

Critical Heritages of Europe

DIVERSITY OF BELONGING IN EUROPE

PUBLIC SPACES, CONTESTED PLACES, CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS

Edited by
Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos



Diversity of Belonging in Europe

Diversity of Belonging in Europe analyzes conflicting notions of identity and belonging in contemporary Europe. Addressing the creation, negotiation, and (re) use of diverse spaces and places of belonging, the book examines their fascinating complexities in the context of a changing Europe.

Taking an innovative interdisciplinary approach, the volume examines renegotiations of belonging played out through cultural encounters with difference and change, in diverse public spaces and contested places. Highlighting the interconnections between social change and culture, heritage, and memory, the chapters analyze multilayered public spaces and the negotiations over culture and belonging that are connected to them. Through analyses of diverse case studies, the editors and authors draw out the significance of the participation or exclusion of differing community, grassroots, and activist groups in such practices and discourses of belonging in relation to the contemporary emergence of identity conflicts and political uses of the past across Europe. They analyze the ways in which people's sense of belonging is connected to cultural, heritage, and memory practices undertaken in different public spaces, including museums, cultural and community centres, city monuments and built heritage, neglected urban spaces, and online fora.

Diversity of Belonging in Europe provides a valuable contribution to the existing bodies of work on identities, migration, public space, memory, and heritage. The book will be of interest to scholars and students with an interest in contested belonging, public spaces, and the role of culture and heritage.

Susannah Eckersley is Senior Lecturer at Newcastle University, UK, an Associated Research Fellow at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany, and the Project Leader of *en/counter/points* – a collaborative European research project on public spaces and belonging funded by HERA. Her expertise is in memory, museums, difficult heritage, migration, identities, and belonging.

Claske Vos is an anthropologist and Assistant Professor in the Department of European Studies at the Humanities Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her current work focuses on the intersection of EU funding, cultural activism, and enlargement. Her expertise is in European cultural policy, cultural heritage, Southeast Europe, and European identity formation.

Critical Heritages of Europe

Series Editors: Christopher Whitehead and Susannah Eckersley, both at the University of Newcastle, UK

The *Critical Heritages of Europe* series seeks to explore the cultural and social politics of the European past in the present. Bridging theoretical and empirical research, the series accommodates broad understandings of Europe – a shifting and historically mutable entity, made both of internal tensions and exogenous encounters, re-imaginings and influences. 'Heritage' too is taken as an expansive paradigm, made in myriad practices where the past is valorised for the present, from folk traditions to museums and memorials, the management of historic sites and traditions, and everyday matters such as education, political discourse, home life, food consumption and people's relations with place. Consequently, the series spans a broad array of foci, disciplinary approaches and ways of investigating and questioning the diverse meanings of European heritages today.

The following list includes only the most-recent titles to publish within the series. A list of the full catalogue of titles is available at: https://www.routledge.com/Critical-Heritages-of-Europe/book-series/COHERE

Creating and Governing Cultural Heritage in the European Union
The European Heritage Label
Tuuli Lähdesmäki, Viktorija L.A. Čeginskas, Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus, Katja Mäkinen and Johanna Turunen

Islam and Heritage in Europe
Pasts, Presents and Future Possibilities
Edited by Katarzyna Puzon, Sharon Macdonald and Mirjam Shatanawi

Decolonizing Colonial Heritage
New Agendas, Actors and Practices in and beyond Europe
Edited by Britta Timm Knudsen, John Oldfield, Elizabeth Buettner and Elvan Zabunyan

Diversity of Belonging in Europe

Public Spaces, Contested Places, Cultural Encounters

Edited by
Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2023 selection and editorial matter, **Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos**; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of **Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos** to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-032-04238-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-04373-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-19169-8 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Figures

Contributors

Susannah Eckersley, Newcastle University, United Kingdom
Susannah Eckersley is Senior Lecturer at Newcastle University, Associated Research Fellow at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany, and the Project Leader of *en/counter/points* – a collaborative European research project on public spaces and belonging funded by HERA. Her expertise is in memory, museums and difficult heritage; migration, identities and belonging.

David Farrell-Banks, Ulster University, United Kingdom
David Farrell-Banks is a Postdoctoral Research Associate on the Museums, Crisis and Covid-19 project at Ulster University, UK. His work is primarily concerned with uses of the past in heritage and political discourse, with a focus on affect, belonging, cultural memory, and constructions of national and transnational identities.

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, University of Warsaw, Poland
Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Department of Social Anthropology and Ethnic and Migration Studies at the University of Warsaw. Among her recent publications is *The Burden of the Past: History, Memory and Identity in Contemporary Ukraine* (co-edited with A. Wylegała, Indiana University Press 2020).

Francesca Gotti, Politecnico de Milano, Italy
Francesca Gotti is a PhD candidate in Architecture at the Department of Architecture and Urban Studies (DASTU) of Politecnico di Milano, Italy. As a member of the editorial board of ARK magazine, she curates the column on the informal re-appropriations of neglected spaces in the north of Italy. Her practice and research focuses on design for the empowerment of urban communities.

Francesca Lanz, University of Lincoln, United Kingdom
Francesca Lanz is a Senior Lecturer in Interior Architecture and Design at University of Lincoln, UK. Her research develops at the intersection between

museum and heritage studies and architecture and museography. It revolves around the role of the built environment and museums in contemporary societies, with key attention to neglected heritages and stories of sites such as prisons and asylums.

Jacopo Leveratto, Politecnico di Milano, Italy
Jacopo Leveratto is a Senior Lecturer in Interior Architecture at the Department of Architecture and Urban Studies (DASTU) of Politecnico di Milano, Italy. His research is focused on public space design, urban habitability, and the human dimension of planning. He has authored numerous publications in peer-reviewed international journals and edited volumes.

Carmen Levick, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
Carmen Levick is a Senior Lecturer in Theatre at the University of Sheffield, UK. Her research interests include memory and trauma studies, and the politics of commemorating the Holocaust and communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Her current work focuses on public representations of trauma in Romania, Hungary, and Kosovo.

Helen Mears, Royal Museums Greenwich, United Kingdom
Helen Mears was a Research Associate for the Newcastle University-led HERA project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place*. Her research interests are in museums and their intersections with issues of migration and diaspora. Helen is also a museum practitioner and currently holds the position of Head of Curatorship and Research at Royal Museums Greenwich.

Kristin Meißner, Centre for Contemporary History, Germany
Kristin Meißner is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany. Her research interests include urban and global history, conceptual and social history. As Research Associate on the HERA project en/counter/points she researched political and social implications of divergent spatial and temporal framings of belonging in 1990s Berlin.

Achim Saupe, Centre for Contemporary History, Germany
Achim Saupe is Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany. He coordinates the Leibniz-Research Alliance Value of the Past. His research interests are Modern European History, twentieth Century German History, history and theory of historiography, conceptual history, heritage, memory and identity.

Carlotta Scioldo, Polytechnic and University of Turin, Italy
Carlotta Scioldo is PhD Candidate at Polytechnic and University of Turin, Italy working on new modes of governance of european cultural policy. After work experience at the European Commission, EACEA, she joined the European Dancehouse Network as Network Manager and Policy Advisor. She worked extensively as a researcher and consultant in the cultural sector and in coordinating international projects.

Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, University of Warsaw, Poland
Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, PhD, is a sociologist at the Institute of Sociology Warsaw University, Poland specializing in the research of Vietnamese diaspora. In her book "Vietnamese in Poland: From Socialist Fraternity to the Global Capitalism Era," she analysed the legacy of "socialist fraternity" between Poland and Vietnam and its impact on the transnational links maintained by the Vietnamese community.

Johanna Turunen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Johanna Turunen is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Music, Art and Culture Studies, at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. In her PhD, Turunen analysed the EU's cultural heritage policies from the perspective of identity politics and coloniality. She has also published on decolonising museums, heritage diplomacy and activism.

Claske Vos, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Claske Vos is an anthropologist and Assistant Professor at the Department of European Studies at the Humanities Faculty of the University of Amsterdam. Her current work focusses on the intersection of EU funding, cultural activism and enlargement. Her expertise is in European cultural policy, cultural heritage, Southeast Europe and European identity formation.

Joanna Wawrzyniak, University of Warsaw, Poland
Joanna Wawrzyniak is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for Research on Social Memory at the University of Warsaw, Poland. Among her recent publications are Regions of Memory: Transnational Formations (co-edited with S. Lewis, J. Olick, and M. Pakier, Palgrave 2022) and Remembering the Neoliberal Turn (co-edited with V. Pehe, forthcoming with Routledge 2023).

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of both collective effort and individual achievements, based on significant work by many contributors, much of it undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic – not only one of the most challenging global periods of recent times, but also one where the boundaries between the personal and professional, between academic work and family life were completely eroded. We would therefore like firstly to thank our partners and families for their patience and their support, without which this book would not have been possible.

Our gratitude goes to all the authors of this volume for their valuable contributions to the book, as well as for their generosity of time and spirit when participating in the online workshops and peer-partnering process, which we organized to develop the volume as a community.

We are very much indebted to everyone who shared their views, experience, expertise, and knowledge as part of the fieldwork and research conducted for the chapters of this book – this includes museum and heritage professionals, artists, designers and cultural actors, archivists and librarians, urban practitioners and planners, representatives of religious and minority communities and of governments, members of civic initiatives, and the general public.

The idea for this book came out of a collaborative European research project – *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* – funded by HERA (Humanities in the European Research Area) from 2019 to 2022, and led by Susannah Eckersley at Newcastle University. Although not all the contributors to the book were involved in *en/counter/points*, the work that was conducted within this project by the PIs (Susannah Eckersley, Francesca Lanz, Jacopo Leveratto, Achim Saupe, Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, and Claske Vos) and research teams (Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Francesca Gotti, Helen Mears, Kristin Meißner, and Joanna Wawrzyniak) underpins our interdisciplinary approach to belonging, culture, and public space. A special thank you goes to Victoria Barone, who provided *en/counter/points* with administrative, organizational, financial, publicity, and all-round support and enthusiasm throughout the project, and to Bruce Davenport, who helped to prepare the documents, images, and supporting materials for the manuscript submission. We are indebted to HERA for funding our project, which also allows us to make the book fully open access.

Thank you to all the team at Routledge and at Taylor & Francis India – in particular, Heidi Lowther, Emmie Shand, Manas Roy, and Heeranshi Sharma – who supported us wonderfully through the process from proposal to publication.

Finally, we also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of the book for their insightful, constructive, and critical reflections, which gave us important food for thought and encouragement. There is so much more that could (and should) be written about belonging, culture, and public space, and we hope that this volume will act as a spur to take some of the ideas further.

Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos
Newcastle and Amsterdam

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MIUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 769478.

Introduction

Susannah Eckersley and Claske Vos

Belonging – or not belonging – lies at the core of many of the recent "crises" and ongoing processes of change that continue to shape as well as shake up contemporary Europe. New forms of socio-spatial inclusion and exclusion have been both embraced and contested – and always (re)negotiated – as part of ongoing processes of social change, connected to migration and displacement, post-socialism and decolonization, and populism and polarization. Due to these processes, new challenges connected to belonging have emerged. The reinvention, politicization, renewal, and destruction of identities and forms or symbols of collective belonging – often connected to culture, heritage, and memory – are evident in societies across Europe and connected to Europe. Facing these transformative processes in Europe that challenge the diversity of belonging, in this book we aim to provide insights into how they impact on identification with (and alienation from) diverse practices and discourses of belonging, at different scales and from multiple perspectives. We focus on the ways in which renegotiations of belonging have been, and continue to be, played out through cultural encounters with difference and change, in public spaces and contested places.

The objective of the book is to analyze recent historical and contemporary "snapshot" examples of moments, places, events, objects, institutions, and practices where renegotiations of belonging connected to major social, political, historical, or cultural upheaval and change in Europe have been taking place. The book does not aim to provide a comparative overview of each country or region in Europe, nor does it primarily address belonging in Europe through a focus on "top-down" notions of formal belonging to the European Union. Instead, it acts – to continue with the photographic metaphors – as an album collecting the analysis of different, multi-layered encounters, places, and spaces of belonging, addressed through a diversity of theoretical and disciplinary approaches in its chapters, which together argue for a more nuanced understanding of the diversity of belonging *in*, *to*, and *for* Europe.

Diversity is central to the (re)negotiations of belonging discussed in this book. Firstly, the book covers a variety of geographical contexts. It includes chapters on countries often considered the "core of Europe" (Germany and Austria), but also on countries frequently considered to be at the "margins", due to their

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-1

post-socialist legacies (Poland, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia) or due to their recent political developments (United Kingdom). Secondly, diversity is also expressed in the variety of public spaces that are discussed and the range of actors central to the (re)negotiation of belonging. Actors included are communities, cultural organizations, museums, public institutions, urban planners, designers, grassroots movements, heritage sites, and discourses. Furthermore, the book exposes a wide variety of processes instigated by these actors in their attempts to (re)negotiate belonging: architectural adaptive reuse, urban heritage redevelopment, participatory strategies and practices, historical and contemporary politics of the uses of the past, new representation practices, and discursive interpellations. Thirdly, the analyses of belonging in relation to public spaces, contested places, and cultural encounters reveal the existence of multiple forms of belonging as well as overlaps between them.

Diversity of belonging

The term "belonging" may be relatively straightforward to understand from a general perspective, but when analyzed in its complexity it is both more nuanced and multifaceted, while also being rather under-theorized (Antonsich, 2010; Lähdesmäki et al., 2016; Eckersley 2022). Put simply, *to belong* means to fit, or to fit in (the opposite of being or feeling "out of place"), to be a member of something, or to have a right to be in a location – all of which can be understood in both metaphorical and physical terms. Often the word belonging is used as a shorthand for a *sense of belonging*, for *belongingness*, which relates to the emotive and affective aspect of belonging rather than the idea of categorizations (commonly used for the analysis of identities). Diversity of belonging is therefore to be understood differently from diversity as framed in terms of identity categorizations and intersectionalities. We approach the idea of diversity of belonging as a means by which the complexities of belonging and its various fluid and flexible dimensions (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016), the multiple senses of belonging, and the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006) can be addressed, paying attention to the specificities of the individual cases discussed in the chapters, while simultaneously seeking to draw wider conclusions from the collection of chapters in this book.

Humans have been described as being fundamentally motivated by a "need to belong" (Baumeister and Leary, 1995, p.21) – a psychosocial human need which affects our relationships between the self and the world – which can be utilized as either a constructive or destructive force within society. In his *Hierarchy of Needs* (1943), Maslow accords a sense of belonging or the need for "belongingness" a significant position. The unconfirmed etymological link between the words, *belonging* and *longing*, in the sense of a desire or a striving,[1] is tempting given the emotional and affective nature of belonging (Guibernau, 2013), which in turn drives the way belonging is frequently used in societies to mobilize political action and civic participation. Belonging can therefore also be seen as the right to participate, to be involved, as well as the right to be represented and seen by

others – as the self in connection to society (May, 2013). In this way, the idea of belonging links to the civic rights and duties of those "who belong" and of those excluded as "other".

Belonging and the significance of a sense of belonging to human understandings of self and other, and of positionality in time and place, therefore lie at the core of what it means to be human, to exist in relation to the rest of humanity and to the world. Multiple aspects of belonging may exist simultaneously within individual or collective senses of belonging, often connected to the "politics of belonging" – how belonging is used politically as a discursive resource (Yuval-Davis, 2006) – or to "place-belongingness" – the personal sense of feeling "at home" (Antonsich, 2010). Much academic analysis of belonging has tended to follow individual disciplinary foci, with, for example, geographers seeing place as the most significant dimension of belonging, and sociologists, society. However, in order to fully understand and analyze the complex and multimodal nature of belonging, we seek to blur these disciplinary boundaries in this book, instead considering belonging simultaneously from multiple perspectives. Three significant and interconnected dimensions of how belonging connects the self relationally to the wider world are important for this book: firstly, dimensions of belonging focused on people or communities (socially located belonging); secondly, those focused on place (spatially located belonging); and thirdly, those focused on time and memory (temporally located belonging) (see Eckersley, 2022). We see these dimensions of belonging as deeply interconnected and overlapping, which lies at the core of the analyses in the several chapters of the book.

Belonging thus underpins our focus on processes and impacts of change in a variety of European settings and scales, for different actors or groups in relation to a variety of practices and processes. As May (2013) points out, the different sources or dimensions of belonging are enmeshed and entangled into multimodal combinations creating a "multidimensional landscape of belonging", one that may seem incidental or go unnoticed until disrupted through change, provoking feelings of not belonging. Belonging is therefore increasingly important in a response to the globalization of contemporary societies, where encounters with difference become more and more commonplace. Stuart Hall saw multiculturalism as "the question that globalization has unconsciously produced" (cited in Yuval-Davis, 2006, p.213), which rests on "the question of the contemporary politics of belonging" (ibid.). The notion of contests between people and cultures, particularly within contemporary political discourses across Europe, is often predicated on a belief that contact creates conflict, in turn sparking fear (Wodak, 2020). This is in opposition to research which indicates that fear of "others" and support for nationalist or populist groups often decrease in places with more diverse populations and cultures (Standish, 2021). In this book, we consider how this could be rationalized in contemporary Europe, where people desire both dedicated places for specific forms of cultural activity or religious practice, as well as physical, political, emotional, and accessible spaces for contact and interconnection across perceived "cultural" divides.

Public spaces and contested places

We see public space, therefore, as a crucial arena in which key cultural interactions and societal dynamics take place, where values, belief systems, memories, daily practices, and social lives operate, evolve, and interconnect. Public spaces can be physical, virtual, or conceptual (including city spaces, built heritage, public institutions, community and cultural organizations, and online spaces such as social media) populated not only by people, but also by material and intangible traces of culture, heritage, and memory providing new opportunities for analyzing multidimensional belonging within a diversified Europe. If an open and inclusive public space is an essential precondition for the development of more sustainable and resilient societies (Delanty and Rumford, 2005), then the influence of cultural memories, actors, practices, and institutions on public space – particularly in times of growing populism and social polarization – is crucial to understanding belonging, whether harmonious or contested. Doreen Massey has argued that a *space* may be transformed into a *place* through the meanings and activities that people bring to it (Massey 2005). This may happen both in the form of signification as practice and through means of signifiers created by those for whom a space holds meaning. Indeed, we agree that

> it may be useful to think of places, not as areas on maps, but as constantly shifting articulations of social relations through time; and to think of particular attempts to characterise them as attempts to define, and claim coherence and a particular meaning for, specific envelopes of space-time.
>
> (Massey, 1995, p. 188)

In this sense, Massey seems to be arguing for spaces and places as important not in and of themselves, but due to their interrelationship with human notions and practices of belonging.

In other words, *space* tends to be something to transit through, something apparently void or empty – both physically and metaphorically in the sense that it appears devoid of meaning or focus – yet it is also an opportunity to imagine things anew or to negotiate a shared reality as a "space in-between". Whereas *place* tends to be more readily understood as being a destination, somewhere that is occupied – whether with existing meaning, objects, people, practices, etc. – but which may be (re)negotiated as well as contested, protected, or destroyed. Of course, there is also overlap or convergence between space and place, as exemplified by the way in which the public spaces of European, American, and global cities became deeply significant public places as a result of the Black Lives Matter protests of spring 2020 in which citizens responded to the presence of controversial statues of historic figures related to the colonial past in the city centres. The hitherto widely uncontested (at least within the official histories and heritage narratives of many of the cities) presence of these statues as signifiers of colonial power and subjugation created a focal point, a gathering place. More

significantly, they also became an "embodied" physical target for protesters, through sometimes destructive, yet often creative interventions into the shape of such public places, which created opportunities to reshape and renegotiate public consciousness and discourse around historic slavery and colonialism in connection to ongoing racism and structural marginalization. Public spaces are the arenas in which key cultural interactions and societal dynamics take place, where values, belief systems, memories, daily practices, and social lives operate and evolve. They are the spaces in which people recognize themselves as part of a collective, but also where specificity, difference, and separateness can be maintained and asserted productively (Madanipour, 2003). In other words, they are spaces of (non) belonging and of the politics of belonging.

Articulations of public spaces as "shared" cultural spaces, places of encounter for Europe's diverse populations, frequently gloss over controversies, competing voices, and power dynamics within the "contact zone" (Pratt, 1991) or "third space" (Bhabha, 1994) of public culture. Public places and spaces are where many of the contests and negotiations over belonging take place. As such, contested places are crucial to considerations of belonging and the politics of belonging, whether they are used to assert contested narratives of identity and belonging by those in positions of power, are symbolic of a contested or difficult past or imagined future, or are the focus for drawing previously hidden histories and dynamics of belonging to wider attention through contentious practices. Such places may be highly visible and recognized within the cultural landscape, or they may be intentionally marginalized due to their contentiousness, and the contested ideas of belonging held by groups seeking such places out. Contestation also occurs when several groups identify with and feel they belong to the same place differently, making contested places potential sites of difficult encounters.

Cultural encounters

Cultural encounters – whether unintended or planned, productive or difficult – are central to the chapters in the book. Cultural encounters refer to the dynamics of cultural flows as well as the interaction between groups and/or individuals across established cultural boundaries. Culture is here not only understood as the ways in which people see and interpret the world they live in, but also as patterns of behaviour or practices, as well as forms of organization. Cultural encounters are then the instances in which the worldviews, codes of conduct, practices and configurations of individuals, communities, organizations, and institutions meet or try to become acquainted with those determined by other cultural denominators. We argue in our book that diverse forms of public space become the "sites" in which cultural encounters are played out leading to the (re)negotiation of manifold and complex forms of belonging. Taking on board the anthropological and museum studies theory of the "contact zone" (Pratt, 1991; Clifford, 1997; Boast, 2011) as a post-colonial tactic for addressing inequalities of agency and power, we consider how such ideas of contact relate also to built heritage, urban, and

city spaces which people inhabit and negotiate spatially and the legacies of past – sometimes colonial – power structures in contemporary societies.

Cultural encounters may be facilitated or encouraged in the creative reappropriation of public spaces in which grassroots organizations respond to local problems by making use of short-term, low-cost, scalable interventions and policies (Lydon and Garcia, 2015) and advocating for a more flexible and adaptable environment (Lang Ho, Cramer, and van der Leer, 2012; Lerner, 2016). For example, the use of institutional or community-made spaces where cultural activities or religious practices are focused can facilitate new modes of engaging with, or forms of solidarity between groups. Furthermore, cultural encounters can be observed when rethinking the complex ways in which groups, institutions, and territories, as well as their heritage and memory, are governed (Dean, 1999, p.29), which reveals the diverse range of actors, both national and transnational, involved in the arena of policymaking (Li, 2007) and who work within the policy frames, responding in diverse ways to their affordances and limitations. This is particularly relevant to societies in "crisis" and following processes of change, where attempts to reframe governmental (and cultural) structures and to reimagine European cultural and memory space/s come into contact and friction (Tsing, 2005) with diverse visions for a shared future.

Simultaneously, "authenticity conflicts" can be seen as an expression of cultural encounters. Such conflicts arise from processes of adaptive reuse and the (re)negotiation of belonging through space, place, culture, and agency. We see authenticity here not as residing within objects or sites themselves nor as merely a discursive construct, but rather as consisting of meanings and associations developed by different social actors (Jones, 2010, 2009) in relation to combined material, spatial, historical, personal, and political dimensions. The notion of "aphasia" (Stoler, 2011) from memory studies, which implies that while the difficult past is always both present and absent from our public spheres, we struggle to articulate it appropriately, is also valid when it comes to these conflicts. This has an impact on the cultural encounters related to these difficult pasts and the diverse notions of belonging – constructed, hidden, and contested – that surround such encounters. Authenticity, therefore, becomes a multi-layered mode of significance, itself constantly being (re)negotiated and adaptively reused in relation to individual and collective strategies of belonging, and sparked off by cultural encounters of one form or another.

The diverse processes of (re)negotiation that take place at these "sites" of cultural encounter, often simultaneously "zones of awkward engagement" (Tsing, 2005), provide a basis for understanding the multiple ways in which belonging is conceived and practised, both in individual public places and for a collective, imagined "public space of belonging" to (as well as in and for) Europe.

The book

The interplay between public space, cultural encounters, and the (re)negotiation of belonging is at the centre of the book. Chapters in the volume analyze complex

multi-layered public spaces and the contests and negotiations over culture and belonging which take place connected to them. Specific examples are provided of the ways in which (re)negotiations of belonging in Europe today are linked to public space, contested places, and cultural encounters in a changing European context. The chapters, therefore, analyze the ways in which people's sense of belonging (and so also their responses to diverse politics of belonging) are connected to cultural, heritage, and memory practices undertaken in different forms of public space, including museums, religious community centres, city monuments and built heritage, neglected and reused buildings, and cultural and artistic centres in the public sphere and on online fora.

We do this by using an inter- and multidisciplinary approach in the analysis of diverse case studies across the chapters. This approach utilizes theories and techniques from the fields of history, anthropology, sociology, museum and heritage studies, and urban and architectural studies and offers an innovative means by which to address the complexity of belonging in Europe. Through their analyses of diverse case studies, the chapters draw out the significance of the integration and participation of differing community, grassroots, and activist groups in practices and discourses of belonging – whether progressive or retrogressive – in relation to the contemporary (re)emergence of identity conflicts and political uses of the past across Europe.

The book is organized into two parts. The first part, "Redefining and negotiating public spaces of belonging", examines the complexities and challenges but also the potential of active interventions – both institutionalized as well as grassroots – in public spaces to instigate and recognize new forms of belonging.

Susannah Eckersley's chapter analyzes museums as a form of democratic public space, highlighting how they replicate dialectics of belonging and difference that are more often played out in the political and public sphere. Using cases from Germany, she investigates the power dynamics at play in the attempts of museum actors to transform their museums into sites for staging and examining claims of belonging, yet finds that belonging (and non-belonging) remains embedded within the power structures upheld by – or shaped by – museums.

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, and Joanna Wawrzyniak analyze how migrant religious institutions in Warsaw operate as sites within discourses of belonging and cultural diversity, arguing that belonging is not a fixed social identity, but rather a discursive tool that allows groups, culturally and religiously different from their host society, to negotiate their presence in social space. Their diverse cases enable them to conceptualize a typology of "public spaces" associated with different negotiations of belonging – closed public spaces, hybrid and invited public spaces, and open public spaces.

Achim Saupe's chapter analyzes the spatio-temporal concepts of belonging through the controversies connected to the reconstruction, re-urbanization, and "revitalization" of the city centres of Berlin and Potsdam, following German reunification. He argues that public spaces and places – in particular, individual buildings representing contested histories – have the potential to mobilize and

politicize groups in relation to belonging. However, the complex historicization of the traces of the past in the two city centres restrained architectural, political, and social diversity.

Carlotta Scioldo investigates the functioning of soft cultural policy tools used during the European Year of Cultural Heritage (EYCH) 2018 and their effects on the diffusion of the EU institutional heritage discourse within the European public sphere. She argues that despite the attempts to enhance transnational, intermediate, and grassroots engagement in EYCH activities, the discourse remained institutional, reflecting an acritical and top-down appropriation of the EU institutional heritage discourse which sustained the discursive gap between EU institutions and the wider public.

Jacopo Leveratto, Francesca Gotti, and Francesca Lanz analyze the approaches, strategies, and tactics used by designers and urban practitioners who seek to address the need for inclusivity in activating marginal and neglected public spaces. They show that designers and urban practitioners have begun to devise reactivations which set the conditions for citizens to (re)negotiate their sense of belonging, potentially encouraging them to look after these spaces. Through the tactics used in these marginalized public spaces, spatially and socially located forms of belonging have become increasingly complementary.

Claske Vos' chapter addresses the strategic adaptation and use of the Creative Europe funding scheme by grassroots cultural actors, highlighting their effects on processes of space making and belonging in (potential) candidate states in Southeast Europe. She argues that instead of participation in Creative Europe being about increasing European belonging or belonging to the European Community, grassroots actors reframe it in order to develop and maintain alternative forms of belonging connected to their own regional, national, and local contexts.

The second part of the book, "Encountering contested belongings in public places", focuses on public spaces that have become sites of cultural encounters in which contested and complex forms of belonging are being (re)negotiated.

Carmen Levick proposes a re-evaluation of the concepts of memory, identity, and belonging within Eastern Europe, highlighting decolonial aspects in the relationship between Eastern Europe and European institutions and examining the position of heritage and citizenship in the processes of national historical becoming. She uses decolonial methodology to analyze the friction between co-existing examples of contemporary commemoration and the systematic pressures – internal, state, or international – on narratives of identity and clashes with localized conceptualizations of identity.

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper's chapter discusses "foreign heritage" in Warsaw (Imperial Russian and Soviet-era built heritage) and individuals' attitudes towards such heritage. She argues that belonging to the city is negotiated through symbolic processes of "domestication", transformation, or reframing, as well as everyday practices within urban space. For built heritage from times of subordination to be perceived as belonging, it is necessary that – despite their

cultural distinctiveness as part of a "foreign heritage" – such sites do not threaten national and local identity narratives.

Kristin Meißner analyzes spatial, temporal, and social references drawn by the different actor groups involved in discussions on the urban development of Berlin Mitte and the symbolically laden public space of the Spreeinsel, during the post-reunification period. She illustrates how sets of specific spatial-temporal-social referencing underpinned their divergent senses of belonging while outlining how these were negotiated. Meißner argues that while certain notions of belonging – governed by specific socio-political values – were promoted and standardized, other dissenting approaches were structurally marginalized.

David Farrell-Banks' chapter looking at the Kahlenberg, on the edge of Vienna, takes inspiration from Massey's walk on Kilburn High Road to interrogate the construction and use of place within transnational networks of far-right political activists. Using heritage traces of a single historical moment as the analytical window through which to view expressions of belonging, he argues that a spatial dimension of belonging has the potential to allow social and temporal connections between groups on a scale beyond the edges of a particular place.

Helen Mears analyzes initiatives developed by two UK museums for displays which addressed contested accounts of belonging (connected to Windrush and Brexit). Both initiatives were informed by socially orientated policy frameworks and the chapter addresses how these displays reflected tensions between policy and practice. Mears argues that while socially instrumentalist agendas push museums towards engagements with belonging, the multiple accountabilities museums carry result in engagements that fail to meaningfully engage with the structural inequalities that they describe.

Johanna Turunen's chapter analyzes the historical moment of the fall of the Colston statue in Bristol from the perspective of critical heritage and the politics of belonging. She examines the collective identities constructed online and during the protests and their effects on people's sense of belonging. Turunen argues that although such statues are individual physical objects existing in specific spaces, they represent differing dimensions of European heritage, acting as important focal points for wider social debates about race and racism in Europe.

Our book analyzes the ways in which people's sense of belonging (and thus also their responses to different politics of belonging) is connected to cultural, heritage, and memory practices undertaken in different forms of public space, including museums and heritage sites, religious community centres, city monuments, built heritage and urban spaces, neglected and reused sites, cultural and artistic centres, and online fora. Together, the chapters of the book focus on the interplay between public space, cultural encounters, and the (re)negotiation of belonging connected to a Europe facing major transformations. The inter- and multidisciplinary examination of this interplay in a variety of European contexts adds to the current literature on belonging by showing how socially located belonging, spatially located belonging, and temporally located belonging, rather than being separate or distinct, in fact coincide, alternate, and often complement one another.

The different chapters address the significance of both formalized and "unofficial" attempts to create spaces and places of belonging in Europe, what it means to recall potentially sensitive memories, to intervene in existing socio-political landscapes of belonging or alienation, and to consider the wider impact of such attempts to renegotiate belonging for the future.

Note

1 See Anatoly Liberman (2006) "The long arm of etymology, or, longing for word origins", *The Oxford Etymologist*, 13 September 2006, https://blog.oup.com/2006/09/the_long_arm_of/.

References

Antonsich, M. (2010) 'Searching for belonging: An analytical framework', *Geography Compass*, 4/6, pp. 644–659.

Baumeister, R. and Leary, M. (1995) 'The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation', *Psychological Bulletin*, 117/3, pp. 497–529.

Bhabha, H. I. K. (1994) *The Location of Culture*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Boast, R. (2011) 'Neocolonial collaboration: Museum as contact zone revisited', *Museum Anthropology*, 34 (1), pp. 56–70.

Clifford, J. (1997) *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Dean, M. (1999) *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage.

Delanty G., Rumford C. (2005) *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. London: Psychology Press.

Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeiten', in Martin Sabrow and Achim Saupe (eds.) *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch.* Göttingen: Wallstein.

Guibernau, M. (2013) *Belonging. Solidarity and Division on Modern Societie*s. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jones, S. (2009) 'Experiencing authenticity at heritage sites: Some implications for heritage management and conservation', *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 11, pp. 133–147.

Jones, S. (2010) 'Negotiating authentic objects and authentic selves: Beyond the deconstruction of authenticity', *Journal of Material Culture*, 15, pp. 181–203.

Lähdesmäki, T. et al. (2016) 'Fluidity and flexibility of ''belonging''. Uses of the concept in contemporary research', *Acta Sociologica*, 59/3, pp. 233–247.

Lang Ho C., Cramer, N., and van der Leer D. (eds.) (2012) *Spontaneous Interventions: Design Actions for the Common Good*. New York: Architect Magazine.

Lerner J. (2016) *Urban Acupuncture*. Washington-Covelo-London: Island Press.

Li, T. (2007) 'Governmentality', *Anthropologica*, 49, 275–294.

Liberman, A. (2006) 'The long arm of etymology, or, longing for word origins', *The Oxford Etymologist*, 13 September. Available at: https://blog.oup.com/2006/09/the_long_arm_of/ (accessed 10 April 2022).

Lydon M. and Garcia A. (2015) *Tactical Urbanism: Short-term Action for Long-term Change*. Washington-Covelo-London: Island Press.

Madanipour A. (2003) *Public and Private Spaces of the City*. London: Routledge.
Maslow, A. H. (1943) 'A theory of human motivation', in *Psychological Review*, 50/4, pp. 370–396.
Massey, D. (1995) 'Places and their pasts', *History Workshop Journal*, 39 (1), pp. 182–192.
Massey, D. (2005) *For Space*. London: Sage.
May, V. (2013) *Connecting Self to Society. Belonging in a Changing World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pratt, M. L. (1991) 'Arts of the contact zone', *Profession*, 91, pp. 33–40. New York: MLA.
Standish, K. (2021) 'Encounter theory', *Peacebuilding*, 9(1), pp. 1–14.
Stoler, A. (2011) 'Colonial aphasia. Race and disabled histories in France', *Public Culture*, 23(1), pp. 121–156.
Tsing, A. (2005) *Friction. An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wodak, R. (2020) 'Learning from the past(s)? Contesting hegemonic memories', in De Cesari and Kaya (eds.) *European Memory in Populism. Representations of Self and Other*. Abingdon: Routledge.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', in *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40/3, pp. 197–214.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Part I

Redefining and negotiating public spaces of belonging

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Introduction to Part I

Redefining and negotiating public spaces of belonging

Claske Vos and Susannah Eckersley

This first part of the book addresses how belonging becomes redefined and negotiated by active interventions in public space. The chapters explore how new museum practices, discourses, architectural mediation, and funding schemes influence the development of new spaces of belonging. The different chapters address questions including: what does it mean to create spaces and places of belonging in Europe, to intervene in existing socio-political landscapes of belonging or alienation, and what are the effects of such interventions? By focusing on a diversity of settings and actors, the authors expose the complexities and challenges, but also the potential of active interventions in public spaces both for instigating new forms and developing broader understandings of belonging.

All the authors agree that active intervention in public space has multiple – often somewhat unintended – effects, revealing the impact of intersecting notions of belonging. Eckersley, for example, shows that museum professionals have started to transform museums into public spaces in which narratives on belonging can be constructed, reinforced, and performed. She shows that this has led to new transformative actions within museums, but not necessarily to individual or group empowerment beyond the museum. In line with this, the chapters by Głowacka-Grajper et al. and by Vos reveal that the politics of belonging instigated by powerful actors, such as the state or the European Union, do not automatically lead to the transmission of such constructed forms of belonging into local settings. Instead, the instruments used for these politics of belonging – discursive frameworks for action and funding schemes – are strategically negotiated by the actors involved. Furthermore, both chapters reveal that such instruments have different results, depending on the setting in which they are used. Głowacka-Grajper et al. show how the wider socio-political context – local, national, as well as international – impacts on the "modes of belonging" of the religious communities in Warsaw. Similarly, Vos reveals that the ways in which EU-funded cultural initiatives are taken up in Southeast Europe cannot be separated from the notions of belonging related to the post-Yugoslav context. All of this confirms that belonging is not a fixed, social identity that can be produced and imposed, but rather something which is negotiated, reframed, and/or rejected by the different actors working with these notions of belonging.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-3

Moreover, the authors in Part I contend that active interventions in public space – discourses, policies, practices – lead to new processes of social, political, and cultural action. Saupe, for example, shows that the construction of the Humboldt Forum in Berlin and the Brandenburg state assembly in Potsdam after German reunification led to the mobilization and politicization of diverse forms of belonging for differing groups in German society. The chapters by Leveratto et al. and Vos show how innovative interventions by grassroots cultural actors, designers, and urban practitioners have enabled citizens to negotiate and renegotiate their sense of belonging in contexts within which belonging has come under threat. Finally, Scioldo shows how EU soft policy instruments such as the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 have led to the institutionalization of EU cultural heritage discourses on different levels of EU governance, while real engagement by EU citizens remained limited. All these authors show that interventions in public spaces both trigger and respond to larger political concerns or institutionalized contexts. Such interventions instigate new processes of change and with that, new forms of belonging.

Finally, all chapters assert that belonging (and non-belonging) is structured and determined by diverse power hierarchies and hegemonies. All authors address the importance of the interdependence between different actors involved in redefining and negotiating public spaces of belonging and how this has an impact on the ultimate shape and form of such spaces. For example, in her chapter, Eckersley shows how the attempts of museum actors to transform the public space of the museum into a site for staging and examining claims of belonging are impacted by the politics and power inherent within museums. The power dynamics these museum actors are confronted with frequently lead to a reproduction of the contested belonging that they try to address. Other chapters also stress the impact of political elites – both on a national and international level – on interventions in public spaces. The mismatches frequently experienced between official ideas and policy discourses about who belongs or how to belong and those at stake on the ground can lead to more innovative approaches to space making and belonging, countering these hegemonic practices of belonging (Vos, Głowacka-Grajper et al., and Leveratto et al.). At the same time, such mismatches have also resulted in a transnational institutionalization of certain heritage discourses (Scioldo) and wholescale renovations of urban landscapes leading to instances of unsettlement and dissonance (Saupe).

Part I therefore focuses on drawing out the interplay between institutional or authorized practices and discourses around belonging – connected to heritage, memory, culture, and urban space – and on-the-ground interventions or reappropriations intended to enable a renegotiation of belonging to fit contemporary, diverse societies.

Chapter 1

Museums as a public space of belonging?

Negotiating dialectics of purpose, presentation, and participation

Susannah Eckersley

Introduction

The chapter addresses the idea that the museum is a public space (Benhabib, 1992) in the dual sense of both being symbolically representative as an institution of the demos and acting as a place where contrasting and varied concepts of belonging may be negotiated and tried out. The chapter examines how the dialectic between belonging and difference described by Benhabib plays out in the political and public sphere of museums that address topics of belonging. Using exhibition and display analyses, interviews, and observations in museums across Germany addressing topics of migration, refugees, race, and discrimination, the chapter is structured around three key elements of such museum work, bringing qualitative empirical data to bear on theoretical and conceptual questions concerning the notion of belonging and difference in contemporary European society – in particular, theories of democracy and public space, of contact and encounter, and of transformative actions. In doing so, it highlights the power dynamics at play in the attempts of museum actors to transform the public space of the museum which they represent into a site for staging and examining claims of belonging. The analysis draws outs the layered ways in which museums address belonging: firstly, through museum professionals' understanding of the role of museums; secondly, through the display strategies chosen by them for museum exhibitions; and thirdly, through the institutional practices used by them to engage with specific communities.

Understanding what a museum is, or is expected to be, is at the core of understanding how and why museum practices are the way they are. While many museums in Germany have taken up the topic of migration following the 2015 European migration "crisis", and in relation to issues of racism and anti-Semitism, how museum work might connect to *belonging* has not been analyzed. By identifying patterns in museum professionals' work to address issues of belonging through the museum as a public space, the chapter raises questions about the politics and power inherent within museums. How are different political and social ideals enacted, reinforced, or disrupted through regimes of control over collective places? Collective places which "are constructions that disguise the fissures, the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-4

losses, the absences, the borders within them" (Anthias, 2009, p.8). It concludes that while museum actors navigate a boundary between exercising centralized power (performative action) and offering dispersed power (transformative action), ultimately both options highlight the continued significance of the museum as a public space of control resting on a *paradigm of difference*.

Public space, museums, and belonging in Germany

Benhabib breaks down the problematic philosophy of "public space" into three main strands, linked to ideas of Arendt's agonistic and associational delineations of public space; the liberal and "legalistic model of public space" resting on a combination of public dialogue and neutrality; and Habermas' principle of *Öffentlichkeit* as a discursive public space relying on participation (Benhabib, 1992, pp.90–107). This is helpful in considering the at-times contradictory, multilayered dialectic between ideas of "public space" as they occur and are enacted within a single form of institutional space – the museum. The museum (and the exhibition, a microcosm of the museum) is understood as a public space in both the representative physical sense and the discursive sense. Firstly, the museum is an institution which represents "the public", as a place invested with authority and trust (over objects, narratives, and representations of the past), and as a site, which is open to the public to visit. Secondly, the museum may increasingly be seen as a space where ideas are discussed, where potentially opposing views of the world may be aired and tested out discursively and creatively.

The international move to redefine museums (Weil, 1999; ICOM, 2018, 2019; Fraser, 2019; Kreps, 2020) by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) is particularly contested within German museum circles (see ICOM Germany, 2020). Some German museum professionals see the traditional roles of collecting, researching, and sharing knowledge as being at risk from "new" priorities of participation, social justice, and activism (Coffee, 2008; Lynch, 2013; Lynch and Alberti, 2010; Sandell, 1998; Janes and Sandell, 2019). Difficult histories (Macdonald, 2009) of belonging – migration, refugees, colonialism, racism – are frequent topics within contemporary museum work, indicating their importance to museum actors and the public. Through exhibitions and activities that project inclusive political ideals of belonging and "a culture of welcome", certain museums may be perceived as actively aiming to become "collective places constructed by imaginings of belonging" (Anthias, 2009, p.8).

Despite dynamism in the perception of museum roles, how and why museums may act as public spaces of belonging has not been addressed. Critical analysis has focused mainly on individual aspects – notably migration and colonialism (Whitehead, Eckersley, and Mason, 2012; Whitehead et al., 2015; Chambers et al., 2016; Bock and Macdonald, 2019) – without connecting them to wider issues of belonging or public space. While the fluidity and flexibility of belonging can be challenging for research (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016), within everyday use it arguably offers a frame with more "universal" public appeal than individual topics

such as race or refugees. The trend for community participation in museums – the "participatory turn" – aiming to counteract previous hegemonic structures (see Mygind, Hällmann, and Bentsen, 2015; Lynch and Alberti, 2010; Lynch, 2013), potentially shifts the "boundaries of belonging" (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Anthias, 2013) presented in or upheld by museums. The ways that museum professionals use such strategies to empower or educate (see Morse, 2018; Walton et al., 2016) could lead to a critical rethinking of museums as public spaces of belonging.

Most of the contemporary public discourses of belonging and public space in Germany focus on migration and the 2015 "refugee crisis", racial and post-colonial injustice, and populist and far-right nationalism (particularly following the 2019 and 2020 attacks in Halle and Hanau). German society accords high status to museums and education, with particular institutions, including national and regional museums, positioned as representative of established narratives (Eckersley, 2007, 2012). However, German museums are not subject to singular measures of value in relation to social impact, due in part to the regional funding and support mechanisms for museums in Germany and the absence of widespread neoliberal instrumental cultural policies (Eckersley, 2007, 2012), where museums step into the public services provision gap left by funding cuts (as in the UK). As such, there is a widespread sense in German society that museums are a *representative public space* for the rehearsing of prevailing narratives of culture, history, and identity, while not formally being expected to act as a *dialogical public space* representing the diversity and complexity of its public(s). This potentially gives German museum actors greater autonomy and power to either exercise or relinquish control over exhibition content and engagement with communities.

Methods

In order to investigate the ways in which museums might act as democratic public spaces (Benhabib, 1992) – not only as symbolically representative public spaces but potentially also as dialogical public spaces – exhibition and display analyses, interviews, and observations in museums across Germany were conducted.

Museums and exhibitions across Germany addressing topics of migration, racism, othering, and belonging were identified and selected for analysis on the basis of their advertised content and – due to the coronavirus pandemic (2020–2021) – the possibility to visit the museum or exhibition. Twenty museums and exhibitions were visited in person to undertake exhibition and display analysis – mostly between 2019 and 2021, some in 2018 during preliminary research. Following site visits, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were undertaken with museum staff from 12 sites. Interviewees were all in positions of responsibility with decision-making powers for the exhibition analyzed, although in varying roles, according to the division of responsibilities in each site. The detailed analysis of this chapter rests on four case study exhibitions, each with a different context and relevance to the wider research question, allowing these cases to speak both in detail for their own specificity and to the broader issues.

Data from site visits (photographs, observations) provided a comprehensive record of each exhibition, its visual, material, and textual content, use of space, layout, and placement of themes and objects, following established analysis methods (Moser, 2010). Interviews[1] provided insights into the aims and motivations of museum staff, their thoughts on the roles and purposes of museums, and in relation to issues of belonging. Interviewees also provided insights into the nuances of the work in their museum, or in relation to issues of particular relevance to their location or audiences. Online and published documentation on the exhibitions provides a further layer of information on how they present their work to the public, and which groups they aim to attract.

These methods allow patterns to be identified within a differentiated body of data, addressing the research question by highlighting broad similarities and nuanced differences in how and why museums may act as public spaces of belonging. The approach emphasizes the intentions of exhibition producers and the presentation of the results of their work (the exhibitions in question), as analyzed by an expert visitor. How these exhibitions may be received and perceived by other visitors – particularly those with personal interests in and experiences of the topics of belonging on display – would provide a rich and valuable additional layer of data. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, such research was not possible; follow-on research on this area would be highly worthwhile.

The four case study exhibitions include two from city museums in major German cities with diverse contemporary populations and two from regional museums with specific historical connections to migration, population change, and belonging. Two of the exhibitions were temporary displays and two form part of permanent displays. Elsewhere, I have pointed out the different affordances of temporary exhibitions to explore more emotive and potentially contested issues, as opposed to permanent exhibitions where there is often a greater expectation of "neutrality" and factuality (in Whitehead, Eckersley, and Mason, 2012, p.36). The cases are not intended to be representative of Germany as a nation, of their individual locations, nor of specific histories or forms of migration. Instead, they were chosen for their broad approach and to exemplify strategies within museum practice seen across Europe.

The first case study is *Migration bewegt die Stadt* (Migration Moves the City), at the Stadtmuseum (City Museum) Munich. Founded in the late nineteenth century, the City Museum offers a local, yet global, focus on Munich's development since its founding in the twelfth century. It includes a permanent exhibition *Typisch München* (Typically Munich) which was developed in the early 2000s. In 2012 a new intervention planned with the City Archives (Eymold and Heusler, 2018, p.11) was intended to showcase hitherto underrepresented histories and stories from Munich's diverse migrant population. Funded by the city council from 2015 onwards (p.11) shortly before the "summer of migration", the exhibition modules for *Migration bewegt die Stadt* opened in September 2018. Although originally funded on a short-term basis (p.11), the exhibition modules and associated staff were later made permanent. The exhibition aimed to show that

migration histories are an inalienable part of city histories (Eymold and Heusler, 2018, p.13), rather than something "other" or "beyond" the norm. It expanded the permanent exhibition *Typisch München* (Typically Munich) using objects from the City Museum and Archives collections and sought new contributions from members of the public and local groups with migrant backgrounds (Fehle in Eymold and Heusler, 2018, pp.59–63). The exhibition development strategy followed participatory approaches, workshop activities and community outreach in order to ensure a broad spectrum of perspectives were included in the new exhibition modules, which were then inserted into the long-term exhibition as interventions (ibid.).

The temporary CityLab exhibition at the Historisches (Historical) Museum Frankfurt *Ich sehe was, was Du nicht siehst – Rassismus, Widerstand, Empowerment* (I Spy with My Little Eye – Racism, Resistance, Empowerment) is the second case. The Historical Museum Frankfurt offers both general and specialist exhibitions on the city's history. The top floor of the museum is dedicated to changing *Stadtlabor* (CityLab) exhibitions on contemporary topics, co-produced by a permanent team of museum staff, with community groups and public participants (Gesser et al., 2021). The exhibition *Ich sehe was, was Du nicht siehst* (October 2020–March 2021) addressed historical and contemporary experiences of race, racism, and othering through three themes: racism, colonialism and the post-colonial present, and empowerment and resistance. The CityLab gave centre stage to personal experiences of racialization within German society, historical racism, and contemporary social justice (Gesser et al., 2021, p.7). The dedicated exhibition space offered spatial significance, with co-curated content merging objects from the existing collections and from community contributions. Historic collections were presented in a new light, questioning the previous dominant narratives of colonial history and putting the experiences of people subject to racialization at the forefront.

The temporary exhibition *entKOMMEN* (Escape/Arrival) on display from February to October 2020 at the Kulturhistorisches Museum Zittau (Cultural History Museum Zittau), part of the Städtische Museen (City Museums), is the third case. This has a similar focus to Munich and Frankfurt, with collections of fine and decorative arts and artefacts of regional historical and religious significance. Zittau sits on the southeastern corner of Germany, bordering both Poland and the Czech Republic, in a region shaped by histories of trade and cooperation and of conflict, border change, and forced migration. The town suffered economic and population decline following German reunification and is now a regional "stronghold" of the right-wing AfD and far-right groups.

entKOMMEN was created in collaboration with regional cultural organizations, bringing together objects from the collection with loans from the public in Zittau and in neighbouring Bogatynia (Poland). The exhibition addressed the topic of flight, expulsion, and forced migration in the region, taking a long historical approach, from seventeenth-century exiles to recent refugee arrivals from Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, with the flight and expulsion of Germans at the

end of the Second World War as a main focal point (Knüvener and Hommel, 2020, p.3).

Fluchtpunkt Friedland, the permanent exhibition at Museum Friedland, is the final case study – *Fluchtpunkt* literally means vanishing point, but also plays on the word *Flucht*, meaning flight or escape. Museum Friedland opened in March 2016, located in Friedland's former station building, in the centre of the small town, adjacent to a major migrant transit camp. The museum manages historic sites connected to the Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland (border transit camp) and the town's refugee history. Historically the camp (set up in 1945) predominantly housed German refugees and migrants from post–Second World War border changes, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, and returning POWs (Holmgren, 2020). During the later history of Friedland Refugee Transit Camp, international refugees and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe were accommodated. Refugees from conflict areas around the globe continue to be housed there on entry to Germany. The exhibition was developed with a strong focus on the twentieth-century history of refugees coming into Friedland, and on migration and refugee movements internationally. The museum is currently developing a new extension building housing interactive and participatory exhibitions on contemporary refugees and migrants.

Findings and analysis

In this analysis, I argue that the museum is a public space in the dual sense of being *both* symbolically representative as an institution of the demos, *and* in offering a place where contrasting and varied concepts of belonging may be negotiated and tried out (Benhabib, 1992). The analysis focuses on the dialectic between belonging and difference, and how it plays out in the political and public sphere of museums (Bock and Macdonald, 2019, p.320). This is structured around three key elements of how museum professionals address belonging within their work. Firstly, how museum professionals perceive the role of museums in contemporary society; secondly, the strategies used by museum professionals to display and communicate topics of belonging; and finally, the understanding by museum professionals of "the public" to whom they address their exhibitions.

First element: perceptions of the role of the museum in and for society

Museum professionals in Germany interviewed for this study – all of whom were (at the time of interview) working on topics of belonging, migration, race, exclusion, etc. – highlighted that diverse, and at times polarized, views on the roles and purposes of museums are held by their peers, particularly regarding the ideal relationship of museums to the public and to contemporary social debates:

> In Germany [museums] focus more on the task of preservation, the task of collection, the task of conservation … All that is more at the forefront. And

> so the museum is a palace, and a state institution still has a very, very strong role, even though in debates about museums […] many young museum workers prefer to head in the direction of extension of the town square/urban space.
>
> (Anon. Interviewee, Munich, 2021)

Interviewees recognized a disparity between two different understandings within the profession on the role of museums, or "what a museum is". This disparity rests on whether the role of museums is seen to be based primarily on fixed material tasks such as collecting, documenting, and conserving – "what a museum *does*" – or primarily on open social tasks such as communicating, engaging, connecting – "what a museum is *for*". Several respondents highlighted their desire to effect change within their own museum, and among museum professionals in Germany more widely away from "a very conservative picture of the museum" (Anon. Interviewee, Dresden, 2020), yet there was also reluctance expressed about becoming "a political museum" (Interviewee U. Bretschneider, 2020).

Although several respondents implied that change was needed in German museums, only one drew attention to a concern about their social relevance:

> I think something has to change for museums to remain relevant. Otherwise you may as well close them, since they will only remain an archive that nobody visits. That is the problem, museums need visitors; they are not an archive where collections are being stored, they are an institution that is meant to show something and actually one that is meant to host a dialogue. I think museums have to open up to keep their right to existence.
>
> (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021)

The perceived need to adapt to changing social realities corresponds to Hooper-Greenhill's analysis of museums as "heterotopias" (1990), in relation to museums in late 1980s Britain. Arguably, following Hooper-Greenhill's categorizations, many museums in Germany, even in the early twenty-first century, continue to act like nineteenth-century museums, "constituted as a general archive […] with a double mission to both transform the mob into 'men' of taste and discrimination, and to provide a sacred site for contemplation and self-renewal" (Hooper-Greenhill, 1990, p.66).

Despite such fundamental differences in the role and purposes of museums, all the museum professionals interviewed considered their work to be a form of public service, not necessarily in relation to outwardly imposed or socially expected notions of relevance as discussed by Nielsen (2015), but rather based on an inward sense of duty to represent and present democratic ideals and values. The aims of the four case study exhibitions were framed in terms of social outcomes, such as increasing tolerance, inclusion, understanding, and encouraging active engagement with social issues. This was most evident in places with practical connections to refugee histories or present-day realities, such as Friedland and Zittau, or with strong local anti-immigrant or far-right tendencies, as mentioned

by additional interviewees in Dresden and rural Thuringia. However, museum professionals also felt that there was a fine line to be negotiated between the museum acting as a forum for dialogue and potentially provoking or platforming strong opposing or extreme reactions:

> defamatory or political contributions are excluded straight away, we do not want to have those, but at the end of the day, contributions that can be controversial or oppose each other can be presented.
>
> (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021)

> One can also have a discussion with people with different or opposing views, in such an exhibition it happens a lot, I mean if you have someone who only has their own agenda, then you will not have any progress anyway.
>
> (Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021)

Such concerns draw out the perceived need of many respondents to retain overall control over the content of the museum, due to the museum being seen as a representative and democratic public space – one in which the boundaries of socially acceptable discourse and of democratic free speech should not be broached. This echoes the ways in which museums differ in their roles and purposes. Conflicts over the political and social roles of museums internationally (Sandell, 1998; Weil, 1999) and in Germany (Thiemeyer, 2019; Wenrich, Kirmeier, and Bäuerlein, 2019) both prefigure and respond to current debates within the sector on the definition of museums (Fraser, 2019; ICOM, 2018, 2019; ICOM Germany, 2020). The development of a new ICOM definition of museums has seen the issue gaining traction in Germany, highlighting the polarization of professional perspectives (ICOM Germany, 2020) and that the idea of a "museum" is homogeneous neither internationally nor within Europe. Although the ways in which museum professionals collectively conceptualize the role of the museum in contemporary society follows cosmopolitan ideals of democracy (Delanty, 2011), related to tolerance and empathy, the differences in their views on the extent to which the museum should be active in social justice mirror the discourses around the value or failure of multiculturalism, integration, and assimilation (Vertovec, 2020; Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). Museum work in Germany is still more often based on a paradigm of difference – in accordance with the dominant social discourses – than on one of inclusive belonging.

Second element: exhibition and display strategies

The four exhibitions analyzed focused on representing what it means to belong – or not belong – within contemporary society, and how this relates to the past, the places, the people, and the politics of these societies. The display strategies chosen all draw connections between different scales – from relatively abstract issues to concrete personal examples – to present factual accounts of the global,

international, and national histories, geographies, and politics of belonging, while also addressing visitors' immediate understanding of and subjective responses to local, personal, and contemporary experiences of belonging. These display strategies can be seen as (unconscious) applications of contact and encounter theory (Standish, 2021; Delanty, 2011), in which the exhibition was designed to facilitate abstract "encounters" with difference. Korff describes the museum as facilitating a

> brokering service as it regulates the distance between the experience of the visitors and the displayed objects or documented cultures. (…) Inasmuch as it presents the unknown and unfamiliar, the alien and what has become alien, the museum is always also a place for the implicit self-examination of society.
> (Korff, Bendix, and Bendix, 1999, p. 269)

Three ways of abstracting "contact" in exhibitions were identified, through the bringing together of oppositions – similar to the suggestion that museums use compensation theory to "play with the dialectic of the near and far, of the alien and familiar" (p.268). The case study exhibitions were not intended to have an impact on the understanding of the exhibited objects themselves (as in Korff, Bendix, and Bendix, 1999), but rather, to effect change in visitors' perceptions of "others". Three strategies to achieve this were identified in the case studies: "past-presencing" (Macdonald, 2009); "distant-proximity" (where the geographically distant is brought into relation with the locationally close); and "private-publicness" (where aspects of the personal, private sphere are brought into the public sphere). These "brokering" strategies position museums as "spaces of encounter", even without direct interpersonal encounters.

Past-presencing

It has been well established that museums deploy techniques of "past-presencing" (Macdonald, 2009), using objects and stories that bring the past into sharper focus within the present, while simultaneously shaping understanding of the present through awareness of the past. In Munich, the well-received new exhibition was deliberately designed to break into the chronology of the long-term *Typisch München* exhibition, using "continuities related to our history, or repetitions with regard to, so to speak, exclusions and inclusions" (Anon. Interviewee, Munich, 2021).

In the *entKOMMEN* exhibition in Zittau (see Figure 1.1) – an area known for right-wing populist and extremist support – material from different time periods was juxtaposed to highlight migration and refugees as a human constant (Interviewee B. Nowak, 2021; Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021).

However, this was not always well-received:

> Criticism was quite active (…) but there are things that come up again and again, to be a foreigner somewhere, to become accepted somewhere, to make

> a new start and things like that. It is the same after 1945 as today, to not be welcome somewhere, these topics were important. The historical reasons and why someone got expelled are always different, but we were often told that you cannot compare this, that the Germans had suffered more, and things like that.
>
> (Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021)

Many museums and exhibitions in Germany relating to issues of migration and belonging have drawn parallels between the expulsion and flight of Germans following the post-war border changes and the recent experiences of refugees as part of the 2015 "migration crisis". Similarly, in Frankfurt, colonial histories are placed in conjunction with contemporary racism, and in Friedland, the stories of refugees from Germany and across the world who arrived in the camp are presented as part of the same narrative. Those interviewed who used past-presencing in their exhibitions made it clear that their motivation was not to position different histories as "the same" (Interviewee B. Nowak, 2021; Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021), but rather as a strategy to provoke empathy and mutual understanding (Interviewee A. Kraft, 2021; Interviewee A. Haut, 2021; Interviewee U. Bretschneider, 2020) between various communities within the visiting public. Such a strategy is one of dialectics, positioning what is sometimes seen as a "completed" past in conjunction with an "incomplete" present in order to create a new rupture or to unsettle established thought patterns surrounding both the past and the present.

Figure 1.1 View of part of the *entKOMMEN* exhibition in Zittau. Photograph by author.

Distant-proximity

Drawing connections between international histories and local stories was particularly important in the Frankfurt CityLab, where the Black Lives Matter movement provided a global frame for the museum's presentations and discussions on local lived experiences of racism and exclusion (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021). The ways in which the global and the local scales interlink was also present in the exhibition development phase in 2020 with the far-right racist attacks in Hanau (a neighbouring city to Frankfurt), which became national and international news:

> we always thought the Rhein-Main area is the most diverse city there is in Germany. Super-diverse. With people with a large number of different nationalities living here, we thought, well, something like that isn't going to happen to us. Everyone was really shocked. And of course we had some controversial discussions; we discussed these large political questions, which were also discussed in smaller circles, the political battle became part of it, which is not unusual for such exhibitions.
>
> (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021)

In Zittau the geopolitics of the museum's location in the "Dreiländereck" of Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic, and the region's historic cross-border movements and post-war border changes, could be brought to bear on the global "migration crisis" of 2015. Using maps both of the local and hyperlocal areas affected by the post-war border changes and population movements, and of the global migration movements into Europe, is a common strategy in exhibitions to put the individual stories into a geographic context and convey a sense of scale (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3).

At Museum Friedland, situated on the site of a refugee transit camp that has been in constant use since the mid-twentieth century, local issues and global issues are inextricably linked, with different groups of refugees from around the globe having been temporarily housed there on arrival in Germany. Origin locations of refugees who have been housed at Friedland and their distance from Friedland are painted onto the glass windows in the museum stairwell, which also overlooks the train line, emphasizing the journey, as well as the distant origin and current location in a temporary transit camp.

The museums here used place-based approaches to break down differences in scale in order to communicate to the public and to achieve the aims of broadening understanding and tolerance for others. Such fracturing of the dichotomy between what is "distant" and what is "close" can be described as a strategy of "distant-proximity". Similar strategies have been observed in museums focusing particularly on historical migration, as a way to achieve empathy between contemporary visitors and the experiences of migrants in the past (Whitehead et al., 2015, pp.52–54). However, here – to differentiate it from the temporal distancing

Figure 1.2 Local map, displayed as part of *entKOMMEN* exhibition. Photograph by author.

and proximity of past-presencing described earlier – the use of "distant-proximity" in exhibitions refers to spatial, geographic distance and proximity rather than temporal.

Private-publicness

A third approach identified in the museums was that objects and stories associated with the rights and responsibilities of formalized, official belonging in the public sphere were positioned or framed in the exhibitions in relation to very personal objects and stories, relating more to the "private sphere". Museums find it difficult to collect or loan significant objects from former refugees, as objects likely to be of interest to museums or to the exhibition-going public are also invested with personal meaning, or are required by their owners in order to evidence their right to remain within the society. Several of the exhibitions, including Zittau, presented smartphones in their displays relating to contemporary refugees, partly as they had become iconic objects associated with refugees, and partly to engage with the divisive discourses on the mobile phone as a luxury object, incongruous



Figure 1.3 Distant map showing routes of contemporary migration, displayed as part of *entKOMMEN* exhibition. Photograph by author.

with public expectations of refugee status (Interviewee B. Nowak, 2021). Within the Munich City Museum, one of the interventions is an interactive test for visitors to use, relating to the iconic city figure of the "*Münch'ner Kindl*" (a symbolic role offered to one local girl each year to represent Munich): "one could do a 'Munich child test' 'Do an ironic test'. And at the end you could acquire

a municipal citizenship ID – a Munich Kindl Passport" (Anon. Interviewee, Munich, 2021). The artist's father had migrated to Munich from Turkey, and the "test" refers ironically both to the need for formal identity documents and to cultural stereotypes. Museum Friedland exhibits a pair of men's underpants, previously owned by a refugee from Syria, who had had them adapted before his flight to create a concealed pocket at the front for money and documents to keep them secure during his journey to Europe. Similarly, in Frankfurt, one display area showed the personal possessions of Matiullah Jabarkhel, a refugee shot dead by police in 2018, three years after his arrival in Germany (see Figure 1.4). Each item was displayed and grouped by category, following the list of his possessions drawn up by the authorities following his death, exposing the small number and value of the possessions of a refugee, while highlighting the liminal place which a refugee occupies in public space.

Museum actors use similar exhibitionary strategies for topics of inclusion and exclusion, regardless of their views on the role of museums within society. Three ways of abstracting "contact" in exhibitions were identified, through the bringing together of oppositions in order to change visitors' perceptions: the well-known strategy of "past-presencing" (Macdonald, 2009); and newly coined ideas of "distant-proximity" and "private-publicness". In all four case studies and other museums visited, the strategies observed acted as "brokering" techniques offering visitors opportunities to develop knowledge, broaden understanding while promoting tolerance and empathy. Such strategies position museums as "spaces of encounter", even when there is no direct interpersonal encounter. Museums exhibiting issues of belonging act as multiscalar and multidirectional public

Figure 1.4 Displays of refugee's possessions in CityLab exhibition, Frankfurt. Photograph by author.

spaces where the complexity of belonging and not-belonging is exposed, and communicated – or brokered – through exhibitionary strategies which bring the public into "contact" with diverse experiences of belonging. In all the museums analyzed, these strategies can be seen as (unconscious) applications of contact and encounter theory (Standish, 2021; Delanty, 2011), where the exhibition was designed to facilitate or broker abstract encounters with difference.

Third element: performative and transformative actions in institutional practices

Institutional practices which relate to interpersonal encounters – both for external audiences, such as visitors and the wider public, as well as for internal audiences, such as museum staff, volunteers, and community participants – provide a further layer for analysis. Individual museum staff not only exert control – according to the affordances of their position – over what is encountered in the "public space" of museums and exhibitions, but also how it is encountered, and to some extent who it is encountered by. That museum actors and museum institutions can undertake either *performative* actions or *transformative* actions in relation to their engagement with social issues has been identified, whether as a "compensatory mechanism" (Anthias, 2013, p.324, as discussed by Mears, this volume) or as integral to their social purpose (Hooper-Greenhill, 2007; Soren, 2009; Garner, Kaplan, and Pugh, 2016; Schlosser and Zimmermann, 2017). Here, the impact of these actions on the issue of belonging is addressed.

Performative actions

In exhibitions where the emphasis lies in presenting factual information about topics of belonging to the public, with the aim to educate and inform while retaining a sense of distanced impartiality or neutrality, a high level of internal control is required. Such internal control rests on reinforcing the role of the museum (and its staff) as experts with knowledge to be imparted.

The intention in these exhibitions was always to spark off a process of change, reflection, and awareness-raising in relation to the idea of belonging today, yet the means by which this was attempted was often more performative than transformative. The focus was on potential or abstract positive outcomes of diverse societies while skimming over some of the more challenging aspects or concrete examples, where contemporary conflicts and contests of belonging emerge. This was particularly marked in those locations where the local population included a high proportion of supporters or high-profile individuals from the far-right scene (Interviewee U. Bretschneider, 2020) – understandably so, given the dangers that such a situation brings to the individuals involved. Even in less tense situations, it was clear that despite good intentions, many museum professionals in fact reinforced their position of control over the content and message of the exhibition, which then risked these exhibitions reinforcing existing positions, "re-othering" or ignoring

issues significant to those they aimed to represent. Some interviewees also reflected on how pre-existing working practices in the museum shaped their work now:

> it's always been conveyed in a different way (…) with the story of the Italian workers who stood up against wage discrimination … the strike is the topic, the rebellious team, who stood up against discrimination, that was the central topic […] not the discrimination itself.
>
> (Anon. Interviewee, Munich, 2021)

In examples where public dialogue, debate, or participation is offered in conjunction with exhibitions, it tends to be carefully managed and controlled, often with the separation of different interest groups or events. For example, in Zittau public community discussion events were arranged as individual targeted events for different groups, rather than combined events where strong feelings or differences of opinion might be aired, and where the museum and its staff have less control. Many interviewees made it clear that retaining strong levels of control resulted from institutional risk-aversion or local political sensitivities, and the fear of unintentionally giving a platform to discriminatory or undemocratic views. Consequently, such museums maintain a veneer of impartiality, neutrality, and distance on the subjective, emotional, and often challenging responses that topics of belonging engender. Such avoidance of emotion and the use of distance and impartiality as a control mechanism by museum institutions can undermine individual museum actors' attempts to offer transformative experiences for diverse visitors. Instead, the absence of engagement with visitors' emotional responses and the disengagement with potential conflicts – a key component of issues of belonging or non-belonging – may result in performative actions likely to have less impact on visitors, and on the social issues being addressed.

Transformative actions

Transformative actions in exhibitions go beyond offering expert content to be absorbed by the public, instead aiming to offer opportunities to those subject to exclusion, to expose the complexities of their everyday existence, and to become agents of the museum content rather than subjects of it (Soren, 2009; Lynch, 2011). Such transformative actions can be divided into two groups: firstly, those aiming to transform the institution from within, for example, through changing its internal actors or public participation in museum activities; secondly, those which aim to make the museum a place where transformative experiences can happen, directed at visitors and potential new audiences who might engage in the museum. Both forms of transformative action require a purposeful relinquishing of power and control, by the museum institution and by individual museum actors, in order to offer power to those more often excluded.

Efforts to diversify the museum staff and integrate anti-racist, anti-discriminatory practices into museum administration and management structures feature in

several interviews, highlighting the awareness among museum professionals of their own limitations and of the boundaries of their experience within the "majority" community of Germans or of Europeans. In some cases, this followed the model seen in the *Multaka* project, where people with a refugee or migrant background are invited to train as guides (Eckersley, 2020; Macdonald et al., 2021). Such projects are often short-term interventions, which face criticism for lack of sustainability; other museums have focused on ensuring that those in long-term, established museum roles are diverse and trained to address diversity constructively. In Museum Friedland, this point was addressed in interviews with the academic director:

> the topic of intercultural exchange is important for us. Half of our team of staff have a migration background (…) one might call it something of an "internal" important value.
>
> (Interviewee A. Haut, 2021)

It was also addressed by the staff member responsible for intercultural mediation:

> every section of the museum touches me and my personal story. So, I belong to the activities I'm conducting and I walk what I talk (…) I was raised by a refugee and worked with refugees in Syria and work with refugees here in Germany.
>
> (Interviewee S. Al-Jundi-Pfaff, 2021)

In Frankfurt, this has been embedded in institutional practice to the extent that staff members at all levels from front-of-house to the director were required to take part in specialist anti-racism workshops and training on how to manage discriminatory or extreme views, "in order to examine our own position and become aware of how far-reaching racism is and that racism still exists even if we don't experience it ourselves" (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021). This form of transformative institutional practice can be carried through into in-depth participatory work and projects, such as co-curated exhibitions, where curatorial control is relinquished or shared between museum professionals and public participants. In Frankfurt, this included an open invitation to people affected by all kinds of racism to participate, as well as ensuring that the "professional museographers (…) themselves have had these kinds of experiences" (2021). This contrasts with shallower participatory work where members of the public are seen as subjects from which information can be gathered, or as providers of objects and stories for inclusion in displays controlled by museum professionals.

One of the risks of such relinquishing of control by museum professionals is that conflict and dissent may be more openly voiced, both in the exhibition development phase and in public responses to the finished product. This was experienced in most of the exhibitions where greater public participation and involvement were integrated into the development processes; "of course we had

some controversial discussions; (…) the political battle became part of it, which is not unusual for such exhibitions" (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021). The ways in which museum professionals handle such conflicts are also dependent on whether strongly discriminatory perspectives or more "casual" "socially accepted" discriminatory perspectives are being voiced (Interviewee A. Haut, 2021), and the extent to which a dialogue appears to offer an opportunity to change perspectives. The case study museum actors aimed to encourage encounters between people with varying perspectives on topics of belonging. They all had concerns about the museum's representative democratic role being undermined either through "casual" racism embedded with social norms or through far-right opinions being expressed within the museum. The extent to which museum actors seek to retain control over this varies. In Zittau, the expectation was that such conflicts would not always be productive – "if you have someone who only has their own agenda, then you will not have any progress" (Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021). Participatory decision-making, as in Frankfurt, where "at the end of the day it is the participants that have the say" (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021), may reduce museum actors' control, but result in more open democratic processes. The role of exhibitions in facilitating self-representation "creates an empowering moment for many people (…) and that is a tool, or a method for strengthening the togetherness, the sense of belonging within the city society" (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021) and indicates how such transformative actions may support a sense of belonging to the museum and to the wider community.

As several interviewees point out, inviting participation and perspectives from beyond museum or academic expertise is relatively new in German museum work (Interviewee A. Kraft, 2021; Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021) and can be challenging: "to give people a feeling of belonging is not always easy (…) It is not only about saying 'come join us', it is really hard work that sometimes pushes one's boundaries" (Interviewee S. Gesser, 2021). Several added (Interviewee A. Haut, 2021; Interviewee B. Nowak, 2021; Interviewee P. Knüvener, 2021; Anon. Interviewee, Munich, 2021) that they had recently – or for future projects they would – put greater emphasis on seeking diverse public contributions in order to create a range of opportunities for transformative experiences: "you should leave the museum a changed person (…) the aim should really be for you to start thinking differently and behaving differently" (Interviewee A. Haut, 2021).

While both performative and transformative actions may be seen as attempts to offer recognition and belonging to people with experiences of migration, racism, discrimination, and exclusion, they are aimed at different audiences. Performative actions are focused on representing difference to a "host society" public, in order to encourage this public to accept "others" as belonging, whereas transformative actions aim to provide and facilitate opportunities for the marginalized public to enact their right to belong and to self-representation. Identifying these nuances revealed that a paradigm of difference is embedded within the boundaries of "who belongs" to, and who is considered "other" from the public addressed by many museums. Using the idea of participation to assert a position within the politics

of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006), museum actors – much like political actors – often negotiate these concerns by situating their work within a space of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) for a dialogic encounter between self and other (Aggarwal, 2015). The extent to which museum actions intended to be transformative can achieve these results could not be assessed; instead, this research has revealed that much museum work on belonging rests on an unspoken paradigm of *difference* rather than a paradigm of inclusion.

Discussion: the paradigm of difference in the museum as a public space of belonging

Together the three elements analyzed here highlight how museums and museum actors replicate dialectics of belonging and difference that are more often played out in the political and public sphere (Benhabib, 1992), by acting *either* as places of education which promote the tolerance of difference *or* as spaces for experimentation where diversity within belonging can be asserted. This brings us back to the idealized notion of the museum as a public space, one which acts as a proxy for democratic dialogic processes around belonging, through the representation of values considered important for "post-multicultural" societies, such as Germany or the EU.

Despite the similar aims of the museum professionals interviewed and the familiar exhibitionary strategies deployed, the means by which exhibitions were created corresponded to different ideas of what constitutes a "public space" and the extent to which museum actors saw social transformation as the role of museums. Although the museum actors aimed to promote understanding and empathy, the strategies used in communicating these issues through exhibitions not only present the problematics of contested belonging, but many also – albeit unintentionally – reproduce these problematics. The three exhibitionary strategies identified – past-presencing, distant-proximity, and public-privateness – tended to be directed towards a "host" society or dominant group audience. The overriding message, that "they" are not so different from "us" – a message rooted in intentions of empathy and tolerance – is based on the premise that there is intrinsic *difference* to be "tolerated" within democratic societies.

The ways in which museum actors engage in their work highlight that they navigate a boundary between holding centralized power (and creating performative actions) and offering dispersed power (to facilitate potentially transformative actions). This connects to the idea that public space can be either agonistic, "a competitive space, in which one competes for recognition, precedence and acclaim" (Benhabib, 1992, p.94), or associational; "they become the 'sites' of power, of common action coordinated through speech and persuasion" (ibid.). This reinforces the continued significance of the museum as a public space of control, despite the participatory turn (Mygind, Hällmann, and Benstsen, 2015) and the significance of museums for belonging: "the feeling of togetherness and

cooperation that a museum radiates is important" (Interviewee B. Nowak, 2021). Museum actors can adopt different approaches to issues of power and control in their wider work and to their staffing, influencing *how* they act as a public space of belonging and *whether* their work is performative or transformative.

Conclusion

The techniques and strategies of museum work in displaying, exhibiting, and thereby communicating difficult topics of belonging may follow similar patterns across different types of museum, and the overall aim of the museum professionals involved tends to follow similar lines (of tolerance, empathy, understanding, democracy). Museum actors recently (and those with more "activist" perspectives on the role of museums) seek to use museums as a means to transform people's lives as well as to influence public discourse on topics connected to belonging. They also see museums as public spaces which reinforce and perform these narratives.

Museums can act as public spaces linking belonging as a personal sense of "home" or dislocation, with belonging as a formalized criterion of citizenship or exclusion. All the museums explored created displays highlighting liminality between private and public belonging, between close and distant locations of contested belonging, and between historical and contemporary issues of non-belonging. Many museums focus on communicating to the "majority" public audience in their exhibitions, seeing "minority" others as sources of material rather than as further constituent audiences. Their aim is therefore primarily to promote tolerance and democratic values of "welcome" or "acceptance" among the majority public, rather than to provide opportunities to create and reinforce a sense of belonging among the minority public and between constituent groups. The few museums where significant transformative action was integrated or attempted aimed not only to embed these values within their work but also to make them commonplace rather than *exceptional*. Some aimed to offer social justice through recognition, participation, empowerment, and solidarity. Some aimed to educate and draw out "neglected" histories. Some aimed to offer diplomacy or promote dialogue. Some highlighted injustice while inviting participation (by handing over control); others highlighted injustice while avoiding potential conflict (and retaining control).

But does having control within the museum space create deeper social belonging beyond the museum? The ideal is that the museum acts as a model of public space that can be "scaled up", or as a "generator" for individual or group empowerment beyond the museum. However, it seems questionable whether this is achievable, given that the temporary invitation to members of the public to take control of museum work is neither long-term nor permanent. The hope that even temporary measures lead to change rests on "if" those museum actors holding power are willing to share or hand over control of the museum space. The notion that museums act as "representative" public spaces – a place of public

trust holding authority of recognition, authenticity, and value – reinforces a position where museum actors hold power over what the institution represents, how, and for whom. The power dynamic of the museum as a public space of belonging is negotiated between the museum actor, the museum as an institution, and the public(s), whether through performative or transformative actions. Belonging (and non-belonging) are therefore embedded within the power structures upheld by – or shaped by – museums.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all of the museum professionals who gave their time to be interviewed and for their openness and frankness in discussing their work. The research for this chapter was part of the project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place*.

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MIUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 769478.

Note

1 Interviewees were informed about options for anonymization and use of data as part of the informed consent process. Some chose to be anonymized and others chose to be named, and all interviewees were aware that the museums and exhibitions investigated would be identified.

References

Aggarwal, G. (2015) 'Mikhail Bakhtin and his response to authoritative discourse', *Contemporary Education Dialogue*, 12(1), pp. 87–109.

Al-Jundi-Pfaff, S. (2021) Intercultural communication, Friedland Museum, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.

Anonymous Interviewee Munich (2021) *City Museum Munich*, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.

Anthias, F. (2009) 'Thinking through the lens of translocational positionality: An intersectionality frame for understanding identity and belonging', *Translocations: Migration and Social Change*, 1(4): pp. 5–20.

Anthias, F. (2013) *Identity and Belonging: Conceptualisations and Political Framings*. KLA Working Paper Series 8. Cologne: Research Network for Latin America.

Benhabib, S. (1992) *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bock, J.-J. and Macdonald, S. (eds) (2019) *Refugees Welcome? Difference and Diversity in a Changing Germany*. Oxford: Berghahn.

Bretschneider, U. (2020) Director, *Museum Kloster Veßra*, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.
Chambers, I., De Angelis, A., Ianniciello, C., Orabona, M., Quadraro, M. (2016) *The Postcolonial Museum*. Routledge: Abingdon.
Coffee, K. (2008) 'Cultural inclusion, exclusion and the formative roles of museums', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 23(3), pp. 261–279.
Delanty, G. (2011) 'Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of cosmopolitanism: A theory of cultural encounters', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 62(4), pp. 633–656.
Eckersley, S. (2007) *Key factors influencing new museum buildings in the UK and Germany*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Newcastle University
Eckersley S. (2012) 'Opening the doors to hold the fort: museums and instrumental cultural policy in 19th century Britain and Germany', *Museum History Journal*, 5(1), pp. 77–104.
Eckersley, S. (2020) 'Encountering authenticity in the "contact zone"? Museums, refugees and participation', in Kimmel, D. and Brüggerhoff, S, (ed.) *Museen - Orte des Authentischen? Museums - Places of Authenticity?*. Mainz: Propylaeum, pp. 291–302.
Eymold, U. and Heusler, A. (eds) (2018) *Migration bewegt die Stadt. Perspective wechseln, Münchner Beiträge zur Migrationsgeschichte, Band 1*. Munich: Allitera Verlag.
Fraser, J. (2019) 'A discomforting definition of museum', *Curator*, 62(4), October 2019, pp. 501–504.
Garner, J., Kaplan, A. and Pugh, K. (2016) 'Museums as contexts for transformative experiences and identity development', *Journal of Museum Education*, 41(4), pp. 341–352.
Gesser, S. (2021), *City Lab, Historical Museum Frankfurt*, interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.
Gesser, S, Henning, P., Koller, M., Nzakizabandi, J., Thimm, S., Wayah, I. (2021) *Ich sehe was, was Du nicht siehst, Projektdokumentation zur Ausstellung, Historisches Museum*. Frankfurt: Zarbock GmbH.
Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Haut, A. (2021). Academic Director, *Museum Friedland*, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.
Holmgren, D. (2020). 'Managing displaced populations: The Friedland transit camp, refugees, and resettlement in cold war Germany', *Central European History*, *53*(2), pp. 335–352.
Hooper-Greenhill, E. (1990) 'The space of the museum', *Continuum*, 3(1), pp. 56–69.
Hooper-Greenhill, E. (2007) *Museums and Education: Purpose, Pedagogy, Performance*. London: Routledge.
ICOM (2018) https://www.icom-ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/5-proposals-for-a-new-museum-definition-1.pdf (accessed December 2021).
ICOM (2019) https://icom.museum/en/news/icom-announces-the-alternative-museum-definition-that-will-be-subject-to-a-vote/ (accessed December 2021).
ICOM Germany (2020) https://icom-deutschland.de/de/nachrichten/147-museumsdefinition.html (accessed December 2021).
Janes, R. and Sandell, R. (eds) (2019) *Museum Activism*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Kraft, A. (2021) *Lower Franconian Cultural Foundation*, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.

Knüvener, P. (2021) Director, *Cultural History Museum Zittau*, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.

Knüvener, Peter and Jens Hommel (eds) (2020) *entKOMMEN. Das Dreiländereck zwischen Vertreibung, Flucht und Ankunft, Zittauer Geschichtsblätter, Heft 54*. Görlitz: Verlag Gunter Oettel.

Korff, G., Bendix, J. and Bendix, R. (1999) 'Reflections on the museum', *Journal of Folklore Research*, 36(2/3), pp. 267–270.

Kreps, C. (2020) 'The work of culture, heritage, and muzealized spaces in "Unprecedented Times"', *Museum World*, 8 (1), pp. 102–110.

Lähdesmäki, T., Saresma, T., Hiltunen, K., Jäntti, S., Sääskilahti, N.,Vallius, A. and Ahvenjärvi, K. (2016) 'Fluidity and flexibility of 'Belonging'. Uses of the concept in contemporary research', *Acta Sociologica*, 59 (3), pp. 233–247.

Lynch, B. (2011) 'Custom-made reflective practice: can museums realise their capabilities in helping others realise theirs?', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 26(5), pp. 441–458.

Lynch, B. (2013) 'Reflective debate, radical transparency and trust in the museum', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 28(1), pp. 1–13.

Lynch B. and Alberti, S. (2010) 'Legacies of prejudice: Racism, co-production and radical trust in the museum', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 25(1), March 2010, pp. 13–35.

Macdonald, S. (2009) *Difficult Heritage*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Macdonald, S., Gerbich, C., Gram, R., Puzon, K. and Shatanawi, M. (2021) 'Re-framing Islam? Potentials and challenges of participatory initiatives in museums and heritage', in Puzon, K, Macdonald, S and Shatanawi, M., (eds) *Islam and Heritage in Europe*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Morse, N. (2018) 'Patterns of accountability: An organizational approach to community engagement in museums', *Museum & Society*, 16(2), pp. 171–186.

Moser, S. (2010) 'The devil is in the detail: Museum displays and the creation of knowledge', *Museum Anthropology*, 33(1), pp. 22–32.

Mygind, L., Hällman, A.K. & Bentsen, P. (2015) ,Bridging gaps between intentions and realities: a review of participatory exhibition development in museums', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 30(2), pp. 117–137.

Nagel, C. & Hopkins, P. (2010) 'Introduction: Spaces of Multiculturalism', *Space and Polity*, 14(1), pp. 1–11.

Nielsen, J.K. (2015) 'The relevant museum: defining relevance in museological practices', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 30(5), pp. 364–378.

Nowak, B. (2021) *Curator, entKOMMEN Exhibition*. Zittau: Cultural History Museum, Interview conducted by Susannah Eckersley.

Sandell, R. (1998) 'Museums as agents of social inclusion', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 17(4), pp. 401–418.

Schlosser Smith, J. and Zimmermann, C. (2017) 'The sanctuary series: Co-creating transformative museum experiences', *Journal of Museum Education*, 42(4), pp. 362–368.

Standish, K. (2021) 'Encounter Theory', *Peacebuilding*, 9(1), pp. 1–14.

Soren, B. (2019) 'Museum experiences that change visitors', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 24(3), Sept. 2009, pp. 233–251.

Thiemeyer, T. (2019) 'Politisch oder nicht: Was ist ein Museum im 21. Jahrhundert?', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 10/2019.

Vertovec, S. (2020) *Considering the work of 'integration' MMG Working Paper 2020–04*. Göttingen: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.

Walton, J., Paradies, Y. and Mansouri, F. (2016) 'Towards reflexive ethnicity: Museums as sites of intercultural encounter', *British Educational Research Journal*, 42(5), pp. 871–889

Weil, S.E. (1999) 'From being about something to being for somebody: The ongoing transformation of the American museum', *Daedalus*, 128(3), pp. 229–258.

Wenrich, R., Kirmeier, J. and Bäuerlein, H. (2019) *Heimat(en) und Identität(en): Museen im politischen Raum*. Munich: Kopaed.

Whitehead, C., Eckersley, S. and Mason, R. (2012), *Placing Migration in European Museums: Theoretical, Contextual and Methodological Foundations*. Milan: MELA Books.

Whitehead, C., Lloyd, K., Eckersley, S. and Mason, R. (eds) (2015) *Museums, Migration and Identity in Europe*. Abingdon: Ashgate.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40(3), pp. 197–214.

Chapter 2

Negotiated belonging

Migrant religious institutions in Warsaw

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz, and Joanna Wawrzyniak

Introduction: belonging, religious sites, and diverse communities

This chapter discusses migrant religious institutions as sites operating within the framework of diverse discourses of belonging and cultural diversity. The significance of a religious site in terms of belonging is usually seen from either a political or a socio-spatial perspective. From a political perspective, the discourse on migrant religious sites in Europe is gaining significance because of growing multiculturalism in the region, on the one hand, and the conflation of faith and political ideologies, on the other (Noble, 2019). Against this background, attitudes towards religious practices in public space play an important role because such practices "set apart, mark the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', and flag internal divides in a given community" (Foret, 2015, p.4). Religious sites attended by migrant communities make differences visible and help to crystallize the discourses of belonging/not belonging to the mainstream culture around them. As such, they have become important instances of the "politics of belonging" (Yuval-Davis, 2006) and a discursive resource for both inclusive multiculturalism and the exclusive politics rooted in essentialist concepts of identity.

From a social perspective, migrant religious sites are significant cases of the negotiation of spatially located belonging (Eckersley, 2022). They connect relocalized histories and memories and religious practices in new spatial contexts and social milieus (Hervieu-Leger, 2000). The religious institutions of immigrants do not exclusively serve as places catering for spiritual needs. They also provide their members with social support as well as cultural continuity through multifold connections to their countries of origin (Herberg, 1960; Handlin, 1971; Urbańska, 2018). In many instances, churches, mosques, temples, or pagodas are designed as – or effectively play the role of – "cultural centres", which direct their offers (e.g., language lessons) towards community members as well as members of the host society. As such, they have become instances of the dynamic and dialectical processes of reconstituting the meanings and senses of social belonging.

In this chapter, we argue that these two perspectives on belonging – the political discursive approach, which defines belonging as a "discursive resource which

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-5

constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion" (Antonsich, 2010, p.645), and the approach that sees belonging through the prism of social interactions "as an ongoing project achieved through everyday practices" (Garbutt, 2009, p.84) – should not be seen as separate from one another, but rather as mutually interdependent. Taken together, they highlight the processes of political inclusion in and exclusion from social and cultural spaces in Europe (Lähdesmäki et al., 2021), as well as the processual relations between social actors and the spatial contexts to which they adhere, including the aspects of "being" and "becoming" (Probyn, 1996; Skrbis, Baldassar, and Poynting, 2007). Overall, they contribute to the formation of new places for religious communities through the development of new sites or the adaptation of formerly existing structures and objects. These places operate within discursive contexts in which categories such as "foreign", "national", "inclusive", and "separate" are defined by migrant communities themselves as well as the host society. They shed light on the meaning of "belonging", not as a fixed, social identity, but rather as a discursive tool that allows groups culturally and religiously different from the host society to negotiate their presence in social space and life.

Our primary interest was the discourses of belonging that accompany the making of religious migrant sites in a city space, building up its multiculturality in recent times. Here, we have focused on Warsaw, Poland, as an important laboratory of such processes. After the fall of the Soviet Bloc, Poland was one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world. Over the last 30 years, the country as a whole and its capital in particular have faced migration waves and developed various stances on ethnic diversity. The immigrant population has grown significantly and systematically. According to General Statistics Office data, the number of work permits issued to immigrants rose sixfold between 2015 and 2020 (GUS, 2021).[1] In the wake of Poland's accession to the EU, the liberal discourse regarding immigrants to "Europeanizing" Poland has been shaped by the aspiration of "catching up" with the West by becoming a full member of the EU, thereby joining the "core" of the world-system (Zarycki, 2020). In this discourse, immigrants have been represented as providers of cultural diversity and included in the general Polish discourse of belonging to Europe. The presence of foreigners, especially "visible" migrants from "faraway" countries, legitimized Poland as a "truly European" country (Makaro, 2016; Dolińska and Makaro, 2013).

Appreciation for immigrants as a source of cultural diversity, a stance that was shaped by and adheres to the EU's postulates of inclusivity, openness, and tolerance, was particularly present in the local-level political discourse of Warsaw before and after 2015. Immigrants formed part of an imaginary of this city as a modern metropolis bursting with "exotic" restaurants and colourful ethnic festivals.[2] In a report titled *Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie* (*Foreigners in Warsaw*) – an outcome of a project funded by the European Economic Area – the authors noted that their respondents, who were city officials, perceived the presence of immigrants as an immanent characteristic of a multicultural metropolis. In their view, "Multiculturality was a value in its own right; therefore Warsaw, to become a 'truly European' metropolis, was to open itself up to different groups of immigrants"[3] (Majewski, 2017, p.48).

However, ever since the right-wing Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS) came to power in 2015, Polish society has been exposed to a revitalized ethno-Catholic national narrative in which some migrants are discursively employed as the negative others, perceived as a threat to "Polishness", which is defined in terms of Polish ethnic background, Roman Catholicism, and whiteness (Cap, 2018; Drozdzewski and Matusz, 2021). This state-led politics of belonging differentiates various groups of migrants and asylum seekers. Viewed from this perspective, Poland does not need to open more widely to non-European and non-Christian migrants, because it has already been accepting enough "culturally similar" Ukrainian migrants (Dudzińska and Kotnarowski, 2019). In this discourse, the acceptance of the presence of immigrants can only be conditional and takes the form of an "invisibility bargain" (Pugh, 2018) in which the migrants obtain acceptance in exchange for either their "assimilation" or agreement to refrain from actively participating in the social and political life of the host society, while at the same time contributing to its economy.

Those discursive political clashes prompted us to closely examine religious sites attended by three different diverse communities in Warsaw to see how they negotiate their belonging within this socio-political context: the Buddhist Vietnamese community, Muslims from various countries of origin, and Greek and Roman Catholic Ukrainians. The chapter is broken into three case studies describing the ways in which migrant religious sites in Warsaw are created or adapted through discursive negotiations of belonging. In the concluding part, we discuss similarities and differences between those cases and consider their general implications for the religious institution as a site entangling different narratives and practices of belonging.

The chapter draws on desk research, statistical data, social media content (particularly community websites and Facebook), public media (including speeches made by Polish political leaders and migrant community activists), semi-structured interviews,[4] and informal conversations with the communities' representatives. The study also included visits to two pagodas (Thiên Phúc and Nhân Hòa), two mosques (the Ośrodek Kultury Muzułmańskiej and Centrum Kultury Islamu), and the Greek Catholic Church of the Dormition of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The chapter was written before the outbreak of Russian invasion to Ukraine (February 2022), therefore it does not account for the changes in Ukrainian community in Poland after that date.

The Vietnamese pagodas: navigating between Polish diversity discourse and own-community affairs

The emergence of the Vietnamese migrant community in Poland is an outcome of the Cold War era when "fraternal assistance" programmes existing within the "socialist ecumene" granted around 5,000 Vietnamese students educational scholarships in Poland between 1955 and 1989 (Bayly, 2008). As a result, multifold connections were formed between the two countries and the inflow of Vietnamese migrants originally inspired by the socialist-era fraternal assistance programmes

continued on a larger scale as economically motivated migration after the political transition of 1989. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese arrived in Poland to make a living in the informal trade and gastronomy sector.

For the Vietnamese who initiate and run religious institutions, Polish public discourse on Vietnamese migrants provides as crucial a context for their activities as the social milieu of the Vietnamese migrant community. Research on stereotypes circulating among Poles indicates that the Vietnamese are considered to be hard-working, enterprising, and polite, but, at the same time, uncommunicative and likely to keep their own company and refrain from engaging in closer contact (Halik and Nowicka, 2002; Mayblin, Valentine, and Winiarska, 2016).

Analysis of the pagoda-building initiatives undertaken by members of the Vietnamese community reveals that their strategies have oscillated between attempts to gain recognition within Polish society and a desire to conform to the discourse constructed around the "invisibility bargain" (Pugh, 2018). According to this, pagodas exclusively serve the Vietnamese community and therefore, by building them, the Vietnamese community are refraining from participating in the social fabric of the host society. They are also unavoidably embedded in yet another area of the politics of belonging: the need to gain legitimacy within the Vietnamese community, which is dominated by proxy migrant organizations affiliated to the Vietnamese state apparatus, enabling the Vietnamese government to effectively manage diaspora affairs (Szymańska-Matusiewicz, 2017). Initiatives to establish a pagoda had to obtain legitimization from state-bound actors or risk being labelled as anti-state initiatives.

In 2004, the Vietnamese community made its first attempts to construct a "proper" pagoda; namely, a site serving religious purposes. Ms Vũ Khánh Tuyết, a member of the Socio-Cultural Society of Vietnamese in Poland, aimed to build a full-size pagoda, preferably in a prominent location such as the banks of the River Vistula (Chełmiński, 2004). This plan, however, was never realized. The initiative was entangled from the very beginning in the politics of the Vietnamese community, which dictated that any project conducted by the community should be supervised by and subordinated to organizations representing the Vietnamese state, such as the Association of Vietnamese in Poland (AVP). Attempts made by representatives of "official" organizations to influence the trajectory of the project met with resistance from some parts of the community – including pro-democratic activists vocal in the Polish media, who expressed their concerns that the pagoda initiative would be infiltrated by a non-democratic government.

Shortly afterwards, the first Vietnamese pagoda in Warsaw was built on the premises of the Thăng Long cultural centre, which occupied land leased by a wealthy Vietnamese businessman. The pagoda, named Thiên Việt, was managed by a Vietnamese-state-affiliated organization, the Association of Vietnamese Admirers of Buddhism. It was located behind the centre's high walls, and security monitoring made it difficult for chance passers-by to enter the pagoda. It was therefore effectively isolated from the public gaze despite being located in the vicinity of the centre of Warsaw. Thiên Việt's activities were closely tied in with

the operations of the Thăng Long cultural centre, following a model common for migrant religious institutions, in which spiritual services are offered together with other cultural assets. However, the centre's cultural offer was not intended to reach the Polish public. This approach stood in sharp contrast to the initial plans drawn up by Ms Tuyết. While the outcome of the strategy pursued by the Thiên Viet/pagoda managing group might have been determined by the internal dynamics of the Vietnamese community, it is plausible that the fear of a hostile response from Polish society also influenced this process. For instance, while some of the participants in the discussion on the gazeta.pl website expressed their support for the initiative, many of the readers' comments included xenophobic and racist arguments fuelled by the fear of Poland being dominated by followers of alien religions (Wietnamczycy chcą zbudować…, 2004). While the Vietnamese community in general was perceived by those participating in the forum as non-threatening and – as such – positively contrasted with Muslim immigrants, constructing a religious site in a prominent location within Warsaw's metropolitan space raised controversies among the Polish public.

The Thiên Việt pagoda operated for six years, until 2010, when it was closed, together with the open-air market based at the Tenth Anniversary Stadium, during the construction of the National Stadium – a new flagship sports ground catering for the Euro 2012 football championship. The decision on how to proceed with the construction of a new pagoda raised intense debates within the Vietnamese community. The former owner of the Thăng Long centre decided to transform his private residential villa in the village of Laszczki (in the Raszyn municipality) into a new pagoda called Thiên Phúc.

However, the Association of Vietnamese Admirers of Buddhism, the organization granted the legitimization to manage Buddhist affairs in Poland by the Vietnamese state, opposed this move and called, instead, for the construction of a "community" pagoda under their supervision. As a result of this conflict, two pagodas were built. Much like Thiên Việt, they are located in the vicinity of a major centre of economic activity for the Vietnamese community, in this case, the Wólka Kosowska complex of wholesale warehouse facilities (close to the village of Laszczki), which has superseded the Tenth Anniversary Stadium as the major wholesale trade centre. Their location in a suburban landscape dominated by single-family houses and devoid of common open spaces makes it difficult for them to become embedded in their social and spatial surroundings. The pagodas remain virtually absent in the Polish public discourse: almost all information about them online is only available in the Vietnamese language and there is little Polish media coverage of their activities.

While the Nhân Hòa pagoda initially attempted to define itself as a Vietnamese cultural centre reaching out to the Polish public, these plans were never implemented. Conversely, the Thiên Phúc pagoda currently undertakes multiple initiatives to reach out to the broader public by attempting to transcend ethnic boundaries. Wary of the conflict around the legacy of the Thiên Việt pagoda, the Vietnamese-state-affiliated organization initially declined to grant formal

recognition to the Thiên Phúc pagoda, prompting the new temple to attempt instead to root itself within the social context of Polish institutions. Soon after its opening, the pagoda launched a series of meetings and events for representatives of the local authorities administering Lesznowola commune and Polish academics. It also hosted educational school trips and workshops on the Buddhist religion and Vietnamese culture for older local people. These efforts, combined with a very welcoming attitude towards any visitors to the pagoda, did not, however, lead to the emergence of any permanent links with the Polish community (Grabowska and Szymańska-Matusiewicz, 2022). Throughout the pagoda's short history, its supporters have been almost exclusively Vietnamese. It also welcomed occasional Polish visitors – including those interested in joining Buddhist practices – but their interest proved to be short-lived. The only permanent link established with a Polish institution was a relationship maintained with the Karma Kamstang Centre, a Polish-operated Buddhist organization. The cooperation between the Vietnamese and Polish pagodas includes mutual visits by members of both congregations, with Polish monks concelebrating religious ceremonies in the two Vietnamese-operated pagodas.

The lack of success of Thiên Phúc's attempts to embed itself into the Polish social context can be attributed to many factors, the most obvious being the linguistic barriers. Another important aspect hindering the acquisition of new converts to Buddhism is the differences in spiritual practices between Asian migrant Buddhist congregations and organizations established by Western followers of Buddhism (Matthews, 2006; Glein, 2019). Moreover, as the Vietnamese adherents of Buddhism are the sole source of income for the pagoda's operations, the management group needs to adjust their agenda to primarily focus on the needs of the ethnic community (Grabowska and Szymańska-Matusiewicz, 2022).

Despite these obstacles, the representatives of the Thiên Phúc pagoda continue their efforts to embed themselves in a complex network of belonging in diverse social contexts. In 2020 and 2021, charity actions became a particularly prominent sphere of negotiations, for example, the Lunar New Year events, during which pagoda representatives directly addressed Polish audiences. The COVID-19 crisis provided yet another opportunity to claim belonging to the Polish social context: the Thiên Phúc pagoda provided substantial quantities of masks, protective garments, and alcohol-based sanitizer to Polish medical staff. These actions supporting the effort to combat COVID-19 received media coverage in the internet versions of major press titles such as *Newsweek Polska* and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, as well as on local public television (TVP3, 2020; Wojtczuk, 2020; Kim, 2020). *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the TVP3 TV channel explicitly mentioned the pagoda management group as one of the Vietnamese organizations actively providing help for hospital medical staff. The participation of representatives of the Vietnamese community in the COVID-19 relief actions resonated particularly well with the prevailing liberal discourse, in which migrants are assumed to enrich the host society. However, the media representing the conservative stance also shared information about

these actions, which might be perceived as a manifestation of the more general trend of contrasting the non-threatening and therefore "good" Vietnamese migrants with potentially dangerous migrants of Muslim origin (Grabowska and Szymańska-Matusiewicz, 2022).

The complex processes involved in the foundation of three Vietnamese pagodas in Warsaw reveal that the Vietnamese attempting to establish Buddhist religious sites had to operate within the differing contexts of Polish discourses on cultural diversity. While Thiên Việt and Nhân Hòa seem to illustrate the "invisibility" strategy, the practices of belonging undertaken by the Thiên Phúc pagoda management group include constant efforts to embed themselves within another social context shaped by a discourse celebrating multiculturality. The pagodas also have to relate their efforts to the discursive realm shaped by the authoritarian Vietnamese state, which exerts a significant impact on the diaspora through the network of state-affiliated migrant organizations. In summary, the case of the Vietnamese pagodas illustrates how minority religious practices and sites catering to the needs of migrant communities are shaped by multiple discourses on belonging and legitimization, coined both inside the ethnic community and within diverse national and transnational contexts.

The story of a mosque: an unsuccessful attempt to build a "multicultural bridge"

Warsaw has several Muslim prayer spaces hidden from the public that do not play a significant role in Polish political discourses. However, the story of the city's only standalone mosque, which was opened in 2015 by the Muslim League (Liga Muzułmańska, LM), accurately reflects the trajectory of multilayered negotiations of belonging that took place against the background of changing political discourses, and among Muslims themselves. Its history also reveals how attempts to create a multicultural discourse of belonging in the wake of the introduction of liberal policies subsequently had to be curtailed due to the onset of an Islamophobic atmosphere.

Muslim communities in Poland are not numerous,[5] yet they are ethnically, linguistically, and socially diverse, encompassing Polish Tatars, Polish converts to Islam, immigrants, and refugees from Arabic-speaking countries and the former Soviet Union as well as other parts of the world. Their public activities have mainly been represented by two distinct associations: the Muslim Religious Union (Muzułmański Związek Religijny, MZR), which was founded by Tatars in the interwar period,[6] and the aforementioned Muslim League,[7] which has been run since the early 2000s by immigrants from the Middle East. Although both associations are Sunni and their representatives are the main cultural brokers of Islam in Poland, they have episodes of competition with each other over their respective claims to religious leadership, during which they manoeuvre against each other by phrasing their belonging to Islam and the Polish and European public spheres differently.

Tatars are the oldest Muslim community in Poland, with settlements dating back to early modern times. They created their distinct identity by mixing Islamic and local traditions and are recognized by the state not only as a religious but also as an ethnic minority. Their historic villages and mosques in Eastern Poland are considered part of the national heritage. After the democratic breakthrough in 1989, the MZR contributed to the revival of Tatar religious legacies by stressing their ties with Polish (and by extension European) culture, openly opposing any radical version of Islam (including the veiling of women). The Mufti of Poland, who was appointed in 2004 to a post that had been vacant since the Second World War, is a Polish Tatar imam. Significantly, until the end of the 1990s, membership of the MZR was only open to Muslims with Polish citizenship. Only later, facing competition from the LM, did the MZR change its policies by broadening its membership base to incorporate migrants holding residence permits (Pędziwiatr, 2011).

The other Muslim community, which is more diverse, was formed at the time of the Cold War, when Poland, along with other socialist countries, was hosting students from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Some of them married and stayed in Poland, becoming both members of the country's middle class and the initiators of Islamic activism that competed with that of the Tatars. Initially, this primarily involved offering space to those Muslims who had not been accepted into the MZR, effectively broadening the multiculturality of Poland's Muslim community. The LM has also undermined the leadership role of the Mufti of Poland by announcing the creation of a new position, the Mufti of the Muslim League, which was offered to Nedal Abu Tabaq, a Polish-Palestinian doctor, in 2008. The LM also set up branches in several major Polish cities, filling social spaces overlooked by the MZR, and both associations competed for the right to issue halal certificates. Not surprisingly, they also clashed over the Warsaw mosque project, and the story of the building's creation reflects the conflict between their differing identities, with the Tatars representing themselves as "legitimate" Polish Muslims, and the LM promoting their pedigree as representatives of a tolerant multicultural Islam (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr, 2017).

The need to build a "proper" mosque in the Polish capital was already being articulated by the Tatars in the interwar period, but their idea for a grandiose mosque with four 20-metre-high minarets was hibernated during the Second World War and under communism, only to resurface in the 1990s. The MZR revived the old plans, but in 1993 ended up adapting a villa on the outskirts of the city. This has operated, alongside its modest Warsaw Islamic Centre (see Figure 2.1), until today.[8] Although the space provided at that location is insufficient for a growing Muslim community, the MZR failed to regain a pre-war land allotment from the city authorities that had been donated for the initial mosque project.

The Muslim League turned out to be more resourceful. In 2004, it bought another plot on the open market thanks to fundraising in the Arab world. The construction of the mosque was ultimately made possible by agreements granted by the Warsaw authorities amid a wave of investment in multiculturality. By the

Figure 2.1 Warsaw Islamic Centre. Source: photograph by Joanna Wawrzyniak.

Figure 2.2 Centre of Muslim Culture. Source: photograph by Joanna Wawrzyniak.

time it was officially opened in 2015, as the Centre of Muslim Culture, it contained a prayer space accommodating several hundred people, conference rooms, and a library. The building's design combines a traditional Middle Eastern style with features of modern European architecture (see Figure 2.2). Its cosmopolitan, futuristic appearance differentiates it from the Tatar mosques in Eastern Poland, the aesthetics of which tend to reflect Catholic and Orthodox borderland culture rather than Islam. Not surprisingly, the construction of the Centre was opposed by the Tatars, with the Mufti of Poland distancing himself from the project and publicly expressing his discontent at the fact that permission to build a mosque in the capital had been granted to the LM, but not the MZR.

While the struggles between the two associations played a certain part in phrasing the role of the Centre of Muslim Culture as a cosmopolitan bridge between the Arab world and Europe that provided an alternative to more locally oriented Tatar

mosques, fully fledged argumentation of this sort was developed when the need arose to counteract the first signs of Islamophobic moral panic. From the very beginning, the construction of the mosque was opposed by the Europa Przyszłości (Europe of the Future) association, run by a few conservative public intellectuals who represented themselves as "liberals" allegedly acting in the defence of open society and human rights and saw their mission in terms of "stopping the development of Islamism in Europe, especially in Poland". This was because, in their view, "Islamism… is a totalitarian movement hostile to democracy … freedom of expression, secularization, gender equality, [and] freedom of religion".[9] In 2011, the association organized protests at the construction site with slogans such as "Blind tolerance kills reason".

The incumbent leader of the Muslim League, Samir Ismail, a Polish-Palestinian paediatrician, counteracted the protests by stressing the LM's commitment to democratic values and the liberal narrative.[10] He presented an ambitious view of the Centre's future, incorporating its mission to build bridges between civilizations and cultures by investing in dialogue with the entire spectrum of Polish society regardless of race, gender, party affiliation, or religion, thereby contributing to the strengthening of Poland's image as a tolerant country. Ismail even used the example of the prominent Muslim football players who were due to come to Poland for Euro 2012 to make his point that Warsaw could not afford not to have a presentable mosque with such famous visitors arriving from abroad.[11] This view comfortably fits the narrative of post-socialist Warsaw transforming itself into a multicultural European capital.

However, the escalation of Islamophobia gradually curtailed such multicultural ambitions. The media started to disseminate representations of Islam that relied on such terms as "invasion", "incubator of jihad", "the clash of civilizations", "the suicide of Europe", and "the mistaken multicultural ideology" (Bertram, Puchejda, and Wigura, 2017). In its electoral campaign, the Law and Justice Party used negative representations of Islam "to affiliate safety and security with a uniform Polish nation, while locating threat and insecurity as disruptions to that unity" (Drozdzewski and Matuszak, 2021, p.3). As a result of this antagonistic politics of (non)belonging, which has been further fuelled by representations of Islam as a dangerous political ideology rather than a religion, Muslims in Poland have gone from "being a largely accepted community to becoming suspicious and opposed by large segments of the Polish society" (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr, 2017, p.442). The Law and Justice rhetoric has encouraged far-right groups to perpetrate verbal and physical attacks on Muslim religious sites as well as contributing to the wider circulation of stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists (Golebiowska, 2018; Górak Sosnowska and Pachocka, 2019; Dudzińska and Kotnarowski, 2019).

The Muslim Centre became the focus of targeted attacks, including the shooting out of all the windows at the construction site with a pneumatic weapon, or the delivery of envelopes stuffed with bacon by a far-right, anti-Muslim organization calling itself Polska Liga Obrony (Polish Defence League) which compared the Koran to *Mein Kampf* and propagated the idea that Muslims should be forcibly

expelled from Poland.[12] In 2015, a week after the opening of the mosque, a woman profaned the site by dropping a pig's head on the premises. Similar attacks happened at other Muslim sites, including the traditional Tatar mosques in Eastern Poland. As Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr (2017, p.445) argue, "the repercussions of heightened anti-Muslim sentiments affect all Muslims in Poland, including the Tatars, who are not themselves immune to this Othering, despite having contributed to the creation of such a narrative".

Ultimately, since its opening, the Centre of Muslim Culture has realized only a fraction of its ambitious initial plans. Even though the Centre has continued to provide a cultural offer for both Muslims and the wider public (for instance, by opening for individual and group visitors, taking part in museum nights or offering general lectures on Islamic tradition on social media during the COVID-19-related lockdown), many of its activities have been confined to those communities with close links to the Muslim League. Both the Centre and the League have refrained from issuing public statements relating to the refugee crisis, so as not to stir up too much public attention.

Overall, the offer of the Centre of Muslim Culture was meant to counteract antagonistic discourse on Islam by making a space for diversity and plurality, locally (in Warsaw), nationally (in Poland), and on a European scale. This discourse surfaced in reaction to a Polish Tatar narrative of belonging that initially was not inclusive enough for Muslim immigrants, as well as the Polish right wing's enforcement of the stereotypical image of the violent "other". Our case study reveals that these attempts to enroot a narrative of belonging of Muslims to Warsaw, composed of liberal, cosmopolitan, and religious content, have so far been less than successful. Yet should the political atmosphere relax, the local actors express some hopes for more sustainable practices in future.

Ukrainian Catholics – between national and religious discourses on belonging

Ukraine is a largely secularized country, a consequence of the times when it belonged to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, 64.9% of Ukraine's inhabitants consider themselves Orthodox, and 9.5% are Greek Catholics (Razumkov Centre, 2019). Greek Catholics predominate in western Ukraine, where most of the Ukrainian migrants living in large cities in Poland, including Warsaw, come from. There are no studies on the religious diversity of Ukrainians in Warsaw, but on the basis of comments in internet groups created by and for Ukrainian migrants[13] and interviews we have conducted with representatives of this community, it can be concluded that these migrants from Ukraine include members of the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, and Baptist churches. Polish research on the religiosity of migrants shows that 10.7% of Ukrainians in Poland attend church in their free time.[14]

This contrasts significantly with the social situation in Poland in at least two aspects. Firstly, Poland's religious life is dominated by the Roman Catholic

Church, whose followers (or at least those formally belonging to this religion) account for over 90% of society. Roman Catholicism is equated with Polishness within the framework of the national ideology and therefore exerts a profound influence on policy decisions made by the contemporary Polish state. Secondly, the Church has a strong socio-cultural position (although this is weaker in large cities such as Warsaw) and many Polish residents regularly participate in religious ceremonies such as Sunday masses or church holidays, a situation that our Ukrainian interlocutors perceive as being significantly different from that in their home country.

When we examined issues impacting how migrants from Ukraine negotiate their belonging to Polish society, the situation of Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic Ukrainians proved to be particularly interesting. The Greek Catholic Church is also known as the Catholic Church of the Byzantine-Ukrainian rite and uses the Ukrainian language during the liturgy. It is part of the Polish Catholic Church and independent from the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine.

The Catholic Church in Poland has an extensive infrastructure, and its material and human resources enable it to organize pastoral ministry for migrants as well as Polish citizens. The Catholic media present the Church as an institution that is aware of the influx of immigrants and provides them with pastoral care.[15] Warsaw, as the capital and the biggest city in Poland, is the most popular destination point for immigrants, who are very diverse in terms of nationality and religion. National diversity is also present among Catholic migrants. The Archdiocese of Warsaw (in the western part of the city) creates chaplaincies that operate in many different languages, and its official website has four language versions reflecting the most numerous groups of Catholics in Warsaw: Polish, Italian, English, and Spanish.[16] Meetings, services, and confessions are also held in French, German, Vietnamese, and Ukrainian. There are also three Greek Catholic parishes. The oldest of these was established in the eighteenth century (see Figure 2.3), and the other two in 2013 and 2015, respectively. There are two further such parishes in the Warsaw-Praga diocese in the eastern part of the city. Both were created in 2020 as a response to the increasing numbers of people arriving from Ukraine.

Ukrainian migrants maintain a presence in the Polish Catholic Church in two ways: as followers of Roman Catholicism and as followers of Greek Catholicism, which has its own, separate structure within the Church. In both cases, the Polish Church focuses on attracting as many believers as possible, but it has various ways of defining the community of believers, its place in the city space, and how migrants may be included in parish communities. Ukrainians coming to Poland do not create their own places of religious worship, tending instead to use the existing infrastructure and church structures. This is because, due to the two countries' cultural and historical closeness, the same denominations function in both Poland and Ukraine, though with varying levels of influence.

Migrants from Ukraine also experience different types of belonging depending on which denomination they belong to. Greek Catholics enter communities that mainly consist of Ukrainians living in Poland who use the Ukrainian language in

Figure 2.3 The Greek Catholic Church and monastery of the Basilian Friars in Warsaw. Source: Wistula. Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UlicaMiodowaWarsawDSC_1224.JPG. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0.

the liturgy and during community meetings. However, some people from Ukraine who were Roman Catholic before coming to Poland or have converted to that religion before marrying a Polish citizen face difficulties with using the Ukrainian language during religious practices because there are almost no Roman Catholic masses in Ukrainian.[17]

The Ukrainian language plays a fundamental role in practices of belonging to the Catholic Church (both Greek and Roman). Our Ukrainian interlocutors emphasized that even if they are familiar with Polish, they are sometimes not proficient enough to be able to fulfil their religious duties, so the opportunity to pray in their native tongue enables them to fully participate in the local religious community. The Dominican Order organizes masses in Ukrainian for such people once a month in the centre of Warsaw, and these sometimes attract about a hundred people. As one middle-aged woman recalled:[18]

> On Freta Street at the Church of Saint Jacek there is a mass in Ukrainian once a month. Then there is confession. And after the Holy Mass, we meet with everyone who is willing, who is able to, to have tea, biscuits… It was difficult for me in Polish and often I just cried because I didn't fully understand

> anything. And now I have started to experience these Holy Masses so spiritually.

Other people we interviewed also spoke about masses in the Ukrainian language being very important for them.

From the point of view of the Church, the priests we interviewed stated that their prime objective should be to eliminate differences between Ukrainians and Poles so that the former can be included in local communities without the need to take any account of their linguistic distinctiveness. According to one of the clergymen celebrating church services in Ukrainian, that language is very important for intimate religious practices, but religious Ukrainians generally end up finding a place for themselves in Polish parishes and that is where they should stay:

> we also assumed that many people who come to us, Roman Catholics, they are involved in various groups and communities in Polish operating in various parishes or churches, in an academic chaplaincy, so we did not create here such a copy of what is happening in parishes in Poland, but in the Ukrainian language. It was just that one mass, the possibility of holy confession, a meeting from time to time. So as not to tear these people away from those places where they pray in Polish.

Such an approach may be characterized as a discourse of incorporation in which actions aimed at the assimilation of migrants are justified with minimal consideration of their cultural background. In other words, from the priest's point of view, the most desirable model for facilitating the religious belonging of Ukrainians to the Catholic Church incorporates them into the structures of the Polish Roman Catholic Church, while at the same time providing them with a clearly defined minimal contact with religion through the Ukrainian language. In this case, belonging to a religious community and religious practices are the most important issues, and the Ukrainian language becomes a tool for such practices.

Some people, however, have an opposite understanding of the relationship between belonging to the Ukrainian community (also understood as a language community) and belonging to a religious community. One of the middle-aged women we interviewed expressed her views as follows:

> the church becomes just such a place where apart from the fact that you have a religious element, there is also a community there. You meet there, you are looking for a job, you are looking for a place to live, you are looking for friends.

For her, Ukrainian migrant meetings in the church were primarily social, regardless of any religious motivation. Even if religious practices are important, it is equally significant to be in a milieu of people speaking the same language and with similar experiences.

To sum up, the linguistic aspect is also very important for the Church in Poland, as Polish Catholicism has a strong national dimension.[19] Consequently, many people involved with the Church are of the opinion that the inclusion in parish life of people who may potentially stay longer in Poland should take place through the Polish language, and activities in Ukrainian can only be a side practice. While Roman Catholicism is strongly associated in the Church discourse with Polishness, Greek Catholicism is associated with Ukrainianness. The religious diversity of contemporary Ukraine also has a political dimension associated with narratives of Ukrainian national identity. Most of the country's inhabitants feel connected with the Orthodox Church, mainly through family traditions. However, it is the Greek Catholic Church that is considered to be the "national Ukrainian Church", especially in western Ukraine. The vast majority of this Church's followers in Ukraine and Poland are people of Ukrainian identity, its official language is Ukrainian, and the Church itself is also viewed as a place where Ukrainian traditions can be cultivated.

After arriving in Poland, Ukrainians enter the historically established structures of the Polish Catholic Church. There is a separate place for them there as Greek Catholics and it is only within this religious social enclave that they can use the Ukrainian language. Those migrants who are Roman Catholics are gradually incorporated into Polish-language parishes. Thus, it is a person's denomination that largely determines how they are admitted to the community of the faithful and how their cultural background is incorporated into the processes that establish belonging to Polish local religious communities. Ukrainian migrants learn some Polish because they need it while working in Warsaw; however, enclaves where they can pray in Ukrainian are organized mainly in the Greek Catholic parishes. Roman Catholic Ukrainians' sense of belonging may be made problematic by having to take part in religious services held in Polish; however, their opportunities to practice in Ukrainian are limited. Therefore, it is their religious denomination which determines the scope of their presence within the linguistic (or language-based) social worlds.

Conclusions: migrant religious sites within the matrix of discourses on belonging in Warsaw

This chapter has identified the complexity of discourses within which three diverse communities negotiate their religious belonging. Vietnamese and Ukrainians are primarily represented through the prism of their country of origin and language rather than their religious affiliation. Conversely, Polish society perceives Muslims solely in terms of their religion; their community's huge internal diversity in terms of ethnicity and nationality is rarely acknowledged. Moreover, the communities themselves differ in the ways they have implemented their religious practices in Warsaw's urban space. Over the last three decades, the Vietnamese and Muslims have begun to construct pagodas and mosques in Warsaw. The histories of these sites represent cases of "negotiated belonging", as we have shown

earlier. In contrast, Roman and Greek Catholic churches have existed in Warsaw for many years, so those Ukrainians who consider themselves Roman or Greek Catholic can rely on an existing religious infrastructure. This affects how the process of negotiated belonging is shaped. Ukrainians are generally perceived as being more "similar" to Poles due to a cultural and linguistic affinity that is not shared by representatives of the other two communities. And yet they negotiate their belonging – to both Polish society and the Ukrainian nation – through reference to their identity, religion, and language. As we have shown, the relations between Ukrainian Catholics and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland are especially interesting in this respect, because the Roman Catholic Church is strongly associated with the Polish national discourse and operates in Polish, while the Greek Catholic Church perceives itself as the Ukrainian national Church and functions in the Ukrainian language.

In the case of the Vietnamese community, the fear of being targeted by exclusionary practices might have led them to abandon their initial plans to construct a pagoda in a central location in Warsaw. However, it is less obvious to what extent the actual practices of migrants exert a reciprocal influence on the public discourse. The representatives of the Vietnamese pagodas, and Thiên Phúc in particular, achieved some success in gaining recognition while at the same time staking a claim to belong to the local and Polish social context by undertaking charity actions that received generally positive media coverage. However, it is difficult to predict how the potential broadening of discursive communities built around the Buddhist pagodas through the enlargement of their presence in the Polish public sphere will resonate within the nationalistic discourse. It seems that the Muslim community has pushed harder against the boundaries of the "invisibility bargain" than the Vietnamese community. The Centre of Muslim Culture had two primary aims: to deconstruct the existing image of the Orientalized, violent Other by educating Poles about Islam, and to offer a space of belonging for multicultural communities that had been homogenized and stereotyped by the discourse of the mainstream majority. More generally, the site was meant to serve as a visible testimony to Poland's cultural openness in an enlarged Europe. But such attempts to gain visibility through this discourse of belonging were curtailed after the Centre was attacked, along with a number of other mosques in Poland, during a wave of anti-Islam actions perpetrated by far-right groups and backed by the rhetoric of the governing party.

In our chapter, we examined migrant religious institutions in Warsaw in the context of the two perspectives on belonging: the political discursive approach and the perspective that sees belonging through the prism of social interactions. We have argued that the diverse phenomena constituting the realm of "belonging" – including the public discourse and everyday practices of actors involved in the operation of migrant religious institutions – become intricately interrelated with one another. The political discourses either encourage minority activists to undertake particular actions that would increase their visibility in the public sphere or restrain them from doing so. At the same time, we have observed practices of

belonging that are shaped by factors other than the political orientation of the host society. For example, actors within pagodas, mosques, and churches tend to negotiate their belonging in relation either to their own homeland, another vision of community building (the Vietnamese); other religious associations (the Muslims); or the existing structures of the Catholic Church (the Ukrainians). Nonetheless, a close examination of the sites that diverse migrant communities use for their religious practices shows that there is a strong relationship between "politics of belonging" and the way those communities negotiate their presence within the socio-spatial context of Warsaw.

Acknowledgements

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 769478. The project *en/counter/points* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, MIUR, NCN, NWO, BMBF, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020.

Notes

1 In late 2019, before the outbreak of the COVID pandemic, the number of foreigners residing in Poland was estimated to be over 2.1 million (including 1.35 million Ukrainians) (GUS, 2020), which still is less than 5% of the population.
2 The Wielokulturowe Warszawskie (Multicultural Warsaw) Street Party, a major event organized annually since 2006, has aimed to promote multiculturalism and celebrate the culture of immigrant communities, invoking the Notting Hill Carnival in London and the Rio de Janeiro Carnival as appropriate models for Warsaw.
3 Original (in Polish): "Wielokulturowość jest wartością samą w sobie, co ma oznaczać, że stolica, aby stać się 'prawdziwą' europejską metropolią musi otworzyć się na różne grupy migrantów". All translations by the authors unless noted otherwise.
4 The research was conducted in accordance with the Code of Ethics developed by the Polish Sociological Society, which applies to all sociologists in Poland. All interlocutors voluntarily agreed to take part in the interviews, and agreed to their recording and transcription. They were informed that their data (name, surname, address) would never be disclosed; that the transcripts of their interviews would only be used in collective studies, in excerpts, and in an anonymous form; and that no one would contact them about these interviews.
5 Muslims in Poland number between 10,000 and 80,000, depending on the source. Their number is most likely rising (see discussion of sources in Dudzinska and Kotnarowski, 2019).
6 For the MZR official website see: http://mzr.pl/historia-mzr-w-rp/ (accessed 15 August 2021).
7 For the LM official website see: https://www.islam.info.pl/ (accessed 15 August 2021).
8 For the Centre's official website see: http://www.centrumislamu.pl (accessed 15 August 2021).
9 https://euroislam.pl/stowarzyszenie/o-nas/ (accessed 15 August 2021).
10 N.a. Meczet w Warszawie? „Nie mamy Ochoty". 27 March 2010, https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/meczet-w-warszawie-nie-mamy-ochoty/776qdse (accessed 15.08.2021).

11 An interview with Dr Samir Ismail by Mariusz Wieczerzyński (in Polish), *As-Salam* 2010 20/21 (2/3).
12 https://polskaligaobrony.pl/ (accessed 15 August 2021).
13 Facebook groups: Українці в Польщі Ukraińcy w Polsce, https://www.facebook.com/ukraincywpolsce/; „Українці у Варшаві Ukraińcy w Warszawie", https://www.facebook.com/groups/1562419947408902/?ref=direct; Варшава оголошення (житло, робота, послуги), https://www.facebook.com/groups/2178348795781943/; Українці в Варшаві, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1021755154535261/about/ (accessed 1 July 2021).
14 https://www.paih.gov.pl/20180904/badanie_ewl_raport_ukraincy_na_polskim_rynku_pracy (accessed 30 October 2021).
15 https://www.niedziela.pl/artykul/154115/nd/Kosciol-wedrujacy (accessed 30 October 2021).
16 https://archwwa.pl/ (accessed 30 October 2021).
17 There is one church in Warsaw that organizes Roman Catholic masses in Ukrainian: https://www.sluzew.dominikanie.pl/index/?show_only=2018-05-26.1248465. After the war in Ukraine broke out, such masses were organized also in the second church in Warsaw: https://parafiaswtomasza.pl/2022/03/05/msza-sw-rzymskokatolicka-po-ukrainsku/ (accessed 4 April 2022).
18 All extracts from interviews translated from Polish or Ukrainian by the author.
19 Sociological research shows that most Poles do not believe that being a Roman Catholic is a prerequisite for someone to be recognized as Polish. However, in extreme Catholic-nationalist circles, the saying "Poland will be Catholic or it will not be at all" is popular. Moreover, the constitutive relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the state and national ideology is emphasized by the party currently in power and is often used in public discourse.

References

Antonsich, M. (2010) 'Searching for belonging: An analytical framework', *Geography Compass*, 4(6), pp. 644–659.

Bayly, S. (2008) 'Vietnamese narratives of tradition, exchange and friendship in the worlds of the global socialist ecumene', in West, H. and Parvathi, R. (eds) *Enduring Socialism. Explorations of Revolution and Transformation, Restoration and Continuation*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 125–147.

Bertram Ł, Puchejda A. and Wigura K. (2017) 'Negatywny obraz muzułmanów polskiej prasie. Analiza wybranych przykładów z lat 2015–2016', *Raport Obserwatorium Debaty Publicznej „Kultury Liberalnej"*. Available at: https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/%2FRaport_Negatywny_obraz_muzulmanow_w_polskiej_prasie_Analiza_wybranych_przykladow_z_lat_2015_2016.pdf (Accessed: 15 August 2021).

Cap, P. (2018) ''We don't want any immigrants or terrorists here': The linguistic manufacturing of xenophobia in the post-2015 Poland', *Discourse & Society* 29 (4), pp. 380–398. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926518754416 (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Chełmiński, J. (2004) 'Wietnamska świątynia w Warszawie?', Gazeta Wyborcza, March 6. Available at: https://wyborcza.pl/7,75248,1950751.html (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Dolińska, K. and Makaro J. (2013) *O wielokulturowości monokulturowego Wrocławia*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Drozdzewski, D. and Matusz P. (2021) 'Operationalising memory and identity politics to influence public opinion of refugees: A snapshot from Poland', *Political Geography*, 86, pp. 1–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102366 (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Dudzińska, A. and Kotnarowski, M. (2019) *Imaginary Muslims: How the Polish right frames Islam*. Brookings Report. Available at: www.brookings.edu/research/imaginary-muslims-how-polands-populists-frame-islam/ (Accessed: 15 August 2021).

Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeit', in M. Sabrow and A. Saupe, eds. *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch.* Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.

Foret, F. (2015) *Religion and Politics in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garbutt, R. (2009) 'Social inclusion and local practices of belonging', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 3(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v1i3.1080 (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Glein, A. (2019) *American Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Modernity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Golebiowska, E. (2018) 'The sources of anti-muslim prejudice in Poland', *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 32(4), pp. 796–817.

Górak-Sosnowska, K. and Pachocka, M. (2019) 'Inventing the Muslim other in Poland (and why does it differ from Western Europe', in Górak-Sosnowska K., M. Pachocka, J. Misiuna, *Muslim Minorities and the Refugee Crisis in Europe*. Warsaw: SGH Publishing House, pp. 223–234.

Grabowska, E. and Szymańska-Matusiewicz, G. (2022) 'How an Immigrant Buddhist Institution Negotiates Belonging in Poland: The Case of Thiên Phúc Pagoda', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2022.2010677

GUS (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). (2020) *Populacja cudzoziemców w Polsce w czasie COVID-19*. Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

GUS (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). (2021) *Zezwolenia na pracę cudzoziemców w Polsce w 2020 r*. Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Halik, T. and Nowicka, E. (2002) *Wietnamczycy w Polsce: Integracja czy izolacja?* Warsaw: Instytut Orientalistyczny, Wydział Neofilologii UW.

Handlin, O. (1971) *Children of the Uprooted*. New York: The Universal Iibrary.

Herberg, W. (1960) *Protestant Catholic Jew. An Essay in American Religious Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hervieu-Leger. (2000) *Religion as a Chain of Memory*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Kim, R. (2020) 'Sajgonki i maseczki dla polskich lekarzy', *Newsweek Polska*, 5 April. Available at: https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/spoleczenstwo/szyja-maseczki-ochronne-dostarczaja-darmowe-posilki-tak-w-czasie-epidemii/ghdgf5p (Accessed: 1 December 2020).

Lähdesmäki, T., Mäkinen, K, Čeginskas, V. L. A. and Kaasik-Krogerus, S. (2021) *Europe from Below: Notions of Europe and the European among Participants in EU Cultural Initiatives*. Leiden: Brill.

Majewski, P. (2017) 'Od mitu wielokulturowości do 'niewidzialności' cudzoziemców - zróżnicowanie kulturowe Warszawy w opiniach urzędników, pracowników

organizacji pozarządowych i cudzoziemców', in Dudkiewicz, M. and Majewskiego, P. (eds) *Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie. Nieunikniona obecność*. Warsaw: Uniwersytet SWPS.

Makaro, J. (2016) 'Miejskie zmagania z wielokulturowością – polskie doświadczenia', in Adamczyk, A., Sakson, A. and Trosiak, C. (ed.), *Polityczne i społeczne aspekty wielokulturowości Migracje i mniejszości*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, pp. 443–457.

Matthews, B. (ed.). (2006) *Buddhism in Canada*. London, New York: Routledge.

Mayblin, L., Valentine, G., and Winiarska A. (2016) 'Migration and diversity in a post-socialist context: Creating integrative encounters in Poland', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 48(5), pp. 960–978.

Narkowicz, K. and Pędziwiatr, K. (2017) 'From unproblematic to contentious: mosques in Poland', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(3), pp. 441–457, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1194744 (Accessed: 15 August 2021).

Noble, I. (2019) *Essays in Ecumenical Theology I*. Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004381094_013 (Accessed: 15 August 2021).

Pędziwiatr, K. (2011) 'The established and newcomers: Islam in Poland or the intergroup relations within the Polish Muslim community', in: Górak-Sosnowska, K. (ed.) *Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam*. Warsaw: University of Warsaw: Faculty of Oriental Studies, pp. 169–182.

Probyn, E. (1996) *Outside Belongings*. New York: Routledge.

Pugh, J. (2018) 'Negotiating Identity and Belonging through the Invisibility Bargain. Colombian Forced Migrants in Ecuador', *International Migration Review*, 52(4), pp. 978–1010.

Razumkov Centre (2019) 'В Україні стало більше «просто православних» і греко-католиків. Available at: https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/community/social_questioning/77812/ (Accessed: 30 November 2021).

Skrbis, Z., Baldassar, L., and Poynting, S. (2007) 'Introduction: Negotiating belonging: migration and generations', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 28(3), pp. 261–269.

Szymańska-Matusiewicz, G., (2017) Remaking the state or creating civil society? Vietnamese migrant associations in Poland. *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, 12(1), pp. 42–72.

TVP3. (2020) 'Warszawa jednoczy się w czasach próby. Społeczność wietnamska przekazuje maseczki', *TVP3*, 6 April. Available at:https://warszawa.tvp.pl/47443978/warszawa-jednoczy-sie-w-czasach-proby-spolecznosc-wietnamska-przekazuje-maseczki (Accessed: 1 December 2020).

Urbańska, S. (2018) 'Assessing the significance of religion in gender and migration studies: New avenues for scholarly inquiry', *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 7 (2), pp. 111–124.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40 (3), pp. 197–214.

Wietnamczycy chcą zbudować w Warszawie świątynię (2004) Comments on discussion forum, Forum Gazeta.pl. Available at: https://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,51,11200594,11200594,Wietnamczycy_chca_zbudowac_w_Warszawie_swiatynie.html?s=3 (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Wojtczuk, M. (2020) 'Wietnamczycy podarowali dzielnicy Śródmieście ręcznie wykonane maseczki', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 6 April Available at: https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl

/warszawa/7,54420,25848497,wietnamczycy-podarowali-dzielnicy-srodmiescie-recznie-wykonane.html (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Zarycki, T. (2020) 'Crises of the communist and neoliberal orders 30 years later: A structural comparison between 1975 and 2019 Poland', *Social Science Information*, 59(3), pp. 484–504. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018420951668 (Accessed: 21 November 2021).

Chapter 3

"Deep historicization" and political and spatio-temporal "centrism"

Layers of time and belonging in the reconstructed city centres of Berlin and Potsdam

Achim Saupe

Introduction

Since the reunification of Germany in 1989/1990, huge urban development projects have reshaped the inner cities of Berlin and neighbouring Potsdam. Among the measures were highly contested reconstructions of two Prussian palaces, now the Humboldt Forum in Berlin and Brandenburg's state assembly in Potsdam. These reconstructions have often been perceived and praised as an attempt to regain national and local urban identity by closing historical "wounds" or criticized for suppressing communist heritage. In contrast to more recent contributions to the debate, which regard the reconstruction projects as being chiefly conservative, revisionist, or right-wing political enterprises, it is my aim to analyze the renegotiation of belonging and the inherent spatio-temporal conceptions in the controversial debates surrounding these reconstruction, re-urbanization, and revitalization processes. In the debates that I am going to examine, I would, in particular, like to take a closer look at the significance of the centre – as a spatial, political, social, and temporal concept. Nowadays, processes of individual and societal identification, as well as the search for and articulation of belonging, tend to crystallize around spaces and places. Cities offer, not least as *Heimat*, individual and collective anchors for identity; they enable people, but also groups and communities, to find their own place. By familiarizing yourself with the past of your own city, you can also establish your own relative place in time. Public spaces, landmarks, and specific buildings are therefore "important means to manufacture, consolidate and control, but also to change identities" (Pott, 2007, p.30).[1]

All forms of belonging articulated in the ongoing debates over the reconstruction and preservation of built heritage in Berlin and Potsdam, as well as related heritage practices, have socio-political, spatial, and temporal dimensions. This chapter addresses these dimensions. First, it will focus on the crucial role played by the notion of historical authenticity in these discourses. After reunification, urban planners drew on images of both cities that predated the Second World War. While the idea of a "critical reconstruction" was central for urban planning processes, civil initiatives involved in these projects were driven by the aim of achieving "authentic reconstructions" that were as true as possible to the original.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-6

This was not merely an expression of nostalgia, a desire to return to a better past, or a retrieval of something that had been lost. Claims to authenticity promised identity and a new historical self-understanding, anchored in the inner cities and in specific buildings.

Second, the chapter will look at the interrelation between articulations of national, political, and social belonging and the renegotiation of German history after 1989. During the heated debates over reconstruction and urban development, different kinds of belonging were enunciated: East and West German socialization, different generational experiences – for example, those who still remembered the Second World War and those who only remembered the Cold War – but also allegiances to different social classes and milieux. These were often linked to different reinterpretations of the past: nothing less than the significance of Prussian history, National Socialism, and the evaluation of the history of the GDR was at stake.

Third, the chapter will analyze the spatial dimensions of the debates, critically investigating the European framing of the reconstruction discourse and analyzing the idea of the city centre that connected spatial with socio-political dimensions of belonging. The chapter will conclude that a centrist discourse formed the dominant ideological backdrop to the reconstruction activities after the year 2000. While heated debates for or against reconstruction remained, political centrism found its idealized representation in the image of the historic inner city.

Fourth, the chapter will show that this spatio-political idea of the centre also had temporal implications. Since the millennium, reconstruction and preservation projects have focused increasingly on the representation of multiple "layers of time". This characteristic temporalization and "deep historicization" of contemporary urban and memory landscapes in Germany has different effects: the creation of "pastness" and continuity or the visualization of ruptures and the complexity of history.

Preserving "the authentic"

"Authentic reconstructions" (Bold et al., 2018) are somehow a contradiction in themselves. From the standpoint of traditional cultural heritage preservation, formulated for example by the Venice Charter of 1964, newly rebuilt "historical" buildings do not fall into the actual sphere of heritage. This sentiment was also upheld by nineteenth-century thinkers like John Ruskin ("Restoration, so called, is the worst manner of destruction") and Georg Dehio ("Konservieren, nicht restaurieren"). According to Laurajane Smith, the "authorised heritage discourse" that "frames heritage policies and practices into the twenty-first century … stresses that heritage is fragile, finite, and nonrenewable" (Smith, 2006). As a result, many professional heritage experts regarded the reconstruction projects initiated by groups of citizens, architects, urban sociologists, planners, and politicians highly critically from the outset.

Nevertheless, this new discourse on reconstruction was strongly informed by patterns of a classical "authorized heritage discourse"; for example, when it drew parallels between lost or destroyed heritage and vulnerable heritage, and when "reconstruction" somehow became a synonym for "safeguarding" the cities' and nations' heritage and their inherent values. Part of this discourse involved claims to authenticity – to the historical authenticity of specific buildings and their relation to the city's history as central icons of local and national identity.

Even though it has been criticized as one of the most "slippery concepts" (Labadi, 2010, p.66), authenticity has become a core value of heritage. It became a prominent concept in international historic preservation in the last third of the twentieth century, beginning with the Venice Charter in 1964. In the course of the UNESCO world heritage programme, set up in 1972, so-called "tests of authenticity" were established as prerequisites for world heritage sites in 1977; these have undergone various modifications since then. From a predominantly European perspective, authenticity was bound foremost to "original substance", in keeping with historical records. This classical understanding of safeguarding existing heritage became scrutinized during the 1980s debates about whether reconstructed buildings or – in the case of Warsaw – entire districts destroyed in the Second World War could receive world heritage status.

Throughout the ensuing debate about globally diverging heritage practices of preservation, restoration, and reconstruction, the Nara Declaration (1994) presented a broader, postmodern, and post-colonial understanding of historical authenticity that recognized cultural diversity and the regional specificity of authenticity. This new understanding of authenticity went far beyond the idea of an "original substance". As well as classifying elements of form and design, materials and substance, use and function as possible criteria for the evaluation of the authenticity of a site, it also included "traditions and techniques, location and setting, spirit and feeling", and "other internal and external factors" (ICOMOS, 1994). This reformulated, integrative, and relational concept of authenticity sowed confusion among heritage practitioners (Inaba, 2009), but it also led to the recognition of immaterial heritage practices. In addition, the new definition obviously linked the evaluation of authenticity to "cultural identity and social values" (Bold et al., 2018, p.20), and therefore to the changing self-understanding of local and national communities. In so doing, it utilized two dimensions inherent in the concept: object-related authenticity and subject- and group-related authenticity (Saupe, 2016). After Nara and within a new constructivist understanding of heritage that was also aware of power asymmetries in processes of heritage-making, it became clear that authenticity was open to interpretation and that heritage was a "discursive practice … rather than an immutable set of objects" (Bold et al., 2018, p.12). However, this insight neither hampered essentialist uses of the concept nor did it lead to a reduction in new additions to the World Heritage List.

Recent research has shown that reconstructions have a long architectural tradition (Nerdinger, 2010). The practice has been particularly evident after wars, catastrophes, and natural disasters (Bold et al., 2018). The examples in Berlin and

Potsdam after 1989 belong, however, to a different category: reconstruction after system change. They are comparable to reconstructions in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain, which were problematized but also acknowledged in the Riga "Charter on Authenticity and Historical Reconstruction" (2000) and in the "Charter of Krakow Principles of Conservation and Restoration in Built Heritage" (2000). Yet the context of the German reconstructions is still unique, as they were built in a formerly divided country.

In line with the differentiation between "transformative" and "facsimile" reconstructions (Charlesworth and Charlesworth, 2006, p.27), it has been pointed out that the debate about reconstructions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been polarized between "rebuilding in contemporary style, signifying a new beginning, eradicating the errors and accretions of the past; or reinstating in a historicist style (replicating original appearance and materials) the buildings which have been lost, for reasons of continuity and identity" (Bold et al., 2018, p.3). In reunified Germany, the second category played the more contested role. As this chapter will show, this historicization of cityscapes could, on the one hand, create an impression of continuity, which favoured a few very selective epochs while ignoring others. On the other hand, it could also be used to create a landscape of memory, which aimed to reveal and historicize the caesuras of German history. Both approaches lend themselves to the production of national identity.

Reconstruction processes in Berlin and Potsdam

Both Berlin and Potsdam have undergone vast urban restructuring processes since 1989. In Berlin, the "critical reconstruction" of the historic city structure became the main paradigm of urban planning. The concept had been developed in the 1980s and influenced the International Building Exhibition in West Berlin in 1987. In April 1990, a civil initiative published a "Charta for the Center of Berlin", arguing that

> after the various phases of destruction, the center of Berlin is not an experimental field for utopian urban development, but a place with precise historical-political ties. It is about city identity and securing the dominance of the unique ensembles of historical architecture and urban architecture.
>
> (Gruppe 9. Dezember, 1990, p.10)

For abandoned areas like Leipziger Platz and Potsdamer Platz, which lay on the border between East and West Berlin, the Charta called for the reconstruction of historic streets. Elsewhere, the initiative argued against an architecture of modernist "super symbols", but also against the "mere reconstruction of what has been" because such approaches would not "do justice to the place" (Gruppe 9. Dezember, 1990, p.10).

In Potsdam, civic initiatives had already been set up in the 1980s to save parts of the baroque Dutch Quarter and other dwellings which were in a critical

condition of decay due to the financial and material constraints in the late GDR. In October 1990, the city's new parliament proclaimed a "cautious approximation of the characteristic, grown historical townscape" (Stadtverordnetenversammlung Potsdam, 1990).

In the years following the Second World War, the devastated centres of Potsdam and East Berlin began to be converted into socialist cities. This process continued until the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the East German regime did not always adopt a radically socialist or modernist approach to its built environment: many historic objects were restored or secured. In the early 1950s, for example, Wilhelm Staab Street in Potsdam, which had been almost entirely destroyed, was restored and became a prominent example of East German preservation praxis. In the late 1970s, new construction sites in East Berlin were accompanied by the restoration of historic dwellings and the reconstruction of the Nikolai Quarter in Berlin (Urban, 2006).

GDR urban planning projects were prestigious and always part of communist self-representation. During the Ulbricht era, in particular, this was combined with historical argumentation that emphasized the rupture with Prussian history and Prussia's militarist traditions. According to the history propagated by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), but also in other historiographical works after the Second World War, these traditions had led more or less directly to National Socialism. This understanding of history partly informed the demolition of the war-torn city palaces in Berlin and Potsdam. As a result of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and its hostile attitudes towards religion, several war-destroyed churches were demolished (Demshuk, 2020). After 1989, the emphasis on the ritualized anti-Prussian attitudes in (early) SED party ideology in the GDR was an iterative argument for the reconstruction of historic buildings from the Prussian era. In this respect, the debate over the demolition of GDR buildings and the reconstruction of a pre-war cityscape was a continuation of the Cold War in the field of urban planning.

Renegotiating history and belonging after 1989

The public and political debates about the reconstruction of parts of the "old towns" and central buildings in the inner cities of Berlin and Potsdam offer rich insights into the renegotiation of belonging in Germany after 1989. Documented in the local and national press and in a large number of books (e.g., Binder, 2015; Buttlar, 2010; Stiftung Berliner Schloss, 2017; Wolter, 2020; Zöller, 2017), the debates on how to "reunify" East and West Germans continue decades after the state was reunified, notwithstanding the increasing diversity of German society.

Urban spaces and specific buildings, both lost and remaining, as well as forms of alternative and grassroots placemaking, played crucial roles in the imagination and constitution of group identities after 1989. As possible encounter points, spaces and places enable "identification and categorization"; they help to locate the individual and societal self and create "commonality, connectedness, groupness"

(Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, pp.17–21). The debates about reconstruction projects are primarily about German identity and self-understanding in relation to German history. Different narratives about German history are invoked, adapted, and rearranged. There are three main historical reference points, the weighting of which already reveals, in part, the respective understanding of history.

First, all the contributions to the debate about reconstruction projects address, in one way or another, Germany's role in the Second World War. Here, the role of National Socialism in German history in relation to other epochs is contested, as has repeatedly been discussed since the *Historikerstreit* in the 1980s (Baldwin, 1990). The voices critical of a return to an image of the city modelled on its pre-war appearance often stress that the Allied bombings had been prompted by Nazi expansionist policies and that such reconstructions obscured or erased this understanding of history. Nevertheless, this argument does not necessarily lead to a radical opposition to reconstruction projects. The rebuilding of the Frauenkirche in Dresden was, for instance, partly framed as an act of international "reconciliation", in particular by the Dresden Frauenkirche Foundation with its motto "Building bridges, living reconciliation, strengthening faith" (Dresden Frauenkirche Foundation, 2022). In contrast to such a revision of the past with a historicist architecture in the name of reconciliation (Mink, 2008), other voices "normalize" German history by suppressing and overwriting its responsibility, for example, through self-depiction as victims or the emphasis on general human suffering in wartime. A strategy often used in public to legitimize reconstructions as apolitical is to refer to the common practice of reconstruction worldwide in past and present. This was shown in the important exhibition "History of Reconstruction – Constructing History" at the Museum of Architecture at the Technical University in Munich (Nerdinger, 2010). This argument was used at several public debates that I took part in during the research for this chapter and was also used by the architect responsible for the highly contested reconstruction of the Garrison Church. This was the place where Reich President Paul von Hindenburg consecrated the new Nazi regime on "The Day of Potsdam", a Nazi-organized propagandistic event on 21 March 1933.

Second, and in close relation to these debates, there are constant calls to reconsider and re-evaluate Prussian history: since the first debates about the reconstruction of the two city palaces, and in particular the Garrison Church in Potsdam, there has been an ongoing public debate in Potsdam civil society, but also on a national level among cultural and architectural critics, about whether these projects are revisionist. In both East and West Germany in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were already signs of renewed interest in Prussian history. Some of the post-unification projects were initiated by conservative cultural critics such as Wolf Jobst Siedler and Joachim Fest, or protagonists who described themselves as deeply affected by the division of Germany and the Cold War, for example, the head of the Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V., Wilhelm von Boddien.

It is becoming increasingly clear that large amounts of money for these partly privately financed reconstructions came from questionable sources, such as the

foundation set up by Rudolf-August Oetker, who had refused to come to terms either with his personal support of the Nazi regime or with that of his company; and Berlin banker Ehrhardt Bödecker, who wrote antidemocratic pamphlets and even called into question the figure of six million Holocaust victims (Häntzschel, 2021; Oswalt, 2021). In Potsdam, the reconstruction of the Garrison Church was supported by Max Klaar, a far-right-wing member of the West German Federal Armed Forces. In the 1980s, Klaar and his association commissioned a copy of the church's carillon that was additionally engraved with the names of Second World War battalions and an outline of Germany showing the borders of 1937. Even though Potsdam officials had the most incriminating illustrations and slogans sandblasted away, the still highly problematic replica, given as a gift to the city in 1991, was an important icon that led to the current reconstruction of the church tower.

The appropriation of historic reconstruction by the far right was also revealed in Björn Höcke's infamous "Dresdner Speech" from 2017. In the address, the AfD politician demanded a "radical 180-degree turn in German memory politics", praising historical reconstructions in Dresden, Potsdam, and Berlin. However, in his opinion the newly created "facades" needed a "dignified spirit … of a new, honest, vital, deeply grounded and self-confident patriotism" (Höcke, 2017; Oswalt, 2019). Nevertheless, the proximity of reconstruction projects to conservative, right-wing, and even apologetic attitudes and politics is contested. Scholars like Stefan Trüby argue that these reconstructions are new "right-wing spaces" (Trüby, 2018, 2019). Others argue that discursive labelling of architecture, places, and spaces is never stable and that it is hardly possible to define, for example, what "fascist architecture" in its many manifestations actually is and how it influences attitudes (Bodenschatz et al., 2011).

Third, all reconstruction projects after 1989 in the former GDR are also a response to communist urban planning processes and inherently touch on the question of how to deal with the communist past, and how to integrate East German experiences into the narration of a reunified Germany. Here, the representative remnants of 40 years of communist urban planning policies were at the core of the debate. Opponents of the demolition of the Palace of the Republic in Berlin, which was later replaced by the Humboldt Forum, stressed, for example, the quality of the building as a showcase of modern architecture, or emphasized the memories of a broader, often not party-affiliated public that used to visit it; for it was a recreational venue as well as the seat of the GDR parliament (Schug, 2007). Others underlined that the Palace of the Republic was never a place where oppositionally minded people would have gone to amuse themselves (Stiftung Berliner Schloss, 2017, p.44). In Potsdam, several characteristic GDR-era buildings were demolished after reunification, for example, the Haus des Reisens, a high-rise apartment block that also housed a state-run tourist bureau, or the University of Applied Sciences. In the 2010s, only a few GDR buildings in the town centre remained, like the Staudenhof and the Rechenzentrum; the latter has been used by artists and Potsdam's creative scene since 2015. Civil initiatives campaigned

for the preservation of the Rechenzentrum, a prefabricated building close to the site of the former Garrison Church, while the Foundation Garnisonkirche Potsdam, along with pro-reconstruction initiatives, have long argued that the city had already agreed to the demolition of the prefabricated building. At the time of writing in February 2022, it looks as if the Rechenzentrum will survive and only the tower of the Garrison Church will be rebuilt. The historic value of the GDR-era building itself is contested, but it is adorned by a communist mosaic "Man conquering the cosmos" created in 1972 by Fritz Eisel, propagandistically praising the "scientific and technological revolution" in communist societies and the utopia of ongoing progress of that time. This has been listed by historical preservationists who regard it as a reminder of a bygone "regime of historicity" (Hartog, 2015).

These debates over history are related to conflicts over political and societal belonging. Within the debates, it is possible to identify a leftist milieu that campaigns against revisionist approaches to history and advocates the preservation of the GDR's built fabric. They also critique what they refer to as the "capitalist," "neoliberal", or "neo-colonial" restructuring of public space after 1989. This argumentation derives from the fact that large donations came from West German and predominantly white, upper-class donors such as SAP founder Hasso Plattner; TV presenter Günther Jauch; Wilhelm von Boddien, an agricultural machine sales company executive and main initiator of the Berlin Palace; and the widow of the head of the Otto mail-order company. Often they caused the pendulum to swing in favour of reconstruction during decisive phases of the various discussions. In this context, questions of belonging and urban representation of different social groups were defined as a problem of access, power, and economics.

Despite the polarized discussions and even though many conservatives and revisionists were among those who propagated the reconstruction of pre-war inner cities, all reconstruction projects were ultimately supported by a broader public and their representatives: the Bundestag decided twice in favour of the reconstruction of the Berlin palace in 2002 and 2007. In Potsdam, a citizens' survey in 1999 voted for an approximation of the historical palace, and several parliamentary resolutions were passed at both state and city levels. But it took until 2008 for the decision for the reconstruction to finally be made, thanks to a private donation of 20 million euros given on the condition that the exterior of the Landtag building should resemble the historic Potsdam City Palace as closely as possible. The decisions were made across party lines and generational boundaries. Whether someone was originally from the East or the West did not determine whether one voted for or against the reconstructions.

However, while the decision-making process was ongoing, the underlying societal and political conflicts between supporters and opponents (most of them from leftist and left-liberal milieux) became increasingly clear. The debates about public spaces provided an opportunity to position oneself politically. At expert hearings and moderated forums like the Stadtforum in Potsdam, arguments were articulated and critics heard. For many civil activists who campaigned for the

preservation of GDR architecture and against reconstruction projects, this process was often nerve-wracking and, in the end, mostly unsuccessful. But those who argued in favour of faithful reconstructions of the original buildings were also frequently disappointed by the results that combined old facades with modern elements and interiors. This was, for example, the case when the architect of the Potsdam city palace decided against a faithful reconstruction of the baroque staircase, which the proponents of reconstruction idealized as a centrepiece of the structure (Zöller, 2017).

European framing

The debates about the city centres not only had national and local dimensions. Urban planners and sociologists also framed them in European terms. The concept of the "European city" goes back to Max Weber, who drew on Georg Simmel's writings about the metropolis at the beginning of the twentieth century, and it provides insights into the economic and socio-cultural significance of the (European) city. Weber, who defined the European city as an ideal type and mainly in comparison to the "Oriental city" (Weber, 2019), was interested in why European cities had become the birthplace of capitalism in pre-modernity. He saw several characteristics: markets functioning with an autonomous trade policy (market economy); autonomous legislation and jurisdiction; the formation of "citoyens"; "Bürgertum" and an emancipated bourgeois society with its characteristic associations; broad political autonomy, self-administration, and self-determination; and a border between the urban and rural worlds, materialized by the city wall. European cities became symbols of cultural and economic innovation, modernization, and fluidity between social ranks. In contrast to Simmel (1903) and later conceptions of urbanity, for example by the Chicago School, Weber conceptualized the city as a social unit and not as a place of heterogeneous possibilities, fragmentation, plurality, and cultural and social diversity. At the end of the twentieth century, Weber's concept gained new prominence among German urban planners like Hartmut Häußermann (2001, 2005), sociologists (Siebel, 2010), and historians (Bohn, 2009; Lenger and Tenfelde, 2006). In particular, Häußermann argued that the European city had come under threat from urban planning paradigms like the "car-oriented" city and the "communist city", and – since the 1990s – from globalization. Therefore, the European city was now understood in contrast to the "American city" with its skyscrapers, downtowns, and neoliberal real-estate development.

Contemporary sociologists have developed further criteria for the characterization of the European city, in particular the division of private and public spaces that established a public sphere of market, politics, and creativity, and a protected private sphere of intimacy and emotionality. The urban sociologist Walter Siebel has even gone further. In his understanding, European cities are not only spaces of political, economic, and social emancipation. They are also

> places where memory has become set in stone (…) where modern society originated. (Where …) contemporary citizens can reaffirm their own history. (And where …) an economically and politically influential socio-economic class lobbies for the protection of the historic fabric of the European city in order to preserve its own historically mediated identity.
>
> (Siebel, 2021, p.2)

The European city as a normative concept and theoretical framework for urban development has been widely discussed in Germany since 1990. The reformulated concept was also a counter-model to the "Global city" (Matznetter and Musil, 2012; Sassen, 1991). In Berlin, the European city became the dominant paradigm of urban reconstruction in the 1990s; the "city of the late nineteenth century (of the Gründerzeit)" was the main point of reference (Molnar, 2010, p.287). This also meant that certain historical layers of the city came under particular scrutiny, especially the modernist and communist urban heritage in the city centre. It is obvious that this discursive framing of Germany's historical inner cities (first and foremost Berlin) by German academics and urban planners was part of a retrospective cultural and historical "Europeanization" of a country that had become one of the main protagonists of the process of European unification. Last but not least, this European self-contextualization helped to reimagine pre-war urban cityscapes and also embedded German history in transnational historical narratives.

The centre as a space, a symbol, and a political concept

The debates over the reconstruction and re-urbanization of Berlin and Potsdam relate to the centre, not peripheries, suburbs, or specific neighbourhoods. This centre is shaped both spatially and socio-politically. Spatially, by a cityscape that has grown over the centuries and is marked by characteristic buildings and public places. These landmarks support memory and guarantee orientation, as they also shape and stabilize everyday actions (Assmann, 2007; Lefebvre, 2011). While the centre can, on the one hand, be located at a specific point, it also remains an indeterminate, vague place, as its edges are often undefined, particularly in modern cities.

Socio-politically, the centre is also a metaphor for what lies between top and bottom, between rich and poor, and between left and right. As a position between the extremes and edges, adopting the centre ground is regarded as moderate and appropriate. It has been said repeatedly that Germans have a real passion for centrism, especially after the experience of the Weimar Republic, which was, according to a commonplace narrative, destroyed from the political margins and extremes. While National Socialism defined its racial core as the Volksgemeinschaft, in the 1950s the concept emerged of a converged middle-class society, a society that had fundamentally overcome class boundaries through post-war economic success.

Germany's Social Democrats had already made winning the political centre their goal in the 1970s. But the idea that elections could only be won by garnering support from outside one's traditional political milieux and camps was reinforced by the "Third Way" of social democracy developed in the late 1990s by Britain's then Labour leader Tony Blair and adapted by the SPD's Gerhard Schröder with his understanding of a "New Centre" (Blair and Schröder, 1998). The Christian Democrats (CDU) under the leadership of Angela Merkel took up this approach, a development that was soon criticized by the conservative camp as a social democratization of the CDU. *Middle and Moderation*, the title of a book written by one of Merkel's key intellectual advisors, the political scientist Herfried Münkler, became one of Merkel's key slogans, as it reformulated the principles of the social market economy and implied a social-moral catalogue of virtues (Münkler, 2010).

Historically, the centre relates to the polis as a place of democracy, and to the emancipation of the urban bourgeoisie and the development of citizenship in the medieval city, which limited the power of the nobility. Centrism today still finds its representation in this spatial order of public and urban spaces. Belonging is understood as formed through a socio-spatially conceptualized centre, a "space of relationships" (Konersmann, 2021), and "of togetherness", "an in-between that is open to design" (Röttgers, 2021). Such centrist ideas are dependent on a periphery that is increasingly perceived as a political problem, as right-wing populist parties are establishing themselves more strongly in peripheries than elsewhere. But by claiming to represent the "will of the people", they also claim to represent the centre of society (Bednarz and Giesa, 2015).

This centrism has also encountered biting criticism. The essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1999), for example, condemned the socio-political centre for preventing progress, the extraordinary and the outstanding. By making its own measure the standard for all, centrism is able "to reduce everything to mediocrity" (Münkler, 2010, p.15). Other critics, like Martina Löw, argue that the centre has lost its function on a representational and a cultural level and that in a highly diverse society, "the loss of the symbolic centre is a chance for social cohesion". Here, the idea of a single (and consensual) space of the centre is replaced by linking heterogeneous spaces through "paths, connections, and nodes", where "a diverse society can come into view" (Löw, 2013, pp.30, 38).

On a local level, institutions like city museums supported the ideal of the historic city centre with exhibitions like *The Forgotten Centre* (2010) in Berlin or the permanent exhibition in the Potsdam Museum where remains of destroyed buildings from the city centre are displayed. Temporary exhibitions showed iconic photographs that shaped Potsdam's visual memory (Tack, 2021). In the field of civil initiatives and historical societies, the link between the spatial centre and political centrist self-understanding becomes more apparent. For example, the association Berliner Historische Mitte supported the reconstruction of the city palace and is still advocating for a re-urbanization of the area between the Berlin TV Tower and the Berlin Palace, an area that is currently characterized by its open spaces due to GDR urban planning decisions. This society, alongside a number

of others, proclaims that the area's previous "historical appearance", rather than "modern architecture", must be given priority. Protagonists of the initiatives regard themselves as situated at the centre of mainstream society, in particular as belonging to the centre-right as they argue repeatedly against communist and leftist urban planning projects.

Potsdam's "Mitteschön! Initiative 'Citizens for the centre'" ("Mitteschön" is a wordplay on "beautiful-centre" and "you are welcome"), describes itself as follows:

> We are not an association, but a citizens' initiative! Or rather: We are a collection of "free-range" citizens! We have no statute, no membership fee, no elaborate procedures. We need this time, which an association would cost, to work constructively. Our heart beats for Potsdam and the building in this city, in particular, it beats for the regaining of the centre. We demand the greatest possible sensitivity in this regard, because this city is a unique world cultural heritage!
>
> (Kuke, 2022)

This case is one example of how groups from new political spectrums adopt the political means of the New Social Movements (Schütz et al., 2021, p.19). In contrast, however, they understand themselves as apolitical, cross-party, and sceptical of democratic processes and party procedures, but not of the "establishment" in general. Since they often belong to an upper- or upper-middle-class milieu, they exert their influence instead by means of lobbying. This becomes clearer when looking at one of their, as they propagate it, success stories: the reconstruction of the city palace in its "exact historical outer façades". Here, "the will of the citizens was demonstrated in pure democratic culture. Citizens who are committed to their city actively co-determine their lebensraum" (Schütz et al., 2021, p.19). This word, which was central to Nazi "Blut und Boden" ideology, is usually used far more circumspectly. This adaption of grassroots politics as well as populist argumentation patterns like "purity" and "direct democracy" shows the mingling of a centre-right and a new-right discourse.

Forced to legitimate their interest in reconstructing the Garrison Church in its entirety, the initiative even developed the idea of relabelling the former military church as a "European Church" that could be used as a place for European reconciliation. Europe as well as reconciliation became legitimizing factors.

Time layers and "deep historicization"

Social-political centrism is a projection of order in space. Bounded by its margins, it strives to counterbalance opposites and tame political centrifugal forces. According to Münkler (2018), the idea of historical development and political positioning recedes into the background if a political order is essentially described by a centrist consensus. Nevertheless, centrism is accompanied by certain

conceptions of temporality that can absorb progress, acceleration and rapid change. I will investigate these temporal implications in the following.

From a temporal perspective, reconstructions can be interpreted as "a form of rebellion, a revolt against time" (Denslagen, 2009, p.220), as attempts to return to a specific past and "to stop the ineluctable process of time and decay … to turn back the clock, reordering time and process, countering a physical assault upon a natural evolution with a philosophical assault on notions of time and memory, risking the distortion of both" (Bold et al., 2018, p.16). In this sense, the reconstructions can be understood as responses to the experiences of loss and related memories, and of acceleration, globalization, and the transformation process after 1989. The same, however, could be said of conservation and preservation projects in general, which seek to keep the remains of the past visible in the present. They also offer a sense of reassurance, a connection to the past and to traditions. Reconstructions, as well as conservation and preservation projects, can be places for nostalgic projections, but whereas reconstructions often involve the reimagining of the past as a better place, preserved sites can relate to much more complex and contested pasts.

Cornelius Holtorf has argued that postmodern history and memory culture produces a sense of "pastness" with its "clever copies, reconstructions, and imaginative inventions" (2017, p.497). He refers to Alois Riegl's concept that cultural heritage possesses not only a "historical value" or "art value", but an "age value" based on the perception of an object or building's visible traces of age. The temporalization and historicization of urban landscapes through museumization, and the reproduction and preservation of cultural heritage with its traces of time and patina, create this kind of age value, enriched by artistic interventions and other forms of aestheticization.

Holtorf proposes "pastness" as a term "for denoting the perception that a given object is 'of the past'". The impression of pastness results from "appearance", its "contexts", and "its correspondence with preconceived expectations among the audience" (Holtorf, 2017, p.497). This age value or "pastness" seems to be one of the most relevant attributions to heritage. As no historical knowledge is needed to recognize the age value as significant, it has a democratizing effect and is an attraction that is legible to a cosmopolitan audience. But the term also sidesteps the efforts heritage professionals make to turn things "of the past" into historically significant things. Therefore, I would like to argue that postmodern memory landscapes can be characterized by creating a *deep historicity* and *temporality*. They are staged as "time-deep areas" with the "esthetic aim … to heighten contrast and complexity, to make visible the process of change", as urban planner Kevin Lynch wrote as early as 1972, arguing against the monotony of modern housing areas (Lynch, 1972, p.57).

This deep historicization and temporalization manifests itself in a wide range of preserved, reconstructed or rebuilt buildings, in spolia and other integrated and reused traces of older structures (Assmann, 1999, 2007; Meier, 2020). This deep historicity has taken up different temporal forms and expressions: ideal-typically,

it can be differentiated between practices, projects, and discourses that favour a return to a specific time layer and conceptions that display historical change. The image of change can stress continuities, or discontinuities and fractures, and hide or reveal a constructivist approach to the past. This becomes particularly explicit when architectural, artistic, or critical interventions complement the reconstruction or restoration projects (Kibel, 2021).

Pro-reconstruction civic initiatives have campaigned for "original" or "authentic" reconstruction and a return to a specific time layer, be it in the case of the Humboldt Forum or the Neues Museum in Berlin, or the City Palace, the baroque old town, and the Garrison Church in Potsdam. In the debates surrounding these reconstructions, both positions are often articulated. While, for example, the "augmented reconstruction" of the Neues Museum by David Chipperfield and his team was praised for showing a "respect for history" by architectural commentator Heinrich Wefing (2009), others were repelled by the fragmentary result, complaining that the "magnificent spaces created by the architect Friedrich August Stüler in the middle of the 19th century" were incompatible with a "restoration philosophy that favored fractures, stains and ruins" (Guratzsch, 2009). The Society for Historical Berlin criticized how the "still existing 'authentic', mostly ruinous and damaged original architecture" had been "manipulated", and missing components had been "supplemented by deliberately false spare parts": the "spirit, harmony and symmetry of the building had been destroyed" (Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin, 2009). While Chipperfield's restoration can be interpreted as a kind of a documentary historicism, supporters of original reconstructions criticized the visualization of time layers and fractures, favouring "harmony", "beauty", and "pureness" (Kibel, 2021, pp.153–178; Nagel, 2017).

Since the birth of modern conservation theory in the nineteenth century, the visualization of different time layers of historic buildings has been part of a romantic and historicist conception of time and history. However, restoration and conservation projects have aimed to restore buildings to a specific and often idealized state or preserve what remained in the present. In the new reconstruction era after the millennium, the artificial historicization of replicas with authentic remains and spolia and the combination of new structures and materials with older ones to compose multi-temporal mosaics became more common practice. What was intended differed: deep temporalization can legitimate a site, show its significance, and reveal historical change or the ambivalent histories of a site.

This new spatio-temporal presentation and conception of history found its expression in the concept of "time layers" that Reinhart Koselleck brought into the discussion in the 1990s (Koselleck, 2018). With their allusion to geological layers, time layers can represent "multiple temporal levels of differing duration and varied origin that are nonetheless simultaneously present and effective" (Koselleck, 2018, p.30). For Koselleck, the metaphor was part of his lifelong reflection on historical time. After the millennium, it became one of the most common spatio-temporal metaphors used by heritage professionals in Germany.

Monument preservation theory considered whether a certain layer of time should be favoured over others, or how the heterogeneity of the various time layers should be represented. In this context, time layers provided historical evidence of certain periods, the use of things and places, and past experiences (Scheurmann, 2005, 2006). The time layer metaphor was used in the context of memorial sites, in relation to lost places like the Olympic Village of 1936, and it was used as a hermeneutic method for reading the histories of a city (Saupe, 2019, 2021). The term referred to temporal levels differing in duration and origin, to different "absent pasts" (Landwehr, 2016) visible in the present. Layers of time also referred to the recent past; they transformed contemporary history and memories into geological formations and archaeological excavation sites. Remains of the GDR came under consideration but were not immediately accepted as "authentic layers" by local communities; however, as evidence from GDR times disappeared, initiatives increasingly campaigned for its preservation (Tessin and Korn, 2011).

In contrast to other spatio-temporal concepts like the city as a "palimpsest" (Huyssen, 2009) or the search for traces in the history workshop and "dig where you stand" movement (Ginzburg, 1983; Lindqvist, 1979; Wüstenberg, 2017), the geological metaphor somehow obscured power relationships and the idea that historical thinking is an activity, a critical enquiry. Its value was to visualize multiple, simultaneous, interrelated, heterogeneous temporalities: unique as well as comparable times, fractures and new beginnings, the longue durée of durable structures. Visualized time layers functioned as witnesses of different historical incidents and epochs, of different uses and experiences.

Representing these multiple time layers at memory sites and in the urban landscape acknowledged different histories and memories in a formerly divided country. Therefore, it was also an adequate representation of history in the context of a centrist understanding of society as a whole. It had an inclusive character, as diverging pasts and different belongings were now represented, but was also exclusive, as the historical remains were unable to represent a changing, post-migration society. Also, the temporal dimension of the understanding and representation of history in time layers can be interpreted in close relation to the centre and its underlying temporality. Time layers privilege continuity over ruptures, a time-deep "regime of historicity" over temporal figures like incidents or even shocks. Layers of time – or, as a new translation suggested, "sediments of time" (Koselleck, 2018) – produce tradition and heritage, even if the underlying understanding of the image shows that history is no longer linear, a form of progress, or entirely unbroken. Time layers create "historical identity" across time and become the mediators of historicity. But they also risk blurring historical knowledge; questions of how we should value different, diverging, and dissonant pasts; and the political dimensions of heritage-making.

Conclusion

Public spaces and buildings in our locality offer an articulation of what is our "own" in cultural terms which is of particular significance in times of transformation and

globalization. To that extent, reconstruction projects, but also other projects that are based on a temporalization and historicization of public space, are characterized by a need for "security, meaning and coherence" (Pott, 2007, p.30). Pott argues that such constructions of history have the potential to be perceived as expressing a sense of historical and local belonging, creating an "impression of authenticity", as they are imagined to be "natural", "original", or expressions of architectural traditions (Pott, 2007, p.30). This attribution of authenticity went hand in hand with a renegotiation of societal self-understanding and political and social belonging. As such, the reconstruction debates were inclusive and exclusive at the same time. Over the last three decades, they have also shifted in relation to public discourses on identity and belonging. The European framing, for example, had its peak in the 2000s, while the debates over the Humboldt Forum in recent years were concerned with post-colonial and global questions.

This chapter has shown that public spaces and places, and individual buildings that refer to specific pasts and contested histories, have the potential to mobilize and politicize groups. The discourses and narratives surrounding them lead to the formulation of group identities and a politics of belonging. Furthermore, I have argued that the reconstruction projects in Berlin and Potsdam should be interpreted in the context of political centrism rather than in terms of differences between right-wing political attitudes, conflicting West and East German memories, or capitalist investments versus an understanding of a city for all. It is clear that conservative and right-wing intellectuals and donors instigated several reconstruction projects, but in the end, these projects were supported by a broader public.

The unifying centrism implicated a harmonized vision of a political, spatial, and temporal centre. Ideal-typically, two poles determined the possibilities of what could be said in the reconstruction discourse in general. On the one hand, there was the desire to regain the centre in the sense of an idealized past. This pro-reconstruction position sought a connection to the pre-war image and thus – sometimes unconsciously, sometimes consciously as a direct political provocation – overwrote the history of National Socialism and the communist past in the former GDR. Here, the proximity to what was discussed in the *Historikerstreit* as the "normalization" of the German past is obvious.

Characteristically, the opposite pole rejected reconstructions as a cult of fake. Here, preserving the existing structure was the essence, along with a cautious continuation of urban planning within the existing structure. Diverging layers of time were taken into account, preserved and visualized, and a complex historicization of the traces of the past was part of the historical self-understanding. However, this did not necessarily lead to a call for architectural, political, and social diversity in the inner city.

Both forms can be understood as deep temporalization and historicization of the city centres of Berlin and Potsdam. Through the (artificial) production, reconstruction, and conservation of different time layers, contemporary urban societies create postmodern memory landscapes. The idea of the city in both approaches draws on images of the past. While the reconstruction discourse is nostalgic at

heart, the time layer approach is based on the remains of the past in the present and is more interested in different eras and their architecture. Both approaches differ only to a limited extent in this temporalization of urban space, though the time layer theory historicizes things more strongly by pointing to the different contexts in which they arose.

Acknowledgements

The research for this chapter was part of the project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place*.

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info) which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MIUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 769478.

Note

1 This and all the following German quotes were translated by the author.

References

Assmann, A. (1999) *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses*. München: C.H. Beck.

Assmann, A. (2007) *Geschichte im Gedächtnis: Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur öffentlichen Inszenierung*. München: C.H. Beck.

Baldwin, P. (ed) (1990) *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians' Debate*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Bednarz, L. and Giesa, C. (2015) *Gefährliche Bürger: Die neue Rechte greift nach der Mitte*. München: Hanser.

Binder, J. (2015) *Stadt als Palimpsest: Zur Wechselwirkung von Materialität und Gedächtnis*. Berlin: Neofelis Verlag.

Blair, T. and Schröder, G. (1998) *Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Bodenschatz, H., Spiegel, D. and Altrock, U. (eds) (2011) *Städtebau für Mussolini: Auf der Suche nach der neuen Stadt im faschistischen Italien*, Berlin: DOM Publ.

Bohn, T. M. (ed) (2009) *Von der "europäischen Stadt" zur "sozialistischen Stadt" und zurück?*. München: Oldenbourg.

Bold, J., Larkham, P. J. and Pickard, R. (eds) (2018) *Authentic Reconstruction: Authenticity, Architecture and the Built Heritage*. London, Oxford, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. (2000) 'Beyond "identity"', *Theory and Society*, 29(1), pp. 1–47.

Buttlar, A. von (ed) (2010) *Denkmalpflege statt Attrappenkult: Gegen die Rekonstruktion von Baudenkmälern – eine Anthologie*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Charlesworth, E. and Charlesworth, E. R. (2006) *Architects Without Frontiers: War, Reconstruction and Design Responsibility*. Amsterdam, Heidelberg, Oxford: Elsevier; Architectural Press.

Demshuk, A. (2020) 'A polish approach for German cities?: Cement old towns and the search for rootedness in postwar Leipzig and Frankfurt/Main', *European History Quarterly* [Online]. DOI: 10.1177/0265691419886277.

Denslagen, W. (2009) *Romantic Modernism: Nostalgia in the World of Conservation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Dresden Frauenkirche Foundation (2022) *Frauenkirche. Contributions from Around the World*. Dresden. Available at https://www.dresden.de/en/05/035/contributions.php (Accessed 2 February 2022).

Enzensberger, H. M. (1999) *Mittelmaß und Wahn: Gesammelte Zerstreuungen*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin (2009) *Nofretete in Trümmern - Welterbe beschädigt. Stellungnahme der Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin zur Wiedereröffnung des Neuen Museums auf der Museumsinsel zu Berlin am 16./17. Oktober 2009*.

Ginzburg, C. (1983) *Spurensicherungen: Über verborgene Geschichte, Kunst und soziales Gedächtnis*. München: Klaus Wagenbach.

Gruppe 9. Dezember (1990) 'Charta-fuer-die-Mitte-von-Berlin',*TAZ*, 9 April, p. 10 [Online]. Available at https://taz.de/Charta-fuer-die-Mitte-von-Berlin/!1773022/

Guratzsch, D. (2009) 'Berlin und sein zusammengeklebter Trümmerrest', *Die Welt*, 27 February.

Häntzschel, J. (2021) 'Genug der Ehre', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 November.

Hartog, F. (2015) *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Häußermann, H. (2001) 'Die Europäische Stad', *Leviathan*, 29(2), pp. 237–255.

Häußermann, H. (2005) 'The end of the European City?', *European Review*, 13(2), pp. 237–249.

Höcke, B. (2017) 'Höcke-Rede im Wortlaut: "Gemütszustand eines total besiegten Volkes"', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 19 January [Online]. Available at https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/hoecke-rede-im-wortlaut-gemuetszustand-eines-total-besiegten-volkes/19273518.html.

Holtorf, C. (2017) 'Perceiving the past: From age value to pastness', *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 24(4), pp. 497–515.

Huyssen, A. (2009) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

ICOMOS (1994) *The Nara Conference on Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention*. Available at: https://www.icomos.org/en/charters-and-texts/179-articles-en-francais/ressources/charters-and-standards/386-the-nara-document-on-authenticity-1994 (Accessed on: May 2021).

Inaba, N. (2009) 'Authenticity and heritage concepts: tangible and intangible discussions in Japan', in Stanley-Price, N. and King, J. (eds) *Conserving the Authentic: Essays in honour of Jukka Jokilehto.* ICCROM Conservation Studies, and International Center for the study of preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, pp. 153–162.

Kibel, J. (2021) *Hoffnung auf eine bessere Vergangenheit: Kollektivierungsdiskurse und ihre Codes der Verräumlichung*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Konersmann, R. (2021) *Welt ohne Maß*. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.

Koselleck, R. (2018) *Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories.* Transl. and edited by Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kuke, J. (2022) *Mitteschön!* Available at https://www.mitteschoen.de/mitteschoen/

Labadi, S. (2010) 'World Heritage, authenticity and post-authenticity: International and national perspectives', in Labadi, S. and Long, C. (eds) *Heritage and Globalisation*. London: Routledge, pp. 66–84.

Landwehr, A. (2016) *Die anwesende Abwesenheit der Vergangenheit: Essay zur Geschichtstheorie*, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.

Lefebvre, H. (2011) *The Production of Space*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Lenger, F. and Tenfelde, K. (eds) (2006) *Die europäische Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert: Wahrnehmung - Entwicklung – Erosion*. Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau Verlag.

Lindqvist, S. (1979) 'Dig where you stand', *Oral History*, 7(2), pp. 24–30 [Online]. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40178565 (Accessed 8 April 2022).

Löw, M. (2013) 'Vielfalt und Repräsentation: Über den Bedeutungsverlust der symbolischen Mitte', *Soziologie*, 42(1), pp. 29–41.

Lynch, K. (1972) *What Time is this Place?* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Matznetter, W. and Musil, R. (2012) 'The European city in the age of globalisation', *Belgeo*, 1–2.

Meier, H.-R. (2020) *Spolien: Phänomene der Wiederverwendung in der Architektur*. Berlin: JOVIS Verlag GmbH.

Mink, G. (2008) 'Between Reconciliation and the Reactivation of Past Conflicts in Europe: Rethinking Social Memory Paradigms', *Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review*, 3, pp. 469–490 [Online]. Available at https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59227

Molnar, V. (2010) 'The Cultural Production of Locality: Reclaiming the "European City" in Post-Wall Berlin', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 34(2), pp. 281–309.

Münkler, H. (2010) *Mitte und Maß: Der Kampf um die richtige Ordnung*. Berlin: Rowohlt.

Münkler, H. (2018) 'Die Entstehung der Mitte – Ein Paradigma in Politik und Gesellschaft', in Schöneck, N. M. and Ritter, S. (eds) *Die Mitte als Kampfzone: Wertorientierungen und Abgrenzungspraktiken der Mittelschichten*. Bielefeld: Transcipt Verlag, pp. 29–38.

Nagel, R. (2017) *Ach schön!*, Potsdam. Available at https://www.mitteschoen.de/2017/12/21/ach-schoen/

Nerdinger, W. (ed) (2010) *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion – Konstruktion der Geschichte: Anlässlich der Ausstellung "Geschichte der Rekonstruktion – Konstruktion der Geschichte" im Architekturmuseum der TU München in der Pinakothek der Moderne, 22. Juli bis 31. Oktober 2010*. München, Berlin: Prestel.

Oswalt, P. (2019) *How Germany's Far-Right Is Gaslighting Architectural History: The Case of Potsdam's Garrison Church*. www.frieze.com. Available at https://www.frieze.com/article/how-germanys-far-right-gaslighting-architectural-history-case-potsdams-garrison-church.

Oswalt, P. (2021) 'Preußentum und Antisemitismus: Ehrt das Humboldt Forum einen Mäzen mit rechtsradikaler Gesinnung?', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 27 October.

Pott, A. (2007) 'Identität und Raum. Perspektiven nach dem Cultural Turn', in Berndt, C. and Pütz, R. (eds) *Kulturelle Geographien: Zur Beschäftigung mit Raum und Ort nach dem Cultural Turn: ausgewählte Beiträge der vierten Kulturgeographietagung in Frankfurt am Main*, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verl., pp. 27–52.

Röttgers, K. (2021) *Das Soziale denken: Leitlinien einer Philosophie des kommunikativen Textes*. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.
Sassen, S. (1991) *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Saupe, A. (2016) 'Authenticity (Version 3.0)', *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*. Available at: https://zeitgeschichte-digital.de/doks/frontdoor/index/index/docId/645 (last accessed 14 April 2021).
Saupe, A. (2019) 'Authentizitätskonflikte in Gedenkstätten.: Umstrittener Begriff, Zuschreibung und Erfahrungsdimension', in Drecoll, A., Schaarschmidt, T. and Zündorf, I. (eds) *Authentizität als Kapital historischer Orte?: Die Sehnsucht nach dem unmittelbaren Erleben von Geschichte*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, pp. 189–207.
Saupe, A. (2021) '"Jedes Denkmal ist eben eine Versteinerung …": Reinhart Kosellecks Zeitschichten-Paradigma und die Erinnerungskultur', in Bösch, F., Eisenhuth, S., Hochmuth, H. and Zündorf, I. (eds) *Public Historians: Zeithistorische Interventionen nach 1945*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, pp. 116–131.
Scheurmann, I. (ed) (2005) *ZeitSchichten - Erkennen und Erhalten: Denkmalpflege in Deutschland*. Bonn: Dt. Stiftung Denkmalschutz.
Scheurmann, I. (ed) (2006) *Echt, alt, schön, wahr: Zeitschichten der Denkmalpflege*. München, Berlin: Dt. Kunstverl.
Schug, A. (ed) (2007) *Palast der Republik: Politischer Diskurs und private Erinnerung*. Berlin: BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.
Schütz, J., Kollmorgen, R. and Schäller, S. (eds) (2021) *Die neue Mitte?: Ideologie und Praxis der populistischen und extremen Rechten*. Wien, Köln: Böhlau Verlag.
Siebel, W. (ed.) (2010) *Die europäische Stadt*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Siebel, W. (2021) 'Die europäische Stadt: Zwischen Geschichte und Utopie', *Politik & Kultur*, 1, pp. 1–2.
Simmel, G. (1903) 'Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben', in Bücher, K. and Petermann, T. (eds) *Die Großstadt: Vorträge und Aufsätze zur Städteausstellung*. Dresden: ⌈Ulan Press, pp. 185–206.
Smith, L (2006) *Uses of Heritage*. Abingdon: Routledge.
Stadtverordnetenversammlung Potsdam (1990) Beschlussvorlage nach Aussprache in der 8. Tagung der Stadtverordnetenversammlung, Anlage 16 (Stadtverordnetenversammlung Potsdam), Potsdam.
Stiftung Berliner Schloss (ed.) (2017) *Palast der Republik: ein Erinnerungsort neu diskutiert*. Berlin: Stiftung Berliner Schloss.
Tack, A. (2021) 'Potsdam imaginiert: Die Neuerfindung von urbaner Public History seit 1989/90', Eisenhuth, S., Hochmuth, H. and Zündorf, I. (eds) *Public Historians: Zeithistorische Interventionen nach 1945*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, pp. 144–161.
Tessin, G. and Korn, T. (eds) (2011) *Und der Zukunft zugewandt: Potsdam und der gebaute Sozialismus*. Potsdam: Metropolar.
Trüby, S. (2018) 'Wir haben das Haus am rechten Fleck', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, (2018), p. 4.
Trüby, S. (2019) 'Altstadt-Opium fürs Volk', *Arch+*, 235, pp. 160–167.
Urban, F. (2006) *Neo-historical East Berlin*. London: Routledge.
Weber, M. (2019) *Economy and Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wefing, H. (2009) 'Brüchige sensation', *Die Zeit*, 2009, p. 47.
Wolter, B. (ed.) (2020) *Das Humboldt Forum im Berliner Schloss*. München, London, New York: Prestel.

Wüstenberg, J. (2017) *Civil Society and Memory in Postwar Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zöller, K. (2017) '"Dies ist kein Schloss!" Die Debatte um den Wiederaufbau des Potsdamer Stadtschlosses zwischen Authentizitätssehnsucht und Pragmatismus', in Bernhardt, C., Sabrow, M. and Saupe, A. (eds) *Gebaute Geschichte: Historische Authentizität im Stadtraum*, Göttingen, pp. 115–136.

Chapter 4

Shaping Europeanness: the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 as a new mode of governance

Between coordinative and communicative discourses

Carlotta Scioldo

Introduction

EU cultural policy employs soft mechanisms, such as steering tools, learning, and socialization processes (Radaelli, 2000; Littoz-Monet, 2012; Mattocks, 2018), to disseminate EU discourse, ideas, and values across different levels. That EU cultural heritage initiatives play a fundamental role in fostering ideas of a common European cultural heritage (Lähdesmäki, 2016) meant as a leverage to foster transnational identity and European belonging-ness is argued in the literature (see Thiel and Friedman, 2012), but which tools are utilized and their effects remain somewhat underexplored. This chapter aims at addressing this gap by enquiring how cultural policy soft mechanisms were used during the European Year of Cultural Heritage (EYCH) 2018, a series of events promoted by the European Commission with the objective of raising the awareness of European heritage as a means of reinforcing a sense of belonging to the European community.

The EYCH 2018 is examined as a relevant case to shed light on these tools and their potential to bring out a sense of European belonging since, on the one hand, the design of the initiative bears witness to the operational and ideational features of an exceptionally complex organization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.270). On the other hand, it promoted new modes of governance implemented within a soft policy area. Supported by a strong political will, on 17 May 2017, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the Decision (EU) 2017/864 of the EYCH, including an ad hoc budget of eight million Euros and establishing the legal basis for stakeholder involvement. Under the motto "Our heritage: where the past meets the future", EYCH 2018 was conceived as a series of events to be held across Europe and beyond, aiming "to get people closer to and more involved with their cultural heritage, to encourage the sharing and appreciation of Europe's rich heritage and to reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018). During the year, soft mechanisms, learning, and socialization tools were employed to engage stakeholders' participation beyond

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-7

the institutional setting, disseminate EYCH discourse across multiple levels, and reach an international dimension, beyond EU member states.

The chapter analyzes these top-down efforts and investigates the means through which EU heritage discourse is created, diffused, and locally appropriated. It does so by examining two of the mechanisms employed: the Stakeholder Committee and the labelling of the Subotica Synagogue as an EYCH site in Serbia. The Stakeholder Committee is an apt example of an experimental governance arrangement that puts discursive negotiation at the centre, with the aim of transferring EYCH messages across levels. Subotica exemplifies the reach of the EYCH 2018 as a strategy of cultural diplomacy and highlights the role of transnational actors in diffusing EU heritage discourse in the EU's internal and external dimensions.

The Discursive Institutionalism (DI) approach (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2011) was adopted to explore different levels of discourse creation: the EU institutional setting, the meso-level with the Stakeholder Committee, and the local level with Subotica Synagogue in Serbia. Such a perspective allows for focusing on the ideational power of the initiative and investigating by what means the EU heritage discourse emerged and has then been recontextualized by the diverse actors involved; EYCH 2018 is therefore analyzed as an interactive process among actors, thus shedding light on the coordinative and communicative dimensions of discourse. Such analysis strives to advance the European cultural policy (ECP) research agenda by exploring how ideas of belonging are discursively constructed transnationally, and yet, locally appropriated and enquiring to what extent the usage of the EU heritage discourse contributes to shifting cognitive frames in alignment with the EU reference; wherein, heritage-making becomes instrumental in creating spaces for implementing other EU policies (Barbehön, 2016) and also in non-EU states (see also Vos, 2017).

The analyzed materials were gathered by means of participant observation of one EYCH Stakeholders' Committee Meeting held in Brussels in 2018[1] and have been complemented with semi-structured qualitative interviews of key actors.[2] To further scrutinize the intertextual sources, such as EU official documents, the Stakeholder Committee's written communications, videos, flyers, and events, critical discourse analysis tools (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) have been employed. The chapter is divided into four sections: first, an overview of the EYCH 2018 is offered; second, the theoretical grounding and approach are defined; and third, the governance architecture and discursive strategies implemented during EYCH are outlined. Finally, the case study of Subotica Synagogue (Serbia) is analyzed to determine the local contextualization of the EU heritage discourse in a non-EU state. This example shows how the EU initiative uses the idea of a shared cultural heritage as a political tool utilizing soft forms of conditionality through cultural programmes to instigate processes of belonging (a similar example is provided by Vos in this volume).

The results of EYCH analysis demonstrated that, despite the attempt of European institutions to enhance the engagement of transnational, intermediate, and grassroots actors in the year's activities, such participation remained highly institutional, which led to a somewhat acritical appropriation of the EU heritage discourse at diverse levels. This indicates that EU-promoted cultural initiatives

have led to the construction of a sense of European belonging, but primarily in terms of reproducing the EU's discourses used in its politics of belonging, denying other – more dissonant – interpretations.

Contextualizing EYCH 2018 within European cultural policy

Based on the subsidiary principle, which means that EU member states maintain full competence in cultural matters, cultural policy is a sector in which new modes of governance arise and the engagement of diverse stakeholders is fundamental to ensuring policy implementation (see also Vos, this volume). Moreover, due to the ideational power of cultural policy, discourse is key in the policy cycle. For these reasons, a complete analysis of European cultural policy, programmes, funding schemes, and events would require taking into account both the governance mechanisms and the discursive strategies implemented in these initiatives. This chapter is divided accordingly, and the current section offers first an overview of the historical development of the policy, followed by a description of its governance arrangements and discourse.

Since the 1980s, European cultural policy (ECP) has evolved as a set of symbolic policies focused on culture, art, and cultural heritage protection with the implicit objective of creating a European sense of belonging (see Ahearne, 2009). Recognized by the Maastricht Treaty as being under the purview of the EU, culture has been treated as a policy matter since the EU increased its role in domains without formal competencies in the late 1990s. Two main events contributed to the further institutionalization of cultural policy under the direction of European institutions: the Lisbon Treaty and the Enlargement Strategy.

In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, soft and new governance arrangements emerged that allowed the European Commission to intervene in sectors without a clear mandate. In conjunction, the Enlargement Strategy was aimed at the formation of a European sense of belonging as a means of facilitating inclusion; as such, a specific chapter of the EU Acquis Communautaire – chapter 26 – which sets out the conditions for enlargement became devoted to culture and education. These events contributed to the legitimization of the EU's role in cultural matters and confirms the strategic role cultural policy plays in constructing a European shared cultural identity.

In operational terms, due to the subsidiary principle, the involvement of stakeholders is fundamental in ensuring coordination and policy diffusion across diverse levels. New modes of governance that can facilitate this have arisen such as networks (Radaelli, 2000), structural dialogue, and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Mattocks, 2018). These alternative modes of governance, on the one hand, have triggered the active engagement of para-institutional and grassroots actors in policymaking processes (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004; Radaelli, 2008), on the other hand, they have enhanced discourse negotiations as fundamental characteristics of policymaking. But, policy coordination tools are not a simple matter of administrative decision-making; instead, they depend on political choices (Lascoumes and Le

Galés, 2007) that involve diverse engagement among various actors, such as EU administrative agencies, national and subnational actors, as well as civil society platforms, external experts, and non-government organizations (NGOs).

At the administrative level, the Directorate General of Culture and Education (DG EAC) and the Executive Agency of Audio-visual, Education, and Culture (EACEA) are the bodies responsible for cultural matters. The DG EAC is largely in charge of activating and steering these governance arrangements, proposing EU symbols and labels, thus designing "explicit identity-creating strategies" (Thatcher, 2019, p.2). EACEA primarily provides EU funds to sustain cultural cooperation, thus "regulating cross-border trade" (p.2). The DG, in addition to better-known initiatives, such as the European Capitals of Culture and European Heritage Labels, dedicated years to specific themes, such as Intercultural Dialogue (2008), Creativity and Innovation (2009), and the EYCH (2018). These initiatives are aimed at raising public awareness of those topics by utilizing both branding and funding schemes.

As a whole, these new governance arrangements, steered by the DG, have the purpose to stimulate and necessitate the discursive interactions between policy, stakeholders, and heritage actors. Such discourse sets the core asset of identity building at the basis of "a European sense of belonging that goes beyond economics and institutions" (Prutsch, 2018, p.20). As also observed by Vos in this volume here, we see a clear "politics of belonging" in which European belonging is discursively constructed to set boundaries of socio-spatial inclusion and exclusion (see Yuval-Davis, 2006). Attempts are made to narrate Europe's common heritage to establish the frameworks for a sense of a shared European community.

Along with the ECP development, three main discursive shifts are recognizable in this respect: first, in the 1990s, cultural heritage was considered an engine for the formation of collective European transnational identities (Thiel and Friedman, 2012); but, due to the political sensitivity of the latter and the consolidated national legacy of cultural matters, *cultural diversity* gained ground as a strategy in EU policy discourse. This concept served to legitimize the creation of a common cultural space aimed at strengthening European integration processes, yet safeguarding national differences. More recently, a *community*, *people-centred* approach to heritage with increased civil society involvement has been fostered through the Faro Convention (2005) and then reflected in the European Agenda for Culture's objectives (2007) (Van der Auwera and Schramme, 2011). The latter perspective has also gained ground in recent Creative Europe programmes and, together with *European transnational identity* and *cultural diversity*, has become a core attribute of EU cultural initiatives such as the EYCH.

European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018

The Council of the European Union invited the European Commission to present a proposal for the European Year of Cultural Heritage with the aim of enhancing "the dialogue with civil society organisations and platforms in cultural heritage-related

policy areas" (2014/C 463/03, cited in Prutsch, 2018, p.21). Following interinstitutional negotiations with the purpose of reinforcing the bottom-up aspect of the initiative (Prutsch, 2018, p.24), the European Commission released Decision (EU) 2017/864 of the EYCH with an ad hoc budget of eight million Euros and the legal basis for fostering a participatory multilevel and multistakeholder governance of the year. Indeed, the initiative officially comprised events intended to "promote debate and raise awareness of the importance and value of cultural heritage and to facilitate engagement with citizens and stakeholders" (EC, 2018, L 131/6). Overall, the message to be transmitted through exhibitions, information, and awareness-raising campaigns was on the one hand to convey the "rich European cultural heritage" (EC, 2018, L 131/6), on the other to stimulate participatory practices.

At the institutional level, two main bodies were in charge of steering and managing the year's activities: the DG EAC established a specific EYCH 2018 Task Force and the Creative Europe Culture Unit at the EACEA. Both have put in place mechanisms for motivating grassroots actors and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders. First, the DG EAC Task Force launched ten cross-sectorial initiatives involving diverse interinstitutional actors, such as UNESCO, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the European Committee of Regions (CoR), ICROM, and local communities (EC, 2018, SWD 167). These were articulated according to four main thematic pillars: engagement, sustainability, protection, and innovation. Second, an ad hoc Stakeholder Committee was created and steered by the DG EAC Task Force. The Committee was composed of institutional as well as grassroots actors, including national representatives of the Ministries of Culture, platforms, and 38 civil society organizations.[3] Third, the EYCH 2018 Task Force was in charge of providing the EYCH 2018 label to diverse initiatives across Europe and released an ad hoc communication materials package for the year. Finally, a specific open call by the Creative Europe programme (the main funding mechanism for cultural projects) was dedicated to EYCH 2018 and was managed by the Creative Europe Unit in EACEA. The granted projects had to reflect the objectives of "reinforcing a sense of belonging to Europe" and "promoting heritage as a source of inspiration for artistic contemporary innovation and creation" (EC, 2018).

The results of the involvement of multilevel actors were reported by official sources as follows: 14,000 events were held in 37 countries under the label EYCH 2018; 29 Creative Europe transnational cooperation projects were implemented; and, among the copious disseminated interinstitutional communication materials, a "European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage" (EC, 2018) was drafted to bring attention and maintain continuity of the topic at the policy level. On the whole, the experimented mechanisms resembled "a laboratory for heritage-based innovation" (EC, 2014) and these actions have been considered by the European institutions as an "opportunity to raise awareness and experiment with a more holistic, integrated and participatory approach to cultural heritage management and governance" (Sciacchinato, 2018; 2019).

Defining a theoretical perspective

Acknowledging the centrality of discourse in the European cultural policy, Discursive Institutionalism (DI) was chosen in this chapter as a theoretical framework to examine how the European Union has used its heritage programme to promote ideational and discursive changes at the meso and local levels. Discursive Institutionalism sheds light on the role of ideas and discourse in politics, valuing both "the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in an institutional context" (Schmidt, 2010, p.1). So, discourse is conceived as a process through which ideas, such as policies, programmes, and philosophies, are conveyed through actors' interactions. The latter is coordinative when it occurs among policy actors and communicative when it is directed towards the public.

Such an understatement supports the analysis of the interactive process at stake during the European Year of Cultural Heritage, shedding light on the content of ideas transmitted, the involved actors, and the governance arrangement; more specifically, it contributes to examining discourse creation at the meso-level with the Stakeholder Committee and the ways in which these discourses are used regarding the specific case of the Subotica Synagogue.

Applying Discursive Institutionalism to our analysis allows us to shed light on what way the EU's heritage discourse is devised through the continuous discursive interactions of actors in the institutional setting, and to trace to what degree such a discourse travels across levels, becoming a constituent element that triggers a change in framing local heritage sites and practices as "European". This approach is thus appropriate to investigate in what matter policy and heritage actors discursively construct the administrative system that governs heritage in a supranational environment and, conversely, underlines in what way processes and practices of (non)belonging are also influenced by the institutional EU heritage discourse. The analysis of the EYCH 2018 discourse across space and time demonstrates this dynamic, yet entailing the multilevel dimensions of the EU's politics of belonging.

Summarizing the argument, applying DI to ECP initiatives strives to advance the research agenda about the EU's attempts to use cultural heritage policy to stimulate identification with the European community by exploring how ideas of belonging are discursively constructed both transnationally and, yet, locally and examining to what degree these created cognitive frames contribute to shaping spaces for implementing other EU policies incrementally (Barbehön, 2016), also in non-EU states (Vos, 2017).

EYCH 2018 governance and discourse

Applying DI (see Schmidt, 2008) to the analysis of the interactive process among actors that convey certain ideas in the institutional setting of the EYCH 2018 allows us to shed light on the two core ideas of the initiative first, to appreciate Europe's rich heritage as a means "to reinforce a sense of belonging to a common

European space" (EC, 2018), and second, to foster a *cross-sectorial*, *integrated*, and *participatory approach* to heritage. Simultaneously the governance of the year, in particular the Stakeholder Committee, offers a specific arrangement to create and disseminate the EYCH discourse across levels, meanwhile reflecting cross-sectorial principles into actions. In the following sections, both the content of ideas and the interactive processes will be taken under scrutiny.

The EYCH Stakeholder Committee

The EYCH 2018, whose governance has played a fundamental role to disseminate EU discourse across levels, has been considered an occasion to translate policy principles into practice. In the official preparatory documents of the year, a *cross-sectorial*, *integrated*, and *participatory approach* to heritage management and practices has been emphasized. Such a holistic perspective is also reflected in the governance arrangement set up by the European Commission to steer the year's activities. In this section, the Stakeholder Committee, which has been central to the EYCH, will be analyzed as the main example.

The first time that the Council of the European Union called for a European Year of Cultural Heritage was in the conclusion of the document "On Participatory Governance of Cultural Heritage" (2014), in which the Commission was invited to present a corresponding proposal and "to […] continue the dialogue with civil society organisations and platforms in cultural heritage-related policy areas" (Prutsch, 2018, p.21). Subsequently, interinstitutional negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission reinforced the bottom-up feature of the initiative (Prutsch, 2018, p.24) as a means of strengthening the role of civil society and promoting the active engagement of cultural organizations and transnational networks.

Moreover, based on the Council's conclusion, an integrated approach to cultural heritage was called for in the EC Communication "Towards an Integrated Approach to Cultural Heritage for Europe" (2014). In this document, a deeper coordinative effort aimed at "enhanced social, economic and territorial cohesion" was sought (EC, 2014). In the same document, "new governance models" that would "strengthen links between local, regional, national and European plans" (EC, 2014/2149, p.8) were envisaged. In summary, an integrated approach was proposed for the revitalization of the multilevel and horizontal administrative systems responsible for culture and cultural heritage discourse and narratives. Such a defined participative approach to heritage would also have served the wider purpose of bringing ideas and discourse of European institutions closer to citizens, thus countering the democratic deficit.

Hence, dialogue with civil society, stronger public engagement, and deeper coordination between policy and heritage actors across levels were the unifying ideas behind the EYCH 2018. These concepts have been operationalized into three main mechanisms put in place and steered by the European Commission: the Stakeholder Committee, ten European cross-sectorial initiatives, and a dedicated

open call of Creative Europe. We will now look more in detail at the setting up and functioning of the Stakeholder Committee.

Before the beginning of EYCH 2018, the European Commission, namely the DG EAC, with the Task Force Unit specifically appointed to the year, established the Stakeholder Committee, which was composed of EU institutional actors, transnational networks, local and grassroots actors in order to transmit EYCH 2018's message and values across multiple levels. Composed of 38 institutional and grassroots organizations, the Stakeholder Committee encompassed national representatives of various cultural ministries, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, European Social and Economic Committee representatives, and international organizations (e.g., UNESCO, ICCROM, ICOMOS, ICOM, etc.). Also on the Committee were private heritage associations, transnational networks, and platforms that were appointed through an open call.[4] The diverse actors have been engaged to cover different roles: national representatives were in charge of triggering national initiatives, designing communication campaigns, scheduling national events, labelling procedures, and reporting to the Stakeholder Committee. Platforms and networks were conceived as multipliers, passing institutional information to their members on the ground and reporting experimented practices back to the Committee. Civil society organizations performed a "watchdog role of EU action, providing practice-led and specialised knowledge relevant for EU policy making" (Tocci, 2018, cited in Quaedvlieg-Mihailović and Aldana, 2019, p.42) and to the Committee. On the whole, the diverse actors have been engaged throughout the whole EYCH policy cycle and positioned themselves as front or late runners in creating innovative modes of promoting and disseminating the EYCH message.

Adopting DI, based on the understanding that coordinative discourse represents interactions within the policy community and communicative the dissemination of ideas, policies, and paradigms in the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008), the Stakeholder Committee was aimed at enhancing both dimensions. Such an approach to governance, which was based on discursive negotiation, had the purpose of engaging different policy and heritage actors in an attempt to tackle a discursive gap between European institutions and the wider public through a multilevel structure. In fact, this arrangement creates an ideational space in which new forms of belonging would arise, thus, the institutional structure entailed also the type of discourse that was formulated on a diverse scale.

In brief, the governance arrangement aimed at guaranteeing the horizontal and vertical exchange of information, practices, and, most importantly, discourses, thus ensuring both coordinative and communicative dimensions. By increasing the coordinative dimension of discourse, the Stakeholder Committee reached the following goals: first, it raised national political awareness of cultural heritage as a shared resource at the core of a European sense of belonging; second, it reinforced the multilevel coordination of heritage management and practices; third, it increased the relevance of heritage among members of civil society through

awareness-raising activities and campaigns, thus enhancing the communicative dimension of the initiative.

In summary, the Stakeholder Committee implemented an experimental governance arrangement that can be understood as an innovative example of inside-out rather than top-down governance in which learning and socialization processes were at play. This configuration strengthened on the one hand the coordinative dimension through interinstitutional multilevel engagement, as foreseen in the official preparatory documents of the initiative; on the other the communicative aspect, by ensuring the dissemination of EYCH message across levels. It has been the fundamental locus of ongoing negotiations concerning EYCH ideas, and it has guaranteed the implementation of events at different levels while shaping and maintaining the transnational cultural heritage discourse. Thus, given the highly institutional design of the Stakeholder Committee's arrangement, it can be argued that divergent practices and narratives were reshaped into rather convergent, and acritical, discourse on the EU belonging. In short, the governance architecture entailed the typology of the discourse that arose, and consequently, also the politics of belonging that emerged.

EU heritage discourse, ideas, and paradigms

After having unpacked actors' interaction in a specific governance arrangement, following DI enables us to analyze in depth the content of discourse by distinguishing diverse levels: *ideas and principles* (Schmidt, 2008, p.3), the values underlying a *policy paradigm* (Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2002, cited in Schmidt, 2008), and *philosophies*. Shedding light on these different levels permits us to better understand the instrumental use of heritage discourse within the EU frame and governance arrangement. In short, it can be argued that *ideas and principles* at the basis of the EU heritage discourse refer to the need for legitimatizing EU actions in cultural matters; indeed the ambiguity of competencies between member states and the EU strongly characterized this policy sector to the point that cultural diversity has been introduced as a discursive strategy to tackle this ambivalence, allowing, on the one hand, to "respect national and regional diversity", on the other to "bring the common cultural heritage to the fore" (EC, 2016/0259). *Philosophies*, instead, emphasize the role of a common past history as the basis of European integration and transnational belonging.

EYCH 2018 was a salient event that further consolidated, legitimized, but not ultimately, mainstreamed these three levels of ideas that underpinned ECP. With the motto "Our heritage: Where our past meets the future", EYCH 2018 strove to "bring the common cultural heritage to the fore" (EC, 2016/0259), aiming "to get people closer to and more involved with their cultural heritage, to encourage the sharing and appreciation of Europe's rich heritage and to reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018). Moreover, "the ideals, principles and values embedded in the European cultural heritage constitute a shared source of remembrance, understanding, identity, dialogue, cohesion

and creativity for Europe" (EC, 2016/0259). Labelling strategies and the hashtag #Europeforculture were disseminated across Europe to convey these principles into practices through award initiatives, awareness-raising campaigns, and projects.

Discursive *topoi* (*loci communes*), known as the "prototype of arguments" (Krzyzanowski, 2010, p.85), were employed in the official communication and policy sources of EYCH 2018 to emphasize three core messages: first, heritage as a means "to reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018); second, the centrality of a community-based approach in heritage practices, management, and governance; and lastly, the cross-sectorial and integrated outlook on heritage. The latter served to further legitimize the instrumental and political use of heritage as contributing to wider objectives, such as economy and society at large, and to promote the EU's international dimension. These *topoi* can be outlined in the year's overall objectives, stated in the preparatory documents of the year:

- It shall contribute to promoting the role of European cultural heritage as a pivotal component of *cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue*.
- It should contribute to promoting cultural heritage as an important element of the EU's *international dimension*.
- It should enhance the contribution of European cultural heritage to *the economy and society*.

(EC, 2016/0259, p.1, italics added)

The *cross-sectorial*, *integrated*, and *participatory approach* to heritage management and practices has been the core argumentative category (Krzyzanowski, 2010, p.85) of the year. Such a perspective has been employed as a means of legitimizing wider instrumental objectives, like "economic growth and social cohesion", "sustainable tourism and urban regeneration", and, finally, digitalization, whereas it maximizes the "*intrinsic and societal values*" of heritage:

> It will stimulate a better evaluation of the *social and economic benefits* of cultural heritage and of its contribution to *economic growth and social cohesion*. This can be assessed, for instance, in terms of the promotion of *sustainable tourism and urban regeneration*. It will highlight the challenges and opportunities linked to *digitisation*.
>
> (EC, 2016/0259, p.1, italics added)

Hence, summing up, two main tendencies of the EYCH discourse arose: first the enhancement of "a sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018), and second the consolidation of heritage *integrated* dimension. If the latter has been built over the 2014 Commission's Communication legacy and expressly recalled for the year, the first has been a recurring *topos* underpinning the whole ECP. These tendencies can also be distinguished in the EU's cultural policy at large, as Vos points out in her contribution to this volume.

In terms of belonging, heritage is often interpreted as an interplay between consensus and dissonance (see Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996), but, it has been argued that the Authorised Heritage Discourse – analytical tool initially nationally framed, then conceptualized in reference to UNESCO discourse – employs neutralization mechanisms in regard to the intrinsic dissonance aspect of heritage (Smith, 2006; Harrison, 2013). Referring to the EU heritage discourse as an authorized discourse thus allows us to shed light on to what extent the use of EU (and EYCH) heritage labels operates to narrow dissonance, in favour of an acritical dissemination of a "sense of European belonging". The analysis of the overlayered messages embedded in the EU (and EYCH) discourse supports us in clarifying the means by which EU labelling and branding strategies operate as political tools, highly sensitive procedures, that contribute to shifting local actors' cognitive frames and perceptions into a stronger alignment with the EU reference system. The latter aspect is rather evident when labelling is employed on heritage sites located in non-EU states: in these contexts, the use of EU heritage discourse becomes highly ambivalent, as will be discussed in the following section.

The Subotica Synagogue: the recontextualization of EU heritage discourse

The diplomatic role played by EYCH 2018 was underlined in the preparatory documents of the initiative, specifying that the event should contribute "to promoting cultural heritage as an important element of the EU's international dimension" (EC, 2016/0259, p.1). This section examines the means by which the EYCH labelling of a heritage site located in a non-EU state opens up a complex debate on the instrumental use of EU brands, symbols, and their ideational constructions. The example represents, more in general, the purpose behind the increasingly EU-promoted cultural initiatives in non-EU or accession states, shedding light on the politics of belonging that arose within these actions. It also shows how potential tensions between Western and Eastern interpretations of heritage policy and heritage discourses have been dealt with, which has also been discussed in the chapter by Levick in this volume.

European cultural programmes have incrementally addressed countries outside the EU; these activities, beyond merely supporting arts and culture, operate as complementary soft tools for creating conditions that facilitate the EU enlargement process (Vos, 2017), devising an ideational space apt to support the implementation of other EU policies (Barbehön, 2016). In these contexts, soft tools are employed to trigger shifts in frames, discourse, and narratives through heritage-making; such changes are often built upon the legacy of different EU initiatives and programmes addressing the same site over time. The EYCH labelling of Subotica Synagogue (Serbia) represents this dynamic well, since the site was nominated in 2014 first as "endangered" by the Seven Most Endangered Programme – Europa Nostra, and then, in 2018 as "European" on the occasion of the EYCH. The example illustrates the ideational and performative power of

discourse and its political implications; it explores how the EU is discursively constructed at the local level, and hence, questions the role that steering tools – such as the EYCH Stakeholder Committee and transnational networks – play in recontextualizing the EU heritage discourse locally.

The Seven Most Endangered Programme is coordinated by Europa Nostra, one of the most renowned heritage transnational networks, and aims to draw international attention to European heritage sites under physical and political threats. The programme is acclaimed to play a relevant role in transforming both ideas and discourses: labelling a site as "endangered" points out negative perceptions, but simultaneously strives to turn these criticalities into international recognition of the nominated site, which consequently would trigger transnational political and economic support. The nomination of Subotica Synagogue as "endangered" sets up the basis to conceive the site as part of European heritage, which was the message further disseminated during EYCH 2018.

On the occasion of the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018, the monument was then labelled as a symbol of "multiculturalism" and "European cultural belonging" in the communication and dissemination materials (i.e., videos and postcards) produced by the Delegation of the European Union in Serbia and the EU Info Point, attendees of the EYCH Stakeholder Committee. In the video *Subotica Synagogue – European and World Cultural Heritage Site* (EU u Srbiji, 2018), Subotica Synagogue is depicted as "a gem of Central European Cultural Heritage" and as "a great symbolic and educational value as a witness of multiculturalism". On the postcard, the Synagogue is categorized under the label "European heritage".

The narratives displayed on the postcard and in the video are designed in such a way that it does not allow space for dissonance, nor does it unpack the layers of diverse and complex belonging represented by the site, which was "realised by a Hungarian architect […], used by the Jewish minority, [and has] witnessed the history of Holocaust", in the words of a cultural expert from Serbia. On the contrary, it reinforces the acritical aspect of EU multiculturalism, and it depicts Subotica as an example of successful bilateral cooperation between Serbia and Hungary, thanks to European Union support, as the expert underlined:

> EYCH had the goal of spreading the message of *common European heritage* that is not dissonant and that is not contested. (…) So, if you look at all the programmes that have been done throughout the European Year of Cultural Heritage, all of them were directed towards *fostering pride and celebrating this EU diversity* and heritage as a *basis for identity*. So, the whole Year was not used at all to talk about sensitive issues and to talk about what European heritage is today with all migrations and multiculturalism. (…) The Subotica Synagogue was a very good example of promoting this *idea that with European support and cooperation*, in this case, *bilateral cooperation* between Serbian and Hungary, *you can achieve great things*. (italics added)

It is noticeable how Subotica Synagogue's complex understanding of intercultural dialogue and multiculturalism has declined to prioritize a discourse focused on a simpler facet: Subotica as a pearl of the Art Nouveau, in denial of any sensitive political issues or dissonant heritage. Thus, this simplified perception of the site was the basis of EYCH dissemination materials, as one cultural expert, who works internationally, argued:

> It [Subotica Synagogue] tells a European story that is *discomforting* on many levels in a city that still struggles with its *multiculturalism*. And I think the potential for synagogues to be used for creating an understanding of certain historical periods and struggles and *what it means to different stakeholders has really been avoided*. Because once you put [the site] for tourists to admire, you cancel this educational opportunity and complexity within that. (…) This potential really has not been used to the dominant discourse, is that the Synagogue is [an] art nouveau pearl of Subotica and this is why tourists come to visit it. (italics added)

In summary, the usage of the Subotica Synagogue image on the occasion of EYCH 2018 shows how the political complexity and the sensitivity of the issues at stake were compressed into a consensual idea of European heritage, in which the Synagogue is depicted as "a gem of Central European Cultural Heritage" and as "a great symbolic and educational value as a witness of multiculturalism". Similar trends were observed by Levick in this volume in her analysis of the effects of the European Heritage Label on the interpretation of the Sighet Memorial Museum. Evidence demonstrated that with socialization mechanisms such as transnational networks and the EYCH Stakeholder Committee, practices and narratives of non-belonging were often neglected and reshaped in alignment with the EU institutional Heritage Discourse, in favour of an unquestioned idea of European belonging.

Conclusion

The chapter investigated how soft mechanisms, such as steering methods, learning, and socialization processes (Littoz-Monet, 2012; Mattocks, 2018), operated in the specific context of EYCH 2018. The analysis sheds light on their impacts, demonstrating that they should not be undervalued (Vos, 2017) but acknowledged as the "subtle impacts of socialisation processes, ideational convergence, learning and re-definitions of policy paradigms and ideas" (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2006, p.38) also in the heritage sector.

Because of the ideational and performative power of discourse in cultural policy initiatives, such as EYCH 2018, the Discursive Institutionalism approach was adopted to examine three different levels: the EU institutional setting, the meso-level with the Stakeholder Committee, and the local level with Subotica Synagogue in Serbia. The Stakeholder Committee governance arrangement and

the labelling of the Subotica Synagogue in Serbia have been analyzed as complementary phases of the creation and dissemination of EU heritage discourse across levels. Based on this approach, discourse is conceived as a process through which ideas – policies, programmes, and philosophies – are conveyed through actors' interactions and two forms of discourse – coordinative and communicative – are outlined. This distinction, in which coordinative discourse occurs among policy actors and communicative discourse is directed towards a wider public, allowed for clarifying the overall aim of the EU's awareness-raising initiatives, such as EYCH 2018. The objective was to reinforce the communicative dimension of ECP ideas and objectives, disseminating messages such as "sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018) through heritage practices and sites across Europe and beyond. With this purpose, an ad hoc governance architecture was devised to mobilize the EU heritage discourse through diverse spatial levels and multiple actors. Stakeholder involvement and bottom-up engagement were triggered through diverse mechanisms: the EYCH 2018 Stakeholder Committee, the labelling EYCH 2018, and the Creative Europe EYCH 2018 Open Call. These mechanisms are relevant examples of steering methods where learning and socialization processes took place.

Both the Stakeholder Committee and the labelling of the Subotica Synagogue revealed mechanisms in the coordinative dimension while also striving to reinforce the communicative purpose of the initiative: reaching a wider public. The Stakeholder Committee focused on creating and disseminating EU heritage discourse in diverse spatial contexts, striving to trigger a transnational public sphere and, most importantly, tackle the discursive gap between European institutions and the wider public. The case of the Subotica Synagogue illustrated the reach of the EYCH 2018 in terms of strategic cultural diplomacy, highlighting to what extent the recontextualization of EU heritage discourse impacts the politics of belonging in countries during the accession process.

The analysis showed that, despite the attempt of the European institutions to promote wider participation in engaging transnational, intermediate, and local actors throughout EYCH activities, the design of the initiative remained highly institutional. Such arrangements affected the typology of discourse that was formulated on diverse spatial scales, and consequently, the politics of belonging arose. Indeed, regardless of the effort, the communicative reach of the EYCH has been rather limited and poorly critically articulated. This results on one hand from the institutional features of the actors involved in the process, on the other hand from the absence of a strong, pre-established European public sphere (Kaiser, 2015) in which the critical appropriation of discourse might have occurred.

Overall, if EYCH 2018 is considered to have been an innovative platform for heritage discourse and governance, where coordinative and communicative discourse overlap, then the initiative achieved its objectives of multilevel stakeholder engagement and openness towards a wider public. Indeed the governance architecture allowed for devising, negotiating, and recontextualizing a "sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018) at different spatial scales actively

engaging policy and heritage actors. Thus, it has been argued that the institutional design of the analyzed governance arrangement affected the type of formulated discourse in favour of an unquestioned idea of belonging. Summarizing the evidence, to illustrate the mechanisms employed during the EYCH 2018 has been fundamental in demonstrating that soft-tool outcomes should not be undervalued; on the contrary, they need to be traced in the form of "subtle impacts of socialisation processes" (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2006, p.38), such as "ideational convergence, re-definitions of policy paradigms" (p.38), shifts of frames, discourse, and narratives also in the cultural and heritage field.

Notes

1 Fourth Meeting of the EYCH Stakeholders' Committee/Joint Meeting with the National Coordinators, 7 March 2018, Brussels.
2 Semi-structured qualitative interviews have been conducted online in the timeframe from 2020 up to 2021 to the Creative Europe–funded transnational networks (ten) attending the EYCH Stakeholders' Committee.
3 For a complete list of the involved organizations, see http://www.voicesofculture.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Stakeholder-committee_web_October18.pdf.
4 For a complete list of the involved organizations, see http://www.voicesofculture.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Stakeholder-committee_web_October18.pdf.

References

Ahearne, J. (2009) 'Cultural policy explicit and implicit: a distinction and some uses', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 15(2), pp. 141–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286630902746245

Barbehön, M. (2016) 'Europeanisation as discursive process: Urban constructions of Europe and the local implementation of EU directives', *Journal of European Integration*, 38(2), pp. 163–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2015.1110147

Borrás, S. and K. Jacobsson (2004) 'The open method of co-ordination and new governance patterns in the EU', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (2), pp. 185–208.

European Commission (2016) *Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a European Year of Cultural Heritage*. Brussels, 30.8.2016 COM (2016) 543 final 2016/0259 (COD).

European Commission, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (2014) *Towards an Integrated Approach to Cultural Heritage for Europe*, Brussels, 22.07.2014 COM(2014) 477 final.

European Commission, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (2018). *A New European Agenda for Culture*. Brussels, 22.5.2018 SWD(2018) 167 final.

EU u Srbiji (2018) *Subotica Synagogue – European and World Cultural Heritage Site*. 7 May. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C3arRjG1ZWY (Accessed: 22 May 2022).

Harrison, R. (2013) *Heritage. Critical Approaches*. London: Routledge.

Kaiser, W. (2015) 'Clash of cultures: Two Milieus in the European union's 'a new narrative for Europe' project', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23(3), pp. 364–377. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2015.1018876

Krzyżanowski, M. (2010) *The Discursive Construction of European Identities: A Multilevel Approach to Discourse and Identity in the Transforming EU*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. ISBN:978-3-631-61046-6.

Lähdesmäki, T. (2016) 'Comparing notions on European cultural heritage in EU policy discourse and scholarly discussion', *International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences*, 11, pp. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.18848/1833-1882/cgp/1-14

Lascoumes, P. and Le Galés, P. (2007) 'Introduction: Understanding public policy through its instruments', *Governance*, 20 (1), pp. 1–21.

Littoz-Monnet, A. (2012) 'Agenda-setting dynamics at the EU Level: The case of the EU cultural policy', *Journal of European Integration*, 34(5), pp. 505–522. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.638065

Mattocks, K. (2018) 'Co-ordinating co-ordination: The European commission and the culture open method of co-ordination', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(2), pp. 318–334.

Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2011) *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo–Weberian State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prutsch, M. (2018) 'The European parliament and the European year of cultural heritage 2018', *Santander Art and Culture Law Review*, 2/2018 4, pp. 19–28. https://doi.org/10.4467/2450050XSNR.18.024.10378

Quaedvlieg-Mihailović, S. and Aldana, L. (2019) 'The European year of cultural heritage 2018: A turning point for the citizens' movement supporting cultural heritage in Europe', *Scientific Research and Information Technology*, 9 (1), pp. 41–49. https://doi.org/10.2423/i22394303v9n1p41

Radaelli, C. M. (2000) 'Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change', *European Integration Paper* .4(8) Available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/vol_4_2000.html (Accessed: 10 April 2021).

Radaelli, C. M. (2008) 'Europeanization, policy learning, and new modes of Governance', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 10(3), pp. 239–254, https://doi.org/10.1080/13876980802231008

Radaelli, C. M. and Pasquier, R. (2006) 'Encounters with Europe: Concepts, definitions and research design', *Politik*, 9(3), pp. 6–14.

Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001) *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London: Routledge.

Schmidt, V. (2008) 'Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), pp. 303–26. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342

——— (2010) 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth new institutionalism', *European Political Science Review*, 2 (1), pp. 1–25.

——— (2011) 'Speaking of change: Why discourse is key to the dynamics of policy transformation', *Critical Policy Studies*, 5 (2), pp. 106–126.

——— and Radaelli, C. (2004) 'Policy change and discourse in Europe: Conceptual and methodological issues', *West European Politics*, 27(2), pp. 183–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000214874.

Sciacchinato, E., (2018) *Building the Legacy of the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018*, DigitCult. https://doi.org/10.4399/97888255159094

Sciacchinato, E. (2019) *Editorial: The European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018. A Laboratory for Heritage-based Innovation*, 9(1), pp. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.2423/i22394303v9n1p1

Smith, L. (2006) *The Uses of Heritage*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203602263

Thatcher, M. (2019) 'Direct and market governance paths for the creation of an EU political identity: Cultural heritage policy', *Comparative European Politics*, 17, pp. 585–602. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00179-0

Thiel, M. and Friedman, R. (2012) *European Identity and Culture, Narratives of Transnational Belonging*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315580913

Tunbridge, J.E. and Ashworth, G.J. (1996) *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*. New York: Wiley.

Van der Auwera, S. and Schramme, A. (2011) 'Civil society action in the field of cultural heritage', *Heritage & Society*, 4(1), pp. 59–82. https://doi.org/10.1179/hso.2011.4.1.59

Vos, C. (2017) 'European integration through 'soft conditionality'. The contribution of culture to EU enlargement in Southeast Europe', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 23(6), pp. 675–689. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2016.1276577

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40 (3), pp. 197–214.

Chapter 5

The iceberg, the stage, and the kitchen

Neglected public places and the role of design-led interventions

Jacopo Leveratto, Francesca Gotti, and Francesca Lanz

Introduction

The existence of open and inclusive public spaces has long been recognized as a key factor for promoting the development of more sustainable and resilient urban societies when dealing with new mobility patterns and migration flows (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). And today, in Europe, the areas that show major potential for the development of inclusive social dynamics are those represented by the so-called "superfluous landscapes" (Nielsen, 2002), a network of minor and residual in-between spaces, often decayed and abandoned, resulting as a leftover after one or more planning processes. Often described as a failure of urban development or a prototype of "anti-public space" (Littenberg and Peterson, 2019), these marginal spaces can also be seen as non-prescriptive places, liable to the continuous experimentation of new values, roles, and practices of public citizenship. For this reason, they have increasingly been considered a central but neglected urban asset, from both a social and spatial point of view, for improving socio-cultural inclusion and development within the city.

The activation of such marginal spaces by means of spatial design requires devising innovative tools and methodologies needed to build a new sense of collective belonging that can encourage people to look after these spaces. Such tools and methodologies frequently clash with the traditional parameters consolidated within the field of architectural and urban practices. Even though attempts have been made at a central level, top-down actions of reactivation have tended to recede in the recent past. Rather than large transformative processes, smaller urban catalysts have increasingly become a preferred mode for building and activating public spaces, by applying short-term, low-cost, and concerted forms of intervention in response to specific local problems to both initiate the process of regeneration and test the feasibility of possible future changes. Thus today, in most cases of regeneration of superfluous landscapes, municipal institutions prefer to fund small and temporary activation projects in advance, both inexpensive and participatory, to verify the social and economic sustainability of more demanding investments. From a design point of view, this not only entails a significant change in scale and in the way of looking at the mechanisms of urban projects, but also challenges the role of planners, architects, and other urban practitioners by

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-8

requiring an approach that can effectively mix top-down and bottom-up impulses and manage heterogeneous contributions.

This is what this chapter looks at: the approaches, strategies, and tactics by which designers and urban practitioners have faced the need for inclusivity to activate residual and neglected public spaces, both in terms of spatial arrangements and production processes. Its main objective is to individuate among them the "catalysts" for triggering spontaneous tactics of placemaking and translate them into replicable design indications – at first by framing the operative role of spatial design in relation to superfluous landscapes and urban interstices in a historical and critical perspective, and then by analyzing three paradigmatic examples, selected from the 80 investigated, which represent three different answers to the questions posed, epitomizing three distinct major lines of thought. The aim is to describe how designers, by means of their disciplinary tools, have devised new ways of enabling different forms of spatial appropriation of public spaces. Instigating a sense of collective belonging to these public spaces turns out to be central in these actions as it encourages people to take care of them, both as part of a universal right to the city and as an effective institutional – yet community-oriented – strategy of urban management. By means of new forms of spatial design, neglected spaces are transformed into places in which new social relations and thus new forms of belonging emerge.

The search for urban inclusivity

Since 2015, more than 80% of European citizens have been living in or around urban areas, and the awareness that inadequate planning and design can have a deeply negative impact on the possibility of promoting forms of integration, coexistence, and mutual interaction among people is commonly acknowledged. For this reason, the individuation of tools and methods for more open and inclusive urban design plays a very central role in the European agenda on research and innovation concerning social sustainability and resilience (European Council, 2013).[1] In this regard, an improved understanding of the design and use of public space within cities is internationally considered fundamental for improving socio-cultural inclusion and development in relation to new mobility patterns and migration flows (UN-HABITAT, 2012, 2013, 2014).

This is because public spaces can be recognized as the arenas in which key cultural interactions and societal dynamics take place, and where values, belief systems, memories, languages, daily practices, and social lives operate and evolve, in that they are spaces in which people recognize themselves as a public, but also where specificity, difference, and separateness can be maintained and asserted in productive ways (Madanipour, 2003). While recognizing that public space takes several forms and shapes, this chapter primarily looks at public space in the form of urban open spaces, or the physical areas of the city that are open and accessible to all members of the public in a society, in principle though not necessarily in practice (Orum and Neal, 2010, p.1). More precisely, we look at their being

"places", or physical centres of meaning defined by one or more personal experiences that generate a sense of identity and mutual belonging with a certain space (Relph, 1976, p.45). Such physical places are characterized by the inescapable "encounter with others" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984, p.13; Massey, 1991), be they people, objects, or material traces of culture, which provide new opportunities for looking at multiple histories and identities within a diversified Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that the physical definition of an open and inclusive public space over the last decade has been considered an essential precondition for the development of more sustainable and resilient urban societies (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p.68).

Today, in this context, the urban areas that show major potential for the development of inclusive social dynamics are those represented by the so-called "superfluous landscapes" (Nielsen, 2002), the system of neglected in-between spaces resulting as an involuntary product of a certain mechanism of development (Tonnelat, 2008). They can be small, like informal parking lots, or large, like the vast agricultural areas bordered by the suburban sprawl; linear, like unused infrastructural facilities, or point-like, such as single vacant plots; temporary, like abandoned places waiting for a new purpose, or permanent, like unbuildable buffer areas; and they have been referred to in different ways, such as "*terrain vagues*" (de Solà-Morales, 1995), "dead zones" (Doron, 2000), "parafunctional spaces" (Papastergiadis, 2002), or simply "voids". In any case, however, their main characteristic is that of being urban enclosures resulting as a leftover of one or more planning processes from which they have been indirectly excluded and, by consequence, of being surrounded, and thus defined only by difference, by spaces with an identity they are totally deprived of: urban "wastes", in other words, involuntarily generated by the logic of abandonment (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1996) or residue (Brighenti, 2013), which often end up becoming exclusionary places for minorities and migrants (Mitchell, 2003; Marcuse, 2009).

However, although their residual and decayed condition frequently reflects a lack of any public interest or collective engagement for which they have been interpreted as a failure of urban development or even as the prototype of "anti-public space" (Chevrier, 2011), they can also be seen as non-prescriptive spaces, liable to a continuous redefinition of social roles and values. In this perspective, therefore, they are not only places of social exclusion, but they can also represent possible incubators for people to experiment with new practices of public citizenship and to negotiate and renegotiate their sense of belonging to the city in the most absolute freedom (Hudson and Shaw, 2009). For this reason, since the mid-1990s, from both a social and spatial point of view, superfluous landscapes, especially in Europe, have increasingly been considered a central but marginalized urban asset. The regeneration of these landscapes may have remarkable potential for facilitating participation and improving socio-cultural inclusion and development (Madanipour, 2004), even though, from a design point of view, this implies the necessity to define new design tools and methodologies of reactivation capable of building a new sense of community within an inclusive perspective.

Learning from tactics

The problem of identifying a possible approach for activating inclusive public spaces from a spatial design standpoint lies in the fact that the need for specific tools partially clashes with the substantial inconsistency affecting this research field. Although current socio-economic trends have been pushing the concept of inclusivity towards the centre of the debate about urban resilience, today, architectural culture is still struggling to define a speculative approach to inclusivity, which could produce a differentiated set of operative indications. Until now, the focus on this topic, with very few exceptions, has been oriented in one single direction, with an almost exclusive thematization of physical or cognitive accessibility (Burton and Mitchell, 2006). And this has led to overlooking the fact that inclusivity, first of all, is a constructive factor based on the possibility of building a sense of belonging that brings people to feel part of a certain space (Basso Peressut, Forino, and Leveratto, 2016), and that spatial belonging, as an act of self-recognition, is essentially determined by the direct possibility that people have to control the space they inhabit, both from a concrete and a symbolic point of view (Lefebvre, 1968).

In this regard, the most interesting advancements have probably been achieved by the uncoordinated efforts of a significant part of design disciplines that, since the early 1960s, have aimed to identify some concrete tools that could enable different forms of placemaking (Carmona, 2003), in order to encourage people to reclaim their urban spaces and exert their sense of belonging, both as part of a universal right to the city (Lefebvre, 1968) and as an effective institutional strategy of urban management that is alternative to the growing phenomena of privatization (Zukin, 1995). Following the first seminal heteronymous works about the fundamentally social character of the city (Lynch, 1960; Jacobs, 1961) and the subsequent redefinition of the urban lexicon (van Eyck, 1962; Hertzberger, 1963; Gehl, 1971; Whyte, 1980), this position today focuses on the research of concrete tools for building richer and more democratic spaces in order to maximize the opportunities of their users by considering the possibility of spatial appropriation as part of the design process (Cooper Marcus and Francis, 1998; Shaftoe, 2008).

This implies specific attention towards the citizens' different and spontaneous practices of public space "domestication" (Jackson, 1988; Kumar and Makarova, 2008), but also towards the specific spatial scale within which those actions take place, thus informally defining a sort of convergence of traditionally distant design disciplines on to this field of research. The investigation in this area, in other words, develops around some key issues concerning the "inhabitable" dimension that projects should materialize, even in spatial contexts that are traditionally subject to a different functional and symbolic regime, like public spaces, defining a new way of approaching urban design, which involves greater attention to the human scale, not only as a metrical parameter, but primarily as the dimension in which people produce their space and thus negotiate their sense of spatial belonging. Both as a more responsive form of spatial design and as a less

demanding tactic of urban management, based on the informal and continuous care for places that an increased sense of attachment usually ends up inducing (Leveratto, 2019).

The result is that today, although attempts are still being made at the level of municipal and regional planning, top-down actions of urban design and management tend to recede (Gadanho, 2014). As cities have become denser and their functional programmes more variable, rather than implementing large-scale transformations unable to deal effectively with the dynamics of contemporary urban developments, smaller "urban catalysts" have pervasively become a preferred mode of intervention for public space building and activation (Oswalt, Overmeyer, and Misselwitz, 2013). Similar to what Vos has observed in the context of Southeast Europe (this volume), these "tactical" modes of intervention have arisen as a counterpart to a classic and strategic notion of planning in the form of everyday and bottom-up approaches to local problems, making use of short-term, low-cost, and scalable interventions and policies (Lydon and Garcia, 2015).

Whether they are sanctioned or not by urban authorities, spontaneously arising from the streets, or emerging from given creative practices and professional specializations, they always represent a creative reappropriation of the contemporary city in the form of a diffuse and uncoordinated process of domestication, testifying to a new sense of place in relation to spaces devoid of any identity (Venturini, 2019; Lang Ho, Cramer, and van der Leer, 2012; Lerner, 2016). For this reason, today, in most of these cases, municipal institutions prefer to fund small and temporary activation projects in advance, both inexpensive and participatory, to verify the social and economic sustainability of more demanding investments, thus changing most of the design parameters in this field, both in terms of spatial arrangements and production processes.

From a design point of view, the sudden success of these forms of intervention has entailed both a significant change in scale, from macro to micro, and a new way of looking at the morphogenetic mechanisms of urban projects from a series of sequential operations to a simultaneous process in which various decisional agents interact to generate a complex spatial system (Leveratto, 2017). Moreover, it has shifted the conceptual core of public space design from a purely spatial dimension to a multi-layered one, which is also made up of immaterial factors such as participatory processes, communication projects, consensus-building mechanisms, specific regulations, and conditions of use (Sadik-Khan, 2016). In summary, the emerging attempts of tactical urbanism have challenged both the traditional parameters of public space design and the role of planners, architects, and other urban practitioners by requiring new tools and methodologies that effectively mix top-down and bottom-up impulses to trigger and foster a constructive and "progressive sense of place" (Massey, 1991). By doing so, these actors aim to integrate forms of socially located belonging with spatially located belonging (Eckersley, 2022) strengthening the reappropriation of public space.

The problem with this requirement of new tools and methodologies is that top-down and bottom-up processes of placemaking are not always compatible.

Whereas the former processes involve academic institutions, associations, municipalities, and other authorities in a multidisciplinary, inter-institutional project, in the latter, place meanings are made by inhabitants' negotiation of their belonging in a dialogical way (Bendiner-Viani, 2013). In other words, when managing the social regeneration of a complex territory, from a top-down point of view, the promotion of communitarian participation is obtained by communication strategies, procedures and targeted consultations involving the development of a network and significant autonomy and clarity of roles. By contrast, less is known about bottom-up and spontaneous forms of activation, in which stories play a fundamental role in how people assign value to a place and to an action. Thus, a key issue for research in this area is to identify the best practice examples of this spontaneous activity across different contexts (Ghibusi and Leveratto, 2019). For this reason, our research conducted in this field was developed through three sequential phases, aiming to analyze the topic according to different levels of detail and operational methodologies.

The first concerned the identification and the preliminary analysis of paradigmatic European examples of tactical interventions in public spaces, which have been mapped through literary reviews and indirect surveys. After having compiled 80 relevant cases, the second phase was to identify the best practices according to their ability to last longer than expected, generate sustainable change, or trigger further actions beyond the originally planned deadline and functional programme, which was considered evidence of the sense of place they were able to generate. This revealed a sense of ownership among the participants in this space caused by a sense of belonging to a community related to this space. This led to the selection of a restricted number of three case studies, which were further analyzed during the following phase by directly surveying the space, redrawing the project, and conducting interviews with the designers involved in the process of placemaking to make them identify the catalysts of success for the interventions taken into consideration. How did the planners, designers, and architects manage to create a place in which socially located belonging became combined with spatially located belonging?

The purpose was to arrive at a critical and dialogic definition of the production processes and spatial arrangements that have determined the success of the single interventions, which are presented, through three different tales, in the following paragraphs. Each one is dedicated to one single case, the *Iceberg* by Orizzontale, the stage by Constructlab, and the kitchen by AtelierMob, which proved to be successful in initiating effective and long-term processes of spontaneous reappropriation, and establishing a strong community presence, in the form of grassroots management and inclusive activities, after the completion of the design intervention.

The *Iceberg*

The story of the first one dates back to 2010 when a group of architecture students founded the Orizzontale collective in Rome, through which they began to conduct

some initial urban explorations aimed at the reconnaissance of familiar and marginal territories to question their condition. One of the areas of major interest was Largo Perestrello in the peripheral neighbourhood of Maranella, an empty and semi-abandoned lot in a state of considerable material decay, originally intended to be occupied by the stalls of the local market. After a first attempt to interact with the inhabitants by organizing an event in 2011, the right occasion to intervene on the site came in 2017 with the New Generations Festival, for which the collective proposed a temporary installation in collaboration with the social psychologists of Noeo.

The design process was initially developed by building a shared narration with the local actors through a series of meetings over three months, aimed at understanding the reason for the detachment from the site and the value that people attributed to the deserted space, and at envisioning a new meaning through a form of spatial storytelling. This strategy reveals similarities with what Głowacka-Grajper et al. (this volume) observed in relation to marginalized communities in the Polish context, namely that "belonging" often does not operate as a fixed, social identity, but rather as a discursive tool that allows groups to negotiate their presence in social space and life. According to Orizzontale (2020), as they have previously tested in other cases, the creation of a strong narrative through an exploratory and playful approach is what can help in getting to know people, especially in those situations when clear situated needs have not been declared yet. When a space remains undefined but not dangerous, citizens do not question it nor reclaim it (De Sola Morales, 1995). The intervention thus served to attract the attention of inhabitants by breaking the existing balance and triggering new reactions. For this reason, the choice was to produce a unique element or a pivotal object that could function as an activator for collateral activities and unintended meanings.

The studio, in other words, decided to develop a spatial device that could have a strong and direct visual character, which people could easily relate to without directly referring to the neighbourhood identity. The creation of a neutral background – which was open for interpretation – was thought of as a scenography for people to build their own narration and claim their role as protagonists belonging to that place (Lydon and Garcia, 2015). All of this was realized through the stylized shape of a small "iceberg", which emerged from the first design phase and guided the whole production of the intervention towards the materialization of a somehow inhabitable sculpture which could offer many possibilities of use: both constituting a sort of entertainment on its own by engaging people on and around its physical configuration and opening a dialogue with citizens aimed at reviving their interest across the whole site.

In terms of construction, Orizzontale was committed to a collaborative self-building process from the very beginning, keeping the construction site open for people to join and passers-by to observe. In line with the principles of do-it-yourself architecture, the materials and techniques applied were accessible and replicable, allowing for the realization of a temporary and reversible structure: two modules, a small ziggurat and a table, with both structure and cladding in wood,

completed by a graphic painted finish, aimed at creating both an evocative and a domestic atmosphere, stimulating alternative visual scenarios and inviting inhabitants to explore, play, and perform. In this way, the collaborative act of building the object itself became a collective action on display, concretizing the abstract idea of spatial regeneration into a factual and accessible operation.

In parallel, collateral actions and reactions happened on and around the *Iceberg*, both the planned ones organized by the team and the unexpected ones: the openness of the project and of the related programme gave the possibility to people to intervene, interpret, and contribute at different levels, producing a sense of inclusivity among diverse publics (Basso Peressut, Forino, and Leveratto, 2016). It provided the people with the sense of participating in a community, which brought together heterogeneous actors "who might relate very differently if they met in other settings" (cf. Cornwall, 2004b, p.76). It did so by initiating the construction of new narratives and testing various initiatives led by local associations, which, after two years, led to another temporary installation by Orizzontale, titled *L'Argo*. In this sense, therefore, the continuity guaranteed by the work of Orizzontale over the years represented a concrete reference in the neighbourhood for the development of new meanings and interactions between place and people, which evolved after the completion of the projects and supported more spontaneous uses of the square.

The stage

Engagement is more about including designers and decision-makers in the life of people and learning the subject they are dealing with, rather than involving people in the design process (ConstructLab, 2019). This perspective on engagement, suggested by the German collaborative studio ConstructLab on the occasion of another fortunate tactical intervention, emphasizes the potential of design-led interventions to overturn roles and develop new practices of spatial production within urban regeneration projects. What design can do is question its founding principles, not only its uses and features but also the policies defining it, the responsibilities it generates, the social issues it can or cannot deal with, and the welfare services it could implement. ConstructLab's project titled *Mon(s) Invisible* was precisely aimed at challenging the role of design and designer on multiple levels.

It all began in 2014 when the German collective was asked by the municipality of Mons in Belgium to think of a reactivation project for an unused park on the roof of a former army bakery, which could also activate a certain sense of publicness. Being promoted by an institution, the challenge was to develop the initiative into a fully community-led project, mediating between top-down strategies and grassroots resources (Bendiner-Viani, 2013). ConstructLab's initial idea was to make a symbolic gesture to visualize the space as an egalitarian background, making a wide circle in the centre of the area. During a series of workshops, conducted together with students and local associations, the team built a big circular

stage of wood, a simplified amphitheatre open to the surrounding. Its shape was essential, almost bi-dimensional: a sculptural horizontal surface, blending with the morphology of the site, realized to make the space for speakers and audience interchangeable through a variation in the section of the decking, which allowed reciprocal observation.

The production of a stage recurs in many of the projects analyzed in the broader research, where it is usually used as a temporary or movable structure for concerts or performances. In *Mon(s) Invisible*, by contrast, it acquired a political and civic value that allowed it to resist for a long time, being maintained and actively used by the citizens of the neighbourhood. The stage primarily served as a listening space, offering a platform of debate for the people working on the project and for those interested in getting involved: it re-signified the park as an "arena of governance", an "invited space" to train democracy (Cornwall, 2004a). Thus, the project moved from the creation of one single structure to the development of additional devices, addressing different needs and supporting the development of a programme for the park: a kitchen, a dining room, and storage spaces were built to be used by the community working on the site. This transformed the whole park into a place of encounter, inviting inhabitants and designers to explore, observe, question, and rethink it collectively. Later, a group of inhabitants took the initiative to create other structures, including an oven, a mobile beer brewery, a sauna, and a children's playground, which were built on-site with the same construction techniques and materials usually applied by ConstructLab in other collaborative projects.

The presence of the stage and the domestic devices growing around it recalled the idea of the ancient *agorà* with its political and civic attributes: it aimed not only to reprogram the functions and redefine the landscape features of the place but to question its management; it puts at the core of the reactivation the potential of a community in terms of self-organization and self-maintenance which is often considered as essential for the instigation of a sense of socially located belonging (May 2013). Such focus on the right to participate, to be involved, as well as the right to be represented and seen by others (Eckersley, 2022), is very common in the projects carried out by ConstructLab, where the collective construction of a space for encounter becomes a mean to empower people in re-appropriating the space: each individual acquires a specific and essential role in taking care of the site, feeling entitled and responsible for its use, recognizing everyday practices as a form of attachment and resistance. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the completion of *Mon(s) Invisible*'*s* installation, a group of users involved in the process founded a non-profit organization named Jardin Suspendu and obtained a positive response to their request to administrate the park, which until now was successfully managed through a continuous series of events and laboratories.

The kitchen

If the previous stories are set in misused sites inside very consolidated urban contexts, the first being a metropolitan periphery and the second a small town, a

different scenario is offered by Terras da Costa, an illegal settlement located in the town of Costa da Caparica, south of Lisbon, developed from some farm buildings around the early 1990s, which is currently home to approximately 500 people. In 2012, the Architecture Department (DA/UAL) and the Architecture, City and Territory Studies Centre (CEACT/UAL) of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa promoted a long-term project to collaborate with the community of the informal village and try to understand how their situation could be ameliorated. The Portuguese studio Atelier Mob was then asked to join the initiative, taking part in the workshop Noutra Costa, an articulated programme led by an association engaged in literacy activities in the area, also involving other local design practices like Colectivo Warehouse.

Following the intentions of Atelier Mob (2020), the group has primarily organized meetings with the residents to get to know their living conditions and find out their needs and what was lacking on the site. Understanding the precariousness of the constructions, architects were hoping that people would find a better living situation elsewhere. Thus, the intervention to be developed was never intended to be a permanent architecture or a facility to consolidate the settlement, but rather a temporary device that could improve the current quality of life in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, inhabitants were willing to fight for their "right to the place" to remain in Terras da Costa: the fact that they had built their own houses had created a strong boundary with the village itself, which represented the legitimation of this marginalized group as a community (Mitchell, 2003; Roy, 2005).

It was clear then, that improvement meant essentially legitimation and recognition: during the meetings with inhabitants, this manifested in the common necessity to access basic infrastructures. Bringing a water line inside the settlement was, therefore, a priority. Furthermore, it was evident that in this project, engagement mostly meant producing services and giving people tools to express their rights as citizens (Hudson and Shaw, 2009). Thus, the entire team finally decided to build a community kitchen, that beyond its final function, first served as a laboratory: in other projects, this typology had previously proved to be particularly suitable for marginal areas lacking a solid social structure or a strong consciousness of the place. Although inhabitants were not called upon to take part in the actual design, they represented the main actors of the construction phase in a process of learning-by-doing that started from choosing the specific spot to place the structure. The design served as a pretext to emancipate people and give them competencies while working on their area (Blundell Jones, 2005).

To allow the building to be self-constructed and follow the limitations of the budget and construction permits, architects opted for the use of wooden slats and boards, which were retrieved from another project that had just been dismantled in a nearby neighbourhood. The result was a partially open building with a simple C plan, organized around a welcoming and intimate shared open space, which had previously been absent from the settlement. On one of the covered sides, Atelier Mob located a big and fixed table for food preparation and dining, while leaving all the other spaces flexible and accessible for more informal uses, like gathering

and hanging out the washing. Only the main nucleus with the kitchenette and various tools was enclosed by walls to keep the equipment safe, whereas most of the space was organized as a flexible and permeable structure resembling a portico or a gallery. This familiar architecture was thought to give the inhabitants an opportunity to meet their personal and collective needs and to experiment with new practices of domestication within the settlements (Lerner, 2016). Central to this particular case is that spatially located belonging is nurtured by means of providing basic living infrastructures. Belonging emerges from the shared need for solutions and the provided agency to solve existing problems that involve the entire community in the marginalized space.

The shape of placemaking

In summary, despite many differences in terms of context, process, and formalization, the three cases analyzed can be seen as the epitomes of a similar approach to managing the regeneration of superfluous urban landscapes by facilitating people to negotiate their sense of belonging, which, during the last decade, has remarkably changed the common approach to placemaking in public space. Until 20 years ago, the direct interaction with the possible users that designers had to activate to implement such a process mainly consisted of inviting them, by means of different dialogical techniques, to express their preferences about the transformation of the space, to monitor the advancements, and to revise the solutions proposed (Blundell Jones, 2005). This, however, entailed the risk of disappointing the citizen's ultimate expectations because of a twofold inherent flaw of this kind of dialogue: that which brings people to ask only what they are expected to desire, or what they already know, with the not infrequent result of figuring either an idealized concept of public space, which was not really interesting to anyone, or a very private version of it, in which people considered public space an extension of their homes.[2] For this reason, the option exemplified by the three case studies has lately begun to thrive with the progressive shift from the idea of participation to that of engagement, which has strengthened the role of spatial design at the expense of traditional urban policies.

Ultimately, engaging means postponing the analysis of the social response after the phase of design, and even though a preliminary dialogue with possible users is still crucial, it is not meant to provide any indications about the future of the area, but it is aimed at tracing the existing social dynamics that revolve around it, which could be intercepted, activated and hopefully enhanced by means of a spatial project. This is usually articulated in a process that follows three macrosteps. The first is the mapping of the different actors, their daily practices and their cultural values by surveying their way of behaving and gathering in public, as well as that of representing themselves as part of different publics; the second is the design of a temporary structure that can not only be open to their different interpretations but also encourage new and unpredictable ones; and the third is the observation of people's reactions and the assessment of the nature of the

predominant uses and the meanings attributed to the space, capable of informing a grounded hypothesis about its possible future identity.

All of these actions are usually implemented by means of a form of design that, rather than solely concerning the space, its physical features, and its historical traces, mainly focuses on the construction of a "device" for its appropriation through a totally different approach from traditional urban design. The reason is that devices like those described in the previous paragraphs cannot be included in a typological catalogue as they represent simple means which are not meant to provide a product, but to activate a process (Peeters and Charlier, 1999). Thus, since this process concerns the engagement of its possible users in the regeneration of a superfluous landscape, the design quality of a device does not merely lie in its formal configuration, but in the kind of experiences that this configuration is able to suggest; also because it is not determined by its adherence to a predetermined function, but by the different uses it grants and the multiple opportunities of appropriation it enables, both functionally and symbolically.

This does not mean that the form of the device, or better, its architectural shape, is not relevant, or at least that it is less important than its "accommodating potential" (Hertzberger, 1991, p.150). On the contrary, contemporary interventions of regeneration like the three case studies examined have proven that their capacity to communicate is essential for activating the process of negotiation and inclusion. In other words, given the lack of identity of superfluous landscapes, the devices used for their regeneration are usually designed to suggest a story that can really engage people by making them protagonists of it. This story can be either given in advance or further developed along with citizens during the installation, but it must ultimately be embedded in an architectural shape that, on the one hand, leaves no room for symbolic misunderstanding and, on the other, can be liable to any form of misinterpretation in terms of use. This is why, for instance, it is not infrequent to see in these cases the recurrence of particular devices recalling specific spatial typologies, like stages or playgrounds, laboratories or vehicles; because, while being clearly identified in terms of iconic form, all these prototypical spaces are always characterized by the centrality of users' active roles in the process of their placemaking. By providing the users of the space with ownership over the space they also directly and indirectly engage in practices of belonging to that space as they become part of the social relations that determine this space.

This, however, is not the only recurrence. Whereas, for example, 20 years ago engagement was achieved by means of interactive terminals, sinuous surfaces, bright colours, and, more generally, a formal repertoire deeply influenced by visual arts, design, and digital graphics, today, by contrast, there is a clear preference for recycled materials, urban ready-mades, and simple scaffoldings; and even though most of the contemporary interventions in this field entail an idea of spatial construction that is more than architectural, as it is also made up of multiple and heterogeneous processes, their material dimension is still crucial for their success. The reason is that many of the designers that work on superfluous landscapes make use of a strategy based on a laboratory approach, to both

reduce the distances between the actors of the production process and combine the phases of research, design, and construction. Thus, choosing poor and common materials, "dry" constructive systems and elementary tectonics represents the optimal solution to build temporary set-ups that could be assembled and dismantled in a few hours by almost anyone, as the final aim of these interventions, in general, is not to build a space, but to encourage different practices of spatial reappropriation, which could restore the idea of publicness where this idea is completely absent.

This explains why, over the last few years, spatial design has taken on a renewed relevance if compared to the urban policies that were previously dictating most of the attempts in this regard: precisely because of its being a more effective tool to figure out the possible nature of a place that gives no hints about it, by defining a spatial construction that enables new practices of citizenship from very diverse and heterogeneous publics. Thus, today, citizens' engagement and the sense of belonging that this is expected to generate unfold from a design standpoint in a dimension in which public space construction increasingly recalls a form of art direction, both in terms of mediation and performativity: on the one hand, because of its aim, which is to set a stage for the actors involved to enact an urban dramaturgy that is not given but has to be scripted from scratch; and on the other, because, in pursuing this goal, it usually makes use of the tools, methods, and languages of set design to build spatial devices that could be characterized not only by a high performative value, but also by a flexible and continuously reinterpretable form, allowing for temporary, multiform, creative, and self-directed events to take place in reaction to it (Amendola, 2014).

Conclusions

The city is not a stable and definite organism but usually lives on the claims and contestations of belonging over certain spaces, which initiate both inclusive and exclusive processes (Madanipour, 2004, p.239). There are some public spaces, however, someway superfluous, over which no one seems interested in advancing any claims or contestations, and which therefore lack any identity: no one feels to belong to these places as much as they do not seem to belong to anyone. And this often triggers a vicious circle of disinterest, decay, and abandonment, which only worsens their material and social conditions, thus risking turning them into exclusionary places for minorities. Their lack of predetermined identity may have a remarkable potential for incubating new practices of public citizenship and allowing different and heterogenous publics to negotiate and renegotiate their sense of belonging with greater freedom. For this reason, over the last 30 years, in the field of urban studies, superfluous landscapes have increasingly been seen as a remarkable but neglected urban asset for facilitating participation and improving socio-cultural inclusion when dealing with new mobility patterns and migration flows. And their regeneration, by means of spatial design, has been increasingly re-evaluated according to this position, which has been considering the sense of

spatial belonging as a constructive factor determined by the actual possibility that people have to control, and thus take care, of the place they inhabit.

In the recent past, as a consequence, top-down actions of design and management have receded in favour of low-cost, short-term, and tactical modes of interventions, aimed at representing generative inputs of a process of reappropriation of these superfluous spaces. Designers have progressively begun to devise their reactivation not from the point of view of their quality and its improvement, but from that of their identity and its definition, trying to understand what kind of places they could become or what kind of people could recognize themselves in them as a public. In other words, they try to connect processes of socially located belonging to spatially located belonging. In so doing, they not only have reconsidered the urban project from a series of sequential and spatial operations to a simultaneous and immaterial process in which various decisional agents interact to generate a complex spatial system, but they also refined consolidated tools and strategies to better address this form of interaction. From participation to engagement, from intermediation to interpretation, all their operative shifts have tried to match a sense of place that cannot be defined in advance but must be built from scratches by means of new narrativity, as well as a sense of spatial belonging that is not only determined by institutional discourses but is also made of the everyday practices aimed at reclaiming public space by simply inhabiting it.

This ultimately explains the renewed relevance of spatial design for the regeneration of superfluous landscapes, which, until 20 years ago, was mainly carried out by means of urban policies. Whereas planning applies established procedures to solve familiar problems within a clear framework, design is meant to devise a framework for solving those problems. And the real effort that this kind of regeneration requires is not problem-solving but problem-setting: setting the conditions for citizens to negotiate and renegotiate their belonging to the city's public dimension.

Acknowledgements

Although the chapter as a whole is the result of the collaboration and dialogue between the authors, we hereby acknowledge that Jacopo Leveratto authored the first three and the last two paragraphs, while Francesca Gotti authored the three central paragraphs about the case studies. The scientific contribution of Francesca Lanz, who actively participated in the definition of the structure and critically revised the chapter during all the writing phases, also made it possible to write this chapter.

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MIUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 769478.

Notes

1 The political relevance of the theme for community institutions was first sanctioned in 2000, when the European Commission in Nice agreed on some common objectives which could be used to fight social exclusion (EC, 2001). From that moment, the aim of providing equal possibilities of access to public spaces has been one of the key factors for improving urban sustainability and resilience, and marginal public spaces have been considered a strategic asset in this regard (Madanipour, 2004).
2 The inherent problems of participated strategies have often been highlighted, especially in recent years. However, the best identification of these issues is probably that which has emerged in some research on urban planning (Balducci and Mäntysalo, 2013) which proposed to overcome them, through the disciplinary translation of Peter Galison's scientific concept of "trading zone" (1997), by focusing planners' attention not so much on the correctness of their choices or their adherence to explicit requests, but on their ability to propose a plan that was a "boundary object".

References

Amendola, G. (2014) 'La nuova scena urbana', in Basso Peressut, L., Bosoni, G. and Salvadeo, P. (eds.) *Mettere in scena, mettere in mostra*. Siracusa: LetteraVentidue, pp. 39–47.

Atelier Mob (2020) *The Best Place Ever*. Interview by Francesca Gotti, 29 January.

Balducci, A. and Mäntysalo, R. (2013) *Urban Planning as a Trading Zone*. Berlin: Springer.

Basso Peressut, L., Forino, I. and Leveratto, J. (2016) *Wandering in Knowledge: Inclusive Spaces for Culture in an Age of Global Nomadism*. Santarcangelo di Romagna: Maggioli.

Bendiner-Viani, G. (2013) 'The big world in the small: Layered dynamics of meaning-making in the everyday', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 31(4), pp. 708–726.

Blundell Jones, P. (2005) *Architecture and Participation*. London, New York: Routledge.

Brighenti, A. (2013) *Urban Interstices: The Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-between*. London: Routledge.

Burton, E. and Mitchell, L. (2006) *Inclusive Urban Design: Streets for Life*. Oxford: Elsevier.

Carmona, M. (2003) *Public Places-Urban Spaces: The Dimensions of Urban Design*. Oxford: Elsevier.

Chevrier, J. (2011) *Des Territoires*. Paris: L'Arachnéen.

ConstructLab. (2019) *Agoraphilia*. Interview by Francesca Gotti, 10 December.

Cooper Marcus, C. and Francis, C. (1998) *People Places: Design Guidelines for Urban Open Spaces*. New York: Wiley.

Cornwall, A. (2004a) 'Spaces for transformation? Reflections on issues of power and difference in participation in development', in Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (eds) *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation*. London: Zed Books, pp. 75–91.

Cornwall, A. (2004b) 'Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised Participation', *IDS Bulletin*, 35(2), pp. 1–10.

De Solà Morales, I. (1995) 'Terrain Vague', in Davidson, C. (ed.) *Any Place*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 118–123

Delanty, G. and Rumford, C. (2005) *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. London: Psychology Press.
Doron, G. (2000) 'The Dead Zone and the Architecture of Transgression', *City*, 4, pp. 247–263.
EC (2001) *Draft Joint Report on Social Exclusion*. Brussels: European Commission.
Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeit', in Martin Sabrow and Achim Saupe (eds) *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch.* Göttingen: Wallstein.
European Council (2013) *Research and Innovation on Sustainable Urban Dynamics*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Gadanho, P. (2014) *Uneven Growth: Tactical Urbanisms for Expanding Megacities*. New York: MoMA.
Galison, P. (1997) *Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Mycrophisics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Gehl, J. (1971) *Life between Buildings: Using Public Space*. Skive: Arkitektens Forlag.
Ghibusi, M. and Leveratto, J. (2019) 'Interstitial practices: The strategy of the in-between', *Int/AR*, 10, pp. 84–89.
Hertzberger, H. (1963) 'Flexibility and polivalency', *Ekistics*, 4, pp. 238–239.
Hertzberger, H. (1991) *Lessons for Students in Architecture*. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
Hudson, J. and Shaw, P. (2009) 'The qualities of informal space: (Re)appropriation within the informal, interstitial spaces of the city', in Occupation: Negotiations with Constructed Space, proceedings, University of Brighton, 2–4 July.
Jacobs, J. (1961) *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Vintage Books.
Jackson, P. (1988) 'Domesticating the street: The contested spaces of the high street and the mall', in Fyfe, N. R. (ed.) *Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space*. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 176–191.
Kumar, K. and Makarova, E. (2008) 'Portable home: The domestication of public space', *Sociological Theory*, 4, pp. 324–343.
Lang Ho, C., Cramer, N. and van der Leer, D. (2012) *Spontaneous Interventions: Design Actions for the Common Good*. New York: Architect Magazine.
Lerner, J. (2016) *Urban Acupuncture*. Washington–Covelo–London: Island Press.
Lefebvre, H. (1968) *Le Droit à la ville*. Paris: Anthropos.
Leveratto, J. (2017) 'From a trading zone to a sharing zone: Exploring interior architecture as a multi-scalar approach to inclusivity', *IE: Studio*, 1, pp. 30–36.
Leveratto, J. (2019) 'Domestication as pacification: Public space design in post-soviet countries', in Dogan, E. (ed.) *Reinventing Eastern Europe: Imaginaries, Identities and Transformations*. London: Transnational Press, pp. 131–142.
Littenberg, B. and Peterson, S. (2019) *Space and Anti-Space. The Fabric of Place, City and Architecture*. New York: Oro Editions.
Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (1996) 'Cracks in the City: Addressing the Constraints and Potentials of Urban Design', *Journal of Urban Design*, 1(1), pp. 91–103.
Lydon, M. and Garcia, A. (2015) *Tactical Urbanism: Short-term Action for Long-term Change*. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press.
Lynch, K. (1960) *The Image of the City*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Madanipour, A. (2003) *Public and Private Spaces of the City*. London: Routledge.
Madanipour, A. (2004) 'Marginal public spaces in European cities', *Journal of Urban Design*, 9(3), pp. 267–286.

Marcuse, P. (2009) 'From critical urban theory to the right to the city', *City*, 13, pp. 185–197.
Massey, D. (1991) 'A global sense of place', *Marxism Today*, 38(6), pp. 24–29.
Mitchell, D. (2003) *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*. New York: Guilford.
Nielsen, T. (2002) 'Superfluous Landscapes', *Space and Culture*, 5(1), pp. 53–62.
Norberg-Schulz, C. (1984) *L'abitare: L'insediamento, lo spazio urbano, la casa*. Milan: Electa.
Orizzontale. (2020) *The 'Empty Stage' Syndrome*. Interview by Francesca Gotti, 24 January.
Orum, A. M. and Neal, Z. P. (2010) *Common Ground: Readings and Reflections on Public Space*. London, New York: Routledge.
Oswalt, P., Overmeyer, K. and Misselwitz, P. (2013) *Urban Catalyst: The Power of Temporary Use*. Berlin: DOM Publication.
Papastergiadis, N. (2002) 'Traces left in cities', in van Schaik, L. (ed.) *Poetics in Architecture*. London: Wiley, pp. 45–51.
Peeters, H. and Charlier, P. (1999) 'Contributions à une théorie du dispositif', *Hermès, La Revue*, 3, pp. 15–23.
Relph, E. (1976) *Place and Placelessness*. London: Pion.
Roy, A. (2005) 'Urban informality: Towards an epistemology of planning', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 71(2), pp. 147–158.
Sadik-Khan, J. (2016) *Streetfight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution*. New York: Viking.
Shaftoe, H. (2008) *Convivial Urban Spaces: Creating Effective Public Places*. London, Sterling: Earthscan.
Tonnelat, S. (2008) 'Out of Frame: The (In)visible Life of Urban Interstice', *Ethnography*, 9, pp. 291–324.
UN-HABITAT (2012) *Migrants' Inclusion in Cities: Innovative Urban Policies and Practices*. Paris: UNESCO.
UN-HABITAT (2013) *Street as Public Spaces: Drivers of Prosperity*. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UN-HABITAT (2014) *Public Space in the Global Agenda for Sustainable Urban Development*. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.
Van Eyck, A. (1962) 'Dutch forum on children's home', *Architectural Design*, 32, p. 602.
Venturini, G. (2019) *Atlas of Emerging Practices: Being an Architect in the 21st Century*. Rezzato: New Generations.
Whyte, W. H. (1980) *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*. New York: Project for Public Spaces.
Zukin, S. (1995) *The Culture of Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapter 6

Establishing a place in the European cultural space

Grassroots cultural action and practices of self-governance in Southeast Europe

Claske Vos

Introduction

"We simply need more air to breathe in these circumstances of criminal flows, corruption, nepotism, and right wing tendencies. They make life less possible, less creative and less free. Culture and arts are tools to create more air to breathe" – this interview extract with art historian and curator from Bihać in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the value of culture and arts. When he noticed how the local government started to devalue culture in the town in which he lives, he decided to act and invest in culture and arts projects to protect spaces of creativity. This art historian is by no means alone in his views. The urge to use culture and arts as a means to create room for manoeuvre in increasingly constraining conditions has been a driving force for many grassroots cultural organizations in Southeast Europe. They see culture and arts as essential for the opening up of spaces in which alternatives can be shown. In the words of one of the founders of Cultural Center REX, a centre for contemporary art and engaged cultural practice in Belgrade: "It is about maintaining the potential of some sort of alternative society. Not to distance yourself from even the smallest possibility to say what you think about the existing problems".

In their attempts to create more air to breathe, these grassroots cultural actors depend on international funding. This chapter looks at the effect of such funding schemes on these processes of space-making and belonging in (potential) candidate states in Southeast Europe and more specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia.[1] It focuses particularly on one of these international funding schemes: the cultural subprogramme of the EU Creative Europe programme. The Creative Europe programme has been open for (potential) candidate states since 2014 with its main aim to provide a place for cultural actors from non-EU states in the EU's cultural space and to stimulate new forms of European belonging (European Commission, 2016). As stated in the most recent European Agenda for Culture: culture "tops the list of factors most likely to create a feeling of community" (European Commission, 2018, pp.1–2). Both the EU and the grassroots cultural actors interrelate culture with processes of place and space-making and see it as a means to enable new

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-9

forms of belonging. Yet while the space advocated by the EU in (potential) candidate states is primarily tied to notions of European belonging, cultural diplomacy, and enlargement, the grassroots cultural organizations primarily focus on notions of belonging that have become marginalized in both the local and the European contexts. The chapter aims to flesh out what happens when these different notions of space-making and belonging become entangled and negotiated.

It does so by, first of all, discussing the way in which the EU sees the interrelation between culture, space, and belonging. For this purpose, official EU policy documents are examined, mapping the ways in which the EU has aimed to use culture to create a European cultural space in which new forms of belonging can be instigated. Second, it focuses on the encounters of grassroots cultural actors from Southeast Europe with EU-funded cultural initiatives. Who makes use of the funding schemes and what are the processes of space-making and belonging that are brought about by means of their participation in the funding schemes? For this purpose, semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with 50 grassroots cultural actors, policymakers, and cultural experts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia in the timeframe from 2016 up to 2020. Twenty-three interviews were held with representatives of grassroots organizations that were successful in obtaining EU funding from the Creative Europe programme. Moreover, 16 interviews were held with members of grassroots organizations that had not (yet) been successful in obtaining funding from the Creative Europe programme, but successfully obtained funding from other international funding bodies. Additionally, 11 interviews were held with the representatives of the Creative Europe Desks, the ministries responsible for the Creative Europe programme, and with a number of local experts with long-term experience in the cultural field.[2] Finally, the chapter discusses the different interpretations of space-making of both the EU and the grassroots cultural organizations and reveals the multiple entanglements at play in these attempts to interconnect space and belonging through culture and arts in a part of Europe located at the margins of the European cultural space.

Ultimately, the chapter hopes to provide new insights into the complexities of processes of space-making brought about by EU-funded cultural initiatives in Southeast Europe by analyzing the effects of the overlapping social, cultural, and political spaces that emerge as a result of these funding schemes. As will become clear, for grassroots cultural organizations in Southeast Europe, the interpretations of belonging to the European cultural space are strongly influenced by the socio-political circumstances in which they operate, their dependency on international funding schemes, and their affiliation to the post-Yugoslav space. While the post-Yugoslav space determines the cultural, social, political, and economic position of the cultural actors, the European cultural space offers possibilities to alter their position in a variety of ways. It reveals that the European cultural space becomes reinvented and renegotiated by those who participate in it – funders as well as cultural organizations – enriching and extending this space.

Culture, space, and belonging in EU cultural initiatives

Dating back to the 1970s, the EU has stressed the need for the creation of a European cultural space. It sees such a space of cultural diversity, dialogue, and mutual listening and learning as indispensable to establish new connections between people and instigate new forms of "belonging" to the European community. Several programmes have been installed in which culture has been given multifaceted instrumental value to strengthen economic and political integration. The idea is that these programmes create spaces in which European values, standards, and technologies can freely flow, allowing for new forms of associations between diverse groups of people in Europe. Culture is presented as a crucial ingredient to create a public space of engagement in which 'European citizenship can become a tangible reality' (European Parliament and the Council, 2006, p.1).

This approach to culture as a means to stimulate a sense of belonging presupposes consensus amongst its participants about the European dimension of this space. As such, it resembles what Habermas once wrote about the value of the public sphere as a participative space of deliberation, which he saw as indispensable for the strengthening of citizens' identification with the EU (2015). As he argued, within the public sphere – which operates outside the domain of the state and provides a space to voice, share, and debate opinions – individuals become part of a wider political community (1984, 1990). Typical of his interpretation of the public sphere is that its premise is the possibility and desirability of consensus. It takes for granted that agreement will be the outcome of the encounters between people with different positions within the space. This resembles what Anthias (2013) has observed when examining integration and diversity discourses in the EU and the UK. She established that "culture has become rather mechanically tied to belonging because difference and belonging are treated as mutually exclusive" (2013, p.325). In other words, without a common interpretation of European culture, and a culturalization of social identity, belonging cannot be achieved.

A similar premise can be found in the ways in which the EU envisages its cultural space. As Cris Shore once observed regarding the early stages of EU cultural policy formation: "where cultural diversity *is* promoted, it is invariably within a conception of a greater, composite, pan-European whole" (Shore, 2006, p.20). Indeed, as the European Commission more recently stated in the 2018 European Agenda for Culture, culture "tops the list of factors most likely to create a feeling of community. […] There is clear scope to increase cultural participation, and bring Europeans together to experience what connects us rather than what divides us" (2016, pp.1–2). Through its cultural initiatives, the EU tries to create an ideational space – a space of contact and transfer – using culture as a means to encourage border crossings and the proliferation of imaginative communities (see Halle, 2014, p.10). Belonging is thus only to some extent related to a bounded spatiality and demarcated materialities, but is primarily socially determined by the ability to participate, exchange, and transfer. Belonging emanates from taking part in activities that are accommodated under a presupposed European label.

The way in which the EU hopes to create this ideational space has taken different forms and shapes. One way has been to use culture to develop a shared European cultural frame of reference. The development of such a frame entails the investment in the development of narrations of a European past, heritage, and memory, with their primary aim to affect people's emotions and make them feel more European and connected to Europe, the EU, and other Europeans (Lähdesmäki, 2017). Typical examples are the European Heritage Label and the European Capital of Culture programme. Here we see a clear "politics of belonging" in which European belonging is discursively constructed to set boundaries of socio-spatial inclusion and exclusion (see Yuval-Davis, 2006). Another way has been to support cultural projects that encourage participation and strengthen cooperation amongst European citizens. Here belonging to the European space of engagement is not necessarily generated by a particular framing and/or staging of Europe which can trigger identification, but is expected to more naturally evolve from the act of participating in cultural initiatives (Vos, 2022, pp.743–744). Finally, a third way has been to connect culture to developments deemed relevant for European integration at large. Some of these were there from the start – for example, economic growth and employment. Others entered the programme more recently, such as gender equality, climate, the digital age, and international relations.[3] By emphasizing the transversal value of culture and its intersection with other EU policy fields, the EU emphasizes the capacity of culture to respond to European challenges, which legitimizes the spending of the EU budget in the field of culture (Littoz-Monnet, 2012).

In the several EU documents representing the role of culture in EU policy the different EU institutions thus present culture as both the symbolic basis of as well as the functional means for the establishment of the European cultural space (see also Lähdesmäki et al., 2021, p.52; Vos, 2022, p.744). Culture allows for the creation of a space in which citizens are invited and feel more connected to their fellow European citizens by means of actively constructing this space as well as facilitating and encouraging active participation within this space. Andrea Cornwall has referred to such spaces as invited spaces. Typical for invited spaces is that external resource-bearing agents – in this case, the diverse EU (funding) programmes – bring these into being and provide a frame for participation within them (Cornwall, 2002, p.17). Characteristic of the EU in its establishment of these frames of participation is that it primarily does so by means of funding mechanisms. Adhering to the subsidiarity principle, the EU cannot impose legislation and member states have full competence in the field of EU cultural policy and has to resort to "soft forms of governance" to bring about change in the field of culture (see Vos, 2017, pp.680–682).

While these forms of governance to some extent lead to the harmonization and standardization of approaches to culture (Karaça, 2009, p.30; Lähdesmäki, 2014; Vos, 2017), they also leave room for negotiation. The EU determines the frames for participation in its programmes and funding schemes, but the participants are responsible for the further implementation and realization of the funded projects.

Even though the EU considers culture an important tool to facilitate identification with the European community and encourage integration processes, participants applying for the EU funding schemes might have different reasons behind their engagement in these schemes. As Randall Halle argued in his reflections on the attempts of the EU to constitute itself as a space designed to eliminate state borders, the increased mobility has not generated a condition in which people move without borders and boundaries; rather it has expanded experiences of contact and cohabitation (Halle, 2014). In these instances of encounter created by processes of space-making, intersectional (Yuval-Davies, 2011) or multiple scales of belonging (Antonsich, 2010) are bound to emerge.

Southeast European encounters with the European cultural space

The majority of the Southeast European organizations that take part in the Creative Europe programme are representatives of the independent cultural scenes of their countries (see Vos, 2022, p.744). Some of these actors started their work in the first half of the 1990s while other organizations emerged in the past decades. What all these organizations share is that they fight against the developments that mark the region's failed post-socialist transition after the fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Largely triggered by the international community, neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization started to determine the political landscape of the region (Horvat and Štiks, 2014; Tomašević et al., 2018, p.65), followed by the growth of unemployment, brain drain, and the rise of xenophobia, further deepening existing tensions in the region (Čukić and Timotijević, 2020, p.44).

Maintaining the potential of an alternative society

In these circumstances of failing post-socialist transition, social movements, organizations, and locally based community initiatives took the role of occupying and creating spaces for providing social services in a context of scarcity. The culture and art sector was central in this effort to create spaces in which the general public could channel its dissatisfaction, alternatives could be shown, and creativity and free thought could be expressed (Dragičević-Šešić, 2018). Organizations from this sector experimented with different forms of community-based management of resources and co-production, and by doing so, gained an increasingly significant role in opening up new perspectives for social and political transformation (Čukić and Timotijević, 2020, p.44; Horvat and Štiks, 2014, p.13). As indicated by interviewee at Cultural Center REX in Belgrade, "the aim was to develop a place and a space where we could generate language and knowledge free of everyday propaganda". In their work, the grassroots cultural actors emphasize the need for space in which (intercultural) dialogue could take place about the politics and practices of memory, the question of minorities, the previously mentioned sociopolitical and economic system, education, mobility, and the cultural participation

of youth (Dragičević-Šešić and Tomka, 2016). As the representative of Cultural Center Rex continues while reflecting on its actions at the end of the 1990s: "We wanted to create spaces of confusion. One of the titles of our programmes was to 'place truth in the sun'".

Such an urge to create spaces for critical engagement is still – almost three decades after the conflicts of the 1990s – at the centre of the work of most grassroots cultural organizations. Democratic backsliding, growing authoritarianism, and a decrease in civil liberties, combined with new waves of privatizations (Bieber and Kmezić, 2017; Bieber, 2020; Solveig and Wunsch, 2020; Tomašević et al., 2018, p.66) reinforced the call for the establishment of spaces in which alternatives could be shown. One could argue that in their efforts to safeguard spaces for critical engagement, cultural actors themselves have started to take up a particular space within their societies, but also in the region at large. When asked why they decided to engage in cultural activism, the majority of the grassroots cultural actors referred to the inevitability of engaging in it. It stemmed from the immediate need to safeguard the space in which they could continue to invest in what they believed in. As a representative of KIOSK, an art organization from Belgrade, argued: "because of what we stand for and the activities we develop, we are automatically drawn into the independent cultural scene. There is no alternative so we need to protect this space". Indeed, many interviewees argued that since the governments do not invest in spaces for alternative engagement, the grassroots cultural actors have to make sure to maintain that space themselves. Responding to a feeling of non-belonging within their own countries, they create their own public spaces of belonging and counteract state-led politics of belonging which limit the inclusivity of public space. It resembles the observation made by Głowacka-Grajper et al. (this volume) that belonging can become an important discursive tool that allows groups to negotiate their presence in social space and life.

One could argue that these efforts of grassroots cultural actors depict what Bloch has called "concrete utopias": concrete action towards the anticipation of the not-yet (1959/1986, pp.196–197). For example, many attempts have been made to develop alternative forms of governance despite the difficulties to change existing structures. In Belgrade, Magacin, a self-organized and self-managed cultural centre, has been established in an abandoned factory and manages to function outside of governmental structures.[4] In Skopje, cultural centre JADRO hopes to bridge the civic and the public sector by means of installing a hybrid cultural institution trying to decentralize power in the field of culture.[5] Moreover, several projects focus on those themes and topics overlooked or heavily influenced by the interference of the state. These projects challenge the official politics and practices of memory, the marginalization of groups in society, the dysfunctional socio-political and economic systems, and the historical revisionism such as the repression of the Yugoslav past (see also Dragičević-Šešić, 2018; Dragičević-Šešić and Tomka, 2016). For example, Crvena (culture and art centre, Sarajevo) developed an online "Archive of Antifascist Struggle of Women of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia"; KIOSK (art

association, Belgrade) made the exhibition "Projekat Jugoslavia" highlighting the relevance of the Yugoslav past for contemporary societies, and Krokodil (literature association, Belgrade) launched a project for critical debate counteracting current practices of historical revisionism in the region: "Who started all this? Historians against revisionism". While in the current conditions the actions of grassroots cultural actors might be considered utopic because local policymakers generally ignore these actions (Dragičević-Šešić and Tomka, 2016), they provide indispensable windows of change. In the words of a cultural expert from Serbia: "Even though these independent cultural actors remain at the margins – only a few are not 'captured' by the state – their very existence shows that it is possible to do things in some other way".

Coming to terms with international frames for participation

In their attempts to preserve and create those spaces for alternative engagement, the grassroots cultural actors make use of international funding schemes. These schemes are a means to continue efforts to fight domination and to use culture and art as a form of prefigurative politics (cf. Graeber, 2009). This transforms these funding schemes into powerful tools for socio-economic change – which has been also recognized by the funders themselves. In the 1990s, it was particularly the Open Society Fund that saw investments in civil society organizations in post-socialist contexts as an important instrument for democratic change. Grants were provided to strengthen a more unified civil society voice in the region and to create a critical mass of people who could contribute to democratic change. In the words of Paul Stubbs: "What Soros' Open Society Foundations created in the post-Yugoslav space, in a very short period of time, was a shift from 'resistance is futile' to 'resistance can be well-funded'" (2013, pp.120). Typical of the Soros funding schemes was that it invested in local networks and resources to stimulate the development of local infrastructures. It provided local actors with considerable autonomy, with the idea to reform the sector from the bottom up. However, this turned out to be rather problematic because public institutions did not want to engage in projects under the Soros label as this was deemed too political (Sretenović, 2017). As a result – and this holds valid for all countries in Southeast as well as Central and Eastern Europe – two parallel worlds emerged: the civic sector supported by international funding schemes and the public sector supported by the government. Up to the present day, both worlds remain largely separated.

While the Open Society Fund was one of the first to arrive, in the early 2000s several other international funding schemes found their way to the region to help it rebuild its societies, which led to a boost of several projects developed by the independent cultural scenes. Most of the interviewed independent cultural organizations that started their actions at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s mentioned this period of abundant funding as an exceptional period. This was the period in which the European integration process of the region commenced and many funders aimed to contribute to the required democratic

change. As a representative from KIOSK Belgrade argued: "It seems that in early 2000s, we were living in a bubble. Funding was omnipresent and we thought that everything in the future would be better. Space was provided for us independent cultural actors and we occupied this space". The funding schemes thus helped in the establishment of an independent cultural scene. However, international funding also started to change the cultural sector. Compliance with Western forms of management led to an "NGO-ization" of the work of grassroots cultural actors: "a shift away from experience-oriented movement politics toward goal- and intervention-oriented strategies" (Lang, 1997, p.116) combined with an increasing bureaucratization and institutionalization of practices (Alvarez, 1998, p.295).

When from around 2005 onwards many international cultural funders left the region and started to fund projects elsewhere in the world, the countries were left with a large group of independent cultural actors that could not rely on state funding. Moreover, these actors increasingly started to realize that the funding schemes had only provided them with short-term solutions which could not change the persisting problems that they were facing. In these circumstances, the grassroots cultural actors struggled with the tricky balance between the need to appeal to international funding bodies and the realities on the ground (see also Naeff et al., 2020, p.96). It resulted in a lively debate about the advantages and downsides of international funding as the criteria of the international funding schemes did not always match local concerns. Many of the independent cultural organizations particularly started to act against the more neoliberal style of governance advocated in the funding schemes which they saw as another expression of the international push to capitalist models, which has been one of the main reasons why transition processes in their own local settings failed (see also Horvat and Štiks, 2014, p.10).

Participation in the Creative Europe programme – one of the few funding schemes in the field of culture which is still available – is strongly influenced by this interdependency of grassroots cultural actors of international funding schemes and determines the debate about the merits as well as downsides of these schemes. Many interviewees insisted that funding schemes should not compromise the main principles of their organization. In the words of a representative of Crvena, an association for culture and art in Sarajevo, "We have to make sure that we are not a subject to either international organisations or to our local governments, which force us to make ourselves move away from the principles we advocate". Nor should these schemes mean precariousness for those who engage in the funded projects. Many of the interviewed independent cultural actors decided not to engage in the Creative Europe programme because they consider it too risky. The discrepancies between local conditions and European demands frequently mean that the cultural actors lose more than they gain from participating in these projects (see also Vos, 2022, pp.748–749). As such, participating in the Creative Europe programme is on the one hand indispensable; on the other hand, it is a reason for concern.

This entanglement with international funding schemes reveals a double sense of non-belonging amongst grassroots cultural actors in their participation in the EU Creative Europe programme. On the one hand, they need the funding to create spaces of belonging that are under threat in their local context. On the other hand, participation in these funding schemes also confirms their non-belonging to the European cultural space which is determined by rules and regulations – and thus frames for participation – that frequently conflict with the conditions in which they work and to some extent also with the principles they advocate.

Manoeuvring between the European and the post-Yugoslav cultural space

This double sense of non-belonging cannot be separated from the intersection of the European cultural space with another space: the post-Yugoslav space. This intersection reflects the positionality of the grassroots cultural actors as being situated at the margins of the European cultural space due to their affiliation with the post-Yugoslav space which determines their political and economic position in Europe. While the Creative Europe programme has been opened to non-EU states to confirm the future prospect of the region becoming part of the European political community, in their efforts the grassroots cultural actors are continuously reminded to catch up with the rest of Europe. In the words of Marina Blagojević-Hughson:

> by being treated as being both different from and like the rest of Europe they have become Europe's semi-periphery. They can only become fully integrated if they implement policy measures which should help them to adjust to the centre and to speed up their modernisation.
>
> (Blagojević, 2009, pp.98–99)

This feeling of being part of Europe's semi-periphery becomes most evident in the grassroots cultural organizations' attempts to comply with the requirements of funding schemes, which reflects the NGO-ization previously discussed. Successful participation in these schemes depends on the ability to work with the rules of the liberal-rights and market economy framework (see Lafont de Sentenac, 2019, p.6; Kappler and Richmond, 2011, p.265). This urge to comprehend EU frameworks of cultural management inevitably leads to divisions amongst cultural actors in the region. Larger and more experienced cultural organizations have the availability of skilled people (often trained abroad), are part of international networks, and are capable of framing the programmes in such ways that local as well as international agendas can be addressed. As such these organizations are leading in the field of international cultural cooperation within their national settings.

However, being successful applicants for the EU funding schemes, and thus being regional forerunners, does not necessarily make these cultural actors equal

players in the European cultural playfield. Compared to their fellow European partners – of which most are based in the western part of the EU – they still fall behind in terms of access to resources and possibilities to effectively translate the international funding requirements within the national institutional context (see Vos, 2022, pp.748–750). This confirms the semi-peripheral position of the participants in the EU funding schemes described by Blagojević-Hughson. On the one hand, the participants have proven that they are capable of partaking in EU projects; on the other hand, the socio-economic and political conditions typical for the wider post-Yugoslav context limit full engagement. The "semi-otherness" the cultural actors experience in their partnerships in the Creative Europe programme creates ambivalence regarding their participation in the European cultural space in their simultaneous opposition and acceptance, imitation, and rejection of this space (Blagojević, 2009, p.99).

The intersection of the European space with the post-Yugoslav space also has a more positive connotation and reflects the ways in which grassroots cultural actors identify with and instrumentalize the post-Yugoslav space for a variety of purposes. Many interviewees underscored the richness of being part of the post-Yugoslav space which as they argue can complement current connotations of the European cultural space. In particular, those organizations that had been already active before Yugoslavia fell apart emphasize the value of the strong ties amongst cultural organizations in the post-Yugoslav space. They mention the naturalness of cooperating with fellow cultural actors in the region as the contexts in which they work are very similar. As a representative of the organization Ministarstvo Prostora, an activist collective which focuses on the use of urban space in Belgrade, argued:

> sure there are differences, but we speak the same language, we have inherited the same laws, and unfortunately even the political situation is getting more similar all across the region. In these circumstances we can learn from each other and be inspired.

Indeed, many examples can be found in which networks between cultural actors in the region have been crucial in the development of initiatives. All over ex-Yugoslavia, social movements have emerged such as Right to the City … in Zagreb and Don't Drown Belgrade … in Serbia (see Štiks, 2015, p.138). These movements closely collaborate and all have their origins in the independent cultural scenes of their countries This networking has led to the establishment of Kooperativa in 2012, a regional platform for culture that aims to create a long-term and sustainable framework for cooperation and development of independent cultural organizations in Southeast Europe.[6]

This engagement with the post-Yugoslav space which exposes feelings of transnational belonging based on social, cultural, and historical affinity can be recognized in a whole series of projects of which quite a few have also been supported by the Creative Europe programme. Some of these focus particularly on

the memory and heritage of this particular period. They use international funding schemes to display Yugoslav history and memory in the public sphere while the different post-Yugoslav governments foreground the national interpretations of the past. An example of this is the project Heroes We Love … which focused on the largely forgotten socialist art from Southeast Europe. Others – such as the PopArt Festival of Pogon in Sarajevo – refer to the post-Yugoslav space to create awareness amongst young generations of the rich cultural scene that marked Yugoslavia. With their projects, they hope to inspire these young generations and remind them that there was a different life before the period of failed transition commenced. Additionally, old and often abandoned Yugoslav factories, houses of culture, cinemas, and art galleries have been provided with new life and redeveloped to merge Yugoslav legacies with new future purposes. For example, Ministarstvo Prostora occupied a series of cinemas and developed a street gallery transforming abandoned spaces into new cultural centres in Belgrade. In Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the organization Revizor has transformed a deserted socialist factory into KRAK, an independent space for contemporary cultural practice. Finally, many grassroots cultural organizations draw on Yugoslav legacies to reaffirm negated and marginalized socialist values to counteract the socio-political situation and particularly the capitalist transformation and conservative-nationalist ideologies (Štiks, 2020, p.464). In these projects, Yugoslavia is often a starting point behind discussions held in public spaces. For example, independent theatre companies such as the Dah Theatre and the Mostar Youth Theatre developed a series of performances that deal with remembering Yugoslavia and the traumas of the wars and how this impacts on the present. All of this reveals that emphasizing shared Yugoslav legacies has become an act of resistance in itself. EU cultural funding is one of the means to continue the use of culture and art to unify different groups of people and stimulate critical thinking in the post-Yugoslav context.

Multiple entanglements: establishing a place in the European cultural space

What became clear is that the interpretation of the European cultural space from a Southeast European perspective is inevitably influenced by what happens in the overlapping social, cultural, and political spaces of its participants and the nature of participation in those spaces (see also Massey, 2005). For grassroots cultural organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia, circumstances typical for their local spaces – resistance against persisting political and economic structures, dependency on international funding schemes, and affiliation with the post-Yugoslav space – have impacted on what is happening in the other space, the European cultural space. What do these multiple entanglements mean for the processes of space-making and belonging brought about by EU-funded cultural initiatives in Southeast Europe?

First – which is related to the previously discussed position of the grassroots cultural actors as guardians of spaces of creativity and free thought – for most

grassroots cultural organizations in Southeast Europe, the European cultural space is primarily seen as the context in which local change can be brought about. This foregrounding of regional concerns breaks with the way in which the EU presents its cultural policy, namely that "Europe's rich cultural heritage and dynamic cultural and creative sectors strengthen European identity, creating a sense of belonging" (European Commission, 2018, p.1). Senses of belonging are indeed brought about, but only when these are of particular relevance within the local context of Southeast Europe. If anything, the grassroots cultural organizations use the Creative Europe programme to protect spaces of creativity within their own local settings, which happen to be located in the wider European cultural space. This proves what has also been observed by Randall Halle in his work on the EU media subprogramme, that the Creative Europe programme creates its own localized spaces that contravene state authority and distant interests (Halle, 2014, p.9). These localized spaces complement the European cultural space, but frequently foreground local concerns – and thus local notions of belonging – instead of European ones.

Second, for grassroots cultural organizations in Southeast Europe, the European cultural space embodies dependency and asymmetrical power relations related to their affiliation to the post-Yugoslav space. While the EU represents the European cultural space as a space in which new forms of European belonging can emerge, the strong dependency on international funding schemes and the challenging conditions in which the grassroots cultural actors work frequently place them in the position of outsiders. For many of the participating organizations, engaging in EU-funded cultural projects means being confronted with their spatial marginality which relates to the social, economic, and political conditions of the national settings of which they form a part (see also Vos, 2022). As such – and this breaks with the official narrative of the EU – participation in the Creative Europe programme does not necessarily mean experiencing what connects them to other Europeans; rather it confirms what sets them apart. The so-called NGO-ization caused by the dependency on international funding schemes is largely seen as a negative outcome of the asymmetrical power relations which confirm that the socio-political space of the region has been largely ascribed from outside (Stubbs, 2015, p.71). In the specific case of EU funding and the Creative Europe programme, the European cultural space has become associated with bureaucracy, neoliberalization, and even to some extent with the failed post-socialist transition process which is seen by many as at least partly a result of EU enlargement strategies.

Third, there is a shared conviction amongst grassroots cultural actors in Southeast Europe that the historical, social, and cultural dimensions of the post-Yugoslav space deserve a place in the wider European cultural space. While the socialist past has found its way into EU cultural policymaking and particularly its heritage programmes,[7] grassroots cultural organizations in Southeast Europe – but also in other post-socialist states – argue that several of the legacies of the socialist period deserve attention for multiple reasons. In the words of a representative of Pogon, an NGO focusing on youth and culture in Sarajevo, "The war re-set

everything and we urgently need to regain what we have lost. Yugoslavia's cultural richness reminds us that we have so much to contribute to the European and Western culture scene". He referred to the music, architecture, literature, theatre, and arts scene of the former Yugoslavia which has become forgotten due to the conflicts of the 1990s and the period of nationalization that followed. As many interviewees argued, Yugoslav culture currently has no place in the European cultural space leaving out a considerable part of European culture. This impacts negatively on the attempts made to develop a shared cultural frame of reference for all Europeans. If the European Union's politics of belonging – and thus the ways in which it discursively constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion and exclusion (Yuval-Davis, 2006) – does not include Europe's socialist past, this will inevitably lead to feelings of non-belonging as the participants from Southeast Europe become marginal subjectivities of these politics (see Harris and Gandolfo, 2014, p.574; Trudeau, 2006, p.423).

Furthermore, this aligns with this call for attention to Yugoslavia's rich cultural history; the post-Yugoslav space seems to be a good starting point behind transnational cooperation and exchange in the field of culture and art which is indispensable for the objectives the European Commission has set for EU cultural initiatives in Southeast Europe: fostering reconciliation, establishing inclusive, democratic societies, and countering radicalization (European Commission, 2016, p.6). By investing in concrete utopias all over the region, projects co-funded by the Creative Europe programme actually facilitate processes that the EU aims to bring about in its enlargement policies and in its strategy for culture in international relations. This reflects the European Commission's hope that cultural interaction and exchange processes can be instigated that impact positively on European integration processes. However, it is important to realize that it was not the EU that started this process. These changes were instigated by the independent cultural scenes in Southeast Europe way before the opening of the Creative Europe programme. Grassroots cultural organizations tactically used their strong networks and international funding schemes to translate their ideas into practices which suited their needs.

Conclusion

By means of its cultural initiatives, the EU aims to create a cultural space in which EU citizens and citizens of its (potential) candidate states are invited to participate which will hopefully lead to new forms of belonging to the European community. However, typical for EU action in the field of culture is that the EU can only to a degree govern its cultural space and set the frames for participation, which leaves room for negotiation amongst the participants to use the funding according to their own particular concerns. While both the EU and the grassroots cultural actors aim to use the funds to instigate new forms of belonging, the forms of belonging that are brought in the implementation of the Creative Europe programme reveal several reversals of the kinds of belonging that the EU intended to

establish. While the EU assumes that belonging to the European community will automatically emerge from the participation it facilitates, in their encounters with the Creative Europe programme, participants from Southeast Europe frequently experienced a double sense of non-belonging. Furthermore, the kinds of belonging brought forward by the funded projects did not reveal consensus, but rather disparity about the European dimension of the European cultural space and feelings of marginality amongst the Southeast European participants.

What became clear is that for many grassroots cultural actors, participating in the Creative Europe programme is not so much about increasing European belonging or belonging to the European community. Instead, for them, participation means finding new possibilities to develop and maintain alternative forms of belonging within their own regional, national, and local contexts. In line with this, the European cultural space is inseparable from the other space they are part of: the post-Yugoslav space. The intersection of these two spaces impacts on the potential of the Creative Europe programme to stimulate identification with the European community within this specific context. For many grassroots cultural actors, participation in the Creative Europe programme does not necessarily lead to more identification with other Europeans. Instead, it confirms their position of being part of Europe's semi-periphery and thus being both different from and like the rest of Europe. Remarkably, many grassroots cultural actors make use of the Creative Europe programme because they feel they do not belong both in their local contexts and in Europe at large. They invest in new spaces of belonging within their own local contexts to maintain what they fear losing. But they also make a plea to the EU for more attention to the post-Yugoslav space in its cultural initiatives: how to fully belong to the European cultural space, when the post-Yugoslav space – which is central to the notions of belonging of the cultural actors from Southeast Europe – remains at the margins of this space.

What this analysis shows is that grassroots cultural actors renegotiate the European cultural space extending its meaning and interpretation. This can be seen as a direct result of encounters created by means of the Creative Europe programme which in the specific case of Southeast Europe has been largely determined by the entanglement of two spaces: the European and the post-socialist space. The entanglement of both spaces places the grassroots cultural actors in an in-between position. On the one hand, they are part of both spaces as citizens and participants. On the other hand, they remain excluded from both spaces, acting as independent cultural actors that operate at the margins of the European community. For them, international funding schemes are a means to actively negotiate their position both in their local and in the European context, counteracting several instances of non-belonging.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks all interviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia for generously sharing their insights about

participating in the Creative Europe programme. The research was made possible due to funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 769478. The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info) which is co-funded by AHRC, MIUR, NCN, NWO, BMBF, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020.

Notes

1 Southeast Europe refers to the countries that were once part of the former Yugoslavia. The research has been carried out in three countries and does not represent Southeast Europe in its entirety. Yet, these countries share quite a few historical, cultural, and socio-political features with the other post-Yugoslav states and face similar challenges related to the unfinished transition processes after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Southeast Europe is preferred over the term Western Balkans due to the historical and political connotations of the term.
2 Most of these interviews were held in 2018 and 2020. Due to COVID-19, the interviews in 2020 were held online. The grassroots organizations that were interviewed represent a variety of sectors – i.e., theatre, performative arts, contemporary and visual art, modern dance, literature, and architecture – sizes, and periods of existence. Most of them are based in the capital cities (Sarajevo, Skopje, and Belgrade) while others are based in other towns and cities (Banja Luka, Mostar, Bitola, and Novi Sad). Some of them act as cultural centres assembling different forms of culture and art. A full list with all details can be requested by contacting the author of this chapter.
3 For the priorities for the period 2019–2024 see: https://ec.europa.eu/culture/policies/strategic-framework-eus-cultural-policy, last accessed May 2021.
4 See https://kcmagacin.org/en/in-short/, last accessed June 2021.
5 Based on models that were already successfully developed in Croatia by organizations such as Clubture and the Kultura Nova Foundation in Zagreb: https://jadroasocijacija.org.mk/?lang=en, last accessed February 2022.
6 See https://platforma-kooperativa.org/, last accessed April 2022.
7 Several post-Soviet states demanded attention to the legacies of the Stalinist period, arguing that this period deserves a similar status in European memory narratives as the Holocaust. This led to the European Parliament's 2009 resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism, condemning totalitarian crimes and recognizing "Communism, Nazism and fascism as a shared legacy" (European Parliament, 2009).

References

Alvarez, S.E. (1998) 'Latin American feminisms 'go global': Trends of the 1990s and challenges for the new millennium', in Alvarez, Sonia E., Dagnino, E. and Escobar, A. (eds.) *Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements*, Boulder: Westview.

Anthias, F. (2013) 'Moving beyond the Janus face of integration and diversity discourses: Towards an intersectional framing', *The Sociological Review*, 61, pp. 323–343.

Antonsich, M. (2010) 'Searching for belonging: An analytical framework', *Geography Compass*, 4 (6), pp. 644–659.
Bieber, F. (2020) *The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bieber, F. and Kmezić, M. (2017) *The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: An Autonomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of the EU Democracy Promotion*. Belgrade: Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Blagojević, M. (2009) *Knowledge Production at the Semiperiphery: A Gender Perspective*. Belgrade: Institute for Sociological and Criminological Research.
Bloch, E. (1959/1986) *The Principle of Hope*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Cornwall, A. (2002) 'Making spaces, changing places: situating participation in development.' *IDS Working Paper* 170, pp. 1–35.
Čukić, I. and Timotijević, J. (2020) *Spaces of commoning: urban commons in the ex-YU region*. Belgrade: Ministry of Space: Institute for Urban Politics, Belgrade.
Dragičević-Šešić, M. (2018) *Umetnost i Kultura Otpora*. Belgrade: Clio.
Dragićević-Šešić, M. and Tomka, G. (2016) 'Art and dissent. Questioning the grid', in Gonçalves, S. and Majhanović, S. (eds) *Art and Intercultural Dialogue*. New York: Springer, pp. 55–86.
European Commission (2016) 'Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations', Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2016%3A29%3AFIN (accessed 17 November 2020).
European Commission (2018) 'A new European agenda for culture', Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:267:FIN (accessed 10 December 2020).
European Parliament (2009) 'European conscience and totalitarianism. European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism', Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2009-0213_EN.html (accessed 23 April 2022).
European Parliament and the Council (2006) 'Decision No 1855/2006/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 12 december 2006 establishing the culture programme' (2007 to 2013). *Official Journal of the European Union L*, 372, pp. 1–11.
Graeber, D. (2009) *Direct Action: An Ethnography*. Oakland: AK Press.
Halle, R. (2014) *The Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Habermas, J. (1984) *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, trans. T. McCarthy*. Boston: Beacon.
Habermas, J. (1990) *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,* trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholson,. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (2015) 'Democracy in Europe: Why the development of the EU into a transnational democracy is necessary and how it is possible', *European Law Journal*, 21(4), pp. 546–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12128.
Harris, A. and Gandolfo, E. (2014) 'Looked at and looked over or: I wish I was adopted', *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography*, 21(5), pp. 567–581.
Horvat, S. and Štiks, I. (2014) *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism. Radical Politics After Yugoslavia*. London: Verso.
Kappler, S. and Richmond, O. (2011) 'Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Resistance or emancipation?' *Security Dialogue*, 42(3), pp. 261–78.

Karaça, B. (2009) 'Governance of or through culture? Cultural policy and the politics of culture in Europe', *Focaal*, 55(14), pp. 27–40.

Lafont de Sentenac, D. (2019) 'United in Growing Diversity. How the EU takes intercultural relations into account in its Western Balkans enlargement policy.' Policy Paper No. 229, Jacques Delors Institute, pp. 1–18.

Lähdesmäki, T. (2014) 'Transnational heritage in the making. Strategies for narrating cultural heritage as European in the intergovernmental initiative of the European heritage label.' *Ethnologia Europaea: Journal of European Ethnology*, 44(1), pp. 75–93.

Lähdesmäki, T. (2017) 'Politics of affect in the EU heritage policy discourse: An analysis of promotional videos of sites awarded with the European heritage label.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23(8), pp. 709–22.

Lähdesmäki, T., Mäkinen, K., Čeginskas, V., and Kaasik-Krogerus, S. (2021) *Europe from Below. Notions of Europe and the European among Participants of EU Cultural Initiatives*. Leiden: Brill.

Lang, S. (1997) 'The NGOization of feminism', in Scott, J.W., Kaplan, C., and Keates, D. (eds) *Transitions, Environments, Translations. Feminisms in International Politics*. London: Routledge, pp. 101–120.

Littoz-Monnet, A. (2012) 'Agenda-setting dynamics at the EU level: The case of the EU cultural policy', *Journal of European Integration*, 34(5), pp. 505–522.

Massey, D. (2005) *For Space*. London: Sage.

Naeff J.A., Ree A. van, Sipkes L., Strava C., Tromp K. and Westmoreland M.R. (2020), 'Dissonant entanglements and creative redistributions', In Kuoni C., Baltà Portolés J., Khan N.N. and Moses S. (eds.) *Forces of Art: Perspectives from a Changing World*. Amsterdam: Valiz, pp. 71–96.

Shore, C. (2006) 'In uno plures (?): EU cultural policy and the governance of Europe.' *Cultural Analysis,* 5, pp. 7–26.

Solveig, R. and Wunsch, N. (2020) 'Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1, pp.41–62.

Štiks I. (2015) '"New left" in the post-Yugoslav space: Issues, sites, and forms', *Socialism and Democracy*, 29(3), pp. 135–146.

Štiks, I. (2020) 'Activist aesthetics in the post-socialist Balkans', *Third Text* 34(4–5), pp. 461–79.

Sretenović, D. (2017) 'Interview with Dejan Sretenović on the role of Soros Centers for Contemporary Art - SCCA in the region and the conditions of art production in the 90s.' Available at: https://www.kuda.org/en/interview-dejan-sretenovi-role-soros-centers-contemporary-art-scca-region-and-conditions-art (last accessed 19-05-2021).

Stubbs, P. (2013) 'Flex actors and philanthropy in (post-)conflict Arenas: Soros' open society foundations in the post-Yugoslav space', *Croatian Political Science Review*, 50(5), pp. 114–138.

Stubbs, P. (2015) 'Performing reform in South East Europe: Consultancy, translation and flexible agency'. In: Clarke, J. Bainton, D., Lendvai, N. and Stubbs, P. (eds.) *Making Policy Mover. Towards a politics of translation and assemblage*. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 65–94.

Tomašević, T., Horvat, V., Midžić, A., Dragšić, I. and Dakić, M. (2018) *Commons in South East Europe. Case of Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia*. Zagreb: Institute for Political Ecology.

Trudeau, D. (2006) 'Politics of belonging in the construction of landscapes: Place-making, boundary drawing and exclusion', *Cultural Geographies*, 13(3), pp. 421–443.
Vos, C. (2017) 'European integration through "soft conditionality". The contribution of culture to EU enlargement in Southeast Europe.' *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 23(6), pp. 675–89.
Vos, C. (2022) 'Moving in and out of the European cultural space. South East European encounters with the creative Europe programme', *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 25(2), pp. 740–760.
Yuval-Davies, N. (2011) *The Politics of Belonging. Intersectional Contestations*. London: Sage.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging.' *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40 (3), pp. 197–214.

Part II

Encountering contested belongings in public places

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

Introduction to Part II

Encountering contested belongings in public places

Claske Vos and Susannah Eckersley

The second part of the book focuses specifically on public spaces as sites of cultural encounters. The different chapters look at how heritage sites, museums, and statues become sites in which diverse notions of belonging intersect. These encounters often result from the presence of socio-historical legacies that are considered contested and/or marginalized within Europe, such as the socialist and colonial past. Moreover, many emerge at sites positioned on "fault lines" within contemporary heritage, memory, and museum practices and are strongly affected by the power dynamics at play in and around them. The chapters here show that such encounters often lead to a (re)politicization of – hidden or silenced – belonging, particularly when the right to belong or to participate is questioned and encounters with difference are suppressed.

The interrelation between the presence of historical legacies, cultural encounters, and the negotiation of belonging in public spaces is central to all the chapters here. Levick and Głowacka-Grajper both touch on the frictions that emerge from official attempts – by both national and European actors – to reinterpret the socialist past in urban settings where local senses of belonging remain entangled with socialist legacies. Meißner and Farrell-Banks focus on similar instrumentalizations of historical legacies which emphasize certain forms of belonging while marginalizing the belonging of others. Meißner examines the debates connected to the urban development of Berlin Mitte and the Spreeinsel following German reunification. She reveals that certain socio-political values were promoted and standardized while dissenting approaches were structurally marginalized. Farrell-Banks examines how traces of the Ottoman Siege of Vienna, in the village of Kahlenberg, have long been targeted by racist and nationalist place-making processes. He indicates how this led to a highly politicized far-right interpretation of European belonging being firmly integrated within a transnational and digitally interlinked public sphere. The online public sphere is also central to Turunen's chapter on the contested historical legacy of colonialism in the UK. In her analysis of responses on online media outlets to the removal of the Edward Colston statue, she shows how its removal did not result in an erasure of historical legacies, but rather in a reinvigoration of previously silenced forms of collective heritage and belonging.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-11

Another aspect of cultural encounters discussed in Part II is the way in which fault lines in contemporary heritage, memory, and museum practices impact on forms of belonging. Mears, in particular, makes a strong claim about how English museums have tried to introduce socially instrumentalist agendas to stimulate engagements with belonging. In line with Eckersley's chapter in Part I, she argues that these museums have failed to meaningfully engage with the structural inequalities that they describe and aim to tackle. She finds that museums tend to fall back into the traditional politics of recognition and symbolic reparation, relying on compensatory mechanisms and so hindering meaningful structural change and more constructive engagement with the politics of belonging. Additionally, Levick shows in her chapter how museum practices in Eastern Europe have been subject to Western European conceptions of cultural heritage. Her examination of the Elie Wiesel Memorial House and Sighet Memorial Museum exposes the multiple fractures, tensions, and discordances emerging from such hegemonic Western discourses, in a setting in which other notions of belonging and non-belonging prevail.

As with Part I, the chapters in Part II emphasize the significant influence of changing power dynamics at play in the different socio-political contexts of belonging at, and in relation to, sites of cultural encounter. For example, in her analysis of responses to the fall of the Colston statue, Turunen shows how a place formally perceived as a space of oppression and violence was transformed into a space of empowerment, solidarity, and creativity. This particular historical event revealed a new power dynamic in which social and political actions not only changed the nature of the public space but also opened up larger social debates about race and racism – and about belonging – in Europe. Other chapters (Levick, Meißner, Mears) expose how the lack of power, or uneven distribution of power, results in processes of marginalization and unequal belonging, particularly when the main powerholders – authoritative European heritage institutes, urban planners, and museum practitioners – control public space. Finally, several chapters address the politicization of belonging (Farrell-Banks, Meißner) and how sites may become marked as "foreign", despite local citizens' ongoing processes of everyday use of and attachment to such spaces (Głowacka-Grajper, Levick).

Part II focuses on the contests and conflicts of belonging connected to specific sites – of heritage, memory, and everyday use – that emerge from diverse cultural encounters with, at, or linked to these sites. Collective processes of engagement with previously hidden, silenced, unwanted or even undesirable forms of belonging are drawn out, positioning them in relation to narratives of belonging that previously dominated due to institutionalized structures and mechanisms of power dynamics.

Chapter 7

Taxonomies of pain

Museal embodiments of identity and belonging in post-communist Romania

Carmen Levick

Introduction

In a working paper presented as part of a seminar organized by the Council of Europe and the European Cultural Centre of Delphi in September 1998, Raymond Weber, the then Director General of Culture, Education, Youth, and Sport, presented the Council's expectations of the meeting: "to encourage interaction between two key concepts in contemporary European debate, heritage-history-memory on the one hand and citizenship on the other" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.27). The discussions that took place at Delphi between 25 and 27 September invited academics, politicians, and artists to explore the complex relationships between heritage, memory, and national identity, within the framework of European belonging and identity. The fall of communism in 1989 represented a turning point in the political and cultural development of the European continent, demanding more careful definitions and consideration of the use of heritage and memory in the construction of new Eastern European national identities. The collapse of communism assumed a vacuum of national identities in the East, that needed to be filled with concepts of diversity and multiculturalism, closely connected to the principles of democratic citizenship (Council of Europe, 2000, p.7). The main worry voiced at Delphi was that this identity gap might be filled by manifestations of nationalism and intolerance, using the tools of memory and heritage to create state narratives that moved against the image of Europe proposed by the Council: "a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.8). The way to counteract such potentially nationalistic tendencies was a vision of Europe as an inclusive and heterogeneous cultural space that allowed for a framework of common values but respected the multiplicity of interacting communities within it. This chapter proposes a re-evaluation of the concepts of memory, identity, and belonging within a theoretical frame that assesses Eastern Europe "otherwise" (Boatcă, 2021), highlighting decolonial aspects in the relationship between Eastern Europe and European institutions and examining the position of heritage and citizenship in the processes of national historical becoming.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-12

Sighet as a site of European memory

My analysis focuses on two institutional "sites of citizenship" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.42), a term proposed at Delphi by Hélène Ahrweiler as a way to avoid the tension contained in Pierre Nora's "lieux de mémoire",[1] in the northern Romanian city of Sighetu Marmației (or Sighet): the Elie Wiesel Memorial House, dedicated to the town's renowned Jewish son, and the anti-communist Sighet Memorial Museum. The apparent uncertainty about the name of the city reflects the position of many Eastern European places that often existed between overlapping empires. Sighet is known by the full Romanian name of Sighetu Marmației, often shortened to Sighet, but also by its Hungarian name, Máramarossziget, and German name, Marmaroschsiget.

The importance of Sighet as a site of European memory and belonging becomes clear from a brief look at its complex history. Inhabited from as early as the Bronze Age, Sighet was in turn part of the Kingdom of Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and eventually Greater Romania after the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. During the Second World War, the city was once again under Hungarian administration as a result of the Vienna Award (1940), to be returned to the Romanian state and communist rule at the end of the war.[2] Thus, Sighet can be viewed as a microcosm of European historical becoming, a site clearly shaped by the great events of the twentieth century, where a multi-ethnic population strived to create narratives of belonging both at a community level and as ways to align with wider national and international narratives of identity. In addition, according to Nira Yuval-Davis, "borders are privileged sites for the articulations of national distinctions – and thus, of national belonging" (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p.95). Therefore, discussing commemoration practices in a border city like Sighet offers an opportunity to examine the ways in which national boundaries and narratives of belonging are created and engaged with at the local level.

The complexity of the city's past unveils ontological insecurities that can be seen in many Eastern European communities. Jelena Subotić argues that the ever-changing political and cultural circumstances of these countries not only created "ruptures in routines; they also lead to the questioning of state identity and, most important, the questioning of foundational state narratives on which this identity is built" (Subotić, 2019, p.27). These uncertainties were then institutionalized in museums, memorial sites, and official days of remembrance that often reflected significant fractures between local and European narratives of belonging. The coexistence of the Elie Wiesel Memorial House and the Sighet Memorial Museum within the same commemorative space aligns with the two conflicting master narratives of European cultural memory: the Holocaust and communism. Although a small Romanian border city, Sighet has the extraordinary capacity to encapsulate the tensions that become apparent on a larger national and international scale. It hosts the memories, traces, and remains of a strong and vibrant Jewish community, largely destroyed during the Second World War, and of one of the most notorious communist prisons in the country. The narratives of display observed

in both locations will be addressed through the lens of decolonial terminology proposed by Walter Mignolo and Aníbal Quijano, in order to reveal the tensions between local, national, and European commemorative processes. In her book *Yellow Star, Red Star*, Jelena Subotić traces the history of this conflict in Eastern Europe, noting that Holocaust remembrance is so central to European memory that it has become closely connected with the idea of Europeanness itself: "joining, contributing, and participating in a shared memory of the Holocaust defines what a European state is, especially for late Eastern European entrants to the EU" (Subotić, 2019, p.21). However, while communist remembrance is a defining characteristic of Eastern European narratives of identity, Holocaust commemoration is seen not only as an enforced Western memory narrative but also as a reminder of Eastern backwardness and inferiority. Ewa Stanczyk notes that during the first EU enlargement to the East, the new member states were seen to be "lagging behind and thus in need of re-education where the remembrance of Shoah is concerned" (Stanczyk, 2016, p.418). Terms like "re-education" and "backwardness" reinforce the Western view that Eastern European countries need to change and do better before any discussion of adherence to European institutions could be considered. These terms were further underpinned by official language in the European Parliament discussing a "Europe with different speeds" or "multi-speed Europe",[3] which, according to Manuela Boatcă "reflected historical hierarchies between multiple and unequal Europes resulted from the shifts in hegemony between different European colonial powers" (Boatcă, 2021, p.6). Furthermore, the European insistence on Holocaust remembrance and on the official recognition from Eastern European states of their involvement in the Holocaust was tied to what was generally seen as a process of "Europeanization" which highlighted the paradox of the European discourse of unity and singularity and reinforced a "historically consistent politics of difference within Europe that has systematically reproduced the East and the South of Europe as peripheral formations of a Western European core" (Boatcă, 2021, p.6). Contemporary decolonial theories and processes allow for a troubling of the official narratives of identity and belonging through a "rhizomatic thinking necessary for understanding the social and cultural transformations set in motion by trans/national dislocations" (Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Tate, 2015, p.2). An in-depth analysis of both the Elie Wiesel Memorial House and the Sighet Memorial Museum in connection with local, national, and European discourses about memory, identity, and belonging reveals fractures and tensions, "cacophonies, irritations and discordances" (Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Tate, 2015, p.7) that invite a careful reconsideration of international hierarchies and a troubling of Western discourses of continental unity and coherence.

Eastern European heritage and memory in a decolonial frame

The fall of communism offered an ideological and cultural opportunity to integrate several newly formed and existing nation-states into a European framework

that assumed a cohesive set of moral values. New or prospective members were required to adopt a widely accepted Western European narrative of the twentieth century, which often did not match the official national narratives. Consequently, how could the ideas of common heritage and democratic citizenship, put forward at Delphi, facilitate both a smoother integration of Eastern European states into the European institutional structures and a successful solidification of democratic values at local levels? To understand the complexity of this framework, it is important to recognize the tensions that these concepts encounter within a decolonial reading of Eastern Europe.

In 1998, the Council of Europe proposed heritage, memory, and belonging, or what they called "roots" or citizenship, as key values to counteract a long list of existential problems experienced by Europe after 1989: globalization, the ideological vacuum caused by the fall of communism, "the malaise of post-modern civilisation" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.7), individualism, and social and cultural exclusion. In the report generated after the meeting at Delphi, heritage was discussed as a fluid concept that moves away from the historical and towards community and memory. The perceived rigidity of heritage was replaced with a symbolic fluidity, closely related to the creation of community identity. This view of heritage, both tangible and intangible, as community-based memory heritage, is also reinforced by more recent scholarly works that argue for emotionally driven heritage management policy and practices that draw on the views of local communities and are consolidated by a range of emotions: pride, joy, or pain.[4] The fluid notion of heritage is closely connected with the concept of memory as a way of accessing significant local and regional aspects of the past.

At Delphi, the Council of Europe considered that to be successful, heritage and memory must be closely connected to the principle of democratic citizenship. It proposed a definition of citizenship that moved beyond the legal and the political, towards "cultural references, such as values, identity and the feeling of belonging" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.40). It was based on the notion of a shared European cultural heritage, solidified in sites of citizenship, "which foster individual freedom and independence and help individuals to use memory for democratic purposes" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.42). These sites of citizenship are an embodiment of memory, places where history has been made, that can help create stronger communities able to coexist with conflicting or contradictory components of histories and memories. As public spaces, these sites of common heritage often struggle to make a meaningful connection between the local and the European. This struggle is sometimes caused by the coexistence of multiple, conflicting sites of memory, some of which are "othered" within the official national narratives of identity. Othering functions as a way of reinforcing a state narrative and responding to what at a local level is perceived as forced, performed memory and commemoration. The Council of Europe report discusses these co-existing sites as "parallel heritages" that mark out communities and divide "those who recognise themselves in [them] and those who do not, those who are accepted from those who are excluded" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.38). Decolonial theory can

aid the elucidation of these complex processes by allowing for a complication of the relationship between memory, identity, and belonging.

Decoloniality invites a re-visioning of Western master narratives and a reconsideration of accepted, official historical accounts. As a fluid condition, much like the contemporary view of heritage, decoloniality "seeks to make visible, open up, and advance radically distinct perspectives and positionalities that displace Western rationality as the only framework and possibility of existence, analysis and thought" (Mignolo and Walsh, 2018, p.17). In this chapter, decolonial practices will be utilized to examine the friction between coexisting examples of contemporary commemoration that can be read as "delinkings" (Mignolo, 2007) from what Aníbal Quijano called "the colonial matrix of power" (Quijano and Ennis, 2000), understood as the systematic pressures exerted on narratives of identity. These pressures can be internal, led by an official state narrative, or external, led by international institutions, that clash with localized conceptualizations of identity.

Having in mind the power of contextual narratives of display within heritage sites, these tensions clearly complicate the Council of Europe's proposed relationship between heritage, memory, and citizenship in connection with European belonging. Successful or not, these "delinkings" constitute actions that interrogate official histories and move towards a heterogeneity of thinking and representation. Nevertheless, when the Eurocentric matrix of power demands heterogeneity as a sign of successful integration, more complications of the relationship between the local and the European ensue.

Romania as a decolonial space

In Romania, the trope of decolonial space can be applied both geographically and ideologically. Geographically, the country is placed at the northern edge of the Balkans and at the eastern edge of the European Union. This position renders it often neither Balkan enough nor European enough. These bordering sensibilities, the constant definition of the country and its people as existing at or within borders, situate Romania within decolonial frameworks. Walter Mignolo notes: "Border thinking and border epistemology emerge among *colonial subjects* who realize that their knowledge has been disavowed and denied. That realization is the starting point of *becoming decolonial subjects*" (italics in the original) (Mignolo and Walsh, 2018, p.207). However, after 1989, the bordering discourse in Romania also highlighted attempts to redefine the country's pre-communist history as a panacea for all the ills caused by the totalitarian rule.

The period just before the Second World War and until 1944 was one of Romanian territorial expansion, aided by its German allies, incorporating Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria to the old Romanian "Regat" (Kingdom) of Wallachia and Moldavia.[5] It was seen as the rebirth of the nation through the force of arms and religious faith. The return to this vision of a powerful Romania both within and without its borders provided a perfect opportunity for the creation

of new right-wing nationalistic narratives after the fall of communism, which were placed on a collision course with Romania's international post-communist ambition: becoming a full member of the framework of European institutions, after officially submitting its application in December 1995.

Consequently, a decolonial exploration of contemporary Romanian commemoration practices in relation to both communism and the Holocaust addresses the various tensions, ruptures, and de-linkings within the process of historical becoming. It also highlights the complexity of decolonial processes in a country where there are constant rearrangements between conflicting memories and traumas. The physical representations of commemoration discussed in this chapter testify to the difficult relationship between the two memorializing processes in the context of both local and European belonging. Both memorials are part of a process that moves beyond the external demands connected to the membership of international organizations. They are witness to a torturous narrative of identity-making within the construction of a new national memory which involves bordering, uneasy fault lines, and victimhood. This is a dynamic process of de-linking and relinking, of distancing and belonging.

The Elie Wiesel Memorial House

Elie Wiesel's credentials as a writer, political activist, Holocaust survivor, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 1986, born in Sighetu Marmației, made him the perfect candidate to represent Holocaust and Jewish remembrance in Romania. Pat Morrison of the *Los Angeles Times* described Wiesel as "history's witness" (Morrison, 2013) and Joseph Berger of the *New York Times* argued that he "became an eloquent witness for the six million Jews slaughtered in World War II and who, more than anyone else, seared the memory of the Holocaust on the world's conscience" (Berger, 2016). In the context of Romania's attempts to join both NATO and the EU in the early 2000s, many Romanian politicians were convinced that Wiesel would represent a great symbol of the country's improved moral ideologies.

Opened in 2002, the Memorial House (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) also hosts the Maramureș County Museum of Jewish Culture. The house belongs to the County Maramureș Ethnographic Museum and represents part of the museum's engagement with Jewish life in the area from the seventeenth century to contemporary times. The private space of the Wiesel family house becomes the public representative of all Jewish communities in the region, connecting contemporary visitors not only to the local Jews who perished during the Holocaust but also creating diachronic links with local Jewish communities as far back as the seventeenth century.

According to the museum narrative both online and on-site, through the objects it displays, the Elie Wiesel Memorial House becomes a witness to and symbol of the cultural heritage of local Jewish communities. The main purpose of the house is "to contribute to the cultural, educational, social and economic unity of the city of Sighet" (my translation) (Elie Wiesel Memorial House), a place where visitors

Figure 7.1 The Elie Wiesel Memorial House, childhood home of Elie Wiesel in Sighet, Romania. Source: Vberger. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Elie_wiesel_house_in_sighet03.jpg CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

can understand the past in order to shape a future based on diversity and inclusion that extends beyond the city. When I visited the Elie Wiesel Memorial House in the summer of 2017, the site presented a "synthesis" (Elie Wiesel Memorial House) of objects that belonged to Jewish families in the city, attempting to recreate a glimpse of what Jewish life was like at the beginning of the twentieth century. While the house belonged to the Wiesel family until their placement into the Sighet ghetto and subsequent deportation to Auschwitz in May 1944, there is a clear tension between the private space of the home and the objects displayed within. The museum represents the life of the Jewish communities in Sighet as a moment frozen in time, lacking continuity into the present. However, the gap between past and present is barely addressed through the organization of the space. Wiesel's career abroad and his support for the museum are highlighted through text and photographs, but no serious questions are asked about the role of local and national institutions in the destruction of Romanian Jewish communities. The Elie Wiesel Memorial House manages to link the performed European narrative of Holocaust commemoration with one that is closer to local politics of belonging: it creates an emotional identification with Wiesel not as a Jew but as a

Figure 7.2 Memorial plaque on the Elie Wiesel Memorial House in Romanian and Hebrew. The plaque says: "In this house was born and spent his childhood the writer and professor Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize for Peace Laureate in 1986". Source: Vberger. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Elie_wiesel_house_in_sighet02.jpg CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

Romanian immigrant who made it abroad. The memorial house website notes that Elie Wiesel and his family were used as examples of what Jews were like in the city at the beginning of the twentieth century: "through the themes presented in the house, we tried to highlight Elie Wiesel's personality as a son of Sighet, and a synthesis of Jewish life in the city of Sighet and county of Maramureș" (my translation) (Elie Wiesel Memorial House). The exhibits in the house, which focus on Wiesel as a son of Sighet and not as a Jew, tell a story that fits the national discourse about Romania's role in the Holocaust and about the suffering of the Jews in the region almost exclusively at the hands of Miklós Horthy's Hungary, who ruled Northern Transylvania after the Vienna Award in 1940. Through Wiesel's identification as Romanian, there is an intended separation between perpetrators (Hungarians) and victims (Romanians), without any attempt to complicate this rather schematic binary.

While a historical link to a flourishing Jewish community in Sighet is supported by the local census, which in 1930 showed 10,520 Jewish citizens out of

a total of 27,270 inhabitants, the most recent Romanian census in 2011, showed a total of 64 Jewish citizens in the whole county of Maramureș (INS, 2011). The dwindling Jewish population in the whole country, clearly connected to the events of the Second World War and later to dubious communist practices of displacement,[6] and the politics of display in the Memorial House reinforce the view of the Holocaust as an imposed narrative, needed for the country's validation as European in values and morals, and not central to the contemporary national narrative of identity.

In Sighet, the Elie Wiesel Memorial House has always been in competition with the Memorial of the Victims of Communism and of the Resistance, just a few streets away. As a physical embodiment of anti-communist memory, the Sighet Memorial Museum is recognized as a symbol of Romanian resistance against communism, a piece of national heritage. In comparison, the Elie Wiesel Memorial House is associated with a memory narrative that is performed and removed from the newly rediscovered national imaginary. Excising the historical presence of Jewish communities from the myth of national identity is also in line with the anti-Semitic discourse voiced by state representatives just before the Second World War and continued by mainstream nationalist parties like the Greater Romania Party after 1989.[7] At the beginning of the twentieth century, Romanian politicians became increasingly vocal in their attempt to legally curtail the rights of Jewish citizens, stressing their non-Christianity and alleged connections with Bolshevism. The myth of anti-communist memory, Romanian and Orthodox, clashes with a view of Jews as "non-Christian" and foreign. This artificial conflict goes beyond the radical nationalism of populist parties. Alianța Civică, a highly regarded Romanian NGO and founder of the Sighet Memorial, took offence at the fact that Elie Wiesel did not respond to an invitation to visit the memorial when he was in Sighet to officially open the Memorial House in July 2002. The *Report on Antisemitism in Romania* (2002) noticed that this reaction furthered the artificial connection between Jews and communism, established by the Iron Guard in the period between the two world wars (Katz and Enache, 2002, p.28).

The museum is organized into five rooms that transform this typical family home into a microcosm of an idyllic past Jewish life. The hallway contains several wall panels that outline Elie Wiesel's life and the story of the house and its transformation into a museum, the troubles faced by the group of writers and scholars who first put forward to the communist regime the idea of a memorial house immediately after Wiesel's Nobel Prize win in 1986. The first exhibition room contains old furniture and paintings that once belonged to and then were left behind by Jews from Maramureș, giving a flavour of "what would have been like for little Elie to live in the house" (my translation) (Elie Wiesel Memorial House). It is a simulation of "authentic" Jewish life in the region with the sombre undertones of an assemblage of objects previously owned by people who were either dead or in exile. The second room focuses on Elie Wiesel's life and work, his books presented in glass cupboards, and posters documenting his meetings

with local and national leaders. The third room is significant in reinforcing the still widely used discourse that all the ills suffered by the local Jews were perpetrated by Horthy's Hungary. Through photographs, documents, personal items, and written testimonies, this room reconstructs the history of the creation of local ghettos, and "the great tragedy of the transportation of all Jews from Sighet and Maramureș to Nazi deathcamps" (my translation) (Elie Wiesel Memorial House). Yet again, Romania's position on its participation in the Holocaust and its aftermath is obscured by a reinforced lack of recognition of guilt and a narrative of victimhood, where, as a nation, Romanians were traumatized by both Hungarians and Germans, and were sharing the martyrdom of the Jews.

Adding to this narrative, the fourth room in the Wiesel house contains a mixture of documents and objects that speak about the richness of Jewish life and experience in the Maramureș region from as early as the seventeenth century. These point towards an idyllic life in the bosom of the local Romanian community, with many Jews becoming pillars of the community and assimilating many aspects of local life. There is a pronounced discrepancy between the positive aspects displayed in this room and the previous one that outlines the extent of Jewish suffering. But what is clear to see is yet again a separation between the foreign perpetrators and the local victims. The memorial house exhibition is completed by a room that discusses other "great Jewish sons" of the region (Hari Maiorovici, Ludovic Bruckstein, Vasile Kazar), and opens up into an interior garden, landscaped for remembrance and reflection, with a large Star of David drawn in stone on the lawn. This outside space has religious connotations, inviting the visitors to rest and reflect on what they have seen in the house. It is emotionally charged as a sacred space that prompts identification with the suffering witnessed inside. However, the emotional connection with the space of the garden is not replicated by the exhibits in the museum. On the contrary, as a visitor, I was struck by the pronounced lack of prompts for emotional engagement from the displays in the house.

In addition, the idyllic acceptance of the Jews by the local community did not translate into the ways in which some responded to the memorial house itself as a space of commemoration. The external walls were often covered in anti-Semitic graffiti, the last example of which was in 2018, when "Nazi Jew lying in hell with Hitler" and "Public toilet, anti-Semite paedophile" were inscribed on the house. The police acted quickly and arrested a 37-year-old man from another county and dismissed the incident as the actions of someone with mental health issues. However, this act of vandalism says much more about the ways in which ordinary Romanians relate to the Holocaust and the fresh debate about the country's role in it. The walls of the house become a public forum where various emotions are expressed. They reflect on the difficult negotiations between past and present to establish an acceptable national identity narrative for the future. The external pressures to comply with certain international standards reveal a split between the outward-facing image of the nation and the struggles of the people to make sense of this new image.

While what happened with the Elie Wiesel Memorial House reinforces Madina Tlostanova's assessment of the stereotypical Eastern European as racist and unhappy about being rejected by the West (Tlostanova, 2018, p.34), the vandalism also exposes what Romanian psychologist Vasile Dem Zamfirescu calls "Balkan neurosis", provoked by the conflict between the rejection of a traumatic communist past and the nostalgia for the same past (Zamfirescu, 2012, p.19). The more discrete trauma of communism, in comparison with the arguably more overt trauma of the Nazi regime, was perpetrated through similar methods, which included a constant process of humiliation through a long, gradual elimination of all basic human rights and liberties (Zamfirescu, 2012, p.27). The Holocaust and anti-communist commemoration coexist in an uneasy space acted upon by various centripetal forces that determine the country's narratives of identity. While anti-communist sentiment was more firmly established through almost half a century of authoritarian rule, the Holocaust triggers national emotions that often prompt defensive reactions of victimhood.

This is the tension between what Aleida Assmann calls "the foundational story of the EU" (Assmann, 2014, p.550), the regulated, institutionalized way to remember and commemorate the Holocaust in Western Europe, and the fragmented and often "aphasic" (Stoler, 2011) way of dealing with the past that is the legacy of decades of communist totalitarianism. Discussing this conflict through the process of decolonial de-linkings allows for a more meaningful conversation between the two, for an awareness of the fragmented and an engagement with both the fragments and the whole. Decolonial praxis acknowledges the existence of fractures within the monolithic matrix of Western European knowledge and invites an in-depth analysis of the place of diversity and multicultural engagement within a national narrative that is still searching for a unified identity. It also provides an insight into the perceived failure of the Elie Wiesel Memorial House to establish itself as a space of belonging. According to Nira Yuval-Davis, belonging "is about an emotional (or even ontological) attachment, about feeling 'at home'" (Yuval-Davis, 2011 p.10), and the Memorial House is certainly fashioned as a domestic, homely space. However, the politics of display, the objects used in the exhibits and the language of engagement with the public, both in the house and online, reinforce a narrative of othering. In this case, the othering is that of the Jewish community, seen as "of the past", and not part of the contemporary memory-making processes in the city, or in the country for that matter. Furthermore, nationally and internationally, the cultural profile of the Memorial House trails behind that of the Sighet Memorial to the Victims of Communism and of the Resistance. In addition to high-profile international donations, the Sighet Memorial receives yearly funding from the Romanian state, which in 1997 officially declared the site one of national importance, and, for more specific projects, like publications and summer schools, from the Council of Europe, which has an information centre within the Memorial Museum. As part of the Maramureș County Ethnographic Museum, the Memorial House receives a limited amount of funding from the state, and otherwise, it has to fight for international funding. As recently as June

2021, the Memorial House managed to secure funding as part of the European Union cross-border collaboration initiative for refurbishment works and to include the house as part of a Jewish Cultural Trail together with the Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk. While the achievements of the Sighet Memorial are constantly present in the national media, including as part of the long-running documentary *Memorialul Durerii* (*The Memorial of Suffering*), which first aired on Romanian National Television in 1991, the Elie Wiesel Memorial House has a much more subdued media presence. This confirms communist commemoration as essential in the process of national belonging, but also reflects Nira Yuval-Davis' observation that state sponsorship of cultural sites "invests them with additional powers" (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p.56) and contributes to the creation and consolidation of official narratives of belonging and not-belonging. The sponsorship of the Sighet Memorial by both national and European agents reaffirms the site as part of what Yuval-Davis calls a process of "constant flagging", "in order to reinforce people's national identities" through ways of selective remembrance and forgetfulness (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p.92). While the Memorial fits neatly within the national narrative, the Elie Wiesel Memorial House exists at the margins, acknowledging the rupture between national and European stories of belonging.

The Sighet Memorial Museum

As a focal point of Romania's commemoration of the victims of communism, the Sighet Memorial plays an important role in the official anti-communist narrative endorsed by the state. Created in 1993 in a former communist prison and officially opened to the public in 2000, the memorial was showcased at the Delphi symposium as an example of good practice in the interaction between heritage and citizenship. It was introduced in the European Heritage Label Sites in 2017, as a space that "brings to life the European narrative and the history behind it" and as a site that promotes "symbolic European values".[8] The starting point for the European Heritage Label Sites programme was the Council of Europe symposium at Delphi, where it was proposed that various sites of memory should be selected across the continent "to embody our vision of a Europe which is simultaneously a diverse but shared heritage, a geographical and a cultural identity, a place where everyone participates, and a blueprint for the future" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.10). This new European list was seen as an equivalent to UNESCO's World Heritage Sites, a welcome addition to the process of European integration.

The creation of the Sighet Memorial, and the establishment of the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of Romanian Exile in 2005 in Bucharest, signalled attempts to give material form to a national process of memory-making that would reinforce the anti-communist narrative at the basis of Romania's new national identity. However, this identity was shaped through a vocabulary of nationalism and Christianity. Both the Memorial and the Institute often use religious vocabulary within the commemoration process,

associating the victims of communism with Christian martyrs[9] and thus continuing the uneasy binary definitions of communist/non-Christian/Jewish vs anti-communist/Christian/Orthodox used by Romanian politicians before and during the Second World War. This brings to the fore the troubled relationship between the commemoration of the Holocaust and that of communist atrocities in Eastern European countries. The co-existence of these competitive commemoration processes in Sighet signals the tension between what is deemed authentic, national, anti-communist commemoration and a foreign, "othered" commemoration imposed from outside. While in the case of the Elie Wiesel Memorial House the innocuous domesticity of the home is used to highlight the tolerance of the local Romanian community and the exclusive evil of the foreign perpetrators against a local Jewish minority, the Sighet Memorial Museum speaks for a collective memory experienced at a national and European level.

Due to its identity as a museum, the Sighet Memorial works towards establishing a close connection between the museum as local, national, and European heritage, and democratic citizenship. By becoming the voice of post-communist remembrance and memory making, the memorial complex is considered "a successful public space" (Council of Europe, 2000, p.43) that enhances the feeling of European belonging. Thus, inviting Ana Blandiana as representative of Alianța Civică and of the Memorial to the Delphi symposium is not surprising. As early as 1998, the Sighet Memorial was considered an example of good practice in fostering a creative space where meaningful conversations about the past can take place. The Memorial of the Victims of Communism and of the Resistance is a complex made up of the Sighet Memorial Museum and the International Centre for Studies on Communism. While the Centre is focused on research and educational outputs like summer schools, the Museum represents the embodiment of theory in practice. It combines factual knowledge about Eastern European communist atrocities with the emotional impact of displayed objects that belonged to the prison inmates. As the visible, public side of the memorial, the museum is carefully curated to both educate and affect (Figure 7.3).

The private architecture of the prison, the narrow corridors, the cells, and the torture chambers, become a public forum that reveals the dark, hidden aspects of the communist prison. Personal objects of former inmates (boots and uniforms) and objects of torture (chains and spaces of solitary confinement) mix with objects of general use from communist times (room 76, labelled "Everyday Life", contains old radios, TVs and vacuum cleaners, telephones, and home décor that attempt to give a flavour of the past) creating a microcosm that reflects the history of communist Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989. However, the history of communism presented in the museum is a history of totalitarianism. It reflects on what Enzo Traverso calls a reduction of communism to "its totalitarian dimension", "a symbol of alienation and oppression" (Traverso, 2017, pp.2–3) that fits in well with the neoliberal requirements of the Western European narrative. The



Figure 7.3 The Sighet Memorial: displayed prisoner uniforms. Source: Nenea Hartia. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Memorialul_Victimelor_Comunismului_%C8%99i_al_Rezisten%C8%9Bei_Sighet_07.jpg. CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

prison building itself acts as material representation of communist oppression. If the prison is the core component of justice in a liberal society,

> it tends to be even more central to the openly authoritarian, undemocratic and oppressive systems that have abounded over the past century. In these societies, the prison is an instrument of social and political control, validated as an instrument of state justice to hold political activists, ethnic groups, dissidents of any kind.
>
> (Wilson et al., 2017, p.4)

The Sighet Museum exposes the usually concealed and controlled practices of the communist prison through well-preserved spaces, effective displays of objects that are constant reminders of absent bodies, and traces of everyday life during communism. Through the absence it so powerfully evokes, the museum constructs a master narrative of communist atrocities that speaks beyond the locality of the prison and incorporates voices and narratives from Eastern Europe as a whole.

This layered aspect of local/national/European becomes clear in the spatial organization of the exhibits.[10] The three floors of the museum (ground, first,

and second) contain an eclectic mixture of spaces that illustrate through objects, photographs, and texts the history of communism in Eastern Europe and various examples of resistance to it. There are separate rooms for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the history of Polish Solidarity, and the events of the Prague Spring in 1968. On the ground floor, the history of communism in Romania is illustrated through a series of maps on which crosses mark former communist prisons, forced labour camps, and mass graves discovered after 1989. Below the main map that marks all the places of communist detention in the country, the caption by Ana Blandiana reads: "When justice cannot be a form of memory, only memory can be a form of justice". It reinforces the role of the Sighet Memorial as a way of seeking justice through memory for those who were detained in spaces that invoked a fundamentally flawed and oppressive legal system. Also on the ground floor, in room 23, photographs and archival documents narrate the history of communism in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989, while in rooms 25 and 26 the visitor can learn more about the chronology of the Cold War. The impact of communism on the county of Maramureș is presented in two rooms, one focusing on atrocities, the other on anti-communist resistance. These general exhibits coexist with more intimate spaces and objects that constitute case studies for a better understanding of life and death in the prison. Two cells, one on the ground floor and one on the second floor, recreate the spaces where the deaths of politician Iuliu Maniu and historian Gheorghe I. Brătianu took place. The captions on the walls of both cells note that they had been reconstructed "as remembered by those present at the death" of the "great men". Unlike the narrative present in the Elie Wiesel Memorial House, which clearly states that the objects in the exhibits are used to "simulate" the way in which the family might have lived in Sighet, suggesting that it was such a long time ago that it is impossible to create an "authentic" account, the Sighet Memorial is built on the assumption of authenticity. Surviving cell mates attest to the ways in which the prison's most well-known inmates died, and the boots and uniforms appear worn and "real", thus having a strong emotional impact on the visitors. Due to the lack of data about the secret workings of the communist prison, the memory of former inmates is employed as a scaffolding for the unfolding narrative of the museum. Personal stories and memories are combined with historical and archival data to generate "a unifying portrait of the victims as faultless national heroes, smoothing over the complex, sometimes unsavoury politics of the prisoners as well as their actual diversity" (Vătulescu, p.323). As Gabriela Cristea reminds us, "Most of the interwar leaders imprisoned in Sighet were responsible for the glorious unification of Romania, but also for its anti-Semitic laws" (Cristea, 2008, p.66). Through its exclusive focus on commemorating the victims of communist oppression, and by overlooking the complexity and diversity of the prisoners, the Sighet Memorial successfully aligns itself with the national narrative. The complexity of the memorial and the careful consideration of the place of Romanian post-communist memory within the wider memory processes of Eastern Europe create a successful public space

of citizenship and belonging that fits the requirements for common European heritage put forward by the Council of Europe at Delphi.

After the physical and sensorial experience of the prison, very much like the interior garden at the Elie Wiesel Memorial House, the memorial complex opens up towards a space of reflection called the Space of Recollection and Prayer, located in the prison courtyard designed by the architect Radu Mihăilescu. On the walls of the trench that leads to the underground chapel, the names of 8,000 dead inmates from the Romanian "gulag" are engraved in grey andesite, a clear reminder of Maya Lin's Memorial Wall as part of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC.

The circular chapel (Figure 7.4) contains a central stone round table showing the remains of wax candles that visitors can light in the memory of the dead. In the middle of the roof, there is a cross-shaped opening that allows daylight to illuminate parts of the table. The space is symbolically and undoubtedly Christian, also incorporating elements of Romanian modernist art by reminding the visitor of Constantin Brâncuși's masterpiece *Table of Silence* exhibited in the Romanian city of Târgu Jiu, as part of his sculptural homage to the Romanian heroes of the First World War. There is a visual assumption that all the visitors, or at least large parts of them, are connected through a shared experience of communism and Christianity. Those are the visitors who "belong" in this space of memory

Figure 7.4 The Sighet Memorial: the underground chapel. Source: GabiS33. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Masa_tacerii-sighet.JPG, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Romania license.

and commemoration, by being able to identify with the victims of the prison and with the past recalled within the prison walls. The memorial ensemble becomes a palimpsest where past, present, and a story for the future are uncovered in the layers of meaning. But the meaning created here is clearly one of both inclusion and exclusion. It is constructed through "a set of symbols and rituals charged with the mission of reinforcing a sense of community" (Guibernau, 2013, p.152) among visitors, a community which is necessarily anti-communist and Christian.

Conclusion

After the revolution in 1989, the new identity narrative in Romania was based on a strong anti-communist standpoint reflected in a new constitution which, on 21 November 1991, replaced the communist constitution of the past 30 years (the previous, communist constitution, was ratified in 1965) (Monitorul Oficial, 1991). The document defined Romania as a presidential republic, democratic, and independent. On 31 October 2003, the Constitution was revised, including articles on the integration into the European Union and the accession to NATO, thus reaffirming Romania's international ambitions (Monitorul Oficial, 2003). While on the surface the country seemed to have dealt with its communist past through political and economic change, the trauma of communism continued to have a clear impact on all levels of society and on the psychological make-up of the nation.

Enzo Traverso argues that the 1989 revolutions created societies obsessed with the past: "museums and patrimonial institutions devoted to recovering national pasts kidnapped by Soviet communism" (Traverso, 2017, p.4) appeared in every Central and Eastern European country. Thus, memory moves into the public space, by inhabiting and shaping the narratives of museums and cultural institutions. After 1990, when the euphoria of the revolution had passed, and influenced by media coverage from the West, Romanians started to voice a negative opinion about themselves as a nation. Vasile Dem Zamfirescu compares this national state of mind with the one discussed in the 1930s by Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran in his book *Schimbarea la Față a României* 'The Transfiguration of Romania' (Cioran, 1992). In times of crisis, the negative self-esteem of Romanians needs a counterpoint, a moment of action that contributes to the creation of a positive myth of national identity (Zamfirescu, 2012, pp.47–48). In the 1930s, it was the national support for Antonescu's fascist regime and ferocious anti-Semitism noted by historians among the general population (Ioanid, 2000). After 1989, it was emigration and a narrative of victimhood that blamed the West for othering and abandoning the East. According to Svetlana Boym, former communist countries display a form of restorative nostalgia, which "attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home" (Boym, 2001 p.xviii) often based on the return to an impossible, "mythical" time. The problem with recovering this mythical past is the disappearance of utopias, "leaving a present charged with memory but unable to project itself into the future". History becomes "a landscape of ruins, a living legacy of pain"

(Traverso, 2017, p.7). The two memorial spaces discussed in this chapter confirm Traverso's analysis of Eastern European memorialization, but furthermore allow for an engagement with new theoretical practices that problematize the image of a Europe of constants. Decolonial thought acknowledges the existence of structural links between peripheralization in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the Global South and challenges the dominant nationalist narratives of Eastern European victimhood. Through its lens, Eastern European commemorative practices can complicate the contemporary European narratives of identity and belonging and encourage a decisive move towards transcultural memorial spaces.

Notes

1 Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory* (Columbia University Press, 1996). For a critique of Nora's concepts, see Etienne Achille, Charles Forsdick, and Lydie Moudileno (eds.), *Postcolonial Realms of Memory: Sites and Symbols in Modern France* (Liverpool University Press, 2020).
2 To read about the complexity of Romanian history in relation with the constantly changing European power structures, see Keith Hitchins's comprehensive *A Concise History of Romania* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
3 While the concept of a "Europe with different speeds" is discussed in "Ten issues to watch in 2019", available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/630352/EPRS_IDA(2019)630352_EN.pdf (accessed on 4 January 2022.), it was introduced as early as 1989 by Michael Mertes and Norbert J. Prill in an article for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 19 July 1989, as a "Europe of concentric circles", reinforced by Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers in 1994 against the concept of "core Europe", defined as the six founding members of the EU: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See Béla Galgóczi, "A 'Europe of multiple speed' in a downward spiral", in *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 15, No.1, 2012, pp. 27–37.
4 For an in-depth discussion of heritage, community, and emotion, see: Divya P. Tolia-Kelly, Emma Waterton, and Steve Watson (eds.), *Heritage, Affect and Emotion* (Routledge, 2018) or Rosy Szymanski and John Schofield (eds.), *Local Heritage, Global Context: Cultural Perspectives on Sense of Place* (Routledge, 2016).
5 For more information on this period in Romanian history, see, among others, Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania* (Chicago: Ivan Dee Publishing, 2000) or Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940–1944* (London: Palgrave, 2006).
6 James Koranyi notes in *The Conversation* on 1 March 2017, that Romania's Jews were bargaining chips early on in the Cold War. According to data, over 100,000 Jews were sold at 8,000 Lei (£310) per head between 1948 and 1951 to Israel with the help of the US-based Joint Distribution Committee. Others were sold in exchange for industrial tools and livestock. The decision to leave was often final. This practice continued, albeit at a lower speed, throughout the Cold War under Ceaușescu from 1965. As with the Germans, Romania's Jews were sold at different prices according to their economic "worth". https://theconversation.com/people-have-been-used-as-bargaining-chips-before-by-romanias-nicolae-ceau-escu-73141.
7 For an in-depth analysis of the Romanian far-right, see Radu Cinpoeș, "The Extreme Right in Contemporary Romania", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *International Policy Analysis*, October 2012, pp. 1–15.

8 For the description of the main principles of the European Heritage Label Sites and a list of the sites see https://ec.europa.eu/culture/cultural-heritage/initiatives-and-success-stories/european-heritage-label-sites.
9 The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile spearheaded the creation of an official day of commemoration of "the martyrs of communist prisons". This was approved by parliament in 2017 and was established as 14 May in memory of those held in communist prisons on that day in 1948.
10 For a virtual tour of the museum, see https://www.memorialsighet.ro/category/ro/muzeul-sighet-ro/vizita-virtuala/.

References

Assmann, A. (2014) 'Transnational memories', *European Review*, 22(4), pp. 546–56.

Berger, J. (2016) *The New York Times*, 2 July. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/europe/elie-wiesel-auschwitz-survivor-and-nobel-peace-prize-winner-dies-at-87.html

Boatcă, M. (2021) 'Thinking Europe otherwise: Lessons from the Caribbean', *Current Sociology*, 69(3) Sage Publishing, pp. 389–414.

Boym, S. (2001) *The Future of Nostalgia*. Basic Books.

Cinpoeș, R. (2012) 'The extreme right in contemporary romania', *International Policy Analysis*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October, pp. 1–15.

Cioran, E. (1992) *Schimbarea la față a României*. Bucuresti: Editura Humanitas.

Council of Europe. (2000) *Report on Remembrance and Citizenship: from Places to Projects*. Brussels: Council of Europe Publications.

Cristea, G. (2008) 'On Maps, Abused Virgins and Nations: Anti- Communist Memorial Museums in Hungary and Romania', *NaMU: Comparing National Museums*, Online available at: http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/030/004/ecp0830004.pdf (last accessed 15 April 2021), pp. 59–69.

Deletant, D. (2006) *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940–1944*. London: Palgrave.

Elie Wiesel Memorial House. Available at: http://muzeulmaramuresului.ro/descopera/casa-memoriala-elie-wiesel/

Guibernau, M. (2013) *Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies*. London: Polity Press.

Gutiérrez, R.E. and Tate S.A. (2015) *Creolising Europe*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Hitchins, K. (2014) *A Concise History of Romania*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Institutul Național de Statistică (INS). (2011) *Recensământul Populației*, Vol. II, https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rpl-2011/rezultate-2011/ (accessed on 12 January 2022).

Ioanid, R. (2000) *The Holocaust in Romania*. Chicago: Ivan Dee Publishing.

Katz, M.M. and Enache, M. (2002) *Antisemitism in Romania – Report 2002*. Centrul de Monitorizare si Combatere a Antisemitismului in România.

Koranyi, J. (2017) 'People have been used as bargaining chips before – by Romania's Nicolae Ceaușescu', *The Conversation*, 1 March, https://theconversation.com/people-have-been-used-as-bargaining-chips-before-by-romanias-nicolae-ceau-escu-73141(accessed on 10 December 2021).

Mignolo, W. D. (2007) 'Coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking', in *Cultural Studies*, 21(2–3), pp. 155–167.
Mignolo, W. D. and Walsh, C. E. (2018) *On Decoloniality*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Monitorul Oficial. (1991) Constituția României din 21 Noiembrie 1991, https://www.monitoruloficial.ro/article--e-Monitor--297.html (accessed on 9 January 2022).
Monitorul Oficial. (2003) Republicarea Constituției României din 1 Ianuarie 2003, https://www.monitoruloficial.ro/article--e-Monitor--297.html (accessed on 9 January 2022).
Morrison, P. (2013) *Los Angeles Times*, 23 April. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-oe-morrison-wiesel-20130418-column.html
Quijano, A. and Ennis, M. (2000) 'Coloniality of power, eurocentrism, and Latin America' *Nepantla: Views from South*, 1(3), pp. 533–580.
Stanczyk, E. (2016) 'Transnational, transborder, antinational? The memory of the Jewish past in Poland', *Nationalities Papers*, 44(3), Cambridge University Press, pp. 416–429.
Stoler, A. (2011) 'Colonial aphasia: Race and disabled histories in France' *Public Culture*, 23(1), pp. 121–156.
Subotić, J. (2019) *Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance After Communism*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Szymanski, R. and Schofield, J. (eds.) (2016) *Local Heritage, Global Context: Cultural Perspectives on Sense of Place*. London: Routledge.
Tlostanova, M. (2018) *What Does It Mean to Be Post-Soviet? Decolonial Art from the Ruins of the Soviet Empire*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Tolia-Kelly, D.P., Waterton, E., Watson, S. (eds.) (2018) *Heritage, Affect and Emotion*. London: Routledge.
Traverso, E. (2017) *Left-Wing Melancholia – Marxism, History, and Memory*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Vătulescu, C. (2013) 'Prisons into museums: Fashioning a post-communist place of memory', in Buckler, Julie and Johnson Emily D. (eds.) *Rites of Place: Public Commemoration in Russia and Eastern Europe*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, pp. 315–336.
Wilson, J., Hodgkinson, S., Piche, J. and Walby, K. (2017) *The Palgrave Handbook of Prison Tourism*. London: Palgrave.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2011) *The Politics of Belonging*. London: Sage Publications.
Zamfirescu, V. D. (2012) *Nevroza Balcanică*. Bucuresti: Editura Trei.

Chapter 8

Negotiation of belonging of built heritage

Russian and Soviet heritage in Warsaw

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper

Introduction

Post-communism in Central Europe was a period of "Europeanization" – not only in political terms but also in terms of social memory and heritage practices (Törnquist-Plewa and Kowalski, 2016). European and global trends in narrating and interpreting the past took on importance in Central Europe but, on the other hand, nationalist narratives also emerged, alongside the discourse on the uniqueness of the East-Central European historical experience (Assmann and Conrad, 2010; Delanty, 2018; Eder and Spohn, 2016).

After the political transformations in the countries of East-Central Europe, the issues of communist heritage, the heritage connected with ethnic diversity, as well as the changes in social memory were of great significance and were extensively researched (e.g., Bernhard and Kubik, 2014; Kałużna, 2018; Tatarenko, 2019). In Poland, a formerly multi-ethnic country with territories that used to be parts of different European empires and borders that changed significantly after the Second World War, several research projects were conducted on the heritage of different national groups and on the heritage of communist times (e.g., Ziębińska-Witek, 2018) but the heritage of Tsarist Russia in Poland was rarely studied. To this day, however, objects such as Orthodox churches and cemeteries, military facilities (forts and citadels), public buildings, and urban infrastructure facilities that were built during the tsarist rule have remained in the landscape of Polish cities. In some places, the memory of the tsarist past and the Russian communities that used to inhabit Polish cities was also preserved. Moreover, there is still a Russian minority in Poland, and some of its members descend directly from the settlers from the tsarist times (Łodziński, Warmińska, and Gudaszewski, 2013). After the beginning of political transformation, monuments from the communist era were gradually removed, but there are still many objects that are associated with the times when Poland was in the Soviet sphere of influence – starting with the cemeteries of Soviet soldiers and ending with the Palace of Culture and Science, which dominates the Polish capital city.

All these buildings and places are constantly subject to a variety of practices, both at the socio-political and individual levels. In this chapter, I will try to show

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-13

how they balance the status of a witness to the times of dependency and an object alien to the city's inhabitants, and the status of a "domesticated" object (transformed into an element of Polish heritage) and a witness to Polish history. They belong to the city as part of its memoryscape, but this belonging changes its nature depending on how it is transformed and presented by local and state authorities. This belonging also has an emotional dimension – Warsaw residents have various feelings about Russian and Soviet-built heritage in the city. The diversity of these feelings results from two reasons. First is the individual biography of every person dealing with built heritage in the city. Particular buildings can be related to an individual life story – as a place for children's playground or even as a fixed point in space, the existence of which is connected with a sense of permanence. They can also be important because of accompanying narratives about the past transmitted in families or through school education. The second reason is the general personal attitude to heritage. For some people, it is mainly a testimony to the past, which is worth preserving even when it is difficult. For others, heritage is part of the narrative about the city's identity, and therefore it is important to maintain those sites that show the positive image and glory of a given place, and not the times of its subordination to foreign rule. These different attitudes towards heritage and the accompanying emotions are visible in the statements of both: professionals – guides telling tourists about the history of the city – and the inhabitants of Warsaw, which I will analyze later in the chapter.

The belonging of the post-dependency heritage in the Polish context

In social research, "belonging" has three main dimensions: belonging to groups or communities, to time and change, and to a place (spatially located belonging) (Eckersley, 2022, p .2). Spatially located belonging can be understood very broadly: as an attachment not only to places or landscapes, but also to individual objects in space (both natural, such as trees, mountains, or rivers, and man-made, such as buildings or monuments). The sense of belonging has different levels. One of them concerns the political sphere, where narratives about belonging are used for political mobilization (Yuval-Davis, 2006), and the other one relates to the sphere of individual feelings, where emotions play the most important role (Antonsich, 2010; Guibernau, 2013). In the case of Warsaw residents' attitudes towards the built heritage of Russian and Soviet times, we are dealing with a personal attitude to individual objects (determined by one's own biography), and on the other side, with the awareness of the characteristics of the periods of Polish history from which these objects originate and the controversy they arouse in the public sphere and in political discourse (especially in the case of Soviet heritage).

Heritage can be considered as a form of discourse (Smith, 2006), in which power relations and social actions determine what will be considered "the heritage" of a nation or local community (what is forgotten and hidden, and what is mentioned, and how). The vision of heritage at the country level is dominated

by the idea of single national history. In such a situation, the presence of "foreign heritage", especially when defined as the heritage of colonizers or occupying forces, is a challenge to the narrative of the politics of memory and may be seen as "negative heritage" (Meskell, 2002). The post-imperial Russian heritage as well as the Soviet one may pose an interpretative challenge for the contemporary creators of the policy of remembrance and narratives about the history of Poland and the entire region, as it carries a double meaning. On the one hand, it is a testimony to political domination and enslavement in the past and constitutes the basis for building martyrological and heroic narratives. However, on the other hand, it is a legacy of development and modernization that took place in the region in the nineteenth century and a legacy of the post-war reconstruction of the destroyed country and modernization.

As Susannah Eckersley states, "The meaning and significance of specific places – in terms of belonging – to groups and individuals inevitably connects to issues of history and memory" (2022, p. 576). Contemporary discussions about Russian and Soviet heritage in Poland often refer to martyrological memory, but also to the concepts of colonialism and decolonization that are used for defining the situation of East-Central Europe (Cervinkova, 2012; Chari and Verdery, 2009). The perspective of "internal European colonization" points to analogies between the policy pursued by colonial empires in their overseas colonies and the policy towards subordinated European nations. By analogy, such arguments share an (often inexplicit) assumption that post-colonial theory helps to highlight issues overshadowed by more conventional notions used by the historiography of the region, such as foreign occupation, nation-building, totalitarianism, (post-)communism, (post-)socialism, and others (Mayblin, Piekut, and Gill, 2016; Moore, 2001; Levick, this volume). A large part of these discussions covers the imperialism of Tsarist Russia and of the Soviet Union (Tlostanowa, 2012, 2015). Research on the post-colonial condition relates generally to the study of the influence of tsarist and Soviet rule on economic and political relations, the legal system and the way of thinking about the state (Eliaeson et al., 2016) as well as the ways of thinking about the "Russian empire" itself and its multinationality (Nowak, 2008). Some research exists on the culture of imperial Russia and its impact on the nations that lived under Russian rule. These studies concerned, for example, literature, the educational system, attitudes towards the institution of the state and civil society, or even "imperial urbanism" (Bilenkyi, 2018; Levick, this volume), as well as discussions on the heritage of the Soviet era and the process of decommunization (e.g., Bernhard and Kubik, 2014; Kałużna, 2018). The example of Polish territories offers an interesting perspective of multiple post-colonialism/post-imperialism. We are dealing here with the Russian Empire on the one hand and the Soviet Empire on the other. While ideologically and socially different, they also shared common features: the centralization of the state and ideas about a strong state power and economy, the Russian language and Russian culture, and narratives about the "Slavic community" (Eberhardt, 2010).

In the modern world, we are dealing, on the one hand, with an overproduction of memory and, on the other, with forgetting, which results from social processes brought about by modernity and related social changes (Assmann and Conrad, 2010; Connerton, 2009). At the same time, both processes – remembering and forgetting – could be analyzed also in the spatial context. As Karl Schlögel (2009) noted, historical events and phenomena always have a spatial dimension. Social memory researchers also pay increasingly more attention to the material, spatial, and landscape dimensions of both remembering and forgetting, and emphasize the usefulness of the category of palimpsest for studying social relations with the past in urban space (Huyssen, 2003; Saryusz-Wolska, 2011). Many studies on the memory of a specific place (Lewicka, 2012) assume that there are cities with their own genius loci that define the perceptual framework for that place and determine its identity and, as such, should be studied also with a focus on affects (Smith, 2006). Interpretations of the material heritage of a city, placed in public spaces,

> form a hyperreality or a hypercity, which lives a life of its own and is, to a certain extent, suitable for manipulation. This is implied by the terrain of city marketing and city branding, as cities in competition try vigorously to differentiate from one another.
>
> (Nas, 2011, p. 8)

The issue of tangible post-imperial Russian heritage in Poland is particularly interesting here thanks to various forms of its presence in space (for example, as a testimony to the times of subordination or as a testimony to the multicultural past of Poland) and various forms of "social invisibility" in which it functions in space (also as "domesticated objects" – recognized as being Polish).

Methodology of the research

The research presented in this chapter is aimed at identifying the issues associated with the Russian and Soviet heritage in the urban space of Warsaw. Selected facilities have been described in the spatial and social context in which they currently operate. As for the heritage of Tsarist Russia, the research has focused primarily on the Warsaw Citadel – a huge tsarist fortress serving both as a military garrison and as a prison and execution site. In addition, the urban space of Warsaw includes two Orthodox churches built in Russian times: the Church of Saint Mary Magdalene Equal to the Apostles and the Church of Saint John Climacus located in the Orthodox cemetery. During the Tsarist times, many tenement houses were built (which, however, only survived in the right-bank part of the city, which was not demolished after the Warsaw Uprising in 1944) and the municipal infrastructure (for example, the Warsaw Filters, which are still a unique engineering construction, or the Poniatowski Bridge). As for the heritage of communist times, it includes primarily the Palace of Culture and Science – a massive building dominating the city centre, built as a "gift of the Soviet nation"

to Poles, but also projects in the style of socialist modernism, such as urban space fragments including downtown streets, squares, and buildings (for example, the MDM estate, the Constitution Square, or Estate behind the Iron Gate) and the Soviet Military Cemetery.

In the second stage of the study, exploratory interviews were conducted with representatives of two groups. The first group was Warsaw guides who offer guided tours around the city to Polish and foreign visitors. They were selected because of their knowledge of the city's history. Their activity is to explain the city's past to tourists, often from abroad. Therefore, they build narratives about the history of the city that will be interesting, and at the same time will allow for an understanding of the buildings and landscape of the city that tourists encounter. The second group of interviewees consisted of local activists from the Warsaw district of Żoliborz. These activists are mainly old and middle-aged people who can remember well communist and post-communist times and are active on the internet platform "Żoliborz – Platforma sąsiedzka" and working voluntarily with local issues (organizing cultural life, local protests connected with the lack of comprehensive city policy, aid for children). One of the women was also a district councillor. Żoliborz was chosen because of the history of the neighbourhood in which they live. This district was built as a model city around the Russian Citadel (i.e., the largest building in Warsaw remaining after the tsarist rule) when Poland regained independence after the First World War. Houses and villas were built there for soldiers, officers, and widows of soldiers fighting for the country's independence, in addition to housing estates (called "colonies"), where architecture and infrastructure were to foster harmonious social life. Most of this district remained intact during the Second World War and is perceived today as one of the few places in Warsaw where you can meet "native Varsovians" (i.e., people whose families have lived in the city for at least three generations).

In total, 13 in-depth interviews with representatives of the two groups mentioned above were conducted by the students within the framework of the research seminar in the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Warsaw between March and June 2021 (in an online form due to restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic).[1] The interviews focused on three groups of topics: the biographies of the interviewees and their individual experiences related to living in Warsaw, their views on historical buildings in the city from the Russian and Soviet times, and their views on the future of these buildings and the city's policy towards cultural heritage.

Warsaw in tsarist and communist times

Poland was under tsarist Russia rule in the years 1795–1915 and although the situation of the Polish population, Russian policy, and mutual relations between Poles and Russians changed many times over that time, the policy of the Russian authorities had a great influence on the history of Warsaw,[2] which was the westernmost metropolis of the Russian Empire (cf. Rolf, 2016; Wiernicka, 2015). In

turn, after the Second World War, in the years 1945–1989, Poland was part of the Eastern Bloc governed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the shape of the Warsaw urban space rebuilt after the wartime destruction was influenced not only by architectural concepts, but also by the social, economic, and legal framework inspired by the ideas originating from the Soviet Union. The tallest building in the city – the Palace of Culture and Science, modelled on Moscow's skyscrapers – is the symbol of such a conditioned reconstruction of Warsaw.

In both periods, i.e., dependence on the Russian Empire and on the Soviet Union, the city underwent a thorough transformation of its material layers. In Russian times, the authorities created urban infrastructure and public spaces, some of which have remained in Warsaw to this day. The same happened with places of public interest for Russian inhabitants of the city, such as Orthodox churches and cemeteries, as well as institutions created in the city by the Russian authorities, such as the University of Warsaw (now the largest university in Poland). During the short period of independence between the two world wars, Polish authorities removed many elements associated with tsarist imperialism, including many monuments and Orthodox churches (Mironowicz, 2005). However, both during Russian rule and in the interwar period, there was a controversy about what could actually be considered a "Russian object" (Wiernicka, 2015). Churches and monuments devoted to Russian officers were unequivocally interpreted as "foreign heritage", but the remaining buildings, such as palaces, tenement houses, public buildings, and the entire infrastructure developed in the times of dynamic modernization and industrialization during the nineteenth century, were most often handled in silence or interpreted as "Polish objects". Although most of the Orthodox churches in Warsaw were demolished after Poland regained independence in 1918 as part of the action to destroy the material signs of the presence of Russian occupying forces in the city, two churches from that period still exist in Warsaw's urban space (nowadays serving mainly Orthodox migrants and students).

In turn, during the communist era, Warsaw was rebuilt after the massive destruction brought about by the Second World War. Some historical buildings were reconstructed, but a large part of the city was built in the style of socialist realist modernism. Moreover, the wartime events meant that the city underwent a thorough social transformation. A large proportion of the city's inhabitants were either killed or displaced, while new residents came to the city in the post-war times. Warsaw has therefore become a place of constant negotiations around the identity of its space and the identity of its inhabitants.

Research conducted within urban sociology and anthropology shows that the value systems present in a society have a large impact on attitudes to spatial values (cf. Nas, 2011). Therefore, the attitude to the Russian and Soviet heritage must be considered in the context of the attitude of Polish society to Russians, Russian culture, and the policy of the Russian authorities in the past and at present. Moreover, whether or not elements of post-imperial heritage are defined as "Russian" depends not only on people's knowledge of the history of urban space, but also on their attitudes towards Russian culture. Sociological research shows that Poles generally have a negative attitude towards Russians and view them as located lower on the

ladder of civilization development, although still dangerous (Zarycki, 2004, 2014). At the same time, there is a distinction between the Russian society, which can be assessed moderately positively or neutrally, and the Russian authorities, which are assessed negatively (see Kirwiel, Maj, and Podgajna, 2011). The link between the attitude towards Russians and the Russian culture and the perception of the heritage dating back to the times of Russian rule is also worth examining in the context of disputes over the post-colonial condition of Poland as a country. This discussion was started by Ewa Thompson (2000), who pointed out that Russian colonialism towards Poland was a special one because the colonized society did not recognize the colonizer as more civilized and therefore the models of Russian culture were not aspirational. Other researchers, however, indicate that the situation was much more nuanced (e.g., Rolf, 2016; Wiernicka, 2015). It was the Russian state, including Russian universities, that was perceived by the Polish elites as a potential career path, and universities in St Petersburg were highly valued. Moreover, it was during the times of Russian rule that Warsaw, the capital city of Poland, was furnished with such elements of modern civilization as the municipal sewage system, railway network, and a university. Moreover, despite the fact that Russians have been a permanent element of the social landscape of central and eastern Poland for 100 years, they are not perceived today as "lost" or "missing others" (Wylegała, 2014) either by the inhabitants of cities or towns or by social memory researchers.

Practices on heritage and the issues of belonging

Heritage is subject to a variety of social practices. In a situation where it is a built heritage from the times of dependency, negatively assessed by the majority of society, it undergoes various transformations during the time of independence. Christoffer Kølvraa and Britta Timm Knudsen developed four categories associated with the practices performed on post-colonial heritage: repression, removal, reframing, and re-emergence. "Repression" means rejection or refusal to deal with the colonial heritage or with some of its parts, whereas "removal" is a kind of social practice by which a community tries to leave the colonial past behind or eliminate it from its life (Kølvraa, 2019). "Reframing" is a practice of inserting colonial heritage into a new narrative or new material environment, whereas "re-emergence" is understood as the contemporary actualization of elements from the past (Knudsen, 2019). In this chapter, I will apply the first three categories (repression, removal, and reframing) to the objects of post-imperial Russian and post-Soviet heritage in Warsaw but I have not found any social practices on this kind of built heritage that could be interpreted as re-emergence (actualization of elements of Russian or Soviet past of the city). These three categories of social practices also relate to how the belonging of a specific element of heritage is perceived. An element may be defined as "ours" (i.e., Polish or closely related to the local community in Warsaw) or as a "foreign" one. Thus, it may belong to the heritage of the group defined as one's own or the heritage of the group defined as foreign or even hostile. In the case of practices referred to as "repression", elements of Russian heritage are defined as Polish (or their Russian elements are

hidden). In the case of "removal" practices, an object is defined as so foreign and hostile that it cannot belong to the urban space. In turn, the practices of "reframing" consist in redefining the belonging of a given object. In this case, the memory of its origin and belonging to the heritage of a foreign group is preserved, but it is used to present the heritage and narrative of the our-group past.

"Repression" practices relate primarily to the "domestication" of objects built during Russian rule. A clear example is the infrastructure of Warsaw water filters, built on the initiative of the Russian president of Warsaw Sokrat Starynkiewicz in the 1880s. Starynkiewicz was a Russian general and mayor of Warsaw during the Russian rule in 1875–1892, but he was highly appreciated by the city's inhabitants and is also now commemorated in the city space. Under his guidance, Warsaw underwent impressive technical modernization, and the sewage system in the city was built earlier than in St Petersburg. Although both Poles and Russians (as well as other nationalities) worked on this investment, it is currently presented primarily as an example of Polish engineering.

Another example is the building which houses the office of the President of Poland but used to serve as the seat of the former Russian governor. This function has been preserved to this day in the official name of the place, i.e., the Governor's Palace,[3] although the building is not identified as "Russian heritage" today. The inhabitants of Warsaw are also unaware that the well-known St Alexander's church in the city centre was erected to commemorate the Russian Tsar Alexander I and to express Polish gratitude to him for "resurrecting" Poland under Russian rule (Getka-Kenig, 2017). Moreover, research on the permanent exhibition of the Museum of Warsaw also shows that Russian heritage (as well as the heritage of other ethnic groups) is not visible to audiences and is generally silenced or domesticated, i.e., presented as part of Polish heritage (Bukowiecki, 2019; Bukowiecki and Wawrzyniak, 2019; Głowacka-Grajper, 2020).

Removal practices concern objects perceived as symbols of foreign domination. After the First World War, when Poland regained its independence, the monuments of Russian commanders and Orthodox churches were demolished, mainly those located in the city centre and near the headquarters of Russian military units. On the other hand, after democratic transformations began in 1989, monuments related to the communist system were demolished. However, this process was significantly extended in time: the last monument of this type, i.e., the Monument of Gratitude to the Soviet Army, was destroyed in October 2018. Removal practices involve objects that are perceived as not belonging to the heritage of a country or city. Removal is the final confirmation of their strangeness, not balanced off by other features (such as usefulness for residents, which would allow them to "domesticate" the foreign element). In Warsaw, however, we are still dealing with a specific object that has not been physically removed, but experienced "symbolic removal" instead: the Soviet Military Cemetery opened in 1950 as a burial place for over 21,000 Soviet soldiers. This place has been abandoned in the social and symbolic sense. Sometimes it was vandalized with anti-communist graffiti. The authorities of Warsaw and Poland have no plans to remove it because a burial

place is seen as "untouchable" in a cultural sense.[4] The burial ground has not been removed or transformed in any way. Although it occupies a large area, it is socially silenced: no commemorations take place there, it is not part of schools' or tourists' itineraries, and no debate is currently underway around its existence (although similar debates are still sometimes held over other objects from communist times, especially the Palace of Culture and Science).

The reframing practices can be traced to the example of the two largest remnants of foreign influences: the Warsaw Citadel and the Palace of Culture and Science. The citadel was built by the tsarist authorities after the fall of the November Uprising of 1830–1831. It was the seat of the garrison of Russian troops, a prison and the place of execution of Poles fighting against the Russian state, and a symbol of Russian domination over the city. Following regained independence, it became the seat of the Polish army and was used for this purpose also after the Second World War. Over time, more museums were opened there. Currently, the citadel houses the Museum of the Tenth Pavilion (documenting the fate of the prisoners kept there), the Katyn Museum (devoted to the fate of Polish officers murdered by the Soviets in Katyn, Kharkiv, and Mednoe), the Polish Army Museum, and the Polish History Museum, which is still under construction. Thus, the city and country authorities reformulated the symbolic meaning of the citadel from a symbol of Russian domination and victory to a symbol of Polish victory, but also of Polish martyrdom and heroism (Figures 8.1 and 8.2).

Figure 8.1 Katyn Museum in the Warsaw Citadel. Source: Adrian Grycuk. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaponiera_po%C5%82udniowa_Cytadeli_Warszawskiej_2021.jpg Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Poland license.

Figure 8.2 Palace of Culture and Science. Source: Nnb. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PKiN_widziany_z_WFC.jpg. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International, 3.0 Unported, 2.5 Generic, 2.0 Generic and 1.0 Generic license. Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw. View from Warsaw Financial Centre.

Spatially located belonging and individual emotions

The practices on heritage described earlier mainly result from the politics of memory and belonging pursued at the level of city and country authorities. However, people perceive particular objects primarily on the basis of their daily experience, both past and present. Emotions play a key role here (see Guibernau, 2013) and determine the perception of a place despite its historical context, and sometimes even against the associations evoked by the history of a specific building.

For local people who live out their everday lives in the Żoliborz district, the citadel has yet another dimension: they perceive it primarily as a vast green area for recreation. They define "belonging to the city" through their daily practices and experience. As one elderly woman – historian and local social activist during communism (in underground movement) and post-communist times – states:

> What does the Citadel remind me of? Basically, that is, when I think about my youth, childhood, it is not about Russian oppression. (…) none of us associated the Citadel so closely with Russian oppression, well … such intellectual knowledge, knowledge was passed on, but emotionally it was just a park where you went for walks, where you gathered chestnuts, where there was a pond, and swans.[5]

The interviewee draws attention to two ways of perceiving built heritage. On the one hand, it involves knowledge about the history of a place, and, on the other hand, it evokes emotional connotations resulting from personal life stories. This way of perceiving the belonging of an object to the urban space, i.e., by defining one's personal experiences related to it, pushes the past of the object to the background, or even invalidates it. It is important for local residents to "domesticate" the building, which then becomes an almost "natural" element of the city space. As city dwellers get used to a building, it is difficult for them to get rid of it, even if its history is controversial. The vast majority of the interviewees (all but one person) are therefore opposed to the demolition of buildings erected during the time of Poland's political subordination, as one of the elderly women who live at Żoliborz and who worked all her life with children said:

> I am, in general, a great enemy of demolishing anything, the Palace of Culture and the like … It has grown into the landscape and it is supposed to be there. And the citadel has its charm (...) It has a detached, historical value. It is a building rooted in the landscape.

The aesthetic value of an object is also of great importance. All interviewees notice a different approach adopted by the city's inhabitants and municipal and central authorities to the facilities dating back to the times of Russian rule and Soviet influence. They explain this primarily by the temporal distance from both epochs, which means that no one has any personal experiences related to the times of subordination to the Russian Empire, but many people have this type of experience related to the communist times. However, the exterior appearance of an object may also determine these differences: objects erected in the nineteenth century are usually perceived as prettier than those built in the style of socialist realism in the twentieth century. This way of thinking is visible in the statement made by one of the younger-generation guides:

> When it comes to the Russian partition and what was built then, i.e. the second half of the 19th century, i.e. the Presidential Palace, the Belvedere Palace, or other such buildings, we are rather glad that they have survived and that they exist. It is true that it was designed and built by Polish architects, but erected for Russian governors (…) So what dates back to those times is not really criticized because those are really nice buildings. On the other hand, in the post-war period, communist times, I think that all this criticism and negative attitudes are related to the fact that people remember it and associate it with the socio-political and economic situation of that time. (…) Well, it was built in those times, but this is part of our history, we cannot blur our history or change our history. It was like that. And the building fits in, it is an object of interest, and it is loved by foreigners.

The Palace of Culture and Science was built on the post-war ruins of Warsaw by Soviet workers as an official gift of the Soviet people to the Polish nation. Since it was originally named after Joseph Stalin, it was perceived as a monument to the Soviet dictator and a sign of Soviet domination over Poland. It is the largest building in the city, towering over its very central part, and significantly different from the surrounding area in terms of its architectural design. The Palace of Culture and Science is a distinctive landmark of Warsaw and a tourist attraction, eagerly visited by foreign tourists. It aroused great emotions already during its construction and voices calling for its demolition are still heard today in public discourse (analysis of the discourses on the Palace can be found in Murawski, 2015).[6] Due to its distinctive appearance (resembling seven similar palaces built in Moscow) and the circumstances of its construction, it is commonly associated with the USSR and communist times. According to the interviewees, however, the building has undergone the process of "domestication" and it no longer belongs to "Soviet culture" but is a primarily Warsaw object, as emphasized by one of the interviewees – a middle-aged woman, history teacher, and guide working mainly with school groups:

> hardly anyone probably remembers that it was a gift from the Soviet people. And it is already "ours" in social thinking. It is not communist or Soviet, it is ours, it is a Warsaw building.

The redefinition of the Palace's affiliation – from a Soviet object to a Polish building – has happened not only through the habits of Warsaw inhabitants and the fact that the generation that still remembers the communist times has been gradually going into the past. The rhetoric surrounding the Polish affiliation of the building also invokes arguments about its unique character, distinguishing it from twin buildings in Moscow, and about the Polish contribution to its construction. These arguments are especially important for one of the guides, who is an art historian by education:

> As we look at the big discussion on what to do with the Palace of Culture and Science. Attention please: now, I'm going to speak as an art historian. Of all the Soviet palaces of culture, ours is the coolest one. There are plenty of Polish motives there. There are exquisite sculptures. For example, Popławski's monument to Mickiewicz, it's an excellent sculpture. (…) Should I forget that Stalin himself ordered that there be Polish motives here? And we have sensational attics taken from twin tenement houses in the town of Kazimierz Dolny. Demolish? Can we cover it with skyscrapers? We have it and it is a kind of tourist attraction.

An object is considered as validly belonging to the urban space if Polish elements can be found in it, but also if it is perceived as a testimony to Polish history, no matter how difficult the past may be. All those who believe that the Palace of Culture and Science should remain in Warsaw raise arguments about its Polish identity: the nationality of some of its creators, architectural elements taken from famous Polish buildings, or the Polish narrative about the past. Secondly, arguments about the building's rooting in the social notions of city geography are invoked. Only one respondent, a tour guide, supports the idea to demolish the Palace, as he views it primarily in symbolic terms. This would not be a precedent in the history of Warsaw, because, after the First World War, when the Russian rule over the city came to an end, a well-known building of the Russian church was demolished, as one of the elder guides recalled:

> There used to be a very nice church, it was the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral. It was dismantled in the 1920s. This was highly controversial, and there were protests among the international public about it. Most Warsaw residents had no illusions that this building should be dismantled as a symbol of Russian rule. This church was in the wrong place because it was in the very centre. It was supposed to be simply the symbol of domination of the Russian rule over the conquered Polish nation and therefore it had to be dismantled. If this church had been located elsewhere, it would've been no problem. (…) In my opinion, the Palace of Culture and Science is also a symbol of Soviet domination over Poland. Besides, few people know that until 1956 it was named as the Palace of Stalin. This is the largest statue of Stalin in Poland, and it's still there. These letters have only been covered, but they are still there. (…) I do not mind the Orthodox Church of Mary Magdalene or Saint John Climacus, but the Palace of Culture and Science, where 200 historic tenement houses were destroyed, the entire area of Warsaw was destroyed. (…) If the Palace of Culture and Science stood somewhere in Praga, OK, let it stand, or in Wola or Żoliborz [districts], but it's in the very centre.

In other words, this man believes that the Palace is so dominant in the city landscape that it cannot be considered an element that belongs to it in the same way

as other buildings. His ideas about which part of the city is presentable and what it should contain mean that he cannot accept the existence of the Palace because its symbolic dominance absorbs all other meanings that other people may attribute to it. Even if other respondents do not want the Palace to be demolished, they all emphasize that they clearly associate this structure with the Soviet Union. Interestingly, everyone claims that this is the only building (apart from the Russian embassy) that evokes such associations among them. They classify the remaining objects created during the post-war reconstruction of Warsaw primarily as socialist realist or modernist, but not Soviet or Russian. When describing the activities of the architects responsible for the reconstruction of Warsaw, one of the interviewees – a middle-aged woman living all her life in the Żoliborz district and very active in local social platforms – said:

> It was not only transforming Warsaw into Moscow. It was a response to the real problems that existed before the war and when there was a chance to create wide streets and let light into the city, they took advantage of this opportunity. It is not that they maliciously wanted to destroy all these monuments. It's like Art Nouveau, isn't it? We now appreciate it, after many years. For the people back then, it was all a symbol of kitsch.

Warsaw had remained under Russian/tsarist rule for 100 years, and it found itself in the Soviet sphere of influence after the Second World War, and both of these periods had a great impact on the appearance of urban space and the way that city residents perceived this space. As the capital of Poland, Warsaw was also a place of symbolic activities by both foreign occupying forces and the Polish state. Objects created in the times of foreign domination were subjected to the processes of domestication and "Polonization", although there were also some that did not have the potential to be considered Polish, such as certain monuments or Orthodox churches.

Summary: the belonging of foreign heritage in Warsaw

As the capital city of Poland, Warsaw nowadays is the place of many national commemorations while the Russian heritage in the city is generally silenced. The built heritage that has remained after the period of dependence on Russian and Soviet rule is the subject of various social practices. Some elements have been "domesticated" and are seen as entirely Polish. There are also buildings such as the Warsaw Citadel, where the memory of its Russian origin serves to strengthen the Polish national martyrdom narrative and the memory of the national heroes who fought for the country's independence. In turn, the Palace of Culture and Science serves as a sign of complicated Polish history and, at the same time, a hallmark on tourist itineraries. Some elements of the urban landscape are actively combated: various activities were carried out in the past to

remove monuments and buildings from the urban space, especially those from the Soviet era. In turn, others, such as the cemetery of Soviet soldiers, found themselves in the sphere of "social silence". They are not a subject of public debate, nor are they presented as an important element of urban space, and no one is trying to remove them. Some other buildings and places (e.g., Orthodox churches and the Orthodox cemetery) are perceived as "non-Polish" heritage, but, at the same time, they are viewed as a permanent element of urban space that defines its identity, nowadays increasingly referred to as "multicultural" (especially in relation to the growing number of migrants from Eastern European countries).

As heritage is a form of discourse, different values and ways of thinking about the relationship between group identity and its past are engaged in the process of defining the heritage that a community wants to keep and protect in the cityscape. Heritage that is perceived not merely as foreign but, above all, as a symbol of a foreign and hostile identity, is viewed as "unsuitable" for preservation in urban space unless it has been assigned a symbolic value referring to either Polish or local identity. Therefore, the Russian and Soviet monuments commemorating the victories of foreign troops or foreign military commanders have been removed. However, even such significant symbols of Russian domination as the vast Warsaw Citadel have been preserved, as they were included in the Polish symbolic domain (i.e., the area the Polish group symbolically reigns over; see Nijakowski, 2006). They belong to the urban space as symbols of Polish heroism and martyrdom, but also as elements of the habitual bond with the city.

Belonging to a city is thus negotiated through symbolic transformations and daily practices which involve experiencing a site as a visual, aesthetic, and useful element. Arguments relating to all these aspects can be found in discussions and opinions about the building that evokes the strongest emotions, i.e., the Palace of Culture and Science, as well as other structures. Material remnants of the times of subordination may begin to belong to the urban space in social perception through the practices of "domestication", transformation, and the reframing of their meaning. However, they will belong to the cityscape without losing their cultural distinctness on the condition that they are recognized as an element that does not threaten the national and local identity narratives.

Acknowledgements

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 769478. The project *en/counter/points* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, MIUR, NCN, NWO, BMBF, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020.

Notes

1 The research was conducted in accordance with the Code of Ethics developed by the Polish Sociological Society, which applies to all sociologists in Poland. All interlocutors agreed to take part in the interviews voluntarily and agreed to their recording and transcription. They have been informed that their data (name, surname, address) will never be disclosed and that the transcripts of their interviews will only be used in collective studies, in excerpts, and in an anonymous form and that no one will contact them about these interviews.
2 Warsaw has been the capital city of Poland since 1596. After the partition of Poland, it was part of the Prussian Empire in 1795–1807, then of the Warsaw Duchy under Napoleon's protection in 1807–1815, while in 1815–1915, it was the most westward city within the Russian Empire. During the First World War, in 1915–1918, Warsaw was under German occupation, becoming the capital city of an independent country in 1918–1939 and falling under German occupation again in 1939–1945. In 1945–1989, Warsaw was the capital city of communist Poland – a satellite state of the Soviet Empire – whereas starting from 1989 it has been the capital city of Poland as an independent post-communist country.
3 For several centuries, this palace was a seat of Polish nobility families, and after the occupation of Warsaw by the Russians, it was rebuilt to serve the tsarist governor (who was then a Polish general) and has functioned in this rebuilt form to this day. Many famous buildings and churches in Warsaw have a similar history: they were built as seats of Polish rulers and nobles or as Catholic churches, and after the Russians took power, they were transformed for the needs of the tsarist authorities and the Orthodox Church (which sometimes entailed a thorough reconstruction). After Poland regained independence, these buildings were used by Polish institutions, and the churches were rebuilt again to get rid of the Orthodox elements. However, today the "Russian" part of the history of these facilities is not presented and it is not commemorated in any way.
4 There are many cemeteries of Soviet soldiers in Poland, as fierce battles took place here during the Second World War. However, the cemetery in Warsaw is special because it is one of the largest of its kind, and it is located in the capital of the country, within a relatively short distance from the modern city centre. In discussions about its future, the supporters of keeping the cemetery in the current place put forward cultural and moral arguments (one should not disturb the peace of the dead, especially since they were "ordinary people" thrown into the whirls of war against their will), and, on the other hand, political arguments (the liquidation of the cemetery of Soviet army soldiers would trigger Russia's reaction such as the liquidation of the cemeteries of Polish soldiers located in Russia).
5 All excerpts from the interviews have been translated from Polish by the author.
6 Such voices, however, are few and mostly symbolic in nature, or they are part of the current political struggle in Poland. In addition, the Palace has been officially recognized as a historical monument and is therefore legally protected.

References

Antonsich, M. (2010) 'Searching for belonging: An analytical framework', *Geography Compass*, 4/6(2010), pp. 644–659. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00317.x

Assmann, A. and Conrad, S. (eds.) (2010) *Memory in a Global Age. Discourses, Practices and Trajectories*. London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bernhard, M. and Kubik, J. (2014) *Twenty Years after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bilenkyi, S. (2018) *Imperial Urbanism in the Borderlands: Kyiv, 1800–1905*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Bukowiecki, Ł. (2019) *Things of Warsaw and Things of the Past: Evolution and Priorities of the Museum of Warsaw*. ECHOES, [Online]. Available at: http://projectechoes.eu/deliverables
Bukowiecki, Ł. and Wawrzyniak, J. (2019) *Dealing with Difficult Pasts at the Museum of Warsaw: Implications of Curatorial Memory Practices*. ECHOES, [Online]. Available at: http://projectechoes.eu/deliverables
Cervinkova, H. (2012) 'Postcolonialism, postsocialism and the anthropology of East-Central Europe', *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 48(2), pp. 155–63.
Chari, S. and Verdery, K. (2009) 'Thinking between the posts: Postcolonialism, postsocialism, and ethnography after the cold war', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 51(1), pp. 6–34.
Connerton, P. (2009) *How Modernisty Forgets*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Delanty, G. (2018) *European Heritage*. London and New York: Routledge.
Eberhardt, A. (2010) 'Rosyjski panslawizm jako idea geopolityczna', *Przegląd Geopolityczny*, 2, pp. 43–64.
Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeit ', in M. Sabrow and A. Saupe (eds.) *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch*, Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
Eder, K. and Spohn, W. (eds.) (2016) *Collective Memory and European Identity*. London and New York: Routledge.
Eliaeson, S. et al. (2016) *After the Soviet Empire. Legacies and Pathways*. Boston: Brill.
Getka-Kenig, M. (2017) *Pomniki publiczne i dyskurs zasługi w dobie „wskrzeszonej" Polski lat 1807–1830*. Kraków: Universitas.
Głowacka-Grajper, M. (2020) *Visitors Studies at the Museum of Warsaw*. ECHOES, [Online]. Available at: http://projectechoes.eu/deliverables
Guibernau, M. (2013) *Belonging. Solidarity and Division on Modern Societie*s. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Huyssen, A. (2003) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kałużna, J. (2018) 'Dekomunizacja przestrzeni publicznej w Polsce – zarys problematyki', *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne*, 2, pp. 157–170.
Kirwiel, E., Maj, E., and Podgajna, E. (2011) *Obrazy Rosji i Rosjan w Polsce od końca XIX wieku do początku XXI stulecia*. Lublin: Wyd. UMCS.
Knudsen, B. (2019) '"Reframing" and "re-emergence"', in *ECHOS Methodological Toolkit*. ECHOES, [Online]. Available at: http://projectechoes.eu/deliverables.
Kolvraa, C. (2019) '"Repression" and "removal"', in *ECHOS Methodological Toolkit*. ECHOES, [Online]. Available at: http://projectechoes.eu/deliverables.
Lewicka, M. (2012) *Psychologia miejsca*. Warszawa: Scholar.
Łodziński, S., Warmińska, K. and Gudaszewski, G. (eds.) (2013) *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce w świetle Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności z 2011 roku*. Warszawa: Scholar.
Mayblin, L., Piekut, A. and Gill V. (2016) '"Other" posts in "other" places: Poland through a postcolonial lens?', *Sociology*, 50(1), pp. 60–76.
Meskell, L. (2002) 'Negative heritage and past mastering in archaeology', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 75(3), pp. 557–574.
Mironowicz, A. (2005) *Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach polskich w XIX I XX wieku*. Białystok: Wydawnictwo UwB.

Moore, D. C. (2001) 'Is the post- in postcolonial the post- in post-soviet? Toward a global postcolonial critique', *PMLA*, 116(1), pp. 111–28.
Murawski, M. (2015) *Kompleks Pałacu. Życie społeczne stalinowskiego wieżowca w kapitalistycznej Warszawie*. Warszawa: Muzeum Warszawy.
Nas, P. (2011) *Cities Full of Symbols. A Theory of Urban Space and Culture*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
Nijakowski, L.M. (2006) *Domeny symboliczne. Konflikty narodowe i etniczne w wymiarze symbolicznym*. Warszawa: Scholar.
Nowak, A. (2008) *History and Geopolitics: A contest for Eastern Europe*. Warsaw: PISM.
Rolf, M. (2016) *Rządy imperialne w Kraju Nadwiślańskim: Królestwo Polskie i cesarstwo rosyjskie (1864–1915)*. Warszawa: WUW.
Saryusz-Wolska, M. (2011) *Spotkania czasu z miejscem. Studia o pamięci i miastach*. Warszawa: WUW.
Schlögel, K. (2009) *W przestrzeni czas czytamy. O historii cywilizacji i geopolityce*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
Smith, L. (2006) *Uses of Heritage*. London and New York: Routledge.
Tatarenko, A. (2019) *Relikty komunizmu. Polityka historyczna wobec materialnego dziedzictwa sowieckiego w Republice Czeskiej*. Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowej.
Thompson, E. (2000) *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Tlostanova, M. (2012) 'Postsocialist ≠ postcolonial? On post-Soviet imaginary and global coloniality', *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 48(2), pp. 130–142.
Tlostanova, M. (2015) 'Between the Russian/soviet dependencies, neoliberal delusions, dewesternizing options, and decolonial drives', *Cultural Dynamics*, 27(2), pp. 267–283.
Törnquist-Plewa, B. and Kowalski, K. (2016) *The Europeanization of Heritage and Memories in Poland and Sweden*. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
Wiernicka, V. (2015) *Rosjanie w Polsce. Czas zaborów 1795–1915*. Warszawa: Bellona.
Wylegała, A. (2014) *Przesiedlenia a pamięć*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40(3), pp. 197–214, DOI: 10.1080/00313220600769331.
Zarycki, T. (2004) 'Uses of Russia: The role of Russia in the modern polish national identity', *East European Politics and Societies*, 18(4), pp. 595–627.
Zarycki, T. (2014) *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge.
Ziębińska-Witek, A. (2018) *Muzealizacja komunizmu w Polsce i Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS.

Chapter 9

In the centre of conflict

Negotiating belonging and public space in post-unification Berlin Mitte

Kristin Meißner

Introduction

Facing the German reunification and Berlin's status as capital-in-the-making, urban planners from the Berlin government felt challenged to reunite the divided city and to navigate an "unprecedented" urban transformation "in a moment of economic, political, social and cultural transition" (Landesarchiv, 1991). While experts met right away in order to discuss concepts for urban development, Berlin citizens were similarly gripped by euphoria at the sudden changes in the wake of the fall of the Wall in 1989 and the sheer openness of urban space and future. The comprehensive post-unification transformation was driven not only by the end of the Cold War but also by processes of economic globalization. In this contemporary context of change, 1990s Berlin was the central place in Germany where spatial, temporal, and social dimensions of urban living were profoundly shaken up. Post-unification Berlin was an extraordinary space for encounters, where divergent social imaginaries and past experiences met and, to an extent, clashed over the question of which paths the urban transformation – which, *pars pro toto*, represented the entire national unification process – was to be channelled along. The dense urban change early on attracted much academic attention. Urban theorists and sociologists examined local effects of globalization, neoliberalization, and related processes of social polarization in relation to Berlin's status as an aspiring global city (Lenz et al., 2006; Mayer and Strom, 1998). Architectural theory and heritage studies analyzed the aesthetics and politics of the contemporary search for national identity through the lens of the vast urban rebuilding (Hertweck, 2010; Ladd, 1997). These studies largely focused on the discourses and practices of political actors, experts, and journalists, thus somewhat neglecting the perspectives of local residents. More recent studies have dismantled top-down perspectives by highlighting the perceptions and actions of artist collectives or civic initiatives (Zitzlsperger, 2021; Copley, 2020; Binder, 2009). While these analyses illustrate divergences between the attitudes of local and state actors, there is still a need for a better understanding of conflicts of belonging and related negotiation processes within the context of structural change in this period of Berlin's historical transformation.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-14

"Belonging" was the key issue underlying discussions in post-unification Berlin, albeit one that was debated implicitly more so than explicitly. As a theoretical concept, it helps to understand heterogeneous forms of social identification in a complex and multi-perspective way that is sensitive to societal transformation processes, conditions of asymmetric resource distribution and processes of marginalization within politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006). In presupposing that belonging is fluid and transitory rather than static, actively lived out rather than passively assigned, and diverse rather than homogeneous, the concept enables to capture shifting senses of belonging in times of structural change, in which the relationship between self-positioning and social verification becomes dynamic (Guiberneau, 2013). By assuming that senses of belonging are negotiated especially in times of transition, when the potential increases for societal (power) structures, values, and visions to be rebalanced, the chapter demonstrates ways in which conflicts of belonging were dealt with in a historically specific context of change. As senses of belonging are formed through spatial, temporal, and social experiences and imaginaries conditioned by contemporary contexts, the chapter examines divergent senses of belonging by analyzing spatial, temporal, or social references drawn by actor groups such as state politicians, experts, civic initiatives, and local residents involved in the debates on the urban development of Berlin Mitte and the symbolically laden public space at the Spreeinsel. By disentangling entwined spatial, temporal, and social dimensions, the analysis firstly illustrates that divergent senses of belonging comprise sets of specific spatial-temporal-social referencing. Secondly, the chapter outlines ways in which divergent senses of belonging were negotiated and argues that particular notions of belonging governed by specific socio-political values were promoted and standardized, while dissenting approaches were structurally marginalized. The findings in the analysis are drawn from printed primary sources such as state publications, newspaper articles, and monographs as well as from unpublished documents held by civic or state archives. Qualitative interviews with actors who were engaged in the post-unification debates on Berlin Mitte helped to correlate the differing actor's perspectives.

Contentious spaces – controversial spatiality

Discussions on rebuilding the central area at the Spreeinsel began as soon as the collapse of the GDR regime became obvious and before the Bundestag had resolved to make Berlin the capital of a reunified Germany. As the former political centre of the GDR, the public space of the then "Marx-Engels-Forum" passed into federal possession, while the West Berlin Senate departments responsible for urban development and construction were tasked with its rebuilding since West Berlin's planning regulations were applied to East Berlin in general. Urban planning in 1990s Berlin evolved into a key sphere not only of high economic relevance in the context of competitive construction policies but also of channelling cultural interpretation, which made it a key platform for the negotiation

of belonging post-unification. Urban rebuilding mainly involved spaces in East Berlin and attracted much debate regarding societal future visions, cultural representation and heritage, socio-economic order, and the qualities of local and national democracy. While the development of some East Berlin squares such as Potsdamer Platz (1991) was discussed controversially by the general and the professional public, no other location evoked such strong feelings as the Marx-Engels-Forum/Schlossplatz. As the urban centre of the Prussian monarchy, the place where the Weimar Republic had been proclaimed, and then, after 1945, the political centre of the GDR, this central space was heavily laden with history and highly symbolic. The questions of how to deal with the Palast der Republik (as the former seat of the GDR's powerless parliament and a popular cultural centre) and how to develop this central public space thus entailed sensitive and contested interpretations of politics of space and history that symbolized the qualities of the German reunification process as well as the new cultural beginning of unified Germany. Spatial frames contested implicitly or explicitly within these discussions ranged from local and national through to global, the European City, public vs private, as well as open/free vs densified spaces. Other spatial patterns that were referenced in the debates, such as inclusion–exclusion or, as a theoretical deduction of this analysis, centrifugal and centripetal visions of social order, are addressed later in this chapter.

In the midst of the turbulent time of change during 1990/1991, state planners, architects, and public figures started right away to discuss concepts for creating a prestigious landmark centre on the Spreeinsel. At symposia such as "Zentrum Berlin. Szenarien der Stadtentwicklung" (1990), at exhibitions such as *Berlin Morgen. Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt* (1991) and in ad hoc expert groups such as the Gruppe 9. Dezember (founded in 1989) or Metropole (1991), experts and public figures mainly from West Berlin projected a need for a "cultural and emotional centre" and an "identificatory reference point" onto the city centre of the former East Berlin (Blomeyer and Milzkott, 1990; Lampugnani and Mönninger, 1991; SenStadt, 1997a, p.48). The longing for an urban centre of (inter)national appeal dated back to the International Building Exhibition of 1984/1987 in West Berlin, where concepts, then envisaged for the area around the Reichstag, were confounded by controversies over the question of whether the national representation of Germany might be "normalised" (Thijs, 2014). In the 1990s process of relocating the federal government to Berlin, however, the unpretentious stance ascribed to the "Bonn Republic" shifted to a more ambitious vision of national representation. This shift was reflected in the label "Berlin Republic" as well as in the tonality with which the Senate's planners and other public figures conceived the development of the Historical Centre on the Spreeinsel. Thus, state planners and the senators for urban development and construction, Volker Hassemer and Wolfgang Nagel, set out to turn Berlin into a capital of international prestige, to make it "the centre of the new German politics" and "the centre of a European peace order" while the Spreeinsel was earmarked as the most central place in the "heart of Europe"

and thus "of great national and international cultural significance" (Nagel, 1990, p.12; Landesarchiv, 1993).

While urban development in early 1990s Berlin featured much debate, a circle of planners and architects from former West Berlin succeeded in dominating the cultural narrative and thus in governing the urban transformation. With the help of public relations strategies, institutional authority, and rhetoric ambivalency, they fashioned development concepts into master plans and thereby secured lucrative construction contracts for their group (Colomb, 2011; Molnar, 2013). By reinterpreting a set of concepts such as Kritische Rekonstruktion, the European City, and "Berlin Architecture", planners such as Hans Stimmann and Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm promoted discourses that envisioned Berlin as a capital of international prestige. While the national framing will be examined in more detail in the following section, it is the European and global framing that had the greatest effect on the politics of space in Berlin Mitte. The 1990s global framing of metropolises as hubs for economic globalization drove urban trends towards the privatization of public institutions and spaces, post-industrialized tertiary-sector and headquarters economies, cutbacks to welfare institutions, socio-economic gentrification, as well as place marketing to foster locational competitivity (Sassen, 1992; Therborn, 2014). In this vein, the Senate's development of a prestigious urban centre in Berlin Mitte was part of placemaking processes designed to attract international investors, high-income residents, and tourists. The aim of reviving the urban splendour of turn-of-the-century Berlin, with its "noble businesses", "spectacular stores", "sophisticated audience", and "highest metropolitan standards" (Hoffmann-Axthelm and Strecker, 1992a, p.13) correlated not only with the marginalization of local interests in favour of international representation but also with shifts from the public towards the private, thus creating both spaces of exclusion and exclusivity on a social, economic, and cultural level. The concepts of Kritische Rekonstruktion and the European City adjusted the gentrification programme to imaginaries of historical tradition, lending discursive legitimacy to this policy and contouring urban particularity to promote locational competitiveness.

Two conceptual aspects guided the European City approach taken by the Senate's planners in order to turn Berlin into the "distinctive European metropolis" that it had been around 1900: (a) its selective historical interpretation and correlating ideals of collective identity according to continental European bourgeois culture (see the next section) and (b) its fierce opposition to modern urban planning, the promotion of urban privatization and densification and correlating devaluation of open spaces. These planning objectives caused much public debate, when Hans Stimmann and Peter Strieder published the *Planwerk Innenstadt*, a development plan for central Berlin affecting some 300,000 citizens, at the 60th Stadtforum ("City Forum") in 1996. The contentious "master plan" came as a "provocation" (Architektenkammer, 1997) in view of its non-public creation process and its normative statements on urban order. In spatial terms, the plan established urban structures of the pre-modern city as standards of development (restricted height for eaves, plot- and perimeter-based block structures, urban

centralization and densification, traditional types of squares, mixture of functions) and marked in red numerous buildings from socialist-era Berlin earmarked for removal, including the densification of the many open spaces in central East Berlin. The Senate's planners dismissed socialist-era urban structures as spaces of "emptiness", "absence", and "deficiency" and its many green areas as "wastelands" deemed to cause "social and spatial voids" and atmospheres of "depression" and "misery" (Gruppe 9. Dezember, 1991, p.562; Stimmann, 1992, p.28). The open-spaced urban landscape of, e.g., Leipziger Straße was evaluated to form barriers to "a fundamental separation of the private and the public spheres", a separation evaluated as the premise for "revitalising urban space" and creating "tangible and lively urban spaces" (SenStadt, 1999, p.64).

Berlin Mitte locals and young urbanites from the subculture scene had a different perspective that contrasted with the "deficiency" discourse. While state officials were busy fragmenting urban space, the results of this planning were yet to be perceived in the daily life of post-unification Berlin. On the contrary, the spaces of East Berlin seemed free from authoritarian control and inspired a euphoria for a future in which anything seemed possible. The writer Judith Hermann, for instance, later remembered the "empty spaces" and "unoccupied places" of central East Berlin as "spaces of possibilities" and "romantic places" representing a

> poetic conception of a city that belonged to you. Rules that no longer applied – in all senses we could open doors, step into the rooms behind them, and appropriate them for one or two weeks in order to show films, produce radio programmes (…) there was something aimless about it all, and (…) that was precisely what made it so captivating.
>
> (Hermann, 2017, p.19)

The views of Berlin Mitte locals, however, differed from the coming-of-age perspective of the creative types enjoying the open spaces in East Berlin. Having been involved in GDR-civic initiatives for urban renewal such as Bürgerinitiative Dorotheenstadt or Oderberger Straße, which were hubs of informal opposition prior to the protests of 1989, East Berliners hoped to finally have a say in the development of their dilapidated environments but were also fearful regarding the state politicians' commitment to promoting the interests of investors rather than civic needs. Thus, when Matthias Klipp from Oderberger Straße met Werner Orlowsky, the councillor for construction in Kreuzberg, at roundtable discussions in 1990 in order to learn about scopes of local democracy, he voiced East Berliners' concerns:

> We stood up against decay, a lack of culture and the demolition of entire areas. But not for total rebuilding, luxury modernisation or the spread of rent explosion and land speculation. (…) We want the third way, between decay and commercialisation. (…) I see a danger of having even less of a say against capital interests (…) than in the days of the SED's omnipotence.
>
> (RHG IBIS 06)

In 1995, civic initiatives based in West and East Berlin founded the *Stadtforum von unten* (City Forum from Below) in order to counterbalance the neglect being shown by the Senate's Stadtforum towards the local citizens' interests (see the following). At these events, citizens discussed ways to participate in urban development, protest against the "selling-out" of their living environments, ensure that the spaces produced by the Senate would be put to public and civic use, and prevent "politicians and investors from dominating the urban space" in general (Landesarchiv Berlin, 1995). While divergences between local civic and national political perspectives on urban development became prominent in the first half of the 1990s, the publication of the *Planwerk Innenstadt* at the 60th Stadtforum in 1996 made the conflict immediately obvious. Besides the demolition of several buildings in East Berlin envisaged in the plan, the proposed densification of open spaces in central Berlin also caused a great deal of public irritation. Art historian Simone Hain echoed the resentment felt by East Germans at the Stadtforum event. Following presentations by the *Planwerk*'s authors in front of an exceptionally large audience of some 1,000 citizens, Hain criticized the wording, mental maps, and undemocratic planning procedures adopted by the Senate's planners. She deemed the plan "problematic" as it disregarded the social realities and existing building stock of East Berlin, whose spaces were discredited as "urban deserts" and thus targeted for rebuilding as soon as possible. This devaluing attitude ignored the fact that these spaces, as Hain put it, were

> filled with memories of small urban everyday rituals: the summer evenings residents would spend in the large open space at the Neptune Fountain or in the parks of the Friedrichsgracht, the rainy Sundays in the "Palast" as well as memories of publicly shared happiness on Alexanderplatz.
>
> (SenStadt, 1996)

The post-unification debates on the Berlin city centre were about politics of space, which social theorists such as Henri Lefebvre characterize as being conditioned by power asymmetries of socio-spatial authority and scopes of action, by disintegrations between abstract/conceived and lived/experienced spaces, and thus by conflicts over the question to whom public space belongs and whose spatial perceptions and experiences are represented by urban landscapes (Lefebvre, 1974; Zukin, 2003). Next to the procedural qualities of the divide between a public space at the disposal of planning officials who devalued existing urban structures in order to project large-scale visions of national prestige on them and who were equipped with the authority to rebuild them on the one hand and lived spaces of decades of daily life experiences held by residents who felt coerced into inaction on the other – moreover, as regards the conceptual level, approaches diverged fundamentally as well. Thus, Simone Hain emphasized that the urban spatiality of "state-dominated order" and "economic-liberal privatisation" as conceived by the Senate would hinder the development of a genuine "republican public space" (SenStadt, 1996). By refuting the archetypal reference to the *polis* that the Senate's

planners had relied on in their European City narratives, she criticized that a politeian public space would integrate democratic negotiation rather than authoritarian determination. By implying different societal roles that public spaces are assigned in different politico-economic systems, Hain suggested the negotiation of diverse spatial understandings that were "ultimately based on a different view and experience of the world" (SenStadt, 1996). For most Berlin Mitte residents as well as for experts with a preference for modern designs, the "open-spaced" and "free-floating" urban landscapes in the tradition of Hans Scharoun were appreciated spaces that offered many green areas for citizens to rest in public. At the same time, locals endorsed urban change led by democratic "dialogue", while in Hain's words, the much-vaunted "dialogue" being practised by the Senate felt rather like a "lack of understanding, knowing it all and mocking" (SenStadt, 1996).

The sociologist Hartmut Häussermann characterized the socialist public space as historically having been, albeit permeated by political authority, a space primarily for "civic-social" culture and strikingly free from private economic use (2006, p.168). Against the backdrop of this experience, the post-socialist expectations held by local citizens were pervaded by fear of the decrease of public spaces for civic use, while the Senate planners promoted spatial privatization and densification and conferred legitimacy to their spatial schemes of national prestige by referring to a normative European City narrative as will be shown in more detail in the following section. The motif of the European City would, if interrogated more closely, disintegrate into varied concepts of urban space according to diverse politico-economic regimes of European history (Benhabib, 1991; Häussermann, 2006, p. 168.). Despite an avowed mission to make Berlin "the centre of [European] reconciliation" (Nagel, 1990, p.12), post-socialist Europe including the former GDR and East Berlin and the lived heritage of these spaces were not included in the Senate planners' designs for an urban Europeanity of political prestige, bourgeois culture, and neoliberal economy. The European City approach brought a positive vocabulary of "integration", "revitalised urbanity", and "tradition" to development schemes that tended to exclude local civic interests in the days of transition post-unification (SenStadt, 1997b). Such a normative and selective approach also pervaded the historical references drawn in the debates on urban development, which correlated the spatio-political "empty centre" trope with the "destruction" trope that held socialist urban development responsible for destroying "traditional" urbanity and identity.

Belonging between the past and the future

While urban spatiality in post-unification central Berlin was politically encoded according to the requirements of (inter)national representation and belonging was framed in line with socio-spatial imaginaries of exclusivity, privacy, and verticality, the institutional discourse on historicity primarily dealt with framing at a national level, e.g., by discussing which historical reference would characterize the future German nationality most appropriately. Whereas political conceptions

of spatial order provoked considerable local arguments, debates on urban historicity tended to be restricted to experts, as East Berlin locals were concerned less with the immediate past that they had just lived through and more with what was going to happen in the future. By contrast, intellectuals from various disciplines focused on discussing the historical significance of urban reordering in the context of the national reunification and clashed over interpretations of cultural identity and national history (Süß, 1995).

Proponents of the historical reconstruction of Prussian architecture in central Berlin conceived local history in a selective way by projecting an idealized concept of historicity, in which the urban history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided the standard towards which the future urban identity was to be refashioned. Thus, by following the critique of modern urbanity expounded by Wolf Jobst Siedler, Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm set the tone early on by founding Gruppe 9. Dezember in 1989 and by publishing the "Charter for the Centre of Berlin" in 1990. He stated that, in order to prevent Berlin from becoming a "metropolis of depression and misery, the mistakes of the past must be dealt with quickly and urban structure must (…) be rebuilt on a large scale". In presuming that a "city that cannot find its image will deteriorate structurally" and that central Berlin was an "empty place", he urged to "fill" this place "with history, with precise memories" as well as with "future tasks" (Hoffmann-Axthelm and Strecker, 1992b, p.32). Having been, together with Bernhard Strecker, commissioned to develop the structural plans for urban spaces in Berlin Mitte, Hoffmann-Axthelm simultaneously published texts, in which he detailed that the "precise memories" to be evoked in the "historical centre" were to "represent" "Berlin within the Customs Wall of the eighteenth and nineteenth", whereby he also demanded the demolition of the Palast der Republik and the rebuilding of the palace of the Hohenzollerns on the Spreeinsel (SenStadt, 1996). Others in favour of the historical reconstruction of the city centre backed these proposals with numerous publications such as Wolf Jobst Siedler's article entitled "The Castle was not in Berlin, the Castle was Berlin" (1992). These publications stylized Berlin's historical role as the prestigious centre of Prussia as an ideal along whose lines the neoclassical capital of the twenty-first century was to be (re)created by reviving positive echoes of an epoque of national power and by providing a model for overcoming the imputed "abnormality" of post-1945 physical and psychological East-West divide of the Cold War, whose urban planning was dismissed as an "ahistorical destruction" of the local tradition (SenStadt, 1996).

In supporting these historicist schemes, the director of the Deutsches Architekturmuseum, Vittorio Lampugnani, started the so-called "Architect's Dispute" by publishing his article "Provocation of the Quotidian" in 1993, in which he glorified pre-1945 architecture, dismissed subsequent styles, and dated the urban destruction having taken place post- instead of pre-1945 (Lampugnani, 1993). Being provoked by such historical interpretation architects such as Daniel Libeskind or Heinrich Klotz, who favoured a modern approach aligned more with utopian than with retrospective imaginaries, dismissed the state planners'

preference for an urban architecture of styles that were "disciplined, Prussian, reserved in colour, stone, straight rather than curved", calling them a "bourgeois, old-fashioned", "reactionary", or "neo-Teutonic" imposition of cultural identity through architecture (ARCH+, 1994; Kähler, 1995; Hertweck, 2010, p.60). For them, the turning point of 1945 was the normative paradigm towards which they were ethically and creatively oriented as modern architecture, with its flat and transparent forms, was understood as being more representative of contemporary democratic culture, while monuments to past monarchies were deemed to represent an anachronistic cultural identity of political authority and social hierarchies. Echoing the *Historikerstreit* of the late 1980s, therefore, the key question being addressed amongst these conflicting approaches was whether the German nationality could be normalized through a new national beginning or whether Germany's National Socialist past would forbid national culture from ever becoming normal. In this vein, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas opposed in his commentary to the debate over the character of the new Berliner Republik the notion that Germany's national history could ever be relieved from its historical burden by evoking a new "normalcy of a Berlin republic". He emphasized that 1989 did not end "a temporary anomaly" and that 1945 marked an irreversible sea change that demanded a continuous collective commemoration (Habermas, 1995).

As regards the broadly "two different understandings of city, society and history" debated in the public sphere, experts discussed the topic at the 69th Stadtforum in 1998 (SenStadt, 1998). While all agreed that the central space of the Spreeinsel symbolized German history and the treatment of this place was more representative of the reunification process than anywhere else in Berlin, they drew different conclusions on how to proceed. The architecture critic Michael Mönninger identified a neoconservative and neoliberal shift following German unification, which influenced the interpretations of German history. In view of the contemporary "heyday of market thinking, invisible hands, deregulation and denationalisation" as well as a post-Cold War "loss of belief in linear progress", he saw an "overcompensation" of the "mobilisation and dissolution of structures and traditions" within the neoconservative trend in historical approaches taking place. With regard to practices of instrumentalizing history for economic purposes and politics of identity in the wake of German reunification, Mönninger feared that the "pluralism" and the "diverging perspectives on history, memory and identity" would fall victim to homogenization processes that hegemonized a historical narrative of a grand national and monarchic tradition while marginalizing "the minimalism of social history from below". By emphasizing leaving urban spaces open for future generations and their respective design preferences and historical projections, he also recommended finding a third, less contentious path out of the Stadtschloss vs Palast der Republik dispute since the social unrest attached to this controversy would not be vanishing any time soon. In the same vein, the political scientist Max Welch Guerra advised to re-encode the contentious discourse of "national normalisation" towards a more modest conception by not referring to a tradition of Prussian heritage and national power but instead

emphasizing historical ruptures. He criticized the fact that the spatial inventory of the GDR was met "with an attitude that suggests urban revanchism" and that "the negation of the GDR urban planning" correlates with the lack of "integration of the citizens of the former GDR" (SenStadt, 1998). Taking up the architect Bruno Flierl's suggestion, he recommended designing the Spreeinsel as a spatial counterpoint to the Spreebogen, which housed the German government, by making it a symbolic space for citizens. Responding to these statements, the Senate's chief planner, Hans Stimmann, defended the *Planwerk Innenstadt* and its orientation towards Prussian Berlin. Aided by the kind of ambivalent wording that was characteristic of the rhetoric employed by state planners post-unification, he stressed the importance of preserving the historical multilayeredness and richness of Berlin's heritage. At the same time, however, he continued to label the post-1945 urban planning of Berlin "ahistorical", having turned the urban landscape into a "quarry" ravaged by "a hatred for the past". Though Stimmann claimed that the Senate's planning was "dialogous" in "reintroducing historical continuity" as an "identity-forming function", it was this disdain for the local history of the past few decades that was a provocation to many (SenStadt, 1998; SenStadt, 1997a, p.13).

The historical approach of a nationally framed urbanity of Prussian heritage, as supported by state planners and pro-reconstruction societies such as Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin e.V., was selective in that it blanked out decades of urban history post-1945. It essentialized and homogenized collective identity in that it understood local identity as having originated in the eighteenth century and having been interrupted between 1945 and 1990, an era characterized as "ahistorical" and "abnormal" (SenStadt, 1996). Such historicized framing of a collective identity corresponds to what Aleida and Jan Assmann have analyzed as "cultural memory", signifying an abstract and normative narration as well as a hegemonic representation of a collective past conceived as a *longue durée* continuity. It correlates with what Henri Lefebvre has termed the "abstract space", an intellectually conceived and politically represented space as an instrument for dominating social imaginaries (Assmann, 2011; Lefebvre, 1974). Both concepts highlight the instrumentality of spatio-temporal representations which are produced to foster or promote socio-political structures of hegemony by universalizing particular perspectives and othering/negating divergent ones. Such politics of history and space were characteristic of post-unification governmentality in Berlin and are evident in the federal resolutions (2002 and 2006) to rebuild the Hohenzollern Palace following a decade of discursive lobbyism in favour of historical reconstructions. Although historical reconstructions differ in quality from existing monuments inherited from the past as they actively produce particular representations of the past by spatially re-enacting them, politics of history were also practised within dealings with "dissonant heritage" at other places. Clare Copley illustrates that the politics of history were a practice of "governmentality in post-unification Berlin" that was applied to historically laden places such as the *Treuhandanstalt* as the former seat of the NS-Air Ministry and of the GDR's House of Ministries. Copley demonstrates a selective approach to history that othered and covered historical

traces of GDR socialism more significantly than, for instance, traces of dissonant heritage from the era of National Socialism (Copley, 2020). The political determination of particular historical representation is instrumental for directing present actions towards future ends (as "instrumental futures" Sandford, 2019) and thus for governing change by channelling developments towards prescribed paths. Such a hegemonization of urban heritage culture is backed by a tradition of scientific historiography that prioritized the history of state power over historiographies from below and is demonstrative of a politico-economic value system of modernization theory representing liberal-national visions of linear progress.

Opposing the spatio-temporal abstractions of hegemonic culture is a counterpoint of a "lived" spatiality and "communicative" memory of daily life. Even if the theoretical binarity of cultural and communicative memory or abstract and lived spaces may be simplified and may be better analyzed, e.g., as trialectics of perceived-conceived-lived spatialities (Soja, 1996) and temporalities, still they heuristically help to contour the conflicting positionalities of post-unification debates on belonging in Berlin Mitte. While civic initiatives trying to preserve the Palast der Republik had met with little success, numerous civic initiatives and associated experts were not overly occupied with preserving GDR-era monuments, with specific historical interpretations or design concepts. Whereas the pro-reconstruction advocates saw Prussian history as a vital concept underpinning their striving to promote collective identity by envisaging the national future as a revival of an idealized national past, the visions of initiatives such as Stadtzentrum e.V. or Aktionskreis Perspektive Schlossplatz, experts such as Bruno Flierl or Simone Hain and engaged Berlin locals were more heterogeneous as well as being rather focused on the present and future. Some wished to preserve the status quo of their urban environments and viewed the demolition of GDR-era places such as the popular restaurant Ahornblatt as "crap" or "culturelessness", as a resident of the Fischerinsel put it (*TAZ*, 1997). Others, like Karin Baumert, the district councillor for construction of Berlin Mitte, criticized that the Senate's planners intended to "impose new social and spatial structures" on the living environments of local residents. Such criticism was not justified by references to GDR history or to socialism in general but was directed towards future living standards and the fear of social displacement due to gentrification (*TAZ*, 1997). Most locals strived to have a say in shaping an urban future that would merge the experiences and expectations of both East and West Germans, rather than universalizing particular visions. In this vein, Simone Hain proposed to replace the "postmodern new historism" of the *Planwerk* with more "future-oriented models that have the backing of the majority" such as the model of the "innovative *Ökopolis*" (SenStadt, 1996) that focused on sustainable living environments, green areas, and local participation. While demanding civic participation was the primary method for seeking open negotiation of a potentially unwritten future in the early 1990s, civic initiatives came to realize that this open approach was a strategic hindrance in itself as, in the meantime, detailed Senate plans had begun to turn discourses into facts. Thus, a guide published by the Aktionskreis Perspektive Schlossplatz in 1999 brought

together a range of concepts covering the whole spectrum of civic approaches to developing the Schlossplatz. Economic usage concepts (exhibition centre, hotels, etc.) were dismissed across the board, with all concepts advocating the square's use for distinctly public and civic purposes (libraries, municipal, and cultural institutions). The individual concepts ranged from the "Spree-Palast", a "Citizens and Communication Centre", and a "World Peace Ballroom" (Ideenwerkstatt Berlin e.V.) through to digging a "River Swimming Pool" (Kunst und Technik e.V.) and many more ideas besides. Most of the concepts opted for a modern design and a public focus, with the Centre Pompidou in Paris serving as a much-appreciated model (AKPS, 1999). This guide provides evidence of the civic preference for a public and non-representational use of the central square and of civic demands for participation in the planning process.

Negotiating urban belonging through civic participation

Rebuilding in post-unification Berlin took place not only against the backdrop of unparalleled urban change in the wake of German reunification and economic globalization, but also in the context of changing planning paradigms that were reconfiguring the municipal role of civil society. As a result of social movements striving for civic participation in the 1980s, new norms in planning theory, and the democratic expectations of East Berliners post-1989, planning policies were deemed to only be legitimate if they included cooperative methods, broadened the scope of civic participation, avoided authoritarian mentalities, and advanced the "project of progressive democratic pluralism" (Healy, 1992). Backing this paradigm shift, international governance agendas such as Agenda 21 (1992) or the World Bank's Post-Washington-Consensus (1998) recommended civic participation and dialogue-based policy styles at a local level as "good governance". As changing planning norms called for cooperative local policies, civic participation was identified as a key element of planning from the very beginning of post-unification discussions on urban rebuilding. While expert groups such as Gruppe 9. Dezember or Metropole differed substantially in their cultural understandings of urbanity, they agreed that "[a]ll planning processes [had to] be carried out with comprehensive public participation" and that "direct participation rights" were to be secured in these processes (ARCH+ 1990; Gruppe 9. Dezember, 1991, p.562). In order to preserve political legitimacy, Senate politicians responded to these paradigms by creating platforms for public dialogue and making civic participation a guiding principle of their policies. Thus, in 1993 the Senate obliged planners in the 3rd and 11th of its "Guidelines for Urban Renewal in Berlin" to plan according to the social needs of the citizens, to "secure opportunities for those affected to participate" and to meet the "high expectations" of East Berlin citizens regarding "democracy and the possibility of being able to participate in the planning and implementation of urban renewal". In order to provide a platform for public dialogue, in 1991 the urban development senator Volker Hassemer set up the monthly consulting Stadtforum to be a model forum for publicly negotiating

planning objectives. The forum consisted of a management board, expert lecturers, a body of permanent members made up of architects, urban planners, politicians, agents of urban society, and a number of uninvited listeners. Despite its claims to be a model of "civic self-regulation", implement a "transparent" and "participative" planning culture, and practise "civic planning", and notwithstanding founding member Helga Fassbinder's assessment that the Stadtforum accomplished a "big leap into a more democratic future" (Fassbinder, 1996, p.62), numerous civic initiatives were deeply critical about the Stadtforum's democratic qualities.

Civic initiatives in East and West Berlin, despite the different contexts in which they had emerged, had been fighting for more civic rights since the 1980s. Being up to speed on changing planning standards their post-unification expectations for local democracy were high but soon disappointed. As a result, initiatives increasingly worked together in order to broaden their scope of action and public reach. The initiative Stadtzentrum e.V., founded in 1991 "to promote civic participation in planning the capital city", established a public forum in 1995, the Stadtforum von unten (City Forum from Below), as a counter-institution to the official Stadtforum, which they informally called the "City Forum from Above". With the aim of "pooling citizens' experiences" and promoting dialogue with "experts, politicians and administrators", they found that the realities of planning deviated significantly from these claims. At their first meeting in October 1995, on "Civic participation and urban development", 250 participants from some 80 initiatives agreed that post-unification planning had hitherto been done "without participation by the citizens affected" and that civic intervention in the capital city planning was needed in order to prevent "politicians and investors from dominating the urban space" (Landesarchiv, 1995; RHG IBIS 76). Key issues discussed included the central district planning, conflicts between state and district institutions, the promotion of civic institutions such as councils of tenants, and the marginal role that citizens' concerns were playing in general, contrary to the Senate's Guidelines of 1993. Criticism was voiced to the effect that the public was only told about planning objectives after decisions had informally been made, that the politicians in charge were ignoring invitations to citizens' panels and that, contrary to its claim to be a civic forum, the Stadtforum was actually an "expert forum close to those in power" informing the state planners' "authoritarian decision-making" (Holtfreter and Schaffelder, 1996, p.143). At such Stadtforum von unten events, district officials confirmed that municipal interests did not play a significant role in the hasty decision-making by administrative "hardliners", who preferred to prioritize Berlin's politico-economic over its social development as a national capital and global metropolis (Landesarchiv, 1996).

The objections raised by local civil society were echoed by non-public communications inside the Senate's committee for urban development. The criticisms voiced by committee members across the political spectrum included the lack of civic involvement in the "secret" decision-making, which was opaque even to the committee members. They emphasized the need to include district politicians and that there was the feeling "in every nook and cranny of the city" that civic

participation was much in demand. One member of the CDU emphasized making sure that no division would be created between "the rulers over here and the ruled over there". Volker Hassemer replied that planning for the Historical Centre was of great national and international concern and therefore no local publicity was needed. Addressing the criticism that no East German judges had been included in the design contest for the Spreeinsel (1993), he replied that he wanted "to prevent a negative decision" on rebuilding the Hohenzollern Palace, thus revealing that the planning outcomes were determined despite the purportedly open nature of the public debate. Faced with the committee members' demands to discuss the lack of democratic planning and transparency, Hans Stimmann merely responded that it made "no sense to bother the public with any plans" (Landesarchiv, 1997). Public criticism of the Senate's planners' methodical procedures increased exponentially after the publication of the *Planwerk Innenstadt* at the 60th Stadtforum in 1996. Thus, the Senate's new director for construction, Barbara Jakubeit, criticized the *Planwerk* for having been made up "without any coordination" with district officials and that the "still-divided state of people's minds in the former divided city" called for planning methods based on public negotiation. The sociologist Harald Bodenschatz lambasted the *Planwerk* to be an "authoritarian-cum-administrative *fait accompli*" and stressed that the fact that "no public debate [had] taken place" was "all the more serious, because as a 'Western' concept, it should have been formulated with the consensus of East Berlin's citizens and experts". The district politician Karin Baumert criticized that the announcement of the plan did "not reflect customs of a democratic planning culture" and that it violated the CDU/SPD coalition agreement (1996), the Senate resolution DS 12/6066 (1995), and building regulations Section 3 (2) BauGB (Architektenkammer, 1997).

Severe criticism was directed not only towards the methods being employed but also towards the socio-political context in which the *Planwerk* was being framed. With regard to its objective of turning the formerly divided Berlin into a "Bürgerstadt" ("citizen's city") in the spirit of turn-of-the-century metropolitan Berlin, commentators complained that Berlin Mitte locals were not considered "Stadtbürger" ("urban citizens") but just as "Anwohner" ("residents") in that they were seen as lacking middle-class "culture", "taste", "cosmopolitanism", as well as "civic identification" and "active participation" (Stimmann, 1992, p.28; Scheinschlag/*TAZ*, 1996). The tendencies of the *Planwerk* towards social exclusion went even further when Hoffmann-Axthelm and Stimmann aspired to turn existing tenant structures in Berlin Mitte into forms of property ownership that shared the dimensions of nineteenth-century "parcels" and to tie participation rights to ownership. In this scheme, civic participation was restricted as a right determined by economic wealth, and, in view of the lack of assets held by East Berlin citizens, by social origin as well. Such socio-economic framing brought about a normative understanding of the term "bürgerlich" that replaced the broader meaning of "civic" with the narrower sense of upper-"middle-class"/"bourgeois" and othered local citizens who supported values that deviated from the neoliberal scheme of social order. While the *Planwerk*-supporters condemned local

democracy as an obstacle to redeveloping "Berlin as a centre of power" and prioritized politico-economic prestige over social policy, the *Planwerk*'s critics sought to prevent economic "upward pressure", "crowding out", and "social marginalisation", aimed to strengthen local democracy and were critical of the rebuilding of Prussian architecture and the social imagery of Berlin as it was in 1900. With these "opposing city models" divergent views on urban democracy were essentially being pitted against each other: a democracy with an upper-middle-class stance that approved socio-economic stratification and conceived an urbanity of national prestige versus a grassroots approach to democracy that strived for social equality and local authority.

The Senate's planners mitigated public criticism by continuing to portray their procedures as inclusive and participative and by offering new public platforms such as the "Workshop on planning the Schlossplatz site", a three-day event in 1997 that was attended by politicians, planners, experts, civic activists, residents, and journalists. While civic participants appreciated the dialogous mediation between the "opposing positions" in the "heated debate" on Berlin's city centre, they regarded it in hindsight as having been more of a publicity stunt than a sincere endeavour, as two oral history interviewees put it. The same conclusion – that no changes were made to the planning process – was drawn after the public hearing of the international expert commission Historische Mitte Berlin in April 2001, which had been convened to reach a preliminary decision before the matter was to be decided by the Bundestag in July 2002. Commentators such as the president of the Chamber of Architects, Peter Conradi, and civic activists criticized the commission's role as "utterly undemocratic" (*SPIEGEL*, 2002, p.19) in that the views of most of the commission's members were known beforehand, that there was no public referendum and the ratio of experts was deemed unbalanced as most came from West Germany. The commission voted 8:7 in favour of the reconstruction of the Hohenzollern Palace but advised against rebuilding it completely. The Bundestag then followed suit in 2002, with 65% supporting the reconstruction of the Prussian palace.

Throughout the 1990s, the paths that the Senate's planning would be taking towards the development of Berlin city centre would remain unchanged despite ongoing public criticism. While public negotiation on the matter was mainly hindered by untransparent planning up until the mid-1990s, public debate and civic participation were incorporated as a strategic symbol of "good governance" more so than a political end in itself after the contentious *Planwerk Innenstadt* had been published in 1996. These symbols included the selective inclusion of civic associations that supported the Senate planners' schemes. Thus, representatives of Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin e.V. or Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V., which shared the socio-political mentality of the Senate's development schemes were invited to non-public Senate conferences on the matter as agents of civil society (Landesarchiv, 1993). In differentiating between political rhetoric and practice, Margit Mayer has illustrated the selective political inclusion of supportive civic associations to be a neoliberal policy style that co-opts and instrumentalizes "social

capital" strategies (Mayer, 2002). While the structural incorporation of civic engagement and dialogue-based policy styles were promoted as good governance, civic participation in Berlin Mitte proved in practice to be selective and superficial as far as social causes were concerned. Not only is divergent and critical civic engagement excluded through its non-promotion, it is even made invisible on the local scene in that the "civil society" rhetoric is effective by programmatically including supportive civic associations but does not represent the whole spectrum of civic engagement. Ironically, therefore, while urban planning was presented as inclusive and participative in post-unification central Berlin, civic activists and expert commentators bemoaned the fact that civic participation had even "fallen behind the progress made in the last 20 years" (Landesarchiv, 1996).

These kinds of procedures that marginalized divergent perspectives on future urbanity denied divergent social mentalities to exert public effect. While the planners in charge employed a detailed spatio-temporal discursivity that contoured and thus determined future urbanity and social order, the civic imaginaries that were engaged in post-unification Berlin Mitte were not as detailed for the negotiation of plural interests needed outcomes left open in order to be truly balanced. Nevertheless, a specific perspective on social belonging correlated with this open-mindedness. While state planners envisaged a centrifugal social order with a strong centre emanating outwards and thus with social relations managed by a central authority, local citizens advocated a centripetal social order that determined policies from the margins. The social imaginary of urban centricity as discussed in post-unification Berlin made such diverging points of view visible. By planning an urban centre of (upper-)middle-class culture as Germany's "identificatory reference point", planning officers aimed to reverse the trend of the middle-class milieu moving to the suburbs. They were afraid of central Berlin turning into a socially deprived place and thus of society being permeated with social corrosion. Such potential for social corrosion was identified not only with post-socialist legacies of "miserable" East Berlin but also with "uncontrollable centres of crime" associated with "guest worker" communities in Kreuzberg or Wedding (Mayer, 2006, p.175). Significantly, the planning discourse on the Berlin city centre did not discuss migrant culture as a socio-cultural factor at all. Thus, it was excluded from cultural discourse production and was not even othered, as East Berlin's urban heritage has been by being labelled as "wastelands" and "voids" and its population as "uncultured" (Gruppe 9. Dezember, 1991, p.562; Stimmann, 1992, p.28).

Conclusion: the in- and outside of belonging

There is a house in the East Berlin district of Prenzlauer Berg whose façade is covered in large letters that read: "This house once stood in another country". Without it having moved, the world around it changed substantially. The change of systems experienced by East Berliners encompassed spatial, temporal, and social dimensions of belonging and was thus of an existential nature. While this change was promoted by the autumn protests of 1989 and thus embraced, it was the state

politics of determination pre-defining socio-economic reordering and cultural identity that thwarted *belonging by choice* in a time of structural change when senses of belonging became fluid. Such fluidity was evident in the often-voiced appreciation of open spaces, open future, and process-oriented policy styles. As the historical context of change post-unification was multidimensional, the negotiation of belonging not only – and not even primarily – concerned the former East–West divide, even when it appeared to be the primary stage of contemporary controversy in that urban reordering mainly took place in East Berlin. A key dimension of the negotiation of belonging in 1990s Berlin Mitte went beyond the binarities of East and West German socialization and rather concerned contemporary divergences between the interests of private capital and urban citizenry, the "above" and "below" of political authority and socio-economic stratification, and the "inside" and "outside" of having a say and a place in the city. In the local initiatives of the 1990s, former East and West Berliners shared values of socio-economic equality and justice in urban spaces and were similarly committed to defending the public use of urban spaces that were facing privatization. In the same spirit, the French sociologist Alain Touraine stated at the federal congress on municipal politics in Bonn 1996 that "the subject of urban rebuilding today is the royal title for a politics of exclusion" and that the opposition between "insiders and outsiders" was "the most important phenomenon today" signalling new economic inequalities and the corresponding formation of urban barriers excluding "'outsiders' living at the margins of society" (Touraine, 1996, p.26).

The heated debates on the Berlin city centre highlighted the contrasts of two divergent approaches to urban and national future and socio-economic and cultural belonging, thus turning the central urban place into an exceptional symbolic encounter space for revealing and negotiating contemporary social imaginaries. The *Planwerk Innenstadt*'s concept of an urban centre of national prestige, traditional bourgeois culture, neoliberal privatization, and social verticality was opposed by civic approaches to a public centre representing socio-economic horizontality as well as a democracy based on pluralism. While officials aimed to shape a homogeneous collective identity of unified Germany with the help of spatio-temporal politics of determination, civic approaches opted for politics of processes: politics of participation and negotiation as the only way to find common grounds for collectivity – politics of processes that were felt to have been prevented by authoritarian policies. The state politics of determination encompassed discursive (as shown in the second and third section of the chapter) and procedural methods (as illustrated in the fourth section) which shaped collective identity along the lines of normative neoliberal and conservative spatio-temporal imaginaries and which were standardized by institutional authority and ambivalent rhetoric that compromised civic involvement. By instrumentalizing concepts such as the European City or the Communicative Turn, state politicians cushioned public criticism of their planning with positive rhetorics of "integration", "reconciliation", "civic participation", and "public dialogue", while at the same time these rhetorics were undermined by contrary political practices.

Acknowledgements

The research for this chapter was part of the project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place*.

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info), which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MIUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 769478.

References

Aktionskreis Perspektive Schlossplatz (1999) *Zukunft des Schlossplatzes. 18 Ideen, Vorschläge, Visionen*. Berlin: Reader.

Anon. (1997) 'Im Schatten der hohen Häuser', *TAZ – Die Tageszeitung*, 21.4. https://taz.de/Im-Schatten-der-hohen-Haeuser/!1404233/

Anon. (2002) 'Hauskrach am Schlossplatz', *DER SPIEGEL*, 16, 14.4, p. 19.

ARCH+ (1990) *ChaosStadt*, 105/106.

ARCH+ (1994) *Von Berlin nach Neuteutonia*, 122.

Architektenkammer Berlin ed. (1997) *Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin. Eine Provokation*. Berlin: Kupijai & Prochnow.

Assmann, J. (2011) 'Communicative and cultural memory', in Meusburger, P. et al. (eds.) *Cultural Memories. The Geographical Point of View*. Heidelberg: Dordrecht, pp. 15–27.

Benhabib, S. (1991) 'Modelle des öffentlichen Raums: Hannah Arendt, die liberale Tradition und Jürgen Habermas', *Soziale Welt*, 42(2), pp. 147–165.

Binder, B. (2009) *Streitfall Stadtmitte. Der Berliner Schlossplatz*. Köln: Böhlau.

Blomeyer, G. and Milzkott, R. eds. (1990) *Zentrum Berlin: Szenarien der Entwicklung. Dokumentation*. Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Colomb, C. (2011) *Staging the New Berlin: Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Copley, C. (2020) *Nazi buildings, Cold War Traces and Governmentality in Post-unification Berlin*. London: Bloomsbury.

Fassbinder, H. (1996) 'Ein Forum für die zivile Stadtgesellschaft', in Kleger, H. et al. (eds.) *Vom Stadtforum zum Forum der Stadt*. Berlin: Fakultas, pp. 59–70.

Gruppe 9. Dezember (1991) 'Charta für die Mitte von Berlin', *StadtBauwelt*, 109, pp. 562.

Guiberneau, M. (2013) *Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity.

Habermas, J. (1995) *Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Häussermann, H. (2006) 'Public space in five social systems in Berlin', in Lenz, G. et al. (eds.) *Toward a New Metropolitanism*. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, pp. 157–170.

Healy, P. (1992) 'Planning through debate. The communicative turn in planning theory', *Town Planning Review*, 63(2), pp. 233–249.

Hermann, J. (2017) 'Stepping into the other', in Fesel, A. and Keller, Ch. (eds.) *Berlin Heartbeats. Stories from the Wild Years 1990–Present*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, pp. 16–21.

Hertweck, F. (2010) *Der Berliner Architekturstreit. Stadtbau, Architektur, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner Republik 1989–1999*. Berlin: Gbr. Mann.
Hoffmann-Axthelm, D. and Strecker, B. (1992a) *Spittelmarkt. Kritische Rekonstruktion des Bereichs*. Berlin: Senatsverwaltung.
Hoffmann-Axthelm, D. and Strecker, B. (1992b) *Städtebaulicher Strukturplan. Kritische Rekonstruktion des Bereichs: Friedrichswerder, Friedrichstadt, Dorotheenstadt*. Berlin: Senatsverwaltung.
Holtfreter, B. and Schaffelder, Ch. (1996) 'Das 'Stadtforum von unten'', in Kleger, H. et al. (eds) *Vom Stadtforum zum Forum der Stadt*. Berlin: Fakultas, pp. 143–147.
Kähler, G. ed. (1995) *Einfach schwierig. Eine deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993–1995*. Basel: Birkhäuser/Springer.
Ladd, B. (1997) *The Ghosts of Berlin. Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lampugnani, V. (1993) 'Die Provokation des Alltäglichen', *DER SPIEGEL*, 51, 19.12. pp. 142–147.
Lampugnani, V. and Mönninger, M. eds. (1991) *Berlin Morgen. Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt.* Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje.
Landesarchiv Berlin, D Rep 001–6981, Sen. resolution no. 113/91, 5 March 1991.
Landesarchiv, D Rep 001–7138, 12/40 minutes of the committee for urban development, 1 September 1993.
Landesarchiv Berlin, D Rep. 920–08 No. 35, newsletter of the 2nd Stadtforum von unten 4 December 1995.
Landesarchiv Berlin, D Rep 920–08 No. 35, 3rd Stadtforum von unten 4 March 1996 – civic participation working group.
Landesarchiv Berlin, D Rep. 920–08 No. 35, protocol of the Stadtforum von unten meeting 20 March 1996.
Landesarchiv Berlin, D Rep 001–14863, minutes of the committee for urban development meeting 19 February 1997.
Lefebvre, H. (1974/1991) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lenz, G., Ulfers, F. and Dallmann, A. eds. (2006) *Toward a New Metropolitanism. Reconstituting Public Culture, Urban Citizenship, and the Multicultural Imaginery in New York and Berlin*. Heidelberg: Winter.
Mayer, M. (2002) 'Soziales Kapital und Stadtentwicklungspolitik - ein ambivalenter Diskurs', in Haus, M. (ed.) *Bürgergesellschaft, soziales Kapital und lokale Politik*. Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, pp.33–58.
Mayer, M. (2006) 'New lines of division in Berlin', in Lenz, G. et al. (eds.) *Toward a New Metropolitanism*. Heidelberg: Winter, pp. 171–184.
Mayer M. and Strom, E. (1998) 'The New Berlin', *German Politics and Society*, 16(4), pp. 122–139.
Molnár, V. (2013) *Building the State: Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Postwar Central Europe*. London: Routledge.
Nagel, W. (1990) 'Einführung: Berlin im Umbruch', in Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen (ed.) *Kongressbericht. Erste Stadtkonferenz Berlin Planen, Bauen, Wohnen*. Berlin: Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, pp. 11–22.
Robert Havemann Archive IBIS Documents.
Sandford, R. (2019) 'Thinking with heritage: Past and present in lived futures', *Futures*, 111, pp. 71–80.

Sassen, S. (1992) *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: University Press.
Scheinschlag and TAZ – Die Tageszeitung eds. (1996) *stadt.plan.mitte*. Special supplement 17.12.
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (1996) *Dokumentation 60. Sitzung des Stadtforums Berlin am 29. November 1996*. Berlin: Koordinationsbüro.
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (1997a) *Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin – Ein erster Entwurf*. Berlin: Kulturbuchverlag.
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (1997b) *Dokumentation 65. Sitzung des Stadtforums Berlin am 26. September 1997*. Berlin: Koordinationsbüro.
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (1998) *Dokumentation 69. Sitzung des Stadtforums Berlin am 12. Juni 1998*. Berlin: Koordinationsbüro.
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (1999) *Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin. Ergebnis, Prozess, Sektorale Planungen und Werkstätten*. Berlin: Kulturbuchverlag.
Soja, E. (1996) *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*. Malden: Blackwell.
Stimmann, H. (1992) 'Redebeitrag', in Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen (ed.) *Pro Bauakademie*. Berlin: Senat, pp. 27–33.
Süß, W. ed. (1995) *Hauptstadt Berlin. 1 – Nationale Hauptstadt, europäische Metropole*. Berlin: Berlin Verlag.
Therborn, G. (2014) *Cities of Power*. London: Routledge.
Thijs, K. (2014) 'West-Berliner Visionen für eine neue Mitte', *Zeithistorische Forschungen*, 11, pp. 235–261.
Touraine, A. (1996) 'Die Stadt – Ein überholter Entwurf?', *Demokratische Gemeinde. Special supplement: Die Stadt – Ort der Gegensätze*, March, pp. 18–32.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40(3), pp. 197–214.
Zitzlsperger, U. (2021) 'Berlin: Narratives of metropolitan transition and national unity', *Journal of Urban Cultural Studies*, 8(2), pp. 187–205.
Zukin, Sh. (2003) 'Whose culture? Whose city?', in LeGates, R. T. and Stout, F. (eds.), *The City Reader*. London: Routledge, pp. 136–146.

Chapter 10

Encounters through Kahlenberg

Urban traces of transnational right-wing action

David Farrell-Banks

Introduction

To understand place, we must look outward. In 1991, Doreen Massey used a walk along Kilburn High Road, northwest London, to interrogate what "place" meant in an increasingly globally connected world. She asked: "Is it not possible for a sense of place to be progressive; not self-closing and defensive, but outward looking?" (Massey, 1991, p.24). Her writing reflected the politics of the time, with the walk introducing the reader to global politics as seen through the local. She highlights support for the Irish Free State among the local Irish community. An encounter with a shopkeeper draws attention to the Gulf War. In combination, Massey uses this juxtaposition of the local and the global to challenge our understanding of what gives a place a "sense of character". She argues that this "can only be constructed by linking that place to places beyond" (Massey, 1991, p.29). Our experience of place is always, in part, outward-looking.

What happens when a place takes on a character that is both outward-looking and, simultaneously, enclosing, defensive, and violent? This chapter takes inspiration from Massey's walk on Kilburn High Road to interrogate the construction and use of place within transnational networks of far-right political activists. The focus on the local, on a specific place, is used to connect this place and the heritage within it to places, spaces, and political actions beyond. The juxtaposition between the local and the global provides a basis for considering how we might perceive different scales of belonging (from the local to the global, or from the individual or small group to nation-state belonging). In this chapter, a single historical moment provides the analytical window through which expressions of belonging through heritage can be viewed.

Encountering 1683: theory and method

This chapter is centred on a trio of encounters with and through Kahlenberg, a hilltop village on the outskirts of Vienna where, in 1683, allied Holy Roman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth forces gathered to break the Ottoman Siege of Vienna. These are encounters with the associated heritages

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-15

of the 1683 Siege of Vienna. Echoing Massey's use of Kilburn High Road, engagement with local heritages of 1683 provides a window to a politics of belonging on a broader scale. Place is articulated here, following Massey, not as "bounded" but as at least partly "open and porous", existing as a set of moments and interactions within wider "networks of social relations" (Massey, 1994, pp.120–121). These are moments where particular ideas, experiences, and identities are constituted in relation to global dynamics beyond that particular moment.

Belonging, like place, is open and porous. It is strengthened by being at least partially grounded, if not bounded. Eckersley (2022, p.572) identifies three dimensions of belonging: "socially-located belonging", or the attachment to groups or communities; "spatially-located belonging", or attachment to place; and temporally located belonging, built on "affect and nostalgia". The uses of the past articulated in this chapter traverse these three dimensions of belonging. The "commemorative" march discussed in the following is an act that creates a sense of social belonging for those taking part. This, too, is tied to the construction of a right to belonging in a particular place (Vienna, Austria, or Europe) for an in-group. The use of heritage roots this belonging within the temporal, connecting it to a sense of ancestry and historical legitimacy. This construction of a collective memory, and the spatially and temporally rooted belonging that emerges from it, helps construct a collective identity that gives confidence in political action (Guibernau, 2013, pp.125–126).

The traces of 1683 encountered are viewed as assemblages (see Bozoğlu, 2020; Macdonald, 2013; Smith, Wetherell, and Campbell, 2018; Waterton and Dittmer, 2014) drawing attention to "the many, diverse and contesting actors, agencies and practices through which human subjects and material objects take form" (Mulcahy and Witcomb, 2018, p.216). Chidgey has adopted an "assemblage toolkit" to approach historical memory as "formed through a constellation of diverse elements" (Chidgey, 2018, p.1), where the mediation and mobilizations of those pasts become part of that constellation. In viewing the multiple heritages of historical moments as an assemblage, attention is drawn not only to individual objects or discourses, but to how multiple actors, agencies, practices, subjects, and objects exist in relation.

Each "encounter" involves interaction with different constituent parts of a heritage assemblage of 1683. This is by no means an exhaustive list of those "diverse elements" (Chidgey, 2018, p.1) of an assemblage, merely the ones that emerged through the course of a research project. Within each part of this assemblage, belonging is expressed and encouraged by different means and on different scales. In some instances, there is a concern with a purely local form of belonging, a focus on what it means to live in Vienna alongside traces of 1683. Elsewhere, the memory and heritages of 1683 are evoked to communicate a mass national (and white, European, transnational) belonging to a global target audience. While there is a diversity in scales of belonging found within these uses of the past, these acts are relationally connected through their common use in 1683.

These encounters with the heritages of 1683 took place over three weeks in Vienna in September 2018. Methodologically, the encounters take inspiration from walking ethnographies (Moretti, 2017; Ingold and Vergunst, 2008) and were in part directed by conversations with political activists and heritage stakeholders in Vienna. They are written as unique encounters with, in, and through place, with the urban environment viewed "as a conglomeration of signs" (Huyssen, 2003, p.49) to be read as a form of heritage discourse. These ethnographic methods sit alongside museum and heritage site visits and the collection of content from digital news sources, far-right blogs, and social media relating to the 1683 siege. Critical discourse, particularly following Ruth Wodak's discourse-historical approach (Wodak, 2015) and ethnographic methodologies are brought together in the assemblage toolkit of this work.

Following these encounters, the chapter outlines the globalization of the racist and nationalist sense of place created at Kahlenberg through a digitally integrated public sphere. This refers to an understanding of a public sphere where digital technologies do not exist as distinct from the non-digital world, but are communicative media integrated within that sphere. This merging of digital methodologies with ethnographic research responds to recent trends in heritage research which interrogate the interaction between "digital natives", or younger generations, and heritage sites (Bareither, 2021; see also Turunen, this volume). This reflects an understanding of public space that includes the streets and parks of Vienna and online spaces such as social media accounts (see Low and Smith, 2006). I argue that political actions rooted in a specific place are designed and performed with global, digital audiences in mind. Through the encounters presented, aspects of place become relationally connected to issues of belonging, identity, racism, European exceptionalism, and acts of extremism.

The 1683 siege of Vienna

From June to September 1683, the Ottoman army placed the city of Vienna under siege. In September, allied Holy Roman Empire forces gathered at Kahlenberg, a hilltop providing a clear vantage point of the Ottoman army and city below, before breaking the siege. The simple narrative of this moment finds it represented as a liberation of Vienna. It is also often represented as the point at which the Ottoman Empire begins a slow but terminal decline. This is an oversimplification of a complex history where a multitude of influences combined to destabilize the Ottoman Empire, including the growing strength of Western European nation-states and instability within the Ottoman economic system (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, pp.172–174). As McCarthy (1997, p.190) articulates, 1683 is better viewed as another moment in various expansions and declines of an empire that had already existed for four centuries, and that "more than 200 more years would pass before the Empire ceased to exist". For some, events following 1683 can be seen as the beginnings of a period of relative peace (Greene, 2015; Tezcan, 2012). The breaking of the siege is a moment within a complex history of the rise and

fall of various empires, nations, and influences, rather than a moment that can be summarized by a simplistic narrative of liberation (Herbjørnsrud, 2018). It is however the simple narrative of 1683 that dominates and finds traction as a symbolic moment for the far and extreme right.

On 22 July 2011, a right-wing extremist detonated a bomb in the government quarter of Oslo, Norway, before travelling to the nearby island of Utøya and opening fire on a Workers Youth League summer camp, killing 77 people across the two attacks. On 15 March 2019, a right-wing extremist attacked two mosques in the New Zealand city of Christchurch, killing 51 people. These two terrorist attacks are connected by their attackers' belief in a violent form of white supremacy. They are also connected by common reference to the 1683 Siege of Vienna. The Oslo attacker released a manifesto entitled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, the title referring to his belief that the 400th anniversary of the Siege of Vienna would mark a renewed liberation of Europe from non-white Christian populations, particularly Muslims and non-white migrants. The Christchurch attacker daubed his weaponry with the names and dates of historical figures and battles, including 1683 Vienna.

These attacks are linked by their connections to far-right groups who make potent use of the memory of the 1683 siege in their rhetoric. The ideology of the Oslo attacker was heavily influenced by a writer on the far-right blogsite *Gates of Vienna*. The tagline for the blog reads: "At the Siege of Vienna in 1683 Islam seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe. We are in a new phase of a very old war".[1] The attacker saw himself as undertaking his duty to defend Christian Europe in attacking the enemy in this mythological, non-existent war. The Christchurch terrorist had spent time in preceding years touring Europe and visiting far-right groups, including Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (Generation Identity Austria; IBÖ). The IBÖ present themselves as speaking out in defence of an Austrian *Heimat*, or sense of homeland and belonging, founded on traditional values and Christian identity. In recent years, the IBÖ have held a commemorative procession each September marking the anniversary of the breaking of the 1683 siege.

These groups are united in their conception of a clear narrative of the purpose and impact of the breaking of the 1683 siege. The breaking of the siege represented a liberation of Christian Europe, threatened by a Muslim "other". Its relevance today, for these groups, is considered in these same terms, the need to protect a European identity – viewed as distinctly white and Christian – from a threat from a Muslim and/or migrant (Muslims whether they are migrants or not, and non-white migrants whether they are Muslim or not) other. The following trio of encounters seeks to understand how these narratives are supported, or countered, in the physical landscape of Vienna and the suburbs near Kahlenberg.

Encounter one: Neubau to Kahlenberg

My first visit to Kahlenberg is meteorologically and, by now, mnemonically hazy. Even with the aid of field notes, memories of repeat visits begin to merge

into one. The tram from a flat in the Neubau district takes me along the edge of the old city centre and on, following the curve of the city canal towards the suburbs. I stop at the end of the line, in the district of Döbling. The last kilometre of the tramline runs alongside Karl-Marx-Hof, a municipal housing complex that is one of the longest single residential structures in the world. In 1934, the building provided the last barricade for anti-Fascist soldiers fighting the Austrian army. It is a building that brims with historical significance, but this is secondary to its continued purpose as a provider of social housing. I question whether the building, and the history it represents, reflect a continued presence of radical-left politics in the area. But, of course, it is simply a collection of houses, filled with political pluralities. My question, scrawled in field notes, projects my own values onto the urban landscape. In doing so I seek to find some personal, spatially located belonging through the politics of the architecture surrounding me.

A bus from here takes me through the wineries of the village-like, suburban streets of Grinzing. Rows of vines stitch the hillside together behind small rows of detached housing. The route meanders slowly upwards towards the peak at Kahlenberg. I am welcomed by a car park, a small kiosk, and a functional, cream-coloured building that houses a part of Modul University Vienna. Across the road is a church (see Figure 10.1). In any other part of the city, it would seem

Figure 10.1 The front of St Josef Church at Kahlenberg. Photograph by the author.

innocuous. Here, it feels remarkable in its placement, away from much sign of residential activity. An inscription above the front door tells of its construction in 1883:

> From these hills, on the morning of September 12, 1683, Jan III Sobieski, King of Poland, the Imperial Lieutenant General Duke Carl V Lorraine, the Churfursten Johann Georg v. Sachsen, Furst Georg Friedrich v. Waldeck, the Margraves Hermann and Ludwig Wilhelm v. Baden, and other army leaders with the troops of Emperor Leopold I, as well as with German and Polish auxiliaries, joined the battle to liberate the city of Vienna, which had been besieged by the Turkish army sixty-one days. In grateful memory of the glorious victory of the armies freeing the city of Vienna: September 12, 1883.[2]

Walking beyond the church in September 2018, I come to a viewpoint from which I can look across the entire city below. It is from here, as the inscription on the church tells us, that armies led by Jan III Sobieski broke the Ottoman Siege of Vienna. The church is one of a number of memorials across the hilltop. Two further plaques are placed on each side of the door, depicting two figures seemingly looking at each other across the doorway. On the left-hand side is a relief and inscription dedicated to Jan III Sobieski. On the right, a relief to Pope John Paul II marks his visit to the church to mark the 300th anniversary of the siege in 1983. The presentation of 1683 as a distinctly *Christian* victory is reconfirmed.

The memory of 1683 is frequently religiously mediated. So too is the form of belonging asked by this past. This religious form of mediation bridges the divide between local, national, and transnational belonging. It is simultaneously a form of heritage that can construct a divide between "us" and "them", between those that belong and those that don't (Głowacka-Grajper, Szymańska-Matusiewicz, and Wawrzyniak, this volume). In this instance, this is a heritage that suggests a Christian right to belong in Vienna, tacitly reminding us that "others" may not have a right to belong. While this is a piece of Viennese heritage, it speaks to a global "politics of belonging" (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Churches are locally rooted, within not just a city but a parish. What they represent, however, is a form of social belonging on a global scale, connected to a transnational religious community.

Set back in the main square behind the viewpoint I find an empty plinth with a plaque to Jan III Sobieski. In this case, it is a plinth for a memorial that will not be completed. The sculpture designed for this location depicts Sobieski on horseback, carrying a mace in his extended right hand. He is shown leading a charge of horses, the design clearly seeking to capture movement and energy, as Sobieski leads the Polish Hussars into battle. The sense of movement is completed by the enlarged wings, a feature of the hussars' clothing, on the backs of the soldiers. Having initially approved the statue, the Viennese government later revoked permission for the installation of the statue. The decision became a touchstone for far-right groups in Austria, accusing the local government of censoring the past. The story found traction globally through online news outlets,

such as the American-based far-right Breitbart News and central European right-wing news site Remix News, who viewed this as a sign of the attack on 'the Christian identity' of Europe. The Remix article sets this connection to European identity in the opening line: "King John III Sobieski is not only known as the savior of Vienna but also the savior of Europe" (Solidarność, 2019). The decision to withdraw permission for the statue is, entirely conjecturally, portrayed as being taken by a "leftist" mayor who may fear the reaction of the Muslim population of Vienna. No evidence is given for this assertion, but the connections between European and Christian identity and the heritage of the 1683 siege are reasserted.

The empty plinth exists now as a memorial to ongoing conflict, an empty space that becomes a complex *lieu de mémoire* (Nora, 1989), evoking different mnemonic responses by both what remains (the plinth) and what is absent (the statue). These become potent signifiers of political viewpoints for those who wish to read them. In the absence of the statue, the plinth ignites tensions that the very absence of a statue was intended to prevent. A local political decision to deny permission for the statue's installation is mobilized by right-wing and far-right commentators globally, within that digitally integrated public sphere, to reinforce an idea of exclusionary European belonging. Heritage becomes a tool, for these groups, to bridge the gap between local and globally connected belonging. The simple narrative of the 1683 siege is as a moment of liberation for Europe. This feature of the simplified narrative of 1683 is mobilized by far-right actors globally, where local council decisions, such as that regarding the Sobieski statue, are portrayed as an attack on European identity. A single feature of a complex, ambiguous heritage becomes the tool through which a local narrative takes on global significance.

Encounter 2: Kahlenberg interrupted

The following night, the hilltop of Kahlenberg trades a handful of tourists for a few hundred far-right protestors with flaming torches, vocally contesting their right to both Kahlenberg as a place and, by extension to speak for the heritage of this place. They are here to commemorate the breaking of the Siege of Vienna in 1683. They are here, according to their website, to liberate Vienna once more.

Visually, this protest march shares many of the common signifiers of far-right marches globally in recent years. The carrying of flaming torches might bring to mind scenes from the "Unite the Right" march in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017**,** where American far-right groups carried torches while chanting Nazi slogans such as "blood and soil" (Wagner, 2017). Those marching also carry banners and flags. Some depict key figures from the breaking of the 1683 siege, including Jan III Sobieski. Some figures, such as Capuchin friar Marco D'Aviano, who fought at the breaking of the siege, are shown holding a Christian cross aloft. Other protestors carry the Viennese flag – two horizontal bars, red and white, with a coat of arms (red shield with a white cross) in the centre. Christian iconography dominates.

The visual construction of the march speaks to a clear conception of legitimate Viennese identity, and by extension Austrian and European identity. These symbols communicate different scales of belonging to different audiences. Viennese emblems communicate directly to a local audience, articulating a sense of Viennese identity as white and Christian. Simultaneously, the mobilization of this heritage to a transnational, far-right audience constructs that same white, Christian identity as a signifier of a globally superior group, legitimizing racist and xenophobic views across different contexts. The online promotional discourse surrounding the march further suggests that this white, Christian identity is under threat. While the march itself is titled Gedenken 1683 (Commemorate 1683), it is spearheaded by the IBÖ, an organization whose political goals include support for "remigration" (or ethnonationalism) and the protection of "traditional values", with these values closely tied to a Christian European identity. In the ephemera of the march itself, the threat to this identity is never made clear, as the march seeks to maintain its supposed legitimacy as a commemorative event rather than a political protest. However, the combination of the language of "liberation" and the broader connection to the political ideal of the IBÖ and the global identitarian movement mobilizes what Wodak (2015) would term a "topos of threat", an argumentation scheme where a potential danger is constructed to argue for a particular action in response. In this instance, the suggested action is made clear within the subtext of the language of "liberation". It suggests the need to liberate Vienna (or Europe) from the threat of a non-white, Christian "other".

This march has become an annual event. Images of previous actions show further evidence of careful curation of the visual identity of each action. Despite the event being dominated by young men, one image posted on the organizer's social media accounts shows a row of young women at the front. There is a deliberate public presentation of gender roles through this act, one that echoes an increasing use of gender among far-right groups across Europe (Merino, Capelos, and Kinnvall, 2021; Mayer, 2015). This action, too, speaks to how an event that is clearly defined by its occurrence in this specific landscape, within the boundaries of Kahlenberg as a place, is concerned with an audience far beyond the roots of this place. These far-right groups have a clear sense of place that, to borrow once more from Massey, is outward-looking. The collective, affective belonging created within the group taking part in the march serves a purpose at the event, but attention is also given to constructing belonging on a global scale, communicated digitally through far-right networks. Heritage, here, provides the location and legitimacy for a local march with a global reach.

Encounter 3: challenging simple narratives in Währing, Döbling, and Kahlenberg

This final encounter with Kahlenberg, and through the distributed heritage of the 1683 siege, takes place two weeks after my initial visit. Conversations with local

academics and activists have allowed me to map a route through a number of locations, each of which brings 1683 into the present. The walk takes sites of Ottoman heritage identified by researchers at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften; OAW, 2010). These sites of heritage and memory range from the mundane to the elaborate. The walk speaks to the depth of the presence of 1683 in the lived urban landscape. This is a moment that is distributed across Vienna, in a manner which consistently and publicly reinforces the siege mythology.

I begin in Währing, the eighteenth district of Vienna. Public parks and the presence of a forest just to the northwest give the area a sense of openness. The majority of streets running on a north–south axis provide a clear view of the hill rising up to Kahlenberg just beyond the city edge. I am here to go to church.

Construction on the Weinhaus Church began in the 1880s, marking the two-hundredth anniversary of the 1683 siege. The project was spearheaded by Joseph Deckert, a priest known for his anti-Semitism. The church stood, in part, as a physical reminder that the history of 1683 could be adopted to stoke opposition to a new "other", in this instance the Jewish communities of Vienna. This is just one in a long history of the 1683 siege being used as a touchstone to foment opposition to "the Turks of the day" (OAW, 2010), referring to any group which becomes the demonized "other", whether that is Jewish people, political opposition, or, more recently, Muslim and migrant populations. Deckert was a "hardcore anti-Semite", with this church standing as a memorial to his "passionate labor" – preaching anti-Semitic hatred (Adler, 2016).

This place is a challenging reminder of the power and influence that racism can exert and of the potential for religious heritage to create an "us/them" divide (Głowacka-Grajper, Szymańska-Matusiewicz, and Wawrzyniak, this volume). The church is no small feature in the urban landscape. The steepled front rises above the four-storey buildings which surround it. It seeks to impart a far greater impact on the landscape, and on the visitor, than the church visited on the hilltop at Kahlenberg. The building asserts itself on the surroundings. The built heritage that emerges in apparent commemoration of the 1683 siege is not simply there to commemorate. It is there to engage in a politically motivated act of past-presencing (Macdonald, 2013), where the past is brought into relevance in the present through representation in heritage discourse. Here, a particular past was dragged into the centre of public view through the construction of the church for a clear purpose: to preach anti-Semitic hatred.

Beginning the journey here also challenges my own perceptions of the role of this heritage. As outlined by Adler (2016), from 2012 to 2014 the Church engaged in an active reflection on its past. One result was the installation of five plaques on the front of the Church which make clear the past role of the church in spreading anti-Semitism. These were unveiled in 2014 to mark the 125th anniversary of the competition of the building. On my visit in 2018, literature in the entrance to the church included adverts for interfaith dialogue events, echoing a continued commitment to opposing anti-Semitism in the present.

In his account of the participatory work that culminated in the creation of these plaques, Adler offers a quote from Father Zitta, the priest of the church. Fr Zitta recounts his experience of the ceremony that accompanied the plaques' unveiling, and a sense of "relief" at finally being "able to speak about all these things, naming them in clear words" after so many years. There is a sense of a clear affective response to confronting the past. Fr Zitta goes on the say that "only at this very place such a 'reformation', such a purge could take place – it had to take place [at the church]" (Zitta, cited in Adler, 2016, p.245).

There is a recognition in Fr Zitta's comments that the built heritage of pasts often used to divide can, through careful engagement, become places of healing (see Reid, 2021; Wergin, 2021; Giblin, 2014). There is a sense that place, again, matters. "Only at this very place" could this act of healing occur. The issues Fr Zitta discusses, such as deep histories of anti-Semitism and division, are global concerns with impacts distributed well beyond the specific site of this church. Despite this, there is a sense that this clear past of anti-Semitism provides this place with the affordance to confront these divisions. What was previously built heritage discursively communicating a limited, exclusionary belonging becomes a heritage that can foster inclusivity across religious divides. It suggests a recognition of the need for belonging to have a spatial dimension, as it is through *place* that healing and connection can occur. These reflections draw us to the negotiation of scales of belonging, in this instance from the global to the local. Racism and anti-Semitism, both past and present, are not merely local issues, they are globally connected, as we saw in the digital distribution of the Gedenken 1683 march. Here, the traces of these global issues within the heritage of the church allow for a renegotiation of identity and belonging on a local level. It is a tool for interfaith dialogue, connectivity, and the potential to create a sense of belonging where previously there may have only been exclusion.

From the Weinhaus Church, I walk west, following the curve of the main road through Währing, to a bakery. Café-Bäckerei "Zum Türkenloch" (see Figure 10.2) not only nods to the Ottoman and 1683 siege heritage in the area through its name but reinforces this connection on its side wall. A mural depicts the hillsides on the edge of Vienna during the breaking of the siege, with forces on horseback coming down the hill to attack Ottoman armies. The position of the mural seems to offer a window into the past through the side of this building, a reminder of what has come before.

I am drawn to the contrast between this bakery and the church. A church provides a clear site of history and heritage, in some form. For a long time, the Weinhaus Church sought to ignore a significant, divisive part of its history. The architecture of the place demanded attention, but efforts were made to silence its own past. In their work on "museal silence", Mason and Sayner have identified different forms of silence that become present in museum collections, including "museums' collusion in society's silences" (2019, p.9). The difficult heritage of the Weinhaus Church was silenced for a number of years, arguably reflecting a societal silence on racism. The grand architecture of the church is countered by

Figure 10.2 A mural depicting the 1683 siege of Vienna on the side of Café-Bäckerei "Zum Türkenloch". Photograph by the author.

this sense of relegating the connection to 1683 to the quiet, the unseen unless you seek it. The bakery, conversely, conveys a sense of countering the banal, forcing this history into public consciousness. As much as a church can project an idea of who may or may not belong, so too can this mural.

The mural reflects a simple narrative of the siege, of an oppressor and a liberator, where the liberation of Vienna by Christian forces is to be celebrated as integral to Viennese, Austrian, and European identity. This narrative is reflected in museums in the city. The Wien Museum – Karlsplatz tells the story of the 1683 siege by way of a painting not dissimilar to this mural, and a small selection of Ottoman loot. The story of the 1683 defeat of the Ottomans immediately makes way, in the visitors' progression through the museum, for the onset of the enlightenment in Europe. At the Military History Museum, a series of grand portraits of Austrian leaders peer across a captured Ottoman military tent. The nuances of the rise and fall of empires, and of decades of trade and movement between Austria and the Ottoman Empire do not make it into the museum display. So far, neither do they make it out into the heritage of 1683 in these suburbs.

From here, I turn back on myself to walk towards the entrance of Türkenschanzpark. This park sits across the apparent remains of trenches from the 1683 siege, the contours of the land speaking of this past. Now, it is a sprawling park with ponds, fountains and statues dotted amongst paths that curve through

the greenery, encouraging you to get lost among the landscape until you find yourself back where you started. There is little initial sign across the bulk of the park of the heritage of the place, beyond the name. Statues commemorate playwrights (Arthur Schnitzler) rather than army generals.

The statue of a Cossack soldier offers one clear link to the heritage of 1683. The figure has a crescent sword and a musket and is depicted relaxing, smoking a pipe. The statue was commissioned in 2003 by the Ukrainian Embassy, supported by the district council, and marked the 320th anniversary of the breaking of the siege. The accompanying inscription reads: "In memory of the Ukrainian Cossacks, the co-liberators of Vienna", pointing to a transnational memory culture around the 1683 siege. The messiness of the expansion and decline of various empires in the 1600s is reduced to a simple narrative of occupation and liberator. The language of liberation, of protection and delivery from the threat of an unwanted "other", echoes that used in the far-right commemoration of 1683. The commemorative heritage discourse of 1683 constructs a narrative that has found easy use in service of the racist politics of belonging of the far-right. That transnational memory culture, then, is one predominantly focused on an "us/them" division and a politics of inclusion/exclusion.

On the northern edge of the park, close to an entrance, I arrive at a fountain. This is a rare encroachment on the singular narrative of 1683. The Türkischer Brunnen (Turkish Fountain; Figure 10.3), sometimes also called the Yunus Emre

Figure 10.3 The Türkischer Brunnen in Türkenschanzpark. Photograph by the author.

Fountain, sits in the park as a marker of friendship between Vienna and Turkey. The fountain is inscribed with excerpts from the poetry of Yunus Emre, the thirteenth–fourteenth-century Turkish poet. These excerpts appear in both German and Turkish and are complemented by a short inscription from the Koran, also presented in both German and Turkish. Elsewhere, the memory of 1683 is used almost exclusively to assert a Christian identity for Western Europe. It is a memory marked on churches and through the visit of Pope John Paul II. This inclusion of words from the Koran marks a subtle break in the memory cultures around 1683. The chosen verse, "we created every living thing from water", speaks to an equality that stands against a history of conflict. As with the interfaith work of the Weinhaus Church, this fountain breaks a heritage silence where simplistic narratives of 1683 are unchallenged. Here, this same history is used as a means of fostering belonging across religious divides. Again, global aspects of religious belonging – expressed in this instance through the use of multiple languages and words from the Koran – allow for counter-narratives of interfaith belonging to be developed.

It is from here that I continue my walk towards Kahlenberg, snaking up the same hillside as before. The fountain at Türkenschanzpark acts as a reminder that memory cultures need not be fixed, and that singular narratives around the past can be challenged. The simplistic narrative and use of 1683 in political discourse *are* challenged in the physical landscape of Vienna, through markers like this fountain, or the interfaith dialogue work of the Weinhaus Church. However, the predominant narrative of 1683 that emerges through encounters with these places speaks largely to that same narrative of repelling a Turkish threat, the same narrative that allows this moment to be used so potently by far-right political actors. It is the *topos of threat* writ large in the Vienna landscape. It is a narrative that seeps into the heritage of the city beyond these suburbs. It is reflected in the statue on the side of St Stephen's Cathedral – the grand Cathedral in the centre of Vienna – depicting a Christian saint standing above the murdered bodies of enemies. It is reflected in the banal presence of the Julius Meinl coffee logo across the city, showing the silhouette of a boy in a fez in a commercialization of the "oriental" as exotic (Said, 1978). These are heritages found within place, but their influence filters beyond place, into the spaces of political action globally.

Connected belonging in a digitally integrated public sphere

Place matters. The encounters presented above have demonstrated the construction of belonging *in* place. Belonging, too, is constructed *through* and *beyond* place. This reinforces the notion that belonging "transcends the bounds of place" while remaining "deeply connected to place" (Eckersley, 2022, p.579). At its most potent and wide reaching, a spatial dimension of belonging uses social and temporal connections to connect with groups on a scale beyond the edges of a

particular place. It is in specific places that physical heritages reinforce particular identities and construct particular belongings. The use of the 1683 siege in political discourse has proved a powerful tool for far-right groups globally. My own encounters with Kahlenberg also speak to an outward-looking, global significance of 1683. The aforementioned encounters brought contact, through Kahlenberg, with Oslo, Christchurch, Krakow, and Turkey. These are merely a fragment of the connections that emerge through the assemblage of 1683 memory. Some of these connections occur almost by chance, while others are sought out. For the IBÖ members marching at Kahlenberg to "commemorate" the 1683 siege, the march represents a performative action that is concerned with global audiences. Through a performance of local group identity and belonging, the small collective marching at Kahlenberg asserts their legitimate belonging on a more substantial scale, as part of global far-right networks.

This form of political performativity can be understood as connective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), where digital media and connectivity become an integral part of any action. While the action is globally connected, the legitimacy of the action is found through a connection to the past provided by Kahlenberg and the surrounding heritage as a particular form of public place. The signifiers of 1683 that exist in place then become discursive tools in the presentation of a particular vision of European identity and, by extension, the right to belong in Europe. References to historical moments within the landscape offer a discursive connection to those pasts. Ruth Wodak (2015) identifies such discursive uses of the past within political discourse as the "*topos* of history". This argumentation scheme operates as follows: an action had "beneficial/terrible consequences in the past" and so to demonstrate learning from this past action, a particular action should take place in the present to achieve a desired goal (Wodak, 2015, p.40). For far-right groups who make discursive use of the 1683 siege, the argument is as follows: the actions of those who broke the 1683 siege protected Europe, and European identity, from a threat from an "other" (conveniently presented as a Muslim other). Indeed, this is how the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) have made potent use of the memory of 1683 in election campaigning (Wodak and Forchtner, 2014; Sauer and Ajanovic, 2016). Through commemorating this past, they reiterate an apparent need to protect Europe, and European identity, from an equal threat in the present.

The presence of traces of the 1683 siege in the place of their political actions matters here, as these groups show that they, as I sought to as a researcher, read parts of the urban environment as a collection of signs. These politically charged signifiers are used to reflect and reinforce the legitimacy of their political viewpoint and actions. The features of the place itself become as important to their political discourse as any written material. Through a physical presence, an occupation of place, the notion of being the legitimate descendants of Jan III Sobieski and the armies who broke the siege is given added weight. It is this power of place that makes it particularly relevant in a digitally integrated public sphere of far-right politics.

When the legitimacy of a group's actions is discursively founded on the understanding of a particular historical moment, mobilizing actions in a place that is teeming with signs of this moment holds significant power. While there has been a focus on the role of digital media in fuelling the success of right-wing authoritarians globally (Fuchs, 2018), the commemorative actions at Kahlenberg speak to the importance of the non-digital and digital acting in combination as assemblages of public places and spaces. This is not a distinctive feature of digital technologies, but rather a development of the manner in which memory and political discourse are mediated between place and the spaces beyond. As Joss Hands argues, "we are always already 'post-human'" (2019). Or, in other words, human existence and action are already always tied to the technologies we use. What changes, according to Hands, is the scale and capacity of those technologies. Through the above encounters, the capacities of a digitally integrated public sphere emerge, with action rooted in place mobilized at rapid speeds to audiences worldwide. Global networks of the far and extreme right are targeted in the online presentation of material from the IBÖ, but this digital material is rooted in action in place. The performance of belonging within a particular place, on a local scale, is a necessary act in developing that belonging on a larger, international scale.

Through this form of use of the past, these far-right groups mobilize the physical heritage surrounding them in the service of constructing belonging on multiple scales. Montserrat Guibernau (2013) has powerfully detailed the role that group belonging continues to play in the mobilization of people to political action. Guibernau outlines five dimensions on which collective belonging is built, including a historical dimension founded on a sense of a deep past and shared ancestry. Commemorating the 1683 siege seeks to discursively reinforce a link between those far-right groups in the present and those described as past "liberators" of Vienna. They present themselves as protectors of what they view as the legitimate, historical identity of Europe. Through building this connection with the past, the groups enforce their own sense of group belonging on a local level. They present themselves as the descendants of the "liberators" of Vienna, with a duty to do the same in the present (Wodak and Forchtner, 2014). Simultaneously, this right to belong is communicated to ever broader groups. It is extended to communicate a belief in what it means to be legitimately Austrian and European (see Farrell-Banks, 2021). Beyond this, there is the communication of a shared belonging with transnational far-right groups beyond the borders of Austria and/or Europe. Through the heritage of Kahlenberg, of one place and its surrounding physical heritage of a particular historical moment, transnational identities and perceptions of belonging are constructed. This place is, to return to Massey's question from the outset of this chapter, inward- as well as outward-looking.

Counterpoint

When walking through these parts of Vienna with the intention of exploring the heritage of 1683, one can read the signs of its presence incredibly frequently. In

the majority, these heritages do not offer any counter to the simplistic narrative of 1683 as a moment of Western European liberation. These are the narratives that find power in far-right discourse. This is a form of discourse that makes use of this heritage to construct a sense of belonging in Europe that is not only opposed to cultural diversity, but actively racist and violent. European identity is reduced, enclosed and only opened to white, Christian in-groups, with all others rejected and excluded. In seeking to read the city through a series of signs, as in the aforementioned encounters, and seeking to understand the heritage as communicating to a global sense of place, it is these transnational networks of racism and exclusion that find prominence. This questions our interactions with the heritages that exist in our urban landscapes. Seemingly banal heritages can carry narratives of white European exceptionalism that find potency among the far-right.

However, this is not to suggest that counter-narratives that reflect the messiness of 1683 and interactions between Vienna and the Ottoman Empire are not existent or possible. The heritages of 1683 are multiple and they are contested. The intercultural dialogue at the Weinhaus Church and the Türkischer Brunnen offers a reminder that heritages historically present as signifiers of division and racism can be used to foster dialogue, healing, and a recognition of diversity. Through the countering of a dominant narrative, a moment that seemingly speaks to a particular form of exclusionary belonging can find power in speaking to a collective belonging across those previously constructed boundaries. This, however, does not filter into the dominant narrative of 1683. These counter-narratives are focused on belonging predominantly on a local level (for example, in speaking to visitors to the Weinhaus Church). How, we might ask, can these find greater expression in the everyday heritage of an urban environment to such a degree that they too can foster belonging on a greater scale? How can we articulate a more open conception of what it means to "belong" in Europe through that same urban environment? When we find a place to be outward-looking, but in the service of a politics of fear and division, we are challenged to find methods to bring counter-narratives of these pasts to positions of greater prominence in the service of a more progressive politics of belonging.

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by a Newcastle University Research Excellence Academy doctoral studentship. Thanks to my supervisory team, Prof Chris Whitehead, Dr Darren Kelsey, and Dr Areti Galani.

Notes

1 This chapter refers to content produced by far-right groups. An ethical choice has been made to not provide direct reference to this material.
2 Author's translation of the original German.

References

Adler, T. (2016) 'Why I started visiting a church regularly', in Milevska, S. (ed.) *On Productive Shame, Reconciliation and Agency*. Berlin: Sternberg Press.

Bareither, C. (2021) 'Difficult heritage and digital media: "Selfie culture" and emotional practices at the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 27(1), pp. 57–72.

Bennett, W. L. and Segerberg, A. (2013) *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bozoğlu, G. (2020) *Museums, Emotion, and Memory Culture: The Politics of the Past in Turkey*. London: Routledge.

Chidgey, R. (2018) *Feminist Afterlives: Assemblage Memory in Activist Times*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeit', M. Sabrow and A. Saupe (eds.) *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.

Farrell-Banks, D. (2021) 'Crossing borders and building walls in right-wing uses of the past', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures*, 30(1), pp. 104–113.

Fuchs, C. (2018) *Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of Trump and Twitter*. London: Pluto.

Giblin, J.D. (2014) 'Post-conflict heritage: Symbolic healing and cultural renewal', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 20(5), pp. 500–518.

Greene, M. (2015) *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: The Ottoman Empire*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Guibernau, M. (2013) *Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity.

Hands, J. (2019) *Gadget Consciousness: Collective Thought, Will and Action in the Age of Social Media*. London: Pluto Press.

Herbjørnsrud, D. (2018) 'The real battle of Vienna', *Aeon*. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/the-battle-of-vienna-was-not-a-fight-between-cross-and-crescent (Accessed: 5 September 2021).

Huyssen, A. (2003) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ingold, T. and Vergunst, J.L. (2008) (eds.) *Ways of Walking: Ethnography and Practice on Foot*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Low, S. and Smith, N. (2006) *The Politics of Public Space*. London: Routledge.

Macdonald, S. (2013) *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today*. London: Routledge.

Mason, R., and Sayner, J. (2019) 'Bringing museal silence into focus: Eight ways of thinking about silence in museums', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(1), pp. 5–20.

Massey, D. (1991) 'A global sense of place', *Marxism Today*, June, pp. 24–29.

Massey, D. (1994) *Space, Place and Gender*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mayer, N. (2015) 'The closing of the radical right gender gap in France?' *French Politics*, 13(4), pp. 391–414.

McCarthy, J. (1997) *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.

Merino, P.K., Capelos, T. and Kinnvall, C. (2021) 'Getting inside the head of the far right: Psychological responses to the socio-political context', in Ashe, S.D., Busher,

J., Macklin, G. and Winter, A. (eds.) *Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 74–91.

Mulcahy, D. and Witcomb, A. (2018) 'Affective practices of learning at the museum: Children's critical encounters with the past', in Smith, L., Wetherell, M. and Campbell, G. (eds) *Emotion, Affective Practices and the Past in the Present*. London: Routledge, pp. 213–229.

Moretti, C. (2017) 'Walking', in Elliott, D. and Culhane, D. (eds.), *A Different Kind of Ethnography: Imaginative Practices and Creative Methodologies*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 91–122.

Nora, P. (1989) 'Between memory and history: Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Representations*, 26, pp. 7–24.

OAW (2010) *Turkengedaechtnis*. Available at: https://www.oeaw.ac.at/tuerkengedaechtnis/ (Accessed: 5 September 2021).

Reid, A. (2021) 'Heritage, reconciliation and cross-border cooperation in cyprus', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures*, 30(1), pp. 144–152.

Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.

Sauer, B. and Ajanovic, E. (2016) 'Hegemonic discourses of difference and inequality: Right-wing organisations in Austria', in Lazaridis, G., Benveniste, A. and Campani, G. (eds) *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering'*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 81–108.

Shaw, S. J. and Shaw, E. K. (1977) *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, L., Wetherell, M. and Campbell, G. (eds) (2018) *Emotion, Affective Practices and the Past in the Present*. London: Routledge.

Solidarność, T. (2019) 'Battle of Vienna: Left-wing mayor rejects statue of polish king who saved city', *Remix News*, 18 November, Available at: https://rmx.news/article/vienna-doesnt-want-its-savior/ (Accessed: 26 February 2022).

Tezcan, B. (2012) *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wagner, M. (2017) '"Blood and soil": Protestors chant Nazi slogan in Charlottesville', CNN, August 12. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-unite-the-right-rally/index.html (Accessed: 5 September 2021).

Waterton, E. and Dittmer, J. (2014) 'The museum as assemblage: Bringing forth affect at the Australian war memorial', *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 29(2), pp. 122–139.

Wergin, C. (2021) 'Healing through heritage? The repatriation of human remains from European collections as potential sites of reconciliation', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures*, 30(1), pp. 123–133.

Wodak, R. (2015) *The Politics of Fear: What Right-wing Populist Discourses Mean*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. and Forchtner, B. (2014) 'Embattled Vienna 1683/2010: Right-wing populism, collective memory and the fictionalisation of politics', *Communication*, 13(2), pp. 231–255.

Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006) 'Belonging and the politics of belonging', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 40(3), pp. 197–214.

Chapter 11

Staged claims of belonging

English museums, Brexit, and the "Windrush Scandal"

Helen Mears

Introduction

This chapter considers how the "social turn" in museum practice has created opportunities for museum engagements with belonging, not least to demonstrate the social utility of such organizations. The expectation that, as public institutions, museums should fulfil a social purpose has become a distinctive feature of scholarship on museums (see, for example, Watson, 2007; Crooke, 2007; Modest and Golding, 2013), some of which has considered this function an extension of their historical development as a form of governmental technology (Bennett, 1995). Other authors have documented the extent to which UK museums specifically have been subject to increasing policy pressures, including to promote social inclusion and community cohesion (Tlili, 2008; Gray, 2016). Alongside literature which has recorded and, often, applauded the efforts of museums to become more socially engaged (Sandell, 2002) has emerged a critique of these practices which has found them often performative and motivated by self-interest rather than a genuine concern with power change (Lynch, 2011).

In the UK, the pressure for museums to demonstrate their value to society has come from various directions – national and local governmental policy (Tlili, 2008) and Museum Studies scholarship, but also sectoral initiatives (Museums Association, 2013; Paul Hamlyn Foundation, n.d.) and the personal motivations of museum workers – and has likewise been responded to by different institutions in different ways. In many cases, these responses have connected to issues of belonging, for example through museum work with marginalized communities or individuals of insecure citizenship status (for example asylum-seekers and refugees), although the explicit intersection of this work with belonging has been rarely addressed (Mears and Eckersley, 2022). This chapter seeks to contribute to understandings of how museums engage with issues of belonging through a focus on display initiatives developed by two institutions which addressed contested accounts of belonging. Both initiatives were informed by socially oriented policy frameworks and, in my discussion of these, I reflect on how these displays reflected tensions between policy and practice.

If UK museums have the potential to be *Centres for Social Change*, as a UK government-commissioned report urged (DCMS, 2000), then arguably their

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-16

engagements with issues of belonging come at a critical time. Commentators have suggested that the UK population is in the grip of a "crisis of belonging" (Alexander, 2019; Nicol, 2020). Even before the COVID-19 pandemic and Black Lives Matter campaigners exposed entrenched divisions between different parts of UK society (see Turunen, this volume), the 2015 European "migration crisis", the 2016 referendum on EU membership, and the so-called "Windrush Scandal" had already revealed deep social and political fracture lines. The latter two developments, in particular, have highlighted the precarity of belonging; as those who may have presumed or felt national belonging (EU citizens living in the UK; long-term UK residents born in the Caribbean) have had the "fact" of their citizenship questioned or refuted. This chapter considers how museums have interceded in public discourse around belonging in relation to these developments, and the opportunities and limitations presented by this work.

It begins with a brief outline of the changing contexts for museum practice in England, away from being publicly funded didactic institutions towards a sector which is increasingly policy-oriented, commercially minded, and socially instrumentalist. Museums today have to fulfil multiple agendas and navigate competing accountabilities, in which accountability to funders and a broadly constituted public generally outweighs the claims of specific constituencies. In terms of social agendas, they are caught between national government policy and local policy priorities, as well as the professional concerns of the sector and the individual interests and motivations of staff and visitors. Here I consider how these pressures influence the space available for museum engagements with belonging by tracking the evolution and reception of two specific museum display projects. In doing so, I argue that while socially instrumentalist agendas push museums towards engagements with belonging, the multiple accountabilities they carry ensure that these engagements are invariably tokenistic and fail to meaningfully engage with the structural inequalities that they describe.

Competing accountabilities and the consequences for museum engagements with belonging

In 2007, writing on the impact of public policy on museums, Caroline Lang, John Reeve, and Vicky Wollard observed:

> The relationship of the government, national and local, with its cultural institutions largely determines their function within the community and the type of service they deliver. Governments may see the role of museums in a variety of ways: as primarily representing a desirable identity for the nation; operating as a public space owned by the wider community; as an instrumental tool for social, economic and educational advancement; and so on.
>
> (2007, p.20)

Vikki McCall (2016) has observed that many UK museums find that they are expected to fulfil all of these roles: to promote national, regional, or local identities, to provide a democratic space for the expression of diverse identity claims, and to promote learning and social inclusion. Furthermore, as Anwar Tlili notes in the context of shrinking public investment in culture, alongside their "public-oriented and … social policy roles and objectives", museums are also today expected to develop new income streams and, correspondingly, "an organisational culture of business-type performance management" (2010, p.3). What outcomes must be reported and to whom has become an area of increasing complexity.

In terms of their role in delivering social policy, museums are subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting agendas (McCall, 2016). Policy drivers may be national government, local government, sectoral support organizations, other funding bodies, and public expectation, all of which are then interpreted and acted upon by individual agents working within the organization (Gray, 2016). These multiple stakeholders matter when it comes to determining to whom the organization is accountable. As Nuala Morse has shown, in today's museums "multiple interests, discourses and logics contend for authority and influence" (2018, p.174) and, in this context, *upwards* accountability (towards providers of governance and funding) tends to be privileged over "downwards and direct relations with participants/communities, since those who make decisions in museums are nearly always those who are situated in upwards forms of accountability" (2018, p.179). These lines of accountability are further complicated by a lack of clarity around who exactly museums are *for*. As Helen Graham has emphasized (2017), while the expectation remains that museums, as public institutions, exist to promote the public good, exactly who constitutes the public for whom museums act "on behalf of", is rarely formulated or critically interrogated. These issues have implications for museum engagements with belonging, as the prioritizing of museum accountabilities *upwards* (towards governance and funding structures) and *outwards* (towards a generalized "public") leaves little space to attend to the claims made by the specific constituencies with which an institution might work.

These diffuse accountabilities also bolster an invented distinction between *us* (museum staff and an imagined public) and *them* (the "other" people who might be featured within museums). In this respect, museums present carefully managed encounters between *us* and *others*, in which the claims of diverse constituencies are made visible but rarely seriously engaged with (Lynch, 2011; see also Eckersley, this volume). The idea of a "managed encounter" finds resonance in the critique Anthias has constructed (2011, 2013) of diversity discourses. These she identifies as reductive, generating fixed, apparently homogeneous group identities and essentializing some aspects of difference while ignoring the structural factors which produce discrimination on the basis of this putative difference (2013). In her challenge to these discourses, which she sees as strategies for managing and containing difference, Anthias describes the use of "compensatory mechanisms" (2013, p.324) which offer a politics of recognition as a substitute for

material redistribution. This idea of a "politics of recognition" has clear resonance for museums and their engagements with marginalized communities and builds on established understandings of museums' contribution to statecraft.

In seeing English museums as compensatory mechanisms, displays which relate to constituencies negatively affected by recent crises of belonging thus become gestures of symbolic reparation, and this chapter also draws on work which discusses the shortcomings of these in the context of human rights violations and international law. In particular, it considers the observation made by Greeley et al. that symbolic reparations often fail against their ambition to "integrate memorial practices into multi-layered strategies for justice and social reconciliation" (2020, p.165) by failing to centre the experiences of those affected, foregrounding "official claims upon the past that function to contain, fix and secure history in the state's image" (2020, p.173), creating reductive historical accounts which reproduce familiar stereotypes, and isolating, decontextualizing, and containing contested accounts (see also Turunen, this volume). In conclusion, the chapter advocates for the development of practices which centre on the experiences and claims of marginalized communities and – in seeing the organization as directly accountable to the community – use its agency to highlight and dismantle the structural factors which produce this marginalization.

Researching belonging in English museums

In considering museum engagements with belonging, the chapter focuses on two display initiatives: one at a local government-funded museum in Canterbury and the other at a university museum in Oxford. Both sought to respond to recent crises of belonging: in Canterbury to the divisive 2016 referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union and, in Oxford, to the so-called "Windrush Scandal", which saw British citizens from commonwealth countries forced to prove their right to work, receive medical care, and even reside in Britain, or risk deportation, and which reached peak public profile in 2018. Both displays were motivated by socially oriented policy frameworks, raised questions about citizenship, identity, and belonging in Britain, and stimulated critical reflection on the interconnections between the nation's past and present and the relationships it holds with other geopolitical entities; however, the form taken by each organization differed significantly. While both outcomes centred on a single display case, The Beaney House of Art and Knowledge in Canterbury took an object-based approach, using museum objects as the basis of a "conversation" about the implications of Brexit. In contrast, the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford commissioned an art installation to make connections between the experiences of the Windrush Generation and the long histories of slavery and empire. Both displays made limited use of accompanying textual interpretation (a short introductory text panel was produced for both, with further label texts produced for individual items in the *Brexit at The Beaney* display).

Research into these displays, which sought to identify the drivers for their evolution as well as the visitor responses they elicited, was undertaken in 2020 and 2021, via site visits and semi-structured online interviews with individuals involved in the initiatives. As the Ashmolean Museum project sought to include a participatory element and was part of a wider programme of events commemorating Windrush Day, the six interviewees consisted of an independent historian, one of the commissioned artists, three museum staff members, and an arts worker. As the project at The Beaney was smaller in scope, involving just museum staff, three staff members were interviewed, including the head of service.

As noted earlier, the public to whom museums see themselves as accountable is often constituted in broad, unspecified terms. An important factor in considering the impact of these museum interventions into the realm of belonging was that both institutions incorporated visitor comment books into the communicative strategies associated with each display (in both cases these were single hard-backed A4 notebooks, into which visitors could add handwritten comments). Often employed by institutions yet rarely interrogated (exceptions include Reid, 2000, 2005; Macdonald, 2005; Noy, 2008, 2015), these documents challenge the idea of a homogeneous public by creating space for noisy, discordant, and often divergent individualized responses to museums' cultural productions. While, as Macdonald discusses, visitor comments must be considered "socially-situated performances" (2005, p.122), they can reveal "strikingly forthright, and sometimes politically surprising, opinions" (2005, p. 121). Furthermore, they provide compelling evidence of the extent to which visitors engage with the poetics and politics of display by demonstrating "sophisticated awareness of exhibitionary dilemmas faced by museums" (2005, pp.121–122). In this chapter, visitor comments relating to the two displays are drawn upon to provide evidence of the extent to which museum publics engage critically with contested accounts of belonging as well as, in some cases, the representational frameworks used by museums to explore these. This was especially important given that in-depth research with visitors (and participants, in the case of the Ashmolean initiative) was prevented by lockdown conditions imposed as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Keen to start a conversation: *Brexit at The Beaney* at The Beaney House of Art and Knowledge

On 23 June 2016, registered voters in the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union by 52% to 48%. The following year, the Prime Minister formally triggered Article 50 and began what was expected to be a two-year countdown to the UK's final departure. In actual fact, various delays and requested extensions meant that this departure took place on 31 January 2020, a date which marked the start of a transition period, which ended on 31 December 2020. The processes of campaigning for the referendum and of preparing for the UK's exit from the Union were politically fraught and deeply divisive. The UK was the first country to leave the Union, having been a member state of the Union and its predecessor,

the European Communities, since 1973, and the referendum exposed huge rifts in the values and outlooks of UK citizens, including along axes of age, class, ethnicity, and geographical location. It also highlighted the marginal status of EU citizens living in the UK, who were not entitled to participate in the referendum and who subsequently had to apply for "settled status" in order to continue their residency.

As would also be evident in the "Windrush Scandal", immigration, bordering, and control played central roles in Brexit discourse. For those aligned with the Leave campaign, separation from the Union would offer a better immigration system, improved border controls, a fairer welfare system, enhanced quality of life, and – most critically – the ability for the UK to set and manage its own laws. In the Leave account, a once-glorious nation of global significance had been weakened by its subordination to Brussels-based bureaucrats, who imposed restrictive policies and weakened the national fabric by condoning widespread immigration. "Take Back Control" was a much-repeated Leave slogan, promising the regaining of sovereignty and reassertion of a distinct English and/or British identity (Patel and Connelly, 2019, p.970).

Despite its far-reaching significance, few English museums chose to address Brexit through their displays or programmes. Its politically contested nature made it difficult for government-run museums to engage with, and for other institutions, it was simply "too soon" and feelings about it "too raw" to risk dedicating resources to this divisive subject. An exception was the display staged by The Beaney House of Art and Knowledge, a local government-run museum and library service based in Canterbury in the county of Kent. Its geographic location is significant: as the most southeasterly part of Britain where the English Channel narrows and ferries and trains provide connections to France, Kent has been described as a "Gateway to Europe". Its location, as well as the strong support given to the right-wing UK Independence Party by its voters, saw the county feature prominently in Brexit discourse.

The Beaney is located in Canterbury's city centre, on a pedestrianized shopping street. It underwent major refurbishment in 2009–2012, through which the original Victorian building was restored and a modern extension added providing improved access, visitor facilities, learning spaces, and a temporary exhibition space. The museum and gallery are owned and run by Canterbury City Council which provides 70% of its income. In the UK museums are a non-statutory service, meaning that, for organizations like The Beaney, there is strong incentive to demonstrate the contribution that such organizations can make to delivering the council's corporate priorities. This need to satisfy the museum's masters was evident in the head of service's comment that the organization has to "constantly … justify why you exist … you have to keep making that case over and over and over again". From other staff, there was also a sense of their work being directed by council priorities: "we've got the strategic priorities for the council and then the senior managers fit in with the vision and the aims and the specific strategies for the museum and galleries. That filters down to how we apply that", noted

the organization's programming officer. Policy agendas often included positive social outcomes and the head of service emphasized the need for The Beaney to provide evidence of a "social return on [the Council's] investment". This social return took the form of a focus on health and wellbeing, on which basis the organization has developed a distinctive reputation positioning itself as a "therapeutic museum" which "uses its unique building and collections to create a 'tonic' to enhance a visitor's experience" (The Beaney, n.d.). Belonging is central to this, informed by the widely endorsed tool for improving wellbeing: *5 Steps to Mental Wellbeing*, the first of which is to "Connect with other people" so as to engender "a sense of belonging and self-worth" (NHS, 2019).

Over the period March to June 2019, The Beaney engaged directly with issues of belonging through a small display in the atrium outside its temporary exhibition space. *Brexit at The Beaney* brought together objects from across the collections with new interpretations to offer, as its printed publicity information noted, "a fresh perspective on the key issues surrounding Brexit".[1] As well as those objects organized within the display case, new interpretation material was created for objects on display in other museum spaces which connected to the theme. A text panel which accompanied the display introduced it as follows:

> Museums like The Beaney keep and display cultural heritage, make it accessible and transmit its meaning and in doing so they adopt a fluid approach to interpreting, exhibiting and mediating cultural heritage to make people look at things differently and question embedded beliefs.
>
> Our Brexit display utilises a mixture of historical insight, humour and unusual juxtaposition of the objects to do this, offering a fresh perspective on the key issues such as democracy, identity, self-determination and movement of people whilst inviting responses from you, the gallery visitor.
>
> Regardless of your political allegiance or your views on Brexit we hope this display gives you the opportunity to consider new ways of looking and thinking about some of the themes around this very current and divisive topic.

In conceiving the display as an opportunity for "invited responses", the display spoke to a new policy direction highlighted in the service's *Vision*: "Conversations, connections and collaborations with our audiences are the foundations of the service, ensuring that our work is relevant and current, reflecting who we were, who we are and who we hope to be" (Canterbury Museums and Galleries, n.d.). In terms of the *Brexit at The Beaney* display, staff thus conceived of it as a form of conversation and the exhibits as "conversation starters". The museum's programming and collections manager noted:

> We felt it was important to have a platform where people could have that conversation and to log their thoughts because it was such a big current thing that was happening and such an important thing historically … We wanted

> to capture that so that we could have it in our collection for people to see in years to come. … So, we thought, "Well, we'll take some little conversation starters from our collection and put it into a display".

Preparatory notes for the display (provided by the staff interviewed) show that the display was underpinned by a set of key themes: democracy, dialogue, identity, immigration, refugees, borders, listening, self-determination, and belonging. These were identified through internal discussion before ideas were generated as to what objects could "reflect those themes or spark questions or make you think about things in a different way", according to the programming officer. "Big P" politics was carefully avoided; the intention, staff asserted, was to facilitate conversations from a position of neutrality. However, as the introductory text panel intimates – "make people look at things differently and question embedded beliefs" – the display was arguably more instrumental than its creators acknowledged, and promoted the kind of liberal worldview generally associated with the "Remain" position. Exhibits, for example, included a taxidermy robin, voted Britain's national bird in 2015. The label gently poked fun at nationalists: "While robins are very tame birds, they fiercely protect their territory", while also emphasizing the significance of shared histories, noting that the kestrel (Belgium's national bird) and little owl (Greece's) can both be found in Britain (Figure 11.1). Other exhibits pointed to long histories of migration, for example, a bible belonging to a Huguenot family who sought refuge in England in the seventeenth century and a fifth- or sixth-century pagan rune stone inscribed with a Germanic language which, according to its interpretation, provided "one small example of how, over time, cultural migration has contributed to, and shaped, England and Britain's heritage". A 1939 Penguin paperback entitled *You and the Refugee: The Morals and Economics of the Problem* included in the display was notable for its time in arguing for the benefits of accepting refugees in terms of meeting labour market needs, and a piece of 1941 sheet music carrying the score to *The White Cliffs of Dover* and bearing the image of the Black American-born musician Turner Layton, troubled conventional associations between this iconic Kent landmark and (white) English nationalism.

In contrast to the expansive and inclusive perspective on belonging offered by museum staff, comments left in the visitors' book revealed the widespread anger and bewilderment experienced in relation to the outcomes of the 2016 referendum. Few entries commented on the display itself; most instead expressed a deep-seated sense of frustration, including with the drawn-out nature of the process. Comments such as "Please hurry up either way!!"; "Hurry up get it done!"; "END IT" were typical. Other comments questioned the validity of the referendum vote (this being in the context of the People's Vote campaign, which called for a second referendum and organized large-scale public protests over 2018–2019), for example "[The] referendum should never have been called. If so, should have been a two-thirds majority to confirm such an important decision"; "far too complex for a binary vote"; "It makes me angry when I keep hearing 'the people have

Figure 11.1 An image of the taxidermy kestrel and robin used in the *Brexit at The Beaney* display, taken during the display's development. Image courtesy of Canterbury Museums and Galleries.

spoken'! The referendum result was far from overwhelming and based on the lies we'd been fed by right wing politicians who wanted Brexit!"

While the extent to which the display engendered the kinds of "conversation" intended by the museum team remained unclear, a few visitor comments suggested that it did provide a prompt for self-reflection, including on issues of belonging:

> This whole process has made me realise (embarrassingly) that I do not know enough about politics to have voted the way I did. It has made me engage in more conversation and pay attention to what is being said. Good or bad. All these decision [*sic*] will affect my grandsons in some way good or bad.

> Well, personally it's made me realise that I am English, British and importantly, European and that all 3 are hugely important to my sense of self.

However, most of the comments evidenced the frustration experienced by those on both sides of the political divide, and of a deep-seated ambivalence in relation to "Europe":

> So much misunderstanding about the EU and its objectives. It is fundamentally a benevolent organisation that protects its citizens! Very angry and frustrated about being stripped of our EU citizenship without our consent!
>
> A battle that the EU would never ever let us win. (…) A great idea, torpedoed by the treachery of the EU and the lily-livered pathetic Labour party. We should now just jump! & leave.

The visitor comments reflect the polarized views circulating in the UK at the time, which framed the EU either negatively as over-controlling and demanding technocrats, a trade arrangement of convenience, an ineffective barrier to the hordes of refugees intent on reaching the British Isles, or more positively as a supportive network motivated by cosmopolitan ideals.

Constructing a democratic space

In interviews, museum staff characterized the museum as a democratic space (as discussed also by Eckersley, this volume), where people – as the organization's programming and collections officer observed – "feel that their voice is heard". She further emphasized that "It's not our museum, it's everybody's museum". In this conceptualization, it was a space in which people could, she argued, "talk about difficult things and things that are important to them" and the Brexit display was thus seen as an extension of "difficult conversations" had in the context of targeted community engagement work. But arguably, *Brexit at The Beaney* served to provide a distancing tool with limited scope for genuine engagement with issues of belonging. As a "conversation", it was carefully managed and directed towards a broadly constituted public rather than those directly affected (such as EU citizens living in the area), with the content and narration provided exclusively by staff (in contrast to other displays held at the museum which have adopted strategies of co-curation). Difficult issues – nationalism, immigration – were obliquely pointed to through the choice of objects, but the interpretation skimmed over these with a liberal multiculturalist discourse which did not engage with the emotional and often conflicting perspectives represented by visitor comments, which were effectively "shelved". Moreover, the engagement with belonging through the prism of "wellbeing" – as a recent iteration of museum social policy interventions – risked promoting an uncritical perspective in which belonging is seen as an individual responsibility rather than an outcome of public discourse and government policy.

As was clear from their comments in the interviews, staff at the Beaney saw themselves as primarily accountable to their governance structure (Canterbury City Council) and to a broadly constituted public. As the programming and collections

officer noted: "it's *everybody's* museum". The museum was a democratic space in which all voices were heard but, in this case, specific claims of belonging were not engaged with. While the organization took considerable risk in engaging with a contentious topic, it chose not to deploy the participatory strategies used elsewhere in its work. What might have been the outcome if the organization had taken a participatory approach to the *Brexit at The Beaney* display? How might the heated and divergent perspectives reflected in the visitor comments book have challenged the liberal multiculturalism preferred by the institution and generated difficult questions, not only about the implications of Britain leaving the European Union, but also about the role of public institutions in society? While such an approach may have been difficult for the organization to "manage", creating space for diverse perspectives is a necessary precondition for genuine critical engagement with issues of belonging. Furthermore, an approach which foregrounded the experiences of those impacted by but fundamentally excluded from the terms of the debate (such as European Union citizens living in Britain), could also have provided opportunities to demonstrate the solidarity and ethics of care advocated for by Floya Anthias (2013, p.336) by centring accountability to those at risk of marginalization rather than more abstract entities.

A claim for space and belonging in a white institution: *A Nice Cup of Tea?* at the Ashmolean Museum

22 June 2018 marked the seventieth anniversary of the arrival of MV *Empire Windrush* at Tilbury Docks, Essex; an occasion often heralded as the moment of "birth of a multicultural Britain" (Hewitt, 2020, p.108) as more than 500 passengers from the Caribbean disembarked to help meet post-war labour shortages. The 2018 date also marked Britain's first official "Windrush Day", a national anniversary intended "to celebrate the contribution of the Windrush Generation and their descendants". The fact that this new anniversary was instituted in 2018 was significant. Between autumn 2017 and spring 2018, a series of stories published by *The Guardian* newspaper revealed the shocking treatment experienced by descendants of the African Caribbean migrants who had formed the Windrush Generation (Gentleman, 2018). Now in their 50s and 60s, some had recently experienced their long-established claims to UK citizenship being questioned by employers, landlords, education and healthcare providers, banks, and government departments. Lacking evidence to "prove" their status – never having been called upon to do so before – resulted in many of these individuals facing unemployment, ill health, poverty, homelessness, and, in some cases, deportation.

The Guardian's investigations identified that these individuals had become the unintended victims of new Home Office policy intended to ensure that illegal migrants in the UK found themselves in a "hostile environment" and thus would be motivated to leave the country. On learning about the treatment of these Black Britons, the public response was swift and unanimous and the condemnation of government that followed cost the Home Secretary her job. A later independent

review into the causes of the "Windrush Scandal" found that "institutional ignorance and thoughtlessness towards the issue of race" (Williams, 2020, p.20) in a governmental department which had a "poor understanding of Britain's colonial history, the history of inward and outward migration, and the history of black Britons" (Williams, 2020, p.139) generated critical failures in the design and implementation of immigration policy. The turn towards national recognition was similarly quick: a compensation scheme was established for those affected by the scandal, an annual National Service of Thanksgiving was instituted at Westminster Abbey, and a new commemorative sculpture was commissioned for London Waterloo train station.

As the review identified, the implementation of the hostile environment critically failed to distinguish between those whose rights to citizenship were undocumented and those who were unlawfully resident and, through its "deputisation" of border controls to a range of third parties (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021), disproportionately affected the vulnerable and the racialized. For many Windrush Generation descendants, whatever the relative novelty of the policy shift, the hostility they experienced under its terms was simply a reaffirmation of the tenuousness and contingency with which their claims to national belonging had always been treated. So, while their claims to *citizenship* had not before been questioned, sustained experiences of racism had ensured that their claims of *belonging* had always remained far from guaranteed. In this respect, the public response to the "Windrush Scandal" took a surprising form. In media and government discourse, members of the Windrush Generation were portrayed as bastions of Britishness, their "arrival" as a cause for national celebration, and their "contribution" to British society as much-lauded. The perspective offered by Member of Parliament Diane Abbott in a House of Commons debate was typical:

> [The Windrush Generation] came here after the second world war to help rebuild this country, and they worked hard and paid their taxes. There are few more patriotic groups of British citizens than the generation from the West Indies that we are talking about.
>
> (Hansard, 2018)

This disconnect between the experiences of Windrush Generation members and their representation in public discourse suggests a form of what Tim Wise has described as "enlightened exceptionalism" (2008), in which in times of heightened public anxiety about race or migration certain non-white and/or migrant individuals or communities are picked out for valorization without disturbing the racism which continues to marginalize others.

As noted earlier, the forceful assertion of the claims of national belonging made on behalf of the Windrush Generation included symbolic gestures of reparation, a process which cultural organizations were drawn into. In late 2018 a new funding scheme was announced: £500,000 was made available through the Ministry of Housing, Local Communities, and Local Government to fund Windrush

Day activities across England. These activities would meet the scheme's objectives "To educate", "To celebrate and recognise the Windrush Generation and their descendants", and "To foster a greater sense of belonging among people of Caribbean background as part of the rich tapestry of our nation's heritage" (MHCLG, 2019). Where government had failed in its recognition of the complexities of "race" and colonial history, cultural organizations and other constituted groups were being asked to fill the breach.

The Ashmolean Museum was one of the institutions to benefit from Windrush Day funds. Established as part of the University of Oxford in 1683, the Ashmolean is often described as the first "modern" museum. Dedicated to the facilitation of scholarship, today it combines its research role with being "a world-class museum and cultural destination" (Ashmolean Museum, n.d.(a)). The majority of its income comes from academic sources (the Higher Education Funding Council for England and the University of Oxford), although earned income has become increasingly important. Housed behind a classical façade, the museum's displays of art and archaeology were remodelled in 2009; a redevelopment which adopted a modern aesthetic, incorporating a great deal of "white linearity and glass" (Watson, 2010, p.103) and using space and juxtaposition to evoke the central interpretative theme of "Crossing cultures, crossing time".

In May 2019, the seamless display aesthetic of the Museum's European Ceramics Gallery was temporarily interrupted by a new installation created by artists Enam Gbewonyo and Lois Muddiman. In contrast to the orderly rows of porcelain around it, the installation – which filled a six-foot-high case formerly occupied by a Georgian tea service – consisted of pieces of smashed ceramic (Figure 11.2). Suspended on invisible lines tied to the case ceiling and lit by a single light bulb, the ceramic shards appeared to be frozen mid-explosion. A closer look revealed that each shattered piece carried a fragment of historical imagery relating to local African Caribbean migration histories. Entitled *A Nice Cup of Tea?*, the installation was intended to both recontextualize the ceramics on display in the gallery by highlighting the links between the trade in commodities like tea and sugar and the transatlantic slave trade, and – its accompanying label announced – to "amplify the stories, lives and resilience of Oxford's communities, particularly those of Oxford's Windrush generation and African Caribbean community". It was produced as a collaboration between the artists and members of BK LUWO, a group of female former refugees, largely of African heritage, and was accompanied by a lightbox display of photographic portraits, including of BK LUWO members, and a soundtrack of extracts from oral testimonies recorded with African Caribbean elders.

The installation represented a significant new departure for the Ashmolean Museum and was a visible manifestation of its newly adopted "Ashmolean for All" policy which intended to "improve the way the Museum represents, works with and includes diverse communities and individuals" (Ashmolean Museum, n.d.(b)). As a university museum which had historically focused on serving academic researchers and traditional museum audiences, the new policy reflected the museum's

Figure 11.2 An image of the installation *A Nice Cup of Tea?* created by artists Enam Gbewonyo and Lois Muddiman. European Ceramics Gallery, Ashmolean Museum. Photograph by the author.

reorientation towards social agendas. As the interpretation manager observed, the policy "was part of the initiative of changing our audience. We serve our students and our university and our upper-middle-class North Oxford community very well. We haven't traditionally served our other local communities as well: Town, not gown". Through the adoption of strategies of co-production and co-design, the ambition was "to bring the University closer to the city and the community in which we live and work" (Richardson, 2019, p.4). A central strand of the work was the introduction of "different voices, perspectives and creative responses" including into the museum's permanent galleries, so that these might become "more dynamic and engaging" (Ashmolean Museum, 2019, p.14).

While the display represented a new departure for the Ashmolean Museum, the relationships on which it built had been forged through the activities of other agencies, including those of the city council–run Museum of Oxford (which had a longstanding community engagement programme), the African and African Caribbean Kultural Heritage Initiative (ACKHI), and locally based artists. In 2017 these agents came together in the development of a Museum of Oxford temporary exhibition (*Journeys to Oxford*), which provided the basis for a new network dedicated to increasing the visibility of Black history in the city. In 2018, the network adopted a specific focus on Windrush, forming the basis of a cross-agency Oxford

Windrush Group which developed the successful bid for a 2019 Windrush Day programme of events.

A claim for space, belonging, and acknowledgement

The installation opened on 23 May 2019. The launch event was considered a success by the museum staff and partners interviewed for this chapter. Given the limited interactions museum staff had previously had with members of Oxford's African Caribbean community, the project seemed to offer a touchstone for a new kind of relationship. One of the commissioned artists commented on the extent to which "everyone felt welcome" and that participants expressed a powerful sense of ownership and belonging: "these are women who have never had their stories told [and] that's all that anyone wants – to feel valued". Similarly, an arts worker involved in the project noted that it was important for "members of the community to see their work in a public arena".

In bringing the experiences of a group of Black women elders into a white institutional space and recognizing their "stories", the Ashmolean was engaging in a set of memorial practices which spoke in self-conscious ways to the broader societal issues around belonging raised by the "Windrush Scandal" as well as to the organization's own recently taken social turn. While those involved in the project had wanted the display to provide "visibility" and to foreground "a sense of connectedness", in practice the space granted to the women was limited and contingent: a temporary display in a single display case in a large institution. In the visitor comments book, several individuals expressed their dissatisfaction with the display's modest scale and perceived marginalization within the museum building:

> Very disappointed to see so many people just passing the installation by. It deserves a much more prominent position. It deserves to be better lit. It deserves to be somewhere people linger rather than walk by. The sound needs to be louder so that people's attention is caught. The transcripts need to be properly mounted. Please make more of this topic and do it justice. So many Ashmolean exhibitions are brilliantly staged – this deserves better!

The issue of sound was repeatedly mentioned. The installation was accompanied by a soundtrack of oral testimony from African Caribbean elders, in which they recounted their experiences of moving to Britain. Their memories of hardship and racism jarred with more nostalgic perspectives on Windrush:

> The early days were rough, we can't get away from it. As many as 38 of us lived in a single three-bedroom house (…) We were having sleeping shifts. You are not going to believe this but it's true. (…) And if we got on the bus, you know, the bus two seats, and three. And if we sat next to, um, an English person, male or female, they would get up. They would get up and hang onto the middle rail and rock all the way. Yes, that's if we sat next to them.

> At the age of 13 I came to England. Well, I'd never experienced cold and it was difficult to understand. The other thing was, because we were a large family, England, well Oxford, was very, very modern at the time. Considering I had come from rural Jamaica, it was very difficult. (…) It was an experience I wouldn't wish on anyone. It was cold and it was different. At first, I thought "why me?" but now I can look back and laugh.

However, the potential of this testimony to disturb the aestheticized narration of history offered by the installation, as well as the conventional Windrush narrative of British welcome, was diminished. Firstly, like all contributors to the display (except the artists), the names of those giving testimony were withheld and they were introduced simply as "Speaker 1", "Speaker 2", etc. Secondly, as visitors to the display repeatedly noted in the comments book which accompanied the display, these voices could simply not be heard:

> The voices were not loud enough … where were the stories of the people behind the legacy of the British Empire and slavery. An opportunity lost!
>
> Voices are inaudible which is such a loss.
>
> I do wish the voices were louder and clearer, and/or that the transcripts were featured more prominently.

In the wider public realm, the characterization of a diverse group of migrants as the "Windrush Generation" was politically expedient, offering visibility and coherence in place of a complex range of individual identities and experiences. Yet, it also came at a cost. As Floya Anthias has noted of conventional diversity discourses, these are typically reductive; generating fixed, apparently homogeneous group identities which can be managed and contained by white institutions. The success of the claims to belonging made by the "Windrush Generation" relied on the creation of a generic identity, seen through a nostalgic lens, which flattened individual experiences (Mead, 2009). As in wider discourse, in the museum, its evocation was contingent on the silencing of individuals whose divergent accounts risked fracture. As with the speakers, the individuals featured in the series of accompanying photographs were also unnamed.

In the museum, visibility was provided but at the cost of recognition. Anthony Alan Shelton has argued that "Museums are a microcosm of the wider society in which inter-ethnic relations are played out through a struggle over interpretation and control of cultural resources" (2006, p.79) and, in this case, the management and containment of Black experiences exemplified by *A Nice Cup of Tea?* mirrored the marginalization of Black lives and experiences within the city of Oxford. Oxford is a relatively diverse city, with the third highest levels of ethnic diversity in the Southeast yet it remains, in the words of the arts worker, "a very divided place". This marginalization was felt in the apparent disinterest of Oxford City Council, evidenced in the fact that, as the same individual observed, "not

one senior member from the local authority came to any of the [Windrush Day] events", as well as the continued lack of support for a long-campaigned-for community and cultural centre for the city's African Caribbean community.

Whatever the shortcomings of the display, for members of the African Caribbean community it marked a significant claim on public space, one which was hard fought and only tenuously held. The issue of legacy was considered critical. Participants were promised that when the time came to remove the installation and restore the Georgian tea service that it would be re-interpreted in ways which recognized the broader social history of the commodities it was designed for. However, at the point of the interview, the arts worker reported that "it's just gone quiet, it's gone dead". As one of the commissioned artists noted in a deft summation of the power relations embedded in the project: "it's up to them – they have the power".

Conclusion: staged claims of belonging in English museums

This chapter has sought to explore the complex forces and agendas at play in the engagements of English museums with belonging. In particular, it has demonstrated how engagements with contested accounts of belonging risk providing visibility at the cost of recognition. In both cases, threats to belonging were signalled through display projects but the claims of those affected were simply not heard or seriously considered – this despite the fact that both display projects were motivated by policy ambitions which promised positive social outcomes.

The limitations of these initiatives to seriously engage with the threats to belonging they described can be related back to a politics of recognition and to the failures of symbolic reparation. The notion of a "politics of recognition" emerged from the social sciences in the late 1980s. In this context, it was not enough to ensure material reparation to victims of violence and discrimination; the affected also needed the positive affirmation of their identities by the state, including through its public institutions (Taylor, 1992; Fraser, 1995). Thus emerged an important role for museums which have been increasingly expected to demonstrate their social value in instrumentalist terms, including through the inclusion of marginalized voices and perspectives. However, as we have seen, inclusion does not come with a guarantee of material redistribution or power change. Indeed, it could be argued that the increased activity by museums in the realm of belonging risks rendering them "compensatory mechanisms" (Anthias, 2013, p.324), for unrealized structural change. Evidence of this can be seen in the case of the Windrush Scandal, where cultural organizations were called on to provide compensation through visibility, while the state did little to improve the material conditions of those affected by the scandal, or to challenge the systemic discrimination perpetuated by its immigration policies.

As Greeley et al. remind us, where gestures of symbolic reparation become disaggregated from the specific claims of those denied belonging, they lose their

ability to directly address the structural factors which produce marginalization and discrimination. In this context, museums risk serving as diversionary tactics which draw attention away from "the state's failure to address the structural conditions that continue to fuel systemic violence and discrimination" (2020, p.171) and becoming part of a "state-sponsored politics of forgetting" (2020, p. 174). While museums cannot address society's failings, they can offer more than rhetorical gestures by grounding their engagements with belonging in a sense of accountability to those affected. How this might work in practice can be seen in the response of London's Black Cultural Archives (BCA) to the Windrush Scandal. In this case, focused accountability to people of African Caribbean heritage saw the organization host legal surgeries for those affected, call town hall meetings, make public statements, and sit on government boards. While BCA's exhibitionary practices ensured symbolic reparation, these other initiatives offered the opportunity for a constructive engagement with the politics of belonging.

As has been demonstrated, museums are increasingly engaging with issues of belonging, often motivated by social agendas and the need to demonstrate a return on investment to funders and governance structures. Until accountability to those affected by these issues is put at the centre of this work, instead of the prioritizing of more diffuse *upwards* and *outwards* accountabilities, its potential impact will remain unrealized.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the assistance and participation of staff and collaborators at The Beaney House of Art and Knowledge (Canterbury Museums and Galleries) and the Ashmolean Museum (University of Oxford). All conclusions drawn from the research, however, are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of contributors.

The research for this chapter was part of the project *en/counter/points: (re) negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place*.

The project *en/counter/points: (re)negotiating belonging through culture and contact in public space and place* is financially supported by the HERA Joint Research Programme, which is co-funded by AHRC, BMBF via DLR-PT, MUR, NWO, NCN, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 769478.

Note

1 *Brexit at The Beaney* display archive: preparatory papers, printed publicity information, exhibition graphics, and visitor comments book were made available to the author by staff members at The Beaney.

References

Alexander, D. (2019) *The Crisis in Belonging*. London: Kings College. Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/the-crisis-in-belonging (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Anthias, F. (2011) 'Intersections and Translocations: New Paradigms for Thinking about Cultural Diversity and Social Identities', *European Educational Research Journal*, 10 (2), pp. 402–415.

Anthias, F. (2013) 'Moving beyond the Janus face of integration and diversity discourses: towards an intersectional framing', *The Sociological Review*, 61, pp. 323–343.

Ashmolean Museum (n.d.a) *About*. Available at: https://www.ashmolean.org/about (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Ashmolean Museum (n.d.b) *Ashmolean for All: Doing Things Differently* blog. Available at: https://ashmoleanforall.blog/about/ (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Ashmolean Museum (2019) *Ashmolean Review 2018–19*. Oxford: Ashmolean Museum. Available at: https://www.ashmolean.org/files/ashmoleanannualreview2018-19pdf (Accessed 29 November 2021).

The Beaney (n.d.) *The Beaney: A Pioneering Therapeutic Museum*. Available at: https://canterburymuseums.co.uk/the-beaney/health-and-wellbeing/ (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Bennett, T. (1995) *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*. London and New York: Routledge.

Canterbury Museums and Galleries (n.d.) *Canterbury Museums & Galleries Vision and Strategy*. Available at: https://canterburymuseums.co.uk/vision-and-strategy/ (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Crooke, E. (2007) *Museums and Community: Ideas, Issues and Challenges*. London and New York: Routledge.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2000) *Centres for Social Change. Museums, Galleries and Archives for All: Policy Guidance on Social Inclusion for DCMS Funded and Local Authority Museums, Galleries and Archives in England*. London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

Fraser, N. (1995) 'From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a "post-socialist" age', *New Left Review*, 212, pp. 68–92.

Gentleman, A. (2018) 'The week that took Windrush from low-profile investigation to national scandal', *The Guardian*, 20 April 2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/20/the-week-that-took-windrush-from-low-profile-investigation-to-national-scandal (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Graham, H. (2017) 'Horizontality: Tactical politics for participation and museums', in Onciul, B., Stefano, M.L. and Hawke, S. (eds.) *Engaging Heritage, Engaging Communities*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 73–88.

Gray, C. (2016) 'Structure, agency and museum policies', *Museum & Society*, 14(1), pp. 116–130.

Greeley, R.A., Orwicz, M. R., Falconi, J.L., Reyes, A.M., Rosenberg, F.J. and Laplante, L.J. (2020) 'Repairing symbolic reparations: Assessing the effectiveness of memorialization in the inter- American system of human rights'. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 17(1), pp. 165–192.

Griffiths, M. and Yeo, C. (2021) 'The UK's hostile environment: Deputising immigration control', *Critical Social Policy*, 41(4), pp. 521–544.

Hansard (2018) 'House of Commons debate on "Windrush Children (Immigration Status)"', 16 April 2018. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-04-16/debates/7234878F-ACEE-48DD-A94C-9013B38FA465/WindrushChildren(ImmigrationStatus) (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Hewitt, G. (2020) 'The Windrush Scandal: An insider's reflection', *Caribbean Quarterly*, 66(1), pp. 108–128.

Lang, C., Reeve, J. and Wollard, V. (2007) *The Responsive Museum: Working with Audiences in the Twenty-First Century*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lynch, B. (2011) *Whose Cake is it Anyway? A Collaborative Investigation into Engagement and Participation in 12 Museums and Galleries in the UK*. London: Paul Hamlyn Foundation. Available at: https://www.phf.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Whose-cake-is-it-anyway.pdf (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Macdonald, S. (2005) 'Accessing audiences: Visiting visitor books', *Museum & Society*, 3(3), pp. 119–136.

McCall, V. (2016) 'Exploring the gap between museum policy and practice: A comparative analysis of Scottish, English and Welsh local authority museum services', *Museum & Society*, 14(1), pp. 98–115.

Mead, M. (2009) 'Empire windrush: The cultural memory of an imaginary arrival', *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 45(2), pp. 137–149.

Mears, H. and Eckersley, S. (2022) *Toolkits, Museums & Belonging. A Report for the en/counter/points Project*. Newcastle University. Available at: https://doi.org/10.25405/data.ncl.19267964.v1 (Accessed 16 November 2022).

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) (2019) *2020 Windrush Day Grant Scheme: Guidance for Applicants*.

Modest, W. and Golding, V. (eds.) (2013) *Museums and Communities: Curators, Collections and Collaboration*. London: Bloomsbury.

Morse, N. (2018) 'Patterns of accountability: An organizational approach to community engagement in museums', *Museum & Society*, 16(2), pp. 171–186.

Museums Association (2013) *Museums Change Lives*. Available at: https://archive-media.museumsassociation.org/26062013-museums-change-lives.pdf (Accessed 29 November 2021).

National Health Service (2019) *5 Steps to Mental Wellbeing*. Available at: https://www.nhs.uk/mental-health/self-help/guides-tools-and-activities/five-steps-to-mental-wellbeing/ (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Nicol, J. (2020) 'We are facing a crisis of belonging', *Medium*. Available at: https://medium.com/discourse/we-are-facing-a-crisis-of-belonging-8f42a06237f1 (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Noy, C. (2008) 'Mediation materialized: The semiotics of a visitor book at an Israel commemoration site', *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 25(2), pp. 175–195.

Noy, C. (2015) 'Writing in museums: Towards a rhetoric of participation', *Written Communication*, 32(2), pp. 195–219.

Patel, T.G. and Connelly, L.J. (2019) '"Post-race" racism in the narratives of "Brexit" voters', *The Sociological Review*, 67(5), pp. 968–984.

Paul Hamlyn Foundation (n.d.) *Our Museum: Communities and Museums as Active Partners*. Available at: https://www.phf.org.uk/programmes/our-museum/ (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Reid, S.E. (2000) 'The exhibition *Art of Socialist Countries*, Moscow 1958–9, and the contemporary style of painting', in Reid, S.E. and Crowley, D. (eds) *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 101–132.

Reid, S.E. (2005) 'In the name of the people. The Manege affair revisited', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 6, pp. 1–43.

Richardson, L. (2019) 'Vice-chancellor's foreword', in *Ashmolean Review 2018–19*. Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, p.4. Available at: https://www.ashmolean.org/files/ashmoleanannualreview2018-19pdf (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Sandell, R. (2002) *Museums, Society, Inequality*. London and New York: Routledge.

Shelton, A.A. (2006) 'Museums and anthropologies: Practices and narratives', in Macdonald, S. (ed.) *A Companion to Museum Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 64–80.

Taylor, C. (1992) 'The politics of recognition', in Gutmann, A. (ed.) *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 25–73.

Tlili, A. (2008) 'Behind the policy mantra of the inclusive museum: Receptions of social exclusion and inclusion in museums and science centres', *Cultural Sociology*, 2(1), pp. 123–147.

Tlili, A. (2010) 'Efficiency and social inclusion: Implications for the museum profession', *Cadernos Sociomuseologia*, 43, pp. 5–34.

Watson, H. (2010) 'Ashmolean Museum, Oxford', *Architectural Design*, 80(3), pp. 102–105.

Watson, S. (2007) *Museums and Their Communities*. London and New York: Routledge.

Williams, W. (2020) *Windrush Lessons Learned Review*. London: House of Commons. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/876336/6.5577_HO_Windrush_Lessons_Learned_Review_LoResFinal.pdf (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Wise, T. (2008) *Between Barack and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama*. San Francisco: City Lights.

Chapter 12

Redefining collective heritage, identities, and belonging

Colonial statues in the times of Black Lives Matter

Johanna Turunen

Introduction

On 25 May 2020, in Minneapolis, United States, George Floyd was murdered by a police officer. Although Floyd repeatedly stated that he could not breathe and went unconscious after being held on the ground for six minutes, the police officer on the scene kept kneeling on his neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. Floyd's death was another addition to a long list of African American men, women, and children who had died at the hands of law enforcement officers in the United States. The reactions to Floyd's death have, on the other hand, been quite remarkable. His death seems to have been the straw that broke the camel's back. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement founded in the United States in 2013 to protest police brutality and anti-black violence expanded into an international phenomenon almost overnight.

In the following two weeks, a wave of protests swiped across the United States, Europe, and beyond. One of these protests was held in Bristol on 7 June 2020, and, like Floyd's death, this particular protest had a significant consequence. It culminated in the forceful removal of the statue of Edward Colston (1636–1721) – a Bristolian "philanthropist" who had made part of his fortune in the transatlantic slave trade. The statue, sculpted by John Cassidy in 1895, was pulled down, rolled hundreds of metres down the road, and eventually thrown into the Bristol harbour. On 13 June 2020, approximately 300 people gathered for an "all lives matter" protest at the Cenotaph close to the former Edward Colston statue. The protest seemed relatively insignificant compared to the 10,000 people who had marched for Black Lives a week earlier. However, this second protest was very revealing from the perspective of heritage, identities, and belonging.

This chapter aims to analyze the fall of the Colston statue as a form of politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis et al., 2006; see also Antonsich, 2010) – as an attempt to demand public recognition and space for Bristolians, whose public visibility had been marginalized by earlier heritage practices around Colston. More precisely, what kind of discourses were invoked online during the protests, how these discourses relate to earlier waves of heritagization around the Colston statue, and what effects the protests had from the perspective of identity politics and belonging.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003191698-17

The relationship between heritage, identity, and belonging is at the heart of these questions. I follow Anthias (2008, p.8), who states that

> Identity involves individual and collective narratives of the self and other, presentation and labelling, myths of origin and myths of destiny with associated strategies and identifications. Belonging is more about experiences of being part of the social fabric and the ways in which social bonds and ties are manifested in practices, experiences, and emotions of inclusion.

As a discursive resource (e.g., Wu and Hou, 2015) that can be used to both create these myths and narratives and connect them to specific objects and cultural landscapes (e.g., Smith, 2006; Harrison, 2013), heritage is incremental for creating collective identities (Graham and Howard, 2008). However, heritage is not simply about our past or collective identities that have emerged at certain points in history. It is a contemporary political act (Association of Critical Heritage Studies, 2011). It *does* things in society (Turunen, 2021, p.39; see also Harvey, 2001): it creates, legitimates, and maintains communities and cultural values – but more importantly – different heritage practices also continuously challenge and renegotiate both collective identities and individual belonging.

If identities are a way to collectively position people (Hall, 1990, p.225; see also Somers, 1994) and heritage is one tool used in this positioning, (non-)belonging, as defined by Anthias previously, consists of the varied ways our attempts to position ourselves and each other are mirrored back to us in our cultural environment (see also the introduction to this volume). Although memorials, like the Colston statue, are physically single objects existing in one single space, they simultaneously represent different dimensions of European heritage (see Whitehead et al., 2019). As this chapter will show, these dimensions are not equally mediated in our public spaces – quite the opposite. There is significant "affective inequality" (see Modlin, Alderman, and Gentry, 2011) between different interpretations, and this inequality is also mirrored in the different degrees to which communities feel as though they belong in society.

Data and methods

Empirically this chapter is based on an analysis of debates that emerged in response to the BLM protest in Bristol on various media outlets, social media, blog posts, and comment columns. I initially used a snowball method to search for relevant platforms. I started from selected international, national, and local newspapers, discussion forums, and activists' social media accounts. By following these initial entry points, I created a manageable sample that was representative of the wider debates. The sample consists of data from Twitter and the comment sections in the *Bristol Post*'s online branch *Bristol Live* – a popular local newspaper with an active comment column used for public debate. I want to avoid undue association with *Bristol Post* and/or *Bristol Live*, as these comments are produced by external,

anonymous actors whose views do not reflect those of *Bristol Post* nor Reach plc or its associated group companies. Hence in the analysis, this latter dataset will be referred to as the "anonymous platform" or as "anonymous commentators".

On both platforms, data was collected from the date of George Floyd's death on 25 May 2020 until 31 July 2021. As such, I was able to analyze also the debates that emerged during the first anniversary of the protest. No additional software was used in either of the cases nor was any big data collected from the sites. I relied on the openly available search functions of the sites in question. On Twitter, my keywords resulted in relatively reliable hits, from which I collected a sample of roughly 5,000 tweets. On the anonymous platform, I analyzed the comments posted under the news stories tagged with "Edward Colston".

There is a seemingly clear division between Twitter and the anonymous comments in this chapter. Rather surprisingly, my keywords for Twitter resulted almost uniformly in pro-BLM commentaries, while systematic tracking of critical comments on Twitter proved difficult. Comments that critiqued the BLM protest or the fall of the statue were not structured under widely shared hashtags. Even the examples of critical Twitter comments (e.g. by Boris Johnson and Robert Poll) follow a peculiar structure. Despite garnering thousands of likes and retweets that create a sense that the comments have broad support, the quote tweets that allow the commenter to complement the initial tweet with his or her insights were almost by default critiquing and condemning the initial tweet. As such, the only "new" content provided by those who engaged with the tweets was uniformly pro-BLM. For this reason, the analysis is partly split so that the analysis of pro-BLM commentaries is based on Twitter and the analysis of the "all lives matter" counter rhetoric is based on a few individual commentators on Twitter and the general trends that arise on the anonymous platform.

There are many ethical concerns related to the use of social media data. There is a growing corpus focused on the ethics of social media research (e.g., Zimmer and Proferes, 2014; Bonacchi, Altaweel, and Krzyzanska, 2018; Richardson, 2018; Bonacchi and Krzyzanska, 2019; Richardson, 2019). These studies span from quantitative big data approaches and data mining to qualitative approaches. Although tweets are commonly shared in media, researchers, for the most part, seem to follow a much stricter code of ethics to protect the anonymity of Twitter commentators who may not be aware that their comments are in the public domain and therefore open also for research use (e.g., Fiesler and Proferes, 2018; see also Farrell-Banks, 2019). Despite this principle, practices that researchers use while conducting research on Twitter vary greatly: some avoid using any direct quotes as they are easily trackable, some quote only public figures, while others claim that quotation with full usernames and details is required as means to give copyright to the person who made the original statement. I follow the middle road and use direct quotes from Twitter only from people who have marked themselves as public figures. In accordance with the Terms of Service of the *Bristol Live* community outreach activities, no direct quotes, usernames, or other identifiable information will be published.

Virtually marching for Black Lives on Twitter: unity, truth, and pride

Statues had already become targets during the 2017 BLM protests in the United States and in the 2015 #RhodesMustFall protest in South Africa. As the BLM protest spread towards Europe in the early summer of 2020, it did not come as a big surprise that interest in Colston and his slaving past heightened quickly in Bristol.

When the protest started on 7 June 2020, photos, videos, and news pieces spread on social media like wildfire, and the most popular videos had tens of thousands of views. Typical hashtags include #BLM, #BLMBristol, #BLMUK, #colstonstatue, and #BristolProtest. Some thematic hashtags, like #RaceEquality or #Slavery, are also used.

Many commentaries are very emotional. People express pride, enthusiasm, unity, and joy in their online posts. As is typical for online debates, many tweets include different kinds of memes or GIFs, and as such, they also include an element of laughter and irony – an essential element for group formation in online environments (Särmä, 2016). The atmosphere of the protest is actively reproduced online.

Especially three elements repeat in people's expressions – unity, truth, and pride. Declarations of unity are widespread, especially on the day of the protest and the following days. In addition to general exclamations which asserted a collective sense of belonging together, like "We stand united" or simply "Unity!", a large portion of the tweets include an emoji of a brown fist – a well-known symbol of the BLM – or a black heart. The black power salute is also repeated by many on-site and then shared online. Once the statue has been pulled down, people take turns to stand on the plinth thereby physically asserting their right to be in and belong to the space formerly occupied by Colston. This pose has later been made famous by Marc Quinn's sculpture *A Surge of Power*, which depicts a Bristolian BLM activist Jen Reid. The statue was raised on the Colston plinth on 15 June, roughly a week after the protest, as a form of unauthorized "guerrilla memorialisation" (Rice, 2010). Although officials quickly took down the sculpture, the image of a confident black woman with her fist held up has become an iconic symbol of the protest for many: it is actively recirculated, recreated, and shared across social media.

Solidarity is also expressed by actors who were not present at the protest. One widely shared image is a screenshot of Google maps taken on the night of the protest. As an example of international solidarity, Google was quick to act on the protest and update the location of the statue in the middle of the harbour and change the status of the statue to closed (for example, @abebrown716, 7 June 2020). As time goes on, unity is also strongly expressed in connection to the #Colston4 aimed at supporting the four people charged with criminal damage for the destruction of the statue. The idea that true responsibility is collectively on all 10,000 protesters who took part in the protest is prevalent.

The second repeating element, truth, is connected to making the silenced history of Colston's slaving past more present in the city's heritagescape. Symbolically

this ability to "speak the truth" or to make "Colston's true nature" visible is especially narrated through the image of Colston at the bottom of the the harbour. The responses to the statue's changed physical location exemplify the spatially located character of belonging (Eckersley 2022). This symbolism is shared especially visually in a variety of memes and drawings where Colston meets his former victims in the water. The associated poetic justice is also acknowledged by Bristol-based historian and broadcaster David Olusoga, who comments on it in a much-shared opinion piece published on 8 June 2020, in the *Guardian* (Olusoga, 2020):

> But tonight Edward Colston sleeps with the fishes. The historical symmetry of this moment is poetic. A bronze effigy of an infamous and prolific slave trader dragged through the streets of a city built on the wealth of that trade, and then dumped, like the victims of the Middle Passage, into the water.

As time goes on, the debates on Twitter are slowly taken over by actors focused on sharing information around Colston, slavery, and racism. These include numerous academics and activist networks such as Countering Colston, founded in 2015. As a result, the tone of tweets changes as time goes by. Instead of emotional commentaries, the majority share media reports, news pieces, and blog posts aimed at raising awareness of the situation. Nurturing this type of historical awareness is crucial for learning to deal with difficult histories (e.g., Turunen, 2020), for unlocking the potential of places and spaces for previously absent or silenced aspects of belonging, and, ultimately, for building new communities.

Finally, there is a prominent sense of pride among the Twitter community. Many want to take a stand by sharing related photos or videos and simply make everyone know that they too took part in the protest. More specified hashtags like #GladColstonsGone or #BristolTakeover are used to narrate the perceived shift in power. The sense of pride is not a temporary phenomenon. Rather, the sense of pride that emerged during the protests seems to remain strong: it is alive and actively passed on to the next generation. For example, roughly a year after the protest, Dan Hicks, professor of contemporary archaeology at the University of Oxford and the curator of the Pitt Rivers Museum, commented in a tweet (@profdanhicks, 11 June 2021) after a visit to the recently opened temporary exhibition in M Shed where the statue was put on display after it was recovered from the harbour:

> overheard in the exhibit:
>
> a three-year-old boy who'd been taken to the exhibit by his dad: "it's that man from the video who fell over!"
>
> the dad: "yes that's right, but remember that he was 'pushed' over"
>
> ❤ Bristol

As the example shows, there is a clear sense of ownership and agency. Highlighting an increased sense of place-belongingness (Antonsich, 2010, p.645), the physical

location of the statue – or rather the remaining plinth – is turned into a space of empowerment. The protests, therefore, led to a reclamation of public space. Much like the empty plinth of the Rhodes statue in Cape Town (see Shepherd, 2020, 2022), the Colston plinth has become a place of gatherings, protests, and creativity. For example, a short video is published on Twitter two days after the protest. The video shows three young women dancing on the plinth. At the time of writing, the tweet had received over 323,000 views, nearly 23,000 likes, over 6,300 retweets, and roughly 480 quote feeds. The response is cheerful, even exuberant.

Additionally, Colston has featured in local artists' work in various forms after the protest. It is present in the poems of Vanessa Kisuule and Lawrence Hoo. The fall has been commented on by Banksy (Instagram, 9 June 2020), and a large mural of Jen Reid, the BLM activist whose powerful stance was already encapsulated in the work of Marc Quin, is also currently in the making by a renowned street artist Mr Cenz.

Anonymous loyalty, anger, and blame

It does not take long to see that the debate over the Colston statue is an extremely charged and divisive political topic in Bristol. As Dressen (2009, p.225), an honorary professor of history at the University of Bristol, noted already over a decade ago:

> his statue has become a symbolic lightning rod for highly charged attitudes about race, history, and public memory. The statue has been defaced, and his name reviled, yet he still inspires loyalty and pride amongst many Bristolians.

This loyalty can be easily identified in comments made by local and national actors. Although the mainstream international coverage of the events in Bristol was mainly positive or supportive, the reception of the protests and the fall of the Colston statue was far from unanimous. Two days after the protest on 9 June 2020, a senior Conservative city councillor, Richard Eddy, claimed on *Bristol Post* (Cork, 2020) that

> Since this frenzied thug violence on Sunday [the BLM protest], I have received a stream of outraged responses from constituents and others – more than I've ever received in such a short time in my 28-year Council service.

Similar discourses are evident also in the national debates. A week after the protest, Boris Johnson, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, took a stand on Twitter (90,766 likes, 16,751 retweets, and 5,053 quote tweets), stating:

> We cannot now try to edit or censor our past … To tear them [statues] down would be to lie about our history … But it is clear the protests have been sadly

> hijacked by extremists intent on violence … The only responsible course of action is to stay away from these protests.
>
> (@BorisJohnson, 12 June 2020)

Soon after the protest Robert Poll, the founder of the Save Our Statues Twitter account (@_SaveOurStatues) and an online petition platform with the same name, is also gaining momentum. Although he joined Twitter only after the fall of Colston, by December 2021, he had published over 4,500 tweets and received over 20,000 followers. Poll founded his site as a reaction to what had happened to Colston's statue, claiming it is "part of a much bigger fight for the soul of Britain" (Poll, 2021, para. 2). In addition to the UK, Robert Poll seeks to protect "our heritage" in former UK colonies with continuing settler populations, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. Through his personal brand of propaganda, he decries the critique of different statues as a "triumph of barbarism over civilisation" (@_SaveOurStatues, 9 September 2021). He uses his platform to mobilize people to attend public consultations and sign petitions to block the removal of statues.

On the anonymous platform, the discussion is initially relatively quiet. However, as time goes on, it starts to fill with comments that seem to echo the ones by Eddy, Johnson, and Poll. There is only a small minority of pro-BLM commentators. In the community that is slowly forming on this anonymous comment section, BLM activists are repeatedly called a "mob", "criminals", "far-left", or even "terrorists", and their actions are primarily referred to as "criminal acts" or "vandalism". Some also suspect that a significant portion of the protesters were not from Bristol. As these people did not "belong" to Bristol, the protest did not really reflect the opinions of "true" Bristolians.

There are many different discourses used to shift attention away from Colston. Many belittle his role in the slave trade. It is pointed out that, although he made money from the slave trade, Colston never personally enslaved people. Moreover, as slavery was legal back then, it is unfair to judge Colston by modern standards. Others try to side-track the discussions by highlighting other forms of slavery, especially the "Arab slavers" and "Romans and Vikings" who enslaved Britons. Responsibility for the slave trade is also repeatedly posited on the Africans, who are blamed for selling their "own people".

This active diminishing of Colston's connection to slavery also has a national historical dimension. For example, Nasar has shown that active silencing of slave histories has been used to shift attention away from Britain's part in the slave trade and into the celebration of "its efforts in the abolitionist movement" (Nasar, 2020, p.1220; see also Moody, 2018) – a discourse that is also often repeated on the anonymous platform. Accordingly, Colston is primarily portrayed as responsible for building and helping the city. He is not only depicted as a local hero but a national one and the BLM protesters are blamed for destroying his legacy.

In addition, this blame-shifting is targeted not only towards the BLM movement, but also towards local authorities and the press. There are constant criticisms

of the police and the legal system. Additionally, Marvin Rees, Bristol's first mayor of colour, is blamed by both sides – for not protecting the statue and for not removing it early enough. Some also start to blame the platform's moderators for blocking some of their comments for racist content as time goes on. It is seen as a sign that all media outlets are biased against them.

Double authorization of Colston

Van Huis has argued that there are times when "heritage is more visibly contested and more rapidly changing" (van Huis, 2019, p.218). Comparing the two aforementioned discourses – the ones supporting and opposing the fall of Colston – it seems that the fault lines were quite easily and quickly drawn. This split could be interpreted as a rapid change in how Colston's societal role has been understood. However, I believe this to be too simplistic. By bringing the online discourses discussed above together with the history of heritagization around Colston, we can see that the changes are not the result of the protest *per se.* Instead, I argue that the fall of the Colston statue is a result of the evolving relationship between two authorized heritage discourses (see Smith, 2006) that have shaped public ideas around Colston for several decades.

Authorized heritage discourse refers to the official discourse produced by heritage experts and legitimated and sanctioned by local, national, or international authorities (Smith, 2006). They often represent the official discourse – for example, the national narrative – that is actively reproduced in society through museums, schools, and media. As authorized heritage discourses are often deeply entwined with social and cultural integration, their effects are durable and long-lasting. However, they are not immune to change. As Harrison (2013, p.198) points out, they require "regular revision and review to see if [they] continue to meet the needs of contemporary society".

The first round of authorization around Colston occurred around the time the statue was erected in 1895 – an impressive 174 years after his death. Therefore, the creation of the statue was not a direct response to his death. Instead, as Dresser (2009) and Branscome (2021) have highlighted, his veneration was used to legitimate and sediment the economic and political aims of the Victorian era Bristolian elite – in part created both by Colston's philanthropy and direct proceeds from the transatlantic slave trade. As Branscome (2021, p.19) explains,

> The Victorian Colston statue thus needs to be understood as a representation of Bristol's class ideology at the time of its erection. It was, in reality, a statue to the city's reformulated elites, and only about Colston in the sense that he had been turned into a proxy for their continued dominance.

The subsequent decades were used to entrench this power dynamic: a certified "cult of Colston" (Dresser, 2009) was institutionalized at the heart of Bristolian heritage, identity and politics of belonging. Over the years, also several smaller

statues, memorials, and traditions have been created around Colston. The first authorization process culminated in 1977 when the statue was officially granted status as a Grade II listed structure. There is the annual Colston day and Colston bun. Colston is also embedded into local cartography: there are Colston Avenue, Colston Street, Colston Hall, Colston Tower, and several schools that bear his name – or at least there were. Colston Hall is today Bristol Beacon, Colston Tower is Beacon Tower, Colston's Primary School is Cotham Gardens Primary School, Colston's Girls School has changed its name to Montpelier High School, and so on. There has even been a local petition to change the names of Colston Street and Colston Avenue back to their original forms, Steep Street and St Augustine's Bank.

Although Colston's involvement in the slave trade was already made public in 1920 by H. J. Wilkins – only 25 years after the erection of the statue – this rather one-sided focus on celebrating Colston as a Bristolian philanthropist continued until the 1990s (Dresser, 2007, p.164). However, increased awareness of Colston's role in the Royal Africa Company and the transatlantic slave trade directly correlated with increased discussions and activism around the statue. As such, the 1990s consist of an activist awakening and a shift in the authorization around Colston.

It is crucial to notice that the city's museums – the expert voices associated with authorized heritage discourses – had a central role. In 1998 a process for a new temporary exhibition, *A Respectable Trade? Bristol and Transatlantic Slavery*, was launched by the City's Museum and Art Gallery. As described by Dresser (2009, p.229), who was herself also involved in the planning, the controversial nature of the exhibition raised questions among the public: "there was a marked defensiveness about the project from elements within the majority population" (p.229). Despite the early opposition, during the six months that the exhibition was open, it "attracted over 160,000 visitors. This was an unprecedented number, which represented an increase of 79 per cent over usual visitor levels" (Dresser, 2009, p.230). It was highly successful in increasing attention towards Bristol's slavery heritage (see also Otele, 2012, for later phases of the exhibition).

Moreover, an accompanying Slavery Trail organized by Bristol Museum enabled people to become more aware of the traces of the slave trade still visible in Bristol. It was one of the first interventions that placed Colston at the centre of critique. As Branscome (2021, p.20) explains,

> Colston was heavily featured as part of this urban trail, further intensifying local discontent with a figure that so many citizens had been prompted to herald since their early childhood, yet who was now being exposed by an upsetting historic narrative that most of them had not been aware of.

In the following decades, there have been several interventions around the statue. Several rounds of petitions have been circled demanding that the statue be removed or at least a second plaque added to complement the highly one-sided description

of the original plaque that described Colston simply as "one of the most virtuous and wise sons" of Bristol. Although many of these interventions received thousands of signatures and organized numerous discussion forums and consultations, none of these campaigns successfully got the actual statue removed, relocated, or managed to have another perspective added to complement the original plaque.

The statue has also inspired several critical artworks that have promoted critical public awareness around Colston. For example, *Colston* (2006) by Hew Locke exhibits a large photographic reproduction of the statue draped with massive golden chains, pearls, diamonds, seashells, and other accolades to the extent that they are now pulling him down. Additionally, there have been many anti-racist artworks focused on the broader black history of Bristol, such as *The Seven Saints of St Paul* (2015–2017) by Michele Curtis and the performative *Who Was Pero?* (2017) by Libita Clayton (see also Schütz, 2020).

Similarly, over the years, the statue itself has been the target of numerous "guerrilla memorialisations" (Rice, 2010). Over the years, the statue has been covered in posters that call him a "murderer", a "human trafficker", and a "slave trader"; the statue's face has been painted; and a ball and chain have been attached to his leg (see also Buchczyk and Facer, 2020). On Anti-Slavery Day on 18 November 2018, an anonymous artwork commenting on modern-day slavery was built around the statue. One hundred small casts of human bodies were arranged on the ground like slaves on board a ship. The hull is structured out of cement blocks that read: fruit pickers, nail bar workers, car wash attendants, sex workers, domestic servants, kitchen workers, farmworkers, and finally, at the bow, "here and now".

This list is not exhaustive. These are simply some examples of the wide variety of interventions that have taken place throughout the years. They exemplify the decades of "competing" authorization around Colston that, I argue, was crucial for empowering those 10,000 people to take a stand on 7 June 2020. These people challenged Colston and claimed space and visibility for forms of belonging that had remained marginalized in Bristol's public space.

Losing our heritage vs reclaiming space

Heritage is often understood in connection with "a threat of losing some material or immaterial element that individuals and communities see as meaningful" (Turunen, 2021, p.66; see Harrison, 2013). It is not only a means to secure the things we feel are threatened, but it also garners part of its value and power from this risk (DeSilvey and Harrison, 2020). The more threatened something is, the more valuable it becomes. In the context of the Colston statue, the fall of the statue sparked an elevated sense of threat in many people's minds. From Johnson and Poll to the anonymous platform, commentators equated the fall of the statue as an erasure of history – in other words, as a loss of something that had historical significance. This experience of heightened risk towards important monuments with British significance was also engrained into a UK policy in the wake of the fall of Colston. In September 2020, Oliver Dowden, the Secretary of State for

Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport, announced that the government was banning the "removal of statues or other similar objects" (UK, 2020) and advising publicly funded museums to avoid "taking actions motivated by activism or politics" (UK, 2020).

Dowden's policy highlights heritage's ability to de-politicize ideological debates into a matter of technocratic knowledge (see Smith, 2006; Gnecco, 2015). The perceived risk gives their protection greater legitimacy and turns a deeply divided and contentious political matter into a legislative concern – into a question of simply following established protection and conservation protocols. I believe the events in Bristol also prove the opposite. Critical activism and citizens' protests can re-politicize heritage that has remained dormant. As Dresser (2007, p.164) puts it, "even dead statues have the power to provoke".

Although the discourse of heritage is not actively brought up by most commentators, the protest is clearly seen by the "all lives matter" commentators as an attack on Bristol's heritage and, more importantly, on (White) Bristolian identity and belonging. His continued presence in the minds of many Bristolians exemplifies the ways "statues and urban landscapes together, through their names and associations, create memories and hence become critical in forming a feeling of identity" (Branscome, 2021, p.20). The reaction to the fall of the statue, therefore, was not really about the statue or even Colston. Quite the opposite, it is likely that the statue itself was rather insignificant for many prior to the protest. The fall of the statue materialized the more abstract threat that some Bristolians had felt towards their identity and position in society – in other words, their sense of belonging. This threat is not new, nor was it born in response to the BLM protest. It is part of a broader discourse on racial tensions that have gained political traction as part of the Brexit campaign (e.g., Bonacchi, Altaweel, and Krzyzanska, 2018; Shankley and Rhodes, 2020; Mears, this volume).

Although the sense of risk or loss is central to the experiences, the effects of the first layer of authorization are still strongly present. Hegemonic heritage narratives promote the belonging of only a small culturally privileged section of society. As Anthias explains, "collective places constructed by imaginings of belonging … [are] produce a 'natural' community of people" (2008, p.8). For those who fail to identify with this "natural" community, the authorized heritage discourses are often experienced as rather exclusionary and hostile constructs. Although not having as strong demographical effects as colonialism (see Shankley, Hanneman, and Simpson, 2020, p.16), the societal consequences of the slave trade and how they are heritagized in Bristol are central to understanding contemporary inequality in Bristol (Runnymede, 2017). Colston's celebration and veneration, symbolized by the statue, is a key element contributing to the conservative, white notion of Bristolian identity. As argued in this chapter and throughout this volume, promoting a feeling of belonging on a broader spectrum requires legitimizing more diverse heritage narratives and changing the ways these narratives are mediated in cultural environments and public discourses. In this context, the growing

awareness of Colston's involvement in the slave trade, symbolized by the statue's fall, is a form of politics of belonging emerging from the growing diversity of British and Bristolian identities.

This chapter shows that the Colston statue has been a target of both political and creative interventions for roughly 30 years. Together these movements are slowly and gradually changing the narrative of Colston – or, as argued earlier, they are re-authorizing him. As a result, people have been learning to "re-read their city" (Branscome, 2021, p.9) and "to comprehend fuller, complex, and often more troubling histories" (p.9) that are associated with it.

This growing critical awareness around Colston is not only about increasing knowledge. The pro-BLM comments were inherently very emotional, and participation in the protest was often a deeply affective experience. As pointed out by Crang and Tolia-Kelly (2010, p.2315), inclusion also requires the "production and circulation of feeling and sentiment". It requires a degree of ownership, agency, and emotional engagement beyond simply existing in a community (see Eckersley, 2022; and the introduction to this volume).

The fall of the statue testifies that the place formally perceived as a space of oppression and violence can be transformed into a space of empowerment, solidarity, and creativity. It sedimented a new layer of meaning to Bristol's public landscape. As such, the BLM protest was able to connect to the two sides of belonging identified by Antonsich. The protest provided a powerful "discursive resource which constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion" (2010, p.645), while the transformation of the space around the former Colston statue has enabled a "personal, intimate feeling of being 'at home'" (ibid.) in the public environment. It has enabled parts of society that formerly have not had a stake in the city's heritagescape to claim a space and speak their mind.

The process has been oppositional and challenging, but it has provided a much-needed re-evaluation of local cultural heritage. This newfound spirit also manifests in the addition of a new guerrilla plaque to Pero's Bridge, where Colston was thrown in the harbour. The plaque has a picture of a crowd cheering as the statue of Colston is in mid-air, falling from its pedestal. The plaque reads:

> June 7, 2020, at this spot, during worldwide anti-racism protest, a statue celebrating the 17th century slave-trader Edward Colston was thrown into the harbour by the people of Bristol. Various campaigns to have the statue removed through official channels had been frustrated.
>
> You came down easy in the end.
> As you landed
> A piece of you fell off, broke away,
> And inside, nothing but air.
> This whole time, you were hollow.
> Vanessa Kisuule, Bristol City Poet 2020

The long-awaited inclusion of a second plaque highlights that "monuments alone will not, in themselves, stimulate a constant rethinking of the past" (Drescher, 2001, p.112). Only the space and discourses created around them enable new forms of knowledge and new forms of community to emerge.

Conclusions: coloniality of European heritage

In this chapter, I have focused on the statue of Edward Colston. As the only statue in Europe that was removed forcibly by protesters, the national and international media spectacle around Colston was on a whole different scale when compared to statues that were removed more quietly by authorities in the wake of the protests – for example, the statue of Leopold II in Antwerp or Robert Millicent in London. As Branscome (2021, p.29) points out, the Colston statue has become "a monument to monuments", a media spectacle that is "worth a million statues" (2021, p.29).

Nevertheless, the events around Colston are not unique. Other similar processes of veneration took place across the globe. We can see Colston's echoes in the 2015 #RhodesMustFall campaigns in Cape Town and Oxford, the 2017 fall of the Confederate statues across the United States, the repeated attacks on Leopold II statues in Belgium, or the recent removals of dozens of Christopher Columbus statues in South and North America. The list goes on. All the aforementioned examples have at some point been described as vandalism. However, the forced removal of statues is not always considered an attack on history – quite the opposite. Sometimes the fall of statues is justified, needed, and legitimate. Drayton (2019, p.654) has captured this uneven dynamic perfectly:

> the Daily Telegraph described the destruction of statues in South Africa in April 2015 as "vandalism". Twelve years earlier, however, in April 2003, the same newspaper had reported the destruction of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad as the symbol of liberation and the toppling of despotism.

The juxtaposition between rightfully removed statues and illegal acts was also reversed in the pro-BLM discourse. The absence of statues of Hitler, Stalin, or Lenin was commented on as a justification for why Colston also deserved to go. People stated that removing symbols of power, like statues, is the norm of political regime change. So, why are colonial statues still prevalent across the globe? And more importantly, why are so many ready to defend them?

An obvious solution would be to look for the answer from the nature of colonialism. Although decolonization as a political process, for the most part, took place over 60 years ago, the overall regime of power colonialism created has remained largely intact. This coloniality is almost like a veil. As Shepherd (2022, p.66) notes, coloniality is "hidden from us, in the sense that we see [it], but we do not recognise [it] as such". It exists as "a form of deep inscription, in landscapes, in lives and in bodies of ideas and practices" (ibid.). Colonial sentiments, values, and biases are also central elements of the European cultural archive (Wekker, 2016;

Turunen, 2021) – they are ingrained in the whole idea of European or Western culture. The debate is, therefore, also far larger than simply statues. In a way, Robert Poll was correct: it is about our collective soul.

Knudsen and colleagues (2021, p.10) have suggested that the murder of George Floyd has become "a lieu de mémoire" of sorts. I would add that places like the empty plinths of Cecil Rhodes or Edward Colston have taken on a similar property. They have become places of memory, belonging, and creativity. They are incremental parts of emerging forms of collective heritage. Therefore, as much as we need to understand the histories that gave birth to these statues, we should "not forget the circumstances in which these monuments are coming down in the present" (Moody, 2021, p.5). They are history and heritage in the making. Although it is premature to debate whether the BLM protest will succeed in becoming a formative moment (see Ringmar, 1996) in the history of Europe, it is undoubtedly a transformative one. It is an active, ongoing phenomenon where different change processes build momentum but whose results – their true formative nature – are still being constructed and debated.

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Academy of Finland Grant 330620 EU Heritage Diplomacy and the Dynamics of Inter-Heritage Dialogue (HERIDI).

References

Anthias, F. (2008) 'Thinking through the lens of translocational positionality: An intersectionality frame for understanding identity and belonging.' *Translocations: Migration and Social Change*, 4(1), pp. 5–20.

Antonsich, M. (2010) 'Searching for belonging: An analytical framework.' *Geography Compass*, 4(6), pp. 644–659.

Association of Critical Heritage Studies (ACHS). (2011) Manifesto. Online available: http ://www.criticalheritagestudies.org/history (Accessed 27 September 2022).

Bonacchi C. and Krzyzanska M. (2019) 'Digital heritage research re-theorised: Ontologies and epistemologies in a world of big data.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(12), pp. 1235–1247. http://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1578989

Bonacchi, C., Altaweel, M. and Krzyzanska, M. (2018) 'The heritage of Brexit: Roles of the past in the construction of political identities through social media.' *Journal of Social Archaeology*, 18(2), pp. 174–192. http://doi.org/10.1177/1469605318759713

Branscome, E. (2021) 'Colston's travels, or should we talk about statues?' *ARENA Journal of Architectural Research*, 6(1), pp. 1–29. http://doi.org/10.5334/ajar.261

Buchczyk, M. and Facer, K. (2020)' The stuff of contention and care: Affective materiality and everyday learning in Bristol, UK.' *City & Society*, 32(3), pp. 603–623. http://doi .org/10.1111/ciso.12352

Cork, T. (2020) 'Edward Colston was 'a hero' for Bristol says outraged Tory councillor', *Bristol Live*, 9 June. Available at: https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/ edward-colston-a-hero-bristol-4205516 (Accessed 23 May 2022).

Crang, M. and Tolia-Kelly, D.P. (2010) 'Affect, Race and Identities', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 42 (10), pp. 2309–2314.

DeSilvey, C. and Harrison, R. (2020) 'Anticipating loss: Rethinking endangerment in heritage futures.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 26(1), pp. 1–7. http://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1644530

Drayton, R. (2019) 'Rhodes must not fall? Statues, post-colonial heritage and temporality.' *Third Text*, 33(4–5), pp. 651–666. http://doi.org/10.1080/09528822.2019.1653073

Drescher, S. (2001) 'Commemorating slavery aFnd abolition in the United States of America.' In Oostindie G. (eds.) *Facing up to the Past: Perspectives on the Commemoration of Slavery from Africa, the Americas and Europe*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, pp. 109–112.

Dresser, M. (2007) 'Set in stone? Statues and slavery in London.' *History Workshop Journal*, 64(1), pp. 162–199. http://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbm032

Dresser, M. (2009) 'Remembering slavery and abolition in Bristol.' *Slavery & Abolition*, 30(2), pp. 223–246. http://doi.org/10.1080/01440390902818955

Durrant, S. (2004) *Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning: J.M. Coetzee, Wilson Harris, and Toni Morrison.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Eckersley, S. (2022) 'Zugehörigkeit', in Sabrow, M. and Saupe, A. (eds) *Historische Authentizität. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch*. Göttingen: Wallstein.

Farrell-Banks, D. (2019) '1215 in 280 characters. Talk ng about Magna Carta on Twitter.' In Galani, A., Mason, R. and Arrigoni, G. (eds.) *European Heritage, Dialogue and Digital Practices*. London: Routledge.

Fiesler, C. and Proferes, N. (2018) '"Participant" perceptions of twitter research ethics.' *Social Media + Society*, 4(1), pp. 1–14. http://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118763366

Gnecco, C. (2015) 'Heritage in multicultural times.' In Waterton E. and Watson S. (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 263–280.

Goldberg, D. T. (2006) 'Racial Europeanization'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29(2), pp. 331–364. http://doi.org/10.1080/01419870500465611.

Graham, B. and Howard, P. (2008) *The Ashgate Companion to Heritage and Identity*. London: Routledge.

Grosfoguel, R. (2007) 'The epistemic decolonial turn: Beyond political-economy paradigms.' *Cultural Studies*, 21(2–3), pp. 211–223. http://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162514

Hall, S. (1990) 'Cultural identity and diaspora.' In Rutherford, J. (eds.) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 222–237.

Harrison, R. (2013). *Heritage: Critical Approaches*. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.

Harvey, D. (2001) 'Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 7, pp. 319–339.

van Huis, I. (2019) 'Contesting cultural heritage: Decolonising the tropenmuseum as an intervention in the Dutch/European memory complex.' In Lähdesmäki, T., Passerini, L, Kaasik-Krogerus, S. and van Huis, I. (eds.) *Dissonant Heritages: Contestation of Meanings and Uses of Memory in Today's Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215–248.

Katriel, T. (1993) 'Our future is where our past is: Studying heritage museums as ideological performative Arenas.' *Communication Monographs*, 60(1), pp. 69–75.

Knudsen B. T. and Andersen C. (2017) 'Affective politics and colonial heritage, Rhodes must fall at UCT and Oxford.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(3), pp. 239–258. http://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2018.1481134

Knudsen B.T., Oldfield, J., Buettner E. and Zabunyan E. (ed). (2021) *Decolonising Colonial Heritage. New Agendas, Actors and Practices in and Beyond Europe*. Abin don and New York: Routledge.

Modlin, E. A., Alderman, D. H. and Gentry, G. W. (2011) 'Tour guides as creators of empathy: The role of affective inequality in marginalising the enslaved at plantation house museums.' *Tourist Studies*, 11(1), pp. 3–19. http ://doi.org/10.1177 /146879761141200.

Moody, J. (2018) 'Remembering the imperial context of emancipation commemoration in the former British slave-port cities of Bristol and Liverpool, 1933–1934.' *Slavery & Abolition*, 39(1), pp. 169–189.

Moody, J. (2021) 'Off the pedestal: The fall of Edward Colston.' *Public History Review*, 28, pp. 1–5.

Munroe, L. (2017) 'Constructing affective narratives in transatlantic slavery museums in the UK.' In Tolia-Kelly, D.P., Waterton, E., and Watson, S. (eds.) *Heritage, Affect and Emotion. Policies, Practices and Infrastructures*. New York: Routledge, pp. 114–132.

Nasar, S. (2020) Remembering Edward Colston: Histories of slavery, memory, and black globality. *Women's History Review*, 29(7), pp. 1218–1225. http://doi.org/10.1080 /09612025.2020.1812815

Olusoga, D. (2020) 'The toppling of Edward Colston's statue is not an attack on history. It is history', *The Guardian*, 8 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2020/jun/08/edward-colston-statue-history-slave-trader-bristol-protest (Accessed: 23 May 2022).

Otele, O. (2012) 'Bristol, slavery and the politics of representation: The slave trade gallery in the Bristol museum.' *Social Semiotics*, 22(2), pp. 155–72. http://doi.org/10.1080 /10350330.2012.665231

Poll, R. (2021) *Save Our Statues*. Available at: https://saveourstatues.net/ (Accessed: 23 May, 2022).

Rice A. (2010) *Creating Memorials, Building Identities: The Politics of Memory in the Black Atlantic*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Richardson, L.-J. (2018) 'Ethical challenges in digital public archaeology.' *Journal of Computer Applications in Archaeology*, 1(1), pp. 64–73. http //doi.org/10.5334/jc aa.13

Richardson, L.-J. (2019) 'Using social media as a source for understanding public perceptions of archaeology: Research challenges and methodological Pitfalls.' *Journal of Computer Applications in Archaeology*, 2(1), pp. 151–162. http //doi.org/10.5334/ jcaa.39

Ringmar, E. (1996) *Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Runnymede (2017) Bristol: A city divided? Ethnic minority disadvantage in education and employment. Accessed 20.2.2022 at http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/code /briefings/localethnicinequalities/CoDE-Briefing-Bristol.pdf.

Schütz, M. (2020) 'Rewriting colonial heritage in Bristol and Marseille: Contemporary artworks as decolonial interventions.' *Heritage & Society*, 13(1–2), pp. 53–74. http:// doi.org/10.1080/2159032x.2021.1914298

Shankley, W. and Rhodes J. (2020) 'Racism in contemporary Britain'. In B. Byrne, C. Alexander, O. Khan, J. Nazroo and W. Shankley (eds.) *Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK. State of the Nation*. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 203–228.

Shankley, W., Hanneman T. and Simpson L. (2020) 'The demography of ethnic minorities in Britain'. In B. Byrne, C. Alexander, O. Khan, J. Nazroo and W. Shankley (eds.)

Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK. State of the Nation. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 15–34.

Shepherd, N. (2020) 'After the #fall: The shadow of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town.' *City*, 24(3–4), pp. 565–579. http://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2020.1784579

Shepherd, N. (2022) 'Spectres of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town.' In Knudsen B.T., J. Oldfield, E. Buettner and E. Zabunyan (eds.) *Decolonising Colonial Heritage. New Agendas, Actors and Practices in and Beyond Europe*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp. 63–80.

Särmä, S. (2016) 'Collaging Internet Parody Images: An Art-Inspired Methodology for Studying Visual World Politics', in Caitlin, H. & Shepherd, L.J. (ed) *Understanding Popular Culture and World Politics in the Digital Age*. London: Routledge, pp. 175–188.

Smith, L. (2006) *Uses of Heritage*. New York: Routledge.

Somers, M. R. (1994) 'The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach.' *Theory and Society*, 23(5), pp. 605–649. http://doi.org/10.1007/bf00992905

Turunen, J. (2019) 'Geography of coloniality: Re-narrating European integration.' In Lähdesmäki, T., Passerini, L, Kaasik-Krogerus, S. and van Huis, I. (eds.) *Dissonant Heritages: Contestation of Meanings and Uses of Memory in Today's Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 185–214.

Turunen, J. (2020) 'Decolonising European minds through heritage.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 26(10), pp. 1013–1028. http://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2019.1678051

Turunen, J. (2021) *Unlearning Narratives of Privilege: A Decolonial Reading of the European Heritage Label*. PhD thesis. JyU dissertations 427. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.

Wekker, G. (2016) *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Whitehead, C., Daugbjerg, M., Eckersley, S., and Bozoğlu, G. (2019) 'Dimensions of European heritage and memory. A framework introduction.' In Whitehead, C., Eckersley, S., Daugbjerg, M. and Bozoğlu G. (eds.) *Dimensions of Heritage and Memory. Multiple Europes and the Politics of Crisis*, Abingdon; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 1–25.

Wu, Z. and Hou, S. (2015) 'Heritage and Discourse', in Waterton, E. and Watson, S. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37–51.

Yuval-Davis, N., Kannabiran, K., and Cassidy, K. (2006) *The Situated Politics of Belonging*. London: SAGE.

Zimmer, M. and Proferes, N. J. (2014) 'A topology of twitter research: Disciplines, methods, and ethics.' *Aslib Journal of Information Management*, 66(3), pp. 250–261. http://doi.org/10.1108/ajim-09-2013-0083

Index

**Page numbers in italics reference figures.