growing numbers of Turkish guest workers in Germany acquiring German citizenship. The amendment also made it possible to reacquire Turkish citizenship immediately after renouncing it. This was a ›practical/pragmatic??‹ solution, since German citizenship prohibited dual citizenship and required the person to renounce his/her former citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010: 4).

5 The Turkish Citizenship Act, No.5901.Article 44-(1) states that: »With regard to the persons who acquire the citizenship of a foreign state for any reason, in case they submit documents showing their status and following the inquiry to be launched, in case it is determined that the individual is the same individual as contained in the records, an explanatory note shall be attached to the birth (civil) registry book stating that the relevant individual has multiple citizenship.« *Turkish Citizenship Law,* Law No. 5901, 29 May 2009, available at: http://www.

tually impossible without the consent of the citizen (Aleinikoff 2000: 120). This greater flexibility of national citizenship regimes towards allowing multiple citizenships has allowed actors with means to seek a second citizenship for their children without having to worry about losing important rights in the parents' country of origin, such as property ownership and inheritance.

If the increasing acceptance of dual citizenship is one important factor in explaining birth tourism, then the other is the state's choice of means for acquiring citizenship. Currently, the vast majority of individuals acquire citizenship through three primary means: by birth on the soil of the sovereign territory *(jus soli),* by descent *(jus sanguinis)* and by naturalization through formalized legal procedures (Klusmeyer 2000: 5). What makes the practice of United States citizenship acquisition possible is the granting of citizenship in the United States in accordance with the *jus soli* principle. The United States enshrined *jus soli* in its Constitution as part of the 14th amendment, meaning that anyone born on American soil is an American citizen. Thus, the interplay of US rules on the acquisition of citizenship and a growing acceptance of multiple nationalities has created the legal background for birth tourism.

The explanations for such historical shifts in legal regimes are usually discussed in terms of the aforementioned activism of migrant populations. There is also emphasis on the motivation of states. First, migrant sending states aim to maintain cultural, and political connections with emigrants (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık 1999; Kaya and Kentel 2005). From this perspective, economic concerns are not unimportant – if for no other reason than remittances, states have an economic incentive for maintaining citizenship ties with those living outside state borders (Walton-Roberts 2004). As for the receiving states, several states have mechanisms in place that offer residency and/or citizenship in return for large cash investments (Joppke 2010). That is, in a sense, states are motivated by the goal of flexible accumulation (Ong 1999: 130). Therefore, the first point of entry into this process, legal opportunity, is already interwoven with market logics on the part of states. The marketization of transnational citizenship continues from this point onwards.

The data obtained from the Turkish Population Registry Office show that the number of Turkish citizens has increased from around 1 000 to around 1 500 (see Table 1).[6] These numbers include people who gave birth while they were residing in the United States and who also registered their children as Turkish citizens.

unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a9d204d2.html [accessed 12 September 2012]. Another interesting point of the new Act is the flexibility of its approach to those who try to avoid military service.

6 Electronic data was not available before 2000.

They exclude those who opted to suffice with American citizenship alone. One way of extrapolating the figure for birth tourism is to deduct from this number those with dual citizenship who are currently living in the United States. This total increased from around 500 at the beginning of the decade to over 600 today. While it is hard to ascertain the exact numbers, both the mushrooming of companies who service couples wishing to travel to the US for the purposes of giving birth, in combination with the numerous blogs where parents exchange information about the logistics of such trips, all testify to a visible tendency among Turkey's upper classes, who are attempting to add to their cultural connections with the United States, to opt for the tie of US citizenship for their children.

One such company's package includes a choice between nine different states, several hospitals, and residences in each of them. The costs range from a minimum of $22,000 US dollars (which includes hospital birth and accommodation) to $60,000 US dollars. It is not only the detailing of the costs of the »birth package«, as these offers describe it, that interweave the act of giving birth in the United States into a market process (had it only been that, all births in private health care systems would be described no differently). In the promotional package, it is the US passport that becomes the marketable good: »With *Yeni Bir Hayat* you can give birth to your child in the United States easily and safely. You give your child the gift of US citizenship, through which they will have access to privileges that last a lifetime.«[7] The gift of US citizenship becomes, accordingly, something couples can purchase, inserting themselves into overlapping networks of health tourism, health care facilities and specialists, concierge services, and real estate.

There appear to be three categories of people who strive for US citizenship for their children. The first, and the largest, is composed of those couples, one or both of who have lived in the United States for some time, mostly for the purpose of higher or post-graduate education, or because of their work. In this group, either both or one of the spouses are high-end professionals with degrees from international schools. They have sufficient financial means to underwrite the costs; and most also have networks of friends and acquaintances, who can offer them logistical assistance and emotional support during their stay in the United States. However, even if a pre-existing network does not exist, the couples are often sufficiently well informed to navigate this process themselves. This group sees citizenship as an extension of their connections with the United States, in a sense, aspiring for their children to not go through some of the institutional hurdles they endured, if and when the children go and live there.

The second group is also made up of high-level professionals who, again, have enough resources. However, this group's ties to the United States are limited to

7 E-mail correspondence with an interviewee, who consulted the company. July 1, 2012

visits for business and tourism purposes. Some have gone to internationally oriented schools, but have lived in Turkey for their entire lives. They aspire to acquire American citizenship for their children as an opportunity that they themselves lacked. The third group, the smallest of the three, may have traveled to the States, but the extent of their travels, as well as their financial means, are much more limited than the first two groups. Citizenship for them represents, among other things, a chance for upward mobility and a way out for their children. They usually have to take risks in covering the costs of the travel, making very tight calculations as to where they can go and how long they can stay.

In most cases, there are strong cultural affinities with the United States, which stimulates the imagination of future lives there. The rise of educational networks and business connections has, in turn, made these cultural affinities possible. In the last decade, Turkey has consistently been in the list of top ten countries sending students to the United States.[8] It has also become a hub for multinational business, as a result of the last two decades of government induced financial liberalization and foreign business friendly policies. This has meant, at the level of the individuals working in these companies, not only more frequent international business trips, but also, for a lucky minority, economic mobility. As a result, people have begun to observe and become slowly acculturated to different life possibilities and associated citizenship regimes without having to make final decisions about where to live and work.

Typically, the process begins in one of two ways. Either one or both of the spouses have long made up their minds up about having their children in the United States, or there is a third influential person, a family member or a close friend residing in the United States, who introduces the idea. There is usually a short window of opportunity for deliberations over the costs and benefits because of travel restrictions for pregnant women (after the thirty-second week, airlines do not accept pregnant passengers without a medical a report from a doctor). The decision making process goes hand in hand with research regarding hospitals, doctors, and places to stay for the duration leading up to and immediately after the birth. For those with previous experience in the country, the choice is usually to go to the states with which they are familiar. Barring that, they usually end up in places where there are friends or family who can, at the very least, help out in difficult circumstances or, at most, can provide accommodation. Doctors and hospitals are arranged in multiple ways. Some couples do extensive internet research, both about the hospitals in the states and cities they are considering and the doc-

8 For annual figures and rankings, see http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Leading-Places-of-Origin (last accessed September 7, 2012).

tors. This research also involves reading about the experiences of other women who have given birth to their children in the United States. There is considerable cyber-word-of-mouth: we have encountered several women, whose ob-gyn were the same person, even though the women did not know each other personally. This is also partly due to the companies offering extensive concierge services, whose lists of hospitals, doctors, and services become widespread knowledge. The owner of a concierge services company in the United States explained that her work consisted of visiting as many hospitals as possible and contacting doctors, both of which she adds to her portfolio if they reach an agreement. In addition, she maintains working relationships with a network of real estate agents, residence complexes, cleaning companies, car services, and translators. The combination of services utilized depends on the demands and the qualifications of the clients. Thus, transnational citizenship is not only connected to market mechanisms because it is transformed into a property; it is also at the center of various markets, connecting them to one another.

The length of stay in the United States varies according to whether the woman is employed, and the extent of the family's financial means. Most mothers-to-be travel around the thirty-second week of their pregnancy, but many also travel after that, with notes from doctors confirming that they can do so safely. They all have prior visas so obtaining a new visa is not a problem. As stated, the destination cities are typically determined as a result of calculations regarding prior experience, proximity to family and friends, climate and expenses. Miami, Los Angeles, Boston, New Jersey and New York outrank other places. At this stage, depending on their arrangements, some settle in with acquaintances, some go directly to places they have subleased, and others stay in hotels until they find more suitable accommodation. Next, hospital and doctor visitations are organized. Experience with the health care system varies dramatically from patient to patient. While some cannot speak more highly of their doctors and hospitals, many others are shocked by standards lower than the level of private health care in Turkey they are accustomed to. After the birth, the passport for the baby is arranged quickly (this in itself means additional fees), and the couple travels back to Turkey. Once they are back, they also apply for Turkish citizenship for the child, with many also registering their child with the US Consulate in Turkey.

After all of the legal procedures are completed, the family's life returns to normal, although many now talk about taking their children to the United States on a regular basis and sending them to international private schools in Turkey. Their plans revolve around raising children who will be able to live and work anywhere in the world, while retaining cultural and emotional ties to Turkey. The expectation is to combine creatively the rights and obligations of both citizenship regimes in order to offer most opportunities as possible to their children.

Market Rationalities of Transnational Citizenship

In the previous section, we focused on the mechanisms that people mobilize, using their market power, to acquire new citizenships for their children. In this section, we focus on the stories of our interviewees to show how they conceive of the dual citizenship as a resource to be utilized when needed. Almost all our interviewees considered their children's dual citizenship status as a resource that they owned, which they expected to give them advantage over others, and something that could be disposed of when not needed. Many of these families worked with lawyers to thoroughly examine their rights and obligations in an effort to gain maximal benefit from each respective citizenship. In other words, these stories reveal the workings of market rationalities where the actors aim to maximize individual benefits and minimize individual costs.

The first advantage that these families emphasized was their ability to give up either of these citizenships when or if necessary. The possibility of an exit option appears to have motivated almost everyone we have interviewed. The importance of an exit option is directly related to their fearful perceptions about the future of Turkey. Almost unanimously, they stated their fear of Turkey's becoming a more »Islamic«, more »oriental« and »less civilized« country. Their fear was sometimes exacerbated because of their children's gender, arguing that the life chances for educated and »liberated« women in Turkey were gradually decreasing. One of the interviewees stated this clearly when we asked whether she recommends the practice of giving birth in the US to the other expecting couples, she said: »Gosh, they should definitely do it, especially if they are expecting a baby girl. In four or five years, their daughter's freedom may be taken away; maybe she will be banned from the streets; maybe she will be harassed by the public police. They should definitely go.« In some other cases, their fear was closely connected to their minority status. In those cases, their community's memories of violence against minorities in Turkey and future anxieties shaped their decision. These families saw dual citizenship as a risk management tool and tried to make sure that their child had an exit option, in case the social and political climate deteriorated, as it frequently had in the past.

Fears over the future of Turkish politics are probably not, however, always related to the current political situation, or the fact that a conservative political party is in power. In fact, the figures for dual citizenship applications have not shown any sharp increase since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002; instead, they have remained more or less stable throughout the 2000s (see Table I). One of the travel company managers also stated that viewing the motivation of these families only as a reaction to the rise of conservatism in Turkey would be wrong. He argued that the Turkish elites have always had anxieties for

the future, albeit the reasons for their anxiety have shifted over time. He claimed that the real factor is actually the instability and unpredictability of the Turkish political regime. The excerpt below aptly encapsulates such feelings voiced by our interviewees:

> This country is always full of unknowns. You cannot simply say this is how things are. You cannot make a plan for the future. You know the situation in education; the college entrance exams are changing everyday. The same is true for military service. We, even adults, fear for our lives, for our tomorrows. Our children have a long life ahead of them, so our worries about them are much more intense. We don't know what they will encounter in the future. US citizenship is a security. In this country, we have injustice everywhere. Nobody gets what they deserve. It is not like we are living in a country where there is rule of law. … We have given them the chance to escape if they want to. This is a huge opportunity.

The second cluster of factors that explain the decision to acquire American citizenship is related to the future benefits that this provides for the children. These benefits include cross-border mobility, educational and work opportunities in the United States, and sometimes evading military service. In other words, for companies selling the process, this is a gift that parents can buy for their children; for parents-to-be, this is a gift token, which the children are expected to cash in when they feel like it. On the one hand, this enables their children to avoid the unwanted obligations of Turkish citizenship, while on the other hand it gives them the desirable advantages of American citizenship. In other words, the owner of dual citizenship has the chance to disaggregate the various rights and responsibilities in order to use whichever suits their interests.

Among these advantages, cross-border mobility was the most frequently mentioned. The majority of these families were frequent travelers – either for work or for recreational purposes. They had complaints about what they viewed as the unpleasant, bureaucratic, drawn-out and expensive visa procures that are applied to Turkish citizens, and the unjust and unequal treatment of Turkish citizens at border crossings. Although they are privileged citizens of Turkey, they do not feel that privilege in their travels abroad. On the contrary, they feel that they are undeservedly treated as low-class citizens. The hurdles of visa acquisition, and their encounters at international borders, prevent them from being the citizens of the world that they feel they are, and aggravate their class anxieties. All of them longed for the freedom to move around internationally without hassles and restrictions, and they believe that American citizenship will give their children this mobility without these restrictions. As one of the interviewees put it,

> This passport gives them global mobility. I did not get US citizenship for my children; they became citizens of the world. Wherever they go, doors will be wide open for them. You are opening the first door. The rest is up to them.

Another one stated a similar view:

> Let's say she turns out to be a child who is deeply devoted to her country, traditions. If she wants to live in Turkey, at least she will be able to travel internationally easily. Let's say she becomes a businesswoman. I have American friends and I know how easily they travel internationally. It is my hope that there are no such unnecessary procedures, paperwork like visas in the future. But this possibility does not seem to be in the foreseeable future. At least my daughter will travel comfortably.

Apart from global mobility, another advantage parents foresaw is the global protection extended to American citizens through US Embassies. One of them indicated, »I don't know whether you have had a US passport issued or not but in it there is really a statement saying that the state will support their citizens everywhere. In other words, if you are in a country other than the United States and register yourself with the embassy, the US state is behind you in any potential problem, health related issues to theft.« As these words signify, our interviewees were apprehensive about the support they could get, as Turkish citizens, if anything happened to them in a foreign country. They believed that, through the acquisition of American citizenship, their children could become thoroughly transnational citizens, whose rights would be protected everywhere by the US Consulates.

Our interviewees also mentioned educational opportunities frequently. They thought that American citizenship would give their children an advantage when or if their children wanted to attend university in the United States. Although all of them were aware that US colleges accepted international students, their real concern, however, was financing the education. While some were under the mistaken impression that colleges were free for American citizens, the majority of interviewees associated American citizenship with the wider availability of education loans and tuition cuts not offered to international students.

In the event that the children decided to stay in Turkey for their university education, some imagined that they could give up their Turkish citizenship in order to take the separate university entrance exam designed for foreign residents. This alternative exam is considered to be easier than the exam Turkish citizens take, and most of the universities have special quotas for foreign residents. For these families, having their children abandon Turkish citizenship would not be a serious

concern, since recent revisions to the Turkish citizenship law have made it easier to reacquire Turkish citizenship after renouncing it.

A less frequently mentioned advantage was employment opportunities. Usually the families, who stated this concern were those that had already worked in the US, and had experienced difficulties obtaining work visas. For these individuals, the ability to seamlessly live and work anywhere was a primary motivation for getting their children second (and third) passports. Most of our interviewees talked about being and raising global citizens, and about the flexibility this involved. For some, the ideology of flexibility was almost a defining personality trait.

> There is also the work permit issue. They can work wherever in the world. Actually US citizenship opens the doors to the world. It will allow our child flexibility in making decisions. I guess flexibility and options were key motivators for us. It is up to her how she uses this.
>
> Initially, my thinking was this: this can provide for my daughter more educational opportunities. When the time for university comes, she can study in her birth state, free of charge, etc. etc. But, of course, she may never really want to go to the States. Even then I just wanted to give her a life where she can be mobile, live without restrictions.

Finally, the opportunity to evade military service seemed to be an important concern for some of the families. Currently, every male citizen of the Republic of Turkey is obliged to perform military service – alternative service outside the army is not possible. Military service applies to any male of Turkish nationality, irrespective of his background or place of residence. In contrast, the US military is a voluntary and professionalized institution. Citizens are not required to complete compulsory military service. As in education, the majority of our families saw American citizenship as providing an exit option for their sons if conditions in Turkey became dangerous. In that event, they stated that their children could forfeit Turkish citizenship. In the past, male Turkish citizens were not allowed to renounce their citizenship without completing their military service. However, in 2003, Article 20 of the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 4866 was changed, and completing military service was no longer a precondition for the renunciation of the Turkish citizenship. In 2009, a new Citizenship Law (5901) was enacted which is more lenient towards those who try to avoid military service. In this new law, military service is not a precondition for the renunciation of the citizenship. Furthermore, failing to respond to regular procedural summons to perform military service is not considered a reason for loss of citizenship. Article 28/1 also states that Turkish citizens who renounce their citizenship can reacquire it back at any time.

These amendments in the law can enable dual citizens to renounce Turkish citizenship at the age of military service and then reacquire when they are old enough for lawful exemption from it.

In sum, several concerns related to the unpredictability of the Turkish context, as well as various opportunities associated with American citizenship were motivating factors for these families to strive towards obtaining the latter for their children. They wanted their children to become transnational citizens to assuage their apprehensions about only possessing Turkish citizenship, as well as to provide their children with the privileges, as they saw them, associated with the American citizenship. For them, transnationality signified opportunities at both the local and global level – perhaps even a guarantee for protecting their existing privileges everywhere.

Conclusion

Usually modern citizenship is defined as a personal status consisting of legal rights (i. e. legal claims on the state) and duties held equally by all members of the nation-state. Beginning with Marshall, modern citizenship has been seen as based on equalizing principles that are expected to mitigate the economic inequalities of social class positions. Discussions of transnational citizenship, which build on this premise, have considered the addition of the term ›transnational‹ as a way to further the promise of citizenship by responding to the contemporary realities of globalization. This means that transnational citizenship can come to mean international human rights and/or the right to hold multiple citizenships for the growing number of people living beyond a singular, one nation-state framework.

Our case introduces a qualifier to these discussions. The popularity in Turkey of the practice of acquiring American citizenship for Turkish children by traveling to the United States solely for purposes of giving birth complicates assumptions about (transnational) citizenship's equalizing power. This practice of transnationalism involves intricate relationships between national laws, economic incentives and various market mechanisms that extend across borders. We call it »market embedded transnationalism« to emphasize how transnational practices of citizenship can also result in new kinds of inequalities at the intersection of global and local hierarchies. This elite group aims to expand the range of their children's legal rights, and plans to disaggregate them to maximize their benefits. However, not everyone has the necessary capital and connections to make use of this possibility. Thus, in addition to solidifying inequalities among different populations, the institution of citizenship, in this case, also exacerbates local inequalities within developing countries between those who have the means to acquire a second citizen-

ship through market mechanisms and those who do not. Thus, although we agree that thinking of transnational citizenship as a possible remedy to contemporary issues of economic inequality and/or immigrant rights is a valid stance, we suggest that it is also important to bring together discussions of markets and citizenship rights in order to better understand unexpected side-effects such as the one discussed here.

Appendix

Table 1

Turkish Citizens whose places of birth are listed as the USA

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1 151	1 218	1 388	1 449	1 512	1 444	1 568	1 614	1 636	1 550	1 613	1 368	212

Turkish citizens whose places of birth are listed as the USA and who reside in Turkey

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
515	553	617	625	616	559	587	657	661	588	646	568	99

Note: These statistics were received on 21.05.2012 from the Turkish General Directorate of Population and Citizenship via correspondence.

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The Digital Bridge Between Turkey and Germany: Transnational Use of Digital Media in the Turkish Diaspora

Çiğdem Bozdağ

Introduction

Transnational migration not only changes the people who are on the move, but also the countries they leave behind through their ongoing transnational networks. Today, these networks are sustained to a great extent through digital media technologies. The experience of migration (before, during and after migrating) has changed throughout history due to constantly changing information and communication technologies (ICTs), among other factors (Clifford 1994; Kaya 2007). Changes in media technologies not only impact the availability of mass media, but also bring about new forms of interpersonal communication, especially through digital communication technologies. These transformations also influence relations of diasporic communities with their homelands.[1] Homeland is today less of a mythical and emotional place left behind, but rather a constant and important part of lives of many migrants through the (digital) media, which serve, in a sense, as a digital bridge (Clifford 1994).

Not long ago, letters were the »small media« (Dayan 1999) of diaspora, and were one of the main communication channels to communicate with people back ›home‹. More recently migrants, and the following generations, have enjoyed a greater range of available media which can be used to maintain social and economic networks, family relationships, and political affiliations, which transcend nation states (Hepp, Bozdağ and Suna 2012, Madianou and Miller 2012). This pa-

1 This research discusses the history, benefits and disadvantages of the term Diaspora critically and in more detail. However, such a discussion will be left out from this paper for more focused argumentation. Diaspora can be briefly defined here as an ethnic, transnational imagined community, which is constructed through the experience of dispersion from a real or imagined origin, and is marked by processes of transnational networking and cultural hybridization (for a discussion of the term cf. Clifford 1994, Cohen 1997, Brubaker 2005).

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per engages with the question of how different media technologies, especially digital media, are being used by the members of the Turkish diaspora – the largest diasporic community in Germany – in order to build and maintain networks with Turkey, their country of origin. Moreover, it discusses how media influence transnational relations between people in different places.

I will argue that ICTs intensify the transnational communication networks of migrants with their countries of origin to such an extent that they become a usual part of their everyday lives. Hence, digital media extend the communication space for what Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins (2003) refer to as »banal transnationalism«. The ›de-mystification‹ of life in the country of origin in the eyes of Turkish migrants is taken a step further with the digital communication technologies. Also, interpersonal communication becomes much cheaper, easier and possible in various ways (e-mail, SMS, VoIP etc.), but also probably less special and less mythical. The feelings of loss and longing are reduced through ongoing mediated communication, according to the interviewees. These possibilities of networking make it possible for small-scale businesses to operate as transnational entities. However, the technological capability of building intense transnational networks through ICTs does not necessarily increase people's interest in building such networks. How people use digital media to build networks in their countries of origin is much more related to their cultural identification patterns, as well as their socio-cultural contexts. Furthermore, because migrants are no longer as familiar with the cultural, social and political context of Turkey (or some of them distance themselves from it), banal transnationalism is marked by disruptions and feelings of estrangement.

The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies

Scholarship on migration was primarily concerned with issues related to the preservation of the nation for a long time, such as the social, cultural, economic and political integration of migrants in the national context. This focus on the nation state and its sustainment, and the fact that it was taken for granted in the social sciences, which Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller (2002) refer to as »methodological nationalism«, was increasingly questioned in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Transnationalism emerged as an alternative approach to the national paradigm in the field of migration studies and also influenced many researches in the field of media and migration, as well as this research (cf. Wimmer/Glick-Schiller 2002; Faist 2007).

The transnational approach conceptualizes migrant communities whose lives are marked by various national and cultural contexts, beyond the national frame-

works. Transnationalism is »grounded in the daily lives, activities, and social relationships of migrants« who are involved in ongoing transnational networks. On the one hand, migrants are consuming cultural products from their countries of origin, which they interpret in a new cultural context in the country of settlement. On the other hand, they are involved in interpersonal networks with family members and friends, whom they left behind. These networks are built through media communication, but also through remittances that they send, their visits, and their political activities that are related to the country of origin. The constant juxtaposition with different cultural contexts forces migrants to »confront, reinterpret and rework on complex identity constructs« (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992: 5). Migrant identities emerge in »transnational social spaces« through cultural tensions between national contexts that they experience, in addition to the processes of continuous negotiation and cultural hybridization (Clifford 1994: 315, Kaya 2007: 483). For many migrants, the country of origin is not necessarily a »final destination of return« or a »homeland« that immediately wakes feelings of familiarity or belonging (Kentel and Kaya 2005: 32). Furthermore, they are integrated in the political, cultural and economic spheres of both countries. Media technologies enable communication beyond territorial borders and offer migrants different possibilities for being involved in both contexts. In particular, the media's role in the strengthening of transnational networks has received a lot of attention among scholars of migration, as well as in communication and media studies, as will be discussed in the next section.

Media and Migration: The State of the Research

The research field of media and migration emerges at the intersection of different disciplines and various subjects (for an overview cf. Karim 2003, Bailey et al. 2007). Despite the transnational evolution in migration studies discussed in the previous section, a great deal of research, especially in the German context, still deals with national issues such as media's role in the political, social or cultural integration of migrants in the national context of the host country. Yet, the transnational approach also has an influence on different projects which recognize the hybrid character of migrants' identities and their transnational networks. For example, one of the classical works in the field is the ethnographic research of Marie Gillespie (1995) on cultural change and the role of television in the Punjabi community in Southhall, England. Gillespie (1995) argues that the »TV talk« in different contexts of migrants' everyday lives (e. g. on the school yard, at the dinner table, during TV consumption etc.) are crucial moments for negotiations of migrant identities and cultural hybridization. Similarly, Asu Aksoy and Kevin

Robins (2003) analyze transnational television consumption among migrants from Turkey and argue that television brings the »ordinary, banal reality of Turkish life to the migrants living in London« (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 95). However, the transnational engagement with Turkish television does not always work because migrants are not necessarily familiar with the context of Turkey, and »familiarity« is a key element of television consumption (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 102). Therefore, migrants can experience feelings of estrangement and distance when they are confronted with daily images in transnational television.

Digital media influence various aspects of everyday life, and this is even more the case for members of diasporic communities since communication beyond borders has a central importance for them. Accordingly, the role of digital media for transnational networks, and identity construction of members of diaspora, has become a central subject in the field of media and migration in recent years (e. g. D'Hanaens et al. 2007; Hepp, Bozdağ and Suna 2012; Madianou and Miller 2012). For example, Mirca Madianou and David Miller (2012) analyze how families that are separated through transnational migration sustain their family ties through different online communication forms like internet telephony and so on. Whereas there are different researches focusing on the Turkish diaspora around Europe and their use of mass media (e. g. Ogan 2001; Aksoy and Robins 2003), there is still room for exploration about the role of digital media in the construction of transnational communication space. Therefore, this research deals with the use of digital media among the members of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and its possible outcomes for sociocultural change in terms of increasing banal transnationalism.

Although new media technologies bring about possibilities for new forms of transnationalism, they are not to be seen as driving forces of sociocultural change, as more techno-deterministic approaches would assume. Their role is to be understood in relation to the daily appropriation practices of their users, through which these technologies are shaped and gain their meaning (Madianou and Miller 2012). Accordingly, this paper will draw upon previous research I was involved in and give examples from the media appropriation patterns in daily lives of migrants, who use the digital media transnationally.

Historical Background of the Turkish Mediascape in Germany

The Turkish diaspora numbers over 2,500,000, and is the largest migrant group in Germany. Although migration between Turkey and Germany has a longer history, most Turkish people living in Germany today are either workers who came

through the labor recruitment agreement *(»Anwerbeabkommen«)* between Turkey and Germany in 1961, or are descended from that generation (Karakaşoğlu 2007: 1054). The majority of migrant workers who came to Germany in the 1960s and 70s were men aiming to save as much money as possible and return to Turkey eventually. Similarly, German authorities anticipated that foreign workers would also return to their country of origin – hence, the term *›Gastarbeiter‹* (guest workers) – a term that was used until the 1990s. After the end of the recruitment agreement *(»Anwerbestopp«)* in 1973, migration to Germany from Turkey has continued more in the form of family reunions, and after the 1980s, also as a result of political refugees (Karakaşoğlu 2007: 1055). Many migrants themselves, as well as the German authorities, realized that the settlement of Turkish workers in Germany was not a temporary situation, but becoming a permanent fixture. However, only in 2005 was this situation officially recognized, and thereafter Germany was declared to be a country of immigration.

The development of the German-Turkish mediascape correlates with historical developments related to Turkish migration in Germany. For example, German authorities introduced the radio program »Radio Köln«[2], a program intended for Turkish migrants to keep them abreast of developments in Turkey. Turks themselves had a similar view of Turkish migrants in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, Turkish workers in Germany were perceived as expatriates *(›gurbetçiler‹)* in a foreign country, who were expected to remain loyal to their countries of origin in political, economic and cultural senses. Moreover, the Turkish media sector capitalized on a potential market in Europe. The Turkish newspapers, Hürriyet and Milliyet, started to be sold in many German cities where Turkish migrants resided. Especially in the 1980s, VCR (video cassette recording) technology changed the Turkish mediascape in Germany and made the consumption of Turkish films very popular and accessible. These videos constituted a small ethnic market in Germany centered around small »Export-Import shops,« as they were mostly called (Weber-Menges 2006: 129). In the 1990s, satellite technology not only changed the mediascape of German-Turks, but also of Turkey in general, and this has led to the privatization of media sector.[3] Through satellite technology

2 A Turkish speaking radio show of the public broadcasting radio WDR (Westdeutscher Rundfunk). The show started in 1964 as a one-hour daily program and contained especially news about Turkey, and is today part of the daily program of the multicultural oriented Radio Funkhaus Europa (one hour every day). It is also available as a (24 hour) online radio. The show is today much about Germany, especially issues that are related to migration. For more information and the podcast of the show: http://www.funkhauseuropa.de/sendungen/koeln_radyosu/ [15. 07. 2012].

3 Although privatization of the media sector in Turkey was not legally the case in the beginning of 1990s, television channels such as Star TV and TeleON started transmitting their

and the diversification of available media in Turkey, Turkish migrants in Germany were able to consume various Turkish programs and retain cultural and political familiarities with Turkey. Many Turkish channels recognized the economic potential of Turkish audiences in Europe, and have today specialized channels catering to their tastes such as Eurostar or Euro D. These channels mostly broadcast similar content with what is found in Turkey, except for advertisements which are directly targeted to Turks in Europe. Within this period, we can also observe the development of a »transcultural« media scene, which can be seen as a product of an ongoing process of cultural hybridization among Turks living in Germany, who increasingly refer to themselves as »German-Turks« (Weber-Menges 2006: 130). This hybrid cultural production in the diasporic mediascape is especially conspicuous in the films of German-Turkish directors such as Fatih Akın, or in the development of the Radio Station Radyo Metropol FM.[4] Also, German programs aimed at migrants changed in tandem with the transformations in the perception of Turks in German society. Hence, instead of issues related to country of origin, cultural diversity or social, cultural, and political integration in Germany became more prominent.

Digital communication technologies, especially the internet, not only brought about new forms of communication that were not possible before, but they also changed the existing forms of communication extensively (e. g. internet television, online newspapers and radios). The internet widened the accessibility of information and programming, but also diversified content with more cultural content from Turkey available within a couple of clicks. These developments in media technologies also led to a diversification of transnational engagement of migrants with their country of origin, as I will argue through different examples in the next sections. On the internet there is also more scope for the development of a transnational space that reflects the cultural complexity of migrant communities through cheaper and easier ways of media production, in comparison to mass media production.[5] In these transnational spaces, German-Turks also negotiate their perceptions of their countries of origin and engage, for example, in the practice

programs in Turkey through satellite technologies. This eventually led to the passing of privatization law in 1993, and to a diversification of Turkish television sector.

4 Radyo Metropol FM is a Turkish-speaking radio station which was started in 1999 in Berlin and expanded its transmission area to Stuttgart, Koblenz, Mainz, Wiesbaden, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen. The station can also be received online: http://www.metropolfm.de/ [29. 09. 2012].

5 There are different types of websites (e. g. web portals, dating websites, news websites, religious websites) that are produced by and for migrants in Germany. These websites are referred to here as diasporic websites. Diasporic websites are typically bi or multilingual.

of TV-Talk, as Gillespie (1995) calls it, or in the exchange of views about political happenings, religion or popular culture in Turkey from their perspective.

Media and Transnational Networks of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

The following sections are based on the materials of two different research projects. The first is a qualitative research project, »Communicative connectivity of ethnic minorities«, which was carried out between 2010 and 2011 at the University of Bremen (lead by Prof. Dr. Andreas Hepp) and funded by DFG (German Research Association). The project deals with communicative networking practices and cultural identities of the Turkish, Moroccan and Russian diaspora in Germany. The empirical data consists of observation notes, qualitative interviews, network diagrams and media diaries (Hepp, Bozdağ and Suna 2012). This paper discusses 37 cases related to the Turkish diaspora. The interviewees were from Bremen and Berlin, and very diverse in terms of their personal histories, economic, educational and religious backgrounds, as well as their media use. Secondly, examples from my doctoral research (2009–2012) will be presented – a media ethnography about diasporic websites, which draws on observations, field notes, interviews and threads from discussion forums on the German-Turkish websites *Vaybee*! (107 threads) and Turkish-Talk (108 threads).

Despite the diversity of Turkish migrants living in Germany, different types of media are relevant for all those who live in Germany and who are engaged in transnational networks. Recent studies have shown that most of the Turkish migrants use radio stations, newspapers, television channels and websites from Turkey and Germany at the same time. How intensively they use the media of each country, and how they combine these, vary quite extensively according to the cultural identities of the users, among other factors. These results show that Turkish migrants do not live in ›media enclaves,‹ as suggested by many nation-state oriented theories of media and migration. Besides the media of the country of origin, they also use the German media with different intensity (Simon and Neuwöhner 2011). Nevertheless, this paper focuses, rather, on the transnational use of media to connect with the country of origin in different ways in order to scrutinize the role of digital media in building daily, transnational networks.

It is not easy to differentiate different kinds of media since the internet can be used for receiving television channels, television for receiving radio stations, a mobile phone can be used as a computer, and so on. Considering this tendency towards the convergence of media technologies, it makes sense to take different kinds of media as a whole into account in order to understand what people do

with the media for what purposes. Consequently, this paper also analyzes different kinds of transnational media and their use. However, the overarching focus remains the digital media and its role in changing transnational networks of migrants with their countries of origin media.

Cultural Identities and Transnational Media Use

Our research, »Communicative Connectivity of Ethnic Minorities,« has shown that migrant's use of media is very much related to their feelings of belonging and identity articulations – in other words, different subjective representations of self in various ways and situations with regard to different cultural contexts. Not surprisingly, people who still identify themselves strongly with their culture of origin, for example as »Turks«, »Turks in a foreign country« and so on, also tend to use various media in order to communicate with people in their countries of origin or consume cultural products from these countries (newspapers, TV shows, music, inter alia). For this group of migrants, which we refer to as origin-oriented, the internet also serves as a bridge to the country of origin in a variety of ways. Recent research, including our own, shows that origin-oriented migrants do not constitute the majority of Turkish migrants living in Germany (cf. Kaya and Kentel 2005; Hepp, Bozdağ and Suna 2012). A second group of migrants identify themselves with both cultural contexts (countries of settlement and origin), and therefore also use (digital) media for both contexts. These hybrid identifications also manifest themselves in the broad use of the »hyphenated« term »German-Turk« *(»Deutschtürke«)* (Kaya 2007), which we generalized under the term »ethno-oriented«[6] in order to refer to all three groups we analyzed. Cultural resources from the country of origin and the transnational interpersonal networks with people there, contribute to such cultural hybridization processes. The third group, the world-oriented, has a more cosmopolitan orientation in terms of his/her identity orientation, but also in terms of their media use, which typically extends beyond the contexts of the countries of settlement and origin. The identity orientations of people who tend to be in these different groups are co-articulated in the reach of their communicative networks (Table 1).

The table above summarizes different orientations in the Turkish diaspora. It is evident that the extent of transnational networks, in which migrants in the Turkish diaspora are involved, differ in relation to their cultural identification patterns

6 The name of this second group of migrants »ethno-oriented« does not suggest that the other groups do not have an ethnic identity, but rather emphasizes that questions of ethnicity and being in-between two ethnic cultures is central for these group of migrants.

Table 1 Cultural Identities and Transnational Networks (Hepp, Bozdağ and Suna 2012)



among other factors. Whereas all groups are somewhat involved in transnational networking practices with and without media, the diversity of the networks is different in all groups. The extent of people's networks and their identifications are also related to questions of migration history, educational and social background, gender and so on. For example, it is mostly the first generation migrants who strongly identify themselves with Turkey, whereas second and third generation migrants see themselves in-between two cultures, and their networks reflect this. The world-oriented migrants, who have more cosmopolitan orientations and have extensive networks around Europe and often beyond, are mostly a well-educated minority both within the analyzed migrant groups, and also in the Turkish diaspora generally. However, we cannot assume that people move progressively from origin-oriented towards the world-oriented category through the generations. There are world-oriented migrants in the first generation, and there are second and third generation migrants who see themselves as »Turkish nationalists«. These examples make it clear how complex the picture actually is. In light of this complexity, we need to avoid simplifying generalizations and linear modals of cultural change, and rather consider the inner diversity of these groups when analyzing patterns of banal transnationalism and media use in migrants' lives.

Interpersonal Networks with the Country of Origin

Digital media offer many different communication possibilities for migrants to their country of origin. Such transnational interpersonal networks did not just emerge with digital media, but were always a part of migrants' mediascapes in the form of »small media« such as letters, video recordings, and so on (Dayan 1999). Nonetheless, the possibilities of mediated interpersonal communication, beyond the borders of nation-states extended through the new technologies. When the interviewees spoke about communication with friends and family in Turkey, they mostly referred to the ›old times,‹ when many options for transnational communication did not exist, and they therefore appreciate today's communication technologies. For example, Ferda[7] (f, 40) and her husband Hamit (m, 40), who both came to Germany as political refugees in the 1990s, state that they have new ways of talking to people in Turkey and this has mitigated their sense of longing for home. As Ferda puts it:

> Before, there was longing and nostalgia and that is not there anymore, I think, I really … Believe me, for example, our people here in abroad [gurbet], we called it abroad

7 The names of the interviewees have been changed in order to maintain their anonymity.

> [gurbet]. They had the need to go to Turkey every year. But people don't have this need to go to vacation any more. They might think, it is ok even if I do it only every second or third year. They can see their families every day.[8]

Hamit:

> You say, turn the (web)camera on, ok, then you see them.

After the conversation above Ferda added that they used to call their relatives in Turkey through the landline mostly. Then, they started to chat with them when they bought a computer a few years ago, and afterwards they started to use internet telephony with webcam. The ease and affordability of transnational communication makes it possible for migrants to communicate with more people for longer durations. With the increase in frequency in communication, quotidian, as well as more serious matters, can be discussed more regularly. For example, Fatoş (f, 40) says she talks to her sister, her mother and her aunt almost every day. They exchange even the smallest details of their daily lives such as recipes, the Turkish serials they have been watching, and so on. Many interviewees mentioned similar experiences in communications with their friends and relatives in Turkey through the internet.

However, there are also restrictions to banal transnationalism through digital media. For example, not all interviewees were enthusiastic about talking with relatives for many hours. Yeliz (f, 40) explains that it is enough for her to ask how people in Turkey are doing, and say hello. She does not feel the need to »sit for hours« and ask again and again »how are you again? *(»daha daha nasılsınız«)*. Others like Nilgün (f, 33) find it awkward to sit in front of a camera and talking.

Another restriction to transnational communication through digital media relates to media literacy – the skills needed to utilize different media technologies effectively. For example, the elderly interviewees, who were usually less familiar with technology, indicated mostly that they cannot use computers themselves. In order to communicate with their relatives, their others must assist them. Such media literacy shortcomings, and the inaccessibility of computers in general for some, likely exclude (especially older) migrants from participating directly in the transnational networks with Turkey. As explained, second and third generation children often play a mediating role in enabling greater participation for the elderly. For example, Orhan, who is 17 years old and a third generation German-Turk, sets up the computer and the chat server to link his family with relatives in Turkey. He is also the one who sends pictures to family members in Turkey with his

8 The interviews were in German or Turkish and were translated into English by the author.

mobile phone. Other interviewees from younger generations shared similar stories about facilitating and helping maintain transnational links with their families in the country of origin.

For younger generations of Turkish migrants in Germany, Turkey is not necessarily a familiar place to them. It is, rather, a country that they became acquainted with through their visits, their parents' or grandparents' narratives, and mediated representations like texts, pictures and videos. The media also connect family members that might not otherwise have the opportunity to meet. Media also allow for the maintenance of old friendships or relations, in addition to providing a platform from which to meet new people. Gökçe (f, 33), for example, stayed in Turkey for a year, when she was in high school. The first thing she did when she registered in the social network site (SNS), Facebook, was to look for her old friends. Halim (m, 33), who is seldom in Turkey, is in contact with different people from Turkey through his SNS-group Employment Agency *(»İş ve İşçi bulma kurumu«).* In other words, transnational social spaces, SNSs, and diasporic websites enable migrants not only to connect with other diaspora members, but also with people in their countries of origin, build new networks, sustain ongoing ones or revive old ones.

Media technologies also connect business associates. Today, even small-scale businesses have the possibility to operate on a transnational level. This is particularly useful for migrant business owners who still have social networks in their countries of origin. Travel agencies and export-import businesses in particular utilize these opportunities to sustain and expand their networks. An illustrative example is that of Nalan (f, 50), a partner in a dressmaking store in Turkey, which tailors the dresses that she then sells on in her shop in Germany. She explains how she manages to operate her transnational business with the help of different media:

> I do this, God bless, there is e-mail today. I send the pictures [of the dresses] which I want to have. And the telephone is also flatrate, you can phone all day long. It is very cheap of course. There are also many ways to take pictures of what they have been sawing and to show it. From here, I can see and intervene and say don't do it like that, do it like this and all that. One doesn't need to fly there and back.

Nalan's wedding dress shop is very well equipped with different kinds of digital media, such as cameras, mobile phones with different lines, a webcam, and internet broadband connection. These media allow her to inexpensively remain connected with her business partners in Turkey daily. Her arrangement typifies the business model that many other migrants have adopted. However, technical equipment and skills are still prerequisite of mediated transnational networks.

These different examples make it clear that media technologies make a daily exchange between Turkey and migrants in Germany possible in various ways. The quotidian character of transnational communication intensifies the connections beyond national borders, on the one hand. On the other hand, such interpersonal connections are often taken for granted, such that they become, in a sense, demythologized and »banalized«, like in the case of transnational television, as Aksoy and Robins (2003) argued.

Diversification and Popular Cultural Products from Turkey

The German-Turkish mediascape has become very diverse and complex through the internet and mobile communication technologies. Whereas many types of Turkish mass media became available online without spatial and temporal constraints, there are also new forms of media through which Turkish migrants can remain attuned to Turkish news and popular culture. Today, even the smallest local newspaper or radio station from Turkey can be reached within a couple of clicks. Although during the history of Turkish migration in Germany, different media were available from Turkey as discussed in the third section (e. g. TRT international, radio stations through satellite connection etc.), such diversity and intensity of transnational media consumption was not possible before the internet. This diversity of available, cultural and informational resources from Turkey, as well as the intensity of communication, allow a more reflexive and critical view about the country of origin, on the one hand (cf. for similar arguments on Satellite Television Aksoy and Robins 2003). On the other hand, it gives migrants a feeling of being closer to their country of origin, easing nostalgia. For example, Yeliz (f, 40) listens to radio stations from the northern region of Turkey around the Black Sea, where she comes from, to feel more connected to her hometown. Similar to Yeliz, Hakan (m, 26) also listens to radio stations from the hometown of his parents, Sultan Radio from Kahramanmaraş, and is enthusiastic about such a possibility:

> I think it was Sultan Radio or something like that, no idea. I listened to that once, not bad at all. One has straight away the feeling that one is in Turkey, doesn't he? One listens to radio directly live from Turkey.

For younger users from the second generation of Turkish migrants, like Hakan, the internet offers a rich informational resource about Turkey, its history, politics and culture, and provides a sense of »being there,« as Hakan puts it – a feeling of being closer to their (parents') origin. Through the internet, migrants search for

films, television series, music, newspapers, and magazines from Turkey. Different websites that gather these kinds of cultural resources like video-portals (diziizle.net, filmizle.net, gazeteoku.com, inter alia) are used by most of the interviewees with differing levels of frequency. Like in the case of interpersonal communication, younger generations of migrants use the internet more often for such purposes. The transnational use of the internet is, however, also not without restrictions. For example, the Turkish language skills of many younger migrants are not sufficient enough to read text-based resources on the internet. Aynur (f, 20) and Serap (f, 20), who are both third generation Turkish migrants in Germany, state that they find it quite difficult to understand Turkish newspapers, and therefore mostly hear about the news from Turkey through their parents. Diasporic websites such as Vaybee.de, Turkdunya.de or Turkish-Talk.com, which are both in Turkish and German, provide a transnational space on the internet through which these younger generations can learn about their country of origin. Through the interactive character of these websites, they can exchange their own views about Turkey from a diasporic perspective and all this in their own language, mostly a mixture of Turkish and German. Through these channels they remain updated about the happenings and the cultural scene in Turkey, as Orhan (m, 17) formulates it: »so one knows what is going on over there«.

Conclusion: What Kind of Bridge and for Whom?

Media technologies build a bridge between migrants and their countries of origin, and this contributes to the emergence of transnational networks and cultures of diasporas. They also provide a mediated transnational space for the members of diasporas, as can be seen in the example of diasporic websites, in which discussions and negotiations about the country of origin take place. In this sense, media contributes to the emergence of banal transnationalism in many different ways, and also ensures that Turkish culture retains a greater presence in the lives of diasporic members. However, the intensity and meaning of these connections differ greatly depending on the social, educational, cultural backgrounds and identifications of the users of the media. There are disruptions in the transnational networks that are mediated through different media technologies due to differences in media literacy, interest in other cultural, political contexts, or social and cultural capital. Digital media technologies build a transnational bridge between Turkish migrants and Turkey, but not necessarily for everyone. Some are not able to utilize media to build transnational networks because of lack of financial resources, media literacy, language skills or cultural capital. In general, ICTs offer migrants new possibilities of action (Madianou and Miller 2012), in this case, for

intensifying transnational networks and engaging in everyday practices with people and media from the country of origin. However, this banalization of transnational networks occurs at different intensity and pace among different migrants. Furthermore, migrants from Turkey, and indeed many migrants the world over, are people on the move in a complex, globalizing and shrinking world. Through mediated networks, Turkish migrants in Europe retain a connectedness with Turkey at a time when Turkey itself also becomes increasingly connected to other parts of the world through this bridge that is strengthened and expanded by digital media technologies.

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»Homeland« in »Dreamland«? Space and Identity in *Göçmen Konutlari*

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Space and Identity: An Attempt to Frame the Theory

In the globalized world of today, national boundaries are getting blurred for some and impassable for others, increasing debates over transnationality and migration. We are now experiencing the fluidity of boundaries, together with the meanings and identities attached to them. Keeping up with changing understandings in academia which now theorizes identity not as a single and holistic term, but as a multi-dimensional and processual concept, not as being but as becoming (Frith 1996: 109), is necessary in contemporary research. I prefer to use identity in the sense which recent studies adapt »belongings« for, following the challenging idea telling that »identity« should leave its place to a new and better defined concept since it is already overwhelmed with the heavy burden of connotations like core of selfhood, sameness, process and so on (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The wine analogy illuminates this notion: identity can be taken for granted not as »blood« but as »wine«, and a strict attachment to certain identities might result in »drunkenness« and even in »blindness« (Özmen 2009: 196). Thus, both for migrants and the migration researchers, fluidity, not rigidity, is key. It is not possible to talk about stable identities in the context of migration, given that the places migrants are »being« in and »longing« for (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002: vii) are fluid themselves.

When referring to places, we should keep in mind the relationship between space and place. We are not only talking about a geographical context with given borders that are never subject to change, but instead we should think about the subjects, institutions, networks and discourses of those places and take as a whole the social, cultural, economic and political relationships of the spaces (Kaya 2012: 77). This understanding of space is borrowed from Henri Lefebvre's social space, which he contends is socially constructed, and every society constructs its particular social space. Contrary to natural space which particularizes, social space as-

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sembles everything including living beings, things, signs and symbols (Lefebvre 2007: 53, 101). Thus, not only the geographical places, but also the elements of everyday life play a role in the construction of social spaces. Considering the effect of changing places in the construction of social spaces and on the identity processes of migrants, it would not be difficult to agree with the idea that »questions of space and place are, in this deterritorialized age, more central to anthropological presentation than ever« (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 47). In light of the existing theories, this paper aims to better understand the context of migration from Bulgaria to Turkey, focusing on a certain place, *Göçmen Konutları,* in an effort to find correspondences between space and identity.

Before and After »The Big Excursion«: An Historical Account

Bulgarian-Turkish encounters can be traced back to the 6th century and to the Northern Caucasus, to the time of tribes before the rule of Khan Kubrat. He is regarded as the founding father of the Bulgarian Khanate, having ascended to the throne in 632, and uniting Bulgarian tribes before the settlement in the Balkans (Dimitrov 2002: 29–51). Following the settlement between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains in the 7th century,[1] and several wars with the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgarians fell under the rule of the Ottomans in the 14th century (Lutem 2000: 15–16) – referred to by some as »the Ottoman yoke« . During the Ottoman rule, the path of the Turkish people was from Anatolia to Bulgaria, a result of the Ottomans' settlement policy which sought to deeply imprint Ottoman culture and presence in the Balkans. The Turkish language was more prestigious than the Bulgarian language by then, and the Bulgarians were willing to adapt to Ottoman culture (Eminov 1999: 44–45). But after the establishment of the Bulgarian nation-state in 1858, the route for the Turkish changed to the opposite direction and with greater frequency due to the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–78 and the Balkan Wars in 1912–13 (Parla 2006: 545).

Three main migration waves were observed from Bulgaria to Turkey after the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the so called »big excursion«[2] in 1989.

1 Bulgarian historians regarded them as Proto-Bulgarians as they were yet a combination of various tribes during the rule of Khan Asparukh (681) before the formation of the Bulgarian nation. Lutem sees the difference between Proto-Bulgarians and Bulgarians as a mere transition from their Turkic origins into Slavic ethnicity, and thus rejects this terminology (Lutem 2000: 15).

2 Media from time to time referred to the mass exodus of Turkish people from Bulgaria in 1989 ironically as »the big excursion« since about half of the migrants turned back to Bulgaria after a short while within the same year (Fatková 2012: 317).

In 1925, an agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria was signed allowing voluntary resettlement, and about 220,000 Turks immigrated via this agreement until 1949. Between 1950 and 1952, about 155,000 people of Turkish origin escaped the communist regime in Bulgaria. And in 1968, another agreement allowed for family reunions, allowing about 115,000 Turks to cross the border and reach their families in Turkey until 1979 (Doğanay 1997).[3] Then the assimilation policy of the Zhivkov regime reached its climax under the »revival process«,[4] leading to the prohibition of the Turkish language in public, the forced changing of Turkish names into Slavic ones, and the denial of Turkish existence within the Bulgarian nation, which resulted in the escape of about 360,000 Turks to the border in only a few months in 1989 (Vasileva 1992: 346–47).

The borders were open for the ethnic kins *(soydaş)* for a short while, and not all of the newcomers were welcome. Thus, about 150,000 immigrants returned to Bulgaria immediately after the fall of the communist regime. The remaining immigrants had alternatives: some of them settled with the relatives who had immigrated beforehand, while others waited for the construction of permanent immigrant towns in the outskirts of cities like Ankara, Bursa and Istanbul. These immigrant towns were built by the state upon the objectives of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Kümbetoğlu 1997: 231).

The migration from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1989 cannot be categorized as forced migration since some Turks in Bulgaria already had a »dream to migrate and live in Turkey« (Kümbetoğlu 1999: 239)[5], and the free market economy in Turkey in the 1980s was better than that in communist Bulgaria, further making it a desirable destination. Thus, the migration was in fact forced towards the »dreamland«

3 Zeynep Zafer mentions 5 periods of assimilation and 6 migration waves from Bulgaria to Anatolia, the first one of which corresponds to the time of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), that is before the foundation of the republic (Zafer 2012: 200) and the second and third ones are after the agreement in 1925 up till 1940, which I preferred to take as a single wave as taken by Doğanay. After the end of the 2nd Balkan War, Istanbul Treaty was signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in 1913 for reestablishing the diplomatic relations between the two countries (Boyar 2010: 57–58), which might have created the atmosphere for that first wave of migration in the 20th century.

4 »Revival process« *(Възродителен процес – Vazroditelen protses)* was the official name of the assimilation policies of the Bulgarian state during the Zhivkov regime in the mid 1980s and Mary Neuburger refers to translate this name into English as the »rebirth process« (Neuburger 1997: 6).

5 The status of the 89 migration of Turks from Bulgaria is debated. Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu gives an account of the terminology used for those immigrants and concludes that the terms *göçmen* and *muhacir* imply a forced migration (Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 31–36). Ayhan Kaya, on the other hand, looks at the transition from the Zhivkov regime to the European Union, and talks about transnational migration concerning the recent conditions of 89 immigrants (Kaya 2012: 81–91).

where the ethnic and religious kins lived (Vasileva 1992: 348). Furthermore, the *Göçmen Konutları* areas were the dream sites for some of the immigrants, since they were to provide immigrants with the opportunity to reunite with the neighbors from their villages back in Bulgaria. Hence, about 20 years after the settlement in those areas, it is possible to find a majority of immigrant residents in *Göçmen Konutları*. However, this is not due to the dream to come together only; the sites are not very appealing for permanent residents concerning spatial factors and the establishment of *Göçmen Konutları* areas as new districts in the outskirts resulted inevitably in ghettoization (Kümbetoğlu 1997: 257–58). In the case of *Göçmen Konutları* in İkitelli-Istanbul, where the research has been conducted, there is also the issue of confrontations with religious kins in the satellite town named *Başakşehir,* which grew immensely in the last decade and became a separate municipality.

The Rise of *Başakşehir*

The İzmit earthquake in 1999 remains vivid in the memories of the relatives of the 17,000 people, who passed away under the ruined buildings in the Marmara region. Not so sad for those who lived in İkitelli, it turned out that the firm ground of the area made the houses more resistant to damage caused by the earthquake, and the site became popular as a new residential area in Istanbul for more prosperous citizens. The popularity of the site was also heightened in response to the social settlement project initiated in early 1990s, with an aim of providing residence for the employees in the new industry area in İkitelli, but which then as a project moved into the hands of political Islam by the rise of Welfare Party (Çavdar 2011: 3–4), which was the Islamic conservative ruling party until the postmodern coup d'état[6] on February 28, 1997 and which was replaced by Justice and Development Party, ruling Turkey for 10 years in 2012, and became a symbol of the interaction between Islamism and consumerism.

This interaction can be considered within the project of »multiple modernities«, in that there is no single modernity of the West, but rather alternatives emerging on the edges in terms of both distance and difference, the Islamic modernity of the Turkish context so to speak (Göle 2000: 93). The Islamist movement became influential in the 1980s in Turkey, leading towards the questioning of civ-

6 Welfare Party didn't fall due to an actual coup but the military memorandum in 1997 resulted in violation of religious freedoms and the fall of the religious ruling party, which resembled the results of previous coups. The 28 February process, in local and global media, was largely referred to as a postmodern coup.

ilization, advancement, and modernization on the basis of religion. Criticizing modernity on the one hand, yet adopting the benefits it offers on the other, the Islamist movement offered an alternative to cultural modernization and the »Western« lifestyle (Avcı 2009: 215). Trying to become an alternative to Western modernity, the Islamist movement is radical in the sense that it aims at changing the course of history and challenging existing traditions by those of the golden age of Islam. This paradoxical relationship with history and traditions results in an Islamic modernity which doesn't reject the Western modernity, but rather critically and creatively reappropriates its values (Göle 2000: 93, 96, 97). *Başakşehir* is one of the rising symbols of this Islamic modernization high up in the sky. With a residence area of 10-storey-buildings, ornamented with mosques and Islamic markets, *Başakşehir* as one of the most expensive and desirable residential areas in Istanbul became the preferred site of high class society of Islamic modernity. The name of the site, which means city of ears, also has connotations referring to the emblem of the Welfare Party with ears of grain. Thus, the relationship between politics and Islam are even manifest in the name of *Başakşehir* itself.

Following the four stages *(etap)* of *Başakşehir* residential development project, different sites like Onurkent and Fuzulkent were built around *Göçmen Konutları,* putting the houses of the immigrants in an architecturally inferior position with fewer stories and with lower quality of construction. The existence of satellite towns reflective of Islamic modernity around *Göçmen Konutları* in the *Başakşehir* municipality, and the facilities provided in those satellite towns that are not available in *Göçmen Konutları,* play role on the identification processes of immigrants and contribute to the feeling of being segregated.

Where Is Homeland? Managing Exclusion

As German-Turkish youth can be seen as sitting on a third chair between Turkishness and Germanness (Kaya 2002: 44, 59), the Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria might as well identify themselves with the same feeling, concerning the understandings of »homeland«, and the processes of othering. The first reason why the immigrants were welcome by the republican Turkish government was their being an ethnic kin *(soydaş).* When the »revival process« is taken into account, it can be seen that the Turkish people in Bulgaria were forced to assimilate since they were »the other« in ethnic terms. However, when they immigrated to Turkey, they once again became the victims of othering – but this time by their ethnic kin, as a reaction to their »Bulgarian« lifestyle (Kümbetoğlu 1997: 235). Religious othering also occurred. Bulgarian Turk *(Bulgar Türkü)* as a concept was used publicly for the immigrants after 1989, with connotations of ethnic othering, and the »Bulgar-

ian Turks« were blamed for »not knowing religion at all«, implying religious othering in addition (Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 63). Being members of the Muslim minority among Orthodox Christian Bulgarians, Turkish immigrants would be enjoying the »dreamland« where they could practice their religion freely together with the religious kin. However, by the rise of political Islam, and the appearance of an Islamic satellite town next to *Göçmen Konutları,* the immigrants were to face being the »not-religious-enough-others« among the religious kin.

The ethnic and religious othering faced by Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria is accompanied by spatial othering. My ongoing research among the immigrants living in the *Göçmen Konutları* in *Başakşehir,* which started in May 2012, focuses on the production of identities through space. Together with ethnographic methods like oral history and in-depth interviews, I have been collecting data through ethno-photography throughout this research, and the material for this paper was mainly drawn from photos. Spatial othering, coupled with religious and ethnic othering, leads the immigrants towards different adaptation strategies, making the *Göçmen Konutları* area the revival of »homeland« in »dreamland«.

As mentioned above, *Göçmen Konutları* has been suffering from ghettoization due to the rise of *Başakşehir* stages and other satellite towns around it. For instance, there are bus and minibus services to *Başakşehir's* stages (photo 1), which also have stops in neighboring sites, except for *Göçmen Konutları,* meaning that immigrants cannot benefit from public transport as easily as their neighbors. There is also a large subway station being built in *Başakşehir,* but it only has an emergency exit in *Göçmen Konutları,* further underlining its lesser status. In addition, *Başakşehir* has large motorways for transport, while *Göçmen Konutları* has small roads, and there are large signs with directions to *Başakşehir,* while there are small arrows for *Göçmen Konutları* (photo 2), which means it is also difficult for nonresidents to visit *Göçmen Konutları* by their own cars if they don't know the area well.

Spatial segregation is also apparent in shopping facilities. *Başakşehir* besides large supermarkets has a shopping mall among buildings (photo 3), while, in contrast, *Göçmen Konutları* has small markets (photo 4). It is significant that alcoholic drinks can be found in these small markets, while they are not available in the conservative Islamic context of the supermarkets and the shopping mall of *Başakşehir.*[7] Moreover, the care of the site provided by the administration makes the buildings in *Başakşehir* far better maintained (photo 5), with professional gardening (photo 6), while *Göçmen Konutları* cannot enjoy such care, and the resi-

7 Alcoholic drinks are also available in *Başakşehir,* but only in few places, one of which is a buffet closer to the industry area than the first stage of the site and another managed to sell alcoholic drinks only after struggling for it (Çavdar 2010: 3).

Photo 1 Motorways of *Başakşehir,* high billboard showing the route of the forthcoming subway next to the station on the left and a municipal bus driving towards the 1st stage on the right.

Photo 2 Huge direction signs for the stages of *Başakşehir* on the left and tiny arrow for *Göçmen Konutları* on the right.

Photo 3 Shopping mall in *Başakşehir,* next to apartments.

Photo 4 A small market sponsored by Tuborg, selling alcoholic drinks in *Göçmen Konutları*.

Photo 5 Well cared 10-storey buildings of *Başakşehir,* with exterior thermal sheathing and regular repainting.

dents must care for their environment themselves; there are several apartments with half painted and half ruined walls, and there are some others where only one story is insulated with foam coating (photo 7). Being on their own makes the immigrants develop strategies for modifying their environment. They do not have much space for enjoying the weather in their site but they can take chairs out and sit in the gardens of their apartments, for instance (photo 8). Also, their agricultural origin back in their villages helps them deal with their gardens differently, that is they can enjoy the fruits and vegetables of their small gardens which don't have professional gardeners (photo 9).

In addition to the aforementioned adaptation strategies, immigrants prefer to build transnational ties between Turkey and Bulgaria in an effort to adapt the Turkish republican way of life. Being stuck between the dilemmas of the »homeland« and »dreamland«, they travel back and forth between the countries with their two passports due to their dual citizenship and have their memories refreshed frequently, and that is why they should be called as transmigrants instead of immigrants now (Kaya 2012: 91). There are cars parked in *Göçmen Konutları* with Bulgarian plates (photo 10), and there is a border crossing bus service which takes immigrants directly from their residential area, instead of using the main

Photo 6 View of a garden in *Başakşehir,* under the care of professional gardeners.

Photo 7 A 5-storey building in *Göçmen Konutları;* half repainted, half neglected.

Photo 8 Handmade garden design in *Göçmen Konutları*.

Photo 9 Handmade agriculture gardens by the immigrant residents in *Göçmen Konutları*.

coach station in Esenler. Furthermore, goods from Bulgaria are brought to Turkey via this transnational mobility so that the ones who settled permanently in Turkey can still enjoy the taste of Bulgaria. However, this transfer is usually illegal. Thus, the man who sells Bulgarian goods at the open air market on Sundays became afraid of me when he saw my camera (photo 11). »Shoot me even with a gun, but not by a camera,« he said, and began sharing stories of his interactions with the police. He was afraid that I would share his photos on social media just like the teenagers living around once did, the police would identify him through these photos and come again for punishing him with fines difficult to pay and seizing his goods.

Since people were suddenly expelled from their homes back in Bulgaria, they still fear for the future. The rising satellite towns around the neighborhood and the rising value of *Başakşehir* because of its firm ground, together with the ongoing gentrification projects all around the country, make the immigrants feel insecure in their housing situation in that they have possibility to lose their site as suddenly as they lost their homes before.[8] The conspiracy theory is that their certificates of ownership will become de-authorized, and they will be expelled from their site in the name of »gentrification«-so that more impressive buildings can rise for the »indigenous« rich in the area they are now residing. Also, the compulsory structural reinforcement of the buildings of the school and health center is interpreted as the expulsion of those social facilities from their site. The residents I talked to thought the school would turn into a religious secondary school *(imam hatip ortaokulu),* in line with the new educational regulations, to teach their children »proper Islam«, and the health center would turn into the quarters for new religious teachers coming to their school. They believed that the government was taking advantage of the maintenance of the two buildings for depriving their neighborhood of secular education and cheap and accessible health service. Concerning the handmade gardens of the site, one elderly woman who used to water the garden was sorry for not being able to do this anymore, »We were able to water our gardens with the municipal water supply for free, but suddenly they made us pay for it«, she said. »How are we going to do this? Don't they see what we earn is barely enough for us and not at all for our plants?« She thought this was another step taken towards expelling them from their neighborhood: first taking the water, then taking the right to reside there, and lastly the houses themselves. She sighed

8 Ayşe Çavdar mentions districts like *Şahintepe* and *Altınşehir,* which are located in *Başakşehir* municipality but which haven't yet been part of satellite town projects, where people from lower classes reside, and talks about the possible gentrification of those districts (Çavdar, 2010: 2). The Islamic modernity of the recent municipality, and the state support for this particular modernity, generates ill-ease not only amongst the residents of *Göçmen Konutları,* but also the poor residents of the neighboring districts.

Photo 10 Cars parked on a road in *Göçmen Konutları,* the anterior with a Bulgarian plate and the posterior with a Turkish plate.

Photo 11 Products with names written in Cyrillic alphabet, brought illegally from Bulgaria to Turkey, sold in *Göçmen Pazarı* (immigrant market) on Sundays

for her olive trees, which need great amounts of water during the summer and which will not be fruitful anymore due to lack of water.

Another strategy for adapting to Turkish life can be seen as a reverse othering; that is, self-segregating from their neighbors along religious and lifestyle factors. The reaction towards the idea of having a religious secondary school within the district resulted from the religious othering mentioned above. Paradoxical to that religious othering of immigrants by their »indigenous« kin, the immigrants I communicated with regarded their neighbors living in *Başakşehir* as less religious than them. An example regarding dress codes: there are women who wear headscarves in both districts, but the dressing styles and age range of women with headscarves differ. An immigrant woman, for example, can recognize who is from *Göçmen Konutları* and who is from *Başakşehir* by just looking at their headscarves. An »open«[9] immigrant looked at the teenagers from *Başakşehir* shopping in the open air market with disappointment because they were wearing bright and colorful headscarves. She turned to me and whispered, »Is this faith in God or faith in fashion? Thank God I don't show off with my religion in that way.«[10]

Being subjected to segregation for so long, the immigrants feel that living in *Göçmen Konutları* is a privilege since they can now be self-segregated from the »indigenous« people in their site, just like once they were together with kins and away from the Bulgarian in their villages. They believe the »indigenous« renters in their apartments, with whom they have to share their »secure« area, are bad neighbors, and they treat the houses terribly since they don't respect the places they live in, like immigrants do. As in the Austrian case where activist immigrants deconstruct the dominant discourse of integration and deny fixed categories (Strasser 2008: 191), the immigrants in the *Göçmen Konutları* in *Başakşehir* reject »going native« by attaching themselves to the values of their »previous homeland«. They do not adopt the dress code of Islamic modernity, but they keep wearing their traditional clothes – and that is why it is easy for an immigrant woman to recognize women of *Başakşehir* based on their headscarves.[11] Although where

9 The women preferred to call their fellows who wear headscarves as *kapalı* (veiled-closed) and those who don't wear headscarves as *açık* (open). They sometimes used this terminology with the connotation that a woman whose head is open is open-minded because her brain is not veiled with the conservative curtain.

10 The religious faith of residents in *Başakşehir* is actually a frequently debated issue. Tayfun Atay discusses Islamic capitalism by giving examples from 5-crescent-hotels, »veiled« fashion shows, and houses rented by married men of Islamist background for their mistresses in *Başakşehir.* He concludes that although the expectation from Islamists was a pious lifestyle, Islamic bourgeoisie turned out to be consumers of the capitalist tastes (Atay 2010).

11 This difference in dress codes can lead to an accepted sharing of public spaces as in the case of *Başakşehir* State Hospital, where people from all districts of the municipality meet. The

the »homeland« is remains a question the answer of which differs from person to person (Parla 2006), it can be said in the *Göçmen Konutları* context that the immigrants were once different from the majority in their »homeland«, and now they are different from the majority living around them in their »dreamland«; nevertheless, they are happy being different.

Will They Ever Go Native? Soon

The spatial belongings of the Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria in their residence area tell much about how they construct and reproduce their transnational identity between Turkey and Bulgaria, how they manage to survive among their ethnic and religious kin who turned out to be not so kin to their lifestyle and how they themselves contribute to the segregation in both spatial and cultural terms. Having experienced the ethnic, religious and spatial othering, the immigrants now adapt strategies of modifying the space they reside in to resemble that of their homes back in Bulgaria, building transnational ties between the two countries to keep memories alive and segregating themselves from the »indigenous« people of *Başakşehir,* through a process of reverse othering, similar to the segregation they encountered from their Bulgarian neighbors before the »big excursion«. However, it should be kept in mind that the images I explain from the field are just snapshots from a larger picture. The identities of the immigrants should not be crystallized with the word »different« only, there are many dynamics which play a role in the identification processes of the residents of *Göçmen Konutları* in *Başakşehir* and their neighbors, and people might have more to tell than photos do, thus the final findings of my research would challenge my arguments in this paper. But taking identity as a processual flow already necessitates adopting such a perspective which is open to challenges and contestation, and the possibility of coming across immigrants sharing their environment, ideas and values with the »indigenous« residents of *Başakşehir* in addition to the ethnic and religious origin should be exciting even if it means the necessity of changing the whole framework of understanding the spatial relations of immigrants. The image of the immigrants in *Göçmen Konutları* I'm now looking at shows people who were once forced to assimilate by Bulgarians and who now feel the threat of assimilation by Islamic modernist Turks, who turned their not-dreamt-of-environment into »homeland«

hospital has several sitting sets in the large waiting room and people from *Göçmen Konutları* share the central sets with people from slums, while people from *Başakşehir* prefer to sit on the sets in the corners (Çavdar 2011: 7).

in their »dreamland«, which turned out to be not so strictly »the homeland«, and who are happy being different with their memories from the past, experiences of the present and fears of the future.

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›Inclusion‹ and ›Exclusion‹: Transnational Experiences of Turkish and Kurdish Youth in London

Doğuş Şimşek

Living across the borders of two settlements has constructed different ways of defining ›home‹, and little has been written on the thoughts of second generation migrants about the country of origin, the city of settlement, and local neighbourhing. In this paper, I aim to explore in which ways their relationship with the places they interact with redefines their sense of self and belongingness to the country of origin and the country of settlement. By doing this, I focus on the youngsters' relationship with London, the city they live in, North London where they locally dwell, and the country of origin where they visit at least once in every year.

Much research on second generation transnationalism has focused on visits to the country of origin, and transnational networks (Eckstein 2002; Golbert 2001; Haller and Landolt 2005; Levitt and Waters 2002; Morawska 2003; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Q'Flaherty et al. 2007; Vickerman 2002; Zhou 1997). This article distinctively looks at Kurdish and Turkish youths' relation with the receiving society, as well as the sending society.

Recent research (Çağlar 2001; Ehrkamp 2005; Faist 2000, 2000a; Kibria 2002; Levitt 2002; Wolf 2002) on urban spaces, identity and transnationalism focus on how urban spaces are transnationalised through immigrants' transnational relations when exploring migrant identity in relation to places. However, the interaction with the city of settlement has not yet received much attention. This paper aims to contribute to the current literature and to fill the existing gap in research relating to Turkish and Kurdish young people living in London. It aims to explore the sense of self and belongingness of Turkish and Kurdish youth in relation to three locales – London, North London and Turkey – that they interact with in their everyday lives. The paper first looks at how ethnic enclaves and urban space influence the ways transnational relations are constructed by asking young people about their perceptions of North London, where the majority of Turkish and

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Kurdish migrants are settled. Secondly, it explores their relationship with London and, then, looks at their experiences with visiting the country of origin.

The findings presented here based on an ethnographic case study carried out in North London. I conducted in-depth interviews with 45 Turkish and Kurdish young people, both male and female. The ages of the young people are between 18 and 23. Most were born in London or came to London at an early age, and they were educated in London. Most of them are bilingual and live with their parents. I chose the age group 18 to 23 under the assumption that young people of this age are in the process of becoming adults. They will be more aware of what is going on around them in comparison to previous generations in terms of interaction with the other community members. Their ability in using the English language also assists them in engaging with different cultural components (Epstein 1998).

Experiencing North London

Cosmopolitan cities like London, New York, and Berlin offer a diversity of cultures, containing localized spaces whilst being at the same time global (Cattacin 2006; Dahinden 2009; Parkin 1999; Smith 2001). These cities are localized because they receive a large number of migrants from all over the world, and migrant communities construct their urban spaces in specific locations they have settled in. As a result of this diversity, transnationally connected and socio-economically differentiated local places can be found in global cities (Dahinden 2009). According to Parkin (1999), the significant migrant populations in the big cities of Europe is an important characteristic feature of these cities, as these migrant communities have their own political agendas which are not necessarily compatible with British, German or French identities. Economic reasons, job opportunities, and other facilities influence migrants' choices about which city to live in. Turkish and Kurdish migrants constructed an urban space in North London where they created local and transnational connections to the country of origin through shops, media, satellite dishes, travel agencies, solicitors, restaurants, bars and coffee houses. They have also created particular neighbourhoods in Kreuzberg in Berlin (Küçükcan 1999, Kaya, 2001). They live in the urban space within the multicultural city where they maintain multiple ties to their country of origin through social networks, consumption practices, and transnational media. In this way, migrants create new transnational social and cultural spaces for themselves.

The majority of Turkish and Kurdish migrants live in North London, Green Lanes which starts in Newington Green and extends to Winchmore Hill in the north part of London. Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that ›newcomers seek to construct a place that they can again call home, and follow their own prefer-

ences.‹ Migrants transform the urban districts by doing, what some outsiders see as, ›ghettoizing‹ those areas (Çağlar 2001). I, rather, focus on the experiences of Turkish and Kurdish youth about living in the ethnic enclaves.

Most participants live in North London, having been born there or at least residing there from a young ago. Thus, their social lives are embedded in this specific urban district. Friendships were built with the people living in the same area, they have gone to school in the same area, and they are familiar with all the shops and institutions established in this specific urban district. Some see living in North London as being a marker of lower status and feel ostracized. According to one respondent, Belgin, the local area she lives in labels her in the eyes of others:

> I have grown up in North East London, Hackney and it really affected my accent. People pick up from my accent that I have grown up in a specific place. I do think that where you live affects your identity.
> (Belgin, 20 years old, Kurdish, interviewee's house)

Belgin's North East London accent, and its lower social connotation, affects her daily life. Because her socio-economic and cultural origin is instantly recognizable by others as soon as she speaks, she feels that it affects her whole identity. There is a risk of exclusion from people outside her local context. In this sense, her belonging to a community has signified her class. Castles already pointed out that ›residential segregation in Britain was presented as the choice of migrants, but the development of minority neighbourhoods then appeared as the result of ›natural processes‹ of racial differentiation‹ (2000: 198–199). Tülay has a similar perspective on this. She feels that this influence on identity is not only related to migratory background, it also touches class issues:

> I say I am from Enfield and my accent is obviously a North London accent. People can realize it is different from other regions of London. It does help to form my identity, and it reveals not only my cultural background, as everyone knows that North London is where Turkish people live, but also my working class background; it is just the way I speak.
> (Tülay, 20 years old, Kurdish, café in North London)

This feeling of ›otherness‹ occurs independently of the cultural and social background of the interviewer. It seems, therefore, motivated by the local environment. Both Belgin and Tülay construct their sense of belonging to North London by experiencing inclusion as a member of the community, but at the same time they feel exclusion from the rest of society as a result of their accent, as well as socio-eco-

nomic and cultural background. The identification processes in relation to their ›ethnic place‹ is therefore related to both inclusion and exclusion depending on which region of London they are in.

The process of exclusion from the rest of the society as a result of living in the ethnic place is also highlighted by Ekim who lives in South London. He claims that living in North London makes it difficult to adapt to the receiving society compared to other places in London:

> I grew up in Lewisham but I know North London. I grew up among English, Indian and black people. Where I live there were not many Kurdish and Turkish people, which is why I had to adapt. If I were to live in North London, which is sort of a ghetto, I would not have been able to adapt. I would not have had such a diverse group of friends.
> (Ekim, 21 years old, Turkish, Gikder)

Ekim feels that living in an environment where there are various cultures and a diverse group of people make the adaptation process necessary. He compared two different urban districts – South and North London – in relation to diversity within the population, claiming that living outside of the urban space where the majority of Turkish and Kurdish community lives aids smooth interaction with the rest of the society. Alternatively, living in North London could also help Turkish and Kurdish youth in negotiating identity positioning by transforming the ›collective belonging‹ discourse of local neighbourhoods.

In the case of some young people who feel stuck in North London, interaction with other cultures is reduced. The predominantly Turkish-Kurdish ethnic composition of the neighbourhoods creates a space where they practice the culture of the country of origin as interpreted by family, relatives and friends, therefore limiting their involvement in British culture. Ersin stated the reasons for not socialising with British people:

> I do not feel any affiliation with British culture. I never had any English friends. I tried my best, but it is quite difficult in North London, because there is not an English population.
> (Ersin, 18 years old, Kurdish, café in Dalston)

Ersin practices the culture of the country of origin at home and in her community. The social environment in which Ersin interacts has limited interface with British culture. As mentioned by the respondents above, living in North London reduces the interaction with the rest of society. This challenges the arguments of Liempt (2011) and Zhou (2004). According to Liempt, the strength of the community can

actually facilitate integration into the country of settlement, especially into the local market. Zhou also argues that local neighbourhoods facilitate opportunities for migrants and their children. However, the experiences of young people living in North London do not necessarily promote social inclusion among Turkish and Kurdish youth.

However, living in North London also has positive influences on identity formation of Turkish and Kurdish youth. Dilek claims that living in a specific urban district where the majority of the Turkish and Kurdish community has settled has a crucial influence on her identity formation:

> Hackney has made me who I am today. But it is not that important. I am closer to my community living in Hackney, possibly because of that I am more engaged with my community. It changed me completely as a person. I still have my beliefs, but it makes me closer to the community. It has got its advantages and disadvantages. You cannot walk with your boyfriends; there is always a chance that you will meet your dad's or mother's friend on the street. You are in their face all the time. Everyone knows your business, you cannot hide anything. The benefit is that you are part of the community, its weddings and parties, and it is not hard to meet people.
> (Dilek, 23 years old, Kurdish, café in Dalston)

Her experiences of living in North London underline the importance of being a part of the community in terms of social networking. She is, at the same time, aware of the negative aspects of living in North London. She has adapted living in North London as a crucial element in defining herself within and with relationship to the Turkish and Kurdish communities in North London. She transforms traditional discourses of the ethnic enclave into her everyday life and negotiates them on her own terms. As Çağlar (2001) states, German Turkish youth accept the ghetto metaphor to define their relationships to places, and this leads to negotiation because they do not adopt the precepts of the dominant discourse. Ehrkamp (2005: 349), similarly, states that ›migrants engage in creating places and transform the urban landscape of contemporary cities‹. Urban settings represent new forms of identity and cultural references in the case of young German Turks (Pecoud 2004).

As illustrated by the interviews, Turkish and Kurdish communities in North London have created a homogenous urban space where they practice their culture, lifestyle, and habits, as seen in other European cities among Turkish migrants settlement as well (Çağlar 2001, 2007; Küçükcan 1999; Wagner 2002). While some respondents enjoy living in North London, others mention the negative aspects of it. For some, this specific urban space plays a crucial role in their everyday life because it is a constitutive part of their habitus which includes their social lives

and friendships, thus imparting a feeling belonging (Ehrkamp 2005). Knowing the people in the area also helps social networking (Zhou 2004). Others underline the negative aspects of living in an ethnic enclave, such as feeling ›other‹ to the rest of the society (Castles 2000). Young people take into account social networking, safety and shared habits as positive aspects of living in an ethnic enclave, but they also think that it reduces their interaction with the rest of the society. Therefore, their identification with the urban space reflects both the processes of inclusion and exclusion.

The Image of ›London‹

The majority of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the UK are settled in London, where educational and job opportunities are more easily attainable (Liempt 2011; Wiles 2008). London has a cosmopolitan character that attracts all sorts of migrants, and migrant culture and influence is a valuable asset for a cosmopolitan city (Aksoy 2006; Glick Schiller et al. 2011). How migrants experience the city varies depending on their everyday life patterns. In order to understand how young people can transform the urban district of the city, and how their interaction with London influences the identity formation of young people, respondents were asked about their experiences of living in London. Most said that the cosmopolitan character of London offers them a rich perspective in understanding other cultures surrounding them. Alev stated that living in London offers a lot:

> Living in London is in fact very attractive, because when I go to Istanbul, I look around and everybody is the same. I love it, but it is not what London can offer. London is multicultural. You meet with different cultures all the time. In the place where we live, there are Asians, Chinese. In Turkey, the upper class encounters different cultures. I like living in London. When I was younger I did not realise what London has to offer, I was happy in Istanbul, but now I appreciate London better.
> (Alev, 22 years old, Kurdish, London School of Economics)

When Alev realised what London offers in terms of diversity of cultures, she started questioning her relationships with Istanbul where she was born and where she travels to every year. London's cosmopolitan character is attractive for Alev who compares it to how big cities are structured in Turkey. Alev clearly negotiates her relationships with Istanbul and London through her experiences and brings elements of both sending and receiving societies.

Serpil also claimed that London is a unique city in terms of the diversity of people and cultures:

> London is a place where there are a whole lot of different cultures. People would never guess that they survived, but they exist in London. You can encounter people from many different cultures and you know that you are not the only one in the world. In a way, living in London is the best. You know how to get along with different people.
> (Serpil, 18 years old, Kurdish, café in Dalston)

Serpil feels that she is a part of the diversity which London offers. The cosmopolitan character of London helps her to be socially included and not discriminated from the rest of the population. She is comfortable with the city because in London everyone is from somewhere else. Living in London offers ›a globally understood and cosmopolitan identity‹ (Lam and Smith, 2009: 1264). Kasinitz et al. (2008) have observed that second generation migrants living in New York appreciate the cosmopolitan nature of the city as well.

While some respondents enjoy the diversity of London, others have a very different experience. For İlkan, diversity does not always have a positive influence on identity formation. He states that learning about other cultures makes one reflective:

> First of all, it affects me positively in that we get to learn about other cultures and identities. We get to understand ourselves more, that is the culture where we belong. There is also a downside, because when there are so many different backgrounds it is likely that there will be clashes. We have different interests, objects, food, different ways of acting and dressing. For example, Arabic people talk from the back of their throat. They sound alien, strange and different. We push it away, it makes us feel insecure, we don't understand, we can't get used to it … Some people say that Pakistani food stinks. Well, to you it stinks because your food is different. If you were from that culture, that ethnicity, it would not stink.
> (İlkan, 23 years old, Turkish, café in Dalston)

This quotation shows that, on the one hand, İlkan appreciates and enjoys the benefits of diversity in London. On the other hand, he claims that living with other cultures, and the relative liberalism in London which allows people to practice their culture, creates problems. He feels safe and comfortable in ethnic enclaves because this is where he interacts with other people from the same ethnic background. He has had a much more ethnic enclave oriented experience of the city, and is therefore more comfortable in his own ethnic enclave. In the case of Turkish migrants living in Marxloh, Ehrkamp (2005) stresses the Turkish character of the environment because it provides migrants a feeling of comfort and safety.

Some young people stated that once their environment has changed, and when they have more social interaction with other cultures, their sense of self also

changes. Alev said that she has learnt Turkish and Kurdish traditions and culture from her family, but started socialising with people from different cultures at university:

> When I was at secondary school, I had a lot of Turkish and Kurdish friends. The cultural activities like Newrooz or Bayram were more important, everybody were celebrating it with their family. You get it from school and from home. I was more exposed to it. I was not really involved community organisations, like youth club, but I was involved with activities. The way I behave is very different and it is not in terms of age, not because I was younger. It is just I cannot remember but I had more Turkish and Kurdish friends, now I have got more English, British friends, because, my environment change. My secondary school was in an area where there was ethnic minorities mainly.
> (Alev, 22 years old, Kurdish, London School of Economics)

In the case of Alev, the socialisation process, different life experiences related to changes in her social environment, and increased interaction with people from different ethnic backgrounds including British people, opens a space for Alev to engage with different identities. This leads her to start questioning why she held onto Turkish culture, and was socially endogamous, when she was in secondary school.

Alev compares herself to her friends in terms of experiencing different aspects of the city. She said that her path diverged from her Turkish friends who preferred to stay among themselves:

> I compare myself with a friend who stayed in the same environment and do not have much of an experience with British culture. It was quite strange that my friend did not know Tate Modern; she lives in London but does not know what it has to offer. She seems more concerned about her family; she wants to get married and is just 19. We did not have much to talk about. We do not have similar interests. She wants to spend more time with her family, get married and have kids. She was my best friend at primary and secondary school. She goes to university but there are a lot of Turkish students there. She has the same friends as before, whereas I do not see the same people. Her environment has not changed even at university, because she had same friends, same things. We became quite different. We have grown apart. Environment is really important. This is also about where do you study and who do you study for.
> (Alev, 22 years old, Kurdish, London School of Economics)

Alev has moved to higher education, expanded her social networks, which are now multi-cultural and multi-racial. However, her friend's social environment has not changed: she was still mixing with peers from the same ethnic background. In

the case of Alev, multi-ethnic and multi-racial networks open up a space for her in which she negotiates the issues of identity. Some young people enjoy the diverse character of the city which helps them interact with different people from various backgrounds and feel included in London.

Visits to the Country of Origin

Trips to the country of origin are hugely important for the interviewees, and, needless to say, necessarily shape their relationship with the country of origin. Young people who were raised in the receiving country do not have as close a relationship with Turkey as their parents do. They cannot make claims to their identities based on birth or a personal history of residence in the country of origin (Kibria 2002: 301). In this respect, their relationship with Turkey is limited to the periods they spend in the country of origin. All of the respondents stated that they travel to Turkey once or twice a year with their parents. Their visits are fairly short in duration, and are focused on seeing family and friends, tourism, learning about their heritage, and participating in cultural production, such as learning about traditional food, music, cinema, inter alia.

In order to understand the transnational engagements of Turkish and Kurdish youth and their relation to the country of origin, they were asked questions relating to their visits to the country of origin, the time period they spend there, and their reflections on this time. The majority of the respondents mainly go to rural areas of Turkey where their relatives live. The lifestyle in Istanbul and in rural areas is different. One of the questions relates to their ability to adapt to the country of origin when they visit. Many young interviewees said that they have problems adapting because of inability to express themselves in the mother tongue, feeling that they do not belong to the country of origin, and because of differences in lifestyles and everyday life. Ersin sees difficulties in adapting to a new environment where life is different:

> I definitely find it difficult to adapt when I go back to Turkey. I was like a stranger in Istanbul. It was very difficult. Even going to a shop, you do not know the prices, the currency, all sorts of problems, like how to pay … I do not have any cultural adaptation problems. They are really kind people. I do not have cultural, but system-related problems when I travel to Turkey.
> (Ersin, 18 years old, Kurdish, café in Dalston)

As it is evident, Ersin claims that adapting to lifestyle in Turkey can be problematic. He finds difficulties in practicing specific rules related to everyday life in Tur-

key, such as shopping and transport. His habits and lifestyle are associated with the receiving country. Like Ersin, Alev and Belgin also feel like outsiders in the country of origin because they are not familiar with the lifestyle and social systems in Turkey. They find it difficult to conform to norms having spent most of their lives in another culture. Alev said,

> ›I found a lot of things different in Turkey. For instance if you wear something unusual, they will stare at you in Turkey but not in London‹.
> (Alev, 22 years old, Kurdish, London School of Economics)

The differences in values and lifestyles make adaptation difficult. Belgin also states clearly that she does not feel she belongs:

> I do not really feel at home when I go there; I feel like an outsider anyway. In that sense, it is quite difficult to adapt … It is because everyone knows that you did not grow up there and assumes that you are different. So they treat you differently. You have to act accordingly.
> (Belgin, 20 years old, Kurdish, interviewee's house)

In the case of Alev and Belgin, adaptation also proved to be a challenge as they were regarded as outsiders and treated differently. Christou (2006: 841) observed that ›second generation Greek Americans feel like strangers in their homeland‹. Alev and Belgin similarly feel like outsiders when they visit the country of origin. Regarding this, it is crucial to look at which parts of Turkey young people visit, and what the concomitant lifestyles they experience there are. If they experience adaptation problems in Turkey it is probably because they find it difficult to adapt to the lifestyle of rural areas after experiencing multicultural London.

Besides problems with the environment and the social systems which these young people perceive in the country of origin, there are problems related to language and feelings of marginalization. The inability to speak fluent Turkish is clearly a concern for Belgin:

> I do not feel very comfortable in the Turkish environment, because I do not feel comfortable with my Turkish and do not want to speak it. When I speak English, they do not understand and everyone gets uncomfortable … I am quite lost.
> (Belgin, 20 years old, Kurdish, interviewee's house).

Language is a central issue for Belgin in terms of adapting to the environment. It plays a crucial role for young people in building social ties with people in the

country of origin. Losing their parents' language over time makes it difficult to participate in social networks and they feel uncomfortable in the environment.

In the case of second generation migrants, the country of origin is not the main place they spend most of their time or socialise – they have built their lives in the country of settlement and are familiar with the social life and regulations of the country of settlement (Haller and Landolt 2005; Schans 2009). Many respondents were either born or raised in London from an early age. Consequently, London provides their sense of belonging, as their schools, friends, and parents are based there. Aziz points out the importance of social networks in London:

> I was in Turkey for four months. But I really missed London when I was in Turkey. It is not because I belong to London. It is because my all friendships and my whole life are in London. I know every single place in London. In Turkey, I do not know any places. I had my life here. In Turkey, you are from Europe and they look at you in a different way.
> (Aziz, 18 years old, Kurdish, café in Dalston)

Social networks and habits are important ways that he embeds himself in London. Aziz also feels he is an outsider in Turkey. Comparatively, he does not know the lifestyle or social system in Turkey, and this make him feel different. The difficulty of living in Turkey is connected with the experience of living in London from an early age. The majority of the respondents feel excluded in Turkey.

Conclusions

Second generation migrants position themselves in three different locales: the city in which they live, the country of origin, and the migrant community in London. Their everyday life experiences are constituted by interacting with these locales. Their positions with regards to these locales are in a process of transformation based on a dialectic relationship which is open to interpretation, reflection and comparison. For example, the majority of Turkish and Kurdish youth said that their attitude to London has changed since realising what London has to offer them outside their ethnic enclave. Their thoughts about the city have changed through everyday experiences. In this way, their positioning with these locales is transformative as a result of everyday experiences.

Youths associate themselves more with the city of residence, the specific urban space, than the country of origin. The experiences of Turkish and Kurdish youths with Turkey, London and North London underlines human relations be-

yond national boundaries, as well as the importance of social relations and social networks in their local and international aspects (Cressey, 2006). In the narratives above, the dualism of inclusion-exclusion is reflected in their relationships with these places and constructions of belongingness. The construction of ›otherness‹ through visits to the country of origin, and living in North London which possesses some cultural elements of the country of origin, creates a sense of ›exclusion‹. In contrast, London's ›multicultural‹ character offers a sense of ›inclusion‹ for the interviewees. As a result, they have diverse ways of conceptualizing their sense of self, which is necessarily informed by the places they inhabit and socialize in. Homogenous spaces, therefore, create forms of exclusion in the case of these young people.

A mixture of 45 male-female Turkish and Kurdish young people were interviewed. However, no significant differences were found between these groups, as they did not refer to ethnic identification in relation to the places they socialize in. Apart from ethnic and gendered identities, religious identities and the practice of religion was not mentioned. It is clear that these young people did not take into account certain identifications when they spoke about their everyday life experiences.

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