



*Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia*

# **PARTIES AS GOVERNMENTS IN EURASIA, 1913–1991**

**NATIONALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEVELOPMENT**

Edited by  
Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira



# Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1913–1991

This book examines the political parties which emerged on the territories of the former Ottoman, Qing, Russian, and Habsburg empires and not only took over government power but merged with government itself. It discusses how these parties, disillusioned with previous constitutional and parliamentary reforms, justified their takeovers with programs of controlled or supervised economic and social development, including acting as the mediators between the various social and ethnic groups in the respective territories. It pays special attention to nation-building through the party, to institutions (both constitutional and de facto), and to the global and comparative aspects of one-party regimes. It explores the origins of one-party regimes in China, Czechoslovakia, Korea, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and beyond, the roles of socialism and nationalism in the parties' approaches to development and state-building, as well the pedagogical aspirations of the ruling elites. Hence, by revisiting the dynamics of the transition from the earlier imperial formations via constitutionalism to one-party governments, and by assessing the internal and external dynamics of one-party regimes after their establishment, the book more precisely locates this type of regime within the contemporary world's political landscape. Moreover, it emphasises that one-party regimes thrived on both sides of the Cold War and in some of the non-aligned states, and that although some state socialist one-party regimes collapsed in 1989–1991, in other places historically dominant parties and new parties have continued to monopolize political power.

**Ivan Sablin** is a research group leader in the Department of History at Heidelberg University, Germany.

**Egas Moniz Bandeira** is a researcher at Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany, and an affiliate researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

## **Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia**

### **Revisiting Japan's Restoration**

New Approaches to the Study of the Meiji Transformation

*Edited by Timothy David Amos and Akiko Ishii*

### **Rice and Industrialisation in Asia**

*A. J. H. Latham*

### **China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States**

In the Wake of Nixon's Visit to China

*Ryuji Hattori*

### **Japan in Upheaval**

The Origins, Dynamics and Political Outcome of the 1960 Anti-US Treaty Protests

*Dagfinn Gatu*

### **Cultures of Memory in Asia**

Dynamics and Forms of Memorialization

*Edited by Chieh-Hsiang Wu*

### **Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1913–1991**

Nationalism, Socialism, and Development

*Edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira*

### **Power and Politics at the Colonial Seaside**

Leisure in British Hong Kong

*Shuk-Wah Poon*

### **British Engagement with Japan, 1854–1922**

The Origins and Course of an Unlikely Alliance

*Antony Best*

For a full list of available titles please visit: <https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-the-Modern-History-of-Asia/book-series/MODHISTASIA>

# **Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1913–1991**

**Nationalism, Socialism, and  
Development**

**Edited by Ivan Sablin and  
Egas Moniz Bandeira**

 **Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
LONDON AND NEW YORK





First published 2022  
by Routledge  
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge  
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The Open Access version of this book, available at [www.taylorfrancis.com](http://www.taylorfrancis.com), has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

*Trademark notice:* Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-032-20733-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-20734-6 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-26497-2 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003264972

Typeset in Times New Roman  
by MPS Limited, Dehradun

# Contents

|   |      |
|---|------|
| <i>List of figures</i>  | vii  |
| <i>Author bios</i>  | ix   |
| <i>Acknowledgments</i>  | xiii |
| <br>  |      |
| Introduction: Parties from Vanguardists to Governments<br>IVAN SABLIN AND EGAS MONIZ BANDEIRA   | 1    |
| <br>  |      |
| 1 The birth of Anfu China, East Asia's first party-state:<br>Toward a constitutional dictatorship of the gentry,<br>1916–1918<br>ERNEST MING-TAK LEUNG                        | 26   |
| <br>  |      |
| 2 The Communist International: A party of parties<br>confronting interwar internationalisms, 1920–1925<br>VSEVOLOD KRITSKIY   | 60   |
| <br>  |      |
| 3 The Left Opposition and the practices of parliamentar-<br>ianism within the Bolshevik Party, 1923–1924<br>ALEXANDER V. REZNIK   | 85   |
| <br>  |      |
| 4 Importing and exporting ideas of nationalism and<br>state-building: The experience of Turkey's Republican<br>People's Party, 1923–1950<br>PAUL KUBICEK                      | 107  |
| <br>  |      |
| 5 Competing with the marketplace: The Chinese<br>Nationalist Party (KMT)'s Department of Propaganda<br>and its political publishing program, 1924–1937<br>CHRISTOPHER A. REED | 127  |

|    |  |     |
|----|--|-----|
| vi | <i>Contents</i>  |     |
| 6  | Aspirations for a mass political party in prewar imperial Japan: Conflicting visions of national mobilization<br>BRUCE GROVER AND EGAS MONIZ BANDEIRA      | 151 |
| 7  | Constitution-making in the informal Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Inner Asia, 1945–1955<br>IVAN SABLIN                                   | 178 |
| 8  | Work teams, leading small groups, and the making of modern Chinese bureaucracy, 1929–1966<br>LONG YANG   | 223 |
| 9  | From revolutionary comrades to “mothers of the nation”: The Workers’ Party of Korea’s approach to the role of women in the 1950s–1960s<br>NATALIA MATVEEVA | 250 |
| 10 | The dawn before one-party dominance: South Korea’s road to party politics under the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, 1961–1963<br>KYONGHEE LEE | 270 |
| 11 | The Yugoslav federation and the concept of one ruling party in its final hour<br>JURE GAŠPARIČ   | 296 |
| 12 | The vanguard’s changing tempo: Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and government institutions, 1921–1990<br>ADÉLA GJURIČOVÁ                                 | 316 |
|    | <i>Index</i>   | 336 |

# Figures

|     |  |     |
|-----|--|-----|
| 1.1 | Organisation Chart of the Anfu Club  | 48  |
| 7.1 | A meeting of the constitutional commission under the presidency of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej during the Thirteenth Session of the Grand National Assembly, Bucharest, between September 22 and 24, 1952 ( <i>Fototeca online a comunismului românesc</i> , Photograph #IA172, 172/1952) | 188 |
| 7.2 | “Housewives of Shanghai joyfully welcomed the publication of the draft constitution of the PRC,” 1954 ( <i>Kitai</i> , No. 7, 1954, p. 3)  | 194 |
| 7.3 | The Second National Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania, Tirana, April 10–14, 1950 ( <i>Novaia Albaniia</i> , No. 32–33, April–May 1950, front matter)   | 205 |
| 7.4 | The Second Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party, Berlin, July 10, 1952. Front row, left to right: Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck, and Otto Grotewohl (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-15410-0097/CC-BY-SA 3.0)   | 206 |
| 7.5 | Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (center) and Petru Groza (left) voting for the Constitution of Romania at the Thirteenth Session of the Grand National Assembly, September 24, 1952 ( <i>Fototeca online a comunismului românesc</i> , Photograph #IA174, 174/1952)                           | 208 |
| 7.6 | Mátyás Rákosi and his wife Fenia Fedorovna Kornilova voting in the local council election, Budapest, October 22, 1950 (Fortepan #126963/Bauer Sándor, CC BY-SA 3.0)  | 209 |
| 7.7 | Elections to the People’s Assembly and district people’s councils of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, December 18, 1949 (State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia (GTsMSIR) 27126/163)   | 210 |

viii *Figures*

- 7.8 Czechoslovak Ambassador to China František Komzala giving a speech before the performance of the Czechoslovak circus troupe, Beijing, December 1953. Portraits, left to right: Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov, Antonín Zápotocký, and Mao Zedong (*Kitai*, No. 1, 1954, p. 39) 211
- 7.9 Delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the session of the State Assembly of the Hungarian People's Republic, November 1955. Mátyás Rákosi is in the front on the right (GTsMSIR 31111/15) 212

## Author bios

**Jure Gašparič** is a senior research associate at the Institute of Contemporary History in Ljubljana and formerly director of the Institute and state secretary for science at the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. In his research, he focuses on Slovenian and Yugoslavian political history since the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and the history of political parties and representative systems. Gašparič is a member of the board of directors of the European Information and Research Network on Parliamentary History (EuParl.net) and the editor of *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino/Contributions to Contemporary History*. His recent publications include *Izza parlamenta: Zakulisje jugoslovanske skupščine 1919–1941* [Behind the parliament: Backstage of the Yugoslav Assembly, 1919–1941] (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2015).

**Adéla Gjuričová (0000-0002-9035-1167)** is a senior researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History at the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague. In her research, she focuses on politics and society during the late socialist era, the 1989 revolutions, and post-communist transformations in Central Europe. She is the head of the Institute's Political History Department and of the Working Group on Parliaments in Transition. Currently, she leads the Project "City as a Laboratory of Change" within Strategy AV21 of the Czech Academy of Sciences. Most recently, she co-authored *Návrat parlamentu: Češi a Slováci ve Federálním shromáždění 1989–1992* [The Return of parliament: The Czechs and Slovaks in the Federal Assembly, 1989–1992] (Prague: Argo – ÚSD AV ČR, 2018).

**Bruce Grover** is a doctoral candidate at Heidelberg University, Germany. He received an MA in the History of the Middle East from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He researches left and right political thought in modern Japan and its global convergences. He is currently completing a dissertation analyzing continuities in political and economic ethics from the Meiji to Shōwa periods among leading reformist total war planners within the military and bureaucracy. The dissertation also deals with the collaboration of progressive labor leaders and labor educators with reformist nationalists and ultimately argues that the

reformist social ideals and aspirations for an alternative to liberalism associated with interwar total war planning in Japan was formed to a significant degree before the First World War.

**Vsevolod Kritskiy (0000-0002-9527-0788)** has a PhD in International History from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He received the Pierre du Bois prize for his dissertation titled “Reorienting the nation: Perspectives from Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s.” He studied the history of international communism during the interwar period as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam within the framework of the Early PostDoc. Mobility fellowship of the Swiss National Science Foundation. He is currently working on international trade union politics and just transition as a project manager at the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung office in Geneva.

**Paul Kubicek (0000-0002-1601-2319)** is a professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies Program at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan. He has also taught at Koç University, Boğaziçi University, and Antalya Bilim University in Turkey. His research on Turkey has been published in numerous journals, including *Democratization*, *Political Studies*, and *World Affairs*. He is the editor of *Turkish Studies*.

**Kyonghee Lee** is a member of the Research Group “Entangled Parliamentarisms: Constitutional Practices in Russia, Ukraine, China and Mongolia, 1905–2005,” sponsored by the European Research Council (ERC) at Heidelberg University. She has a previous academic background in philosophy and sinology and work experience in publishing and knowledge management. She defended her doctoral thesis on the concept and institution of community compact in East Asia in 2022.

**Ernest Ming-tak Leung** is a PhD candidate at the Department of Japanese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He gained his BA in History and French from the University of Hong Kong and an MPhil in Japanese Studies from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He currently focuses on the history of economic planning in East Asia between 1920 and 1966.

**Natalia Matveeva** holds a PhD in Korean history from SOAS, University of London and is currently a Researcher at the Department of Korea and Mongolia of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, in Moscow. Her research focuses on the early stages of nation-building in North and South Korea, assessing and comparing the economic, political, and social development of the two countries in the broader regional and international historical context.

**Egas Moniz Bandeira (0000-0002-8563-0380)** is a researcher at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany, where he works as a member of the project “Writing History with China—Chinese Concepts in Transnational Historiography,” and an affiliate researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory in Frankfurt, Germany, where he is a member of a comparative research project on the emergence of modern legal practices in Japan, China, and the Ottoman Empire. After studying Law and East Asian Studies at Heidelberg University, he completed his PhD program at Heidelberg and Tohoku Universities with a dissertation on late Qing constitutional history. His main research interest is global intellectual history with a focus on its refractions in modern East Asia. His work has been published in *The Journal of Transcultural Studies*, *Global Intellectual History*, the *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, and others. He also co-edited *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia, 1850–1950: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies* (London: Routledge, 2021).

**Christopher A. Reed** received his PhD from the University of California in 1996. Currently, he teaches modern Chinese and East Asian history at the Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio. The focus of his research is modern Chinese print culture, print capitalism, and print communism. He is best-known for his book *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese print capitalism, 1876–1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004) but has recently published on a wide range of Chinese print culture topics in the twentieth century, including “From text(s) to image(s): Maoist-era texts and their influences on six oil paintings (1957–79),” in *Redefining propaganda in modern China: The Mao Era and its legacies*, ed. by James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson (London: Routledge, 2021).

**Alexander V. Reznik** holds a PhD in Russian History. He is an associate professor (docent) at the Department of History, HSE University, Saint Petersburg. His most recent publications include the anthology *L. D. Trotskii: pro et contra* (two editions in Russian, published in 2016 and 2017), the monograph *Trotsky and the comrades: The left opposition and political culture of the RCP(b), 1923–1924* (two editions in Russian, published in 2017 and 2018 by European University at Saint Petersburg Press), as well as articles in *Kritika*, *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, *Historical Materialism*, and other journals. His current research project is devoted to political culture, communication, images, and languages of the Russian Civil War in general and the cult of leaders in particular.

**Ivan Sablin (0000-0002-6706-4223)** leads the Research Group “Entangled Parliamentarisms: Constitutional Practices in Russia, Ukraine, China and Mongolia, 1905–2005,” sponsored by the European Research Council (ERC), at Heidelberg University. His research interests include the history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, with special attention to Siberia and the Russian Far East, and global intellectual history. He is the author



of two monographs – *Governing Post-Imperial Siberia and Mongolia, 1911–1924: Buddhism, Socialism and Nationalism in State and Autonomy Building* (London: Routledge, 2016) and *The Rise and Fall of Russia's Far Eastern Republic, 1905–1922: Nationalisms, Imperialisms, and Regionalisms in and After the Russian Empire* (London: Routledge, 2018) – and research articles in *Slavic Review*, *Europe-Asia Studies*, *Nationalities Papers*, and other journals. He also co-edited *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia, 1850–1950: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies* (London: Routledge, 2021).

**Long Yang** is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Freiburg. He is writing a book on how the personalization of authority shaped the Maoist bureaucracy and is working with his colleagues on the politics of information and misinformation in twentieth-century China.

# Acknowledgments

This volume was prepared as part of the project “ENTPAR: Entangled Parliamentarisms: Constitutional Practices in Russia, Ukraine, China and Mongolia, 1905–2005,” which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement no. 755504). Most of the chapters were presented at the Workshop “The Vanguard of Class and Nation: Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1920s–1990s,” hosted by Heidelberg University on April 12–13, 2021. The editors would also like to thank Alexandra Eremia and Vincent Conway for their assistance with preparing the index to this volume.



# Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

# Introduction: Parties from Vanguardists to Governments

*Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira*

Over the course of the twentieth century, a broad array of parties as organizations of a new type took over state functions and replaced state institutions on the territories of the former Ottoman, Qing, Russian, and Habsburg Empires. In the context of roughly simultaneous imperial and postimperial transformations, organizations such as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in the Ottoman Empire (one-party regime since 1913), the Anfu Club in China (parliamentary majority since 1918), and the Bolshevik Party in Russia (in control of parts of the former empire since 1918), not only took over government power but merged with government itself. Disillusioned with the outcomes of previous constitutional and parliamentary reforms, these parties justified the takeovers with slogans and programs of controlled or supervised economic and social development. Inheriting the previous imperial diversities, they furthermore took over the role of mediators between the various social and ethnic groups in the respective territories. In this respect, the parties appropriated some of the functions which dynastic and then constitutional and parliamentary regimes had ostensibly failed to perform. In a significant counterexample, in spite of prominent aspirations, no one-party regime emerged in Japan, for there the constitutional monarchy had survived the empire's transformation to a major industrialized imperialist power.

For most of the twentieth century, one-party and single-party regimes – regimes led by dominant or single parties in the absence of electoral competition (Greene 2010, 809–10; Meng 2021, 1) – thrived on both sides of the Cold War and in some of the non-aligned states. The ideologies of the ruling parties relied on nationalist and socialist discourses, or, quite often, their combination. Even though most of the one-party regimes were based on competing ideologies of state socialism and extreme nationalism, they demonstrated structural similarities on several levels, including their appeals to the masses defined in national or class terms. Whereas several state socialist single-party regimes collapsed in 1989–1991 (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia), some of the communist parties have continued to rule without electoral competition (China, Laos,

North Korea, and Vietnam). Furthermore, new parties managed to establish controlled political regimes across Eurasia, for instance, in Russia and Turkey.

Bringing together twelve case studies of one-party regimes from the interconnected Eurasian contexts, including Eastern Europe, West and East Asia, this volume explores the performance of these (in most cases) extraconstitutional organizations as governments and their approaches to development in global and comparative contexts. It pays special attention to nation-building through the party (including its multiethnic versions), to institutions (both constitutional and extraconstitutional), and to the global and comparative aspects of one-party regimes. The volume addresses the geneses of one-party regimes, the roles of socialism and nationalism in the parties' approaches to development and state-building, as well as the pedagogical and tutelary aspirations of the ruling parties in China, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and other postimperial and postcolonial polities. Hence, by revisiting the dynamics of the transition from empire via constitutionalism to single-party government, and by exploring the internal and external dynamics of single-party regimes after their establishment, the volume helps to more precisely locate this type of regime within the contemporary world's political landscape.

Historians have predominantly studied one-party regimes and the parties at the helm within the respective national contexts (Ciddi 2009; Gill 1994; Zheng 2009), paying particular attention to leaders (Apor et al. 2004; Hanioglu 2017; Khlevniuk 2015; Taylor 2009; Terrill 1999) and violence under one-party regimes (Conquest 2008; Kaplonski 2014; Lankov 2002; Naimark 2016; Yan and Gao 1996). Whereas comparative outlooks, as well as theoretical and institutional studies of one-party regimes have been common in political science (Hess 2013; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Meng 2021; Rothman 1967; Swain 2011), historians have rarely paid attention to the mechanics of the one-party regimes and the fusion of parties with governments. There have nevertheless been studies, both involving diachronous comparisons within the same national contexts (Ayan 2010), and taking transnational and global perspectives, but mainly on communist parties (Bergien and Gieseke 2018; Feliu and Brichs 2019; McAdams 2017; Pons and Smith 2017; Naimark et al. 2017). Broader comparisons, involving nationalist (and fascist) and state socialist regimes and their institutions have been especially rare (Jessen and Richter 2011; Paxton 1998).

Political parties entered the global stage in the nineteenth–early twentieth century, together with the spread of parliamentarism. The turn toward constitutions and parliamentary institutions was not limited to Western Europe and the Americas. Japan's adoption of a constitution and convocation of the Imperial Diet in 1889/90 crowned its process of political reforms, which had been initiated in the middle of the century through the clash with the Western imperialist powers, and turned the country into a major imperialist power. Thereafter, Japan developed into a powerful point

of reference throughout the globe (Colley 2021). Between around 1905 and 1910, in the wake of Russia's military defeat against Japan, the ruling elites and influential oppositional circles of several large Eurasian empires engaged in a roughly concomitant effort to introduce constitutions and parliamentary institutions (Kurzman 2008, Moniz Bandeira 2017). The Russian Revolution of 1905–1907 took a constitutional turn and resulted in the formation of the imperial parliament, the State Duma, in 1905/1906. The events in Russia contributed to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Two years later, in 1908, the Young Turk Revolution reinstated the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. The government of the Qing Empire, trying to avoid the difficulties faced by Russia and Persia, decided to follow suit after a long reform period of “constitutional preparation,” but published an outline of a constitution in 1908 and convened preliminary assemblies thought to be precursors to the eventual imperial assembly.

Given that these Eurasian constitutions and parliaments were established as answers to existential crises, they were predominantly, although far from exclusively, aimed at strengthening the state or reorganizing it from the perspective of the political elites (Sablin and Moniz Bandeira 2021, 3–4). Constitutions and parliaments were deemed to be the key to transform dynastic regimes into nation-states (Banerjee 2017; Moniz Bandeira 2022) or more regulated and cohesive empire-states (Stoler 2009, 49); they helped to promote nationalism (both inclusionary and exclusionary), imperialism, and militarism (Grotke and Prutsch 2014). Parliamentary institutions were established as political talent pools and as communication avenues between governments and populations; they served as avenues for political mobilization as well as for the management of imperial diversities.

In these imperial contexts, political parties were only begrudgingly accepted and struggled to find their place in the new constitutional systems. In Eurasia, imperial officials and conservative members of the public (who often cited Western critics of political parties and, by extension, of parliamentarism) tended to view political parties and factionalism as divisive and ultimately detrimental to their cause of national strengthening (Sablin 2020, 266–68). As Robert A. Scalapino (1962, 68) writes on the Japanese case, the emerging parties at the time of the Meiji Constitution's promulgation “still existed in the political demimonde.” Stringent anti-factionalist laws curtailed their action, the government did not acknowledge their inevitability, and they had not yet any political or legal significance. However, the Japanese case is peculiar among those covered in this volume in so far as the new constitution promulgated in 1889 remained in force for several decades to come and witnessed Japan's economic growth and rise as an expansive imperialist power. In this context, the political parties which had evolved since the 1880s came to play a significant role, and even laid the groundwork for the country's postwar party system (Scalapino 1962, 68).

Parties were often successors to and reconfigurations of various pre-existing forms of political associations. By 1906, when the Qing Court

announced its intention to prepare for constitutional government, constitutionalist intellectuals increasingly conceived of themselves as a “party” united not by personal bonds like the factions of old, but by ideas and an impersonal, lasting relationship to the “nation” (Blitstein 2018, 177–81, on the concept of nation in China see Matten 2012). Consequently, they called for the development of institutionalized parties as an element of political modernity (Zhu 2002; Chen 2013). Yet, they tended to conceptualize parties less as pathways to channel particularist interests than as vehicles to increase societal cohesion and train political elites (Zhu 2002, 96). Like all other elements of political modernization, the need for parties was interpreted in light of the country’s political and economic weakness and the ambition to overcome its internal and external problems. One pseudonymous essay in the *Sein min choong bou* (*Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報), a magazine edited in Yokohama by the paramount reformist intellectual Liang Qichao 梁啟超, is illustrative in this respect (Yu zhi 1906). Having dramatically begun with the statement that China’s very existence depended on the development of political parties, the essay reflected on the relationship between Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, and extensively discussed the cases of Russia and Japan. It narrated that after violently suppressing political parties, the Japanese government had had to accept parties as a political fact and acknowledge their value for the implementation of constitutional politics, pointing to a coming parallel development in China (Yu zhi 1906, 13–14; see also Scalapino 1962, 146–199). The author pondered that a balance between progressives and conservatives was necessary and stressed the positive function of politicians outside of government. Thereby, he saw two main functions of political parties, namely controlling the government and guiding the people. Yet, while he vociferously criticized the current Qing government as utterly corrupt, the writer emphasized the common interest of the constitutional state served by the parties within it, and the function of the parties to overcome individualism. Concluding his essay by stating that the state was “the subject and the individuals and factions” were “all the objects of the state,” the author again adduced the example of Japan. He was impressed that, as soon as the wars against China (1894/95) and Russia (1904/05) erupted, all Japanese parties immediately set aside their differences. Despite still having a multiparty configuration in mind, the explanation of the second function of parties as vanguards of political development pointed toward what would become one of the main features of single-party regimes in Eurasia, and which Liang Qichao himself would forcefully argue for in the early years of the Republic:

Now, as a country’s political thought is not immediately popularized in the whole country, it needs to rely on visionaries (*xianjuezhe* 先覺者) to promote it. Only then will self-aware citizens arise. There is nobody but political parties to nurture this political thought and to gather these visionary gentlemen. Therefore, political parties are truly the morning

stars (*shuxing* 曙星) of a society's first enlightenment, and the harbingers (*xianhe* 先河) of constitutional politics.

(Yu zhi 1906, 17)

These words appeared in a paper located in Japan, where thousands of Qing students and intellectuals across the political spectrum were vying to shape China's political future. In fact, many parties in Eurasia emerged as non-parliamentary, underground or émigré, organizations ahead of parliaments. Such were the CUP in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), and the Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR) in the Russian Empire, as well as the Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmenghui* 同盟會), the predecessor of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomintang, Kuomintang, or KMT), founded in Tokyo in 1905. Although parliamentarism was on their agenda, the members of these organizations did not shun away from anti-parliamentary considerations. The debates at the Second Congress of the RSDLP, which took place in Brussels and London in the summer of 1903, and those around it are illustrative in this regard. After the members of the Jewish Labor Bund departed the Congress out of protest, the remaining delegates adopted a program of two parts, "minimum" and "maximum." The maximum part set socialist revolution as the Party's ultimate goal and the dictatorship of the proletariat as its prerequisite. The minimum part aimed at establishing a democratic republic in Russia and featured *inter alia* the creation of a parliament. Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov, one of the first Russian Marxists and later a leader of the Menshevik faction, voiced a rather cynical opinion on parliament during the debates.

If, in an impulse of revolutionary enthusiasm, the people had elected a very good parliament – a kind of *chambre introuvable* [*unobtainable chamber*] – we [the Social Democrats] should try to make it a long parliament, and if the elections had failed, we should try to disperse it not in two years but, if possible, in two weeks.

(Shanshiev 1959, 182)

These words evoked protests from some of those present and other imperial intellectuals. Although Plekhanov eventually changed his position and called for the RSDLP's participation in the State Duma elections, the Ukrainian legal scholar Bohdan (Fedir) Oleksandrovich Kistiakovskii later dismissed such a position as "monstrous" and emblematic of the low level of the Russian intelligentsia's legal consciousness (Kistiakovskii 1916, 558–59). Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, who would come to power at the helm of the RSDLP's radical Bolshevik faction, by contrast, applauded Plekhanov's 1903 statement and quoted it, for instance, when justifying Red Terror in late 1917 (Lenin 1974, 185).



The activities of the non-parliamentary parties and their members involved interactions in imperial borderlands, for instance, between Russia and Iran, and across the whole of Eurasia (Deutschmann 2013; Harper 2021). When an attempt at political reforms was botched in the Qing Empire in 1898, some of its intellectual leaders, including the aforementioned Liang Qichao and his preceptor Kang Youwei 康有為, fled to Japan. For them, the emerging parties of the Qing Empire were not limited to political borders, but transcontinental associations resting on a non-territorial Chinese nation (Blitstein 2018, 181). Kang travelled the world to promote his ideas, especially among Chinese diaspora communities. In Mexico, whither he intended to bring Chinese immigrants to build a “New China,” he met with President Porfirio Díaz, whom he described as an “autocratic” ruler whose dictatorial government was necessary to develop the nation, a strand of thought which had also been quite widespread in nineteenth century Latin America (Blitstein 2016, 241–43). Liang, too, was a *persona non grata* on Qing territory, but nonetheless came to decisively shape the late Qing constitutional reforms. His Political Information Society (*Zhengwenshe* 政聞社) was founded in Japan in 1907 and moved its headquarters to Shanghai in 1908. Although it was soon disbanded by the Qing government, it became one of the predecessors of the the Qing Empire’s first officially recognized political party, the Association of Friends of Constitutionalism (*Xianyouhui* 憲友會), which was founded in summer 1911.

Kang’s globe-trotting activity rivalled with that of the revolutionary leader and founder of the Revolutionary Alliance, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙. When visiting Europe in 1905, Sun met Belgian socialist leaders Émile Vandervelde and Camille Huysmans and tried to join the Second International (Spooner 2011). A year later, in 1906, Sun met Grigori Andreevich Gershuni, one of the PSR’s founders, in Japan and discussed the forms of underground political struggle in person with him (Sablin 2018, 48). Revolutionary leaders like Sun, the Philippine Mariano Ponce, and the Vietnamese Phan Bội Châu and Phan Châu Trinh built far-reaching Pan-Asian networks (Bui 2012; CuUnjieng Aboitiz 2020). Inspired by both Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen, political associations connected to Phan Bội Châu, like the Modernization Association and the Restoration Association, fought against French colonialism in Vietnam, first promoting constitutional monarchism and later taking inspiration in the Republic of China (Bui 2012).

Although most of such organizations became involved in late imperial and revolutionary parliamentary institutions, the brief global parliamentary moment of the 1900s–1910s soon gave way to a new form of political organization, namely the one-party dictatorship. Although the first one-party regime had emerged elsewhere, with Liberia’s True Whig Party remaining in power between 1878 and 1980 (Meng 2021, 7), it was in postimperial Eurasia that such regimes became especially widespread.

The first Eurasian one-party regime was established by the CUP in the Ottoman Empire. The CUP, which started as a secret revolutionary

organization, played a key role in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the reestablishment of the constitutional regime and the imperial parliament. As argued by Ferdan Ergut, the transition from indirect to direct rule was especially important for the CUP leadership, and after the 1908 Revolution the main goal of the CUP regime was to eliminate the intermediary societal forces (Ergut 2003). While the 1908 Revolution itself was dominated by a model of a state as a provider of legal liberty and equality, state organicism – the belief that a state acts like a natural organism – came to play an important role in the political thinking of the 1910s, elevating the power of the political elite and rulers (Turnaoğlu 2017, 156–57). The CUP did not seek unrestricted control of the government immediately after the Revolution, first acting as a competitive political party (Ergut 2003, 53, 59). However, it did not manage to increase its popularity and temporarily lost power in 1912 (Zürcher 2010, 93). In the context of the Balkan crisis of late 1912, the CUP organized prowar mass rallies and launched a massive propaganda campaign against the government. Alleging that they were “saving the state” (Zürcher 2010, 117), the CUP staged a coup on January 23, 1913. Later the same year, it launched a harsh campaign against opposition, including socialists and the ulema, and established total control of the bureaucracy (Hanioglu 2008, 156–57, 159).

As noted by M. Şükrü Hanioglu, the CUP developed some features of a mass party, including broad membership. At the same time, it avoided full institutionalization, retaining conspiratorial qualities, and never formally outlawed other parties and organizations. Initially, the CUP’s main objective was the preservation of the diverse Ottoman Empire, for which it adopted a policy of inclusiveness. This made the Party’s platform essentially conservative and also meant that it had no ethnic or class basis for membership. Furthermore, the vague notion of Ottomanism undermined the Party’s internal cohesion. The CUP, however, became increasingly influenced by Turkist ideas, with the difference between “Ottoman” and “Turkish” becoming ever more blurred, which stimulated particularistic movements on the peripheries (Hanioglu 2008, 160–61, 166–67). During the First World War, its leadership opted for a violent approach to imperial diversity and organized mass violence, against the Armenians in the first place, as part of building a homogeneous Turkish nation in the heterogeneous imperial space (Kévorkian 2011; Kieser 2018; Suny 2017).

Simultaneously with the existence of the CUP regime, China saw a period of political upheaval. The Qing government’s attempt at gradual constitutional preparation was run over by the country’s rapid societal and political development. In late 1911, a provincial troop mutiny set off a domino chain of provinces falling off from the empire, eventually forcing the negotiated abdication of the Emperor in early 1912 (Chen 2017). The newly established Republic of China tried to build a political system in which the parliament was of paramount political importance, under a provisional constitution that took much inspiration from the constitution of the French Third

Republic. Suffrage was expanded from 0.39 to 10.5 percent of the population (Chang 2007, 55, 80 91–96), and political parties proliferated, taking center stage in the new system (Chang 1985; Wang 1988; Liu and Liu 2015, 45–51). The Revolutionary Alliance evolved into the KMT, while the late Qing Association of Friends of Constitutionalism evolved into a number of successor parties, most notably the Progressive Party (*Jinbudang* 進步黨). Yet, the political practice of the young republic turned out quite different from what had been hoped for. It was shaken by traumatizing political strife, including the assassination of the KMT leader Song Jiaoren 宋教仁 in March 1913, possibly at the behest of President Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (Yao 2008). In 1914, Yuan, a leading figure of the late Qing reforms who had negotiated the Emperor’s abdication and secured considerable continuity between the Qing Empire and the Republic, disbanded the parliament and took steps to consolidate his own power. After passing a new constitutional compact and creating a new advisory council acting as his private consultative chamber, he eventually attempted to establish the Empire of China with himself as Emperor (Moniz Bandeira 2021, 164–72). Encountering unsurmountable resistance to this move, Yuan was forced to abdicate and died shortly thereafter.

Yuan’s death, in principle, meant a return to the constitutional system of 1912–1913 – but not for long. The resulting power grab of 1916–1917, again, gave pluralist party politics a bad name. A year later, as a reaction to the perceived chaos, China saw another short-lived attempt at monarchic restoration, this time a coup trying to reestablish the Qing dynasty with Emperor Puyi at the helm. In the wake of these events, a new and hitherto understudied force gained prominence in Chinese politics: the Anfu Club, which appropriated the institutional arrangements laid down by the erstwhile Progressive Party and remained in power between 1918 and 1920. Whereas it had been judged in overwhelmingly negative ways in historiography, Ernest Ming-tak Leung (Chapter 1) uncovers its historical significance as East Asia’s first *de facto* one-party developmentalist regime. Relying on rarely used and newly discovered sources, Leung offers a revision of the dominant narrative by addressing the birth, life, and death of the “Progressive–Anfu System.” Not unlike the Ottoman Empire, organic state theory had gained a prominent place in Chinese political thought since the last years of the Qing Empire. Shaped by this intellectual trend, the Anfu leaders, who were themselves mostly educated at prestigious institutions abroad, envisioned a societal order in which the old mandarin-literati class would take the reins of the state and become an industrializing elite. The Club also set out to change the constitutional structure of the state, coming to propose an ultimately unsuccessful bill to reform the Senate, which would have turned the institution into East Asia’s first corporatist chamber. Due to its secrecy, the Anfu Club was barely visible to the outside as a political party at the time, but in fact developed a sophisticated corporatist party structure, which it was keen to expand to the provinces. Yet, due to its own

mistakes as well as to external factors, the Anfu regime remained a rather short episode in Chinese history, being toppled in 1920.

At roughly the same time, an organization of a different kind managed to erect a more long-lasting single-party regime in the former Russian Empire. The Bolshevik Party, which emerged as a separate organization from the RSDLP's eponymous faction, came to power in Petrograd on October 25–26, 1917, as part of a radical coalition with the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, formerly a faction of the PSR. The coalition proved short-lived, and since 1918, the Bolsheviks controlled parts of the former empire as a single party. By that time, Lenin had developed a dynamic, flexible approach to party-building. As argued by Paul Le Blanc (2015, x), “the political program of revolutionary Marxism and the living movement and struggles of the working class” were the two things of fundamental importance for Lenin, and the function of the revolutionary party was to bring the two together. He sought to build a Russia-wide party, integrated into an international socialist movement, whose members worked to realize this dual commitment. In organizational terms, the theme of class leadership was at the center. As summarized by Lars T. Lih (2011, 14–15), this theme had two levels: leadership by the class – that is the proletariat’s leadership of the whole people – and the party’s leadership of the proletariat, that is, its role as the “vanguard” of conscious revolutionaries.

Over the course of the Russian Civil War (1918–1922), the Bolshevik Party consolidated its regime in most of the remaining imperial territory and became the center of a new imperial formation, the Soviet Union (Suny and Martin 2001). During its first decade in power, the Party developed from a small disciplined organization into a hierarchical mass organization, which fully controlled the government and most spheres of public life. The developments in the Soviet Union were projected onto the international level, with world revolution, both in its social and anticolonial dimensions, expected to unfold along the Bolshevik path (Sablin 2021).

At the same time, Lenin argued that the “vanguard” and its course of action had to be context-specific:

To seek out, investigate, predict, and grasp that which is nationally specific and nationally distinctive, in the concrete manner in which each country should tackle a single international task: victory over opportunism and Left doctrinairism within the working-class movement; the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship – such is the basic task in the historical period that all the advanced countries (and not they alone) are going through. The chief thing – though, of course, far from everything – the chief thing, has already been achieved: the vanguard of the working class has been won over, has ranged itself on the side of Soviet government and against parliamentarianism, on the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat and against bourgeois democracy.

[...] Victory cannot be won with a vanguard alone. To throw only the vanguard into the decisive battle, before the entire class, the broad masses, have taken up a position either of direct support for the vanguard, or at least of sympathetic neutrality towards it and of precluded support for the enemy, would be, not merely foolish but criminal. [...]

The immediate objective of the class-conscious vanguard of the international working-class movement, i.e., the Communist parties, groups and trends, is to be able to lead the broad masses (who are still, for the most part, apathetic, inert, dormant and convention-ridden) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead, not only their own party but also these masses in their advance and transition to the new position (Lenin 1920).

Vsevolod Kritskiy (Chapter 2) analyzes the institutional aspects of the Bolsheviks' approach to world revolution, focusing on the early years of the Communist International (Comintern) in the context of interwar internationalisms. The Bolsheviks sought to control the Comintern's proceedings, opposing those who preferred a more democratic structure for the organization. While the Comintern was supposed to facilitate the fusion of national communist parties with the respective governments, the re-configuration of the international system after the First World War gave it an opportunity to stake a claim on the system itself, replacing it with a party-of-parties. Kritskiy explores these processes of capture – by the Bolsheviks of the Comintern and by the Comintern of the international system – in the context of the radical left's competition with the liberal internationalism of the League of Nations and the moderate socialist internationalism of the remnants of the Second International, which consolidated into the Labour and Socialist International in 1923. Kritskiy argues that the lack of unity on the left at the international level facilitated the growth and establishment of the liberal system of international relations.

For most of the 1920s, there was also a lack of unity within the Bolshevik Party itself, which Alexander V. Reznik (Chapter 3) explores in his study of the discourses and practices of “democracy” and “parliamentarianism” within the Party in 1923 and 1924. Rejecting the mainstream notion of mere factional “struggle for power” among the higher echelons of the Soviet party-state, he analyzes the actual political practices of both the leaders and rank-and-file party members during open political contests. Although the Bolsheviks were famous for their vocal rejection of (bourgeois) parliamentarianism and democracy, they continuously argued for “workers' democracy.” Reznik argues that the controversies in 1923 and 1924 over the meaning of “democracy” are crucial for understanding the limits of political action and reforms, as they need to be put into the context of the actual practicing of “intraparty democracy,” a process that included long, active debates in press and at assemblies, elections of different bodies,

petitioning and protesting cases of unsatisfactory results, and so on. His analysis of the Left Opposition's rhetorical approaches to intraparty democracy reveals their complex ideological and organizational nature, weakening the Opposition's claims against "bureaucratization."

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the spread of one-party regimes across the whole Eurasian continent. With the exception of the Soviet Union,<sup>1</sup> nationalism became the ideological foundation of the absolute majority of one-party regimes during this period. In most Western European cases, single-party regimes were based on the extreme nationalist ideologies of fascism (for instance, in Italy and Spain) and Nazism (in Germany). In the post-imperial settings of Turkey and China, vernacular versions of nationalism, associated with the mythologized founding fathers of the modern nations, Kemal Atatürk and Sun Yat-sen respectively, became the main ideological underpinnings of controlled state-building and developmentalism.

Paul Kubicek (Chapter 4) locates the experience of Turkey's Republican People's Party (CHP) as a single party in 1923–1950 within the global context by focusing on the historical and intellectual roots of the CHP, its praxis, and its performance as a model for other single-party regimes. Kubicek discusses the envisioned tutelary role for the Party, which both identified with and sought to serve the "general will" in terms of nation-building and modernization. While the CHP shared some features with the CUP, the main inspiration for much of its guiding philosophy, featuring republicanism, nationalism, secularism, and populism, came from Western sources. The CHP, which served as an appendage to the state, sought to develop a unifying national identity, one that denied any class, ethnic, or sectarian divisions, and made the existence of alternative parties unneeded for the unity of the people. Although the CHP's regime was celebrated as a success, its Western origins and orientation limited its ability to serve as a model for non-Western development.

In China, the KMT established control over most of the country in 1927–1928 and remained the dominant force until the Japanese invasion of 1937. Christopher A. Reed (Chapter 5) explores the themes of "the pedagogical state" and nation-building through the party through the KMT's propaganda establishment and its political publishing program. Examining propaganda as a key tool in modern party- and state-building processes, Reed explores how the borrowing from the Soviet "propaganda state" via the Comintern led to the emergence of the KMT's own "propaganda state," in which the Party's Department of Propaganda performed as a propaganda ministry, supporting the KMT's more general effort to take over state functions. Drawing on internal Party documents as well as on published contemporary sources, Reed focuses on the issues of party-state organization, jurisdiction, inner party dynamics, message control, and mobilization in the late 1920s and 1930s.

Some of the single and dominant parties in Eurasia opted for formalizing their status in the legal documents of the respective states. The KMT became

the first ruling party to formally include itself and its own “political tutelage” over the country’s development in the Provisional Constitution of 1931 (Hsia 1931). The Italian National Fascist Party (PNF) was formally subordinate to the state, but in practice it became a massive bureaucracy which played an important role in the state architecture, with Party membership becoming compulsory for teachers and state employees after 1933 (Whittam 1995, 54). The Bolshevik Party was mentioned in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 (Trainin 1940, 188), but was never formally made the only legal party, unlike the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) in Germany. When working on the new constitution and consulting foreign legal documents, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, who chaired the drafting committee, underlined the opening sentence of the Nazi Law against the Foundation of New Parties of July 14, 1933, which read “In Germany, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party exists as the only political party,” and wrote “ha-ha” on the margin.<sup>2</sup> One can only speculate about the meaning of this reaction. At the time when the new Soviet constitution was being drafted, it was not yet clear if the new elections would be contested, while it had never been formally illegal to form political parties other than the Bolshevik (Communist) Party in the USSR. The Soviet legislative elections of 1937 and all subsequent ones until 1989, however, were uncontested (Hazard 1974; Velikanova 2021).

In some cases, dictatorial regimes and regimes based on nationalist ideologies, however, did not have a formal ruling party. The unchallenged National Union of Portugal, for instance, was created as a “civil association” and “non-party,” designed to restrain rather than mobilize the “public,” and it was not mandatory for officials to join it (Gallagher 1990, 167). In Japan, the political parties, which, from their troubled beginnings in the 1880s, had evolved to play a considerable role in Japanese politics, declined amidst the rising militarism of the 1930s (Berger 1977). Yet, they managed to maintain a foothold on power, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei yokusankai* 大政翼賛会, IRAA), established in 1940, never quite became a mass political party. Although most parliamentary leaders accepted posts connected to the IRAA in the hope of regaining their influence, the power struggles surrounding the new organization eventually led it to focus less on political mobilization than on public spiritual identification with the throne (Berger 1977, 326–329). Bruce Grover and Egas Moniz Bandeira (Chapter 6) discuss the ultimately frustrated aspirations for the creation of a mass political party in Japan in the 1930s and the 1940s, focusing on the “Alliance for a New Japan” (*Shin Nihon dōmei* 新日本同盟), a group consisting of some of Japan’s most important bureaucrats, and the writings of the magazine *Ishin* 維新 (“Restoration”), which brought together many reform-minded military officers. Chapter 6 shows that, while they did not put the role of the parliament as such into question, the focus of these thinkers lay on representing the “will of the people” through the Diet beyond liberal party politics, positioning Japan within the global trend toward reconstruction of political systems. They envisioned a temporary tutelage of the

people with the terminal goal being the independent, critical awareness of politics, and a rule through principle and culture rather than arbitrarily through bureaucrats.

The Second World War did not mark the end of nationalist one-party regimes, which thrived in many postcolonial settings, but state socialist one-party regimes became especially widespread in Eurasia, thanks to the Soviet efforts in exporting the model (Naimark 2019). Ivan Sablin (Chapter 7) provides an overview of dependent constitution-making under one-party regimes in Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia during the first decade after the Second World War. Relying on the concept of the informal Soviet empire, he compares the adoption and authorship of the constitutions, as well as their texts, and surveys the role of non-constitutional institutions in political practices and in propaganda. Sablin concludes that the standardization of governance in the informal Soviet empire manifested itself in the constitutional documents only partially, while nonconstitutional institutions, parties and leaders, as well as the involvement of Soviet representatives in state-building, were especially prominent.

Shortly after the spread of one-party regimes in Eastern Europe, however, a strong intellectual response to them emerged in the form of vernacular dissident movements, which often had connections across borders. Here, Milovan Djilas's book *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (1957), which was published abroad while the author was incarcerated in Yugoslavia, proved especially influential. Djilas, who was a leading Yugoslav Communist before becoming a fierce critic of the Party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia), argued that a new class became dominant in the state socialist countries, namely the class of privileged party bureaucracy.

Because this new class had not been formed as a part of the economic and social life before it came to power, it could only be created in an organization of a special type, distinguished by a special discipline based on identical philosophic and ideological views of its members. A unity of belief and iron discipline was necessary to overcome its weaknesses.

The roots of the new class were implanted in a special party, of the Bolshevik type. Lenin was right in his view that his party was an exception in the history of human society, although he did not suspect that it would be the beginning of a new class.

[...]

This is not to say that the new party and the new class are identical. The party, however, is the core of that class, and its base. It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the limits of the new class and to identify its members. The new class may be said to be made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the



administrative monopoly they hold.

(Djilas 1957, 39)

Djilas argued that the rise of the new class of party bureaucracy diminished the role of party itself. The party transformed from a compact organization full of initiative into the oligarchy of the new class.

The party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the party as a basis. The class grows stronger, while the party grows weaker; this is the inescapable fate of every Communist party in power.

(Djilas 1957, 40)

Critical opinions of the realities of the one-party state socialist regimes were articulated by members and leaders of the parties themselves. The most notable case was the attempted democratization and decentralization undertaken by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Alexander Dubček in 1968, which became known as the Prague Spring and which was suppressed by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's Action Program, adopted on April 5, 1968, celebrated the Party's role in the country's development but at the same time pointed to an acute social crisis, which was stimulated by the inadequacies in the Party's rule.

Socialist democracy was not expanded in time, methods of revolutionary dictatorship deteriorated into bureaucracy and became an impediment to progress in all spheres of life in Czechoslovakia. [...]

The main link in this circle was that of remnants or reappearance of the bureaucratic, sectarian approach in the Party itself. The insufficient development of socialist democracy within the Party, the unfavorable atmosphere for the promotion of activity, the silencing or even suppression of criticism – all of this thwarted a fast, timely, and thorough rectification. Party bodies took over tasks of State and economic bodies and social organizations. This led to an incorrect merging of the Party and State management, to a monopolized power position of some sections, unqualified interference as well as the undermining of initiative at all levels, indifference, the cult of mediocrity, and to unhealthy anonymity.

(Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1970, 4)

The reform plan did not, however, downgrade the position of the Party which was to keep its leading role and become “the vanguard of the entire socialist society” with “the victory of socialism.” It was, however, not supposed to be “a universal ‘caretaker’ of the society, to bind all organisations and every step taken in life by its directives” but instead

was expected to arouse “socialist initiative” (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1970, 6–7). Although the Prague Spring of 1968 was suppressed, it further stimulated transnational dissent in state socialist countries in Eastern Europe (Alexeyeva 1987; Trencsényi et al. 2018).

Whereas the Soviet Union provided state-building blueprints and advice to the dependent parties, the degree of dependency and own experience of such parties contributed to the diversity of vernacular approaches to governance. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which replaced the KMT as the dominant party in the China in 1949, for instance, allowed the formal survival of several other parties (Rudolph 2021). Long Yang (Chapter 8) shows that the CCP developed a number of original formal and provisional bureaucratic institutions over the 1920s–1960s. He traces the origins and development of replacing formal Party and government organs’ functions with provisional institutions and argues that the war context shaped the CCP’s bureaucratic practices. In the 1920s–1940s, the context of the Civil War proved especially important for such institutions, while in the 1950s and 1960s, the provisional institutions acquired the characteristics of their formal counterparts as Chinese leaders restructured the Party and government organs in the context of the Cold War.

During the early Cold War, several previously coherent territories became divided between competing regimes, some of which came to be dominated by one party. Such was the case of mainland China and Taiwan, which had come under the control of the Republic of China after the end of the Second World War and whither the KMT government relocated in 1949, after being defeated in the Chinese Civil War (Cheng 1989; McCormick 1990), as well as the case of North and South Korea. Natalia Matveeva (Chapter 9) discusses the former, exploring the formation and formalization of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s policies toward women in the 1950s and the 1960s and comparing them to those in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). She argues that although the North Korean elites followed the Soviet example, adopting laws on gender equality and emancipation, the emulation of the Soviet Union of the 1930s did not extend to the social sphere and to gender policies. In North Korea, the Marxist–Leninist concept of women as active participants in the public life and an important part of the labor force was transformed into “mothers of the nation,” tasked with providing overall support to the Party’s policies and raising the next generation of revolutionary fighters with loyalty to the Party and ultimately to the Great Leader Kim Il-sung.

Whereas in North Korea the one-party regime started with the Party, which soon gave way to a personalized dictatorship (Simotomai 2009), in South Korea the development of the regime followed the opposite way. Kyonghee Lee (Chapter 10) offers insights into the party-political formation initially intended by the South Korean military junta under the leadership of Park Chung Hee when it founded the Democratic Republican Party in 1963. South Korea’s first military junta sought to acquire a popular mandate to

stay in power by a demonstration of its adherence to the pledge of a swift return to civilian rule, albeit one in which its members would retire from the army and run as candidates for its own political party. With anti-communism becoming the cornerstone of any political program in the country, the leading members of the junta spoke of an alternative democracy, different from the ill-fitting Western democracy, but had to deny labels like “guided democracy.” What resulted was a political party that spoke much more frequently about what it did not believe in, namely communism, Western democracy, and the one-party system, than about what it did.

The relations between state socialism, the notion of an overarching country-wide community, and substate nationalism proved difficult to navigate for the ruling communist parties, with nationalism playing an important role in the collapse of socialist federations in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Suny 1993). Discussing the case of Yugoslavia and focusing on Slovenia, Jure Gašparič (Chapter 11) addresses the contradictions between the country’s federalist structure and the single ruling party. During the power monopoly of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia until 1952), the Yugoslav state was reformed along corporatist and federalist lines, with the six constituent republics becoming states, while the Party and the state were supposed to fade away gradually. Gašparič demonstrates that when the Yugoslav political crisis intensified, the Party started losing its influence and became increasingly divided along the borders between the individual republics.

Exploring the case of Czechoslovakia, another socialist federation, Adéla Gjuričová (Chapter 12) takes a *longue durée* perspective on the ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Party, founded in 1921, became the most important radical protest party during the interwar democratic period and underwent all the key developments of the socialist movement. It was made illegal in 1938, but its wartime underground activity won the Party a completely new reputation after the Second World War. Gjuričová reviews the Party’s rhetorical and practical strategy of gaining full control of the government and focuses on the institutional aspect of the “twist from party to government” in 1948–1989, discussing which of the institutions of the previous democratic framework were preserved and how they were adjusted to the regime. Gjuričová pays particular attention to time and speed, the tempo in the Party and governmental politics that reveal shifts and unnoticed continuities and ruptures in what has often been described as “forty years of static Communist rule and general timelessness.”

Perestroika in the USSR and the state’s eventual collapse had a tremendous effect on the communist parties, both those solely in power and those competing for voters in more democratic regimes (Di Palma 2019). It was itself also part of a global period of – at least nominal, although not always substantial – political democratization and liberalization. In the 1970s, several dictatorships in Southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, and Greece) crumbled, marking the start of this “third wave of democratization”

(Huntington 1991). In Latin America, military dictatorships gave way to competitive presidential systems during the 1980s (Gargarella, 2013, 148–171). In Taiwan, where the KMT government had tolerated and tightly controlled the presence of two minor parties – the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party – President Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 lifted martial law and the ban on the establishment of new parties (*dangjin* 黨禁) in 1986. A newspaper commentary of the time, still written in the cautious tone of a country coming out of the world’s longest martial law regime, demonstrates how the political liberalization reflected long-standing internal aspirations as well as the international trends of the time:

In recent years, Taiwan has achieved a considerable level of democratic politics. Unfortunately, due to the existence of “martial law” and the “ban of parties,” it has always been difficult in the international community for the image of democracy to reach perfection. [...] The immediate effect of the lifting of martial law and the allowance of political parties is that it makes democracy live up to its name. The long-term goal is to make the substance of democracy loftier!

(Kao 1986)

However, the expectation present in the 1980s and 1990s that competitive multiparty democracy would prevail as the world’s principal political system, and that single-party systems were relics of the past bound to gradually wither, proved to be premature. The year 1991 did not mark an end for the ruling communist parties. Some of them, namely the CCP (which engaged in market-oriented reforms since the late 1970s), the Communist Party of Vietnam, and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, departed from state socialism. Despite the introduction of capitalist economies, the three parties retained control over the respective regimes (Bui 2016; Malesky et al. 2011; Schuler 2021; Vu 2016). Some of the previously ruling communist parties, like the Mongolian People’s Party, also survived in new competitive landscapes (Smith 2020). Furthermore, the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century in fact witnessed an expansion in one-party autocracies, with one-party regimes becoming the most common type of authoritarianism (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010).

In China, where the government of the Communist Party had also undergone a severe crisis in the late 1980s, several decades of strong economic growth, the country’s increased international power, and the perception that multiparty regimes are chaotic and unable to tackle the societal and economic problems they encounter, have created considerable internal support for the Party and confidence about the country’s political system. This confidence, however, has not fully supplanted insecurities about it nor dispelled fears of a possible “Tocqueville effect” endangering the CCP’s dominance (Moniz Bandeira 2020, 135–42). Against this background, the political leadership around Xi Jinping 習近平, who took office as the Party’s

General Secretary in 2012, has identified ideological weakness as one of the main reasons for the Soviet Union's collapse, and put great effort in emphasizing the CCP's leading societal role (Xi 2012, 21). In this vein, Xi stressed at a ceremony to celebrate the CCP's 100th anniversary that:

China's success hinges on the Party. The more than 180-year-long modern history of the Chinese nation, the 100-year-long history of the Party, and the more than 70-year-long history of the People's Republic of China all provide ample evidence that without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation. The Party was chosen by history and the people. The leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the greatest strength of this system. It is the foundation and lifeblood of the Party and the country, and the crux upon which the interests and wellbeing of all Chinese people depend.

(Xi 2021)

After periods of more competitive politics, one-party dominance also re-emerged in Russia and Turkey, where United Russia and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), respectively, have been dominant in a situation of insubstantial political competition (Babacan et al. 2021; Carney 2015; Öney 2018; Reuter and Remington 2009). For example, in the elections to the Russian State Duma held on September 17–19, 2021, only those parties which openly supported President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin managed to win seats, while United Russia retained a constitutional majority (Mislivskaia 2021). Commenting on the then upcoming 2021 election, the economist Vladislav Inozemtsev maintained that there was no opposition in Russia anymore, since the term implied that such a group would have legal and democratic means to come to power, and noted the return to Soviet-style politics (Inozemtsev 2021, 6).

In Russia, there remains one party [United Russia] and several of its spoilers – this embodies either the traditional for the Soviet Union “indestructible alliance of communists and non-party members,” or, which may be familiar to Putin, the political system of the GDR [German Democratic Republic], where the Socialist Unity (the mention of unity is very noteworthy) Party of Germany was assisted by several other party structures and even (what a coincidence!) the National Front, “in which mass organizations united all the forces of the people to move along the path of building a socialist society.” So, we understand where we are going, and we can only hope for the absence of a Berlin Wall, in case of an attempt to cross which the soldiers would shoot without warning.

[...]

The vote on September 19 of this year (which has been clear for a long time, but with which until recently some opponents of the regime could not come to terms) will become not an election to the State Duma, but an appointment of 450 extras who imitate lawmaking in the interests of the Kremlin.

(Inozemtsev 2021, 7)

Developments like in Russia show that wishful assumptions about a teleological and well-nigh automatic development from single-party to multi-party, and more generally from authoritarian to democratic regimes were not justified. Single-party regimes themselves emerged as one of the dominant regime types in Eurasia in the first part of the twentieth century to a large extent as a reaction to the perceived failures of the parliamentary regimes which had been installed amidst high hopes during the transformations of the Russian, Ottoman, Qing, and other empires. They were far from uniform in their ideological premises and internal organization, but they responded to similar situations and made similar promises of economic and social development. Eventually, they only partially delivered on these promises, and their subsequent histories saw many ruptures and shifts which ended in the demise of many of these single-party regimes. Yet, the democratic backsliding experienced in the first quarter of the twenty-first century shows that the end of history (Fukuyama 1989) has not been reached, and that single-party regimes will remain a significant type of government in the global political landscape for the foreseeable future.

## Notes

- 1 Although the Bolsheviks pursued a state socialist program of modernization in the Soviet Union, nation-building also remained important, with the establishment and maintenance of separate institutions for the constituent nationalities of the multilevel Soviet federation coexisting with the centralized and hierarchical single-party regime (Suny 1993).
- 2 RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), f. 558, op. 11, d. 143, l. 67 (*Konstitutsii burzhuaznykh stran* [Constitutions of bourgeois countries], vol. 1: *Velikie derzhavy i zapadnye sosedi SSSR* [Great Powers and Western neighbors of the USSR], Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1935, with notes by I. V. Stalin).

## Bibliography

- Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. 1987. *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Apor, Balázs, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees, eds. 2004. *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ayan, Pelin. 2010. "Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party." *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 2: 197–215.

- Babacan, Errol, Melehat Kutun, Ezgi Pinar, and Zafer Yilmaz, eds. 2021. *Regime Change in Turkey: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Islamism and Hegemony*. London: Routledge.
- Banerjee, Milinda. 2017. "The Royal Nation and Global Intellectual History: Monarchic Routes to Conceptualizing National Unity." In *Transnational Histories of the "Royal Nation,"* edited by Milinda Banerjee, Charlotte Backerra, and Cathleen Sarti, 21–44. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Berger, Gordon Mark. 1977. *Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bergien, Rüdiger, and Jens Gieseke, eds. 2018. *Communist Parties Revisited: Sociocultural Approaches to Party Rule In The Soviet Bloc, 1956–1991*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Blanc, Paul Le. 2015. *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
- Blitstein, Pablo Ariel (2016). "A New China in Mexico: Kang Youwei and his Languages of Cohesion-Making on the Two Sides of the Pacific (1895–1911)." *Oriens Extremus* 55, 209–60.
- Blitstein, Pablo Ariel (2018). "El concepto de 'partido político' y los mandarines chinos en exilio: concepto y experiencia entre China y las Américas (fines del siglo XIX–principios del XX)." [The concept of "political party" and Chinese mandarins in exile: concept and experience between China and the Americas (late 19th–early 20th century)]. *Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales* 20, no. 40, 159–84.
- Bui, Ngoc Son. 2012. "The Introduction of Modern Constitutionalism in East Asian Confucian Context: The Case of Vietnam in the Early Twentieth Century." *National Taiwan University Law Review* 7, no. 2: 423–64.
- Bui, Thiem Hai. 2016. "Constitutionalizing Single Party Leadership in Vietnam: Dilemmas of Reform." *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 11, no. 2: 219–34.
- Carney, Richard W. 2015. "The Stabilizing State: State Capitalism as a Response to Financial Globalization in One-Party Regimes." *Review of International Political Economy* 22, no. 4: 838–73.
- Chang, P'eng-yüan 張朋園. 2007. *Zhongguo minzhu zhengzhi de kunjing: Wanqing yilai lijie yihui xuanju shulun* 中國民主政治的困境，1909–1949：晚清以來歷屆議會選舉述論 [The difficulties of democratic politics in China, 1909–1949: An exposition of the elections for the various parliaments since the late Qing]. Taipei: Linking.
- Chang, Yu-fa 張玉法. 1985. *Minguo chunian de zhengdang* 民國初年的政黨 [Political parties in the early Republic of China]. Taipei: Zhongyanyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo.
- Chen, Fei. 2017. "Disassembling Empire: Revolutionary Chinese Students in Japan and Discourses on Provincial Independence and Local Self-Government." *Journal of Asian History*, 2: 283–315.
- Chen, Yuxiang 陳宇翔. 2013. *Qingmo Minchu zhengdang sixiang yanjiu* 清末民初政黨思想研究 [Research on thinking about parties in the late Qing and early Republic]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe.
- Cheng, Tun-jen. 1989. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan." *World Politics* 41, no. 4: 471–99.
- Ciddi, Sinan. 2009. *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Colley, Linda. 2021. *The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2021.

- Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 1970. *The Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*. Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.
- Conquest, Robert. 2008. *The Great Terror: A Reassessment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CuUnjieng Aboitiz, Nicole. 2020. *Asian Place, Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887–1912*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deutschmann, Moritz. 2013. “Cultures of Statehood, Cultures of Revolution: Caucasian Revolutionaries in the Iranian Constitutional Movement, 1906–1911.” *Ab Imperio* 2013, no. 2: 165–90.
- Di Palma, Francesco, ed. 2019. *Perestroika and the Party: National and Transnational Perspectives on European Communist Parties in the Era of Soviet Reform*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Djilas, Milovan. 1957. *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Ergut, Ferdan. 2003. “The State and Civil Rights in the Late Ottoman Empire.” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 13, no. 1: 53–74.
- Feliu, Laura, and Ferran Izquierdo Brichs, eds. 2019. *Communist Parties in the Middle East: 100 Years of History*. London: Routledge.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, no. 16: 3–18.
- Gallagher, Tom. 1990. “Conservatism, Dictatorship and Fascism in Portugal, 1914–45.” In *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe*, edited by Martin Blinkhorn, 157–75. London: Routledge.
- Gargarella, Roberto. 2013. *Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810–2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gill, Graeme. 1994. *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, Kenneth F. 2010. “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance.” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7: 807–34.
- Grotke, Kelly L., and Markus J. Prutsch, eds. 2014. *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. 2008. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. 2017. *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Harper, Tim. 2021. *Underground Asia: Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hazard, John N. 1974. “Soviet Model for Marxian Socialist Constitutions.” *Cornell Law Review* 60, no. 6: 985–1004.
- Hess, Steve. 2013. *Authoritarian Landscapes: Popular Mobilization and the Institutional Sources of Resilience in Nondemocracies*. Boston, MA: Springer.
- Hsia, C. L. 1931. “China’s People’s Convention: National Constitution and Ten-Year Plan.” *Pacific Affairs* 4, no. 9: 779–98.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.



- Inozemtsev, Vladislav. 2021. “Konchina rossiiskoi oppozitsii” [The demise of the Russian opposition]. *Novaia gazeta*, July 2, 2021.
- Jessen, Ralph, and Hedwig Richter, eds. 2011. *Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections Under 20th Century Dictatorships*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- Kao, Tsu-min 高資敏. 1986. “Qing rang minzhu fanpu guizhen” 請讓民主返璞歸真 [Please let democracy return to its original state]. *Lianhe bao* 聯合報, November 13, 1986: 2.
- Kaplonski, Christopher. 2014. *The Lama Question: Violence, Sovereignty, and Exception in Early Socialist Mongolia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Kévorkian, Raymond. 2011. *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Khlevniuk, Oleg V. 2015. *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*. Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kieser, Hans-Lukas. 2018. *Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kistiakovskii, B. A. 1916. *Sotsial'nye nauki i pravo: Ocherki po metodologii sotsial'nykh nauk i obshchei teorii prava* [Social sciences and law: Essays on the methodology of social sciences and the general theory of law]. Moscow: Izdanie M. i S. Sabashnikovykh.
- Kurzman, Charles. 2008. *Democracy Denied, 1905–1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy*. Cambridge (USA): Harvard University Press.
- Lankov, Andrei N. 2002. “Kim Takes Control: The ‘Great Purge’ in North Korea, 1956–1960.” *Korean Studies* 26, no. 1: 87–119.
- Lenin, V. I. 1920. “Left-Wing” *Communism: an Infantile Disorder*, Marxists Internet Archive <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/lwc/ch10.htm>, Accessed January 29, 2022.
- Lenin, V. I. 1974. “Plekhanov o terrore” [Plekhanov on terror]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Collected works], 5th ed., 35: 184–6. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury.
- Lih, Lars. T. 2011. *Lenin*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Liu, Zehua, and Jianqing Liu. 2015. “Civic Associations, Political Parties, and the Cultivation of Citizenship Consciousness in Modern China,” translated by Peter Zarrow. In *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals, and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890–1920*, edited by Joshua A. Fogel and Peter G. Zarrow, 39–60. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. “Political Order and One-Party Rule.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 123–43.
- Malesky, Edmund, Regina Abrami, and Yu Zheng. 2011. “Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China.” *Comparative Politics* 43, no. 4: 409–27.
- Matten, Marc (2012). “‘China is the China of the Chinese’: The Concept of Nation and its Impact on Political Thinking in Modern China.” *Oriens Extremus*, 53, 63–106.
- McAdams, A. James. 2017. *Vanguard of the Revolution: The Global Idea of the Communist Party*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- McCormick, Barrett L. 1990. *Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Meng, Anne. 2021. “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength.” *British Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2: 526–40.

- Mislivskaia, Galina. 2021. "TsIK utverdil okonchatel'nye itogi vyborov v Gosdumu" [The Central Election Commission approved the final results of the election to the State Duma]. *Rossiiskaia gazeta*. September 24, 2021. <https://rg.ru/2021/09/24/cik-utverdil-okonchatelnye-itogi-vyborov-v-gosdumu.html>
- Moniz Bandeira, Egas. 2017. "China and the Political Upheavals in Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia: Non-Western Influences on Constitutional Thinking in Late Imperial China, 1893–1911." *Journal of Transcultural Studies* 8, no. 2: 40–78. DOI: 10.17885/heiup.ts.2017.2.23701
- Moniz Bandeira, Egas. 2020. 'Between Chaos and Liberty: Chinese Uses of the French Revolution of 1789.' In *Alternative Re presentations of the Past: The Politics of History in Modern China*, 119–47. Edited by Chan, Ying-kit and Fei, Chen. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.
- Moniz Bandeira, Egas. 2021. "The 22 Frimaire of Yuan Shikai: Privy Councils in the Constitutional Architectures of Japan and China, 1887–1917." In *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies, 1850–1950*, edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 150–87. Abingdon: Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003158608
- Moniz Bandeira, Egas. 2022. "From Dynastic Cycle to Eternal Dynasty: The Japanese Notion of Unbroken Lineage in Chinese and Korean Constitutionalist Debates, 1890–1911." *Global Intellectual History* 7, no. 3 (2022): 517–32. DOI: 10.1080/23801883.2020.1796236.
- Naimark, Norman M. 2016. *Genocide: A World History*. Oxford University Press.
- Naimark, Norman M. 2019. *Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Naimark, Norman, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge. 2017. *The Cambridge History of Communism*. Vol. 2: The Socialist Camp and World Power, 1941–1968. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Öney, Berna. 2018. "Constitutional Debate in Turkey: From Dominant Party Heresthetical Strategy to Single-Party Hegemony, Quantitative Text Analyses." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 3: 33–54.
- Paxton, Robert O. 1998. "The Five Stages of Fascism." *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 1: 1–23.
- Pons, Stephen, and Stephen Smith, eds. 2017. *The Cambridge History of Communism*. Vol. 1: World Revolution and Socialism in One Country, 1917–1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reuter, Ora John, and Thomas F. Remington. 2009. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 4: 501–26.
- Rothman, Stanley. 1967. "One-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis." *Social Research* 34, no. 4: 675–702.
- Rudolph, Henrike. 2021. "The Preparations for the First Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Quest for Legitimacy." In *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia, 1850–1950: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies*, edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 282–310. London: Routledge.
- Sablin, Ivan, and Egas Moniz Bandeira. 2021. "Introduction." In *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia, 1850–1950: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies*, edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 1–12. London: Routledge.

- Sablin, Ivan. 2018. *The Rise and Fall of Russia's Far Eastern Republic, 1905-1922: Nationalisms, Imperialisms, and Regionalisms in and after the Russian Empire*. London: Routledge.
- Sablin, Ivan. 2020. "Russia in the Global Parliamentary Moment, 1905–1918: Between a Subaltern Empire and an Empire of Subalterns." In *Locating the Global: Spaces, Networks and Interactions from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, edited by Holger Weiss. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.
- Sablin, Ivan. 2021. "From Autonomy to an Asian Revolution: Koreans and Buriat-Mongols in the Russian Imperial Revolution and the Soviet New Imperialism, 1917–1926." In *The Russian Revolution in Asia: From Baku to Batavia*, edited by Sabine Dullin, Étienne Forestier-Peyrat, Yuxin Rachel Lin, and Naoko Shimazu, 37–54. London: Routledge.
- Scalapino, Robert A. 1962. *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Schuler, Paul. 2021. *United Front: Projecting Solidarity through Deliberation in Vietnam's Single-Party Legislature*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Shanshiev, G. N., ed. 1959. *Vtoroi s"ezd RSDRP, iul'–avgust 1903: Protokoly* [The Second Congress of the RSDLP, July–August 1903: Minutes]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury.
- Simotomai, Nobuo. 2009. *Kim Ir Sen i Kremľ': Severnaia Koreia epokhi kholodnoi voiny (1945–1961 gg.)* [Kim Il-sung: North Korea of the Cold War period (1945–1961)]. Edited by D. V. Strel'tsov. Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet.
- Smith, Marissa J. 2020. "Power of the People's Parties and a Post-Soviet Parliament: Regional Infrastructural, Economic, and Ethnic Networks of Power in Contemporary Mongolia." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 11, no. 2: 107–16.
- Spooner, Paul B. 2011. "Sun Yat-sen and the Second International: His Activities in Europe, Winter-Spring 1905," *Chinese Cross-Currents* 8, no. 4.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. 2009. "Considerations on Imperial Comparisons." In *Empire Speaks out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire*, edited by Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov, 33–55. Leiden: Brill.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor, and Terry Martin. 2001. "Introduction." In *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, 3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1993. *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2017. *"They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian Genocide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Swain, Geoff. 2011. *Tito: A Biography*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Taylor, Jay. 2009. *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Terrill, Ross. 1999. *Mao: A Biography*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Trainin, I. P. 1940. *Konstitutsii i konstitutsionnye akty Soiuza SSR: 1922–1936* [Constitutions and constitutional acts of the USSR: 1922–1936]. Moscow: Izdanie Vedomostei Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR.
- Trencényi, Balázs, Michal Kopeček, Luka Lisjak Gabrijelcic, Maria Falina, and Mónika Baár, eds. 2018. *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central*

- Europe. Vol. 2: Negotiating Modernity in the “Short Twentieth Century” and Beyond, Part II: 1968–2018. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turnaoğlu, Banu. 2017. *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Velikanova, Olga. 2021. “Nominal Democracy in Stalinism.” In *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia, 1850–1950: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies*, edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 256–81. London: Routledge.
- Vu, Tuong. 2016. *Vietnam’s Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wang, Guolian 王國聯. 1988. “Minchu zhengdang zhi yanjiu” 民初政黨之研究 [Research on political parties in the early Republic]. *Sanmin zhuyi xuebao* 三民主義學報 12, no. 12: 169–98.
- Whittam, John. 1995. *Fascist Italy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Xi, Jinping 習近平. 2012. “‘Yi mo gao yu ai min, xing mo hou yu le min’—zai Guangdong kaocha gongzuo shi jianghua (2012 nian 12 yue 7 ri zhi 11 ri)” 「意莫高於愛民，行莫厚於樂民」——在廣東考察工作時講話（2012年12月7日至11日）[‘The greatest meaning is loving the people; the most generous action is making the people happy’—speech given during inspection in Canton (7th–11th December 2012)]. *Da shijian* 大事件, no. 19 (2013): 13–24.
- Xi, Jinping 習近平. 2021. Zai qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua 在慶祝中國共產黨成立100週年大會上的講話, *Qiushi* 求是, no. 14, available under [http://www.qstheory.cn/yaowen/2021-07/01/c\\_1127615372.htm](http://www.qstheory.cn/yaowen/2021-07/01/c_1127615372.htm). English translation as “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” *CPC Central Committee Bimonthly Qiushi*, no. 4, available under [http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-09/06/c\\_658164.htm](http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-09/06/c_658164.htm)
- Yan, Jiaqi, and Gao Gao. 1996. *Turbulent Decade*. Translated by D. W. Y. Kwok. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Yao, Qi 姚琦. 2008. “Song Jiaoren yu Minchu zhengdang zhengzhi” 宋教仁與民初政黨政治 [Song Jiaoren and party politics in the early Republic]. *Guangxi shehui kexue* 廣西社會科學, no. 4: 124–8.
- Yu, Zhi 與之 [“With it,” pseudonym]. 1906. “Lun Zhongguo xianzai zhi dangpai ji jianglai zhi zhengdang” 論中國現在之黨派及將來之政黨 [On China’s present factions and future political parties]. *Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報 4, no. 20: 23–44.
- Zheng, Yongnian. 2009. *The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction, and Transformation*. London: Routledge.
- Zhu, Renxian 朱仁顯. 2002. “Lun Qingmo lixianpai de yihui sixiang” 論清末立憲派的議會思想 [On the parliamentary thought of the constitutionalist faction during the late Qing]. *Xueshu yuekan* 學術月刊, no. 6: 93–8.
- Zürcher, Erik J. 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.

# 1 The birth of Anfu China, East Asia's first party-state: Toward a constitutional dictatorship of the gentry, 1916–1918

*Ernest Ming-tak Leung*<sup>1</sup>

The Anfu Regime has an evil reputation in modern Chinese history, being the embodiment of the absence of morals, ideals, or achievement, and for having brought destruction and misery to the country. It was seen as having begun a long warlord era and was thus a stain on the already dismal record of China's Republican era. Despite the many attempts at re-evaluating events and personages such as Yuan Shikai [*Yuan Shih-k'ai* 袁世凱] and Chiang Kai-shek, Anfu has been deliberately and singularly left out.

Yet the Anfu Regime had in fact been greatly misunderstood; the years 1917–20 were indeed marked by brutal internal strife, but the state possessed a progressive vision of establishmentarian reform. It should be seen as a classic case of failed developmental state-building, comparable to other military-dominated, single-party “developmental dictatorships” in the twentieth century Third World. This paper focuses on the origins of the Anfu Regime in State Organicism and State Corporatism. Another paper has dealt with legislation by and political struggles in the Anfu Parliament in 1918–20 (Yan and Leung 2022), and a further article will concern the two waves of developmentalist economic policies in late-1917 and mid-1920 respectively (for a preliminary treatment see Leung 2021).

The Anfu Club [*Anfu Julebu* 安福俱樂部] governed in 1918–20 on the foundations of a political system and economic strategy laid down by men from the erstwhile Progressive Party in late 1917. The “Progressive-Anfu System” thus attempted to build a disciplined party with centralized decision-making, based on a stable alliance between interest groups. This enabled the emergence of a militarily supported, “constitutional dictatorship” of the gentry, which in the process of hoping to transform itself into an industrial class, required support from the state's expanding corpus of technocrats. With the help of German legal theories transmitted through Japan, they attempted to justify greater representation for themselves within government institutions – most notably demonstrated in a late-1917 attempt to reform the Senate into a chamber of functional constituencies – which, had it been materialized, would have been East Asia's first corporatist Parliament. Meanwhile, the Anfu “entrepreneurial regime,” intent on building State Capitalism, was influenced

via Japan by early developmentalist theories such as Listianism and German State Socialism. However, the attempt was inconclusive, as many of these ideas failed to come to fruition.

Anfu's reputation owes itself to the fact that the regime alienated and incurred the wrath of every single subsequently important political force, from rival factions within the northern military establishment, to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, to the CCP and even the Proto-Fascists (the Young China Party). Historians also seem to have the unfortunate and rarely questioned habit of using as evidence sensationalist political pamphlets, mostly published under pseudonyms in the immediate aftermath of Anfu's collapse in 1920. Many for instance agree that Anfu was not even a political party, had no concrete organization, political vision or ideology, nor even a charter (Chang 2007b: 128–129). This paper intends to provide some evidence to the contrary, focusing on the construction of Anfu as a party and the ideology of its institutional design. Such evidence could never possibly be complete – much of the documentation has been lost or was deliberately destroyed<sup>2</sup> – but it should be able to demonstrate how Anfu attempted to be a coherent state-building project. Anfu's highly disciplined organization was unprecedented in late-imperial early republican politics, and utterly remarkable considering that the Manchu Empire had been dissolved only six years prior. Being an alliance of several parliamentary and bureaucratic factions, its highest executive organ was the 86-member Club Council, comparable to the CCP's Central Committee. On the second tier was the “Club Congress of Parliamentarians of Both Chambers.” These decided all matters regarding the Club and Parliament, and concentrated all political and legislative deliberation in the high Anfu elites, chosen on the basis of their ability to represent interest groups. Anfu MPs were then obliged to follow the Club's resolutions and act accordingly in Parliament (Xitang Yeshe 1920: 20–21).

Unlike a Leninist party, Anfu did not control the military; rather, it relied on it, controlling in turn the civil service and legislature; General Xu Shuzheng [Hsu Shu-cheng 徐樹錚] once said that “Since the start of the Republic in 1912, government has been puppeted by Parliament, resulting in sheer disorder. Why can't we organize a party for ourselves, like training and organizing an army? If we have our own army of children, they will be puppeted by us” (Zhang 1979, 194). This system, whereby the army runs the party, is similar to many developmental dictatorships.<sup>3</sup> But the Club later increasingly acquired a mind of its own as when it cut the military budget by 20% (see Yan and Leung 2022). Finally, what also deserves attention is the overwhelmingly foreign – mostly Japanese – education background of the Progressive and Anfu elites. Duan Qirui [Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞] had been trained in artillery at the Berlin War College and had interned at Krupp in 1889–90. This scientific training distinguished him from his subordinates, mostly trained in law and political science, if not only schooled in the classics or even being outright illiterates. The Anfu Regime had every reason to be highly accomplished, but fell foul of its own missteps plus the many structural and external problems which this three-part series will attempt to explain.

In historical institutionalist analysis, the state is seen as “an idea,” “a legal system” and an “organised expression of hegemony.”<sup>4</sup> In that sense, it is a natural tendency of the state, quite independently of malice, to be all-encompassing in its bureaucracy, to assume the guise of absolute authority in executing the law, to monopolize political decision through its branches of power, to settle social conflict, provide public services, administer the economy, and ultimately, to repress by force if necessary. Anfu’s fortunes and defeat were determined by its quest to be an “organised expression of hegemony” – to alienate everyone in its quest to be hegemon, and to end up consigned to the dustbin of history when it ultimately failed to deliver that hegemonic ability. It was never going to be a successful totalitarian regime even if it wished to be, when it preserved relatively large spheres of freedom and declined to suppress despite being able to. Anfu never announced what its official ideological platform was, but it fitted well into Juan Linz’ definition of an authoritarian regime:

Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.

(Linz 1970, 255)

### **The “Anfu Era” at a glance**

During 1917–20, the Peking (or “Beiyang” [Peiyang 北洋]) Republican Regime was subordinated to the control of men who created the “Anfu Club” in 1918, and to Anhui [Anhui 安徽 / Wanxi 皖系] Clique military leaders such as Premier Duan Qirui and Army Vice Minister Xu Shuzheng, as well as Beiyang bureaucrats including President Xu Shichang [Hsu Shih-ch’ang 徐世昌] and Senate leader Liang Shiyi [Liang Shih-i 梁士詒]. The so-called “Beiyang” (“North Sea”) establishment had been a group of late-imperial military and bureaucratic modernizers, mostly born and raised under traditional circumstances, but whom during the late-nineteenth century had received an education that was to varying extents western-influenced. They had worked under Viceroy Li Hongzhang [Li Hung-chang 李鴻章] and Yuan Shikai to build the “North Sea Fleet,” which was sunk in 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War; subsequently, their focus transitioned toward establishing a new western-styled army, modern administration, and promoting state-led economic development.

In the desperation of the 1911 Republican Revolution, revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen offered his position as Provisional President to anyone who could make Emperor Puyi abdicate. Duan Qirui then led a petition of 143 imperial generals to force Puyi to step down, thus becoming his “first

making of the republic.” The Empire was dissolved, and the last Imperial Prime Minister, Yuan Shikai, duly accepted the Republican Presidency; but by 1915 he had grown disillusioned with Republicanism and attempted to enthrone himself as the new emperor. Duan bitterly opposed this, and Yuan, who sacked Duan for being disloyal, reappointed him as Premier during his dying days in 1916 – thus Duan had made the republic a second time. Duan revived the Kuomintang-dominated “1912 Parliament” that Yuan had dissolved in 1914, and attempted to transition toward a pluralist constitutional order. That failed when his relations with Parliament ruptured on various questions surrounding the draft constitution, provincial autonomy, personnel appointments, corruption accusations, and China’s participation in the First World War.

At the nadir of the political chaos in June–July 1917, Zhang Xun [Chang Hsun 張勳] a mid-ranking Beiyang leader, forced a second dissolution of Parliament and launched a coup to restore Puyi. He was quickly defeated by Duan’s forces entering from Tientsin. Duan had thus “made” the Republic a third time, and himself a national hero, sweeping away at one stroke both the radicals and the ultra-conservatives. Duan then made the fateful decision that a fundamental reform to the constitutional order was necessary, upon consulting Liang Qichao [*Liang Ch’i-ch’ao* 梁啟超], a Statist theorist and leader of the late-imperial constitutional monarchist movement – which had become the “Progressive Party” after the Republic was established. According to him, the 1912 Parliament should not be reconvened; instead, a new “Provisional Senate” should be organized to redraft electoral legislation. Duan’s cabinet was made up mostly of ex-Progressives. Yet between Duan and Liang schisms emerged, and Duan’s cabinet resigned in November 1917. This was whilst Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang government in Canton went to war with Peking.

When Yuan died in 1916, both the Kuomintang and the Progressive Party [*Jinbudang* 進步黨] had dissolved themselves in a spirit of cordiality, having opposed Yuan’s monarchism together. Factions then emerged. By early 1917 the resultant factionalism was regretted universally, and the ex-Progressives (known at the time as the “Research Clique”) worked to reform itself into a “Grand Progressive Party,” holding a special conference for that purpose on 27 July, 1917, but nothing came out of it.<sup>5</sup> By late August, news began to abound that there were plans to create an “all-controlling” party that would rise above both the Kuomintang and the Progressive Party.<sup>6</sup> From that time, Anfu men started to gain control of the legislature and executive, whilst the Progressive men faded out by the end of November.

With the help of Xu Shuzheng, Duan began to consolidate his own power base in the Provisional Senate and various branches of government, and the “Anfu Club,” named after the alley (*hutong*) where its Peking headquarters were based, was created on 8 March, 1918. Various names had been proposed for the Club, including the “Republican Club,” “Democratic Club” and “Popular Constitutional Club” [*Minxian julebu* 民憲俱樂部],<sup>7</sup> but they



all fell through due to the initial uncertainty over the orientation of the seemingly provisional organization. When made Premier again in March 1918, Duan oversaw the expansion of a sprawling Anfu empire, which proceeded to control two-thirds of the new Parliament in August 1918. Yet a complete “Anfu Cabinet” was never formed, and it did not manage to help Duan win the Presidency, in the face of competition from his main Beiyang rival, Acting President and Zhili [*Chihli* 直隸 / *Zhixi* 直系] Faction leader, General Feng Guozhang [Feng Kuo-chang 馮國璋].

The Presidency went instead to a figure agreeable to the entirety of the Beiyang establishment, ex-Manchuria Governor and Yuan-era Premier Xu Shichang, who had been aide to Yuan since the 1890s. Duan and Feng both “retired” from politics, Duan only nominally, being still in charge of the “War Participation Supervisory Office” [*Duban canzhan shiwuchu* 督辦參戰事務處]. The Anfu Regime collaborated extensively with Japan, and received substantial loans through the State Socialist thinker Nishihara Kamezō 西原龜三, aide to Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake 寺內正毅. These were meant to induce rapid, planned industrial growth and the creation of an “East Asian Economic League”; the funds went instead to repay debts and fund the campaign against the south. After a civil war was declared by the southern military junta based in Canton, directed by Sun Yat-sen, the Beiyang Government deployed vast forces and resources in a war that saw widespread atrocities, and was reluctant to come to the bargaining table despite Zhili Faction generals refusing to fight further. During the May Fourth Movement, the Anfu Club came under widespread condemnation for its prior pro-Japanese stance, yet the government quickly released the students arrested during the violent protests. Two months later the Anfu Club effectively announced its intention to transition towards socialism, and by mid-1920 a series of State Socialist reforms affecting a number of economic sectors had been proposed (see Leung 2021). On 14 July 1920 war broke out between the Zhili and Anhui Factions, resulting in the defeat of the latter and Duan’s unsuccessful suicide attempt on 21 July 1920 (Hu 2006, 179). The Anfu Regime collapsed and President Xu ordered Anfu Club’s disbandment on 3 August 1920.

### **The road to State Corporatism, 1916–17**

In what theoretical context should Anfu be understood? “Corporatism,” as the antonym to “Pluralism,” might be a suitable framework. These two are opposing solutions to the increasingly diversified interests and differentiated structures in the “modern polity”; while pluralists “place their faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces; corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole” (Schmitter 1974, 97). Philippe C. Schmitter has pointed out that all too often, analysts of corporatist and authoritarian regimes “merely mourn the passing or degeneration of pluralism and either advocate its return”

(Schmitter 1974, 95–96). This is precisely the case with Chinese historians, beginning in the 1930s, who lament how Anfu killed off competitive, pluralist parliamentary politics. To Schmitter, this does no justice to Corporatism as an alternative model (Schmitter 1974, 93–94).

Schmitter proceeds to distinguish between two forms of Corporatism based on different premises – “State Corporatism,” which happens mostly in “anti-liberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist” (Schmitter 1974, 105) states, whereby the government chooses and appoints representatives of interest groups to form the government, and consciously plans the make-up of representative institutions in order to ascertain the source and composition of state authority, rather than letting this be determined by free, competitive elections. Opposed to this was Social Corporatism for the “postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state,” with competitive elections within interest sectors.

The Anfu Club itself was not explicitly made up of sectors or corporations beyond provincial ones. It was, however, a powerful corporation in itself<sup>8</sup> that bound together consciously into one centralist organization the representatives of bureaucratic and parliamentary factions, as well as consciously choosing men of different professions to lead expert committees. By doing so, it was able to ensure the stable operation of the three branches of government for almost three whole years, including a legislature that according to the original plans would have had an economic and ethnically corporatist Senate, and which, after the plans were defeated, still ensured adequate representation for the leading mandarin literati class. It achieved monopolization through de facto uncontested elections, and made possible reciprocal support between politicized soldiers and the industrializing literati. The Anfu Regime was decidedly State Corporatist. Indeed, it could be seen as the precursor of the mode of political organization after the 1920s, under the Kuomintang and the CCP, which has been characterized by Corporatism (Tsui 2018, 37, 41, 73, 231).

Many such Corporatist regimes, including Spain under Franco or Indonesia under Sukarno and Suharto, have been referred to, or promoted themselves as “Organic States” or “Organic Democracies” (Linz 1970, 254). A whole philosophical tradition existed in Germany, notably counting Hegel amongst its ranks, that sees the state as an organism or body. The “Organic State Theory” (Bluntschli 1885b) of the Swiss-German jurist Johann Kaspar Bluntschli from 1875–76 entered East Asian consciousness very early on, though the works of Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 and Liang Qichao. Organicism believes that “political communities (or states) function like natural organisms in which the parts [...] exist to contribute to the well-being of the whole,” and that “collective interests take precedence over individual or sectional interests and consensus takes precedence over institutionalized conflict” (Bourchier 2019, 600). The late-Qing intelligentsia, such as the Constitutional Monarchist Yang Du [*Yang Tu* 楊度],<sup>9</sup> already possessed Statist, Corporatist, and Organicist inclinations in their idea of political

parties – a corpus with a unified, directional ideology representing universal interests seeking to be a single group dominating all of politics, as opposed to parties under pluralism having “broad aggregate goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan ideologies” (Schmitter 1974, 101). The party must become the leader of the organic national totality thus formed.

It is true that organicism was against legal theories that threatened to weaken the state. Yet organicism prioritized clearly defined legislation which bureaucrats must follow, to prevent them from becoming oppressors. Organicism greatly influenced American Progressives at the turn of the twentieth century, including Woodrow Wilson and the constitutionalist Frank Goodnow, who provided theoretical support to Yuan Shikai’s monarchical restoration in 1915. They all saw need to replace rotten nineteenth-century liberalism, and looked up to the German model of the strong bureaucratic executive state and the “visible hand” in the economy. Executive power must be expanded, and since the separation of powers threatened the organic integration of society, it would have to be modified (Rosser 2014, 100–101, 103, 106).

The Progressives and Anfu did not seem to have directly quoted State Organicism in their official documents, but in 1916–17, by the time the “Progressive-Anfu System” was being set-up, the theory was certainly in vogue amongst its members, and was in fact so embedded in their consciousness that it often featured without warning in their remarks on various matters.<sup>10</sup> Lin Baishui [*Lin Pai-shui* 林白水], editor of *Fair Comment* [*Gongyanbao* 公言報], an army newspaper which later became Anfu’s official newspaper, wrote in September 1917 that “the state must not lack an organic composition and a unified hierarchy throughout.”<sup>11</sup> Organicism was cited on several occasions by *L’Impartial* 大公報 [*Ta-kung Pao*] editor and later Anfu “extra-parliamentary member” Hu Zhengzhi [Hu Cheng-chi 胡政之], under his pseudonym “Cold Observer” [*Lengguan* 冷觀].<sup>12</sup> Hu’s editorial *A Chance for National Awakening* on 16 August 1917, soon after war was declared, adopted the stance of “Social Organicism” [*shehui you jiti lun* 社會有機體論] and expounded on what would become the Anfu worldview of how China should deal with the pressures of imperialism, economic warfare and national industrial development.

The prelude to the establishment of the “Progressive-Anfu System” was the failed transition in 1916–17 toward pluralist politics. Since the 1912 Provisional Constitution was modeled upon the 1875 French Third Republic Constitutional Laws, this had the effect of introducing to Peking politics all the inherent instabilities of French multi-party politics and the frequent changes of cabinet, in addition to all sort of constitutional deadlocks, notably between the Presidential Palace and the Premier’s State Council (cabinet). Such “Palace-Council Struggles” [*Fuyuan zhi zheng* 府院之爭] became a staple of Peking political life until the Anfu Club came along. Duan Qirui’s battles with President Li Yuanhong [*Li Yuan-hung* 黎元

洪] and his allies in the Kuomintang-dominated Parliament, concerned the make-up of the initial Beiyang-Kuomintang-Progressive coalition cabinet, provincial autonomous powers in the new constitution, the severance of relations with and declaration of war against Germany and Austria, and the composition of the wartime “National Defence Cabinet” meant to be a grand coalition of political factions. Whilst Duan was allied with the Japanese civilian government under Prime Minister Terauchi and Nishihara, Li was under the influence of the Japanese Army, which did not wish China to enter the war (Dickinson 1999, 169–171).

The factional situation then was dizzying and ever-changing, with the Kuomintang split into four factions, each with sub-groups, whilst the Beiyang *Tuchuns* 督軍 (*provincial commanders*) formed a Congress but were also fractious. Executive-legislative relations were in a protracted deadlock. In October 1916, the largest Kuomintang faction split on the question of whether to elect as Vice President a northern general, Feng Guozhang, or a southerner, Lu Rongting [*Lu Jung-t'ing* 陸榮廷]; the position went to Feng. By obstructing cabinet appointments, the *Tuchuns* prevented Duan from gaining the support of the Kuomintang, and their relations soured. Matters improved briefly in March 1917, when under Liang Qichao's encouragement, Duan pushed for the severance of relations with Germany and Austria, and in a rare stroke of luck for Duan, the bill passed in Parliament. Duan then decided to promote again the idea of having more Kuomintang ministers, in exchange for passing the bill to declare war – an initiative promptly blocked by the *Tuchuns'* Congress.

The Kuomintang majority took Duan's goodwill for granted, perceived him as a hypocrite, and thought the *Tuchuns* to be carrying out Duan's real plot. With the exception of the Political Science Society [*Zhengxuehui* 政學會], the most moderate of the Kuomintang factions, all of them mustered their full strength to topple Duan. Any compromise was predicated on Duan resigning. Presidential Secretary Ding Shiyi [Ting Shih-i 丁世嶧], a member of the Kuomintang radical group, the “People's Friends Society” [*Minyoushe* 民友社], reportedly announced that “To be honest, I am for China's participation in the war. But since it is Duan's policy, I will oppose it to the end” (Tao 1971, 62; in Xu 2005, 221). In addition were corruption charges in Spring 1917 brought forth by multiple factions, including Duan's Beiyang rivals, against their opponents, affecting the Finance, Communications, and Naval Ministries. Matters had become a direct threat to Duan.

The first State Corporatist solution was suggested at this critical juncture. Duan proposed a “National Defence Cabinet” that would incorporate all main factions and lead China's central government during the world war. This idea had come from Zhang Shizhao [Chang Shih-chao 章士釗], a member of the Political Science Society and a personal friend of Duan's. He suggested setting up an “Extraordinary State Council” (ESC) [*Tebie guowu huiyi* 特別國務會議] composed of ministers without portfolio representing various parties, on the lines of Herbert Asquith's May 1915 cabinet

reshuffling, which Chang argues had made “Britain’s military plans [...] most swift and flexible.” The ESC would also include Chief of Staff Wang Shizhen [Wang Shih-chen 王士珍], one of Duan’s Beiyang rivals (Zhang 2000 [1917-03-12], 46–47). Duan was wary of this proposal, for it would also have allowed southwestern political forces to penetrate into Peking. In March he set up an “International Political Council” [*Guoji zhengwu pingyihui* 國際政務評議會] that had corporatist functions but included only second-tier factional leaders, satisfying therefore none of the factions.

With his failure to bring Kuomintang men into the cabinet, Duan by May had to prevent a dissolution of Parliament, perceived then to be a suicidal act for the military. He announced on 8 May 1917 to all factions at a meeting at the State Council that once the War Bill was passed in Parliament, he would set up the National Defence Cabinet (Ding and Zhao 2010, 426). Yet on the night of 9 May, the Political Science Society held a heated four-hour meeting to debate the issue, where the motion to support the War Bill was voted down by a small margin, which meant that the last moderate Kuomintang faction had decided to give Duan a vote of no confidence. The next morning, when Parliament resumed its session, thousands of thugs and beggars calling themselves the “Citizens’ Corps,” organized by Duan’s two lieutenants notorious for their brashness, Jin Yunpeng [Chin Yun-p’eng 靳雲鵬] and Fu Liangzuo [Fu Liang-tso 傅良佐], surrounded the houses of Parliament and beat up Kuomintang legislators. Some reports suggest that the Kuomintang had sent in their own agent provocateurs.<sup>13</sup> This became the last straw on executive-legislative relations, and the whole cabinet save for Duan himself resigned in protest. One *Tuchun*, Zhang Xun, then pressured President Li into dissolving Parliament and restored Emperor Puyi for a week, before he too was defeated by Duan’s forces entering from Tientsin.

From the point of view of the Beiyang leaders, pluralist politics created a situation that was as uncontrollable as it was beyond comprehension. Beiyang officials like Zeng Yujun [Tseng Yu-tsün 曾毓雋] still insisted, in his old age in the 1950s and as an advisor to the PRC government, that politicians in 1916–17 “were of too low a quality and were too easily swayed” (Zeng 1988, 32). Understandably, even the more open-minded amongst them would have asked why it was necessary to pay an extraordinary political price to maintain a frequently gridlocked pluralist system, when so much needed to be done. On the other hand, information flow was incomplete, even when a major political crisis was at hand. Some bureaucrats showed signs that they only half understood the ground-level facts in the factional struggle.<sup>14</sup> The task for Beiyang now was to design a non-factional political system. Any future political arrangement would need to resemble the ESC proposal, as well as incorporating the army more organically into it. Duan turned to Liang Qichao and the Progressives for advice; they had advocated Statism in its charter as early as 1913, and Liang was widely known since the 1900s for promoting the idea of an “enlightened despotism.”

Whom would Duan and Liang's "National Defence State" have benefitted, beyond the narrow confines of the Beiyang establishment? If we are to trust the judgment of the historian Chang P'eng-yuan [Zhang Pengyuan 張朋園], then Liang's designated ruling class "undoubtedly was the gentry" (Chang 2007a, 19). Facing the chaos of pluralism and anxious about their replacement by immature political forces such as the young revolutionaries, the gentry, or mandarin literati, were eager to reinvigorate their political strength by building a controlling political party, and to foster a German and Japanese-styled protectionist economic policy (Chang 2007b, 15). Liang detested pluralism, stating that in competitive politics, "worthless" people uttering "worthless" words, like certain "self-proclaimed publicists," would only create chaos. Liang explained his "theory of the national central core class" [*Guojia zhongjian jieji lun* 國家中堅階級論] as thus –

they must be a small, excellent and noble minority, that earns the respect and adoration of the citizenry, so that their words may carry the greatest weight in the world [...] In fact, majority politics is still governed by a minority [...] any parliament in the world, any party in the world – are they directed and commanded by a majority or a minority? [...] Where their followers are numerous, every raising of the hand, and every movement of the foot, carries enormous weight.

(Liang 1936, "Duoshu zhengzhi zhi shiyan" 多數政治之實驗 [Experimentation in majoritarian politics], 35–36)

Liang believed that "since the last generation of mandarin literati possessed both a traditional Confucian upbringing and up-to-date western knowledge, they bore the brunt of the mission to save China, and did so without hesitation" (Chang 2007a, 19). But he claims that effective government "depends on whether, for any issue, public opinion could be neatly divided into two camps, one of which must then assume the majority. [...] Only then could governance be systematic and non-collisional" (Liang 1936, "Duoshu Zhengzhi zhi Shiyan", 37).

Liang's true intentions are only clear when his words are viewed as a system. He seemed to want a dualistic political system – a two-party system perhaps – but wanted only one core class, leading if necessary two parties. As such, what he really wanted was a monist political system. The fact of a single-party system could be achieved without explicitly calling it as such. Liang had strict requirements when it came to party discipline. He proposed something akin to "democratic centralism," understandable considering that he wanted nothing less than a vanguard party of the mandarin literati. In 1912–13 he issued these guidelines for his Republican Party (later merged into the Progressives) –

Rule IV – Party members must refrain from free action. [...] For a party is like an army, and party strategy is like war strategy, [...] Thus the

interdiction on free action in the party is the same as the interdiction on free action in the army. [...] Should the citizenry refuse to be the mechanical apparatus of the nation, the nation would have no foundation on which to stand; should the party member refuse to be the mechanical apparatus of the party, the party would not live. [...] One can be a mechanical part on one hand and still be the subject on the other. How? When the party decides its course, its members must all be in attendance, and freely express their opinions. A vote of majority is then taken, and once a resolution is made, it should be followed. Much as there shall be no freedom after the deliberation, there must be complete freedom during the deliberation.

(Liang 1936, “Gonghedang zhi diwei yu qi taidu” 共和黨之地位與其態度 [The position and attitude of the Republican Party], 26–27)

The concept of incorporating multi-focal interests under a wartime national unity system had come from Europe to China soon after the outbreak of war in August 1914, and soon became a “hip” term signifying all that was new about the age of war.<sup>15</sup> After the outbreak of WWI, Liang deeply admired the German wartime state, and under the influence of what he imagined of Walther Rathenau’s industrially mobilized state, described his ideal state as being a machine (Liang 1914, 100–101). He analyzed in 1915 the various European national unity governments, suggesting that declaring war could help sooth ethnic and socialist struggles as long as it implemented reformist policies (Liang 1915, 22). Japan’s “national unity system” [J. *Kyokoku icchi taisei*; C. *Juguo yizhi tizhi* 舉國一致體制] naturally also became an inspiration. The populist Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 had performed poorly during his tenure both domestically and diplomatically, as shown by the brash Twenty-One Demands for China, an attempt to turn China into a Japanese protectorate. The Meiji elder Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋 subsequently replaced Ōkuma with Terauchi Masatake, a general who had studied in France, in the Bluntschlian hope that he would use his “neutral” position to deepen Japan’s internal strength and to “unite and guide the people without bias” (Dickinson, 1999, 157).

The anti-pluralist strategy was widely reported to be a success in the Chinese media, notably Anfu’s own outlets like *L’Impartial*.<sup>16</sup> Even Vice-President Feng Guozhang mentioned the concept in his speech when arriving in Peking on 1 March 1917, in the presence of Duan, the State Council, legislators, and even Wang Jingwei. “In these treacherous times,” he said, “we must strive under national unity, and place the new Chinese State amongst the ranks of the powers.”<sup>17</sup> Yet by mid-1917, Liang had given up on co-opting the recalcitrant Kuomintang “young turks”; only mature representatives of the gentry were to be included. He blamed the failure of pluralism on “the defective elements in Parliament” (Ding 1958 [1936] in Chang 2007a, 81), and opposed any suggestion of reconvening the 1912 Parliament, opting instead to appoint a new, unicameral Provisional Senate

which would pave way for the domination of power by a new, regrouped Progressive Party at the head of a monolithic wartime state. Editor of *L'Impartial* Hu Zhengzhi still hoped in February 1917 that, with Yuan dead, different factions might rally under National Unity and seek progress to “meet the trends of the new world,” despite the existing regime being less than ideal.<sup>18</sup> After the bitter struggles of mid-1917, Hu had evidently lost his patience, and exclaimed –

Now if we are to consider the long-term benefits of this country, we should take advantage of the “Third Making of the Republic”, and establish a national strategy for the next century. We should, in the spirit of National Unity, seek a solution for our legislature. In the case of the old Parliament, it has been disbanded twice in the same session, and has lost all sacred dignity and respect from within and without. One should no more recover spilled water than to go through this all over again.<sup>19</sup>

### **The Old Guard, the Corrective Revolution, and the New Order**

The restoration of Emperor Puyi by Zhang Xun was itself a reaction against what he perceived to be the republican disorder of the “bad partisan habits” – pluralism – and in the nine theses announced on July 1st, he promised to design a political system on the best practices of constitutional monarchies worldwide. The coup that Duan Qirui in turn launched on 3 July 1917 against Zhang, with the help of Liang Qichao and a host of early technocrats – the so-called “Third Making of the Republic” – paved way for a new, *renovationist* political system to be designed by a newly appointed Provisional Senate, dominated by Statist elites. When fleets of trains spirited Duan’s troops from Tientsin into Peking, where they launched East Asia’s first air raid against Zhang’s “Pig-tail Army,” it was not only a “revolution” against a traditionalist monarchism rendered increasingly anachronistic by the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the Russian revolution of February 1917 but an act that also put the final nail into the coffin of radicalism and pluralism, and as we shall see, economic liberalism. In the sense that this “Corrective Revolution” – a term that in Middle Eastern politics refers usually to centrist military coups defeating rightwing reaction or leftwing adventurism – expelled from Peking the Kuomintang “young turks” and recalcitrant monarchists and re-installed the mandarin literati modernizers, though within the institutions of a constitutional republic and in alliance with a rising class of technocrats to promote a vast programme of modernization, this could be understood as a case of the “Old Guard, New Order,” which was how Robert O. Paxton (1972) described Vichy France and Marshal Pétain’s National Revolution. As such, the “Progressive-Anfu System” was the most class-based of Beiyang-era regimes, and was designed to allow an autocratic republic of gentry landlords to evolve into a modern bourgeois dictatorship.



To be granted a seat in the Provisional Senate, one would have needed to have a university degree or its equivalent, or pay in tax Mex \$100 or more, or have real estate of Mex \$50,000 or more. In a country rife with poverty, notes Chang P'eng-yuan, this was equivalent to creating a new aristocracy (Chang 2007b, 112–113). The Provisional Senate was therefore the epitome of an extreme elitism, and was equivalent to a House of Peers. The number of provincial deputies decreased from 220/274 in the 1912 Senate (the actual elected total being 263) to 110/168 in the Provisional Senate. Seats for the clearly corporatist “Central Academic Caucus” [*Zhongyang xuehui* 中央學會] increased from 8 to 30, representing “old high-ranking bureaucrats, the rich, Manchu and Muslim aristocrats, educators, and academics possessing a degree and who had worked for three years or more in academic institutions or have published academic works” (Chang 2007b, 113). Given that no elections were held in the South, and the final number of senators was only 140, the Central Academic Caucus constituted 21% of the Provisional Senate, at a time when nationwide literacy was only around 20%. Property requirements for voters were also vastly increased, with the electoral law passed in late 1917 for the New Parliament stipulating that voters must be males above 25 years of age, having resided in the constituency for two years or more, paying taxes of Mex \$4 or more, or having real estate of Mex \$500 or above, in addition to having graduated from primary school or its equivalent. In that sense, only the propertied and the educated would have any political power (Chang 2007b, 115–116).

As a result, in Jilin [Kirin 吉林] Province, where the percentage of voters was highest, it stood at a mere 0.166%; in Gansu [Kansu 甘肅] Province, where it was lowest, it was a pitiful 0.01%. These were even lower than the levels for the late-Imperial elections for the Advisory Council. The “Progressive-Anfu System” thus totally achieved the purpose of concentrating political power in the “central core” gentry class through the use, rather than rejection of, constitutional republican institutions (Xiong 2011, 176).

Liang's cry of war was echoed by many provincial commanders and local elites.<sup>20</sup> The next step was to co-opt them permanently; and corporatism, which could be “the product of a ‘new order’ following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special ‘collective spirit’” (Malherbe 1940, 13–14, in Schmitter 1974, 105) was naturally taken up. Given how the gentry had discovered the merits of investing in modern industry and commerce during the wartime economic boom, it was clear that any future arrangement would have to take into consideration the transitional nature of the gentry. In late-1917, Duan's cabinet proposed a *Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill* [*Xiuzheng guohui zuzhifa cao'an* 修正國會組織法草案], which would have seen the Senate reformed into a chamber of economic, ethnic, and socio-cultural corporations, resembling the Irish and Estonian Senates after their 1930s reforms. This has its origins in early 1917, when Parliament debated the draft constitution; some thought it odd that the Kuomintang-dominated Senate behaved more radically than the House of Representatives. Liang, noting such opinion, suggested that the Senate should be formed of functional

constituencies and government representatives, and that the object should be to prevent revolution<sup>21</sup> (Ding and Zhao 2010 [1936], 420).

The Provisional Senate held its opening ceremony on 10 November 1917, and Duan spoke on behalf of the State Council, pointing out that the preceding political chaos had been due to unsatisfactory legislation on elections and parliamentary organization, and that the task of the Provisional Senate was precisely to modify such laws. Duan's speech was a clear manifestation of his eclectic thinking, using traditional knowledge to support modern aims. For example, to boost morale, he argued on the basis of the *I Ching* that matters progressed in a zig-zag fashion and that setbacks necessarily happen. Next he switched to using mechanical political discourse, popular since the French Revolution (which produced terms such as "reaction"). Quoting the physics that he learnt during his artillery training – in this case statics and the laws of motion – he encouraged the senators to legislate in the direction of seeking an equilibrium between political forces, especially between the branches of power which should complement rather than to check and balance each other, and thus to determine the proper "track" of forward motion for government, which would bring wellbeing to China's 400 million population.<sup>22</sup>

The bill was however doomed from the outset when Duan and other Progressive cabinet members resigned at the end of November. Chief of Staff Wang Shih-chen became Premier, and Jiang Yong [*Chian Yung* 江庸] (Waseda) Justice Minister. On 28 November the Senate Review Committee decided on bicameralism after a two-hour debate.<sup>23</sup> Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Fang Shu 方樞 (Waseda), who had contributed to late-Imperial reforms, and who would later become an Anfu Extraparliamentary Member, was responsible for drafting the *Amendment Bill*. On 13 December the cabinet voted to send the Bill to the Provisional Senate, where three Legislation Bureau members explained the document and responded to queries.<sup>24</sup>

The Bill, patterned on Liang's ideas, established the principle that the upper chamber, by incorporating "classes and forces," would be more temperate than the lower chamber. Its "Explanatory Note" appears to have quoted at length a textbook first published in 1908 entitled *Political Science* written by Satō Ushijirō 佐藤丑次郎, Assistant Professor of Law at Kyoto Imperial University, especially on vocational representation and bicameralism under constitutional monarchies (Satō 1908, 380–381). The Note cited the British legalist James Bryce, best known for his works on the US political system, that most unicameralist countries revert eventually back to bicameralism.<sup>25</sup> It holds that since China was not a federalist country like Germany or the US, it did not have to replicate its political design, creating a situation where the two chambers served the same purpose and "might as well have been one chamber." However, unicameralism was proven to be only practical in small states. Bicameralism would be a brake on the radicalism of the lower chamber, which could reduce conflict between the executive and the legislature. Thus, the two chambers must be "utterly different, with the lower chamber representing the common folk, and the upper chamber representing

special forces,” elected by “special bodies” including the Central Academic Caucus or the Overseas Chinese Caucus.<sup>26</sup>

The Bill proceeded to propose that of the 134 seats in the Senate, 57 (42.5%) would be “Enterprise Representatives”; 37 (27.5%) would be “High-ranking Officials of the Judiciary and Executive”; 12 (9%) would be Academic Representatives; 16 (12%) would be chosen by Manchu, Mongolian, and Muslim aristocrats; and 4 (3%) elected respectively by those with state honors; by Overseas Chinese; and by the Lhasa electoral college. The last would be formed of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and senior officials of the Lhasa government, the precondition being that they understood Chinese and could participate in parliamentary discussions.<sup>27</sup> Enterprise Representatives would have been elected by the economic sector –

These deputies will be produced by enterprise bodies in agriculture, industry and commerce. This is designed with reference to various countries such as Prussia having Reichstag deputies recommended by Junkers, and deputies in the Japanese and Italian Parliaments representing large taxpayers. [...] Thus all sectors, agriculture, industry, commerce and mining could be included. In our case we are different from these systems in that they provide for overall representation whilst we propose representation specific to each constituent group. Since the start of the 20th Century, we have entered an epoch of economic representation. Politics in any country are always influenced by the power of economic bodies. Thus modern academics like Schäffle have advocated vocational representation as the way of electing parliamentary deputies. Such vocations may be economic entities or otherwise, and amongst the economic entities he has specified peasants, industrialists and businessmen, handicrafts workers, and labourers. This matches the spirit of our enterprise representatives being produced by agricultural, industrial and commercial bodies – the rationale for including 57 enterprise representatives in the Senate, for unless it is as numerous as that, given the breadth of Chinese territory, with some 26 provinces and special administrative regions, distribution will be difficult.<sup>28</sup>

The intention of this Bill to introduce corporatist representation, and considered even the issue of representation for laborers, in the context of stemming extra-parliamentary conflict, is no coincidence considering the State Socialist “economic spurt” (a concept explained in Gerschenkron 1962) that Duan and Liang were planning at the time. Albert Schäffle, a German legalist and sociologist quoted in the Explanatory Note, was a State Socialist vocal in his opposition against Marxism and Communism. In the 1880s he had participated in the drafting of social legislation under Bismarck (Siewert 2020, 311), and as the author of *The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection* (Schäffle 1893), advocated the establishment of a “rational social state.” To build it and to establish the right kind of socialism, the state in the

eyes of Schäffle would need to balance various interests and bring the various parts of the organism into harmony. Neither large-scale nationalization nor universal suffrage, as demanded at the time by the Social Democrats, would therefore be advisable. Universal suffrage to him over-emphasises the individual, creating imbalance.

Schäffle pointed out that education, church, art, and science – the “major branches of the national economy” (and indeed the sources of productivity according to Friedrich List) – were unrepresented in constitutions; in proper socialism, however, both functional and local representation would be necessary.<sup>29</sup> (Schäffle 1894, 146; 1896, 585). Bluntschli had also complained earlier on about universal suffrage providing incomprehensive representation, (Bluntschli 1885a, 58) and this would have been an influence on Schäffle, who argued that half of any legislature (or two-thirds, even three-fifths) should comprise of *Berufskörperschaften*, or “vocational corporations”; only such bodies make up the socio-economic organic fabric, and only when they were represented, would “complete representation” be achieved. (Schäffle 1894, 133) This was known as the “Principle of Functional Representation.” It was Satō’s book which first suggested the formula “peasants, industrialists and businessmen, handicrafts workers and labourers” taken up by the 1917 “Explanatory Note,” in an elaboration of Schäffle’s ideas.<sup>30</sup>

Schäffle’s principles appear to have been immediately defeated. In contrast to the Note, the Bill stipulated not a system like future Fascist Italy whereby legally prescribed vocational corporations produced deputies, but one large electoral college for eligible voters from all sectors electing Enterprise Representatives – in effect an “economic aristocracy.” This was far from Schäffle’s State Socialist vision, which would have also included labourers and handicraft workers. The Note made instead reference to the property requirements of the Belgian and Swedish upper chambers.<sup>31</sup> The new non-economic sectors included the Academic Electoral College designed on the basis of Spanish, Italian and Peruvian practice, and was much stricter in its provisions than the Central Academic Caucus of the 1918 New Senate.<sup>32</sup> Representatives of “High-ranking Officials of the Judiciary and Executive” was an extension of Liang’s idea of having official members of parliament, and partially satisfied some calls in 1916-7 for a “Chamber of Elders” [*Yuanlaoyuan* 元老院]; this is whilst the actual points of reference were Hungary and Italy, and proposed to “net in conservatively inclined talent with rich experience and knowledge.” They were to be produced from electoral colleges at central and local levels for officials appointed by the two levels of government. Yet the candidates could not be officials in active duty, and this meant that the system was reserved for retired officials, or that it was meant to be some sort of “revolving door.”<sup>33</sup>

All this suggests that the December 1917 *Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill* was a complete manifestation of the conservative vision of the late-Imperial Constitutional Monarchist movement under Liang, as revised for the Republican era – the belief in a hierarchical society and the

need for an aristocracy, and thus the need for a House of Peers idealistically made up of conservative, experienced men. Had this Bill been voted into existence, this could have been the start of China's march toward a Corporatist Developmental State, and was in every way a milestone for intellectual history. Had the system survived into the 1920s, it could have been the very point of embarkation of the proto-Fascistisation of the Anfu Regime. It already resembled, in its 1917 form, the Irish Senate from 1936 to the present; and with minor modifications it could have turned into an Italian or Estonian-styled legislature. In fact, the concept of Functional Representation was still popular after WWII, as shown notably in Indonesia.

Yet the Bill suffered a miscarriage. On 18 December the Provisional Senate's Committee of the Whole convened, and the intentions of the Senate Reform were immediately discerned. Hu Jun [Hu Chün 胡鈞] (Berlin) pointed out after the Legislation Bureau representatives had spoken that the Senate "would, I'm afraid, in this sense create a caste system."<sup>34</sup> On 23 December the Provisional Senate decided that the New Senate would still be elected from Provincial Assemblies and local or other electoral colleges.<sup>35</sup> This provided Anfu men and the Progressives with greater political certainty, given their existing hold on many Provincial Assemblies. The two parties continued to confront each other over the method for electing Senators, where both suggested different corporatist solutions. The Progressives argued that the 1912 election law should be maintained, with direct elections from the Provincial Assemblies, where it was sure of its dominance. Anfu MPs instead proposed local election colleges bypassing existing Provincial Assemblies. The Progressives, outnumbered in the Provisional Senate, changed tact and began to issue "policy papers" to arouse public attention – whilst the Anfu bribed its way through the weaker elements of the Progressives, and struck out the names of the paper authors from an internal list of supported candidates for the 1918 election (Liu 1998).

Eventually, a compromised was reached and the method of local electoral colleges was adopted, on the understanding that the Kuomintang elements which remained in the Provincial Assemblies would need to be eliminated from the process (Xiong 2011, 96–100). In the elections of May–June 1918, the Anfu Club took a total of 330 seats in both chambers; the allied New Communications Clique another 20 seats; the Old Communications Clique, which was at the time on good terms with Anfu, 50 seats; whilst the Progressives (now known as the "Research Clique") took only 20 seats (Mao 1991, 118). Electoral irregularities were widespread. Numbers in voter registers were often inflated, and on election day, beggars and even children turned up to vote. The Research Clique spent huge sums of money aiming at becoming the governing majority but was still defeated, and Liang Qichao bitterly regretted his involvement in setting up the political system (Chang 2007b, 116). Yet one must also see that this election achieved what Liang set out to accomplish, and that the beggars and children served only as "voting cattle" (as Engels would have called them) for the deputies of the gentry, and for the military, which lent them support. The legislators voted in were almost all

from lists predetermined by local commanders or even Xu Shuzheng at the Army Ministry and his Anfu headquarters (ZKJYJZB 1963, 205–206, in Zhou 2011, 229–230).

These lists were not made up of random, unrepresentative names; the men chosen were often the equivalent of Japanese local leaders or *meibōka*. In this sense, compared to Japan's attempt in 1940 to build a single-party state, which failed due to its strategy of circumventing the local leaders, Xu's strategy of incorporating such elements by means of "non-competitive nominations" was much more successful. On 24 March 1918, Xu telegrammed Anhui commander Ni Sichong [Ni Ssu-ch'ung 倪嗣冲], one of the three generals who led troops to crush Zhang Xun, asking him to make sure that pro-military candidates would "yield total victory in a dozen provinces,"<sup>36</sup> and sent Anfu staff armed with huge sums of money to the provinces to control election results. The Club also "secretly liaised with heads of local administration to control nominations."<sup>37</sup> Yan and Leung (2022) believe that the socio-economic background and relative maturity of the Anfu MPs were later conducive to efficient, "conservative legislation."

Also accused of vote-buying, the Central Academic Caucus actually carefully vetted its voters and asked for certification of their qualifications, not forgetting in the process to eliminate potential radicals. The qualifications held included the French Army Cavalry School, the Belgian École des mines de Mons, Cornell University and in China, the Peking, Beiyang, and Shanxi Universities.<sup>38</sup> The industrialist Chen Jihua [Ch'en Ch'i-hua 陳濟華] sponsored a banquet where Anfu member and former Minister to Belgium Wu Zonglian [*Wu Tsung-lien* 吳宗濂] and Zhejiang Education Association Chairman Sun Zengda [Sun Tseng-ta 孫增大] were invited to make speeches.<sup>39</sup> Some voters invented a new form of protest, of deliberately casting flawed ballots. In a way not dissimilar to late-Soviet voters who also wrote their dissatisfactions on the ballots, voters in 1918 with their wry sense of humor wrote the names of prostitutes, or dead politicians like Yuan Shikai, or the wrong characters for the candidates' names, and even the insult "big turtle" (*bastard*) or drawing a turtle on it (Xiong 2011, 191–192).

To this, one might ask why Duan and Xu did not scrap elections altogether, and appoint another Parliament as they had done in 1917. It has been recently argued that authoritarian states including the Soviet Union also hold elections, not only to preserve a façade of constitutionality but also as one mechanism to maintain the scarcity of places in the "winning coalition" – the group that would benefit from being in government. This would make such identity – be it the membership of a party, government, or parliament – a valuable commodity, and something to be held onto precariously; it could also be terminated anytime when the person in question "misbehaves." Support for his re-election could be withdrawn, or he could be shunted aside in a controlled campaign, and replaced by someone else from the "talent pool" (de Mesquita 2003, 54–55). Indeed, this was how the Research Clique was eliminated, and the same could have been done for any unruly Anfu elements.

### The design of the Anfu Club

The design of the Anfu Club's internal organization also served to bolster the gentry's monolithic rule, by being a corporatist organ co-opting all political factions, save for the Progressives (Research Clique), and the Zhili Faction military leaders, who hated Duan's Anhui Faction. This was both Anfu's main strength and the fatal weakness. The factions that were co-opted were not random associations of politicians, which congregated only because of personal reasons, as some suggested, but were interest groups differentiated according to their functions and properties. The Anfu Club Charter, which has usually been assumed to have been lost or never to have existed, actually stipulated that "The Headquarters holds monthly congresses, but where major issues arise, the Chairman, or Councillors, or 20 or more club members, can request an extraordinary congress" ("Anfu Club Charter," Xitang Yeshi 1920, 4).

The Club Council – Anfu's de facto central committee – "holds meetings twice a month, but an extraordinary meeting can be convened by the President of the Council, or five or more Councillors, or 10 or more club members" ("Provisional Regulations for the Club Council," in Xitang Yeshi 1920, 22). The councillors came in two categories – parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, the second having one-third of the number of seats of the first ("Anfu Club Charter," in Xitang Yeshi 1920, 3). Every five legislators chose one Parliamentary Councillor (PC), and the Parliamentary Councillors then elected the Extra-Parliamentary Councillors (EPC). It would seem that although inner-party democracy was proclaimed, the PCs did no more than to approve a pre-determined list of EPCs. The qualifications of the leading members of the Club Council and the EPCs reveal that most of them had been trained in modern administration or studied abroad, mostly in Japan. A glance at the list of EPCs also shows them to be representatives of different factions, of which the most important were the Old Communications Clique [*Jiu jiaotong xi* 舊交通系, OCC], which controlled the railways and their associated financial institutions such as the Bank of Communications before Yuan's death in 1916.

This was in addition to the New Communications Clique [*Xin jiaotong xi* 新交通系, NCC], which took over the reins of such departments and finances when Yuan and his proteges fell from power. These men had been educated in Japan as legalists, and had been appointed to the late-Imperial political reform planning agency and facility for training new bureaucrats, the humbly named Constitutional Compilation Commission [*Xianzheng biancha guan* 憲政編查館]. As new intellectuals who worked under huge constraints – notably ethnic – to reform the Empire, they possessed an ultra-realistic worldview that permanently prepared them for setbacks, as well as being pro-Japanese as a conditional reflex. In addition to them were pro-Duan (D) men who were at the head of the military, judiciary, and even the Metropolitan Police, in addition to the legislature. Anfu's attempts to co-opt the OCC, notably its leader Liang Shiyi who briefly served as Senate President, did not turn out to be particularly successful, but another of its leaders, Ye Gongchuo [Yeh Kung-cho 葉恭綽], served as Vice Minister of Communications and took part in deciding the lists of provincial parliamentary candidates in 1918.

Anfu Club Council Leaders and Extra-Parliamentary Councillors [yuanwai pingyiyuan 院外評議員]<sup>40</sup>

| Name                                 | Education/training   | Portfolio  |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Tian Yinghuang [T'ien Ying-huang]    | Late Imperial New Civil Service Examination – Special Subject of Economics         | Council President; Vice President of the Senate                          |
| Wang Yinchuan [Wang Yin-chuan]       | Political Economy, Waseda; LLB, Hosei. Ex-Progressive.                             | Council Vice President; Speaker, House of Representatives                |
| Xu Shuzheng (D) [Hsu Shu-cheng]      | Imperial Japanese Army Academy   | Army Vice Minister; Anfu Organizer                                       |
| Duan Zhigui (D) [Tuan Chih-kuei]     | Imperial Japanese Army Academy   | Army Minister; Peking Regional Commander                                 |
| Wu Bingxiang (D) [Wu Ping-hsiang]    | Imperial Qing New Army   | Metropolitan Police Commissioner   |
| Li Sihao (D) [Li Ssu-hao]            | Peking Grand Academy (now Peking University)                                       | Finance bureaucrat   |
| Yao Guozhen (D) [Yao Kuo-chen]       | Transport Academy ( <i>Jiaotong chuanxixue</i> 交通傳習所, now Jiaotong University)     | Railway technocrat   |
| Yao Zhen (D) [Yao Chen]              | Waseda University  | Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Magistrate, Higher Tribunal for PoWs |
| Zeng Yujun (OCC) [Tseng Yu-tsun]     | Traditional Civil Service Examination  | Railway technocrat   |
| Cao Rulin (NCC) [Tsao Ju-lin]        | Tokyo Vocational School ( <i>Tōkyō senmon gakkō</i> 東京專門學校, now Waseda University) | Minister of Finance  |
| Lu Zongyu (NCC) [Lu Tsung-yu]        | Waseda University  | Finance bureaucrat and diplomat  |
| Ding Shiyuan (NCC) [Ting Shih-yuan]  | Shanghai St. John's University; Legal training in Britain.                         | Railway technocrat and police administrator                              |
| Wu Dingchang (O/NCC) [Wu Ting-chang] | Tokyo Higher Commercial School (now Hitotsubashi)                                  | President of the Government Mint   |



The term “Club” certainly did not mean that Anfu was any less serious about itself; Clause 22 of the Club Charter stipulates that anyone who had contravened the orders of the headquarters or had committed criminal offences would be expelled after a vote in the Club Congress (“Anfu Club Charter,” in *Xitang Yesi* 1920, 4). Yet certain behaviors in the Club would be difficult to comprehend today; for example, some sources insist that the Anfu headquarters had been a place to “hold banquets and summon prostitutes,”<sup>41</sup> and had recreational facilities. By extension therefore, it was argued that Anfu was never a serious political organization. But this had less to do with the Club’s politics than most historians from a Marxist tradition would imagine. Early political parties both in the West and Japan often doubled as elite social clubs, or had been evolved from them. This was particularly the case with French political parties before the Third Republic and for a short time after its establishment, which had begun life mostly as salons or elite clubs for politicians and intellectuals.<sup>42</sup> These clubs soon began to discover, during their foray into parliamentary politics, the importance of public speaking and debate training. The fact that Anfu had a special panel in its Recreational Section for that purpose, is a clear sign that Anfu was the inheritor of these traditions.

As for its political manifesto, especially with regard to economic policy, Anfu remained hesitant until its final days to show its State Socialist inclinations. As we have seen, it was not until July 1919 that Anfu began to openly warm up to the idea of building socialism; this was followed by a package of proposed reforms until the regime was toppled in mid-1920 (see Leung 2021). The Charter contained only the slogans “Guarding national unity, consolidating republicanism, exercising constitutionalism, and protecting popular livelihood.” This shows that Anfu deliberately adopted, as a “big tent” strategy, an indistinct platform that offended no one, and which contained only values that could no longer be disputed after the fall of Zhang Xun (republicanism, constitutionalism, and unification) or which scarcely required debate (statism). This was a strategy appropriate for the 1918 elections, but which would become anathema after May Fourth. The internal organization of Anfu displayed influences from Japanese political parties, and indeed terms such as *Liaison* (J. *kōsai*, C. *jiaoji* 交際) appears to have been taken directly from them. Its think tank was the very Japanese-sounding Political Investigation Committee [*zhengwu diaocha hui* 政務調查會] of which the sub-committees – Industrial, Communications, Military etc. –

...resembled the ministries of the state, and the President of the Political Investigation Committee (PIC) mirrored the Premier of the State Council, whilst the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the sub-committees could be regarded as the ministers and deputy ministers of state. Its research methods were even more comprehensive than cabinet meetings, to the point where any matter that was not deliberated by the PIC was

thought to be the cause of quarrels and disputes. Its source of support came from the Congress of Parliamentarians of Both Chambers. Any important resolution would have to be passed by the Congress before it could be adopted by the Club. [...] The Speakers of both chambers of Parliament, Li Shengduo [*Li Sheng-to* 李盛鐸], Tian Yinghuang, Wang Yitang [*Wang I-t'ang* 王揖唐] and Liu Enge [*Liu En-ko* 劉恩格], and the secretaries of both chambers of Parliament, Liang Hongzhi [*Liang Hung-chih* 梁鴻志], Wang Yinchuan and Zang Yinsong [Tsang Yin-sung 臧蔭松], all belonged to the Anfu Club.

(Xitang Yeshi 1920, 17)

Li Shengduo, President of the PIC, had been one of five ministers sent in 1905–6 by the Imperial Qing Government to some 14 countries to “investigate constitutionalism.” PIC Internal Affairs Sub-Committee Chairman, Senator Zhang Yuanqi [Chang Yuan-ch'i 張元奇] would be appointed as President of the Economic Investigation Bureau in 1920, the “Economic General Staff” of the Anfu Regime responsible for proposing a substantial number of State Socialist reforms. Some of the panels were run by professionals. Wu Zesheng [Wu Tse-sheng 烏澤聲], (Waseda) “Acting Full-time Executive” [*daixing zhuanren ganshi* 代行專任幹事] of the Secretariat’s Press Division, had been a legislator since 1912, and was President of the *New People’s Daily* 新民報 in Peking. Translation Division Executive Chen Huanzhang [Ch'en Huan-chang 陳煥章] had earned his PhD from Columbia University, and had written a work in English, *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School* (1911), praised by John Maynard Keynes (1912) (Figure 1.1).

Other Anfu executives achieved notoriety or legendary status. Wang Zhilong [Wang Chih-lung 王鄧隆], the main Anfu benefactor who had a “rags to riches” story unusual for the era, was Accounting Section Chief. He was the well-known General Manager of Yuyuan 裕元 Textiles Mill in Tientsin, the city’s largest, built with Japanese loans and counting amongst its shareholders Duan and many other Beiyang leaders. Zang Yinsong, Secretary of the House of Representatives, was Planning Division Full-time Executive under Wang. The Liaison Section was responsible not only for dealing with domestic and foreign politicians and businessmen but also according to the Charter had to “investigate” matters, which likely meant assembling intelligence.

The Liaison Section’s subsidiary, the Diplomatic Liaison Division (DLD), was led by Li Guojie [Li Kuo-chieh 李國杰], a late-Imperial diplomat and constitutional monarchist friend of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's. DLD Executive Wei Sijiong [Wei Ssu-chiung 魏斯炅] (Chūō) was best known as the husband of the politically conscious former courtesan Sai Jinhua [Sai Chin-hua 賽金花], who was previously married to a Chinese diplomat sent to Germany. She had reportedly met Bismarck, spoke several European languages, and had saved Wei from Yuan Shikai during the Second Revolution in 1913. Bian Yinchang [Pien Yin-ch'ang 卞蔭昌], also a DLD Executive and a late-imperial official,




Figure 1.1 Organisation Chart of the Anfu Club.

had led the Chinese delegation to the Panama World Exposition in 1915 representing Tientsin's industries and businesses. In 1916 when French authorities detained Chinese police and forcibly expanded their concession, Bian led the Tientsin Council for the Upholding of National Rights and Territory [*Tianjin guoquan guotu weichi hui* 天津國權國土維持會] to rally against the French (Bian 1917). Anfu's choice of these accomplished and experienced men was well-considered, reflecting the growing clout of what is today called the "foreign policy public" – a globally informed community in high politics; their placement in Parliament was therefore a strategic act.

Anfu was intent on establishing branches on both provincial and prefectural levels, and drafted the corresponding provisions, but they appear to have never materialized. The Club intended to establish "Correspondence Offices" at each province prior to the formal establishment of a branch, and stated in its Charter that the "Office Establishment Commissioner" would be elected by Anfu members in Peking. A formal branch would be set up when each Office reaches 100 members, pending approval from the Peking HQ. The Chairman of each branch would be appointed by the superior party organization, but the rest of the branch's leaders (eg. Executive Commissioner, Executives, Council President, and Councillors) would be

ected from amongst its members, and they would then appoint the branch's staff. The branches would need to report to the HQ (and prefectural branches to the provincial HQ) regularly on its affairs, the membership roll, the list of staff, resolutions passed, budget and expenses, and other matters. These were subject to a number of detailed charters and regulations (Xitang Yeshe 1920, 6–9).

However in the end Anfu appeared to have settled on commanding over satellite organizations at provincial level, such as the Chenglu Club [*Chenglu julebu* 澄廬俱樂部] in the Zhejiang [Chekiang 浙江] Provincial Assembly, established with Mex \$2,000,000 of funds provided by the Peking HQ. This fought against the “Society of the Good” [*Liang she* 良社] set up by ex-Kuomintang members. They were also divided on prefectural lines, with Chenglu representing legislators from Taizhou, Wenzhou, and Chuzhou in eastern Zhejiang, and the “Society of the Good” representing west Zhejiang. Yet the satellite organizations appeared to have never reached the level of discipline seen in Peking. When the election for the Zhejiang Assembly President was held on 22 October 1918, Ruan Xingcun [*Juan Hsing-tsun* 阮性存], the candidate supported by Chenglu, was observed to be distinctly lacklustre in his campaign, refusing to treat his supporter to banquets or to buy votes. As a result, the Wenzhou legislators defected and Zhou Jiyong [Chou Chi-ying 周繼濛], the “Society of the Good” candidate, was elected instead; Zhou would later come to regret that his own campaign had been dirtier than Ruan's, despite the latter being an Anfu politician (Shen 2005, 225–228). It was a rare defeat compared to Anfu's hold on the vast majority of Provincial Assemblies.

### **Concluding remarks**

The lack of press coverage on the proceedings of the Anfu Club Council meetings and the lack of any documentation whatsoever on the functioning of its sections, panels, and sub-committees makes it very difficult to analyse the efficacy of Anfu operations. Yet it should be evident by now that the Anfu Club bore the hallmarks of a modern political party, and rather than being a “faction,” it was the first Chinese party to actually attempt to dominate all of government and its operations. It is my intention however to insist that we should be careful not to judge it using the standards of a Leninist Party, as would be appropriate for Soviet-inspired parties such as the Kuomintang after the 1920s, but to parliamentary caucuses. Any progress toward being a Leninist organization was a plus, and that could partly explain the rapid expansion of Anfu abilities by 1920, when it tried to direct a second economic lift-off. Yet we must above all be wary of a “factionalist historiography” popular in China and which has centrally figured in the work of Andrew Nathan –

...the failure of the republic taught the need for a strong, unambiguous single focus of loyalty. “Equality groups,” in Lyon Sharman's phrase –

non-hierarchical forms of organisation, with ambiguous loci of power – did not work in early twentieth-century China. The politicians were uncomfortable in such settings and, when thrust into them, arranged themselves in the congenial form of factions, which provided some sense of hierarchy and stable affiliation. [...] A small elite with a political culture framed largely in the traditional society knew just enough about constitutions to believe that they were easy to operate and efficacious in supplying stable government. The early republicans hoped to avoid conflict by gathering consensus around a constitutional process. But the process mandated by any republican constitution is precisely a process of conflict. Not unnaturally, practicing politicians fell back on the tools at hand [...] They formed factions...

(Nathan 1976, 224)

Nathan's judgment is not entirely without ground, for it described the events of 1916–17 much better than the three Anfu years, which was the bulk of the period he covered in his book. When it came to the Anfu years, Nathan's conclusion serves only to confuse. Pluralism did not fail in early Republican China because politicians had a love for authoritarianism and that, being uncomfortable without it, had to form factions; rather, factions were the staple of pluralism, a process which some legislators found liberating, especially when it allowed them to challenge and attack the establishment for the first time in years without fear of reprisals. It also facilitated various regional interests. Yet Pluralism failed because it became a shambles, giving rise to all sorts of rent-seeking in 1917, and it was evident even then, to a country eager to enter into a war and to resolve all of its international problems at once, that it provided no basis on which China's many urgent problems could be solved. World War I and the initial success of National Unity governments across the west, compressing pluralist politics and phasing in monopolistic government, was to Anfu-era politicians the best evidence there was that having a unified and unambiguous focus of loyalty would deliver a much better deal for China. Pluralism simply presented no convincing case and did not create the conditions for its own success.

Nathan judged that “the early republic was the last traditional Chinese polity – the last in which the legitimate political voice belonged to a narrowly circumscribed elite” (Nathan 1976, 224). In this, he was only marginally correct. In the sense that Liang and Anfu sought to build a constitutional dictatorship for the gentry, rather than being a traditional Chinese polity, this was a traditional class asserting itself via modern means, rejecting in the course of it the need for a monarch. Also, rather than being a cluster of imperial mandarins who had minimal knowledge of constitutionalism, many Anfu-era politicians as we have seen, had studied law in Japan or even in the west, and were highly informed on legal and constitutional matters. The situation where a dazed Yuan Shikai asked the diplomat Wellington Koo [Gu Weijun 顧維鈞] “What exactly is a

Republic?” had evaporated a year after his death. The pluralism that these men witnessed in Japan was of course a limited one, and the system that they most looked up to, Imperial Germany, was no better at tolerating dissent. Various National Unity Governments in erstwhile liberal countries also served as examples for Chinese politicians. Thus, the miraculous act of looking so incredibly outward for resources for political design – a sign of the deep internationalization amongst political circles at the time and something that a decade earlier might have been unimaginable – led them in the direction of creating a monopolistic party regime (Linz 1970, 252) that helped the “conscience of the nation” – the mandarin literati – to re-emerge at the “Corrective Revolution” of 1917 as the guiding force of the country. That it subsequently had to resort to the most corrupt means to make sure the monopoly would be maintained as a matter of course but also a tragedy and irony.

China’s official view holds that “The Anfu Parliament was a mutation of western parliamentary politics, and betrayed the principles of a democratic republic. This shows that the parliamentary system, appropriate for western capitalist politics, economics, and historical circumstances, was unworkable in China dominated by feudalistic production methods, feudalistic thinking, and the warlord-bureaucratic hegemony” (Zhou 2011, 238). Such views are simply what Lenin would have called an *embarras de richesses* (Lenin 1974 [1920]). One cannot insist enough that the Anfu Parliament, far from being a feudalistic product, was a product of high modernity, envisioned by thinkers like Liang Qichao, inspired by the discipline and efficacy of wartime states, notably again Germany and Japan. That it represented the declining gentry did not conceal the fact that Liang had wished to provide the conditions for the gentry’s transition into being a class of entrepreneurs, as the December 1917 Senate reform would have helped induce. In this sense Liang, born of a gentry family that had declined in its fortunes and was mired in poverty, was China’s François Guizot – and perhaps just as prejudiced and blinkered by his self-made success – guarding piously the system of electoral property requirements, telling the people that if they wished to enjoy political representation, they should work hard, save up and “enrich themselves.”

It also seems in that “official view” that parliamentary politics were progressive as long as they functioned in the bourgeois West. That would in fact be a double standard – that somehow the “one-class democracy” Liang envisioned for an industrializing gentry was any worse than what they would have called “bourgeois dictatorships” of the west at the time. The fact is that corporatist constitutionalism became the key to the successful operation and indeed survival of many western republics. Taking into account how Schmitter also argues that State Corporatism also included the planning of the use of resources, and the expansion of bureaucratic institutions, a condemnation of Anfu vote-buying should not conceal the fact that it was a successful, modern political operation that was meant to deliver a State Corporatist system – one where the industrializing gentry would have a

stable environment in which to invest, and to receive technical support from technocrats, to emulate the practices of model factories and state farms, and to receive government guarantees of interest in the first years of investment, and to be reliant on the state's planned investment of Social Overhead Capital – to be explained in a future paper on Anfu's developmental policies.

Such an arrangement could only have been guaranteed under the conditions of a global war by a military-supported single-party regime, which sheltered these gentry elements from the challenge of a young generation of Kuomintang revolutionaries. And much as matters alienate themselves in the course of motion, the regime came eventually to harm the interests of some local gentry, as was the case of the army's atrocities in Hunan in 1918. Yet no successful attempt was made in Parliament to raise taxes for the gentry, even when domestic war spending far exceeded expectations. This alone explains the very nature of the Anfu regime – a conservative-revolutionary regime, and an Old Guard in a New Order. Yet the quest for a corporatist developmental state would continue under vastly changed circumstances. Given how many of them would contribute to the formation of the PRC – Yang Du became a CCP member – and would be appointed to executive, legislative or advisory positions after 1949 – including but not limited to quite a number of figures mentioned in this paper: Fang Shu, Fu Dingyi,<sup>43</sup> Jiang Yong, Li Sihao, Shao Cong'en, Ye Gongchuo, Zeng Yujun, Zhang Shizhao, etc. – Anfu was not the last New Order they created.

## Notes

- 1 Many people have helped me research this topic over the past decade. I thank in particular Egas Moniz Bandeira, Simon Angseop Lee, Yan Quan, Jeremy Yellen, Benjamin Ng, Clemens Büttner, Andrew Levidis, Xu Guoqi, Kwong Chi Man, and Zhang Yan for their enormous help and constant encouragement.
- 2 A pamphlet entitled "Anfu Club" [*Anfubu* 安福部] written by an unknown author, Xitang Yeshe 西塘野史 (The Unofficial Historian of the West Pond), has quoted many of Anfu's internal documents, including its organizational charter and various membership rolls, which fill a huge historical gap. Compared to others' emphasis on Anfu's impotence and disorganization, Xitang Yeshe has depicted a political organization that dealt with huge destruction due to its disciplined and strategic behavior. The Anfu Club also controlled the newspaper *Fair Comment* [*Kung-yen Pao* or *Gongyan Bao* 公言報], which was founded by Hsu Shu-cheng in July 1916 as an army-backed newspaper, becoming at some point in 1918 Anfu's de facto party newspaper and started to report in detail its various congresses and the texts of the speeches delivered, in addition to being even more precise-worded than the Government Gazette about the contents of cabinet meetings and the various pieces of legislation decreed, in addition to Anfu Club Congresses. What were intriguingly never reported were the meetings of the Anfu Club Council much as the Pravda or People's Daily would not usually report the contents of politburo meetings. Wang Zhilong [Wang Chih-lung 王郵隆], the Anfu Club's main sponsor and the chief of its Accounting Section, controlled the *Ta-kung Pao* 大公報, at the time known officially as *L'Impartial*. There was also the Japanese-owned *Shuntian Shibao* [*Shun-t'ien Shih-pao* 順天時報], which supported Anfu at times. The latter two are better known amongst

- historians; only one historian, Deng Ye 鄧野, appears to have used *Fair Comment* in any meaningful way. One set of microfilms is known to exist at the Beijing National Library.
- 3 Notably Park Chung-hee's "Democratic-Republican Party" in South Korea; Suharto's "Golkar" in Indonesia; and the "Popular Movement of the Revolution" under Mobutu in Zaire.
  - 4 Theda Skocpol's argument as summarized in Young and Turner (1985, 13-14).
  - 5 "Jinbudang Huifu zhi Niyi" 進步黨恢復之擬議 [Proposals to Resurrect the Progressive Party], *Fair Comment* 1917-08-14, 3.
  - 6 "Xinzu Dazhengdang Jiang Chuxian" 新組大政黨將出現 [A Newly Assembled Grand Political Party Will Soon Appear], *Shuntian Shibao* 1917-08-26, 2; see also "Zuzhi Dazhengdang Shuo You Fuhuo" 組織大政黨說又復活 [Rumours Resurrect Regarding the Formation of a Grand Political Party] *Shuntian Shibao* 1919-11-03, 2.
  - 7 The Anfu called itself a Club, and was descended from the "Moderate Club" set up in 1916-17 by Xu Shuzheng as a pro-military parliamentary group. Yet this was at the time a proper name for political parties, when by 1916 the word "party" had been disgraced by the failure of partisan politics in 1912-14. It reflects influence from the Jacobin Club of the French Revolution. This was in turn adopted by Japanese political parties, where it remained in use into the 1920s with Inukai Tsuyoshi's "Reform Club" and Ozaki Yukio's "Shinsei Club" [*Shinsei kurabu* 新正俱樂部].
  - 8 Mihail Manoilescu, leader and financier of the Romanian Fascist "Iron Guard" Movement defined, in the 1930s, a "Corporation" as "a collective and public organization composed of the totality of persons (physical or juridical) fulfilling together the same national function and having as its goal that of assuring the exercise of that function by rules of law imposed at least upon its members" (Manoilescu 1936, 176, in Schmitter 1974, 94).
  - 9 Yang Du, in his 1908 article on L'Impartial and in his book *A Theory of Gold and Iron* [*Jintie zhuyi shuo* 金鐵主義說] quoted legalists including Edmund Burke and Bluntschli, who advanced that parties, being a "union of comrades," should adopt a consistent ideology to take-over, when the chance comes, "all of politics," implement specific policies for national interest and popular livelihood, and to advance the benefit of all society. "Zhengdang zhi yiyi" 政黨之意義 (The Significance of Political Parties), *L'Impartial* 1908-04-15, 1; Yang 2015).
  - 10 It was quoted by future Anfu MP Huang Yunpeng [Huang Yun-p'eng 黃雲鵬] during the Constituent Conference of early 1917, at a time when he was a member of the pro-military "Moderate Club." [*Zhonghe julebu* 中和俱樂部] It was a speech in support of ex-police bureaucrat Sun Runyu [Sun Jun-yu 孫潤宇] who argued that "sovereignty rests in the state" [*zhuquan zai guo* 主權在國] and opposed direct democracy modeled upon Switzerland. ("Xianfa qicao weiyuanhui kaihui jishi" 憲法起草委員會開會紀事 [Minutes of the Conference of the Constituent Committee], *L'Impartial* 1917-02-01, 2).
  - 11 "Gongyan bao zhounian zengkan" 公言報周年增刊 [Fair Comment 1st Anniversary Supplement], *Fair Comment* 1917-09-02.
  - 12 Editorials by "Cold Observer" on *L'Impartial* include – "Zhengzhi zhi zhong-xindian" 政治之中心點 [The centre-point of politics], 1916-12-20, 2; "Zhengfu yi zhengdun gesheng zhengzhi" 政府宜整頓各省政治 [The government should shake up provincial politics], 1917-03-02; "Guomin zijue zhi jihui" 國民自覺之機會 [A chance for national self-awakening], 1917-08-15 and 16.
  - 13 "Zuori Zhongyiyuan bei wei ji" 昨日眾議院被圍記 [An Account of the Siege on the House of Representatives Yesterday], *Morning Bell* 1917-05-11, 2.



- 14 Zhang Guogan [Chang Kuo-kan 張國淦], for example, tried to persuade Tuan to incorporate in his National Defence Cabinet two men from the Kuomintang, two from the Progressives, and two from amongst the State Council bureaucrats. This totally ignored how the Kuomintang was itself a cluster of four factions – the Good Friends [*Yiyoushe* 益友社], the People’s Friends, the Recreation Club, and the Political Science Society – all of which could be further subdivided. Only Zhang Shizhao’s broadly corporatist Extraordinary State Council proposal could have resolved the problem, yet it was not taken up (Ding and Zhao 2010 [1936], 426–427).
- 15 For example, “Qingkan Ouzhou lieqing zhi juguo yizhi (1)” 請看歐洲列強之舉國一致 (一) [Please look at the national unity of the European powers], *Shuntian shibao* 1914-08-13, 2; “Lieqiang zhi jingjizhan zhunbei” 列強之經濟戰準備 [Preparations for economic warfare among the powers], *L’Impartial* 1917-08-29.
- 16 See for example “Waijiao xingshi jinpo zhi zuowen” 外交形勢緊迫之昨聞 [News yesterday of the emergency on the diplomatic front], *L’Impartial* 1918-03-02.
- 17 “Zhengtuan huanying Feng fuzongtong zhi shengkuang” 政團歡迎馮副總統之盛況 [The spectacle of the reception for Vice-President Feng by political parties], *L’Impartial* 1917-03-02.
- 18 Cold Observer, “Ribensho zhi guafengshuo” 日本報之怪風說 [Strange rumours in the Japanese press], *L’Impartial* 1917-02-28.
- 19 Cold Observer, “Shanhou wenti” 善後問題 [The problem of the settlement], *L’Impartial* 1917-07-14.
- 20 “Gesheng zancheng Canyiyuan laidian xuzhi” 各省贊成參議院來電續誌 [Continued reports on telegrams of support for the new Senate from the provinces], *L’Impartial* 1917-08-04.
- 21 “Liang Rengong zhi xianfa zijian xuzhi” 梁任公之憲法意見續誌 [Continued report about the constitutional opinion of Liang Rengong], *L’Impartial* 1917-01-15. Incidentally the Kuomintang had, in 1913, been briefly advocates of a corporatist arrangement for the Senate. Their recommendations, published in July 1913, included a Senate that had representatives elected by local self-governing bodies, chambers of commerce, chambers of agriculture, chambers of industry and commerce and the Central Academic Caucus, whereas the Congress would have been elected by the common voter. The justification for this system was that the Senate should absorb “special social forces”. But this was quietly dropped soon afterwards, and in August 1913 the Kuomintang Constitution Discussion Committee [*Guomindang xianfa taolun hui* 國民黨憲法討論會] resolved to abolish this recommendation, on the grounds that voter categorisation would be difficult especially when such professional bodies did not already exist, and suggested that the existing property requirements system for the Senate elections would be adequate. See *Xianfa xinwen* 憲法新聞 [Constitutional News] 1913, no. 13, 108-109 and 1913, no. 15, 133.
- 22 “Ji Linshi Canyiyuan kaimu qingxing” 記臨時參議院開幕情形 [On the opening ceremony of the Provisional Senate], *Fair Comment* 1917-11-11, 2.
- 23 “Guohui zuzhifa yu zhengfu” 國會組織法與政府 [The Parliament Organisation Act and the government], *L’Impartial* 1917-11-03; “Zuori liangfa shenchahui jiwen” 昨日兩法審查會紀聞 [Report on the deliberation cCommittees for the two bills], *L’Impartial* 1917-11-29.
- 24 These were Shao Cong’en [Shao Ts’ung-en 邵從恩] (Tokyo Imperial), a late-Imperial Ministry of Justice director; Zhong Gengyan [Chung Keng-yen 鍾廣言] (Tokyo Imperial), and Cheng Shude [Cheng Shu-teh 程樹德] (Hōsei). See “Zuori geyi jiwen” 昨日閣議紀聞 [Report on yesterday’s cabinet decisions], *L’Impartial* 1917-12-14; “Canyiyuan kaihui pangting ji, Liu Enge dangxuan weiyuanzhang”

- 參議院開會旁聽記，劉恩格當選委員長 [Auditing the Senate conference; Liu Enge elected chairman], *L'Impartial* 1917-12-19.
- 25 The Explanatory Note quoted a US legalist whose name is given as “Gerui” 格芮 and it is a mystery as to who this is. It could refer to the turn-of-the-century US legalist John Chipman Gray, but he was not known to have made any judgments on the merits of bicameralism. However, many Japanese legal works at the time quoted James Bryce’s *American Commonwealth*, which argued that most US states which tried unicameralism later found it to be brash, dictatorial and corrupt, and mostly reverted to unicameralism. This appears to have led to a misquote, whereby a corruption of Bryce, ブライス, led to “Grai” グライ. The Japanese legalist Hozumi Yatsuka, a major influence on China, quoted the works of Bryce, for example in Uesugi (1913, 523) and Minobe (1930, 112–113). I am greatly indebted, on this and the research about Albert Schäffle, to the help of Egas Moniz Bandeira and Simon Angseop Lee, who helped me with interpreting the German legal works.
  - 26 “Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui zuzhifa cao’an quanwen” 請看修正國會組織法草案全文 [Please read the full text of the Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-16, 3.
  - 27 “Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui zuzhifa cao’an quanwen (xu)” 請看修正國會組織法草案全文 (續) [Please read the full text of the Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill (continued)], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-17, 3.
  - 28 “Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui Zuzhifa Cao’an Quanwen,” 3.
  - 29 It deserves to be mentioned that the formula “school, church, art and science” came from Bluntschli, who in turn took it from the early promoter of social policies and the first to suggest social insurance, the French economist Jean-Charles-Léonard Sismonde de Sismondi, in his *Études sur les constitutions des peuples libres* (Bluntschli 1885a, 58-59; Chisholm 1911, 25:159).
  - 30 It is strange that the Explanatory Note matched what Satō wrote in the 1935 edition of his 1908 book, which probably suggests that it made reference to Satō’s lecture notes or other publications’ during this period (Satō 1908, 465–468; 1935, 330–335).
  - 31 “Xiuzheng Canyiyuan yiyuan xuanjufa’an liyoushu” 修正參議院議員選舉法案理由書 [Explanatory Note for the Senator Election Act Amendment Bill], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-18, 6.
  - 32 One would have needed to be university teaching staff for two years or more (or three years, if one did not possess a degree), or had “specific academic inventions”, by which what was probably meant were publications or patents. (Ibid.)
  - 33 “Qingkan xiuzheng Guohui Zuzhifa Cao’an Quanwen,” 3–4.
  - 34 “Zuori Canyiyuan kaihui ji” 昨日參議院開會記 [The Senate proceedings yesterday], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-19, 6.
  - 35 “Zuori Canyiyuan quanyuan weiyuanhui jiwen” 昨日參議院全院委員會紀開 [Proceedings of the Senate Committee of the Whole yesterday], *Fair Comment* 1917-12-25, 6.
  - 36 “Zhi Ni Sichong dian” 致倪嗣冲電 [Telegram to Ni Sichong], 1918-03-24, in *ZKJYJZB* 1963, 64.
  - 37 Chang 2007b, 135.
  - 38 *Zhengfu Gongbao* 政府公報 [Government gazette] May-June 1918, in Xiong (2011, 169–173).
  - 39 “Zhongyang xuanju di 1 bu zhi lianhuahui” 中央選舉第一部之聯歡會 [Party organised by the Central No.1 Caucus], *Shenbao* 申報 1918-05-23, 3, in Chang (2007b, 137).
  - 40 Wu Wenhan has been left out of this table since no background information on him is available.

- 41 The accusation comes from Zhou (2011, 222).  
42 For studies of these salons and elite clubs, see Joana (1999).  
43 Fu Dingyi [Fu Ting-i 符定一] was an Anfu Club Councillor and MP whom as Principal of the Hunan Higher Normal Academy was mentor to a young Mao Zedong.

## Bibliography

### *Newspapers and journals*

- Fair Comment* [Kung Yen Pao] 公言報  
*L'Impartial* [Ta-kung Pao] (Tientsin Edition) 大公報 (天津版)  
*Morning Bell* [Chen-chung Pao] 晨鐘報  
*Shuntian Shibao* [Shun-tien Shih-pao] 順天時報

### *Other references*

- Bian, Yinchang 卞蔭昌. 1917. "Zi Guowuyuan song Tianjin Weichi Guoquan Guotu Hui huizhang Bian Yinchang deng wei shouhui Tianjin zujie wai Laoxikai difang qingyuanshu wen" 諮國務院送天津維持國權國土會會長卞蔭昌等為收回天津租界外老西開地方請願書文 [Petition to the State Council on the Reclamation of the Laoxikai area of the Tientsin Concession from the Chairman of the Tientsin Council for the Upholding of National Rights and Territory Bian Yinchang et al.]. *Minguo 6 nian 6 yue bian: Canyiyuan di 2 qi changhui yijue'an huibian*. 民國六年六月編: 參議院第二期常會議決案彙編. Peking: Canyiyuan gongbaochu. 1-4.
- Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. 1885a. *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, Vol. 2, *Allgemeines Staatsrecht*, 6th ed. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.
- Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. 1885b. *The Theory of the State*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bourchier, David. 2019. "Organicism in Indonesian Political Thought." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Political Theory*, edited by Leigh K. Jenco, Murad Idris, and Megan C. Thomas, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 598-617.
- Chang, P'eng-yuan. 張朋園 2007a. *Liang Qichao yu Minguo zhengzhi* 梁啟超與民國政治 [Liang Qichao and Republican politics]. Changchun: Jilin chuban jituan.
- Chang, P'eng-yuan 張朋園. 2007b. *Zhongguo minzhu zhengzhi de kunjing* 中國民主政治的困境 [The Impasse of Chinese democratic politics]. Taipei: Linkin Books.
- Chen, Huan-chang. 1911. *The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School*. 2 vols. New York: Longmans.
- Chisholm, Hugh (1911). "Sismondi, Jean Charles Leonard de." In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed. 29 vols., no. 25: 159. Cambridge: University Press.
- Dickinson, Frederick R. 1999. *War and National Reinvention – Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919*. Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Harvard University Asia Centre.
- Ding, Wenjiang 丁文江, & Zhao, Fengtian 趙豐田. 1958 (1936). *Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao* 梁任公先生年譜長編初稿 [Preliminary draft of an unabridged version of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's annals]. Taipei: Shijie shuju (World Books).
- Ding, Wenjiang 丁文江, & Zhao, Fengtian 趙豐田. 2010 (1936). *Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao* 梁任公先生年譜長編初稿 [Preliminary Draft of an Unabridged Version of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Annals]. Beijing: Chung-Hwa Books.

- Gerschenkron, Alexander. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Hu, Xiao 胡曉. 2006. *Duan Qirui nianpu* 段祺瑞年譜 [The annals of Duan Qirui] Hefei: Anhui University Press.
- Hugh, Chisholm, ed. 1911. "Sismondi, Jean Charles Leonard de." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 25 Cambridge University Press, p. 159
- Jinbudang 進步黨 [Progressive Party]. 1913. *Jinbudang xuanyanshu, dangzhang, zhengwubu guize, dangwubu guize, Guohui yiyuan jianzhang, benbu yiyuanhui mingdan*. 進步黨宣言書、黨章、政務部規則、黨務部規則、國會議員會簡章、本部議員名單 [Manifesto, Charter, Political Department Regulations, Organisational Department Regulations, Charter of Parliamentarians and List of Headquarter Parliamentarians of the Progressive Party]. Peking: Self-Published.
- Joana, Jean. 1999. *Pratiques politiques des députés français au XIXe siècle: du dilettante au spécialiste*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Keynes, J. M. 1912. "Review - The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School. By CHEN HUAN-CHANG. Columbia University Studies. (New York: Longmans. 1911. 2 Vols. Pp. xv+756.)" *The Economic Journal* 22, no. 88 (Dec., 1912): 584–588.
- Lenin, Vladimir. 1974 (1920). "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky." *Lenin's Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, Vol. 28, 227–325.
- Leung, Ernest Ming-tak. 2021. "Developmentalisms - The Forgotten Ancestors of East Asian Developmentalism." *Phenomenal World*, September 18, 2021. <https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/developmentalisms>
- Liang, Qichao 梁啟超. 1914. *Ouzhou zhanyi shilun* 歐洲戰役史論 [A historical theory of the European war]. Shanghai: Commercial Press.
- Liang, Qichao 梁啟超. 1915. "Ouzhan lice: Geguo jiaozhan shi zhi juguo yizhi" 歐戰叢測：各國交戰時之舉國一致 [Superficial observations of the European war: The national unity of the combatant nations]." *The Great Chung Hwa Magazine (Da Zhonghua 大中華)* 1, 1915, no. 03: 20–23.
- Liang, Qichao 梁啟超. 1936. *Yinbingshi wenji* 飲冰室文集 [Anthology of the Yinbing Chamber] Vol. 30. Shanghai: Chung-hwa Books.
- Linz, Juan. 1970. "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain." *Mass Politics – Studies in Political Sociology*. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds. New York: The Free Press. 251–283.
- Liu, Yifen 劉以芬. 1998. *Minguo zhengshi shiyi*. 民國政史拾遺 [Forgotten anecdotes from Republican political history]. Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe.
- Malherbe, Jean. 1940. *Le Corporatisme d'association en Suisse*. Lausanne: Imprimerie Henri Jordan Fils.
- Manoilescu, Mihail. 1936. *Le Siecle Du Corporatisme: Doctrine Du Corporatisme Integral Et Pur*. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan.
- Mao, Zhili 毛知礪. 1991. "Liang Shiyi yu Wanxi zhengquan (1916-1920)" 梁士詒與皖系政權 (1916–1920) (Liang Shih-i and the Anhui Clique regime, 1916–1920). *Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue lishi xuebao*. 國立政治大學歷史學報 (The Journal of History, National Chengchi University) 8, 1991, no. 01: 113–130.
- Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, et al. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Boston: MIT Press, 2003

- Minobe, Tatsukichi 美濃部達吉. 1930. *Gikai seidoron* 議會制度論 (A theory of the parliamentary system). Tokyo: Nihon Hyōonsha.
- Nathan, Andrew. 1976. *Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism*. Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
- Paxton, Robert O. 1972. *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*. New York: Knopf.
- Rosser, Christian. 2014. “Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s Organic Theory of State and Public Administration.” *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 36 (2014: 1): 95–110.
- Satō, Ushijirō 佐藤丑次郎. 1908. *Seijigaku jōkan* 政治學上卷 (Political science, upper volume). Tokyo: Kinkōdō. 金港堂
- Satō, Ushijirō 佐藤丑次郎. 1935. *Seijigaku* 政治學 (Political science). Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
- Schäffle, Albert. 1896. *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, Vol. 2, *Spezielle Sociologie*, 2nd ed. Tübingen: H. Laupp.
- Schäffle, Albert. 1893. *The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.
- Schäffle, Albert. 1894. *Deutsche Kern- und Zeitfragen*. Berlin: Ernst Hofman.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” *The Review of Politics* 36, (1974, 1): 85–131.
- Shen, Xiaomin 沈曉敏. 2005. *Chuchang yu qiubian – Qingmo Minchu de Zhejiang ziyiju he shengyihui* 處常與求變 – 清末民初的浙江諮議局和省議會 [Being constant and seeking change – The Chekiang Advisory Council and Provincial Assembly in the late-Qing and early-Republican period]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian.
- Shen, Zongzheng 沈宗正. 1993. “Guojia tonghe zhuyi yu Taiwan jingji fazhan jingyan (1949–87).” 國家統合主義與台灣經濟發展經驗(1949-87) (State corporatism and the Taiwanese economic developmental experience, 1949-87). MA thesis, National Chengchi University.
- Siewert, Hans-Jörg ハンス＝エルク・ジューヴェルト. 2020. “Dōitsu shakaigaku no kenkyū kadai toshite no Feruain (Kurabu – Kumiai)” ドイツ社会学の研究課題としてのフェルアにン(クラブ・組合) [Zur Thematisierung des Vereinswesens in der deutschen Soziologie = *Verein* as a research object in German sociology], trans. by Kōno Makoto 河野真. *Kokuken Kiyō* 国研紀要 155, 2020, no. 3: 287–316
- Tao, Juyin 陶菊隱. 1971. *Dujuntuan zhuan* 督軍團傳 [A Biography of the Tuchuns’ Congress] Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社.
- Tsui, Brian. 2018. *China’s Conservative Revolution: The Quest for a New Order, 1927–1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Uesugi, Shinkichi 上杉慎吉 ed. 1913. *Hozumi Yatsuka Hakushi Ronbunshū* 穗積八東博士論文集 [Anthology of Dr. Hozumi Yatsuka’s works]. Tokyo: Self-Published.
- Xiong, Qiuliang 熊秋良. 2011. *Yizhi yu shanbian – Minguo Beijing zhengfu shiqi guohui xuanju zhidu yanjiu* 移植與嬗變：民國北京政府時期國會選舉制度研究 [Transplantation and disfiguration – A study of the parliamentary election system of the Republican Peking government era]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Press.
- Xitang Yeshi 西塘野史. 1920. *Anfu Bu* 安福部 [The Anfu Club]. Peking: Rixin Shuju.
- Xu, Guoqi. 2005. *China and the Great War- China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2007.
- Yan, Quan, & Leung, Ernest Ming-tak (2022). “The Anfu Parliament in Republican China. The life and death of a failed single-party state, 1918–20”. *Parliaments*,

- Estates and Representation, 42, no. 1: 60–83. doi: 10.1080/02606755.2022.2039458.
- Yang, Du 楊度. 2015. *Yang Du Juan* 楊度卷 [Volume on Yang Du]. Edited by Zuo Yuhe 左玉河. Beijing: Renmin University Press.
- Young, Crawford & Thomas Turner. 1985. *The Rise & Decline of the Zairian State*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Zeng, Yujun 曾毓雋. 1988. “Huanhai chenfu lu” 宦海沉浮錄 [A record of my rising and declining fortunes in the bureaucracy]. *Jindaishi ziliao*. 近代史資料 [Modern Historical Materials] no. 68. 19–56.
- Zhang, Guogan 張國淦. 1979. “Zhonghua Minguo neige bian” 中華民國內閣篇 [Chapter on the cabinets of Republican China]. *Jindaishi ziliao* 近代史資料 [Modern Historical Materials] no. 40: 150–231.
- Zhang, Shizhao 章士釗. 2000 (1917) “Chuangshe tebie guowu huiyi zengzao buguanbu zhi Guowuyuan yi” 創設特別國務會議增造不管部之國務員議 (Thesis on the creation of an extraordinary State Council with the addition of ministers without portfolio). *Zhang Shizhao quanji* 章士釗全集 [Full Anthology of Zhang Shizhao's Works] 4: 46–47.
- ZKJYJZB (Zhongguo Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jindaishi Ziliao Bianjizu) 中國科學院近代史研究所近代史資料編輯組 [Chinese Academy of Sciences Modern History Institute Modern Historical Materials Editorial Group] 1963. *Xu Shuzheng diangao*. 徐樹錚電稿 (Xu Shuzheng's draft telegrams). Beijing: Chung-Hwa Books.
- Zhou, Tiandu 周天度. 2011. “Anfu guohui de zhaokai” 安福國會的召開 [The convening of the Anfu parliament]. *Zhonghua Minguo Shi* 中華民國史 [A history of Republican China], Vol. 3, 1916–1920. Beijing: Chung-Hwa Books, 229–230.

## 2 The Communist International: A party of parties confronting interwar internationalisms, 1920–1925

*Vsevolod Kritskiy*

### Introduction

Throughout the interwar period, new and existing political parties set themselves the task of capturing state power to bring about a utopian nationalist vision by fusing themselves into the structure of the state. At the same time, the international system was in flux: new international organizations, movements, arenas, and solidarities emerged, seeking to participate, control, or oppose these processes of capture. The Communist International (Comintern), birthed out of the embers of the October Revolution and spearheaded by the Bolshevik Party, was designed to unite communist forces and scrap existing international relations entirely. It was a unique historical project that sought to establish itself as a sort of party-of-parties, a single centralized organization that was explicitly based on communist parties as its members (Thorpe 1998, 637). In so doing, it reproduced the goals of national parties represented across this volume at the international level. As with the Bolsheviks who successfully captured state power at the national level and fused the party into the Soviet state, the Comintern sought to encourage the capture and fusion of states with their national communist parties, and the creation of an entirely new international system based on these new party-states as its building blocks.

The Comintern, however, was not the only international organization seeking to remake the world in its image at the time. The League of Nations, birthed out of the Versailles Peace Treaty and spearheaded by the Allied powers, was designed to create a new international system based on the colonial and imperial international relations that dominated the previous era but also an organization that acted as an entirely new space for these relations to be conducted in. The building blocks of the international system that the League was designing were instead nation-states: exclusive members of a global system within which every territory was supposed to be represented. As such, both the Comintern and the League engendered new approaches to international relations, embodying at once the status of international organizations, internationalisms, arenas, and political projects.

Moreover, the Comintern was not the only international political project on the left – the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) sought to unite the more

moderate socialist and independent parties that could potentially have joined the Comintern, while the Amsterdam International (International Federation of Trade Unions) explicitly opposed the Comintern by uniting worker organizations on the basis of pursuing workers' economic rights primarily via political and economic reform, rather than the more radical pursuit of revolution. International women's, peace, anti-colonial, anti-communist, fascist, and other organizations sprang up across the world, recognizing that international relations were being reforged in post-war Europe. As such, the questions asked within this volume of national parties can not only be applied to the international arena(s) but can also reveal new transnational connections.

In this chapter, I explore these processes of capture – by the Bolsheviks of the Comintern, by the Comintern of the international system – and the attempts to oppose these processes within the Comintern and at the international level, where other organizations presented different visions of world order. I focus on the Labour and Socialist International as the Comintern's main rival for leftist international legitimacy and the working class, and the League of Nations as the Comintern's main rival in the fight for a new world order. At the same time, the party remains central to this inquiry as the building block of leftist international organizations, and of the system that the Comintern sought to build. The question of political action, membership, and the place of the political party was at the core of all leftist organizations from the First International onwards – something that I explore at the beginning of the chapter.

After this historical note, the main body of the chapter focuses on the first few years of the 1920s in order to interrogate these processes of capture as they were being initiated, providing the global backdrop and context to the actors and events discussed in this volume in an effort to better understand the international political climate of the period. Furthermore, in tracing the creation of the global system of international relations between nation-states as we know it today, and in positioning the League of Nations at the same analytical level as the Comintern and the LSI, this chapter introduces the foundational principles that led to the establishment of this global system. In so doing, I show specifically that the leftist internationalisms failed to mount a significant challenge to the liberal system being built with and by the League of Nations due to in fighting, the heavy-handed approach utilized by the Bolsheviks, and their inability to recognize the League as their main competitor for international legitimacy and status.

For this chapter, I delineate the organizations into three camps: the liberal League of Nations, the reformist socialist Second International and the LSI, and the communist Comintern. This categorization is defined by the stated internationalist goals of these organizations that this chapter explores. The Western liberal movements sought full control over international relations and were inherently anti-communist, the socialist organizations promoted long-term reforms to what they implicitly accepted as the liberal international order, while the communist internationalisms existed to overturn it.



These organizations and their goals, however, changed with time – something that is apparent by the fact that the Soviet Union was accepted to the Council of the League of Nations by 1934, for example. As such, this chapter explores the early, explosive years of these internationalisms, a formative period during which they defined themselves against each other, laying the foundations for their policies and directions. One of the goals of this chapter is to make connections between these movements, focusing on the Comintern as the self-proclaimed vanguard of the international working class, contextualizing it in a history of competing internationalisms. As such, after a brief historical note, this chapter discusses the degree to which the Bolsheviks directed the early Comintern policy – a well-trodden path in the literature, but one that remains broadly unexplored in this context.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Comintern archives allowed historians an opportunity to analyze the institutional dynamics from the perspective of the Executive Committee (ECCI) and other bodies located in Moscow. As such, historians focused on the degree of control that Bolsheviks were able to exercise over the organization. Historiographic studies and overviews generally agree that the literature on the early history of the Comintern revolves mostly around interpretations of congresses, center-periphery relationships, and the degree to which Moscow controlled the Comintern agenda (Petersson 2007; McDermott 1998; Datta Gupta 2012). Authors working in the post-Soviet period also began to overturn the assumptions that the Soviet Union had full control over the Comintern Secretariat, as well as over the parties that formed part of the organization, highlighting the independence of local agents. These histories tend to focus largely on specific parties in specific countries, such as Sobhanlal Datta Gupta's and Sanjay Seth's explorations of Comintern and India, or taking a broader regional approach such as Michael Weiner's discussion of Comintern presence in East Asia (Datta Gupta 2006; Seth 1995; Weiner 1996). An even more recent turn toward transnationalism instead highlights that the Comintern presented an opportunity for local agents to use the organization as a source of radical legitimacy (Makalani 2011). Other scholars explore similar ways that individuals and groups used the Comintern, as a way of connecting diasporic communities in the work of Anna Belogurova, or as ways of creating radical networks by traveling to Soviet Russia in the work of Joy G. Carew on Africans in the USSR (Belogurova 2017; Carew 2015). From the Comintern perspective, this chapter focuses on the ECCI and the congresses, thereby returning to a more traditional subject – but at the same time providing a different approach by situating the central machinery of the organization in a global history of internationalisms, rather than in a history of (international) communism or the Soviet Union.

Consequently, along with the literature that is strictly focused on Comintern as an actor and space for action, this chapter is also in conversation with a set of literature on international organizations in the interwar period, specifically one that focuses on the League of Nations. In this literature, authors approach

the League from a variety of angles but hold in common an explicit rejection of the traditional understanding of the League as an organization that was narrowly defined by its failure to maintain peace (Pedersen 2015; Clavin 2013; Fink 2004). Instead, Anthony Anghie, for example, traces the colonial roots of the League, and how it maintained colonial relations throughout the interwar period, thereby transferring the colonial mentality into the United Nations development agenda (Anghie 2001–2002). These works are inspiring new researchers to question fundamental traits of the League, such as its status as a “liberal” organization, for instance (Petruccelli 2020). Glenda Sluga, on the other hand, approaches the League from a normative perspective that focuses on its significance in the transition to a new “international order.” In this chapter, leftist internationals emerge within the context of the establishment and construction of the League of Nations, and as such I am explicitly interested in the League’s legitimacy as a space for the conduct of international relations, something that is explored by both Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Sluga and Clavin 2016; Sluga 2019).

As a result, this chapter lies between the two camps that focus on the League and the Comintern, and can be situated in the literature on burgeoning leftist internationalisms of the interwar period as explored by a variety of scholars focusing on anti-fascism, transnational connections between European socialist parties, colonial issues and relief (Dogliani 2017; Imlay 2018; Drachewych 2019; Brasken 2015; Brasken et al. 2021). National, colonial, and racial issues represent an important entry point into transnational and international communism in the literature, as shown by the diversity of the authors and subject matter in *Left Transnationalism*, a recent volume edited by Oleksa Drachewych and Ian McKay (2020). Another pertinent example is Daniel Laqua’s work, connecting socialist and liberal orders, but focusing on the Second International’s relationship with the League of Nations, rather than on the Comintern (Laqua 2015).

All these authors represent a new approach to international communism and socialism in the interwar period, one that focuses primarily on understanding the transnational and international connections made during this time, rather than a more traditional focus on organizational dynamics of the Comintern, or a political explanation of the failure of international communism. This chapter contributes to the discussions held within these volumes, analyzing the degree of control exercised by the Bolsheviks and the contributions by non-Bolshevik actors, and investigating the transnational connections between these organizations against the backdrop of the establishment of the League of Nations and the ongoing construction of the international system.

### **The role of political parties in an international**

The interwar internationalisms identified above did not arise out of a vacuum – they were informed by predecessors that had already wrestled with

the key problems in organization, political action, and membership. The role of the political party in particular was central to these debates ever since the second half of the nineteenth century, with *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* drafted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels specifically for the formation of the Communist League in 1847. It took almost twenty years, however, for the first socialist international organization to form in Europe due to the 1848 revolutions and the long-term political, social, and economic upheaval they caused.

The International Workingmen's Association (IWA), established in London by a variety of European socialist activists, trade unionists, and workers in 1864, was the first international seeking to unite workers at the global level, in practice limited to Western Europe and the United States. IWA was originally conceived by the English trade unionists who sought to create an international network of workers in pursuit of specific economic goals such as the nine-hour day: its stated overall goal was the establishment of "a central medium of communication and co-operation between workingmen's societies existing in different countries and aiming at the same end; viz., the protection, advancement, and complete emancipation of the working classes" (Nepomnyashchaya et al. 1964, 288–289).

The IWA could thus hardly be described as a party-of-parties; at its founding the socialist movement was still at an early stage of political development. The General German Workers' Association, established a year prior, was the only socialist political party that took part in the first meeting in London. French and English parties did not yet exist, and their workers were instead represented by trade unions. As a result, political organization, establishment, and coordination of political parties represented one of the central issues faced by the IWA. Its General Rules and the Inaugural Address to workers clearly laid out a vision in which the party was not the only method of organization, however, due to the importance of trade unions as representatives of the working class and the desire to attract anarchists and revolutionaries who aligned themselves with various leftist currents of the time, in particular those led by Ferdinand Lassalle, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Louis Auguste Blanqui. As a result, membership was based on country sections and any person or organization could join the Association.

The IWA's position on this issue changed with time, however, due to internal disagreement and debate, mainly between Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, eventually leading to an impasse that resulted in the collapse of the Association. Marx was highly influential and active in the IWA from the outset, having authored both the Rules and the Address, supporting a more centralized approach to organization, and emphasizing the importance of political struggle (Comninel 2014, 74–79). Bakunin, on the other hand, promoted economic action first and foremost, standing against centralized political organization and political action by workers, including the formation of political parties.

From 1868 onwards, he employed a variety of tactics including establishing a secret alliance of his supporters within the International to

undermine, split and question the strategies and goals of the IWA, seeking to take over and/or redirect the Association toward his agenda. At the 1871 London Congress, the organizational matter of political action by workers and the importance of the political party was put on the agenda, and Marx was able to convince the underattended Congress of changing direction. The IWA focus shifted from economic questions to the creation of a more centralized organization that was to support, and direct, the establishment of political parties across Europe. In the aftermath, Marx and Engels then drafted the revised General Rules adopted at the 1872 Congress, stating that “the working class cannot act as a class except by constituting itself into a political party” (Karmanova et al. 1976, 282).

This was a seminal moment: the first call for the creation of mass political parties to represent the working classes of Europe, later taken up by the Second International and the Comintern. At the same time, Bakunin was expelled from the Association at the 1872 Congress as his campaign against the IWA and Marx became more aggressive. His followers questioned the change of direction as well, leaving the Association and creating a parallel Anarchist International that cemented the formal split between communist and anarchist tendencies. With Bakunin and his followers gone, the IWA itself quickly faded and disbanded in 1876 (Nimtz 2015; Musto 2014, 22–25).

It is important to note that I used a traditional interpretation of the chronology and activity of the IWA as an international here. Recent studies began to question the importance of the congresses and focus more on broader processes through which workers began to manifest international solidarity in the 1860s and onwards (Cordillot 2015). Workers in England and France certainly established close ties in this period, as debates and action began happening on the international scale in the European space (Dogliani 2017, 38–40). For this volume, however, the focus remains on internationals as organizations that sought to unite political parties, necessitating a more traditional approach.

In the aftermath of the IWA’s dissolution, internationalism remained on the agenda, but European workers were unable to immediately unite under a new banner. Again, the issue of political parties was at the center of the disagreement: the majority of the French workers as well as those in smaller European countries preferred to follow in the footsteps of the IWA and create a similar organization out of its ashes, while German workers in particular sought first the establishment of national political parties that could later be united into a fully functioning international with parties as members. The two groups met in 1889 at two separate congresses in Paris, eventually joining forces at the first united Congress in Brussels in 1891 and establishing the New International (only re-interpreted as the Second International after the outbreak of the First World War).

Up until the early 1900s, it could hardly be described as an international organization, however: instead, it was originally conceived as a set of periodical meetings of socialists at an international stage without a secretariat or permanent body, and was not designed to direct action of its members at the

national level. With the birth of mass political parties in the 1890s and beyond, such as in Italy in 1892, Portugal in 1893, and France in 1904, the International coalesced into a more concrete organization, forming a standing Secretariat and Bureau at the Paris Congress in 1900, and establishing an interparliamentary commission and a press coordination body by 1904.

The IWA focused on creating a medium of communication and was hampered by a lack of political organization at the national level to undertake international action, while in contrast by the outbreak of the First World War the Second International was a robust organization of national parties that sought to represent a “parliament of the proletariat” (Dogliani 2017, 43).<sup>1</sup> Certainly, socialists in the International ascribed significance to the nation and national culture, seeing them as wholly compatible and required for the progress toward the emancipation of the working class, making the national party an important tool (Mulholland 2015, 623–624).

The integration of national political parties into the structure of the Second International at once gave a powerful voice to socialists across Europe, as well as an authority and prestige never reached by a leftist movement at an international level. Traditional interpretations of its history generally argue that it failed to prevent the First World War, however that argument presumes that it could do so in the first place (Haupt 1972, 218–225). More recent research presents a nuanced picture of an organization that was active and robust because of the presence of socialist leaders from all major European parties and nations. Most of these leaders, however, have through their contributions to the International made known on numerous occasions that they were committed to national defense above the ideological ties that bound together the parties at the international level. This was shown expertly by Marc Mulholland, who pointed out that even the Resolution against War and Militarism passed at the 1907 Stuttgart Congress implicitly approved defensive wars (2015). As such, given the complex political situation in the lead up to 1914, socialists across Europe, whether German, French, or English, could argue convincingly that they were, in fact, defending their nation from aggression, remaining true to their principles.

The Second International was not a monolith, and debates on fundamental issues by members with widely different views took place at every congress. The organization’s position on imperialism, for instance, was intensely debated by Karl Kautsky, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and many others in the years before the First World War (Haupt 1972, 135–160; Gaido and Quiroga 2020). Nevertheless, most European parties did not oppose the war after its outbreak and participated in it actively. At a crucial point in European and global history, the agency and goals of the Second International were subsumed by those of the belligerent nation-states. Rather than seeking to capture state power, either at national or international levels, the Second International was disbanded. The collapse and inability to maintain an identity that superseded the national identity of its individual party members thus makes it difficult to interpret the Second

International as a party of parties. Fundamentally, it was a federation of autonomous parties, leading Haupt to argue that parties “clung jealously to the principle of autonomy [that] did not undergo any fundamental change” throughout the life of the Second International (Haupt 1972, 15–16).

In contrast, as I show in the next section, the Third International was designed at the outset in opposition to its predecessor: the call for workers to assume the responsibilities of the state, of course through national communist parties, united in a centralized international party-of-parties, was the reason for its existence. The Communist International was created not only in a completely new international postwar environment that required a new set of tactics, but it was also created with the explicit goal of capturing state power and establishing a new international system of party-states.

### **Communist International: A party of parties**

The Second International was not disbanded only because its member parties took up arms against each other but also because the left wing declared its opposition to the war and all belligerent parties. Lenin quickly recognized the existential threat that the First World War posed to the Western Powers and the capitalist system as a whole, disavowing the Second International completely and drawing a line in the sand between the communist and socialist approaches at the international level. The break from the more moderate socialist forces and his consistent opposition to the war in principle were not insignificant in the Bolsheviks’ rise to power, and thus greatly informed the establishment and organization of the Communist International.

The First Comintern Congress took place on March 2, 1919, in Moscow, with only nine delegates representing parties outside of Soviet Russia. It provided a clear statement of intent in its inaugural call:

The war and revolution has finally shown not only the complete bankruptcy of the old socialist and social-democratic parties as well as the Second International, not only the inability of transitional elements of the old social democracy (the so-called “center”) to carry out active revolutionary action; [but also] right now, the outline of a truly revolutionary International is becoming clear.

The Comintern was set up with a simple goal – in order to pursue world revolution and destroy the capitalist world order, an international tasked with assisting the proletariat to “capture state power” was needed.<sup>2</sup> At the national level, it would assist parties in their efforts at home, and at the international level create a party-of-parties and the infrastructure of a new global system of governance that would eventually replace what was left of postwar capitalism.

The Comintern’s position on the preceding and contemporary internationals was similarly clear cut from the outset. Referring to the reformist forces of the Second International, the Theses on the Main Tasks of the

Communist International clearly stated that “any thought about peaceful submission of capitalists to the will of the exploited masses, about a peaceful, reformist transition to socialism is not only extremely philistine dumb-headedness but also a clear deception of the workers.”<sup>3</sup> In the opening statement of the first session of the Second Congress, Grigorii Zinov’ev sharply criticized both the prewar and postwar incarnations of the Second International, claiming that “already by the end of the war, [it] sought to link its fate with the bourgeoisie: with the League of Nations, the cat that was the strongest of the beasts.”<sup>4</sup> Adopted at the Second Congress, the terms of acceptance of new parties into the Third International clarified the Comintern’s stance on the League as well: “no ‘democratic’ reorganization of the League of Nations [could] save mankind from new imperialist wars.”<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to the League, the first two Internationals, and the Labour and Socialist International, the Comintern bodies and congresses operated within the national boundaries of one state, Soviet Russia, as the Bolsheviks retained significant influence over its operation. Historiography of the Comintern is in broad agreement that the Bolsheviks eventually came to dominate and control Comintern congress proceedings as well as its internal bodies (Pettersson 2007). Within the narrative of this volume, this process can be interpreted as part of the broader pursuit by political parties to co-opt state power, conducted at three distinct levels. At the national level, the Bolsheviks captured state power in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, fusing themselves into the state. At the international level, the Comintern was established to facilitate the capture of other states by like-minded parties and eventually create an entirely new international system of parties as states. At the same time, the Bolsheviks also sought to co-opt the process at the international level via its evolving control of the Comintern, seeking to fuse into the international system itself.

### **A Bolshevik internationalism**

The Second Congress is widely considered to be the true beginning of the Third International in the literature; taking place between July 19 and August 8, 1920, across Petrograd and Moscow, it brought together over 200 delegates from 37 countries and set up a number of important rules, guidelines, and precedents (McDermott and Agnew 1996, 12–13, 17; Pons 2014, 19). Despite the arrival of representatives of various parties from across the world, some of whom stayed to staff the Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks maintained their influence. At the first ECCI meeting, Paul Levi’s proposal to seat four non-Russian and three Russian members on the Small Committee of the ECCI to limit the Bolshevik influence was shot down immediately by Nikolai Bukharin and Zinov’ev. They argued that the Small Bureau was a technical committee in charge of bringing to life the decisions of the ECCI, and as a result should be staffed with Russians who could quickly deploy local resources. Zinov’ev in

particular was dismissive of any criticism, stating that Levi's proposal surprised the session and dismissing John Reed's concerns about the nomination of Mikhail Kobetskii as Secretary of the Bureau because he was not a member of the Bolshevik Party.

Levi countered by noting that if the twenty-person ECCI was to meet frequently, as was the wish of the Bolsheviks, then it was inevitable that the Small Bureau would be drafting theses and establishing agendas, hence by definition conducting crucial political work. One of the interesting moments of this debate came when Zinov'ev attempted to argue that Karl Radek, who Levi proposed as a member of the Bureau, should not be in Moscow working in the Comintern, but in Poland, "where a lot of things [were] being resolved right now," since Radek was Polish. Arguing that his presence in Poland was significant while his place in the Small Bureau could be taken up by someone else, Zinov'ev noted that Levi must interpret this issue "from an internationalist point of view."<sup>6</sup>

This line of argumentation reveals a few important details. First of all, while Zinov'ev and Levi disagreed, both of them were using internationalist perspectives – they were just not identical. Zinov'ev was clearly informed by the Bolshevik insistence that capitalism was on its death bed and it was important to act quickly to pursue the momentum of the Russian Revolution by instigating revolutions in Europe. As a result, for Zinov'ev, Radek's authority and knowledge were better used to ensure the revolution in Poland succeeded, thereby strengthening world revolution as a result, rather than to ensure the foundation of the Comintern was well set. Capturing state power at the national level took priority.

Levi's point of view is clear as well: a Small Bureau that was not dominated by the Bolsheviks would by definition be internationalist, and its ability to set the agenda of the ECCI meetings would thereby influence the Comintern at large toward a more internationalist perspective, regardless of the efficiency with which non-Bolsheviks were able to command local resources. Radek himself also agreed with Levi that the nature of the Bureau's work would be political.

Secondly, Levi and the German delegation foresaw the difficulties inherent to a Bolshevik-ran Small Bureau, revealing their priorities did not end with pursuing revolutions at a breakneck pace. Instead, they sought to ensure that the Communist International, as an international organization, was set up correctly, without overdue Russian influence, becoming a truly legitimate internationalist institution that was able to direct parties across the world and protect them as they gained power, in the long term.

In the end, the composition remained at three Russians (Zinov'ev, Kobetskii, and Bukharin) and two non-Russians: Ernst Meyer and Endre Rudnyánszky.<sup>7</sup> The importance of the Small Bureau, and the inevitably political nature of its work, was evidenced immediately. The second ECCI session began with Zinov'ev announcing that the Bureau was tasked with determining the composition of a special commission to review the text of



the Comintern call to trade unions and selecting individuals to sign the call.<sup>8</sup> Within a few months, the ECCI members were complaining that the Small Bureau had too much influence and acted outside of its “technical” remit. The Austrian Karl Steinhardt, for example, noted that members would routinely receive final decisions from the Small Bureau they had no context for, even seeing their signatures on calls and manifestos that they had not read, as well as seeing signatures of individuals who were not members of the ECCI. Dismissing Zinov’ev’s counterargument that foreign members had to be more proactive, he maligned that every time he tried to participate in important work, such as setting up better communication lines between the ECCI and parties in other countries, he was thwarted by the Small Bureau, in this case not even being invited to participate in its meeting on this issue. Steinhardt went as far as claiming that at times he felt like the “Executive Committee was just a side show for the Russian comrades.”<sup>9</sup>

While it is certainly possible to argue that the Bolsheviks merely sought to control the Comintern, it did not represent all their motivations. This discussion reminds historians of a crucial feature of our work that is often taken for granted – the transplanting of meaning into the past. Both Levi and Zinov’ev had two different understandings of “internationalism” and its priorities, perhaps representative of certain camps within the Comintern but also highlighting the idea that the meaning of these terms was up for grabs during this period. Certainly, Levi’s argument fits more neatly with our contemporary understanding of “internationalism” – but that does not necessarily mean that Zinov’ev was being disingenuous in his argumentation to obfuscate the “real” motivation of packing the Small Bureau with Russians. Instead, as historians we must be open to the interpretation that these debates reflected a time during which the idea of “internationalism,” to take this example, was not fully settled. It is in these types of disagreements and arguments that these motivations can be unearthed and analyzed, rather than dismissing the entire endeavor simply as a dominant party seeking to retain control over proceedings.

At this early stage of the Comintern’s development, Bolshevik leaders were still optimistic about the success of world revolution – hence their impatience and the necessity of swift action in support of fledgling revolutions, in Europe in particular. The Comintern was being set up with a particular Bolshevik understanding of internationalism. It was still also an international organization, however, and as with its two predecessors, it was host to a wide diversity of views. Many members openly challenged the Bolshevik dominance, disagreed with their leaders’ proposals, and sought to combat Bolshevik attempts to control the co-optation of the international system via the Comintern.

### **Pushback against the Bolsheviks in the Comintern**

At the subsequent congresses, debates with Bolshevik leaders were held out in the open. In order to further demonstrate the early ambitions of the

Communist International as an organization that was proactively seeking to create a new system, I focus here in particular on the debates around the international situation, and the ways in which the Comintern members related to the other international organizations that could provide competition and alternatives to world revolution. The deliberation of Comintern's policy and rhetoric toward other internationalisms is ripe for analysis not only with the aim of better understanding the history of internationalism but also as a point of tension between the Bolsheviks and representatives of other parties.

The presentation and discussion of Lev Trotskii's report on the global political and economic climate at the Third Congress in 1921 presents ample opportunity to analyze not only the attitudes of the Comintern members toward the international situation and international organizations but also highlights the ways in which the Bolsheviks communicated with the rest of the members. Trotskii noted in the presentation of this report that "[c]apital still holds the reins of power in most parts of the world, and we must consider whether, on the whole, our conception of world revolution is correct, under the circumstances." He acknowledged that during the previous two congresses, the Third International failed to act, instead drawing up "great plans" in the anticipation of the revolution, trying to pinpoint exactly when it would take place. At the same time, while the hope of a quick revolution after the war did not come to pass, that did not equate to an irreparable failure of world revolution conceptually, nor of the Comintern itself. Using Marx's and Engels's statements about the importance of crises in leading up to revolutions, he argued that worker exploitation would continue to increase in intensity due to the inherent logics of capitalism, eventually leading to a true revolution as more and more brutal suppression of workers by the bourgeoisie would take place. In the meantime, the world situation was one of "unstable, temporary, and most limited equilibrium," rather than a full-blown restoration of the capitalist world order. Instead, Trotskii argued, both Europe and the United States would continue undergoing deepening economic crises because capitalism itself was "in the midst of a period of a long and deep depression" that would lead to an eventual revolution with the collapse of international trade.<sup>10</sup>

The discussion of Trotskii's report showed the range of opinions of the Comintern members, and the ways in which they sought to push back against the Bolshevik attempts at controlling the International. Some delegates, for instance, brought up the internationals competing with the Comintern for the allegiance of the working class. Alexander Schwab, one of the founders of the Communist Workers' Party of Germany, noted that Trotskii's theses had to undergo significant review before publication to show "due allowance for the necessity of controversy with the reconstruction of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals." With the alternative socialist internationals (re)emerging, members of the Comintern recognized not only the potential danger of splitting the base of leftist support but also the fact that the Comintern itself had to be more precise in its statements. In 1921, two years before the First Congress of the Labour and Socialist International and a year

before the failure to unite the three internationals in Berlin, some members of the Comintern clearly saw a possible future in which their support would dwindle in favor of the less radical socialist organizations, and as a result advocated for public statements to be more theoretically sound. As such, Schwab argued sharply that the theses were “not adequate for the analysis” which the Comintern had to present to its global audience, and that they should instead focus on the fact that the postwar economic system was based on the pursuit of profit rather than production, with the latter being simply one “accidental” way to achieve the former, going on to explain in depth exactly how this was occurring.<sup>11</sup>

The theses were further questioned by Bernhard Reichenbach, a co-founder of the Communist Workers’ Party of Germany. In his reply, he noted that Russia, as a market for Western European products, represented an outlet for capitalists to maintain their ever-intensifying pursuit of profit. Reichenbach reassured his Bolshevik colleagues that it was Russia’s moral prerogative to use Western capital for post-Civil War restoration, but warned them that this must not “injure the revolutionary movement and its progress” in Europe as a result.<sup>12</sup> Making the point that these economic fundamentals were not part of the theses, he requested them to be addressed explicitly so that the tactics of the Communist International could be based on solid theoretical footing that reflected international material relations. This economic argument was also implicitly a warning to the Bolsheviks that the non-Russian members were monitoring Soviet foreign policy and were ready to criticize it if the relations with Western powers became too close.

József Pogány, a Hungarian delegate and former People’s Commissar of War in the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, criticized the theses from a different angle. He noted that Trotskii’s analysis of the global state of communist insurrection was erroneously based on the idea that it would follow the Russian example: an inevitable victory that would be caused by the strengthening of the working class as a result of the increased postcrisis economic activity, ascribing the 1905–1919 period in Russia to the post-1919 world situation.<sup>13</sup> This criticism directly challenged not only this economic point but the broader Bolshevik internationalist vision of an inevitably quick world revolution that guided their strategy to dominate the Comintern. Thomas Bell, the founder of the Communist Party of Great Britain, was even more direct in attacking Trotskii, accusing him of overexaggerating and misrepresenting the failure of unions to revolutionize the working masses, since unions faced significant intimidation from the police, especially in England.<sup>14</sup>

M. N. Roy, the Indian communist who at the time was the head of the Turkestan Bureau of the Comintern, was the first delegate to point out a rather obvious discrepancy – while the report and discussion was supposed to reflect the world situation, the focus had been exclusively on Europe and the United States of America.<sup>15</sup> As such, he argued that the theses must include a passage about the importance of the colonial issue, a proposal that was echoed by the next speaker Wilhelm Koenen, another German representative, who

explicitly pointed out the discrepancy between discussing the “world situation” using the particular Russian and German point of view adopted by Trotskii. Taking a more conciliatory tone, he argued that while the overall debate around the severity of the crisis and the varieties of its character was important, it was more pertinent to the discussion to focus on tangible steps that the Comintern should be taking within the next year given that the congress accepted that the crisis did exist.<sup>16</sup>

The traditional argument that explains the failure of the Comintern, and broadly its *modus operandi*, points out that as an organization it was dominated by Bolshevik leaders, with congresses taking place in Moscow and most of the funding for holding them coming from the Soviet budget (Thorpe 1998: 637–639). Trotskii’s replies to the criticisms heard during the discussions add another dimension to this argument. It is clear from his somewhat mocking tone throughout and a dogmatic refusal to admit any mistakes that Trotskii was uninterested in participating in the Congress as a peer – instead he was there to educate its members and direct them to do his bidding. Even when responding to M. N. Roy’s comments regarding the importance of the colonial issue, comments that were fully in line with the Lenin-inspired Bolshevik conception of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism, Trotskii neither agreed nor disagreed. Instead, he simply noted that Roy “reminded” the Congress that the revolution was progressing along three routes of Europe, America, and the colonies, briefly characterizing each, without committing to any edits.<sup>17</sup>

The theses were then delivered to the committee in charge of the question, which presented the final edited version during the sixteenth session. This version reflected the bulk of the comments, with the most significant change being a compromise between Trotskii and the German delegation, wherein references to the possibility of the current crisis enduring longer, rather than breaking out into an open conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class in the short term, as well as references to the tactics that communist parties must be adopting, were included. While the German delegation was the second largest in number and influence behind the Russian contingent, this was nevertheless an important development, showing that the Bolshevik-dominated Congress was still willing and able to compromise with other delegates and was not simply stonewalling every possible edit or proposition. Bell’s comments on the English trade unions were included, while Roy’s wish to see more emphasis placed on the colonies was not.<sup>18</sup>

As such, the discussion of the world situation at the Third Congress showcased the various dynamics of the Comintern operation: a diversity of opinions in regards to other emerging internationalisms among its delegates, a willingness to oppose fundamental Bolshevik ideas, as well as a Bolshevik willingness to compromise. In this early period, the Bolsheviks dominated as a result of their interpretation of what a communist internationalism must represent, but the Comintern was clearly still reflecting the aim of creating a party-of-parties, both by replicating a constant struggle along the hierarchy,

as well as the flexibility of the center that is required to maintain allegiance of party members.

### **Labour and Socialist International as a Comintern competitor?**

While some Comintern members pushed back against the Bolshevik control of the organization from within, European socialist parties began to put aside their wartime differences, seeking to provide a common front to push back against the Comintern attempts at creating a new international system. Prior to the establishment of the Labour and Socialist International in 1923, socialist and communist forces attempted to come to a mutual understanding. In April 1922, representatives of the prewar Second International, the Communist International, and the Vienna Union gathered in Berlin in an attempt to smooth over their differences and work toward common action, while explicitly stating at the outset that there would be no discussion of organizational fusion. The Vienna Union consisted of representatives of various European socialist parties, which would later go on to establish the Labour and Socialist International, such as Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer. While the representatives were unable to unite in any meaningful way, the rhetorical reasons why are significant.

At the outset, Vienna Union delegates sought to smooth over differences by explicitly referring to the limits of the Congress, and the fact that there was no need to delve into existing arguments but rather look forward to try and accomplish the goal that all leftist internationals shared. Quickly, however, it became apparent that the Comintern representatives saw the Congress as a way of asserting their dominant position and reiterating their criticisms of the other attendees. The Second International representatives played their part in the way the discussions unfolded, focusing on the Soviet government's imprisonment of socialists and anarchists, as well as of their annexational policies in Georgia, as the wedges that split apart the broader international leftist movement.<sup>19</sup>

It took Giacinto Menotti Serrati, invited as a guest representative of the Italian Socialist Party, to ask the delegates about the purpose of this conference, noting that instead of working on practical goals, the discussion devolved into name-calling and judgments of past actions, by all sides. He was also one of the only speakers who attempted to unite the sides by explicitly noting that "We have all committed many errors" – referring to himself, as well as the Second, Two-and-a-Half, and Third Internationals – admittedly going on to explain why the Comintern's intensity of argumentation and attack on the Second International was justified, yet also showing his understanding for the position taken by the latter.<sup>20</sup> This semantic device was not used by the representatives of the internationals, who made sure to distinguish themselves from each other and outline their own positions on existing disagreements before providing a few platitudes with regards to moving toward common action.

The congress was able to agree on a statement in which the Comintern made promises on behalf of the Soviet government with regards to Georgia, imprisoned socialists, and the work toward uniting the Amsterdam and Red Trade Union Internationals. However, the experience of the Paris congresses in 1889 was not repeated and the sides were unable to agree on a date for the next congress. Any goodwill and momentum that the Berlin Conference mustered quickly disappeared as the Vienna Union representatives, as well as some Second Internationalists, set up the Labour and Socialist International expressly in opposition to the Comintern.

The LSI emerged as a socialist alternative to the uncompromising maximalism of the Bolsheviks and hence was governed somewhat more democratically. The Bureau of the LSI included members from Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Russia, and Georgia, as its composition was designed specifically to ensure that a diversity of voices was represented. A report from an early meeting even explained in detail why some of the representatives were unable to attend the session, affirming that a new meeting that would include more members was scheduled as a result.<sup>21</sup>

At its First Congress in 1923, the LSI cemented the crucial division between it and the Comintern. The ideological differences between a reformist socialism of the former and the more leftist communism of the latter were clearly stated from the beginning by both parties and were discussed at length in Berlin. The more interesting difference, however, was their attitudes to the League of Nations – a liberal, capitalist international that already by then represented the *de jure* world order. The LSI passed a resolution that condemned the Versailles Peace Treaty, demanded the League to “cease to be the instrument for the imposition of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,” requested it to open its membership to “all the nations of the world” and rework its constitution based on democratic principles. At the same time, it voted to approve the existence of the League, also supporting “all efforts to advance labour legislation, put forth by the [League’s] Labour Office.” In the resolution on the League, the LSI also acknowledged the need for “some international authority [to preserve] peace and the organization of the economic life in the world.”<sup>22</sup> Hence, while the criticism of the League was motivated by the fact that it was currently unfit to become this authority, it was clear that the League was considered as the only organization that was able to fulfill that role – at least before a vaguely defined global Socialist Commonwealth would form to take up its place.

This was made clear in another resolution, with the LSI declaring that “all international conflicts [must] be settled by impartial arbitration.” In the context of a changing international system in the aftermath of a world war that plunged traditional Great Powers into chaos, this declaration certainly refers to the idea that “impartial arbitration” should replace bilateral diplomacy and treaties in which victors set the post-conflict peace terms. This statement also expresses a curious hope that impartiality in arbitrating international conflicts was even possible in the first place. The only body that

had the authority and the capacity to conduct such arbitration was the League of Nations, and the LSI's support for it clearly aligned it with a reformist view of international relations, rather than the more radical transformational view that was evident in the Comintern's rhetoric.<sup>23</sup>

Before the Second Conference, the LSI Bureau met several times to discuss the most pressing issues, revealing that the League was also accepted from an operational day-to-day perspective. In one of the first meetings in July, representatives from the German and British parties welcomed the fact that the attitudes of both their governments to the League improved, as both were more open to the idea of Germany joining the League of Nations. In October 1923, as a result of a request from French and Belgian representatives, the Bureau adopted a resolution that argued for the reformation of the Versailles Peace Treaty with regards to its treatment of Germany and reparations, claiming that the workers agreed on a peace and reconciliation plan but "the Governments refused to."<sup>24</sup>

This is where the difference between the Comintern approach and the LSI approach to the League as an organization can be seen at its most apparent. Both internationals recognized that the peace was inherently compromised by the reparations and restrictions applied to Germany by the victorious Allied powers – it is their conclusions that differ, however. Since the goal of the Comintern was to effectuate widespread state capture, bringing about the world revolution and a new international system, the League of Nations was treated as an extension of that flawed peace, to be dismissed and attacked. State capture was not on the LSI's agenda as it was instead focused on step-by-step gains while working within the existing system stewarded by the League of Nations. As a result, its criticism of the League stopped short of condemning it wholly, seeking only to reform the way it applied the conditions of Versailles.

As with the Comintern, the membership of the LSI also held different opinions on this issue. The Dutch representative Pieter Troelstra succinctly summarized the situation by pointing out that the diplomatic route taken by the Bureau in 1923 was unsuccessful, noting that this effort had been "so absolutely ineffective" that a new strategy should be adopted, one that focused on engendering an anti-reparations and pro-peace movement within the masses, rather than seeking to accomplish these goals strictly via diplomatic means.<sup>25</sup> Unlike the Comintern, however, the diversity of views was discussed openly within the executive Bureau itself, as it was composed of representatives of various European parties specifically in order to ensure that important decisions were made by a representative committee rather than by a single powerful party. The Bureau did not meet often, seeking the attendance of as many delegates from as many parties as was feasible, even issuing explanations when certain parties were not represented – more akin to a parliamentary cabinet rather than the party-of-parties approach of the Comintern.

At the following Conference in 1925, this reformist view and an acceptance of the League's existence and its role as the arbiter of international

relations was cemented. The broader attitude remained the same – the League was necessary but insufficient. However, by now the criticism was much more muted in character. Instead of highlighting that the League was unfit to carry out its duties, C. R. Buxton, a British Labour Party member who played a central role in designing the LSI policy toward the League, noted that it would “not fully accomplish its task” unless it accepted all peoples equally, fully recognized the LSI peace program and created “a sound economic foundation” for itself.<sup>26</sup> Overall, the same demands from the First Conference continued, but the existence and authority of the League of Nations was no longer questioned.

Buxton’s ideas and perception of the League were based on his experience of being a member of an opposition party in Great Britain, where “blaming the League for ‘doing nothing’” was a common public refrain from the Tories in power. By 1923 the Labour Party had already established a complex position on the League of Nations as a fusion of its domestic and foreign policy, creating a specific set of goals and instructions for its members under an umbrella of a “League of Nations policy.” At its core, Labour sought to create a League foreign policy instead of a traditional balance of power foreign policy which it ascribed to the British cabinet. This policy was driven by an agenda that sought to reform the League’s covenant while promoting its multilateral and technical cooperation. Labour accepted the League’s legitimacy as a space for the conduct of international relations but also sought to strengthen it by encouraging the United States and the Soviet Union to be admitted as members. This perception of the League clearly bled into the position of the LSI, with Buxton being an influential figure.<sup>27</sup>

As such, during a discussion on disarmament at the 1925 Conference, Buxton called for parties to ensure that any new measures taken by their governments would remain “under the control of the League of Nations.” Moreover, he criticized the security pacts that existed outside the remit of the League, arguing that they must be supervised by the League because it can provide “a system which will lend itself to never being turned against any other Power [...] and which consequently will not lead to a possible revival of a false balance of power.” Buxton also called for Russian workers to pressure the Soviet government into applying for League membership. In a similar vein, when condemning the actions of Spain and France during the Rif War in Morocco, the LSI stated that the League of Nations “should provide a regime similar to that of the international mandates it has already established.”<sup>28</sup>

These claims further confirm the broader perception that existed within the LSI ranks that the League represented the sole legitimate international political arena through which states and other organizations could act, rather than an internationalism with which the LSI was competing for the future of international relations – in direct contrast to the Comintern. Another important conclusion one can draw from these statements is a combination of Eurocentrism and an inability, or unwillingness, to confront the assumed neutrality of the League. Based in Geneva and designed by the



Great Allied Powers, winners of the First World War, clear biases in favor of Great Power Western liberalism were baked into not just the operation and decision-making processes of the League but also its structure, purpose, and identity. The mandate system, for instance, was largely based on a combination of existing colonial relations and the aspirations of Western powers to expand their colonial territories – yet was accepted at face value as neutral due to the presence of the League of Nations (Pedersen 2015, 17–44).

### **Comintern and the League of Nations: A missed opportunity**

Having established the difference between the Comintern and the LSI, it is important to further elaborate on the peculiar similarities between the Comintern and the League of Nations, as well as the peculiar absence of the liberal internationalism from the discussions between communist party representatives. There was a distinct lack of references to the League in the debate about the international situation at the Third Congress, for instance, especially one that had such a narrow focus on Europe and the United States. During the discussion of Trotskii's report, the Polish representative Henryk Brand argued that the rebuilding of the capitalist economy could only be accomplished

in the sphere of the imperialist Peace of Versailles [that] caused the creation of a number of artificially established states, all of whom have proved their inability to exist, and have always, and will always have to keep fighting one another.<sup>29</sup>

In making this point, Brand built on Trotskii's argument by insisting that capitalist reconstruction was impossible in the current circumstances because of this infighting and the absence of a true peace. At the same time, this statement is a judgment of the League of Nations – the organization responsible for enacting the Versailles Treaty and maintaining the peace. Here, the League is portrayed as an inherently flawed capitalist creation, established to maintain an impossible peace between the constantly quarrelling capitalist states. Its role and failure were predetermined from this perspective, yet at the same time this established its importance as the overseer of the international system – “the sphere of the imperialist peace” being a clear reference to the League.

This was an isolated argument, however, as members avoided discussing the League of Nations. The Comintern congresses focused more often on ideological issues with regards to party compositions and how far could the membership of the international lean to the right or the left. It is important to emphasize that the membership of the Comintern was solely comprised of parties, and as a result it had a limited amount of influence over the national policies of the countries where these parties existed since most of them were not in power. The only communist party that had solidified its position in

power at the time was the Bolshevik Party. As a result, it was rational for the communist members to look inward and concentrate on facilitating state capture at the national level. On the other hand, the Comintern's stated goal as a party-of-parties was fundamentally international – the spread of world revolution, creating the international space where these party-states could conduct international relations. In other words, fundamentally, the Comintern was conceived as the equivalent of the League of Nations before the latter was even created.

In contrast, the League's membership was comprised of states, thereby being theoretically "apolitical," but in practice representing a particular Western, liberal Great Power internationalism when compared with the Comintern's communist ideals and the socialist base of the Labour and Socialist International (Sluga 2019, 29–31). As such, at the outset it claimed to be the new arbiter of international relations, as the space where states discussed international affairs – as the organization that the Comintern sought to become. Consequently, it is somewhat surprising that neither the relations between these two nor the theoretical underpinnings of their complimentary approaches to international relations had been covered in depth by secondary literature.<sup>30</sup>

While there were many differences between them, at a fundamental level both were created to establish a new world order, which they would administer, and wherein they would be considered as the sole legitimate arbiter of international relations. To ensure their status, however, their claim to legitimacy had to be convincing enough for other states and parties around the world. Key to ensuring this status was the extent to which governments and peoples would accept the internationals' ability to recognize and bestow statehood. The League of Nations was able to do so due to its association with the Great Powers that, despite the devastation of the First World War, remained in the driving seat of international relations. Susan Pedersen put it most succinctly, stating that the League's core contribution to international relations was displacing some political functions from national and imperial centers to the international arena: "the work of legitimation moved to Geneva, as imperial powers strove to defend – and others to challenge – their authority" (Pedersen 2015, 4–5). In contrast, the Comintern was just one of many international organizations and movements of varying political affiliations, goals, and sizes that all competed for the attention of the global population. The Third International could not even claim all socialist parties, as the previous section showed. The Comintern's goals were informed by the Bolsheviks' faith in the end of the capitalist world order, in the imminent world revolution, and as such they were grandiose in nature.

At the same time, perhaps partly because of this faith, the Comintern did not seek to actively confront the process through which this international "work of legitimation" was transferred to the League. This was a miscalculation, as the lack of attention afforded to providing fundamental critiques of the League's uneven application of the national self-determination

principle and its use by Western powers as a tool to maintain colonial relations allowed the League to substantiate its claims to legitimacy without fielding any significant resistance from a potentially powerfully disruptive international organization such as the Comintern. Instead of focusing its efforts on delegitimizing the League of Nations as a consequence of the Versailles Peace and a reflection of oppressive imperial and colonial power, the Comintern delegates looked inward and focused on attacking the legitimacy of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, as well as the Amsterdam International as organizations that sought to recruit parties and worker groups that the Comintern set its sights on.

From this perspective, the failure of the Comintern and other leftist internationalisms to pursue world revolution and make significant gains across the world in the interwar period can largely be attributed to their inability to present a common front against an emerging nation-state-based international system. It is important to note that while the leftist groups were occupied with infighting, the League carried on setting up various international institutions such as the mandate system that maintained colonial relations, the Labour Office that was able to put forward a liberal claim on the working class, the minorities section that designated national minority status, thereby further entrenching the League as a source of international legitimacy, and more. The League was backed, albeit timidly, by Western powers united in their experience of the First World War and by their general liberal ideology, one that remained deeply rooted in colonial and imperial materialities, but one that was also in the process of transition toward a neoliberalism that provided certain political freedoms to its populations.

## **Conclusion**

The early 1920s represented a period of intense transition and change at the international level. On the left, emerging internationalisms navigated complex political positions, as well as even more complex political relations. With trust broken by the First World War and enthusiasm strengthened by the Russian Revolution, socialists and communists were unable to cooperate and present a united front – not only in the face of Great Power liberalism but also Great Power internationalism. The subsequent years of declining autonomy of the Comintern under Iosif Stalin's regime revealed that the early years represented an opportunity missed. Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks sought to dominate the Third International from the outset, they did so as part of an internationalist vision that prioritized building a nimble organization that could react quickly to support state capture at the national level, sacrificing democratic decision-making and alienating socialist reformers. A Comintern without allies on the left was powerless before a Bolshevik Party that was reforming around a single individual, while the Labour and Socialist International was unable to command significant resources or authority and

continued to cooperate with the League of Nations that was emerging as the avatar for the liberal world order.

Consequently, the League was able to wield its legitimacy at the international level – assigning mandates, promoting international technical cooperation, deciding whether or not certain groups “deserved” national minority status, and sharing this legitimacy with new nation-states by selectively approving certain claims to nationhood. Despite the glaring failure to prevent another world war and arrest the spread of fascism worldwide, the League existed largely unopposed as an international organization of states, so much so that public opinion in Western countries welcomed the idea of the United Nations in the aftermath of the Second World War (Sluga 2019, 36–40).

The Bolshevik vision of a communist international as a party-of-parties proved to be based on a faulty assumption that the capitalist system was unable to persevere. In remaining narrowly committed to that particular Bolshevik type of internationalist vision and seeking to dominate, rather than creating a democratic system of governance that would allow plural visions and broader ownership over the international by communist parties around the world, the Comintern was unable to portray itself as a source of legitimacy at the international level. At the same time, the refusal to accommodate any demands of reformists in the Labour and Socialist International shut down potential sources of international solidarity and cooperation, resulting in a divided international left that was similarly unable to pose a threat to a liberal international system emerging out of the League of Nations. This chapter acts as one of the first steps in relating these internationalisms together, and I hope that other researchers will pursue further the connections discussed here in an attempt to establish a more thorough understanding of the internationalist landscape of the interwar period across the political spectrum.

## Notes

- 1 Dogliani here is quoting Adéodat Compère-Morel’s introduction to the first history of the Second International in French written in 1913 by Marx’s grandson, Jean Longuet (1913).
- 2 Komintern Archive (ARCH01862) at the International Institute of Social History archive, Amsterdam, originals at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), f. 488, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1b.
- 3 RGASPI, f. 489, op. 1, d. 21, l. 95 (Theses on the Main Tasks of the Communist International, Second Congress, July 1920).
- 4 RGASPI, f. 489, op. 1, d. 2, l. 3 (Stenographic report of the first session of the Second Comintern Congress, July 19, 1920).
- 5 RGASPI, f. 489, op. 1, d. 21, l. 108 (Terms of acceptance of new parties to the Communist International, Second Congress, July 1920).
- 6 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 1, d. 7, l. 16–19 (Stenographic report of the first session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, August 7, 1920).
- 7 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 1, d. 7, l. 16–19.

- 8 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 1, d. 8, l. 54 (Stenographic report of the second session of the ECCI, August 8, 1920).
- 9 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 1, d. 27, l. 25. “Порой мне чудится, что Исполком является только кулисами для русских товарищей” (Stenographic report of the seventeenth session of the ECCI, January 14, 1921).
- 10 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 45, l. 2, 27, 34, 41 (Stenographic report of the second session of the Third Comintern Congress).
- 11 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 6–7. Schwab was speaking under the pseudonym “Sachs” (Stenographic report of the third session of the Third Comintern Congress on Trotskii’s report on “World situation and our tasks,” June 24, 1921).
- 12 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 13.
- 13 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 14–17.
- 14 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 22–24.
- 15 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 28–29.
- 16 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 31.
- 17 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 43–44.
- 18 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 109, l. 4–10 (Stenographic report of the sixteenth session of the Third Comintern Congress on the report by the commission on the “World situation and our tasks” theses, June 4, 1921).
- 19 See (The Second and Third Internationals and the Vienna Union 1922, 7–28).
- 20 See (The Second and Third Internationals and the Vienna Union 1922, 48).
- 21 Labour and Socialist International, and Sozialistische Arbeiter-Internationale (SAI) archive ARCH01368 (hereafter: LSIA), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, item 3390, image 9 (Meeting of the Bureau of the LSI in Brussels, July 11, 1923).
- 22 LSIA, item 7, image 3 and 4 (Resolution on the Treaty of Versailles, reparations and war debts, and Resolution on The League of Nations, International Labour Congress of Socialist Parties, Hamburg 1923).
- 23 LSIA, item 7, image 9 (Motion 7: Resolution of the Committee on point (1) of the agenda, International Labour Congress of Socialist Parties, Hamburg 1923).
- 24 LSIA, item 3390, image 16–17 (Meeting reports, International Party Conference on the Ruhr question, July 22, 1923); 34 (Resolutions passed at Brussels, October 5, 1923).
- 25 LSIA, item 3390, image 45 (Letter to the Bureau of the LSI from Comrade Troelstra, November 14, 1923).
- 26 LSIA, item 27, image 20–21 (C. R. Buxton’s theses on disarmament and danger of war, Second Congress in Marseilles, 1925).
- 27 LSIA, item 3083, image 22 (Labour and the League of Nations: The need for a League Foreign Policy memorandum, July 9, 1923).
- 28 LSIA, item 27, image 26–27 and LSIA, item 29, image 2 (LSI Resolution on Morocco, July 28, 1925).
- 29 RGASPI, f. 490, op. 1, d. 48a, l. 2.
- 30 According to Patricia Clavin, “quite how international communism related to liberal internationalism in the interwar period is still unclear” (Clavin 2013, 9).

## Bibliography

- Anghie, Antony. 2001–2002. “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations.” *N. Y. U. Journal of International Law and Politics* 34: 513–633.

- Belogurova, Anna. 2017. "Networks, Parties, and the 'Oppressed Nations': The Comintern and Chinese Communists Overseas, 1926–1935." *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 24: 61–82.
- Brasken, Kasper, Nigel Copsey and David J. Featherstone, eds. 2021. *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities and Radical Internationalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Brasken, Kasper. 2015. *The International Workers' Relief, Communism, and Transnational Solidarity: Willi Münzenberg in Weimar Germany*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Carew, Joy G. 2015. "Black in the USSR: African diasporan pilgrims, expatriates and students in Russia, from 1920s to the first decade of the twenty-first century." *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 8, no. 2: 202–215.
- Clavin, Patricia. 2013. *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Comninel, George C. 2014. "Marx and the Politics of the First International." *Socialism and Democracy* 28, no. 2: 59–82.
- Cordillot, Michel. 2015. "Essor et déclin de l'Association internationale des Travailleurs: quelques éléments de réflexion" [Rise and decline of the International Workingmen's Association: Some points of reflection]. *Cahiers Jaurés* 1–2, no. 215–216: 5–18.
- Datta Gupta, Sobhanlal. 2006. *Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India 1919–1943: Dialectics of Real and a Possible History*. Kolkata: Seribaan.
- Datta Gupta, Sobhanlal. 2012. *Marxism in Dark Times: Select Essays for the New Century*. London: Anthem Press.
- Dogliani, Patrizia. 2017. "The Fate of Socialist Internationalism." In *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History*, edited by Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, 38–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drachewych, Oleksa and Ian McKay, eds. 2020. *Left Transnationalism: The Communist International and the National, Colonial and Racial Questions*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Drachewych, Oleksa. 2019. *The Communist International, Anti-Imperialism and Racial Equality in British Dominions*. New York: Routledge.
- Fink, Carole. 2004. *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, The Jews, and the International Minority Protection, 1878–1938*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaido, Daniel and Manuel Quiroga. 2020. "Marxism in the Age of Imperialism – the Second International." In *Routledge Handbook of Marxism and Post-Marxism*, edited by Alex Callinicos, Stathis Kouvelakis and Lucia Pradella, 51–65. London: Routledge.
- Haupt, Georges. 1972. *Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Imlay, Talbot. 2018. *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Karmanova, Natalia, Margarita Lopukhina, Maria Shcheglova, and Ludgarda Zubrilova, eds. 1976. *The Hague Congress of the First International. September 2–7, 1872. Minutes and Documents*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Laqua, Daniel. 2015. "Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism." *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2: 175–192.

- Longuet, Jean. 1913. *Le mouvement socialiste international* [The international socialist movement]. Paris: Aristide Quillet.
- Makalani, Minkah. 2011. "Internationalizing the Third International: African Black Brotherhood, Asian Radicals, and Race, 1919–1922." *The Journal of African American History* 96, no. 2 (Spring): 151–178.
- McDermott, Kevin. 1998. "The History of the Comintern in Light of New Documents." In *International Communism and the Communist International 1919–1943*, edited by Tim Reed and Andrew Thorpe, 31–40. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- McDermott, Kevin and Jeremy Agnew. 1996. *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*. London: MacMillan.
- Mulholland, Marc. 2015. "'Marxists of Strict Observance'? The Second International, National Defence, and the Question of War." *The Historical Journal* 58, no. 2: 615–640.
- Musto, Marcello, 2014. "Notes on the History of the International." *Socialism and Democracy* 28, no. 2: 5–38.
- Nepomnyashchaya, Nina, Molly Pearlman, and Lydia Belyakova, eds. 1964. *Documents of the First International. The General Council of the First International, 1864–1866: The London Conference, 1865. Minutes*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Nimtz, August H. 2015. "Marxism versus Anarchism: The First Encounter." *Science & Society* 79, no. 2: 153–175.
- Pedersen, Susan. 2015. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Petersson, Fredrik. 2007. "Historiographical Trends and the Comintern – The Communist International (Comintern) and How It Has Been Interpreted." *CoWoPa Comintern Working Papers* 8: 1–19.
- Petrucelli, David. 2020. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: The Legacies of the League of Nations Reconsidered." *Journal of World History* 31, no. 1: 111–136.
- Pons, Silvio. 2014. *The Global Revolution: A History of International Communism 1917–1991*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Seth, Sanjay. 1995. *Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Sluga, Glenda and Patricia Clavin, eds. 2016. *Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sluga, Glenda. 2019. "Remembering 1919: International Organizations and the Future of International Order." *International Affairs* 95, no. 1: 25–43.
- The Second and Third Internationals and the Vienna Union. 1922. *Official Report of the Conference between the Executives, Held at Reichstag, Berlin, on the 2nd of April 1922, and the Following Days*. London: Labour Publishing Company.
- Thorpe, Andrew. 1998. "Comintern 'Control' of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1920–43." *The English Historical Review* 113, no. 452 (June): 637–662.
- Weiner, Michael. 1996. "Comintern in East Asia, 1919–39." In *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*, edited by Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, 158–190. London: MacMillan.

### 3 The Left Opposition and the practices of parliamentarianism within the Bolshevik Party, 1923–1924<sup>1</sup>

*Alexander V. Reznik*

Six years after the October Revolution, in the autumn of 1923, a political contest broke out in Soviet Russia. Commonly referred to as the “struggle for power and for Lenin’s legacy,” it began as a conflict within the Party leadership, but eventually involved the Party as a whole. A heterogeneous coalition – headed by Lev Trotskii – challenged the majority group of the Party’s Political Bureau of the Central Committee, led by the Triumvirate (“Troika”) faction of Iosif Stalin, Grigorii Zinov’ev, and Lev Kamenev. This conflict triggered one of the most fundamental crises faced by the Bolshevik Party while in power. Initially beginning within the intraparty regime – having been started by a group which advocated a reform in the context of the deepening bureaucratization of the Party’s leadership and having been made worse by the latter’s monopolization of power – the conflict spread and ruptured the links between the top tier of the Party and its grassroots, leading to political passivity among many lower-level members.

The roots of this conflict go back to the early 1920s, before the death of Vladimir Lenin. According to official Party statutes, the intraparty regime was to function according to the norms of “workers’ democracy,” which included considerable opportunities for deliberation and leadership renewal. The members of the intraparty (Left) Opposition argued that the effectiveness of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was also in crisis, depended on the success of the Party’s reforms. In the end, the Opposition lost and faced condemnation on a number of fronts. The symbolic consolidation of this defeat came with the death of Lenin (the Party’s undisputed leader) on January 21, 1924, as the sacred image of Lenin was deployed in a rhetorical attack against the threat to “Party unity” personified by the Opposition. The importance of these few months of intense confrontation can hardly be overestimated in the communist project’s subsequent evolution. As the power of the Party apparatus strengthened, the constant denunciation, demonization, and ultimately repression of the Opposition became the foundation for Stalin’s regime. These factors influenced not only the USSR, but became the norm in Soviet-styled parties and regimes globally. While the history of the power struggle and the so-called “Trotskyist Opposition” has been the subject of numerous studies (Carr 1956; Deutscher 1959; Daniels 1960; Olekh 1992;



Demidov 1994; Kruzhinov 2000; Halfin 2007; Pirani 2008), this inquiry goes further by exploring the practices of intraparty parliamentarianism.<sup>2</sup>

Intraparty discussions were a significant political event; although they occurred within the framework of a single-party system, they were comparable in their importance and intensity to the government crises experienced in Western democracies of the time. Émigré newspapers generally framed the political struggle within the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) or the RCP(b) as analogous to parliamentary debates in the West. However, what made the Soviet case peculiar was the practice of limiting the discussions to “only the Party members,” as a caption on one of the discussion pamphlets stated (*Diskussionnyi sbornik* 1923, 1). “What is settled within a bourgeois democracy by voting, by a discussion of the whole people,” the de facto Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Rykov pointed out, “in our [system], under the dictatorship of the Party, is settled by the intraparty order, and every peasant, every worker, every *spets*<sup>3</sup> and *nepman*<sup>4</sup> – they know that this discussion [...] determines the structure of the government and all of its policy.”<sup>5</sup>

In fact, public sentiment was sometimes alarming to Party functionaries. The editor-in-chief of the newspapers *Krest'ianskaia gazeta* (“The Peasant Newspaper”) and *Bednota* (“The Poor”) claimed to have received letters from peasants, which, according to him, “fundamentally” contained the message “give us democracy!” He appealed to a “sense of responsibility” of his fellow Party members in the face of the danger of “the formation of class consciousness in the corresponding strata [of the petty bourgeoisie] which read in the discussion articles” that the working class was losing its power to bureaucracy.<sup>6</sup> The members of the Opposition were charged with discussing bureaucratization in a manner that threatened the Soviet system; in response, they acknowledged this threat but did not change their approach, as they saw the strengthening of “workers’ democracy” as the best solution.

Although the Soviet system did not solicit public sentiment, democracy was integrated into the Party system in a variety of ways – most notably through the regular conferences, at which pressing issues were debated, reports were heard, and the leadership was elected or reelected. Many members of the Opposition saw the Civil War period as the ideal time for the Party due to the frankness of the discussions among its members, and noted that these democratic Party traditions began to gradually stagnate in the years that followed. In 1922, the Twelfth Party Conference amended the Party Statute. Provincial and district conferences were to be held every six months instead of every three months; the all-Party conferences were to be held once a year instead of twice (as had been resolved by the Tenth Congress a year before). Viacheslav Molotov, a secretary of the Central Committee and a close associate of Stalin, justified these changes by arguing that they matched the existing practices and claiming, “the implementation of parliamentarianism in our Party has not, in fact, been carried out” (Nazarov 2000, 71). The Party’s “parliamentarianism” was supposed to be revived with a new course within intraparty politics. The

resolution “On Party Construction” of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, adopted on December 5, 1923, stated that at future elections “the Party apparatus should be systematically refreshed from below, by promoting into decision-making positions those members who are capable of ensuring intraparty democracy.”<sup>7</sup>

What did the Opposition mean by parliamentarianism, and how did they take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Party’s turn toward it? In order to answer this question, one needs to understand the dual practices of “electoral” mobilization and the nomination of their supporters at the conferences of all levels, as well as to explore the relationship between the leadership of the Opposition and the grassroots of the Party, and the Opposition’s perception of their fight for a majority in the Party.<sup>8</sup>

The discourse on intraparty parliamentarianism was primarily influenced by the principle of anti-parliamentarianism, as established in the RCP(b) program (*Vos’moi s’ezd RKP(b) 1959*), and reinforced by the norms of political rhetoric (Iarov 2014). While commenting on the conflict over the composition of the Credentials Commission at a Party conference, Timofei Saprionov, an especially vocal Opposition leader, noted that “it is totally inappropriate for the conference to be turned into a historic bourgeois parliament.”<sup>9</sup> Alongside the perceptions of the institutional obsolescence of parliaments, the members of the Opposition cited the objective realities in the Party politics. David Riazanov, one of the sharpest critics in the Party, stated, “We all understand that [we have] the conditions of a military encampment; the conditions of the Communist Party itself do not allow any referendum, any direct voting rights.”<sup>10</sup> Some members of the Opposition even came up with ad hominem arguments against those whom they accused of participating in parliamentarianism. For Karl Radek, a member of the Central Committee and Trotskii’s supporter, the point was “not that C[omrade] Trotskii is a greater democrat than comrades Tomskii and Zinov’ev; each of them is a democrat of the same kind, good or bad.” To prove his orientation toward compromise, he could unleash criticism on the “overzealous” Opposition members and state:

Comrades, I have never been a democrat in my entire life. I was a left-wing communist, but not a democrat [...] And if ten resolutions were adopted that said: you must become a democrat, I would not become one, because I cannot.<sup>11</sup>

Trotskii, whose articles were essential to the intraparty discussion, carefully steered clear of the metaphors of parliamentarianism. In the amendments to the draft resolution of the Thirteenth Party Conference of January 16–18, 1924, the resolution which denounced the Opposition, Trotskii wrote that the Party’s “governing institutions” both at the center and in the provinces “could never be” turned into a “parliament of opinions” in addition to stressing that “democracy is neither an end in itself nor a single means of

salvation.” Nevertheless, he considered it essential to defend the “free opinion” against the “bureaucratic regime,” as well as to protest the “liquidation of all discussion and any democracy.”<sup>12</sup> In his public statements, the Opposition leader spoke out more often on the issue of voting rights, which was the most visible part of the discourse on the Party’s parliamentarianism. For example, when speaking about the practice of “renewing the apparatus,” Trotskii reminded that those who were “renewed” were “elected” by the Party.<sup>13</sup>

There were nevertheless important nuances and differences in the context of Riazanov’s “conditions of a military encampment” and Radek’s democrats “of the same kind.” In a lengthy discussion in a Moscow printing house, a certain Cherniak polemicized with a more cautious comrade, stressing that the “intraparty democracy is nothing similar to the state democracy” in European countries. Neither this nor other arguments in favor of a more decisive implementation of democracy were supported by the majority. Equally vigorous debates were held at the Party cell of the Moscow State Tram Depot, where one of the Opposition leaders, Vladimir Smirnov, spoke to an audience of just 46 people. The minutes registered opposing views: while Smirnov argued that the transition to the NEP required a simultaneous transition to “democracy,” a supporter of the Central Committee (who eventually attracted most of the votes) stated the opposite – that the NEP was associated with “a limitation of democracy.” The discussion in the Party cell of the *Gospirt* [State Alcohol] factory lasted until two in the morning, and after 18 of the 29 being present had spoken, an Opposition resolution demanding “the steadfast implementation of Party democracy” was adopted with all but one vote.<sup>14</sup> The brief form of the minutes hides a subjective and perhaps a more nuanced interpretation of democracy. While each of these meetings had common features, they also illustrate the important nuances and differences in what might be called the practical meaning of democracy.

Some Party members did not merely express their thoughts in the circle of their comrades in one Party cell. A Party member, who authored one of the many oppositional articles that polemicized with Stalin and went unpublished in *Pravda* (“Truth”), defended the “democrat” Georgii Piatakov (a member of the Central Committee and a moderate member of the Opposition), while at the same time questioning Trotskii’s alleged “democratism.” His conclusion was that among the Opposition “there are, without a doubt, also some bureaucrats. But the Opposition’s line is democratic, antibureaucratic.”<sup>15</sup> An anonymous note submitted to Zinov’ev at a meeting at the Communist University maintained that Lenin’s authority could only be replaced by “the Party bodies endowed with the maximum trust of the vast majority of the Party, as revealed in free elections.” Another one relied on symbolic authority:

I think of “workers’ democracy” as Rosa Luxemburg thought of it. If the Party mass does not participate in the discussion and elaboration of issues

[...] then the “top leaders” are nothing more than a “withering sect,” to quote Rosa. This leads to bureaucratism, careerism, and so on.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, the “red” students formed a particularly active part of the Opposition. The memoirs of Isai Abramovich, who in 1923 was a student at the Moscow Institute of National Economy, are illustrative in this regard.

My institute mates and I first comprehended the values of democracy when, in the twenties, we began to study the works of Marx and Engels under the tutelage of such teachers as D. B. Riazanov. We could not, of course, fail to see that the principles proclaimed by the founders of scientific communism were sharply at odds with the policies pursued by our Party. But we believed that the centralization of power, the prohibition of “dissent” and so on were temporary phenomena, caused by the fact that the country was under siege. We believed that with the transition to peacetime, the democratic methods of governing the country would be implemented.

And so, when the republic entered peacetime, in 1923–1926, disagreements arose and intensified within the Party, precisely on the question of democracy. Perhaps many of us (myself included) joined the Opposition, which proposed to rebuild the Party in a democratic way, under the fresh impression of having read the works of Marx and Engels.

At the same time, it must be admitted, we did not even think of granting any rights to other socialist parties [...] we did not go that far. But we believed that, within the ruling Party, there should be complete freedom of criticism regardless of persons, freedom of factions and groupings, free speech in the press and at meetings, unrestricted elections of Party organs and so on. (We did not yet understand then that freedom based on privilege is not freedom).

(Abramovich 2004, 68)

Certainly, common sense suggested a skeptical attitude to the prospects of the Party’s democratization under the tutelage of its own apparatus. Stalin, the chief of this apparatus, warned against the “extreme” reliance on elections, which, as he put it, “consists in the fact that some comrades seek elections ’till the end.’ If there are elections, then elect all the way! Party record?! What is it for? Elect whoever pleases your soul. This view, comrades, is erroneous.”<sup>17</sup> Speaking in the Zamoskvoretsky District of Moscow on the newly adopted resolution on intraparty democracy, Kamenev chided “the comrades who said with a sneer: the freedom of election was granted,” referring to the “liberal manifesto” of October 17, 1905, which declared but did not guarantee liberties. Kamenev promised the opportunity “to renew the entire apparatus of the Party at the forthcoming elections.”<sup>18</sup> Speaking

after Kamenev, Evgenii Preobrazhenskii joked that he was not thinking of blaming “the Central Committee the same way as they blame the next ministry to be brought down in Italian parliamentary elections, which is even blamed for the fact that goats do not give enough milk.”<sup>19</sup>

But the accusations were not ungrounded. The further away from Moscow, the less friendly the system of intraparty democracy was toward potential opposition. Zinov’ev, speaking at a conference of the Petrograd Provincial Party organization on December 1, 1923, felt no need for the liberalism of his Moscow colleague in the Triumvirate:

We might have been told: the Central Committee of the Party, just before the congress at which it will be criticized [and] reelected, picks its own delegates and cuts the voting rights of Party members. From the point of view of abstract workers’ democracy, this is a mockery of “democracy.” But we needed this from the point of view of the fundamental interests of the revolution, from the point of view of the benefits of the revolution, to allow only those who are the real Party guard to [get] elect[ed].<sup>20</sup>

Apparently, even in Petrograd, a city where the Opposition was barely supported, Zinov’ev decided to secure his position by holding a conference before the publication of the resolution “On Party Construction,” one month before the All-Union Party Conference and five months before the Party Congress. Shortly afterwards, speaking to Moscow cell leaders, Zinov’ev maintained that one must wait for the next congress, if it was to be convened immediately, “in a disciplined manner, and not go running [‘snooping’ in the version in *Pravda*] through cells and undermine confidence in the Central Committee.”<sup>21</sup> The fact that there was applause in response is deeply symbolic. Sapronov interpreted Zinov’ev’s words as a demand for keeping silent until the congress and a prediction that the Opposition “will not get the support of even three percent at our Party congress,” and then, for a newspaper publication, extended the phrase to “will not get the support in our Party.” Later Sapronov “assured” Zinov’ev that “if this congress is elected without pressure from the apparatus,” then “there will be a few dozens of those you do not like.”<sup>22</sup> Overall, the members of the Opposition did not appear to be overly optimistic about their electoral prospects.

Speaking at the aforementioned meeting of Moscow cell bureau members, Sapronov expressed his understanding of the electoral freedom: “One must elect without recommendations, without reinforced testimonials, without prior arrangements, and elect the cells of one’s bureaus without any pressure [...]” The same understanding can be seen in the Central Committee resolution proclaiming a “new course,” although the emphasis which Sapronov placed when speaking to this particular audience was different. Public discussions were pervaded by mistrust and, as a consequence, there was a demand for “safeguards.” For example, Georgii Andreichin, a former

activist in the Bulgarian and American socialist movements, noted that “the strongest guarantee is open debate, open elections.”<sup>23</sup> There is at least one letter, which Saprnov addressed directly to factory cells, calling for the immediate reelection of the apparatus. Curiously, a week later, a response to Saprnov’s letter with an expression of confidence in the Central Committee was adopted by a vote of nine to four.<sup>24</sup>

The Opposition’s “campaigning” influenced both the Party “electorate” and the candidates for the Party bodies. On December 29, 1923, in response to the “hesitation” of the subordinate apparatchiks (apparatus functionaries), the members of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee approved a letter to a narrow circle of the Party staff, in which they claimed that the Opposition had the aim of seizing the apparatus for themselves and that “they want to do this under the guise of reelecting the apparatus, deposing its members, and so on while dressed up in a ‘democratic’ garb” (Demidov 1994, 22). Articulating the same argument to an audience in Moscow, Zinov’ev exclaimed, “Everything else is empty gibberish, all the words about democracy – this is not worth a jigger.”<sup>25</sup> Zorin, a supporter of the Central Committee, argued that “democracy” meant settling “personal debts” for the Opposition.<sup>26</sup> Feliks Dzerzhinskii made one of the most spectacular juxtapositions of different projects of “democracy.”

Our democracy is not about people coming and saying that the Central Committee is not good at all, that there are such-and-such mistakes and such-and-such mistakes, and so on and so forth. All the more reason for the Party organization to express the unanimous opinion and the unanimous will that we ought to continue the struggle to solve the problems which history has put before our Party. And we shall be promoting democracy, but not that of which Comrade Preobrazhenskii and Comrade Rafail are the heralds (*applause*).<sup>27</sup>

Negative examples of democracy were drawn from the Party’s history, with the 1920–1921 debates being particularly often used for that purpose. For Kamenev, for instance, it was a time when

there was a race throughout Russia for the co-rapporteurs and rapporteurs, and [when] some voted for the Lenin line and others for the Trotskii line. We tried to avoid this by all means. We realize that if this was dangerous under Lenin, it is ten times more dangerous without Lenin.<sup>28</sup>

Such a “race” was avoided in 1923–1924, when, unlike their opponents, the members of the Opposition made very few attempts to mobilize support across the country and never succeeded. Preobrazhenskii also offered to recall the facts of the “trade union discussion” in order to be “justified in saying: we do not want democracy winded up or wrapped up in a paper

resolution.”<sup>29</sup> Vagarshak Ter-Vaganian, speaking at the same meeting with Preobrazhenskii, referred to earlier years to emphasize the lost democracy of the Party. “In 1917 I was secretary here and often did not know what was being put forward [at the Party meetings].”<sup>30</sup> Such a kind of leadership style seemed anachronistic in 1923.

As represented by its leaders, the Central Committee apparatus took an active part in the intraparty struggle. Lazar Kaganovich, the head of the Organizational Department, for instance, had earned the nickname “Commissar of the Central Committee” among the Opposition members in the Zamoskvoretsky District (Rees 2013, 37). But the Opposition in the capital’s Party organization also gave the impression of an organized force. According to Rykov, the Opposition group’s “apparatus for connecting with the district, apparatus of speakers, apparatus for recruiting speakers” were “better than ours.”<sup>31</sup>

This was largely due to the energetic activity of the Opposition leaders in fighting for the votes of rank-and-file Party members. For example, as early as November 30, 1923, at a joint meeting of the cell of the Central Executive Committee and the Auto-Military Unit of the Central Executive Committee, a resolution by Rikhard Rein on Saprnov’s report was adopted with only two votes against and several abstentions. It was no coincidence that many of the cells that voted for the Opposition had leaders of the Opposition among their ranks; such examples included the *Ikar* Factory (Ivan Smirnov), the Sixteenth Printing House (Petr Drobniš), and the Paris Commune Factory (Boris Breslav) (Ignat’ev 1969, 149). Most importantly, many of the signers of the “Statement of the Forty-Six” (which was seen as the program of the Opposition) spoke in the cells. Lev Sosnovskii, for instance, opposed Rykov and Mikhail Kalinin and received 200 votes in favor and only 68 against at the Mining Academy; Vladimir Kosior and Ter-Vaganian received 400 votes from students at the Institute of National Economy.<sup>32</sup>

At the same time, of course, the Opposition also suffered many defeats. For instance, Saprnov’s resolution was rejected at a numerous meeting of workers’ cells of the Sokolniki workshops in Moscow, the *Geofizika* Factory, the Hosiery Factory, and the *Posadchik* Factory.<sup>33</sup> On December 19–20, 1923, at a joint meeting of the cell of the Joint State Political Directorate and other agencies, Nikolai Bukharin, who was opposed by Preobrazhenskii, received an overwhelming majority out of 1,500 votes.<sup>34</sup> These and many other facts were later used against the Opposition as a proof of its rejection at the grassroots level.

On December 14, 1923, it was announced at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee that the Opposition had its own agitation department (Garniuk 2014, 165). The rumors of an Opposition apparatus soon spread to other regions. The main task that such a “center” would perform was sending its speakers to discussion meetings in order to replicate the actions of the Party committees. “They know that they have to attract votes, that they need to have communication, that they need to select speakers, to select resolutions,

to prepare cheat sheets for speakers, which are sent out to the provinces.”<sup>35</sup> Speaking at the district Party conference, Radek unequivocally supported the notion that there was a “center,” admitting, “It is clear that I was not called by the district committee. I got a phone call today and was told to come to the conference [...] I felt that it was not an invitation from the district committee (*applause*).”<sup>36</sup> Being a moderate member of the Opposition, Radek was being ironic about the mutual accusations of “factionalism” in this case. However, very few members of the Opposition could afford making such risky jokes, as the consequences could be very serious.

Breslav, one of the “forty-six” signers, had to refute the accusations that he was involved in adopting the most radical and critical resolution in Moscow by several military organizations on December 14. In his statement, which he demanded to be read out before the delegates to the Moscow Provincial Conference, Breslav pointed out that the Moscow Military District cell was “just as much a Soviet cell as, for example, the apparatus cells of the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee of the RCP,” that is, a cell of employees, and its decision was entirely independent. Breslav, the Head of the Moscow Military District, claimed that he was attached to another cell and did not take part in the meeting, and that therefore “the members of the Central Committee are trying in vain to use this resolution against the Party members of the Staff.”<sup>37</sup> These Central Committee members were Molotov and Zinov’ev, who specifically referred to the December 14 resolution during the district Party conferences in early January 1924 in order to fully defeat the Opposition.<sup>38</sup> Here is the most problematic point of the resolution on intraparty democracy.

The cell believes that the All-Russian Conference, scheduled for the middle of January, which will be composed mainly of the Party functionaries who have actively pursued an antidemocratic policy within the Party, cannot be considered fully competent in resolving the questions relating to the implementation of the principles of workers’ democracy. Therefore, provided it is not possible to reelect the district [*uezd*] committees and provincial committees before this date, it is necessary to try to intensively influence the delegates at the Conference from below by means of a resolution [“On Party Construction”], by submitting voter instructions [*nakazy*], and via the Party press.<sup>39</sup>

Having thereby expressed distrust of the supporters of the Central Committee, the meeting considered “it necessary to extend the discussions until the Thirteenth Party Congress (concerning the questions regarding the genuine implementation of the workers’ democracy).”<sup>40</sup> While Kamenev could say that “any democracy is an organized distrust and that democracy is no good if it is not an organized distrust,”<sup>41</sup> for Molotov the Opposition’s points were no good. He said that by articulating them the “rampant” members of the Opposition were “presenting an unheard-of challenge [...] by juxtaposing



themselves to the forthcoming Conference in advance.”<sup>42</sup> One of the authors of the resolution was given the opportunity to respond to Molotov’s criticism. Insisting on his correctness, he expressed the concern that “the Central Committee might overestimate the importance of the [January] Conference.”<sup>43</sup> It was this controversial point that Molotov latched on to, arguing that it was impossible to “protect the authority of the Central Committee” from the Conference delegates, many of whom had previously been appointed or recommended to leadership positions by the same Central Committee. Certainly, this was outright self-defense of the apparatus, but the facts were in favor of the Central Committee’s secretary: a week before the All-Party Conference, no Party organization had “demanded an immediate change of its provincial and regional Party committees.”<sup>44</sup>

The Central Committee supporters were concerned not only by individual vociferous statements but also by the significant presence of the Opposition members at assemblies. During an exchange of accusations of violating the principles of “workers’ democracy” at the Khamovniki District Party Conference, for instance, a Central Committee supporter stated that “a number of Opposition comrades” were bringing “staffs” of supporters to Party meetings, “who were influencing the elections” (the response was: “lies,” *noise in the hall*).<sup>45</sup> Such an accusation was also heard at some other meetings in Moscow, but it is impossible to determine the scale of this phenomenon. There were also accusations which allegedly came from the workers: “Comrade Ter[-Vaganian] travels around and votes in all districts.” “Some of the indignant, like the Georgian deviators, go to all university meetings and vote,” claimed another Central Committee supporter.<sup>46</sup>

The intraparty struggle was sometimes seen as a kind of “election campaign.”<sup>47</sup> One of the most straightforward dialogues on this subject occurred during Kamenev’s speech at the Military Academy:

Why do you go to meetings, do you want to have your resolution adopted? (*applause*). What did I come for? To win a majority (*applause*). I say: let us not cover ourselves. The question is clear. The question is who will hold the majority at the next congress (*voice: you*). If you know in advance that we will, then don’t forget that we have won [...] (*Radek: far too much*). Comrade Radek says we won too much at the last congress. I believe that if we are to win, we must win to the end. Your task is to win a majority in Moscow, because with a majority in Moscow [...] you will win in general. As we are used to looking at what is being done in the organization, we can see that Comrade Serebriakov is undoubtedly a *tsekist* [Central Committee member] by nature (*voice: are there any?*), he is campaigning in the Baumansky District. I. N. Smirnov, a member of the Central Committee [...] is suddenly operating in the Baumanovsky [Baumansky] District [...] Of course, district committees must be won, because this is the first step to winning a majority in the Moscow organization.<sup>48</sup>

Sapronov recounted a speech made by the *Kauchuk* Factory worker at a Party meeting: "I want to criticize, but I am afraid they will think I want to get into the Central Committee."<sup>49</sup> Nikolai Nemtsov, an honored Party official from amongst the workers, a member of the Supreme Court cell, reflected on the group of "forty-six" in the following way: "I will die first, but I will never vote for them."<sup>50</sup> However, curiously enough, Nemtsov, like the majority in his cell, was on the side of the Opposition. Most likely, he needed such a turn of phrase to once again refute the idea that there was a fight for seats in the Central Committee. In support of his words, Nemtsov went on a long historical excursus, explaining how he was offended by the Opposition leaders of a district committee in 1921.

The actual campaign at the grassroots level manifested in the reelections of cell bureaus. The transition from theory to practice was expressed in the fact that reelections were either held or planned at the meetings at which the resolution on intraparty democracy was discussed. The election of cell delegates to Moscow district conferences were held in the middle of December 1923. According to the statistics compiled by the Moscow Party Committee, in the Khamovniki District there were 44 *tsekists* and 15 supporters of the Opposition among the 67 delegates from the workers' cells; among the 21 delegates from the *soviet* cells there were 11 *tsekists*, 4 supporters of the Opposition, and 6 vacillators; among the 111 delegates from the university cells there were 51 *tsekists*, 47 supporters of the Opposition, 11 vacillators, and 2 uncertain; among the 78 military delegates there were 35 *tsekists*, 37 supporters of the Opposition, 2 vacillators, and 4 uncertain. According to other data of the Moscow Party Committee, there were almost twice as many *tsekist* delegates as supporters of the Opposition.<sup>51</sup> If the functionaries were guided by this data, they should have been surprised by the Opposition's majority at the Khamovniki District Conference. In any case, these facts show that the competition between various factions was real.

Finding themselves in the minority at the Moscow Provincial Conference, the members of the Opposition ostentatiously exercised their democratic rights. During a discussion of the members of the new Moscow Committee, the members of the Opposition were not allowed to put their candidates forward. However, they managed to put the removal of ten other candidates, including Bukharin and Kaganovich, to vote. It was then decided to discontinue individual voting "in view of the fact that the counting produced the same figure."<sup>52</sup>

In the midst of this intraparty struggle, *Pravda* named an important aspect of the Opposition's parliamentarianism: the demand for "proportional representation" in the Moscow Party Committee (obviously, in the district committees as well). According to the supporters of the Central Committee, this constituted the Opposition's "minimum program." *Pravda's* editorial board based its assertion on a letter by Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov recounting Preobrazhenskii's speech at a meeting of the State Power Plant on December 21, although it was noted that Preobrazhenskii immediately stated that he had

been misinterpreted.<sup>53</sup> An interpretation of this principle was also given by Rykov, who said that it meant

a coalition of two parties in all Soviet organs, a reorganization of the Central Committee on the basis of an agreement between the two factions [...] and that means organizing a joint committee, as it was under the Mensheviks, and that means a split.

In this quote, Rykov is referring to the prerevolutionary period of Party-building, during which the Bolsheviks had been in the minority. Preobrazhenskii, who spoke next, confined himself to a simple promise, to “set an example of loyalty to the Party” for his opponents: “If we get a majority, then we will pick them as we would under normal circumstances.”<sup>54</sup> At the Moscow Provincial Conference, when there was no longer any doubt that the Central Committee majority would prevail, the Opposition member Nazarov put forward the idea of proportional representation in a most transparent form:

I ask [...] is it necessary to take into account the proportion of the opinions that have been revealed in this discussion? [...] I am sure that only by the joint work of the representatives of these two opinions in the organization will you build that old steel apparatus which the Party yearns for and which we had while we were underground and which the Party masses so persistently demand. Do not ostracize the Opposition, but draw it into the apparatus, make it responsible, as you are, for everything you do.

(XI Moskovskaia gubernskaia konferentsiia RKP(b) 1924, 78)

But already then, the supporters of the Central Committee called the Opposition “unprincipled.” An article titled “What They Promise and What They Give” appeared in *Pravda* on January 11. Its author referred to the case of the Voskresensk District Party Conference, at which the Opposition, “led by Sapronov,” did not allow the minority of people who supported the Central Committee to join the delegation to the Provincial Party conference. Thereby, the author argued, Preobrazhenskii’s promise had been broken.<sup>55</sup> Whatever circumstances might have played a part at this conference, the attitude of the Opposition members to proportional representation had its nuances. “Comrades, we in the Party are not federalists, we are not putting forward any slogan advocating for proportionality,” Radek said, not clarifying on behalf of which group he was speaking.<sup>56</sup> However, rejecting this slogan did not mean rejecting proportional representation. A statement by a minority of delegates to the Zamoskvoretsky Party Conference, for instance, read:

We believe that we indeed do not uphold any principle of proportional representation, and we have always endeavored to form our executive

bodies in a homogeneous manner, so that they are able to implement the majority line of our congresses and conferences, but we have always sought to ensure that all shades of sentiments and opinions within our Party have the ability to reveal themselves [...].<sup>57</sup>

At the cell level, this aspiration was expressed in the following election results for delegates to the Conference: the *tsekist* candidates were elected most often unanimously, while the Opposition candidates got through by a “ratings vote,” often accompanied by the *tsekists* second to them and the vacillating ones.<sup>58</sup> The results of the elections to the Moscow Conference appeared miserable to the Opposition (Hincks 1992), making Preobrazhenskii draw the following reasonable conclusion regarding the technology which would be used to prepare a future “unanimous” condemnation of the Opposition:

At the Krasnopresnensky District Conference, the Opposition had 188 votes and we were denied representation on the list. In Zam[oskvoretsky] District we have a ratio of 260 to 230 votes. Furthermore, in Rogozhsko-Simonovsky district we have 127 to 90, and yet only 4 Opposition representatives were elected. When we see such politics, what can we count on? In Moscow, according to the Central Committee’s estimate, it [the Central Committee] has slightly more than a half, and it seems to us that we have a half, we won’t debate this, but the ratio roughly stands at that level, yet at the conference elections this ratio has been reduced in all places. At the provincial conferences there will apparently be a similar method of electing delegates, which hides the actual proportion [of votes] in our Party. This is nothing but the preparation for the bureaucracy’s wellbeing, a conference of 600 members will gather with only 50 or 60 representatives from the Opposition. This does not represent the real balance of forces.<sup>59</sup>

The actual All-Union Conference turned out to have even fewer Opposition members, and they sent statements to the Moscow Provincial Conference protesting the disproportionately low number of their delegates.<sup>60</sup> “We have never previously, even [during the] trade union discussions, had the Opposition excluded from representation in an organized manner,” protested Preobrazhenskii.<sup>61</sup> Addressing the more friendly atmosphere of the Conference, Sapronov said that in the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District not a single Opposition delegate was picked for the Moscow Provincial Conference, even though the supporters of the Central Committee had a majority of only 30 votes; in the Zamoskvoretsky District, where the supporters of the Central Committee won by 31 votes, 3–4 Opposition members were delegated to the Provincial Conference out of 40 in total. In response to the shout that “this was proportional,” Sapronov replied that the number of delegates did not have to reflect the abstract total strength of the Opposition, but that it should be appropriate for the particular assembly,

“so that its opinion is reflected in its entirety.” “Is this an atmosphere of concessions and agreement on issues within the Party?” Sapronov resented. “This is a schismatic arithmetic (*applause*).” He ironically suggested that the Opposition could only get a majority if 95 percent in the Party supported it, and that 80 percent was no longer enough.<sup>62</sup>

At the Krasnopresnensky District Conference, the Opposition was denied proportional representation in the District Committee and to the Provincial Party Conference, but this was a peculiar conflict. In reference to another member of the Central Control Commission, Emel’ian Iaroslavskii told the Political Bureau members that after this:

[...] Rafail proposed that a meeting of the Opposition be opened and declared the session open to discuss the situation and to elect delegates to the Provincial Party Conference and to the District Committee from the Opposition. But the meeting could not in fact take place because of the continuous roar and noise which lasted from two to four in the morning, after which everyone dispersed in an incredibly angry mood.<sup>63</sup>

The Opposition won virtually no majority in the elected bodies anywhere. This relieved the Central Committee’s anxieties only partially. Shortly after this triumph, Bukharin requested that Zinov’ev did not

overestimate the size, character or strength of the victory. We fought essentially only in Moscow. We had the entire apparatus in our hands. We had the press, and so on. Finally, we had – very importantly – in our hands the ideals of unity and of continuing the tradition of the Party, personally embodied [in Lenin]. And yet the Opposition proved to be quite considerable in Moscow, to say the least.

(Iakushev 1990, 61–62)

But Bukharin naturally publicly denied the importance of “formal democracy” for intraparty affairs during the debate (Vilkova 2004, 400). Against all odds, political pragmatism prevailed.

It was not only the Opposition leaders but also its rank-and-file supporters in the cells who initially remarked that “many people do not know what democracy means.”<sup>64</sup> The worker Okhapkina exclaimed in her overemotional and confused speech during a conference in the Khamovniki District of Moscow: “Here is a meeting of the Central Committee, the Moscow Committee, the District Committee, the Comintern, but there is not a single worker.”<sup>65</sup> It was then that dozens of Party members signed up to participate in the debate, and the question of whether to stop giving speeches altogether or to limit them to five minutes was repeatedly being raised. Eventually, however, a decision was reached using a class-based approach: to give the floor only to worker delegates “from the machine.” One of them, a worker from a printing house, based his whole speech on the rhetoric of confusion:

what was such an obscure struggle about?<sup>66</sup> A woman worker who spoke next expressed it literally: “[...] we cannot work out which of them is right and which is wrong, the devil knows, they are probably fighting over their ministerial posts, and they are messing with our heads. We don’t have a clue about it.” The worker did not question her class status, on the contrary, she stressed it in order to urge the “upper class” to stop “fighting” on behalf of her class.<sup>67</sup> As one of the Joint State Political Directorate’s intelligence reports shows, even those workers who had been Party members since 1900 could also perceive this discussion as a question of “who would be in power: Zinov’ev or Trotskii.”<sup>68</sup> It was not surprising that the political conflict was perceived through the traditional framework of the “struggle for power.” Not only a participant at a small meeting in Petrograd could say that “the hype raised by writers and newspapermen creates the opinion that someone aspires to power,” but the old Bolshevik Matvei Muranov could also not resist exclaiming:

[...] Our leaders had launched the revolution as a people’s revolution, a proletarian one, and now they are ending it as a palace revolution (*shouting, noise*). This is why it is necessary for the leaders to come to an agreement, and there will be no discussion in the grassroots either.<sup>69</sup>

One could reasonably assume that the majority was also resentful when one of the workers in his speech openly and insistently persuaded his audience that “democracy,” as the word was being understood by the members of the working class, would only bring “harm.” From his point of view, the workers “do not support democratic centralism.” It is not important whether what was being referred to was specifically “worker’s democracy,” here the keyword is “democracy.” The Central Committee supporter was emphatic: “Comrades, the workers know very well that they are underdeveloped, they understand this very well (*loud noise*). Comrades, the workers know very well that they are underdeveloped (*noise: enough*).” The solution, according to the speaker, was to maintain the regime. However, when the worker began to speak of the need, as opposed to “Sapronov’s methods,” for the State Political Directorate to be employed, “loud” and “prolonged” laughter began to sound throughout the hall. However, one of the other “grassroots” Party members who spoke also stated bluntly that the workers did not have the necessary knowledge of Marxism and needed “a higher level of socialist consciousness” in order to implement Sapronov’s suggestion to replace the *apparatchiks*.<sup>70</sup>

It is possible that some members of the Opposition walked out of the room during speeches of this kind. This served as an opportunity to contrast the working-class grassroots with the elite of the Opposition. Iaroslavskii added a phrase in *Pravda* which was absent in the transcript of his speech: “You only talk about democracy, but when the workers from the

neighborhood spoke here, you did not want to listen to them and you left the hall like herds (*voices: right; applause; noise*).<sup>71</sup>

One of the sharpest and somewhat paradoxical juxtapositions between the “tops” and the “bottoms” was voiced by the head of the Soviet government, Kalinin, who stated that “the people, the working class are not in fact suffering from a lack of democracy, rather, it is the Party which is suffering from a lack of it.”<sup>72</sup> One of the workers’ Opposition activists from the *Kauchuk* Factory would probably not agree with this, as he claimed that the Moscow Committee had twice canceled the results of their cell’s reelection. Being certainly aware of such controversies, Bukharin, at a closed-door Central Committee Plenum on January 14–15, 1924, stated that the Opposition was heterogeneous and set the objective: “The workers who express a healthy tendency should be isolated from the Opposition leaders” (Vilkova 2004, 400).

Lenin’s death on January 21, 1924, triggered a series of resolutions from factories and plants, which were aimed not so much against the Opposition as against discussion in general. Thus, the Communists and the Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl Plant *Trud i Tvorchestvo* demanded from the Central Committee to “concentrate all forces and ban all discussions”; all discussions were deemed “self-destructive” for the Party. A meeting of thousands of workers at the Sormovo plants supported the demand “to put an end to these incomprehensible differences of opinion” (Ennker 2011, 120). In his report, the secretary of the Vasileostrovsky District Committee of Leningrad wrote: “The disputes over the [Opposition] platform’s correctness have quickly faded after receiving the news of Comrade Lenin’s death, and now many ardent supporters of the so-called Opposition are publicly admitting their mistake.”<sup>73</sup>

On rare occasions, Party members inclined toward the Opposition continued their activities. At a city-wide meeting in Kaluga on January 7, 1924, where the majority supported the Opposition, after the Party Conference’s decision to end the discussion, “a few comrades [...] did not calm down and brought democracy from the Party to the non-partisan masses.” Following an investigation by a special commission, “some comrades were transferred and some were expelled [from the Party].”<sup>74</sup> The members of the Opposition in Krasnoyarsk had been elected to one of the district committees while the Thirteenth Party Conference was in progress. There they gained a foothold and continued their work. The chairman of the Siberian Bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Iurii Figatner, described in a letter to a colleague that a Communist who had previously been transferred from Tula for “squabbling” had been elected as the new secretary. From then on, Figatner wrote:

[...] the work [of the Opposition] went into full swing, the cell secretaries in the First District were thoroughly treated, as the Siberians say, “to perfection,” the secretaries are all workers, good, energetic lads, the

Opposition spent all their time in the District, they not only worked in cells, they worked the public individually, they spent all their free time in the District, sleeping in the District, drinking with the lads, in short, doing everything possible to make the District their own, and they more than succeeded in this.<sup>75</sup>

The victory of the Central Committee's supporters cemented the trend of contrasting the "word and deed." Dzerzhinskii, for example, was applauded during a discussion after saying that criticism of the Opposition does not simply take place under the Party's "democracy," but leads to "arch-democracy, because no other party would allow such idle talk to take place."<sup>76</sup> By the end of 1924 no one would be any longer surprised by what Mikhail Kharitonov, the head of the Ural Bureau of the Central Committee, had to say:

I attended two *okrug* [area] conferences, one in Perm and the other in Yekaterinburg. In Perm I did not hear a single word about intraparty democracy and I heard very little about it in the Yekaterinburg *okrug*. I think it is correct to say that in each individual district, the more they talk about democracy, the less they carry it out.

(RKP(b) 1924, 110–111)

Not only could democracy's defeated supporters be blamed for talking about it, but also for being silent about it. Three members of the defeated Opposition who were located in a cell within the People's Commissariat of Finance, for instance, made a statement at a district Party conference which read, "Objectively, the Opposition has been cultivating among its followers, politically speaking, a dog's senility (passivity and unprincipledness) and organizational formlessness (abstention from voting, conscious maintenance of 'calm' at Party meetings), and so on and so forth" (RKP(b) 1924, 75). Whether this statement corresponded to reality is difficult to judge. However, one can ascertain that, even if the Opposition had not been deprived of their seats in the governing organizations (there were none of its members at the level of the district committees anymore), they would have still completely lost the initiative in implementing democracy.

For a while the intraparty struggle led to the formal democratization of the Party apparatus: electoral recommendations and "transfers" were reduced, and the leadership was partially renewed (Pavliuchenkov 2008, 327). The Tomsk Regional Party Committee democratized the election to district Party organizations to such an extent that it soon regretted it, as its secretaries became markedly "younger" and "intellectual" (Kulikov 1991, 120). Democratic practices were used in order to defeat the Opposition and to legitimize the domination of the apparatus, which had returned to the old path of bureaucratic centralism. What worried the *apparatchiks* was the atmosphere of uncertainty which democratic procedures, elections, appeals,



and endless discussions created. The members of the Opposition initially conditioned their “electoral” successes on the “terms” of the intraparty democracy resolution, being rightfully concerned about their opponents’ technologies. The latter, in turn, were confident that the Opposition had the ability to “fight for power.” The ordinary electorate was often unable to grasp the essence of this debate and perceived it as a “struggle over seats.”

## Notes

- 1 This chapter is a revised version of a chapter from the author’s book on the Left Opposition, published in Russian (Reznik 2018). I want to express here my sincere gratitude to my friends and colleagues Deirdre Harshman and Misha Lerner for their help with translation, and to Ivan Săblin for the kind invitation to contribute to this volume.
- 2 For more details on the current state of research of the Left Opposition, see (Reznik 2019).
- 3 A non-Party specialist.
- 4 A private entrepreneur within the NEP system.
- 5 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 3 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 6 Ia. Iakovlev, “Iz neotlozhnykh prakticheskikh zadach partii,” *Pravda*, January 11, 1924.
- 7 *Pravda*, December 7, 1923.
- 8 The situation in the Army Party cells differed from the others, which requires a separate inquiry. According to the report of the Political Department of the Moscow Military District, “[...] the tendency toward electability of political organs and commissars, or rather toward the excessive broadening of the rights of the party organs at the expense of the commissar and political apparatus, took place in a small number of cells” (RGVA (Russian State Military Archive), f. 25883, op. 2, d. 512, l. 64). As was noted in that and many other reports, this debate was attended almost exclusively by political commissars.
- 9 RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), f. 323, op. 2, d. 39, l. 2 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 2, January 8–10, 1924).
- 10 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 38, l. 189 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 1, January 7, 1924).
- 11 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 37, l. 31, 33 (Transcript of the meeting of the Baumansky District Conference of the RCP(b), January 7–8, 1924).
- 12 RGASPI, f. 325, op. 1, d. 105, l. 7 (Trotskii’s amendments to the draft resolution of the Thirteenth Party Conference, January 16–18, 1924); d. 84, l. 2–3 (Trotskii’s project of the resolution for the Thirteenth Party Conference, January 16–18, 1924).
- 13 Lev Trotskii, “Gruppirovki i fraktsionnye obrazovaniia,” *Pravda*, December 28, 1923.
- 14 TsGA Moskvyy (Central State Archive of Moscow), f. 67-P, op. 1, d. 229, l. 37ob (Minutes of the general meeting of the RCP(b) cell of the First Model Print Shop, December 5, 1923); *Ibid.*, l. 76 (Minutes of the general meeting of the Moscow State Electric Tram Station and Substation, December 19, 1923); *Ibid.*, l. 105ob (Minutes of the general meeting of the RCP(b) *Gossprint* cell, December 12–13, 1923).
- 15 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 171, d. 27, l. 73 (S. Pestkovskii, “Regarding the letter of Comrade Stalin”).

- 16 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 171, d. 26. l. 95, 107 (Anonymous notes to Zinov'ev).
- 17 I. Stalin, "Zadachi partii," *Pravda*, December 6, 1923.
- 18 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 33, l. 11–12 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, December 6–9, 1923).
- 19 *Ibid.*, l. 13.
- 20 *Pravda*, December 7, 1923.
- 21 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 40. l. 81 (Transcript of the general meeting of the bureau of Moscow RCP(b) cells, December 11, 1923); "Rech' tov. Zinov'eva" *Pravda*, December 16, 1923.
- 22 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 40. l. 92 (Transcript of the general meeting of the bureau of Moscow RCP(b) cells, December 11, 1923).
- 23 TsGA Moskvyy, f. 67-P, op. 1, d. 248, l. 98 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, January 4, 1924).
- 24 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 171, d. 26, l. 221–223 (Sapronov's letter to the cell of the former Dedovskii enterprise, December 15, 1923).
- 25 TsGA Moskvyy, f. 67-P, op. 1, d. 248, l. 98 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, January 4, 1924).
- 26 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 33, l. 40 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, December 6–9, 1923).
- 27 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 83 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 28 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 38, l. 25 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 1, January 7, 1924).
- 29 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 33, l. 24 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, December 6–9, 1923).
- 30 *Ibid.*, l. 42.
- 31 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 14 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 32 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 11, d. 204, l. 82, 84, 86 (Discussion material in the Zamoskvoretsky district cells for the Central Committee).
- 33 "Rezoliutsii," *Pravda*, December 21, 1923.
- 34 *Pravda*, December 22, 1923; "V iacheike OGPU i MGO," *Pravda*, December 23, 1923.
- 35 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 124 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference of the RCP(b), January 7–8, 1924).
- 36 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 34, l. 4 (Transcript of the Rogozhsky-Simonovsky District Conference of the RCP(b), January 3–6, 1924).
- 37 TsGA Moskvyy, f. 3-P, op. 5, d. 43, l. 57 (Breslav's statement to the Conference Presidium).
- 38 V. Molotov, "So stupen'ki na stupen'ku," *Pravda*, January 3–4, 1924; V. Molotov, "Zhertvy fraktsionnosti?" *Pravda*, January 12, 1924; RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 37, l. 87–88; TsGA Moskvyy, f. 67-P, op. 1, d. 248, l. 28.
- 39 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 11, d. 205, l. 26 (Resolution of the Cell of the Political Administration Staff, the Special Purpose Unit Headquarters, and the Moscow Military District's Military Communications Headquarters, December 14, 1923).
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 33, l. 135 (Transcript of the Zamoskvoretsky District Party Conference, December 6–9, 1923).
- 42 V. Molotov, "So stupen'ki na stupen'ku," *Pravda*, January 3–4, 1924.
- 43 N. Durmanov, "V poiskakh fraktsionnosti," *Pravda*, January 12, 1924.
- 44 V. Molotov, "Zhertvy fraktsionnosti?" *Pravda*, January 12, 1924.

- 45 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 39, l. 2 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 2, January 8–10, 1924).
- 46 Rabochii S-ev. “Rezoliutsii. V raionakh. V Rogozhsko-Simonovskom raione (Vpechatleniia rabochego),” *Pravda*, December 14, 1923; “Otkliki s mest,” *Pravda*, December 23, 1923.
- 47 See Rykov’s speech: RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 5 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 48 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 66, l. 64 (Kamenev’s report to the Military Academy, December 1923).
- 49 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 38, l. 69 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 1, January 7, 1924).
- 50 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 39, 58 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 2, January 8–10, 1924).
- 51 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3-P, op. 11, d. 85a, l. 122–126 (Khamovniki Conference); *Ibid.*, l. 10 (Summary of the debate on the intraparty situation and on the elections to the district Party conference through December 29, 1923).
- 52 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3-P, op. 5, d. 43, l. 4–5 (Minutes of the Eleventh Moscow Provincial Party Conference, 10–12 January 1924).
- 53 I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, “Partiinaia diskussiia i moskovskaia organizatsiia,” *Pravda*. December 25, 1923.
- 54 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 15, 49 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 55 [K. Ia.] Kadlubovskii, “Chto obeshchaliut i chto daiut,” *Pravda*, January 11, 1924.
- 56 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 37, l. 131 (Transcript of the meeting of the Baumansky District Conference of the RCP(b), January 7–8, 1924).
- 57 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3-P, op. 5, d. 43, l. 79 (Petition to the Moscow Provincial Party Conference).
- 58 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3-P, op. 11, d. 85a, l. 122–126 (Khamovniki Conference).
- 59 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 37, l. 116 (Transcript of the meeting of the Baumansky District Conference of the RCP(b), January 7–8, 1924).
- 60 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3-P, op. 5, d. 43, l. 36, 40, 42, 60–61, etc. (The Opposition members’ statements to the Conference).
- 61 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 53 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).
- 62 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 38, l. 53, 71–72, 78–77 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 1, January 7, 1924).
- 63 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 171, d. 29, l. 102 (Iaroslavskii to the Political Bureau, January 5, 1924).
- 64 For example, Kramarov, at a closed-door meeting of the *Gosstroii* cell on December 12, 1923, claimed that the failure to implement the resolutions of the Twelfth Congress lay with the “literate” upper classes, who “had not explained the resolutions to the lower classes.” TsGA Moskvy, f. 67-P, op. 1, d. 229, l. 114.
- 65 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 39, l. 99 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 2, January 8–10, 1924).
- 66 *Ibid.*, l. 82, 99.
- 67 *Ibid.*, l. 101.
- 68 RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 74, l. 67 (OGPU report).
- 69 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 39, l. 63 (Transcript of the meetings of the Khamovniki District Party Conference, Vol. 2, January 8–10, 1924).
- 70 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 40, l. 34, 49 (Transcript of the general meeting of the bureau of Moscow RCP(b) cells, December 11, 1923).

- 71 “Rech’ tov. Iaroslavskogo.” *Pravda*, December 18, 1923.  
 72 “Rech’ tov. Kalinina.” *Pravda*, December 14, 1923.  
 73 TsGAIPD SPb (Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documents of St. Petersburg), f. 4, op. 1, d. 123, l. 8 (Report on the activities of the Vasileostrovsky District Committee of the RCP(b) in January 1924).  
 74 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 215, l. 38 (Survey of the situation and activities of the Kaluga Party organisation for the period from April 1923 to March 1924).  
 75 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 33, d. 205, l. 1 (Figatner to Dogadov, April 28, 1924).  
 76 RGASPI, f. 323, op. 2, d. 36, l. 82 (Transcript of the meeting of the Sokolniki District Conference, January 7–8, 1924).

## Bibliography

1923. *Diskussionnyi sbornik: voprosy partiinogo stroitel'stva* [Discussion collection: the issues of Party-building]. Moscow: Moskovskii Rabochii.
1924. *XI Moskovskaia gubernskaia konferentsiia RKP(b)* [The Eleventh Moscow provincial conference of the RCP(b)]. Moscow.
1959. *Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart 1919 goda. Protokoly* [The Eighth Congress of the RCP(b). March 1919. Minutes.]. Moscow: Gospolitizdat.
- Abramovich, I. L. 2004. *Vospominaniia i vzgliady. Kn. 1: Vospominaniia* [Memories and views. Vol. 1: Memoirs]. Moscow: Kruk-Prestizh.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. 1956. *The Interregnum: 1923–1924*. London: Penguin
- Daniels, Robert Vincent. 1960. *Conscience of the Revolution. Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Demidov, V. V. 1994. *Politicheskaia bor'ba i oppozitsiia v Sibiri. 1922–1929* [Political Struggle and Opposition in Siberia. 1922–1929]. Novosibirsk: Izdatel'stvo Sibirskogo kadrovogo tsentra.
- Deutscher, Isaac. 1959. *The Prophet Unarmed. Trotskii: 1921–1929*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Ennker, Benno. 2011. *Formirovanie kul'ta Lenina v Sovetskom Soiuze* [Creation of the Cult of Lenin in the Soviet Union]. Moscow: Politicheskaia entsiklopediia.
- Garniuk, S. D. 2014. *Moskovskaia vlast'. Ocherki istorii partiinykh i sovetskikh organov. Mart 1917–oktiabr' 1993* [Moscow Power: Essays on the History of the Party and Soviet Bodies. March 1917–October 1993]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Glavnogo arkhivnogo upravleniia goroda Moskvy.
- Halfin, Igal. 2007. *Intimate Enemies. Demonizing the Bolshevik Opposition, 1918–1928*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Hincks, Darron. 1992. “Support for the Opposition in Moscow in the Party Discussion of 1923–1924.” *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1: 137–152.
- Iakushev, S. V. 1990. “Iz istorii sozdaniia partiinykh arkhivov v SSSR [From the history of party archives in the USSR].” *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 5: 50–65.
- Iarov, S. V. 2014. *Chelovek pered litsom vlasti. 1917–1920-e gg.* [A man in the face of authority. 1917–1920s] Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf.
- Ignat'ev, V. L., ed. 1969. *Bor'ba partii bol'shevikov protiv trotskizma v posleoktiabr'skii period* [The Bolshevik Party's struggle against Trotskism in the post-October period]. Moscow: Mysl'.
- Kruzhinov, V. M. 2000. *Politicheskie konflikty v pervoe desiatiletie sovetsoi vlasti (na materialakh Urala)* [Political conflicts during the first decade of Soviet: case studies from the Urals]. Tyumen: Izdatel'stvo Tiumenskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta.

- Kulikov, E. A. 1991. "Diskussiiia 1923 goda po partstroitel'stvu na stranitsakh tsentral'noi pečhati i v Tomskoi gubernskoi partorganizatsii." [Discussion of party building in 1923 in the pages of the central press and in Tomsk provincial party organization]. In *Partiinye organizatsii Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka: istoriia i sovremennost': Sb. statei*, edited by V. A. Demeshkin, 106–122. Tomsk: Izd-vo Tom. un-ta.
- Nazarov, O. G. 2000. *Stalin i bor'ba za liderstvo v bol'shevistskoi partii v usloviakh NEPa* [Stalin and the Struggle for Leadership in the Bolshevik Party under the NEP]. Moscow: IVI RAN.
- Olekh, G. L. 1992. *Povorot, kotorogo ne bylo: Bor'ba za vnutripartiinuuiu demokratiuu 1919–1924 gg.* [The Turn That Didn't Happen: The Struggle for Intra-Party Democracy 1919–1924] Novosibirsk: Izdatel'stvo Novosibirskogo universiteta.
- Pavliuchenkov, S. A. 2008. "Orden mechenostsev": Partiiia i vlast' posle revoliutsii. 1917–1929 gg. [The Knights of the Sword: Party and Power after the Revolution. 1917–1929]. Moscow: Sobranie.
- Pirani, Simon. 2008. *The Russian Revolution in Retreat, 1920–24. Soviet Workers and the New Communist Elite*. London: Routledge.
- Rees, E. A. 2013. *Iron Lazar: A Political Biography of Lazar Kaganovich*. London, New York: Anthem Press.
- Reznik, Alexander. 2018. *Trotskii i tovarishchi: levaia oppozitsiia i politicheskaia kul'tura RKP(b), 1923–1924 gody* [Trotskii and Comrades: the Left Opposition and political culture of the RCP(b). 1923–1924]. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Evropeiskogo universitet v Sankt-Peterburge.
- Reznik, Alexander. 2019. "Revising the 'Trotskiiist' Opposition of the Bolshevik Party in 1923–1924." *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 53, no. 1–2: 107–120.
- RKP(b). 1924. *Stenograficheskii otchet VI Ural'skoi oblastnoi konferentsii RKP(b)*. [Transcript of the Sixth Urals Regional Conference of the RCP(b)]. Ekaterinburg: Uralobkom.
- RKP(b). Moskovskaia organizatsiia. Zamoskvoretskii raionnyi komitet. 1924. *Zamoskvoretskii raikom RKP(b). Biulleten' III raipartkonferentsii. № 1. 21 dekabria 1924 g.* [Zamoskvoretsky district committee of the RCP(b). Bulletin of the Third District Party Conference. No. 1. December 1, 1924]. [Moscow].
- Vilkova, V. P., ed. 2004. *RKP(b): Vnutripartiinaia bor'ba v dvadtsatye gody. Dokumenty i materialy. 1923 g.* [RCP(b): Intraparty Struggle in the 1920s. Documents and materials. 1923] Moscow: Politicheskaia entsiklopediia.

## 4 Importing and exporting ideas of nationalism and state-building: The experience of Turkey's Republican People's Party, 1923–1950

*Paul Kubicek*

For over a quarter-century after its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was ruled by the Republican People's Party<sup>1</sup> (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) in a single-party regime. The CHP, founded in the same year as the Republic, grew out of the nationalist-resistance movement in the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922). It was the creation of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk),<sup>2</sup> who served as its chairman as well as the country's president until his death in 1938. Although it competed (usually without opposition) in elections, the CHP was conceived less as an institution to win votes or compete for power, but more as an instrument to uphold and advance the fundamental policies and principles of what would eventually come to be known as Kemalism (sometimes rendered *Atatürkçülük* in Turkish). The CHP, in many ways, was fused with the state, and also supplanted various civil society organizations. It implemented Atatürk's revolution from above that sought to fundamentally transform Turkey into a secular, Western-oriented republic. While precepts of democratic centralism technically governed the party, in practice the CHP presided over a system of “democracy with unanimous vote” (Tunçay 1981: 304) and eventually elevated its leader to hero/cult status. However, unlike other single-party regimes at that time, the CHP did eventually allow political opposition and, in 1950, cede power to a rival party.

Much has been written on the early years of CHP.<sup>3</sup> One of the primary historiographical debates is whether the early CHP should be understood as a proto-democratic party or whether it was akin to totalitarian parties that ruled Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union during the same time (Ete 2019). Some scholars have celebrated the CHP and Kemalism as creating “at least a precondition for liberal democracy” (Özbudun 1988: 14), developing a new identity that is compatible with a “European value system” (Kili 2011: 274), and setting Turks “firmly on the road not only to independence but to that rarer and more precious thing that is freedom” (Lewis 2002: 293). According to Andrew Mango (1999: 536, 534) Atatürk was a “democrat in theory” who, upon his death in 1938, “left behind him the structure of democracy, not of dictatorship.” Other accounts are more ambivalent, noting that the

CHP's single-party rule is best understood as a pragmatic response to particular conditions, and that its rule, although authoritarian, was more tutelary than rigidly ideological (Özbudun 1981, Ete 2019). Maurice Duverger even carved out a unique category for the CHP as tutelary or "potentially democratic," based on what he considered its non-totalitarian nature and that it eventually peacefully ceded power (Duverger 1959: 280). Others are less generous, casting Kemalism and the early CHP as fundamentally anti-democratic, with either inherent (Parla and Davison 2004) or evolved (Zürcher 2010) fascist and totalitarian "tendencies" that elevated the state and nation above that of the individual, or suggesting that the establishment of one-party rule was not conceived as something temporary or purely tutelary in nature (Tunçay 1981).

Mindful both of the comparative focus on this volume as well as Atatürk's own admonishment that "We can only be likened to ourselves,"<sup>4</sup> this chapter will delve into this debate (among other topics), looking at both the intellectual and philosophical roots of the CHP's program, in particular Western influences, as well as its organizational structure and practices. While aware of similarities and suggestions that various regimes in the early twentieth century "copied" from one another, it will seek to highlight some fundamental differences between the CHP regime and those of more ideologically oriented totalitarian states. Finally, bearing in mind the relative success of Turkey and its status (unlike that of Germany, Italy, and even the Soviet Union) as a semi-peripheral, anti-imperialist, and non-Western state, this chapter will extend the comparative approach by suggesting the appeal and limits of the Turkish "model" of the CHP under Atatürk to other contexts.

### **The intellectual roots of single-party rule in Turkey**

The CHP was the primary institutional vehicle through which Atatürk – who served as party leader from its founding until his death in 1938 – and his allies sought to transform the new Turkish republic. It was, in Kemal Karpat's words, the "epitome" and "reflection" of the various conflicts and aspirations of Atatürk's revolutionary agenda (Karpat 1991: 42). The six primary pillars or "arrows" (*Altı Ok*) of what would later be called Kemalism featured prominently in the CHP's first-party program in 1931, and were added to the second article of the Turkish Constitution in 1937. These were republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), populism (*halkçılık*), étatism (*devletçilik*), and revolutionism (*inkılapçılık*). Atatürk, as party leader, enjoyed control over the party, including nominating its candidates for the Grand National Assembly, where it enjoyed a near-monopoly of representation. As explained more below, the CHP was a cadre/elite-dominated party, one that served more of a tutelary role in guiding society toward fulfillment of Atatürk's goals.

Much has been written on Kemalism, and there is a long debate about whether it is coherent enough to be deemed an ideology (Hanioglu 2011, 2012).

Sinan Ciddi (2009: 6) concedes that Kemalism is a “fuzzy” and “problematic” concept. Certainly, one could contend that it neither produced a defining text nor assumed some of the more dogmatic, deterministic, or universalistic features of totalitarian ideologies of German National Socialism or Soviet communism. It was “designed,” if that is the proper word, for the specific circumstances of Turkey. Arif Payaslıoğlu (1964: 418) and Ergun Özbudun (1981: 87) both suggest that the praxis (one-party rule) came first, with guiding components/ideology codified later, and Atatürk himself repeated on numerous occasions that one needed to develop principles from real life, not abstract theory (Dodd 1991: 27). On this point, it is notable that the CHP lacked a fully-fledged party program until 1931, eight years after its formal creation. Even so, one can question how coherent Kemalism really was. As a reflection of its elements of ambiguousness or incompleteness, various figures (leftist, rightist, even Islamist) have tried to appropriate Atatürk’s legacy.<sup>5</sup> However, as Paul Dumont (1984: 25) noted, Kemalism was more than a vague prescription; it became a “network of doctrinal options” that emerged out of a series of various exegeses. Irrespective of how one chooses to label it, our aim is to understand Kemalism’s intellectual roots and rationales, which provided, eventually, both the basis for the CHP’s legitimacy as well as its policies and programs.

Kemalism did not appear overnight, nor can be considered wholly original, a matter of Atatürk’s unique genius, as has been interpreted in traditional Turkish historiography (Zürcher 2010; Hanioglu 2011, 2012).<sup>6</sup> It evolved in many respects in response to the limited success of various reforms in the late Ottoman period and was influenced by numerous Ottoman-era thinkers (Deringil 1993). Its most immediate institutional antecedent was the Union and Progress Party, formed in 1909 as an outgrowth of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), which spearheaded the 1908 “Young Turk” Revolution to re-instate the Ottoman Constitution. In 1913, after a brief period of pluralism and competition among various parties, the CUP effectively established single-party rule over the Empire, becoming, arguably, the first single-party regime in history. The CUP presented itself as movement for reform and modernization and rejected notions of social classes and class struggle in favor of presenting a unifying, tutelary role to ensure the salvation of the Empire. These notions were later articulated by the CHP (Kiriş 2012). This should hardly be surprising, as many cadres of the CHP were active in the CUP; Atatürk himself joined the CUP in 1908 and remained a member until its dissolution in 1918 (Zürcher 2010: 124–125).

This does not mean, however, that one should view the CHP as a full-fledged successor to the CUP. While they did share some common ideological elements, the CHP did not embrace the CUP’s pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, and Atatürk was far less sanguine than most CUP leaders on reconciling Islam with modernization (Hanioglu 2012: 62). The CHP enthusiastically promoted secularism and favored a citizen-based conception of Turkism over the CUP’s



embrace of Ottoman Muslim nationalism. Erik Zürcher (2010: 149), while cognizant of broad similarities between the CUP and CHP, contends that Atatürk and his closest allies identified themselves with the “most extreme ‘Westernists’” of the Young Turk period, which was reflected both in their staunch secularism as well as their broader goals to radically change Turkish society. In terms of practices, one might also note that under the CUP power effectively resided in a secret, extra-parliamentary committee, whereas the CHP, as we’ll develop more below, the party became an appendage of the state. Notably, Atatürk, as part of an effort to legitimize his own leadership, tried to distance his movement from the CUP, which, by the 1920s, was viewed as a failure. He remarked upon the poor example set by all political parties – he deemed them “factions” – of the “Young Turk” period (Dodd 1991: 27–28) and explicitly denied any connection between the CUP and CHP (Kiriş 2012: 398).

However strongly one wishes to draw an intellectual or institutional connection between the CUP and CHP/Kemalism, a larger point, more salient for this chapter, is that both drew inspiration from the Western/European sources. Indeed, as M. Şükrü Hanioglu (2012) emphasizes, both tended to view the West (Europe) as the singular form of modernity. Thus, it should hardly be surprising that numerous elements of Westernization were manifest both in CUP reform programs and were embedded in Atatürk’s reforms. Karpas (1991: 44) is most explicit on this issue, declaring that the CHP “was established to pursue a path of modernization according to a predetermined model, which in this case was that of the Western type of the national state.” More specifically, France, in terms of the solidaristic ideology behind the 1789 Revolution and the institutions of its Third Republic (1870–1940), as well as thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), stands out as an important source. Selim Deringil (1993: 165) argues that Kemalism was the “epitome” of the “ideological transplantation” of the ideals of the French Revolution. It is worth emphasizing, however, that this French influence, which was far more grounded in ideas of social unity, laicism, national will, collective consciousness, and radical republicanism than in liberalism, democracy, separation of powers, and individual rights,<sup>7</sup> provided the basis for one-party rule and strict limits on political competition and the cultivation of pluralism.

This can best be demonstrated by focusing on the Kemalist ideas of republicanism, nationalism, and populism, all of which were tightly linked together and central to aspects of CHP rule (Parla and Davison 2004: 87–88).<sup>8</sup>

Republicanism emerged as an alternative to rule by the sultan or caliph, and Atatürk himself, in a copy of *Du Contrat social*, highlighted Rousseau’s contention that “every legitimate government is republican” (Hanioglu 2011: 110–111). By the 1920s, republicanism was widely understood to mean popular sovereignty – thus justifying the abolition of the sultanate – but what this meant in terms of institutions or balancing individual rights and

state powers was contested (Turnaoğlu 2017). Ultimately, a “radical” republican vision, grounded in the vocabulary of the French Revolution, prevailed. From Rousseau, Atatürk and his allies embraced the idea of equal citizens, who collectively constituted a sovereign, general will. The 1921 Law on Fundamental Organization, declaring that “sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation,” copied directly from Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 (Zürcher 2010: 238). However, sovereignty and freedom were always viewed through the prism of the collective (the nation); little emphasis was placed on individual freedom or rights (Dodd 1991: 28). In this regard, the orientation of Le Bon – whose works on secularism and rationalism as well as crowd psychology and the guiding role of political elites had been influential in the CUP but also with Atatürk himself – had a “glaring influence” on the “republican elitism” (Hanioğlu 2011: 45) that was exemplified by the tutelary role envisioned for the CHP (developed more below). For Atatürk, the primacy of the sovereign or general will also justify the use of violence to crush opposition. In practice, however, this meant the creation of a political power that not only assumed upon itself the power to establish this general will as the source of legitimacy but also the power to interpret it and delegitimize or suppress those who offered a different interpretation of what is expected or required. Banu Turnaoğlu (2017: 241) concludes that

although [Ataturk] and his devoted deputies and journalists claimed that the sovereignty of the nation had been conferred on the people, the people were given no genuine opportunity to exercise their sovereignty, and laws and reforms were whatever the Kemalist elite pronounced them to be.

Nationalism, or, more precisely, “Turkism” (*Türkçülük*), was envisioned as a core substantive element within this general will. However, this was not simply emancipatory nationalism directed at freeing Turks from foreign influences and allowing them to chart their own political destiny. Rather, it was a state-led, nation-building process, predicated on the construction of a new identity, one in which loyalty was given to the national territory and political culture as opposed to the Sultan, Caliph, or the larger Muslim *umma* (Karpát 1991). Turkism, as expressed by Atatürk and the CHP, embraced a holistic, corporatist, and solidarist view of Turkish society, one that elevated the (ostensibly unified) collective over the individual and owed much to the influence of Durkheim. In particular, scholars have pointed to the influence of Durkheim on Mehmet Ziya (1875–1924), better known as Ziya Gökalp, a sociologist and poet who was influential both in the CUP and an intellectual force behind the Kemalist movement (Spencer 1958; Parla and Davison 2004; Nefes 2013; Özvaci, 2014; Turnaoğlu 2017). For Gökalp, Turkish (or, more precisely, Anatolian) society was organically united by its own collective consciousness, having no need for elements of

Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, or pan-Islam (the last two of which featured prominently in the CUP) to bind it together. Non-Turkish ethnic identities,<sup>9</sup> particularly Kurdish identity, were downplayed or actively repressed as the assumption was that every citizen was or should assume a monolithic Turkish identity.<sup>10</sup> Class divisions also had no place; instead, the underlying culture and “spirit” were envisioned as the bases for an essentially homogeneous society. From the very beginning, solidarism thus became a central tenet in Turkish republicanism. This was later reflected in core documents of the CHP. At its 1935 congress, for example, the CHP defined the fatherland (*vatan*) as a “sacred country,” a “Unity which does not accept separation under any circumstance” and that the nation (*millet*) was bound together by “language, culture, and ideal” (quoted in Spencer 1958: 652). In this respect, nationalism and republicanism were sacralized and became inviolate, serving the role as a new secular, civic religion, analogous to Durkheim’s notion of *moralité civique* (Hanioglu 2011: 181).

These ideas were also reflected in the CHP’s definition of populism. In the early 1920s, populism had assumed some anti-capitalist elements, and the very choice of the word “*halk*” (as opposed to “*millet*”) captured some of this leftist orientation.<sup>11</sup> Over time, however, populism came to mean legal equality, social unity, and solidarism, thereby aligning it with both republicanism and nationalism. The 1935 CHP Congress, for example, when defining populism, noted that “The source of all Will and Sovereignty is the Nation” and that the people of Turkish Republic are not composed of different classes, but instead – with a clear nod to Durkheim’s vision of a corporatist, organic society – are “a community divided into the various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor.” Accordingly, the aims of the party would be to “secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish a harmony of interests.” (quoted in Özbudun 1981: 88). Şerif Mardin (1981: 212) adds that solidarism, “the official ideology of the French Third Republic,” thus became the “social ideology of Kemalism,” one that not only informed the CHP’s developmental and redistributive socio-economic program but also its very theory of citizenship, which was predicated on the notion of all Turks working together for the good of the Turkish nation. In this sense, one can argue that development of solidaristic populism was designed to “penetrate individual consciences” and “drag” them (to use Durkheim’s term) into the broader whole by fixing their public identity as members of the Turkish nation in order both save and resurrect it (Parla and Davison 2004: 250). What should be clear, however, is that invocations of “populism” or “the people” did not translate into their democratic empowerment. On the contrary, as noted more below, the idea of a singular united people, bound together by nationalism, would become a central justification for creation of a single-party regime, which would be empowered to uphold the people’s sovereign will.

## **CHP rule in practice**

The People's Party (later the CHP) was formally established in September 1923, a month after the second Grand National Assembly was convened. All members, save one, of this Assembly were CHP members and with very minor exceptions, all members of the Turkish legislature and executive until 1950 were members of this party. In this respect, Turkey was a single-party state, and over time elements of the party and state were melded together. However, while Turkey shared some features with regimes in, for example, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, the CHP never became a totalitarian party.

As suggested above, the CHP aimed to be representative of all of Turkish society. In this respect, it corresponded to Atatürk's Burkean vision of a political party that represented the national interest, as opposed to a faction that represented a more narrow or particular interest (Dodd 1991). In particular, Atatürk wished to avoid the in-fighting, instability, and occasional violence that marked the (brief) period of competition among various parties (1909–1913) in the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution. Karpas (1991: 50) thus notes that “the concept of an interest-oriented political party was thus rejected from the start.” Instead, the CHP reflected a holistic, “populist” vision of Turkish society, as defined above. In Atatürk's words, the CHP was to be a “sacred association,” one that would avoid “base politicking” or “ordinary street politics” as it fought to “secure the interests of the people of all classes” (quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 210–211).

Single-party rule in this solidaristic, anti-pluralist rubric was not, from the CHP's perspective, restrictive or repressive. On the contrary, it was a guarantor of freedom. A 1943 CHP document declared that

our Party has shown to all the world that the principle of ‘freedom’ that is fundamental to democracy to democracy can be maintained without the existence of parties that are based on class interests and without the necessity of struggle among them.

(quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 218)

This conception of “freedom,” one should note, is not grounded in liberalism or individual rights; rather, it is nested within and dependent upon the unity and order ensured by corporatist solidarity. In this vein, leaders of the CHP viewed it as more authentically representative. One boasted in 1938 that

No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely and as sincerely as the Republican People's Party. Other parties defend the interests of various social classes and strata. For our part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set and this set is the Turkish nation.

(Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, quoted in Dumont 1984: 33)

It is worth emphasizing, that the representative role of the CHP was far more *aspirational* than substantive, meaning that its overarching goals – Westernization, secularization, modernization – and its leadership – overwhelmingly drawn from the bureaucratic and military elite – reflected less what the Turkish people of the time wanted and more the vision of what Atatürk and his circle wished Turkey to become. In other words, the CHP was “for the people, with or without the people” (Kazancıgil 1981: 51). One of its primary goals was to serve a tutelary, educational function, to be a “teacher of the people” (Karpas 1991: 48), and bring enlightenment (*tenvir*) and guidance (*delâlet*) to those in an ignorant, “raw state” and transform them into genuine citizens whose values would align with those of the (enlightened) party (Dodd 1991: 28–29). While Atatürk extolled the potential of the Turkish nation, he was rather less sanguine about the nation as it was prior to being “enlightened.” He noted, “if we leave the people to themselves, there will be no longer any steps forward” (quoted in Dodd 1991: 29). Özbudun (1970: 393) suggests that the “Ataturk Revolution *exploited* [emphasis added] the basic bifurcation between the educated elite and the uneducated masses, rather than deploring it or immediately attacking it.” Ahmet Demirel (2011) notes that two features of this elite/mass divide were that, from the late 1920s onward, elected deputies increasingly had higher education credentials and “localism” – meaning that one was born in and resided in one’s constituency – among CHP deputies in the National Assembly became less common, particularly in the less-developed and more Kurdish-populated provinces in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia.

However, it would be a mistake to assume the CHP was a truly autonomous, empowered actor with a powerful mandate for social mobilization. It was the creation and tool of Atatürk, who was able to exercise control over it, preventing any challengers to his rule while ensuring his priorities were carried out. In practice, this meant that CHP nominees for political office at the national, provincial, and even local level were determined by the central leadership, that parliamentary elections were indirect, meaning voters would choose electors or secondary voters who would formally ratify the election of the CHP nominees (in most cases there was no competition at all), and that the CHP, particularly in its first few years, became more a means to organize the Assembly and assure state control and legitimize the actions of the government and less an institution to engage in political mobilization (Karpas 1991: 49). While debate among party members was allowed on some issues, democratic centralism prevailed, so that once a decision was reached, all members were expected to publicly support it and refrain from any critique of the party (Koçak 2005). Furthermore, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly remained, formally, the repository of legislative and executive power (echoing the notion of “All power to the Soviets!”), because of the CHP’s near-monopoly within it and the CHP’s hierarchical structure, power was effectively put in the hands of Atatürk, who served as party head and as president. Zürcher (2010: 252) noted that at

the zenith of the reform period in the 1920s, the CHP played “hardly any political role at all,” as its primary purpose was to serve as a platform through which Atatürk could implement his agenda.

While it might be tempting to place the CHP in the same category as the German National-Socialists or the Soviet Communist Party, this overlooks some fundamental differences. Spencer (1958, 646–647), for example, while acknowledging that Kemalism and the CHP emerged out of the same “situational matrix” of Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, and Jozef Stalin, emphasizes that their methods and national aims differed: there was no external imperialism, no quest for *Lebensraum*, no “missionizing assertions of moral or historical superiority,” no plans to create a new *Homo Sovieticus* or references to laws of History. At most, the CHP was a tutelary party, focused on raising Turkey up to the standards of contemporary civilization (the West) while guaranteeing Turkish unity and independence (Özbudun 1981: 90). Furthermore, as suggested above, the Durkheimian vision of society precluded any sort of class-based vision of society or the creation of class-based enemies. This provides a clear contrast not only between the CHP and Marxist-oriented parties but it also marks a difference with fascist parties, which arose in capitalist settings and tried to defuse class contradictions, whereas (at least in the official Kemalist discourse) Turkey was essentially pre-capitalist and had no clearly-defined social classes, thus rendering both fascist and Marxist ideology irrelevant (Ahmad 1993: 66).

Moreover, in principle at least, Turkism was not racially exclusive<sup>12</sup>; anyone living within the borders of Turkey could become a Turk (language acquisition and embrace of “Turkish” ideals were requirements), although in some cases (e.g. the Kurds) one was simply declared or mandated to become a Turk. Although Kemalists defended such policies on the grounds of creating national unity and combatting the “backward” tribal and feudal elements of Kurdish society in eastern and southeastern Turkey – which was the center from 1925 to 1930 for several religious-ethnic rebellions that were brutally crushed<sup>13</sup> – state policy toward the Kurds was often repressive. Public use of the Kurdish language was banned, and influential Kurdish leaders were forcibly re-settled to other parts of Turkey. Beginning in the late 1920s, most “elected” representatives from Kurdish-populated regions were (ethnic) Turkish bureaucrats from the CHP (Demirel 2011). Hakan Özoğlu (2009) even suggests that the state manipulated and used the rebellions in order to suppress political opposition more broadly. While the CHP was able to consolidate its own power, Kurdish identity persisted, and its continued existence has provided a counter-identity to the monolithic “Turkishness” propagated by the CHP, creating a division that continues to affect Turkish politics and society.

Most significantly, the CHP neither developed the strong, well-institutionalized features of totalitarian parties nor their monolithic composition. Özbudun (1981: 82), for example, notes that because the CHP was an amalgamation of various local resistance groups, it retained, despite

centralizing efforts, pluralistic characteristics associated with its origins. This was manifested in the short-lived experiments with officially-blessed “opposition” parties – which would have been unthinkable in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union – in 1924–1925 (The Progressive Republican Party) and 1930 (The Free Republican Party), whose leaders largely came from the CHP itself but were shut down when the regime felt they might present a real threat to its power (Zürcher 1991). There were also few efforts directed at ideological indoctrination or purges within the CHP (reflecting, in part, the “looseness” of Kemalist “ideology”), debates within the CHP on various policy measures (primarily over economic questions), and, eventually, splits in the party between the civilianized military leaders and genuine civilian officials, the later of which eventually constituted the basis of the Democrat Party, which formed in 1946 and won power in elections four years later. Payaslıoğlu (1964: 421) therefore speaks of “plurality within a single party.” Furthermore, the CHP never developed a doctrine to justify any permanency to single-party rule. Duverger (1959: 277) notes that the party was “always embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monopoly [of power]. The Turkish single party had a bad conscience.”

What is interesting is that despite the presence of various groups (and interests), conflict within the CHP was rather low. In part, this was because the CHP gradually narrowed its base, jettisoning various factions or groups, including Islamic-oriented actors, who were part of the nationalist movement in the early 1920s (Karpas 1991: 47). Later, the CHP primarily served more of a role to unify the “enlightened” elite and educate the broader public but not mobilize the “unenlightened” masses who, if brought into the political arena, might challenge the regime (Zürcher 2010: 251).<sup>14</sup> It was, in this sense, a “cadre” party (Özbudun 1981). Berk Esen (2014) also highlights the lack of intra-elite conflict within the CHP, and contends that this mitigated the need to turn the CHP into a more empowered, institutionalized organization.

One should note that over time, the CHP did begin to engage in more mobilization, and, according to some (Zürcher 2010; Ete 2019) move in a more totalitarian direction. In the early 1930s, the creation of People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*) and People’s Rooms (*Halkodaları*), meeting places run by the CHP that promoted education, social work, sports, and cultural events, all directed to advance the regime’s modernizing program, can be seen as an example of mobilization as well as an implicit admission by the CHP that it needed to do more to win the support of the masses, and, in Atatürk’s words, “eliminate the drawbacks of [being] an oppositionless party” (quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 215).<sup>15</sup> The People’s Houses and Rooms replaced clubs run by the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), a reflection of a broader takeover of other civil society organizations (e.g. Turkish Women’s Union, Turkish Teacher’s Union) by the CHP. However, it is notable that these programs were not totalitarian in scope or centered on violence or the physical elimination of potentially troublesome or

“undesirable” social actors. Overall, building connections with the people through the People’s Houses was part of the CHP’s tutelary project to “enlighten” the masses, broaden political participation,<sup>16</sup> and bridge the gap between the center and periphery (Özbudun 1981: 95). Its impact, however, was arguably limited. Erik Zürcher (2010: 254) contends that the vast majority of peasants and workers did not participate in the activities of People’s Houses or People’s Rooms; at best, these organizations re-enforced the notion that the CHP catered to a narrow, middle-class cadre of supporters. Özbudun (1970: 393) similarly observes that the CHP made “no notable effort” to broaden its social base. Payaslıoğlu (1964: 420) concludes that “large segments of the population remained aloof from politics.”

Significantly, more explicit efforts in the 1930s, led by the CHP’s Secretary-General Recep Peker, an admirer of fascist regimes in Europe, to turn the CHP into something more closely resembling a totalitarian party, one that would sponsor and control a vast array of social organizations as well as control more of the country’s economic life, met with Atatürk’s disapproval. Peker was unceremoniously demoted from his position in 1936 (Karpas 1991: 56–57). Still, it is worth noting that in 1938, after his death, Atatürk was declared the CHP’s Eternal Chairman and the party adopted the slogan “One party, one nation, one leader,” which at the time would no doubt have found echoes in Berlin and Moscow. Hanioglu (2011: 187–192) suggests that the cult of personality around Atatürk, which only grew in the immediate aftermath of his death, helped undergird a “Turkish version of totalitarianism” that envisioned the state, under rule of a single-party, pushing forward its social and cultural transformation of society. However, he notes that there was a tension between a potential “cult of the party” and the cult of Atatürk, one that the CHP was not able to resolve in its favor.

Ultimately, Atatürk’s successors were unable and, it is likely fair to say, unwilling to institutionalize a totalitarian regime. Indeed, within eight years opposition parties were again legalized and in 1950 the CHP ceded power after losing elections, thus ending the single-party period and ushering in Turkey’s (sometimes rocky) experience with democracy. The transition to a multi-party system was a significant event – one that clearly distinguishes the CHP from its totalitarian contemporaries – and has been extensively examined (Karpas 1959). While 1950 thus marks the end of the temporal scope of this chapter, one point worth re-emphasizing is that the creation of a multi-party system that was, in part, shepherded into existence by the CHP itself, was later used to argue that the CHP under the single-party period, despite various forms of repression and explicit bans on competing parties, was nonetheless proto-democratic in nature (Ete 2019).

### **The CHP’s legacy beyond Turkey**

While the CHP’s period of single-party rule created an important legacy within Turkey – one that was both full of noteworthy accomplishments in



terms of state and nation-building but also increasingly challenged and questioned over time by liberals, Kurds, and Islamic-oriented actors – can we say that, in comparative terms, it is particularly noteworthy or stands out as a model for others? What broader lessons might be drawn from the CHP and the Turkish experience during the single-party period?

These questions can be answered in a variety of ways. One approach might be to focus on the idea of Turkey as a whole constituting a model for developing and/or Muslim-majority countries. Certainly, there is a large literature on this topic, one that focuses in particular on Turkey's secularism and post-1950 democratic experience as fundamental components of this model (Kubicek 2013).<sup>17</sup> Concomitantly, one might also focus on Atatürk himself as a “model,” and certainly upon his death in 1938 there was an outpouring of praise for him from both Western leaders and those in the developing world, including Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Muhammed Ayub Khan and Mohammad Jinnah (Pakistan), and Habib Ali Bourguiba (Tunisia) indicating that other countries might derive useful lessons from what he accomplished in Turkey.<sup>18</sup>

For our purposes, however, it is worth considering whether there is anything particular about the CHP itself – as opposed to the broader Turkish “revolution” under Atatürk – that assumes larger, comparative import. While it may be true that Kemalism in general and the CHP in particular were “specifically designed to oversee the development of Turkey alone” (Ciddi 2009: 6) one can easily imagine how the CHP's experience could be drawn upon by others in different contexts. For example, in the 1930s the leftist-oriented *Kadro* group within the CHP extolled its ideology as a model for national liberation movements that could be used by peoples across Asia and Africa (Hanioglu 2012: 35). Certainly, one could imagine how the idea of a holistic people, not beset with class or sectarian divisions but unified under the banner of a single tutelary party, could have resonance in struggles to achieve national independence and, for elites in particular, to legitimize their rule. In this respect, one could argue that there are at least echoes of the CHP in India's Congress Party or what would become Pakistan's Muslim League. In a somewhat different vein, Esen (2014) views the CHP less an institution for national liberation and more one for “national developmentalism,” comparable in broad terms to similar regimes in Lazaro Cardenas's Mexico, Juan Peron's Argentina, Getulio Vargas's Brazil, Sukarno's Indonesia, and Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt.

Among its contemporaries, perhaps the most fruitful line of comparison might be between the CHP and China's Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), which established its own single-party state in 1927. Like the CHP, the Kuomintang clearly saw itself as a tutelary party leading, as Christopher Reed describes it in his contribution to this volume, a “pedagogical state.” Sun Yat-sen, the party's co-founder who was later, like Atatürk, dubbed “Father of the Nation,” explicitly developed this tutelary vision in his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (1924), and the subsequent 1931

Constitution drafted under Chiang Kai-shek has been labeled “the Tutelage Constitution” (Ch’ien 1961: 133–137). The Kuomintang, like the CHP, had a democratic vision of sorts, but it prescribed that realization of this vision would be predicated on strong, one-party rule that would lay the institutional and cultural groundwork to make democracy successful (Eastman 1974: 143–149). The Kuomintang’s ideology also prioritized the state and society over the individual, based around a solidarist, populist vision articulated in Sun’s “Three Principles of the People.” Of course, the Kuomintang had several possible “models” to draw upon: Sun himself looked to the Soviet Union for assistance in the early 1920s, and “Blue Shirt” leaders in the Kuomintang as well as Chiang, who cultivated himself as the supreme, infallible leader, openly admired fascism (Eastman 1974: 179; Eastman 1980: 41). Atatürk, potentially, presented a possible model, and early Chinese writings on the Turkish Republic praised it as an example of a modernizing state (Dong 1998). Jozef Stalin even acknowledged, albeit in a disparaging manner, the possibility of Chiang becoming a “Chinese Kemal” (Ter-Matevosyan 2019: 191). How far he actually moved in this direction is subject to debate. Under his leadership, the military’s political role was far more pronounced than in Atatürk’s Turkey, and the Chiang’s Nanking government, although subject to some Western influence, ultimately adopted a more culturally conservative orientation and did not pursue the far-reaching social transformation that Turkey pursued under the CHP. In terms of the party itself, Lloyd Eastman suggests that it remained weak, beset by factionalism, bereft of a mass base, and unable to overcome both the military and Chiang’s personal ambitions. He suggests that by the early 1930s it had “atrophied” and became “im-masculated” (*sic*), a “hollow shell” (Eastman 1980: 31).

The relative failure of the Kuomintang, however, does not necessarily tarnish Turkey or the CHP as a potential model. Compared to its contemporaries with single-party regimes, Turkey’s CHP was relatively successful: it established and preserved the country’s independence; it advanced social and economic development; it avoided defeat in World War II; was overall far less repressive; and eventually, peacefully ceded power to an opposition party. However, I believe there are several reasons to be more critical of this assessment, as a more detailed view of some aspects of the CHP’s orientation and organization point to its limitations.

One point that bears emphasizing is that the CHP can hardly be described as ideologically innovative. True, the idea of establishing a republican, secular government in a Muslim-majority country was novel, but the underlying principles of CHP were not. Furthermore, as noted above, Atatürk and his allies explicitly borrowed many of their ideas from the West/Europe and aspired to join what they viewed as the universal (Western) civilization. Even the development in the 1930s of the Turkish History Thesis, which was used to bolster Turkish nationalism, was designed to show that Turks, despite their origins in Central Asia, were part of Western civilization and were central to the latter’s development (Hanioglu 2012). There was no exposition

of any alternative, non-Western vision of modernity or invocation of something akin to what later would be called “Asian values” or “African socialism.” The CHP, at its core, was designed to Westernize Turkey. As Özbudun (1970: 393) notes, the party’s goal was the “extension and consolidation of the precarious beachhead won by the Westernized intellectuals, to make it secure beyond all possible challenges.” It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that many of the quotes praising Atatürk from the developing world come from leaders (e.g. Nehru, Nasser, Jinnah) who, if not wholly Western in outlook, were nonetheless rather secular in orientation. On this score, it is notable that the two earliest and most comprehensive efforts to emulate the Turkish “model” – those in Iran under Reza Shah (1925–1941) and Afghanistan under Amanullah Khan (1919–1929) – failed, in large part because of Islamic-oriented resistance in societies that, compared to Turkey, were geographically and culturally further removed from Europe. Similarly, Ira Lapidus (2014: 535, 830) makes the point that while the Turkish “revolution” had some initial appeal to modernizers in the Muslim world in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and Syria, this influence did not last, as Islamic notions of identity arose to challenge the claim of the intelligentsia that it had a “right to rule as the enlightened exemplar of modernity.” Put somewhat differently, one could suggest that the CHP’s secularism was too radical a program to allow it to be hailed as a durable model for many Muslim-majority countries.

On other fronts, however, one might suggest that the CHP’s program was not radical enough. While the notion of state-led development (*étatisme*) was a major feature of CHP rule (particularly in the 1930s), this was fundamentally a state capitalist model. As Dumont (1984: 33) suggests, its populist vision of a united, classless society “aged quickly” as Turkey began to experience social and economic development. Thus, while it is true that some of the early national liberation movements/ruling parties did embrace the *étatist* model (India’s Congress Party comes to mind), by the 1950s and 1960s a more radical, Marxist-inspired model (often backed with weaponry from the Soviet Union) was far more influential in the developing world than any invocation of Atatürk or a Turkish “model.” Not coincidentally, Soviet and Chinese interpretations of Kemalism, which viewed it more as a progressive, anti-colonial ideology in the 1920s, became far more critical over time, in part because it reconciled itself both to the West and to capitalism (Dong 1998; Ter-Matevosyan 2019).

Finally, one might point to limits of the CHP as an organization, which affected both its staying power in Turkish politics and its ability to act as a model for other ruling parties. Despite its rhetoric of representing the entirety of the Turkish nation, it never aspired to be a mass party. It did not expand its social base to include peasants or workers – the CHP notably did not pass significant land reform or implement a progressive labor policy – or even business leaders. Despite corporatist rhetoric, it never created large-scale organizations (as the PRI did in Mexico) to help advance its program

(Özbudun 1970). Most significantly, perhaps, it, like the Kuomintang, never gained autonomy from the bureaucratic-military elite and a powerful chief executive. On this point, Esen (2014: 611) notes that Peker's dismissal as General Secretary of the CHP was less because of his open sympathies with fascism and due more to his efforts to strengthen the party as an autonomous, empowered institution, thus potentially giving Atatürk's rivals an independent, institutionalized power base to challenge his supreme, charismatic authority. In the end, Peker's defeat

thwarted the possibility for the rise of a strong ruling party, however authoritarian, which could promote its agenda over both the civil bureaucracy and the social classes. Instead, the state-party fusion enhanced bureaucratic tutelage over the already weak CHP provincial organization, thereby limiting its institutional presence in the ensuing years.

As noted above, (Hanioglu 2011: 187–189), efforts to construct a “cult of the party” ran aground against Atatürk's desire to develop his own charismatic authority around his own personality cult. Further evidence of the CHP's weakness was its rapid decline after a multi-party system was introduced in 1946. The eventual defeat of the CHP in elections in 1950, while perhaps allowing its supporters to contend that it had helped democratize Turkey, reflected its limited social base and limited its appeal as a model for subsequent national-developmental leaders.

## **Conclusion**

In the spirit of this volume, it might be fair to conclude briefly by reflecting upon what broader lessons the CHP's experience in Turkey demonstrates about single-party regimes, particularly in the context of nation-building and economic modernization in Eurasia, and well as the legacy of the CHP in Turkey today.

One prominent theme that emerges from the CHP's experience (as well as that of other single-party regimes) is the aspiration to be representative of the entire society. In other words, there is the intention or assumption – whether this is self-justifying or not can clearly be debated – that single-party rule is “democratic” in the sense that it intends to represent the entire society and serve the “general will.” While the precise definition of the “general will” may vary from country to country, common elements are economic and socio-cultural modernization. This conception denies class interests or antagonisms and is intended to be “progressive” by looking forward to a more developed future instead of celebrating a mythical past. Opposition to this vision is rejected as a reflection of benighted elements of the population, whose genuine interests the tutelary party leadership has both identified and is committed to serve.

From a twenty-first-century perspective – particularly one informed by contemporary Western standards – such an approach sounds self-serving and/or naïve. Few would recognize it as “democratic,” although some single-party regimes, such as China’s, continue to cloak themselves in a version of this discourse. What the Turkish case makes clear, however, is that many of the basic tenets of tutelary, single-party states were actually Western in origin, offering an alternative to a more liberal and individualistic ethos that would eventually be upheld as “the” Western path of development. Moreover, at least in the Turkish case, the desired endpoint was actually to “become” Western, even if, from the perspective of the CHP leadership, the country would be unable to follow the exact path of Western countries. In the early part of the twentieth century, as highlighted in several chapters in this volume, this liberal Western path actually found few advocates in Eurasian states where leaders prioritized nation-building and economic development, relying upon a more statist approach to unify the population and make the most of the “advantage of backwardness” (Gerschenkron 1962).

Nearly a century after the founding of the Turkish Republic, many of the basic tenets of liberal democracy are again widely questioned (both in Turkey and beyond), often by nationalist/populist forces who seek to unify “the people” while denying the legitimacy of more pluralistic visions of the nation. Whether these forces can take positive inspiration from previous single-party regimes is an interesting question. Certainly, in the end many such regimes failed, often due to the emergence of indigenous actors who questioned the wisdom and legitimacy of single-party rule. The Turkish case, perhaps more so than most of the others in this volume, illustrates that single-party rule can succeed for a time, particularly when there is unified leadership, low levels of economic development, and a relatively unmobilized population, but eventually the CHP also fell from power, although it did so through democratic elections that it had denied in the first two decades of its rule. Today in Turkey the legacy of the CHP is often rigorously questioned, particularly by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who claims he is building a “New Turkey,” one that will transcend the country’s longstanding center-periphery division and that is less enamored with Westernization while favoring greater expression of Turkey’s Islamic or Ottoman identity. What is interesting, however, is that despite clear differences between “Erdoğanism” and Kemalism, the former still holds onto a tutelary role for the state and governing party and regularly makes appeals to the “national will” (*milli irade*), even as its vision of what the Turkish nation is (or should become) is quite different from the one once advanced by the CHP (Yilmaz 2021). To invoke one last French expression, “*plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.*”

## Notes

- 1 The party was founded in 1923 as the *Halk Firkasi* (People's Party), but a year later it became the CHP.
- 2 Mustafa Kemal was given the name Atatürk ("Father Turk") in 1934 upon passage of a law mandating surnames. I will use Atatürk throughout this chapter, as he is best known by this name.
- 3 Definitive sources on the CHP in Turkish include Tunçay 1981 and Yetkin 1983. The best source in English, at least for the period considered here, is Karpas 1991.
- 4 Quoted in Hanioglu 2011, 190.
- 5 This is well captured by Akyol 2008, whose title can be translated as "But Which Atatürk?"
- 6 This interpretation was encouraged by Atatürk himself, who, in his monumental six-day speech (*Nutuk*) in 1927 before the Second Congress of the CHP, documented his singular contributions to the Turkish Revolution while criticizing many of his erstwhile comrades.
- 7 This is not to say that there were no debates in Turkey about alternatives. Turnaoğlu 2017, in particular, highlights that there was a more "liberal republican" faction that challenged some aspects of Atatürk's program. Many expounders of this viewpoint, however, were expelled from the CHP and, in some cases, later put on trial for sedition.
- 8 Among Atatürk's reforms, it is perhaps secularism that has received the most attention and arguably on this element his program represented the most significant break with the Ottoman past. While not denying the importance of secularism/laicism to the larger Kemalist project, it is more peripheral to the CHP and single-party rule itself, which is the focus of this chapter.
- 9 The Lausanne Treaty (1923) did carve out special recognition for non-Muslim minorities (e.g. Greeks, Jews) still living in Turkey. This stipulation did not apply to (Muslim) Kurds. However, Christian and Jewish Turkish citizens were often treated as "outsiders" with uncertain loyalty to the Republic. See, for example, White 2013.
- 10 The latter is perhaps best exemplified by a popular saying attributed to Atatürk, "Happy is he who can call himself a Turk" (*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*).
- 11 Zürcher (2010: 251) notes the echoes of the *Halka Doğru* (Toward the People), campaign of the Young Turks in 1917 that had clear echoes of the "to the people" movement of Russian *narodniki*.
- 12 Zürcher 2010; In the 1930s, the Turkish History Thesis, which posited a central role for Turks in human history, did acquire some racial elements.
- 13 For more on these rebellions, see Zürcher 1991.
- 14 In this respect, the relative unity of the CHP merely reflected the unity of the "center," as opposed to the masses on the "periphery." This center-periphery division, which assumed more importance when the single-party period ended, would become a prominent theme in Turkish politics (Mardin 1973).
- 15 Dodd (1991) and Zürcher (2010) both make the point that the development of People's Houses arose after the challenge posed by the short-lived Free Republican Party in 1930 revealed weak support for the CHP, particularly in rural areas. Esen (2014) adds that these efforts by the CHP should be seen not as a move to totalitarianism but as an admission of weakness, as it was too weak to create its own institutions to compete successfully with existing civil society organizations.
- 16 Membership in the party reached over 1,200,000 by 1936, even though the party lacked organizations in several provinces (Karpas 1991: 64 n. 19).

- 17 For a provocative work that suggests how Turkey was a “model” for Hitler and the Nazi Party, see Ihrig 2014. Ihrig is careful to argue, however, that the Nazi’s use of Atatürk is based on a selective and often faulty interpretation, and that the parallels between the CHP and Nazi Party are actually limited.
- 18 A collection of tributes to Atatürk from world leaders and the international press can be found at <https://ataturktoday.com/AtaturkWorldPressLeadersTribute.htm>.

## Bibliography

- Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Akyol, Taha. 2008. *Ama Hangi Atatürk? [But Which Atatürk?]*. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap.
- Ch’ien, Tuan-sheng. 1961. *The Government and Politics of China*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ciddi, Sinan. 2009. *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism, and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Demirel, Ahmet. 2011. “Representation of the eastern and southeastern provinces in the Turkish Parliament during the national struggle and single-party era (1920–1946).” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 44: 73–102.
- Derinçil, Selim. 1993. “The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal.” *European History Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (April): 165–191.
- Dong, Zheng-hua. 1998. “Chinese Views of Atatürk and Modern Turkey.” Published Proceedings of International Conference: Atatürk and Modern Turkey, Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, October 22–23.
- Dumont, Paul. 1984. “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology.” In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, edited by Jacob Landau, 25–44. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Dodd, C.H. 1991. “Atatürk and Political Parties.” In *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, 24–41. London: IB Tauris.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Eastman, Lloyd. 1974. *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Eastman, Lloyd. 1980. “China Under Nationalist Rule: Two Essays.” Illinois Papers in Asian Studies, Volume 1, University of Illinois (Urbana) Center for Asian Studies.
- Esen, Berk. 2014. “Nation-Building, Party-Strength, and Regime Consolidation: Kemalism in Comparative Perspective.” *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 4: 600–620.
- Ete, Hatem. 2019. “Tutelar Regimes of Single-Party Period: Segue or Impediment to Democracy?” *OPUS-International Journal of Society Researches* 10, no. 17: 1963–1982. DOI: 10.26466/opus.511156
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. 2011. *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. 2012. “The Historical Roots of Kemalism.” In *Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey*, edited by Alfred Stepan and Ahmet Kuru, 32–60. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ihrig, Stefan. 2014. *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

- Kazancıgil, Ali. 1981. "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun. 37–56. London: Hurst.
- Karpat, Kemal. 1959. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Karpat, Kemal. 1991. "The Republican People's Party, 1923–1945." In *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, 42–64. London: IB Tauris.
- Kili, Suna. 2011. *Atatürk Devrimi: Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli [Ataturk Revolution: A Model of Modernization]*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Kiriş, Hakan Mehmet. 2012. "The CHP: From the Single Party to the Permanent Main Opposition Party." *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 3 (September): 397–413.
- Koçak, Cemil. 2005. "Parliament Membership during the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925–1945)." *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 3, on-line at <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.497>
- Kubicek, Paul. 2013. "Debating the Merits of the 'Turkish Model' for Democratization in the Middle East," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (Fall): 66–80.
- Lapidus, Ira. 2014. *A History of Islamic Societies*, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. 2002. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mango, Andrew. 1999. *Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. London: John Murray Publishers Ltd.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1973. "Center-Periphery Relations?: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (Winter): 169–190.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1981. "Religion and secularism in Turkey." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun. 191–220. London: Hurst.
- Nefes, Türkay Salim. 2013. "Ziya Gökalp's adaptation of Emile Durkheim's sociology in his formulation of the modern Turkish nation." *International Sociology* 28, no. 3: 335–350.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 1970. "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: Considering Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey." In *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, edited by Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, 380–405. New York: Basic Books.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 1981. "The nature of the Kemalist political regime." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, 57–78. London: Hurst.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 1988. "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruption, and Re-equilibriums." In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Erdun Özbudun, 1–58. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association.
- Özoğlu, Hakan. 2009. "Exaggerating and exploiting the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 for political gains." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 41: 181–210.
- Özvacı, Hilmi Ozan. 2014. "Differing Interpretations of *la conscience collective* and 'the Individual' in Turkey: Émile Durkheim and the Intellectual Origins of the Republic." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 75, no. 1: 113–136.



- Parla, Taha. 2009. *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm, ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm* [*Ziya Gokalp, Kemalism, and Corporatism in Turkey*]. Istanbul: Deniz Yayınları.
- Parla, Taha, and Andrew Davison. 2004. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Payashoğlu, Arif T. 1964. “Political Leadership and Political Parties: Turkey.” In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, 411–433. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Spencer, Robert. 1958. “Culture Process and Intellectual Current: Durkheim and Atatürk.” *American Anthropologist* 60, no. 4: 640–657.
- Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram. 2019. *Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union*. Cham Switzerland: Palgrave.
- Tunçay, Mete. 1981. Türkiye cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti yönetimi’nin kurulması, 1923–1931 [*Establishment of Single Party Rule in the Republic of Turkey, 1923–1931*]. Ankara, Turkey: Yurt Yayınları.
- Turnaoğlu, Banu. 2017. *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- White, Jenny. 2013. *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Yetkin, Çetin. 1983. *Türkiye’de tek parti yönetimi, 1930–1945* [*Single Party Rule in Turkey 1930–1945*]. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi.
- Yılmaz, Ihsan. 2021. *Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zürcher, Erik-Jan. 1991. *The Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic*. Leiden: Brill.
- Zürcher, Erik-Jan. 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey*. London: IB Tauris.

# 5 Competing with the marketplace: The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)'s Department of Propaganda and its political publishing program, 1924–1937

*Christopher A. Reed\**

## Introduction

The past three decades have seen an outpouring of studies on the print culture of the late Qing (1644–1911) and Republic of China (ROC, 1912–49) along with its political, cultural, economic, and social effects. In most of these publications,<sup>1</sup> analysis of market-driven publishing has allowed historical and literary scholars to expand discussion of the political, literary, and news marketplaces. The social and political impact of mostly privately or corporately owned sales-oriented publishing facilities (whether operated by newspaper, journal, or book publishers) has generally been the focus of this work. The bounty of sources – from archival materials to the publications themselves – has opened doors for all kinds of scholarship from PhD dissertations onward.

What has gotten lost in this celebration of Chinese print capitalism and the commercial printing and publishing realm (with implications for a public sphere) is that, by the mid-1930s, privately owned and market-driven publishing of the sort characterized by Shanghai's Wenhuaajie (publishers' and booksellers' district)<sup>2</sup> and other urban centers was already becoming an anachronistic relic of the "golden age" of Chinese print capitalism (1912–28). Indeed, by the early 1930s, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang 中國國民黨, hereafter KMT)'s statist and disciplinarian agenda<sup>3</sup> was coming to dominate key sectors of the publishing economy organizationally<sup>4</sup> and also through its Department of Propaganda (Xuanchuanbu 宣傳部, hereafter XCB).<sup>5</sup> Unlike others, this unit of the party never was duplicated in the state structure. Instead, as with other state- and nation-building regimes across Eurasia, this party department (or bureau) effectively substituted for a state ministry of propaganda. In this case, and in pursuit of its hegemonic aspirations, the XCB also took charge of national and international political, economic, and cultural information flow – and access to it.

Drawing on a combination of primary and secondary historical sources, this chapter will address, in a preliminary way, issues of party-state organization, jurisdiction, inner-party dynamics, message control, and mobilization

during Republican China's Nanjing Decade (1927–37), so-named in recognition of the ten years that the KMT spent in its national capital along the Yangzi River before withdrawing westward ahead of the Japanese army in December 1937. The social history of the KMT's official print culture – the party's political publishing program – is revealed in Republican China's propaganda dynamics. So, too, are the early stages of the KMT's propaganda establishment in creating what has been called “the pedagogical state.”<sup>6</sup> Both of these topics shed light on the broader theme of state- and “nation-building through the party (including aspects of its multiethnic versions).”<sup>7</sup>

In particular, we will find that, by the 1930s, the KMT's publishing program was competing vigorously against the ROC's private publishers, mostly based in Shanghai, to advance its official “Three Principles of the People” (*Sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義) ideology and other aspects of its pedagogy. By the early 1930s, under the impact of “parti-fication” (*danghua* 黨化) of society (Fitzgerald 1996, 19; Nedostup 2009, Ch. 1, esp. 36ff.), the Three Principles of the People was being taught in all public and denominational schools, in universities, in the army, and throughout society. As a result, the XCB's *raison d'être* now extended well beyond the central party to include all sectors of society. Thus, with respect to print media, the XCB actually came to operate much like the modern publishing houses with which it increasingly competed for readership. Such was true even as the KMT benefited from its imposition of single-party rule from the national capital of Nanjing outward toward China's provincial capitals and commercial cities.

### Scholarly context

From its earliest days, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT, 1895/1919-present) was, as Hans J. van de Ven once characterized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “a text-centered party.”<sup>8</sup> In van de Ven's view, the CCP was made possible by the expansion of the modern print media at the end of the Qing dynasty and during the early Republic. As a political party with its roots reaching back into the late Qing (conventionally, 1895), what became KMT doctrines were long advanced via cause- and public-oriented newspapers,<sup>9</sup> pamphlets, and magazines. In 1921, after Shanghai's and indeed China's leading publisher, the Commercial Press, refused to publish Sun Yat-sen's *Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen* (*Sun Wen xueshuo* 孫文學說), Sun sought out an alternate publisher to print and distribute the work for him. However, the experience alerted Sun to the limitations of China's non-political and market-driven modern publishing sector. Further, it led the KMT to establish its own party publishing firm, Minzhi shuju 民智書局,<sup>10</sup> that same year with capital raised from overseas compatriots.

Even more important, the Soviet- and Comintern-sponsored reorganization of the KMT in the early 1920s yielded a more expansive party printing and propaganda operation. In the decade after October 1927, when the

Nationalists first established their government at Nanjing, in tandem with other KMT government units, the party issued thickets of laws restricting the activities of non-KMT printers and publishers and favoring its own. KMT government officials were insinuated onto the boards of public corporations to weaken the economic independence of the market-driven sector. Official bookstores such as Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局, Zhongguo wenhua fuwushe 中國文化服務社 (Chinese culture service association), Bati shudian 吧提書店 (“Party” bookstore), Duli chubanshe 獨立出版社 (Independent publishing), and Tiefeng chubanshe 貼風出版社 (On the wind publishing) also advanced the government’s political, economic, social, and cultural causes, particularly its anti-factional and anti-Communist propaganda.

Recent social science studies of Chinese cultural organizations (both official and NGOs), the contemporary Chinese print media, and the modern nation-state suggest that relations between these three entities continue to form a critical axis for scholars’ understanding of the development of China’s modern political culture. At the same time, this pronounced interest in China’s contemporary print media cries out for historically balanced studies of related phenomena, which is one rationale for this chapter.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, however, as suggested by the 1965 translation from French of Jacques Ellul’s *Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes*, the English-language scholarly world has long been aware of the importance of propaganda services in modern politics and state-building, particularly of the kind that Ellul termed “integration propaganda” in his taxonomy of propaganda systems. To Ellul, unlike the more familiar “agitation propaganda,”<sup>12</sup> integration propaganda “is a propaganda of conformity”<sup>13</sup> that contributes to state-building. Somewhat later, Peter Kenez in *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Urbanization, 1917–1929* advanced our understanding of the sophisticated state-dominated and state-building propaganda apparatus in Soviet Russia.<sup>14</sup> Although scholarship on the CCP’s and the PRC’s propaganda apparatus is extensive, and has been selectively influenced by both Ellul’s and Kenez’s ideas, by and large, the KMT’s role, both as a one-party state (or “party-state”; *dangguo* 黨國, but see Harrison 2000, 220) and in anticipating and laying the foundation for the eventual CCP propaganda system, has been nearly absent from existing scholarship.

In 1974, a monograph by Lee-Hsia Hsu Ting<sup>15</sup> did examine KMT control of the press through 1949, but Ting’s work became outdated as new sources appeared in both the PRC and Taiwan. Stephen Mackinnon, for example, was able to build on new materials for his study of the 1930s Chinese press.<sup>16</sup> John Fitzgerald’s *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* discussed fundamental aspects of the KMT’s propaganda system but chiefly as they related to his larger theme. My own *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876–1937* examined market-oriented printing and publishing both prior to and during the Nanjing Decade (1928–37) but touched only in passing on aspects of the KMT’s efforts to dominate the independent Shanghai publishers both

organizationally and politically. The KMT state appears again in the early work of Robert Culp, who studied the ideological overlap between the KMT state and local society via schools, textbooks, and citizenship, and also in his more recent research.<sup>17</sup>

### **The Nationalist Party-State**

Although Western social scientists and historians have generally ignored the KMT's propaganda system and the ways in which it supported the party in its state-building efforts, the same cannot be said of early Western journalists who interacted with those institutions. In 1946, for instance, American journalist Theodore White explained the nature of the Nationalist ROC's wartime government to his readers with commentary directly relevant to the goals of the KMT party-state outlined above. In particular, White wrote, the Executive Yuan 行政院 "administered civilian affairs, introduced legislation, drew up budgets, made appointments, declared wars, and framed treaties." To Westerners, its eleven ministries made the Executive Yuan seem like a conventional government cabinet. However, wrote White, "the [XCB] was not included in the war cabinet [at all,] but was directly responsible to the Kuomintang" (White and Jacoby 1946, 98) itself.

In fact, this pattern had been developed in the middle of the 1920s, following Sun Yat-sen's establishment in Shanghai on October 10, 1919 of the KMT as an oppositional and revolutionary party. John Fitzgerald, author of a pioneering study of the emergence of the KMT's one-party state, observes that, already in Spring 1920, Sun began to revise the party constitution. By November 1920, a draft emerged that included an oath to be sworn by every member to the party itself.<sup>18</sup> Anticipating the party's eventual policy of the late 1920s, Sun also called for government by "tutelage" (*xunzheng* 訓政). However, this early version of tutelage was suppressed, partly through the intervention of party elder and longtime Sun stalwart, Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (1879–1936) (Fitzgerald 1996, 197).<sup>19</sup>

Before departing Shanghai for the new revolutionary base in Guangzhou in December 1920, Sun also extended the future party-state's writ to include a propaganda department to be based at the Shanghai party headquarters. When Sun and a large number (38/84) of propaganda workers left for Guangzhou, the Shanghai office defaulted to taking temporary responsibility solely for international fund-raising duties (Fitzgerald 1996, 198). From January to September 1921, those responsible for domestic propaganda followed Sun, first to Guangzhou and then, in January 1922, to Guilin (Fitzgerald 1996, 199–200). Meanwhile, Zhang Ji 張繼 (1882–1945), former head of the Guangzhou office, returned to Shanghai in October 1921 to open the KMT's first true *central* propaganda department, laying the foundation for what would follow, five years later, in Nanjing (Fitzgerald 1996, 200).

Then, in August 1922, following the collapse of his Guangzhou base-area government that he had expected to liberate China's other provinces from

the grip of the Beijing-based Warlord Era (1916–28) government, Sun himself followed Zhang Ji back to Shanghai. Soon, reflecting Sun’s disillusionment with the corrupt liberal politics of parliamentary constitutionalism and the compromises needed to cultivate fickle public opinion, Sun embraced Comintern sponsorship of the KMT. Now, Sun and his party changed emphasis, with a turn to party rule and top-down mass propaganda aimed at the public (Fitzgerald 1996, 206). An informal assembly under Zhang Ji’s leadership led to unanimous endorsement of Sun’s plan to reorganize the KMT to allow the Chinese Communists, with whom Sun and the KMT had interacted informally in Guangzhou, to join the KMT as individuals. Zhang Ji himself took on the sponsorship of CCP leader Li Dazhao 李大釗 (1889–1927) as the first Communist to join the KMT (Fitzgerald 1996, 203, 204). Thus was born the short-lived 1st United Front (1924–27) of the KMT and the CCP.

In Fitzgerald’s telling, the next year, “1923[,] marked the nadir of liberal politics in the Republic” (Fitzgerald 1996, 185) formed after the 1911 revolution. Early that year, Sun had begun to distinguish “political activity” in the liberal sense from “party rule,” which in his mind transcended politics and political activity. Having long advocated “using the party to govern the state” (*yidang zhiguo* 以黨治國), early in the next year, at the 1st Nationalist Party Congress (January 1924) held in Guangzhou with the new CCP members mixed in among the KMT membership, Sun pushed the issue farther, calling now for “using the party to *build* the state” (*yidang jianguo* 以黨建國) (Fitzgerald 1996, 185; Ma 2015, 15). Simultaneously, essential to building the new party was its National Revolutionary Army (Guomin gemingjun 國民革命軍, NRA), founded on May 1, 1924 with the opening of the Soviet-financed Whampoa Military Academy at Guangzhou.

Half-way through 1924, in an important symbolic move in August, Sun ordered the old five-bar, multi-racial, liberal-constitutional Republic of China flag that dated to the very early republic (Harrison 2000, 101–106) lowered throughout southern China in favor of the KMT’s own flag. This “Blue Sky and White Sun” (*Qingtian bairi* 青天白日) flag exhibited a cantoned party flag overlaid onto the red flag of revolution, signaling the rising preeminence of the single-party state.<sup>20</sup> As Fitzgerald observes, the new national flag was also monoracial: “Sun felt that the [five-bar flag] betrayed the most fundamental principle of the [1911] revolution: racial unity” (Fitzgerald 1996, 183).<sup>21</sup>

Just as “the party flag was to be converted into a national one by making the Nationalist party (sic) identical with the national state,” so too was “the party to duplicate the organization of the government and oversee its operations at every level” (Fitzgerald 1996, 185). Predictably, the KMT and Sun now also reorganized the party’s XCB. Right-wing ideologue Dai Jitao 戴季陶 (1891–1949) was appointed first head of the restructured XCB; Dai was later replaced by Sun’s former right-hand man and once-presumed successor, Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883–1944). Wang, in turn, appointed

Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976) to run the department on his behalf from October 1925 to March 1926 (Fitzgerald 1996, 226–33). Borrowing from the Soviet “propaganda state” via the Comintern, Sun and the KMT had now laid the foundation for China’s Republican pedagogical propaganda state.<sup>22</sup>

While Sun was alive, says Fitzgerald, he “was” the revolution in the minds of those who mattered. He monitored the party’s messages himself and so the XCB remained relatively inactive in this regard. Inner-party discipline, says Fitzgerald, involved little more than guaranteeing that Sun was not attacked by either party propaganda or by the commercial popular press. With Sun’s death in March 1925, however, bureaucratic forces began to take over some of Sun’s activities. In particular, Mao Zedong, acting on Wang Jingwei’s behalf, introduced a new and heightened level of central control to the party’s message.<sup>23</sup> According to Fitzgerald, when Mao took over the XCB,

...a more detailed form of internal communication came into circulation. The propaganda outline (*xuanchuan dagang* 宣傳大綱), as it was called, offered ready-made analyses and prescribed slogans for adoption by all party, military, and government agencies under the jurisdiction of the issuing authority.

(Fitzgerald 1996, 240; also Harrison 2000, 215)<sup>24</sup>

The 1st United Front had been promoted by the Comintern as part of its worldwide anti-imperialist strategy. In China, in order to unify the country’s commercial and laboring classes against Western and Japanese imperialists, Communists had been urged to join hands with Nationalists in what Comintern agent Henk Sneevliet (Maring, 1883–1942) was the first to call the “Nationalist Revolution” (*guomin geming* 國民革命) (Fitzgerald 1996, 167). The United Front alliance would endure, albeit precariously, until Spring 1927, when it ended in a hail of bullets in Shanghai and beyond, directed by Sun’s heir now directing the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887–1975). What transpired then was, in the view of the KMT, a Party Purification Movement (*Qingdang yundong* 清黨運動); conversely, the CCP called it the White Terror (*Baise kongbu yundong* 白色恐怖運動).<sup>25</sup> Regardless of its name, the movement occurred in the middle period of the Northern Expedition (*Guomin gemingjun beifa* 國民革命軍北伐, 1926–28), Chiang Kai-shek’s effort to finally realize Sun Yat-sen’s dream, never achieved in the senior revolutionary’s lifetime, of freeing Central and North China from the grip of the warlords—and then reuniting China militarily.

By February 1928, with Sun long dead, conflict with the Communists out in the open, and Nanjing proclaimed the new capital, at the second session of the 4th Party Congress, party units and departments were re-organized yet again. According to researcher Ma Rui, in Spring 1928, Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin worked together to apply Sun Yat-sen’s “stage theory of history” to the KMT’s present situation. Sun’s stage theory of history, which

postulated the need for the party leadership to direct China's progression through military, tutelage, and constitutional government stages, dated back at least to 1905, but was given its final form in a series of lectures delivered between January and June 1924 that were then published that year as *Three Principles of the People* (*Sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義). Chiang and Hu now declared the end of the Military Stage and the start of the Tutelage Stage (1929–47). Sun's former associate Hu Hanmin, working together with Sun's son, Sun Ke 孫科 (1891–1973, aka Sun Fo), and others wrote the *Draft Outline of the Tutelage Stage* (*Xunzheng dagang cao'an* 訓政大綱草案). Among its main ideas was that of “using the party to unify the nation [or state, and] using the party to train [or instruct] in politics (*yidang tongyi, yidang xunzheng* 以黨統一，以黨訓政)” (Ma 2015, 11).

In March 1928, the party's Central Propaganda Department (Guomintang zhongxuanbu 國民黨中宣部) was reorganized (again) with Ye Chucang 葉楚傖 (1893–1967), long-time party leader and respected party journalist, as department head and Zhu Yunguang 朱雲光 as party secretary (Zhu 2001, 36.a.). The KMT's internal party propaganda *department* now expanded its reach sufficiently to substitute for the party-state's propaganda *ministry*, supporting the KMT's more general effort to “take over state functions and replace state institutions” (CFP).

The Tutelage Stage of state-building began informally in August 1928 with its declaration by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's declaration was followed by that of party elder Tan Yankai 譚延闓 (1880–1930). On October 10, 1928, with the KMT's Party Congress substituting for the national assembly, similar declarations were made, this time somewhat more formally (Harrison 2000, 220; Ma 2015, 12). Finally, the landmark 3rd Party Congress in March 1929 formalized the plan by making Sun Yat-sen's own writings, including his *Last Will and Testament* (*Zongli yishu* 總理遺囑), the core of the party curriculum and public rituals during the Tutelage Phase.

### **Organizing the KMT's Nanjing Decade media system**

To anyone viewing a copy of the new party-state's internal instructional organ, *Zhongyang zhoubao* 中央週報 (Central weekly journal, hereafter ZYZB), in late winter 1928, the overlap between party and government would have been suggested immediately. Adorning the journal's cover was an artist's image of the main, cupola-topped, KMT party headquarters. It was located in Nanjing's former Hunan Road Jiangsu Provincial Assembly buildings dating from 1910.<sup>26</sup> The XCB itself was located along the side of the party headquarters – and the ZYZB journal was directly managed by the XCB. The party's print shop was located nearby.

ZYZB was in fact just one part of the increasingly comprehensive party-controlled national media system implemented by the KMT starting in 1928. The groundwork for the public-facing apparatus had been laid in April 1924 with the establishment of the Central News Agency (*Zhongyang tongxunshe*



中央通訊社), which was directly administered by the XCB from the start. In 1927, Yin Shuxian 尹述賢 (1897–1980), erstwhile head of the XCB’s publishing department, became the agency’s new director. In July of that year, the KMT announced that the Central News Agency would take on both propaganda/publicity and “inspection responsibilities” (*shencha zhi ze* 審查之責) (Ma 2015, 12), assuming the duties previously performed by Sun and Mao, among others. In effect, it would become the soon-to-be ruling party’s news monitoring and censorship bureau.

The creation of the Central News Agency was followed by that of the Central Broadcasting Station (*Zhongyang guangbo diantai* 中央廣播電台) in August 1928. Initially, for technical reasons, the radio service’s geographical coverage was limited to the two provinces of Jiangsu (where Nanjing and Shanghai were located) and Zhejiang, of which Hangzhou was the capital. By the middle of 1932, however, a new, far larger transmitter was erected outside Nanjing’s Jiangdong Gate 江東門, giving the KMT’s radio broadcasting service the most expansive coverage of any in East Asia and access to all of the ROC’s 23 provinces (Ma 2015, 13).

The third pillar of the KMT’s public-facing media system was the *Central Daily News* (*Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報). Early efforts in Wuhan (March to September 1927) and Shanghai (February to September 1928) to establish such an organ were eventually aborted for political reasons. Then, in late 1928, in response to a motion by then-Standing Committee member and XCB head Ye Chucang, the party finally brought the paper to Nanjing. Its first issue went on sale on February 21, 1929 (Ma 2015, 13).

Hence, by about mid-1932, the KMT was able to achieve a far-reaching, outward-facing, and comprehensive print and electronic media system aimed at China’s vast national public and guided by the XCB. Not surprisingly, given the trauma of the 1927/28 showdown with the CCP, KMT party members at that time were deemed by the party leadership still potentially vulnerable to Communist and left-wing persuasion. In fact, such concerns were the reason that the *inward-facing* ZYZB was established in the first place. According to publication information on the journal itself, it was published weekly in Nanjing from June 1928 to June 1937,<sup>27</sup> leading over that period to a total of 473 issues.

Rather than bring about the suspension of the journal following the commencement of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in early July 1937, the war with Japan actually tightened the relationship between the central authorities of the KMT and its XCB. After a brief delay while its staff evacuated Nanjing, the ZYZB resumed publication, first in Changsha, Hunan province, and then, a month later, in what would eventually become the ROC’s long-term wartime capital, Chongqing, in the western province of Sichuan. The fact of the party-state’s chief propaganda journal arriving in Chongqing some 14 months prior to the government’s own relocation there following the fall of the short-term capital Wuhan in October 1938 is indicative of the journal’s importance to party-state leadership for maintaining KMT morale and discipline.

## The political publishing program of the KMT's Department of Propaganda

Despite his absence from standard biographical dictionaries of twentieth-century KMT politics, Zhu Zishuang 朱子爽 became a well-known central-party propagandist. Zhu worked in the party-state's XCB from 1928 to 1946, the key Tutelage Stage years when the party was striving to build the nation, suppress the CCP, and, eventually, resist the Japanese invasion. In 2001, he published a short article with his recollections of how the editorial office of the XCB operated.<sup>28</sup> He provides a fly-on-the-wall perspective with insight into some of the XCB's research, writing, and publishing activities that would otherwise remain hidden.

Zhu grew up in the same (unnamed) town as the recently appointed (March 1928) XCB party secretary, Zhu Yunguang, whom we met earlier as new department chief Ye Chucang's associate. The two men surnamed Zhu were apparently not related by blood. They had, however, been classmates at some point. Zhu Zishuang also says Zhu Yunguang did recommend him for employment at the XCB. Afterwards, Zhu Zishuang writes, "I gladly consented and threw myself into this work for [the next] 18 years" (*...wo xinran lejiu, cong ci tounshen xuanchuan shi you ba nian* 我欣然了就，從此投身宣傳十有八年...) (Zhu 2001, 36.a).

When Zhu Zishuang started work, he reports, the department was very simple and had just seven units: general affairs, supervision, editorial, news, publication, overseas affairs, and international matters. As the general administrator of the editorial office, he determined that the most important part of that work was having access to reference materials. When he proposed a project to create an editorial research library to XCB head Ye Chucang, Ye authorized him to hire a few people to establish a materials collection and catalogue them (Zhu 2001, 36.a).

Initially, Zhu focused on the very basic activity of clipping articles from newspapers. The department was then receiving important contemporary newspapers from throughout China, including the big ones from Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing,<sup>29</sup> Tianjin, and Guangzhou. All were essential to the writing and editing of ZYZB, says Zhu. Editors first surveyed the newspapers and circled items deemed useful. Zhu's news-cutting room clipped and pasted the articles into binders, which were then shelved for future reference (Zhu 2001, 36.b).

In addition to monitoring and rescuing important articles from the contemporary periodical press, Zhu's unit was also responsible for keeping track of new books generated by China's private-sector publishers, most of which were concentrated in Shanghai. Issued in 1928, the new Publications Law required all Chinese publishers to submit pre-publication manuscripts for approval to the XCB, making the information-collecting part of Zhu's job relatively straightforward when it came to new or impending publications. The problematic part of the job "was collecting previously published

books and periodicals,” an issue on which he spent a great deal of time (Zhu 2001, 36.b). Even Sun Yat-sen’s early publications,<sup>30</sup> which were clearly essential for the KMT to have on hand, were hard to locate, not to mention related ones such as Zou Rong 鄒容 (1885–1905)’s *Revolutionary Army* (*Geming jun* 革命軍, 1903) and Huang Zao 黃藻’s *Spirit of the Yellow Emperor* (*Huangdi hun* 皇帝魂, 1903). Periodicals such as Sun’s early Tokyo-issued Revolutionary Alliance newspaper *Minbao*, early issues of the Commercial Press’s nationally important general-purpose journal, *Eastern Miscellany* (*Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌, 1904–1949), and many others were also hard to come by in Nanjing (Zhu 2001, 36.b).

Thus, in pursuit of materials for the XCB’s editorial library, Zhu had no choice but to visit second-hand bookstores and old-book stalls. On Sundays and holidays, he writes, he typically went to Nanjing’s Huapailou 花牌樓 and the historic Confucian Temple (Qinhuai 秦淮) districts. He also visited the old bookshops on Mochou Road 莫愁路. In each locale, he searched for relevant revolutionary books and periodicals. He bought what he could and carted them back to the XCB offices. Sometimes, when he saw multi-volume collections such as runs of *Eastern Miscellany*, he had no choice but to head over to the XCB and ask his colleagues to help him carry them back on their bicycles. Zhu did long-term business (*changqi jiaoyi* 長期交易) with many of these establishments and developed relationships with as many as possible. Not surprisingly, once the proprietors learned what he wanted, they were willing to save treasures for him (Zhu 2001, 36.b).

In 1934, Zhu even wrote letters to provincial, county, and municipal governments throughout China, asking them to send the XCB all post-Guangxu emperor (i.e. post-1908) gazetteers (local histories) for the department’s consultation. Within a year, the XCB received nearly a thousand of them (Zhu 2001, 37.a). Thus, by 1936, says Zhu, the XCB, which had started with merely two book-stack rooms, had built up eight of them. Zhu’s subordinates had created a detailed catalogue that covered nearly everything in detail. They had also produced an index that made finding sources very convenient.

Then, tragically, after nine years of collective effort by Zhu et al., the 2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) broke out at the Marco Polo Bridge, some twelve miles from Beijing’s Forbidden City. It spread quickly south to Shanghai and the lower Yangzi River area that autumn. Few of the materials the XCB had painstakingly assembled under Zhu’s leadership could be moved from Nanjing. In fact, in December 1937, when Nanjing fell to the Japanese army in what became known as the Rape of Nanjing, these propaganda materials of the KMT’s pedagogical state were mostly destroyed.

Before then, however, in the days just before he left Nanjing, Zhu considered various ways to transport at least some of the reference materials. He decided that the best approach was to reduce his own personal luggage to a minimum, wear his winter clothes (in the steamy central China summer!),

and then use his suitcases and baskets (*wanglan* 網籃) to create room for materials he had collected for his own future writing. He also wanted to save the ten years' worth of ZYZB, particularly the "Spring Festival [New Year] Commemorative Issues" (*Chunjie jiniankan* 春節紀念刊). He took these items to Chongqing and later used them to write *Guomindang zhengce congshu* 國民黨政策叢書 (Collectanea of KMT policies) in eleven thick volumes (Zhu 2001, 37.a).

In summary, despite the substantial history of KMT propaganda efforts dating back to Sun's reestablishment of the party in 1919, it is clear from Zhu's account of how the XCB's reference library came into existence that the KMT's propaganda institutions' developments at the start of the Nanjing Decade still hinged on a relatively haphazard and contingent process. The ZYZB was published, in part, to systematize propaganda, to standardize messaging, and to impose a higher degree of discipline and uniformity of thought on the party membership itself, rather than on the public at large. In this way, the ZYZB complemented the outward-facing entities of the national media system discussed in the previous section.

### **Tutoring the KMT itself with *Zhongyang zhoubao***

During the KMT government's Nanjing Decade, few non-party outsiders were in fact likely to have actually encountered or read ZYZB, mentioned by Zhu as his purpose for compiling a reference library in the first place. In the view of one recent researcher, who invokes present-day PRC phrasing, it was published "for internal [party] circulation only" (*neibu faxing* 内部发行) (Ma 2015, 14). Nonetheless, the journal points to the utter importance of printing and publishing "the right words" in the non-market driven, inward-facing political publishing system of the now-ruling, state-building, pedagogical party.

Most commonly, Ellul's integration (or state-building) propaganda is viewed as targeting the masses, but intellectuals (or educated persons) are, in his view, most vulnerable to it (Ellul 1965, 76). In the case of ZYZB, the intended readership was party members and cadres, as well as probationary party members, with access to party branch offices. When the journal's first issue appeared in June 1928, the KMT was still nominally locked into the 1st United Front alliance with the CCP. Despite a wide-ranging purge that had already cost tens of thousands of Communists and suspected Communists their lives, Chiang's KMT was still preoccupied with rooting out hidden saboteurs and left-leaning party members. Eventually, in March 1929, at the 3rd Party Congress already mentioned, Chiang and the KMT's right-wing would purge any remaining actual or suspected left-wing, usually younger, members. In the meantime, ZYZB would strive to straighten them and any survivors out ideologically.<sup>31</sup>

To do so, each issue of ZYZB provided a road map to topics that the party leadership considered essential for its party members and officials to know. Issues began with “Review of the Week’s Main Events,” followed by a section labeled “Main Propaganda Points of the Week.” Next came “Excerpts,” and “Reprints.”<sup>32</sup> And, echoing the notion of the pedagogical state, throughout the journal, the emphasis was laid on educating the party membership, particularly with respect to the KMT’s central dogmas – the founder Sun Yat-sen and his “Three Principles of the People” – and their applications to contemporary politics. In the journal’s 2nd issue, its purpose was declared to be “providing a week’s current events as the object of research...to further each comrade’s knowledge of the revolution while encouraging his/her revolutionary courage” (Ma 2015, 17). The journal also offered elementary tutelage about the following week’s leading propaganda points while supplying all levels of the party with published rules, regulations, programs, and other documents for reference (Ma 2015, 17).

All levels of the party organization were required to subscribe to ZYZB, but, because the central party’s links with the lower levels of the party hierarchy were then weak and unreliable, it was particularly aimed at them (Ma 2015, 17). Distribution was limited to party branches and access was tightly guarded and clandestine. Initially, only some 10,000 copies were printed and subscribers – whether party units or individuals – could not request more. Subscribers were also forbidden to lend or sell issues to the non-KMT public. Over time, but especially between 1930 and 1935, as Ma Rui shows persuasively, the party strived to make sure that the lowest party ranks (*qufen dangbu* 區分黨部) got increasing access to the journal while the provincial and district levels got fewer copies, relatively speaking (Ma 2015, 19).

As we saw earlier, ZYZB had an editorial committee below the XCB that included Zhu Zishuang, who helped it assemble its library. Apart from news clippings and bulletins, the editorial committee also collected party affairs news, major propaganda points, summaries/minutes of meetings, collected speeches, etc. (Ma 2015, 23). Contributing editors came from a wide variety of top party officials, not surprising given the journal’s purpose. Based on a quantitative analysis of some 37 contributors who wrote in response to the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, a date that is often taken to mark the start of Japan’s invasion of China, Ma Rui found that Hu Hanmin – former Sun associate, recent president of the Legislative Yuan, and future Chairman of the KMT who in Fall 1931 had already come out in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s party leadership – contributed the most articles with 115. Chiang Kai-shek’s own articles ranked second most numerous, with 68; by-lines of the sitting Vice-President of the Legislative Yuan, Shao Yuanchong 邵元沖 (1890–1936), numbered third-most numerous with 36. Those from inaugural XCB head Dai Jitao came in fourth with 33. Clearly, the XCB was striving to alert the rank and file as to who the party leaders –

both in terms of incumbent high government office-holding and ideological leadership – were and what they thought.<sup>33</sup>

### **Excerpts from the KMT's political publishing program during the Nanjing Decade**

The ZYZB was not the XCB's sole publication. Although during the Nanjing Decade, the XCB also clearly engaged in Ellul's agitation propaganda (with an emphasis on border affairs, foreign powers, and treaty ports), the following discussion, in keeping with the themes presented above, will provide an overview of integration propaganda delivered through the XCB's own print media to reveal something of the full range of the KMT's political publishing during the Nanjing Decade. The discussion is necessarily selective, but this approach will allow us to bring together with a single focus the various threads introduced in this chapter up to here. In particular, the notions of the party-state merger, with the KMT and its political publishing program operating, in many respects, like a non-market driven party publishing house that stood in for state institutions; the influence of the pedagogical state; and nation- and state-building through the party, including (contrary to Sun Yat-sen's own intentions) aspects of multi-ethnicity, will become clear.

Our main historical source for this section which will take us inside the KMT itself is the internal party documentation known as *XCB Weekly Work Outlines* 中央宣傳部工作概要 (*Zhongyang xuanchuanbu gongzuo gaiyao*,<sup>34</sup> hereafter *Gaiyao*). Representing a later incarnation of Mao Zedong's *xuanchuan dagang* discussed earlier, the *Gaiyao* were issued more or less weekly during the Nanjing Decade and reflected the statist, disciplinarian KMT of the Nanjing Decade. Intended to summarize the standardized propaganda goals and messages of the KMT, these summaries were prepared steadily by XCB staff from mid-July 1927 to mid-July 1937 on the orders of the KMT's Central Executive Committee (*Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui* 中央執行委員會 or CEC, that is, the top-most unit of the party and state).<sup>35</sup> The CEC was also the body that supervised the XCB; the XCB head sat on the CEC. The XCB *Gaiyao* were submitted weekly to the CEC, which then retained them for archiving after discussion.

All of the extant *Gaiyao* are dated and numbered internally. Although they clearly became formulaic over time, the formulas did change periodically throughout the Nanjing Decade. Two factors that seem to have had an impact on their contents were unpredicted and contingent contemporary events along with the evolution of the KMT's communications technology reviewed earlier. The latter, in particular, produced increasing numbers of summaries about radio broadcasts from the early 1930s. Much like Shanghai's Commercial Press and Zhonghua Books, the leading corporate publishers of the day, the XCB also got involved in film production in the 1930s.

The very first Gaiyao to survive is dated July 16 to 31, 1927. It reports that the KMT's Shanghai party bookstore, the previously mentioned Minzhi shuju, had sent the XCB 1500 copies of the late President Sun Yat-sen's *Mourning Records* (*Aisilu* 哀思錄) ("278th XCB WR," items 1, 9). *Mourning Records* was a massive collection of commemorative essays that had been published in 1925 following the revolutionary's death that year. Another 500 copies came from the Presidential Funeral Preparation Office (Zongli zangshi choubei chu 總理葬事籌備處) in Nanjing. *Mourning Records* was the sort of publication – one with clearly limited commercial appeal prior to the establishment of the KMT's national government in 1927 when the KMT was known chiefly for its party army (the NRA) and its Northern Expedition to reunite the country under party rule – for which Sun and the KMT had first established Minzhi shuju in the early 1920s. *Mourning Records* was now to become a collection of essays to educate the party's rank and file about their party's founder and his political goals.<sup>36</sup>

In the first week of July, Minzhi shuju had also arranged to have 9,000 copies of the first issue of an early competitor publication to ZYZB printed and then delivered to Nanjing. Although only 2150 copies of this *Central Party Biweekly* (*Zhongyang banyuekan* 中央半月刊) were distributed in the second half of July 1927 to every member of the CEC ("278th XCB WR," item 28) along with provincial party branches, by the time the second issue appeared, that number had been boosted to 6000,<sup>37</sup> suggestive of an ambitious party- and state-building print-based propaganda apparatus that was nonetheless still under construction. One way the XCB broadened the impact of this journal was to reprint issue 1, which included party bylaws and standardized forms, in Nanjing and then include that issue as a supplement with issue 2 ("278th XCB WR," item 3).<sup>38</sup> When the third issue appeared, Minzhi shuju shipped Nanjing 12,000 copies but, paradoxically, actual distribution numbers declined. Only 3000 copies were now distributed by Nanjing, but the Gaiyao offers no direct explanation why.

However, the Gaiyao does report some resistance from within the party's army (NRA) to wide distribution of the journal. For instance, in late July 1927, Comrade<sup>39</sup> Chen Zongxun 陳宗訓, the Distribution Section chief working for the General Political Department's General Headquarters, came to the XCB to ask about distribution methods. He inquired whether the *Biweekly* should really be sent to each political department within the military. "On the spot (*dangji* 當即)," reports the XCB Gaiyao, "we told him about the regulation requiring all [of them] to subscribe from issue 3 onward; and we passed on the order that each political department in the army must subscribe" ("278th XCB WR 1927," item 12).

Numerous other state-building publications sent to the XCB's main offices on Nanjing's Hunan Road are also mentioned in this first Gaiyao. For example, 577 copies of *Outline of the Three Principles of the People* (*Sanmin zhuyi yaolie* 三民主義要略) were received and distributed to the various levels of party branches. Just as significant from the viewpoint of a

still-living revolutionary hero from Sun's generation, 5000 copies of the first volume of longtime Sun associate *Mr. Hu Hanmin's Collected Speeches* (*Hu Hanmin xiansheng yanjiang ji* 胡漢民先生演講集) were delivered to Nanjing by Minzhi shuju ("278th XCB WR 1927," item 23). Two thousand copies of these were then forwarded to the General Political Training Department (Zongzhengzhi xunlianbu 總政治訓練部) and 500 to each provincial party headquarters ("278th XCB WR 1927," item 25). Added to those in this half-month were 1560 copies of the suggestively titled official document equating party and nation, *Protecting the Party & Saving the Nation* (*Hudang jiuguo zhi wenshu* 護黨救國之文書). Four hundred thirty-plus copies of each of the three volumes of *National Revolution Propaganda Collections* (*Guomin geming xuanchuan ji* 國民革命宣傳集)<sup>40</sup> were also forwarded.

The multi-lingual aspirations of the XCB were reflected already in an appeal to the Accounting Office for June and July subsidies for the French-language newspaper, *Three People's Newspaper* (*Sanminbao* 三民報, which reflected the phrasing of the KMT's founding ideology) ("278th XCB WR 1927," item 33). *Three People's Newspaper* might have been aimed at both Chinese living in Shanghai's French Concession as well as at sympathetic French-language readers in Indochina. The same logic operated behind the many English-language translations of KMT documents. Subsequent Gaiyao recorded repeated efforts to translate key texts into Mongolian, Tibetan, Manchu, Uighur, and other Chinese minority languages, indicating the ruling-party KMT's shift away from Sun Yat-sen's foundational single-race view of 1924 and earlier.

The XCB itself had contracted in Nanjing for an extra 1000 copies of each of two items – *Propaganda Outline for the Workers Movement* (*Gongren yundong xuanchuan dagang* 工人運動宣傳大綱) and *Propaganda Outline for the Peasant Movement* (*Nongmin yundong xuanchuan dagang* 農民運動宣傳大綱) – indicative of the wider and on-going social revolution that had until recently been led by the KMT's CCP allies. The titles and contents of each certainly reflected the lingering influence of Mao Zedong's efforts in 1925 and 1926 to systematize and standardize party messages via the propaganda outlines (*xuanchuan dagang* 宣傳大綱) mentioned earlier, but the KMT now sought to domesticate those movements by bringing them under its own direct supervision.

The multiple copies of *Attitudes that Revolutionary Comrades Should Hold Regarding the Hunan & Hubei Party Purification Movements* (*Geming tongzhi duiyu liang Hu qingdang yundong ying chi zhi taidu* 革命同志對於兩湖清黨運動應持之態度) that are reported by the Gaiyao as having been distributed that July point to another ongoing campaign that consumed XCB energy that summer. Although the Spring 1927 Party Purification Movement had begun in Shanghai, it had not ended there. From Shanghai, the KMT took this campaign to all of its newly occupied provinces in Central and North China, including Hunan and Hubei. Indeed, it continued



that campaign against its own party members via ZYZB and other publications well into the 1930s.

As part of the XCB's supervisory, that is, censoring and monitoring responsibilities that were intended to ensure that its own party members understood the ROC's official Three Principles of the People ideology and were loyal to it, the XCB now also commenced to distribute "propaganda personnel examination forms" (*xuanchuan rencai diaocha biao* 宣傳人才調查表) and "propaganda conditions investigation forms" (*xuanchuan qingxing diaocha biao* 宣傳情形調查表) to all provincial party offices, including Hunan's and Hubei's. At the same time, it ordered the printing section of the party's General Political Department (Zong zhengzhibu 總政治部) to produce some 10,000 more copies of the General Political Training Department (Zong zhengzhi xunlianbu 總政治訓練部)'s *Declaration to the Masses in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi* (*Gao Xiang E Gan minzhong shu* 告湘鄂贛民眾書), which were added to the 9775 copies that had already been distributed. In terms of sheer numbers of party-subsidized printing and publishing, as suggested by the Gaiyao, this campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of both common folk and party members had no near-equal in Summer 1927.

A decade later, in 1937, the KMT's political circumstances had changed significantly. Despite substantial public opposition to the party's policies and operations, on again/off again intra-party factional and even military competition, along with a running civil war with the CCP, the KMT had maintained its one-party grip on the government with Chiang Kai-shek at its head. For example, the Gaiyao for March 22–27, 1937 makes clear that the Party Purification Movement that had begun exactly a decade earlier in April 1927 in Shanghai was still in force nationally. The Gaiyao reports a regularized annual commemoration day on April 12 that was listed for enforcement (*banxing* 頒行) in the XCB's self-published *Concise List of Revolutionary Commemoration Days* (*Geming jinianri jianming biao* 革命紀念日簡明表), an essential reference work for all party offices ("XCB WGWS 1937," item 1).

Even in 1937, the Gaiyao editor felt the need to repeat to his own readers, that is, to the KMT's CEC, the by-then familiar charges against the CCP. Invoking "the main propaganda points" worked out by the XCB for nationwide enforcement, he emphasized that the party branches should present their members with a potted history of the party's 1924 reform that had tolerated the CCP in its midst until the Communists carried out "multiple crimes" (*zhongzhong zui'e* 種種罪惡) against the KMT. At that point, the KMT terminated the "Red Calamity" (*chihuo* 赤禍) at the 1929 3rd Party Congress (that had substituted for a national assembly).

Hu Hanmin, whose involvement with both party and government stretched back to 1905, had died on May 12, 1936 at the age of 57 from a cerebral hemorrhage. In effect merging party and government ceremonies, he was now to be commemorated for the first time in 1937. At its 38th meeting, the party's Central Standing Committee had resolved to establish the day of Hu's passing as a *national day* of commemoration henceforth, much like

that of party founder, Sun Yat-sen. The XCB drafted various ceremonies for commemorating Hu's passing that would draw on a specially composed short history of the party elder's revolutionary activities. This text was so potentially significant that it was sent to the Central Party History Department's Historical Materials Compilation Committee (Zhongyang dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui 中央黨史史料編纂委員會) for verification of its accuracy ("XCB WGWS 1937," item 3). By late April, the XCB was again at work on the Hu commemoration, having produced a propaganda outline for distribution to each party branch in anticipation of the solemn events to come that were intended to integrate those of the local branches into the national party-state one ("XCB TWGWS 1937," item 1).

The following week's Gaiyao is the last one known to make mention of Zhu Zishuang's journal, the ZYJB, introduced earlier. Covering two weeks' work, this Gaiyao recorded the department's publication of the 460th and 461st issues of the central party organ that would halt production temporarily that last summer of the Nanjing Decade with issue 473 before Zhu and his subalterns fled the city. His committee had been hard at work in the weeks prior, with an earlier Gaiyao commenting that the XCB "had collected materials," presumably still clipped from newspapers and magazines, "on important international news items" ("XCB WGWS 1937," item 4). Multiple foreign-language manuscripts were underway, both from Chinese into foreign tongues and from those languages into Chinese. This linguistic work continued into late April with translations into Mongolian of declarations from the one-party proxy national assembly and from the party-state's leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Of course, these particular translations carried ponderous significance because of steadily expanding Japanese military influence in Mongolia since 1933.

The final Gaiyao were sent on to the CEC throughout July and early August as war with Japan now spread across North China, promoting ever-closer ties between party and government. By mid-summer 1937, following the Xi'an Incident of December 1936, the KMT once again bound itself into a United Front with the CCP.<sup>41</sup> Filling the party-state breach, the KMT's XCB tried to help the party-government claim the political high ground with a campaign, little known today, termed the Unified National Salvation Movement (Tongyi jiuguo yundong 統一救國運動). It sought to coopt the patriotic energy mobilized in May 1936 when some 280 non-governmental national and cultural figures had signed a National Salvation Declaration (Jiuguo yundong xuanyan 救國運動宣言) in Shanghai to protest the KMT's military inaction regarding Japan's incursions in North China south of the Great Wall that were intended to create a new Manchukuo. Following the Xi'an Incident, the KMT created its own official movement in response to the Shanghai one in an effort to undermine the non-party, non-governmental one.<sup>42</sup>

Now, the XCB formulated an internal document, titled *Unified National Salvation Theory and Program* (Tongyi jiuguo lilun gangling 統一救國理論綱領) for widespread dissemination to party branches and, through them, to the

general populace. Instructing the party that the program was “the moment’s most urgent [and] most important work” (*muqian zui poqie zui zhongyao zhi gongzuo* 目前最迫切最重要之工作), the document was “distributed to all provincial and municipal party branches [and] to all special party branches” (“XCB GWS 1937,” item 1). They, in turn, were instructed to reprint it and then further distribute it at local levels. All party branches and collective units were instructed to work hard discussing and investigating “so that the real intent of national salvation can be publicized [and] spread to each locale’s newspapers for publishing in a timely manner to uphold unity against separatists” (“XCB GWS 1937,” item 1). Further, party branches were ordered to supervise all of China’s magazines, which should now publish special Unified National Salvation issues.

By the time the next *Gaiyao* was compiled and forwarded to the CEC, China and Japan had been at war for a month already. Now, with no hint whatsoever of serving as a *government* institution, the XCB defaulted to its functions of organizing the party branches for the widening circles of the conflict. This time, the XCB’s *Gaiyao* started by stating its activities as having included *secret* “instructions to all party branches on the propaganda work they must prepare.” On July 27 and 28, confidential cables had been sent to all party branches, instructing them to quickly arrange “to encourage the common folk to resist the enemy’s outrages under the leadership of the central party [apparatus (my emphasis)]” (*guli minzhong zai Zhongyang lingdao xia zhunbei kang di yu* 鼓勵民眾在中央領導下準備抗敵禦) (“XCB GWS 82, 83 1937,” item 1). Half a dozen specific guidelines followed, ending with inspirational words about self-sacrifice in extreme situations.

Compiling, editing, and publication did remain active to the bitter end, however. A new propaganda summary of main issues to be covered in commemorating Sun Yat-sen’s first armed uprising in 1895, a propaganda outline, and two new publications on the Imperial Japanese Army’s encroachments on North China, along with small propaganda pamphlets (*xuanchuan xiaoce* 宣傳小冊) continued to be produced at XCB initiative (“XCB GWS 82, 83 1937,” items 5, 6) along with the kinds of daily news summaries that Zhu Zishuang had initiated in 1928. All of them gave the KMT’s XCB primacy of place in the centralized flow of party-state information and access to it.

## Summary and conclusion

In common with numerous one-party states across Eurasia, after laying a foundation from 1919 when the KMT’s Department of Propaganda was first formed, to 1927/28, when its new Republic of China (ROC) was declared, the KMT brought about its own form of party-state merger. With respect to propaganda, it started and ended by substituting the XCB’s political publishing operation for a formal, even just nominal governmental ministry of propaganda. With the KMT and its XCB-led political publishing

program operating, in many respects, like a non-market-driven publishing house, the idea of the pedagogical state supporting party-centered nation- and state-building, including aspects of multi-ethnicity, started to bear fruit. Ideologically and politically, the structure laid out by Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin for the Tutelage Stage of Chinese nation-building within a one-party structure contributed mightily to what must have seemed to both the natural overlay of party and state propaganda.

In this chapter, an introduction to the KMT's political publishing program during the Nanjing Decade has been structured to take us from the general context of the KMT's early 1920s political messaging overseen by Sun Yat-sen to the specifics of the XCB's post-1927 internal operations, particularly regarding its Nanjing-based, party-centered publication, the ZYJB (Central weekly journal, 1928–1937). In the next section, we moved on to the “deep within” of the XCB's weekly internal propaganda outlines (Gaiyao) created at KMT Party Headquarters on Nanjing's Hunan Road from 1927 to 1937. Seen from another perspective, we have also progressed from the public operations of a non-market-driven<sup>43</sup> party propaganda department that merged party and state ideological and enforcement systems to the progressively more anonymous and bureaucratically disciplined, ideological, and pedagogical state.

Different from Shanghai's comprehensive private and corporate publishing operations, however, as seen here, the KMT's XCB focused strongly on inward-facing political publishing, especially for party functionaries but also, through their tutelage, implicitly including the larger public via outward-facing media as well. And it did so while aspiring, from the mid-1920s onward, to hegemonic control of information and messaging in competition with the private sector. Seen from this perspective, the KMT turns out to have been a text-centered political party that became a publishing organization almost in spite of its initial haphazard development, in the late 1920s, under director Ye Chucang and his acquisitions and reference librarian Zhu Zishuang. Inner party dynamics, party mobilization, and media jurisdictions all combined during the party's post-1928 Tutelage Stage to promote what Ellul terms integration propaganda, a form of propaganda aimed at state-building through conformity and discipline, particularly among literate intellectuals.

First organized in 1919, the XCB was reconfigured in 1924 and again in 1928 to create the KMT's version of a pedagogical propaganda state. In only five months, from 1925 to 1926, and following John Fitzgerald, Mao Zedong introduced central bureaucratic discipline to the party's message, replacing charismatic Sun Yat-sen at the center via the instrument of the propaganda outline (*xuanchuan dagang* 宣傳大綱). This outline, by mid-1927, became the anonymously compiled Gaiyao on which the final section of this chapter has focused. Like the early propaganda outline, the Gaiyao laid out “ready-made analyses and [occasionally] prescribed slogans for adoption by all party, military, and governmental agencies under the jurisdiction of the issuing authority” (Fitzgerald 1996, 240).

Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen's ideas of 1923 and 1924, to wit, "using the party to govern the state" and "using the party to build the state," became, in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin, the *Draft Outline of the Tutelage Stage*, which included a program of mobilizing the party to unify the nation by training both party members and the public in the KMT's statist and disciplinarian ideology known as the Three Principles of the People. That ideology was laid out officially by the KMT's 3rd Party Congress in 1929, which made Sun's writings the core of the party curriculum (and which the ZYZB was able to reinforce thanks to Zhu's then-year-old editorial library). At the same time, as we have seen, the Gaiyao reveal some multi-lingual aspirations of an XCB that actually undermined Sun's early 1920s mono-racial view of China.

In the end, by the middle of 1937, with still no independent, non-party, government propaganda ministry or workers to lead the resistance to imperial Japan, the central KMT appears to have had no choice but to delegate direction of the pedagogical state to its party branches. Presumably more disciplined than they had been in 1928 when, for example, ZYZB was launched in the wake of the Party Purification Movement, the responsibilities for mobilizing resistance and maintaining morale across the ROC now fell to the branches. In the meantime, the central XCB monopolized the flow of international news propaganda of the sort needed to defend China on a global stage, first against imperial Japan and then, eventually, in tutoring Republican China's Allies in the axioms of the KMT's war effort. Some, like journalist Theodore White, chafed under wartime China's ever-tighter merger of party and state and would eventually seek to expose this restrictive system to outsiders in unflattering ways.<sup>44</sup>

## Notes

\* The author thanks the organizers and participants of the online conference, "The Vanguard of Class and Nation: Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1920s–1990s," convened April 12–13, 2021 through the University of Heidelberg, Germany, for their questions and comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. In addition, I wish to acknowledge comments and insights offered separately on that draft by Robert Culp of Bard College, USA, and by Shuge Wei of The Australian National University.

1 The contemporary discussion of Chinese print culture involves too many titles to list here but arguably stems from Leo Ou-fan Lee and Andrew J. Nathan, "The Beginnings of Mass Culture: Journalism and Fiction in the Late Ch'ing and Beyond," in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1987), 360–98. Representative works include: Joan Judge, *Print and Politics: 'Shibao' and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996) and *Republican Lens: Gender, Visuality, and Experience in the Early Chinese Periodical Press* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872–1912* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); Alexander Des Forges, *Mediasphere Shanghai: The Aesthetics of Cultural Production* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007); Fei-Hsien Wang, *Pirates and Publishers: A Social History of Copyright in Modern China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Reed 2004; and Culp 2019.

- 2 On Wenhua jie, see Reed 2004, 16–22, 207–22, 261–63, etc.
- 3 For more on the transition of the KMT from a Western-style liberal party with parliamentary aspirations to a vanguard-oriented, state-building, and discipline-driven political party on the Soviet model, see Huang Jianli, *The Politics of Depoliticization in Republican China: Guomindang Policy toward Student Political Activism, 1927–1949* (Bern & New York: P. Lang, 1999); Harrison 2000, esp. Ch. 6; and Fitzgerald 1996.
- 4 For example, through the 83-member, state-directed Shanghai Booksellers' Same-Industry Association (Shanghaishi shuye tongye gonghui 上海市書業同業公會) established in 1930 to allow the KMT's one-party state to supervise and legislate on the book publishing economy. See Reed 2004, 211, 224, 240, etc.
- 5 Typically translated as “propaganda,” *xuanchuan* 宣傳 can also be rendered “publicity,” “information,” and “public relations.” In this respect, the XCB seems to parallel other more familiar terms such as Britain's wartime Ministry of Information, headquartered in London University's Senate Building. More sinisterly, however, this ministry, was transformed into writer George Orwell's Ministry of Truth in the novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Similarly, although 部 (*bu*) often is translated as ministry, regarding the KMT government, it is more commonly rendered as a party “department.”
- 6 For an early publication that anticipates the notion of the Chinese pedagogical state, see Richard W. Wilson, *Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970). On the pedagogical state *per se*, see Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, 18–20. More recently, Culp 2019, 20 & 244, has deployed this notion, arguing that the early PRC “actively supported and facilitated the production and dissemination of knowledge for the purposes of promoting economic development, preserving national culture, and cultivating its citizenry.”
- 7 Cf. “Call for Papers: The Vanguard of Class and Nation: Parties as Governments in Eurasia, 1920s–1990s, An E-Conference, April 12–13, 2021, University of Heidelberg, Germany.”
- 8 For another perspective, see Hans J. van de Ven, “The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party,” in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, ed. by Tony Saich and Hans J. van de Ven (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 5.
- 9 For example, *Minbao* 民報 (People's journal, 1905–19). It would be followed by *Minguo ribao* 民國日報 (Republican daily news, 1915–29), *Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報 (Central daily news, 1928–2006), and others. See Schoppa 1995, ch. 3; Fitzgerald 1996, 28, 280–83; Yeh 1996, ch. 7, 9, 10. Thanks to Robert Culp for these references.
- 10 For more on *Minzhi shuju*, which Fitzgerald translates as “Popular Wisdom Press,” particularly on its budget and overseas (mostly American) financing, see Fitzgerald 1996, 195 and 378, n. 58. *Minzhi shuju*, located at the center of Shanghai's Wenhua jie on Henan Middle Road, published textbooks, reference works, and official party materials. It operated from 1921 to 1937. See Reed 2004, 286.
- 11 For social science-inspired literature, insightful but characterized by historical amnesia, see works by Daniel C. Lynch, *After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and Yuezhi Zhao, *Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
- 12 On agitation propaganda, which Ellul argues is often but not always a propaganda of opposition, see Ellul 1965, 70–74.
- 13 For more on this topic, see Ellul 1965, “The Characteristics of Propaganda,” 1–6; and Christopher A. Reed, “From Text(s) to Image(s): Maoist-Era Texts and Their Influences on Six Oil Paintings (1957–79),” 205–234, in *Redefining*

- Propaganda in Modern China: The Mao Era and Its Legacies*, ed. by James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2021).
- 14 Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
  - 15 Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, *Government Control of the Press in Modern China, 1900–1949* (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, 1974).
  - 16 Stephen MacKinnon and Oris Friesen, *China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
  - 17 Robert Culp, *Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912–1940* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007) and Culp 2019.
  - 18 The oath had begun as a statement of personal loyalty to Sun himself (Fitzgerald 1996, 196).
  - 19 In Tokyo in 1905, when Hu was made chief of the Revolutionary Alliance headquarters and began contributing to the party paper, *Minbao*, the former Hu Zhantang renamed himself Hu Hanmin (“Han person or people”) to signal the anti-Qing, Han-liberationist motivation of Sun’s revolution. See Boorman 1968, II: 160.
  - 20 Fitzgerald 1996, 184, notes that delegates also agreed to a new party song to be titled “Three Principles of the People.” The earlier Republican anthem was now replaced with one that favored one political party—the KMT—and ended with the lines “...One heart, one soul/One mind, one goal.” It would become the national anthem in 1928.
  - 21 According to Fitzgerald, almost immediately after the KMT’s new national flag was raised in Guangzhou on January 1, 1925, a pogrom against remaining descendants of the Manchu Banners living in the city began.
  - 22 To be followed later by that of the People’s Republic; see Lynch, *After the Propaganda State*.
  - 23 On Mao’s leadership of the KMT’s XCB, see Fitzgerald 1996, 213–16. The earliest propaganda outline that Fitzgerald reports having seen was created by Zhou Enlai’s office in Fall 1925; Mao then learned the approach from Zhou. The propaganda outline became a standard feature of XCB weekly reports once the KMT arrived in Nanjing.
  - 24 The final section of this chapter will suggest that Zhou-Mao’s *xuanchuan dagang* anticipated the *XCB Weekly Work Outlines* (*Zhongyang xuanchuanbu gongzuo gaiyao* 中央宣傳部工作概要, or *Gaiyao*).
  - 25 For a near-contemporary source on the events of Spring 1927, possibly written from a Trotskyist perspective, see Harold R. Isaacs, *Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961 [1938, with an Introduction by Leon Trotsky]). Andre Malraux’s *La condition humaine* (1928) is a well-known fictional account of these events.
  - 26 Although large, the actual party headquarters was far less palatial than a planned facility that was never built. See Charles D. Musgrove, *China’s Contested Capital* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), Fig. 3.5, 101; 105; Harrison 2000, 213–214.
  - 27 After a brief delay while its staff fled from Nanjing following the commencement of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the ZYZB resumed publication, first in Changsha, Hunan and, a month later, in Chongqing, Sichuan. It finally halted publication in November 1948.
  - 28 Thank you to my Ohio State University colleague, Ying Zhang, for bringing Zhu Zishuang’s article to my attention.
  - 29 The KMT renamed Beijing “Beiping” at the start of the Nanjing Decade and, in 1949, the Chinese Communists restored its original name.
  - 30 Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary career stretched back to 1894.

- 31 For a different interpretation of the impact of the 3rd Party Congress on internal KMT pedagogy and propagandization, particularly that aimed at party propaganda activists, see Christopher A. Reed, "Propaganda by the Book: Contextualizing and Reading the Zhejiang GMD's 1929 Textbook, *Essentials for Propaganda Workers*," *Frontiers of History in China* 10: 1 (March 2015), 96–125.
- 32 This summary draws from Ma 2015, Abstract (*zhaiyao* 摘要), 1.
- 33 Questions regarding whether the credited author was the actual author remain unanswered.
- 34 Although the basic content of the *Gaiyao* remained remarkably constant over the decade worth of summaries that I have seen, the specific names given to the *Gaiyao* varied over time and included *gongzuo baogao* 工作報告 (work report) and *gongzuo gaikuang* 工作概況 (work survey).
- 35 Not as large as today's CCP Central Committee, the CEC was its structural equivalent.
- 36 Approximately 67% (1344) of the total copies received were distributed to party branches for reference and study in the parts of China that the NRA had occupied.
- 37 Guangzhou alone is recorded as having confirmed receipt of its 500 copies in "278th XCB WR," item 32.
- 38 In fact, given its importance, the XCB reprinted 20,000 copies of issue 1.
- 39 The use of the term "comrade" (*tongzhi* 同志), typically associated with the Bolsheviks and its epigones such as the CCP, was widely used by the KMT as well in both speech and writing until the 1940s.
- 40 Unless cited separately, titles in this paragraph all appear in "278th XCB WR 1927," item 7.
- 41 In December 1936, one of Chiang Kai-shek's generals had kidnapped him outside the city of Xi'an when the generalissimo had arrived on an inspection tour. The objective was to force Chiang to declare war on Japan and mobilize for anti-Japanese resistance the forces Chiang had installed around Xi'an to barricade the CCP in nearby Yan'an. Following Stalin's intervention via Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the CCP leveraged Chiang's release.
- 42 For more on the KMT-sponsored Unified National Salvation Movement, see Zhou Bin 周斌, "Xi'an shibian hou de 'Tongyi jiuguo yundong,'" 西安事變後的「統一救國運動」[The United Salvation Movement following the Xi'an Incident], *Junshi lishi yanjiu* 軍事歷史研究 [Military history research] (May 11, 2016), 1–13.
- 43 But nonetheless commercial; the ZYZB was distributed according to paid subscriptions.
- 44 On the KMT's monopoly of news propaganda, see Shuge Wei, *News Under Fire, China's Propaganda Against Japan in the English-Language Press, 1928–1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017).

## Bibliography

### Archival sources

- "278th Central Propaganda Department [XCB]'s Work Report [WR] for July 16 to 31, 1927 [and] Synopsis of Important Work from August 10 to [date missing, 1927]" (*Di 278 hao, Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao qiyue shiliu zhi sanshiyi ri, shiliunian bayue shiri dao [date missing in the original] zhongyao gongzuo zuolu* 第278號, 宣傳部工作報告七月十六至三十一日, 十六年八月十日到[...], 重要工作撮錄).
- "Central Propaganda Department [XCB]'s 64th Week General Work Situation [WGWS], From March 22 to 27 [1937]" (*Zhongxuanbu di liushisi zhou gongzuo gaikuang, zi sanyue ershi'er ri zhi ershiqiri* 中宣傳部第六十四週工作概況, 自三月二十二日至二十七).



- “Central Propaganda Department [XCB]’s 68th & 69th Two-Week General Work Situation [TWGWS], From April 19 to May 1 [1937]” (*Zhongyang xuanchuanbu di liushibajiu liangzhou gongzuo gaikuang, zi siyue shijiuri zhi wuyue yiri* 中央宣傳部第六十八九兩週工作概況，自四月十九日至五月一日).
- “Central Propaganda Department [XCB]’s General Work Situation [GWS] for the 79th, 80th, & 81st Weeks, from July 5 to 24 [1937]” (*Zhongxuanbu gongzuo gaikuang di qishijiu bashi bashiyi zhou* 中宣部工作概況第七十九八十八十一週).
- “Central Propaganda Department [XCB]’s General Work Situation [GWS 82, 83] for the 82nd & 83rd Weeks, July 26-August 7 [1937]” (*Zhongxuanbu gongzuo gaikuang di bashi’ersan liangzhou gongzuo gaikuang zi qiyue ershiliuri zhi bayue qiri* 中宣部工作概況第八十二三週，自七月二十六日至八月七日).

### **Published primary source**

- Zhu, Zishuang 朱子爽. 2001. “Wo zai Guomindang Zhongxuanbu de shibanian” 我在國民黨中宣部的十八年 [My 18 years in the KMT’s Central Propaganda Department].” *Zhongshan fengyu* 鍾山風雨 2001, no. 4: 36–38.

### **Secondary works**

- Boorman, Howard, ed. 1968. *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Culp, Robert. 2019. *The Power of Print in Modern China: Intellectuals and Industrial Publishing from the End of Empire to Maoist State Socialism*. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Ellul, Jacques. 1965. *Propaganda, The Formation of Men’s Attitudes*, translated by K. Kellen and J. Lerner. NY: Knopf (1962 in French).
- Fitzgerald, John. 1996. *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Harrison, Henrietta. 2000. *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911–1929*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ma, Rui 馬瑞. 2015. “Zhongyang zhoubao” yu Guomindang zhengzhi xuanchuan (1928–1937) 《中央週報》與國民黨政治宣傳 (1928–1937) [*Zhongyang zhoubao* and the KMT’s political propaganda]. M.A. thesis, Department of History & Culture, Central China Normal University, Wuhan.
- Nedostup, Rebecca. 2009. *Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Reed, Christopher A. 2004. *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876–1937* Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Schoppa, R. Keith. 1995. *Blood Road, The Mystery of Shen Dingyi in Revolutionary China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- White, Theodore H., and Annalee Jacoby. 1946. *Thunder Out of China*. NY: William Sloane.
- Yeh, Wen-hsin. 1996. *Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

## 6 Aspirations for a mass political party in prewar imperial Japan: Conflicting visions of national mobilization\*

*Bruce Grover and Egas Moniz Bandeira*

### **Introduction: The Establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association**

Although often included as part of the fascist contingent in the 1930s and 1940s, Imperial Japan has been treated as an anomaly resulting from its lack of a mass political party. In fact, however, the outbreak of war with China prompted calls for a unified political organization and an integrated social and political system to transcend debilitating factionalism and harness national resources for the war effort ultimately propelling the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA; *Taisei yokusankai* 大政翼賛会) in 1940. The formation, operations and ensuing limitations of the IRAA itself have been documented by previous scholarship. The aristocrat Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891–1945), popular with many reformist forces and the broader public, formed a cabinet in 1937 before the outbreak of the war with China. As Japan's war offensive deteriorated into a protracted total war, attempts to create a totalitarian party centered on Konoe in the summer of 1938, supported by military officers, reform bureaucrats, and the proletarian Social Masses Party (*Shakai taishūtō* 社会大衆党), failed to overcome ideological divisions and spirited opposition from entrenched power bases in the bureaucracy and parties whose authority was challenged by the creation of new policy making institutions. Geo-political conditions in 1940 such as the rapid German blitzkrieg fueled calls for a New Order movement prioritizing the public good through the "separation of capital and management" envisioned to compel corporations to conform to national policy (Makino 2016, 218). With war conditions becoming ever more dire, the parties were dissolved to form the IRAA in October, 1940. Nevertheless, the IRAA never became a mass totalitarian party with effective centralized control entirely eclipsing the confines of the Meiji state. The effort to establish a mass political organization is seen as having been derailed by tense ideological divisions and criticism among various power bases, finally leading to the relegation of the IRAA under the auspices of the Home Ministry tasked with domestic governance such as the police (Makino 2016). Gordon Berger has shown that the established parties were able to

maintain a foothold of influence, and conservative rightists denounced economic and social planning as depriving the personal power of the emperor enshrined in the Meiji constitution (Berger 1977, Makino 2016, Levidis 2020). Ultimately, it is argued that the political structure of the Meiji constitutional state was not so fundamentally changed as to warrant the label fascism or totalitarianism.

Standard accounts further stress that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the concepts propagated by it were largely a top-down, pragmatic response to the deepening quagmire in China. This conclusion is bolstered by two key themes in the scholarship. One is the belief in the military's pursuit of dictatorship to construct a national defense state in response to the rise of the concept of total war following WWI. The other is the rise of technocratic expertise in government administration following the Great Depression, which was assumed would eventually supplant the policy making role of the Diet. These themes are part of a broader tendency to view the drastic interventionism of the military and bureaucracy in wartime through the lens of a static dichotomy between an authoritarian state increasingly subject to an activist and politicized military, and a passive people who remained objects of mobilization from above. Yet, as Gordon Berger (1977, 163) has noted, there were important cases among reform leaders of autonomous "linkage made between the national defense concept and local reform issues." Berger (1977, 162) gives a telling example in 1938 of Arima Yoriyasu 有馬頼寧 (1884-1957), Agriculture Minister in the Konoe cabinet who later held a pivotal leadership position in the IRAA, giving an address as president of the National Federation of Industrial Guilds about the need to enter politics and "mobilize the power of the average citizen" in order to assist Konoe in his reform plans. Arima lent enthusiastic support to the radical members of the youth auxiliary who sought to create an agrarian party with a "Japanist" platform which seized on the concept of national defense. Among the central items of the party was the "overthrow of capitalism," the liberation of workers from exploitation and the elimination of the monopoly of finance capital, revealing how the prospect of national mobilization could harness long-standing aspirations for social change (Berger 1977, 164).

Recent literature has begun to acknowledge the centrality of the issue of popular support for national mobilization which has significantly challenged conventional assumptions. Tamaki Hiroki (2020) has shown that many of Japan's most impactful military planners in the 1930s in fact recognized the limits of the military supreme command's independence. Learning from the defeat of the vaunted German army, military dictatorship and the subordination of society to military concerns was deemed unsuitable for protracted wars which demanded the active contribution and sustained morale of the totality of a complex society, necessitating close cooperation with civilians. Military solutions were relativized by these leading thinkers as only one method of achieving strategic objectives. In a similar vein, Clinton Godart

(2021), building on these emerging trends in research on military thought, has highlighted how anxiety over public morale prompted calls to proactively engage with public opinion and the rise of mass politics. For example, Nagata Tetsuzan 永田鉄山 (1884–1935), the leader of the army’s “Control Faction” (*tōseiha* 統制派), advocated cooperation with Diet politics and party rule. Total mobilization for a protracted future war would ultimately demand a more tightly imbedded relationship with society, which was envisioned by some prominent officers to result in egalitarian consequences.

Yet, the watershed significance of total war preparation or great depression notwithstanding, the central emphasis placed on active popular support and ideological commitment of the common people as well as many of the mobilization proposals seeking to promote welfarist policies were not prompted by WWI alone. This chapter will seek to show that they were in part products of changes in ethnic nationalist thought, and that the aspirations for national reconstruction among both state officials and the common people outside of power emerged out of these same trends. It will contribute to the field of global intellectual and political history by tracing the emergence of overlooked strands of reformist ideals which helped to propel the movement to create a mass party through an analysis of the several factions which ultimately coalesced, albeit contentiously, to form the IRAA. These were, namely, reformist bureaucrats within the Home Ministry, reformists within the military, proletarian party activists, and civilian nationalist activists.

The first network is the “Alliance for a New Japan” (*Shin Nihon dōmei* 新日本同盟), a group consisting of some of Japan’s most important bureaucrats, including Gotō Fumio 後藤文夫 (1884–1980), Home Minister in the Okada 岡田 cabinet during the mid-1930s, and Tazawa Yoshiharu 田沢義鋪 (1885–1944), who was central to the Alliance’s activities and was the leader of the politically important semi-public youth and self-cultivation groups throughout Japan and the empire encouraged by the military and wielded by the state to guide the thought of the populace. This elite group also saw participation from academics and politicians who hoped to initiate a movement led by Konoe Fumimaro himself to rectify the corrupt Japanese party system through “election purification.” Some of these hopes would later come to fruition in the mid-1930s through their intervention in elections to enforce corruption laws, allowing for the rise of the Social Masses Party and setting the development toward the IRAA into motion. The central aim of the Alliance was to engage in “political education” and moral suasion campaigns to prepare Japan for general elections with universal manhood suffrage in the 1920s. Political education and moral suasion was designed to, on the one hand, steer the population from dangerous thoughts and avoid debilitating divisions within society. Yet, more importantly, it also sought to instill a critical perspective on corruption through nationalist awareness and encourage the political participation of the general population, albeit a participation premised on the ideological unity of the people managed by thought guidance. This was based in the belief that national power and international cultural prestige stemmed from the fervent commitment of the people to the

program of the nation-state. The Alliance not only later produced personnel for the agencies of the wartime state, it also facilitated the collaboration of reformist networks and served as an incubator for political concepts later employed by the IRAA.

The second network to be investigated in this chapter is centered around the writings of the periodical *Ishin* 維新 (“Restoration”), published by former progressive education labor leader Shimonaka Yasaburō 下中弥三郎 (1878–1961). This publication served as one venue to discuss national reconstruction and brought together leading civilian ideologues and active-duty military officers through articles as well as roundtable discussions. *Ishin* boasted regular contributions from prominent national socialist inspired Japanist intellectuals such as Akamatsu Katsumaro 赤松克麿 (1894–1955), Tsukui Tatsuo 津久井龍雄 (1901–1989), and Nakatani Takeyo 中谷武世 (1898–1990). It also gave voice to activists such as Nakahara Kinji 中原謹司 (1889–1951), who sought to harness opportunities presented by the Election Purification Movement (*shukusei senkyo undō* 選挙肅正運動) and the controversy over the nature of the Japanese constitution to mobilize local Army reservist groups first locally in Nagano prefecture, and then ultimately to participate in the New Order movement. The network of activists presented in *Ishin* in fact extended in ways which defied simple factional boundaries, overlapping with the Imperial Way leaders as well as the pan-Asian organizations of Matsui Iwane 松井石根 (1878–1948) and Hayashi Senjurō 林銑十郎 (1876–1943), who were eager to form a new mass political organization to harness popular support for the state.

One central concern was how to reflect the will of the people through the Diet beyond liberal party politics, which was seen as fundamentally corrupt. As one activist put it, “not a single Japanese nationalist fundamentally denies the role of the Diet.” Yet, the Diet was not to be a contest over power or even to allow conflicting perceptions of subjective self-interest. A parliamentary system based on assisting a benevolent emperor and reflecting Japan’s ethnic nature of ideological unity would harness the willing commitment and participation of the people. This unity would empower the nation and form the basis of the Ethical State. These political ideals were also perceived as inherently intertwined with a planned economy to overcome the exploitative flaws of capitalism in which military spending and production increases would stabilize inflation, employment and wages, and serve as a “social work program” contributing to a more moral economic order. And although a failure in the history of one-party states, if analyzed from a global perspective this history may bring to light convergences and suggestive contrasts in worldviews with other countries seeking developmentalist reforms, such as China.

### **The Alliance for a New Japan, political education and the origins of “New Order” reforms**

In the postwar telling of the primary motive of members behind the formation of the Alliance in preparation for general elections with universal manhood

suffrage, the fundamental catalyst was the fear of a complete collapse among the people in confidence in the parties as a result of their corruption and destructive pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the entirety of the nation. This disillusionment with parliamentary politics was believed by the group to have begun during the Hara Kei 原敬 (1856–1921) administration following World War I. Fear of political apathy led the elite reformers of the Alliance to advocate a nation-wide political education and moral suasion campaign to achieve the “moralization of politics” through the unity of “politics and morality and everyday life.” This group, which sought leadership from Konoe Fumimaro and saw participation from Gotō Shinpei 後藤新平 (1857–1929), included not only the bureaucrats Gotō Fumio, Tazawa Yoshiharu, Maruyama Tsurukichi 丸山鶴吉 (1883–1956), and the later prime minister and foreign minister Hirota Kōki 廣田弘毅 (1878–1948), but also the progressive legal scholar and social education activist Hozumi Shigetō 穂積重遠 (1883–1951), and the progressive welfare economist professor Ueda Teijirō 上田貞次郎 (1879–1940). It is through the writing of this group that the early emergence of the ideal of ‘election purification’ which played such a profound role in the 1930s can be glimpsed. It is through the writing of this group that the early emergence of the ideal of ‘election purification’ which played such a profound role in the 1930s can be glimpsed.

As explained in postwar interviews by Hashimoto Seinosuke 橋本清之助 (1884–1891), who uniquely rose through the youth group movement and not through the exam system to enter the Home Ministry, the philosophical guiding light of the Alliance were the ideals of British New Liberalism promoted by Ueda Teijirō. Ueda believed New Liberal economics represented a progressive “revision of capitalism,” which could maintain the dynamism of free enterprise and free trade yet offset the social consequences of capitalism through social policy and regulation. This vision further idealized an electoral system represented by a triad of Liberal, Conservative and Labor parties. Ueda’s economic and political reformism appears as a moderate product of serious study of a range of current European welfarist influences. Ueda explained that he had initially been entirely convinced of the Fabian position of nationalizing major industries. The failures of the Soviet example, however, had shown the necessity of private enterprise reflecting a belief in the importance of private property for both pragmatic issues of efficiency as well as reasons of morality (Ueda 1927, introduction and p. 134). Although the most prominent articulation of New Liberalism stemmed from the neo-Hegelian idealism of the movement’s founder Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), Ueda’s conception of New Liberalism was highly sensitive to current global trends and was perhaps parallel to the younger, less statist generation of the New Liberal movement thinkers spearheaded by Leonard Hobhouse (1864–1929) as well as John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940), whose concept of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism influenced Lenin’s understanding of imperialism.

New was Liberalism an important strand of welfare economics before World War II, exerting influence on the British Labour Party in the 1920s,

and was seen as a third way between authoritarian, statist socialism, and market capitalism.<sup>1</sup> The writings of the Alliance reveal sympathies consonant with the stated ideals of Ueda, which claimed some convergences with moderate Fabians and Labour thinkers such as Henry George (1839–1897), and included support for land redistribution through heavy taxation (see Kitaoka 1927, 2–4). However, for Tazawa Yoshiharu, the vigorous proponent of national youth group organizations and together with Hashimoto Seinosuke the driving force behind the Alliance's publication *Shinsei* 新政, New Liberalism was not merely an economic worldview. It was a movement of self-cultivation to elevate one's realization as a person (*jinkaku* 人格). The role of the state was to provide the conditions most conducive to this spiritual cultivation undergirding social cohesion and the common good. Thus, Tazawa's interpretation of New Liberalism appears more closely attuned to the conception of positive liberty of Thomas Hill Green, who advocated achieving the common good through state intervention in labor contracts, public health and education yet emphasized the importance of personal autonomy for self-cultivation within the moral community.

One acolyte of Thomas Hill Green, James Seth (1860–1925), whose work on ethics was read and discussed by nationalist philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), may help provide context for the enthusiastic reception of this general worldview by nationalist reformers such as Tazawa. Seth's promotion of positive liberty through a benevolent Ethical State may also shed light on how a highly interventionist state could be seen as maximizing the personal autonomy, potential and well-being of citizen-subjects in the prewar period among social reformers. Seth identified as a Christian socialist making clear that the “evils of unlimited and unregulated competition have thrown into clear relief the advantages of co-operation; the superiority of organized to unorganized activity has become manifest.” (Seth 1924, 291) Nevertheless, Seth rejected the elimination of private property. Although the concept of private property is often seen as a litmus test in a stark dichotomy between capitalism and socialism, according to this Hegelian view, the “State must not merely secure to the individual the opportunity of exercising his power of activity; it must also secure to him the fruits of such activity, and the larger opportunity which comes the possession of these fruits.” Property ultimately was “an expression of personality” and one base for the autonomous cultivation of ethics (Seth 1924, 305). Furthermore, Seth's optimistically expansive view of the benevolence of the state and of universal truth, which dismissed the centrality of pluralistic negative liberty, thus may provide insights into the affirmation, on progressive welfarist grounds, of a communalist fusion of the will of the individual and the will of the state leading to a drastic revision of the concept of democracy. Seth went as far as writing that “Obedience to the State is obedience to the citizen's own better self” and that “I am, after all, sovereign as well as subject, subject of my own legislation. The right of the State is therefore supreme, being the

right of personality itself.” Finally, Seth believed that individuals “can yield a willing obedience” to the state “because it is the creation of his own will and, in obeying it, he is really obeying himself” (Seth 1924, p. 292).

On the surface, the leaders of the Alliance, such as Tazawa Yoshiharu, would appear to confirm the image of Japanese politics in the prewar period as incapable to extricating procedural politics from statist tutelage and elite managerialism led by a Confucian inspired bureaucratic elite seeking to suppress challenges to its autonomous policy-making prerogatives through ethnic nationalist social education. The most cynical interpretation of the movement among ranking Home Ministry bureaucratic leaders to engage in political education is that it represented an effort to contain the growth of party power not only at the national level but also in local affairs. In this skeptical view, the discourse of local autonomy and political preparation of the local people could be interpreted as motivated by the fear of the emergence of a mass politics which threatened, through the incursion of corrupt and self-serving parties, to usurp the policy making prerogatives enjoyed by elite bureaucrats.

Gordon Berger has discussed the Alliance for a New Japan in the context of its cooperation with the young Konoe Fumimaro, who shared their critique of the corruption of party politics as well as of capitalism and their emphasis on social policy to guarantee the welfare of the people. Berger notes that in the 1920s, Konoe and his Alliance colleagues “accepted the notion of representative government, but criticized the parties and the local landowners for their corruption, short-sighted focus on pork-barrel issues, and obstruction of the rational administrative supervision of national life.” (Berger 1974, 473) He accurately presents the work of Tazawa Yoshiharu as arguing for the importance of the inclusion of the people in politics, and of instilling the critical ability to choose candidates in order to staunch the tendency of the parties to bribe local elites, the *meibōka* 名望家, who could deliver local votes in blocs. However, Berger persists in describing the group as not only anti-party, but as theoretically groundless, and as seeking to entrench premodern hierarchies in reaction to exposure to threatening foreign ideas:

Alliance members and other social conservatives never formulated a coherent ideological response to the alien ideas they feared. However, Konoe, Gotō, and several other young nobles and Home Ministry officials gave extensive patronage to Yasuoka Masahiro [安岡正篤, 1898–1983] in the 1920s. Their association with Yasuoka suggests that they hoped to find in his expostulation of “Oriental theories” [*tōyō shisō* 東洋思想] of hierarchical social harmony some answer to the notion of class conflict.

(Berger 1974, 469)

Berger concludes that the Alliance achieved what he understands as their goals in the late 1930s: “They had driven the parties from power, restored the independence of their offices from outside influences, and preserved the



social cohesiveness of the country through the turmoil of rapid industrialization, mobilization and war” (Berger 1974, 469).

Building on Berger’s work, Roger Brown has produced a highly incisive body of scholarship, which has produced important insights into the political worldview of leading “New Bureaucrats” led by Gotō Fumio. It highlights the influence of pre-Meiji Confucian administrative thought as an important corrective to the overemphasis of previous studies on the bureaucracy’s reception of European thought, such as the idealist-influenced German Historical School. Brown focuses on the nationalist thinker Yasuoka Masahiro and his concept of *bokumin* 牧民 (“shepherding the people”). Brown shows that nonparty elites in government as critical of parties out of fear of losing governing prerogatives, stating that:

... Yasuoka reproduced his Confucian-influenced nationalist perspective on proper governance for patrons within the nation’s nonparty political elite during the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, he provided culturally specific “Oriental” theories legitimizing the ongoing relevance of these men in an age of parliamentary government and serving their immediate political objective of reining in the power of the political parties and thereby securing their own administrative authority.

(Brown 2009, 289)

Brown ultimately concludes that Yasuoka’s *bokumin* ideology signified a renovated form of bureaucratic “transcendentalism” (*chōzenshugi* 超然主義) whereby the emperor might reign but his officials governed, leaving members of the Lower House to “assist imperial rule” (*yokusan* 翼贊) by reflecting popular opinion without unduly influencing policy formulation and government administration (Brown 2009, 289–90).

Brown has undoubtedly touched on one of the “New Bureaucrats” core priorities, namely reflecting general public opinion while privileging expertise. However, by broadening the scope of analysis of political education and election purification beyond the inner circle of the ‘New Bureaucrats,’ by including the complex range of influences often fully in tune with current global reform thought, and by avoiding a teleological understanding of a trajectory toward the wartime *yokusan* elections, it may also be gleaned that the Alliance’s attitudes to the role of the people in creating an ethical, powerful and independent state, one which would they openly hoped would become the leading contributor to world civilization, was not entirely a reaction or a belief in the permanent tutelage of the people. To be sure, election purification and political education were hallmarks of a pedagogical state. Yet, the Alliance, at least judging from the rhetoric of their journal *Shinsei*, appears to have been eagerly committed to stoking a fervent sense of responsibility in the people as bearers of the nation’s success. The Alliance appeared to imagine a temporary tutelage through political education which would galvanize popular support for the “moralization of politics.” In fact, the language used

evokes less a system of guidance by elite individuals than rule by the ethically refined customs based on the *kokumin* 国民 (“national citizens”) and informed by an ethnic essence which required enlightened custodians of this culture to bring full awareness to the people. An analysis of the writings and activities of the Alliance may also reveal a base of support for these ideals not only among officials, but among the local members of youth and self-cultivation groups who potentially held a belief in a sense of agency and self-realization in a participatory mass nationalism explaining how common people outside of power could have equated their own perception of self-interest and identity with the development of the nation. In terms of the intent of reformist officials as well as their potential social base of support, the secondary literature on the subject, beginning with Maruyama Masao, has undergone significant shifts in interpretation of the aspirations, or mentality, of the people. Furthermore, the potential support for a nationalist mass politics which gradually developed over time has not been fully explored.

The classic interpretation of the political thought in relation to society at the time offered by Maruyama Masao was that that “fascism from below” was crushed in the early to mid-1930s after the February 26th Incident of 1936, to be replaced with an elitist fascism from above (Maruyama 1963, 36–41). This military rule from above was made possible by a passive civil society whose political consciousness was never allowed to mature. The state facilitated this passive acquiescence through the external indoctrination of the emperor-ideology complex, a unitary value system conflating state and religion and which stemmed the emergence of a critical independence necessary for a pluralistic liberalism.

One prominent scholar who has contributed to this shift is Yoshimi Yoshiaki, who, in his work *Grassroots Fascism*, reveals the emergence of a popular base of support for the war resulting from a commitment to empire during the height of total war, and the confrontation of soldiers with the resistance of the Chinese. Yet, Yoshimi claims that the common people were committed to constitutional parliamentarianism until the outbreak of war in 1937 and were thus less susceptible to the nationalist reconstruction plans pursued by the military and Japanist ideologues (Yoshimi 2015). Sayaka Chatani’s recent work on youth groups in Japan and the empire also suggests that, rather than being manipulated from above, youth groups directed by the Home Ministry officials – who were in fact members of the Alliance for a New Japan –, actively embraced and absorbed state propaganda, perceiving it as a tool for their own advancement. In fact, Chatani argues that youth groups of which Tazawa Yoshiharu was considered the “father,” were seen in part as vehicles for rural youth to “enter into contentious politics” (Chatani 2020, 58). Chatani’s work suggests the possibility of a social base for what she refers to as the militarist worldview of the Japanese state. Chatani notes that when “examining Japan’s assimilation policy in its colonies, scholars rarely question how assimilation or nationalization occurred within Japan in the first place,” stating that:

The spread of emperor-centered nationalism, which itself was simultaneously a device and a goal in creating a national consciousness, did not happen simply because it was imposed on people through the Boshin Imperial Rescript, school curricula, and propaganda. Rather, it resulted from intermediary concepts like “rural youth,” which not only carried the ideology but directly attracted people and groups with differing visions. (Chatani 2020, 62)

Tamaki Hiroki’s pathbreaking research concerning local Army Reserve units and their intervention into politics come to parallel conclusions about the ground up nature of the motives driving politicization in the interwar period (Tamaki 2020). Contra to Maruyama Masao, an analysis of the Alliance for a New Japan in the context of non-elite thought and political action helps explain not only the potential appeal of nationalist mass politics and ethnic nationalist welfarism but that, rather than acting as passive spectators, a range of Japanese thought leaders outside of the state as well as reformers within the state could actively endorse the ideals of communalist, anti-liberal *kakushin* and wield them for their own agendas, gradually collaborating, often with tension, with state initiatives.

In sum, the ethnic nationalist reformism of the Alliance for a New Japan did not represent, as Maruyama argued, a premodern inability to accept value pluralism or a suppression of an independent social critique (Maruyama 1963, 36–41). Their worldview emphasized the cultivation of individual autonomy though through communal solidarity. It was part of a global trend toward a communalist concept of mass politics and a response to very modern challenges stemming from industrialization and a cosmological crisis caused by the perceived soullessness of materialism during industrialization. Furthermore, in the 1920s, this group of prominent bureaucrats did not advocate a “*yokusan* election-”style façade of democracy to suppress the emerging will of the people, and it was not articulated in terms of top-down elitist management. The underacknowledged emphasis on the role of the people may shed light on the potential social base of support for this vision of social reform which collaborated with other strands of *kokumin*-centric ethnic nationalism in the 1930s to construct the IRAA and the wartime state.

By analyzing some representative articles in the journal *Shinsei*, this section will seek to explain the potential appeal and social base of this worldview by identifying several themes through the lens of the discourse on the active role of the people in the creation of a more ethical political system, as well as the emphasis on the self-described “progressive” economics of welfare and the public good and its interconnection with a publicly minded cultivation of an autonomous self.

Not only did the concepts of a new political and economic order, and the consequences of their implementation by these leading bureaucrats in the mid-1930s have a direct impact on reformist trends in the interwar period, the

Alliance had important institutional aftereffects. During the Okada cabinet, Alliance members created extra-parliamentary, extra-party councils of experts to guide policy. These councils merged with the Resources Bureau of the Army and ultimately filtered into the Cabinet Planning Board. The Alliance also contributed directly to the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association through later providing personnel. Although the Alliance was led by some of the most powerful and elite reformers in Japan, and even interacted with elites of an older generation such as Gotō Shinpei, the purpose of this section in tandem with the following section on the publication *Ishin*, is in part to explain how the trenchant critiques of corruption and party infighting of this exclusive circle was reflective of a broader set of a nationalist mass politics and welfarist worldview.

The envisioned movement of the Alliance was conceived as a method of purifying the corruption of the two national political parties in anticipation of the first general election with universal male suffrage. The ultimate agent of this purification, as described in *Shinsei*, the publication of the Alliance, was to be the voters themselves who would be equipped with the political awareness, morality and knowledge of a modern citizen-subject. This awareness would provide a critique of party politics and rationalize the political structure. For Gotō Fumio, Tazawa Yoshiharu and other elite bureaucrat leaders of the Alliance, the political ideal of an engaged Japanese people demanding moral accountability in national politics through an acute political awareness and “healthy public opinion,” was part of a historical development toward their understanding of “democracy,” an “organic” union of people and state through the willing participation of the people in a moral and rational order (Mori 1979, 118–130).

### **Autonomous action, public opinion, and the will of the people**

The two major themes of mass politics and economic communalism, understood as intertwined are discussed colorfully and vigorously throughout the publication *Shinsei*, the publication of the Alliance for a New Japan. One contributor to *Shinsei*, named Tōge Minoru 藤下三策 (dates unknown), laments that politics, culture, and education had become separate from its core essence, and that it was no exaggeration to say that this artificial civilization was the source of unease in the political world. The political class, in fact, promotes dangerous thought. Speaking like conspirators seeking bring down the state, they themselves wield force within the Diet, and their views shift based on the gifts they receive. They are the ones propagating this so-called dangerous thought: “Politics is power but at the same time it is education. Yet, in the broad sense. The critical point of the education issue is in influence” (Tōge 1924, 71). This is not mere leadership and supervision, it is an “indirect spiritual interaction” and can come from reading and listening to the thoughts of others. Tōge cautions that the rise and fall of the nation depends on casting off artificial politics.

In a striking and revealing passage, Tōge forcefully denounces the hypocrisy of the destructive policies of the established parties. Politicians fear a Jewish Peril. Yet, it is they who are making the people distant from politics. Without shame they demonize the anarchist assassin Namba Daisuke of the Toranomon Incident, but the politicians themselves act with a cool indifference as if unaware of their complicity in the fundamental problems of Japanese politics. Here the author Tōge's equation of the threat to the nation from the corruption of politicians and their infighting, with treasonous conspiracies, represents the most severe level of criticism and is a reflection of the seriousness with which many contributors, such as Tazawa in particular, valued the fervent commitment of the people to national politics. Tōge states that his ideal solution for reform was the civic mentality of the youth: "Taishō youths who cultivate a critical ability and a philosophy of creation, rise up to thrust out the abuses of those of within the established parties, and uproot this superficial politics to construct a new civilization!"

Tōge then shows that exploitative selfishness in politics was parallel with Japan's flawed economic policies. Those who "earn income without work," such as collecting the interest from property – the classic nemesis of socialist minded thinkers and a common resentment within the military – emphasize the importance of the interests of the consumer to justify their own laziness and maintain the limitlessness of the control of the leisure class. Those with resources want to protect consumption, but what is neglected are the vast numbers of poor small producers who are faced with cruel conditions. The protection of well-to-do consumers at the expense of small producers is a dangerous trend stemming from dangerous thought. Tōge concludes with a common refrain, that the corruption, greed, and exploitation of the economically disadvantaged derive from a lack of unity of values and thought. Tōge states that "politics whose content (does not promote) unity of thought based on values (*kachikan* 価値観) is artificial politics, is dangerous thought and contains the seeds of crisis for Japan" (Tōge 1924, 72).

The insistence on increased inclusion in electoral politics, yet with an underlying logic that viewed politics as a method of harnessing the active contribution to the nation, rather than progress through the pluralistic debate of agonistic liberalism, can be seen in certain voices published in *Shinsei* supporting equal political participation for women. One example which in fact also reveals a base of readership for the journal beyond a narrow circle of elite officials was the publication of the winners of an essay contest held by *Shinsei* on the issue of women's political rights. Although one contributor admittedly rejected the necessity of granting equal political rights based on a traditionalist view of a natural order between men and women and a dismissive attitude to women's political knowledge, some winners of the contest forcefully argued that many Western countries had granted suffrage to women because of their extraordinary levels of "diligence and fight for the nation" at the Homefront during the Great War. In the Soviet Union, so one contributor believed, political inclusion had come as women had proven, in industry and many

other fields, that they were equally or even more qualified than men. Given the tragic conditions of working women particularly in agriculture, what was needed was the liberation of women, respect for equal *jinkaku*, the spread of political education, and adequate time for women to engage in self-cultivation. With the elevation of the political knowledge of the general population of women through equality of opportunity in fundamental substantive education, the granting of the same political rights as men was appropriate (various authors 1926, 58-64).

Tazawa's writings on political education and "election purification" further clarified the stated belief within the publications of the Alliance for a New Japan that a politically aware general populace was to be a central agent in an ideal reformed political system. The two ideals become movements in their own right with enormous relevance for reforms in the late 1930s, culminating in the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in October 1940. Political education would appear to lend itself to elitist management of public opinion, and "healthy public opinion" was a central goal for political reform.

Yet, the ideals stated within *Shinsei* are designed to equip the *kokumin* with the ability to critique the parties, as a check against their "various corruptions." Specifically, political education was the enlightenment of the people through the elevation of morality and political knowledge necessary for the universal male suffrage era of elections. One core problem routinely denounced was a lack of interest among the people in the depredations committed by parties who merely sought to seize power for themselves at the expense of other political interest groups, and the nation. Tazawa describes the root cause of this corruption in one article, as deriving from a politics not based on political thought (*seiji-jō no shugi* 政治上の主義), but rather on a politics centered on political figures themselves (Tazawa 1927a, 1-3). Political education aimed to rectify these flaws through the temporary tutelage of thought guidance. Yet, the stated goal was empowering the public sphere to demand a more just political order.

The Alliance's view of mass politics in which the people actively participate yet through the unified values of morality can be seen in the discourse on "healthy public opinion" (*kenzen na yoron* 健全な輿論), which allowed disagreement yet prioritized a shared public good. It also confirms this circles' distinct belief in the vitality and dynamism of the autonomous self-initiative of the people managed through a prescribed solidarity. The journal *Shinsei* stressed that public opinion was the basis of a constitutional state, yet it required significant interest and enthusiasm from the people. This interest in politics would be initially instilled through political education (Ikeoka 1926, 52). *Shinsei* emphasized that a politically aware people needed critical awareness to judge the statements of others. The ability for the broader population to engage in the formation of public opinion, which *Shinsei* supported, required reason, and an attitude of fairness and objectivity. Yet its admonition not to be controlled by emotion reveals its effort to

enforce an ideological self-regulation. Likewise, it argued that in order to create a healthier, and more broad public opinion, one must protect the morals of brotherly love and harmony. This demands placing one's own opinion (*iken* 意見) within the whole, as well as not thinking merely in terms of one's small self-interest. The article concludes by that "without neglecting self-cultivation, the Japanese people must have awareness and strive to become the driving force of a healthy public opinion, to elevate the level of politics and self-governing groups" (Ikeoka 1926, 52).

In a similar vein, Tazawa Yoshiharu explained the purpose of publishing the journal *Shinsei* was to protect and facilitate the realization of the people's will. One of the recurring criticisms of the parties within the publication of the Alliance was that they "obstruct the true will of the people." Parties, according to this circle of reformers, take morality lightly and in order to achieve a majority or maintain a majority, ally themselves with financial power and engage in corruption. The people lose hope in politics and lose interest and fervor for national life, which Tazawa regards as the "most fearsome thing" for the well-being of the nation. As a result, a section of the people seek to escape striving for the construction of national life out of disgust, and become resigned to the conclusion that the meaning of life is enjoying culture. A subsection goes as far as using language about destroying the state. The result of these tendencies will be natural decline. In response, to avoid stepping in this chaos, it is necessary to devise a political purification suitable for the sparking of the public will of the people, and the resuscitation of their interest and fervor in national society. The content of political education is the elevation of political morality and the spreading of political knowledge. Yet, despite Tazawa's vigorous advocacy for a form of state tutelage through political and moral education, this did not lead to a belief in status hierarchy. According to Tazawa, there should be no different treatment or separation between those who are politically educated and those who are not. Furthermore, youth groups, in the spirit of mutual learning, were promoted as ideally not top-down. Teachers must learn from students as well, a point that Tazawa learned during his experience as a youth group leader (Tazawa 1924, 2–6).

It was also the case that to implement reform and achieve modern people-centric politics, the authors associated with the Alliance argued for the need to instill values of autonomous initiative. Yet, this understanding of autonomy appears to have been a collective one, intimately tied to the ethnic nation. Political education, therefore, was also seen as a method of molding ethnic national culture. Articles in *Shinsei* stress that the vitality and morality of the nation depends on the individual cultivation of the people, their active commitment and participation in the program of the nation. Yet this emphasis on the centrality of the action and inclusion of the people is premised on a shared core of unity in the emotions, principles, and values of the people secured by a unified ethnic nature, through ethnic essentialism. Ethnic nature which is the wellspring of culture changes according to the era

and can be refined through education and self-cultivation to maximize its strengths and diminish its weaknesses.

The emphasis on autonomy stemmed from a belief in the power of “self-creation” often touted as one of the group’s most fervent ideals. Many of the reformers, including major national figures such as Gotō Fumio and Tazawa Yoshiharu, saw autonomous self-creation as the source of economic dynamism and national strength. Tazawa wrote that as the work of an individual is the reflection of an individual personality, for great culture, we need a great ethnic nature. Just as individual personality (*seikaku* 性格), has to be molded, the ethnic nature of the country had to be molded first. Parallel to the development of individual character, “we must devote all power to molding the ethnic nature of the Japanese people. As a result, for the first time, the ethnic nation awakens to its individuality, and as it achieves the creation of culture based on this individuality, we will surely achieve the creation of an even greater culture, a more remarkable culture through the tempering and reconstruction of that ethnic nature.” Furthermore, “we of course know the difficulty of day in and day out educational efforts to mold and reconstruct ethnic nature, yet, I think unyielding devotion allows for the achievement of this heavenly work” (Tazawa 1927b, 1–15).

In the end, political education to inculcate the values of autonomous self-creation was necessary to correct the fundamental flaws of the Japanese nation. Yet, in this argument an explicit opposition to statist coercion as cowering the people into a static submission comes into focus. Tazawa explains that strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese ethnic nation was the Imperial Household at the center, signifying the nation as a family. The strength of Japan’s ethnic essence resides in its burning with shared emotion (*kangeki* 感激). The simplicity and relative discipline in terms of material desires were also a cultural asset. The weakness and flaw, however, is the lack of free creation (*jiyū sōzō* 自由創造), and a tendency to emulate models. In Tazawa’s analysis, the Japanese ethnic nature had its glorious essence in the “Great Way” of respect for the gods and the worshiping of the Imperial ancestors, but its greatest flaw was that it lacked this spirit of free creativity.

Tazawa deemed that concentration of power centrally was probably temporarily necessary during the Meiji Restoration to break through the damaging customs of feudal fiefdoms and spiritually unify the nation under the emperor. Yet, the superstition of all powerful law and rules of regional bureaucrats, and an over-reliance on *kokken* 国権, i.e. on the states’ rights as opposed to people’s rights, had stunted the ability of autonomous critical thinking imperative for the development of a modern nation. Tazawa judged that, since the Meiji period, Japan had an ever-increasing affliction of imitation, in which regional locales passively emulated the centers, and warned that regions which over-relied on central models lost their sense of responsibility. In contrast, the harnessing of each creative individual would ultimately produce an abundant society, and mutually stimulating institutions particular to their locales could create a high-level culture. Tazawa



continued by turning the same criticism of a passive lack of autonomous creativity against the country's large business conglomerates (*zaibatsu* 財閥) for their overreliance on the power of the state. In his words, the “*zaibatsu* represented feudal-thinking capitalism, which cannot become liberal capitalism, and is a far cry from free creation” (Tazawa 1927b, 1–15). In sum, political education was not envisioned as an instrument of ensuring a pliable populace but rather as a tool of collective national empowerment.

### **Ethnic nationalist reformism in the 1930s: Military and civilian collaboration through the publication *Ishin***

In the aftermath of the financial turbulence in the late 1920s as well as the nationalist upsurge after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the timbre of reformist voice began to reflect shifting social realities. The Depression led to altered understandings of agency and reconsiderations of what tools were available to enact social change. Throughout the spectrum of political views there were subtle reorientations of thought leading some ideologues to transgress boundaries and collaborate with new networks. In the crucible of the 1930s, the state and ethnic nationalism began to be regarded as the only possible instrument of stabilizing the economy. Nationalist reformers sought greater collaboration with the military and prominent former progressives, even those intellectuals most wary of the state, began to reevaluate the role of the state in improving conditions. Prominent strands of Japanists, whose ideal social order was grounded in a belief in the symbiotic relationship between self-realization and national empowerment through moral-spiritual cultivation, began to begrudgingly acknowledge the rise of technocracy and the need for social policy determined by bureaucrats. Yet, the rise of the bureaucracy led to a fear that bureaucratic forces whose claim to expertise beyond the accountability of the people would form a new despotic base of power. This also prompted some nationalists to reemphasize the importance of the people and their direct relationship to the emperor.

One network which provides insights into this confluence of overlapping networks can be gleaned from the pages of *Ishin* 維新, a publication by the originally leftist publishing house *Heibon-sha* 平凡社 of Shimonaka Yasaburō 下中弥三郎 (1878–1961). Initially rising to national prominence as a leftist labor leader from humble origins, Shimonaka's conversion to Japanism in the interwar period was closely observed by military thinkers as can be seen through the private papers of Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫 (1877–1966). The monthly magazine *Ishin* is an important window into the social reformist and Japanist networks, which coalesced under the rubric of a Shōwa Restoration (*Shōwa Ishin* 昭和維新) and normalized the concepts underpinning the New Order and Imperial Assistance Association under Konoe Fumimaro. Through Shimonaka, *Ishin* organized regular panel discussions bringing together Communist-Party-founder-turned-Japanist

Akamatsu Katsumaro, economists Takahashi Kamekichi 高橋亀吉 (1894–1977) and Kojima Seiichi 小島精一 (1895–1966), as well as high-ranking military planners such as general Matsui Iwane and his Pan-Asianist associates. Contributions included at least one article from Kono Fumimaro himself. Yet, most importantly, the panel discussions and articles featured mid-level officers often driving policy discussions. Most civilian contributors came from social reformist backgrounds.

Several key themes emerge in *Ishin*. One was support for a totalitarian political system under the intimate rule of the emperor, which could reflect the will of the people unhindered by the self-serving liberal parties, and the role of the Diet to facilitate this ideal unity. Through articles and roundtable discussions, Shimonaka and the networks supported in *Ishin*, argued that intimate imperial rule was not incompatible with parliamentary representation of the popular will (*min'i* 民意) equated with public opinion (*yoron* 輿論). Another was economic restructuring facilitated by the military. Mass increases in military spending would increase the welfare of the people and a planned economy could overcome the crisis of capitalism. One last theme was the rejection of materialism and the continued importance of personal spiritual cultivation. It was stressed that representation through “true and fair elections” was the starting point, and that despotism was inimical to the benevolent “ethical state.” *Ishin* concluded that the purpose of the Diet was the implementation of assisting the rule of emperor (*yokusan*) by channeling the will of the people whose needs would be organically unified, facilitating an active and mutually beneficial cooperative system of morality (Shimonaka 1936, 11–16). The writings of *Ishin* may provide an explanation of a theme which deserves further exploration: the belief that social control to mobilize national power was conceived as compatible with the “will of the people” typically conceived as monolithic and abstracted beyond recognizable reality. It also helps to reinforce that some leading military officers, and the nationalists who shared their views, appeared to have held convictions in regards to social reform independent from purely military concerns.

This worldview finds expression in the ideals of Nakatani Takeyo 中谷武世 (1898–1990), an active contributor to *Ishin* and its roundtable discussions who stood in the intellectual lineage of the national socialist Kita Ikki 北一輝 (1883–1937). For Nakatani, the conflicts of liberalism would be solved by the intimate rule of the emperor. Yet, in his view, the emperor was not despotic, or dictatorial, but rather a manifestation of a principle uniting the people. Juxtaposing “representative democracy” (*daigiteki minshu seiji* 代議的民主政治) with a political system based on “national holism” (*minzokuteki zentai seiji* 民族的全体政治), Nakatani claimed that a Japanist political system would be premised on the organic unity of the people, and the emperor would achieve shared values, thought, and self-interest to overcome divisions (*okuchō isshin* 億兆一心). Imperial politics, according to this worldview, was ethnic totalitarian politics, which transcended class and

occupation. This system would be realized through the Diet as an Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei yokusankai* 大政翼賛会) (Nakatani 1934, 32–41). Thereby, Nakatani presaged the term later used to name the central political organization established in 1940.

For Nakatani, the will of the people was not to be confused with the party coalitions, which received the majority of votes in elections. In fact, he argued that parties obstructed the will of the people, and that their infighting encouraged a corrupting contest of power. Rather, the will of the people was equated with ethnic essence and national tradition. This emphasis on culture and tradition, however, did not translate into elite repression of the people. On the contrary, Nakatani argued that “Imperial politics is the politics of people’s movements while liberalism was the politics of exploitation and despotism.” Nakatani argued for the “organic” unity of the will of the people and the will of the emperor to overcome conflicting self-interest. Nonetheless, he still appears to emphasize the central role of the people. Nakatani imagined that the “the general will of the people in Japan, through the Diet, structures the will of the Emperor. Through the will of the Emperor, the will of the state is structured.”

Another political activist who intersected with the circle publishing in *Ishin* was Nakahara Kinji, the leader of an Army Reservist group in Nagano Prefecture who collaborated with other national socialist-inflected activists, such as Nakatani Takeyo and Hashimoto Kingorō 橋本欣五郎 (1890–1957). Tamaki Hiroki has shown that Nakahara was deeply sympathetic to socialistic ideals of social justice and sought to mobilize Army Reservists as a proletarian movement. Although he later had a position within the IRAA, in the 1930s the Waseda University educated Nakahara sought to enter into electoral politics to lead efforts for drastic reform yet was met with serious opposition from Reservists headquarters and the Army Ministry who sought to temper the politicization of the military. Nevertheless, Nakahara’s embrace of the Election Purification Movement and the specific way in which the political imaginary of a local reformer was imbedded in aspirations for totalistic mobilization conceived through Imperial assistance provides insights into how activists even outside of power could see their own interests, and a sense of collective empowerment, reflected in the state.

In articles published in *Ishin* in the mid-1930s during the ferment of the Election Purification Movement and the controversy over the nature of the relationship of the Emperor to the state, Nakahara lamented that Election Purification had excited many groups, but had yet to live up to its promise in elevating the politics of the *kokutai*. Nakahara appeared to believe that more action was necessary to counteract the forces obstructing change, but forcefully argued that the “great tide of Showa Restorationism, regardless of whether it is wanted by the government or not, will be propelled forward” and further that “the Election Purification and Clarification of the Kokutai movements were weapons provided to ensure the perfect chance for the new popular impetus” for reform through prefectural and national elections

(Nakahara 1935, 18). Nakahara sought to establish political organizations to reform the political economy and advance ethnic development with a platform which included the eradication of utilitarian class-based liberalism, the overcoming of capitalism, financial fascism, and socialism, as well as the elimination of feudal thought. Nakahara believed the time was ripe to transcend anti-Japanese thought, politics and diplomacy “through the election struggle” (Nakahara 1935, 20).

Nevertheless, Nakahara showed a deepening frustration with the established political parties’ squabbles and barefaced ambition. The urgent need, according to Nakahara, for a Lower House which would more directly serve the will of the people was made painfully clear. For the establishment of a reformist Diet, there needed to be a structural reorganization of the Diet and its membership (Nakahara 1936, 14). Japan, argued Nakahara, was facing international and domestic crisis and the obstructionist forces maintaining the *status quo* could lead the government and Diet to atrophy and, ultimately, lose its function. For Nakahara, the Imperial military was not merely an organization for defense, it was the protector of the *kokutai* and the nation of the emperor. If those responsible for the national constitution and laws, namely the government and Diet, failed to adhere to the way of assisting the Emperor, who was to say that there would be no case in which a revision of the constitution and laws would not be revised through extra-legal means? (Nakahara 1936, 15).

Parallel to his associate Nakahara, the radical Hashimoto Kingorō sought to mobilize a reformist movement through his Greater Japan Youth Party (*Dai Nihon Seinentō* 大日本青年党) based on the concept of “Imperial Assistance.” The explanation of their demands for economic controls and a revised Diet sheds light on the potential appeal of this worldview. According to a published book which served as an explanation of their platform, the current era was confronted with the deadlock of materialist liberalism, an age in which money became authority, the wealthy were arrogant, and spirit was dismissed. This deadlock meant the deadlock of capitalism and party politics. It was an era of domestic and geopolitical crisis. The Greater Japan Youth Party, which took an aggressive posture against exploitative landlords, demanded the reform of capitalism and “controls” (*tōsei* 統制). Hashimoto and the Youth Party were adamant that Controls, economic or political, were entirely separate from the concept of “restrictions” which had defined the feudal era (Hashimoto 1937, 13). Restrictions suppressed the essential purpose, the essential life of things. Controls, in contrast, employed craft to carry out the completion of an essential purpose. Crucially, Controls were born from the transcendence of a fusion of restrictions and of freedom. It was the fundamental principle of the future (Hashimoto 1937, 15). The problem with the current government, argued the text, was that it had no theory of control (Hashimoto 1937, 14).

The solution to overcoming this crisis was a totalitarian system of intimate Imperial rule. Nevertheless, Hashimoto and his followers still

emphasized the importance of a political system which integrated the popular will. The Party text explained that

the main issue in reforming the political structure was the Diet and the parties. Concentrating state power back to the Imperial Household is the desperate call of the ethnic nation. This may raise some doubts as to whether we reject the Diet. Yet, we should make clear we do not.

(Hashimoto 1937, 58)

The current Diet system, corrupted by bribery and officials who received small percentages of votes, did not reflect true popular will. The goal of the Youth Party was to “revitalize the unique features of traditional Imperial politics through a progressive new form” (Hashimoto 1937, 58). And unlike some radical reformers, Hashimoto and the Youth Party did not believe in an absolute rejection of elections. In fact, “elections were one important measure of knowing the popular will.” What was needed, however, was a rationalization of elections through election revision (Hashimoto 1937, 72). Hashimoto, not unlike other Japanist thinkers, interpreted the historical emergence of the singular Japanese constitution as a document which, in contradistinction to the contest for power between monarch and people in Europe, facilitated the intimate relationship of people and emperor. Constitutional rule and People’s Rights had developed as a method of checking minority rule and the excessive encroachment of bureaucrats. A revitalized Japanese Diet, which could channel true popular will to the emperor, would realize the traditional national life of the Japanese ethnic nation and effectively provide the conditions for the realization of ethnic essence. This discourse, common among Japanists of this general circle, also appears strikingly consonant with mid-Meiji “national essence” activists who pursued a Japanese-style constitution and elections to protect an intimate relationship between emperor and people (see Grover 2021).

Yet another voice amplified by *Ishin* who discussed revised systems of reflecting the will of the people was the national socialist Tsukui Tatsuo. Speaking during an age of geopolitical ruptures, in which total mobilization became a centrifugal force on politics, Tsukui wrote in *Ishin* that in the civilized world there were no political structures which did not listen to the people at all. Nevertheless, democracy and parliamentarianism had collapsed and in its stead a new national, totalitarian and technocratic politics had emerged (Tsukui 1934, 17). In these systems, the protectors of the interests of society were an elite few who secured the welfare for the entirety of nation and people. However, according to Tsukui, in terms of the central priority of the public good, Japan had from antiquity implemented a “higher-level form of fascist political theory.” Japan’s political tradition was already equipped with the “correct politics for the flourishing and welfare of the entirety of nation and people based in the principle of the unity of the people under the emperor

(*ikkunbanmin* 一君萬民).” Tsukui’s vision of reform would embrace the spirit of parliamentarianism as well as expertise, and this would be crowned with the implementation of “radiant Mahāyāna (Buddhist) politics.” This ideal politics would not be operated by one or two individual minds, but could be found in the clarification of traditional ideals built through deeply rooted ethnic practice. The Diet had been founded to reflect the people’s demands, yet flaws continued to be exposed in its function. Tsukui exclaimed that

for the Diet to truly serve as the seat of Imperial Way Assistance (*ōdō yokusan* 皇道翼贊), and not serve the cabinet as an institution of monopoly for party factions, urgent efforts must be exerted for the Diet to assume the character of national unity to the letter. Transcending parliamentarianism does not mean eliminating the Diet, it means making it a place which more correctly reflects the public opinion of the people.  
(Tsukui 1934, 19)

The thought of Tsukui, who routinely touted Mahāyāna values in his writings, nevertheless stressed the forward-looking developmentalist quality of the Japanese spirit, challenging the common perception of a strict binary among Japanese nationalists between modernist technocrats and irrational spiritualists (see Mimura 2011). Most importantly, Tsukui’s idealized ethnic nationalism was emphatically people-centric. Tsukui cautioned that in an effort to overcome liberalism and socialism, many Japanists had fallen to advocating a blunt statism. It must not be forgotten that Japanism was a transcendent synthesis of liberalism-socialism and not a mere reaction to it. Tsukui’s felt compelled to clarify Japanism against fanatical nationalist demagogues who abused the sacrosanct nature of the core imagery of the *kokutai* to attack others, as well against, in the background, the advance of a technocratic bureaucracy. Japan was “an Imperial country, but at the same time was a nation of the people (*minshū* 民衆).” In fact, the “emperor was not above the people, but among the people” (Tsukui 1940, 19). The progressive Japanese spirit was founded in the fundamental principle of the “people as base” (*minpon* 民本), and was believed to foster the flourishing of the people. What is more, Japanism did not merely seek to restore the past. It was also a “vigorous developmental progressivism” (Tsukui 1940, 21).

In a parallel vein to his writings in *Ishin*, Tsukui states that it is forgotten that Japan was a “true democratic nation” (Tsukui 1940, 19). The Japanese ethnic nation, he argued, had long secured not a fake liberty, but a true liberty which sprang from the depths of ethics and pathos. Thus, those who believed that the Japanese *kokutai* contained dictatorship or bureaucratic supremacy were gravely mistaken (Tsukui 1940, 19-20). Japan was not a country of the unity of the emperor and bureaucrats, the unity of the emperor and the military or the unity of the emperor and political parties. Any politics not backgrounded by the will of the people, economics which did

not expand the power of the people, or through which lacked a people-based quality was irrelevant and disconnected to life. Japanism must take the place of liberalism and socialism and must become representative of the voice of the people (Tsukui 1940, 21).

From these fervent writings, which exude confidence in significant social transformation, it can be seen how intellectuals and activists could serve as conduits of a mass nationalism independent of state direction. This nationalism was malleable enough for a critical mass of the population to seize upon for the imagining of their own interests functioning to both provide a critique of government officials who fell short of the ideal and to pressure ideological conformity. In fact, public media such as *Ishin*, which provided a mouthpiece for an increasingly politicized military and helped publicize their positions, were entirely uncritical of the military. Some authors who advocated a planned economy wrote that the 1934 army pamphlet promoting an economy grounded in morality for the sake of the well-being of the people was welcome reassurance that the army was a representative of “national socialism” (*kokka shakaishugi* 国家社会主義). Shimonaka Yasaburō and others saw military spending as a form of “public works program,” which would flow like a shot of medicine to every part of the organic body, increasing employment and income for the nation. The people and intellectuals needed closer relations with the military, which was one pillar of the ethical state. The military would maximize national production, and through it, the welfare of the people (Shimonaka 1936, 11–16). This emphasis on maximizing welfare through increased industrial production facilitated by mass government spending, with the belief that the negative effects of inflation could be offset through an equal expansion of productivity was in fact a crucial global trend. Yet it is also true that planned economy proponent Kojima Seiichi, although highly receptive in principle to many of the pamphlet’s proposals was also cautious, among others things, about its vagueness and the potential for spending to lead to detrimental inflation without controls.

Lastly, domestic movements were not the only hotbed for exploring new concepts of social reform, mobilization and the role of people. Empire also infused new vistas for imagining socio-political systems which harnessed the active support of the people. Imperatives for total preparation acutely felt by military visionaries, coupled with the need for a free space for experimentation, led to early programs for a mass party emerging in Manchuria. Efforts within the military to construct a new political system were driven by Ishiwara Kanji, among the most impactful Japanese military officers in the 1930s.

In April 1932, Ishiwara Kanji, who spearheaded the invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931 as part of a broader attempt to create a self-sufficient bloc in preparation for war against the Soviet Union, encouraged Japanese residents of Manchukuo to establish the Concordia Association (*Kyōwakai* 協和会; *Xiehehui* in Mandarin), a civic organization whose goal was to promote a sense of nationhood in Manchukuo and which aimed to make the ideal of “ethnic harmony” a reality. To Ishiwara, developing a

strong civic organization to shape politics appeared to provide an alternative to the Japanese military-controlled Manchukuo government nominally headed by Puyi. He insisted that this association, with grassroots support, should assume the role of political leadership in the new state functioning as a single party dictatorship that would reflect the people's will" (Kishida 2020, 19). Yet, Ishiwara's vision was not prompted merely as a response to war preparation. In fact, during his younger years in training at the Military Academy in Tokyo, Ishiwara sought the guidance of political thinkers Tokutomi Sohō 徳富蘇峰 (1863–1957), Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典 (1849–1912), and Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1838–1922), who had been prominent in the Meiji period (Kishida 2020, 19).

Although the maverick Ishiwara was soon disillusioned with the direction of the Concordia Society, Ishiwara began wielding his contacts to press for a significant reorganization of the political structure domestically; and these efforts shed light on the processes leading up to the establishment of the IRAA. In 1936, Ishiwara organized meetings among reformist leaders including representatives from the military such as general Hayashi Senjurō, the bureaucracy, such as Gotō Fumio of the Alliance for a New Japan, and industry at the home of future leader of the IRAA, Arima Yoriyasu, to develop a new party under Prince Konoe Fumimaro.

Undergirding these efforts was the ideal of integrating the "will of the people" into a system of national unification which would intervene into every aspect of social life. An advisor to Ishiwara, Asahara Kenzō 浅原健三 (1897–1967), a former leftist labor leader and associated with the Concordia Society, and who sought the formation of a mass party to deal with the Lower House, helped articulate the Ishiwara plan. According to Asahara, the organization of the Concordia Association was twofold, and it was these two aspects which could serve as a model for Japan. The first would implement a process to speak to the will of the people through councils, reminiscent of Meiji era thought. Asahara envisioned that

The members of the Concordia Association, which make up a direct organization reflecting the will of the people to officials and the will of state officials to the people (*min'i jōtatsu, jōi katatsu* 民意上達, 上意下達), which would gather in one party where other necessary bureaucratic officials would attend; and under a roundtable discussions, carry out the necessary duties of through a union of councils (*rengō kyōgikai* 連合協議会), which is the first aspect of organization.

(Asahara 1937, 51–58)

The reorganization of the Concordia Society in 1937 was a product of this vision. The way the central ideal of organic state-society relations through "reflecting the will of the people to officials and the will of state officials to the people" ultimately became the key phrase in the New Order Declaration of the Konoe administration in August 1940, which laid the conceptual



groundwork for the IRAA, exposes the impact of the colonial periphery on the reformist imaginary of the Japanese metropole.

In terms of the second theme, Asahara argued that outside of this direct organization of channeling the will of the people upwards, and the will of the high to the low, there is an administrative system which is a cell structure of (organizations) from central government to the provinces. This system would, according to Asahara, touch the everyday lives of the people. Under this control system, members of the Concordia Association facilitated the implementation improvements for workers, farmers, etc., and also labored for ethnic harmony (Asahara 1937).

Asahara explained that the one critical factor for the Concordia Society and its attractiveness as a model for Japan, was its utility as a pedagogical state to tutor or guide rather than coerce the people into the necessary transformations for a more just society as well as one more prepared for the threat of total war. Asahara explains the Concordia Society was “an organization for moral suasion, an education organization, a social organization, a religious organization, thought organization, an economic organization, and at the same a political organization.” Yet, Asahara continues by cautioning that “the Concordia Association is different from Japanese political organizations. Japanese political organizations and movements have power as their goal. In Manchukuo, competition of power is not forgiven” (Asahara 1937, 51–58). Asahara concludes that, not unlike the bureaucrats in the Alliance for a New Japan, political systems which seek to implement the true will of the people can only be successful if the state represented the ethnic essence of the people. This view that policy which reflected ethnic culture also reflected the true will of the people was in fact a central theme which became more pronounced over the course of the interwar period. Finally, Asahara, like virtually all reformers in Japan at that time, but particularly those connected to Japanists circles such as *Ishin*, saw political economic change as linked and argued characteristically that increased spending and production serve to stabilize the economy and provide for the welfare of the people.

## **Conclusion**

Japanese aspirations for a mass party or totalitarian reforms in the 1930s and 1940s represented more than mere total war mobilization or an ad hoc reaction to the needs of the war with China. The repressive ideology of the period was ultimately rooted in certain utopian aspirations for a more just social order, which emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to what was perceived as a corrupt and unfair state of things. In fact, prominent elements of IRAA discourse began as opposition ideas before they found their way into official war-time ideology. In this sense, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was the result of a longer intellectual lineage to transform the state by overcoming liberal democracy.

However, this political transformation was never completed. The constitutional system established in the second half of the 19th century proved to be comparatively stable—much more so than those established during the wave of imperial transformations which affected the Qing, Russian, and Ottoman Empires in the first two decades of the 20th century. The Japanese party system withered, but did not completely disappear, and the political parties maintained a certain foothold on power (Berger 1977). Accordingly, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association established in 1940 was never developed into a mass party to dominate the state akin the other Eurasian single-party regimes. In this sense, the Japanese case was somewhat atypical among the cases discussed in this volume. It was, however, part of the same global trend toward the authoritarian reconstruction of political systems and a tighter organizational coherence of the masses.

### Unpublished archival sources

*Nihon kindai shiryō kenkyūkai kyūzōshiryō* 日本近代史料研究会旧蔵資料 [Old material of the research commission on modern Japanese historical records]. Held at Hitotsubashi University, Japan.

### Note

- \* The authors would like to thank Tobias Weiss of Sophia University, Tokyo, for generously providing access to his personal sources on the Alliance for a New Japan.
- 1 Hashimoto Seinosuke 橋本清之助, handwritten record of postwar interview, in *Nihon kindai shiryō kenkyūkai kyūzōshiryō* 日本近代史料研究会旧蔵資料 [Old material of the research commission on modern Japanese historical records], 3–9–1, 16–17. Held at Hitotsubashi University, Japan.

### Bibliography

- Asahara, Kenzō 浅原健三. 1937. “Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai no honshitsu to sono katsudō” 満州帝国協和会の本質とその活動 [The essence of the Concordia Association of the Empire of Manchuria and its activities]. *Keisatsu kyōkai zasshi* 警察協会雑誌 10, no. 449: 51–58.
- Berger, Gordon. 1974. “Japan’s Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro’s Early Political Career, 1916–1931.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 29, no. 4: 451–475.
- Berger, Gordon. 1977. *Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Roger H. 2009. “Shepherds of the People: Yasuoka Masahiro and the New Bureaucrats in Early Showa Japan.” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 35, no. 2: 285–319.
- Chatani, Sayaka. 2020. *Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Godart, G. Clinton. 2021. “Future War and Future Peace after 1919: Ishiwara Kanji and the Imperial Japanese Army in the Wake of the First World War,” in *Beyond*

- Versailles: The 1919 Moment and a New Order in East Asia*. Edited by Minohara, Tosh and Dawley, Evan, 227–45. Lanham et al.: Lexington Books.
- Grover, Bruce. 2021. “Public Opinion Under Imperial Benevolence: Japanese ‘National Essence’ Leader Torio Koyata’s Anti-Liberal Parliamentarianism in the *Genrō-in* and the House of Lords.” In *Planting Parliaments in Eurasia: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies, 1850–1950*. Edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 75–102. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hashimoto, Kingorō 橋本欣五郎. 1937. Hashimoto Kingorō sengen (kaisetsu) 橋本欣五郎宣言 (解説) [Manifesto of Hashimoto Kingorō (explained)]. Ōmiya (Shizuoka): Dainihon Seinentō Fuji shibu.
- Ikeoka, Naotaka 池岡直孝. 1926. “‘Yoron’ ni tsuite” [輿論] について [About “public opinion”]. *Shinsei* 新政 3, no. 3: 48–53.
- Kitaoka Juitsu 北岡寿逸. 1927 “Shin-jiyūshugi to shakaishugi no kyōtsūten” 新自由主義と社会主義の共通点 [The shared points of New Liberalism and Socialism]. *Shinsei* 新政 2, no. 3: 2–7.
- Kishida, Yuka Hiruma. 2020. *Kenkoku University and the Experience of Pan-Asianism: Education in the Japanese Empire*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Levidis, Andrew. 2020. “Politics in a Fallen Empire: Kishi Nobusuke and the Making of the Conservative Hegemony in Japan.” In *Imperial Violence, State Destruction and the Reorganization of Modern East Asia*. Edited by Barack Kushner and Andrew Levidis, 248–82. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Makino, Kuniaki. 2016. “The New Konoe Order and Reform Bureaucrats.” In *Fifteen Lectures on Showa Japan: Road to the Pacific War in Recent Historiography*, edited by Tsutsui Kiyotada, translated by Noda Makito and Paul Narum, 217–35. Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture.
- Maruyama, Masao. 1963. “Characteristics of Japanese ‘Fascism.’” In *Japan 1931–1945: Militarism, Fascism, Japanism?* Edited by Ivan Morris, 36–41. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co.
- Mimura, Janis. 2011. *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Mori, Ariyoshi 森有義. 1979. *Seinen to ayumu Gotō Fumio* 青年と歩む後藤文夫 [Gotō Fumio walking with the youth]. Tokyo: Kenbunsha.
- Nakahara, Kinji 中原謹司. 1935. “Senkyo tōsō to Nipponshugi jin’ei” 選挙闘争と日本主義陣営 [Electoral struggle and the camp of Japanism]. *Ishin* 維新 2, no. 9: 18–20.
- Nakahara, Kinji 中原謹司. 1936. “Tokubetsu gikai inshōki” 特別議会印象記 [Impressions from the special session]. *Ishin* 維新 3, no. 6: 14–15.
- Nakatani, Takeyo 中谷武世. 1934. “Daigiteki minshu seiji to minzokuteki zentai seiji” 代議的民主主義と民族的全体主義政治 [Politics of representative democracy and politics of national holism]. *Ishin* 維新 1, no. 1: 32–41.
- Seth, James. 1924. *A Study of Ethical Principles*. 16th edition. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
- Shimonaka, Yasaburō 下中彌三郎. 1936. “Takahashi Zaisei no jidai sakugo.” 高橋財政の時代錯誤 [The epochal mistakes of the Takahashi financial politics]. *Ishin* 維新 3, no. 2: 11–16.
- Tamaki, Hiroki 玉木寛輝. 2020. *Shōwa ki seigun kankei no mosaku to sōryokusen kōsō: senzen, senchū no rikugun, chishikijin no kattō* 昭和期政軍関係の模索と総力戦構想: 戦前・戦中の陸海軍・知識人の葛藤 [The Showa-era Search for Civil-Military

- Relations and the Framework for Total War: Prewar, wartime conflict of the military and civilian experts]. Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku shuppankai.
- Tazawa, Yoshiharu 田沢義鋪. 1924. “Shinsei no shuppan ni tsuite” 新政の出版について [Concerning the Publication of *Shinsei*]. *Shinsei* 2, no. 9: 3–5.
- Tazawa, Yoshiharu. 1927a. “Seiji kyōiku no futatsu no ketsuron” 政治教育の二つの結論 [Two conclusions of political education]. *Shinsei* 新 4, no. 2: 1–3.
- Tazawa Yoshiharu. 1927b. “Nihon bunka kensetsu to kokuminsei no kaizō” 日本文化建設と国民性の改造 [The construction of Japanese culture and the reconstruction of the people’s nature]. *Shinsei* 新政 4, no. 3: 1–15.
- Tōge, Minoru 藤下三策. 1924. “Yogi seiji no daha” 余技政治の打破 [The dismantling of hobby politics]. *Shinsei* 新政 1, no. 1: 20–24.
- Tsukui, Tatsuo 津久井龍雄. 1934. “Dokusai seiji ka dokudan riron ka” 独裁政治か独断理論か [Dictatorial politics or monocratic theory?]. *Ishin* 維新 1, no. 2: 12–19.
- Tsukui, Tatsuo 津久井龍雄. 1940. “Nihonshugi no kichō” 日本主義の基調 [Fundamentals of Japanism]. *Keikoku* 經國 7, no. 1: 18–21.
- Ueda, Teijirō 上田貞次郎. 1927. *Shin jiyūshugi* 新自由主義 [New liberalism]. Tokyo: Dōbunkan.
- Various authors. 1926. “Joshi ni sankaken o ataubeki ka ina ka” 女子に参加権を与うか否か [Should one confer political rights to women or not?]. *Shinsei* 新政 3, no. 5: 58–64.
- Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. 2015. *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*. Translated by Ethan Mark. New York: Columbia University Press.

# 7 Constitution-making in the informal Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Inner Asia, 1945–1955\*

*Ivan Sablin*

## Introduction

During the first decade after the Second World War, all Soviet dependencies in Europe and Asia adopted new constitutions or introduced substantial amendments to the existing ones. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 was the main reference for most of the constitutions, while Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin personally edited some of the drafts. Despite the similarities between many provisions and direct borrowings from the Soviet Constitution, there were major differences between the constitutions of Albania (1946), Bulgaria (1947), China (1954), Czechoslovakia (1948), East Germany (1949), Hungary (1949), North Korea (1948), Mongolia (1940), Poland (1947<sup>1</sup> and 1952), Romania (1948 and 1952), and Yugoslavia (1946). They varied in terms of the sources of sovereignty and in their discussions of political subjectivity, established different supreme state institutions, and did not necessarily mention the ruling party, the Soviet Union, or socialism. There were in fact no clear guidelines for constitution-making in Soviet dependencies until 1957 (Hazard 1974, 988). Although their adoption was often directed or supervised by Moscow, the authorship of the constitutions was heterogeneous, with the participation of domestic and Soviet leaders, jurists, and officials. Variable forms of dependence, from military occupation to ideological and pragmatic allegiance, as well as the ad hoc solutions in individual contexts contributed to the variety of constitutional norms.

This lack of uniformity attested to the imperial character of Soviet governance in Eurasia (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 11–12). In 1985, ahead of the imperial turn in Russian and Soviet history (Sunderland 2016), the economist Charles Wolf conceptualized the informal (external) Soviet empire. It excluded the internal empire, that is the Soviet Union proper, and had several distinguishing features: partial contiguity, the variety in the forms of domination (satellites, allies, or cooperating regimes), and the special role of the ruling parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)<sup>2</sup> as the primary agent of imperial power and the associated parties

in the dependent polities (Wolf 1985, 997–98). Although Wolf wrote about the 1980s, the main characteristics of the informal Soviet empire consolidated already in 1945–1955.

This chapter focuses on the constitutional and nonconstitutional government architectures, which together with the establishment of state socialist economies became an important part of the structural adjustments (Duara 2007) within the informal Soviet empire. Structural adjustments did not necessarily occur through coercion. Allegiance was also ensured through ideological commitment to building socialism, which made the informal Soviet empire also a hegemonic formation (Morozov 2021), and pragmatic interest in Soviet assistance (Li 2001, 29–31). The Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948, as well as the later Albanian–Soviet and Sino–Soviet splits, demonstrated that structural adjustments did not predetermine subordination and were reversible.

Formal integration of different parties and states also took shape during the first decade after the Second World War but the respective multilateral organizations did not cover the whole informal empire. Whereas the integration through the Communist International (Comintern, 1919–1943) included parties from the whole world, postwar organizations were confined to Europe. The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform, 1947–1956), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1949–1991), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955–1991) only included European members in the 1940s and the 1950s.

The analyses of the constitutions' adoption and authorship was based on secondary literature and archival documents, predominantly those published by Tat'iana Viktorovna Volokitina and her colleagues (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997; 1998; Volokitina 1999; 2002). The provisions of the constitutions, pertaining to sovereignty, political subjectivity, supreme state institutions, and dependence, were compared in their Russian translations. The survey of nonconstitutional institutions and their representation relied on archival documents, secondary literature, and illustrated propaganda magazines. These magazines were modeled after the journal *SSSR na stroike* ("USSR in Construction"), renamed *Sovetskii Soiuz* ("Soviet Union") in 1950, and were usually published in the respective states and in multiple languages. No magazines were available for Mongolia and Yugoslavia.

Constitution-making was not a one-sided adoption of the supposed model of people's democracy<sup>3</sup> and followed the nuanced imperial logic. Multiple actors, including domestic party leaders and legal scholars, Soviet advisors, and the leaders and functionaries of the VKP(b)/CPSU, partook in drafting the constitutions. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946, for instance, was drafted by Yugoslav Communists in contact with the Soviet Ambassador, while the North Korean Constitution of 1948 was practically written at Stalin's dacha (country house). The heterogeneous authorship and ad hoc political solutions contributed to the major differences in the texts.

In the constitutions, sovereignty and political subjectivity were ascribed to the people, the toilers, classes, nationalities, and regions, often in combination. Most of the constitutions proclaimed parliaments supreme bodies of state power, rejecting thereby separation of powers, and introduced standing bodies with broad competence, acting between parliamentary sessions. Several constitutions were more restrictive than their Soviet counterpart, barring different groups from elections. The ruling parties were rarely mentioned. The goal of building socialism and the special relations to the Soviet Union were mentioned more frequently but were also not ubiquitous.

The standardization of governance in Soviet dependencies also pertained to nonconstitutional (in most cases) institutions of parties and leaders. The ruling parties were presented as the main agents of societal change and the *de facto* governments in propaganda and archival documents and were treated as such by Moscow. A special role was also ascribed to leaders, most of whom formally headed the parties but not the states. Domestic parties and leaders were presented as subordinate to the VKP(b)/CPSU and the Soviet leader. The dominance of the Soviet Union as a state was also evident both in propaganda and archival documents.

## **Background**

The Bolsheviks, whose Party was the center of the Soviet empire (Suny and Martin 2001), had been involved in constitution-making in Soviet dependencies since the 1920s. The concepts of “people’s republic” and “people’s democracy” played an important role in describing pro-Soviet regimes since the 1920s and the 1940s, respectively, but neither of them corresponded to complete uniformity of the dependent regimes.

The concept of people’s republic was introduced by the non-Bolshevik socialists of the Ukrainian Central Rada, who proclaimed such a republic in November 1917 in response to the Bolshevik-led coup in Petrograd. The 1918 Constitution of the Ukrainian People’s Republic specified that sovereignty belonged to “the people, that is, to all citizens” and was exercised through the universally elected People’s Assembly, which was called the “supreme body of power” and granted supreme legislative power. The Council of Minister and the General Court were granted supreme executive and judicial power, respectively. The Constitution also introduced autonomy for non-Ukrainian nationalities (Pryliuk and Ianevs’kyi 1992).

Although the Ukrainian Central Rada opposed the Bolsheviks, the latter appropriated the concept of people’s republic. Most of Soviet Russia’s dependencies which later joined the unified state were called socialist soviet republics, but the Far Eastern Republic (1920–1922), the Khorezm People’s Soviet Republic (1920–1923), the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic (1920–1924), and the People’s Republic of Tannu-Tuva (1921–1944) did not

have the word “socialist” in their names. Neither did the Mongolian People’s Republic (1924–1991), which remained formally independent and became a “prototype” for modern satellite states (Lattimore 1956, 39).

The 1921 Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic was an important milestone in the legal development of the informal Soviet empire. Unlike the 1918 Soviet Constitution, which ascribed sovereignty and political subjectivity to classes, to the toilers, and to nationalities, the Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic stated that all power in the republic belonged to the people, although it also established autonomies for non-Russian nationalities, implying differentiated subjectivity. It also did not mention the goal of building socialism, unlike the 1918 Soviet Constitution, but still transferred natural resources to state property and granted the toilers special rights and protection. The Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic introduced universal elections, unlike in the USSR. It granted the People’s Assembly legislative power, but the Administration (a “collective president”) of seven people also received broad competence, including the right to adopt provisional laws between parliamentary sessions. This meant that the system of the Far Eastern Republic had similarities to that of Soviet Russia, where supreme authority between the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets belonged to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its standing Presidium (Far Eastern Republic 1921, 7, 10, 28–31; Vyshinskii 1938, 423–26). The potent Administration facilitated the control of the Bolshevik Party over the Far Eastern Republic, but the Party also relied on nonconstitutional measures (Sablin 2018, 182–85).

The Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic granted some preferences to Soviet Russian citizens, but the 1921 Constitution of Tannu-Tuva was the first one to formally proclaim dependence on Soviet Russia in foreign relations (Far Eastern Republic 1921, 32; Dubrovskii and Serdobov 1957, 295). The five constitutions of formally independent Tuva (1921, 1924, 1926, 1930, and 1941) are exemplary of constitutional variability. The 1926 Constitution of the Tuvan People’s Republic glorified the October Revolution in its preamble but still spoke of people’s power. The 1930 Constitution of the Tuvan Arats’ [Herders’] Republic declared adherence to a non-capitalist path to socialism and “the dictatorship of the toiling arat masses.” The 1941 Constitution of the Tuvan People’s Republic called it “a state of the toilers” and reaffirmed the non-capitalist path (Dubrovskii and Serdobov 1958, 281–82, 286–87, 293). The 1924 Constitution of Mongolian People’s Republic did not mention the USSR but stated that “because the toilers of the whole world” aspired to destroy “capitalism and achieve socialism (communism),” the Republic had to pursue a foreign policy corresponding “to the interests and the main objectives of the oppressed small peoples and revolutionary toilers of the whole world” (Vaksberg 1925, 44). Irrespective of their constitutions, Mongolia and Tuva, the only Soviet dependencies between 1922 and the Second World War, were run by the domestic “people’s” parties and, through them, by the Bolshevik



Party. Their populations experienced violence and mass purges similar to those in the USSR (Kaplonski 2014; Rupen 1965, 612).

The Soviet Constitution of 1936, which was often called the “Stalin Constitution” and was adopted following a “popular discussion” (Lomb 2017; Velikanova 2018), vested sovereignty with two classes (workers and peasants), with the toilers, and with the constituent republics. It also referenced multiple political subjects. The Constitution declared the USSR a “socialist state of workers and peasants,” stated that “all power in the USSR” belonged “to the urban and rural toilers,” but also granted “all citizens,” with the exception of “insane persons” and those who were disenfranchised by court, passive and active voting rights, eliminating the previous restrictions. The Constitution also defined the USSR as a union state, founded through the “voluntary unification” of republics which retained partial sovereignty and had the right to secession. Finally, it called the VKP(b) “the vanguard of the toilers” and “the leading core of all organizations of toilers, both civic and state” (Trainin 1940, 179–81, 188–89).

The USSR’s new institutional design was also self-contradictory. Whereas the Constitution vested “all power” of the toilers in the soviets (councils) of toilers’ deputies, it also introduced the Supreme Soviet as “the supreme body of state power,” while the soviets of toilers’ deputies were defined as local bodies of state power. The Supreme Soviet had two equal chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, and was called the only legislative authority. At the same time, the standing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had broad competence between the sessions of the assembly, including the right to issue decrees. Several other institutions had the word “supreme” in their description. The Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers since 1946) was the “supreme executive and administrative body,” while the Supreme Court was the “supreme judicial body.” The Prosecutor (the Prosecutor General since 1946) was responsible for “supreme” legal oversight. The overall “supreme” status of the Supreme Soviet and the subordination of all other bodies to it meant that there was no formal separation of powers (Trainin 1940, 179, 182–87).

The Communist leadership appeared to have considered contested elections (Getty 1991, 18) but did not introduce them until 1988/1989. All candidates were pre-appointed by the Party, and the so-called “bloc of Communists and non-party members” always won all of the seats. All major decisions were made in the Central Committee of the Party and unanimously ratified either by the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium (Juviler 1960, 3). By the time the Constitution of 1936 was adopted, the initial oligarchic collective leadership of the Bolshevik Politbiuro (Political Bureau) had already given way to Stalin’s dictatorship, which achieved its full power with the onset of the Great Terror (1937–1938). The apparatuses of the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars, which Stalin chaired since 1941, became the two main institutions of the state. They drafted resolutions to be approved by Stalin as the *de facto* supreme institution

(Oleg V. Khlevniuk 2008, xiv–xvi, xix–xxi). The Constitution of 1936 further bolstered the personality cult of Stalin as the supreme leader (*vozhd'*) in all areas of Soviet life (Gill 2011, 117–21, 138).

The adoption of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was connected to domestic and international developments. The Soviet leadership hoped for social stability and reconciliation with at least some of the groups which had been persecuted in the previous years. In July 1935, Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, who participated in drafting the new constitution, published an article celebrating the emergence of a unified Soviet people through the cohesion of classes and nationalities. International considerations also played a role, as a “democratic” Soviet Union was supposed to facilitate the shift of politics in foreign states to the left and help the struggle against fascism (O. V. Khlevniuk 1996, 156–57; Whittington 2019, 147).

By 1936, at least three different understandings of people’s democracy consolidated in the international communist discourse. In the context of anticolonialism, it was evoked already in 1926, when the Korean Communist Party, under the auspices of the Comintern’s Executive Committee, proclaimed the slogan of a “people’s democratic republic” as a means of struggle against Japan. Such a republic would have a universally elected parliament as its supreme body, would be allied to the USSR, and protect workers’ and peasants’ interests (Vada et al. 2007, 386–88). In 1936, Wang Ming of the Chinese Communist Party spoke of the need to create a “people’s democratic republic” in China, reaffirming the need for a universally elected parliament and a government of national defense against Japan.<sup>4</sup> In 1935–1936, the notion of “people’s democracy” was used in relation to the regime of the new Soviet Constitution.<sup>5</sup> It also became strongly associated with the tactics of a united or popular front and antifascism.

In 1935, the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern supported the tactics of a united front “of the proletariat” and “of all toilers” against capital, fascism, and war on national and the international level, but at the same time reaffirmed the need to win most of the working class over to communism. It also resolved to turn the national communist parties into mass parties.<sup>6</sup> Following the Congress, Nikos Zachariadis, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece, spoke of the “parties of people’s democracy” when discussing an anti-fascist united front in December 1935.<sup>7</sup> After the victory of the Popular Front in the Spanish legislative election in February 1936, Jesús Hernández Tomás of the Spanish Communist Party called for advancing the “people’s democratic” revolution in Spain.<sup>8</sup> At the onset of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), in September 1936, Georgi Dimitrov, who then headed the Comintern’s Executive Committee, argued that if the Republicans won, a republic of a new type would be established, “a state with genuine people’s democracy.” Such a state would not yet be “soviet,” but it would be an “antifascist, left state, with the participation of the genuine left part of the bourgeoisie” (Dam’è et al. 1999, 36).<sup>9</sup> In 1937, Spanish Communists reaffirmed the understanding

of “people’s democracy” as “a democratic parliamentary republic of a new type” (Pozharskaia and Saplin 2001, 299). After the Spanish Civil War, in 1941, émigré participants of the Popular Front highlighted the nationality aspect of people’s democracy when discussing freedom for Catalonia and the Basque Country.<sup>10</sup>

Unlike in the USSR, universal elections were not introduced in the two informal Soviet dependencies, Tuva and Mongolia. Although the 1940 Constitution of Mongolia and the 1941 Constitution of Tuva had significant borrowings from the Soviet Constitution of 1936, non-universal, unequal, and indirect elections were retained in both countries. Their continued dependence on the USSR also reflected in the new constitutions. Both constitutions reaffirmed the non-capitalist path to socialism and included provisions on the special role of their respective ruling parties, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and the Tuvan People’s Revolutionary Party. By analogy with the “Stalin Constitution,” its Mongolian counterpart was called the “Choibalsan Constitution” after Khorloogiin Choibalsan, Mongolia’s leader. Tuva’s 1941 Constitution also granted Soviet citizens in the country active and passive voting rights. (Dubrovskii and Serdobov 1958, 295, 300–301; Iaskina 2007, 112; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 36, 46–47).

Tuva was ultimately annexed to the USSR in 1944, like Western Belarus and Western Ukraine (Eastern Poland), Bessarabia (Moldova), Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania a few years before it (Naimark 2017, 63–64). No other immediate Sovietizations followed. In 1943, Moscow rejected the idea of the Polish Workers’ Party, which took the place of the Communist Party of Poland, disbanded in 1938, to establish workers’ and peasants’ power in the country. Instead, it supported the slogans of national freedom and people’s democratic power along with the united front tactics (Kemp-Welch 2008, 18–19). Immediately after the war, Stalin also urged German Communists against a violent revolution, stressing the need to take the electoral path to power, if necessary, in coalition with other parties in the context of broader support for socialism across Europe (Slaveski 2013, 117).

Unlike in Yugoslavia and Albania, where the Axis powers were defeated by own communist-led partisan forces, in the rest of Eastern Europe, in North Korea, and in Manchuria, they were defeated by the Soviet Red Army. The Red Army remained a major factor in most of Eastern Europe – with the exception of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia (from which it withdrew in December 1945) – as well as in North Korea and Mongolia. The Soviet secret police detachments in the occupied territories and Soviet advisors also played an important role in the postwar political developments (Békés et al. 2015, 18; Volokitina, Murashko, and Noskova 1993, 5).

In Eastern Europe, the Soviet takeover of the economies and defense establishments and the creation of new dependencies went on since the closing stages of the war and was especially swift in the former Axis countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. In Austria, the attempts to penetrate the economy failed due to Anglo–American pressure. Although

Moscow's guidelines were incomprehensive and despite the predominance of coalitional arrangements, domestic communist parties took dominant positions of power in the police, foreign relations, local governments, the army, and economic bodies across the region in 1945–1946. Non-communist parties were pushed away through a variety of tactics, including arrests and infiltration by clandestine communists. When constitutional means did not work, the communists turned to mass mobilization and political violence. All this allowed gradual establishment of communist monopolies in all countries of the region, irrespective of the appearances of the regimes (Békés et al. 2015, 9–15; Naimark 2017, 66–67).

Competitive elections were held in 1946–1947 in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary, but in all four cases communists admitted to rigging them (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 12–13, 15, 379). During the establishment of the Cominform in September 1947, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, a prominent Bolshevik, repeated Stalin's earlier claim that the world was divided and urged communist parties to assert control. Forcible incorporation of social democratic parties followed, major industries were completely nationalized, and first attempts at collectivization of agriculture were made. Secret police operations, often overseen by Soviet representatives, helped to finish off the opposition. The Cominform, like the Comintern in its later stages, was used to ensure Soviet control of the Eastern European parties, which was one of the reasons for the Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948. Following the split, the most direct Sovietization took place between 1949–1950 and 1953–1956 (Naimark 2017, 68–70).

### **Authorship and adoption**

Multiple actors participated in drafting the constitutions of Soviet dependencies. The involvement of domestic communist leaders and jurists was significant in most cases. In some cases, Soviet jurists and diplomats played a role. Direct involvement of the VKP(b)/CPSU leadership in writing and editing the texts was rare and was documented in the cases of North Korea, Poland, and Romania. Yugoslav Communists contributed to the making of the Albanian Constitution, while non-communist politicians initially participated in drafting the Czechoslovak Constitution. Most of the constitutions were adopted by assemblies after a “popular discussion,” like in the USSR. In several cases, non-communists had the opportunity to expressed their opposition to the texts.

The first postwar people's republics run by a single party were formed in Yugoslavia and Albania, where the communists became dominant forces without Soviet military involvement. Despite initial coalitional arrangements in Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito quickly took control over the key spheres of the reestablished state. Prominent non-communists left the government in October 1945, but could not consolidate the opposition. The Communist-led People's Front won all

seats in the Constituent Assembly on November 11, 1945. Western powers recognized the election as legitimate (Volokitina, Murashko, and Noskova 1993, 13–16, 97–99, 103). The Constituent Assembly convened on November 29, 1945, and the same day proclaimed the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Nikiforov 2011, 547). The first draft of the constitution was prepared by Yugoslav jurists under the Communist leaders Edvard Kardelj and Moša Pijade and was very close to the Soviet Constitution of 1936, but Tito introduced significant changes to the draft. Soviet Ambassador Ivan Vasil'evich Sadchikov provided some advice, but the Yugoslav authors did not appear to have followed it strictly (Chernilovskii 1947, 56; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 328).

Like in the USSR, the draft was published for a “popular discussion.” The similarities between the draft and the Soviet Constitution prompted some non-communists to claim that it was dictated by Moscow and that it would make Yugoslavia a simple vassal of the USSR, akin to Mongolia. Other critics argued that even though the Yugoslav system was more democratic, it established a concealed one-party system, and rebuked the one-sided pro-Soviet orientation. No major changes were introduced, and the Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted on January 31, 1946 (Volokitina, Murashko, and Noskova 1993, 106–7; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 325–26, 329, 333). In 1953, the Constitution was subject to major amendments, supervised by the Central Committee of the Party (which was renamed to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952). Kardelj and Pijade were responsible for the amendments (Nikiforov 2011, 607–8).

The Communist Party of Albania also adopted the tactics of a Democratic Front in the context of local armed opposition. On December 2, 1945, the Democratic Front won all seats in the Constituent Assembly. With the exception of several independents, there was no contest from organized opposition. In Northern Albania, the election featured numerous violations, but Western observers concluded that it reflected the broad support for the Democratic Front. On January 11, 1946, the Constituent Assembly declared Albania a people's republic. The Provisional Democratic Government under Enver Hoxha, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, presented draft constitution, which was prepared with the assistance of Yugoslav Communist advisors. After a “popular discussion,” the Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania on March 14, 1946 (Smirnova 2003, 265–68; Volokitina, Murashko, and Noskova 1993, 17, 111–13). Following the Soviet–Yugoslav split, the Communist Party of Albania was reformed into the Party of Labor of Albania in 1948, and in 1950 substantial amendments were introduced to the Constitution, making it closer to the Soviet counterpart (Kuprits 1951, x–xi; Smirnova 2003, 303).

In Bulgaria, Soviet involvement was more prominent, and the process of adoption was more contested. Initially, the Fatherland Front, which came to power in 1944, was a broad coalition, but it became dominated by the

Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists). The Front won 88 percent of votes in the parliamentary election in November 1945. In September 1946, a referendum supported the proclamation of a people's republic. The election to the Sixth Grand National Assembly, which was to adopt a new constitution, took place on October 27, 1946. Despite numerous violations, the Fatherland Front won only about 70 percent of votes, and the parliament included members of the opposition who were ready for political struggle (Brunnbauer 2008, 52; Volokitina 1999, 1: 356; Znepolski et al. 2018, 77).

In September 1946, Stalin advised Dimitrov, who in November 1946 would become Bulgaria's first Communist Prime Minister, that the country should adopt "a people's constitution," which would fall "more to the right than the Yugoslav one" (Rieber 2009, 116). The Fatherland Front's draft was prepared by the Bulgarian Communists with the assistance of Soviet advisors Il'ia Pavlovich Trainin (a legal scholar), Vsevolod Nikolaevich Durdenevskii (a legal scholar), Konstantin Petrovich Gorshenin (Prosecutor General of the USSR), Aleksandr Fedorovich Gorkin (Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), and Petr Nikolaevich Fedoseev (a Marxist-Leninist philosopher). The opposition came up with their own drafts, but the "popular discussion" of the Front's draft began in May 1947. In April-May 1947, all oppositional newspapers were shut down in Bulgaria, and the anti-communists in the parliament decried the lack of outlets to properly discuss the Front's draft. Fearing a discussion of the situation at the United Nations Security Council, the Communists allowed some debates, which revolved around separation of powers, private property, and political and civil liberties. The Front's draft did not receive a two-thirds majority in the Grand National Assembly but passed the first reading on June 20. On December 4, 1947, the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which became known as the "Dimitrov Constitution," was adopted (Lazarev 1952, 7; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 630-31, 742; Znepolski et al. 2018, 78-79).

In Romania, King Michael I formally led the coup, which in 1944 established the government of the National Democratic Bloc, including the Romanian Communist Party. Under the pressure from Andrei Ianuar'evich Vyshinskii, who was the Soviet negotiator in the peace talks, the King made the Communist Petru Groza Prime Minister in 1945. Ahead of the election to the Grand National Assembly on November 19, 1946, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, informed a Soviet representative that his party planned to ensure its own majority with the help of "special 'technical' means." With numerous violations, the Communist-led Bloc of Democratic Parties won around 70 percent of votes. Romanian Communists then used the Soviet military presence to eliminate political opposition and prompt Michael I to abdicate on December 30, 1947, with the proclamation of the Romanian People's Republic. In February 1948 Romania signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union,

becoming the first Eastern European dependency to do so. The same month, the Communists merged their party with the Social Democratic Party, forming the Romanian Workers' Party. In the new election to the Grand National Assembly on March 28, 1948, the Communist-led Popular Democratic Front won 405 out of 414 seats. On April 13, 1948, the Grand National Assembly unanimously adopted the provisional Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic. No detailed information is available on the drafting of this constitution,<sup>11</sup> but it was most certainly supervised by the Party leadership, and the draft had been published before the discussion in the parliament (Deletant 2018, 66; Focseneanu 1998, 116–17; Leustean 2007, 306–7; Tismaneanu 2003, 94; Van de Grift 2011, 49; Volokitina, Murashko, and Noskova 1993, 28, 182–84; Volokitina 1999, 1: 370, 375–76).

The Soviet leadership was directly involved in drafting the second postwar constitution. In 1951, Gheorghiu-Dej asked for Soviet assistance, to which Stalin agreed. After the commission under Gheorghiu-Dej (Figure 7.1) provided the draft, it was edited by Vyshinskii, Vagan Grigor'evich Grigor'ian (who chaired the VKP(b) Central Committee's Foreign Policy Commission), and Gorshenin in 1952. On June 25, 1952, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov submitted draft recommendations on the text to



*Figure 7.1* A meeting of the constitutional commission under the presidency of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej during the Thirteenth Session of the Grand National Assembly, Bucharest, between September 22 and 24, 1952 (*Fototeca online a comunismului românesc*, Photograph #IA172, 172/1952).

Stalin who apparently rejected them. On July 6, 1952, new recommendations were submitted and approved two days later. In Romania, the amended draft was put up for a “popular discussion.” On September 23, 1952, Gheorghiu-Dej presented the draft to the Grand National Assembly, and on September 27, 1952, it was adopted (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 582, 771, 796, 804–5; Volokitina 2002, 2: 632–35).

In Czechoslovakia, the drafting of a new constitution was especially contested. The government-in-exile under Edvard Beneš, the prewar President, and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia under Klement Gottwald agreed to form the coalitional National (People’s) Front in 1943. The Communists found themselves in a contested landscape, with Beneš resuming his presidency in 1945 and the Soviet troops withdrawing later the same year. Ahead of the election to the Constituent National Assembly, the Czechoslovak Communist leaders Rudolf Slánský and Gottwald informed the Soviet side that they intended to limit the participating parties to those in the National Front and rush with the election date due to the disagreements among the Front’s members. The election, which took place on May 26, 1946, did not result in a Communist plurality (Mar’ina 2005, 2:49; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 379, 575–76).

The parliament’s constitutional commission, chaired by the Social Democrat Oldřich John included members of different parties and its work entailed fierce debates (Gronský 2006, 2:329). The VKP(b) Department of Foreign Policy reported in September 1947 that the opposition attempted to remove the foundations of the “people’s democratic system” from the text, while Slovak politicians sought to “have their separatist proposals passed.” It also criticized the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for not using “nonparliamentary forms of struggle” and rebuked the weakness of the Communist Party of Slovakia. During the crisis of February 1948, caused by the tensions between the Communists and non-Communists in the government, Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was then in Prague, instructed Gottwald and the rest of the Czechoslovak Communist leaders to take a firmer stance. According to Zorin, Gottwald was afraid to go against Beneš, feared American involvement, and asked the Soviets to move their troops in Germany and Austria around Czechoslovakia, which Moscow rejected (Mar’ina 2005, 2:74; Volokitina 1999, 1: 498–99, 551–52).

The crisis ended with the Communist coup on February 21–25, 1948, and the Communist Party established control over the Constituent National Assembly.<sup>12</sup> On April 14, 1948, the National Front, then under Communist control, approved the draft of the new constitution and it was put up for a short “popular discussion.” Beneš refused to support the undemocratic constitution and the undemocratic elections, which would include one list of candidates. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia nevertheless resolved to submit the draft to the parliament on May 4. On May 9, 1948, the Constituent National Assembly adopted the



new Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. Edward Taborsky, a former secretary of Beneš, called the text a “hybrid” of Western parliamentarism and the Soviet system. Beneš resigned after the adoption of the Constitution and the new election, which gave the absolute majority to the National Front. On June 9, 1948, Gottwald signed the Constitution into force as Prime Minister and acting President, and on June 14, he was elected President (Abrams 2009, 358; Dobeš 2010, 357–68; Mar’ina 2005, 2:80–81; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 868–70; Volokitina 1999, 1: 612).

The constitution-making in North Korea was fully controlled by the Soviet side. According to Nobuo Shimotomai, all important political documents were most likely written by Soviet advisors under the supervision of the Soviet generals in charge of North Korea, Terentii Fomich Shtykov, Nikolai Georgievich Lebedev, and Andrei Alekseevich Romanenko. In February 1947, the Communist-dominated congress of people’s committees formed the People’s Assembly and approved Kim Il-sung’s government, which was active since February 1946. In November 1947, at the third session of the People’s Assembly, Kim Tu-bong, the first Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, reported on the plan to draft a provisional constitution. The session created a commission of the members of the Communist-led Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, which prepared a draft with the assistance of Boris Vasil’evich Shchetinin, a Soviet jurist. Following the recommendation of the Bolshevik Politbiuro, the draft was put up for a “popular discussion” in February–April 1948 (Simotomai 2009, 73, 78, 82; Vanin 2016, 131).

According to Shtykov, however, the proper discussion of the draft took place at Stalin’s dacha on April 24, 1948. This meeting, which apart from Stalin and Shtykov included Molotov and Zhdanov, amended the draft and decided to make the constitution permanent. It was to be enacted in South Korea as well, while the new government was to include its representatives. On April 28–29, 1948, the extraordinary session of the People’s Assembly in Pyongyang pre-approved the draft to be adopted by the future all-Korean legislature. On July 9–10, 1948, the People’s Assembly enacted the Constitution and set the election to the Supreme People’s Assembly, the new legislature. The election was held on August 25, 1948, in the North and, illegally in two stages, in the South. The new assembly included 360 deputies from the South and 212 from the North. On September 8, 1948, the first session of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea approved the Constitution. The next day it declared the country’s independence. Moscow withdrew its troops in 1949. According to Nobuo Shimotomai, Lebedev was the one who proposed the name of the country, although it also repeated the abovementioned 1926 slogan of the Korean Communists (Simotomai 2009, 82–87; Vanin 2016, 132, 138–40).

In Hungary, the Soviet occupation did not prevent competitive parliamentary election in November 1945, in which the Hungarian Communist Party won only 17 percent. Mátyás Rákosi, its leader, nevertheless noted

that elections did not matter much, given the domination of the Communists in the army, the police, the secret police, local government, and the judiciary. The parliament did not play a significant role, as the Communists also passed laws through the Supreme National Council, for instance, on the Soviet–Hungarian Economic Agreement of 1945. In May 1946, after meeting Stalin, Rákosi revealed to the Party’s top functionaries that proletarian dictatorship was on the agenda as soon as peace treaties were signed and the elections in Western Europe were over (Békés et al. 2015, 10, 19).

Ahead of the second postwar parliamentary election, the leaders of the Communists and the Social Democrats agreed to disenfranchise some 300,000 “reactionaries” and omit some people from voters’ lists. Despite the use of intimidation and fraud, the Communists won only 22 percent of the votes on August 31, 1947, which displeased the Bolshevik Foreign Policy Department. Ahead of the third election, the Communists forced the Social Democrats to merge the two parties into the Hungarian Working People’s Party in 1948. The new Party joined the Hungarian Popular Front of Independence, which ran uncontested in the election on May 15, 1949, and won the absolute majority of seats, effectively finalizing the establishment of a one-party regime (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 571; Volokitina 1999, 1: 593; 2002, 2: 279; Fekete 2019, 196–97).

Before the election, Rákosi informed Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, who then headed the Bolshevik Foreign Policy Commission, that his party planned to adopt a new constitution after the election (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 71). The draft of the new constitution was prepared by a commission, formed by the Council of Ministers and chaired by Rákosi. Two Hungarian jurists, Imre Szabó and János Beér, played an important role in drafting the text. Beér maintained that the presence of the Soviet troops was a revolutionary factor, that the teachings of Stalin were the main inspiration, and that the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was the example for the new Hungarian constitution. The draft was put up for a brief “popular discussion” on August 5–10, 1949, which resulted in some revisions. On August 17, 1949, the revised draft was submitted to the parliament, where it was unanimously adopted as Act XX on August 20, 1949 (Fekete 2019, 198, 201–2).

Although it is often discussed as a special case, the Soviet Occupation Zone in East Germany also underwent a comparable transformation into a one-party state (Connelly 2009, 170–71). The Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany were forced to merge into a new party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, already in April 1946. Like in the case of Korea, Moscow envisioned a constitution for the whole country and encouraged the convocation of the First People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace, which included nominees from parties and other organizations, in December 1947. Members of the Socialist Unity Party and the West German Communists had around 72 percent of seats. The Second People’s Congress convened in March 1948 and elected the People’s Council

of 300 members from the East and 100 members from the West. The People's Council formed a commission to draft a constitution for Germany. Although it included members from West Germany, their participation was deemed illegal by the West German authorities in the context of the rising tensions, which culminated in the start of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948 (Markovits 2008, 1314–15).

The constitution was drafted under the supervision of the Socialist Unity Party leadership. Otto Grotewohl, a Social Democrat before the merger, chaired the commission. The Party's First Secretary Walter Ulbricht and the jurist Karl Polak, both of whom had returned from the Soviet Union, played a key role in the process. Moscow supported a draft which would be suitable for the whole country, and until the adoption of the Basic Law in West Germany on May 8, 1949, Grotewohl had apparently hoped that a compromise was possible. Although the Socialist Unity Party had a majority, there were debates in the commission. After the formal creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the West, the East German leadership proceeded with constituting a separate state. On October 7, 1949, the People's Council approved the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (Markovits 2008, 1314, 1316–17; for a detailed account, see Amos 2005).

In Poland, the Democratic Bloc, led by the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party, won the election to the Legislative Sejm in January 1947, in the context of violence against the opposition. Although the opposition had the opportunity to voice their concerns in the Sejm and declared the election fraudulent, rejecting therefore the parliament's constituent status, the Sejm adopted the provisional Small Constitution on February 19, 1947. The document, which amended the Constitution of 1921, pertained to the competence of the main government bodies and introduced the State Council, a new institution, and national councils. The opposition interpreted the Small Constitution as a step toward the Soviet system. The Sejm also elected the Communist Bolesław Bierut President. After the practical elimination of the Polish People's Party, the Communist-led Democratic Bloc remained the only organized political force, although the Catholic Church continued to be an important independent actor in a broader sense (Kemp-Welch 2008, 47; Kersten 1991, 346–48, 350, 352; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 554–55). In December 1948, the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party were merged into the Polish United Workers' Party. The parties, which were formally "allied" to it, had little independence. Furthermore, the Communists controlled the secret police, which had Soviet advisors. In November 1949, the Soviet Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskii took over the command of the Polish Army. The Communist leadership under Bierut was in constant contact with the VKP(b) leadership and Soviet diplomatic representatives (Noskova 2012, 565–69).

In May 1951, the Sejm created a commission for drafting a new constitution. The Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party

prepared the draft, which was then edited by Stalin. The draft was put up for a “popular discussion” in January 1952. The opponents of the draft claimed that it was the same as the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and demanded, for instance, that the provision on liquidating “exploiter” classes was removed. The separation of church and state was also heavily contested. Catholic activists opposed it, arguing that the Polish people needed a Polish Constitution and not a Stalinist one. The Communist leadership, however, did not actively suppress them. They informed Moscow that in view of adopting the constitution, the new election, and general religiosity of the population, they did not want to strain relations with the Episcopate. The Episcopate, in its turn, did not obstruct the promulgation of the Constitution by the Sejm on July 22, 1952, and the subsequent parliamentary election (Kemp-Welch 2008, 47; Noskova 2012, 579; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 691, 730; Volokitina 2002, 2: 627).

There was no Soviet military presence in China after their withdrawal from Manchuria in 1946. Stalin nevertheless advised Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, on the design of the Chinese political system since April 1948. Mao initially planned to exclude all other parties from politics, but Stalin urged the Chinese Communist Party to cooperate with them, and Mao conceded. In 1949, Stalin supported the formation of “a people’s democratic dictatorship” instead of “a proletarian dictatorship” after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1927–1937, 1945–1949). Shortly before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the first Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, representing the Communist-dominated United Front, approved the Common Program, which laid out the basics of the state system. It relied on the concept of “democratic dictatorship of the people,” which was defined as the power of the United Front of the “working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie, led by the working class.” The Common Program envisioned the convocation of a parliamentary body, the National People’s Congress (Li 2001, 32–35, 38–39; Tikhvinskii and Galenovich 2017, 8: 21–23, 25).

In 1949, Stalin argued that the Chinese constitution, to be adopted by 1954, was supposed to reflect the pre-socialist stage. Mao by contrast wanted to postpone the constitution until after socialism was built. In the fall of 1952, Stalin reaffirmed his previous position, and Mao conceded (Li 2001, 39–41). In February 1953, the Chinese government introduced the law for unequal, indirect, and non-universal elections to the National People’s Congress, similar to the Soviet elections before 1936. The entire process was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. The elections continued for over a year between May 1953 and July 1954. In January 1954, the government formed a constitutional commission under Mao, who proceeded with the plan despite Stalin’s death in March 1953. Among other Party leaders only Liu Shaoqi worked on the text. The initial draft was prepared by Mao and his aides Chen Boda, Hu Qiaomu, and Tian Jiaying. It was then revised by members of the



*Figure 7.2* “Housewives of Shanghai joyfully welcomed the publication of the draft constitution of the PRC,” 1954 (*Kitai*, No. 7, 1954, p. 3).

Politbiuro of the Communist Party and by senior members of the constitutional commission. In April 1954, the draft was put to a “popular discussion” (Figure 7.2), which resulted in a few minor revisions. The Government Administration Council pre-approved the draft on September 9, 1954, and the first session of the National People’s Congress unanimously adopted the Constitution on September 20, 1954 (Diamant and Feng 2015, 22–24; Li 2001, 29, 42–45; Sudarikov 1955, 82–90; Tikhvinskii and Galenovich 2017, 8:55–57).

The Mongolian Constitution of 1940 was amended several times, in 1944, 1949, and 1952. In 1946, Mongolia’s independence was recognized by the Guomindang’s government of China, and in October 1949 the Mongolian and Chinese People’s Republics established relations (Iaskina 2007, 177–78, 186).

### **Sovereignty and political subjectivity**

The most common sources of sovereignty and collective bearers of political subjectivity in the constitutions of Soviet dependencies were the “people,”

the “toilers,” and the classes of workers and toiling peasants, which were at times mentioned simultaneously. Several constitutions mentioned multiple peoples or nationalities, while the East German Constitution also referred to regions (lands).

The “people,” which could mean the whole population (nation) or imply the social category of the working people (toilers), was the most common source of sovereignty and political subject. All Soviet dependencies, except East Germany and Czechoslovakia, had the words “people’s republic” in their official names. “People’s democracy” was explicitly mentioned in the constitutions of China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania (1952), and Poland (1952). Only the 1952 Romanian Constitution defined “people’s democracy,” specifying that it was the power of the toilers (Durdenevskii 1948a, 50; Israelian 1954, 27; Karev 1953, 6–7; Kotok 1954, 36; Sudarikov 1955, 29). With the exception of the Small Constitution of Poland, universal elections<sup>13</sup> were mentioned in all constitutions, although several population groups were disenfranchised in China,<sup>14</sup> Hungary,<sup>15</sup> and Romania,<sup>16</sup> making the legislation there more restrictive than in the USSR. Like in the Soviet text, the expression “all citizens” was mentioned in most of the constitutions, even if the “people” was not discussed as the source of sovereignty (Chernilovskii 1947, 37; Demidov 1952, 52; Durdenevskii 1948a, 51; 1948c, 88; Israelian 1954, 46; Karev 1953, 26; Kuprits 1951, 13; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 50; Lazarev 1952, 25; People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 56; Sobinov 1953, 39; Sudarikov 1955, 82; Tavrov 1952, 55; Trainin 1940, 189).

The people as the source of sovereignty was explicitly mentioned in the constitutions of Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Poland (1947 and 1952), Romania (1948 and 1952), and Yugoslavia. The Constitution of Albania initially stated that “all power originated in the people and belonged to the people.” The 1950 amendments changed this provision, but the constitution still mentioned “sovereignty of the people and the state” and the universally elected representatives of the people (Kuprits 1951, 3, 7, 13; People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 51, 56). The Bulgarian Constitution claimed that the People’s Republic emerged from the heroic struggle of the “Bulgarian people” and stated that all power originated in the people and belonged to the people (Lazarev 1952, 25). The Czechoslovak Constitution stated that the people were “the only source of power in the state” (Durdenevskii 1948a, 51). The Hungarian Constitution mentioned “the sovereignty of the people” but excluded the “enemies of the toiling people” from the franchise (Israelian 1954, 30, 46). The East German Constitution spoke of the German people (Sobinov 1953, 27). The North Korean Constitution vested the power in the people (Tavrov 1952, 55). In Romania, the Constitution of 1948 stated that “all state power originates in the people and belongs to the people” (Durdenevskii 1948c, 87). The Constitution of 1952 did not include such a provision but still mentioned national independence, sovereignty of the Romanian people, and the

interests of the “popular masses” (Kotok 1954, 31–32). Yugoslavia was defined as a people’s state, in which “all power originates in the people and belongs to the people” (Chernilovskii 1947, 35–36). According to Sadchikov, Tito removed the statement that all power belonged to “urban and rural toilers,” like in the Soviet Union, from the original draft (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 328).

The national understanding of the people was especially strong in the Chinese and Polish cases, even though the social aspect was also there. The Chinese Constitution located all power with the people and, by including the overseas Chinese into the franchise, made the national understanding prominent. At the same time, it mentioned ethnic heterogeneity and implied the social understanding of the people, stating that there were enemies of the people inside each nationality (Sudarikov 1955, 29–31, 35). The Small Constitution of 1947 spoke of the Polish people or nation as the main collective subject (Republic of Poland 1947). The Polish Constitution of 1952 mentioned the progressive “traditions of the Polish people,” the struggle against “national slavery” against Prussian, Austrian, and Russian colonizers, and national revival in its preamble; the Sejm officially embodied the sovereign rights of the people (Karev 1953, 5, 11). Stalin made the national aspect of the draft more prominent, removing, for instance, a direct mention of Soviet leadership from the preamble (Noskova 2012, 579).

The toilers as a source of sovereignty and a bearer of political subjectivity were mentioned in the constitutions of Albania (after the amendments of 1950), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland (1952), and Romania (1952). Similar to the Soviet Constitution of 1936, in most cases this made the texts self-contradictory, with both the inclusionary people and the exclusionary toilers serving as sources of sovereignty. The statement that all power belonged to the “urban and rural toilers” was copied from the respective article of the Soviet Constitution, while “the socialist state of workers and peasants” transformed into the state of toilers. The constitutions of Albania (before the amendments of 1950), East Germany, Romania (1948), and Yugoslavia granted the toilers or the toiling people assistance or special care (Chernilovskii 1947, 40; Demidov 1952, 37; Durdenevskii 1948c, 87; Israelian 1954, 28; Karev 1953, 5, 7; Kotok 1954, 31–33; Kuprits 1951, 3; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 36; People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 52; Sobinov 1953, 31; Trainin 1940, 179). Only the Mongolian Constitution provided an exhaustive definition of the toilers as the “arat herders, workers, and intelligentsia” (Demidov 1952, 37; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 36).

Apart from restricting the voting rights, the Chinese, Hungarian, and Romanian (1952) constitutions granted some other rights only to the “toilers” or the “toiling citizens” rather than simply the “citizens” (Fekete 2019, 202; Israelian 1954, 42–46; Kotok 1954, 52; Sudarikov 1955, 51; Trainin 1940, 187–89). The Polish Constitution of 1952 claimed that the People’s Republic defended the toilers from the forces which were “hostile to the

people” and contained a self-contradictory paragraph, claiming that the Sejm represented the will of the toilers and manifested the sovereign rights of the people (Karev 1953, 7, 11). When there was no explicit tension between the people and the toilers, it was implied. The Yugoslav Constitution specified, “Every citizen is obliged to work according to his abilities: whoever does not give to society cannot receive from it” (Chernilovskii 1947, 44). During the discussion of the draft, Sadchikov claimed that “popular sovereignty” made Yugoslavia akin to “bourgeois democratic republics” but also mentioned that a base for future class differentiation was present, citing the assistance to the toilers and the abovementioned clause. According to Sadchikov, Kardelj informed him that the clause would be used to crush the bourgeoisie (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 326–27).

Class sovereignty and subjectivity was articulated in the Albanian, Chinese, Hungarian, Polish (1952), and Romanian (1948 and 1952) constitutions. After the amendments of 1950, Albania was defined as “a state of workers and toiling peasants” (Kuprits 1951, 3). The Chinese Constitution specified that the state was “led by the working class and based on the union of workers and peasants” (Sudarikov 1955, 31). The Romanian Constitution of 1948 maintained that the state emerged as a result of the people’s struggle under the leadership of the working class (Durdenevskii 1948c, 87), while the Constitution of 1952 referred to the “toilers” led by the “working class” and mentioned its union with toiling peasants, again specifying the leading role of the working class (Kotok 1954, 31–32). In the Hungarian Constitution, the state of “workers and toiling peasants” was also based on the union of the two classes under the leadership of the former (Israelian 1954, 27–28). The Polish Constitution of 1952 ascribed state-building to the “heroic working class” and the union of workers and peasants under the former as the most “advanced class” of the society. It also mentioned the liquidation of the exploiter classes as the objective of the People’s Republic (Karev 1953, 5–7).

Nationalities as sources of sovereignty, political subjects, or bearers of special rights were mentioned in the constitutions of China, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was constituted as a federation, like the USSR, but unlike a union of equal republics (Trainin 1940, 180), Yugoslavia was a union of equal peoples based on self-determination. Like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia also included territorial autonomies within union republics (Chernilovskii 1947, 35). The biggest difference between the two federations was the lack of the right to secession in Yugoslavia. According to Sadchikov, Tito and Kardelj argued that, unlike in the USSR, there were no deep “national differences” in Yugoslavia since all peoples were Slavic. They also argued that the peoples were not numerous enough to function as sovereign (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 326). In the 1940s, there were discussions of larger Eastern European federations among the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders, including the possible merger of Bulgaria and Albania with Yugoslavia



(Perović 2007). Besides, the Yugoslav Communists criticized the Bulgarian draft constitution for hampering the self-determination of the Macedonians (Volokitina 1999, 1: 393).

In 1945–1955, no Soviet dependency other than Yugoslavia was constituted as a federation. The Czechoslovak Constitution established a state “of two equal Slavic peoples, the Czechs and the Slovaks,” with the latter getting their own national bodies (Durdenevskii 1948a, 51). This political community was exclusionary in the ethnic sense. Already the electoral law of April 1948 disenfranchised the Hungarians and the Germans. In May 1948, the exclusion of the Hungarians from the Constitution led to a conflict between the Hungarian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Bolsheviks criticized the absence of national minority rights from the Czechoslovak Constitution but also rebuked the existence of separate bodies for the Slovaks, which ostensibly made the Czechs unequal to them. In June 1948, after the Constitution was enacted, the Czechoslovak leadership assured Molotov that ensuring the legal equality of the Hungarians with the Czechs and the Slovaks was a priority for the cabinet (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 874, 912; Volokitina 1999, 1: 615–16, 620).

The Constitution of China stated that different nationalities untied into “one great family of free and equal peoples” and established a “unitary multinational state” with autonomy for territories where particular national minorities predominated (Sudarikov 1955, 30–31). Both Romanian constitutions included the rights of national minorities, while the 1952 one established a territorial autonomy for the Hungarians, the Magyar (Hungarian) Autonomous Region (Durdenevskii 1948c, 88; Kotok 1954, 32, 37–38). During the “popular discussion,” the Hungarian Autonomous Region evoked many questions pertaining to possible travel restrictions between it and other regions, to the official language, and to the voting rights of the Romanians there (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 804). The North Korean Constitution specified that national minorities had the right to use their language and develop national culture (Tavrov 1952, 61). The Constitution of East Germany was the only one to include the subjectivity of regions (lands) (Sobinov 1953, 44, 51).

### **Supreme state institutions**

The constitutions of Soviet dependencies established different structures of government, although there were some shared aspects. Most of them did not introduce separation of powers, declaring parliaments the supreme bodies of state power, similar to the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Furthermore, with the exception of East Germany, standing bodies with legislative authority between parliamentary sessions had been established in all Soviet dependencies by 1955. Several constitutions also borrowed the contradiction between the locally organized councils, which ostensibly had all power, and the parliaments, as the supreme bodies, from the Soviet system.

Following the Soviet example, most of the constitutions proclaimed a universally elected parliament the supreme body of state power, which meant that there was no separation of powers. The only exceptions were the Small Constitution of Poland and the Constitution of Czechoslovakia, which called the Legislative Sejm and the National Assembly, respectively, the supreme *legislative* bodies. In the case of Czechoslovakia, there was also a separate legislative body in Slovakia, the Slovak National Council. Most of the constitutions, with the exception of the East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav ones, specified that the parliament was the sole legislative authority. In the case of East Germany, the universally elected People's Chamber was declared the "supreme state body," but there was also the second chamber, the Chamber of Lands, which was formed by the parliaments of the lands. The Hungarian Constitution stated that the State Assembly had legislative rights. In East Germany, parliamentary elections were direct to the People's Chamber and indirect to the Chamber of Lands. In Mongolia (before 1949) and China, they were indirect. The Chinese Constitution did not introduce a universal franchise and made urban votes more important than rural ones, which made it similar to the Soviet Constitution of 1918, although there were fewer voting restrictions in the Chinese case. The Chinese Constitution also established a fixed number of seats for national minorities and for the overseas Chinese in the National People's Congress (Chernilovskii 1947, 50–51, 62; Demidov 1952, 41, 52; Durdenevskii 1948a, 51; 1948b, 64; 1948c, 89; Iaskina 2007, 186; Israelian 1954, 30–31; Karev 1953, 7, 10; Kotok 1954, 33, 38; Kuprits 1951, 13; Lazarev 1952, 28; Mongolian People's Republic 1947, 39, 42–43, 45–46; People's Republic of Albania 1947, 56; Sobinov 1953, 44; Sudarikov 1955, 35, 82, 86–87; Tavrov 1952, 55, 62; Trainin 1940, 182; Republic of Poland 1947; Vyshinskii 1938, 427, 431–32, 436).

In Yugoslavia, the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities, the two chambers whose names and design were adapted from the Supreme Soviet, were established as directly elected and equal. The whole People's Assembly was proclaimed the supreme body of state power at the federal level, while the individual republics had their own people's assemblies. The departure from the Soviet model in 1953 included the absorption of the Council of Nationalities into the Federal Council and the creation of a new chamber, the Council of Producers, consisting of delegates from workers' councils and other economic organizations. Direct universal elections were partially kept only for the Federal Council (Chernilovskii 1947, 50–51, 62; Nikiforov 2011, 608–10).

All constitutions (except the Small Constitution of Poland) established standing bodies which were active between parliamentary sessions. In most cases, they were the presidiums of the parliaments, modeled after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. According to the Small Constitution of Poland, the Sejm could grant legislative authority to the Cabinet between the parliamentary sessions. The Polish Constitution of 1952 made the State

Council, which the Small Constitution established as an executive body separate from the Sejm, similar to the standing bodies of parliaments in other Soviet dependencies. The State Council, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in China, and the presidiums<sup>17</sup> elsewhere had broad competence, including the right to issue decrees, and in most cases were the collective heads of state. In Czechoslovakia, the Presidium of the National Assembly had limited competence, and the provisional legislation, adopted between parliamentary sessions, had to be supported by the President and the Prime Minister and approved by the National Assembly upon its convocation. East Germany remained the only Soviet dependency where a potent standing body had not been created by 1955, but the People's Chamber still formed three standing commissions, on general matters, on economic and financial matters, and on foreign affairs. In Yugoslavia, the competence of the Presidium of the People's Assembly was narrower than that of its Soviet counterpart, and in 1953 it was abolished completely. Instead, the President and the Federal Executive Council, led by the former, were to be elected by the People's Assembly (Chernilovskii 1947, 55–57; Demidov 1952, 43–44; Durdenevskii 1948a, 58; 1948c, 89; Iaskina 2007, 186; Israelian 1954, 33–34; Karev 1953, 12–14; Kotok 1954, 41–42; Kuprits 1951, 16–17; Lazarev 1952, 31–32; Neal 1954, 233–34; People's Republic of Albania 1947, 57; Sobinov 1953, 40; Sudarikov 1955, 37–39; Tavrov 1952, 65–66; Trainin 1940, 182–83; Republic of Poland 1947; Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1997, 1: 327–28).

Soviet officials rebuked the amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution, known as the Yugoslav Constitutional Act of 1953. In particular, they decried the introduction of the office of the President, claiming that it gave one man the “supreme legislative, executive, and military power” and negated the democratic achievements of the Yugoslav people (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 907). There were, however, presidents in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland (until 1952) as well. In Czechoslovakia, the President, also elected by the parliament, had broad competence (Durdenevskii 1948a, 51, 59). In East Germany, the President, elected by the two chambers, had mostly representative functions but could also issue orders, which needed to be approved by the Prime Minister or the responsible minister (Sobinov 1953, 41, 50). The Small Constitution of Poland retained the President, elected by the Sejm, as part of the executive branch, but the 1952 Constitution abolished the office and made the State Council the collective head of state (Republic of Poland 1921; Karev 1953, 13; Republic of Poland 1947). The Chinese Constitution gave broad executive and military competence to the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, elected by the National People's Congress (Sudarikov 1955, 40–42).

Most of the constitutions established locally formed bodies, most frequently called “councils,” which followed the example of the soviets in the USSR. Two of them also borrowed the key contradiction between the clause which made parliament the supreme body of state power and the clause

which gave all power to the soviets (Trainin 1940, 179, 182, 186). In 1950, the statement that “All power in the People’s Republic of Albania belongs to the urban and rural toilers as represented by the people’s councils” was added to the Albanian Constitution (Kuprits 1951, 3; People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 51). In a similar manner, the Mongolian Constitution stated that “All power in the Mongolian People’s Republic belongs to the urban and *khudon* toilers as represented by the *khurals* [assemblies]” of the toilers. Like in the Soviet case, the Great People’s Khural and the territorial *khurals* of toiler’s deputies were different institutions, since the latter were explicitly called “local bodies of state power” (Demidov 1952, 37, 41, 46; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 36).

Other constitutions, however, managed to avoid this contradiction. In Romania, the Constitution of 1948 simply defined the people’s councils as the local bodies of state power (Durdenevskii 1948c, 92), as did the constitutions of Bulgaria and Hungary (Israelian 1954, 38; Lazarev 1952, 35). The Albanian (before the amendments of 1950), Chinese, North Korean, Romanian (1952), Polish (1952), and Yugoslav constitutions also defined such bodies as local bodies of state power but connected them to the larger system. The Yugoslav Constitution stated that the people realized their power through the “representative bodies,” which included both the people’s committees and the parliaments at the republican and federal levels (Chernilovskii 1947, 36, 66). The same approach was used in the Albanian Constitution before the amendments (People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 51, 60). The Romanian Constitution of 1952 stated that the power belonging to the “urban and rural toilers” was realized through the Great National Assembly and people’s councils (Kotok 1954, 33, 46). In a similar manner, the Polish Constitution of 1952 stated that the toilers acted through their representatives in the Sejm and in the “people’s councils,” which were already mentioned in the Small Constitution (Karev 1953, 7, 14, 16; Republic of Poland 1947). The Chinese Constitution stated that “All power in the Chinese People’s Republic belongs to the people as represented by the National People’s Congress and local people’s congresses” (Sudarikov 1955, 31, 44). The North Korean Constitution stated that the people’s committees assisted the Supreme National Assembly (Tavrov 1952, 55, 71). The Czechoslovak and East German constitutions did not use the concept of local bodies of state power. The former still described the territorial people’s (national) committees as part of the unified public administration (Durdenevskii 1948b, 67). The latter established a system of local self-government (Sobinov 1953, 57–58).

Most of the constitutions used the word “supreme” in relation to the cabinets, courts, and prosecutors, but only the Small Constitution of Poland clearly established the separation of legislative (the Legislative Sejm), executive (the President, the State Council, and the Cabinet), and judicial (independent courts) powers (Republic of Poland 1947). The constitutions of Albania, Bulgaria, China, Mongolia, Poland (1952), Romania, and Yugoslavia followed the Soviet Constitution of 1936, which made the

Council of People's Commissars the "supreme executive and administrative body" (Trainin 1940, 184), when discussing the cabinets (Chernilovskii 1947, 58; Demidov 1952, 44; Durdenevskii 1948c, 91; Karev 1953, 14; Kotok 1954, 43; Kuprits 1951, 17; Lazarev 1952, 32; Mongolian People's Republic 1947, 41; People's Republic of Albania 1947, 58; Sudarikov 1955, 42). The North Korean Constitution stated that the Cabinet of Ministers had "supreme executive" power (Tavrov 1952, 66). The Hungarian Constitution defined the Council of Ministers as the "supreme body of state administration" (Israelian 1954, 35). In the cases of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, supreme executive authority as a concept was not mentioned. The Czechoslovak Constitution divided the central executive authority between the President and the Cabinet, while Slovakia also had its own cabinet (Durdenevskii 1948a, 60; 1948b, 62–63). The East German Constitution did not include the word executive at all when discussing the Cabinet (Sobinov 1953, 47).

Following the Soviet example (Trainin 1940, 187), supreme courts as supreme judicial bodies were introduced in Albania (after the 1950 amendments), China (as the Supreme People's Court), Mongolia, North Korea, and Poland (1952) (Demidov 1952, 50; Karev 1953, 19; Kuprits 1951, 23; Mongolian People's Republic 1947, 44; Sudarikov 1955, 49; Tavrov 1952, 75). Supreme courts were also established by the constitution of Albania (prior to the amendments), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania (1948), and Yugoslavia but the notion of supreme judicial authority was not articulated (Chernilovskii 1947, 68; Durdenevskii 1948b, 68; 1948c, 92; Israelian 1954, 40; Kotok 1954, 49; Lazarev 1952, 37; People's Republic of Albania 1947, 61; Sobinov 1953, 55).

With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the office of prosecutor general and the respective agency were established in all Soviet dependencies. The Soviet notion of "supreme" legal oversight was used in relation to such an office in the constitutions of Bulgaria (where it was called the Chief Prosecutor), Mongolia, and Romania (1952) (Demidov 1952, 50–51; Kotok 1954, 50; Lazarev 1952, 376; Mongolian People's Republic 1947, 44; Trainin 1940, 187). The Chinese Constitution established the Supreme People's Prosecutor's Office and the position of the Prosecutor General (Sudarikov 1955, 50). The office of the Supreme Prosecutor was also established in Hungary (Israelian 1954, 41). The constitutions of North Korea and Poland (1952) did not use the word "supreme" when discussing the competence of the Prosecutor General (Karev 1953, 19; Tavrov 1952, 75–76). The Romanian Constitution of 1948 limited the Prosecutor General's oversight functions to criminal law (Durdenevskii 1948c, 93). In the constitutions of Yugoslavia and Albania, the prosecutor's office was defined as a body of the parliament (Chernilovskii 1947, 70–71; Kuprits 1951, 23; People's Republic of Albania 1947, 61–62). The East German Constitution mentioned the Prosecutor General but did not specify the competence of the office (Sobinov 1953, 55).

## **Dependence**

Some of the constitutions made the dependence on the USSR, the socialist ideology, and the special role of the ruling parties explicit. The USSR was presented as the liberator, as a model, and as an ally in several texts. Some constitutions also mentioned or implied the goal of building socialism. The ruling parties were mentioned only in several cases.

The constitutions of China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (1952) mentioned the Soviet Union. The Czechoslovak Constitution cited the Great October Revolution as the inspiration and the “Russian workers and peasants” as the example for the Czechs and the Slovaks. It also mentioned the country’s liberation with the help of the Allies, the USSR in the first place. The USSR was called “the great Slavic power,” which strengthened the nationalist aspect of the Constitution (Durdenevskii 1948a, 50–51). The Hungarian Constitution mentioned the liberation by the “great Soviet Union” and its “selfless support” for rebuilding the country (Israelian 1954, 27). The Polish Constitution of 1952 referenced the liberation through the Soviet victory and claimed that the Polish working class relied on the Soviet experience of socialist construction (Karev 1953, 5–6). The 1952 Constitution of Romania claimed that the formation of the People’s Republic resulted from the Soviet victory over German fascism and Romania’s liberation by the Soviet Army. The Constitution also mentioned the friendship and alliance with the USSR and its “selfless brotherly support and aid.” The friendship and union with the countries of people’s democracy were also included into the formulation of the state’s foreign policy in the Constitution (Kotok 1954, 31–33). The Chinese Constitution also referred to the “unbreakable friendship” with the “great” USSR and the “countries of people’s democracy” (Sudarikov 1955, 30–31).

Socialism was mentioned in the constitutions of Albania (after the amendments of 1950), China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania. The Mongolian Constitution stated that the country was following the “non-capitalist path of development” for the eventual “transition to socialism” (Demidov 1952, 37; Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 36). The amended Albanian Constitution stated that the foundations of socialism had already been built in the country (Kuprits 1951, 3; People’s Republic of Albania 1947, 51). The Czechoslovak Constitution mentioned the peaceful way to socialism (Durdenevskii 1948a, 50). The Hungarian Constitution stated that the country was on its way to socialism and cited Soviet assistance in building its foundations (Israelian 1954, 27–28). The 1952 constitutions of Poland and Romania included the goal of building socialism (Karev 1953, 6; Kotok 1954, 32). The Chinese Constitution also set the goal of building “prosperous and happy socialist society” (Sudarikov 1955, 29). The East German Constitution did not mention socialism but referred to social justice and state economic plans (Sobinov 1953, 27, 32–33).

Parties were mentioned only in the cases of Albania, China, and Romania. The reference to the special role of the Party of Labor of Albania

was included in the Constitution in 1950. Like in the Soviet case, it was mentioned in the clause on the right to association: “conscientious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the toiling people are united in the Party of Labor of Albania” (Kuprits 1951, 8; Smirnova 2003, 303; Trainin 1940, 188). A similar passage on the Romanian Workers’ Party was included in the Romanian Constitution of 1952. The text also referenced the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party in the creation of the state twice (Kotok 1954, 31, 33, 54). The Chinese Constitution stated that the Chinese Communist Party led the Chinese people to its victory (Sudarikov 1955, 29–30).

### **Nonconstitutional institutions**


Similar to the USSR, the parties, which were at best only briefly mentioned in the constitutions, and the leaders, whose authority derived from their positions in the parties, played pivotal roles in the political systems of Soviet dependencies. The central bodies of the ruling parties became the *de facto* supreme government agencies. The leaders performed as the heads of state irrespective of their government offices. The VKP(b)/CPSU, the Soviet government, and the Soviet leader were often presented as external sources of authority, even when there was no Soviet military presence.

The monopolization of control over political and social life by the communist parties, irrespective of their official names and nominal popular front arrangements, happened before the adoption of the constitutions in most cases. The Yugoslav Communist Boris Zihelr acknowledged the formation of a one-party regime in January 1946. “The word ‘party’ in Yugoslavia has the same meaning as in the USSR: the people mean exclusively the Communist Party by it” (Volokitina 1999, 1: 271). Each of the domestic communist parties in Soviet dependencies became known as the “Party” in the respective context, and their control of the government was not concealed. This was an intentional policy. When the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict developed in 1948, Stalin rebuked the lack of public presence from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its semi-legal status, claiming that “according to the theory of Marxism, the party has to control all state bodies of the country.”<sup>18</sup> Within the parties themselves, small ruling circles became the main governing bodies, with one or several persons having the final say. The nominal character of popular fronts was also not concealed (Mar’ina 2005, 2:91–92; Noskova 2012, 576–77). The coverage of the Third Congress of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front in 1952, for instance, claimed that the program and the main goals of the Communist Party and the Fatherland Front were the same.<sup>19</sup>

The leadership of the ruling parties in people’s democratic state-building, building socialism, and developing the country was affirmed in propaganda.<sup>20</sup> East Germany, for instance, ostensibly owed all of its achievements to the Party.<sup>21</sup> The “correct policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea” was

deemed the source of inspiration for the “Korean people” in the Korean War (1950–1953).<sup>22</sup> The people and the toilers were occasionally said to “love” their respective party.<sup>23</sup> Propaganda outlets presented party congresses (Figure 7.3) and conferences (Figure 7.4) as events of great importance. The plenums of central committees were treated as the main decision-making bodies.<sup>24</sup>

Even though the decisions were made in small circles, it was indeed at the large party gatherings, and not, for instance, in the parliaments, where the most important policies were announced. Ulbricht, for instance, proclaimed the objective of building socialism in East Germany at the Second Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party in 1952 (Figure 7.4), and “thousands” of people ostensibly promised the Conference to engage in “socialist competition” in order to achieve it.<sup>25</sup> A report on the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1954 presented the Party as the inspiration for “all honest citizens of Czechoslovakia” and as their educator. “Faith in the Party, in the truth of its teachings, in the correctness of its path, kindled a flame in the hearts and minds of the people.” The report attached features of a parliament to the Congress, arguing that it brought together representatives of all “spheres of our national life and all regions of our republic,” the “genuine representatives of the Party and the Czechoslovak people.”<sup>26</sup>



*Figure 7.3* The Second National Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania, Tirana, April 10–14, 1950 (*Novaia Albaniia*, No. 32–33, April–May 1950, front matter).





*Figure 7.4* The Second Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party, Berlin, July 10, 1952. Front row, left to right: Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck, and Otto Grotewohl (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183–15410-0097/ CC-BY-SA 3.0).

Although the achievements of the people were mentioned, especially prominently in Poland,<sup>27</sup> propaganda outlets tended to present the people not as the political subjects but as the followers of the ruling party and the implementers of its tasks. The election results, which usually reported victories of the respective fronts with over 99 percent of votes, were presented as the unity of the whole people and its affirmation of the tasks, set by the party, the cabinet, or the leader. The support for the party was often presented as unanimous.<sup>28</sup> The notion of “the moral-political unity” of the people under the party’s leadership as, for instance, articulated in North Korean propaganda,<sup>29</sup> was borrowed directly from the Soviet discourse (Gill 2011, 105).

In the parliaments, the hierarchy did not change, as there was no deliberation on the presented goals and plans. The coverage of parliamentary sessions included references to the “objectives” and “directives,” set by party and the leader, which the people were striving to fulfill, and often stressed the unanimity of decisions.<sup>30</sup> A report on the session of the Grand National Assembly of Romania, for instance, stressed the commitment to fight for the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan, which rank-and-file deputies

made “on behalf of the workers, engineers, and technicians.”<sup>31</sup> In North Korea, the Supreme People’s Assembly was said to have adopted the budget in order to implement the policies of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Cabinet.<sup>32</sup> The linkage between the party authorities and the populace, political and ideological education and socialization, and the integration of diverse social groups within one state were in fact the primary tasks of the state socialist parliaments, given that they did not engage in deliberative legislation (Nelson 1982, 4, 7–9, 11; for a discussion of the Czechoslovak case, see Gjuricová 2019).

In Albania, the complete subordination of the People’s Assembly to the Party was openly acknowledged.

The strength of the Albanian state, of the people’s democratic system lies in the strength of the Party and the full provision of its leading and controlling role in the entire work of the state apparatus. Therefore, the first session of the Third People’s Assembly, unanimously expressing the will of the people, revealed love and unbreakable loyalty to the Party and its Central Committee, unanimously approving the program of the new Cabinet, which in turn undertook, like all previous people’s Cabinets, to unswervingly implement the Party line.<sup>33</sup>

The exact status of individual leaders differed across the informal Soviet empire, but there was always one or several persons who were treated as the *de facto* head(s) of the respective state. Within their states, the power of some of the leaders was comparable to that of Stalin in the Soviet Union, and many of them modeled their behavior and images on Stalin (Naimark 2017, 70). This applied in particular to Hoxha in Albania, Valko Chervenkov in Bulgaria, Mao in China, Rákosi in Hungary, Choibalsan in Mongolia, Kim in North Korea, and Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania (after the purges of other leaders in 1952). They usually were prime ministers and first or general secretaries<sup>34</sup> of the respective ruling parties. With the exception of the presidents Gottwald and Beirut, most of the leaders were not formally heads of state, but they were nevertheless presented as the leaders (often “great” and “beloved”) of the people or the toiling people in propaganda outlets. Hoxha was, for instance, called “the organizer of our victories,” the “leader of the Albanian people,” the “founder and organizer” of the Albanian state. The leaders of the people in Soviet dependencies were mutually recognized as such.<sup>35</sup> Domestic personality cults involved broad circulation of the leaders’ images and statements, public celebrations of their birthdays, and publication of their works.<sup>36</sup> There were also cults of the deceased leaders, which were modeled after that of Lenin in the USSR, and included those of Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Sun Yat-sen in China, Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, and Damdiny Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan in Mongolia<sup>37</sup> (Apor et al. 2004; Iaskina 2007, 187; Mar’ina 2005, 2:92; Myadar 2019, 60).

Several regimes had collective leadership. In East Germany, where the

recent history of Nazism made a single leader problematic, Wilhelm Pieck (President), Grotewohl (Prime Minister), and Ulbricht (First Secretary of the Party) were all celebrated in propaganda outlets (Figure 7.4), while the Party was defined as the “Leader of the Nation.”<sup>38</sup> The notion of the Party as the “genuine leader, inspirator, and teacher of the people” was also used in Czechoslovakia. Although Antonín Zápotocký succeeded Gottwald, who died, as the President and was prominently featured in propaganda,<sup>39</sup> Antonín Novotný headed the Party. The German and Czechoslovak (since 1953) cases were, however, an exception. In Poland, where Bolesław Bierut, Jakub Berman, and Hilary Minc ruled as a group, Moscow still considered Bierut as the leader of the Party and hence its primary contact in Poland, and he was celebrated as such in propaganda outlets.<sup>40</sup> Individuals also consolidated their positions through the purges, which were initiated or sanctioned by Moscow, as was the case in Romania. With the exception of Ana Pauker,<sup>41</sup> who was purged by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1952, all leaders were men (Hodos 1987, 94; Mar’ina 2005, 2:107, 136; Noskova 2012, 569).

Although only the “Choibalsan Constitution” in Mongolia and the “Dimitrov Constitution” followed the example of the “Stalin Constitution” of the USSR, propaganda outlets still presented some of the leaders as the key actors in drafting the constitutions (Figure 7.1), presenting the drafts, and getting them adopted<sup>42</sup> (Figure 7.5).



*Figure 7.5* Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (center) and Petru Groza (left) voting for the Constitution of Romania at the Thirteenth Session of the Grand National Assembly, September 24, 1952 (*Fototeca online a comunismului românesc*, Photograph #IA174, 174/1952).



*Figure 7.6* Mátyás Rákosi and his wife Fenia Fedorovna Kornilova voting in the local council election, Budapest, October 22, 1950 (Fortepan #126963/ Bauer Sándor, CC BY-SA 3.0).

The leaders were also featured during the implementation of the constitutions. There were numerous reports and photographs of the leaders campaigning, voting in elections (Figure 7.6), being nominated and elected as deputies to local and central bodies, speaking in parliaments and other assemblies, or being appointed to offices by them.<sup>43</sup> Gheorghiu-Dej was, for instance, called “the best son of the Romanian people” and “the first candidate,”<sup>44</sup> while Chervenkov was celebrated as the “first deputy of the toilers.”<sup>45</sup> Gheorghiu-Dej was often shown voting in the parliament.<sup>46</sup> In a similar manner, the leaders were featured during the coverage of party assemblies.<sup>47</sup>

Soviet representatives participated in state-building across the informal empire, often at the formal request of the respective leaders. In 1949, for instance, Gottwald asked Stalin to send advisors to assist in establishing bodies of state security and border control. Although initially these advisors were considered temporary, in 1950 they were already treated as permanent both in Moscow and in Prague (Volokitina, Islamov, and Murashko 1998, 2: 382). In 1951–1952, numerous Soviet advisors came to Czechoslovakia, and there was even a request to send a “chief advisor” to work in the government, which Moscow denied (Mar’ina 2005, 2:102). Whereas terror, coercion, anti-religious campaigns, and mass purges were perpetuated by domestic authorities most of

the time, the Soviets also occasionally intervened directly, as was the case when they suppressed the East German uprising in 1953 (Naimark 2017, 72–76).

Soviet representatives often criticized the policies of the dependent regimes, sometimes citing the constitutions. In 1948, for instance, Zorin criticized the restrictive religious law in Bulgaria, fearing that it could stimulate opposition among the clergy and believers in the country and cause a reaction abroad. Moscow then advised the Bulgarian Communists to change the law so that it would follow the Constitution (Volokitina 1999, 1: 643, 645–46). In 1950, a Soviet secret police advisor informed Rákosi that the existing police courts were unconstitutional, and Rákosi agreed to form people's courts instead (Volokitina 2002, 2: 271). In 1953, Soviet representatives described the state subventions to the Catholic Church and religious education in Poland as unconstitutional (Volokitina 2002, 2: 861).

Propaganda outlets often cited the supremacy of the VKP(b)/CPSU, the Soviet Union, and their leaders. The cult of Stalin spread across the whole informal empire (Naimark 2017, 70). Portraits of Stalin were displayed in domestic and public settings (Figure 7.2), including polling stations (Figure 7.7). Almost 13 million copies of the works of Stalin and Lenin had been, for instance, printed in Romanian by the end of 1954 (Deletant 2018, 67). Numerous places were named after Stalin and Lenin. Domestic events were often accompanied by the portraits of Soviet leaders (Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4). The



*Figure 7.7* Elections to the People's Assembly and district people's councils of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, December 18, 1949 (State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia (GTsMSIR) 27126/163).

respective peoples and parties were said to “love” the USSR, its people, and Stalin, who was often called a “genius.” Domestic communist parties were said to learn and get inspiration from the VKP(b) and the USSR. The XIX Congress of the VKP(b)/CPSU and the anniversaries of the October Revolution were widely celebrated.<sup>48</sup> Bulgarian propaganda, for instance, referred to the Soviet Union as the “double liberator and selfless patron,”<sup>49</sup> while Romanian propaganda deemed Stalin “the genius teacher of the toilers of the whole world.”<sup>50</sup> In a similar manner, the report on the Second Party Congress in Albania stated, that “The Congress clearly revealed the boundless love and loyalty of the Party of Labor and the entire Albanian people to the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet Union, and the genius leader of all humanity, Comrade Stalin.”<sup>51</sup>

Bilateral meetings and events, including the visits of ensembles and circus troupes, within the informal Soviet empire were accompanied by the portraits of the leaders of the two sides and those of Soviet leaders, even if the Soviet side was not involved (Figure 7.8). After Stalin’s death, the portraits of Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov and then Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin were displayed as those of the current leaders. Given that the influence of the two within the USSR was far from that of Stalin, this meant that the Soviet leader as an institution, rather than Stalin personally, had symbolic importance.<sup>52</sup>




Figure 7.8 Czechoslovak Ambassador to China František Komzala giving a speech before the performance of the Czechoslovak circus troupe, Beijing, December 1953. Portraits, left to right: Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov, Antonín Zápotocký, and Mao Zedong (*Kitai*, No. 1, 1954, p. 39).

The visits of Soviet specialists, the signing of treaties with the Soviet Union, Soviet aid, and the events known as the “Month of Friendship” with the Soviet Union contributed to the cohesion of the Soviet informal empire and were extensively covered in propaganda outlets.<sup>53</sup> The USSR and its dependencies also regularly exchanged parliamentary delegations (Figure 7.9). Soviet dependencies supported the USSR’s international initiatives, including its “struggle for peace” campaign<sup>54</sup> (Johnston 2008).

In 1955, the signing of the Warsaw Treaty was a major step toward the formal integration of the informal empire, although it was still confined to Europe. Hoxha, for instance, stressed the honor of joining the treaty and promised that the Albanian people would protect the interests of the “camp of socialism.”<sup>55</sup> Apart from the further integration of the informal empire, the regimes in the USSR and its dependencies strengthened their international legitimacy in 1955. The Supreme Soviet joined the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which meant that it became recognized as a parliament by the organization (Juviler 1961, 25). The same year, Albania,



*Figure 7.9* Delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the session of the State Assembly of the Hungarian People’s Republic, November 1955. Mátyás Rákosi is in the front on the right (GTsMSIR 31111/15).

Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were admitted to the United Nations, joining Czechoslovakia and Poland, its original members (“Member States” n.d.), which boosted the USSR’s position within the organization.

## **Conclusion**

The constitution-making in the informal Soviet empire in 1945–1955 continued the Bolshevik practice which started in the 1920s. The concepts of “people’s republic,” borrowed from the Ukrainian socialists, and “people’s democracy,” developed in the Comintern, contributed to the idea of a Soviet satellite in the general sense. At the same time, there was no coherent blueprint on how a “people’s republic” was to be constituted. Multiple actors joined the practical implementation of the idea in each particular context and, having adopted different elements from the Soviet Constitution of 1936, came up with different legal architectures. The sources of sovereignty, political subjectivity, supreme state institutions, and the indications of dependence on the USSR and the domestic communist party varied across the constitutions of Soviet dependencies. Whereas there were considerable similarities between some of the texts or their parts, only the establishment of a standing legislative body became the most prominent albeit also not ubiquitous feature of the dependent regimes in this period.

The nonconstitutional structural adjustments in governance were, however, much more profound. Similar to the VKP(b)/CPSU and Stalin in the USSR, the domestic communist parties and leaders came to dominate the political systems of Soviet dependencies. The fusion of parties and governments was openly admitted and in fact celebrated in propaganda outlets. So were the leaders, few of whom were the constitutional heads of state. Propaganda and political practice also demonstrated that the VKP(b)/CPSU, the Soviet government, and the Soviet leader played an explicit role of external sources of authority. The launch of de-Stalinization in 1956 threatened this nonconstitutional architecture, which is one of the reasons for its mixed reception in Soviet dependencies (A. R. 1956, 492–93) and the eventual splits with Albania and China. The same year, however, the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution demonstrated that Moscow was ready to use military measures for preserving its informal empire if ideological and pragmatic allegiance was insufficient (Borhi 2004, 3).

## **Periodicals**

*Bolgariia* [Bulgaria]

*Chekhoslovakiia* [Czechoslovakia]

*Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike* [German Democratic Republic in Construction]

*Kitai* [China]

*Kommunisticheskii internatsional* [Communist International]



*Narodnaia Pol'sha* [People's Poland]  
*Narodnaia Rumyniia* [People's Romania]  
*Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia* [People's Democratic Romania]  
*Novaia Albaniia* [New Albania]  
*Novaia Koreia* [New Korea]  
*Vengerskii biulleten'* [Hungarian Bulletin]

## Notes

- \* This study was completed as part of the project “ENTPAR: Entangled Parliamentarisms: Constitutional Practices in Russia, Ukraine, China and Mongolia, 1905–2005,” which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement no. 755504).
- 1 Major amendments to the 1921 Polish Constitution, which became known as the Small Constitution of 1947, predated the adoption of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland in 1952.
  - 2 The party was called the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) or the VKP(b) in 1925–1952.
  - 3 Propaganda usually presented the community of Soviet dependencies in a differentiated manner, as the countries of people’s democracy, the People’s Republic of China, and the German Democratic Republic (*Bolgariia*, No. 7, 1951, p. 3), but the notion of the “countries of people’s democracy in Europe and Asia” was also present (*Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3, 1954, p. 1).
  - 4 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 14, 1936, p. 93.
  - 5 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 23–24, 1935, p. 90; No. 16, 1936, p. 9.
  - 6 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 22, 1935, pp. 3, 5.
  - 7 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 18, 1936, p. 104; No. 5–6, 1936, p. 74.
  - 8 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 11–12, 1936, p. 52–53.
  - 9 The author is grateful to Aleksandr Shubin for his comment on the matter.
  - 10 *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 5, 1941, p. 98.
  - 11 The author is grateful to Cristian Vasile for his clarification on the matter.
  - 12 The author is grateful to Adéla Gjuríčová for her advice on the subject.
  - 13 In 1944, universal elections were introduced in Mongolia (Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 50).
  - 14 In China, the Constitution claimed that the elections were universal, with the exception of insane persons and those who were disenfranchised by law. The election law of 1953 specified that landowners who had not yet “changed their class affiliation according to law,” “counterrevolutionary” elements, and other individuals who were disenfranchised by court did not have active or passive voting rights (Sudarikov 1955, 51, 83).
  - 15 In Hungary, the “enemies of the toiling people” were disenfranchised (Israeliian 1954, 46).
  - 16 In Romania, voting rights to people’s councils were limited in 1950, with former industrialists, bankers, and other “representatives of large bourgeoisie,” as well as kulaks (prosperous peasants) being disenfranchised (*Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 5, 1950, p. 6; No. 6, 1950, p. 9). The Constitution of 1952 stated that only “toiling citizens” had voting rights. The elections were still called “universal” in the election law of 1952, but it reaffirmed the disenfranchised categories: “former landowners, former industrialists, former bankers, former large businessmen, kulaks, owners of private trade companies and small non-

- nationalized companies based on the exploitation of hired labor,” and those who were sentenced for war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity, in addition to the standard exclusion of insane persons and those disenfranchised by court (Kotok 1954, 56, 65).
- 17 In Mongolia, its functions were performed by the Small Khural and its Presidium (Mongolian People’s Republic 1947, 39–40). In 1949, the Small Khural was abolished, with the Presidium of the Great People’s Khural taking over its functions (Iaskina 2007, 186).
  - 18 RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), f. 558, op. 11, d. 398, l. 29 (To Comrade Tito and other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from Molotov and Stalin on behalf of the VKP (b) Central Committee, March 27, 1948).
  - 19 *Bolgariia*, No. 5, 1952, p. 31.
  - 20 *Kitai*, No. 5, 1954, p. 3; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 4, 1951, p. 2; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 11, 1951; *Novaia Koreia*, No. 6, 1954, p. 8; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 52, 1952, cover, p. 5.
  - 21 *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3, 1954, p. 1.
  - 22 *Novaia Koreia*, No. 2, 1955, p. 3.
  - 23 *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 7, 1954, p. 1; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 4–5, 1952, p. 4; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 32–33, 1950.
  - 24 *Bolgariia*, No. 2, 1954, p. 1; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 1, 1951; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 7, 1954; *Novaia Koreia*, No. 2, 1955, p. 4; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 29, 1951, p. 1.
  - 25 *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 5, 1952, p. 1.
  - 26 *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 7, 1954, p. 1.
  - 27 *Narodnaia Pol’sha*, July 1953.
  - 28 *Bolgariia*, No. 1, 1954, p. 2–3; *Narodnaia Rumyniia*, No. 12, 1955, p. 2; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 5, 1954; No. 6, 1954; No. 8, 1954; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 141, 1953, p. 6.
  - 29 *Novaia Koreia*, No. 9, 1954, p. 5.
  - 30 *Bolgariia*, No. 3, 1955, p. 31; No. 5, 1955, p. 5; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 52, 1952, cover, p. 5.
  - 31 *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 8, 1950, p. 4.
  - 32 *Novaia Koreia*, No. 6, 1954, p. 5; No. 4, 1955, p. 8.
  - 33 *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 8, 1954.
  - 34 In the VKP(b)/CPSU, there was no formal leader in 1934–1953.
  - 35 *Kitai*, No. 1, 1952, p. 2; No. 1, 1954, p. 2; No. 7, 1955, pp. 8–9; *Narodnaia Pol’sha*, December 1953; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 5, 1950, p. 6; No. 10–11, 1951, p. 8; No. 6, 1952, p. 2; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 11, 1951; *Novaia Koreia*, No. 6, 1954, p. 8; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 52, 1952, cover, p. 1.
  - 36 *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 1, 1951; *Kitai*, No. 11, 1951; No. 1, 1952, pp. 2–3; *Narodnaia Pol’sha*, July 1953; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 3, 1950, p. 1; No. 5, 1951, p. 1; No. 10–11, 1951, pp. 8, 26; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 52, 1952, cover.
  - 37 *Bolgariia*, No. 1, 1951, pp. 37–39; No. 2, 1951, p. 1; *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 4, 1954, p. 2; No. 7, 1954, p. 2; *Kitai*, No. 11, 1951; No. 4, 1955, p. 3.
  - 38 *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3–4, 1953, p. 2; No. 3, 1954, pp. 1–2.
  - 39 *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 4, 1954, p. 1–2; No. 7, 1954, p. 1.
  - 40 *Narodnaia Pol’sha*, December 1955.
  - 41 *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 2, 1950, p. 24; No. 4, 1951, p. 7.
  - 42 *Kitai*, No. 4, 1954, p. 1; No. 7, 1954, p. 1; *Vengerskii biulleten’*, No. 52, 1952, front matter.

- 43 *Bolgariia*, No. 1, 1954, p. 1; No. 4, 1951, p. 1; No. 2, 1953, p. 30; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 2, 1951; No. 3, 1952, p. 4; No. 1, 1954, p. 1; No. 5, 1955, p. 5; *Kitai*, No. 9, 1954, p. 1; No. 10, 1954, p. 6; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 5, 1950, p. 6; No. 6, 1950, pp. 12–13; No. 11, 1952, p. 15; No. 12, 1952, p. 15; No. 1, 1953, p. 7; *Narodnaia Pol'sha*, March–April 1953; *Narodnaia Rumyniia*, No. 3, 1955, p. 4; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 21–22, 1949, p. 8; No. 6, 1955; *Vengerskii biulleten'*, No. 142, 1953, cover; No. 143, 1953, front matter.
- 44 *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 6, 1950, p. 13; No. 4, 1951, p. 2; No. 12, 1952, p. 15.
- 45 *Bolgariia*, No. 1, 1953, 1.
- 46 *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 8, 1950, p. 5; No. 4, 1951, p. 3; No. 3, 1952, p. 3.
- 47 *Bolgariia*, No. 2, 1954, p. 1; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3, 1954, front matter; *Kitai*, No. 4, 1955, p. 1; *Kitai*, No. 11, 1955, p. 2; *Narodnaia Pol'sha*, December 1953; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 17, 1949, pp. 2–11, 18; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 32–33, 1950; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 4–5, 1952; *Vengerskii biulleten'*, No. 69, 1952, front matter.
- 48 *Bolgariia*, No. 7, 1951, p. 3; No. 1, 1952, front matter; No. 2, 1952, p. 32; No. 5, 1952, p. 30; No. 2, 1953, p. 30; *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 2, 1953, p. 3; No. 4, 1954, p. 2; No. 6, 1954, p. 24; No. 7, 1954, p. 1; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3, 1951; No. 6, 1952, p. 3; No. 1, 1953, pp. 3, 29; *Kitai*, No. 11, 1952, pp. 2–3; No. 12, 1954, p. 3; No. 12, 1955, p. 3; *Narodnaia Pol'sha*, July 1953; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 2, 1950, p. 24; No. 3, 1950, p. 24; No. 6, 1950, p. 25; No. 8, 1950, p. 4; No. 5, 1951, p. 7; No. 10–11, 1951, p. 1; No. 12, 1951, p. 18; No. 4–5, 1952, p. 4; No. 10, 1952, p. 2; No. 11, 1952, p. 1; No. 2, 1953, p. 10; No. 11, 1953, pp. 1–2; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 17, 1949, p. 18; No. 25–26, 1949, p. 14; No. 34, 1950; No. 11, 1951; No. 4, 1954; No. 6, 1954; *Vengerskii biulleten'*, No. 18, 1950, p. 9; No. 11, 1951; No. 29, 1951, cover.
- 49 *Bolgariia*, No. 6, 1951, p. 6.
- 50 *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 7, 1950, p. 6.
- 51 *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 32–33, April–May 1950.
- 52 *Bolgariia*, No. 8, 1954, p. 31; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 3, 1952, p. 20; *Kitai*, No. 4, 1954, p. 2; No. 9, 1954, p. 39; No. 3, 1955, p. 2; No. 5, 1955, p. 37; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 12, 1954; *Vengerskii biulleten'*, No. 73, 1953, cover.
- 53 *Bolgariia*, No. 6, 1951, p. 10; *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 3, 1954, p. 25; No. 7, 1954, p. 3; *Germanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika na stroike*, No. 1, 1952, p. 18; No. 1, 1953, p. 3; *Kitai*, No. 12, 1951; No. 1, 1952, p. 20; No. 3, 1952, p. 1; *Narodnaia Pol'sha*, December 1953; *Narodno-demokraticheskaia Rumyniia*, No. 7, 1950, p. 6; No. 10, 1952, pp. 1, 8; *Narodnaia Rumyniia*, No. 6, 1954, p. 8; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 11, 1951; No. 11, 1954; *Novaia Koreia*, No. 6, 1954, p. 8; *Vengerskii biulleten'*, No. 137, 1953, cover.
- 54 *Chekhoslovakiia*, No. 11, 1955, p. 24; *Narodnaia Rumyniia*, No. 3, 1955, p. 5; *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 4, 1955; *Novaia Koreia*, No. 4, 1955, p. 1.
- 55 *Novaia Albaniia*, No. 6, 1955.

## Bibliography

- A. R. 1956. "Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and Eastern Europe." *The World Today* 12, no. 12: 488–498.
- Abrams, Bradley. 2009. "Hope Died Last: The Czechoslovak Road to Stalinism." in *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe*, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu, 345–365. Budapest: Central European University Press.

- Amos, Heike. 2005. *Die Entstehung der Verfassung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone / DDR 1946–1949: Darstellung und Dokumentation* [The Emergence of the Constitution in the Soviet Occupation Zone/ GDR, 1946–1949: Representation and Documentation]. Münster: LIT Verlag.
- Apor, Balázs, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees, eds. 2004. *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Békés, Csaba, László Borhi, Peter Ruggenthaler, and Ottmar Trașcă. 2015. "Introduction." In *Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria 1944/45–1948/49*, edited by Csaba Békés, László Borhi, Peter Ruggenthaler, and Ottmar Trașcă, 1–28. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Borhi, László. 2004. *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2008. "Making Bulgarians Socialist: The Fatherland Front in Communist Bulgaria, 1944–1989." *East European Politics and Societies* 22, no. 01: 44–79.
- Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. 2010. *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chernilovskii, Z. M., ed. 1947. *Konstitutsiia Federativnoi Narodnoi Respubliki Jugoslavii* [Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia]. Moscow: Iuridicheskoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva iustitsii SSSR.
- Connelly, John. 2009. "The Paradox of East German Communism: From Non-Stalinism to Neo-Stalinism?" In *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe*, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu, 161–193. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Dam'e, V. V., N. P. Komolova, M. B. Korchagina, and K. K. Shirinia, eds. 1999. *Komintern protiv fashizma: Dokumenty* [The Comintern against Fascism: Documents]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Deletant, Dennis. 2018. *Romania under Communism: Paradox and Degeneration*. London: Routledge.
- Demidov, S. S., ed. 1952. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the main legal acts of the Mongolian People's Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoï literatury.
- Diamant, Neil J., and Xiaocai Feng. 2015. "The PRC's First National Critique: The 1954 Campaign to 'Discuss the Draft Constitution.'" *The China Journal*, no. 73: 1–37.
- Dobeš, Jan. 2010. "Národní shromáždění v letech 1945–1948" [National Assembly in 1945–1948]. PhD Thesis, Prague: Charles University.
- Duara, Prasenjit. 2007. "The Imperialism of 'Free Nations': Japan, Manchukuo and the History of the Present." In *Imperial Formations*, edited by Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue, 211–239. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press.
- Dubrovskii, V. A., and N. A. Serdobov, eds. 1957. "Tuva v 1919–1921 godakh: Dokumenty i materialy" [Tuva in 1919–1921: Documents and Materials]. In *Uchenye zapiski*, 5: 266–303. Kyzyl: Tuvinskii nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut iazyka, literatury i istorii.
- Dubrovskii, V. A., and N. A. Serdobov, eds. 1958. "Konstitutsii Tuvinskoi Narodnoi Respubliki" [Constitutions of the Tuvan People's Republic]. In *Uchenye zapiski*, 6: 276–304. Kyzyl: Tuvinskii nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut iazyka, literatury i istorii.

- Durdenevskii, V. N., ed. 1948a. "Konstitutsiia Chekhoslovatskoi Respubliki, chast' 1" [Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, Part 1]. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 8: 50–60.
- Durdenevskii, V. N., ed. 1948b. "Konstitutsiia Chekhoslovatskoi Respubliki, chast' 2" [Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, Part 2]. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 9: 62–72.
- Durdenevskii, V. N., ed. 1948c. "Konstitutsiia Rumynskoi Narodnoi Respubliki" [Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic]. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 6: 87–93.
- Far Eastern Republic. 1921. *Osnovnoi zakon (Konstitutsiia) Dal'nevostochnoi Respubliki: Utverzhen Uchreditel'nym sobraniiem Dal'nego Vostoka 27 apreliia 1921 g.* [Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the Far Eastern Republic: Adopted by the Constituent Assembly of the Far East on April 27, 1921]. Chita: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia.
- Fekete, Balázs. 2019. "Law I of 1946 and Law XX of 1949: Continuity or Discontinuity in Traditional Hungarian Constitutionalism?" In *A History of the Hungarian Constitution: Law, Government and Political Culture in Central Europe*, edited by Ferenc Hörcher and Thomas Korman, 184–210. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Focseneanu, Eleodor. 1998. *Istoria constitutională a României, 1859–1991* [Constitutional History of Romania, 1859–1991]. 2nd ed. Bucharest: Humanitas.
- Getty, J. Arch. 1991. "State and Society under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1: 18–35.
- Gill, Graeme J. 2011. *Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gjuricová, Adéla. 2019. "Too Ideal to Be a Parliament: The Representative Assemblies in Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1948–1989." In *The Ideal of Parliament in Europe since 1800*, edited by Remieg Aerts, Carla van Baalen, Henk te Velde, Margit van der Steen, and Marie-Luise Recker, 199–217. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gronský, Ján. 2006. *Komentované dokumenty k ústavním dějinám Československa* [Commented Documents on the Constitutional History of Czechoslovakia]. Vol. 2. Praha: Univ. Karlova, Nakl. Karolinum.
- Hazard, John N. 1974. "Soviet Model for Marxian Socialist Constitutions." *Cornell Law Review* 60, no. 6: 985–1004.
- Hodos, George H. 1987. *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe 1948–1954*. New York: Praeger.
- Iaskina, G. S. 2007. *Istoriia Mongolii: XX vek* [History of Mongolia: Twentieth Century]. Moscow: Institut votokovedeniia RAN.
- Israelian, V. L., ed. 1954. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the Hungarian People's Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Johnston, Timothy. 2008. "Peace or Pacifism? The Soviet 'Struggle for Peace in All the World', 1948–54." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86, no. 2: 259–282.
- Juviler, Peter H. 1960. "Functions of a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938–1959." PhD Thesis, Political Science, Columbia University.
- Juviler, Peter H. 1961. "Interparliamentary Contacts in Soviet Foreign Policy." *American Slavic and East European Review* 20, no. 1: 25–39.
- Kaplonski, Christopher. 2014. *The Lama Question: Violence, Sovereignty, and Exception in Early Socialist Mongolia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

- Karev, D. S., ed. 1953. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the Polish People's Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Kemp-Welch, A. 2008. *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kersten, Krystyna. 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Khlevniuk, O. V. 1996. *Politbiuro: Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 30-e gody* [Politbiuro: Mechanisms of Political Power in the 1930s]. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
- Khlevniuk, Oleg V. 2008. *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kotok, V. F., ed. 1954. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Rumynskoi Narodnoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the Romanian People's Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Kuprits, N. Ia., ed. 1951. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Narodnoi Respubliki Albanii* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the People's Republic of Albania]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Lattimore, Owen. 1956. "Satellite Politics: The Mongolian Prototype." *Western Political Quarterly* 9, no. 1: 36–43.
- Lazarev, M. I., ed. 1952. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Narodnoi Respubliki Bolgarii* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the People's Republic of Bulgaria]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Leustean, Lucian N. 2007. "Constructing Communism in the Romanian People's Republic: Orthodoxy and State, 1948–49." *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 2: 303–329.
- Li, Hua-yu. 2001. "The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948–1954." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 2: 28–47.
- Lomb, Samantha. 2017. *Stalin's Constitution: Soviet Participatory Politics and the Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution*. London: Routledge.
- Mar'ina, V. V., ed. 2005. *Chekhiiia i Slovakiia v XX veke: Ocherki istorii* [Czechia and Slovakia in the Twentieth Century: Historical Essays]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Nauka.
- Markovits, Inga. 2008. "Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990." *William and Mary Law Review* 49, no. 4: 1307–1346.
- "Member States." n.d. United Nations. Accessed March 22, 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/member-states/>.
- Mongolian People's Republic. 1947. "Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi zakon) Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Mongolian People's Republic]. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 8: 36–50.
- Morozov, Viacheslav. 2021. "Uneven Worlds of Hegemony: Towards a Discursive Ontology of Societal Multiplicity." *International Relations*. 10.1177/00471178211010321.
- Myadar, Orhon. 2019. "The City, Memory, and Ideology in Ulaanbaatar: Inscribing Memory and Ideology in Postsocialist Mongolia." In *The City as Power: Urban Space, Place, and National Identity*, edited by Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, 57–70. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Naimark, Norman. 2017. "The Sovietization of East Central Europe, 1945–1989." In *The Cambridge History of Communism*, edited by Norman Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, 2: The Socialist Camp and World Power, 1941–1968:63–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Neal, Fred Warner. 1954. "The Reforms in Yugoslavia." *American Slavic and East European Review* 13, no. 2: 227–244.

- Nelson, Daniel. 1982. "Communist Legislatures and Communist Politics." In *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Daniel Nelson and Stephen White, 1–13. London: Macmillan Press.
- Nikiforov, K. V., ed. 2011. *Iugoslaviia v XX veke: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii* [Yugoslavia in the Twentieth Century: Essays on political history]. Moscow: Indrik.
- Noskova, A. F., ed. 2012. *Pol'sha v XX veke: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii* [Poland in the Twentieth Century: Essays on Political History]. Moscow: Indrik.
- People's Republic of Albania. 1947. "Konstitutsiia Narodnoi Respubliki Albanii" [Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania]. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 6: 51–63.
- Perović, Jeronim. 2007. "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2: 32–63.
- Pozharskaia, S. P., and A. I. Saplin, eds. 2001. *Komintern i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii: Dokumenty* [The Comintern and the Civil War in Spain: Documents]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Pryliuk, Iu. D., and D. B. Ianevs'kyi, eds. 1992. "Konstytutsiia Ukrain's'koi Narodnoi Respubliki (Statut pro derzhavnyi ustrii, prava i vil'nosti UNR) (1918)" [Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Statute on the State System, Rights, and Freedoms of the UPR) (1918)]. In *Konstytutsiini Akty Ukraini, 1917–1920: Nevidomi Konstitutsii Ukraini*, 73–79. Kyiv: Filosofs'ka i sotsioloichna dumka.
- Republic of Poland. 1921. "Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921." Biblioteka Sejmowa. 1921. <http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html>
- Republic of Poland. 1947. "Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 19 lutego 1947 r. o ustroju i zakresie działania najwyższych organów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" [Constitutional Act of February 19, 1947 on the Organization and Scope of Activities of the Highest Organs of the Republic of Poland]. Biblioteka Sejmowa. 1947. <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19470180071>
- Rieber, Alfred J. 2009. "Popular Democracy: An Illusion?" In *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe*, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu, 103–128. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Rupen, Robert A. 1965. "Tuva." *Asian Survey* 5, no. 12: 609–615.
- Sablin, Ivan. 2018. *The Rise and Fall of Russia's Far Eastern Republic, 1905–1922: Nationalisms, Imperialisms, and Regionalisms in and after the Russian Empire*. London: Routledge.
- Simotomai, Nobuo. 2009. *Kim Ir Sen i Kreml': Severnaia Koreia epokhi Kholodnoi voiny (1945–1961 gg.)* [Kim Il-sung: North Korea of the Cold War Period (1945–1961)]. Edited by D. V. Strel'tsov. Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet.
- Slaveski, Filip. 2013. *The Soviet Occupation of Germany: Hunger, Mass Violence and the Struggle for Peace, 1945–1947*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smirnova, N. D. 2003. *Istoriia Albanii v XX veke* [History of Albania in the Twentieth Century]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Sobinov, M., ed. 1953. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Germanskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the German Democratic Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.
- Sudarikov, N. G., ed. 1955. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the Chinese People's Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostrannoi literatury.

- Sunderland, Willard. 2016. "The USSR as a Multinational State from the Revolution to the Death of Stalin: Western Scholarship since 1991." *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University: History*, no. 4: 142–158.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor, and Terry Martin. 2001. "Introduction." In *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, 3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tavrov, G., ed. 1952. *Konstitutsiia i osnovnye zakonodatel'nye akty Koreiskoi Narodno-Demokraticheskoi Respubliki* [Constitution and the Main Legal Acts of the Korean People's Democratic Republic]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo inostranno literaturey.
- Tikhvinskii, S. L., and Iu. M. Galenovich, eds. 2017. *Istoriia Kitaia s drevneishikh vremen do nachala XXI veka* [History of China from the Ancient Times until the Early Twenty-First Century]. Vol. 8: Kitaiskaia Narodnaia Respublika (1949–1976) [Chinese People's Republic (1949–1976)]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 2003. *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Trainin, I. P. 1940. *Konstitutsii i konstitutsionnye akty Soiuza SSR: 1922–1936* [Constitutions and Constitutional Acts of the USSR: 1922–1936]. Moscow: Izdanie Vedomostei Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR.
- Vada, Kh., K. K. Shirinia, G. M. Adibekov, N. Midzuno, Iu. Khe Chzhon, Zh. G. Adibekova, and L. A. Rogovaia, eds. 2007. *VKP(b), Komintern i Koreia, 1918–1941 gg.* [VKP(b), the Comintern, and Korea]. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
- Vaksberg, M. A. 1925. "Konstitutsiia Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki (priinata I Velikim khuraldanom 26 noiabria 1924 g.)" [Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic (adopted by the First Great Khural on November 26, 1924)]. In *Konstitutsiia revoliutsionnoi Mongolii* [Constitution of Revolutionary Mongolia]. Irkutsk: Irkutskaiia sektsiia nauchnykh rabotnikov rabprosa.
- Van de Grift, Liesbeth. 2011. *Securing the Communist State: The Reconstruction of Coercive Institutions in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Romania, 1944–1948*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Vanin, Iu. V. 2016. *Sovetskii Soiuz i Severnaia Koreia, 1945–1948* [The Soviet Union and North Korea, 1945–1948]. Moscow: IV RAN.
- Velikanova, Olga. 2018. *Mass Political Culture Under Stalinism: Popular Discussion of the Soviet Constitution of 1936*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Volokitina, T. V., ed. 1999. *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953: Dokumenty* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953: Documents]. Vol. 1: 1944–1948. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
- Volokitina, T. V., ed. 2002. *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953: Dokumenty* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953: Documents]. Vol. 2: 1949–1953. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
- Volokitina, T. V., T. M. Islamov, and G. P. Murashko, eds. 1997. *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953 gg.* [Eastern Europe in the Documents of Russian Archives, 1944–1953]. Vol. 1: 1944–1948. Moscow: Sibirskii khronograf.
- Volokitina, T. V., T. M. Islamov, and G. P. Murashko, eds. 1998. *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953 gg.* [Eastern Europe in the Documents of Russian Archives, 1944–1953]. Vol. 2: 1949–1953. Moscow: Sibirskii khronograf.



- Volokitina, T. V., G. P. Murashko, and A. F. Noskova. 1993. *Narodnaia demokratiia: Mif ili real'nost'? Obshchestvenno-politicheskie protsessy v Vostochnoi Evrope 1944–1948 gg.* [People's Democracy: Myth or Reality? Social and Political Processes in Eastern Europe of 1944–1948]. Edited by P. V. Volobuev. Moscow: Nauka.
- Vyshinskii, A. Ia., ed. 1938. *Pervaia sovetskaia konstitutsiia (Konstitutsiia RSFSR 1918 goda): Sbornik dokumentov* [The First Soviet Constitution (the RSFSR Constitution of 1918): A Collection of Documents]. Moscow: Iuridicheskoe izdatel'stvo NKIu SSSR.
- Whittington, Anna. 2019. "Making a Home for the Soviet People: World War II and the Origins of the Sovetskii Narod." In *Empire and Belonging in the Eurasian Borderlands*, edited by Krista A. Goff and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 147–161. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wolf, Charles. 1985. "The Costs of the Soviet Empire." *Science* 230, no. 4729: 997–1002.
- Znepolski, Ivaylo, Mihail Gruev, Momtchil Metodiev, Martin Ivanov, Daniel Vatchkov, Ivan Elenkov, and Plamen Doynov. 2018. *Bulgaria under Communism*. London: Routledge.

# 8 Work teams, leading small groups, and the making of modern Chinese bureaucracy, 1929–1966\*

*Long Yang*

## Introduction

The subject of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed, developed, and coordinated the relationship between its formal and provisional institutions has long been a central topic in the analysis of Chinese governance. Important elements of that relationship include bureaucratic routines, CCP top leaders' personal power, departmental interests, forms of governance, and policy making and implementation. Previous scholarship has stressed the role of provisional institutions in intensifying competition between government departments for their own interests. Such competition further caused fragmented governance (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Lieberthal 2004). This approach tried to predict whether China's political system would eventually reach its demise. As the CCP seems to be becoming increasingly responsive to political and economic challenges, recent studies have shifted to explore instead the operations of provisional institutions so as to discuss the longevity of China's ruling system. These studies have revealed that the operations of provisional institutions helped the CCP make governance practices effective through formal institutional approaches and informal political channels (Miller 2008; Walder 2009; Zhou 2010; Perry 2019; Tsai and Zhou 2019). Moving beyond this governance approach, this chapter focuses on the inner workings of the CCP, with a particular emphasis on the origins and development of these provisional institutions.

This chapter will first trace how, between the late 1920s and 1940s, the CCP assembled two prominent forms of provisional organizations, i.e., "small groups" (*xiaozu* 小组) and work teams (*gongzuo dui* 工作队), both of which still play their part in today's Chinese politics. Work teams often adopted a grassroots-oriented approach while small groups operated in a top-down manner. The establishment of both forms of provisional institutions to replace part of the functions of formal Party and government organs occurred during the flow of the CCP's internal history: Party leaders of the time were handling the questions of political control and participation in the context of the long-term war. Historians of modern China have highlighted the profound impact of the constant warfare on the operation of the CCP's

armed forces, party cells, and administrative organs (Mitter 2005). For example, the historian Hans van der Ven has stressed that warfare acted as a vehicle for creating a more tightly disciplined CCP so as to provide cohesion in the 1930s and 1940s (Ven 2018, 5). Building upon this literature, this chapter will argue that in the context of the warfare of this period, the peculiarities of the CCP's military operations and its army's relationship with local society fundamentally influenced the formation of these provisional institutions.

A careful examination of the development of these provisional institutions in the 1950s and 1960s shows how international security concerns further drove their militarization. The CCP turned the international tensions of the Cold War into pressing domestic concerns that resulted in the restructuring of the Party and government organs. In the first place, the CCP set up small groups to replace the functions of formal Party and government organs in an attempt to tighten centralized control. This centralization led these provisional institutions to have the characteristics of their formal counterparts. In the second place, the CCP assembled work teams and dispatched them to counties or villages to carry out policies and broaden political participation. These teams could also be developed into an institution with a hierarchical structure and take over the functions of the Party and government organs from the county to the village levels. Recent studies have revealed the centrality of military practices and ideas to a pronounced militarization of Mao's China. These practices and ideas shaped China's domestic policies (Meyskens 2020). The disjuncture between provisional institutions and their formal counterparts was important in how major political campaigns like the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries (1955–1962) and the Socialist Education Movement (1962–1966) were implemented. This chapter will further argue that this militarization led the CCP to outrank the earlier inherited institutions and adopt some of their institutional practices and culture.

Although these institutions could provisionally take over the functions of the Party and government organs, they did not acquire its legal status in law, particularly Chinese constitutional law.<sup>1</sup> Instead, their position as formal institutions was granted in the CCP's constitutions since 1945. The CCP had already practiced small groups and work teams, but it did not legitimize such practices until the revision of its Constitution in 1945.<sup>2</sup> The 1945 Party Constitution stipulated that Party Committees at each level could establish provisional work committees or departments (*linshi de gongzuo weiyuanhui huo bumen* 临时的工作委员会或部门) only for special or temporary work (Article 28).<sup>3</sup> This regulation differentiated provisional institutions from their formal counterparts. In 1956, when the Party revised the Constitution, provisional institutions were ascribed an almost equivalent status as other formal committees or departments. In the words of the Constitution, the Party Committees at each level could set up departments and “other organizations (*qita jigou* 其他机构) on an *ad hoc* basis (*genju xuyao* 根据需要)”

(Article 30).<sup>4</sup> This change illustrates that provisional institutions could occupy their prominent position within the Party and government system, and that the CCP considered them as part of its formal institutions.

### **The military origins of the CCP's provisional organizations: Work teams and small groups, 1920s–1940s**

In the decades between the 1920s and the 1940s, the CCP evolved into a centralized organization with the operations of *ad hoc* institutions for specific missions. It was the long-term war with the Nationalist Government and Japan that stimulated the CCP to survive by establishing such institutions. As early as the late 1920s, the CCP dispatched its military officials and soldiers as work teams to the local places where they were tasked with establishing Party and government organs from the county to the village levels. The CCP did so in an attempt to mobilize villagers to support the army through the supply of soldiers and grain. In the two decades that followed, dispatching work teams to assist in building up local governments and mobilize villagers became an integral part of the CCP's governance practices (Li 2010). Just as importantly, facing an overwhelming military challenge from the Nationalist Government, the CCP set up “small groups” at its top level to centralize the decision-making authority. The success of the group in commanding the army brought Mao Zedong back to the center of military decision making. The institutionalization of the small groups to replace the functions of the CCP's Politburo and government further assured the centrality of Mao in the early 1940s (Gao 2018, 326–330). This section illustrates that the practices of these provisional institutions were rooted in the context of the long-term wartime environment in which the CCP lived and worked.

#### ***The military origins of work teams***

The genesis of work teams can be traced back to the shift in the relationship between army and local society in the late 1920s. In an attempt to survive in the war and expand the CCP's military force, Mao Zedong decided to select army officers and soldiers to assemble work teams and sent them to counties, townships, or villages. These work teams mobilized the people and set up local Party committees and governments. Rather than bypassing the regular administrative hierarchy, they functioned provisionally as local Party committees and governments or assist them in establishing the subordinate Party and government organs. The CCP's army and high-level party organs continued to deploy work teams, while also assisting local Party committees and governments to perform their functions, all against the backdrop of the CCP's success in the expansion of its territory during the Sino-Japanese War (Chen 1986; Lai 2011). However, such practices impacted the work teams' relationship with the governments in the regions where the former were deployed. Their tensions emerged because work teams gained bureaucratic

power after their deployment became more regular. Work teams thus sometimes replaced part of the functions of local governments in implementing specific policies.

The practices of work teams grew out of the context of the CCP's military expansion, because it needed to broaden villagers' political participation and build up a base for recruiting soldiers and collecting grain tax. In 1929, the CCP's Central Committee agreed with Mao's idea that the Red Army should take responsibility to not only fight against the Nationalist Government, but also to build up local Party committees and Soviet governments. The army was instructed to dispatch its soldiers to mobilize people to establish these committees and governments. After the establishment of these organs, the army transferred the power of collecting grain tax and recruiting soldiers to them. Meanwhile, the soldiers who served in work teams still played their role in assisting local governments in organizing villagers and training militia.<sup>5</sup> In the words of a general of the army at the time, these soldiers formed the "mass work teams" (*qunzhong gongzuo dui* 群众工作队) that helped to enlarge the CCP's military force (Gong 1978). Work teams taught villagers to read and write and broadened their political participation by organizing them into labor unions, peasant associations, and village Soviet governments. From the CCP's point of view, enlightening and arming villagers would be an important way of enabling them to participate in the revolution.<sup>6</sup> However, in practice, these work teams sometimes put local Party and government organs under their own control after they had set up these formal institutions (Ying 2018).

With the Sino-Japanese War sweeping across North and Central China, the CCP's army sent its officers and soldiers as work teams to establish local Party committees and governments in Japanese-occupied areas. This was also the first time that the systematic deployment of work teams came into being.<sup>7</sup> In late 1937, Zhu De, then commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, was directly in charge of dispatching work teams to North and Central China. He said that as team members, soldiers were responsible for setting up county Party committees and governments (*Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* 2006). The functions of these work teams were changed with the expansion of base areas. In the first stage, their work was not only to establish county Party committees and governments in the Japanese-occupied areas, but also to take over these organs' functions provisionally.<sup>8</sup> Given that the CCP military force of the time was nominally part of the Nationalist Government, the county governments set up by work teams could not operate on their own names (Yang 2008).<sup>9</sup> For example, in Gaoping county, Shanxi province, work teams composed of military officers and soldiers initiated the *de facto* county Party committee and government. These organs had two names. The first was "Party Committee and Government," but was only used within the CCP. The second, "Gaoping Mass Movement Work Teams" (*Gaoping minyun gongzuo dui* 高平民运工作队), was the one by which they referred to the newly established Party and government organs in public (Lin 2012, 50–53; Wu and Yuan 2015).

In the second stage, the focus of work teams in North and Central China was on (1) assisting county governments in setting up governmental institutions at the township and village levels, and (2) mobilizing villagers to participate in the newly established local authorities. As local officials could run the de facto county Party committees and governments, the army started sending work teams to the countryside. In a county of Hebei province, a work team consisting of four infantry companies was stitched together from three military units. In cooperation with the County Party Committee and Government, the work team went to the countryside with the task of mobilizing villagers to help build up township- and village-level governments and “peasant associations” (*nonghui* 农会) alike. After succeeding in doing so, the work team transferred the power of these township- and village-level governments to the County Party Committee and Government and returned to their regiments.<sup>10</sup> With county Party committees and governments being widely established in Central China in the early 1940s, these local organs also assembled their own work teams. Different from their counterparts sent by the army, these work teams were mainly tasked with implementing a wide range of policies such as the mobilization of villagers for rent reduction or other economic concessions (Liu 1943). Just as importantly, they sometimes also needed to take over part of the functions of the township- and village-level governments because the latter did not have enough qualified cadres (Esherick 1998; Liu 2003). In some cases, these work teams acted as township or village governments (Zhou 2018).<sup>11</sup> In short, work teams from both the army and higher-level governments played a crucial role in establishing Party and government organs from the county to the village level in North and Central China.

It was during the Civil War between the CCP and the Nationalist Government that the relationship between work teams and local governments shifted. Such a relationship would persist into the People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter). In particular, the CCP’s routinized use of work teams to carry out specific missions created the ground for them to function as the local Party and government organs and replace officials with the activists they trained. The CCP’s efforts to routinize the use of work teams can be exemplified by Liu Shaoqi’s letter to local officials in 1947. Liu, a senior leader who later became Chinese president, said that the initiative of policy implementation in the countryside should always start with dispatching work teams.<sup>12</sup> However, this routinization impacted the work teams’ interaction with local Party and government organs. In the regions under the CCP’s control for years, when work teams entered into communities, they could supervise or remove village leaders by channeling villagers into political participation through the establishment of “peasant associations.” The dismissal of village leaders brought up tensions between work teams and local authorities (Li 2010). In the newly “liberated” areas of North China where local authorities lacked enough qualified cadres to fulfill their duties, work teams continued to make township- and village-level

bureaucracy work (Geng 2018). However, some of these teams took advantage of this situation by accusing the cadres of being unqualified and thus replaced them with the activists that they trained (Li 2012). In this case, although work teams retained their *ad hoc*, task-specific character, they were in the position of being able to influence formal local bureaucracy.

In sum, the practices of dispatching work teams to counties or countryside stemmed from the attempt of CCP's Red Army to support its military operations through the establishment of local governments and the mobilization of the people. With the CCP's base areas expanding in North and Central China during the Sino-Japanese War, the functions of work teams experienced continuity and change. On the one hand, the army continued to send its officers and soldiers to set up local Party and government organs. On the other hand, work teams dispatched by the army assisted local governmental bodies in making their daily operations smooth when they lacked enough qualified officials at the township and village levels. The routinization of dispatching work teams in the late 1940s complicated work teams' relationship with local Party and government organs. For the CCP, the routinization of sending work teams to the countryside was a way of making its policy implementation more effective. However, for work teams themselves, the implementation process allowed them to replace part of the functions of the local Party and government organs, cultivated their own activists, and appointed them to take up the vacant posts.

### ***The military origins of small groups and its institutionalization***

Unlike "work teams," which were usually dispatched to very local places to carry out specific missions, "small groups" were originally established at the top level of the CCP. These groups were designed to centralize decision-making authority within the CCP's Centre. Under the circumstances of the protracted war, the functions of these groups replaced those of both the CCP's Politburo and the Chinese Soviet Republic and contributed to consolidating the CCP supreme leaders' personal power. In the early 1940s, when the CCP had consolidated its base areas, Mao Zedong initiated the Rectification Movement (1942–1945) and institutionalized a small group system to replace the functions of Party and government organs from the central to the provincial level. The institutionalization of "small groups" shaped its relationship with the Party and government organs in the decades that followed.

The establishment of small groups enabled the CCP's top leaders to tighten centralized control against the backdrop of the difficult circumstances of evacuation. In 1934, the Nationalist Government's army encircled Ruijin, the capital city of the Chinese Soviet Republic, with rings of blockhouses and gradually reduced its area. Facing this, the CCP's Central Committee had no choice but to prepare for evacuation. Bo Gu, general

secretary of the CCP's Central Committee, set up a temporary team called "Three-Person Group" (*sanren tuan* 三人团) to take over the functions of the CCP's Politburo, the Chinese Soviet Republic, and its Central Revolutionary Military Commission (CRMC hereafter) (Itoh 2016, 103). In the following half a year, the Three-Person Group bypassed these Party, government, and military organs, and made major decisions directly. For example, as the Chinese Soviet Republic became a *de facto* government-in-exile, its leaders were excluded from decision making in relation to governmental affairs. Zhang Wentian, chairman of the Republic, said that his power had been transferred into the hands of this "Three-Person Group" (Zhang 1990, 31).<sup>13</sup> What is more, this group also prevented military leaders of the CRMC from knowing important information about military operations.<sup>14</sup> As a result, setting up this group enabled the three top leaders to centralize power in their hands.

However, a succession of failures in military operations in the early stage of the CCP's evacuation caused a crisis of confidence for this Three-Person Group. In January 1935, when the Red Army obtained a temporary respite after arriving in Zunyi, Guizhou province, the CCP's Centre convened a Politburo conference to review the performance of this Three-Person Group. The majority of Politburo members blamed this group for over-centralizing power and lacking the adaptive capacity to support sustained contingency military operations. Their choice was to reestablish collective leadership, a form of ruling that stressed the importance of consensus in decision-making. Therefore, the meeting decided to dismiss this group and convene Politburo conferences regularly.<sup>15</sup>

Under the reinforced attack from the Nationalist Government, it was almost impossible for the CCP's Politburo to convene meetings with the attendance of the majority of its members. This partly led to the failure of rebuilding collective leadership. In early 1935, the military troops, acting together with the CCP's Politburo, were placed in a life-or-death situation. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong successfully directed a series of battles, despite having been stripped of his military role two years prior. The success made him renowned among the CCP's Politburo again for his military prowess (Yang 2016). In March, the Politburo decided to set up a new "Three-Person Group" only responsible for military operations. This group took over the functions of the CRMC, and Mao was awarded a place among this group to assist Zhou Enlai in commanding the army. In the following twenty months, this group managed to lead the army to arrive in Yan'an, Shaanxi province, which later became the headquarter of the CCP in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The successful military operations under the leadership of this group also contributed to confirming Mao Zedong's role as the military's supreme leader. As the Politburo settled in Yan'an, it resumed the CRMC and concluded with the dismissal of this "Three-Person Group" in the name of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Yang 2016). Just as importantly, Mao was



appointed as chairman of the CRMC, and he eventually came back to the power center of the CCP again.

In initiating and implementing the Rectification Movement in Yan'an, Mao set up a provisional institution with a hierarchical structure. The institutionalization of this provisional institution gave Mao an upper hand in consolidating the centrality of his role within the CCP and its government. In 1942, he created the Central Committee General Study Committee (CCGSC) to serve as the provisional supreme power organ for this movement. As the historian Hua Gao puts it, the establishment of the CCGSC marked a shift in power because it had the characteristics of a formal institution. The CCGSC had its administrative office and subordinate branch study committees at each level of the Party and government organs. At the top level, the CCGSC took over the functions of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government, previously known as the Chinese Soviet Republic. It operated under Mao's direct orders and was answerable only to him (Gao 2018, 326–330). Furthermore, Mao froze out the government system of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and put a branch of the CCGSC in charge of governmental affairs (Dai and Zhao 2011). The CCGSC constituted one of the most important mechanisms to ensure his centrality as the supreme leader of the CCP and its government. More importantly, the institutionalization of such a provisional institution preserved Mao's freedom of action within a bureaucratic system that naturally tended to routinize power.

In sum, the CCP's top leaders successively established two "Three-Person Groups" in response to the military threat from the Nationalist Government. In the 1930s, the first one took over the functions of the CCP's Politburo and the Chinese Soviet Republic. However, military failure brought an end to this institution. After this, the CCP's Politburo set up a second "Three-Person Group" specifically for military command and appointed Mao Zedong as one of its core members. This group only took over the role of the CRMC, a military unit body of the Chinese Soviet Republic. As the army under Mao's leadership succeeded in escaping from the encirclement, his prominent position with the CCP's military system was affirmed. In the early 1940s, Mao further set up a new provisional institution to replace the functions of the CCP's Politburo and its border region government. The institutionalization of this organ not only established the centrality of Mao in the Party and its government, but also played an important role in influencing the CCP's policy implementation in the decades that followed.

### **Militarization, small groups, and the campaign to wipe out hidden counterrevolutionaries, 1955–1962**

This section explores the militarization of small groups in the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries that began to sweep across China

in 1955. This campaign aimed at identifying so-called “hidden enemies” within the Party and government organs through the reassessment and reclassification of cadres, soldiers, intellectuals, and so on (Lin 2009, 548–564; Eddy 2019, 99–100). After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP initiated a series of political campaigns like the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries in the hunt for the so-called “enemies” (Strauss 2006; Yang 2008). Unlike the previous campaigns implemented by the formal Party and government organs, the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries was carried out by a provisional institution named “small groups” set up from the central authorities down to the county levels. According to the statistics collected for the CCP’s internal use, between 1955 and 1960, the small groups reviewed more than 51 million officials, intellectuals, and staff of public institutions, and more than 0.63 millions of them were identified as “hidden enemies.”<sup>16</sup> Although the scale of this campaign was huge, the structure and functions of these small groups remain obscure to us. An examination of the processes of running these groups will show how they became institutionalized and replaced part of the functions of organizational departments, public security departments, courts, and so on.


This campaign occurred against the backdrop that the CCP’s top leaders were increasingly concerned with the alleged collusion between the American camp and Chinese domestic “enemies” who were deemed to have the intention to subvert the state from within. Firstly, at the Party’s Eighth National Congress in March 1955, its leaders like Mao Zedong highlighted the possibility of a war and the connections between American “imperialism” and domestic “hidden enemies.” Mao thus argued that the campaign against these “enemies” was to ensure the security of the Chinese socialist system (Mao 1977 [1955], 138–142). Secondly, the founding of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) in 1955 deepened these leaders’ anxiety about China’s precarious situation in international relations. This was because China only acquired observer status at the WPO (Lüthi 2007).

The establishment of a provisional small group at the central level originally aimed to ensure Mao’s personal authority in leading this campaign. In May 1955, Mao instructed to set up a Central Five-Person Small Group (*zhongyang wuren xiaozu* 中央五人小组) with the appointment of Lu Dingyi, head of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, as the head of this group. This group consisted of senior officials from the Central Departments of Propaganda, Organization, Public Security, and so on. Meanwhile, Lu regularly reported to Mao rather than to the CCP’s Politburo after he assumed overall responsibility of this group. Through Lu and this group, Mao steered this campaign under his personal control.<sup>17</sup> For example, in an attempt to support this group’s work, Mao forwarded one of its briefings to provincial Party committees and required them to write reports back to him and his group by consulting this

briefing.<sup>18</sup> Just one day later, the Hebei Provincial Committee sent Mao and this group a report in which it planned to set up Five-Person Groups from the provincial down to the county level.<sup>19</sup> This report inspired Mao to institutionalize this group from the central to the county levels.

The institutionalization of these groups from the central to the county levels outstripped the routine power of some formal Party and government organs like organizational departments and public security departments. In July 1955, in the name of the CCP's Central Committee, Mao instructed provincial Party committees to establish such small groups from the provincial to the county levels in order to widen its hunt for the so-called hidden enemies (see Table 8.1). The CCP's Centre tasked these groups with reviewing and documenting the backgrounds, thoughts, and behaviors of the individuals affiliated with public institutions and Party and government organs.<sup>20</sup> Just two months later, this group was expanded into a Central Ten-Person Small Group (*zhongyang shiren xiaozu* 中央十人小组) with other senior officials from the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate,

Table 8.1 The relationship between the “small groups” and Party and government organs



and the Ministry of Public Security (see Table 8.2). This Ten-Person Group set up its own administrative office with a group of officials drawn from these departments. Such an expansion meant that this provisional institution stripped part of the authorities away from these Party, government, and judicial organs and incorporated that into itself.<sup>21</sup> At the local level, the Shanxi Provincial Committee, for example, formed a Provincial Ten-Person Small Group and Five-Person Small Groups at the prefectural and county levels. It further authorized them to take over part of the functions of

Table 8.2 The members of the Central Five/Ten-Person Group





Table 8.3 The Five-Person Groups of the southern Shanxi prefecture<sup>23</sup>

organizational departments, public security, and judicial organs (see Table 8.3).<sup>22</sup>

The formation and expansion of these small groups' routine power also came into effect, along with the policy implementation surrounding the hunt for "hidden enemies." In July 1955, the CCP's Centre released a document stipulating that small groups were in full charge of this work. Given that these groups did not have enough cadres to complete all tasks associated with this campaign, local Party and government organs were permitted to convene public meetings to expose potential "hidden enemies." However, before doing so, they must first request permission from the small groups at the same level. The groups had the authority to assign local officials to collect denunciations and confessions, monitor the progress of these meetings, and ask them to report back to them directly. They just needed to inform the officials' superiors of their decision.<sup>24</sup> What is more, these groups also had the power to remove local Party and government leaders from their posts if the latter were deemed to have failed to perform their duties during this campaign.<sup>25</sup> Through these ways, these groups developed their power networks at each level of Party and government organs and constructed their bureaucratic routines to carry out the campaign.

In the course of investigating the suspected officials or staff, these small groups took over part of the functions of organizational departments, public security, and procuratorate. They were not only responsible for receiving and collecting denunciations and confessions as well as processing these materials, but also reviewed each case by themselves and decided whether to arrest officials or staff suspected of being “hidden enemies.”<sup>26</sup> For example, the Central Ten-Person Group thoroughly investigated the case of Hu Feng, a celebrated leftist writer. It sent its officials to collect archival materials from the Second National Archives in Nanjing, located in Jiangsu province, because Hu was accused of having had connections with the Nationalist Government’s spy organizations in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the review of the archives by the officials showed that the Nationalist Government put a great deal of effort into watching him and circumscribing his public activities in an attempt to prevent him from spreading socialist ideas. Although the officials found these documents, the leaders of the Central Ten-Person Group still decided to arrest Hu (Wang 2014).

The institutionalization of these small groups paralleled them to the formal institutions, particularly in regard to their hierarchal relations with the latter and within themselves. In August 1955, the CCP’s Central Committee ordered its subordinate Party and government departments to submit their plans about the implementation of the campaign to the Central Ten-Person Group for review and approval. Just a few days later, the Commerce Department of the State Council stated that it had been working on a plan concerning this campaign and would submit to this group for review. The Department further asked for instruction from this group about how to keep a balance between the initiative and implementation of the campaign and their quotidian work.<sup>27</sup> Just as importantly, the CCP’s Central Committee exerted its control over the Provincial Five/Ten-Person Groups through a sophisticated institutional design, especially dual leadership. According to the relevant policies, the groups at the provincial level had to be under the leadership of both their central counterparts and the Party committees at the same level. In December 1955, the Jiangsu Provincial Ten-Person Group reported to both the Central Ten-Person Group and the Jiangsu Provincial Committee about the problems of deciding on verdicts. It found that the punishments the “hidden enemies” received for their offenses had often been excessive. This provincial group thus suggested that ordinary officials were barred from participating in the adjudication process. Instead, leaders of its subordinate groups at the prefectural and county levels took charge of reviewing each case file and made such decisions collectively. The Central Ten-Person Group approved this suggestion and then forwarded it to other provincial Ten-Person Groups.<sup>28</sup>

The institutionalization of the Central Ten-Person Group was accompanied by its formal exertion of authority in issuing documents and orders in their own names. The bureaucratic power of this group was substantially different from that of previous provisional institutions like the “Three-Person Groups”

and the CCGSC, both of which could not issue documents directly. Instead, their official decrees were written and distributed in the name of the CCP's Politburo and/or the Chinese Soviet Republic.<sup>29</sup> In contrast, the Central Ten-Person Group used its own name to release documents and instructions to its subordinates as well as provincial Party and government organs. For example, this group ordered local Party committees and governments to investigate each case thoroughly before they convened the public meetings for denunciation. As explained in the relevant document, the reason for doing so was to avoid falling into a passive position without reliable evidence.<sup>30</sup>

The Central Ten-Person Group's power to formulate national policies associated with the campaign further exemplified its bureaucratic routines. Like the Chinese Central Government, this group also adopted the way of feeding local experiences back into national policy formulation (Heilmann 2008). Forming and using "special squads" (*zhuan'an xiaozu* 专案小组) to conduct investigations was a case in point. In early 1956, this group noticed that a "special squad" in Shanxi province had failed to investigate an official's case. During the course of questioning the official, the leader of this squad was found to have been lying in bed, two members were roasting sweet potatoes, one member was reading a newspaper, and the remaining one was responsible for taking notes. It was said that the suspected official fell asleep because no one raised questions.<sup>31</sup> By taking a lesson from this, the Central Ten-Person Group stipulated a national policy that local groups from the provincial down to the county levels must directly lead their own special squads to conduct investigations and that public security departments at the same level must assist these squads to carry out the investigation.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, this group also permitted its subordinates to adjust these policies according to local conditions. According to a document issued by this group in April 1956, its provincial government could adjust the regulations on how to identify and classify "hidden enemies." But before doing so, they had to request permission from this group.<sup>33</sup>

The power of the Central Ten-Person Group established in 1955 took more bureaucratic forms by mid-1956. In the following years, both Mao and the CCP's Central Committee were almost not concerned with this campaign, but the groups from the central down to the county level continued to review officials and staff and investigated the suspected ones.<sup>34</sup> For instance, the Five-Person Group of the Southern Shanxi Prefecture and its subordinates reviewed 355,133 people and classified 4,431 of them as "hidden enemies" in a period from 1955 to 1962, when this campaign eventually came to an end.<sup>35</sup>

In sum, establishing small groups contributed to carrying out the campaign against the formal institutions' bureaucratic routines. However, its organs from the central down to the county levels became institutionalized as they took over part of the functions of Party and government organs, particularly organizational departments, public security departments, and courts. They also acquired a parallel status with formal institutions at the same level and thus issued orders and documents in their own names.

## **Militarization, work teams, and the Socialist Education Movement, 1962–1966**

Between 1962 and 1966, the CCP initiated and implemented the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), a campaign that aimed at rectifying local officials and rural cadres to contend with the lack of effective leadership (Baum 1975). In the CCP's words, cadres' deviation was a result of the influence of "revisionist ideas" on their thoughts. The CCP's Central Committee even equated these cadres to counterrevolutionaries.<sup>36</sup> Because of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, China's security situation became more precarious (Lüthi 2008; Li and Xia 2014). For the CCP's top leaders, the initiative of this campaign was to prevent domestic counterrevolutionaries from subverting the state from within because they were said to have been influenced by their Soviet counterparts. Such anxieties about war with the Soviet Union had far-reaching consequences for the militarized campaign. The CCP thus dispatched work teams to counties and villages to investigate the cadres who were deemed to be unqualified. During the movement, from a total of 11 million rural cadres, over two million were affected to varying degrees, and more than 630,000 cadres received disciplinary sanctions across the country.<sup>37</sup> Unlike their previous counterparts who had assisted local Party and government organs, these work teams challenged local bureaucratic routines and gradually formed their own hierarchical structures. This section explores work teams' developing positions within the CCP and their relationship with local Party and government organs. It demonstrates that work teams' bureaucratic power was routinized as they became administratively independent of the Party committees and governments of the counties where they carried out the SEM.


The unfolding of the SEM witnessed the shift in the administrative relationship between work teams and county Party committees and governments. The year 1964 marked the shift in that relationship. Before that year, work teams were under the leadership of the Party committees of the counties where they carried out the campaign. The provincial party committees in North China instructed work teams to assist the county Party committees rather than to take everything on their hands.<sup>38</sup> In some areas like Tangshan, Hebei province, the Prefectural Party Committee even ordered its work teams to implement county- and commune-level Party committees' decisions. By placing work teams under the leadership of county Party committees, their higher-level counterparts could ensure that local authorities monitored and controlled the process of investigating their cadres.<sup>39</sup> In August 1964, the CCP's Central Committee circulated the Taoyuan experience nationwide. The Taoyuan experience, as summarized by Wang Guangmei, the wife of then China's President Liu Shaoqi, advocated for keeping work teams administratively independent of county Party committees. In the following years, work teams across the country thus had more leeway to drive their operations than they previously had done.<sup>40</sup> The CCP's Centre transformed work teams into a hierarchical system from the county to the village levels. In a few



months of 1964–1965, the CCP's Central Committee even permitted work teams to take responsibility for leading the Party committees from the county to brigade levels if necessary.<sup>41</sup> In short, the developing administrative relationship between work teams and county Party committees complicated bureaucratic routines during the SEM.

The ways to appoint and direct work teams changed along with the shift in their administrative relationship with county Party committees and governments. Before August 1964, Party committees from the central down to the county levels sent their own officials as work teams to communes and villages. County Party committees directed these work teams immediately after they had arrived in the local places. The teams reported back to both county Party committees and the organs with which they were formally affiliated.<sup>42</sup> After August 1964, when work teams became administratively independent, the provincial Party committees organized their work teams into a single work regiment (*gongzuo tuan* 工作团). For instance, in Tangshan, Hebei province, the provincial Party committee assigned more than 14,000 officials, university students, and staff of public institutions to a work regiment.<sup>43</sup> The work regiments formed its own hierarchical bureaucracy by dividing themselves into a number of sub-regiments (*gongzuo fentuan* 工作分团) and sent them to communes. One sub-regiment included dozens of work teams that were responsible for implementing the SEM in villages (see Table 8.4).<sup>44</sup> As we will see, the institutionalization of work teams inclined them to replace rural cadres with activists whom they trained and with whom they built up connections during their stay in the villages.

Table 8.4 The administrative hierarchies of work teams and local Party committees



The institutionalization of work teams went hand in hand with the developing ways to assign officials, students, and staff at public institutions to form each work team. Before August 1964, Party committees at the county level and above often organized those who came from the same institution into a work team. For work teams, they moved into their roles almost without storming as they were familiar with each other. However, after August, the CCP's Centre adopted a model from the Taoyuan experience suggesting that work teams should be composed of officials from different Party and government organs. According to the Taoyuan experience, through this way, work teams could break away from their existing connections, which had become established in the bureaucratic system. They constructed new connections with activists, and carried out the campaign without the worry of their interpersonal relations with other work team members. In the following two years, provincial Party committees employed in this way to formulate work teams.<sup>45</sup> Because work team members were well aware of the *ad hoc* nature of its institution's hierarchy, they sometimes argued with each other over the implementation of SEM policies. Their infighting further influenced the way of mobilizing villagers, cultivating activists, and investigating cadres (Zhao 2009).

The mode of work teams' mass mobilization also changed in step with their institutionalization. Generally speaking, the process of mobilizing villagers began with "squatting on a point" (*dundian* 蹲点), which meant that work team members went to stay in a village for a period of months. It continued with their practice of "three togethers" (*santong* 三同) of living, eating, and working with "poor peasants" (*pinmang* 贫农). Meanwhile, they attempted to cultivate activists who would later play a crucial role in exposing cadres' alleged malfeasance through denunciation and "speaking bitterness" (*suku* 诉苦) at public meetings. The final phase of this process constituted the dismissal of cadres who were charged with engaging in misconduct. The institutionalization of work teams had a substantial impact on the use of the very same process to live together with villagers, cultivate activists, and sanction cadres. Before this, it was commune and brigade cadres who helped work teams to find the villagers with whom they practiced the "three togethers." These villagers often had good interpersonal relationships with these commune and brigade cadres, while work teams often selected and trained activists from the villagers with whom they lived together. Because of this, these activists were unlikely to expose malfeasances of cadres, which could result in considerable damage to their relations.<sup>46</sup> Arranging "three togethers" in this way allowed local officials to keep most cadres in their posts. This mode of operation often made the SEM unfold in a relatively restrained manner. After the institutionalization of work teams, they were ordered by their superiors to put cadres aside when they had arrived in villages. They first searched for "poor peasants" who had grievances against cadres, then practiced the "three togethers" with them, and finally trained them into activists. By so doing, work teams radicalized

the campaign by replacing cadres with the newly cultivated activists (Wang 2019).

The process of institutionalizing work teams influenced the power relationship between cadres and villagers. Before August 1964, work teams advised villagers to focus on the denunciations of cadres' economic corruption and misappropriation of collective property. Although few villagers were brave enough to participate in the denunciations of malfeasance, some of them were even insulted by the cadres who were the targets of the SEM. In Tangshan, Hebei province, both work teams and county Party committees treated these cases as civil disputes and were unwilling to support villagers.<sup>47</sup> This meant that work teams had not had the intention to change the cadres' dominant position in villages. Starting in August 1964, work teams dramatically changed their attitudes toward the cadres' revenge against the villagers who voiced out their grievances during public meetings. If a cadre took revenge against these villagers by spreading rumors about them or even striking them, their actions were now subjected to criminal punishment.<sup>48</sup> Also in Tangshan, the work regiment ordered county prosecution officials to arrest these cadres at public meetings, in an attempt to show their support to villagers. As work teams tried to remove some cadres from their posts by investigating their alleged malfeasance from economic corruption to moral improprieties, more villagers also could participate in the SEM and express their grievances through denunciation.<sup>49</sup> The institutionalization of work teams also led to the disruption of cadres' dominant position and impacted the village-level politics.

In sum, the developing role of work teams in carrying out the SEM had to do with their institutionalization. Before August 1964, together with county Party committees, work teams played an essential role in preventing a large number of cadres from being dismissed from their posts. With the Taoyuan experience disseminating nationwide from August 1964, work teams were organized into a relatively stable bureaucratic organ with hierarchical structures. On the one hand, they were not only administratively independent of county Party committees and governments but also took responsibility for leading these Party and government organs for a few months. At the same time, these work teams cultivated activists, built up connections with them, and appointed some of them to replace the cadres who were deemed to be unqualified. On the other hand, as work teams tried to dismiss a large number of cadres from their posts, their actions disrupted the dominant position of cadres in villages. Such a disruption created the ground for villagers to challenge cadres.

## **Conclusion**

The CCP inherited some institutional structures from the practices of its early years. It considered those structures to be part of its formal institutions. In addition to this, it developed a number of new institutional

structures of its own. This chapter has discussed the two most prominent institutions: work team and small group. In the context of the civil war, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Cold War, the military threats and anxieties drove the CCP to use such provisional institutions constantly. This chapter has argued that work teams emerged from the army, and that both work teams and small groups came in some regards to outrank the earlier inherited institutions and adopted some of their institutional practices and culture. It has also argued that the disjuncture between work teams and the inherited institutions was important in how a major campaign, the Socialist Education Movement, was implemented.

In examining the origins and development of small groups and work teams as institutions, this chapter has concluded that the CCP's attempt to build up base areas for military recruitment and the collection of grain tax was crucial in shaping the way of using such institutions. In the context of the long-term war between the 1920s and 1940s, the CCP's army played an important role in setting up local Party and government organs and assisted them in their operations. Therefore, the provisional institutions' peculiar relationships with these formal organs complicated bureaucratic politics in the decades that followed. Just as importantly, it was also the context of the long-term war in which the CCP's top leaders tightened the centralized control through the establishment of small groups.

It is important to note that the practices of work teams were also associated with the issue of political participation in twentieth-century China. The CCP's top leaders of the time were handling the question of how to broaden political participation. From their point of view, the deployment of work teams was a way of dealing with the increasing breach between bureaucracy and the people in the 1960s. The examination of the role of work teams in the SEM has shown that they could not substantially broaden villagers' political participation when they were under the leadership of county Party committees. Instead, their institutionalization not only allowed them to be administratively independent of county Party committees but also created tensions between formal bureaucratic organs and work teams. The complicated relationship between work teams and county Party committees led the former to dismiss the cadres appointed by the latter. Work teams replaced these cadres with the activists they trained. What is more, the actions of dismissing cadres encouraged villagers to express their grievances in public. Therefore, the institutionalization of work teams to some degree helped broaden villagers' political participation.

## Notes

\* I am grateful to Egas Moniz Bandeira, Ivan Sablin, and Vincent Conway for their insightful comments.

1 *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xianfa* (1954) 中华人民共和国宪法 (1954) [The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954)]. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/>

- wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content\_4264.htm; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xianfa* (1982) 中华人民共和国宪法 (1982) [The Constitution of People's Republic of China (1982)]. [http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content\\_4421.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4421.htm).
- 2 *Zhongguo Gongchandang dangzhang* (1928) 中国共产党党章 (1928) [The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (1928)], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji* 中共中央文件选集 [Selection of CCP Central Committee Documents], ed. by Zhongyang dang'anguan 中央档案馆, 18 vols. (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1989), 4:468–482.
  - 3 *Zhongguo Gongchandang dangzhang* (1945) 中国共产党党章 (1945) [The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (1945)], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 15:126.
  - 4 *Zhongguo Gongchandang dangzhang* (1956) 中国共产党党章 (1956) [The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (1956)]. [https://zh.m.wikisource.org/zh-hans/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E7%AB%A0%E7%A8%8B\\_\(1956%E5%B9%B4\)](https://zh.m.wikisource.org/zh-hans/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E7%AB%A0%E7%A8%8B_(1956%E5%B9%B4))
  - 5 “Zhongyang gei hongjun di si jun qianwei de zhishixin” 中央给红军第四军前委的指示信 [A directive to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army from the Center], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 5:480–482.
  - 6 “Zhongguo Gongchandang hongjun di si jun di jiu ci daibiao dahui jueyi an” 中国共产党红军第四军第九次代表大会决议案 [Resolution on the Ninth Congress of the CCP's Fourth Red Army], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 5:800–834.
  - 7 “Guanyu gonggu yu kuoda Jin-Cha-Ji genjudi de zhishi” 关于巩固与扩大晋察冀根据地的指示 [Directive concerning the consolidation and expansion of the Jin Cha Ji base area], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji* 11:503.
  - 8 “Zhongyang guanyu jianli Wandong kang Ri genjudi de zhishi” 中央关于建立皖东抗日根据地的指示 [Directive of the Central Committee on setting up an anti-Japanese base in eastern Anhui], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 12:52–53.
  - 9 “Guanyu Jinan xin zhengfu chengli hou de gongzuo zhishi” 关于冀南新政府成立后的工作指示 [Directive on the work after the establishment of new government in southern Hebei], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 11:541.
  - 10 “Huairou ji Pingbei di yi ge Zhonggong xianji zuzhi lingdao jigou: Zhonggong Luan-Chang-Huai lianhe xian gongzuo weiyuanhui” 怀柔暨平北第一个中共县级组织领导机构: 中共滦昌怀联合县工作委员会 [The first county-level Party organ in Huairou and Pingbei: The CCP Luanchang Joint County Working Committee]. [http://www.bjhrqw.gov.cn/hrdw/dsdc/dszl/hr\\_212644/index.html](http://www.bjhrqw.gov.cn/hrdw/dsdc/dszl/hr_212644/index.html).
  - 11 Zhou, Xiaohan 周晓寒, “Zhou Liren gensui Liu Shaoqi kaizhan Yancheng minyun gongzuo” 周利人跟随刘少奇开展盐城民运工作 [Zhou Liren following Liu Shao's lead to organize masses in Yancheng]. <http://www.xsjn4a.cn/post.html?id=5afbc5c5fa9b8b09973b4662>
  - 12 “Liu Shaoqi tongzhi guanyu chedi jiejie tudi wenti gei Jinsui tongzhi de yi feng xin” 刘少奇同志关于彻底解决土地问题给晋绥同志的一封信 [Comrade Liu Shaoqi's letter to comrades in Shanxi and Suiyuan concerning resolving land problems thoroughly], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 16:488.
  - 13 Zhang, Wentian 张闻天, “Cong Fujian shibian dao Zunyi huiyi” 从福建事变到遵义会议 [From the Fujian Incident to the Zunyi Conference], in *Zhang Wentian yu Zunyi huiyi* 张闻天与遵义会议 [Zhang Wentian and the Zunyi Conference], ed. by Zunyi huiyi jinianguan 遵义会议纪念馆 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1990), 31.
  - 14 “Zhongyang guanyu fandui diren wuci weijiao de zongjie de jueyi (Zunyi huiyi)” 中央关于反对敌人五次围剿的总结的决议 (遵义会议) [Resolution by the Central Committee on summing up the campaign against the enemy's five

- rounds of encirclement (Zunyi Conference)], in *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, 10:466–467.
- 15 “Dakai zunyi, Zhongyang zhaokai zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi” 打开遵义, 中央召开政治局扩大会议 [After occupying Zunyi, the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politbureau], in *Zunyi huiyi wenxian* 遵义会议文献 [Documents on the Zunyi Conference], ed. by Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui 中共中央党史资料征集委员会 and Zhonggong Zhongyang dang'an-guan 中共中央档案馆 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), 99–101.
  - 16 “Zhonggong zhongyang shiren xiaozu guanyu suqing ancang fan geming fenzi yundong de zongjie baogao” 中共中央十人小组关于肃清暗藏反革命分子运动的总结报告 [Summary report by the Ten-Person Group of the CCP Central Committee concerning the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries], in *Suqing ancang fan geming fenzi yundong wenjian* 肃清暗藏反革命分子运动文件汇编 [Collections of Documents from the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries], ed. by Zhonggong Shandong shengwei sufan lingdao xiaozu 中共山东省委肃反领导小组 (Jinan: Internal Publication, 1961), 32.
  - 17 “Dui Zhongyang guanyu kaizhan douzheng suqing ancang fan geming fenzi zhishi gao de piyu” 对中央关于开展斗争肃清暗藏反革命分子指示稿的批语 [Comments on the Central Committee's draft directive on the struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries], in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* 建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic of China], ed. by Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中央文献研究室, 13 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 5:179.
  - 18 “Zhongyang zhuanfa wuren xiaozu bangongshi guanyu Zhongyang yiji jiguan suqing ancang fan geming fenzi de douzheng qingkuang jianbao de piyu” 中央转发五人小组办公室关于中央一级机关肃清暗藏反革命分子的斗争情况简报的批语 [Comments on the Central Committee's transmission of the Office of Five-Person Small Group's bulletin concerning the struggle to eliminate hidden counterrevolutionaries], in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 5:195.
  - 19 “Zhongyang zhuanfa hebeishengwei guanyu sufan douzheng de liangge wenjian de piyu” 中央转发河北省关于肃反斗争的两个文件的批语 [Comments on the Central Committee's transmission of the Hebei Provincial Committee's two documents concerning the struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries], in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 5:205–206.
  - 20 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jielu hufeng fan geming jituan gei gedi dangwei de zhishi” 中共中央关于揭露胡风反革命集团给各地党委的指示 [Directive of the CCP Central Committee to local Party committees regarding the exposure of the Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Clique], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku (1949–1955)* 中国五十年代初中期运动数据库 (1949–1955) [Database of the Chinese political campaign in the beginning and mid-1950s], ed. by Song, Yongyi 宋永毅 (Hong Kong: Universities Service Centre, 2014).
  - 21 “Lu Dingyi zai shiba ge shengshi dangwei he zong zhengzhibu wuren xiaozu fuzeren huiyi de baogao jilu” 陆定一在十八个省市党委和总政治部五人小组负责人会议的报告记录 [Minutes of Lu Dingyi's speech at the meeting with Five-Person Small Groups of eighteen provinces and the General Political Department], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
  - 22 “Diyi pi sufan zuzhi qingkuang” 第一批肃反组织情况 [The situation of the first round of *sufan* organizations], in *Jinnan qu sufan yundong zhong qingcha chu de fan geming fenzi he qita huai fenzi ziliao huibian* 晋南区肃反运动中清查出的反革命分子和其他坏分子资料汇编 [Compilation of material on the identified counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements in the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Enemies in Jinnan], ed. by Zhonggong Shanxi Jinnan diwei wuren xiaozu bangongshi 中共山西省晋南地委五人小组办公室 (Jinnan: Internal Publication, 1963), 1:21–22.

- 23 “Di er pi sufan zuzhi qingkuang” 第二批肃反组织情况 [The situation of the second round of *sufan* organizations], *ibid.*, 23–25.
- 24 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kaizhan douzheng suqing ancang fan geming fenzi de zhishi” 中共中央关于开展斗争肃清暗藏的反革命分子的指示 [Directive of the CCP Central Committee on the implementation of the struggle to eliminate hidden counterrevolutionaries], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 25 “Zhongyang shiren xiaozu pizhuan gansu shengwei wuren xiaozu guanyu qixiang ju lingdao yundong chengyuan buchun qingkuang de tongbao” 中央十人小组批转甘肃省委五人小组关于气象局领导运动成员不纯情况的通报 [A circular by the Five-Person Small Group of the Gansu Provincial Committee on the impurity of the Weather Bureau’s members responsible for the campaign], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 26 “Youjin yu Lu Dingyi huitan jiyao: Jieshao Zhongguo zhengzhi yundong de qingkuang” 尤金与陆定一会谈纪要: 介绍中国政治运动的状况 [Minutes of the talk between (Pavel) Yudin and Lu Dingyi: Introducing the situation of the political campaign in China], in *Eluosi jiemi dangan xuanbian: Zhongsu guanxi* 俄罗斯解密档案选编: 中苏关系 [Selections of declassified Russian archives: Sino-Soviet relations], ed. by Shen, Zhihua 沈志华, 12 vols. (Shanghai: Dongfang chubun zhongxin, 2015), 6:76.
- 27 “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu shangye xitong sufan gongzuo yu yewu gongzuo jiehe wenti gei shangye bu dangzu de pifu” 中共中央关于商业系统肃反工作与业务工作结合问题给商业部党组的批复 [Comments of the CCP Central Committee on the issues of combining *sufan* work with daily operations to the Leading Party Group of Commerce Department], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 28 “Zhongyang shiren xiaozu pizhuan Jiangsu shengwei shiren xiaozu guanyu zhenbie ding’an gongzuo de qingkuang baogao” 中央十人小组批转江苏省委十人小组关于甄别定案工作的情况报告 [Report by the Jiangsu Provincial Ten-Person Small Groupon reinvestigation and verdict work], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 29 For the documents, see *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 10.
- 30 “Zhongyang shiren xiaozu pizhuan Beijing shi di si jianzhu gongsi san gongqu de gongren sufan douzheng qingkuang de tongbao” 中央十人小组批转北京市第四建筑公司三工区的工人肃反斗争情况的通报 [Circular on the situation of workers’ struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries at the Third Division of the Beijing Fourth Construction Company], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 31 “Luo Ruiqing zai ge sheng shi zhongyang guojia jiguan he junshi xitong wuren xiaozu fuzeren huiyi shang de baogao” 罗瑞卿在各省、市、中央直属机关、中央国家机关和军事系统五人小组负责人会议上的报告 [Luo Ruiqing’s speech at the ministerial-level meeting with the Party, government, and military leaders of Five-Person Small Groups], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 32 “Zhongyang shiren xiaozu guanyu zhuan’an xiaozu jige wenti de guiding” 中央十人小组关于专案小组几个问题的规定 [Regulation of the Central Ten-Person Group about several problems of special case groups], available in *Zhongguo wushi niandai chuzhongqi yundong shujuku*.
- 33 “Zhongyang shiren xiaozu guanyu fan geming fenzi he qita huai fenzi de jieshi ji chuli de zhengce jixian de zanxing guiding” 中央十人小组关于反革命分子和其他坏分子的解释及处理的政策界限的暂行规定 [Interim provision by the Central Ten-Person Small Group about the definition and treatment of the political demarcations of counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements], author’s collection, 8.

- 34 “Luo Ruiqing zai ge sheng shiwei wuren xiaozu fuzeren huiyi shang de zongjie fayan” 罗瑞卿在各省，市委五人小组负责人会议上的总结发言 [Luo Ruiqi’s speech at the meeting with leaders of provincial and municipal Five-Person Small Groups], *ibid.*
- 35 “Zhonggong Jinnan diwei wuren xiaozu guanyu zai quanqu kaizhan neibu sufan yundong de gongzuo zongjie” 中共晋南地委五人小组关于在全区开展内部肃反运动的工作总结 [Work summary by the CCP Jinnan Prefectural Committee’s Five-Person Small Group on the implementation of *sufan* campaign], in *Jinnan qu sufan yundong zhong qingcha chu de fan geming fenzi he qita huai fenzi ziliao huibian*, vol. 1: 5.
- 36 “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu yinfa nongcun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong zhong yixie juti zhengce guiding de xiuzheng cao’an de tongzhi” 中共中央关于印发农村社会主义教育运动中一些具体政策规定的修正草案的通知 [Notification of the CCP Central Committee about the circulation of the revised draft of specific policies and regulations concerning the Socialist Education Movement in the countryside], *Zhongfa* (64), no. 600, available in *Zhongguo dayuejin-dajihuang shujuku (1958–1962)* 中国大跃进–大饥荒数据库 (1958–1962) [Database of the Chinese Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine], ed. by Song, Yongyi 宋永毅 (Hong Kong: Universities Service Centre, 2013).
- 37 “Pingfan yuanjia cuo’an luoshi ganbu zhengce cujing he tuidong zuzhi gongzuo de quanmian boluan fanzheng” 平反冤假错案，落实干部政策，促进和推动组织工作的全面拨乱反正 [The reversal of unjust, false, and wrong cases, the implementation of cadre policies, and the acceleration of bringing order out of chaos in organizational work], in *Boluan fanzheng: zhongyang juan* 拨乱反正：中央卷 [Bringing Order Out of Chaos (Part on the Centre)], ed. by Zhonggong Zhongyang zuzhibu 中共中央组织部, 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1999), 1:234.
- 38 “Guanyu Beijing jiaoku nongcun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong shidian de jingyan” 关于北京郊区农村社会主义教育运动试点的经验 [The experience of the experiment of the Socialist Education Movement in suburban Beijing], Beijing Municipal Archives, file no. 001-014-00756.
- 39 “Zhonggong Tangshan diwei guanyu siqing wufan yundong lingdao wenti de jiancha baogao” 中共唐山地委关于四清、五反运动领导问题的检查报告 [Self-criticism report by the CCP Tangshan Prefectural Committee on the problem of leading the Four Cleanups and Five-Antis], *Tang* (64) no. 124, 2.
- 40 “Zhonggong zhongyang zhuanfa guanyu yi ge dadui de shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong de jingyan zongjie de pishi” 中共中央转发<关于一个大队的社会主义教育运动的经验总结>的批示 [Summary of the experience of a production brigade in the Socialist Education Movement], *Zhongfa* (64), no. 527, 81.
- 41 “Zhonggong Zhongyang yinfa Zhongyang guanyu nongcun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong zhong gongzuotuan de lingdao quanxian de guiding (cao’an) de tongzhi” 中共中央印发《中央关于农村社会主义教育运动中工作团的领导权限的规定（草案）》的通知 [Regulations of the CCP Central Committee on the authority of work regiments during the Socialist Education Movement in the countryside (draft)], available in *Zhongguo dayuejin-dajihuang shujuku*.
- 42 “Zhonggong Baoding diwei guanyu kaizhan shehuizhuyi jiaoyu jinxing si qing gongzuo xiang shengwei de baogao” 中共保定地委关于开展社会主义教育进行四清工作向省委的报告 [Report by the CCP Baoding Prefectural Committee to the Provincial Committee on the implementation of the Socialist Education Movement and the work on the Four Cleanups], available in *Zhongguo dayuejin-dajihuang shujuku*.
- 43 “Zhonggong Tangshan diwei di jiu ci quanhui guanyu jindong mingchun shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong de bushu de jue ding” 中共唐山地委第九次全会关于今冬明春社会主义教育运动的部署的决议 [Directive of the CCP’s Tangshan Prefectural Committee’s Ninth Plenary Session on the deployment of the



- Socialist Education Movement this winter and next spring], *Zhonggong Tangshan diwei wenjian* 中共唐山地委文件 [Documents of the Tangshan Party Committee], 4–5. Author's collection.
- 44 “Zhonggong Zhongyang pizhuan Li Xuefeng tongzhi gei Liu Shaoqi tongzhi de xin” 中共中央批转李雪峰同志给刘少奇同志的信 [Comrade Li Xuefeng's letter to Comrade Liu Shaoqi], available in *Zhonggong dayuejin-dajihuang shujuku*.
- 45 “Zhongyang guanyu shejiao gongzuodui bianzu he jiaoliu shejiao gongzuo jingyan wenti de zhishi” 中央关于社教工作队编组和交流社教工作经验问题的指示 [Instruction of the CCP Central Committee on the problem of organizing Socialist Education Movement work teams and exchanging experience about the Socialist Education Movement work], in *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao* 建国以来刘少奇文稿 [Manuscripts of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of the People's Republic of China], edited by Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2018), 12:250–251.
- 46 “Zhongyang guanyu zai wenti yanzhong de diqu you pinxie xingshi quanli de pishi” 中央关于在问题严重的地区由贫协行使权力的批示 [Instruction of the CCP Central Committee on the exertion of power by Poor Peasant Associations in the regions with serious problems], in *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao* 中共党史教学参考资料 [Reference materials for the teaching of CCP history], ed. by Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi 中国人民解放军国防大学史党建政工教研室, 24 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue chubanshe, 1988) 24:509–510.
- 47 “XXX si qing gongzuo dui guanyu chuli fan shehuizhuyi xianxing fan geming fenzi dahui qingkuang de baogao” XXX四清工作组关于处理反社会主义现行反革命分子大会情况的报告 [Report of the XXX Four Cleanups Work Team on the meeting of handling anti-socialist, active counterrevolutionaries], *Tang* (64) no. 123, 3.
- 48 “Zhonggong Tangshan diwei zhuanfa XX xian XXX si qing gongzuodui guanyu XXX deng dadui si bu qing ganbu daji baofu qingkuang de baogao” 中共唐山地委转发XX县XXX四清工作队关于XXX等大队四不清干部打击报复情况的报告 [Report of the XXX Four Cleanup Work Team on the four unclean cadres' retribution in XXX village and others], *Tang* (64) no. 128, 1–3.
- 49 “Zhonggong Tangshan diwei pizhuan Zhonggong XX xianwei guanyu dazhang qigu chuli daji baofu pinxiazhongnong anjian de liang ge baogao” 中共唐山地委批转中共XX县委关于大张旗鼓处理打击报复贫下中农案件的两个报告 [Two reports by XX County Party Committee on handling the cases of retributing poor and lower-middle peasants on a grand scale], *Tang* (64) no. 123, 1–2.

## Bibliography

- Baum, Richard. 1975. *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962–66*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chen, Yung-fa. 1986. *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dai, Maolin 戴茂林 and Zhao, Xiaoguang 赵晓光. 2011. *Gao Gang zhuan* 高岗传 [Gao Gang: A biography]. Xi'an: Shanxi renmin chubanshe.
- Eddy, U. 2019. *Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Esherick, Joseph. 1998. “Revolution in a Feudal Fortress: Yangjiagou Mizhi County, Shaanxi, 1937–1938.” *Modern China* 24, no. 4: 339–377.
- Gao, Hua. 2018. *How the Red Sun Rose: The Origin and Development of the Yan'an Rectification Movement*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

- Geng, Lei 耿磊. 2018. “Jixu geming yu xiangcun biange: huabei jiefangqu de gongzuodui” 继续革命与乡村变革: 华北解放区的工作队, 1946–1949 [Continuous revolution and rural reform: Work teams in liberated areas in north China, 1946–1949]. *Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue* 党史研究与教学, no. 4: 25–34.
- Gong, Chu 龚楚. 1978. *Gong Chu jiangjun huiyilu* 龚楚将军回忆录 [General Gong Chu’s memoirs]. Hong Kong: Mingbao yuekan she.
- Guo, Xuezhi. 2019. *The Politics of Core Leader in China: Culture, Institution, and Legitimacy, and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process.” *The China Journal* 59, 1–30.
- Itoh, Mayumi. 2016. *The Making of China’s War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lai, Xiaogang. 2011. *A Springboard to Victory: Shandong Province and the Chinese Communist Military and Financial Strength, 1937–1945*. Leiden: Brill.
- Li, Danhui and Xia, Yafeng. 2014. “Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961–July 1964,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1: 24–60.
- Li, Lifeng 李里峰. 2010. “Gongzuodui: yizhong guojia quanli de feichanggui yunzuo jizhi” 工作队: 一种国家权力的非常规运作机制 [Work teams: A type of irregular operational mechanism of state power]. *Jiangsu shehui kexue* 江苏社会科学, no. 3: 207–214.
- Li, Lifeng 李里峰. 2012. “Dangzuzhi dangyuan yu qunzhong: huabei tugai qijian de zhengdang yundong” 党组织, 党员与群众: 华北土改期间的整党运动 [Party organizations, Party members and masses: Rectification campaign in north China during Land Reform]. *Anhui shixue* 安徽史学, no. 1: 66–76.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. 2004. *Governing China: From Revolution to Reform*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth and David Lampton. 1992. *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lin, Yunhui 林蕴晖. 2009. *Xiang shehui zhuyi guodu: Zhongguo jingji yu shehui zhuanxing* 向社会主义过渡: 中国经济与社会的转型 [Moving toward the transition to socialism: The transformation of China’s economy and society, 1953–1955]. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Lin, Zhenhong 林振洪. 2012. “Kangri minzu yingxiong Bai Yihua” 抗日民族英雄白乙化 [The anti-Japanese nationalist hero Bai Yihua]. *Beijing dang’an* 北京档案, no. 11: 50–53.
- Liu, Chang. 2003. “Making Revolution in Jiangnan: Communists and the Yangzi Delta Countryside, 1927–1945.” *Modern China* 29, no. 1: 3–37.
- Liu, Shaoqi 刘少奇. 1943. “Liunian huabei huazhong gongzuo jingyan de baogao” 六年华北华中工作经验的报告 [Report on work experience during the last six years in North and Central China]. <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/liushaoqi/marxist.org-chinese-lsq-194303.htm>
- Lüthi, Lorenz. 2007. “The People’s Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955–63.” *Cold War History* 7, no. 4: 479–494.
- Lüthi, Lorenz. 2008. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1977 [1955]. “Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang quanguo daibiao huiyi shang de kaimuci” 在中国共产党全国代表会议上的开幕词 [Opening

- remarks at the CCP's National Representative Congress]. In *Mao Zedong xuanji* 毛泽东选集 [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 5. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Meyskens, Covell. 2020. *Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, Alice. 2008. "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Group." *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 26: 1–21.
- Mitter, Rana. 2005. "Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China." *Historical Journal* 48, no. 2: 523–543.
- Perry, Elizabeth. 2019. "Making Communism Work: Sinicizing a Soviet Governance Practice." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 61, no. 1: 535–562.
- Shen, Zhihua 沈志华, ed. 2015. *Eluosi jiemi dangan xuanbian: Zhongsu guanxi* 俄罗斯解密档案选编: 中苏关系 [Selections of declassified Russian archives: Sino-Soviet relations], 12 vols. Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe.
- Strauss, Julia. 2006. "Morality, Coercion, and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation and After, 1949–1956." *The China Quarterly* 188, 891–912.
- Tsai, Wen-Hsuan and Zhou, Wang. 2019. "Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics." *The China Journal* 82, 1–22.
- Ven, Hans van der. 2018. *China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walder, Andrew. 2009. *Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wang, Haiguang 王海光. 2019. "Si qing yundong de jieji douzheng jiangou: 'Taoyuan jingyan' yanjiu" 四清运动的阶级斗争建构: "桃园经验"研究 [The Construction of Class Struggle in the Four Cleanups Movement: A Study on the "Taoyuan Experience"], *Ershiyi shiji* 二十一世纪, no. 175: 82–105.
- Wang, Kang 王康. 2014. "Wo canjia le shencha hufeng an" 我参加了审查胡风案 [I participated in reviewing Hu Feng's case]. <https://www.hbzx.gov.cn/49/2014-09-15/6015.html>.
- Wu, Zhonggui 吴中贵 and Yuan, Liming 袁黎明. 2015. "Gaoping kangri genjudi de chongxin kaipi" 高平抗日根据地的重新开辟 [The reestablishment of the Gaoping anti-Japanese base]. <https://m.jcszgdsh.com/nd.jsp?id=2360>.
- Yang, Kuisong. 2008. "Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries." *The China Quarterly* 193, 102–121.
- Yang, Kuisong 杨奎松. 2016. "Guanyu changzheng tuzhong Mao Zedong junshi lingdao diwei queli wenti de zai kaocha" 关于长征途中毛泽东军事领导地位确立问题的再考察 [An reexamination of the problems in establishing Mao's military leadership during the Long March], *Suqu yanjiu* 苏区研究, no. 4: 4–14.
- Ying, Xing 应星. 2018. "Cong difang junshihua dao junshi difanghua: yi hongsjun banzhe fazhan zhanlue de yuanyuan liubian wei zhongxin" 从地方军事化到军事地方化: 以红四军伴着发展战略的渊源流变为中心 [From local militarization to military localization: A case study of the origins and development of the Fourth Red Army's strategies of incorporating military operations into local society]. *Kaifang shidai* 开放时代, no. 5: 11–42.
- Zhang, Wentian 张闻天. 1990. "Cong fujian shibian dao zunyi huiyi" 从福建事变到遵义会议 [From Fujian Incident to Zunyi Conference], in *Zhang Wentian yu Zunyi huiyi* 张闻天与遵义会议 [Zhang Wentian and the Zunyi Conference]. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe.

- Zhao, Youfu 赵有福. 2009. *Beijing tongxian diqu de si qing yundong* 北京通县地区的四清运动 [The Four Cleanups Movement in Tong County, Beijing]. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe.
- Zhonggong Shandong shengwei sufan lingdao xiaozu 中共山东省委肃反领导小组, ed. 1961. *Suqing ancang fan geming fenzi yundong wenjian* 肃清暗藏反革命分子运动文件汇编 [Collections of Documents from the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries]. Jinan: Internal Publication.
- Zhonggong Shanxi Jinnan diwei wuren xiaozu bangongshi 中共山西省晋南地委五人小组办公室, ed. *Jinnan qu sufan yundong zhong qingcha chu de fan geming fenzi he qita huai fenzi ziliao huibian* 晋南区肃反运动中清查出的反革命分子和其他坏分子资料汇编 [Compilation of material on the identified counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements in the Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden Enemies in Jinnan]. Jinnan: Internal Publication.
- Zhonggong Zhongyang dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui 中共中央党史资料征集委员会 and Zhonggong Zhongyang dang'anguan 中共中央档案馆, eds. 1985. *Zunyi huiyi wenxian* 遵义会议文献 [Documents on the Zunyi Conference]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室, ed. 2018. *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao* 建国以来刘少奇文稿 [Manuscripts of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of the People's Republic of China], vol. 12. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Zhonggong Zhongyang zuzhibu 中共中央组织部, ed. 1999. *Boluan fanzheng (zhongyang juan)* 拨乱反正: 中央卷 [Bringing Order Out of Chaos: Part on the Central Committee], 2 vols. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe.
- Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi 中国人民解放军国防大学史党建政工教研室, ed. 1988. *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao* 中共党史教学参考资料 [Reference materials for the teaching of CCP history], 24 vols. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue chubanshe.
- Zhongyang dang'anguan 中央档案馆 ed. 1989. *Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji* 中共中央文件选集 [Selection of CCP Central Committee Documents], 18 vols. Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao chubanshe.
- Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中央文献研究室, ed. 1991. *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* 建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic of China], 13 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中央文献研究室 ed. 2006. *Zhu De zhuan* 朱德传 [Zhu De: A biography]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Zhou, Wang 周望. 2010. *Zhongguo "xiaozu jizhi" de yanjiu* 中国“小组机制”的研究 [A study on the mechanism of China's Leading Groups]. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe.
- Zhou, Xiaohan 周晓寒. 2018. “Zhou Liren gensui Liu Shaoqi kaizhan Yancheng minyun gongzuo” 周利人跟随刘少奇开展盐城民运工作 [Zhou Liren following Liu Shao's lead to organize masses in Yancheng]. <http://www.xsjn4a.cn/post.html?id=5afbc5c5fa9b8b09973b4662>.
- Zunyi huiyi jinianguan 遵义会议纪念馆, ed. 1990. *Zhang Wentian yu Zunyi huiyi* 张闻天与遵义会议 [Zhang Wentian and the Zunyi Conference]. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe.

# 9 From revolutionary comrades to “mothers of the nation”: The Workers’ Party of Korea’s approach to the role of women in the 1950s–1960s

*Natalia Matveeva*

## **Introduction**

Social revolutions have been defined as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures” characterized by a combination of societal structural change with class upheaval and political and social transformation (Skocpol 2008, 4–5). The notion of structural social transformation as an essential feature of social revolutions seems especially relevant to modern history, from the 1917 Russian revolution to other revolutions in Asia, Africa, and America throughout the 20th century.

The “communist revolution,” as Marx and Engels claimed, was “the most radical rupture with traditional ideas” (Marx and Engels 1969, 126). And the so-called “woman question,” the issue of the role and place of women in society and family, was an important part of it. According to Lenin, it was the most demonstrative indicator of the differences between “bourgeois” and “socialist” democracies: where the former (i.e. the Western capitalist world) merely offered women promises of equality and freedom from the patriarchal yoke, the latter actually delivered on those promises, providing genuine freedom and equality to the “oppressed sex” (Lenin 1974, 285–288).

The “woman question” was also entangled with broader socio-economic issues. In the eyes of Marxist-Leninists women’s inferior status under capitalism was caused by their dependence on men and the confines of the bourgeois family. They needed to be freed from “kitchen slavery” and provided not just with property but with new political, economic, and social roles, and brought into the public life and workforce.

In line with that, in the Soviet Union women came to play an extensive role both in society and economy (Mcauley 1979, 290). Soviet women activists in the 1920s claimed that “the situation of women in regard to political and other rights [was] much better in Russia than in Europe” and that this “immense progress” had been “realized by the woman worker” (Ruthchild 2010, 253). The intensive industrialization of the 1930s especially saw unprecedented female participation and increase in numbers of women workers. Moreover, women also started challenging the traditional lines of sex segregation in the

workplace, expanding branches of older industries and entering new industries such as the chemical industry and machine building, filling jobs previously reserved for men (Goldman 2002). While after its first radical years, the Soviet regime returned to viewing the traditional family as an important part of society, Soviet policies in the first half of the 20th century, unlike those of the West, constructed gender by emphasizing women's roles as workers, and not just mothers, and promoted "state support and collective responsibility" for mothers and children (Hoffmann 2011, 144).

A similar approach was also adopted in other socialist states. In the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong stated that the emancipation of Chinese women was part of the socialist revolution in China, and that women should be widely included in production and contribute to the nation's wealth and prosperity (Mao 1993, 83). Only with the collective effort of the whole of society could socialism be built, and women and men should labor equally; the Chinese women were "a source of labor" which needed to be used to the benefit of the country (Mao 1977, 312). Thus, in the understanding of the Chinese communists, women should leave home and fully join the workforce, working equally with men; and marriage, family, and motherhood were placed under the state's and the party's supervision and care.<sup>1</sup>

Publicly and outwardly, the policies of the PRC's close neighbor and fellow member of the socialist bloc, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), went along similar lines. Among the first measures introduced by the North Korean Workers' Party (which in 1949 was transformed into the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK]), the ruling party of the DPRK that essentially presided above all the state institutions and the state itself,<sup>2</sup> in collaboration with the Soviet Administration in northern Korea was a series of laws and reforms aimed at eliminating inequality between men and women and emancipating women. The land reform, announced on March 5, 1946, allowed women to own land (Lee 1963, 67), thus, in line with Marxist ideology, abolishing men's monopoly on having property. The Labor Law stipulated women's right to work, and the Law on Sex Equality adopted in July 1946 stated equal rights for men and women in all areas of life, including inheritance and family matters (Kim 1980, 185).

On the outside, the adoption of the laws on gender equality and extension of property rights to women could be taken to mean that North Korea has "closely adhered to the Marxist perspective on the 'woman question'" (Park 1992, 527). In general, the North Korea of the 1950s, and to a lesser extent the 1960s, is typically assessed as closely emulating the Soviet Union's experience from the 1920s–1930s, since its leadership saw "compelling parallels" between the situation, objectives and needs of the Soviet Union in those decades of industrialization and the DPRK after the war (Buzo 1999, 58). Yet while that assessment is largely true for economic development strategies and domestic politics, it is much less applicable to the social sphere and to gender policies.

Despite outward similarities, the WPK's position on the role and place of women in society diverged from the official Marxist-Leninist line and on closer inspection incorporated not only the Marxist-Leninist ideas widely introduced under the Soviet Occupational Administration (1945–1948), but also colonial legacies, reflections of anti-Japanese struggle (see Kim 2010), as well as the leadership's own nationalist views, and reflected the transformations occurring within the North Korean society and ideology in the post-war decades. Moreover, it also retained more traditional and Confucian elements, which according to Marxist position should have been eradicated as vestiges of the past, but were instead included into and became a part of the new state ideology.

While actually calling North Korea a (neo-)Confucian society might be going too far, the Confucian influence on it and on the style of leadership created by Kim Il-sung is hard to deny. The image of Kim created by the state was not just that of a “benevolent king” envisioned by Confucian scholars, but that of a “father of the nation” commanding “filial loyalty of his officials and the people” (Robinson 2007, 157). As this study aims to showcase, the latter concept extended to the level of family, and the task of disseminating and implementing it was placed on the women of North Korea. The result of state policies was thus not so much the creation of a “new type of social actor that did not have a gender affiliation” (Kim 2016, 33), but rather a reinvention of traditional gender identities and the women's role in the patriarchal world to fit the new realities. Essentially, a woman's duty to husband and family was replaced with the duty to the state, the Party, and the leader, and was combined with the responsibility of raising the next generation of revolutionary fighters with loyalty to the Party and ultimately to the “Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung.”

This study looks beyond the early stages of state formation, which have previously been the main focus of scholarly attention,<sup>3</sup> to the second half of the 1950s- and mid-1960s, from the completion of the post-war reconstruction to the time when the formation of state ideology and practical policies, including gender policies, was finalized (Person 2013, 5). It explores the DPRK at that time as a “pedagogical (party-)state” using pedagogic strategies not just within but outside the formal education framework to govern the people (see Pykett 2010; Kaplan 2006) and entrench among them the WPK leadership's views of, and approaches to, the role of women in the new society. Special attention is paid to the role of the press, including the official women's magazine *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* [Korean Woman] in that process, since in North Korea, like in many one-party states, the press played a major role in propaganda, agitation, and organization of society (Lee 2009, 196), and was the vehicle of state social policies.

Essentially, this chapter explores how on North Korean soil the Marxist-Leninist concept of women as active participants in the public life and important addition to the labor force was transformed into “mothers of the nation” tasked with providing overall support to the Party's policies and the

upbringing of loyal citizens, and how that shift was used to further strengthen the Party's and its leader's position.

### **Women in the workforce: An economic necessity**

By 1957, the year in which the economic reconstruction after the Korean War (1950–1953) was deemed completed, the ratio of men to women in North Korean society was roughly 9:10. The war had caused a significant shift from the 1946 level of 1:1 (Eberstadt and Banister 1992, 32). In these circumstances, given the need to rapidly rehabilitate and develop the economy, the logical decision for the state would be to put all the available resources to the task, including women. For example, in the Soviet Union the government actively took measures to ensure that female workers who had joined the workforce during the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) remained part of it and assisted with rehabilitation (Nakachi 2011, 424). Yet, in North Korea, the share of women in labor force was only 20 percent in 1957, less than half the level of the Soviet Union or the PRC in the same years, and lower even than in the Soviet Union in 1929, before the start of its rapid industrialization.<sup>4</sup> The highest representation rate was in light industry, agriculture, and trade. From their Marxist-Leninist positions, Soviet diplomats stationed in North Korea attributed the low levels of female engagement in production to the “vestiges of the past, according to which a woman could only be involved in domestic labor.” They also noted that the system of childcare and other institutions that would allow women to be more active in society was underdeveloped in the DPRK: according to the 1957 economic plan, there were only 11,000 places available in daycare and nurseries to assist working women with child rearing.<sup>5</sup>

Those two issues were interconnected. Despite being a nominally communist party, the WPK did not publicly condemn or outlaw the traditional Confucian values (unlike the CCP during the Cultural Revolution), nor did it renounce family as a source of social ills and oppression, as the Bolsheviks had done in the early years of Soviet Russia. The Soviet leaders had since the 1920s worried that the “double shift” of work and household chores limited women's productivity in the workplace, and especially in the post-World War II decades attempted to take measures to lighten that burden by improving social services (Clements 2012, 259). On the other hand, in North Korea the family was seen as “a building block of North Korean communism” (Kim 2010, 745) and had remained uncontestedly the women's domain. The state did not feel the need to step in to supervise child upbringing, like it did in the PRC, nor did it provide suitable conditions for many women to join the workforce.<sup>6</sup>

However, rapid economic development and industrialization, for which the Party and its leader insistently pushed, dictated its own rules. In 1958, and especially in 1959, in order to achieve the extremely high target of a 50-percent increase in industrial output put forward by the WPK Central



Committee and by Kim Il-sung personally, the industrial ministries and heavy industry enterprises took the route of extensive development and attracted more workers, mostly from the countryside, but also from less important light industries. The average yearly number of workers in 1959 was estimated at 1.517 million, almost half a million more than in 1958, and even more than was expected by the State Planning Committee.<sup>7</sup> Most of those workers were male, of course – but not all of them, and moreover women got recruited to fill in the places in light industry left by men who moved to heavy industries. As a result, the absolute number of women in the workforce almost tripled from 1957 to 1960, going from 169,000 to 493,000 by the 1960s. However, with the overall increase in the number of workers, the percentage of female workers rose much less dramatically, from 20 to 32.7 percent, averaging an increase of three percentage points per year. In the following years, the tempo slowed down to slightly more than 1 percentage point per year, reaching 36 percent by 1964.<sup>8</sup> Overall, the share of female workers fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent in urban industries, reaching a higher share only in some light industry enterprises such as the Chŏngjin chemical fiber plant.<sup>9</sup>

The situation was different in the countryside. With men leaving for urban industrial work, women were left to take care of the agricultural sector, which now had to support the increased urban population. In 1963, Soviet diplomats on visit to provinces noted that only women and children were working the fields, “possibly because part of the male population moved to cities to become industrial workers, or were mobilized into the army.”<sup>10</sup> Kim Il-sung himself admitted that the overwhelming majority of the workforce in the countryside was comprised of women and the elderly.<sup>11</sup> Yet while he did not say that this was how it should be, his solution to the agricultural problems was enacting the technical, cultural, and ideological revolution in the countryside, rather than distracting workers from industrial enterprises.

Working women were allowed 77 days of maternity leave and after that were supposed to return to work, leaving the kids to state childcare services.<sup>12</sup> Yet by 1964 there were still not enough nurseries and kindergartens to accommodate all the children,<sup>13</sup> so many women chose to stay at home with their kids. To help support the family, some of them took up working from home, collecting and recycling secondary raw materials and making “food by-products.”<sup>14</sup> The work was time-consuming, but the pay was low; the head of a repairs brigade at the Pyongyang silk mill, An Hyon-won, recounted that his salary was 50 won in 1963, and that his wife working from home earned 20–25 won. They and their two kids spent more than 50 won on food per month, and thus their combined income was barely enough for their family of four.<sup>15</sup> Thus, in regard to economic life, oftentimes women were forced to work by circumstances, but their inclusion in the workforce was not actively facilitated by the Party.

The WPK Central Committee’s official newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* [Workers’ Newspaper] stated that by 1965 63 women had been awarded the

honorary title of “hero of republic and labor,” and over 47,000 had received medals for their service to the country.<sup>16</sup> Overall, in the 20 years since liberation, 35,000 women had completed higher education – yet, given that the country’s population was over 10 million, more than half of whom were female, the share of women with higher education was less than 1 percent. By the mid-1960s, about 25,000 women were deputies of local government bodies and the Supreme People’s Assembly.<sup>17</sup>

However, where at the lowest government levels women did indeed occupy about one-third of the seats in village representative organs, the percentage got lower the higher the power echelons: in the counties, cities, and provinces it was only 20–25 percent,<sup>18</sup> which was not much given that women comprised more than half of the population. In the Supreme People’s Assembly, less than 14 percent of deputies were women. The trend was not unusual either for other socialist or for capitalist countries. In the neighboring PRC, for example, women comprised about 18 percent of the deputies in the National People’s Congress (Andors 1976, 101). Overall, in the years 1957–1965, among the 45 members of the North Korean cabinet of ministers only three had been female. One of them was Ho Chŏng-suk, the wife of Kim Il, the First Deputy Chair of the Council of Ministers; another one was Pak Chŏng-ae, a well-known women activist, long-time head of the Democratic Women’s Union and a faithful Kim Il-sung supporter; and the third one, Yi Yang-suk, whose husband was also a high-ranking North Korean official, had only served for one month.<sup>19</sup> Ho Chŏng-suk and Pak Chŏng-ae, together with Kim Ok-sun, the wife of the Chief of General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, were also the only female members of the WPK Central Committee in those years.

Kim Il-sung himself later noted that women were underrepresented in the political and social sphere, and that their representation was “in areas of secondary importance” (Kim 1976, 105–126) – however, he did not propose any real steps to rectify the situation. And while, for example, in the Supreme People’s Assembly one-fifth of seats were reserved for women deputies, the actual percentage was often lower, and even now the female representation is seen as a token “to brighten the optics” (Demick 2020).

### **The WPK and the “woman question”**

But if women were not proportionately represented in local and central government, did not take a proactive role in political matters, and were involved in the economic production and workforce largely by necessity (either state-induced or in order to support the family), what was the place, role and mission of women in the North Korean society according to the WPK ideologues? The answer appears to be trifold: the women of North Korea needed to stand by the Party and with the Party in its struggle against imperialism; they were tasked with disseminating the Party’s ideology within the country on the lowest levels to their families; and it was their

responsibility to raise the future generation of revolutionary fighters and instill in them loyalty to the state and Party.

### *Women as anti-imperialist fighters*

Throughout the socialist camp, especially during the periods of industrialization, women's press such as the Soviet Union's *Rabotnitsa* [working woman] and *Krest'ianka* [peasant woman] magazines, followed the general narrative of extolling labor heroes and heroism of ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances (see Brandenberger 2012). Outwardly, North Korea's *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, the main magazine targeted at female audiences, fell into that trend. There also, like in *Rabotnitsa*, appeared real-life stories of outstanding women who worked to the benefit of the country – like, for example, Yŏm Chŏng-ja, a worker from the Nyŏngbyŏn textile factory who was awarded the title of “labor hero” for her dedication to work and outstanding productivity.<sup>20</sup> Yet, unlike its Soviet counterparts, the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, rather than putting emphasis on female workers' actual achievements and calling for more women to join the workforce and follow that example, emphasized their overall dedication and determination to serve the country and follow the Party's leadership.

The *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* was the organ of the Democratic Women's Union, one of the largest and most important and influential mass social organizations in North Korea, founded after liberation and subordinated to the Party. Already in 1946, a year after its establishment it incorporated one-third of the adult female population and had committees on all administrative levels, from village to city and province (Kim 2013, 114–116). By the 1960s the majority of the women of North Korea were members of the Democratic Women's Union – in comparison, in the Soviet Union less than five percent of the female citizens were members of the women's councils and the Committee of Soviet Women, the closest the USSR had to all-female social organizations analogous to the DWU (Pukhova 1989; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR 1985). A similar situation existed in other Eastern European “people's democracies.”

Such high rates of participation in the Democratic Women's Union made its press organ a powerful instrument for the dissemination of the Party's policies and ideology to female audiences. As the DWU was subordinated directly to the WPK, the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* also published key Party decisions and statements among stories of heroism and the typical content aimed at female audiences such as recipes, patterns, instructions for making clothes, and tips for child-rearing, thus significantly expanding their audience.<sup>21</sup>

Where the Soviet women's press understood “battle” with imperialism figuratively, more as an economic competition with the capitalist world, North Korea's interpretation was more literal. Thus what further distanced the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* from similar women's journals of contemporary Soviet Union and “fraternal countries” was the abundance of articles about women

fighters who stood alongside men and defended their homes, not just in the recent Korean War against American imperialists,<sup>22</sup> but also against the Japanese in the 1930s.<sup>23</sup> These were arguably more numerous than the tales of heroic women workers who overfulfilled plans and contributed to the country's economic development, and appeared more and more frequently as time progressed.

Covering the proceedings of the Third Congress of the Democratic Women's Union in 1965 (the Second Congress was held more than ten years earlier, in 1954), the WPK newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* proclaimed that the women of Korea needed to be always ready to stand together with their husbands and sons and, "holding in one hand their weapons, and in the other hand sickle and hammer," defend the Party and the country against any enemies (how the authors of the article imagined holding a sickle and a hammer in the same hand remains a mystery). It stressed that as "the trusted ally of the WPK," the Democratic Women's Union had to be unreservedly faithful and devoted first and foremost not to the cause of women's freedom and rights, but to "the leaders of the Party."<sup>24</sup>

The DWU's organizations were expected to rely "from beginning to end" on Party organizations, lead all their work in the directions designated by the Party and follow its decisions, and battle courageously "shoulder to shoulder with the Party." As for the "battle" part, the *Rodong Sinmun* clarified that "the Democratic Women's Union of Korea and the women of [the] country together with the whole Korean people" should "expose and thwart the machinations of the American imperialists, steadfastly defend the Eastern outpost of socialism, and determinedly fight for peace in Asia and in the whole world."<sup>25</sup>

The personification of the "woman fighter" role model that the WPK presented to the North Korean women was Kim Jong-suk, Kim Il-sung's deceased wife, mother of his son and successor Kim Jong-il, and his fellow guerilla fighter from the 1930s to 1940s. According to Kim Il-sung's Western biographies, Kim Jong-suk joined the guerilla brigades in the second half of the 1930s, where she sewed and cooked for the fighters and worked various odd jobs, and at one time was even arrested by the Japanese but managed to get back to her comrades (Suh 1988). It was there that she met the future "Great Leader" of North Korea and, according to his official biography, even saved his life:

One day, while the unit was marching under the General's [Kim Il-sung] command, five or six enemies unexpectedly approached through the reeds and aimed at the General. The danger was imminent. Without losing a moment, Comrade [Kim Jong-suk] shielded the General with her own body and shot down an enemy with her revolver. [Each time such danger occurred,] Comrade [Kim Jong-suk] rose to the occasion with fury, and protected the Headquarters of the revolution at the risk of her life.

(Baik 1969, 512)

Kim Jong-suk was celebrated as the “woman commander” and praised for being an anti-Japanese hero fighter and for upholding “the original idea and policy of Kim Il-sung.”<sup>26</sup> The WPK’s idea was for women to comprehensively support the policies put forward by the Party and the leader, but not be widely and actively included in politics and actual decision-making. For that reason, Kim Il-sung’s next wife, Kim Sŏng-ae, who was involved in North Korea’s political life and was elected vice-chairwoman of the Central Committee of the Democratic Women’s Union in 1965, and later became a representative of the People’s Supreme Assembly, did not exactly fit the requirements for a role model, unlike Kim Jong-suk.

*Women as faithful comrades and vehicles of ideological education*

Thus, the decisions were to be taken by men in the Party leadership, and women were tasked with disseminating and implementing those decisions at the lowest levels within the family, with little input into the actual decision-making process. Women should be ready to stand with the Party and its leader against imperialist forces, but in peaceful times, in the absence of an actual war, they needed to follow the Party and its decisions.

In this aspect of the WPK gender policies, the pedagogical component came to the forefront and went beyond the formal educational framework. The Third Congress of the Democratic Women’s Union in 1965 stated that women needed to be educated in the spirit of Party policy and revolutionary traditions and needed to keep up their “revolutionary watchfulness.” Both the delegates’ speeches and the Congress’s final report pointed out the necessity of “educating all the women” in the spirit of “boundless devotion to the Party and the leader”:

The Democratic Women’s Union’s organizations need to ensure that the Union’s members and the women gather even more monolithically around the Party, defend ever more vigorously the Party’s Central Committee and its leader comrade Kim Il-sung, stand steadfastly on the Party’s line and policy and fight till the very end for making them the reality.<sup>27</sup>

For that purpose, in addition to the meetings and events regularly organized by the Democratic Women’s Union under the Party’s supervision, the Party and the DWU carried out short-term educational courses for women throughout the country through local people’s committees, continuing on from the first post-liberation years (see e.g. Kim 2013). Together with Party organizations, the people’s committees explained to the women the WPK’s domestic and foreign policies, so that they could relay that knowledge at home, and organized mass cultural events in order to popularize the Party’s policies and decisions.<sup>28</sup> Ideological education was being carried out on a large scale and for various “target audiences.” Thus, for example, Soviet

diplomats on a visit to the provinces mentioned that 3–4 month long courses were organized specifically for women in South Hwanghae province in the south-west of North Korea, close to the border with South Korea, to strengthen their – and their families’ – ideological consciousness. Reportedly, more than a thousand women were attending those courses.<sup>29</sup> Similar courses were also being organized for women from former wealthy peasantry and small city bourgeoisie in order to educate them in the proper socialist and party ways and through them promote the Party’s ideas to their families and to the North Korean youth.

The final report of the Third Congress also stressed that the Women’s Union’s organizations throughout the country needed to stand for and support the principle of *juche* (self-sufficiency and self-reliance), which was finalized as the state’s ideology in the second half of the 1960s (Person 2013). They were also tasked with entrenching “Marxist-Leninist ideology” among their members and fighting against revisionism and reactionary ideology which marred “the purity of Marxism-Leninism.”<sup>30</sup> The WPK CC’s greeting to the delegates of the Congress specifically postulated that “the DWU members and women, who outstandingly carry out the Korean revolution, have to fight against revisionism and dogmatism, for the purity of Marxism-Leninism.”<sup>31</sup>

The Soviet representatives who attended the DWU Congress stated that while the matter of “enforcing class education” figured prominently in the delegates’ speeches and the final report, neither of those paid sufficient attention to elimination of bourgeois ideology and outdated patriarchal ideas. Even less attention was given to the question of “international education” of women and international cooperation. The USSR itself attributed much importance to internationalism – thus, for example, one of the goals of the Committee of Soviet Women was formulated as expressing solidarity with the women of the world against all forms of aggression, and achieving peace and mutual understanding between the nations of the world, to which end the Committee actively cooperated with the Women’s International Democratic Federation (Shumilina 1981).

In North Korea, on the other hand, as Soviet diplomats disapprovingly noted, the international aspect was notably neglected. According to the delegates’ reports and the final report of the DWU Congress, the first and foremost task of the Democratic Women’s Union was educating the women “not in the spirit of internationalism, but in the spirit of nationalism.”<sup>32</sup>

While that does not mean that “internationalist” education was completely scrapped, it, as everything else, was ultimately subordinated to the Party’s goals. From time to time and on specific occasions such as anniversaries and national holidays, the WPK newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* published materials on well-known international revolutionary figures like Lenin or Karl Marx, stressing their ideas’ and actions’ impact on the world. And the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* in similar publications focused more on the

“personal” side of historical figures, their families and family life, and the roles played by women.

Initially, in the mid-1950s, the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* articles were close in style and focus to other press not aimed specifically at female audiences, looking more at the masculine and revolutionary side of things. For example, in 1955, an article titled “Karl Marx’s Family” talked more of Marx’s work and his writing of *Das Kapital* and other works than about his family, despite the title,<sup>33</sup> and the women of Marx’s family got little attention from the article’s author.

But with the need to actively engage women in ideological education and teach them to be proper citizens, wives, and mothers, the focus also shifted. Several years later, the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* published several articles specifically about Karl Marx’s wife Jenny, this time actually making her, rather than her husband, the main focus. One story stressed that above all else Jenny was Karl Marx’s faithful and trusted comrade and companion.<sup>34</sup> According to another one, she was the kind of woman to occupy herself with the kids and economize so that her husband could worry less about earning a living wage and rather dedicate himself to his writing, “the noblest deed for the benefit of mankind,”<sup>35</sup> creating and promoting socialist ideas. The article stressed that even in the difficult times for the family Jenny Marx always supported her husband and gladly welcomed his friends in their home. Her life, the article’s author proclaimed, offered an example of a true revolutionary’s wife, who was also his trusted comrade, and was the model all the women of the world should follow in their family lives.<sup>36</sup>

### *Women as “mothers of the nation”*

However all that did not negate the more traditional image of women as mothers. In 1961, giving a speech at the National Congress of Mothers organized by the Democratic Women’s Union, Kim Il-sung stressed that it was the mothers’ duty (rather than the state’s or the Party’s) to bring up the children to be good and responsible builders of communism, fighters, and followers of the Party.<sup>37</sup> The event itself in its official title identified women as mothers, stressing motherhood as the one most important and defining role for women.

A mother, in Kim Il-sung’s words, was “a person” (*sic*) who took great interest in their children’s education and upbringing, and paid effort to raise them to become good human beings. As Kim Il-sung stated in his opening speech at the Congress of Mothers, one of the main goals of the Party was educating the people, and especially the youth, to be proper builders of communism.<sup>38</sup> For that, the mothers’ input was essential. It is curious how Kim blamed the past and the traditional society for the lack of accessible universal education, stating that, whereas before only those with money could afford to properly educate their children and the rest had to school them at home at best, now the WPK and the socialist government had

rectified that injustice and made education available to everyone at every level of society. And yet at the same time he proclaimed that proper socialist education started in the family and that the mothers, not the state schools, were primarily responsible for children's education.

While Kim Il-sung also mentioned other areas that women needed to pay attention to in his opening speech at the congress, such as domestic work, and praised women for their contribution to the country's economy, nevertheless their important and "heavy duty" of bringing up the next generation of North Koreans stood first in the list of tasks assigned to them by the Party.<sup>39</sup> As the country became more autarkic and the rhetoric of self-sufficiency and self-reliance was established as the Party's main ideological line, that aspect became ever more important.

Here again the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* presented several examples of model women. Some were international – thus, an article entitled "Lenin's Mother" named Vladimir Lenin's mother Maria Ulyanova one of the greatest women, not because of who she was, but because of who her son was.<sup>40</sup> It emphasized how she, despite being unable to access formal education, educated herself at home after work, learning foreign languages and Russian and European literature. Her determination and efforts allowed her to take an external exam and become a schoolteacher. However, she nonetheless mainly dedicated herself to her children and to raising and teaching them, including the future "leader of world proletariat" Vladimir Lenin. The *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* specifically emphasized Maria Ulyanova's motherly side, how she taught her children all she knew and gave them passion for music and learning, and how the children and family were always her joy and hope. She always supported them, especially her sons Alexandr and Vladimir. The article concluded that Maria Ulyanova was widely remembered as the "mother of the revolutionaries,"<sup>41</sup> thus showing the North Korean women the path they should take, namely being first and foremost mothers, even to the detriment of work and other occupations, dedicating themselves to family and children, and bringing them up to be proper revolutionary fighters.

Yet the ultimate example of a mother and the model to follow proposed by the WPK and the North Korean press for the women was the "Great Leader" Kim Il-sung's own mother, Kang Ban-sŏk. Having been awarded the titles of "mother of Korea" and "mother of all," she essentially had her own personality cult established in the 1960s alongside her son Kim Il-sung. Her birthday, April 21, was made a memorial day.

Kang Ban-sŏk was celebrated for upbringing Kim and raising him to be a revolutionary and anti-imperialist fighter. According to the North Korean state myth, Kang Ban-sŏk encouraged her son to fight against the Japanese occupants. Reportedly, after Kim and his mother visited his father in a Japanese prison, she cried: "I want you to grow up fast and avenge your father!" to which Kim "swore before his mother that he would avenge his father without fail" (Jager 2003, 115).



The official historiography states that under the Japanese occupation Kang organized women's associations not only in her own village, but also in the neighboring villages, educated women and inspired the Korean people to struggle against the Japanese. The *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* told a story of how in 1917, after the arrest of Kim's father Kim Hyŏng-jik, the Japanese police came again to the village and into the Kims' house in order to search it. Kang Ban-sŏk was enraged by this and fearlessly stood up against the police, and it was they who were afraid and had to leave her house empty-handed.<sup>42</sup> The story seems quite improbable, as it is much more likely that in such a situation the police would have arrested the woman who attacked them, rather than fear her and run away from her house. Moreover, while Kim's father was indeed a resistance activist, his mother in reality had little involvement with it; yet the official historiography has her picking up the revolutionary banner after the arrest of her husband and carrying on his work.<sup>43</sup> By depicting Kim Il-sung's mother as a fearless revolutionary fighter and a source of inspiration for her son, the official state myth not only ascribed to Kim a long legacy of revolution, but also made his mother into the model of a woman and mother, an ideal for all the others to follow.

In 1967, through the Democratic Women's Union and its organ *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, the WPK launched a campaign for "learning from Madame Kang Ban-sŏk." It called for women to visit the memorial places linked to the life of Kang Ban-sŏk, which had "deep revolutionary history" and were dear to all patriots,<sup>44</sup> such as Chilgol, where she was born, and Mangyŏngdae, where she lived with her husband and where her son Kim Il-sung was born. The women were called on to follow Kang's spirit and example in all spheres of life, however small and menial. Thus, for example, she loved her motherland and reportedly praised the "clear and cool" waters of Korean rivers<sup>45</sup> – and in her spirit the Korean women needed to treasure and economize water, not waste it. Pictures accompanying the articles showed the women, the members of the DWU, visiting Kang's birthplace, her house, the sites of her revolutionary activities, and "learning" from her life and experience.

The cult of Kang Ban-sŏk was later further entrenched in 1978 with the publication of her official biography entitled "Mother of Korea." It portrayed her as a dedicated wife and mother, a comrade to her husband and inspiration for her son, but also as a hard worker, a skilled weaver blessed with exceptional talent. All this endowed her with "heroic qualities," allowing her to become the mother of the national hero who liberated Korea from Japanese imperialism and founded the just socialist state and society (Kim 2011).

Kang Ban-sŏk's title of "Mother of Korea" was later also shared with Kim Il-sung's wife (and Kim Jong-il's mother) Kim Jŏng-suk, thus creating the cults of personality for the two (mythologized) women in the leader's life, and putting both of them officially on equal level as the role models and ideals to which the North Korean women should aspire. This distinctly put North Korea's case apart from the cases of personality cults of the leaders in

other “fraternal countries.” In the Soviet Union, the leaders’ families did not feature majorly in their cults of personality, and in general were never much in the public eye, until much later years, the 1980s. Stalin’s wife Nadezhda Allilueva was not included into his cult, and definitely did not get her own, neither before nor after her death (even despite her suicide not being disclosed to the public). Perhaps the one who came the closest to having her own personality cult was Lenin’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya, but that was only after Lenin’s death, and she was celebrated not as the wife of the incumbent head of state but as a faithful revolutionary comrade of the “leader of world proletariat.”

In North Korea though, with Kim Il-sung’s wife and mother being presented as role models for the North Korean women to follow, Kim Il-sung himself essentially took on the quazi-Confucian role of patriarch and head of nation-family, as well as head of state. That also contributed to the strengthening and entrenchment of Kim’s own cult. According to Michael Robinson, Kim’s position as “father of the people” flew naturally out of Korea’s Confucian tradition, which especially in the 1950s–1960s was still present in North Korea, and his leadership drew extensively from it to cement his total power within the political system (Robinson 2007, 156–157). As nurturing the “family” was the father’s (leader’s) obligation, Confucian filial piety in the form of loyalty to the leader and the country was the responsibility of the people, his “children” (Ibid., 157).

That image of the state as family and the leader as the father was promoted in various ways and through various mediums. The press, the covers of the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng* and the colorful pictures inside rarely pictured a full family – husband, wife and children – but frequently featured the Great Leader surrounded by women and/or children, giving them advice and instructions on how to be proper citizens and mothers and bring up the next generation of revolutionary fighters.<sup>46</sup> And while Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and other leaders of the socialist bloc (and not only the socialist bloc) were also from time to time pictured with children in the press, the image of Kim as leader and “father” was much more widely promoted and more lasting. In North Korea, the Kim family, Kim Il-sung himself, his mother, wife, and later his son Kim Jong-il came to embody “national independence and the revolution” (Robinson 2012, 157).

Overall, the second half of the 1960s finalized the WPK’s policies with regard to the role of women in the North Korean society. In contrast to many other Eastern bloc states including the Soviet Union, the role that the WPK offered for the North Korean women was not that of an outstanding worker and contributor to the economic life of the country, but of loyal comrade to her husband (who was said worker and contributor) and even more importantly “mother of the nation,” mentor of the next generation of revolutionary fighters with loyalty to the state, the Party, and ultimately to the patriarchal figure of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung himself.

## Conclusion

The “woman question,” the matter of the role and place of women in society, became an important part of the intellectual debate in the second half of the 19th century for both the capitalist Western societies (with the questions of women’s suffrage, property, and legal rights), and for the emergent Marxist ideology, especially after the Russian revolution and the founding of the first socialist states. The Marxist-Leninist answer to the “woman question” was to adopt equal rights laws, give women property rights, and more importantly include them into the workforce alongside men, contributing to rapid structural social and political transformations and finalizing the social revolution.

For the leaders of the Soviet Union, abolishing “kitchen slavery” also meant getting rid of the vestiges of patriarchal and religious past, a notion they actively promoted in the Soviet republics in Central Asia and then in other states joining the socialist camp. In the Soviet Union, women took active part in the industrialization of the 1930s; later, during the Great Patriotic war, they replaced at the factories men who went to war, and after the war the state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made efforts to keep women working and contributing to the national economy.

In East Asia, the PRC and its leaders largely followed that idea and rhetoric, seeing women workers as a valuable addition to the labor force. The neighboring North Korea also adopted laws on gender equality and women’s right to work. However, as this chapter aimed to explore, despite outward similarities, the North Korean ruling Party’s approach to the “woman question” essentially diverged from the official Marxist-Leninist line.

A relatively small percentage of women actually worked in fully-paid official employment in factories and offices (although they did constitute a significant part of rural workers, having to replace men conscripted into the army or working at industrial enterprises), and the women’s further inclusion into workforce was complicated by insufficient nursery and daycare facilities. The WPK saw little need in improving those facilities, as evidenced by the lack of attention given to the matter in the plans for the development of the national economy.

The social revolution in North Korea did not bring with it a complete abolition of the traditional societal structure. Rather, in the area of gender roles, it adjusted it to new realities and needs of the Party. In North Korea, women were not so much expected to contribute to economic development by leaving the confines of the house to become industrial workers and stand together with men at the forefront of socialist construction. Instead, they were to be the fighters in a different kind of battle – ideological rather than economic. To that end, the WPK took a “pedagogical state” approach and paid extensive effort to educate women in the Party policies so that they could disseminate those within the family, be faithful supporters of the Party, and ultimately as mothers raise and educate the next generation of revolutionary fighters in loyalty to the state and the Party.

If for Soviet women in the 1960s–1970s an example to look up to was Valentina Tereshkova, the world’s first female cosmonaut (see for example Clements 2012, 256–258), for their North Korean counterparts the WPK and its official propaganda offered a different, and somewhat controversial, image of a fighter and mother rather than worker, scholar, or cosmonaut. The overall militarization of the North Korean society which was happening at the time also contributed to this, affecting the WPK’s approach to the “woman question.”

Two women were presented as models: “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung’s wife and comrade in arms, heroically deceased in the fight against the Japanese oppression, and his mother. In a sense, following the Confucian tradition, which, unlike in the PRC, or religion in early years of the USSR, was not eliminated and not even actively condemned, Kim Il-sung as the leader of the country and the Party took the place of the metaphorical “father of the nation.” The women were expected to provide unreserved support to him and to the Party, disseminate Kim Il-sung’s and the WPK’s ideology – the rhetoric of *juche* and self-sufficiency – within their families, and bring up their children in the spirit of *juche*.

Overall, women were seen as comrades in spiritual rather than actual (for example economic or political, since very few women got to leading roles within the Party and the government) fight. They were “mothers of the nation,” and their traditional Confucian duty to family was essentially replaced with the duty to the state and to the leader. Essentially, the North Korean state and Party, combining socialist ideas with patriarchal and Confucian background, saw women not as active participants in the public life and important addition to labor force, but as “mothers” tasked mainly with upbringing the next generation. Entrenching this shift in the nation’s consciousness further strengthened the Party’s and its leader’s position, and legacies of the 1950s–1960s can still be seen in North Korea’s social structure, ideology and public life up to the present day.

## Notes

- 1 “V svobodnom Kitae” [In the Free China]. *Krest’ianka* [Peasant Woman] No. 10, 1954, p. 15.
- 2 As many other socialist countries, North Korea from its very early years was essentially a one-party state, with the party guiding all state and social organs. According to the DPRK constitution, the country “[conducts] all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea” (Gause 2012, 27).
- 3 The period from the 1940s to the second half of the 1950s has been the primary focus of most of previous studies on the topic; see for example Suzy Kim, “Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 742–767; Natalia N. Kim, “Gender Politics and Nation-Building: Constructing a New Type of Femininity in North Korea (1945–1957).” *RUDN Journal of World History*, No. 4, 2016, pp. 20–36.

- 4 “Ekonomika KNDR” [The DPRK Economy], 1958. Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation] (AVPRF) Fund 0102, Register 14, Folder 78, File 40, p. 4.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Though, to give credit where credit is due, the Labor Law and Sexual Equality Law adopted back in 1946 were respected, and those women who did work received equal salary to men in the same position. “O rezul’tatakh vypolneniia pervogo piatiletnego plana razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva, 1957–1961” [On the results of fulfillment of the First Five-Year plan of the development of the national economy, 1957–1961], 1961. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 21, Folder 40, File 19, p. 61.
- 7 “Dnevnik posla SSSR v KNDR A.M. Puzanova” [Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov], November 18, 1959. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 15, Folder 81, File 7, p. 269.
- 8 “Ekonomicheskaia situatsiia v KNDR/Spravka posol’stva” [Economic situation in the DPRK/Soviet Embassy report], 1964. AVPRF Fund 102, Register 24, Folder 49, File 18, p. 18.
- 9 “Ekonomicheskaia situatsiia v KNDR” [Economic situation in the DPRK], 1964. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 20, Folder 103, File 26, p. 28.
- 10 “Otchet o poezdke v vonsanskii region” [A report on the visit to the Wonsan region], May 1963. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 19, Folder 99, File 26, p. 102.
- 11 “Uri nara sahoejuüi nongch’on munje-e kwanhan t’je” [On the problems of socialist agriculture in our country]. *Rodong Simmun* [Workers’ newspaper] February 26, 1964, pp. 1–4.
- 12 For comparison, in the Soviet Union in the same years maternity leave was one year, as stated in the Program of the CPSU adopted at the XXII Congress in 1961.
- 13 “Uroven’ zhizni naseleniia KNDR” [Standards of living of the DPRK population], 1963. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 19, Folder 99, File 26, p. 85.
- 14 In the DPRK, almost any food apart from grain was considered “by-products,” so these women sorted vegetables, fish, made food for sale in cooperative shops.
- 15 “A report on the visit to Hyesan,” 1963, AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 19, Folder 99, File 26, p. 184.
- 16 “Chosŏn minju nyŏsŏng tongmaeng chungang wiwŏnhoe saŏp ch’onghwa-e taehayŏ” [On the work of the Central Committee of the Democratic Women’s Union of Korea]. *Rodong Simmun*, September 2, 1965, p. 3.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 There were overall more than 70,000 representatives on village, town, and county committees (see Kim 2013, 96).
- 19 “Spravka na gosudarstvennykh i politicheskikh deiatelei KNDR” [A note on the government and political officials of the DPRK], 1965. AVPRF Fund 102, Register 25, Folder 51, File 17, p. 4.
- 20 *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, February 1955, pp. 6–9.
- 21 For example, a *Rodong Simmun* editorial titled “Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp,” published in October 1963 at the height of North Korean-Soviet cooling of relations and seen by the contemporaries as an attack on the Soviet Union and the CPSU and confirmation of the DPRK’s siding with China, was promptly reprinted in the November issue of the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, occupying the majority of the issue.
- 22 *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, March 1960, pp. 8–11, 12, 13.
- 23 *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, February 1960, pp. 4–6, 10–11.
- 24 *Rodong Simmun*, September 2, 1965, pp. 1–4.
- 25 Ibid.

- 26 In fact, she continues to be celebrated and honored nowadays. See for example “National Meeting on International Women’s Day Held”. Korean Central News Agency, March 8, 2012.
- 27 AVPRF Fund 102, Register 25, Folder 51, File 17, p. 51.
- 28 See for example “Otchet o poezdke v Sinuiju” [A report on visit to Sinuiju city], 1962. AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 18, Folder 95, File 25, p. 177.
- 29 See AVPRF Fund 0102, Register 15, Folder 81, File 7, p. 235.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 “K’al Makssū-wa kū-ūi kajōng” [Karl Marx and his family]. *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, May 1955, pp. 10–13.
- 34 “K’al Maksū-wa kū-ūi puin Yenni” [Karl Marx and his wife Jenny]. *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, March 1966, pp. 26–29.
- 35 “Chwenni Maksū” [Jenny Marx]. *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, July 1959, pp. 24–25. (The North Korean spelling of Karl Marx’s surname and his wife’s name changed from closely emulating the Russian pronunciation in the mid-1950s to resembling more the original German variant in the 1960s).
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 “Hudaedūr-ŭl chŏnmyŏnjŏk-ūro palchŏndoeng kongsanjuūi yŏkkun-ūro kyoyang yuksŏnghaja” [Let us bring up future generations as devoted communist laborers]. *Rodong Sinmun*, November 16, 1961, p. 1.
- 38 “Kongsanjuūi ōmōni-ga toeyŏ chanyŏdūr-ŭl tŏ hullyunghi yangyuk’aja” [Let us become communist mothers and raise children even better]. *Rodong Sinmun*, November 17, 1961, pp. 1–2.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 “Renin-ūi ōmōni” [Lenin’s mother]. *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, November 1957, pp. 2–4.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, July 1967, pp. 1–17.
- 43 See Ibid.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Such pictures featured frequently on the covers and pages of the *Chosŏn Nyŏsŏng*, at times almost monthly in the late 1950s–1960s. For example, in 1960, pictures of Kim Il-sung appeared on the first pages of five out of twelve issues: in January, March, July, October, and November.

## Bibliography

- Andors, Phyllis. 1976. “Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960–1966.” *Signs* 2, no. 1 (Autumn): 89–119.
- Baik, Bong. 1969. *Kim Il-Sung: Biography. Vol. 1 From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland*. Tokyo: Miraisha.
- Brandenberger, David. 2012. *Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror under Stalin, 1927–1941*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Buzo, Adrian. 1999. *The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea*. London: Tauris.
- Clements, Barbara Evans. 2012. *A History of Women in Russia: From Earliest Times to the Present*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

- Demick, Barbara. 2020. "In North Korea, The Fourth Man Could Be a Woman." *The New Yorker*, April 25, 2020. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/in-north-korea-the-fourth-man-could-be-a-woman>
- Eberstadt, Nick and Judith Banister. 1992. *The Population of North Korea*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Gause, Ken. 2012. "The Role and Influence of the Party Apparatus," in *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Edited by Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder, 27–50. Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Goldman, Wendy Z. 2002. *Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffmann, David L. 2011. *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914–1939*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jager, Sheila Miyoshi. 2003. *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kaplan, Sam. 2006. *The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Kim, Il-sung. 1976. *Selected Works, Vol. 6*. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Kim, Il-sung. 1980. *Works, Volume 2, Jan.–Dec. 1946*. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Kim, Natalia N. 2016. "Gender Politics and Nation-Building: Constructing a New Type of Femininity in North Korea (1945–1957)." *RUDN Journal of World History*, no. 4: 20–36.
- Kim, Suzy. 2010. "Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52, no. 4: 742–767.
- Kim, Suzy. 2013. *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kim, S.-Y. 2011. "Dressed to Kill: Women's Fashion and Body Politics in North Korean Visual Media (1960s–1970s)." *Positions: Asia Critique* 19, no. 1: 159–191.
- Lee, Chong-Sik. 1963. "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea." *The China Quarterly* 14 (April-June): 65–81.
- Lee, Jung Woo. 2009. "Red Feminism and Propaganda in Communist Media: Portrayals of Female Boxers in the North Korean Media." *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 44, no. 2–3: 193–211.
- Lenin, Vladimir I. 1974. *Complete Works, Vol. 39: June-December 1919*. Moscow: Politizdat.
- Mao, Zedong. 1977. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Mao, Zedong. 1993. *Works, Vol. 1*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1969. "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1*, 98–137. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- McCauley, Alastair. 1979. "The Woman Question in the USSR." *Slavic Review* 38, no. 2: 290–293.
- Nakachi, Mie. 2011. "A Postwar Sexual Liberation? The Gendered Experience of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War." *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 52, no. 2/3: 423–440.

- Park, Kyung Ae. 1992. "Women and Revolution in North Korea." *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 4: 527–545.
- Person, James F. 2013. "Solidarity and Self-Reliance: The Antinomies of North Korean Foreign Policy and Juche Thought, 1953–1967." Washington, DC: George Washington University.
- Pukhova, Zoya P. 1989. "Zhenskoe dvizhenie i perestroika v SSSR" [The women's movement and perestroika in the USSR], in *Zhenshchiny v sovremennom mire* [Women in the modern world], edited by V. V. Lyubimova, 58–63. Moscow: Nauka.
- Pykett, Jessica. 2010. "Introduction: The Pedagogical State: Education, Citizenship, Governing." *Citizenship Studies* 14, no. 6 (December): 617–619.
- Robinson, Michael E. 2007. *Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Ruthchild, Rochelle Goldberg. 2010. *Equality and Revolution: Women's Rights in the Russian Empire, 1905–1917*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Shumilina, V. P. 1981. "Deiatel'nost' KPSS po razvitiuu obshchestvenno-politicheskoi aktivnosti zhenshchin" [The CPSU's efforts to increase the socio-political activism of women], in *Opyt KPSS v reshenii zhenskogo voprosa* [The CPSU's experience in resolving the woman question], edited by Kondakova, N. I., 200–219. Moscow: Mysl'.
- Skocpol, Theda. 2008. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Suh, Dae-Sook. 1988. *Kim Il Sung: North Korean Leader*. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press.
- Tsentrāl'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR [The Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR]. 1985. *Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1985. Statisticheskie Materialy* [Women in the USSR 1985. Statistical data]. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika.



# 10 The dawn before one-party dominance: South Korea's road to party politics under the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, 1961–1963

*Kyonghee Lee*

## Introduction

In January 1963, South Korea's national intelligence chief, Kim Jong-pil, revealed plans for the formation of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in a ceremonial congress of its founding members. Rather than state the obvious fact that the party was to be a vehicle for the junta members' continued exercise of power in the promised civilian government, he stressed that it would be a "working party" (*ilhanin chŏngdang*), and not a "party that only talks" like other previous Korean parties (PRDDRP 1967, 9).

Kim and other officers of the military had come to power with a coup two years earlier under the leadership of Major General Park Chung Hee, with the pledge to promptly return to civilian rule.<sup>1</sup> The party under the name of DRP was disbanded by a new junta in 1980, after it had taken power with another military coup in December 1979 in the wake of Park Chung Hee's death. As in 1961, it dissolved all political parties in a move reminiscent of what Karl Marx, that demigod of *yonggong punja* (communist sympathizers) detested by both military regimes, had sneered at as a repetition of world-historical phenomena. Other parties with different names, however, followed one after another and built a line of descent that goes back to the DRP, displaying a clear continuity from it in terms of their core members, political convictions, and regional affiliation of the voter base.<sup>2</sup> The line of parties consisting of the DRP and its successors stayed in government until 1997, and its descendant remains a major party to this day.

This chapter narrates the process in which a relatively small group of military men in South Korea consolidated political power with a coup and managed to gain sanction from the United States by vouching a return to civilian rule, and then to remain in power for two decades by forming a political party designed to be and remain the dominant party. The eventual character of the party was the result of negotiations of conflicting views on party politics of the two leading men, the later President Park and the first DRP head Kim Jong-pil, and of other elements of the junta. Park's strong aversion to factional strife in Korean history and skepticism about

deliberative and electoral politics were at odds with Kim's penchant for building and running organizations and ambitions for a giant political party orchestrated by a strong secretariat. However, the two men shared one trait, namely their distrust in the power of language. From the early days after the coup, their military regime vowed to "engender a clean and new spirit" with their reform measures until the promised return to civilian rule and aptly used intellectuals and new legislations to that end. Contrary to the solemn announcements made at the inauguration of the DRP, Kim's intelligence agency had been building up the party in secret for over a year. In the midst of a legitimacy crisis brought about by discontents from both in and outside the junta with how the party was created, Park repeatedly made public pledges and went back on them.

The military junta's choice of keywords for their political propaganda included "revolution," "reconstruction," and "administrative democracy," while the DRP postulated "liberty," "independence," "democracy," and "republicanism" in its constitution. As if in reflection of its leaders' pliant attitude toward language, the ideological content or the actual political program related to these were rarely discussed. Instead, the junta and the DRP's political stance was more often than not defined in negation, by the enumeration of evils committed by other political forces in the country in the past and the present, and would therefore be most suitably characterized as anti-intellectual. The party's anti-intellectualism was borne out by its slogan "working party" and the party logo of an ox, an animal of labor that symbolized hard, patient, and silent work for Koreans and was sometimes brought in to walk on election campaign grounds.

### *The May 16 coup and the revolutionary pledges*

In the early hours of May 16, 1961, lower-rank officers of the army under the leadership of Major General Park and upper-rank officers known to be led by the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Chang To-yŏng, seized Seoul and broadcast their "Revolutionary Pledges" on the radio. Prime Minister Chang Myŏn of the ruling Democratic Party failed to take any military action, which in turn made it hard for the United States or the United Nations to involve themselves. The military junta, under the name of Military Revolution Committee, issued a proclamation to declare an extraordinary martial law, the harsher of the two types of South Korean martial law, and banned all kinds of political activities.

The little age difference between graduates of different classes of the Korea Military Academy (KMA), as Kim Hyung-A pointed out in greater detail, created lasting antimonies that crystallized into a revolt within the army in 1960 (Kim 2004, 58–63). The revolt broke out about a month after the April Revolution, which had brought down the Rhee Syngman regime. The KMA's first few classes of graduates were qualified after very short training periods of a few months to meet the needs of a new nation and then

of a civil war. By the end of the Korean War, graduates of earlier generations had already occupied most of the higher ranks of the army, which led to a growing resentment among the officers, who came to believe that they would never be able to advance their career as their seniors had done. These officers felt that the seniors, hardly older than themselves, merely had the luck of getting trained a couple of years earlier and were exploiting their positions with indulgence and corruption. The so-called “military purification movement,” in which junior officers like Kim Jong-pil demanded that the upper-rank officers leave the army, was an expression of such sentiments. For Kim and other lower-rank participants of it, the May 16 coup was an extension of that movement.

The leaders of the May 16 coup were ambitious men with a strong desire to break the career deadlock they found themselves in. Among them, Park Chung Hee was someone who had once experienced the personal victory of overcoming his humble beginnings as the youngest of an impoverished family in colonial Korea and becoming a military officer in Japan after an education in the military academy of Manchukuo. Scholars of Park point out that it was during his years in Manchukuo and Japan that he built a lasting personal network and suspect a formative influence from Japanese militarism or young officers’ radicalism that had come to a head with the February 26 Incident (Kim 2004, 18–20; Han 2010). Following the liberation of Korea, Park finished training as a second-class graduate of the Chosŏn Defense Academy, later the KMA, and was commissioned as an officer. When his membership of the Workers’ Party of South Korea, which was at the time not an unnatural decision considering that his brother Park Sang-hŭi was a famous communist, led to suspicions of his involvement in a major left-wing military rebellion in 1948 known as the Yŏ-Sun Incident, he was discharged from the army. The Korean War gave Park, then working as a civilian in the army bureau of intelligence, another chance to become a military officer, but his past record as a member of the Workers’ Party would pose a great hurdle for his career prospects.

Kim Jong-pil, the strategist of the coup, had also gone through the disgrace of being discharged from the ranks the previous year. He had led a rebellion of junior officers within the army following the “military purification movement.” His marriage to Park Sang-hŭi’s daughter, which made him Park Chung Hee’s nephew-in-law, had not exactly been an advantage for his military career yet. An eighth-class graduate of the KMA and to be considered the second leader of Korean politics throughout the 1960s, Kim mobilized fellow eighth-class officers and other younger members of the army to join the coup (Scalapino 1963, 33; Paige 1967, 21).

The junta’s Pledges, reprinted in national newspapers on the same day and later known to have been drawn up by Kim Jong-pil, may be summarized as follows: (1) anti-communism; (2) adherence to the United Nations Charter and respect for and faithful fulfillment of all treaties and agreements with the United States and other allies of the free world;

(3) complete elimination of corruption and old evils and encouragement of new habits; (4) speedy solution of the problem of the livelihood of the people who are on the verge of starvation and reconstruction of an independent national economy; (5) strengthening of power and effectiveness to combat communism and reunify the peninsula; (6) handover of the government to clean and conscientious civilians after the mission is accomplished.<sup>3</sup>

The pledges, simple as they are, were created for the primary purpose of heightening the chances of securing sanction to seize and remain in the government from the international society as well as the Korean public. Against the background of South Korea's reliance on the United States in economic and national defense issues and of how the United States had interpreted the political situation in Korea and envisaged its future course before what the junta called the "revolution" happened, the presence of the United States comes into relief between the lines of the pledges. Earlier that year, the United States had predicted that more political unrest would be unavoidable if the Chang government, which had come to power in the wake of the April Revolution of the previous year, did not break the impasse by tackling the old problems of corruption and poverty and gaining trust from the people.<sup>4</sup> As it had been no secret that tensions within the Korean army kept escalating since the beginning of the "military purification movement," the coup in May would not have been a great surprise to insiders and those in intelligence circles.

Anti-communism, in this context, was an essential justification for the coup if its leaders were to stay in power after seizing the government. The real fear for the United States was not the prospect of repeated upheavals as such, but a scenario in which political turbulence acted as a catalyst to flip the economically and politically feeble nation to communism.<sup>5</sup> Kim Jong-pil later professed that his choice of anti-communism as the first pledge was for the sake of Park Chung Hee, who had long been placed under scrutiny by the United States because of his past involvement in left-wing activities (Chōn 2015a). Immediately after the coup, the US intelligence did indeed make sure that Park did not collude with communist forces.<sup>6</sup>

The revolutionary pledges, as a whole, were likely aimed just as much at the international society in the midst of the Cold War as at Korean citizens. The pledges addressed important points made in earlier intelligence reports by the United States, declassified several decades later. In these, the United States especially warned of corruption in major institutions of the Korean society and of the potential receptivity of the people to communist agitation.<sup>7</sup> Aside from the first pledge of anti-communism, the second was a straightforward appeal for a sanction by the United States and other developed, aid-giving, countries, while the third and the fourth pledges could be read as answers to the prediction of political unrest. Another declassified communication drafted a month after the coup gave the junta a reminder of the last pledge about the handover to civilian rule. It advised the junta to

publicly reaffirm their intention eventually to restore representative government and constitutional liberties; and that failure over the long run to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will compromise them in the eyes of the people of the United States and other Free World countries and in the United Nations.

This piece of advice constituted a prerequisite for future aid for the ambitious five-year economic plan.<sup>8</sup>

The UN forces and the American embassy had initially expressed doubt, but their attitude became less hostile after two days.<sup>9</sup> Following the reaffirmation of support from the United States, Prime Minister Chang announced the resignation of the entire cabinet, and President Yun Po-sŏn showed little resistance. The junta formed its Revolutionary Cabinet by May 19, and the new government was in place when the UN forces also announced their support on the 20th after a round of talks with Kim (Kim 1995, 157–158). On May 27, the military government switched down the status of the martial law from extraordinary to precautionary, but the martial law remained in place for another year and a half until the junta lifted it before the referendum on the constitutional amendment in December 1962.

Within days, the junta put their pledge of anti-communism into action. Over the course of the following week, it rounded up two thousand and twelve people as communist sympathizers and detained students with pro-North Korean tendencies, as Dong-A Ilbo reported on May 23, 1961. One of the campaign's targets was the *Minjok Ilbo*, a progressive daily that had repeatedly asserted its anti-communist convictions. In an effort to ferret out all communists, the junta banned its publication, arrested all executives the day after the coup, and, by the end of the year, executed its owner Cho Yong-su. Mun Hong-ju, a constitutional scholar and later the junta cabinet's Minister of Government Legislation, explained in his guide to the Emergency Measures Act for students that "meanwhile, the Military Revolution Committee rounded up pro-communists and pinkos with a lightning speed and continued with its bold measures for the clean-up of old evils and the establishment of order" (Mun 1961, 19). The United States interpreted these actions to be demonstrative appeals driven by the coup leaders' scruples about their own left-wing activities in the past (Cho 1999a, 107).

If the pledges contained a message for the international society, the people in the nation became acquainted with their new government with a greater spectacle. The junta commenced ostentatious campaigns across the country within days or weeks after the coup. These included the aforementioned anti-communist busts and were supposed to be literal execution of the pledges. One day after the coup, a series of decrees prepared by Kim Jong-pil was issued, one of which, the Decree 10, made it possible for citizens to be "arrested, detained, and searched without a court warrant when deemed necessary for completion of the revolution" and to install military courts. In ten days, some 12,000 people were rounded up as "cancer for the law and

order of the capital,” about half of whom received summary justice in accordance with the decree, as Chosun Ilbo reported on May 27. The greatest number of offenders had breached curfew, while other offences included operating or frequenting music or dance halls, prostitution, and unauthorized construction, but it was “thugs” (*kkangp’ae*) who created the most eye-catching spectacle. The “thugs,” who had formed close relationships with politicians and involved themselves in elections during their heyday in the Rhee Syngman regime, were driven out to the streets to join a repentance march. The junta also fired civil servants who committed corruption or concubinage, banned high-interest loans in rural areas, and confiscated assets of some of the most affluent entrepreneurs for reasons of illegal acquisition. The prohibition of usury would later cause an economic crisis and the confiscation would eventually turn out to be the beginning of the regime’s close relationship with conglomerates (*chaeböl*). The campaigns altogether formed an eloquent message of adherence to the pledges on corruption and poverty that differentiated the junta from the two previous governments since the nation’s independence.

### *The groundwork for a dictatorship with a sell-by-date*

After the regime takeover, the junta faced the task of making important political and legal decisions. Many of its early decisions smack rather of improvisation than of premeditation. The decision-makers of the junta, as military men unexperienced in government management, had started out with a handful of rough ideas for their first steps in the event of success, to make the rest up in response to further developments. Their decisions in the early days of the regime exhibit two patterns. In the first, the junta would invite civilian intellectuals, including legal experts, to create *ex post facto* a legal frame for actions that it had already taken. In other cases, the junta claimed the credit for existing organizations or movements as its own.

The junta renamed itself from “Military Revolution Committee” to “Supreme Council for National Reconstruction” (SCNR) three days after the coup, shifting the rhetoric of its cause from revolution to reconstruction. The SCNR’s legal basis was created, after the fact, three weeks later by the Emergency Measures Act for National Reconstruction on June 6. The Council would remain the sole holder of legislative, judiciary, and executive powers until the new constitution it drafted took effect in December 1963.<sup>10</sup> The previous constitution, promulgated in 1960 as a consequence of the April Revolution, was never abolished, but Clause 24 of the Emergency Measures Act obliterated its status as the supreme law by stating that “any stipulations in the constitution that do not comply with these Emergency Measures are to be applied according to those in the Emergency Measures.” Until the new constitutional order took effect in 1963, the SCNR drafted several hundred new laws and frequently revised them. The military regime

thus exhibited a behavioral pattern in which laws consistently came after action and had the inevitable appearance of an afterthought.

The Emergency Measures Act for National Reconstruction began with the preamble that the SCNR was to be formed “as an emergency measure to protect the Republic of Korea from communist invasions, overcome the state and the nation’s crisis caused by corruption, graft, and poverty, and reconstruct it into a truly democratic republic.” It was drafted by Han T’ae-yŏn, a constitutional scholar and Carl Schmitt specialist who also participated in the drafting process of the Third Republic Constitution as well as of the Yushin Constitution of 1972. Han reminisced about how he came to write it in an interview, a rare occasion for him. Asked by the Supreme Council member Yi Sŏk-che to draft a “Revolutionary Constitution,” he remembered how the Nazis had managed to encroach on the Weimar constitutional order following Hitler’s rise to power. Yi, an erstwhile law student, oversaw legal matters in the SCNR, so it is altogether possible that the ideas in the Act came from Yi and other Council members. Han single-handedly drafted the Act during a week spent alone in a hotel room, taking the Weimar history of “making a constitution with a law” as his inspiration (Han 2002, 34–35). Like the Weimar Enabling Act, the Emergency Measures Act conferred supra-constitutional powers on the SCNR.

The new government’s first and arguably most important move was the creation of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) with Kim Jong-pil at its head. The KCIA quickly grew into a large organization that engaged not only in surveillance and intelligence, but also in important political planning activities. Kim asserted that he created the KCIA by modeling it after the American CIA and was motivated by the desire, first, to make his revolution a *fait accompli*, second, to deal with foreseeable counter-revolutionary activities, and third, to capitalize on his abilities in planning and structuring, which he was confident of (Yi 1967, 109–115). While Kim often spoke of the agency as his own invention, in reality it inherited a part, including the personnel, of the Central Information Study Committee that had been set up by the previous Chang government (Chŏng 2013, 283). Even so, the extraordinary speed of four days it took for the KCIA to be created suggests that it had been a priority for the junta’s preliminary planning before the coup. In contrast, the new regime spent more time providing itself with legal and constitutional bases. In a parallel to how the Emergency Measures Act was drafted after the SCNR was set up, the KCIA Act took effect weeks after the creation of the agency.

Kim Jong-pil initially devised the KCIA and the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters to be under direct control from the SCNR. In reality, though, factional differences meant that Kim often steered the KCIA independently of the SCNR. The KCIA was commonly referred to as simply the CIA in Korean media during the 1960s, but unlike the CIA, it spent most of its energy on surveillance, political operations, and public opinion manipulation within the country. Its character, if at all, was

therefore more comparable to that of the FBI. The KCA's activities went far beyond the realm of intelligence. As will be discussed in the following sections, the KCIA was a main actor in the foundation of the DRP and in important legislation processes. For Kim, who had chosen not to be a member of the Council, it also functioned as a vehicle to consolidate his position and influence in the junta and expand his faction.

The National Reconstruction Movement was conceived to mobilize people and promote "reconstruction," the junta's choice of rhetoric. The Act on the National Reconstruction Movement, promulgated at around the same time as the KCIA and Emergency Measures Acts, stated that it was a nationwide movement that aimed to "encourage the entire nation to nurture new habits, maintain a system of new life, and reinforce the ideology of anti-communism." More specifically, but not less abstractly, it also listed objectives of the movement, which included the rejection of sympathies and impartiality toward communism, endeavor to lead a frugal life, instillation of an industrial spirit, promotion of the will to produce and build, a moral elevation of the people, purification of mentality, and improvement of the national status.<sup>11</sup> Although the movement began less than a month after the coup, numerous elite intellectuals such as its first general manager Yu Chin-o, who was a constitutional scholar, novelist, and university dean, joined it. It quickly established a hierarchical network of branches not only in big cities but also on all administrative levels across the country as well as within various civic organizations. Such a rapid and structured mobilization was possible because the junta had absorbed the participants and much of the message of a civic movement that had begun the year before under the name of "National New Life Movement." It was, in turn, a consolidation of various campaigns of the 1950s, which included the Life Improvement Movement, the Christian Rural Movement, and the Nationalist Movement (Hö 2003).

The movement was launched when the junta had just set up and provided a legal basis for the SCNR and the KCIA. Several readings are possible as to what political purposes this half civic, half state-led campaign was to serve at this point. As Yu Chin-o himself had mentioned, there was a suspicion from the beginning that it was a tool for mass mobilization in the fascist mold from "sceptics who question if it does not orient itself toward a totalitarian system similar to those of Japan, Germany, and Italy" (Yu 1961). The movement has also been touted as an earlier incarnation of the better-known New Village Movement of the 1970s (ADB 2012, vii). This chapter, however, limits its attention to the junta's own perspectives of that time.

The first possible interpretation is that since the junta had banned all political activities, it needed a proxy political organization of a professedly non-political nature to mobilize people and consolidate support for the regime. Yu Chin-o's explanation that the purpose of the movement was "to retrieve our nation's democracy that has temporarily been lulled into a stupor by the May 16 Military Revolution" may be read as a volunteering statement to fill a gap that the regime left open for just such civilian elites as



himself (Yu 1961). The fact that the movement petered out after the elections of 1963 and the Headquarters were disbanded in August 1964 also supports this view. Second, the geographical coverage of the organization with hierarchically connected branches could have helped deter the growth or formation of political forces hostile to the regime. This interpretation is borne out by the fact that the junta amended the Act on the National Reconstruction Movement to ban political activities of movement participants in November 1962, shortly before the national ban on political activities was planned to be lifted.<sup>12</sup> Third, the movement may be evaluated in the context of the conspicuous campaigns that had eloquently shown how the new regime acted on its pledges. The regime, in need of a long-term campaign that would add substance to its rhetoric of reconstruction, borrowed the network and the language of an existing nationwide campaign. Lastly, the reconstruction movement was in part also a preliminary step toward the foundation of the DRP. Some participants of the movement were recruited to join what would later become the DRP as its founding “agents,” which was being secretly built already from late 1961 (Cho 2016, 117–120).

Having found justification for the coup in Chang government’s failures, the SCNR’s propaganda materials regularly alluded to the previous regime’s faults. Conversely, its achievements were appropriated as the military junta’s own or simply not acknowledged. One example is the first Five-Year Plan. Often recognized as one of the Park regime’s successes, it was announced in 1961 and commenced in January 1962. In a Ministry of Finance document dated January 6, 1962, it was stated that the Five-Year-Planning was “created by the Revolutionary Government to clean up corruption and social evils and contribute to an independent growth of the national economy.”<sup>13</sup> The Plan had an incubation period that went several years back, however. In 1958, the Rhee Syngman government had established the Economic Development Council, from which a Three-Year Plan came out the following year. The Plan received approval in 1960, but was halted due to the April Revolution. The Chang regime in turn began revising it into a Five-Year Plan in the same Council and finished it in May 1961. A June 1961 report to the White House mentioned that the American ambassador would forward the message about the United States’ aid for the Five-Year Plan.<sup>14</sup> This communication was prepared in response to the Chang government’s request for aid that had been made shortly before the coup.

The Chang regime had revised the Plan to extend it to five years and to opt for an imbalanced development. The new Plan, which retained these two elements, was therefore a legacy and less of an invention (Wolf 1962, 23-24). Because of the potential suspicions the idea of an economic planning would arouse, the regime declared that the Five-Year Plan simply added a sense of planning to the revolutionary government’s principle of a free market system.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, Park Chung Hee would likely have had less scruple

about the economic planning, having been educated in Manchukuo (Nagaharu 1938).

***The road to a party-state: Intellectuals, secret agents, and laws***

In August 1961, Park Chung Hee, now the chairman of the SCNR, published a statement reiterating the junta's pledge about the return to civilian government. His statement included a rough political timetable toward the promised return: after a year of reforms in 1962, a general election would take place, and a new constitution would be promulgated in May 1963. It was also made known that the political system of the future civilian government would be presidential, replacing the parliamentary cabinet system that had been introduced the previous year after the collapse of the Rhee government. Shortly before the statement, Chang To-yŏng, who had acted as the leader of the coup d'état in May and then as the SCNR chairman, had been accused of a counterrevolutionary incident and pushed out of the way (Chŏn 2015b). Although this battle ended with a victory for Park, it was merely the first of the many conflicts of factional strife within the military government caused in the main by tensions between junior officers around Kim Jong-pil and factions of senior officers, especially of those with a background in Northern provinces like Chang.<sup>16</sup> Besides, there had been pressure from the United States to confirm the timing of the transition, and the scheduled UN summit in September would also have come into consideration before this announcement.<sup>17</sup>

An important message in the statement was the government's decision that there would be "a new law to prevent former politicians with a record of graft and corruption from entering politics," as the daily *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, among others, reported on August 12. Contrary to the last Revolutionary Pledge, Park had been against the idea of an early return to civilian government on the grounds that it would bring former politicians back to political life.<sup>18</sup> He ousted Chang To-yŏng because Chang had persistently demanded an early return, but having acknowledged that an eventual return was inevitable, some measures needed to be made to prevent the dreaded resurrection of politicians. The resulting Act on the Purification of Political Activities (hereafter the Purification Act) entered into force in March 1962 and was, like many other early products of the regime, not entirely novel, for the previous government had also had a similar law that stopped people related to Rhee Syngman's Liberal Party from entering politics. The Purification Act banned political activities of those who had been subject to the previous ban, all party politicians, party employees, and higher government officials who had been active at the time of the coup, and heads of public corporations.<sup>19</sup> The lists published in the March 30 issue of the official gazette name over 4,000 people. President Yun Po-sŏn, who had remained in office and thus contributed to an impression of constitutionality, resigned at this time, and Chairman Park became the acting president.

A book that Park had allegedly penned himself, *Our Nation's Path* (its Korean title means *Our Nation's Future Path*): *An Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, was published around this time (Pak 1962). The book made use of the rhetoric of crisis throughout and begins with the condemnation of the lack of sense of national identity prevalent among Koreans as a cause of that crisis: "We may find the cause of the national crisis which has persisted for more than a dozen years in the past in 'our lack of national consciousness,' an extreme deficiency in the national awareness of the fact that 'we live together; we die together'" (Pak 1962, 17). Contrary to its forward-looking title, about two thirds of the book were dedicated to a lengthy description of old ills in the nation's past. The greatest ills of the Chosŏn dynasty, Park argued, were factional strife (*tangjaeng*), servile submission to China, and the aristocracy's complacency. He deplored that it was especially the evil habits of the factional strife, a historical form of party politics, which lingered on into post-liberation Korea and plagued the politics of previous governments (Pak 1962, 75). Koreans' most harmful and humiliating habit, namely infighting, was also a legacy of the historical factionalism (Pak 1962, 83).

Although a reconstruction of the Korean society would only be made possible by overcoming these ills, the nation, like many other nations, had unreflectingly embraced Western democracy like ill-suited clothes, contributing to a hindered growth of its democracy (Pak 1962, 84, 128–131, 219–227). The fault lay in the failure to acknowledge that the "luscious tree" that was the Western European democracy could not "blossom in inhospitable Korean soil" (Pak 1962, 84). Unlike South Korea, Park declared, some nations had been exemplary in recognizing the fault of implanting Western-European-style democracy into a non-Western society. His examples in the book, Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Nasser of Egypt, were also frequently mentioned by Park and Kim Jong-pil elsewhere.

In comparison to the extensively elaborated ills of the past, his proposed solution was curtly presented as an "administrative democracy." Park explained that a democracy "imported directly from Europe" would have a hard time to take actual effect under the social and economic climate of Asia. In Korea, evils such as corruption and injustice "have deeply infiltrated every cell of the structure of the nation, because of the abnormal pressure of party politics in the past." In the book, in which there is no concise definition of administrative democracy, the following is what comes closest to it:

We cannot, as a matter of fact, enjoy complete political freedom in this revolutionary period. Nevertheless, democratic principles must be maintained at the administrative levels at least (...) For this reason, the revolutionary period until the turnover of the Government to civilian control must be utilized to lay the intellectual and moral foundation for true democracy. Also, it is a period during which the public can develop ability in self-government and self-help. (Pak 1962, 227–236)

As for ways of developing ability in self-government and self-help, no further details were given apart from the brief mention of an administrative reform of the government and education of the people by means of a national movement.

While this view on democracy was apparently shared by Park and Kim Jong-pil, “administrative democracy” was not the only name for this thought. From the early months of the regime, Kim was reported to have expressed his admiration for a “guided democracy” in speeches, a term made famous by Indonesia’s Sukarno. But people who scrutinized Kim’s alleged admiration were those who did not fully trust the junta members’ professed anti-communism and wondered if they were not too left-wing and radical after all (Sō 1961). Guided democracy remained a topic of scrutiny for several years and featured, for example, in a press conference with Park, to which he simply said he had no idea.<sup>20</sup>

*The State, the Revolution, and I*, Park’s second book published a couple of months before the presidential election in 1963, had a more pronounced focus on the argument that Western democracy is unsuitable for Korea. For the argument, the book dedicated sub-chapters to more detailed case studies of other countries, which included Nasser’s Egypt, Sun Yat-sen’s China, the Meiji Restoration, and Kemal Pasha’s Turkey, but made no mention of “administrative democracy” (Pak 1962). Ayub Khan’s case, highly praised in Park’s book the previous year, may have been considered less appropriate because of developments in Pakistan’s international relations, which caused the country to get closer to communist China, and was missing in this book. Park’s choice of democracy during the election campaigns was “national” (*minjokchōk*), instead of “administrative.” It is hard to tell whether such a fluidity of terminology was accidental or intended. Beside the obvious possibility that these lengthy written works were not created by Park himself or that Park and Kim had simply not thought their notions of democracy through, another possibility is that they were shy of appealing to present doctrinal ideas, after facing suspicions unrelentingly raised by students, intellectuals, and politicians that linked their form of democracy to communist or totalitarian mentality.

Along with the Purification Act, Park’s proposed timetable for 1962 contained the drafting of a new constitution for the civilian government to come, commonly known as the Third Republic Constitution. The South Korean practice of giving each regime that installed itself with a revision of the constitution the moniker of a new “republic,” which titled the previous Rhee and Chang governments the First and Second Republics, respectively, was most likely borrowed from French history, albeit technically incorrect (Sōng 2005). When the Purification Act took effect in March, the SCNR’s own monthly *Supreme Council Review* published opinion pieces by constitutional scholars Yu Chin-o and Han T’ae-yōn, imparting the impression that the Council was inviting civilian specialists to give advice in preparation of the amendment process (Han 1962; Yu 1962). Major newspapers

continued to frequently report on the progress of the drafting process in the run-up to the referendum in December, so that it appeared as if broader opinions were being taken into consideration for the otherwise *sub rosa* process. In July, a special committee called “Constitutional Deliberation Committee” with 21 specialist members was established under the SCNR. It was also announced that constitutional scholars from the United States would be invited as advisors in October, a fact that the Council made sure to be known for months. It is unlikely, however, that any advice provided by the two American professors made a difference to the constitution, for the draft was finalized in the same month. Besides, there also was a public hearing on the constitution in September. The Third Republic Constitution was passed by a referendum on December 17 and came into force exactly one year later in accordance with the constitution’s provisional article 1, which stipulated that “this Constitution is to enter into force from the day when the National Assembly convenes for the first time under this Constitution.”

Because the actual drafting process remained invisible despite these appearances, it had been not clear whether it was the junta or the civilian deliberation committee that led the amendment process. In all likelihood, however, the junta did lead most of the drafting (Scalapino 1963, 33; Lee 2000). For one, former DRP employees recounted that the KCIA set up a policy institute not long after the creation of the KCIA. University professors who were scouted to work for the policy institute were split up into different teams dedicated to specific areas such as the constitution and the party, to secretly carry out preparatory research for legislation and the foundation of the DRP (Cho 2016, 41–45). Han T’ae-yŏn’s account, who was also a member of the deliberation committee, bears out this recount. According to Han, the KCIA had invited other professors to draw up a draft, about which he and other committee members were later called in to make comments. The committee members’ opinions were, with the exception of a few minor matters, not reflected in the final draft (Han 2002, 37). The fact that the name of the committee mentioned by the media in their reports on the drafting process had been “Constitution Drafting Committee” all along until the inauguration of the committee in July may have been due to a last-minute decision by the junta to limit the committee’s role to mere deliberation.<sup>21</sup> While these circumstances and the details of the resulting amendment suggest that the constitution was drafted by the regime, it is not yet entirely clear how much the KCIA was involved, considering the factional division between the KCIA and members of the SCNR, which became more visible a year later.

The preamble of the Third Republic Constitution contained two new clauses that had no overlap with those of earlier constitutions.<sup>22</sup> The newly added clauses therefore had some bearing on the regime’s priorities. Clause six was about the role and the legal status of public servants, while Clause

seven on political parties stipulated the freedom of founding political parties, a multi-party system, organizational democracy, and the possibility of disbanding in the case of a violation of the basic democratic order. The addition of these clauses to a preamble that had no mention of the form of government makes one wonder what the drafters intended for the executive and legislative bodies.

From the moment the final draft was published, it was frequently pointed out that the constitution contained elements of a party-state. What did the regime intend to achieve in the political reality of the time, in which the representative system still had a long way to go? Most controversial were the stipulation that a party nomination was the prerequisite for presidential and parliamentary candidacy (Clause 36), ruling out independent candidacy, and that members of parliaments disqualify themselves by leaving or changing their party (Clause 38). These clauses would make the MPs' status subordinate to the party, but they could also potentially strengthen the president's control over the legislative.

Such a strong presidency called for some preconditions. The form of the government should be one in which the president had a strong set of powers to preside over the executive. The president would have to be from the ruling party, and ideally, the party would have a central organ that could steer the party's agenda. The Third Republic Constitution established a presidential government and yet did not specify whether cabinet members had control over the presidency, allowing the president to exercise strong executive powers. It replaced the bicameral system of the Second Republic with a unicameral system, simplifying the process of becoming a ruling party. As major civilian politicians pointed out, the constitution had no stipulation as to the potential case of a conflict between the president and the ruling party. To wit, the new constitution was drafted under the assumption that the president would be from a pro-government party (Hö and Yang 1963).

Throughout 1962, the military junta carried out government reforms and made preparations for the pledged return to civilian government. The drafting of the constitution was an important part of the preparations and choreographed to be a public event. The junta emphasized that the process was democratic, and school children were made to memorize and recite the Revolutionary Pledges (Son 1994, 254). Park Chung Hee's book *Our Nation's Path* was widely distributed and promoted (Scalapino 1963, 31). In hindsight, with knowledge of what unfolded in 1963 around the founding of the DRP, the referendum on the constitution, the first referendum in South Korean history, inevitably appears to have been a political maneuver to build a narrative of progress toward democracy under the leadership of a new political force, if not a vote of confidence for the junta. The referendum was held just at the point when the junta members were about to move away from the SCNR's monistic rule and enter an unknown pluralistic political landscape.

***The formation of the Democratic Republican Party***

Earlier political parties in Korea of the early post-liberation years had been formed in an environment that afforded them neither enough time nor the desire to build a sound party platform (Pak 1966). In comparison, the DRP had the relative luxury of having over a year's time to build the party organization, albeit in secret, and a government with legislative powers that drew up a series of laws optimized for the party. For all the meticulous planning to build a party with a dominant position in the parliament and a centralized administrative structure in which the secretariats would control its assemblymen, the developments in the first few months surrounding its formation were anything but what its founders had hoped for. The party nonetheless survived the tumultuous months and stood victorious after two elections, but the party-political constellation that emerged was somewhat removed from the original design.

With the beginning of the year 1963, the regime lifted the ban on political activities. It also unveiled the Political Parties Act and the Election Acts on the parliamentary and presidential elections. Former politicians and the politically minded public who had seen the disbanding of all political parties and the Purification Act in the past welcomed the general direction of new developments, but they were less happy about the details of the new laws.

The Political Parties Act was new to South Korea and was a global rarity at the time (Kim 1963). It contained items on requirements of party registration (Clause 4 and Clauses 25–27), which were likely designed to shape the future party-political landscape. According to these, a party's number of local chapters was required to be at least a third of the national total number of constituencies as stipulated in the Act on the Parliamentary Election. A party was also required to have at least one chapter in Seoul, Pusan, and each of the five provinces, and each chapter needed to have at least 50 party members. Besides, civil servants and those to whom the Purification Act was applicable were not eligible to become a party member or a founding member.<sup>23</sup> It appears that the Act sought to limit the overall number of parties by setting down prerequisites concerning the size, assets, and organizational competence. As it was required by the newly amended constitution that election candidates receive nomination from a registered party, independents would no longer be eligible for candidacy. The drafters of the Act presumably also believed that a smaller number of parties would contribute to streamlining the presidency's already strong control over the legislature.

The Act on the National Assembly Election introduced proportional representation for the first time in Korea with national constituency seats. A third of all seats would be allocated proportionately (Clause 15) to candidates on party lists (Clause 24). The party that won the highest number of district constituency seats would be given the half of all national constituency seats even if it won less than 50% of all votes, and the party that

came second would receive at least two-thirds of the remaining seats regardless of the number of votes it won (Clause 125).<sup>24</sup> This meant that if a party managed to win more district seats than any other party, it could give its seats to candidates who would otherwise have little chance in the district election. At the same time, the second-largest party would also have some advantages over other parties. Many former politicians protested about the junta's decision to greatly reduce the overall number of district constituencies, ostensibly to reduce the evils of regionalism and kinship (NEC 1964, 205).

The SCNR explained that the aims of the new laws were to make it harder for Western-style socialist parties to be formed, for it could not ban the formation of such parties altogether, and to encourage the growth of a conservative two-party system. The Council held that it was not desirable for latecomer nations like Korea to have parties divided by ideology. Such nations should instead have conservative parties of the same ideological ilk that competed with policy decisions to guard themselves against communism.<sup>25</sup>

Debatably, the bi-party system and the proportional representation that the new laws introduced were not mere tools for victory for a pro-government party. As it proved to be the case in the elections in October and November, an election flooded with minor parties could be more favorable to candidates from the ruling party than one held against a single strong opponent. The DRP did also initially plan to mainly nominate elite intellectuals who had little or no experience in politics to stay true to their agenda of bringing in newness to Korean politics.

That being said, it is undeniable that the new laws were engineered for the parliamentary hegemony of the junta's own party. Robert Scalapino suspected that a minimal number of parties would be the desideratum for the junta, and that this number was more likely to be one-and-a-half than two. Admittedly, though, he was biased by his greater familiarity with the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party when he spoke of a one-and-a-half party system (Scalapino 1963, 35). The arguably most important monthly in Korea in the 1960s, *Sasangye*, published a detailed analysis of the Political Parties Act. Stating that the few earlier examples of laws on political parties had the function of protecting and controlling political parties, it argued that the Act was unconstitutional, because its only function was controlling parties: the government was allowed to file lawsuits to dissolve political parties (Clause 41), but the grounds for dissolution were vaguely stipulated as violation of the democratic basic order. On the contrary, it made the formation of political parties extremely difficult (Kim 1963).

Amid such apprehensions, Kim Jong-pil stepped down from his position as KCIA chief and set out to launch the as-yet-unnamed party. In mid-January, he held a general meeting of its founders and officially kick-started the formation process with the declaration that the new party would "not be a party like the parties of the past that only paid lip serve, but a party that



does real work” (PRDDRP 1967, 32). While Kim’s role had also been integral to the May 16 coup and to the creation of the KCIA, Kim often called the DRP his “alter ego,” for he had been involved in all stages of its formation from the beginning (Yi 1967, 194). He derived great pride in the fact that he was the midwife in the DRP’s birth as much as he had been the midwife of the “revolution” as the intelligence chief (Yi 1967, 175–176).

It was around the time of the general meeting that a serious conflict from inside the military government broke out. The conflict was ignited when it was found out that the DRP had been much longer in the making than it was publically claimed and that all the excitement about its formation process was play-acting. Kim had, in reality, already drawn up plans for a political party when Park Chung Hee announced the Purification Act in August 1961. He mobilized the KCIA to scout hundreds of people to put together a preparatory network called Reconstruction Comrade Group (*Chaegöndongjihoe*), which had been in operation for at least a year. What enraged the junta members the most was that all along, Kim had applied the same level of secrecy of the KCIA to his party formation project and opted to keep everyone in the SCNR, apart from those considered to be his men, in the dark for as long as it was possible. On top of that, he had rather chosen to recruit complete strangers using his KCIA agents than to bring in other army men from competing factions in the junta (Cho 2016).

Kim Jong-pil and other founders of the DRP recognized, as it appears, that sooner or later, a shift toward a pluralistic party system would become inevitable. This convinced them to make the most out of the grace period that was the military government to prepare themselves for a more competitive environment of civilian government. Kim’s plans, in a way, had begun with the drafting of the Pledges. The junta labelled former politicians as “old” and the military government as a “harbinger of newness” (*hyöksin*), hinting that they could be equated with the “old evils” (*ku’ak*) mentioned in the Pledge. Kim Hyöng-uk, the later head of the KCIA, once made it clear what he meant by “newness.” In a less elegant fashion than Kim Jong-pil would have, he wrote about how he looked forward to the coming politics of “newness” from the new party because Korea had ended up in such a poorly state owing to the old failure of politics caused by the “crazy trend” in which “anyone who had enough to eat gets it into his head to muddle in politics, be it students, professors, farmers, laborers, entrepreneurs, engineers, educationists, civil servants, and even artists and sportsmen” (Kim Hyöng-uk 1963).

The Purification Act would tie up “old” former politicians and give the unexperienced new generation of politicians to grow enough to put up a fight. Kim Jong-pil’s rationale was that if the government landed again in the hands of politicians who were “forever stuck in outdated authority and the citadel of traditionalism,” it would be to “choose the path of self-destruction again.” Therefore, Kim argued, members of the revolutionary military government must themselves join politics as civilians, and “the Purification Act would tie up those who are in the grip of old ways of

thinking” (Yi 1967, 167–168). A former member of the Reconstruction Comrade Group, recounted that the Group had believed that his people, being amateurs, would never stand a chance against professional politicians without such secret preparations (Cho 1999b). He joined the operations convinced that “the law can never beat power,” i.e., unlawful operations could always be made legal as soon as they gained power (Cho 2016, 38–39). Kim’s decision to keep the party formation process a secret was prompted by his wish to make the most out of the given time of a year without hindrance from within and outside the junta. Neither the politicians who had grudgingly accepted the disgrace of the Purification Act nor the Council members of opposing factions would have kept quiet if they had found out that Kim was making himself the only exception to the ban on political activities.

The Cabinet head, Song Yo-ch’an, and other Council members publicly raised objections, pointing out that, first, it would go against the Pledges if military men simply retired from the army to take part in the civilian government, that second, Kim Jong-pil acted out of a factional interest, and that third, most importantly, they would never accept the dual structure of the new party.<sup>26</sup> The DRP’s party constitution established a structure with the three axes of representatives, policymakers, and secretariats, but because previous Korean parties had all revolved around representatives, the DRP, by splitting the control of the party between assemblymen and secretariats, was considered to have a dual structure. It was indeed the secretariats that were to have the powers to steer the party and not the representatives, so Kim’s opponents within the SCNR accused him of attempting to build a structure “similar to communist parties” (Yi 1967, 175, 180).

This was not the first time the party’s organizational structure became an object of scrutiny. In November 1962, the *Hankook Ilbo* newspaper reported that some leaders of the revolution were building a party preliminarily known as a Social Labor Party and that its platform and policies were modeled after those of the British Labour Party. The article promptly caused a scandal, as can be gathered from brief accounts of it published by other newspapers on November 29. The military government denied the allegations and had the journalist and other editorial staff arrested. The newspaper suspended its publication for three days, and the December 26 issue of *Dong-A Ilbo*, amid long coverages of the new constitution and the junta’s propitious steps toward a new ruling party, very briefly reported that the journalist confessed that the story was a fabrication in a court martial.<sup>27</sup> It is not known whether the member of the government who denied the allegation knew anything about Kim’s group. The scandal was probably caused in the main by the word “labor,” as it instantly reminded Koreans of the North Korean Workers’ Party, which uses the same Korean word for labor.

The DRP never changed its stance about the allegations raised by the newspaper, but the British Labour Party did in all likelihood provide the

blueprint for the DRP's secretariat-oriented dual organizational structure and orientation toward a nominal two-party system. First of all, several employees of the DRP have recently given similar accounts about the Labour Party and plainly acknowledged that it took the latter as its model (Cho 2016, 77–78, 110, 121–122, 227, 244). Second, Chairman Park and the military government repeatedly stated that the Political Parties Act aimed to bring in a conservative two-party system in early 1963.<sup>28</sup> The SCNR's public positions on such matters can be found in the *Supreme Council Review*, which replaced the official monthly of the National Assembly from August 1961 to December 1963. The commentaries on the Act in the magazine pointed to Britain as a primary example of the two-party system and explained that the new constitution combined the American presidential system with elements of the party-state as exemplified by the British political system of the Conservative and Labour parties (Yi 1962; Mun 1963). Besides, the *Review* occasionally published articles about international examples in three different rubrics on political personages, revolutions, and election systems. Of these, the rubric on electoral systems featured West Germany and Communist China once, respectively, whereas the British election system appeared seven times.

Politicians banned from politics by the Purification Act condemned the covert operations for the new party that had been carried out in disregard of the universal ban on political activities. They had accepted the ban because they had been led to believe that the junta would eventually retire from politics and bring the former politicians back in, but it now appeared that it could not be farther away from the junta's real intentions. The military government was too occupied with its own internal strife to mount a counteroffensive to the rebuke. The SCNR members went so far as to publicly denounce Kim Jong-pil, demanding that he clear the so-called "Four Counts of Suspicion" of graft to raise funds for the new party, in which he was involved. The scandal had to do with four cases of large-scale graft: stock price manipulation, corruption around the construction of the Walkerhill hotel, illegal smuggling of *Saenara* automobiles, and of *pachinko* game machines (NEC 1964, 228).

On February 18, Park Chung Hee sought to break the deadlock with a public statement that he would not join the civilian government and put an end to the Purification Act when the chaotic political situation was stabilized. On the 27th, Park took a public oath to abide by his words of the statement in front of former politicians, members of the DRP and military personnel and lifted the ban on political activities of politicians affected by the Purification Act, with the exception of some 200, most of whom were affiliated with the previous government. Kim Jong-pil stepped down from the party and went abroad on exile.

It soon turned out that Park's February 18 statement was only the beginning of what was to become his famous flip-flop politics (*pŏn'ŭijŏngch'i*). In early March, the KCIA announced that the SCNR member of the anti-Kim

faction Kim Tong-ha attempted a counterrevolutionary coup. A few days later, some junior officers and soldiers held a demonstration demanding capital sentence of counterrevolutionaries, declaration of martial law, and an extension of the military government. Park jumped at this expression of loyalism the next day on March 16 and announced that it had become inevitable to ban political activities again because of the chaos caused by previous politicians. He then went on to propose a referendum on the extension of the military government by four years, nullifying his February oath. This announcement was followed by sharp rebukes from politicians like Yun Po-sŏn and a statement by President Kennedy in a press conference that the United States desired South Korea's return to civilian government. On April 8, Park published another statement to put the proposed referendum on hold and lift the ban on political activities again, which was a message that he would run for the presidency after all. The DRP nominated Park as the party's candidate for presidency on May 27 (NEC 1964, 203–212).

The media reacted to the flip-flopping with cynicism. A newspaper sneered at the March denunciation of counterrevolutionaries, commenting that it was a mystery how a former colonel pulled off the feat of “bypassing the national police and the world-class surveillance of the KCIA to expose Mr. Song's crimes.”<sup>29</sup> It was also noted that the pledge to hand over the control of the government to clean and conscientious civilians was being interpreted in a most novel way, for it now transpired that it meant building a party in the midst of the ban on political activities and Chairman Park's transformation into a civilian so he could join the civilian government himself.<sup>30</sup> Admittedly, such criticisms had only been made possible when the military government declared an end to the martial law together with the ban on political activities.

Regardless of what the media and the general public thought about Park's flip-flop politics, it bought him enough time to arbitrate in the factional disputes and put the DRP, which was still reeling from the lambasting from inside and outside the junta, back on its feet (NEC 1964, 242). Members of opposing factions founded other parties, which included the Liberal Democratic Party, and Chairman Park's attempts to unite them with the DRP eventually foundered. Outside the military government, there was no end of splintering and realigning: the Democratic Party reformed, the People's Party united Yun Po-sŏn's Civil Rule Party, the New Politics Party and the Democratic Friendship Party and then collapsed again. The state of things did not look like it would come any closer to the two-party state envisaged by the junta, but the relatively large number of candidates in the presidential election proved to be an advantage for Park. Seven candidates ran for the office, and two dropped out in the end. Park won the election by gaining 46.6% of all votes by a margin of only 150,000 votes (NEC 1964, 210). There is a chance that he would not have won if the opposition parties had mounted a united offensive.

Park's opponents exposed his left-wing past, as yet a relatively unknown fact, and criticized that he had not entirely shed his communist thoughts, but the attacks did not prove to be lethal (NEC 1964, 210). Park and the DRP appealed to nationalist sentiments with the keyword "national democracy" and stressed that it was a democracy that prioritized the building of an economic basis needed for political progress. Park advised himself as a "farmers' president" to leverage his advantage in rural areas, where candidates from the ruling party had fared better in earlier elections.

After the victory in the presidential election, Kim Jong-pil returned from his exile in time for the parliamentary election. The DRP struggled with internal differences about nominees for district seats and in the end nominated not a small number of "old" politicians with a history of involvement in election corruption. These were experienced politicians who had a good chance of winning district seats, but the party's secretariats were against their nomination, as they saw it bending the party's principles. Many secretariat employees left the party over this, and the party's original design of secretariat dominance took considerable damage (NEC 1964, 245–246; Cho 2016, 132–133). For the time being, it did not appear to pose a great problem. The DRP won a landslide victory, winning 67.1% of all seats (NEC 1964, 246). To be more precise, it was a victory for the electoral system laid down by the junta, for the party had only won 33.5% of all votes. In Seoul, where ruling parties have had until today a long track record of being less popular than in most other parts of the country, the Democratic Party won 22.6% and the Civil Rule Party 28.2%, while the DRP won only 21.8% (NEC 1964, 614).

## **Conclusion**

The military junta led by Park Chung Hee founded the Democratic Republican Party with some affinity to one-party systems, as is revealed by its championing of "administrative democracy" and "guided democracy." Yet it was aware of the political reality in which a pluralistic party system would be the inevitable choice. In the early days of the regime takeover, the junta applied the old rhetoric of national crisis to communism and poverty in order to rationalize its defiance of the constitution and promised a prompt return to civilian government. The new constitution, drafted by the military government and touted as one that had gone through a democratic deliberation process, established a presidential system in which the president would have a strong set of executive powers, and parliamentary representatives would be subordinate to parties. It opened ways to a presidency with a potential control over both the executive and the legislative, provided that the president's party dominated the National Assembly.

In time, the return to a civilian government and a pluralistic party system did materialize. It was not without the junta members' own transformation into civilians and thorough groundwork to shape the political landscape to

their favor, which included drafting of new laws and organizing the pro-government DRP in secret. In this regard, the South Korean military government built a contrast to its Meso- and South American counterparts, where military leaders of National Revolutionary Party-era Mexico, Pinochet's Chile, and the "Argentinian Revolution" remained in the military. Nevertheless, political opponents persistently questioned the authenticity of Park and Kim Jong-pil's professed anti-communism, and there was no going back on the Revolutionary Pledges that had been the junta's bid for political legitimacy. When Chairman Park visited the United States in November 1961, President Kennedy "particularly expressed his satisfaction with the Korean government's intention to restore civilian government at the earliest possible date."<sup>31</sup> Instead, they opted for elective politics and were determined to emerge victorious. Their confidence came, on the surface, from popular mobilization via non-political means like the Reconstruction Movement and, behind the scenes, from political maneuvers and the secret party formation operations of the KCIA. They thus sought to consolidate support from the Korean population, but at the same time, South Korea's special status in the non-communist world and its relationship with the United States and economic dependence on it made an approval from the United States indispensable.

A crack showed in the junta's promise of a pluralistic civilian government when it was known in early 1963 that a pro-government party had been in the making while a universal ban on political activities and an additional indefinite ban on over 4,000 politicians by the Purification Act had been in force. For the Purification Act, the junta members had effectively turned "new" and "old" into political categories. They presented themselves as young men of the military eager to rejuvenate the country, while many other elements of the Korean society, especially former politicians, were given the label "old." With the Act, military men of the junta earned time to grow into party politicians of the DRP. The chaos and recurrent stalemate in and outside the military government during the period from the party's founding to the general election in November show how the junta's premeditated political maneuvers were often unsuccessful. At the same time, it also suggests that the extra time provided by the Purification Act and Park Chung Hee's flip-flop politics were all the more valuable to the amateur politicians of the military.

## Notes

- 1 This chapter uses the McCune-Reischauer romanization system for Korean names with following exceptions: Names of people whose romanized names are widely known (e.g., *Park Chung Hee* and *Kim Jong-pil*), non-Korean names and words in citations (e.g., *Emerson* instead of *Emōsūn*) of Korean authors of publications in English, and of Korean authors who explicitly provide romanized names in their publications. Conversely, names in citations of Korean sources are romanized according to the system with no exceptions (e.g., *Pak Chōng-hūi*).

- 2 The names of political parties in South Korea have, as a rule, rarely survived changes in their leadership. To date, the DRP remains the party that survived the longest, having had a leader who stayed in power for nearly two decades (Bailey 2010; Chōng and Kim, 2013).
- 3 Dong-A Ilbo, “Onŭl mimyōng kunbu sŏ pan’gong hyōngmyōng” [An anti-communist revolution from the military at dawn today], May 16, 1961.
- 4 JFKPOF-121-001 (Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files. Countries. Korea: General, 1963, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/121/JFKPOF-121-001>), (Incoming message from CG EUSA Seoul Korea, May 20, 1961).
- 5 CIA FOIA (Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room), (Restlessness in South Korea – Current Intelligence Weekly Review, April 13, 1961), <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000617166>.
- 6 CIA FOIA (South Korea – Current Intelligence Weekly Review, May 18, 1961), <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000617174>.
- 7 JFKPOF-121-004 (Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files. Countries. Korea: Security, 1961–1963, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/121/JFKPOF-121-004>), (The Situation in Korea, February 1961, March 6, 1961).
- 8 JFKPOF-121-004 (The Situation in Korea, February 1961, March 6, 1961).
- 9 JFKPOF-121-001 (Memorandum, May 18, 1961).
- 10 NLIC (National Law Information Center), “Kukkajaegōnbisangjoch’ibōp,” June 6, 1961, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=92860>.
- 11 NLIC, “Chaegōn’gungminundongegwanhanbōmnyul,” June 12, 1961, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=3575>.
- 12 NLIC, “Chaegōn’gungminundongegwanhanbōmnyul,” November 20, 1962, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=3578>.
- 13 NAK (National Archives of Korea) DA0547078, (Kyōngjegaebal 5-kae’nyōn’gyehoek.)
- 14 JFKPOF-121-004 (Summary and Revision of Recommendations of Task Force Report on Korea, June 12, 1961).
- 15 NAK DA0547078.
- 16 GCIAR (General CIA Records), (Short-Term Outlook for South Korea, September 7, 1962), <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79r01012a021300020001-4>.
- 17 JFKPOF-121-004 (Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, June 29, 1961).
- 18 GCIAR (Current Situation in South Korea, May 18, 1961), <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79s00427a000100060001-2>.
- 19 NLIC, “Chōngch’ihwaltongjōnghwabōp,” March 16, 1962, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsEfInfoP.do?lsiSeq=3581>.
- 20 *Chosun Ilbo*, “Sōn’gōgwalli nūn kunjōngbu ka tamdang” [The military government to take charge of elections], October 18, 1961 and *Chosun Ilbo*, “Minjujuūi wa Han’guk ūi saehōnbōp: Harvard taehak Emerson Kyosu wa Yonsei tae Sō Kyosu taedam” [Democracy and the new Korean constitution: Professor Emerson from Harvard University talks to Professor Sō from Yonsei University], October 19, 1962.
- 21 *Chosun Ilbo*, “Hōnpōpkich’owi 20-myōngjōngdo ro kusōng?” [The constitution drafting committee to consist of some twenty members?], July 7, 1962.
- 22 NLIC, “Taehanmin’gukhōnpōp,” December 26, 1962, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=53191>.
- 23 NLIC, “Chōngdangbōp,” December 31, 1962, <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=5935>.
- 24 NLIC, “Kuk’oetūwōnsōn’gōbōp,” January 16, 1963, <https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=5955>.

- 25 *Dong-A Ilbo*, “Posuyangdangje rül chihyang: sahoejuüi chöngdang ün ökche” [A vision of a system of two conservative parties: socialist parties to be suppressed], November 28, 1962.
- 26 *Chosun Ilbo*, “Hyöngmyöngjuch’eseryöngnaebu üi igyön kwa kü künbonwönin ül haebuhanda” [An analysis of the differences among the leaders of the revolution and their fundamental causes], January 24, 1963.
- 27 *Dong-A Ilbo*, “Höwigsaim ül chain” [Acknowledges the falsity of the article], December 26, 1962.
- 28 *Chosun Ilbo*, “‘Kunggüngmokp’yo nün chayuminjuüi’ Pak üijang sachamaji kijahoegyön” [“The ultimate goal is liberal democracy,” Chairman Park’s new year press conference], January 1, 1963.
- 29 *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, “Wigiüsik üi mitpat’ang” [The bases of the sense of crisis], March 16, 1963.
- 30 *Dong-A Ilbo*, “Kong’yaginyön (11)” [Two years since the Pledges (11)], May 14, 1963.
- 31 JFKPOF-121-001 (Communiqué, 14 November 1961).

## Bibliography

- ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2012. *The Saemaul Undong Movement in the Republic of Korea: Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development*. <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3111115>
- Bailey, Daniel. 2010. “Politics on the Peninsula: Democratic Consolidation and the Political Party System in South Korea.” *Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies* 7, no. 1: 32–48.
- Cho Kap-che. 1999a. *Nae mudöm e ch’im ül paet’öra* [Don’t spit on my grave]. Vol. 4. Seoul: Chosön’ilbosa.
- Cho Kap-che. 1999b. “Cho Kap-che Kija ka ssünün ‘kündaehwa hyöngmyöngga’ Pak Chöng-hüi üi saeng’ae naemudöm e ch’im ül paet’öra 407” [The life of the modernizer-revolutionary Park Chung Hee written by Cho Kap-che: don’t spit on my grave 407]. *Chosun Ilbo*, March 26, 1999, no. 24327, p. 23.
- Cho Yöng-jae, ed. 2016. *Pak Chöng-hüi sidae Minju Konghwadang kusul yön’gu* [An oral history of the Democratic Republican Party of the Park Chung Hee era]. Seoul: Sönnin.
- Chön Yöng-gi. 2015a. “Pan’gong kuksi ch’öüm pon Pak Chöng-hüi ‘Igö na ttaemun’e ssötkekumön...’” [Seeing the national principle of anti-commuism, Park Chung Hee said, ‘This must be for my sake...’]. *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 3, 2015, no. 15575, pp. 4–5.
- Chön Yöng-gi. 2015b. “‘Chang To-yöng önhæng hyökmyöng panghae’ JP, Pak Sojang e’ge pogo ank’o kisüp ch’epo,” [“Chang To-yöng’s words and deeds stood in the way of revolution:” JP arrested him by surprise without notifying Major General Park]. *JoongAng Ilbo*, April 6, 2015, no. 15604, pp. 6–7.
- Chöng Kyu-jin. 2013. *Han’guk chöngbo chojik: amhaeng ösa esö chungang chöngbobu kkaji* [Intelligence organizations of South Korea: From secret royal inspectors to the Central Intelligence Agency]. Paju: Hanul ak’ademi.
- Chöng T’ae-il and Kim Il-su. 2013. “Han’guk e issö chipkwönjöngdang üi hyöngsönggwajöng e kwanhan yön’gu” [A study on the formation of ruling parties in South Korea]. *Sahoegwahakyön’gu* 30, no. 2: 167–189.



- Han Sök-chöng. 2010. “Pak Chönghui, hokün Manjugukp’an high modernism üi hwaksan” [Park Chung Hee, or the diffusion of Manchukuoan high modernism]. *Ilbonbip’yöng*, 3: 120–137.
- Han T’ae-yön. 1962. “Hönpöpkaejöng üi panghyang kwa i’e ttarünün chemunje” [The course of the constitutional revision and accompanying issues]. *Supreme Council Review*, March 1962, 6: 9–12.
- Han T’ae-yön. 2002. “Yöksa wa hönpöp sirijü che-1-hoe: Han’gukhönpöp kwa hönpöp’ak üi hoe’ko” [The 1st installment of the series on history and constitution: A reminiscence on Korean constitutions and constitutional studies]. *Hönpöp’ak’yön’gu* 8, no. 1: 9–52.
- Hö Chöng and Yang Ho-min. 1963. “Taedam: Kungmin üi pömjoeja ro molchi malla” [A conversation: Don’t condemn the people of being criminals]. *Sasangye*, March 1963: 56–63.
- Hö Ün. 2003. “5.16-kunjönggi’ chaegön’gungminundong üi sönggyök: ‘Pundan’gukka kungminundong’ nosön üi kyörhap kwa punhwa” [The character of the National Reconstruction Movement during the May 16 military rule: The combination and division of the ‘national movement of a divided nation’ course]. *Yöksamunjejön’gu* 11: 11–51.
- Kim Ch’öl-su. 1963. “Sae chöngdangböp ün wiböp i a’nin’ga” [Is the new party law illegal or not?] *Sasangye*, February 1963: 51–61.
- Kim Hyöng-uk. 1963. “Saejöngdang kwa chöngch’ihwaldong e puch’inda” [My words to the new political party and its political activities]. *Supreme Council Review*, February 1963, 17: 4–7.
- Kim Hyung-A. 2004. *Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79*. London; New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Kim Yong-uk. 1995. “Che-3-konghwaguk Minjukonghwadang üi tangjöng yön’gu” [A study on the party politics of the DRP of the Third Republic]. *Honamjöngch’ihak’oebo* 7: 153–186.
- Lee Wan Bom (Yi Wan-böm). 2000. “Pak Chönghui kunsajöngbu ‘5-ch’ahönpöpkaejöng’ kwajöng üi kwonryökkujo non’üi wa kü sönggyök: Chipkwön üi wihan ‘kangryök’an taet’ongryöngje’ to’ip” [Discussions on the power structure and their nature during the ‘fifth constitutional revision’ process of Park Chung Hee military regime: The introduction of a ‘powerful presidency’ for seizure of power]. *Han’gukchöngch’ihak’oebo* 34, no. 2: 171–192.
- Mun Ch’ang-ju. 1963. “Che-3-konghwaguk chöngdangjöngch’i üi chönmang” [Prospects of power politics of the Third Republic]. *Supreme Council Review*, January 1963, 16: 57–60.
- Mun Hong-ju. 1961. *Kukkajaegön pisangjoch’iböp* [The Emergency Measures Act for National Reconstruction]. Seoul: Pömmunsa.
- Nagaharu, Yasuo. 1938. “Manchukuo’s New Economic Policy.” *Pacific Affairs* 11, no. 3: 323–337. 10.2307/2750925
- NEC (Chung’angsön’gögwaliwiwönhoe [National Election Commission]). 1964. *Taehanmin’guk chöngdangsa* [History of political parties in Republic of Korea]. Seoul: NEC (Chung’angsön’gögwaliwiwönhoe [National Election Commission]).
- Paige, Glenn D. 1967. “1966: Korea Creates the Future.” *Asian Survey* 7, no. 1: 21–30. 10.2307/2642450
- Pak Chöng-hüi. 1962. *Uri minjogüi nagal kil*. Seoul, Korea: Tong-a-ch’ulp’ansa. Translated as Park Chung Hee, *Our Nation’s Path*. (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1970).

- Pak Kwön-sang. 1966. "Party Politics in Korea." *Korea Journal* 6, no. 2: 4–10.
- PRDDRP (Minjugonghwadang Kihoeokchosabu [The Planning and Research Department of the Democratic Republican Party]). 1967. *Minjugonghwadang sanyönsa* [A four-year history of the Democratic Republican Party]. Seoul: Minjugonghwadang Kihoeokchosabu.
- Scalapino, Robert A. 1963. "Korea: The Politics of Change." *Asian Survey* 3, no. 1: 31–40. 10.2307/3024648
- Sö Sök-sun. 1961. "Minjujöngch'i nün tashi shidodoeöya handa" [Democracy must be attempted again]. *Dong-A Ilbo*, August 12, 1961, no. 12181, evening edition, p. 2.
- Son In-su. 1994. *Han'guk kyoyuk undongsa: 1960-yöndaek kyoyuk üi yöksa insik* [History of education movements in Korea: Perception of history in education of the 1960s. Munömsa.
- Söng Nak-in. 2005. "Han'guk'önjöngsa e issösö konghwaguk üi sunch'a (sösu)" [The order (ordinal numbers) of republics in the constitutional history of Korea]. *Söultaehakkyo pöp'ak* 46, no. 1: 134–154.
- Wolf, Charles. 1962. "Economic Planning in Korea." *Asian Survey* 2, no. 10: 22–28. 10.2307/3023492
- Yi Kükch'an. 1962. "Hyöndaejöngdang üi yuhyöng kwa urinara chöngdangje e taehan kwan'gyön" [A typology of modern political parties and my limited observations on the party system of this country]. *Supreme Council Review*, September 1962, 12: 46–50.
- Yi Tal-sun. 1967. *Piwön üi pönyöngt'ap: Kim Chong-p'il üijang üi öje wa onül* [The tower of prosperity I yearned for: Chairman Kim Jong-pil's past and present]. Seoul: Chinmyöngmunhwasa.
- Yu Chin-o. 1961. "Chaegön'gungminundong üi sönggyök kwa panghyang" [The nature and the course of the National Reconstruction Movement]. *Supreme Council Review*, August 1961, 1: 34–35.
- Yu Chin-o. 1962. "Hönpöpkaejöng üi panghyang kwa i'e ttarünün chemunje" [The course of the constitutional revision and accompanying issues]. *Supreme Council Review*, March 1962, 6: 6–8.

# 11 The Yugoslav federation and the concept of one ruling party in its final hour

*Jure Gašparič*

Neither the state nor the system or a political party can make a person happy. People themselves are the only creators of their happiness.

(Edvard Kardelj, *Development Orientations of the Socialist Self-Management Political System*, 1977)

The Slovenian Communist politician Edvard Kardelj (1910–1979), mockingly referred to as “the ideological tailor” in Western Europe, is considered the leading creator of the Yugoslav post-war system. In 1977, he wrote the aforementioned study, representing a recapitulation of the past achievements and a guide for the future (Kardelj 1977). The book’s print run was enormous. In 1978, the ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia confirmed its contents and made it a formal political guideline.<sup>1</sup> Until that time, the basic Party principle had been the constant distancing from the classic parliamentary system and the gradual introduction of a specific corporatist system – and it would remain so. Three years before, in 1974 (*Ustava Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije 1974; Zakon o združenem delu 1976*), “the delegate system” was created (Kristan 2010, 257–60; Žagar 2010, 231–56). Kardelj and the architects of the new order deconstructed society and all its organizations into the smallest possible parts (all institutions, companies, etc.) to encourage the mass politicization of the population. Furthermore, the six Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia) became states, continuing the process of federalization.

All in all, the Party and the state were supposed to fade away gradually. This indeed happened years later, in 1991, although not as foreseen by the system’s creators, already deceased by that time. Therefore, the central question remains: Who governed the country during this process and how? The Party, the governments with the assemblies, or the narrow circle of senior Party officials (the leaders)? With repression, or by persuading the people and guiding them toward the “ideal” future? Hopefully, the answers

will allow for the Yugoslav system to be placed in a broader comparative context within the framework of this volume.

This chapter will focus on the analysis of a particular dichotomy: the project of the federalization of the Yugoslav state (consisting of six republics) and the politicization of the masses on the one hand, and the role of the Party on the other hand. The presentation will take place on several levels: first, *the organizational aspect of the system* will be presented (the Party system and the state system); followed by the description of the *relationship between the Party and the state* and the *ways in which the decision-making bodies operated*. Finally, the *people's perception* of the role of the Party and constitutional decision-makers (the Executive Committee and the Assembly) will be examined. Additional focus will be on Slovenia, the northernmost Yugoslav republic, and on the final period of the Yugoslav federation, which is analytically particularly interesting as, at that time, the relations and relationships between the republics and the national parties were becoming increasingly tense.

During the 1980s, political issues were no longer being addressed at the Party forums but rather by the constitutional bodies – the Assemblies and republican governments and Presidencies – as solutions were sought within the existing federation. Until then, the proceedings in the Assemblies had been tedious and very formal, almost bureaucratic: the delegates had mostly read “reports” and agreed with the proposals at the sessions. At that time, however, the delegates started assuming a different role.

The author proposes the following thesis: the purpose of the self-management mechanisms was primarily to ensure that the system, as envisioned in the Party programs, was not threatened. However, when the leader who “owned the system” died (Josip Broz Tito), the Yugoslav political crisis intensified, while the Party started losing its influence and became increasingly divided along the republican borders. When opposition groups started emerging, the system turned out to be a suitable aggregator and accelerator of various opinions, based on the interests of each nation in the state. The national parties prevailed: they resorted to appropriate survival strategies.

The federal institutions, including the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ), were in a different situation. The ZKJ was becoming increasingly defensive: it would mostly respond to the actions of the individual republics, primarily Slovenia, but appeared to be toothless. In September 1989, during the increasingly tense relations between Ljubljana and Belgrade, a motto wittily and evidently illustrating the logic of the Party sessions became popular: “If you have problems, convene a session of the Central Committee. This will result in even more problems, but at least you’ll have a Central Committee session” (Močnik 1989).

## **The Party**

Soon after the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the formation of the first Yugoslav state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – the

Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communist) was established in the new state (in April 1919). It included the social democratic parties and the representatives of the workers' movement from all parts of the state (initially with the exception of Slovenian representatives). At the second Congress in Vukovar, it was renamed as the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and kept rapidly increasing its membership (Čolaković et al. 1963; Perovšek 2012). The Party took advantage of the post-imperial wave of dissatisfaction and effectively addressed the masses, much like in many other European countries. It came third at the first state elections – the Constitutional Assembly elections – in November 1921. Its representatives eagerly participated in the constitutional debate while fervently and consistently emphasizing the advantages of the Soviet Constitution.<sup>2</sup>

Simultaneously, numerous strikes broke out in the state. The government reacted harshly against the workers' movement and the Party, which, in turn, responded with violence (the assassination of the Minister of the Interior). Consequently, it was banned, and its MPs prosecuted. After 1921, the Party thus went underground, while its membership and influence reduced drastically. In Czechoslovakia, which was seen as a close Yugoslav ally and friendly state until the end of the 1930s, the Party was legal throughout that time. In the middle of the 1930s, it managed to resume its activities. Apart from the central Party, several national Party organizations were gradually formed. In 1937, the Communist Party of Slovenia and the Communist Party of Croatia were established, followed by the Communist parties of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Monte Negro. After the Axis Powers' attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized a successful resistance against the occupiers and became the central political power by the end of the war. By the onset of World War II, its membership had increased to 12,000 members (less than 1000 in Slovenia), while at the end of the war, it had 141,000 members (5000 in Slovenia) (Čepič 2017, 168–69, 77).

Already during the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia – in agreement with the Allies – gradually yet decisively assumed all the power (Vodušek Starič 1992, 106–7, 130–45, 331–7; Gabrič 2005a, 104). During the first post-war elections, a state-wide coalition named the People's Front was established, headed by the Communist Party.<sup>3</sup> The so-called extra-Front opposition was thwarted (the communists controlled the repressive apparatus and the political police as well as the media) (Vodušek Starič 1992, 343–69). In the autumn of 1945, the American embassy in Yugoslavia reported to Washington that the country was turning into a totalitarian police state with no freedom of speech and press, but that “any significant opposition or objections to the existing situation are nevertheless virtually non-existent” (Gabrič 2005a, 102). The political structure of Yugoslavia after 1945 was becoming increasingly monolithic. However, the complete absence of any opposition did not result exclusively from the activities of the communists but also from the actions of the pre-war political parties. Their

wartime activities and collaborationist heritage had pushed them to the edge of the political space (Pleterski 2003, 109).

After World War II, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was not officially registered with the state authorities (unlike certain parties that wished to restore their activities), bringing the attention to the crucial moment that defined its role until as late as 1990: the Party did not see itself as a classic political party, but instead identified itself with the state.

In terms of its organization and terminology, it followed the example of other communist parties. After renaming itself as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it also redefined its role. Afterward, it was supposedly no longer directly responsible for the state but instead assumed a guiding role. The League of Communists instructed, educated, and governed using pedagogical strategies (Pykett 2010, 617–9).

In the organizational sense, the Party's highest body was the Congress, which defined its politics. At its fifth consecutive Congress in 1948 – the first one held after the war – the Party adopted a Statute with a more precise definition of its operations. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia adhered to the Leninist understanding of political organization with a firm structure and selected cadres. It was the “leading, organised section of the working class of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the highest form of its class organisation” (Čepič 2017, 168). Many provisions of its statute were copied from statute that the VKP(b) had adopted at its 18th Congress. The next Congress, held four years later in 1952, already reflected the introduction of the worker's self-management. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia renamed itself as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and redefined its role. Thereafter, it would no longer be directly responsible for the state, but rather act as a guide that should, “above all, use its power of persuasion to influence all the organisations, bodies, and institutions to follow its line and viewpoints” (Čepič 2017, 173). The Congresses were initially held every few years and later in regular four-year intervals. Apart from the Congresses of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ), the Congresses of the republican Leagues of Communists were also organized. In terms of contents, they followed the decisions made by the federal Congresses. In the formal and statutory sense, the ZKJ functioned like any other political party in traditional Western democracies. However, even a brief overview of the Congresses reveals that until the end of the 1980s, they were either a declarative reflection of the political developments (in 1948, the Cominform dispute called for a patriotic consolidation; in 1952, a new path to socialism was to be determined; in 1964, the national question needed to be tackled in Yugoslavia, etc.) or routine meetings (as of the 1970s). The Congresses (Program in Statut Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije 1958; 10. Kongres ZKS 1987) always conveyed the impression of “unity and accord” (Čolaković et al. 1963; Čepič 2017, 176) and legitimized the power of the Party.

Between the Congresses, the Party was ruled by the Central Committee that held plenums and elected an executive political body, initially called the

Politburo and later the Executive Bureau. The League of Communists was initially headed by the General Secretary, while as of the ninth Congress, it was led by the President of the ZKJ (Josip Broz Tito held this function until his death and was simultaneously also the president of the state). The naming of the bodies thus followed the established communist nomenclature. The republican Leagues of Communists, which were organizationally a part of the united Yugoslav Party according to the Soviet example, were constructed in the same manner. The political power structure was therefore clearly defined in the statutory sense. It was based on the Congress and directed upward, yet in the political practice, the situation was in fact reversed. The Politburo or the executive body of the Central Committee with the General Secretary was the decision-making body – as was the Central Committee Plenum, but to a much lesser degree (Čepič 2017, 181). Similar is true of the political parties in the Western parliamentary democracies: narrow presidencies shape the politics and then seek the support (or correction) of the broader party forums.<sup>4</sup> Typologically, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was no different than any other political party: it had all three typical organizational “faces”: a well-organized secretariat with a leadership, a widespread field network with a multitude of support organizations, and an Assembly “club” (as well as a cabinet of ministers) (Addison 1999, 289–98; Gašparič 2017, 25–48).

### **The state system**

On the one hand, the specific Yugoslav corporatist system reflected the federalist idea and emphasized the particularity of each of the six Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Monte Negro, and Macedonia), while on the other hand, it stemmed from the concept of workers’ self-management. Above all, it represented a social experiment that was constantly being altered and reformed, gradually becoming more and more complicated.

The Constitutional Assembly consisted of two chambers: the Federal Assembly, elected based on the state-wide and equal right; and the Assembly of Nations, in which each republic had 25 representatives. Unicameral Assemblies of the People’s Republics existed at the republican level (Gabrič 2005b, 854–60; Gabrič 2005c, 867–8). After the 1953 constitutional reform, the Assembly of Nations was annexed to the Federal Assembly, and in its stead, a new chamber called the Council of Producers was established. Its members were elected indirectly, according to the specific branches of the economy, which was the first step toward corporatism. The new Constitution of 1963 implemented a further systemic upgrade. The Federal Assembly, later renamed as the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was expanded to five councils: the Federal Council (which included the Council of Nations), the Economic Council, the Educational and Cultural Council, the Social and Health Council, and the Organizational-Political Council. The same system was introduced in each

of the republics, but here the Republican Council took the place of the Federal Council (Režek 2005a, 950–2; Režek 2005b, 998–9).

The last thorough constitutional reform followed in 1974 (before that, numerous constitutional amendments had been adopted between 1968 and 1971). This reform represented the culmination of the “Yugoslav experiment” and remained in force until the 1990s.<sup>5</sup> The Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia once again became bicameral, consisting of two equal chambers: the Federal Chamber and the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, to which the delegates were appointed from the Assemblies of six republics and two autonomous provinces. The Republic Assemblies, also the Slovenian Assembly, became tricameral, consisting of the Chamber of Associated Labour, Chamber of Municipalities, and Socio-Political Chamber. Generally, the position of the republics became stronger, and the Yugoslav federation included many confederal elements. Apart from the federal government and ministries, each republic also had its own government with its secretariats (ministries) (Čepič 2005a, 1094–101; Čepič 2005b, 1052–4; Gašparič 2015, 41–59).

According to Peter Vodopivec, Kardelj’s delegate system was based on the author’s “Bolshevik Proudhonistic socio-political fantasies” (Vodopivec 2005, 286–7). In the second half of the 1970s, almost 300,000 people – in Slovenia, with its two million inhabitants – held delegate functions. To become delegates in the Slovenian Assembly, people first needed to be elected as members of the delegation of their local community (in the case of the Chamber of Municipalities). Then the local communities elected delegations for the municipal communities, and after that, the municipal communities organized groups of delegates to join the Republic Assembly (*Zakon o volitvah in delegiranju v skupščine. Zakon o volitvah in odpoklicu predsedstva Socialistične republike Slovenije* 1985). The literary historian Dušan Pirjevec colorfully described what that meant for the position of delegates: “In the past, being a delegate meant something. Today, it does not mean anything. It is no longer a political function – politicians are now only in the Party” (Vodopivec 2005, 287).

### **The party and the state**

In the first years after the war, all lines of power intersected in the Political Bureaus of the republican and federal parties. The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with its seven members, would make decisions regarding all the political issues as well the economic and cultural life in general. In its minutes, the Slovenian Political Bureau even referred to itself as the “temporary leadership” – the leadership of the Party and the republic. The functions within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the state were intertwined, and all the positions were filled by the so-called “cadres” – chosen and vetted people, each possessing a “personal file” (*Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945–1954* 2000). In this regard, the



Communist Party of Yugoslavia was no different from any other communist party (Weber 2012, 168–9). The explicit interconnectedness of the cadres gradually diminished, and the Party – in line with the spirit of its mission to “direct” the society – started to separate between functions, although only to a certain degree. Its cadres did not hold each and every position, but only the crucial ones.<sup>6</sup>

While throughout the post-war period, the Yugoslav state kept becoming increasingly federalized (so as to almost confederalize itself at the end), the Party remained organized according to the democratic centralism principles, which were understood almost completely in the spirit of the tenth Congress of the VKP(b) of 1921, where Lenin had said that the Party had not been a “debating society” but rather a “vanguard party.”<sup>7</sup> Free discussion needed to be tolerated and even encouraged, but once a decision had been adopted, all discussion had to end. The vote of the majority had to be binding for all (Ball and Dagger 2008). In other words – or as the principle was defined by the ZKJ Programme of 1958, which remained in force until the end: “Democratic centralism implies a confrontation of opinions in the communist organization, while it also involves a mandatory adoption of conclusions and organization of actions based on the universal exchange of opinions and decisions adopted by the majority” (Sedmi kongres Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije 1959). Political dissent was not allowed in the relations between the lower and higher bodies or in the relations between the republican Central Committees and the federal Central Committee. The leadership of the Party was thus strictly centralized, regardless of the existence of the national Party organizations. One of the key reasons for this was the state’s federal structure, as the Party leadership believed that the unity of the Party should be maintained as the crucial connecting factor (Čepič 2017, 175).

The conceptual dichotomy between the organization of the state and the functioning of its bodies, on the one hand, and the organization and functioning of the Party, on the other hand – while taking into account what happened in 1990 and 1991 (as well as later) – leads to a simple teleological conclusion: the excessively federal structure of the state broke the Party’s unity and, consequently, also the state. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was eventually destroyed by the very constitutional system it had established. This, however, would not have been possible had the Party been united and politically omnipotent – if the Belgrade Political Bureau had indeed been pulling all the strings. After all, it could have reformed the state, centralized it, and kept it alive in accordance with the democratic centralism concept. It was crucial that in the second half of the 1980s, the relations – even within the Party – ultimately deteriorated.

In the 1980s, when the Yugoslav political system gradually became less rigid and increasingly reflected the cacophony of different interests, visions, and policies, the proponents of various political concepts remained within the single Party, yet were divided in terms of the republics they came from

(Jović 2009). The viewpoints of the League of Communists of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, etc., drew further and further apart. Toward the end, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ) was merely a league of national communist organizations from the individual republics, each asserting its own demands in the federalized state.<sup>8</sup> The Communist Party of Slovenia (ZKS) was the Slovenian political power – the Slovenian authority, which the people in fact supported.<sup>9</sup> The vanguard of class and nation became the vanguard of one of the nations. As Ciril Ribičič, a high-ranking politician of the Communist Party of Slovenia and subsequently a Constitutional Court judge, stated: “The most important ideological force easily renounced its class convictions and replaced them with a national orientation” (Centrih 2016, 31). The individual republican Leagues of Communists became national parties, each advocating its social modernization concept (Čepič 2020, 175–209). The national narrative prevailed (liberal only partially and in some republics), which is also evident elsewhere in the European east until today (Mark et al. 2019, 3).

### **Operating principles**

How was this reflected? Apart from certain oscillations at individual plenums and in some Assemblies, the functioning of the Party organization and Yugoslav political system was generally rigid and smooth. There were not many affairs such as the one that occurred in 1971, when 25 deputies of the Slovenian Republic Assembly proposed (although unsuccessfully) – apart from the “official” candidate – its own candidate as a member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thus questioning the cadre monopoly of the Party leadership (Gašparič 2012). In the delegate system of the late 1970s, such incidents became even rarer. In 1978, Miha Ribarič, secretary of the Constitutional Commission of the Republic Assembly, said:

One of the fundamental unacceptable characteristics of the delegate Assembly system is ... that the delegate Assemblies in fact often function as a sort of ratification or verification bodies of materials, decisions, solutions, and proposals, prepared by the executive or administrative bodies.

(Ribarič 2015, 61)

These bodies were led by the selected cadres and followed the guidelines of the narrower Party leadership. At the sessions, the delegates would mostly read the “reports” and agree with the proposals (Potrč 2014a). The president of the Slovenian Assembly from 1986 to 1990 Miran Potrč said that formally, his function was very important, as, in Slovenia, only the President of the Republic was superior to him. However,

the President of the Executive Committee (the government) and especially the President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia – and occasionally also the President of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People – had a greater influence on the situation in the society.

(Potrč 2014b, 116)

However, the Yugoslav crisis intensified, and a decade after Ribarič had made his resigned observations, the role of Assemblies and delegates started changing. The sessions of the Federal Assembly became increasingly lively and conflicting. In 1988, the President of the Federal Government Branko Mikulić even resigned because he failed to secure the Assembly support for his budget proposal (Vodopivec 2005, 292). While this is a rather normal occurrence in classic parliamentary democracies, in Yugoslavia, something like this happened for the first time after 1945. At that time, certain Republic Assemblies started becoming far more important than the Federal Parliament, among them especially the Slovenian Assembly. During the Yugoslav 1980s crisis, solutions were sought within the constitutional system. Thus, the constitutional factors – the Presidency of the Republic and the Assembly – were becoming increasingly important.<sup>10</sup>

It is therefore appropriate to inquire how the Assembly functioned when its role started to change. Did it still do nothing but mechanically ratify the materials prepared by the executive power and inspired by the Party? While searching for the answer, I applied a different methodological method: by resorting to the achievements of the digital humanities, I analyzed the quantitative characteristics of discussions based on a few reference books containing verbatim records of the Assembly sessions (Table 11.1).

It seems that the political dynamics, felt everywhere in Slovenia and Yugoslavia, also found their way into the Assembly and characterized its

*Table 11.1* A part of the quantitative analysis, prepared by Andrej Pančur and Mojca Šorn based on the selected collections of verbatim records of certain assembly/parliament sessions in the stated years<sup>11</sup>

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Number of speeches per session</i> | <i>Number of words per session</i> | <i>Number of speeches of the president per session</i> | <i>Number of words of the President per session</i> |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| 1973        | 73                                    | 16,315                             | 42   | 3524  |
| 1982        | 71                                    | 18,987                             | 42   | 5497  |
| 1984        | 90                                    | 27,252                             | 53   | 7088  |
| 1986        | 98                                    | 22,055                             | 59   | 6909  |
| 1987        | 111                                   | 25,123                             | 63   | 7190  |
| 1989        | 130                                   | 35,530                             | 75   | 10045   |
| 1990        | 472                                   | 68,401                             | 221  | 18610   |
| 1991        | 258                                   | 54,498                             | 133  | 12627   |
| 1992        | 415                                   | 76,544                             | 225  | 26218   |

work: more was being said there. Based on certain shorter studies, we may also conclude that gradually, more was said and differently: the language started to change, while “reports” were no longer being read as often. Meanwhile, the political passion intensified (sentences were shorter, vocabulary different, etc.) (Gašparič and Šorn 2013, 37–47).

As the *modus operandi* and the political language in the Assembly changed, so did the Party’s functioning. Numerous studies focusing on the ZKS reveal that it democratized itself notably from within in the second half of the 1980s. The tenth Congress of the ZKS in 1986 still focused on the “old rhetoric” (the entire form of the Congress followed the established patterns that emphasized the leading social role of the Party).<sup>12</sup> However, already the early 11th Congress in 1989 was characterized by the Party’s transformation into a modern social-democratic party that advocated “its descent from power” (Repe 2001, 62). In 1986, the leadership was assumed by the younger generation headed by Milan Kučan, later the President of the Republic of Slovenia. The toughest conceptual debates would still take place behind closed doors, in the narrower circles. Even as late as in 1989, a group of older communists at a closed meeting criticized Kučan, claiming that his democratization policy was damaging and that the multi-party system was senseless (Repe 2001, 64; Repe 2015).

### **The public opinion**

No regime can be maintained only by repression, which was very much present also in Yugoslavia (although to a much lesser extent than in the GDR, for example). The legitimacy of a parliamentary democracy regime is determined through elections, whereas the legitimacy of socialism stems from its historic mission and especially from the belief that the “current government is the best answer to the challenges faced by the people” (Jović 2009, 73). The crucial question about the role and position of the Party and the constitutional factors in the state is therefore the following: what were the public opinion dynamics? What did the people think, and how did they perceive and comprehend the political and decision-making system?

In Slovenia, the so-called Slovenian Public Opinion research has been conducted continuously ever since 1968. It includes large representative samples of the population and is based on standardized sociological surveys.<sup>13</sup> No similar research has been carried out in any other Yugoslav republic.

From as early as 1968 until 1988, people were regularly asked whether the policies pursued by the League of Communists were in line with the interests of the majority of people. We can assume that when answering, many were guided by conformism and their mental integration into the existing social framework. Nevertheless, the results are telling (Table 11.2).

Except for the year of Party liberalism in 1968, until the beginning of the critical period of the 1980s, almost nobody claimed that the activities of the communists were contrary to the people’s interests. The vast majority

*Table 11.2* Are the politics pursued by the League of Communists in Slovenia in accordance with the interests of the majority of the people? (Toš 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d; 1999e; 1999f; 1999g; 1999h; 1999i; 1999j; 2000)

|         | <i>Yes, in complete<br/>accordance</i> | <i>Partially in<br/>accordance</i> | <i>Not in<br/>accordance</i> | <i>I don't know, I'm<br/>not familiar with<br/>the issue</i> |
|---------|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1968    | 19%                                    | 36%                                | 10%                          | 35%  |
| 1972    | 27%                                    | 38%                                | 5%                           | 30%  |
| 1975/76 | 38%                                    | 26%                                | 3%                           | 33%  |
| 1978    | 44%                                    | 23%                                | 2%                           | 31%  |
| 1980    | 49%                                    | 23%                                | 2%                           | 26%  |
| 1981/82 | 23%                                    | 38%                                | 7%                           | 32%  |
| 1983    | 19%                                    | 48%                                | 12%                          | 21%  |
| 1984    | 22%                                    | 46%                                | 10%                          | 24%  |
| 1986    | 12%                                    | 50%                                | 17%                          | 21%  |
| 1987    | 8%                                     | 49%                                | 26%                          | 17%  |
| 1988    | 6%                                     | 44%                                | 32%                          | 18%  |

responded that the communists' efforts were either completely or partially suitable. Well over a third did not know how to respond or was unfamiliar with the activities of the League of Communists. During the last decade of socialist Yugoslavia, however, the percentage of those who claimed that the communists' activities were completely suitable started declining, while those who claimed they were unsuitable gradually became more numerous. However, until the very end, the majority insisted that the work of the communists was at least partly in line with the people's interests.

First, we can establish that despite the crisis, the League of Communists was relatively successful at addressing the people and that its role as a guide and the direction it took were accepted. The pedagogical strategies used proved successful. There are quite a few reasons for this, and many of them are explained in the literature studied. Among other things, the League of Communists (ZK) was perceived as a progressive and modernist factor that had transformed Yugoslavia and ensured a fairer social order and general economic and social progress.

Naturally, in light of such a perception of the League of Communists, the logical question arises how the constitutionally defined bodies of the authorities were understood. In 1969, when this issue was examined, no major deviations were noted. The federal as well as republic governments and assemblies were assessed as "good" (with the republic government and assembly ranking somewhat higher) (Tables 11.3 and 11.4).

The respondents' answers imply that broader awareness of the interconnected role of the League of Communists, the government, and the assembly was present in the state. However, the answers given in 1972 to the question of whose influence on social development was stronger indicate that the decisions were nevertheless in the hands of the Assembly and the government. These were followed by the army, which represented an important

Table 11.3 In Yugoslavia, we often refer to progressive and conservative forces. Who would you mention as an example of the most progressive and the most conservative force (an open question)? (Toš 1999k)

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1969   |     |
| Progressive  |     |
| No answer  | 44% |
| League of Communists                               | 21% |
| Trade unions, Socialist Alliance of Working People | 13% |
| ...  |     |
| Conservative                                       |     |
| No answer  | 54% |
| The Church   | 6%  |
| Not interested                                     | 5%  |
| ...  |     |

Table 11.4 In your opinion, how do the people evaluate the efforts of the republican and federal institutions for the good of the citizens? (Toš 1999a)

| 1968                | <i>Mostly positive</i> | <i>Mostly adequate</i> | <i>The institutions do not care enough</i> | <i>I don't know</i> |
|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------|
| Federal assembly    | 16%                    | 38%                    | 26%  | 20%                 |
| Federal government  | 16%                    | 38%                    | 22%  | 24%                 |
| Republic assembly   | 21%                    | 41%                    | 17%  | 21%                 |
| Republic government | 21%                    | 39%                    | 16%  | 24%                 |
| CK ZKJ              | 20%                    | 27%                    | 16%  | 37%                 |
| CK ZKS              | 20%                    | 31%                    | 14%  | 35%                 |

factor in Yugoslavia; the leading cadres in the economy; and finally by the communists and scientists. The latter and the economists are a reflection of the conviction exhibited by all the public opinion surveys in Slovenia: people believed (and most likely responded according to this impression) that experts should possess more decision-making power, while the influence of the politics should be smaller. The answers almost correspond to the structure of the state and society as envisioned by Kardelj and his associates. The Party is only the ideological and spiritual leader, while the government is the one that actually “governs.” A decade later, already during the state-wide economic crisis, the President of the Government Milka Planinc was also the most recognizable Yugoslav politician. Until the death of the legendary Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980 (and that of his close comrade Edvard Kardelj, who was considered as Tito’s “natural successor,” in 1979), people knew who “owned the system”: Tito et consortes. Later, in the 1980s, nobody was left to lead anymore. The motto “after Tito, Tito,” popular at that time, turned out to be an illusion (Tables 11.5 and 11.6).<sup>14</sup>

*Table 11.5* What degree of influence do the following organizations and groups exert on the development of our society nowadays? (Toš 1999b)

---

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1972  |     |
| Considerable and major influence; as follows: |     |
| State authorities (ASSEMBLY, GOVERNMENT)      | 62% |
| The army                                      | 50% |
| Managers in the economy                       | 49% |
| League of Communists                          | 48% |
| Experts and scientists                        | 45% |

---

*Table 11.6* Who holds the functions in Yugoslavia in 1983? (Toš 1999g)

---

| <i>Do you happen to know who holds the following functions in Yugoslavia:</i> | <i>No answer</i> | <i>Correct</i> | <i>Incorrect</i> |
|---|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| President of the SFRJ Presidency  | 52%              | 36%            | 12%              |
| President of the Government   | 41%              | 56%            | 3%               |
| President of the CK ZKJ   | 60%              | 35%            | 5%               |
| And in Slovenia?  |                  |                |                  |
| President of the SRS Presidency   | 72%              | 16%            | 12%              |
| President of the Government   | 69%              | 26%            | 5%               |
| President of the CK ZKS   | 75%              | 19%            | 6%               |

---

Except for the President of the Federal Government, others are not as widely known, especially the President of the CK ZKJ

---

Shortly before the dissolution of the state, during the all-present democratization that was the strongest precisely in Slovenia, the League of Communists nevertheless persevered. The people no longer saw it as the only exalted guide. Aside from it, they wished to see other parties, yet they nevertheless expressed their expectations that in uncertain times, the Party would “energetically take over and solve the social and political problems” (Table 11.7).

*Table 11.7* League of Communists in 1988 (Toš 2000)

---

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Do you agree with these standpoints regarding the League of Communists (ZK)?  |     |
| The ZK is a political organization that has fulfilled its role in the society during a certain period. Nowadays, however, it is outdated, and there is no longer any need for it. |     |
| Yes, completely and mostly  | 40% |
| The ZK should only be one of the political parties  |     |
| Yes, completely and mostly  | 56% |
| The ZK should energetically take over and solve the pressing social and political problems  |     |
| Yes, completely and mostly  | 44% |
| The ZK should be the only political force in the society  |     |
| Yes, completely and mostly  | 19% |

---

### **Conclusion (with brief post-Yugoslav trajectories of the transformed national communist parties)**

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was a party with a magnificent history, deeply rooted in the Yugoslav society, similarly as in many other Eastern European countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia). It was a mass organization supported by the people, organized in a similar manner as other parties around the world and led in accordance with the established system of democratic centralism.

Its leaders, headed by Kardelj, constructed a unique state system. They progressively federalized the state and introduced the workers' self-management. The system was "too ideal";<sup>15</sup> people engaged in self-management; the League of Communists directed; the republics were like states; and a complex yet unique structure – an ideal social system that the people accepted – was constructed. However, during the 1980s, once the common modernization concept focusing on the construction of a fairer socialist society started fading due to its inefficiency, the constitutional state bodies were becoming increasingly important, as the system started crumbling at the borders between the republics. Consequently, the single Party led according to the democratic centralism system fell apart along these same borders. If the government and the Assembly had needed the League of Communists and its agreement as a guide earlier, the situation changed toward the end of the 1980s. In its aspirations, the League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS) could resort to the republic's Constitution and its bodies, primarily the Assembly. Like all other nascent political actors, the ZKS urgently required the Assembly if it wanted to adhere to the Constitution while asserting its "new modernization aspirations," based on the resolution of the national question. The people saw the Slovenian Assembly as a defender from the Belgrade threat, which in itself gave it legitimacy. The Assembly was obviously attaining certain dimensions that form the core of parliamentarism (Ihalainen et al., 2016): deliberation (it was not a bureaucratic voting assembly any longer) and sovereignty (it began to exercise its constitutional role), responsibility to some extent (of the government and administration) and representation (it claimed such a role, although the delegates' status was based on an imperative mandate).

The national constitutional bodies and national parties thus prevailed, while the federal ones toothlessly faded away. The survival and adjustment strategies of the national communist parties were obviously appropriate and timely, which is why these parties still exist today (mostly as social-democratic parties). In Slovenia, the SD participated in several governments after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and led the government between 2008 and 2011; in Croatia, the SDP led the government twice, during the 2000–2003 and 2011–2015 period; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDP BiH took part in the 2001–2003 government; while in Northern Macedonia, the SDSM participated in and led several governments (it also leads the current



government). In Serbia, the SPS (the Socialist Party of Serbia) was dominated by Slobodan Milošević and was the key political player in the war during the 1990s; while in Montenegro, the DPS party (the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro) participated in the governments continuously until December 2020, which makes it the politically most influential national post-communist party.

## Notes

- 1 The thought from the title was also published on the posters announcing the VIII Congress of the League of Communists of Slovenia (*dLib.si – VIII. kongres ZKS*, accessible at: <https://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:IMG-CBELMTY7?euapi=1&query=%27keywords%3dsre%27%20de%27%20dloveku+ne+more%27&sortDir=ASC&sort=date&pageSize=25>, acquired on 16 April 2021).
- 2 They did this so resolutely that they even doubted the legitimacy of the Constitutional Committee's work: "Gentlemen, the Soviet Constitution that we demand ... is not being written in the bourgeois Constitutional Assembly, but rather among revolutionary workers and peasants. Such a constitution is not born from parliamentary negotiations with the bourgeoisie, but from the revolutionary struggle of workers and peasants against the bourgeoisie. Revolution is the mother of the Soviet Constitution," deputy Milojković said. "A bourgeois constitution cannot solve the national question," Filip Filipović added. "That can only be solved by a new social order: the Soviet system and the Soviet Constitution. Allegedly, the principle of the self-determination of nations was best understood by comrade Trotsky, as he had effectively defended it during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk (Engelsfeld 1972, 181–262; *Stenografske beleške Ustavotvorne skupštine Kraljevine SHS* [Stenographic Protocols of the Constitutional Assembly of the Kingdom of SCS]. Fifth session, 8 February 1921).
- 3 Throughout Central and Southeastern Europe, the basic characteristics of the "People's Front" approach were the same. A similar platform was formed in Czechoslovakia, for example, where the bourgeois politics headed by Beneš had a much stronger initial position than in Yugoslavia. At that time, the so-called "Košice Government Programme," which meant the first step toward a "people's democracy," was perceived differently. Some people saw it as a maximum reform package, while others saw it as merely the beginning of a radical transformation (Vykoukal et al. 2000, 126).
- 4 In Yugoslavia, where democratic elections did not exist between 1927 and 1990, such a *modus operandi* of the parties was particularly well established (especially in the 1930s). For the strongest Slovenian political party in the Kingdom, see Gašparič (2007).
- 5 The Constitution had 406 articles and was among the longest in the world, as it meticulously outlined the complex socio-economic system. Kardelj himself was aware that "certain formulations will not be understandable for the workers" (Čepič 2005a, 1095).
- 6 Cf. Adela Gjuričova's chapter "The Vanguard's Changing Tempo: Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Government Institutions, 1921–1990" in this volume.
- 7 Cf. Timofei Rakov's forthcoming article "Parliamentarism in One Party: The Trade Union Debate of 1921 in the Bolshevik Party as a Semi-Parliamentary Practice" in *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*.
- 8 In this regard, we should also mention that, apart from the Leagues of Communists in the six republics, a separate Party organization existed within the

Yugoslav People's Army. In the political sense, this placed the Army in the position of the seventh republic – the most “Yugoslav” of all republics, which declared itself as the defender of the state during its dissolution.

- 9 This was also evident from the fact that in the 1980s, Belgrade no longer represented the political center where all serious politicians had to be if they wanted to preserve their position and further their careers. The politicians from the Yugoslav republics would now only go “to work” in Belgrade and return home every week. They depended on the support from their republics (Repe 2001, 9).
- 10 The Socialist Alliance of Working People was a transformed People's Front organization that represented the political umbrella for all other political organizations. It was a unique structure worthy of a dedicated analysis, which is why I leave it out intentionally at this point.
- 11 The upgrading of the search tools in the context of the digitalization of session records, currently carried out at the Institute of Contemporary History, will allow for a more advanced and temporally more comprehensive linguistic research, not only regarding the quantitative characteristics, but also the contents of what was said. For now, this is only possible for the materials after 1990.
- 12 In the speeches, “the vanguard role” of the League of Communists was still omnipresent (10. *Kongres ZKS*. 1987. Ljubljana: Komunist, 193).
- 13 Twenty-five adult respondents in each of the 100 districts of what was, at the time, the Socialist Republic of Slovenia were included in the survey; the actual sample included 2475 people (Toš 1999a).
- 14 Cf. Ivan Sablin's chapter “Constitution-Making in the Informal Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Inner Asia, 1945–1955” in this volume.
- 15 Adéla Gjuričová convincingly described the Czechoslovak socialist parliament as “too ideal” to be real, because everything was running perfectly (Gjuričová 2019, 199–218).

## Bibliography

10. *Kongres ZKS* [Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Slovenia]. 1987. Ljubljana: Komunist.
- Addison, Paul. 1999. “The British Conservative Party from Churchill to Heath: Doctrine or Men?” *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 2: 289–298.
- Ball, T. and Richard Dagger. 2008. “Democratic centralism,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 5, 2008. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/democratic-centralism>.
- Centrih, Lev. 2016. *Put do sloma: smrt Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* [A Road to Breakdown: The Death of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.
- Čepič, Zdenko. 2005a. “Ustava 1974: preureditev jugoslovanske federacije, delegatski sistem in dogovorna ekonomija.” [Constitution 1974: Reconstruction of Yugoslav Federation, Delegate System, and Agreed Economy] in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 1094–1104. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.
- Čepič, Zdenko. 2005b. “Federaliziranje federacije 1967–1971.” [Federalising the Federation 1967–1971] in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 1052–1054. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.

- Čepič, Zdenko. 2017. "Obrisi organiziranosti komunistične stranke v času druge Jugoslavije." [The Outlines of the Communist Party's Organizational Structure during the Second Yugoslavia]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 57, no. 1: 166–186.
- Čepič, Zdenko. 2020. "Politika Zveze komunistov Slovenije v osemdesetih (Izbrane teme)." [Politics of the League of Communists of Slovenia in 1980's – Selected Topics] in *Narod – politika – država. Idejnopolitični značaj strank na Slovenskem od konca 19. do začetka 21. Stoletja*, edited by Jurij Perovšek and Mojca Šorn, 175–209. Ljubljana: INZ.
- Čolaković, Rodoljub et al. 1963. *Pregled Zgodovine Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije* [History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. Belgrade: Inštitut za proučevanje delavskega gibanja; and Ljubljana: Inštitut za zgodovino delavskega gibanja.
- Engelsfeld, Neda. 1972. "Rad kluba komunističkih poslanika u plenumu Ustavotvorne skupštine (u prosincu 1920. i u siječnju 1921)." [Communist Parliamentary Club at the Plenary Sessions of the Constitutional Assembly in December and January 1921]. *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu* 2, no. 1: 181–262.
- Gabrič, Aleš. 2005a. "Opozicija v Sloveniji po letu 1945" [Opposition in Slovenia After 1945]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 45, no. 2: 97–120.
- Gabrič, Aleš. 2005b. "Volitve v Ustavodajno skupščino novembra 1945" [Constitutional Assembly Elections in November 1945], in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 854–858. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.
- Gabrič, Aleš. 2005c. "Prva slovenska ustava." [The First Slovenian Constitution], in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 867–868. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.
- Gašparič, Jure. 2007. *SLS pod kraljevo diktaturo: diktatura kralja Aleksandra in politika Slovenske ljudske stranke v letih 1929–1935* [The Slovenian People's Party under the King's Dictatorship: Dictatorship of King Alexander and politics of the Slovenian People's Party 1929–1935]. Ljubljana: Modrijan.
- Gašparič, Jure. 2012. *Državni zbor 1992–2012: o slovenskem parlamentarizmu* [National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia 1992–2012: on Slovenian Parliamentarianism]. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.
- Gašparič, Jure. 2015. "Slovenian Socialist Parliament on the Eve of the Dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. A feeble 'ratification body' or important political decision-maker?" *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 55, no. 3: 41–59.
- Gašparič, Jure. 2017. "Slovenska ljudska stranka in njena organizacija (1890–1941)" [Slovenian People's Party and its Organization]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 57, no. 1: 25–48.
- Gašparič, Jure and Mojca Šorn. 2013. "Poklicna struktura poslancev Narodne skupščine Kraljevine SHS/ Jugoslavije" [Occupational Structure of the National Assembly Members of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 53, no. 2: 37–47.
- Gjuričová, Adéla. 2019. "Too Ideal to Be a Parliament: The Representative Assemblies in Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1948–1989," in *The ideal of parliament in Europe since 1800*, edited by Remieg Aerts et al., 199–218. Palgrave-Macmillan.

- Ihalainen, Pasi, Cornelia Ilie, and Kari Palonen, eds. 2016. *Parliament and Parliamentarism. A Comparative History of a European Concept*. New York – Oxford: Berghahn.
- Jović, Dejan. 2009. *Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
- Kardelj, Edvard. 1977. *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja* [Development Orientations of the Socialist Self-Management Political System]. Ljubljana: ČZP Komunist.
- Kristan, Ivan. 2010. “Ustava SFRJ 1974 – generator krize Jugoslavije?” in *Slovenija – Jugoslavija. Krize in reforme 1968/1988* [Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974 – the Generator of the Yugoslav Crisis? In Slovenia – Yugoslavia. Crisis and Reforms 1968/1988], edited by Zdenko Čepič, 257–260. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.
- Mark, James, Bogdan C. Jacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska. 2019. *1989. A Global History of Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Močnik, Rastko. 1989. “Paralogizmi argumentov in logika institucije” [Paralogic of Arguments and the Logic of the Institution]. *Telex*, 5 October 1989.
- Perovšek, Jurij. 2012. *Samoodločba in federacija. Slovenski komunisti in nacionalno vprašanje 1920–1941* [Self-Determination and Federation: Slovenian Communists and the National Question 1920–1941]. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.
- Pleterski, Janko. 2003. “O soslednosti novejših zgodovine Slovencev: Nekaj pripomb ob in k posvetu Slovenci in leto 1941.” [On the Consecutiveness of Contemporary Slovenian History. A Few Remarks Regarding the Conference Slovenians and the Year 1941]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 43, no. 1: 103–124.
- Potrč, Miran. 2014a. Interviewed by the author, INZ, Ljubljana, 24 April 2014. The sound recording and transcription of the discussion are kept by the author.
- Potrč, Miran. 2014b. *Klic k razumu: spomini* [Call to Reason]. Ljubljana: Modrijan.
- Program in Statut Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije. 1958. [Programme and Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. Ljubljana: Ljudska pravica.
- Pykett, Jessica. 2010. “Introduction: The Pedagogical State, Education, Citizenship, Governing.” *Citizenship studies* 14, no. 6: 617–619.
- Repe, Božo. 2001. *Slovenci v osemdesetih* [Slovenes in 1980’s]. Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije.
- Repe, Božo. 2015. *Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik* [Milan Kučan. The First President]. Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2015.
- Režek, Mateja. 2005a. “Ustavna reforma leta 1953” [The 1953 Constitutional Reform], in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 950–952. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.
- Režek, Mateja. 2005b. “Na pragu reform” [Before Reforms Began], in *Slovenska novejša zgodovina. Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992*, edited by Jasna Fischer et al., 998–999. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga.
- Ribarič, Miha. 2015. *Spomini: Slovenija – Jugoslavija* [Memoirs: Slovenia – Yugoslavia]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
- Sedmi kongres Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije* [The Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. 1959. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

- Stenografske beleške Ustavotvorne skupštine Kraljevine SHS* [Stenographic Protocols of the Constitutional Assembly of the Kingdom of SCS]. Fifth session, 8 February 1921.
- Toš, Niko. 1999a. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1968* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1968]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM68. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM68\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999b. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1972* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1972]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM72. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM72\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999c. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1975/76* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1975/1976]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM76. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM76\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999d. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1978* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1978]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM78. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM78\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999e. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1980* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1980]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM80. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM80\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999f. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1981/82* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1981/1982]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM82. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM82\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999g. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1983* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1983]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM83. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM83\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999h. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1984* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1984]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM84. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM84\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999i. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1986* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1986]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM86. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM86\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999j. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1987* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1987]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM87. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM87\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 1999k. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1969* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1969]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM69. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM69\_V1
- Toš, Niko. 2000. *Slovensko javno mnenje 1988* [Slovenian Public Opinion 1988]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM88. 10.17898/ADP\_SJM88\_V1
- Ustava Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije* [Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. 1974. Ljubljana: Dopisna delavska univerza.
- Vodopivec, Peter. 2005. “Komunistične skupščine v senci partije” [Communist Assemblies in the Shadow of the Party], in *Analiza razvoja slovenskega parlamentarizma*, edited by Barbara Vogrinec, 258–297. Ljubljana: Inštitut za civilizacijo in kulturo.
- Vodušek Starič, Jerca. 1992. *Prevzem oblasti* [Takeover of Power]. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

- Vykoukal, Jiří, Bohuslav Litera, and Miroslav Tejchman. 2000. *Východ: Vznik, vývoj a rozpad sovětského bloku 1944–1989* [The East: Rise, Growth and Fall of the Soviet Bloc 1944–1989]. Prague: Libri.
- Weber, Herman. 2012. *Die DDR 1945–1990*. Munich: Oldenbourg.
- Žagar, Mitja. 2010. “Ustava SFRJ in ustavni sistem 1974: povzročitelj krize ali mehanizem na njeno razreševanje?” [Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974 and Constitutional System: Cause of Crisis or Mechanism for its Solution?], in *Slovenija – Jugoslavija. Krize in reforme 1968/1988*, edited by Zdenko Čepič, 231–256. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.
- Zakon o volitvah in delegiranju v skupščine. Zakon o volitvah in odpoklicu predsedstva Socialistične republike Slovenije* [Assembly Elections and Delegations Act. Slovenian Socialist Presidency Elections Act]. 1985. Edited by Ciril Ribičič and Franc Grad. Ljubljana: Uradni list SRS.
- Zakon o združenem delu* [Associated Labour Act]. 1976. Belgrade: Časopisno-založniški Zavod Uradni list SFRJ.
- Zapiski politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945–1954* [Politburo Protocols]. 2000. Edited by Darinka Drnovšek. Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije.

# 12 The vanguard's changing tempo: Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and government institutions, 1921–1990\*

*Adéla Gjuričová*

## Introduction

We wish to buttress the democratic elements in our Party and the society. Whether we speak of the work or discipline, they are not in contradiction. Yet to buttress means to develop more deeply, since our society has reached an advanced stage of development. The Czechs and Slovaks are cultured, learned nations that need a democratic form of living and of decision-making.

(Gustáv Husák, 31 May 1969 [Doskočil 2011, 205–206])

With the benefit of a non-participant hindsight, the Communist rule of Czechoslovakia (1948–1989) may seem to be a case of a long, efficient and viable political constitution, based on a strong permeation of the whole institutional structure through the Communist Party. A more detailed examination, however, enables an identification of the historical factors that contributed to the gravity and endurance of the system, but also a number of shifts in the dynamics and appeal of the ruling-party policy during its dictate, and a variety of responses to its internal contradictions and crises.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) was founded in 1921. It became the most imperative radical protest party within the liberal democratic system in Czechoslovakia and one of the stoutest communist parties outside the Soviet Union. The Party engaged in – and kept dividing along – all key debates of the interwar socialist movement, such as those on Bolshevization, the Moscow Trials, or the popular front against Fascism. CPC was banned in 1938, but its wartime activity – along with the pro-communist reinterpretation of the whole resistance movement after 1945 – earned the Party an utterly new reputation in the early post-war years. It was the pre-war experience, however, that made it possible for the Party to find a key to the “twist from party to government” by 1948. No matter how imperfect the democratic system in the early post-war Czechoslovakia was, the “twist” had been unimaginable for a large segment of the electorate and general public, along with the most educated observers and partners from other relevant democratic parties. Yet then the imagination became a fact.

The following analysis focuses on the rhetorical and practical strategy of gaining full control of government in a gradual process, including the electoral victory in 1946, the infiltration and reconstitution of a number of government bodies ranging from key ministries to regional administration before and after the Communist coup of February 1948. The chapter explores the issue of Party and government identity as it follows the (dis)continuity of government and other public institutions, in the interwar period and during the Communist dictatorship. It tracks the modes of relations between the Communist Party and government institutions, with particular focus on the elected legislatures and on the quest for institutional instruments of infiltration, control, empowerment or distancing. Which institutions of the previous democratic constitution were preserved and why? How was their image altered and control ensured by a dominant party; which institutions retained their original names and what role did this play in adjusting to and the functioning of the new system?

What is, on the contrary, not the central focus of the chapter is the scope of communist administrative, police, and judicial abuse and oppression, its effects and the injustice involved. This is not to mean the author's lack of respect for the suffering and loss experienced by so many people. Neither does the article address the foreign, mostly Soviet influence and pressure. A further theme that will not have been elaborated throughout the study is the existence of the somewhat self-reliant Communist Party of Slovakia and its strive for autonomous policy. The article is intrigued by the institutional setting of the central state and its transformations, rather than its possible foreign inspirations or internal divisions.

The institutional aspect of the relationship between the state and the Party has not been perceived as an important topic by local historiography. The initial accounts of the Communist dictatorship that were published soon after its fall were fascinated by the external factor, namely the backing and pressure by the Soviet Communist elite and its leaders during the turning points (e.g. Kaplan 1993). Rupnik (2002) in his earlier work based on the internal Party analyses compiled in 1968 followed the line of authoritarian Party organization, anti-democratic mindset, growing distance from the Social Democratic Party, and the ideological divisions. Muriel Blaive (2001) asked the obvious, yet intriguing question of why there was no de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia in 1956. Many others have focused on the sudden collapse of the Communist dictatorship in 1989 and on the historical reasons for the electoral support for the Communist Party in the following two decades (Balík et al. 2003; Kunštát 2013). The most recent syntheses lean toward social history. Ultimately, though, they tend to include the topics of the changing membership structure, internal Party life and the perception of the Party by general public in the analysis (Kocian et al. 2020). It is striking that until very recently, the literature on the institutional framework of the communist party and the communist government had been



scarce (Kaška 2014; Hemza 2019) or, as in the case of communist parliaments, practically inexistent (Felcman 2015; Gjuričová 2019).

This study argues that the considerations on the forms of communist participation in, manipulation and transformation of Czechoslovak governmental institutions should no longer be reduced to the arguments that such institutions were insignificant because of the dominance of the Communist Party or the absence of free elections. On the contrary, following their continuity and the Party institutional trajectory since its inception, rather than focusing on what is usually understood as the communist rule, results in building an unconventional chronology, highlighting uncommon turning points and drawing attention to novel actors, rhetorical concepts and factors.

### **Moscow lessons taken in Prague**

Czechoslovakia was among the states that emerged from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. Constitution of the first Czechoslovak Republic established a liberal democratic system based on a balance of institutions, proportionate electoral system, and a panoptic spectrum of political parties. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was founded in 1921 by seceding from the Social Democratic Party, after an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1920. The Party emerged as a chaotic concoction of various and often contradictory wings and factions: the Marxist left around Bohumír Šmeral – Social Democrat of pre-war Austrian pedigree; a sizeable German-speaking faction based in the North Bohemian Sudetenland stronghold of Liberec/Reichenberg led by Karl Kreibich. In the early years, the Party had a strong intellectual wing, spanning from anarchists to the moderate left-wing leaning poets, literary critics, and a number of prominent artists. There were also those who became communists while in Russian captivity during the World War I and joined the Red Army.

The Party was a professionally, ethnically, and politically heterogeneous body. It tried to accommodate the generation that grew up in Austria–Hungary, in its Social Democratic Party and on the frontlines of the Great War, and the people socialized in the post-war context. Yet, the first general election in which the Party took part, was a tremendous success: Communists scored second in 1925, taking over 13 percent of the ballot and 41 out of 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. They outshined the Social Democrats, but also other well-established political parties. In the following elections of 1929 and 1935, the Party never enjoyed similar success, but it did reach continuous support of over 10 percent of voters. What it lacked, though, was a stable leadership and Party elite. Balík et al. (2019) show that the rate of exchange among Communist MPs was much higher than in any other party. Until the collapse of democratic Czechoslovakia in 1938, every electoral term brought in two-thirds of newcomers to the Communist faction.

The Party differed from its other relevant counterparts in the Parliament in many other aspects. Its MPs were by far the youngest: their average age was 38, while in most parties it was over 50. Women also enjoyed an exceptional position in the Communist faction, no matter how relative such proportion is by contemporary means: the Communist club had between 7 and 10 percent of female MPs (i.e. two or three), while the entire chamber only included about ten women out of 300 members. By contrast, the Communist Party had the lowest rates of university educated deputies, falling critically low after 1929, when the general election brought only about 3 percent of university graduates in the Communist faction in the chamber. The professional structure of the club was yet another peculiarity: no other party, including the Social Democrats, was able to claim to have over one-third of workers in the faction (Balík et al. 2019, 32–66).

Despite the ideological and personal ruptures the Party experienced, the continuity of these trends was striking. The founding fathers such as Šmeral and Kreibich were removed from local leadership as early as in the mid-1920s. They were dispatched to the Comintern headquarters in Moscow and sent to occasional missions to the Far East. Yet, the major demise came after the Party “Bolshevization Congress” in 1929: within one year afterward, the membership shrank to a mere quarter of the previous 100 thousand. The Party thus lost not only its intellectual and artistic wing, but a lot of its heterogeneity in general (Rupnik 2002, 76–79; Křest’an 2004). This was also the point when the young Party faction, the so-called Karlín lads led by Klement Gottwald (Karlín was a poor, blue-collar neighborhood in Prague), took control over the Party organization, its official ideology and the strategy within political institutions. As of 1929–1930, the Communist Party had abandoned its mass-party policy and opted for one of a smaller Bolshevik vanguard that would lead the masses of non-members to revolution (Kárník 2003, 69–70).

Even as members of the parliament, the Communists were excluded from mainstream politics and remained an exemplary protest party until the mid-1930s. In addition to presenting ostentatious alternative proposals, the Communists used the legislature as a stage for their inflammatory statements, claims and accusations. Gottwald’s fervent speeches were infinitely interrupted by equally fervent exclamations by MPs from other factions. In a legendary exchange, the Party chairman responded to the cries about not understanding the matter and only going to Moscow to get guidelines by saying: “You know what we go to learn in Moscow? We are learning from the Russian Bolsheviks how to twist your necks. And you know that they are masters of the craft!”<sup>1</sup> Yet the parliamentary job also provided salary and immunity, both exploited in building the network of party cells and organizing industrial strikes and, often violent, street protests. Communist MPs and senators were often seen at the head of protest marches in working-class communities. The aggressive rhetoric and engaging in fierce conflicts seemed to be a deliberate tactic (Rychlík 2021, 263).

This parliamentary experience, the ideological and tactical debates within the international socialist movement – on “social Fascism”, the Moscow Trials and so on – had split and weakened the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Yet it did not fully prevent the Party from abandoning the extremist position, at least occasionally. In 1935, the Party benefited from assisting in the election of the successor to the aged and frail President Masaryk. The President-to-be Edvard Beneš negotiated a deal with the Communist Party that was willing to grow more constructive. At the same time, however, the Party presented itself as an embodiment of the Soviet Union in local politics. It understood the Soviets ever more as an ally of Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 1930s. Rupnik (2002, 124–128) stressed that it was the non-Gottwaldian leadership that contributed to the *détente*, while Gottwald fled to Moscow to escape a police arrest. It was a vital experience for Czechoslovak Communists as it made them realize that there was space to manoeuvre between ideology, current situation in the Soviet Union and the Comintern, the communist parties in Western Europe, and internal politics (Kárník 2003, 67–69). The policy of the popular front against fascism and, in the local context, the Communist role in the multi-party Committee for the Defence of the Republic in 1938, were impressive results of that understanding.

The Party was once again gaining momentum in the mid-1930s. Its membership rose by 70 percent from early 1934 to the end of 1935. The Communists won 30 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 16 Senators, also because of an unprecedented success in Slovakia (Kárník 2003, 70–88). Even in international comparison, the interwar Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was exceptional in many respects. First, it was a real mass party, because it attracted a majority of the former Social Democratic membership. Second, it was allowed to act legally in spite of the radical anti-system rhetoric. It succeeded in becoming one of Europe’s strongest communist organizations. Third, unlike its Social Democratic or Christian Democratic counterparts, the Communist Party attempted to overcome ethnic divisions and the 19th-century roots of Central European parties. The Communists consistently formed a common, multi-ethnic party structure in Czechoslovakia, or, more precisely in the Czech speaking mainland and the German speaking borderland in the Czech lands. Contrary to the impression made by the foundation of a Slovak Soviet Republic in mid-1919, an episodic pendant of the Soviet Hungary, the Slovak Communist base and organization remained weak, and majority of the party elite came from the Bohemian and Moravian backgrounds. All this was to have a major effect in the years to come.

Following the Munich Agreement, the communist press was banned. The Party was formally ordered to cease activity just a few days after a new, authoritarian government was formed on 1 October 1938. Paradoxically, the Communist MPs were allowed to sit in the reconstructed parliament until the Party was dissolved in December, and its MPs spoke against several key anti-democratic provisions, along with non-communist left (Kunštát 2013,

44–45). The Parliamentary Standing Committee became a welcome stage for Klement Gottwald. On 10 October 1938, in one of his last public appearances before leaving for Moscow, he stated: “We declare to all world that the Government did not have constitutional or political right to capitulate. The people wished to fight. The army wished to fight. The whole nation wanted to defend its country by all means!” (Rupnik 2002, 148; cf. Gebhart and Kuklík 2005, 57).

It was certainly the effect of this period that contributed to the communist aura of a fighter for Czechoslovak independence. Nonetheless, the situation grew more difficult ever since. A tiny part of the communist elite was chosen to be invited to spend the war in Moscow. The rest went underground. They were left behind and erased from the agenda of the Comintern. Their domestic political position was further aggravated by the Soviet pact with Hitler of August 1939, getting them very far from the initial nationalist proclamations of their leaders, now based in Moscow. The Communist presence in the resistance was dispersed and isolated. Still, Nazi authorities took brutal action against its participants. And yet, it was this fact that was successfully transformed into the legend of the foundation after 1945.

### **National and democratic revolution**

“Everyone and everything—with the notable exception of the well-fed Allied occupation forces—seems worn out, without resources, exhausted.” Thus depicts Tony Judt Europe in 1945 (Judt 2005, 13). He nuanced his description in the subsequent chapters, yet, when reflecting on the Czechoslovak Communist Party, his observation does not fit. Rather than showing exhaustion, the CPC seemed full of life. It had been dispersed and personally battered but had also reached crucial deals on the post-war settlement of Czechoslovakia with her exile government in London. The CPC seemed to emit energy and grow stronger by the day. Crucially though, similarly to the Soviet Union in the international context, the CPC was generally not perceived as the same party as before the war. The Party had metamorphosed into a fully accepted, respected political player.

Judt’s description is highly convincing in terms of Czechoslovakia in his explanation of the generally shared post-war mentality of the Western world: the sense of a new start, of a need for a radical shift away from the world before the war, toward an establishment that would not allow yet another crisis similar to that of the Great Depression (Judt 2005, 72). The project of the National and Democratic Revolution was a rhetorical and program expression of this major turn in Czechoslovakia. The Communist-drafted scheme was formally adopted by both the Moscow and the London exile delegations in the eastern Slovak city of Košice, which was already liberated in early April 1945. The scheme encompassed a strong political as well as ethnic agenda: Czechoslovakia was to be re-established, but a vast portion of its citizens – German and Hungarian speaking – were to be

stripped of their rights and expelled from the country. Furthermore, all political actors who were suspected of collaboration with the Nazis were to be banned any further political activity. Hence, only a very narrow part of the pre-war party spectrum was re-established and allowed to act legally.<sup>2</sup> All of these parties, overlapping with the partners of the Košice deal, shared a left-wing or centrist orientation that came to embrace radical socialist agendas, including vast nationalization of mining and most larger manufacturing, banking and insurance companies, and the film industry. The Communist Party, which acquired a strong nationalist tint, later described the post-war National Revolution as a catch-all program of “restoring the national freedom of Czechs and Slovaks,” as a “warrior union of the revolutionary forces which included all categories of our nations’ labour force, regardless of party affiliation, world view or religion, even encompassing a part of the bourgeoisie that had not been compromised by Nazi collaboration” (Reiman et al. 1961, 465).

The signing parties of the Košice program formed a new government with Klement Gottwald, once infamous extremist, being appointed Deputy Prime Minister. National Committees, new bodies of public administration at local, district and regional levels, replaced the pre-war self-governing municipalities. They were even designed, by the Presidential Decree, to appoint delegates who would then form a provisional national parliament, the Interim National Assembly.

The aforementioned reforms brought about a specific political system, a form of limited democracy. All legally standing parties worked in a permanent coalition – the National Front. They were bound not to challenge or even criticize the government agenda and the system as a whole (Balík et al. 2003, 129–130; Kaplan 2012). The space for open party campaigning shrank substantially. Misgivings about the expulsion of three million ethnic Germans or about the new interpretation of the wartime underground activity – by then following the Communist narrative of the resistance movement – were excluded and ostracized (Drápala 2001; Brenner 2015). The executive and legislative powers, held by the National Front parties, were supposed to merge, be subjected to key values of collectivism and social justice, and controlled by new forces such as trade unions and district National Committees. Yet, as Jan Dobeš shows and as will be further argued in the following paragraphs, it was the National Assembly that became an arena for several crucial conflicts between the government and parliament. The Assembly thus played the role of the only remaining, though highly restricted opposition power (Dobeš 2010).

Such public policy – and the decisive role that the Communist Party played in it – was made possible by the methodical break-up with the pre-war past. It was further aided by the memory of the last months at the turn of 1938 and 1939: when majority of the political scene supported the post-Munich authoritarian government and its undemocratic and antisemitic policies, the Communists were in open opposition that eventually earned

them harsh punishment. Similar local developments, rather than open Soviet pressure on reinterpreting the history of the anti-Nazi resistance movement, won the Party a new reputation, and other players and political phenomena acquired a different value in the immediately post-war era (Sommer 2009).

The Communist Party benefited from its new reputation and successfully combined it with a rhetorical distance from Moscow, articulated nationalism containing its Panslavic undertones, and a moderate, generally acceptable program using almost traditionalist language: “We fully respect the major figure and magnificent historic work of T. G. Masaryk (...) We build upon his work and subscribe to all his living values, particularly his democratic and humanistic ideals which we implement in a new form,” stated Václav Kopecký, minister and member of the CPC Presidium, in a speech at the Party Congress in March 1946 (Sněm budovatelů 1946, 118). All of these elements were new and unorthodox for the Party. Yet they enabled its leaders to successfully manoeuvre between praising themselves for successful social reforms and criticizing the National Front for not being decisive enough in less popular achievements. The Communists reached major progress in several key areas: they infiltrated the left wings of other parties, extended their own influence in the police and army, and, crucially, reached a decisive victory in the general election of 1946. With over 30 percent of the ballot, they did not win in Slovakia. Yet, in the Czech lands theirs was a gain of over two-fifths of all votes (Volby 2008, 85–86; Charvát 2014, 41). With 114 out of 300 seats, the Communists were by far the strongest faction in the Constitutional National Assembly. Together with the radicalizing Social Democrats, they held 151 seats. Klement Gottwald became prime minister. Consequently, regional and local representations, the National Committees, were reconstructed along the same results.

In the newly elected parliament, the Party dominance in the government was challenged to an extent in connection with a number of unrelated issues. The key dispute was about who was to draft the new Constitution. Non-communist parties wanted to include extra-parliamentary experts in the drafting, while the Communist club, in the words of Rudolf Slánský, objected against such “attempts to revise the people’s will” clearly expressed in the election, through involving “reactionary professors” in the process (Dobeš 2010, 228–229).<sup>3</sup> In other issues, it was the Communist ministers who first presented draft bills to the public, and only then brought them to the parliament, aided by the pressure from the interest groups. This selective, pragmatic understanding of parliamentary principles was an efficient tool that was merely challenged by verbal opposition of the other parties. The rhetoric of the Communist Party oscillated between defending the authority of the parliament and government, once the others seemed to challenge it with criticism, and diminishing the central institutions by pointing to the people’s control through National Committees and public associations (Dobeš 2010, 202–225). Thus, the National Assembly became a laboratory for the Communist Party

to test the methods of infiltration, pressure and ultimately the “hostile takeover” of parties, unions and government institutions.

### **Taking the helm of the state**

The political success of the Communist strategy in the post-war months and years was accompanied by a massive increase in membership. The Party recovered from the war losses and quickly attracted vast new membership, growing to nearly half a million members as early as in mid-1945. The membership skyrocketed to 1.4 million by the end of 1947 – in a country of population of around 13 million (Rupnik 2002, 204). In the Czech lands, one in nine people were CPC members, as opposed to one in 25 in Slovakia.

This vast party organization, along with the aforementioned institutional steps, became the Communist base before the pivotal political crisis in February 1948. Hoping for an early election, 12 non-Communist ministers resigned in protest against the decision taken by the Minister of Interior, the Communist Václav Nosek, to dismiss regional police chiefs and replace them by Communist candidates. Instead of a collapse of the cabinet, however, Prime Minister Gottwald mobilized various tools to exert pressure on President Beneš to accept the resignations and allow the PM to reconstruct the government. In addition to addressing private threats to the president, the Communists mobilized mass forces by convening a trade unions congress, setting up units of armed Communists in factories – the so-called People’s Militias, and by bringing allies among the working class to the streets – all united in protest against the supposed “attempts at infraction” (e.g. Jungmann 1948, 7). To give an example of their opponents’ feeble game plan, one of the parties of the resigning ministers held a ball during the same weekend and rejoiced at its “superb” atmosphere in party press (Rupnik 2002, 241). Unsurprisingly, the Communists won the contest. The exhausted Beneš adopted the ministers’ resignation, while noting privately that “one can’t stand against such an avalanche” (Rupnik 2002, 246).

During the same days, the Communists initiated the foundation of “action committees” of the National Front at offices and companies, state agencies, political parties, even in the parliament. They were to become the self-proclaimed managing bodies that took over the “renascent” institutions, started to dismiss people, recommend their arrest, appoint administrators of confiscated property, and speak on behalf of the institutions. On 25 February 1948, Klement Gottwald announced to the vast crowd which gathered at the Wenceslas Square in Prague that the president had just accepted the resignation of the cabinet ministers. The new names of ministers came, yet again, from all National Front parties, though now from their “renascent” wings. This apparently pluralist, multi-party transformation of the government represented the starting point of a new, dictatorial Czechoslovakia with the Communist Party in full control.

In the National Assembly, its Action Committee started to arrange the parliamentary process: it reorganized the committees, prepared sessions and debates, pre-negotiated proposals and interpellations. It thus practically replaced the parliament presidium that still existed, though mostly met only to take formal steps. The Action Committee also decided on personal matters: while the first MPs tried to flee the country, several others resigned. Others were arrested for anti-state activity. The Action Committee, however, formally contacted majority of the MPs inviting them to join the “renascent National Front.” Out of the 300 MPs, 220 promptly complied. The Presidium report of the 12 May stated that 10 MPs were in prison, 33 abroad and 2 went missing (Dobeš 2010, 248).

The National Assembly, deprived of its most critical voices and threatened by arrests, was swiftly disciplined. As a result, the parliament taken over from the previous term served as a convenient instrument in laying the foundations of the communist dictatorship even prior to the new election. The Assembly adopted the electoral law that preserved the limitation of the voting rights to the citizens of Czech, Slovak, or other Slavic ethnicity. All eligible voters had to vote as a compulsory matter, yet, under the new legislation, all parties made up together a single united ballot of the National Front. After 16 months of laboring on the new Constitution, a draft was swiftly completed. It introduced a new administrative structure, gave substantial formal powers to the National Committees and the trade unions. The Constitution was adopted at the closing session of the Constituent National Assembly on 9 May 1948. It ceremoniously convened in the Gothic Vladislav Hall of the Old Royal Palace at the Prague Castle and was often interrupted by long applause both for “our beloved Czechoslovak Republic” and for Generalissimus Stalin.<sup>4</sup> The consequent parliamentary term brought a storm of new legislation, launching radical reshape of the national social and economic program in Czechoslovakia.

In addition to the masterminded cabinet crisis in February 1948, the Communist Party set off an equally well-organized and timed system of pressure and manipulation of all key institutions, or their selected, thoroughly tested and screened sections. Furthermore, the sweeping changes inspired by Soviet Stalinism were outweighed by a deliberately constructed sense of continuity. A number of institutions of the previous democratic framework have been preserved, although their image and activities were strictly controlled. Yet, this sense of certain coherence with the past played a major role in public adaptation to the new regime and its long-term running. Contrary to many other communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia preserved the institution of the president throughout the socialist period. Notably, the Czechoslovak Communists also allowed the National Assembly to retain its structure and name, tactically preferring that to the more Stalinist term *soviet* or council. A number of popular social institutions had also been ingeniously transferred into the new scheme. The case of the mass gymnastic presentations



organized by the pre-war non-communist sports organization Sokol was perhaps the most peculiar one: the Communist government outlawed Sokol, but took over the format and, renamed it to *Spartakiads*, convening them regularly as a new, spectacular communist festival (Roubal 2020).

Following the institutional aspect of the twist from party to government, as explored throughout this volume, it should be highlighted here that the complex institutional structure distinctive of the communist era was created in steps and was subject to reforms and reshuffles at different points in time. Rather than being a more-or-less traditional dictatorship with the secretary general as an absolute power-holder, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia parasited on the state administration, using a special system of its declared leading role. The CPC designed a complex apparatus parallel to the public administration, sharing and, to some extent duplicating, its structure. Yet it was the Party central organs, divided in sections corresponding to the agendas of public administration, which remained the originator and final gate-keeper. These organs constituted the agenda through their own decision-making process. The government ministries, on the other hand, only served as mediators, executors of the decision taken at the Party level. High ministerial officials were assigned tasks by the respective section in the Communist Party apparatus. These assignments had to be carried out at all relevant strata in the government and/or legislature. Yet the difference between the Party and the state was recognized and understood, although – to make it even more complicated – all government agencies, all organizations also had their own Communist Party cell (other National Front parties did not enjoy such opportunity) which was fed information along the Party lines. Thus, the compliance with the Party decision could be double-checked.

The whole system was also made feasible through the personal link between the Party and government institutions. For example, the National Assembly routinely had among its deputies several dozens of members of the Central Committee, and a number of district and regional Party officials (Hoppe 2011, 103; Felcman 2015, 26). Members of the communist hierarchy were among the groups consistently represented in the parliament. The same applied to the highest echelons of the other parties who were automatically included in the – always elected – National Front ballot. It was this whole specific manner by which Party elites grew into the pillar of government institutions. It was yet another feature distinctive of the communist party-state.

In the initial phase of its monopoly, both the Party and government were mostly managed by the pre-war Communist leaders, while majority of membership consisted of new, post-1945 members. The Party organization had restructured by then, acquiring a powerful presidium, and the political and organization institute of the Central Committee. Meanwhile, the CPC had to develop strategies to discipline its mass membership: from distributing printed guidelines and regulations, through special language of vigilance and self-criticism, to subordination, examination and investigation procedures and bodies. Such set of internal tools and public campaigns did

not produce similar levels of activity and commitment as before 1948. From the outset of the power monopoly, the Party suffered from inner crises, examinations, purges, and punishments for fabricated offences that culminated in the show trials of a number of leading Communist officials in 1951–1952. Some of the systematic reviews and purges got out of control, for instance in 1958, when the process acquired its own momentum at regional level (Hemza 2019, 297–198). The radical phase was therefore replaced by deliberate bureaucratic stabilization, considerably ignoring the appeal of de-Stalinization. As Václav Kaška shows in his detailed analysis of internal situation in the South Moravian regional organization, the real picture of the Party life was a “cocktail of laziness and hard work, careerism and loyalty, arrogance and obedience which the Party leadership had to keep under control” (Kaška 2014, 268). Kaška shows that, even in the 1950s, there was more bureaucracy and stability than revolutionary will to rebuild, reshape, and guide the entire society.

The 1960s represented a major shift in this respect. Czechoslovakia suffered from an economic and social crisis, yet the Communist proclamations and the new Constitution of 1960 declared that socialism, as the Communists called the system, had been achieved in Czechoslovakia. The government became rivetted by technological innovation, expert governance and technocratic management (Sommer et al. 2019). Within the Party, this policy side-lined some exponents of the young generation that had been responsible for that Stalinist purges in the 1950s (Hemza 2019, 300–302). Government bodies did not remain intact by the new trend either. The number of public officials approved by the respective Communist Party committees, estimated at 250,000 in the 1950s, started decreasing (Hemza 2019, 297; Kocian et al. 2020, 82). The National Assembly, with 225 Communists out of 300 MPs in the early 1960s, became an issue too. Some voices even called for the “increased expertization” of the parliament (Hoppe 2011, 103). The Central Committee stated there was a need for “deepening,” i.e. intensification of the parliament’s activity, and emphasized its control mandate over the government. Deputies were now encouraged take part in drafting new bills at government ministries. Following the general election in 1964, parliamentary committees and other bodies were led by new people and engaged in new issues, including cooperation with the National Committees (Felcman 2015, 43–61). In summary, the Communist Party was able to re-direct attention to government institutions, mostly of representative nature, and their self-improvement at the moment of a crucial crisis, while avoiding explicit commitment to de-Stalinization.

Yet some of the institutions did not stop there. Later in the 1960s, the National Assembly, for instance, made a move toward “self-parliamentarization” (Gjuričová and Zahradníček 2018). In February 1968, it seriously considered withdrawing the immunity of the corrupt General Jan Šejna, a close ally of President Antonín Novotný, unaware that Šejna defected abroad with critical defense documents. He was then the second highest-

ranking officer to ever defect to the West from the Eastern bloc. Equally seriously, the parliament exerted pressure on President Novotný, scandalized by Šejna's defection, to abdicate (Hoppe 2011, 104–106, Felcman 2015, 151–166). It made substantial changes in the Assembly Presidium to increase the relevance of the body. As popular reform-minded Communist Josef Smrkovský stated after he was elected the new Speaker, “I shall exert my utmost effort for this National Assembly to have the gravity, esteem and respect that it deserves as the supreme legislative body of our state.”<sup>5</sup> The atmosphere of the Prague Spring, set in motion by the Communist reform project, made it impossible to agree on an electoral law. The Assembly thus postponed the general and municipal elections. It used its authority to choose 150 delegates to the Czech National Council, a counterpart to the self-confident Slovak representation. It adopted a number of liberal norms, such as the amendment to the Press Act that declared censorship impermissible. It also discussed conservative bills, including the proposal of the National Front Act to prevent founding or re-creating other political parties. Yet, legal experts in the Assembly managed to prevent adoption of several other attempts at illiberal norms.

Immediately following the Soviet-led military invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the National Assembly held a sort of permanent sitting, because it feared abduction and paralyzation carried out by the Soviet military as had been the case of Alexander Dubček and other top officials in the Party and the government. For several days, MPs were barricaded in the parliament building. The Assembly declared itself to be the only legitimate – and operational – supreme state body. It issued statements addressing the Soviet Communist Party and the parliaments of the five countries of the Warsaw Pact that took part in the military campaign.

### **Quick, but long normalization**

It took only several weeks before most of the liberalizing institutions and actors adapted to the new *modus operandi* which the Communist Party coined “normalization.” It meant gradual re-instatement of unreformed communism, a process that escalated throughout the 1970s. When the National Assembly was requested to approve the Treaty on Stationing the Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia in October 1968, out of 300 MPs only four – two women and two men – voted against the bill. An extensive wave of emigration was accompanied by purges in public administration and white-collar jobs. The purges in the Communist Party forced out one-third of the membership. Yet the Party had 1.2 million members in 1971, which represented 11.5 percent of the entire adult population (12.6 in the Czech lands, 8.7 in Slovakia). This figure slowly grew to reach over 1.6 million in 1989 (Kocian et al. 2020, 62–63, 105).

The policy at the time focused on the system of representation, in the sense of an envisaged proper composition of age, gender, professional, and

ethnic segments, not only in various government institutions, but even among Party members (Gjuričová and Zahradníček 2018, 119–121; Kocian et al. 2020, 100–104). To become a Communist Party member, one needed a recommendation by three other members after a two-year period of candidacy. A sophisticated system of drafting candidates for membership was devised to reach over 30 percent of workers. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s, the system collapsed. Local committees were merely able to draft about one-third of the projected numbers (Kocian et al. 2020, 114–117). Yet, in government bodies, the drafting system of quotas proved more successful. It produced several parliaments with a proportion of women exceeding one-third of all MPs – a rate that has not been reached ever since.

The Party practiced a retreat from ideology as a program for securing popular support. It focused much more on regular pace of meetings, conferences and congresses. These gatherings were paralleled in public institutions at all levels. The Communist Party Congress was preceded by the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. It was followed by general elections. The so-called *nomenclature*, a traditional system of approving Party people for posts in public institutions, police, school, administration, etc., became one of the most important responsibilities of the respective Party committees and for sure, the most frequent part of their agenda. The central bodies, such as the Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat, consisted of the same people, mostly appointed after the defeat of the Prague Spring. Key speakers, including the CPC Secretary General and the President of Czechoslovakia Gustáv Husák, as the opening quote in this chapter shows, used self-contradictory repertoire of party discipline, initiative and activity, internal party democracy and faithful attachment to the principles. A system based on such regular pace, all-pervasive control and rhetoric of grandiose values combined with substantial consumer gains, but also widespread petty economic crime, helped the Party consolidate its authority within the institutional framework and popular sentiments in the 1970s. Yet, the public eventually came to decipher it as corrupt and motionless in the following decade of the 1980s.

The federal structure that Czechoslovakia gained as a result of liberalization in 1968, which, however, was put into practice only in the Normalization period, did not represent but a formal change. It was in fact embodied by the new triplet of parliaments – the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National Councils. They epitomized the well-oiled machine-like functionality of late communist institutional framework. Theirs was a stable pace and little dynamism. Keeping a mandate for the full 18 years between 1971 and 1989 was by no means an exception. A working schedule was regularly set for the following year: four meetings of the committees, four sessions of the presidium and four plenary sessions at which both chambers met for one or at most two days. The rigidly formalized meetings mostly elected the same chairmen of chambers and committees, referring to their experience and great achievements in the previous

terms. Committees approved, and plenary sessions passed, several laws each year, mostly minor amendments of the existing ones. When assessing the sessions, parliament officials and the communist elite explicitly emphasized the criteria of “thorough preparation” and “successful coordination” of speeches, “high quality” of the sessions and professional impressions made (Gjuričová 2019, 209).

Along with symbolizing the federal structure, parliaments were once again used as “backup” institutions to be called to duty at a moment of crisis, as was the case in the mid-1980s when most socialist countries, Czechoslovakia including, suffered from economic and political stagnation. Mikhail Gorbachev’s new course of *perestroika* was the answer, but because of resembling the Prague Spring reforms, top Czechoslovak Communists observed it with reservation, if not fear. As late as at the turn of 1987 and 1988, the Gorbachev’s call for the return of power to the *Soviets* was translated into a directive calling for “enhancing” the role of representative institutions once again. The National Committees were supposed to oversee experimental public companies transformed into novel “state enterprises.” Parliaments were to assist with economic reforms and at the same time show the “spirit of openness,” that is to perform democratic procedures and initiatives vis-à-vis the public (Gjuričová 2019, 209). Yet, as in 1968, the parliaments used the new conditions to free themselves from the government automatic expectations, to seek their new presentation in the media, and to enhance their status. Explicit criticism directed toward economic development and various ministers by then regularly appeared in committee debates. In that sense they played an ideal part in the game designed by the Communist Party: in fact and for obvious reasons, the parliaments never pointed their finger at the Party and kept ragging the wrong people and institutions, while the irritated public berated parliamentary deputies at constituency meetings.

### **Epilogue: Democratic communists**

The Party guidelines also suggested that “some new elements that are not in contradiction with the electoral law” be tested, especially choosing from wider pool of candidates (Charvát and Štefek 2010). Such by-elections took place in the Spring of 1989. A number of constituencies experienced competitive electoral campaigns and were allowed to freely choose from more candidates for the first time in several decades. Nonetheless, it seemed that democratization was not part of the repertoire that the Communist Party was to implement successfully. An ever growing part of the public did not care, and the Party and its symbiosis with the government institutions was falling apart. The events on November 17, 1989, which set off a democratic revolution, carry all traces of underlying conspiracy – or even several conspiracies – by the Secret Police and other actors within the party-state complex against the current formal leaders of the Communist Party.

In March 1990, when other communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe were, under new labels of Parties of Democratic Left, Social Democracy etc., transforming into leading left-wing players in the fresh new political scenes, their Czechoslovak counterpart left the issue to democratic discussion at its Congress. The result was a shocking conservative majority voting for preserving the original name (Gjuričová et al. 2011, 348). The event ossified a number of historical issues and condemned the Party to play, once again, a radical opponent of the economic transformation. That position enjoyed wide popular support in the early 1990s and the Communists reached an unexpected success. They won nearly 14 percent of the ballot in the first free elections of 1990. In spite of the electoral outcome, they were never included in any coalition government in the following decades. Their first silent support to the cabinet of Andrej Babiš in 2017 seems to have been the last nail in the Party's coffin, rather than a new start.

## **Conclusion**

Understanding the Communist-dominated Czechoslovak state and the state-dominating Communist Party, importance from an insight into the learning process in the period preceding 1948 that was of tremendous benefit to the Party. It created a functional system of symbiosis of public administration and political party, where the party was growing through the state. Meanwhile it was always able to decide to take distance from institutions it was a constitutive part of and to direct all responsibility, guilt in many cases, to them at moments of crises.

The Communists collected leverage by mobilizing different forces at different times: charismatic individual leaders (Klement Gottwald up to World War II, Gustáv Husák in the late 1960s), mass organizations and movements (trade union councils, workers' militias, working-class street protests), but even – as this chapter points out – government institutions, such as parliaments. The Party exploited a whole range of instruments to discipline its members and local organizations, including repeated extensive purges and systematic long-term “cadre work.” They were the obstacles to the policies of the time, and often resulted in substantial drop in membership (by three-quarters after 1929, by one-third in 1969–1971). Yet, they did not prevent the Party elites from attracting new categories of the public, and hundreds of thousands of new members. Contrary to the reality of major policy breaks and drastic social changes, the complex institutional system had the potential to produce a sense of continuity that was the key to preventing wide public protest.

These general principles explain why preserving the “pillar” of public administration next to or within the Party structure was very far from a mere compromise with the previous establishment, or a costly error. From the institutional perspective, it proved to be an advantageous and convenient setting in the long term. The two-tier system made it relatively easy to engage and exploit nationalist rhetoric and policies, theoretically an

absolute counter-thesis to communist principles, while trying to channel Czech anti-German sentiments or to control Slovak autonomist movement. Such system provided a context in which the ruling Party could differentiate widely, such as carrying out less extensive purges in Slovakia, an occasion that proved to be one of the key elements of public support for the post-1968 regime. The Party shifted priorities toward consumer gains and widespread social policy at the same time. It was willing to slow down and let others sound more radical, while, under different circumstances, it stormed the public with sweeping revolutionary changes and violent oppression.

All these skills and strategies, including changing the pace and re-directing attention from Party to government and vice versa, were a special craft. It has been fascinating to observe the process through which the Party has been discovering and mastering the expertise. It is equally striking to find out that the same skills had eroded by the second half of the 1980s, and its few remnants were only engaged in a pure and blatant struggle for survival.

## Notes

- \* The author is based at the Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences. The study emerged within the Inter-Excellence/Inter-Vector project “Parliamentary Cultures in Europe” (Czech Ministry of Education, No. LTV20005).
- 1 *Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna* [Joint Czecho-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library], National Assembly 1929–1935, Chamber of Deputies, Stenographic Protocols, 7th Session, December 21, 1929, <http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/007schuz/s007003.htm>
  - 2 Program vlády [Government Program], adopted Košice, April 5, 1945, <http://www.moderni-dejiny.cz/clanek/kosicky-vladni-program-5-4-1945/>
  - 3 Cf. Slánský’s speech in the digitized records of the Constituent National Assembly, *Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna* [Joint Czecho-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library], Constituent National Assembly 1946–1948, Stenographic Protocols, 5th Session, July 10, 1946, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/005schuz/s005002.htm>
  - 4 *Ibid.*, 114th session, May 9, 1948, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/114schuz/s114001.htm>
  - 5 *Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna* [Joint Czecho-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library], National Assembly 1964–1968, Stenographic Protocols, 2nd Session, April 8, 1968, <https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1964ns/stenprot/022schuz/s022002.htm>

## Bibliography

- Balík, Stanislav, Vít Hloušek, Jan Holzer, and Jakub Šedo. 2003 *Politický systém českých zemí 1848–1989* [Political System in the Czech Lands 1848–1989]. Brno: MPÚ MU.
- Balík, Stanislav, Michal Pink, and Petr Voda. 2019. *Parlament s lidskou tváří: Biografické aspekty české legislativní politiky* [A Parliament with a Human Face: Biographical Aspects of Czech Legislative Politics]. Brno: CDK – Masarykova univerzita.

- Blaive, Muriel. 2001. *Promarněná příležitost. Československo a rok 1956* [An Opportunity Wasted: Czechoslovakia and the Year 1956]. Prague: Prostor.
- Brenner, Christiane. 2015. *Mezi Východem a Západem: České politické rozpravy 1945–1948* [Between the East and the West: Czech Political Debates 1845–1848]. Prague: Argo.
- Charvát, Jakub. 2014. “Analýza průběhu a výsledku voleb do Národního shromáždění konaných v roce 1946 [An Analysis of the Progress and Outcome of the 1946 Elections into the National Assembly],” in *Květnové volby 1946 – volby osudové? Československo před bouří* [May 1946 Elections – Fateful Elections? Czechoslovakia on the Brink of a Storm], edited by Kocian, J., Smetana, V. et al., 23–58. Prague: ÚSD AV ČR.
- Charvát, Jakub and Martin Štefek. 2010. “Kořeny československé volební reformy připravované v druhé polovině osmdesátých let dvacátého století [Origins of the Czechoslovak Electoral Reform Proposed in the Late 1980s].” *Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2010): 24–38.
- Dobeš, Jan. 2010. *Národní shromáždění v letech 1945–1948* [National Assembly in 1945–1948]. Doctoral thesis, Prague: FF UK.
- Doskočil, Zdeněk. 2011. “‘My ľudí krágl'ovať nebudeme, ale ani krigl'ovať našu spoločnosť nedovolíme’: Projev Gustáva Husáka na aktivu funkcionářů KSČ z obvodu Prahy 9 v závodě ČKD v Praze-Vysočanech 31. května 1969 [‘We shan’t be cutting throats, though we shan’t let our country turn Kriegel-like either’: Speech by Gustáv Husák at the session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party dignitaries from the Prague 9 district held in Prague-Vysočany on 31 May 1969],” in *Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu* [Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia], Vol. IV, edited by Jiří Kocian, Jaroslav Pažout and Jakub Rákosník, 187–207. Prague: ÚSD AV ČR – Dokořán.
- Drápala, Milan (ed.). 2001. *Na ztracené vartě Západu: antologie české nesocialistické publicistiky z let 1945–1948* [At the Lost Sentry of the West: Anthology of Czech Non-Socialist Journalism from 1945–1948]. Prague: Prostor.
- Felcman, Ondřej. 2015. *Československý parlament na prahu Pražského jara: Národní shromáždění na cestě k reformě (1964-duben 1968)* [Czechoslovak Parliament at the Dawn of the Prague Spring: National Assembly on the Path Towards Reform (1964–April 1968)]. Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny.
- Gebhart, Jan and Jan Kuklík. 2005. “Pomnichovská politika KSČ a její reflexe v Kominterně [Post-Munich Reflection of the CPC Politics in the Comintern],” in *Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu* [Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia], Vol. VIII, edited by Zdeněk Kárník and Michal Kopeček, 55–71. Prague: ÚSD AV ČR – Dokořán.
- Gjuričová, Adéla. 2019. “Too Ideal to Be a Parliament: The Representative Assemblies in Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1948–1989,” in *The Ideal of Parliament in Europe since 1800*, edited by R. Aerts, C. van Baalen, H. te Velde, M. van der Steen, and M.-L. Recker, 199–217. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gjuričová, Adéla, Michal Kopeček, Petr Roubal, Jiří Suk, and Tomáš Zahradníček. 2011. *Rozdělení minulosti. Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989* [Divided by the Past. The Making Political Elites in the Czech Republic after 1989]. Prague: Knihovna Václava Havla.



- Gjuričová, Adéla and Tomáš Zahradníček. 2018. *Návrat parlamentu. Češi a Slováci ve Federálním shromáždění 1989–1992* [The Return of Parliament. The Czechs and Slovaks in the Federal Assembly 1989–1992]. Prague: Argo – ÚSD AV ČR.
- Hemza, Tomáš. 2019. *Rozhodující síla strany: Aparát ÚV KSČ v éře Antonína Novotného (1953–1967)* [The Decisive Power of the Party: The CC CPC Apparatus in the Era of Antonín Novotný (1953–1967)]. Prague: FF UK.
- Hoppe, Jiří. 2011. “Pražské jaro 1968 v parlamentu Prague Spring 1968 in the Parliament,” in *Parlament v čase změny: Případové studie z vývoje českého a československého parlamentarismu* [Parliament at the Time of Change: Case Studies of the Evolution of Czechoslovak Parliamentaryism], edited by V. Doubek, M. Poláček et al., 101–122. Prague: Akropolis.
- Judt, Tony. 2005. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. London: Penguin Press.
- Jungmann, František. 1948. *Celostátní sjezd závodních rad a skupin ROH* [National Congress of Corporate Councils and Clusters of the Movement of Revolutionary Unions]. Prague: Práce.
- Kaplan, Karel. 1993. *Nekrvavá revoluce* [Bloodless Revolution]. Prague: Mladá fronta.
- Kaplan, Karel. 2012. *Národní fronta 1948–1960* [The National Front 1948–1960]. Prague: Academia.
- Kárník, Zdeněk. 2003. “KSČ – úspěchy a neúspěchy v klíčově významných parlamentních volbách v roce 1935 [CPC – Successes and Fiascos in the Key Parliamentary Elections in 1935],” in *Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu* [Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia], Vol. I, edited by Zdeněk Kárník and Michal Kopeček, 63–88. Prague: ÚSD AV ČR – Dokořán.
- Kaška, Václav. 2014. *Neukáznění a neangažovaní: Disciplinace členů Komunistické strany Československa v letech 1948–1952* [The Naughty and the Non-Involved: Disciplining the Members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1948–1952]. Prague: ÚSTR – *Conditio humana*.
- Kocian, Jiří, Jaroslav Pažout, Tomáš Vilímek, Stanislav Balík, and Vít Hloušek. 2020. *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa IV (1969–1993)* [A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia IV (1969–1993)]. Prague: Academia
- Křest’án, Jiří. 2004. “KSČ, Společnost pro hospodářské a kulturní styky s SSSR a obraz Sovětského svazu v prostředí české levicové intelligence (1925–1939) [CPC, Society for Economic and Cultural Relations with the USSR and the Image of the Soviet Union in the Context of the Czech Left-wing Intelligentsia (1925–1939)],” in *Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu IV* [Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia, Vol. II, edited by Zdeněk Kárník and Michal Kopeček, 84–109. Prague: ÚSD AV ČR – Dokořán.
- Kunštát, Daniel. 2013. *Za rudou oponou: Komunisté a jejich voliči po roce 1989* [Behind the Red Curtain: Communists and Their Voters after 1989]. Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství.
- Reiman, Pavel et al. 1961. *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa* [A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. Prague: Státní nakladatelství politické literatury.
- Roubal, Petr. 2020. *Spartakiads: The Politics of Physical Culture in Communist Czechoslovakia*. Prague: Karolinum.

- Rupnik, Jacques. 2002. *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa: Od počátků do převzetí moci* [A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: From Early Days to the Seizure of Power]. Prague: Academia.
- Rychlík, Jan. 2021. "Rozhovor [An Interview]," in *Pěticípá totalita* [Five-Pointed Totality]. Zlín: Kniha Zlín, 250–311.
- Sněm budovatelů. 1946. Protokol VIII. řádného sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa ve dnech 28.-31. března 1946. [The Assembly of Builders: Protocol VIII of the Ordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 28–31 March 1946]. Prague: Sekretariát ÚV KSČ.
- Sommer, Vítězslav. 2009. "Válka, odboj a hledání historické identity československého komunismu [War, Resistance and the Search for the Historical Identity of the Czechoslovak Communism]," in *Válečný prožitek české společnosti v konfrontaci s nacistickou okupací (1939–1945)* [War Experience of the Czech Society in the Confrontation with the Nazi Occupation (1939–1945)], edited by Zdeněk Hazdra, 111–124. Prague: Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes.
- Sommer, Vítězslav, Matěj Spurný, and Jaromír Mrňka. 2019. *Řídit socialismus jako firmu. Technokratické vládnutí v Československu, 1956–1989* [Managing Socialism Like a Corporation. Technocratic Governanance in Czechoslovakia, 1956–1989]. Prague: NLN – ÚSD AV ČR.
- Volby do zákonodárných orgánů Československa a České republiky 1920–2006* [Elections to the Legislative Bodies of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic 1920–2006]. 2008. Prague: ČSÚ.

# Index

- AKP *see* Justice and Development Party  
Abramovich, Isai 89  
Academic Electoral College 41  
Act on the National Assembly  
    Election 284  
Act on the National Reconstruction  
    Movement 276–77  
Act on the Parliamentary Election 284  
Action Committee 324–25  
Adler, Friedrich 74  
Advisory Council 8, 38  
Afghanistan 120  
Africa 118, 120, 250  
*Aisilu see* Mourning Records  
Akamatsu Katsumaro 154, 167  
Albania 1, 13, 178–79, 184–86, 195–97,  
    199–205, 207, 211–14  
Albanian–Soviet split 179  
All-Russian Central Executive Committee  
    181 *see also* Central Executive  
    Committee (VKP [b]); Executive  
    Committee (Comintern; ECCI);  
    All-Russian Conference 93  
All-Russian Congresses of Soviets 181  
All-Union Party Conference 90  
Alliance for a New Japan 12, 153–61,  
    163–64, 173–75, 175n\*  
Allilueva, Nadezhda 263  
Amendment Bill 38–39, 41  
America 32, 72–73, 250, 256  
    *see also* Americas, Latin America,  
    South America, USA  
Americas 2  
Amsterdam International 61  
An Hyon-won 254  
Andreichin, Georgii 90  
Anfu Club 1, 8, 26–32, 39, 42–50, 52n2,  
    56n43; Charter 44, 46; Congress 27,  
    46; Council 27, 44, 49, 52n2;  
    correspondence offices 48; Diplomatic  
    Liaison Division 47; extra-  
    parliamentary councillors 44; Office  
    Establishment Commissioner 48;  
    Political Investigation Committee  
    46–47  
Anfu Regime 9, 26–27, 30–31, 42, 47, 52;  
    in parliament 26, 51  
Anglo–American 184  
Anhui 28, 30, 43–44, 139, 143  
Anhui Faction 30, 44  
April Revolution 271, 273, 275, 278  
Araki Sadao 167  
Argentina 118 *see also* Argentinian  
    Revolution  
Argentinian Revolution 291  
Arima Yoriyasu 152, 173  
Armenians 7  
Army Cavalry School (France) 43  
Army Ministry (China) 43  
Army Ministry (Japan) 168  
Asahara Kenzō 173  
Asia 118, 178, 250, 257, 280  
    *see also* Central Asia, East Asia  
Asquith, Herbert 33  
Assemblies (Yugoslavia) 297, 300–01,  
    303–04, 306  
Assembly of Nations 300  
Association of Friends of  
    Constitutionalism 8  
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (Pasha) 11,  
    107, 123n2, 281 *see also* Kemalism  
*Attitudes that Revolutionary Comrades  
Should Hold Regarding the Hunan &  
Hubei Party Purification  
Movements* 141  
Austria 33, 184, 189

- Austria–Hungary 318  
 authoritarianism 17, 19, 31, 43, 50, 108,  
 121, 152, 156, 175, 317, 320, 322  
 Ayub Khan, Muhammed 118, 280–81  
 Axis Powers 184, 294
- Babiš, Andrej 331  
 Bakunin, Mikhail 64  
 Balkan crisis (1912) 7  
 Bank of Communications 44  
 Basque Country 184  
 Bauer, Otto 74  
 Baumansky District 94  
*Bednota* (magazine) 86  
 Beijing 28–29, 32, 34, 36–37, 43, 45,  
 47–49, 53n2, 131, 148n29  
*see also* Beiping  
 Beiping 135–36, 148n29 *see also* Beijing  
 Beiyang 28–30, 33–35, 37, 43, 47  
 Beiyang-Kuomintang-Progressive  
 coalition cabinet 33  
 Belgium 6, 41, 43, 76  
 Belgrade 297, 302, 309  
 Belgrade Political Bureau 302  
 Bell, Thomas 72  
 Belogurova, Anna 62  
 Beneš, Edvard 189–90, 310n3, 320, 324  
 Berlin Blockade 192  
 Berlin Conference 75  
 Berlin Wall 18  
 Berlin War College 27  
 Berman, Jakub 208  
*Berufskörperschaften see* vocational  
 corporations  
 Bessarabia 184  
 Beér, János 191  
 Bian Yinchang 47  
 bicameralism 39, 55n25, 283, 301  
 Bierut, Bolesław 192, 208  
 Bismarck, Otto von 40, 47  
 Bluntschli, Johann Kaspar 31, 36  
 Bohemia *see* Sudetenland  
 Bo Gu 228  
*bokumin* 158  
 Bolsheviks (VKP [b]) 1, 5, 9–10, 12,  
 19n1, 60–63, 67–69, 70–72, 75, 79–80,  
 85–87, 93, 96, 149n39, 179–82, 185,  
 188–89, 192, 198, 204, 210–211, 213,  
 214n2, 215n34, 253, 310n7, 299, 319;  
 Central Committee 85–101, 182;  
 Foreign Policy Department 191;  
 Politbiuro 182, 190  
*see also* Communist Party (Russia)
- Boshin Imperial Rescript 160  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 296, 298,  
 300, 309  
 bourgeois dictatorship 37  
 Bourgeoisie 9, 68, 71, 73, 86, 183, 193,  
 197, 214n16, 259n, 310n2, 322  
 Bourguiba, Habib Ali 118  
 Brand, Henryk 78  
 Brazil 118  
 Breslav, Boris 92–93  
 Britain 34, 39, 45, 75–77, 147n5, 288  
 Brussels 5, 65  
 Bryce, James 39  
 Buddhism *see* Mahāyāna  
 Bukharan People's Soviet Republic 180  
 Bukharin, Nikolai 68, 92  
 Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich 211  
 Bulgaria 1, 13, 179, 184, 186–87, 195,  
 197, 201–02, 207, 210, 213  
 Bulgarian Fatherland Front 204  
 Bureaucratization 11, 85–86  
 Burke, Edmund 53n9, 113  
 Buxton, C. R. 77
- Cabinet Planning Board 161  
 Caliph 111  
 Campaign to Wipe Out Hidden  
 Counterrevolutionaries 224, 230–31  
 Canton *see* Guangzhou  
 Cao Rulin 45  
 Cardenas, Lazaro 118  
 Catalonia 184  
 Catholic Church 192, 210  
 CCP *see* Communist Party (China)  
 Central Academic Caucus 38, 40–41, 43,  
 54n21  
 Central Asia 119, 264  
 Central Broadcasting Station 134  
 Central Committee *see* Communist  
 Parties; Democratic Women's Union;  
 League of Communists of Slovenia;  
 Polish United Workers' Party;  
 Workers' Party of Korea  
 Central Committee General Study  
 Committee 230, 236  
 Central Control Commission 87, 98  
 Central Daily News 134  
 Central Europe 310n3, 320  
 Central Executive Committee (KMT)  
 139–40, 142–44, 149n35, 181  
*see also* Kuomintang  
 Central Executive Committee (VKP  
 [b]) 92

- Central Five-Person Small Group 231  
 Central Information Study Committee 276  
 Central News Agency 133–34  
 Central Party Biweekly 140  
 Central Party History Department's Historical Materials Compilation Committee 143  
 Central Propaganda Department (CCP) 231, 233  
 Central Propaganda Department (KMT) 130, 133 *see also* Department of Propaganda  
 Central Rada (Ukraine) 180  
 Central Revolutionary Military Commission 229–30  
 Central Standing Committee 142  
 Central Ten-Person Small Group 232  
 Central Weekly Journal *see Zhongyang zhoubao*  
 Centrist Military Coups 37  
 Chamber of Associated Labour 301  
 Chamber of Deputies 318, 320  
 Chamber of Elders 41  
 Chamber of Lands 199  
 Chamber of Associated Labor 301  
 Chamber of Municipalities 301  
 Chang Myŏn 271, 273–74, 276, 278, 281  
 Chang P'eng-yuan 35, 38  
 Chang To-yŏng 271, 279  
 Changsha 134, 148n27  
 Chen Boda 193  
 Chen Huanzhang 47  
 Chen Jihua 43  
 Chen Zongxun 140  
 Cheng Shude 54n24  
 Chenglu Club 49  
 Cherniak 88  
 Chervenkov, Valko 207, 209  
 Chiang Ching-kuo 17  
 Chiang Kai-shek 26, 119, 132–33, 137–38, 142–43, 145–46, 149n41  
 Chile 291  
 Chilgol 262  
 China 1–2, 4–5, 7–8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 26, 32–33, 35–36, 39, 43, 49–51, 55n25, 129, 131–32, 135–38, 143, 146, 146n1, 147n3, 147n6, 149n36, 151–52, 154, 174, 178, 183, 193, 201–03, 207, 213, 214n14, 223–24, 230–31, 237, 241, 251, 280–81; Central China 132, 136–37, 141, 226–28; North China 132, 141, 143–44, 226–27, 237, 241; historians 31; immigrants from 6; nation 6, 18, 145  
 Chinese Civil War 15, 193  
 Chinese Communist Party *see* Communist Party (China)  
 Chinese Culture Service Association 129  
 Chinese Democratic Socialist Party 17  
 Chinese Nationalist Party *see* Kuomintang  
 Chinese Soviet Republic 228–230, 236  
 Cho Yong-su 274  
 Choibalsan, Khorloogiin 184, 207  
 Chongjin 254  
 Chongqing 134, 137, 148n27  
 Choson *Nyŏsŏng* 252, 256, 259–62, 265n21, 266n46  
 Chosun *Ilbo* 274, 292n20–21, 291n26, 291n28  
 Chosŏn Defense Academy 272  
 CHP *see* Republican People's Party  
 Christian Rural Movement 277  
 Christians 123n9, 156  
 Chunjŏ *jiniankan* *see* "Spring Festival Commemorative Issues"  
 Chuzhou 49  
 CIA 276  
 Citizens' Corps 34  
 Civil Rule Party 289–90  
 "Cold Observer" *see* Hu Zhengzhi  
 Cold War 1, 15, 221, 224, 273  
*Collectanea of KMT Policies* 137  
 colonialism 6, 183  
 Columbia University 47  
 Cominform 179, 185, 299  
 Comintern 10–11, 60–63, 65, 67–81, 98, 128, 131–32, 179, 183, 185, 213, 319–21; League of Nations 72; World Congress 183; 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress 71, 73, 78, 204 *see also* Executive Committee (Comintern; ECCI)  
 Commerce Department of the State Council 235  
 Commercial Press 128, 136, 139  
 Committee for Union and Progress 1, 5–7, 11, 109–12 *see also* Union and Progress Party  
 Committee for the Defence of the Republic 320  
 Committee of Soviet Women 256, 259  
 Communication Clique *see* New Communication Clique; Old Communication Clique  
 Communist International *see* Comintern

- Communist Parties 1, 2, 10, 16–17, 60, 67, 73, 81, 183, 185, 204, 211, 213, 287, 298–99, 309, 316
- Communist Party (Albania) 186; Central Committee 207
- Communist Party (China) 15, 17–18, 27, 31, 52, 128–29, 131–32, 134–35, 137, 141–43, 149n35, 149n39, 149n41, 183, 193, 204, 223–31, 237, 240–41, 242n2–4, 242n10, 243n16, 243n20, 244n24, 244n27, 245n35–36, 245n39–43, 245n46–47, 253; Politburo 52, 194, 225, 228–31, 236; Central Committee 27, 44, 149n35, 228–29, 232, 235–38, 326–27; 8th National Congress 231
- Communist Party (Croatia) 298
- Communist Party (Czechoslovakia) 14–16, 184–85, 189, 198–99, 205, 316–18, 320–21, 323–25, 326, 329; Central Committee 189, 329
- Communist Party (Germany) 191
- Communist Party (Greece) 183
- Communist Party (Great Britain) 72
- Communist Party (Hungary) 190, 198
- Communist Party (Poland) 184
- Communist Party (Romania) 187, 204; Central Committee 187
- Communist Party (Russia) *see* Bolsheviks
- Communist Party (Slovakia) 189, 317
- Communist Party (Slovenia) 298, 303, 305, 307–09
- Communist Party (Spain) 183
- Communist Party (Vietnam) 17
- Communist Party (Yugoslavia) 16, 185, 204, 215n18, 298–302; Central Committee 186 *see also* League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 100, 178–80, 185, 204, 210–11, 213, 215n34, 266n12, 266n21; Central Committee 182 *see also* Bolsheviks
- Communist Workers' Party of Germany 71–72
- Concise List of Revolutionary Commemoration Days* 142
- Concordia Association 173–74
- Confucian 35, 157–58, 252–53, 262, 263, 265
- Confucian Temple District *see* Qinhuai District
- Congress of Mothers 260
- Congress Party 118, 120
- Constituent Assembly (Yugoslavia) 186
- Constituent National Assembly (Czechoslovakia) 189, 325, 332n3
- Constitution Drafting Committee (South Korea) *see* Constitutional Deliberation Committee (South Korea)
- Constitution of Albania 185, 201, 203
- Constitution of Bulgaria 187, 195, 208
- Constitution of Czechoslovakia 185, 195, 198–99, 202–03
- Constitution of China (1954) 193, 196–98, 199–204
- Constitution of the DPRK 179, 185, 198, 201–02
- Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic 181
- Constitution of the GDR 195, 201–03
- Constitution of Hungary 191, 195, 197, 199, 202–03
- Constitution of Japan (Meiji Constitution) 3, 152, 154, 170
- Constitution of Mongolia (1924) 181
- Constitution of Mongolia (1940) 194, 196, 201, 203, 208
- Constitution of the Ottoman Empire (1876) 3, 109
- Constitution of Poland (“Small Constitution”) 192, 195–96, 199–201, 214n1
- Constitution of Poland (1952) 193, 196–97, 199, 201, 203, 214n1
- Constitution of the ROK (Third Republic Constitution) 276
- Constitution of the ROK (Yushin Constitution) 276
- Constitution of Romania (1948) 197–98, 202
- Constitution of Romania (1952) 195, 198, 201, 203–04, 208
- Constitution of Turkey 108
- Constitution of the Tuvan Arats' [Herders'] Republic 181
- Constitution of the Tuvan People's Republic (1926) 181
- Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic 180
- Constitution of the USSR (1936) 12,

- 178, 182–84, 186, 191, 193, 196, 198, 201, 208, 213
- Constitution of Yugoslavia 179, 197, 200–01
- Constitutional Assembly (Kingdom of SCS) 298, 300, 310n2
- Constitutional Compilation  
Commission 44
- Constitutional Deliberation Committee (South Korea) 282
- constitutional monarchies 37, 39  
*see also* monarchism
- constitutional dictatorship 26, 50
- Du Contrat social* 110
- Control Faction 153
- Cornell University 43
- corporatism 8, 16, 26, 30–31, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 51–52, 54n14, 54n21, 111–13, 120, 296, 300
- corporatist constitutionalism 51
- corrective revolution 37, 51
- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 179
- Council of Ministers (Hungary) 191, 202
- Council of Ministers (North Korea) 255
- Council of Ministers (USSR) 182, 191
- Council of Nationalities 199
- Council of People's Commissars (USSR) 182, 202
- Council of Producers 199, 300
- CPC *see* Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
- CPSU *see* Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Credentials Commission 87
- Croatia 296, 298, 300, 303, 309
- Cultural Revolution 253
- CUP *see* Committee for Union and Progress
- Czechoslovakia 1–2, 13–16, 178, 184–85, 189, 195, 197, 200, 202–03, 205, 207–09, 213, 298, 309, 310n3, 316–18, 320–21, 324–25, 327–29, 330
- Dagongbao see L'Impartial*
- Dai Jitao 131, 138
- Dalai Lama 40
- Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 111
- Declaration to the Masses in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi* 142
- democracy 9–11, 16–17, 31, 44, 51, 67, 85–95, 98–102, 107, 110, 113, 117, 119, 122, 156, 160–61, 175, 213, 271, 277, 280–81, 283, 290, 292n20, 293n28, 305, 322, 329, 331 *see also* direct democracy; people's democracy; representative democracy; socialist democracy; workers' democracy
- Democratic Club *see* Anfu Club
- Democratic Friendship Party 289
- Democratic Front 186, 188, 190
- Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea 190
- Democratic Party (South Korea) 289–90
- Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro 310
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea *see* Korea (North)
- Democratic Republican Party 15, 53n3, 270, 290, 270–71, 277–78, 282–91, 292n2
- Democratic Women's Union (North Korea) 255–60, 262; Central Committee 257; 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress 257–59
- Deng Ye 53n2
- Department of Propaganda 11, 127–28, 130–46, 127–8, 147n5, 148n23–24, 149n37–38, 149n40 *see also* Central Propaganda Department (KMT)
- developmentalism (developmental state; developmental dictatorships) 26–27, 42, 52, 112, 121, 171
- Diet (Japan) 2, 12, 152, 154, 161, 167–71
- Dimitrov Constitution *see* Constitution of Bulgaria
- Dimitrov, Georgi 183
- Ding Shiyi 33
- Ding Shiyuan 45
- direct democracy 53n10
- Dong-a Ilbo* 274, 287
- Dongfang zazhi see Eastern Miscellany*
- DPS *see* Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro
- Draft Outline of the Tutelage Stage* 133, 146
- Drobnis, Petr 92
- DRP *see* Democratic Republican Party
- Duan Qirui 27–30, 32–37, 39–40, 43–44, 47
- Duan Zhigui 45
- Duban canzhan shiwuchu see* War Participation Supervisory Office
- Dubček, Alexander 14, 328
- duchun see tuchun*
- Durdenevskii, Vsevolod Nikolaevich 187

- Durkheim, Émile 110  
 DWU *see* Democratic Women's Union  
 Dzerzhinskii, Feliks 91
- East Asia xi, 2, 8, 26, 37, 62, 134, 264  
 East Asian Economic League 30  
 East Germany *see* Germany (East)  
 Eastern Europe 2, 3, 15, 178, 184–85, 188, 197, 256, 309, 310n3, 325, 331  
*Eastern Miscellany* 136  
 École des Mines de Mons 43  
 Economic Council (Yugoslavia) 300  
 Economic Development Council (South Korea) 278  
 Economic Investigation Bureau 47  
*Economic Principles of Confucius and His School* (1911) 47  
 Educational and Cultural Council (Yugoslavia) 300  
 Egypt 118, 120, 280–81  
 Eighth Route Army 226  
 “election purification” 153–55, 158, 163, 168  
 Ellul, Jacques 129, 137, 139, 145, 147n12  
 Emergency Measures Act 274–77  
 Emergency Measures Act for National Reconstruction 275–76  
 Enabling Act (1933) 276  
 Engels, Friedrich 42, 64, 65, 89, 250  
 England 65, 72 *see also* Great Britain  
 enlightened despotism 34  
 Episcopate (Poland) 193  
 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 122  
 Estonia 38, 42, 184  
 “ethical state” 154, 156, 167, 172  
 Eurasia 2–6, 11–13, 19, 121–22, 127, 144, 175, 178  
 Europe 35–36, 61, 64–66, 70–73, 78, 117, 120, 170, 178–79, 184, 212, 214n3, 250, 280, 320 *see also* Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, Western Europe  
 Executive Committee (Comintern; ECCI) 62, 68–70, 183 *see also* All-Russian Central Executive Committee; Central Executive Committee (VKP [b])  
 Executive Committee (Yugoslavia) 297, 304  
 Executive Yuan 130  
 “Explanatory Note” 39–41, 55n25, 55n30  
 Extraordinary State Council 33–34, 54n14
- Fair Comment* (Gongyanbao; Kung-yen pao) 32, 52–53n2  
 Fang Shu 39, 52  
 Far Eastern Republic xii, 180–81  
 fascism 2, 11, 27, 41–42, 53n8, 61, 108, 115, 117, 151–52, 159, 169, 171, 183, 203, 27, 316, 320  
 “Father of the People” *see* Kim Il-sung  
 Fatherland Front 186, 187, 204  
 FBI 277  
 February 26 Incident (1936) 159, 272  
 Federal Assembly (Czechoslovakia) 329  
 Federal Assembly (Yugoslavia) 300–01, 304, 307  
 Federal Council (Yugoslavia) 199, 300–01  
 Fedoseev, Petr Nikolaevich 187  
 Feng Guozhang 30, 33, 36  
 First World War 7, 10, 29, 36, 50, 65–66, 78–80, 152, 155, 318  
 Five-Year Plan (Romania) 206  
 Five-Year Plan (South Korea) 274, 278  
 flip-flop politics 288–90  
 Forbidden City 136  
 “Four Counts of Suspicion” (South Korea) 288  
 France 6, 36–37, 46, 48, 55n19, 64–66, 75–77, 110, 281 *see also* French Concession; French language; French Revolution; Third Republic (France)  
 Franco, Francisco 31  
 Free Republican Party 116  
 French Concession (Shanghai) 141  
 French language 81n1, 141  
 French Revolution 39, 53n7, 110–11  
 Fu Dingyi 52, 56n43  
 Fu Liangzuo 34  
 functional representation 41–42  
*Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* 118
- Gaiyao* (Propaganda Department Weekly Work Outlines) 139–46, 148n24, 149n34  
 Gansu 38  
 Gao Kelin 233  
*Gao Xiang E Gan minzhong shu see Declaration to the Masses in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi*  
 Gaoping County 226  
 GDR *see* Germany (East)  
*Geming jinianri jianming biao see Concise*



- List of Revolutionary Commemoration Days*
- Geming jun* *see* *Revolutionary Army*
- Geming tongzhi duiyu liang Hu qingdang yundong ying chi zhi taidu* *see* *Attitudes that Revolutionary Comrades Should Hold Regarding the Hunan & Hubei Party Purification Movements*
- General German Workers' Association 64
- General Political Department (KMT) 140, 142
- General Political Department (CCP) 233
- General Political Training Department 141–42
- Geneva 77, 79
- Geofizika* Factory 92
- George, Henry 156
- Georgia 74–75
- German Democratic Republic *see* Germany (East)
- Germany 1, 11–13, 18, 27, 31, 33, 39, 47, 51, 55n25, 71–72, 76, 107–09, 113, 116, 178, 189, 191–92, 195–96, 198–200, 202, 204–05, 207, 277, 288; legal theories 26; historical school 158; as a model 32; Nazi Germany 113, 116, 275
- Germany (East) 1, 13, 18, 178, 191–92, 195–96, 198–99, 200, 202, 204–05, 207, 213, 214n3, 305
- Germany (West) 192, 287
- Gershuni, Grigorii Andreevich 6
- Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 187–89, 207–09
- Golkar 53n3
- Good Friends (*Yiyhoushe*) 54n14
- Goodnow, Frank 32
- Gongren yundong xuanchuan dagang* *see* *Propaganda Outline for the Peasant Movement*
- Gongyanbao* *see* *Fair Comment*
- Gorbachev, Mikhail 330
- Gorkin, Aleksandr Fedorovich 187
- Gorshenin, Konstantin Petrovich 187–88
- Gospirt* (State Alcohol) 88
- Gottwald, Klement 189–90, 207–09, 319–24, 331
- Gotō Fumio 153
- Gotō Shinpei 155
- Government Gazette (China) 52n2
- Grand National Assembly (Bulgaria) 187–88
- Grand National Assembly (Romania) 188–89, 206, 208
- Grand National Assembly (Turkey) 108, 113–14
- Gray, John Chipman 55n25
- Great Britain 34, 44, 72, 75, 77, 147n5, 288 *see also* England
- Great Depression 152–53, 321
- “Great Leader” *see* Kim Il-sung
- Great Patriotic War 253, 264
- Great People’s Khural *see* Khural
- Great Terror 182
- Great Wall 143
- Great War *see* First World War; Second World War
- Great Way 165 *see also* Imperial Way
- Greater Japan Youth Party 169
- Greece 16, 183
- Green, Thomas Hill 155–56
- Grigor’ian, Vagan Grigor’evich 188
- Grotewohl, Otto 192, 206, 208
- Groza, Petru 187, 208
- Gu Weijin *see* Wellington Koo
- Guangxu Emperor 136
- Guangzhou 29–30, 130–31, 135, 148n21, 149n37
- Guilin 130
- Guizhou 229
- Guoji zhengwu pingyihui* *see* International Political Council
- Guomin geming xuanchuan ji* *see* *National Revolution Propaganda Collections*
- Guomintang *see* Kuomintang
- Guomindang zhengce congshu* *see* *Collectanea of KMT Policies*
- Habsburg 1, 297, 318
- Halk Firkası* (People’s Party) *see* Republican People’s Party
- Halka dođru* *see* “Toward the People” campaign
- halkevleri* *see* People’s Houses
- halkodaları* *see* People’s Rooms
- Han T’ae-yōn 276, 281–82
- Hangzhou 134
- Hankook Ilbo* 287
- Hara Kei 155
- Hashimoto Kingorō 168–70
- Hashimoto Seinosuke 155–56
- Hayashi Senjurō 154, 173
- Hebei 227, 232, 237–38, 240
- Hegel 31; (Neo-)Hegelianism 155–56

- Heibon-sha* 166  
 Hernández Tomás, Jesús 183  
 Hirota Kōki 155  
 Hitler, Adolf 115, 124n17, 276, 321  
 Ho Chong-suk 255  
 Hobhouse, Leonard 155  
 Hobson, John Atkinson 155  
 Hosiery Factory 92  
 House of Peers (ROC) 38, 42  
 House of Representatives (ROC) 38, 45, 47  
 Hoxha, Enver 186, 207, 212  
 Hozumi Shigetō 155  
 Hsu Shu-cheng *see* Xu Shuzheng  
 Hu Feng 235  
 Hu Hanmin 130, 132–33, 138, 141–42, 145–46, 148n19  
 Hu Hanmin's Collected Speeches (*Hu Hanmin xiansheng yanjiang ji*) 141  
 Hu Jun 42  
 Hu Qiaomu 193  
 Hu Zhengzhi 32, 37  
*Huang jinguo zhi wenshu see Protecting the Party & Saving the Nation*  
 Huang Yunpeng 53n10  
 Huang Zao 136  
*Huangdi hun see Spirit of the Yellow Emperor*  
 Huapailou District 136  
 Hubei 141–42  
 Hunan 134, 140–42, 145, 148n27  
 Hunan Road 133  
 Hungarian Autonomous Region 198  
 Hungarian Popular Front of Independence 191  
 Hungarian Soviet Republic 72, 320  
 Hungarian Working People's Party 191  
 Hungary 1, 13, 41, 178, 184–85, 190, 191, 195–96, 201–03, 207, 213, 214n15  
 Huysmans, Camille 6  
 Husák, Gustáv 316, 329, 331  
  
 Iaroslavskii, Emel'ian 98  
 Imperial Rule Assistance Association 12, 151–52, 160–61, 163, 168, 173–75  
 Imperial Way 154, 171  
     *see also* Great Way  
 imperialism 3, 32, 66, 73, 115, 155, 231, 255–56, 262  
 India 62, 72, 118, 120  
 Indochina 141  
 Indonesia 31, 42, 53n3, 118, 281  
  
 Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties *see* Cominform  
 Inoue Tetsujirō 156  
 Inozemtsev, Vladislav 18  
 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 212  
 International Federation of Trade Unions *see* Amsterdam International  
 International Political Council (*Guoji zhengwu pingyihui*) 34  
 International Workingmen's Association (IWA) 64–66  
 internationalism 10, 60–63, 65, 68, 70, 71, 73, 77–81, 259  
     *see also* transnationalism  
 Inukai Tsuyoshi 53n7  
 IRAA *see* Imperial Rule Assistance Association  
 Iran 6, 120  
 Iraq 120  
 Iron Guard Movement 53n8  
*Ishin* (magazine) 12, 154, 161, 166–68, 170–72, 174  
 Ishiwara Kanji 172–73  
 Italy 11–12, 41, 44, 66, 107–08, 277  
  
 Jacobin Club 53n7  
 Japan 1–5, 11–12, 27, 30, 33, 35–36, 40, 43–44, 46–47, 50–52, 55n25, 132, 134, 138, 143–44, 146, 149n41, 151–54, 157, 159–66, 168–75, 183, 225, 252, 258, 262, 265, 272, 277, 285; Army 33, 45, 128, 136, 144; China as a Japanese Protectorate 36; invasion of China 11, 135, 138, 173; Japanese-Occupied areas in China 226; militarism 143, 172–73, 272; occupation of Korea 262; parties and political organizations 4, 46, 53n7, 153, 174–75 *see also* Army Ministry (Japan); Imperial Rule Assistance Association; *meibōka*; Sino-Japanese War  
 Jewish Labor Bund 5  
 “Jewish Peril” 162  
 Jews 123n9  
 Jiang Yong 39, 52  
 Jiangdong Gate 134  
 Jiangsu 133–35, 235  
 Jiaotong University 45  
 Jilin 38  
 Jin Yunpeng 34  
*Jinbudang see* Progressive Party  
 Jinnah, Mohammad 118

- Jintie zhuyi shuo* see *Theory of Gold and Iron*  
*Jiuguo yundong xuanyan* see *National Salvation Declaration*  
 John, Oldřich 189  
 Joint State Political Directorate 92  
*Juche* 258, 264, 268  
 Justice and Development Party (Turkey) 18
- Kadro* group 118  
 Kaganovich, Lazar 92  
 Kalinin, Mikhail 92, 100  
 Kaluga 100  
 Kamenev, Lev 85  
 Kang Ban-sök 261–62  
 Kang Youwei 6  
*Das Kapital* 260  
 Kardelj, Edvard 186, 197, 296, 301, 307, 309, 310n5  
 Karlín 319  
 Karpat, Kemal 108  
 Katō Hiroyuki 31  
*Kauchuk* Factory 95, 100  
 Kautsky, Karl 66  
 KCIA see *Korean Central Intelligence Agency*  
 Kemalism 107–10, 112, 115, 118, 120, 122 see also *Atatürk*, *Mustafa Kemal (Pasha)*  
 Kennedy, John F. 289, 291  
 Keynes, John Maynard 47  
 Khamovniki District (Party Conference) 94–95, 98  
 Khan, Amanullah 120  
 Kharitonov, Mikhail 101  
 Khorezm People's Soviet Republic 180  
 Khural 201, 215n17  
 Kim Hyöng-jik 262  
 Kim Hyöng-uk 286  
 Kim Il-sung 15, 190, 252, 254–55, 257–58, 260–63, 265, 267n46  
 Kim Jong-il 257, 262–63  
 Kim Jong-pil 270, 272–73, 276, 279–81, 285–88, 290–91, 291n1  
 Kim Jong-suk 257–58, 262  
 Kim Ok-sun 254  
 Kim Song-ae 258  
 Kim Tong-ha 289  
 Kim Tu-bong 190  
 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 297  
 Kirin see *Jilin*
- Kita Ikki* 167  
 KMT see *Kuomintang*  
 Kobetskii, Mikhail 69  
 Koenen, Wilhelm 72  
 Kojima Seiichi 167, 172  
*kokun* 166  
*kokumin* 159–60, 163  
*kokutai* 172  
 Komsomol 100  
 Konoe Fumimaro 151, 153, 155, 157, 167, 173  
 Koo, Wellington 50  
 Kopecký, Václav 323  
 Korea 2, 190–91, 205, 257, 259, 262, 270, 272, 291n1 see also *Korea (Colonial)*; *Korea (North)*; *Korea (South)*  
*Korea (Colonial)* 272  
*Korea (North)* 2, 13, 15, 178, 184–85, 190, 197, 202, 207, 251–53, 255–57, 259, 263–64, 265n2, 266n21, 267n35, 287  
*Korea (South)* 15, 53n3, 190, 259, 270, 276, 280, 284, 292n2; *army* 273  
*Korea Military Academy (KMA)* 271–72  
*Korean Central Intelligence Agency* 276–77, 282, 285–86, 289, 291  
*Korean Communist Party* 183  
*Korean People's Army* 255  
*Korean War* 205, 253, 257, 272  
 Kosior, Vladimir 92  
 Košice 310n3, 321–22  
 Krasnopresnensky District Conference 97–98  
 Kreibich, Karl 318  
 Kremlin 19  
*Krest'ianka* (magazine) 256  
*Krest'ianskaia gazeta* ("The Peasant Newspaper") 86  
 Krupp 27  
 Krupskaya, Nadezhda 263  
*Kung-yen pao* see *Fair Comment*  
*Kuomintang* 5, 8, 11, 15, 17, 27, 29, 31, 33–34, 36–38, 42, 49, 52, 54n14, 54n21, 118–9, 121, 127–46, 147n3–n5, 148n20–n21, 148n23, 148n29, 149n31, 149n39, 149n42, 149n44, 194; 1st Party Congress 131; 3rd Party Congress 133, 137, 142, 146, 149n31; 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress 132; *Constitution Discussion Committee* 54n21; *Party flag* 131 see also *Central Executive Committee*

- Kurds 112, 114–15, 118, 123n9  
 Kučan, Milan 305  
*Kyōwakai* *see* Concordia Association  
*Kyunghyang Shinmun* 279, 293n29
- Labor Law (North Korea) 251, 266n6  
 Labor and Socialist International 10,  
 60–61, 68, 71–72, 74–78, 79–81  
 Labor Party (Great Britain) 77, 155, 287  
 Lao People's Revolutionary Party 17  
 Laos 1  
*Last Will and Testament (zongli yishu)* 133  
 Latin America 6, 17  
 Latvia 184  
 Lausanne Treaty 123n9  
 Law against the Foundation of New  
 Parties (Nazi Germany) 12  
 Law on Fundamental Organization  
 (Turkey) 111  
 Law on Sex Equality 251, 266n6  
 Le Bon, Gustave 110  
 League of Communists (Slovenia,  
 Croatia, Serbia, etc.) 303–04; Central  
 Committees 302; Slovenia 310n1;  
 Central Committee (Slovenia) 304  
 League of Communists of Yugoslavia  
 13, 16, 186, 296–7, 299, 303, 305, 309;  
 Central Committee 297, 299–300, 302;  
 Ninth Congress 296; Politburo 300  
*see also* Communist Party of  
 Yugoslavia
- Lebedev, Nikolai Georgievich 190  
 Legislation Bureau (China) 39, 42  
 Legislative Sejm 192–93, 196–97,  
 199–201  
 Legislative Yuan 138  
 Leninism 27, 49, 299  
*see also* Marxism–Leninism  
 Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich 5, 9–10, 13, 51,  
 66–67, 73, 85, 88, 91, 98, 100, 155, 207,  
 210, 250, 259, 261, 263, 302  
 Leningrad 100 *see also* Petrograd  
 Levi, Paul 68  
 Lhasa 40  
 Li Chuli 233  
 Li Dazhao 131  
 Li Guojie 47  
 Li Hongzhang 28  
*L'Impartial (Dagongbao; Ta-kung Pao)*  
 32, 36–37, 52n2, 53n9, 53n12  
 Li Shengduo 47  
 Li Sihao 45, 52  
 Li Yuanhong 32
- Liang Guobin 233  
 Liang Hongzhi 47  
 Liang Qichao 4, 6, 29, 31, 33–42, 47,  
 50–51  
 Liang Shiyi 28, 44  
*Liangshe* *see* Society of the Good  
 Liberal Democratic Party 285  
 Liberal Party 279  
 liberalism 32, 90, 110, 113, 159, 162,  
 167–69, 171–72, 305; economic  
 liberalism 37; Great Power liberalism  
 78, 80; New Liberalism 155–56  
 Liberec 318  
 Liberia 6  
 Life Improvement Movement 277  
 Lin Baishui 32  
 Linz, Juan 28  
 List, Friedrich 41; Listianism 27  
 Lithuania 184  
 Liu Enge 47  
 Liu Lantao 233  
 Liu Shaoqi 193, 227, 237  
 Ljubljana 297  
 London 5, 147n5, 321  
 Longuet, Jean 81n1  
 LSI *see* Labor and Socialist  
 International  
 Lu Dingyi 233  
 Lu Rongting 33  
 Lu Zongyu 45  
 Luo Ruiqing 233  
 Luxemburg, Rosa 66, 88
- Ma Rui 132, 138  
 Macedonia 198, 296, 298, 300, 309  
 Mahāyāna 171  
 Malenkov, Georgii  
 Maksimilianovich 211  
 Manchus 27, 38, 40, 141, 148n21  
 Manchukuo 143, 173–74, 272, 279  
 Manchuria 30, 172–73, 184, 193  
 Manchurian Incident 166  
 Mandarin literati 8, 37  
 Mangyongdae 262  
 Manoilescu, Mihail 53n8  
 Mao Zedong 56n43, 132, 134, 139, 141,  
 145, 148n23–24, 149n41, 193, 207,  
 211, 224–26, 228–32, 236, 251, 263  
 Maoism 147n13  
 Marco Polo Bridge 136  
 Martial Law 17, 271, 274, 289  
 Maruyama Tsurukichi 155  
 Marx, Jenny 260, 267n35

- Marx, Karl 64–65, 71, 81n1, 89, 250, 259–60, 267n35, 270
- Marxism 5, 9, 15, 40, 46, 99, 115, 120, 204, 251–52, 264
- Marxism–Leninism 15, 187, 250, 252–53, 269, 264 *see also* Leninism
- Masaryk, Tomáš 320, 323
- Mass Movement Work Teams 226–27
- Matsui Iwane 154, 167
- May 16 Coup 271–72, 277, 286
- May Fourth Movement 30
- meibōka* (Japanese local leaders) 43, 157
- Meiji 3, 36, 151–52, 158, 165–66, 170, 173, 281 *see also* Constitution of Japan
- Menotti Serrati, Giacinto 74
- Mensheviks 5, 96
- Meso-America 291
- Metropolitan Police 44–45
- Mexico 6, 118, 120, 291
- Meyer, Ernst 69
- Michael I 187
- Middle East 37
- Mikulić, Branko 304
- militarism 3, 12, 66, 272
- Military Revolution Committee 271, 274–75
- Milošević, Slobodan 310
- Minbao* 136, 147n9, 148n19
- Minc, Hilary 208
- Ministry of Finance (South Korea) 278
- Ministry of Public Security (China) 233
- Minjok Ilbo* 274
- Minxian julebu see* Anfu Club
- Minyoushe see* People’s Friends Society
- Minzhi shuju* 128, 140–41, 147n10
- Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré 53n3
- Mochou Road 136
- Modernization Association (Vietnam) 6
- Molotov, Viacheslav 86
- monarchical restoration 32
- monarchism 37; constitutional monarchism 6, 29, 31, 41, 47
- Mongolia 1, 13, 40, 141, 143, 178–79, 181, 184, 186, 194–96, 199, 201–03, 207–08, 214n13, 215n17
- Mongolian People’s Party 17
- Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 184
- Mons *see* École des Mines de Mons
- Montenegro 296, 310
- Month of Friendship 212
- moralité civique* 112
- Morocco 77, 82n28
- Moscow 62, 67–69, 73, 88–95, 97–98, 117, 178, 180, 184–86, 189–93, 208–10, 213, 319–21, 323
- Moscow Committee (RCP) 93, 95, 100 *see also* Communist Party (Russia)
- Moscow Institute of National Economy 89
- Moscow Military District 93, 102n8
- Moscow Provincial Conference 96–98
- Moscow State Tram Depot 88
- Moscow Trials 316
- “Mother of all” *see* Kang Ban-sōk
- “Mother of Korea” *see* Kang Ban-sōk
- Mourning Records (Aisilu)* 140
- Mukden Incident 138
- Mun Hong-ju 274
- Munich Agreement 320
- Muranov, Matvei 99
- Muslim League 118
- Muslims 38, 40, 110–11, 119–20, 123n9
- Mussolini, Benito 115
- Nagano 154, 168
- Nagata Tetsuzan 153
- Nakahara Kinji 154, 168
- Nakatani Takeyo 154, 167–68
- Namba Daisuke 162
- Nanjing 128–30, 132–37, 140–41, 145, 148n23, 148n27, 235; Decade 128–29, 137, 139, 143, 145, 148n29; Rape of 136
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel 118, 120, 280–81
- nation-building 11, 19n1, 111, 118, 121, 128, 145 *see also* state-building
- National Assembly (Bulgaria) 187
- National Assembly (China) 133, 142–43
- National Assembly (Czechoslovakia) 199–200, 322–23, 325–28
- National Assembly (Romania) 187–89, 201, 206, 208
- National Assembly (South Korea) 282, 288, 290
- National Congress of Mothers 260
- National Council (Slovakia) 199, 329
- National Defence Cabinet (China) 33–34, 54n14
- National Democratic Bloc (Romania) 187
- National Fascist Party (PNF) 12
- National Federation of Industrial Guilds (Japan) 152
- National Front (Czechoslovakia) 18, 189–90, 322–26, 328

- National Front Act 328  
 “national holism” 168  
 National Library (China) 53n2  
 National New Life Movement (South Korea) 276  
 National People’s Congress (PRC) 193–94, 199–201, 255; Standing Committee 200  
 National Reconstruction Movement (South Korea) 276–78  
*National Revolution Propaganda Collections (Guomin geming xuanchuan ji)* 141  
 National Revolutionary Army (China) 131, 140, 149n36  
 National Revolutionary Party (Mexico) 291  
*National Salvation Declaration (Jiuguo yundong xuanyan)* 143  
 National Socialism 109, 172  
 National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) 12, 124n17  
 National Union (Portugal) 12  
 nationalism 3, 11–13, 16, 108, 110–12, 119, 159–60, 166, 171–72, 260, 323  
 Nazarov 86, 96  
 Nazism 11–12, 113, 116, 124n17, 208, 276, 321–23 *see also* National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP)  
 Nehru, Jawaharlal 118  
 Nemtsov, Nikolai 95  
 Netherlands 75  
 New Bureaucrats (Japan) 158  
 New Communications Clique (NCC) 42, 44–45  
 New Economic Policy (NEP) 85  
 New International 60, 65, 67–68, 74, 76 *see also* Second International  
 New Order Movement (Japan) 151, 154, 167 Declaration 174  
*New People’s Daily* 47  
 New Politics Party (South Korea) 289  
 New Village Movement (South Korea) 277  
 Ni Sichong 43  
 Nishihara, Kamezō 30, 33  
 Nogi Maresuke 173  
 Non-Turkish ethnic identities 112  
*Nongmin yundong xuanchuan dagang see Propaganda Outline for the Workers’ Movement*  
 North Korea *see* Korea (North)  
 North Sea Fleet 28  
 Northern Expedition 132, 140  
 Nosek, Václav 324  
 Novotný, Antonín 208, 327–28  
 NSDAP *see* National Socialist German Workers’ Party  
 Nyōngbyōn 256  
 October Revolution *see* Russian Revolution  
 Okada cabinet 161  
 Ōkuma Shigenobu 36, 173  
 Old Communications Clique (OCC) 42, 44–45  
 one-party regimes 1, 2, 6, 11, 13, 17, 191 *see also* single-party regimes  
 opposition 7, 18, 40, 67, 75, 77, 85–102, 107, 111, 115–17, 119, 121, 138, 142, 147n12, 151, 165, 168, 175, 185–87, 189, 192, 210, 289, 297–98, 322–23  
 organicism 7–8, 26, 31–32  
 Organizational-Political Council (Yugoslavia) 300  
 Ottoman Empire 1, 5–8, 19, 109–10, 112, 123n8, 175  
 Ottomanism 7, 112, 122  
*Our Nation’s Future Path: An Ideology of Social Reconstruction* 280, 283  
 Overseas Chinese Caucus 40  
 Ōzaki Yukio 53n7  
 Pak Chong-ae 255  
 Pakistan 118, 280–81  
 Pan-Asianism 6, 154, 167  
 Pan-Islam 109, 112  
 Panama 48  
 Panchen Lama 40  
 Pan-Slavic 323  
 Paris 65–66, 75  
 Paris Commune Factory 92  
 Park Chung-hee 15, 53n3, 270, 272–73, 278–79, 286, 288, 290, 291n1  
 Park Sang-hŭi 272  
 Parliament Organisation Act Amendment Bill (China) 38, 41  
 parliamentarianism 9, 10, 86–8, 95, 159, 170–71  
 Parliamentary Standing Committee (Czechoslovakia) 321  
 Party Committee and Government *see* Mass Movement Work Teams  
 Party Purification Movement (China) 132, 141–42, 146  
 Party of Labor (Albania) 186, 203–05

- Pauker, Ana 208  
 Paxton, Robert O. 37  
 Peasant Associations (China) 226–27  
 pedagogical state 11, 118, 128, 136,  
 138–39, 145–46, 147n6, 158, 174, 264  
 Peiyang *see* Beiyang  
 Peking *see* Beijing  
 Peking University 45  
 People's Assembly (Albania) 207  
 People's Assembly (Bulgaria) 210  
 People's Assembly (Far Eastern  
 Republic) 181  
 People's Assembly (North Korea) 190,  
 207, 255  
 People's Assembly (Ukraine) 180  
 People's Assembly (USSR) 180–81  
 People's Assembly (Yugoslavia)  
 199–200, 207  
 People's Chamber (Germany) 199–200  
 People's Commissariat of War  
 (Hungary) 72  
 People's Commissariat of Finance  
 (Russia) 101  
 people's democracy 179–80, 183–84, 189,  
 195, 203–04, 207, 213, 214n3, 256,  
 310n3; people's democratic  
 dictatorship 193  
 People's Friends Society (China) 33  
 People's Front 185, 298, 310n3, 311n10  
 People's Houses (*halkevleri*) 116–17,  
 123n15  
 People's Militias (Czechoslovakia) 324  
 People's Party (Poland) 192  
 People's Party (South Korean) 289  
 People's Party (Turkey) *see* Republican  
 People's Party (CHP)  
 People's Republic of China 18, 34, 52,  
 129, 137, 147n6, 193, 214n3, 227, 231,  
 253, 255, 264–65, 281, 288  
 People's Republic of Poland 214n1  
*see also* Republic of Poland  
 People's Republic of Tannu-Tuva 180  
 People's Rooms (*halkodaları*) 116–17  
 People's Supreme Assembly (North  
 Korea) 258  
 Perestroika 16, 330  
 Peron, Juan 118  
 Persia 3  
 Peru 41  
 Pétain, Philippe 37  
 Petrograd 9, 68, 90, 99, 180  
*see also* Leningrad  
 Phan Bội Châu 6  
 Phan Châu Trinh 6  
 Piatakov, Georgii 88  
 Pieck, Wilhelm 206, 208  
 Pijade, Moša 186  
 Pinochet, Augusto 291  
 Planinc, Milka 307  
 Plekhanov, Georgii Valentinovich 5  
 pluralism 28, 30, 32, 35–37, 50–51,  
 109–10, 160  
 PNF *see* National Fascist Party  
 Pogány, József 72  
 Polak, Karl 192  
 Poland 1, 13, 69, 178, 184–85, 192,  
 195–96, 200–03, 206, 208, 210, 214n1  
 Political Information Society  
 (*Zhengwenshe*) 6  
 Political Parties Act (South Korea)  
 284–85, 288  
 Political Science Society (*Zhengxuehui*)  
 33–34, 54n14  
 Ponce, Mariano 6  
 Popular Constitutional Club *see* Anfu  
 Club  
 Popular Democratic Front 188  
 Popular Front (Spain) 183–84  
 Popular Movement of the Revolution  
 53n3  
 populism 36, 113, 119–20, 122  
 Porfirio Díaz 6  
 Portugal 12, 16, 66  
 Posadchik Factory 92  
 Potrč, Miran 303–04  
 Prague Castle 25  
 Prague Spring 14–15, 328–30  
 Prague 189, 209, 319, 324–25  
*Pravda* (“Truth”) 52n2, 88, 90, 95–96, 99  
 PRC *see* People's Republic of China  
 Prefectural Party Committee 237  
 Premier of the State Council 46  
 Preobrazhenskii, Evgenii 90–92, 95–97  
 Presidential Funeral Preparation  
 Office 140  
 Presidential Palace 32  
 Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  
 182, 199  
 Press Act (Czechoslovakia) 328  
 Progressive–Anfu System 8, 26, 32,  
 37–38  
 Progressive Party 8, 26, 29, 32–35, 37,  
 42, 44, 53n5, 54n14 *see also* Research  
 Clique  
 Progressive Republican Party 116  
 proletarian dictatorship 9, 191, 193

- Propaganda Outline for the Peasant Movement (Gongren yundong xuanchuan dagang)* 141
- Propaganda Outline for the Workers' Movement (Nongmin yundong xuanchuan dagang)* 141
- Propaganda state 11, 129, 132, 145
- Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* 129 *see also* Ellul, Jacques
- Protecting the Party & Saving the Nation (Hudang jiuguo zhi wenshu)* 141
- Provincial Assemblies (China) 42, 49; Jiangsu 133
- Provincial Committee (CCP); Hebei 232; Jiangsu 235; Shanxi 233
- Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) 7, 32
- Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1931) 12, 118–19
- Provisional Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic 188
- Provisional President (Republic of China) 28
- Provisional Senate 29, 36–39, 42; Committee of the Whole 42
- Prussia 40
- PSR *see* Socialist Revolutionary Party
- Publications Law (Republic of China) 135
- Purification Act (Act on the Purification of Political Activities) 279, 281, 284, 286–288, 291
- Pusan 284
- Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich 18
- Puyi 8, 28–29, 34, 37, 173
- Pyeongyang 190, 254
- Qian Ying 233
- Qing Empire 1, 3–8, 19, 31, 45, 47, 127–28, 146n1, 148n19, 175; army 45
- Qinhuai District 136
- Rabotnitsa* (magazine) 256
- Radek, Karl 69, 87
- radicalism 37, 39, 272
- Rákosi, Mátyás 190–91, 207, 209–10, 212
- Rathenau, Walther 36
- RCP (b) *see* Communist Party (Russia)
- Reconstruction Comrade Group 286–87
- Recreation Club (China) 54n14
- Rectification Movement 228, 230
- Red Army (China) 226, 228–29; (Soviet Union) 184, 318
- Red Terror (1917) 5
- Red Trade Union International 75
- Reed, John 69
- Reform Club 53n7
- Reichenbach, Bernhard 72
- Reichenberg *see* Liberec
- Reichstag 40
- representative democracy 168
- Republic of China 6–7, 15, 26, 50, 127, 131, 144, 193, 195, 197, 199; 1912 Parliament 29, 36; 1912 Senate 38; Senate Review Committee 39
- Republic of Korea *see* Korea (South)
- Republic of Poland 196, 199, 200–1, 214 *see also* People's Republic of Poland
- Republican Club *see* Anfu Club
- Republican People's Party (CHP) 11, 107–22, 123n1, 123n3, 123n6–8, 123n14–15, 123n17; Second Congress 123n6
- republicanism 11, 29, 46, 108, 110, 112, 271
- Research Clique 29, 42–44
- Resolution against War and Militarism 66
- Resources Bureau (Japanese Army) 161
- Restoration Association (Vietnam) 6
- Revolution of 1911 (China) 28, 37
- Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmenghui*) 5–6, 8, 136, 148n19
- Revolutionary Army (Geming jun)* 136
- Revolutionary Cabinet (South Korea) 274
- Revolutionary Government (South Korea) 278
- Revolutionary Pledges (South Korea) 271, 273–75, 283, 286–87
- Reza Shah 120
- Rhee Syngman 271, 275, 278–79, 280
- Riazanov, David 87
- Ribarič, Miha 303–04
- Rif War 77
- ROC *see* Republic of China
- Rodong Sinmun* 254, 257, 259
- Rogozhsko-Simonovsky district 97–98
- Rokossovskii, Konstantin Konstantinovich 192
- Romanenko, Andrei Alekseevich 190
- Romania 1, 13, 53n8, 178, 184–85, 187–89, 195–98, 201–04, 206–11, 213, 214n16; People's Republic 187–88
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 110
- Roy, M. N. 72



- RSDLP *see* Russian Social Democratic Labor Party
- Ruan Xingcun 49
- Rudnyánszky, Endre 69
- Ruijin 228
- Russia 1–6, 9, 18–19, 68–70, 72–73, 75, 80, 91, 93, 102n1, 175, 178–80, 210, 250, 267n35, 318; Russian Empire 5, 9 *see also* Soviet Russia
- Russian Civil War (1918–1922) 9
- Russian Revolution 3, 68–69, 80, 250, 264; Revolution of 1905–1907 3; February Revolution 37; October Revolution 60, 85, 181, 203, 218
- Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) 5
- Rykov, Alexei 86
- Sadchikov, Ivan Vasil'evich 186, 196–97
- Saenara Automobiles 288
- Sai Jinhua 47
- Sanmin zhuyi see* Three Principles of the People
- Sanminbao see* Three People's Newspaper
- Sapronov, Timofei 87, 90–92, 95–98
- Sasangye* (magazine) 285
- Schwab, Alexander 71, 82n11
- Second International 6, 10, 61, 65–68, 71, 74, 81n1 *see also* New International
- Second Republic (South Korea) 281, 283
- Second World War 13, 15–16, 42, 81, 119, 155, 162, 178–79, 181, 253, 293, 299, 331
- secret police 184–85, 191–92, 210, 331
- Sein min choong bou* 4
- Šejna, Jan 327
- Senate (Ireland) 38, 42
- Seoul 271, 284, 290
- Serbia 296, 298, 300, 303, 310
- Serebriakov 94
- Seth, James 156
- Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government 230
- Shaanxi 229
- Shanghai 6, 45, 127–32, 134–36, 139–43, 145, 147n4, 147n10, 194
- Shangwu yinshuguan *see* Commercial Press
- Shanxi 226, 233, 236
- Shao Cong'en 54n24
- Shao Yuanchong 138
- Shchetinin, Boris Vasil'evich 190
- Shimonaka Yasaburō 154, 172
- Shin Nihon Dōmei see* Alliance for a New Japan
- Shinsei* 156, 158, 160–65
- Shinsei Club 53n7
- Shtykov, Terentii Fomich 190
- Shuntian Shibao* 52n2
- Shōwa Restoration 167
- Siberia 91, 100
- Sichuan 134, 148n27
- single-party regimes 1–2, 4, 11, 17, 19, 35, 86, 107, 121–22, 175 *see also* one-party regimes
- Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) 28, 134, 136, 148n27, 225–28, 241, 257, 261
- Sino-Soviet split 179, 237
- Sixteenth Printing House 92
- Skvortsov-Stepanov, Ivan 95
- Slavic peoples 197–198, 203, 325
- Slovak Soviet Republic 320
- Slovakia 189, 198–99, 203, 320–25, 328–29, 332
- Slovenia 16, 296–301, 303–09, 310n1, 310n13
- Slovenian Assembly 301, 303–04, 309
- Slovenian Public Opinion 305
- Slánský, Rudolf 189, 323, 332n3
- Small Bureau 68–70
- Small Khural *see* Khural
- Šmeral, Bohumír 318
- Smirnov, Ivan 92, 94
- Smirnov, Vladimir 88
- Sneevliet, Henk 132
- Social Democratic Party (Czechoslovakia) 317–18
- Social Democratic Party (Germany) 191
- Social Democratic Party (Romania) 188
- Social Democrats 5, 41, 191, 318–19
- Social Labor Party 287
- Social Masses Party 151, 153
- social organicism *see* organicism
- Social and Health Council (Yugoslavia) 300
- Socialist Commonwealth 75
- Socialist Education Movement 224, 237–41
- Socialist Party (Italy) 74
- Socialist Party (Poland) 192
- Socialist Party (Serbia) 310
- Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR) 5, 9
- Socialist Unity Party of Germany 18, 191

- Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia 298, 303
- Society of the Good (*Liangshe*) 49
- Socio-Political Chamber 301
- Sokol 326
- Sokolniki 92
- Song Jiaoren 8
- Song Yo-ch'an 287
- Sormovo plants 100
- Sosnovskii, Lev 92
- South America 291
- South Hwanghae 259
- South Korea *see* Korea (South)
- Southeastern Europe 310n3
- Soviet Empire 13, 178–81, 207, 211, 213, 311n14
- Soviet government 9, 74–77, 100, 204, 213, 226
- Soviet legislative elections of 1937 12
- Soviet Occupation Zone 191
- Soviet Occupational Administration 252
- Soviet Russia 62, 67–68, 85, 129, 181, 253
- Soviet Union 1, 2, 9, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19n1, 43, 62, 77, 85, 107–08, 113, 116, 119, 120, 162, 173, 178–187, 192, 195–97, 200, 203–04, 207–08, 211–3, 237, 249–250, 251, 253, 256, 259, 263–4, 265, 266n12, 266n21, 316, 320–21 *see also* Soviet Russia
- Soviet Union* (magazine) 179
- Soviet of Nationalities 182  
*see also* Supreme Soviet
- Soviet of the Union 182  
*see also* Supreme Soviet
- Soviet–Hungarian Economic Agreement 191
- Soviet–Yugoslav split* 179, 185–6
- Sovetskii Soiuz see Soviet Union (magazine)*
- Spain 11, 16, 31, 41, 77, 183
- Spanish Civil War 183–84
- Spartakiads 326
- Spirit of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi hun)* 136
- “Spring Festival Commemorative Issues” (*Chunjie jiniankan*) 137
- SPS *see* Socialist Party (Serbia)
- SSSR *na stroike see USSR in Construction*
- stage theory of history 132; military stage 133; tutelage stage 12, 133, 135, 145–46; constitutional stage 133
- Stalin Constitution *see* Constitution of the USSR (1936)
- Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich 12, 85–86, 88–89, 115, 119, 178, 182–84, 187–91, 193, 196, 204, 207–11, 213, 263, 325
- State Alcohol *see* *Gossnirt*
- state capitalism 26
- state corporatism 26, 30–31, 33, 51
- State Council 32–34, 36, 39, 46, 54n14, 192, 200–01, 235
- State Duma 3, 5, 18–19
- State Planning Committee 254
- state socialism 27, 30, 47
- state-building 2, 11, 13, 15, 26–7, 107, 129–30, 133, 137, 139–40, 145, 197, 204, 209 *see also* nation-building
- “Statement of the Forty-Six” 92
- The State, The Revolution, and I* 280
- statism 29, 31, 34, 37, 46, 122, 127, 139, 146, 155–56, 165, 171
- Steinhardt, Karl 70
- Stuttgart 66
- Sudetenland 318
- Suharto 31
- Sukarno 31, 118, 281
- Sultan 111
- Sun Ke 133
- Sun Runyu 53n10
- Sun Yat-sen 6, 11, 27, 28–30, 118, 128, 130, 132–33, 136, 138–39, 140–41, 143, 114–16, 148n18, 148n30, 207, 281
- Sun Zengda 43
- Supreme Council Review* 281, 288
- Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) 275–79, 281–83, 285–88
- Supreme National Assembly (North Korea) 201 *see also* Supreme People's Assembly (North Korea)
- Supreme National Council (Hungary) 191
- Supreme People's Assembly (North Korea) 190, 207, 255 *see also* Supreme National Assembly (North Korea)
- Supreme Soviet 182, 187, 199, 212
- Suslov, Mikhail Andreevich 191
- Switzerland 31, 53n10
- Syria 120
- Szabó, Imre 191
- Sükhbaatar, Damdiny 207
- Ta-Kung Pao see L'Impartial*
- Taborsky, Edward 190

- Taishō era 162  
 Taiwan 15, 17, 129  
 Taizhou 49  
 Takahashi Kamekichi 167  
 Tan Yankai 133  
 Tangshan 237–38, 240  
 Taoyuan 237, 239–40  
 Tazawa Yoshiharu 153, 155–7, 159, 161, 164–65  
 Ten-Person Group (Jiangsu) 235  
   *see also* Central Ten-Person Small Group  
 Ter-Vaganian, Vagarshak 92  
 Terauchi, Masatake 30, 33, 36  
 Tereshkova, Valentina 265  
*The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection* 40  
*Theory of Gold and Iron (Jintie zhuyi shuo)* 53n9  
 “Theses on the Main Tasks of the Communist International” 67–68  
 Third International 67–68, 71, 79–80  
 Third Republic (France) 46, 110, 112; Constitutional Laws 32  
 Third Republic Constitution (Korea) 276, 281–83  
 third wave of democratization 16  
 Third World 26  
*Three People’s Newspaper (Sanminbao)* 141  
 Three Principles of the People (*Sanmin zhuyi*) 119, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 146, 148n20  
 Three-Person Groups 229–30, 235  
 Three-Year Plan (South Korea) 278  
 Tian Jiaying 193  
 Tian Yinghuang 45, 47  
 Tianjin 29, 34, 37, 47–48, 135  
 Tibet 141  
 Tiefeng chubanshe 129  
 Tientsin *see* Tianjin  
 Tientsin Council for the Upholding of National Rights and Territory 48  
 Ting, Lee-Hsia Su 129  
 Tito, Josip Broz 185, 297, 300, 307  
 Tocqueville effect 17  
 Tōge Minoru 161  
 Tokutomi Sohō 173  
 Tokyo 5, 45, 148n19, 173  
 Tokyo Imperial University 54n24  
 Tomsk Regional Party Committee 101  
*Tongmenghui* *see* Revolutionary Alliance  
*Tongyi jiuguo lilun gangling* *see* Unified National Salvation Theory and Program  
 Toranomom Incident 162  
 “Toward the People” (*halka dođru*) campaign 123n11  
 Trainin, Il’ia Pavlovich 187  
 transnationalism 62–63  
   *see also* internationalism  
 Triumvirate (“Troika”) 85, 90  
 Troelstra, Pieter 76  
 Trotskii, Lev 71–73, 78, 85, 87–88, 91, 99  
 Trud i Tvorchestvo Plant 100  
 True Whig Party 6  
 Tsukui Tatsuo 154, 170  
 Tuan Ch’i-jui *see* Duan Qirui  
*tuchun* 33–34  
 Tunisia 118, 120  
 Turkestan 72  
 Turkey 2, 7, 11, 18, 107–09, 110–22, 123n3, 123n7, 123n9, 123n14, 124n17, 281; as a model 108, 120  
 Turkish Hearths (*Türk ocakları*) 116  
 Turkish History Thesis 119, 123n12  
 Turkish Revolution 120, 123n6  
 Turkish Teacher’s Union 116  
 Turkish War of Independence 107  
 Turkish Women’s Union 116  
 Turkism 111–12, 115  
 Turnaođlu, Banu 7, 111, 123n7  
 tutelage *see* stage theory of history  
 Tutelage Constitution *see* Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1931)  
 Tuvan People’s Revolutionary Party 184  
*Türk ocakları* *see* Turkish Hearths  
 Twenty-One Demands for China 36  
 Two-and-a Half International 71  
 two-party system 35, 285, 288  
  
 Ueda Teijirō 155  
 Uighur 141  
 Ukraine 184  
 Ulyanova, Maria 261  
 UN *see* United Nations  
 Unified National Salvation (Movement) 143–44, 149n42  
 Unified National Salvation Theory and Program (*Tongyi jiuguo lilun gangling*) 143  
 Union and Progress Party 310  
   *see also* Committee for Union and Progress

- United Front (China) 131–32, 137,  
 143, 193  
 United Nations 63, 81, 271, 274; Charter  
 272; Security Council 187  
 United Russia 18  
 United Workers' Party (Poland) 192  
 United States 39, 64, 71–72, 77–78,  
 270–74, 278–79, 282, 289, 291  
 Ural Bureau of the Central  
 Committee 101  
 USA *see* United States  
 USSR *see* Soviet Union  
*USSR in Construction (SSSR na  
 stroike)* 179
- Vandervelde, Émile 6  
 VKP (b) *see* Bolsheviks  
 Vargas, Getúlio 118  
 Vasileostrovsky District Committee 100  
 Versailles Peace Treaty 60, 75–76  
 Vichy 37  
 Vienna Union 74–75  
 Vietnam 2, 6, 17  
 Vladislav Hall 325  
 vocational corporations 41  
 Voskresensk District Party  
 Conference 96  
 Vukovar 298  
 Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuar'evich 187–88
- WPK *see* Workers' Party (North Korea)  
 WWI *see* First World War  
 WWII *see* Second World War  
 Walkerhill Hotel 288  
 Wang Guangmei 237  
 Wang Jingwei 36, 131–32  
 Wang Ming 183  
 Wang Shizhen 34, 39  
 Wang Yinchuan 45, 47  
 Wang Yitang 47  
 Wang Zhilong 47, 52n2  
 War Bill (Republic of China) 34  
 War Participation Supervisory Office  
 (*Duban canzhan shiwuchu*) 30  
 Warlord Era 26, 131  
 Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty  
 Organization) 14, 179, 231, 328  
 Waseda University 39, 45, 47, 168  
 Washington 298  
 Wei Sijiong 47  
 Weimar 276  
 Wenceslas Square 324  
*Wenhuaqie* 127, 147n2, 147n10
- Wenzhou 49  
 West 2, 46, 50–51, 86, 110, 115, 119–20,  
 192, 251, 328  
 West Germany *see* Germany (West)  
 Western Europe 2, 11, 64, 72, 110, 119,  
 191, 280, 296, 320  
 Whampoa Military Academy 131  
 White House 278  
 White Terror 132  
 White, Theodore 130, 146  
 Wilson, Woodrow 32  
 Women's International Democratic  
 Federation 259  
 workers' democracy 10, 85–86, 88, 90,  
 93–94  
 Workers' Party (Bulgaria) 187  
 Workers' Party (North Korea) 15, 190,  
 204, 207, 251–65, 265n2, 287; Central  
 Committee 254–55, 258–59  
 Workers' Party (Poland) 184, 192  
 Workers' Party (Romania) 188, 204  
 Worker's Party (South Korea) 272  
 World Exposition 48  
 World War *see* First World War; Second  
 World War II  
 Wu Bingxiang 45  
 Wu Dingchang 45  
 Wu Zesheng 47  
 Wu Zonglian 43  
 Wuhan 134
- Xi Jinping 17  
 Xi'an Incident 143  
*Xianyouhui* *see* Association of Friends of  
 Constitutionalism  
 Xiao Hua 233  
*Xiehehui* *see* Concordia Association  
*Xinminbao* *see* *New People's Daily*  
 Xu Shichang 28, 30  
 Xu Shuzheng 27–29, 43, 45, 52n2, 53n7  
*Xuanchuanbu* *see* Department of  
 Propaganda *see also* *Gaiyao*  
*Xunzheng dagang cao'an* *see* *Draft  
 Outline of the Tutelage Stage*
- Yamagata Aritomo 36  
 Yang Du 31, 52, 53n9  
 Yang Qiqing 233  
 Yangzi River 128, 136  
 Yao Guozhen 45  
 Yao Zhen 45  
 Yaroslavl 100  
 Yasuoka Masahiro 157–58

- Ye Chucang 133–35, 145  
 Ye Gongchuo 44, 52  
 Yi Sök-che 276  
 Yin Shuxian 134  
*Yiyoushe* *see* Good Friends  
 Yokohama 4  
 Yöm Chöng-ja 256  
 Yö-Sun Incident 272  
 Young China Party 17, 27  
 Young Turk Revolution 3, 6–7, 109, 113  
 Young Turks 36–37, 110, 123n11  
 Yu Chin-o 277, 281  
 Yuan Shikai 26, 28–29, 43, 47, 50  
 Yugoslavia 1–2, 13, 16, 178–79, 184–86,  
 195–99, 200–02, 204, 297, 298–300,  
 302, 304–08, 310n3–4  
 Yun Po-sön 274, 289  
 Yushin *see* Constitution of the ROK  
 (Yushin Constitution)  
 Yuyuan Textiles Mill 47
- ZKS *see* Communist Party (Slovenia)  
 Zachariadis, Nikos 183  
 Zaire 53n3  
 Zamoskvoretsky District 89, 92, 97  
 Zang Yinsong 47  
 Zápotocký, Antonín 208, 211  
 Zeng Yujun 34, 45, 52  
 Zhang Guogan 54n14  
 Zhang Ji 130–31  
 Zhang Shizhao 33, 52, 54n14  
 Zhang Wentian 229, 242n13  
 Zhang Xun 29, 34, 37, 43, 46  
 Zhang Yuanqi 47  
 Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich  
 185, 190  
 Zhejiang 43, 49, 134, 149n31  
 Zhejiang Education Association 43  
*Zhengwenshe* *see* Political Information  
 Society
- Zhengxuehui* *see* Political Science  
 Society  
 Zhengzhong shuju 129  
 Zhili 30  
 Zhili Faction 44  
 Zhong Gengyan 54n24  
 Zhongguo Guomindang  
*see* Kuomintang  
 Zhonghua Books 139  
*Zhongxuanbu* *see* Central Propaganda  
 Department  
*Zhongyang banyuekan* *see* Central Party  
 Biweekly  
*Zhongyang dangshi shiliao bianzuan  
 weiyuanhui* *see* Central Party History  
 Department's Historical Materials  
 Compilation Committee  
*Zhongyang ribao* *see* Central Daily News  
*Zhongyang tongxunshu* *see* Central News  
 Agency  
*Zhongyang zhoubao* 133–35, 137–40,  
 142–43, 145–46, 148n27, 149n43  
 Zhou Enlai 148n23–24, 149n41, 229  
 Zhou Jiying 49  
 Zhou Yang 233  
 Zhu De 226  
 Zhu Yunguang 133, 135  
 Zhu Zishuang 135, 138, 143–45, 148n28  
 Zihlerl, Boris 204  
 Zinov'ev, Grigorii 68  
 Ziya, Gökalp 111  
 Ziya, Mehmet 111  
 ZKJ *see* League of Communists of  
 Yugoslavia  
*Zongli yishu* *see* Last Will and Testament  
 Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich 91,  
 189, 210  
 Zou Rong 136  
 Zunyi 229, 242n13–15